Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East: Land Reform, Demographic Change, and Environmental Constraints 9780295999753, 0295999756

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LAND REFORM, DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE,

AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

EDITED BY Kurt E.

boston public library L-opley Square

Boston

MA

02116

Rural Development

in

Eurasia and the Middle East

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2017 with funding from

Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780295980478

Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East Land Reform, Demographic Change, and Environmental Constraints

Edited by

Kurt E. Engelmann Vjeran Pavlakovic

Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies Center at the

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies University of Washington in association

with

University of Washington Press Seattle

and London

Copyright 2001 by the University of Washington Press Printed in the United States of America

All rights reserved.

No

part of this publication

may

be reproduced or transmitted

any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in in

writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rural Development in Eurasia and the Middle East change, and environmental constraint

/

edited

:

land reform, demographic

by Kurt Engelmann and Vjeran

Pavlakovic. p.

cm.

Includes bibliographic references and index.

ISBN 0-295-98047-8 1.

(alk.

paper)

Rural development-Case studies.

2.

Rural development-Russia

(Federation). 3. Rural development-Asia, Central. 4. Rural Africa, North. 5. Rural I.

Engelmann, Kurt.

II.

Development-Middle Pavlakovic, Vjeran.

development-

East.

III.

Henry M. Jackson School of

International Studies. Russian, East European, and Central

Asian Studies

Center.

HN49.C6 R87526 2000 307.r412’0956— dc21

The paper used

Sciences 1984.

and recycled from 10 percent 50 percent pre-consumer waste. It meets the

in this publication

post-consumer and

minimum

00-060703

least

at

requirements

—Permanence

is

acid-free

of American

National

Standard

for

of Paper for Printed Library Materials,

Information

ANSI

Z39.48-

Contents

1

2 Introduction, Kurt E.

3

4 /

Engelmann

vii

Change in Russian Agrarian Reform, 1992-1998: The Case of Kostroma Oblast 3 5 Stephen K. Wegren 6 /

Continuity in Rural Russia

Gregory

45

Ioffe

7 /

Rural Population Change in Russia, 1959-1998

8

Dmitry Sharkov 9

/

62

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

A

Kyrgyz Republic

Legal Perspective

in the

87

Renee Giovarelli /

Agricultural Sector

Reform and Rural

Development in Uzbekistan Jim Butterfield /

117

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral

Sea Basin:

A Geographical Perspective

140

Philip Micklin

/

Agricultural

Development and Environmental

Constraints in Northwest Africa Will D.

/

185

Swearingen

Development or Sustainable Agriculture: The Case of the Middle East 210 Michael E. Bonine

Agricultural

/

The Smallholder

in

Turkish Agriculture:

Obstacle or Opportunity?

Paul Kaldjian Contributors

Index

279

281

239

1

.

:

-

n

rS?

1

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.

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w

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t

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*w oijijii

,

^;

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ur

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Hu

-

vrTr-

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,

L

-.

r'^f

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fci»^ rTji45j^l*c..,^

i.

i

V'

rur«lA)'

t

3

'

•

>

/

t-

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10/v

-•?

irji?’'.Oi^/

.

•,

,

-“. .

^v

.

•

ijt'--

-i'*

^

J^ic

p.-

f--'

»'

1

\

!-#»

.

^A. r

sw

*

.'ir

» f

'\

oJ?

H

—

Total

— — Urban — — Rural A:

)•

Source; Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.

o?'''

Rural Population Change

in

1959-1998

Russia,

71

Rural Migration

Two

other factors

- migration and administrative change - played

rural population dynamics.

was

rural to urban. This

key role

a

in

Before 1991, the prevailing direction of migration

flow did not change overnight

after the

breakup of the

Soviet Union. Rather, starting with the second half of the 1970s, fewer and fewer

people were leaving the countryside for urban areas (see Figure although rural-to-urban migration was

significant

a

still

trend,

3.5). it

And

became

relatively (and absolutely) less important in Russia in the early 1990s.^ Starting

Russian rural areas have been experiencing positive net migration. The

in 1991,

migration inflow (peaked in 1994) was enough to compensate for the natural decrease of the rural population. The combination of the overall decrease in

migration flows within Russia, return migration to rural areas of people

could not adapt to urban

life

during the time of economic

number of urban dwellers who moved

small

contributed to the significant slowing

within Russia. However,

became one of

the

it

rural

down of positive

the

as,

areas for subsistence

rural-to-urban migration

was immigration from other Soviet republics

major factors of rural population growth

distribution of rural migration flows

Table

to

well

crisis, as

who

at that time.

that

The

between 1989 and 1995 can be seen

in

3.1.

It

is

quite

clear

that

rural-to-urban migration within Russia

dramatically after 1989, and between 1992 and 1993 urban-to-rural positive net flow (see

column

5

it

of Table

predominantly

rural-to-urban

accelerated after 1993, which

flow.

The

of the country’s economy. The main contributors

This revision was,

to a familiar pattern

out-migration

rural

was consistent with

actually reversed into

3.1).

however, short-lived, and since 1994 migration returned

stabilization to the

decreased

of

significantly

and improvement

growth of Russia’s

rural

population were immigrants (returning migrants and refugees) from urban and to a lesser extent rural areas of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Before

1994, the majority of

new immigrants found

despite the fact that the majority of the centers.

Most of

these people

resources, and with the Russian next,

new immigrants were

government.

left their

their

new homes

in rural

Russia

newcomers originated from urban

homelands without adequate financial

economy going from one economic

crisis to the

not able to get any meaningful help from the Russian

Dmitry Sharkov

72

Table

3.1. Distribution of

Rural Migration Flows, 1989-1995 (thousands)

INTERNATIONAL FLOWS Year

Immigration

Immigration

Emigration from

Urban-to-Rural

Net Rural

from Urban

from Rural

Rural Areas in

Migration

Migration

Areas Outside

Areas Outside

Russia to Areas

within Russia

Russia

Russia

Outside Russia

1989

157.6

143.0

89.6

-483.9

-272.9

1990

198.9

145.5

77.8

-339.2

-72.6

1991

158.2

103.1

181.5

-22.4

57.4

1992

258.8

113.5

173.7

90.9

289.5

1993

247.5

110.1

132.3

38.7

264.0

1994

262.9

145.3

93.1

-42.7

272.4

1995

190.5

105.8

99.3

-100.8

96.2

1996

142.0

79.8

81.2

-106.4

34.2

1997

141.4

79.6

64.4

-100.2

56.4

Source; Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.

The government, on would go through were

the other hand,

existing residential controls.

settling in the rural areas,

did not have enough

was (and

Russia.

It is

still is)

money

to

first

pay

where the newcomers

to

The main reason

that

newcomers

When

real estate costs

half of the 1990s, these

new immigrants

however, was financial.

skyrocketed in Russia during the

it

had a say as

for housing in

urban areas. At the same time,

quite easy to find a place to live (but not to

work) in rural

move

to the cities as

also very likely that the former urbanites will

quickly as their financial situations will allow. It

has been suggested that the increased importance of rural destinations

reflected an element of choice

on behalf of the migrants.

On

one hand, food

shortages in the cities during the early 1990s revitalized interest

among urban

dwellers in obtaining land plots in the countryside, not just for recreational use

but primarily for livestock and food production.

On

the other hand,

some

migrants could choose rural destinations in anticipation of Russian agrarian

reform and land privatization, where they would have some advantages over urban residents. As people became used

to a

permanent (yet relatively mild)

Rural Population Change

economic

crisis,

in Russia,

1959-1998

food shortages became a story from the

73

past,

and land reform

did not materialize, the most active part of the rural population (see Figure 3.4), those in their twenties, started to leave the countryside. Thus, the factor that was

seen as a positive and important sign in changing the unfavorable rural age structure^* started to disappear.

With

the departure of the tv\'enty-somethings,

prospects of “natural” demographic revival in rural Russia are also diminishing.

Stephen Wegren identified three major groups of reasons for migration out of rural Russia.

The

first

group comprises factors determining work conditions

low wages, abundance of manual

in the countryside:

and lack of

labor,

shift

work. The second group included “cultural-service” conditions, such as the low quality of the service sector (where available), geographical isolation of villages,

and the lack of anonymity social psychology, social

in private life.

when people became

group concerned a change

third

oriented towards urban values.

As

in

the

and economic transformation of Russia did not really touch on any. of

these factors, rural areas did not

during the late 1980s. In rural

The

fact,

become any more

were

attractive then they

not only has the gap between living standards in

and urban Russia widened

at a

much

faster

pace since the beginning of the

1990s, but there has also been an absolute decline in rural living standards in Russia.

As

a result, urban-to-rural

movements

traditional rural-to-urban migration

was

all

but disappeared after 1993, and

rural areas continues to occur, fueled primarily

Soviet Union.

It is

some migration

fully restored. Still,

by immigrants from

the former

important to note, however, that the appeal of the urban

style has increased

over the past several years even for

analysis of recent migration trends, Zh.

Zayonchkovskaya

new

to

arrivals.

life-

In an

noted that the share

of rural immigrants received by urban areas increased from 39 percent to 81 percent from 1993 to 1996, making the countryside’s share of net migration far

below

its

share of total immigration to Russia.

Administrative

Finally,

Change

administrative change also contributed to the relative and absolute

growth of the rural population.

The

reclassification took place during

1991 and 1992, when

greatest

share

of the it

urban-to-rural

involved almost

650,000 people. However, during 1995 only 1,800 people found themselves “rural” due to this process, although in 1996 and 1997 this

number began

to

Dmitry Sharkov

74

grow

again, reaching

more than 57,000 and 44,000 people,

year’s end. Overall, 797,940 people to reclassification.

the future

is

The

uncertain, but

economic

likely to maintain

it is

to

villages

from urban

to rural

the

due

its role.

If the natural increase

be negative, the flow of immigrants dries up, and

situation does not significantly improve,

and settlements of the urban type

become

their status

by

direction of this contributor to rural population growth in

of the population continues the overall

changed

respectively,

many

will continue to lose their

small towns

urban status and

and rural settlements.

Future Trends

By

1996, rural population growth had stopped, rural areas again were losing

population, and the share of rural population

might

for this

lie in

the fact that

by 1995,

signs of stabilization, with urban centers

magnet.

was

also declining.

the Russian

economy was showing

becoming again

a strong population

one of the main sources of rural population growth was

Also,

immigration from the republics of the former Soviet Union. to

assume

made

that the majority

their

The explanation

of ethnic Russians,

move between 1991 and

1995.

who wanted

The

It

would be

logical

to migrate to Russia,

financial crisis of

August 1998

might actually revive some sectors of the Russian economy, thus intensifying rural out-migration,

and

at the

same

time,

making Russia

a

much

less desirable

place for potential immigrants.

Various population projections covering Russia’s future population that

were published recently showed

that the share

and absolute number of rural

population will continue to drop in the future, and that the trend that started in

1991-1992 was

employ which

the

short-lived.

As

T. Heleniak notes, most of these projections

same basic methodology and

in turn

differ primarily in their assumptions,

can result in wide variations in the forecast outcomes.'^ Current

projections indicate that the total Russian population will decline the turn of the century,

and

that

growth will resume

at a

low

somewhat by

rate during the first

Population growth rates will then stabilize and

part of the twenty- first century.

continue without significant changes (positive or negative) until at least 2015-

2020, with a subsequent

new and

rapid population decline. Childbearing cohorts

women bom in the 1980s and will be replaced by a much smaller generation of women bom in the 1990s, with a simultaneous increase in deaths

will lose

among

the aging population.

In the absence of major political and economic

Rural Population Change

catastrophes outside the Russian Federation, the countries of the former Soviet

and

stabilize at

low

Some

levels.

1959-1998

in Russia,

Union

it

likely that immigration

is

will decrease (as

it

However,

will

it

the rural out-migration that should intensify as the

most

economic

from

decreasing now)

is

reclassification of urban places

the population will continue to decline.

starts to

75

is

very likely as

likely

be offset by

situation in Russia

improve.

Regional Patterns of Change

Historically, patterns

significant

spatial

of rural population change were characterized by very

differences

(Table

Unfortunately,

3.2).

it

not

is

always

possible (even on the oblast level) to separate the influence of different factors

such as natural increase, migration, and administrative change on population dynamics. Those patterns do allow

us,

however,

to visualize different regional

patterns of rural population change as displayed in Figure 3.7.

Region

was

(the North)

Since

population.

historically characterized

1959,

by

a steady decline of rural

Vologda Oblast has been losing

throughout the whole time period, while in

Komi

The Northern

rural

population

Republic and

Murmansk

Oblast the numbers of rural dwellers increased until

1970.

The Karelian

Republic was unique in the region, posting a 42 percent increase

in

rural

population between 1989 and 1997. That dramatic increase, however, was due to administrative changes in 1991,

when about 50,000

reclassified as rural residents.

Significant rural population decline

urbanites found themselves

observed in Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Nenetsk Autonomous

Northwest

is

a region that also

population, with Pskov and

grow

there during the 1980s

1-3 percent.

St.

is

also

District.

The

experienced long-term decline in

Novgorod Oblasts

whole period. Leningrad Oblast

was

somewhat

and continued

to

its

rural

losing rural population during the

different: rural population started to

grow through

the 1990s at a rate of

Petersburg, located at the center of the oblast, undoubtedly has a

strong impact on the surrounding oblast in attracting people not only from the

Northwest but from

all

over the country. The

residential restrictions that

enforced by the city

city,

however, has a number of

were introduced during Soviet times and are

officials.

still

1

11

1

Dmitry Sharkov

76

Table

3.2.

Russian Rural Population Change by

Subjects of the Russian Federation, 1959-1997

Rural Population

Region/Suhiect of

(

1

,000s of people)

Rural Population

Change

Increase

(percent)

the Federation

1959

1970

1979

1989

1995

1998

Natural

1959

1970

1979

1989

-1970

-1979

-1989

-1998

1997

2.074

1.842

1.540

1.436

1.427

1.397

-11

-16

-7

-3

-7.7

Karelian Republic

242

223

163

145

203

204

-8

-27

-11

41

-9.7

Komi Republic

331

367

325

308

302

299

1

-11

-5

Arkbiangelsk Oblast

581

462

390

397

388

368

-20

-16

2

Nenetsk .AD

20

18

19

21

20

19

-10

6

Vologda Oblast

855

681

541

474

443

424

-20

-21

Murmansk

45

91

102

91

81

83

.102

12

1.768

1.402

1.182

1.107

1.078

1.065

-21

-16

23

6

0

0

0

0

-74

Leningrad Oblast

595

559

547

566

569

573

-6

Novgorod Oblast

455

336

255

229

218

213

Pskov Oblast

695

502

380

312

291

10.404

7.928

6.252

5.293

Bryansk Oblast

1,010

832

619

Vladimir Oblast

608

488

Ivanovo Oblast

417

Kaluga Oblast

North

1

-12

-4.6 -7

-7.8

-10

3.1

-1

-10.5

-9

1.9

-d

-4

-14.1

.2

3

1

-9.6

-26

-24

-10

-7

-17.6

279

-28

-24

-18

-11

-20.8

5.142

5.027

-24

-21

-15

-5

-14.1

483

470

461

-18

-26

-22

-5

-13.5

394

344

329

320

-20

-19

-13

-7

-14.2

309

253

229

226

220

-26

-18

-9

-4

-13.4

588

479

382

332

289

280

-19

-20

-13

-15

-14.4

Kostroma Oblast

555

405

291

254

274

275

-27

-28

-13

8

-11.8

Moscow

City

284

37

29

1

0

0

-87

-22

-97

Moscow

Oblast

2,087

1,765

1,583

1,383

1,348

1,330

-15

-10

-13

-4

-11.0

709

569

400

336

342

334

-20

-30

-16

-1

-12.5

1,012

747

568

461

429

412

-26

-24

-19

-11

-19.0

775

577

449

370

357

345

-26

-22

-18

-7

-17.9

Tver Oblast

1,019

741

550

476

457

437

-27

-26

-13

-8

-17.9

Tula Oblast

758

560

418

354

341

332

-26

-25

-15

-6

-16.2

Yaroslavl Oblast

582

419

316

270

280

281

-28

-25

-15

4

-14.4

5.064

3,956

3.163

2,640

2.545

2.482

-22

-20

-17

-6

-JO.O

Oblast

Northwest St.

Petersburg City

Central

Orel Oblast

Ryazan Oblast

Smolensk Oblast

Volga- Vyatka

-1

1

Rural Population Change

Region/Suhjcci of

Rural Population

1

1

(

1

in Russia,

1959-1998

,000s of people)

77

Rural Population

the Federation

Change

1970

1979

1989

1995

1998

Natural Increase

(percent)

1959

Man

1

1959

1970

1979

1989

-1970

-1979

-1989

-1998

1997

465

405

329

291

289

291

-13

-19

-12

0

-5.2

818

656

525

419

397

384

-20

-20

-20

-8

-11.6

835

787

698

563

539

531

-6

-1

-19

-6

-6.8

Kirov Oblast

1,183

783

594

509

491

470

-34

-24

-14

-

-9.0

Nizhegorod Oblast

1.763

1,325

1,017

858

829

806

-25

-23

-16

-6

-13.4

Central Chernozem

5,652

4,

3.076

3.040

2.967

-15

-

-18

-4

-13.5

+0

-12.6

El

Republic

Mordovian Republic

Chuvash Republic

784

3.

732

f

Belgorod Oblast

986

817

617

510

518

512

-17

-24

-17

Voronezh Oblast

1,548

1,376

1,138

965

964

943

-1

-17

-15

Kursk Oblast

1,180

988

732

564

541

523

-16

-26

-23

-7

-15.7

797

682

535

460

459

449

-14

-14

.2

-12.4

1,141

921

710

577

558

540

-19

-23

-19

-6

-13.1

6,569

5,913

5,002

4,389

4.563

4.546

-10

-15

-12

4

-6.0

76

175

175

199

191

21

-1

0

9

2.3

1,660

1,517

1,264

981

997

995

-9

-17

I

-4.6

Astrakhan Oblast

337

342

298

318

337

341

1

-13

7

7

-1.0

Volgograd Oblast

846

800

706

624

694

695

-5

-12

-12

1

1,009

857

678

573

564

551

-15

-21

-15

-4

-10.8

Samara Oblast

859

781

676

628

649

644

-9

-13

-7

3

-7.2

Saratov Oblast

999

856

740

689

714

729

-14

-14

-7

6

-5.2

Ulyanovsk Oblast

713

584

465

401

409

400

-18

-20

-14

-0

-10.6

6.640

7,175

6.991

7.154

7,855

7,930

8

-3

2

11

-0.6

Adygey Republic

219

233

21

207

208

208

6

-9

+0

-3.9

Dagestan Republic

748

924

988

1016

1225

24

7

3

21

15.0

Kabardino-Balkar

254

308

282

295

318

337

21

-8

5

14

5.9

219

232

208

214

229

243

6

-10

3

14

1.6

Lipetsk Oblast

Tambov

Oblast

Volga

Kalmyk Republic-

146

1

-13.4

Khalmg Tangch Tatarstan Republic

Penza Oblast

North Caucasus

1

197

-6.4

Republic

Karachay-Cherkess Republic

1

1

1

Dmitry Sharkov

78

/?e;g/o/j/Subject

Rural Population

of

(

1

,000s of people)

Rural Population

Change

Increase

(percent)

the Federation

1959

1970

1979

1989

1995

1998

Natural

1959

1970

1979

1989

-1970

-1979

-1989

-1998

1997

213

196

192

198

201

206

-8

.1

3

4

Chechen Republic*

308

460

491

552

567

530

49

7

12

-4

Ingush Republic*

108

161

172

194

197

182

49

7

13

-6

13.3

Krasnodar Krai

2,075

2,156

2,106

2,131

1

2.347

4

.1

1

10

-6.2

Stavropol Krai

1,083

1,094

1,066

1,1

1,227

1,233

1

-3

4

1

-3.3

Rostov Oblast

1,413

1,41

1,275

1,236

1,419

1,419

0

-10

-3

15

-5.9

Urals

7.380

6.

724

5,644

5,124

5.228

5,215

-9

-16

-9

7

-3.6

Bashkortostan

2,059

1,979

1,662

1,429

1,442

1,446

-4

-16

-14

1

-1.4

Udmurt Republic

744

609

518

487

494

499

-18

-15

-6

2

-2.8

Kurgan Oblast

671

621

533

500

505

491

-7

-14

-6

*2

-6.0

Orenburg Oblast

1,005

962

829

761

797

802

-4

-14

-8

5

-2.3

Perm Oblast

1,024

820

656

593

602

603

-20

-20

-10

2

-5.1

Komi-Permyak

202

172

131

112

111

106

-15

-24

-15

-5

-6.0

Sverdlovsk Oblast

971

835

667

609

584

581

-14

-20

-9

-5

-7.4

Chelyabinsk Oblast

704

726

648

633

693

687

3

-11

.2

8

-4.2

5,528

4.678

4,191

4,082

4,407

4.372

-15

-10

-3

7

-4.1

127

128

124

140

153

153

1

-3

13

9

1.5

1,673

1,314

1,151

1,100

1,291

1,265

-21

-12

-4

15

-5.2

637

517

407

400

405

399

-19

-21

.1

-0

-7.7

1,024

867

747

704

719

717

-15

-14

-6

2

-4.4

934

816

726

689

710

712

-13

-11

-5

3

-2.1

387

320

299

311

374

360

-17

-7

4

16

-5.6

615

569

536

516

560

560

-7

-6

-4

9

-2.2

91

101

123

115

113

121

11

22

-7

5

0.5

40

46

78

107

82

85

15

70

37

-21

7.4

3,059

2,851

2,552

2,572

2,624

2,589

-7

-10

/

/

-2.1

397

449

388

401

428

422

13

-14

3

5

-0.8

North Ossetian

0.1

Republic-Alaniya

1

'>

9

')

Republic

^Vesi Siberia

Altay Republic Altay Krai

Kemerovo Oblast Novosibirsk Oblast

Omsk

Oblast

Tomsk

Oblast

Tiumen Oblast Khant-Mansii

AD

Yamalo-Nenetsk

AD East Siberia Buryat Republic

1

Rural Population Change

in

Russia,

Rural Pop ulation (1,000s of peop e)

Region/Suh]ect of

1959-1998

19

Rural Population

the Federation

Change

1970

1979

1989

1995

1998

Natural Increase

(percent)

1959

Twa (Tuva)

1

1959

1970

1979

1989

-1970

-1979

-1989

-1998

1997

122

144

154

163

160

163

IS

7

6

0

4.4

Khakass Republic

189

180

159

157

160

170

-5

-12

-1

8

-4.6

Krasnoyarsk Krai

1,108

927

794

785

788

765

-16

-14

-1

-3

-5.0

Taimyr (Dolgano-

13

15

15

18

16

15

15

0

20

-7

3.6

9

9

10

17

15

14

0

70

-18

2.3

Irkutsk Oblast

617

517

467

441

435

421

-16

-10

-6

-5

-2.6

Ust-Orda Buryat

132

123

108

143

144

-7

-12

3

30

1.5

426

435

406

427

425

422

2

-7

5

-1

1.1

46

52

51

52

54

53

13

.2

2

2

6.2

1,569

1,648

1,738

1,920

1,847

1,776

5

5

10

-7

-0.4

Sakha Republic

248

289

325

360

367

358

17

12

1

-1

8.0

Pnmorskii Krai

453

467

479

508

506

483

3

3

6

-5

-j.

Khabarovsk Krai

248

245

264

322

306

300

-1

8

22

-7

-2.0

AO

46

54

60

73

69

66

17

11

22

-10

0.3

Oblast

289

303

328

342

351

358

5

8

4

5

-2.5

Kamchatka Oblast

58

48

45

63

55

54

-17

-6

40

-14

-1.2

22

21

20

24

26

23

-5

-5

20

-4

-1.2

25

58

62

60

36

24

132

7

-3

-60

-2.1

20

31

40

43

30

25

55

29

8

-42

4.1

Sakhalin Oblast

160

132

1

15

125

101

85

-17

-13

9

-32

-4.3

Kaliningrad Oblast

216

196

190

182

203

210

-9

-3

-4

15

-4.9

Republic

AD

Nenetskii)

AD

Evenk

1

1

1

1

AD Chita Oblast

Aga Buryat

AD

Far East

Jewish

Amur

Koryak

AD

Magadan Oblast Chukotka

AD

*estimates **natural increase per 1,000 population

/

Dmitry Sharkov

80

The small increase due

to the fact that

Leningrad Oblast

in rural population in

people trying to

The

step.

The oblast

number of migrants from Baltics and northern

Central, Volga- Vyatka,

most

likely

in St. Petersburg often settle in

settle

Leningrad Oblast as a temporary but necessary relatively large

is

also attracted a

parts of Russia.

and Central Chernozem regions experienced

very similar rural population trends since 1959. During the examined period every one of the twenty-three subjects of the Russian Federation located there population in every intercensal period. Also,

lost rural

been losing

all

but five oblasts have

1989. Out of these five oblasts, three

rural population since

-

Kostroma, Orel, and Belgorod Oblasts - gained a small number of rural dwellers

between 1989 and 1995. However,

proved

this trend

to

be a short-lived, and

since 1995 rural population continued to decline there. Ivanovo and Yaroslavl are the only

two oblasts where

rural population

growth has continued

after 1995.

In the Volga Region, five oblasts and the Republic of Tatarstan were losing rural

between

population

1959

and

1989,

with

only

the

Penza

Oblast

experiencing rural population decline throughout the period between 1959 and 1997. Volgograd, Samara, Ulyanovsk Oblasts, and the Republic of Tatarstan

posted a gain between 1989 and 1995 with subsequent decline, while in Saratov Oblast rural population increased slightly even after 1995. Rural population in

Astrakhan Oblast increased, except during the period from 1970 to 1979, and this

was

also the case with the rural population in the

this trend

changed

Kalmyk

Republic, though

after 1995.

The North Caucasus

is

historically very

different

European Russia. The dynamics of rural population there

from the Chechen and Ingush Republics,

for

which

from other parts of is

no exception. Apart

rural population

can only be

estimated, the region’s rural population has increased significantly in all other eight subjects of the Russian Federation since 1989. In the Republic of Dagestan, rural population

time.

growth continued steadily throughout the examined period of

The Adygey and Karachay-Cherkess Republics and Rostov Oblast

experienced a slight rural population decline during the 1970s and 1980s, and the rural population of Kabardino-Balkaria,

North Ossetia, Krasnodar, and

Stavropol Krais declined during the 1970s. However, those declines were very

modest

in

comparison

to the other regions in

European Russia.

Rural Population Change

Figure

3.7.

in

Russia,

1959-1998

Russian Rural Population Change

Russian Rural Population Change

Source; Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.

81

Dmitxy Sharkov

82 In the Urals,

of the Federation were facing a rural

eight subjects

all

population decline between 1959 and 1989, and in Sverdlovsk Oblast and Komi-

Permyak Autonomous

District

though the

continued

decline

this

1990s.

Population increases were short-lived in Kurgan and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, which

gained in rural population between 1989 and 1995.

On

population growth continued in the Bashkortostan and

Udmurt Republics

as in

Orenburg and Perm Oblasts

In

West

the other hand, rural as well

starting in 1989.

Siberia rural population

was declining

in the period

between 1959

and 1989 in Altay Krai, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tyumen Oblasts. All of

them experienced

with a subsequent decline.

and

Yamalo-Nenetsk,

involved primarily in in the south

Two

in the period

northern autonomous

gained

generally

oil

Tomsk

between 1989 and 1995 Khanty-Mansii

districts,

non-agricultural

rural

and natural gas industries

of the region.

1979 with some drop

growth

a slight

as well as

little

population

Altai Republic

Oblast lost rural population between 1959 and

after 1995, but

gained about 75,000 rural dwellers in the

period between 1979 and 1995. In East Siberia different

and the Far

developments were somewhat

East, population

from other parts of the country. Rural population decline throughout the

whole period was observed only the rural population

grew

in

in the

Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Oblast, while

Republic of Tyva and

Amur

Oblast. Several

subjects of the Federation demonstrated a trend very unique to these rural population

was growing before 1989 and

after that started to decline at

dramatic rates. These areas were the Taimyr, Evenk, and Chukotka

Autonomous

Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Primorskii, and to some extent,

Districts, the

Khabarovskii Krais and Oblasts,

two regions:

areas

these

Magadan

did not

deteriorating living conditions

Oblast.

attract

after

Along with Sakhalin and Kamchatka

any new migrants, and with rapidly the collapse

system, the local rural population started to

Between 1989 and 1997, Magadan Oblast

lost

of the old socioeconomic

move away from

these locations.

58 percent of its rural population,

and the numbers for Chukotka and Sakhalin are 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively.

the

On

Ust-Orda

the other hand, the Buryat, Khakass, and

and Aga

Buryat Autonomous

Districts

Sakha Republics and gained

some

rural

population in the period from 1989 to 1995.

Kaliningrad Oblast lost rural population between 1959 and 1989, but after that

its

rural population increased, primarily

due

to

an influx of Russian-speaking

immigrants from the newly independent Baltic States.

Rural Population Change

To summarize

1959-1998

in Russia,

83

the above, a very significant redistribution of rural population

affected mostly the “belt” of territories along the borders between the Russian

Federation and other states of the former Soviet Union where significant growth occurred. In the regions of East Siberia and the Far East, the situation with the rural

population

changed dramatically and

opposite

the

in

direction

due

primarily to social and economic factors.

Table

Rural Population Change

3.3.

at the

Raion Level

Decline

No Change

1989-1990

997

278

723

1991

714

444

860

1992

450

421

1,158

1993

778

518

728

1994

937

426

661

1995

1,145

463

415

1996

1,324

417

381

Overall 1989-1996

1,134

73

860

Year

Growth

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of Goskomstat’s official publications.

Another interesting trend that rural population

can be seen from the population

that

growth was

abolition of the Soviet Union.

in fact localized

To

number of administrative raions (roughly analogous States) that experienced rural population

the

rural

population declined

at the

we can examine

the total

to counties in the

administrative

occurred in only 860 between 1989 and population grew

after the

in

1996.

raions,

As noted above,

growth

in relatively

migrants and refugees

the

rural

few raions, probably due

chain migrants from other parts of the former Soviet Union. Also,

were

and growth

same time by almost 950,000 people, which suggests

rather high concentration of

to note that there

United

growth or decline. As Table 3.3 shows,

1,134

in

1992

and peaked

illustrate this point,

statistics is

officially designated oblasts that

who moved

to the

to

important

were recipients of forced

Russian Federation due

conflicts elsewhere (including the conflict in

it is

a

to interethnic

Chechnya within Russia

itself).

The

peak of the number of administrative raions with population growth took place

Dmitry Sharkov

84 in

1992 and

after that declined significantly.

growth had occurred

By 1997

to raions experiencing rural population decline

while only a few years earlier in 1992,

it

was

3 to

where

the ratio of raions

was

1

to 4,

1.

Conclusion

During the

last

decade Russia experienced dramatic

social,

economic,

and demographic changes. In terms of population dynamics, the

political,

result

of these

changes was population decline in both absolute numbers and negative natural increase that

was not compensated by immigration from

the republics of the

former Soviet Union. At the same time, rural population experienced short-lived

growth

population

associated

immigration of ethnic Russians

home

in

mainly

with

administrative

who were unable

and

change

(or not willing) to find a

urban areas. In 1995, Stephen Wegren suggested that the

new

shift

in

migration patterns that favor rural in-migration might have profound long-term effects it

is

on agrarian reform and the very nature of the Russian countryside. In

fact,

quite possible that agrarian transformation (not even reform) in Russia

produced only small-scale and low-risk individual agricultural private plots and collective gardening, due to a

Russia.

activities,

such as

weak demographic base

in rural

However, some researchers also noted

that the absolute majority

of

migrants to Russia’s rural areas are moving there not due to pull factors but rather they are influenced

by

significant

push factors - forces

that are either

pushing them from urban centers within Russia, or more important, from other parts of the former Soviet Union,

With

relative stability in other parts

of the

former Soviet Union and an upswing in economic performance in Russia, the traditional pattern

of rural-urban migration can be expected

to

predominate in

the future.

Thus, long-term rural development will depend on non-demographic factors that

both influence rural development directly and affect demographic and

migratory behavior, which influences rural development indirectly. Russia has a relatively high proportion of

compared

to

its

still

population employed in agriculture

economically advanced countries, and problems with the food

supply are primarily associated not with depopulation but with the organization

and mechanization of agricultural production and the organization

and mechanization of the

rural

distribution. Efforts to

economy could

improve

lead to a genuine

Rural Population Change

1959-1998

in Russia,

85

- one based on long-term economic improvements

rural revival

rather than

short-term demographic gains.

Notes

Nicholas Dima, Rural Population Change

1.

Implications: 2.

John

in

the Soviet

1959—1970 (New York: Columbia University

F.

Its

Press, 1976).

Besemeres, Socialist Population Politics: The Political Implications

of Demographic Trends

USSR and

in the

Sharpe, 1980). The focus of this chapter

Eastern Europe (White Plains, is

NY: M.

on the “net” population dynamics

Russian Federation rather than on the more analytic measures of

and in-migration or out-migration proper. Also, the issues of migration and

Union and

fertility,

E.

in the

mortality,

official policy

towards

(including pro- versus anti-natalism) were outside the scope

fertility

6.

of

this

paper as they were

dynamics 3.

modem

in

filled

with contradictions, and their effects on population

Russia were rather minimal.

Dima, Rural Population Change.

Timothy Heleniak, “Economic Transition and Demographic Change

4.

in

Russia, 1989—1995,” in Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 36, No. 7 (1995), pp. 446-458.

Chislennost

5.

gorodskogo

tipa

i

rainom: na

Committee on

State

naselenii

(Moscow),

7.

1997);

State

Committee on

.11 (1999),

p.

J.

poselskam

Statistics, 1998).

44-47.

Geography and Economics, Vol.

Donald

gorodam,

and Dernograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii

Timothy Heleniak, “Russia’s Age Structure

Post-Soviet 8.

N

po

ianvaria 1997 goda (Moscow: Russian Federation

Statistics,

(Moscow: Russian Federation //og/

1

Federatsii

Rosiiskoi

in

1996:

A

Research Report,”

in

37, No. 6 (1996), pp. 386-395.

Bogue, Principles of Demography (New York: John Wiley and

Sons, 1969). 9.

Beth Mithchneck and David Plane, “Migration Patterns During a Period of

Political

and Economic Shocks

in

laroslavl’ Oblast,” in Professional

the Former Soviet Union:

Geographer, Vol. 47, No.

1

A

Case Study of

(1995), pp. 17-30.

10. Ibid. 11.

Reform:

Stephen

Wegren,

A Companson

of

“New

Two

35, No. 8 (1994), pp. 455-481.

Perspectives

on Spatial

Russian Oblasts,”

in

Patterns

of Agrarian

Post-Soviet Geography, Vol.

.

Dmitry Sharkov

86

12.

Stephen Wegren, “Weapons of the Weak: Rural Responses to Urban Bias

and Consequences for Land Reform

in

Russia,” in The Soviet

and Post-Soviet

Review, Vol. 21, No. 2-3 (1994), pp. 283-318; Stephen Wegren, “Rural Migration

and Agrarian Reform

in Russia:

A

Research Note,”

in

Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47,

No. 5 (1995), pp. 877-888. 13.

Alfred Evans,

1990s,” in Journal of

Jr.,

“The Decline of Rural Living Standards

Communist Studies and Transition

in

Russia

Politics, Vol. 12,

in the

No.

3

(1996), pp. 293-314. 14.

Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, “Recent Migration Trends

in

Russia,”

in

Population Under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia, eds. George J.

Demko, Grigory

Ioffe,

and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 1999), pp. 107-138. 15. Heleniak,

16.

“Economic Transition and Demographic Change,” pp. 446-458.

Ward Kingkade, Population

Trends:

Russia

(Washington,

DC: U.S.

Department of Commerce, 1997). 17. Victor

m Population 18. 19.

Perevedentsev, “The Demographic Situation in Post-Soviet Russia,”

Under Duress, pp. 17-38.

Wegren, “Rural Migration and Agrarian Reform,” pp. 877-888. Gregory

Ioffe,

Population Change

in

Rural Restructuring

in

Central Russia, Part IIP Rural

European Russia (Washington, DC: The National Council

for

Soviet and East European Research, 1996); Grigory Ioffe and Tatyana Nefedova,

“Rural Population Change and Agriculture,” in Population Under Duress, pp. 231259; Argumenty

i

Fakty (Moscow), 2 January 1996,

p.

1

4 / Land Reform and Farm Reorganization in the Kyrgyz Republic: A Legal Perspective Renee Giovarelli

The Kyrgyz Republic,

a small,

mountainous, and landlocked Central Asian

country with a population of 4.5 million, has pursued a fast-track transformation

of

its

economy following

mountain ranges, term

lies in the

it

Bounded by two

the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

has limited natural resources.

Its

advantage over the

medium

development of its agricultural sector and related agro-processing

activities.

To

that end, the

transform

its

Kyrgyz Republic

agricultural sector

from

is

continuing efforts

began

it

in

1991 to

collective to private farming, to ensure

private land rights, and to create the legal and administrative infrastructure

necessary to

support a freely functioning

land market.

Such

efforts

have

contributed significantly to the strengthening of democratic institutions, the

expansion and modernization of agricultural capacity, and the creation of a

market economy. At the time of

this

writing,

the

Kyrgyz Parliament was

preparing to adopt a package of laws that would create a strong legal framework for further agrarian

This report

Kyrgyz

is

reform

Kyrgyz Republic.

based on extensive

legislation

restructuring.

in the

and

field research, as well as

draft legislation pertaining to

The Rural Development

Institute

on analysis of

land reform and farm

(RDI) has been conducting

field

research regarding issues of land tenure and agrarian reform in the Kyrgyz

Republic from 1992 to the present.' generally focuses on to

(2)

farm

in

tliree

RDTs

field research in the

Kyrgyz Republic

principal questions: (1) are individual households able

any form they choose without a legal bias for or against

their choice;

does a legal framework exist that enables farmers to have a secure and

remunerative relationship to the land they farm; and (3)

developing?

is

a

land market

Renee Giovarelli

88

Agriculture in the Kyrgyz Republic

The

agricultural sector in the

of the

percent

Kyrgyz Republic accounted

domestic

gross

product

between

for approximately

and

1988

42

and

1993,

approximately one-third of the republic’s citizens depend on agriculture for their livelihood.^ Yet, only 7 percent of land in the 4.1),'^

Almost

all

Kyrgyz Republic

of the 1.4 million hectares of arable land are

is

arable (Table

irrigated.

The main

crops are cotton, winter and spring wheat, com, barley, oats, vegetables, and tobacco. Sheep, goats, cattle, and horse herds are also significant parts of the

Kyrgyz Republic’s

Table

agricultural output.^

4.1.

Land

in the

Kyrgyz Republic

(in hectares)

Total Land Area*

19,180,000

Agricultural Area

10,420,000

Arable Land

1,400,000

Permanent Crops**

20,000

Permanent Pasture

9,000,000

Forest and All Other

Wood

730,000

Land

8,030,000

*Excludes area under inland water bodies

**Excludes land under trees grown for wood or timber and land that

is

is

not meant to indicate the

amount of

potentially cultivable

The Kyrgyz Republic endured forced herds, and famine

collectivization, the destmction

of

between 1927 and 1932.^ The period of collective farming and

strong central planning continued for six decades. In 1991, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government of the efforts

At

toward privatization of land rights and reform of the agricultural

that time, the

land.

Kyrgyz Republic began

470

state

its

sector.

and collective farms held 96 percent of all agricultural

Reformers in the Kyrgyz government aggressively pursued reorganization

and privatization of these collective and

state farms.

Land reform and farm restmcturing

in the

Kyrgyz Republic appear

associated with better agricultural sector performance.

As

in all

to

be

former Soviet

Land Refonn and Farm Reorganization

in the

Kyrgy’z Republic

89

republics, the years immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet

were marked by economic turmoil and decline, especially In

sector.

the

1995,

projections

show

agricultural

sector

slowed

that the agricultural sector

in the agricultural

decline.

its

Union

In

the

1996,

expanded. In addition, the Kyrgyz

Republic’s agricultural sector has performed well compared to other former Soviet republics, most of which are not as far along in the farm reorganization

and land reform processes.

Development of the Legal Framework

for

Land Reform

and Farm Reorganization

Land reform and farm reorganization distinct time periods.

The

in the

Kyrgyz Republic

fall

early reforms (1991-1993) principally focused

voluntary reorganization of failing state and collective farms. Individuals

wanted

on

who

such farms were allowed to withdraw from the farm with land

to leave

and property (including sheep and other animals) and

The

enterprises.

two

into

later

reorganize and gave

set

reforms (1994-present) encouraged

members of

all

up private fann farms to wholly

the former state and collective farms land use

rights that they could sell, lease, mortgage,

and bequeath.

Developments, 1991-1993

Land reform

in the

Kyrgyz Republic began several months

prior to the republic’s

declaration of independence in September 1991.^ Early reform laws focused on

voluntary reorganization.

The Kyrgyz Republic Law on Peasant Farms

February 1991) encouraged private farm enterprises by allowing individuals

(2 to

apply to the local Council of People’s Deputies^ for unused land or land to be allocated

from

failing collective or state farms. Private farmers

receive inputs from the state at the

The

first

Republic, the to provide,

same prices

among

to

as a collective or state farm.^

comprehensive law on agrarian and land reform

Law on Land Reform

were able

in the

Kyrgyz

(19 April 1991), followed. This law sought

other things, a framework for the “equitable development of

various forms of farming,” and began the process of redistribution of land.

Law on Land Reform

called for (1) inventory and classification of

all

The

public and

private land; (2) voluntary reorganization of “inefficiently operated” collective

Renee Giovarelli

90 and

and

state farms;

unused and

(3) creation

of a special land

which was

fiind,

to contain

used lands for redistribution to other land users.

inefficiently

Inefficiently operated collective

and

state

farms could voluntarily reorganize as

cooperatives, other types of legal entities, associations of peasant farms, or

Land commissions were

private farm enterprises.

consider

requests

commissions were Six months

signed

a

distribution

for to

be created

later, in

presidential

agricultural reforms

which sought

decree,*'

local officials

that those collective

First, the

and

state

the

Similar

locality.

and federal

levels.

1991, newly elected President Askar

overcome

to

Akayev

resistance

and directors of collective and

farms. This decree and related regulations

forward in three ways.

within

land

at the raion, oblast,

November

from

of

established at the local level to

moved

to

state

land reform effort

the

decree and accompanying regulations mandated

farms with less than 15 percent profitability be

privatized, with redistribution of land

and other

assets to

farm members

to

be

used for creation of private farm enterprises and cooperatives. The farms that

were

to

be privatized were to be chosen by the State Property Committee

together with the Ministry of Agriculture and the oblast and raion Councils of

People’s Deputies.

Second, the decree and regulations allowed individual members of nonreorganized state and collective farms to withdraw a share of land and property (non-land assets) from the farm to share of each

member was

to

start a private

farm enterprise. The property

be determined based on the member’s length of

service and labor contribution.

Third, the decree and regulations redistributed land held collective farms in

two ways.

of agricultural land (out of a to the special land to

create private

First, the

total

and

of approximately 10.4 million ha) to be added

who wanted

farm enterprises, small cooperatives, gardens, and private it

provided

that, in addition,

irrigated arable lands allocated for the organization

no

less than

“50 percent of

of peasant farms” would be

newly created and separate land fund, the National Land Fund

(NLF), to support the way of life of Kyrgyz peasants.

The reference

peasants was apparently intended to allow distribution of ethnic Kyrgyz,

state

decree called for 1.5 million hectares (ha)

fund for redistribution to rural and urban citizens

individual plots. Second,

transferred to the

by

and

to exclude the

NLF

to

Kyrgyz

land only to

43 percent of Kyrgyz citizens who are ethnic

Russians, Germans, Uzbeks, Tajiks,

etc.*"*

7

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization Setting aside land for use First,

this

because

it

would be

in the Kyrgy’z

by ethnic Kyrgyz presented

Republic

91

three major problems.

provision appeared to be inconsistent with the

new

violated provisions stating that

Kyrgyz Republic

treated

all

persons

in the

constitution

Second, the provision created the potential for

equally.

furthering ethnic conflict. Third, the provision created insecurity of tenure for

those farms waiting to have half of their land taken.

Due

to these concerns, the

provision referring to Kyrgyz nationals was later removed. After the 1992 planting and harvest, a the

reiterated

new

decree was issued.'^ This decree

above mentioned decrees and added

(1)

a

requirement that

National Land Fund land be allocated to commodity-producing private farm enterprises

ethnic

on a competitive basis

Kyrgyz was dropped); and

(the reference to supporting the (2) a

recommendation

that collective

farms divide their land into shares to ensure that every worker or right to a land plot. This right to a land plot

represents a share of land

on

owns

share system

was created

An

called a “land share.”

individual

member

A

means

to distribute the land

state

has the

land share

may

and

or worker

the use right attached to the land share.

as a

and

member

the territory of an agricultural enterprise

be demarcated or undemarcated. agricultural enterprise

is

way of life of

on the

The land

of collective and

state

farms to individuals. The raion state administrations were given control over the

implementation of

on land reform

this

land reform system with input from the rural committees

(village governments).^^

The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, adopted on that land belongs to the state

5

May

and cannot be privately owned, but

1993, provided that land plots

may be

given to citizens and legal entities for private use. The purchase and sale

of land

is

not allowed under the constitution.

1

While some reform occurred between 1991 and 1994, several important issues

were insufficiently addressed. Specifically, the process

for restructuring

farms and the rights of individual farm members were not outlined in

detail.

Moreover, the types of enterprises allowed were not defined and described, so that

people did not have clear choices or even an understanding of their options.

Developments, 1994-Present

A

number of positive

other problems.

legal

developments occurred

in

1994

to redress these

Whole-farm reorganization was encouraged, while

at the

and

same

time individuals were given a legal right to agricultural land. Most prominently.

1

Renee Giovarelli

92

a February 1994 presidential decree guaranteed (rather than right

of members of collective and

state

and gave these holders of land share

recommended)

the

farms to receive land share use rights

rights the right to transfer them.

absence of a constitutional amendment allowing

full

In the

ownership of land, the

president allowed forty-nine year,*^ fully disposable and mortgageable rights to agricultural land.^^ lease,

The decree guaranteed

the right of land share

exchange, bequeath, or mortgage their land plots or land shares.

In addition to providing clear rights to land for state farms, the all

owners 2

and

collective

decree reduced the National Land Fund by half, to 25 percent of

arable land except pastures.

The decree

established.

members of

to sell,

A maximum

transferred

size

of land plot per family was

privatization

Property Fund to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Detailed regulations for the National Land 1994, which corrected

some of the

powers from the

(MOAF).

23

Fund were promulgated

earlier problems.

The

State

in

May

regulations called for

the land to be distributed (1) for lease to livestock breeders, seed producers, rural

household enterprises; (2) as land shares to collective and

state

and

farm

workers not otherwise entitled to land shares from the farms they had joined; and

temporary use

(3) for lease or

rules set out in this resolution

to other agricultural

were

still

commodity producers. The

unclear as to what quality of land was to

be selected for the fund, the use terms of the land

in the fund,

and who was

to

9
z Republic

rotation patterns, they

made

it

93

difficult, if

not

impossible, to establish a single-family farm.^^ In January

1995, the Ministry of Agriculture and

“Program of Land and Agrarian Reform

in the

Food published

Kyrgyz Republic

1996.” This program focused on whole-farm breakup reorganization

by 1996 of all

created

units

committees

from

state

and

land

and collective farms property

to inventory the assets

shares.

for

the

1995-

and called for the

into smaller

management

The program

established

of farms to be reorganized, calculate land and

property shares of members, develop a plan for reorganizing the farm, and then

implement the plan.

Under

this

program, agricultural producers were classified by the size and

mode of production of regulation

reorganized enterprises.

their

defined seven

new

enterprise categories.

A

later

government

These categories were

intended to eliminate some of the confusion caused by the tendency of some collective-type enterprises to adopt

names suggesting

that they are associations

of independent peasant farms. The categories are as follows: 1)

personal household enterprise (household plot cultivated by family members);

2)

farm enterprise (farm operated by one family on ha of irrigated land or

at least

1

at least 5

ha of suburban vegetable

land);

3)

peasant enterprise (two or more families cultivating 5-100

ha of irrigated land or 1-100 ha of suburban vegetable land); 4)

collective peasant enterprise (cultivating

more than 150 ha of

9Q

irrigated land); 5)

joint-stock

company

(enterprise capitalized with shareholders’

non-land property and using shareholders’ land shares); 6)

state enterprise (enterprise

a state program); 7)

agricultural

using state land and operating under

and

cooperative

(composed

of

independent

farm

enterprises or peasant enterprises). In

November

1995, a presidential decree^^ significantly furthered the rights

of land share owners. Existing forty-nine-year use rights

to agricultural land

were

extended to ninety-nine years. Heads of oblast and raion governments were instructed to complete the issuance of land share certificates

1995. The decree abolished the

maximum

size

by

3

1

December

of plots that one family

may

use.

Renee Giovarelli

94

and reduced the minimum 1

of land plots to 5 ha in

size

all

cultivation zones (and

ha for rural and suburban vegetable operations). In addition, the

November 1995 decree

abolished the National

and transferred the land remaining in the fund

Fund (LRF)

to

to the

new Land

Land Fund

Redistribution

be run by the Ministry of Agriculture. The decree provided that

land parcels from the fund are to be used for expansion of rural settlements, creation of experimental agricultural facilities, or are to be auctioned as ninety-

nine-year use rights for organizations of “peasant communities” and for other

purposes to be decided by the government.

One

year later (November 1996), Presidential Decree No. 327 called for (1)

registration rights to

of land use rights transactions; (2) sale (tender and auctions) of use

50 percent of land of the Land Redistribution Fund; and

lease agreements for the remaining land in the

Procedures for the sale of

Kyrgyz Republic

On

this

(3) one-year

Land Redistribution Fund.^’

land were promulgated by the government of the

in January 1998.

32

17 October 1998, a nationwide referendum was held to introduce the

concept of private ownership of land to the constitution in the hopes that such a constitutional legislation.

amendment would provide

Prior to the referendum,

presidential decree

was passed

the impetus for

much-needed land

which passed by a large majority, a

that outlined the concept

of private ownership of

land and provided that seven laws should be promulgated (if the referendum

passed) that would establish and encourage a land market.^^

They include

Land Code, Peasant Farm Law, Mortgage Law, Law on Cooperatives, and introducing land-related

amendments

to

law

to the civil code.

These laws underwent intensive drafting and revision processes and are expected

a

the

in late

1998

be adopted in 1999. They could become models for other

transition-economy countries, because they will create a strong legal framework that will

enhance and protect land rights of poor rural households, allow such

households to access land (or additional land), and access to farm credit resources. rural

They allow

and urban land; do not severely

and disposal of interests

their land;

private farmers.

is

as

No

such households’

for the free transfer

restrict the rights

and mortgage of

of private farmers on use

and provide a legal framework

of lenders and creditors.

has a set of laws that

facilitate

that balances the

other country of the former Soviet

Union

market oriented and allows freedom of choice for

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

in the

Kyrgy>z Republic

Development of Institutional Framework

95

for

Land and Agrarian Reform The

institutional

framework

and agrarian reform has had a significant

for land

impact on both the pace and the depth of the reforms Until early 1994, the State Property

in the

Kyrgyz Republic.

Committee was responsible

for privatization

of enterprises; in 1994 the Ministry of Agriculture and Food took over responsibility.^"^

The Ministry of Agriculture moved

the land

this

and agrarian reform

forward by establishing and implementing a policy that mandated farm

effort

restructuring.

The

framework

institutional

is

fairly

and organizations. At the federal

actors

and Agrarian Reform

is

complex and has many overlapping

level, the

Republican Center for Land

under the Ministry of Agriculture and

is

responsible for

policy on land and agrarian reform and for privatization of the agricultural sector. Provincial

and county Centers

farm reorganization

at the local level,

for

Land and Agrarian Reform

but are funded by the republican budget.

While land and agrarian reform policy local

developed

is

government has been largely responsible

farms.

assist in

The county administration and

at the republic level,

for the actual reorganization of

the village

government have had primary

responsibility for farm reorganization and land and property share distribution.

Rural committees (village governments) were introduced in January 1992

and were responsible for the physical aspect of farm restructuring.^^ The county administrations had control over the rights of land share owners to withdraw and set

up private farm

The

enterprises.

village

government was given the

participate in this reform process with the county administration

1992 presidential decree.

RDTs

1993

controlled set their

A

and agrarian reform

rules and, in

local administrators

regulation

many

were not

was passed

a

largely

reform was obstructed because the

of farm reorganization.

March 1994

in

an effort

to

broaden and define

The regulation gave

the village

wide range of power over implementation of the agrarian reform

and general development collective

Kyrgyz Republic was

that time, local administrations often

cases, land

in favor in

At

in the

the functions of the village governments.^^

government

December

(conducted with the World Bank) indicated that

by county administrations.

own

a

36

field research

the process of land

by

right to

or state

in rural areas.

It

permitted appointment of the head of a

farm who would also head the village government

that

Renee Giovarelli

96 operates the farm.^^

The

govemment was

village

generally responsible for

enforcing laws and regulations regarding rights to land, land reform, agrarian reform, rational land use, formation and registration of enterprises, land and

water relations

among

farmers,

economic disputes among farmers, and the

granting of land shares and property shares. In response to fears that the village governments were dominated or state farm leaders

who might impede

the reform process, the

by

collective

govemment

adopted a regulation in January 1995 creating a “committee for implementation of land reform and reorganization of agricultural enterprises” on each reorganizing

farm

enterprise."^®

These committees were

set

up

to

be more broadly representative

of those involved in the land reform process and are more narrowly focused than the village governments. fifteen

The committees must be composed of no more than

members, including the head of the

village

govemment and

representatives

of the Ministry of Agriculture, the county administration, the provincial and county Centers for Land and Agrarian Reform, financial bodies

who have

and elected representatives of the reorganizing

enterprise.

enterprise,

During

RDTs

October 1995

field research,

many

a stake in the

farmers stated that the

county administration had thrown up obstacles to reorganization. One example given was that the county administration had intentionally delayed processing land certificates.

The farmers

to allow the reorganization,

dependent upon the county

stated that the county administration

since

it

meant

that the

However, federal

by

conflict

reluctant

farmers would be less

officials.

County- and village-level governments continue authority and ability to

was

either

move

the

to

have a great deal of

reforms forward or hinder them.

legislation attempts to ensure that the reforms are not hindered

of interest and resistance from those in power

at the local level

by

providing for mral committees on implementation of land reform and for centers

on agrarian reform.

It

is

substantially diminish the

own

not

a

feasible

power of

or

necessarily

local officials.

land and have a stake in the land and

its

desirable

goal

Farmers who control

productivity will be

more

to

their

willing to

advocate for themselves and play a role in the existing local processes as a

means of securing county

officials.

rights, allocation

of resources, and the attention of the local

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

in the

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization Currently, use rights to agricultural land in the private citizens

who

97

Kyrgy>z Republic

Issues

Kyrgyz Republic

are (1) held

by

are farming independently or with other families in small

groups; (2) held by private citizens working on large collective farms in the form

of land shares; or (3) leased by private citizens or collective farms from the Land Redistribution Fund. Approximately half of the arable land in the Kyrgyz

Republic

is

held by private farm enterprises and farmed by single families or

small groups of families. For the most part, these individual or multi-family

farms were created into

much

when

smaller units.

a

former

state or collective

The farms

that

have not yet broken into private farm

enterprises have cosmetically reorganized and are collective farms.

Most of

certificates to their

Kyrgyz Republic

is

still

functioning essentially as

these farms, however, have distributed land share

members. Approximately 25 percent of the arable land

The package of laws expected

reform process. Following

be addressed within

is

this

to

on

a

temporary

a

be adopted

framework

likely provide a strong legal

basis.

in the first half

of 1999 will

for the continuation of the agrarian

broad discussion of some important issues

upcoming

legislation,

that

such as (1) privatization of

farm debt and newly created private farms;

land; (2)

in the

held in the Land Redistribution Fund and leased or given to

private individuals or legal entities to use

will

farm as a whole reorganized

(3)

documentation and

registration of rights to land; (4) land transactions; (5) security of land tenure; (6)

machinery and service cooperatives; and

(7) mortgages.

Privatization of

Land

Land Shares Workers, pensioners, invalids, and specified social-sphere workers of collective

and

state

farms (and their dependents) hold the right to a portion of the arable

land (not pastureland) on those farms. Generally, the system developed in the

Kyrgyz Republic farm’s land

among and

1.5

the

is

for distributing this land

is

as follows.

The

collective or state

divided on paper into shares. The shares are then divided equally

farm population.

An

individual’s land share

ha in northern provinces and between

0.1

is

generally between 0.75

and 0.3 ha

in

more populated

Renee Giovarelli

98

southern provinces."** While each person

among

the farm’s population

of the land, the family, not the individual, receives a certificate from

to a share

the village council that indicates that family’s share of the land."*^

members

land of individual family

are not clear under

farms, the families’ land shares are located are not.

more

enterprise (two or

knows

The

Kyrgyz law.

rights to

On some

on a map, while on other farms they

However, when families withdraw

generally

entitled

is

their land shares to start a peasant

each family within the peasant enterprise

families),

the precise location of its land.

Land share owners can withdraw

their land shares to establish

an individual

with other families and

farm enterprise, or they can pool

their land shares

withdraw land

farm enterprise, cooperative, or association

to establish a peasant

of peasant farms, provided that the farm contains a

minimum amount of

land."*^

Conversely, the land share owner can leave his share with whatever large farm enterprise replaces the collective or state farm.

suburbs

may withdraw

Land

who

live in

smaller plots for cultivation of vegetables.

While approximately half of the arable land farmed by collective and

by

share owners

state farms, the vast

Kyrgyz Republic

in the

majority of the arable land

is still is

held

private families either as land plots or land shares. In theory, collective farms

that use their

members’ land shares should

lease these land shares

members. RDI

field research indicates that generally

break up or stay

together,"*"*

whole farms decide

with few individual families choosing to leave.

Since half of the private arable land in the Kyrgyz Republic land share owners

remain crucial

who have

not

to a continuing

to use, dispose of, or

farms on which

RDI

left the collective,

all

members and

have a continuing right

to

withdraw

may

owners are the most qualified

many

to decide

how

start their

own

economic conditions improve. Only those individuals who

choice.

Of the

leaders stated

their land shares

to start a private

is critical

because

to use the land their

land share owners remain on collective farms,

choose to leave the collectives to

withdraw land

held by

land shares had been contributed to the charter capital

shares represent. Thus, while

they

"*^

reform process. Land share owners have the right

researchers held interviews,

if the

to

land share owners’ rights

of the agricultural enterprise. This ongoing right to withdraw the land share

is still

withdraw the land represented by the land share. "*^

that individual families

from the farm, even

from the

farm enterprise

farms in the future as retain their ability to

in the future will

have a meaningful

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization The impact of

system on intra-household relationships

land share

the

requires further study and consideration. certificate

right to

is

issued per family.

withdraw

the

family breaks down, or

if the

to leave the farm.

head of the farm,

in

It is

whose name

the certificate

We

if

members have

a

one or several family

RDI

not clear from

spouse or children.

to the land than his

members have

law, only one land share

their land shares, or sell or lease their land shares. This issue

becomes important

members want

Under current

unclear whether individual

It is

99

Kyrgy^z Republic

in the

is

field research

more

registered, has

have recommended

whether rights

that all adult

the right to partition their land and that a transfer of land require

the signature of all adult

The 13 October Private Property

members.

"On

Presidential Decree,

on Land

the

Concept of Introduction of

Kyrgyz Republic," directed

in the

that use rights to

certain categories of land (land shares, agricultural land parcels allocated based

on land shares, household ownership land code.

rights.

The

and dacha

plots) should

all

Land Code,

the draft Peasant

Farm Law, and

allow for withdrawal of land in kind

farm enterprise leaves the enterprise. This ongoing is

be converted into

This conversion will occur by operation of law in the pending

draft

on Cooperatives

plots,

right to

when

the draft

Law

member of

a

withdraw land

in

a

kind

not guaranteed in other countries of the former Soviet Union including, for

example, Russia and Uzbekistan.

Land Redistribution Fund Twenty-five percent of the arable land in the Kyrgyz Republic

Land Redistribution Fund (formerly local

the National

Land Fund) and controlled by

communities and the Ministry of Agriculture. The questions of who should

control disposition of this land and

who

should receive use rights to

have been debated since the National Land Fund was created

The head of the Center

for

Land and Agrarian Reform

reported that 49 percent of the land in the

was leased that

held in the

is

in

1997

to private

was not leased was used

LRF

in 1991.

Issyk-Kul Province

in the oblast (about

farm enterprises and for

in

collectives.

development of seeds,

this land

18,000 ha)

The 51 percent

cattle breeding,

and

enlarging household plots of citizens of the village. This land continues to be available for lease.

Although the Ministry of Agriculture controls the

LRF

land, there appears to

be a great deal of local control as well. For example, two villages

in

Issyk-Kul

Renee Giovarelli

100

Province each operate a service cooperative. In 1996, the village government

LRF

gave 100 percent of the land from the villagers

and those who work

to

people

did not have land

—

1997, however, the service

at the sanitarium. In

cooperatives cultivated the land for themselves.

who

The revenue was used

to

pay the

land tax, to buy fuel, and for other needs. Another cooperative leader in Issyk-

Kul Province

stated that the cooperative rents out all of the land

required to set aside for the

had been

it

Land Redistribution Fund. The cooperative pays

1

percent of the income from the rented land to the local budget.

The two

issues

- who

LRF -

land from the

controls the land, and

have begun

to

commission made up of

determine

officials to

who

has the right to receive

be addressed by the law.

law divests local communities of some of establishing a

who

their control

First, the current

over

LRF

land by

and central government

village, county,

has priority for leasing land, and by calling for

auctions to sell the use rights to 50 percent of the land.

48

Second, current law

provides that “local residents and agricultural producers living on the territory of the village”

LRF

have priority for the

land that

is

leased, although the land will

be leased out on a “competitive basis.” The land use rights sold

at

tender or

auction will be sold to individuals and legal entities for “organization of peasant

communities and other purposes.”

A

government

and

resolution

accompanying

regulations

that

were

promulgated in January 1998 provide guidelines and procedures for auctioning land from the LILF."^^

determine the land

who

is

is

The auction procedures provide

eligible to bid at these auctions.

a

Pilot auctions

Members of the

were held

in fourteen raions this year.

was generated by these land auctions, and many Although these

auctions

have

been

fair in

village

where

The procedures

The auctions were open and

A

great deal of excitement

local villagers attended.

stopped

since

referendum passed, because of uncertainty over whether ownership or long-term use

criteria to

of the auction commission.

at the discretion

transparent, with several bidders for each land plot.

and

of ten

located are given priority, as are direct producers.

allow for payment over three years

into

list

rights, the auctions

this

the

constitutional

land should be sold

have been very successful

terms of getting land into the hands of private owners. These auction

procedures should not be discarded, but rather should be continued once policy

and procedural decisions have been made.

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

in the

Farm Debt and Newly Created Former

state

Private

new

101

Farms

and collective farms accmed massive debts

collective period.

formation of

Kyrgy>z Republic

to the state during the

This indebtedness has been a significant issue in terms of farms.

When

farm decides

a collective or state

break up mto

to

smaller private farms, the newly created private farms are expected to divide the

debt

still

research,

owed and become

RDI found

responsible for

that debts

created

its

by

repayment. In the 1995 field

and collective farms were a

state

crushing burden on newly created smaller farms. Debt continues to be an issue for

newly created farms and appears

to restrict the potential profitability

new

of these

farms.

Members of both property assets, but

state

and collective farms have the

members wishing

to

right to claim non-land

claim non-land property assets from

state

farms have to purchase the property, while collective farm members do not have to

purchase non-land property property they receive even form(s) and even

if the

assets.

when the

State

farm members have

entire enterprise

is

to

pay

for non-land

reorganized into other legal

debt of such a state farm has been repaid.

Government Decision No. 42 (16 Febmary 1995) somewhat mitigated difference in treatment

members

will

by providing

that

payments for property by

state

be spread out over ten years and effectively carry no

this

farm

interest.

Moreover, Government Decision No. 42 reduced the debt of reorganizing

state

farms by 50 percent and reduced the debt of reorganizing collective farms by 25 percent. These debts are to be paid over a period of fifteen years beginning

on

1

January 1997.

Most

private farmers interviewed in

indicated that they had not yet state

begun

to

RDTs

pay back

the debt

and collective farms. Each of the farmers indicated

begin to pay back a portion of the debt, interviewed did not the

October 1997

know whether

the debt

amount or terms of repayment would

be.

although

owed by

that they

many of

had been accruing

The

state

field research

the former

would soon the

farmers

interest or

what

had forgiven some of

the

debt on most of the farms.

Many, but not

some of

their

reorganization.^'

property shares.

all,

of the collective and

property to pay

The

rest

off

state

some of

farms

the

RDI

visited

debt before

had sold

whole-farm

of the property was then distributed in the form of

Renee Giovarelli

102

We have recommended that all farni debt that existed or exists

time of

at the

reorganization be written off for farms that voluntarily reorganize into private

farm enterprises.

No

debt should be collected against resulting farms whenever

they are formed. Moreover, no debt should be collected against the productive

of a farm that

assets

private farm enterprises

on these

assets

must

be greater

pay off old

assets are sold to

enterprises

need productive

likely to

is

sell

of whole-farm reorganization. Resulting

in the process

is

assets,

(in the

and the return

form of taxes) than

assets.

government

if

may be

debt. Further reorganization

their productive

to the

productive

hindered

if

However, debts should not be

written off or reduced for farnis that undertake “cosmetic” reorganization, but

only for those farms that break into private farm enterprises.

Documentation and Registration of Rights

Land

documentation and registration

rights

is

to

Land economy

necessary in a market

both to protect such rights and to provide information to land users, potential buyers, and mortgagees. If land rights are protected through documentation and registration, land users will

are protected, rights

is

A

develop confidence that their rights have meaning,

and can be relied upon. Without documentation a market

for land

not possible.

federal

buildings)

law on

state registration

was adopted

in the

of rights to immovable property (land and

Kyrgyz Republic on 22 December 1998.

implemented over time, as each registration

federal law will be

office

is

This set up.

Until implementation occurs in a specific raion, documentation of rights to land will

contmue

as

currently.

it is

Unfortunately,

RDI

researchers found during October 1997 field research that

registration

was thus

government

to private farms or

gifts,

far limited to the initial allocation

of use rights from the

farm households. Registration of

or other transactions of use rights between private parties

sales, bequests,

was not

occurring.

Moreover, long-term leases were not being registered in the registration offices visited.

One county

right

registered, there

is

administration head confirmed that after an is

initial

land use

no further tracking. The newly adopted federal law

requires land transactions to be registered. Transactions that are not registered will

be void.

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

in the

Kyrgyz Republic

103

Land Transactions Detailed regulations concerning land transactions are needed and have not yet

been promulgated. RDI researchers found

that the lack

of adequate regulations

has affected the willingness of individuals to engage in purchase and sale transactions.

The 1997

field research indicated that

taking place. In

Naryn Province,

the

few

head of

sales

of land or land shares are

a county administration stated that

were not occurring because there were no procedures. In Issyk-Kul

sales

Province the provincial head of the Center for Land and Agrarian Reform stated that

no sales of land have occurred

now because

there are

no

in the oblast

rules regarding sales.

and

One

that

it is

illegal to sell

land

private farmer reported that

he wanted to buy land, but there were no procedures and individual land shares

were very small. Regulations and forms for purchase and sale should be promulgated once the

Land Code has been

passed.^^ These regulations and forms should provide a

step-by-step procedure for a prospective buyer and seller in a land transaction. In countries where land transactions are unfamiliar, regulations and

model forms

help people understand what issues they need to be aware of to

make an

equitable agreement.

The

current draft

Land Code

prohibits foreign ownership of agricultural

land, but does allow foreign citizens for

up

to fifty-year terms.

and legal

entities to

hold use rights to land

This restriction was inserted because opponents of

private land ownership argued that foreigners

would purchase

large

amounts of

land.

Security of

Land Tenure

Individual rights to agricultural land in the secure. Agricultural land

is

now

Kyrgyz Republic

held in ownership and

is

definite,

are

relatively

most farmers

and document

their rights, land use

rights are not subject to periodic readjustment as in China,

and farmers have the

have written land

certificates that describe

right to freely sell, lease, bequeath, gift, or

mortgage

their use rights to land.

The

primary source of insecurity derives from the threat of confiscation from non-use of land.

Renee Giovarelli

104

RDI that

many

when

shown

researchers’ comparative experience in various countries has

land

government

legislators,

and individual citizens believe

officials,

not used for a period of time, especially agricultural land,

is

that

should

it

be confiscated (taken without payment) by the government. Generally, they reason that inefficient land use should be punished. Ironically, the greatest

impediment

to efficient land use

and protection of land

is

most often not the

actions of private landowners, but the actions of the state or local authorities that

undermine confidence

County Resources

in private land rights.

of the State Agency on Land Management and Land

offices

(SALMLR)

are actively involved in controlling non-use of land in the

Kyrgyz Republic. In Issyk-Kul Province,

Land and Agrarian Reform that

were uncultivated

the

stated that action

The process

in 1996.

head of the provincial Center for

had is

to

be taken on 4,250 ha of land

as follows.

The

SALMLR

office

inspects for non-use of land plots. If a person does not use his land, the inspector

determines the reason for such non-use. If the reason will

be warned. (Presumably

if the

taken immediately.) If the land

Land and Agrarian Reform

who wants

to use

it.

The

is

reason

is

is

well founded, the holder

not well founded the land will be

not cultivated for a second year, the Center for

will arrange for the land to

be leased out

lease has to have the landowner’s consent.

to

someone

The

lease

is

negotiated and the lessor has input, including say in the length of the term of the lease.

The terms of the

lease are usually that 10 to

20 percent of

all

crops from

the land will be paid to the landowner, and the lessee accepts responsibility for the land tax.

The center helps

Land and Agrarian Reform

lessors find lessees.

stated that

many

either leasing or offering land for lease but

The head of

the Center for

Province stated that

added

to the

if the

land

is

The head of

the Center for

times neighbors are interested in

do not know of one another’s

Land and Agrarian Reform not used for three years,

it

will

for Issyk-Kul

be taken and

Land Redistribution Fund. The government would have

court to take the land, but

would not have

because the government already owns the

to

land.^"^

interest.

to

go

to

compensate the land possessor

No

such cases have occurred in

the province.

The land engineer his office

was

in

one county in the province stated that the major goal of

to exercise control over the use

different account, he stated that if land year,

the

SALMLR

Redistribution

Fund

is

of land. Giving a somewhat

not cultivated in his county for one

could confiscate the land and include in the fall

it

in the

Land

of the second year. The farmer will be warned

at

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization two times before land

least

the

owner

is

is

in the

taken. If the land tax

Kyrgyz Republic

paid on the unused land,

is

not fined, but only warned. If the land tax

the land can be taken, but there have

The land engineer

105

not paid for one year,

is

been no cases of this. 47 ha

stated that in 1996,

in

one

territory

governed by

one rural committee were taken and 6 ha were contributed (without warnings) the

Land Redistribution Fund. This land primarily belonged

who could

not cultivate their land and young people

to

people

to elderly

who moved away. The

raion administration issued a resolution stating that they were confiscating the land.

The landholders were informed of the

resolution.

could choose to go to court, but no one did

The land

Land Code allows

draft

if the

government

The land use

owners

right

so.

for state withdrawal of use rights to agricultural

land has not been used for three years. The draft requires the to

provide a written warning to the landholder before land rights are

taken and to increase the land tax on the unused land for the three consecutive years of non-use. If the land

is

withdrawn,

notice and an opportunity to appeal.

must be sold

it

The proceeds from

at a

forced sale, after

the sale will be given to

the landowner.

Machinery and Service Cooperatives

Access

to

machinery and other non-land assets

is critical

to the success

farm enterprises newly emerging from former collective and

Kyrgyz Republic. In

the former Soviet republics,

have found that

much more

it is

to

machinery

many would-be

difficult to get access to

get access to land. Collective and state farm as a reason for not

state

members

of private

farms in the

private farmers

machinery than

it is

to

often cite a lack of access

withdrawing from a failing collective or

state

and

state

farm. In the

Kyrgyz Republic, workers and pensioners of

farms (but not their spouses and children to a share

if

is

they are not members) have the right

of the non-land assets (property share) of the enterprise, such as

buildings, machinery, fuel, and livestock.

share

collective

The

size

of each recipient’s property

determined by the length and nature of his service on the farm, such that

higher-salaried and longer-working recipients receive larger shares.

property

breakup.

among

the

members of

the farm

is

the

most

difficult aspect

Dividing

of farm

Renee Giovarelli

106

In principle, there are several possible models for allocating machinery

when

and

collective

farms reorganize

state

private

into

farm enterprises,

including:

sharing machines and equipment so that each family only

1 )

needs to have one or two types of machines;

common and

related families claim property in

2)

all

own

machines together; 3)

formal service cooperatives;

4)

one family purchases a machine (new or used from another private or collective farm) and hires out the

machine and a

driver;

residual

a

5)

organization

from the

former

farm

collective

remains in the form of a service cooperative.

Members of former the right to

withdraw

government

is

fimd.^^

collective farms

who want

their property shares in

this

same

were given

and technical purpose”

(as well as

and cultural objects, repair shops, garages, gas storage, water supply, and

common inputs) citizens

with

of the enterprise production

regulation, the village governments

responsibility over objects of “production social

farm independently have

kind or in money. The village

to allocate the property share out

However, under

to

to render centralized services.

based on

many

common

These objects are

share ownership. Although

private farm enterprises that

RDI

be owned by

researchers spoke

had received livestock or bams

property shares (usually purchasing a portion of the share did not cover the cost),

RDI

to

bam

as their

because the property

researchers spoke with no one

who had

received a tractor or other farm machine as part of his property share.

farm remained as a service center, the members of

If the collective or state

the former farm contributed their property shares to the service center. In the

examples

seen,

enterprises.

58

the

The

centers

centers will service anyone, including those

members of the former

money paid

charged to plow land for peasant and farm

farm, although the price

for the services

is

is

who were

not

higher for non-members. The

used to buy spare parts and to pay the wages of

the drivers. Additional funds are generated because the service center continues to

farm a portion of the land of the former farm and uses the profit

itself,

contract

The is

to support

service center has a written contract with every farmer and the

renegotiated on a yearly basis.

The

service center has a charter and

employs people. Drivers are seasonal and are paid per hectare. Mechanics are

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

in the

paid a fixed monthly wage. Service centers also buy for the

members of

Kyrgyz Republic

107

and seeds

fertilizers

in

bulk

farm enterprises. The service centers do not do

the private

any marketing.

Formal service cooperatives are necessary

move machinery

to

out of the

control of the village governments and into the control of the farmers.

of the service cooperative should have the ability service cooperative and

deal with

all

how

it

will

to vote

on who

Law on

be managed. The

will

Members

manage

the

Cooperatives will

types of cooperatives, including service cooperatives, and will

provide a framework for a

new

type of organization.

Mortgages

Farmers around the world often require (or

at least

would benefit from)

credit for

both short-term and long-term purposes. Farming operations usually involve long

periods

cultivation,

harvest.

of negative

cash

flow

(during

land

preparation,

planting,

and harvest) followed by a peak period of positive cash flow

Because many farmers do not have the liquid resources

consumption and

cultivation,

the

need

for

to

short-term credit

after

cover costs of is

ubiquitous.

Moreover, establishing or expanding farming operations requires large outlays for capital assets such as land, machinery, livestock,

and buildings. These large

capital outlays are slow-maturing investments that provide returns over a period

of years. Unless a farm family has sufficient liquid resources for the investment, it

must secure medium-term or long-term

credit.

Access

to credit

is

often an

important determinant of a farmer’s performance.

Secure and transferable land rights can have an extremely beneficial effect

on

a farmer’s access to credit

because such land rights can be pledged as

collateral for loans. Collateral plays

because

it

an important role

in

has several important and interrelated effects.

most lending decisions First, collateral partly

or fully shifts the risk of principal loss from the lender to the borrower. Second, collateral creates

an incentive for borrowers

(as a result), the existence

to

avoid intentional default.^' Third

of collateral increases the likelihood that a lender will

offer credit to a farmer. Fourth, at a given interest rate, the

amount of

credit

is

expected to increase as the value of the collateral increases. Finally, for a given

amount of used.^^

credit, the interest rate will

be substantially lower when collateral

is

Renee Giovarelli

108

Land

is

when

collateral

Lenders prefer collateral that

transferable.

is

land rights are secure and

easy to appropriate in case of

does not easily lose value due to theft or damage, cannot be concealed,

default,

and can continue is

form of

a preferred

plentiful in

to benefit the borrower.

most

rural settings.

for agricultural lending in

Laws

As

Land

satisfies all these conditions

a result, land

is

the

most common

and

collateral

developed countries and many developing countries.

to create mortgageability will not

have the positive effects anticipated

unless other conditions enabling farmers to take advantage of mortgageability are first satisfied. In addition to secure land tenure

land market,

these

support

attractive;

conditions services

include

that

can

willing

and the existence of a rural

lenders;

ensure

help

farmers

terms

success

in

find

agricultural

innovation; a political and legal situation that permits foreclosure if necessary;

and prices for produce

that permit recovery

of the costs of investment

(or,

otherwise stated, the farmer’s ability to present a viable business plan to the lender).

The

draft

Mortgage Law

agricultural land

in the

and does not attempt

Kyrgyz Republic allows mortgaging of to protect farmers to

such an extent that

mortgagees will not lend to farmers. Under the draft Mortgage Law, farmers will

be able

to

Mortgage

provide both their land and their houses as collateral. The draft

Law

that

is

now

before Parliament provides a basic framework for

mortgages, as well as detailed provisions regarding the process of foreclosure

and realization of the subject of a mortgage. Detailed procedures for notice and opportunity to appeal will provide necessary safeguards to mortgagors.

Conclusion

The

agricultural sector

and the

rural land

undergone extensive reform, especially land

is

now farmed by

in the last three years.

private farmers, and

producing collective farms.

system in the Kyrgyz Republic have

it

Half of the arable

appears that these farmers are out-

Individual rights to land have been strengthened

and broadened so that many farmers have secure, long-term, and transferable land rights. Continued application of the legal reforms under

way

in the

Kyrgyz

Republic, however, will be essential to expanding the benefits, of tenure security

and the opportunity to participate in a land market

The

to

more and more farmers.

land-related laws that are expected to be adopted in 1999

would be

steps

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization toward the

this end,

in the

and would be important additions

Kyrgyz Republic.

If

implemented

Kyrgyz Republic

to the land

reform process

experiences in a variety of other countries. The Kyrgyz Republic has as other countries

way

economy

many of the

of the former Soviet Union, and the draft laws

resolve these concerns, not from the standpoint of rather in a

in

can provide a model for

well, these laws

other transition economies because they are a compilation of market

same concerns

109

that provides choice

command and

control, but

and process.

For example, the Land Code does not allow for confiscation of land (withdrawal without payment) for non-use, but rather calls for notice, opportunity to appeal, and forced sale. The Land to agricultural land into private

for purchase,

sale,

gift,

Code

an

also converts use rights

ownership rights by operation of law, and allows

and lease of

land.

No

unreasonable restrictions or

requirements are placed on landowners or users.

The Mortgage Law deals with foreclosure on

agricultural land

farmers a chance to appeal the default up to the time of the

sale.

the right of first refusal for lease or purchase of the land if the

by allowing

Farmers have

new owner

or sells the land within a given period of time. Moreover, the Mortgage

leases

Law

has

detailed provisions regarding notice of default and procedures for foreclosure

and realization of the subject of a mortgage.

The Peasant Farm Law and Law on Cooperatives both allow of land in kind so that

new

farmers continue to have the ability to try different

legal arrangements for farming.

Both laws provide

enterprise and do not place all of the single

for withdrawal

power over

a structure for the

the enterprise in the hands of a

Neither law restricts the rights of private farmers to

leader.

farm

make

appropriate choices regarding their land and their business.

As

in all countries, there

Following

is

a

list

is

always need for improvements to legal

of specific recommendations for continued

rules.

efforts in the

Kyrgyz Republic: •

The

oblast- and ra/on-level centers for land and agrarian reform should

be strengthened and supported so that they can more actively disseminate information regarding the rights of private land use holders and resolve conflicts

between local administrations or farm leaders and individual •

designed

A to

public

information

program should be

inform land shareholders about

right holders.

implemented which

their rights,

is

about the risks and

benefits of particular land share transactions, and about the value of registration.

no

Renee Giovarelli

Members of reorganized

•

state

farms should not be required to pay for the

non-land property they receive as a property share. collective farms

and

members of

Currently,

farms are treated differently in terms of property shares.

state

All farm debt that existed or exists at the time of reorganization of a

•

collective or state

farm should be written off

for enterprises that voluntarily

reorganize into private farm enterprises. Moreover, no debt should be collected against the productive assets of a farm that

is

in the process of

whole-farm

reorganization.

The requirement

•

for demarcation

ground should be eliminated

map

or

on the

ready to withdraw

expensive and does not appear to

is

farm reorganization.

The

• listed

until a family or several families is

Land share demarcation

the land share in kind. assist in

of land shares on a

registrar should

on a land share

the land in

list

certificate in the registration

common, and

rights. Listing all

be required to

those

members who

names of land share holders

the

names of family members

book. Each family

member owns

are not listed have less secure land

also provides third-party notice.

Regulations and forms for purchase and sale transactions should be

•

adopted to

facilitate

regulations and

land transactions.

Where

land transactions are unfamiliar,

model forms help people understand and recognize what makes

an equitable agreement.

Notes

1

.

RDI

rural land

is

a nonprofit research and consulting organization specializing in issues of

law and policy. RDI has

in twenty-nine countries 2. in the

rural fieldwork

and government advisory experience

of Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Kathleen Braden, “Kyrgyzstan,” in Environmental Resources and Constraints

Former

Soviet Republics, ed. Philip R. Pryde (Boulder,

CO: Westview

Press,

1995).

Food and Agriculture Organization, 1996 Production Yearbook, Vol. 50

3.

(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1997). This figure includes actively 4.

engaged

in agriculture

Figures are for

and

1994.

their

Braden, “Kyrgyzstan,”

p.

Food and Agriculture Organization,

313.

persons

non-working dependents.

Database (12 January 1998), online version, www.fao.org. 5.

all

in

FAOSTAT

1

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

6.

Braden, “Kyrgyzstan,”

p.

308. Kirghizia

in the

became

Kyrgyz Republic

1 1

a republic of the Soviet

Union

in 1936. 7.

Reuters North American Wire (22 December 1995), on LEXIS.

The Council of People’s Deputies was

8.

Soviet

the

name

the

for

local

administration at both the raion and oblast levels. 9.

Law on

Peasant Farms (2 February 1991).

10. For further discussion

of the governmental structure for oversight of the land

reform, see section IV of this report.

Decree No. VII-369, “On Urgent Measures

Presidential

11.

Realization of the

Laws of the Kyrgyz Republic Regulating Land

November

Relations in Agnculture” (10

Government Resolution

12.

on

Farms and Other

Privatization of State

to

Secure the

Relations and Other

1991). Peculianties

the

of the

Destatization

and

State (Municipal) Agricultural Enterprises in the

Kyrgyz Republic (13 January 1992). 13. Presidential

(10

March

Decree on the National Land Fund of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan

1992) provided

as

details

manner of

the

to

NLF’s formation,

the

distnbution, and use. 14. Point

Land Fund

1

of the regulations attached to the Presidential Decree on the National

(see note 13) provided that the

amount of land could be increased or

decreased in certain regions where a majonty of the population consisted of one ethnic group. 15. Presidential

Decree on Measures for Further Implementation of the Land and

Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (10 December 1992). 16.

See section IV of this report for further discussion of rural committees. The 13

January 1992 Government Resolution on the Rural Committees on Land Reform

Republic

of

Kyrgyzstan

established

rural

committees,

which

were

in the

farm-level

committees given authonty over intra-farm reorganization. Rural committees are essentially the executive branch of the village.

The

rural council,

which was formerly called the

the village council,

is

the legislative

body

at the

the rural council and the rural committee are are used interchangeably. In

1996 the

government” (ailokmotu), and village

They

this

rural

are also referred to as rural soviets.

rural soviet

and

is

sometimes called

village-farm level. Often, in practice,

made up of the same people and

committee’s

term will be used

name was changed

to “village

in this report to distinguish the

government from the farm reorganization committees, which

rural committees.

the terms

are also called

Renee Giovarelli

112

17.

Kyrgyz Constitution, Article

4.

While the purchase and

allowed, the purchase and sale of land use rights Presidential

Reform

of land

not

is

allowed by presidential decree. See

Decree No. 23, “On Measures to Enhance (Deepen) Land and Agrarian

in the

Kyrgyz Republic” (22 February 1994).

18. Presidential

Decree No. 23, see note

17.

Decree on Measures for Further Development and State Support

19. Presidential

of Land

is

sale

And Agranan Reform

in the

Kyrgyz Republic

(3

November 1995) extended

the forty-nine-year use rights for agricultural land to ninety-nine years. 20. See Presidential Decree No. 23, see note 17, at §§ 2-3.

2 1 The decree authorized land plot users and land share owners to .

members of their

or shares immediately to other sale to

non-members

17,at§§2, 22.

1

plots

collective or state farms, but prohibited

January 1995. See Presidential Decree No. 23, note

6.

The maximum

agriculture, limit

until after

sell their

25 ha for

was abolished

of land that could be held was 20 ha for intensive

size

less intensive agriculture,

in

November 1995 by

Further Development and State Support of

and 30 ha for mountainous

areas. This

the Presidential Decree on Measures for

Land and Agrarian Reform

in the

Kyrgyz

Republic (3 November 1995). 23. See section

IV of this

of Agriculture and Food 24.

is

report for further discussion of this issue.

now the

The Ministry

Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.

Government Resolution No. 345, “On the National Land Fund” (19

May

Government Regulation on the Procedure

Land

1994). 25.

for Determining Citizens’

Shares and for Issuance of Certificates Containing Land Share Use Right, adopted by Resolution No. 632 (22 August 1994), addressed the issue of

who would

allocate the

land by providing that with the consent of the raion administration, the Ministr>^ of Agriculture could delegate to the village government the right to lease out

Following

this regulation, the

that

NLF

yields,

7,

“On

the National

Land Fund”

(8

February 1995),

land could not be divided into land shares unless the raion

administration, with permission

of (a) raising

land.

Board on Land and Agrarian Reform under the Ministry

of Agriculture passed Decision No.

which provided

NLF

making an

from the

MOAF, made

such a proposal for the purpose

enterprise profitable, increasing production of beef

and

milk, increasing employment; or (b) allocating shares to workers in specified fields of the social sphere. Other land in the fund could be temporarily leased to peasant farms

with permission from the village government.

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

26.

in the

Kyrgyz Republic

Government regulation adopted by Resolution No. 632, see note

1

13

25.

27. Individual land shares vary in size from 0.3 to 1.5 ha.

28. in the

Government Regulation on Categones of Subjects of Agncultural Enterpnses

Kyrgyz Republic (adopted by Government Resolution No. 158, “On Adoption of

the Regulation of Categones of Subjects of Agncultural Enterpnse in the Kyrgyz

Republic” (12 Apnl 1996). 29. There appears to be

no category

30. Presidential Decree of 3

100—150 ha of land.

for

November

31. Presidential Decree No. 327,

1995, see note 19.

“On Measures Aimed

at

Introduction of Market

of Land Use Rights and on Establishment of the Market Credit System (25

November 32.

Agnculture”

in

1996).

Government Resolution No.

Market for Land Use Rights”

14,

“On Measures Aimed

(9 January 1998)

at

Introduction of the

and accompanying regulations, “On

Republican and Raion Executive Commissions on Sale of Rights to Use Land Plots of the Agricultural

Land Redistribution Fund under

the Ministry of Agriculture and Water

of the Kyrgyz Republic” and “Temporary Regulations on Auction Sales of Rights to

Use Land

Plots of the Agncultural

Land Redistribution Fund under

the Ministry of

Agnculture and Water of the Kyrgyz Republic” (9 January 1998).

Land Ownership

33. Presidential Decree on the Concept of Introduction of Private to the

Kyrgyz Republic (13 October 1998).

34. Presidential Decree

No. 23, see note

35. Presidential Decree on the Rural

17.

Committees on Land Reform

in the

Republic

of Kyrgyzstan (13 January 1992). Rural committees were essentially the executive branch of government council,

at

the level of the old state and collective farms.

which was formerly called the

rural soviet

“village council” {sel’skii soviet, aiyl kenesh), level.

Though

in principle these

- were conceived

two

entities

-

and sometimes refened

the legislative

is

body

at

The

rural

to as the

the village-farm

the rural committee and the rural council

as separate entities, often in practice, the rural council

and the

rural

committee are composed of the same people and the terms are used interchangeably. 1996 the this

rural committee's

term will be used

name was changed

to "village

In

government" (mlokmotu), and

in this report to distinguish the village

government from the

committees that served to implement the farm reorganization program

until

rural

1996.

36. Presidential Decree No. 23, see note 17. 37.

The author

participated in fieldwork in

September 1998. Earlier findings are reported

May and June

in

1995, October 1997, and

Robert Mitchell, “On Development of

Renee Giovarelli

114

Agrarian Reform in Kirghizia” (paper presented to the National Conference on

Agrarian Reform, Tamga, Kyrgyz Republic, 6 June 1995, transcript on

Development

also

Institute;

Roy

L. Prosterman

Reform and Farm Restructuring

in

and Leonard

J.

Rolfes

Jr.,

“Recommendations

Roy

with Rural Jr.,

“Land

the Republic of Kyrgyzstan” (January 1994);

Timothy Hanstad, “Protecting the Kyrgyz Republic's Land Resources,” Together (Spring 1994);

file

L. Prosterman,

12 Surviving

in

Timothy Hanstad, and Leonard

Reform

to Assist the Agrarian

in the

J.

Kyrgyz Republic,”

Rolfes in

RDI

Reports on Foreign Aid and Development, No. 75 (July 1992). 38.

Government Regulation on Rural Committees on Land and Agrarian Reform,

adopted pursuant to Government Resolution No. 148 (25 March 1994). 39. In fact, in

many instances

the former head of the collective or state farm

is

also

the head of the village government.

40.

Annex

to Decision

for Implementation

of the Board No.

Government Resolution on Committee

3,

of Land Reform and for Reorganization of Agricultural Enterprises

(23 January 1995).

James

41.

Delehanty

and

Kathryn

Rasmussen,

“Land Reform and Farm

Restructuring in the Kyrgyz Republic,” in Post Soviet Geography, Vol. 36 (1995), pp.

571-572. 42. While

Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632

stipulates that each family will receive a certificate, in certificate

has been issued to every

member of the

and Water Resources does not recognize these 43. rural

The minimum

size requirement is 5

family.

Chu

(see note 25)

Oblast, a land share

The Ministry of Agriculture

certificates.

ha

in all cultivation

zones (and

1

ha for

and suburban vegetable operations). 44. Included in those that stay together are enterprises that divide minimally into

two or three

still-large entities in

operation. Thus, in 1991 there

which each maintains the collectivized mode of

were 470

collective

and

state enterprises,

and by October

1997 that number had increased to 720 (many of the original 470 had broken up completely by then, but in some cases the

now

nearly landless and assetless collectives

had retained a technical existence and may have been counted

in the 720).

45. This stands in sharp contrast to land reform in Russia,

where very

little

whole-

farm breakup has occurred and therefore peasant farm creation only occurs when individuals or families leave the larger farm. In the Russian case, the pace of formation

of private farm enterprises has been very slow. 46. Presidential Decree No. 23, see note 17.

Land Reform and Farm Reorganization

47. Part

Kyrgy^z Republic

in the

115

of the Civil Code of the Kyrgyz Republic provides some rules as to

I

division and disposition of shared and joint ownership property; however, these rules

do not adequately protect individual shareholders. Article 276 provides

that

the

property of a peasant farm enterpnse will be held in joint ownership unless otherwise agreed. Article

272 requires consent

for disposition of property held in joint ownership,

but does not require wntten consent. 48.

Land

Temporary Government Resolution No. 480, “On Lease

Plots

Land Users of

to

from the Land Redistnbution Fund of Agnculture Belonging

to the Ministry

of Agriculture and Water Resources of the Kyrgyz Republic” (27 August 1997). 49.

Government Resolution No.

14,

“On Measures Aimed

at

Introduction of the

Market of Land Use Rights” (9 January 1998) and accompanying regulations, “On Republican and Raion Executive Commissions on Sale of Rights to Use Land Plots of the Agricultural

Land Redistribution Fund under

the Ministry of Agriculture and Water

of the Kyrgyz Republic” and “Temporary Regulations on Auction Sales of Rights

Use Land

Plots of the Agricultural

Land Redistribution Fund under

to

the Ministry of

Agriculture and Water of the Kyrgyz Republic” (9 January 1998). 50.

51.

Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632, see note Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632

owed by

provides that consideration must be given to the debt

25.

(see note

25)

the enterpnse in

determining the value of the property shares. 52.

Kyrgyz Republic, Parliamentary Law on

of Rights to

Registration

State

Immovable Property (22 December 1998). 53. In Russia, the federal government issued specific procedures for the purchase

and

sale

of small

market developed.

plots.

These procedures

facilitated transactions

Over one million small

plots

and a very active

changed hands

in

1996.

The

procedures were contained in Government Resolution No. 503, “The Procedures of

Purchase and Sale of Land Plots by Russian Federation Citizens” (30

May

54.

The pnvate holder had ninety-nine-year use nghts

55.

Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632, see note

56. In Russia, lack of access to machinery

is

at that

time.

daunting to individuals

leave large collective farms and farm independently and

is

1993).

25.

who want

to

often cited as a reason for

not withdrawing from the collective farm. 57.

Government Regulation Adopted by Resolution No. 632,

58. Service centers charge approximately the cost of fuel.

see note 25.

200 soms per hectare

to

plow, including

Renee Giovarelli

116

59.

One

service center

RDI

researchers visited

was an exempt

enterprise that

still

held 370 ha and produced specialized seeds. 60. While collateral factor.

is

an important factor in the lending decision,

it is

not the only

Other factors include the amount of the loan, the direct and indirect price

(interest rate or tied

buying and selling

deals), the duration

specific information concerning the ability or likelihood of credit history, reputation, ties to the locality,

of the loan, borrower-

repayment (such as past

non-farming income), general information

pertaining to large groups of borrowers such as forecasts of product prices, the costs of

obtaining relevant information, and the relative administrative costs in proportion to the size

of the loan. See Gershon Feder

et ah.

Land

Policies

and Farm Productivity

Thailand (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988); and John Bruce,

Land

Indigenous Tenure Systems Constrain Agricultural Development?” in

Agrarian Systems, eds. Thomas Bassett and Donald

Crummey

in

in

“Do

African

(Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press, 1993). 61.

Hans

Binswanger

and

Mark Rosenzweig,

“Behavioral

and

Material

Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture,” in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 22,

No. 510 (October 1985).

62. Evidence rates

from informal

credit markets in

Myanmar

of interest are about two-thirds higher when not secured with

Development Bank, Pradumna Rana, and Naved Hamid, to

indicates that customary

Market Economies: The Asian Approach, Vol.

eds.,

3 (Oxford:

From

collateral.

Asian

Centrally Planned

Oxford University Press,

1996), p. 208. 63. John Bruce, “Indigenous Tenure Systems,” in

Land

in

African Agrarian

Systems, p. 53. 64. Minister of Agriculture, conversation with author, October 1997.

5 / Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural

Development

Uzbekistan^

in

Jim Butterfield

As with

all

agricultural

countries of the former Soviet sector

is

going

Union and Eastern

through a

bloc, Uzbekistan's

post-communist

difficult

transition.

Decollectivization and privatization have proven challenging, and the

government has been inconsistent the sector’s

policy,

market

transition.

in determining

The

but by the nature of the

transition

transition

sector

must cope with an and climate,

is

how

and

how

affected not only

Uzbekistan’s

well.

as

fast

saline soil

Uzbek

far to press

by

official

agricultural

and groundwater, very high

population densities, the legacy of Soviet planning and cropping profiles, and a fresh water shortage that has already resulted in the ecological disaster of the

Aral Sea. Uzbekistan’s agricultural economy nation.

It

accounts for over one-third of

is

crucial to the overall welfare of the

GDP, about 40

percent of employment,

and nearly 60 percent of export earnings. Sixty percent of the population rural areas,

many of them underemployed and

massive campaign

By

to

poor.

After

lives in

World War Two

a

extend the hectarage of irrigated arable land was launched.

1990, the amount of arable land was extended from 2.46 million ha to 4.28

million, an increase of

74 percent.

This was accomplished

at a

supply Uzbekistan’s water - the the point that the Aral

heavy

Amu

cost;

outflow from the two rivers that

Dar’ia and the Syr Dar’ia

Sea receded, creating a man-made

- diminished

to

With cotton

disaster.

considered a strategic crop and increasingly high production quotas imposed on the republic during the Soviet era, monocultural cropping practices resulted in soil

degradation and grossly inefficient water management practices. Unraveling

Soviet-era

institutions

agricultural sector. in its

commitment

and practices

is

essential

to

reforming Uzbekistan’s

Yet the Uzbek post-communist government has been to

even

its

own

erratic

goal of ordered, gradual transition.

Several conditions have served as a starting point for the government’s transition planning

most

and future agricultural development.

significant crop in the country

First,

cotton

and a major contributor

to

is

by

far the

Uzbekistan’s

Jim Butterfield

118

As

export ledger.

such, the government considers

will continue to take

a strategic

commodity and

measures into the foreseeable future to ensure high levels of

production. Second, food security that end,

it

a high priority for the

is

Uzbek government;

heavy emphasis has been placed on wheat as an import

(the “grain

to

substitute crop

independence” campaign). Third, agriculture virtually does not exist

without irrigation. Fully 97 percent of arable land under cultivation Efficient use

and maintenance of water resources are crucial

to

is

irrigated.

growth

in the

sector as well as the long-term quality of life of the population. Finally, untying the knot of sixty years of collectivized agriculture will not occur overnight.

Uzbek government has committed

itself to

avoiding what

it

The

perceives to be the

serious decline experienced in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia after rapid

reforms in the agricultural sector by taking a more gradual approach to decollectivization and land reform. for policy

Each of these conditions serves

as a context

and planning.

Uzbekistan’s properly cared

for,

often

is

has

sector

agricultural

Many

fertile.

enormous

potential.

Land,

crops, especially fruits, nuts, and

vegetables, are well suited for the agro-climatic conditions.

The countryside has

an adequate, relatively young labor force in contrast to the European former Soviet Union. Vigorous trade

is

when

carried

states

on with Russia, the other

of the

states

of

Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and China.

Yet the gradual and inconsistent course adopted by the Uzbek leadership has resulted in reforms that have

privatized and

many

been slow and uneven. Collective farms have been

reorganized into stock companies with shares. The right to

incorporate as a private farmer has been established, and

have opted to do

so.

Yet land reform remains

some 20,000 people

virtually nonexistent with the

notable exception of leasing rights.

This

chapter

will

survey Uzbekistan's

including land and enterprise agricultural practices

reform.

efforts

in

agricultural

After briefly examining

and trends, and environmental

soil,

reform, water,

issues, the balance will

be

devoted to measures taken - and not taken - to reform agricultural enterprises

and land tenure.

Agricultural Sector Reform

and Rural Development

in

Uzbekistan

19

1

Water, Irrigation, and Drainage

Soil,

Soil quality varies, with the best in the wilowats (provinces) of the Fergana

Valley, Tashkent, and Samarkand, and the poorest in Karakalpakstan and the central wilowats of Syr Dar’ia

of

soil

gradation (a Soviet-era system), the republic average

percent of

Uzbek

that the split

Humus Just

soil is in the top four quintiles

low, and monoculture cropping has diminished

it

is

cannot exist without water, so

Soil

compaction from heavy machinery

Saline groundwater in

away

drained

is

of the grading system, and of is

agriculture

fertilizers.

59. Nearly 100

is

between the top 40 percent and the next 40 percent

content

as

ditches

and Jizzakh. Based on the Uzbek 100-point scale

some

is

it

about

even

even.'^

further.

cannot exist without

also a serious problem.^

areas leaches up and reduces soil quality if not

properly. Maintenance of saline water collectors and drainage

as important in these areas as the irrigation networks are.

Virtually any specialist

Uzbek academic

in

agencies will acknowledge that water agricultural sector

is

management

break

infrastructure

(the

to

or

institutions

government

management must be reformed

have any chance of prospering. Issues related

down latter

three

into

related

to

categories:

management, and governance (including associations and water markets).

The

of

desalinization

and

irrigation soil),

to

if

the

water

drainage

water resources

the potential of both self-governing

irrigation infrastructure has

examined both by domestic and international

been carefully

experts, in part because of the

attention paid to the Aral Sea disaster. Indications are preliminary, but not surprising: in the six years after independence,

The

desalinization

has

infrastructure

international experts with the exception of a

examining the

feasibility

river. Saline soil

much of it received

is

in decline.

less

attention

World Bank planning

project that

of building an outflow canal paralleling the

problems are significant

in

many

from

areas: the Aral

is

Amu Dar'ia Sea area of

Karakalpakstan and Khorezm; the central wilowats of Bukhara, Jizzakh, and Syr Dar'ia; parts

of Surkan Dar'ia and Navoi wilowats", and the central Fergana

Valley. Karakalpakstan ’s saline soil is

is

the result of the Aral Sea desiccation

being addressed by the multi-government Aral Sea

assistance.

But elsewhere

Uzbekistan’s topography basins

the is

problem

such that

with high water tables

is

initiative

and

with international

unrelated to the Aral Sea’s desiccation.

many zones

suitable for agriculture he in

and saline groundwater. The natural saline

groundwater leaches up through the

soil,

especially under the compaction of

Jim Butterfield

120

heavy salt

tractors.

During the Soviet

drainage systems were built to divert the

era,

water away from the fields and drain

it

into salt reservoirs.

Drainage systems for desalinization come in three types: underground pipes beneath

running

the

(“collectors”) lining the edges of fields.

The

latter are in

open ditches

and

pumps,

with

pipes

vertical

soil,

noticeable disrepair,

overgrown with reeds and with sides occasionally collapsing inward. The condition of the underground discharge pipes

deteriorating

is

lack of

for

maintenance.^

Water management practices

community

output,

are a crucial factor in addressing agricultural

water

health,

and

security,

Problems abound in maintaining the

network of

intricate

troughs, and pipes. Nineteen percent of irrigation

another 2 percent the pipes

is

through pipes. ^ The rest

and cement troughs

is

Much

not metered.^

One district)

is

Long furrows

norm

for the tail

by excessive watering

well. Preliminary

more head

is

by earthen

canals.

Leakage from

as half the water diverted into

at the

much

longer than

canals, or to take

it

is

g

optimal. at the tails

caused by the fact that underwatering

head often

recommendations were

(although considerably more significant

is

end of long furrows, and attempts

to

is

the

compensate for

result in overwatering at the tail as

to either shorten the furrows

and build

one step further and develop a staggered watering

system based on division of the

field into ninths.

so

than the

manage

The former

current

change in labor allocation, while the

require altered labor allocations to irrigation

through cement troughs and

head and irregular watering

result in overwatering at the

of the furrows. The irregularity

this

irrigation ditches,

study of irrigation systems in central Uzbekistan (Bulungur Tuman, or

noted that furrow length in local fields

expected

problems.

through seepage, evaporation, and tail-end waste.

is

of the flow

is

common. As much

irrigation channels

lost

is

environmental

is

less efficient

system) but requires no

latter is

more

efficient but will

the staggered schedule. Bulungur’s

system operates on twenty-four-hour increments, another factor that

leads to overwatering.

Only recently has water management the dual factors of limited supply

There

how

is

in

Uzbekistan taken into consideration

and the concomitant

effect

on

the environment.

increased awareness of the importance of efficiency, but

to build the institutions to achieve

are not optimal, nor are

management

it.

little

idea of

Operation and maintenance standards

practices designed to achieve

maximum

Agricultural Sector Reform efficiency.''

part

economics of the ministry

in

Water resources and and Uzbek

action dilemmas

ownership.

Uzbekistan

121

is

sufficient

convinced

who

set them.

that the threat

of potential collective

evidence of the necessity of continued state

While few Uzbeks accept

assistance of a

officials

in

the water infrastructure remain the property of the

specialists are

associations,'"' at least

the viability of self-governing water

one experiment was conducted from 1996-1998 with the

TACIS

Water markets

group.

of Agriculture and Water Resources

USAID

in

The weaknesses of operation and maintenance standards stem

from poor training

state,

and Rural Development

is

are another matter; the Ministiy^

sufficiently interested to

training project to address water policy

and markets.

have invited a In fact, private

farmers are already required to pay for their water usage where

metered, although they often don’t

know

the costs until after harvest.

it

can be

Even when

metered, charges are not always applied, and in any event they don’t apply to the large users.

Herein

lie

most of the obstacles

to

a water market:

technical

problems (metering and regulating flow), enforcement problems, and a bias toward large producers.

Crops

Crops are dominated

in

Uzbekistan by cotton and, more recently, wheat. Cotton

production dates back centuries before the arrival of Russian influence, but value as a strategic crop has risen only in the

last three

decades. In 1994 fully 44

Wheat and

percent of irrigated land was planted to cotton.

its

other grain production

increased significantly after 1994 due to increased emphasis reflected in state orders and on the government’s campaign for “grain independence,” an import substitution strategy

begun

hectarage was 53 percent higher that figure in actual output

1995 grain production measured in

in 1997. Indeed,

was 68

it

had been

was

percent.'^ This

in 1991, at the

and the corresponding

expense of cotton (down

13 percent in hectarage and 15 percent in production) and vegetables

percent in production). Rice

is

also a

(down 19

key product, cultivated principally

in the

western provinces. Sugar beets are grown almost exclusively on private plots for fodder, although the government signaled

its

intent to

emphasize sugar beet

production in 1997.'^ The Ministry of Agriculture requested a report from

European

specialists

examining the

viability

of sugar beets in Uzbekistan, and

determined to increase sugar beet production for import substitution purposes

Jim Butterfield

122

(but not for fodder). Fruits, vegetables, and nuts are particularly suited to

Uzbekistan’s agro-climatic conditions, but currently this potential sufficiently exploited. In fact

Bank and

may be

development First, the

to

stating

that

horticulture

Uzbekistan’s best comparative advantage in agriculture.

government’s campaign for grain independence

and opportunities for

be temporary,

not being

donor agencies, including the Asian Development

World Bank, have gone on record

the

is

widely thought

may be

shifting production

term, not longer. Second, in the past attempts have been

is

made

in the near

to shift

production to horticulture, but severe limitations, especially upstream, large-scale horticulture unviable.

packaging, and transportation are

Storage all

facilities

some

made

(especially refrigerated),

grossly inadequate for marketing fresh

produce, especially in the faraway markets of urban Russia and other countries

Processing plants are too few in number and of

of the former Soviet Union. insufficient

standards to mass-produce processed fruits

export. Thus,

and bazaars

most horticulture production

if not

Fertilizer

usage in the

fertilizers are at

third.

consumed by last

is

and vegetables for

marketed through

street

markets

the growers or bartered locally.

seven years has dropped dramatically. Chemical

one-quarter of their 1990 level, and mineral fertilizers at one-

This can be traced to the financial condition of farms and the deterioration

of application equipment. Imported agrochemicals are are expensive. correctly.

Those farms

that

now

available, but they

can afford them are reportedly not using them

Monoculture practices are also a problem; crop rotation schedules

could help reduce the need for

fertilizers.

Livestock

Livestock production in Uzbekistan declined precipitously after independence. Factors regularly cited are insufficient quality and availability of fodder and poor

animal husbandry practices on private farms and plots. The the livestock sector. In

latter are crucial to

1996 private plots and farms were responsible for 77.5

percent of Uzbekistan’s meat production (up from 72 percent in 1995), 84

percent of milk production (an increase of 8 percent in one year), and 63 percent

of egg production (a 5 percent increase in one

year).^"^

Fodder production declined by 30 percent and 1995.

in the four years

between 1991

This was an unintended consequence of the campaign for grain

Agricultural Sector Reform

and Rural Development

in

Uzbekistan

independence. This has further undermined meat production, and

grown

thin or

been slaughtered. Measures

to

123

have

cattle

reverse the decline in fodder

production, including both allocation of land to peasant farms for the expressed

purpose

of fodder

and the

production^^ were

production ineffective.^^

of demands

relaxing

Artificially

low prices

for

for

grain

meat and dairy

products undermine attempts to create more investment in livestock.

Environmental Issues Associated with Agriculture

The environmental most

situation in Uzbekistan ranges

visible catastrophe, of course,

from poor

to catastrophic.

The

the desiccation of the Aral Sea, a direct

is

product of water diversion to increase arable land under irrigation. Scientists estimate

the

that

water lost through poor water management practices in

Uzbekistan constitutes 80 percent of the annual shortfall of the outflow of. the

two main

Khorezm

rivers feeding the Aral Sea.'"

Dust storms

(the affected areas adjacent to the Aral Sea)

populated areas; the same winds salinate vast less catastrophic, yet

Fungicides,

tracts

Karakalpakstan and

in

blow

of land

salty dust into

in rural areas.

Other

important environmental issues abound in the rural sector.

pesticides,

herbicides,

and

other

chemicals

are

often

used

improperly, resulting in groundwater pollution that taints drinking water.^^ Poor

farming practices create erosion. Heavy tractors and excessive plowing result in soil

compaction - especially

in subsoil

- and

less

water retention during spring

seedbed preparation.

An

extensive and long-term record of soil quality for every tuman has been

kept for years. Soil scientists are aware of the benefits of crop rotation and have

long suggested rotating cotton with lucerne, perennial grasses, and other fodder crops, but export needs and import substitution strategies have driven the current

crop structure.

Land Reform

It is

in the context

of

all

the preceding issues

-

water,

soil,

crops, livestock, and

environmental concerns - that land and enterprise reform must take place. Land

and enterprise reform - specifically the privatization of each -

is

a crucial

and

Jim Butterfield

124

necessary step toward market reform in the agricultural sector. While there has

been marked progress priority

in privatizing enterprises, land

reform has not been a high

of the Uzbek government.

Two

reasons explain the lack of progress in land reform. The

same hesitancy

to allow land to

become

a

commodity

first is

the

can be found in most

that

of the countries that were part of the Soviet Union. Attitudes toward land

among

privatization in Russia, for example, are conservative even

stands to benefit

most from land privatization and a land market - namely,

Land

farmers.

private

“commodified”

a

lest

is

A

understood

as

resource

a

of owners

succession

underutilized, or neglected.

wealth.

the group that

allows

must not be

that

it

The second reason concerns

be

to

the distribution of

land market would inevitably allow successful producers

successful speculators

-

accumulate large

to

tracts

mistreated,

of land while

-

as well as

less successful

producers would be relegated to the role of agricultural wage labor. Given Uzbekistan’s

high

population

policy-makers

density,

high

fear

levels

unemployment along with vast numbers of poor tenant farmers. Equity

of

issues

underscore land reform policy side by side with the priority of increasing

and

agricultural production, productivity,

The

attitudes

efficiency.

toward land reform are reflected in the

legislation.

On

1

July

1998 a new comprehensive Land Code came into effect in Uzbekistan. Enacted

by

the Olii Majlis (Parliament)

efficient in replacing

This

is

not,

its

on 30

Soviet-era

Land Code than has

however, because the Uzbek government

regarding land. Instead, the restrictive land code Majlis and President Islam

on

Karimov

are of one

is

the Russian Federation.

more reform minded

is

an indicator that the Olii

mind on preserving

state controls

the dispensation of land.

Two Article

principles permeate the code. First, there

be no land market. The

to

16 of the all-important chapter regarding land as property indicates

unambiguously

that “land is the property

of the

state

sale or purchase, exchange, presentation as gift or

are a

is

of the code terms land part of the “overall wealth of the nation,” and

first line

few exceptions

and there is

proved much more

April, Uzbekistan

is

no basis

.

for the

.

and

mortgaging

to this stark statement, in general the

code

is

.

is

.

not subject to .”

While there

true to

its

word

development of a land market. The second principle

centralized control over land distribution. All

either in the

.

mechanisms

for dispensation are

hands of the hakims (administrators) of the various administrative

levels or are subject to their approval.

and Rural Development

Agricultural Sector Reform

The Land Code permits

the

Uzbekistan

in

125

of land plots both to legally

distribution

incorporated entities and to individuals in a myriad of forms. Only agricultural enterprises

—

specifically the large cooperatives

and shirkats^~

- may

have land

with permanent possession rights. Non-agricultural businesses, including wholly

owned

foreign companies,

may

One

use rights or by lease.

acquire land plots with permanent or temporary

curious exception, which contradicts the clause in

Article 16, awards land plots in the

and service businesses

at

form of private property

moment of

the

privatization.

to retail, wholesale,

There

provision, however, for acquiring land plots as private property retail,

is

no

when

parallel

starting a

wholesale, or service-oriented business.

The most common form of land tenure

for individuals

is

lifetime inheritable

possession. This includes plots for both housing and private gardens. Peasant

farms

may

lease land for not less than ten

possession rights

inheritable

and not more than

accorded as well

are

to

fifty years.

collective

Lifetime

vegetable

gardens, orchards, and vineyards.

Acquiring land plots,

if

not done through the privatization of enterprises,

done by petitioning the local hakim.

An

petitions for a housing or garden plot; this

he or she works, yet full

power

that loses

is

is

when

a

farmworker

done through the cooperative where

tuman hakim

subject to the

to rescind land tenure rights,

its

exception occurs

is

's

approval.

Hakims

also have

although the entity (person or business)

land has recourse to the courts for appeal. Notably, the hakim does

not need to use the courts to rescind tenure rights.

Rescinding tenure rights to the restrictions

on

may

utilization

occur for a host of reasons, mostly connected

of land

plots.

Every land plot has

a designated

usage that must be maintained (in extraordinary circumstances the code allows the possibility of changing to the

most

restrictions;

some

land’s designation). Agricultural land

some of

is

subject

the reasons that justify abrogation of tenure

rights are:

land

is

used for other than

2) land

is

not rationally utilized, as measured by yields lower than the norms

1)

for three years running

3) land

is

its

designated purposes;

(norms are based on the

used in such a way as

plot's soil quality);

to lead to a reduction

of the

fertility

of the

soil;

4) land lies unused for one year; 5) in the event

of the cessation of work relations according

to

which the land

Jim Butterfield

126 allotment was granted

(e.g., if

a peasant farm were to hire workers; since

all

workers on a peasant farm are required to be partners, hiring someone changes the

“work

Some

relations”).

of

the

more

of

clauses

liberal

Code

Land

the

grant

the

on

their

possessors/users/lessees full independence in conducting their activities

land (as long as such activities correspond to the land’s designated usage); the

whatever income

right to

is

generated on the land; the right to water (a key

provision for agricultural producers); and the right to use whatever resources are

on or under the surface - again,

accordance with designated usage.

if in

Individual landholders with lifetime inheritable possession rights their land

- another

contradiction with Article 16

- although

it’s

may mortgage not clear what

mortgageable value a plot could have in the eyes of a lending institution in the absence of any state

restricts

way

to generate cash

interference

into

specifically legislated instances

One

liberal clause in the

the

from

it.

A

activities

due process clause (Article 41) conducted on a land plot to

and procedures.

code provides

that land

usage will be conducted on

a paid basis. This sets the stage for usage fees and/or land taxes,

impute value to the land as a resource. practice indicates the

any more than

it

government

is

ready to seriously employ such measures

recognizes cooperatives

the “basic organizational-legal

with most of their

fruit

33

-

its

purposes the “creation of

forms of economic activity,” in a

all

essentially reconstituted collective farms

form of

are given special lease provisions

any time. Dekhan farms

-

one of

as

states

conditions of equal development of it

however, nothing in Uzbek

date,

has been prepared to charge for water rights or usage.

While the Land Code

clause

To

which could

later

-

as

agricultural production.” Peasant farms

and the opportunity

the family plots

to extend their holdings at

which currently provide the bazaars

and vegetables and much of their milk, eggs, and meat -

are nonetheless limited in size to .35

ha

if irrigated

and

.5

ha

if not.

Enterprise Reform

The government has been somewhat more reform.

Most of Uzbek

state farms, or

agriculture during the

liberal in

its

Communist

policy on enterprise

era

was organized

into

sovkhozes, and collective farms, or kolkhozes. The former were

Agricultural Sector Reform

and Rural Development

on which peasants (farmers) worked

large state-owned farms

111

Uzbekistan

in

wage

as

laborers.

There was no pretense of ownership as with the formally cooperative kolkhozes.

Both were targeted early

for transformation as

one of the

reform. In

1991 there were

remained.

All 971 kolkhozes were reorganized.^^

first

steps in enterprise

1,137 sovkhozes; by the end of 1995 only 16

The sovkhozes and kolkhozes were replaced by

several organizations.

Many

of them were reincorporated as collectives with cooperative ownership of the

and

business

Cooperative

assets.

Law on

according to the

collectives

were

(shirkats)

incorporated

Cooperatives passed on 14 June 1991 and the process

accelerated after additional legislation later that year.^^ Production profile to the

farm

The

rest

similar in

Uzbek

to determine, at least

form

to

according to the legislation.

new forms of farm

of the

enterprise are private. Peasant farms are

Russian peasant farms, although based on

legislation.^^

later, specifically

Peasant farmers are supposed to have lifetime, inheritable

possession rights to their land, although some have

have the right

to sublet all or part

it

on

lease.

cooperative from

whom

pay no land tax

for the first

They generally

of their land. Most owners are families or

extended families; some are partnerships. The land they receive

is

chosen by the

they request the right to establish a peasant farm. They

two years of operation;

after that,

land tax

minimal. As with the cooperatives, production decisions are formally the owners.

As of

up

is

left

the beginning of 1996, over 21,000 peasant farms

is

up

to

were

registered with the state.

Many vineyards and orchards have been privatized to take advantage of what may be Uzbekistan’s best comparative advantage in agricultural production. Irrigation

is

much more

efficient in vineyards

and orchards

of water usage/production output ratios) than in cotton and wheat markets of Siberian and Central Asian

(in

fields,

cities are ripe for exploitation.

terms

and the

From

the

passage of legislation in early 1994^^ until the end of 1995, 12,798 ha of orchards and 6,174 ha of vineyards were privatized. Land

on

inheritable possession with subletting rights dependent

original privatization agreement. profile for five years, after

Owners must maintain

which they are

free to

make

is

their

held on lifetime the terms of the

existing production

own

choices.

Livestock farms were singled out for privatization in decrees announced early 1993 and 1994.^^

Some 600

in

farms were auctioned to individuals or small

groups of farmers, either wholly or (usually)

in pieces,

by

the

end of

1995."^^

Others were privatized to workers as cooperatives with the stipulation that no

Jim Butterfield

128

more than

5 percent

state.

of livestock was required to establish a livestock

thirty units

ration of

of production would be sold to the

ha per

.3

cow was

allocated, resulting in

farm

A minimum of farm,"^^ A land

sizes of between 9

and 50

ha.

Leasing land for private farming became an option following the adoption of

Law on Land and

the

the

Law on

Leasing.

agreements between lessees and lessors. The

was

originally five years, but

feel

more secure and

invest

was

more

Terms vary and depend on

minimum

lease established

encourage farmers to

later increased to ten to

in the land they lease.

by law

By

February 1996 over

12,000 leased farms were in operation."^^ Personal plots increased in both size and number due to a conscious policy to

promote

Plot sizes tripled in size to an average of .24 ha, and the

them."^"^

number of

plots

increased 26

subsistence to plot owners, but in the bazaars in

percent."^^

make

their

way

the beginning of the reforms

plots provided

of its land.

By

into the

is

in production

Table

5.1.

only provide

plots'^^ to

- President Islam Karimov reported

40 percent of the country’s

both their

hard to exaggerate. In early 1991

agricultural production

that private

on 4.5 percent

1995 plots were producing 68 percent of meat, 81 percent of milk,

66 percent of potatoes, and 64 percent of vegetables. to 550,000, or

not

market both as barter and

urban areas. The importance of private

owners and the Uzbek agricultural economy

-

Personal plots

about double what

on private

plots

it

was

in 1991.

Hectarage had extended

Table 5.1 patterns the increase

from 1991-1995.

Private Plot Production as Percentage of Overall Production"^^

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

8.6

9.0

10.4

11.2

11.2

Potatoes

47.8

51.9

43.2

55.4

66.3

Vegetables

53.4

55.9

62.6

62.6

63.8

Meat

59.1

65.1

73.2

73.2

75.8

Milk

71.0

75.7

76.3

76.3

80.8

Eggs

37.2

49.1

55.1

58.1

65.6

Grain

Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural Development

in

Uzbekistan

1

29

While many enterprises have been privatized and many new, small private farms created, numerous factors prevent the

Two

are key: the absence of a land market

new

and

private sector

from flourishing.

the persistence of external control

over newly privatized enterprises.

None

ot the organizational forms noted above are permitted to

own

their

land with the exception of the private livestock farms, and then only the land

used

to

house the animals can be privately

permanent

minimum

possession

(cooperatives),

Thus, there land,

and land

used

(if

it

is

lifetime

that

stays

is

rest,

inheritable

land

is

given as

possession,

was

in the

in their if

or it

prohibited.

no efficient mechanism

cooperative collectives,

for successful farmers to acquire

possession of ineffective farmers

hands) or reverts back

to

is

more

either poorly

previous owner (the

its

private fanners cease operation).

by cooperatives remains poorly

however.

For the

ten-year lease. In no case can land be sold, although in most cases

can be leased. Subletting

Few

held."*^

Land poorly

utilized

utilized.

farmers and farm managers complain about lack of land ownership,

But

they

constantly

authorities. Collectives,

note

interference

in

business

decisions

by

whether one of the few remaining sovkhozes or one of

the formally private cooperatives, are required to fulfill state orders for products

- usually cotton and grain -

at

below-market prices.

Although

this directly

contradicts most of the legislation awarding decision-making rights with regard to

production and investment to the owners of virtually

the strategic im^portance of both cotton

continue relying on

command

farmers and leaseholders

is

to

planning, a remnant of the communist era. Peasant

who have

received their land from a collective (the fulfill its state orders.^'

In such cases

acting rationally, because the government has not reduced state

orders for those farmers.

types of enterpnses,

and wheat have led the government

majority) are required to help the collective the collective

all

who

leased their farms or have given

them up

to

peasant

Jim Butterfield

130

Although 20,093 peasant farms were reported

many were

1996,^^

in operation as

of January

not functioning as independent farming enterprises in the true

sense of the term.^^

Some

collectives

farms were created in their stead.

were disbanded and associations of peasant

Many

of these peasant farms do not have

(to lifetime inheritable possession) to their

title

land and do not have bank accounts.

Production targets for state orders are distributed by association leadership. In

do not function

actual practice, they

like

peasant farms

at all. In other

cases

formal peasant farms function more like sharecroppers, leasing land from

and functioning within

collectives

them.^"^ All inputs

and marketing channels are

within the larger collective, and production targets are largely determined by the collective

farm leadership or by Noting

peasant

individual

leaseholders.

comparison

to the larger cooperatives (a

critical

given to the collective, not the

state orders

the

farms'

marked

lower

productivity

in

contrast to Russia), one highly

study argued that the state provided no material, moral, organizational, or

financial resources to the farms.

In an experiment in Ellikkala

Tuman

Karakalpakstan Republic in

in the

western Uzbekistan, the entire tuman was reorganized into roughly peasant farms.

On

1,700

average, six to seven families farm roughly 10 ha of land.^^

Assets (not including land) were distributed according to time of service in the collective. In order to

avoid the chaos likely to be associated with such an abrupt

of Peasant Farms were created to provide supervision to

transition. Associations

the peasant farms. In

most cases the associations cover the

territory

of a previous

sovkhoz or kolkhoz, and the peasant farms are operated by what was formerly the workers’ brigades within the collective. While the peasant farms were organized

on the basis of the 1992 for peasant farms’

the associations

Law on

Peasant Farms - which provides the legal basis

independence in production and marketing decisions - in fact

make most of the

decisions regarding crop structure, inputs and

investment, water allocation, and marketing, including fulfilling state orders for

which peasant farms are ostensibly not supposed have

their

own bank

peasant farm in what

to

be responsible.

accounts; instead, the association keeps accounts for each is

generally a non-transparent system.

Since they are legally incorporated as peasant farms, included in the total of 20,993 reported by the

number of peasant farms that.^^

And

demand

yet,

They do not

state.

that function as they are

such farms are

Estimates by experts put the

supposed

to^^ at less

than half

according to Eckert and Elwert's 1996 field study, the potential

for peasant farms is considerably higher than current rates,

further

and Rural Development

Agricultural Sector Reform

Uzbekistan

in

131

suggesting obstruction on the part of authorities and the lack of a support infrastructure.^^

Another experiment,

down

similarly broken

one

this

in

Ak

Altin

Tuman

in

Syr Dar'ia Wilowat, was

There are 140

into peasant farms.

fully incorporated

peasant farms and another twenty-eight private livestock farms. All have their land, but the majority

are

more than

five

still

management

hierarchical

as to limit the

do not have individual bank accounts.^’ There

hundred small farms, which are referred

but which in fact do not have

peasant farms

to as

and bank accounts. As with Ellikkala Tuman,

titles

structures

were created and function

such a manner

in

independence of the private farms. The farms are subsumed within

150 Associations of Peasant Farms, which

The

Unions of Peasant Farms. the peasant farms.

agency

title to

that operates

much

subsumed within eleven

financed by a 20 percent profit tax on

latter are

At the top of

in turn are

the hierarchy

like the agricultural

is

an agrofirm, a coordinating

department of the former tuman

executive committee in the Soviet system of agricultural administration.

While both the Ellikkala and building

a private-sector

Ak

Altin experiments are touted as steps in

market economy

in

the

agriculture,

government’s

reluctance to allow the newly privatized farms to function without very high

- much of which functions in practice like the administrative system - holds out little promise for progress.

levels of managerial control

Soviet agricultural Financial

limitations

financial shape.

The

hinder private

first set

poorest financial condition.

were unprofitable

at

enterprises.

Many

started

in

poor

of sovkhozes to be privatized were the ones

Most of

the six hundred auctioned livestock farms

time of auction.

generally not available since there

in

Credit for any private

is little

in the

way of

enterprise

collateral with

is

no land

market. Crops in fields and storage are not acceptable for collateral so long as state orders

Payment

remain; credit agencies could not obtain them in lieu of repayment.^^

for

produce can only be made via bank transfer (an inflation-fighting

mechanism), so unless the enterprise has been able

which while sometimes except through

its

legal, is often obstructed

-

to it

open

a

bank account -

cannot receive payment

parent cooperative.

Service agencies are

still

few

in

number and can exact demanding terms

from producers - whether cooperatives or one of the smaller private

The former have one advantage over

enterprises.

the latter, however; they are required to

service the cooperatives before servicing other enterprises.^"^ enterprises (peasant, private livestock,

The smaller

and leased farms) are

last

private

in line for

Jim Butterfield

132

service and receive the toughest terms. Moreover, inputs such as machinery

supply and service are

Water

is

still

attuned to large-scale production.

allocated formally

by

the state through the water agencies of the

Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management. But the agencies devolve responsibility to the cooperatives for allocation to the smaller private enterprises that

were divested from them. Naturally, the cooperatives generally see

own

water needs before allocating water to the other enterprises.

Land

quality varies,

and leased farms

livestock, is

signed)

up

is

and the choice of land given at the

peasant, private

to

time of their incorporation (or

to the collective to decide.

Often

it

is

to their

when

the lease

land which

is

more

remote^^ or of poorer quality.

Inputs, Processing, and Marketing

Agricultural significant

processing,

constraints

on growth

export-led growth.

including

between

inputs,

field

and in

There

marketing the is

and table range well

are

agricultural

much

in excess

spheres sector

potential;

that

provide

of Uzbekistan,

estimates

of losses

of 50 percent, especially in

horticulture. Exploiting Uzbekistan’s comparative advantage in horticulture will

not be easy, and the processing, storage, and transportation sectors will need considerable development in order to do so. Enterprises involved in providing inputs to agriculture and in processing

its

outputs have been almost fully privatized. Rejecting the voucher privatization

program of Russia,

the

Uzbek government gave preference

in privatization to

workers and managers while frequently holding a minority stake. Both foreign

and domestic

interests are eligible to

purchase the land

-

not just the assets

hold shares, and both have the right to

- of the

enterprises.^^

The most common mechanisms of enterprise and employee buyout, competitive tender, and sale

privatization

were management

(as privatization progressed)

open

of stock. Early privatization (1992-1993) was accomplished principally

through competitive tenders, and the most

common form

of incorporation was

closed joint-stock companies. In the period that followed (mainly 1994), larger enterprises

were privatized and generally incorporated as open-stock companies.

Twenty-five percent stakes were reserved for foreign investment and open sale

on the stock market, leaving both government and employee shares limited

to

25

Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural Development

Uzbekistan

in

133

percent each. In 1994 roughly nine hundred enterprises in the agricultural input

and output sectors were privatized.

Yet the enterprises rarely

act like independent agents. In

procurement and processing enterprises,

this is

not surprising; the government

maintains a 51 percent stake in these.^^ But elsewhere percent and sometimes none.

The

wheat and cotton

holds less than 25

it

managed by production

state’s interests are

associations, Soviet-era overseer institutions that have not lost their tendency to

manage through managers

(if

procurement inertial,

but

choosing

not

prices.

it

Such interference

diktat.

outright)

and

includes

commodity

In part the influence of the

from a

also stems

enterprises with acquiring

raw

production

setting

by

real role played

of

choice

influencing

and

targets

associations

is

the associations in assisting

and financing.

materials, markets,

In dealing with the very important input of agricultural machinery and

equipment, the Uzbeks have reached back to an organizational structure not seen in the Soviet

Union

since the late 1950s. Since 1997

tuman

regions have been experimenting with machine-tractor parks

Soviet era

called machine-tractor

equipment park

MTS),

or

that purportedly takes advantage

ensures proper maintenance. is

stations,

One

MTP

officials in

(MTP -

serves several large farms, and each farm

speak highly of the experiment,^’ arguing that

market mechanisms by providing services on contract is

not entirely persuasive since

to

provide timely service

or harvest on time.

73

is

MTPs

heavy-

of economies of scale and

required to pay for mechanized services either in cash or in kind.

officials

during the

centralized

a

some

to

it

Some

will serve to

local

enhance

any type of farm.

This

have no competition. Their sole motivation

a potential fine that

The experiment’s success

may is

be levied

if

they

fail to

plow

as yet impossible to assess.

Conclusion

Due

in part to the

market economy

much

Uzbek government’s

deliberately cautious transition to a

in the agricultural sector, the sector did not decline nearly as

as in other countries of the former Soviet Union.

decline

was no more than 10 percent

less than

pre-independence

countries

level of

levels.

But

much to do with the need to its viability as a major export of cotton - much of which goes to outside the former Soviet Union - as it does with reform policy. Thus,

Uzbekistan’s post-independence performance has as maintain

The lowest

Jim Butterfield

134

government has maintained a policy of massive cotton production

the

Uzbek

while increasing grain production to reduce imports.

cotton accounted for

about 17.3 percent of the world market in 1998—1999^'^ (and up its

export earnings in 1996)/^ and the government

share and consequent export earnings.

The harmful

is

to

40 percent of

loath to reduce

effects

for export

on

its

market

the soil caused

by

monocultural practices in cotton-producing areas and the high demand for water resources for the thirsty crop are dealt with palliatively and otherwise

left for the

future.

Another reason for Uzbekistan’s relatively good performance is

that

and

it

in agriculture

produces a number of important inputs, including agricultural chemicals

some

equipment.

Uzbekistan

is still

(Despite

well ahead of

reductions

agrochemical

in

some neighboring

countries.)

applications,

Not needing

to

import such inputs has relieved the state budget, and price controls keeps them relatively affordable for farms

whose own budgets

But while the government claims

on reasonable

caution, conservatism

methods are equally important

that

its

and the

factors.

are not very elastic.

emphasis on gradualism

inertia

It

is

based

of Soviet-style administrative

does

little

good

to

remove old

administrative structures after creating ostensibly independent enterprises similar

administrative

structures

are

And whatever

put in their place.

government’s intention, local and regional

officials

if

the

and the leaders of the new

agrofirms and associations are not hesitant to dictate

management decisions

to

privatized farms of any type.

Some

caution

certainly reasonable.

is

The government must move

carefully

with respect to land reform in order to balance priorities of equity, performance,

and environmental protection. With 23 million people, a population growth

rate

of 2.1 percent,^^ and only 4.28 million ha of irrigated arable land, population density

is

very high. The ratio of .22 ha per capita of irrigated land in 1970

declined to .18 ha per capita to Southeast

Asian

distribution

is

levels.

not

If

result.

Indeed, in the Fergana Valley

some measure of equity

maintained,

underemployment could in the

by 1996.

massive

of

levels

policy

of denying

near

and resource

unemployment

and

However, by leaving control of land dispensation

hands of large producers and the hakims, the

Soviet-era

in land

it is

virtually

everyone

state

has continued the

opportunities

for

private

farming. While poverty currently exists, the social infrastructure of the former state

farms system

still

ensures that people eat and are housed. With so

many

Agricultural Sector Reform

and Rural Development

in

Uzbekistan

135

people packed tightly together, high unemployment and increases in poverty levels could result in

Yet

massive suffering and prove explosive as well.

for this very reason that Uzbekistan cannot afford not to

it is

agricultural sector

more

efficient.

water to maintain that which the

most

efficient

is

There

make

its

no unexploited land and not enough

is

mechanism

exploited. Without a

to ensure that

producers acquire the land resources they need, increased

performance will prove elusive. With due consideration of such factors as

static

arable land area, a growing population, and an ecological disaster looming in the

background, the government

may

eventually conclude

it

has no choice but to

pursue a faster pace of reform.

Notes

1.

Philip

Micklin,

Askar Juraev, and Abdullah Bimukhamedov provided

logistical assistance in Uzbekistan. Ekaterina

and feedback on a draft of

this chapter.

My

Levintova provided research support

appreciation

is

extended to each. Note:

Transliterations in the text correspond to the Library of Congress system. English

language sources which use transliterations have been 2.

Data obtained from the World Bank office

government 3.

left as originally

in

published.

Tashkent, based on

Uzbek

data.

Prakticheskie rekomendatsii

po sel’skomu

khoziaistvu: zeml’ia, voda

i

udo-

breniia (Tashkent: Ministerstvo Sel’skogo Khoziaistva, Akademiia Sel’skokhoz-

iaistvennykh

Nauk and

Assotsiatsiia

“Uzplodovoshchvinprom,” 1996),

p. 35.

4. Ibid., p. 13. 5.

Vladimir Savelin, Department Head of State Committee for the Protection of

Nature, interview, 16 July 1997. 6.

Tokir Khamrakulov, Director of the Jizzakh Agncultural College, interview,

12 July 1997; Saidrahman Mirzaev, Tashkent Institute of Engineers for Irrigation

and Mechanization of Agnculture, interview, 15 July 1997. 7. 8.

Akmal Kanmov, Mirzaev

Institute

interview;

Islam

Uzbekistan Agricultural Sector

August 1995), 9.

p. 2.

Karimov

interview.

of Water Problems, interview, 10 July 1997.

Karimov,

President,

Framework Paper

interview;

Republic

of

(Tashkent: The World Bank, 25

Jim Butterfield

136

TACIS

10.

Commonwealth of Independent

Development Program, Bulungur

Integrated

Pilot

States)

Assistance for the

(Technical

District,

Samarkand,

Uzbekistan: Preliminary Report BS3: Irrigation and Soils, September 1995. 1 1

.

Mirzaev interview; Karimov interview.

As

12.

indicated in the

Reform Policy

in the

niia

Usage, described

in

Land

Republic of Uzbekistan (TACIS Food and Agricultural Policy

Advisory Unit: July 1996), 13.

Law on Water and Water

p. 13.

Sandjar Djalalov, “Gosudarstvennoe regional’noe regulirovanie ispoTzova-

zemeTno-vodnykh resursov v usloviiakh rynka,” Kurbon Choriev,

Uzbekistan, Vol. 2 (1997), pp. 45-47; in the Agro-Industrial

Complex, interview,

1 1

in

Sel’skoe

Institute

July 1997;

khoziaistvo

of Market Reforms

Isamukhamedov

interview;

Mirzaev interview; Karimov interview. 14. Collective action

investigations

dilemmas with water resources

by Western

researchers, such as Elinor

interested in disproving the free rider thesis of

are the subject of extensive

Ostrom and Norman Uphoff

Mancur Olson. See Elinor Ostrom,

Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992);

Norman Uphoff, Learning from Gal Oya

Press, 1992);

and Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge,

(Ithaca: Cornell University

MA:

Harvard University Press, 1965). 15.

Sandjar Djalalov, Project Advisor,

TACIS Food and

Policy Unit, interview,

9 July 1997. 16.

United States Agency for International Development.

17.

The Uzbekistan Water and Environmental Policy

18.

Uzbekiston za gody nezavisimosti (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1996),

19.

One farm

although

had

it

commitment

in Jizzakh

Wilowat decided

to seek the Cabinet

to cotton

and

grain.

Project.

to plant 1,000

p. 60.

ha to sugar beets,

of Ministers’ approval in order to reduce

Muminjon Kakhorov,

Director of the

its

Khamid

Olimjon farm, Jizzakh Wilowat, interview, 12 July 1998. 20. Choriev and Djalalov interviews.

21

.

The

last

time

it

was

22. This conclusion

European

specialists in

tried

was

in the early 1980s.

was reached

recently in a baseline study conducted

Bulungur Tuman. They estimated

by

that in order to bring

existing facilities up to standards sufficient to export fresh produce, including

equipment purchases, some US$400,000 would have to be invested. That

is

new

only one

Agricultural Sector Reform

tuman. Even Integrated

that,

at

and Rural Development

the transportation issue

Development

Program,

Bulungur

TACIS

Samarkand,

Distnct,

137

Uzbekistan

unaddressed.

left

is

in

Pilot

Uzbekistan:

Report BS5: Horticulture, 1996. 23.

Abdu-Kadir Ergashev,

24. Solikh

UNDP Tashkent,

Isamukhamedov, Tashkent

interview, 16 July 1997.

State Agricultural University, interview,

14 July 1997. 25.

Land Reform

26.

“On

the

Uzbekistan, p. 39.

in

Improvement of Reforms

in

Livestock Production and Protection of

Farms and Privatized Farms,” Decree No.

the Interests of Peasant

87, 23 February

1994. 27. Choriev interview. 28. 29.

Isamukhamedov

interview.

TACIS Water Resources Management and

Agricultural

Production in

Central Asia Project data. 30. Savelin interview. 31. in

Jim Butterfield, Mikhail Kuznetsov, and Sergei Sazonov, “Peasant Farming

Russia,” in Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July 1996), pp. 79-105. 32. Shirkats are collective lease-holding units within a larger cooperative.

are legally entitled to

all

receipts gained

from production

They

after the leasing fee is paid.

Eckert and Elwert, section 2.4. 33.

This term originally referred to

fermerskoe khoziastvo), but plots, a

35.

new Land Code

is

(family)

used only

farms

(in

Russian,

in reference to

family

non-incorporated form of small-scale production. Section 46 spells out the

differences: only family 34.

in the

peasant

Land Reform

Don Van

in

Atta,

members may work on

a

dekhan farm.

Uzbekistan (Tashkent: TACIS,

“The

1 1

Reform

State of Agrarian

July 1996), p. in

1

1.

Uzbekistan,” in Post-

Soviet Geography, Vol. 34, No. 9 (1993), p. 600. 36.

Law on

Denationalization and Privatization, 19

37.

Law on

Peasant Farms, 3 July 1992.

38.

Cabinet

Fulfillment of 39.

Economic Reforms

“On Measures

Production,” 15

for the

Land Reform

in

in

88,

in Agriculture,”

“On

1991.

Additional

Measures

the Further

Development of

8.

in

Livestock

Privatization

Livestock Production,” 24 March 1994.

Uzbekistan, p.

for

23 February 1994.

Development of Economic Reforms

March 1993; “On

Support of Private Enterprise 40.

Decree No.

of Ministers

November

and

.

Jim Butterfield

138

41. Julie Eckert and

Georg Elwert, Land Tenure

Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft (http ://

in

Uzbekistan (Eschbom,

Technische Zusammenarbeit, 1996), section 1.2

ftir

WWW .gtz de/orboden/ eckert/ eckinh .htm) .

42. July 1990 and 43. 44.

Land Reform

“On

the

November 1991, Uzbekistan, p.

in

respectively. 6.

Further Development of Personal

Members, Sovkhoz Workers, and

Plots

Owned by Kolkhoz

and on Individual House Construction,”

Citizens;

passed on 18 November 1990. 45.

Land Reform

Uzbekistan, p. 10.

in

46. Literally, personal subsidiary plots. 47. Uzbekistan za

gody nezavisimosti,

p. 60.

48. Ibid. 49. This restriction

was

50. Generally, about

less clear after

passage of the Land Code.

50 percent of world market

51. Choriev interview;

Land Reform

in

prices.

Uzbekistan, pp. 33, 47.

52. Prakticheskie rekomendatsii, p. 13. 53. Djalalov interview; Choriev interview.

Van

54. Choriev interview;

Atta,

“The

Reform

State of Agrarian

in

Uzbek-

istan,” p. 604.

55. A.

Radzhapov and

S.

Baizhanov, “Ispol’zovanie zemli dekhanskimi

(fer-

merskimi) khoziastvami,” SeTskoe Khoziaistvo Uzbekistana, No. 3 (1997), pp. 5557. 56.

A Study of Land Reform

TACIS, February 1997),

in Ellikkala

Raion, Karkalpakstan (Tashkent:

p. 2.

57. Ibid., pp. 4, 9. 58. Defined as having their

possession) to their land.

Few

own bank

accounts and

title

(lifetime inheritable

peasant farms have complete independence in

production and marketing decisions because of the persistence of state orders. 59. Choriev interview.

60. Eckert and Elwert, section 2. 61.

An

Investigation

of Farm Restructuring

in

Ak

Altin Rayon, Syr

Darya

Oblast (Tashkent: TACIS, 24 June 1996), pp. 1-3. 62.

Not

sovkhozes 63.

surprisingly, the

in the

numbers correspond exactly

to the

tuman (11) and divisions within the sovkhozes

Land Reform

in

Uzbekistan, p. 18.

number of former

(150).

Agricultural Sector Reform and Rural Development

in

Uzbekistan

139

64. Ibid., p. 17. 65. Eckert and Elwert claim that 75 percent of peasant farms are over 10

km

from the farmers' village of residence. Given the lack of personal transportation, 10

km

is

very

far.

Section 2.1.

The land

66.

came about

privatization provision

foreign interests that investment might depend on

was possible only

passed, tenure Privatization

(Tashkent:

of Agro-Industrial

TACIS,

1 1

June 1996),

as

in

response to indications by

In fact

it.

once the Land Code was

lifetime inhentable possession

Enterprises

the

in

Republic

rights.

The

of Uzbekistan

p. 2.

67. fbid., pp. 2-3.

68. Ibid., p. 4. 69. Ibid., p.

11.

70. Ibid., p. 5.

71

.

Kakhorov interview.

72. Orzikul Karimov, Jizzakh

Tuman

Agricultural Department Chief, interview,

12 July 1998. 73.

Aspar Turabaev, faculty member of the Department

Machine-Tractor Parks interview,

14 July

significantly

was

at

1997.

for the

Usage of

the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Mechanization,

One

signal

that

the

expenment would be extended

the creation of a small but specialized department at the Institute

devoted to study and instruction regarding the MTPs. 74.

May

1999/2000 World Cotton Outlook

1999),

online

version,

(USDA

Foreign Agricultural Service,

http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/1999/9905

/toc.htm. 75. Cotton:

August

1997),

World Markets and Trade online

version,

(USDA

Foreign Agncultural Service,

http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/1997/97-

08/cover/uzbekistan.htm. 76.

World Development Report 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1997).

77. Prakticheskie rekomendatsii, p. 4. 78. Population density in the Fergana Valley

is

such that

if

everyone were

to

be

given a plot of land, each would receive less than one hectare. Eckert and Elwert, section 1.2.

6 / Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin: A Geographical Perspective Philip Micklin

The Aral Sea Basin

lies in the

huge

around

to

area, estimated

seven

states falls

heart of Central Asia (Figure 6.1).

It

1.8 million square kilometers.' Territory

covers a

belonging

within the basin, with Uzbekistan accounting for 25 percent,

Turkmenistan for 21 percent, Kazakhstan for 21 percent, Afghanistan for 15 percent, Tajikistan for 8 percent, Kyrgyzstan for 8 percent, and Iran for 2

The Aral Sea Basin includes Kzyl-Orda and Chimkent Oblasts

percent.

in

southern Kazakhstan, most of Kyrgyzstan with the exception of the northern and northeastern territory (drainage basins of Lake Issyk-KuF and the

Chu and

Talas

Rivers), nearly all of Uzbekistan with the exception of a part of the Ust-Urt

Plateau situated in the far northeast of the country,

all

of Tajikistan, the northern

part of Afghanistan, a small part of the extreme northeast of Iran,

and

all

but the

western one-third of Turkmenistan.

Lands

that

now

constitute

five

of the seven basin

states

(Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan) were part of the Russian

Empire and

its

successor, the Soviet Union,

until the collapse

of the

USSR

situated in the latter country territory.

from the

late

nineteenth century

in 1991. Eighty-eight percent

and over 90 percent of

of the basin was

river flow

came from

its

Afghanistan and Iran control the remaining portion and contribute

together no

more than 9 percent of river

discharge. Neither

Soviet state nor the preceding Tsarist Empire.

basin was 38 million in 1995 according to the include Afghanistan or Iran.

An

was ever

part of the

The estimated population of

World Bank,^ but

this

the

does not

estimate for 1996, which includes Afghanistan

but not Iran, placed total basin population at 45.2 million (37.3 million in the

former Soviet republics and 7.9 million in Afghanistan)."'

Because of

its

geographical extent within the basin, economic might, and

political-military power, the Soviet

Union dominated

the water

management

agenda. Critical water-related decisions for the portion of the Aral Sea Basin within that state were

among

made

the basin republics

in

Moscow. Water

were

sharing and other water disputes

settled there as well.

The Soviet Union paid

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin little

Atghan and

attention to

Iranian water

management views

141

or interests.

Basin management was treated as essentially a domestic matter.

The

situation

changed dramatically

at the

end of 1991 with the dissolution

and shattering of the USSR. The Aral Sea Basin and than being dominantly controlled and

were shared by seven part of the basin,

states. (It

management policy

managed by one superpower, suddenly

practically

politically,

for the basin

water resources, rather

should be noted that Iran controls only a tiny

which generates

geographically,

position,

its

on

its

no flow.) None of the

economically,

own

or

states is in a

militarily,

terms as was done by the

In the following pages, the author attempts to lay out in

to

dictate

USSR.

more

detail

and

analyze the complicated problems of managing interstate water resources in the

Aral Sea Basin in this

new

are described. This

followed by a discussion of the key water management

problem

in the

region

the basin states interstate

water

promoting

this

for

is

-

era. First, the region’s transnational

water resources

irrigated agriculture. Next, institutional approaches that

have adopted since independence for managing and sharing resources

and the

process are presented.

of international

role

A

organizations

in

concluding section appraises the future

management of interstate water resources

in the basin.

Transnational Water Resources of the Aral Sea Basin

Water resources of transnational

the

Aral Sea Basin

(interstate).

The

former

may be

divided into national and

consist

of

rivers,

lakes,

usable

groundwater, and return flows from uses situated entirely within the bounds of

one or another of the basin latter are the

states that

same hydrologic

do not directly

affect the other states.

The

entities that cross national borders or directly

affect water resources in other basin states.^ In the Aral

Sea Basin,

interstate

water resources are by far larger and more important than national water resources.

The key

two major

which these

rivers

—

transnational water resources of the Aral Sea Basin are the the

rivers flow.

Amu

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia

—

and

the Aral

Sea into

142

Philip Micklin

Asia

Central

of

Basin

Sea

Aral

The

6.1.

Figure

1

Ma?mging Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

Amu The most important

among

Originating

Dar’ia and Syr Dar

and Afghanistan,

it

journey, the river, or

leaving,

major

its

two

last

Amu

Dar’ia and

states several times (Figure 6.1). is

tributaries but several “terminal” rivers^

its

in the hydrologic sense

The

Of these

Amu

Dar’ia

rivers, all but

an “exotic”

is

used here means that essentially

Pamir Mountains but

originates in the well-watered

Average

around 79 km^. This includes not only

the Kaskadar’ia cross international boundaries.

which

this

and Uzbekistan - entering,

(Zeravshan, Murgab, Tejen) that disappear in the deserts.^

river,

from the

along the borders and across

tributaries, flows

annual flow from the drainage basin the flow of the

Dar’ia.

During

the Aral Sea.

into

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan,

and reentering the

km

flows nearly 2,400

mountains across the Kara-Kum desert and

-

Amu

the

is

the glaciers and snowfields of the Pamir Mountains of

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,

four states

’ia

within the Aral Sea Basin

river

143

that this

flow

is

all its

flow

substantially

diminished by evaporation, transpiration from phreatophytic (water loving) vegetation growing along

its

banks, and bed filtration as the river passes across

the

Kara-Kum

the

development of modem, large-scale

desert to the Aral Sea.

decreased to around 40

km

from

Owing

its

exotic nature, even prior to

irrigation,

average inflow to the Aral

the 62

to

km

coming out of

Tajikistan contributes 80 percent of flow generated in the

by Afghanistan

basin, followed (3 percent),

which

is

(8 percent),

Uzbekistan (6 percent), Kyrgyzstan

the Tian’

Shan Mountains, located

of the Pamirs. Glaciers and snowmelt also chiefly feed is

tributaries, the

then

across

Dar’ia river

in Iran).^

The Syr Dar’ia flows from

it

Amu

and Turkmenistan and Iran together around 3 percent (most of

formed

2,500 km,

the mountains.

a

somewhat longer than

the

Amu

it.

Dar’ia.

With

The

strip

of Tajikistan

that

a total length of

river (or

Naryn and Karadar’ia) flows from Kyrgyzstan narrow

to the north

protmdes,

its

main

into Uzbekistan,

thumblike,

into

Uzbekistan, and finally across Kazakhstan and into the Aral Sea. Average

annual flow of the Syr Dar’ia,

Amu

at

37 km^,

is

considerably less than that of the

Dar’ia. Kyrgyzstan contributes 74 percent of river flow, Uzbekistan

percent, Kazakhstan 12 percent, and Tajikistan 3 percent.^ the Syr Dar’ia

was

is

exotic. Prior to the

substantial during

its

modem

As

the

Amu

1

Dar’ia,

age of irrigation, flow diminution

long journey across the

Kyzyl-Kum

desert, with less

than half of the water coming from the mountains reaching the Aral Sea.

144

Philip Micklin

Together, the two rivers (and the terminal rivers in the basin of the

Amu

Dar’ia) provide, on an annual average basis, 116 km^. Groundwater contributes additional flow to interstate water resources. According to recent estimates, total

renewable water resources in the Aral Sea Basin perhaps, 16

kmVyr

usable.’^

Some 30

may be 44 km

percent of groundwater

is

/yr with,

believed to be

across national boundaries or

is

hydraulically connected to aquifers in other countries. However, groundwater

is

where the aquifer

transnational in nature

lies

Amu

a significant contributor to the flow of the

Dar’ia and the Syr Dar’ia in

those rivers’ headwaters whereas in the desert regions along the middle and

lower course, the rivers are net suppliers of flow to groundwater. Hence, the net

beyond

addition groundwater adds to transnational water resources above and river

flow

difficult to determine.

is

During Soviet times. Central Asian water

was not connected with

experts estimated usable groundwater that

17

km /yr

interstate portion to this gives 5

flow

at

Applying the 30 percent coefficient for the

Sea Basin.

in the Aral

river

km /yr.

Adding

this to the

km

flow provides a reasonable upper limit of 121

116

km

for river

for transnational average

annual water resources of the Aral Sea Basin.

km /yr,

At 121

On

considerable.

interstate

water resources of the Aral Sea Basin are

a per capita basis (assuming a mid- 1998 basin population of

near 47 million) they equal nearly 2,600 meters/person, whereas on a per unit area basis (assuming a basin area of 1.8 million

meters/km

.

They do not

However, such per capita and per

the

On

)

they equal 67,000 cubic

unit area figures are meaningless.

take into account the sharp spatial discontinuities of the region in

terms of where flow heavily.

km

is

this basis,

generated and where people live and use water most

we may

divide the basin into two basic zones. First are

upstream mountains where the flow

inhabited and

whose water use

is

is

generated,

far less than the supply.

which

are

sparsely

This zone occupies

only 20 percent of the basin but generates 90 percent of the flow for the Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia.

The second zone

consists of the

downstream

Amu

arid plains

(covering 80 percent of the basin) where most of the population lives, where

most of the water

is

used, and

whose indigenous water resources

than used. The deficit in the plains

is,

are far less

of course, covered by outflows from the

well- watered mountains.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan occupy the core of the mountain zone of the

basin and are “water rich” (Figure 6.2). The former supplies 55 percent of

average annual basin river flow and the

latter

25 percent for an aggregate

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

145

contribution of 80 percent. Water withdrawals for the two countries together in

1995 were only 16 percent of the

total.

Consequently, these states are large net

donors to basin water supplies. Afghanistan provides about 4 percent of basin flow (but over 6 percent of flow for the

were probably not much more than places

it

in the category

downstream

for the

are large net

Amu Dar’ia river basin).

withdrawals

Its

percent of the total in 1995, which also

1

The

of net upstream donor.

picture

exactly opposite

is

of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which

states

consumers of basin water resources. They

mainly on the plains

lie

of the Central Asian deserts and contribute as a group only 14 percent of flow.

With

substantial

withdrawals of but

irrigated

1 1 1

km^

withdrawals

its

areas,

these

states

took

of basin

percent

83

in 1995. Uzbekistan contributes 8 percent of basin flow

were 52 percent of the

1995

in

Turkmenistan

total.

contributes essentially no flow (most of the discharge of the Tejen and rivers that enter

Turkmen

territory

comes from

Murgab

major consumer

Iran), but is a

accounting for 20 percent of withdrawals in 1995. Kazakhstan contributes 4 percent of aggregate basin flow (but 13 percent of the flow in the Syr Dar’ia

That

river basin).

state

withdrew 10 percent of basin

contributes about 3 percent of basin flow and consumes, at most,

Sufficiency of

A

key question

for

1995. Iran

in

totals 1

percent.

Renewable Water Resources

management of transnational water resources

Basin revolves around the sufficiency of the resource

to

in the Aral

meet demand.

Sea

On

an

average annual basis, an upper limit estimate of renewable water resources in the Aral

Sea Basin

km^-1 16 km^ from 17

km^

for

(this

groundwater not connected

There

is

least, a

1990s.

km

in

are available.

some

variation for

1990

to a

to river flow.

Water withdrawals ranged

low of 111

km

These withdrawal figures

them from one source

in 1995, the last year for

are, at best,

kmVyr

returned to river channels, albeit with degraded quality, and

depressions

A

in

large quantity of the

deserts

and

withdrawn flow evaporated

(16

is

also

good

estimates.

but they provide, at

to another,

portion of the flow withdrawn (around 24

dowstream.'^

around 133

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and

reasonable idea of the range of withdrawals during the

A

is

Amu

the flow in the basins of the

from a high of 126

which data

includes both national and transnational)

first

for is

1990-1994)

is

available for use

dumped

kmVyr

half of the

for

into closed

1990-1994).

146

%) (in

States

Basin

Sea

Aral

the

for

withdrawals

1995

vs.

Generation

Flow

Annual

Average

6.2.

Figure

Philip Micklin

8

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin It

also

147

potentially usable for irrigation purposes, although the salinity of

is

return flow

too high for

is

on an average annual (90-95 percent) of

this.

One

basis.

this

Thus,

total return

flows are probably near 40 km^

36-38 km^

authoritative source estimates that

potentially available for reuse.

is

some

Including these

reserves gives a total upper limit of 170 km^/yr for the usable water resources in the basin. This

suggest, at

is

first

significantly

glance, that there

now and

countries and users

The

situation

river

Amu

currently withdrawn and might

plenty of water to go around for

considerably more complicated.

is

bed,

riparian vegetation).

is

is

at least difficult

basin

evaporation from reservoirs,

These may run

to 16

km^

to

reduce

is

when they

are

from

flow years along the

uneven on an

when

of

(e.g., filtration

evapo-transpiration

in average

interannual basis. Thus, there are seasons and years

than usage and other seasons and years

First, there are losses

and costly

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia.^^ Second, river flow

the seasonal

all

for the foreseeable future.

flow that are unavoidable, or

from the

more water than

flows are

much

less.

intra-

and

much more

To maximize

and multiyear availability of water, large dams and reservoirs are

constructed to store water during high flow periods (spring and early summer)

and years for use during low flow periods of high demand

summer) and low flow However,

it

is

(late spring

1

years.

neither economically feasible nor environmentally wise to

totally regulate rivers, particularly those as large as the

Amu

Dar’ia and Syr

Dar’ia. Economically, the marginal cost of total or near total regulation

storing

would

all

or nearly

all

spring-early

summer flow

in

every year for

entail constructing costly additional storage capacity that

short periods.

and

Such an approach would also mean

(i.e.,

later release)

is filled

for only

that for substantial periods

during the high flow season, river beds below the dams would be dry or nearly dry for significant distances (to the next major tributary or next reservoir) with

extremely serious negative environmental and sanitary consequences.'^ Thus, not

all

the seasonal surplus flow,

years, can be stored for times

and especially the surplus flow

when flow

is

low and demand

is

in

high-water

high.

Seasonal and multiyear storage dams have been built on both rivers and their tributaries to increase

water resource availability during low flow periods.

The aggregate, usable storage capacity

km^ (17 The

in the basin

of the

Amu

in the entire Aral

Sea Basin

is

cited as

44

Dar’ia and 27 in the basin of the Syr Dar’ia).

largest storage facilities are the

Toktogul (gross capacity of 19.5 and usable

capacity of 14 km^) on the Syr Dar’ia and the Nurek (gross capacity of 10.5 and

Philip Micklin

148 o

useable capacity of 4.5

km

on

)

the Vakhsh, a tributary of the

Amu

Dar’ia.

21

Storage has allowed the increase of the ensured yield of water (a measure of the

flow that can be used) in a 90 percent flow year,^^ occurring, on average, once in ten years, to 52

km^ on

Amu

the

Dar’ia and to 27 km^ on the Syr Dar’ia for a

low flow years

total

of 79 km^. The amount of water that

fact,

most

state

of water resources in arid regions such as the Aral Sea Basin than the is

available in the

management.

crucial for water resource

average annual figure, which

is

It is

more

is,

in

indicative of the

overweighted by the high flow years,

much of

whose flow cannot be stored nor used. Examining water

availability in

low flow

years,

which usually occur

in

cycles in arid regions rather than being randomly distributed, the situation looks

much

less

sanguine than the average annual flow scenario presented above. If

km figure for a 90 percent flow year and subtract “unavoidable” losses of 16 km only 64 km remain as the usable resource. Assuming usable 3 3 return flows of 38 km and groundwater additions of 17 km would give a total available resource of 9 km This figure falls within the range of withdrawals (low of 1 1, high of 126 km for the period 1990-1995). But several caveats are in order. First, to reach the 119 km figure assumes two critical preconditions: we

take the 79

,

1 1

.

1

(1) storage

of nearly

all

spring high flows for later use, and (2) filling of the

multiyear reservoirs to capacity at the beginning of the dry period. Second,

use would need to be

made of usable groundwater and of return flows

not returned to rivers. In 1992, for example, estimates are that around 12 the former (71 percent)

Based on experience

were used, and only 6

km

(38 percent) of the

in the basin, these conditions are unlikely to

full

that are

km

of

latter.

be met

anytime in the foreseeable future. In reality, during

low flow years withdrawals from

the

Amu

Dar’ia and Syr

Dar’ia river systems in the downstream net-consuming countries of Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan

are,

return flows). Furthermore,

is

among

it

of necessity, substantially reduced (as are

these years that cause heightened tensions

the states of the basin as the downstreamers try to

maximize

their share

of water coming from the upstreamers (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). The former also apply pressure

on the

latter,

which

is

strongly resisted, to increase the

amount of water delivered downstream by reducing

more water from

reservoirs

on

their territory.

their

usage and releasing

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

149

The Aral Sea Besides the

Amu

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, the other key transnational water

resource in the Aral Sea Basin the great deserts

A

6.1).

from

its

i.e.,

Amu

on

mainly determine

it)

from 1911

term equilibrium with a than

to

this

water body’s

measure, plays an

Inflow and net evaporation each

lake level variation over this period of less

m. Only two of the seven Aral Sea Basin

1

amid

Hence, the water balance was in long-

to 1960.

maximum

difficult

is

insignificant role in the sea’s water balance.

km

sits

Dar'ia and Syr Dar’ia and net evaporation (evaporation

surface minus precipitation

averaged 56

This water body

without surface outflow, the balance between surface

Net groundwater exchange, which

level.

itself.

(Kara-Kum, Kyzyl-Kum, Betpakdala) of Central Asia (Figure

terminal lake,

inflow from the

the Aral Sea

is

states are riparian

on the Aral

Sea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with each having an approximately equal

length of shoreline.

The

entire Aral coastline within

Uzbekistan

lies

within that

nation’s Karakalpakstan Republic.

At nearly 67,000 km“, fourth-largest inland water

was the world's

the Aral Sea, according to area,

body

in

1960.^^

As

a brackish lake with salinity

averaging near 10 grams/liter, less than a third that of the ocean, chiefly as a

by freshwater

species.

The

key regional transportation

Amu

agriculture,

was inhabited

sea supported a major fishery and functioned

route.

The extensive

deltas of the Syr Dar'ia

Dar'ia sustained a diversity of flora and fauna.

irrigated

it

They

and

supported

also

animal husbandry, hunting and trapping, fishing, and

harvesting of reeds. Over the past four decades the sea has steadily shrunk and salinized (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.1). irrigation that

diminished inflow from the

—

divided into two water bodies in 1987

The main cause has been expanding

Amu

Dar'ia and Syr Dar'ia.

The Aral

the Small Aral Sea in the north

and the

Large Aral Sea in the south. The Syr Dar'ia flows into the former, and the Dar’ia into the lakes.

latter.

A

Amu

channel (river) has intermittently connected the two

Between 1960 and 1998,

the level of the Small Aral fell 13

m

and the

Large Aral 18 m. The area of both seas taken together diminished more than 50 percent and the volume nearly 80 percent. Salinity in the small sea rose around

300 percent and

in the large sea nearly

450

percent.

The anthropogenically caused desiccation of

the Aral Sea has had severe

negative impacts. However, these have not affected the basin states equally.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,

as

the

shoreline

riparians,

have

been

most

150

Philip Micklin

impacted. Turkmenistan, although not abutting on the sea, has the

Amu

Dar’ia delta that

is

close

enough

to

is

territory.

may

Three

the territory suffering

a small part of each nation’s area and contains a minor

portion of each country’s population.

impacted area

For the three

cover, at most, 400,000

to four million

km

,

people out of a

states

percent of their aggregate

total

population of 44 million

1

than 10 percent) live here.

Figure

6.3.

combined, the

1

or

'^‘7

(less

territory in

have suffered substantial damage.

Even within Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, substantial impacts

some

The Shrinking Aral Sea

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin Table

6.1.

151

Hydrographic and Hydrologic Characteristics of the Shrinking Aral Sea

Level

Area

%of

Volume

%of

Salinity

%of

(meters)

(kmb

1960

(km^)

1960

(g/i)

1960

53.4

66,900

100

1090

100

9.9

100

Large Sea

53.4

60,541

100

1003

100

Small Sea

53.4

6,359

100

87

100

1971

51.1

60,200

90

925

85

11.2

113

1976

48.3

55,700

83

763

70

14

141

39,734

59

364

33

Year (January

1)

1960

1989 Large Sea

39.1

36,930

61

341

34

30

303

Small Sea

40.2

2,804

44

23

26

30

303

35,271

53

294

27

1993

Large Sea

37.1

32,301

53

270

27

~35

353

Small Sea

40.8

2,970

48

24

28

~25

252

30,758

46

236

22

1998 Large Sea

35.2

27,996

46

214

21

~45

454

Small Sea

40.0

2,762

43

22

25

~30

303

23,880

36

164

15

2010 Large Sea

31.6

19,880

33

126

13

>60

606

Small Sea

45.0

4,000

63

38

44

~15

151

Values from 1960

from in

S.

1998 are derived from Soviet

data, data

from Glavgidromet of Uzbekistan; data

Shivareva, E. Ponenkova, and B. Smerdov; “Modeling the level of the Aral Sea,” pp. 5-10,

Problems of the Aral Sea Basin, research, projects, and recommendations (Tashkent, “Chinor”

ENK

1998)

(in

assumptions; 4.5

km^

km^

for

for

for

(1

m/yr.

for

)

2010

are

calculated

from the water balance model

with

the

following

average annual flow of Syr Dar’ia to Small Aral of 3.5 km^ for 1998 and 1999 and

2000-2010,

1999-2010,

2006-2010,

m/yr

Russian); and calculations from an annualized water balance model developed by the

Values

author.

8

to

(2) average annual

(3) flow

(4) evaporation

(5) precipitation

from Small

flow of to

Amu

Dar’ia to Large Aral of 20

km^

in

1998 and

Large Aral of 0 km^ for 1998-2005 and of 1.65 km^

from the Small Aral of 0.960 m/yr and from the Large Aral of 0.966

on the surface of the Large Aral of

0.1 81

m/yr and on the Small Aral of 0.198

Philip Micklin

152 Furthermore,

administrative

the

regions

suffering

the

most

(the

Karakalpakstan Republic in Uzbekistan, Kzyl-Orda Oblast in Kazakhstan, and

Dashauz Oblast

Turkmenistan) are politically impotent and do not have

in

influence at the national level. Thus, officials in

Akmola), the capital of Kazakhstan, and

Almaty

in Tashkent, capital

moved

(recently

of Uzbekistan

to

(less

so in Ashgabat, capital of Turkmenistan), give lip service to the Aral desiccation

and associated consequences as being a regional, and even global, catastrophe of major proportions. This has been a winning strategy international aid.

On

own

the other hand, their

to

efforts

attract

substantial

and expenditures on

solving the worst problems here have not matched their rhetoric precisely

because the “crisis” zone

is

and

localized, has a relatively small population,

lacks political clout.

The

other states of the basin (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran)

are so distant

from the zone where intense

suffered no demonstrable

harm from

to

overcome or

much

The

pushing the

why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have

states

of the basin

alleviate the worst problems,

less interest

Iran have

in

to

undertake measures

whereas Turkmenistan has shown

and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan even

less.

had no formal involvement whatsoever with Aral Sea substantial

Uzbekistan in the

have

the drying of the sea. These “geographic”

considerations are key to understanding

been the motive forces

effects are apparent that they

Afghanistan and issues.

Aral fishing industries developed by Kazakhstan and

first

half of the twentieth century ended in 1983 as the

indigenous fish (twenty species), which provided the basis for the commercial

disappeared from the effects of rising salinity and loss of shallow

fishery,

spawning and feeding

areas.

It

should be noted, however, that

indigenous fish survive in the deltaic lakes and rivers,

except for the Aral salmon that has

tolerant

fishes

(four

species)

Amu

become

all

of the

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia

extinct. Introduced, salt-

have survived and some even flourished as

competition from native species for food disappeared, but even these will

probably vanish,

from

at least in the

rising salinity.

Large Aral Sea, by the early twenty-first century,

Several edible species remain, such as the Black Sea

flounder, sprat, and smelt, but are not caught commercially.

Because of the

loss

of the fishery tens of thousands were thrown out of work. Navigation on the Aral also ceased as they abandoned efforts to keep the increasingly long channels open to the major ports of Aral’sk

Kazakhstan and Muinak

at the

at the

northern end of the sea in

southern end in Uzbekistan (Karakalpakstan).

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

As

indicated above, the zone of significant

and

the sea

immediate shoreline.

its

around the sea (including

all

An

damage

153

stretches well

beyond

approximately 400,000-km^ region

of the Karakalpakstan Republic and Khorezem

Oblast in Uzbekistan, Dashauz Oblast in Turkmenistan, and the western half of

Kzyl-Orda and the southeastern portion of Aktiubinsk Oblast

in Kazakhstan),

with a population of nearly four million, has been substantially affected. This region

is

commonly designated

the “ecological disaster zone” (Russian: zona

ekologicheskogo bedstviia).

Damage

Amu

has been particularly severe to the rich ecosystems of the extensive

Dar'ia delta, primarily located in the Karakalpak Republic of Uzbekistan

but stretching into Dashauz Oblast of Turkmenistan.

The Syr

Dar'ia delta in

Kzyl-Orda Oblast of Kazakhstan has also suffered. Desertification and intensifying and

soils

in both.

dry

is

spreading

Halophytes and xerophytes (plants tolerant of saline

conditions)

replacing

rapidly

are

endemic

vegetation

communities.

Expanses of unique tugai (vegetation communities of

bushes, and

grasses, including poplar, willow, oleaster, salt cedar,

tall

that formerly stretched along all the

have been particularly hard 100,000 ha in the

1970s and

to

Amu

hit.

main

According

rivers to

trees,

and reeds)

and distributary channels here

one expert, whereas tugai covered

Dar’ia delta in 1950,

it

had shrunk

only 15,000-20,000 ha by the mid-1990s.

52,000 ha by the

to

Tugai complexes

around the Aral Sea are habitats for a diversity of animals, including sixty species of varieties

mammals, more than

of amphibians.

three hundred types

of birds, and twenty

32

Desiccation of the deltas has significantly diminished the area of lakes, wetlands, and their associated reed communities. area of reeds in the

Amu

Between 1965 and 1986,

the

Dar’ia delta decreased from 500,000 ha to 1,000 ha.

33

This has been of serious ecological consequence as lakes, wetlands, and their associated reed communities provide prime habitat for a variety of permanent

and migratory waterfowl, a number of which are endangered. the

Diminution of

aggregate water surface area coupled with increasing pollution of the

remaining water bodies (primarily from irrigation runoff containing fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides,

salts,

and cotton defoliants) has decimated aquatic

bird populations. Irrigated agriculture in the deltas of the

Amu

Dar'ia and Syr Dar'ia has

suffered from an inadequacy of water as inflow to the deltas has decreased

owing

to

heavy upstream consumptive use

for irrigation. Additionally, water

Philip Micklin

154

that

does reach the deltas has elevated salinity from the leaching of

by repeated usage

in the

middle and upper courses of the

salts

caused

At times over

rivers.

2 grams/liter, these saline flows have lowered crop yields and, in conjunction

inadequate

with

salinization.

the

of

drainage

irrigated

Animal husbandry, both

promoted

fields,

in the deltas

secondary

soil

and desert regions adjacent

to

Aral Sea, has been damaged by reduction of the area and declining

productivity of pastures resulting from desertification, dropping groundwater levels,

and replacement of natural vegetation suitable

species.

For example, in the

from 350,000 ha

in the

the remaining pastures

Amu Dar’ia

1950s

to

delta, the area

125,000 by the

was halved.

over 36,000

km

now

salt,

and dust from the dried

largely a barren, salt-covered desert with an area is

they are transported great distances. Since the mid-1970s,

shown and

the

major

salt/dust

salt to settle

while productivity of

36

onto adjacent lands. The major problem

,

inedible

of natural pastures went

late 1980s,

Frequent strong winds are blowing sand,

bottom of the Aral Sea,

by

for grazing

and

the dust

salt,

as

images have

satellite

plumes extending 200 and even 400 km, causing dust

over a considerable area adjacent to the sea in Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, and to a lesser degree, in Turkmenistan.^^ Around 60 percent of the storms occur with north and northeast winds, carrying the dust and Ust-Iurt Plateau to the sea’s west the water body.

The

latter is the

and the

Amu

most densely

from 13 million

to as

over the

Dar’ia delta at the south end of settled as well as

and ecologically important region around the deflated material run

salt

economically

Estimates of the total

sea.

high as 231 million metric tons/yr,

with the most probable value between 15 and 150 million tons.^^ The entrained salts are

believed to constitute only

salt transferred,

a careful study

even

at the

1

percent of the

total,

so that the tonnage of

higher figure, would be 1.5 million

by well-known

geologists and experts

1980s concluded annual aeolian transport of

salt

tons."^^

However,

on the Aral from

the

mid-

alone from the dried bottom

was around 43 million metric tons but would decrease

39 million

slightly to

metric tons by 2000.^^^

Whatever the

true tonnage, considerable

amounts of salts

and aerosol

in dry

forms, the most harmful of which include sodium bicarbonate, sodium chloride,

and sodium

sulfate, are settling

plants are killed outright, but

on natural vegetation and

more commonly

yields) are substantially reduced.

The

salt

their

crops.'^^

In

some

cases,

growth (and for crops,

and dust also has

ill

effects

and domestic animals by directly harming them and by reducing

on wild

their

food

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin supply.'^^

Local health experts also consider airborne

155

and dust a factor

salt

contributing to high levels of respiratory illness and impairment, eye problems,

and possibly even throat and esophageal cancer

Owing

Summers have warmed and humidity

is

more

100

to

km

regimes.

winters cooled, spring frosts are later and

fall frosts

lower, and the growing season shorter.

The growing season

in the northern part

a switch

Amu

of the

from

Dar’ia

crop to

this

rice.

living in the “ecological disaster zone” suffers acute health

Some of these

problems.

and

continental

and become too short for cotton, forcing

The population

band up

deseritic

by an average of ten days

has decreased

in a

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan/^ Maritime

in

conditions have been replaced by

delta

changed

to the sea’s shrinkage, climate has

wide along the former shoreline

earlier,

in the near Aral region/"^

are direct consequences of the sea’s recession (e.g.,

respiratory and digestive afflictions and possibly cancer

from inhalation and

ingestion of blowing salt and dust and poorer diets from the loss of Aral fish as a

major food source). Other serious health-related problems owe pollution

associated

agriculture. to

with

the

heavy use of toxic chemicals

However, probably the most serious health

“Third World” medical,

health,

high

rates

Tuberculosis

is

of typhoid,

prevalent as

is

paratyphoid,

is

issues are directly related

pervasive and has led to

and

hepatitis,

viral

dysentery.

anemia, particularly in pregnant woman. Liver

and kidney ailments are widespread. Medical care variety,

irrigated

in

and hygienic conditions and

nutrition,

practices. Bacterial contamination of drinking water

very

environmental

to

and adequate sewage systems are

rare.

is

Owing

very poor, diets lack

to these factors, general

mortality and morbidity and infant mortality and morbidity are the highest

among the

the

new

states that

formerly were part of the

Karakalpak Republic in Uzbekistan appear

to

USSR. Health

be the worst

Basin with reports of infant mortality rates of 100/1,000

some

districts.

These

in the

former

percent), alleviation of the problems

USSR

States.

Although the severe impacts of the drying of the Aral are relatively small portion of the basin

Aral Sea

live births reported for

rates are four times the national level in the

and more than ten times that of the United

conditions in

(some 400,000

km

felt

over a

out of 1.8 million, or 22

must involve the management of water over

the entire Aral Basin. Particularly important are the areas of greatest irrigation is

here that so

withdrawn

for irrigation

water usage in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

much of the flow of the

Amu

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia

and consumptively used which has led

is

It

to the great reduction in discharge.

48

Philip Micklin

156

from 1911

If

to 1960, discharge to the sea

Dar’ia averaged 56 kmVyr, by the 1980s,

it

Amu

from the

had

fallen to 6

Dar’ia and Syr

km^/^ The

early

Amu Dar’ia and Syr km /yr, but this was a

1990s (1990-1994) saw a cycle of heavy flow years on the

which increased average inflow

Dar’ia,

to the sea to 15

temporary phenomenon (1995, 1996, and 1997 were low flow years, and 1998 a high flow year). Hydrologic probability indicates basin river flow over the longer term will be substantially less than during the

decade, although likely above what

Amu average), A

the flow of the

term

it

was

conservative

be on the order of 1 0

km

is

assuming

that average annual inflow to the sea

larger decrease in

it

was

three decades ago

by some 45

km

upstream withdrawals

.

14 percent (based on the figures cited above of 16

would require

This would necessitate

compensate

to

km

for natural

Assuming

losses of the net additions to flow before they reached the sea. at

years,

.

increasing average discharge to the sea

somewhat

many of these

assumption,

reasonable

but

Thus, to restore the Aral to what

a

1980s (for

part of the present

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia was significantly below the long-

continuation of recent basin withdrawals, will

in the

first

natural losses

these

from an

average annual basin flow of 116 km^), then an additional 6 km^ reduction

would be necessary

for a total of

upstream use (amounting

to

around 50

km

.

That such a reduction of

km )

45 percent of 1995 withdrawals of 111

could

be attained in the foreseeable future without causing economic and social havoc for the countries of the basin that are the

major users of water for irrigation

seems remote. To even stop the sea’s further shrinkage would require an increase in inflow to around 25

long-term

figure

under present conditions)

upstream withdrawals of 15 Indeed, the

Amu

being hand,

many

km

,

half times the estimated

and necessitate

reductions

in

or 14 percent of the 1995 level.

experts (including this author) hold that additional water from

Dar’ia should be used to rehabilitate the deltaic ecosystems rather than

dumped it

km^ (some two and one

may

into the

On

Large Aral Sea to uselessly evaporate.

the other

reasonably be argued that supplementary flow from the Syr Dar’ia

should be used to raise the level of the

which could be accomplished with the differing approach

is

now

separated small northern Aral Sea,

relatively

modest

additions.^*

based on several considerations. To even

Large Aral Sea would require increases in the flow of the

Amu

simply unattainable in the near or even mid-term future. Even

The

logic of

stabilize the

Dar’ia that are

if the

Large Aral

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin Sea could be stabilized

at its

significant ecological or

economic value.

The opposite

much

is

present level,

true for the

its

157

salinity is so high that

Small Aral Sea (Table

6.1).

smaller than the Large Aral Sea, an inflow of 4.5

Because

it

its

has no

area

is

km^ on an average

annual basis (for 1990-1997 the corresponding figure was 4.2 km^) could within five years raise

its

m mark was reached,

m and expand the

45

level to

area to 4,000

km^ Once

the 45

could be maintained with an inflow of 2.85

km\

allowing 1.65 km^ of more saline water in the western part of the sea to

spill

this level

over to the Large Aral, enhancing the pace of freshening of the sea and creating habitat conditions over the entire Small Aral for the return of indigenous fishes

from the Syr Dar’ia with the concomitant restoration of a commercial

The

local

Kazakh

authorities (of Aral’sk

Raion

in

fishery.

Kzyl-Ordinsk Oblast) in

the early 1990s constructed a crude dike to block the channel (river) that

formed between the two periodically

However,

dam

this

that raised water levels 3

project to fund construction of a

dike, along with construction

more

in

the

ensuing

years

makeshift dike with a 20-

m by early

1999.

A

World

technically sophisticated and stable

of a control gate and channel from the western part

of the small sea to the large sea,

dam was

dike

the

washed away. In 1997, they replaced

km-long, 26-m-wide

Bank

seas.

had

is

to

be implemented in the near

term.^"^

The

“overtopped” by wave and wind-running action in April 1999 and

breached with a significant loss of water.^^

When the

the critical situation of the Aral Sea

amounts of water needed

to

is

taken into consideration and

begin to improve conditions are added

existing water uses discussed earlier,

it

is

to the

manifestly clear that the Aral Sea

Basin’s water resources are stretched to the limit and beyond. Thus, even during the high flow period of the early 1990s, after upstream withdrawals, there

was

insufficient inflow to the Aral to stop the sea’s recession. In dry years such as

occurred during the

1980s, practically no

water reached the sea and the

desiccation proceeded alarmingly rapidly.

Irrigation

The key

to

improving management of the Aral Sea Basin’s water resources

(including provision of substantial additional quantities of water for the Aral

Amu Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and expanding economic uses) agriculture. A recent World Bank report cites the irrigated area in the

Sea, the deltas of the is

irrigated

Philip Micklin

158

basin in 1995 (excluding Afghanistan and Iran)

Uzbekistan,

at

54

percent,

has

majority

the

7.94 million ha (Table 6.2).

at

of the

Turkmenistan (22 percent) a distant second. Irrigation

is,

irrigated

far

with

area

and away, the chief

source of water withdrawals in the basin, accounting for 92 percent of the 100

km^

total in that

percent,

trailed

same year (Table by Turkmenistan

consumptive user of water,

i.e.,

6.3). at

Uzbekistan again leads the pack percent.

22

much of

Irrigation

the water that

is

is

a

it

is

53

heavily

withdrawn

returned to the source (river or groundwater) from which

at

is

not

taken but

evaporates from fields, transpires from crops, or runs off into desert depressions.

Taking

this into consideration, irrigation’s contribution in

use to the diminution of basin water resources

is

terms of consumptive

greater than

its

92 percent share

of withdrawals implies.

Table

6.2. Irrigated

Areas

in the

Amu Dar’ia % Country

Basin

Aral Sea Basin in 1995 (million ha)

Syr Dar’ia

%

Aral Sea Basin

%

Basin

Uzbekistan

2.48

53

1.80

55

4.28

54

Turkmenistan

1.74

37

0.00

0

1.74

22

Tajikistan

0.43

9

0.29

9

0.72

9

Kazakhstan

0.00

0

0.74

22

0.74

9

Kyrgyzstan

0.00

0

0.46

14

0.46

6

Total

4.65

100

3.29

100

7.94

100

Source: Adapted from World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Table

and

Iran.

2.

Excludes Afghanistan

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin Table

6.3.

Water Withdrawals Aral Sea Basin

159

for Irrigation in the

1995 (km^)

in

Amu

Syr

Aral

Dar’ia

Dar’ia

Sea

Basin

Basin

Basin

Basin

(m^/ha)

withdrawals

Uzbekistan

33.2

19.8

53.0

53.0

12,383

58.0

91

Turkmenistan

22.4

0.0

22.4

22.4

12,874

23.1

97

Tajikistan

7.0

3.3

10.3

10.3

14,306

12.0

86

Kazakhstan

0.0

9.7

9.7

9.7

13,108

11.0

88

Kyrgyzstan

0.0

4.6

4.6

4.6

10,000

5.1

90

62.6

37.4

100.0

100.0

12,594

109.2

92

Country

Total

%of

Specific

Aral Sea withdrawal

Source: Adapted from World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Table

and

2.

Total basin

Irrigation

water

% of total

Excludes Afghanistan

Iran.

Substantial savings of water are possible in the irrigation sector through

contraction of the irrigated area, improvements in iiTigation efficiency, and

switching from higher to lower water use crops. The irrigated area in the Aral

Sea Basin was 7.25 million ha percent increase.

in 1990.^^

It

rose to 7.94 million ha in 1995, a 9.5

All the basin states except Kazakhstan plan further near-term

increases in the irrigated area:

Kyrgyzstan by over 400,000

between 40,000 and 140,000

Turkmenistan by 600,000 ha, and Uzbekistan

from 420,000 increases

is

to

the

ha,

over 600,000 ha.^^

need

to

A common

ha,

argument used

expand food production

to

Tajikistan

to justify the

meet population growth.

Hence, the likelihood of significant water savings from reductions irrigated area appears

dim

in

for the foreseeable future.

Substantial water savings in irrigation, therefore, most probably must

through

improvements

in

efficiency

efficiency entails determining the

mix.

The

in a

and

replacement

of

highly

varieties. Arriving at savings

consumptive crops with lower-use

withdrawn

the

minimum amount

come

water-

from raised

of water that needs

to

be

given area for optimal (or near optimal) growth of a specific crop

difference

between

this

represents potential gross savings.

figure

and what

is

actually

However, the net additions

withdrawn

to usable

water

resources would be less as corrections are necessary to take account of reduced

Philip Micklin

160

“minimum”

drainage water return flows to rivers. Calculating the Soviet terminology availability

still

used in Central Asia)

is

not easy as

of detailed and accurate data on climate,

it

(or

“norm”

in

depends on the

and crops

soil conditions,

at

a scale sufficiently large to reflect the regional variability in the Aral Sea Basin as well as calculating the

system.

An

minimum

minimum

obtainable losses in the irrigation delivery

authoritative figure cited at the

end of the Soviet period

average field application rate obtainable was 8,500

m /ha.

the average losses in the delivery canals could be lowered to

meaning

that

80 percent of the water would reach delivery points

the overall withdrawal

would be 10,600 m^/ha. Subtracting

basin- wide withdrawal for 1995 of 12,594

m /ha

Assuming 20 percent,

to the fields,

this figure

from

the

indicates possible savings of

m /ha. This would translate into a basin-wide reduction of 15.8 km /yr. Net

1994

savings (corrected for reductions in return flows to rivers)

Assuming

would be

would be reduced by

withdrawals (15.8 percent), net savings would equal 12

the

to the

the countries of the region in the mid-1990s,

first

same percentage

km /yr.

The gross

within the range of estimated feasible water savings (12.7 to 18.3

made by

less.

return flows to rivers at 24 percent of withdrawals, typical for the

half of the 1990s, and that they

falls

for the

and the net figure

is

as

figure

km) close

lower end of the range.

The savings noted above

are mainly based

on introduction of

traditional

technologies for reducing irrigation water usage through lining canals, leveling fields,

and applying water

with newer methods

more

to crops

carefully.

Combining these techniques

replacing furrow irrigation, which occupies

(e.g., partially

70 percent of the irrigated area, with drip and subsoil

irrigation; introduction

of

scheduling computers and specialized software; real-time monitoring of soil

moisture and crop water needs; genetic engineering of crops to lower water requirements; precision farming using satellite imagery and GPSs) could lead to substantially greater savings.

Thus

Israel,

with similar climatic conditions to the

Aral Sea Basin, but technologically sophisticated irrigation practices, has an

average withdrawal of 5,590

m /ha.

the Aral Sea Basin because of the

canals and the different crop mix.

Such

much

a figure

is

probably out of reach in

longer length of water-losing delivery

However,

if

average water withdrawals could

be lowered to 8,000 m^/ha, as Victor Dukhovnyi, a leading Central Asian irrigation expert,

proposed in 1985, gross savings of 36.5 km^ and net savings of

27.7 km^ would accrue.

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

161

Savings from efficiency improvements could well be significantly larger than indicated above. Evidence suggests that the official figures provided by the basin states for their irrigation withdrawals are underestimated.^^ The system of

measuring deliveries farms),

inadequate

Frequently, what

is

to “cooperative” users (the

during

Soviet

(because measuring equipment

is

has

times,

reported as farm usage

former collective and

is

significantly

state

deteriorated.

not based on actual measurement

absent or not working) but

is

an educated

guess derived from the established water use norms (standards) for the region

and farm crop mix

what

is

actually used).

developed

represents what should be delivered to the farm, not

(i.e., it

in the Aral

Usage by

the variety of “private” farming types that have

Sea Basin countries since independence

is

even more of a

mystery. In the majority of instances, no organized system exists to measure withdrawals.

their

exaggerated as

it

It

is

also

area irrigated in any given year

likely the

is

represents the area with completed irrigation facilities but

is

not adequately reduced for those systems that are under repair, not working, or

have been removed from production salinization or lack of water).

The farms and

to overreport the area irrigated

them look

example, because of excessive

(for

states,

of course, have an incentive

and underreport water withdrawals as

better in terms of efficiency,

i.e.,

soil

makes

it

water use per hectare.

Implementation of a large-scale program for technical improvement of irrigation in the Aral

Sea Basin would be a gigantic undertaking and require

a

long period for implementation. For the basin as a whole in 1994, the length of

main and interfarm

irrigation channels

of these were lined to reduce

farm canals: over 268,000

was around 48,000 km; only 28 percent

filtration.

km with 21

main and interfarm canals need

The

situation

was even worse

for on-

km of

percent lined. In Uzbekistan 10,000

lining,

and nearly 2 million ha with older

irrigation systems, nearly one-half the irrigated area,

need reconstruction.^^

Fifty percent of irrigated lands in the basin suffers

from

salinity,

which

is

probably the most serious problem faced by irrigated agriculture.^^ In a 1989 survey of salinized lands, 53 percent were considered slightly salinized, 32 percent moderately salinized, and 13 percent strongly salinized. Large areas of irrigated lands also suffer

from high water

tables as a result of the lack of

drainage facilities or ones that are inadequate or not working properly.

major

irrigation zones, only the

adequate drainage

facilities.

Of

the

Golodnaia steppe and Khorezm oasis have

In general, groundwater levels are rising nearly

everywhere, exacerbating waterlogging and

soil

salinization. Disposal

of the

Philip Micklin

162

huge volumes of salinized and polluted (with agricultural chemicals and fertilizers) irrigation

drainage water

these discharges reached 43 the land that

now

km

irrigated

is

is

growing problem. The volume of

also a

annually by the mid-1990s.

by pumped

irrigation

A

large part of

needs to be converted to

gravitational delivery.

Uzbekistan experts have estimated the rehabilitation costs for the older systems in the basin. According to one calculation, the introduction of

irrigation

drip irrigation

would cost

$5, 000-7, 000/ha and the general raising of system

A

$3,000^,000/ha.^^

efficiency

World

Bank-sponsored

study

indicates

renovation of irrigation and drainage systems could run to $3,000/ha.^^ This

document

also estimates that 5.4 million (68 percent) of the 7.94 million ha of

irrigated lands in billion.

this

would cost $16

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with the largest areas under irrigation and

the largest share the

1995 need reconstruction. At $3, 000/ha,

bill.

It

is

collectively,

of the systems needing reconstruction, would bear the brunt of

extremely doubtful that the states of the basin, individually or

have the funds now, or will in the near or mid-term

future, to

fund

so costly a project. Furthermore, the condition of irrigation systems in the basin

has deteriorated since independence as funds for maintenance and repair have

plummeted; responsibility for system maintenance has or been

dumped on farm

fallen

between the cracks

units that are incapable or unwilling to conduct the

necessary work; and the supply of replacement parts and equipment that

formerly came from other republics of the

USSR

has dried up. Thus, overall

rehabilitation costs are steadily rising with time.

One

disturbing result of the deteriorating condition of irrigated lands in the

Aral Sea Basin (plus other factors such as poor seed quality, a sharp drop in

usage of

fertilizers

and

pesticides, poorly timed agricultural operations,

and

ill-

timed harvests) has been a steady decline in yields of most major irrigated crops, especially in Kazakhstan fell

19

percent

in

and

From 1990

Tajikistan.^^

Uzbekistan,

37 percent

in

to

1994 yields of cereals

Kazakhstan,

23 percent in

Turkmenistan, 50 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 59 percent in Tajikistan. Cotton yields declined 7 percent in Uzbekistan, 3

1

percent in Kazakhstan, 2 percent in

Turkmenistan, 24 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 31 percent in Tajikistan. Vegetable yields rose

by 23 percent

in

Turkmenistan, held steady in Uzbekistan, but

between 33 percent and 68 percent

fell

for the other states.

Switching the crop mix from high water-use crops (rice and cotton) toward

lower (grains, vegetables, melons,

fruits,

and soybeans) could be a relatively

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin low-cost

means

rehabilitation.

of reducing

water

use

compared

massive

to

the reason irrigation water withdrawals

In fact,

163

technical the basin

in

remained essentially the same (around 100 km^) between 1990 and 1995 while the irrigated hectarage substitution.^*

wheat).

was growing nearly 10 percent can be

The primary switch was from cotton

From 1990

grains increased

attributed to crop

(mainly winter

to grains

1994, the percent of the total cropped area devoted to

to

from 12 percent

to

26 percent, whereas cotton shrank from 40 "70

The purpose of

percent (or perhaps 45 percent) to 37 percent.

however, was not so bases. Uzbekistan

much water

made

these changes,

savings but strengthening of the national food

the largest absolute substitution of grain for cotton and

Turkmenistan the largest percentage switch. states will replace further large areas

It is

unlikely grains in these two

of cotton in the near future, as cotton

is

an

important foreign-currency-eaming export crop for both.

Adoption of governmental policies promoting

irrigation

water pricing,

privatization of land, and giving rights of self-governance and responsibility for

management of on-farm and

inter-farm irrigation systems to farmer-irrigators

could encourage introduction of water saving practices in the Aral Sea Basin

governmental expenditures.

massive

without

particularly

Kyrgyzstan have

taken

some

Kazakhstan,

serious

steps

Tajikistan,

in

and

direction.

this

Uzbekistan has talked about these subjects but made only feeble moves toward

implementing meaningful policies. Turkmenistan has done practically nothing.

Among

the

key problems hindering further advancements along these

lines are

governmental resistance based on fear of losing social and economic control, opposition from the officials, fear

former collective (now cooperative)

of land speculation and exacerbating rural underemployment and

unemployment, lack of means impoverished

state

to

measure water deliveries

to farmers,

and the

of the farming economy.

Small-scale, locally

Asia prior to Soviet fields

and local

fanns

managed

rule.^"*

irrigation systems

were

common

in Central

These systems employed small, carefully leveled

surrounded by low earthen walls planted with trees

to effectively control

water use and prevent secondary salinization. Although the technology of these

systems was “primitive,” water usage was surprisingly low: net field-side irrigation

norms were 8,000 mVha and gross withdrawals (including

losses in

delivery canals of 30 percent) ranged from 10,700-11,500 m^/ha. During the

1920s and afterward, these

by much

larger,

facilities

were completely obliterated and replaced

supposedly technically advanced systems. However, the new

164

Philip Micklin

systems proved to be more water consumptive, less resistant to secondary salinization,

and more unstable than what they replaced.

The major burden it

for reducing irrigation usage

must

rest

on Uzbekistan

as

has the majority of the irrigated area and irrigation withdrawals in the Aral Sea

Basin. Turkmenistan,

and withdrawals

which accounts

in

the

Amu

contributions to water savings. (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,

for a significant share of the irrigated area

Dar’ia

The remaining

and Kyrgyzstan)

basin and withdraw considerably less

although not insignificant, would be

could

basin,

states that

irrigate

water.

much

much

by

make

technical

substantial

were part of the

USSR

smaller portions of the

However, Tajikistan and

smaller.

higher than the other states, so they could

make

Their possible contributions,

Kazakhstan (see Table 6.3) have specific water use

addition to savings, the former

also

rates in irrigation that are

a disproportionately large

improvement and the

latter

by

significantly reducing production of rice, a very water-consumptive crop, along the lower reaches

withdraw very is nil.

its

in the delta of the

from the basin;

may change

This

increase

little

and

their possible contribution to

in the future for Afghanistan as

withdrawals from the

Institutional Structures for

How to improve

Syr Dar’ia. Afghanistan and Iran

irrigation to

it

water savings

could substantially

Amu Dar’ia.

Managing Transnational Water Resources

make more

efficient use

of basin water resources

is

not the only serious problem that confronts the Central Asian states. Equally serious are the issue of equitable sharing of water resources riparians (Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan) and the lower riparians (Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan), contention over

on

the

Amu

between the upper

how

the

main upstream dams

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia should be operated (for hydropower

production or for irrigation), and the interstate response to the Aral Sea

The former Aral Sea Basin republics of

the Soviet

Union

crisis.

realized in late

1991, as independence approached, that they needed to establish institutional

mechanisms resources.

to

The

enhance cooperation first

in the

management of

major step was the signing

in

interstate

water

February 1992 of an

agreement on the joint management and protection of interstate water resources.

The agreement created

the Interstate Coordinating

for overseeing regulation, efficient use,

and bodies.

Water Commission (ICWC)^^

and protection of interstate watercourses

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin The commission

is

composed of

the heads of the

165

main water management

organizations in each republic or their designate (Water Resources Committee in

Kazakhstan, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management for Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan, Ministry of Reclamation and Water

Management

and Tajikistan).

to discuss

It

meets several times each year

water management policy issues.

It

Aral Sea and

to the

deltas based

its

Turkmenistan

and decide

interstate

also sets (and if necessary later adjusts) the

among

hydrologic year (October to October) allocation of water

and

for

on forecasts of water

by the hydrological and meteorological agencies

in

the republics

availability

made

each country. The allocation

scheme, basically, was a continuation of the system codified

in

1984 and 1987

under the Ministry of Water Management of the former USSR. Determination of operating regimes for the reservoirs along the interstate rivers was also placed

on

the

ICWC.

Inter-republic water

the commission, with help

from

management

disputes are to be decided

a neutral arbitrator,

if

needed. The

by

ICWC

consists of a Secretariat (in Hojent, Tajikistan), Scientific Information Center (in

Tashkent, Uzbekistan), and the basin management authorities

Basseinovoe

vodokhoziaistvennoe

Tashkent) and established

by

Amu Dar’ia the USSR in

(in

ob’edinennoe)

(BVOs) Syr

Dar’ia

BVOs

were

the

for

Urgench, Uzbekistan). The

first

ICWC

to

states.

The

ICWC

makes annual withdrawal

allocations based

water availability for the ensuing hydrologic year. Corrections the regular quarterly meetings or at specially

was

(in

1986.^^ Since independence, they are the bodies

charged with managing and monitoring the allocations made by the

member

(Russian:

the case

irrigation

allocations

interests

for the

of the downstream riparian

1996-1997 hydrologic

may

be made

at

convened sessions of this body. As

under the Soviets, the water-sharing scheme

and the

on estimates of

year.

is

heavily tilted toward

states.

Table 6.4 shows

The two leading

irrigators,

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, were assigned 38 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of the total, with each to receive 36 percent of the flow of the Dar’ia, and Uzbekistan to get an additional

discharge.

Syr Dar’ia.

The

ICWC

Amu

42 percent of the Syr Dar’ia’s

allocated Kazakhstan 30 percent of withdrawals from the

Philip Micklin

166

Table

6.4.

Water Withdrawal Allocations Made by

for the 1996-1997 Hydrologic

Country

%

Syr Dar’ia

Year

(in

ICWC

km^)

%

Amu Dar’ia

Basin

the

%

Aral Sea

Basin

Basin

Tajikistan

1.65

7.4

7.90

12.9

9.55

11.4

Kyrgyzstan

0.18

0.8

0.15

0.2

0.33

0.4

Turkmenistan

0.00

0.0

22.00

35.9

22.00

26.3

Uzbekistan

9.46

42.1

22.00

35.9

31.46

37.5

Kazakhstan

6.72

29.9

0.00

0.0

6.72

8.0

Aral Sea region

4.43

19.7

9.30

15.2

13.73

16.4

22.43

100.0

61.35

100.0

83.78

100.0

Total

Source: Compiled from data in Scientific Information Center of the Interstate Coordinating Water Management Commission of Central Asia, Bulletin 14, p. 22 (in Russian).

The upstream-flow-generating

were given the

states

allocated 11 percent: 7 percent of the withdrawals

Amu

from the

percent

representing less than

percent from the

1

Dar’ia.

from the Syr Dar’ia and 13

Kyrgyzstan was

given

only

is

percent,

0.4

The

ICWC

of the Syr Dar’ia and

allotted 16 percent of the withdrawals

Amu Dar’ia

to the

Aral Sea region. In

Soviet times, the Aral Sea region did not have a specific allocation.

water

was

percent of the withdrawals from the Syr Dar’ia and 0.2

Amu Dar’ia.

(in this case, flow)

residual. Tajikistan

intended for both the deltas and the sea and

much

less

The

allotted

water than might

appear reaches the sea proper owing to major diversions into the delta for ecological purposes (e.g., support of deltaic lakes and reservoirs), water supply, TO

and even

irrigation.

The low

allocation for Kyrgyzstan

average flow year

it is

supposed

from the Syr Dar’ia

to receive 4.90

km^

is

puzzling. In an

or about 13 percent.^^ Thus,

one would have expected Kyrgyzstan to receive around 3 km^ in the 1996-1997 hydrologic year (a below-average flow year for the Syr Dar’ia).

may be

that

Kyrgyzstan withdraws some water from

a “national” resource

and

only empowered to

allocate

character.

is

not included in river

ICWC

flow that

is

An

this river that is

explanation

considered

allocations as the

ICWC

considered “interstate”

is

in

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin There are two caveats about the allocation

by

the

European Union’s

indicates missing data sets (those

WARMAP BVOs

data base developed independently Part

an analysis of these

data. First,

Project for the period 1994/95—1996/97

and data inconsistencies with two other comparable data

developed by the

project).

167

for the

by

the

Amu

European Union’s

may

of the inconsistencies

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and the

result

WARMIS

from changes

database

in

ICWC

reporting practices from year to year. Second, the actual total withdrawals and

may

withdrawals by each state

differ

somewhat from

the allocations in any

given year. In the 1995-1996 (and probably 1996-1997) years, which were dry, for

example,

much

less

than the allocated share of water reached the Aral Sea

region as upstream irrigation took more than

As might be

its

share.

expected, the upstream states, particularly Kyrgyzstan, have

complained about the allocation scheme. Their mountain

territories generate

75

percent of the flow in the basin of the Aral Sea, yet their allowed withdrawals are small

compared with

the share assigned to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and

Turkmenistan. Furthermore, to serve

accumulated in reservoirs on

irrigation,

their territories

most of the flow must be

and released during the growing

season, restricting the ability of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to generate winter hydroelectricity. This

since

it

is

a particularly serious

problem

for the former country

has faced chronic winter energy shortages in the 1990s, as deliveries of

coal (from Kazakhstan) and gas (from Uzbekistan) have, at best, been irregular.

During the Soviet era such deliveries were guaranteed

to

cover Kyrgyzstan’s

opportunity costs in forgoing winter hydroelectric generation.

The 1992 agreement has become acutely contentious among Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and especially Uzbekistan want

schemes

allocation

Tajikistan

expand

and operational

regimes

continued.

want considerably more of the flow allocated

irrigation)

and

more

freedom

to

generate

to

the five states.

to see the existing

Kyrgyzstan

them

winter

(so they can

hydropower.

Kyrgyzstan over the past five years has repeatedly violated winter release (set

by

the

ICWC)

at the

and

limits

huge Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn, the chief

tributary of the Syr Dar’ia. This action has reduced water available during the

following

summer season

for

downstream

irrigation.

It

also has caused winter

flooding in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, forcing emergency diversion of flow,

which should go the Aral Sea,

to

been leveled against Kyrgyzstan irrigation water

from Toktogul

Lake Amasay that

in the

it is

in the desert.

Charges have also

not releasing the obligatory quantity of

summer.

Philip Micklin

168

There are also allocation conflicts among the downstream contentious

Kara-Kum

the disagreement

is

Canal.

km-long canal

is

almost

irrigates

1

km

since the mid-1950s, the almost 1,400-

annually from the

million ha in Turkmenistan and

Amu Dar’ia.

the source of municipal

is

considers the canal fundamental to national survival and

and

irrigating

even larger

areas.

On

government views the unlined Kara-Kum the desert that loses as

huge amounts of water

one of the key factors contributing

hand,

man-made

to filtration.

to the

intent

is

other

the

as a

deteriorating,

In

which

it.

Owing

Uzbekistan

river flowing through

They

also see the canal

it

and increased

lack of maintenance, the canal

to

The

demise of the Aral Sea.

further increases water losses

March 1993,

on lengthening

the

Uzbekstanis are adamantly opposed to further construction on water diversions to

This facility

The Turkmenistan government

water supply for the capital of Ashgabat.

it

Most

between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the

Under construction

allocated 13

states.

from

is

rapidly

it.

the presidents of the five republics signed an agreement to

promote cooperation

in solving the

surrounding region.

It

key problems related

established the Interstate Council

to the

on

the

Aral Sea and

Problems of the

Aral Sea Basin (ICAS) (Russian: Mezhgosudarstvennyi Sovet po problemam basseina AraTskogo moria).

A

major purpose of the new organization was

to oc

facilitate

assistance

Composed of

from the World Bank and other

twenty-five members, five from each

international donors.

state,

ICAS was given

duty to manage various Aral Sea Basin assistance programs. at irregular intervals (six

in

January

1994

to

meet

meetings were held between July 1993 and February

by an Executive Council

1997), but day-to-day activities were to be handled

located in Tashkent.

ICAS was

the

The the

existing

ICWC

was made

a

component of ICAS, and

Development

Sustainable

Commission

(SDC),

headquartered in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, was added to the administrative structure of the organization. for the Aral

The

presidents also created the International

Fund

Sea (IFAS) [Russian: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond spaseniia Arala],

composed of ten members, two from each

state,

with the responsibility to collect

funds from each basin state (recommended contribution of

income) for financing of rehabilitation

efforts.

1

percent of national

The fund’s headquarters were

placed in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan was elected as the

The 1997.

first

head.

presidents

made major changes

The most important

step

in the

ICAS and IFAS

was abolishing ICAS and merging

in

February

the functions

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin of the two organizations into a restructured IFAS

to

169

reduce duplication of

effort,

simplify the administrative structure, overcome bureaucratic inertia that had

developed, and revitalize improvement efforts in the Aral Sea Basin. The leadership of

IFAS

is

to rotate in a

two-year cycle among the Central Asian

heads of state, with Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan, chosen to begin the

Annual

cycle. to

0.3

financial contributions to the fund

percent

Turkmenistan,

and

downstream

“richer”

for to

percent

0.1

for

were also revised downward

Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan,

and

“poorer” upstream Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan.

International

Donor Efforts

to

Promote Water Management Cooperation

Since independence, international aid donors have played a major role in

promoting cooperation in the

in the

management of

The World Bank

Aral Sea Basin.

and Development) was the

first

the transnational water resources

(International

Bank

for Reconstruction

major player on the scene. In 1992 and 1993, the

Bank formulated an Aral Sea Basin Assistance Program (ASBP)

to

be carried

out in three phases over fifteen to twenty years and expected to cost around $250

The main

million (as of 1996, the estimated cost had risen to $470 million).

goals of the program are (1) rehabilitation and development of the Aral Sea disaster zone; (2) strategic planning

water resources of the institutions

Amu

Dar’ia and

states to create

ICAS and IFAS and

through these organizations to realize the the

ASBP

Syr Dar’ia;

and

(3)

building

has worked with and

ASBP. Afghanistan was

invited to join

but did not respond to the overture.

The preparatory portion of

the first phase

was supposed

to take eighteen

months and be finished by the end of 1995.^^ The bank declared these finished in mid- 1997, twelve

planning process were (for the

of

and implementing the above programs. The bank

for planning

encouraged the basin

and comprehensive management of the

bank) social,

still

months behind schedule, even though

parts of the

under way. Lack of experience working in the new

political,

and economic environment of Central Asia and

laggard funding of the preparatory project financing

activities

work

(as

of mid- 1997 only $15.4 million of

was completed or under way) appear

to

be the chief reasons

for the delay.

The bank undertook

a

review of the

ASBP

in July

1996

in

which donor and

regional representatives participated.^^ Recognizing the accomplishments and

Philip Micklin

170

number of major changes. The basin

progress made, the review proposed a states

were advised

of regional institutions and depend

to strengthen the role

on donor influence,

to increase their political

and financial commitments

less

to the

regional bodies, to clarify the priorities between national and regional tasks, to

make

focus more attention on quickly implementable activities, and to

ICWC, SDC, and BVOs). The reduce

The next phase

ASBP,

projects supportive of the

World Bank’s Aral Sea Basin Program

in the

new emphasis on

With

and a half years

slated to run for four

it is

managing

the program.

intended to improve the

important of these

the

is

a planned start date of

at a cost

is

Most of

management of

water and

and development of low-cost, is

to

components of

the

salt

ASBP,

this

local,

August

the executive role, is

plan are directly

transnational water resources.

management, which aims salt

management

Water

of $21.2 million. In line

regional responsibility for the

of national and regional water and

serious

at the

strategies

Most

formulation

and agreements,

on-farm water conservation measures. The

improve the efficiency of water use, deal with the increasingly

problem of

salinization of soils

from improper

irrigation practices,

and

reduce the amount of irrigation drainage water flowing back into rivers.

second program aims agreements.

at the

for saving water

reservoir

management

and

the interstate rivers.

quality

the

and water users

to the

to effect behavioral

The

and safety of

fifth

and quantity, which

interstate

a public awareness

campaign

key issues and

change in water users.

dam and

undertaking is

is

Dam and intended

transboundary monitoring of water

a precondition to

more

water management/sharing agreements. This

USSR is

is

of the

reservoir infrastructure along

is

effective

and accepted

of great importance as

network of hydrologic and water quality observations

under the

to sensitize

strategies

constitutes a fourth piece of the project. This

to ensure the sustainability

A

strengthening of existing interstate water sharing

A third component entails

the public, water suppliers,

ASBP

it

gradually

committee of the IF AS, with the bank playing a cooperative/advisory

purpose

that

ASBP.

and Environmental Management Project.

with the

bank

to the

technical assistance role, and speedily prepare the follow-up project to

its

the first phase of the

1998,

recommended

basin states

more on financing of

concentrate

in 1997], IF AS,

(ICAS [abolished

the roles of the different regional entities

clearer

stations established

deteriorating at a rapid pace.^"^

Besides those of the World Bank, there are several other international efforts to

improve management of

interstate

water resources in the Aral Sea

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin The United

Basin.

States,

Technology (EPT)

through the USAID-funded Environmental Policy and

which ran from 1993

project,

1998, supported regional

to

agreement on operation of the Toktogul

efforts to reach

the Syr Dar’ia.^^ Located in Kyrgyzstan, this

downstream water use

171

dam and

huge storage

reservoir

controls

facility

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Controversy over the

in

appropriate operating regime (for hydropower, for irrigation, or

between these two) had risen

to the flash point

somewhere

between upstream Kyrgyzstan

and downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Working with the Council for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (ICKKU), the

Interstate

EPT

Project

helped the three countries reach a framework agreement that was signed

March

way

A

1998.^^

smaller-scale follow-up project sponsored

ICKKU

to help the

on

by

USAID

is

in

under

implement the agreement.

The United Nations has been providing

a variety

The most ambitious

Sea Basin since 1990.

UN

of assistance

to the

Aral

efforts in recent years are

proceeding under the direction of the United Nations Development Program

(UNDP). One of UNDP’s major

efforts

is

aimed

at

strengthening the regional

organizations that have been established to deal with the Aral crisis (earlier

ICAS and IFAS, now

the reconstituted IFAS).

The European Union states in

1995

Production

known the

in

objectives of the

initiated a

as the

Central

policies, strategies,

management of

Water Resources Management and Agricultural Asian

program were

framework within which the

major aid program for the Aral Sea Basin

Republics

(WARMAP)

“to provide the administrative

five republics

The

Project.^^

and technical

of the Aral Sea Basin can develop

and development programs

for utilization, allocation,

and

the water resources of the basin; and to assist at the regional

level with the establishment

of the institutional structure required to prepare and

execute policies and strategies to give effect to the agreed framework on water allocation and a cost

A

management.”

Phases

1

and 2 were completed by mid- 1997

at

of around $6 million.

number of

resources

activities directly related to

were completed over

this

period,

management of including

interstate

development of

Geographic Information System-based land and water database providing help to the World

Bank and ICAS (now IFAS)

improve and legally codify the

1992

interstate

water a

for the basin,

in their efforts to

water sharing

agreement,

sponsorship and funding of training seminars and workshops, and an attempt to gather detailed data on irrigated water use at the farm level through a Water Use

Philip Micklin

172

and Farm Management Monitoring Survey (WUFMAS).^^'

WARMAP

follow-up project to

more

years.

in early

continuation or

1998 and will run for several

102

Improvements Needed

The

began

A

five Central

in the

Management of International Waters

Asian republics of the former USSR,

created regional institutions (IF AS,

ICWC, and ICKKU)

to their credit,

have

to deal with questions

of basin-wide and transboundary concern, including the allocation of water

among them from

human and So

far,

Amu

the international rivers,

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia, and the

ecological problems connected with the desiccation of the Aral Sea.

the Central

Asian

have approached these matters in a

states

mutual cooperation and respect for national

spirit

of

rights.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the international community has

become deeply involved on water sharing and

to

in assisting the basin states in their efforts to cooperate

overcome

the

most serious problems associated with the

human

Aral Sea. Donor aid has focused on several key issues: (1) improving the

condition and ecological situation in the zone around the sea that has been most seriously afflicted; (2) raising the efficiency of water use in irrigated agriculture

of the regional institutions created to deal with

in the basin; (3) capacity building

Aral Sea Basin issues to their duties;

and

(4)

make them more

effective

and

efficient in carrying out

promoting the development of agreements on sharing of the

waters of international rivers and operation of the Toktogul reservoir that

comport with international legal standards and norms. In spite of the successes enumerated above, resolution.

The regional organizations

their roles clarified. Responsibilities

areas of

(IF AS,

many

critical

issues await

ICWC, and ICKKU) need

to

and functions of the three overlap

management and program implementation. This has

have

in

key

led to confusion,

disagreements, and costly duplication of effort that have slowed the introduction

of improvement measures.

A

sincere

effort

should be

Afghanistan in negotiations about water allocations from the country accounts for about 8 percent of that river’s flow.

Afghans were invited

to join the

However, when peace and be made

to include

organizations.

ASBP,

As

made

to

include

Amu Dar’ia

as this

indicated above, the

but did not respond to the overture.

stability returns to this nation, further efforts

should

Afghanistan in the work of the basin water management

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin The

International

support from the

Fund

member

for the Aral

more

to receive

countries in terms of financing, recognition of

and supplying

interstate status,

Sea (IFAS) also needs

173

it

its

with qualified personnel. Lack of adequate

funding has been a serious hindrance to the work of

this organization.

On

the

other hand, the Aral Sea Basin states on a national basis have invested in water

management and Aral Sea zone improvement

efforts.

The executive committee

of the IFAS reports that Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have together been spending around

$650 million annually on socioeconomic and

environmental stabilization efforts in the disaster zone around the figure

substantial, although likely exaggerated, particularly

is

use of an artificially high exchange rate between the International donors need to

implement several changes

Primary importance should be given players such as the

sum and

to

sea.^®^

This

by Uzbekistan’s

the U.S. dollar. in their operations.

improving cooperation among the major

World Bank, United Nations, United

and European

States,

Union. Talk abounds of “working together” to minimize program duplication

and costs as well as maximizing

working

in the

donor community

1998 suggests such rhetoric large

number of donors and

is

results.

in

Flowever, this author’s experience

Tashkent during 1996-1997 and summer

more good

the complexity of programs under

way

Basin and the inevitable duplication of effort and conflicts that be advisable

to

establish

in the

arises,

high-level council of donors that

a

Given the

intentions than reality.

it

Aral

would

would meet

regularly (at least twice each year?) to discuss the activities of the different

donors and to

facilitate field-level

coordination and cooperation.

The laggard pace of donor program implementation Expensive

feasibility

and planning studies drag on and,

Central Asians, there are no tangible results. Certainly this the hindrances faced

by

needed

to

move more

of

in the eyes is

many

partially a result

of

donor community in working within societies

the

undergoing major economic,

also needs attention.

social,

and

political transition.

But

a real effort

is

quickly from the feasibility study and design phase to the

completion of projects that make a difference in the lives of the region’s people.

The World Bank failing

and

is

as a result

of its July 1996 review has explicitly recognized

attempting to correct the problem in

Another problem

is

that

the

What

institutions in Central

this

means

is

new ASBP

efforts.

donor community may, inadvertently, be

developing an “international welfare mentality” Aral Sea Basin.

its

this

among

the aid recipients in the

that frequently regional, national,

and local

Asia approach international donors seeking funding for

174

Philip Micklin

what are worthwhile endeavors but should region. Often,

it

is

and monuments water supply

money

not a case of lack of

about spending priorities

in the capital cities over

new

community has

Although complaints international assistance.

community

It is

is

but of governmental choices

hospitals, clinics,

Aral Sea disaster zone). This

pervasive attitude that the Aral Sea situation international

be funded from within the

giving precedence to grandiose public buildings

(e.g.,

facilities in the

really

is

is

and drinking

helped along by a

a “world problem” and that the

a moral and ethical obligation to help solve

heard

frequently

are

Asia

Central

in

it.

that

the

not doing enough, donors have provided substantial

difficult to estimate the overall contributions

because of lack of

comprehensive data and double counting (the World Bank commonly includes in

its

figures

funding of Aral Sea Basin efforts that are also counted by

individual donors such as the United States). But in addition to other Aral Sea

Basin

efforts, the

Bank

alone has, or

planning through fiscal year 2000,

is

sixteen loans and credits to Central Asian states totaling $605

million for

improvement of land and water management. Other donors have given or plan

to

provide hundreds of millions more.

The Future The Aral Sea Basin

states face

transnational waters. the flow of the

basis

Amu

The region

difficulties in the joint

to

management of their

not inherently “short” on water resources as

is

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia

would appear

there

many

is

substantial.

On

an average annual

be sufficient water in the region (including

groundwater) to meet current withdrawals. But average figures are deceptive

and do not

reflect the intra-

and inter-year

variability

of these

rivers’ discharge

and the associated problem of storing flow during “surplus” flow seasons and years for use during times of flow deficit, availability.

When

when demand

is

greater than natural

these factors are taken into consideration, resources are

already severely strained, particularly in the cycles of low flow years.

The key problem withdrawals.

The chief

the states except

which accounts

is irrigation,

irrigating states are

Kazakhstan plan

to

expand

for

more than 90 percent of

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. All their irrigated areas.

For one

state to

increase irrigation necessitates that other states along these rivers reduce theirs

or that large quantities of water are freed

by major technological improvements

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

175

water use efficiency and/or implementation of switches from high- to low-

in

A

water-consuming crops.

comprehensive and thorough program

to raise

water

use efficiency in irrigation could free substantial amounts of water, perhaps 36.5

km

,

km^ withdrawn

or over 33 percent of the 111

massive investments of unlikely to be

made

at least

$16

in the near to

Crop substitution

would require

billion which, as explained earlier,

mid-term

is

highly

future.

much cheaper means

a

is

in 1995. This

to obtain sizable reductions in

water use, but done on a large scale would necessitate considerable reduction in the hectarage devoted to cotton,

Turkmenistan

and

chief export crop for Uzbekistan and

the

foreign-currency

earner

for

Adoption

former.

the

of

governmental policies promoting irrigation water pricing, privatization of land,

and giving rights of self-governance and responsibility for management of systems

irrigation

farmer-irrigators

to

A

encouraging water conservation.

is

partial return to

avenue

for

use of small-scale

the

systems that characterized parts of Central Asia in earlier times,

irrigation

coupled with the sensible employment of also

promising

very

a

contribute

to

efficiency

introduction of such changes

Turkmenistan appear dim Inherent water

irrigation technology, could

and water savings.

among

the

key

However, prospects

irrigating states

for

of Uzbekistan and

at best.

management

(Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,

modem

conflicts exist

between

the upstream states

and Afghanistan) and the downstreamers (Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan). The former generate a large preponderance of basin flow (more than 80 percent) but use relatively

reversed for the

latter.

Tajikistan,

little

of this. The situation

and particularly Kyrgyzstan, are

withdrawing significantly more of the water coming from

expand

to

Turkmenistan as upstream

it

states also

their territory to

the interests the

Such action

irrigation.

summer

is

intent

is

on

their territory in order

opposed by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and

reduces the water available for their national uses. The

want

to operate the large hydroelectric stations located

maximize winter hydropower production, which

of downstream irrigating

states that

need

maximum

on

counter to

is

releases during

irrigation season. This has already led to sharp conflict

between

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the one hand, and Kyryzstan on the other. Serious differences also have developed

among

the downstreamers, especially

between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the Kara-Kum Canal. The is

further exacerbated

by

situation

the tendency of the basin states to overestimate their

share of the Aral Sea Basin’s resources.

When

these are totaled, they

come

out

176

Philip Micklin

significantly

resources.

more than any reasonable estimate of usable basin-wide water

106

Finally there shrink,

is

the

problem of the Aral Sea. This water body continues

and the serious environmental and human problems

“disaster zone” are not substantially abating. stabilize the

Large Sea in the south,

let

To provide

to

in the surrounding

sufficient inflow to

alone begin to raise

its

level,

would

require sizable cutbacks in irrigation (or a substantial effort to improve irrigation efficiency and implement crop substitution).

None of

be implemented anytime in the foreseeable

future.

states

have formally agreed

two

the deltas of the

rivers

more water

to provide

and

these options

The (former

for preserving

partially restoring the

Aral Sea, but attaining even these modest goals

is

now

proving

is

likely to

Soviet) basin

what

is left

of

separated northern

difficult.

Nevertheless improved management of the interstate waters in the Aral Sea

Basin

is

far

from hopeless. Since independence, the basin

states

have taken

important steps to put in place regional institutions to promote basin-wide cooperation in coping with both the problem of water sharing and the Aral Sea.

The

international

organizations

is

community through

the major multilateral and bilateral aid

providing material financial and technical assistance plus policy

advice to help in these endeavors. However, progress the critical problems remain formidable

Looking to

follow

is

conflict,

slow and uneven, and

and largely unresolved.

to the future, the only rational

avenue for the Aral Sea Basin

cooperation and compromise

transnational water resources. This

is

in

managing and sharing

states

their

not only necessary to avoid interstate

is

perhaps even military confrontation, but to develop an integrated,

basin-wide strategy to optimize water use efficiency and maximize efforts to restore

and protect

environs.

Such

most populous, strategic,

critical water-related

a strategy

would benefit

politically powerful,

and heaviest-irrigating

interstate cooperative

all

basin riparians. Uzbekistan, as the

economically developed, geographically

state

management of

ecosystems such as the Aral Sea and

in

the basin

is

critical

in the past, regional efforts to

national water resources will founder.

successful

transnational waters. If this state focuses

excessively on national self-interest in water management, as

do

to

effectively

it

has been wont to

and peacefully manage

trans-

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

1

77

Notes

Center for International Projects, The Modern State of Nature, Population,

1.

and Economy of

the Aral Sea Basin:

International Projects, 1991), p. 4

Russian).

Basin areas calculated from World Bank

2.

Map IBRD

25944,

and Uzbekistan) (Water and Environmental Management

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

Washington, D.C.,

Project,

Tashkent

Institute

May

1998), p.

1.

of Engineers of Irrigation and Agricultural Mechanization

and The Aral Sea International Committee, “The Mirzaev Report,”

demographic appendices. This from an

title

report,

Asian experts devoted to finding

It

EC

World Bank,

new approaches

of ICAS, and

in

and

7. Philip P.

regions,

(Aral Sea Basin

for

in

arise in

sponsored

(river, lake, or sea).

They

rates are so high they lose

Management

their water.

all

Crisis in Soviet Central Asia,” in

Russian and East European Studies, No. 905 (Pittsburgh:

Russian and East European Studies, August territory

1991),

of the basin,”

p.

in

4;

D.

Vestnik

(water resources). Spring 1996, pp. 5-7 (in Russian).

1

D. C.

and Uses

Program Technical

humid mountainous zones and flow

Mamatkanov, “Water resources of the mountain Arala, No.

Water

a Regional

p. 14.

where they

Micklin, “The Water

The Carl Beck Papers

The Center

management

to alleviating water

ICWC, Developing

and Work Plan

Strategy: Issues

where evaporation

into deserts

8.

September 1996 under the

in

Terminal rivers are not tnbutary to a body of water

common

translated

grew out of a seminar of independent Central

Senes, Washington, D.C., April 1996),

are

was

1998,

Aral Sea Basin.

in the

Management

for the pnncipal author,

May

“Conceptual Strategy for Proper Development of the Water Ecology

Relations in the Aral Sea Basin.”

problems

named

Russian-language report published

earlier

translated

6.

1994,

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,

3.

5.

May

February 1999.

utilizing a polar planimeter,

4.

(m

Diagnostic Study (Moscow: Center for

McKinney and

in the

S.

Akmansoy, “What Are

Aral Sea Region?” Paper presented

by the

SSRC,

Tashkent,

Fundamental Provisions of Water Management Strategy of Water Allocation,

at

Uzbekistan,

Rational

Competing Water Needs

the

Aral Sea Basin Workshop,

May

in the

Water Use,

19-21,

1998;

Aral Sea Basin: A

ICAS,

Common

and Protection of Water

Resources, prepared with the assistance of the World Bank, October 1996 (no pagination). Chapter 6.

Philip Micklin

178

9. Ibid.

10.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

11. Micklin,

“The Water Management

6,

Table 6.3.

Crisis,” p. 99.

12.

Mamatkanov, “Water resources of the mountain,”

13.

World Bank

14.

et ah.

Dukhovnyi, Reclamation

15.

7,

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter Chapter

Arid Zone

the

Fundamental Provisions,

6,

Table 6.6.

7,

Tables 7.1 and 7.2.

6.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

18. Micklin, 19.

and Water Management of

Tables 7.1 and 7.2.

16. Ibid., 17.

p. 16.

1993), p 56 (in Russian); ICAS,

(Tashkent: Mekhnat,

Chapter

Developing a Regional,

p. 5.

“The Water Management

Crisis,” pp. 4-7.

Michael Collier, Robert H. Webb, and John C. Schimdt,

Dams and Rivers:

Primer on the Ecological Effects of Dams, U.S. Geological Circular 1126 (Tucson:

uses, June

1996),

94 pages; Philip

Micklin,

P.

“Man and

the

water cycle:

challenges for the 21st century,” in Geojournal No. 39 (July 1996), pp. 285-298. 20.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

a reservoir

and

is

refilled is

termed gross capacity, whereas

known

as usable capacity.

21. Dukhovnyi, Reclamation lation

and Analysis of Regional

p.

1

and Water,

Strategies on

A

p.

260;

p.

227

water-storage volume of

full

that portion is

of

it

that can

be drained

termed dead storage.

WARMAP

Project,

Formu-

Land and Water Management

and Watering

12 (in Russian); B. G. Shtepa, ed..

(Moscow: Kolos, 1975), 22.

The

The difference

1997), p. 8; A. N. Askochenskii, Irrigation

Kolos, 1967),

6.

in the

(July

USSR (Moscow:

Land Reclamation

in the

USSR

(in Russian).

90 percent flow year

is

a probabilistic concept.

It is

a flow year

which

probability analysis of a long record of annual flows, at least thirty years, indicates likely to

is

be exceeded 90 percent of the time. The probability analyses used to create

such probabilities are based on the

fitting

of a theoretical probability curve to the

flow record or plotting of the actual flow record on probability paper. 23.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

24. V. N. Bortnik

and

Table 12.

S. P. Chistiaevaia, eds..

chemistry of the Seas of the USSR, Vol. 1990), p. 38 (in Russian).

7,

8,

Hydrometeorology and Hydro-

Aral Sea (Leningrad: Gidrometeoizdat,

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

25. Ibid., p. 36, Table 4.1; Philip P. Micklin,

179

“The Aral Sea Problem,”

in Civil

Engineering, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers (August 1994),

p.

115.

26. Mieklin, The Water

was exceeded by

1.

in the

m

Crisis, pp.

M. Zholdasova,

1.

42-54.

In surface area, the Aral

Union and

Lake Victoria

in

A. N. Urasbaev, E. Adenbaev, and

S.

the Soviet

Iran,

United States and Canada.

“The Aral Sea Problem,”

27. Micklin,

28.

the Caspian Sea

Lake Supenor

Africa, and

Management

p. 116.

P. Pavlovskaia,

K. Lubimova, “Biological Bases of Fishery Development in the Waterbodies of the

Southern Aral Region,”

UNESCO

Deltas,

UNESCO,

in

Ecological Research and Monitoring of the Aral Sea

Aral Sea Project

1992—1996, Final Scientific Reports (Pans:

1998), pp. 213—215; Micklin, The Water

29. Micklin,

The Water Management

30. Micklin,

“The Aral Sea Problem,”

31. N. Novikova,

“The Tugai of

Management

Crisis, pp. p.

1

Crisis, pp.

49-50.

50-52.

16.

the Aral Sea Region

is

dying:

Can

it

be

restored?” in Russian Conservation News, No. 6 (February 1996), pp. 22-23. 32. Ibid. 33.

M.

some

Palvaniiazov, “The effect of dust storms on the habitats of

mammals of the

coastal

zone of the Aral Sea,”

in

Problemy osvoeniia pustyn

’,

No.

1

(1989), p. 56 (in Russian). 34. Ibid.; Philip P. Micklin,

35.

“The Aral Sea Problem,”

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,

36. N. Novikova, Principles

p. 116.

pp. 3-5.

of preserving the botanical diversity of the deltaic

plains of the Turan, dissertation in the form of a scientific report to meet the

requirements for a doctoral degree 37. Micklin,

F.

geography (Moscow, 1997),

The Water Management

Aral Catastrophe,” in

N.

in

Glazovskii,

Crisis, pp.

p. 71 (in Russian).

48-49; D. B. Oreshkin, “The

Nauka o zemle. No. 2 (Moscow: Znaniye, 1990)

(in

Russian);

The Aral Crisis: Causative Factors and Means of Solution

(Moscow: Nauka, 1990),

pp.

20-23

(in

38. Bortnik and Chistiaevaia, eds..

Russian).

Hydrometeorology and hydro chemistry’,

p. 27, Fig. 2.7.

39. Glazovskiy, The Aral Crisis, p. 22.

40. G.N. Chichasova, ed.. Hydrometeorological

Region (Leningrad: Gidrometeoizdat, 1990),

p.

215

Problems of the Near Aral

(in Russian).

Philip Micklin

180

41.

M, Rubanov and N. M. Bogdanava,

I.

deflation on the dried

bottom of the Aral Sea,”

(1987), p. 14 (in Russian).

and

in spite

salt,

The reason

“Quantitative estimation of the salt

in

Problemy osvoeniia pustyn

No. 3

for the predieted decrease in exported dust

of a larger area of dried bottom, was an expected significant

decrease in losses from “old” areas of the bottom where the loose material subject to

would become

transport

largely depleted, carried

by

precipitation

below the surface

or formed into a hard, deflation-resistant crust. 42.

and

M. Ye. Bel’gibayev,

salt in air currents,” in

“Dust-salt meter

- an instrument

Problemy osvoeniia pustyn’. No.

for entrapping dust 1

(1984), p. 74 (in

Russian). 43. Palvaniiazov,

“The

effect of dust storms,” p. 56.

44. Ch. A. Abdirov, N. A. Agadzhanian, A. V. Vervikhvost, K. P. Primbetov,

A. Ye. Severin, Yu. P. Brushkov, and L. G. Konstantinova, “Stress Reaction of healthy children in

Aral region,” in

Nukus

of negative ecological factors in the near

to the influence

Vestnik Karakalpakskogo otdeliniia Akademii

Nauk

Uzbekistana, No. 2 (1993), pp. 15-20 (in Russian); Pravda Vostoka (22

Respubliki

May

1987),

p. 3.

45. Micklin, The Water

CmA, pp.

Management

Crisis, pp.

52-53; Glazovskii, The Aral

19-21.

46. Philip P. Micklin,

“The Aral

Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 33, No. 5

Crisis: Introduction to the Special Issue,” in

(May

1992), p. 276.

47. Ibid.

48. Withdrawals are a measure of the total water taken from sources (rivers and

groundwater) for

withdrawn

irrigation.

Consumptive use

that is lost to evaporation

is

a measure of the water that

(from conveyance canals and

transpired from or incorporated into crops.

The

return flow. Return flow includes filtration

difference between the

from canals,

filtration

fields)

two

from

is

is

and

termed

fields,

and

surface runoff from fields. Part of return flow ultimately reaches the river from

which takes or adds

to groundwater, while another portion runs off into desert

hollows to form lakes (the water from these 49. Hydrologic data collected

by

is lost

to evaporation).

the author between

1984-1998 from a variety

of sources, including the Gidroproekt (Hydro Planning) Institute in

Glavgidromet (Main Administration of Hydrometeorology) derive long-term time series flows for the

balances for the Aral Sea.

Amu

Moscow and

in Tashkent,

and used

to

Dar’ia and Syr Dar’ia and water

.

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

50. Micklin,

“The Aral Sea Problem,”

51. N. V. Aladin, and

I.

S.

181

pp. 120-121.

Plotnikov, “Concerning the question of the possible

preservation and rehabilitation of the Small Aral Sea,” in Biological

Science Problems of the Aral Sea and Near Aral Region,

RAN,

Zoological Institute,

Vol. 262, pp. 3-16;

WARMAP

and Natural

Proceedings of the

Formulation

Project,

&

Analysis, pp. 66—67.

However, once the Large Sea

52.

to separate the

of the

Amu

restore

it

more meters,

falls several

it

may be

possible

deep western part from the shallow eastern by a dike, direct the flow

Dar’ia into the western part and, over time, freshen and ecologically

by allowing

a controlled flow of saline water to the eastern portion.

eastern part, nevertheless,

would rapidly shnnk and

53.

The Christian Science Monitor

54.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,

(5

The

salinize.

February 1999),

p. 7.

p. 10.

55. Conversation with Victor Dukhovnyi, director of the SIC,

ICWC,

Delft,

Netherlands, 19 July 1999. 56.

Dukhovnyi, Reclamation and Water,

may be

57. This figure tight

p. 56.

high, as a 10 percent growth over five years, given the

water situation in the basin, seems improbable. Growth from 1985-1990 was

less than

58.

4 percent.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

program of future development of

(Spnng 1996),

6;

V. Antonov, “Concerning the

irrigation in Uzbekistan,” in Vestnik Arala,

(Ministry of Water

Management

Construction),

World Bank

61.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

et al..

Deputy Minister of Minvodstroi

Moscow,

60.

14 September 1989.

Developing a Regional, pp. 24-25. 4,

Table 4.1

62. V. Dukhovnyi, “Save irrigation water!” in Gidrotekhnika

64.

melioratsiia.

No.

and discussions with Mr. Onno Schapp, on-farm imgation

specialist,

WARMAP

Program, during the period October

working

i

40-43.

63. Conversations

management

1

pp. 7-10.

59. Interview with Mr. Polad-Polad Zade, First

5 (1985), pp.

No.

as director of a

World Bank

USAID

et al..

Project

of the

European

TACIS

1996-August 1997 when the author was

project in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Developing a Regional,

65. Antonov, “Concerning the

Union’s

p. 23.

program of future,”

p. 9.

Philip Micklin

182

66. E.

I.

Pankova,

Aidarov,

P.

I.

and Anthropogenic

Blarovolin, Natural

Geography,

I.

F.

Novikoa, and N.

of the Aral Sea Basin

Salinization

(Moscow:

Evolution

Genesis,

A. lamnova, A.

Academy

Russian

S.

Soils:

of Agrocultural

Sciences, 1996), pp. 85-87. 67.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

68. Report given

Uzbekistan,

at

6.

by G. N. Djalalov, Deputy Minister of Water Management

Working Meeting of Representatives of

the

the

for

Water-Energy

Services of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan for Preparation of

Recommendations

Use of

for the Efficient

the Resourees of the Naryn-Syr Dar’ia

Cascade of Reservoirs over the Long-Term, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 1-2 October 1996. 69.

World Bank

70.

ICAS, Fundamental Provisions, Chapter

et ah.

Developing a Regional,

p. 25.

10,

Table 10.2.

71. Ibid., Chapter 10, Table 10.1. 72.

cotton

The

from which these data

was from 45 percent

handbook data

report

to

are taken (footnote 70) states the drop in

37 percent. Data

indicate the 1990 percentage of cotton

among

“authoritative” sources

is

in

the

was 40

1990 Soviet

statistieal

percent. Inconsistency of

a major problem.

Information acquired by the author during a one-year assignment as

73.

Resident

Advisor

on

Water

and

Management Policy

Environmental

the

to

Government of Uzbekistan, under USAID’s Environmental Policy and Technology Project,

September 1996-October 1997; Philip

Governing

Irrigation

Systems

in Uzbekistan:

P. Micklin,

“Development of

Problems and Prospects,”

report on the training seminar held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan,

Self-

draft final

29-30 April 1997,

prepared for the Central Asia Mission U.S. Agency for International Development,

Almaty,

Kazakhstan,

under

No.

Contract

CCN-0003-Q- 14-3 165-00

Environmental Policy and Technology Project, 25

May

of

the

1997; Philip P. Micklin,

“Developing Water Pricing Systems for Uzbekistan: Key Policy Issues and

Initial

Steps,” draft final report on the training seminar held in Khodjikent, Uzbekistan, 28

July-1

August 1997, prepared

International

Central Asia Mission U.S.

for the

for

Development, Almaty, Kazakhstan, under Contract No. CCN-0003-Q-

14-3165-00 of the Environmental Policy and Technology Project, 74. K. Sh. Sirozhidinov,

“About the

Aral Sea,” in Problemy osvoeniia pustyn 75.

Agency

ICWC,

Central Asia

real reasons for the ’,

August 1997.

in the level

of the

No. 6 (1991), pp. 23-28.

J 992-1 997,

Scientific Information Center (SIC)

drop

1 1

Tashkent,

of ICWC, pp. 4-8.

1997,

published

by

the

.

.

Managing Transnational Waters of the Aral Sea Basin

76.

In Russian this

is

183

Mezhgosudarstvennaia koordinatsionnaia vodokhoz-

iaistvennaia komissiia. 77. International

and a look toward June 1997, 78.

p. 7 (in

Fund

for

Saving the Aral, Aral Sea basin program: the past

the future^ Phase

Report 4 (work implementation), Tashkent,

1,

Russian).

WARMAP Projeet, Formulation and Analysis,

79. T. Sarbaev,

Vestnik Arala, No.

p. 72.

“Concerning future development of imgation

1

(Spnng 1996),

p.

1

1

(in

in

Kyrgyzstan,”

Russian).

80.

WARMAP Project, Formulation & Analysis,

81

Information acquired by the author dunng a one-year assignment.

.

Tim Hannan and Sarah

L.

Canal: Problems and Prospects,”

in

82.

in

pp. 72-84.

O’Hara, “Managing Turkmenistan’s Kara

Kum

Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 39,

No. 4 (Apnl 1998), pp. 225-235. The Water Management

83. Micklin, 84.

Agreement on

around the sea

crisis,

Crisis, p. 46.

Sea and the zone

joint activities in addressing the Aral

improving the environment, and ensuring the

economic development of the Aral Sea region, signed

in

social

and

Kzyl-Orda, Republic of

Kazakhstan, 26 March 1993. 85. Philip P. Micklin, “International

An Overview

and Regional Responses

of Efforts and Accomplishments,”

to the Aral Crisis:

Post-Soviet Geography

in

and

Economics, Vol. 39, No. 7 (September 1998), pp. 406-409. 86. International 87. Ibid., pp. 88.

Fund

for

Saving the Aral, Aral Sea basin program, pp. 4-1

41-42; World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,

1

p. 9.

See Micklin, “International and Regional,” pp. 399-417, for a detailed

treatment of international assistance efforts in the Aral Sea Basin. 89. Ibid., pp.

406-409.

90.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,

91

Ibid., p. 9.

.

92.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,

p. 9,

footnote 16.

pp. 8-1

1

93. Ibid., pp. 19-34.

94.

World Bank

et al..

Developing a Regional,

p.

1

5.

95. Micklin, “International and Regional,” pp. 409-410. 96.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program,

Institutions for Central

Summary,”

13

p. 21;

Environmental Policies and

Asia (EPIC) program, sponsored by USAID, “Information

September 1999, 7 pages.

184

Philip Micklin

97. Ibid.

and Regional,” pp. 410-41

98. Micklin, “International

1.

99. Ibid., p. 411.

100.

European Commission, Water Resources Management and Agricultural

Production

in the

Central Asian Republics:

Preparation Reports, Exeeutive 101.

Summary

WARMAP

Project, Phase

(Tashkent, September 1995), p.

1:

Project

1.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, pp. 8-9.

102. Information acquired

by

the author during a

consultant to the National Sustainable Development

two-month assignment

as

Commission of Uzbekistan,

May-July 1998. 103.

104.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Information

acquired by the

p. 12.

author

during

a

one-year

assignment;

information acquired by the author during a two-month assignment. 105.

World Bank, Aral Sea Basin Program, Tables

106.

World Bank

Provisions, Chapter 6.

et al..

Developing a Regional,

4, 5, 6. p.

15;

ICAS, Fundamental

7 / Agricultural

Development and Environmental

Constraints in Northwest Africa Will D. Swearingen

Agriculture in Northwest Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) has been intensifying for

most of the present century. Since the mid-1980s,

process

this

has accelerated significantly. Intensification has occurred in two key directions, horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, farmers have progressively expanded

expanded livestock

cultivation to lower-rainfall areas. In addition, they have raising to marginal areas that previously

were

little

used. Vertically, farmers

have intensified agriculture through irrigation development, reduction of fallow, increases in use of fertilizer and other chemical inputs, and intensification of

stock raising. In the near term, these intensification processes have

development

and

enabled

region’s

the

countries

to

populations. However, Northwest African agriculture

environmental

limits. Specifically,

it is

is

fueled economic

feed

now

for

—

environment,

the

region’s

agricultural

approaching

its

approaching the limits of available land

and water resources. This has serious implications for

growing

their

sustainability,

Northwest Africa’s future

economy, and

politics.

A This

is

profile of

Northwest Africa’s environment and agriculture

followed by a historical overview of agricultural development in the focusing

region,

on long-term

agricultural intensification are

trends are

theme and

provided.

is

is

on a

processes.

intensification

examined

next.

Current trends

The major theme

is

of

that these

collision course with the region’s environmental constraints. This

developed through an analysis of the environmental, socioeconomic,

political implications

of current intensification trends.

Northwest Africa’s Environment and Agriculture

There are three major environmental zones plains

and plateaus

mountain highlands

to in

in

Northwest Africa: the coastal

the north, the Saharan desert to the

between (see Figure

7.1).

The

south,

desert zone

is

and the

by

far the

Will D.

186

largest.

Roughly 70 percent of

consists of desert.

region’s territory.

the

Swearingen

combined

for only 10 percent of the

The northern lowlands account

Mountain highlands account

of the three countries

territory

for

around 20 percent.^

However, the proportions of these major environmental zones vary greatly from country

to country. Coastal plains

Tunisia's national territory Algeria's. territory,

and a

fifth

and plateaus comprise around a fourth of less than 5 percent

of Morocco's, but

Mountainous highlands occupy roughly a

of

of Morocco's national

third

but only about a tenth of Tunisia’s and Algeria’s. Desert areas cover

nearly 90 percent of Algeria’s national territory, two-thirds of Tunisia’s, but

only half of Morocco’s (including the Western Sahara).

The region

is

clearly distinguished

from the

rest

of North Africa by

its

extensive mountains and relatively well-watered coastal lowlands. Mountain

highlands extend, from west to east, for over 2,000 kilometers (km). Elevations

exceed 4,000 meters (m) in Morocco’s High Atlas tapering

down

to a

maximum

Overall, these mountains

of around 1,500

form a

to

the

gradually

west,

m in Tunisia's Dorsal to the east.

substantial barrier

up

to

400

km

in width. This

highland barrier gamers precipitation from storms arriving from the Atlantic and

Mediterranean during the autumn-spring cool season. Rainfall rain-fed agriculture throughout levels in the

significant

much of

is

sufficient for

the coastal lowlands. Higher rainfall

mountains (or snowfall on higher peaks) are the source of a

number

of permanent

streams.

However,

Northwest

Africa's

mountains also cast a long rain shadow. Desert abmptly begins beyond the mountains.

Most of Northwest plains and plateaus. level terrain,

Africa’s arable land

These lowlands have

and access

is

concentrated in the northern

relatively higher rainfall, better soils,

to irrigation water.

Arable land

is

relatively extensive

by Middle Eastern/North African standards. Morocco has around

9.7 million

hectares (ha) of arable and permanently cropped land, Algeria around 8 million ha,

and Tunisia nearly 5 million ha (see Table

7.1).

Unfortunately, precipitation levels in Northwest Africa’s coastal lowlands are not generally sufficient to ensure a prosperous, drought-resistant rain-fed agriculture.

Most of Northwest

mm (approximately

1

Africa's arable lowlands receive only

300

to

500

2 to 20 inches) of rainfall in an average year. These rainfall

levels are only marginally adequate for rain-fed agriculture. In the southern

lowlands, where rainfall

is

less

than 300

mm per year, irrigation

is

essential.

Develop?nent and Environmental Constraints

Figure

7.1.

Landforms

in

in

Northwest Africa

Northwest Africa

1

87

Will D.

188

Northwest Africa's

lowlands

arable

and chronic drought. “Normal

variability

of extreme

and the

Swearingen

rainfall conditions, too

total

the region’s

much

are

to

an abstraction

rainfall” is

or too

subject

also

little.

Both

high rainfall

—

an average

the timing of rainfall

accumulations fluctuate dramatically from year to year. Drought

most

common

natural hazard. During the present century,

is

for

example, drought in Morocco has occurred, on average, about one year out of every three.

Due

to

Northwest Africa's relatively arid character,

and the often intense nature of rainfall,

this

region

thin soils,

its

naturally vulnerable to land

is

degradation.

Since the colonial takeover of Northwest Africa, beginning in Algeria in 1830,

modem

economic development has been focused on the northern coastal

lowlands. Today, most of Northwest Africa's population, urban areas, industry,

and

tourist

developments are concentrated in the environmentally more-favored

Most

coastal lowlands.

lowlands.

agricultural intensification has also taken place in these

They contain most of Northwest

Africa’s

modem

agriculture

and

perennially irrigated areas.

Table 7.1 presents a profile of agriculture in the three Northwest African countries.

It

shows the areas covered respectively by arable and permanently

cropped land (including fallow land), cereal crops, permanent crops, and irrigated

crops.

This

table

reveals

agriculture in the region. First, cereals,

region’s

human

least

at

three

interesting

which represent the

about

things

staple foods for the

population as well as supplemental feed for livestock, are the

predominant crops. Wheat and barley are the primary cereal crops, but category also includes maize,

rice,

cereal crops accounted for around

oats,

sorghum,

rye,

and

49 percent of Algeria’s arable

millet.

area,

this

In 1996,

68 percent

of Morocco’s, and 69 percent of Tunisia’s. Second, permanent crops represent an important element of agricultural production in

all

three countries.

These

permanent crops include olives (which represent around 80 percent of the permanently cropped area in Tunisia, half in Morocco, and a third in Algeria), dates,

and a broad range of subtropical

fruits

and

nuts, including

wine grapes

and most of the other permanent crops grown in California. Third, the areas in each country account for a relatively small

some 12 percent

in

amount of the arable

Morocco and Tunisia and only 6 percent

However, these areas are

critically

irrigated total

—

in Algeria.

important in producing crops for export.

Development and Environmental Constraints

Table

7.1.

in

Northwest Africa

Agriculture in Northwest Africa, 1996

Total Arable

Cereal Crops

(in hectares)

Permanent

Irrigated

Crops

Land

and Permanently

Cropped Land Algeria

8,040,000

3,663,000

519,000

450,000

Morocco

9,661,000

5,992,000

855,000

1,093,000

Tunisia

4,878,000

1,971,000

2,036,000

350,000

Source;

URL:

FAOSTAT

Database (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of

http://apps.fao. org./default.htm.

Note: The irrigation figures include both

modem

(opportunistic) irrigation following periodic 1

the United Nations),

and traditional

irrigation.

They do not include spate

which accounts roughly

floods,

for

an additional

10,000 ha in Algeria, 165,000 ha in Morocco, and 30,000 ha in Tunisia.

Historical

Since

began

agriculture

mountain

Northwest

had already been developed prior

valleys

intensification

as

Northwest Africa. initiated

in

Intensification

Africa

several

millennia

ago,

occurred sporadically in time and space. For example,

intensification has irrigation

Overview of Agricultural

a Its

to

general

the

trend

in

many of the

Roman is

a

period.

relatively

region’s desert oases and

However,

modem phenomenon

origins are linked to agricultural

by European colonization

agricultural

development

activities

in the region.

Prior to the colonial period, agriculture in most of Northwest Africa

extensive

in

nature,

rather

in

than intensive.

In most of the

region’s

was

arable

expanses, agriculture consisted of an extensive agropastoral system of rain-fed cereal cultivation

combined with semi-nomadic animal husbandry. Most land

was communally owned. Fallowing

(periodically letting cropland

lie idle)

was

Swearingen

Will D.

190

widely practiced. Fallowing both replenished

Low

soil fertility.

moisture and helped to restore

soil

population pressure gave the extensive coastal plains and

inland plateaus a relatively underutilized appearance.

Land Intensification under European Colonization In all three countries, colonization introduced vast changes in agriculture and agricultural landscapes. Algeria

became

a French colony in 1830, Tunisia a

French protectorate in 1881, and Morocco a French and Spanish protectorate in 1912. All three countries experienced large-scale colonization. Colonization initiated processes

of intensification that have continued up

Colonization dislodged native farmers from region. Europeans acquired roughly

to the present.

much of

the best land in the

30 percent of Algeria's arable

million ha;^ nearly 20 percent of Tunisia's land, or 800,000

of Morocco's land, or land

concentration

1

by

ha;"^

million ha.^ This land concentration native

landowners,

who

profited

land, or 2.7

and 13 percent

was

paralleled

from new

by

land

registration procedures and, often, their alliances with Europeans. In Algeria,

some 25,000

native Algerians acquired nearly 2.8 million ha,

somewhat over 30

percent of the country's arable land.^ In Tunisia, 7,200 Tunisians acquired

630,000 ha

—

15 percent.^

And

in

Morocco, 7,500 Moroccan landowners

acquired 1.6 million ha, or 21 percent of the arable

summary of land Table

Morocco Tunisia

Table 7.2 provides a

concentration during the colonial period in Northwest Africa.

7.2.

Land Concentration under European Colonization in

Algeria

total.

Northwest Africa

Colonial

Native Large

Total Large

% of Total

Landowners

Landowners

Landholdings

Agricultural

(in hectares)

(in hectares)

(in hectares)

Land

2.7 million

2.8 million

5.5 million

60%

1.6 million

2.6 million

34%

0.6 million

1

million

35%

1

million

0.8 million

Sources: See footnotes in paragraph above.

.4

Development and Environmental Constraints

Land expropriation and concentration during

Northwest Africa

in

the colonial period

important consequences related to agricultural intensification.^ native Northwest African

expropriated,

First, as

lie

With reduced landholdings, farmers had

fallow.

land was

farmers became concentrated on a

diminished amount of land. Land expropriation reduced their ability

of their land

had two

to

to let part

put a larger

percentage of their land into cultivation to produce sufficient food for their

household needs. The result was more intensive land use. Second, large numbers of farmers were dislodged to marginal land that was not sufficiently attractive for colonization.

These marginal areas were commonly characterized by poor

unfavorable slope, and/or deficient

soils,

most of

rainfall. Previously,

this land

had been used only for livestock grazing. Cultivation represented much more intensive land use.

Colonial

agricultural

policy

also

fostered

agricultural

Between roughly 1915 and 1928, French colonial

intensification.

authorities

in

three

all

countries had a mandate to substantially increase cereal production for France.

Various subsidies and bonuses were offered to encourage cereal cultivation, specifically cultivation

by mechanized means. High market

offered, particularly for wheat. Agricultural mechanization

prices were also

and high crop prices

enabled marginal areas to be profitably cultivated during higher-than-normal rainfall periods.

Although Europeans and native large landowners were the

primary beneficiaries of these subsidies and bonuses, attractive crop prices also enticed native Northwest African farmers into the cash

them

to significantly

The In

their cereal acreage.

colonial cereal policy

Morocco,

1918

expand

was successful

in

expanding the cultivated

for example, the area planted in cereals

to nearly 3 million

economy and encouraged

grew from

1.9 million

ha in 1929, an increase of roughly 60 percent.

area.

ha in

Cereal

acreage in neighboring Algeria and Tunisia also expanded dramatically. These increases reflected both vertical and horizontal intensification. Part of the cereal acreage

Much

of the

came from

rest

the reduction of fallow

came from

—

i.e.,

as rangeland.

Both of these processes increased the potential

The primary purpose of fallowing

Northwest Africa

is

to

allow

intensive land use.

the extension of cultivation to lower-rainfall areas,

which had previously been used exclusively

degradation.

more

soil

in

for

drought and land

semi-arid

regions

like

moisture to accumulate.*' Approximately 20 to

25 percent of the precipitation falling during the fallow year soil.

new

is

retained in the

Thus, fallowing stockpiles precipitation and substantially increases the

192

Will D.

Swearingen

water supply available for subsequent crop use. In low-rainfall areas, moisture component

and crop

failure.

is

this soil

often the critical difference between a successful harvest

With

the

reduction of fallowing,

buffer

this

was

lost.

Vulnerability to drought increased. Intensification of land use also increased the potential for land degradation, as did the extension of cultivation to lowerrainfall areas,

which were

typically characterized

by

thin,

sandy

soils that

were

prone to rapid wind and water erosion. While these lower-rainfall areas could sustain crops during higher-than-normal rainfall years, they

were subject

to

both

drought and accelerated erosion following the return of normal or lower-than-

normal

rainfall conditions.

Intensification in dryland agriculture

was matched by more

intensive land

use within colonial irrigation zones during the early years of colonization.

Following the agricultural

economic

became a

crisis

crisis

of the 1930s, which was linked to the world

and magnified by extended drought,

priority. All three colonial countries initiated

programs

develop

to

Northwest Africa’s

irrigation

irrigation

major

dam

potential

development construction for

colonial

agriculture. Irrigation

development focused primarily on production of export

mainly

and market vegetables. However, a secondary motive

crops,

fruits

behind colonial irrigation development was concern over Northwest Africa’s

burgeoning native population.

Food Security

Crisis following

Independence

Following independence (in 1956 for Morocco and Tunisia and 1962 for Algeria), all three countries recovered ownership of colonial landholdings. In

Algeria, this process

was

recovery process was

abrupt; in Tunisia and particularly

much more

Morocco, the land

cautious and gradual. All three countries

subsequently engaged in land reform. However,

much of

the former colonial

land passed into the hands of more prosperous or powerful native landowners. In addition,

most of the large landholdings acquired by native landowners during

the colonial period

were never subject

to land reform.

Because the

politically

powerful native large landowners had the same economic interests as the previous colonial farmers, high-value,

all

export-oriented

three countries continued to develop irrigation for agriculture,

national agricultural development policies.

which largely accounted

for

their

Development and Environmental Constraints While the three countries were developing

in

^93

Northwest Africa

irrigation for export agriculture,

they were neglecting their rain-fed agricultural sectors, which produced wheat

and barley and other staple food crops. Indeed, for following

independence,

the

at

Northwest African

three

neglected domestic food production. Until the 1950s,

all

least

two decades

countries

seriously

three countries

basically self-sufficient in production of these staple cereal crops.

were

Between

the

1950s and the 1980s, however, due to population growth and stagnation in production, 1980s,

all

all

three countries gradually lost this self-sufficiency. Indeed,

three

symptoms of

were experiencing a severe food security

this

crisis

by

the

The key

crisis.

were declining per capita cereal production; ever-

growing levels of cereal imports; heavy foreign indebtedness related

to these

imports; and massive food subsidy programs.

By

the early 1980s, Algeria

cereal supply, Tunisia

over a

third.

was importing approximately two-thirds of

was importing nearly

The import

bill for

half,

and Morocco was importing

these staple foods

was very

1980s, for example, Algeria’s total agricultural imports billion per year.^^ In

its

high. In the early

bill

averaged $2.2

each country, a large percentage of the population was

experiencing hunger and malnutrition, particularly during drought years. The political

implications of this crisis

became

experienced a tumultuous food-related Tunisia in 1983-1984, again in

riot.

Morocco

agricultural policy reforms.*'^

all

by 1981, when Morocco

Similar food-related riots erupted in

in 1984,

Contemporary Agricultural

Since the early-to-mid 1980s,

clear

and

in Algeria in 1988.

Intensification

three countries have

The overriding

been undertaking major

objective has been to increase food

production for the national markets, with a major focus on cereal crops. Specific reforms have included loosening of state controls over crop prices to stimulate additional production; promotion of agricultural mechanization; specific efforts in Algeria to

irrigation

develop so-called “new lands”; accelerated programs

development; and

to

maximize

initiatives to increase livestock production.

These

reforms have met with limited success. While they have increased overall food production, the resulting gains have been largely outstripped by population

growth. In addition, these reforms have played a key role in intensifying

Swearingen

Will D.

194

up

agriculture

—

to

possibly even beyond

—

the limits of

Northwest Africa’s

resource base. These reforms will be described and analyzed.

Changes

in

Pricing Policy

Following independence, the three Northwest African countries maintained tight control over producer prices of basic food crops. Prices for these crops, cereals

were held

in particular,

artificially low. Indeed, for

prices were only one-fourth to one-half of

government

was

that

intervention.^^

As

in

many

much of

this period,

crop

what they would have been without

other developing countries, the rationale

low crop prices could enable these governments

to

provide food

inexpensively to their urban populations. This would help keep wages low,

thereby assisting industrialization and other urban development initiatives. Additionally,

it

would help prevent

social unrest

among

the growing ranks of the

urban poor. Unfortunately, low crop prices acted as a major disincentive.

To

counteract stagnant production, the governments gradually raised fixed

producer prices for cereals and other basic food crops beginning in the 1970s. In Algeria and Tunisia, prices approached world market levels

by

late

the

These price increases were likely a significant factor behind

mid-1980s.

increased cereal production in the two countries. In Morocco, the government

boosted producer prices of barley and wheat to approximately twice world

market

levels.

As

will

be seen shortly, the stimulus effect of this action has been

remarkable.

Morocco’s high producer prices have been controversial (1)

These high prices have been costly

drought

years,

to the

when domestic production

for several reasons:

government. Ironically, during substantially

is

reduced,

the

government saves money by importing more of the country’s food supply

at

lower world market levels. (2) These high prices have almost exclusively benefited a small landowning elite 5 percent of

(3)

prices to

those with surplus grain to

Morocco’s cereal farmers are net

are essentially self-sufficient, grain.

—

sellers

sell.

Fewer than

of grain. Fifteen percent

and the remaining 80 percent are net purchasers of

Because the government passes on part of the cost of high producer

consumers, these consumers

—

virtually

all

of Morocco’s urban

—

pay

to subsidize the large

populations and four-fifths of the rural population grain growers. (4)

High crop prices have stimulated

a major expansion of cereal

Development and Environmental Constraints cultivation

to

marginal

areas,

resulting

in

Northwest Africa

unsustainable

in

land

^

^5

and

use

environmental deterioration.

Promotion of Agricultural Mechanization

All

governments have promoted agricultural mechanization through

three

subsidies since the early 1980s.

The success of this

increases in the use of agricultural machinery in

For example,

7.3).

effort all

is

reflected in dramatic

three countries (see Table

in Algeria, during the ten-year period

from 1982-1984

to

1992-1994, the number of tractors and harvesters increased by 78 and 92 percent respectively. In Morocco, the respective increases were 34 and percent, and in Tunisia they

were 15 and 19 percent. The overall

13

levels of

mechanization are relatively high. In Algeria, during the 1992-1994 period, there

were around 96,000

tractors

and 10,000 harvesters

in use. In

Morocco, the

respective figures were 42,000 tractors and 4,500 harvesters; in Tunisia, 30,000 tractors

and 3,100 harvesters.

Government

promote mechanization have

efforts to

facilitated the

expansion

of cereal cultivation to rangeland areas. Since the early 1980s, the tractor and disk

plow have converted

Some of

countries.

large stretches of rangeland to cereal acreage in

new

these

lands

(approximately 8 inches) of annual for a

few

normally receive as

rainfall.

little

as

normal or lower-than-normal

200

three

mm

Their poor soils can sustain cultivation

years, particularly during higher-than-normal rainfall periods.

the return of

all

However,

rainfall levels ultimately forces their

abandonment. Desertification quickly advances

in the

abandoned

areas. In effect,

farmers are destroying the grazing potential of these lands through clearing the natural vegetation, unsustainably “mining” their fragile soils, and leaving

exposed

to

wind and water

them

erosion.

“New Lands ” Program

in

Algeria

In Algeria, cultivation of marginal lands has actually

become

official policy.*^ In

1983, Algeria's government passed legislation that established an ambitious

homesteading program. The overriding purpose of

this

program has been

to

encourage Algerian citizens to maximize the country’s agricultural potential through

development

of

previously

Homesteaders have been required

to

pay

uncultivated a token

public

sum of one

domain

dinar. In

land.

exchange.

Will D.

196

Swearingen

They have

they have been given an allotment in one of the designated areas.

been required the

end of

and are

develop

to

this

this

land for agriculture within a five-year period. At

“proving up” period, they have been granted unrestricted

title,

free to sell or use their land as they choose.

Table

7.3.

Increases in Agricultural Mechanization in Northwest Africa

Harvesters

Tractors

% Change

Average

Number

Number

since

in

% Change

Average

since

in

Use, 1992-94

1982-84

Use, 1992-94

1982-84

Algeria

95,562

78

9,786

92

Morocco

42,000

34

4,500

13

Tunisia

30,158

15

3,070

19

Source: World Resources 1998-99

The goal has been production.

water

is

(New York: Oxford

this

p.

approximately 800,000 ha of

to put

About half of

University Press, 1998),

land

available for irrigation.

is

in the

286.

new

land into

Saharan zone where subsurface

However, the other

half,

some 400,000

involves dryland allotments in the country's high plateau region. Virtually

new

"cropland" in this region

is

ha, all

low-rainfall steppe land suitable only for stock

raising.

The homesteading program, however,

is

only part of Algeria's current "new

lands" scheme. In 1984, the Algerian government initiated a plan that envisions putting 2 million

come from is

to

short,

new ha of

land into production. Two-fifths of this land

the homesteading program.

come from reduction of fallow the

Algerian

initiative

The other

is

to

three-fifths, or 1.2 million ha,

in currently cultivated rain-fed areas. In

involves

intensification. Unfortunately, the results

both

horizontal

and

vertical

of Algeria’s “new lands” scheme have

not been encouraging. Large areas claimed under the homesteading program

have already been abandoned. Stripped of

their natural vegetation, these areas

Development and Environmental Constraints

in

197

Northwest Africa

have since been attacked by wind and water erosion and are becoming barren wastelands.

Maximizing Irrigation Development

In addition to striving to three countries have irrigation

been attempting

irrigated areas

much of which are

devoted

(tomatoes, onions, lettuce, (lentils,

to

are

increase cereal production through

to

all

produced

for export.

Indeed, the newly

high-value crops such as market vegetables

etc.), fruits,

fava beans, chickpeas,

However,

olives.

in their dryland areas, all

development. They have not been neglecting production of high-value

irrigated crops,

crops

expand cereal production

wine grapes, fodder crops, leguminous

etc.),

dates, sugarcane, sugar beets,

and

three countries have been attempting to address declining

per capita cereal production through irrigation. The irrigated area in

all

three

countries has steadily increased, as has cereal production through irrigated

means.

As Table area

in

7.4 demonstrates, there has been a steady increase in the irrigated

both Algeria and Tunisia. The increase in Morocco appears

impressive. However,

Morocco began

to heavily invest in

development before the other two countries. put around 400,000 ha in

modem

By

modem

the early 1970s,

it

less

irrigation

already had

perennial irrigation. (Another 410,000 ha in

the early 1970s consisted of traditional irrigation schemes,

many of which were

centuries old.)

The

figures in Table 7.4 only partially reflect the major emphasis that has

been placed on large-scale

irrigation

development

in all three countries since the

mid-1980s. All three countries are aggressively engaged in canal constmction programs.

The

dam and

irrigation

irrigated areas in all three countries will

expanding rapidly over the next decade and will approach the

limits

be

of the

sustainable potentially irrigable area (see Table 7.4). For example, in Morocco, the National Irrigation irrigation

Program expects

by 30 percent within

a decade,

expect to put into perennial irrigation year 2010.^^

all

to increase the area

and

in Tunisia,

under perennial

government planners

of the potentially irrigable land by the

Swearingen

Will D.

198

Table

Increases in the Perennial Irrigation Area

7.4.

in

Northwest Africa

(in hectares)

1984

1972

1996

Sustainable

Perennial Irrigable

Algeria

130,000

188,000

450,000

510,000

Morocco

811,000

1,073,000

1,093,000

1,488,000

Tunisia

170,000

270,000

350,000

402,000

Sources:

FAOSTAT Database

(Rome; Food and Agriculture Organization of

FAO,

online version, http://apps.fao.org/default.htm;

FAO

Area

Irrigation in the

the United Nations),

Near East Region

in

Figures;

Hypermedia Collections on Desertification (Rome: Food and Agnculture Organization of

the

United Nations), online version http://193.43.36.7/LIBRARY/Desert/DOCS/372135/37213500.htm. Note: These figures do not include spate irrigation, which accounts for an additional 110,000 ha in Algeria, 165,000 ha in

Irrigation

the

three

Morocco, and 30,000 ha

in Tunisia.

development has had a significant impact on cereal production in

countries,

particularly

Morocco. Morocco’s cereal areas

in

now

account for approximately 38 percent of Morocco’s total perennially irrigated area (see Table 7.4). In the other

two

countries, the percentage

is less,

and can

be estimated as perhaps 20 percent in Algeria and 15 percent in Tunisia.

Although in some cases, the

irrigated lands

were grown by rain-fed means,

this

has been offset by

cereals are

grown with

even

those in rain-fed areas are

triple

Irrigation

sociopolitical

irrigation.

development

in

have replaced lands where cereals

much higher

yields

where

Cereal yields with irrigation that are double or

common.

Northwest Africa has not been without significant

and economic problems. These include the following:

1) Irrigation

development in the three Northwest African countries has been

undertaken largely

at

the expense of the respective governments,

and has

Development and Environmental Constraints

in

199

No?~thwest Africa

primarily benefited relatively small numbers of wealthy landowners and client classes of land reform beneficiaries. 2)

Water prices charged by

even collected) are

below

far

government currently charges

the respective governments (which are often not

the real costs. For example, in

less than 10 percent

Morocco, the

of the actual long-term costs

of providing irrigation water to the agricultural sector. 3)

Heavily subsidized irrigation water charges have promoted production of

—

water-intensive crops

low value per

relatively

4) for

Water

—

which have

irrigation-distribution networks are high. In Tunisia,

combined

the

sugarcane, and rice

alfalfa,

unit of water use.

from

losses

example,

such as

from

losses

networks have been estimated

and urban distribution

irrigation

700 million m^ per year

at

—

roughly a quarter of

0A

all

of the water used by the country in a year.

dam

of

5) Siltation

reservoirs,

erosion in associated watersheds, the

accumulated capacity

m^, which

is

is

owing

becoming

lost to siltation in

around 7 percent of

to excessive deforestation

a serious problem.

Morocco

is

estimated

The annual

total capacity.

loss

and

soil

For example, at

is

800 million estimated

at

50 million m^.^*

More

significant

development

is

any

than

of these

around 92 percent of water use

in general,

world. Hydrologists

is

Morocco, 89 percent

Unfortunately,

commonly

all

consider countries with less than 1,000 m^ of a

chronic

three North African countries

According

to projections

(FAO) of the United Nations,

now

shortage fall

below

—

urban,

is still

in the year

demand. In Morocco, around 4 percent.

and agricultural for

Where

residents

this critical

—

are

all

Yet the region’s

three sectors of the

economy

experiencing rapid increases in

example, the annual growth in demand for water will all this water

set for serious political conflict

23

2000, Algeria will have only some 576

rapidly growing. In addition,

industrial,

of water.

of the Food and Agriculture Organization

m^ per person, Tunisia only 445 m^, and Morocco 943 population

in

one of the most water-scarce regions in the

water per person per year to have

threshold.

in

the highest in the world.

North Africa,

fresh

irrigation

The Moroccan and Tunisian percentages

Tunisia, and 60 percent in Algeria.

among

problems,

beginning to exhaust the region’s available water resources.

Irrigation accounts for

are

individual

come from? The

stage seems to be

over water. This political conflict will

and industry against the agricultural

sector.

is

pit

urban

Will D.

200

Impending water shortages

Swearingen

will not

be experienced equally because of

natural disparities in the distribution of water resources.

develop in certain regions

—

governments will be forced

from remaining surplus water

sector

in

As water

for example, in the Rabat-Sale metropolitan area to invest in water transfer

areas. This will

systems to import water

over

for

percent

25

government’s investment budget. World Bank analysts expect

by the year 2020,

—

be expensive. Public investments in the

Morocco already account

increase to 60 percent

shortages

of the

figure to

this

reflecting the escalating costs associated

with interbasin transfers and the exploitation of increasingly marginal water resources.

Initiatives to Increase Livestock

The governments production as a 7.5

in

way

to

the

early 1980s,

region have also attempted to increase livestock

improve food security in

shows the buildup

Production

their respective countries.

Table

in the sheep herds in the respective countries since the

which ranges from

a

low of 21 percent

in

Morocco

to a

high of 30

percent in Tunisia. These increases are on top of levels that were probably already excessive in

many

areas. In Tunisia, for

were already estimated by one study

to

example, stocking rates in 1981

be three

to eight times greater than the

'^’1

There has been a similar buildup of goat herds in Algeria and

optimal level.

Tunisia (but not Morocco) during this period.

Table

7.5.

Increases in Sheep in Northwest Africa

1980-82

1996-98

Average

Average

Algeria

13,740,000

17,023,000

+24%

Morocco

14,113,000

16,204,000

+21%

Tunisia

4,935,000

6,431,000

+30%

Source;

FAOSTAT Database

Net Change

(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of

online version http://apps.fao.org/default.htm.

the United Nations),

Development and Environmental Constraints

Government attempts

in

201

Northwest Africa

numbers have involved both

to increase livestock

subsidies and price interventions. In general, government policies have had two

key

government subsidies

effects: (1) In the higher-rainfall regions,

for barley,

other feed crops, irrigation, and fertilizer have encouraged the intensification of livestock production (mainly of sheep and cattle) and the integration of this

production with crop production. This has led to a buildup of herd sizes and an extension of feed crop cultivation to marginal rangeland areas

mechanized

cultivation. (2) In the lower-rainfall areas,

—

usually

government provision of

subsidized feed grains has prevented the usual dramatic declines in herd size

during drought years. This well-intentioned effort has contributed to the buildup

of herd sizes and their maintenance

well beyond range carrying

levels

at

capacity.

In both cases,

conversion significant

the

on the environment has been dramatic. The

effect

of marginal

rangeland

to

feed

grain

production

has

entailed

environmental problems. In Tunisia, for example, an estimated

500.000 ha of land

in

semi-arid and hilly areas have been brought into

production over the past two decades. Over half of the rangeland in the southern part of the country

And permanent

is

loss

now

considered to be moderately to severely degraded.

of land

to desertification

is

estimated to average around

8.000 ha per year.^^

Results of Reforms and Analysis

Because many of these agricultural reforms to

expand the area cultivated

in cereals,

in it

Northwest Africa were intended

is

appropriate to examine cereal

cultivation trends. Unfortunately, these trends are difficult to identify because of

weather-related fluctuations in agricultural performance from year to year.

These fluctuations are due

to

animal-drawn plows aren’t able has land

first is

several factors.

For example, farmers using

to put their land into cultivation until rainfall

softened the earth. This means that during drought years,

much

of the

not able to be put into cultivation. Or, farmers with access to mechanized

plowing

may

decide, on the basis of early signs of drought, not to put

land into production.

On

all

of their

the other hand, during higher-than-normal rainfall

Swearingen

202

Will D.

years, farmers are both able

and willing

maximize the cultivated

to

area. In

terms of agricultural trends, comparing a single year with another year relatively meaningless.

years included

Even multiyear averages can be misleading, because

may not be

Nonetheless,

it

is

is

the

representative.

useful

to

attempt to

identify

trends

in

agricultural

performance over time. Table 7.6 compares the area cultivated in the three

Northwest African countries during the six-year period 1979-1984 with that during the more recent six-year period

compares cereal cultivation

in the three

reforms to that after reforms were

7.6.

Northwest African countries before

The

initiated.

between the respective countries are

Table

1993-1998. This table essentially

differences in performance

striking.

Increases in Cereal Area in Northwest Africa (hectares cultivated annually)

Net Change

1979-84

1993-98

Average

Average

Algeria

2,729,000

2,383,000

-13%

Morocco

4,438,000

5,307,000

+20%

Tunisia

1,421,000

1,212,000

-15%

Sources;

FAO

World Crop and Livestock

Statistics,

Organization of the United Nations, 1987);

1948-1985 (Rome: Food and Agriculture

FAOSTAT

Database (Rome: Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations), online version http://apps.fao.org/default..

This table reveals that only in Morocco was there a significant increase in the total area cultivated in cereals (mainly

wheat and barley). In Morocco, the

total area cultivated in cereals

increased

by about

fifteen-year period. In Algeria

and Tunisia,

a fifth over this roughly

in contrast, there

were actually

significant decreases in the areas cultivated in cereals. In Algeria, the decrease

over

this

period was roughly 13 percent; in Tunisia,

must be noted, however, in the

cultivated area

that these average figures

from year

to

it

was roughly 15

mask

percent.

It

substantial fluctuations

year as a result of different weather

conditions. For example, in Algeria, during the

most recent six-year period, the

1

Development and Environmental Constraints

in

203

Northwest Africa

area cultivated in cereals varied from a low of 1.1 million ha to a high of 3.7

million ha. In Morocco, the range

was from

4.9 to 6 million ha; and in Tunisia,

it

0.6 to 2 million ha.

The increase

in the cereal area in

roughly 20 percent

cultivation

—

of fallow; and (2) the extension of cereal

A

marginal rangeland.

to

Morocco of approximately 900,000 ha —

has resulted from two different types of agricultural

(1) the reduction

intensification:

Morocco

was from

reveals that, already

by

of agricultural production in

history

the early 1940s, cereal cultivation in

had reached the 4.4 million ha figure In short, virtually all viable cropland

that

still

Morocco

prevailed during the early 1980s.

was already

in production a half century

However, encouraged by extremely high crop prices since the mid-1980s,

ago.

Moroccan farmers have dramatically reduced

the acreage left in fallow.

continuously cropped areas are not allowed to accumulate

Because

soil moisture, as

they

do when fallowed, the reduction of fallowing has effectively deducted an input of water from the cropping system and substantially increased the vulnerability to drought.

Besides reducing fallow since the mid-1980s, Moroccan farmers

have also substantially expanded the area of cereal crops

These marginal new lands are not only prone

rainfall areas.

and wind erosion, they are also highly vulnerable

Drought region's

is

an endemic natural hazard

in

in

to desertification

to drought.

Northwest Africa. However, the

drought hazard (viewed as a socioeconomic rather than purely a

meteorological phenomenon) has actually been increasing.

drought hazard are

directly

related

percentage of the region’s cropland to policies

is

to

the

now

fact

at a

located in low-rainfall areas.

record level. In Morocco, for example,

Morocco

than 400

proportion

of

is

mm

is

now

in

drought-prone areas

at least 5

percent of the cereal

located in drought-prone areas

—

those receiving

(approximately 16 inches) of precipitation a year.^° The

cropland

performance from year

creates

to year.

dramatic

fluctuations

in

For example, cereal production

ranged from a disastrous harvest of only

1.8

million tons in

exceptionally bountiful harvest of 10 million tons in 1996.

While higher crop prices help explain

how

1

is

probably even higher in the other two countries. This record level

drought-prone

area,

Owing

implemented during the 1980s, which encouraged mechanization and

cultivation in less

Increases in the

an increasingly high

that

expansion of cultivation, the proportion of cropland

now

marginal low-

in

Morocco

1995

to

an

3

the increases in

can the decreases in the cultivated areas

agricultural

Morocco’s cultivated

in Algeria

and Tunisia be

Will D. Swearingen

204 explained?

Actually,

these

decreases

more recent attempts

countries. Despite

continue to

a

expand

long-term trend

in

both

their cereal-producing areas,

both Algeria and Tunisia have been losing ground for the past several decades.

For example, cereal hectarage in Algeria during the 1954-1960 period averaged 3.3 million

ha per year. Thus, there has actually been a decrease in cereal

hectarage of around 28 percent over the past four decades. In Tunisia, the reduction has been even more striking. Cereal hectarage during the 1954-1960

period averaged around 2.1 million ha. The decrease since then amounts to

roughly 42 percent.

The explanation converted to urbanization

practices that have desertification

substantial

is

more important,

to

not that former cereal lands have been Rather,

these

reductions

unsustainable

been causing environmental

are

agricultural

due

land

deterioration. Soil erosion

to

use

and

have been progressively advancing in both countries, causing

amounts of cropland

These reductions limits

both countries

crop production.

other and,

in

to

be abandoned or used only for stock raising.

in the cultivated areas in Algeria

of arable land resources

may have

and Tunisia indicate

that the

already been reached. Indeed, they

suggest that there has actually been a permanent reduction in the agrarian resource base.

The

efforts

of these two countries to intensify rain-fed agriculture

have been a losing effort - indeed, they have seemingly been counterproductive. It is

also revealing to

compare overall cereal production

in the three

Northwest

African countries before reforms were initiated to that after these reforms. Table 7.7 compares total cereal production in the three Northwest African countries for the six-year period

1979-1984 with

that during the

1986-1992 and 1993-1998

periods.

Table 7.7 shows that there was a substantial increase in cereal production in all

from a low

three countries following the policy reforms. This increase varied

of 23 percent in Algeria

to a

reflect the various policy

high of 52 percent in Morocco. These increases

reforms and demonstrate that these reforms were

generally successful in expanding total cereal production in the respective countries.

It is

significant,

however, that following

1992 period, cereal production

may be

partly a weather-related

initial

gains in the 1986-

in all three countries again declined.

phenomenon,

it

does suggest that a

While

new

this

ceiling

has been reached and that possibly environmental deterioration related to intensified land use

is

beginning to affect agricultural performance.

Development and Environmental Constraints Table

7.7.

in

Northwest Africa

Cereal Production Trends in Northwest Africa

(in

metric tons)

1979-84

1986-92

1993-98

Average

Average

Average

Algeria

1,740,000

2,223,000

2,147,000

+23%

Morocco

3,831,000

6,270,000

5,843,000

+52%

Tunisia

1,124,000

2,199,000

1,602,000

+43%

Sources:

FAO

World Crop and Livestock

Organization of the United Nations, 1987);

Statistics,

205

Net Change

1948-1985 (Rome: Food and Agriculture

FAOSTAT

Database (Rome: Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations), online version http://apps.fao.org/default.htm.

However, increases

in total

production are

less

important to food security

than increases in per capita production, which take into account population

growth. Table 7.8 reveals cereal production trends on a per capita basis,

expressed in kilograms/person, during

Table

7.8.

same

period.

Per Capita Cereal Production (in

Sources:

this

in

Northwest Africa

kilograms per person)

1979-84

1993-98

Average

Average

Algeria

90

76

-16%

Morocco

193

220

+ 14%

Tunisia

170

178

+5%

FAO

Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics (diverse issues);

Net Change

FAOSTAT Database

(Rome: Food

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), online version http://apps.fao.org/default.htm.

206

Will D.

Swearingen

This table shows that growth in per capita cereal production was modest or

even negative in the three Northwest African countries. Morocco’s increase was a

modest 14 percent, Tunisia’s increase was only

capita cereal production actually declined

by 1 6

the previous increases in total cereal production is

entirely

due

5 percent,

percent.

The

and Algeria’s per difference between

and these modest or poor

results

to population growth.

Population growth has been one of the primary forces behind intensified use

of land and water resources in Northwest Africa. As in most of the developing world, the rate of population growth in Northwest Africa during the present

century has been without historical precedent. Until the twentieth century, the region's total population

Now,

remained below 12 million inhabitants.

century’s end, the region’s population

estimated 70 million people.

is

nearly six times larger, with an

Population pressure

is

clearly

one of the key

underlying causes of environmental deterioration in Northwest Africa. capacities

of the

respective

natural

population, in a sustainable manner, are

at

resource

bases

to

support

becoming increasingly

The

additional

strained.

Conclusion

To summarize, 1)

the following

key trends have been

identified:

Cereal cultivation has been expanding to marginal lower-rainfall areas,

leading to environmental degradation and increasing vulnerability to drought. 2)

The percentage of cropland

left in

fallow has been progressively reduced,

contributing to a gradual deterioration in agricultural productivity and increasing vulnerability to drought. 3) Livestock

numbers have grown well beyond

and stock raising has been expanding little

used.

The

result has

to

the range carrying capacity,

marginal areas that previously were

been overgrazing of rangeland resources and land

degradation processes such as soil erosion and desertification. 4) Irrigation

development

is

leading to impending water shortages, as the

region approaches the limits of its economically mobilizable water resources.

Signs that these agricultural intensification processes are reaching the limits

of the region’s land resources include reductions in the cultivated acreage in Algeria and Tunisia

—

despite

government

efforts

to

expand

this

acreage;

Development and Environmental Constraints declines in total cereal production in

three countries

all

and 1993-1998 periods; and apparent increases conclusion,

In

agricultural

three countries.

all

some short-term economic

in the

intensification

Northwest Africa

frequency of drought.

in

Northwest

has

policy changes were

Although these three countries have achieved

collision course with the region’s environmental constraints.

approaching or exceeding the limits of

its

now on

Northwest Africa

a is

available land and water resources,

for the region’s future.

Will D. Swearingen and Abdellatif Bencherifa, eds.. The North African

1.

Environment 2.

Africa

gains, current intensification processes are

which has serious implications

207

between the 1986-1992

when major

accelerated significantly since the mid-1980s, established in

in

at Risk (Boulder,

Will D. Swearingen,

CO: Westview

Press, 1996), pp. 3-7.

Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions,

1912-1986 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University “Drought Hazard

in

Morocco,”

in

Press, 1987); Will D. Swearingen,

Geographical Review, Vol. 82, No.

4, pp.

401-

412. 3.

Karen

Pfeifer,

CO: Westview 4.

Agrarian Reform under State Capitalism

Algeria (Boulder,

Press, 1985).

Hafedh Sethom, “L’Action des Pouvoirs Publics sur

I’Economie Rurale dans

au Maghreb,

in

eds.

P.

la

les

Paysages Agraires

Tunisie Independante,” in Etats, Territoires

R. Baduel et

al.

Centre National de

(Paris:

la

et

et Terroirs

Recherche

Scientifique, 1985), pp. 98-113. 5.

Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages, pp. 143-144.

6. Pfeifer,

Agrarian Reform, pp. 98-103.

7.

Sethom, “L’Action des Pouvoirs Publics,” pp. 102-103.

8.

Swearingen, Moroccan Mirages, pp. 144-145.

9.

Will D. Swearingen, “Northwest Africa,” in Drought Follows the Plow, ed.

M. H. Glantz (Cambndge: Cambridge University Sweanngen,

“Is

Drought Increasing

in

Press, 1994), pp.

Northwest Afnca?:

A

1

17-133; Will D.

Historical Analysis,” in

The North African Environment, pp. 17-34. 10.

11.

Rene Hoffherr, L ’Economie Marocaine

(Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1932).

World Meteorological Organization, Drought and

Note No. 138 (Geneva:

WMO,

1975).

Agriculture, Technical

208

Will D.

D. Swearingen, “Government Agricultural Policies and the Growing

12. Will

Food Security Phillip C.

Swearingen

Crisis,” in State

and Society

in Algeria, eds.

John

P. Entelis

and

Naylor (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 117-149; Will D.

Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform in Northwest Africa: Economic Necessities and

Environmental Dilemmas,”

Economy, 13.

North Africa: Development and Reform

in

Dirk Vandewalle

ed.

FAO

(New York:

St.

in

a Global

Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 67-92.

Trade Yearbook 1985 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of

the United Nations, 1985). 14. 15.

Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform

Kevin Cleaver,

in

Northwest Africa,” pp. 73-92.

The Agricultural Development Experience of Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia: A Comparison of Strategies for Growth, Staff Working Paper 552 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1982). 16.

John Schamper, “Policy Dialogue Agenda: Agricultural Pricing and Trade,”

Unpublished briefing paper for USAID/Morocco, 1994. 17.

cultural 18.

Swearingen,

Reform

in

“Government Agricultural

Policies”;

Swearingen,

“Agri-

Northwest Africa.”

AQUASTAT (Rome: Food

and Agriculture Organization of the U.N.),

http://www.fao.org/waicent/FaoInfo/Agricult/AG17AGLW/AQUASTAT/profil.htm. 19. Ian

Goldin and David Roland-Host, “Economic Policies for Sustainable

Resource Use

in

Wilfrido Cruz,

Mohan Munasinghe, and Jeremy Warford (Washington, DC: World

Bank),

Morocco,”

in

The Greening of Economic Policy Reform, eds.

p. 58.

20.

Mohamed

Matoussi, “Sources of Strain and Alternatives for Relief in the

Most Stressed Water Systems of North the Middle East: Challenges

Africa,” in Water

and Opportunities,

eds. E.

Management

22.

Africa

and

Rached, E. Rathgeber, and

D. Brooks (Ottawa: International Development Research Center), 2\.

in

p. 87.

AQUASTAT. FAO,

Irrigation in the

Near East Region

in

Figures,

FAO

Hypermedia

Collections on Desertification (Rome:

Food and Agriculture Organization of the

United

http://l 93.43. 36.7/LlBRARY/Desert/DOCS

Nations),

online

version

/372135/37213500.htm. 23. Matoussi, “Sources of Strain,” p. 90. 24.

FAO,

State

of Food and Agriculture 1993 (Rome: Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations). 25. Goldin

and Roland-Host, “Economic Policies,”

p. 57.

.

Development and Environmental Constraints

in

^09

Northwest Africa

26. Ibid., p. 58.

Zeinab

27.

Environmental

Partow and Stephen Impacts

during

Economic Policy Reform,

Mink, “Tunisia:

Economic

Livestock

Adjustment,”

in

The

and

Policies

Greening

of

p. 170.

28. Ibid., p. 169.

Swearingen,

29.

“Drought

Hazard”;

Swearingen,

“Northwest

Afnca”;

Swearingen, “Is Drought Increasing?” 30.

“USAID

1986, Morocco: Country Development Strategy Statement

1987-1991). Annex C: The Agricultural

Unpublished

report,

Sector in

Morocco:

A

(FYS

Description,”

February (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International

Development). 3

1

.

EAOSTA T Database.

32. Swearingen, “Agricultural Reform,” p. 88.

33.

Rene

Escallier, “Population et Urbanisation,” in

Espaces, ed. Jean-Fran 9 ois Troin (Paris: Escallier,

“Demographic

et

Armand

Migrations,” in

Yves Lacoste (Tours: La Decouverte, 1991), 34. p.

Le Maghreb: Hommes

Colin, 1985), pp. 119-174;

LEtat du Maghreb, pp.

World Resources 1998-99 (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1998),

244. 35.

Rene

eds. Camille

19-91

Swearingen and Bencherifa, The North African Environment

at Risk.

et

and

5 / Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture: The Case of the Middle East Michael E. Bonine

Agriculture in the Middle East

providing

is

an important economic sector and

much of the food consumed by the

climatically

arid

and semi-arid,

still

Most of the Middle

depend upon

East,

however,

issues. Irrigation often is needed,

water between and within countries

is

and these conditions create considerable

environmental limitations and problems for agriculture. Sufficient water and

management become paramount

for

inhabitants of the states of the region.

Despite increasing urbanization, substantial numbers of people the cultivation of crops for their livelihoods.

is critical

is

its

and conflict over

common.

The physical environment, however, may be only one of the

difficulties

when

considering the broader topic of agricultural development. National governmental policies

and goals influence or attempt to control the agricultural

sector, as well as

provide the institutional and financial framework for the implementation of agricultural planning is

grown and

and production. State incentives and

harvested.

Major

irrigation

restrictions

impact what

and water delivery systems, provision of

many

other

Yet, even the best of intentions and government policies confront a

most

loans and credit, building of roads for marketing of crops, and infrastructure supports

difficult

demographic

most rapid

must be provided by a

reality.

central government.

Population increase in the Middle East

in the world. Increasing irrigation or

expand areas under cultivation may indeed add Yet, while attempting to provide their

percentage of relentless

it),

the nations of the

one of the

mechanization to intensify and/or to the total quantity

own people

of production.

with sufficient food (or even a

Middle East continue

to lose

ground

to the

growth of their populations. Rising incomes and standards of living also

result in greater per capita

food demands.

Another relevant theme for the Middle East

which has developed

is

sustainable.

is

whether or not the agriculture

Particularly in certain countries

questionable whether or not the agricultural development term.

is

The depletion of aquifers, dependence on risky

is

it

is

viable for the long

rainfall or irrigation, frequent

droughts, and continual expansion of cultivated areas in a moisture-deficit region create

major problems for sustaining agricultural production.

Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture

211

This paper examines issues of agricultural development in Southwest Asia and

North Africa (called the Middle East for simplification). Although generalizations are

made about

more

the region, several countries of the

Middle East are examined

in

including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Eg>T3t. The paper focuses

detail,

on national policies and goals

specifically

those goals and resulting projects

Food production, indeed, be sustainable

in the

is

may

for developing agriculture,

how

contrast with agricultural sustainability.

increasing in the region, but

future.

and

many programs may

not

In conclusion the paper presents the principal

challenges for agriculture in the Middle East in the twenty-first century.

Agriculture in the Middle East:

Drylands or arid lands have a the

deficit

Some Environmental

of moisture measured on an annual basis, and

Middle East constitutes one of the

largest arid regions in the world.

the moisture deficit, the greater the aridity. Aridity can be

precipitation versus the transpiration

Limitations

amount of (potential) moisture

The

larger

measured by an index of

loss

from evaporation and

from plants (called potential evapotranspiration), calculated by the

formula P/PET. Using such an aridity index,

LTNESCO

has devised a classification

system of world arid zones or regions as follows: hyperarid (P/PET = < 0.05), arid

(P/PET = 0.05-0.20), semiarid (P/PET - 0.20-0.50), dry subhumid (P/PET = 0.50-




0.65).'

Most of North Africa and Southwest Asia environment (Figure

8.1).

is

classified as

al-Khali deserts comprise

millimeters

(mm) of rainfall

uninhabited.

arid

North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are principally

hyperarid, the largest such extremely dry region in the world.

Rub

some type of

much of

this area, receiving

annually, or no rain in

The next category,

arid zones,

may

some

The Sahara and

the

only some tens of

years,

receive from

and are largely

80-350

mm

of

moisture in winter rainfall areas (as in the Mediterranean), and begin to have some

human

occupation, including pastoral nomadic economies.

The northern and

southern margins of the hyperarid Sahara Desert merge into these arid zones, while

much of the

northern Arabian Peninsula, Iran, and Central Asia are also climatically

arid zones (Figure 8.1).

212

Michael

Figure

8.1.

E.

Bonine

Arid Zones in North Africa and the Middle East

Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture

The semiarid zones, however, in the

Middle

East.

rainfall areas, this

is

With the

are the principal location of

precipitation

from 200

major agricultural zone

to

700

213

human

habitation

mm annually

for the region.

in winter

Morocco, northern

Algeria and Tunisia, the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean), Turkey, and northern Iran are

some of these

areas (Figure 8.1), often classified as a Mediterranean Climate

(winter rainfall, dry summers). Highlands or mountains are also significant for these zones, particularly for moisture-laden westerly winds being forced up and

condensing over such systems as the Atlas Mountains, Lebanon Mountains, highlands of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the Zagros Mountains of

western

Iran.

While the western slopes receive considerable winter

descending and warming resulting in arid

air

on the eastern

sides are

much

rainfall,

drier, this rain

shadow

and even hyperarid zones.

The dry subhumid zone and

the

even wetter humid zone also have considerable

population, but they comprise smaller areas in the Middle East and sometimes represent less inhabitable mountainous regions as well. Parts of northwest Africa,

northwest Iran, Lebanon, and particularly Turkey comprise these major wetter areas.

Rainfed or dryland farming can be practiced

in the

dry subhumid and humid

zones as well as in some other highland areas in the Middle East where greater

These lands

precipitation occurs than in the surrounding, lower elevations.

comprise some of the principal agricultural regions of the Middle East.

A

key element

for agriculture in dry climates

precipitation. Generally the drier the climate, the

be from year

to year;

it

more

arid.

more

variable the conditions can less

While interannual

and

less reliable as

rainfall variability is

25 percent for dry subhumid zones and 25-50 percent for semiarid zones,

can be 50-100 percent in arid zones and even

The increase

in variability

of drier climates

planners either ignore or minimize agricultural projects.

upon

rainfall

-

is

less reliable in hyperarid zones.

a concept that

to the peril

many

engineers and

of the viability of

Averages often can be meaningless

Droughts can impact drylands rely

the variability of the annual

annual averages of precipitation are

general climatic conditions are less than

is

many

in a dryland climate.

drastically, especially if cultivation

and snow either for crops or the water supply

is

attempting to

for irrigation.

Related to dryland climates are soil-related problems. Arid soils tend to be

shallow and coarse textured and have poorly developed horizons.

Low

moisture

content limits biological activity, which in turn restricts the amount of organic material that can enrich the

soil.

oxidation of the organic material.

High summer temperatures increase

the rapid

The infrequent but heavy rainstorm can remove

Michael E. Bonine

214

much of

the loose soil. In lowland, basin areas,

heavy impermeable clays can

develop, as well as salt crusts. Alluvial floodplains often are the most

fertile

areas

'y

for cultivation.

Whatever

source, water availability

its

agriculture in the

Middle

farmlands, in

fact,

levels per unit

agricultural

And where

East.

farming (or even where that

is

the principal physical constraint for

there cannot be rainfed or dryland

too risky), irrigation must take place. Irrigated

is

provide areas for more intensive agriculture, and so production

of land are

much

higher than in the rainfed regions.

Most major

development schemes are concerned with creating or expanding

irrigated areas.

The majority of

the irrigation systems are rather small-scale

systems, similar to most of the world's irrigated cropland (where about 85 percent rely

on small-scale, hand-built, gravity-flow canal systems, managed by

local

groups of farmers).^ However, there are also larger, state-supported irrigation and cultivation schemes, although the success of these often has will

been questionable,

as

be discussed in the case studies below.

Agricultural Patterns in the Middle East

Most of the land

in the

Middle East

is

not arable. All states have less than one-third

of their land cultivated (with Turkey's 35 percent that percentage).

of the area

is

Table

8.1

shows

that in

bemg the

1996 for the

only

state slightly

over

entire region, only 7.6 percent

arable or in permanent crops. Six states have at least one-fifth of their

land arable, and

many of the more

arid states, as in the

Arabian Peninsula, have

only a small percentage of all their land cultivated. Turkey dominates in total area in agriculture, with 26.9 million hectares (ha)

Iran

is

of arable land and permanent crops.

a solid second place, with 19.4 million ha, followed

by Sudan's estimated 13

million ha of agricultural land.

Permanent crops are those

that

do not need

to

be replanted with each harvest,

including fruit and nut trees and vines. Sizeable percentages of many countries are

permanent crops, where date palms, olive

trees,

or citrus fruit trees

may be

particularly prominent. For instance, over half of the (minuscule) arable lands in

Bahrain,

Oman, and

the United

palms), while over 40 percent

(mostly olives and citrus

Arab Emirates is

in

is

in

permanent crops (mostly date

permanent crops

fruit trees).

in Tunisia

and Lebanon

Turkey and Iran have sizeable areas of

permanent crops, although Tunisia also has over 2 million ha of these arable lands.

5

Agricultural Development or Sustainable Agriculture

2

1

per arable

land Persons

3.6

19.2

rN

of

CO 04

2.9

150.0

3.2

13.3

360.0

12.7

r^4

00*

31.3

2.8

r-T

2.3

rr

o

3.5

c^

lu

1 land person

(hectares)

0,280

0.052

0.399

0.362

o rT

1 0.536

0.341

0.007

per

r-i 0.281

-T Population

28.7

(million)

5.3

62.7

26.7

0.075

0.093

fOOO

0,105

0.079

0.026

0.032

0.203

0.353

0.429

T

2.4

0.5

18.9

14.7

62.8

2.6

28.0

98.4

38.6

21.7

15.6

96.0

0.283

0

o'

Arable

If

27.3

23.6

00

00 20.6

OO TT

399.7

>0

' of area

0

1996

CO

percent

7.0

22.2

13.0

CO lUircau

15.0

125.0

37.4

019

45.5

18.3

001

Area

0001

31.3

25.9

OO

arable

Use,

As Kcfcrciicc

Irrigated

ha)

Land Area

560

470

3266

1258

1946

380

2800

7265

3525

199

75

88

o oo T

62

(1000

1127

72

4200

485

29281 I'upulalion

1996, Agricultural

Arable

crops

6.5

14.2

14.3

Percentage

6 8

90

oo 41.7

o o'

o

OO 8.5

19.7

22.0

1

40.8

1

-T

18.8

3.4

13.7

9.2

53.3

7.0

9.0 Slieel,

J

Data

Permanent

ha)

East

519

Area

300

466

855

80

2036

T -r

fN

1650

280

86

06

1

1

128

47

130

710

o TT

2472

108

10146

ropntalioii

(1000

Middle

of

I'AO

area

8.1.

CN

percent

3.4

3.3

21.6

12.4

6 0

oo

CO

5.5

12.0

13.2

21.2

4.6

0.3

30.7

28.3

0.3

35.0

ro

Cn 04

7.6 Natiims,

total

As

i

Table

Unilcd

51,

ha) Arable

Area

8040

2115

3266

9661

13000

4878

8054

19400

5780

437

314

410

63

3830

5196

26946

1 75

1548

113038

vol.

(1000

1997,

L

ha)

Land

Area

238174

99545

175954

44630

237600

15536

65209

69

162200

43832

2062

8893

1782

1023

21246

1100

214969

18378

76963

8360

52797

1490322 Yearbook,

(1000 Total

j Total I'lOilnciion

Arabia

Country

Afghanistan

5 Morocco

.Mgeria

1

Kuwait

I’unisia

Libya

Sudan

n

Jordan Israel

Iran

Iraq

o 5

X

y

Qatar

Oman

Saudi

Syria

Turkey