Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East: Land Reform, Demographic Change, and Environmental Constraints 9780295999753, 0295999756
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LAND REFORM, DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
EDITED BY Kurt E.
boston public library L-opley Square
Boston
MA
02116
Rural Development
in
Eurasia and the Middle East
Digitized by the Internet Archive in
2017 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation
https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780295980478
Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East Land Reform, Demographic Change, and Environmental Constraints
Edited by
Kurt E. Engelmann Vjeran Pavlakovic
Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies Center at the
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington in association
with
University of Washington Press Seattle
and London
Copyright 2001 by the University of Washington Press Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved.
No
part of this publication
may
be reproduced or transmitted
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in in
writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East change, and environmental constraint
/
edited
:
land reform, demographic
by Kurt Engelmann and Vjeran
Pavlakovic. p.
cm.
Includes bibliographic references and index.
ISBN 0-295-98047-8 1.
(alk.
paper)
Rural development-Case studies.
2.
Rural development-Russia
(Federation). 3. Rural development-Asia, Central. 4. Rural Africa, North. 5. Rural I.
Engelmann, Kurt.
II.
Development-Middle Pavlakovic, Vjeran.
development-
East.
III.
Henry M. Jackson School of
International Studies. Russian, East European, and Central
Asian Studies
Center.
HN49.C6 R87526 2000 307.r412’0956— dc21
The paper used
Sciences 1984.
and recycled from 10 percent 50 percent pre-consumer waste. It meets the
in this publication
post-consumer and
minimum
00-060703
least
at
requirements
—Permanence
is
acid-free
of American
National
Standard
for
of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
Information
ANSI
Z39.48-
Contents
1
2 Introduction, Kurt E.
3
4 /
Engelmann
vii
Change in Russian Agrarian Reform, 1992-1998: The Case of Kostroma Oblast 3 5 Stephen K. Wegren 6 /
Continuity in Rural Russia
Gregory
45
Ioffe
7 /
Rural Population Change in Russia, 1959-1998
8
Dmitry Sharkov 9
/
62
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
A
Kyrgyz Republic
Legal Perspective
in the
87
Renee Giovarelli /
Agricultural Sector
Reform and Rural
Development in Uzbekistan Jim Butterfield /
117
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral
Sea Basin:
A Geographical Perspective
140
Philip Micklin
/
Agricultural
Development and Environmental
Constraints in Northwest Africa Will D.
/
185
Swearingen
Development or Sustainable Agriculture: The Case of the Middle East 210 Michael E. Bonine
Agricultural
/
The Smallholder
in
Turkish Agriculture:
Obstacle or Opportunity?
Paul Kaldjian Contributors
Index
279
281
239
1
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oJ?
H
—
Total
— — Urban — — Rural A:
)•
Source; Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.
o?'''
Rural Population Change
in
1959-1998
Russia,
71
Rural Migration
Two
other factors
- migration and administrative change - played
rural population dynamics.
was
rural to urban. This
key role
a
in
Before 1991, the prevailing direction of migration
flow did not change overnight
after the
breakup of the
Soviet Union. Rather, starting with the second half of the 1970s, fewer and fewer
people were leaving the countryside for urban areas (see Figure although rural-to-urban migration was
significant
a
still
trend,
3.5). it
And
became
relatively (and absolutely) less important in Russia in the early 1990s.^ Starting
Russian rural areas have been experiencing positive net migration. The
in 1991,
migration inflow (peaked in 1994) was enough to compensate for the natural decrease of the rural population. The combination of the overall decrease in
migration flows within Russia, return migration to rural areas of people
could not adapt to urban
life
during the time of economic
number of urban dwellers who moved
small
contributed to the significant slowing
within Russia. However,
became one of
the
it
rural
down of positive
the
as,
areas for subsistence
rural-to-urban migration
was immigration from other Soviet republics
major factors of rural population growth
distribution of rural migration flows
Table
to
well
crisis, as
who
at that time.
that
The
between 1989 and 1995 can be seen
in
3.1.
It
is
quite
clear
that
rural-to-urban migration within Russia
dramatically after 1989, and between 1992 and 1993 urban-to-rural positive net flow (see
column
5
it
of Table
predominantly
rural-to-urban
accelerated after 1993, which
flow.
The
of the country’s economy. The main contributors
This revision was,
to a familiar pattern
out-migration
rural
was consistent with
actually reversed into
3.1).
however, short-lived, and since 1994 migration returned
stabilization to the
decreased
of
significantly
and improvement
growth of Russia’s
rural
population were immigrants (returning migrants and refugees) from urban and to a lesser extent rural areas of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Before
1994, the majority of
new immigrants found
despite the fact that the majority of the centers.
Most of
these people
resources, and with the Russian next,
new immigrants were
government.
left their
their
new homes
in rural
Russia
newcomers originated from urban
homelands without adequate financial
economy going from one economic
crisis to the
not able to get any meaningful help from the Russian
Dmitry Sharkov
72
Table
3.1. Distribution of
Rural Migration Flows, 1989-1995 (thousands)
INTERNATIONAL FLOWS Year
Immigration
Immigration
Emigration from
Urban-to-Rural
Net Rural
from Urban
from Rural
Rural Areas in
Migration
Migration
Areas Outside
Areas Outside
Russia to Areas
within Russia
Russia
Russia
Outside Russia
1989
157.6
143.0
89.6
-483.9
-272.9
1990
198.9
145.5
77.8
-339.2
-72.6
1991
158.2
103.1
181.5
-22.4
57.4
1992
258.8
113.5
173.7
90.9
289.5
1993
247.5
110.1
132.3
38.7
264.0
1994
262.9
145.3
93.1
-42.7
272.4
1995
190.5
105.8
99.3
-100.8
96.2
1996
142.0
79.8
81.2
-106.4
34.2
1997
141.4
79.6
64.4
-100.2
56.4
Source; Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.
The government, on would go through were
the other hand,
existing residential controls.
settling in the rural areas,
did not have enough
was (and
Russia.
It is
still is)
money
to
first
pay
where the newcomers
to
The main reason
that
newcomers
When
real estate costs
half of the 1990s, these
new immigrants
however, was financial.
skyrocketed in Russia during the
it
had a say as
for housing in
urban areas. At the same time,
quite easy to find a place to live (but not to
work) in rural
move
to the cities as
also very likely that the former urbanites will
quickly as their financial situations will allow. It
has been suggested that the increased importance of rural destinations
reflected an element of choice
on behalf of the migrants.
On
one hand, food
shortages in the cities during the early 1990s revitalized interest
among urban
dwellers in obtaining land plots in the countryside, not just for recreational use
but primarily for livestock and food production.
On
the other hand,
some
migrants could choose rural destinations in anticipation of Russian agrarian
reform and land privatization, where they would have some advantages over urban residents. As people became used
to a
permanent (yet relatively mild)
Rural Population Change
economic
crisis,
in Russia,
1959-1998
food shortages became a story from the
73
past,
and land reform
did not materialize, the most active part of the rural population (see Figure 3.4), those in their twenties, started to leave the countryside. Thus, the factor that was
seen as a positive and important sign in changing the unfavorable rural age structure^* started to disappear.
With
the departure of the tv\'enty-somethings,
prospects of “natural” demographic revival in rural Russia are also diminishing.
Stephen Wegren identified three major groups of reasons for migration out of rural Russia.
The
first
group comprises factors determining work conditions
low wages, abundance of manual
in the countryside:
and lack of
labor,
shift
work. The second group included “cultural-service” conditions, such as the low quality of the service sector (where available), geographical isolation of villages,
and the lack of anonymity social psychology, social
in private life.
when people became
group concerned a change
third
oriented towards urban values.
As
in
the
and economic transformation of Russia did not really touch on any. of
these factors, rural areas did not
during the late 1980s. In rural
The
fact,
become any more
were
attractive then they
not only has the gap between living standards in
and urban Russia widened
at a
much
faster
pace since the beginning of the
1990s, but there has also been an absolute decline in rural living standards in Russia.
As
a result, urban-to-rural
movements
traditional rural-to-urban migration
was
all
but disappeared after 1993, and
rural areas continues to occur, fueled primarily
Soviet Union.
It is
some migration
fully restored. Still,
by immigrants from
the former
important to note, however, that the appeal of the urban
style has increased
over the past several years even for
analysis of recent migration trends, Zh.
Zayonchkovskaya
new
to
arrivals.
life-
In an
noted that the share
of rural immigrants received by urban areas increased from 39 percent to 81 percent from 1993 to 1996, making the countryside’s share of net migration far
below
its
share of total immigration to Russia.
Administrative
Finally,
Change
administrative change also contributed to the relative and absolute
growth of the rural population.
The
reclassification took place during
1991 and 1992, when
greatest
share
of the it
urban-to-rural
involved almost
650,000 people. However, during 1995 only 1,800 people found themselves “rural” due to this process, although in 1996 and 1997 this
number began
to
Dmitry Sharkov
74
grow
again, reaching
more than 57,000 and 44,000 people,
year’s end. Overall, 797,940 people to reclassification.
the future
is
The
uncertain, but
economic
likely to maintain
it is
to
villages
from urban
to rural
the
due
its role.
If the natural increase
be negative, the flow of immigrants dries up, and
situation does not significantly improve,
and settlements of the urban type
become
their status
by
direction of this contributor to rural population growth in
of the population continues the overall
changed
respectively,
many
will continue to lose their
small towns
urban status and
and rural settlements.
Future Trends
By
1996, rural population growth had stopped, rural areas again were losing
population, and the share of rural population
might
for this
lie in
the fact that
by 1995,
signs of stabilization, with urban centers
magnet.
was
also declining.
the Russian
economy was showing
becoming again
a strong population
one of the main sources of rural population growth was
Also,
immigration from the republics of the former Soviet Union. to
assume
made
that the majority
their
The explanation
of ethnic Russians,
move between 1991 and
1995.
who wanted
The
It
would be
logical
to migrate to Russia,
financial crisis of
August 1998
might actually revive some sectors of the Russian economy, thus intensifying rural out-migration,
and
at the
same
time,
making Russia
a
much
less desirable
place for potential immigrants.
Various population projections covering Russia’s future population that
were published recently showed
that the share
and absolute number of rural
population will continue to drop in the future, and that the trend that started in
1991-1992 was
employ which
the
short-lived.
As
T. Heleniak notes, most of these projections
same basic methodology and
in turn
differ primarily in their assumptions,
can result in wide variations in the forecast outcomes.'^ Current
projections indicate that the total Russian population will decline the turn of the century,
and
that
growth will resume
at a
low
somewhat by
rate during the first
Population growth rates will then stabilize and
part of the twenty- first century.
continue without significant changes (positive or negative) until at least 2015-
2020, with a subsequent
new and
rapid population decline. Childbearing cohorts
women bom in the 1980s and will be replaced by a much smaller generation of women bom in the 1990s, with a simultaneous increase in deaths
will lose
among
the aging population.
In the absence of major political and economic
Rural Population Change
catastrophes outside the Russian Federation, the countries of the former Soviet
and
stabilize at
low
Some
levels.
1959-1998
in Russia,
Union
it
likely that immigration
is
will decrease (as
it
However,
will
it
the rural out-migration that should intensify as the
most
economic
from
decreasing now)
is
reclassification of urban places
the population will continue to decline.
starts to
75
is
very likely as
likely
be offset by
situation in Russia
improve.
Regional Patterns of Change
Historically, patterns
significant
spatial
of rural population change were characterized by very
differences
(Table
Unfortunately,
3.2).
it
not
is
always
possible (even on the oblast level) to separate the influence of different factors
such as natural increase, migration, and administrative change on population dynamics. Those patterns do allow
us,
however,
to visualize different regional
patterns of rural population change as displayed in Figure 3.7.
Region
was
(the North)
Since
population.
historically characterized
1959,
by
a steady decline of rural
Vologda Oblast has been losing
throughout the whole time period, while in
Komi
The Northern
rural
population
Republic and
Murmansk
Oblast the numbers of rural dwellers increased until
1970.
The Karelian
Republic was unique in the region, posting a 42 percent increase
in
rural
population between 1989 and 1997. That dramatic increase, however, was due to administrative changes in 1991,
when about 50,000
reclassified as rural residents.
Significant rural population decline
urbanites found themselves
observed in Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Nenetsk Autonomous
Northwest
is
a region that also
population, with Pskov and
grow
there during the 1980s
1-3 percent.
St.
is
also
District.
The
experienced long-term decline in
Novgorod Oblasts
whole period. Leningrad Oblast
was
somewhat
and continued
to
its
rural
losing rural population during the
different: rural population started to
grow through
the 1990s at a rate of
Petersburg, located at the center of the oblast, undoubtedly has a
strong impact on the surrounding oblast in attracting people not only from the
Northwest but from
all
over the country. The
residential restrictions that
enforced by the city
city,
however, has a number of
were introduced during Soviet times and are
officials.
still
1
11
1
Dmitry Sharkov
76
Table
3.2.
Russian Rural Population Change by
Subjects of the Russian Federation, 1959-1997
Rural Population
Region/Suhiect of
(
1
,000s of people)
Rural Population
Change
Increase
(percent)
the Federation
1959
1970
1979
1989
1995
1998
Natural
1959
1970
1979
1989
-1970
-1979
-1989
-1998
1997
2.074
1.842
1.540
1.436
1.427
1.397
-11
-16
-7
-3
-7.7
Karelian Republic
242
223
163
145
203
204
-8
-27
-11
41
-9.7
Komi Republic
331
367
325
308
302
299
1
-11
-5
Arkbiangelsk Oblast
581
462
390
397
388
368
-20
-16
2
Nenetsk .AD
20
18
19
21
20
19
-10
6
Vologda Oblast
855
681
541
474
443
424
-20
-21
Murmansk
45
91
102
91
81
83
.102
12
1.768
1.402
1.182
1.107
1.078
1.065
-21
-16
23
6
0
0
0
0
-74
Leningrad Oblast
595
559
547
566
569
573
-6
Novgorod Oblast
455
336
255
229
218
213
Pskov Oblast
695
502
380
312
291
10.404
7.928
6.252
5.293
Bryansk Oblast
1,010
832
619
Vladimir Oblast
608
488
Ivanovo Oblast
417
Kaluga Oblast
North
1
-12
-4.6 -7
-7.8
-10
3.1
-1
-10.5
-9
1.9
-d
-4
-14.1
.2
3
1
-9.6
-26
-24
-10
-7
-17.6
279
-28
-24
-18
-11
-20.8
5.142
5.027
-24
-21
-15
-5
-14.1
483
470
461
-18
-26
-22
-5
-13.5
394
344
329
320
-20
-19
-13
-7
-14.2
309
253
229
226
220
-26
-18
-9
-4
-13.4
588
479
382
332
289
280
-19
-20
-13
-15
-14.4
Kostroma Oblast
555
405
291
254
274
275
-27
-28
-13
8
-11.8
Moscow
City
284
37
29
1
0
0
-87
-22
-97
Moscow
Oblast
2,087
1,765
1,583
1,383
1,348
1,330
-15
-10
-13
-4
-11.0
709
569
400
336
342
334
-20
-30
-16
-1
-12.5
1,012
747
568
461
429
412
-26
-24
-19
-11
-19.0
775
577
449
370
357
345
-26
-22
-18
-7
-17.9
Tver Oblast
1,019
741
550
476
457
437
-27
-26
-13
-8
-17.9
Tula Oblast
758
560
418
354
341
332
-26
-25
-15
-6
-16.2
Yaroslavl Oblast
582
419
316
270
280
281
-28
-25
-15
4
-14.4
5.064
3,956
3.163
2,640
2.545
2.482
-22
-20
-17
-6
-JO.O
Oblast
Northwest St.
Petersburg City
Central
Orel Oblast
Ryazan Oblast
Smolensk Oblast
Volga- Vyatka
-1
1
Rural Population Change
Region/Suhjcci of
Rural Population
1
1
(
1
in Russia,
1959-1998
,000s of people)
77
Rural Population
the Federation
Change
1970
1979
1989
1995
1998
Natural Increase
(percent)
1959
Man
1
1959
1970
1979
1989
-1970
-1979
-1989
-1998
1997
465
405
329
291
289
291
-13
-19
-12
0
-5.2
818
656
525
419
397
384
-20
-20
-20
-8
-11.6
835
787
698
563
539
531
-6
-1
-19
-6
-6.8
Kirov Oblast
1,183
783
594
509
491
470
-34
-24
-14
-
-9.0
Nizhegorod Oblast
1.763
1,325
1,017
858
829
806
-25
-23
-16
-6
-13.4
Central Chernozem
5,652
4,
3.076
3.040
2.967
-15
-
-18
-4
-13.5
+0
-12.6
El
Republic
Mordovian Republic
Chuvash Republic
784
3.
732
f
Belgorod Oblast
986
817
617
510
518
512
-17
-24
-17
Voronezh Oblast
1,548
1,376
1,138
965
964
943
-1
-17
-15
Kursk Oblast
1,180
988
732
564
541
523
-16
-26
-23
-7
-15.7
797
682
535
460
459
449
-14
-14
.2
-12.4
1,141
921
710
577
558
540
-19
-23
-19
-6
-13.1
6,569
5,913
5,002
4,389
4.563
4.546
-10
-15
-12
4
-6.0
76
175
175
199
191
21
-1
0
9
2.3
1,660
1,517
1,264
981
997
995
-9
-17
I
-4.6
Astrakhan Oblast
337
342
298
318
337
341
1
-13
7
7
-1.0
Volgograd Oblast
846
800
706
624
694
695
-5
-12
-12
1
1,009
857
678
573
564
551
-15
-21
-15
-4
-10.8
Samara Oblast
859
781
676
628
649
644
-9
-13
-7
3
-7.2
Saratov Oblast
999
856
740
689
714
729
-14
-14
-7
6
-5.2
Ulyanovsk Oblast
713
584
465
401
409
400
-18
-20
-14
-0
-10.6
6.640
7,175
6.991
7.154
7,855
7,930
8
-3
2
11
-0.6
Adygey Republic
219
233
21
207
208
208
6
-9
+0
-3.9
Dagestan Republic
748
924
988
1016
1225
24
7
3
21
15.0
Kabardino-Balkar
254
308
282
295
318
337
21
-8
5
14
5.9
219
232
208
214
229
243
6
-10
3
14
1.6
Lipetsk Oblast
Tambov
Oblast
Volga
Kalmyk Republic-
146
1
-13.4
Khalmg Tangch Tatarstan Republic
Penza Oblast
North Caucasus
1
197
-6.4
Republic
Karachay-Cherkess Republic
1
1
1
Dmitry Sharkov
78
/?e;g/o/j/Subject
Rural Population
of
(
1
,000s of people)
Rural Population
Change
Increase
(percent)
the Federation
1959
1970
1979
1989
1995
1998
Natural
1959
1970
1979
1989
-1970
-1979
-1989
-1998
1997
213
196
192
198
201
206
-8
.1
3
4
Chechen Republic*
308
460
491
552
567
530
49
7
12
-4
Ingush Republic*
108
161
172
194
197
182
49
7
13
-6
13.3
Krasnodar Krai
2,075
2,156
2,106
2,131
1
2.347
4
.1
1
10
-6.2
Stavropol Krai
1,083
1,094
1,066
1,1
1,227
1,233
1
-3
4
1
-3.3
Rostov Oblast
1,413
1,41
1,275
1,236
1,419
1,419
0
-10
-3
15
-5.9
Urals
7.380
6.
724
5,644
5,124
5.228
5,215
-9
-16
-9
7
-3.6
Bashkortostan
2,059
1,979
1,662
1,429
1,442
1,446
-4
-16
-14
1
-1.4
Udmurt Republic
744
609
518
487
494
499
-18
-15
-6
2
-2.8
Kurgan Oblast
671
621
533
500
505
491
-7
-14
-6
*2
-6.0
Orenburg Oblast
1,005
962
829
761
797
802
-4
-14
-8
5
-2.3
Perm Oblast
1,024
820
656
593
602
603
-20
-20
-10
2
-5.1
Komi-Permyak
202
172
131
112
111
106
-15
-24
-15
-5
-6.0
Sverdlovsk Oblast
971
835
667
609
584
581
-14
-20
-9
-5
-7.4
Chelyabinsk Oblast
704
726
648
633
693
687
3
-11
.2
8
-4.2
5,528
4.678
4,191
4,082
4,407
4.372
-15
-10
-3
7
-4.1
127
128
124
140
153
153
1
-3
13
9
1.5
1,673
1,314
1,151
1,100
1,291
1,265
-21
-12
-4
15
-5.2
637
517
407
400
405
399
-19
-21
.1
-0
-7.7
1,024
867
747
704
719
717
-15
-14
-6
2
-4.4
934
816
726
689
710
712
-13
-11
-5
3
-2.1
387
320
299
311
374
360
-17
-7
4
16
-5.6
615
569
536
516
560
560
-7
-6
-4
9
-2.2
91
101
123
115
113
121
11
22
-7
5
0.5
40
46
78
107
82
85
15
70
37
-21
7.4
3,059
2,851
2,552
2,572
2,624
2,589
-7
-10
/
/
-2.1
397
449
388
401
428
422
13
-14
3
5
-0.8
North Ossetian
0.1
Republic-Alaniya
1
'>
9
')
Republic
^Vesi Siberia
Altay Republic Altay Krai
Kemerovo Oblast Novosibirsk Oblast
Omsk
Oblast
Tomsk
Oblast
Tiumen Oblast Khant-Mansii
AD
Yamalo-Nenetsk
AD East Siberia Buryat Republic
1
Rural Population Change
in
Russia,
Rural Pop ulation (1,000s of peop e)
Region/Suh]ect of
1959-1998
19
Rural Population
the Federation
Change
1970
1979
1989
1995
1998
Natural Increase
(percent)
1959
Twa (Tuva)
1
1959
1970
1979
1989
-1970
-1979
-1989
-1998
1997
122
144
154
163
160
163
IS
7
6
0
4.4
Khakass Republic
189
180
159
157
160
170
-5
-12
-1
8
-4.6
Krasnoyarsk Krai
1,108
927
794
785
788
765
-16
-14
-1
-3
-5.0
Taimyr (Dolgano-
13
15
15
18
16
15
15
0
20
-7
3.6
9
9
10
17
15
14
0
70
-18
2.3
Irkutsk Oblast
617
517
467
441
435
421
-16
-10
-6
-5
-2.6
Ust-Orda Buryat
132
123
108
143
144
-7
-12
3
30
1.5
426
435
406
427
425
422
2
-7
5
-1
1.1
46
52
51
52
54
53
13
.2
2
2
6.2
1,569
1,648
1,738
1,920
1,847
1,776
5
5
10
-7
-0.4
Sakha Republic
248
289
325
360
367
358
17
12
1
-1
8.0
Pnmorskii Krai
453
467
479
508
506
483
3
3
6
-5
-j.
Khabarovsk Krai
248
245
264
322
306
300
-1
8
22
-7
-2.0
AO
46
54
60
73
69
66
17
11
22
-10
0.3
Oblast
289
303
328
342
351
358
5
8
4
5
-2.5
Kamchatka Oblast
58
48
45
63
55
54
-17
-6
40
-14
-1.2
22
21
20
24
26
23
-5
-5
20
-4
-1.2
25
58
62
60
36
24
132
7
-3
-60
-2.1
20
31
40
43
30
25
55
29
8
-42
4.1
Sakhalin Oblast
160
132
1
15
125
101
85
-17
-13
9
-32
-4.3
Kaliningrad Oblast
216
196
190
182
203
210
-9
-3
-4
15
-4.9
Republic
AD
Nenetskii)
AD
Evenk
1
1
1
1
AD Chita Oblast
Aga Buryat
AD
Far East
Jewish
Amur
Koryak
AD
Magadan Oblast Chukotka
AD
*estimates **natural increase per 1,000 population
/
Dmitry Sharkov
80
The small increase due
to the fact that
Leningrad Oblast
in rural population in
people trying to
The
step.
The oblast
number of migrants from Baltics and northern
Central, Volga- Vyatka,
most
likely
in St. Petersburg often settle in
settle
Leningrad Oblast as a temporary but necessary relatively large
is
also attracted a
parts of Russia.
and Central Chernozem regions experienced
very similar rural population trends since 1959. During the examined period every one of the twenty-three subjects of the Russian Federation located there population in every intercensal period. Also,
lost rural
been losing
all
but five oblasts have
1989. Out of these five oblasts, three
rural population since
-
Kostroma, Orel, and Belgorod Oblasts - gained a small number of rural dwellers
between 1989 and 1995. However,
proved
this trend
to
be a short-lived, and
since 1995 rural population continued to decline there. Ivanovo and Yaroslavl are the only
two oblasts where
rural population
growth has continued
after 1995.
In the Volga Region, five oblasts and the Republic of Tatarstan were losing rural
between
population
1959
and
1989,
with
only
the
Penza
Oblast
experiencing rural population decline throughout the period between 1959 and 1997. Volgograd, Samara, Ulyanovsk Oblasts, and the Republic of Tatarstan
posted a gain between 1989 and 1995 with subsequent decline, while in Saratov Oblast rural population increased slightly even after 1995. Rural population in
Astrakhan Oblast increased, except during the period from 1970 to 1979, and this
was
also the case with the rural population in the
this trend
changed
Kalmyk
Republic, though
after 1995.
The North Caucasus
is
historically very
different
European Russia. The dynamics of rural population there
from the Chechen and Ingush Republics,
for
which
from other parts of is
no exception. Apart
rural population
can only be
estimated, the region’s rural population has increased significantly in all other eight subjects of the Russian Federation since 1989. In the Republic of Dagestan, rural population
time.
growth continued steadily throughout the examined period of
The Adygey and Karachay-Cherkess Republics and Rostov Oblast
experienced a slight rural population decline during the 1970s and 1980s, and the rural population of Kabardino-Balkaria,
North Ossetia, Krasnodar, and
Stavropol Krais declined during the 1970s. However, those declines were very
modest
in
comparison
to the other regions in
European Russia.
Rural Population Change
Figure
3.7.
in
Russia,
1959-1998
Russian Rural Population Change
Russian Rural Population Change
Source; Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.
81
Dmitxy Sharkov
82 In the Urals,
of the Federation were facing a rural
eight subjects
all
population decline between 1959 and 1989, and in Sverdlovsk Oblast and Komi-
Permyak Autonomous
District
though the
continued
decline
this
1990s.
Population increases were short-lived in Kurgan and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, which
gained in rural population between 1989 and 1995.
On
population growth continued in the Bashkortostan and
Udmurt Republics
as in
Orenburg and Perm Oblasts
In
West
the other hand, rural as well
starting in 1989.
Siberia rural population
was declining
in the period
between 1959
and 1989 in Altay Krai, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tyumen Oblasts. All of
them experienced
with a subsequent decline.
and
Yamalo-Nenetsk,
involved primarily in in the south
Two
in the period
northern autonomous
gained
generally
oil
Tomsk
between 1989 and 1995 Khanty-Mansii
districts,
non-agricultural
rural
and natural gas industries
of the region.
1979 with some drop
growth
a slight
as well as
little
population
Altai Republic
Oblast lost rural population between 1959 and
after 1995, but
gained about 75,000 rural dwellers in the
period between 1979 and 1995. In East Siberia different
and the Far
developments were somewhat
East, population
from other parts of the country. Rural population decline throughout the
whole period was observed only the rural population
grew
in
in the
Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Oblast, while
Republic of Tyva and
Amur
Oblast. Several
subjects of the Federation demonstrated a trend very unique to these rural population
was growing before 1989 and
after that started to decline at
dramatic rates. These areas were the Taimyr, Evenk, and Chukotka
Autonomous
Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Primorskii, and to some extent,
Districts, the
Khabarovskii Krais and Oblasts,
two regions:
areas
these
Magadan
did not
deteriorating living conditions
Oblast.
attract
after
Along with Sakhalin and Kamchatka
any new migrants, and with rapidly the collapse
system, the local rural population started to
Between 1989 and 1997, Magadan Oblast
lost
of the old socioeconomic
move away from
these locations.
58 percent of its rural population,
and the numbers for Chukotka and Sakhalin are 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively.
the
On
Ust-Orda
the other hand, the Buryat, Khakass, and
and Aga
Buryat Autonomous
Districts
Sakha Republics and gained
some
rural
population in the period from 1989 to 1995.
Kaliningrad Oblast lost rural population between 1959 and 1989, but after that
its
rural population increased, primarily
due
to
an influx of Russian-speaking
immigrants from the newly independent Baltic States.
Rural Population Change
To summarize
1959-1998
in Russia,
83
the above, a very significant redistribution of rural population
affected mostly the “belt” of territories along the borders between the Russian
Federation and other states of the former Soviet Union where significant growth occurred. In the regions of East Siberia and the Far East, the situation with the rural
population
changed dramatically and
opposite
the
in
direction
due
primarily to social and economic factors.
Table
Rural Population Change
3.3.
at the
Raion Level
Decline
No Change
1989-1990
997
278
723
1991
714
444
860
1992
450
421
1,158
1993
778
518
728
1994
937
426
661
1995
1,145
463
415
1996
1,324
417
381
Overall 1989-1996
1,134
73
860
Year
Growth
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.
Another interesting trend that rural population
can be seen from the population
that
growth was
abolition of the Soviet Union.
in fact localized
To
number of administrative raions (roughly analogous States) that experienced rural population
the
rural
population declined
at the
we can examine
the total
to counties in the
administrative
occurred in only 860 between 1989 and population grew
after the
in
1996.
raions,
As noted above,
growth
in relatively
migrants and refugees
the
rural
few raions, probably due
chain migrants from other parts of the former Soviet Union. Also,
were
and growth
same time by almost 950,000 people, which suggests
rather high concentration of
to note that there
United
growth or decline. As Table 3.3 shows,
1,134
in
1992
and peaked
illustrate this point,
statistics is
officially designated oblasts that
who moved
to the
to
important
were recipients of forced
Russian Federation due
conflicts elsewhere (including the conflict in
it is
a
to interethnic
Chechnya within Russia
itself).
The
peak of the number of administrative raions with population growth took place
Dmitry Sharkov
84 in
1992 and
after that declined significantly.
growth had occurred
By 1997
to raions experiencing rural population decline
while only a few years earlier in 1992,
it
was
3 to
where
the ratio of raions
was
1
to 4,
1.
Conclusion
During the
last
decade Russia experienced dramatic
social,
economic,
and demographic changes. In terms of population dynamics, the
political,
result
of these
changes was population decline in both absolute numbers and negative natural increase that
was not compensated by immigration from
the republics of the
former Soviet Union. At the same time, rural population experienced short-lived
growth
population
associated
immigration of ethnic Russians
home
in
mainly
with
administrative
who were unable
and
change
(or not willing) to find a
urban areas. In 1995, Stephen Wegren suggested that the
new
shift
in
migration patterns that favor rural in-migration might have profound long-term effects it
is
on agrarian reform and the very nature of the Russian countryside. In
fact,
quite possible that agrarian transformation (not even reform) in Russia
produced only small-scale and low-risk individual agricultural private plots and collective gardening, due to a
Russia.
activities,
such as
weak demographic base
in rural
However, some researchers also noted
that the absolute majority
of
migrants to Russia’s rural areas are moving there not due to pull factors but rather they are influenced
by
significant
push factors - forces
that are either
pushing them from urban centers within Russia, or more important, from other parts of the former Soviet Union,
With
relative stability in other parts
of the
former Soviet Union and an upswing in economic performance in Russia, the traditional pattern
of rural-urban migration can be expected
to
predominate in
the future.
Thus, long-term rural development will depend on non-demographic factors that
both influence rural development directly and affect demographic and
migratory behavior, which influences rural development indirectly. Russia has a relatively high proportion of
compared
to
its
still
population employed in agriculture
economically advanced countries, and problems with the food
supply are primarily associated not with depopulation but with the organization
and mechanization of agricultural production and the organization
and mechanization of the
rural
distribution. Efforts to
economy could
improve
lead to a genuine
Rural Population Change
1959-1998
in Russia,
85
- one based on long-term economic improvements
rural revival
rather than
short-term demographic gains.
Notes
Nicholas Dima, Rural Population Change
1.
Implications: 2.
John
in
the Soviet
1959—1970 (New York: Columbia University
F.
Its
Press, 1976).
Besemeres, Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications
of Demographic Trends
USSR and
in the
Sharpe, 1980). The focus of this chapter
Eastern Europe (White Plains, is
NY: M.
on the “net” population dynamics
Russian Federation rather than on the more analytic measures of
and in-migration or out-migration proper. Also, the issues of migration and
Union and
fertility,
E.
in the
mortality,
official policy
towards
(including pro- versus anti-natalism) were outside the scope
fertility
6.
of
this
paper as they were
dynamics 3.
modem
in
filled
with contradictions, and their effects on population
Russia were rather minimal.
Dima, Rural Population Change.
Timothy Heleniak, “Economic Transition and Demographic Change
4.
in
Russia, 1989—1995,” in Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 36, No. 7 (1995), pp. 446-458.
Chislennost
5.
gorodskogo
tipa
i
rainom: na
Committee on
State
naselenii
(Moscow),
7.
1997);
State
Committee on
.11 (1999),
p.
J.
poselskam
Statistics, 1998).
44-47.
Geography and Economics, Vol.
Donald
gorodam,
and Dernograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii
Timothy Heleniak, “Russia’s Age Structure
Post-Soviet 8.
N
po
ianvaria 1997 goda (Moscow: Russian Federation
Statistics,
(Moscow: Russian Federation //og/
1
Federatsii
Rosiiskoi
in
1996:
A
Research Report,”
in
37, No. 6 (1996), pp. 386-395.
Bogue, Principles of Demography (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1969). 9.
Beth Mithchneck and David Plane, “Migration Patterns During a Period of
Political
and Economic Shocks
in
laroslavl’ Oblast,” in Professional
the Former Soviet Union:
Geographer, Vol. 47, No.
1
A
Case Study of
(1995), pp. 17-30.
10. Ibid. 11.
Reform:
Stephen
Wegren,
A Companson
of
“New
Two
35, No. 8 (1994), pp. 455-481.
Perspectives
on Spatial
Russian Oblasts,”
in
Patterns
of Agrarian
Post-Soviet Geography, Vol.
.
Dmitry Sharkov
86
12.
Stephen Wegren, “Weapons of the Weak: Rural Responses to Urban Bias
and Consequences for Land Reform
in
Russia,” in The Soviet
and Post-Soviet
Review, Vol. 21, No. 2-3 (1994), pp. 283-318; Stephen Wegren, “Rural Migration
and Agrarian Reform
in Russia:
A
Research Note,”
in
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47,
No. 5 (1995), pp. 877-888. 13.
Alfred Evans,
1990s,” in Journal of
Jr.,
“The Decline of Rural Living Standards
Communist Studies and Transition
in
Russia
Politics, Vol. 12,
in the
No.
3
(1996), pp. 293-314. 14.
Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, “Recent Migration Trends
in
Russia,”
in
Population Under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia, eds. George J.
Demko, Grigory
Ioffe,
and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1999), pp. 107-138. 15. Heleniak,
16.
“Economic Transition and Demographic Change,” pp. 446-458.
Ward Kingkade, Population
Trends:
Russia
(Washington,
DC: U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1997). 17. Victor
m Population 18. 19.
Perevedentsev, “The Demographic Situation in Post-Soviet Russia,”
Under Duress, pp. 17-38.
Wegren, “Rural Migration and Agrarian Reform,” pp. 877-888. Gregory
Ioffe,
Population Change
in
Rural Restructuring
in
Central Russia, Part IIP Rural
European Russia (Washington, DC: The National Council
for
Soviet and East European Research, 1996); Grigory Ioffe and Tatyana Nefedova,
“Rural Population Change and Agriculture,” in Population Under Duress, pp. 231259; Argumenty
i
Fakty (Moscow), 2 January 1996,
p.
1
4 / Land Reform and Farm Reorganization in the Kyrgyz Republic: A Legal Perspective Renee Giovarelli
The Kyrgyz Republic,
a small,
mountainous, and landlocked Central Asian
country with a population of 4.5 million, has pursued a fast-track transformation
of
its
economy following
mountain ranges, term
lies in the
it
Bounded by two
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
has limited natural resources.
Its
advantage over the
medium
development of its agricultural sector and related agro-processing
activities.
To
that end, the
transform
its
Kyrgyz Republic
agricultural sector
from
is
continuing efforts
began
it
in
1991 to
collective to private farming, to ensure
private land rights, and to create the legal and administrative infrastructure
necessary to
support a freely functioning
land market.
Such
efforts
have
contributed significantly to the strengthening of democratic institutions, the
expansion and modernization of agricultural capacity, and the creation of a
market economy. At the time of
this
writing,
the
Kyrgyz Parliament was
preparing to adopt a package of laws that would create a strong legal framework for further agrarian
This report
Kyrgyz
is
reform
Kyrgyz Republic.
based on extensive
legislation
restructuring.
in the
and
field research, as well as
draft legislation pertaining to
The Rural Development
Institute
on analysis of
land reform and farm
(RDI) has been conducting
field
research regarding issues of land tenure and agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz
Republic from 1992 to the present.' generally focuses on to
(2)
farm
in
tliree
RDTs
field research in the
Kyrgyz Republic
principal questions: (1) are individual households able
any form they choose without a legal bias for or against
their choice;
does a legal framework exist that enables farmers to have a secure and
remunerative relationship to the land they farm; and (3)
developing?
is
a
land market
Renee Giovarelli
88
Agriculture in the Kyrgyz Republic
The
agricultural sector in the
of the
percent
Kyrgyz Republic accounted
domestic
gross
product
between
for approximately
and
1988
42
and
1993,
approximately one-third of the republic’s citizens depend on agriculture for their livelihood.^ Yet, only 7 percent of land in the 4.1),'^
Almost
all
Kyrgyz Republic
of the 1.4 million hectares of arable land are
is
arable (Table
irrigated.
The main
crops are cotton, winter and spring wheat, com, barley, oats, vegetables, and tobacco. Sheep, goats, cattle, and horse herds are also significant parts of the
Kyrgyz Republic’s
Table
agricultural output.^
4.1.
Land
in the
Kyrgyz Republic
(in hectares)
Total Land Area*
19,180,000
Agricultural Area
10,420,000
Arable Land
1,400,000
Permanent Crops**
20,000
Permanent Pasture
9,000,000
Forest and All Other
Wood
730,000
Land
8,030,000
*Excludes area under inland water bodies
**Excludes land under trees grown for wood or timber and land that
is
is
not meant to indicate the
amount of
potentially cultivable
The Kyrgyz Republic endured forced herds, and famine
collectivization, the destmction
of
between 1927 and 1932.^ The period of collective farming and
strong central planning continued for six decades. In 1991, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government of the efforts
At
toward privatization of land rights and reform of the agricultural
that time, the
land.
Kyrgyz Republic began
470
state
its
sector.
and collective farms held 96 percent of all agricultural
Reformers in the Kyrgyz government aggressively pursued reorganization
and privatization of these collective and
state farms.
Land reform and farm restmcturing
in the
Kyrgyz Republic appear
associated with better agricultural sector performance.
As
in all
to
be
former Soviet
Land Refonn and Farm Reorganization
in the
Kyrgy’z Republic
89
republics, the years immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet
were marked by economic turmoil and decline, especially In
sector.
the
1995,
projections
show
agricultural
sector
slowed
that the agricultural sector
in the agricultural
decline.
its
Union
In
the
1996,
expanded. In addition, the Kyrgyz
Republic’s agricultural sector has performed well compared to other former Soviet republics, most of which are not as far along in the farm reorganization
and land reform processes.
Development of the Legal Framework
for
Land Reform
and Farm Reorganization
Land reform and farm reorganization distinct time periods.
The
in the
Kyrgyz Republic
fall
early reforms (1991-1993) principally focused
voluntary reorganization of failing state and collective farms. Individuals
wanted
on
who
such farms were allowed to withdraw from the farm with land
to leave
and property (including sheep and other animals) and
The
enterprises.
two
into
later
reorganize and gave
set
reforms (1994-present) encouraged
members of
all
up private fann farms to wholly
the former state and collective farms land use
rights that they could sell, lease, mortgage,
and bequeath.
Developments, 1991-1993
Land reform
in the
Kyrgyz Republic began several months
prior to the republic’s
declaration of independence in September 1991.^ Early reform laws focused on
voluntary reorganization.
The Kyrgyz Republic Law on Peasant Farms
February 1991) encouraged private farm enterprises by allowing individuals
(2 to
apply to the local Council of People’s Deputies^ for unused land or land to be allocated
from
failing collective or state farms. Private farmers
receive inputs from the state at the
The
first
Republic, the to provide,
same prices
among
to
as a collective or state farm.^
comprehensive law on agrarian and land reform
Law on Land Reform
were able
in the
Kyrgyz
(19 April 1991), followed. This law sought
other things, a framework for the “equitable development of
various forms of farming,” and began the process of redistribution of land.
Law on Land Reform
called for (1) inventory and classification of
all
The
public and
private land; (2) voluntary reorganization of “inefficiently operated” collective
Renee Giovarelli
90 and
and
state farms;
unused and
(3) creation
of a special land
which was
fiind,
to contain
used lands for redistribution to other land users.
inefficiently
Inefficiently operated collective
and
state
farms could voluntarily reorganize as
cooperatives, other types of legal entities, associations of peasant farms, or
Land commissions were
private farm enterprises.
consider
requests
commissions were Six months
signed
a
distribution
for to
be created
later, in
presidential
agricultural reforms
which sought
decree,*'
local officials
that those collective
First, the
and
state
the
Similar
locality.
and federal
levels.
1991, newly elected President Askar
overcome
to
Akayev
resistance
and directors of collective and
farms. This decree and related regulations
forward in three ways.
within
land
at the raion, oblast,
November
from
of
established at the local level to
moved
to
state
land reform effort
the
decree and accompanying regulations mandated
farms with less than 15 percent profitability be
privatized, with redistribution of land
and other
assets to
farm members
to
be
used for creation of private farm enterprises and cooperatives. The farms that
were
to
be privatized were to be chosen by the State Property Committee
together with the Ministry of Agriculture and the oblast and raion Councils of
People’s Deputies.
Second, the decree and regulations allowed individual members of nonreorganized state and collective farms to withdraw a share of land and property (non-land assets) from the farm to share of each
member was
to
start a private
farm enterprise. The property
be determined based on the member’s length of
service and labor contribution.
Third, the decree and regulations redistributed land held collective farms in
two ways.
of agricultural land (out of a to the special land to
create private
First, the
total
and
of approximately 10.4 million ha) to be added
who wanted
farm enterprises, small cooperatives, gardens, and private it
provided
that, in addition,
irrigated arable lands allocated for the organization
no
less than
“50 percent of
of peasant farms” would be
newly created and separate land fund, the National Land Fund
(NLF), to support the way of life of Kyrgyz peasants.
The reference
peasants was apparently intended to allow distribution of ethnic Kyrgyz,
state
decree called for 1.5 million hectares (ha)
fund for redistribution to rural and urban citizens
individual plots. Second,
transferred to the
by
and
to exclude the
NLF
to
Kyrgyz
land only to
43 percent of Kyrgyz citizens who are ethnic
Russians, Germans, Uzbeks, Tajiks,
etc.*"*
7
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization Setting aside land for use First,
this
because
it
would be
in the Kyrgy’z
by ethnic Kyrgyz presented
Republic
91
three major problems.
provision appeared to be inconsistent with the
new
violated provisions stating that
Kyrgyz Republic
treated
all
persons
in the
constitution
Second, the provision created the potential for
equally.
furthering ethnic conflict. Third, the provision created insecurity of tenure for
those farms waiting to have half of their land taken.
Due
to these concerns, the
provision referring to Kyrgyz nationals was later removed. After the 1992 planting and harvest, a the
reiterated
new
decree was issued.'^ This decree
above mentioned decrees and added
(1)
a
requirement that
National Land Fund land be allocated to commodity-producing private farm enterprises
ethnic
on a competitive basis
Kyrgyz was dropped); and
(the reference to supporting the (2) a
recommendation
that collective
farms divide their land into shares to ensure that every worker or right to a land plot. This right to a land plot
represents a share of land
on
owns
share system
was created
An
called a “land share.”
individual
member
A
means
to distribute the land
state
has the
land share
may
and
or worker
the use right attached to the land share.
as a
and
member
the territory of an agricultural enterprise
be demarcated or undemarcated. agricultural enterprise
is
way of life of
on the
The land
of collective and
state
farms to individuals. The raion state administrations were given control over the
implementation of
on land reform
this
land reform system with input from the rural committees
(village governments).^^
The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, adopted on that land belongs to the state
5
May
and cannot be privately owned, but
1993, provided that land plots
may be
given to citizens and legal entities for private use. The purchase and sale
of land
is
not allowed under the constitution.
1
While some reform occurred between 1991 and 1994, several important issues
were insufficiently addressed. Specifically, the process
for restructuring
farms and the rights of individual farm members were not outlined in
detail.
Moreover, the types of enterprises allowed were not defined and described, so that
people did not have clear choices or even an understanding of their options.
Developments, 1994-Present
A
number of positive
other problems.
legal
developments occurred
in
1994
to redress these
Whole-farm reorganization was encouraged, while
at the
and
same
time individuals were given a legal right to agricultural land. Most prominently.
1
Renee Giovarelli
92
a February 1994 presidential decree guaranteed (rather than right
of members of collective and
state
and gave these holders of land share
recommended)
the
farms to receive land share use rights
rights the right to transfer them.
absence of a constitutional amendment allowing
full
In the
ownership of land, the
president allowed forty-nine year,*^ fully disposable and mortgageable rights to agricultural land.^^ lease,
The decree guaranteed
the right of land share
exchange, bequeath, or mortgage their land plots or land shares.
In addition to providing clear rights to land for state farms, the all
owners 2
and
collective
decree reduced the National Land Fund by half, to 25 percent of
arable land except pastures.
The decree
established.
members of
to sell,
A maximum
transferred
size
of land plot per family was
privatization
Property Fund to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Detailed regulations for the National Land 1994, which corrected
some of the
powers from the
(MOAF).
23
Fund were promulgated
earlier problems.
The
State
in
May
regulations called for
the land to be distributed (1) for lease to livestock breeders, seed producers, rural
household enterprises; (2) as land shares to collective and
state
and
farm
workers not otherwise entitled to land shares from the farms they had joined; and
temporary use
(3) for lease or
rules set out in this resolution
to other agricultural
were
still
commodity producers. The
unclear as to what quality of land was to
be selected for the fund, the use terms of the land
in the fund,
and who was
to
9
z Republic
rotation patterns, they
made
it
93
difficult, if
not
impossible, to establish a single-family farm.^^ In January
1995, the Ministry of Agriculture and
“Program of Land and Agrarian Reform
in the
Food published
Kyrgyz Republic
1996.” This program focused on whole-farm breakup reorganization
by 1996 of all
created
units
committees
from
state
and
land
and collective farms property
to inventory the assets
shares.
for
the
1995-
and called for the
into smaller
management
The program
established
of farms to be reorganized, calculate land and
property shares of members, develop a plan for reorganizing the farm, and then
implement the plan.
Under
this
program, agricultural producers were classified by the size and
mode of production of regulation
reorganized enterprises.
their
defined seven
new
enterprise categories.
A
later
government
These categories were
intended to eliminate some of the confusion caused by the tendency of some collective-type enterprises to adopt
names suggesting
that they are associations
of independent peasant farms. The categories are as follows: 1)
personal household enterprise (household plot cultivated by family members);
2)
farm enterprise (farm operated by one family on ha of irrigated land or
at least
1
at least 5
ha of suburban vegetable
land);
3)
peasant enterprise (two or more families cultivating 5-100
ha of irrigated land or 1-100 ha of suburban vegetable land); 4)
collective peasant enterprise (cultivating
more than 150 ha of
9Q
irrigated land); 5)
joint-stock
company
(enterprise capitalized with shareholders’
non-land property and using shareholders’ land shares); 6)
state enterprise (enterprise
a state program); 7)
agricultural
using state land and operating under
and
cooperative
(composed
of
independent
farm
enterprises or peasant enterprises). In
November
1995, a presidential decree^^ significantly furthered the rights
of land share owners. Existing forty-nine-year use rights
to agricultural land
were
extended to ninety-nine years. Heads of oblast and raion governments were instructed to complete the issuance of land share certificates
1995. The decree abolished the
maximum
size
by
3
1
December
of plots that one family
may
use.
Renee Giovarelli
94
and reduced the minimum 1
of land plots to 5 ha in
size
all
cultivation zones (and
ha for rural and suburban vegetable operations). In addition, the
November 1995 decree
abolished the National
and transferred the land remaining in the fund
Fund (LRF)
to
to the
new Land
Land Fund
Redistribution
be run by the Ministry of Agriculture. The decree provided that
land parcels from the fund are to be used for expansion of rural settlements, creation of experimental agricultural facilities, or are to be auctioned as ninety-
nine-year use rights for organizations of “peasant communities” and for other
purposes to be decided by the government.
One
year later (November 1996), Presidential Decree No. 327 called for (1)
registration rights to
of land use rights transactions; (2) sale (tender and auctions) of use
50 percent of land of the Land Redistribution Fund; and
lease agreements for the remaining land in the
Procedures for the sale of
Kyrgyz Republic
On
this
(3) one-year
Land Redistribution Fund.^’
land were promulgated by the government of the
in January 1998.
32
17 October 1998, a nationwide referendum was held to introduce the
concept of private ownership of land to the constitution in the hopes that such a constitutional legislation.
amendment would provide
Prior to the referendum,
presidential decree
was passed
the impetus for
much-needed land
which passed by a large majority, a
that outlined the concept
of private ownership of
land and provided that seven laws should be promulgated (if the referendum
passed) that would establish and encourage a land market.^^
They include
Land Code, Peasant Farm Law, Mortgage Law, Law on Cooperatives, and introducing land-related
amendments
to
law
to the civil code.
These laws underwent intensive drafting and revision processes and are expected
a
the
in late
1998
be adopted in 1999. They could become models for other
transition-economy countries, because they will create a strong legal framework that will
enhance and protect land rights of poor rural households, allow such
households to access land (or additional land), and access to farm credit resources. rural
They allow
and urban land; do not severely
and disposal of interests
their land;
private farmers.
is
as
No
such households’
for the free transfer
restrict the rights
and mortgage of
of private farmers on use
and provide a legal framework
of lenders and creditors.
has a set of laws that
facilitate
that balances the
other country of the former Soviet
Union
market oriented and allows freedom of choice for
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
in the
Kyrgy>z Republic
Development of Institutional Framework
95
for
Land and Agrarian Reform The
institutional
framework
and agrarian reform has had a significant
for land
impact on both the pace and the depth of the reforms Until early 1994, the State Property
in the
Kyrgyz Republic.
Committee was responsible
for privatization
of enterprises; in 1994 the Ministry of Agriculture and Food took over responsibility.^"^
The Ministry of Agriculture moved
the land
this
and agrarian reform
forward by establishing and implementing a policy that mandated farm
effort
restructuring.
The
framework
institutional
is
fairly
and organizations. At the federal
actors
and Agrarian Reform
is
complex and has many overlapping
level, the
Republican Center for Land
under the Ministry of Agriculture and
is
responsible for
policy on land and agrarian reform and for privatization of the agricultural sector. Provincial
and county Centers
farm reorganization
at the local level,
for
Land and Agrarian Reform
but are funded by the republican budget.
While land and agrarian reform policy local
developed
is
government has been largely responsible
farms.
assist in
The county administration and
at the republic level,
for the actual reorganization of
the village
government have had primary
responsibility for farm reorganization and land and property share distribution.
Rural committees (village governments) were introduced in January 1992
and were responsible for the physical aspect of farm restructuring.^^ The county administrations had control over the rights of land share owners to withdraw and set
up private farm
The
enterprises.
village
government was given the
participate in this reform process with the county administration
1992 presidential decree.
RDTs
1993
controlled set their
A
and agrarian reform
rules and, in
local administrators
regulation
many
were not
was passed
a
largely
reform was obstructed because the
of farm reorganization.
March 1994
in
an effort
to
broaden and define
The regulation gave
the village
wide range of power over implementation of the agrarian reform
and general development collective
Kyrgyz Republic was
that time, local administrations often
cases, land
in favor in
At
in the
the functions of the village governments.^^
government
December
(conducted with the World Bank) indicated that
by county administrations.
own
a
36
field research
the process of land
by
right to
or state
in rural areas.
It
permitted appointment of the head of a
farm who would also head the village government
that
Renee Giovarelli
96 operates the farm.^^
The
govemment was
village
generally responsible for
enforcing laws and regulations regarding rights to land, land reform, agrarian reform, rational land use, formation and registration of enterprises, land and
water relations
among
farmers,
economic disputes among farmers, and the
granting of land shares and property shares. In response to fears that the village governments were dominated or state farm leaders
who might impede
the reform process, the
by
collective
govemment
adopted a regulation in January 1995 creating a “committee for implementation of land reform and reorganization of agricultural enterprises” on each reorganizing
farm
enterprise."^®
These committees were
set
up
to
be more broadly representative
of those involved in the land reform process and are more narrowly focused than the village governments. fifteen
The committees must be composed of no more than
members, including the head of the
village
govemment and
representatives
of the Ministry of Agriculture, the county administration, the provincial and county Centers for Land and Agrarian Reform, financial bodies
who have
and elected representatives of the reorganizing
enterprise.
enterprise,
During
RDTs
October 1995
field research,
many
a stake in the
farmers stated that the
county administration had thrown up obstacles to reorganization. One example given was that the county administration had intentionally delayed processing land certificates.
The farmers
to allow the reorganization,
dependent upon the county
stated that the county administration
since
it
meant
that the
However, federal
by
conflict
reluctant
farmers would be less
officials.
County- and village-level governments continue authority and ability to
was
either
move
the
to
have a great deal of
reforms forward or hinder them.
legislation attempts to ensure that the reforms are not hindered
of interest and resistance from those in power
at the local level
by
providing for mral committees on implementation of land reform and for centers
on agrarian reform.
It
is
substantially diminish the
own
not
a
feasible
power of
or
necessarily
local officials.
land and have a stake in the land and
its
desirable
goal
Farmers who control
productivity will be
more
to
their
willing to
advocate for themselves and play a role in the existing local processes as a
means of securing county
officials.
rights, allocation
of resources, and the attention of the local
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
in the
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization Currently, use rights to agricultural land in the private citizens
who
97
Kyrgy>z Republic
Issues
Kyrgyz Republic
are (1) held
by
are farming independently or with other families in small
groups; (2) held by private citizens working on large collective farms in the form
of land shares; or (3) leased by private citizens or collective farms from the Land Redistribution Fund. Approximately half of the arable land in the Kyrgyz
Republic
is
held by private farm enterprises and farmed by single families or
small groups of families. For the most part, these individual or multi-family
farms were created into
much
when
smaller units.
a
former
state or collective
The farms
that
have not yet broken into private farm
enterprises have cosmetically reorganized and are collective farms.
Most of
certificates to their
Kyrgyz Republic
is
still
functioning essentially as
these farms, however, have distributed land share
members. Approximately 25 percent of the arable land
The package of laws expected
reform process. Following
be addressed within
is
this
to
on
a
temporary
a
be adopted
framework
likely provide a strong legal
basis.
in the first half
of 1999 will
for the continuation of the agrarian
broad discussion of some important issues
upcoming
legislation,
that
such as (1) privatization of
farm debt and newly created private farms;
land; (2)
in the
held in the Land Redistribution Fund and leased or given to
private individuals or legal entities to use
will
farm as a whole reorganized
(3)
documentation and
registration of rights to land; (4) land transactions; (5) security of land tenure; (6)
machinery and service cooperatives; and
(7) mortgages.
Privatization of
Land
Land Shares Workers, pensioners, invalids, and specified social-sphere workers of collective
and
state
farms (and their dependents) hold the right to a portion of the arable
land (not pastureland) on those farms. Generally, the system developed in the
Kyrgyz Republic farm’s land
among and
1.5
the
is
for distributing this land
is
as follows.
The
collective or state
divided on paper into shares. The shares are then divided equally
farm population.
An
individual’s land share
ha in northern provinces and between
0.1
is
generally between 0.75
and 0.3 ha
in
more populated
Renee Giovarelli
98
southern provinces."** While each person
among
the farm’s population
of the land, the family, not the individual, receives a certificate from
to a share
the village council that indicates that family’s share of the land."*^
members
land of individual family
are not clear under
farms, the families’ land shares are located are not.
more
enterprise (two or
knows
The
Kyrgyz law.
rights to
On some
on a map, while on other farms they
However, when families withdraw
generally
entitled
is
their land shares to start a peasant
each family within the peasant enterprise
families),
the precise location of its land.
Land share owners can withdraw
their land shares to establish
an individual
with other families and
farm enterprise, or they can pool
their land shares
withdraw land
farm enterprise, cooperative, or association
to establish a peasant
of peasant farms, provided that the farm contains a
minimum amount of
land."*^
Conversely, the land share owner can leave his share with whatever large farm enterprise replaces the collective or state farm.
suburbs
may withdraw
Land
who
live in
smaller plots for cultivation of vegetables.
While approximately half of the arable land farmed by collective and
by
share owners
state farms, the vast
Kyrgyz Republic
in the
majority of the arable land
is still is
held
private families either as land plots or land shares. In theory, collective farms
that use their
members’ land shares should
lease these land shares
members. RDI
field research indicates that generally
break up or stay
together,"*"*
whole farms decide
with few individual families choosing to leave.
Since half of the private arable land in the Kyrgyz Republic land share owners
remain crucial
who have
not
to a continuing
to use, dispose of, or
farms on which
RDI
left the collective,
all
members and
have a continuing right
to
withdraw
may
owners are the most qualified
many
to decide
how
start their
own
economic conditions improve. Only those individuals who
choice.
Of the
leaders stated
their land shares
to start a private
is critical
because
to use the land their
land share owners remain on collective farms,
choose to leave the collectives to
withdraw land
held by
land shares had been contributed to the charter capital
shares represent. Thus, while
they
"*^
reform process. Land share owners have the right
researchers held interviews,
if the
to
land share owners’ rights
of the agricultural enterprise. This ongoing right to withdraw the land share
is still
withdraw the land represented by the land share. "*^
that individual families
from the farm, even
from the
farm enterprise
farms in the future as retain their ability to
in the future will
have a meaningful
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization The impact of
system on intra-household relationships
land share
the
requires further study and consideration. certificate
right to
is
issued per family.
withdraw
the
family breaks down, or
if the
to leave the farm.
head of the farm,
in
It is
whose name
the certificate
We
if
members have
a
one or several family
RDI
not clear from
spouse or children.
to the land than his
members have
law, only one land share
their land shares, or sell or lease their land shares. This issue
becomes important
members want
Under current
unclear whether individual
It is
99
Kyrgy^z Republic
in the
is
field research
more
registered, has
have recommended
whether rights
that all adult
the right to partition their land and that a transfer of land require
the signature of all adult
The 13 October Private Property
members.
"On
Presidential Decree,
on Land
the
Concept of Introduction of
Kyrgyz Republic," directed
in the
that use rights to
certain categories of land (land shares, agricultural land parcels allocated based
on land shares, household ownership land code.
rights.
The
and dacha
plots) should
all
Land Code,
the draft Peasant
Farm Law, and
allow for withdrawal of land in kind
farm enterprise leaves the enterprise. This ongoing is
be converted into
This conversion will occur by operation of law in the pending
draft
on Cooperatives
plots,
right to
when
the draft
Law
member of
a
withdraw land
in
a
kind
not guaranteed in other countries of the former Soviet Union including, for
example, Russia and Uzbekistan.
Land Redistribution Fund Twenty-five percent of the arable land in the Kyrgyz Republic
Land Redistribution Fund (formerly local
the National
Land Fund) and controlled by
communities and the Ministry of Agriculture. The questions of who should
control disposition of this land and
who
should receive use rights to
have been debated since the National Land Fund was created
The head of the Center
for
Land and Agrarian Reform
reported that 49 percent of the land in the
was leased that
held in the
is
in
1997
to private
was not leased was used
LRF
in 1991.
Issyk-Kul Province
in the oblast (about
farm enterprises and for
in
collectives.
development of seeds,
this land
18,000 ha)
The 51 percent
cattle breeding,
and
enlarging household plots of citizens of the village. This land continues to be available for lease.
Although the Ministry of Agriculture controls the
LRF
land, there appears to
be a great deal of local control as well. For example, two villages
in
Issyk-Kul
Renee Giovarelli
100
Province each operate a service cooperative. In 1996, the village government
LRF
gave 100 percent of the land from the villagers
and those who work
to
people
did not have land
—
1997, however, the service
at the sanitarium. In
cooperatives cultivated the land for themselves.
who
The revenue was used
to
pay the
land tax, to buy fuel, and for other needs. Another cooperative leader in Issyk-
Kul Province
stated that the cooperative rents out all of the land
required to set aside for the
had been
it
Land Redistribution Fund. The cooperative pays
1
percent of the income from the rented land to the local budget.
The two
issues
- who
LRF -
land from the
controls the land, and
have begun
to
commission made up of
determine
officials to
who
has the right to receive
be addressed by the law.
law divests local communities of some of establishing a
who
their control
First, the current
over
LRF
land by
and central government
village, county,
has priority for leasing land, and by calling for
auctions to sell the use rights to 50 percent of the land.
48
Second, current law
provides that “local residents and agricultural producers living on the territory of the village”
LRF
have priority for the
land that
is
leased, although the land will
be leased out on a “competitive basis.” The land use rights sold
at
tender or
auction will be sold to individuals and legal entities for “organization of peasant
communities and other purposes.”
A
government
and
resolution
accompanying
regulations
that
were
promulgated in January 1998 provide guidelines and procedures for auctioning land from the LILF."^^
determine the land
who
is
is
The auction procedures provide
eligible to bid at these auctions.
a
Pilot auctions
Members of the
were held
in fourteen raions this year.
was generated by these land auctions, and many Although these
auctions
have
been
fair in
village
where
The procedures
The auctions were open and
A
great deal of excitement
local villagers attended.
stopped
since
referendum passed, because of uncertainty over whether ownership or long-term use
criteria to
of the auction commission.
at the discretion
transparent, with several bidders for each land plot.
and
of ten
located are given priority, as are direct producers.
allow for payment over three years
into
list
rights, the auctions
this
the
constitutional
land should be sold
have been very successful
terms of getting land into the hands of private owners. These auction
procedures should not be discarded, but rather should be continued once policy
and procedural decisions have been made.
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
in the
Farm Debt and Newly Created Former
state
Private
new
101
Farms
and collective farms accmed massive debts
collective period.
formation of
Kyrgy>z Republic
to the state during the
This indebtedness has been a significant issue in terms of farms.
When
farm decides
a collective or state
break up mto
to
smaller private farms, the newly created private farms are expected to divide the
debt
still
research,
owed and become
RDI found
responsible for
that debts
created
its
by
repayment. In the 1995 field
and collective farms were a
state
crushing burden on newly created smaller farms. Debt continues to be an issue for
newly created farms and appears
to restrict the potential profitability
new
of these
farms.
Members of both property assets, but
state
and collective farms have the
members wishing
to
right to claim non-land
claim non-land property assets from
state
farms have to purchase the property, while collective farm members do not have to
purchase non-land property property they receive even form(s) and even
if the
assets.
when the
State
farm members have
entire enterprise
is
to
pay
for non-land
reorganized into other legal
debt of such a state farm has been repaid.
Government Decision No. 42 (16 Febmary 1995) somewhat mitigated difference in treatment
members
will
by providing
that
payments for property by
state
be spread out over ten years and effectively carry no
this
farm
interest.
Moreover, Government Decision No. 42 reduced the debt of reorganizing
state
farms by 50 percent and reduced the debt of reorganizing collective farms by 25 percent. These debts are to be paid over a period of fifteen years beginning
on
1
January 1997.
Most
private farmers interviewed in
indicated that they had not yet state
begun
to
RDTs
pay back
the debt
and collective farms. Each of the farmers indicated
begin to pay back a portion of the debt, interviewed did not the
October 1997
know whether
the debt
amount or terms of repayment would
be.
although
owed by
that they
many of
had been accruing
The
state
field research
the former
would soon the
farmers
interest or
what
had forgiven some of
the
debt on most of the farms.
Many, but not
some of
their
reorganization.^'
property shares.
all,
of the collective and
property to pay
The
rest
off
state
some of
farms
the
RDI
visited
debt before
had sold
whole-farm
of the property was then distributed in the form of
Renee Giovarelli
102
We have recommended that all farni debt that existed or exists
time of
at the
reorganization be written off for farms that voluntarily reorganize into private
farm enterprises.
No
debt should be collected against resulting farms whenever
they are formed. Moreover, no debt should be collected against the productive
of a farm that
assets
private farm enterprises
on these
assets
must
be greater
pay off old
assets are sold to
enterprises
need productive
likely to
is
sell
of whole-farm reorganization. Resulting
in the process
is
assets,
(in the
and the return
form of taxes) than
assets.
government
if
may be
debt. Further reorganization
their productive
to the
productive
hindered
if
However, debts should not be
written off or reduced for farnis that undertake “cosmetic” reorganization, but
only for those farms that break into private farm enterprises.
Documentation and Registration of Rights
Land
documentation and registration
rights
is
to
Land economy
necessary in a market
both to protect such rights and to provide information to land users, potential buyers, and mortgagees. If land rights are protected through documentation and registration, land users will
are protected, rights
is
A
develop confidence that their rights have meaning,
and can be relied upon. Without documentation a market
for land
not possible.
federal
buildings)
law on
state registration
was adopted
in the
of rights to immovable property (land and
Kyrgyz Republic on 22 December 1998.
implemented over time, as each registration
federal law will be
office
is
This set up.
Until implementation occurs in a specific raion, documentation of rights to land will
contmue
as
currently.
it is
Unfortunately,
RDI
researchers found during October 1997 field research that
registration
was thus
government
to private farms or
gifts,
far limited to the initial allocation
of use rights from the
farm households. Registration of
or other transactions of use rights between private parties
sales, bequests,
was not
occurring.
Moreover, long-term leases were not being registered in the registration offices visited.
One county
right
registered, there
is
administration head confirmed that after an is
initial
land use
no further tracking. The newly adopted federal law
requires land transactions to be registered. Transactions that are not registered will
be void.
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
in the
Kyrgyz Republic
103
Land Transactions Detailed regulations concerning land transactions are needed and have not yet
been promulgated. RDI researchers found
that the lack
of adequate regulations
has affected the willingness of individuals to engage in purchase and sale transactions.
The 1997
field research indicated that
taking place. In
Naryn Province,
the
few
head of
sales
of land or land shares are
a county administration stated that
were not occurring because there were no procedures. In Issyk-Kul
sales
Province the provincial head of the Center for Land and Agrarian Reform stated that
no sales of land have occurred
now because
there are
no
in the oblast
rules regarding sales.
and
One
that
it is
illegal to sell
land
private farmer reported that
he wanted to buy land, but there were no procedures and individual land shares
were very small. Regulations and forms for purchase and sale should be promulgated once the
Land Code has been
passed.^^ These regulations and forms should provide a
step-by-step procedure for a prospective buyer and seller in a land transaction. In countries where land transactions are unfamiliar, regulations and
model forms
help people understand what issues they need to be aware of to
make an
equitable agreement.
The
current draft
Land Code
prohibits foreign ownership of agricultural
land, but does allow foreign citizens for
up
to fifty-year terms.
and legal
entities to
hold use rights to land
This restriction was inserted because opponents of
private land ownership argued that foreigners
would purchase
large
amounts of
land.
Security of
Land Tenure
Individual rights to agricultural land in the secure. Agricultural land
is
now
Kyrgyz Republic
held in ownership and
is
definite,
are
relatively
most farmers
and document
their rights, land use
rights are not subject to periodic readjustment as in China,
and farmers have the
have written land
certificates that describe
right to freely sell, lease, bequeath, gift, or
mortgage
their use rights to land.
The
primary source of insecurity derives from the threat of confiscation from non-use of land.
Renee Giovarelli
104
RDI that
many
when
shown
researchers’ comparative experience in various countries has
land
government
legislators,
and individual citizens believe
officials,
not used for a period of time, especially agricultural land,
is
that
should
it
be confiscated (taken without payment) by the government. Generally, they reason that inefficient land use should be punished. Ironically, the greatest
impediment
to efficient land use
and protection of land
is
most often not the
actions of private landowners, but the actions of the state or local authorities that
undermine confidence
County Resources
in private land rights.
of the State Agency on Land Management and Land
offices
(SALMLR)
are actively involved in controlling non-use of land in the
Kyrgyz Republic. In Issyk-Kul Province,
Land and Agrarian Reform that
were uncultivated
the
stated that action
The process
in 1996.
head of the provincial Center for
had is
to
be taken on 4,250 ha of land
as follows.
The
SALMLR
office
inspects for non-use of land plots. If a person does not use his land, the inspector
determines the reason for such non-use. If the reason will
be warned. (Presumably
if the
taken immediately.) If the land
Land and Agrarian Reform
who wants
to use
it.
The
is
reason
is
is
well founded, the holder
not well founded the land will be
not cultivated for a second year, the Center for
will arrange for the land to
be leased out
lease has to have the landowner’s consent.
to
someone
The
lease
is
negotiated and the lessor has input, including say in the length of the term of the lease.
The terms of the
lease are usually that 10 to
20 percent of
all
crops from
the land will be paid to the landowner, and the lessee accepts responsibility for the land tax.
The center helps
Land and Agrarian Reform
lessors find lessees.
stated that
many
either leasing or offering land for lease but
The head of
the Center for
Province stated that
added
to the
if the
land
is
The head of
the Center for
times neighbors are interested in
do not know of one another’s
Land and Agrarian Reform not used for three years,
it
will
for Issyk-Kul
be taken and
Land Redistribution Fund. The government would have
court to take the land, but
would not have
because the government already owns the
to
land.^"^
interest.
to
go
to
compensate the land possessor
No
such cases have occurred in
the province.
The land engineer his office
was
in
one county in the province stated that the major goal of
to exercise control over the use
different account, he stated that if land year,
the
SALMLR
Redistribution
Fund
is
of land. Giving a somewhat
not cultivated in his county for one
could confiscate the land and include in the fall
it
in the
Land
of the second year. The farmer will be warned
at
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization two times before land
least
the
owner
is
is
in the
taken. If the land tax
Kyrgyz Republic
paid on the unused land,
is
not fined, but only warned. If the land tax
the land can be taken, but there have
The land engineer
105
not paid for one year,
is
been no cases of this. 47 ha
stated that in 1996,
in
one
territory
governed by
one rural committee were taken and 6 ha were contributed (without warnings) the
Land Redistribution Fund. This land primarily belonged
who could
not cultivate their land and young people
to
people
to elderly
who moved away. The
raion administration issued a resolution stating that they were confiscating the land.
The landholders were informed of the
resolution.
could choose to go to court, but no one did
The land
Land Code allows
draft
if the
government
The land use
owners
right
so.
for state withdrawal of use rights to agricultural
land has not been used for three years. The draft requires the to
provide a written warning to the landholder before land rights are
taken and to increase the land tax on the unused land for the three consecutive years of non-use. If the land
is
withdrawn,
notice and an opportunity to appeal.
must be sold
it
The proceeds from
at a
forced sale, after
the sale will be given to
the landowner.
Machinery and Service Cooperatives
Access
to
machinery and other non-land assets
is critical
to the success
farm enterprises newly emerging from former collective and
Kyrgyz Republic. In
the former Soviet republics,
have found that
much more
it is
to
machinery
many would-be
difficult to get access to
get access to land. Collective and state farm as a reason for not
state
members
of private
farms in the
private farmers
machinery than
it is
to
often cite a lack of access
withdrawing from a failing collective or
state
and
state
farm. In the
Kyrgyz Republic, workers and pensioners of
farms (but not their spouses and children to a share
if
is
they are not members) have the right
of the non-land assets (property share) of the enterprise, such as
buildings, machinery, fuel, and livestock.
share
collective
The
size
of each recipient’s property
determined by the length and nature of his service on the farm, such that
higher-salaried and longer-working recipients receive larger shares.
property
breakup.
among
the
members of
the farm
is
the
most
difficult aspect
Dividing
of farm
Renee Giovarelli
106
In principle, there are several possible models for allocating machinery
when
and
collective
farms reorganize
state
private
into
farm enterprises,
including:
sharing machines and equipment so that each family only
1 )
needs to have one or two types of machines;
common and
related families claim property in
2)
all
own
machines together; 3)
formal service cooperatives;
4)
one family purchases a machine (new or used from another private or collective farm) and hires out the
machine and a
driver;
residual
a
5)
organization
from the
former
farm
collective
remains in the form of a service cooperative.
Members of former the right to
withdraw
government
is
fimd.^^
collective farms
who want
their property shares in
this
same
were given
and technical purpose”
(as well as
and cultural objects, repair shops, garages, gas storage, water supply, and
common inputs) citizens
with
of the enterprise production
regulation, the village governments
responsibility over objects of “production social
farm independently have
kind or in money. The village
to allocate the property share out
However, under
to
to render centralized services.
based on
many
common
These objects are
share ownership. Although
private farm enterprises that
RDI
be owned by
researchers spoke
had received livestock or bams
property shares (usually purchasing a portion of the share did not cover the cost),
RDI
to
bam
as their
because the property
researchers spoke with no one
who had
received a tractor or other farm machine as part of his property share.
farm remained as a service center, the members of
If the collective or state
the former farm contributed their property shares to the service center. In the
examples
seen,
enterprises.
58
the
The
centers
centers will service anyone, including those
members of the former
money paid
charged to plow land for peasant and farm
farm, although the price
for the services
is
is
who were
not
higher for non-members. The
used to buy spare parts and to pay the wages of
the drivers. Additional funds are generated because the service center continues to
farm a portion of the land of the former farm and uses the profit
itself,
contract
The is
to support
service center has a written contract with every farmer and the
renegotiated on a yearly basis.
The
service center has a charter and
employs people. Drivers are seasonal and are paid per hectare. Mechanics are
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
in the
paid a fixed monthly wage. Service centers also buy for the
members of
Kyrgyz Republic
107
and seeds
fertilizers
in
bulk
farm enterprises. The service centers do not do
the private
any marketing.
Formal service cooperatives are necessary
move machinery
to
out of the
control of the village governments and into the control of the farmers.
of the service cooperative should have the ability service cooperative and
deal with
all
how
it
will
to vote
on who
Law on
be managed. The
will
Members
manage
the
Cooperatives will
types of cooperatives, including service cooperatives, and will
provide a framework for a
new
type of organization.
Mortgages
Farmers around the world often require (or
at least
would benefit from)
credit for
both short-term and long-term purposes. Farming operations usually involve long
periods
cultivation,
harvest.
of negative
cash
flow
(during
land
preparation,
planting,
and harvest) followed by a peak period of positive cash flow
Because many farmers do not have the liquid resources
consumption and
cultivation,
the
need
for
to
short-term credit
after
cover costs of is
ubiquitous.
Moreover, establishing or expanding farming operations requires large outlays for capital assets such as land, machinery, livestock,
and buildings. These large
capital outlays are slow-maturing investments that provide returns over a period
of years. Unless a farm family has sufficient liquid resources for the investment, it
must secure medium-term or long-term
credit.
Access
to credit
is
often an
important determinant of a farmer’s performance.
Secure and transferable land rights can have an extremely beneficial effect
on
a farmer’s access to credit
because such land rights can be pledged as
collateral for loans. Collateral plays
because
it
an important role
in
has several important and interrelated effects.
most lending decisions First, collateral partly
or fully shifts the risk of principal loss from the lender to the borrower. Second, collateral creates
an incentive for borrowers
(as a result), the existence
to
avoid intentional default.^' Third
of collateral increases the likelihood that a lender will
offer credit to a farmer. Fourth, at a given interest rate, the
amount of
credit
is
expected to increase as the value of the collateral increases. Finally, for a given
amount of used.^^
credit, the interest rate will
be substantially lower when collateral
is
Renee Giovarelli
108
Land
is
when
collateral
Lenders prefer collateral that
transferable.
is
land rights are secure and
easy to appropriate in case of
does not easily lose value due to theft or damage, cannot be concealed,
default,
and can continue is
form of
a preferred
plentiful in
to benefit the borrower.
most
rural settings.
for agricultural lending in
Laws
As
Land
satisfies all these conditions
a result, land
is
the
most common
and
collateral
developed countries and many developing countries.
to create mortgageability will not
have the positive effects anticipated
unless other conditions enabling farmers to take advantage of mortgageability are first satisfied. In addition to secure land tenure
land market,
these
support
attractive;
conditions services
include
that
can
willing
and the existence of a rural
lenders;
ensure
help
farmers
terms
success
in
find
agricultural
innovation; a political and legal situation that permits foreclosure if necessary;
and prices for produce
that permit recovery
of the costs of investment
(or,
otherwise stated, the farmer’s ability to present a viable business plan to the lender).
The
draft
Mortgage Law
agricultural land
in the
and does not attempt
Kyrgyz Republic allows mortgaging of to protect farmers to
such an extent that
mortgagees will not lend to farmers. Under the draft Mortgage Law, farmers will
be able
to
Mortgage
provide both their land and their houses as collateral. The draft
Law
that
is
now
before Parliament provides a basic framework for
mortgages, as well as detailed provisions regarding the process of foreclosure
and realization of the subject of a mortgage. Detailed procedures for notice and opportunity to appeal will provide necessary safeguards to mortgagors.
Conclusion
The
agricultural sector
and the
rural land
undergone extensive reform, especially land
is
now farmed by
in the last three years.
private farmers, and
producing collective farms.
system in the Kyrgyz Republic have
it
Half of the arable
appears that these farmers are out-
Individual rights to land have been strengthened
and broadened so that many farmers have secure, long-term, and transferable land rights. Continued application of the legal reforms under
way
in the
Kyrgyz
Republic, however, will be essential to expanding the benefits, of tenure security
and the opportunity to participate in a land market
The
to
more and more farmers.
land-related laws that are expected to be adopted in 1999
would be
steps
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization toward the
this end,
in the
and would be important additions
Kyrgyz Republic.
If
implemented
Kyrgyz Republic
to the land
reform process
experiences in a variety of other countries. The Kyrgyz Republic has as other countries
way
economy
many of the
of the former Soviet Union, and the draft laws
resolve these concerns, not from the standpoint of rather in a
in
can provide a model for
well, these laws
other transition economies because they are a compilation of market
same concerns
109
that provides choice
command and
control, but
and process.
For example, the Land Code does not allow for confiscation of land (withdrawal without payment) for non-use, but rather calls for notice, opportunity to appeal, and forced sale. The Land to agricultural land into private
for purchase,
sale,
gift,
Code
an
also converts use rights
ownership rights by operation of law, and allows
and lease of
land.
No
unreasonable restrictions or
requirements are placed on landowners or users.
The Mortgage Law deals with foreclosure on
agricultural land
farmers a chance to appeal the default up to the time of the
sale.
the right of first refusal for lease or purchase of the land if the
by allowing
Farmers have
new owner
or sells the land within a given period of time. Moreover, the Mortgage
leases
Law
has
detailed provisions regarding notice of default and procedures for foreclosure
and realization of the subject of a mortgage.
The Peasant Farm Law and Law on Cooperatives both allow of land in kind so that
new
farmers continue to have the ability to try different
legal arrangements for farming.
Both laws provide
enterprise and do not place all of the single
for withdrawal
power over
a structure for the
the enterprise in the hands of a
Neither law restricts the rights of private farmers to
leader.
farm
make
appropriate choices regarding their land and their business.
As
in all countries, there
Following
is
a
list
is
always need for improvements to legal
of specific recommendations for continued
rules.
efforts in the
Kyrgyz Republic: •
The
oblast- and ra/on-level centers for land and agrarian reform should
be strengthened and supported so that they can more actively disseminate information regarding the rights of private land use holders and resolve conflicts
between local administrations or farm leaders and individual •
designed
A to
public
information
program should be
inform land shareholders about
right holders.
implemented which
their rights,
is
about the risks and
benefits of particular land share transactions, and about the value of registration.
no
Renee Giovarelli
Members of reorganized
•
state
farms should not be required to pay for the
non-land property they receive as a property share. collective farms
and
members of
Currently,
farms are treated differently in terms of property shares.
state
All farm debt that existed or exists at the time of reorganization of a
•
collective or state
farm should be written off
for enterprises that voluntarily
reorganize into private farm enterprises. Moreover, no debt should be collected against the productive assets of a farm that
is
in the process of
whole-farm
reorganization.
The requirement
•
for demarcation
ground should be eliminated
map
or
on the
ready to withdraw
expensive and does not appear to
is
farm reorganization.
The
• listed
until a family or several families is
Land share demarcation
the land share in kind. assist in
of land shares on a
registrar should
on a land share
the land in
list
certificate in the registration
common, and
rights. Listing all
be required to
those
members who
names of land share holders
the
names of family members
book. Each family
member owns
are not listed have less secure land
also provides third-party notice.
Regulations and forms for purchase and sale transactions should be
•
adopted to
facilitate
regulations and
land transactions.
Where
land transactions are unfamiliar,
model forms help people understand and recognize what makes
an equitable agreement.
Notes
1
.
RDI
rural land
is
a nonprofit research and consulting organization specializing in issues of
law and policy. RDI has
in twenty-nine countries 2. in the
rural fieldwork
and government advisory experience
of Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Kathleen Braden, “Kyrgyzstan,” in Environmental Resources and Constraints
Former
Soviet Republics, ed. Philip R. Pryde (Boulder,
CO: Westview
Press,
1995).
Food and Agriculture Organization, 1996 Production Yearbook, Vol. 50
3.
(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1997). This figure includes actively 4.
engaged
in agriculture
Figures are for
and
1994.
their
Braden, “Kyrgyzstan,”
p.
Food and Agriculture Organization,
313.
persons
non-working dependents.
Database (12 January 1998), online version, www.fao.org. 5.
all
in
FAOSTAT
1
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
6.
Braden, “Kyrgyzstan,”
p.
308. Kirghizia
in the
became
Kyrgyz Republic
1 1
a republic of the Soviet
Union
in 1936. 7.
Reuters North American Wire (22 December 1995), on LEXIS.
The Council of People’s Deputies was
8.
Soviet
the
name
the
for
local
administration at both the raion and oblast levels. 9.
Law on
Peasant Farms (2 February 1991).
10. For further discussion
of the governmental structure for oversight of the land
reform, see section IV of this report.
Decree No. VII-369, “On Urgent Measures
Presidential
11.
Realization of the
Laws of the Kyrgyz Republic Regulating Land
November
Relations in Agnculture” (10
Government Resolution
12.
on
Farms and Other
Privatization of State
to
Secure the
Relations and Other
1991). Peculianties
the
of the
Destatization
and
State (Municipal) Agricultural Enterprises in the
Kyrgyz Republic (13 January 1992). 13. Presidential
(10
March
Decree on the National Land Fund of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan
1992) provided
as
details
manner of
the
to
NLF’s formation,
the
distnbution, and use. 14. Point
Land Fund
1
of the regulations attached to the Presidential Decree on the National
(see note 13) provided that the
amount of land could be increased or
decreased in certain regions where a majonty of the population consisted of one ethnic group. 15. Presidential
Decree on Measures for Further Implementation of the Land and
Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (10 December 1992). 16.
See section IV of this report for further discussion of rural committees. The 13
January 1992 Government Resolution on the Rural Committees on Land Reform
Republic
of
Kyrgyzstan
established
rural
committees,
which
were
in the
farm-level
committees given authonty over intra-farm reorganization. Rural committees are essentially the executive branch of the village.
The
rural council,
which was formerly called the
the village council,
is
the legislative
body
at the
the rural council and the rural committee are are used interchangeably. In
1996 the
government” (ailokmotu), and village
They
this
rural
are also referred to as rural soviets.
rural soviet
and
is
sometimes called
village-farm level. Often, in practice,
made up of the same people and
committee’s
term will be used
name was changed
to “village
in this report to distinguish the
government from the farm reorganization committees, which
rural committees.
the terms
are also called
Renee Giovarelli
112
17.
Kyrgyz Constitution, Article
4.
While the purchase and
allowed, the purchase and sale of land use rights Presidential
Reform
of land
not
is
allowed by presidential decree. See
Decree No. 23, “On Measures to Enhance (Deepen) Land and Agrarian
in the
Kyrgyz Republic” (22 February 1994).
18. Presidential
Decree No. 23, see note
17.
Decree on Measures for Further Development and State Support
19. Presidential
of Land
is
sale
And Agranan Reform
in the
Kyrgyz Republic
(3
November 1995) extended
the forty-nine-year use rights for agricultural land to ninety-nine years. 20. See Presidential Decree No. 23, see note 17, at §§ 2-3.
2 1 The decree authorized land plot users and land share owners to .
members of their
or shares immediately to other sale to
non-members
17,at§§2, 22.
1
plots
collective or state farms, but prohibited
January 1995. See Presidential Decree No. 23, note
6.
The maximum
agriculture, limit
until after
sell their
25 ha for
was abolished
of land that could be held was 20 ha for intensive
size
less intensive agriculture,
in
November 1995 by
Further Development and State Support of
and 30 ha for mountainous
areas. This
the Presidential Decree on Measures for
Land and Agrarian Reform
in the
Kyrgyz
Republic (3 November 1995). 23. See section
IV of this
of Agriculture and Food 24.
is
report for further discussion of this issue.
now the
The Ministry
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.
Government Resolution No. 345, “On the National Land Fund” (19
May
Government Regulation on the Procedure
Land
1994). 25.
for Determining Citizens’
Shares and for Issuance of Certificates Containing Land Share Use Right, adopted by Resolution No. 632 (22 August 1994), addressed the issue of
who would
allocate the
land by providing that with the consent of the raion administration, the Ministr>^ of Agriculture could delegate to the village government the right to lease out
Following
this regulation, the
that
NLF
yields,
7,
“On
the National
Land Fund”
(8
February 1995),
land could not be divided into land shares unless the raion
administration, with permission
of (a) raising
land.
Board on Land and Agrarian Reform under the Ministry
of Agriculture passed Decision No.
which provided
NLF
making an
from the
MOAF, made
such a proposal for the purpose
enterprise profitable, increasing production of beef
and
milk, increasing employment; or (b) allocating shares to workers in specified fields of the social sphere. Other land in the fund could be temporarily leased to peasant farms
with permission from the village government.
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
26.
in the
Kyrgyz Republic
Government regulation adopted by Resolution No. 632, see note
1
13
25.
27. Individual land shares vary in size from 0.3 to 1.5 ha.
28. in the
Government Regulation on Categones of Subjects of Agncultural Enterpnses
Kyrgyz Republic (adopted by Government Resolution No. 158, “On Adoption of
the Regulation of Categones of Subjects of Agncultural Enterpnse in the Kyrgyz
Republic” (12 Apnl 1996). 29. There appears to be
no category
30. Presidential Decree of 3
100—150 ha of land.
for
November
31. Presidential Decree No. 327,
1995, see note 19.
“On Measures Aimed
at
Introduction of Market
of Land Use Rights and on Establishment of the Market Credit System (25
November 32.
Agnculture”
in
1996).
Government Resolution No.
Market for Land Use Rights”
14,
“On Measures Aimed
(9 January 1998)
at
Introduction of the
and accompanying regulations, “On
Republican and Raion Executive Commissions on Sale of Rights to Use Land Plots of the Agricultural
Land Redistribution Fund under
the Ministry of Agriculture and Water
of the Kyrgyz Republic” and “Temporary Regulations on Auction Sales of Rights to
Use Land
Plots of the Agncultural
Land Redistribution Fund under
the Ministry of
Agnculture and Water of the Kyrgyz Republic” (9 January 1998).
Land Ownership
33. Presidential Decree on the Concept of Introduction of Private to the
Kyrgyz Republic (13 October 1998).
34. Presidential Decree
No. 23, see note
35. Presidential Decree on the Rural
17.
Committees on Land Reform
in the
Republic
of Kyrgyzstan (13 January 1992). Rural committees were essentially the executive branch of government council,
at
the level of the old state and collective farms.
which was formerly called the
rural soviet
“village council” {sel’skii soviet, aiyl kenesh), level.
Though
in principle these
- were conceived
two
entities
-
and sometimes refened
the legislative
is
body
at
The
rural
to as the
the village-farm
the rural committee and the rural council
as separate entities, often in practice, the rural council
and the
rural
committee are composed of the same people and the terms are used interchangeably. 1996 the this
rural committee's
term will be used
name was changed
to "village
In
government" (mlokmotu), and
in this report to distinguish the village
government from the
committees that served to implement the farm reorganization program
until
rural
1996.
36. Presidential Decree No. 23, see note 17. 37.
The author
participated in fieldwork in
September 1998. Earlier findings are reported
May and June
in
1995, October 1997, and
Robert Mitchell, “On Development of
Renee Giovarelli
114
Agrarian Reform in Kirghizia” (paper presented to the National Conference on
Agrarian Reform, Tamga, Kyrgyz Republic, 6 June 1995, transcript on
Development
also
Institute;
Roy
L. Prosterman
Reform and Farm Restructuring
in
and Leonard
J.
Rolfes
Jr.,
“Recommendations
Roy
with Rural Jr.,
“Land
the Republic of Kyrgyzstan” (January 1994);
Timothy Hanstad, “Protecting the Kyrgyz Republic's Land Resources,” Together (Spring 1994);
file
L. Prosterman,
12 Surviving
in
Timothy Hanstad, and Leonard
Reform
to Assist the Agrarian
in the
J.
Kyrgyz Republic,”
Rolfes in
RDI
Reports on Foreign Aid and Development, No. 75 (July 1992). 38.
Government Regulation on Rural Committees on Land and Agrarian Reform,
adopted pursuant to Government Resolution No. 148 (25 March 1994). 39. In fact, in
many instances
the former head of the collective or state farm
is
also
the head of the village government.
40.
Annex
to Decision
for Implementation
of the Board No.
Government Resolution on Committee
3,
of Land Reform and for Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises
(23 January 1995).
James
41.
Delehanty
and
Kathryn
Rasmussen,
“Land Reform and Farm
Restructuring in the Kyrgyz Republic,” in Post Soviet Geography, Vol. 36 (1995), pp.
571-572. 42. While
Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632
stipulates that each family will receive a certificate, in certificate
has been issued to every
member of the
and Water Resources does not recognize these 43. rural
The minimum
size requirement is 5
family.
Chu
(see note 25)
Oblast, a land share
The Ministry of Agriculture
certificates.
ha
in all cultivation
zones (and
1
ha for
and suburban vegetable operations). 44. Included in those that stay together are enterprises that divide minimally into
two or three
still-large entities in
operation. Thus, in 1991 there
which each maintains the collectivized mode of
were 470
collective
and
state enterprises,
and by October
1997 that number had increased to 720 (many of the original 470 had broken up completely by then, but in some cases the
now
nearly landless and assetless collectives
had retained a technical existence and may have been counted
in the 720).
45. This stands in sharp contrast to land reform in Russia,
where very
little
whole-
farm breakup has occurred and therefore peasant farm creation only occurs when individuals or families leave the larger farm. In the Russian case, the pace of formation
of private farm enterprises has been very slow. 46. Presidential Decree No. 23, see note 17.
Land Reform and Farm Reorganization
47. Part
Kyrgy^z Republic
in the
115
of the Civil Code of the Kyrgyz Republic provides some rules as to
I
division and disposition of shared and joint ownership property; however, these rules
do not adequately protect individual shareholders. Article 276 provides
that
the
property of a peasant farm enterpnse will be held in joint ownership unless otherwise agreed. Article
272 requires consent
for disposition of property held in joint ownership,
but does not require wntten consent. 48.
Land
Temporary Government Resolution No. 480, “On Lease
Plots
Land Users of
to
from the Land Redistnbution Fund of Agnculture Belonging
to the Ministry
of Agriculture and Water Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic” (27 August 1997). 49.
Government Resolution No.
14,
“On Measures Aimed
at
Introduction of the
Market of Land Use Rights” (9 January 1998) and accompanying regulations, “On Republican and Raion Executive Commissions on Sale of Rights to Use Land Plots of the Agricultural
Land Redistribution Fund under
the Ministry of Agriculture and Water
of the Kyrgyz Republic” and “Temporary Regulations on Auction Sales of Rights
Use Land
Plots of the Agricultural
Land Redistribution Fund under
to
the Ministry of
Agriculture and Water of the Kyrgyz Republic” (9 January 1998). 50.
51.
Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632, see note Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632
owed by
provides that consideration must be given to the debt
25.
(see note
25)
the enterpnse in
determining the value of the property shares. 52.
Kyrgyz Republic, Parliamentary Law on
of Rights to
Registration
State
Immovable Property (22 December 1998). 53. In Russia, the federal government issued specific procedures for the purchase
and
sale
of small
market developed.
plots.
These procedures
facilitated transactions
Over one million small
plots
and a very active
changed hands
in
1996.
The
procedures were contained in Government Resolution No. 503, “The Procedures of
Purchase and Sale of Land Plots by Russian Federation Citizens” (30
May
54.
The pnvate holder had ninety-nine-year use nghts
55.
Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632, see note
56. In Russia, lack of access to machinery
is
at that
time.
daunting to individuals
leave large collective farms and farm independently and
is
1993).
25.
who want
to
often cited as a reason for
not withdrawing from the collective farm. 57.
Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632,
58. Service centers charge approximately the cost of fuel.
see note 25.
200 soms per hectare
to
plow, including
Renee Giovarelli
116
59.
One
service center
RDI
researchers visited
was an exempt
enterprise that
still
held 370 ha and produced specialized seeds. 60. While collateral factor.
is
an important factor in the lending decision,
it is
not the only
Other factors include the amount of the loan, the direct and indirect price
(interest rate or tied
buying and selling
deals), the duration
specific information concerning the ability or likelihood of credit history, reputation, ties to the locality,
of the loan, borrower-
repayment (such as past
non-farming income), general information
pertaining to large groups of borrowers such as forecasts of product prices, the costs of
obtaining relevant information, and the relative administrative costs in proportion to the size
of the loan. See Gershon Feder
et ah.
Land
Policies
and Farm Productivity
Thailand (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); and John Bruce,
Land
Indigenous Tenure Systems Constrain Agricultural Development?” in
Agrarian Systems, eds. Thomas Bassett and Donald
Crummey
in
in
“Do
African
(Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1993). 61.
Hans
Binswanger
and
Mark Rosenzweig,
“Behavioral
and
Material
Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture,” in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 22,
No. 510 (October 1985).
62. Evidence rates
from informal
credit markets in
Myanmar
of interest are about two-thirds higher when not secured with
Development Bank, Pradumna Rana, and Naved Hamid, to
indicates that customary
Market Economies: The Asian Approach, Vol.
eds.,
3 (Oxford:
From
collateral.
Asian
Centrally Planned
Oxford University Press,
1996), p. 208. 63. John Bruce, “Indigenous Tenure Systems,” in
Land
in
African Agrarian
Systems, p. 53. 64. Minister of Agriculture, conversation with author, October 1997.
5 / Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural
Development
Uzbekistan^
in
Jim Butterfield
As with
all
agricultural
countries of the former Soviet sector
is
going
Union and Eastern
through a
bloc, Uzbekistan's
post-communist
difficult
transition.
Decollectivization and privatization have proven challenging, and the
government has been inconsistent the sector’s
policy,
market
transition.
in determining
The
but by the nature of the
transition
transition
sector
must cope with an and climate,
is
how
and
how
affected not only
Uzbekistan’s
well.
as
fast
saline soil
Uzbek
far to press
by
official
agricultural
and groundwater, very high
population densities, the legacy of Soviet planning and cropping profiles, and a fresh water shortage that has already resulted in the ecological disaster of the
Aral Sea. Uzbekistan’s agricultural economy nation.
It
accounts for over one-third of
is
crucial to the overall welfare of the
GDP, about 40
percent of employment,
and nearly 60 percent of export earnings. Sixty percent of the population rural areas,
many of them underemployed and
massive campaign
By
to
poor.
After
lives in
World War Two
a
extend the hectarage of irrigated arable land was launched.
1990, the amount of arable land was extended from 2.46 million ha to 4.28
million, an increase of
74 percent.
This was accomplished
at a
supply Uzbekistan’s water - the the point that the Aral
heavy
Amu
cost;
outflow from the two rivers that
Dar’ia and the Syr Dar’ia
Sea receded, creating a man-made
- diminished
to
With cotton
disaster.
considered a strategic crop and increasingly high production quotas imposed on the republic during the Soviet era, monocultural cropping practices resulted in soil
degradation and grossly inefficient water management practices. Unraveling
Soviet-era
institutions
agricultural sector. in its
commitment
and practices
is
essential
to
reforming Uzbekistan’s
Yet the Uzbek post-communist government has been to
even
its
own
erratic
goal of ordered, gradual transition.
Several conditions have served as a starting point for the government’s transition planning
most
and future agricultural development.
significant crop in the country
First,
cotton
and a major contributor
to
is
by
far the
Uzbekistan’s
Jim Butterfield
118
As
export ledger.
such, the government considers
will continue to take
a strategic
commodity and
measures into the foreseeable future to ensure high levels of
production. Second, food security that end,
it
a high priority for the
is
Uzbek government;
heavy emphasis has been placed on wheat as an import
(the “grain
to
substitute crop
independence” campaign). Third, agriculture virtually does not exist
without irrigation. Fully 97 percent of arable land under cultivation Efficient use
and maintenance of water resources are crucial
to
is
irrigated.
growth
in the
sector as well as the long-term quality of life of the population. Finally, untying the knot of sixty years of collectivized agriculture will not occur overnight.
Uzbek government has committed
itself to
avoiding what
it
The
perceives to be the
serious decline experienced in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia after rapid
reforms in the agricultural sector by taking a more gradual approach to decollectivization and land reform. for policy
Each of these conditions serves
as a context
and planning.
Uzbekistan’s properly cared
for,
often
is
has
sector
agricultural
Many
fertile.
enormous
potential.
Land,
crops, especially fruits, nuts, and
vegetables, are well suited for the agro-climatic conditions.
The countryside has
an adequate, relatively young labor force in contrast to the European former Soviet Union. Vigorous trade
is
when
carried
states
on with Russia, the other
of the
states
of
Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and China.
Yet the gradual and inconsistent course adopted by the Uzbek leadership has resulted in reforms that have
privatized and
many
been slow and uneven. Collective farms have been
reorganized into stock companies with shares. The right to
incorporate as a private farmer has been established, and
have opted to do
so.
Yet land reform remains
some 20,000 people
virtually nonexistent with the
notable exception of leasing rights.
This
chapter
will
survey Uzbekistan's
including land and enterprise agricultural practices
reform.
efforts
in
agricultural
After briefly examining
and trends, and environmental
soil,
reform, water,
issues, the balance will
be
devoted to measures taken - and not taken - to reform agricultural enterprises
and land tenure.
Agricultural Sector Reform
and Rural Development
in
Uzbekistan
19
1
Water, Irrigation, and Drainage
Soil,
Soil quality varies, with the best in the wilowats (provinces) of the Fergana
Valley, Tashkent, and Samarkand, and the poorest in Karakalpakstan and the central wilowats of Syr Dar’ia
of
soil
gradation (a Soviet-era system), the republic average
percent of
Uzbek
that the split
Humus Just
soil is in the top four quintiles
low, and monoculture cropping has diminished
it
is
cannot exist without water, so
Soil
compaction from heavy machinery
Saline groundwater in
away
drained
is
of the grading system, and of is
agriculture
fertilizers.
59. Nearly 100
is
between the top 40 percent and the next 40 percent
content
as
ditches
and Jizzakh. Based on the Uzbek 100-point scale
some
is
it
about
even
even.'^
further.
cannot exist without
also a serious problem.^
areas leaches up and reduces soil quality if not
properly. Maintenance of saline water collectors and drainage
as important in these areas as the irrigation networks are.
Virtually any specialist
Uzbek academic
in
agencies will acknowledge that water agricultural sector
is
management
break
infrastructure
(the
to
or
institutions
government
management must be reformed
have any chance of prospering. Issues related
down latter
three
into
related
to
categories:
management, and governance (including associations and water markets).
The
of
desalinization
and
irrigation soil),
to
if
the
water
drainage
water resources
the potential of both self-governing
irrigation infrastructure has
examined both by domestic and international
been carefully
experts, in part because of the
attention paid to the Aral Sea disaster. Indications are preliminary, but not surprising: in the six years after independence,
The
desalinization
has
infrastructure
international experts with the exception of a
examining the
feasibility
river. Saline soil
much of it received
is
in decline.
less
attention
World Bank planning
project that
of building an outflow canal paralleling the
problems are significant
in
many
from
areas: the Aral
is
Amu Dar'ia Sea area of
Karakalpakstan and Khorezm; the central wilowats of Bukhara, Jizzakh, and Syr Dar'ia; parts
of Surkan Dar'ia and Navoi wilowats", and the central Fergana
Valley. Karakalpakstan ’s saline soil is
is
the result of the Aral Sea desiccation
being addressed by the multi-government Aral Sea
assistance.
But elsewhere
Uzbekistan’s topography basins
the is
problem
such that
with high water tables
is
initiative
and
with international
unrelated to the Aral Sea’s desiccation.
many zones
suitable for agriculture he in
and saline groundwater. The natural saline
groundwater leaches up through the
soil,
especially under the compaction of
Jim Butterfield
120
heavy salt
tractors.
During the Soviet
drainage systems were built to divert the
era,
water away from the fields and drain
it
into salt reservoirs.
Drainage systems for desalinization come in three types: underground pipes beneath
running
the
(“collectors”) lining the edges of fields.
The
latter are in
open ditches
and
pumps,
with
pipes
vertical
soil,
noticeable disrepair,
overgrown with reeds and with sides occasionally collapsing inward. The condition of the underground discharge pipes
deteriorating
is
lack of
for
maintenance.^
Water management practices
community
output,
are a crucial factor in addressing agricultural
water
health,
and
security,
Problems abound in maintaining the
network of
intricate
troughs, and pipes. Nineteen percent of irrigation
another 2 percent the pipes
is
through pipes. ^ The rest
and cement troughs
is
Much
not metered.^
One district)
is
Long furrows
norm
for the tail
by excessive watering
well. Preliminary
more head
is
by earthen
canals.
Leakage from
as half the water diverted into
at the
much
longer than
canals, or to take
it
is
g
optimal. at the tails
caused by the fact that underwatering
head often
recommendations were
(although considerably more significant
is
end of long furrows, and attempts
to
is
the
compensate for
result in overwatering at the tail as
to either shorten the furrows
and build
one step further and develop a staggered watering
system based on division of the
field into ninths.
so
than the
manage
The former
current
change in labor allocation, while the
require altered labor allocations to irrigation
through cement troughs and
head and irregular watering
result in overwatering at the
of the furrows. The irregularity
this
irrigation ditches,
study of irrigation systems in central Uzbekistan (Bulungur Tuman, or
noted that furrow length in local fields
expected
problems.
through seepage, evaporation, and tail-end waste.
is
of the flow
is
common. As much
irrigation channels
lost
is
environmental
is
less efficient
system) but requires no
latter is
more
efficient but will
the staggered schedule. Bulungur’s
system operates on twenty-four-hour increments, another factor that
leads to overwatering.
Only recently has water management the dual factors of limited supply
There
how
is
in
Uzbekistan taken into consideration
and the concomitant
effect
on
the environment.
increased awareness of the importance of efficiency, but
to build the institutions to achieve
are not optimal, nor are
management
it.
little
idea of
Operation and maintenance standards
practices designed to achieve
maximum
Agricultural Sector Reform efficiency.''
part
economics of the ministry
in
Water resources and and Uzbek
action dilemmas
ownership.
Uzbekistan
121
is
sufficient
convinced
who
set them.
that the threat
of potential collective
evidence of the necessity of continued state
While few Uzbeks accept
assistance of a
officials
in
the water infrastructure remain the property of the
specialists are
associations,'"' at least
the viability of self-governing water
one experiment was conducted from 1996-1998 with the
TACIS
Water markets
group.
of Agriculture and Water Resources
USAID
in
The weaknesses of operation and maintenance standards stem
from poor training
state,
and Rural Development
is
are another matter; the Ministiy^
sufficiently interested to
training project to address water policy
and markets.
have invited a In fact, private
farmers are already required to pay for their water usage where
metered, although they often don’t
know
the costs until after harvest.
it
can be
Even when
metered, charges are not always applied, and in any event they don’t apply to the large users.
Herein
lie
most of the obstacles
to
a water market:
technical
problems (metering and regulating flow), enforcement problems, and a bias toward large producers.
Crops
Crops are dominated
in
Uzbekistan by cotton and, more recently, wheat. Cotton
production dates back centuries before the arrival of Russian influence, but value as a strategic crop has risen only in the
last three
decades. In 1994 fully 44
Wheat and
percent of irrigated land was planted to cotton.
its
other grain production
increased significantly after 1994 due to increased emphasis reflected in state orders and on the government’s campaign for “grain independence,” an import substitution strategy
begun
hectarage was 53 percent higher that figure in actual output
1995 grain production measured in
in 1997. Indeed,
was 68
it
had been
was
percent.'^ This
in 1991, at the
and the corresponding
expense of cotton (down
13 percent in hectarage and 15 percent in production) and vegetables
percent in production). Rice
is
also a
(down 19
key product, cultivated principally
in the
western provinces. Sugar beets are grown almost exclusively on private plots for fodder, although the government signaled
its
intent to
emphasize sugar beet
production in 1997.'^ The Ministry of Agriculture requested a report from
European
specialists
examining the
viability
of sugar beets in Uzbekistan, and
determined to increase sugar beet production for import substitution purposes
Jim Butterfield
122
(but not for fodder). Fruits, vegetables, and nuts are particularly suited to
Uzbekistan’s agro-climatic conditions, but currently this potential sufficiently exploited. In fact
Bank and
may be
development First, the
to
stating
that
horticulture
Uzbekistan’s best comparative advantage in agriculture.
government’s campaign for grain independence
and opportunities for
be temporary,
not being
donor agencies, including the Asian Development
World Bank, have gone on record
the
is
widely thought
may be
shifting production
term, not longer. Second, in the past attempts have been
is
made
in the near
to shift
production to horticulture, but severe limitations, especially upstream, large-scale horticulture unviable.
packaging, and transportation are
Storage all
facilities
some
made
(especially refrigerated),
grossly inadequate for marketing fresh
produce, especially in the faraway markets of urban Russia and other countries
Processing plants are too few in number and of
of the former Soviet Union. insufficient
standards to mass-produce processed fruits
export. Thus,
and bazaars
most horticulture production
if not
Fertilizer
usage in the
fertilizers are at
third.
consumed by last
is
and vegetables for
marketed through
street
markets
the growers or bartered locally.
seven years has dropped dramatically. Chemical
one-quarter of their 1990 level, and mineral fertilizers at one-
This can be traced to the financial condition of farms and the deterioration
of application equipment. Imported agrochemicals are are expensive. correctly.
Those farms
that
now
available, but they
can afford them are reportedly not using them
Monoculture practices are also a problem; crop rotation schedules
could help reduce the need for
fertilizers.
Livestock
Livestock production in Uzbekistan declined precipitously after independence. Factors regularly cited are insufficient quality and availability of fodder and poor
animal husbandry practices on private farms and plots. The the livestock sector. In
latter are crucial to
1996 private plots and farms were responsible for 77.5
percent of Uzbekistan’s meat production (up from 72 percent in 1995), 84
percent of milk production (an increase of 8 percent in one year), and 63 percent
of egg production (a 5 percent increase in one
year).^"^
Fodder production declined by 30 percent and 1995.
in the four years
between 1991
This was an unintended consequence of the campaign for grain
Agricultural Sector Reform
and Rural Development
in
Uzbekistan
independence. This has further undermined meat production, and
grown
thin or
been slaughtered. Measures
to
123
have
cattle
reverse the decline in fodder
production, including both allocation of land to peasant farms for the expressed
purpose
of fodder
and the
production^^ were
production ineffective.^^
of demands
relaxing
Artificially
low prices
for
for
grain
meat and dairy
products undermine attempts to create more investment in livestock.
Environmental Issues Associated with Agriculture
The environmental most
situation in Uzbekistan ranges
visible catastrophe, of course,
from poor
to catastrophic.
The
the desiccation of the Aral Sea, a direct
is
product of water diversion to increase arable land under irrigation. Scientists estimate
the
that
water lost through poor water management practices in
Uzbekistan constitutes 80 percent of the annual shortfall of the outflow of. the
two main
Khorezm
rivers feeding the Aral Sea.'"
Dust storms
(the affected areas adjacent to the Aral Sea)
populated areas; the same winds salinate vast less catastrophic, yet
Fungicides,
tracts
Karakalpakstan and
in
blow
of land
salty dust into
in rural areas.
Other
important environmental issues abound in the rural sector.
pesticides,
herbicides,
and
other
chemicals
are
often
used
improperly, resulting in groundwater pollution that taints drinking water.^^ Poor
farming practices create erosion. Heavy tractors and excessive plowing result in soil
compaction - especially
in subsoil
- and
less
water retention during spring
seedbed preparation.
An
extensive and long-term record of soil quality for every tuman has been
kept for years. Soil scientists are aware of the benefits of crop rotation and have
long suggested rotating cotton with lucerne, perennial grasses, and other fodder crops, but export needs and import substitution strategies have driven the current
crop structure.
Land Reform
It is
in the context
of
all
the preceding issues
-
water,
soil,
crops, livestock, and
environmental concerns - that land and enterprise reform must take place. Land
and enterprise reform - specifically the privatization of each -
is
a crucial
and
Jim Butterfield
124
necessary step toward market reform in the agricultural sector. While there has
been marked progress priority
in privatizing enterprises, land
reform has not been a high
of the Uzbek government.
Two
reasons explain the lack of progress in land reform. The
same hesitancy
to allow land to
become
a
commodity
first is
the
can be found in most
that
of the countries that were part of the Soviet Union. Attitudes toward land
among
privatization in Russia, for example, are conservative even
stands to benefit
most from land privatization and a land market - namely,
Land
farmers.
private
“commodified”
a
lest
is
A
understood
as
resource
a
of owners
succession
underutilized, or neglected.
wealth.
the group that
allows
must not be
that
it
The second reason concerns
be
to
the distribution of
land market would inevitably allow successful producers
successful speculators
-
accumulate large
to
tracts
mistreated,
of land while
-
as well as
less successful
producers would be relegated to the role of agricultural wage labor. Given Uzbekistan’s
high
population
policy-makers
density,
high
fear
levels
unemployment along with vast numbers of poor tenant farmers. Equity
of
issues
underscore land reform policy side by side with the priority of increasing
and
agricultural production, productivity,
The
attitudes
efficiency.
toward land reform are reflected in the
legislation.
On
1
July
1998 a new comprehensive Land Code came into effect in Uzbekistan. Enacted
by
the Olii Majlis (Parliament)
efficient in replacing
This
is
not,
its
on 30
Soviet-era
Land Code than has
however, because the Uzbek government
regarding land. Instead, the restrictive land code Majlis and President Islam
on
Karimov
are of one
is
the Russian Federation.
more reform minded
is
an indicator that the Olii
mind on preserving
state controls
the dispensation of land.
Two Article
principles permeate the code. First, there
be no land market. The
to
16 of the all-important chapter regarding land as property indicates
unambiguously
that “land is the property
of the
state
sale or purchase, exchange, presentation as gift or
are a
is
of the code terms land part of the “overall wealth of the nation,” and
first line
few exceptions
and there is
proved much more
April, Uzbekistan
is
no basis
.
for the
.
and
mortgaging
to this stark statement, in general the
code
is
.
is
.
not subject to .”
While there
true to
its
word
development of a land market. The second principle
centralized control over land distribution. All
either in the
.
mechanisms
for dispensation are
hands of the hakims (administrators) of the various administrative
levels or are subject to their approval.
and Rural Development
Agricultural Sector Reform
The Land Code permits
the
Uzbekistan
in
125
of land plots both to legally
distribution
incorporated entities and to individuals in a myriad of forms. Only agricultural enterprises
—
specifically the large cooperatives
and shirkats^~
- may
have land
with permanent possession rights. Non-agricultural businesses, including wholly
owned
foreign companies,
may
One
use rights or by lease.
acquire land plots with permanent or temporary
curious exception, which contradicts the clause in
Article 16, awards land plots in the
and service businesses
at
form of private property
moment of
the
privatization.
to retail, wholesale,
There
provision, however, for acquiring land plots as private property retail,
is
no
when
parallel
starting a
wholesale, or service-oriented business.
The most common form of land tenure
for individuals
is
lifetime inheritable
possession. This includes plots for both housing and private gardens. Peasant
farms
may
lease land for not less than ten
possession rights
inheritable
and not more than
accorded as well
are
to
fifty years.
collective
Lifetime
vegetable
gardens, orchards, and vineyards.
Acquiring land plots,
if
not done through the privatization of enterprises,
done by petitioning the local hakim.
An
petitions for a housing or garden plot; this
he or she works, yet full
power
that loses
is
is
when
a
farmworker
done through the cooperative where
tuman hakim
subject to the
to rescind land tenure rights,
its
exception occurs
is
's
approval.
Hakims
also have
although the entity (person or business)
land has recourse to the courts for appeal. Notably, the hakim does
not need to use the courts to rescind tenure rights.
Rescinding tenure rights to the restrictions
on
may
utilization
occur for a host of reasons, mostly connected
of land
plots.
Every land plot has
a designated
usage that must be maintained (in extraordinary circumstances the code allows the possibility of changing to the
most
restrictions;
some
land’s designation). Agricultural land
some of
is
subject
the reasons that justify abrogation of tenure
rights are:
land
is
used for other than
2) land
is
not rationally utilized, as measured by yields lower than the norms
1)
for three years running
3) land
is
its
designated purposes;
(norms are based on the
used in such a way as
plot's soil quality);
to lead to a reduction
of the
fertility
of the
soil;
4) land lies unused for one year; 5) in the event
of the cessation of work relations according
to
which the land
Jim Butterfield
126 allotment was granted
(e.g., if
a peasant farm were to hire workers; since
all
workers on a peasant farm are required to be partners, hiring someone changes the
“work
Some
relations”).
of
the
more
of
clauses
liberal
Code
Land
the
grant
the
on
their
possessors/users/lessees full independence in conducting their activities
land (as long as such activities correspond to the land’s designated usage); the
whatever income
right to
is
generated on the land; the right to water (a key
provision for agricultural producers); and the right to use whatever resources are
on or under the surface - again,
accordance with designated usage.
if in
Individual landholders with lifetime inheritable possession rights their land
- another
contradiction with Article 16
- although
it’s
may mortgage not clear what
mortgageable value a plot could have in the eyes of a lending institution in the absence of any state
restricts
way
to generate cash
interference
into
specifically legislated instances
One
liberal clause in the
the
from
it.
A
activities
due process clause (Article 41) conducted on a land plot to
and procedures.
code provides
that land
usage will be conducted on
a paid basis. This sets the stage for usage fees and/or land taxes,
impute value to the land as a resource. practice indicates the
any more than
it
government
is
ready to seriously employ such measures
recognizes cooperatives
the “basic organizational-legal
with most of their
fruit
33
-
its
purposes the “creation of
forms of economic activity,” in a
all
essentially reconstituted collective farms
form of
are given special lease provisions
any time. Dekhan farms
-
one of
as
states
conditions of equal development of it
however, nothing in Uzbek
date,
has been prepared to charge for water rights or usage.
While the Land Code
clause
To
which could
later
-
as
agricultural production.” Peasant farms
and the opportunity
the family plots
to extend their holdings at
which currently provide the bazaars
and vegetables and much of their milk, eggs, and meat -
are nonetheless limited in size to .35
ha
if irrigated
and
.5
ha
if not.
Enterprise Reform
The government has been somewhat more reform.
Most of Uzbek
state farms, or
agriculture during the
liberal in
its
Communist
policy on enterprise
era
was organized
into
sovkhozes, and collective farms, or kolkhozes. The former were
Agricultural Sector Reform
and Rural Development
on which peasants (farmers) worked
large state-owned farms
111
Uzbekistan
in
wage
as
laborers.
There was no pretense of ownership as with the formally cooperative kolkhozes.
Both were targeted early
for transformation as
one of the
reform. In
1991 there were
remained.
All 971 kolkhozes were reorganized.^^
first
steps in enterprise
1,137 sovkhozes; by the end of 1995 only 16
The sovkhozes and kolkhozes were replaced by
several organizations.
Many
of them were reincorporated as collectives with cooperative ownership of the
and
business
Cooperative
assets.
Law on
according to the
collectives
were
(shirkats)
incorporated
Cooperatives passed on 14 June 1991 and the process
accelerated after additional legislation later that year.^^ Production profile to the
farm
The
rest
similar in
Uzbek
to determine, at least
form
to
according to the legislation.
new forms of farm
of the
enterprise are private. Peasant farms are
Russian peasant farms, although based on
legislation.^^
later, specifically
Peasant farmers are supposed to have lifetime, inheritable
possession rights to their land, although some have
have the right
to sublet all or part
it
on
lease.
cooperative from
whom
pay no land tax
for the first
They generally
of their land. Most owners are families or
extended families; some are partnerships. The land they receive
is
chosen by the
they request the right to establish a peasant farm. They
two years of operation;
after that,
land tax
minimal. As with the cooperatives, production decisions are formally the owners.
As of
up
is
left
the beginning of 1996, over 21,000 peasant farms
is
up
to
were
registered with the state.
Many vineyards and orchards have been privatized to take advantage of what may be Uzbekistan’s best comparative advantage in agricultural production. Irrigation
is
much more
efficient in vineyards
and orchards
of water usage/production output ratios) than in cotton and wheat markets of Siberian and Central Asian
(in
fields,
cities are ripe for exploitation.
terms
and the
From
the
passage of legislation in early 1994^^ until the end of 1995, 12,798 ha of orchards and 6,174 ha of vineyards were privatized. Land
on
inheritable possession with subletting rights dependent
original privatization agreement. profile for five years, after
Owners must maintain
which they are
free to
make
is
their
held on lifetime the terms of the
existing production
own
choices.
Livestock farms were singled out for privatization in decrees announced early 1993 and 1994.^^
Some 600
in
farms were auctioned to individuals or small
groups of farmers, either wholly or (usually)
in pieces,
by
the
end of
1995."^^
Others were privatized to workers as cooperatives with the stipulation that no
Jim Butterfield
128
more than
5 percent
state.
of livestock was required to establish a livestock
thirty units
ration of
of production would be sold to the
ha per
.3
cow was
allocated, resulting in
farm
A minimum of farm,"^^ A land
sizes of between 9
and 50
ha.
Leasing land for private farming became an option following the adoption of
Law on Land and
the
the
Law on
Leasing.
agreements between lessees and lessors. The
was
originally five years, but
feel
more secure and
invest
was
more
Terms vary and depend on
minimum
lease established
encourage farmers to
later increased to ten to
in the land they lease.
by law
By
February 1996 over
12,000 leased farms were in operation."^^ Personal plots increased in both size and number due to a conscious policy to
promote
Plot sizes tripled in size to an average of .24 ha, and the
them."^"^
number of
plots
increased 26
subsistence to plot owners, but in the bazaars in
percent."^^
make
their
way
the beginning of the reforms
plots provided
of its land.
By
into the
is
in production
Table
5.1.
only provide
plots'^^ to
- President Islam Karimov reported
40 percent of the country’s
both their
hard to exaggerate. In early 1991
agricultural production
that private
on 4.5 percent
1995 plots were producing 68 percent of meat, 81 percent of milk,
66 percent of potatoes, and 64 percent of vegetables. to 550,000, or
not
market both as barter and
urban areas. The importance of private
owners and the Uzbek agricultural economy
-
Personal plots
about double what
on private
plots
it
was
in 1991.
Hectarage had extended
Table 5.1 patterns the increase
from 1991-1995.
Private Plot Production as Percentage of Overall Production"^^
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
8.6
9.0
10.4
11.2
11.2
Potatoes
47.8
51.9
43.2
55.4
66.3
Vegetables
53.4
55.9
62.6
62.6
63.8
Meat
59.1
65.1
73.2
73.2
75.8
Milk
71.0
75.7
76.3
76.3
80.8
Eggs
37.2
49.1
55.1
58.1
65.6
Grain
Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural Development
in
Uzbekistan
1
29
While many enterprises have been privatized and many new, small private farms created, numerous factors prevent the
Two
are key: the absence of a land market
new
and
private sector
from flourishing.
the persistence of external control
over newly privatized enterprises.
None
ot the organizational forms noted above are permitted to
own
their
land with the exception of the private livestock farms, and then only the land
used
to
house the animals can be privately
permanent
minimum
possession
(cooperatives),
Thus, there land,
and land
used
(if
it
is
lifetime
that
stays
is
rest,
inheritable
land
is
given as
possession,
was
in the
in their if
or it
prohibited.
no efficient mechanism
cooperative collectives,
for successful farmers to acquire
possession of ineffective farmers
hands) or reverts back
to
is
more
either poorly
previous owner (the
its
private fanners cease operation).
by cooperatives remains poorly
however.
For the
ten-year lease. In no case can land be sold, although in most cases
can be leased. Subletting
Few
held."*^
Land poorly
utilized
utilized.
farmers and farm managers complain about lack of land ownership,
But
they
constantly
authorities. Collectives,
note
interference
in
business
decisions
by
whether one of the few remaining sovkhozes or one of
the formally private cooperatives, are required to fulfill state orders for products
- usually cotton and grain -
at
below-market prices.
Although
this directly
contradicts most of the legislation awarding decision-making rights with regard to
production and investment to the owners of virtually
the strategic im^portance of both cotton
continue relying on
command
farmers and leaseholders
is
to
planning, a remnant of the communist era. Peasant
who have
received their land from a collective (the fulfill its state orders.^'
In such cases
acting rationally, because the government has not reduced state
orders for those farmers.
types of enterpnses,
and wheat have led the government
majority) are required to help the collective the collective
all
who
leased their farms or have given
them up
to
peasant
Jim Butterfield
130
Although 20,093 peasant farms were reported
many were
1996,^^
in operation as
of January
not functioning as independent farming enterprises in the true
sense of the term.^^
Some
collectives
farms were created in their stead.
were disbanded and associations of peasant
Many
of these peasant farms do not have
(to lifetime inheritable possession) to their
title
land and do not have bank accounts.
Production targets for state orders are distributed by association leadership. In
do not function
actual practice, they
like
peasant farms
at all. In other
cases
formal peasant farms function more like sharecroppers, leasing land from
and functioning within
collectives
them.^"^ All inputs
and marketing channels are
within the larger collective, and production targets are largely determined by the collective
farm leadership or by Noting
peasant
individual
leaseholders.
comparison
to the larger cooperatives (a
critical
given to the collective, not the
state orders
the
farms'
marked
lower
productivity
in
contrast to Russia), one highly
study argued that the state provided no material, moral, organizational, or
financial resources to the farms.
In an experiment in Ellikkala
Tuman
Karakalpakstan Republic in
in the
western Uzbekistan, the entire tuman was reorganized into roughly peasant farms.
On
1,700
average, six to seven families farm roughly 10 ha of land.^^
Assets (not including land) were distributed according to time of service in the collective. In order to
avoid the chaos likely to be associated with such an abrupt
of Peasant Farms were created to provide supervision to
transition. Associations
the peasant farms. In
most cases the associations cover the
territory
of a previous
sovkhoz or kolkhoz, and the peasant farms are operated by what was formerly the workers’ brigades within the collective. While the peasant farms were organized
on the basis of the 1992 for peasant farms’
the associations
Law on
Peasant Farms - which provides the legal basis
independence in production and marketing decisions - in fact
make most of the
decisions regarding crop structure, inputs and
investment, water allocation, and marketing, including fulfilling state orders for
which peasant farms are ostensibly not supposed have
their
own bank
peasant farm in what
to
be responsible.
accounts; instead, the association keeps accounts for each is
generally a non-transparent system.
Since they are legally incorporated as peasant farms, included in the total of 20,993 reported by the
number of peasant farms that.^^
And
demand
yet,
They do not
state.
that function as they are
such farms are
Estimates by experts put the
supposed
to^^ at less
than half
according to Eckert and Elwert's 1996 field study, the potential
for peasant farms is considerably higher than current rates,
further
and Rural Development
Agricultural Sector Reform
Uzbekistan
in
131
suggesting obstruction on the part of authorities and the lack of a support infrastructure.^^
Another experiment,
down
similarly broken
one
this
in
Ak
Altin
Tuman
in
Syr Dar'ia Wilowat, was
There are 140
into peasant farms.
fully incorporated
peasant farms and another twenty-eight private livestock farms. All have their land, but the majority
are
more than
five
still
management
hierarchical
as to limit the
do not have individual bank accounts.^’ There
hundred small farms, which are referred
but which in fact do not have
peasant farms
to as
and bank accounts. As with Ellikkala Tuman,
titles
structures
were created and function
such a manner
in
independence of the private farms. The farms are subsumed within
150 Associations of Peasant Farms, which
The
Unions of Peasant Farms. the peasant farms.
agency
title to
that operates
much
subsumed within eleven
financed by a 20 percent profit tax on
latter are
At the top of
in turn are
the hierarchy
like the agricultural
is
an agrofirm, a coordinating
department of the former tuman
executive committee in the Soviet system of agricultural administration.
While both the Ellikkala and building
a private-sector
Ak
Altin experiments are touted as steps in
market economy
in
the
agriculture,
government’s
reluctance to allow the newly privatized farms to function without very high
- much of which functions in practice like the administrative system - holds out little promise for progress.
levels of managerial control
Soviet agricultural Financial
limitations
financial shape.
The
hinder private
first set
poorest financial condition.
were unprofitable
at
enterprises.
Many
started
in
poor
of sovkhozes to be privatized were the ones
Most of
the six hundred auctioned livestock farms
time of auction.
generally not available since there
in
Credit for any private
is little
in the
way of
enterprise
collateral with
is
no land
market. Crops in fields and storage are not acceptable for collateral so long as state orders
Payment
remain; credit agencies could not obtain them in lieu of repayment.^^
for
produce can only be made via bank transfer (an inflation-fighting
mechanism), so unless the enterprise has been able
which while sometimes except through
its
legal, is often obstructed
-
to it
open
a
bank account -
cannot receive payment
parent cooperative.
Service agencies are
still
few
in
number and can exact demanding terms
from producers - whether cooperatives or one of the smaller private
The former have one advantage over
enterprises.
the latter, however; they are required to
service the cooperatives before servicing other enterprises.^"^ enterprises (peasant, private livestock,
The smaller
and leased farms) are
last
private
in line for
Jim Butterfield
132
service and receive the toughest terms. Moreover, inputs such as machinery
supply and service are
Water
is
still
attuned to large-scale production.
allocated formally
by
the state through the water agencies of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management. But the agencies devolve responsibility to the cooperatives for allocation to the smaller private enterprises that
were divested from them. Naturally, the cooperatives generally see
own
water needs before allocating water to the other enterprises.
Land
quality varies,
and leased farms
livestock, is
signed)
up
is
and the choice of land given at the
peasant, private
to
time of their incorporation (or
to the collective to decide.
Often
it
is
to their
when
the lease
land which
is
more
remote^^ or of poorer quality.
Inputs, Processing, and Marketing
Agricultural significant
processing,
constraints
on growth
export-led growth.
including
between
inputs,
field
and in
There
marketing the is
and table range well
are
agricultural
much
in excess
spheres sector
potential;
that
provide
of Uzbekistan,
estimates
of losses
of 50 percent, especially in
horticulture. Exploiting Uzbekistan’s comparative advantage in horticulture will
not be easy, and the processing, storage, and transportation sectors will need considerable development in order to do so. Enterprises involved in providing inputs to agriculture and in processing
its
outputs have been almost fully privatized. Rejecting the voucher privatization
program of Russia,
the
Uzbek government gave preference
in privatization to
workers and managers while frequently holding a minority stake. Both foreign
and domestic
interests are eligible to
purchase the land
-
not just the assets
hold shares, and both have the right to
- of the
enterprises.^^
The most common mechanisms of enterprise and employee buyout, competitive tender, and sale
privatization
were management
(as privatization progressed)
open
of stock. Early privatization (1992-1993) was accomplished principally
through competitive tenders, and the most
common form
of incorporation was
closed joint-stock companies. In the period that followed (mainly 1994), larger enterprises
were privatized and generally incorporated as open-stock companies.
Twenty-five percent stakes were reserved for foreign investment and open sale
on the stock market, leaving both government and employee shares limited
to
25
Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural Development
Uzbekistan
in
133
percent each. In 1994 roughly nine hundred enterprises in the agricultural input
and output sectors were privatized.
Yet the enterprises rarely
act like independent agents. In
procurement and processing enterprises,
this is
not surprising; the government
maintains a 51 percent stake in these.^^ But elsewhere percent and sometimes none.
The
wheat and cotton
holds less than 25
it
managed by production
state’s interests are
associations, Soviet-era overseer institutions that have not lost their tendency to
manage through managers
(if
procurement inertial,
but
choosing
not
prices.
it
Such interference
diktat.
outright)
and
includes
commodity
In part the influence of the
from a
also stems
enterprises with acquiring
raw
production
setting
by
real role played
of
choice
influencing
and
targets
associations
is
the associations in assisting
and financing.
materials, markets,
In dealing with the very important input of agricultural machinery and
equipment, the Uzbeks have reached back to an organizational structure not seen in the Soviet
Union
since the late 1950s. Since 1997
tuman
regions have been experimenting with machine-tractor parks
Soviet era
called machine-tractor
equipment park
MTS),
or
that purportedly takes advantage
ensures proper maintenance. is
stations,
One
MTP
officials in
(MTP -
serves several large farms, and each farm
speak highly of the experiment,^’ arguing that
market mechanisms by providing services on contract is
not entirely persuasive since
to
provide timely service
or harvest on time.
73
is
MTPs
heavy-
of economies of scale and
required to pay for mechanized services either in cash or in kind.
officials
during the
centralized
a
some
to
it
Some
will serve to
local
enhance
any type of farm.
This
have no competition. Their sole motivation
a potential fine that
The experiment’s success
may is
be levied
if
they
fail to
plow
as yet impossible to assess.
Conclusion
Due
in part to the
market economy
much
Uzbek government’s
deliberately cautious transition to a
in the agricultural sector, the sector did not decline nearly as
as in other countries of the former Soviet Union.
decline
was no more than 10 percent
less than
pre-independence
countries
level of
levels.
But
much to do with the need to its viability as a major export of cotton - much of which goes to outside the former Soviet Union - as it does with reform policy. Thus,
Uzbekistan’s post-independence performance has as maintain
The lowest
Jim Butterfield
134
government has maintained a policy of massive cotton production
the
Uzbek
while increasing grain production to reduce imports.
cotton accounted for
about 17.3 percent of the world market in 1998—1999^'^ (and up its
export earnings in 1996)/^ and the government
share and consequent export earnings.
The harmful
is
to
40 percent of
loath to reduce
effects
for export
on
its
market
the soil caused
by
monocultural practices in cotton-producing areas and the high demand for water resources for the thirsty crop are dealt with palliatively and otherwise
left for the
future.
Another reason for Uzbekistan’s relatively good performance is
that
and
it
in agriculture
produces a number of important inputs, including agricultural chemicals
some
equipment.
Uzbekistan
is still
(Despite
well ahead of
reductions
agrochemical
in
some neighboring
countries.)
applications,
Not needing
to
import such inputs has relieved the state budget, and price controls keeps them relatively affordable for farms
whose own budgets
But while the government claims
on reasonable
caution, conservatism
methods are equally important
that
its
and the
factors.
are not very elastic.
emphasis on gradualism
inertia
It
is
based
of Soviet-style administrative
does
little
good
to
remove old
administrative structures after creating ostensibly independent enterprises similar
administrative
structures
are
And whatever
put in their place.
government’s intention, local and regional
officials
if
the
and the leaders of the new
agrofirms and associations are not hesitant to dictate
management decisions
to
privatized farms of any type.
Some
caution
certainly reasonable.
is
The government must move
carefully
with respect to land reform in order to balance priorities of equity, performance,
and environmental protection. With 23 million people, a population growth
rate
of 2.1 percent,^^ and only 4.28 million ha of irrigated arable land, population density
is
very high. The ratio of .22 ha per capita of irrigated land in 1970
declined to .18 ha per capita to Southeast
Asian
distribution
is
levels.
not
If
result.
Indeed, in the Fergana Valley
some measure of equity
maintained,
underemployment could in the
by 1996.
massive
of
levels
policy
of denying
near
and resource
unemployment
and
However, by leaving control of land dispensation
hands of large producers and the hakims, the
Soviet-era
in land
it is
virtually
everyone
state
has continued the
opportunities
for
private
farming. While poverty currently exists, the social infrastructure of the former state
farms system
still
ensures that people eat and are housed. With so
many
Agricultural Sector Reform
and Rural Development
in
Uzbekistan
135
people packed tightly together, high unemployment and increases in poverty levels could result in
Yet
massive suffering and prove explosive as well.
for this very reason that Uzbekistan cannot afford not to
it is
agricultural sector
more
efficient.
water to maintain that which the
most
efficient
is
There
make
its
no unexploited land and not enough
is
mechanism
exploited. Without a
to ensure that
producers acquire the land resources they need, increased
performance will prove elusive. With due consideration of such factors as
static
arable land area, a growing population, and an ecological disaster looming in the
background, the government
may
eventually conclude
it
has no choice but to
pursue a faster pace of reform.
Notes
1.
Philip
Micklin,
Askar Juraev, and Abdullah Bimukhamedov provided
logistical assistance in Uzbekistan. Ekaterina
and feedback on a draft of
this chapter.
My
Levintova provided research support
appreciation
is
extended to each. Note:
Transliterations in the text correspond to the Library of Congress system. English
language sources which use transliterations have been 2.
Data obtained from the World Bank office
government 3.
left as originally
in
published.
Tashkent, based on
Uzbek
data.
Prakticheskie rekomendatsii
po sel’skomu
khoziaistvu: zeml’ia, voda
i
udo-
breniia (Tashkent: Ministerstvo Sel’skogo Khoziaistva, Akademiia Sel’skokhoz-
iaistvennykh
Nauk and
Assotsiatsiia
“Uzplodovoshchvinprom,” 1996),
p. 35.
4. Ibid., p. 13. 5.
Vladimir Savelin, Department Head of State Committee for the Protection of
Nature, interview, 16 July 1997. 6.
Tokir Khamrakulov, Director of the Jizzakh Agncultural College, interview,
12 July 1997; Saidrahman Mirzaev, Tashkent Institute of Engineers for Irrigation
and Mechanization of Agnculture, interview, 15 July 1997. 7. 8.
Akmal Kanmov, Mirzaev
Institute
interview;
Islam
Uzbekistan Agricultural Sector
August 1995), 9.
p. 2.
Karimov
interview.
of Water Problems, interview, 10 July 1997.
Karimov,
President,
Framework Paper
interview;
Republic
of
(Tashkent: The World Bank, 25
Jim Butterfield
136
TACIS
10.
Commonwealth of Independent
Development Program, Bulungur
Integrated
Pilot
States)
Assistance for the
(Technical
District,
Samarkand,
Uzbekistan: Preliminary Report BS3: Irrigation and Soils, September 1995. 1 1
.
Mirzaev interview; Karimov interview.
As
12.
indicated in the
Reform Policy
in the
niia
Usage, described
in
Land
Republic of Uzbekistan (TACIS Food and Agricultural Policy
Advisory Unit: July 1996), 13.
Law on Water and Water
p. 13.
Sandjar Djalalov, “Gosudarstvennoe regional’noe regulirovanie ispoTzova-
zemeTno-vodnykh resursov v usloviiakh rynka,” Kurbon Choriev,
Uzbekistan, Vol. 2 (1997), pp. 45-47; in the Agro-Industrial
Complex, interview,
1 1
in
Sel’skoe
Institute
July 1997;
khoziaistvo
of Market Reforms
Isamukhamedov
interview;
Mirzaev interview; Karimov interview. 14. Collective action
investigations
dilemmas with water resources
by Western
researchers, such as Elinor
interested in disproving the free rider thesis of
are the subject of extensive
Ostrom and Norman Uphoff
Mancur Olson. See Elinor Ostrom,
Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992);
Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya
Press, 1992);
and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge,
(Ithaca: Cornell University
MA:
Harvard University Press, 1965). 15.
Sandjar Djalalov, Project Advisor,
TACIS Food and
Policy Unit, interview,
9 July 1997. 16.
United States Agency for International Development.
17.
The Uzbekistan Water and Environmental Policy
18.
Uzbekiston za gody nezavisimosti (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1996),
19.
One farm
although
had
it
commitment
in Jizzakh
Wilowat decided
to seek the Cabinet
to cotton
and
grain.
Project.
to plant 1,000
p. 60.
ha to sugar beets,
of Ministers’ approval in order to reduce
Muminjon Kakhorov,
Director of the
its
Khamid
Olimjon farm, Jizzakh Wilowat, interview, 12 July 1998. 20. Choriev and Djalalov interviews.
21
.
The
last
time
it
was
22. This conclusion
European
specialists in
tried
was
in the early 1980s.
was reached
recently in a baseline study conducted
Bulungur Tuman. They estimated
by
that in order to bring
existing facilities up to standards sufficient to export fresh produce, including
equipment purchases, some US$400,000 would have to be invested. That
is
new
only one
Agricultural Sector Reform
tuman. Even Integrated
that,
at
and Rural Development
the transportation issue
Development
Program,
Bulungur
TACIS
Samarkand,
Distnct,
137
Uzbekistan
unaddressed.
left
is
in
Pilot
Uzbekistan:
Report BS5: Horticulture, 1996. 23.
Abdu-Kadir Ergashev,
24. Solikh
UNDP Tashkent,
Isamukhamedov, Tashkent
interview, 16 July 1997.
State Agricultural University, interview,
14 July 1997. 25.
Land Reform
26.
“On
the
Uzbekistan, p. 39.
in
Improvement of Reforms
in
Livestock Production and Protection of
Farms and Privatized Farms,” Decree No.
the Interests of Peasant
87, 23 February
1994. 27. Choriev interview. 28. 29.
Isamukhamedov
interview.
TACIS Water Resources Management and
Agricultural
Production in
Central Asia Project data. 30. Savelin interview. 31. in
Jim Butterfield, Mikhail Kuznetsov, and Sergei Sazonov, “Peasant Farming
Russia,” in Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July 1996), pp. 79-105. 32. Shirkats are collective lease-holding units within a larger cooperative.
are legally entitled to
all
receipts gained
from production
They
after the leasing fee is paid.
Eckert and Elwert, section 2.4. 33.
This term originally referred to
fermerskoe khoziastvo), but plots, a
35.
new Land Code
is
(family)
used only
farms
(in
Russian,
in reference to
family
non-incorporated form of small-scale production. Section 46 spells out the
differences: only family 34.
in the
peasant
Land Reform
Don Van
in
Atta,
members may work on
a
dekhan farm.
Uzbekistan (Tashkent: TACIS,
“The
1 1
Reform
State of Agrarian
July 1996), p. in
1
1.
Uzbekistan,” in Post-
Soviet Geography, Vol. 34, No. 9 (1993), p. 600. 36.
Law on
Denationalization and Privatization, 19
37.
Law on
Peasant Farms, 3 July 1992.
38.
Cabinet
Fulfillment of 39.
Economic Reforms
“On Measures
Production,” 15
for the
Land Reform
in
in
88,
in Agriculture,”
“On
1991.
Additional
Measures
the Further
Development of
8.
in
Livestock
Privatization
Livestock Production,” 24 March 1994.
Uzbekistan, p.
for
23 February 1994.
Development of Economic Reforms
March 1993; “On
Support of Private Enterprise 40.
Decree No.
of Ministers
November
and
.
Jim Butterfield
138
41. Julie Eckert and
Georg Elwert, Land Tenure
Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft (http ://
in
Uzbekistan (Eschbom,
Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1996), section 1.2
ftir
WWW .gtz de/orboden/ eckert/ eckinh .htm) .
42. July 1990 and 43. 44.
Land Reform
“On
the
November 1991, Uzbekistan, p.
in
respectively. 6.
Further Development of Personal
Members, Sovkhoz Workers, and
Plots
Owned by Kolkhoz
and on Individual House Construction,”
Citizens;
passed on 18 November 1990. 45.
Land Reform
Uzbekistan, p. 10.
in
46. Literally, personal subsidiary plots. 47. Uzbekistan za
gody nezavisimosti,
p. 60.
48. Ibid. 49. This restriction
was
50. Generally, about
less clear after
passage of the Land Code.
50 percent of world market
51. Choriev interview;
Land Reform
in
prices.
Uzbekistan, pp. 33, 47.
52. Prakticheskie rekomendatsii, p. 13. 53. Djalalov interview; Choriev interview.
Van
54. Choriev interview;
Atta,
“The
Reform
State of Agrarian
in
Uzbek-
istan,” p. 604.
55. A.
Radzhapov and
S.
Baizhanov, “Ispol’zovanie zemli dekhanskimi
(fer-
merskimi) khoziastvami,” SeTskoe Khoziaistvo Uzbekistana, No. 3 (1997), pp. 5557. 56.
A Study of Land Reform
TACIS, February 1997),
in Ellikkala
Raion, Karkalpakstan (Tashkent:
p. 2.
57. Ibid., pp. 4, 9. 58. Defined as having their
possession) to their land.
Few
own bank
accounts and
title
(lifetime inheritable
peasant farms have complete independence in
production and marketing decisions because of the persistence of state orders. 59. Choriev interview.
60. Eckert and Elwert, section 2. 61.
An
Investigation
of Farm Restructuring
in
Ak
Altin Rayon, Syr
Darya
Oblast (Tashkent: TACIS, 24 June 1996), pp. 1-3. 62.
Not
sovkhozes 63.
surprisingly, the
in the
numbers correspond exactly
to the
tuman (11) and divisions within the sovkhozes
Land Reform
in
Uzbekistan, p. 18.
number of former
(150).
Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural Development
in
Uzbekistan
139
64. Ibid., p. 17. 65. Eckert and Elwert claim that 75 percent of peasant farms are over 10
km
from the farmers' village of residence. Given the lack of personal transportation, 10
km
is
very
far.
Section 2.1.
The land
66.
came about
privatization provision
foreign interests that investment might depend on
was possible only
passed, tenure Privatization
(Tashkent:
of Agro-Industrial
TACIS,
1 1
June 1996),
as
in
response to indications by
In fact
it.
once the Land Code was
lifetime inhentable possession
Enterprises
the
in
Republic
rights.
The
of Uzbekistan
p. 2.
67. fbid., pp. 2-3.
68. Ibid., p. 4. 69. Ibid., p.
11.
70. Ibid., p. 5.
71
.
Kakhorov interview.
72. Orzikul Karimov, Jizzakh
Tuman
Agricultural Department Chief, interview,
12 July 1998. 73.
Aspar Turabaev, faculty member of the Department
Machine-Tractor Parks interview,
14 July
significantly
was
at
1997.
for the
Usage of
the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Mechanization,
One
signal
that
the
expenment would be extended
the creation of a small but specialized department at the Institute
devoted to study and instruction regarding the MTPs. 74.
May
1999/2000 World Cotton Outlook
1999),
online
version,
(USDA
Foreign Agricultural Service,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/1999/9905
/toc.htm. 75. Cotton:
August
1997),
World Markets and Trade online
version,
(USDA
Foreign Agncultural Service,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/1997/97-
08/cover/uzbekistan.htm. 76.
World Development Report 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
77. Prakticheskie rekomendatsii, p. 4. 78. Population density in the Fergana Valley
is
such that
if
everyone were
to
be
given a plot of land, each would receive less than one hectare. Eckert and Elwert, section 1.2.
6 / Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin: A Geographical Perspective Philip Micklin
The Aral Sea Basin
lies in the
huge
around
to
area, estimated
seven
states falls
heart of Central Asia (Figure 6.1).
It
1.8 million square kilometers.' Territory
covers a
belonging
within the basin, with Uzbekistan accounting for 25 percent,
Turkmenistan for 21 percent, Kazakhstan for 21 percent, Afghanistan for 15 percent, Tajikistan for 8 percent, Kyrgyzstan for 8 percent, and Iran for 2
The Aral Sea Basin includes Kzyl-Orda and Chimkent Oblasts
percent.
in
southern Kazakhstan, most of Kyrgyzstan with the exception of the northern and northeastern territory (drainage basins of Lake Issyk-KuF and the
Chu and
Talas
Rivers), nearly all of Uzbekistan with the exception of a part of the Ust-Urt
Plateau situated in the far northeast of the country,
all
of Tajikistan, the northern
part of Afghanistan, a small part of the extreme northeast of Iran,
and
all
but the
western one-third of Turkmenistan.
Lands
that
now
constitute
five
of the seven basin
states
(Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan) were part of the Russian
Empire and
its
successor, the Soviet Union,
until the collapse
of the
USSR
situated in the latter country territory.
from the
late
nineteenth century
in 1991. Eighty-eight percent
and over 90 percent of
of the basin was
river flow
came from
its
Afghanistan and Iran control the remaining portion and contribute
together no
more than 9 percent of river
discharge. Neither
Soviet state nor the preceding Tsarist Empire.
basin was 38 million in 1995 according to the include Afghanistan or Iran.
An
was ever
part of the
The estimated population of
World Bank,^ but
this
the
does not
estimate for 1996, which includes Afghanistan
but not Iran, placed total basin population at 45.2 million (37.3 million in the
former Soviet republics and 7.9 million in Afghanistan)."'
Because of
its
geographical extent within the basin, economic might, and
political-military power, the Soviet
Union dominated
the water
management
agenda. Critical water-related decisions for the portion of the Aral Sea Basin within that state were
among
made
the basin republics
in
Moscow. Water
were
sharing and other water disputes
settled there as well.
The Soviet Union paid
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin little
Atghan and
attention to
Iranian water
management views
141
or interests.
Basin management was treated as essentially a domestic matter.
The
situation
changed dramatically
at the
end of 1991 with the dissolution
and shattering of the USSR. The Aral Sea Basin and than being dominantly controlled and
were shared by seven part of the basin,
states. (It
management policy
managed by one superpower, suddenly
practically
politically,
for the basin
water resources, rather
should be noted that Iran controls only a tiny
which generates
geographically,
position,
its
on
its
no flow.) None of the
economically,
own
or
states is in a
militarily,
terms as was done by the
In the following pages, the author attempts to lay out in
to
dictate
USSR.
more
detail
and
analyze the complicated problems of managing interstate water resources in the
Aral Sea Basin in this
new
are described. This
followed by a discussion of the key water management
problem
in the
region
the basin states interstate
water
promoting
this
for
is
-
era. First, the region’s transnational
water resources
irrigated agriculture. Next, institutional approaches that
have adopted since independence for managing and sharing resources
and the
process are presented.
of international
role
A
organizations
in
concluding section appraises the future
management of interstate water resources
in the basin.
Transnational Water Resources of the Aral Sea Basin
Water resources of transnational
the
Aral Sea Basin
(interstate).
The
former
may be
divided into national and
consist
of
rivers,
lakes,
usable
groundwater, and return flows from uses situated entirely within the bounds of
one or another of the basin latter are the
states that
same hydrologic
do not directly
affect the other states.
The
entities that cross national borders or directly
affect water resources in other basin states.^ In the Aral
Sea Basin,
interstate
water resources are by far larger and more important than national water resources.
The key
two major
which these
rivers
—
transnational water resources of the Aral Sea Basin are the the
rivers flow.
Amu
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia
—
and
the Aral
Sea into
142
Philip Micklin
Asia
Central
of
Basin
Sea
Aral
The
6.1.
Figure
1
Ma?mging Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
Amu The most important
among
Originating
Dar’ia and Syr Dar
and Afghanistan,
it
journey, the river, or
leaving,
major
its
two
last
Amu
Dar’ia and
states several times (Figure 6.1). is
tributaries but several “terminal” rivers^
its
in the hydrologic sense
The
Of these
Amu
Dar’ia
rivers, all but
an “exotic”
is
used here means that essentially
Pamir Mountains but
originates in the well-watered
Average
around 79 km^. This includes not only
the Kaskadar’ia cross international boundaries.
which
this
and Uzbekistan - entering,
(Zeravshan, Murgab, Tejen) that disappear in the deserts.^
river,
from the
along the borders and across
tributaries, flows
annual flow from the drainage basin the flow of the
Dar’ia.
During
the Aral Sea.
into
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan,
and reentering the
km
flows nearly 2,400
mountains across the Kara-Kum desert and
-
Amu
the
is
the glaciers and snowfields of the Pamir Mountains of
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
four states
’ia
within the Aral Sea Basin
river
143
that this
flow
is
all its
flow
substantially
diminished by evaporation, transpiration from phreatophytic (water loving) vegetation growing along
its
banks, and bed filtration as the river passes across
the
Kara-Kum
the
development of modem, large-scale
desert to the Aral Sea.
decreased to around 40
km
from
Owing
its
exotic nature, even prior to
irrigation,
average inflow to the Aral
the 62
to
km
coming out of
Tajikistan contributes 80 percent of flow generated in the
by Afghanistan
basin, followed (3 percent),
which
is
(8 percent),
Uzbekistan (6 percent), Kyrgyzstan
the Tian’
Shan Mountains, located
of the Pamirs. Glaciers and snowmelt also chiefly feed is
tributaries, the
then
across
Dar’ia river
in Iran).^
The Syr Dar’ia flows from
it
Amu
and Turkmenistan and Iran together around 3 percent (most of
formed
2,500 km,
the mountains.
a
somewhat longer than
the
Amu
it.
Dar’ia.
With
The
strip
of Tajikistan
that
a total length of
river (or
Naryn and Karadar’ia) flows from Kyrgyzstan narrow
to the north
protmdes,
its
main
into Uzbekistan,
thumblike,
into
Uzbekistan, and finally across Kazakhstan and into the Aral Sea. Average
annual flow of the Syr Dar’ia,
Amu
at
37 km^,
is
considerably less than that of the
Dar’ia. Kyrgyzstan contributes 74 percent of river flow, Uzbekistan
percent, Kazakhstan 12 percent, and Tajikistan 3 percent.^ the Syr Dar’ia
was
is
exotic. Prior to the
substantial during
its
modem
As
the
Amu
1
Dar’ia,
age of irrigation, flow diminution
long journey across the
Kyzyl-Kum
desert, with less
than half of the water coming from the mountains reaching the Aral Sea.
144
Philip Micklin
Together, the two rivers (and the terminal rivers in the basin of the
Amu
Dar’ia) provide, on an annual average basis, 116 km^. Groundwater contributes additional flow to interstate water resources. According to recent estimates, total
renewable water resources in the Aral Sea Basin perhaps, 16
kmVyr
usable.’^
Some 30
may be 44 km
percent of groundwater
is
/yr with,
believed to be
across national boundaries or
is
hydraulically connected to aquifers in other countries. However, groundwater
is
where the aquifer
transnational in nature
lies
Amu
a significant contributor to the flow of the
Dar’ia and the Syr Dar’ia in
those rivers’ headwaters whereas in the desert regions along the middle and
lower course, the rivers are net suppliers of flow to groundwater. Hence, the net
beyond
addition groundwater adds to transnational water resources above and river
flow
difficult to determine.
is
During Soviet times. Central Asian water
was not connected with
experts estimated usable groundwater that
17
km /yr
interstate portion to this gives 5
flow
at
Applying the 30 percent coefficient for the
Sea Basin.
in the Aral
river
km /yr.
Adding
this to the
km
flow provides a reasonable upper limit of 121
116
km
for river
for transnational average
annual water resources of the Aral Sea Basin.
km /yr,
At 121
On
considerable.
interstate
water resources of the Aral Sea Basin are
a per capita basis (assuming a mid- 1998 basin population of
near 47 million) they equal nearly 2,600 meters/person, whereas on a per unit area basis (assuming a basin area of 1.8 million
meters/km
.
They do not
However, such per capita and per
the
On
)
they equal 67,000 cubic
unit area figures are meaningless.
take into account the sharp spatial discontinuities of the region in
terms of where flow heavily.
km
is
this basis,
generated and where people live and use water most
we may
divide the basin into two basic zones. First are
upstream mountains where the flow
inhabited and
whose water use
is
is
generated,
far less than the supply.
which
are
sparsely
This zone occupies
only 20 percent of the basin but generates 90 percent of the flow for the Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia.
The second zone
consists of the
downstream
Amu
arid plains
(covering 80 percent of the basin) where most of the population lives, where
most of the water
is
used, and
whose indigenous water resources
than used. The deficit in the plains
is,
are far less
of course, covered by outflows from the
well- watered mountains.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan occupy the core of the mountain zone of the
basin and are “water rich” (Figure 6.2). The former supplies 55 percent of
average annual basin river flow and the
latter
25 percent for an aggregate
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
145
contribution of 80 percent. Water withdrawals for the two countries together in
1995 were only 16 percent of the
total.
Consequently, these states are large net
donors to basin water supplies. Afghanistan provides about 4 percent of basin flow (but over 6 percent of flow for the
were probably not much more than places
it
in the category
downstream
for the
are large net
Amu Dar’ia river basin).
withdrawals
Its
percent of the total in 1995, which also
1
The
of net upstream donor.
picture
exactly opposite
is
of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which
states
consumers of basin water resources. They
mainly on the plains
lie
of the Central Asian deserts and contribute as a group only 14 percent of flow.
With
substantial
withdrawals of but
irrigated
1 1 1
km^
withdrawals
its
areas,
these
states
took
of basin
percent
83
in 1995. Uzbekistan contributes 8 percent of basin flow
were 52 percent of the
1995
in
Turkmenistan
total.
contributes essentially no flow (most of the discharge of the Tejen and rivers that enter
Turkmen
territory
comes from
Murgab
major consumer
Iran), but is a
accounting for 20 percent of withdrawals in 1995. Kazakhstan contributes 4 percent of aggregate basin flow (but 13 percent of the flow in the Syr Dar’ia
That
river basin).
state
withdrew 10 percent of basin
contributes about 3 percent of basin flow and consumes, at most,
Sufficiency of
A
key question
for
1995. Iran
in
totals 1
percent.
Renewable Water Resources
management of transnational water resources
Basin revolves around the sufficiency of the resource
to
in the Aral
meet demand.
Sea
On
an
average annual basis, an upper limit estimate of renewable water resources in the Aral
Sea Basin
km^-1 16 km^ from 17
km^
for
(this
groundwater not connected
There
is
least, a
1990s.
km
in
are available.
some
variation for
1990
to a
to river flow.
Water withdrawals ranged
low of 111
km
These withdrawal figures
them from one source
in 1995, the last year for
are, at best,
kmVyr
returned to river channels, albeit with degraded quality, and
depressions
A
in
large quantity of the
deserts
and
withdrawn flow evaporated
(16
is
also
good
estimates.
but they provide, at
to another,
portion of the flow withdrawn (around 24
dowstream.'^
around 133
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and
reasonable idea of the range of withdrawals during the
A
is
Amu
the flow in the basins of the
from a high of 126
which data
includes both national and transnational)
first
for is
1990-1994)
is
available for use
dumped
kmVyr
half of the
for
into closed
1990-1994).
146
%) (in
States
Basin
Sea
Aral
the
for
withdrawals
1995
vs.
Generation
Flow
Annual
Average
6.2.
Figure
Philip Micklin
8
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin It
also
147
potentially usable for irrigation purposes, although the salinity of
is
return flow
too high for
is
on an average annual (90-95 percent) of
this.
One
basis.
this
Thus,
total return
flows are probably near 40 km^
36-38 km^
authoritative source estimates that
potentially available for reuse.
is
some
Including these
reserves gives a total upper limit of 170 km^/yr for the usable water resources in the basin. This
suggest, at
is
first
significantly
glance, that there
now and
countries and users
The
situation
river
Amu
currently withdrawn and might
plenty of water to go around for
considerably more complicated.
is
bed,
riparian vegetation).
is
is
at least difficult
basin
evaporation from reservoirs,
These may run
to 16
km^
to
reduce
is
when they
are
from
flow years along the
uneven on an
when
of
(e.g., filtration
evapo-transpiration
in average
interannual basis. Thus, there are seasons and years
than usage and other seasons and years
First, there are losses
and costly
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia.^^ Second, river flow
the seasonal
all
for the foreseeable future.
flow that are unavoidable, or
from the
more water than
flows are
much
less.
intra-
and
much more
To maximize
and multiyear availability of water, large dams and reservoirs are
constructed to store water during high flow periods (spring and early summer)
and years for use during low flow periods of high demand
summer) and low flow However,
it
is
(late spring
1
years.
neither economically feasible nor environmentally wise to
totally regulate rivers, particularly those as large as the
Amu
Dar’ia and Syr
Dar’ia. Economically, the marginal cost of total or near total regulation
storing
would
all
or nearly
all
spring-early
summer flow
in
every year for
entail constructing costly additional storage capacity that
short periods.
and
Such an approach would also mean
(i.e.,
later release)
is filled
for only
that for substantial periods
during the high flow season, river beds below the dams would be dry or nearly dry for significant distances (to the next major tributary or next reservoir) with
extremely serious negative environmental and sanitary consequences.'^ Thus, not
all
the seasonal surplus flow,
years, can be stored for times
and especially the surplus flow
when flow
is
low and demand
is
in
high-water
high.
Seasonal and multiyear storage dams have been built on both rivers and their tributaries to increase
water resource availability during low flow periods.
The aggregate, usable storage capacity
km^ (17 The
in the basin
of the
Amu
in the entire Aral
Sea Basin
is
cited as
44
Dar’ia and 27 in the basin of the Syr Dar’ia).
largest storage facilities are the
Toktogul (gross capacity of 19.5 and usable
capacity of 14 km^) on the Syr Dar’ia and the Nurek (gross capacity of 10.5 and
Philip Micklin
148 o
useable capacity of 4.5
km
on
)
the Vakhsh, a tributary of the
Amu
Dar’ia.
21
Storage has allowed the increase of the ensured yield of water (a measure of the
flow that can be used) in a 90 percent flow year,^^ occurring, on average, once in ten years, to 52
km^ on
Amu
the
Dar’ia and to 27 km^ on the Syr Dar’ia for a
low flow years
total
of 79 km^. The amount of water that
fact,
most
state
of water resources in arid regions such as the Aral Sea Basin than the is
available in the
management.
crucial for water resource
average annual figure, which
is
It is
more
is,
in
indicative of the
overweighted by the high flow years,
much of
whose flow cannot be stored nor used. Examining water
availability in
low flow
years,
which usually occur
in
cycles in arid regions rather than being randomly distributed, the situation looks
much
less
sanguine than the average annual flow scenario presented above. If
km figure for a 90 percent flow year and subtract “unavoidable” losses of 16 km only 64 km remain as the usable resource. Assuming usable 3 3 return flows of 38 km and groundwater additions of 17 km would give a total available resource of 9 km This figure falls within the range of withdrawals (low of 1 1, high of 126 km for the period 1990-1995). But several caveats are in order. First, to reach the 119 km figure assumes two critical preconditions: we
take the 79
,
1 1
.
1
(1) storage
of nearly
all
spring high flows for later use, and (2) filling of the
multiyear reservoirs to capacity at the beginning of the dry period. Second,
use would need to be
made of usable groundwater and of return flows
not returned to rivers. In 1992, for example, estimates are that around 12 the former (71 percent)
Based on experience
were used, and only 6
km
(38 percent) of the
in the basin, these conditions are unlikely to
full
that are
km
of
latter.
be met
anytime in the foreseeable future. In reality, during
low flow years withdrawals from
the
Amu
Dar’ia and Syr
Dar’ia river systems in the downstream net-consuming countries of Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
are,
return flows). Furthermore,
is
among
it
of necessity, substantially reduced (as are
these years that cause heightened tensions
the states of the basin as the downstreamers try to
maximize
their share
of water coming from the upstreamers (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). The former also apply pressure
on the
latter,
which
is
strongly resisted, to increase the
amount of water delivered downstream by reducing
more water from
reservoirs
on
their territory.
their
usage and releasing
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
149
The Aral Sea Besides the
Amu
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, the other key transnational water
resource in the Aral Sea Basin the great deserts
A
6.1).
from
its
i.e.,
Amu
on
mainly determine
it)
from 1911
term equilibrium with a than
to
this
water body’s
measure, plays an
Inflow and net evaporation each
lake level variation over this period of less
m. Only two of the seven Aral Sea Basin
1
amid
Hence, the water balance was in long-
to 1960.
maximum
difficult
is
insignificant role in the sea’s water balance.
km
sits
Dar'ia and Syr Dar’ia and net evaporation (evaporation
surface minus precipitation
averaged 56
This water body
without surface outflow, the balance between surface
Net groundwater exchange, which
level.
itself.
(Kara-Kum, Kyzyl-Kum, Betpakdala) of Central Asia (Figure
terminal lake,
inflow from the
the Aral Sea
is
states are riparian
on the Aral
Sea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with each having an approximately equal
length of shoreline.
The
entire Aral coastline within
Uzbekistan
lies
within that
nation’s Karakalpakstan Republic.
At nearly 67,000 km“, fourth-largest inland water
was the world's
the Aral Sea, according to area,
body
in
1960.^^
As
a brackish lake with salinity
averaging near 10 grams/liter, less than a third that of the ocean, chiefly as a
by freshwater
species.
The
key regional transportation
Amu
agriculture,
was inhabited
sea supported a major fishery and functioned
route.
The extensive
deltas of the Syr Dar'ia
Dar'ia sustained a diversity of flora and fauna.
irrigated
it
They
and
supported
also
animal husbandry, hunting and trapping, fishing, and
harvesting of reeds. Over the past four decades the sea has steadily shrunk and salinized (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.1). irrigation that
diminished inflow from the
—
divided into two water bodies in 1987
The main cause has been expanding
Amu
Dar'ia and Syr Dar'ia.
The Aral
the Small Aral Sea in the north
and the
Large Aral Sea in the south. The Syr Dar'ia flows into the former, and the Dar’ia into the lakes.
latter.
A
Amu
channel (river) has intermittently connected the two
Between 1960 and 1998,
the level of the Small Aral fell 13
m
and the
Large Aral 18 m. The area of both seas taken together diminished more than 50 percent and the volume nearly 80 percent. Salinity in the small sea rose around
300 percent and
in the large sea nearly
450
percent.
The anthropogenically caused desiccation of
the Aral Sea has had severe
negative impacts. However, these have not affected the basin states equally.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,
as
the
shoreline
riparians,
have
been
most
150
Philip Micklin
impacted. Turkmenistan, although not abutting on the sea, has the
Amu
Dar’ia delta that
is
close
enough
to
is
territory.
may
Three
the territory suffering
a small part of each nation’s area and contains a minor
portion of each country’s population.
impacted area
For the three
cover, at most, 400,000
to four million
km
,
people out of a
states
percent of their aggregate
total
population of 44 million
1
than 10 percent) live here.
Figure
6.3.
combined, the
1
or
'^‘7
(less
territory in
have suffered substantial damage.
Even within Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, substantial impacts
some
The Shrinking Aral Sea
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin Table
6.1.
151
Hydrographic and Hydrologic Characteristics of the Shrinking Aral Sea
Level
Area
%of
Volume
%of
Salinity
%of
(meters)
(kmb
1960
(km^)
1960
(g/i)
1960
53.4
66,900
100
1090
100
9.9
100
Large Sea
53.4
60,541
100
1003
100
Small Sea
53.4
6,359
100
87
100
1971
51.1
60,200
90
925
85
11.2
113
1976
48.3
55,700
83
763
70
14
141
39,734
59
364
33
Year (January
1)
1960
1989 Large Sea
39.1
36,930
61
341
34
30
303
Small Sea
40.2
2,804
44
23
26
30
303
35,271
53
294
27
1993
Large Sea
37.1
32,301
53
270
27
~35
353
Small Sea
40.8
2,970
48
24
28
~25
252
30,758
46
236
22
1998 Large Sea
35.2
27,996
46
214
21
~45
454
Small Sea
40.0
2,762
43
22
25
~30
303
23,880
36
164
15
2010 Large Sea
31.6
19,880
33
126
13
>60
606
Small Sea
45.0
4,000
63
38
44
~15
151
Values from 1960
from in
S.
1998 are derived from Soviet
data, data
from Glavgidromet of Uzbekistan; data
Shivareva, E. Ponenkova, and B. Smerdov; “Modeling the level of the Aral Sea,” pp. 5-10,
Problems of the Aral Sea Basin, research, projects, and recommendations (Tashkent, “Chinor”
ENK
1998)
(in
assumptions; 4.5
km^
km^
for
for
for
(1
m/yr.
for
)
2010
are
calculated
from the water balance model
with
the
following
average annual flow of Syr Dar’ia to Small Aral of 3.5 km^ for 1998 and 1999 and
2000-2010,
1999-2010,
2006-2010,
m/yr
Russian); and calculations from an annualized water balance model developed by the
Values
author.
8
to
(2) average annual
(3) flow
(4) evaporation
(5) precipitation
from Small
flow of to
Amu
Dar’ia to Large Aral of 20
km^
in
1998 and
Large Aral of 0 km^ for 1998-2005 and of 1.65 km^
from the Small Aral of 0.960 m/yr and from the Large Aral of 0.966
on the surface of the Large Aral of
0.1 81
m/yr and on the Small Aral of 0.198
Philip Micklin
152 Furthermore,
administrative
the
regions
suffering
the
most
(the
Karakalpakstan Republic in Uzbekistan, Kzyl-Orda Oblast in Kazakhstan, and
Dashauz Oblast
Turkmenistan) are politically impotent and do not have
in
influence at the national level. Thus, officials in
Akmola), the capital of Kazakhstan, and
Almaty
in Tashkent, capital
moved
(recently
of Uzbekistan
to
(less
so in Ashgabat, capital of Turkmenistan), give lip service to the Aral desiccation
and associated consequences as being a regional, and even global, catastrophe of major proportions. This has been a winning strategy international aid.
On
own
the other hand, their
to
efforts
attract
substantial
and expenditures on
solving the worst problems here have not matched their rhetoric precisely
because the “crisis” zone
is
and
localized, has a relatively small population,
lacks political clout.
The
other states of the basin (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran)
are so distant
from the zone where intense
suffered no demonstrable
harm from
to
overcome or
much
The
pushing the
why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have
states
of the basin
alleviate the worst problems,
less interest
Iran have
in
to
undertake measures
whereas Turkmenistan has shown
and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan even
less.
had no formal involvement whatsoever with Aral Sea substantial
Uzbekistan in the
have
the drying of the sea. These “geographic”
considerations are key to understanding
been the motive forces
effects are apparent that they
Afghanistan and issues.
Aral fishing industries developed by Kazakhstan and
first
half of the twentieth century ended in 1983 as the
indigenous fish (twenty species), which provided the basis for the commercial
disappeared from the effects of rising salinity and loss of shallow
fishery,
spawning and feeding
areas.
It
should be noted, however, that
indigenous fish survive in the deltaic lakes and rivers,
except for the Aral salmon that has
tolerant
fishes
(four
species)
Amu
become
all
of the
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia
extinct. Introduced, salt-
have survived and some even flourished as
competition from native species for food disappeared, but even these will
probably vanish,
from
at least in the
rising salinity.
Large Aral Sea, by the early twenty-first century,
Several edible species remain, such as the Black Sea
flounder, sprat, and smelt, but are not caught commercially.
Because of the
loss
of the fishery tens of thousands were thrown out of work. Navigation on the Aral also ceased as they abandoned efforts to keep the increasingly long channels open to the major ports of Aral’sk
Kazakhstan and Muinak
at the
at the
northern end of the sea in
southern end in Uzbekistan (Karakalpakstan).
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
As
indicated above, the zone of significant
and
the sea
immediate shoreline.
its
around the sea (including
all
An
damage
153
stretches well
beyond
approximately 400,000-km^ region
of the Karakalpakstan Republic and Khorezem
Oblast in Uzbekistan, Dashauz Oblast in Turkmenistan, and the western half of
Kzyl-Orda and the southeastern portion of Aktiubinsk Oblast
in Kazakhstan),
with a population of nearly four million, has been substantially affected. This region
is
commonly designated
the “ecological disaster zone” (Russian: zona
ekologicheskogo bedstviia).
Damage
Amu
has been particularly severe to the rich ecosystems of the extensive
Dar'ia delta, primarily located in the Karakalpak Republic of Uzbekistan
but stretching into Dashauz Oblast of Turkmenistan.
The Syr
Dar'ia delta in
Kzyl-Orda Oblast of Kazakhstan has also suffered. Desertification and intensifying and
soils
in both.
dry
is
spreading
Halophytes and xerophytes (plants tolerant of saline
conditions)
replacing
rapidly
are
endemic
vegetation
communities.
Expanses of unique tugai (vegetation communities of
bushes, and
grasses, including poplar, willow, oleaster, salt cedar,
tall
that formerly stretched along all the
have been particularly hard 100,000 ha in the
1970s and
to
Amu
hit.
main
According
rivers to
trees,
and reeds)
and distributary channels here
one expert, whereas tugai covered
Dar’ia delta in 1950,
it
had shrunk
only 15,000-20,000 ha by the mid-1990s.
52,000 ha by the
to
Tugai complexes
around the Aral Sea are habitats for a diversity of animals, including sixty species of varieties
mammals, more than
of amphibians.
three hundred types
of birds, and twenty
32
Desiccation of the deltas has significantly diminished the area of lakes, wetlands, and their associated reed communities. area of reeds in the
Amu
Between 1965 and 1986,
the
Dar’ia delta decreased from 500,000 ha to 1,000 ha.
33
This has been of serious ecological consequence as lakes, wetlands, and their associated reed communities provide prime habitat for a variety of permanent
and migratory waterfowl, a number of which are endangered. the
Diminution of
aggregate water surface area coupled with increasing pollution of the
remaining water bodies (primarily from irrigation runoff containing fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides,
salts,
and cotton defoliants) has decimated aquatic
bird populations. Irrigated agriculture in the deltas of the
Amu
Dar'ia and Syr Dar'ia has
suffered from an inadequacy of water as inflow to the deltas has decreased
owing
to
heavy upstream consumptive use
for irrigation. Additionally, water
Philip Micklin
154
that
does reach the deltas has elevated salinity from the leaching of
by repeated usage
in the
middle and upper courses of the
salts
caused
At times over
rivers.
2 grams/liter, these saline flows have lowered crop yields and, in conjunction
inadequate
with
salinization.
the
of
drainage
irrigated
Animal husbandry, both
promoted
fields,
in the deltas
secondary
soil
and desert regions adjacent
to
Aral Sea, has been damaged by reduction of the area and declining
productivity of pastures resulting from desertification, dropping groundwater levels,
and replacement of natural vegetation suitable
species.
For example, in the
from 350,000 ha
in the
the remaining pastures
Amu Dar’ia
1950s
to
delta, the area
125,000 by the
was halved.
over 36,000
km
now
salt,
and dust from the dried
largely a barren, salt-covered desert with an area is
they are transported great distances. Since the mid-1970s,
shown and
the
major
salt/dust
salt to settle
while productivity of
36
onto adjacent lands. The major problem
,
inedible
of natural pastures went
late 1980s,
Frequent strong winds are blowing sand,
bottom of the Aral Sea,
by
for grazing
and
the dust
salt,
as
images have
satellite
plumes extending 200 and even 400 km, causing dust
over a considerable area adjacent to the sea in Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and to a lesser degree, in Turkmenistan.^^ Around 60 percent of the storms occur with north and northeast winds, carrying the dust and Ust-Iurt Plateau to the sea’s west the water body.
The
latter is the
and the
Amu
most densely
from 13 million
to as
over the
Dar’ia delta at the south end of settled as well as
and ecologically important region around the deflated material run
salt
economically
Estimates of the total
sea.
high as 231 million metric tons/yr,
with the most probable value between 15 and 150 million tons.^^ The entrained salts are
believed to constitute only
salt transferred,
a careful study
even
at the
1
percent of the
total,
so that the tonnage of
higher figure, would be 1.5 million
by well-known
geologists and experts
1980s concluded annual aeolian transport of
salt
tons."^^
However,
on the Aral from
the
mid-
alone from the dried bottom
was around 43 million metric tons but would decrease
39 million
slightly to
metric tons by 2000.^^^
Whatever the
true tonnage, considerable
amounts of salts
and aerosol
in dry
forms, the most harmful of which include sodium bicarbonate, sodium chloride,
and sodium
sulfate, are settling
plants are killed outright, but
on natural vegetation and
more commonly
yields) are substantially reduced.
The
salt
their
crops.'^^
In
some
cases,
growth (and for crops,
and dust also has
ill
effects
and domestic animals by directly harming them and by reducing
on wild
their
food
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin supply.'^^
Local health experts also consider airborne
155
and dust a factor
salt
contributing to high levels of respiratory illness and impairment, eye problems,
and possibly even throat and esophageal cancer
Owing
Summers have warmed and humidity
is
more
100
to
km
regimes.
winters cooled, spring frosts are later and
fall frosts
lower, and the growing season shorter.
The growing season
in the northern part
a switch
Amu
of the
from
Dar’ia
crop to
this
rice.
living in the “ecological disaster zone” suffers acute health
Some of these
problems.
and
continental
and become too short for cotton, forcing
The population
band up
deseritic
by an average of ten days
has decreased
in a
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan/^ Maritime
in
conditions have been replaced by
delta
changed
to the sea’s shrinkage, climate has
wide along the former shoreline
earlier,
in the near Aral region/"^
are direct consequences of the sea’s recession (e.g.,
respiratory and digestive afflictions and possibly cancer
from inhalation and
ingestion of blowing salt and dust and poorer diets from the loss of Aral fish as a
major food source). Other serious health-related problems owe pollution
associated
agriculture. to
with
the
heavy use of toxic chemicals
However, probably the most serious health
“Third World” medical,
health,
high
rates
Tuberculosis
is
of typhoid,
prevalent as
is
paratyphoid,
is
issues are directly related
pervasive and has led to
and
hepatitis,
viral
dysentery.
anemia, particularly in pregnant woman. Liver
and kidney ailments are widespread. Medical care variety,
irrigated
in
and hygienic conditions and
nutrition,
practices. Bacterial contamination of drinking water
very
environmental
to
and adequate sewage systems are
rare.
is
Owing
very poor, diets lack
to these factors, general
mortality and morbidity and infant mortality and morbidity are the highest
among the
the
new
states that
formerly were part of the
Karakalpak Republic in Uzbekistan appear
to
USSR. Health
be the worst
Basin with reports of infant mortality rates of 100/1,000
some
districts.
These
in the
former
percent), alleviation of the problems
USSR
States.
Although the severe impacts of the drying of the Aral are relatively small portion of the basin
Aral Sea
live births reported for
rates are four times the national level in the
and more than ten times that of the United
conditions in
(some 400,000
km
felt
over a
out of 1.8 million, or 22
must involve the management of water over
the entire Aral Basin. Particularly important are the areas of greatest irrigation is
here that so
withdrawn
for irrigation
water usage in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.
much of the flow of the
Amu
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia
and consumptively used which has led
is
It
to the great reduction in discharge.
48
Philip Micklin
156
from 1911
If
to 1960, discharge to the sea
Dar’ia averaged 56 kmVyr, by the 1980s,
it
Amu
from the
had
fallen to 6
Dar’ia and Syr
km^/^ The
early
Amu Dar’ia and Syr km /yr, but this was a
1990s (1990-1994) saw a cycle of heavy flow years on the
which increased average inflow
Dar’ia,
to the sea to 15
temporary phenomenon (1995, 1996, and 1997 were low flow years, and 1998 a high flow year). Hydrologic probability indicates basin river flow over the longer term will be substantially less than during the
decade, although likely above what
Amu average), A
the flow of the
term
it
was
conservative
be on the order of 1 0
km
is
assuming
that average annual inflow to the sea
larger decrease in
it
was
three decades ago
by some 45
km
upstream withdrawals
.
14 percent (based on the figures cited above of 16
would require
This would necessitate
compensate
to
km
for natural
Assuming
losses of the net additions to flow before they reached the sea. at
years,
.
increasing average discharge to the sea
somewhat
many of these
assumption,
reasonable
but
Thus, to restore the Aral to what
a
1980s (for
part of the present
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia was significantly below the long-
continuation of recent basin withdrawals, will
in the
first
natural losses
these
from an
average annual basin flow of 116 km^), then an additional 6 km^ reduction
would be necessary
for a total of
upstream use (amounting
to
around 50
km
.
That such a reduction of
km )
45 percent of 1995 withdrawals of 111
could
be attained in the foreseeable future without causing economic and social havoc for the countries of the basin that are the
major users of water for irrigation
seems remote. To even stop the sea’s further shrinkage would require an increase in inflow to around 25
long-term
figure
under present conditions)
upstream withdrawals of 15 Indeed, the
Amu
being hand,
many
km
,
half times the estimated
and necessitate
reductions
in
or 14 percent of the 1995 level.
experts (including this author) hold that additional water from
Dar’ia should be used to rehabilitate the deltaic ecosystems rather than
dumped it
km^ (some two and one
may
into the
On
Large Aral Sea to uselessly evaporate.
the other
reasonably be argued that supplementary flow from the Syr Dar’ia
should be used to raise the level of the
which could be accomplished with the differing approach
is
now
separated small northern Aral Sea,
relatively
modest
additions.^*
based on several considerations. To even
Large Aral Sea would require increases in the flow of the
Amu
simply unattainable in the near or even mid-term future. Even
The
logic of
stabilize the
Dar’ia that are
if the
Large Aral
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin Sea could be stabilized
at its
significant ecological or
economic value.
The opposite
much
is
present level,
true for the
its
157
salinity is so high that
Small Aral Sea (Table
6.1).
smaller than the Large Aral Sea, an inflow of 4.5
Because
it
its
has no
area
is
km^ on an average
annual basis (for 1990-1997 the corresponding figure was 4.2 km^) could within five years raise
its
m mark was reached,
m and expand the
45
level to
area to 4,000
km^ Once
the 45
could be maintained with an inflow of 2.85
km\
allowing 1.65 km^ of more saline water in the western part of the sea to
spill
this level
over to the Large Aral, enhancing the pace of freshening of the sea and creating habitat conditions over the entire Small Aral for the return of indigenous fishes
from the Syr Dar’ia with the concomitant restoration of a commercial
The
local
Kazakh
authorities (of Aral’sk
Raion
in
fishery.
Kzyl-Ordinsk Oblast) in
the early 1990s constructed a crude dike to block the channel (river) that
formed between the two periodically
However,
dam
this
that raised water levels 3
project to fund construction of a
dike, along with construction
more
in
the
ensuing
years
makeshift dike with a 20-
m by early
1999.
A
World
technically sophisticated and stable
of a control gate and channel from the western part
of the small sea to the large sea,
dam was
dike
the
washed away. In 1997, they replaced
km-long, 26-m-wide
Bank
seas.
had
is
to
be implemented in the near
term.^"^
The
“overtopped” by wave and wind-running action in April 1999 and
breached with a significant loss of water.^^
When the
the critical situation of the Aral Sea
amounts of water needed
to
is
taken into consideration and
begin to improve conditions are added
existing water uses discussed earlier,
it
is
to the
manifestly clear that the Aral Sea
Basin’s water resources are stretched to the limit and beyond. Thus, even during the high flow period of the early 1990s, after upstream withdrawals, there
was
insufficient inflow to the Aral to stop the sea’s recession. In dry years such as
occurred during the
1980s, practically no
water reached the sea and the
desiccation proceeded alarmingly rapidly.
Irrigation
The key
to
improving management of the Aral Sea Basin’s water resources
(including provision of substantial additional quantities of water for the Aral
Amu Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and expanding economic uses) agriculture. A recent World Bank report cites the irrigated area in the
Sea, the deltas of the is
irrigated
Philip Micklin
158
basin in 1995 (excluding Afghanistan and Iran)
Uzbekistan,
at
54
percent,
has
majority
the
7.94 million ha (Table 6.2).
at
of the
Turkmenistan (22 percent) a distant second. Irrigation
is,
irrigated
far
with
area
and away, the chief
source of water withdrawals in the basin, accounting for 92 percent of the 100
km^
total in that
percent,
trailed
same year (Table by Turkmenistan
consumptive user of water,
i.e.,
6.3). at
Uzbekistan again leads the pack percent.
22
much of
Irrigation
the water that
is
is
a
it
is
53
heavily
withdrawn
returned to the source (river or groundwater) from which
at
is
not
taken but
evaporates from fields, transpires from crops, or runs off into desert depressions.
Taking
this into consideration, irrigation’s contribution in
use to the diminution of basin water resources
is
terms of consumptive
greater than
its
92 percent share
of withdrawals implies.
Table
6.2. Irrigated
Areas
in the
Amu Dar’ia % Country
Basin
Aral Sea Basin in 1995 (million ha)
Syr Dar’ia
%
Aral Sea Basin
%
Basin
Uzbekistan
2.48
53
1.80
55
4.28
54
Turkmenistan
1.74
37
0.00
0
1.74
22
Tajikistan
0.43
9
0.29
9
0.72
9
Kazakhstan
0.00
0
0.74
22
0.74
9
Kyrgyzstan
0.00
0
0.46
14
0.46
6
Total
4.65
100
3.29
100
7.94
100
Source: Adapted from World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Table
and
Iran.
2.
Excludes Afghanistan
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin Table
6.3.
Water Withdrawals Aral Sea Basin
159
for Irrigation in the
1995 (km^)
in
Amu
Syr
Aral
Dar’ia
Dar’ia
Sea
Basin
Basin
Basin
Basin
(m^/ha)
withdrawals
Uzbekistan
33.2
19.8
53.0
53.0
12,383
58.0
91
Turkmenistan
22.4
0.0
22.4
22.4
12,874
23.1
97
Tajikistan
7.0
3.3
10.3
10.3
14,306
12.0
86
Kazakhstan
0.0
9.7
9.7
9.7
13,108
11.0
88
Kyrgyzstan
0.0
4.6
4.6
4.6
10,000
5.1
90
62.6
37.4
100.0
100.0
12,594
109.2
92
Country
Total
%of
Specific
Aral Sea withdrawal
Source: Adapted from World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Table
and
2.
Total basin
Irrigation
water
% of total
Excludes Afghanistan
Iran.
Substantial savings of water are possible in the irrigation sector through
contraction of the irrigated area, improvements in iiTigation efficiency, and
switching from higher to lower water use crops. The irrigated area in the Aral
Sea Basin was 7.25 million ha percent increase.
in 1990.^^
It
rose to 7.94 million ha in 1995, a 9.5
All the basin states except Kazakhstan plan further near-term
increases in the irrigated area:
Kyrgyzstan by over 400,000
between 40,000 and 140,000
Turkmenistan by 600,000 ha, and Uzbekistan
from 420,000 increases
is
to
the
ha,
over 600,000 ha.^^
need
to
A common
ha,
argument used
expand food production
to
Tajikistan
to justify the
meet population growth.
Hence, the likelihood of significant water savings from reductions irrigated area appears
dim
in
for the foreseeable future.
Substantial water savings in irrigation, therefore, most probably must
through
improvements
in
efficiency
efficiency entails determining the
mix.
The
in a
and
replacement
of
highly
varieties. Arriving at savings
consumptive crops with lower-use
withdrawn
the
minimum amount
come
water-
from raised
of water that needs
to
be
given area for optimal (or near optimal) growth of a specific crop
difference
between
this
represents potential gross savings.
figure
and what
is
actually
However, the net additions
withdrawn
to usable
water
resources would be less as corrections are necessary to take account of reduced
Philip Micklin
160
“minimum”
drainage water return flows to rivers. Calculating the Soviet terminology availability
still
used in Central Asia)
is
not easy as
of detailed and accurate data on climate,
it
(or
“norm”
in
depends on the
and crops
soil conditions,
at
a scale sufficiently large to reflect the regional variability in the Aral Sea Basin as well as calculating the
system.
An
minimum
minimum
obtainable losses in the irrigation delivery
authoritative figure cited at the
end of the Soviet period
average field application rate obtainable was 8,500
m /ha.
the average losses in the delivery canals could be lowered to
meaning
that
80 percent of the water would reach delivery points
the overall withdrawal
would be 10,600 m^/ha. Subtracting
basin- wide withdrawal for 1995 of 12,594
m /ha
Assuming 20 percent,
to the fields,
this figure
from
the
indicates possible savings of
m /ha. This would translate into a basin-wide reduction of 15.8 km /yr. Net
1994
savings (corrected for reductions in return flows to rivers)
Assuming
would be
would be reduced by
withdrawals (15.8 percent), net savings would equal 12
the
to the
the countries of the region in the mid-1990s,
first
same percentage
km /yr.
The gross
within the range of estimated feasible water savings (12.7 to 18.3
made by
less.
return flows to rivers at 24 percent of withdrawals, typical for the
half of the 1990s, and that they
falls
for the
and the net figure
is
as
figure
km) close
lower end of the range.
The savings noted above
are mainly based
on introduction of
traditional
technologies for reducing irrigation water usage through lining canals, leveling fields,
and applying water
with newer methods
more
to crops
carefully.
Combining these techniques
replacing furrow irrigation, which occupies
(e.g., partially
70 percent of the irrigated area, with drip and subsoil
irrigation; introduction
of
scheduling computers and specialized software; real-time monitoring of soil
moisture and crop water needs; genetic engineering of crops to lower water requirements; precision farming using satellite imagery and GPSs) could lead to substantially greater savings.
Thus
Israel,
with similar climatic conditions to the
Aral Sea Basin, but technologically sophisticated irrigation practices, has an
average withdrawal of 5,590
m /ha.
the Aral Sea Basin because of the
canals and the different crop mix.
Such
much
a figure
is
probably out of reach in
longer length of water-losing delivery
However,
if
average water withdrawals could
be lowered to 8,000 m^/ha, as Victor Dukhovnyi, a leading Central Asian irrigation expert,
proposed in 1985, gross savings of 36.5 km^ and net savings of
27.7 km^ would accrue.
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
161
Savings from efficiency improvements could well be significantly larger than indicated above. Evidence suggests that the official figures provided by the basin states for their irrigation withdrawals are underestimated.^^ The system of
measuring deliveries farms),
inadequate
Frequently, what
is
to “cooperative” users (the
during
Soviet
(because measuring equipment
is
has
times,
reported as farm usage
former collective and
is
significantly
state
deteriorated.
not based on actual measurement
absent or not working) but
is
an educated
guess derived from the established water use norms (standards) for the region
and farm crop mix
what
is
actually used).
developed
represents what should be delivered to the farm, not
(i.e., it
in the Aral
Usage by
the variety of “private” farming types that have
Sea Basin countries since independence
is
even more of a
mystery. In the majority of instances, no organized system exists to measure withdrawals.
their
exaggerated as
it
It
is
also
area irrigated in any given year
likely the
is
represents the area with completed irrigation facilities but
is
not adequately reduced for those systems that are under repair, not working, or
have been removed from production salinization or lack of water).
The farms and
to overreport the area irrigated
them look
example, because of excessive
(for
states,
of course, have an incentive
and underreport water withdrawals as
better in terms of efficiency,
i.e.,
soil
makes
it
water use per hectare.
Implementation of a large-scale program for technical improvement of irrigation in the Aral
Sea Basin would be a gigantic undertaking and require
a
long period for implementation. For the basin as a whole in 1994, the length of
main and interfarm
irrigation channels
of these were lined to reduce
farm canals: over 268,000
was around 48,000 km; only 28 percent
filtration.
km with 21
main and interfarm canals need
The
situation
was even worse
for on-
km of
percent lined. In Uzbekistan 10,000
lining,
and nearly 2 million ha with older
irrigation systems, nearly one-half the irrigated area,
need reconstruction.^^
Fifty percent of irrigated lands in the basin suffers
from
salinity,
which
is
probably the most serious problem faced by irrigated agriculture.^^ In a 1989 survey of salinized lands, 53 percent were considered slightly salinized, 32 percent moderately salinized, and 13 percent strongly salinized. Large areas of irrigated lands also suffer
from high water
tables as a result of the lack of
drainage facilities or ones that are inadequate or not working properly.
major
irrigation zones, only the
adequate drainage
facilities.
Of
the
Golodnaia steppe and Khorezm oasis have
In general, groundwater levels are rising nearly
everywhere, exacerbating waterlogging and
soil
salinization. Disposal
of the
Philip Micklin
162
huge volumes of salinized and polluted (with agricultural chemicals and fertilizers) irrigation
drainage water
these discharges reached 43 the land that
now
km
irrigated
is
is
growing problem. The volume of
also a
annually by the mid-1990s.
by pumped
irrigation
A
large part of
needs to be converted to
gravitational delivery.
Uzbekistan experts have estimated the rehabilitation costs for the older systems in the basin. According to one calculation, the introduction of
irrigation
drip irrigation
would cost
$5, 000-7, 000/ha and the general raising of system
A
$3,000^,000/ha.^^
efficiency
World
Bank-sponsored
study
indicates
renovation of irrigation and drainage systems could run to $3,000/ha.^^ This
document
also estimates that 5.4 million (68 percent) of the 7.94 million ha of
irrigated lands in billion.
this
would cost $16
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with the largest areas under irrigation and
the largest share the
1995 need reconstruction. At $3, 000/ha,
bill.
It
is
collectively,
of the systems needing reconstruction, would bear the brunt of
extremely doubtful that the states of the basin, individually or
have the funds now, or will in the near or mid-term
future, to
fund
so costly a project. Furthermore, the condition of irrigation systems in the basin
has deteriorated since independence as funds for maintenance and repair have
plummeted; responsibility for system maintenance has or been
dumped on farm
fallen
between the cracks
units that are incapable or unwilling to conduct the
necessary work; and the supply of replacement parts and equipment that
formerly came from other republics of the
USSR
has dried up. Thus, overall
rehabilitation costs are steadily rising with time.
One
disturbing result of the deteriorating condition of irrigated lands in the
Aral Sea Basin (plus other factors such as poor seed quality, a sharp drop in
usage of
fertilizers
and
pesticides, poorly timed agricultural operations,
and
ill-
timed harvests) has been a steady decline in yields of most major irrigated crops, especially in Kazakhstan fell
19
percent
in
and
From 1990
Tajikistan.^^
Uzbekistan,
37 percent
in
to
1994 yields of cereals
Kazakhstan,
23 percent in
Turkmenistan, 50 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 59 percent in Tajikistan. Cotton yields declined 7 percent in Uzbekistan, 3
1
percent in Kazakhstan, 2 percent in
Turkmenistan, 24 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 31 percent in Tajikistan. Vegetable yields rose
by 23 percent
in
Turkmenistan, held steady in Uzbekistan, but
between 33 percent and 68 percent
fell
for the other states.
Switching the crop mix from high water-use crops (rice and cotton) toward
lower (grains, vegetables, melons,
fruits,
and soybeans) could be a relatively
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin low-cost
means
rehabilitation.
of reducing
water
use
compared
massive
to
the reason irrigation water withdrawals
In fact,
163
technical the basin
in
remained essentially the same (around 100 km^) between 1990 and 1995 while the irrigated hectarage substitution.^*
wheat).
was growing nearly 10 percent can be
The primary switch was from cotton
From 1990
grains increased
attributed to crop
(mainly winter
to grains
1994, the percent of the total cropped area devoted to
to
from 12 percent
to
26 percent, whereas cotton shrank from 40 "70
The purpose of
percent (or perhaps 45 percent) to 37 percent.
however, was not so bases. Uzbekistan
much water
made
these changes,
savings but strengthening of the national food
the largest absolute substitution of grain for cotton and
Turkmenistan the largest percentage switch. states will replace further large areas
It is
unlikely grains in these two
of cotton in the near future, as cotton
is
an
important foreign-currency-eaming export crop for both.
Adoption of governmental policies promoting
irrigation
water pricing,
privatization of land, and giving rights of self-governance and responsibility for
management of on-farm and
inter-farm irrigation systems to farmer-irrigators
could encourage introduction of water saving practices in the Aral Sea Basin
governmental expenditures.
massive
without
particularly
Kyrgyzstan have
taken
some
Kazakhstan,
serious
steps
Tajikistan,
in
and
direction.
this
Uzbekistan has talked about these subjects but made only feeble moves toward
implementing meaningful policies. Turkmenistan has done practically nothing.
Among
the
key problems hindering further advancements along these
lines are
governmental resistance based on fear of losing social and economic control, opposition from the officials, fear
former collective (now cooperative)
of land speculation and exacerbating rural underemployment and
unemployment, lack of means impoverished
state
to
measure water deliveries
to farmers,
and the
of the farming economy.
Small-scale, locally
Asia prior to Soviet fields
and local
fanns
managed
rule.^"*
irrigation systems
were
common
in Central
These systems employed small, carefully leveled
surrounded by low earthen walls planted with trees
to effectively control
water use and prevent secondary salinization. Although the technology of these
systems was “primitive,” water usage was surprisingly low: net field-side irrigation
norms were 8,000 mVha and gross withdrawals (including
losses in
delivery canals of 30 percent) ranged from 10,700-11,500 m^/ha. During the
1920s and afterward, these
by much
larger,
facilities
were completely obliterated and replaced
supposedly technically advanced systems. However, the new
164
Philip Micklin
systems proved to be more water consumptive, less resistant to secondary salinization,
and more unstable than what they replaced.
The major burden it
for reducing irrigation usage
must
rest
on Uzbekistan
as
has the majority of the irrigated area and irrigation withdrawals in the Aral Sea
Basin. Turkmenistan,
and withdrawals
which accounts
in
the
Amu
contributions to water savings. (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,
for a significant share of the irrigated area
Dar’ia
The remaining
and Kyrgyzstan)
basin and withdraw considerably less
although not insignificant, would be
could
basin,
states that
irrigate
water.
much
much
by
make
technical
substantial
were part of the
USSR
smaller portions of the
However, Tajikistan and
smaller.
higher than the other states, so they could
make
Their possible contributions,
Kazakhstan (see Table 6.3) have specific water use
addition to savings, the former
also
rates in irrigation that are
a disproportionately large
improvement and the
latter
by
significantly reducing production of rice, a very water-consumptive crop, along the lower reaches
withdraw very is nil.
its
in the delta of the
from the basin;
may change
This
increase
little
and
their possible contribution to
in the future for Afghanistan as
withdrawals from the
Institutional Structures for
How to improve
Syr Dar’ia. Afghanistan and Iran
irrigation to
it
water savings
could substantially
Amu Dar’ia.
Managing Transnational Water Resources
make more
efficient use
of basin water resources
is
not the only serious problem that confronts the Central Asian states. Equally serious are the issue of equitable sharing of water resources riparians (Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan) and the lower riparians (Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), contention over
on
the
Amu
between the upper
how
the
main upstream dams
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia should be operated (for hydropower
production or for irrigation), and the interstate response to the Aral Sea
The former Aral Sea Basin republics of
the Soviet
Union
crisis.
realized in late
1991, as independence approached, that they needed to establish institutional
mechanisms resources.
to
The
enhance cooperation first
in the
management of
major step was the signing
in
interstate
water
February 1992 of an
agreement on the joint management and protection of interstate water resources.
The agreement created
the Interstate Coordinating
for overseeing regulation, efficient use,
and bodies.
Water Commission (ICWC)^^
and protection of interstate watercourses
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin The commission
is
composed of
the heads of the
165
main water management
organizations in each republic or their designate (Water Resources Committee in
Kazakhstan, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management for Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan, Ministry of Reclamation and Water
Management
and Tajikistan).
to discuss
It
meets several times each year
water management policy issues.
It
Aral Sea and
to the
deltas based
its
Turkmenistan
and decide
interstate
also sets (and if necessary later adjusts) the
among
hydrologic year (October to October) allocation of water
and
for
on forecasts of water
by the hydrological and meteorological agencies
in
the republics
availability
made
each country. The allocation
scheme, basically, was a continuation of the system codified
in
1984 and 1987
under the Ministry of Water Management of the former USSR. Determination of operating regimes for the reservoirs along the interstate rivers was also placed
on
the
ICWC.
Inter-republic water
the commission, with help
from
management
disputes are to be decided
a neutral arbitrator,
if
needed. The
by
ICWC
consists of a Secretariat (in Hojent, Tajikistan), Scientific Information Center (in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan), and the basin management authorities
Basseinovoe
vodokhoziaistvennoe
Tashkent) and established
by
Amu Dar’ia the USSR in
(in
ob’edinennoe)
(BVOs) Syr
Dar’ia
BVOs
were
the
for
Urgench, Uzbekistan). The
first
ICWC
to
states.
The
ICWC
makes annual withdrawal
allocations based
water availability for the ensuing hydrologic year. Corrections the regular quarterly meetings or at specially
was
(in
1986.^^ Since independence, they are the bodies
charged with managing and monitoring the allocations made by the
member
(Russian:
the case
irrigation
allocations
interests
for the
of the downstream riparian
1996-1997 hydrologic
may
be made
at
convened sessions of this body. As
under the Soviets, the water-sharing scheme
and the
on estimates of
year.
is
heavily tilted toward
states.
Table 6.4 shows
The two leading
irrigators,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, were assigned 38 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of the total, with each to receive 36 percent of the flow of the Dar’ia, and Uzbekistan to get an additional
discharge.
Syr Dar’ia.
The
ICWC
Amu
42 percent of the Syr Dar’ia’s
allocated Kazakhstan 30 percent of withdrawals from the
Philip Micklin
166
Table
6.4.
Water Withdrawal Allocations Made by
for the 1996-1997 Hydrologic
Country
%
Syr Dar’ia
Year
(in
ICWC
km^)
%
Amu Dar’ia
Basin
the
%
Aral Sea
Basin
Basin
Tajikistan
1.65
7.4
7.90
12.9
9.55
11.4
Kyrgyzstan
0.18
0.8
0.15
0.2
0.33
0.4
Turkmenistan
0.00
0.0
22.00
35.9
22.00
26.3
Uzbekistan
9.46
42.1
22.00
35.9
31.46
37.5
Kazakhstan
6.72
29.9
0.00
0.0
6.72
8.0
Aral Sea region
4.43
19.7
9.30
15.2
13.73
16.4
22.43
100.0
61.35
100.0
83.78
100.0
Total
Source: Compiled from data in Scientific Information Center of the Interstate Coordinating Water Management Commission of Central Asia, Bulletin 14, p. 22 (in Russian).
The upstream-flow-generating
were given the
states
allocated 11 percent: 7 percent of the withdrawals
Amu
from the
percent
representing less than
percent from the
1
Dar’ia.
from the Syr Dar’ia and 13
Kyrgyzstan was
given
only
is
percent,
0.4
The
ICWC
of the Syr Dar’ia and
allotted 16 percent of the withdrawals
Amu Dar’ia
to the
Aral Sea region. In
Soviet times, the Aral Sea region did not have a specific allocation.
water
was
percent of the withdrawals from the Syr Dar’ia and 0.2
Amu Dar’ia.
(in this case, flow)
residual. Tajikistan
intended for both the deltas and the sea and
much
less
The
allotted
water than might
appear reaches the sea proper owing to major diversions into the delta for ecological purposes (e.g., support of deltaic lakes and reservoirs), water supply, TO
and even
irrigation.
The low
allocation for Kyrgyzstan
average flow year
it is
supposed
from the Syr Dar’ia
to receive 4.90
km^
is
puzzling. In an
or about 13 percent.^^ Thus,
one would have expected Kyrgyzstan to receive around 3 km^ in the 1996-1997 hydrologic year (a below-average flow year for the Syr Dar’ia).
may be
that
Kyrgyzstan withdraws some water from
a “national” resource
and
only empowered to
allocate
character.
is
not included in river
ICWC
flow that
is
An
this river that is
explanation
considered
allocations as the
ICWC
considered “interstate”
is
in
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin There are two caveats about the allocation
by
the
European Union’s
indicates missing data sets (those
WARMAP BVOs
data base developed independently Part
an analysis of these
data. First,
Project for the period 1994/95—1996/97
and data inconsistencies with two other comparable data
developed by the
project).
167
for the
by
the
Amu
European Union’s
may
of the inconsistencies
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and the
result
WARMIS
from changes
database
in
ICWC
reporting practices from year to year. Second, the actual total withdrawals and
may
withdrawals by each state
differ
somewhat from
the allocations in any
given year. In the 1995-1996 (and probably 1996-1997) years, which were dry, for
example,
much
less
than the allocated share of water reached the Aral Sea
region as upstream irrigation took more than
As might be
its
share.
expected, the upstream states, particularly Kyrgyzstan, have
complained about the allocation scheme. Their mountain
territories generate
75
percent of the flow in the basin of the Aral Sea, yet their allowed withdrawals are small
compared with
the share assigned to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan. Furthermore, to serve
accumulated in reservoirs on
irrigation,
their territories
most of the flow must be
and released during the growing
season, restricting the ability of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to generate winter hydroelectricity. This
since
it
is
a particularly serious
problem
for the former country
has faced chronic winter energy shortages in the 1990s, as deliveries of
coal (from Kazakhstan) and gas (from Uzbekistan) have, at best, been irregular.
During the Soviet era such deliveries were guaranteed
to
cover Kyrgyzstan’s
opportunity costs in forgoing winter hydroelectric generation.
The 1992 agreement has become acutely contentious among Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and especially Uzbekistan want
schemes
allocation
Tajikistan
expand
and operational
regimes
continued.
want considerably more of the flow allocated
irrigation)
and
more
freedom
to
generate
to
the five states.
to see the existing
Kyrgyzstan
them
winter
(so they can
hydropower.
Kyrgyzstan over the past five years has repeatedly violated winter release (set
by
the
ICWC)
at the
and
limits
huge Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn, the chief
tributary of the Syr Dar’ia. This action has reduced water available during the
following
summer season
for
downstream
irrigation.
It
also has caused winter
flooding in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, forcing emergency diversion of flow,
which should go the Aral Sea,
to
been leveled against Kyrgyzstan irrigation water
from Toktogul
Lake Amasay that
in the
it is
in the desert.
Charges have also
not releasing the obligatory quantity of
summer.
Philip Micklin
168
There are also allocation conflicts among the downstream contentious
Kara-Kum
the disagreement
is
Canal.
km-long canal
is
almost
irrigates
1
km
since the mid-1950s, the almost 1,400-
annually from the
million ha in Turkmenistan and
Amu Dar’ia.
the source of municipal
is
considers the canal fundamental to national survival and
and
irrigating
even larger
areas.
On
government views the unlined Kara-Kum the desert that loses as
huge amounts of water
one of the key factors contributing
hand,
man-made
to filtration.
to the
intent
is
other
the
as a
deteriorating,
In
which
it.
Owing
Uzbekistan
river flowing through
They
also see the canal
it
and increased
lack of maintenance, the canal
to
The
demise of the Aral Sea.
further increases water losses
March 1993,
on lengthening
the
Uzbekstanis are adamantly opposed to further construction on water diversions to
This facility
The Turkmenistan government
water supply for the capital of Ashgabat.
it
Most
between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the
Under construction
allocated 13
states.
from
is
rapidly
it.
the presidents of the five republics signed an agreement to
promote cooperation
in solving the
surrounding region.
It
key problems related
established the Interstate Council
to the
on
the
Aral Sea and
Problems of the
Aral Sea Basin (ICAS) (Russian: Mezhgosudarstvennyi Sovet po problemam basseina AraTskogo moria).
A
major purpose of the new organization was
to oc
facilitate
assistance
Composed of
from the World Bank and other
twenty-five members, five from each
international donors.
state,
ICAS was given
duty to manage various Aral Sea Basin assistance programs. at irregular intervals (six
in
January
1994
to
meet
meetings were held between July 1993 and February
by an Executive Council
1997), but day-to-day activities were to be handled
located in Tashkent.
ICAS was
the
The the
existing
ICWC
was made
a
component of ICAS, and
Development
Sustainable
Commission
(SDC),
headquartered in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, was added to the administrative structure of the organization. for the Aral
The
presidents also created the International
Fund
Sea (IFAS) [Russian: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond spaseniia Arala],
composed of ten members, two from each
state,
with the responsibility to collect
funds from each basin state (recommended contribution of
income) for financing of rehabilitation
efforts.
1
percent of national
The fund’s headquarters were
placed in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan was elected as the
The 1997.
first
head.
presidents
made major changes
The most important
step
in the
ICAS and IFAS
was abolishing ICAS and merging
in
February
the functions
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin of the two organizations into a restructured IFAS
to
169
reduce duplication of
effort,
simplify the administrative structure, overcome bureaucratic inertia that had
developed, and revitalize improvement efforts in the Aral Sea Basin. The leadership of
IFAS
is
to rotate in a
two-year cycle among the Central Asian
heads of state, with Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan, chosen to begin the
Annual
cycle. to
0.3
financial contributions to the fund
percent
Turkmenistan,
and
downstream
“richer”
for to
percent
0.1
for
were also revised downward
Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan,
and
“poorer” upstream Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.
International
Donor Efforts
to
Promote Water Management Cooperation
Since independence, international aid donors have played a major role in
promoting cooperation in the
in the
management of
The World Bank
Aral Sea Basin.
and Development) was the
first
the transnational water resources
(International
Bank
for Reconstruction
major player on the scene. In 1992 and 1993, the
Bank formulated an Aral Sea Basin Assistance Program (ASBP)
to
be carried
out in three phases over fifteen to twenty years and expected to cost around $250
The main
million (as of 1996, the estimated cost had risen to $470 million).
goals of the program are (1) rehabilitation and development of the Aral Sea disaster zone; (2) strategic planning
water resources of the institutions
Amu
Dar’ia and
states to create
ICAS and IFAS and
through these organizations to realize the the
ASBP
Syr Dar’ia;
and
(3)
building
has worked with and
ASBP. Afghanistan was
invited to join
but did not respond to the overture.
The preparatory portion of
the first phase
was supposed
to take eighteen
months and be finished by the end of 1995.^^ The bank declared these finished in mid- 1997, twelve
planning process were (for the
of
and implementing the above programs. The bank
for planning
encouraged the basin
and comprehensive management of the
bank) social,
still
months behind schedule, even though
parts of the
under way. Lack of experience working in the new
political,
and economic environment of Central Asia and
laggard funding of the preparatory project financing
activities
work
(as
of mid- 1997 only $15.4 million of
was completed or under way) appear
to
be the chief reasons
for the delay.
The bank undertook
a
review of the
ASBP
in July
1996
in
which donor and
regional representatives participated.^^ Recognizing the accomplishments and
Philip Micklin
170
number of major changes. The basin
progress made, the review proposed a states
were advised
of regional institutions and depend
to strengthen the role
on donor influence,
to increase their political
and financial commitments
less
to the
regional bodies, to clarify the priorities between national and regional tasks, to
make
focus more attention on quickly implementable activities, and to
ICWC, SDC, and BVOs). The reduce
The next phase
ASBP,
projects supportive of the
World Bank’s Aral Sea Basin Program
in the
new emphasis on
With
and a half years
slated to run for four
it is
managing
the program.
intended to improve the
important of these
the
is
a planned start date of
at a cost
is
Most of
management of
water and
and development of low-cost, is
to
components of
the
salt
ASBP,
this
local,
August
the executive role, is
plan are directly
transnational water resources.
management, which aims salt
management
Water
of $21.2 million. In line
regional responsibility for the
of national and regional water and
serious
at the
strategies
Most
formulation
and agreements,
on-farm water conservation measures. The
improve the efficiency of water use, deal with the increasingly
problem of
salinization of soils
from improper
irrigation practices,
and
reduce the amount of irrigation drainage water flowing back into rivers.
second program aims agreements.
at the
for saving water
reservoir
management
and
the interstate rivers.
quality
the
and water users
to the
to effect behavioral
The
and safety of
fifth
and quantity, which
interstate
a public awareness
campaign
key issues and
change in water users.
dam and
undertaking is
is
Dam and intended
transboundary monitoring of water
a precondition to
more
water management/sharing agreements. This
USSR is
is
of the
reservoir infrastructure along
is
effective
and accepted
of great importance as
network of hydrologic and water quality observations
under the
to sensitize
strategies
constitutes a fourth piece of the project. This
to ensure the sustainability
A
strengthening of existing interstate water sharing
A third component entails
the public, water suppliers,
ASBP
it
gradually
committee of the IF AS, with the bank playing a cooperative/advisory
purpose
that
ASBP.
and Environmental Management Project.
with the
bank
to the
technical assistance role, and speedily prepare the follow-up project to
its
the first phase of the
1998,
recommended
basin states
more on financing of
concentrate
in 1997], IF AS,
(ICAS [abolished
the roles of the different regional entities
clearer
stations established
deteriorating at a rapid pace.^"^
Besides those of the World Bank, there are several other international efforts to
improve management of
interstate
water resources in the Aral Sea
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin The United
Basin.
States,
Technology (EPT)
through the USAID-funded Environmental Policy and
which ran from 1993
project,
1998, supported regional
to
agreement on operation of the Toktogul
efforts to reach
the Syr Dar’ia.^^ Located in Kyrgyzstan, this
downstream water use
171
dam and
huge storage
reservoir
controls
facility
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Controversy over the
in
appropriate operating regime (for hydropower, for irrigation, or
between these two) had risen
to the flash point
somewhere
between upstream Kyrgyzstan
and downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Working with the Council for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (ICKKU), the
Interstate
EPT
Project
helped the three countries reach a framework agreement that was signed
March
way
A
1998.^^
smaller-scale follow-up project sponsored
ICKKU
to help the
on
by
USAID
is
in
under
implement the agreement.
The United Nations has been providing
a variety
The most ambitious
Sea Basin since 1990.
UN
of assistance
to the
Aral
efforts in recent years are
proceeding under the direction of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP). One of UNDP’s major
efforts
is
aimed
at
strengthening the regional
organizations that have been established to deal with the Aral crisis (earlier
ICAS and IFAS, now
the reconstituted IFAS).
The European Union states in
1995
Production
known the
in
objectives of the
initiated a
as the
Central
policies, strategies,
management of
Water Resources Management and Agricultural Asian
program were
framework within which the
major aid program for the Aral Sea Basin
Republics
(WARMAP)
“to provide the administrative
five republics
The
Project.^^
and technical
of the Aral Sea Basin can develop
and development programs
for utilization, allocation,
and
the water resources of the basin; and to assist at the regional
level with the establishment
of the institutional structure required to prepare and
execute policies and strategies to give effect to the agreed framework on water allocation and a cost
A
management.”
Phases
1
and 2 were completed by mid- 1997
at
of around $6 million.
number of
resources
activities directly related to
were completed over
this
period,
management of including
interstate
development of
Geographic Information System-based land and water database providing help to the World
Bank and ICAS (now IFAS)
improve and legally codify the
1992
interstate
water a
for the basin,
in their efforts to
water sharing
agreement,
sponsorship and funding of training seminars and workshops, and an attempt to gather detailed data on irrigated water use at the farm level through a Water Use
Philip Micklin
172
and Farm Management Monitoring Survey (WUFMAS).^^'
WARMAP
follow-up project to
more
years.
in early
continuation or
1998 and will run for several
102
Improvements Needed
The
began
A
five Central
in the
Management of International Waters
Asian republics of the former USSR,
created regional institutions (IF AS,
ICWC, and ICKKU)
to their credit,
have
to deal with questions
of basin-wide and transboundary concern, including the allocation of water
among them from
human and So
far,
Amu
the international rivers,
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and the
ecological problems connected with the desiccation of the Aral Sea.
the Central
Asian
have approached these matters in a
states
mutual cooperation and respect for national
spirit
of
rights.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the international community has
become deeply involved on water sharing and
to
in assisting the basin states in their efforts to cooperate
overcome
the
most serious problems associated with the
human
Aral Sea. Donor aid has focused on several key issues: (1) improving the
condition and ecological situation in the zone around the sea that has been most seriously afflicted; (2) raising the efficiency of water use in irrigated agriculture
of the regional institutions created to deal with
in the basin; (3) capacity building
Aral Sea Basin issues to their duties;
and
(4)
make them more
effective
and
efficient in carrying out
promoting the development of agreements on sharing of the
waters of international rivers and operation of the Toktogul reservoir that
comport with international legal standards and norms. In spite of the successes enumerated above, resolution.
The regional organizations
their roles clarified. Responsibilities
areas of
(IF AS,
many
critical
issues await
ICWC, and ICKKU) need
to
and functions of the three overlap
management and program implementation. This has
have
in
key
led to confusion,
disagreements, and costly duplication of effort that have slowed the introduction
of improvement measures.
A
sincere
effort
should be
Afghanistan in negotiations about water allocations from the country accounts for about 8 percent of that river’s flow.
Afghans were invited
to join the
However, when peace and be made
to include
organizations.
ASBP,
As
made
to
include
Amu Dar’ia
as this
indicated above, the
but did not respond to the overture.
stability returns to this nation, further efforts
should
Afghanistan in the work of the basin water management
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin The
International
support from the
Fund
member
for the Aral
more
to receive
countries in terms of financing, recognition of
and supplying
interstate status,
Sea (IFAS) also needs
173
it
its
with qualified personnel. Lack of adequate
funding has been a serious hindrance to the work of
this organization.
On
the
other hand, the Aral Sea Basin states on a national basis have invested in water
management and Aral Sea zone improvement
efforts.
The executive committee
of the IFAS reports that Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have together been spending around
$650 million annually on socioeconomic and
environmental stabilization efforts in the disaster zone around the figure
substantial, although likely exaggerated, particularly
is
use of an artificially high exchange rate between the International donors need to
implement several changes
Primary importance should be given players such as the
sum and
to
sea.^®^
This
by Uzbekistan’s
the U.S. dollar. in their operations.
improving cooperation among the major
World Bank, United Nations, United
and European
States,
Union. Talk abounds of “working together” to minimize program duplication
and costs as well as maximizing
working
in the
donor community
1998 suggests such rhetoric large
number of donors and
is
results.
in
Flowever, this author’s experience
Tashkent during 1996-1997 and summer
more good
the complexity of programs under
way
Basin and the inevitable duplication of effort and conflicts that be advisable
to
establish
in the
arises,
high-level council of donors that
a
Given the
intentions than reality.
it
Aral
would
would meet
regularly (at least twice each year?) to discuss the activities of the different
donors and to
facilitate field-level
coordination and cooperation.
The laggard pace of donor program implementation Expensive
feasibility
and planning studies drag on and,
Central Asians, there are no tangible results. Certainly this the hindrances faced
by
needed
to
move more
of
in the eyes is
many
partially a result
of
donor community in working within societies
the
undergoing major economic,
also needs attention.
social,
and
political transition.
But
a real effort
is
quickly from the feasibility study and design phase to the
completion of projects that make a difference in the lives of the region’s people.
The World Bank failing
and
is
as a result
of its July 1996 review has explicitly recognized
attempting to correct the problem in
Another problem
is
that
the
What
institutions in Central
this
means
is
new ASBP
efforts.
donor community may, inadvertently, be
developing an “international welfare mentality” Aral Sea Basin.
its
this
among
the aid recipients in the
that frequently regional, national,
and local
Asia approach international donors seeking funding for
174
Philip Micklin
what are worthwhile endeavors but should region. Often,
it
is
and monuments water supply
money
not a case of lack of
about spending priorities
in the capital cities over
new
community has
Although complaints international assistance.
community
It is
is
but of governmental choices
hospitals, clinics,
Aral Sea disaster zone). This
pervasive attitude that the Aral Sea situation international
be funded from within the
giving precedence to grandiose public buildings
(e.g.,
facilities in the
really
is
is
and drinking
helped along by a
a “world problem” and that the
a moral and ethical obligation to help solve
heard
frequently
are
Asia
Central
in
it.
that
the
not doing enough, donors have provided substantial
difficult to estimate the overall contributions
because of lack of
comprehensive data and double counting (the World Bank commonly includes in
its
figures
funding of Aral Sea Basin efforts that are also counted by
individual donors such as the United States). But in addition to other Aral Sea
Basin
efforts, the
Bank
alone has, or
planning through fiscal year 2000,
is
sixteen loans and credits to Central Asian states totaling $605
million for
improvement of land and water management. Other donors have given or plan
to
provide hundreds of millions more.
The Future The Aral Sea Basin
states face
transnational waters. the flow of the
basis
Amu
The region
difficulties in the joint
to
management of their
not inherently “short” on water resources as
is
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia
would appear
there
many
is
substantial.
On
an average annual
be sufficient water in the region (including
groundwater) to meet current withdrawals. But average figures are deceptive
and do not
reflect the intra-
and inter-year
variability
of these
rivers’ discharge
and the associated problem of storing flow during “surplus” flow seasons and years for use during times of flow deficit, availability.
When
when demand
is
greater than natural
these factors are taken into consideration, resources are
already severely strained, particularly in the cycles of low flow years.
The key problem withdrawals.
The chief
the states except
which accounts
is irrigation,
irrigating states are
Kazakhstan plan
to
expand
for
more than 90 percent of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. All their irrigated areas.
For one
state to
increase irrigation necessitates that other states along these rivers reduce theirs
or that large quantities of water are freed
by major technological improvements
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
175
water use efficiency and/or implementation of switches from high- to low-
in
A
water-consuming crops.
comprehensive and thorough program
to raise
water
use efficiency in irrigation could free substantial amounts of water, perhaps 36.5
km
,
km^ withdrawn
or over 33 percent of the 111
massive investments of unlikely to be
made
at least
$16
in the near to
Crop substitution
would require
billion which, as explained earlier,
mid-term
is
highly
future.
much cheaper means
a
is
in 1995. This
to obtain sizable reductions in
water use, but done on a large scale would necessitate considerable reduction in the hectarage devoted to cotton,
Turkmenistan
and
chief export crop for Uzbekistan and
the
foreign-currency
earner
for
Adoption
former.
the
of
governmental policies promoting irrigation water pricing, privatization of land,
and giving rights of self-governance and responsibility for management of systems
irrigation
farmer-irrigators
to
A
encouraging water conservation.
is
partial return to
avenue
for
use of small-scale
the
systems that characterized parts of Central Asia in earlier times,
irrigation
coupled with the sensible employment of also
promising
very
a
contribute
to
efficiency
introduction of such changes
Turkmenistan appear dim Inherent water
irrigation technology, could
and water savings.
among
the
key
However, prospects
irrigating states
for
of Uzbekistan and
at best.
management
(Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
modem
conflicts exist
between
the upstream states
and Afghanistan) and the downstreamers (Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan). The former generate a large preponderance of basin flow (more than 80 percent) but use relatively
reversed for the
latter.
Tajikistan,
little
of this. The situation
and particularly Kyrgyzstan, are
withdrawing significantly more of the water coming from
expand
to
Turkmenistan as upstream
it
states also
their territory to
the interests the
Such action
irrigation.
summer
is
intent
is
on
their territory in order
opposed by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
reduces the water available for their national uses. The
want
to operate the large hydroelectric stations located
maximize winter hydropower production, which
of downstream irrigating
states that
need
maximum
on
counter to
is
releases during
irrigation season. This has already led to sharp conflict
between
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the one hand, and Kyryzstan on the other. Serious differences also have developed
among
the downstreamers, especially
between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the Kara-Kum Canal. The is
further exacerbated
by
situation
the tendency of the basin states to overestimate their
share of the Aral Sea Basin’s resources.
When
these are totaled, they
come
out
176
Philip Micklin
significantly
resources.
more than any reasonable estimate of usable basin-wide water
106
Finally there shrink,
is
the
problem of the Aral Sea. This water body continues
and the serious environmental and human problems
“disaster zone” are not substantially abating. stabilize the
Large Sea in the south,
let
To provide
to
in the surrounding
sufficient inflow to
alone begin to raise
its
level,
would
require sizable cutbacks in irrigation (or a substantial effort to improve irrigation efficiency and implement crop substitution).
None of
be implemented anytime in the foreseeable
future.
states
have formally agreed
two
the deltas of the
rivers
more water
to provide
and
these options
The (former
for preserving
partially restoring the
Aral Sea, but attaining even these modest goals
is
now
proving
is
likely to
Soviet) basin
what
is left
of
separated northern
difficult.
Nevertheless improved management of the interstate waters in the Aral Sea
Basin
is
far
from hopeless. Since independence, the basin
states
have taken
important steps to put in place regional institutions to promote basin-wide cooperation in coping with both the problem of water sharing and the Aral Sea.
The
international
organizations
is
community through
the major multilateral and bilateral aid
providing material financial and technical assistance plus policy
advice to help in these endeavors. However, progress the critical problems remain formidable
Looking to
follow
is
conflict,
slow and uneven, and
and largely unresolved.
to the future, the only rational
avenue for the Aral Sea Basin
cooperation and compromise
transnational water resources. This
is
in
managing and sharing
states
their
not only necessary to avoid interstate
is
perhaps even military confrontation, but to develop an integrated,
basin-wide strategy to optimize water use efficiency and maximize efforts to restore
and protect
environs.
Such
most populous, strategic,
critical water-related
a strategy
would benefit
politically powerful,
and heaviest-irrigating
interstate cooperative
all
basin riparians. Uzbekistan, as the
economically developed, geographically
state
management of
ecosystems such as the Aral Sea and
in
the basin
is
critical
in the past, regional efforts to
national water resources will founder.
successful
transnational waters. If this state focuses
excessively on national self-interest in water management, as
do
to
effectively
it
has been wont to
and peacefully manage
trans-
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
1
77
Notes
Center for International Projects, The Modern State of Nature, Population,
1.
and Economy of
the Aral Sea Basin:
International Projects, 1991), p. 4
Russian).
Basin areas calculated from World Bank
2.
Map IBRD
25944,
and Uzbekistan) (Water and Environmental Management
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Washington, D.C.,
Project,
Tashkent
Institute
May
1998), p.
1.
of Engineers of Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanization
and The Aral Sea International Committee, “The Mirzaev Report,”
demographic appendices. This from an
title
report,
Asian experts devoted to finding
It
EC
World Bank,
new approaches
of ICAS, and
in
and
7. Philip P.
regions,
(Aral Sea Basin
for
in
arise in
sponsored
(river, lake, or sea).
They
rates are so high they lose
Management
their water.
all
Crisis in Soviet Central Asia,” in
Russian and East European Studies, No. 905 (Pittsburgh:
Russian and East European Studies, August territory
1991),
of the basin,”
p.
in
4;
D.
Vestnik
(water resources). Spring 1996, pp. 5-7 (in Russian).
1
D. C.
and Uses
Program Technical
humid mountainous zones and flow
Mamatkanov, “Water resources of the mountain Arala, No.
Water
a Regional
p. 14.
where they
Micklin, “The Water
The Carl Beck Papers
The Center
management
to alleviating water
ICWC, Developing
and Work Plan
Strategy: Issues
where evaporation
into deserts
8.
September 1996 under the
in
Terminal rivers are not tnbutary to a body of water
common
translated
grew out of a seminar of independent Central
Senes, Washington, D.C., April 1996),
are
was
1998,
Aral Sea Basin.
in the
Management
for the pnncipal author,
May
“Conceptual Strategy for Proper Development of the Water Ecology
Relations in the Aral Sea Basin.”
problems
named
Russian-language report published
earlier
translated
6.
1994,
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
3.
5.
May
February 1999.
utilizing a polar planimeter,
4.
(m
Diagnostic Study (Moscow: Center for
McKinney and
in the
S.
Akmansoy, “What Are
Aral Sea Region?” Paper presented
by the
SSRC,
Tashkent,
Fundamental Provisions of Water Management Strategy of Water Allocation,
at
Uzbekistan,
Rational
Competing Water Needs
the
Aral Sea Basin Workshop,
May
in the
Water Use,
19-21,
1998;
Aral Sea Basin: A
ICAS,
Common
and Protection of Water
Resources, prepared with the assistance of the World Bank, October 1996 (no pagination). Chapter 6.
Philip Micklin
178
9. Ibid.
10.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
11. Micklin,
“The Water Management
6,
Table 6.3.
Crisis,” p. 99.
12.
Mamatkanov, “Water resources of the mountain,”
13.
World Bank
14.
et ah.
Dukhovnyi, Reclamation
15.
7,
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter Chapter
Arid Zone
the
Fundamental Provisions,
6,
Table 6.6.
7,
Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
6.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
18. Micklin, 19.
and Water Management of
Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
16. Ibid., 17.
p. 16.
1993), p 56 (in Russian); ICAS,
(Tashkent: Mekhnat,
Chapter
Developing a Regional,
p. 5.
“The Water Management
Crisis,” pp. 4-7.
Michael Collier, Robert H. Webb, and John C. Schimdt,
Dams and Rivers:
Primer on the Ecological Effects of Dams, U.S. Geological Circular 1126 (Tucson:
uses, June
1996),
94 pages; Philip
Micklin,
P.
“Man and
the
water cycle:
challenges for the 21st century,” in Geojournal No. 39 (July 1996), pp. 285-298. 20.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
a reservoir
and
is
refilled is
termed gross capacity, whereas
known
as usable capacity.
21. Dukhovnyi, Reclamation lation
and Analysis of Regional
p.
1
and Water,
Strategies on
A
p.
260;
p.
227
water-storage volume of
full
that portion is
of
it
that can
be drained
termed dead storage.
WARMAP
Project,
Formu-
Land and Water Management
and Watering
12 (in Russian); B. G. Shtepa, ed..
(Moscow: Kolos, 1975), 22.
The
The difference
1997), p. 8; A. N. Askochenskii, Irrigation
Kolos, 1967),
6.
in the
(July
USSR (Moscow:
Land Reclamation
in the
USSR
(in Russian).
90 percent flow year
is
a probabilistic concept.
It is
a flow year
which
probability analysis of a long record of annual flows, at least thirty years, indicates likely to
is
be exceeded 90 percent of the time. The probability analyses used to create
such probabilities are based on the
fitting
of a theoretical probability curve to the
flow record or plotting of the actual flow record on probability paper. 23.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
24. V. N. Bortnik
and
Table 12.
S. P. Chistiaevaia, eds..
chemistry of the Seas of the USSR, Vol. 1990), p. 38 (in Russian).
7,
8,
Hydrometeorology and Hydro-
Aral Sea (Leningrad: Gidrometeoizdat,
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
25. Ibid., p. 36, Table 4.1; Philip P. Micklin,
179
“The Aral Sea Problem,”
in Civil
Engineering, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers (August 1994),
p.
115.
26. Mieklin, The Water
was exceeded by
1.
in the
m
Crisis, pp.
M. Zholdasova,
1.
42-54.
In surface area, the Aral
Union and
Lake Victoria
in
A. N. Urasbaev, E. Adenbaev, and
S.
the Soviet
Iran,
United States and Canada.
“The Aral Sea Problem,”
27. Micklin,
28.
the Caspian Sea
Lake Supenor
Africa, and
Management
p. 116.
P. Pavlovskaia,
K. Lubimova, “Biological Bases of Fishery Development in the Waterbodies of the
Southern Aral Region,”
UNESCO
Deltas,
UNESCO,
in
Ecological Research and Monitoring of the Aral Sea
Aral Sea Project
1992—1996, Final Scientific Reports (Pans:
1998), pp. 213—215; Micklin, The Water
29. Micklin,
The Water Management
30. Micklin,
“The Aral Sea Problem,”
31. N. Novikova,
“The Tugai of
Management
Crisis, pp. p.
1
Crisis, pp.
49-50.
50-52.
16.
the Aral Sea Region
is
dying:
Can
it
be
restored?” in Russian Conservation News, No. 6 (February 1996), pp. 22-23. 32. Ibid. 33.
M.
some
Palvaniiazov, “The effect of dust storms on the habitats of
mammals of the
coastal
zone of the Aral Sea,”
in
Problemy osvoeniia pustyn
’,
No.
1
(1989), p. 56 (in Russian). 34. Ibid.; Philip P. Micklin,
35.
“The Aral Sea Problem,”
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,
36. N. Novikova, Principles
p. 116.
pp. 3-5.
of preserving the botanical diversity of the deltaic
plains of the Turan, dissertation in the form of a scientific report to meet the
requirements for a doctoral degree 37. Micklin,
F.
geography (Moscow, 1997),
The Water Management
Aral Catastrophe,” in
N.
in
Glazovskii,
Crisis, pp.
p. 71 (in Russian).
48-49; D. B. Oreshkin, “The
Nauka o zemle. No. 2 (Moscow: Znaniye, 1990)
(in
Russian);
The Aral Crisis: Causative Factors and Means of Solution
(Moscow: Nauka, 1990),
pp.
20-23
(in
38. Bortnik and Chistiaevaia, eds..
Russian).
Hydrometeorology and hydro chemistry’,
p. 27, Fig. 2.7.
39. Glazovskiy, The Aral Crisis, p. 22.
40. G.N. Chichasova, ed.. Hydrometeorological
Region (Leningrad: Gidrometeoizdat, 1990),
p.
215
Problems of the Near Aral
(in Russian).
Philip Micklin
180
41.
M, Rubanov and N. M. Bogdanava,
I.
deflation on the dried
bottom of the Aral Sea,”
(1987), p. 14 (in Russian).
and
in spite
salt,
The reason
“Quantitative estimation of the salt
in
Problemy osvoeniia pustyn
No. 3
for the predieted decrease in exported dust
of a larger area of dried bottom, was an expected significant
decrease in losses from “old” areas of the bottom where the loose material subject to
would become
transport
largely depleted, carried
by
precipitation
below the surface
or formed into a hard, deflation-resistant crust. 42.
and
M. Ye. Bel’gibayev,
salt in air currents,” in
“Dust-salt meter
- an instrument
Problemy osvoeniia pustyn’. No.
for entrapping dust 1
(1984), p. 74 (in
Russian). 43. Palvaniiazov,
“The
effect of dust storms,” p. 56.
44. Ch. A. Abdirov, N. A. Agadzhanian, A. V. Vervikhvost, K. P. Primbetov,
A. Ye. Severin, Yu. P. Brushkov, and L. G. Konstantinova, “Stress Reaction of healthy children in
Aral region,” in
Nukus
of negative ecological factors in the near
to the influence
Vestnik Karakalpakskogo otdeliniia Akademii
Nauk
Uzbekistana, No. 2 (1993), pp. 15-20 (in Russian); Pravda Vostoka (22
Respubliki
May
1987),
p. 3.
45. Micklin, The Water
CmA, pp.
Management
Crisis, pp.
52-53; Glazovskii, The Aral
19-21.
46. Philip P. Micklin,
“The Aral
Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 33, No. 5
Crisis: Introduction to the Special Issue,” in
(May
1992), p. 276.
47. Ibid.
48. Withdrawals are a measure of the total water taken from sources (rivers and
groundwater) for
withdrawn
irrigation.
Consumptive use
that is lost to evaporation
is
a measure of the water that
(from conveyance canals and
transpired from or incorporated into crops.
The
return flow. Return flow includes filtration
difference between the
from canals,
filtration
fields)
two
from
is
is
and
termed
fields,
and
surface runoff from fields. Part of return flow ultimately reaches the river from
which takes or adds
to groundwater, while another portion runs off into desert
hollows to form lakes (the water from these 49. Hydrologic data collected
by
is lost
to evaporation).
the author between
1984-1998 from a variety
of sources, including the Gidroproekt (Hydro Planning) Institute in
Glavgidromet (Main Administration of Hydrometeorology) derive long-term time series flows for the
balances for the Aral Sea.
Amu
Moscow and
in Tashkent,
and used
to
Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia and water
.
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
50. Micklin,
“The Aral Sea Problem,”
51. N. V. Aladin, and
I.
S.
181
pp. 120-121.
Plotnikov, “Concerning the question of the possible
preservation and rehabilitation of the Small Aral Sea,” in Biological
Science Problems of the Aral Sea and Near Aral Region,
RAN,
Zoological Institute,
Vol. 262, pp. 3-16;
WARMAP
and Natural
Proceedings of the
Formulation
Project,
&
Analysis, pp. 66—67.
However, once the Large Sea
52.
to separate the
of the
Amu
restore
it
more meters,
falls several
it
may be
possible
deep western part from the shallow eastern by a dike, direct the flow
Dar’ia into the western part and, over time, freshen and ecologically
by allowing
a controlled flow of saline water to the eastern portion.
eastern part, nevertheless,
would rapidly shnnk and
53.
The Christian Science Monitor
54.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,
(5
The
salinize.
February 1999),
p. 7.
p. 10.
55. Conversation with Victor Dukhovnyi, director of the SIC,
ICWC,
Delft,
Netherlands, 19 July 1999. 56.
Dukhovnyi, Reclamation and Water,
may be
57. This figure tight
p. 56.
high, as a 10 percent growth over five years, given the
water situation in the basin, seems improbable. Growth from 1985-1990 was
less than
58.
4 percent.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
program of future development of
(Spnng 1996),
6;
V. Antonov, “Concerning the
irrigation in Uzbekistan,” in Vestnik Arala,
(Ministry of Water
Management
Construction),
World Bank
61.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
et al..
Deputy Minister of Minvodstroi
Moscow,
60.
14 September 1989.
Developing a Regional, pp. 24-25. 4,
Table 4.1
62. V. Dukhovnyi, “Save irrigation water!” in Gidrotekhnika
64.
melioratsiia.
No.
and discussions with Mr. Onno Schapp, on-farm imgation
specialist,
WARMAP
Program, during the period October
working
i
40-43.
63. Conversations
management
1
pp. 7-10.
59. Interview with Mr. Polad-Polad Zade, First
5 (1985), pp.
No.
as director of a
World Bank
USAID
et al..
Project
of the
European
TACIS
1996-August 1997 when the author was
project in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Developing a Regional,
65. Antonov, “Concerning the
Union’s
p. 23.
program of future,”
p. 9.
Philip Micklin
182
66. E.
I.
Pankova,
Aidarov,
P.
I.
and Anthropogenic
Blarovolin, Natural
Geography,
I.
F.
Novikoa, and N.
of the Aral Sea Basin
Salinization
(Moscow:
Evolution
Genesis,
A. lamnova, A.
Academy
Russian
S.
Soils:
of Agrocultural
Sciences, 1996), pp. 85-87. 67.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
68. Report given
Uzbekistan,
at
6.
by G. N. Djalalov, Deputy Minister of Water Management
Working Meeting of Representatives of
the
the
for
Water-Energy
Services of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan for Preparation of
Recommendations
Use of
for the Efficient
the Resourees of the Naryn-Syr Dar’ia
Cascade of Reservoirs over the Long-Term, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 1-2 October 1996. 69.
World Bank
70.
ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter
et ah.
Developing a Regional,
p. 25.
10,
Table 10.2.
71. Ibid., Chapter 10, Table 10.1. 72.
cotton
The
from which these data
was from 45 percent
handbook data
report
to
are taken (footnote 70) states the drop in
37 percent. Data
indicate the 1990 percentage of cotton
among
“authoritative” sources
is
in
the
was 40
1990 Soviet
statistieal
percent. Inconsistency of
a major problem.
Information acquired by the author during a one-year assignment as
73.
Resident
Advisor
on
Water
and
Management Policy
Environmental
the
to
Government of Uzbekistan, under USAID’s Environmental Policy and Technology Project,
September 1996-October 1997; Philip
Governing
Irrigation
Systems
in Uzbekistan:
P. Micklin,
“Development of
Problems and Prospects,”
report on the training seminar held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
Self-
draft final
29-30 April 1997,
prepared for the Central Asia Mission U.S. Agency for International Development,
Almaty,
Kazakhstan,
under
No.
Contract
CCN-0003-Q- 14-3 165-00
Environmental Policy and Technology Project, 25
May
of
the
1997; Philip P. Micklin,
“Developing Water Pricing Systems for Uzbekistan: Key Policy Issues and
Initial
Steps,” draft final report on the training seminar held in Khodjikent, Uzbekistan, 28
July-1
August 1997, prepared
International
Central Asia Mission U.S.
for the
for
Development, Almaty, Kazakhstan, under Contract No. CCN-0003-Q-
14-3165-00 of the Environmental Policy and Technology Project, 74. K. Sh. Sirozhidinov,
“About the
Aral Sea,” in Problemy osvoeniia pustyn 75.
Agency
ICWC,
Central Asia
real reasons for the ’,
August 1997.
in the level
of the
No. 6 (1991), pp. 23-28.
J 992-1 997,
Scientific Information Center (SIC)
drop
1 1
Tashkent,
of ICWC, pp. 4-8.
1997,
published
by
the
.
.
Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin
76.
In Russian this
is
183
Mezhgosudarstvennaia koordinatsionnaia vodokhoz-
iaistvennaia komissiia. 77. International
and a look toward June 1997, 78.
p. 7 (in
Fund
for
Saving the Aral, Aral Sea basin program: the past
the future^ Phase
Report 4 (work implementation), Tashkent,
1,
Russian).
WARMAP Projeet, Formulation and Analysis,
79. T. Sarbaev,
Vestnik Arala, No.
p. 72.
“Concerning future development of imgation
1
(Spnng 1996),
p.
1
1
(in
in
Kyrgyzstan,”
Russian).
80.
WARMAP Project, Formulation & Analysis,
81
Information acquired by the author dunng a one-year assignment.
.
Tim Hannan and Sarah
L.
Canal: Problems and Prospects,”
in
82.
in
pp. 72-84.
O’Hara, “Managing Turkmenistan’s Kara
Kum
Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 39,
No. 4 (Apnl 1998), pp. 225-235. The Water Management
83. Micklin, 84.
Agreement on
around the sea
crisis,
Crisis, p. 46.
Sea and the zone
joint activities in addressing the Aral
improving the environment, and ensuring the
economic development of the Aral Sea region, signed
in
social
and
Kzyl-Orda, Republic of
Kazakhstan, 26 March 1993. 85. Philip P. Micklin, “International
An Overview
and Regional Responses
of Efforts and Accomplishments,”
to the Aral Crisis:
Post-Soviet Geography
in
and
Economics, Vol. 39, No. 7 (September 1998), pp. 406-409. 86. International 87. Ibid., pp. 88.
Fund
for
Saving the Aral, Aral Sea basin program, pp. 4-1
41-42; World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,
1
p. 9.
See Micklin, “International and Regional,” pp. 399-417, for a detailed
treatment of international assistance efforts in the Aral Sea Basin. 89. Ibid., pp.
406-409.
90.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,
91
Ibid., p. 9.
.
92.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,
p. 9,
footnote 16.
pp. 8-1
1
93. Ibid., pp. 19-34.
94.
World Bank
et al..
Developing a Regional,
p.
1
5.
95. Micklin, “International and Regional,” pp. 409-410. 96.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,
Institutions for Central
Summary,”
13
p. 21;
Environmental Policies and
Asia (EPIC) program, sponsored by USAID, “Information
September 1999, 7 pages.
184
Philip Micklin
97. Ibid.
and Regional,” pp. 410-41
98. Micklin, “International
1.
99. Ibid., p. 411.
100.
European Commission, Water Resources Management and Agricultural
Production
in the
Central Asian Republics:
Preparation Reports, Exeeutive 101.
Summary
WARMAP
Project, Phase
(Tashkent, September 1995), p.
1:
Project
1.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, pp. 8-9.
102. Information acquired
by
the author during a
consultant to the National Sustainable Development
two-month assignment
as
Commission of Uzbekistan,
May-July 1998. 103.
104.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Information
acquired by the
p. 12.
author
during
a
one-year
assignment;
information acquired by the author during a two-month assignment. 105.
World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Tables
106.
World Bank
Provisions, Chapter 6.
et al..
Developing a Regional,
4, 5, 6. p.
15;
ICAS, Fundamental
7 / Agricultural
Development and Environmental
Constraints in Northwest Africa Will D. Swearingen
Agriculture in Northwest Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) has been intensifying for
most of the present century. Since the mid-1980s,
process
this
has accelerated significantly. Intensification has occurred in two key directions, horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, farmers have progressively expanded
expanded livestock
cultivation to lower-rainfall areas. In addition, they have raising to marginal areas that previously
were
little
used. Vertically, farmers
have intensified agriculture through irrigation development, reduction of fallow, increases in use of fertilizer and other chemical inputs, and intensification of
stock raising. In the near term, these intensification processes have
development
and
enabled
region’s
the
countries
to
populations. However, Northwest African agriculture
environmental
limits. Specifically,
it is
is
fueled economic
feed
now
for
—
environment,
the
region’s
agricultural
approaching
its
approaching the limits of available land
and water resources. This has serious implications for
growing
their
sustainability,
Northwest Africa’s future
economy, and
politics.
A This
is
profile of
Northwest Africa’s environment and agriculture
followed by a historical overview of agricultural development in the focusing
region,
on long-term
agricultural intensification are
trends are
theme and
provided.
is
is
on a
processes.
intensification
examined
next.
Current trends
The major theme
is
of
that these
collision course with the region’s environmental constraints. This
developed through an analysis of the environmental, socioeconomic,
political implications
of current intensification trends.
Northwest Africa’s Environment and Agriculture
There are three major environmental zones plains
and plateaus
mountain highlands
to in
in
Northwest Africa: the coastal
the north, the Saharan desert to the
between (see Figure
7.1).
The
south,
desert zone
is
and the
by
far the
Will D.
186
largest.
Roughly 70 percent of
consists of desert.
region’s territory.
the
Swearingen
combined
for only 10 percent of the
The northern lowlands account
Mountain highlands account
of the three countries
territory
for
around 20 percent.^
However, the proportions of these major environmental zones vary greatly from country
to country. Coastal plains
Tunisia's national territory Algeria's. territory,
and a
fifth
and plateaus comprise around a fourth of less than 5 percent
of Morocco's, but
Mountainous highlands occupy roughly a
of
of Morocco's national
third
but only about a tenth of Tunisia’s and Algeria’s. Desert areas cover
nearly 90 percent of Algeria’s national territory, two-thirds of Tunisia’s, but
only half of Morocco’s (including the Western Sahara).
The region
is
clearly distinguished
from the
rest
of North Africa by
its
extensive mountains and relatively well-watered coastal lowlands. Mountain
highlands extend, from west to east, for over 2,000 kilometers (km). Elevations
exceed 4,000 meters (m) in Morocco’s High Atlas tapering
down
to a
maximum
Overall, these mountains
of around 1,500
form a
to
the
gradually
west,
m in Tunisia's Dorsal to the east.
substantial barrier
up
to
400
km
in width. This
highland barrier gamers precipitation from storms arriving from the Atlantic and
Mediterranean during the autumn-spring cool season. Rainfall rain-fed agriculture throughout levels in the
significant
much of
is
sufficient for
the coastal lowlands. Higher rainfall
mountains (or snowfall on higher peaks) are the source of a
number
of permanent
streams.
However,
Northwest
Africa's
mountains also cast a long rain shadow. Desert abmptly begins beyond the mountains.
Most of Northwest plains and plateaus. level terrain,
Africa’s arable land
These lowlands have
and access
is
concentrated in the northern
relatively higher rainfall, better soils,
to irrigation water.
Arable land
is
relatively extensive
by Middle Eastern/North African standards. Morocco has around
9.7 million
hectares (ha) of arable and permanently cropped land, Algeria around 8 million ha,
and Tunisia nearly 5 million ha (see Table
7.1).
Unfortunately, precipitation levels in Northwest Africa’s coastal lowlands are not generally sufficient to ensure a prosperous, drought-resistant rain-fed agriculture.
Most of Northwest
mm (approximately
1
Africa's arable lowlands receive only
300
to
500
2 to 20 inches) of rainfall in an average year. These rainfall
levels are only marginally adequate for rain-fed agriculture. In the southern
lowlands, where rainfall
is
less
than 300
mm per year, irrigation
is
essential.
Develop?nent and Environmental Constraints
Figure
7.1.
Landforms
in
in
Northwest Africa
Northwest Africa
1
87
Will D.
188
Northwest Africa's
lowlands
arable
and chronic drought. “Normal
variability
of extreme
and the
Swearingen
rainfall conditions, too
total
the region’s
much
are
to
an abstraction
rainfall” is
or too
subject
also
little.
Both
high rainfall
—
an average
the timing of rainfall
accumulations fluctuate dramatically from year to year. Drought
most
common
natural hazard. During the present century,
is
for
example, drought in Morocco has occurred, on average, about one year out of every three.
Due
to
Northwest Africa's relatively arid character,
and the often intense nature of rainfall,
this
region
thin soils,
its
naturally vulnerable to land
is
degradation.
Since the colonial takeover of Northwest Africa, beginning in Algeria in 1830,
modem
economic development has been focused on the northern coastal
lowlands. Today, most of Northwest Africa's population, urban areas, industry,
and
tourist
developments are concentrated in the environmentally more-favored
Most
coastal lowlands.
lowlands.
agricultural intensification has also taken place in these
They contain most of Northwest
Africa’s
modem
agriculture
and
perennially irrigated areas.
Table 7.1 presents a profile of agriculture in the three Northwest African countries.
It
shows the areas covered respectively by arable and permanently
cropped land (including fallow land), cereal crops, permanent crops, and irrigated
crops.
This
table
reveals
agriculture in the region. First, cereals,
region’s
human
least
at
three
interesting
which represent the
about
things
staple foods for the
population as well as supplemental feed for livestock, are the
predominant crops. Wheat and barley are the primary cereal crops, but category also includes maize,
rice,
cereal crops accounted for around
oats,
sorghum,
rye,
and
49 percent of Algeria’s arable
millet.
area,
this
In 1996,
68 percent
of Morocco’s, and 69 percent of Tunisia’s. Second, permanent crops represent an important element of agricultural production in
all
three countries.
These
permanent crops include olives (which represent around 80 percent of the permanently cropped area in Tunisia, half in Morocco, and a third in Algeria), dates,
and a broad range of subtropical
fruits
and
nuts, including
wine grapes
and most of the other permanent crops grown in California. Third, the areas in each country account for a relatively small
some 12 percent
in
amount of the arable
Morocco and Tunisia and only 6 percent
However, these areas are
critically
irrigated total
—
in Algeria.
important in producing crops for export.
Development and Environmental Constraints
Table
7.1.
in
Northwest Africa
Agriculture in Northwest Africa, 1996
Total Arable
Cereal Crops
(in hectares)
Permanent
Irrigated
Crops
Land
and Permanently
Cropped Land Algeria
8,040,000
3,663,000
519,000
450,000
Morocco
9,661,000
5,992,000
855,000
1,093,000
Tunisia
4,878,000
1,971,000
2,036,000
350,000
Source;
URL:
FAOSTAT
Database (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of
http://apps.fao. org./default.htm.
Note: The irrigation figures include both
modem
(opportunistic) irrigation following periodic 1
the United Nations),
and traditional
irrigation.
They do not include spate
which accounts roughly
floods,
for
an additional
10,000 ha in Algeria, 165,000 ha in Morocco, and 30,000 ha in Tunisia.
Historical
Since
began
agriculture
mountain
Northwest
had already been developed prior
valleys
intensification
as
Northwest Africa. initiated
in
Intensification
Africa
several
millennia
ago,
occurred sporadically in time and space. For example,
intensification has irrigation
Overview of Agricultural
a Its
to
general
the
trend
in
many of the
Roman is
a
period.
relatively
region’s desert oases and
However,
modem phenomenon
origins are linked to agricultural
by European colonization
agricultural
development
activities
in the region.
Prior to the colonial period, agriculture in most of Northwest Africa
extensive
in
nature,
rather
in
than intensive.
In most of the
region’s
was
arable
expanses, agriculture consisted of an extensive agropastoral system of rain-fed cereal cultivation
combined with semi-nomadic animal husbandry. Most land
was communally owned. Fallowing
(periodically letting cropland
lie idle)
was
Swearingen
Will D.
190
widely practiced. Fallowing both replenished
Low
soil fertility.
moisture and helped to restore
soil
population pressure gave the extensive coastal plains and
inland plateaus a relatively underutilized appearance.
Land Intensification under European Colonization In all three countries, colonization introduced vast changes in agriculture and agricultural landscapes. Algeria
became
a French colony in 1830, Tunisia a
French protectorate in 1881, and Morocco a French and Spanish protectorate in 1912. All three countries experienced large-scale colonization. Colonization initiated processes
of intensification that have continued up
Colonization dislodged native farmers from region. Europeans acquired roughly
to the present.
much of
the best land in the
30 percent of Algeria's arable
million ha;^ nearly 20 percent of Tunisia's land, or 800,000
of Morocco's land, or land
concentration
1
by
ha;"^
million ha.^ This land concentration native
landowners,
who
profited
land, or 2.7
and 13 percent
was
paralleled
from new
by
land
registration procedures and, often, their alliances with Europeans. In Algeria,
some 25,000
native Algerians acquired nearly 2.8 million ha,
somewhat over 30
percent of the country's arable land.^ In Tunisia, 7,200 Tunisians acquired
630,000 ha
—
15 percent.^
And
in
Morocco, 7,500 Moroccan landowners
acquired 1.6 million ha, or 21 percent of the arable
summary of land Table
Morocco Tunisia
Table 7.2 provides a
concentration during the colonial period in Northwest Africa.
7.2.
Land Concentration under European Colonization in
Algeria
total.
Northwest Africa
Colonial
Native Large
Total Large
% of Total
Landowners
Landowners
Landholdings
Agricultural
(in hectares)
(in hectares)
(in hectares)
Land
2.7 million
2.8 million
5.5 million
60%
1.6 million
2.6 million
34%
0.6 million
1
million
35%
1
million
0.8 million
Sources: See footnotes in paragraph above.
.4
Development and Environmental Constraints
Land expropriation and concentration during
Northwest Africa
in
the colonial period
important consequences related to agricultural intensification.^ native Northwest African
expropriated,
First, as
lie
With reduced landholdings, farmers had
fallow.
land was
farmers became concentrated on a
diminished amount of land. Land expropriation reduced their ability
of their land
had two
to
to let part
put a larger
percentage of their land into cultivation to produce sufficient food for their
household needs. The result was more intensive land use. Second, large numbers of farmers were dislodged to marginal land that was not sufficiently attractive for colonization.
These marginal areas were commonly characterized by poor
unfavorable slope, and/or deficient
soils,
most of
rainfall. Previously,
this land
had been used only for livestock grazing. Cultivation represented much more intensive land use.
Colonial
agricultural
policy
also
fostered
agricultural
Between roughly 1915 and 1928, French colonial
intensification.
authorities
in
three
all
countries had a mandate to substantially increase cereal production for France.
Various subsidies and bonuses were offered to encourage cereal cultivation, specifically cultivation
by mechanized means. High market
offered, particularly for wheat. Agricultural mechanization
prices were also
and high crop prices
enabled marginal areas to be profitably cultivated during higher-than-normal rainfall periods.
Although Europeans and native large landowners were the
primary beneficiaries of these subsidies and bonuses, attractive crop prices also enticed native Northwest African farmers into the cash
them
to significantly
The In
their cereal acreage.
colonial cereal policy
Morocco,
1918
expand
was successful
in
expanding the cultivated
for example, the area planted in cereals
to nearly 3 million
economy and encouraged
grew from
1.9 million
ha in 1929, an increase of roughly 60 percent.
area.
ha in
Cereal
acreage in neighboring Algeria and Tunisia also expanded dramatically. These increases reflected both vertical and horizontal intensification. Part of the cereal acreage
Much
of the
came from
rest
the reduction of fallow
came from
—
i.e.,
as rangeland.
Both of these processes increased the potential
The primary purpose of fallowing
Northwest Africa
is
to
allow
intensive land use.
the extension of cultivation to lower-rainfall areas,
which had previously been used exclusively
degradation.
more
soil
in
for
drought and land
semi-arid
regions
like
moisture to accumulate.*' Approximately 20 to
25 percent of the precipitation falling during the fallow year soil.
new
is
retained in the
Thus, fallowing stockpiles precipitation and substantially increases the
192
Will D.
Swearingen
water supply available for subsequent crop use. In low-rainfall areas, moisture component
and crop
failure.
is
this soil
often the critical difference between a successful harvest
With
the
reduction of fallowing,
buffer
this
was
lost.
Vulnerability to drought increased. Intensification of land use also increased the potential for land degradation, as did the extension of cultivation to lowerrainfall areas,
which were
typically characterized
by
thin,
sandy
soils that
were
prone to rapid wind and water erosion. While these lower-rainfall areas could sustain crops during higher-than-normal rainfall years, they
were subject
to
both
drought and accelerated erosion following the return of normal or lower-than-
normal
rainfall conditions.
Intensification in dryland agriculture
was matched by more
intensive land
use within colonial irrigation zones during the early years of colonization.
Following the agricultural
economic
became a
crisis
crisis
of the 1930s, which was linked to the world
and magnified by extended drought,
priority. All three colonial countries initiated
programs
develop
to
Northwest Africa’s
irrigation
irrigation
major
dam
potential
development construction for
colonial
agriculture. Irrigation
development focused primarily on production of export
mainly
and market vegetables. However, a secondary motive
crops,
fruits
behind colonial irrigation development was concern over Northwest Africa’s
burgeoning native population.
Food Security
Crisis following
Independence
Following independence (in 1956 for Morocco and Tunisia and 1962 for Algeria), all three countries recovered ownership of colonial landholdings. In
Algeria, this process
was
recovery process was
abrupt; in Tunisia and particularly
much more
Morocco, the land
cautious and gradual. All three countries
subsequently engaged in land reform. However,
much of
the former colonial
land passed into the hands of more prosperous or powerful native landowners. In addition,
most of the large landholdings acquired by native landowners during
the colonial period
were never subject
to land reform.
Because the
politically
powerful native large landowners had the same economic interests as the previous colonial farmers, high-value,
all
export-oriented
three countries continued to develop irrigation for agriculture,
national agricultural development policies.
which largely accounted
for
their
Development and Environmental Constraints While the three countries were developing
in
^93
Northwest Africa
irrigation for export agriculture,
they were neglecting their rain-fed agricultural sectors, which produced wheat
and barley and other staple food crops. Indeed, for following
independence,
the
at
Northwest African
three
neglected domestic food production. Until the 1950s,
all
least
two decades
countries
seriously
three countries
basically self-sufficient in production of these staple cereal crops.
were
Between
the
1950s and the 1980s, however, due to population growth and stagnation in production, 1980s,
all
all
three countries gradually lost this self-sufficiency. Indeed,
three
symptoms of
were experiencing a severe food security
this
crisis
by
the
The key
crisis.
were declining per capita cereal production; ever-
growing levels of cereal imports; heavy foreign indebtedness related
to these
imports; and massive food subsidy programs.
By
the early 1980s, Algeria
cereal supply, Tunisia
over a
third.
was importing approximately two-thirds of
was importing nearly
The import
bill for
half,
and Morocco was importing
these staple foods
was very
1980s, for example, Algeria’s total agricultural imports billion per year.^^ In
its
high. In the early
bill
averaged $2.2
each country, a large percentage of the population was
experiencing hunger and malnutrition, particularly during drought years. The political
implications of this crisis
became
experienced a tumultuous food-related Tunisia in 1983-1984, again in
riot.
Morocco
agricultural policy reforms.*'^
all
by 1981, when Morocco
Similar food-related riots erupted in
in 1984,
Contemporary Agricultural
Since the early-to-mid 1980s,
clear
and
in Algeria in 1988.
Intensification
three countries have
The overriding
been undertaking major
objective has been to increase food
production for the national markets, with a major focus on cereal crops. Specific reforms have included loosening of state controls over crop prices to stimulate additional production; promotion of agricultural mechanization; specific efforts in Algeria to
irrigation
develop so-called “new lands”; accelerated programs
development; and
to
maximize
initiatives to increase livestock production.
These
reforms have met with limited success. While they have increased overall food production, the resulting gains have been largely outstripped by population
growth. In addition, these reforms have played a key role in intensifying
Swearingen
Will D.
194
up
agriculture
—
to
possibly even beyond
—
the limits of
Northwest Africa’s
resource base. These reforms will be described and analyzed.
Changes
in
Pricing Policy
Following independence, the three Northwest African countries maintained tight control over producer prices of basic food crops. Prices for these crops, cereals
were held
in particular,
artificially low. Indeed, for
prices were only one-fourth to one-half of
government
was
that
intervention.^^
As
in
many
much of
this period,
crop
what they would have been without
other developing countries, the rationale
low crop prices could enable these governments
to
provide food
inexpensively to their urban populations. This would help keep wages low,
thereby assisting industrialization and other urban development initiatives. Additionally,
it
would help prevent
social unrest
among
the growing ranks of the
urban poor. Unfortunately, low crop prices acted as a major disincentive.
To
counteract stagnant production, the governments gradually raised fixed
producer prices for cereals and other basic food crops beginning in the 1970s. In Algeria and Tunisia, prices approached world market levels
by
late
the
These price increases were likely a significant factor behind
mid-1980s.
increased cereal production in the two countries. In Morocco, the government
boosted producer prices of barley and wheat to approximately twice world
market
levels.
As
will
be seen shortly, the stimulus effect of this action has been
remarkable.
Morocco’s high producer prices have been controversial (1)
These high prices have been costly
drought
years,
to the
when domestic production
for several reasons:
government. Ironically, during substantially
is
reduced,
the
government saves money by importing more of the country’s food supply
at
lower world market levels. (2) These high prices have almost exclusively benefited a small landowning elite 5 percent of
(3)
prices to
those with surplus grain to
Morocco’s cereal farmers are net
are essentially self-sufficient, grain.
—
sellers
sell.
Fewer than
of grain. Fifteen percent
and the remaining 80 percent are net purchasers of
Because the government passes on part of the cost of high producer
consumers, these consumers
—
virtually
all
of Morocco’s urban
—
pay
to subsidize the large
populations and four-fifths of the rural population grain growers. (4)
High crop prices have stimulated
a major expansion of cereal
Development and Environmental Constraints cultivation
to
marginal
areas,
resulting
in
Northwest Africa
unsustainable
in
land
^
^5
and
use
environmental deterioration.
Promotion of Agricultural Mechanization
All
governments have promoted agricultural mechanization through
three
subsidies since the early 1980s.
The success of this
increases in the use of agricultural machinery in
For example,
7.3).
effort all
is
reflected in dramatic
three countries (see Table
in Algeria, during the ten-year period
from 1982-1984
to
1992-1994, the number of tractors and harvesters increased by 78 and 92 percent respectively. In Morocco, the respective increases were 34 and percent, and in Tunisia they
were 15 and 19 percent. The overall
13
levels of
mechanization are relatively high. In Algeria, during the 1992-1994 period, there
were around 96,000
tractors
and 10,000 harvesters
in use. In
Morocco, the
respective figures were 42,000 tractors and 4,500 harvesters; in Tunisia, 30,000 tractors
and 3,100 harvesters.
Government
promote mechanization have
efforts to
facilitated the
expansion
of cereal cultivation to rangeland areas. Since the early 1980s, the tractor and disk
plow have converted
Some of
countries.
large stretches of rangeland to cereal acreage in
new
these
lands
(approximately 8 inches) of annual for a
few
normally receive as
rainfall.
little
as
normal or lower-than-normal
200
three
mm
Their poor soils can sustain cultivation
years, particularly during higher-than-normal rainfall periods.
the return of
all
However,
rainfall levels ultimately forces their
abandonment. Desertification quickly advances
in the
abandoned
areas. In effect,
farmers are destroying the grazing potential of these lands through clearing the natural vegetation, unsustainably “mining” their fragile soils, and leaving
exposed
to
wind and water
them
erosion.
“New Lands ” Program
in
Algeria
In Algeria, cultivation of marginal lands has actually
become
official policy.*^ In
1983, Algeria's government passed legislation that established an ambitious
homesteading program. The overriding purpose of
this
program has been
to
encourage Algerian citizens to maximize the country’s agricultural potential through
development
of
previously
Homesteaders have been required
to
pay
uncultivated a token
public
sum of one
domain
dinar. In
land.
exchange.
Will D.
196
Swearingen
They have
they have been given an allotment in one of the designated areas.
been required the
end of
and are
develop
to
this
this
land for agriculture within a five-year period. At
“proving up” period, they have been granted unrestricted
title,
free to sell or use their land as they choose.
Table
7.3.
Increases in Agricultural Mechanization in Northwest Africa
Harvesters
Tractors
% Change
Average
Number
Number
since
in
% Change
Average
since
in
Use, 1992-94
1982-84
Use, 1992-94
1982-84
Algeria
95,562
78
9,786
92
Morocco
42,000
34
4,500
13
Tunisia
30,158
15
3,070
19
Source: World Resources 1998-99
The goal has been production.
water
is
(New York: Oxford
this
p.
approximately 800,000 ha of
to put
About half of
University Press, 1998),
land
available for irrigation.
is
in the
286.
new
land into
Saharan zone where subsurface
However, the other
half,
some 400,000
involves dryland allotments in the country's high plateau region. Virtually
new
"cropland" in this region
is
ha, all
low-rainfall steppe land suitable only for stock
raising.
The homesteading program, however,
is
only part of Algeria's current "new
lands" scheme. In 1984, the Algerian government initiated a plan that envisions putting 2 million
come from is
to
short,
new ha of
land into production. Two-fifths of this land
the homesteading program.
come from reduction of fallow the
Algerian
initiative
The other
is
to
three-fifths, or 1.2 million ha,
in currently cultivated rain-fed areas. In
involves
intensification. Unfortunately, the results
both
horizontal
and
vertical
of Algeria’s “new lands” scheme have
not been encouraging. Large areas claimed under the homesteading program
have already been abandoned. Stripped of
their natural vegetation, these areas
Development and Environmental Constraints
in
197
Northwest Africa
have since been attacked by wind and water erosion and are becoming barren wastelands.
Maximizing Irrigation Development
In addition to striving to three countries have irrigation
been attempting
irrigated areas
much of which are
devoted
(tomatoes, onions, lettuce, (lentils,
to
are
increase cereal production through
to
all
produced
for export.
Indeed, the newly
high-value crops such as market vegetables
etc.), fruits,
fava beans, chickpeas,
However,
olives.
in their dryland areas, all
development. They have not been neglecting production of high-value
irrigated crops,
crops
expand cereal production
wine grapes, fodder crops, leguminous
etc.),
dates, sugarcane, sugar beets,
and
three countries have been attempting to address declining
per capita cereal production through irrigation. The irrigated area in
all
three
countries has steadily increased, as has cereal production through irrigated
means.
As Table area
in
7.4 demonstrates, there has been a steady increase in the irrigated
both Algeria and Tunisia. The increase in Morocco appears
impressive. However,
Morocco began
to heavily invest in
development before the other two countries. put around 400,000 ha in
modem
By
modem
the early 1970s,
it
less
irrigation
already had
perennial irrigation. (Another 410,000 ha in
the early 1970s consisted of traditional irrigation schemes,
many of which were
centuries old.)
The
figures in Table 7.4 only partially reflect the major emphasis that has
been placed on large-scale
irrigation
development
in all three countries since the
mid-1980s. All three countries are aggressively engaged in canal constmction programs.
The
dam and
irrigation
irrigated areas in all three countries will
expanding rapidly over the next decade and will approach the
limits
be
of the
sustainable potentially irrigable area (see Table 7.4). For example, in Morocco, the National Irrigation irrigation
Program expects
by 30 percent within
a decade,
expect to put into perennial irrigation year 2010.^^
all
to increase the area
and
in Tunisia,
under perennial
government planners
of the potentially irrigable land by the
Swearingen
Will D.
198
Table
Increases in the Perennial Irrigation Area
7.4.
in
Northwest Africa
(in hectares)
1984
1972
1996
Sustainable
Perennial Irrigable
Algeria
130,000
188,000
450,000
510,000
Morocco
811,000
1,073,000
1,093,000
1,488,000
Tunisia
170,000
270,000
350,000
402,000
Sources:
FAOSTAT Database
(Rome; Food and Agriculture Organization of
FAO,
online version, http://apps.fao.org/default.htm;
FAO
Area
Irrigation in the
the United Nations),
Near East Region
in
Figures;
Hypermedia Collections on Desertification (Rome: Food and Agnculture Organization of
the
United Nations), online version http://193.43.36.7/LIBRARY/Desert/DOCS/372135/37213500.htm. Note: These figures do not include spate irrigation, which accounts for an additional 110,000 ha in Algeria, 165,000 ha in
Irrigation
the
three
Morocco, and 30,000 ha
in Tunisia.
development has had a significant impact on cereal production in
countries,
particularly
Morocco. Morocco’s cereal areas
in
now
account for approximately 38 percent of Morocco’s total perennially irrigated area (see Table 7.4). In the other
two
countries, the percentage
is less,
and can
be estimated as perhaps 20 percent in Algeria and 15 percent in Tunisia.
Although in some cases, the
irrigated lands
were grown by rain-fed means,
this
has been offset by
cereals are
grown with
even
those in rain-fed areas are
triple
Irrigation
sociopolitical
irrigation.
development
in
have replaced lands where cereals
much higher
yields
where
Cereal yields with irrigation that are double or
common.
Northwest Africa has not been without significant
and economic problems. These include the following:
1) Irrigation
development in the three Northwest African countries has been
undertaken largely
at
the expense of the respective governments,
and has
Development and Environmental Constraints
in
199
No?~thwest Africa
primarily benefited relatively small numbers of wealthy landowners and client classes of land reform beneficiaries. 2)
Water prices charged by
even collected) are
below
far
government currently charges
the respective governments (which are often not
the real costs. For example, in
less than 10 percent
Morocco, the
of the actual long-term costs
of providing irrigation water to the agricultural sector. 3)
Heavily subsidized irrigation water charges have promoted production of
—
water-intensive crops
low value per
relatively
4) for
Water
—
which have
irrigation-distribution networks are high. In Tunisia,
combined
the
sugarcane, and rice
alfalfa,
unit of water use.
from
losses
example,
such as
from
losses
networks have been estimated
and urban distribution
irrigation
700 million m^ per year
at
—
roughly a quarter of
0A
all
of the water used by the country in a year.
dam
of
5) Siltation
reservoirs,
erosion in associated watersheds, the
accumulated capacity
m^, which
is
is
owing
becoming
lost to siltation in
around 7 percent of
to excessive deforestation
a serious problem.
Morocco
is
estimated
The annual
total capacity.
loss
and
soil
For example, at
is
800 million estimated
at
50 million m^.^*
More
significant
development
is
any
than
of these
around 92 percent of water use
in general,
world. Hydrologists
is
Morocco, 89 percent
Unfortunately,
commonly
all
consider countries with less than 1,000 m^ of a
chronic
three North African countries
According
to projections
(FAO) of the United Nations,
now
shortage fall
below
—
urban,
is still
in the year
demand. In Morocco, around 4 percent.
and agricultural for
Where
residents
this critical
—
are
all
Yet the region’s
three sectors of the
economy
experiencing rapid increases in
example, the annual growth in demand for water will all this water
set for serious political conflict
23
2000, Algeria will have only some 576
rapidly growing. In addition,
industrial,
of water.
of the Food and Agriculture Organization
m^ per person, Tunisia only 445 m^, and Morocco 943 population
in
one of the most water-scarce regions in the
water per person per year to have
threshold.
in
the highest in the world.
North Africa,
fresh
irrigation
The Moroccan and Tunisian percentages
Tunisia, and 60 percent in Algeria.
among
problems,
beginning to exhaust the region’s available water resources.
Irrigation accounts for
are
individual
come from? The
stage seems to be
over water. This political conflict will
and industry against the agricultural
sector.
is
pit
urban
Will D.
200
Impending water shortages
Swearingen
will not
be experienced equally because of
natural disparities in the distribution of water resources.
develop in certain regions
—
governments will be forced
from remaining surplus water
sector
in
As water
for example, in the Rabat-Sale metropolitan area to invest in water transfer
areas. This will
systems to import water
over
for
percent
25
government’s investment budget. World Bank analysts expect
by the year 2020,
—
be expensive. Public investments in the
Morocco already account
increase to 60 percent
shortages
of the
figure to
this
reflecting the escalating costs associated
with interbasin transfers and the exploitation of increasingly marginal water resources.
Initiatives to Increase Livestock
The governments production as a 7.5
in
way
to
the
early 1980s,
region have also attempted to increase livestock
improve food security in
shows the buildup
Production
their respective countries.
Table
in the sheep herds in the respective countries since the
which ranges from
a
low of 21 percent
in
Morocco
to a
high of 30
percent in Tunisia. These increases are on top of levels that were probably already excessive in
many
areas. In Tunisia, for
were already estimated by one study
to
example, stocking rates in 1981
be three
to eight times greater than the
'^’1
There has been a similar buildup of goat herds in Algeria and
optimal level.
Tunisia (but not Morocco) during this period.
Table
7.5.
Increases in Sheep in Northwest Africa
1980-82
1996-98
Average
Average
Algeria
13,740,000
17,023,000
+24%
Morocco
14,113,000
16,204,000
+21%
Tunisia
4,935,000
6,431,000
+30%
Source;
FAOSTAT Database
Net Change
(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of
online version http://apps.fao.org/default.htm.
the United Nations),
Development and Environmental Constraints
Government attempts
in
201
Northwest Africa
numbers have involved both
to increase livestock
subsidies and price interventions. In general, government policies have had two
key
government subsidies
effects: (1) In the higher-rainfall regions,
for barley,
other feed crops, irrigation, and fertilizer have encouraged the intensification of livestock production (mainly of sheep and cattle) and the integration of this
production with crop production. This has led to a buildup of herd sizes and an extension of feed crop cultivation to marginal rangeland areas
mechanized
cultivation. (2) In the lower-rainfall areas,
—
usually
government provision of
subsidized feed grains has prevented the usual dramatic declines in herd size
during drought years. This well-intentioned effort has contributed to the buildup
of herd sizes and their maintenance
well beyond range carrying
levels
at
capacity.
In both cases,
conversion significant
the
on the environment has been dramatic. The
effect
of marginal
rangeland
to
feed
grain
production
has
entailed
environmental problems. In Tunisia, for example, an estimated
500.000 ha of land
in
semi-arid and hilly areas have been brought into
production over the past two decades. Over half of the rangeland in the southern part of the country
And permanent
is
loss
now
considered to be moderately to severely degraded.
of land
to desertification
is
estimated to average around
8.000 ha per year.^^
Results of Reforms and Analysis
Because many of these agricultural reforms to
expand the area cultivated
in cereals,
in it
Northwest Africa were intended
is
appropriate to examine cereal
cultivation trends. Unfortunately, these trends are difficult to identify because of
weather-related fluctuations in agricultural performance from year to year.
These fluctuations are due
to
animal-drawn plows aren’t able has land
first is
several factors.
For example, farmers using
to put their land into cultivation until rainfall
softened the earth. This means that during drought years,
much
of the
not able to be put into cultivation. Or, farmers with access to mechanized
plowing
may
decide, on the basis of early signs of drought, not to put
land into production.
On
all
of their
the other hand, during higher-than-normal rainfall
Swearingen
202
Will D.
years, farmers are both able
and willing
maximize the cultivated
to
area. In
terms of agricultural trends, comparing a single year with another year relatively meaningless.
years included
Even multiyear averages can be misleading, because
may not be
Nonetheless,
it
is
is
the
representative.
useful
to
attempt to
identify
trends
in
agricultural
performance over time. Table 7.6 compares the area cultivated in the three
Northwest African countries during the six-year period 1979-1984 with that during the more recent six-year period
compares cereal cultivation
in the three
reforms to that after reforms were
7.6.
Northwest African countries before
The
initiated.
between the respective countries are
Table
1993-1998. This table essentially
differences in performance
striking.
Increases in Cereal Area in Northwest Africa (hectares cultivated annually)
Net Change
1979-84
1993-98
Average
Average
Algeria
2,729,000
2,383,000
-13%
Morocco
4,438,000
5,307,000
+20%
Tunisia
1,421,000
1,212,000
-15%
Sources;
FAO
World Crop and Livestock
Statistics,
Organization of the United Nations, 1987);
1948-1985 (Rome: Food and Agriculture
FAOSTAT
Database (Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations), online version http://apps.fao.org/default..
This table reveals that only in Morocco was there a significant increase in the total area cultivated in cereals (mainly
wheat and barley). In Morocco, the
total area cultivated in cereals
increased
by about
fifteen-year period. In Algeria
and Tunisia,
a fifth over this roughly
in contrast, there
were actually
significant decreases in the areas cultivated in cereals. In Algeria, the decrease
over
this
period was roughly 13 percent; in Tunisia,
must be noted, however, in the
cultivated area
that these average figures
from year
to
it
was roughly 15
mask
percent.
It
substantial fluctuations
year as a result of different weather
conditions. For example, in Algeria, during the
most recent six-year period, the
1
Development and Environmental Constraints
in
203
Northwest Africa
area cultivated in cereals varied from a low of 1.1 million ha to a high of 3.7
million ha. In Morocco, the range
was from
4.9 to 6 million ha; and in Tunisia,
it
0.6 to 2 million ha.
The increase
in the cereal area in
roughly 20 percent
cultivation
—
of fallow; and (2) the extension of cereal
A
marginal rangeland.
to
Morocco of approximately 900,000 ha —
has resulted from two different types of agricultural
(1) the reduction
intensification:
Morocco
was from
reveals that, already
by
of agricultural production in
history
the early 1940s, cereal cultivation in
had reached the 4.4 million ha figure In short, virtually all viable cropland
that
still
Morocco
prevailed during the early 1980s.
was already
in production a half century
However, encouraged by extremely high crop prices since the mid-1980s,
ago.
Moroccan farmers have dramatically reduced
the acreage left in fallow.
continuously cropped areas are not allowed to accumulate
Because
soil moisture, as
they
do when fallowed, the reduction of fallowing has effectively deducted an input of water from the cropping system and substantially increased the vulnerability to drought.
Besides reducing fallow since the mid-1980s, Moroccan farmers
have also substantially expanded the area of cereal crops
These marginal new lands are not only prone
rainfall areas.
and wind erosion, they are also highly vulnerable
Drought region's
is
an endemic natural hazard
in
in
to desertification
to drought.
Northwest Africa. However, the
drought hazard (viewed as a socioeconomic rather than purely a
meteorological phenomenon) has actually been increasing.
drought hazard are
directly
related
percentage of the region’s cropland to policies
is
to
the
now
fact
at a
located in low-rainfall areas.
record level. In Morocco, for example,
Morocco
than 400
proportion
of
is
mm
is
now
in
drought-prone areas
at least 5
percent of the cereal
located in drought-prone areas
—
those receiving
(approximately 16 inches) of precipitation a year.^° The
cropland
performance from year
creates
to year.
dramatic
fluctuations
in
For example, cereal production
ranged from a disastrous harvest of only
1.8
million tons in
exceptionally bountiful harvest of 10 million tons in 1996.
While higher crop prices help explain
how
1
is
probably even higher in the other two countries. This record level
drought-prone
area,
Owing
implemented during the 1980s, which encouraged mechanization and
cultivation in less
Increases in the
an increasingly high
that
expansion of cultivation, the proportion of cropland
now
marginal low-
in
Morocco
1995
to
an
3
the increases in
can the decreases in the cultivated areas
agricultural
Morocco’s cultivated
in Algeria
and Tunisia be
Will D. Swearingen
204 explained?
Actually,
these
decreases
more recent attempts
countries. Despite
continue to
a
expand
long-term trend
in
both
their cereal-producing areas,
both Algeria and Tunisia have been losing ground for the past several decades.
For example, cereal hectarage in Algeria during the 1954-1960 period averaged 3.3 million
ha per year. Thus, there has actually been a decrease in cereal
hectarage of around 28 percent over the past four decades. In Tunisia, the reduction has been even more striking. Cereal hectarage during the 1954-1960
period averaged around 2.1 million ha. The decrease since then amounts to
roughly 42 percent.
The explanation converted to urbanization
practices that have desertification
substantial
is
more important,
to
not that former cereal lands have been Rather,
these
reductions
unsustainable
been causing environmental
are
agricultural
due
land
deterioration. Soil erosion
to
use
and
have been progressively advancing in both countries, causing
amounts of cropland
These reductions limits
both countries
crop production.
other and,
in
to
be abandoned or used only for stock raising.
in the cultivated areas in Algeria
of arable land resources
may have
and Tunisia indicate
that the
already been reached. Indeed, they
suggest that there has actually been a permanent reduction in the agrarian resource base.
The
efforts
of these two countries to intensify rain-fed agriculture
have been a losing effort - indeed, they have seemingly been counterproductive. It is
also revealing to
compare overall cereal production
in the three
Northwest
African countries before reforms were initiated to that after these reforms. Table 7.7 compares total cereal production in the three Northwest African countries for the six-year period
1979-1984 with
that during the
1986-1992 and 1993-1998
periods.
Table 7.7 shows that there was a substantial increase in cereal production in all
from a low
three countries following the policy reforms. This increase varied
of 23 percent in Algeria
to a
reflect the various policy
high of 52 percent in Morocco. These increases
reforms and demonstrate that these reforms were
generally successful in expanding total cereal production in the respective countries.
It is
significant,
however, that following
1992 period, cereal production
may be
partly a weather-related
initial
gains in the 1986-
in all three countries again declined.
phenomenon,
it
does suggest that a
While
new
this
ceiling
has been reached and that possibly environmental deterioration related to intensified land use
is
beginning to affect agricultural performance.
Development and Environmental Constraints Table
7.7.
in
Northwest Africa
Cereal Production Trends in Northwest Africa
(in
metric tons)
1979-84
1986-92
1993-98
Average
Average
Average
Algeria
1,740,000
2,223,000
2,147,000
+23%
Morocco
3,831,000
6,270,000
5,843,000
+52%
Tunisia
1,124,000
2,199,000
1,602,000
+43%
Sources:
FAO
World Crop and Livestock
Organization of the United Nations, 1987);
Statistics,
205
Net Change
1948-1985 (Rome: Food and Agriculture
FAOSTAT
Database (Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations), online version http://apps.fao.org/default.htm.
However, increases
in total
production are
less
important to food security
than increases in per capita production, which take into account population
growth. Table 7.8 reveals cereal production trends on a per capita basis,
expressed in kilograms/person, during
Table
7.8.
same
period.
Per Capita Cereal Production (in
Sources:
this
in
Northwest Africa
kilograms per person)
1979-84
1993-98
Average
Average
Algeria
90
76
-16%
Morocco
193
220
+ 14%
Tunisia
170
178
+5%
FAO
Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics (diverse issues);
Net Change
FAOSTAT Database
(Rome: Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), online version http://apps.fao.org/default.htm.
206
Will D.
Swearingen
This table shows that growth in per capita cereal production was modest or
even negative in the three Northwest African countries. Morocco’s increase was a
modest 14 percent, Tunisia’s increase was only
capita cereal production actually declined
by 1 6
the previous increases in total cereal production is
entirely
due
5 percent,
percent.
The
and Algeria’s per difference between
and these modest or poor
results
to population growth.
Population growth has been one of the primary forces behind intensified use
of land and water resources in Northwest Africa. As in most of the developing world, the rate of population growth in Northwest Africa during the present
century has been without historical precedent. Until the twentieth century, the region's total population
Now,
remained below 12 million inhabitants.
century’s end, the region’s population
estimated 70 million people.
is
nearly six times larger, with an
Population pressure
is
clearly
one of the key
underlying causes of environmental deterioration in Northwest Africa. capacities
of the
respective
natural
population, in a sustainable manner, are
at
resource
bases
to
support
becoming increasingly
The
additional
strained.
Conclusion
To summarize, 1)
the following
key trends have been
identified:
Cereal cultivation has been expanding to marginal lower-rainfall areas,
leading to environmental degradation and increasing vulnerability to drought. 2)
The percentage of cropland
left in
fallow has been progressively reduced,
contributing to a gradual deterioration in agricultural productivity and increasing vulnerability to drought. 3) Livestock
numbers have grown well beyond
and stock raising has been expanding little
used.
The
result has
to
the range carrying capacity,
marginal areas that previously were
been overgrazing of rangeland resources and land
degradation processes such as soil erosion and desertification. 4) Irrigation
development
is
leading to impending water shortages, as the
region approaches the limits of its economically mobilizable water resources.
Signs that these agricultural intensification processes are reaching the limits
of the region’s land resources include reductions in the cultivated acreage in Algeria and Tunisia
—
despite
government
efforts
to
expand
this
acreage;
Development and Environmental Constraints declines in total cereal production in
three countries
all
and 1993-1998 periods; and apparent increases conclusion,
In
agricultural
three countries.
all
some short-term economic
in the
intensification
Northwest Africa
frequency of drought.
in
Northwest
has
policy changes were
Although these three countries have achieved
collision course with the region’s environmental constraints.
approaching or exceeding the limits of
its
now on
Northwest Africa
a is
available land and water resources,
for the region’s future.
Will D. Swearingen and Abdellatif Bencherifa, eds.. The North African
1.
Environment 2.
Africa
gains, current intensification processes are
which has serious implications
207
between the 1986-1992
when major
accelerated significantly since the mid-1980s, established in
in
at Risk (Boulder,
Will D. Swearingen,
CO: Westview
Press, 1996), pp. 3-7.
Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions,
1912-1986 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University “Drought Hazard
in
Morocco,”
in
Press, 1987); Will D. Swearingen,
Geographical Review, Vol. 82, No.
4, pp.
401-
412. 3.
Karen
Pfeifer,
CO: Westview 4.
Agrarian Reform under State Capitalism
Algeria (Boulder,
Press, 1985).
Hafedh Sethom, “L’Action des Pouvoirs Publics sur
I’Economie Rurale dans
au Maghreb,
in
eds.
P.
la
les
Paysages Agraires
Tunisie Independante,” in Etats, Territoires
R. Baduel et
al.
Centre National de
(Paris:
la
et
et Terroirs
Recherche
Scientifique, 1985), pp. 98-113. 5.
Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages, pp. 143-144.
6. Pfeifer,
Agrarian Reform, pp. 98-103.
7.
Sethom, “L’Action des Pouvoirs Publics,” pp. 102-103.
8.
Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages, pp. 144-145.
9.
Will D. Swearingen, “Northwest Africa,” in Drought Follows the Plow, ed.
M. H. Glantz (Cambndge: Cambridge University Sweanngen,
“Is
Drought Increasing
in
Press, 1994), pp.
Northwest Afnca?:
A
1
17-133; Will D.
Historical Analysis,” in
The North African Environment, pp. 17-34. 10.
11.
Rene Hoffherr, L ’Economie Marocaine
(Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1932).
World Meteorological Organization, Drought and
Note No. 138 (Geneva:
WMO,
1975).
Agriculture, Technical
208
Will D.
D. Swearingen, “Government Agricultural Policies and the Growing
12. Will
Food Security Phillip C.
Swearingen
Crisis,” in State
and Society
in Algeria, eds.
John
P. Entelis
and
Naylor (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 117-149; Will D.
Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform in Northwest Africa: Economic Necessities and
Environmental Dilemmas,”
Economy, 13.
North Africa: Development and Reform
in
Dirk Vandewalle
ed.
FAO
(New York:
St.
in
a Global
Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 67-92.
Trade Yearbook 1985 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, 1985). 14. 15.
Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform
Kevin Cleaver,
in
Northwest Africa,” pp. 73-92.
The Agricultural Development Experience of Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia: A Comparison of Strategies for Growth, Staff Working Paper 552 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1982). 16.
John Schamper, “Policy Dialogue Agenda: Agricultural Pricing and Trade,”
Unpublished briefing paper for USAID/Morocco, 1994. 17.
cultural 18.
Swearingen,
Reform
in
“Government Agricultural
Policies”;
Swearingen,
“Agri-
Northwest Africa.”
AQUASTAT (Rome: Food
and Agriculture Organization of the U.N.),
http://www.fao.org/waicent/FaoInfo/Agricult/AG17AGLW/AQUASTAT/profil.htm. 19. Ian
Goldin and David Roland-Host, “Economic Policies for Sustainable
Resource Use
in
Wilfrido Cruz,
Mohan Munasinghe, and Jeremy Warford (Washington, DC: World
Bank),
Morocco,”
in
The Greening of Economic Policy Reform, eds.
p. 58.
20.
Mohamed
Matoussi, “Sources of Strain and Alternatives for Relief in the
Most Stressed Water Systems of North the Middle East: Challenges
Africa,” in Water
and Opportunities,
eds. E.
Management
22.
Africa
and
Rached, E. Rathgeber, and
D. Brooks (Ottawa: International Development Research Center), 2\.
in
p. 87.
AQUASTAT. FAO,
Irrigation in the
Near East Region
in
Figures,
FAO
Hypermedia
Collections on Desertification (Rome:
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United
http://l 93.43. 36.7/LlBRARY/Desert/DOCS
Nations),
online
version
/372135/37213500.htm. 23. Matoussi, “Sources of Strain,” p. 90. 24.
FAO,
State
of Food and Agriculture 1993 (Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations). 25. Goldin
and Roland-Host, “Economic Policies,”
p. 57.
.
Development and Environmental Constraints
in
^09
Northwest Africa
26. Ibid., p. 58.
Zeinab
27.
Environmental
Partow and Stephen Impacts
during
Economic Policy Reform,
Mink, “Tunisia:
Economic
Livestock
Adjustment,”
in
The
and
Policies
Greening
of
p. 170.
28. Ibid., p. 169.
Swearingen,
29.
“Drought
Hazard”;
Swearingen,
“Northwest
Afnca”;
Swearingen, “Is Drought Increasing?” 30.
“USAID
1986, Morocco: Country Development Strategy Statement
1987-1991). Annex C: The Agricultural
Unpublished
report,
Sector in
Morocco:
A
(FYS
Description,”
February (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International
Development). 3
1
.
EAOSTA T Database.
32. Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform,” p. 88.
33.
Rene
Escallier, “Population et Urbanisation,” in
Espaces, ed. Jean-Fran 9 ois Troin (Paris: Escallier,
“Demographic
et
Armand
Migrations,” in
Yves Lacoste (Tours: La Decouverte, 1991), 34. p.
Le Maghreb: Hommes
Colin, 1985), pp. 119-174;
LEtat du Maghreb, pp.
World Resources 1998-99 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998),
244. 35.
Rene
eds. Camille
19-91
Swearingen and Bencherifa, The North African Environment
at Risk.
et
and
5 / Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture: The Case of the Middle East Michael E. Bonine
Agriculture in the Middle East
providing
is
an important economic sector and
much of the food consumed by the
climatically
arid
and semi-arid,
still
Most of the Middle
depend upon
East,
however,
issues. Irrigation often is needed,
water between and within countries
is
and these conditions create considerable
environmental limitations and problems for agriculture. Sufficient water and
management become paramount
for
inhabitants of the states of the region.
Despite increasing urbanization, substantial numbers of people the cultivation of crops for their livelihoods.
is critical
is
its
and conflict over
common.
The physical environment, however, may be only one of the
difficulties
when
considering the broader topic of agricultural development. National governmental policies
and goals influence or attempt to control the agricultural
sector, as well as
provide the institutional and financial framework for the implementation of agricultural planning is
grown and
and production. State incentives and
harvested.
Major
irrigation
restrictions
impact what
and water delivery systems, provision of
many
other
Yet, even the best of intentions and government policies confront a
most
loans and credit, building of roads for marketing of crops, and infrastructure supports
difficult
demographic
most rapid
must be provided by a
reality.
central government.
Population increase in the Middle East
in the world. Increasing irrigation or
expand areas under cultivation may indeed add Yet, while attempting to provide their
percentage of relentless
it),
the nations of the
one of the
mechanization to intensify and/or to the total quantity
own people
of production.
with sufficient food (or even a
Middle East continue
to lose
ground
to the
growth of their populations. Rising incomes and standards of living also
result in greater per capita
food demands.
Another relevant theme for the Middle East
which has developed
is
sustainable.
is
whether or not the agriculture
Particularly in certain countries
questionable whether or not the agricultural development term.
is
The depletion of aquifers, dependence on risky
is
it
is
viable for the long
rainfall or irrigation, frequent
droughts, and continual expansion of cultivated areas in a moisture-deficit region create
major problems for sustaining agricultural production.
Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture
211
This paper examines issues of agricultural development in Southwest Asia and
North Africa (called the Middle East for simplification). Although generalizations are
made about
more
the region, several countries of the
Middle East are examined
in
including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Eg>T3t. The paper focuses
detail,
on national policies and goals
specifically
those goals and resulting projects
Food production, indeed, be sustainable
in the
is
may
for developing agriculture,
how
contrast with agricultural sustainability.
increasing in the region, but
future.
and
many programs may
not
In conclusion the paper presents the principal
challenges for agriculture in the Middle East in the twenty-first century.
Agriculture in the Middle East:
Drylands or arid lands have a the
deficit
Some Environmental
of moisture measured on an annual basis, and
Middle East constitutes one of the
largest arid regions in the world.
the moisture deficit, the greater the aridity. Aridity can be
precipitation versus the transpiration
Limitations
amount of (potential) moisture
The
larger
measured by an index of
loss
from evaporation and
from plants (called potential evapotranspiration), calculated by the
formula P/PET. Using such an aridity index,
LTNESCO
has devised a classification
system of world arid zones or regions as follows: hyperarid (P/PET = < 0.05), arid
(P/PET = 0.05-0.20), semiarid (P/PET - 0.20-0.50), dry subhumid (P/PET = 0.50-
0.65).'
Most of North Africa and Southwest Asia environment (Figure
8.1).
is
classified as
al-Khali deserts comprise
millimeters
(mm) of rainfall
uninhabited.
arid
North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are principally
hyperarid, the largest such extremely dry region in the world.
Rub
some type of
much of
this area, receiving
annually, or no rain in
The next category,
arid zones,
may
some
The Sahara and
the
only some tens of
years,
receive from
and are largely
80-350
mm
of
moisture in winter rainfall areas (as in the Mediterranean), and begin to have some
human
occupation, including pastoral nomadic economies.
The northern and
southern margins of the hyperarid Sahara Desert merge into these arid zones, while
much of the
northern Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and Central Asia are also climatically
arid zones (Figure 8.1).
212
Michael
Figure
8.1.
E.
Bonine
Arid Zones in North Africa and the Middle East
Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture
The semiarid zones, however, in the
Middle
East.
rainfall areas, this
is
With the
are the principal location of
precipitation
from 200
major agricultural zone
to
700
213
human
habitation
mm annually
for the region.
in winter
Morocco, northern
Algeria and Tunisia, the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean), Turkey, and northern Iran are
some of these
areas (Figure 8.1), often classified as a Mediterranean Climate
(winter rainfall, dry summers). Highlands or mountains are also significant for these zones, particularly for moisture-laden westerly winds being forced up and
condensing over such systems as the Atlas Mountains, Lebanon Mountains, highlands of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the Zagros Mountains of
western
Iran.
While the western slopes receive considerable winter
descending and warming resulting in arid
air
on the eastern
sides are
much
rainfall,
drier, this rain
shadow
and even hyperarid zones.
The dry subhumid zone and
the
even wetter humid zone also have considerable
population, but they comprise smaller areas in the Middle East and sometimes represent less inhabitable mountainous regions as well. Parts of northwest Africa,
northwest Iran, Lebanon, and particularly Turkey comprise these major wetter areas.
Rainfed or dryland farming can be practiced
in the
dry subhumid and humid
zones as well as in some other highland areas in the Middle East where greater
These lands
precipitation occurs than in the surrounding, lower elevations.
comprise some of the principal agricultural regions of the Middle East.
A
key element
for agriculture in dry climates
precipitation. Generally the drier the climate, the
be from year
to year;
it
more
arid.
more
variable the conditions can less
While interannual
and
less reliable as
rainfall variability is
25 percent for dry subhumid zones and 25-50 percent for semiarid zones,
can be 50-100 percent in arid zones and even
The increase
in variability
of drier climates
planners either ignore or minimize agricultural projects.
upon
rainfall
-
is
less reliable in hyperarid zones.
a concept that
to the peril
many
engineers and
of the viability of
Averages often can be meaningless
Droughts can impact drylands rely
the variability of the annual
annual averages of precipitation are
general climatic conditions are less than
is
many
in a dryland climate.
drastically, especially if cultivation
and snow either for crops or the water supply
is
attempting to
for irrigation.
Related to dryland climates are soil-related problems. Arid soils tend to be
shallow and coarse textured and have poorly developed horizons.
Low
moisture
content limits biological activity, which in turn restricts the amount of organic material that can enrich the
soil.
oxidation of the organic material.
High summer temperatures increase
the rapid
The infrequent but heavy rainstorm can remove
Michael E. Bonine
214
much of
the loose soil. In lowland, basin areas,
heavy impermeable clays can
develop, as well as salt crusts. Alluvial floodplains often are the most
fertile
areas
'y
for cultivation.
Whatever
source, water availability
its
agriculture in the
Middle
farmlands, in
fact,
levels per unit
agricultural
And where
East.
farming (or even where that
is
the principal physical constraint for
there cannot be rainfed or dryland
too risky), irrigation must take place. Irrigated
is
provide areas for more intensive agriculture, and so production
of land are
much
higher than in the rainfed regions.
Most major
development schemes are concerned with creating or expanding
irrigated areas.
The majority of
the irrigation systems are rather small-scale
systems, similar to most of the world's irrigated cropland (where about 85 percent rely
on small-scale, hand-built, gravity-flow canal systems, managed by
local
groups of farmers).^ However, there are also larger, state-supported irrigation and cultivation schemes, although the success of these often has will
been questionable,
as
be discussed in the case studies below.
Agricultural Patterns in the Middle East
Most of the land
in the
Middle East
is
not arable. All states have less than one-third
of their land cultivated (with Turkey's 35 percent that percentage).
of the area
is
Table
8.1
shows
that in
bemg the
1996 for the
only
state slightly
over
entire region, only 7.6 percent
arable or in permanent crops. Six states have at least one-fifth of their
land arable, and
many of the more
arid states, as in the
Arabian Peninsula, have
only a small percentage of all their land cultivated. Turkey dominates in total area in agriculture, with 26.9 million hectares (ha)
Iran
is
of arable land and permanent crops.
a solid second place, with 19.4 million ha, followed
by Sudan's estimated 13
million ha of agricultural land.
Permanent crops are those
that
do not need
to
be replanted with each harvest,
including fruit and nut trees and vines. Sizeable percentages of many countries are
permanent crops, where date palms, olive
trees,
or citrus fruit trees
may be
particularly prominent. For instance, over half of the (minuscule) arable lands in
Bahrain,
Oman, and
the United
palms), while over 40 percent
(mostly olives and citrus
Arab Emirates is
in
is
in
permanent crops (mostly date
permanent crops
fruit trees).
in Tunisia
and Lebanon
Turkey and Iran have sizeable areas of
permanent crops, although Tunisia also has over 2 million ha of these arable lands.
5
Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture
2
1
per arable
land Persons
3.6
19.2
rN
of
CO 04
2.9
150.0
3.2
13.3
360.0
12.7
r^4
00*
31.3
2.8
r-T
2.3
rr
o
3.5
c^
lu
1 land person
(hectares)
0,280
0.052
0.399
0.362
o rT
1 0.536
0.341
0.007
per
r-i 0.281
-T Population
28.7
(million)
5.3
62.7
26.7
0.075
0.093
fOOO
0,105
0.079
0.026
0.032
0.203
0.353
0.429
T
2.4
0.5
18.9
14.7
62.8
2.6
28.0
98.4
38.6
21.7
15.6
96.0
0.283
0
o'
Arable
If
27.3
23.6
00
00 20.6
OO TT
399.7
>0
' of area
0
1996
CO
percent
7.0
22.2
13.0
CO lUircau
15.0
125.0
37.4
019
45.5
18.3
001
Area
0001
31.3
25.9
OO
arable
Use,
As Kcfcrciicc
Irrigated
ha)
Land Area
560
470
3266
1258
1946
380
2800
7265
3525
199
75
88
o oo T
62
(1000
1127
72
4200
485
29281 I'upulalion
1996, Agricultural
Arable
crops
6.5
14.2
14.3
Percentage
6 8
90
oo 41.7
o o'
o
OO 8.5
19.7
22.0
1
40.8
1
-T
18.8
3.4
13.7
9.2
53.3
7.0
9.0 Slieel,
J
Data
Permanent
ha)
East
519
Area
300
466
855
80
2036
T -r
fN
1650
280
86
06
1
1
128
47
130
710
o TT
2472
108
10146
ropntalioii
(1000
Middle
of
I'AO
area
8.1.
CN
percent
3.4
3.3
21.6
12.4
6 0
oo
CO
5.5
12.0
13.2
21.2
4.6
0.3
30.7
28.3
0.3
35.0
ro
Cn 04
7.6 Natiims,
total
As
i
Table
Unilcd
51,
ha) Arable
Area
8040
2115
3266
9661
13000
4878
8054
19400
5780
437
314
410
63
3830
5196
26946
1 75
1548
113038
vol.
(1000
1997,
L
ha)
Land
Area
238174
99545
175954
44630
237600
15536
65209
69
162200
43832
2062
8893
1782
1023
21246
1100
214969
18378
76963
8360
52797
1490322 Yearbook,
(1000 Total
j Total I'lOilnciion
Arabia
Country
Afghanistan
5 Morocco
.Mgeria
1
Kuwait
I’unisia
Libya
Sudan
n
Jordan Israel
Iran
Iraq
o 5
X
y
Qatar
Oman
Saudi
Syria
Turkey