Rulers and Nobles in Fifteenth-Century Muscovy 0860781208, 9780860781202

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Polnyj pravoslavnyj bogoslovskij enciklopediceskij slovar’ 2 vols. (1913) Russian edition

N. TIXONRAVOV Pamjatniki otrecennoj russkoj literatury I & II 1863 St. Petersburg & Moscow editions

K.I.DIKSON, A.V.MEZ’ER & D. A.BRAGINSKIJ Bibliograficeskie ukazateli perevodnoj belletristiki 1897 & 1902 St. Petersburg editions In the Collected Studies Series:

MARZ SZEFTEL Russian Institutions and Culture up to Peter the Great

SAMUEL H. BARON Muscovite Russia

P.N.BERKOV Literary Contacts between Russia and the West since the 14th Century

DIMITRI OBOLENSKY The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe

IHOR SEVCENKO Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World

BARI SA KREKIC Dubrovnik, Italy and the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages

ALEXANDRE SOLOVIEV Byzance et la formation de l’Etat russe

ANDRZEJ POPPE The Rise of Christian Russia

J. A. BOYLE The Mongol World Empire, 1206-1370

OMEUAN PRITSAK Studies in Medieval Eurasian History

Rulers and Nobles Fifteenth-Century Muscovy

Professor Gustave Alef

Gustave Alef

Rulers and Nobles Fifteenth-Century Muscovy

VARIORUM REPRINTS London 1983

British Library CIP data

Alef, Gustave Rulers and nobles in fifteenth-century Muscovy. - (Collected studies series; CS172) 1. Moscow - History I. Title II. Series 947'.04 DK102 ISBN 0-86078-120-8

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CONTENTS

Introduction

I

The Political Significance o f the Inscriptions on Muscovite Coinage in the Reign of Vasilii II

i-iii

-1 9

Speculum XX X IV . Cambridge, Mass., 1959

II

The Battle of Suzdal’ in 1445. An Episode in the Muscovite War of Succession

1 -2 0

Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 25. Berlin, 1978

III

Muscovy and the Council o f Florence

389 401

Slavic Review XX. Seattle, Washington, 1961

IV

Das Erlöschen des Abzugrechts der Moskauer Bojaren Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 10. Berlin, 1965

-7 4

/ V

The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy: A Factor in the Growth o f Monarchical Power

15—58

Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 15. Berlin, 1970

/©>

Reflections on the Boyar Duma in the Reign of Ivan III

7 6 -1 2 3

Slavonic and East European Review XL V. London, 1967

,0 )

Muscovite Military Reforms in the Second Half of the 15th Century

7 3 -1 0 8

Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 18. Berlin, 1973

. VIII

The Origin and Early Development o f the Muscovite Postal Service

1—15

Jahrbücher fü r Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, 15. Munich, 1967

IX

The Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle: A Discordant View

1—21

Speculum XLI. Cambridge, Mass., 1966

®

Aristocratic Politics and Royal Policy in Muscovy in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 27. Berlin, 1980

77—109

XI

Diaspora Greeks in Moscow

26—34

Byzantine Studies/Etudes Byzantines 6. Tempe, Arizona, 1979

Index

1 -5

This volume contains a total of 354 pages

INTRODUCTION These eleven studies deal with military, political and social developments of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Almost all of them touch upon aspects of the transformation of political power in the reigns of Vasilii II (1425-1462) and Ivan III (1462-1505). Most historians agree on the importance of the second half of the fifteenth century as a time when the ruler of Moscow annexed most of the neighboring principalities. Yet this was also the period when grand princely suzerainty turned into sovereignty. The emergence of a ruling prince with absolute authority over his subjects may fairly be dated to this time. This development began during the dynastic wars earlier in the century and the subsequent annexations only accelerated a process in being. What is clear to me now was but dimly sensed at the beginning o f my quest. The sources are not friendly to questions concerned with the internal transformation. The chronicles explain little about the changes. Other documentation, such as treaties, testa­ ments, land grants and charters of immunity, added examples of change but not the reasons. A venture into numismatics revealed when the concept of sovereignty emerged. Where one would have expected the clues to come from images impressed upon the coinage o f Vasilii II (since so few were able to read), the evidence for the break with the past was found in the inscriptions. In a later study of the grand princely seals, the opposite held true. At the very time when coinage inscriptions revealed the emergence o f a sovereign concept, the images on the wax seals yielded a parallel manifestation. Somewhere the Muscovites had obtained possession o f classical gemstones, which the princes employed in the creation of their seals. Vasilii II first selected the representation o f the pagan sun-god Helios in bust profile, with rays emanating from his braided hair, mistaking it for a crowned figure. When this device was lost in 1445 he replaced it with another Helios, smaller in size —depicted in chariot —but still showing the rayed

elements. Ivan III evidenced some uncertainty about his royal device until the contacts developed with the Habsburgs in the 1480s and ’90s. A desire to declare equality with Emperor Frederick III led Ivan to adopt a Morean version of a two-headed eagle. This became the symbol of the Russian tsardom until the end o f the Romanov dynasty. Originally Ivan III introduced his eagle as a diplomatic ploy, one that had little to do with sovereignty. Symbols were but expressions of aspiration. Power is fashioned of more durable stuff. The discovery of the mechanisms of change required different kinds of inquiry. First came a linear investigation of the rights of departure by free servitors, which revealed that the vanquished lost the privilege of voluntary service in the aftermath of the dynastic wars. The price of their rehabilitation was perpetual service. The Muscovite government thereafter employed every opportunity to impose the concept of unswerving and continual service upon the entire warrior class. A subsequent study of the mobilization of military manpower in the later Fifteenth century revealed the patterns employed by Ivan III to staff his armies. While it could be demonstrated that Vasilii II and Ivan III endeavored to transform the old service nobility and the blooded aristocrats into obedient servants, these inquiries did not reveal why the elite members accepted the new conditions. Their ancestors had vehemently opposed subordination and thereby had prevented the emergence of unfettered power in the hands of the grand prince. This question led to an investigation o f the economic underpinnings of the Russian aristocracy. That approach uncovered the major weakness of the Russian elite. Unlike their Western counterparts they never developed the means to maintain unified bases of regional power. Each male heir inherited a portion of his father’s estates. In time the practice eroded the possibility of effective opposition to the emerging royal power. The impoverished aristocrats, lacking markets for the produce of their meager lands and drawing insufficient revenues from the peasants settled on their lands, had no choice but to accept service with a territorial prince. This process was accelerated by the conditions created during the dynastic wars. Had this surplus of inheritors arisen in

the fourteenth century, when the lords of Muscovy were still comparatively weak, perhaps a different solution would have developed. As luck would have it, the Black Death penetrated Russia by the 1350s and its ravages postponed the increase of inheritors until the later fifteenth century, after the emergence o f the new and disadvantageous political conditions. Thereafter, the arena of conflict, which in the past had pitted principality against principality, shifted to the grand princely court, where the elite concentrated. In the new setting competition for position and office occupied their attention. Here they had to subordinate themselves to the senior prince if they were to survive and thrive. The study of the aristocracy, which now can be reduced to simple generalizations, required years of labor. Individual and family careers had to be extracted from isolated traces found in a variety o f sources. Only when they were compiled could some sense be made of the career patterns and commonalities seen. Research along these lines was facilitated by the contributions of the late Aleksandr Zimin and the posthumous publication of Stepan Veselovskii’s works. The articles contained in this volume do not answer all the questions concerning the development of a centralized monarchy in the later fifteenth century, but, it is hoped, they point in the proper direction. GUSTAVE ALEF

University o f Oregon, September, 1982

THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INSCRIPTIONS ON MUSCOVITE COINAGE IN THE REIGN OF VASILI II* reign of Vasili II Vasilievich, grand prince of Vladimir and “of all Russia,” marks a turning point in the history of the Muscovite state. The significance of this pivotal period (1425-62) has been customarily overlooked, primarily because the seemingly melancholy figure of Vasili II has been submerged among the more exciting personalities and exploits of predecessors and successors. The names of Ivan Kalita, Dmitri Donskoi, Ivan the Great, and Ivan the Terrible pluck the chord of students’ recognition much more quickly than mention of Vasili “Tiomnyi” (the Dark, the Blind). The greater measurable achievements and accelerated course of events in the tenure of his son, Ivan III, have cast a shadow over the accomplishments in his father’s reign. This was due, in part, to the greater historical sense of Ivan III and the Muscovite propagandists. Ivan’s marriage to Zoe Paleologina, niece of the last Byzantine emperor, and the emergence of the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome advertised the translatio imperii from Byzantium to Russia. Moscow, the Russian-proclaimed seat of Orthodox Christianity since the apostasy of the Byzantine emperor and patriarch at the Council of Florence, was confirmed in its position by the fall of Con­ stantinople. Vasili II was tortured by the problem of Byzantine relations; his son reaped the fruit of the fateful decision. Ivan I l l ’s reign is equally cited as a turning point in Muscovite history because the Tatar yoke was officially “overthrown” in 1480, when the timid khan was too weak to assert his authority over northeastern Russia. Thus the collapse of the religious and secular overlordship created the Muscovite state as an in­ dependent power and reflected upon its growing importance. Ivan is also credited with the conquest of Novgorod (1471, 1478), Tver (1485), and Viatka (1489). For these reasons, among others, Russian historians have chosen Ivan “the Great” as the great unifier of the east Russian lands, and have considered his reign as the turning point in Muscovite history.

The

* The major portion of this paper was developed and delivered at the 1953 session of the Summer Seminar of the American Numismatic Society.

2

The Coinage of Vasili I I

The achievements of Ivan, and indeed the bases for many of his ideas and ex­ perience, cannot be envisaged without the troublous events which marked his father’s tenure as grand prince. Vasili’s reign almost witnessed the collapse of the cautious Muscovite expansion policy which had characterized that principality’s history from the beginning of the fourteenth century. The period encompassed a bloody and violent princely civil war, the first and only one in the history of this dynasty, jwhich almost destroyed the self-appointed mission of the Kalita descendants. The struggle tested the supporters of the throne and only the dedi­ cated loyalty of the boyars, servitors, the people of Moscow, and later the clergy, saved the tottering princedom. Three times the unfortunate grand prince was deprived of his principality, and upon the last occasion he was cruelly blinded. Yet this buffeted and blinded human hulk returned to rule for the last fifteen years of his life. These were the years of vengeance. Active opponents and even suspected malcontents were severely punished by loss of patrimonies and imprisonment. The neutral Novgorodians, who had granted asylum to Vasili’s antagonists, felt the heavy hand of revenge. The Viatchane, who had consistently aided the grand princely opponents, were conquered as a result of their activities. These years also witnessed the search for new state solutions. Fresh views concerning the problem of succession, the relationship between grand and local princes, between prince and servitor, the manner of reward for faithful or unfaithful service, either stem from this internecine struggle, or were accentuated by it. The interrupted policy of cautious expansion assumed a more aggressive form. The major lines of foreign policy, especially with regard to the Kazan khanate and Novgorod, were laid down in the last years of Vasili’s reign. The energy released by this first Rus­ sian “Time of Troubles” accelerated the policy of the unification of Russian lands under the aegis of Moscow, and only spent itself in the late sixteenth cen­ tury. While few students have properly emphasized the secular significance of this period, they have, on the other hand, long demonstrated its importance because of the establishment of an autocephalous church in Russia.1 When the Greek appointee to the Russian metropolitanate accepted union with Rome in 1438/39 and returned to Moscow in 1441, Vasili II was instrumental in deposing him. In 1448 Vasili, in conjunction with an episcopal council, selected a Russian as metropolitan without Byzantine approval. No Greek ever again occupied the Metropolitan See, nor indeed, did any ecclesiastic who was not favored by the reigning grand prince. There are decided obstacles to a full examination of Vasili I I ’s reign. The source materials are sometimes treacherous, often scanty. The various Russian chron­ icles yield a comparatively full narrative account of the civil war and its aftermath, yet noteworthy omissions are evidenced when chronicle information is compared with existing contemporary documentation. Historians may also sus­ pect any hint of new political terminology as being later interpolation when 1 See, for example, M. Diakonov, Vlast' moskovskikh gosudarei (St Petersburg, 1889), Chapter 3; £ . Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi, Vol. ii, Part 1 (Moscow, 1900), pp. 452 ff.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

3

monastic chroniclers customarily refer to the grand princes as sovereigns. Docu­ mentary materials, often undated, are scanty at crucial moments. Some treaties and agreements, described in the seventeenth-century inventories of the De­ partment of Foreign Affairs, are no longer extant.2 Consequently, the student must be extremely wary in reconstructing and interpreting these crucial years. Ecclesiastical epistles, while rich in evidence, must also be carefully studied, since the attitude of the church in supporting secular consolidation and uniformity may have been partisan, especially after 1448. This does not mean that the sources cannot be gainfully employed, but that they must be used judiciously. In evaluating the impact of the civil war upon contemporaries, more con­ clusive primary evidence is needed to indicate that contemporaries were aware of the problems leading to the internecine war; that the solutions offered attempted to change the relationship between grand prince and local patrimonial princes. In sum, evidence is needed that would support the hypothesis that the civil war led to a re-evaluation of the political role of the grand prince and the ideological conception of his position. Here numismatics offers invaluable aid, for the crudely fashioned Russian silver pieces, barbaric in execution, bespeak a change in the political position of Vasili II only faintly indicated in the sources.3This evidence is based upon coin legends. Before presenting these data, however, it is necessary to depart from the main line of development in order to illustrate the contemporary importance of inscriptions, when only few, presumably, could read. Coinage first appeared in northern Russia late in the fourteenth century and by the mid-fifteenth century both artistic representation and inscriptions showed marked development. Yet examination seems to indicate no discernible correla­ tion between legend and figure. The earliest known Muscovite coins, dating from the latter part of Dmitri Donskoi’s reign (about 1375-89), show either the figure of a cock or the bust of man with sword in one hand and axe in the other.4 Those of his son, Vasili Dmitrievich (1389-1425), while continuing the two previous* * See Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty vdikikh i udeVnykh kniazei X IV -X V I w. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 445-458, 459-484, for the published lists of documents according to the Inventories of 1614 and 1626. Only these references to documents relating to the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries are recorded here. 1 Numismatists as early as the second quarter of the nineteenth century have identified the “sovereign” coins of Vasili II. See A. D. Chertkoff, Opisanie russkikh monel (Moscow, 1834), p. 13; and sections describing coinage of Vasili II. See also S. de Chaudoir, Aperçu sur les monnaies russes, il (St Petersburg, 1836), 10-11; T. D. de Schubert, Monnaies et médailles russes (Leipzig, 1858), pp. 60-61. 4 A. Oreshnikov, Russkie monety do 15^7 (Moscow, 1896), pp. 87-88, coin nos. 448-453. See Plate III, Coin nos. 321-325. Chaudoir, Aperçu, n, pp. 4-5, coin nos. 8-12. On the problem of dating the first coins and the different arguments proposed for their appearance, see G. B. Fedorov, “ Den’gi moskovskogo kniazhestva vremeni Dmiitriia Donskogo i Vasiliia I (1359-1425),” Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR, xn (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949), 158-159. Fedorov holds that coinage first ap­ peared in the 1370’s. He cites opinions of Markov and Tolstoi who date its appearance after 1380. See also 1.1. Kaufman, “Serebrianye rubl’ v Rossii,” Zapiski numismalicheskago oideleniia imperatorskago russkago arkheologicheskago obschcheslva, ii (St Petersburg, 1910), 34. Kaufman claims that Donskoi was ordered to strike money at the command of Khan Tokhtamysh who desired that coins with his own name be inscribed in Arabic as a mark of submission by the Muscovites.

4

The Coinage of Vasili I I

types, also include a mounted rider in varying poses,6 or a four legged animal,6 identified as a leopard by Oreshnikov7 and Fedorov.8 In the reign of Vasili II these types continue to appear9but others are added: a prince seated either upon a throne10 or footstool, with sword in hand,11 Heracles breaking the lion’s jaw,12 winged griffons13and sirens,14*a sphinx with human head.16 The flux of artistic representation suggests that no iconography of political im­ portance was meant to be conveyed. The winged griffon, for example, was found on a Byzantine enamel fastened to the vestments of Metropolitan Alexei (135478) and Kondakov has noted the similarity between the coin figure and artistic prototype.16 There is the possibility that some, if not all, of the figures were mechanically copied from existing prototypes of local or Byzantine origin. The type that emerges triumphant from the mid-fifteenth century onwards is the horseman later identified with St George.17 While artistic depiction remained unstable, the inscription was evolutionary. These legends provide clues to grand princely political aspiration and their sig­ nificance should not be overlooked. It would be logical to suspect on the basis of Roman and Byzantine precedent that portraiture or artistic representation would have been used as propaganda, as a means of disseminating ideas. The evi­ dence, if it is correctly interpreted, militates against such approach. Only the inscription, comprehensible to the lettered minority, the clergy, and the members of the ruling class, shows a definite and conscious development. The importance of coin legends for this period is demonstrated by monetary and chronicle evidence. Grand prince Vasili I had tried through various means to insure the succession of his ten-year-old son Vasili (II). A regency council of princes headed by Metropolitan Photius, and under the protection of the grand prince of Lithuania, was assigned the task of protecting the interests of the child successor. Vasili I, for the purpose of announcing this decision ordered coinage struck (probably in 1425) with the name of Vasili II on one side, and on the re­ verse side with the names of the Russian regent-princes. So all the extant coins 6 Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 454-461, 466-467, 474-478, 482-483, 485-486, 488-492. Nos. 468-469 show a man's head under the horse’s feet; nos. 471-473 depict a horseman spearing the head of a dragon. See Plate III, no. 328; plate IV, nos. 336-337,339. • Chaudoir, Aperçu, ii, no. 32. See Plate V, no. 361. 7 Russkie monety, nos. 493-504. 8 “Den’gi moskovskogo kniazhestva . . . ,” p. 174. • See, for example, Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 507 ff., 519 ff., 547 ff., and 588. 10 Ibid., coin nos. 563, 589, 629-630. See Plate VIII, no. 474. 11 Ibid., coin nos. 533, 562. See Plate VI, no. 408. 12 Ibid., coin nos. 594-595. See Plate VII, no. 439; Plate VIII, no. 467. 18 Ibid., coin no. 569. See Plate VI, no. 415. u Ibid., coin nos. 592, 608-609. u Ibid., coin no. 611. 18 N. Kondakov, Histoire et monuments des émaux byzantins (Frankfort-am-Main, 1922), pp. 347-348. 17 Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 648-664, 667-670, 673-901. See Oreshnikov, “Materialy k russkoi sfragistike,” Trudy moskovskogo numismaticheskago obshchestva, m (1905), 112-113. Oreshnikov observes that the seals of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not have any symbolic meaning and th at princely emblems had no relation to the art forms on coins before 1583.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

5

bear the obverse legend, “Grand Prince Vasili (II)” and the reverse carry the name of individual princes: “Prince Andrei Dmitrievich,”18 “Prince Peter Dmitrievich,”19 “Prince Simeon Vladimirovich,”20 and “Prince Alexander” (Danilovich) of Suzdal.21 The narrowest interpretation that can be placed upon these coins is that the grand princely chancery sought to use coinage inscriptions to make known that the prince regents were the guarantors of the succession. Hence the importance of the inscription is underscored. Further evidence concerning the importance of monetary legends is deduced from a passage of the Nikon Chronicle relating the negotiations before the battle of the Vorskla River in 1399. Grand Prince Vitovt of Lithuania demanded that the Tatar khan place his name on all the money minted at the Horde. The khan in turn delivered an ultimatum to Vitovt, if he wanted to avoid war, that “throughout your whole principality, on all the Lithuanian money, be inscribed my Horde mark.”22Even if the cited passage was a later interpolation, the Musco­ vite monk-chronicler was aware of the importance of the suzerain inscription on the coinage. The degree of penetration of Tatar influence into Russia is still a matter of scholarly debate. With regard to Russian coinage a strong case might be made on the side of Tatar penetration. The Moslem aversion to representation of images had affected artistic depiction on the coinage of Islamic rulers, although occa­ sionally figures were used on their money. The strong Islamic influence, particu­ larly after the conversion of the Golden Horde rulers in the fourteenth century, can also be seen on the Russian coinage, for on both Tatar and Russian money the inscription is of major importance. The earliest Muscovite specimens had the circular obverse legend “Grand Prince Dmitri” or “Mark of Grand Prince Dmitri” enclosing the figure of a cock or a male bust, and on the reverse there is always an Arabic inscription. The name of the reigning khan is found on most of these early coins. Thus on the reverse of some of Dmitri’s coins is the Arabic legend, “Sultan Tokhtamysh Khan, may his life be prolonged. ” 23 181. I. Tolstoi, “Tri klada russkikh deneg XV i nachala XVI veka.” Zapiski imperatorskago russkago arkheologicheskago obshchestva. New Series, iv (St Petersburg, 1889), 42, coin nos. 81-83. 19 Ibid,., p. 43, coin no. 86. 20 Ibid., p. 42, coin no. 84. 21 Ibid., p. 43, coin no. 85. Tolstoi erroneously identified this Alexander with Alexander Theodorovich Yaroslavskii. An examination of available evidence makes this highly improbable. The Alexander of the regency council could have been Prince Alexander of Suzdal, brother-in-law of Vasili II. This problem of two-name coinage which appeared around 1425 bears more directly upon the difficulties of succession in the Muscovite house in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century and will be developed in connection with a later study. The two-name coins with Vasili IPs name on one side and that of Prince Yuri of Galich on the other (described by Tolstoi, op. at., p. 42, nos. 75-8;) did not belong to the period around 1425 but to 1428 or later. 22 Polnoe sobranic russkikh letopisei, xn (St Petersburg, 1897), 173. Also cited by Fedorov, “ Den’gi moskovskogo kniazhestva,” p. 157, and G. Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, 1953), p. 281. 23 Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 448-453; Chaudoir, Aperçu, i i , coin nos. 8,11,12. Coin no. 10 carries the legend: “The very sublime Sultan Mohammed Usbeg Khan.”

6

The Coinage of V asili I I

Coinage inscriptions of mediaeval Moscow were marked by three distinct turn­ ing points. First appeared the phrase “Grand Prince of all Russia.” The earliest manifestation of this title appeared on the silver pieces of Vasili I, although it had been used sporadically in documents and on seals since the early fourteenth century.24 The phrase “of all Russia” reflected the aspirations of the Muscovite princes to impose their hegemony over the neighboring de facto independent principalities. It was an imitation of the ecclesiastical title “Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Russia. ” 25 The second turning point of coinage inscription occurred in the reign of Vasili II, when the grand prince suddenly assumed the new dignity Ospodar’ vseia Rusi (Sovereign of all Russia) or Ospodar’ vseia russkoi zemli (Sovereign of the Whole Russian Land) in the late 1440’s.26Only the barest suggestion of any forthcoming change in title is found in the interprincely documents. It was not duplicated on any of the extant seals of the period and the earliest seal with this formula was attached to a document dated July 1497 — forty-nine years after its appearance on the coinage.27 After 1488 — forty years after the title was introduced on the coinage — the title gosudar' was generally used on treaties with western powers.28 In the Muscovite treaties with subordinate princes, however, the senior prince continued to be addressed as simply grand prince, older brother, or lord,29 and only occasionally as sovereign.30 The third and final change in inscription on mediaeval Muscovite coinage occurred after 1547, with the appearance of the exalted title, tsar. 24 Ivan Kalita used the title first in the Muscovite house. See Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoiu Ekspeditsieiu Akademii Nauk, i (St Petersburg, 183C), nos. 3 and 4; see also S. M. Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, t (St Petersburg, n.d.), col. 1156. For the seal inscriptions, see Oreshnikov, “Materialy k russkoi sfragistike,” p. 122 (Simeon), p. 125 (Dmitri), p. 128 (Vasili Dmitrievich). 25 Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, p. 201. 26 For the origin and meaning of uspodar\ godpodar\ gosudar', see A. G. Preobrazhensky, Etymo­ logical Dictionary of the Russian Language (New York, 1951), pp. 151-152; Entsiklopedicheskii slovar', ix (St Petersburg, 1893), col. 424. The term in its political sense was undoubtedly introduced from Lithuania in the 1420's. See Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty, nos. 23, 25, 26. It should be noted, in passing, that the weight of Muscovite coinage declined between its introduc­ tion during the third quarter of the fourteenth century and 1462. This knowledge has helped numis­ matists to date many coins more accurately. According to Oreshnikov’s deductions (Russkie monety, p. 96), from Dmitri Donskoi’s reign when coins first appeared to 1410, the weights declined from 1.029 grams to .797. Between 1410 and 1434, the drop was from .797 gr. to .583 gr. and from 1134 to 1462, the weights reached their lowest point: from .532 gr. to .310 gr. The greatest drop takes place during the period of the civil ivar, 1425-50. Significantly, the ospodar* coinage coincides with the coins of smallest weight. 27 The seal of Ivan III is described in Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty, p. 575: “Grand Prince Ivan, by Grace of God, Sovereign of all Russia and Grand Prince of Vladimir, Moscow, Pskov, Tver, the Far North, Viatka, and Perm.” 28 Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s derzhavnami inosirannymi, i (St Peters­ burg, 1851), 2, 7 ff. 29 See, for example, documents dated 1486 (Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty, no. 80), 1504 (ibid., no. 93) and 1531 (ibid., no. 101). 30 In the treaty dated 16 July 1504, between Vasili III and his brother Yuri, Vasili is referred to as gosudar in the salutation, but in the text only as lord (gospodin).

The Coinage of Vasili I I

7

I t is now possible to examine in detail the hypothesis posed earlier, namely that the civil war led to a re-evaluation of the political power and ideological conception of the grand-princely position. The ambiguous phraseology of the final testament of Dmitri Donskoi31and the ambition of his second son, Prince Yuri Dmitrievich of Galich, were the imme­ diate causes of the first struggle for the throne of grand prince of Vladimir among the descendants of Ivan Kalita. In his testament of 1389 Dmitri divided his principality among his five sons according to custom. The eldest, Vasili I, re­ ceived the grand-princely title with the undivided lands of Vladimir and part of Moscow. The second son, Yuri, was bequeathed the territory of Galich and the city of Zvenigorod.32 When Vasili I died in 1425 he left his throne to his ten-yearold son, Vasili II.33From that moment Yuri Dmitrievich endeavored to remove his nephew from the throne, claiming that he was the legitimate successor. The chronicles indicate that until 1431 only the intervention of Metropolitan Photius, head of the regency council, and the protection of Vitovt of Lithuania, young Vasili’s grandfather, prevented an armed struggle. Yet in 1428, according to fragmentary evidence, Yuri was recognized as co-ruling grand prince.34 While the situation was soon restored, the struggle was renewed in 1431 when both Vasili’s protectors died. In 1433 Yuri deposed the grand prince and assumed the throne himself. The servitors of Vasili II, as well as the people of Moscow, refused to serve the usurper. Instead they flocked to the side of their legitimate ruler. The position of Yuri was so untenable that he temporarily recognized Vasili as grand prince and returned to his own principality for reinforcements. In 1434 he again defeated Vasili in battle and again occupied Moscow. After a rule of only three months, Yuri suddenly died, but his eldest son Vasili Cross-Eye attempted to succeed his father. The ensuing struggle lasted two years and ended in the blinding of Yuri’s son.35 Vasili IPs troubles were temporarily over. The numismatic evidence for this period mirrors the political events. When 31 Dukkovnye i dogovornye gramoty, no. 12, p. 35. “And [if] for his sins, God takes my son Vasili, then whichever of my sons will be under him [i.e., next in seniority] then to that son belongs the udel, and my princess will divide that udel among them [i.e., will divide the holdings of the next oldest brother equally among the remaining brothers].“ Yuri seized upon the terseness of this document for his own advantage. What the will actually stated was that Vasili I was as yet unmarried and consequently childless. Hence, if Vasili should die without issue, then the succession was to go to Vasili’s oldest brother. 33 Ibid., no. 12. 33 Ibid., no. 22. See also Polnoe sobranie russkikh Ictopisei, vm (1859), 96. The account of the negoti­ ations at the Horde tribunal in H32/S3 indicates that a patent for the grand-princely throne had been obtained from the khan by Vasili I for his son. 34 In the Inventory of the Department of Foreign Affairs of 1626, published in part in Dulchovnye i dogovornye gramoty, there is a record of two treaties (p. 462) between Vasili II and his uncle Yuri that are no longer extant. “Two treaties [copies] of Grand Prince [my italics] Yuri Dmitrievich with Grand Prince Vasili Vasilievich . . . written in the year 6936 [1427/8] during the metropolitanate of Photius.“ “Two treaties [copies] of Grand Prince [my italics] Yuri Dmitrievich and his son, Prince Dmitri . . . . with Grand Prince Vasili Vasilievich . . . on which are five seals on black wax, written in 6936, during the metropolitanate of Photius.“ *’ Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, pp. 298 ff.

8

The Coinage of Vasili I I

Yuri received his patrimonial grant in 1389, he, along with his own brothers, minted his own coinage. 36 When he was prince of Galich, his inscriptions simply read, “Stamp (mark) of Prince Yuri” or “Stamp of Prince Yuri Dmitrievich. ” 37 When he assumed the grand-princely throne he ordered money struck with the legend “Grand Prince Yuri. ” 38 There are other coins which are much more diffi­ cult to date. The obverse of these contain the inscription “Grand Prince Vasili” and read on the reverse, “Prince Yuri Dmitrievich. ” 39 Since Yuri was never a member of the regency council and was openly hostile to Vasili II from the very beginning of his reign, they must either belong to the period immediately after the re-establishment of normal relations in 1428, or more probably, after Yuri gave up his throne in 1433. These double-name coins were struck to announce a change in political relationship, namely, that Yuri again acknowledged the senior­ ity of Vasili II. Since a treaty between the two re-established their formal posi­ tion, the coin legends must have been intended as a means of disseminating the news. Although there was no attempt on the part of Yuri's remaining children to re­ sume the struggle between 1436 and 1446, the period was far from uneventful. The acceptance of the terms of the Council of Florence by Metropolitan Isidore stunned the Russian clergy. Despite the official Byzantine indorsement of re­ union with Rome, Grand Prince Vasili, with the concurrence of the clergy, de­ posed and imprisoned the metropolitan in 1441. Relations with Constantinople were not broken, but the respect for emperor and patriarch as the defenders of Orthodoxy was considerably weakened. It was not until 1448, however, that a Russian council of bishops elected a new metropolitan at the behest of the grand prince,40 but even then Vasili II did not wish this act to be considered in Con­ stantinople as a repudiation of Byzantine authority. Full relations would be re­ sumed when Byzantium would renounce union with Rome.41In none of the docu­ ments relating to the deposition of Isidore do we find any indication of a change in the grand prince’s title.42 In a letter dated 1451/2 to Emperor Constantine XI, informing him of the election of Iona as metropolitan, Vasili called himself Grand Prince of Moscow and of all Russia,43 and in the same letter he referred to the Lithuanian grand prince as Ospodar’ litovskyia zemli (Sovereign of the Lithuanian Land).44 This letter was written at least four years after the appearance of the ospodar on the MFedorov, “Den’gi moskovskogo kniazhestva,” p. 184; Oreshnikov, Russkie moneiy, p. xii. 87 Oreshnikov, Russkie moneiy, coin nos. 702 ff. See Plate X, nos. 552-553, 555-558. 88 Ibid., coin nos. 709-712. See Plate X, nos. 564-566. 89 Ibid., coin nos. 707-708; Tolstoi, “Tri klada russkikh deneg,” p. 42, coin nos. 75-80. 40 Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, xii (1901), 94; see also note 41 below. 41 See Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, pp. 311-313. 48 Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioleka, vi (St Petersburg, 1908), cols. 526-536, no. 62. Vasili (ibid., col. 525) called himself "velikii kniaz’ moskovskii i vseia Rusi.” Iona notifying the Lithuanian princes, boyars and people about his election (ibid., no. 64) referred to Vasili II: **i po dume gospodina, syna moego, velikogo kniazia Vasili’ia Vasili'evicha, i ego molodshie bratia, kniazei. . . . ” 48 Ibid., col. 576. 44 Ibid., col. 578.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

9

Muscovite coinage. I t cannot be maintained, therefore, that the term “sovereign” was assumed by the grand prince because of the events centering upon and sub­ sequent to the Council of Florence. It was not the religious dissension, therefore, but the second phase of the civil war (1446-53) which affected the change in political conception. Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence to show that it was the experimentation of Vasili’s antagonist, Dmitri Shemiaka of Galich, which originally forced the grand prince to accept and utilize the innovation. The interlude between the two phases of the civil struggle was not uneventful; it was also not peaceful. The Tatars had become increasingly active in the early 1440*s. In 1443 Riazan, the grand principality south of Moscow, was attacked. An army aided by Vasili I I ’s troops routed the invaders, but in the following year the southern frontier of the Muscovite state was overrun. This penetration began a struggle which culuminated in 1445 (7 July) with the capture of Vasili II by the Tatars. While this catastrophe demoralized the Muscovite populace, Dmitri Shemiaka, the second son of Yuri of Galich, decided to turn this tragedy to his personal advantage. When Vasili II regained his freedom upon promise of a huge ransom,45 elation reigned in Moscow, but when the terms of release became known, cheer gave way to discontent. So huge a ransom would have meant an onerous and extraordinary tax levy. Simultaneously a rumor arose, undoubtedly fostered by Shemiaka, that Vasili had promised to cede Moscow to the khan and accept the throne of Tver as his patrimony. The Tatar contingent which had come with Vasili to collect the promised ransom, increased the seeming truth of the suspicion. Four months after the return of Vasili, in 1446, when the grand prince made a pilgrimage to Trinity monastery, some forty miles north of the capital, Shemiaka and his accomplices took Moscow by ruse. They then hastened to Trinity, captured the unsuspecting grand prince and blinded him. Once again the unfortunate Vasili was deprived of his throne. The speed of Shemiaka’s action and the resultant shock to Vasili’s servitors precluded any organized resistance. A handful fled to Lithuania, but the majority grudgingly pledged allegiance to the new grand prince. Shemiaka then feared that if opposition were to arise, it would rally around Vasili’s two young sons who had escaped the trap at Trinity monastery. This motivated Shemiaka to entice them back to Moscow. He gave his sacred oath to the clergy that he would not harm the boys if they were returned to Moscow. But upon their return, they were summarily cast into prison. This was too much, both for the loyal partisans of Vasili and the prelates. New opposition began to form against Shemiaka, and the clergy clamored for the release of the prisoners. Shemiaka was now aware of his delicate position and he attempted to halt the growing resistance to his rule by promising to free not only the children, but the blind Vasili also. In return for his pledge to acknowledge Shemiaka as grand « Most chronicles speak of a huge ransom. Vasili was to pay “as much as he could." See, for exam­ ple, Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, vm , 114; x n ; 66; xvm (1913), 195. The Novgorod Chronicle (Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis' [Moscow-Leningrad, 1950], p. 426) reports that the sum was 200,000 rubles, a suspiciously high figure.

10

The Coinage of Vasili I I

prince, Vasili was given the city of Vologda in patrimony. But the release of Vasili, instead of halting the growing opposition, increased it. “A psychological reaction against Shemiaka,” states Vernadsky,46 “became evident everywhere.” The abbot of the St Cyril monastery recognized Vasili as the legitimate grand prince and absolved him from his oath: “I take thy sins upon myself and my brothers. . . and go with God [my] Sovereign (gosudar’) to your rightful votchina (patrimony), the grand principality, and we will pray . . . to God for you.”47 Vasili II went to Tver, where he wron the support of the ruler of that prin­ cipality. His followers in Lithuania, now grown to significant numbers, came to his aid; and those supporters who had remained leaderless in Moscow slipped out to join him. Faced by superior forces and probably the hostility of the Muscovite populace, Shemiaka retired to Galich. From this point in 1447 onward, to the poisoning of the Galich prince in 1453, an army of Vasili II was on the offensive. The church actively aided Vasili. Shemiaka was threatened with excommunica­ tion and his followers were enjoined to support their legitimate sovereign, Grand Prince Vasili.48 In the episcopal letter of 1447 to Shemiaka, the bishops stated that the rightful grand prince was once again on his throne, and what God had given to Vasili, no one could take from him. Shemiaka was charged to give up his futile ambition.49 Clearly the attempt was made to suggest that the right to the grand-princely throne was not contingent upon Tatar patent, or acquisition by naked force, but upon God’s appointment. The position of the clergy is not surprising. Ecclesiastical unity and administra­ tive uniformity were always the objectives of the Russian metropolitan see. Past experience had shown that these aspirations could be achieved only through secular consolidation under a single power that could settle differences. “This is why,” stated Soloviev,50 “when the Muscovite princes began to strive for unifica­ tion, their endeavors coincided completely with the strivings of the clergy.” The role of Vasili in the popular decision to depose Isidore and the later election of Iona as metropolitan further strengthened the ties between grand prince and upper clergy. This may explain why the clergy willingly referred to and addressed the Muscovite grand prince as sovereign; why in the contest for secular power the clergy deliberately exalted the grand prince as sovereign, the God-chosen and appointed ruler. For these reasons chronicle references concerning the grand prince as sovereign, recorded by monks, and the ecclesiastical epistles, dictated by bishops, may not have necessarily reflected the existing secular relationships, al­ though they would, in the long run, influence them. Therefore it is natural to 48 The Mongols and Russia, p. 323. 47 Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, iv (1848), 146; v (1851), 269. 48 Rvsskaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, vi, no. 64, pp. 539-542. The second part of this letter is an appeal to Shemiaka’s allies to “ . . . bili chelom svoemu gospodariu velikomu kniaziu o zhalovan’i kuk emu Bog polozhit na serdtse. . . . ” See also A. Eck, Le moyen âge russe (Paris, 1933), p. 130; A. Pres­ niakov, Obrazovanie velikorusskago gosudarstva (Petrograd, 1918) , p. 403. 49 Akty istoricheskie, i (St Petersburg, 1841), no. 40, pp. 77 ff. V. Valdenberg, Drevne-russkiia ucheniia o predelach tsarskoi vlasli (Petrograd, 1916), p. 176. 80 Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii, i, col. 1076.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

11

suspect the chronicle references to Vasili II as gosudar' under the years 143251and 1446.“ Not only were these compilations made at a later date, but it may be assumed that the monks would not be averse to the use of the title sovereign. If the bulk of the literary evidence — the chronicles and ecclesiastical epistles — is momentarily put aside and examination is only made of the interprincely treatises, there is only one instance when Vasili II insisted upon the title of sovereign (gospodar’). Here is Vernadsky’s evaluation of this unique case: In 1448 (or early 1449) the Moscow chancery attempted to make a step forward by defin­ ing the authority of the grand duke of Moscow in regard to the apanage princes. In the treaty with a Suzdal prince Vasili II was called the former’s “gospodar.” This formula was not repeated, however, in any of the subsequent treaties. But Vasili n ’s son, Ivan III, made full use of it, demanding in 1478 that the Novgorodians recognize him as their gosudar' (which is the Great Russian variant of the West Russian form “gospodar”). The recognition of the term by the Novgorodians meant the end of Novgorod's inde­ pendence.“ What the historian has not yet noted is that the coinage inscriptions changed immediately after the recovery of Moscow by Vasili II. The formula, “Vasilievich Sovereign of all Russia,”54 “Sovereign of the Whole Russian Land,”56 and “Sov­ ereign of all Russia,”56 appeared on the coinage immediately upon the grand prince’s return to Moscow in February 1447. Sometime late in 1448 or early 1449, the coinage reflected the co-optation of Vasili’s eldest son Ivan as grand prince. After the co-optation the title on the coins read “Sovereigns of all Russia.”61623*57This reconstruction is based upon the treaty between Vasili II and the appanage prince of Suzdal, concluded between December 1448 and July 1449.68The document be­ gins as follows: “By the Grace of God and His Virgin Mother, and with the bless­ ing of our father Iona, Metropolitan of all Russia, in all (that we have agreed up­ on) Prince Ivan Vasilievich, kisses the cross (i.e., takes an oath) to me, to his sovereign (gospodar’), to Grand Prince Vasili Vasilievich and to my son Grand Prince Ivan Vasilievich. . . .” Thus the coins struck in the name of the sovereigns (gospodari) belong to the period after the co-optation; those with “Grand Prince Vasili” on the obverse, and the reverse formulas with sovereign in the singular belong to the short period between the return of Vasili to Moscow in February 1447 and the co-optation of his son Ivan. Since the change in title appeared immediately upon Vasili's return to his throne, the question arises: why was the grand prince so hast}'? The evidence suggests that he was pressed to emulate Shemiaka’s precedent. The early coinage of Dmitri Shemiaka is easy to identify. From the death of 61 Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, vm, 96: “ Nash gosudar’ veliki kninz’ Vasilei isc het stola svoego velikogo kniazhenia. . . . ” 62 Ibid., iv, 146; v, 269. See above, p. 10 for quotation. 63 The Mongols and Russia, pp. 351-352. MOreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin no. 613. See Plate VII, nos. 459-460. 65 Ibid., coin nos. 618, 627-628, and probably 619. Plate VIII, nos. 474-475. “ Ibid., coin nos. 625-626, 629. Plate VIII, nos. 471-472, 476. 67 Ibid., coin nos. 615, 617, 632, 634. 58 Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty, no. 52. See Cherepnin’s argument for dating the treaty in ibid., pp. 159-160 and in his Russkie feodaVnye arkhivy X IV -X V vv, i (Moseow-Leningrad, 1958), 147-148.

12

The Coinage of Vasili I I

his father in 1434 until 1446 he used the title “Prince Dmitri Yurievich.*’89 After his usurpation of the grand-princely throne he imitated the time honored formula and called himself “Grand Prince Dmitri.”80 But when he found his position deteriorating, particularly after his scandalous breach of oath in imprisoning the two sons of Vasili II, he must have tried various ways to assert his weakening hold on the throne. One of these attempts was to proclaim on the coinage his right to the throne. This would explain the coin with the obverse inscription “ (Grand) Prince (Dm)itri Yurievich” and the reverse legend “Sovereign of the Russian Land.”61 Therefore when Vasili recovered his throne, he felt compelled to follow suit. Another coin type of the double-name variety also appeared in 1446. These pieces have the obverse inscription “Grand Prince Dmitri” on one side and “Grand Prince Vasili” on the other.62 It is inconceivable that when Dmitri Shemiaka blinded and imprisoned his cousin he found any necessity for inscribing Vasili’s name as co-grand prince on the coinage. Similarly, it is equally improb­ able, from the evidence of the extant sources, that when Vasili II recovered his throne, he would acknowledge to his hated cousin the title of grand prince, since his military position was far too strong for so great a concession. Consequently, these double-name coins were struck in 1446 after Shemiaka found it necessary to free Vasili. The support of the servitors and clergy, and later that of the Grand Prince of Tver, for Vasili, certainly alarmed Shemiaka and he probably at­ tempted through diplomacy to appease the growing opposition and still main­ tain the grand princely throne. It is possible that Vasili II may have even accepted such a proposition while in Tver negotiating for military aid. The historical significance of the Muscovite grand prince as sovereign in the mid-fifteenth century should not be overlooked. The statement in the standard Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’Mthat “Ivan III ordered money struck with the title *Gospodar of all Russia* on the seals and money” is correct only in the narrowest sense: Ivan did indeed order the title of sovereign to be placed upon his money, but he did not initiate the practice. Adopted by Shemiaka in the final stages of the civil war, it was emulated and continued by Vasili II. The clearest contemporary meaning of gospodar is found in a letter of Metropoli­ tan Iona to Bishop Misail of Smolensk in 1454 relating the confiscation of the lands of Prince Ivan of Mozhaisk and his flight to Lithuania to escape imprison­ ment: “Know, my son, . . . what has occurred because of what Prince Ivan Andreevich (has done) to . . . his eldest brother, but I should not say to his brother, but to his sovereign, Grand Prince Vasili Vasilievich. . . .”64 Iona at­ tempted to reject the traditional hierarchical terminology so prevalent in the con­ temporary treaties and he sanctioned the right to punish those princes who had 69 Oreshnikov, Russkie moneiy, coin nos. 713-715. Sec Plate X, nos. 568-569. •° Ibid., coin nos. 717-718. See Plate X, no. 572. 61 Ibid., coin no. 716. Unfortunately the coin is not too well preserved. However, it is possible to read the circular inscriptions. Obverse: “ + K N Z ’ (VELIKI DM I)TRI YUR ‘EVICH’ ” and on the reverse: “OSPO(DAR’ ZE)MLI RUSKIU.” See Plate X, no. 570. « Ibid., 719-721. See Plate X, nos. 573-574. 68 ix, col. 424. 64 Akty istoricheskie, i, no. 56, pp. 103-104.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

13

opposed Vasili. Opposition implied treason and treason was now punishable by the confiscation of lands and imprisonment. The conception of state and state­ hood, while not yet fully conceived, began to emerge with the definition of gospodar*. True, the attempt by the Moscow chancery in 1448/9 to encourage the new title was short-lived and the customary terminology continued. These written agreements testify to a duality which had been developing in the Muscovite polit­ ical complex since the fourteenth century. The landed princes, the Riurikides, who had received their territories by patrimonial division, maintained their own courts, armies, and dispensed justice. They were enjoined by treaties to serve their grand prince, their “older brother,” in war and not to entertain relations with foreign powers, and so forth. In the fourteenth century, these treaties, de­ pendent upon cooperation and mutual respect, were adhered to among the mem­ bers of the Muscovite house. At the same time the growing prosperity of Moscow, the almost uninterrupted acquisition of the Tatar patent for the grand princely throne, and the prestige of having the metropolitan seat in Moscow, drew many of the less prosperous princes to Moscow. In return for military, administrative, and courtly positions, along with grants of land, they became boyars and servi­ tors of the Muscovite house. I t was the aid of this group that insured victory for Vasili II. In short, their fortunes were dependent upon their grand prince’s posi­ tion and largess. The princes who held land not by the grand prince’s grace, but by right of sharing their father’s patrimony, personified the centrifugal forces. The host of Muscovite servitors who served the grand prince personified the centripetal forces. It was to them that the grand prince was gospodar’, ospodar\ or gosudar\ The civil war, with its violence, upheaval, duplicity, and horror, posed the problem of relationship between the grand prince and his rebellious princely rela­ tives. Those who revolted were punished according to this new principle by im­ prisonment and confiscation of land.65The treaties which*in the course of the civil war were frequently formulated and conveniently violated, were now backed by the military forces of the grand prince and the active support of the clergy. It was no longer possible to break an oath with impunity. I suggest that the treaties after 1448, although they contained the old terminology, were based upon a strict observance of the articles mentioned in the agreements. The use of “sovereign” on the coinage and not in the documents displays a traditional conservatism with regard to the political title of the grand prince. Ivan Kalita (1328-41) was the first member of the family to use hesitatingly the title “Grand Prince of all Russia.”66 This phrase was not generally used in the interprincely documents of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Though Dmitri68 68 There is only one previously recorded case in the history of the Muscovite family when a member of the princely family was deprived of his patrimony because he refused to adhere to the wishes of the grand prince. In 1419 Vasili Dmitrievich demanded that his youngest brother Constantine sup­ port in writing the succession of his son as the senior member of the family. When Constantine re­ fused, he was deprived of his patrimony (Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, xxv, 244). In 1421 Con­ stantine relented and agreed to his brother’s demands (ibid., xxv, 245) and received a grant of land as his patrimony. This is known from a treaty of 1434. See Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty, no. 84, p. 87. * See above, footnote 24.

14

The Coinage of Vasili I I

Donskoi was the first to strike coinage in his own name, his son initially inscribed the legend on the money. Similarly, Vasili II hesitatingly used the title of sov­ ereign in the documents, but he continued to use it upon the currency since he had first been forced to do so by Shemiaka. It may also be suggested that Ivan III began cautiously to call himself tsar. Yet he did not make full use of the title, nor did his son Vasili III (1505-33). It was only in 1547 that Ivan IV offi­ cially crowned himself tsar. It is generally accepted, however, that the Musco­ vite princes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries thought in terms of unifying east Russia under Moscow’s hegemony. Certainly Ivan III acted as though he were tsar, even though he did not have frequent recourse to the title. Shall we deny the intent of Vasili to act as such even though he did not call himself sov­ ereign in the interprincely documents? That this element of caution with regard to title played a role in the grandprincely circle can be deduced from other numismatic evidence of the period. The chronicles relate that in the winter of 1450 Vasili II sent his army into Galich. “God aided . . . Vasili” and a defeated Shemiaka fled to Novgorod. The grand prince took the entire principality for himself and, leaving governors there, returned to Moscow.67*While Shemiaka made several ineffectual attempts to continue the struggle, his forces were too weak. He died of poison in Novgorod in 1453. The Galich coinage disappeared, and Muscovite money bearing the inscription “Sovereigns of all Russia” replaced it. In Mozhaisk, where a similar political solution was effected, the coinage in­ scriptions developed differently. Ivan, the prince of Mozhaisk, was also a grand­ son of Dmitri Donskoi. Though he held a patrimony within the teritory of the grand principality and he was bound by treaty and custom to aid Vasili, he had steadfastly supported Shemiaka.68 In 1454 when Vasili II, seeking revenge, in­ vaded Mozhaisk and annexed it to his own lands, Ivan fled to Lithuania.69 After Vasili attached the principality, the coinage reflected the change. Instead of the Muscovite formula with “Grand Prince Vasili” on the obverse and “Gospodari vseia Rusi” on the reverse, the reverse contained a new formula, “Denga Mozhaiska(i)a.”70 How long this type was struck cannot be ascertained. It imitated a late coin of Mozhaisk minted before 1454.71 But there was no doubt about Vasili’s intention in annexing Mozhaisk. The lands of this principality were treated as personal and were divided among Vasili’s sons by testament.72 It seems reasonable to assume since the ospodar’ coinage did not appear in Mozhaisk until some later time, that the more cautious and conservative formula was used. If this type is compared with those undoubtedly used in Galich after the 1450 occupation, two conclusions may be drawn. First, that since Shemiaka struck coinage with the ospodar' formula which was circulated in Galich, Vasili 67 Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, v, 269, 270; vi, 178-179. M See Presniakov, Obrazovanie, p. 409. •• Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, iv, 132; v, 271; vi, 180; vm , 144. 70 Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin no. 763. See Plate XI, no. 617. 71 Ibid., coin no. 762. 73 Dukhovnye i dogovomye gramoty, no. 61.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

15

found it necessary to follow suit when he took over the province. Second, that the formula used on the Mozhaisk coinage indicated what the grand-princely officials believed suitable for occupation coinage. The use of the term denga poses a problem. By the early fifteenth century, denga was the common name given to a minted silver coin struck in Novgorod, Pskov and the East Russian principalities. 73 It had not yet acquired the general meaning of “money,” for from the thirteenth to the end of the fifteenth century the term serebro (silver) was utilized in that connection. 74 Yet denga had another connotation when used in inscriptions. In Pskov, from the time when small silver pieces first appeared in that republic in the 1420’s,75 until 1510 when Mos­ cow finally annexed the territory, the coinage bore the inscription “Denga of Pskov . ” 76 A number of coins of the grand principality of Tver also bore the legend “Denga of Tver” during the reigns of Grand Prince Boris Alexandrovich (1425-1461)77 and Michael Borisovich (1461-1485).78 A survey of the Tver coin­ age catalogued by Oreshnikov indicates that a preponderance carried the inscrip­ tions, “Mark of Grand Prince (name) . ” 79 The question arises whether the term denga on some of the Tver coins had any special meaning, or whether it was simply a variation. Since the name for a coin was denga and the Republic of Pskov had used it exclusively upon its money, the immediate conjecture would be that this was a natural use of the term. There is, however, reason to believe that the currency of Tver with the legend “Denga of Tver” had another contemporary meaning. This suspicion is based upon an examination of the coinage of Gorodnia (or Goroden). Gorodnia was a village on the right bank of the Volga, about eighteen miles distant from Tver. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the grand princes of Tver were also princes of Gorodnia. In the reign of Grand Prince Ivan Mikhailovich (13991425) the obverse inscription on this coinage read, “Mark of Grand Prince Ivan” and the reverse continued the legend: “Mikhailovich. Gorode(n)sk. ” 80 In the reign of Grand Prince Boris Alexandrovich, the obverse carried a new legend: “Denga of Gorodnia. ” 81 Since the change upon the Gorodnia money and upon some of the Tver coins 73 Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, p. xii; I. Sreznevskii, Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkago iazyka po pis'mennym pamiatnikam, i (St Petersburg, 1893), col. 652; Kaufman, Serebrianye rubl* v Rossii, pp. 19 ff. 74 Kaufman, Serebrianyi rubl' ». Rossii, pp. 2-9; F. von Schrötter, Wörterbuch der Münzkunde (Berlin-Leipzig, 1930), p. 627; Sreznevskii, Materialy, I, cols. 652-653. By the end of the fifteenth century dengi replaced serebro as the term for money. 76 Pskovski letopisi, i (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941), 35; n (Moscow, 1955), 39; V. L. Ianin, “0 nachale pskovskoi monetnoi chekanki,” Numizmaticheskii sbomik, i (Moscow, 1955), 21-23. 76 Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 65-77. 77 Ibid., coin nos. 155-60; 236-237. 78 Ibid., coin nos. 264-266, 296, 305, 307-310. 78 Ibid., pp. 22-52. 80 Ibid., coin no. 398. 81 Ibid., coin nos. 400-405. See also Oreshnikov, “ Materialy k russkoi numizmatike do tsarskago perioda,” Trudy moskovskago numizmatickeskago obshchestva, H (Moscow, 1899-1901), 333, coin nos. 52-56.

16

The Coinage of Vasili I I

occurred during the reign of Grand Prince Boris, it might have indicated that some specific meaning was implied by the use of the term denga. In the case of Gorodnia a stronger conclusion may be drawn. The legend “Denga of Gorodnia” meant that the money belong specifically to that principality and that the terri­ tory belonged personally to the reigning Tverian grand prince. Those specimens with the inscription “Denga of Tver” may have been used in areas newly acquired by the Tverian grand prince. For example, in 1426 the prince of Kashin was de­ posed and deprived of his principality by Grand Prince Boris and independent Kashin coinage disappeared. No successor was named as prince of Kashin and that principality was directly incorporated into the grand-princely possessions.82 It is therefore possible that the first coinage to be struck in Kashin bore the name of Boris and the legend “Denga of Tver,” in order to make known that Kashin was no longer independent. The denga coinage of Tver appeared during the reign of Boris Alexandrovich (1425-1461) who was an exact contemporary of Vasili II (1425-1462). It was dur­ ing Vasili’s reign that denga first appeared on Muscovite currency. There is a strong possibility that the Tver precedent of using denga on coins in areas seized by the grand prince was copied in the Muscovite realm. This seems to have been the case in Mozhaisk, and it also appears to have figured in Vasili’s relations with Riazan and Novgorod the Great. The grand principality of Riazan, which lay south of Moscow and constituted a buffer between the southern Mongols and Muscovy, was one of the three East Russian grand principalities created by the Tatars in the fourteenth century that were still in existence in the mid-fifteenth century. The other two were Moscow and Tver. Despite various pressures by Moscow and Lithuania, Riazan maintained its independence. Before Grand Prince Ivan Fedorovich of Riazan died in 1456, he named his more powerful neighbor Vasili II as guardian of his eight-year-old son. The child was taken to Moscow and Vasili’s governors and lieutenants ruled Riazan in the name of the Muscovite grand prince.83The sources relate nothing more. Undoubtedly, under the guise of guardianship, Moscow en­ joyed the profits of taxation and justice. Until 1464 Riazan remained under Muscovite jurisdiction, but in that year the heir, Vasili Ivanovich, was allowed to return to his patrimony. The sister of Grand Prince Ivan of Moscow was given him as bride and he was allowed to rule under the watchful eye of Moscow. It was not until 1520 that Riazan was finally incorporated into the expanding Muscovite state. The coin evidence for Riazan during this period is most difficult to evaluate. There is a faint suspicion that Vasili II may have had other plans for Riazan. The Riazan princes had begun to strike their own money late in the fourteenth cen­ tury, using the weight standard of the neigboring Tatars and not that of Moscow. After the Muscovite guardianship was established, both coin inscriptions and weights showed a significant change. Before 1456 the silver coin in weight* * Presniakov, Obrazovanie, pp. 213-219; Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, pp. 69-70. u Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, xxv, 275.

The Coinage of Vasili I I

17

averaged over .9 grams; after that date not quite .35 grams. Instead of the pre­ vious Tatar tamgau on one side and “Mark of the Grand Prince” or “Grand Prince Ivan Fedorovich” on the other,85 the coinage, inscription-wise, was identical with that of Mozhaisk. “Grand Prince Vasili” appeared on the obverse and “Denga Rezanskaia” on the reverse.86 The artistic representations similarly showed radical change. On the coinage before 1456 all the Riazan coins had a crude head of a ram, or perhaps, more accurately, two eyes separated by a long nose. After 1456 there was a variety of figures on the coinage, for example, a profile of a head, or a four-footed animal. It is indeed possible that Grand Prince Vasili referred to Vasili Ivanovich of Riazan. But what coinage circulated in Riazan during the guardianship? Was it of the Muscovite sovereign variety? This would hardly be likely unless Vasili II was intent upon immediately annexing Riazan officially. There is a coin which definitely belongs to Vasili Ivanovich. On the obverse is a symbol of a star with eight rays, enclosing a globule in the center and a globule at the end of each ray. The reverse carries the three line inscription “KNZ’V /(A)SILEI/(IV)ANOVICH’.”87 The weight of this coin is .89 grams. The coins with the simple inscription “Grand Prince Vasili” on them weigh .42 grams, .32 grams, .138 grams, and so forth. So the coin definitely belonging to Vasili Ivano­ vich differs in weight, inscription and artistic representation from those bearing the name Grand Prince Vasili. It is highly likely that these coins with “Denga Rezanskaia” belonged to Vasili II of Moscow. Does this indicate that Vasili II wished to end the independence of Riazan but died too soon to accomplish his aim? Did his son and successor, Ivan III, also defer this plan in his more ambitious policy? While a conclusion on the basis of the coinage alone is impossible, it is tempting enough to suggest a re-examination of the existing evidence, as well as a reconstruction of the expansion policies of Vasili II and Ivan III with the question of intentions towards Riazan as a point of study. The last problem concerning the coinage of Vasili II relates to the subjugation of Novgorod the Great. Throughout the civil war the independent and commer­ cially prosperous Novgorod had maintained neutrality. At various times the momentarily vanquished protagonist sought haven in the great trading city. Shemiaka used its territories as his base of operations and as a refuge during the last three years of his life. After 1448 Metropolitan Iona demanded that Novgo­ rod deny Shemiaka asylum, but he was rebuffed. In 1456 the grand prince reaped his revenge. The Novgorodian forces were decisively defeated in battle and a particularly onerous treaty was imposed. Both a fine and a war indemnity were exacted. The tax paid by the free Novgorodian peasantry was now to be rendered m T atar clan mark. See article, "Tamgha,” by R. Vasmer in Schrötter, Wörterbuch der Münzkunde, pp. 678-779. 86 E. K. Gutten-Chapskii, Udel'nyia, velikoleniazheskiia i tsarsleiia dengi drevnei Rust (St Peters­ burg, 1875), coin nos. 34, 36. Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 435-442. See Plate II, no. 308. 86 T. D. de Shubert, Monnaies et médailles russes, coin nos. 284-286. Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin nos. 444-446. See Plate II, nos. 313-314. 87 Shubert, Monnaies et médailles russes, coin n. 288. For another example with the inscription, Prince Vasili Ivanovich, see Oreshnikov, Russkie monety, coin no. 447.

18

The Coinage of Vasili I I

directly to Moscow. Similar penalties had been exacted before from Novgorod, but this time a new provision was added. The Novgorodians were forbidden to conclude treaties without the prior approval of the grand prince. The statement of limitation is explicit, yet cryptic: “And the seals (pechati) are to be those of the grand prince.“88 Historians have concluded that pechati referred only to seals on documents.89 This, of course, meant that Novgorod could not conduct an inde­ pendent foreign policy and, perhaps, even trade policy. The terms of the treaty of 1456 have led Presniakov90 to suggest what Bazilevich91 terms a “completely likely hypothesis,” that the thought of the complete submission of Novgorod be­ gan to mature in Moscow. The numismatists Chaudoir,92 Oreshnikov,93 and Kraumann,94 among others, suggest that the Novgorodian coinage also changed as a result of the conditions imposed by the treaty of 1456. The statement in the treaty that the seal of the grand prince would be affixed has been taken by Oreschnikov, in particular, to mean that not only were they to be so marked, but also the coinage. Novgorodian coinage, minted since the beginning of the fifteenth century, shows a crowned figure seated on a throne holding a sword in the right hand and extending the left to a person in a suppliant position. On the back of these coins are variously spelled inscriptions of Novgorod the Great. 95 After the Muscovite victory the symbol on the obverse continued, but the reverse changed in a manner similar to those noted on the coinage of Mozhaisk and Riazan: “Mark of the Grand Prince” and “Denga of the Grand Prince” replaced “Novgorod the Great. ” 96*9 The appearance of the grand-princely title on this coinage is particularly sig­ nificant. Even if the Novgorodians wanted to hide the terms of the humiliating treaty, the propaganda on the coinage would have negated the attempt. Secondly, the inscriptions indicate the degree of submission was greater than that com­ monly stated by historians. If coinage was struck in the name of the grand prince, then conceivably, the Muscovite government considered Novgorod to be directly under its control. 88 “A pechati byti kniazei velikikh.” Akty arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu, i (St Petersburg, 1836), no. 58, p. 43; Gramoty Vdikogo Novgoroda i Pskova (Moskow-Leningrad, 1949), pp. 41-42. 89 See, for example, Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii, iv, col. 1089; Eck, Le moyen âge russe, pp. 420-421; K. Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsenlralizovannogo gosudarstva:vtoraia polovina X V veka (Moscow, 1952), p. 50; Ocherki istorii SSSR: Period feodalizma X I-X V w.t part 2: X IV -X V vv. (Moscow, 1953), p. 105. 90 Presniakov, Obrazovanie, p. 431. 91 Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika, p. 88. 92 Chaudoir, Aperçu, n, 20. Coins listed under Vasili II. 93 Oreshnikov, RussJeie monety, p. 7. 94 F. Kraumann, “Obrys ruskeho knizeciho minocovnictvi,” Numismaticky casopis, xx (1951), 80. 98 Chaudoir, Aperçu, n, coin nos. 3002-29; Gutten-Chapskii, UdeCnyia, velikokniazheskiia i tsarskiia den’gi, coin nos. 203-235. See Plate I, nos. 7-11. The crowned figure seated on the throne has long been a subject of controversy. A very convincing identification with St Sofia is made by A. V. Artsikhovskii, “Izobrazhenie na novgorodskikh monetakh,” Isvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia istorii ifilosofii, V, no. 1 (1948), pp. 99-106. 99 Chaudoir, Aperçu, il, coin nos. 3032, 3035, 3029, 3037. See Plate I, nos. 17-18.

The Coinage of Vasili II

19

The use of the term denga is most illuminating. In three separate instances il had been used by the Muscovite monetary officials: in Mozhaisk, which was directly assimilated into the grand princely realm; in Riazan, which was tem­ porarily returned to the legitimate grand prince by Ivan III; and in Novgorod, which found itself shackled by at least the first degree of dependence to the Muscovite grand prince. It appeared initially in all three cases within three years, 1454-1456. I suspect that the separate Mozhaisk coinage disappeared within a short time and bore thereafter the same inscriptions as the rest of the grand principality. If this is true, then the title gospodar, thrown up in the heat of the civil war, was used in those areas directly belonging to the grand princes of Moscow, and denga on the coinage of the territories subservient to Vasili, but not yet fully annexed. U niversity

of

O regon

Variorum Reprints wish to thank Messrs A. H. Baldwin & Sons Ltd for their kind loan o f a copy o f A. Oreshnikov, Russkie monety do 1547 (Moscow, 1896), from which the plates that follow are taken, thus allowing improved reproduction.

Plate

Plate II

3Z'f Plate III

PUte IV

Plate V

Plate VI

Plate V II

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Plate V III

P late IX

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Plate X

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Plate X I

II

THE BATTLE OF SUZDAL’ IN 144S. AN EPISODE IN THE MUSCOVITE WAR OF SUCCESSION

Only some of the innumerable military engagements recorded in the chronicles of Muscovy are worthy of individual mention. One of these was the battle near Suzdal' on July 7, 1445 between the forces led by Grand Prince Vasilii II of Moscow and detach­ ments from the Horde of Khan Ulug Mehmed. While neither the Russian defeat nor the small number of warriors engaged offer sufficient reason to render it distinction, this clash was transformed into a significant event when the Tatars captured Vasilii II. Despite the subsequent release of the grand prince, the capture and the khan’s ensuing activities contributed to the development of the most critical phase of the dynastic war that shook Muscovy in the second quarter of the fifteenth century. Although scholars have noted the link between military debacle and the renewed internecine strife, no one has explained satisfactorily why Vasilii II fielded an army so much smaller than its maximum potential at the very time the Tatar danger was fully recognized. Most historians have contented themselves with resumes of the chronicle accounts, avoiding either comment or evaluation.1 Several, however, have endeavored to pass judgment. Karamzin questioned the wisdom and ability of the grand prince; “Only Vasilii was not able to imitate his grand­ father and, in a word, to gather a great army; the land had grown poor, not in popula­ tion, but in the wisdom of the ruler."2 Spuler, assessing the outcome of the battle from a Tatar point of view, criticized Khan Ulug Mehmed for neglecting a golden opportunity, when he could have subjugated Muscovy easily.3 Both historians posed the problem in simple terms. Karamzin criticized Vasilii II for fielding too small an army; Spuler assumed that Muscovy was defenseless after the capture of the grand prince. George Vernadsky rejected Spuler s opinion, suggested that "Ulug Mehmed might have understood the situation better than his twentieth century advisor." HeS .

S. M Solov ev. Istoma Rossn s drevneishikh vremen, II (Moscow, 1960), 402 - 403, idem, Istoriia otnoshenn mezhdu (Moscow. 1847) pp 450-451; N l Kostomarov, Russkaia istoriia v zhizneopisamiakh eia glavneishikh deiatelei 2nd ed . I (St Petersburg, 1880), 249. A V Ekzempliarskii. Velikie i ud eln ye kniaz'ia sevem oi Rusi v Tatarskii period s 1238 po 1505. I (St Petersburg. 1889), 168 - 169: K Bazilevich. Vneshmaia pohtika russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva Vtoraia polovma XV veka (Moscow, 1952), p. 50; V V. Vel'iaminov-Zernov, Izsledovame o kasim ovskikh rsanakh i tsarevichakh. I (St Petersburg, 1863). 7 ff ; L V. Cherepnm, Obrazovame russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v X IV - XV vekakh (Moscow, 1960) pp 768-769 ' N Karamzin. Istoma gosudarstva Rossuskogo, 3rd ed.. V (St Petersburg, 1830), 354 1 B Spuler Die Goldene Horde: Die Mongolen in Russland, 1223-1505 (Leipzig, 1943), 165: „Eine große Chance, sich das Moskauer Grossfurstentum fest zu unterwerfen, war von Ulug Mehmed leichtfertig vertan worden russkimi km aziam i nunkova doma

II 12

believed that the balance of military and economic forces favored Moscow and estimated that the khan’s maximum strength was weaker than Moscow’s, numbering at most ten thousand men. The victory near Suzdal' had resulted from an accidental encounter and, under the circumstances, Ulug Mehmed could not have conquered Muscovy or even established his suzerainty over Vasilii II.4* Of the opinions cited above, Vernadsky’s is the most balanced. Moscow indeed had superiority in manpower and resources. But none of the assessments examined the circumstances facing Vasilii II when he led out his forces to push the marauding Tatars from Muscovite soil. The failure of the grand prince to assemble an army large enough to accomplish this limited purpose lay in the particularly critical circum­ stances Moscow faced in the mid-1440s.

I The first strands of the web that ensnared the grand prince in 1445 were spun in 1437. Khan Ulug Mehmed had then moved the remnant of his followers northward towards the Muscovite frontier. For eighteen years the khan had struggled for control over the southeastern European steppe. When confronted by the superior forces of two rivals, the aging descendant of Chingis Khan decided to withdraw from the arena of perpetual conflict. He planned to settle temporarily near Belev, a Lithuanian town near the Muscovite frontier.5 This close proximity of armed Tatars alarmed the Muscovite court. Vasilii II and his advisors thought it best to dislodge them and sent out a force sufficient to accomplish the mission. Despite the khan’s entreaties that he had come in peace and even offered to give hostages as guarantee for the good behavior of his horde, the overconfident and numerically superior Muscovite troops attacked. The Tatars prevailed and even inflicted considerable losses among the Russians. They momentarily continued to occupy the Belev salient.6 No one then envisaged the importance of the setback for the future of the Muscovite principality. The Tatars were too few to follow up their surprise victory. During the next two years they moved along the Muscovite frontiers, though their location and activities were not recorded by the chroniclers.7 Suddenly, on July 3, 1439, they launched a

4 G. Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia {New Haven, 1953). p 319 4 Spuler. Die Goldene Horde, pp. 154-163. b Polnoe sobrame russkikh letopisei, hereafter cited as PSRL. VI (St Petersburg. 1853). 150, VIII (St Petersburg 1859) 107 XII (St Petersburg, 1901). 24-25 According to the sixteenth century Kazan chronicle, the khan, fearing a renewal of the Muscovite attack moved his Horde eastward beyond Riazan' to Kazan', on the great bend of the Volga, where he founded a new khanate (Kazanskaia istoriia. ed G N Moiseeva (Moscow-Lenmgrad. 1954), pp 52-53) Karamzin (Istonia gosudarstva Rossnskago V 311 f) and Solov ev (Istoma Rossn. II 401) in the nineteenth century and Spuler (Die Goldene Horde p 164) in the twentieth, represent a significant school of historians who follow the view expressed in the Kazan chronicle A vigorous dissent was entered by Vel iaminov-Zernov. writing a century ago. who. after a careful sifting of the available sources, con­ cluded that not Ulug Mehmed. but his son. Mamutek founded the Kazan khanate m 1445 and not m 1438 izsledovarne l 4 ft In recent years this thesis has found a warm adherent in Vernadsky (Mongols and Russia p 302) Ulug Mehmed had remained along the southern or eastern border of the Muscovite state during the intervening years but had not settled yet m Kazan

II T H E B A T T L E OF S U Z D A L

IN 1445

13

surprise attack on the citadel of Moscow. They had come so unexpectedly that Vasilii II had no time to summon levies from the surrounding countryside. Leaving the beleaguered capital in the capable hands of Prince lurii Patrikeevich (his uncle, who was also the senior boyar), Vasilii II rushed to the north, to the far side of the Volga River, where he urgently summoned the Muscovite levies to assemble. Meanwhile, the Tatars milled before the stone walls of the kremlin, which they were unable to breach or scale. They vented their frustration on the defenseless suburbs. Finally, they retired southwards with their booty and captives to the obscurity from which they momentarily issued.8 The proximity of a large band of aroused and hostile Tatars so close to Muscovy was not viewed with undue alarm during these years. During the next four years the court’s attention focused primarily upon the west and south. In 1441 Vasilii II declared war upon Novgorod, concentrating most of his forces against the republic.9 When the Tatars from the Great Horde in the southern steppe seriously troubled Riazan’ (the principality south of Muscovy) in 1442-1444, Vasilii II willingly aided in driving out the Tatars.10 Yet the presence of Ulug Mehmed and his followers in old Nizhni Nov­ gorod, a Muscovite town on the eastern frontier, did not call forth a similar effort.11 Lithuanian pressures upon Novgorod the Great in 1443/44 forced the government of Vasilii II to consider the western danger to be the greater. While Novgorod resented the Muscovite overlordship and sought to weaken it, it was also menaced by its western neighbor. For Moscow, there was no alternative but to resist Casimir’s encroachment.12 Grand Prince Casimir had demanded the control over Gorodishche,13 the right to gather tribute from some of the border provinces and to place his servitors in other Novgorodian regions as administrators.14 To counter this menace, Vasilii II sent a Muscovite force into Lithuania, led by two tsarevichi (Tatar prince­ lings). The army invaded without warning in the late months of 1444 and penetrated as far as Smolensk, attacking Briansk, Viazma and several smaller towns.15 Learning of this western involvement, Ulug Mehmed began to attack Muscovite 8 8 18 11 12 13 14 ,s

V (St. Petersburg. 1851). 267; VI. 169; VIII. 107; XII. 30; XVIII (St. Petersburg. 1913), 150; XXV (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949). 260. P S R L IN(St. Petersburg. 1841), 113,141; IV(Dt. Petersburg. 1848). 211; V, 29 - 30; XVI (St. Petersburg. 1889), col. 182. P S R L XII. 42. 61-62 Ib id ., p. 62. The Nikon chronicler identified the city held by Ulug Mehmed in the winter of 1444/45 as old Nizhni Novgorod. Vernadsky, (M o n g o ls a n d R u s s i a ), pp. 316-317, believed this to be the location of Gorodets-on-the-Oka. Since the beginning of the fourteenth century the Moscow princes claimed hegemony over Novgorod in their quality as grand princes, though Novgorod maintained a d e fa c to independence. See A. V. Artsikhovskii, “K istorii Novgoroda," I s to r i c h e s k i e z a p is k i, II (1938). 127 ff; Solov’ev. O b o tn o s h e n iia k h N o v g o r o d a k v e lik im k n ia z 'ia m , pp. 72-79. Atown near the mouth of the Volkhov River, above Novgorod. N o v g o r o d s k a ia p e r v a ia l e to p is ' s t a r s h e g o i m la d s h e g o iz v o d o v (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), p. 424; P S R L , XVI, col. 185. P S R L , XII, 63; XVII (St. Petersburg, 1907), cols. 69-70,108,184. Almost all the east Russian chronicles are silent over the Muscovite initiation of the war with Lithuania. When the Tatar princes, who led the attack, entered Muscovite service is not known. Vbrnadsky (M o n g o ls a n d R u s s ia , p. 302) attempted to identify one ts a r e v ic h , Berdidad, as a Juchid prince and speculated that he may have entered Muscovite service in 1437 or shortly thereafter. Other scholars, such as A. E. Presniakov, O b r a z o v a n ie v e l ik o r u s s k a g o g o s u d a r s tv a (Petrograd, 1918), p. 398, merely state that Berdidad and the unidentified princeling were in Muscovite service at this time. Though they were the first Tatars mentioned for the reign of Vasilii II, others may have aj/eady served in the previous reign. In the sixteenth century Stepennaia kniga (P S R L , XXI/2 [St. Petersburg, 1913], 4 1 4 ), it is related that when Tamerlane attacked Tokhtamysh (1395). three highly placed Tatars sought service in Moscow. No more about them is known. PSRL.

II 14

towns on the eastern perimeter, threatening Murom in particular. The seriousness with which Vasilii II viewed this newest menace may be seen from the mobilization of the entire available military strength in December 1444, composed of Vasilii's personal following and troops from the principalities of Galich, Mozhaisk, Vereia and Serpukhov. Though the Tatar forces were outnumbered and widely dispersed, the Muscovite army seemingly did not press its advantage. In a compaign continuing from early January to the middle of March, Ulug Mehmed managed to avoid defeat and to retain his hold on old Nizhnii Novgorod.16 The chroniclers did not explain why the larger Muscovite force did not press advantage. But a new danger had arisen, which at first forced the withdrawal of the troops dispatched from the western Muscovite principalities and finally dictated abandonment of the campaign. For this was the moment Grand Prince Casimir chose for his counterattack. "And when,” relates the Ermolin chronicler, "the grand prince (Vasilii II) was in Vladimir, in that same winter there came the Lithuanian generals . . . and with them seven thousand Lithuanians .. .”17 Casimir s forces overwhelmed the lightly defended western Muscovite districts, Mozhaisk and Serpukhov-Borovsk, whose princes and fighting levies were then on the lower Oka chasing the followers of Ulug Mehmed.18 A grave crisis confronted Muscovy. Two frontiers, over one hundred and fifty miles apart, were menaced by dangerous antagonists. The udel princes of the west, whose territories had been despoiled by the Lithuanians, thereafter resisted summons to counter the Tatars of Ulug Mehmed. Grand Prince Vasilii, fearing attack from either flank and lacking the support of the territorial princes, decided against renewed offensives against either Lithuania or the Tatars. This indecision emboldened Ulug Mehmed. The withdrawal of the grand princely army from the east in the winter of 1444/45 created a vacuum that allowed for further penetration of the Muscovite frontier provinces. In the late spring Ulug Mehmed sent his sons with a large raiding force to seek further plunder. Lacking sufficient troops of his own, he invited numerous unruly frontiersmen (identified as Cossacks from Cherkas) to join the expedition.19 The grand prince could no longer hesitate, for this newest Tatar raid menaced the agriculturally rich and prosperous region of Suzdal’and Vladimir. The Nikon chronicle recorded that Vasilii II left Moscow on June 14 with whatever troops were available. He also summoned the udel princes and tsarevich Berdidad to bring their contingents and meet him in Suzdal’. Two weeks later, on June 29, he reached lur’ev in Suzdalia, ’« 17

P S R L .V III. 112;

XII, 63-64. XXIII (St. Petersburg, 1910), 151. Several of the Uthuanian chronicles mention that Vasilii II was in the east, engaging Ulug Mehmed at Murom when the Uthuanian invasion began: P S R L , XVII, cols. 70. 109. 141 Other West Russian chronicles carry a different version, placing the Uthuanian attack at the time of the Suzdal1battle in the summer of 1445: ib id ., cols..289,341, 467-468. 18 K h r o n ik a B y k h o v ts a , ed. and trans. by N. N. Udalshchik (Moscow. 1866), p. 96. "I razorili Kozel sk. Vereia. Kaluga. Mozhaisk I mnogo zia sdeiali moskvicham." For the chronicles that reveal that all the u d e l rulers were with Vasilii II in the east, see PSRL. VIII. I l l - l i a XII. 63. XVIII. 193; XXV, 395; XXVI (Moscow-Leningrad. 1959). 159; XXVII (MoscowLeningrad. 1962). 109. 18 The Ermolin chronicle (P S R L , XXIII, 151) states that 2,000 Cossacks had come in response to Ulug Mehmed s invitation to join his forces. PSRL,

II T H E B A T T L E OF S U Z D A L

IN 1445

15

where he learned that the beleaguered Muscovite garrison in the inner fortress of Old Nizhni Novgorod had finally surrendered to Ulug Mehmed. Finally, on July 6, near the city of Suzdal’, the grand prince was joined by his cousins, Princes Ivan of Mozhaisk and Michael of Vereia, as well as by his brother-in-law, Prince Vasilii laroslavich of Serpukhov-Borovsk. But the Nikon chronicler recorded that “the entire Muscovite army numbered around 1,500 warriors, because all the regiments of the princes had not succeeded in assembling." Missing were the troops of Berdidad, who had only reached lur’ev, and those of Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka, who had decided to abandon the grand prince to his fate.20 Other chronicles cast additional light upon the composition of the Muscovite forces. While the narratives are substantially the same - the absence of Berdidad and Dmitrii Shemiaka being duly recorded - they do reveal that .. there came to him (i.e., Vasilii II) . . . Prince Ivan Andreevich and his brother Prince Michael, and Prince Vasilii laroslavich with few people.”21 The emphasis upon the meager forces brought to Suzdal’ indicates that they represented token rather than maximum strength. According to the customary treaty obligations, the udel princes were required to bring the bulk of their fighting men whenever the grand prince led an expedition. Obviously, valuable information for our problem was not recorded by the chroniclers. A reconstruction, however, is possible. Grand Prince Vasilii II left Moscow June 14 and arrived in lur’ev on June 29. Presuming he stopped at Trinity Monastery to pray and allowing for a leisurely pace, this journey of 130 versts (approximately 81 miles)22 should have taken no more than a week at most. In the light of Vasilii’s hurried departure from Moscow, two weeks was far too long a time for such a journey. It is suggested here that Vasilii II had not gone directly to Suzdal’, as the chroniclers would have us believe; instead, he had rushed west to meet with Princes Michael of Vereia and Ivan of Mozhaisk to plead for their support in this latest crisis. At this point it is necessary to introduce a document that is specifically dated, a rather rare phenomenon for inter-princely treaties of this period. In this case, how­ ever, the inscribed date, July 17, 1445, is impossible to accept; the correct date is June 17, 1445. The document in question is an agreement between Vasilii II and Princes Michael of Vereia and Ivan of Mozhaisk. The last sentence clearly states that "this treaty was concluded in the year 6953 (1445), the month of July on the seven­ teenth day.”23 Yet on that particular day Vasilii II and Michael were prisoners of the Tatars, while Prince Ivan was not. It cannot be supposed, as did Solov’ev24 and Ekzempliarskii25 that Ivan of Mozhaisk was made party to an agreement, to which « P S R L . X 11.64-65. ai P S R L . VI. 170; XXV. 262; XXVI. 197; XXVII. 109; XXVIII (Moscow-Leningrad. 1963), 103. 270. î2 V. A. Petrov. „Geograficheskie spravochniki XVII v..“ Is to r ic h e s k ii a rk h iv , V(Moscow-Leningrad). 103. These distances are computed from seventeenth century roads, which probably did not differ much fromthose of the 15th centuries between the major interior towns. 23 S o b r a n ie g o s u d a r s t v e n n y k h g r a m o t i d o g o v o r o v , hereafter cited as S G G D , I(Moscow, 1813), No. 61. pp. 133-135; D u k h o v n y e i d o g o v o m y e g r a m o t y v e lik ik h i u d e l'n y k h k n ia z e i X I V - X V vv„ hereafter cited as D D G (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), No. 41, pp. 121-123. 24 Is to n ia R o s s ii, II, 404. 25 V elikie i u d e l 'n y e k n i a z ’ia, II. 323. n, 873.

II 16

his seal was also affixed. These inconsistencies suggest that an error is involved. Cherepnin recognized this and concluded that the treaty could only have been formulated after Vasilii II returned to Moscow in November 1445.26 Presniakov offered the most sensible solution of how the error developed: the word “lulia” should have read “lunia,” making it June instead of July.27 A mistake of a single letter on the part of the scribe is far more understandable and plausible than Cherepnin’s attribution, which reflects upon the genuineness of the document. Support for Presniakov’s thesis is found within the treaty itself. First of all, Vasilii II promised Michael of Vereia that he need not pay the Tatar tribute for the following year "from Peter’s day to Peter’s day .. .’’28 Since “Peter’s day" fell on the twenty ninth of June, the agreement was made before that date. Much more conclusive for establishing June 17 as the date of the treaty’s formulation is the appearance of Vasilii ll’s seal. Between 1434 and June 17,1445 Vasilii II had utilized a classical gemstone with a carved figure of a bust of Helios, the Greek sun-god, as his personal seal. After his liberation, Vasilii employed another form of the Helios, this one much smaller, and shown driving a quadriga, viewed from the front.29 The lost seal had either been in Vasilii Il s possession or in that of Demid, the secretary of the treasury (Kazennyi d’iak), who lost his life at the Suzdal’ battle.30 The seal had been lost on the battlefield or it fell into the possession of the Tatars. Dating the document on June 17 explains why the short journey to lur’ev report­ edly took two weeks. Vasilii II had actually journeyed west for his meeting with Princes Ivan and Michael and demanded their support in the forthcoming campaign. I believe that the udel princes had initially rejected Vasilii M’s plea for aid. They had been angered by the grand prince’s attack on Lithuania, with the retribution visited upon their possessions. Now they were asked to lead their forces again to the east. So long as a state of war still existed with Casimir of Lithuania, they had refused to follow the summons of their suzerain. This attitude, in turn, had aroused the anger of Vasilii, for at the conclusion of the June 17 treaty Princes Ivan and Michael asked the grand prince to soften his attitude towards them.31 But it was not Vasilii's anger that persuaded them to change their minds. They had struck a hard bargain. Prince Ivan of Mozhaisk acquired a number of lands and Prince Michael of Vereia received relief of one year’s payment of the Tatar’s tribute.32 Secondly, they insisted upon leaving the bulk of their forces at home to defend against a possible Lithuanian attack. Thus, they took with them only token forces in support of the grand princely venture. In essence, the grand prince had rewarded

26 L. V. Cherepnin, R u s s k i e fe o d a l'n y e a r k h iv y , hereafter cited as RF A , I(Moscow-Leningrad, 1948), 135-137. 27 Presniakov, O b r a z o v a n ie , p. 400, n. I. A. A. Zimin („0 khronologii dukhovnykh i dogovornykh gramot velikikh kniazei XIV-XV w.," P r o b le m y is to c h n ik o v e d e n iia , VI [Moscow, 1958), 306-307) accepted Presniakov s solution. Cherepnin knew of Presniakov s suggestion, but rejected it {RFA, 1,134). 28 D D G . p. 122. 29 G. Alef. "The Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle: ADiscordant View." S p e c u lu m , XLI (1966), 19 and note 52. 30 D re vn ia ia R o s s iis k a ia V ivliofika. hereafter cited as DRV. VI (Moscow. 1788), 458. 31 D D G , No. 41. p. 123: "A chto ti. gospodine. kniaz’ veliki, na nas, na svoiu brat'iu na molodsheiu. bylo na sertse, i to ti. gospodine, po se nashe dokonchan'e zadnee vse nam ostaviti." 32 D D G . p. 122.

II T H E B A T T L E OF S U Z D A L

IN 1445

17

them for their losses to the Lithuanians and received but little aid in his most recent crisis. They were very much aware of the possible peril of this strategy, which the two udel princes admitted to in the text of their treaty. And if for our sins, lord, God should take you, the grand prince, from us, then we and our children will not seek the grand principality under your children. And whichever of us God should take away, lord, you, the grand prince, are not to interfere in our patrimonies, nor your children in the reigns of our children.33

A foreboding is voiced that in the forthcoming venture some among the signa­ tories might be killed. Vasilii II had urgently appealed to the Galich prince, Dmitrii Shemiaka, to support him, particularly since his udel principality was not menaced by Lithuania, but only silence greeted the grand prince.34 While the western princes finally agreed to participate in the attempt to contain the raiding Tatars, the Lithuanian frontier remained a continuing concern. It is possible also that the contingent of tsarevich Berdidad, whose presence was awaited so impatiently on the fateful day in Suzdal', had also been stationed along the Lithuanian frontier. In view of Muscovy’s compromised position, the summer campaign of 1445 could hardly have been envisaged as decisive. It was hoped that the small, and possibly scattered, raiding forces led by Ulug Mehmed’ sons would withdraw before the grand princely contingents, thereby temporarily restoring the integrity of the eastern frontier. Even the revised Muscovite strategy crumbled under the shifting of events. The first reversal was the loss of the garrison in the citadel of old Nizhnii Novgorod, which made the increasingly confident Tatars more difficult to deal with; the second was the tardiness of Berdidad and the ominous absence of the Galich contingents; the third was the surprisingly deep penetration of the enlarged Mongol force into Muscovite territory. On the night of July 6 the grand princely “army” camped just before the town of Suzdal’, on the right bank of the Kamenka River, where they awaited the arrival of the forces under Berdidad. Thinking that this was but another night on the mono­ tonous march, the princes and boyars whiled away the night eating and drinking. But the following morning news electrified the camp that the Tatars were close at hand. The Muscovites quickly learned that they confronted a superior force of 3,500 warriors rather than a small raiding party. Unable to disengage, they rose to the / occasion. They beset the Tatars with a furious initial attack, forcing the enemy to j give ground. When the jubilant Russians pursued them, they discovered too late that they had fallen victim to the classic Mongol maneuver: after they broke formation, the Tatars turned and counterattacked with fury. Outnumbered and disorganized, the3 5 35 Ib id 34 This is evident from the summary of Shemiaka's infidelities to the grand prince as summarized in their letter of 1447: A k ty is to r ic h e s k ie . s o b r a n n y e i i z d a n n y e A r k h e o g r a fic h e s k o iu e k s p e d its ie iu . hereafter cited as AI, I (St. Petersburg. 1841), No. 40. p. 77.

II 18

Muscovite forces fled in disarray. Among the captured that fateful day were Prince Michael and Vasilii II himself.35 The Russian debacle resulted from an accidental encounter that caught both sides by surprise, then caused consternation in Moscow and embarrassment to the Tatars. News of the disaster spread quickly with the return to Moscow of the survivors and the appearance of an official Tatar emissary. As if this disaster was not enough, wooden Moscow ignited mysteriously during the night of July 14. So gutted was the city from this greatest of fires that many of the greater personages deemed the city indefensible and began to leave. The spirit of the populace saved Moscow from complete abandonment. Having no place to go and fearing imminent attack by the Tatars, the inhabitants stopped the faint at heart from flight and feverishly began to restore the sagging defenses.3 36 5 The Tatars never came. They too exhibited grave concern. The victors had remained in the vicinity of the battleground for three days, resting and loading the transportable spoils. They then moved eastward to Nizhnii Novgorod. When Ulug Mehmed realized the implications of the grand prince’s capture, and knowing how many men the Russians could put in the field if the occasion warranted, he decided to increase his security. On August 25 the victorious horde withdrew to the safety of Kurmysh, some ninety miles east of Nizhnii Novgorod, well away from the Muscovite frontier. These movements betrayed uneasiness of position though not of design. Ulug Mehmed did not believe he could conquer Muscovy and was ever fearful of a counter­ attack; nevertheless, he desired a Muscovite ruler who was more friendly to him. Vasilii II had proved intractable in 1437, which the khan never forgave. Consequently, he decided to exploit a rift in the princely family of Moscow and place another member of that house upon the Muscovite throne. Since the beginning of the fifteenth century Prince lurii of Galich, the second born son of Dmitrii Donskoi, made it clear that he wanted to succeed to the Muscovite throne when his brother, Vasilii I, would pass away. Open warfare developed in 1430. When lurii died suddenly in 1434, he had usurped the throne of his nephew, Vasilii II. lurii’s eldest son, Vasilii Kosoi, sought to succeed his father. His claim evaporated in 1436, when Vasilii II ordered him blinded. Dmitrii Shemiaka was the third son of Prince lurii, who became sole prince of GalfcFT by 1440. Shemiaka’s ambitions were screened until the 1440’s, though he harbored ambitions to become the senior Moscow prince. Yet, he remained dutiful, at least until 1441/2. In 1437 Shemiaka had been one of the commanders of the Musco­ vite army at Belev. His alienation may possibly have dated from 1439, when he did not

35

VI. 17; VIII. 112-113; XII. 65. In a cumulative memorial for the distinguished dead, paid for by the grand prince of Muscovy is a section commemorating the fallen at Suzdal “for all the Orthodox Christians killed in that battle in Suzdal by the godless Mamutek . . {DRV, VI. 457-459) the names are given. These included servitor princes and members of old serving families (such as Kolychev, Goltiaev, Zvorykin, Pteshcheev and Sobakin). But far more numerous are those identified only by their first names (73). indicating that Vasilii II had been forced to impress as soldiers menial members who worked at court. This is an exceptional instance, for in other cases, only the distinguished are memorialized. 36 P S R L . V. 268; VI. 171. VIII. 113; XII. 65; XXV. 263. PSRL.

II T H E B A T T L E OF S U Z D A L

IN 1445

19

respond to the appeal to defend Moscow. Open hostility surfaced in 1441/2 when Vasilii II declared war against his cousin after Shemiaka had refused to pay the Tatar tribute.37 Only the hurried mediation of the hegumen of Trinity Monastery prevented a major struggle.38 Between 1442 and 1445, Shemiaka discharged his obligations to the grand prince, taking part in the winter campaign of 1445. But several month later, when Vasilii II desperately needed the Galich regiments to complement his small forces, Shemiaka refused to appear. A later document reveals that Vasilii repeatedly implored him to send aid and the Russian bishops subsequently blamed Shemiaka for the disaster on the Suzdal' plain.39 Despite these sometimes strained relations, Dmitrii Shemiaka had not actively sought the senior throne of Moscow, though he never forgot that his father had died as grand prince.40 While he might have harbored such a desire, his resources and lack of alliances curbed his ambition. But when Khan Ulug Mehmed offered Shemiaka the grand princely throne following the capture of Vasilii II, the Galich prince leaped at the opportunity. The khan offered the sanction of a letter patent (iartyk) along with the promise that he would detain Vasilii II as his prisoner. Accident prevented consummation of the agreement. A Muscovite patrol captured Ulug Mehmed’s envoy as he was returning from Shemiaka to the khan. By October 1445 the khan suspected the worst. For all he knew, Shemiaka had rejected his offer and he determined to salvage what he could from his distinguished prisoner. He released Vasilii II upon conditions not divulged by the sources, but which included ; demand for a considerable ransom to be paid as soon as the sum could be gathered.41 Vasilii M's return to Moscow evoked jubilation, while Shemiaka panicked and fled in the direction of Tver’. But the momentary joy turned rancid with the allocation of the ransom assessments. The presence of a Tatar troop, which had accompanied the grand prince to his capital, so that the funds could be transported to Ulug Mehmed, gave rise to rumors of privations still to come. Within several months Dmitrii Shemiaka turned the evolving unhappiness to his advantage. He attracted the frightened and disillusioned to a conspiracy aimed at deposing Vasilii II. This ushered in the most critical phase of the dynastic crisis. This development lies outside the scope of this paper.

37 Cherepnin. FIFA, 1,125-128. dated an extant treaty between Vasilii II and Shemiaka to 1441/42 (D O G , No. 38. pp. 107-117; S G G D , I. Nos. 52-55, pp. 107-118). The treaty indicates that Vasilii II sent his envoys to tsars Kuchuk Mehmed and Sajjid Mehmed to signify that he recognized the khans as overlords. Zimin ("O khronologii," P r o b le m y is to c h n ik o v e d e n iia , VI. 303 - 304) has accepted Cherepnin s dating of the treaty. Previous scholars adopted the dating of the editors of the S G G D . who placed it in 1434: e g.. Presniakov, O b r a z o v a n ie , p. 393, n. 1; Spuler, D ie G o ld e n e H o rd e, p. 162; Ekzempliarskii, V elikie i u d e l 'n y e k n ia z 'ia , II. 273. Cherepnin s dating is the more convincing. 38 P S R L , XII, 42. 39 A I, I, p. 77. 40 A k t y s o t s ia l ’n o - e k o n o m i c h e s k o i isto rii s e v e ro - v o s to c h n o i R u s i k o n ts a X lV -n a c h a la XVI v., I(Moscow. 1952), Nos. 164-165, pp. 120-121. Inthese 144Qgrants to Trinity Monastery. Shemiaka referred to his father as Grand Prince lurii Dmitrievich". 41 Most chronicles state that Vasilii II promised to pay the khan "as much as possible"; P S R L , VI. 172; VIII, 114; XII, 66. XXV, 263; XXVI. 199; XXVIII. 104. The Novgorodian chronicles give the suspiciously high figure of 200,000 rubles (e.g.. P S R L . III. 141. The Pskovian chronicles give the amounts as 29,500 or 30.000: P s k o v s k ie le to p isi, I (Moscow-Leningrad. 1941), 47; II (Moscow. 1955). 136.

II 20

The battle of Suzdal’ illustrates not only the difficulties engendered by the coin­ cident foreign dangers, but also illuminates the problems of Vasilii II, which he experienced in marshaling the effective forces of the grand principality when the interests of the appanage princes differed from those of their sworn suzerain. After Vasilii II regained his throne in 1447, the Muscovite policy makers set in motion a series of reforms. The grand prince would never again be allowed to take the field without an accompanying superior force. His eldest son, designated also as grand prince, would remain in safety, prepared to step into his father s shoes, should disaster strike. More frequently, trusted commanders would lead Muscovite armies while the ruler remained at home. This practice became more marked in subsequent reigns. The warrior prince became a figure of the past. Second, by the late reign of Vasilii II the military entourage in residence at court, the dvor, was significantly enlarged, so that it could be utilized as an elite force. This was a Muscovite equivalent to the praetorian guards, drawing most of its personnel from the significant segments of society. While its members would have many assigned duties, its primary purpose was to protect the prince. Third, the punishments meted out to the appanage princes in the 1450s stemmed from their less than faithful obedience over a considerable period of time. While these fundamental changes did not result solely from the lessons learned from the Suzdal’ disaster, that debacle remained fresh in mind as Vasilii II and his advisors vowed that the well being of the grand principality required the application of drastic measures.

Ill

THE

MUSCOVY AND C O U N C I L OF F L O R E N C E

Any discussion of the Council of Florence and the reception of its decisions in Moscow can hardly be construed as breaking new historical ground. A t best, it can be described as still another visit to a wellworked excavation. T h e problem is too central to have suffered neg­ lect, and a continuing stream of studies ranging from articles to mono­ graphs and general histories has touched upon the subject. W ithin recent years Father Joseph Gill has produced an excellent study on the Council and has appended an epilogue dealing with the reactions in eastern Europe.1 In his most recent monograph, Oscar Halecki devoted a substantial section to the immediate impacts and consequences in the Slavic East.2 In a memorable session of the 1954 meeting of the Ameri­ can Historical Association, three panelists devoted their attention to the Council and its afterm ath in eastern Europe. One paper focused directly upon the reaction in Muscovy.3 Perhaps the current drive for Christian ecumenicity will spur even further study of the last attem pt prior to the Reform ation to restitch the torn pieces of Christ’s garment. Those hostile to these efforts may well concentrate their attention upon the vigorous reactions in the O rthodox East. It is not the purpose of this paper to wrestle with the larger impli­ cations of the decisions made at the Council; its aim is to concentrate upon the reasons for the apparent creation of an autocephalous church in Moscow in 1448. This unusual step should not be interpreted as a rejection of Byzantine ecclesiastical hegemony.4 N either can I accept the view that lack of patience alone led to this development,5 nor even M R . A L E F is assistant professor of history, University of Oregon. This paper u'as read at the April, 1961, meeting of the Far Western Slavic Conference in San Francisco. 1 Joseph Gill, The Council of Florence (Cambridge, 1959). 2 Oscar Halecki, From Florence to Brest (1439-1596) (Rome, 195b). 3 T he papers have been published in Church History, XXIV (1955). I. sevfenko, “Intel­ lectual Repercussions of the Council of Florence,” pp. 291-323; D. Gcanakoplos, “The Council of Florence (1438-1439) and the Problem of the Union between the Greek and Latin Churches,” pp. 324-46; M. Chcrniavsky, “T he Reception of the Council of Florence in Moscow,” pp. 347-59. 4 II. ycneiiCKiifi, UcmopuH Bu3 annnuicKoii UMiicpun, HI (Mosrow-Lcningrad, 1948), 774. 5 George Yernadskv, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, 1953), p. 313: "Only after they had become convinced that the Byzantine authorities had no intention of repudiating

III 390 that fear of the reappearance of the Uniate Isidore prompted the new creation.*6 Instead I should like to suggest the thesis that the consecra­ tion of a native m etropolitan in Moscow was a consequence of severe secular pressures resulting from a local crisis.7 T he generally encountered interpretation can be dehydrated to fit into the following capsule. In 1438/39 the representatives of Orthodox Christendom met with the papal delegates, first in Ferrara, then in Florence, where they reluctantly accepted reunion with the Roman Church. Pressed by the Byzantine emperor, John V III, who required Western military aid to repel the threatening Ottoman Turks, the Eastern delegation hesitatingly subm itted to the suzerainty of the pope and accepted the Latin definitions of dogma. T he Greek Isidore, hand­ picked in 1436 by the emperor as M etropolitan of Rus, labored ener­ getically to achieve* union. As reward, he received a cardinal’s hat and a commission to implement the decision in the Slavic East. W hen the m etropolitan arrived in Moscow in 1441 and announced the union with Rome to an assembly of court and ecclesiastical officials, the grand prince convened a synod to depose the apostate. W hile the emperor and patriarch in Constantinople remained adherents of the union, Moscow did not ask for a replacement. Finally in 1448 a synod of local bishops consecrated a local prelate as metropolitan. Henceforth only Muscovite appointees locally chosen and confirmed occupied the office of senior primate.8 Certainly Muscovites reacted violently to reunion with Rome, and they were shaken by the official denial of Orthodoxy.9 A similar re­ action swept through the population of the Greek East.10 Mere change the union did the Russians decide to act." Dimitri Strémooukhoff, “Moscow the T hird Rome: Sources of the Doctrine,” Speculum, XXVIII (1953), 88, n. 23: “Vasili II and the Metropolitan Jona explain the necessity of electing the metropolitan at Moscow and not at Constantinople by the dissension which divided the imperial city when there was no longer a patriarch of the ancient piety.” 6 E. rojiy6HHCKiH, Hcmopin pyccKOÜ yepneu, I I / l (Moscow, 1900), 479-80. 7 Two historians in recent years have hinted that the civil war had some impact on the religious problem. See Chemiavsky, “Reception of the Council of Florence in Moscow.” Church History, XXIV, 355, and A. M. Ammann, Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte (Vienna, 1950), pp. 145-46. s Many accounts deal with these events, differing in some details, emphases, and in inter­ pretation, but conforming essentially to this scheme. See, for example, Ammann, Abriss ..., pp. 139 ff.; A. Ziegler, Die Union des Konzils von Florenz in der russischen Kirche (Würz­ burg, 1939); H. KapaM3HHT», Hcmopin toeydapemea pocciücicaio, V. (St. Petersburg, 1892), 170-83, 204-5; C. CojioBLeBi, Hcmopin Pocciu ci> dpeentbümuxT» opubMCHo, I (St. Petersburg, n.d.: «06mecTBenHaH nojn»3a»)> cols. 1259 ff.; TojiyÖHHCKiH, Hcmopin__ I I / l , 428 ff. ,J IIoAnoe coöpanie pyccKUXT> mmonuceu, hereafter cited as nCPJ, XII (St. Petersburg, .1901), 41. Some Western historians have attempted to attribute sole responsibility to Vasilii II for the rejection of union in Moscow. See J. Ledit, “Russie,” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, XXIV (1939), 243; Gill, Council of Florence, p. 361; Ziegler, Die Union . . ., pp. 108 ff. 10 yciieucKHH, Hcmopim Bu3anmuücK0Ü UMnepuu, III, 773-74; Martin Jugie, Le schisme byzantin (Paris, 1941), p. 368; Edward Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury, VII (London, 1900), 135-38; Gill, Council of Florence, pp. 350 ff., 356; Geanakoplos, “T he Council of Florence,” Church History, XXIV, 355-56.

I ll

Muscovy and the Council of Florence

391

in official Byzantine policy could not negate the teachings of centuries. Since the tenth-century conversion, Byzantine ecclesiastical ideas, frequently colored by political and ideological considerations, had been communicated to Rus. From Byzantium the Russians acquired not only dogma and ecclesiastical practices but also a pronounced antiLatin attitude, which runs like a thread throughout Russian history from the late eleventh century. In the earliest extant Russian chron­ icle, the compiler admonished a prince: “Do not accept the teachings of the Latins, whose instruction is vicious.”11 In the mid-fifteenth century, a simple-minded diarist, who was a member of the Russian delegation en route to the Council of Ferrara-Florence, testified to the continuance of this conditioning. In describing the wonders of the city of Dorpat, including its many monasteries and churches, he noted that only two “C hristian” churches were to be found and few true members of the faith.1213 A pattern of relations evolved after the conversion, in which the Russians recognized the Byzantine emperor as the protector of O rtho­ doxy and the ruler of the Christian empire. At the very least, emperors generally approved candidates for the Russian metropolitanate. Suc­ cessful nominees then went through the canonical procedure of elec­ tion by a synod of bishops in Constantinople and consecration in a ceremony presided over by the patriarch.18 Byzantines appeared to have monopolized the senior ecclesiastical post in Rus until the end of the thirteenth century.14 Byzantium encountered a series of difficulties with the Russians in the course of the fourteenth century. At the opening of the century, a Greek-born m etropolitan transferred his residence from devastated and depopulated Kiev to the newer political and demographic center of the Volga-Oka region. T h e newly emerging principality of Moscow became the principal beneficiary of this move, when a succession of metropolitans made the city on the Moskva their permanent place of residence.15* Here the princes encouraged the metropolitans to aid them 11 T he Russian Primary Chronicle, trans. S. H. Cross, in Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature, XII (Cambridge, 1930), 203. T he entry is found under the year 988, but apparently was inserted at a later date. See also Hildegard Schaeder, Moskau das dritte Rom (2nd ed.; Darmstadt, 1957), pp. 22-23. 12 “Reisebericht eines unbekannten Russen (1437-1440),” ed. and trans. G. Stöckl, Byzan­ tinische Geschichtsschreiber, II (Graz-Vienna-Cologne, 1954), 153-54. For additional evidence on the development of the anti-Roman conditioning, see Jugie, Le schisme byzantin, pp. 230 ff.; A. lïonoBi, HcmopuKO-Aumepamypnuü oöjopi, dpceiie-pyccKuxz noAe.vmecKnxT» coHuneniü npomuez jfammuim (XI-X V ee ) (Moscow, 1875). 13 M. (Hi>fiK0ii0Bi>, B.iacmh mockoccküxt» toeydapeü (St. Petersburg, 1889), pp. 10 ff.; A. Vasiücv, “Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium?” Speculum, VII (1932), 358. 14 rojiyCniiCKin, IIcmopin - . ., I / b 281 ff.

is Differing views on the reasons for the move arc held by modern historians. See B. 0. KjnoqenCKHH, K y p c p y c c K O u uemopuu, II (Moscow, 1937), 23-24; A. E. IIpeciiJiKOBi, 0 6 p a (Petrograd, 1918), pp. 121-23, 136-37; Ammann, Abriss . .., pp. 82-84; CojiOBi.eBi, Hcmopin Pocciu . . ., I, col. 917.

3 0 0 anie e e A U K o p y c c x a i o l o e y d a p c m a a

III 392 to become the most powerful rulers in the area: to use the ecclesiasti­ cal weapon of excommunication against local secular enemies16 and to exert influence upon the T atar overlords so that the Moscow princes could retain the precious patents to the Grand Principality of Vladi­ m ir.17 Moscow’s enemies would have preferred primates for their own territories, b u t at the very least they desired to divorce ecclesiastical interference from secular conflicts. Moscow’s great enemies of the fourteenth century, the grand princes of Lithuania, periodically at­ tempted to found a separate m etropolitanate.18 T he end result of these politically inspired moves can best be described as a triangular tension, with Byzantium attem pting to stress ecclesiastical unity for its northern eparchy and subordination to the patriarch of Constantinople; and with Lithuania and Moscow at the two other angles, each pulling for ecclesiastical support irt its own secular interest. In 1354 the Byzantine authorities retreated before the determ ined demands coming from the two major political powers of northern Rus. Patriarch Philotheos appointed a Lithuanian as m etropolitan there and the Muscovite can­ didate, Aleksei, received consecration as M etropolitan of Kiev and of all Rus (1354-78). W hen the Lithuanian incum bent died in 1361, the patriarch reunited the two ecclesiastical territories under Aleksei’s jurisdiction, though difficulties continued.19 But when Patriarch Philo­ theos agreed to the elevation of Aleksei as the first Muscovite to hold the prim ate’s throne, he voiced deep concern over the possible conse­ quences. “This is very unusual,’’ he wrote to Grand Prince Ivan II of Moscow, “and not fully without danger to the Church; we have agreed to it only because of the trustworthy and praiseworthy testimony con­ cerning him and out of regard for his virtuous and pious life . . ., but henceforth we will not allow, nor consent at any future time to, any other Russian becoming hierarch there.”20 Grand Prince Dm itrii (1359-89) did force the ecclesiastical suzerains to yield on several occa-

i6 T o cite but one example, in 1329 the Greek-born Metropolitan Feognost rendered valuable assistance to Ivan I of Moscow, when he excommunicated Prince Alexander of Tver and his Pskovian hosts. Alexander was forced to leave Pskov, thereby allowing the citizens of the merchant town to make peace with the prince of Moscow. B.CP1, VII (St. Petersburg, 1856), 207. it Direct evidence to support this statement is difficult to obtain. One wonders, however, why metropolitans visited the capital of the T atar khans on occasions when they were not required to obtain the usual confirmations for the church, such as when a new khan assumed the throne. One such instance occurred in 1333. “Metropolitan Feognost arrived in Moscow, having been in Constantinople and at the Horde.” UGP1, VII, 204. is Ammann, Abriss . . ., pp. 90 f., 93 ff. 10 IIpccuflKODT», OOptuoeanie . . . , pp. 306 ff.; Ammann, Abriss . . pp. 94-96; ro.iyouiiCKiii, Ilcmopin . . U /\, 179-85, 190-92. 20 P y c c K o n u c m o p u 'i c c K a n ô u Ô A io m e n a , hereafter cited as PHB, VI (St. Petersburg, 1908), Supplement, cols. 44, 46. D. Obolensky (“Byzantium, Kiev and Moscow,” D u m b a r t o n O a k s P a p e r s , XI [Cambridge, Mass., 1957], pp. 38-39) has translated this passage from the original Greek.

I ll

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sions,21 b u t after 1390 the Byzantine position stiffened and not another Muscovite became m etropolitan of Rus before 1448.22 N either the Muscovite nor Byzantine position, as each had developed by the late fourteenth century, changed significantly during the subse­ quent decades. T h e grand princes of Moscow continued to press for m etropolitans resident in their capital, preferably selected from among the local clergy, who would aid their secular plans. As the political fortunes of later Rome declined alarmingly, the Byzantine authorities treasured all the more their ecclesiastical suzerainty over the northern eparchy. They insisted upon the appointm ent of primates for Rus who would promote the interests of Byzantium. Despite the opposing concerns, the cement of Orthodoxy and the tradition of centuries kept Moscow fastened to the Byzantine ecclesiastical structure. Tw o series of developments, one originating in Byzantium, the other in Muscovy, led into the m ajor crisis upon which turned the future of the Russian m etropolitanate. T h e first stemmed from the now chronic state of emergency faced by the rem nant of the Byzantine state. T he emperor, John V III, desperately needed military aid to stave off the encroachments of the Ottom an Turks. T he appeals of his predecessor, M anuel II, to win support in the West from major rulers or the pope had evoked little interest, and from Muscovy came only a trickle of funds.23 T h e Muscovites sent an undisclosed, though presumably small, sum of money in 1399. In the words of a chronicler, this constituted “alms for those who are in such need and misery . . .”24 By the 1430’s John V III had concluded that his one rem aining alternative was to agree to ecclesiastical reunion with Rome in return for the troops and supplies necessary to tu rn back the Turks. T h e second chain of developments that led to the creation of an autocephalous church in 1448 turned on internal Muscovite difficulties. 2 1 Ammann, A briss. . pp. 101-3; ToiyOHHCKiH, Hcmopifi. . . , I I / l , 226-60. 2 2 Cyprian, a Bulgarian, had been made “Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Rus” in 1375, with headquarters in Lithuanian Kiev. Upon the death of Aleksei (which came in 1378) he was to become the sole prim ate for all Rus. He never won definitive recognition in Moscow until 1390, where he resided until his death in 1406. Apparently Cyprian maintained close relations with the rulers of Lithuania (roayÔHHCKiü, Hcmopin . . I I / l , 341). Photios (140831) and Isidore (1436-41) were both Greeks. Neither had been a candidate of the rulers of L ithuania or Moscow (ibid., I I / l , 357-58). A Lithuanian bishop, Gerasim of Smolensk, won Byzantine approval as metropolitan of the entire eparchy in 1432 (to 1435) (JlcnoecKue iemonucu, I [Moscow-Leningrad, 1941], 41-42; II [Moscow, 1955], 44; npeciiJiKOBi, 06\m30eauie . . . , p. 395, n. 1). For the correct dating of Gerasim’s enthronement, see rojtyÔHHCKiii, H cm o p in ..., I I / l , 416, n. 2. T he appointm ent of Gerasim must be viewed as an unusual case. At this time the Byzantine emperor anticipated the convocation of an ecumenical council and Gerasim’s pro-union sympathies made him a timely candidate (Halccki, From Florence to Brest, p. 39). T he Muscovite court, however, following a precedent set in the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi, refused to recognize Gerasim as metropolitan for north­ eastern Rus. In the episcopal letters of Bishop Iona of Riazan of the 1440's and 1450's, Gerasim’s tenure, along with Isidore’s, was passed over in silence. Iona referred to the “widowhood” of the Russian church since the death of Photios (PUB, VI, No. 66, col. 557). 23 G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (New Brunswick, 1957), pp. 492-93. 24/7CPJ, XI (St. Petersburg, 1897), 168.

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Civil war, the first in the history of the principality, broke out in 1425 and waxed in intensity between 1431 and 1436, when it came to an abrupt halt. First the uncle of the ten-year-old Vasilii II, Prince Iurii Dmitrievich of Galich (d. 1434), and then Iu rii’s eldest son, Vasilii Kosoi, attem pted to wrest the seniority from the legitimate incumbent. Twice Iurii Dmitrievich took Moscow (first in 1433 and then in 1434), only to die a month after he assumed the Muscovite throne. Vasilii Kosoi sought to succeed his father as the senior prince of Moscow, though he won even less support for the venture than his father had. He nevertheless continued his opposition until he was captured by the grand princely forces. At the order of Vasilii II, the eyes of Vasilii Kosoi, nicknamed the Squinter (or Cross-eye), were put out.25 T he most violent phase of the dynastic crisis occurred after the death of the metropolitan. W hile Photios lived, he headed the regency council for the minor Vasilii II and even managed to win an uneasy armistice with Iurii Dmitrievich.26 His disappearance from the scene possibly contributed to the ferocity of the conflict and encouraged the repeated breaking of agreements of peace sealed with sworn oaths. In 1433, or perhaps even earlier, the Muscovite court had nominated Bishop Iona of Riazan as the successor to Photios.27 Iona did not make the trip to Constantinople until late in the year 1436, and he arrived after Isidore had been invested.2829 H ad Iona appeared earlier, he would not in any event have received the approval of the emperor and patri­ arch. No provincial Russian bishop would have been acceptable on the eve of the projected council with the Romans. Isidore, the former hegumen of the St. Demitrios Monastery in Constantinople, had long proved his worth as an imperial envoy and had helped lay the ground­ work for the ecumenical ecclesiastical assembly.20 Now Isidore’s task was to continue his role of imperial delegate, this time in the garb of 25 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, pp. 294-301; CoaOBbem, Ecmopin Pocciu . . . . I. cols. 1052-60; IIpeceaKOBi, 06pa3oeame. . . , pp. 386-94; JL B. TepemraH, Oôpa.woanue pyccuoto t^eumpaAU3oeamoio tocydapcmea e X IV -X V eenax (Moscow, 1960), pp. 743-68. se n C P l, VIII, 92-93. 27 T he earliest definitive date scholars have been able to assign to the nomination of Iona is March, 1433. In a letter of that date, the bishop revealed that he had been “nominated to the most holy Russian m etropolitanate.” PEE, VI, No. 61, col. 521. 28 Two reasons may be proposed for the delay: first, a metropolitan for Rus, Gerasim of Smolensk, had already been enthroned in 1432 (see above, n. 22); second, and perhaps less convincing, is the argument that the dynastic crisis impeded this venture. Actually, if Vasilii II can be believed, he desired to have Iona become metropolitan so that he might use the spiritual sword to bolster the grand princely position. In a 1441 letter, addressed to Patriarch Metrophanes, Vasilii noted (PEE, VI, No. 62, cols. 529-30), “After the death of . . . Photios and after I was forced to journey to the T atar court [1432-33], both because of the internecine struggle, and for the well-being of Christianity and the benefit of the clergy, I ordered Bishop Iona of Ria/an to go to you . . . with a petition to the Holy Tsar and the Most Holy Patriarch and the Divine Sobor, with our letters and petitions, asking you that Iona be made m etropolitan.” For the dating of Isidores consecration, see Ziegler, Die Union ... , p. 59. 29 Gill, Council of Florence, pp. 54 ff.

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Russian m etropolitan.30 T he frustrated Iona, ignorant of the Greek tongue and seemingly unaware of the imperial court’s determination to make ecclesiastical concessions at the projected assembly in return for military aid, never prepared the notables in Moscow for the pos­ sible results. Even the more knowledgeable Isidore, when he sojourned in Moscow during the spring and summer of 1437, did not enlighten the most illustrious members of his flock as to the possible conse­ quences. If there was disappointm ent in Moscow, it was over the fail­ ure of Iona to win confirmation and the continued vacancy of the senior ecclesiastical throne.31 I suspect that, contrary to some scholarly opinion and even to some Muscovite sources dating from a later time, the Muscovite court made little attem pt to dissuade Isidore from his mission, or that the grand prince required him to promise not to compromise the Orthodox faith. Domestic tranquillity had returned to the Muscovite scene. T he two younger sons of Iurii Dmitrievich of Galich showed no inclination to continue the fiery struggle that had ended in 1436. Representation at an ecumenical council, the first one to be held since the conversion of the Rus, was an honor. Comfortable in their faith and probably convinced that the Western “heretics” would be dazzled by the light of Divine T ru th , the notables in Moscow and in Rus at large were unprepared for the abject surrender to the Latins and were stunned by the outcome.32 If the immediate decision to depose Isidore in March, 1441, appeared to have been taken with dispatch,33 subsequent activity in Moscow 3o Ammann, A b riss..., p. 139: “Aber jetzt machten sich die Gesichtspunkte Konstanti­ nopels erst recht geltend. Der Kaiser und der Patriarch wollten in Moskau einen Mann ihres Vertrauens haben, der die russische Kirche im Sinne der Grosskirche lenkte. Und der Sinn der beiden H äupter dieser Kirche stand auf Verhandlungen mit Rom und gegebenenfalls auch auf eine Vereinigung der beiden Kirchen. So sandten sie als Metro­ politen Isidor . . . nach Russland.“ ai Vasilii II later claimed that he accepted Isidore because he was duly consecrated. He reluctantly consented to Isidore’s departure for the West, but also required Isidore to swear protection for the Orthodox position at the Council (PUB, VI, No. 71, cols. 580-81). We may wonder, since Vasilii wrote this after Isidore's retufn and deposition, whether he did not wish to appear wise in hindsight by indicating concern about the fate of Ortho­ doxy on the eve of the Council. When Isidore left for the West he had a considerable Russian following, including the bishop of Suzdal. Any suspicion of betrayal would have surely reduced the size of the contingent. For the composition of the suite that left Rus in 1437, see roiyÔHHCKÎH, Hcmopvi •.., H /l, 431-32. 32 Several early returnees came back in 1440 with the news of the Council’s decisions and Isidore's adherence to union (rojyÔHHCKiH, Hcmopin . • .. I I / l , 455, n.l; Ziegler, Die Union ..., p. 96). Yet when Isidore finally arrived in Moscow in March, 1441, the grand prince allowed him to celebrate mass in the cathedral church inside the Kremlin. Only after Isidore inserted the pope’s name in the diptychs and had the decree of union proclaimed, did the grand prince then convene a synod to decide Isidore’s fate (IICPJ, VIII, 108-9). Vasilii and the bishops, already summoned to Moscow prior to Isidore’s return (ibid., XII, 41), saw no other recourse, after hearing the heresy with their own ears, than to depose Isidore and remand him to a dungeon. The embarrassed silences in the chronicles over key events and the long period of hesitation after the first news of the betrayal suggest that the members of the Muscovite court and the upper clergy were caught in a dilemma for which they had no precedent in the Russian past to guide them. 33 ro.iy6MHCKifi, Hcmopix. . . , U /h 452 ff.; UCP1> VIII. 109; PUB, VI, No. 62. col. 534.

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was less than decisive. T h e members of the synod that deposed Isidore and ordered him imprisoned knew well the canonical prescription for apostasy;34 yet they left him for seven months in a fortified monastic prison within the Kremlin walls. T h en the grand prince allowed Isidore to escape, much to the relief of official Moscow.35* Still another indication betraying vacillation and a troubled state of mind emerges from an official explanatory letter composed in 1441 (but never dis­ patched), from Vasilii II to Patriarch Metrophanes of Constantinople. T he grand prince saluted the Uniate patriarch as “Spiritual ruler of Orthodox Christianity” and identified himself as “Son of Your H oli­ ness.”30 Nowhere in this letter, which condemned Isidore in the black­ est of terms and defended the traditional Russian understanding of Orthodoxy, was there any overt suggestion of Byzantine deviation, except for the oblique petition: “allow us the freedom to elect a new metropolitan” and consecrate him in Moscow.37 T he reasons given for this unusual request were specious: hostile Tatars blocked the roads to the south and were even attacking the frontiers of Muscovy, and domestic difficulties demanded the presence of a metropolitan.38 But travel was possible. T atar activity had increased, though princi­ pally along the eastern borders. T here is sufficient evidence to suggest that communications with the south and even with Byzantium con­ tinued at this time. T h e Orthodox monks of M ount Athos congratu­ lated Vasilii II for his defense of the faith, and the Muscovite court replied to the message with a repetition of the statements made in the letter formulated to the patriarch.39 Moreover, Vasilii addressed his letter to Patriarch Metrophanes, yet the latter did not receive his ap­ pointm ent until May, 1440, after the emperor and his delegation had returned to Constantinople.40 News of this event could only have come by way of travelers from the south. Apparently members of the Muscovite court and the clergy resolved to await a return to O rtho­ doxy by the emperor and patriarch. They bided their time for almost eight years, from March, 1441, to December, 1448. Was it mere loss of patience that prompted the decision to consecrate Iona in Moscow 34 PME, VI, No. 87, cols. 654-55. 35 IlCPJly VI, 161-63. No official admission exists that Isidore was allowed to escape. T he closest to such a statement we possess is in a letter of 1460 of Metropolitan Iona to the Lithuanian bishops, where he claimed that Isidore escaped. Continued Iona: "T he O rtho­ dox Grand Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich did not pursue him in order to bring him back, for he was stupid and impious, nor did he desire to detain him and become contaminated by his heresy, since the holy rule of the divine law of the Holy Apostles decrees that such an abjurer of the Church be burned at the stake or buried alive.” PUE, VI, No. 87, cols. 654-55. For a similar view, see Gill, Council of Florence, p. 361. PUB, VI, col. 525. a" For the entire letter, see ibid.. VI, cols. 52-1-36. 38 Ibid., cols. 535-36. 30 Jlmnovitcb Ap.rcoipaffiuhcckou Kommuccîu, III (St. Petersburg, 1864), Supple­ ment, pp. 28-36. 40 ycnencKnii, Hcniopuji lhuanmuücKOÛ UMucpuu, III, 774.

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w ithout Byzantine sanction? T he reason is to be sought in local politi­ cal affairs, rather than in the sphere of religious reaction. T h e dynastic struggle, believed term inated in 1436, resumed its incendiary course a decade later and caused the most severe domestic crisis in the history of the house of Moscow.41 Since 1437, Vasilii II had antagonized Khan Ulug Mehmed, when the latter transferred the domicile of his Horde close to the Muscovite frontiers.42 In 1445 a large T atar force surprised a smaller Muscovite contingent led by the grand prince and in the course of battle took Vasilii II prisoner.43 W hen Ulug Mehmed learned that D m itrii Shemiaka of Galich (second son of Iurii Dmitrievich) had not supported the grand prince in his m ilitary ventures, he offered the patent to the grand principality to the Galich prince. T he negotiations were never completed, since the Khan’s intermediary, returning from Galich, fell into the hands of a Muscovite patrol. T he Khan never learned why his ambassador dis­ appeared and, fearing the worst, liberated Vasilii II upon the promise of a huge ransom and continued fidelity. Vasilii II returned to Moscow with a T ata r detachment, charged with the collection of the ransom.44 T h e initial elation experienced by the Muscovites at the return of their ruler soon turned rancid when they learned of the huge levies assessed. W ithin a few months after his release, some began to accuse Vasilii of greater concern for the well-being of the Tatars than for his subjects. “You love the T atars,” runs the charge in several chronicles, “and their language above everything; you oppress Christians severely and w ithout mercy, and give gold, silver, and (valuable) possessions to the T atars.”45 Meanwhile D m itrii Shemiaka, whose appetite for power had been whetted by the Khan’s offer, planned to unseat Vasilii II. Taking advantage of the dissension caused by the onerous burden imposed by the Tatars, Shemiaka used rumors of further concessions and private bargains to fashion a conspiracy, which included many Muscovites of various ranks, boyars, merchants, and monks.46 In one account, the monks of the famed and im portant T rin ity Monastery were in­ cluded among the conspirators.47 T he conspirators seized Moscow in February, 1446, while a small group descended upon T rinity Monas­ tery, where Vasilii had gone to pray. They returned him to Moscow, blinded him, deprived him of his personal possessions and imprisoned 41 Summaries and analyses of these developments may be found in Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, pp. 315-25; CoaoBBeBB, Hcmopùi P o c c iu ..., I* cols. 1062-79; IIpecHJiKOBi, 06pa3oeanie . . . , pp- 398-407; ^epenHHH, 06pa3oeanue . . . , pp. 769-72; 787-808. 4 2 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, pp. 301-2. 4 3 nCPJl, VIII, 112-13. 44 Ibid., VIII, 113-14. 45 ibid., IV (St. Petersburg, 1848), 125. 4e Ibid., VIII, 115; XII, 67. 47 Ibid., X X III (St. Petersburg, 1910), 152.

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him, along with his wife, in the remote town of Uglich.48 T he Galich prince now claimed the throne for himself. For the first time during these dynastic conflicts, the grand princely servitors and members of various influential groups such as the merchantry and clergy had sided with the rebel. How many clerics sided with Shemiaka cannot be told from the available sources. Significantly, no senior member of the clergy spoke out against Shemiaka’s usurpation immediately after the event. Seeing little hope for the miraculous return of their lord, a num ber of servitors of the Muscovite grand prince transferred their loyalties to the new ruler.49 Not all of Vasilii I I ’s former supporters abandoned him now, b u t the speed with which the conspiracy had unfolded left many in confusion, with recourse only in flight. In the turm oil sur­ rounding the capture of Vasilii II, his two young sons, who accompa­ nied him, managed to escape. Shemiaka, determ ined to prevent them from becoming a focus of a resistance movement, and deciding against the use of troops, which he needed to m aintain his position in Moscow, turned to Bishop Iona for assistance. If Iona would bring the children back to Moscow, Shemiaka pledged himself to release the blinded Vasilii and grant him a provincial territory to live out his days in peace. Iona’s reward would be support for his candidacy to the m etropolitan throne. T he bishop fulfilled his mission, only to see half the ru ler’s side of the bargain honored. T he boys were remanded to a prison and Iona was told to take up his residence in the m etropolitan’s palace.50 T he compromised bishop raised his voice in anger for the first time and was joined by other clerics. 51 U nder such pressure, Shemiaka ful­ filled his agreement to free Vasilii II, upon the latter’s oath that he would not seek to regain his throne.52 In a series of swift moving events and complex maneuvers, the sup­ porters of Vasilii II rallied and helped chase Shemiaka from Moscow. A year after his deposition, on February 17, 1447, the sightless grand prince returned in trium ph to the Kremlin.53 Dm itrii Shemiaka still retained a hard core of support and an un­ relenting am bition to regain the throne he had briefly held. T he pros­ pect of a continuing struggle forced the advisers of the grand prince to formulate measures necessary to guarantee victory to Vasilii II and to ensure the succession from father to eldest son. Remembrance of the fissures in lay and clerical ranks in 1445/46 prompted some high policy decisions, in which a key role was assigned to the clergy. Sometime between February, 1447, and December, 1448 (more preIbid., VIII, 115-17. Ibid., XII, 69. so ibid., VIII, 117-18. si Ibid., VIII, 118; XXIII, 153. sa ibid., VIII, 118-19; XII, 71. 63 ^lepenHHH, 06pa3oeaui(e . . . , pp. 799-804. 48

49

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cise dating is impossible, given the state of extant evidence), the Muscovite advisers decided upon three fundamental measures. First, Vasilii's eldest son, the future Ivan III, was co-opted as grand prince.54 T he court also initiated the policy that in time of danger both rulers would not be found in the same place.55 T hus a repetition of the near tragedies and dislocating consequences of such events as those of 1445 and 1446 would be prevented. Second, Vasilii II adopted the title of sovereign, which he displayed on his coinage, as a means of asserting his superior legitimate position.56 Most sorely needed was a united church behind the throne. In December, 1447, the clerics of the Muscovite area met to formulate a policy of concerted action against D m itrii Shemiaka and his partisans. After reviewing the various transgressions of the Galich prince, the clerics issued an ultim atum . If he did not lay down his arms within three weeks, he would be placed under the ban of excommunication.57 W hen, by the spring of 1448, D m itrii Shemiaka refused to bow before the clerical injunction, a grand princely army forced him to terms and the clergy administered to him an oath more severe than any previously forced upon a prince of Moscow.58 T h e clergy also extracted a similar oath from Shemiaka’s steadfast ally, Prince Ivan of Mozhaisk.59 W hen the insurgents again took up arms in early 1449, Metropolitan Iona and the senior Muscovite clerics accompanied the grand princely army on campaign to make certain that all who resided in Muscovy honored the ban and that no one would render aid to the rebel chief­ tains.60 After early 1448, when the synodal injunction went into effect, the fortunes of Shemiaka noticeably declined. He could no longer find allies w ithin Muscovy willing to risk excommunication. After 1450 Shemiaka found support in Novgorod, whose leaders refused to rec­ ognize Iona as the legitimate m etropolitan.61 T he prince of Galich died in Novgorod in 1453, presumably from an overdose of poison 54 PHB, VI, No. 84, cols. 633-34. T he following statement is found in an episcopal letter of 1459: “. . . Grand Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich and his son Grand Prince Ivan Vasil’evich, summoning us, their intercessors, . . . consecrated our lord Iona, Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Rus.” Reference to Ivan as grand prince at the time of Iona’s elevation (December, 1448) dates the co-optation before that time. 55 H. Te^yjHHi, «Hoamn» III BacHJtLeBH1

die erst nach der Übergabe von Tver* gekommen waren: Fürst Ivan Michajlovic Teljatevskij, Fürst Vladimir Andreevic Mikulinskij (1495)165. Aber Ivan verlangte, daß diejenigen, die gekommen waren, um zu „dienen", auch tatsächlich ihr Wort hielten, wenn man sie rief. Die Entwicklung der Vorstel­ lung, zu kommen um zu dienen, war nicht neu. Man kann genügend Beispiele für diesen Gebrauch des Terminus im 14. und frühen 15. Jahrhundert in Verbindung mit zugezogenen Kriegern finden. Was in solchen Fällen im späteren 15. Jahr­ hundert anders ist, ist die Haltung des Großfürsten. Er bestand darauf, daß die Dienstverpflichtungen eingehalten wurden, und er war nicht einverstanden mit der Praxis, die hundert Jahre zuvor gehandhabt wurde, als politische Verbannte von außerhalb Moskaus kamen, „Dienst* nahmen und dann wieder, wenn die Situation es erlaubte, in ihr Heimatland zurückkehrten. Ivan III. hielt sich an die Vertrags­ urkunde und verlangte dauernden Dienst, wie er ihn wollte, und nicht, wie der Verbannte ihn wollte. Die großen militärischen Verpflichtungen, die der Großfürst auf sich genommen hatte, die Notwendigkeit, die fernen Grenzen zu verteidigen und das Prinzip der Treue im Dienst zu erzwingen, machten es im großen Ausmaß erforderlich, Mittel zu suchen, durch die er ein großes Kontingent von Kriegs­ mannen auf Abruf zur Verfügung haben konnte. Noch eine andere Entwicklung, die aus der späteren Regierungszeit Vasilijs II. herrührte, wurde zu einem Instrument gegen den Abzug. Das waren Schenkungen, die nicht als votcina, sondern als Besitz auf Lebenszeit vergeben wurden. Es ist jedoch auffallend, daß diese bedingten Schenkungen nie mit großfürstlichem Land bestritten wurden, sondern zunächst mit den Ländereien der Großfürstin und dann später mit denen der Kirche. Sie wurden großfürstlichen Dienstmannen von hohem Rang als Belohnung für treue Erfüllung auferlegter Pflichten gegeben. Bei dem Tode des Empfängers einer solchen Schenkung kehrten die Länder wieder in den Besitz des ursprünglichen Stifters zurück. Nach einer Versuchszeit, die das dritte Viertel des Jahrhunderts umspannt und dann allmählich aufhörte, wurden solche Schenkungen selten. Statt dessen war der großfürstliche Hof bemüht, eine engere Verbindung zwischen den notwendigen Landbelohnungen und dem dauernden Dienst zu finden, was zur Entwicklung des pomesfe-Systems führte. Vasilij II. übertrug seinen treuen Helfern nur wenige von den vielen Gütern, die er seinen Feinden in den fünfziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts fortnahm. Von den vielen treuen Mitgliedern der Familie Obolenskij erhielt nur einer, Fürst Semen, ein Dorf mit seinen Weilern als völliges Eigentum. Ein Bojar, Fedor Michajlovic Celjadnja, erhielt einige Stücke aus der großen Menge konfiszierten Landes164. 1« DRV, Bd. 20, S. 7. 166 DDG, Nr. 58, S. 180, 184. Fedor M ichajlovii hatte 1435 als großfürstlicher Voevode in Vologda gedient, wo er vom Fürsten Vasilij Kosoj gefangengenom m en wurde (PSRL, Bd. 26, S. 191). Gegen Ende der Regierungs-

IV 52

Meistens bestand die Belohnung in der Übertragung sehr lohnender militärischer oder administrativer Stellungen. Wenn der Großfürst sich auch nicht selbst auf die zeitbedingte Schenkung von Ländern an militärische Dienstmannen einließ, so hat er doch diese Praxis offenbar unterstützt. Ende der vierziger, Anfang der fünfziger Jahre des 15. Jahrhunderts überließ die Großfürstin Sofija, die Mutter Vasilijs II., dem Fedor Basenok, der den Großfürsten in einer Zeit der Unruhen hervorragend unterstützt hatte167, die Dörfer Okulovskoe und Repinskoe in Kolomna zur Nutzung für die Dauer ihres (d. h. Sofijas) Leben. Dies ist allerdings aus ihrem Testament (1451 formuliert) nicht ersichtlich; denn in ihm vermachte sie diese Dörfer Vasilij mit der Auflage, daß er sie selbst behalten oder irgend jemandem schenken könne, wie er wolle168. Die Art, in der die Bestimmung umschrieben wird, läßt die Vermutung zu, daß Sofija an Basenok die Nutzung dieser Dörfer und den Gewinn daraus für die Zeit ihres Lebens verlieh. Großfürst Vasilij II. nahm jedoch die Möglichkeit, Basenok zu ver­ treiben, nicht wahr. In einem Anhang zu seinem Testament, ganz sicher Anfang des Jahres 1461 oder Anfang des Jahres 1462 zu datieren, befahl er, folgende Be­ stimmung einzufügen: „Meine Mutter, die Großfürstin, hat dem Fedor Basenok in Kolomna ihre Dörfer Okulovskoe und Repinskoe gegeben, und in ihrem Testament schrieb sie, daß ich, ihr Sohn, in diesen Dörfern tun kann, was ich will. Die Dörfer sollen nach dem Tode des Basenok meiner Großfürstin gehören."169 Der Entschluß, Basenok für die Zeit seines Lebens die Pacht über die Dörfer zu lassen, hing allein vom Willen des neuen Eigentümers, des Großfürsten, ab. zeit Vasilijs I. wird er als Bojar erwähnt (ASVR, Bd. 1, Nr. 20, S. 37). Vom Ende der vierziger Jahre an diente er Vasilij II. in der Verwaltung (ebenda. Bd. 1, Nr. 201, S. 144; Nr. 277, S. 198). 1461 fungierte er als einer der Bojarenzeugen beim Testament des Großfürsten (DDG, Nr. 61, S. 199). 147 1446, als Dmitrij Semjaka den großfürstlichen Thron usurpierte, war Fedor Basenok, ein unbedeutendes Bojarenkind, einer der wenigen, die sich weigerten, dem neuen Herrscher von Moskau den Eid zu leisten. 5emjaka ließ ihn in Ketten legen und bewachen, aber Basenok überredete den Kerkermeister, ihn zu befreien. Er floh nach Litauen, wo er sich mit den Parteigängern Vasilijs II. im Exil verband (PSRL, Bd. 12, S. 69; Bd. 25, S. 266). Er kehrte nach Moskau zurück, nachdem Vasilij II. 1447 seinen Thron zurückgewonnen hatte. W egen seiner Treue in widrigen Zeiten hielt Vasilij II. ihn in seiner Nähe und machte ihn zu einem der Befehlshaber «eines persönlichen Regiments, des »dvor* der Bojarenkinder. 1449 und 1454/55 wird er als Dienstmann und militärischer Befehlshaber erwähnt (PSRL, Bd. 25, S. 270; Bd. 4, S. 147). Das erste Mal wird 1452 in einer Nachricht von seiner Ernennung in den Rang eines Bojaren berichtet, als er im Feldzug gegen Ustjug ein Regiment g eg en Semjaka führte (PSRL. Bd. 25, S. 272). 1456 befehligten er und Fürst Ivan Vasil'eviä Striga Obolenskij die Truppen, die Staraja Rusa angriffen, wobei er sehr zu der N iederlage der Novgoroder beitrug (PSRL, Bd. 12, S. 110-111). Basenok scheint für den Rest der Regierungszeit Vasilijs II. einer der Einflußreichsten am Hof geblieben zu sein, und er wor einer der vier Bojaren, die das Testament des Großfürsten Unterzeichneten (DDG, Nr. 61, S. 198). us DDG, Nr. 57, S. 176: „A cto esm’ pereze sego dala dvo svoi sela, Okulov skoe da Répin'skoe . . . [hier ist der Text verderbt, aber Cerepnin nimmt an, daß nur vier Buchstaben fehlen], i tö oba sela moi s(y)nu ze moemu, velikomu kn(ja)zju Va(sil')ju, v tom volen on, za soboju li ich deriit, kogo li imi sam pozaluet* (Und was die beiden Dörfer Okulovskoe und Repinskoe betrifft, die ich früher vergeben habe . . . [ . . . ] , diese beiden Dörfer soll mein Sohn, der Großfürst Vasilij, haben und sie, w ie er will, fOr sich behalten oder sie jemandem schenken). iw DDG, Nr. 61, S. 199.

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Die Großfürstin Sofija war für noch eine andere zeitbedingte Schenkung, nämlich an Michail Fedorovic Saburov, verantwortlich. Dieses Mitglied des Hauses Saburov scheint Anfang der zwanziger Jahre des 15. Jahrhunderts ein Bojar im Dienste Vasilijs I. gewesen zu sein170. Als Zeuge des letzten Testaments Vasilijs I. gab Michail Fedorovic an, daß er mit dem Inhalt, der hauptsächlich die Nachfolge Vasilijs II. auf den Thron seines Vaters betraf, einverstanden war. Irgendwann zwischen 1424 und 1447 wechselte Saburov die Partei und diente den Feinden Vasilijs II. Zumindest ist er 1447 als Dienstmann des Fürsten Dmitrij Semjaka von Galic zu identifizieren. Denn als Semjaka endlich die Großfürstin Sofija, die einige Zeit seine Gefangene gewesen war, frei ließ, gab er ihr eine Eskorte, die von „seinem Bojaren* Michail Fedorovic Saburov geführt wurde. Als dieser seine Aufgabe erfüllt hatte, „unterwarf sich Saburov dem Großfürsten und kehrte nicht zu Semjaka zurück, sondern blieb bei dem Großfürsten, um ihm zu dienen*.171 Saburovs Reichtum hatte während der Zeit seines Abfalls und seiner Rückkehr abgenommen. Wahrscheinlich hatte er seine Ländereien verwirkt, als er das erste Mal in den Dienst von Galic übertrat; denn er wechselte die Partei im Kriege, was Verrat bedeutete. Als er nach Moskau zurückkehrte, verlor er alles Land, das er in Galic erworben hatte. So war er ein landloser Krieger geworden. Die GroßfürstinWitwe Sofija hatte Mitleid mit Saburov und vermachte ihm ihr Dorf Cjuchistovo als zeitweiligen Besitz172. Sofija hatte dies zweifellos als eine Schenkung auf Zeit angesehen; denn sie wählte dafür ein Dorf aus, das traditionsgemäß nicht für immer veräußert werden durfte173. Als 1451 für Sofija die Zeit gekommen war, ihr Testament aufzusetzen, vermachte sie das Dorf Cjuchistovo ihrem Sohn Vasilij II.174. Der Großfürst behandelte Saburov nicht so freundlich wie Basenok; denn er be­ raubte ihn des gewährten Besitzes und überschrieb das Dorf seiner eigenen Gemah'70 So identifiziert ihn S. B. Veselovskij [Iz istorii drevnerusskogo zem levladenija (Aus der Geschichte der altrussischen Grundherrschaft), in: Istoriieskie zapiski 18 (1946), S. 81]. Als Beleg nennt er die Unterschrift eines .M ichailo Fedorovii* unter einer Urkunde, die der Großfürst Vasilij I. am 30. Januar 1424 ausstellte [Akty XIII-XVII w ., predstavlennye v razrjadnyj prikaz (Akten des 13. bis 17. Jhs., eingereicht beim Dienstlistenamt), hrsg. von A. I. Juikov, Teil I (1257-1613), in: Ctenija v Imperatorskom O bliestve Istorii i Drevnostej Rossijskich pri Moskovskom Universitete, 1898, Buch 2 (im folgenden: Ju§kov, Akty), Nr. 4, S. 4]. Das würde mit dem Beleg übereinstimmen, den die letzten beiden Testamente Vasilijs I. liefern. In dem früheren Testament, das ungefähr dem Jahre 1417 zugeschrieben wird, war ein Bojar .Fedor Ivanovii' Zeuge, sehr wahrscheinlich Saburov, der Vater des Michail (vgl. die G en ealogie in PSRL, Bd. 24, S. 231). Im letzten Testament Vasilijs I. ist der Nam e Fedor Saburov durch .M ichailo Fedorovii (= Saburov) ersetzt, was vermuten läßt, daß der Sohn den Platz seines verstorbenen Vaters erhalten hatte. PSRL, Bd. 8, S. 121; Bd. 26, S. 207; vgl. auch Bd. 12, S. 73. 173 In Vasilijs II. Testament heißt es (DDG, Nr. 61, S. 196): .. . . , da selo Cjudiistovo, 6to ei dal Michailo Fedorovii Saburov, so vsëm k nemu potjoglo' (. . . und das Dorf Cjuchistovo, das ihr Michail Fedorovii Sabu­ rov g ab, mit allem , was dazu gehört). 173 D q S Dorf gehörte ursprünglich Evdokija, der Mutter Vasilijs I. Dieser bestimmte in seinem ersten Testa­ ment (1406/07), daß nach Evdokijas Tod das Dorf zusammen mit anderen Gütern seiner Gemahlin Sofija g e ­ hören sollte (DDG,Nr. 20, S. 56). Tatsächlich erhielt Sofija 1407, als Evdokija gestorben war, Cjuchistovo (ebenda, Nr. 21, S. 58; Nr. 22, S. 60). 174 Ebenda, Nr. 57, S. 176.

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lin Mar’ja Jaroslavna175. Nur, wann Vasilij II. die bedingten Schenkungen rück­ gängig machte, ob 1453, als Sofija starb, oder 1461, als er sein Testament schrieb, läßt sich nicht herausfinden. Die Großfürstin Mar’ja Jaroslavna übertrug das Dorf Cjuchistovo nicht wieder an Saburov, sondern vermachte es später ihrem Sohn Andrej, doch spielte sie offensichtlich die Rolle eines Beschützers von Saburov weiter, nachdem ihre Schwiegermutter gestorben war. Denn nun teilte sie Saburov das Dorf Michajlovskoe (auch im Gebiet von Kostroma) für kurze Zeit zu176. In den beiden oben zitierten Fällen lag die Initiative, Ländereien als zeitliche Schenkung zu gewähren, bei der Großfürstin; die Großfürsten, Vasilij II. wie auch Ivan III., drängten die Kirche, ähnliche Übereinkommen mit verdienten Dienst­ mannen zu treffen. Ein erstes solches Beispiel datiert vom März 1460. Der Metro­ polit lona gab damals seine Einwilligung, daß dem Fürsten Dmitrij Ivanovic (allem Anschein nach Rjapolovskij) aus dem Kirchengut das Dorf Kubenskoe, seine Wiesen und sein Ödland auf Lebenszeit gewährt wurden177. Kurz darauf, im November 1462, überließ der Metropolit Feodosij dem Boris Matveevic, dem Sohn des Tjutcev Slepec, die lebenslange Nutzung eines Dorfes und seiner Umgebung in Suzdal’. In diesem Fall stellte der Metropolit Feodosij ausdrücklich fest, daß er diese Schenkung „für meinen Herrn und Sohn, den Großfürsten Ivan Vasil’evic*, verlieh, d. h. entsprechend einer Bitte Ivans III.178. In einer Begleiturkunde, in der Boris Ebenda, Nr. 61, S. 196. Sofija hatte Saburov auch die Verwaltung und die Erträge einer W eide in Moskau, die vorher dem Fürsten Jurij von G a lii gehört hatte, überlassen. Auch diese nahm Vasilij II. und vermachte sie seiner Gemahlin (ebenda, Nr. 61, S. 198). 17‘ Ebenda, Nr. 70, S. 243, 248. Nach Veselovskij [Iz istorii drevnerusskogo zemlevladenija, in: Istoriceskie zapiski 18 (1946), S. 81 ff.] wurde Michail Saburov später dvoreckij Vasilijs II. und starb 1464 ohne männliche Erben. Seine Tochter heiratete den Fürsten Jaroslav Vasil’evié, einen der Fürsten Obolenskij, der von Saburov ein Stück Land als Mitgift erhielt. Er schenkte auch dem Hypatiuskloster in Kostroma ein Dorf, bevor er starb; den größeren Teil seines Grundbesitzes, den er sicherlich nach 1447 erworben hatte, vermachte er der Groß* fürslin Mar1ja Jaroslavna. Veselovskij hat zugegeben, hinsichtlich einer Erklärung dieses Vermächtnisses in Verlegenheit zu sein, und erwogen, ob dies vielleicht aus Dankbarkeit für die ihm zuteil gew ordene Verzei» hung und den Schutz durch die Großfürstin geschehen sei. Es ist schwierig festzustellen, ob Saburov dvoreckij am Hofe Vasilijs II. wurde, w ie Veselovskij behauptet. Veselovskij fand eine Angabe darüber in der Seremetevschen Abschrift der Hofdienstliste (DRV, Bd. 20, S. 2); A. A. Zimin [O sostave dvorcovych ucrezdenij russkogo gosudarstva konca XV i XVI v. (Ober den Bestand der Hofinstitutionen des russischen Staates am Ende des 15. Jhs. und im 16. Jh.), in: Istoriceskie zapiski 63 (1958), S. 203] behauptet allerdings, daß>nach den Unterschriften auf den vorhandenen Urkunden Ivan Borisoviö Tuöko Morozov der erste nachweisbare dvoreckij zu sein scheint. 177 Akty feod al'nogo zem levladenija i chozjajstva XIV-XV w . (Akten des feudalen Grundbesitzes und der feudalen Wirtschaft vom 14. bis 16. Jh.), hrsg. von L. V. Cerepnin (im folgenden AFZCh), Bd. 1, M 1951, Nr. 174, S. 159; vgl. auch Nr. 175, S. 159/60). Veselovskij identifizierte den «Fürsten Dmitrij Ivanoviö* als Rjapo­ lovskij (Veselovskij, Feodol'noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 246). Er hat zweifelsohne recht; denn eine Übersicht über die erreichbaren Namen bedeutender großfürstlicher Dienstmannen in dieser Periode enthält keine andere Person mit gleichem Namen in Fürstenrang. «Fürst Dmitrij IvanoviC* wird in einer Urkunde von ungefähr 1463 als großfürstlicher Bojar erwähnt (ASVR, Bd. 2, M 1958, Nr. 370). Fürst Dmitrij Rjapolovskij hatte seit 1446 zusammen mit seinen Brüdern Ivan und Semen Vasilij II. aktiv unterstützt (PSRL, Bd. 12, S. 69). In der Chronik wird er zum letzten Mal 1459 erwähnt, als er der dritthöchste Voevode in dem Feldzug gegen Vjatka war (PSRL; Bd. 25, S. 276). ,7* AFZCh, Bd. 1, Nr. 159, S. 142; Cerepnin, Iz istorii drevne-russkich otnosenij, in: IstoriCeskie zapiski 9 (1940), S. 46 f.

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Matveevic sein Versprechen, die Güter nach seinem Tod der Kirche zurückzugeben, wiederholte, stellt der Beliehene fest, daß er diese Urkunde „seinem Herrn, dem Metropoliten Feodosij, gegen das Siegel des Großfürsten und die Unterschrift des großfürstlichen D'jaken* gab179. Wenn die Aufzeichnung des Vertrages mit der großfürstlichen Kanzlei als ein Hinweis darauf gedeutet wird, daß Ivans III. Bitte geachtet wurde, sollte man sie auch als ein Zeichen der Furcht seitens des Metro­ politen und seines Kanzleigerichtes ansehen. Der Metropolit brauchte einen Bürgen dafür, daß das veräußerte Eigentum in seinen Besitz zurückkehrte180. Eine spätere Schenkung derselben Art macht noch deutlicher, daß einige ertrag­ reiche Ländereien der Kirche als Belohnung für besonders ausgewählte großfürst­ liche Dienstmannen benutzt wurden. Am 28. Februar 1486 erhielt Ivan Vasil’evic Oscera auf Anweisung des Metropoliten Gerontij an den Abt des NovinskijKlosters den Besitz des schon lange bewirtschafteten und wohlhabenden Dor­ fes Kudrino im Gebiet von Moskau für die Zeit seines Lebens181. Ivan Os£era lebte nicht lange genug, um sich seiner zeitbedingten Erwerbung zu erfreuen; denn er starb innerhalb eines Jahres, nachdem er die Schenkung erhalten hatte182. Aber wir wissen, daß es nicht das erste Mal war, daß Kudrino einem großfürst­ lichen Dienstmann als bedingte Schenkung zugesprochen wurde. In derselben Ur künde, die Ivan Oscera dem Abt des Novinskij-Klosters, zu dem Kudrino offizic I gehörte, geben mußte, wird berichtet, daß das Dorf früher Ivan Tovarkov gehört habe ( „ ...to selo Kudrino, cto bylo za Ivanom za Tovarkovym")183. Dieser Ivan Tovarkov gehörte zu der jüngeren Generation der großfürstlichen Dienstmannen und war mit der Rangerhöhung zum Bojaren kurz vor 1483 belohnt worden184. Ent­ weder zugleich mit der Belohnung oder etwas vorher hatte der Großfürst auf den 179 AFZCh, Bd. 1, Nr. 160, S. 142; Veselovskij, Feodal’noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 247. 180 Boris Matveevic Tjutcev Slepec erscheint in den Chroniken zuerst als einer der beiden militärischen Befehlshaber auf der Seite Moskaus im Dvina-Feldzug von 1471 (PSRL, Bd. 8, S. 166). 1478 nahm er am Kazan'* Feldzug teil (PSRL, Bd. 23, S. 185, 191; Veselovskij, in ASVR, Bd. 1, S. 628). 181 AFZCh, Bd. 1, Nr. 33, S. 50-51. Ivan OSdera wurde zuerst 1446 als Bojarenkind erwähnt, als einer der vielen, die die Befreiung Vasilijs II. aus dem G efängnis planten (PSRL, Bd. 12, S. 70): .Bö ze v toj mysli togda s nimi knjaz' Ivan Vasil'evic Striga, da Ivan Osdöra z bratom Bobrom, da Julko Dranica, i inye m nogie döti bojarskie dvora velikogo knjazja* (Dies planten dam als mit ihnen Ivan Vasil'evid Striga und Ivan O idera mit seinem Bruder Bobr, und JuSko Dranica und viele andere Bojarenkinder vom Hofe des Großfürsten). Nach dem Tode Vasilijs II. diente er dessen Sohn Jurij, bis dieser 1472 starb (DDG, Nr. 68, S. 224). In der Dienstliste wird er 1475 und 1479 als okol'nidij des großfürstlichen Hofes genannt (DRK, S. 11, 13) und 1480 als einer der Ratgeber erwähnt, die Ivan III. drängten, nicht mit Chan Achmat zu kämpfen [K. V. Bazilevid, Novgorodskie pomeîdiki iz posluiil'cev v konce XV veka (Novgoroder Dienstgutbesitzer aus der Klasse der Dienstmannen am Ende des 15. Jhs.), in: Istorideskie zapiski 14 (1945), S. 71], doch Ivan III., der in diesem kritischen Augen­ blick selbst zögerte, hielt dies niemals seinem vertrauten Ratgeber vor. iw DRV, Bd. 20, S. 6. im AFZCh, Bd. 1, S. 51. iw Veselovskij, in ASVR, Bd. 1, S. 628. Ivan Tovarkov wurde zuerst als Bojarenkind unter einer Anzahl von Kriegsmannen genannt, die Ivan III. 1475 nach N ovgorod begleiteten. Wahrscheinlich war er dann Mit* glied des großfürstlichen „dvor“ (loasafovskoja letopis*, S. 93). 1477 ging er als Ivans persönlicher Kurier zu den Novgorodern (ebenda, S. 115). Er wird wieder als Bojarenkind im G efolge des Großfürsten 1479 bei einer Mission nach N ovgorod genannt (DRK, S. 13). Die letzte Erwähnung Ivon Tovarkovs findet sich im Juni 1479 (ASVR, Bd. 1, S. 516).

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Metropoliten eingewirkt, dem Tovarkov Kudrino zu schenken, welches dieser dann bis zu seinem Tode innehatte185. Wir können vermuten, daß die Metropoliten, die die unmittelbare Gerichtshoheit über das Novinskij-Kloster hatten, sich einem beträchtlichen Druck des Großfürsten beugten, als sie zweimal nacheinander in die zeitweilige Übertragung dieses reichen Dorfes und seiner Einkünfte an großfürstliche Dienstmannen einwilligten. Die Besorgnis des Abtes und seiner Brüder schimmert vielleicht durch die Bestim­ mung hindurch, die in der Einwilligungsurkunde steht, welche 1486 dem Ivan Oscera die Gewalt über Kudrino für die Zeit seines Lebens gab. Nach dessen Tod, so heißt es, wenn das Dorf dem Kloster zurückgegeben sein wird, solle „für Ivans nahe Verwandte und für Ivans Seele und seine ganze Familie*186 gebetet werden. Solche Versprechen wurden anderen, die weniger wertvolle zeitliche Schenkungen vom Novinskij-Kloster innehatten, nicht gemacht187. Im Kloster mag man befürchtet haben, daß Ivan Ozcera wünschen könnte, daß sein Sohn ihm als Inhaber des Dorfes folgte. Es gibt zumindest eine Schilderung, die die Behauptung unterstützen kann, daß einige dieser Landinhaber auf Zeit versuchten, die ihnen zugeteilten Ländereien zu vererben. Während der Amtszeit des Metropoliten Filip (1464-1473) erwarb Ivan Grigor’evic Kisilev die Gerichtshoheit auf Lebenszeit über ein Ödland am Fluß Kutra in Murom, als Erfolg einer Bitte an Ivan III. Trotz der traditionellen Formeln, daß „ich . . . und meine Kinder das Ödland keinem geben werden, noch verkaufen, austauschen, verpachten oder für mein Seelenheil verschenken wer­ den"188, erhielt sein Sohn, Grigorij Ivanovic, dieses Ödland zu denselben Bedin­ gungen vom Metropoliten Zosima im Jahre 1491/92 verliehen189. Das letzte bekannte Beispiel einer Schenkung von Kirchenland an einen groß­ fürstlichen Dienstmann auf Lebenszeit stammt aus dem Jahre 1496. Fedor Michajlovic Vikent’ev, ein Hofdienstmann von niederem Rang190, erhielt vom Metroiw So Veselovskij, Feodol'noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 247. Die Ansicht über die Schenkung an Tovarkov gründet sich auf eine Deduktion, da sie in der Urkunde, die Ivan O îcera betrifft und die nur angibt, daß Kudrino früher dem Tovarkov gehört habe, nicht berichtet wird. Die Art des Besitzes ist nicht angegeben worden. Doch ist Veselovskijs Schluß gut begründet. Vermutlich gela n g te er dazu, nachdem er auf die kurze Geschichte Kudrinos gestoßen war, die während der Amtszeit des Metropoliten Fotij (1409-1431) abgefaßt und in den Archiven des M etropolitenhofes aufbewahrt wurde. Demnach hatte das Dorf ursprünglich dem Fürsten Vladimir Andreeviä von Serpuchov-Borovsk (gestorben 1416) gehört. Seine Gemahlin Elena gab das Dorf und seine umliegenden Besitzungen später der Kirche. Der Metropolit Fotij stellte das Dorf und seine W eiler unter die Gerichtshoheit des Novinskij-Klosters (AFZCh, Bd. 1, Nr. 31, S. 49-51). In den späten neunziger Jahren wird wieder berichtet, daß Kudrino unter der direkten Jurisdiktion des Novinskij-Klosters stehe, nachdem es nach dem Tode des Ivon OScera an das Kloster zurückgefallen war (ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 32, S. 50). AFZCh, Bd. 1, S. 51. iw Vgl. ebenda. Bd. 1. Nr. 35-37, S. 52-53. iw Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 228, S. 201. ’»» Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 227, S. 201. no Vikent’ev wurde 1494/95 der erste jasel’nicij Ivans III. und starb 1498 [DRV, Bd. 20, S. 8, Zimin, O sostave dvorcovych ucrezdenij, in: Istoriceskie zapiski 63 (1958), S. 205]. Nach Zimin (ebenda, S. 183-183) beaufsichtigte der jasel'ni£ij die staatlichen Pferdeknechte und nahm an Verhandlungen mit den Krimtataren teil da einige der besten Pferde aus deren Gebiet kamen.

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politen Simon das Dorf Turab'ev an der Kljaz'ma im Moskauer Gebiet „mit W äl­ dern, Weiden und Ackerland". Fedor Michajlovic mußte selbst für Landarbeiter sorgen, aber es scheint, daß das Dorf kein Ödland war und schon einige Zeit be­ baut worden war. Nach seinem Tode und der Rückgabe des Dorfes versprach der Metropolit, daß für den Verstorbenen und seine Familie gebetet werden würde, was auf den Wert, den die Kirche diesem Besitz beimaß, hinweist191. Gewisse Unterschiede sollten bei den verschiedenen Typen kirchlicher und klösterlicher Schenkungen an militärische Dienstmannen des Großfürsten beachtet werden. Im ersten Fall geschah eine Anzahl solcher bedingter Übertragungen auf besonderes Ersuchen des Großfürsten. Es mag auch sein, daß alle diese Schen­ kungen auf Lebenszeit an Krieger eine großfürstliche Erlaubnis verlangten. Wenn solche Gesuche gebilligt wurden, teilte der Metropolit den bestimmten Dienstman­ nen Ländereien von Klöstern zu, die unter seiner direkten Kontrolle standen (wie das Novinskij-Kloster), oder von Besitzungen, die vom entsprechenden Amt des Metropolitensitzes verwaltet wurden. Die Metropoliten versuchten nicht, Klöster außerhalb ihrer unmittelbaren Gerichtshoheit zu zwingen, sich an der Belohnung staatlicher Dienstmannen zu beteiligen. Das Troice-Sergiev-Kloster (Dreifaltigkeits­ kloster), das reichste in der Moskauer Rus’, gab zu diesem Zweck keine Ländereien heraus. In den verschiedenen Fällen, in denen es ein Dorf aus seinen umfassenden Besitzungen großfürstlichen Dienstmannen zuwies, sollte das Dorf vor Übergriffen der Bauern einer benachbarten fürstlichen votcina geschützt werden. Das Kloster gab an Kriegsmannen auch etwas Ödland unter der Bedingung, daß das Land be­ baut und zur bestimmten Zeit zurückgegeben werde192. Im dritten Fall, in dem die Metropoliten das großfürstliche Ersuchen, würdige staatliche Dienstmannen mit Land zu belohnen, gerne erfüllen wollten, versuchten sie ohne Zweifel, solche Ländereien zuzuweisen, die Verbesserungen und Bevölke­ rungszuwachs brauchten, während auf der anderen Seite die Empfänger von Land­ schenkungen auf Lebenszeit sich sehr um reiche Dörfer mit größeren Erträgen bemühten. Dienstmannen, wie Ivan Tovarkov, Ivan OScera und Boris Matveevic Tjutcev Slepec war es offenbar gelungen, bereits kultivierte Dörfer zu erhalten. Sogar Fürst Dmitrij Ivanovic Rjapolovskij, dem ein Ödland gegeben wurde, erhielt zugleich ein Dorf und Weiden. Neben dem wirtschaftlichen Aspekt dieser bedingten Schenkungen (in denen die Beschenkten nicht nur die Rückgabe der Güter versprachen, sondern auch die Über­ tragung aller Verpflichtungen der Bauern sowie des Getreides und der Tiere, die 191 AFZCh, Bd. 1, Nr. 40, S. 55-56; Veselovskij, Féodal’noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 248. Vgl. ebenda, Bd. 1, S. 249 ff. andere Arten bedingten Besitzes von Kirchengut. Vgl. auch bei Cerepnin (Obrazovanie, S. 195 ff.) die ausführliche Diskussion des zitierten Beispieles und anderer Fälle bedingter Landschenkungen verschiedener Art. Aber weder Cerepnin noch Veselovskij machten einen Unterschied zwischen bedingtem Landbesitz mili­ tärischer und nichtmilitärischer Dienstmannen. 192 Veselovskij, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 250 ff.

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sie halten konnten, an die Kirche), taucht ein anderes Problem auf. Dauernder Besitz hing nicht von ständigem Dienst ab. Man kann sogar vermuten, daß diejenigen, die solche Ländereien erhalten hatten, ihren großfürstlichen Dienst nicht lange fort­ setzten. Da Belege spärlich sind, muß man dies als eine Hypothese und nicht als einen sicheren Schluß betrachten. Allerdings hat Boris Matveevic Tjutäev Slepec noch gedient, nachdem er die Schenkung erhalten hatte. Doch scheint es mit Fedor Basenok eine ganz andere Bewandtnis gehabt zu haben. Er hat seine Schenkung vermutlich in den frühen fünfziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts erhalten und wird 1456 zum letzten Mal als militärischer Dienstmann erwähnt193. Er setzte in führender administrativer Stellung seinen Dienst fort bis zum Ende der Regierung Vasilijs II., da er das Testament des Großfürsten als Zeuge unterschrieb. Ivan III. enthob ihn seines Sitzes im Bojarenrat, und er verschwand vom Hof194. Einige Zeit später be­ fahl Ivan, aus noch nicht geklärten Gründen, ihn gefangenzunehmen, zu blenden und ihn ins Kirillov-Kloster in Beloozero einzusperren195. Ebenso verwirrend ist der Fall des Ivan Oscera. Er wird zuletzt im Zusammenhang mit der Erwerbung des Dorfes Kudrino erwähnt196. Von ihm wird berichtet, daß er innerhalb eines Jahres nach der Schenkung starb, doch gibt es Anzeichen dafür, daß sein Tod vielleicht nicht natürlich war. Aus unbekanntem Grunde scheint sich auch sein Verhältnis zu Ivan III. verschlechtert zu haben, und er fiel in Ungnade. Diese Folgerung muß man aus der Tatsache ziehen, daß seine früheren unfreien Dienstmannen (posluzil'cy) Dienstgüter (pomesf ja) in Novgorod gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts erhielten197. Fürst Dmitrij Ivanovic Rjapolovskij, der 1460 die bedingte Schenkung von Kirchenland erhielt, focht 1459 seinen letzten Kampf als Truppenbefehlshaber198, diente anschlie­ ßend in der Verwaltung Ivans III. und verschwindet dann aus dem Blickfeld199. Ob irgendeine Beziehung bestand zwischen dem Wunsch, sich nach dem Emp­ fang dieser Schenkungen vom aktiven Dienst zurückzuziehen und dem möglichen Unwillen des Großfürsten auszuweichen, dazu können auf Grund des vorliegenden Materials nur Vermutungen angestellt werden. Aber wenn Ivan III. auch die Ver­ waltung der Kirche verpflichtete, seine Dienstmannen mit Schenkungen auf Lebens'*» PSRL, Bd. 25, S. 274. 194 Vgl. die Beschreibung des Bojarenrates von 1442 bei Sergeevii (Russkie juridiieskie drevnosti, Bd. 1, S. 401). 195 Ja. S. Lur'e, Ideologiéeskaja bor'ba v russkoj publicistike konca XV - na£ala XVI v. (Der ideologische Kampf in der russischen Publizistik vom Ende des 15. bis zum Anfang des 16. Jhs.), M-L 1960, S. 53, 60. 196 So Bazilevi£, Novgorodskie pomeSüiki, in: Istoriteskie zapiski 14 (1945), S. 71; Bazilevit, VneSnjaja politika, S. 359. 197 Veselovskij, Feodal’noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 289. In der Liste Seremetevs, in der sein Tod verzeich­ net wird (DRV, Bd. 20, S. 6), gibt es an anderen Stellen Andeutungen dafür, daß der Ausdruck .gestorben* eine Vielzahl von Vergehen verschwieg. So sollen z. B. Fürst Ivan Jur'evi£ Patrikeev und sein Sohn Vasilij Kosoj 1499 .gestorben* sein, als in Wirklichkeit ihr Todesurteil umgewandelt wurde und sie in ein Kloster verbannt wurden. Andererseits wird berichtet, daß dem Fürsten Semen Rjapolovskij der Bojarenrang aberkannt wurde, als er in Wirklichkeit hingerichtet wurde (DRV, Bd. 20, S. 9). PSRL, Bd. 25, S. 276; Bd. 26, S. 217. ASVR, Bd. 2, Nr. 374-375, S. 368-374.

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zeit zu belohnen, so ließ er selbst sich wie sein Vater niemals auf solche Praxis ein. Nur in seltenen Fällen schenkte Ivan etwas von seinen eigenen Besitzungen. 1469 belohnte er einen führenden Dienstmann mit Ländereien als unbeschränktem Eigen­ tum200. Als er seinem Bruder Boris die Besitzungen, die er früher vom Fürsten von Vereja eingezogen hatte, übertrug, nahm er die Ländereien aus, die er Klöstern und Bojarenkindern gegeben hatte201. Nachdem Ivan 1480 mit seinem Bruder Boris vereinbart hatte, dessen Besitzungen zu vermehren und ihm Mozajsk zu geben, bestimmte er, daß in diese Schenkungen nicht das mit einbezogen sei, was er seinen Bojaren und Bojarenkindern gegeben hatte202. Unglücklicherweise ist die Art des Besitzes nicht angegeben; so kann man nur vermuten, ob es dauernder oder be­ dingter Besitz war. Veselovskij hat einen Beweis dafür gefunden, daß Ivan III. Dienstmannen von niederem Rang Ländereien in Galic zuteilte unter der Bedin­ gung, daß sie ihm dienten203. In den sechziger und siebziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts, wie überhaupt wäh­ rend seiner Regierung, suchte Ivan III. nach Mitteln, den Umfang der Ländereien zu vergrößern, die als Belohnung für verdiente Kriegsmannen verwendet werden konnten, ohne dabei seine eigenen Besitzungen heranzuziehen. Deshalb gibt es so wenig Schenkungen, die auf seine eigenen Güter zurückgreifen, und daher rührt die gelegentliche Übertragung von kleinen Anteilen aus neu erworbenen Gebieten an Dienstmannen. Und doch erforderte die Notwendigkeit eines großen stehenden Heeres oder eines Heeres, das in Krisenzeiten verfügbar war, einige Mittel, den Dienst solcher Kriegsmannen zu erzwingen, die ihr Vorrecht, nicht zu dienen, jeder­ zeit wahrnehmen konnten. Außerdem erforderte die dauernde Unzufriedenheit der Novgoroder in den siebziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts die Notwendigkeit einer ausreichenden Lösung, welche die Loyalität dieses weiten Gebietes sichern und die wiederholten Versuche, sich von der Moskauer Kontrolle zu lösen, unmöglich machen würde. Die Novgoroder verdienten in den Augen der Moskauer Strafe für das, was vom Standpunkt Moskaus aus als Verrat betrachtet wurde. Bei der Suche nach einer dauerhaften Lösung erblickte Ivan auch eine Gelegenheit, ein Exempel für seine eigenen Dienstmannen zu statuieren, gegen die er drastische Methoden in großem Maßstab nicht anzuwenden wagte, sondern die er nur mit berechtigten, für die Gruppe der Dienstmannen ausreichenden Gründen bestrafen konnte. Gleichzeitig trachtete er dabei Ländereien zu gewinnen, die er für die Vergröße­ rung des stehenden Heeres nutzbar machen konnte. Um zu einer Lösung zu kommen, war ein planmäßiges Vorgehen notwendig. Daher wandte er sich dem nicht sehr zufriedenstellenden Experiment zu, großfürstlichen Kriegsmannen für die 200 Juzkov, Akty, Nr. 28, S. 26 f. 201 DDG, Nr. 69, S. 226; Cerepnin, Obrazovanie, S. 197. DDG, Nr. 72, S. 253; Cerepnin, Obrazovanie, S. 197. 203 Veselovskij, Feodal noe zem levladenie. Bd. 1, S. 301-302. 202

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Zeit ihres Lebens Kirchenländereien zu übertragen. Das entsprach seinem Plan, den Besitz der Kirche stärker heranzuziehen. Im Gegensatz zu den verschiedenen klösterlichen und kirchlichen Gruppen innerhalb Moskaus, die zögerten, bei diesem Vorhaben mitzuarbeiten, bot die Novgoroder Kirche eine bessere Aussicht. Sie hatte sich selbst kompromittiert, als ihr Bischof es mit den führenden, antimoskauisch gestimmten Kreisen gehalten hatte. In den siebziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts zeigte sich zuerst Ivans Absicht, seine Hand auf die Gebiete Novgorods zu legen. Unter der Beschuldigung des Verrates, der Verschwörung oder des Verdachtes pro-litauischer Orientierung ergriff er ent­ scheidende Maßnahmen gegen einige der führenden Bojaren in Novgorod, die zufällig zugleich zu den reichsten Grundherren gehörten204. Im Annexionskrieg (1477/78) aber zog er etwas weniger als die Hälfte der Klosterländereien ein. Diese Haltung gegenüber der Kirche bedeutete eine revolutionäre Abwendung von der früheren Staatspolitik. Bis dahin wollte Ivan versuchen, die Novgoroder Gebiete dem Staat zur Verfügung zu stellen. Man darf die Begründung für die folgenden Proskriptionen der großen und mittleren Grundherren 1483/84 und 1488/89 in Zweifel ziehen, nämlich daß die fortgesetzten aufständischen Bewegungen allein genügend Grund für die Bestrafung mehrerer tausend Leute waren. Um 1499 be­ endete Ivan III. den Vorgang mit der Konfiszierung des Restbestandes der Novgo­ roder Kirchenländereien. Noch vor der vollständigen Durchführung des Konfiszie­ rungsplans faßte Ivan einen neuen. Er verstreute die entwurzelten großen und mittleren Grundherren über die verschiedenen Moskauer Gebiete und ersetzte sie durch militärische Dienstmannen, die zu dauerndem treuen Dienst verpflichtet waren. Mehr als 2000 Moskauer Kriegsmannen wurden in Novgorod angesiedelt. Fast alle von ihnen stammten aus den landlosen, verarmten Familien mit votäinaBesitz, aus den weniger bedeutenden jüngeren Linien der alten Bojarenfamilien und aus den verschiedenen Gebieten des Moskauer Staates. Sehr wenige Moskauer Bojaren erhielten ein großes pomesfe (Staatsland, zugeteilt mit der Bedingung des Dienstes), und dies nur für kurze Zeit. Ungefähr 100 früher abhängige Leute von Bojaren, die in Ungnade gefallen waren (posluzil'cy), wurden auch pomesciki. Auf diese Weise wurden ungefähr 1 Million Desjatinen, vom Ackerland bis zu fast unfruchtbarem Land, von allodialem und klösterlichem Besitz zu Dienstgütern205. Die Zusammensetzung der neuen Gruppe von Dienstmannen zeigt die Einstel­ lung des Großfürsten. Von einigen bedeutenden Bojaren, die große Anteile er­ hielten, ganz abgesehen, konnte das Durchschnittsgut einen Dienstmann mit aus204 Im Juli 1471 verfügte er für vier posadniki die Todesstrafe wegen Verrats und schickte eine Anzahl anderer ins Gefängnis nach Moskau (PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 193; Bd. 8, S. 166; Bd. 26, S. 239). 1476 verfügte er wieder­ um eine Verbannung (PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 203) und 1479 noch eine (Bazilevic, Vnesnjaja politika, S. 126-127). 205 Vgl. die ausführliche Diskussion bei Veselovskij, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 226-227, 287-299, Bazilevi£, Novgorodskie pomeSciki, in: Istoiiäeskie zapiski 14 (1945), S. 62-80.

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reichenden Mitteln versorgen. Die Anteile für die früheren posluiil’cy beliefen sich auf 23-24 obzi, die für Bojarenkinder aus den Städten auf ungefähr 32 obzi, die für Nachkommen alter Bojarenfamilien auf 34 und auf 43-44 obzi die für verarmte kleine Fürsten206. Daß so viele zukünftige Dienstmannen eilten, solche Angebote anzunehmen, weist auf den Mangel nutzbaren Landes innerhalb des Moskauer Staates infolge der Bevölkerungszunahme und des Anwachsens des kirchlichen Landbesitzes hin. Der Fürst zog aus ihrer Verfügbarkeit Nutzen. Er sorgte auch dafür, daß die reich­ sten landbesitzenden Moskauer Dienstmannen, die schon Einkommensquellen hatten, ausgeschlossen wurden. „Kleinere* Dienstmannen konnten leichter kon­ trolliert werden. Daher hing die Dauer des gesicherten Einkommens aus diesen bedingten Verleihungen von treuem und gehorsamen Dienst für den Großfürsten ab. Ivan III. hatte so in den unruhigen westlichen Grenzgebieten eine kampffähige Truppe zu seiner Verfügung. Eine ähnliche Organisation bestand an den östlichen Grenzen seit der späten Regierungszeit Vasilijs II., seitdem nämlich der Großfürst dort ein tatarisches Fürstentum geschaffen hatte, das Moskau untertan war207. Aber diese Tataren standen unter der direkten Gerichtshoheit eines tatarischen carevià, der Moskau untergeordnet war, und daher waren seine Dienstmannen nicht dem Großfürsten unmittelbar verantwortlich. Ivan III. versuchte am Ende seiner Regierung, den Umfang des Landes, das in Form von Dienstgütern verliehen wurde, auszudehnen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, stellte er sich auf die Seite einer Gruppe von kirchlichen Reformern, die das christ­ liche Leben mit einem auf die Rückkehr zu den Werten der Urchristenheit gerichte­ ten Programm reformieren wollten. Der Teil des Programms, der bei ihm am meisten Anklang fand, war die Aufforderung an die Kirche, sich selbst ihrer ange­ häuften Ländereien zu entledigen. Da diese mehr als ein Viertel des ackerbau­ fähigen Landes ausmachten, sah Ivan hier ein Mittel, durch das er sein pomest’eSystem ausdehnen konnte, ohne weiter auf seine eigenen Besitzungen zurück­ greifen zu müssen. Im Zusammenhang mit den Novgoroder Proskriptionen hatte ms Veselovskij; Feodal'noe zem levladenie. Bd. 1, S. 296, 311. Den Berechnungen Veselovskijs entsprechend können 20-60 o b ii in die üblicheren Einheiten von 200-600 detverti oder 300-900 desjatiny übertragen werden. W enn wir annehmen, daß die Berechnungen Veselovskijs richtig sind, ist er zu seiner Schlußfolgerung berech­ tigt, .d a ß die Moskauer, die am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts ein pomest'e in Novgorod erhielten, sehr gut versorgt w aren'. Aber man sollte dabei nicht vergessen, daß die Novgoroder immer Schwierigkeiten hatten, für den Eigenbedarf an Nahrungsmitteln zu sorgen. Korn mußte traditionell von den .unteren' (niinie) Ländern eingeführt werden, d. h. aus dem Moskauer G ebiet. Die G ebiete um Novgorod waren weitgehend unfrucht­ bar, was erklären mag, warum hier scheinbar Riesengüter verliehen wurden. Außerdem wurde die Hälfte des Landes jeweils nicht gepflügt auf Grund des üblichen Zwei-Felder-Systems. Es gibt auch einige Zweifel hinsichtlich des Umfanges der o b ia . Wenn die o b ia die Fläche war, die ein Monn mit einem Pferd an einem Tag pflügen konnte (vergleichbar dem römischen iugum), so würde Veselovskijs Berechnung etwas zu hoch gegriffen sein. vt Vernadsky, The M ongols and Russia, S. 331-332; G. Vernadsky und M. Karpovich, A History of Russia, Bd. 4: G. Vernadsky, Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age, New Haven 1959, S. 58, 76, 81,112.

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er eine Anzahl von Bojarenfamilien auf Dienstgüter im altmoskauischen Gebiet um­ gesiedelt208. Das einzige verfügbare Land waren hierbei seine eigenen Güter ge­ wesen, durch deren Abgabe er sein persönliches Einkommen geschmälert sah. Aber Ivans Hoffnungen auf eine Vermehrung des pomest’e-Landes wurden mit der Ab­ lehnung des Reformprogramms auf dem Kirchenkonzil von 1503 zerstört. Trotz weiterer Bemühungen der Regierung wurde damit die Säkularisierung der Kloster­ güter um zweieinhalb Jahrhunderte verschoben209. Ivan hatte weit mehr Erfolg mit seiner litauischen Politik, die sich, wie so viele seiner politischen Maßnahmen, aus dargebotenen Gelegenheiten ergab. Einige unzufriedene Fürsten des Großfürstentums Litauen waren in den späten siebziger Jahren auf die moskauische Seite übergegangen und dort Dienstmannen geworden. Andere Unzufriedene wollten durch einen Aufstand gegen Kasimir von Litauen ihren Landbesitz retten. 1481 ersannen drei der Unzufriedenen, die Fürsten Michail Olej'kovic, Ivan Gol'sanskij und Fedor Bel'skij, einen scheinbar unglaublichen Plan, Kasimir zu töten und sich sowie alles Land östlich der Berezina dem Großfürsten von Moskau zu unterstellen. Kasimir hörte von dem Plan und nahm die Fürsten Michail und Ivan gefangen. Fedor Bel’skij kam gerade mit dem Leben davon, indem er in solcher Eile floh, daß er seine Braut, die er eben erst geheiratet hatte, in Stich ließ. Ivan III. empfing Bel’skij herzlich und übertrug ihm einige Novgoroder Dörfer unmittelbar an der litauischen Grenze als votcina210. Der Empfang, der Bel’skij bereitet worden war, konnte Kasimir nicht gefallen. In einem Zornesausbruch lehnte er ein Gesuch Ivans III. ab und erlaubte nicht, daß moskauische Gesandte litauisches Gebiet durchquerten, um Elena, die Braut des ältesten Sohnes Ivans, von der Moldau nach Moskau zu geleiten. Ivan rächte sich, indem er seine Verbündeten von der Krim einlud, Kiev zu plündern. Erst da ließ Kasimir das Moskauer Geleit zu211. Aber Kasimir hatte kaum Grund, Moskau der Untreue anzuklagen. W eder in der Politik noch in seinen privaten Handlungen war er seinem östlichen Rivalen gegenüber freundlich gewesen. Moskauer Flüchtlinge lebten immer noch in Litauen und hatten dort sogar Dienste angenommen. Nie war einem Flüchtling eine Freistatt verweigert worden, und Litauen blieb weiterhin eine letzte Zuflucht für diejenigen, die aus Moskau flohen212. Keine der beiden Parteien »• PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 36; vgl. auch Veselovskij, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 295. 20* E. E. Golubinskij, Istorija russkoj cerkvi, Bd. 2, Teil 1, M 1900, S. 624 ff.; D'iakonov, Skizzen, S. 359; N. A. Kazakova, Vassian Palrikeev i eg o socinenija (Vassian Patrikeev und seine Werke), M-L 1960, S. 27-35. 210 O. P. Backus, Motives of West-Russian N obles in Deserting Lithuania for Moscow, 1377-1514, Lawrence, Kansas 1957, S. 86, 98-99; vgl. D'jakonov, Vlast’, S. 187; S. B. Veselovskij, Poslednye udely v severo-vostofnoj Rusi (Die letzten udely im nordöstlichen Rußland), in: Istoriceskie zapiski 22 (1947), S. 116. 2" PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 234-235. 2’2 1484 wurde Fürst Vasilij Michajlovic von Vereja dort willkommen geheißen (PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 235), ebenso 1492 ein Dienstmann mit Namen Julko Elizarov (ebenda, Bd. 4, S. 161). Kurz vor 1501 floh ein Mann mit dem tatarischen Namen Bachferiar von Moskau nach Litauen (Sergeevic, Russkie juridifeskie drevnosti, Bd. 1, S. 357).

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hatte irgendeine Anteilnahme an den Schwierigkeiten des anderen gezeigt, und beide hatten jede Gelegenheit wahrgenommen, des anderen Lage für den eigenen Vorteil auszunutzen. Als Ivan III. Fedor Bel'skij einen Platz an der litauischen Grenze anwies, hatte er schon beschlossen, seine Grenzen nach Westen zu verschieben. Die Flucht Bel'skijs, so entdeckten die Moskauer bald, war das symptomatische Zeichen einer beträchtlichen Verstimmung unter vielen von den Fürsten, die votciny in den Grenz­ gebieten des Großfürstentums Litauen hatten213. Auch waren die Streifzüge Bel’skijs nach Litauen hinein nicht auf eigene Initiative unternommen, denn andere Streif­ züge in den achtziger Jahren wurden vom Fürsten Andrej Vasil’evic dem Älteren von Mozajsk in das Gebiet von Vjaz’ma, Dzat’ und Dubrovo inszeniert. Andere Raubzüge wurden von den erst kürzlich erworbenen Gebieten Tver’s und von den Besitzungen der Fürsten Obolenskij aus unternommen214. Die Verstärkung der Angriffe und das Ausbleiben militärischer Gegenmaßnah­ men von seiten ihres Oberherrn veranlaßte 1489 eine Anzahl dieser Grenzfürsten, mit ihrer votcina zu Ivan III. überzutreten, um ihm „zu dienen". Ivan empfing sie huldvoll und wies jeden Versuch Kasimirs, die Oberhoheit über die verlorenen Gebiete wiederzuerlangen, verächtlich zurück. Diese Fürsten hatten nach Ivans Ansicht einst den Großfürsten der Rus’ gedient und kehrten nun an ihren recht­ mäßigen Ort zurück. Durch verschiedene Zwangsmaßnahmen, einschließlich zweier Kriege, gelang es Ivan bis 1503, seine Kontrolle über beinahe ein Drittel des G roß­ fürstentums Litauen auszudehnen. Im ganzen kamen ungefähr 16 große Städte und mehr als 75 Dörfer unter die Gerichtshoheit Ivans als des nunmehrigen Oberherrn. Das Gebiet umfaßte das ganze Becken der oberen Oka und ihrer Nebenflüsse, das Becken der Desna und der unteren Soz, sowie die Bereiche des oberen Dnepr215. Die Einverleibung dieses politisch unsicheren Gebietes, das an Feindesland grenzte, zwang Ivan, die örtlichen Magnaten mit größerem Einfühlungsvermögen zu behandeln als seine fürstlichen Dienstmannen innerhalb Moskaus. Sie behielten natürlich ihre votcina-Rechte, was auch die Erhaltung großer Gruppen bewaffneter Dienstmannen einschloß. Die Moskauer Beamten mischten sich in ihre Angelegen­ heiten nicht ein, und sie erfreuten sich autonomer Rechte innerhalb ihres Gebietes. Ivan konnte nicht anders handeln angesichts seines Vorgebens, daß diese votcinniki freiwillig in seinen Dienst übergetreten seien, und besonders weil dies ein Beispiel 213 Backus, Motives, S. 98; Bazilevic, Vnesnjaja politika, S. 284 ff. 214 Solov'ev, Istorija Rossii, Bd. 5, Sp. 1446-1447; Bazileviä, Vnesnjaja politika, S. 287-289; Backus, Motives, S. 99. Die Hauptmasse der Moskauer Truppen nahm an diesen Streifzögen an der Grenze nicht teil, da sie vor allem mit dem Feldzug gegen Tver', der Wiederaufrichtung der Herrschaft in Vjatka und einigen Feld­ zügen gegen Kazan* beschäftigt war (DRK, S. 14-15). ns Bazilevic, Vnesnjaja politika, S. 289 ff.; M. K. Ljubavskij, Obrozovanie osnovnoj gosudarstvennoj territorii veliko-russkoj narodnosti (Die Bildung des zentralen Staatsterritoriums der großrussischen Nationalität), L 1929, S. 123-127. Vgl. auch Eck, Le moyen â g e russe, S. 81-82.

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sein würde für andere, die überlegten, ob sie zu Moskau übertreten sollten. Bei zuviel Druck konnte eine rückläufige Bewegung einsetzen. Aber die Fürsten, die auf die moskauische Seite übergetreten waren, hatten einige minimale Bedingungen anzuerkennen: ewige Ergebenheit gegenüber dem Großfürsten von Moskau, Treue und Kriegsdienst auf Abruf216. Am Anfang wurden wenige der neuen votcinaFürsten aufgerufen, ihren Dienst bei einem Feldzug zu leisten217, doch wurde von ihnen erwartet, daß sie an der Verteidigung ihres Gebietes teilnahmen218. Aber schon das geringste Anzeichen dafür, daß einer abzuziehen wünschte, veranlaßte den großfürstlichen Hof zu handeln. 1493 war Fürst Fedor Bel’skij von einem Litauer bezichtigt worden, daß er zurückzugehen wünsche. Ivan befahl sofort Bel’skijs Gefangennahme und zog seine votcina in Novgorod ein. Er ließ Bel’skij etwas später wieder frei, wahrscheinlich gegen die Leistung des (jetzt üblichen) festen Eides, und teilte ihm eine neue votcina zu, die freilich nunmehr an der mittleren Volga, an der östlichen Grenze, sicher gelegen war219. So willkommen diejenigen waren, welche sich jetzt der Moskauer Oberhoheit unterstellt hatten, so wurden ihnen doch im Großfürstentum keine bedeutenden Vertrauensstellungen eingeräumt, die mit den Schenkungen zu vergleichen wären, welche einigen, die früher von Tver’, Jaroslavl’ oder Rostov gekommen waren, gemacht worden waren. Nicht einer von ihnen (einschließlich des oben erwähnten Fedor Bel’skij, der 1497 Ivans Nichte heiratete)220 erhielt in seiner Regierungszeit den Bojarenrang221. Erst unter Vasilij III. wurden diese früheren litauischen kleinen Fürsten, wie die Bel'skij, Glinskij und Odoevskij, in die höchste Kategorie der Dienstmannen eingestuft. Ivan stellte sie den udel-Fürsten notgedrungen, wenn auch nicht sehr gern, gleich. Ihm war die Zunahme seiner militärischen Stärke, die ihre Kontingente brachten, willkommen, doch mußte er sie behutsam be­ handeln. Große Unzufriedenheit konnte zum Massenabzug führen. Seine Haupt­ sorge war, die Dienstmannen oder Fürsten aus neu erworbenen Gebieten vom îu Die Massenflucht wurde in Litauen bitter beklagt, wo der Großfürst verfügen ließ, daß der Abzug mit Verrat gleichgesetzt werde und denjenigen, die für schuldig befunden wurden, Konfiszierung der Ländereien und Todesstrafe drohe. Es wurde sogar genau angegeben, wo Nachfolgerechte nicht zugelassen waren (1495 und 1509), vgl. D’jakonov, Vlast', S. 188. Anzeichen von Dienstversprechen durch Neuankömmlinge aus Litauen vgl. PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 37; Bd. 8, S. 225, 238, 239; Bd. 26, S. 292-293; Kljuöevskij, Bojarskaja duma, S. 236. 2,7 Im September 1496 wurden die Fürsten Dmitrij Fedoroviö Vorotynskij und Ivan Michajloviö Vorotynskij mit ihrem G efolge dem führenden Regiment im Schwedenfeldzug zugeteilt (DRK, S. 23). Die Fürsten Semen Starodubskij und Vasilij Semjatiö hatten 1501 die Ehre, das große Regiment zu führen, doch wurden sie offen­ bar von zwei großfürstlichen Bojaren aufmerksam beobachtet, als sie ihr früheres Heimatland angriffen (DRK, S. 30; PSRL, Bd. 26, S. 294). Es scheint, daß immer dann, wenn votiina- oder udel-Fürsten ein Kommando in irgendeinem der fünf Regimenter, die das Moskauer Heer ausmachten, übertragen wurde, auch Voevoden vom großfürstlichen Hof zum Regiment gehörten. So wurde z. B. 1502 im Feldzug gegen Smolensk, in dem Staro­ dubskij und Semjaäiü das Kommando über das führende Regiment erhielten, auch einem Voevoden vom Hofe eine Kommandostellung erteilt (DRK, S. 32). ™ Z. B. PSRL, Bd. 26, S. 292. Veselovskij, Poslednye udely, in: lstori£eskie zapiski 22 (1947), S. 116; PSRL, Bd. 4, S. 162. ® PSRL,- Bd. 6, S. 43. a ’ Vgl. DRV, Bd. 20, S. 5 ff.

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Abfall zurückzuhalten. Vielleicht hielt Ivan diese früheren Litauer deshalb aus der zentralen Verwaltung heraus, weil die alten Moskauer Dienstmannenfamilien gegenüber dem wachsenden Reichtum der jüngeren fürstlichen Ankömmlinge aus erloschenen unabhängigen Fürstentümern Ressentiments hegten. Aber allein seine Haltung gegenüber denjenigen, die erst kürzlich nach Moskau gekommen waren, die sich ihrer kleinen Herrschaft und des Schutzes des mächtigen Groß­ fürsten erfreuten, zeigte ihnen deutlicher als jede andere angekündigte Maßnahme, daß sie gleichsam unter Anklage standen. Die so geführte Politik gegenüber abhängigen Gebieten, den votcina- und udelFürsten sowie gegenüber den Dienstmannen setzte sich ins 16. Jahrhundert hinein fort. Vasilij III. (1505-1533) nahm Pskov, Rjazan’ und Smolensk und schob so die Grenzen Moskaus nach Süden und Westen weiter vor. Aus Pskov entfernte er 300 einflußreiche Familien, denen er so viel mitzunehmen erlaubte, wie sie tragen konnten. Er ersetzte sie durch pomesciki. Die anderen mußten dem Großfürsten den nunmehr üblichen Treueid schwören222. Wie sein Vater behielt Vasilij das Vor­ gehen seiner Brüder genau im Auge. Er sandte Agenten unter die udel-Dienstleute, um Absichten und Pläne seiner Brüder zu erfahren223. Als Fürst Semen Ivanovic sich aus irgendeinem unbekannten Grunde entschloß, nach Litauen zu fliehen, erfuhr Vasilij durch sein Netz von Spionen sofort davon. Die Chronisten berichten, daß Vasilij III. seinem Bruder Semen befahl, nach Moskau zu kommen - zweifellos wurde er dorthin unter Bewachung gebracht. In Moskau stieß Vasilij seinen Bruder in Ungnade und stellte ihn unter Hausarrest. Nur die Intervention der anderen Brüder und die Gesuche der höheren Geistlichkeit bestimmten Vasilij III., seine Meinung zu ändern. Er gab Semen das Erbteil zurück, doch tauschte er aus Vorsicht Semens Dienstmannen gegen seine eigenen aus, wodurch er die Loyalität seines Bruders sicherte und dessen politische Aktivität einschränkte224. Ivan III. hatte immer darauf bestanden, daß der Großfürst das Heimfallsrecht in den udely der Familie in Anspruch nahm, wenn es keine männlichen Erben gab. Vasilij III. gab dem eine raffinierte Wendung hinzu. Er verbot seinen Brüdern, ohne seine Einwilligung zu heiraten; nur einer, Andrej, erhielt solche Erlaubnis. Somit sorgte Vasilij dafür, daß der Hauptteil der udely schließlich den großfürstlichen Ländereien wieder einverleibt wurde225. 222 Pskovskie letopisi, Bd. 2, S. 257; Veselovskij, Feodal’noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 86, 304; Eck, Le moyen â g e russe, S. 439. Die endgültige Annexion Rjazan’s folgte dem vertrauten Muster, das sich in der Regierungs­ zeit Ivans III. entwickelt hatte. Als sich der Großfürst von Rjazan* auf geheim e Verhandlungen mit dem Chan der Krim einließ, in der Hoffnung, sich von der Moskauer Herrschaft freimachen zu können, verfügte Vasilij III. die Annexion. Der letzte Fürst von Rjazan* floh nach Litauen. HJ Vgl. das von Solov*ev (Istorija Rossii, Bd. 5, Sp. 1651) zitierte Beispiel; AI, Bd. I, Nr. 36, S. 197-198. 22< PSRL, Bd. 6, S. 251; Bd. 8, S. 252. Einem Bericht zufolge ließ Vasilij III. die .unvernünftigen' Ratgeber des Fürsten Semen in Ungnade fallen, er lenkte aber ein, als sein Ärger obgekühlt war (PSRL, Bd. 26, S. 302). 22* Veselovskij, Poslednye udely, in: lstori£eskie zopiski 22 (1947), S. 104.

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Die fortschreitende Entwicklung der großfürstlichen Politik nahm dem in den zwischenfürstlichen Verträgen immer noch wiederholten Recht auf freien Abzug beinahe jede Bedeutung. D'jakonov hat darauf hingewiesen, daß zwei Fürsten §ujskij, Ivan und Andrej Michajlovic, Moskau verlassen und bei Vasiiijs Bruder Jurij Dienst angenommen hatten. Beide wurden nach Moskau zurückbeordert und ins Gefängnis geworfen224*226. Fürst Jurij benutzte nicht einmal die Gelegenheit, um gegen diese Verletzung der vertraglichen Garantien zu protestieren. Im Juni 1528 ließ Vasilij III. die Rehabilitierung der Fürsten Sujskij zu, aber erst, nachdem sie lebenslangen, treuen Dienst geschworen hatten, und nur gegen Hinterlegung einer Bürgschaft von 2000 Rubeln. Um diese hohe Summe227 zu beschaffen, versammelten zwei Bojaren des Hofes, Petr Zachar’ic und Fürst Boris Gorbatyj, 29 wohlhabende Dienstmannen, von denen jeder eine Summe von 50-150 Rubeln hinterlegte228. Zahlreiche Dienstmannen mußten ähnliche Urkunden, in denen sie Vasilij III. lebenslangen Dienst versprachen, unterschreiben. Im Oktober 1506 hatten sie zu schwören: „Ich werde nicht von meinem Herrn, dem Großfürsten Vasilij Ivanovic von ganz Rußland, und von seinen Kindern abziehen zu [dem Dienst bei] seinen Brüdern, noch zu irgendeinem andern bis zu meinem Tod."229 1522 leistete Fürst Vasilij Vasil’evic Sujskij ein ähnliches Versprechen230. Als der okol’nicij Michail Andreevic Plesceev231 in Ungnade fiel, verlangte Vasilij III., daß in die Versöh­ nungsurkunde die ausdrückliche Bestimmung aufgenommen wurde, Plesceev dürfe nie den Brüdern des Großfürsten dienen oder helfen: „Und auch zu den Brüdern meines Herrschers, meines Großfürsten Vasilij Ivanovic von ganz Rußland, zum Fürsten Jurij und zum Fürsten Andrej, werde ich nicht fortziehen, noch sollen meine Kinder es tun, noch sei es mir und meinen Kindern erlaubt, uns mit den Brüdern meines Herrn zu verbünden .. ,"232 In manchen dieser Versöhnungsurkunden, soweit sie frühere litauische Adlige betrafen, die der Dienstaufsage verdächtigt wurden, fügte Vasilij III. das Verbot ein, zu den Moskauer udel-Fürsten überzutreten233. Die neun Urkunden Vasiiijs III., die dauernde Verpflichtungen zu ständigem Dienst als Entgelt für die Verzeihung früherer Vergehen enthalten, zeigen auch den Wechsel in der Haltung des Monarchen zu den Leuten der dienenden Klasse. In der frühesten Urkunde dieser besonderen Gruppe, die aus dem Beginn der Regierungszeit stammt (1506), sprach der Fürst Konstantin Ostrozskij von sich als 224 D’jakonov, Vlast', S. 183. 222 1523 berechnete Vasilij III., daß der Bau eines ziemlich großen Klosters 3000 Rubel kosten würde (SGGD, Bd. 1, Nr. 150, S. 416). Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 156, S. 430-432. zw Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 146, S. 403-404. 2» Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 149, S. 414-415. m Nach DRV, Bd. 20, S. 21, von 1521/22 an. 2M SGGD, Bd. 1, Nr. 162, S. 449. 213 Vgl. den Eid, den Fürst Ivan Michajlovic Vorotynskij leistete (ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 154, S. 425-427).

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einem Dienstmann des Großfürsten („menja svoego slugu .. .")234. In genau dersel­ ben Form hatte Fürst Danilo Cholmskij 1474 unterschrieben235. Doch in der Zeit um 1520 zeigte die Formel eine bedeutende Änderung. Jetzt wurde ein so belasteter Bojar gezwungen, sich selbst als Sklaven des Großfürsten zu betrachten („... menja svoego cholopa.. .")236. Der Eindruck, daß der häufig gebrauchte Ausdruck „Sklaven des Zaren" im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert von dem Adel aus dieser Formel entwickelt worden sei, wäre falsch. Tatsächlich findet man diesen knechtischen und verwerflichen Terminus schon im späten 15. Jahrhundert im Gebrauch, als vor­ nehme Dienstmannen sich selbst cholopy des Großfürsten nannten237. Das wachsende Ausmaß der Kontrolle über adlige nichtfreiwillige Dienstmannen (und über freiwillige Dienstmannen schließlich ebenso) spiegelt sich in der Aussage des Fürsten Fedor Michajlovic Mstislavskij (23. August 1529) wider. Fürst Fedor mußte nicht nur versprechen, nie wieder in Polen-Litauen zu dienen oder ohne Wissen Vasilijs III. mit irgend jemanden in diesem Staat Verbindung aufzunehmen, sondern er mußte auch schwören, niemals mit seinem Vater, der in Litauen ge­ blieben war, Kontakt aufzunehmen. Wenn sein Vater eine mündliche oder schrift­ liche Nachricht durch einen Boten sandte, sollte der Sohn den Unterhändler er­ greifen und ihn sofort nach Moskau zum Verhör schicken238. Auch darf die Rolle der kirchlichen Hierarchie in diesem Prozeß, der den Adel seiner früheren Abzugsrechte beraubte, nicht übersehen werden. In allen Urkunden einer bedingten Versöhnung spielte die hohe Geistlichkeit eine zentrale Rolle. Durch ihre Intervention wurde die Verzeihung gewährt. Die Verletzung irgend­ einer der festgelegten Bedingungen, die mit einem kirchlichen Eid beschworen worden waren, zog die schwersten weltlichen Strafen nach sich und ebenso die auto­ matische Exkommunizierung. Als in den fünfziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts das Formular zuerst eingeführt wurde, war es die Rolle der Geistlichkeit gewesen, das strenge Urteil eines rachsüchtigen Großfürsten zu besänftigen. Aber indem sie dasselbe Formular für mehr als ein Jahrhundert unterschrieb, sanktionierte die Geistlichkeit in Wirklichkeit die Rolle des Großfürsten bei der Einschränkung der Freiheit für die Dienstmannen. Der Anteil der hohen Geistlichen an dieser Entwick­ lung konnte der Aufmerksamkeit der Dienstmannen kaum entgehen. Denn jede K* Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 144, S. 404. os Ebenda, Bd. 1, Nr. 103, S. 249. In der Formel, von der Cerepnin annimmt, daß sie von dem in den fünf­ ziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts üblichen Typ herrührte, wird der Terminus .M ann' (äelovek) benutzt [Cerepnin, Iz istorii drevnerusskich feodal'nych otnoienij, in: lstori£eskie zapiski 9 (1940), S. 56]. 236 Vgl. SGGD, Bd. 1, S. 414, 421, 423, 425, 448. 237 Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istorideskogo Obidestva (Sammelband der Kaiserlichen Russischen Historischen G esellschaft), Bd. 35: Pamjatniki diplomatiieskich snoienij drevnej Rossii s derzavami inostrannymi (Urkunden zu den diplomatischen Beziehungen des alten Rußland mit ausländischen Mächten), SPb 1882, Nr. 20, S. 87 (1493); Bd. 41: Pamjatniki diplomatiéeskich snoienij Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Krymskoju i Nogajskoju ordami i s Turcieju (Urkunden zu den diplomatischen Beziehungen des Moskauer Staates mit der Krim- und der N ogaier Horde und mit der Tükei), SPb 1884, Nr. 34, S. 118 (1491). 238 SGGD, Bd. 1, Nr. 157, S. 433-435.

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dieser Urkunden begann mit einer Bitte um Vergebung an den Großfürsten> den Metropoliten und den kirchlichen Synod. Jeder beschuldigte, reuige Dienstmann mußte die Unterschrift und das Siegel des Metropoliten erlangen. Ein Teil der Zeremonie erforderte die Anwesenheit einer großen Zahl von Bürgen, welche die vom Großfürsten verlangte Summe aufzubringen hatten. 31 Dienstmannen und einige Zeugen vom Hof wurden in die Affäre der Söhne des Fürsten Michail Sujskij verwickelt. 46 Bürgen waren notwendig, um die Bürgschaft von 5000 Rubeln für den Fürsten Michail L’vovic Glinskij im Februar 1527 aufzubringen239. Alle, die un­ mittelbar an der Urkunde beteiligt waren, kannten die Anklagen und die Verbote, die den Angeklagten betrafen, und mußten die Rolle des Metropoliten in dem Verfahren wahrnehmen. Das Lösegeld - Unterpfand für das künftige Verhalten des kompromittierten Magnaten - mußte sicherlich zum Gerede in Hofkreisen bei­ getragen haben. Man darf also annehmen, daß somit fast allen die kirchliche Unterstützung der großfürstlichen Maßnahmen und damit die Stellung der Kirche fühlbar wurde. Grundpfeiler der großfürstlichen Macht blieb die Person des Großfürsten. Die Treue zu ihm behielt immer noch einen stark persönlichen Charakter, obwohl ihr nun mehr Zwang und weniger Freiwilligkeit zugrunde lagen. Starke Monarchen forderten durch ihre Erfolge und ihre Wachsamkeit ein festeres Treueverhältnis. Ein schwacher Monarch oder ein Interregnum konnten die ganze Entwicklung ge­ fährden, die sich seit der Zeit um 1450 anbahnte. Einen bedeutsamen Probefall brachte das Ende des Jahres 1533, als Vasilij III. starb und sein ältester Sohn, der sein Nachfolger sein sollte, drei Jahre alt war, so daß ein Regentschaftsrat gebildet werden mußte. Die Ernennnung der aus dem Großfürstentum Litauen stammenden Gemahlin Vasilijs III., Elena Glinskaja, zur Hauptregentin vergrößerte die G e­ fahren. Sie gehörte einer erst kürzlich zugezogenen Familie an, die wenige Freunde oder Verbündete in Moskau hatte. Während früher die Moskauer Herrscher ihren Untertanen durch wohlberechnete Maßnahmen Furcht vor Vergehen einflößten, charakterisierte nun die Furcht selbst die Politik der Regentschaft. Sofort nach dem Tode Vasilijs zwang der Metropolit Daniil dessen noch lebende Brüder, die Fürsten Andrej und Jurij, zu schwören, daß sie großfürstlichen Dienstmannen, die in böser Absicht kämen, nicht in ihren Dienst aufnehmen würden. D’jakonov nimmt an, daß jeder Dienstmann, der in diesem kritischen Augenblick abzog, so eingeschätzt worden wäre, so daß in Wirklichkeit der Abzug als solcher verboten wurde240. Trotzdem entstand fast schon eine Woche nach dem Tode Vasilijs Unruhe. Einigen Chronikberichten zufolge strebte Fürst Jurij danach, Großfürst zu werden und versuchte, die großfürstlichen Dienstmannen für sich zu gewinnen. Der Bericht ist W* SGGD, Bd. 1, Nr. 155, S. 428-429. wo D'jakonov, Vlast', S. 184-185; SGGD, Bd.1, Nr. 163, S. 451-452.

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vermutlich unrichtig und beruht wohl mehr auf allgemeinem Gerücht als auf Tat­ sachen. In einer Panik befahl Elena Glinskaja, Jurij in Haft zu nehmen und im Kreml' gefangen zu halten241. Der Hang, die Verdächtigen und die auf ein Gerücht hin Angeklagten ins Gefängnis zu werfen, veranlaßte wahrscheinlich den Fürsten Semen Fedorovic Bel'skij, der. okol'nicij Ivan Vasil’evic Ljackij und dessen Sohn, zusammen mit »vielen Bojarenkindern, den dvorjane des Großfürsten", 1534 nach Litauen zu fliehen. Elena Glinskaja reagierte darauf, indem sie die nächsten Ver­ trauten der Flüchtlinge in Ketten werfen ließ242. Die Krise verschärfte sich im Jahre 1537. Der einzige noch in Freiheit gebliebene Onkel Ivans IV. wurde vom Regentschaftsrat verdächtigt. Angeblich forderte Andrej eine Vergrößerung seiner Gebiete, was ihm verweigert wurde. Die Dienstmannen aus beiden Lagern wurden zu böswilligen Unterhändlern in der wachsenden Spannung. Um seine Sicherheit besorgt, floh Andrej mit seinen Dienstmannen nach Westen. Als er Groß-Novgorod erreichte, verbreitete er einen Appell an die pomesciki, sich ihm anzuschließen, weil »der Großfürst klein ist und die Bojaren in Moskau herrschen". Nur einige 30 pomesciki gingen auf seine Seite über. Die Mehrheit blieb dem Appell gegenüber gleichgültig, obwohl man in Moskau Vor­ sichtsmaßnahmen ergriff, um sich gegen eine weitere Fluchtbewegung zu sichern. Zuletzt lockten Vertreter des Hofes Andrej mit dem Versprechen persönlicher Sicherheit nach Moskau. Innerhalb von wenigen Tagen wurden Andrej, seine G e­ mahlin und sein Sohn gefangengesetzt. Seine Bojaren und Dienstmannen wurden ergriffen, weil sie ihrem Herrn in den Verrat gefolgt waren, und wurden grausam geschlagen; die überlebenden wurden ins Gefängnis geworfen oder in die Pro­ vinzen abgeschoben. Die brutalsten Strafen aber sah der Hof für die pomesciki vor, die ihre persönlichen Verträge mit dem Großfürsten gebrochen hatten. Sie wurden in Moskau öffentlich ausgepeitscht und dann zum Tode verurteilt. Als Warnung für andere wurden ihre Leichen an Bäumen „entlang der [Haupt-]Straße nach Novgorod, nicht alle zusammen, sondern den ganzen Weg entlang" auf­ gehängt243. Die Regenten hatten als eine „notwendige" Maßnahme beide Oheime hinrichten lassen, Jurij 1536 und Andrej kurz nach seiner Gefangennahme. Ihre udely wurden konfisziert. Der Bojarenrat ließ 1540 schließlich Andrejs Sohn Vladimir wieder frei und gab ihm ein Jahr später sogar den udel Starica zurück. Aber ihm wurde ein­ geschärft, seine Dienstmannen nicht aus den Reihen der Leute zu nehmen, die PSRL, Bd. 13, Teil 1, SPb 1904, S. 77-78; Bd. 8, S. 242 PSRL, Bd. 13, Teil 1, S. 79, 85; Bd. 26, S. 321. Im Elena Glinskaja ihren Onkel Michail L’vovié mit der nehmen. M3 PSRL, Bd. 8, S. 292-295; Bd. 13, Teil 1, S. 91-97; 322-323; D’jakonov, Vlast’, S. 184-185. mi

286. August 1534, einen Monat nach der Bel'skij-Affäre, ließ Begründung, er habe Vasilij III. vergiftet, gefan gen­ Bd. 13, Teil 2, SPb 1906, S. 428-431; Bd. 26, S. 317-318,

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seinem Vater gedient hatten, und nur erlaubt, unter den Dienstmannen, die in groß­ fürstlichem Dienst standen, auszuwählen244. IV Obwohl Moskau im 16. Jahrhundert weiterhin manche Schwierigkeiten mit den udel-Fürsten und einigen Dienstmannen zu bestehen hatte, blieben Vorbild für die Beziehungen annähernd die Formen, die sich in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahr­ hunderts und den ersten 30 Jahren des 16. Jahrhunderts herausgebildet hatten. Die Abzugsrechte wurden zwar theoretisch bis 1531 gewährt, waren aber in Wirk­ lichkeit eng begrenzt. Die Großfürsten wandten die erweiterte Definition des Ver­ rats mit immer größerer Regelmäßigkeit nicht nur auf diejenigen an, die ihnen unmittelbar unterstanden, sondern auch auf die udel-Fürsten und ihre Dienst­ mannen. Persönliche Eide, die Bindung vieler Dienstmannen durch bedingte Schen­ kungen oder durch Urkunden, die dauernden Dienst forderten, sowie ein wachsen­ des allgemeines Furchtgefühl trugen sehr zu einer immer stärkeren Festlegung der militärischen Dienstleute in Moskau bei. Diese Faktoren, zusammen mit dem Zurückgehen der Anzahl der rivalisierenden Fürstentümer, erklären das Zer­ bröckeln des Rechtes auf freien Abzug. Soweit die Großfürsten verschiedene Maß­ nahmen trafen, um ihre politische Autorität zu stärken, wann immer die Um­ stände und die Dienstmannen es erlaubten, wirkten sich diese Maßnahmen not­ wendigerweise auf die Tradition aus, die aus einer Vergangenheit stammte, in der die großfürstliche Autorität schwächer und die Rechte lokaler Herrscher, erblicher Grundbesitzer und freier Dienstmannen bedeutend stärker gewesen waren. Im 14. und in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts waren die udel-Fürsten die eifrigsten Vorkämpfer lokaler Rechte in Moskau gewesen. Solange sie sich ihren Handlungs- und Kompetenzbereich erhielten, bildeten sie für die Dienstmannen eine Ausweichmöglichkeit. Die Macht der Großfürsten war verhältnismäßig gering. Und solange das politische Gleichgewicht von freiwilliger Unterstützung abhing, waren Spielraum und Rechte der Dienstmannen entsprechend weit und zahlreich. Folglich behandelten der Großfürst ebenso wie die udel-Fürsten die freien Dienst­ mannen mit gebührender Achtung. Eine Anklage wegen Verrats mußte mit dem allgemeinen Wohl begründet werden und für die Dienstleute im allgemeinen ein­ sichtig sein. Eine solche Anklage konnte an Substanz gewinnen und weitgehend akzeptiert werden, wenn ein verstimmter Dienstmann während eines Krieges in den Dienst des gegnerischen Fürsten trat oder wenn er sogar erfolgreich zum Krieg gegen seinen früheren Wohltäter und seine ehemaligen Kameraden drängte. 344 Veselovskij, Poslednye udely, in: Istoriceskie zapiski 22 (1947), S. 105. Die weitere unglückliche Geschichte des udel Sfarica bis zu seiner Konfiszierung vgl. ebenda, S. 105-107.

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Es war sehr einfach, ein Urteil gegen ihn zu fällen und dabei die Privilegien, die ihn schützten, aufzuheben. Wenn ein Fürst die üblichen Konventionen verletzte, konnte er die Empörung der Kriegerkaste erregen, und er riskierte dabei einen Massenabzug. So diente die Gewohnheit, die von gemeinsamem Interesse ge­ tragen wurde, als Schutzwall, obwohl die Großfürsten natürlich wünschten, ihre politische Macht über das stehende Heer zu stärken. Im 14. Jahrhundert zog Moskau großen Nutzen aus seiner Lage im Innern, der dauernden Übernahme der „jarlyki* von den Tataren und der Ansiedlung der höheren Geistlichkeit Rußlands in den Mauern seiner fürstlichen Hauptstadt. Es erfreute sich außerdem einer noch nicht erlebten Periode inneren Friedens, wie sie in keinem der rivalisierenden Fürstentümer zu beobachten war. Die Belohnungen für Siedler und Dienstmannen, die nach Moskau kamen, waren beträchtlich, aber die Möglichkeit, ihre Gewinne in einer ruhigen Umgebung zu nutzen, waren noch wertvoller. Alle diese Vorteile kamen durch die großen Schwierigkeiten in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts in Gefahr. Die 50 Jahre der Unruhen und Krisen ließen den Wohlstand zerbröckeln und zerstörten die Stabilität und die Sicherheit, die vorher geherrscht hatten. Wenn Vasilij II. von der Mehrheit der Kriegsmannen unterstützt wurde, so geschah das vielleicht weniger auf Grund persönlicher Treue zu ihm oder zu einer besonderen Thronfolgeordnung, als vielmehr infolge des Wunsches, ihre Stellung und ihre Erwerbungen zu behalten und die verlorene Sicherheit wieder­ zugewinnen, was nur durch die Stärkung der Macht des Großfürsten erreicht werden konnte. Als die titulierten Bojaren und einige zögernde udel-Fürsten die Konfiszierung bisher unveräußerlichen Eigentums guthießen, und ebenso die Strafen, die rebel­ lischen Dienstmannen und Fürsten zugemessen wurden, spiegelte sich darin die Stimmung des Volkes im ganzen und besonders der Krieger, die auf der Seite des Siegers gekämpft hatten, wider. Wenn der Schlag, den sie führten, auch der Rache entsprang, so erfolgte er doch im Namen einer höheren Souveränität. Untreue der udel-Fürsten oder sogar derer, die ihnen dienten, erforderte strenge Bestrafung; weder der Großfürst noch seine Handlanger waren übermäßig rück­ sichtsvoll bei der Beachtung mildernder Umstände. Indem die Dienstmannen die Proskriptionen anderer in ihrer Klasse guthießen und an ihnen mitwirkten, erweiter­ ten sie die Definition des Verrats und unterstrichen die Bedeutung der Treue zum Großfürsten von Moskau. Dadurch erweiterten sie den Bereich großfürstlicher Macht; zugleich verminderten sie tatsächlich die Rechte ihrer eigenen Klasse. Durch ihre Hilfe bei der Zerstörung der udel-Rechte entfernten sie selbst die erste Reihe der Posten, die gegen die vermehrten Machtbefugnisse der Großfürsten Wache standen. Die Gemeinsamkeit der Interessen, die die traditionellen Rechte

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in der Vergangenheit geschützt hatte, war zerbrochen. Wenn die Großfürsten auch weiter in Verträgen mit udel-Fürsten und fremden Fürsten das Recht auf Abzug versprachen, so hatten sie sich doch in der Praxis auf dessen Einschränkung festgelegt. Das Bestrafen derjenigen, die sich ihrer Vorrechte bedienten, entsprach einer vorsichtigen, aber entschiedenen Politik. Besondere Beschuldigungen standen jeweils in der Anklageschrift, doch die Absicht war unmißverständlich. Eine iro­ nische Folgeerscheinung der Periode der Bürgerkriege war, daß die Dienstmannen auf der Seite Vasilijs II. ebensoviel zur Zerstörung der Rechte ihrer Klasse bei­ getragen hatten wie ihre Feinde. Das schnelle Wiedererstarken Moskaus in den späten fünfziger Jahren des 15. Jahrhunderts führte zu einer weiteren Einschränkung des Abzugsrechts. Vertrag­ liche Übereinkommen mit Tver’ und Rjazan’ sowie die Novgorod auferlegte Ober­ herrschaft hatten eine entmutigende Wirkung. Die Furcht vor dem großen Einfluß der moskauischen Macht auf die bedeutend schwächeren Fürstentümer wirkte als praktisches Abschreckungsmittel. Religiöse und politische Differenzen mit Litauen erlaubten dem Moskauer Hof, die Übertragung des Dienstes dorthin für verräterisch dem Fürsten sowie der Kirche gegenüber zu erklären. Ohne Zweifel waren Vasilij II. und Ivan III. ehrlich in ihren religiösen Überzeugungen. Aber wer kann sagen, wo die Aufrichtigkeit aufhörte und die Berechnung begann? K u r z , d e r M o s k a u e r H o f n u t z t e je d e G e l e g e n h e i t , s e in e M a c h t ü b e r d i e D ie n s t ­ m a n n e n s o w ie ü b e r d i e K la s s e n , a u s d e n e n sie s ta m m te n , a u s z u d e h n e n . A b w e c h ­ s e ln d e r

D ru c k ,

b a ld

w e ic h

und

v e r lo c k e n d ,

b a ld

h a n d g r e i f lic h

und

z w in g e n d ,

d r ä n g t e sich im m e r m e h r in d a s B e w u ß ts e in d e r d ie n e n d e n G r u p p e n . D ie s e w a r e n Z e u g e n des w a c h s e n d e n

D ru c k s a u f M o s k a u s s c h w ä c h e r e N a c h b a r n , d ie f a s t a b ­

h ä n g ig v o n M o s k a u w a r e n , u n d a u f d i e B r ü d e r d e s G r o ß f ü r s t e n . S ie s e lb s t n a h m e n t e il a n d e n S t r a f e x p e d i t i o n e n ; sie h a lf e n , d e n B e s ie g te n d i e T r e u e id e a b z u n e h m e n un d w irk te n

m it b e i A u s f ü h r u n g e n d e r S t r a f e n , d ie d e r G r o ß f ü r s t b e s tim m t h a t t e .

D e r H a n d l a n g e r d e s e in e n T a g e s k o n n t e a m

n ä c h s te n

s e lb e r d a s O p f e r w e r d e n ,

u n d d e r D ie n s t b e im

a ls e in e

g e h o r s a m le h r e n d e

Ebenso

e r w ie s

M o s k a u e r H e r r n w irk te

sich a ls

a b s c h re c k e n d

der

s t ä n d ig e

S tr o m

von

F re m d en

S c h u le . aus

an­

g r e n z e n d e n G e b i e t e n , d ie k a m e n , u m in M o s k a u e r D ie n s t e z u t r e t e n . A l l e W e g e f ü h r t e n n a c h M o s k a u , n ic h t v o n d a f o r t . S o w i r k t e sich n ic h t n u r d ie V e r m i n d e r u n g d e r a n d e r e n F ü r s t e n t ü m e r , in d e n e n m a n D ie n s t n e h m e n k o n n t e , g e g e n d e n A b z u g a u s , s o n d e r n a u c h d e r p s y c h o lo g is c h e E ffe k t s p r a c h d a g e g e n . Im

M oskauer

s tä rk e re s

S ta a t

In te r e s s e

h a tte n

an

der

d ie

ä lte r e n

G ru p p e n

A u f r e c h t e r h a lt u n g

von

ih r e r

D ie n s t m a n n e n

i n d iv id u e lle n

e in

S t e llu n g .

v ie l Be­

lo h n u n g e n f ü r D ie n s t le is t u n g e n u n d R a n g e r h ö h u n g e n k o n n t e d e r G r o ß f ü r s t g e b e n o d e r z u r ü c k h a lt e n , w i e von

v o rn e h m e n

R iv a le n

e r es f ü r a n g e m e s s e n in

Iv a n s

III.

h ie lt. M i t d e m

R e g ie r u n g s z e it ,

d ie

s t ä n d ig e n

u n te r

der

Z u s tro m

B e d in g u n g ,

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den Diensteid zu schwören, aufgenommen worden waren, wurde die Konkurrenz um bedeutende Schlüsselstellungen noch härter. Nur durch ihren Beruf hatten die neuen und alten Dienstmannen ein gemeinsames Interesse, aber es war nur eine Frage der Zeit, wann sie sich vereint wiederfänden, um scheel auf die neuesten Einwanderer und auf die Art des Großfürsten, Belohnungen zu verteilen, herabzusehen. In die Verteidigung gedrängt, willigten die alten Dienst­ mannen schließlich in das System des mestnicestvo ein, wobei der Rang in den Dienst- und Protokollregistern von der sozialen Stellung des Mannes zu dem Zeitpunkt abhängen sollte, zu dem seine Familie zuerst zum Dienst nach Mos­ kau gekommen war. So standen im 16. Jahrhundert Nachkommen von Groß­ oder udel-Fürsten höher als alte Moskauer Bojaren. Wenn sie aber ihre Besit­ zungen verloren hatten und Dienst bei fremden Herren oder bei Moskauer udelFürsten genommen hatten, standen sie unterhalb der alten Moskauer Bojaren. Für diejenigen, deren Stellung sonst die gleiche geblieben wäre, bedeutete so der Ein­ tritt in den Moskauer Dienst einen Rangwechsel. Ivan III. hatte sich der Entwicklung dieser bald kompliziert gewordenen, lästigen, hierarchischen Struktur erfolgreich widersetzt. Er nannte sie einmal eine litauische Sitte und ein andermal, als Jurij Zacharie Koskin sich beklagte, weil er das Kommando eines Reserveregimentes erhalten hatte, während ein verhältnismäßig „Neuer* die Hauptstreitmacht befeh­ ligte, antwortete er: „Du beschützt nicht den Fürsten Danilo, sondern verteidigst mich und meine Sache.*245 Erst im 16. Jahrhundert waren die wichtigsten Familien von Dienstmannen in der Lage, ihren Dienst- und Protokollrang vor den Großfürsten zu verteidigen246. Dieses System konnte erst gedeihen, als der Abzug keine Alter­ native mehr war. Die Gruppen der Dienstmannen wandten sich von da an dem Schutz ihrer Stellung innerhalb Moskaus zu. Indem sie sich an den Großfürsten wandten, damit er bei ihren häufigen Streitigkeiten vermittelte, begaben sie sich jedoch noch mehr unter seine Aufsicht. Im Vergleich zu der im 14. Jahrhundert üblichen Heeresstärke hatte sich die Klasse der Dienstmannen am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts verhältnismäßig stark vergrößert. Viele Faktoren hatten zu dieser Entwicklung beigetragen. Der erste lag in äußeren Ursachen. Der Bedarf, immer mehr Männer unter Waffen zu stellen, vergrößerte sich während der aufreibenden Kriege bedeutend und wurde auch durch die Anforderungen, die durch die ehrgeizigen militärischen Unternehmungen Ivans III. bedingt waren, nicht geringer. Im Zuge der raschen Ausdehnung des Staa­ tes erforderten die weiten Grenzen ortsgebundene Truppen, um die Grenzen zu schützen. Zweitens erhöhte der Zustrom an Dienstmannen ihre Zahl. Drittens ver­ mehrte sich die Bevölkerung am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts und in der ersten Hälfte Z4Î Kljucevskij, Socinenija, Bd. 2, S. 140 ff.; DRK, S. 27. 244 Vgl. M arkevic, Isforija m estnicestva, in: Zapiski im peratorskogo N ovorossijskogo universitela 47 (1888), S. 241 ff.

IV 74

des 16. Jahrhunderts, vielleicht nur, weil es keine vernichtenden Seuchen mehr gab, die im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert sehr oft die Reihen der Bevölkerung gelichtet hatten. Durch die steigende Zahl der Nachkommen in den adligen Bojarenfamilien wurden die Familienanteile immer kleiner. Diejenigen, die einen ehrenhaften Dienst suchten, neigten dazu, in die niederen Dienststellungen des Großfürsten und in weit geringerem Ausmaß in die der udely einzutreten. Die Hauptmasse der Dienstmannen, die in Novgorod ein pomest’e erhielten, setzte sich aus diesen Gruppen zusammen. Je mehr das stehende Heer sich vergrößerte, desto stärker verminderte sich der Einfluß des einzelnen Dienstmannes. Die Beziehung zum Großfürsten wurde not­ wendigerweise formaler und weniger persönlich247. Während es anderthalb Jahr­ hunderte früher für einen Großfürsten von Moskau durchaus möglich war, alle oder fast alle seine Dienstmannen zu kennen, traf unter Ivan III. das Gegenteil zu. Der Verlust des persönlichen Kontaktes und die wachsende Schwierigkeit, ein so weites Gebiet zu verwalten, veranlaßten die Großfürsten, mit der Klasse der Dienstmannen insgesamt umzugehen und sie als ein unpersönliches Werkzeug, das ihrem Befehl gehorchen sollte, zu betrachten. Der Typus des persönlich an­ sprechbaren Befehlshabers hatte sich in der späten Regierungszeit Vasilijs II. allmählich gewandelt. Aus dem Fürsten früherer Zeit, der selbst Kriegsmann gewesen war, wurde ein Herrscher im Audienzsaal, der in der Schlacht nicht mehr selbst sein Schwert zog und der das Heer nur auf sehr wichtigen Feldzügen beglei­ tete. Hinter den Mauern des neuen Kreml’ konnte ein Mann wie Vasilij III. seine Dienstmannen weniger als Menschen denn als Figuren auf dem Schachbrett be­ handeln. Als er die Dienstmannen seines Bruders Semen durch seine eigenen er­ setzte, wobei die Betroffenen ihn kaum mit einem protestierenden Murren behellig­ ten und der Großfürst sich um die laute Unruhe der Dienstmannen insgesamt nicht kümmerte, bildete der Abzug schon lange kein Mittel mehr, um ein Mißbilligen auszudrücken. Man konnte nicht abziehen, sondern höchstens noch fliehen, wie es einige taten; aber das blieb in jedem Falle nur ein letzter Ausweg. Das Tor zum Abzug der Bojaren hatte sich allmählich geschlossen. Viele Kräfte und Umstände hatten dabei mitgewirkt. Der Augenblick der größten Schnelligkeit dieses Prozesses war vor der Einung der nördlichen Rus’ erreicht; er war ge­ kommen, als die Wächter des ofFenen Tores, die udel-Fürsten, dezimiert waren und die bis dahin gewohnheitsmäßig ausgeübten Rechte der udel-Fürsten und Dienstmannen im Namen der Ordnung und der Sicherheit geopfert wurden.

w So Veselovskij, Féodal'noe zem levladenie, Bd. 1, S. 306, 308.

V

THE C R I S I S O F T H E MUSCOVITE ARISTOCRACY: A FACTOR IN T H E G ROWTH OF M O N A R C H I C A L P OWER

A centralized Muscovite monarchy began to em erge by the late fifteenth cen­ tury, becam e established, despite various vicissitudes, during the next two hun­ dred years and continued, albeit with changes in nam e and emphasis, as the prevailing form of governm ent until our troubled era. Its perpetuation is easier to explain than its origin. Tradition, clerical teaching, the mailed fist of rulers, a backw ard agricultural state exploiting its human resources to exist and to expand, the lack of a middle class, which might have tem pered some of the excess features of a service state, and the absence of an intellectual caste dedicated to preserving the knowledge of the ancients or to theological hair-splitting, contributed to the perpetuation of unfettered monarchical power. Even the Byzantine exam ple of autocracy tem pered by revolution1 found no echo on the Russian scene until modern times. N ot O rthodox Byzan­ tium but the heretical W est provided the seeds and doctrines of questioning and limitation. The reasons proposed by historians for the em ergence of tsardom and its rapid acceptance by Muscovites are varied, though explanations differ con­ cerning the w eight to be given diverse factors. Interpretations range from the simplistic to the complex, em bracing on the one extreme an emphasis upon foreign influences— Byzantine and/or Tatar—to those which virtually exclude alien impact and focus largely upon internal factors2. A review and an analysis of current scholarly opinion on this subject, without a substantive analysis of the sources, could create still another interpretation which would be equally subject to criticism.

1 J. B. Bury, The Constitution of the Later Roman Empire, in: Selected Essays of J. B. Bury, ed. by H. Temperly, Cambridge 1930, pp. 99—122. 2 The Eurasianist G eorge Vernadsky best exemplifies one tendency of seeking single causality in alien impingement (G. Vernadsky, M. Karpovich, A History o f Russia, vol. 3: Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, N ew Haven 1953, chapter 6 and p. 335 in particular). To estimate the degree of M ongol influence, he advocat­ ed a comparison of the society, institutions and spirit of Kiev with those of the Muscovite state. In the six­ teenth and seventeenth centuries he found .a new concept of society and its relations to the state. All the classes of the nation, from top to bottom, except the slaves, are bound to the service of the state.' W hile Professor Vernadsky is too canny a historian to ascribe all of the fundamental changes of later Muscovy to ‘he M ongol impact, he nevertheless selects evidence to support his primary thesis.

V

16 I would, However, suggest that an important, possibly a key, elem ent con­ tributing to the rapid evolution of a strong Muscovite monarchy w as the absence of serious opposition by the aristocracy. I. A century-and-a-half ago, Nikolai Karamzin already created the framework for this interpretation, though not from a Eurasianist point of view. He too contrasted Kievan and Suzdalian institutions and societies with that o f later Moscow. The Tatars, he believed, introduced barbarization and capital punishment. The Russian princes, as agents of the supreme khans of the steppe, became awesom e lieutenants who lorded over their subjects. .M oscow owed its greatness to the khans,' concluded Karamzin, thereby coining the oft-repeated phrase. N. M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo (History of the Russian State), ed. P. N. Polevoi, voI. 5, SPb 1892, pp. 227-235. With greater or lesser emphasis, a number of historians attributed considerable change in Russian manners, morals and institutions to the Tatar impact. Karl Stählin, for example (Geschichte Rußlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 1, Stuttgart 1923; reprinted Graz 1961, p. 133) wrote: .Aber auch die allmählich ein­ reißende Treulosigkeit der Politik, die Bestechlichkeit der Beamten, die Willkür in der Rechtspflege, die Grau­ samkeit der Strafen, die Folterung, die Ausbeutung des Volkes haben vermutlich in den tatarischen Bräuchen manchen besonderen Antrieb em pfangen.' And on p. 134: .Dennoch bleibt es eine unbedingte Wahrheit, daß die Tatarenzeit für Rußland in sittlicher, kultureller, staatlicher Beziehung ein schweres Verhängnis war. Sie hat die innere Entwicklung von Land und Volk unendlich gehemmt und ihnen auf lange hinaus einen halb­ asiatischen Charakter verliehen.' I. D. Beliaev, Lektsii po istorii russkogo zakonodatelstva (Lectures on the History of Russian Legislation), Moscow 1901s, p. 223, romantically saw the Russian princes as the beneficiaries of popular attachment because of their role as defenders against the Tatars: .In the pre-Mongol period, the populace saw the princes as judges, the overseers of quiet and calm and defenders against the Polovtsi and other foreigners. But with subjugation by the M ongols, the Russian princes, not ceasing to be the same in these regards, became more­ over gatherers of the Russian lands, defenders of the populace from the brutality of the Tatars. Setting out for the Horde, the prince states that he was going to plead for the forgiveness of his people . . . , that he went with danger to his life and was prepared to accept death for his subjects* [actions]. From this there developed such love and devotion to the prince, such that it would be difficult to imagine. The tribute lay heavily upon the Russian people, paid to the princes, but it was not irked by this, knowing that the pay­ ments went to the Horde. The people, by living ordeal, knew the difference between the gathering of tribute by Tatar collectors, and by Russian princes. Thus, indirectly, the Tatars changed the moral relations between princes and populace, and, as a consequence of this, also the judicial [relations]. Thus, princes imperceptibly, found themselves in another position. Pointing to the significance of the princely power at the time of the M ongol yoke, it is necessary to observe the changing relations am ong princes.* Then Beliaev (pp. 223 ff.) attributed the changing relations in Russia to Tatar influence and the imposed conditions. For a brief summary of other scholarly opinion, see Vernadsky, M ongols, pp. 332—333 and particularly B. D. Grekov and A. lu. lakubovskii, Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie (The G olden Horde and its Decline), MoscowLeningrad 1950, part 2, chapter 7. Still another level of abstraction concerning the nature of Tatar influence is found in the conclusions of Michael Cherniavsky's Khan or Bas ileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Thought, in: Journal of the History o f Ideas, 30 (1959), p. 476: 'If the basileus signified the holy tsar, the 'most gentle' . . . tsar in spiritual union with his flock, then the khan, perhaps, stood for the absolutist secu­ larized state, arbitrarily through its separation from the subjects.' Theories concerning Byzantine influence upon Muscovy and later Russia range from the limited to the en­ compassing. To G eorge Ostrogorsky, 'the great traditions of Byzantium, its faith, its political ideas, its spirituality lived on through the centuries in the Russian Empire.' (History of the Byzantine State, transi. J. Hussey, New Brunswick, N. J. 1957, p. 509). Ostrogorsky limited his remarks to cultural influence, putting him in company with a number of other Byzantinists who justifiably stress the legacy of religion and culture. See, for exam ple, N. H. Baynes, The Hellenistic Civilisation of East Rome, in: Byzantine Studies and Other Essays, London 1955, p. 21; The Thought World of East Rome, in*, ibid., pp. 29, 31—32; Baron Meyendorff and Norman Baynes, The Byzantine Inheritance in Russia, in: Byzantium: An Introduction to East Roman Civiliza­ tion, ed. by N. H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss, Oxford 1961, pp. 369—383; the remainder of the chapter, con­ cerned with the impact of Byzantine political theory and ceremonials (pp. 383—391) is less certain o f its grounds. Charles Diehl (Byzantium, Greatness and Decline, trans. N. Walford, N ew Brunswick, N. J. 1957, pp. 267 ff.) also stressed cultural differences, but then carried his interpretation in a bit further (pp. 269—70): 'Russian society followed the prince's example and took Byzantium for its pattern. As late as the sixteenth century it preserved the formal complicated etiquette and oriental customs made known to us by the Domo-

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By the fifteenth century, a t the very time the grand princes moved to con­ solidate their power, the East Russian nobles concerned themselves prima­ rily with their economic well being, with social privileges and with vying for state positions they considered in keeping with their aristocratic station. Unlike their counterparts in neighbouring Lithuania, they could not force conditions upon the ruling prince; the aristocracy in East Russia cam e largely as petitioners, seeking em ploym ent com mensurate with their social station or their previous political importance. As petitioners they were hardly capable of guarding their previous rights,* as supplicants, vying with other of similar condition and previous position, they were unable to stand as a class against the continuing inroads m ade into their former prerogatives by the growing royal power. sfroi as well as the dress, entertainments, and superstitions of Byzantium. Czarist Russia remained until the dawn of the twentieth century the continuator and most faithful likeness of the vanished Byzantine Empire, in its aristocratic despotism, its Orthodoxy, its unflexible diplomacy, and its conviction of having a religious and political mission to accomplish in the world.* For Mikhail D'iakonov, V lasf moskovskikh gosudarei (The Power of the Muscovite Rulers), SPb 1889, who attempted a preliminary analysis of the development of autocratic power in Muscovy, there was sufficient evidence to suggest the transfer of Byzantine political theory and its infusion into the Russian body politic. D'iakonov admitted to a perplexing problem, one already noted by some of his predecessors: namely, that prior to the middle of the fifteenth century there was no evidence to suggest the development of independent political concerns or of a national political idea. On the other hand, there was recognition — though no acceptably developed monograph — of the need to explain the rapidity of the development of political selfawareness after the middle of the fifteenth century. In his introductory remarks D'iakonov linked this rise in political awareness to the rejection of the Roman and Uniate positions after the Council of Florence and the fall of the Byzantine Empire (pp. V—VI). Following his preconceived thesis, he strongly emphasized the new role of Moscow itself as an Orthodox successor to fallen Byzantium (chapter 3). In following this theme, he found his evidence only in clerical literature. Despite D'iakonov's exhaustive tracing, there is no evidence to show that the Muscovite ruler in the later fifteenth century desired as yet to follow the drum­ beat of assertion concerning the new role of Muscovy and that its prince was the ruler of the New or Third Rome. M agnetized by his primary preoccupation (concerning the logic of Byzantinization and the continued aversion to Latinity), D'iakonov assumed that these contributed greatly to the shaping of the Russian auto­ cracy. Looking for the logical and inevitable process of evolution towards the strong sixteenth century enunciation of a Russian tsardom, which cannot be denied, he sought the late fifteenth-century bridge. In so doing, he did not entertain the possibility that the trappings of imperium came after the *de facto* develop­ ment of royal power. In other words, he did not suspect that the creation of the theoretical, ceremonial and secular liturgical trappings of power came after the creation of a centralized state. In all fairness to D'iakonov, he did appreciate the role of the Moscow government in curbing the powers of the appan age princes and in reducing free servitors to unwilling subjects (chapters 5—6). Yet his overview is sketchy, emphasizing again that his opinions concerning the developments of the fifteenth century — the period of transition — was less satisfactorily treated than was the more crystalline century that followed. A number of historians have chosen to ignore both the Tatar and Byzantine influences. The earliest to do so was S. M. Solov'ev, who renounced the nineteenth century penchant of dividing Russian history into compart­ mentalized periods and set out to examine the seamless web of his country's past. Not external appearances, but the nature of internal developments became his prime concern and, in doing so he generally ignored the question of alien impact (Istoriia Rossii s dre\neishikh vremen (History of Russia from the Earliest Time), ed. by L. V. Cherepnin, vol. 1, Moscow 1960, pp. 449 ff.). W hile understating possible Tatar influence, he at­ tributed considerable importance to the consequences of Ivan Ill s marriage to Sofia Palaeologus (ibid., vol. 3, pp. 58 ff.). Both Kliuchevskii and A. E. Presniakov (Obrazovanie velikorusskogo gosudarstva (Formation of the Great-Russian State], Petrograd 1918), two of Russia’s greatest medievalists, continued along the lines first traced by Solov'ev and tended to downgrade the impact of foreign influence upon the development of the early Muscovite slate.

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18 Some historians of Russia are fond of com paring the centralization of Muscovite royal authority a t the end of the fifteenth century with the em er­ gence of strong monarchies in the W est. They view the reign of Ivan III in the same light as western scholars consider the reign of the Tudors, Louis XI of France and Ferdinand and Isabella in Aragon and Castile3. W hile one may detect a number of similarities, at least one striking differ­ ence emerges. N ational economic vitality and the em erging middle class allow ed the "new monarchs" the m onetary income to raise and pay standing armies and to disregard feudal levies. If nobles still participated in the fre­ quent wars, they no longer exerted the independent influence against the crown they had in earlier times. In Muscovy, crown revenues also increased but never to the point where they could support mercenary forces of consequence. Nevertheless, Russian aristocrats rushed to seek military service by the late fifteenth century, though their political influence and juridical rights declined over w hat they had been a half-century to a century before. A number of developments contributed to the declining fortunes of the East Russian aristocracy. The Muscovite dynastic wars (1425—53), much as the wars of the Roses in England, prepared the climate of opinion for accept­ ance of increasing royal power. The annexation of neighboring city states and principalities, between 1463 and 1510, destroyed forever the remaining small political units of the Russian north and began to erode locally oriented loyalties. Even before the conquests, the Muscovite rulers had m ade it im­ possible for their servitors and subjects to change military and political allegiances4. Territorial growth enlarged the population of commoners and nobles; it also permitted the extension of Muscovite political practices and administration into the new provinces. The conquests also com pounded the problems of the old aristocracy, for former rulers of the annexed regions and their servitors began to clamor for significant military and administrative positions in the enlarged realm. Descendants of the old untitled Muscovite aristocracy and the princes who had recently enrolled in service found themselves in competition for the influential posts at court and in the army. The animosities that developed over family seniority and personal position 3 Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodclizm a v IX—XV vv. (Sketches of the History of the USSR. Period of Feudalism in the 9th—15th Centuries), 2: Obedinenie russkikh zem el’ vokrug Moskvy i obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva (The Unification of the Russian Lands around Moscow and the Formation of the Great Russian State), Moscow 1960, pp. 7—8. Cherepnin, who wrote this section, presumably in consulta­ tion with his colleagues, also included Sweden and a number of Asian countries. 4 G. Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, in: Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 10 (1965), pp. 7 -7 4 .

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caused constant strife and thereby prevented any possibility of a coalescence of interest to resist the growing powers of the crown. M oreover, most of the aristocratic families could not establish an economic independence. A pervasive Russian tradition of dividing property am ong all the m ale heirs, coupled with the increased size of families in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, would have robbed many prominent aristocrats of their econom ic independence even under conditions of normalcy5. The members of the north Russian nobility had little alternative but to take service with the ruling princes of Moscow. Most ap p eared unwilling or unable to go into m ercantile activities and only a very few scions of good families went into the church6. The absence of honorable professions that could provide a means of livelihood and a degree of self sufficiency forced the "noblesse de le p é e " to seek positions in keeping with their rank, which, by the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, only the lords of Moscow could provide. In a critical century of Muscovite history, the aristocracy faced its crisis equipped largely for failure. Families of princely and non-princely origin combined to form the Musco­ vite aristocracy of historical record. Most who carried the title of prince claim ed descent from Riurik, the legendary founder of the line that created the Kievan realm in the ninth century. O riginally Scandinavian, the early conquerors quickly intermarried with the indigenous population and before the term ination of the tenth century they had forgotten their native language, lost their old culture and becam e integrated with the subordinated population in all but rank and position. In their medieval and early modern periods of history, the G reat Russians adm itted the title of prince only to their own Riurikides, to the descendants of Gedimin of Lithuania, and to Tatar immigrants who could trace their 5 N. P. Pavlov-Sil’vanskii, Gosudarevy sluzhilye liudi. Liudi kabal’nye dokladnye (Slate Serving People. Bonded and Recorded People), SPb 19092, pp. 50—51. Pavlov-Sil’vanskii discussed the impoverization of serv­ ing-princes in the sixteenth century as a result of the division of family properties. The same conditions pre­ vailed in the previous hundred years: M. Raeff, Orgins of the Russian Intelligentsia. The Eighteenth Century Nobility, N ew York 1966, pp. 16—17. * A survey of the genealogical registers, available in printed form and covering the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, indicate that very few members of aristocratic families became clerics. See: Vremennik Imperatorskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh (Chronicle of the Imperial Moscow Society of History and Antiquities of Russia (hereafter cited as Vremennik), vol. 10, Moscow 1851, Materialy, pp. 1—266. Further, an exam ination of the available identities of the Russian clergy — metropolitans, bishops, hegumens, archi­ mandrites — for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, reveals that only an insignificant handful occupied senior clerical positions. The Russian church, more like the Byzantine than its western counterparts, was not viewed as a means of finding sinecures for younger sons or as a method of preserving intact family patrimonies.

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ancestry to the Mongol aristocracy. N ot until the eighteenth century did the relatively new dynasty of the Romanovs create the positions of counts and princes for those of non-royal lineage. Through the many centuries of earlier Russian history, at least from the ninth through the fifteenth, there also developed a non-princely aristocracy of service. This w as as true for old Kiev as for the area of northeastern Rus’, w here a new power center began to develop after the twelfth century. Local princes, descended from Scandinavian progenitors, holding territory by in­ heritance and in need of man-at-arms, accepted as retainers anyone of valor and fidelity. They offered emoluments or lands in return for services. Un­ fortunately, the record for these developments— indeed, for all occurences that might interest the historian— is so sparse as to preclude any detailed systematic study. Even for the history of early Muscovy, w here the sources become som ew hat fuller, only a general sketch can be fashioned. Chronicles, recording the retrospective history of the fourteenth century, are riddled with inaccuracies. Even the genealogical registers, dating from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, upon which a considerable portion of this study is based, contain a share of misleading inform ation7. The princely rulers of fourteenth-century Muscovy attracted a number of immigrant and, possibly, indigenous untitled w arriors who contributed their talents and efforts to the strengthening of Moscow’s position against neigh­ boring rivals. Some members of this military corps, and later their des­ cendants, becam e the chief advisors to the princes. They dom inated the council of boyars and established g reat estates. Kliuchevskii estimated that up to 40 boyaral families may be counted as significant for the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries8. Veselovskii modified Kliuchevskii's appraisal, when he suggested that somewhat less than 35 families formed the core of the fourteenth century aristocracy. Except for some that w ere excluded or ex­ tinguished, their descendants " stood a t the head of the Muscovite state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and partly into the seventeenth century“. O f the families accepted into service in the reign of Vasilii I (1389— 1425), 7 Any number of examples of this manifestation may be cited, though at this point an uncritical use of such information by some historians may be suggested. Solov'ev (Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 507), relying upon a genealogy of the Kikin family published in the Simbirskii sbornik [(Simbirsk Collection), Moscow 1845), accepted one Loggin Mikhailovich Kikin as a councillor of Dmitrii Donskoi and his son s membership in the duma as well. There is no documentary evidence of any kind to substantiate this claim. Apparently, the Kikin family had tried to make such a claim in order to gain higher service rank at some point after the early sixteenth century and forged a distinguished service record for its ancestors. • V. O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia (Works), vol. 2, Moscow 1957, p. 140: 'The most important of these were the Koshkins, Morozovs, Buturlins, Cheliadnins, Vel iaminovs and Vorontsovs, Khorvins and Golovins, Saburovs and others.' In this illustration, Kliuchevskii included the Khorvins, who became important in the fifteenth century, and their descendants, the Golovins, who became prominent in the sixteenth.

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only two succeeded in reaching into the ranks of the boyar council: the Khovrin-Golovins (of Crimean G reek stock) and the Patrikeev branch of the Lithuanian grand princely family9. W hile the descendants of the successful fourteenth century immigrants did rather well in dom inating important court positions, their ancestors, who first cam e to a still insignificant Muscovy had to be w ooed with concessions and emoluments greater than those they had enjoyed in their former areas of residence. A few distinguished warriors came from the ravaged south (from Kiev and Chernigov), though most of those who cam e to serve in Moscow undoubtedly arrived from adjacent territories10. It is generally believed that the early lords of Muscovy had to promise land and high court positions to acquire the services of gifted w arriors, though Dmitrii Donskoi aband o n ed these practices by the beginning of the fourth quarter of the fourteenth century11. Even prior to this time the princes of Moscow had sought less costly alter­ natives. More and more, as the fourteenth century w ore on, and exclusively by the early fifteenth century, the primary system of rew ard becam e "korm lenies" and the military booty acquired on successful campaigns. "Kormlenie", literally feeding, w as an administrative position in town or village, province or district, granted to the holder for one, two, or, occasion­ ally, three years, in which the recipient acted as agent and regional military chief for the prince. He derived his income from locally collected gifts, dues, fees and judicial fines. G enerally a holder received such a lucrative position after a stipulated term of service and, we may suppose, a man's military rank determ ined the "korm lenie" that might be assigned to him12. W e cannot tell, 9 S. B. Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie v severo-vostochnoi Rusi (Feudal Landholding in North­ eastern Rus’), vol. 1, Moscow 1947, p. 85: 'The most significant historical families (branches of families) in the XV—XVI centuries and partly into the seventeenth century, were those belonging to earlier families, who arrived in M oscow before Dmitrii Donskoi's reign. I will enumerate them in brief: Vel'iaminovVorontsovs, Pleshcheevs, and Basmanovs (the family of the Chernigov boyar F. Biakont), the FedorovsKhromois, Buturlins, Chebotovs and Chulkovs, Cheliadnins, Tovarkov-Pushkins (the family of Andrei Kobyla), Saburovs and Godunovs (the Kostroma family of Zernovs), the Morozovs, Sheins, Saltykovs and Tuchkovs (the family of the Morozovs). Significantly weaker were the families that began to serve in the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi: the Kvashnins, Kutuzovs, Karpovs, Vsevolozh Zabolotskiis, e t c / i° Solov’ev (Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 503) has indicated that Rodion Nestorovich cam e to serve in Moscow, coming from Kiev and that Boris Fedorovich Polevoi, a warrior from Chernigov decided on Tver*, where he and his sons becam e boyars and their later descendants also occupied high office. But Solov'ev is wrong in his contention that princes o f the Riurikide line came to serve in Moscow prior to the second quarter of the fifteenth century. ii Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 84; M. Liubavskii, Lektsii po drevnei russkoi istorii do kontsa XVI veka (Lectures on Early Russian History to the End of the 16th Century), Moscow 1918*, pp. 178—179. Liubavskii s attempt to find feudal forms in Russia is not acceptable. n On 'korm lenie', see M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, Obzor istorii russkogo prava (A Sketch o f the History of Russian Law), Kiev — SPb 19003, p. 176. For the second half of the fifteenth century, it is now known that members of the boyar duma, the council o f the grand prince, did not receive 'korm lenies', but normally

V 22

because of a lack of source information, whether "kormlenies" in the four­ teenth and early fifteenth centuries were reserved to servitors of less than dum a rank, as was the practice by the reign of Ivan III. The second major form of rew ard w as booty acquired on cam paign. Prisoners taken as slaves, movable wealth and cattle w ere prized. Both the rank of a servitor and the size of his following of personal retainers governed his share of the spoils in the final division13. Muscovy’s fourteenth century rivals, most notably Tver’, could offer similar rew ards, but Moscow held an edge in the competition. In a period of great turbulence and punishing raids into the southern and eastern borderlands of northeastern Rus’, it alone offered relative safety. The Tatars periodically raided Riazan’ to the south and Nizhnii N ovgorod to the east. Tver’, located to the northwest of Muscovy, also enjoyed locational immunity from Tatar raids for the last three quarters of the fourteenth century, but princely strife over succession destroyed the stability it might otherwise have enjoyed14. These conditions, in the principalities surrounded sheltered Muscovy w ere hardly attractive to some military men, who desired to enjoy the profits garnered in victorious battles or in lucrative governorships. O ther factors played their part in attracting servitors to Moscow. After 1327 the senior princes of Moscow m anaged to win from their Tatar overlords virtually perm anent possession of the G rand Principality of Vladimir, earning them a position of seniority over all the other princes of northeastern Rus’15. O f g reat importance also w as the significant population centered within or near Moscow’s expanding frontiers, although we are still uncertain about questions of gradual migrations or the periods for rate of growth in this period. According to Liubavskii, prior to the Tatar invasion of the mid-thir­ teenth century, the dem ographic center of northeastern Rus' was in the lands

remained at court or were posted to extraordinary appointments. Provincial governorships (except for Novgorod the Great) went only to men of lower service rank. See G. Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma in the Reign of Ivan III, in: Slavonic and East European Review, 45 (1967), pp. 83ff. Whether this system was new or had carried over from earlier practice is not known. 13 Veselovskii, Feodal’noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 76; V. Sergeevich, Lektsii i issledovaniia po drevnei istorii russkogo prava (Lectures and Investigations for the Early History of Russian Law), SPb 19033, p. 297; idem, Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti (Russian Juridical Antiquities), vol. 1: Territoriia i naselenie (Territory and Population) SPb 1902*, pp. 369ff. 14 For the fourteenth century conditions in the lands surrounding Muscovy, see Presniakov, Obrazovanie, chapters 5—8. 15 Grekov and lakubovskii, Zolotaia Orda, pp. 236ff. For an interesting analysis of the politics of Ivan Kalita in strengthening Moscow's position vis-à-vis its neighbors in the early fourteenth century, see L. V. Cherepnin, Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV—XV vekakh (Formation of the Russian Centralized State in the 14th—15th Centuries), Moscow 1960, pp. 460—513.

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of Suzdal’-Vladimir, that is to say, in the area bounded by the confluence of the O ka and Volga rivers. The first devastating onslaught of the Tatars and their repeated sweeps into the exposed area of settlement decided many to seek safety to the west in the less fertile but more sheltered interior forests of the then insignificant territories of Tver’ and Moscow. "The Muscovite principality", claimed Liubavskii, "w as not filled by colonists from the south, but by those who fled from the Povolzh'e, the Vladimir-Suzdal' regions and, probably, from Riazan’, w ho sought refuge from the Tatars in the distant and remote Muscovite region. And later the flow of population into the Muscovite principality w as completed partly voluntarily and partly un­ willingly."16 If the bulk of Moscow’s population originated in the em igration from the less stable areas of beleaguered northeastern Rus’, it is hard to believe that only members of the lower classes left their homes to seek a new life in the sheltered interior. A number of the w arrior class should also have moved to take ad v an tag e of new opportunities. Yet we search in vain for evidence to substantiate this thesis. The sources for the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century are silent about the hom elands of the servitors w ho drifted into Moscow. W e are certain only that such a shift in population as Liubavskii proposed w as not followed by a similar movement of the improverished princes of that region. This problem of origins is further com pounded by the fictional ancestries found in the later genealogical registers. For som ew hat different reasons, but with similar addiction and dedication, the untitled Muscovite serving families of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, much like England's "new men" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, falsified their origins to enhance their lineage17. Affluent Englishmen sought to connect their family trees with the N orm an conquerors, the more distant Romans and even the Trojans; the 16 M. Liubavskii, Lektsii, pp. 214—217. The internal difficulties in Tver' in the fourteenth century added to the immigration (p. 217). The evidence for Liubavskii’s thesis is to be found in his Obrazovanie osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii velikorusskoi narodnosti — naselenie i obedinenie tsentra (Formation of the Principal State Térritory of the Great Russian Nationality: Population and the Unification o f the Center), Leningrad 1929, pp. 8ff. 17 L. Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558—1641, Oxford 1965, p. 23: “. . . i n society the rise of new men was disguised by forged genealogies and the grant o f titles of honour. O ne of the most striking features of the a g e was a pride of ancestry which now reached new heights of fantasy and elaboration. Though it soon became a fad, a craze, a quasi-intellectual hobby for the idle rich, its prime purpose was social integration, the welding o f a hom ogeneous group a f seem ingly respectable lineage from a crazy patchwork of the most diverse, sometime dubious, origins. Genuine g enealogy was cultivated by the older gentry to reassure themselves of their innate superiority over the upstarts; bogus genealogy was cultivated by the new gentry in an effort to clothe their social nakedness, and by the old gentry in the internal jockeying for position in the ancestral pecking order. A lengthy pedigree was a useful weapon in the Tudor battle for status.*

V 24 Russian untitled nobility set its sights upon the servitors of the early Caesars and the imperial Tatars. This search for lineage w as linked, in part, with the quest of the royal family to seek illustrious forebears. Insignificant tw o-and-a-half centuries earlier, the House of Moscow found itself in undisputed possession of a huge realm, yet isolated and virtually ignored by most of Christendom. Its previous subordination in the spiritual and temporal realms had disappeared with the decline and fall of fabled Byzantium and the collapse of the Tatar Horde in the west. As the mid-fifteenth century uncertainties dimmed with the passing years, a quest began to acquire recognition for Muscovy as one of the leading powers in Europe. Ivan III hungered for foreign acknowledgm ent that he was em peror of Muscovy, though fear of rebuff forced him to employ only in­ direct hints in his negotiations with W estern powers. Towards the w eak and inconsequential he could be more direct and assertive. He called himself tsar in communications sent to the Livonian grand master and to an important Crimean Jew in the 1470’s and 80’s. More circumspectly, he sought the same recognition from the Habsburgs, the Italian city states with whom he had contact, and even from the Ottom an sultan. His caution was w arranted, for not one would accept Muscovite imperial claims18. Clerical assertion did not mirror official discretion. Since the ill-fated Council of Florence (1437/39) when the Byzantine em peror persuaded the O rthodox representatives to subscribe to Union with the Roman Church, the Russian clergy found itself facing a religious crisis. W hile they refused to accept the dictated solution, they also did not denounce the Byzantine im­ perial and religious authorities for their apostasy; they w ere prepared to aw ait a return to O rthodox sanity. W hile they deposed Isidore, the Byzantine appointed metropolitan, for his role a t Florence, the Muscovite government would have been content to leave the prim ate’s chair vacant for the time being. A secular crisis, dem anding clerical support for the throne forced the G rand Prince Vasilii II to nam e his own metropolitan in 1448. Byzantium fell before normal relations could be restored. Attacks upon the newly nam ed Russian m etropolitanate forced clerical apologists to defend the decision of 1448. To justify Vasilii M’s actions, they hailed him as tsar and as the defender of the faith19. In the next half century the Muscovite church sought to shape

11 G. Alef, The Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle: A Discordant View, in: Speculum, 41 (1966), pp. 1—21; see also M. Cherniavsky, Khan or Basileus, in: Journal o f the History of Ideas, 20, vol. 4 (1959), pp. 459—478. G. Alef, Muscovy and the Council of Florence, in: Slavic Review, 20 (1961), pp. 389—401; M. Cherniavsky, The Reception of the Council of Florence in Moscow, in: Church History, 24 (1955), pp. 347—359.

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a focus for itself and the senior prince in keeping with its O rthodox and imperial legacy. In 1492, at the end of the seventh millenium in the Byzantine system of reckoning, when the world did not come to an end, to satifsy the predictions of those who forecast it, M etropolitan Zosima had to fashion a new Paschalian calender. In its pream ble, he proclaimed Ivan III as "the pious and Christloving G rand Duke Ivan Vasilevich, Sovereign and Autocrat of all the Russias, the new Tsar of Constantinople and of the new city of Constantinople, the Sovereign of Moscow and all the Russian land and many other lands." Shortly thereafter, Filofei, a monk in the Eleazarov monastery in Pskov, conceived the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, in which "there is only one O rthodox Tsar in all the Universe20." The clerically-inspired argum ents did not win official acceptance. The quest for a t notable lineage and W estern recognition continued. "The Tale of the Vladimir Princes," possibly a late fifteenth or an early sixteenth century Muscovite invention, gave the East Russian rulers a personal grandeur and the desired W estern link, which the more abstract Filofeian scheme could not21. The "Tale" becam e for Muscovy w hat the story of the "Aeneid" had been for Imperial Rome: it created a personal tie between a civilization on the make and an illustrious antecedent. The "Tale" is basically a manufactured genealogy for the grand princes of Moscow, purporting that they had descended from imperial Roman stock. W hen Augustus ruled the civilized world, he assigned a brother nam ed Prus to govern the territories centered on the Vistula, who then gave his nam e to these lands under his governorship. Riurik and his brothers, summoned by 20 N . Andreyev, Filofey and his Epistle to Ivan Vasil'yevich, in: Slavonic and East European Review, 38 (1959), pp. 1—31; see especially p. 14, note 16, pp. 11 and 21. Andreyev, in a brilliant analysis of the sources and circumstances, redated the most important of Filofei's three letters. It was, he argues, addressed to Ivan III between 1499 and 1503, rather than to Ivan IV in his minority years. Second, he demonstrates that behind Filofei's theory lurked a concern for keeping ecclesiastical properties from becoming secularized. For a somewhat different view of the development of political consciousness in Muscovy a f the end of the fifteenth — beginning of the sixteenth century, see: A. A. Zimin, I. S. Peresvetov i eg o sovremenniki (I. S. Peresvetov and his Contemporaries), Moscow 1958, pp. 408—410; D. S. Likhachev, N atsional'noe sam osoznanie drevnei Rusi (National Consciousness in Early Rus'), Moscow-Leningrad 1945, pp. 98ff. 21 The precise dating of the 'T ale' has been at issue since I. N. Zhdanov first brought out the published version of 1891. Zhdanov and the many who followed him placed its formulation in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century. See, for exam ple, N. K. Gudzy, History of Early Russian Literature, trans. by S. W. Jones, N ew York 1949, pp. 265—65; Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 2, p. 124, cautiously put it in the early sixteenth century. In recent years, R. P. Dmitrieva, after an analysis of the various redactions of the 'T a le', dated its appearance in the first half of the sixteenth century, but before 1547. Skazanie o kniaz’iakh Vladimirskikh (Tale of the Princes of Vladimir), ed. R. P. Dmitrieva, Moscow-Leningrad 1955, pp. 70—71. la. S. Lur’e and A. A. Zimin have taken issue with Dmitrieva and would place its formulation in the closing years of the fifteenth century. See la. S. Lur'e, Ideologicheskaia bor’ba v russkoi publitsistike kontsa XV — nachala XVI veka (The Ideological Struggle in Russian Publicist Literature at the End of the 15th — Beginning of the 16th Century), Moscow-Leningrad 1960, pp. 381—90.

V 26 the N ovgorodians to rule over them in the ninth century, were identified as lineal descendants of Prus. By virtue of this bogus lineage, the rulers of Moscow claimed higher rank than all other European rulers22. To reinforce this point, the Muscovite fantasy attributed a spurious and dem eaning origin to the Gediminovichi of Lithuania, claiming that they had sprung from a union between a prince of Smolensk and his slave23. Nonetheless the Musco­ vite court continued to respect the princely titles of G edim in’s descendants. By the mid-sixteenth century the rulers of Moscow gave official credence to the falsified genealogy24. A great fresco painting in the Palace of Facets, dating from the reign of Tsar Fedor (1584— 98) graphically depicted the rela­ tionship between Augustus Caesar and the royal house of Moscow25. In the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the story assumed its place as pream ble for family registers of the ruling house26. Even the Romanovs, at 22 Skazanie, pp. 153, 171—178. The originator of this sham genealogy is alleged to have been Spiridon Saw a (ibid., pp. 159 ff.). Spiridon, believed to have been a native of Tver' who became Metropolitan of Kiev in the 1470s, but fell afoul of the Lithuanian authorities. Eventually he found refuge in Moscow by the 1480s and became a closely guarded resident of Ferapontov Monastery. (Ibid., pp. 73ff.) 22 Ibid., p. 179. 24 Giles Fletcher, in his 1591 account (Of the Rus Commonwealth, ed. A. G. Schmidt, Ithaca, N. Y. 1966, p. 24) reported 'That their ancestry came not o f the Rus nation Ivan Vasilievich, father of this Emperor, would many times boast, disdaining, as should seem, to have his progeny derived from the Rus blood. As namely, to an Englishman, his goldsmith, that had received bullion o f him to make certain plate, whom the Emperor commanded to look well to his weight, 'for my Rus', said he, 'are thieves all'. W hereat the workman, looking upon the Emperor, began to smile. The Emperor, being o f quick conceit, charged him to tell him what he smiled at. ’If Your Majesty will pardon me', quoth the goldsmith, ‘I will tell you. Your Highness said that the Rus were all thieves and forgot in the meanwhile that yourself was a Rus*. 'I thought s o ,’ quoth the Emperor, ’but you are deceived. For I am no Rus. My ancestors were Germans.'* 25 A. Voyce, Moscow, and the Roots of Russian Culture, Norman, Okla, 1964, pp. 142—143. 24 See the descriptions of the seventeenth century 'Rodoslovnye knigi* (G enealogical Books) in the manuscript division catalogue of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: O pisanie rukopisnogo otdela biblioteki Akademii Nauk SSSR (A Description of the Manuscript Division of the Libraries of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), vol. 3, fase. 1, Moscow-Leningrad 1959*, pp. 535, 540, 547, 556. The fiction of imperial Roman antecedents continued into the eighteenth century (ibid., pp. 569, 581). In volume 10 of the Vremennik there are three genealogical registers of the rulers of Rus’ and the nobility o f Moscow. Here the progressions of the impact of falsified origins of the Riurikides are quite visible. The earliest composite genealogy published therein dales from the early reign of Ivan IV (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 1—11) and begins with the older familiar style to those acquainted with the story of the coming of the Varangians in the 'P ovesf vremennykh let* (cf. PSRL, vol. 1; SPb 1846, p. 9; 2nd ed. Leningrad 1926, cols. 19—20). The genealogy in the Vremennik began with: *V leto 6370 sede na velikom Novgorode pervoi kniaz’ Velikii Riurik v NoVegrade, byst' na Gosudarstve let 1 7 / Dmitrieva, after examining some of the genealogical registers o f the previous century, stated (Skazanie, p. 126): 'for the fifteenth century it was typical tomention that Riurik ‘came from the Germans’. In a series o f copies of genealogical compilations of thesame time, they simply state that Riurik was ‘from the Varangians’/ The effect of the Skazanie is evident in the published register attributed to the reign of Tsar Fedor. Chapter 1 begins (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 131): 'V leto 6370 pride na Rus' iz Nemets iz Prus muzh ehesten ot roda Rimska Tsaria Avgusta Kesaria, imia emu kniaz' Riurik . . / By the early seventeenth century, the genealogy of the Muscovite tsars is introduced with the grandiose fictional details woven from the Skazanie, but with am plification and some errors. (Cf. Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 1—4 and Skazanie, pp. 170ff.). For its late seventeenth century impact on the official Barkhatnaia kniga (Velvet Book), see Rodoslovnaia kniga kniazei i dvorion rossiiskikh i vyezzhikh (The G enealogical Book of Russian and Emigrant Princes and Courtiers), ed. by N. I. Novikov, vol. 1, Moscow 1787, pp. 11—12.

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least until the eighteenth century, also adopted the legend of descent from Prussian stock27, even though they had sprung from non-princely stock.

II The creation of the falsified genealogy for the rulers of Muscovy w as to sanction the legitimacy of the new tsardom as a lawful offshoot of the First Rome. The hunger for W estern acceptance cam e after the establishment of a powerful kingdom. A similar search for honorable and non-Russian lineage characterized the concern of the untitled Muscovite nobility. In their case, however, the desire to create em inent ancestry was more a matter of survival than snobbery. Their m onopoly on high state positions, which they had held from the fourteenth century, began to crumble by the last quarter of the fifteenth. In the pivotal century of Moscow’s em ergence, the non-Muscovite princes, even those whose economic circumstances would have suggested seeking service appointm ents, disdained unsheathing their swords even on behalf of the khan's lieutenant. Consequently, all the great serving men in th at century w ere commoners, who occupied every m ajor position in the military and ir the council (boyar duma). The titled thought it beneath their dignity to wor ; for an o th er prince. Enough land existed in the fourteenth century, along with fav o rab le conditions to permit such a chance. Their situations deteriorated m arkedly by the second-half of the fifteenth century. Many of the now numerous princes, no longer independent or even affluent, came to seek em ployment, thereby competing with the descendants of the old serving families. They insisted that their superior blood lines and previous political positions entitled them to higher offices than the base born. Though the crown did not fully yield to these dem ands, it began to make some com pro­ mises in the course of a century to the disadvantage of the older retainer families28. The untitled used various devices to maintain their previous gains. v The genealogy of fhe untitled family of Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla, the first known ancestor of the later Romanovs, is identified simply — even in an early seventeenth century register as 'The family of Andrei Ivanovich Kobylina and of his brother Fedor Ivanovich Shevliaga.' Thereafter followed the names of Kobyla’s descendants in their various branches. (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 86.) An eighteenth century family list of Empress Elizabeth's progenitors, composed by P. N. Krekshin (between 1744 and the 1750s), had Andrei Kobyla emigrating from Prussia (Opisanie rukopisnogo otdela AN SSSR, vol. 3, fase. 1, p. 584). 28 By the 1480s men of princely lineage began to take over army commands. A survey of the surviving military register will indicate that this development will increase in the course of time. See Drevneishaia rozriadnoia kniga offitsialn oi redaktsii (p. 1565) [The Earliest G en ealogical Book According to the Official Redaction (to 1565)] (hereafter cited as DRK), ed. by P. N. Miliukov, Moscow 1901, pp. 13ff., Razriadnaia Kniga, 1475__1598 g g ., ed. V. I. Buganov, M oscow 1966, pp. 19ff. The long service requirement demanded for elevation to the royal council — approximately 25—30 years for boyars, 15 years for okol'nichie — kept the duma a preserve for the commoners for the remainder of the fifteenth century and the early decades

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28 This they did not in concert, but as families, though the general scramble that resulted leaves a false image of group action. This preoccupation with station, th at would be directly related to the im portance of o ne’s state position, robbed both the untitled and titled nobility of the possibility to act as a brake on the evolving pow er of the crown. The creation of the first fictional genealogies for some members of the aristocracy of service may have originated in the late fifteenth century, possibly antedating the formulation of the Prus legend; certainly other untitled nobles followed the lead of the House of Moscow, manufacturing spurious genealogies to prove th a t they had come very early to serve the grand princes of the Russian northeast. The most complex case is that of the Morozovs, w here fact and legend are liberally blended. In the earliest published register, based upon a sixteenth century manuscript, the family’s genealogy began with: "G rand Prince Aleksandr laroslavich Nevskii had some fellow nam ed Terentii, nicknamed Morozov. G rand Prince Aleksandr fought a battle with the G erm an king Vargush, and a t that battle Terentii fought bravely against the Germ ans, . . . and for his g reat manliness and bravery, the G rand Prince deem ed him worthy of great honor and the G rand Prince m ade him his boyar." From the time of Terentii in the mid-thirteenth century until the mid-fourteenth century, when Ivan Semenovich M orozov lived, each generation is identified by only one male name. With Ivan Morozov, the number of inheritors increase29. By the late sixteenth century the family’s history of descent changed to allow for the incorporation of the Prus legend: "G rand Prince Aleksandr Nevskii vanquished the Germans, and a t that battle there w ere six brave men, and am ong those six valiant men one was nam ed Mikhail, nicknamed Misha, from the Prussian la n d s . . . " In this version, Mikhail had an only son called Terentii and the latter in turn sired a son called Mikhail. This Mikhail was the father of Semen and the grandfather of a single grandson, Ivan Semenovich Morozov. Thereafter the progeny of the Morozovs expanded at a rem arkable rate30. Here the compiler of the genealogy adjusted his story to include a Prussian origin for the Morozovs, along with a change in the family’s pro­ genitor. *

of the sixteenth. Here, undoubtedly, the influence of the councillors played a role in the m aintenance of majority control for members of their group over the most sought after positions in the state. See Alef, Reflections, pp. 101 ff. By the late 1520s titled aristocrats began to show a decided increase in the senior rank of the council. For a preliminary study, see A. A. Zimin, Sostav boiarskoi dumy v XV—XVI vekakh (The Composition of the Boyar Ouma in the 15th and 16th centuries), in: Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1957 god, Moscow 1958, pp. 44flF. and especially pp. 52ff. ** Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 255. » Ibid., p. 180.

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In the seventeenth century version of the family’s origin, the M orozov progenitor is called Mikhail Prushanin, w hose son Terentii fought alongside A leksandr Nevskii and thereby won a boyar's hat31, thereby combining, but not erasing the inconsistency of, the elements of the two earlier stories. Complicating the issue of origins is the dem onstrable knowledge that the M orozovs w ere of N ovgorodian origin and w ere associated with "Prussian Street" in the thirteenth century. In an early eighteenth century "Sinodik" for the Church of the Ascension on Prussian Street, it is revealed that the builders and patrons of the church, who were buried along the southern and northern walls w ere nam ed Mikhail Terentii, Mikhail, Simeon, Ioann, all called M orozovs. The information then continues: "there w ere also others*. Mikhail, Vasilii, Ignatii and many others, and even their wives: Ul’ianiia, Kseniia A g rip p in a ,. . . " The necrology ends with the statem ent that the Morozovs cam e to N ovgorod the G reat "from the Prussian lands during the reign of grand prince Aleksandr laroslavich called Nevskii." V. L. lanin, who rediscovered the necrology first published in 1860 by M akarii, claims that the Ascension "sinodik" relies on authentic material, that the identification of Michael as Terentii’s father and the naming of other M orozovs by nam e strengthens the reliability of the evidence. But the information of the "sinodik" is not fully trustworthy. W hile a reading leaves the impression that the necrology had an independent source of information in order to nam e previously unknown members of the Morozov family, con­ siderable suspicion is raised by the precise identification of the early Morozovs (Mikhail, Terentii, Mikhail, Simeon, Ioann) in the same order as found in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century genealogical lists. Secondly, while Prussian Street may be a perfectly reliable reference for the Morozov family church in N ovgorod, why the addition of the statem ent that the Morozovs originally cam e from the Prussian lands during Nevskii's time? If we accept such information, we are faced with the legitimacy of claim on the part of other Muscovite families claiming "Prussian descent"310. Ibid., pp. 107—108. 3ia V. L. lanin, Zametlci o novgorodskikh berestianykh gramotakh, in: Sovetskaia Arkheologiia, 1965, No. 4, pp. 122—123. In foirness to lanin, it should be indicated that he found considerable doubt about the identification of the progenitor Mikhail of the sixteenth and seventeenth century genealogies as that brave Mikhael who fought whit Nevskii. The 'sinodik* claims that he was buried in the Church of the Ascension; the gen ealogy, in the Church of the Archangel Mikhail. The genealogy asserted that Mikhail fought bravely with Nevskii and received a boyar's rank; the necrology omits such reference. Ivan Semonovich Morozov, w e might add, whom the 'sinodik* claims os being buried in Novgorod, was in the service of Dmitrii Donskoi and was killed at Kulikovo Pole in 1380 (so Veselovskii, in: Akty sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severo-vostochnoi Rusi kontsa XIV — nachala XVI vv. (Documents of Social and economic history of north-eastern Rus at the end the fourteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth centuries], ed. by S. B. Vese­ lovskii and L. V. Cherepnin, Moscow 1952, hereafter cited as ASEISVR, p. 621). I am indebted to A. A. Zimin, who called my attention to lanin's article.

V 30 These M orozov registers illustrate the preoccupations and the problems facing the designers of bridges to a more ancient service origin. They began with the purpose of conjuring up a Prussian ancestor, but the problem w as to bring him over to the Russian side. The first major historical contact with the "Prussians," whom the Muscovite compilers could not well distinguish from the hated Latinity of the imperialistic knight-crusaders of the thirteenth century, cam e in the time of Aleksandr Nevskii, who repulsed their efforts at expansion to the east in the 1240's. The Nevskii saga lived in oral and recorded memory and becam e the convenient crossing point, though the circumstances surrounding the transfer to the Russian side are not explained. O nce the "Prussian" ancestor w as brought over to the Russian side, the question was how to extend the span to the first historic personage known in the family. For the Morozovs, the situation may possibly have been easier; others found it much more difficult. The telling point in evaluating the general scheme is to determine the moment when a man had more than one son and the family tree begins to branch out. A most outrageous claim is found in the register of the Vel’iaminovs and Vorontsovs. They designated a Shiman Ofrikanovich (Shiman, son of the African), taken directly from the spurious "Tale of the Vladimir Princes," as coming from the G erm an lands to serve G rand Prince laroslav Vladimirovich (laroslav the Wise), who ruled in Kiev in the mid-eleventh century, laroslav then granted his son Vsevolod the principality of Vladimir and assigned Shiman’s son to accom pany him32. Even here the compiler erred. In the division of his realm, G rand Prince laroslav gave Pereiaslavl’, not Vladimir, to his son Vsevold33. Then follows the usual "bridge": a single son is created to occupy each generation between the eleventh century lurii Shimanovich and the mid-thirteenth century Protasei, "w ho came from Volodimer to Moscow with G rand Prince [sic] Danilo Aleksandrovich34". With an early biblical disregard for the span of m an’s life, the author of this genealogy accomplished this feat (two hundred years in time) in three generations! He also perform ed a rem arkable geographical feat when he confused Vladimir in Volynia with the "new " Vladimir, situated east of Moscow. The first corroborative nam e we know belongs to Protasei's grandson, Vasilii Vasil’evich (often called Veliaminov) who becam e chief of the Moscow 33 Ibid., p. 90. 33 Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei (Full Collection of Russian Chronicles) (hereafter cited as PSRL), vol. 1, Leningrad 1926*, col. 161. See also The Russian Primary Chronicle, ed. S. H. Cross, in: Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature, vol. 12, Cambridge 1930, p. 232: *To Svyatoslav I give Chernigov, to Vsevolod Pereyaslavl, to Igor the city of Vladimir [in Volynia], and to Vyacheslav Smolensk.' 34 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 90.

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militia (tysiatskii) until his death in 137335. His children apparently enjoyed high positions. O ne son, Michael, probably w as a boyar of Dmitrii Donskoi (the genealogical list errs in identifying him as brother-in-law to the grand prince)36. M ichael’s own daughter married Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhskii, w ho later becam e a distinguished boyar. Michael himself fell in the 1380 battle against the Tatars37. The V eliam inovs and the cadet branch of the Vorontsovs, despite an occasional setback, continued to acquire profit and honors. Some of their members served in the boyar council in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. N or w ere these all. Sixteenth and seventeenth century genealogies ascribe G erm an, or specifically Prussian, origins to a number of other old Muscovite families, such as the Kutuzovs38, the many descendants of the servitor Ratsha (Cheliadnins, Buturlins, Chulkovs, Chebotovs, Slizens, etc.)39, and the Bekle­ mishevs40. A host of minor and late-arriving families joined the p arad e41. N ot all the untitled nobility fell prey to this compulsion. The Pleshcheevs, caught in the spotlight of a distinguished ancestor, could not ad o p t this device. Early in the fourteenth century, a Fedor Biakont left devastated Chernigov for service in Moscow42. The oldest of his five sons becam e M etro­ politan Aleksei, the first native Muscovite ever to attain the highest Russian 35 PSRL, Vol. 25, Moscow-Leningrad 1949, p. 189. According to the genealogy of the Vel’iaminov-Vorontsov progenitors, the office of the 'tysiatskii* was a family monopoly. Protasei allegedly was 'tysiatskii' at the time of Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich (d. 1303), thereafter the office supposedly held in successions by his son and grandson, both named Vasilii (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 90; so accepted by Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 503). But a Muscovite 'tysiatskii* named Aleksei Petrovich was killed mysteriously in 1356 by unknown assailants (PSRL, vol. 25, p. 180; V. N . Tatishchev, Istoriia rossiiskaia, vol. 5, Moscow 1965, p. 108; Karamzin, Istoriia, vol. 4, p. 183; see also Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 261). Solov'ev identified Aleksei Petrovich as 'Khvost* who had run afoul of Grand Prince Semen for some kind of sedition, was deprived of his lands and dignities. There is a possibility that this Aleksei Petrovich was surnamed Bosovolkov, a highly placed Muscovite, who, with Andrei Kobyla, went to Tver* to escort Princess Mariia Aleksandrovna, bride-to-be of Grand Prince Semen, to Moscow (PSRL, vol. 25, p. 176). 34 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 90, states that Michael married Grand Prince Dmitrii’s sister. Dmitrii's one identifiable sister married a Lithuanian prince in 1356 (A. V. Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel'nye kniaz’ia severnoi Rusi v Tatarskii period, s 1236 po 1505 g [Grand and Appanage Princes o f Northern Rus’ in the Tatar Period, from 1236 to 1505], vol. 1. SPb 1889, p. 92). The testament of Donskoi's father does not even mention the one known daughter; see: Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh kniazei XIV—XVI vv. (The Testaments and Treaties of the Grand and Appanage Princes of the 14th—16th Cen­ turies), ed. L. V. Cherepnin (hereafter cited as DDG), Moscow-Len ingrad 1950, N o. 4, pp. 15—19. 37 Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitve (Tales Concerning the Battle o f Snipe Field), ed. M. N. Tikhomirov, Moscow 1959, p. 37: 'There, at that very same battle, were killed on the steppe: . . . Mikula, son of Vasilii the tysiatskii . . .' 33 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 110. 33 Ibid., pp. 168—171, 102. « Ibid., p. 113. For example, the Melikovs (ibid., p. 114), the N agois (p. 117), the Levashovs (p. 118) and the Danilovs (p. 109).

42 Veselovskii, Feodal’noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 334; E. Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi (History of the Russian Church), vol. 2, part 1, Moscow 1900, pp. 171—173.

V 32 ecclesiastical office43. N ative pride prompted the chronicles not only to record the event, but also to p arad e his origin44. Aleksei’s younger brother, Aleksandr, becam e the founder of the Pleshcheev line45. Another family that, with reason, did not attem pt to fictionalize its ancestry belonged to a Dmitrii Mikhailovich Bobrok, who cam e from Volynia in the reign of Donskoi. Dmitrii Mikhailovich possessed outstanding military abilities46 and becam e a boyar sometime before 138947. Unlike many of the earlier w arrior families, Bobrok’s descendants did not retain their high posi­ tions, though a number served in lesser capacities as pomeshchiki at the end of the fifteenth to the early sixteenth century48. Some families that originated in northeastern Russia resorted to another kind of fiction, in claiming that they w ere really of princely descent. Among these w ere the fourteenth century progenitors of the soon to be distinguished clan of Vsevolozh-Zabolotskii, who claimed Smolensk as their early home, and the politically unsuccessful Monastyrs49. A fourth origin found in the genealogical lists for distinguished families is a claim to Tatar ancestry. The most celebrated example is that of the Godunovs. They and their blood relatives, the Saburovs, claimed descent from a Tatar nam ed Chet, w ho allegedly migrated to Moscow during the reign of Ivan Kalita (1327— 41 )50. Despite the announced skepticism of Russian scholars more than a half century ag o 51, contem porary writers still perpetuate the myth of Tsar Boris's Tatar origin52. N ot long ag o Veselovskii neatly peeled back the layers of the legend, noting the internal inconsistencies found in the genealogies and in this family’s history of the early fourteenth 43 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 98, 259. 44 PSRL, vol. 25, p. 194. 45 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 260; Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p.334, cited the Tverian Chronicle (PSRL, 15, SPb 1863, cols. 437—439) in identifying Fedor Biakont's sons Feofan and Aleksandr Pleshchei as boyars of Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi. Neither, however, is found among the boyar witnesses to the testaments of Donskoi, the first dating before 1378 and the second shortly before 1389. See: DDG, pp. 25, 36—37 and Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, pp. 309—310. 44 He is called 'prince* in the chronicles (PSRL, vol. 8, SPb 1859, p. 24; vol. 25, p. 192), but this is not supported by the available documents. 47 Dmitrii Mikhailovich witnessed the second testament of Dmitrii Donskoi (DDG, p. 36). Solov'ev identified him as Volynskii (Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 309). 48 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. I l l —112; Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 292. 49 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 95, 123, 164, 168, 252, 262. For the declining fortune of the provincial Monastyrs, see: Veselovskii, Issledovanie po istorii oprichniny (Investigations on the History of the Oprichnina), Moscow 1963, p. 413. 50 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 93, 162, 256. S) Pavlov-Sil'vanskii, Gosudarevy sluzhilye liudi, pp. 88—89, and especially note 29 for a roll call of the skeptics. a See, for example: J. Clarkson, A History of Russia, New York 1961, p. 126: 'Sprung from a family of Tatar origin . . .',* N. V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, New York 1963; p. 172: 'Coming from a Mongol gentry family which had been converted to Orthodoxy and russified . . .'; J. Billington, The Icon and the

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century. He also observed that neither the very know ledgeable Prince Andrei Kurbskii in the sixteenth century nor the official genealogies (the "G osudarev rodoslovets" of the mid-sixteenth century and the "B arkhatnaia kniga" of the late seventeenth) w ent any further back than Dmitrii Zerno (second and third quarter of the fourteenth century) in identifying the progenitors of the Saburovs and G odunovs1*53. M oreover, local records found in a "synodik" in the Rostov Uspenskii Sobor started the register with Zerno’s grandfather Zakharii54. Veselovskii located Z erno’s ancestors in Kostroma (northeast of Moscow and centering on the upper Volga), based upon their descendants’ rich landholdings in the region. He suggested that Dmitrii Zerno came into Muscovite service after 1330, becam e a boyar, and that his three sons, Ivan Krasnoi, Konstantin Sheia and Dmitrii, also rose to the same rank by the beginning of the fifteenth century55. In his perceptive dissection of the fictional Tatar origin of the Godunovs and their relatives, Veselovskii did not touch upon a number of vexing issues. He skirted the question of the w idespread attribution of Tatar ancestry to Z erno’s family in the private genealogies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the problems of other untitled families claiming Tatar ancestry and the motives that prom pted the formulation of such claims. Among the older Muscovite serving families making similar assertions w ere the Dobrinskies, some of whom w ere im portant at court in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen­ turies56, and the Starkovs, who lost their previous ascendancy after the middle of the fifteenth century57.

Axe, N ew York 1966, p. 101: '. . . Boris, who had a non-boyar, partly Tatar genealogy, . . . '; W. E. N. Allen, M arriage Projects of Boris Godunov, in: Oxford Slavonic Papers, 12 (1965), p. 70: 'A gain, while Boris could not find a Palaeologa for his son, the antiquity of the Bagratid House — with their legendary descent from King David and their lineage linked with Comnenes and Bogoliubskois — must have been attractive to a relative parvenu of remote Tatar origin always subject to the jealousies of the Riurikid offshoots am ong the higher Russian aristocracy.' S1 The Barkhatnaia kniga was published by N. I. Novikov as Rodoslovnaia kniga kniazei i dvorian rossiiskikh i vyezzhikh in 2 volumes in 1787 (see note 27 above). The 'Rod Saburovykh i Godunovykh', which begins with Dmitrii Zerno, makes no mention of Tatar family origin (vol. 1, p. 240). The Barkhatnaia kniga, dating from the very end of the Muscovite period, did not allow for Tatar origin to any of the old fam ilies, or even for German antecedents, despite such claims in private genealogical lists. 54 S. B. Veselovskii, Iz istorii drevnerusskogo zem levladeniia (From the History of Early Russian Landholding), in: Istoricheskie zapiski (Historical Notes), 18 (1946), p. 58. ss Ibid., pp. 61—62. As evidence, he identified two boyars who witnessed the first testament of Grand Prince Vasilii I called 'Konstantin i Ivan Dmitrievichi'. Further, at a memorial service held for the deceased G enadii Buturlin, they are clearly identified as brothers. u Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 258—259. Konstantin Dobrynskii (early fifteenth century) fathered a long line of distinguished personages: the Dobrinskies, Khromois, Obrazets-Simskies, Khabarovs and even Shigona lur evich Podzhogin, a junior boyar who became a close confident of Grand Prince Vasilii III. s; Ibid., p. 123. The official seventeenth century Barkhatnaia kniga did not take notice of these claims: Rodoslovnaia kniga, vol. 2, 206—207, 129.

V

34 W hen did these falsified claims of Tatar ancestry first a p p e ar? The Prussian association may be dated in the period of Ivan III to Vasilii III. I suspect that the preoccupation with finding non-Russian progenitors for some of the older untitled families developed first in the late fifteenth century and continued into the sixteenth; and that those opting for Tatar origins an tedated the quest for the Prussian tie. This hypothesis requires further investigation into the extant but unpublished fifteenth century genealogies. W hile this knowledge would be useful, it is not of pivotal im portance to the thesis th at a crisis developed in the ranks of the northeastern Russian aristocracy that affected its political relations with the Muscovite crown. Ill The Russian aristocracy developed in a traditional setting, though it possessed an Achilles heel almost unknown to its W estern counterparts. A fairly rigid social structure had developed by the time Muscovy eased into the limelight of history. In that essentially agrarian society, the greatest portion of the population performed agricultural and manorial duties. From this peasantry came the majority of town dwellers: the workers, the artisans and most of the merchantry. W hile social and even juridical differentiations existed within these groups, they nonetheless belonged to the lower social classes. The aristocracy constituted the highest secular category, consisting of the blooded princes and the nobility of service. Descent, land and the traditional w arrior function combined to give this group its social and political justi­ fication. Undoubtedly, in the early uncharted history of the Russian northeast, the untitled landholders of importance had em erged from the ranks of the low born, but by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the chances for such upw ards mobility had all but disappeared. If in these characteristics the East Russian nobility resembled its W estern counterparts, it differed considerably in the precariousness of its economic position and ultimately in its almost abject dependence upon the state for sustenance. Rigid customary law dem anded that a father divide his posses­ sions fairly equally am ong his male heirs. With each succeeding generation an individual’s wealth decreased unless he could find supplemental sources of income. This immemorial custom was to continue unchecked for most of Russian history. Peter the G reat introduced a system of entail (edinonasledie), which restricted inheritance to one son, thereby obliging the others to take state service. This system did not survive the changes of the eighteenth century. Those familiar with the history of Kiev will recall the domestic anarchy that resulted from a surfeit of princes who then w arred on one another. O nly our

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paucity of sources for this period of early Russian history prevents us from making a study of the overlooked developm ent w hereby the untitled landed nobility also becam e impoverished, with consequences which one can only guess. The transfer of the pow er center from the southwest to the northeast merely allow ed the princely rulers and their followers a fresh start and a continuance of old practices. Long ag o Kliuchevskii vividly described the impact of family increase upon the fortunes of the numerous princes of the northeast, w ho descended from Vsevolod III (d. 1212). Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, his heirs, more numerous with each succeeding gene­ ration, divided and subdivided the lands of the once unified realm. Ultimately some of Vsevolod’s descendants slid to that level of impoverization in which some possessed nothing more than a miserable village and their blue blood with which to impress the world around58. Foreign observers, such as Giles Fletcher in the late sixteenth and Adam O learius in the seventeenth century, testified to the continuation of this unfortunate developm ent59. O n e can, without difficulty, find exam ples of the same manifestation for the untitled as well. O ne of Veselovskii's case studies may be offered to illustrate the effects of numerous progeny upon the fortunes of a distinguished fourteenth century Muscovite family. Rodion Nestorovich cam e from Kiev in 1332 with a large military following60. Ivan Kalita induced him to accept service in M oscow by naming him a senior boyar. Rodion’s only son61, becam e a boyar in the council of Dmitrii Donskoi and died in th at rank in 139062. Ivan had three sons, the second of whom, ll'ia, becam e the family’s representative in the g rand princely council in the early fifteenth century63. Thereafter, the Kvashins, as the family becam e known through its senior branch, lost its representation in the council and with that the ability to acquire worthy 9 Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 1, Moscow 1956, pp. 353—355. 9 G iles Fletcher, O f the Rus Commenwealth, p. 42: 'The fourth and lowest degree o f nobility with them is such as bear the nam of k n i a z i a or dukes, but com e of the younger brothers o f those chief houses through many descents and have no inheritance o f their own save the bare name or title o f duke only. For their order is to deliver their names and titles of their dignities over to all their children alike, whatsoever else they leave them . . . and the sons of a k n i a z , or duke, are called k n i a z i a , though they have not one groat of inheritance or livelihood to maintain themselves withal. O f this sort there are so many that the plenty maketh them cheap, so that you shall see dukes glad to serve a mean man for five or six rubles or marks a year, and yet they will stand highly upon their b e s c h e s t e or reputation for their honors.* Adam O learius, Moskowitische und Persische Reise, Berlin 1959, p. 136: 'D ie Knesen aber, so auf den Dörfern wohnen, weil ihrer etliche nicht so viel haben, daß sie ihrem Stande gem äß leben können, halten sich desto schlechter, daß man sie, wenn man sie nicht kennt, oft für Bauern halten muß.* 9 Karamzin, Istoriia, vol. 4, p. 155 and note 324. 9 Vremennik, vol. 10, M aterialy, p. 92. 9 DDG, pp. 25, 36; Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 387. « The only evidence of Il ia's rank as boyar comes from a letter addressed in 1409 to Grand Prince Vasilii Dmitrievich by the emir Edigei: Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov (Collection of State Papers and Treaties) (hereafter cited as SGGD), vol. 2, SPb 1819; p. 16.

V 36 positions obtainable through the court. From the three sons of Ivan Rodio­ novich, at the end of the fourteenth century, the descendants expanded to a clan of about twenty-five in 1500 and to approxim ately sixty a half-century later64. Some am ong its impoverished members obtained service a t various episcopal and lay provincial courts, which did not afford them the prestige, the power and the wealth to be found within the grand princely establish­ ment. Some sought refuge in monasteries as a means of escaping lives of penury; about eighteen becam e low-ranking military servitors (pomeshchiki) of Moscow in the N ovgorodian lands65. But there is an inherent contradiction in this theoretical equation. Had the size of landholding families grown uninterruptedly, as Kliuchevskii and his followers believed, even taking into account the losses incurred during the Tatar pogroms, the number of landless and needy warriors, both princely and untitled, would have been considerable by the end of the fourteenth century and we would reasonably expect a number of these to be seeking service at the courts of the more affluent princes, notably in Moscow and Tver’, possibly in Nizhnii N ovgorod and RiazarT. Yet we seek in vain for the identity of a single servitor prince in the em ploy or in the council of fourteenth century Moscow, despite the favor shown by the Tatar overlords66. As social equals to the more fortunate rulers of populated territories, they feared that employment in the household of a prince would reduce them to the level of untitled servitors. W hat saved them, at least for a historical moment, w as not an opportunity to colonize new lands (for such territories were no longer available in the Russian region of the northeast), but the consequences of the Black Death. The great fourteenth century pandem ic that played such havoc in W estern Europe w as not stopped by some eastern iron curtain67. It swept out of Asia and touched the Crimea and then entered Europe through the ports of the western M editerranean sea, reaching into almost every corner of Europe w here the flea carriers of bubonic plague and the human transporters of the 4*7

44 Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 54. 44 Ibid., pp. 195-196. 44 Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 504: according to Solov’ev, princes did serve in the council of Prince Dmitrii Konstantinovich (d. 1393) of Nizhnii Novgorod, the older one of settlement, where the descendants of Vsevolod III had multiplied in considerable numbers. Since this pattern is not duplicated in the other territories, one should carefully examine Solov’ev's source to determine whether this is not a much later alteration. 47 K. F. Helleiner, The Population of Europe from the Black Death to the Eve of the Vital Revolution, in: The Cambridge Economic History, vol. 4, Cambridge 1967, p. 8. In the traditional pattern of Western historians, Helleiner appears to be ignorant of developments in the East. In describing the limits of the Black Death, he found it 'from Portugal to Poland, and from Sicily to Sweden . . .*

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pneum onic variety could reach68. In almost every country w here the plague ran its cyclical course, the death rate w as so g rea tth at it required from several generations to even a century or two before the pre-plague level of population could be regained69. Some Russian chronicles, reporting from afar the human toll in the N ear East and the Crimea in 1346/47, likened in to the divine afflictions visited upon the Egyptians when the Hebrews w ere in b ondage70. And in the W est the survivors massacred Jews71. The Black Death entered northern Russia not from the south and up the Volga or Don rivers in 1346 or 1347, but from the west in 1352, striking first in Pskov and then moving on to the more populous Novgorod the G reat. The holocaust in Pskov spared no sector of the population. The toll reached such proportions that many of the victims w ere dumped into common graves, from five to ten to an excavation72. N o one ap p eared immune. All of western Russia from Kiev to N ovgorod felt the edge of the scythe. Even Suzdal', on the distant middle Volga, did not escape. Some towns, such as Glukhov (near Putivl') in the south and Beloozero in the almost inaccesible reaches of the northern forest did not have a single survivor73. The plague reached Moscow the following year. G rand Prince Semen Ivanovich, his two only sons, his brother Andrei and M etropolitan Feognost all succumbed. The senior family position passed to Semen’s only remaining brother, Ivan. For a moment it ap p e ared as though the House of Moscow would be extinguished. At the end of his testam ent, probably written when the plague w as taking its toll of Muscovites, Semen w rote: "And so, I write this to you so that the memory of

M Cf. E. Carpentier, Autour de la peste noire: Famines et épidémies dans l'histoire du XlVe siècle, in: Annales (1962), pp. 1062—1092; for som e recent local studies on the impact of the 1348 plague in the West, see: R. W. Emery, The Black Death of 1348 in Perpignan, in: Speculum, 42 (1967), pp. 611—623; W. M. Bowsky, The Impact of the Black Death upon Sienese Government and Society, in: Speculum, 39 (1964), pp. 1—34. ** G. C. Russell, Ancient and M edieval Population, in: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. N ew Series, vol. 48, part 3 (1958), p. 35; Helleiner, The Population o f Europe, in: Cambridge Economic History, vol. 4, pp. 10—11. » PSRL, vol. 7, SPb 1856, p. 211; vol. 25, Moscow-Leningrad 1949, p. 175, vol. 30, Moscow-Leningrad 1965, p. 108. 71 Carpentier, Autour de la peste noire, pp. 1066—67. n Pskovskie letopisi, vol. 1, Moscow-Leningrad 1941, p. 21. It appears rather odd that the plague is believed to have missed most of Poland, though the Black Death must have moved through that area before spreading into the West Russian lands. Cf. Carpentier, Autour de la peste noire, pp. 1072—1073. 73 PSRL, vol. 10, SPb 1885, p. 224. See Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, pp. 541 ff., for a summary of the various afflictions visited upon northern Rus* — fire, plague and famine. The section on plague (pp. 543 bis 546) is the best to be found to date. Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Ninteenth Century, Princeton 1961, p. 60, relied upon Solov’ev's inquiry, though, surprisingly he did not attempt to ascertain the consequences of the Black Death for his subject of manorial or political relations. Billington's laconic comment on the impact o f the plague (The Icon and the Axe, p. 22) appears questionable: T h e flea and the rat collaborated to bring Russian epidemics of the black plague in the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries that were even worse than those of western Europe.- He does, however, admit (p. 637, note 20) that w e lock a systematic study of the subject.

V 38 and of us may not die and so the candle [of our family] may not go out74." Unaccountably, the chronicler neglected to record the plague's toll of the Muscovite population75. With the exception of a local reapp earan ce in Pskov in 1360, the pestilence spared northern Russia for a decade76. In 1364— 66 the scourge cam e again, this time up the Volga, cutting a swath in the popu­ lation of Russia's once-famed "mezhdurechie" and then spread to every major town in northeastern Rus’. In Pereiaslavl', then relatively small, the daily toll of dead for a time numbered 20—30, reaching to 60—70 and sometimes exceeded 10077. Moscow itself in 1365— 66, observed a chronicler, suffered as greatly as Pereiaslavl’ had previously78. Thereafter, the plagues reoccurred in roughly twenty years cycles: 1386, 1408, 1417 (but only in N ovgorod the G reat and in the lands west of Moscow), 1425,1448 and 147879. This is the pattern discernable in the catastrophes of the W est80. The pestilence of 1425 appears to have been the last of the serious erruptions. The epidemic of 1448 carried a light touch and that of 1478 confined itself to N ovgorod the Great. The effects of the century-long devastation cannot be m easured by the available sources. Moscow still lacked the tax rolls and hearth counts by which population change in town and country can be gauged. The chronicle citations leave us with only the barest outline of the plagues' course. If parish registers are unavailable, we do have the genealogical registers of later date that do chart noble family trees, which permit something of a crude index to dem ographic change. O ne of the pitfalls in interpreting the evidence comes in weighing the term "childless" as applied to male members who left no issue. O ne cannot tell when they died, w hether as infants just after baptism or in childhood, or even their dates, for the com­ pilers of these genealogies included issue by generation. O n the other hand, they did often indicate death in battle or execution for treason, the extremes of honor’s yardstick in a w arrior society. W hat can be deduced, however, is that the number of childless males w as rather high in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. By the second half of the fifteenth century there

74 The Testament of the Grand Princes of Moscow, translated and edited with commentary by Robert C. Howes, Ithaca, N . Y. 1967, pp. 191-192. ” PSRL, vol. 10, p. 226; vol. 15, p o r tl, Petrograd 19222, cols. 62—63; vol. 25, p. 179. 74 Pskovskie Letopisi, vol. 1, pp. 22—23; PSRL, vol. 10, p. 232. 77 PSRL, vol. 25, pp. 182—183; cf. vol. 11, SPb 1897, p. 3. » PSRL, vol. 25, p. 183. * PSRL, vol. 25, pp. 212, 237, 243, 246, 270, 322. * Helleiner, The Population of Europe, p. 10. In the initial onslaught the plague lasted about six months in each locality before abating. See Carpentier, Autour de la peste noire, pp. 1072—1073. W e may assume the same basic features for Russia.

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w as an increase in the number of surviving males in noble fam ilies81. A few exam ples will illustrate the point. Ivan Semenovich Moroz, sire of the Muscovite Morozovs, lived in the mid­ fourteenth century82. He had six sons, but the high rate of mortality curbed the growth of this and the next generation. By the mid-fifteenth century there w ere eight males, descended from three of the sons. The others had no issue. At the end of the fifteenth century, the third generation of Moroz's descen­ dants comprised eighteen males83. The sam e pattern of retardation during the century of recurring plagues is noticeable in the case of two other distinguished untitled families. Andrei Ivanovich, grandson of that Akinf Gavrilovich, who defected from Moscow to Tver' and w as killed in 1304, served at the Muscovite court in the mid­ fourteenth century. He had eight children. At the end of the fifteenth century, fifteen males are identifiable (divided into the kernels of the Chromois, Osteevs, Buturlins, Slizens and Cheliadnins)84. Similarly, an arrested rate of growth for the later fourteenth century and an acceleration in the fifteenth is noted for the Vel'iaminov-Vorontsovs. In the third quarter of the fourteenth century the 11 O ne other index of a considerable decline in population would be a movement to increase immigration to offset losses due to the plague. H elleiner suggested that: 'After each major epidemic [in the West), urban communities, despairing of their ability to replenish their ranks by natural increase alone, would liberalize their immigration policies.' (The Population o f Europe, p. 15). On the Russian scene, where the bulk of the population was overwhelmingly agrarian and the country sparsely populated, the Black Death not only reduced the cultivating population, but others might have fled their domiciles in hope of finding safety elsewhere. Their desire to w oo new settlers and those who had fled, in part, lay behind the establishment of a policy in Muscovy, whereby old inhabitants who returned (starozhil'tsy) would receive a waver of fees for three to five years; new settlers were offered freedom from such payments for ten to fifteen years. See Cherepnin, Russkie feodal'nye arkhivy (Russian Feudal Archives), vol. 2, Moscow 1951, pp. 133ff.; for an index to other discussion on this topic, see ibid., p. 421. Cherepnin's views did not take into account the role of the Black Death in the formation o f this kind o f immunity to draw field labor to abandoned areas. The documents for the period after the mid-fourteenth century are full of references to 'pustoshi' (abandoned farmsteads). For references, see: ASEISVR, vol. 1, Moscow 1952, p. 756. Another unexplored manifestation o f the Black Death in Russia had to do with the foundation of m onasteries after the middle of the fourteenth century. Prior to the mid-fourteenth century, monasteries were largely founded by the influential and the wealthy. These were generally controlled directily by lay or ecclesiastical lords. After mid-century, monasteries of a new type began to emerge, founded primarily by poor and undistinguished personages, often simple priests or emigrants from the towns. In the 1350s a considerable number of peasants were drawn to the environs o f such establishments. W e are led to believe that the spur to this activity was a search for the pure religious life; this may have played a role in the impetus and once formulated, this drive for the eremetic life or for isolated life in the forests continued to play a role in later Russian monasticism. But how many who sought God in the wilderness, fled His wrath in the towns and in the areas visited by the plague? Despite the considerable attention paid to the monastic movement, its drives and ideology, nothing is said about the role o f the Black Death. The latest study on Russian monasticism in the early period is that of I. U. Budovnits, Monastyri na Rusi i bor’ba s nimi krest’ion v XIV—XV w . (Monasteries in Russia and the Peasants’ Struggle with them in the 14 and 15 Centuries), M oscow 1966; see particulary pp. 73—77, 84—87, 9 6 flF., 110—111, 160—161, 183. ■* His son Lev was killed in 1380 at the famous battle o f the Don (PSRL, vol. 25, p. 204) . » Vremennik, vol. 10, M aterialy, pp. 107—109. « Ibid., pp. 102 ff.

V 40 family had six surviving male members; by the close of the fifteenth, a t least twenty living males can be identified85. These are representative examples of the aristocratic growth patterns in Muscovy in the 150 years following the first outbreak of the Black Death. The number of male heirs would have been far larger and the rate of fourteenth and early fifteenth century growth much greater had it not been for the decimation of the plague. This same pattern of decimation and subsequent growth applied to princely families, for whom we have enough evidence to substantiate the pattern, and for the peasantry, for whom no com parable material is available. W hile the landholdings of the aristocracy becam e more plentiful after the ravages of the plague, the numbers of cultivators had also diminished. W e may suspect that the competition for labor becam e intensified, resulting in higher w ages and reduction in taxes for immigrants. Temporarily, at least, the surviving princes may not have been better off after the plague than before, but at least they had lands and the hope of future enrichment and improvement. This undoubtedly explains why they did not feel obliged to become servitors of others. If those of princely descent refused subordinate warriors’ offices, the untitled men of service took full advantage of the opportunities and tightened their influence at the Muscovite court. Q uite possibly the same developm ent took place in the major principalities surrounding Muscovy. The scarcity of talent and number, coupled with the traditional right of the military class members to resign their positions without prejudice or penalty, yielded this group riches, the power of influence and the dom inance of the prince’s council86. These nobles-via-service, having attained ascendancy and rank, never­ theless lacked the high social station accorded to those of princely blood. However impecunious a prince might become, he resisted marital alliances with plebian families. The untitled elite of Moscow considered such sentiment an unsatisfactory slight to their wealth and importance, and they endeavored to break through the caste barrier. Some of the most powerful succeeded. The Vel’iaminovs becam e related to the ruling family of Moscow, when the granddaughter of Vasilii Vasilevich, the last com m ander of the Moscow militia, becam e the bride of Prince Peter of Dmitrov, son of the late Dmitrii « Ibid., pp. 90 -9 1 . 84 N ot one of the negotiators from Moscow who signed the armistice of 1371 with Olgerd of Lithuania were of princely rank: Dmitrii Mikhailovich, Dmitrii Aleksandrovich, Ivan Fedorovich (DDG, p. 22). The same is true of the boyar witnesses to Dmitrii Donskoi's two testaments (ibid., pp. 25, 36—37). According to the hagiographer who wrote Dmitrii Donskoi's 'vita* (PSRL, vol. 8, p. 56), the grand prince on his deathbed enjoined his family to honor, befriend and to listen to the boyars. When Edigei wrote to Grand Prince Vasilii I in 1409 (SGGD, vol. 2, p. 19), he urged him to listen to the good advice of his boyars — all untitled: Ivan Fedorovich Koshkin, ll'ia Ivanovich, Petr Konstantinovich and Ivan Nikitich.

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Ivanovich Donskoi (1406)87. Earlier, in 1390, the boyar Fedor Andreevich Koshka gave his daughter in m arriage to Prince Fedor Mikhailovich Mikulinskii of the Tverian line88. And the boyar Konstantin Dmitrievich Sheia becam e the son-in-law of Prince Aleksandr of Rostov89. Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhskii, a boyar whose service in Moscow would span more than a quarter of the early fifteenth century90, insisted that his daughters marry only princes91. His eldest, Elena, he betrothed to Prince Andrei Vladimirovich of Radonezh (early in the fifteenth century), a younger son to Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov (a great grandson of Ivan Kalita of Moscow)92. Later he arranged a match for another daughter to Prince lurii Ivanovich of Tver' (1421)93, whose father probably sought to use Vsevolozhskii’s considerable influence in Moscow to further his own dynastic schemes94. Ultimately, Ivan Dmitrievich’s ambition outran his luck. In 1432 he dem anded th at G rand Prince Vasilii II reward him for serving his throne a t the Horde tribunal by marrying a still unwed daughter. The young, grateful and inexperienced Vasilii impetuously consented, only to have his mother overrule the decision. Defeated on the eve of w hat might have been his greatest triumph, the em bittered old man defected to Vasilii's enemy and encouraged a renewal of the struggle. For this treasonous act, Vsevolozhskii lost his honor, his position, his lands, and, ultimately, his eyes95. 87 PSRL, vol. 8, p. 80. Poluekht, third son of the 'tysiatskii' Vasilii Vasil’evich, had a daughter named Efrosiniia, who wed Prince Petr (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 90; Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel’nye kniaz'ia, vol. 2, p.343 and note 931). According to some genealogies (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 90; Rodoslovnaia kniga, vol. 2, p. 15), the second son of the 'tysiatskii*, Mikula, wed one of Dmitrii Donskoi's daughters. Only a daughter was born of the union and she, it is claimed, married the boyar Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhskii; but there is no information to confirm that such a marriage took place. See: Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel’nye kniaz’ia, vol. 1, pp. 122—123 and note 277. *■ Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel’nye kniaz’ia, vol. 2, p. 551. Fedor Koshka's daughter, born o f this m arriage, becam e the bride of Prince laroslav Vladimirovich of Serpukhov (1407). O ne daughter o f that union became the wife of Vasilii II of Moscow and thereby the mother of Ivan III. A second daughter of laroslav married Prince Mikhail Andreevich o f Vereia. Thus, the blood of the Koshkins, ancestral kin of the Romanovs, mingled with that of the ruling princes of Moscow. (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 133, 161; PSRL, vol. 25, p. 237.) w Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 162. This Konstantin was a brother of that Aleksandr who sired the Saburovs and Godunovs. w First mention after 1406: DDG, p. 57. ’1 In the gen ealogy of the 'Rod V sevolozh' no daughters are mentioned. Cf. Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 95 with p. 133. n Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel’nye kniaz'ia, vol. 2, pp. 3—8—309 and note 829; ASEISVR, vol. 1, p. 592; Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 133; DDG, p. 46. Elena's husband died in 1426. Sometimes between 1428 and 1432 she gave a grant of land to Trinity Monastery in which she mentioned both her husband and father: ASEISVR, vol. 1, note 54, p. 55. *3 PSRL, vol. 25, p. 245. *4 Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia, vol. 2, pp. 503—504. »5 PSRL, vol. 25, pp. 249—250; Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 393; Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, pp. 22—23. The sins of the father were not visited upon his family. This was usual practice in fifteenth century Muscovy. Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhkii’s eldest son, Ivan, also became a boyar. His only son died young, but the surviving daughters did well. O ne married the boyar Prince Danilo

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42 These m arriages between daughters of the untitled Muscovite nobility and members of the princely caste reveal a desire am ong the boyars to ally themselves with significant members of the titled aristocracy of the northeast. The accumulated wealth of the fathers of the brides insured handsome dowers to less affluent husbands. Some of the princes undoubtedly desired to utilize the influence of well-placed fathers-in-law at the most important East Russian court. For the families of the boyars, the opportunity to become kinsmen of territorial princes inspired them to seek further marital o p p o r­ tunities and to guard zealously the status confered by their service positions. Nevertheless, the gulf between princes and the untitled rem ained deep and wide for all but the w ealthiest and most powerful of the untitled. The first prince to gain a seat on the council of the grand princes of Mus­ covy w as an immigrant, lurii Patrikeevich, great-grandson of Gedimin of Lithuania96. Prince lurii married a daughter of G rand Prince Vasilii I, sometime in the early fifteenth century97, which won him an immediate berth in the dum a98. W e may accept, with a fair am ount of certainty, the evidence that the m arriage rather than his own social rank won for Prince lurii grudging acknowledgm ent of the senior protocol position on official and festive occasions99. The character, attitudes and problems of both the Muscovite principality and its aristocracy changed markedly in the course of the fifteenth century.

Kholmskii in the later fifteenth century, the second becam e wife to the boyar Prince Ivan Bulgak, the third took as husband Semen Briukho Borisovich Morozov, whose brother Vasilii was a boyar. A fourth daughter married Prince Vasilii Mnikh Ivanovich Riapolovskii, the son of an influential member of the royal council. See Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, p. 82, note 27. N N. A. Kazakova, Vassian Patrikeev i ego sochineniia, Moscow-Leningrad I960, pp. 3d—37. n PSRL, vol. 7, SPb 1856, p. 254. Strangely, the exact date is not recorded. Almost all chronicles pass over mention of the marriage, as if in shame and embarassment. Cf. Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia, vol. 1, p. 147. * His name appears for the first time and in first position in the second will of Vasillii I (dated by Cherepnin around 1417): DDG, p. 59 and in Russkie féod al'nye arkhivy, vol. 1, p. 90. ** Appended to the Tipografskaia letopis' (PSRL, vol. 24, Petrograd 1921, p. 232) are notices of memorials held for Gennadii Buturlin and Mikhail Borisovich. These date from the first half of the fifteenth century. Gennadii was a monk in Trinity Monastery, born Grigorii Ivanovich Buturlin, son o f the boyar Ivan Andreevich (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 169; ASEISVR, vol. 1, note 21, p. 37). The chronicle entry relates that 'a s Prince lurii Patrikeevich arrived then (the following boyars] stepped down [otekhal]: Konstantin Sheia, Ivan Dmitrievich, Volodimir Danilovich, Dmitrii Vasil'evich, Fedor Koshkin G oltiaia.*** There then follows information about still another memorial service, this onr> for the late boyar Petr Konstantinovich Dobrynskii (PSRL, vol. 24, p. 232), attended by the wives of the Muscovite boyars. At that occasion, Princess Anna (the name should have read Mariia: Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia, vol. 1, p. 147; Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, vol. 2, p. 504), wife of Prince lurii Patrikeevich sat in the place of precedence above the other assembled ladies. Solov'ev (ibid.) discovered another bit of information about the question of seating involving princes and boyars. At the wedding of Prince lurii and Princess Mariia, lurii's elder brother. Prince Fedor Khovanskii, insisted that as a prince he had the right to sit in a higher position than Fedor Sabur. Sabur refused, indicating that, while Prince lurii had won his right and precedence by marrying a member of the ruling family, this did not confer similar status to his brother. See also Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 2, p. 153.

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As the devastating effects of the Black Death diminished, the population b egan to recoup its losses. W hile the growth of the peasant classes benefited, the landholders and repopulated lands laid w aste during the plagues, the increase in the number of males in aristocratic households soon upset the fav o rab le balance. The continuance of the practice of property divisions re­ created the old pattern of gradual impoverization. Before the late fifteenth century clam or for service positions developed, two fundam ental developm ents w ere in process that would alter the power structure within Muscovy and create conditions that would become inimical to the interests of the blooded and service aristocracies. The first of these was the dynastic struggle; the second, the subsequent expansion of Muscovy to include virtually all of the Russian north. The dynastic w ars began as a family dispute over succession to the grand princely throne. The sam e difficulties that plagued all landholders also plagued the ruling house of Moscow, which w as subject to the consequences of partible landholding. Fortunately, in the fourteenth century the governing family barely m aintained itself, though not altogether as a result of the pandem ics. From the time of Danilo, in the late thirteenth century, to Dmitrii Donskoi, a t the end of the fourteenth, the senior princes of Moscow w ere able to keep together most of the family inheritances and even to add to them. The strife th at characterized the internal affairs of some neighboring prin­ cipalities, w here the princely progeny w as greater and family cooperation less pronounced, did not affect Muscovy until the early fifteenth century. Then the more numerous descendants of Donskoi, primarily his son lurii of Galich and the latter's offspring, destroyed the domestic tranquility that Moscow had enjoyed in a critical period of its early development. W h a t began as a dynastic dispute involved not only servitors of the opposing sides but also neutrals and sympathizers as well. The bitterness and duration of the struggle forced a number of decisions and precedents that altered thereafter the relations am ong family princes and between ruler and servitors. The struggle ended in a victory for the "legitim ate" prince, Vasilii II (1425— 1462), thereafter insuring the succession of the eldest son of the ruler; the solutions spaw ned in w ar also served to reverse the dangers of fragm en­ tation of family lands through irrevocable inheritance bequests. The formerly untouchable patrimonies of near relatives could now be confiscated for cause, an d cause w as not hard to find. Those w arriors obedient to the rebel princes paid the penalty for their loyalty. They too lost their lands, their liberty, and in some instances even their lives for having chosen the losing side. The v engeance and bitterness that precipitated such anti-traditional reactions

V 44 created a new definition of treason and an altogether new concept of royal power. Treason for dem onstrable action rapidly gave w ay to charges of treason for suspected thought. The old and permissive concept that a free military servitor could determ ine when and w here he could serve lost its validity in the course of the second half of the century. This growth of royal power cam e at a time when w arrior families w ere growing in size. As individual holdings and revenues decreased, many of these aristocrats of the sword found themselves unable to live solely on the income of their estates and a considerable number had to seek rem unerative military positions. Secondly, for those w ho sought service, there w ere dangers in accepting employment a t the courts of minor princes or in any of the north­ east Russian territories. For by the last portion of the century almost the entire region had fallen under Muscovite control, either through annexation, as in the case of N ovgorod the G reat and Tver', or through the extension of influence into the remaining independent areas such as Riazan' and Pskov. Moreover, the rew ards to be gained through employment in either the existing Muscovite ap p an ag es or in the "de jure" independent entities w ere smaller and the political risks greater. The Muscovite m onarch’s displeasure could fall upon the servitors as well as the lords. Nor could one seek sanc­ tuary in distant Lithuania without incurring the charge of apostasy in addition to treason100. Thus the military serving groups becam e caught between the political restrictions from above and the economic contractions from below. Had the Black Death not interrupted the tem po of dem ographic increase in the four­ teenth century, the pressures to seek service at the various courts of the territorial lords would have come at a time more advantageous to the military aristocracy, before Moscow had developed into a strong monarchy. The conditions of service might have been far more beneficial and quite possibly the shape of relationships between w arriors and the reigning prince might have been far different from that which em erged at the end of the fifteenth century. The "if" about the possibilities concerning historical developm ent 100 For the evolution of the conception of treason, see Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Mos­ kauer Bojaren, pp. 19—74; for the growth of royal power, the territorial expansion of the state and the changing status of the serving classes, see Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 2, chapters 25—27. Cherepnin, Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV—XV vv. (Formation of the Russian State in the 14th—15th Centuries), Moscow I960, chapter 6, discussed the expansion of Moscow in the second half of the fifteenth century. There are two detailed studies of recent vintage for Muscovite diplomacy and foreign policy: K. B. Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva. Vtoraia polovina XV veka (Foreign Policy of the Russian Centralized State. Second Half of the 15th Century), Moscow 1952; and J. L. I. Fennell, Ivon the Great of Moscow, London and New York 1961. For the exploitation of the religious motif for secular purposes 'vis-à-vis* Lithuania, see: Golubinskii, Isloriia russkoi tserkvi, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 536 ff.

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cannot change the record. Absence of suitable professions, other than the military, precluded alternations. W hile a very few might have veered to the church or the employ of some w ealthy prince, ultimately most turned to the g rand prince, for he com m anded the largest number of openings and offered the possibilities of greatest rewards. W ithin Muscovy the dynastic wars called for an increase in the size of military levies, even prior to that dem anded by the g reat territorial expansion later in the century. Two groups of service categories, absent in the term ino­ logy of the previous period, are mentioned in the documents after 1428. These are the serving princes (sluzhebnye kniaz'ia101) and the junior boyars ("deti boiarskie": literally, children of the boyars102). Vladimirskii-Budanov, the historian of Russian law, believed that the junior boyars’ most im portant differentiation from the boyars w as only in the size of their landholdings. The former w ere allegedly small landholders while the latter ow ned large estates. These junior boyars were, in his opinion, the impoverished descendants of the multiplied boyar families103. Sergeevich contended that the term " deti boiarskie" replaced "slugi vol’nye" (free servi­ tors) "an d really, this is only another description for free servitors." He illustrated his point with a quotation from the "Resurrection Chronicle" where it is noted (under the year 1445) that a Muscovite force contained " .. .many other princes and boyars and junior boyars and other w arriors."104 Both scholars agreed that these junior boyars were landholders residing on their own estates, who served on call. Sergeevich, who constantly w an d ered back in his discussion to Kievan times, believed th at the "children of the boyars" was an exact term in the early period, but that, by the fifteenth century it defined only a particular step of service am ong w arriors, one which stood between the boyar and the simplest servitors105. He w as correct in describing a process w hereby a literal term gave w ay to a generic one, but he did not quite realize that— because of the effects of the 101 First mention (DDG, p. 65) in a treaty of 1428 between Grand Prince Vasilii II and his uncle, Prince lurii of Galich, early in the dynastic wars: "A kn[ia]zei moikh sluzhebnykh v votchinoiu sobe v sluzhbu ne priimati.* (And you are not to accept my serving princes into your service.) For the reasons behind these restrictions, see Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts derMoskauer Bojaren, pp. 21-22. Further mention of serving princes are found in later treaties between the senior prince of Moscow and the appan age princes (ibid., p. 28). In 1436, Prince Gleb Ivanovich O bolenskii, identified as a general in Muscovite service, was killed by Prince Vasilii Kosoi of Galich: PSRL, vol. 25, p. 252). 102 First mention in 1433: DDG, p. 70. 10î M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov, Obzor istorii russkogo prava (A Sketch of the History of Russian Law), Kiev—SPb 19003, p. 127; Cherepnin (in: Pamiatniki russkogo prava [Documents of Russian Law], vol. 3, M oscow 1955, p. 498), referred to them as 'sm all and middling feudals.* 104 Sergeevich, Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti, vol. 1, pp. 360—361; PSRL, vol. 8, p. 113. w Sergeevich, Russkie iuridicheskie drevnosti, vol. 1, pp. 361—363.

V 46 Black Death— the term still retained a literal quality in Muscovy which only subsequently assumed the m eaning of a service rank. Though the evidence is spotty, enough shines through to make the point. In 1437 a large Tatar force occupied the area around Belev, which, while on Lithuanian soil, w as much too close for the Muscovite governm ent's com­ fort. Vasilii II dispatched a large force under his cousins, the two Princes Dmitrii of Galich, "and many other princes." The Tatars not only rem ained masters in the field, but killed a good many Russians as well104*106. Among those nam ed by the chronicler were Prince Andrei Loban Ivanovich Starodubskii and Nikita Fedorovich Turikov. Turikov w as a nephew of the boyar Ivan Vasilevich Vsevolozhskii and undoubtedly a junior boyar107. The g en e a­ logical lists reveal other names belonging to members of distinguished families who fell a t Belev*. Vasilii Semenovich, second cousin to Ivan Vsevo­ lozhskii108; Akinf Borisovich, a grandson of the distinguished boyar, Dmitrii Mikhailovich Bobrov109; Semen Fedorovich Sviblov, only son of the boyar Fedor Andreevich Sviblo110,* and Nikita Vasil evich, second son of Vasilii Ivanovich Zabolotskii111. O ther sons of distinguished members of the service nobility also fell on the field of Suzdal’ in 1445112. O n the basis of these identifications, we may assume that many male members belonging to di­ stinguished untitled families participated in this cam paign. They w ere not simple servitors nor were they members of the dum a; the nam e junior boyar (more exactly, children of boyars) accurately describes their family origin as well as rank. By the mid-1440s the muster rolls of the warring Muscovite family princes swelled with partisans. The rank of junior boyar began to include warriors neither descended from nor related to im portant families. Fedor Basenok, of uncertain ancestry, sprang into the limelight in 1446 with a spirited refusal to join the service of the rebel prince of Galich, even when the latter tem po­ rarily trium phed113. Basenok rose from junior to boyar by the end of Vasi­ lii ll's reign114. Ivan Dmitrievich Runo, another of previous undistinguished family, mentioned first in 1446, when he opted to free the imprisoned Vasi104 PSRL, vol. 25, p. 260; vol. 26, p. 193; loasafovskaia letopis* (loasaf Chronicle), ed. A. A. Zimin, Moscow 1957, pp. 28—29. 107 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 95, 164. 701 Ibid., p. 165; Rodoslovnaia kniga, vol. 2, p. 43. 104 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 112. 110 Rodoslovnaia kniga, vol. 1, pp. 335 f. 111 Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 165. n* PSRL, vol. 25, p. 26; Andrei Alekseevich, a great, great, grandson of Andrei Ivanovich Kobyla (Vremennik, vol. 10, p. 86); Dmitrii Gorbatyi (ibid., p. 111). n3 PSRL, vol. 8, p. 117; vol. 25, p. 266; vol. 6, pp. 174—175. 114 Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, p. 82, note 27.

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lii II115, found his rew ard in the subsequent reign, when he becam e a detach­ ment com m ander on several cam paigns, though he could never rise above the rank of junior boyar116. A more extended survey of the sourses will be sure to reveal others of undistinguished origin who attained middle service rank in the sudden expansion of military contingents in the w ars117. The term junior boyar after the middle of the fifteenth century becam e a truly military and adm inistrative service rank identifying medium-ranked men of service. It included the descendants of the old boyar families, untitled newcomers and even men of princely origin and title. The Princes Riapolovskii an d Obolenskii w ere am ong the first to accept perm anent military appointm ents in the later years of the internal crisis, undoubtedly as mediumranked men-of-service118. Prince Ivan Aleksandrovich Zvengorodskii also accepted a court position, possibly in the late 1440s. He first em erged as a com m ander charged with repelling invading Tatars (1451); he ab andoned his post, causing panic in Moscow119. Undoubtedly, talents other than these had earned him a boyar’s seat. He was the first Riurikide serving-prince to be so honored120. His two children, the Princes Ivan Zvenets and Vasilii Nozdre™ PSRL, vol. 6, p. 175; vol. 25, p. 267; vol. 26, pp. 204. PSRL, vol. 25, pp. 280, 282. 117 In 1435 an army loyal to Vasilii II was placed under the joint command of Fedor Mikhailovich Cheliadnin and Andrei Fedorovich G oltiaev, both boyars from distinguished families. Their secom liin-command were identified as Vladimir Andreevich Zvorykin and Mikhael Chepechkin, presumably junior boyars, but whose families were not previously known to Muscovite service. Veselovskii identified this Zvorykin as a Rostov landholder (ASEISVR, vol. 1, p. 669; see also documents numbered 114 and 185 in the same volume). Chronicle citations of 1446 describing the activities of those plotting to free the imprisoned Vasilii II mention the actions centering on the three princes Riapolovskii: 'With them were Prince Ivan Vasil* evich Striga [Obolenskii] and Ivan Oshchera with his brother Dmitrii Bobr, lushko Dranitsa and many other junior boyars of the dvor of the grand prince. In agreem ent with them were Semen Filimonov with all his children [they were descendants of Ivan Morozov: G. A.] and Rusalka and Runo and many other junior boyars.' (PSRL, vol. 26, pp. 203—204). Another notation reads, '. . . a z nim Riapolovskie tri da kniaz* Ivan Striga, da Oshchera, i inye m nogie deti boiarskie s nimi . . .' (,. . . and with them [were] the three Riapolovskies and Princes Ivan Striga, and Oshchera, and many other boyars' children . . .') (ibid., p. 205). These comments leave unclear whether all or just some of these servitors were junior boyars. Ivan Oshchera and his brother Dmitrii Bobr were quite young and on the thresh­ olds of careers in Muscovite service. They were of a previously unimportant family (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, pp. 121—122) that held lands in Dmitrov (ASEISVR, vol. 1, p. 607). The Riapolovskies, descended from the princely line of Starodub (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 250), seem to have begun their service in this phase of the civil wars. Prince Semen Obolenskii is first mentioned in 1446—47. Veselovskii (Féodal*noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 80) believed that he subsequently became a boyar, though solid evidence for this is wanting. For the Riapolovskies, see PSRL, vol. 26, pp. 202—207. Prince Gleb Ivanovich Obolenskii was the first of his family to take service with Vasilii II. In 1436 Prince Vasilii Kosoi, after his troops took Ustiug, killed its Muscovite commander. Prince Gleb Obolenskii (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 21; vol. 25, p. 252). W hile his brothers may have enlisted under the banner o f Vasilii II to avenge their younger brother's unjust murder, they may have had to become servitors to improve their economic position. In the next generation a considerable number of Obolenskies sought grand princely employment, though only the children of Prince Vasilii Ivanovich rose to high court positions and, presumably, attained great wealth. See Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, p. 102, note 127. m PSRL, vol. 12, p. 76; vol. 26, p. 210. i® ASEISVR, vol. 1, note 201, p. 144.

V 48 vatyi, served Ivan III well and eventually becam e second-step dum a members (okol'nichie)121. Information ascertainable from chronicles leaves a rather incomplete pic­ ture of the changes occurring in the aristocratic rank at mid-century. The conspiracy of the Galich princes to seize the throne from Vasilii II is skeletal in description. W e perceive the main characters but lack the m eans to identify all but a few members of the supporting casts. In the conspiracy of 1446 the chroniclers reveal that Prince Ivan of Mozhaisk (a member of a junior line of the Muscovite house), the Dobrynskies and "other boyars" sided with Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka of Galich122. From a variety of sources we learn that upon the defeat of the rebels (after 1450), the victors laid avenging hands upon their adversaries and their servitors123. The rew ards to the royal sup­ porters are not easily detected (though it was not in lands), yet we have seen that at least some won coveted positions at court. Thus the narrative sources do not reveal some of the sub-surface changes. The clash of opposing forces unsettled the normal pace of life, breeding insecurity and economic upheaval. Marching armies lived off the land, pillaging w hat was movable, destroying w hat w as not. Peasant and lord suffered, though perhaps not to the same degree. The Tatars, heartened by the sight of domestic Muscovite crisis, launched forays from south and east, inflicting further misery upon an already suffering population, taking captives and prizes o f w ar124. W e may also suspect that many who had previously shunned military service in Muscovy, though their lands lay within the confines of the territory, joined the ranks of the grand prince’s regiments. W hile full evidence for this is wanting, some of these spare illustrations cited above lend some weight to conjecture. The flow of the titled to Muscovite service increased during the second half of the century. Sometimes there w as forcible encouragem ent from the crown 121 For the services performed by Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets from 1448 to his death in 1496, while on a mission to the Crimean Tatars, see PSRL, vol. 4, pp. 188, 203, 213; vol. 8, p. 153; DRK, pp. 11, 19; Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society) (hereafter cited as SIRIO), vol. 41, SPb 1884, pp. 17 ff., 25, 223 ff. He became an 'okol’nichii' as early as 1490: Zimin, Sostav, p. 47 and note 63. Vasilii Nozdrevatyi also became an 'okol'nichii* in 1509, at the end of his life (ibid., p. 45). 122 PSRL, vol. 12, p. 67: *. . . . izhe togda bysha u nikh Konstantinovich! i prochii boiaria ikh . . . .* (. . . they had there with them the Konstantinovichi and other boyars.*) 123 Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, pp. 31—33. 124 Any number of indications in a variety of sources attest to the dislocating economic effects and the human misery engendered by the wars. Metropolitan Iona, in language less felicitous than one might sxpect from such an eyewitness, capsuled the effects of war and invasion in one sentence in a letter to Patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople (circa 1453): *Your Holiness, do not condemn us for our meager gifts, since . . . our lands have been wasted and wearied by Tatars and the great domestic wars.* (Akty istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoiu Ekspeditsieiu (Historical Documents, Collected and Published by the Archeographic Expedition) (hereafter cited as Al), vol. 1, SPb 1896, p. 495). A. V. Oreshnikov, Russkie monety do 1547, Moscow 1896, has shown that the sharpest drop in the weight of Muscovite coinage took place in the period of the dynastic wars.

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to compel formerly independent lords to serve in Muscovy. W hen Ivan III annexed the independent portions of laroslavl' in 1463, he deprived the princes of their patrim onies and their juridical rights over the inhabitants. He also committed them to accept perpetual service125. A number of laroslavl’ princes are subsequently found in the Muscovite service registers, with several attaining high office126. O n e of the best places to seek information concerning the impact of competition for positions between old and newly-arriving serving men after mid-century is in the grand princely "dvor", a combination of household regim ent and household, m ade up of favorites and the sons of the influential. Both descendants of the old serving families and servitor princes w ere to be found in its register, though in the 1460s the untitled still dom inated appoint­ ments. The "dvor" itself grew in size, possibly from the time of the civil wars, certainly afterw ards, as the Muscovite governm ent expanded its military responsibilities and enlarged its administrative functions. The prestige, influence and opportunities available to members of the Kremlin "dvor" elevated them far above provincial servitors. Prior to Ivan Ill's reign many of its members lived on estates not too distant from the W hiteStone Kremlin walls and within easy summons of the heralds' call, though they often did not assemble quickly enough in times of fast-breaking crises. In the fourteenth century, when distances w ere shorter in Muscovy and when most of the Russian northeast w as still divided into small principalities, each court had its "dvor", whose members w ere never far from points of assembly. The rapid growth of Muscovy by the later part of the fifteenth century had its effect upon the duties imposed upon the "dvor" of the Muscovite ruler. Each of the junior family members of the House of Moscow had acquired a portion of his father’s lands, along with his own small military organization. 125 Veselovskii, Issledovaniia po istorii oprichniny (Investigations on the History of the Oprichnina), Moscow 1963, pp. 169—170. 126 Veselovskii, Velikie i udel'nye kniaz'ia, vol. 2, p. 95 and note 293; Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 2, p. 112. Prince Semen Romanovich is first mentioned as being in Muscovite service in 1467 (PSRL, vol. 8, p. 153; vol. 26, p. 223) and continued as a general, as governor of Pskov and, later, as governor-general of Novgorod (DRK, pp. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 28; PSRL, vol. 6, p. 40; vol. 8, p. 231; Pskovskie letopisi, vol. 1, pp. 80—81). He became a boyar by 1495 (DRK, p. 19; Zimin, Sostav, p. 46 and note 59). Prince Danilo Vasil evich laroslavskii is first mentioned in 1469 as a commander of middling rank who led a detachment of junior boyars to Ustiug (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 121). Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich laroslavskii, son of the last independent ruler of laroslavl', is known to have resided in Moscow by 1487 (PSRL, vol. 23, p. 185). By the 1490s he emerged as a general (DRK, pp. 18—19) and by 1500 he became a boyar (DRK, p. 9; Zimin, Sostav, p. 47 and note 74). Prince Petr Vasil’evich Velikoi, from the Shatun branch of the numerous laroslavskies (Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 233), was the 'dvorelskii' of Ivan III after 1495 (DRK, p. 19; DDG, p. 363). Prince Semen Romanovich s eldest son Konstantin became a junior boyar at the Muscovite court by 1495 (DRK, p. 20). Some of the various laroslavl’ princes took service with the less prestigious appanages. See, for example, Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 234). Some eventually became ’pomeshchiki' in Novgorod: that is permanent provincial junior boyars.

V 50 In time of w ar or trouble, these a p p a n ag e princes com m anded their own contingents, but w ere sworn to aid the senior prince. By the 1450s, after Vasilii II confiscated the lands belonging to relatives (excepting those of the prince of Vereia), he controlled an area larger than that of the state of Cali­ fornia (or almost twice the area of W estern Germany). Servitors in the ap p an ag es becam e subjects of the Muscovite grand prince. They took their instructions from appointed governors or military officers sent out from Moscow. And these lieutenants w ere selected from the membership of the grand princely "dvor". This pattern continued in subsequent reigns. Vasilii II divided his realm am ong his five sons, though he took care to leave more than half to the oldest, Ivan III (indicating that the princes of Moscow, at least, w ere coping with the problem of inheritances). Ivan inherited the central ond eastern portions of Muscovy, with its larger towns, greater population and also vaster distan­ ces. His brothers and the prince of Vereia had to render obedience and to provide troops, though they m aintained separate adm inistrations in the areas of their inheritances. Within his own patrimony, Ivan, as his father before him, had to look after the defences and the recruitment of local levies in outlying regions. Local landholders and their children m ade up the provincial contingents. Service in the capital district differed markedly. The prospect of rewards and prestige increased competition for positions in the court regi­ ment. Positions in the "dvor" opened important doors at court, allow ed for advantageous social and political alliances, and facilitated appointm ents to lucrative administrative posts. Most of all, presence at court could make the fortune of a grand prince’s favorite and of his relatives as well. For those with military talents, choice commands were readily available. In the division of the spoils of war, a leader traditionally acquired a larger portion of the booty than did his subordinates. For those inclined tow ards adm inistrative affairs, the growing dem ands of government provided opportunities hitherto restricted when the princedom w as smaller and the household activities w ere more elementary. The road to highest positions— membership in the grand prince's council— led through the "dvor"127; hence the "dvor" of the secondhalf of the fifteenth century contained the most im portant junior boyars of the realm, including members of distinguished families and others who had achieved membership through meritorious service or influence. The social composition of the "dvor" of the later fifteenth century is partly, though never fully, ascertainable from the sources available. In the 1460s 127 Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, pp. 103—104.

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most of the royal household positions w ere still staffed largely by descendants of the old service families, though one may detect a sprinkling of service princes who came in during the dynastic wars. In 1468 Ivan III had ordered a harrassing cam paign against some Kazanian outposts. “ In that spring . . . the grand prince sent many junior boyars, his 'dvor', to the Kama to w age w ar against K azanian places, from Moscow to Galich [Ivan] Runo with Cossacks, and from Galich the children of Semen Filimonov, G leb, Ivan Shust [and] Vasilii G uba . . . and from Ustiug came Prince Ivan Zvenets and Ivan Ignat'evich Glukhoi with the Kichemzhane."128 John Fennell used this citation erroneously, I believe, when he deduced that the sons of Semen Filimonov w ere provincial servitors from Galich129. All of the above-nam ed com m anders assigned to lead out provincial detachments w ere junior boyars of the Muscovite “dvor“130. The following year, in 1469, Ivan III mounted his great cam paign against Kazan'. In this connection, other members of the “dvor“ are identified as taking com mand of the local contingents from Ustiug. In the list of nine junior boyars (which, incidentally, included the sons of Semen Filimonov) w ere re­ presentatives of old service families and some of the more recent arrivals. Prince Danilo Vasil'evich laroslavskii took charge of this cadre; presumably, he becam e the senior com m ander, when the rem ainder of his group becam e detachm ent leaders of the provincial levies. Prince Danilo w as a relative newcomer, having entered the em ploy of the grand prince around 1463131. The cadre included Timofei Mikhailovich lurlo Pleshcheev, son of the boyar Michael Borisovich132. Fedor Borisovich Briukho Morozov w as another scion PSRl, vol. 25, p. 280. Fennell, Ivan the Great, p. 241, note 3. Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets-Zvenigorodskii, son of the late boyar Prince Ivan Aleksandrovich Zvenigorodskii, was just entering upon an illustrious martial career. He became an 'okol'nichii' by July 1490 and died while on a mission to the Crimea (see above, note 121). In 1475 he was identified as a junior boyar who accompanied Ivan III to Novgorod (DRK, p. 11; PSRL, vol. 6, p. 213; DRK, p. 13); in 1489 he led a contingent of Ustiuzhane against Viatka [Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod (Ustiug Chronicle Collection), ed. K. N. Serbina, Moscow— Leningrad 1950, p. 97]. Ivan Dmitrievich Runo was a 'hom o novus', who might have served since 1446, when he actively fought for the freedom of Vasilii II. This later earned him a position of prominence in the Muscovite 'd v o r' (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 70); last mentioned in 1478 (PSRL, vol. 25, p. 315). Some time after this, for reasons and circumstances unknown, Ivan III disgraced him and deprived him of land and servitors (Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 227). Semen Filimonov and his children belonged to a branch of the Morozovs. Descended from the third son of Ivan Moroz, Semen and his children first loomed into view, along with Runo, in the crisis of 1446. Vasilii Guba and G leb, Semen Filimonov's sons, received orders to command Ustiuzhane detachments on the Kazan campaign (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 121). 131 PSRL, vol. 25, p. 281; see above note 126. 132 PSRL, vol. 8, p. 120; vol. 25, p. 268; Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 260. The center of Michael Borisovich's lands was around thirty kilometers from Moscow [Veselovskii, Selo i derevnia v severo-vostoch* noi Rusi XIV—XV w . (Village and Hamlet in Northeastern Rus' of the 14th—15th Centuries), Moscow— Leningrad 1936, p. 75]; idem, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. p. 84. Timofei Pleshcheev’s older brother

130 Prince

V 52 of a distinguished service family who, like Timofei Pleshcheev, rem ained a junior boyar of the "dvor" for the rem ainder of his active life*133. Prince Peter Vasilevich N agoi Obolenskii came from a family that sided with the grand prince during the dynastic wars. He was also a member of the "dvor". In the 1469 cam paign against K azan’, he com manded an unusual— even motley— form of merchants and artisans134. He remained a member of the "dvor" until the end of century, when he finally attained duma rank135. The remaining junior boyars mentioned in 1469 as "dvor" members on this cam paign ap p e ar to have come from less influential families136. Thissituation,then, in the late 1460ssuggests that some persons of talent but of insignificant origin, aided by the dynastic crisis, mingled with descendants of the old service nobility and a few princely newcomers, obtained positions in the Kremlin "dvor". A few parvenus, such as Fedor Basenok and Ivan Runo did well; the first as a boyar by the early 1460s, the latter as a successful general. But resistance by the old aristocracy and the resentment of the more recently arrived servitor princes against these rank commoners must have been considerable and both enjoyed only tem porary success. Basenok fell from favor in the early reign of Ivan III, losing his dum a seat. Ivan deprived him of his sight and rem anded him to monastic custody for the rem ainder of his days137. Runo merely disappears from the court register. At the same time very few members of princely rank found their w ay into court positions during the 1460s. The Patrikeevs, Obolenskies, Riapolosvskies and some of the laroslavl’

Andrei would become a boyar and his younger brother an okol'nichii. Both undoubtedly served their joumeym anship in the 'dvor* for a considerable number of years prior to their elevation to the royal council (Zimin, Sostav, pp. 46, 47). Timofei died during this campaign. His two sons were selected for "dvor' membership and they served until they fell from favor (DRK, p. 22. According to the Rodoslovnaio kniga, vol. 1, pp. 188 f., the eldest son fled to Lithuania, the second died in a monastery after being disgraced. Two younger sons died in battle, thereby extinguishing this branch of the Pleshcheevs). 133 He is mentioned as a junior boyar in 1495 (DRK, p. 20). His brothers became boyars in the reign of Ivan III (so Veselovskii, in: ASEISVR, vol. 1, p. 633). w PSRL, vol. 12, p. 121. 135 Zimin, Sostav, p. 47 and note 73. In 1425 he is specifically mentioned as a junior boyar of the 'dvor' (DRK, p. 11). He continued to serve in a number of military commands in the 1490s, presumably as a junior boyar. As sons of a distinguished bojar, he and his brothers did remarkably well in the promotion lists at court. 134 Ivan Ivanovich Saltyk Travin, first mentioned here, continued to serve as a junior boyar into the 1490s (Veselovskii, in: ASEISVR, vol. 1, p. 627); Nikita Konstantinovich died on the campaign of 1469 (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 123); Grigorei Mikhailovich Perkhushkov becam e the court master of the hunt (lovchei) by 1474 (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 156; vol. 25, p. 303). The remaining two junior boyars identified in the 1469 citation were Andrei Buriak and Ivan Gavrilovich. Possibly the last-named was of good family. His son succeeded him in the 'dvor' as a boyar towards the end o f century. He is mentioned in the list of 'dvor' members of 1495, who accom panied Ivan III to N ovgorod: 'Vasilei Ivanov syn G avrilova.' (DRK, p. 20). 137 Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, p. 82, note 27; la. S. Lur’e, Ideologicheskaia bor’ba, pp. 53—60. Veselovskii, Issledovaniia, p. 358, noted that the Basenkovs 'for unknown reasons* were excluded from court by the early sixteenth century and became unimportant provincials.

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princes w ere successful. Some of them m ade their w ay into the influential council and their close relatives more easily obtained court appointments. Undoubtedly others of Riurikide origin w anted entry but found their way blocked by those well-placed families who kept the circle of entrants small. The number of newcomers nevertheless increased in the 1470s and 1480s. Some, such as the princely family of Paletskies, were closely related to those w ho had come before (in this case, the Riapolovskies)138 and probably re­ ceived a helping hand. O ther newcomers profited from grand princely policy. Influential Tverian defectors become beneficiaries of the new Muscovite attitude tow ards their hapless land. First to arrive, in the late 1460s, was Prince Danilo Dmitrievich Kholmskii, a relative of the grand prince of Tver’. He immediately received some choice military assignments and attained a boyar’s hat by the early 1470s139. This was the harbinger of the w ave to follow. A considerable number of Tverians defected in 1476, realizing that their principality could not long remain independent. Moscow’s tightening control over N ovgorod in the 1470s and the acquisition of the remnants of the Rostov principality in 1474 crumbled the remaining buffers between an enveloped Tver’ and an em bracing Muscovy. Those high ranking Tverian w arriors who defected received coveted positions in the "dvor"140. Before the annexation of Tver' in 1485, Ivan Ill’s governm ent employed a variety of measures to deplete the strength of its prepared victim. Ivan offered rich governorships to two high-ranking Tverian general (Princes Andrei Mikulinskii and Osip Dorogobuzhskii) as rew ards for joining his service. Meanwhile he directed his agents along the borders to create incidents and he refused to make am ends in reply to the evoked protests. The inability of the Tverian ruler to

138 Prince Fedor Davydovich Pestryi Paletskii of the Starodub line received the chore of pacifyihg Great Perm in 1472, which he accomplished with remarkable results (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 143; vol. 25, pp. 296—297). For his relationship to the Riapolovskies, see Vremennik, vol. 10, Materialy, p. 250. 139 First mentioned as a voevoda on the Kazan campaign o f 1449 (PSRL, vol. 5, p. 275; vol. 8, p. 157). Possibly he served a year earlier (ibid., vol. 5, p. 274). He became a leading general by the 1470s and a boyar (Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, pp. 105—106; idem, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, p. 39). 140 On May 30, 1476 'there cam e to serve Grand Prince Ivan Vasil’evich from Tver* many boyars and junior boyars, G rigorei Nikitich (Borozdin), (his brother) Ivan Zhito, Vasilii Danilov, Vasilii Bokeev, three Karpovichi, Dmitrii Kindyrev, and many others.' (PSRL, vol. 25, p. 308). In 1471 Ivan Zhito had been one o f the two generals sent by the ruler o f Tver’ to aid Ivan III on his Novgorodian campaign (PSRL, vol. 12, p. 132). In the campaign of 1478 both brothers, Grigorei and Ivan Zhito were Muscovite detachment commanders (PSRL), vol. 12, p. 172; DRK, pp. 12, 13). Vasilii Semenovich Bokeev and Semen Karpovich participated in the 1489 expedition against Viatka (DRK, p. 15). For Semen Karpovich’s further services, see ibid., pp. 23, 24, 25, 30. Dmitrii Kindyrev is identified as a detachment commander against Kazan in 1487 (DRK, p. 15) and a regimental commander against Lithuania in 1493 (ibid., pp. 17, 18) and again in 1500 (ibid., p. 27). The Tverian boyars did not receive equivalent rank in Moscow. See Zimin, Sostav, pp. 44 ff. and Alef, Reflections on the Boyar Duma, pp. 110—118.

V 54 defend the rights of his subordinates persuaded others to seek the protection of Moscow141. O utright annexion took place with very little opposition. During these years, and particularly closer to the end of the century, O rthodox princes living on Lithuanian soil also began to transfer allegiance to Muscovy. In 1481 Prince Fedor Ivanovich Bel’skii participated in a plot to kill Casimir, G rand Prince of Lithuania and King of Poland. O f the three principal conspirators, only Bel’skii m anaged to escape after the discovery of the plot. He fled to Moscow, w here Ivan III granted him a hastily carved alod on former N ovgorodian soil, conveniently close to the Lithuanian frontier142. Thereafter, for a variety of reasons, the O rthodox Lithuanian lords residing along the southwestern boundary began to seek Muscovite pro­ tection and service. N ot least important in the fashioning of their decisions was Ivan Ill's conscious policy of creating border incidents, as he had earlier against Tver', forcing the beset victims to seek the protection of the stronger143. In rapid succession they began to defect, declaring that they and their lands w ere now under the jurisdiction and protection of Ivan III. Such transfers and two w ars with Lithuania pushed the frontiers of Muscovy westward. According to Liubavskii's calculations, between the 1480s and 1500 the Lithuanian state had lost nineteen towns, seventy volosts, twenty-two defense centers and thirteen villages144. The various border princes: the Bel’skies, Vorotynskies, Belevskies, Mezetskies and Novosil’skies retained control over their patri­ monies, thereby becoming ap p a n ag e princes within Muscovy, though they had to sw ear faithful service to Ivan III145. From each the Muscovite govern­ ment dem anded loyalty, fidelity and military assistance when required146. Initially they w ere allowed to remain in their patrimonies and w ere rarely called out on cam paign. Ivan III studiously avoided giving im portant senior com mands to these celebrated defectors and few as yet cam e to the capital to seek their fortunes. A m eager handful acquired subordinate state positions. The addition of formerly foreign Riurikide princes affected the composition of the Muscovite service aristocracy. Socially, the more im portant members of the old Muscovite boyaral families m aintained contacts and even con­ tracted marital alliances with the princes. Politically, the effects w ere trouble141 PSRL, vol. 6, p. 237; Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, p. 50. 142 M. K. Liubavskii, Ocherk istorii Litovsko-russkogo gosudarstva do Liublinskoi unii vkluchitel'no (A Sketch o f the History of the Lithuanian-Russian State to the Union o f Lublin Inclusively), Moscow Î9152, p. 203; O. P. Backus, Motives of the West Russian Nobles in Deserting Lithuania for M oscow, 1377—1514, Lawrence Kansas 1957, pp. 98—99. 143 See Backus, Motives, pp. 98 ff.; Liubavskii, Ocherk, p. 203; O. Halecki, From Florence to Brest, 14391596, Rome 1958, p. 107. 244 Liubavskii, Ocherk, pp. 203-205. 343 See, K. V. Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika, pp. 291 ff. 144 Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, p. 64.

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some, for the addition of a considerable group of aristocrats, whose prime occupation w as military, m eant that competition for posts and emoluments increased, causing bitterness am ong those who felt they were kept from coveted positions by the rivalry of the newly arrived. The muster rolls of the military levies and the leaders of the various regiments show a marked in­ crease tow ards the end of the fifteenth century in the number of persons of princely title who began to take over the commands on minor cam paigns and of the secondary positions on major ones147. W e may imagine that some of the newcomers loudly proclaimed the superiority of their lineage. Dorogobuzhskies, Mikulinskies, Teliatevskies and Kholmskies, descended from the g reat Tverian rulers of the fourteenth century, began to ap p e ar on the d e­ tachment and regim ental com mand rolls immediately after the conquest of their hom eland. The evidence, while far from complete, does dem onstrate that an increasing number of highly-ranked (by virtue of previous family positions) and well-born members of the aristocracy came into Muscovite service by the late fifteenth century. Political and military pressures had persuaded a number to cast their lot with Moscow. Less visible from the nature of our evidence are the economic necessities that persuaded many others to serve. The rewards to those found acceptable came not in lands or in m onetary compensation. Muscovy abandoned bequests in land by the second half of the fourteenth century and w ages, as such, had not yet been established in payment for military service. Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the govern­ ment never had enough income to establish w idespread m onetary com pensa­ tion for its troops. Lacking funds, yet requiring large armies, the monarchs increasingly dem anded service from landholders. Rewards, as in the earlier period, cam e in booty taken on cam paign and in profits derived from crown appointm ents. Governorships of towns and districts given as tem porary sinecures for faithful service, usually for a period of one year, but rarely ever more than three years, allow ed those selected to recoup their previous serviceconnected expenditures and to make a profit. Local exactions, a portion of the judicial fines, and other such devices (including malpractices) augm ented incomes. Those who served in the royal council, who normally had to remain in the capital, had other means of enriching themselves. Some members of the council, the state secretaries and even the scribes, received stipulated fees from court proceedings in cases of appeal or review. Probably, charges for various m erchants’ goods in transit and other levies found their w ay into the pockets of adm inistrative appointees. Some favored courtiers even acquired 147

Razriadnaia Icniga, pp. 22 ff.

V 56 lifetime use of monastic-held properties, upon intercession of the grand prince148. But the paucity of such holdings available for secular exploitation and the resistance of the church to secularization of its lands or enjoyment of its usufruct prevented any large-scale utilization of these considerable oroperties to gratify the desires of crown servitors. The annexation of N ovgorod the G reat in the last quarter of the fifteenth century provided in the Muscovite government with a solution to a number of problems, not the least of which was expansion of the army on the newly active western frontier and a means to satisfy the landhunger of the in­ creasingly numerous impoverished descendants of old families of distinction. The government of Ivan III confiscated the vast holdings of the N ovgorodian boyars, of rich landholders and even of the compromised archdiocese of Novgorod. It then broke up these formerly private and church holdings into about 2000 service-connected bénéficiés149. Veselovskii’s analysis of the recipients of these "pom est’es" leaves no doubt as to the pressures at work in Muscovy to create state-supported livings for those no longer able to live off their pitiful alodial incomes150. W hile some Soviet scholars are fond of concentrating on the 100 to 150 former military dependents of disgraced nobles (whether formerly free or slave is unresolved) who acquired "pom est’es"151, a t least 61 princes received "pom est’es" as well, in addition to a considerable number of impoverished descendants of distinguished old families. A very few highly influential duma representatives and courtiers also acquired152 "pom est’es," which added to their incomes, but for which they probably gave no additional com pensatory service. Serving the state on the highest echelon, they assumed no supplemental liabilities153. The rem ainder of the recipients belonged to the land-poor or landless categories, of which Veselovskii took the pains to count sixteen Rostov princelings, ten of the laroslavskies, three Starodubskies, four of the lesser O bolenskies and a

14# Alef, Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren, pp. 54 ff. m* Ibid., pp. 60 f. 150Veselovskii, Féodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, pp. 290 ff. 151 Ibid., pp. 226—227, 290. K. B. Bazilevich, Novgorodskie pomeshchiki iz posluzhil'tsev v kontse XV veka (Novgorodian Pomeshchiks from Dependents at the End o f the 15th Century), in: Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 14, (1945), pp. 62—80. V. N. Bernadskii, Novgorod i Novgorodskaia zemlia v XV veke (Novgorod and the N ovgorodian Land at the End of the 15th Century), Moscow—Leningrad 1961, pp. 325—326. is: Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 291, claimed 61 'kniazhata', but it is not clear whether he included only the impoverished princelings or all the princes receiving lands in N ovgorod. Bazilevich counted 73 princes: Novgorodskie pomeshchiki, in: Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 14, p. 63. i$3 Veselovskii, Feodal'noe zem levladenie, vol. 1, p. 291. In this group Veselovskii identified Princes Vasilii and Semen Dmitrievich Kholmskii, Prince Semen Ivanovich Patrikeev, Prince Osip Dorogobuzhskii, Princes Aleksandr Vasil'evich and Ivan Lyko O bolenskii. Of these only Kholmskii, Dorogobuzhskii and Ivan Lyko Obolenskii were not boyars of the council, but they were highly placed and well connected at court.

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number of rather insignificant "kniazhata". O ne hundred and seventy-five are easily recognizable as descendants of the old Muscovite serving fa ­ milies154. A majority of the new pomeshchiki derived from the larger body of provincial landholders and even some from significant merchant families155. Though we still lack systematic studies of the impact of partible inheritance upon the descendants of once rich and landed families in rrfbst of the districts and provinces of Moscow, there are enough indicators to w arrant tentative conclusions. The vast majority of the princely and the untitled were in need of lucrative employment. Only Muscovy could provide this and the pressure for positions becam e intense. Those who accepted "pom est’es" thereby admitted they would take anything, for they becam e equated with the lower-born in all but aspiration and heritage. They acquired posts that henceforth prevented them from climbing higher in the service hierarchy. For those at court, the scramble for position am ong the descendants of great princely families and of the influential aristocracy of service assumed a competitiveness that soon manifested itself into the "m estnichestvo" system of the early sixteenth century, a valiant attem pt to insure service positions and emoluments for particular branches of influential families. Reflections of the competition and the attend­ ant bitterness, the search for more mythical forebears, establishing more distinguished social and service origins, the effect upon politics and con­ spiracies a t the end of the fifteenth century, have not yet ap p eared in the discussions of the developments in Ivan Ill's later reign. Instead we have learned discussions about non-existent struggles between centripetal and centrifugal forces: that is, between the ap p a n ag e princes and their supporters, allegedly seeking greater freedom , and the grand prince and his supporters, who stood for tighter central power. The ap p a n ag e princes had long since lost their pow er and the nobility had more serious problems, most of which dealt with finding renumerative positions commensurate with their aspirations and past and near-present service stations. For most, only the senior prince of Moscow had the means to support them; only he would determine w hether to accept them in service. The alternatives, employment in the ap p an ag es or as lay servitors in the church, w ere unattractive, limited, relatively unrewarding and even dangerous. Had the g reat plagues of the fourteenth century not arrested the growth of population, when Moscow was small and more vulnerable to pressure than it would become a century later, and when the powers of the Kremlin princes w ere far w eaker, no doubt the history of the Russian northeast would have 1« Ibid., pp. 291 ff. Ibid., pp. 294 ff.

V 58 turned out far differently; as it was, the flood-tide of population came after the great consolidation of Muscovite power, putting the petitioners at an insuperable disadvantage. It is imprudent to attribute great developments to single cause, and this study does not wish to do that. Yet in the evaluation of factors given to explain the em ergence of a great centralized power on the fringes of Europe, con­ siderable weight should be given to the immemorial system of partible in­ heritances, practiced with monotonous regularity by the Eastern Slavs. The House of Moscow found the means to prevent this apportionm ent; the aristoc­ racy did not. If we speak only of Byzantine and Tatar influence in the shaping of the Russian autocratic tradition, we are prone to underestimate the crucial domestic developments that allowed for the creation of a monarchy with virtually unlimited powers. At any rate, we must ask w hat on the domestic scene favored the adoption of certain foreign institutions or attitudes and not others.

VI

Reflections on the Boyar Duma in the Reign of Ivan III* C o n s i d e r a b l e pressures for administrative change developed at the Muscovite court in the second half of the 1 5 th century. The realm tripled in size, increasing from an area of 1 9 0 , 0 0 0 square miles in 1 4 6 2 to well over 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 in 1 5 0 5 . A defensive yet active foreign policy during the early years of Ivan I l l ’s reign later turned belli­ gerent and expansionist and necessitated an enlarged and reorgan­ ised army. A commensurate increase in diplomatic activity called into being a more professional corps of envoys, a growing cadre of translators and interpreters, and an expanding subsection of the treasury, replete with clerks and scribes, which preserved docu­ ments and catalogues of instructions given to the various embassies. The same period witnessed an expansion of princely power. In this late medieval principality of state-like proportions, the court had to face growing problems of jurisdiction and adm inistration, of develop­ ing methods to ensure loyalty on the p art of new or sometimes re­ luctant subjects, and of financing growing commitments in a relatively poor realm. Above all, there were the questions of tax collection and the judicial competence of the crown. U ndoubtedly impressed by a comment made by Ilovaysky in the late 1 9 th century, the late Stepan Veselovsky remarked that in the 1 4 th century, when small principalities dotted the area of north­ eastern Rus', a reigning prince knew his im portant people by sight and name ; his servitors always had access to him. The incorporation of surrounding territories into an enlarged Muscovy swelled the ranks of the serving class, making impossible the continuance of the earlier close relationship. This led to impersonalisation—to a system wherein the ordinary servitor turned into a name on a list, rather than a familiar to whom solicitude and favour could be shown . 1 Territorial growth also affected the m anner in which the realm was administered. The personal supervision of the grand prince gradually gave way to reliance upon designated lieutenants and record-keeping clerks. According to Ambrogio Contarini, a V enetian * I a m in d e b te d to th e In s titu te fo r A d v a n c e d S tu d y a n d to th e U n iv e rs ity o f O r e g o n G r a d u a te S ch o o l fo r s u p p o rt w h ic h m a d e th is s tu d y possible. A g e n e ra lise d v e rsio n w as p re s e n te d a t a m e e tin g o f th e A m e ric a n A sso c ia tio n fo r th e A d v a n c e m e n t o f S la v ic S tu d ie s h e ld in N e w Y o rk in A p ril 1964. 1 S. B. V eselovsky, Féodal'noyé zemlevladeniye v severo-vostochnoy Rusi, I , M o sc o w / L e n in ­ g r a d , 1947, p . 3 0 6 ; fo r a n e a r lie r su g g estio n a lo n g th e s a m e lin e , see D . Ilo v a y s k y , Istoriya Rossiiy I I : Moskovsko-Litouskiy period Hi sobirateli Rusi, 2 n d e d ., M o sco w , 1896, p . 5 0 3 .

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who visited Moscow in the autum n and early w inter of 1 4 7 6 , Ivan I I I toured ‘the various parts of his dominions every year ’. 2 This fortuitous observation we owe to C ontarini’s frustration. D uring three of the four months that he spent in Moscow, Ivan II I was away visiting parts of his realm . 3 These journeys became less frequent in later years as the pressure of business increased in the capital; yet the grand prince continued the practice whenever time allowed to the very end of his life . 4 While Ivan I II may have desired to continue the leisurely practice of his forefathers, the tempo of court activity increased, necessitating an enlargem ent of the responsibilities assigned to a variety of house­ hold officials and the creation of a num ber of new offices. A rising m ound of paper m arked the gradual change from oral to written instructions. In the old household treasury, where all valuables were deposited, a special section housed the grand-princely records. In this half-century the offspring outgrew the parent. Here secretaries and scribes toiled ceaselessly, cataloguing and assigning to boxes the originals or copies of all im portant documents, instructions and reports. I Though functionaries, obligations and records multiplied, the basic agency aiding the grand prince in the governance of the realm was his council, the boyar dum a. Despite considerable scholarly attention to the competence, functioning and composition of this body throughout its long history, we still lack thorough understand­ ing of the mechanics whereby the Muscovite dum a aided centralisa2 Travels to Tana and Persia by Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini, H a k lu y t S o c ie ty , F ir s t S eries, N o. 4 9 , L o n d o n , 1873, p. 159. 3 Ibid., p p . 1 6 3 -4 : ‘I re m a in e d in M o sco w fro m th e 2 5 th o f S e p te m b e r u n til th e 21st o f J a n u a r y . . . . A fte r v isitin g his d o m in io n s , th e D u k e r e tu r n e d to M o sco w a b o u t th e e n d o f D e c e m b e r ’. 4 T h e in fo rm a tio n a v a ila b le , c u lle d p rim a r ily fro m th e c h ro n ic le s, is fr a g m e n ta ry . I t is n o t p o ssib le to s u b s ta n tia te fully C o n ta r in i’s s ta te m e n t fro m th is so u rc e , a lth o u g h th e r e is e n o u g h e v id e n c e to su g g est th a t Iv a n I I I trie d to visit th e v a rio u s p ro v in c e s fa irly fre ­ q u e n tly . T h e s e v is ita tio n s o c c u rre d in th e a u tu m n , a fte r th e h a rv e s t w as in . H e r e a r e s o m e in d ic a tio n s : I n 1467 h e v isite d K o lo m n a ( Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisey (h e re a fte r c ite d as PSRL), I V , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1848, p. 149) a n d in th e fo llow ing y e a r V la d im ir a n d P e re y a s la v l' {ibid., I V , p . 149; V , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1851, p . 174) ; in la te 1475 a n d e a rly 1476 h e w as in N o v g o ro d , a c c o m p a n ie d b y a n im p ressiv e e n to u ra g e , in c lu d in g m e m b e rs o f th e d u m a (PSRL, IV , p. 152; Drevneyshaya Razryadnaya Kniga ojfitsial'noy redaktsii [p o 1565 g .], ed . P . N . M ily u k o v (h e re a fte r c ite d as D R K ), M o sco w , 1901, p. 11) ; in la te O c to b e r (o r fro m 2 D e c e m b e r) 1479 to e a rly 1480 h e w as a g a in in N o v g o ro d (PSRL, I V , p . 152; V I , S t P e te r s b u r g , 1853, p p . 1 9 -2 0 ); in la te 1481, V la d im ir (Ioasafovskaya letopis', ed . A . A . Z im in , M o sco w , 1957, p . 123; PSRL, IV , 1 5 5 ); fro m la te O c to b e r 1495 to M a r c h 1496 h e w as in N o v g o ro d (Ioasafovskaya letopis', p . 131; Sbornik imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva (h e re a fte r c ite d as SIRIO), X L I , ed. G . K a rp o v , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1884, N o . 4 8 , p . 2 17) ; fro m S e p te m b e r to N o v e m b e r 1503, I v a n I I I , a c c o m p a n ie d b y his sons, v is ite d P e re y a s la v l', R o sto v , a n d Y a ro s la v l' (PSRL, X X V I , M o s c o w /L e n in g ra d , 1959, p . 2 9 6 ; Ioasafovskaya letopis', p p . 1 4 5 -6 ; see also SIRIO , X L I , N o. 93, p . 497 )*

VI 78 tion. After a century of effort, a leading Soviet medievalist, Alexander Zimin, could in truth rem ark th at ‘an investigation of the composi­ tion of the boyar dum a in the 1 6 th century appears to be a necessary precondition for study o f the rôles which this central institution played in the adm inistrative apparatus of the Russian centralised state . ’ 5 This observation applies equally to the second half of the 1 5 th century. The standard view of the dum a is based on an amalgam of evi­ dence with illustrations chosen to support the arguments of the scholars concerned. A num ber of historians have subscribed to a provocative thesis, already formed in the early 1 9 th century , 6 that departure of free servitors from Muscovy to neighbouring princi­ palities became impossible after the consolidation of north-eastern R us' in the late 1 5 th century. In consequence these formerly free members of the aristocracy were transformed into subservient sub­ jects. Yet an identity of interests between ruler and subjects sur­ vived into the early 1 6 th century, and the w arrior class lent its energies to the further unification of the growing realm . 7 Thus personal gain and the continued evolution of the monocratic grand principality worked for the benefit of ruler and well-born subjects alike. The dum a, an institution of early origin, rem ained as an advisory group. In the period prior to consolidation the opinions of princely councillors carried greater weight, thereby tempering the decisions of local rulers, since the senior advisers could resign their positions, and even leave the service of the territorial prince, if their advice went unheeded . 8 After consolidation dum a members, like the whole of the serving class, lost mobility and their bargaining position weakened. 6 A . A . Z im in , ‘S o stav b o y a rsk o y d u m y v X V - X V I vekakh*, Arkheograficheskiy yezhe1 9 5 7 god (h e re a fte r c ite d as A E 1 9 5 7 ), M o sco w , 1958, p . 41. • N . M . K a ra m z in , Istoriya gosudarstva rossiyskago, e d . P . N . P o lev o y , V I , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1892, p p . 2 2 0 -1 . 7 V . O . K ly u c h ev s k y , Kurs russkoy istorii in Sochineniya, I I , M osco w , 1957, p p . 139 ff. ; idem, Istoriya sosloviy v Rossii in Sochineniya, V I , M osco w , 1959, p p . 365 ff. ; e a r lie r S. M . S o lo v 'y o v , th e te a c h e r o f K ly u c h ev sk y , h a d a lre a d y h in te d a t this thesis ( Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremyon, V I I , M oscow , 1962, p p . 3 0 -1 ) a n d u n d o u b te d ly th is u n d e r la y th e e x p a n s io n o f th e id e a b y his b rillia n t s tu d e n t. N . P . Z a g o sk in ( Istoriya prava Moskovskago gosudarstva, I , K a z a n ", 1877) also d iv id e d e a r lie r R u ss ia n h isto ry in to tw o p a r ts : th e p re M u sc o v ite a n d th e M u sc o v ite ts a rd o m . T h e m o n o c ra tic a n d a u to c ra tic p e r io d h a d a lr e a d y b e g u n to fo rm a fte r 1462. T h o u g h h e d e als w ith slig h tly d iffe rin g fa c to rs— p la c in g g r e a te r e m p h a sis u p o n th e re a so n s for u n ific a tio n r a t h e r th a n its c o n se q u e n ce s (p p . 1 -2 7 )— Z a g o sk in re a c h e s th e s a m e c o n clu sio n as S o lo v 'y o v a n d K ly u c h ev s k y in d iscu ssin g th e effects u p o n th e system o f g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e re s tric te d s p h e re o f a c tiv ity b y th e s erv ice a ris to c ra c y a n d th e b o y a r d u m a ( I , p p . 140 ff., I I , p . 25 ). S ee a lso A . E . P re s n y a k o v , Moskovskoye tsarstvo, P e tro g r a d , 1918, p p . 42 ff. ; Ilo v ay sk y , Istoriya Rossii, I I , p . 5 0 3 ; V . S e rg e y e v ic h , Lektsii i izsledovaniya po drevney istorii Russkago prava, 3 rd e d ., S t P e te rs b u rg , 1903, p . 259. 8 M . K . L y u b a v s k y , Drevnyaya russkaya istoriya do kontsa X V I i\, M o sco w , 1918, p p . 2 3 6 7 ; M . F . V la d im irs k y -B u d a n o v , Obzor istorii russkago prava, 3 rd e d ., K ie v /S t P e te rs b u rg , 1900, p. 173.

godnik za

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In consequence they became simple councillors, whose judgem ents m ight not be valued . 9 Students of Russian law in the past century, who were interested in the theory of power, contended that the princely dum a never really acquired an independent constitutional existence. It was a customary institution with only advisory func­ tions. The power of the princes, and later of the Muscovite monarch, was absolute, based upon divine sanction; he did not have to rely upon the advice of his councillors, although he may have done so out of respect for their superior judgem ent or, prior to unification, to m aintain the loyalty of able warriors with their retinues . 10 Throughout the history of the dum a its members aided the princely ruler in affairs of adm inistration and justice . 11 VladimirskyBudanov stressed that even in the period of developing ‘mono­ cracy* Ivan II I insisted that the boyars had to sanction all im portant decisions, such as the grand prince’s marriage to Zoe Palaeologa or the attack on Novgorod in 1 4 7 1 . 12 Sergeyevich suggested that the dum a did not decide im portant issues, but only replied to questions put to it by the ruler . 13 There was a general consensus among late 1 9 th-century juridical historians th at Ivan II I was respectful and tolerant of his councillors, and even rewarded those who took issue with him, while his son Vasily I I I punished those who flouted his opinions . 14 Klyuchevsky believed th at Ivan I I I consulted his boyars on momentous occasions, but th at in more stable periods he assigned some dum a members to provincial administrative positions, where they acted as governors or generals. The rem ainder took up court positions. The purpose of sending out dum a members as regional agents was to take over administrative and judicial functions from local authorities . 15 W ith a slightly different twist, VladimirskyBudanov saw the governorship of towns and districts as a means of adm inistering localities and also as rewards for faithful service, which allowed the holders to enrich themselves by ‘feeding’ off the local inhabitants . 16 In his recent study of early m odern Muscovy, George Vernadsky took a completely different view. He ascribed omnicompetent powers to Ivan I l l ’s dum a. T he boyars ‘ruled Russia jointly with the grand • L y u b a v s k y , Drevnyaya russkaya istoriya, p . 2 3 7 ; Z a g o sk in , Istoriya prava, I I , K a z a n ', *879, P P - 2 1 - 2 . 10 S e rg e y e v ic h , Lektsii, p p . 257 ff. ; Z a g o sk in , Istoriya prava, I , 3 8 -9 , p p . 140 ff. 11 S e rg e y e v ic h , Lektsii, p p . 2 6 1 -4 ; idem, Russkiya yuridicheskiya drevnosti, 2 n d e d ., I , S t P e te r s b u r g , 1902, p p . 3 92, 4 0 8 -1 0 . ia Obzor, p . 174. 13 Lektsii, p p . 265 ff. ; fo r a m o re te m p e re d v iew see his Drevnosti, I I , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1900, p p . 3 8 6 -7 . 14 V la d im irs k y -B u d a n o v , Obzor, p . 174; S e rg e y e v ic h , Lektsii, p . 2 6 5 ; Z a g o sk in , Istoriya prava, I , p . 1 46; I I , p . 24. 15 K ly u c h e v s k y , Boyarskaia duma, 5 th e d ., P e tro g r a d , 1919, p p . 152 ff. 14 Obzor, p . 176.

VI 8o duke through . . . the boyar dum a’. This council was ‘the highest body of government and adm inistration’ which ‘served as a legis­ lative council and directed both internal and foreign affairs, as well as arm y adm inistration’. Indeed, Vernadsky believed that the dum a boyars became so powerful that Ivan II I tried to erode some of their power by relying upon state secretaries to conduct certain affairs of the realm . 17 Not only does a difference of opinion exist concerning the re­ sponsibility and function of the dum a, but there is also some question about its personnel. Substantial agreement exists, however, on the changing character of dum a appointments. The increasing flow of princely families from annexed or neighbouring principalities had by Ivan I l l ’s reign gradually displaced some of the older boyaral families from their privileged position in both the army and the dum a . 18 These themes, or their variants, are to be found embedded in the textbooks of our age. Soviet scholars, with some notable exceptions, have cast little light on the dum a. Instead they have, so to speak, ridden over the problem with their hobbyhorse of socio-economic conditions and inevitable class war. While 1 9 th- and early 2 0 thcentury scholars may be taken to task by Soviet historians for starting from a particular theoretical position and looking for substantiating evidence, the same comment applies to current Soviet studies. U ntil recent years little has been done to identify the personnel of the dum a ; in consequence, there have been few attem pts to discover the actual functions performed by individual dum a members . 19 This may appear an exaggeration, in view of the existence of a 1 7 thcentury text known as the ‘Sheremetev list of court ranks’, which contains the names of dum a incumbents and their presumed dates of service . 20 Some historians have commented upon its unreliability, 17 G . V e rn a d s k y , Russia at the Dawn o f the Modern Age, N e w H a v e n , C o n n ., 1959, p p . 1 1 7 -18. 18 S o lo v 'v o v , Istoriya Rossii, I I I , M o sco w , i9 6 0 , p p . 1 5 4 -5 , a lre a d y su g g este d th is. K ly u c h ev sky m a d e th is a m a jo r fa c e t o f his th ir d p h a se o f R u s s ia n h is to ry : Boyarskaya duma, p p . 203 ff. ; Kurs russkoy istorii in Sochineniya, I I I , p p . 140 ff. ; idem, Istoriya sosloviy in Sochineniya, V I , 3 8 1 -3 ; see also P re s n y a k o v , Moskovskoye tsarstvo, p p . 48 ff.; S e rg e y e v ic h , Drevnosti, I I , p . 403. 19 S. B. V eselovsky d id c o n sid e ra b le re s e a rc h a lo n g th ese lines in his ‘E x p la n a to r y n o te s to th e d o c u m e n ts ’, in th e c o o p e ra tiv e e d itio n o f th e Akty sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy istorii severo-vostochnoy Rusi kontsa XIV-nachala X V I v. (h e re a fte r c ite d as ASISR), I , M o sco w , 1952, p p . 5 9 0 -6 3 7 . T h e n o te s in v o lu m e s I I a n d I I I , d o n e b y a n o th e r h a n d , a r e n o t o f th e s a m e q u a lity . Y e t e v e n V eselovsky p u t to o m u c h tru s t in th e c h ro n ic le id e n tific a tio n s a n d u p o n th e S h e re m e te v list. N . A . K a z a k o v a , Vassian Patrikeyev i ego sochineniya, M o sc o w / L e n in g r a d , i9 6 0 , p p . 36 ff. h as a n in te re s tin g d iscussion o f th e c a re e rs o f P r in c e I v a n Y u r'e v ic h P a trik e y e v a n d his son P rin c e V a sily Iv a n o v ic h , b o th o f w h o m w e re im p o r ta n t d u m a m e m b e rs in th e re ig n o f Iv a n I I I . T h e r e a re som e e x c e lle n t e n trie s u n d e r in d iv id u a l n a m e s in th e p re -re v o lu tio n a ry Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar ', th o u g h th e r e , to o , m a n y o f th e a u th o rs re ly r a th e r h e av ily u p o n c h ro n ic le c ita tio n s a n d th e S h e re m e te v list fo r b o y a r sta tu s. 20 Drevnyaya rossiyskaya vivliofika (h e re in a fte r c ite d as D R V), 2 n d e d ., X X , M o sco w , 1791.

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yet continued to cite it as evidence and to derive generalisations from it . 21 Sergeyevich, for example, noted th at ‘from the middle of the 1 5 th century we know the names of all the [council] boyars [i.e. vuedyonnyye boyare] and we can follow each change in its composition to the very end of the 1 7 th century ’. 22 He, and others who depended upon the Sheremetev list, could then say that in 1 4 6 2 only five boyars sat in the dum a and that by the end of Ivan I l l ’s reign the num ber rose to thirteen . 23 From this list derives the constantly repeated generalisation that with the reign of Ivan I I I members of the princely line began to supersede members of the old untitled boyar families, who dom inated the council in the period prior to the m id- 1 5 th century. This dilem m a has prom pted Alexander Zimin to discard completely the inform ation contained in the Sheremetev compilation. He sus­ pects not only th at the dates of service may have been wrong, but also that some of the names of dum a members were not bona fide. In a pioneering endeavour he has constructed a new list of members of the council between 1 4 6 2 and 1 4 8 3 , utilising only references found in contem porary documents. Q uite properly, he disregards chronicle identifications, since the term boyar could be used to identify a mem­ ber of the highest non-princely social group rather than a member of the royal council . 24 O f the forty-nine boyars and twenty-two okol'nichiye (second-grade dum a members) mentioned for the halfcentury of Ivan I l l ’s reign in the Sheremetev list, Zimin finds docum entary confirmaton for half (i.e. twenty-four boyars—with an additional two in question—and twelve okol'nichiye ) . 25 He also identifies as members of Ivan I l l ’s council eight boyars and one okol'nichiy not included in the Sheremetev list. Possibly some dum a personnel were om itted by Zim in’s method, because they did not participate in any of the activities recorded by extant docum ents ; 26 21 S e rg e y e v ic h . Drevnosti, I , p . 3 9 5 : ‘N o tw ith s ta n d in g its g re a t im p o rta n c e , it is n o t c o m p le te , c o n ju rin g u p n o s m all n u m b e r o f q u e stio n s, w h ic h a re im p o ssib le to a n sw e r e v e n w ith c o n je c tu re s ’. N . P. L ik h a c h e v ( Razryadnyye d'yaki X V I vekay S t P e te rs b u rg , 1888, p . 107, n . 1) m a d e v irtu a lly th e sa m e c o m m e n t. K ly u c h ev sk y ( Boyarskaya duma, p . 217) n o te d th a t th e S h e re m e te v list ‘w as n o t e x a c t. V e rify in g it w h e n e v e r possible w ith th e a id o f c h ro n ic le s, razryadnyye a n d b o y a ra l books a n d lists, b o th in p u b lis h e d a n d in m a n u s c rip t fo r m , w e a r e a b le to n o te th a t w ith th e re ig n o f V a sily [ I I I ] Iv a n o v ic h th e in e x a ctn e ss o f c h ro n o lo g ic a l e v id e n c e o f th e lists consists n o t so m u c h in th e in c o m p le te n ess o f th e e n trie s, as m u c h as in th e u n re lia b ility o f c h ro n o lo g ic a l e v id e n c e ; m a n y o f th e b o y a rs a n d o k o l'n i­ c h iy e w e re ra is e d to th e ir ra n k s e a rlie r th a n is in d ic a te d in th e lis t.’ H a d K ly u c h ev sk y c h e c k e d th e in fo rm a tio n fro m th e S h e re m e te v list for th e e n trie s o f th e la te r 15 th c e n tu ry — w h ic h , s ig n ific a n tly , h e d id n o t— h e w o u ld h a v e h a d to e x te n d th e lim its o f his o b s e rv a ­ tio n s. V eselo v sky also re lie d h e a v ily o n th e S h e re m e te v lis t; th is is e v id e n t fro m a close r e a d in g o f his n o te s in ASISR , I , p p . 590 ff. 22 S e rg e y e v ic h , Drevnosti, I , p . 399. 23 Ibid., I , p . 401 ; Z a g o s k in , Istoriya prava, I I , p p . 2 6 -7 . 24 Z im in , ‘S o s ta v ’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p p . 4 4 -8 7 ; for th e re g iste rs o f b o y a rs a n d o k o l'n ic h iy e in I v a n I l l ’s r e ig n , see p p . 4 4 -8 . 25 S e e A p p e n d ic e s I a n d I I to th is a rtic le . 26 Z im in p la c e d p rim a r y re lia n c e u p o n th e e a rlie st m ilita ry serv ice re g is te r ( D R K ), m o n a s tic c a r tu la rie s , ju d ic ia l d o c u m e n ts , tre a tie s a n d d ip lo m a tic p a p e rs.

VI 82 one may even point to at least five boyars (possibly six) and one okol'nichiy (possibly two) he overlooks in his survey ; 27 nevertheless, we now have a core of confirmable names. *7 S ec A p p e n d ic e s I a n d I I . T h e fo llo w in g e x a m p le s w ill illu s tra te th is. T h e n a m e o f F y o d o r V a s ily e v ic h B asen o k is c o n sp ic u o u sly a b se n t. H is n a m e does n o t a p p e a r in a n y o f th e rodoslovnyye knigi, p re s u m a b ly b e ca u s e h e w as o f h u m b le b irth . H e first e m e rg e d in to h is to ric a l lig h t in 1446, w h e n h e d e fie d P rin c e D m itr y S h e m y a k a , th e u s u r p e r o f th e th r o n e o f M u sc o v y . A fte r V a sily I I re c o v e re d his th ro n e in 1447, B ase n o k ’s s ta r ro se ra p id ly . H e c o m m a n d e d th e p e rs o n a l re g im e n t ( dvor) o f th e g r a n d p rin c e o n a n u m b e r o f occasio n s a n d a p p e a rs to h a v e w o n p ro m o tio n to b o y a r in 1452. T h is a t le a st is th e v ie w re fle c te d in s o m e c h ro n ic le s ( PSRLt IV , p . 147; X X V M o s c o w /L e n in g ra d , 1949, p p . 2 6 6 , 2 7 0 , 272, 2 7 4 ; X X V I I I , M o s c o w /L e n in g ra d , 1963, p . 2 8 0 ). E v e n if o n e w o u ld b e in c lin e d to re je c t th e c h ro n ic le in fo rm a tio n fo r th e id e n tific a tio n o f b o y a rs , w e k n o w th a t B asen o k , as a b o y a r, w itn essed th e te s ta m e n t o f V a sily I I in 1461 ( Dukhovnyye i dogovornyye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh knyazey X IV -X V I vv. (h e re a fte r c ite d as DDG), e d . L . V . C h e r e p n in , M o sc o w / L e n in g r a d , 1950, N o . 61 , p . 198: ‘[A s w itnesses] to th e te s ta m e n t th e r e s a t: T r ifo n , a r c h im a n d r ite o f S passkiy, A fo n asey , a r c h im a n d r ite o f S im an o v sk iy , a n d m y b o y a rs , P r in c e I v a n Y u r'y e v ic h [P a trik e y e v ], Iv a n Iv a n o v ic h , V a sily Iv a n o v ic h [ K ita y N o v o sil'tsev ], a n d F y o d o r V a sil'y e v ic h [B a se n o k ]’). W h ile B asen o k u n d o u b te d ly c o n tin u e d in th e r a n k s o f th e b o y a rs o f th e n e w re ig n , d e sp ite th e la c k o f su ch m e n tio n in th e S h e re m e te v list, th e re a r e n o in d ic a tio n s o f his a ctiv itie s a fte r 1462 in e ith e r c h ro n ic le s o r d o c u m e n ts . T h is , o f itself, m e a n s n o th in g , in t h a t th e la st c h ro n ic le m e n tio n o f h im c a m e in 1456, y e t w e k n o w th a t h e c o n tin u e d in a n o n -m ilita ry c a p a c ity a t c o u rt a fte r th a t. A ll w e k n o w o f h im a t p re s e n t w as d is c o v e re d b y Y a. S. L u r 'y e in a m a n u s c rip t r e d a c tio n o f th e S o fia c h ro n ic le : Ideologicheskaya bor'ba v russkoy publitsistike kontsa X V — nachala X V I veka, M o sc o w / L e n in g r a d , i9 6 0 , p . 53. B asen o k is b lin d e d b y o r d e r o f Iv a n I I I a n d in c a r c e r a te d in K irillo v m o n a s te ry (ibid., p . 6 0 ). F y o d o r M ik h a y lo v ic h (C h e ly a d n in ) is a lso m issin g fro m b o th th e list c o m p ile d b y Z im in a n d th e S h e re m e te v c o m p ila tio n . H e to o c o n tin u e d as a b o y a r in to th e e a r ly r e ig n o f I v a n I I I . C h e ly a d n in , lik e N o v o sil'tse v , s erv ed p rim a r ily in a n a d m in is tr a tiv e c a p a c ity . I n 1461 o r e a rly 1462 h e a p p e a re d as a b o y a r w itn ess to th e a d d e n d u m to th e te s ta m e n t o f V a sily I I ( DDG , N o . 6 1 , p . 1 9 9 ); th e id e n tific a tio n o f F y o d o r M ik h a y lo v ic h is V e se lo v ­ sk y ’s (ASISR , I , p . 6 0 6 ). C h e ly a d n in a p p e a rs to h a v e serv ed as a ju d g e fo r I v a n I I I in th e o p e n in g y e ars o f th e re ig n . S ee th e e a rly 1 5 th -c e n tu ry d o c u m e n t w ith a m i d - 1 5 th -c e n tu ry p o s ts c rip t, in w h ic h ‘v y slu sh a l s u d b o y a rin e svoego F y o d o ra M ik h a y lo v ic h a ’. T h e p o s t­ s c r ip t, w ritte n b y th e g ra n d -p r in c e ly d'yak A leksey P o lu e k h to v , p u ts th e e v e n t in th e e a r ly y e a r s o f I v a n I l l ’s re ig n (ASISR, I , N o . 20, p . 37 ). T h e id e n tific a tio n o f th e b o y a r I v a n Iv a n o v ic h , m e n tio n e d in th e a b o v e q u o ta tio n , p o ses so m e d ifficu lty . V eselovsky (ASISR, I , p . 611) id e n tifie d h im as B u tu rlin . T h is a ss o c ia tio n d o es n o t a p p e a r c o n v in c in g . I v a n Iv a n o v ic h B u tu rlin w as th e f a th e r o f b o y a r A n d r e y Iv a n o v ic h B u tu rlin , k n o w n to h a v e s a t in th e d u m a as e a rly as 1456, th e re b y m a k in g im p r o b a b le a n a s s u m p tio n th a t th e e ld e r B u tu rlin w as still a liv e (see th e g e n e a lo g y in L ik h a c h e v , Razryadnyye d'yaki, p . 138, n . 2). G o lu b ts o v h a s s u g g este d t h a t th is m y s te rio u s I v a n Iv a n o v ic h w as a m e m b e r o f th e K o sh k in fa m ily (ASISR, I I , M o sco w , 1958, p . 5 6 2 ). I . 1. K o sh k in w as a m a n in h is m id d le y e ars in th e la te 1450s, as m a y b e d e d u c e d fro m th e f a c t t h a t his first c o u sin (a n d g e n e a lo g ic a l e q u a l), A n d re y F y o d o ro v ic h G o lty a y , m e t his d e a t h a t th e b a ttle o f S u z d a l' in 1445 (Rodoslovnaya kniga knyazey i dvotyan Rossiyskikh i v'yezzhikh, e d . N . I . N o v ik o v , I I , M o sco w , 1787, 123). T h is K o sh k in h a d n o so n s, o n ly tw o d a u g h te rs , n e ith e r o f w h o m m a d e a d v a n ta g e o u s m a rria g e s — h a r d ly c re d ib le h a d th e ir fa th e r s a t in th e d u m a . T h e r e is still a n o th e r I v a n Iv a n o v ic h w h o m ig h t b e c o n ­ s id e re d . H e b e lo n g e d to a n o ld M u sc o v ite serv in g fa m ily w h ic h h a d c o m e to M o sco w in th e m id -1 4 th c e n tu ry . A c c o rd in g to th e g e n e a lo g ic a l lists h e w as d e s c e n d e d fro m a ‘Prince* A le k s a n d r V se v o lo d o v ic h , w h o h a d e m ig ra te d fro m S m o len sk . T w o o f th is A le k s a n d r’s sons s erv ed in th e le a d in g re g im e n t a t K u lik o v o P o le in 138 0 ; th e e ld e r o f th e se w as th e g ra n d fa th e r o f I v a n Iv a n o v ic h . T h is g ra n d s o n I v a n re a c h e d a d u lth o o d b y th e 1430s, fo r his cousins (a n d g e n e a lo g ic a l e q u als) serv ed in th e re g im e n ts o f V a sily I I ; o n e o f th e se w as k illed a t th e b lo o d y b a ttle o f B elev in 1437, a n d a n o th e r in 1445 w h ile a c c o m p a n y in g V a sily I I h o m e a fte r his re le a se fro m T a t a r c a p tiv ity (Rodoslovnaya kniga, I I , 4 3 ff. ; Vremennik Imperatorskago Moskovskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostey Rossiiskikh (h e re a fte r c ite d as Vremennik), X , M o sco w , 1851, ‘M a te ria ly ’, p . 2 5 2 ). W h a t m a k e s th is I v a n Iv a n o v ic h a p rim e c a n d id a te is t h a t his b r o th e r w as a b o y a r (ASISR, I , N o . 2 7 7 , p p . 198 a n d 612) a n d th a t his fo u r d a u g h te rs s u c c e ed e d in fin d in g d is tin g u is h e d h u s b a n d s . T h e e ld e st m a rrie d P rin c e D a n ilo K h o lm s k y , th e n o te d T v e r i a n é m ig ré . T h e s e c o n d w e d

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II Zimin has also published another study which bears in part upon the delegation o f authority to dum a members. This sets out to con­ struct a list of governors (n am estn iki ) assigned to the various cities and towns of Muscovy in the late 1 5 th and 1 6 th centuries . 28 U n­ happily this list is far from complete, largely because the evidence for such a reconstruction is not available, but also because it has not used available source citations. Nevertheless we are again in Zim in’s debt for making available this valuable information. I f the revised list of Ivan I l l ’s dum a members is collated with the one containing the names of identifiable governors, several deduc­ tions emerge which call in question the validity of some accepted generalisations. The first concerns a widely held belief that the towns of Muscovy were grouped administratively according to their im­ portance : the more im portant the town, the higher the rank of the governor assigned. Thus the most im portant towns were adminis­ tered by boyars and towns of secondary or tertiary im portance by okol'nichiye and non-dum a functionaries . 29 A second generalisation, from the pen of Klyuchevsky, contends that boyars sent out as provincial adm inistrators were divorced from the decision-making process in the dum a. Klyuchevsky, on the strength of a single

P r in c e I v a n V a s il'y e v ic h B u lg a k P a trik e y e v , g ra n d s o n o f th e e x tra o rd in a rily in flu e n tia l b o y a r in V a sily I P s re ig n a n d n e p h e w o f th e b o y a r P rin c e Iv a n Y u r'y e v ic h . T h e th ir d m a r r i e d S e m y o n B orisovich B ry u k h o T u c h k o -M o ro z o v a n d th e la st, P r in c e V a sily M n ik h R y a p o lo v sk y ( Rodoslovnaya knigay I I , p . 4 3 ; Vremennik, X , ‘M a te ria ly ’, p . 2 5 2 ), b o th clo sely r e la te d to in flu e n tia l b o y a ra l fam ilies. A c c o r d in g to th e S h e re m e te v list. P rin c e P y o tr V a s ily e v ic h V elik o y d ie d as a n o k o l'n ic h iy a n d dvoretskiy (ro y a l s te w a rd ) {DRV, X X , p . 16). S ee A p p e n d ix I. P re s u m a b ly h e w as c a s t o u t o f th e c o u n c il a n d lo st his p o s t in 1500/01, w as re in s ta te d in 1503/04 a n d d ie d in 15 12 / 13 as a n o k o l'n ic h iy a n d d v o re tsk iy . S in c e Z im in d id n o t fin d a n y d o c u m e n ta r y c o n ­ f ir m a tio n o f P r in c e P y o tr ’s c o u n c il ra n k , h e d id n o t in c lu d e h im in th e list. I t a p p e a rs to m e , h o w e v e r, t h a t P r in c e P y o tr V a sil'y e v ic h V e lik o y S h e stu n o v -Y a ro slav sk y (th e id e n ti­ fic a tio n is t h a t o f L . V . C h e r e p n in in Akty JeodaVnogo zemleuladeniya i khozyaystva X V -X V I vekov (h e r e a f te r c ite d as A F ^K h), I , M o sco w , 1951, p . 377) w as a d v o re tsk y a t le a st fro m 14 8 9 /9 0 to th e e n d o f I v a n I l l ’s re ig n . I n 1489/90 h e w as a lre a d y p e rfo rm in g th e d u tie s o f a d v o re ts k iy (ASISR, I , N o . 541, p p . 4 2 0 -1 ) a n d I v a n I I I re fe rre d to h im as his d v o re tsk iy in h is te s ta m e n t, c o m p o se d a b o u t 1504 ( DDG , N o . 89 , p . 3 6 3 ). F o r o th e r e v id e n ce o f h is a c tiv ity , see AFZKh, I , p p . 1 2 6 -7 , 2 3 2 - 3 ; ASISR, I, p p . 4 9 0 ff., 5 3 4 -5 . S in ce th e p re v io u s ro y a l s te w a rd s o f th e la te r 1 5 th c e n tu ry w e re alw ay s m e m b e rs o f th e c o u n c il, it seem s re a s o n a b le to a ss u m e t h a t P rin c e P y o tr w as also a d m itte d , b y v irtu e o f his d o c u m e n te d p o s itio n . I f Z im in ’s list is in c o m p le te w ith r e g a rd to d u m a p e rs o n n e l, it is e q u a lly in e x a c t a b o u t so m e d a te s o f p ro m o tio n . T h e a b o v e e x a m p le o f V a sily Iv a n o v ic h N o v o sil'tse v , b o y a r a t le a st sin c e 1461, is a c ase in p o in t. Z im in (‘Sostav*, A E 1957, p . 45) finds th e first m e n tio n o f h im as a b o y a r in 1475. F u r t h e r re s e a rc h s h o u ld a m p lify o u r k n o w le d g e o f th e c o m ­ p o s itio n o f th e d u m a in th e la te r 15 th c e n tu ry . *« Z im in , ‘S p iso k n a m e s tn ik o v R u ssk o g o g o s u d a rs tv e p e rv o y p o lo v in y X V I v .’, Arkheograficheskiyyezhegodnik za i960 (h e re a fte r c ite d as A E 1960), M o sco w , 1962, p p . 2 7 -4 2 . 89 Pamyatniki diplomaticheskikh snosheniy drevney Rossii s derzhavami inostrarmymi (h e re a fte r c ite d as PDS), I, S t P e te rs b u rg , 1851. T h e e d ito r sta te s (p . xxi) : *. . . g o ro d a r a z d e ly a lis ' n a r a z lic h n iy a s te p e n i; n a m e s tn ik a m i b o ley e v a z h n y k h g o ro d o v im e n o v a lis' b o y a re , a d r u g ik h m e n e y e v a z h n y k h o k o l'n ic h iy e , i t.d . p o c h in a m . . . .’

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illustration, even held th at some boyars merely preserved honorific court rank while they occupied provincial governorship . 30 Com paring the information to be derived from Zim in’s two lists, one is impressed with the lack of substance in these generalisations, at least for the latter p art of the 1 5 th century . 31 Boyars and okol'nichiye did not win assignments to governorships of towns or districts of the realm on any regular or rotational basis. Nor did Ivan I II 80 K ly u c h cv sk y , Boyarskaya duma, p p . 1 5 7 -8 : ‘A n o th e r fo re ig n e r fro m L i th u a n ia , P a n S u d im o n t, a p p e a rs as a boyarin vvedyonnyy [i.e. a b o y a r o f th e c o u n cil] o f I v a n I I I a n d n a m e s tn ik o f K o s tro m a , th e n in V la d im ir, so th a t it is p ossible to say o f h im : “ h e w a s a boyarin vvedennyy a n d p ro v in c ia l a d m in is tra to r, b u t b e y o n d t h a t h e h e ld K o s tr o m a a n d V la d im ir b y p rin c e ly g r a n t.” T h u s p ro v in c ia l a d m in is tra to rs re ta in e d c o u r t r a n k ; o n th e o th e r h a n d , b o y a rs w h o p a rtic ip a te d a t c o u rt s o m etim es c a r rie d th e ra n k o f p ro v in c ia l ru le rs . I t is k n o w n th a t M u sc o v ite c o u n c il p e o p le in th e 15th a n d 16th c e n tu rie s w e re id e n tifie d in th e d ip lo m a tic p a p e rs as n a m e s tn ik i o f M osco w , N o v g o ro d , K o lo m n a , e tc . S e e m in g ly , th e se ra n k s w e re a lre a d y h o n o ra ry title s in th e re ig n o f I v a n I I I . F r o m th e le tte r o f I v a n I I I to P a n S u d im o n t it is see n th a t s o m etim es th is n a m e s tn ik , g o v e rn in g K o s tro m a , a r r iv e d in M o sc o w ; p ro b a b ly h e a p p e a re d th e re as a b o y a r.’ K ly u c h e v s k y la te r a d d e d (ibid. y p p . 1 5 8 -9 ) th a t Iv a n fo rb a d e S u d im o n t to a p p e a r in M o sc o w w ith o u t p e rm issio n . ‘A fte rw a rd s th e b o y a rs a d m in is te rin g p ro v in c e s s o m etim es p re s e rv e d c o u r t d ig n ity ra n k s , b u t d id n o t a p p e a r in th e d u m a , a n d s a t in th e ir p ro v in c ia l kormleniya'. U n fo rtu n a te ly K ly u c h ev s k y re lie d u p o n a m o st u n fo r tu n a te te x t fo r h is illu s tra tio n a n d th e n d re w c o n clu sio n s e x c e e d in g th e b o u n d s p e rm itte d b y h is e v id e n c e . T h e d o c u m e n t h e ch o se c a m e to lig h t o n ly as a re s u lt o f a c o n flic t o v e r so cial p re c e d e n c e in c h u r c h b e ­ tw e e n th e tw o n a m e stn ik i o f K o s tro m a , P a n Iv a n S u d im o n t K o n d r a t'y e v ic h a n d Y a k o v Z a k h a r'y e v ic h K o sh k in a n d th e ir w ives. T h e d a te o f th e a lte rc a tio n is n o t k n o w n . I su sp e c t t h a t th is d o c u m e n t, d a te d b y th e e d ito r ‘a ro u n d 1499’ ( Akty istoricheskiyey sobrannyye i izdannyye Arkheograficheskoyu Kommissieyu, I , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1841, N o . n o , p . 164) re a lly s h o u ld b e d a te d p e rh a p s as e a rly as 1469 a n d n o la te r th a n 1479. A s a re s u lt o f th e a lte r ­ c a tio n b e tw e e n Iv a n S u d im o n t a n d K o sh k in , I v a n I I I tra n s fe rre d K o s h k in to V la d im ir as a sec o n d n a m e s tn ik to serv e u n d e r P rin c e D a n ilo K h o lm s k y . N e ith e r K h o lm s k y n o r K o sh k in a re c a lle d b o y a rs, in c o n tra s t to Iv a n S u d im o n t, w h o is c a lle d ‘v v e d y o n n y y bo y arin*. I s u sp e c t th a t n e ith e r o f th e V la d im ir n a m e s tn ik i w e re as y e t b o y a rs . P rin c e K h o lm s k y serv ed as a g e n e ra l in th e K a z a n 7 c a m p a ig n in 1469 (see b e lo w , n . 147) a n d V la d im ir m a y h a v e b e e n th e s p rin g b o a rd for his fo rce ’s offensive. E v e ry in d ic a tio n w e h a v e o f b o y a rs b e in g a ssig n ed to posts as n a m e stn ik i show s t h a t th is w a s to p e rfo r m sp ecific tasks. I v a n I I I d id n o t u s u a lly fa rm o u t his b o y a rs to k e ep th e m o u t o f M o sco w o r to b re a k th e ir c o n ta c t w ith th e d u m a . F u r th e r m o re , th o u g h n a m e s tn ik i, w h e n tw o w e re assig n e d to a g iv e n ju ris d ic tio n , w e re a c c o rd e d e q u a l so cial h o n o u rs , o n ly o n e c o u ld b e o f s e n io r d u m a ra n k . A . P . P ro n s h te y n h a s n o te d ( Velikiy Novgorodv X V I veke, K h a r k o v , 1957, p p . 2 0 4 -5 ) ^ a t th e tw o n a m e stn ik i assig n e d to N o v g o ro d w e re a c c o rd e d e q u a l p riv i­ leg e s: ‘F ro m th e m o m e n t o f th e u n io n w ith M osco w , in N o v g o ro d th e r e re s id e d s im u l­ ta n e o u s ly tw o n a m e s tn ik i, possessing e q u a l rig h ts a n d p o s itio n . D a ta w h ic h s u p p o r t a n e q u a l p o s itio n o f b o th n a m e s tn ik i o f N o v g o ro d c a n b e v o lu m in o u s ly p ro v id e d . W h e n , fo r e x a m p le , th e a rc h b is h o p o f N o v g o ro d w as h o st a t a b a n q u e t o n 25 M a r c h 1548 fo r th e n a m e s tn ik i P rin c e Iv a n M ik h a y lo v ic h S h u y sk y a n d P rin c e Y u ry M ik h a y lo v ic h B u lg a k o v , h e sh o w e d th e m h o n o u r in e q u a l d e g re e a n d p re s e n te d th e m w ith gifts o f id e n tic a l v a lu e , U n f o rtu n a te ly , P ro n s h te y n d id n o t c o m p a re th e ra n k s o f th e in d iv id u a ls s e n t to N o v g o ro d in th e la st q u a r te r o f th e 15th c e n tu ry , o r ev en in th e 16th c e n tu ry . (E v e n in 1548 P r in c e Y u ry B u lg a k o v w as a b o y a r; P rin c e Iv a n S h u y sk y d id n o t o b ta in th is ra n k u n til so m e tim e la te r .) H e m ig h t h a v e n o te d th a t th e s e n io r w as a lw ay s a b o y a r a n d th e j u n i o r n a m e s tn ik u s u a lly o f n o n -d u m a ra n k . T h is q u e stio n w ill be e x a m in e d la te r in th e p re s e n t a r tic le . B u t th e social e q u a lity e x em p lifie d b y th e tre a tm e n t a c c o rd e d to th e g o v e rn o rs in th is in s ta n c e is also re fle c te d in th e q u a r r e l b e tw e e n S u d im o n t a n d Y a k o v K o s h k in in th e d o c u m e n t c ite d b y K ly u c h ev sk y . R e t u r n in g to K ly u c h e v s k y ’s c o m m e n ts, it is o n ly a n a s s u m p tio n , a t le a st in th is p e rio d , th a t p ro v in c ia l g o v e rn o rs r e ta in e d d u m a ra n k as a n h o n o ra ry title o r th a t c o u r t p e rs o n n e l re c e iv e d title s o f n a m e s tn ik i w ith o u t a c tu a lly s erv in g as su c h . T im e a n d a g a in su ch u n w a r r a n te d c o n clu sio n s h a v e b e e n a c c e p te d as v a lid g e n e ra lisa tio n s a n d h a v e so e n te re d th e m a in s tre a m o f h is to ric a l stu d ie s. 31 ‘Sostav*, A E 1957; ‘§ p iso k n a m e s tn ik o v ’, AE i960.

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85 send out these valued servitors to be rid of them at court, or as a means of perm itting them to recoup their fortunes. If dum a members did receive such adm inistrative assignments—and the occasions were rare rather than common—it was only to fulfil specific instructions im plem enting grand-princely policy. In most instances such assign­ ments were tied to defence or m ilitary activity; in unusual circum­ stances, as in Novgorod the G reat in the early 1 4 9 0 s, administrative reorganisation called for the presence of an experienced okol'nichiy . 32 A pparently there is only one m ajor exception to this general policy. After the definitive annexation of Novgorod in 1 4 7 8 , Ivan III appointed a council boyar as senior viceroy in that western province . 33 These observations require illustration. Ivan Vasil'yevich Shchadra Vel'yaminov, a member of an ancient Muscovite serving family, is first mentioned in the chronicles in 1 4 9 1 , when Ivan II I sent him to Uglich to administer the confiscated lands of his brother, Prince Andrey the Elder . 34 At the time of his appointm ent Ivan Shchadra was only a m edium-ranking servitor attached to the court. He may have served for some time prior to this, although not in a position th at brought him to the attention of the chroniclers. From m id - 1 4 9 5 to I5°3 served as governor in V yaz'm a, a territory recently wrested from Lithuania. In the second M uscovite-Lithuanian war ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 3 ), while still governor, he also served as a regimental officer in a striking force th at stormed Dorogobuzh . 35 Since the newly annexed territory was contiguous with the area already under his adm inistration, Ivan I I I extended his jurisdiction as governor over Dorogobuzh. He held this dual position between 1 5 0 3 and 1 5 0 5 . At the same time Ivan I I I pro­ moted Ivan Shchadra to the dum a rank of okol'nichiy ( 1 5 0 3 ) and allowed him to rem ain m ilitary governor . 36 We may draw several tentative conclusions from this information. Ivan Shchadra had been governor of Uglich, an im portant interior town, while still a m edium-ranking court functionary. U ntil late in his career he apparently ascended the ladder of the civil adm inistra­ tion, as may be inferred from the absence of his name from the mili­ tary register. Subsequently, when renewal of w ar with Lithuania was 88 P y o tr M ik h a y lo v ic h P le s h ch e y e v , a n o k o l'n ic h iy , w a s a ssig n e d as j u n i o r b o y a r to N o v g o ro d fro m 1490 to 1495 (see A p p e n d ix I I I ) . T h e s e n io r v ic e ro y in th e d e c a d e fro m 1485 to 1495 w as th e tru s te d b o y a r Y a k o v Z a k h a r'y e v ic h K o sh k in . 83 S ee A p p e n d ix I I I . 34 PSRL, X X V I I , M o s c o w /L e n in g ra d , 1962, p . 362. 36 Z im in , ‘S p iso k n a m e s tn ik o v ’, AE i960, p . 29. I v a n S h c h a d r a b e c a m e s e n io r n a m e s tn ik in 1503, w ith his h e a d q u a r te r s in V y a z 'm a , w h ile P rin c e F y o d o r Y u r'y e v ic h P ro zo ro v sk y , a n e ld e rly j u n io r b o y a r, b e c a m e th e s u b s id ia ry n a m e s tn ik in D o ro g o b u z h (ibid., p . 3 0 ). F o r I v a n S h c h a d r a ’s p a r tic ip a tio n in th e m ilita r y c a m p a ig n , see DRK, p . 2 6 ; PSRL , X X I I I , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1910, p . 196; fo r th e g e n e r a l d e v e lo p m e n ts , see J . L . I . F e n n e ll, Ivan the Great o f Moscow, C a m b rid g e , 1961, p p . 221 ff. 84 Z im in , ‘S o s ta v ’, A E 1957, p . 4 8 , n . 83.

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imm inent, he was given a particularly sensitive frontier post in the west. Though we cannot tell from the meagre source entries, he was most probably charged with keeping the territory loyal to Moscow. He also assumed responsibility for m aintaining local defences and for leading local contingents in time of war. Presumably Ivan I II pro­ moted Ivan Shchadra to the rank of okol'nichiy only in small p art for his successes in his last position. Entry to the dum a during this reign (as will be shown below) was never won for a single action; one may conclude that Ivan Schadra had successfully passed a series of tests over a long time, wherein he gave evidence of his fidelity, accomplishment and ability. Let us now turn to several instances where boyars received appointm ents as governors. Prince Semyon Ivanovich Ryapolovsky served as governor of the im portant eastern town of Suzdal' towards the end of the 1 5 th century, after his entry into the dum a as a boyar . 37 His governorship was connected with military ventures, the precise nature of which is not certain. In the K azan' campaigns of 1 4 7 8 and 1 4 8 7 he was one of the leading military commanders . 38 Between 1 4 9 7 . and 1 4 9 9 , the time of his execution for some still unidentified crime, he is repeatedly mentioned as a general on the K azan' frontier . 39 Relations with the khanate had taken a turn for the worse. The present writer suspects th at Ryapolovsky was gover­ nor and general assigned to Suzdal' on at least one, or perhaps several, of these occasions. Boyars did receive assignments as mili­ tary governors of districts when m ajor campaigns were in the offing. As was the case with Ivan Shchadra Vel'yam inov in V yaz'm a, Ryapolovsky’s responsibilities in Suzdal' were to assemble the regional forces in preparation for an offensive and to ensure adequate defence measures. Since Suzdal' was a m ajor pivot for river and road movement against K azan', the assignment of a boyar as governor becomes understandable. Special circumstances of a military or non-military nature occasionally called for the assignment of an influential boyar to the 87 A c c o rd in g to Z im in (‘S p iso k n a m e s tn ik o v ’, A E ig6o, p . 4 0 ), ‘P r in c e S e m y o n I v a n o ­ vich* s e rv e d as n a m e s tn ik in S u z d a l' ‘a t th e e n d o f th e fifte e n th cen tu ry * . U n f o r tu n a te ly h is s o u rc e (SIRIO, L I X , p . 549) d id n o t a llo w a m o re p re c ise d a tin g . S in c e P r in c e S e m y o n w as d e p o se d as a b o y a r a n d e x e c u te d in 1499, his serv ice in S u z d a l' to o k p la c e b e fo re t h a t d a te ( PSRL, V I , p . 243 ; X X I I I , p . 196). T h e first d o c u m e n ta r y m e n tio n o f P r in c e S e m y o n as a b o y a r d a te s fro m 1495 ( D R K , p . 19), b u t th e S h e re m e te v list cla im s th a t h e r e a c h e d th e r a n k in 1477/78 (DRV, X X , p . 4 ). T h o u g h Z im in (‘S o s ta v ’, A E 7957, p . 4 6) p re fe rs th e 1495 d a te , I a m in c lin e d to a c c e p t th e in fo rm a tio n fo u n d in th e S h e re m e te v list. I n 1477 P r in c e S e m y o n p a r tic ip a te d as a g e n e ra l in th e G r e a t R e g im e n t in th e N o v g o ro d ia n c a m p a ig n (DRK, p . 12). G iv e n th e size o f th e fo rce , th e le a d e rs h ip o f th e m o s t im p o r ta n t re g im e n t m u s t h a v e g o n e to b o y a rs. M o re o v e r, in th e fo llo w in g y e a r h e a n d V a sily F y o d o ro v ic h O b ra z e ts , w h o h a d b e e n b o y a r a t le a st sin ce 1475 (DRK, p . 11), w e re j o i n t c o m m a n d e r s o f a la rg e s trik in g fo rce a g a in s t K a z a n ' (PSRL, X X I I I , p . 162). 88 PSRL, X X I I I , p . 1 78; X X V I I I , p . 287. *• D RK, p p . 2 3 -4 . %

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office of namestnik. Vasily Fyodorovich Obrazets, grandson of Constantine Ivanovich Dobrynsky (a rich and influential personage in the reign of Vasily I I ) , 40 was one of the more trusted boyar confidants of Ivan III. He became a boyar in the early 1 4 7 0 s, cer­ tainly no later th an 1 4 7 5 . 41 O n a num ber of occasions Obrazets served as namestnik in various towns, but in each instance his service was tied to a specific grand-princely venture. In 1 4 7 7 he became governor in Torzhok on the eve of the Novgorodian cam paign . 42 Torzhok was a key centre of communications and a troop assemblypoint. Subsequently he led the G reat Regiment of one of the army wings attacking Novgorod . 43 In 1 4 7 9 I van H I nam ed Obrazets as his namestnik in Borovsk, with orders to apprehend secretly Prince Ivan Lyko Obolensky. Obolensky had defected to the service of one of Ivan I l l ’s brothers rather than face charges brought against him by the inhabitants of a Novgorodian frontier town for alleged viola­ tion of their rights during his tenure there as namestnik. Obrazets successfully carried out his mission . 44 Finally, after the conquest of T ver' in 1 4 8 5 , Ivan I I I assigned Obrazets as his governor of the conquered capital . 45 In each instance Ivan I I I used this trusted and responsible boyar to carry out a mission of importance. Assignments to governorships normally went to middle-ranking men of service, except when circumstances required the presence of a council member. In his list of namestniki for Ustyug in the last qu arter of the 1 5 th century, Zimin identified as governors Pyotr Fyodorovich Chelyadnin in 1 4 7 7 / 7 8 ; Prince Ivan Ivanovich Zloba (Zvenets?) in 1 4 8 8 ; and Fyodor Krasnyy ‘at the end of the 1 5 th century ’. 46 Pyotr Chelyadnin was a fifth-generation descendant of the famous A kinf Gavrilovich 47 and thus a m em ber of an old Muscovite serving family. Pyotr’s father had been a boyar in the later reign of Vasily I I 48 and his brother Andrey Fyodorovich attained boyar rank by ! 4 9 5 /g 6 ; 49 Pyotr himself became a boyar at least as early as 1475.60 40 S . B. V eselo v sk y , Feodal'noye zemlevladeniye v severo-vostochnoy Rusi, I , M o sc o w /L e n in g r a d , 1947, p p . 1 4 8 -9 . 41 A c c o r d in g to DRV, X X , p . 4 , h e b e c a m e a b o y a r in 1 4 7 3 /7 4 ;th e first d o c u m e n ta r y e v id e n c e is fo r 1475 (Z im in , ‘S o s ta v ’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p . 4 5 , n . 33 ). 42 Ioasafovskaya Utopis', p . 98. 43 D RK, p . 12; PSRL, V I , p . 207. 44 PSRL, V I , p . 222. 45 PSRL, X V , S t P e te rs b u rg , 1863, col. 500. 4# Z im in , ‘S p iso k n am estn ik o v * , A E i960, p . 40. 47 Vremennik, X , ‘M a te r ia ly ’, p p . 102, 104. 43 ASISR, I , N o . 277, p . 198; DDG, N o . 6 1 , p . 199. 42 D R K , p . 19; DRV, X X , p . 8. f „ 30 D RK, p . 11, w h e re h e is id e n tifie d o n ly as ‘P y o tr F y o d o ro v ic h ’. Z im in (‘S o sta v , A E 1957, p . 45) e rro n e o u s ly id e n tifie s h im as P y o tr F y o d o ro v ic h K h ro m o y . In d e e d , F y o d o r D a v y d o v ic h K h ro m o y h a d a so n n a m e d P e te r, b u t Z im in h im s e lf id e n tifie d th is P e te r as o n ly r e a c h in g th e r a n k o f o k o l'n ic h iy in a b o u t 1501 {ibid., p . 4 8 ).

VI 88 Possibly he attained this rank even earlier, for in 1472 he commanded the grand prince’s regiment at Aleksin at the time of the T atar invasion.51 This was an extraordinary occasion. Pyotr Fyodorovich apparently spent most of his time at court. He was one of the boyars selected to accompany Ivan I II on his state visits to Novgorod in 1475 and 1479,52 but in the final campaign against the republic Ivan gave him the governorship of Ustyug, rather far from the western theatre of w ar.53 Though the chronicler of Ustyug is unclear in his account of the events of the year 1477/78, the hostility of the K azan' khan accounted for the presence of a boyar as m ilitary governor of that isolated north-eastern frontier town. Fear of an im m inent attack compelled the citizens to rem ain inside the fort. Only the spring floods prevented the approach of a T atar force. Apparently advised of the inadequate defences of the old town by his boyar namestnik, Ivan I I I commanded him to raze the old forti­ fications and to replace them with a new set of walls.54 Ivan Ivanovich Zloba, hesitatingly and erroneously identified by Zimin as Prince Ivan Zvenets-Zvenigorodsky, does not appear in the published genealogies. There is no doubt, however, that this un­ known Zloba was namestnik of Ustyug in 1488/89, for in the cam paign against Vyatka of 1489 he is mentioned as a participant. According to the m ilitary register, in the boat force were ‘voyevoda Ivan Ivanovich Soltyk Travin and Prince Ivan Semyonovich Kubenskoy, and Yury Ivanovich Shestak, and the namestnik of Ustyug Ivan Ivanovich Zloba, and Prince Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets; and Zloba did not survive but died and they then took V yatka’.55 Zloba and Zvenets were obviously two different people; the former was not of princely stock. The «account in the Ustyug chronicle does cause some initial confusion. W ith an ususual eye for detail, the chronicler identified the contingent commanders on the Vyatka cam paign: ‘The Tverian voevody were Andrey Korobov and Prince Osip Dorogobuzhskoy; and of the Ustyuzhane, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets ; and of the Dvinyane, Prince Ivan Lyko, and of the Vashane and Kargopol'tsy, Yury Ivanovich Shostak’.56 At first sight it might be assumed that Prince Ivan Zvenets, as com m ander of the forces of Ustyug, was also the namestnik, though the chronicler carefully refrained from saying so. It should be explained th at the government of Ivan I I I relied 31* 31 PSRL, IV, p. 1 5 1 ; X X III, p. 1 6 0 . 6i D R K y pp. 1 1 , 1 3 . 53 Sec the lists of command for 1 4 7 7 / 7 8 in D RKt pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 64 Ustyuzhskiy letopisnyy svody Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 5 0 , p. 9 2 ; see also the short bio­ graphy by B. Beneshevich, ‘Chelyadnin, Pyotr Fedorovich’, Russkiy biogrqficheskiy slovar St Petersburg, 1 9 0 5 , p. 1 3 8 . 33 DRKy p. 1 5 . 33 Ustyuzhskiy letopisnyy svody p. 9 7 .

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upon a practice whereby selected members of the grand-princely regiment (the dvor) received assignments to organise and lead regional contingents when a major cam paign was in the offing. Only the forces of Pskov and Novgorod the G reat were exempted from this practice, largely because veteran commanders invariably received those assignments. Thus on this major cam paign against Vyatka, com m anded by the boyar Prince Danilo Shchenya, Yury Shestak and Prince Ivan Lyko Obolensky (rehabilitated after his disgrace of 1479) are immediately identifiable as junior boyars of the court g u ard .57 So too is Prince Ivan Zvenets. Zvenets was first mentioned in the chronicles in 1468 as the m ilitary com m ander of the Ustyug contingent in the K azan' cam paign.58 In 1475 he was a junior boyar at court.59 Im m ediately after the successful Vyatka campaign of 1489, this servitor of more than twenty years’ service became an okol'nichiy (1490).60 Fyodor Krasnyy, like Zloba, is not identifiable from such a vague description (‘Fyodor the H andsom e’). It is certain, however, that he was not a m em ber of the dum a. An exam ination of the persons assigned as namestniki to the key town of Nizhniy Novgorod will demonstrate further the general lack of correlation between the ranks of governors and the importance of the towns assigned to their keeping. Since Nizhniy Novgorod lay at the confluence of the Oka and Volga rivers, on the frontier of the K azan' khanate, its significance as a trading, communications and defence centre cannot be questioned. Zimin identified D m itry Vasil'yevich Bobr as namestnik there ‘at the end of the 15th century’.61 From information currently available we cannot tell w hether Ivan I I I employed dual namestniki in Nizhniy Novgorod as he did in Novgorod the Great. Dmitry Bobr served neither in the dum a nor in any im portant army command. M uch earlier, in 1446, he had been a junior boyar, one among many who joined in the conspiracy to win Vasily II his freedom and return him to the throne of his forefathers.62 Thereafter his name disappears from the pages of the chronicles and from the documents pertaining to court activities. H e did purchase a village in Dmitrov uyezd.63 His elder brother, Ivan Vasil'yevich Oshchera, had become an 67 67 See DRK, p. 1 1 for Shestak and pp. 1 7 , 1 8 for Prince Ivan Lyko Obolensky. A con­ siderable num ber of the members of the grand princely regiment and the court branch of the dvor accompanied Ivan I II to Novgorod in 1 4 9 5 ; fortunately their names are listed in the military register {ibid.y pp. 2 0 - 2 2 ). « PSRLy V I, p. 1 8 8 ; V III, St Petersburg, 1 8 5 9 , p. 1 5 3 . *• PSRLy V I, p. 2 0 3 ; D R K y p. I I . #0 Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E iQ57y p. 4 7 and n. 6 3 . #1 ‘Spisok namestnikov’, A E / 9 6 b, p. 3 2 . •* PSRLy X X V , Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 4 9 , p. 2 6 7 ; Veselovsky, ASISR, I, p. 6 1 6 . •a ASISRy I, No. 3 8 9 , p. 2 8 3 .

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okornichiy by the 1470s.64 Possibly it was through his influence that Dm itry Bobr attained the tem porary but lucrative post of governor of Nizhniy Novgorod. In 1491 this post was held by one Ivan Vasil'yevich.65 This seems to have been Ivan Vasil'yevich Chebot, descended from an old Muscovite boyaral family, the Sviblovs, with a record of distinguished service to the early rulers of Muscovy. He attained the rank of okol'nichiy by 149066 and served almost exclusively at court in capacities as yet undiscovered.67 It should be noted that 1491 was a year of peace with K azan' and that Ivan I I I was then mobilising his army, including the regiments of the now friendly K azan' khanate, to aid his ally, the khan of the Crimea. This would explain why a civilian rather than a w arrior should be assigned to a sensitive military vantage point.68 Prince Fyodor Khovansky was namestnik in the eastern frontier town of M urom in 1489.69 A descendant of the Lithuanian ruler Gedimin, he belonged to the Patrikeyev branch of the family.70 W hen he or his father first came to Muscovy is uncertain. A part from this office Prince Fyodor never attained any significant posi­ tion. Perhaps in disappointm ent, the Khovanskys transferred their allegiance to the appanage princes of the Moscow house. Fyodor’s son, Prince Andrey Fyodorovich Khovansky, served in the udely of Volok and Uglich in the subsequent reign of Vasily I I I .71 These illustrations indicate the value to be derived from a com­ parison of the known membership of the dum a and the governors selected for the m ajor towns of the realm. F urther systematic inquiry may lead to a réévaluation of the system whereby certain persons were assigned to provincial posts in the second half of the 15th century. Sweeping generalisations based upon single illustrations are insufficient. A better way of assessing the rôle played by the dum a, given the relative absence of contem porary commentaries, would be to discover the functions assigned to its members. This necessitates first the identification of the dum a’s personnel, and for this we must depend heavily upon Zimin’s research—which still needs to be comVremennik, X , ‘M aterialy’, p. 1 2 2 ; D RK, pp. 1 1 , 1 3 . Zimin, ‘Spisok namestnikov**•, A E i 9 6 0 , p. 3 2 . *• PDS, I, cols. 2 6 - 7 . 67 This can be deduced from the fact that his name is not found in the military service register and that he had occasion and opportunity to become a close friend of Prince Vasily Danilovich Kholmsky, in that he was a distinguished participant a t the latter’s wedding party in the Kremlin in 1 5 0 0 (D R K , p. 9 ). •* PSRL, X X V III, p. 2 9 0 . •• Zimin, ‘Spisok namestnikov’, A E i 9 6 0 , p. 3 2 . 70 Vremennik, X , ‘M aterialy’, p. 2 2 5 . 71 Zimin, ‘Knyazheskiye dukhovnyye gramoty nachala X V I v.*, Istoricheskiye zapiski, X X V II, 1 9 4 8 , p. 2 7 9 . •4 86

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pleted.72 After identification it is necessary to ascertain, as best we can from the meagre evidence, the responsibilities assigned to these individuals. Ill Identity, duties assigned, and the dum a’s effect upon decision­ making—these are vital enough questions ; yet it may also be possible to learn more of the politics of the time by inquiring into the methods employed to win membership in the small exclusive club that was the dum a. T he effects of family connection and m arital ties upon political influence have hardly been touched upon. Why, for example, when a son m anaged to follow his father into the dum a, was that son not always the eldest?73 W here members of families previously excluded from it did finally break into the charmed inner ring, w hat leverage did they employ ? W hy should the scion of one favoured family be preferred over th at of another? W hy should members of some old boyaral families continue to enjoy promotion to the highest positions, while others found themselves relegated to second rank or to displacem ent? W hat role did competition play, and w hat were the rewards for ability, success and loyalty ? One needs to consider w hether the great achievements of Ivan I l l ’s foreign 73 Zimin (‘Sostav', A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 4 ) himself has suggested the difficulty of reconstructing the dum a membership in Ivan I l l's reign: T t is not possible to ascertain accurately the composition of the boyar dum a, and even less so the changes in its composition at the end of the 1 5 th century, in view of the paucity of materials’. 73 For example, the distinguished, powerful and rich Patrikeyev family might be taken to illustrate the point. Yury Patrikeyevich had m arried the sister of Vasily I early in the 1 4 th century. In consequence he soon became one of the leading Muscovite boyars and rem ained im portant to the middle of the 1 5 th century. According to the genealogical lists, Yury had two sons, Vasily and Ivan (PSRL, V II, St Petersburg, 1 8 5 6 , 2 5 4 - 5 ; Vremennik, X , M aterialy, p. 2 2 5 ). T h e second son became the all-powerful namestnik in Ivan I l l ’s reign, though he, as did so m any others in the time of civil wars, won early promotion to boyar from an appreciative Vasily II. His elder brother, who sired the senior line of Patrikeyevs, does not appear to have become a dum a member, although his two sons, Princes Ivan Bulgak and Danilo Shchenya, eventually became boyars. Ivan Yur'yevich had three sons: Mikhaylo Kolushka, Vasily Kosoy (later the monk Vassian) and Ivan M yndyna. O f these only the second, Vasily Kosoy, reached boyar rank. We know that Mikhaylo Kolushka served as a junior boyar, for he so appears in the retinue of Ivan I II in 1 4 7 5 (D R K , p. 1 1 ), Some time between 1 4 7 5 and 1 4 9 9 he died or was killed, but the youngest son survived (DDG, No. 8 7 , pp. 3 4 5 - 9 ). There is no record of his services, yet we are informed th at when Ivan I II ordered the arrest of Prince Ivan Yur'yevich in 1 4 9 9 , he also included his children (i.e. Vasily Kosoy and Ivan Myndyna) in his instructions {PSRL, X X III, p. 1 9 6 ; X X V III, p. 3 3 1 ). Another pertinent illustration is that of the Muscovite branch of the Kholmsky family. Prince Danilo Kholmsky became a boyar in the m id- 1 4 7 0 s. H e had two sons, Princes Semyon and Vasily ( Vremennik, X , ‘M aterialy’, p. 5 1 ). Veselovsky (Selo i dereonya 0 severovostochnoy Rusi X IV -X V I vv., Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 3 1 , p. 7 2 ), following the information of the Sheremetev list (DRV, X X , p. 7 ), stated that the elder son, Semyon, attained boyar rank in 1 4 9 4 / 5 . Yet in the latter p art of 1 4 9 5 Prince Semyon is listed in the ranks of the junior boyars in the retinue of Ivan I I I (DRK, p. 2 4 ). T here is no documentary evidence to support the claim of the Sheremetev list. O n the other hand, the second-bom son, Prince Vasily, who m arried a daughter of Ivan I II in February 1 5 0 0 (DRK, p. 9 ), probably be­ came a boyar immediately afterwards, although the first documentary confirmation of this dates from m id - 1 5 0 4 (Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 8 ).

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and domestic policies, both in formulation and in execution, can be tied to the functioning of the dum a. A modicum of testimony by a contem porary, Ivan Bersen' Beklemishev, a fairly low-ranking but highly regarded diplom at at the court of Ivan I I I in the last thirteen years of his reign,74 indicates that he respected the advice given by his councillors.78 In one instance he refused to give audience to an imperial Austrian envoy without having his boyars present.76 In the 1570s Prince Andrey Kurbsky, a former boyar of the council of Ivan IV , then living in Lithuanian sanctuary, looked back to the time when councillors were respected and their advice played a p art in the form ulation of Muscovite policy : It is hardly worth mentioning him who is still on the lips of everyone there [in Russia], namely the grandfather of the tsar, Grand Prince Ioann [Ivan], who increased his frontiers to such an extent, and, still more wondrous, drove out the khan of the Great Horde in whose bon­ dage he had been, and destroyed hisy u rt, not because of bloodthirstiness and love of plunder, no, but in truth, because he took frequent counsel with his wise and bold advisers; for they say that he greatly loved counsel and ventured on nothing without much profound counsel.77 Both Ivan Bersen' Beklemishev and Prince Kurbsky railed against the grand princes in the light of personal wrongs done to them ; the one against Vasily II I , the other against Ivan the Terrible. They sensed but did not fully articulate the essential differences in conditions that existed between the 15th and 16th centuries, between the tem per and character of an Ivan I I I and the traits of his successors. In the latter p art of the 15th century Ivan I I I and his advisors endeavoured to win the allegiance of the w arrior class in areas recently annexed or in those marked for conquest. Emoluments and rewards had to be dangled before them. At the same time the Muscovite men of service, whose rights as free servitors had suffered considerable restriction, had to be assured th at their positions would not be endangered. Inevitably, conflicts arose between titled immigrants and members of the old service groups, which sometimes assumed a political form. 74 DRK, p. 2 1 ; SIRIO, X X X V , pp. 6 0 , 6 8 , 7 4 , 8 2 , 1 0 8 , 1 1 7 - 3 6 , 4 9 5 ; X L I, pp. 4 3 3 - 4 4 , 4 5 2 ,453-65.471,477, 4 8 1 , 4 8 3 , 4 8 8 , 5 2 6 , 5 3 7 , 5 4 1 . 75 According to Ivan Nikitich Bersen' Beklemishev, Ivan I II encouraged contrary opinions, even rewarding those who differed from him. Sergeyevich, Lektsii, p. 2 6 5 ; Klyuchcvsky, Kurs russkoy istorii in Sochineniya, II, p. 1 6 2 . 74 W hen the imperial envoy, Nicholas Poppel, came to Moscow in 1 4 8 9 on his second visit, he requested a private audience with the grand prince. Ivan I II initially replied that he would not meet the envoy unless his boyars were present (PDS, I, col. 6 ). Present at the subsequent interview were Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev, Prince Danilo Shchenya, and Yakov Zakhar'yevich Koshkin, who was then namestnik in Novgorod (Pronshteyn, Velikiy Novgorod, p. 2 6 0 ; cf. V. N. Bernadsky, Novgorod i novgorodskaya zemlya v X V veke, Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 6 1 , p. 3 3 2 ). 77 Kurbskys History o f Ivan IV, ed. and trans. J . L. I. Fennell, Cambridge, 1 9 6 5 , p. 8 9 .

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T he delicate problems involved in stemming these conflicts de­ m anded, and quite possibly received, a good deal of discussion in the dum a. T he problems of the 16th century were quite different. Im m igra­ tion of foreign orthodox warriors diminished with the lack of m ilitary success against L ithuania. Increasingly the rulers of Muscovy found it expedient to spurn the voluntary cooperation of the m ilitary magnates, as they began to fashion coercive weapons to enforce their participation. T he growth of the pom eshchik group as a depen­ dent and obedient fighting organisation; the annexation of surround­ ing orthodox principalities ; the broader definition of treason, ending the right of free departure ; the growth of an impersonal relationship between the ruler and his m ilitary following; and finally the inincreasing tendency to rule by decree— all these factors contributed to the arbitrariness condemned by Beklemishev and Kurbsky. In tem peram ent and m anner of action Ivan I I I also differed sharply from his son and grandson. How much this difference may be attributed to acceptance of the advice of his council, we cannot tell ; b u t he appears to have been cautious, calculating and deliberate. He manoeuvred his adversaries into positions where they felt compelled to act, so m aking it appear th at he was reacting in defence of formu­ lated treaties or of custom, or even to protect the faith. A selfstyled upholder of past traditions, he interpreted custom and history to benefit the monarchy, to transform the present to his advantage. N either of his two im m ediate successors displayed the patience, craftiness, or even the occasional willingness to forgive, of Ivan III. Sigismund von Herberstein, H absburg ambassador to the court of Vasily I I I in the early years of the 16th century, commented on the powers of the Muscovite prince as com pared to those of sovereigns in the L atin west : In the control which he exercises over his people, he easily surpasses all the rulers of the entire world. That which his father began, he himself carried out : without exception, he forces all the princes and others out of all forts and fortified places. He certainly permits no citadels to belong to his brothers, nor entrusts any to them. He obliges all people to do hard service, to such an extent that whomever he orders to be with him at court, or to go to war, or to go on any mission is forced to do so at his own expense.78 I t would appear th at Vasily I I I relied more upon favourites and state secretaries, and commensurately less upon his council.79 And Ivan IV asserted th at Russian autocracy was an inheritance from his fore79 Commentaries on Muscovite Affairs by Sigismund, Freiherr von Herberstein, Nyberg and Guttenhagy ed. and trans. Oswald P. Backus III, Lawrence, Kansas, 1 9 5 6 , p. 1 6 . 79 Solov'yov, Istoriya Rossiif I II, p. 2 9 9 .

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94 fathers: (But as for the Russian autocracy, they themselves [the autocrats] from the beginning have ruled the[ir] dominions and not the boyars and not the grandees’.80 W hile more influential, the members of Ivan I l l ’s dum a none­ theless owed their positions to the continued confidence of the grand prince, m uch as did their successors. Once adm itted to the dum a, members served for life, although always subject to the ruler’s pleasure. Periodic expulsions acted as a forcible rem inder where supreme power resided.81 Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev was the most im portant boyar in Ivan I l l ’s reign. His father, Prince Yury Patrikeyevich, descended from the royal Lithuanian house of Gedimin, came to serve in Moscow early in the 15th century. There he m arried the sister of Vasily I and im m ediately became a boyar. In the divisive civil wars of the reign of Vasily II, Prince Yury rem ained steadfastly loyal until his death in the 1440s.82 His second son Ivan is first mentioned as a m ilitary com m ander in 145583 and as a boyar by 1461/62.84*I f we accept that he entered the dum a in the year 1462, Prince Ivan rem ained a boyar for thirty-seven years. L ater he, like his father before him, became m ilitary governor of Moscow and chairm an of the dum a. Foreign governments recognised the rôle played by Prince Ivan. The expense account of a representative from R eval' lists a gift for him upon arrival in Moscow.86 W hen the Lithuanian magnates sought to persuade Ivan I I I to reduce frontier incidents or to end war, they addressed letters specifically to Prince Ivan Patrikeyev, who non-committally replied in the name of ‘We and our brethren, the rada [i.e. dum a] of our sovereign’.86 W hen an im m igrant general, whose loyalty was called in question, had to swear never to leave Muscovite service, the quasi-religious ceremony and the deposit of a bond by his friends took place before Prince Ivan, who then affixed his seal to the docum ent.87 So powerful was this first boyar of the realm that when Ivan I l l ’s brother, Audrey the 80 The Correspondence Between Prince A. M . Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV o f Russia, 1 5 6 4 - 1 5 7 g, cd. and trans. J . L. I. Fennell, Cambridge, 1 9 5 5 , pp. 1 3 , 1 5 . 81 Lur'ye, Ideologicheskaya bor'ba, p. 5 3 . T he case of the disgrace of the boyar V. F. Obrazets, suggested by Zimin (‘Sostav’, AE 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 7 ) stems from the misinterpretation of a source. Both the enum eration of disgraces and the reasons given for them are in need of a thorough reexamination. 88 Kazakova, Vassian Patrikeyev, p. 3 7 ; PSRL, V II, 2 5 4 - 5 ; X X V III, pp. 1 0 4 , 1 0 7 , 1 1 0 . 88 PSRL, V III, p. 1 4 4 . 84 DDG, No. 6 1 , pp. 1 9 8 - 9 . 88 Liv-, est- und kurländisches Urkundenbuch, Series II, Vol. I, Riga/Moscow, 1 9 0 0 , No. 3 1 , pp. 2 1 - 2 . 88 SIRIO, X X X V , St Petersburg, 1 8 8 2 , No. 2 2 , pp. 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 - 8 . This practice con­ tinued well into the 1 6 th century: so S. O. Shmidt, ‘K istorii Tsarskago arkhiva*, Trudy Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo istoriko-arkhivnogo instituta, X I, Moscow, 1 9 5 8 , pp. 3 8 4 - 5 . 87 Sobraniye gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khranyashchikhsya 0 gosudarstvennoy kollegii inostrannykh del (hereafter cited as SGGD), I, Moscow, 1 8 1 3 , No. 1 0 3 , pp. 2 4 9 - 5 0 .

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Elder, heard a rum our in 1488 th at he was about to be arrested, he appealed to Prince Ivan Patrikeyev to determ ine the tru th of the m atter, b u t the latter prudently refused.88 From the early years of Iv an I l l ’s reign he appears as one o f the boyars who gave advice to the grand prince in judicial appeals.89 Between 1495 and 1499 Prince Ivan Yur'yevich and his son Prince Vasily Ivanovich were charged with collecting the reports of such cases and carrying out the grand-princely judgm ents pertaining to them .90 By the time Prince Ivan Patrikeyev was deposed as a boyar in 1499, charitably forced into m onk’s garb rather than suffer the penalty of execution, he had accum ulated riches far greater than those of any other boyar or even a jun io r prince of the house of Moscow.91 As the reason for Ivan I l l ’s severe judgem ent against his ally in the great council is not to be found in the sources, theories abound. His influence, and possibly his political involvements, had reached a level which m ade him dangerous to the monarchy’s interests. W ith a severity th at Kurbsky would associate with Vasily I I I or Ivan IV , Ivan I I I ensured the collapse of the Patrikeyevs by in­ carcerating Prince Ivan and his sons. U nable to m arry and lacking heirs, this branch of the house of Gedimin became extinct in the next generation.92 In view of the available evidence it would be dangerous to attem pt a ranking of the rem aining members of the dum a in descending order of im portance. N or is this possible on the basis of which councillors rem ained at court and which received assignments away from Moscow. In fact, it would appear th at all the council members spent most of their time in the capital. The most sedentary were the treasurer {ka zn a ch ey) and the state steward (dvoretskiy) .93 The chair88 302

PSRL, V III, p.

217

. For speculation about this affair see Fennell, Ivan the Greaty p.

.

ASISR, I, Nos. 3 3 0 (p. 2 4 0 ), 4 3 0 (p. 3 2 0 ). 80 See L. V. Cherepnin, Russkiye feodal'nyye arkhivy X IV -X V vekov, I I, Moscow, 1 9 5 1 , pp. 3 0 6 - 8 . 81 Com pare the holdings described in his testament (DDGt No. 8 6 , pp. 3 4 5 - 9 ) with those of other boyars, such as Andrey Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev (ASISR, I, No. 5 6 2 , pp. 4 3 9 - 4 2 ) and Vasily Borisovich Tuchko Morozov (ibid.t No. 6 1 2 , pp. 5 2 3 - 5 ); see also J . Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century, Princeton, 1 9 6 1 , p. 2 0 2 . 82 Vremenniky X , ‘M aterialy’, p. 2 2 5 . 88 This was certainly the case for Dm itry Volodimirovich Khovrin, youngest son of the boyar V ladim ir Grigor'yevich Khovrin ( Vremenniky X , ‘Materialy*, p. 8 9 ; Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 19 5 7 y p. 4 4 ), who became kaznachey around 1 4 9 4 / 5 (DRKy p. 1 9 ; D RVt X X , p. 8 ). H e never so much as led a detachm ent into battle, as did most of the other boyars. Only on one known occasion did he leave Moscow in an official capacity, and that was in 1 4 9 5 » when he joined the retinue of the grand prince for the state visit to Novgorod (D RKf p. 1 9 ). This is the only m ention of Dm itry Khovrin in the Razryadnaya kniga. There are num erous citations attesting his participation in diplomatic activities at court (see SIRIO, X X X V , X L I, PDS, I). Ivan I II inherited his first dvoretskiy from his father’s administration. According to the Belyayev list (Rospis' dvortsovykh chinov), Mikhail Fyodorovich Saburov was dvoretskiy for the first year of Ivan I l l ’s reign, that is, to 1 4 6 3 / 4 (Zimin, ‘O sostave’, Istoricheskiye zapiski, 88

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m an of the dum a, who was also the governor of the capital and the m ilitary prefect, rarely absented himself, and then only on m ilitary matters in exceptional circumstances.94 T he rem aining boyars led the armies on m ajor cam paigns.9596 L X III, p. 2 0 3 ) ; according to the Shcrcmctev list, there were two dvoretskiye in 1 4 6 2 » Suburov and Grigorey Vasil'yevich Zabolotsky. Saburov, according to this list (DRV, X X , p. 2 ), died in 1 4 6 3 / 4 . Veselovsky (ASISR, I, p. 6 1 3 ) believed that Saburov acquired boyar rank towards the end of Vasily Fs reign, i.e. prior to 1 4 2 5 . During the civil wars he trans­ ferred allegiance to Prince Dmitry Shemyaka of Galich. In 1 4 4 7 Shemyaka entrusted Saburov with the mission of escorting the captive G rand Princess Sofia (m other of Vasily II) back to her son in Moscow. Saburov never returned to Shemyaka, defecting to the side of Vasily II. Presumably in return for his service and continued loyalty, Saburov reentered grand-princely employ as dvoretskiy. W hether he was actually adm itted to the dum a as a boyar is not known. He died without leaving any male heirs. T he information about Saburov’s immediate successor is confusing. In the Belyayev list it is recorded that Grigorey Vasil'ye vich Zabolotsky became dvoretskiy for a year upon the death of Saburov (Zimin, ‘O sostave*, Istoricheskiye zapiski, L X III, p. 2 0 3 and pp. 1 8 1 - 2 ) ; in the Sheremetev list (DRV, X X , p. 2 ) Saburov and Zabolotsky are recorded as joint holders of the office, Saburov dying in 1 4 6 3 / 4 and Zabolotsky in 1 4 7 3 (ibid., p. 3 ). The Sheremetev list further records that, upon the death of Saburov, Mikhaylo Yakovle­ vich Rusalka Morozov became dvoretskiy. But it is not evident from the source whether Zabolotsky continued in the office until his demise. All that is certain is that Zabolotsky had been a boyar in the later reign of Vasily I I and continued as one into the subsequent reign (so Veselovsky, ASISR, I, p. 6 1 3 ). W orthy of note is that none of these boyars took p art in any military campaigns or received posts as namestniki. While the evidence for these assertions is rather thin, we are also in want of proof to show that the state stewards ever received governorships over Muscovite towns or districts. Concerning Mikhaylo Yakovlevich Rusalka Morozov we are better informed. T he Belyayev list (Zimin, ‘O sostave’, Istoricheskiye zapiski, L X III, p. 2 0 3 ), and the Shereme­ tev list as well, suggest that Morozov became dvoretskiy in 1 4 6 5 . But the way to the top was much slower than these sources indicate. T hough Mikhaylo Yakovlevich, as a junior boyar, was among those to free Vasily II in 1 4 4 6 (PSRL, X X V , p. 2 6 7 ), he did not achieve the rank of okol'nichiy until 1 4 6 5 , or perhaps a bit later. T he first indication of his eleva­ tion, as reflected in extant official documentation, is for 1 4 7 5 (DRK, p. 1 1 ). By 1 4 9 0 he became a boyar, one of the few to reach the top via the administrative route (SIRIO, X X X V , No. 1 2 , pp. 5 0 - 1 ). T he notices we have do not indicate that he participated in land disputes appealed to the grand-princely court, or that he took part in any adminis­ trative functions outside the duties dem anded by his office. H e was one of the few of boyaral rank to receive a land grant in Novgorod, after the division of that territory into pomest'ya. (See Veselovsky, FeodaVnoye zemlevladeniye, I, p. 2 9 6 .) 94 Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev, frequently mentioned as a m ilitary com m ander in his early career—which went back to the 1 4 5 0 s (PSRL, X X V , pp. 2 7 3 , 2 7 6 ; IV, p. 1 4 8 ) —took less part in such activity during the reign of Ivan I II . This change coincided with his elevation to the office of military prefect of Moscow. In 1 4 7 8 he participated, as did most of the council boyars, in the great offensive against Novgorod (DRK, p. 1 2 ). In 1 4 8 0 he was, as senior boyar, charged with the defence of the capital during the crisis engen­ dered by K han Ahmed’s invasion (PSRL, IV , p. 1 5 3 ; V I, p. 2 2 5 ). Thereafter he rarely led forth the Moscow regiment. In 1 4 8 5 /6 , when the deposed G rand Prince Mikhail of T ver 7 attem pted to launch an invasion from Lithuanian soil, Ivan I I I despatched Prince Ivan Yur'yevich with the Moscow garrison force to drive him back (PSRL, X X III, p. 1 6 2 ). His successor, the much younger Prince Vasily Kholmsky, participated in several m ajor campaigns at the turn of century, in 1 5 0 2 and in 1 5 0 4 / 0 5 (DRK, pp. 3 1 , 3 3 ; PSRL, X X V I, p. 2 9 6 ). 96 See D R K , p. 1 2 , for the principal military chiefs in the Novgorodian cam paign of 1 4 7 7 / 8 : Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev, Vasily Obrazets, Vasily and Ivan Borisovich (Tuchko-Morozov), Prince Semyon Ryapolovsky and Prince Aleksandr Vasil'yevich Obolensky; 1 4 8 2 : Prince Ivan Vasil'yevich Bulgak (DRK, p. 1 3 ) ; 1 4 8 7 / 8 : Prince Danilo Dmitriyevich Kholmsky (ibid., p. 1 4 ); 1 4 8 9 : Prince Danilo Vasil'yevich Shchenya (ibid., p. 1 5 ) ; 1 4 9 2 : Prince Danilo Kholmsky and Yakov Zakhar'yevich (ibid., p. 1 5 ), etc. These are a few examples chosen from the m ilitary register. Chronicle information will support and amplify the generalisation. It may be noted that the policy of having boyars as commanders on major campaigns and junior boyars in charge of smaller ventures was

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As noted earlier, with the exception of the boyar assigned to Novgorod as senior viceroy, dum a members rarely received gover­ norships o f provinces or towns. This exception constituted an innovation. From 1478— th at is, from the moment of the formal incorporation o f Novgorod into the Muscovite realm— Ivan I II designated two governors to adm inister the affairs of the former re­ public. T he senior one was a lw a y s a m em ber of the dum a throughout Ivan I l l ’s reign.98 This vast territory—greater in size than that of its*• an inheritance from the later reign of Vasily II. In the early 1 4 th century, when the governing family was small, the princes placed great responsibility upon the boyars for military leadership. But even Dm itry Donskoy, who paid such great tribute to his boyars in his death-bed testimonial, relied heavily upon his cousin, Prince Vladim ir Andreyevich, for military direction. Vasily I surrendered to his brothers and cousins responsible military commands, in large p art because they added their contingents to the grand-princely levies. During the minority of Vasily II the loyal uncles served as regents and arm y leaders. But it was during those turbulent and trying days of civil war that a pronounced shift took place. T he lack of political reliability and the frequent ineptitude of royal rela­ tives led to their displacement by loyal and talented senior servitors. A study of the last years of Vasily I I ’s reign suggests that the quickness of promotion to boyar rank depended in considerable measure upon military successes. Throughout the second half of the 1 5 th century there is a continuing evolution in the process of utilising veteran servitors as senior commanders. Lower-ranking warriors acquired their experience in inferior assignments. As the foreign policy of Muscovy turned more active and the huge size of Muscovy forced the creation of regional defence forces, the functions previously exercised by the regional princes now fell to veteran commanders who had reached dum a rank. While this was still an age far from specialisation, when dum a appointees performed a variety of tasks, it is nonetheless noteworthy that the boyars by and large concerned themselves with m ilitary m atters in time of war, and the okol'nichiye remained the principal administrators per­ forming court duties. This prem ium on military function had m uch to do with the increasing prominence of a num ber of princely families residing in recently annexed territories. More and more of them enrolled in Muscovite service, where they were assigned to the military. A perusal of the m ilitary register (D R K ) indicates that they took advantage of the Muscovite need for professional fighting men and converted it to their benefit, for they began to dominate the ranks of the lower echelon commands by the fourth quarter of the 1 5 th century. Princes by birth, and thereby claiming superiority over the untitled, they wanted to displace the scions of the old Muscovite serving families. T he policy of encouraging defections to Mos­ cow and the desire to win the services of so many able-bodied servitors eased the decision to fill prim e low- and m edium-ranking military commands with these titled newcomers. In time the replacements for some of the first tier of dum a personnel were to come from the ranks of these recent arrivals to service. •• This statement is difficult to substantiate from studies currently available. Two interesting lists have appeared in recent years, endeavouring to establish the identities of the Novgorodian namestniki. O ne is Pronshteyn’s ( Velikiy Novogorod, pp. 2 5 9 ff.) and the other Zim in’s (‘Spisok namestnikov*, A E i 9 6 0 , pp. 3 3 - 6 ). Neither is complete, though Zim in’s is far superior. To use either without caution, however, would lead to error in generalisation. Because the evidence is incomplete, only single namestniks are entered for a num ber of years. In some instances, the single entry identifies a junior boyar, who could not possibly have been the senior namestnik. For example, okol'nichiy Pyotr Mikhaiylovich Pleshcheyev is listed by Zimin (Pronshteyn’s list is very similar) as having been namestnik in Novgorod in Jan u ary 1 4 9 1 , M ay 1 4 9 3 and January-F ebruary 1 4 9 5 . W e may assume from these citations that he was actually namestnik between 1 4 9 1 and 1 4 9 5 . For none of these years is a second namestnik mentioned, where there should have been one of boyar rank. Pronshteyn certainly adm itted in the text of his volume that ‘from the m om ent of its annexation to Moscow, in Novgorod there lived simultaneously two namest­ niki, possessing equal rights and position* ( Velikiy Novgorody p. 2 0 4 ). While the second p art of his statement is subject to revision, the first part is correct. V. N. Bemadsky in his excellent Novgorod i novgorodskaya zemlya v X V veke (Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 6 1 ) bears this out indirectly through several citations (pp. 3 3 2 , 3 3 3 , n. 1 0 2 ). T he senior namestnik in Novgorod in the second half of the 1 4 8 0 s to 1 4 9 5 at least was Yakov Zakhar'yevich, a boyar of the dum a. This was noticed by Bemadsky (p. 3 3 2 ) from a close reading of the m ilitary register.

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conqueror, although more sparsely inhabited— dem anded th at it be administered by governors with viceregal powers resident in the Novgorodian capital. T he responsibilities given these viceroys, whose area of jurisdiction adjoined hostile territory, necessitated the assignment of trusted and experienced adm inistrators who were also veteran arm y commanders. Moreover, m any served in the post of senior namestnik for unusually long periods of time. Yakov Zakhar'yevich Koshkin served as senior viceroy for a full decade ( ï 485-95) during which Moscow firmly established its control over the territory. In the subsequent ten-year period only three boyars served as senior viceroys. W ith the sole exception of an okol'nichiy, Pyotr Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev (1490-95), subordinate viceroys were not dum a members. T he post was considered so im portant that the junior governors were selected from veterans in the upperechelon m ilitary and administrative ranks. Several subsequently became members of the grand-princely council.97 The office of subordinate viceroy appears to have been a highly sought-after position as well as a responsible one. Success in this office undoubtedly enhanced a candidate’s chances of dum a mem­ bership. Moreover, the experience gained profited the m onarchy in the decisions to be made by dum a participants. In time of w ar these viceroys com m anded the Novgorodian contingents against the Livonian Knights, the Lithuanians, and T ver' in the 1485 cam paign th at ended its independence. Beyond that Ivan I I I em­ powered his viceroys to conduct diplomatic negotiations and even perm itted them to sign treaties in his nam e.98 I t seems certain that they first won approval from Moscow. Ivan I I I could hardly have relied upon his brothers to fulfil these large responsibilities. He suspected their political reliability and resolved to lim it their rôle in the affairs of state. Hence they were Strangely enough, Pronshteyn, who spotted the same evidence, interpreted it too narrowly —and hence missed its significance. H e stated that 'a t the end of the 1 5 th and beginning of the 1 6 th century this same namestnik, Yakov Zakhar'yevich, repeatedly led out the Novgorodian regiments against Lithuania and the Swedes’ ( Velikiy Novgorod., p. 2 0 5 ). H e might well have asked himself what a boyar was doing leading the Novgorodian forces, if he were not the senior namestnik and voyevoda. O n the very same page Pronshteyn stated: ‘T he namestniki commanded the Novgorodian arm y.’ Hence, in revising the lists of Novgorodian namestniki, it would seem advisable to suggest that when a voyevoda of boyar rank led out the Novgorodian levies, he was, in effect, the senior assigned namestnik in the former republic. Despite the paucity of evidence for the early years after annexation, it is possible to see that even at the very beginning the Muscovite court established a pattern whereby the senior namestnik was a m ember of the royal council. In 1 4 7 8 Ivan nam ed as first senior governor of Novgorod Prince Ivan Vasil'yevich Striga Obolensky (a boyar) and his brother, Prince Yaroslav Vasil'yevich Obolensky, who died without having reached the top rank. Cf. Appendix I II for the boyar namestniki. • 7 See Appendix I II : Yury Zakhar'yevich Koshkin, Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich Penko Yaroslavsky and Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky all became boyars. •s Pronshteyn, Velikiy Noogorodt pp. 2 0 6 ff.

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b u t rarely called upon, as their predecessors had been, to command armies on great campaigns. They were certainly not allowed to participate in the consolidation of royal power. IV T he okol'nichiye, as well as the majority of boyars, spent most of their time in court residence. Okol'nichiye generally appear to have had no great gifts in m ilitary matters. Both their norm al routes of service advancem ent and their infrequent assignment to posts de­ m anding m ilitary aptitude indicate th at their talents lay elsewhere. O nly a few participated in m ilitary ventures or served as provincial adm inistrators in special circumstances. Most busied themselves with dom ainal, court and occasional diplomatic assignments. These generalisations require further discussion. For some okol'nichiye evidence of military, diplomatic or judicial service is not recorded in the available sources. Undoubtedly Pyotr Fyodorovich Davydov, Grigorey Fyodorovich Davydov and Afanasy Stepanovich Sakmyshev served in posts concerned with court economy or adm inistration. Ivan Vasil'yevich Chebot similarly served at court; on several occasions he acted as an adviser in judicial disp u tes," and in only one known instance was he appointed a provincial governor.100 Ivan Vasil'yevich Oshchera also stayed close to the court adm inistration, never serving as namestnik or in a m ilitary command. I t is presumed th at he had been an okol'nichiy at the end of Vasily IP s reign, continuing in th at of his son Ivan I I I . 101 But either on the death of Vasily II or shortly after, there is a suspicion th at he entered the service of Ivan I l l ’s brother, Prince Yury Vasil'yevich of D m itrov.102 After 1472 he is again found in the grand-princely retinue; by 1475 Ivan I I I raised him to okol'nichiy ran k .103 Ivan I l l ’s liking for him may have accounted for his readmission into the dum a, though his previous service and experi­ ence should not be overlooked as a factor. According to one chronicle, this okol'nichiy was one of the close confidants of the grand prince in 1480 who urged his lord to make peace rather than fight K han A hm ed.104 T here is some indication th at he adjudicated land dis­ putes brought before the grand-princely court.106• •• ASISR, I, No. 5 3 6 , p. 4 1 2 ; II, No. 4 0 0 , p. 4 0 8 . Sec above, p. 9 0 . 101 So D R V, X X , p. 2 . 1 0 2 In 1 4 7 2 he was one of the three lay witnesses to that prince’s testament: DDG, No. 6 8 , p. 2 2 4 . 10 8 D R K ,p . 1 1 . 104 PSRL, V I, p. 2 3 0 . Ivan I I I must have valued Oshchera highly, for he took him with him on his two visits to Novgorod: DRK, pp. 1 1 , 1 3 . 1 06 ASISR, I, No. 4 3 0 , pp. 3 1 8 - 2 0 . 100

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ioo Pyotr Grigor'yevich Loban Zabolotsky played some p art in ceremonial and diplom atic functions. H e accom panied Ivan I I I on his state visit to Novgorod in 1495.106 L ater th at year he became a m em ber of the ceremonial cortège th at accom panied the grand prince’s daughter to Lithuania, where she was to m arry G rand Prince A leksandr.107 Two years later he again journeyed to Lithu­ ania, this time as a diplom at with instructions to dissuade Aleksandr from attacking Muscovy’s ally M oldavia.108 Pyotr Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev, like Ivan Shchadra Vel'yam inov,109 enjoyed a more varied experience than most of his fellow okol'nichiye. He became an okol'nichiy some time prior to O ctober 1487.110 L ater he served as second viceroy in Novgorod (1491-5) under the tutelage of boyar Yakov Koshkin.111 He subsequently assumed both m ilitary and diplomatic duties. In Ju n e 1497 Ivan I I I assigned him to a force sent against the Livonian Knights with the apparent purpose of negotiating with the G erm ans.112 1499/1500 found him as the namestnik in Kozel'sk113 in the recently annexed Lithuanian lands; as m ilitary governor he served under Yakov Zakhar'yevich in the 1500 cam paign against P utivl'.114 Towards the end of the second L ithuanian w ar Ivan despatched him to Lithuania to discuss armistice term s.115 Andrey Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev, an elder brother of Pyotr Mikhaylovich, was one of very few okol'nichiye to attain the rank of boyar in this reign. Unlike his more versatile brother, he made his way up through the civil adm inistration; his nam e does not appear in the m ilitary register. He became an okol'nichiy by 1475116 and continued to serve at court. He and his brother Pyotr went to Lithuania in 1482 to negotiate a safe conduct for Yelena of M oldavia, who was to m arry the heir to the throne, Ivan Ivanovich.117 W hen K han Ahmed invaded Muscovy in 1480, Ivan I I I sent his wife and his personal treasure to Beloozero for safe-keeping. Along with the grand princess he sent the boyar Vasily Borisovich Tuchko Morozov, the okol'nichiy Andrey Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev, and his secretary Vasily D olm atov,118 thus dem onstrating his confidence in their 103 D RK, p. 1 9 . SIRIO, X X X V , No. 3 1 , p. 1 6 3 . 103 PSRL, V I, p. 4 2 . 109 See above, p. 8 5 . 110 SIRIO, X X X V , No. i, p. i, n. i ; p. 4 . 111 See Appendix III. 118 D R K , p. 2 4 . 113 SIRIO, X X X V , p. 2 8 2 . 114 D R K , p. 2 6 . 116 PSRL, V I, pp. 4 8 - 9 ; SIRIO, X X X V , p. " • D R K , p. 1 1 . 117 PSRL, V I, pp. 2 3 4 - 5 . 113 Ibid.. V I, pp. 2 2 4 - 5 . 103 107

412

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I OI

loyalty and honesty. Five years later Ivan I I I assigned Pleshcheyev, with boyar Grigory Vasil'yevich Morozov, jo in t governor of Moscow while he personally led the cam paign against T v e r'.119 In 1490 Andrey Pleshcheyev, now a boyar, acted as court receptionist in greeting an envoy of King M axim ilian.120 Prince Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets Zvenigorodsky, who first appeared as a m ilitary servitor in the 1460s and 1470s,121 became an okol'nichiy in or before 1490122 and died six years later while on a diplomatic mission to the C rim ea.123 These meagre gleanings strongly indicate th at the okol'nichye busied themselves largely with court and administrative assignments, th at few derived profit from lucrative governorships, and that only a few served in m ilitary positions. V T he above-cited and other items of evidence in the mosaic of careers in which lam entably so m any stones are missing suggest that talent, evidence o f success and proven ability played some rôle in determ ining assignments to responsible positions and in selecting candidates who would in time be adm itted to the dum a. One looks in vain for evidence of failure in the careers of those who became dum a members. T hey apparently discharged their duties with efficiency and loyalty. This is not to say that m erit alone governed selection. Certainly family connections, advantageous marriages and even close friendships played their time-honoured p a rt in affecting decisions concerning prom otion and assignment. Even the fragmen­ tary inform ation available hints a t the powerful influence of m arriage and family relations upon prom otion.124 But such connections were not as decisive as first impressions m ight suggest. We should be in error, for example, if we were to assume th at because Prince Ivan Vasil'yevich Striga Obolensky was a boyar in the earlier years of Ivan I l l ’s reign,126 his brothers Aleksandr and Pyotr Nagoy auto“ • D R K , p. 1 4 . PDS, I, col. 2 6 . 1 , 1 PSRL, V I, p. 1 8 8 . ' “ D R K , p. 1 9 . '** Zimin, ‘Sostav*, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 7 , n. 6 3 . 1 . 4 See Appendices I and II. 1 . 4 Prince Ivan Vasil'yevich Striga Obolensky was the eldest of the six talented sons of Prince Vasily Ivanovich Obolensky. As a junior boyar he had served Vasily II with faith* fulness and distinction (PSRL, X X V , pp. 2 6 7 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 4 ). H e undoubtedly became a boyar in the later reign of Vasily II, since the Sheremetev list calls him boyar at the very outset of Ivan I l l ’s reign {DRV, X X , p. 2 ). Zimin’s investigation (‘Sostav’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 44 and n. 2 5 ) indicates th at die docum entary support for his ranking as a boyar can be dated between 1 4 6 2 and 1 4 6 4 . Prince Ivan Striga’s value as a boyar may be seen in the rôle he played in Yaroslavl' after its annexation in 1 4 6 3 . Ivan I II assigned him as namestnik in the newly assimilated region, where he took measures to introduce Muscovite practices

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matically won adm ittance to the d u m a.126 We should be hard pressed to explain why the rem aining three brothers were not allowed entry .127 The dum a had far too few openings to accommodate those who in earlier times would have won adm ittance by virtue of birth, influence and service. An inordinate pressure had developed by the (ASISR, I, No. 3 3 8 , p. 2 4 5 and p. 6 1 6 ). How long he served in this post is not known; thereafter he continued to serve as a senior general (PSRL, IV , p. 1 4 7 ; V, p. 2 7 5 ; V I, p. 1 8 7 ; X X V I, p. 2 2 2 ; A. V. Ekzemplyarsky, Velikiye i udel'nyye knyaz'ya sevemoy Rusi v tatarskiy period, II, St Petersburg, 1 8 9 1 , p. 3 7 2 . Apparently, Prince Ivan Striga’s success in his Yaroslavl7 post prom pted Ivan I II to assign him as senior namestnik in Novgorod in 1 4 7 8 , immediately after the annexation (PSRL, V III, p. 1 9 8 ; X X V , p. 3 3 2 ), but he died only a few months later (PSRL, V I, p. 1 9 ). 1># Prince Aleksandr Vasil'yevich most probably served in a court position prior to his selection as a boyar in 1 4 7 5 (D R K , p. 11 ; D R V , X X , p. 4 ). At least there is no record of his military career prior to this time. Thereafter, however, he took part in the major cam ­ paigns of the end of the century until his death in battle in 1 5 0 1 (DRK, pp. 1 2 , 1 5 , 2 4 ; PSRL, IV , p. 1 5 6 ; V I, p. 2 0 7 ; X X V I, p. 2 9 5 ). Prince Pyotr Nagoy became a boyar in 1 5 0 0 . For his career see below, p. 1 0 4 . 1 , 7 Prince Vasily Ivanovich Obolensky had six sons, of which only the first, second and fourth became boyars. T he third son, Yaroslav, the fifth, Vasily Telepen7, and the sixth, Fyodor Telepen7, did not. Prince Yaroslav first appears on the rolls of Muscovite service in 1 4 7 8 , when for a short time he became a divisional namestnik in the city of Novgorod ‘on the merchants* side’ under the jurisdiction of his eldest brother, Prince Ivan Striga (PSRL, V III, p. 1 9 8 ; Pskovskiye letopisi, I, Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 4 1 , p. 7 5 ). T he following year he was joint voyevoda of a detachm ent of local levies from Dmitrov and Borovich, sent to aid Pskov against the Livonian Knights (PSRL, V I, p. 2 3 4 ; Pskovskiye letopisi, I, p. 7 9 ). Between 1 4 8 5 and 1 4 8 8 he became the prince of Pskov. There he, his wife and a younger son caught the plague and died (Pskovskiye letopisi, I, pp. 8 0 - 1 ). While Prince Yaroslav served as prince of Pskov, there is considerable evidence that he was there on assignment by Ivan III. For no sooner did he die than the Pskovian chronicler recorded th at Ivan I II , in February 1 4 8 9 , sent his ‘namestnik*, Prince Semyon Romanovich Yaroslavsky, a future boyar, but then a rather high-ranking junior boyar of the court, to replace the deceased Prince Obolensky (ibid., I, p. 8 1 ). Since Prince Semyon Romanovich eventually became a boyar, one may suspect that Prince Yaroslav might have attained this rank through the same route, had he lived. It should be of interest to note (») that Ivan I I I assigned for the m ilitary defence of Pskov candidates who, from a Muscovite point of view that was shared by the Pskov chronicler, were namestniki of the grand prince, although Pskov m aintained its de jure independence; and (ii) that this kind of service as prince in Pskov counted in the testing procedure for dum a candidates. Further, we see another dimension of the accum ulated experience of the dum a membership and the advantages derived from having someone in the council who was personally conversant with Pskovian affairs. This aspect was missed by N. N. Maslenikova, Prisoyedineniye Pskova k russkomu tsentralizovannomu gosudarstvu, Leningrad, 1 9 5 5 , pp. 5 8 ff., in an otherwise interesting discourse on the increased dependence of Pskov on Muscovite suzerainty. W e know more about the youngest brother, Prince Fyodor, of this branch of Obolenskys th an of the next but youngest, Prince Vasily. Prince Fyodor Telepen 7 received only minor positions of trust in his early career. In 1 4 9 2 , when he was probably of middle age, he received his first significant assignment as a voyevoda of the reserve regiment in the ‘northern* campaign (DRK, p. 1 6 ). T hen in the same year he participated in the capture of Mchensk and brought its military governor to Moscow (PSRL, X X III, p. 1 6 1 ). In 1 4 9 4 he and his younger brother served as junior boyars assigned to ceremonial court functions (SIRIO, X X X V , No. 2 4 , p. 1 1 3 ). T he following year Prince Fyodor embarked upon a series of more im portant m ilitary assignments (DRK, pp. 1 9 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 3 2 ), indicating th at he had emerged in the upper echelons of command. His family connections stood him in good stead and he was one of the guests invited to the m arriage of Prince Vasily Kholmsky to Ivan I l l ’s daughter in 1 5 0 0 . While still a junior boyar at the time (DRK, p. 9 ), he did become a boyar in the following reign, that is after 1 5 0 5 (SIRIO, X X X V , No. 8 4 , p. 4 8 3 ) : T knyaz 7 velikiy Vasiley Ivanovich vyslal k nim s otvetom boyarina knyaz'ya Fyodora Vasil7yevicha Telepnya- Obolenskogo . . .* This information is not reflected in Zim in’s compilation.

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second half of the 15th century, due in p art to the considerable influx of m ilitary servitors from neighbouring free or annexed territories. T o a m uch greater degree this pressure derived from a sharp increase in the size of Muscovite boyaral families, which was symptomatic of a general increase in population. In the generation of the Obolensky family ju st mentioned there were twenty-three males. In the previous generation there had been only six, and in the one preceding th at b u t three.128 This is not an uncommon example. W hat connection and influence did ensure was a position con­ nected with the grand-princely court. The capital of Ivan I I I drew to it a large population, not only of artisans, merchants and a small arm y of labourers engaged in the reconstruction of the Kremlin, but also of warriors. T he size of the city’s population can be gauged from the fact th a t later, in the early 16th century, it contained 41,500 houses.129 For those with the requisite influence the doors of oppor­ tunity opened w ith relative ease. They acquired positions either in the personal regim ent of the grand prince (the dvor)130 or in the lower ranks of the court or the adm inistration.131 T he grand prince chose from this reservoir of ju n io r boyars (a rather confusing term de­ noting m edium -ranking men of service) those who were to command regional garrison forces,132 to adm inister oaths of allegiance to individuals or groups in newly annexed areas,133 or to serve him in a variety of ways. T he exercise of these duties, which kept such fortu­ nate m en in frequent contact with the grand prince and other 1 8 8 Vremennik, X , ‘M aterialy’, pp. 2 4 0 - 2 . 128 Commentaries on Muscovite Affairs, p. 7 3 . 1 8 0 For excellent examples of the junior boyars of the dvor, see the composition of the suite accompanying Ivan I I I to Novgorod in 1 4 7 5 (DRK, p. 1 1 ) and particularly in I495 {ibid.y pp. 2 0 - 2 ). T he latter list is particularly informative. 18 1 Take the excellent illustration found in the foreign policy papers dealing with L ithuania {SIRIO, X X V , No. 3 1 , pp. 1 6 0 - 2 ). O n 6 January 1 4 9 5 a negotiating team of high-ranking Lithuanians arrived a t Ivan I l l's court. After their initial audience with the grand prince, they retired to assigned quarters. T hen Ivan I I I sent the customary m ead to each of them. W hat interests us are the names of the servitors assigned this duty: K onstantin Grigor'yevich Zabolotsky, his brother Aleksey, and Ivan Grigor'yevich Mamonov. T he Zabolotsky brothers were the third and fifth sons of the deceased boyar Grigorey Zabolotsky. Konstantin had already achieved some diplomatic experience, since he had been an envoy to the Crimea in 1 4 9 2 {Ioasafovskaya letopis', p. 1 8 4 ). H e had also served as a census-taker and adjudicated land disputes in the nam e of the grand prince {Akty otnosyashchiyesya do yuridicheskago byta drevney Rossii, I, St Petersburg, 1 8 5 7 , No. 1 0 3 /II, cols. 6 3 9 - 4 0 ; Veselovsky in ASISR, I, p. 6 3 4 ). In 1 5 0 3 Ivan I I I promoted him to okol'nichiy (Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 7 9 5 7 , p. 4 8 and n. 8 2 ). T he younger brother, Aleksey, despite his military and diplomatic service (see D R K , pp. 2 0 , 2 5 , 2 6 ; PSRL> X X V I, p. 2 9 6 ), did not make the grade and dropped from sight after 1 5 0 4 . 1 8 8 Any num ber of illustrations can be culled from the chronicles to illuminate this point; one will suffice, since indications of this development are contained elsewhere in this article. In 1 4 6 9 Ivan I I I sent to Ustyug his voyevoda, Prince Danilo Vasil'yevich Yaroslavsky, a junior boyar, along with ten other members of the dvor. Since they were to participate in the cam paign against K azan7, obviously their task was to recruit the local militia and lead them in the forthcoming venture {PSRL, V III, p. 1 5 5 ). 1 8 8 Ioasafovskaya letopis', p. 1 1 4 : ‘A na pyat 7 kontsev [of Novgorod] poslal knyaz 7 velikiy svoikh detey boyarskikh i d'yakov svoikh, i priveli ikh vsekh k tselovaniyu na toy zhe gram ote: vse tselovali lyudi i zheny boyar'skye i vdovy i lyudi boyar'skiye’ (January 1 4 7 8 ). See also p. 1 2 5 for a similar occurrence in T ver 7 in 1 4 8 5 .

VI

104 im portant personages at court—at a time when relations between the court and its hum bler servitors were becoming more impersonal— had a considerable effect upon the careers of this group. But the ladder leading into the dum a was long and the climb arduous, even for those with relatives or friends within. Prince Pyotr Vasil'yevich Nagoy Obolensky, who had an elder brother in the dum a, served at least thirty-one years before he was prom oted boyar.134 Prince Semyon Romanovich Yaroslavsky was the first of his family to become a boyar. He first appears in the sources as a m edium -ranking servitor in 1467.135 He may have begun his service as early as 1463, when Muscovy annexed Yaroslavl'.136 H e served with distinction, and was occasionally rewarded with m ajor commands; he too waited over thirty years before his elevation to senior council ran k .137 The same applied to Prince Semyon Ivanovich Ryapolovsky. As a youth in 1446 he and his brothers joined the partisans of Vasily II against the Galich pretender. He appears to have remained in grand-princely service, for in 1458 he served as a com m ander in the K azan' campaign. Thereafter he dropped from sight of the chroniclers until 1477/78, when he emerged as a general in the Novgorodian cam paign.138 According to the Sheremetev list, Prince Semyon became a boyar in 1468/69.139 T he first docum entary substantiation dates from Jan u ary 1494.140 He thus served some thirty years prior to becoming a boyar. 1 8 4 T he first mention of Prince Pyotr Nagoy comes in 1 4 6 9 , when he led a most unusual and motley contingent on the K azan' campaign. T he force consisted almost wholly of merchants of the Surozh corporation, cloth merchants, and sons of the smaller Muscovite m erchantry, in addition to a num ber of other Muscovites, presumably artisans (PSRL, V I, pp. 1 8 8 - 9 ; X X V I, pp. 2 2 5 - 6 ). Prince Nagoy became a boyar in 1 5 0 0 and died nine years later (DRV, X X , pp. 9 , 1 4 ; Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 7 and n. 7 3 ). In the course of his long apprenticeship he served as a junior boyar of the grand-princely dvor (DRK, p. 1 1 ) and by the 1 4 9 0 s progressed to the position of a regimental com m ander (DRK, p. 1 8 ). In the year of his admission into the dum a he was one of the principal generals in the Lithuanian war (DRK, p. 2 7 ; PSRL, X X III, p. 1 9 6 ). I t may be of some interest that in addition to family advantage he also had some peerless court connections. This is witnessed by the composition of the wedding party of Ivan I l l ’s daughter. Prince Pyotr Nagoy served as one of the ‘best men* for the groom (DRK, p. 9 ). 1 3 6 H e led a detachm ent of junior boyars against the Cheremissians (PSRL, V III, p. 1 5 3 ; X X V I, p. 2 2 3 ). 1 3 3 PSRL, X X V II, p. 3 5 0 . 1 3 7 By 1 4 8 5 he reached the point where he acquired positions of considerable military responsibility. Both in 1 4 8 5 and in 1 4 8 7 / 8 he served as a regimental com m ander on the K azan' campaigns (DRK, pp. 1 4 - 1 5 ). In 1 4 8 9 Ivan I I I assigned his ‘namestnik’, Prince Semyon Yaroslavsky, to Pskov as replacement for the recently deceased Prince Yaroslav Obolensky (Pskouskiye Utopisi, I, pp. 8 0 - 1 ). 1 3 3 DRK, p. 1 4 . 1 3 3 DRV, X X , p. 3 . This information does not correspond with his assignment as prince of Pskov in 1 4 8 9 . Ivan I I I and his dum a advisors appear to have followed a strict policy of not assigning anyone of dum a rank to take charge of the responsibilities of prince while Pskov retained its de jure independence. Since Prince Semyon rem ained in Pskov until February 1 4 9 1 (Pskouskiye Utopisi, I, p. 8 1 ), he could not have become a boyar before his return to Moscow. 1 4 0 SIRIO, X X V , p. 1 1 4 ; Zimin (‘Sostav*, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 6 ,n . 6 o), relying on the informa­ tion from the DRK, used the 1 4 9 5 date as the first reference to Prince Semyon as a boyar.

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III

I O5

T he apprenticeship of okornichiye was commensurately shorter th an th at of boyars. This m ay be seen from the career of Ivan Grigor'yevich Morozov, whose father had been a boyar between 1475 and approxim ately 1491.141 The younger Morozov may have begun his service as early as the mid-1480s, although the first indisputable reference to his service activity dates from Jan u ary 1494.142 T hereafter he acquired a little m ilitary and considerable court experience143 being appointed okol'nichiy by 1507.144 Thus it took a t least thirteen years before this son of a boyar completed his journeym anship. Prince Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets Zvenigorodsky acquired his first significant com m and in 1468, as voyevoda of the Ustyug m ilitia,145 and became an okol'nichiy in about 1490,146 having served for at least twenty years. While these extended periods of service apparently applied to most dum a candidates during the latter p art of the 15th century, some exceptions were made. W hen political circumstances so dictated Ivan I I I dispensed with the usual testing period. Prince Danilo Kholmsky, who em igrated from T ver' to Moscow, and was perhaps the ablest of his line, served a journeym anship of five to nine years before becoming a boyar.147 Ivan I I I must have been elated to acquire the services of this high-ranking prince, whose brother was chief adviser to the grand prince of T v e r'.148 I f he could retain him in Moscow other Tverian aristocrats might be induced to defect, Grigorey Vasil'yevich Morozov, boyar from 1 4 7 5 to a t least 1 4 8 9 or 1 4 9 1 (DRK, ; D RV, X X , p. 4 ; Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 1 9 5 7 y p. 4 5 and n. 4 0 ). 1 4 1 SIRIO, X X X V , No. 2 4 , p. 1 3 4 . In Zim in’s ‘Spisok namestnikov’, A E 1 9 6 0 , p. 3 2 , an Ivan Grigor'yevich is mentioned as namestnik in Ladoga in 1 4 8 6 / 7 . This may be Morozov. 14 8 In 1 4 9 5 he was a junior boyar in the retinue of Ivan I I I on the visit to Novgorod. H e is listed in the membership of the military branch of the dvor, suggesting that he may have acquired some military experience with that organisation (DRKy p. 2 1 ). There is one specific indication th at Ivan Grigor'yevich could serve in a m ilitary capacity. An entry under M ay 1 5 0 1 in the military register (DRKt p. 2 8 ) notes an instruction: if G rand Prince Vasily Ivanovich was in Novgorod and trouble started with Lithuania, I. G. Morozov was to become the voyevoda of the left regiment. From a reading of the text and from the absence of his nam e in the military register on other occasions or in the chronicle notices of military campaigns, it may safely be assumed that this Morozov made his way through the administrative cursus honorum. For some positive evidence of this, see SIRIO, X X X V , No. 2 4 , p. 1 3 4 . 1 44 Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E i 9 5 7 f pp. 4 8 - 9 and n. 8 9 . H e became an okol'nichiy by 1 5 0 7 : PSRL, V I, p. 5 2 ; first such mention in the D R K (p. 4 3 ) is for 1 5 0 9 . 14 8 PSRL, V I, p. 1 8 8 ; V III, p. 1 5 3 . 144 PDSy I, P. 2 6 . 14 7 T he earliest mention of Prince Danilo Dmitriyevich Kholmsky in Muscovite service is under an entry of 1 4 6 9 , when he served as commander in the leading regiment in the K azan ' cam paign (PSRL, V, pp. £ 7 4 - 2 7 5 ; V. S. Borzakovsky, Istorxya Tver'skago knyazhestva, St Petersburg, 1 8 7 6 , p. 1 9 9 and n. 9 5 1 ). In the 1 4 7 1 attack on Novgorod, Kholmsky served with distinction (PSRL, X X V II, pp. 1 3 1 , 1 3 3 , 1 3 4 ; DRK, p. 1 2 ). In 1 4 7 3 / 4 Ivan I I I sent him against the Teutonic Knights in command of a sizeable force, in response to an appeal from the Pskovians (Pskovskiye letopisi, II, Moscow, 1 9 5 5 , pp. 1 9 6 ff.). He entered die dum a in 1 4 7 3 / 4 or by 1 4 7 9 . (According to the Sheremetev list, promotion came in 1 4 7 3 / 4 : DRV, X X , p. 4 . Zimin, ‘Sostav*, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 5 and n. 4 5 found first confirmation in 1 4 7 9 . I suspect that Kholmsky became a boyar in 1 473/4» immediately 14 1

p.

11

VI io6

thereby weakening the m ilitary strength of T ver'. Significantly, when Ivan I I I prom oted Prince Danilo to the rank of boyar, he first compelled him to swear never to leave his service.148149*Prince D anilo’s second son Vasily did as well as his father. He too became a boyar after approxim ately five years of service;160 but he m arried the grand prince’s daughter. VI We may now offer some reflections on the dum a membership of Ivan I l l ’s reign and its changing character and functions. First, there were far more boyar members in 1462 than in 1505. In the year of Ivan I l l ’s accession twelve or possibly thirteen enjoyed this rank; a t the end of the reign only six boyars can be identified.151 Secondly, there was no fixed num ber of boyaral positions in the council during these years. From the existing information it is possible to state th at Ivan I I I allowed the num ber of boyars to diminish in the late 1460s and early 1470s by refusing to make replacements for those who died or were expelled. R ather than ju m p to the conclusion th at Ivan I I I inaugurated a change from past policy, one should rem em ber th at his father had to reward a considerable num ber of loyal servitors for their support in the succession wars th at rocked Muscovy in the second quarter of the 15th century. Moreover, the defensive foreign policy pursued in the early years of the new reign did not require an expansion of the council. The membership rose again after the mid-1470s and by 1480 there were at least eleven boyars in the dum a. Circumstantially, one may point to the danger of Novgorod’s growing hostility and the possibility of w ar with Lithuania. The need to administer the newly incorporated Novgorodian lands and the increase of m ilitary activity in several areas m ay have contributed to the change. From the 1480s the num ber again declined. O n the other hand, the ranks of the second-grade members, the okol'nichiye, increased by the end of the period to at least six, in a m inim um council membership of twelve. I f further examination proves these figures reliable, the total after he took an oath never to leave Muscovite service). As a boyar, Kholmsky continued to serve as a senior general, in 1486/7 and 1487/8 against Kazan' (PSRL, IV, p. 156; XXIII, p. 162; XXVI, p. 287; DRK, p. 14) and in 1492 on the ‘northern’ campaign {DRK, p. 15). He was voyevoda again in 1492/3: DRK, p. 18. 148 PSRL, XXVI, pp. 277-8. 149 SGGD, I, Nos. 103-04, pp. 249-51. 160 Vasily Kholmsky is first mentioned in 1495 as a junior boyar of the dvor {DRK, p. 20). According to Zimin (‘Sostav’, AE 1957, p. 48 and n. 84), he was a boyar in June 1504. The Sheremetev list cites the date of his elevation as 1500. 1 suspect that Kholmsky became a boyar immediately upon marrying Ivan I l l ’s daughter in 1500. The first corroborative evidence of this is in a chronicle of 1502, in which Prince Vasily Kholmsky is called ‘voyevoda and boyarin* {PSRL, XXVI, p. 296). 191 See Appendix I.

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membership in most periods of the reign fluctuated between approxi­ mately twelve and fifteen. T he apparent change in the balance between boyars and okol'nichiye suggests the developing im portance of administrative, judicial and ceremonial functions. The volume of reports from pro­ vincial governors, the issue of instructions, the keeping of records for tax purposes and raising m ilitary levies, the hearing of judicial appeals, the development of diplomacy with several foreign states, no longer m ade possible personal supervision by the grand prince. As the bureaus developed out of archaic institutions, state secretaries became im portant functionaries. Undoubtedly the okornichiye played a significant role in the supervision of some of the new activities, making periodic reports to the dum a and helping to shape decisions. I t should be noted th at at the very time when Muscovy was expanding to the west, north and east—when its armies grew to meet increased responsibilities along expanded frontiers—and when persons of princely descent began to dom inate the higher military posts,152 increasing the debilitating quarrels over rank and prece­ dence— at such a time more than half of the dum a personnel were becoming more deeply involved in ceremonial and administrative affairs. T he generalisation is often repeated th at by the end of the 15th century the older Muscovite serving families were losing their seats in the dum a to privileged titled newcomers. It is certainly true that the changing composition of personnel acquiring significant military commands at this time—from non-princely to princely, from old Muscovite to newly im m igrated—would in time be reflected in the composition of the dum a, for tradition and continued practice dem anded th at persons of outstanding m ilitary record be considered for council membership. W hile these pressures m ounted towards the end of the 15th century, they were not reflected in the composition of Ivan I IP s dum a. O nly two princes (or possibly three) of the Yaroslavsky line and two Kholmsky princes m anaged to infringe the monopoly of the older serving Muscovite boyaral families. In part, the long apprenticeship dem anded of dum a candidates helped to postpone decisions concerning the entry of newcomers. Even more im portant, those already inside the dum a showed an understandably greater preference for sons and relatives or for members of families of deceased colleagues. Thus the old privy councillors m anaged to m aintain effective control over dum a appointm ents until the 1520s and 1530s, when the newcomers m ade their first significant inroads. T he politics generated by these pressures and the resistance to them 1#I Sec p. 92, above.

VI io8 need to be examined with an eye to the dum a’s p art in the dynastic struggle at the end of the 15th century. The oligarchic cast of the dum a membership intimates th at the grand prince succumbed to pressures benefiting a num ber of select families. T he price was minimal, for he derived inestimable gain from long years of loyal service by the m any members of these families who vied for appointm ents and competed for promotion. Not all who entered upon the cursus honorum could possibly secure adm ittance to the council. Moreover, those who eventually won entry brought with them a composite fund of experience, a penchant for obedience, an intim ate knowledge of varied problems encountered during their years of service, and a prudence fashioned by time. Success in their previous career undoubtedly played a considerable p art in their selection. Kurbsky, writing a century later in the 1570s, described the m erit system in the early campaigns of Ivan IV : ‘And should anyone show himself courageous in battle and stain his hands with the blood of the enemy, he would be honoured with gifts, both movable and im ­ movable. And because of this certain of them, the most skilled, were elevated to higher ranks.’153 This comment may readily be applied to the practices of the later 15th century. Another Kurbsky observa­ tion may be used for our purposes : ‘Now at th at time I and another comrade of mine were entrusted with the com m and of the R ight Wing . . . although I was of tender years (for at th at time I was still only about twenty-four years old) ; but nevertheless, thanks to the grace of my Christ, I achieved this rank not without reason, b u t I ascended by m ilitary degrees.’164 Four years after assuming his first m ajor command, Kurbsky became a boyar at the age of twentyeight.155 Young men were not appointed to Ivan I l l ’s council, but Kurbsky’s reference to ascent from the lower ranks and ‘tender years’ with regard to m ajor com m and is also valid for the earlier period. We do not know the acceptable age for beginning service. Presumably it was somewhere between fifteen and twenty. Certtainly by the time a m an of service received a position in which he would be mentioned by a chronicler as the holder of a com m and or an assigned position, he would be a t least twenty. I f we assume th at the first notices of service were m ade a t the average age of twenty, boyars would usually have been about fifty years old at the time of their selection, and okol'nichiye well over thirty. I f dum a members received assignments both m ilitary and civil, some o f which carried them far from the capital, it nevertheless 168 Kurbsky’s History . . . , p. 2 3 . 1#4 Ibid., p. 3 9 . 168 Ibid., p. viii; D R K , p. 181; V. S. Ikonnikov, Opyt russkoy istoriografii, II/2, Kiev, 1908, pp. 1817 fr.

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IOg

appears th a t Iv an I I I norm ally kept his councillors close at hand for most of their tenure; b u t we still need to know more about the duties assigned to them , particularly to the okornichiye. O n the boyars we are somewhat better informed. O ne was assigned to the viceroyalty of Novgorod on an irregular basis, with no particular term of office. T he state steward, the treasurer and the Moscow pre­ fect, who was also the chairm an of the dum a, performed assigned court tasks. T he rem ainder of the boyars served as generals on major campaigns and carried out prescribed duties in the provinces, but always for brief periods. They spent most of their time in Moscow, serving as councillors in ordinary and extraordinary matters. Al­ though the evidence is more circum stantial than direct, it seems that Ivan I I I relied heavily upon the accum ulated experience of his council. H erein lies one of our keys to the development of centralised procedures and methods in this period. T he councillors not only helped to form policy b u t aided in its execution. Building on Zim in’s research and the resultant lists, we have attem pted to show th at the severe reduction in the dum a’s mem ber­ ship during Ivan I l l ’s reign, by methods which appear to be legiti­ m ate, invalidates the generalisations and conclusions drawn from the data of the 17th-century Sheremetev list. Significantly, there is no substantiation for the view th at the dum a was invaded by new princely im m igrants. Further study is unquestionably desirable, not only of the dum a, b u t also of the careers of numerous individuals whom we can identify in our sources as having served in the middle echelons of the Muscovite adm inistration. Such investigations for this and subsequent reigns m ay disclose much about the working of the Muscovite autocracy.

VI

no APPENDIX I

Boyars in the Duma o f Ivan III T h e first list below is from the Sheremetev copy of court ranks (DRV, X X ). Boyars for whom Zimin found documentary proof arc identified in capital letters. Dates of service from the Sheremetev list are listed under Sh; Zimin’s under £ . Sh

z

1462-7/8 1462-99/ 1500

1462-99

P rince I van V asil' yevich Striga O bolensky

1462-77/8

1462-78

Mikhaylo Fyodorovich Saburov (dvoretskiy)

1462-3/4

Mikhaylo Borisovich Pleshcheyev P rince I van Y ur ' yevich P atrikeyev

Relationships

Uncle of Princess Ivan Bulgak and Danilo Shchenya; father of Prince Vasily Kosoy Patri­ keyev; boyar from the latter part of Vasily II’s reign. His father, Prince Vasily Ivano­ vich, had been a boyar in the reign of Vasily II (ASISR, I, p. 198) and in the early years of Ivan I l l ’s reign (A. Yu. B , No. 103/I, col. 639). Prince Ivan was the father of Archi­ mandrite Vassian, later bishop of Tver' (after 1477) and brother of boyars Aleksandr Vasil'yevich and Pyotr Nagoy. Veselovsky believed that Mikhay­ lo Fyodorovich had been a boyar in the reign of Vasily I (1389-1425); no male heirs; daughter married Prince Yaro­ slav Vasil'yevich Obolensky, brother of boyars Ivan Striga, Pyotr Nagoy and Aleksandr Vasil'yevich. After a transfer of allegiance during the civil wars of the second quarter of the 15th century, Saburov re­ turned to grand-princely ser­ vice. According to the Sheremetev and Belyayev lists, Mikhaylo Fyodorovich was dvoretskiy in 1462/4 (ASISR, I, p. 613). The Saburovs were a well-connected wealthy family, but not very influential in the latter part of Ivan I l l ’s reign ; they were related to the Vel'yaminovs and Godunovs. The Saburov political fortunes improved markedly but tern-

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Mikhaylo Fyodorovich Saburov (dvoretskiy)— (cont.)

Sh 1462-3/4

IVAN III

III

Relationships porarily after 1506, when Vasily III married a lady from the most junior branch of the family.

*

G rigory V asil' yevich 1462-4 Z abolotsky (dvoretskiy)

1462-4

An elder brother was killed at the battle of Belev, 1438; father of okol'nichiye Kon­ stantin and Pyotr Grigor'evich Zabolotsky.

V asily F yodorovich Saburov

1464-85

1462-4

Younger brother of boyar Ivan Fyodorovich Saburov; father of future okol'nichiy (in Vasi­ ly’s reign) Andrey Vasil'ye­ vich Saburov.

M ikhaylo Y akovlevich R usalka M orozov (dvoretskiy)

n .d .-i5 0 i

14 9 5 -i 50i

Distant relative of Grigory Vasil'­ yevich Morozov; raised from okol'nichiy; see Appendix II.

P rince S emyon R omano­ vich Y aroslavsky

14691501/02

14951503/04

First of the family to become a Muscovite boyar. Daughter married okol'nichiy Pyotr Fyo­ dorovich Davydov, son of boyar Fyodor Davydovich Khromoy.

F yodor D avydovich K hromoy

1470/11475-7 1482/3

Dmitry tskoy

Isakovich

Bore-

1470/1-1/2

P rince D anilo D mitriyevich K holmsky

1473/ 4“ 1492 13

1479-

1492 13

Related to the Chelyadnins, Buturlins, Chebots and Osteyevs; second cousin to Andrey Romanovich Khrul' Osteyev; father of the okol'nichiy Gri­ gory Fyodorovich Khromoy.

Niece Ul'yana married Prince Boris of Volok, brother of Ivan III. Prince Danilo Dmitriyevich was brother of the chief boyar of Tver' and married a daughter of the boyar Ivan Ivanovich (see n. 18), whose sister married Prince Ivan Vasil'yevich Bulgak Patrikeyev. Danilo’s daughter married Ivan Golova, whose father had been a boyar in the early part of Ivan I l l ’s reign and whose brother Dmitry Volodimirovich was boyar-kaznachey in the latter part of the reign. His son Vasily subsequently married a daughter of Vasily III.

VI 112 Sh V asily F yodorovich O brazets S imsky

1472/ 31483/4

P rince

I van V asil' ye Bulgak

1475/6— 1478/9

P rince D anilo V asil' yevich S hchenya

1475/61514/15

vich

I van Borisovich T uchko M orozov (as Borozdin)

Z 1475-7 ?

I475~ I5 I5

1475-85

1475/61500/01

14751502/03

Relationships Boyar from the early 1470s to at least 1485: see PSRL, X V , col. 500. Descended from a wealthy serving family, whose fortunes declined in the latter part of Vasily II*s reign. His son, Ivan Khabar, married the daughter of boyar Dmitry Volodimirovich Khovrin; he subsequently became an okol'nichiy and later a boyar in the reign of Vasily III. See below under Dmitry V. Ovtsa [Khovrin]. Nephew of Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev; brother o f boyar Prince Danilo Shche­ nya; married daughter of boyar Ivan Ivanovich (see under his name below). His sister-in-law married boyar Prince Danilo Kholmsky. His son Mikhailo became a boyar in the reign of Vasily III. Nephew of Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev; brother of Prince Ivan Bulgak; married daughter of Prince Ivan Vasil'yevich Gorbaty of the Shuysky family. Identified in the Sheremetev list as I. B. Borozdin, who was killed by the Germans in 1500/01:D R V y X X , p. 10; in the Rodoslovnaya kniga pub­ lished by Novikov (II, p. 141) Ivan Borisovich Borozdin and his brothers Pyotr and Vasily are called ‘boyars in Moscow and in Tver'.* Ivan Borisovich was killed on the Seritsa river, in the ‘German lands’ west of Pskov (cf PSRL, X X V , p. 236). Zimin (‘Sostav*, p. 45) questioned the identification as Borozdin for Ivan and Vasily Borisovich, but left their names on the list. A check of the military register for the campaign of 1500/01 against the Germans (D R K , pp. 28-9) does not show a

VI THE

BOY AR DUMA U N D E R IVAN III Sh

I van Borisovich T uchko M orozov (as Borozdin)— (cont.)

£ 1475-85

1475/6— 1500/01

1475-

1475/61502/03 1475/6i 491/2

1475-150*

P rince A leksandr V asil'YEvicH O bolensky

i 475/6-

*475“ *5°*

Grigory Nikitich Borozdin

1475/61479/80 1477/8-?

Vasily Borisovich Borozdin G rigory V asil' yevich M orozov

Prince Mikhaylo Fyodorovich Mikulinsky Ivan Zhito Nikitich Borozdin P rince S emyon I vanovich K hripun R yapo -

1502/03

*475-89

1501/02

1477/8-? 1477/8-99

*495/9

Nephew of Prince Dmitry Ivano­ vich Ryapolovsky, boyar in the early part of Ivan I l l ’s reign.

*479-*5*o

Elder brother of boyar Yury Zakhar'yevich ; son of future okol'nichiye Pyotr Yakovle­ vich and Vasily Yakovlevich. Pyotr subsequently became a boyar.

LOV SKY

Semyon Fyodorovich Pe- 1477/8shek Saburov 1483/4 Prince Vasily Mikhaylo- 1479/80vich Obolensky 1480/81 Y akov Z akhar ' yevich 1479/80[K oshkin] i5i°/ ! i

Prince Pyotr Mikhaylovich Obolensky

” 3

Relationships Borozdin in command of any unit, suggesting that he was certainly not of boyar rank. Veselovsky (ASISR, I, p. 633) identified ‘Ivan and Vasily Borisovich* as Tuchko Moro­ zov rather than Borozdin. This is a much more sensible sug­ gestion, since the Morozovs were an influential Muscovite serving family. The brothers Borisovich, both boyars, were imprisoned by Ivan III in the autumn of 1484 for some serious but unknown crime. Ivan Borisovich served as dvoretskiy while boyar (ASISR, I, No. 330, p. 240). See note above under Ivan Borisovich Tuchko Morozov. Father of future okol'nichiy Ivan Grigor'yevich Morozov (in the reign of Vasily III); first cousin to boyars Vasily and Ivan Borisovich Tuchko Morozov. Younger brother of boyar Prince Ivan Striga Obolensky; elder brother of Prince Pyotr Nagoy Obolensky.

1479/801481/2

VI 1 14 Relationships Married cousin o f Yakov and Yury Zakhar'yevich.

Sh A ndrey M ikhaylovich P leshcheyev okornichiy

1475/6-

1479/80 boyar

1479/80-

«490/1 V asily Borisovich T uchKO M orozov

1479/801480/1

Fydor Grigor'ycvich Borozdin Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Shestun Yaroslavsky Prince Pyotr Nikitich Obolensky Y ury Z akhar ' yevich [K oshkin]

1479/801493/4 1486/71494/5 1492/31498/9 1492/31503/04

Pyotr Borisovich Borozdin

1492/3-

Prince Fyodor Borisovich Khripun Ryapolovsky P rince V asily I vanovich K osoy P atrikeyev

1492/931497/8 1494/51499/1500

A ndrey F yodorovich C helyadnin konyushiy after

1494/51499/1500 1495/6

Prince Semyon Danilovich Kholmsky Prince Osip Andreyevich Dorogobuzhsky Prince Ivan Mikhaylovich Telyatevsky Prince Volodimir Andreyevich Mikulinsky D mitry V olodimirovich O vtsa [K hovrin ]

1494/51500/01 1494/51529/30 1494/51511 /12 1494/951508/09 1496/71509/10

»475-

1479/80? 1479/80?1491 ? -« 485

First cousin to boyar Vasily Grigor'yevich Morozov; ar­ rested in 1484 for some serious but unknown crime.

1483-1500

Descended from an old Musco­ vite boyaral family; brother of Yakov Zakhar'yevich; father of future okol'nichiy and boyar Mikhaylo Yur'yevich Zakharin.

1503/04 I495~9

Son of Prince Ivan Patrikeyev; cousin to Princes Ivan Bulgak and Danilo Shchenya. 1495Brother of Peter Fyodorovich 1499/1500 Chelyadnin; father of future boyars Vasily and Ivan Andre­ yevich Chelyadnin; son of boyar Fyodor Mikhaylovich.

14951502 ?

Boyar at least to 1509: SIRIO, X X X V , No. 84, p. 489. Son of boyar Vladimir Grigor'yevich ; brother Ivan Volodimirovich married daughter of boyar Prince Dmitry D. Kholmsky. Had two daughters: the elder married Ivan Grigor'yevich Morozov, who became an okol'nichiy and then a boyar

VI THE

BOY AR DUMA U N D ER IVAN III

D mitry V olodimirovich O vtsa [K hovrin ]— (1cont.)

P rince

Sh 1496/71509/10

V asily D anilo ­ K holmsky

1 499/ 15 0 0 -

D anilo A leks­ androvich P enko Y aro ­ slavsky P rince P yotr V asil' ye vich N agoy O bolensky

I 499/I 5 ° ° -

Prince Dmitry Volodimi­ rovich Rostovsky Dmitry Vasil'yevich Shein [Morozov] Prince Aleksandr Volodi­ mirovich Rostovsky Semyon Ivanovich Voront­ sov

1500/01-

vich

P rince

z 14951502?

i5 ° ° -° 8

1523/4 *50° - ?

1519/20 1499/15°°~~ i5 ° ° -° 9

1509/10

II5

Relationships in the reign of Vasily III ; the younger daughter married Prince Mikhaylo Vasil'yevich Kisly, of the Shuysky family, who later became okol'nichiy and then boyar in the reign of Vasily III ( Vremennik, X , ‘Materialy*, pp. 89, 227). According to another genea­ logical register, referred to by Zimin (‘Sostav*, p. 49, n. 95), Dmitry Khovrin’s elder daughter married Ivan Vasil'­ yevich Khabar, son of the boyar Vasily Obrazets, who later became okol'nichiy and then boyar in the reign of Vasily III. Dmitry Volodimirovich*s sister married Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev. Son of Prince Danilo Dmitriyevich Kholmsky; married Prin­ cess Feodosiya, daughter of Ivan III; imprisoned in 1508. Son of Prince Aleksandr Fyodoro­ vich, the last reigning prince of Yaroslavl'. Fourth of six sons of boyar Prince Vasily Ivanovich Obo­ lensky; elder brothers Ivan Striga and Aleksandr also became boyars. His next elder brother, Yaroslav, was prince of Pskov upon assignment of Ivan III, and probably would have become a boyar had he not died of the plague in 1488.

■517/18 1500/01>5°5/6

1500/01-

>522/3 1503/041517/18

Zimin added the following names of boyars, based upon documentary references: Iv a n F y o d o ro v ic h S ta rk o v

c.

Z 1462-84

Relationships His father, Fyodor Andreyevich Starko, was identified by Veselovsky as a boyar

VI n6 Relationships earlier in the 15th century (ASISR, I, p. 612). Ivan Fyodorovich was a boyar certainly before 1478, i.e. before the death of Prince Ivan Striga Obolensky (ASISR, II, p. 365). Ivan Fyodorovich’s son Aleksey was a court servitor, used at least once in the 1470s as an envoy to the Crimea. Aleksey’s sons served under the command of the postel'nichiy, but none became duma members.

I van F yodorovich Starkov (cant.)

0. 1462-84

V ladimir G rigor ' yevich [K hovrin ]

1462-4

O f Greek descent; the first of his line to be­ come important; probably a merchant, certainly a man of wealth; daughter married Prince Ivan Yur'yevich Patrikeyev. His eldest son, Ivan Golova, married daughter of boyar Prince Danilo Kholmsky; his youngest son, Dmitry, became a boyar and state treasurer.

P rince D mitriy I vanovich R yapolovsky

1462-84

Probably died very early in the reign of Ivan III; boyar in the late 1450s (if not earlier) and early 1460s; childless. Uncle of Prince Semyon Ivanovich Ryapolov­ sky, boyar in the latter part of the 15th century.

Andrey R omanovich [K hrul ' O steyev]

1462-84

Probably died in the 1460s. Uncle of okol'nichiy Ivan Vasil'yevich Chebot; second cousin to boyar Fyodor Davydo­ vich Khromoy. Related to the Buturlins and Chelyadnins, being descended from Andrey Gavrilovich, who served in Moscow at the beginning of the 14th century.

P yotr F yodorovich [C hel yadnin ]

I van [F yodorovich Us']

Identified erroneously by Zimin (‘Sostav*, p. 45) as Khromoy. Pyotr Fyodorovich Khromoy only became an okol'nichiy in the later part of Ivan I l l ’s reign: so also Zimin, p. 48. This Pyotr Fyodorovich was the brother of boyar Andrey Fyodo­ rovich Chelyadnin, son of boyar Fyodor Mikhaylovich. 1483

Descended from a fairly undistinguished branch of servitors. His great-greatgrandfather was Ivan Morkhina, brother of Akinf Gavrilovich. Ivan’s father, Fyodor, had been an ambassador of the Muscovite court to Prince Yury of Galich in an attempt to make peace (PSRL, V III, p. 97). Ivan Fyodorovich’s son, Ivan Ivanovich, became an okol'nichiy of Ivan III.

VI THE P rince V asily [O bolensky]

BO B OY Y A R D U M A U N D E R IV A N II I

I vanovich

V asily I vanovich [N ovosil' tsev]

K itay

117

Z 1462-4

Relationships Identified by Zimin only by first name and patronymic. Surname as ascribed by Veselovsky (ASISR, p. 612). Boyar at least from the mid-1450s; father of boyars Ivan Striga, Aleksandr Vasil'yevich and Pyotr Nagoy.

! 475_7

Boyar at least from 1461/2. See above, note 27. Last mention in 1477 as namestnik of Torzhok (PSRL, X V III, p. 255). De­ scended from 14th-century serving family.

Overlooked by Zimin in the compilation of his list : F yodor V asil' yevich [Basyonok]

I van I vanovich

Dates o f Service Relationships 1460 Descended from an untitled and non-noble family; made his fame and fortune as a strong supporter of Grand Prince Vasily II; a significant general in the mid-15th century, particularly in the Novgorodian campaign of 1456; rewarded with boyar’s rank, probably in the 1450s. Maintained his influence to the death of Vasily II. Deposed, imprisoned and blinded upon order of Ivan III. Only member of the family to become a boyar. His son Nikifor was a trusted ambassador in the 1470s and apparently close to Ivan III in the 1480s. May have been an okol'nichiy, but the only evidence is the Sheremetev list. 1460s

Descendant of the senior branch of the family that claimed descent from Prince Aleksandr Vsevolod Glebovich ; distantly related to the Zabolotskys; boyar in the latter part of Vasily II’s reign and early part of Ivan I l l ’s reign. No sons, but four daughters who married well : one to boyar Prince Danilo Kholmsky; the second to boyar Prince Ivan Bulgak; the third to Semyon Bryukho Borisovich Morozov, brother of boyar Vasily Borisovich Tuchko Morozov; the fourth to Prince Vasily Mnikh Ivanovich Ryapolovsky, son of boyar Prince Semyon Khripun Ryapolovsky, who, despite thirty years of service, never entered the duma (notwithstanding information to the contrary in the Sheremetev list (DRV, X X , pp. 7, 8).

VI

118 Relationships

Dates of Service F yodor M ikhaylovich [C helyadnin]

1460

s-

70

s

but before

1473

I van F yodorovich Saburov

c.

1 4 6 5 -9

I van Sudimont K ondrat' ye -

c.

1469

vich

See Veselovsky, ASISR, I, p 6 1 5 Boyar of V asily II w ho continued service in the subsequent reign; related th ro u g h his fath er to the B uturlins an d K hrom oys; his elder b ro th er Iv an m arried Y elena, d a u g h te r of P rince Iv an Y u r'yevich P atrikcyev; fath er of boyars P yotr a n d A ndrey C helyadnin. E lder b ro th er of boyar V asily Fyodorovich; younger b ro th er o f (boyar dvoretsky?) M ikhaylo F yodorovich. H is nephew Y ury K on stan tin o v ich (son of his youngest b rother) becam e a boyar im m ediately after G ra n d P rince Vasily I I I m arried his d au g h ter. A p p aren tly a political a p p o in tm e n t: an im m ig ran t from L ith u a n ia . N o o th er M uscovite source except AI, I, No. n o . N o t included in the Rodoslovnyye knigi. See footnote 3 0 above.

A P P E N D IX II

Okol'nichiye of Ivan III

1 to 0

This is the list of okol'nichiye found in the Sheremetev compilation. Those verified by Zimin are in capital letters. Dates of service from the Sheremetev list are listed under Sh; Zimin’s under Sh Relationships A ndrey M ikhaylovich ' 475/ 6Boyar after 1479/80: ‘raised ' 475P leshcheyev 1479/80 1479/80 from okol'nichiy’ {DRV, X X , p. 5). See Appendix I above. I van V asil' yevich O sh- I462Called okol'nichiy of Vasily II chera 1485/6 in the Sheremetev list {DRV, !493 X X , p. 2). Called one of the anti-war councillors in 1480 {PSRL, VI, p. 230). Father of Ivan Ivanovich Oshcherin, who served Ivan III long and well; a favourite, but never achieved duma rank. I van V asil' yevich Shcha - 1475/6Eldest son of Vasily Fyodorovich 1503dra V el ' yaminov 1520s Vel'yaminov, who served as a ■5*5/6 boyar in the udel principality of Dmitrov in the 1470s. Vasily Borisovich Tuchko okol'nichiy ‘[Raised to boyar] from okol'nibefore chiy* : DRV, X X , p. 5. See Morozov 1479/80 Appendix I above. Fyodor Grigor'yevich Bo­ okol'nichiy ‘[Raised to boyar] from okol'ni­ rozdin before chiy*; DRV, X X , p. 5. 1479/80

VI THE

BOY AR DUMA U N D E R IVAN III sh

Yurlo Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev Nikifor Fyodorovich Basenkov

Yury Ivanovich Shestak Kutuzov Boris Vasil'yevich Kutu­ zov

z

1484/51495/6 1486/ 71502/03

Son of boyar Fyodor Basyonok; active as an ambassador in negotiations with Khan Ahmed in 1480.

1488/91498/9 1488/91500/01

P yotr M ikhaylovich P leshcheyev

1494/ 5-

P rince I van I vanovich Z venets [Z venigorod­ sky]

1494/5-

P yotr G rigor ' yevich Z abolotsky

1494/5>495>504/05 before 1505

Ivan Oblyaz Vasil'yevich Vel'yaminov

>497/ 8>523/4

I van V asil' yevich C he -

1499/1500- 1490-1500

bot

D anilo I vanovich

1503/04

1487-

after 1510 >495-6

1503/04

I 5OO/OI

1499/1500- c. 1497I500/ 0 I

Grigory Andreyevich Mamon

I499/ 15OOI509/10

G rigory F yodorovich D avydov boyar

I 5 O O /O I -

I 5 O5 / 0 6 -

P yotr F yodorovich D a ­

I 5 O O /O I -

vydov

II9

Relatiodships

1502

I5 O I-O 7

I 5O5/06 1 5 0 7 -1 7

1517/18

I5I4/Ï5

I5 O I-O 9

Brother of okol'nichiy, later boyar Andrey Pleshcheyev. Made okol'nichiy as early as 1490: PDS, I, col. 26. Second son of late boyar Grigory Vasil'yevich Zabolotsky; bro­ ther of okol'nichiy Konstantin Zabolotsky.

Descendant of Akinf Gavrilo­ vich ; father was first cousin of boyar Andrey Khrul' Osteyev; more distantly related to the Khromoys, Buturlins and Chelyadnins. First cousin to Ivan Ill's favour­ ite, Grigorey Mamon; de­ scended from a rather unim­ portant serving family; grandson was to become a boyar in Ivan IV ’s reign.

Son of boyar Fyodor Davydo­ vich Khromoy; brother of okol'nichiy Pyotr Fyodoro­ vich; distant relative of the Chebots, Buturlins, Chelyadnins; became a boyar in the reign of Vasily III. Son of boyar Fyodor Davydo­ vich; brother of okol'nichiy, later boyar Grigory Fyodoro­ vich.

VI 12 0 Sh

A fonasy Stepanovich Sakmyshev

1 5 0 0 /0 1

P rince V asily V asil'yevich R om odanovsky

1 5 0 0 /0 1

Iv a n G rig o r'y ev ich M a m o ­ nov

1 5 0 2 /0 3

K onstantin G rigor ' ye ­ vich Z abolotsky

1 5 0 5 /0 6

z -

1 5 0 1 -0 9

1 5 0 9 /1 0

-

after

1509

1 5 1 1 / 12

Relationships E rroneously identified as A fonasy Ivanovich Sakm yshev in th e S herem etev list; b u t see Vremennik, X , ‘M aterialy*, p. 1 1 9 . D escended from a T v e ria n serving fam ily, according to this genealogy from boyars o f T v e r'; fam ily history in M os­ cow undistinguished. Boyar in the udel p rin cip ality o f V erey a u n til i 4 8 6 ; transferred to M uscovite service; no in d i­ cation th a t he a tta in e d d u m a ra n k before th e reign o f V asily I I I . Son o f G rigory A ndreyevich M a m o n ; served a t c o u rt a n d as a n occasional envoy; ac­ cording to Z im in (‘Sostav*, p . 4 8 , n. 8 1 ) he never b ecam e a d u m a m em b er a n d d ied in

-

1 5 0 4 /0 5

I5ï6. -

1 5 0 3 -1 2

Son o f b o y ar G rigory V asil'yevich Z abolotsky; you n g er b ro ­ th e r o f P y o tr G rigor'yevich Zabolotsky.

14 8 4 / 5

Son o f b o y ar Iv a n Fyodorovich T ovarkov . See notes u n d e r his fa th e r’s nam e.

1 5 1 4 /1 5

A d d ed b y Z im in :

I van I vanovich T ovarkov

O m itte d b y Z im in :

M ikhaylo Y akovlevich R usalka M orozov

14 6 4 /51 5 0 0 /0 1

(dvoretskiy)

L isted as dovretskiy a n d okol'nichiy in 1 4 7 5 (D R K , p . 1 1 ) ; raised to ra n k o f b o y ar b y 1 4 9 5 (ibid., p . 1 9 ). A ccording to th e S herem etev list, h e d ied in th e office o f dvoretskiy, b u t w ith th e ra n k o f b o y ar (D R V , X X ,

p. 10). P rince P yotr V asil' ye vich [S hestun-Yaro slavsky]

to 1 5 0 0 / 0 1 (deposed) ; 150 3 /0 4

(rein­ stated) to »5 *2 /1 3

See footnote

27

above.

VI THE

121

BO Y A R DUMA U N D E R IVAN III A P P E N D IX I I I

Namestniki in Novgorod D u m a m em b ers a t th e tim e o f th eir governorships are recorded in cap ital letters. N am estn ik i w h o la te r b ecam e m em bers of the d u m a are italicised. Z = Z im in , ‘Spisok nam estnikov*, A E i 9 6 0 , p p . 2 7 - 4 2 . P = P ro n sh tey n , Velikiy Novgorod, A pp en d ix 3 , p p. 2 5 9 ff.

1478

1482

P rince I van V asil' yevich Striga O bolensky (d. spring 1478) Prince Yaroslav Vasil'yevich Obolensky (recalled spring 1478) Prince Vasily Fyodorovich Shuysky1 Ivan Zinov'yevich G rigory V asil' yevich [M orozov]

1485 i486 1487 1488

Prince Vasily Fyodorovich Shuysky Y akov Z akhar ' yevich [K oshkin] Y akov Z akhar ' yevich Y akov Z akhar ' yevich Y akov Z akhar ' yevich

14801

I48 U

z,

p

z. p Z, p Z, p Sbomik Mukhanova, No. 27,

p- 39

z,

p Z, p p

z

Yury Zakhar'yevich 2

1489

Y akov Z akhar ' yevich

Z, p

Yury Zakhar'yevich

•49°

Y akov Z akhar ' yevich P yotr M ikhaylovich [Pleshcheyev]8 (okol'nichiy)

p

1 Prince Vasily Fyodorovich Shuysky rem ained a middle-ranking military administrator for the rem ainder of his life. In 1 4 8 7 / 8 he was one of two m en assigned to take reinforcements to the commanders on the K azan' campaign (D R K , p. 1 8 ). Later, in the early 1 4 9 0 s, Ivan assigned him to the governorship of Pskov ( 1 4 9 1 : Pskovskiye Utopisi, I, Moscow/Leningrad, 1 9 4 1 , p. 8 1 ) from whence he led forth the local militia on various Muscovite campaigns upon order of the grand prince ( 1 4 9 2 : D RK, p. 1 9 ; 1 4 9 5 : Ioasafovskaya letopis', p. 1 9 0 ; Pskovskiye Utopisi, II, Moscow, 1 9 5 5 , pp. 8 1 - 2 ). 1 Yury Zakhar'yevich Koshkin, younger brother of the distinguished boyar, general and governor, Yakov Zakhar'yevich Koshkin, first emerges in the extant sources as a junior boyar in the dvor of Ivan I II in 1 4 7 9 (DRK, p. 1 3 ). His appearance as a junior governor of Novgorod in 1 4 8 8 m ay in p art reflect die influence of his brother, though his death in 1 5 0 4 (Veselovsky in ASJSR, I, p. 6 3 0 ) may also suggest that he had spent a num ber of years in service before 1 4 8 8 . Acquisition of the post of governor of Novgorod marked him as rather high up in the cursus honorum leading to dum a rank. H e had become a boyar by 1 4 8 3 (Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 4 , n. 3 0 ; DDG, No. 7 7 , p. 2 9 2 ). In the 1 4 9 0 s he appears in the m ilitary register as a general (DRK, pp. 1 8 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 2 7 ). * Pyotr Mikhaylovich Pleshcheyev, younger brother of okol'nichiy Andrey Mikhaylovich, was already an okol'nichiy by the tim ehe went to Novgorod as junior governor (SIRIO, X X X V ,N o. 1 , p. 4 : first mention 1 4 8 7 ). His assignment to Novgorod coincided with a period of considerable social discontent and adm inistrative change. Beginning in 1 4 8 7 , the Moscow government de­ cided to transfer a num ber of Novgorodian landowners to the Muscovite interior and to replace them with loyal military servitors. T he unhappiness of the Novgorodians spawned a plot to m urder the boyar governor of Novgorod, Yakov Zakhar'yevich. The conspirators were executed and the forcible removal of rich and landed Novgorodians went on apace for the next decade and a half (Bemadsky, Novgorod i novgorodskaya zemlya v X V veke, pp. 3 2 1 - 2 ). T he assignment first of Yakov’s brother Yury as his co-namestnik in 1 4 8 8 - 9 and then of the okol'nichiy Pyotr Pleshcheyev suggests th at loyal and experienced administrators helped first with the problem of restoring order and then with the more complicated m atter of administering and institutionalising the assignment of pomest’ye lands. Pyotr Pleshcheyev’s half-decade provided the firm hand of a

VI

122 1491 1492 1493

1494 •495 (early) (Jan.-Feb.) (from Aug.)

(from Nov.)

1496 1497

1498 1499

1500 (Dec.)

P yotr M ikhaylovich Y akov Z akhar ' yevich Y akov Z akhar ' yevich

P yotr M ikhaylovich P yotr M ikhaylovich Y akov Z akhar ' yevich 4 P yotr M ikhaylovich Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich Penko Taroslavsky5 Prince Ivan Volodimirovich Lyko Obo­ lensky P rince Semyon R omanovich [Yaro­ slavsky]

Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich Penko Yaro­ slavsky P rince S emyon R omanovich Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich Penko Yaro­ slavsky A ndrey F yodorovich C helyadnin A n d re y F y o d o ro v ich C h e ly a d n in Ivan Andreyevich Loban Kolychev A ndrey F yodorovich C helyadnin Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky8 Ivan Andreyevich Kolychev

Z D R K , p. 18: voyevoda in Nov. SIRIO, X X V , No. 20, p. 85; No. 21. p. 94; Sb. Mukh., p. 49 Z, P Z, P Z, P Z, P Z, P p DRK, p. 19; PSRL, V III, p. 231 P Z Z, P

z Z, P Z, P

z z, P

court administrator in Novgorod, even while Yakov Zakhar'yevich continued to lead the Novgorodian contingents on grand-princely wars. It should be noted further that Pyotr Pleshcheyev’s appointm ent as second Novgorodian namestnik is the only known instance in Ivan I l l ’s reign when an okol'nichiy received such an assignment. 4 Yakov Zakhar'yevich was the senior Novgorodian governor until August. In that m onth the Muscovite forces attacked Vyborg. T he boyar Prince Danilo Vasil'yevich Shchenya com­ m anded the forces sent from Moscow. ‘And from the Novgorodian lands the grand prince ordered [them] out against the Swedish Germans*. (D RK, p. 1 9 ). T hen follows the listing of commanders of the five regiments, traditional for a Muscovite army. Yakov, as com m ander of the Novgorodian contingent, was appointed first voyevoda of the G reat Regiment. Immediately after this information the following entry appears: ‘A v Novgorode velikom velel kniaz’ velikiy byt' namestnikom : Knyaz'yu Danilu Aleksandrovich Yaroslavskomu, da knyaz'yu Ivanu Volodimirovichu Lyko Obolenskomu*. 5 Prince Danilo Aleksandrovich Yaroslavsky was one of the namestniki who later attained boyar rank. T he first notice of his promotion to the top echelon of the council is from February 1 5 0 0 (DRK, p. 9 ; Zimin, ‘Sostav’, A E 1 9 5 7 , p. 4 7 , n. 7 4 ). Prior to his appointm ent as namestnik in Novgorod, he had already performed military service against Lithuania (DRK, pp. 1 7 , 1 8 ). His appointm ent in Novgorod was as a junior governor charged with viceregal responsibilities, while the senior governor fulfilled the military functions assigned to him by Ivan III. • This identification of Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Shuysky is a difficult one to make, in that there were three Shuysky princes with those forenames who could have been alive at this time. Vasily Vasil'yevich Blednoy does not appear in the service register of Ivan I II. A second, nick­ nam ed Grebenka, is a somewhat stronger possibility. In the 1 4 5 0 s he had commanded the Psko­ vian forces in the quality of a hired prince (Pskovskiye letopisi, I, pp. 5 0 - 1 ). Later he became prince of the military in Novgorod the Great. Here he performed well but unsuccessfully, losing the Dvina land to the Muscovites in 1 4 7 1 (PSRL, IV , p. 1 5 0 ), and in 1 4 7 7 / 8 he had to surrender to the Muscovites when Novgorod’s defeat seemed inescapable (Pskovskiye letopisi, II, pp. 2 1 3 - 1 4 ). By 1 4 7 9 Prince Vasily Shuysky, lacking other available means of earning his livelihood, made his peace with Ivan I II . T he politic grand prince accorded him honour and gifts (PSRL, V I, p. 2 1 6 ). A third Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky is the likeliest candidate. H e was the

VI THE 1501 (Apr.-May)

slavsky

(Autumn-Dec.) 1502 (Dec.) I 5°3 (Feb.) 1504 (May) 15°5 (June)

123

BOY AR DUMA U N D E R IVAN III

P rince S emyon R omanovich Y aro ­ Ivan Andreyevich Kolychev P rince D anilo V asil' yevich S hchenya Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky P rince D anilo V asil' yevich Shchenya Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky P rince D anilo V asil' yevich Shchenya Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky P rince D anilo V asil' yevich Shchenya Prince Vasily Vasil'yevich Nemoy Shuysky

Z, P DRK, p. 30, 31 DRK, p. 30, 31 D R K , p. 32; P D R K , p. 32 ; Z, P Z PDS, I, p. 123 Z, P Z, P Z, P

son of Vasily Fyodorovich Shuysky, who had been a junior namestnik in Novgorod in 1 4 8 0 / 1 and served into the 1 4 9 0 s as prince of Pskov. This Vasily m arried Princess Anastasiya, daughter of the K azan ' tsarevich Pyotr ( Vremennik, X , ‘M aterialy’, p. 4 5 ), an act probably dictated by grandprincely politics. Moreover, this Vasily Shuysky became a boyar no later than 1 5 1 2 (Zimin, ‘Sostav*, A E 1957, p. 5 0 and n. 1 0 5 ).

VII

M U S C O V I T E M IL IT A R Y R E F O R M S IN THE S E C O N D -H A L F O F T HE F I F T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

In the forty-three years of Ivan Ill's reign, his realm expanded from approxi­ mately 190,000 square miles to an area in excess of 600,000. The annexations included the vast but underpopulated lands of Novgorod the Great, the princi­ palities of Tver', laroslavl’, the remaining half of Rostov, and about one-third of the populous Lithuanian possessions. The chronicling of this expansion is suffi­ ciently familiar to avoid repetition. How the government harnessed Muscovite military capabilities and obtained support of the aristocratic landholding class are less well known. Military organization and its impingement upon the secular classes of society played a substantial role in the shaping of political developments within this period. The frequency and extent of belligerent involvements influenced the demands made upon the aristocracy of the sword, dictated the coercive measures employed in forcing noble landholders into battle dress, and ultimately advanced the development of the service state. The creation of an all-Muscovite army and, particularly, the means of exacting service contributed significantly to the creation of sovereign power. In a land rather diverse in regional attitudes, local loyalties and even in cultural patterns, the military organization provided an effective common denominator for cen­ tralization. The levies served upon call and went wherever sent. Service became a mandatory imposition in every area annexed in this period. Within the older Muscovite domains, this practice seems also to have held sway, though the mechanism remains unclear. For many a Muscovite landholder, particularly of military age, the government discovered means of exerting pressure; more often than not, the landholder himself, or his sons, would serve with little coercion, if only to augment meager incomes. Undoubtedly too, the crown developed a series of seductions—promotions, honors, residence in Moscow or even at court— for those who played the game. Military ties to a single center were also paralleled by a system of lieutenancies (n a m e s t n i k i). While the system itself had a long history, it was now employed as a strengthened tie to the administrative center. The designated officials in Ivan Ill’s reign were chosen almost wholly from the low and medium-ranked in the military service register. Those assigned to vulnerable or strategically important areas, most often possessed campaign experience and martial ability. Moreover, their desire to rise in the service hierarchy made them admirable agents in fulfilling the wishes of the ruler. Usually, residents from different

VII

74 areas, they had little tie or sympathy with the territory they administered. While political policies regarding lieutenancies lie outside the bounds of this study, the military considerations concerning appointees demanded loyalty and the requisite skills. Particularly along the frontier marches, where danger of incursion still existed, the evidence for this period suggests that n a m e s t n i k i were selected from among the members of the immediate entourage of the grand prince. I The military developments from the 1450s to the end of century differed markedly from the practices found in earlier Muscovite history. In the fourteenth and early fifteenth century division of the Muscovite realm followed the traditional inheritance patterns found on all levels of secular society. Family princes con­ cluded treaties with their titular senior, promising to be governed by his foreign policy and to contribute their forces in time of danger. Cooperation, not coercion, marked these relationships. Good fortune and the bubonic plague of the midfourteenth century helped to keep the family's male membership down and Moscow thereby avoided the war-torn history that afflicted Tver' in that same fourteenth century. The free warriors who gravitated to Moscow benefited from the liberality and good sense of the Muscovite grand princes. The most important of these men-at-arms had become generals of the military establishment and the boyars of the duma (council). They enjoyed the best of two worlds. Being free to leave without penalty or loss of possessions, in the event of disagreement with their lord, they helped to temper and to shape policy. Unchallenged by those of princely lineage, who refused to take service in Moscow, these untitled d e f a c t o aristocrats built impressive fortunes and exerted considerable influence at the court, which could not do without their cooperation. The sharp increase of princely family members of the Muscovite house, by the last quarter of the fourteenth century, began to displace the influence of the senior servitors. Dmitrii Donskoi had to provide for five sons in the division of his realm. One close relative, Prince Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov-Borovsk, held a portion from an earlier division. They also shared in the military responsibilities, though the effective strength of the grand principality depended upon their willing collaboration. This increase in the number of family princes commensurately lessened the role of the boyars as genera Is, for, while most remained with the senior prince, they could only command the diminished forces directly under his command. Bound by custom, the senior prince was obliged to sign treaties concerning the precise limits of his mili­ tary obligations. Whenever the grand prince *sat his horse*, the princes of the line were obligated to do the same. Campaigns of smaller mobilization (when the grand prince did not participate personally) brought forth commensurately scaled down contributions by the family princes, led only by their designated commanders ( v o e v o d y ) . The insistence upon treaties among members of the Muscovite line (a practice common also in neighboring princely lands), indicates that concurrence, common good and not compulsion, was the key to effective unity of purpose.

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

75

The number of annual fighting days was not specified, nor did stated punish­ ments exist for violation of treaty agreements. Only in the course of the fifteenth century did the grand prince impose penalties — imprisonment or confiscation of lands — upon an errant family prince. Division of the realm among members of the ruling house also posed question concerning regional defense. In time of attack, all the military servitors, regardless of which prince they served, were ordered to assemble in the citadels closest to their residences. Only in offensive actions were such servitors to join under the banner of their particular overlord1. The division of Muscovy into u d e I y (princely patrimonies) and the traditional reliance upon collaboration weakened the military power of the senior prince. The 'common good" that bound the family princes to cooperation disappeared in the dynastic crisis of the fifteenth century. The question of succession, raised by Donskoi’s second son, lurii of Galich, divided the loyalties of the u d e I rulers and affected the morale of their retainers. When Prince lurii withdrew his coopera­ tion, even before the outbreak of military hostilities, Moscow’s defense posture suffered. Grand Prince Vasilii I (1389-1425) had to watch rather helplessly as his father-in-law, Grand Prince Vitovt of Lithuania, extended his influence eastwards. Instead of replying with force, he found himself compelled to name Vitovt as guard­ ian of his minor son, in the hope that this would avoid bloodshed in Moscow. In the subsequent hostilities, even the loyal princes of the family did not perform according to the spirit of the contracted obligations. For example, Prince Constan­ tine, who commanded the grand prince’s forces against lurii of Galich in 1425, with the purpose of forcing lurii’s acceptance of Vasilii II as the grand prince, never engaged his older brother in battle. At the first obstacle, a defended river crossing, he returned without accomplishing his mission2. Nor was the history of support by the u d e I princes much better in the subsequent period of dynastic divisions. Prince Dmitrii Shemiaka was the third and last member of the Galich branch to seek the senior throne of Muscovy. Prior to his active opposition, he had dutifully responded to a summons for miJitary assistance3. But at a crucial moment, when Tatars invaded Suzdal’ in 1445, Shemiaka ignored repeated appeals for assistance, leading to one of the catastrophes in that troubled reign4. Those who contributed most to Vasilii Il’s ultimate triumph were less the members of the house of Moscow than the steadfast untitled servitors. Their loyalty and experience played a deciding role in the shaping of the subsequent military organization, with increasing reliance placed upon those who could and would perform ably in battle. 1 A. M. Sakharov, pp. 188-190.

Goroda

levero-vostochnoi

Ru s i

X I V — XV

2 P o l n o e l o b r a n i e r u s s k i k h l e t o p i s e i (hereafter cited as 92; XII (St. Pet., 1901), 2; XXV (Moscow—Leningrad, 1949), 246. > PSRL,

XII, 24.

4 PSRL,

XVIII (St. Pet., 1913), 194: 'Kniaz' Dmitrei Shemiaka . . .

vekov

(Moscow, 1959),

P S R L), VIII (St. Pet., 1659),

ne prishel, ni polkov svoikh ne

VII

76 In the closing years of Vasilii ll's reign the basic patterns of future military prac­ tice may be detected: an increased reliance upon the d v o r (the court bodyguard) as a fighting unit, the reemergence of the boyars as the principal generals ( v o e v o d y ) , the continued utilization of the u d e I units, but always under the watchful eye of a high-ranked Muscovite representative, repeated utilization of Tatar units in service and the establishment of some border defense points along the more vulnerable frontiers. In addition,the Muscovite government devised a new system of quick mobilization of military units, which were then able to hasten to an endangered position. Thus, the necessities imposed during the dynastic wars became part of the new operational practices. In the early reign of Ivan III one detects a sustained increase in the demands placed upon provincial levies to ren­ der frequent military service. Service Tatars were a relatively new addition to the Muscovite military force. The continuing fragmentation of the former western Mongol horde forced some of the losers off the southern steppe in the 1430s. Khan Ulug Mehmed decided to move the remnants of his following north in 1437. He had come seeking Musco­ vite aid, but the reception was hostile. He subsequently moved his following east­ wards, where he established his khanate at Kazan’. From this base the Tatars launched border raids against Moscow's eastern frontier. Establishment of an "early warning system* and a better organized frontier guard became a necessity. When the sons of Ulug Mehmed quarreled among themselves over succession, the losers sought haven in Muscovy and joined Vasilii ll’s service. In 1446/47 they were employed alongside the grand princely levies in the dynastic battles5. At first they were kept close to Moscow, but this irritated the populace, long accustomed to viewing Tatars with hatred and suspicion. In 1449 a son of Ulug Mehmed, Tsarevich Kasim, was stationed in Zvenigorod, with orders to repel a foray by a steppe khan, Sedi Ahmed6. But by 1452 Kasim and his followers received a permanent base of operations on the southeastern flank of the realm, from which they could move either against their sworn enemies in Kazan’ or westwards along Moscow's southern defense perimeter7. This settlement, in Veselovskii's words, became a military colony, while the Tatar t s a r e v i c h i acquired autonomous status in the lands given them, with rights of justice and the profits of k o r m l e n i e (feedings)8.

• • 7

•

prislal.* For a catalogue of Shemiaka's transgressions, see the letter sent him by the Russian bishops in the winter of 1447: A k t y istoricheskie, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheog r a f i c h e s k o i u é k s p e d i t s i e i u , I (St. Pet., 1841), N o. 40, pp. 76—77. E. g., P S R L , XVI11, 202—203. P S R L , XII, 75; XVIII, 204. For the foundation of the G orodets principality on the Oka, later known as Kasimov, see V. V. Veriaminov-Zemov, I s s l e d o v a n i e o K a s i m o v s k i k h t s a r i a k h i t s a r e v i c h a k h , I (St. Pet., 1863); G. Vernadsky, T h e M o n g o l s a n d R u s s i a (New Haven, 1953), pp. 316, 324, 331—332; B. Spuler, D i e G o l d e n e H o r d e : D i e M o n g o l e n i n R u ß l a n d , 1223—1502 (Leipzig, 1943), p. 175; B. D. Grekov and A. lu. lakubovskii, Z o l o t a i a O r d a i e e p a d e n i e (Moscow—Leningrad, 1950), pp. 418—419. For a summary of other Tatars who came to serve in M oscow, see G. Stökl, D i e E n t s t e h u n g d e s K o s a k e n t u m s (Munich, 1953), pp. 65 ff. S. B. Veselovskii, .Poslednie udely v severo-vostochnoi Rusi', I s t o r i c h e s k i e z a p i s k i , XXII (1947), p. 123.

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

77

There is also evidence from the late reign of Vasilii II that peasants living on grand princely estates in Uglich were assigned to "frontier" duty9. This practice appears to have been continued in Ivan Ill's period, though it cannot be discovered whether these levies were recruited for normal or special purposes, for military or menial tasks. In the negotiations between Muscovite and Novgorodian officials in December 1477,theNovgorodians requested that their troops no longer be sent to serve in the "Nizhni" lands (i.e., in the east, along the Volga)10. In the annoying forays across the Tverian frontier, in the winter of 1484/85, the Muscovite pillagers were identified as part of a frontier contingent ( r a t ' p o r u b e z h n a i a ) n . Unfortunately, we are not informed where these troops were recruited. Two further instances underline the pragmatism in the shaping of frontier poli­ cies. In 1469 bitter fighting had erupted on the Kazan' frontier and there was apprehension concerning the possibility of a sudden winter raid. To guard against this, Ivan III directed his brother Prince lurii to position three hundred men along the traditional routes of approach. The number of soldiers is deduced from the supply of food and clothing sent from Moscow: 7 0 0 c h e t v e r t s of flour, 300 p u d s of meat, 300 bows, 6,000 arrows, 300 sheepskin coats, 300 of another kind of garment and 300 rough silk caftans. They were to remain on station all winter12. In 1486 another hastily constructed border defense took place, this time on the distant northeastern frontier. The ever-unreliable Viatchane began to raid the districts of Ustiug and G reat Perm. Local levies finally turned the Viatchane back, but not before three v o l o s t s were devastated. The inhabitants of Great Perm feared further attacks and they appealed to Moscow for help. Two members of the grand princely d v o r , Prince Ivan Lyko Obolenskii and lurii Shestak were sent out to secure the frontier. They recruited local troops from among the Dviniane, Vazhane and Kargopoltsy, positioning them to defend the isolated outposts of Ustiug and Vychegodok. Here they remained until the cold weather set in13. These developments foreshadow in miniscule the great frontier defense units created in the sixteenth century. We may suspect that long stretches of frontier were left unattended in the later fifteenth century, with greater reliance placed upon strategically located fortifications, situated along the major routes of pene­ tration. Their function was to bring news of impending danger to the capital and to hold off raiders until help could arrive. A Tatar attack in 1472 illustrates the * Akty otnosioshchieiia do iuridicheskogo byta drevnei Rossii, II (St. Pet., 1864), N o. 37, cols. 125—126; S. M. Solov’ev, I s t o r i i a Rossi i s drevneishikh v r e m é n , II (Moscow, 1960), 512. W e have an interesting reference to a 'nariad po beregu' for 1489/90, whidt has not survived: O p i s i T s a r s k o g o a r k h i v a XVI v. i a r k h i v a P o s o l s k o g o p r i k o z a 1614 g ., ed. S. O . Shmidt (Moscow, 1960), p. 33. « P S R L , XXV, 318: '. . . da sluzhby by, pozhaloval, v Nizovskuiu zemliu ne nariazhal, a kniaz’ veliki tern vsem pozhaloval ikh.* » P S R L , VI (St. Pet., 1853), 62. u U s t i u z h s k i i l e t o p i s n y i s v o d , ed. K. N. Serbina (Moscow—Leningrad, 1950), p. 88. 13 Vychegodsko-Vymskaia letopis’ in 'Dokumenfy po istorii Komi', I s t o r i k o - f i l o l o g i c h e s k i i s b o r n i k (Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Komi Filial), fasc. 4 (Syktyvkar, 1958), p. 263.

VII

78 importance of such selected positions. The story in the chronicles, while garbled and brief, permits some deductions. Though the variants do not indicate how news of the Tatar approach reached Moscow, the gathering of the forces, the posting of messengers to the u d e I y and to the Tatars of Gorodets, reveal the presence of an alert system. Though the Tatars finally chose to attack Aleksin (on the middle Oka) as their point of crossing into Muscovite territory, the contingency plans called for levies to convene at designated points 'along the shore' of the Oka, with mobile units placed further inland at designated points: Rostislavl’, Kolomna and Serpukhov. The u d e I princes were domiciled closer to Aleksin and their warriors were the first to arrive. Meanwhile, the major forces were summoned and sent to Serpukhov, where they would be in position to withstand a major assault14. Aleksin, of course, could not withstand a concerted attack. Weakly fortified and undermanned, the defenders also lacked for muskets, cannon, catapults and even a sufficient supply of arrows. The two commanders, Peter Fedorovich Cheliadnin, son of a prominent boyar, and Semen Beklemishev, were members of the grand princely d v o r on assignment. The garrison apparently did its duty before aban­ doning the position, blunting the Tatar thrust momentarily until reenforcements could arrive. When Khan Ahmed learned of the forces preparing to engage him, he ordered a retreat to the steppe15. This strategy of a southern defense system, hinted at in 1472, will become fully developed by the reign of Vasilii III (1505-1533). By then, a threat from the south brought massive concentrations of troops to key defense points16.

II The chroniclers’ pointed references to an absence of artillery and firearms at Aleksin would appear to be a subtle criticism. Small cannon or, at least, cannon of small bore, in fixed positions had long been a commonplace on walls of major towns and by the second-half of the fifteenth century probably were found on bas­ tions of outposts as well. The first fixed artillery pieces appeared in Moscow al­ most a century earlier, in 1382. Fashioned of iron at first, copper and brass super­ seded them as Muscovites learned how to cast in these metals17. In 1382, along with cannon, the defenders of Moscow employed crossbows, catapults and the usual caldrons of boiling water to dissuade assault forces18. Mobile artillery pieces began to appear by the mid-fifteenth century. Tverian cannon, on loan to Vasilii i4 According to one account, the commanders had received orders to abandon the fort, because reenforce­ ments could not reach them in time: P S R L , XXVIi (Moscow—Leningrad, 1962), 352—353. PSRL, IV (St. Pet., 1848), 150—151; XVIII, 241—242; XXVI (Moscow—Leningrad, 1959), 249—250; Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod, pp. 90—91. 14 R a z r i a d n a i a k n i g a 1475—1598 gg ., ed. V. I. Buganov, hereafter cited as R K , (Moscow, 1966), pp. 45—47, 61—62, 71—74, 7 5 -7 7 etc. 17 L. V. Cherepnin in P a m i a t n i k i r u s s k o g o p r a v a , III (Moscow, 1955), p. 16; A. V. Chernov, Vooruzhennye s i l y R u s s k o g o g o s u d a r s t v a v XV—XVII v v. (Moscow, 1954), p. 13. 14 Solov’ev, I s t o r i i a R o s s i i , II, 516; P S R L , XI (St. Pet., 1897), 75. «

M USCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

.

79

Ils troops, frightened the townsmen of Uglich into surrender in 144619. But the Muscovites tended to rely primarily upon cannon in fixed emplacements. Major towns received their share of artillery pieces, along with strengthened walls. By 1488 a cannon-casting works stood inside Moscow on the Neglinnaia River, within sight of the kremlin's northern apex, turning out firearms for the royal arsenal20. A full century later, Giles Fletcher, envoy of Queen Elizabeth, could say: *lt is thought that no prince of Christendom hath better store of munition than the Russe emperor. And it may partly appear by the artillery house at Moscow where all sorts of great ordnance, all brass pieces, very fair, to an exceeding great number*21. Ivan III well appreciated the advanced techniques of the West. His agents zealously courted masters of technology in Italy and in the German states. Aside from architects, builders and craftsmen, military engineers were highly prized22. The most celebrated of the foreigners seduced into service by Ivan III was Rudolfo Fioraventi degli Alberti, known more fittingly as Aristotle Fioraventi, a native of Bologna and a celebrated architect-engineer. His most famous monument in Muscovy is the still-standing Cathedral of the Dormition, located on the brow of the Kremlin hill. To construct such edifices, he first had to teach Muscovites how to fire brick that would not easily crumble. In 1477 Ivan III took his Italian genius-in-residence along on the Novgorodian campaign, where he asked him to construct a bridge across the Volkhov River. Fioraventi directed the fashioning of a pontoon bridge, floated on available boats. In awe, the chronicler reported that the floating roadway held up23. In the 1482 campaign against Kazan', which the Muscovites did not push to the point of fighting, Fioraventi came along with artillery, partly of his design and for use under his direction24. Against Tver’ in 1485, Fioraventi again appeared with his cannon and other firearms, possibly matchlock muskets, but here too there is no record uf use25. Other Italians were also at work at forges and in the casting

i*

I n o k o F o m y s l o v o p o k h v a l ’n o e o b l a g o v e r n o m v e l i k o m k n i a z e B o r i s e Aleksandroviche in P a m i a t n i k i drevnei pis'mennosti i iskusstva, CLXVIII (St. Pet., 1908), p. 46. Boris of Tver’ had sent cannon and on expert handler named Mikula Krechetnikov, 'n o takov beioshche toi master no iako sredi nemets ne obresti takova.* See also L. V. Cherepnin, 'K voprosu o roli gorodov v protsesse obrazovaniia Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva'. G o r o d a f e o d a l ' n o i R o s s i i (Moscow, 1966), pp. 110—111.

»

P S R L , VI, 238; XXVIII (Moscow—Leningrad, 1963), 319. E. E. Kolosov, 'Razvitie artillereiskogo vooruzheniia v Rossii XVII v.", I s t o r i c h e s k i e z a p i s k i , LXXI (1962), 260; P. V. Sytin, I s t o r i i a p l a n i r o v k i i z a s t r o i k i M o s k v y , I: 1147—1762 (Moscow, 1950), pp. 42, 44.

11 R u d e p. 186.

and

Barbarous

Kingdom,

a

PSRL,

XXIII (St. Pet., 1910), 186—187.

a

PSRL,

VI, 214; VIII, 192; XII, 180.

a

PSRL,

VI, 234.

»

I b i d . , p. 237.

ed. L. E. Berry and R. O. Crummey (Madison, W ise., 1968).

VII

80 shops on the Neglinnaia. Paolo Dubosis earned immortality in the chronicles, when he fashioned a particularly large cannon in 148826. Undoubtedly, the Italians taught the Muscovites the techniques of casting superior bronze pieces instead of the more rupture-prone iron ones. Rybakov grudgingly attributes this change primarily to Fioraventi, though the activities of others from the West made this more of a group contribution27. The acquired appetite for more and effective artillery and firearms will remain, particularly in the sixteenth century, when wars with Western powers required a search for parity in armaments. The efforts to induce skilled foreigners to come to this alien world, to teach innovation and technique, will increase in every succeeding period. What cannon could accomplish in fifteenth-century Muscovy was another matter. Almost all the new pieces were kept in the Kremlin armories or placed on the walls of citadels. Not all of the bulwarks were strong enough to mount heavy pieces or to withstand the impact of recoil, leading to the rebuilding or strengthening of fortifications. The absence of passable roads, except in winter, and the nature of Russian military organization limited the use of artillery in the field. Most who became adept in the aiming and firing of cannon generally remained on garrison duty, while the more traditional mobile levies continued to take the field. Speed of movement, as well as the lack of a permanently armed force trained in modern weaponry, for which one would need elementary knowledge of trajectories and ballistics, precluded the use of cannon on most campaigns28. Even those field pieces that, on occasion, were hauled before walled towns, inflicted negligible damage. Their small calibre was not effective in gouging holes of sufficient size in the walls. When the Muscovite armies marched against Novgorod in 1477, they, as usual, transported no artillery, despite the presence of Fioraventi. The grand prince did command the Pskovians to bring theirs29, for Pskov was closer and the difficulties of hauling cannon were great. Not the appearance of cannon, but of hunger and the first unsettling signs of plague, persuaded the Novgorodians to surrender30. Against the Livonian knights in 1481, for whom the Pskovians held particular animosity, their cannon performed as advertised. Joined with the Muscovite force sent against Fellin, 26 I o a s a f o v $ k a i a I e t o p i s', ed. A. A. Zimin (Moscow, 1957), p. 126; P S R L, VIII, 217; XII, 219. According to the V o l o g o d s k o - P e r m s k a i a letopis', the brass cannon weighed 3,600 pounds ('V nei tysiocha pudov m edi'): P S R L , XXVI, 279. In 1494 another cannon caster was identified upon his arrival as 'Petr pushechnik' ( P S R L , XII, 238). 27 B. A. Rybakov, R e m e s l o d r e v n e i R u s i (Moscow, 1948), p. 602. 22 In 1489, among the instructions Ivan III gave to his envoy, lurii Trakhaniotes, for execution in Germany, was to recruit a master cannoneer, who would be oble to aim cannon effectively: 'kotoryi by umel iz pushek streliat" : P a m i a t n i k i diplomaticheskikh snoshenii drevnei Rossii s d e r z h a v a m i i n o s t r a n n y m i , hereafter cited as P D S , I (St. Pet., 1851), col. 19. ** P S R L , VI, 208; XVIII, 258; XXV, 313; l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ' , p. 102: 's pushkami i pishchalmi i samostrely.' But the Pskovian chronicles make no mention of these; only that the grand prince demanded foodstuffs for the use of the army ( P s k o v s k i e l e t o p i s i , II [Moscow, 1955], 214). 30 l o a s f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ’, p. 112.

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cannonballs breached the walls. This is the only instance in Ivan Ill's reign where cannon facilitated the direct assault on a fortress31. Most often the fiery monsters bellowed and roared, causing more fright than damage, as at Galich in 1450, when, "thank God, no one was killed"32. Testimony by observant foreign visitors in the next hundred years substantiated the marginal use of firearms by the Muscovites; though the Livonian knights, more effectively geared to such weaponry and, ironically, the victims of the only success Moscow had as yet with portable cannon, decided, at the turn of the sixteenth century, to impose restrictions on the export of Western raw materials to Moscow. The embargo sought to deny Moscow access to saltpeter, lead, copper and sulphur33. Ill

Not gunpowder but additional manpower more effectively used remained the basis of army reforms, with increasing compulsion to serve and a heavier reliance upon a leadership of experienced and trustworthy generals. With an everincreasing army, the government of Ivan III could create regional defenses and plan longer and more frequent campaigns. Reliance upon the older techniques of warfare was necessary, since the Muscovite crown had neither the technical means nor the economic resources to create a military establishment of the type coming into being in Western Europe. The chain-mailed horseman, with bow, sword, javelin, whip and shield, remained the warrior par excellence34. Pay, as always, came largely in the form of booty. Since the Russian population shared a common hostility towards Tatars, the government sensitively used them sparingly in campaigns against enemies in the north. In 1471, when Ivan III used his Gorodets-based Tatars, he forbade them to join in the plunder of Novgorod or to take prisoners. Instead he presented them with special gifts35. After the Tverian surrender of 1485, the grand prince decreed that his junior boyars and d ’ i a k i (state secretaries), sent into the city to administer oaths of allegiance, were to defend against looting "with all their strength"36. Presumably, all the army received in plunder came from the coun­ tryside and from what could be taken in the faubourgs, when troops burned the suburbs37. In the aforementioned campaign against Novgorod, Ivan III assigned his brother. Prince Andrei the Younger, to take charge of the city of Moscow, while he directed the other brothers to join in the main drive against the republic. * 8

I b i d . , p. 123; P S R L , XII, 213. P S R L , VIII, 122: *nachasho pr’voe z goroda push Ici pishdiati, i i tiufiaki i pishchali i samostreli, no nivochtozhe se byt' im, Bozhieiu blagodastiiu ne ubita do nikodozhe.* 33 T. Esper, 'A Sixteenth Century anti-Russian Arms Embargo*, J a h r b ü c h e r f ü r G e s c h i e h te O s t e u r o p a s , N eue Folge, XV (1967), 187. * Sigismund zu Herberstein, R e i s e z u d e n M o s k o w i t e r n , 1526, ed. T. Seifert (Munidi, 1966), p. 141. * P S R L , VI, 192, 193. m P S R L , XXVII, 287; this was fulfillment of a promise made beforehand ( P S R L , IV, 156). 33 P S R L , XXVII, 287.

VII

82 The more fortunate participants returned laden with silver, horses and other spoils, while Andrei and his following were not issued a share. Instead, Ivan III rewarded them with a license to pillage. Though the war was over, Ivan allowed Andrei’s troops to make a diversion on their way home, where they could rob villagers in Novgorodian territory38. A narrative of the 1469 fighting along the eastern frontier reveals another kind of compensation for loss as well as for outstanding bravery. In a Tatar ambush of a Muscovite force, the casualties ran high on both sides. One chronicle account stated that the Russian lost 530 men, of which 110 were Ustiuzhane. The survivors made their way to the protection of Nizhnii Novgorod, where they sent messages to Moscow, asking for suitable rewards. The grand prince twice sent them "a golden denga'. This the warriors gave to the priest Ivan, who had accompanied them as chaplain. All they demanded from him were his prayers to be said for the sovereign and his warriors39. At first view, this last piece of information makes as little sense to us as it undoubtedly did to the recipients. Golden d e n g i did not exist as a monetary unit. Nor should this be confused with the gold coins minted by Ivan III (modeled on the Hungarian florin), designed as payment to foreigners40. This golden d e n g a , so inadequately described, was a newly conceived medal for valor. It will be better known in the sixteenth century; this notation of 1469 is the first evidence of its earlier existence. The English envoy, Giles Fletcher, who visited Russia in 1489/90, described it so: 'If any behave himself more valiently than the rest and do any special piece of service, the emperor sendeth him a piece of gold stamped with the image of St. George on horseback, which they then hang on their sleeves or set in their caps. And this is accounted the greatest honor they can receive for any service they do*41. If the number of warriors taking the field increased immensely in Ivan Ill’s reign, unfortunately no absolute or even approximate figures are obtainable. Those figures provided by chroniclers are too exaggerated to adopt as reliable. For example, in the K h r o n i k a B y k h o v t s a there is a description of the famous battle on the Vedrosha in 1500. The Lithuanian forces were estimated at a reasonable three and a half thousand, plus footmen, and the Muscovite army allegedly had '40,000 well-armed horsemen', as well as infantry42. Nor are the military registers for the later period of Ivan Ill’s reign of much help in ascertaining size of armies. These list only the major commanders of armies, regiments, or of smaller units, but the size of the forces they led are nowhere mentioned. An increase in the number of v o e v o d y for a particular campaign undoubtedly reflected increased size. For this period we also lack many of the basic sources » P S R L , VI, 193. ** U s t i u z h s l c i i l e t o p i s n y i s v o d , pp. 87—88. 40 I. G. Spasskii, 'Z olotye—Voinskie nogrady v dopetrovskoi Rusi', T r u d y g o s u d a r s t v e n n o g o Ê r m i t a z h a , IV (Leningrad, 1961), 95. 41 R u d e a n d B a r b a r o u s K i n g d o m , p. 186. 42 K h r o n i k a B y k h o v t s a , ed. and trans. by N. N. Ulashchik (Moscow,1966), p. 113.

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

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83

for estimating population figures or for military levies, such as hearth rolls, plowland surveys, individual contribution of tribute paid to the grand prince and military recruitment registers. Yet we know that cadastral surveys had come into being by the end of the fifteenth century. Those for Novgorod are largely extant43, but the compilations made for the central districts (Moscow, Pereiaslavl’, lur'ev, Dmitrov, Tver’, Vladimir, Rostov, and possibly some others) are not44. Nor do we possess the results of surveys made for Great Perm ' in 1480/8145 and Beloozero in 148246. The cadasters registered the names of landholders, the properties cultivated, or those held in waste or in meadow, along with an estimate of the income derived. These became the bases for taxation and military service47. No precise or even approximate ratio of wealth to service is known for Muscovy in this period. W e do not know whether service was uniform for all regions or differentiated according to local custom. W e do have some glimmers, however. One comes from Pskov, where, in the winter of 1499/1500, Mikula Angelov, a Greek in Muscovite service, arrived from Moscow with orders that a local con­ tingent be formed for participation in the forthcoming Lithuanian campaign. The Pskovians complied, assessing a horse from every ten s o k h a s 48 and an armed horseman (with mount) for every 40 rubles of wealth. To this cavalry force, they added a contingent of impoverished peasants (b o b y I i). Unfortunately, no figure was given for the total force49. W e may assume, however, from the surveys of the central region, such as that for Tver’ in-1491/92, where the lands were 'surveyed according to the Muscovite sokha'50 that some similar method existed for the calling up of levies.

43 N o v g o r o d s k i i o p i s t s o v y i a k n i g i , 6 vols. (St. Pet., 1859—1910); S. B. Veselovskii, S e I o i d e r e v n i a v s e v e r o - v o s t o c h n o i R u s i XIV—XVI w . (Moscow, 1936), p. 41. u A. A. Zimin, 'Sobytiia 1499 g. i. bor’ba politicheskikh gruppirovok pri dvore Ivana III', N o v o e o p r o s h l o m n a s h s i s t r a n y (Moscow, 1967), pp. 99, 101. Zimin, in an article published three years before the once cited immediately above ('O politicheskikh predposylkakh voznikoveniia Russkogo absoliutizm a', A b s o l i u t i z m v R o s s i i [ XVII—XVIII v v. ) , (Moscow, 1964], pp. 33 -3 4 ) tied the survey of Tver’ in 1491/92 to an attack on Tverian autonomy. One may suspect that the broader utilization of the surveys found in his 1967 article reflects a modification of view. «s 'Dokumenty po istorii Komi',

Istoriko-filologicheskii

sbornik,

fasc. 4, pp. 262—263.

44 Veselovskii, S e l o i d e r e v n i a , p. 41. 43 N . M. Kostomarov, R u s s k a i a i s t o r i i a v z h i z n e o p i s a n i i a k h e e g l a v n e i s h i k h deiatelei, I (St. Petersburg, 1873), 177. According to Herberstein ( R e i s e z u d e n M o s k o ­ w i t e r n , pp. 140—141), in the early sixteenth century, a muster of the military levies was held every three years, with records kept of all a b le-b o d ied . aristocrats, and they were called to serve on any endangered frontier. « A s o k h a was a unit of arable, tillable land that was used as a tax unit. Unfortunately, the unit was reckoned differently in the various parts of the Russian north at this time. See I. I. Sreznevskii, Materioly dlia slovaria drevne-russkago iazyka po p i s ’mennym p a m i a t n i k a m , III (St. Pet., 1906; reprinted Graz, 1956), cols. 469—470. m PSRL,

VI, 24;

*

XXVIII, 156.

PSRL,

Pskovskie

letopisi,

I (Moscow—Leningrad, 1941), 84.

VII

84 W e may take for granted another factor that augmented the number of men under arms. There was a general increase in population in the course of the fif­ teenth century. The evidence gleaned from the genealogical registers for aristo­ cratic families suggest a three to a fourfold growth. Despite periodic recurrences of plague, but of far lesser severity than the pandemics of the fourteenth century, and the losses incurred in war or by famine, the increase in population was respectable. Vasilii II followed patrimonial tradition and created u d e I y for his younger sons, though he safeguarded the position of his successor by making his share larger than the total area given to u d e I y. Ivan Ill's problem was to render his brothers politically docile and militarily subservient. The demanded cooperation was not always forthcoming. Consequently, by the end of his reign most of the u d e I y were reincorporated into the grand princely holdings. Prince lurii, the one brother for whom Ivan III held the greatest affection, died in 1472. Thus the largest u d e I reverted to the crown. The principality of Vereia, the only Muscovite family u d e l to survive the confiscation of the 1450s, was annexed in 1484. Its would-be-inheritor was labelled a traitor on a trumped-up charge. Prince Andrei the Younger, who died in 1481, also had his lands sequestered. The most disgruntled among the brothers, Boris of Volok and Andrei the Elder, had desired landed rewards from the Novgorodian settlement of 1478; they received nothing, aside from booty. They decided to defect in the great crisis of 1479/80, when the Tatars again threatened. To keep them loyal and to have their forces available on the battle line, Ivan made some grudging concessions; but he never forgot or forgave their transgressions. Andrei the Elder was thrown into prison in 1491, when he refused a military order. He died in chains three years later and his lands were recovered by the crown. Only Volok was allowed to be inherited by Boris's sons51. Despite this somewhat troubled history, Ivan III insisted that the u d e l forces be used profitably in the interests of the monarchy. He made little secret that the u d e l servitors owed prime allegiance to Moscow and not to their immediate lords. Secondly, they were not among the best of the serving men, particularly in the last decades of the fifteenth century. The ablest and most ambitious of the untitled aristocracy had enlisted under the banners of the grand prince. Thirdly, the nature of rewards in the u d e I y were commensurately less, largely because the u d e l princes were saddled with heavy hidden taxes (in the form of tribute payments), reducing the amount of wealth available to the appanage lords. Finally, when called to serve with the grand princely regiments, either directly under their own lords or their v o e v o d y , they were rarely given particularly choice battle assignments. All in all, service in the provincial capitals was not eminently attractive to the able and ambitious. It is generally noteworthy that few scions of important Muscovite serving families chose service there. A. E. Presniakov, pp. 417— 427.

Obrazovanie

velikorusskago

gosudarstva

(Petrograd,

1918),

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

85

Muscovite policy decreed that the u d e I troops were to be utilized wherever the government decided. Instructions flowed continuously from the citadel on the Moskva, directing the u d e I contingents to specified points. When the royal brothers proved to be less than reliable, they were placed under the observation of an official sent out from the duma. In the early years of the new reign, when foreign policy was cautious and hostilities largely confined to the Kazan' frontier, the crown relied upon its own forces, led by members of the d v o r or of the duma. The size and importance of the operation dictated the choice of a commander. When a campaign of major proportions developed, the u d e I princes were summoned. In the Kazan’ hostilities that carried through Lent of 1468, Ivan III accompanied the army to Vladimir. His two brothers Andrei were left in charge of the defenses of Moscow, and the other brothers accompanied him. W e know nothing, un­ fortunately about the actual command or strategic maneuvers52. A staged escalation was planned for the following year. A small force set out from Ustiug, commanded by junior boyars of the Moscow d v o r , with orders to ravage the Kama region and to bring pressure upon the flank of Kazan's territories. The main forces were concentrated at Nizhnii Novgorod, made up of provincial contingents from the eastern districts. Their orders were to remain alert and only to allow volunteers to penetrate the no-man's land near the fortified citadel of Kazan', but not into an area from which the defenders could strike back easily. The boat forces then sailed along the river, plundering and pillaging, retreating to the cover of their defensive line whenever the Tatars came out in pursuit. A northern force, coming down to Nizhnii Novgorod, fell afoul of a Tatar ambush and was decimated. Many of their commanders were taken captive53. The spring probes became desultory over the summer; by fall it was turned into a full-scale offensive. The chronicle evidence is contradictory. According to some accounts, Ivan III sent his brothers, Princes lurii and Andrei the Elder out in the spring54, while others claim that they came during the September offensive against Kazan’. According to the l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o pi s ' , Ivan III placed the cavalry under the command of his brothers lurii and Andrei the Elder, as well as Prince Michael of Vereia55. Prince lurii led the entire army on the final attack. This information is also repeated in other versions. The Muscovites surrounded the fortress of Kazan’ and cut off the water supply, prompting the tsar’ to sue for peace55. The Ustiug chronicle noted that the grand prince’s brothers were accompanied by "voevody and princes and the dvor of

a P S R L , XXV, 280. a l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ' , pp. 57—60. M P S R L , IV (St. Pet., 1848), 149; V, 274 (adds Prince Michael of Vereia); U s t i u z h s k i i l e t o p i s n y i s v o d , p. 87. a l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ' , p. 60; P S R L , XII, 123 (without time of year), a l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ' , pp. 60—61 ; P S R L , IV, 149; VIII, 157—158 (under spring, 1470).

VII 86

the grand prince*57. The Sofia I chronicle identified them as Prince Ivan lur'evich Patrikeev, Fedor Davydovich Khromoi and Prince Danilo Kholmskii58. Patrikeev was the senior boyar of the duma; Khromoi, if not yet a boyar, would reach that level shortly; and Kholsmkii, a Tverian émigré, was already marked for rapid advancement. One may suspect that Patrikeev carried instructions for the campaign and might even have been charged with overall responsibility for the operations. The presence of at least one boyar of Ivan Ill's council on this campaign was no accident. The same pattern emerges with greater clarity in an examination of the two Novgorodian military operations—that of 1470/71 and 1477/78. While the u d e l princes and the Tatar servitors were summoned in 1470, the central offensive thrust was entrusted to boyar-led forces, which engaged and defeated the Novgorodians59. The final assault in the second campaign allows for an even better understanding in distinguishing the real from the apparent. According to the r a z r i a d (military register) for the 1477 campaign, Ivan III divided his forces in mid-November into four wings. He entrusted seniority of the lead regiment to Prince Andrei the Younger, but also assigned three boyars with provincial levies to accompany the force. The right wing went to Andrei the Elder, to which the Tverians were assigned; Prince Boris of Volok led the left wing, which included the forces of Mozhaisk and those sent by the dowager grand princess. The Great Regiment, under the control of the grand prince, was huge. It contained no less than six duma members, each leading large contingents of provincials, as well as additional commands controled by lower ranking v o e v o d y. This division was hardly a deployment ready for battle; it merely detailed the routes and units of march. Once they reached appointed stations close to Novgorod, the strategic positions in the ring of siege went to the boyar commanders. Tsarevich Dan’iar and his Tatars also occupied an important position, but his instructions came via two attached members of the Muscovite d v o r 60. The chronicles give an even better picture of how the boyar-led forces occupied the key monastic centers surrounding Novgorod, thereby denying the besieged access to stored food sup­ plies in outlying areas. Any sallies from the town gates would effectively be con­ tained by these strategically positioned troops61. The armies of Muscovy would continue to include u d e l forces on all major campaigns and for regional defense in time of danger, but increasingly the u d e l troops were overshadowed in overall strategy as the Muscovite armies swelled with troops from provincial towns and the annexed areas. Tradition still required place of military honor to be accorded to princes of the line and the idea of & » » «• «

U s t u i z h s k i i I• t o p i s n y i i v o d , P S R L , V, 274. P S R L , VIII, 189; XXV, 287—290. R K , pp. 18-1 9 . E.q ., P S R L , XXV, 31^—315.

p. 87.

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

87

aristocratic seniority would also become increasingly important among the blooded members of the service nobility, but in this reign, at least, substantive control remained with the grand prince, with strong participation by members of the boyar duma. The increased utilization of provincial forces is encountered from the beginning of the reign. In the 1469 spring campaign, men from the eastern districts were sent to the Kliazma and to Nizhnii Novgorod, probably commanded by members of the grand prince’s d v o r . Fighting men were summoned from Murom, Vladimir, Suzdal', Dmitrov, Uglich, laroslavl', Rostov, Kostroma and from other towns62. The Ustiuzhane and Viatchane were also called43. The Nikon chronicle recorded that the grand prince demanded the presence of the junior boyars from the entire land, including the u d e l y 64. The campaigns against Novgorod re­ quired the participation of all the available military contingents65, as did the stand on the Ugra in 148066. We may expect that the major assaults upon Kazan’ and the wars with Lithuania called forth strenuous efforts on the part of the provincials and that the frequency of participation increased in the ever-expanding military ventures. What coercive methods or arrangements the government employed are not always revealed, though the presence of provincial servitors on the many campaigns is undeniable. The pressure upon those from annexed areas to serve is apparent throughour the second-half of the fifteenth century. Whenever Ivan III purchased or annexed a territory, he induced or coerced the warrior aristocracy to take service with him. At first, a variety of seductions and inducements were employed, but in time the very success of these measures threatened to engulf the existing military hierarchy in Moscow. «

loasafovskaia

•* U s t i u z h s k i i

letopis',

letopisnyi

p. 58. svo d ,

p. 87.

* P S R L , XII, 120-121. •s 1470/71: P S R L , VI, 9. Ivan III summoned not only the Tatars and the u d e l levies, but 'a ll the people of his lan d '. The Ustiuzhane and Viatchane were again uitilized in the neighboring Novgorodian province, this time against the Dvina land, under command of junior boyars of the d v o r ( l o a s a ­ fovskaia l e t o p i s ’ , p. 66; P S R L , IV, 150). In the west, the Pskovians were ordered out against the Novgorodians ( P S RL , XXV, 286, 288). In 1477/78, again all the provincials were ordered out ( l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ’ , pp. 98 ff.). According to the r a z r i a d (R K , p. 18) the follow ing provincials had obeyed the grand prince's summons: Kostromichi, Kolomnichi, Volodimertsy, Dmitrovtsy, Kashintsy, Suzdal'tsy, lur’evtsy, Koluzheny, Oleksintsy, Serpukhovichi, Khotuntsy, Moskovichi, Radonezhtsy, Novotorzhtsy, Mozhaichi, Vologzhane, Zvenigorodtsy, Volochane, Ruzhane, G alichane, laroslavtsy, Rostovtsy, Uglichane, Bezhechane and Muromtsy. The Vydiegodsko-Vymskaia chronicle, oriented primarily to local affairs in the region o f Great Perm', Ustiug and Viatka, demonstrates the frequent use o f local levies on Muscovite ventures. Repeatedly called w ere the Vologzhane, Ustiuzhane, Belozertsy, Vychegzhane, Vymichi, Sysolechi, Cherdyntsy. After the final passification of Viatka, the Viatchane learned how to obey. G radually, the Dviniane, Penizhane, Vazhane, however reluctant, appeored upon call ('Dokumenty po istorii Komi', Is t o r i ko f i l o l o g i c h e s k i i s b o r n i k , fasc. 4, pp. 262 ff.). M loasafovskaia

l e t o p i s ’, pp. 120—121; P S R L , VI, 21.

VII 88

The importance of these policies and adjustments of the 1480s have a bearing on both military and political affairs. A detailed analysis becomes desirable if we are to understand how Ivan Ill's government utilized the army to increase his hold over servitors, particularly in annexed areas and the impact these measures had upon the old untitled aristocracy. In 1463 Ivan III coerced the ruler of laroslavl’ to deed his lands to Moscow67. Kliuchevskii and Veselovskii believed that both princes and servitors from the time of annexation became militarily subordinate to the Muscovite monarch68. In Ivan Ill’s testament of 1504, it is specified that "the Yaroslavl’ boyars and junior boyars, with their patrimonies and their purchases shall not leave [the service of] my son Vasiliy to go to anyone, anywhere. And concerning those who leave, their lands [shall pass] to my son, but he shall not interfere in the lands of them that serve him, nor [shall he interfere in the lands] of their wives and children*69. The service of the laroslavl' nobility is attested to by the r a z r i a d for 147770. While the paragraph in Ivan Ill’s will did not include the princes, we have other evidence to show that the princes of laroslavl’ came, possibly under compulsion, to Moscow, where they enlisted in the d v o r as medium-ranked servitors. Some rose to high military and administrative positions71. Prince Danilo Vasilevich Penko laroslavskii, son of the last independent ruler, and his relative, Prince Semen Romanovich, became boyars in time72. Some of the lesser laroslavl' princes also became important in Moscow. Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Shastun occupied some administrative position73. His brother Danilo was also in Moscow’s employ, for in 1469 he commanded the Ustiug detachments in the Kazan’ campaign74. Prince

°

Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi k n i a z ' i a S e v e r n oi Rus i 95; see also L. V. Cherepnin, gosudarstva v XIV—XV v suspect dating of the annexation documents were transferred to the P. 32).

s v o d , p. 85; A. V. Êkzempliarskii, V e l i k i « i udel'nye v T a t a r s k i i p e r i o d , s 1238 p o 1505, II (St. Pet., 1891), Obraiovanie Russkogo Isentralizovannogo e k a k h (Moscow, I960), pp. 825—830, for an interesting but of laroslavl*. After annexation, all the laroslavl* treaties and Muscovite treasury ( O p i s i T s a r s k o g o a r k h i v a XVI v . ,

«• V. O. Kliuchevskii, K u r s R o s s k o i istorii, in S o c h i n e n i i a , II (Moscow, 1957), 112; S. B. Veselovskii, F é o d a l * n o e zemlevladenie v severovostochnoi Rusi , I (Moscow—Leningrad, 1947), 301. M The T e s t a m e n t s of the (Ithaca, N .Y ., 1967), p. 276. »

RK,

Grand

Princes

of

Moscow,

ed. and trons. by R. C. Howes

p. 18.

71 G. Alef, «Das Erlöschen des Abzugsrechts der Moskauer Bojaren”, F o r s c h u n g e n e u r o p ä i s c h e n G e s c h i c h t e , X (Berlin, 1965), 47—48 and note 154.

zur

ost­

71 A. A. Zimin, 'Sostav boiarskoi dum y', A r k h e o g r a f i c h e s k i i e z h e g o d n i k z a 1957 g ., hereafter cited as A E , 1957 (Moscow, 1958), pp. 46 & 47; G. A lef, 'Reflections on the Composition of Ivan Ill’s Dum a', S l a v o n i c and East European Review, hereafter cited as S E E R , XLV (London, 1967), 104. n

RK , p. 20. He remained in Moscow with Grand Princess Sofia in 1485, when Ivan III accom panied his armies on the Tverian campaign.

»

P S R L , VI, 189.

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

89

Vasilii Vasilevich's son, Peter, also served in the court administration, becoming d v o r e t s k i i by 149575 and attained the duma rank of o k o Pn i c h i i (second step member) in the following reign76. Other laroslavl' princelings were found serving in the d v o r of Ivan III (such as the Romanovichi, Ushatois, lukhotskies, Prozorovskies and Zasekins)77. Given the lack of laroslavl's importance, they flooded the Muscovite court in disproportionate number. They had, undoubtedly, taken advantage of the grand prince’s desire to keep them under a watchful eye and made careers for themselves.

”

RK,

*

Zimin, 'Sostav*,

p. 25.

n

Prince Dmitrii Fedorovich lukhotskii was listed under the princes and junior boyars of the d v o r , accompanying Ivan III to Novgorod in 1495 (R K , p. 25). His father. Prince Fedor lukhotskii was a guest at the wedding of Princess Feodosiia Ivanovna to Prince Vasilii Donilovich Kholmskii in 1500 (R K , p. 16), suggesting that he was at least resident in Moscow. Prince Andrei Dmitrievich Kurbskii was the childless son of Prince Dmitrii Semenovich Kurbskii (Vremennik Imperotorskago Moskovskago obshchestva istorii i d r e v n o s t e i R o s s i i s k i k h , hereafter cited as V r e m e n n i k , X (Moscow, 1851), Materialy, p. 233), who appeared in the 1495 listing of the d v o r contingent that went to Novgorod (R K , p. 25). According to A. B. Lobonov-Rostovskii ( R u s s k a i a r o d o s l o v n a i a k n i g a , I (St. Pet., 1873), 19), he served as a voevoda at Orsha in 1495. Kurbskii continued to serve as a v o e v o d a on the campaigns of Vasilii III, in 1508, 1509, 1513 (R K , pp. 40, 42, 50). Prince Semen Fedorovich Kurbskii, first cousin to A. D. Kurbskii ( V r e m e n n i k , X, Materialy, p. 233), a lso appeared in the 1495 list of the d v o r (R K , p. 25). He worked his way up to a low-ranked detachment commander by the end of century (R K , p. 29: 1598/99; p. 36: October, 1505; p. 39: May, 1508). From 1512—1528, he commanded units of significant size on the Lithuanian and Kazan' campaigns (R K , pp. 48, 52—53, 56—57, 59, 64, 69, 71). His brother Roman was killed on one of the Kazan' attacks ( V r e m e n n i k , X, Materialy, p. 233). Prince Andrei Ivanovich Prozorovskii’s older brothers and nephews had either been in Vasilii It’s service, or had come to his aid in 1445, for they were identified as casualties at the battle of Suzdal' ( D r e v n i a i a R o s s i i s k a i a V i v l i o f i k a , 2nd ed., hereafter cited as D R V , VI [Moscow, 1788], 457). Prince Andrei served in the command of Prince Alexander Penko laroslavskii at Velikie Luki in 1493 (R K , p. 23). In 1495, he too was a member of the d v o r (R K , p. 25). Prince Konstantin Semenovich, son of the boyar Semen Romanovich, was found in the 1495 dvor (R K , p. 25); by 1519 he achieved the position of v o e v o d a in the Kazan' campaign (R K , p. 65). Prince Michael L'vovich Romanovich, nephew of Semen Romanovich, also served in the 1495 d v o r (R K , p. 26). Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Shestunov and his brother Semen were also found in the dvor in 1495 (R K , p. 26). They were the sons of Prince Vasilii Shestun, who had already been in Ivan Ill's service for some time (R K , p. 20). Prince Fedor Petrovich Sittskoi's father and uncle Boris lost their lives in 1445 at the battle of Suzdal' ( D R V , VI, 457—459), suggesting that they may have then been in grand princely service. Prince Fedor’s first identifiable service is found in the 1495 dvor (R K , p. 25). In 1500 he was a member of Prince V. D. Kholmskii’s wedding party (R K , p. 16). Between 1506 and 1528, he served as a medium-ranked v o e v o d a ( RK, pp. 36, 38, 41, 42—43). Prince Konstantin Ushatoi began service as early as 1492, as a v o e v o d a of the guard regiment of a force sent against the Severe lands (R K , p. 22). In 1495 he was found in the d v o r suite (R K , p. 25). Ivan III employed him as a m essenger to his v o e v o d y on the Lithuanian front (R K , p. 30). In 1504/05 he was namestnik in Dmitrov (Zimin, 'Spisok namestnikov", A r k h e o g r a f i c h e s k i i e z h e g o d n i k z a 1960 (Moscow, 1961], p. 30) and later in Ivangorod ( P D S , I, cols. 125—126, 131—132). He continued to advance in rank, becoming an o k o I ' n i c h i i in 1512 (Zimin, 'Sostav", A E , 1957, p. 50). For his further military career, see R K , pp. 39, 40, 45, 49, 50, 56, 61—63, 66. Princes Dmitrii and Davyd Ivanovich Zasekin served in the d v o r of 1495 (R K , p. 25) and then disappear from view.

A E,

1957,

p. 49.

VII

90 Similarly, the princes of Rostov came into royal service. Vasilii II had already purchased half of Rostov, prior to 1462, and then bequeathed it to his wife78. In 1474 Ivan III acquired the remaining half79. According to Vasilii Il's testament, the princes living in the half of Rostov acquired by him were to 'hold it in the same manner [as that in which they held it under me]*80. The passage implies conditions, though we may only guess that they included service. The available evidence of such service comes rather late, no earlier than the beginning of the 1490s. This does not mean, however, that they had not assumed military obligations earlier, for investigation now shows that Ivan III demanded prior court and low-ranked military employment before posting members of his d v o r on missions of greater responsibility81. Hence, appearance of a v o e v o d a ’s name in the r a z r i a d , particularly towards the end of century, meant earlier service of a less distinguish­ ed, and consequently of a less visible, nature. Prince Alexander Volodimerovich Rostovskii was the most important of the Rostov nobility to make early inroads into the central Muscovite power structure. He became a boyar by 150982, but had served his journeymanship in the d v o r 83, emerging as a v o e v o d a of medium rank by 1491/9284 against the Lithuanians. After 1501 he regularly commanded regiments in Moscow's continuing wars85. His brother Dmitrii also became a boyar (by 151786), making the top of the service order via the administrative route. He had served as Prince of Pskov in 1502/0387, indicating that his trustworthiness and abilities met the tests of the Muscovite court. Other Rostov princes also came to Moscow where they served in a variety of offices. A list of members of the d v o r , accompanying Ivan III to Novgorod in

n

Dukhovny« i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh kniazei v v. , hereafter cited as D D G (Moscow—Leningrad, 1950), p. 195; Howes, T e s t a m e n t s ,

n

P S R L , V, 283; VIII, 180; Kliudievskii, K u r s ,

»

Howes, T e s t a m e n t s ,

«

Alef, 'Reflections*, S E E R ,

«

Zimin, 'Sostav', A E , 1957, p. 49 and note 90.

«

R K , p. 25.

p. 254;

in S o c h i n e n i i a ,

XIV—XVI p. 254.

II, 112.

D D G , p. 195.

XLV, 104—105.

•* R K , p. 22. ** R K , p. 32: September, 1502; p. 34: 1501; p. 37: O ctober, 1505; p. 38: September, 1507; p. 42: September, 1508; p. 44: September 1509; p. 46: May, 1512; P D S , I, cols. 193, 212: March, 1517; P D S , I, cols. 256, 258: October, 1518; R K , p. 48: September, 1521; R K , p. 50: 1518. He also served as a justice in a dispute involving Trinity Monastery and o local landholder: A k t y s o t s i a l ’ noè k o n o m i c h e s k o i i s t o r i i s e v e r o - v o s t o c h n o i Rusi, hereafter cited as A S E I S V R , I (Moscow, 1952), No. 651, pp. 574—575. In March, 1517 he was n a m e s t n i k o f Novgorod ( P D S , I, cols. 193, 212. u

Zimin, 'Sostav',

”

P S R L , VI, 24.

A E,

1957, p. 50.

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

91

REFORMS

1495; identifies some of them. At least five verifiable members of that clan were present88. Of these. Prince Alexander Andreevich Khokholkov-Rostovskii will be­ come a boyar by the end of Vasilii Ill's reign89. Fear of continued Muscovite expansion and the benefits derived by the laroslavtsy and Rostovtsy princes in joining Moscow's government appear to have had an effect upon the attitudes of the Tverian military aristocracy. The first to defect was Prince Danilo Dmitrievich Kholmskii, a descendant of the ruling Tverian house. Arriving as early as 1467, he was favored with influence and position. Yet Ivan III questioned his continued fidelity, despite his laudatory service. In 1474 the grand prince forced him to sign a document promising steadfast and continued service. Immediately thereafter the grand prince raised him to boyaral rank90. This stick and carrot treatment was not lost upon contemporaries, particularly upon those who may have wavered. At the same time Moscow began to exert pressure upon other Tverians to transfer allegiance and service. In 1476 the chronicler also noted that 'there came to Grand Prince Ivan Vasilevich from Tver' many boyars and junior boyars to serve: Grigorei Nikitich [Borozdin], Ivan Zhito [Borozdin]91, Vasilii Danilov, Vasilii Bokeev, three Karpovichi, Dmitrii Kindyrev and many others*•*92. Moscow’s grip on Tver’ had been tightening for some time. The incremental pressures would continue. The Tverian grand prince had been obliged to send his troops to aid Moscow against Novgorod in 1470. The commanders were Prince lurii Andreevich Dorogobuzhskii and Ivan Nikitich Zhito Borozdin93. The latter was one of the defectors in 1474. W hat pressures or inducements were employed against the Tverian ruler to make his military contribution are not known. More visible is the consistent demand that Tverian forces join with Muscovite on major grand princely campaigns, such as the second attack on Novgorod in 1477 and the defense against the Tatars in 148094. Thus defection from Tver’ took place precisely during the period when Moscow denigrated the Tverian ruler’s prestige by for­ cing his cooperation on Muscovite ventures. *

R K , p. 25: Prince Andrei Ivanovich Khokholek and his two sons, lushko and Alexander; Princes Ivan and Semen Ivanovichi lanov-Rostovskii. For their careers, see the index o f R K. Princes Ushatoi and Golenin accom panied Princess Elena Ivanovna to Lithuania in January, 1495, escorting her to marry the Lithuanian grand prince ( S b o r n i k I m p e r a t o r s k a g o R u s s k a g o i s t o r i c h e s k a g o o b s h c h e s t v a , hereafter cited as S I R I O , XXXV [St. Pet., 1882], 164).

•* Zimin, 'S ostav', «

A E,

1957, pp. 52—53.

Alef, .D as Erlöschen', F o r s c h u n g e n zur osteuropäischen 39—41; idem, 'Reflections', S E E R , XLV, 105 and n. 147. Vremennik,

Geschichte,

X,

X, Materialy, p. 116.

«

PSRL,

VIII, 182—183.

n

PSRL,

XXV, 288.

f*

P S R L , XV (St. Pet., 1863), col. 484: Prince Michael Fedorovich Mikulinskii led the Tverian brigade. Col 498: in 1480 Prince Michael Dmitrievich Kholmskii, brother o f the Moscow boyar, Danilo Kholmskii, ond Prince O sip Dorogobuzhskii were the Tverian commanders.

VII 92 The Moscow strategists — most certainly the grand prince and the duma mem­ bers — already envisioned the annexation of Tver’. They designed a strategy they would later employ against Lithuania. They planned altercations between Muscovite and Tverians living just across the frontier. They then studiously ignored Tverian appeals for adjudicating interprincely disputes according to treaty obligations95. When the grand prince of Tver' could not protect the rights of his aggrieved mili­ tary landholders, they chose Muscovite protection and thereby entered the service of Tver's principal enemy96. The Tverian chronicler merely recorded the depar­ tures97; but one of his Muscovite counterparts saw through the coloration of Ivan Ill's developing domestic policy and called them traitors to their lord98. W ere they Muscovites, they surely would have been found guilty of treason. Muscovite strategy carefully designed these irritants to deplete Tverian military ranks prior to a formal outbreak of hostilities, while Ivan III posed infuriatingly as the correct monarch. When Grand Prince Michael Borisovich married a second time in 1483, Ivan offered him his congratulations. Later in the same year, Ivan sent a messenger to Tver’, announcing the birth of his grandson. This time Michael refused the envoy an audience and forbade him to speak with any member of his immediate family99. Michael could only sit and pout helplessly as he found himself coerced into further disadvantageous agreements with Moscow. In March of 1485 Ivan dragooned Michael to sign another contract, this time reducing Tver’ to the status of a Muscovite u d e I. By this, Michael became a subordinate prince, forbidden to entertain independent relations with Lithuania or the Tatars, without prior Muscovite consent. He could not offer sanctuary to anyone declared an enemy of Moscow and he had to provide troops any time Ivan issued a call100. With the end in sight, Michael appealed for Lithuanian support, providing Ivan III with the legal excuse for annexation101. While maneuvering Michael into a corner, Ivan simultaneously did his utmost to encourage the remaining Tverian generals to defect. Princes Osip Dorogobuzhskii and Andrei Mikulinskii were induced to transfer to Muscovite service. ♦5 E. g., P S R L , VI, 237; D D G , No. 59, pp. 187—188 (1456); N o. 63, pp. 202-204 (1462—1464). *

P S R L , VI, 236—237; V. S. Borzakovskii, 1876), p. 202.

”

PSRL,

Istoriia

Tverskago

kniazhestva

(St. Pet.,

XV, col. 500.

** P S R L , XII, 217; l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s * , p. 125; Borzakovskii, I s t o r i i a T v e r s k a g o k n i a z h e s t v a , p. 203. For a discussion of Muscovite policies concerning treason in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Alef; »Das Erlöschen*, F o r s c h u n g e n z u r o s t e u r o p ä i s c h e n G e s c h i c h t e , X, 7—74. ”

P S R L , cols. 498—499; S. B. Veselovskii, 'Vladimir Gusev — sostavitel1 sudebnika 1497 g.*, I s t o r i c h e s k i e z o p i s k i , V (1939), 40.

100 D D G , No. 79, pp. 295 ff. The document has all the elements of subordination Ivan III and his father had imposed on princes of the house of Moscow. Cf. the observation of the chronicler ( P S R L , VI, 236): 'n e zvatisia emu bratom, no molodshii brat.' See also K. V. Bazilevich, V n e s h n i a i a p o l i tika Russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva. Vtoraia polovina XV v e k a (Moscow, 1952), pp. 228-229. 101 P S R L ,

IV, 155-156; XXIV, 204; XXVII, 358; l o a s a f o v s k a i a

l e t o p i s 1, p. 125.

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

93

REFORMS

Ivan rewarded them with laroslavl’ and Dmitrov, respectively. Panic seized other Tverian servitors, who desired to salvage their positions, and many followed their example102. If the Muscovite government had discovered the means to detach the Tverian aristocracy from allegiance to Michael Borisovich, it now had to deal with the post-annexation settlement. The solution adopted differed considerably from that applied earlier to laroslavl’ and Rostov. The Tverian warriors were to remain domiciled on their patrimonial estates and to serve with local Tverian contingents. Even those seductive grants made to Princes Dorogobuzhskii and Mikulinskii were revoked; the Moscow government required them to return to their own lands. Yet it demanded the same loyalty and service from the Tverians as it had from the more privileged laroslavtsy and Rostovtsy. According to the terms Moscow imposed upon Tver’ immediately after the surrender, all inhabitants were required to take an oath of allegiance to Ivan III103. Princes, boyars and, presumably, all other servitors had to participate on Musco­ vite ventures104. Ivan III threatened the Tverian princes with the loss of their patrimonies, if they ever departed from his employment. His 1504 testament reveals that he specifically shackled them with the same liabilities previously imposed upon the laroslavskie princes: „And concerning the serving princes in the Moscow Land and in the Tver* land, now these princes shall all serve my son Vasiliy, and they shall hold their patrimonies under me. And concerning those serving princes who leave [the service of] my son Vasiliy [and go over] to my younger sons, or to anyone whomsoever, now the patrimonies of these princes [shall pass] to my son Vasiliy"105.

For those who had succumbed to the Muscovite blandishments, the settlement was bitter. Unable to serve in the Muscovite d v o r or to command troops from other Muscovite domains, they were excluded from the c u r s u s h o n o r u m that led to duma positions106.

in

PSRL,

VI, 237; Borzakovskii, I s t o r i i a T v e r s k a g o

m

PSRL,

IV, 156; XII, 218; XXVII, 287.

m

P S R L , XII, 217—218; XXIV, 205; XXVII, 287: ®. . . i bisha chelom v sluzhbu.® This statement pertoined to remaining boyars of Tver', who defected just as soon as Muscovite forces surrounded the walls. The chronicles of Moscow called them *koromolniki®, presumably because they permitted their grand prince to make an agreem ent with Lithuania. Later, all the inhabitants had to swear allegiance to Ivan III: *velel grazhan vsekh k tselovaniiu privesti . . .® The nature of the oath is not explained, nor are the conditions dem anded, aside from loyalty from all, plus service from the aristocracy,

m

Howes, T e s t a m e n t s ,

m

Zimin ('Sostov®, A E , 1957, p. 45, notes 47 & 48) identified as boyars in 1479 Vasilii and Ivan Borisovidii Borozdin from Tver1. Here he followed an error in the Sheremetev list. This is not confirmed: see A!ef 'Reflections®, S E E R , XLV, 112—113, and Vèselovskii in A S E I S V R , I, p. 633. These 'Borisovichi® were Tuchko-Morozovs, Muscovites and not Tverians. Aside from Prince Danilo Dmitrievich Kholmskii, who emigrated from Tver* in the late 1460s, and his son Vasilii, who married Ivan Ill's daughter Feodosiia, no other Tverians made duma membership in the reign of Ivan III or even of Vasilii III. Cf. Zimin's article, pp. 44—53, omitting the error o f the Borozdins, for confirmation.

p. 280;

kniazhestva,

p. 202.

D D G , p. 357.

V II

94 After 1486/87, the number of noble Tverians serving in secondary command positions became marked. From 1487 to the end of Ivan Ill's reign, the military registers of v o e v o d y included the names of the Borozdins: Ivan Zhito107, Vasilii Borisovich108, Peter Borisovich109 and Ivan Zhito’s son Peter110. Other untitled aristocratic second-level commanders were Dmitrii Ivanovich Kindyrev111, Vasilii Semenovich Bokeev112 and Semen Karpovich113. The r a z r i a d y , generally vague on details for the second-half of the fifteenth century, do reveal some specifics about service by Tverian contingents. Under he year 1492/93, the d 'i a k who kept the record noted that „from Tver [came] the voevody: ..." ; then follows a list of regimental commands that arrived in Mozhaisk, but subject to the direction of a Muscovite boyar, Prince Danilo Vasil­ evich Shchenia. The Tverian detachment commanders were identified as Peter Nikitich Borozdin, Prince Osip Andreevich Dorogobuzhskii, Ivan and Peter Boriso­ vich Borozdin114. In 1493 "to the shore [of the Oka River] from Tver’": Prince Osip Andreevich Dorogobuzhskii, Prince Mikhail Fedorovich Mikulinskii and Ivan Borisovich Borozdin115. In the list of that suite accompanying Ivan III to Novgorod in 1495, the grand princely boyars "from the Tverian lands" were identified as Princes Osip Dorogobuzhskii, Mikhail Teliatevskii and his son Ivan, and Prince Vladimir Andreevich Mikulinskii116. These bits of information suggest that when the Tverians were identified as commanders, they led their own provincial contingents, when they came under the senior direction of high-ranking Muscovite v o e v o d y117. According to the Ustiug chronicle, on the Viatka campaign of 1489, which once again imposed that land to Muscovite control, the Tverian contingents were identified as marching under their own voevody (Prince Osip Dorogobuzhskii and Andrei Korobov), though overall jurisdiction went to Grigorii Vasilevich Morozov, a boyar from Moscow118. How pervasive this Muscovite control was is illustrated

1» ,0* ** n°

"» ’M '« 117

1,1

R K , pp. 21, 23, 27, 31. R K , pp. 21, 23, 28, 31. R K , pp. 23, 27, 28, 31. R K , pp. 30, 33, 35, 36. Peter Zhitov would later become a Tverian boyar ( R K , p. 44). This wcs Ivan Ill's sop to the ranking Tverian aristocracy, in the hope that it would take the sting out of the refusal to let them stand for Muscovite duma membership. R K , pp. 23, 30. R K , p. 21. R K , pp. 21, 27, 28, 33. R K , p. 23. R K , p. 23. R K , p. 26. For the military services of Prince Osip Dorogobuzhskii, see R K , pp. 20, 23, 27, 30, 33; for those of Prince Vladimir Andreevich Mikulinskii, se R K , pp. 21, 30, 31, 33, 36; for those of Prince Michael Ivanovich Teliatevskii, see R K , pp. 28, 30, 34. U s t i u z h s k i i l e t o p i s n y i s v o d , p. 97; see also P S R L , XXIII, 186. Also identified in the Ustiug chronicle, participating as detachment commanders, were Prince Vladimir Andreevich Mikulinskii, Vasilii Borozdin, Vasilii Bokeev and Semen Karpovich. This confirms the information in the r a z r i a d : RK, p. 21.

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

95

by the chronicler's revelation in 1500 that prior to the attack on Lithuanian Dorogobuzh, Prince Danilo Shchenia, a Muscovite boyar, arrived 'with theTverian regiments1'119. The decision to regionalize the forces of Muscovy, while appearing to be largely military in intent, nevertheless had decided political implications and necessitated allowance of a special status for Tver. Ivan III assigned his designated successor and co-grand prince as the new viceroy120. Originally intended as a method to allay discontent of the slighted Tverians, the assignment of the region to a junior grand prince inevitably involved some Tverian malcontents when the dynastic crisis over succession broke at the end of century121. The military decision made immediately after annexation could hardly have anticipated the subsequent political ramifications of the following decade. Only a handful of Tverians were ever admitted to the d v o r with residence in Moscow122, far fewer than members of other central Russian areas. Only one Tverian, Prince Osip Dorogobuzhskii, won the reward of a p o m e s t ’e in Novgorod, which he held in a b s e n t i a 123. W hat effect the unhappiness of the downgraded Tverians had in future politics should be subjected to further investigation. Undoubtedly, those warriors already in Muscovite service bitterly opposed another influx of competitors. Yet, a paramountcy of military considerations probably carried the day. This suggestion is built upon three premises. First, the size of the area of the expanding Muscovy necessitated protection of a larger frontier. Increasing military activity to the east, west and south made regional defense planning a principal preoccupation within the duma. Strategically, Tver’ was well located for the movement of troops to any of these frontiers. Secondly, the employment of Tverian contingents, locally raised and led by local commanders to points decided upon by the Muscovite planners, is observable from information found in the military registers. Third, the pattern for Tver was not unique; it paral­ leled the arrangements made for nominally independent Riazan' and with annexed Novgorod.

’if

P S R L , XII, 252; M. N. Tikhomirov, 'lz Vladimirskogo letopistsa*, XV (1964), 292.

Istoricheskie

z a p i ski,

1»

A. A. Zimin, 'O politicheskikh predposylkakh voznikoveniia Russkogo absolutizma- , Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII—XVIII w .) (Moscow, 1964), pp. 3 2 -3 3 .

w

I b i d.,

m

In the list of 1495, five young Tverians were found in the d v o r as junior boyars: Fedor, Nikita and Semen, sons of Ivon Karpovich; Ivan and Michael, sons of Ivan Borozdin. The Karpovichi, at least, con­ tinued to serve at the Muscovite court, primarily in administrative positions.

m

A. M. Gnevushev, O c h e r k i é k o n o m i c h e s k o i i s o t s i a l ’ noi z hi z n i s e l ' s k o g o naseleniia Novgorodskoi oblasti posle prisoedineniia Novgorod a k M o s k v e (Kiev, 1915), Appendix I. P. 288; Veselovskii, F é o d a l ’ n o e z e m l e v l o d e n i e , I, 291.

p. 33.

VII

96 Riazan’, much as Pskov, had come under a degree of Muscovite control by the end of Vasilii M’s reign. In 1456, when Grand Prince Ivan Fedorovich of Riazan’ died, he made Vasilii II guardian of his eight-year-old son. The young Vasilii Ivanovich was brought to Moscow and Riazan’ came under the administration of Muscovite n a m e s t n i k i124. Eight years later, Ivan III permitted the sixteenyear-old Prince Vasilii Ivanovich to return to his patrimony, but only after he married the grand prince’s sister, Anna125. The chronicles reveal nothing beyond these barren announcements, but it would be difficult to believe that the Moscow government would allow special liberality to Riazan’, while forcing other peripheral principalities into greater dependence upon Moscow. In domestic affairs, as with Pskov and with Novgorod prior to the late 1470s, domestic affairs were left under local control. Ivan Ill's brother-in-law caused him no trouble. The situation changed in 1483, when Prince Vasilii Ivanovich of Riazan’ died. He left two sons, the older, who succeeded his father as grand prince, and the younger, Fedor. The lands of Riazan’ were divided between them. On 9 June 1483 Ivan III compelled the new Riazanian grand prince to sign a treaty, in which the latter agreed to be­ come a "younger brother", in effect, making him a subordinate prince. Foreshado­ wing the conditions to be imposed upon Michael Borisovich of Tver’ two years later, Riazan’ was always to remain loyal to Moscow, particularly in the growing friction Moscow contemplated against Lithuania126. Until the 1490s Riazan' remained free of Muscovite pressure for military assis­ tance,- thereafter the summonses became frequent. Here is a synopsis. In 1491 Khan Mengli Girei of the Crimea, an ally of Moscow, requested military assistance agains the troublesome Tatars of the southern steppe. Ivan III informed his ally that he was sending out a considerable force composed of Russians, service Tatars and Riazanians127. The following year the Muscovite government again called out the forces of Grand Prince Ivan Vasil'evich Riazanskii and Fedor Vasil'evich120. The r a z r i a d for the same year (1492) noted that many Riazanians appeared for service in the west129. In the attack on Smolensk in late 1502, a "Prince Fedor Ivanovich Rezanskoi" appears as a general on the left wing130. He obviously commanded a force of fellow Riazanians.

iw P S R L ,

XII, 112; XVIII, 212.

,JS P S R L , XVIII, 216: XXIV, 185; ÉIczempliarskii, V e l i k i e i u d e l ’ n y e k n i a z ' i a , 11,599—600; D. Ilovaiskii, I s t o r i i o R i a z a n s k a g o k n i o z h e s t v a (Moscow, 1858), pp. 213—215. 1,4 D D G , No. 76, pp. 283—290; Ilovaiskii, I s l o r i i a , pp. 216—219; M. K. Liubavskii, O b r a z o v a n i e osnovnoi gosudarstvennoi territorii veliko-russkoi norodnosti (Leningrad, 1929), pp. 127—128. 177 S I R I O , XLI (St. Pet., 1884), No. 30, p. 116: 'd a i bratny voevody poshli s moimi voevodami i sestrichichev moikh rezanskikh oboikh voevody poshli.* ,M P S R L ,

XII, 234.

»» R K ,

p. 22.

150

p. 34.

RK,

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

97

The degree of political pressure exerted upon Riazan’ by the end of century is evident from other sources. Contrary to a testamentary arrangement made between Ivan Ill's aging nephews, that the intestate death of one would reunite the territories of Riazan’ under the survivor, Ivan III acquired the possession of Prince Fedor Vasil’evich’s lands, which ultimately came into the possession of Ivan's successor, Vasilii III131. The grip upon the remaining section of Riazan is evidenced by the integration of Riazan’s forces with Moscow's. In 1502, Princess Agrafina, guardian of the then six-year-old Riazanian grand prince, received a message from Ivan III, which, in part, read: "'Your serving people, boyars, junior boyars and villagers, are all to be in my service, and the best and middling tradesmen and those who pay the black tax, are to remain with you in the g o r o d of Riazan'. And whoever disobeys and goes willfully to the Don in a foolhardy display of courage, you are instructed to punish .. .*132. Moscow could easily have toppled Riazan’, which was then far weaker than either Novgorod or Tver’ had been. But not even the device of border disputes had been employed along the mutual frontier; it was enough to have control over the military contingents. The case of Novgorod provides the most interesting case where military con­ siderations led to drastic reforms. After the annexation of 1478, the territory was governed by a viceroy. The senior n a m e s t n i k sent there was always a boyar of the Moscow duma and the second (two were always named), a mediumranked official from the grand princely d v o r , already marked for advance­ ment on the basis of proven trust and ability. Both of the designated governors were always experienced generals and administrators. In time of war, they directed military operations as outlined by instructions sent from Moscow. The senior n a m e s t n i k who contributed the most to the organization of Novgorod as a Muscovite province was the boyar Iakov Zakhar'ich Koshkin. His tenure there exceeded a decade, from 1485 to the late 1490s133. Even before the organization of Novgorod along p o m e s t ’ e lines (con­ ditional, military service-connected lands), the government of Ivan III had sought to integrate Novgorod’s military forces into the regional system. Prior to 1477/78, but after the first campaign of subordination of 1470/71, Moscow demanded that Novgorodian forces be used for frontier duty in the east; after annexation the government subjected the Novgorodians to the same calls for military support required from other annexed territories. One of the conditions imposed upon them in January 1478 was to render regular military service. They also had to subscribe, upon oath, never to 'depart*134. Under this arrangement the more in

Howes, T e s t a m e n t s , pp. 282—283 and note 54. Q uoted in Liubavskii, O b r a z o v a n i e , p. 129. A. P. Pronshtein, V e l i k i i N o v g o r o d v XVI v e k e (Kharkov, 1957), p. 209; V. N. Bemadskii, N o v g o r o d i N o v g o r o d s k a i a z e m l i a v XV v e k e (Moscow—Leningrad, 1961), p. 332; Alef, 'R eflections', S E E R , XLV, 121—122. 1M P S R L , VI, 219. The Novgorodian boyars, junior boyars and z h i t i e l i u d i , stated the dironider, *bili chelom v sluzhbu'. 18

V II 98 reliable Novgorodian boyars and serving men retained their possessions, much as the Tverian aristocracy would later be frozen into a distinctly regional position. The Muscovite government did not spare the Novgorodians. In 1481, when Ivan III ordered a punitive expedition against the Livonian Knights for breaking their treaty and attacking Pskov the year before, the Muscovite boyar Prince Ivan Vasil'evich Bulgak led the army. Some chronicles claim that "all the men of Novgorod" joined the force135. In the winter of 1483/84 the Novgorodians and Pskovian forces were again ordered out in an attack on the "German land" and with them as a v o e v o d a was Kazimir, a boyar of Novgorod136. In 1485 Ivan III instructed his senior n a m e s t n i k to bring "all the Novgorodian forces" before Tver’137. Political opposition and military unrealiability forced changes in the initial Muscovite solution. The story of Novgorodian unhappiness is familiar enough. The government of Ivan III tried to neutralize political opposition as early as 1475 with the arrest of six leading Novgorodian leaders138. The move, calculated to intimidate, proved unsuccessful, as other prominent Novgorodians continued to seek Lithuanian aid as a counterpoise to the Muscovite threat. They desired to regain the freedoms lost by the Muscovite treaties of 1456 and 1471. Even after annexation, Ivan III spent nine weeks in Novgorod (during the winter of 1479/80), blocking a Novgorodian attempt to recreate their proscribed v e c h e (the republic's assembly). Meanwhile, Ivan III accused the archbishop of complicity in obstructionist politics; he ordered him deposed and confiscated the properties administrated by the archiépiscopal chancery. A Muscovite force again occupied Novgorod for seventeen weeks in 1484 suppressing a mutiny. Those suspected of again soliciting Lithuanian aid were arrested. Many Novgorodian boyars lost their lands; some Ivan III had transferred to towns in interior Muscovy, where some received conditional landed settlements. Presumably, they became military servitors. The great blow fell in 1487—1489, with wholesale confiscation. This time not only boyars but landholders of smaller means were forcibly evicted and settled as p o m e s h c h i k i in the Volga-Oka region. In their place, Ivan III brought in military servitors from his own domains. A minute number of Nov­ gorodian proprietors remained on their lands, but they became military de­ pendents. In all, about 2,000 p o m e s t ' e holdings came into being.

1«

p S R L, XII, 213; P s k o v s k i e l e t o p i s i , I, 78—79. Only a small portion of the effective Nov­ gorodian forces would appear to have been dispatched, for they went under the command of junior officers. The v o e v o d y were Prince Vasilii Fedorovich Shuiskii and Ivan Zinov'evich. Neither was a senior boyar - n a m e s t n i k o f Novgorod.

134 U s t i u z h s k i i l e t o p i s n y i s v o d , p. 95. Shortly thereafter the Muscovite government arrested Kazimir, but there was no indication whether it was related to his military performance or to political activity. w

PSRL.

>» P S R L ,

XII, 217; XVIII, 271; Pronshtein, VI, 18.

Velikii

Novgorod,

p. 205.

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

99

The reasons for the severe 'solution* are not fully enunciated in the narrative sources. The ostensible excuse was a Novgorodian plot to kill the Muscovite n a m e s t n i k , the boyar Iakov Koshkin139, a compliment previously paid to another particularly hated Muscovite in 1460, Fedor Basenok. Novgorodian intransigence and particularly a lack of military prowess un­ doubtedly fathered the momentous decision. Even in Kievan times, the warriors of the south had contemptuously dismissed the Novgorodians as carpenters, not worthy of carrying the implements of war. The later-day Novgorodians, now liable to military service under the Muscovite banner, were hardly capable of satisfying a new and demanding master. In the fifteenth-century chronicle ob­ servations, one detects a contemptuous attitude in the recording of the ratio of forces between opposing Novgorodians and Muscovites. A small grand princely contingent had usually been sufficient to defeat, even to rout, any large Nov­ gorodian assembly of artisans led by merchants. The small professional mercenary contingent hired by the republic never amounted to much. The republic placed its primary trust in the strength of its fortifications for protection. The Muscovite government, which already had good reason to doubt the political reliability of the Novgorodians, harbored considerable reservations about the political capabilities of the merchant-artisan levies, particularly when a more active policy on the Lithuanian border was contemplated. Both weighed heavily in the decision to replace Novgorodians with Muscovites. W e have some knowledge of the Muscovite military leadership at the end of the fifteenth century. The boyars of Muscovy were mostly seasoned warriors with considerable experience in the field. Their advice, particularly regarding the increase of border altercations with Lithuanians and their negative assessment of the military potential of the Novgorodians may well have carried the argument in council. The timing was propitious. The landholding aristocracy, subjected to the iron tradition of partible landholding, suffered from an increase of family size. A significant number of proved but impoverished warriors auxiously petitioned for service with compensation to reduce their penury140. The need for servitors and enlargement of the military establishment had grown considerably in the second-half of the century, yet the government maintained its longstanding aversion to pay troops. Pressure from the needy, some of whom were even distantly related to duma members, reenforced the military arguments for màking the western province more politically reliable and militarily potent. In the creation of the p o m e s t ' e s , several thousand trusted fighting men received lands now belonging to the monarch, from which they drew sustenance and for which they paid rents and taxes. Several thousand sword arms, plus retainers, created a reliable instrument in the more vigorous military policy con­ templated against Lithuania. 1«

Bemadskii, N ovgorod, pp. 317—322. G. A lef, 'The Crisis of the Russian Aristocracy: A Factor in the Growth o f Monarchical Power', s c h u n g e n z u r o s t e u r o p ä i s c h e n G e s c h i c h t e , XV (Berlin, 1970), 44 ff.

For­

VII 100

To these would be added the forces of Pskov, which in 1496 alone spent some fifteen weeks campaigning against the Germans and still another twelve before Ivangorod. All the "princes" of Pskov, since the days of Vasilii II were Muscovite servitors, who took their orders from Ivan III141. In 1500 the Pskovians were required to raise a subscription as well as a force as their contributions to the anti-Lithuanian effort142. The creation of p o m e s t ’ e s in Novgorod extended developments already in process. First, there had been the growing pattern of regional commands; second, a demand for both loyalty and service, which increased steadily since the upheavals of the dynastic wars of mid-century. Nor is the case of Novgorod unique in the radicality of solution. After the 1489 punitive expedition against the Viatchane, the most significant landed families and merchants were forcibly moved and resettled within Muscovy in p o m e s t ’ e status143. The Muscovite government had considered the lands of the Viatchane annexed since 1459, in punishment for the aid they had rendered the Galich princes144. Dutifully obedient at first, the Viatchane found themselves caught between demands emanating from Moscow and threats of reprisal from Kazan'. Most of their fighting men participated in the 1468 campaign against Kazan', but a number returned home upon receiving news of an impending reprisal attack upon their homeland145. According to other sources, the Viatchane had dissembled, promising to march only if the grand prince's brothers would also participate on the campaign146. On the other hand, they did not object to taking up arms against the Novgorodians in the Dvina region, where the loot was ample and the opposition weak147. Such selective obedience and questionable trust did not sit well with the Muscovite government. The question was not whether but when to bring the dissidents to heel. Demands imposed upon the u d e I y were equally binding. Prince Andrei the Elder paid the price for his disobedience two years later, when he neglected to send out his forces as directed in 1491. Prince Andrei and his family were im­ prisoned and his u d e I confiscated. Old memories and unforgotten trans­ gressions swam to the surface. Ivan III also ordered the arrest of Andrei's servitors who had followed him in the short-lived revolt of 1478/79148. 141 P S R L , VI, 23; N . N. Maslennikova, P r i s o e d i n e n i e Pskova k Russkomu tient r a l i z o v a n n o m u g o s u d a r s t v u (Leningrad, 1955), p. 55 ff. P S R L , VI, 24. i« P S R L , VI, 239; XXVII, 288; Bemadskii, N o v g o r o d , p.338. 144 Cherepnin, O b r a z o v a n i e , p. 825; D D G , No. 61, p. 194: Vasilii II explicitly bequeathed to Ivan III the land of Viatka ('da daiu svoemu s(y)nu Ivanu zemliu Viat’skuiu'. P S R L , XXV, 282. 144 l o a s a f o v s k a i a l e t o p i s ’, pp. 59—60. Still another version found is the reply of the Viatdiane that they promised the Kazan’ tsar that they would remain neutral in the struggle: P S R L , VI, 189; XII, 121; XXV, 282; XXVI, 226; XXVII, 126. 147 Veselovskii, 'Vladimir G usev', I s t o r i c h e s k i e z a p i s k i , V, 35. 141 Alef, «Das Erlöschen', F o r s c h u n g e n z u r o s t e u r o p ä i s c h e n Geschichte, X, 45; P S R L , XXV, 287.

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

101

REFORMS

The accumulated examples spelled out the royal demands. Unquestioned obedience and prime loyalty to the liege lord of Muscovy had superseded brotherhood and the old bonds that once existed between a regional lord and his subjects. Even among the servitors at the Kremlin court, pressures against departure and for continuing and compliant service had increased in this second half of century. Those who may have wavered also could recall sufficient examples of what happened to the suspected and of the methods employed to insure steadfastness of service149. Thus, in terms of increasing military capability and insuring political reliability, the p o m e s t ' e system was part of an evolving process. The result in Nov­ gorod was the creation of a sufficiently strong western shield, capable of the same effort and trustworthiness imposed upon other sectors and groups in the realm. IV

*Western shield" may not be a precise term, but it did reflect a conviction within the government that a more durable force had to be positioned along the Lithuanian frontiers. Moreover, the rapidly evolving application of a conveniently refurbished older dream—to reunite "all Rus’"—made Muscovite foreign policy in the west more belligerent and active than before. Muscovite-Lithuanian rivalry had been born during the expansionist reigns of the Lithuanian grand princes Olgerd and Vitovt. A m o d u s v i v e n d i had been established in 1430, after Vitovt died. A treaty of 1449 reflected this detente150. But the "eternal peace", in the pious phrasing of the agreement, did not last. When Moscow imposed the first ties of dependence upon Novgorod in 1456, the Lithu­ anian government reacted sharply. Several years later Rome appointed a Uniate metropolitan for "Little Russia", upon the encouragement of the Lithuanian author­ ities. His appearance touched off a violent reaction in Moscow by both ecclesiasti­ cal and secular authorities. The creation of a rival metropolitanate left Moscow with jurisdiction only in the areas controlled by the Muscovite grand prince and those politically dependent upon him151. The Lithuanians had also encouraged the Novgorodian merchants' proclivities to look west, while the merchants desired an alliance against Moscow. But when­ ever the Novgorodians turned to Lithuania, the twin sensitivies were aroused: the metropolitan loosed warnings about doing business with apostates and the grand prince hurled his troops against the merchant republic. In both Novgorodian cam­ paigns, Ivan III mobilized far more troops than were necessary, reflecting fear of

Alef, .D as Erlöschen*, F o r s c h u n g e n iso D D G ,

zur

osteuropäischen

Geschichte,

X, 39—40.

N o. 53, pp. 160—163.

«■ A. M. Ammann, A b r i ß der ostsla w isch en Kirchengeschichte (Vienna, pp. 184—185. Cf. O. Holedti, F r o m F l o r e n c e t o B r e s t (1439—1596) (Rome, 1958), pp. 91 ff.

1950),

VII 102

Lithuanian intervention. In 1479/80 Lithuania planned a joint offensive with the steppe Tatars against Muscovy; only the timely intervention by Moscow’s Crimean allies diverted the Lithuanians to their vulnerable Kievan flank and rendered the plan useless152. Though the Lithuanian government showed singular ineptitude in the conduct of its anti-Muscovite efforts, hostilities accelerated. By the 1480s and 90s the Muscovite government appears to have transformed its subjectivized conception of history into a sense of destiny. Ivan Ill’s predeces­ sors had borrowed the concept of a united Rus', which had momentarily existed in early Kievan history. The metropolitans, headquartered in Moscow since the early fourteenth century, carried the phrase of "all Rus’" in their title. Ivan Kalita, in whose reign the metropolitan first came to Moscow, opportunistically assumed the title, but used it cautiously in several documents. His successors never lost sight of the claim, spurious as it may have been. The coinage of Vasilii II and his son Ivan asserted the title even more publicly153. However pragmatic the immediate reasons may have been, the conflict with Novgorodian aspirations also affected the arguments Moscow employed. The grand princes insisted that Novgorod had always been the possession of their ancestors, since the days of Kievan unity154. In 1470 Ivan III took along with him a learned d'i a k , Stepan Borodatyi, who "spoke according to the Russian chroni­ cles", who cited the record to show how Novgorod had defected from its true overlords155. W hat had been used against Novgorod could also be turned against Lithuania, for the Lithuanian grand princes had extended their sway over a goodly portion of the old Kievan realm. In the words of Miliukov, this was history utilized as an arm of politics, an ancient reality employed in the creation of a new one156. The issue of prior right justified Moscow’s expansionist policies and led to hostilités. Ivan III insisted that the Lithuanian ruler recognize his right to the title "of all Rus’ this the latter strenuously resisted, for he recognized the dire territorial implications for his realm. Finally, Muscovite military superiority persuaded the Lithuanian grand prince of the merits of Ivan's claim to the disputed title.

ib

J. L. I. Fennell, I v a n niaia politika,

the G reat pp. 148ff.

of

Moscow

(London, 1961), pp. 79, 87; Bazilevich, V n e s h -

iss G. Alef, 'The Political Significance of the Inscriptions on Muscovite Coinage in the Reign o f Vasili IT, S p e c u l u m , (1959), 6, 11 ff. is* P S R L , XXV, 285. iss P S R L , VI, 192; L. V. Cherepnin, R u s s k a i a istoriografiia do XIX v e k a . Kurs I e k t s i i (Moscow, 1957), p. 87. For the background of Borodatyi, see A S E I S V R , I, pp. 144, 606, 619. is* P. Miliukov, 1897), 151.

Glavnyia

techeniia

Russkoi

istoricheskoi

mysli,

I (Moscow,

VII M USCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

103

Border incidents, opportunistically begun in 1481/82, escalated into punishing border conflicts and then to full-scale war. By 1503 Muscovite forces occupied almost a third of former Lithuanian lands, including sixteen larger towns and seventy five villages. None was ever returned157. Of greater interest for this study were the methods employed in escalating the incidents on the frontier and the problems presented to the Muscovite government when princes on the other side of the border, in the Severa region, decided to transfer their allegiance. Dealing with the Severa princes was not quite as simple as had been those with the warriors of laroslavl’, Rostov and Tver’. Ivan wanted control over the patrimonies of these aristocrats, to transfer their jurisdiction from Lithuania to Moscow. The Lithuanian government helped considerably in the development, possibly even in the initiation of Muscovite policies. In 1481 the Catholic grand prince enjoined the Orthodox of his realm from any new church construction. He also irritated some of the Orthodox princes by refusing to grant them official positions in Kiev. A few of the dissatisfied hatched a quixotic plot to assassinate the grand prince and then to hand over the Orthodox regions to Muscovy; in effect, to trans­ fer ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the metropolitan in Moscow and political control to Ivan III. Grand Prince Casimir learned of the plot against him and ordered the arrest of the ringleaders. Two, Prince Michael Olel’kovich and Prince Ivan Gol’shanskii were apprehended and later executed. Prince Fedor Ivanovich Bel'skii managed to escape to Moscow158. Since Bel’skii fled, leaving everything including a bride behind, Ivan III granted him a patrimony carved out of Novgorodian territory, just bordering on the Lithuanian frontier. Ivan obviously assigned trusted men at arms to Bel’skii as "servitors* and surely they kept him under watch. The knowledge of the unhappiness of other Orthodox Lithuanian border princes living in the Severa region, encouraged Moscow to engage in frontier altercations and raids across the Lithuanian line. Bel’skii, who led these marauding ventures, could not have done so without his new lord’s permission. As the raids intensified, the Lithuanian government did little more than protest the transgressions during the later 1480s and 1490s. The victimized and unsupported Severa princes defected to the stronger side, "bringing" their patrimonies with them159. For example, in 1492/93 "there came to serve from the king [of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithuania], Prince Semen Fedorovich Vorotynskoi and Prince Mikhailo Romanovich Mezettskoi,

is? Liubavskii, O b r a z o v a n i e , pp. 123—127; Bazilevich, V n e s h n i a i a politika, pp. 289ff.; M. K. Liubavskii, O c h e r k isrorii Litovsko-Russkago gosudarstva do Li ublinskoi u n i i v k l i u c h i t e l ’ n o , 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1915), pp. 204—205. Liubavskii listed Lithuanian losses in 70 volosts, 22 gorodishches and 13 villages. ia

O. P. Backus, M o t i v e s of W e s t- R u ss ia n Nobles in D e s e r t i n g Lithuania f o r M o s c o w , 1377—1514 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1957), pp. 89—99. Cf. Solov'ev, I s t o r i i a R o s s i i , III (Moscow, I960), 94—95. S. B. Veselovskii, 'Poslednie udely y severo-vostochnoi Rusi*, I s t o r i c h e s k i e z a p i s k i , XXII (1947), 116. Badcus, M o t i v e s ,

pp. 110ff.

VII

104 and Prince Vasilii and Prince Ondrei Vasil'evichi Belevskie with votchinas and volosts, with Mezettskoi and with Serpeisk*160. Ivan III then sent his envoy to Grand Prince Alexander (son and successor to Casimir) with the formal renunciation of fealty from the defectors161. When Lithuania finally endeavored to regain the lost possessions by force, Muscovite troops counterattacked successfully162. The complicated politics of inducing the Severa princes to transfer their lands and services to Moscow necessitated more than pressure; they also involved concessions. Ivan III permitted them to retain their patrimonies along with auto­ nomous rights in their areas of jurisdiction. Muscovite agents were to be kept out. These privileges, d e j u r e , created u d e I y on Muscovite soil at the very time Ivan III was systematically undermining the prerogatives and freedoms of his landed relatives and his servitors. If the newly transferred princes required pre­ ferential treatment, so that they would not cause difficulties and to encourage still others to seek Muscovite ties, Ivan Ill’s government kept a close watch over their behavior. The first indication of suspicion brought swift response. The same Fedor Ivano­ vich Bel’skii, who in 1482 received a v o t c h i n a on the Novgorodian-Lithuanian frontier was accused in 1493, unfairly I believe, by a Prince Lukomskii of planning a return to Lithuania. Without investigation, Ivan III ordered the immediate arrest of Bel’skii and the confiscation of his deeded patrimony. BePskii soon obtained his release and the grant of a new v o t c h i n a , but this one was found on the eastern confines of the middle Volga, far from his Lithuanian homeland163. This grant was conditional, predicated upon his and his children's continuing service164. Bel’skii undoubtedly had to take a special oath pledging unswerving fidelity and obedience to the royal commands, which had become fairly common at the con­ clusion of the dynastic wars. And much as the Tverian Prince Danilo Kholmskii’s (whose deposition plegding non-departure is still extant and who subsequently became a boyar) so too Bel'skii’s future brightened after momentary disgrace. While retaining his eastern patrimony, Ivan summoned him to court, where he was found as a member of the d v o r in 1495165. Presence in the capital permitted him contacts not accorded to those who remained resident on their estates. In 1498 fortune indeed smiled when he won the hand of Princess Anna Vasil'evna of Riazan', niece of Ivan III166. Thereafter the grand prince permitted him to command integrated Muscovite forces. In August 1498 BePskii was one of two generals of 1»

RK,

Hi

s I RIO

, XXXV, N o. 1?, pp. 80 ff.

h*

Fennell,

Ivan

h*

Veselovskii, 'Poslednye udely',

144

Howes, T e s t a m e n t s ,

pp. 22—23.

the

Great,

pp. 140ff. Istoricheskie

zap Iski,

XXII, lid .

pp. 278—279; D D G , No. 89, p. 357.

hs

RK,

144

Veselovskii, 'Poslednye udely',

p. 25. Istoricheskie

zopiski,

XXII, 116.

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

105

the army sent to protect Kazan' against its enemies167. Two years later, in 1501/02, he received an important military post in the west. In the assault on Smolensk, he was found on the right wing of the army. Titular leadership went to Prince Fedor of Volok, as a member of the house of Moscow; but Bel'skii and Dmitrii Vasilevich Shein were identified as v o e v o d y o f t h e g r a n d p r i n c e 168. In the fall of 1506, Bel'skii went on his last campaign. He was the senior general of a fully Muscovite force169. Bel’skii's son, Dmitrii Fedorovich, will become the first descendant of the Lithua­ nian defectors to become a boyar. His ties to the house of Moscow (through his mother) undoubtedly helped his career; yet his father’s service at court and in the army had been found reliable and undoubtedly had been an equally critical factor. Had the older Bel’skii remained on his originally granted lands, close to the Lithuanian frontier, the story would have turned out differently, even if he had married the niece of the grand prince. He would never have been permitted to reside at court or to lead Muscovite troops. His son would not have attained a boyar's hat in the early 1520s170. The Severa princes, who transferred to Moscow with their v o t c h i na s , were wooed, used and mistrusted. Ivan Ill’s government added their manpower to its campaigns. Using them solely against Lithuanians and always under the obser­ vation of assigned Muscovite officers, the Severa princes could command only their own contingents171. They received the honor of their birthright, special privileges of control within their patrimonies, but were not trusted with full com-

167 R K , p. 28. Bel'skii was a senior commander of on unusual force, for the lead regiment commander was boyar Prince Semen Ivanovich Riapolovskii and the right wing v o e v o d a , boyar lurii Zakhar'ich Koshkin. This is the first instance in which a former Severa prince received such honor and seniority, which may have caused displeasure am ong the boyars. Prince Semen Riapolovskii will be disgraced a year later and executed. And in the same year as Riapolovskii's death, lurii Zakhar'ich would make bitter protestation that he was assigned as v o e v o d a to the guard (i. e., lowest ranking) regiment, while Prince Danilo Vasil'evich Shchenia, also a boyar, was given command of the Great Regiment. The other regimental commanders outranking Shchenia in blood relationship to the grand prince, were newly rehabilitated relatives of Ivan III: Prince Semen Ivanovich Starodubskii of the Moxhaisk line and Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Shemiachich, grandson of Dmitrii Shemiaka of Galich (R K , p. 30). It may be appropriate to raise the question of the impact of seniority assigned to newly arrived v o t c h i n a princes over boyars, even those of princely rank themselves. Ivan III had replied to lurii Zakhar'ich's complaint that the latter was to guard Prince Shchenia, but to look after the affairs of the grand prince. We know further from a recorded altercation of seating of wives of n a m e s t n i k i in a provincial church, between the wives of Iakov Zakhar'ich Koshkin (lurii's older brother) and a Lithuanian, Ivan Sudimont, that the grand prince called this kind of ceremonial bickering a Lithuanian custom, as if Muscovites were above that sort of thing. This was a gross exaggeration, in view of the social ceremonial seniority already found in Muscovy of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (e.g. R K , p. 17). But the unsettling effect of the increasing influence of the increasing number and influence of Lithuanian and regional princes coming into Muscovite service and acquiring choice military rank, has not been properly assessed, particularly by those who theorize about the dynastic crisis at the end of century and the disgrace of some of the boyars. R K , p. 34. im R K , p. 36. t» Zimin, 'S ostav', A E , 1957, p. 51. 171 E. g., R K , p. 34, under 7011, December.

VII

106 mands in Muscovite ventures. The military forces in the west continued to be regionalized, but with some degree of uncertainty for the former Lithuanian sub­ jects. The Severa region was not placed under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Novgorod, nor could it yet be consolidated into a new regional complex under the direction of another Muscovite boyar. The Muscovite government had to con­ sider the sensitivities of these newly transferred princes, for fear they might choose to again switch allegiance. Yet, Ivan III would not permit them to reside in Moscow, nor allow them to enter the c u r s u s h o n o r u m leading to duma rank. Content at first with their new situations and undoubtedly profiting from successful forays into Lithuania, they would, in time, come to realize that real influence and position were to be found in Moscow, not in the border regions. The history of that develop­ ment belongs to the subsequent reign.

V

The Muscovite military establishment had grown to relatively huge proportions by the beginning of the sixteenth century, when one compares it to the forces available to the grand princes in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Expansion alone does not explain the size of military formations or the increase in number. Ivan Ill's government also increased pressure on landholders to give service, took advantage of impoverization that transformed a previous reluctance into an eagerness for position, coerced contingents from weaker independent neighbors, and continued the use of dependent Tatars in military formations. Such manpower resources and unity of direction never before existed in the Russian north. The territories of Muscovy would remain local and provincial in attitude and outlook, even in dialect and in deviation of custom and dress, but their prime allegiances had to change. Distant decisions now affected provincials. While most living in a given locale were daily occupied with parochial concerns, the military aristocracy became more cosmopolitan, if only because its members were forced repeatedly to travel. They had traversed the principal roads of Muscovy, seen Kazan’, stopped in Moscow, sailed down the Oka and Volga, stood before the walls of Novgorod or Tver’, camped before the Swedish fortress of Viborg or some town in Livonia, defended the shores of the southern frontiers, forded innu­ merable streams on the way to Viazma and Dorogobuzh and rode along the road to Smolensk. For the more fortunate and ambitious there was service in Moscow, the center of power, influence and largesse. The expansion of the military organization posed innumerable problems for the crown. There could be no question of change in the style of fighting, the means of calling up levies or altering the nature of rewards. The sheer size of the mustered forces and their successes, employing the older system of battle technique, precluded the possibility of change. Insufficient royal income could not allow for a more professionalized army. Rewards continued to be based primarily upon

VII MUSCOVITE

MILITARY

REFORMS

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booty taken on campaign, making victorious ventures essential. The unusual string of victories undoubtedly explain why Ivan Ill’s government had little difficulty in compelling service of both old and new warriors. Nor were any significant changes introduced in the methods of administering provinces. Revenues and income had grown greatly with the additional acquisi­ tions, but so too had expenditures and obligations. Payment in gold, of which Muscovy had no source but through trade, was restricted to the payment of foreign experts. Little, if any, monetary compensation went to either administrative or military personnel. Governorships, particularly in militarily sensitive regions, were reserved to meritorious and experienced generals. For the sake of reliability, they were never posted to their native habitats. Unfortunately, not a few were grasping and ruthless. At the same time, as royal lieutenants, they obeyed faith­ fully the direct instructions from Moscow, since they were concerned about their future careers. The role of the provincial n a m e s t n i k has been well investigat­ ed, with regard to local jurisdiction in the dispensation of justice and the mainten­ ance of order. The same n a m e s t n i k must also have had a roster of local fighting men to be called in times of danger or war. Given the size of the forces employed towards the end of this reign, and the still ephemeral system of record keeping at court, jurisdiction over local levies must have been kept locally. N a m e s t n ik i did not always become v o e v o d y in time of war. There were too many occasions when the court sent out assigned commanders to lead the provincials on campaign. The n a m e s t n i k i would then be instructed to supervise the defense of the local fortifications, utilizing garrison forces left behind, while the main forces went out under an experienced and instructed v o e v o d a. W arfare in the later fifteenth century necessitated a greater flow of communi­ cations between Moscow and armies in the field. The grand prince rarely accom­ panied his forces. The warrior prince of yesteryear had become an enthroned and withdrawn monarch. Meanwhile, the scope, complexity and duration of campaigns had been growing. The r a z r i a d y only occasionally indicate the nature of communications sent; far more had been sent orally and no longer survive. At first, messages were carried by junior court officials, but these were soon supersed­ ed by state secretaries ( d’i a k i ) or their clerks. W e may suspect that written communications became increasingly utilized, since these were literate personages. Supplies, routes of march, changes in orders, information about conditions found in the field, policy decisions to be discussed in the duma on the basis of reports, had all to be coordinated. The growth of the army and the complexity of cam­ paigning contributed to the growth of central administration. The great expansion of the military establishment enhanced the figure of the monarch. The steps in this evolution will be discussed elsewhere, but here the concern is with the psychological as well as the practical reflections. In the earlier age of small principalities and modest military followings, each territorial ruler

VII

108 led his own contingents and knew his warriors well. Ceremonial, ritual, or even a glittering reception hall were not only absent but would have been out of place. The comparison with the developments of the later fifteenth century becomes all the more striking. Court etiquette and ceremonial had become a necessity and the old camaraderie disappeared. The evolution of the g r o z n y i ruler owed much to the developments that attended the end of the dynastic wars. The consequences of conquest and annexation merely accelerated the process. With so many sub­ jects, particularly with those recently added, a means of enunciating the majesty of power, with its concommitant impersonality, had become even more necessary. The rapidity with which an awesome majestic grand prince was accepted owed something to the growth and dependence of the military establishment. Prestigious newcomers began to challenge the position of the old untitled aristocratic families, who had monopolized key military and court positions. The boyars and their families resisted the pressures, but they continued to mount in the later years of the reign. The primary competition first centered upon military and administrative offices. One consequence of this rivalry was to make the competitors more de­ pendent upon the grand prince. They were more concerned to demonstrate their particular abilities in the hope of being noticed and honored than in opposing the assertions of royal power. I would suggest that the enlarged Muscovite army became the basis for Ivan Ill's foreign policy and that the methods employed to make it an efficient instrument of its day and place also provided some of the means by which the monarch could exert his will at home.

VIII

The Origin and Early Development of the Muscovite Postal Service Among the valuable observations contained in the early sixteenth century travel account of S i g i s m u n d v o n H e r b e r s t e i n , a Hapsburg envoy, was one pertaining to official travel in Muscovy. T h e r u le r h a s p o s ta l ro u te s to a ll p a r ts o f th e d o m in io n , w ith a n a d e q u a te n u m b e r o f ho rses, in d if f e r e n t p la c e s , th u s , w h e n a c o u rie r is s e n t a n y w h e re , he gets a h o rse o n d e m a n d w ith o u t d e la y , b u t th e c o u rie r is fre e to choose a n y h o rse he m ig h t w ish . W h en I tr a v e lle d q u ic k ly fro m N o v g o r o d th e G r e a t to M u sc o v y , th e m a ste r o f th e p o s t, w h o is c a lle d in th e ir la n g u a g e iam sh ch ik , to o k c a r e to h a v e le d to m e so m etim es t h ir ty , a t o th e r tim e s fo r ty o r fif ty , ho rses a t su n rise, b u t I d id n o t n e ed o f m o re th a n tw e lv e . E ach o n e o f o u r m en , th e re fo re , to o k a h o rse w hich lo o k e d s u ita b le to h im . T h e n w h e n e v e r th e horses w e re tir e d w e a rriv e d a t a n o th e r p o s t w hich th e y c a lle d ia m a , w e im m e d ia te ly c h an g ed horses a n d k e p t th e s a d d le b la n k e t a n d b it. A n y o n e w as p e r m itte d to rid e ho rses a t to p s p eed a n d if a n y ho rses b y chance fe ll, o r c o u ld n o t la st, it w as p e rm is sib le to seize a n o th e r fro m a n y n e a rb y h o u se, o r fro m a n y o n e w h o m o n e b y ch an ce m et o n th e w a y , e x c e p tin g o n ly th e c o u rie r o f th e ru le r, a n d to ta k e th e h o rse w ith im p u n ity . T h e ia m sh ch ik is a c c u s to m e d to lo o k fo r ho rses e x h a u s te d a n d le ft en ro u te , to re s to re a n o th e r h o rs e to h im fro m w h o m it w as ta k e n , a n d to p a y th e p ric e a c c o rd in g to th e le n g th o f th e tr ip . O r d in a r il y fro m te n to tw e n ty v e rsts c o st six d e n g i 1. In th a t w a y m y s e r v a n t tra v e lle d b y p o s t h o rses fro m N o v g o ro d to M o sc o w , a d is ta n c e o f six h u n d re d v e rsts, t h a t is o n e h u n ­ d r e d a n d tw e n ty G e rm a n m iles, in s e v e n ty -tw o h o u rs. T h a t is so m eth in g all th e m o re to be m a r v e lle d a t sin ce th e ho rses a re little a n d a re c a re d fo r f a r m o re n e g lig e n tly th a n b y us, a n d y e t p e r f o r m such l a b o r s 2.

The Austrian envoy described a remarkably well developed system of official com­ munications. Nothing comparable to this speed of travel is recorded for the West in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. According to Herberstein’s comments, his servant covered an average of one hundred and thirty-three miles ( 214,03 km) per day for three successive days. The best speed obtainable in sixteenth century England was seventysome miles (approx. 112,65 km) in a d ay3. Herberstein relied upon a contemporary estimate given to him for the number of versts between Novgorod the Great and Moscow. According to a seventeenth century distance

1 (S igmund F rh . zu H erberstein ) Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii Sigismundi Liberi Baronis in H erberstain, Neyperg et Guettenhag. Unveränd. Nachdr. der Ed. 1571. Frankfurt a. M. 1964. 227 S.; here cited according to: Notes Upon Russia. Being a Translation of the Earliest Account of that Country, Entitled Rerum Moscoviticarum commentarii, by the Baron S igismund von H erberstein . Transi, and ed. by R. H. Major = The H akluyt Society. Works. First Series, vol. 10, London 1851, p. 106: A workman at that time earned one and a half dengi per day, an artisan, two. A century later A dam O learius (Moskowitische und Persische Reise [Berlin 1963] p. 85) commented on the speed of winter travel in Russia and the low cost in­ volved in such journeys. 2 This translation is from S igismund von H erberstein Commentaries on Muscovite Affairs. Ed. and transi, by O. P. Backus III. Lawrence, Kansas 1956, pp. 64 —65. It is superior to M ajor’s. Cf. The H akluyt Society. Works vol. 10, pp. 108 — 109. See also V. O. K ljucevskij Skazanija inostranccv o Moskovskom gosudarstve. Petrograd 1918, p. 262. 3 M. S t. C lare B yrne Elizabethan Life inTown and Country. London, New York 1961, p. 111.

VIII 2

chart [Poverstnaja kn ig a j when, presumably, the roads followed the same routes of a century earlier, the span “from Moscow to Novgorod the Great [was] 540 [versts], and in winter, 530 ” 45. Taking the smaller figure, the distance covered by Herberstein’s servant would have averaged one hundred eighteen ( 189,89 km) rather than one hundred and thirty-three miles ( 214,03 km) for each of three days. N or was this necessarily the optimum speed. At the end of the sixteenth century, Sir Jerome Horsey recorded a winter’s expedition with an average of two hundred miles ( 321,86 km) per d ay6. The best recorded speeds known for late medieval France seemed to range from fifty-four to fifty-six miles (from 86,9 to 90,12 km) in a day, though the majority of journeys covered a more leisurely twenty to thirty-three miles ( 32,18 to 53,1 km )6. On the other hand, French travel was swift if compared with a summer’s voyage in western Russia. Then the solidified and easily traversed rivers, streams and roads melted into water, mud, bog and swamp. One harassed seventeenth century visitor complained that it was impossible to go more than four to five miles ( 6,43 to 8,04 km) on a summer’s day by land. Another traveler counted five hundred and thirty-three bridges between Moscow and Smolensk; in one stretch of four miles (6,43 km) he crossed forty bridges. In many instances streams lacked bridges and bogs the indispensible log paths7. A Venetian envoy, A m b r o g i o C o n t a r i n i , going from Moscow to Troki (near Vilna in Lithuania) in the winter of 1476, described a slower, seemingly a more primitive, and certainly a more poorly organized system of travel within Muscovy, while he accurately noted that Novgorod was eight days’ journey from Moscow (in prepost days)8. Contarini was not as keen an eyewitness as Herberstein, partly because he was obsessed with an uncommon desire to shake the snow of eastern Europe from his frost-

V. A . P etrov Geograficfeskie spravocniki X V II v., in: IstoriCeskij archiv vol. 5 (1950) p. 146. The H akluyt Society. Works. First Series, vol. 20, London 1856, p. 190: “My slead and horss and 2 0 servants posted that night 90 meills to O ttvcr [Tver] wher vittuals and fresh hors wear prepared and so to Novgorod and Placsco [Pskov] and to Ncwhouse, 600 meills in three dayes.” Tver was 175 versts (about 117 miles from Moscow), according to the poverstnaja kniga: P etrov GeografiCeskie spravocniki p. 144. 9 M. N. B oyer A D ay’s Journey in Medieval France, in: Speculum 26 (1951) pp. 597 — 606; see especially pp. 603 —606. 7 K ljucevskij Skazanija inostrancev p. 264. George Killingsworth, an agent of the Muscovy Company in 1555, noted in his report (H akluyt Voyages vol. 1 [London, New York 1939. Everyman ed.] p. 308) “And we did lade the Empcrour’s suger, with part of all sort of wares to have had to the Mosco with us, but the way was so deepe, that we were faine to turne back, and leave it stil at Vologda till the frost. And we went forth with poste horse, & the charge of every horse being still ten in number, comes to 10. s. 7. d. hälfe penie, besides the guides. And wee came to the Mosco the 4. day of October . . . ”. Since Killingsworth’s party left Vologda on September 28th or 29th, the journey took six or seven days. Vologda was 420 versts, or approximately 280 miles from Moscow (P etrov GeografiCeskie spravocniki p. 106). A nthony J enkinson (H akluyt’s Voyages vol. 1, pp. 413 — 414), in his account of his first voyage to Russia in 1557, reported that the distance “was accompted 500 verstes asunder.” H e undoub­ tedly acquired the figure from his Russian hosts. Jenkinson, traveling in December, made the trip from Vologda to Moscow in six days, paralleling the experience of Killingsworth. 8 G iosaphat B arbaro Viaggi fatti da Venetia alia Tana, in Persia ecc. 2nd ed. 1545; here cited according to: Travels to Tana and Persia by J osafa B arbaro and A mbrogio C ontarini . Transi, by W. Thomas and S. A. Roy. ( = T h e H akluyt Society. Works. First Series, vol. 49 [1873])p. 163: Novgorod was “eight days’ journey west of Moscow.” Barbaro, who visited Muscovy earlier in the fifteenth century, also noted that it took eight days to make the trip. 4 5

VIII O r ig in a n d D e v e l o p m e n t o f M u s c o v it e P o s t a l S e r v ic e

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bitten feet. “I welcomed every discomfort and was intent on nothing but travelling day and night; nor had I any fear, so great was my desire to escape from those places and ways of living." Departing in the bitter cold of January, Contarini received a sani, a fully enclosed horsedrawn sled 9. Within, the sani was equipped with all the necessary food and clothing. A court-appointed guide led the party of travelers through the silent and almost unpopulated forest. Only occasionally did they spy a village and conse­ quently they usually slept in their portable shelters. They took their meals at midday “where we found that fires had been made, and the ice broken to water the horses by persons who had preceded us.” Nowhere did he mention jam stations for the acquisition of provisions and the changing of horses101. The differences between the accounts of Contarini and Herberstein lie as much in the acuity of observation and in the faithfulness of reporting as in the evidence of a rapidly evolving system of communication. Contarini desired to escape to the balmier and more cosmopolitan climes of his native Italy after a four years’ absence; Herberstein came with an eye to discern and won just fame for his accuracy and perception of obser­ vation. G e o r g e T u r b e r v i l l e , an Englishman writing from Moscow to his friend Parker in London in 1568, attested in verse to the value and popularity of the Austrian’s record: Adieu friend Parker, if thou list, to know the Russes well, To Sigismundus booke repaire, who all the trueth can tell: For he long earst in message went unto that savage King, Sent by the Pole [sic], and true report in ech respect did bring. To him I recommend my seife, to ease my penne of paine, And now at last do wish thee well, and bid farewell againe n .

Every ruler in medieval Europe had to contend with the difficulty in communications. Messengers went forth with letters, proclamations, inquiries, offers of peace and declara­ tions of war. Towns employed messengers on municipal business. Couriers carried letters to and from the Roman curia. Messengers often were not even in the permanent employ of the sender. Travel expense varied and not infrequently the carrier bargained for adequate or beneficial rates12. In England the first regulation concerning a systematic supply of horses for a letter post to Dover dates from the mid-sixteenth century13. An interior postal system existed, primarily for communication of the towns with London

• O learius (Moskowitische und Persische Reise pp. 84 — 85) was well satisfied with the com­

forts of travel by covered sled. “Wegen so starken Frostes und vielen Schnees, so sich in ganz Ruß- und Livland findet, is gut Reisen und die russischen Schlitten, so niedrig und aus Bast oder Lindenborken gemacht, dafür gut zu gebrauchen. Unser etliche fütterten die Schlitten mit Felz aus, legten sich mit langen Schafpelzen, welche man daselbst gar wohlfeil haben kann, hinein und dekten oben den Schlitten mit einem Felz oder tuchenden Decke zu; wir konnten uns dar­ unter in der größten kälte gar warm, ja schwitzend und schlafend von den Bauern hinführen lassen.” 10 The H akluyt Society. Works. First Series, vol. 49, pp. 165 —166. 11 H ak lu y t’s Voyages vol. 2, p. 108. For the popularity of Herberstein’s account in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see F. von A delung Kritisch-literarische Übersicht der Reisenden in Rußland bis 1700, deren Berichte bekannt sind. 2 vols. St. Petersburg 1846 (republished Amster­ dam 1960); here vol. 1, pp. 165 — 175. 12 C f. M. N . B o y e r Status and Travel Stipends in Fourteenth Century France in: Speculum vol. 39 (1964) pp. 4 5 - 5 2 . 18 Encyclopedia Britannica, l l t h ed., vol. 22, p. 176.

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and for the dispatch of royal letters. The crown allowed the postal agents to hire out horses to travelers, but never for carrying correspondence14. Similarly in France a poste royale came into existence in the mid-fifteenth century, although the University of Paris operated its own communication system since the thirteenth century. Louis X I, in establishing this king’s post, desired to increase his control over the distant portions of the realm. H e allowed members of the aristocracy to utilize the relays, but insisted that all their communications be examined prior to dispatch in order to prevent politically dangerous letters from reaching the ad­ dressees 15*. German commercial towns supported a postal service since the thirteenth century and it subsequently extended throughout central Europe and as far south as Italy. By the end of the fifteenth century, this relatively loose interlocking net, controlled by private enterprisers, gave way before the competition of the family of de Taxis. François de Taxis at the end of the fifteenth century and later his descendants organized a vast mid-continent network of postal stations. Supported by kings and emperors, the service extended through most of continental Europe west of Russia and east of France18. These medieval and early modern developments in communications met the political and commercial needs of their times, but they were not the first or even the most extensive networks known to man. Official postal systems tying empires together existed in imperial Rome and continued on in Byzantium, its later day successor17. Pre-Mongol China had a well developed network of routes and relay stations for the changing of horses or couriers. The war minister in the Tang dynasty controlled the organization, though its operating personnel was largely civilian. Later, in the Sung period, the military took over all of its operations. For a country so vast as China, the postal service provided the means of stitching the outlying regions to the center18. This system, adapted by the Mongols, became the great tool of communications in the sprawling empire put together by Chingis Khan and his successors that stretched from the Pacific to the lands of the Russians19. Perhaps this was the greatest and most efficient communications net known to the pre-modem world. After the conquest of the Russian northeast in the thirteenth century, the inhabitants became tributary to the Mongols in terms of allegiance and taxes. Among the many financial obligations imposed upon the inhabitants was one called jam , the Tatar name

14 C lare B yrne Elizabethan Life in Town and Country p. 111.

La Grande Encyclopédie vol. 28 (Paris n. d.) p. 416. Ibidem pp. 428 —429. 17 L. B rêhier Le monde byzantin vol. 2 : Les institutions de l’empire byzantin. Paris 1949, pp. 324 —333. On the relative slowness of travel in early Byzantium, see A. H . M. J ones The Later Roman Empire, 284 —602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey. 4 vols. O xford 1964; here vol. 1, pp. 402 —403. 18 P. O lbricht Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13. und 14. Jah r­ hundert. Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 34 —39 = Göttinger asiatische Forschungen vol. 1 . Olbricht commendably, but perhaps with excessive caution, did not wish to commit himself on the question of the influence of tne Chinese post system upon the development of the pan-Mongol com­ munications network: “. . . die Frage der Beeinflussung ist nicht leicht zu beantw orten” (p. 8 ). 18 I. J a . G urljand Jamskaja gonba v Moskovskom gosudarstve do konca X V II veka. Jaroslavl’ 1900, pp. 32 ff., B. S puler Die goldene H orde. Die Mongolen in Rußland, 1223 — 1502. Leipzig 1943, p. 406 ff. ( = D a s Mongolische Weltreich. Quellen und Forschungen vol. 2 ); 2 nd ed. Wiesbaden 1965. 15

18

V III O r ig in a n d D e v e l o p m e n t o f M u s c o v it e P o s t a l S e r v ic e

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for postal service. B e r t h o l d S p u l e r subscribes to the generally accepted view that the jam assessed against the Russians was “Postgelder**20 and thus not an obligation to maintain a system of overland post stations in the northeast21. Among those who accept jam as a tax for the upkeep of the pan-Mongol postal service, G r e k o v went further. H e believed that the Tatar rulers introduced the jam as an obligation upon the Russians to supply horses to official emissaries who came into their lands22. Unfortunately, he gave neither source nor reason for his speculation. The question of jam in the early period of the conquest is dealt with circumspectly by historians. This is understandable in view of the laconic entries in the sources. The senior princes of Moscow, as had their thirteenth century predecessors, gathered the annual tribute from the lands under their jurisdiction and conveyed the funds to the khans of the Golden Horde. Entries concerning these collections are found in the prin­ cely treaties of the Muscovite house. First called dan 23 and later vydood24, these col­ lections presumably covered almost all of the imposts levied against the subservient east Russians. The earliest mention in the Muscovite documents of jam as a tax, which was separate from the tribute payment is found in the first testament of Grand Prince Vasilij I, dating from the beginning of the fifteenth century. In a section concerned with an allocation of lands to be left to his wife in lifetime tenure, he stated: “And if dan or jam is to be taken, then my princess is to give from those provisions and villages according to the assessment. . .**25*. By the second quarter of the fifteenth century, that is, in the early reign of Vasilij II, jam became increasingly mentioned as a separate tax. In 1428 the young Vasilij II included in a treaty with his uncle, Prince Jurij of Galic: “And dan and jam you are to give me from your patrimony, from Gali£ and its pro­ vinces as before, as you gave to my father, the grand prince**28. In 1433 Jurij of Galic promised Grand Prince Vasilij II: “And dan and jam I am to give from my patrimony, both from Zvenigorod and its provinces and from Galic and its provinces, as in the past we gave to your father the grand prince**27. By the end of the fifteenth century jam was no longer a tax but the name identifying individual relay stations created by Ivan III*s government at intervals along some of the main roads of the realm. The extent of this developing system is not adequately mirrored in the phraseology found in the testament of Ivan III ( 1504): “And my son Vasilij [III] is to keep jams and carts on the roads in those places where there were jams and wagons during my lifetime**28. This is the last and also the most meaningful

Ibidem p. 335. See also G. V ernadsky The Mongols and Russia. New Haven 1953, p. 221 ( = G. Vernadskij and Michail Karpovic: A History of Russia vol. 3); G urljand Jamskaja gonba p. 39; 1.1. S reznevskij M aterialy dlja slovarja drevne-russkago jazyka po pismennym pam jatnikam . 3 vols. St. Petersburg 1893 — 1903; here vol. 3, col. 1658. 21 S puler Die goldene H orde pp. 414 —415. 22 B. D. G rekov and A. Ju. J akubovskij Zolotaja O rda i ee padenie. Moscow, Leningrad 1950, p. 224 ( = Akademija nauk SSSR. Serija “Itogi i problemy sovremennoj nauki”). 23 Duchovnye i dogovornye gram oty velikidi i udel’nych knjazej X IV —XVI w . Ed. L. V. Cerepnin (hereafter cited as DDG). Moscow, Leningrad 1950, pp. 20, 28, etc. See p. 513 for a complete list of entries. 24 Ibidem p. 512 for entries under vychod. 25 Ibidem p. 56. 28 Ibidem p. 64, also p. 6 6 . 27 Ibidem p. 76. 28 Ibidem p. 362. 20

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mention of jam in the princely treaties and testaments. At the very time the post became an important institution, one of prime importance in extending administrative controls into recently acquired outlying districts, jam as a tax lost its relevance in the old agreements 29. These citations suggest that at least in part the unification of northeastern Rus at the end of the fifteenth century decided the Muscovite court to inaugurate a post relay system to facilitate administrative centralization. This service was also a boon to diplo­ matic travel at the very time Muscovy opened diplomatic relations with the Crimean Tatars and some western states. Speed, facility, frequency of travel by Muscovite agents, and the sensing of provincial governors that they were under constant scrutiny, contri­ buted their share to the development of obedience to the royal wish. The creation of the post system should be considered one of the significant achievements of Ivan I l l ’s reign. It would not be inappropriate to recall S p u l e r ’ s evaluation of the Mongol relays service as “eine der glänzenden Einrichtungen des Gesamtreidies” 30. As in the heyday of that great empire, the post stations provided horses, wagons, food and rest for accre­ dited travelers. M a r c o P o l o in the thirteenth century described in great detail the sumptuous accommodations to be found in the Chinese jam stations31. The Russian counterparts, though far less luxurious, provided analogous functions. If Ivan I l l ’s government introduced the post service into Muscovy, his successors con­ tinually added jam stations along important routes as the need and changing demands dictated. Foreign envoys found travel within Muscovy to be as safe as they might experience within the best protected areas of Europe and as comfortable as the rigors of climate, the inadequacy of summer roads, the vastness of distances, and the modest resources available would allow. H e i n r i c h v o n S t a d e n , a sixteenth century German adventurer in Russia, commented on the considerable cost of maintaining the vast system of post stations 32. M .S. A n d e r s o n overpainted the conditions facing English voyagers to Russia in the sixteenth century. His comments certainly cannot apply to the more populated regions of Muscovy. The English discovered the White Sea route to Russia in 1553 and there­ after exploited the possibilities of trade with this eastern outpost of Europe. The road

29 In point of fact, the term jam as signifying a separate tax disappeared during the reign of Ivan III. From the moment of Ivan’s accession, he deleted dan and jam as special levies and demanded only the general tribute / vychod] from his relatives. See DDG pp. 209, 214, 215, 218, 226, 243, 254, 270, 279, 295, 318, 325. This should not be regarded as a reduction in the grand princely income from his relatives. Only Prince Michail Andreevic of Vereja benefited from this arrangement, though he had to surrender his patrimony to Ivan III upon his death. Ivans’s brothers, I suspect, had to pay a higher proportion of their income, based upon the provisions of their father’s will. In the sixteenth century, with the expanded development of the jam system, the jam tax became one of the direct imposts levied against the population. See A. A. Z imin O sloicnii prikaznoj sistemy na Rusi, in: Akademija Nauk SSSR. Doklady i soobscenija Instituta istorii vol. 3 (1954) p. 168. 30 Die goldene H orde p. 412. 31 The Book of Ser M arco P olo , the Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East. Transi, and ed. by Sir H enry Yule. 2 vols. London 1921; here vol. 1, pp. 433 —438. 32 H einrich von S taden Aufzeichnungen über den Moskauer Staat. 2nd ed. Ed. by F. T. Epstein. Hamburg 1964 ( = Universität Hamburg. Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der Auslands­ kunde Band 34. Reihe A. Rechts- und Staatswissenschaften Band 5) p. 59: "Die jammen oder postheuser kosten den grosfurschten jehrlich trefflich viel zu halten.”

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from the White Sea to Moscow led these Tudor adventurers through northern waste and forested wilderness, where settlements were few and far between. Wrote A n d e r s o n : Travel was difficult, uncomfortable, expensive and often slow. Wooden houses, poor bedding, prim itive eating arrangements, and badly-cooked food shocked even travellers accustomed to the considerable rigors of journeys in western Europe. Above all, the lack of roads and the total absence of inns, which forced the traveller to rely very largely on his own resources for food and shelter, were criticized by English merchants and diplomats. Jenkinson 85 insisted that the traveller in Russia must carry, as the barest of essentials, a hatchet, a tinder box and a bottle ‘for there is small succour in those parts, unlesse it be in townes’84.

The situation described by the adventurer H e i n r i c h v o n S t a d e n , who resided in Muscovy in the 1560’s and 1570’s 343536, or by the English ambassador Sir Jerome Horsey in 1587 does not at all support Anderson’s view. At one point H o r s e y commented: This Emperowr [Ivan IV], among many other such like acts, did build in his tyme 155 castells, in all parts of kyngdoms, planted them w ith ordinance and garrisons. H e built 300 towns in wast places and wildernesses, called yams, of a miell and two in length; geave every inhabitant a proporcion of land to kepe so many spedie horsses for his use as occasion requiers 3#.

Ivan IV continued the process begun by his grandfather and father, extending post routes into hitherto unserviced areas. The same Anthony Jenkinson, quoted by Ander­ son, unwittingly reveals that sometime during the early sixteenth century, the Muscovite government had created jam stations northwards to Vologda. Jenkinson’s account of travel difficulties pertained primarily to the route from Cholmogory on the Northern Dvina to Vologda, which, by his reckoning amounted to one thousand versts (about 666 miles). From Vologda the route became easier to traverse. “There are 14 postes called Yannes between Vologda andMusco, which are accompted 500 verstes asunder”37. Vologda, an interior oversized village of no importance in the fifteenth century38, had developed into a large town by the time of Jenkinson’s first visit, flourishing as a trade and a communications center. The discovery of the White Sea route by the English enhanced the value of the northern road and demanded the extension of way stations to aid wanted merchants and distin­ guished envoys. Horsey’s description of his voyage from Moscow to the White Sea in the 1580’s differs sharply from J e n k i n s o n ’ s earlier account:

One of the first Englishmen to visit the Muscovite interior (in 1557) via the White Sea route. For his account, see H ak lu y t’s Voyages vol. 1, p. 408 ff. 34 M. S. A nderson Britain’s Discovery of Russia, 1553 — 1815. London 1958, p. 12. 35 H einrich von S taden Aufzeichnungen p. 59: “Es seind auch postheuser in die lenge und breite durchaus, in welchen gewöhnet haben freiwillige leute mit ganz guten pferden, darmit einer kunte kommen in 6 tagen aus der Moscau an eine umbligende grenze oder von der grenze in die Muscaw. Die eine jamme oder posthof ligt von der anderen 20, 30, 40, 50 vorste.” 36 The H akluyt Society. Works. First Series, vol. 20, pp. 208 —209. 37 H ak lu y t’s Voyages vol. 1, p. 414, see also p. 413. The distance according to the seventeenth century distance chart was 420 versts rather than 500. See P etrov Geograficeskie spravoctoiki p. 106. The Englishman, A rthur Edwards, in 1567, estimating the distances along the main roads leading from Moscow, held that 420 versts separated Vologda from Moscow, via Jaroslavl’, Rostov, and Percjaslavl’ (H akluyt’s Voyages vol. 2, p. 53). 38 Polnoe sobranie russkich letopisej (hereafter referred to as PSRL). 30 vols. Moscow, Lenin­ grad 1962 — 1965; here vol. 28, 1963, p. 108. The chronicler referred to Vologda in 1447 as a distant wasteland. 33

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I departed the cittie of Musco verie honnorablie atended, went easie journeyes and pitched my tents; dinner and supper, provicion of all things prepared upon the waye. At Vollogda, Knez Michaeli Dolgaruca, the viavode, came to me well atended, to waelcome me with the Emperors goodnes. Prepared two great barckes or dosnickes with pillotts and 50 men to rowe me down the river Dwina, a thowsand miells. My gentilman atendant, with one of my servants, to see he did not bribe nor misuse the countrie, still passinge before me in a light boate, to make provicion of meat, drincke and men, at everie town I came at, till I arived at the monestarie and castell Archangell, where the duke’s Knez Michaeli Izvenigorodscoie mett me at the castell gate with 300 gonners . . .39.

These passages from the journals of English voyagers indicate a constant expansion of ja m services into the less inhabited reaches of Muscovy. The vastness of the realm,

which exceeded that of virtually every Western state of the period, precluded the extension of the post into each district. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the crown concentrated upon the principal roads radiating from Moscow. These largely followed the watercourses to avoid the difficulties of plunging through dense forests and allowed for river travel in both summer and winter40. The first evidence we have of organized way stations in Ivan I l l ’s tim e41 comes from the record of the first Muscovite mission to the Hapsburgs in 1489 —1490. Jurij Trachaniot, an educated Greek expatriate in Muscovite service, and his junior colleague, a state secretary named Vasilij Kulesin, received carefully formulated instructions on procedure and ceremonials to be observed at their destination, advice on what to say depending upon the development of negotiations, and an escort for the mission to guide the party safely and in reasonable comfort on the first leg of the journey. One of the chancery sections prepared a special travel document charting the route, specify­ ing the provisions to be acquired and the cooperation to be demanded along the Musco­ vite roads. Whether the document emanated from the office of the treasurer or that of the state steward cannot be discovered, though the latter would be the more logical possibility. And such was the road-travel document [podoroznaja gram otaj given to Jurij and Vasilij to Novgorod: “From G rand Prince Ivan Vasil’evi£ of all Rus, from Moscow along the roads of our domains, in the Muscovite and Tverian lands from jam to jam [po jamom jamScikom] to Torzok, and in T o rio k by the starosta [i. e., the peasant elder], and from Torzok along the N ovgorodian road from iam to jam to Novgorod the Great: that there be given to Jurij the Greek together with Chalep [the scribe] and Kost ja the falconer, thirteen telegas with horses; and to Vasilij KuleSin together with Jusko [the scribe], thirteen telegas with horses from jam

The H akluyt Society. Works. First Series, vol. 20, p. 230. Jenkinson noted that “In the W inter time, the people travell w ith sleds, in towne and countrey, the way being hard, and smooth with snow: the waters and rivers are all frozen, and one horse w ith a sled will draw a man upon it 400 miles, in three daies: but in the Summer time, the way is deep with mire, and travelling is very ill." H akluyt’s Voyages vol. 1 , p. 418. By comparison, summer travel in Elizabethan England could be just as bad and in winter, much worse. See C lare B yrne Elizabethan Life pp. 105 — 107. 41 The origin of the jam system is generally credited to the reign of Ivan III. This is amply demonstrated in G urljand’s definitive work (Jamskaja gonba p. 41 ff.V See also I.P .K ozlovskij Pervye po2ty i pervye pocîtmejstery v Moskovskom gosudarstve vol. 1 , Warsaw 1913, p. 23. (I am indebted to Professor George Vernadsky for this citation.) Cf. N. P. EroSkin Ocferki istorii gosudarstvennych uÆreïdenij dorevoljucionnoj Rossii. Moscow 1960, pp. 36 —37; A. A. Z imin O sloienii prikaznoj sistemy na Rusi, in: D oklady i soob^enija Instituta istorii vol. 3 (1964) pp. 1 6 5 -1 6 6 . 89

40

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to jam; and provisions [korm] are to be given them at the stopping place where it would be best for them to halt, to Jurij together with Chalep and Kostja a carcass of sheep — but the sheepskin is to be taken back4243— and three hens, in addition to bread.”

The order also provided for identical rations for Vasilij Kulesin, the scribe JuSko and their party48. Whoever organized the transit facilities for the mission also sent along a court functionary, the junior boyar Fedor Cirka Surmin, with letters instructing the governors of Novgorod to provide him with a German interpreter, a suitable escort for the remainder of the journey and some money, so that he might precede the embassy to Reval, in order to make appropriate arrangements there. Once the Muscovite con­ tingent took ship in Reval, court instructions required that Surmin send back a written report, indicating the name of the ship, the date of departure and its destination44. A designated functionary was accountable for each phase of the journey. Aleksandr Golochvastov, in later years an ambassador of some note45, began his career as an apprentice overseer / pristav]. H e had to see to the necessary accommodations between Moscow and Novgorod; Surmin took responsibility for the next stage, as far as R eval46. These post stations spaced along the road to Novgorod came into being prior to 1489 but after 1478, the time of the definitive incorporation of the defunct republic’s lands into the realm. It is possible to be a bit more precise. Ivan III annexed Tver in 1485; the jam stations in Tver came into being after that date. The western expansion, which erased the buffer with hostile Lithuania and made subjects of the disgruntled Novgorodian aristocracy, demanded rapid communications between Moscow and the viceroys assigned civil and military responsibilities in the conquered land. By 1493 the govern­ ment extended the jam system to the Pskovian frontier47. Muscovite messengers carried instructions along these roads to provincial governors and hurried back with informa­ tion and reports. Overseers assigned to conduct foreign or Muscovite missions to the frontier were to relay news deemed important to the crown. In 1493 the scribe Elka, conducting a foreign ambassador as far as Pskov carried instructions to Prince Sujskij, the Muscovite appointee as “Prince of Pskov.” Sujskij was to relay any information about events in Lithuania and, further, he was to keep the governors of Novgorod informed as w ell48. N ew post stations appeared at intervals along other roads to the west after the turn of the century. By 1501 a series of jams extended along the Mozajsk road into the newly

42 Some of the sheepskins were fashioned into coats and issued to troops for winter use. See Ustjuzskij Letopisnyj Svod. Ed. K. N. S erbina . Moscow, Leningrad 1950, p. 8 8 . There are a number of indications th at Ivan III kept winter patrols along the borders of the steppe in time of danger. See, for example, Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago istori£eskago ob&estva (hereafter cited as SIR IO ). 48 vols. St. Petersburg; here vol. 41, 1884, p. 98. 43 Pam jatniki diplomatiCeskich snosenij s derzavam i inostrannymi (hereafter cited as PDS). 10 vols. St. Petersburg; here vol. 1, 1851, cols. 48 —49. 44 Ibidem cols. 34 —65. 45 To Lithuania, July 1498: SIR IO vol. 35, 1882, p. 261; to the Crimea, 1499: SIR IO vol. 41, p. 280 ff., and to the sultan, 1502: SIR IO vol. 41, p. 398 ff. 43 PDS vol. 1, col. 34. . . . ¥Y. 47 S IR IO vol. 35, p. 101: “. . . a ot N ovagoroda i do Pskova, takze i nazad po jamom jamscikom . . . ” ; see G urljand Jam skaja gonba p. 52; according to the “Pervaja Pskovskaja Letopii” a special zem skij d ’jak was instituted in Pskov in 1520. 48 Ibidem p. 94.

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conquered Lithuanian lands, via Vjazma as far as Dorogobuz, a distance of 210 versts (140 miles) from M oscow49. Muscovite troops had occupied Vjazma in 1493 but there was no evidence of immediate extension of posts along this key road. A Lithuanian envoy returning home in 1494 via this route received sufficient food and transporta­ tion to take him as far as Mozajsk. There he acquired a like number of wagons and horses to replace those he received in Moscow, which would take him as far as Vjazma. By 1501 the situation had changed considerably. Way stations dotted the road all the way to Dorogobuz50. Still another route into former Lithuanian possessions, this one more southerly, acquired jams. A road document of 1504 indicates that such stations were placed along the road from Moscow to Kaluga on the middle Oka, and then on to Vorotynsk: From Grand Prince Ivan Vasil’evi2 of all Rus, from Moscow along the road to Kaluga from jam to jam, that there be given to Midiajlo Dolmatov [appointed as overseer] three telegas with horses from jam to jam; and from Kaluga to Vorotynsk from jam to jam, and from Vorotynsk to Bryn, and at Bryn by the prince, and from Bryn to Brjansk, and from Brjansk to Novgorod in Severeja, by all persons without exception . . .51.

Vorotynsk was 195 versts (130 miles) southwest of M oscow52. Bryn lay more than 80 versts further down the road. Military activity against Lithuania and the prospects of continued hostilities demanded that a regularized and speedy system of communications be created to the western fron­ tiers. The roads to the Kazan border merited a lower priority despite the necessity for frequent contact with outlying provinces in the east, which also experienced increasing military or diplomatic activity. By the early 1490’s post stations lined the route to Murom, but not yet to the more important center of Niznij Novgorod, on the strategic junction of the Oka and the Volga rivers. Stepan Osorin, a Tatar in grand princely service, charged with escorting a Kazanian ambassador back to his master and convey­ ing messages to two Muscovite envoys then at the court of the Nogai khan (fall, 1491), took the land road to Murom and from there the Oka water route to Niznij Novgorod. Between Moscow and Murom, Osofin was to avail himself of the jam facilities. At Murom he was to acquire a boat with two rowers and a provisioner [ korm nik] to take him as far as Niznij Novgorod. The rowers were then to take the boat back to their home station and the governors of N iin ij were to provide similar transportation for the river journey to Kazan 53. According to the seventeenth century distance chart, the land span between Moscow and Murom was 260 versts (173 miles) and 510 versts (340 miles) by water54. I suspect that the short overland route to Murom was estab­ lished in the late 1480’s for rapid communication with the eastern outposts. The last leg of the water journey from Murom to Niznij Novgorod of approximately 160 miles by the water route was considered sufficiently rapid to rely upon boat travel55.

49 P etrov Geografi£eskie spravo&iiki p. 134.

SIR IO vol. 35, pp. 155, 307; see also p. 439. SIR IO vol. 41, p. 511. 52 P etrov Geografi£eskie spravo&iiki p. 134. “ SIR IO vol. 41, p. 132. 54 P etrov Geografi£eskie spravoifniki p. 115. 55 The straight-line distance between Murom and Niznij Novgorod is one hundred and twenty versts (ibidem p. 115). 50

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Possibly post villages and stations existed along some roads other than on the three leading west and the one to Murom56. Road documents, from which the information is derived, do not always appear with the other reports belonging to a mission. In fact, the scribes frequently tended to omit this seemingly minor document from their preser­ ved records. There is also a possibility that important interior land arteries, such as those leading from Moscow to Kolomna, Dmitrov, Kostroma, Galic, or Serpuchov might also have had such newly established jams. Since envoys did not take these routes, there is no evidence to provide basis for conclusion. The sources at hand merely allow for the observation that Ivan III decreed the creation of post stations along the major arteries connecting the newly won lands of the west and along a shorter overland road to Murom to provide for faster communications with his governors along the Kazan frontier. Creation of these jams required planning, the building of villages dedicated to this one function or of adding the responsibility to already existing habitations, staffing and considerable expense. Larger towns could and did supply horses, two-wheeled telegas or sani in winter, and even guides for outward journeys where jams did not exist. In such cases the treasury paid for the use of vehicles and horses and compensated the owners for any losses57. Horses in the hundreds were necessary to supply the jam stations. Most of these, undoubtedly, were imported from the steppe58 and their cost added up to a prince’s ransom 59. Russian rivers, arteries of transportation as well as of travel since the time of settlement long preferred by merchants carrying bulk goods, even utilized for the transport o military forces60, in Ivan I l l ’s time were employed for missions involving foreign and domestic service only where jams did not exist, or when land travel was too slow. The

56 See G urljand Jamskaja gonba pp. 52 — 54, for additional minor routes. In several instances he pushed his evidence too hard. For example, he believed that jam stations existed between Novgorod the G reat and Rugodiv [Narva] around 1490 — 1493. In another instance, he employed a source of 1512 concerning dilapidated jam stations, to date the creation of a jam system between Moscow and Beloozero and Ergol’skij prior to 1500. 57 S IR IO vol. 35, pp. 82, 83. 58 G reat herds of horses were imported from the steppe. Many, or perhaps most, of these were bought directly by the state for m ilitary or domainal needs. See M. N . T ichomirov Srednevekovaja Moskva v X IV —XV vekach. Moscow 1957, p. 115. For fragments of such evidence, see PSRL vol. 25, pp. 308 — 309; SIR IO vol. 41, p. 81: instruction given to the governor of Murom in 1489. Fodder at state expense was not to be supplied for horses brought to Moscow for sale. PSRL vol. 12, p. 156; vol. 26, p. 254: “In that year [1474], on the 7th of July, there came from t h e . . . G reat H o r d e . . . 3 200 merchants with horses and other goods, and horses for sale were more than forty th o u san d . . . " See also PSRL vol. 27, p. 353; The H akluyt So­ ciety. Works. First Series vol. 49, p. 154: describing the caravan that took him from the mouth of the Volga to Moscow, Contarini noted th at “There were, besides, more than two hundred horses led for food and for sale in Russia." 59 According to an itemized account of goods taken from a Muscovite caravan on the steppe, horses were valued at an average of two and a half rubles each. Presumably the travellers placed a replacement price of fifty rubles on their twenty stolen horses (SIRIO vol. 41, p. 407). While the m arket price of horses undoubtedly varied according to the conditions of the ani­ mals and the available supply, this at least provides an index to the going rate. 60 See the repeated references to campaigns employing boat forces during the reign of Ivan III: DrevnejSaja R azrjadnaja kniga official’noj redakcii (po 1565 g.). Ed. P. N . Miljukov (here­ after cited as D RK ). Moscow 1901, pp. 14, 23, 25, 34, etc.

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government demanded speed of its messengers and a rather brisk pace for ambassadors. Frequent instructions are found commanding messengers, envoys, and the overseers who guided them not to tarry en route [ne izderzivaja ni casa]*1. Foreign diplomats fared somewhat better. In season they might be assigned the relative comfort of boat or barge, though sometimes a good reason lay behind the kindness. In 1490 the Russian envoy, Jurij Trachaniot, returned from the West accompanied by Georg von Thurn, a Hapsburg emissary. Upon standing orders of the grand prince they made a well-provided journey from Pskov to Novgorod by boat. The instructions called for Trachaniot to hasten to Moscow by horse-drawn vehicle. Von Thurn was to continue his river journey along the Msta, the Tverca and the Volga as far as $o$a6162. Only then could he and his party move on to Moscow by overland jams. In this instance, the grand prince desired to talk with his returning ambassador before von Thurn put in his appearance. Comfort rather than excuse prompted the decision to send the Mazovian ambassador homeward in the spring of 1493 by boat along the same route63. The clerks in the capital charged with the formulation of the road documents paid close attention to the number of passengers involved on a mission and the goods neces­ sary to transport. They calculated the number of conveyances needed for handlers and supplies, and estimated the food and fodder required for the journey. The occasional similarities in menus for different missions along the same routes arouse a suspicion that check lists existed, and the clerks only varied the quantities of provisions depending upon the number of travelers. They were also aware of dietary differences between Christians and Moslems. Christian envoys could be provided with alcoholic beverages but never Mohammedans. Similarly, they never offered ham to a Tatar. Fish were to be provided Christians on meatless days, when available. The dispatching officer in Moscow armed the overseer [pristav] assigned to conduct official parties within the confines of Muscovy with necessary letters, instructions, and requisitions so that he might obtain clearances to travel through the provinces and obtain some supplemental provisions enumerated in the travel document. On the voyage of the Mazovian envoy in 1493, the road document for the land leg of the trip called for seven wagons for the ambassador and his servants and two for the overseer, Elka the scribe. At each night’s stop at a convenient jam , Elka was to supply a sheep’s carcass, presumably roasted, three roosters, four parts of ham, thirty eggs, a bowl of cream, rolls and bread. Flour and bread were available without measure. They were to be fed fish on meatless days, when obtainable. An instruction in the document enjoined the overseer to take back the sheepskin whenever he served mutton to his charges64. This was a general practice, followed in all such instances. Presumably the overseer surrendered the skin over to an agent of the treasury or of the steward’s office when he rendered an account of his expenditures. Distinguished envoys received wine and the more heady mead as part of their rations on the road. Since such luxuries were not found in larders at country jams, they had to

Eg. SIRIO vol. 35, p. 101; vol. 41, p. 132; PDS vol. 1, col. 125. PDS vol. 1, cols. 24- 25. SIRIO vol. 35, p. 93. Ibidem. A low ranking Muscovite mission, using the same road in 1503, received the same items of provisions, but in different quantities.

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come from the wine cellars in Novgorod or M oscow65. Tatars received milk as their beverage66, whether mare’s or cow’s is not indicated. Within Moscow’s Kremlin, under the jurisdiction of the state postmaster [jamskij d ’ja k ] 67, knowledgeable clerks and scribes kept up-to-date information on the routes to be used by native and foreign official travelers. They also kept abreast of informa­ tion of conditions beyond the frontiers so that they might direct outgoing missions along relatively safe roads. They knew of existing inventories to be found at the post stations and the availability of transportation—horses, wagons, sani and boats —for the use of envoys. And they exhibited considerable knowledge of what should be provided for foreigners. Many overseers, who went as guides and master provisioned, were drawn from the pool of literate scribes and clerks. Some would later serve as envoys in their own right. Ivan Bersen BeklemiSev, whose father Nikita had been a state secretary68, who would himself become an envoy to the Crimea ( 1502, 1503) 69, served in his earlier career as a pristav ( 1493) 70. The clerk Timocha was an overseer in 1499 71. Kult Oksent’e v 72, Elka Sergeev73, Tretjak Gubin74, and JuSka75, all clerks, received occasional assignments as overseers for outgoing missions. The majority of these, as these select illustrations make clear, were not of the aristocracy, but much as the aristocracy in service, they too were called upon to serve in a variety of courtdesignated function. Administrative procedures, undoubtedly formulated in the later fifteenth century, de­ manded that a letter should be addressed to the governor of each major province or town through whose area of jurisdiction the party traveled. Each, written in the name of Ivan III, indicated the nature of the mission, the composition of the party, instruc­ tions for maintenance, and orders to place at the party’s disposal whatever was needed for the next stage of the journey. When a group went through Novgorod the Great, as did most diplomatic missions moving to or from western destinations, a letter would sometimes be included for the Novgorodian dvoreckij, administrator of the properties

PDS vol. 1, cols. 25, 124. O learius Moskowitisdie und Persische Reise p. 89, noted that “Walnüsse und Wein findet man nicht in der Muskow; der Wein aber, von alferhand Art, wird häufig durch holländische und andere Schiffe über Archangelsk und nunmehr auch von Astrachan, woselbst er itzo gebaut wird, dahin gebracht.” In the fifteenth century, wine was acquired in N ovgorod via the Baltic trade. See A. L. C horo $kevi£ Torgovlja Velikogo Novgoroda s Pribaltikoj i Zapadnoj Evropoj v X IV —XV vekach. Moscow 1962, pp. 33Ö ff. 66 S IR IO vol. 41, p. 511. .. .. 67 A. A. Z imin Reformy Ivana Groznogo. 0£erki social’no-ékonomiceskoj i politiceskoj istorii Rossii serediny XV I veka. Moscow 1960, p. 182. The first mention of a jamskij d*jak dates from 1490: T. S. Moklakov, a state secretary, received prim ary responsibility for conducting the state post. Cf. G urljand Jam skaja gonba p. 44 and note 3; see also A. A. Z imin O sloienii prikaznoj sistemy na Rusi pp. 164 — 176. 68 D R K p . 11. •• S IR IO vol. 41, p. 434 ff., p. 453 ff. 70 SIR IO vol. 35, p. 136. 71 Ibidem p.289. 72 SIR IO vol. 41, p. 292; PDS vol. 1, cols. 14ff. 78 PDS vol. 1, cols. 6 4 - 6 5 ; S IR IO vol. 35, p. 92 ff. 74 S IR IO vol. 35, pp. 80, 158, 410. 75 S IR IO vol. 41, pp. 81, 497, 538; PDS vol. 1, cols. 4 8 - 4 9 . 65

VIII 14

held in the grand prince’s personal domain. Enclosed directions told him to provide food and drink according to specified measures76. Instructions entrusted to the overseers ranged from the brief to the detailed. All were written as though dictated by the grand prince; however, one may easily doubt that Ivan III concerned himself with such trivial matters. Yet the form was important. It is traceable to an earlier age when a ruler of a small patrimony habitually concerned himself with petty detail; while this no longer applied, the form remained but took on new meaning. Nothing could be done of an official nature unless it flowed from grand princely decision. A new substance had replaced an older practical rationale. A letter in the spring of 1495, addressed to the governor of Brjansk in momentarily friendly Lithuania, illustrates this attention to minutiae. Having acquired the prior consent of the Lithuanian ruler, Ivan III notified the governor that he was to welcome a Muscovite party of fifty-eight persons en route to the Crimea. This circuitous route was necessary, he explained, in view of the activity of hostile Tatars along the more direct roads traversing the steppe. In consequence, Ivan III asked the governor to facilitate the passage of the group of diplomats and merchants. The pristav conducting the mission was to send back a report to Moscow (a usual instruction) immediately after the party cleared Brjansk. The Brjansk governor was to assign an overseer from his own entourage who was familiar with the roads to the Crimea. Finally Ivan asked the governor to record the name of each person departing and to give the list to another Muscovite envoy who was to break off from the caravan and continue on to Kiev. Since an appendix to the papers of this mission identified the travelers by name, the governor of Brjansk and the pristav carried out the instructions77. Whenever official parties left Muscovite outposts, their last concern prior to departure was to replace incapacitated animals.. The overseer charged with caring for the com­ forts of the group had to find sound horses as replacements, leaving guarantees of future repayment. Discharge of these responsibilities had to be assigned to someone in the treasury. Diplomats and administrators found travel within Muscovy to be as safe as that found within the best protected areas of Europe. A Contarini could grumble about the quality of lodgings, but he was a grumbler by nature. Yet he too found travel in the Russian wilderness safer than he encountered on the steppe. N ot one foreign or Muscovite group of travelers recorded assaults upon the roads of Ivan I l l ’s realm. In contrast, Muscovite agents faced greater delays, dangers, and inconveniences abroad. In a report from Lübeck, Trachaniot complained that some unnamed individuals prevented his party from continuing to the court of King Maximilian and they had to wait for the protection o f a royal messenger78. An entry in the “Ioasafovskaja letopis” ( 1494) reveals that Muscovite merchants and diplomats were sadly misused by the Reval authorities. " . . . the same indignities were experienced by the envoys of the grand prince who were sent to Rome, and to Italy, and to the German lands; also the old merchants of Novgorod suffered many injuries. . .” 7#. Most hazardous of all was

76 77 76 76

SIR IO vol. 35, pp. 9 3 - 9 4 ; cf. PDS vol. 1 , col. 113. SIR IO vol. 41, pp. 2 1 5 -2 1 6 . PDS vol. 1 , cols. 6 2 - 6 3 . Ioasafovskaja letopii. Ed. A. A. Zimin. Moscow 1957, p. 189.

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travel on the southern steppe. The catalogue of assault, robbery, ransom and murder can easily be documented by examples from the Crimean papers. If the roads of Muscovy were safer, this does not imply that the eastern realm was more civilized than its neighbors. Insecurity and danger to life and property stood near to every inhabit­ ant, whether native or foreign. Enticed westerners, invited artisans and specialists, could not leave Muscovy without royal permission, which was frequently difficult to obtain. Woe to those unfortunate doctors who could not save their illustrious patients. Ivan III had at least two executed for failing to perform the desired miracles. On the other hand, the safety of travel along approved roads may suggest a higher degree of internal order or at least a better policed main road than could be found in the fifteenth century West. By the end of the fifteenth century the Muscovite government had established one of the best systems of internal communications to be found upon the European scene. In time the post service would extend along the main roads to every corner of the devel­ oping empire. Undoubtedly Ivan I l l ’s administrators took the Tatar system of the Mongol period as their model. It was well adapted to a limitless and relatively un­ populated plain and could only exist as a government operated monopoly. But if the Muscovites duplicated an Asian invented system of communications, they adopted it only at the time when it suited their needs. Had the model not existed, surely they would have invented something patterned to their own requirements.

IX

THE ADOPTION OF THE MUSCOVITE TWO-HEADED EAGLE: A DISCORDANT VIEW* I n the 1490’s the grand prince of Muscovy first adopted the two-headed eagle on a newly created state seal. The first extant seal (1497) is made of wax and is found attached to a treaty by a thin cord. On the reverse impression is a horse­ man, wielding a downward pointed spear. The tip of the spear is plunged into a winged dragon of rather snake-like proportions. On the reverse side is the twoheaded eagle. A radiate crown sits upon each of the heads-in-profile. A circular in­ scription surrounds each of these representations. On the obverse it reads: GRAND PRINCE IOAN BY GOD’S GRACE SOVEREIGN OF ALL RUS. The reverse legend would appear to be a continuation: AND GRAND PRINCE OF VLADfIMIR], AND MOSC[OW], AND NOVGOROD], AND PSK[OV], AND TVE[R], AND UGO[RA], AND VIAT[KA], AND PER[M], AND BOLfGAR].1 Both figures survived on the Muscovite and subsequently the Romanov coat-of-arms until the Russian Revolution. The eagle, however, became * A short version of this paper was read at the West Coast Slavic Conference, held 1 0 - 1 1 April 1965, at Claremont, California. 1 For a description of the seal, see Dukhomye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel'nykh kniazei X I V X V I m., ed. L. V. Cherepnin, hereafter cited as DDG (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), p. 575; a good copy (engraving, but not photograph) is found in the Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov khraniashchikhsia v gosudarstvennoi kottegii inostrannykh del, hereafter cited as SGGD, I (Moscow, 1813), p. 3 3 3 (see Plate I, No. 1 attached to this article); more accessible sketches may be found in E. I. Kamentseva and N. V. Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika i geral’dika (Moscow, 1963), p. 109; N. V. Vodovozov, Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury (Moscow, 1962), p. 190. The mounted horseman spearing the winged serpent will probably be identified as St George the Dragonslayer by those familiar with the iconography concerned with this saint. In the recent publica­ tion of the Istoriia russkogo iskusstva, II (Moscow, 1954), there are three Novgorodian icons of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries depicting the dragonslayer motif (pp. 133, 2 2 0 op., 235). The one facing p. 220 is extraordinarily close to the depiction on the 1497 seal in at least some of the details: the flowing cape of the rider, the placing of the horse’s left forefoot on a slightly higher plane than the right, and the winged serpent stretched beneath the full range of the horse’s body. However close the similarity, the horseman on the seal lacks the nimbus around the head of the rider. Further, in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rider is identified by contemporaries as the tsar. See Ka­ mentseva and Ustiugov, Ruskaia sfragistika, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 .

IX Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle

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more prominent from the sixteenth century, while the horseman motif diminished in size, often inset in a plaque on the eagle’s breast.2 This double-headed eagle has figured large in the theory of Byzantine influence upon Muscovy. Most recently, George Ostrogorsky stated in his excellent syn­ thesis of Byzantine history: Ivan III, the great liberator and consolidator of the Russian lands, married the daughter of the Despot Thomas Palaeologus, the niece of the last Emperor of Byzantium. He as­ sumed the imperial Byzantine two-headed eagle in his arms, introduced Byzantine cere­ monial into Muscovy and soon made Russia the leader of the Christian East as Byzantium had once been. Russia became the obvious heir of the Byzantine Empire and it took over from Constantinople Roman conceptions in their Byzantine form: if Constantinople was the New Rome, Moscow became the “Third Rome.” The great tradition of Byzantium, its faith, its political ideas, its spirituality, lived on through the centuries in the Russian Empire.3

In a much earlier, but recently republished, work Charles Diehl also stressed the role of the two-headed eagle as symbolizing the transference of the Byzantine religio-political inheritance.4* A considerable number of historians of Russia as well have pointed to the Byzantine origin of the double-headed eagle when discussing either the impact of the marriage of Sofia (Zoe) Palaeologus to Ivan III or the growth of ceremonial which accompanied the emergence of an independent Muscovite state in the second half of the fifteenth century.6*8 A t the turn of this century, V. I. Savva published a rebuttal to the theory of Sofia’s influence over Ivan and her supposed impact on the emergence of court titles and ceremonial. Savva’s views have had considerable effect at least upon some contemporary Russian historians.6 The most recent to subscribe to these doubts is J. L. I. Fennell: Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, pp. 1 1 2 ff. G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. J. Hussey (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1957), p. 509; cf. A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 2 nd ed. (Madison, 1952), p. 590; R. L. Wolff, ‘“The Three Romes: The Migration of an Ideology and the Making of an Autocrat,” Daedalus, l x x x v i i i (1959), 302-303. 4 C. Diehl, Byzantium, Greatness and Decline, trans. N. Walford (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1957), p. 295: But it was mainly through the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia, the last of the Palaeologi, in 1472, that Russia became the political heir of Byzantium. By taking the Byzantine double-headed eagle as the new arms of his kingdom, the Grand Prince of Moscow proclaimed himself the heir of the Greek Emperors and announced his intentions of making his capital succeed Byzantium, as Byzan­ tium had succeeded Rome. * E.g., N. M. Karamzin, Istariia gosudarstva Rossiiskago, ed. P. N. Polevoi, v (St Petersburg, 1892), 4 4 - 4 5 ; V. 0. Kliuchevskii, Kurs russkoi istorii in Sochineniia, u (Moscow, 1957), 123-124; N. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York, 1963), p. 117; B. H. Sumner, A Short History of Russia (New York, 1949), p. 79; Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, pp. 109-110. 8 V. I. Savva, Moskovskie tsari i vizantiiskie vasilevsy. K voprosu o vlianii Vizantii na obrazooanie idei tsarskoi dasti moskovskikh gosudarei (Kharkov, 1901). The thesis of the volume was ably summarized and reviewed by Roth in Byzantinische Zeitschrift, xii (1903), 328-333. For the effect of Savva’s views, see G. Vernadsky, Russia at the Dawn of the Modem Age (London, New Haven, 1959), pp. 25-26; D. Obolensky, “Russia's Byzantine Heritage,” Readings in Russian History, ed. S. Harcave, I (New York, 1962), 102-103. 3 3

IX

Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle

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Many of the changes, such as the adoption of the Byzantine emblem of the two-headed eagle on the grand prince’s seal and the institution of certain high offices of high court functionaries did not take place until a quarter of a century after her arrival;. . . some of the innovations . . . bear a faint resemblance to the previous court ceremonial of Con­ stantinople. Indeed, following Savva, Fennell puts forth the interesting suggestion that the growth of a court ceremonial and rich trappings evolved only after Muscovite rulers had developed contacts with western courts and conceived a desire to emulate them .7 The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the two-headed eagle as a device on the M uscovite coat-of-arms came into being as a reaction to some of the diplo­ matic maneuvering of the Hapsburg rulers and their emissaries. In sum, the M uscovite grand prince, discovering that the Holy Roman Emperor utilized the two-headed eagle on his state seal, while his son and designated successor could only display a single-headed one, replied by adopting a similar device for his own. While the original documents are no longer extant, I shall nonetheless suggest that seals embodying the new device were appended to the letters sent by Ivan III to the Hapsburgs and that they had also been attached to the treaty made with King Maximilian, son of the emperor. This was but one means by which Ivan asserted his equality with Frederick III. Implicitly this intimates that Ivan III accepted the Byzantine inheritance, though he did not do much else to push the claim in theory or in deed. In order to develop this thesis, it is necessary to examine two pertinent areas of information. The first concerns the opening of diplomatic relations with the states to the west of Muscovy. Quite early in the diplomatic pourparlers Ivan III as­ serted his equality with the Hapsburg emperor. Sensitivity with regard to his imperial rank antedates direct contact, but there appears to be little doubt about Ivan’s desire to communicate the equivalence of his position immediately after the opening of negotiations. A second area of evidence examined in this paper concerns the evolution of seals belonging to the Muscovite grand princes until the appearance of the double-headed eagle. The story of the opening of relations between the Hapsburgs and Moscow has been sufficiently examined to make it familiar to students of the period.8 Almost all that is known of the diplomacy between the Austrian archducal house and M uscovy comes from the Russian diplomatic papers.789 Unfortunately, the Haus7 J. L. I. Fennell, Ivan the Great of Moscow (London-New York, 1961), pp. 319-820. Savva, Moskovskie tsari, pp. 196 ff., 243 ff., 269. 8 See, for example, P. Karge, “ Kaiser Friedrich’s III. und Maximilian’s I. Ungarische Politik und ihre Beziehungen zu Moskau, 1486-1506,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, ix/1 (1893), 259-287; Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, III (Book V), 134-140; Fennell, Ivan the Great, pp. 117-131; F. von Adelung, Kritisch-Literärische Übersicht der Reisenden in Russland bis 1700, I (St Petersburg, 1846), 149-160; Ocherki istorii SSSR; Period feodalizma I X - X V vv., II (Moscow, 1953), 328-329; K. B. Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva vtoraia polovina X V veka (Moscow, 1952), pp. 255-281. • Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Rossii s derzhavami inostrannymi, hereafter cited as PDS, I (St Petersburg, 1851).

IX Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle

4

Hof- and Staatsarchiv holdings are virtually useless, in that only copies of the Hapsburg-Moscow treaty of the early 1490’s have been preserved. The fuller register of the diplomatic accounts in that depository dates only from the early sixteenth century.10 By 1480 a number of eastern and central European countries — Hungary, Moldavia, and the Holy Roman Empire — recognized Muscovy as a desirable potential ally. At various times, each tried to forge a coalition against the Polish dynasty of the Jagiellons, which attempted to extend its influence over Hungary, Bohemia, and Moldavia. The Hapsburgs desired not only to prevent the creation of a giant Jagiellon confederation, but also endeavored to extend their own con­ trol over Bohemia and Hungary. Ivan I l l ’s reaction to proffered offers of alliances was extremely cautious and predicated on self-interest. He too desired allies, also against the Jagiellons of Poland-Lithuania, since he coveted those lands of ancient Kiev now in the possession of his western neighbors. Despite vows of friendship, promises of reciprocal aid against common enemies, and the resultant formal alliances, Muscovy played virtually no role in the out­ come of the political and military affairs on the western fringes of Eastern Europe. Alternatively, the western allies provided no aid in the Muscovite wars with Poland-Lithuania at the end of the century. If the primary purposes of the negotiations wrere not realized, there were some important by-products. Through their envoys, the central European rulers learned of the extent and power of Muscovy, which persuaded them to explore further the possibilities of utilizing this eastern power as a counterpoise against the Jagiellons and also against the Turks. For the Muscovite court, the consequences of eastern Russia’s long isolation from the West had become clearer, at least in the technical realms.

First at the Council of Florence (1438-39), then in the time of negotiations for Ivan I l l ’s marriage with Zoe Palaeologus, Russians learned something of the ma­ terial wonders of Italy. Even before that celebrated marriage, skilled Italians ap­ peared to have been encouraged, if not enticed, to come to Moscow. Italians in the employ of Ivan III had acted as the negotiators for the marriage, beginning as early as 1468. Shortly thereafter Ivan learned that his principal Italian agent, Gian Battista della Volpe, served not only him but the Venetian government as well. For this della Volpe received a sentence of life imprisonment and lost all of his accumulated wealth.11 On the next mission to Italy (1474-75) charged with seeking artisans and architects for service in Moscow, Ivan sent a Russian, Semen Tolbuzin, as his principal agent; thereafter, however, he employed resident Greeks for such purposes.12Possibly to train native Russians in the arts of diplo­ macy and the mysteries of foreign languages, but also to guard himself against duplicity such as della Volpe had practiced, the Muscovite court sent a Russian along as junior ambassador. In all such instances the attached Russians were Karge, “ Kaiser Friedrich’s III . . . ” Deutsche Zeitschrift fü r Geschichtswissenschaft, i x / 1 , 264. Vernadsky, Daum, pp. 18-22; Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, hereafter cited as PSRLt xxv (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949), 299. 12 P. Pierling, La Russie etVOrient (Paris, 1891), pp. 124 ff. 10

11

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low-ranking functionaries of the court. Ivan followed this pattern on the missions sent to the Empire. A versatile Greek, Iurii (George) Trakhaniotes, served as the principal negotiator and a junior-ranking Russian always accompanied him.18 In contrast, Ivan III always sent Russians as emissaries to Moldavia, Lithuania, and Hungary. The pattern illustrates the recognition in Moscow for the need to send more ex­ perienced bargainers to the more advanced areas of the West; it may also show greater Muscovite respect for the Empire and Italy. This, in turn, hints at a corollary: namely, a greater willingness to learn from these more advanced areas. Thus, notwithstanding the religious and culturally nurtured mistrust that had evolved over centuries, the M uscovite court evinced a readiness to learn about and to adopt western practices, provided — of course — that these did not violate the canons and customs of religion and conduct. Architects, brickmakers and layers, cannon masters, goldsmiths and silversmiths, miners skilled in the dis­ covery and exploitation of precious ores, and physicians were in great demand. Even the prospect of a marriage alliance between one of Ivan’s daughters and the King of the Romans, which ultimately came to naught, engaged the active interest of Ivan III. The difficulties and alarms raised by a mixed marriage with a Latin did not create as much objection as did the proposed alternative bridegroom of a prince or margrave of the Empire.11*14 Ivan wanted only the son of the emperor for his daughter, though within his realm he had little objection to a second daughter, marrying one of his subject princes.15 Ivan’s insistence on equality of rank with Frederick III was but another manifestation of the same urge that led him to ape the imperial ritual in the reception of Hapsburg ambassadors. The shaping of these attitudes may be seen in the earliest records of diplomatic nego­ tiations with the Empire.

The first Austrian envoy to Muscovy, a knight name Nicholas Poppel (or Popplau), arrived there late in 1486. According to his own admission, he came out of a traveller’s curiosity, yet he carried a letter from the emperor attesting to his quasiofficial purpose. Though the Muscovites were unduly suspicious of his ex­ planation, Poppel had in fact spent the preceding three years in similar missions, touring many princely and royal courts of Europe.16Immediately upon his return from Moscow in the spring of 1487, he sought out the emperor at Nuremberg to report on his visit. Muscovy had impressed him greatly as a powerful state not tributary to the enemy Poles, as had apparently been the impression at the im­ perial court. The deteriorating situation in the area contested by Hapsburgs and Jagiellons prompted Frederick to send Poppel again to Moscow, this time as a

See, for example, PDS, I, col. 19. m PD S, I, cols. 31, 41, 44-45. 18 Drevneishaia Razriadnaia Kniga offitsiaVnoi redaktsii (po 1565 g.), ed. P. N. Miliukov (Moscow, 1901), pp. 9-10; P SR L , viii (St Petersburg, 1859), 238. 18 Karge, “ Kaiser Friedrich’s III, . . . ” Deutsche Zeitschrift fü r Geschicktsvnssenschafl, ix/1, 265; Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika, pp. 256-258; Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, h i (Book V), 134-135; Fennell, Ivan the Great, pp. 118-119. 11

IX 6

Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle

fully accredited ambassador. He left Ulm late in December 1488 with instruc­ tions to lay a foundation for an alliance aimed against the Jagiellons. On his second visit Poppel met with increasing difficulties, many of his own making; by the time he left, he had alienated the important courtiers and even the grand prince. He began with a request for a private audience with the grand prince. This was refused on the grounds that the boyars of the duma had to be present. He followed this with a proposal that Ivan allow one of his daughters to marry a nephew of Frederick III, the Margrave of Baden. Then Poppel trans­ mitted a complaint from the Livonian grand master against alleged Pskovian en­ croachment on the territories of the Order. He claimed the right to do this, since he was the imperial representative and Livonia came under the jurisdiction of the emperor. Subsequently, he asked to see Ivan’s daughter so that he could include an evaluation of her in his report. Poppel culminated his series of ineptitudes in a private audience that Ivan finally allowed to him. At this confrontation, Poppel claimed that he had heard that Ivan sometime earlier had petitioned the pope to grant him a kingship. Never realizing his blunder, Poppel plunged on recklessly. He indicated that popes had jurisdiction only in matters clerical, whereas the emperor alone had the power to grant such requests. Hence, Ivan might petition Frederick for a crown. In any event, cautioned Poppel, Ivan should take care not to let the Poles hear of this, for they feared the impact this might have upon the Orthodox inhabitants living in the eastern part of their realm. B y the time of his departure, the boyars of the council had become duly in­ censed by Poppel’s condescension and poor taste. While the envoy’s approach may have had success at courts of western princelings, he hardly understood the situation in Muscovy, nor did he even scent the ferment then brewing within the Kremlin regarding the aura of pomp that was to reflect the might of the ruler, in the same way the Tatar retreat of 1480 had elevated his prestige, and the new edifices in the citadel added to his glory. As Ivan had spurned the initial request for a private audience, so too did he brush aside the suggestion of a marriage contract between his daughter and a mere nephew of the emperor. The complaint of the Livonian grand master similarly received a summary rejection. The Pskovian frontiers will remain as of old. Nor was Ivan disposed to display his daughter for inspection to this in­ sufferable busybody. The iceburg of fury, kept submerged by the civility de­ manded in diplomacy, emerged a bit more in the response given to the suggestion that Ivan seek a royal crown by petitioning the emperor. “We, by God’s grace, have been sovereigns in our lands from time immemorial, from the time of our earliest ancestors.” The power to rule in M uscovy derived from God and not from the hands of men.17 Ivan let it be known that he would send his own envoy to treat with Poppel’s master.18 Poppel departed knowing full well that he had failed in his mission, but he 17 PDS, I, cols. 1-14; Fennell, Ivan the Great, pp. 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 ; Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, m (Book V), 134-186. Bazilevich (Vneshniaia politika, p. 262) believed that Frederick’s principal purpose in send­ ing Poppel to Moscow was to offer Ivan III a royal crown. 18 PDS, I, cols. 8-9.

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Adoption of the Muscovite Two-Headed Eagle

7

stubbornly refused to admit his faults, in addition to his ignorance, in dealing with this non-western court. Subsequently, he petulantly complained in a letter that the members of Ivan’s court had questioned his credentials and had slandered him with rumors.19 He had left behind a deeper impression than he realized. In suggesting the hand of a margrave for Ivan’s daughter, he furthered crystallization of Muscovite policy with regard to whom sons and daughters of the grand prince could marry among the royal houses to the West. Consultation presumably took place with members of the duma. In any event, Ivan decided that only reigning monarchs or their immediate issue could qualify. This conformed with a precedent of 1483 when he allowed his eldest son, Ivan Ivanovich, to marry the daughter of Stephen of Moldavia. Subsequent to this, in 1495, Ivan’s daughter Elena married Grand Prince Alexander of Lithuania. As for the Hapsburgs, only Frederick’s son Maxi­ milian was deemed qualified. Implicit in this last decision was the equality assumed by Ivan with the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire. This received oblique emphasis in the instructions im­ parted to Iurii Trakhaniotes on the eve of his departure as emissary to the court of Frederick III in March 1489. Ivan informed Iurii that if the issue of marriage be­ tween his daughter and the margrave should be raised, he was to reply: this “is not fitting, for our lord is a great sovereign over many lands.” Should the Hapsburg ruler persist, Iurii was still to reply in the negative and to deliver the clinch­ ing reserve argument. The M uscovite rulers were descended from an ancient house. Though not spelled out, Ivan meant to convey that he could claim a more ancient lineage than the Hapsburgs. Moreover, he instructed Iurii to make the point a bit more sharply by taking another tack: the rulers of Rus had lived for many generations in brotherhood and friendship with the former emperors “who gave Rome to the popes and themselves lived in Byzantium.” To the very end of the empire’s existence, even Ivan I l l ’s father, Vasilii II, had lived “in brother­ hood, friendship, and love” with the emperors. Further, Ivan I l l ’s aunt had married an emperor, John Palaeologus. “How could such a Great Sovereign hand over his daughter to that margrave?” If, however, the Hapsburg ruler desired to arrange a marriage contract for his son, then let him send a special envoy to Moscow for further conversations.20 In the instructions given Trakhaniotes, Ivan omitted any reference to his own union with a princess of the family of Palaeologus. Seemingly, he could have strengthened his case by citing this latest example of close relations with the for­ mer ruling house of Byzantium. At the time of his marriage (1472) he apparently toyed with the thought that the alliance conferred imperial status upon him. Just a year later, when the Pskovian envoys concluded a treaty with the Livonian " Ib id ., cols. 52 ff. ,0 Ibid., col. 17; see also Fennell, Ivan the Great, p.

1 2 2 . For evidence concerning the very late appear­ ance on the Russian scene of the spurious Donation of Constantine, see N. K. Gudzy, History of Early Russian Literature, trans. by S. W. Jones (New York, 1949), pp. 288-292; A. N. Pypin, Istoriia russkoi literatury, I (St Petersburg, 1911), pp. 341-344; D. Ciievskij, History of Russian Literature from the Eleventh Century to the End of the Baroque (The Hague, 1960), pp. 203-204.

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Order, after threats of Muscovite intervention, the Pskovian version of the docu­ ment began with “Our sovereigns, the orthodox Grand Princes and Tsars, Ivan Vasil’evich, and his son Ivan Ivanovich. . . . ”21 In an armistice agreement be­ tween Ivan III and the Livonian grand master, von der Borch, signed on 1 September 1482, the same formula appeared.22 Two years later Ivan III also addressed a letter to a Jew of Caffa, named Zakharii Skar’e, asking that the latter enter his service. Neither the contents of the letter nor any subsequent investiga­ tion has uncovered the reason for the mysterious invitation. But there is no doubt that Ivan intended to impress Zakharii both with a gold seal attached by silk cord to the letter and by its grandiose salutation : By the Grace of God, the Great Sovereign of the Russian lands. Grand Prince Ivan Vasil’evich, Tsar of all Rus, Vladimir, Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Iugorsk, Viatka, Perm, etc., to Zakharii the Hebrew.23

In sum, Ivan III had begun to play with the title of tsar even before the selfproclaimed liberation from the Tatar yoke.24

If Ivan did not disown his imperial pretentions in the sixteen years that elapsed prior to his sending Trakhaniotes as his envoy to the Hapsburgs, why did he neglect to mention Sofia as his link with Byzantium? His caution in the utilization of the title, employing it only with inferiors, such as a mysterious Jew and the head of the Livonian Order, may suggest a fear at being rebuffed by the more prestigious powers. Then, too, the silence over the marriage to Sofia may have mirrored a temporary shift in Ivan’s conception of the Muscovite tsardom. The victory of 1480 over the Sarai khan led to the proclamation of independence and hence to a co-equality of status. In consequence, the imperial tie through Sofia may not have been deemed as pivotal as it had prior to 1480. In the light of such general concerns, the offer of a marital alliance through Ivan’s daughter and “that margrave” resulted in the summary rebuff. The silence concerning Ivan’s marriage to Sofia would fit this interpretation. Sofia, though a Palaeologus, was not the daughter of an emperor, not even of a reigning monarch, but an orphan who had been a papal ward. There was an unwillingness to admit that this alliance created a new relationship that of itself enhanced the prestige of the grand prince. There was still another residual effect of Poppel’s proposals in Moscow. The in­ sult of a suggestion of a kingship had cut deeply. In addition, Poppel had made 21 Akty otnosiashchiesia kistorii Zapadnoi Rossii, I (St Petersburg, 1846), No. 69; Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, III (Book V), 128-129. H. Schaeder (Moskau, das dritte Rom., 2nd ed. [Darmstadt, 1957], p. 54) has pointed out that in 1473 the title of tsar was used in an exploratory and cautious manner (“im kleinen ausprobiert”). 22 Sbornik Mukhanova (Moscow, 1836), No. 27, p. 39: Po Bozhei voli i po Velikikli Gosudarei veleniiu Tsarei Russkikh, Velikogo Kniazia Ivana Vasil’evicha vseia Rusi, i syna svoego, Vclikogo Kniazia Ivana Ivanovicha vseia Rusi . . . 23 Sbornik Imperatorskago Russlcago istorichcskago obshchestva, hereafter cited as S IR 0 , XLI (St Petersburg, 1884), No. 1 0 , p. 41. 24 Cf. Kliuchevskii, Kurs russkoi istorii in Sochineniia, II, 123. The title of tsar was never used in the correspondence with the Poles or the Crimean Tatars. Only once did Ivan and his son, Vasilii III, sign themselves as tsars in negotiating with the Hapsburgs, and that was only to the son of the Em­ peror Maximilian (Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii, H I 145).

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Ivan III pointedly aware of the suzerainty of the emperor over the Baltic Ger­ mans, though this undoubtedly had been known in Moscow. Nevertheless, the grand masters of the German orders had always negotiated with the Russian states in their own names rather than in those of the emperors. Poppel had not known that since 1473 Ivan had let the Livonian Knights know that he and his son were to be considered as both grand princes and tsars. PoppePs unwitting faux pas did result in one alteration — minor, but signifi­ cant — in the title, making it conform a bit closer to western practice. On the very embassy leaving Moscow in March 1489, which included the departing Poppel and Iurii Trakhaniotes on his maiden ambassadorial voyage, Ivan III in­ structed the group to go via Reval, where they were to take ship to Lübeck or an­ other convenient north German port. An overseer (jyristav), in whose charge the group was placed to satisfy their wants until they reached Reval, carried a letter to the town authorities. In it Ivan asked that passage be procured for the mission destined for the court of the emperor. The letter to the Reval authorities began “loan, by God’s grace, Great Sovereign, Tsar of all Rus, Vladimir, Moscow, Nov­ gorod, Pskov, Tver, Iugora, Viatka, Perm, and Bolgar.”25 Ivan III showed re­ markable alacrity in announcing his equality with the emperor to the officials in the imperial towns in the lands of the Teutonic Order. No doubt Poppel learned of this while in Reval, for it was customary for local officials to entertain such im­ portant envoys during their sojourn. The very novelty of the title, in this first address to them, could not have escaped either the local administrators or Poppel. Frederick’s envoy must then have grasped something of the magnitude of his blunder in his private audience with the grand prince. For Ivan, however, this was more than a lesson in protocol. The utilization of the form loan, rather than the customary Ivan Vasil’evich, was not merely an adaption from a Church Slavic form, coincidental as this may be;26it sprang from a desire to conform to the practices employed by other European monarchs. Were it merely a propensity for a more ancient form of Ivan, the grand prince could have resorted to the name of loan (or Ioann) Vasil’evich, not the stark Christian name without patronymic. Secondly, the stringing together of the names of lands possessed by the ruler after his titles mirrored a western practice of some standing. A state seal belonging to Emperor Sigismund may be taken as an illustration. It contained the following circular inscription: SIGISMVNDVS . D E I . GRACIA . ROMANORVM . IMPERATOR . SEMPER . AVGVSTVS . AC . HVNGARIE . BOHEMIE . DALMACIE . CROACIE . RAME . SERVIE . GALICIE . LODOMERIE . CVMANIE . BVLGARIE . REX . ET . LVCEMBVRGENSIS . HERES.27 In form, the Muscovite and Hapsburg titles show con* PDS, I, col. 2 2 . 28 This was Kliuchevskii’s contention (Kurs russkoi istorii in Sochineniia, II, 123-124), but compare the more traditional Church Slavic form on an inscription, in both Latin and Russian, dated in 1491, and found on the Kremlin Tower of the Savior: Ioann Vasilevich, bozhiei milost’iu velikii kniaz’ Vladimirskii, moskovskii, novgorodskii, tverskoi, pskovskii, viatskii, ugorskii, permskii, bolgarskii i inykh i vseia Rossii gosudar’, v leto 30 svoego sii bashni povelel postroit’, a délai Petr Antonii Solarii, Mediolanets, v leto ot voploshcheniia gospodinia 1491. KMP (Istoriia russkogo iskusstva. III, 310). 27 O. Posse, Die Siegel der deutschen Kaiser und Könige von 761 bis 1806, II (Dresden, 1910), Plate 17, Nos. 1 & 2 (see appended Plate I, No. 2 ).

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siderable similarity, not because the former borrowed from the latter, but because the practice was widespread in the West. An examination of the salutations found in the earlier fifteenth-century treaties indicates that this style penetrated from Lithuania.28 It was not used by Muscovite rulers in their agreements with neighboring independent Russian princes. Possibly the grandiose use of titles by Ivan III with foreign courts began in response to the initiation of diplomatic intercourse by Stephen, Hospodar’ of Moldavia in 1480 and Matthais Corvinus of Hungary in 1482.29 There is sufficient collateral evidence to show that Ivan III borrowed practices when they suited his purpose. This is demonstrated by the Muscovite copies of Hungarian gold coins and in the borrowing of Hapsburg protocol in the reception of western ambassadors. The Hermitage numismatic collection contains the only extant specimen of an issue of gold coins struck in the reign of Ivan III. This series contained an exact duplication of the representations found on fifteenth-century Hungarian gold coins. The obverse representation is that of St Vladislav, complete with nimbus, sceptre in right hand, and a cross-surmounted orb in the left. On the reverse is a Hungarian coat-of-arms. Numismatists, with good reason, assume that coins of this type were not intended for internal circulation, but for payment to foreign artisans enticed to Moscow and therefore paid in a currency and metal that was both transportable and negotiable in the West. But the Russian gold coins were not minted in an attempt to mislead by imitation; the names of Ivan III and his co-opted son Ivan appear in the circular inscriptions found on both sides of the coin.30 If the coin evidence suggests a lack of reticence in the M uscovite willing­ ness to accept some western practices, the attitude towards duplicating some aspects of court ceremonial reenforces this contention. 28 The first time a Russian prince of the northeast acknowledged the long title to a prince outside the region took place in 1427. In a treaty between Boris Aleksandrovich of Tver and Vitovt of Lithuania, Boris saluted Vitovt as “ Velikii kniaz’ Vitovt litov’skii i mnogikh Rus’skikh zeml’ gospodarem” (DDG, No. 23, p. 62). The first time a prince of Moscow employed the expanded title for himself took place in 1449, in a treaty between Vasilii II and Casimir, King of Poland and Grand Prince of Lithu­ ania. Vasilii called himself “kniaz’ velikii Vasilei Vasil'evich, moskovskii, i novgorodskii, i rostovskii i permskii, i inykh” (Ibid., No. 53, p. ICO). Significantly, these elaborate titles did not supersede the short identifications common in the princely treaties of northeastern Rus, whereas the Lithuanian rulers made consistent use of them. See Akty, otnosiashcshiesia k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii, I (St Petersburg, 1846), p. 7 (1415): “ Vitovt, velikii kniaz’ Litovskii, Ruskii, Zhomoitskii” ; p. 1 1 (1430): “Milost’iu Bozheiu, my velikii kniaz’ Shvitrikail, Litovskii, Russkii i inykh” ; see also pp. 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 27. 29 Fennell, Ivan the Great, p. 1 1 2 ; Bazilevich, Vneshniaia politika, pp. 246 ff. 30 I. G. Spasskii, “ ‘Zolotye’—voinskie nagrady v dopetrovskoi Rusi,” Trudy gosudarstvennogo ermitazha, IV (Leningrad, 1961), p. 95; idem, Russkaia monetnaia systema, 3rd ed. (Leningrad, 1962), p. 97. Spasskii’s speculation (Trudy, IV, 95-96) that gold coins of the Muscovite type were distributed to those honored for military exploits appear to have no foundation in the sources. No gold coins of this variety exist for the period. It is just as probable that the gold coins of the Hungarian type (“ ugorskie”) were utilized for this purpose.

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In the summer of 1490, Iurii Trakhaniotes arrived in Novgorod on his trip from the West. He brought with him an envoy from King Maximilian, Georg von Thurn, who is identified in the Russian diplomatic papers as Iurii Delator (from the Italian, della Torre).31 Apparently the unwordly Muscovites did not know the opprobrium attached to this phonetic Russian rendering of von Thurn’s Italian­ ized name, though we may guess that the diplomat may have writhed within. Delatôre in Italian means informer or denouncer. Ivan III had awaited the return of his envoy with impatience. While the issue for the Hapsburgs was a military alliance, the grand prince at the moment was more concerned with the nature of the reception accorded to his envoy in the West. How Trakhaniotes was received would indicate to Ivan in what regard he was held by the emperor. Impatience and curiosity are reflected in the instruc­ tions Ivan III had sent to his Novgorodian senior governor. Directly upon his ar­ rival in that western Russian city, Trakhaniotes was to speed directly to Moscow by horse-drawn vehicle. Ivan ordered that the Austrian envoy be sent by boat along the water route, via the upper Volga, then by appropriate tributaries on the slow route to the capital. As von Thurn journeyed leisurely to Moscow, Tra­ khaniotes had arrived and received an immediate audience with the grand prince. Ivan queried him closely about his reception by the Hapsburgs. Trakhaniotes re­ ported that both Frederick and Maximilian had accorded him great honor. At the court of the King of the Romans, Maximilian had come forward three or four steps and greeted Iurii with a handshake. Prior to the formal portion of the inter­ view, the king ordered a bench to be brought for Iurii, bade him sit opposite the throne, and only then seated himself. When Iurii subsequently journeyed to the emperor’s court, Frederick despatched some court functionaries to meet Tra­ khaniotes, five to six kilometers from the city, who conducted him to the palace. The closer Trakhaniotes drew to the imperial audience chamber, the greater be­ came the functionaries assigned the ceremonial .function of ushering the ambas­ sador along. When the emperor greeted Iurii, he seated him in the same way as had his son Maximilian. Upon learning of this, Ivan III immediately sent out a messenger bearing gifts to meet and greet von Thurn along the water route. On the third day after the envoy had arrived in Moscow and had rested sufficiently, Ivan ordered a duma councillor of the second rank (the okoVnichii> Ivan Zvenets) and Trakhaniotes to conduct him to the audience. As they entered the stone hall, another team of courtiers took over the duties of ushering von Thurn to the doors of the small palace. There, a boyar and a state secretary conducted him into the audience chamber. Apparently this conformed precisely to the experience of Trakhaniotes in Germany. Ivan acted out his part in the same role his envoy attributed to the Hapsburgs at the western receptions: he rose from his throne, stepping off his footstool, inquiring about the health of the king (since von Thurn was Maxi­ milian’s envoy), and shook the ambassador’s hand while standing. He then n Karge, “ Kaiser Friedrich’s i n . . . , ” Deutsche Zeitschrift fü r Geschichtswissenschaft, IX /1, 269; PDS, I, col. 25.

X

Plate I

4

Plate II

X

4

IX

*o

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ordered th at von Thurn be seated on a bench placed opposite the throne, after which Ivan seated himself. All of this was acted out in the presence of the duma members.32 A number of indications, then, point to a M uscovite desire to express equality w ith western countries, m ost particularly w ith the imperial H apsburg court: the expansion and adjustm ents m ade in the grand princely title, the copying of ceremonial in the reception of ambassadors, the insistence th at only a son of the emperor was fit to marry a daughter of the grand prince.

To this list should be added the adoption of the two-headed eagle for the new Muscovite state seal. It would be erroneous to assume, however, that Ivan III had copied the Hapsburg device in the same manner that he had adopted the ceremonial for the reception of ambassadors from the West. Not only is the Muscovite two-headed eagle closer iconographically to the Byzantine, but there is also little doubt that Ivan III valued the link with the defunct universal Christian empire. The instructions given Trakhaniotes in 1489 clearly indicate that Ivan retained considerable pride in the close association enjoyed by his predecessors with Byzantium and that he continued to bask in the pleasure that his aunt Anna had been the first wife of John (VIII) Palaeologus. He may not have known, or conveniently forgot, that she never lived to become empress.33 In all probability, the adoption of the emblem of the two-headed eagle was intended to convey the idea that the ruler of Muscovy — with his growing pretentions to become master of all Rus — had a better claim to this late Roman insignia than did the Hapsburgs. This does not mean that Ivan claimed it as an inheritance through his marriage to Sofia. I contend that had the Muscovite court not learned that the 82 PDS, I, cols. 24-27. Cf. Savva, Moskovskie tsari, pp. 243-244. At the second audience granted to von Thurn the identical procedure was observed (PDS, I, col. 27). Thereafter the Muscovite court ob­ served the same ritual for the greeting of Hapsburg envoys and emissaries from other great western powers. Sigismund von Ilerberstein, an ambassador of Maximilian and later of Charles V and of the Archduke Ferdinand in the early sixteenth century, gave an amplified description of the ritual of greeting and audience, though he nowhere suggested that it compared with that in use at the Haps­ burg courts. (Sigismund von Herberstein, Commentaries on Muscovite A fa irs, ed. and trans. by O. P. Backus III [Lawrence, Kansas, 1956], pp. 141-143.) Thomas Randolph, envoy of Elizabeth I of England in 1568, described how he was ushered into the presence of Ivan IV and conducted to the middle of the audience chamber,

where I was willed to stand still and to say that which I had to say. I by my Interpreter opened with my message as I receiucd it from the Queene my Mistresse, from whom I came, at whose name the Emperour stood up and demaunded diuers questions of her health and state: wherevnto answere being made, he gaue me his hand in token of my welcome and caused me to sit downe, and further asked me diuers questions. Hakluyt Society. Works. First Series, No. 73, p. 247. Ambassadors from eastern powers were received in the eastern manner. Compare the description of the reception of the envoy of the Turkish Sultan Selim I in 1514. The ceremonial of conducting the envoy to the throne was somewhat similar to that accorded to western ambassadors, the envoy kissed the hand of Grand Prince Vasilii I II while he remained seated on his throne. N. P. Likhachev, Razriadnye d’iaJei X V I veka (St Petersburg, 1888), p. 59, note 9. 88 P SR L , xxv, 240; “Kniaz’ veliky Vasilei Dmitreevich otdast’ dscher’ svoiu kniazhnu Annu v Tsar’grad za tsarevicha Ivana Manuilovicha.” Anna was the first of three wives taken by John VIII Palaeologus. She died in 1418 before John became co-emperor (1421). F. I. Uspenskii, Istoriia vizantiiskoi imperii, III (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948), p. 767.

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western emperor utilized the two-headed eagle on his state seal (and that his son, the King of the Romans, bore a one-headed eagle as his mark of identification34), Ivan III would not have incorporated it on his official seal. Several pieces of evi­ dence support the contention that the Muscovite adoption of the imperial eagle sprang from its usage by the Hapsburgs. The first, concerned with a comparison of the state seal of Frederick III and that of Ivan III, is the more circumstantial and hence the weaker; the second will show that the two-headed of Ivan III was markedly different from any seal motif employed by Muscovite princes in the period prior to 1486. An imperial state seal of Frederick III, dated 5 July 1442, contains on the ob­ verse side an image of the enthroned emperor, holding orb in left hand and sceptre in the other; the reverse side contains the eagle. Each of the eagle’s heads has the identifying marks of a halo {Heiligenschein). The holy meaning of the halos is made clear by the circular inscription : AQVILA . EZECHIELIS . SPONSE [sic] . MISSA . EST . DE . CELIS . UOLAT . IPSA . SINE . META . QUO . NEC . UATES . NEC . PROPHETA . EUOLAUIT . ALCIUS . The eagle was sent to the betrothed of Ezechiel from heaven. This same [bird] flies without point of return where neither poetic seer nor prophet has flown higher.

Surrounding the obverse portrait of Frederick III is the inscription : SIGILLVM . MAIESTAS . F R ID E R IC I. D E I . GRA . ROMANORÜ . IMPERATORIS . SEMPER . AVGVSTI. DVCIS . AVSTRIE . STIRIE . KARINTHIE . ET . CARNIOLE . COMITIS . QUE . TIROLIS . ETC . Below this in a second circular ring is the statement: QUI NATVS EST IN DIE MATHÈI AP AN DNI MCCCCXV.36 The Russian state seal substituted the mounted horseman in the space oc­ cupied by the throning emperor on the Hapsburg device. Only the inscription giving title and lands came close to the Hapsburg form. The side containing the two-headed eagle is surrounded by a continuation of the obverse one, listing the lands controlled by the grand prince. The Russian eagle is markedly different in style, in the formation of the wings and the use of diadem crowns rather than Heiligenscheine. George Soulis has called my attention to a Morean church floor mosaic of the Palaeologian period from Mistra in which a two-headed eagle is rep­ resented with a crown set on each head, and with a larger one placed over the division of the necks.36 ** Roemer-BUchner, Die Siegel der deutschen Kaiser, Könige, und Gegenkönige (Frankfurt am Main, 1851), Nos. 85-87, pp. 58-59; J. W. Woodward and G. Burnett, A Treatise on Heraldry, British and Foreign, I (Edinburg and London, 1892), p. 253. » Posse, Die Siegel der deutschen Kaiser, II, Plate 25, figures 1 & 2 (see appended Plate I, No. 3; a clearer representation of the halos around the heads of the eagle can be seen on another seal of Frederick III: attached Plate I, No. 4; Posse, Plate 26, No. 4). » M. G. Soteriou, Mistra, 2 nd ed. (Athens, 1956), p. 1 2 , A. V. Solovjev, “Les emblèmes héraldiques

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Soulis is of the opinion, which I now share, that the prototype for the Russian eagle is Byzantine, specifically Morean. Further investigation will probably bear this out. Yet it should also be emphasized that the two-headed eagle had never been a coat-of-arms, in the western sense, of the imperial branch of the house of Palaeologus; it was never used in Constantinople in the same fashion as it would be in Moscow. Maclagan of Oxford submitted an interesting paper a decade ago at the Byzantine Congress in Istanbul, wherein he denied that the two-headed eagle, or another escutcheon, a cross with four B’s in the quadrants, were im­ perial coats-of-arms. “One docs not find these coats-of-arms on the seals, the money, or the tombs.” Nor were they used on the shields or tunics of the imperial guard in the manner prevalent in the West. Constantine X I’s guards did display the eagles on their boots.37If the two-headed eagle served as a coat-of-arms among the Palaeologian despots of the Morea, one of whom was the father of the future spouse of Ivan III,38 it came to Moscow probably in the possession of Sofia or among members of her suite. Yet Ivan did not adopt this Palaeologian insignia immediately after his marriage, but almost two decades later, after the opening of relations with the Hapsburgs. The earliest extant seal of Ivan I l l ’s with the eagle of two heads dates from 1497; the Hapsburg seal wTith this device could not have appeared in Moscow earlier than 1489.39 Since the first official utilization of the title of tsar, denoting de Byzance et les Slaves,” Seminarium Kondakovianum, vii (1035), 135, note 98, described this as Surtout la belle aigle à trois couronnes sur une plaque encastrée dans le pavement au milieu de la grande nef de la Métropole. 87 M . M aclag an , “ L e blason en B yzance,” Actes du X . Congrès International d'Études Byzantines (Ista n b u l, 1957), 230-231. F o r a review of th e h isto rio g rap h y on th e q uestio n , w h e th er B y za n tiu m h a d a co at-of-arm s in th e period of th e Palaeologi a n d w h eth er it was th e tw o -h ead ed eagle, see Solovjev, “ L es em blèm es h érald iq u es,” Seminarium, Kondakovianum, v u (1935), 119-122. I n th is o fte n im pressive s tu d y (119-164), Solovjev traces th e w andering of th e tw o -h ead ed eagle m o tif th ro u g h tim e a n d from th e N e a r E a s t th ro u g h E u ro p e. I n th e fo u rte e n th c e n tu ry th e dou b le-h ead ed eagle becam e p o p u la r a t th e c o u rt of th e Palaeologi, b u t n o t as a n im perial co at-o f-arm s. Solovjev (134) described a m in ia tu re found in th e L ouvre in w hich E m p ero r M an u el a n d his co -o p ted son, J o h n V III , w ear im perial p u rp le robes w ith o u t eagles, w hile th e y ou n g er sons, T h eo d o re a n d A n dronicus, a re c lothed in sca rle t robes, sprin k led w ith encircled golden double-head ed eagles. C oncluded S olovjev, “ C ’e st encore une preu v e de ce q ue les aigles é ta ie n t p lu tô t insignes des p rem iers d ig n itaires d e la cour, q u e d es arm es im périales.” 88 Ibid., p. 135: “ E nfin, M istra nous a conservé quelques belles aigles q ui d o iv e n t se ra p p o rte r au x d e rn iers d espotes T h o m as e t D ém étrois. Ces aigles couronnées o n t d é jà to u t a fa it la to u rn u re h érald io u e e t d o iv e n t être envisagées com m e blasons des d erniers despotes.” 88 This is based upon the assumption that Frederick’s letter accrediting Poppel in 1489 had attached to it the imperial state seal. Secondly, after that point, the septuagenarian Frederick III turned over the Muscovite negotiations to his son Maximilian. The Moscow grand princely diplomatic papers record that an agreement between Maximilian and Ivan III was reached in 1490-91. Iurii Trakhaniotes brought a copy of the treaty back with him to Moscow in the spring of 1491. According to the records, Maximilian’s copy “ with the gold seal” was deposited into the grand princely treasury (PDS, I, col. 6 6 ). Presuming that the seal was Maximilian’s, it could not have contained a two-headed eagle. As King of the Romans he was entitled only to the single-headed eagle. We are next informed that when Maximilian’s envoy, von Thurn, arrived in Moscow subsequently, in November 1491, he saluted Ivan III as “Tsar of all Rus” and as “Sole Tsar of all Rus” (ibid., cols. 73, 77). While this can be viewed as a diplomatic device by a royal envoy, in that Maximilian desperately desired that the Muscovite

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imperial pretentions, appeared in 1473, the question arises whether some clue could be found to suggest an earlier adoption of the eagle motif. The answer to this must remain in the negative, notwithstanding the knowledge that Ivan at­ tached a gold seal to his letter to Zacharii.40 Precisely what the images were on this now lost gold (or gilded) seal cannot be determined. To suggest that it con­ tained an image of the Palaeologus eagle would lead us back to the Sofia theory, which appears negated by the information gleaned from the diplomatic papers. Nor is it justified to tie in an appearance of the Byzantine eagle with the 1480 “victory” or an evolution of the Third Rome theory. The strongest evidence against the possibility of a two-headed eagle making its appearance on the gold seal sent to Zacharii the Hebrew are the seal motifs employed by Ivan III on the extant documents of the 1470’s and 1480’s, even as late as 1486. Until that ter­ minal date at least the grand prince utilized — what we shall term for the mo­ ment as — seals of the old type.41 Therefore a more than reasonable assumption exists that the changes on the state seal occurred at least between 1486 and 1497, but most probably in 1489-90. Wide variation characterized these seals of the “old type.” In Russia, as in most early, mediaeval, and modern states, seals of rulers verified treaties after they were attached. Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries the Russian princes and princelings who utilized seals did not trouble themselves with having their names carved or stamped on them. Since these seals customarily carried a representation of the prince’s patron saint, they can be identified, when cornarmy take the field, there was really no need to go this far, unless it had been known at the Hapsburg courts th at Ivan III had called himself tsar, and that it would be diplomatic at the moment to yield to the fancy of the grand prince. But where could this have been learned? Poppel, for one, could have in­ formed Frederick upon the return from his second visit of Ivan’s claim in the letter to the officials of Reval. Secondly, von Thum himself, having been to Moscow, could also have picked it up. More likely, however, Ivan had already employed the imperial two-headed eagle on the gold seal attached to his version of the proposed treaty he sent with Iurii Trakhaniotes in 1490. If Maximilian would ac­ cept the proposed terms, Trakhaniotes was to turn the document over to the king. Maximilian did accept Ivan I l l ’s terms and also the conditions of how the treaty was to be concluded (ibid., cols. 31-40). My hypothesis with regard to the chronology of events leading to the appearance of the Muscovite double-headed eagle is as follows: When Poppel returned to Moscow in 1489 as the accredited imperial ambassador, he brought with him an official document of identity, which had attached to it the state seal of Frederick III. Insulted by Poppel’s suggestion of a royal crown and a marital alliance between his daughter and an imperial subject, Ivan not only spurned these, but also ordered the fashioning of an imperial seal for himself. He chose a Byzantine model of a two-headed eagle, resembling the Hapsburgian in some respects, but endeavoring to make it plain that he too was an emperor. The new seal was attached to the treaty proposed to Maximilian. Had Maximilian refused to accept Moscow’s terms, which included recognition of the two-headed eagle emblem on the seal (asserting Moscow’s claim to co-equality with the empire), the proposed alliance would have fallen through. Maximilian accepted and instructed his envoy, von Thurn, on his return to Ivan i n ’s court, to be careful in acknowledging the imperial title of the grand prince. Thus, von Thurn’s saluting Ivan as tsar was more than a rhetorical expression or even a misconception of the meaning of the term. 40See above, p. 8 . This was not the first known gold seal utilized by a grand prince of Muscovy. See note 43 below. 4 1 SOGD, I, Nos. 123-126.

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pared with the names of princes who formulated the documents. By the four­ teenth century the system changed. Henceforth each prince usually commanded that his name and title be added to his seal.42 Seals belonging to princes of the Muscovite house reach back to the early four­ teenth century. The first extant one belonged to Grand Prince Ivan I (d. 1341). The earliest specimens, attached to the testaments of the senior princes of Mus­ covy, were made of gilded silver and struck in octagonal foim. The shape soon changed to round but remained of gilded silver when attached to grand princely testaments. This practice continued down through the time of the formulation of Vasilii I ’s first testament (about 1406); there are indications that the tradition of using gold-covered silver seals on testaments, with the image of the prince’s pa­ tron saint, continued into the middle of the fifteenth century.43 Seals in this same period appended to princely treaties, belonging to the members of the Muscovite house, were another matter. These were made of wax. The earliest known example dates from 1350-51 : an undecipherable seal of wax was attached to a treaty con­ cluded between Grand Prince Semen and his brothers, Ivan and Andrei. The first recognizable example of this type belonged to Maria Aleksandrovna, wife of Grand Prince Semen, who caused her seal to be attached to her husband’s testa­ ment. This singular development reflects the only occurrence when the wife of a Muscovite grand prince inherited her husband’s possessions. The seal was made by pressing a cameo or a carved gem stone, portraying the bust of a woman, into a globe of warm wax, that had been poured onto a silken cord. The cord was then attached to the document.44 Thereafter a variety of figures, decidedly non-Christian, most of which are classical in character and probably in origin, appeared on the personal seals of grand princes, their near relatives, and even as the identifications of lords of sur­ rounding non-Muscovite territories. All of these that have been found appended to treaties have been reproduced as engravings at the end of the documents pub­ lished in the “Collection of State Documents and Treaties.”46 According to the Soviet authors of a recent short survey of the history of sigillography and ° Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, pp. 69-78. u Ivan I: SGGD, I, pp. S3, 35 (see appended Plate I, no. 5); Semen: p. 38 (Plate I, No. 6 ); Ivan II: pp. 41, 43 (Plate I, No. 7 ); Dmitrii: pp. 51, 62 (Plate I, No. 8 ); Vasilii I: p. 74 (Plate I, No. 9). Vasilii IPs extant testaments (actually a single testament with an addendum, though it was counted as two in the seventeenth-century inventories) had wax seals attached. A testament known to have belonged to him, though no longer extant, had a gilded seal attached to it. In the 1614 inventory of documents found in the Moscow archives, the scribe described a delapidated will belonging to Vasilii II, which had a “gold” seal attached (Opisi Tsarskogo arkhiva i arkhiva PosoVskogo prikaza 16H g., ed. S. 0 . Shmidt [Moscow, 1960], p. 56). In the subsequent inventory of 1626, another scribe similarly mentioned the bad condition of this testament and indicated that the seal was not made of silver but of a baser metal covered with gilt. DDG, p. 465: 3 gramoty dukhovnye velikogo kniazia Vasil’ia Vasil’evicha, odna vetkha i podralas’, a u nei pechat zheleznaia, zolochena, . . . Both seal and testament disappeared at some time after the taking of the 1626 inventory. Whether Ivan III (d. 1505) and Vasilii III (d. 1533) continued the tradition cannot be determined. That belonging to Ivan I II is a later copy; Vasilii IITs will is not extant. « SGGD, I, No. 24, p. 38 (Plate II, No. 2 ). « SGGDf I.

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heraldry, these reproductions “were not notable for their great accuracy.” They do admit to the continuing difficulty in rendering accurate drawings of these.48 While these copies are not precise representations of the original seals, they are still far superior to their published descriptions. Cherepnin’s contribution in this regard, while useful, tends — however inadvertently — to mislead occasionally.4 0*47489 When a study of these seals will eventually be made from the originals or from their photographs, a new dimension will be added to our knowledge. Such an in­ quiry would benefit greatly if it were done in conjunction with a scholar versed in classical literature, numismatics, and sigillography.48 Some conclusions can, nevertheless, be drawn even from the published en­ gravings. Craftsmen in the Russian principalities made the master seals, utilizing antique gem stones, which they set into silver mountings. They cut the name of the owner of the seal into the mounting in reverse lettering. From what can be told by the published engravings, the carvings made into the precious or semi­ precious stones dated from antiquity.49 Some, presumably, were made of hard­ ened paste, since these too had wide currency in ancient times. The mounted horseman genre undoubtedly were of either western or perhaps Mediterranean origin ; one of the master seals, whose impressions are attached to two testaments of Vasilii I (about 1417 and 1423), appear to have been made of metal. The in­ dentations made upon the wax seals portray a warrior astride a galloping charger, wearing a conical headpiece (roughly similar in form to the headgear popular with peasants in southeastern Asia), with raised sword in right hand. This seal has erroneously been ascribed to Vasilii I, though it probably belonged to his fatherin-law, Grand Prince Vitovt of Lithuania.50According to Professor Panofsky, the 40 Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, p. 18. For a comparison of the representation of several of the seals found in the SGGD, I, see P. Ivanov, Sbornik snimkov s drevneishikh pechatei, prilozkennykh k gramotam i drugim iuridicheskim atkam, khraniashckimsia v Moskovskom Arkhive Ministerstva Iustitsii (Moscow, 1858), plates 1-3. Ivanov’s work is particularly useful as a yardstick for the popularity of gem-stone seals among members of the aristocracy and clergy well into the eigh­ teenth century. The representations of seals found in both Ivanov’s work and in the SGGD are sufficiently faithful to identify many of the origins and almost all of the motifs needed for this study. 47 DDG, pp. 567 ff. Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, pp. 82-83, utilized some of Cherepnin’s descriptions. 48 When I showed the illustrations of the princely seals to the late Professor Kantorowicz, he im­ mediately identified a number of them and guided me to the major catalogues of gem stones. A num­ ber of questions that arose in subsequent conversations have not yet been answered. Considerable re­ search must still be done before we can determine the points of origin of these stones, how they came to Moscow, and how their motifs were interpreted by their owners and viewers. Consequently, these and the subsequent Remarks about Russian seals of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are not in­ tended as a substitute for a systematic study. There are hundreds of seals for the period prior to Peter the Great’s time, attached to a wide variety of documents, belonging to grand and appanage princes, to magnates, landowners, and clerics. Even the seals belonging to members of the House of Moscow deserve a thorough treatment, which they have yet to receive. 49 Cf. Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, p. 81. 60 SGGD, I, No. 41, p. 82; No. 42, p. 85 (Plate II, No. 1 ). This seal has long been attributed to Vasilii I {DDG, pp. 568-569; Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, p. 80) because they were found attached to his second and third testaments (dated ca 1417 and March, 1423: DDG, pp. 57, 60). Scholars have therefore assumed that the seal with the armed horseman belonged to Vasilii I. Neither

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style of the engraving shown him (SGGD, I, p. 85) almost certainly suggests that it is of northern Gothic style, of which similar representations are to be found on French and English seals. More remarkable are some of the grand princely seals of the House of Moscow, beginning with the reign of Vasilii II.61Appended to a treaty of the mid-1430*s are two seals, one belonging to Vasilii II, the other to his cousin, Prince Dmitri Shemiaka of Galich. Shemiaka’s contains the bust of a man dressed in western

the undeciphered lettering of the inscription nor this particular type of mounted rider is in any way similar to the seals belonging to any of those belonging to members of the House of Moscow in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. I believe that the seal belonged to Grand Prince Vitovt of Lith­ uania, rather than to Vasilii I. The reasons are as follows: ( 1 ) the seal differs markedly not only from the testamentary seals of all of Vasilii Fs predecessors, but even from the one he appended to his first testament of 1406. That one was fashioned of the customary gilded silver, containing on the obverse a bust of St Basil of Caesarea, complete with nimbus, and the identification: VASIL KSA. The reverse has a six line inscription: “Seal of Grand Prince Vasilii Dmitrievich of all Rus.” (SGGD, I, p. 74; DDG, p. 568 [see appended Plate I, No. 9J: Pechat’ kniazia velikogo Vasilieva Dmitrieva [sic] vseia Rusi). This use of a patron-saint seal made of silver and gilded was the vogue among the senior Mos­ cow princes from the early fourteenth through the mid-fifteenth century. See above p. 16 and note 43. (2 ) There is probably more than coincidence attached to the fact that in the two cases when this Gothic horseman seal was appended to the second and third testaments of Vasilii I, Vitovt of Lith­ uania was named guarantor of the succession. (DDG, No. 2 1 , p. 59: A prikazyvaiu svoego s(y)na, kniazia Vasil’ia, i svoiu kniaginiu, i svoi deti svoemu bratu i tistiu, velikomu kniaziu Vitovtu, . . . See also p. 62). Vitovt accepted the responsibility thrust upon him by his son-in-law, Vasilii I. We may assume that Vasilii had won prior agreement from his father-in-law before he named him the principal guarantor for the succession of Vasilii II. The purpose of these maneuvers of 1417 and 1423 was to block the attempted succession of Vasilii I’s next younger brother, Prince Iurii, and to safeguard the accession of his own minor son, Vasilii II. The most obvious way of announcing Vitovt’s agreement was to have his seal appended to the testaments. (3) Not all of the seals that should have been a t­ tached to the second and third testaments are appended thereto. There is the very likely prospect that Vasilii I ’s is missing from both of his later wills. While Vitovt was named guarantor to the succession, Vasilii I set up a regency council of his loyal relatives. Three of these were his brothers: Andrei, Peter, and Constantine. Two were near relatives, Princes Semen and Iaroslav of Serpukhov (DDG, p. 59). If we add the seals of the council members to those of Vitovt and Vasilii I, there should have been seven seals; instead there are just five, all of wax. One is too badly damaged to be identified; a second is the Gothic horseman; the other three belonged to Princes Andrei, Peter, and Constantine (SGGD, I, p. 85). Therefore the possibility exists that these have fallen off. In the 1423 testament, with Vitovt again named as principal guarantor of the succession, the regency council remained the same, except for the deletion of Prince Constantine (DDG, p. 62). Yet only one seal is appended to the extant treaty: that of the Gothic horseman (SGGD, I, p. 85). In both the second and third testaments, the desire is not so much to proclaim their authenticity as is the hope of preventing a civil war. In each instance the Metropolitan Photius signed the document, thereby placing the spiritual power of the church behind the secular guarantors. In view of the fears revealed by these elaborate precautions, Vitovt’s seal would have been more important than one belonging to Vasilii I. 61 The cameo seals of Grand Prince Vasilii I, used to authenticate princely treaties, were primarily of the mounted horseman variety. These, which varied considerably in style from the Gothic horseman found on his later testaments, usually depicted the rider carrying a spear in right hand, and sometimes one where the rider carries a raised sword (Kamentseva and Ustiugov, Russkaia sfragistika, p. 80; SGGD, I, pp. 64, 71). The mounted horseman in various poses also found his way onto a number of Muscovite coins beginning with Vasilii Fs reign (G. Alef, “The Political Significance of the Inscrip­ tions on Muscovite Coinage in the Reign of Vasilii II," S peculum, xxxiv (1959), 4.

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armor and helmet; that of Vasilii II, according to Cherepnin, portrays “a female head with a toothed wreath.”52 The figure is actually a profile bust of a crowned Helios, with coiled hair and a seven-rayed diadem. Such representations were not uncommon and often were used as stones for ring settings.6263Possibly this personal seal with the bust of Helios was lost at or surrendered after the Suzdal battle of 1445, when Vasilii II became prisoner for a time at the hands of Khan Ulug Mehmed; thereafter this seal disappears from view. Attached to the next known treaty of this grand prince (formulated in 1450) is another device, also of Helios. This time Helios, wearing the identifying seven-rayed radiate crown, is driving a four-horsed chariot. The view is from the front of the horses, with one pair tugging to the right and the other pair to the left. Helios has both arms raised, the right hand holding a whip, the other controlling the reins.6465The common icono­ graphie form of the head-on Helios in chariot should have had the whip in left hand and the reins in the right. Since the gem used in the seal ring was pressed on wax, the image came out reversed.66 We may safely assume that all who came in contact with these seals on the Muscovite scene in this period knew nothing of the sun god of ancient Greece. Iconographically, a five-pointed radiate gold crown was reserved by mediaeval Russian miniaturists in their chronicle illuminations for imperial figures, such as Byzantine emperors, Tatar khans, Turkish sultans, the Latin emperors of Con­ stantinople, as well as the monarchs of Bulgaria and Armenia. Serbian rulers, whether kings or despots, also received the occasional reward of these imperial crowns. Russian grand princes, prior to Ivan IV’s coronation, wore identifying hats, but never crowns.66 The Helios bust as the personal seal of Vasilii II ap­ peared in the mid-1430’s, just after the termination of the first phase of the civil wars against the princes of Galich. The figure with the radiate crown must have appealed to Vasilii II, for upon the loss of the first he found an adequate replace­ ment. Yet, nothing in the literary sources would suggest imperial pretentions in the second half of the 1430’s. In the last year of his reign (1461-62), Vasilii II adopted another seal. The Helios with the four-horsed chariot continued in use, though a new imprint was impressed on the opposite side of the wax seal affixed to treaties. The outer form 62 DDG, No. 35/1, p. 570; SGGDt I, Nos. 52-53, p. 1 1 2 (Plate II, No. 3); Nos. 54-55, p. 118; see also pp. 124 and 130. I t was last used as the official seal of Vasilii II in June 1445, just prior to the battle of Suzdal (ibid., p. 135). On the proper dating of this last mentioned document, see A. E. Presniakov, Obrazovanie velikorusskago gosudarstva (Petrograd, 1918), p, 400, note 1. For another en­ graving of the same grand princely seal, see Ivanov, Sbornik snimkov, Table I, No. 4. 63 Catalogue of the Collection of Antique Gems (Southesk Collection) I (London, 1908), Plate IV, D-3. MSGGD, I, pp. 170,176 (Plate II, No. 4), 184,189,201. 65 For descriptions of several of these seal rings, see Catalogue of the Collection of Antique Gems (Southesk Collection), I, Plate IV, D -l and p. 53; G. Richter, Caalogue of Engraved Gems (Rome, 1956), Plate XL, No. 281 and p. 279. This stone looks very much like the engraving of the Russian seals. 66 A. V. Artsikhovskii, Drevnerusskie miniatury kak istoricheskii istochnik (Moscow, 1944), pp. 115116; see also pp. 9 7 , 103. For a miniature depicting the coronation of Ivan IV from the sixteenthcentury Tsarstvennaia kniga, see Istoriia russkogo iskusstva, III, 601.

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of the new seal mark was oblong in shape, as was that of Helios in chariot, though the stone inset was octagonal in form. Cut into the gem stone of the new device was a depiction of a lion attacking a snake. It is impossible at first glance to tell which is the obverse and which is the reverse of this dual seal, for each side bore identical inscriptions: “Seal [or mark] of Grand Prince Vasilii V asilevich.”67 Where this unusual gem came from and what it was meant to portray has not yet been determined. N o surviving examples of this iconography has been discovered elsewhere, nor does it have any meaning in classical mythology. The closest ancient example to it is that of another baffling depiction of a lion attacking a dolphin, of which there appears to be but one known example.68 The Muscovite court may have attached some symbolism to the representa­ tion of the lion attacking the snake. The snake usually had a connotation of evil attached to it. The lion is the most noble of animals, vaunted for his power and fearlessness, whose qualities were recognized and transmitted through scripture and popular imagery.

The grand prince considered the lion-snake motif more than just a mark of per­ sonal identification. While it may have suggested the triumph of Vasilii II and his son over a near relative, Prince Dmitri Shemiaka of Galich, who had lost his con­ test for the throne in a war recently ended, it seems to have been considered more than a personal seal. Vasilii II had shown a strong partiality to Helios. Ivan n i abandoned this device and experimented with gem stones of his own choosing. In the earlier part of his reign he showed a marked preference for a gem that also conveyed royal connotations. A winged figure, easily identified as an angel, holds a diadem aloft in right hand in the act of crowning one who might be a prince — in that the recipient holds either an upright sword or sceptre in his left hand.69 In the Graeco-Roman world it would have been recognized as a Winged Victory crowning a Tyche or Hermes.60 For a brief moment, around 1463, Ivan adopted and then abandoned a gem stone seal containing two mounted figures approach­ ing one another.61Perhaps this too closely resembled the mounted horseman motif utilized by the rulers of Tver, with whom Ivan III would scarcely seek equality. Thereafter Ivan settled for the Winged Victory until at least 1486. Occasionally « SGGDt I, pp. 206,208 (Plate II, No. 5). 68 G. Lippold, Gemmen und Kameen des Alterums und der Neuzeit (Stuttgart, n.d.), Plate LXXXV, No. 4. Identified by Lippold as Greek, fourth-century B.C. (p. 180), though he gave no evidence for such a precise dating. Professor Kantorowicz recalled having seen one in Boston, but subsequent in­ vestigation revealed that it was the same one described by Lippold. Nor is the lion-snake or liondolphin combination known in the minor or major art expressions of Byzantium, the Middle Ages, or of the Renaissance West. 68 SGGD, I, pp. 215 (Plate II, No. 6), 222,225,238,243,248,259, 265,270, 289, 313,320. Cherepnin (DDG, p. 573) described it as the “representation of a man with a sword, standing opposite an angel, who is holding a wreath in his hands." Bazilevich (Vneshniaia politika, p. 88) correctly identified the winged figure as a Victory. 80A Furtwängler, Beschreibung der geschnittenen Steine im Antiquarium (Berlin, 1896), No. 2571: “Tyche (Moidius, Füllhorn, Steurruder) von Nike bekränzt." Avariant is found in No. 2566: “Hermes von Nike bekränzt." 81 SGGD, I, pp. 217 (Plate H , No. 7), 2 2 0 .

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he employed this motif for the single-sided wax seals; more frequently it appeared with the lion-snake motif as the reverse wax impression. In every case where Ivan III caused a single-sided seal, with a blank reverse, to be appended to a treaty, only the Winged Victory theme appeared; the lion-snake appeared only as a re­ verse depiction. Consequently, we may conclude that the grand prince considered the former as his mark of personal identification; yet the lion-snake motif must have been considered more than a mere complement. I am inclined to believe that this motif was considered as the state seal, first appearing in the last year of Vasilii IFs reign and disappearing sometime after 1486. Unfortunately we do not possess any grand princely treaties with Russian princes for the subsequent decade. The next known seal to appear on a treaty to which Ivan III was a party was the two-headed eagle of 1497, which thereafter superseded the silver seals ap­ pended to testaments and the gem stone impressions on wax utilized for political agreements. All indications point to the period of the initial diplomatic contacts with the House of Hapsburg as the time for the appearance of the Muscovite two-headed eagle. However great the preoccupation with royal symbolism on grand princely seals prior to I486, there appeared to be no inclination to move towards an eagle emblem. Neither the marriage to Sofia, nor the events of 1480, nor even the cau­ tious attempts of Ivan III in employing the imperial title, hinted at its adoption. Though patterned after a Byzantine model, the two-headed eagle would probably not have become the principal device on the Muscovite coat-of-arms had Ivan III not learned that a similar device identified the imperial rank of the western em­ peror. U n iv e r s it y

of

O regon

X

A R IS TO CRA TIC P O L IT IC S AND ROYAL POLICY IN M USCOVY IN THE LATE F IF T E E N T H AND EARLY SIX TE E N TH C E N TU RIES

The changing relations between the rulers of Muscovy and their servitors spanned the better part of three centuries. The voluntary men-in-service of the fourteenth century became the reluctant subordinates after the middle of the fifteenth century. Their numbers swelled as their positions deteriorated vis-à-vis the evolving powers of the crown. They lost their customary right to leave their lord’s employ, to retire without permission or to seek better conditions elsewhere. Their marginal economic circumstances and a traditional system of dividing inheritances robbed them of the possibility to resist the territorial lord and the oppor­ tunity to deny him their military support. The service state was a product of need for both the Muscovite monarch and his servants. By the turn of the sixteenth century the annexation of most of the independent principalities of the Russian north left Lithuania as a refuge of la? resort for the acutely discontented. For better or worse the aristocracies of birth and servie i were fixed in the Muscovite firmament. If the outline of development is well known, the politics of change are unexplained in our sources. How the aristocracies of birth and service reacted to their new circumstances was not recorded. The surviving sources obscure more than they divulge. Instead of diaries, letters and complaints, which could have revealed motives, cabals, or strategies, we have chronicles, treaties, military registers, diplomatic papers, monastic cartularies, a handful of records from court archives and the genealogies of distinguished families. The chronicles divulge little of consequence beyond the bare mention of the disgrace or imprisonment of important personages. The genealogies, compiled primarily in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, delineate descent and family connections, with an occasional glimpse of marital ties with other distinguished families. When added to information derived from the military registers and diplomatic papers, they allow for the reconstruction of individual and family careers. When placed against the backdrop of known historical developments, this informa­ tion provides the framework for charting the changing policies of the crown and suggest some­ thing of the politics of the major aristocratic figures and families. The motives ascribed to the politics of the aristocracy, while not found in the primary sources, are deduced from patterns of service and appointments.I.

I.

The creation of a greater Muscovy or the “unification of northern Rus”’ - however it may be viewed - coming so quickly upon the heels of the great dynastic struggle of the early fif-

X 78 te e n th c e n tu ry , c re a te d in sta b ility in th e r a n k s o f b irth a n d s e rv ic e . P rio r to th e d y n a s tic w a rs ( 1 4 2 5 - 1 4 5 3 ) th e p rin c e s h a d re fu s e d to a c c e p t p e r m a n e n t p o s itio n s a t th e c o u rt o f th e s e n io r M o s c o w p rin c e , th e r e b y a llo w in g a n a ris to c ra c y o f s e rv ic e to d e v e lo p in M u s c o v y . T h e w a rs c h a n g e d all th a t. P rin c e s re s id in g w ith in M u s c o v y w e r e c o m p e lle d to s e r v e , a c o n d itio n th a t c o n tin u e d e v e n w ith th e re tu rn o f p e a c e . E n te r e d o n th e s e rv ic e rolls, th e y c o m p e te d fo r p o s i­ tio n s fo rm e rly re s e r v e d to th e fo r e m o s t o f th e u n title d w a rrio rs . A h a n d fu l o f p rin c e s b e c a m e b o y a rs o f V a s ilii II a s re w a rd fo r th e ir s te a d fa s t s u p p o rt; th e y w e r e a m o n g th e first to b re a c h th e m o n o p o ly o f th e th irty -fiv e to fo rty g r e a t u n title d s e rv ic e fa m ilie s .1 T h e n c a m e th e a n n e x a ­ tio n o f n e ig h b o rin g la r o s la v l’ a n d R o s to v in th e 1 4 6 0 s a n d 1 4 7 0 s , fu rth e r s w e llin g th e ra n k s o f th e s e rv in g p rin c e s . T h e ir c la m o r fo r p o sitio n s c o m m e n s u ra te w ith th e ir birth rig h t d is c o m fit­ e d th e p re v io u s ly p riv ile g e d u n title d s u p p o rte rs o f th e g ra n d p rin c e s . T h e ir a n c e s to rs h a d s to o d b y th e M u s c o v ite lo rd s w h o m th e R iu rik id e s h a d c h o s e n to ig n o re ; n o w th e titled n e w ­ c o m e r s in c re a s in g ly d is p la c e d th e ra n k a n d file o ld tim e rs a s m ilita ry o ffic e rs a n d in th e a p p o in tm e n t o f th e c o u rt e n to u ra g e ( dvor). If a n im o s ity d iv id e d th e o ld e r fro m th e n e w e r s e rv ito rs , th e th r e a t o f fu rth e r in flux fo rc e d th e m in to p ra g m a tic a llia n c e . T h is a ttitu d e c o n flic t­ e d w ith th e e s ta b lis h e d p o lic y o f th e g o v e rn m e n t. V a s ilii II a n d p a rtic u la rly Iv a n III h a d e n c o u r a g e d d e fe c tio n s o f w a rrio rs fro m th e still in d e ­ p e n d e n t p rin c ip a litie s a n d th e y s o u g h t to in te g ra te th e n e w c o m e r s in to a s in g le a ris to c ra c y of th e s w o rd . T h e ru le rs r e q u ire d th e im m ig ra n ts to r e s id e in th e c a p ita l w h e r e th e y c o u ld b e w a tc h e d . T h e y d a n g le d c o u rt p o sitio n s a n d m ilitary c o m m a n d s a s in d u c e m e n ts . L o n g y e a r s o f jo u rn e y m a n s h ip in th e r a n k s o f th e “ju n io r b o y a r s ” c o n s titu te d a p ro c e s s e q u iv a le n t to n a tu ra liz a tio n . G r a d u a lly th e n e w c o m e r s a c c lim a te d s o c ia lly a n d p o litica lly to th e ir n e w c o n d itio n , w h ile th e y fo u n d th e ir lo ya lty te s te d a n d th e ir a b ilitie s s c ru tin iz e d . W ith tim e th e y m ig h t re c e iv e p o sitio n s o f g r e a te r re s p o n s ib ilitie s a n d a u g m e n te d r e m u n e r a tio n . In th e o ry , th e a b le s t o f th e w e ll b o rn c o u ld b e a p p o in te d to th e c o u n cil ( duma) o f th e g ra n d p rin c e , bu t o n ly a fte r th e y h a d s e r v e d lo n g a n d w e ll. E x c e p tin g th e o c c a s io n a l po litical a p p o in tm e n t or m a r r ia g e to a d a u g h te r o f th e ru le r, w h ic h e a r n e d e a rly p ro m o tio n , th e a v e r a g e tim e in s e rv ic e fo r th o s e w h o e v e n tu a lly b e c a m e s e n io r c o u n c illo rs (b o y a rs ) in Iv a n Ill’s reig n w a s tw e n ty fiv e y e a r s . S e c o n d s te p a d v is o rs (o k o l’n ic h ie ) s p e n t a n a v e r a g e o f fifte e n y e a r s b e fo r e b e - 1 I

1 These were Prince Ivan Aleksandrovich Zvenigorodskii (A k ty s o ts ia ïn o -é k o n o m ic h e s k o i istorii s e v e ro -v o s to c h n o i R u s i k o n ts a X lV -n a c h a la X V I v., ed. B. Grekov, hereafter cited as A S E IS V R , I (Moscow, 1952], pp. 144,606); Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Obolenskii (ib id ., pp. 198,612); Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich (Riapolovskii) (A S E IS V R , III (Moscow, 1964], p. 480). The document last cited was dated in 1463, that is, in the first year of Ivan Ill’s reign. Riapolovskii had been one of the supporters of Vasilii II and there is no further indication of his service. Consequently, his appointment as boyar occurred earlier. There is one previous exception. The first prince to become a boyar was lurii Patrikeevich, a descendent of Gedimin of Lithuania, who emigrated to Moscow early in the fifteenth century. He married Anna, sister of Vasilii I ( V re m e n n ik im p e r a to rs k a g o o b s c h c h e s tv a isto rii i d re v n o s te i rossiis k ik h , X, hereafter cited as V re m e n n ik (Moscow, 1851 ], Materialy, p. 222). This earned him the position of senior councillor (D u k h o v n y e i d o g o v o rn y e g r a m o ty velik ikh i u d e l'n y k h k n ia z 'ia X I V - X V I v v . , ed. L. V. Cherepnin, hereafter cited as D D G (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950], pp. 57,59,62). The first citation of “Prince lurii Ivanovich" (p. 57) is a scribal error. After Prince lurii’s death his son Ivan succeeded him as the senior boyar (ib id ., p. 198).

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c o m in g e lig ib le .2 B e tw e e n 1 4 6 2 a n d 1 5 0 5 o n ly tw o la ro s la v s k ie p rin c e s a n d tw o fo r m e r T v e r ia n s b e c a m e b o y a r s .3 T h e a n n e x a tio n o f T v e r ’ in 1 4 8 5 trig g e r e d a crisis u n re c o r d e d in .th e n a rra tiv e s o u rc e s . Iv a n fo r b a d e th e T v e r ia n p rin c e s a n d s e rv ito rs to m o v e to th e M u s c o v ite c a p ita l a n d re q u ire d th e m to s e r v e fro m th e ir e s t a t e s .4 H e p e r m itte d o n ly a h a n d fu l to jo in his e n to u r a g e .5 T h e a d v a n t a g e o f c o u rt s e r v ic e in o b ta in in g a p p o in tm e n ts to th e g r a n d p rin c e ly c o u n c il is s e e n in th e c a s e o f t h e T v e r ia n F e d o r Iv a n o v ic h K a rp o v , w h o b e c a m e a n o k o l’nichii in 1 5 2 7 .6 H e h a d a d is tin g u is h e d c a r e e r a s a d ip lo m a t. B y w a y o f c o n tra s t, th e first T v e r ia n p rin c e to b e c o m e a b o y a r, w h o s e p r e d e c e s s o r s h a d b e e n b a r re d fro m Iv a n Ill’s d v o r, w a s P rin c e S e m e n Iv a n o ­ v ic h M ik u lin s k ii. H is a p p o in tm e n t c a m e in 1 5 5 0 , s ix ty -fiv e y e a r s a fte r th e a n n e x a tio n o f T v e r ’.7 T h e b e s t p o s itio n s th e s e T v e r ia n a ris to c ra ts c o u ld o b ta in p rio r to Iv a n IV ’s re fo rm s o f th e 1 5 5 0 s w e r e a s g o v e rn o rs in s e c o n d a r y to w n s a n d districts. T h e d e c is io n c o n c e rn in g th e T v e ria n p rin c e s a n d s e n io r m ilitary s e rv ito rs re m o v e d th e la te s t th r e a t to th e e n la r g e d M u s c o v ite a ris to c ra c y b u t it d id little to s o lv e th e p ro b le m s fa c e d b y m a n y m id d le -r a n k e d s e rv ito rs o f g o o d , b u t n o t th e m o s t p re s tig io u s , fa m ilie s , w h o s a w th e ir o p p o rtu n itie s in c re a s in g ly re s tric te d . T h e y fo u n d th e m s e lv e s e a s e d o u t o f th e m o re lu c ra tiv e m ilita ry c o m m a n d s , th e b e tte r g o v e rn o rs h ip s a n d s e n io r c o u n cil p o sitio n s. T h e d is c o n te n te d v ie w e d w ith a p p r e h e n s io n a d e v e lo p in g p r a c tic e a m o n g th e in flu e n tia l b o y a rs w h o fa v o re d th e ir k in s m e n a n d m a rita l a llie s in m a k in g a p p o in tm e n ts . O n ly a ra d ic a l shift in th e p o lic ie s o f s e le c tio n c o u ld s a tis fy th o s e w h o fe lt u n fairly p a s s e d o v e r o r w h o p ro te s te d th e re in s titu tio n o f a c a s te s y s te m th a t d e n ie d re c o g n itio n o f m e rit. D u rin g th e d y n a s tic w a r s V a s ilii II h a d r e w a rd e d th e lo ya l a n d a b le . M e m o rie s re m a in e d a s o p p o rtu n itie s d w in d le d . A s w ith th e o u tc ry a g a in s t T v e ria n s , th e c h ro n ic le rs ig n o re d th e m a la is e , re c o rd in g o n ly is o la te d e x p re s s io n s o f d is c o n te n t a n d e v e n th e n re fu s in g to re la te m a n ife s ta tio n to c a u s e . T h e first d is c e rn ib le r e a c tio n c a m e in 1 4 9 7 w h e n a s m a ll g ro u p o f m a lc o n te n ts s o u g h t p e rs o n a l a d v a n ta g e in a d y n a s tic d is p u te th a t e ru p te d w ith in th e g ra n d p rin c e ly fa m ily . Iv a n III d e te rm in e d to n a m e his g r a n d s o n , D m itrii Iv a n o v ic h , a s his s u c c e s s o r, b y p a s s in g his o ld e s t living son V a s ilii. A n u m b e r o f lo w -ra n k in g c o u rtie rs u rg e d P rin c e V a s ilii to rev o lt in o rd e r to a s s e r t his s e n io rity . T h e m in i-c o n s p ir a c y n e v e r h a tc h e d . E a rly d is c o v e ry b ro u g h t d is g ra c e to V a s ilii a n d e x e c u tio n fo r th e r in g le a d e r s .8

2 G. Alef, "Reflections on the Boyar Duma in the Reign of Ivan III," S la v o n ic a n d E a s t E u ro p e a n R e v ie w , hereafter cited as S E E R , XLV (London, 1967), 91-107. 3 Princes Semen Romanovich and Danilo Aleksandrovich Penko laroslavskii, Prince Danilo Dmitrievich Kholmskii and his son Vasilii (ib id ., pp. 110-118). 4 G. Alef, "Muscovite Military Reforms in the second half of the Fifteenth Century." F o rs c h u n g e n z u r o s te u r o p ä is c h e n G e s c h ic h te , hereafter cited as F z O G , XVIII (1973), 91 -9 5 . B. N. Floria, “Oputiakh politicheskoi tsentralizatsii Russkogo gosudarstva (na primere Tverskoi zemli),” O b s c h e s tv o i g o s u d a r s tv o fe o d a l'n o i R o s s ii (Moscow, 1975), pp. 281 -290. 5 These included Fedor, Nikita and Semen, sons of the Tverian boyar Ivan Karpovich, and their second cousins Mikhail and Ivan ll'inich Bokeev. An uncle of the Bokeevs, Vasilii Semenovich, also served as namestnik in Murom in 1495 (R a z r ia d n a ia k n ig a , 1 4 7 5 - 1 5 9 8 , ed. by V. I. Buganov, hereafter cited as R K [Moscow, 1966], p. 26); for their genealogies, see V re m e n n ik , X, Materialy, pp. 250-251. 6 A. A. Zimin, "Sostav boiarskoi dumy v X V-XV I vekakh." A r k h e o g ra fic h e s k ii e z h e g o d n ik z a 1 9 5 7 , hereafter cited as A E , 1 9 5 7 (Moscow, 1958), p. 53. 7 Ib id ., p. 62. 8 P o ln o e s o b ra n ie ru ssk ikh le to p is i, hereafter cited as P S R L , XII (St. Pet., 1901; reprinted Moscow,

X 80 C o m m o n p u rp o s e h a d u n ite d th e p ro p o n e n ts o f V a s ilii: s u c c e s s w o u ld h a v e e a r n e d th e m fa v o r a n d p ro m o tio n s . D is a d v a n ta g e h a d b ro u g h t th e m to g e th e r: u n d is tin g u is h e d lin e a g e , ill lu ck o r th e ir fa m ilie s ’ s e rv ic e a t th e c o u rts o f th e a p p a n a g e p rin c e s h a d p la c e d th e m o u ts id e th e

cursus honorum. T h e

o n ly p rin c e a m o n g th e m , P rin c e Iv a n Iv a n o v ic h K h ru l’ P a le ts k ii, w a s

o n e o f th e m a n y m in o r R iu rik id e s a t c o u rt. T h e o n e d e s c e n d a n t o f a d is tin g u is h e d M u s c o v ite s e rv ic e fa m ily w a s V la d im ir E liz a re v ic h G u s e v , s p ru n g fro m th o s e D o b ry n s k ie s w h o h a d s e r v e d a s b o y a rs in th e e a r lie r fifte e n th c e n tu ry . M o s t o f this fa m ily h a d b e tr a y e d V a s ilii II a n d p a id fo r th e ir m is ta k e s . V la d im ir G u s e v s fa th e r o p te d fo r s e rv ic e in a n a p p a n a g e a n d V la d im ir h a d n o fu tu re o f c o n s e q u e n c e a t Iv a n Il l’s c o u rt. O n e o f V la d im ir ’s b ro th e rs h a d fle d to L ith u ­ a n ia in 1 4 9 2 ; tw o o th e rs b e c a m e b o y a rs in th e s e r v ic e o f th e D m itro v a p p a n a g e e a r ly in th e s ix te e n th c e n tu r y .9 T h e a b s e n c e o f m a g n a te s , c o u n cil m e m b e r s o r sc io n s o f g r e a t s e rv in g h o u s e s a m o n g th e s u p p o rte rs o f P rin c e V a s ilii Iv a n o v ic h s u g g e s ts , w h a te v e r th e ir g rie v a n c e s , th a t n o n e h a d b e e n w illing to risk s u p p o rtin g th e p r e te n d e r. T h e o v e rt s u p p o rte rs o f th e fu tu re V a s ilii III h a d b e e n d e s p e r a te e n o u g h to c a s t e v e ry th in g o n o n e roll o f th e p o litica l d ic e a n d th e y p a id th e u ltim a te price. T h e c h ro n ic le a c c o u n ts id en tifie d o n ly a h a lf-d o z e n o f P rin c e V a s ilii Iv a n o v ic h ’s s u p p o rte rs b u t in fe rre d th a t o th e rs h a d b e e n e q u a lly s u p p o rtiv e o f th e plot. T h e s iz e o f th e g ro u p is u n ­ k n o w n , th o u g h th e n u m b e r o f th e d is c o n te n te d h a d g ro w n c o n s id e ra b ly b y th e e n d o f th e fif­ te e n th c e n tu ry . T h e d e s c e n d a n ts of th e old e lite s e rv in g fa m ilie s h a d m u ltip lie d into c la n -lik e un its. T h e y h a d fo u n d th e ir o p p o rtu n itie s a n d e c o n o m ic c irc u m s ta n c e s d e te rio ra tin g , p a rtic ­ u larly a s p rin c e s o u s te d th e m fro m p rim e m ilitary c o m m a n d s .10 R a n k in g s e rv ito rs fro m th e e s c h e a te d M u s c o v ite a p p a n a g e s s w e lle d th e r a n k s of th e u n h a p p y a s th e y w e r e c o m p e lle d to a c c e p t lo w e r le v e l p o sitio n s a t th e g ra n d p rin c e ly co u rt. E v e n th e titled n e w c o m e r s w e r e d is g ru n tle d . A d v a n c e m e n t c a m e to o s lo w a s th e b o y a rs c o n tin u e d to r e c o m m e n d k in s m e n a n d s o n s o f old c o u n cillo rs fo r v a c a n t d u m a p o sitio n s. T h e p o te n tia l fo r p o litica l m e d d lin g im p re s s e d u p o n Iv a n III th e n e e d to in itia te m e a s u r e s th a t w o u ld le s s e n th e p o ss ib ility of d o m e s tic d is s id e n c e . It is in this c o n te x t th a t I v ie w th e d e p o s itio n o f s o m e o f Iv a n Ill’s c lo s e s t a n d m o s t tru s te d c o u n c illo rs .11 In 1 4 9 9 th e g ra n d p rin c e o r d e r e d th e a rre s t o f th e b o y a rs P rin c e Iv a n lu r’e v ic h P a trik e e v , th e la tte r’s so n , V a s ilii K o s o i, a n d his s o n -in -la w , P rin c e S e m e n Iv a n o v ic h R ia p o lo vskii. All w e r e s e n te n c e d to d e a th b u t o n ly R ia p o lo v s k ii k e p t his d a te w ith th e h e a d s m a n ’s a x e . T h e P a trik e e v s h a d th e ir s e n te n c e s c o m m u te d a n d w e r e s h riv e d a s m o n k s . T h e ir c o n ­ s id e r a b le p o s s e s s io n s w e r e c o n fis c a te d b y th e c ro w n . S o e n d e d th e c a r e e r s o f this b ra n c h o f th e P a trik e e v s , re la te d b y m a r r ia g e to th e g ra n d p rin c e ly h o u s e a n d th e w e a lth ie s t o f th e fif­ te e n th c e n tu ry b o y a rs .

1965), 246, 263; J. Fennell, Iv a n th e G re a t o f M o s c o w (London-New York, 1961), p. 336. (For a summary of the various interpretations of the conspiracy, see S. M. Kashtanov, S o ts ia l'n o -p o litic h e s k a ia isto riia R o s s ii k o n ts a X V -p e r v o i p o lo v in y X V I v e k a (Moscow, 1967], pp. 79ff.) 9 S. B. Veselovskii, “Vladimir Gusev - sostavitel“sudebnika 1497 goda," Is to ric h e s k ie z a p is k i, here­ after cited as IZ , V (1939), 33 -34, 40-47; id e m , Is s le d o v a n iia p o isto rii k la s s a s lu zh ily k h z e m le v la d e l'ts e v , hereafter cited as IP IK S Z (Moscow, 1969), pp. 317-318. 10 See, for example, the roster of commanders from 1482-1495: R K , pp. 19-24. 11 This.was the hypothesis of my Oxford paper in 1975: "The Fall of the Patrikeevs: Eshchë Raz."

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M o d e r n h is to ria n s h a v e tie d t h e s e d e p o s itio n s to th e c o n tin u in g p ro b le m s in vo lvin g s u c c e s s io n , w h ic h w e r e n o t re s o lv e d until 1 5 0 2 , o r to d iffe r e n c e s o v e r fo re ig n p o lic y .12 T h e s e h is to ria n s s u s p e c te d a lin k a g e o f th e d e p o s itio n s w ith s o m e m a jo r p ro x im a te crisis fa c in g th e g o v e r n m e n t o f Iv a n III. T h e y a s s u m e d th a t a c tiv e o p p o s itio n b y th e v ic tim s le d to th e ir d o w n ­ fa ll. B o th th e o r ie s lie w ith in th e re a lm o f p ro b a b ility . T h e p o ss ib ility a ls o e x is ts th a t Iv a n III fe lt c o m p e lle d to s a c rific e th e s e c lo s e a d v is o rs if o n ly to q u ie t a g ro w in g ho stility w ith in th e s e rv it­ o r ra n k s . J u s t a s e lite s o c ia l d is c o n te n t h a d fo rc e d a c h a n g e in po lic y to w a rd s th e T v e ria n s , so to o d id a s im ila r m a n ife s ta tio n in th e 1 4 9 0 s r e q u ire a r e s p o n s e to m o u n tin g g rie v a n c e s . P r in c e Iv a n P a trik e e v h a d fa s h io n e d a p o w e rfu l n e p o tic b lo c in th e g ra n t p rin c e ly c o u n cil. B y th e m id 1 4 9 0 s s e v e n o f th e e le v e n b o y a rs b e lo n g e d to this g ro u p . S e c o n d ly , th e b o y a rs h a d b e g u n to a m a s s p r iv ile g e s a n d ric h e s fa r g r e a te r th a n th o s e h e ld b y th e ir p re d e c e s s o rs . T h e c r o w n ’s c o n fis c a tio n o f e x te n s iv e la y a n d e c c le s ia s tic a l e s ta te s , p rim a rily in N o v g o ro d , le d to la v is h g ra n ts m a d e to th e s e n io r c o u n c illo rs . T h ird ly , th e c o u n c illo rs c o n tro lle d a p p o in t­ m e n ts to s e n io r m ilita ry c o m m a n d s , to g o v e rn o rs h ip s a n d th e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n s fo r p r o m o ­ tio n s w e r e u s u a lly e n d o rs e d b y th e g r a n d p rin c e . T h e ru le r h a d n o lo n g e r th e tim e o r th e k n o w l­ e d g e to c o n tro l a p p o in tm e n ts , fo r his c o n ta c ts w ith s e rv in g m e n w e r e fa r m o re lim ited th a n in th e p a s t. T h e c re a tio n o f a c o u rt c e r e m o n ia l d e s ig n e d to r a is e th e ru le r a b o v e his s e rv a n ts h a d s c r e e n e d Iv a n fro m c o n ta c t w ith all b u t a fe w of his e n to u ra g e . H is tim e a n d e n e rg ie s w e r e o c c u p ie d w ith th e la r g e r is s u e s o f g o v e r n a n c e a n d his a c tiv e fo re ig n po licy. T h e co u n cil b e c a m e his filte r to sift o u t all b u t th e m o s t im p o rta n t is s u e s . A s Iv a n re lie d in c re a s in g ly u p o n his c o u n c illo rs to c a rry o u t th e d a ily fu n c tio n s o f g o v e r n ­ m e n t, th e d is c o n te n te d v ie w e d th e m a s p e r p e tra to rs o f th e ir u n h a p p y c o n d itio n . W h ile th e P a tr ik e e v g ro u p w a s h a rd ly r e s p o n s ib le fo r all th e ir g rie fs , it h a d b e c o m e th e s y m b o l o f th e ir o p p r e s s io n . Iv a n III u ltim a te ly fe lt c o m p e lle d to a c t. R a th e r th a n c h a n c e a fu rth e r c o n s p ira c y , o s te n s ib ly to c h a m p io n th e c a u s e o f th e d is g ra c e d P rin c e V a s ilii Iv a n o v ic h , th e s a c rific e o f P rin c e Iv a n P a tr ik e e v a n d his im m e d ia te fa m ily h a d b e c o m e a po litical n e c e s s ity . T h e la rg e tra c ts o f N o v g o r o d ia n la n d s g iv e n to th e b o y a rs w e r e w ith d r a w n , th e r e b y re d u c in g th e d is p a ri­ ty o f r e w a rd s g iv e n to s e n io r c o u n c illo rs a n d to o th e r s e rv ito rs o f ra n k . T h e s e w e r e b u t th e first o f a n u m b e r o f c o rre c tiv e a c tio n s ta k e n b e tw e e n 1 4 9 9 a n d 1 5 0 5 . T h e v a r io u s in te re s ts g ro u p s in th e d u m a h a d s u c c e s s fu lly lo c k e d o u t c o m p e tito rs fo r p o sitio n fro m th e ra n k s o f th e n e w c o m e r s . T h e first s o n o f a p re v io u s ruling te rrito rial p rin c e to o b ta in a d m is s io n w a s P rin c e D a n ilo A le k s a n d ro v ic h P e n k o , w h o s e fa th e r h a d b e e n th e la s t ru le r of la r o s la v l’. H e b e c a m e a b o y a r in 1 5 0 0 a fte r th irty y e a r s o f s e rv ic e a n d a fte r th e d e s tru c tio n of th e P a tr ik e e v b lo c in th e d u m a .13

12 A summary of the historiography is found in A. A. Zimin, “Sobytiia 1499 g. i bor'ba politicheskikh gruppirovok pri dvore Ivana III,” N o v o e o p ro s h lo m n a s h e i s tra n y (Moscow, 1967), pp. 91 -9 7; see also N. A. Kazakova, V a s s ia n P a t r ik e e v i e g o s o c h in e n iia (Moscow - Leningrad, I960), pp. 4 0 -48. 13 Zimin, "Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 47. First mention in Muscovite service in 1469, though the Ustiug chronicle suggests that 1467/68 may be more correct: U s tiu zh s k ii le to p is n y i s v o d (Moscow - Lenin­ grad, 1950), p. 86. Prince Danilo was not the first laroslavskii to serve as boyar. That distinction went to his distant and junior relative, Prince Semen Romanovich in 1495 (Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 46). But Prince Semen had friends at court. He married the widow of an okol’nichii and the daughterin-law of a deceased boyar (Iz v e s tiia R u s s k a g o g e n e a lo g ic h e s k a g o o b s h c h e s tv a [St. Pet., 1900], fasc. 1, pp. 109-111).

X 82 Iv a n Il l’s a p p o in tm e n ts of o k o l’n ic h ie a fte r 1 4 9 9 a ls o r e fle c te d a re c o g n itio n o f th e u n h a p p in e s s h a r b o r e d b y th o s e u n title d m e n -in -s e r v ic e w h o s e e a r lie r c a r e e r s (o r th e ir f a th e r s ’) h a d b e e n c o n n e c te d w ith th e a p p a n a g e c o u rts . G rig o rii A n d re e v ic h M a m o n b e c a m e a n o k o l’n ich ii d u rin g his w a n in g y e a r s ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 9 ) . 14 H e h a d s e r v e d Iv a n III w e ll, e v e n b e ­ c o m in g a c lo s e c o n fid a n t. H is fa th e r h a d b e e n a b o y a r in th e M o z h a is k a p p a n a g e , h e ld b y o n e of V a s ilii l l ’s s w o rn e n e m ie s , w h ic h s h o u ld h a v e ta in te d M a rn o n s c a r e e r . O n ly Iv a n ’s fa v o r s a v e d h im , b u t th e r e h a d b e e n no p o ss ib ility o f a w a r d in g him a c o u n c il s e a t until th e c h a n g e s o f 1 4 9 9 . 15 M a rn o n s first c o u s in , D a n ilo Iv a n o v ic h , a ls o b e c a m e a n o k o l’nichii in th e la s t y e a r o f his life ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 1 ) . 16 H e h a d s e r v e d in th e a p p a n a g e o f V o lo k , p o s s ib ly until 1 4 9 4 . 17 S in c e th e n o rm a l p e rio d o f s e rv ic e fo r o k o l’n ich ie a v e r a g e d fifte e n y e a r s , th e e x c e p tio n m a d e in th is c a s e c o n s titu te d a c o n s id e r a b le c o n c e s s io n to th o s e w h o h a d p re v io u s ly s e r v e d in th e M o s c o w a p p a n a g e s . F o r A fa n a s ii S te p a n o v ic h S a k m y s h e v ( 1 5 0 1 - 1 5 0 9 ) w e p o s s e s s n e i­ th e r fa m ily g e n e a lo g y n o r p rio r re c o rd o f s e r v ic e .18 A n o th e r u n e x p e c te d a d d itio n to th e o k o l’n ic h ie w a s Iv a n V a s il’e v ic h S h a d r a V e l’ia m in o v ( 1 5 0 3 - 1 5 0 9 ) . 19 H e d e s c e n d e d fro m o n e o f th e g r e a t M u s c o v ite s e rv in g fa m ilie s b u t his p a rtic u la r b ra n c h o f th e fa m ily h a d fa re d p o o rly . H is fa th e r h a d fo u n d fe w o p p o rtu n itie s a t th e g ra n d p r in c e ’s c o u rt a n d h a d o p te d fo r a c a r e e r in th e D m itro v a p p a n a g e . T h e s o n d e m o n s tr a te d his a d m in is tra tiv e skills in th e s e rv ic e o f Iv a n III. H e o b ta in e d his p ro m o tio n w h ile s e rv in g a s g o v e r n o r o f V ia z ’m a o n a n e x te n d e d to u r.20 A s Iv a n III c h a n g e d th e c h a ra c te r o f d u m a a p p o in tm e n ts a fte r 1 4 9 9 , h e e n d e a v o r e d to c a lm th e fe a r s o f th o s e w h o c a m e fro m th e old in n e r e lite . P rin c e V a s ilii D a n ilo v ic h K h o lm s k ii a n d P e te r V a s il’e v ic h O b o le n s k ii b e c a m e b o y a rs in 1 5 0 0 , e a c h th e s o n o f a b o y a r. V a s ilii K h o lm s k ii’s m a r r ia g e to Iv a n Ill’s d a u g h te r g a v e him s p e c ia l s tatu s. T h e la s t a p p o in te d b o y a r in th is re ig n c o n firm e d a p a tte rn o f s o m e p ro te c tio n fo r th e old u n titled s e rv in g c la n s . G rig o rii F e d o ro v ic h D a v y d o v ( 1 5 0 3 - 1 5 2 1 ) c a m e fro m a d is tin g u is h e d fa m ily a n d his fa th e r h a d b e e n a b o y a r in th e 1 4 7 0 s .21 T h e c h a ra c te r o f a p p o in tm e n ts to th e c o u n cil a fte r 1 4 9 9 u n d e rla y th e c o n c e s s io n s to th e m a jo r d is c o n te n te d g ro u p s : h ig h -r a n k in g a p p a n a g e tra n s fe rs , h ig h -b o rn n e w c o m e r s a n d w a rrio rs o f old fa m ilie s th a t h a d b e e n p u s h e d a s id e b y a n in n e r e lite o f a fe w p riv ile g e d fa m i­ lies. A t th e s a m e tim e th e g ra n d p rin c e s o u g h t to a s s u re th e o ld e r s e rv ic e e lite th a t its p o sitio n

14 R K , pp. 16,44. 15 For a summary of his career, see Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , p. 452. 16 Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 47, offered an approximate dating of his service: 1497-1502; that is based upon information derived from the Sheremetev list: D re v n ia ia R o s s iis k a ia Vivliofika, ed. by N. Novikov, 2nd ed., hereafter cited as D R V , XX (Moscow, 1791 ), 9 -1 0 . 17 Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , p. 453. 18 Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 48. 19 Ib id . 20 Alef, “Reflections,” S E E R , XLV, 85 -86. 21 Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 48, believed that Davydov became a boyar in 1507, but see S b o m ik im p e r a to rs k a g o r u s s k a g o is to ric h e s k a g o o b s c h c h e s tv a , hereafter cited as S I R I O (St. Pet., 1882), pp. 350,376. His father had been a boyar ca. 1472 to at least 1478 (P S R L , VI [St. Pet., 1853] 197; XXV [Moscow - Leningrad, 1949], 321 ). The Khromoi-Davydovs descended from the early fourteenth century Akinf Gavrilovich and were related to the Cheliadnins, Buturlins, Chebots and Chulkovs, most of whom served the princes of Moscow.

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w o u ld n o t b e to ta lly d is r e g a r d e d in th e r e o rg a n iz a tio n . T h e s e a c tio n s d e a lt o n ly w ith a fe w p o s itio n s fo r w h ic h th e r e w e r e m a n y a s p ira n ts . T h u s th e y m a y b e v ie w e d m o r e a s s y m b o lic th a n a s a d e m o n s tr a te d im p r o v e m e n t o f th e c o n d itio n o f th e a g g r ie v e d . B u t th e s y m b o lis m w a s im p o rta n t. T h e g ra n d p rin c e d e m o n s tr a te d , o n c e h e b e c a m e a w a r e o f th e p ro b le m s , th a t h e w o u ld a c t w ith v ig o r to c o rre c t im b a la n c e s . W h e t h e r Iv a n a c te d o n ly to d e fu s e a n im m e d i­ a te d a n g e r o u s c o n d itio n o r w h e th e r h e d e s ir e d s im u lta n e o u s ly to re tu rn to a s y s te m th a t w o u id in te g ra te th e n e w e r w ith th e o ld e r s e rv ito rs in th e c o u rs e o f tim e is a m a tte r fo r s p e c u la tio n . T h e c h a n g e s in itia te d in o r s h o rtly a fte r 1 4 9 9 in clin e in fa v o r o f th e la tte r a s s u m p tio n . T h e c o n fis c a tio n o f h u g e tra c ts o f N o v g o ro d ia n la n d s in th e la s t th r e e d e c a d e s o f th e fif­ te e n th c e n tu ry a llo w e d th e M u s c o v ite g o v e r n m e n t to c re a te s e r v ic e -c o n n e c te d e s ta te s . T h e s e la n d s b e c a m e th e p ro p e rtie s o f th e g ra n d p rin c e a n d w e r e h a n d e d o u t to w a rrio rs in re tu rn fo r th e ir c o n tin u in g s e rv ic e . A c c o rd in g to V e s e lo v s k ii, th e m a jo rity o f p o m e s h c h ik i c a m e fro m th r e e b a s ic g ro u p s , re fle c tin g th e in c re a s in g a ll-R u s s ia n c h a ra c te r o f th e re a lm . S ix ty o n e o f th e 1 6 0 0 p o m e s h c h ik i w e r e p rin c e s , p rim a rily fro m R o s to v , la r o s la v l’ a n d S ta ro d ub . O n e h u n d re d a n d s e v e n ty fiv e d e s c e n d e d fro m th e m a jo r u n title d s e rv ic e c la n s o f th e fo u r­ te e n th c e n tu ry , w h o s e e c o n o m ic a n d s e rv ic e p ro s p e c ts h a d d e te rio ra te d . T h e la rg e s t n u m b e r o f p o m e s h c h ik i c a m e fro m th e m in o r M u s c o v ite s e rv ic e fa m ilie s , w h o ra n k e d b e lo w th e m em b e rs

o f th e

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h o ld e r s .22 In a re c e n tly c o m p le te d d o c to ra l d is s e rta tio n a L e n in g ra d s c h o la r s u g g e s ts th a t p re v io u s a n a ly s e s o f th e p o m e s t’e s y s te m h a d n o t ta k e n in to a c c o u n t th e c h a n g e s in th e c o m p o s itio n o f th e p o m e s h c h ik i a n d in th e s iz e o f th e ir h o ld in g s . G le b V la d im iro v ic h A b ra m o v ic h c o u ld a c c o u n t fo r n o m o r e th a n 1 4 0 p o m e s h c h ik i until 1 4 8 4 23, s e v e n ty -s e v e n o f w h o m w e r e p r in c e s , b o y a rs , m ilita ry c o m m a n d e rs a n d m e m b e r s o f th e old u n title d M u s c o v ite e lite w h o d id n o t s e r v e a t c o u rt. T h o u g h th e y a c c o u n te d fo r 5 5 % o f th e to ta l n u m b e r o f p o m e s h c h ik i, th e y o b ta in e d th e u s e o f 7 4 . 6 % o f th e a s s ig n e d la n d s . B y 1 4 9 9 th e p o m e s h c h ik i n u m b e re d 1 0 6 4 a n d 1 3 0 0 b y 1 5 0 5 . If th e p o m e s h c h ik i a s s ig n e d to Iv a n g o ro d w e r e to b e in c lu d e d in th e

Veselovskii, F e o d a in o e z e m le v la d e n ie v s e v e r o -v c s to c h n o i R u s i, I (Moscow - Leningrad, 1947), 290-296. In arriving at the figure of approximately 2000 pomest es, Veselovskii had to speculate. He claims to have had a hand list of “around 1600 persons." Since the cadastres for Shelonskaia and Bezhestskaia provinces were not complete, he added an estimated 400 to his total (ib id ., pp. 2 8 9 290,299). 23 “Pomestnaia sistema i pomestnoe khoziaistvo v Rossii v poslednei chetverti XV i v XVI v." Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie sistema uchenoi stepeni doktora istoricheskikh nauk (Leningrad, 1975), p. 14. Dissertation defended on 27 January 1976 in the Leningrad branch of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences. I am indebted to Prof. R. G. Skrynnikov for calling attention to this study and for providing me with a copy of the abstract. According to Abramovich’s categories, the following data emerged: % obzhi of land Pomest’es % 55.8 6970 31.4 44 1. Princes, boyars, voevody 18.8 2350 23.6 33 2. Non-court members of distinguished families 2741 21.9 34.3 48 3. Servitors of lower rank 3.5 440 10.7 15 4. Former slave servitors 22

X 84 to ta ls , th e s e w o u ld b e 1 2 3 4 a n d 1 4 7 3 r e s p e c tiv e ly .24 A t n o tim e in th e la te fifte e n th c e n tu ry did th e n u m b e r o f id e n tifia b le p o m e s h c h ik i re a c h th e 1 6 0 0 fig u re c la im e d b y V e s e lo v s k ii. T h e la tte r h a d n o t ta k e n into a c c o u n t th e im p a c t o f th e 1 4 9 9 c h a n g e s a s th e y a p p lie d to N o v g o ro d , in w h ic h s e rv ito rs o f lo w e r ra n k d is p la c e d h igh ra n k in g M u s c o v ite c o u rtie s a s p o m e s h c h ik i. A c c o rd in g to A b ra m o v ic h , th e c a te g o rie s o f s e rv ic e la n d h o ld e rs c h a n g e d s h a rp ly a fte r 14 9 9 25: to 1 4 9 9

by 1 5 0 5

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19

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N e a r e s t a s s o c ia te s o f Iv a n III, n o t in d u m a

40

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R a n k a n d file s e rv in g m e n fro m old b o y a ra l a n d d v o r ia n e c la n s

225

229

N o n -a r is to c ra tic s e rv in g m a n

610

845

F o rm e r s la v e -s e rv ito rs

146

172

1064

1300

P r in c e s , no t m e n tio n e d in m ilita ry re g is te r

T h e id e n tific a tio n o f n in e te e n c o u n cil m e m b e r s a s p o m e s h c h ik i b e fo re 1 4 9 9 is s u s p ic io u s ­ ly h ig h .26 C lo s e r e x a m in a tio n m u s t a w a it p u b lic a tio n o f th e d is s e rta tio n . M u c h m o r e striking is A b ra m o v ic h ’s c o n te n tio n th a t hig h ran kin g c o u rtie rs o f Iv a n III w h o h a d a c q u ire d

in absentia

p o m e s t’e s p rio r to 1 4 9 9 s u b s e q u e n tly lost th e m , w h ile im p o v e ris h e d m e m b e r s o f old s e rv in g fa m ilie s a n d th o s e o f m e a n e r s ta tio n a c q u ire d m ilitary d e p e n d e n c ie s in N o v g o ro d . T h e s e c h a n g e s o n th e N o v g o ro d ia n s c e n e fu rth e r illu m in a te th e p o lic ie s in itia te d in 1 4 9 9 . R e w a r d s o f p o m e s t’e s w e r e w ith d ra w n fro m ra n k in g c o u rt s e rv ito rs , th e r e b y re d u c in g th e d is p a rity in in c o m e s b e tw e e n h igh a n d m id d le m e n o f s e rv ic e . T h e c re a tio n o f s m a lle r g ra n ts in c r e a s e d th e s iz e o f N o v g o r o d ’s r e s id e n t w a rrio r c o n tin g e n t. T h e tr a n s fe r o f a n a d d itio n a l s e v e r a l h u n d re d r a n k a n d file w a rrio rs g u a r a n te e d p o o re r s e rv ito rs a s o u rc e o f p e r m a n e n t in c o m e . S o m e o f th e s e m e n w e r e tr a n s fe r r e d fro m th e c a p ita l a n d its e n v iro n s a n d th e ir p o s i­ tio n s a n d la n d s w e r e g iv e n to, o r a c q u ire d by, c o u rt s e rv ito rs . E a c h g ro u p fo u n d its p o sitio n s o m e w h a t im p ro v e d . T h e o re tic a lly , Iv a n III c o u ld h a v e d o u b le d th e n u m b e r o f p o m e s t’e s , for h e r e ta in e d in his p e rs o n a l p o s s e s s io n h a lf o f th e c o n fis c a te d la n d s in N o v g o r o d .27 B u t h e n e e d e d th e in c o m e to d e fr a y rising c o u rt e x p e n d itu re s . T h e n e e d fo r r e v e n u e a n d a d d itio n a l s e r v ic e la n d s to s u p p o rt th e ra n k a n d file w a rrio rs

« Ib id ., p. 18. 25 Ib id . 26 Cf. Veselovskii, F e o d a l’n o e z e m le v la d e n ie , I, 291,297; Prince Semen Riapolovskii, Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Patrikeev, Prince Aleksandr Vasil’evich Obolenskii, Prince Danilo Penko laroslavskii and Prince Vasilii Kholmskii acquired pomest’es though they did not become boyars until 1500. Prince Ivan lur’evich Patrikeev, as senior boyar, acquired the whole of Berezovets volost that had belonged to Marfa Boretskaia (V. N. Bernadskii, N o v g o r o d iN o v g o r o d s k a ia z e m lia v X V v e k e [Moscow - Lenin­ grad, 1961], p. 325, n. 56). To these may be added the boyars Andrei Fedorovich Cheliadnin and Iakov Zakhar'ich Koshkin. (The latter served as senior governor of Novgorod from 1485-1495): A. M. Gnevushev, O c h e r k i e k o n o m ic h e s k o i i s o ts ia l'n o i z h iz n i s e l ’s k o g o n a s e le n iia N o v g o ro d s k o i o b la s ti p o s le p ris o e d in e n iia N o v g o r o d a k M o s k v a (Kiev, 1915). Appendix I, pp. 156,166,169,176, 191. I can find only nine boyars (and no okol’nichie) holding pomest'es, seven of whom acquired these holdings prior to 1499. 27 Abramovich, “Pomestnaia sistema," p. 18. 2

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85

p ro m p te d Iv a n to fa v o r a m o v e to s e c u la riz e m o n a s tic p ro p e rtie s a n d c h u rc h la n d s . An a r o u s e d c le r g y v ig o ro u s ly r e je c te d th e p ro p o s a l in 1 5 O 3 .20 T h e p r o b le m s c o n fro n tin g Iv a n III re fle c te d u p o n th e n a tu re o f his a u th o rity . H e s ty le d h im ­ s e lf e m p e r o r , s e e k in g p a rity w ith th e H o ly R o m a n E m p e ro r a n d th e T u rk is h s u lta n . W ith in th e re a lm h e m a d e g o o d his c la im to s o v e re ig n ty . H e h a d fo rc e d his b ro th e rs to o b e y his w is h e s o r to s u ffe r th e c o n s e q u e n c e s . H e c o m p e lle d th e m to s h a re his b u rd e n s b u t re fu s e d th e m s h a re s o f th e p ro fits. H e r e q u ire d th e a p p a n a g e w a rrio rs to o w e him prio r lo ya lty . H e h a r n e s s ­ e d th e m ilita ry m a n p o w e r o f th e re a lm a n d m a d e th e a ris to c ra c y o f th e s w o rd his o b e d ie n t s e r v a n ts . E v e n th e c o u n c illo rs o f th e re a lm g ru d g in g ly a c k n o w le d g e d th e m s e lv e s a s th e g ra n d p rin c e ly s e r v a n ts (lite ra lly , s la v e s ). W h ile m e m b e r s o f th e e lite re q u ire d o th e rs to a c ­ k n o w le d g e th e m b y title, n a m e a n d p a tro n y ic , to w a rd s th e s o v e re ig n th e y a s s u m e d th e ro le s o f lo w ly fa m ilia rs . A s c h ild re n w e r e k n o w n to th e ir e ld e r s b y th e ir d im in u itiv e s , so to o th e y id e n tifie d th e m s e lv e s b e fo r e th e ir m o n a rc h . T h e g ra n d p rin c e h e ld th e ir lives, c a r e e r s a n d fo rtu n e s in his h a n d s . H e r b e r s te in did n o t e x a g g e r a te w h e n h e a d m itte d th a t V a s ilii III e x e r c is ­ e d g r e a te r a u th o rity o v e r his s u b je c ts th a n did a n y w e s te rn ru le r.2 29 H a d th e H a b s b u rg e n v o y 8 a rr iv e d in M u s c o v y a q u a r te r c e n tu ry e a rlie r, his ju d g m e n t w o u ld h a v e b e e n th e s a m e . C e r ta in ly n o w e s te rn m o n a r c h e v e r d r o v e his s u b je c ts so h a rd a n d fo r s u c h m e a g e r re w a rd s . T h e f a c a d e o f p o w e r is d e c e iv in g . T h e g ra n d p rin c e o p e r a te d w ith in im p lie d lim its. H e c o u ld in v o lv e h im s e lf in th e s e le c tio n o f s e n io r c le ric s o r fo rc e th e ir r e tire m e n t fro m office , but h e c o u ld n o t c o m p e l th e e c c le s ia s tic a l e s ta b lis h m e n ts to s u r re n d e r th e ir w o rld ly p o s s e s s io n s . A p o s to lic p o v e rty w a s r e s e r v e d to th e a p o s tle s . R e la tio n s w ith th e h ig h e r s e rv ic e a ris to c ra c y p la g u e d V a s ilii III a n d Iv a n IV a s th e y h a d Iv a n III. C o n te n tio u s n e s s a n d in trig u e b e c a m e p e r m a n e n t c h a ra c te ris tic s o f c o u rtie r p o litics in th e q u e s t fo r h o n o r, p o sitio n a n d in c o m e . A n y e x p lo ita b le c o n d itio n c a lle d to a c tio n th e a m b itio u s a n d th e d is g ru n tle d .

T h e p ro b le m s th a t v e x e d Iv a n III to w a rd s th e e n d o f his life r e a c h e d a c u te le v e ls in his s o n ’s re ig n . T h e first w a s w ith th e a ris to c ra tic e lite , w h o s e m e m b e r s c o n tin u e d to c la m o r fo r p re f­ e re n tia l tr e a tm e n t in o b ta in in g o ffic e s a n d p o s itio n s . T h e s e c o n d w a s a p ro tra c te d d y n a s tic cris is . A n h e ir to th e th ro n e w a s n o t b o rn until th e tw e n ty -fifth y e a r o f th e reig n a n d th e p ro s ­ p e c t o f a m in o rity g o v e r n m e n t d id little to e a s e th e s itu a tio n . T h e c o m b in a tio n o f th e tw o d e v e lo p m e n ts p r o d u c e d a d a n g e r o u s c o n d itio n c h e c k e d o n ly b y th e firm h a n d o f V a s ilii III. Y e t h e to o h a d to a llo w fo r c o n c e s s io n s . W ith his d e a th th e p o litics o f p riv ile g e a n d s e lfis h n e s s in v a d e d th e th ro n e ro o m until Iv a n IV a tta in e d his m a jo rity . B y th e b e g in n in g o f V a s ilii Ill’s re ig n th e titled e lite n e w c o m e r s e s c a la te d th e ir d e m a n d s fo r c o u n c il a p p o in tm e n ts a s a g r e a t m a n y o f th e m a tta in e d th e n e c e s s a ry y e a r s in s e rv ic e fo r e lig ib ility . T h e s e n io r p rin c e s o f S u z d a l', R o s to v a n d la r o s la v l’, d e s c e n d e d fro m fo rm e r g ra n d

28 F. von Lilienfeld, N il S o rs k ii u n d s e in e S c h rifte n . D ie K ris e d e r Trad itio n in R u ß la n d Iv a n s I II (Berlin, 1963), p. 67 and n. 72. 29 S. von Herberstein, C o m m e n ta r ie s o n M u s c o v ite A ffa irs ed. and trans. by O. P. Backus III (Lawrence, Kansas, 1956), p. 16.

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p rin c e s w e r e in th e fo re fro n t o f th e litig a n ts in sisting u p o n th e ir su p e rio rity by v irtu e o f birth a n d o rig in. In his c la s s ic s tu d y of th e b o y a r d u m a , K liu ch ev s k ii s ta te d th a t h ie ra rc h ic a l c a te g o rie s of elig ib ility h a d d e v e lo p e d by th e s ix te e n th c e n tu ry . T h e first g r a d e w a s c o m p o s e d o f th e h ig h e s t s e rv ic e p rin c e s , w h o s e a n c e s to rs h a d c o m e fro m L ith u a n ia o r fro m th e fa m ilie s th a t o n c e ru le d g ra n d p rin c ip a litie s in th e R u s s ia n no rth . H e in c lu d e d in this c a te g o ry th e d e s c e n d ­ a n ts o f P rin c e lurii P a trik e e v ic h , th e M s tis la v s k ie a n d B e l’s k ie p rin c e s , th e P e n k o v s of la r o s la v l’, th e s e n io r b ra n c h e s of th e R o s to v s k ie s , th e S h u is k ie s o f S u z d a l’ a n d o th e rs . O f th e old u n title d M u s c o v ite fa m ilie s , h e s in g le d o u t o n ly th e K o s h k in s a s b e lo n g in g to th e h ig h e s t g r a d e . T o th e s e c o n d a ry c a te g o ry h e a s s ig n e d th o s e p rin c e s w h o s e a n c e s to rs h a d ru led s ig n ific a n t a p p a n a g e s in th e fo r m e r g ra n d p rin cip a lity , s u c h a s T v e r ’, la r o s la v l’ “a n d o th ers ," a s th e T v e ria n M ik u lin s k ie s a n d th e la ro s la v s k ii K u rb s k ie s . H e a ls o in c lu d e d th e P rin c e s V o ro ty n s k ie a n d th e s e n io r O b o le n s k ie s . T o th e s e h e jo in e d th e u p p e r e c h e lo n o f th e u n titled M u s c o v ite e lite g ivin g a s e x a m p le s th e V o ro n ts o v s , D a v y d o v s a n d C h e lia d n in s . H e p la c e d in th e third c a te g o ry th e u n title d M u s c o v ite s o f lo w e r s ta tu s , s u c h a s th e K o ly c h e v s , S a b u ro v s a n d S a lty k o v s , th e le s s e r a p p a n a g e p rin c e s fro m a n n e x e d a r e a s a n d th o s e w h o h a d e v e n lost th e ir p o s s e s s io n s prio r to th e M u s c o v ite a n n e x a tio n . A s e x a m p le s of th e la tte r h e g a v e th e U s h a tie s , P a le ts k ie s , M e z e ts k ie s , S its k ie s a n d P r o z o r o v s k ie s .30 K liu c h e v s k ii’s s c h e m e , w h ile m irro rin g th e d e s ire s o f th e u p p e r a ris to c ra c ie s o f birth a n d s e rv ic e , h a rd ly r e fle c te d th e p r a c tic e s d u rin g V a s ilii Il l’s life tim e . Iv a n Il l’s s o n , in th e m a in , c o n tin u e d his fa th e r's p o lic ie s . H e to o did n o t a llo w a n y p rin c e re ta in in g s u z e ra in righ ts o v e r his s u b je c ts to b e c o m e a c o u n cillo r. S o th e M s tis la v s k ie s a n d V o ro ty n s k ie s w e r e e x c lu d e d fro m th e d u m a a n d e v e n fo rb id d e n to r e s id e in M o s c o w until th e y s u rre n d e re d t h e m .31 T h e T v e ria n s s im ila rly s e rv e d fro m th e ir e s ta te s , th e r e b y p re v e n tin g th e ir m o s t d is tin g u is h e d m e m b e r s fro m o b ta in in g c o u n cil p o s itio n s .32 N o r w e r e th e B e l’s k ie s a u to m a tic a lly g iv e n a c c e s s to th e d u m a e v e n a fte r th e ir m a rita l tie to th e g ra n d p rin c e ly h o u s e . If tw o la ro s la v s k ie s b e c a m e b o y a rs d u rin g Iv a n Il l’s la te r reig n , th e R o s to v a n d S u z d a lia n p rin c e s h a d to w a it th e ir turn until th e e a rly s ix te e n th c e n tu ry . T h e s e n io r R o s to v s k ie s , A le k s ­ a n d r V la d im iro v ic h a n d his b ro th e r D m itrii, e n te re d th e d u m a in 1 5 0 6 a n d 1 5 1 7 re s p e c tiv e ly .33 T h e first S u z d a lia n p rin c e to b e c o m e a b o y a r w a s V a s ilii V a s il’e v ic h N e m o i S h u is kii ( 1 5 0 8 / 0 9 - 1 5 3 8 ) . 34 H is y o u n g e r b ro th e r Iv a n fo llo w e d him tw e lv e to tw e n ty -fiv e y e a r s la te r .35 W h ile th e y w e r e g e n e a lo g ic a lly s e n io r to th e ir k in s m e n , th e G o rb a tie s - w h o a ls o b e c a m e s e n io r c o u n c illo rs in this re ig n 36 - th e y did n o t b e lo n g to th e o ld e s t living b ra n c h o f th e S u z d a lia n

30 V. O. Kliuchevskii, B o ia rs k a ia d u m a d r e v n e i R u si, 5th ed. (Peterburg, 1919), pp. 212-213. 31 The first Mstislavskii to enter the duma was Prince Ivan Fedorovich in 1549; the first Vorotynskii took his seat in 1550: see Appendix III. 32 Prince Semen Ivanovich Mikulinskii was the first Tverian since the Kholmskies to become a boyar (1550): Appendix III. 33 Appendix I; see also A. A. Zimin, “Suzdal’skie i Rostovskie kniaz’ia vo vtoroi polovine XV - pen/oi treti XVI v.,” V o s p o m o g a te l’n y e is to ric h e s k ie d is ts ip lin y , hereafter cited as V ID , VII (1976), 65-68. 34 Ib id ., pp. 59-61 ; Appendix I. 35 Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , pp. 52, 57, chose 1532 as the earliest definitive date for his elevation, though Ivan Shuiskii was identified as “boyar and voevoda namestnik of Smolensk" in 1520 by Lithuanian envoys: S IR IO , XXXV, p. 574. 36 Appendix I; Zimin, "Suzdal’skie i Rostovskie kniaz’ia,’’ V ID , VII, 62-64.

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fa m ily . T h a t d istin c tio n b e lo n g e d to Iv a n S k o p a 37, w h o s o m e h o w a v o id e d re n d e rin g s e rv ic e to V a s ilii III. T h e B e l’s k ie s w h o , to g e th e r w ith th e S h u is k ie s , p la y e d s o p ro m in e n t a ro le in th e po litics o f th e 1 5 3 0 s a n d 1 5 4 0 s , h a d a n e v e n m o re difficult tim e in b re a k in g into th e c irc le o f th e royal c o u n c il. P rin c e F e d o r Iv a n o v ic h B e l’skii h a d c o m e fro m L ith u a n ia in 148 1 a s a fu g itiv e w ith a p ric e o n his h e a d .38 S ix te e n y e a r s la te r h e m a rrie d Iv a n Il l’s n ie c e 39 a n d h e re c e iv e d a re g a l p a trim o n y in e a s te r n M u s c o v y c o n d itio n a l u p o n his c o n tin u in g s e r v ic e .40 B ut ro y al fa v o r w e n t o n ly s o fa r. F e d o r B e l’skii w a s n e v e r p e rm itte d a s e a t in th e c o u n cil. T h a t p riv ile g e w e n t to his o ld e s t s o n , D m itrii in 1 5 2 7 .41 T h e s e c o n d s o n , Iv a n , a ls o b e c a m e a b o y a r s e v e n y e a r s la te r ( 1 5 3 4 ) . 42 T h e m is tru s t o f th e fa th e r did no t e x te n d to th e s o n s , fo r th e la tte r re s p e c tiv e ly s e r v ­ e d e ig h t a n d tw e lv e y e a r s p rio r to th e ir p r o m o tio n .43 B oth a p p o in tm e n ts w e r e po litically in sp ir­ e d . V a s ilii III n e e d e d D m itrii B e l’s k ii’s s u p p o rt a g a in s t th o s e w h o c h a m p io n e d th e s u c c e s s io n of P rin c e lurii Iv a n o v ic h to th e th ro n e ; Iv a n B e l’skii h a d a p p a r e n tly p re v a ile d u p o n E le n a G lin s k a ia to a p p o in t him b e c a u s e s h e n e e d e d a tru s te d re la tiv e o n th e co u n cil. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f p rin c e ly c o m p e titio n h a d b e c o m e c le a r to th e o ld e r M u s c o v ite s e r v ic e a ris to c ra c y in Iv a n Ill’s re ig n . A s th e p rin c e s c a m e to d o m in a te th e m ilitary c o m m a n d s , th e y m o n o p o liz e d th e tra d itio n a l ro u te to b o y a ra l a p p o in tm e n ts . M e m b e r s o f th e o ld e r un titled e lite s o u g h t a d v a n ta g e in th e g ro w in g a d m in is tra tiv e s tru c tu re , w h ic h th e y d e v e lo p e d into an a lte r n a te tra c k to th e s e n io r c o u n cil p o sitio n s. T h e e x p a n s io n o f g o v e r n m e n ta l a p p a ra tu s a llo w e d fo r a n in c r e a s e in th e n u m b e r o f o k o l’n ic h ie . In 1 4 7 0 o n ly o n e s u c h po sitio n e x is te d b u t b y 1 5 0 5 th e r e w e r e six. T h r e e o f th e s ix te e n o k o l’n ic h ie in Iv a n Ill’s reig n b e c a m e b o y a rs . A ll w e r e u n title d .44 W h ile th e n u m b e r o f p ro m o tio n s a p p e a r to b e s m a ll, it s h o u ld b e r e m e m b e r e d th a t th e o ld e r s e rv in g e lite h a d a ls o d o m in a te d th e s e n io r co u n cil ra n k . O n ly fo u r p rin c e s w h o b e c a m e b o y a rs in Iv a n Ill’s reig n (tw o K h o lm s k ie s a n d tw o la r o s la v s k ie s ) c a m e fro m fa m ilie s e n te rin g M u s c o v ite s e rv ic e a fte r 1 4 6 2 . A lm o s t all th e o th e r b o y a r p rin c e s o w e d th e ir ris e to th e ir o r th e ir fa m ilie s ’ s u p p o rt o f V a s ilii II d u rin g th e d y n a s tic w a rs . T h e long jo u r n e y m a n s h ip r e q u ire d fo r c o u n cil elig ib ility h a d fa v o re d th e s tro n g e r u n title d e lite fa m ilie s .45 In V a s ilii Ill’s re ig n n in e o f th e tw e n ty -th r e e o k o l’n ich ie b e c a m e s e n io r c o u n cillo rs , e ig h t o f

37

R o d o s lo v n a ia k n ig a k n ia z e i i d v o ria n R o s s iis k ik h i v y e z z h ik h ,

1787), 68-73. 38 For his career in Moscow, see Fennell,

Iv a n th e G re a t,

hereafter cited as R o d .

k n .,

I (Moscow,

pp. 85, 86, 113, 139, 146; O. P. Backus III, 1 3 7 7 - 1 5 1 4 (Lawrence,

M o tiv e s o f W e s t R u s s ia n N o b le s in D e s e r tin g L ith u a n ia fo r M o s c o w ,

38 4° 41

Kansas, 1957), pp. 86, 98-100. P S R L , XII, 246. D D G , p. 357. S o b r a n ie g o s u d a rs tv e n n y k h g r a m o t i d o g o v o r o v k h ra n ia s h c h ik h s ia v g o s u d a rs tv e n n o i k o lle g ii

hereafter cited as S G G D , I (Moscow, 1813), p. 429. Cf. Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 52, who dated his promotion in 1530. Dmitrii Bel’skii had not yet attained his thirtieth birthday in 1527. 42 Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 54. 43 P S R L , XIII, 32; R K , pp. 68 -69. 44 Mikhail Iakovlevich Morozov (okol’nichii in 1475: R K , p. 11; boyar by 1495: ib id ., p. 49); Andrei Mikhailovich Pleshcheev (okol’nichii by 1475: Zimin, "Sostav,” A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 45 and n. 43; boyar by 1479/80: ib id ., p. 45 n. 43); Grigorii Fedorovich Davydov (okol'nichii by 1501 : ib id ., p. 48; boyar in 1503: S I R IO , XXXV, p. 350). 45 Alef, "Reflections," S E E R , XLV, 107-108. in o s tra n n y k h d e l,

X 88 w h o m w e r e c h ild re n o f u n titled b o y a r s .46 T h o s e p ro m o te d fro m o k o l’n ic h ie to b o y a rs a c c o u n t­ e d fo r 2 5 . 7 % o f th e to ta l o f s e n io r c o u n cillo rs . A d d in g th e m to th e s e v e n o f th e u n title d e lite w h o b e c a m e b o y a rs d ire c tly , th e u n title d c la im e d 4 2 . 9 % o f th e s e n io r c o u n cil s e a ts b e tw e e n 1 5 0 5 a n d 1 5 3 3 .47 O f th e r e m a in in g n in e te e n b o y a rs o n ly te n w e r e n e w c o m e r s .48 T h e d e fin i­ tio n o f n e w c o m e r is o n e w h o s e fa th e r o r c lo s e b lo o d r e la tiv e h a d n o t s e r v e d a s g ra n d p rin c e ly c o u n cillo rs . O n ly o n e a p p o in te e , P rin c e S e m e n D m itrie v ic h S e re b ria n y i O b o le n s k ii, fell b e ­ tw e e n tw o sto o ls. N e ith e r his fa th e r o r g r a n d fa th e r h a d b e e n b o y a rs , b u t his g r a n d fa th e r ’s b ro th e r a n d th a t b r o th e r ’s d e s c e n d a n ts w e r e p ro m in e n t in th e co u n cil fro m th e m id -fifte e n th into th e s ix te e n th c e n tu ry . If S e re b ria n y i w e r e to b e c o u n te d a s a n e w c o m e r , th a t w o u ld m a k e e le v e n p rin c e ly b o y a rs ra n k e d a m o n g th e n e w a rriv a ls . In s h o rt, w h ile a m a jo rity o f V a s ilii Ill’s b o y a rs w e r e p rin c e s (e le v e n o f th e n in e te e n , o r 5 7 . 8 % ) , le s s th a n o n e -th ird o f th e m c a n b e c a lle d n e w c o m e r s . T h e ratio o f u n title d to titled c h a n g e s ra d ic a lly w h e n th e c o m b in e d ra n k s o f th e c o u n cil a re c o n s id e re d . T w e n ty -th r e e o k o l’n ic h ie s e r v e d b e tw e e n 1 5 0 5 a n d 1 5 3 3 . O n ly fo u r w e r e titled b u t o n ly tw o o f th e s e w e r e first g e n e ra tio n a p p o in tm e n ts .49 N in e te e n c a m e fro m th e u n title d M u s c o v ite s e rv in g c la n s . T h e y r a n g e d in im p o rta n c e fro m m e m b e r s o f e lite fa m ilie s (a c le a r m a jo rity ) to a h a n d fu l o f r e p re s e n ta tiv e s fro m le s s e r fa m ilie s . T h r e e o f th e la tte r h a d b e c o m e o k o l’n ic h ie a fte r th e fall o f th e P a tr ik e e v s .50 A n o th e r tw o b e lo n g in g to ju n io r b r a n c h e s o f s ig n ific a n t old fa m ilie s h a d b e e n a d m itte d d u rin g Iv a n Ill’s tim e .51 A m o n g th e u n title d n e w c o m e r s , o n ly o n e T v e ria n , F e d o r Iv a n o v ic h K a rp o v , b e c a m e a n o k o l’n ic h ii.52 T h e n e w c o m e r s n u m b e r e d le s s th a n a th ird o f all th e c o u n cillo rs d u rin g V a s ilii Ill’s reig n . A fe w fa m ilie s m a n a g e d to re ta in m e m b e r s h ip in th e c o u n cil fo r s u c c e s s iv e g e n e r a tio n s . T h e K o s h k in s ( Z a k h a r ’in s, Ia k o v le v s , lu r’e v s a n d R o m a n o v s ) w e r e r e p re s e n te d fo r 2 0 0 y e a r s .53 T h e D o b ry n s k ie s h a d b e e n p ro m in e n t in th e e a r lie r fifte e n th c e n tu ry , b u t a m a jo rity c h o s e th e w ro n g s id e d u rin g th e d y n a s tic w a r s a n d th e r e b y lo st th e ir h o ld o n c o u n c il s e a ts .

46 A. V. Saburov, G. F. Davydov, I. V. Khabar Obraztsov, I. G. and V. G. Poplevin (Morozov), P. la. Zakhar’in (Koshkin), M. lu. Zakhar'in (Koshkin) and M. V. Tuchkov (Morozov). 47 Two were carryovers from the previous reign: Iakov Zakhar’ich Koshkin and Dmitrii Volodimirovich Khovrin. The other five were S. I. Vorontsov, his son Mikhail, the brothers I. A. and V. A. Cheliadnin and lu. K. Saburov, father-in-law of Vasilii III. 48 Pr. A. V. Rostovskii, Pr. V. V. Nemoi Shuiskii, Pr. B. I. Gorbatyi, Pr. D. V. Rostovskii, Pr. lu. D. Pronskii, Pr. M. V. Kislyi Gorbatyi, Pr. D. F. Bel’skii, Pr. I. V. Shuiskii, Pr. M. L. Glinskii and Pr. A. A. KhokholkovRostovskii. 49 Prince Konstantin Fedorovich Ushatyi of the Mologa branch of the laroslavskii line ( V r e m e n n ik , X, Materialy, p. 152) and Prince Vasilii Vasil'evich Romodanovskii, a former boyar of the extinct Vereia appanage (see Zimin, “Sobytiia," N o v o e o p ro s h lo m n a s h e i s tra n y , p. 96). Prince Vasilii Ivanovich Nozdrevatyi was the grandson of a boyar (A S E IS V R , I, pp. 144 and 606). His brother, Ivan Zvenets, had been an okol’nichii ca. 1490-1496 (Alef, “Reflections,” S E E R , XLV, 119; for the family genealogy, see V re m e n n ik X, Materialy, p. 245). Prince Peter Vasil’evich Shestun-laroslavskii was a carryover from the previous reign. 50 Grigorii Mamon, Afanasii Sakmyshev and Ivan Shadra Vel’iaminov. 51 M. K. Bezzubtsev. He was related to the Koshkins, but he was the first of his branch to enter the duma. I. A. Zhulebin was the first of his line to make the council. 52 His father, Ivan Karpovich, a Tverian boyar, transferred to Muscovite service in 1476: P S R L , XII, 168; for further information about this family, see Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , p. 366; for the genealogy, see V re m e n n ik , X, Materialy, p. 252. 53 Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , pp. 147-154.

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F e d o r S im s k ii w a s th e o n ly b o y a r in th a t fa m ily to r e m a in lo ya l, w h ic h a llo w e d his s o n , g r a n d ­ s o n a n d g r e a t-g r a n d s o n to b e c o m e b o y a r s .54 T h e d e s c e n d a n ts o f th e fo u rte e n th c e n tu ry A k in f G a v r ilo v ic h ’s g ra n d s o n A le k s e i (K h r o m o ie s , D a v y d o v s , O s te e v s , C h e b o ts , C h u lk o v s , Z h u le b in s , B u tu rlin s a n d C h e lia d n in s ) w e r e r e p re s e n te d in th e c o u n c il in to th e s e v e n te e n th c e n tu r y .55 T h r e e w e r e b o y a rs a n d tw o o k o l’n ic h ie in V a s ilii Ill’s re ig n . T h e M o r o z o v s fo llo w e d a s im ila r p a tte rn , w ith r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f th e m a jo r b ra n c h h o ld in g d u m a s e a ts in e v e r y g e n e r ­ a tio n fro m th e e a r ly fifte e n th c e n tu ry un til Iv a n IV ’s la te r re ig n , w h e n th e y w e r e v ic tim iz e d by th e ts a r . T h e m o s t s u c c e s s fu l w e r e th e P o p le v in s , fo llo w e d b y th e T u c h k o v s a n d S h e in s .56 N o t all o f th e u n title d old fa m ilie s did w e ll. T h e S ta rk o v s a n d D o b ry n s k ie s n e v e r r e c o v e r e d fro m

th e ir d is a s te r in V a s ilii M’s re ig n . T h e Z a b o lo ts k ie s , S a b u r o v s , P le s h c h e e v s a n d

N o v o s il’ts e v s fa ile d to e s ta b lis h d u m a d y n a s tie s . T h e K h o v rin s , d e s p ite th e ir w e a lth a n d c o n tin u in g in flu e n c e a t c o u rt b e c a m e ta in te d b y th e ir a llia n c e w ith th e P a trik e e v s a n d th e y d id n o t p la c e a n o th e r m e m b e r in th e b o y a r ra n k s until th e 1 5 6 0 s .57 N o r d id th e p rin c e s first fa v o re d b y V a s ilii II a n d Iv a n III f a r e w e ll a fte r th e tu rn o f th e c e n tu ry . T h e y o w e d th e ir g o o d fo rtu n e to th e ir c h o ic e o f th e w in n in g s id e d u rin g th e d y n a s tic w a rs , not to th e ir lin e a g e . T h e s u b s e q u e n t p r e s s u re s g e n e r a te d b y th e m o re p re s tig io u s n e w c o m e r s c a u s e d th e g r a d u a l d is a p p e a r a n c e fro m th e r a n k s o f th e s e n io r c o u rt a p p o in tm e n ts . T h e Z v e n ig o r o d s k ie s a n d R ia p o lo v s k ie s w e r e d r o p p e d fro m th e d u m a until th e m id d le reig n of Iv a n IV . T h e O b o le n s k ii b ra n c h d e s c e n d e d fro m P rin c e V a s ilii Iv a n o v ic h K o so i (p ro g e n ito r of th e S trig in s , la r o s la v o v s , N a g ie s a n d T e le p n e v s ) in itially did v e ry w e ll a n d th e n slid g ra d u a lly o u t o f th e c o u n c il p o s itio n s . F o u r o f K o s o i’s s o n s a n d tw o g ra n d s o n s b e c a m e b o y a rs , b u t a fte r 1 5 3 8 th e y lo st th e ir d u m a re p re s e n ta tio n . O th e r O b o le n s k ie s fro m p re v io u s ly u n re p re s e n te d b r a n c h e s d id b e tte r th e r e a fte r . T h e T v e ria n K h o lm s k ie s g a v e tw o m e m b e r s to Iv a n Il l’s c o u n c il a n d th e n d is a p p e a r e d fro m t h e ro s ter. O n ly th e o n e s u rviv in g b ra n c h o f th e P a trik e e v s , d e s c e n d e d fro m Iv a n B u lg a k a n d his b ro th e r D a n ilo S h c h e n ia (B u lg a k o v s , S h c h e n ia te v s , K u ra k in s a n d G o lits y n s ) d id w e ll.58 T h e s e illu s tra tio n s s u g g e s t th e p o te n tia l fo r d is c o n te n t a n d th e p o s s ib ilitie s fo r in trig u e . W h a t e v e r p o lic ie s th e g r a n d p rin c e p u rs u e d w ith r e g a rd to r e w a rd s , th o s e w ith u n re a liz e d e x p e c ta tio n s w o u ld jo c k e y fo r p e rs o n a l a d v a n ta g e . If p o litics h a d a lw a y s b e e n in th e fo re fro n t o f th e a c tiv itie s o f th e s e n io r s e r v ic e p e rs o n n e l, th e n u m b e r of c o n te n tin g g ro u p s c o m p o u n d ­ e d th e p ro b le m s . T h e g r a n d p rin c e d e a lt v ig o ro u s ly w ith in d iv id u a l d is s id e n ts , b u t it w a s not p o s s ib le to s u p p re s s th e m u ltitu d e o f m a c h in a tio n s . V a s ilii Ill's a b ility to c o n tro l th e s c h e m in g a ris to c ra ts w a s c o m p o u n d e d b y tw o v e x in g p ro b ­ le m s . T h e firs t w a s h is c o n tin u in g q u e s t to s e c u la riz e m o n a s tic p ro p e rtie s a n d to turn th e m into s e r v ic e r e la te d e s ta te s fo r his g ro w in g a rm y o f w a rrio rs . H e n e e d e d th e s u p p o rt o f th e u p p e r a ris to c ra c y a g a in s t th e c h u rc h o r h e ris k e d s ta n d in g a lo n e a g a in s t th e tw o im p o rta n t " e s ta te s " o f th e r e a lm . B y 1 5 2 5 his r e q u ir e m e n t o f e c c le s ia s tic a l s u p p o rt fo r a n a n n u lm e n t o f his m a r ­ r ia g e p u t a n e n d to his s tru g g le w ith th e c h u rc h .

54 Ib id ., pp. 302-320: Vasilii Obrazets, Ivan Khabar and Ivan Khabarov. 55 Ib id ., pp. 54-74; R o d . k n ., I, 335, ff. 56 Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , pp. 200-208. 57 Zimin, “Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 70. 58 Ib id ., pp. 49, 50, 56, 58, 60, 62, 68, 69.

X 90 T h e s e c o n d p ro b le m d e v e lo p e d in c re m e n ta lly . T h e in ab ility to p r o d u c e a n h e ir in tw e n ty o n e y e a r s o f m a r r ia g e e n c o u r a g e d a ris to c ra tic jo c k e y in g fo r p o sitio n , w h ic h c o lo re d th e p o li­ tics o f th e la te r re ig n . T h e lo g ic a l s u c c e s s o r w a s P r in c e lurii Iv a n o v ic h , Iv a n Ill's s e c o n d b o rn s o n , w h o m V a s ilii III v ig o ro u s ly o p p o s e d . T h e b o y a rs u n d o u b te d ly s u p p o rte d V a s ilii in his d e s ir e to p r o d u c e a n h e ir, fo r th e s u c c e s s io n o f P rin c e lurii m ig h t c a u s e th e ir d is p la c e m e n t.59 A s his s e c o n d w ife V a s ilii c h o s e E le n a G lin s k a ia , fro m a d is tin g u is h e d L ith u a n ia n fa m ily , w h o p ro v id e d V a s ilii w ith th e n e c e s s a r y h e irs . In 1 5 3 0 a s o n , Iv a n , w a s b o rn a n d a y e a r la te r, a s e c o n d , lurii, p ro v id e d th e in s u ra n c e th a t th e m a jo r lin e o f th e M u s c o v ite h o u s e w o u ld s u r­ v iv e .60 B u t th e birth o f a n h e ir a q u a r te r of a c e n tu ry a fte r V a s ilii first m a r r ie d a n d in his fifty s e c o n d y e a r in c r e a s e d th e lik e lih o o d o f a c a r e ta k e r a d m in is tra tio n . If K u rb s kii is to b e b e lie v ­ e d , a fe a r e x is te d th a t a m in o r o n th e th ro n e w o u ld e v o k e a c h a lle n g e fro m V a s ilii Ill's b ro th e r lurii. K u rb s kii c la im e d th a t V a s ilii in s tru c te d his w ife a n d a d v is o rs to m u r d e r lurii “s o o n a fte r his d e a t h .”61 S o m e e v id e n c e o f P rin c e lu rii’s a m b itio n m a y b e in fe rre d fro m his r e fu s a l to a tte n d th e b a p tis m o f his n e p h e w in 1 5 3 0 .62 T h e th r e a t p o s e d b y lurii c a m e no t fro m his m ili­ ta ry m ig h t b u t fro m th e n u m b e r o f s e rv ic e a ris to c ra ts w h o w o u ld s e e k p e rs o n a l a d v a n ta g e in s u p p o rtin g V a s ilii Il l’s b ro th e r. D ire c t e v id e n c e to s u p p o rt this c o n te n tio n is n o t to b e g le a n e d fro m th e c h ro n ic le a c c o u n ts , th o u g h th e y a n d s o m e s u g g e s tiv e d o c u m e n ts p e rm it s o m e g lim p s e of th e s u b te r ra n e a n d e v e lo p m e n t. A m o n g th e in v e n to rie d p a p e r s in th e s ix te e n th c e n tu ry ro y al tr e a s u r y w e r e a n u m b e r in vo lv in g s w o rn o a th s ta k e n b y c o m p r o m is e d s e rv ito rs to th e g ra n d p rin c e . B o x n u m ­ b e r 3 9 h o u s e d a n u m b e r b e lo n g in g to th e re ig n s o f V a s ilii III a n d Iv a n IV in w h ic h th e n a m e s of th e s e rv ito rs w e r e g iv e n .63 A v a rie ty o f fa c to rs p ro m p te d th e s o licitatio n o f th e s e o a th s . S o m e of th e r e c e n t a rriv a ls p ro m is e d no t to d e fe c t to th e ir c o u n try o f o rig in .64 W h ile all th e s w o rn

59

60

S. M. Solov’ev, p. 287.

Isto riia R o s s ii s d re v n e is h ik h v re m e n ,

III (Moscow. 1960), 285.

Ib id .,

ed. and trans. by J. L. I. Fennell (Cambridge. 1965). p. 201. (Moscow, 1972), p. 367. 63 O p is i ts a rs k o g o a rk h iv a X V I v. i a rk h iv a p o s o l's k o g o p r ik a z e 1 6 1 4 g ., ed. S. O. Shmidt (Moscow, 1960), p. 23. Other boxes (Nos. 34. 35, 72 and 147) contained additional sworn documents of perpetual and loyal service as well as those naming the guarantors who promised to observe the behavior of the rehabilitated. 64 Tsarevich “Peter." son of Khan Ibrahim of Kazan, who became brother-in-law to Vasilii III. took such an oath in 1505 (S G G D , I, No. 145). He promised to remain a true convert to Christianity and to avoid contacts with any of Moscow’s foreign enemies or even with his brother, the tsar of Kazan. Prince Konstantin Ostrozhskii had become a prisoner of the Muscovites in 1500, took an oath of lifetime service to Ivan III in 1506, but then fled to Lithuania the following year: Zimin. R o s s iia , pp. 80-81; S G G D . I, No. 146. Prince Fedor Mikhailovich Mstislavskii, a distinguished Lithuanian magnate, defected to Moscow in July 1526 (P S R L , XIII. 45). Prince Fedor took an oath of perpetual service in 1529. prior to marrying Vasilii Ill's niece, daughter of Tsarevich Peter (SGGD, I, No. 157; Zimin R o s s iia , pp. 315-316). Zimin speculated that Vasilii III considered making Mstislavskii heir to his throne. Prince Mikhail Glinskii was still another Lithuanian magnate and, perhaps, the most important defector to come to Moscow. Risen to high rank in Lithuania, he defected in 1508 and was warmly received (P S R L , XIII, 8 .10). But in 1514. he sought to betray Smolensk to King Sigismund of Poland. He was arrested and returned to Moscow (P S R L , XIII. 21 ). He remained in detention until 1526. Vasilii Ill’s marriage to Glinskii s niece won his release, but only after he took an oath to serve Vasilii III. Forty-seven courtiers put up a bond of 5,000 rubles that would be forfeit if Glinskii defected; S G G D , I, No. 155. 61

K u rb s k y 's H is to ry o f Iv a n IV,

62

A. A. Zimin,

R o s s iia n a p o r o g e n o v o g o v re m e n i

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oaths contain a provision prohibiting desertion to Moscow’s foreign enemies, they also forbade service with any of the Muscovite appanage princes.65 T h e firs t in d ic a tio n o f a c ris is w ith in th e r a n k s o f th e ro y al c o u n cil d a te s fro m 1 5 2 2 , w h e n V a s ilii III r e q u ir e d his b o y a r P rin c e V a s ilii V a s il’e v ic h S h u is kii to t a k e s u c h a n o a th .66 T h is is s u rp ris in g s in c e S h u is k ii h a d a lr e a d y b e e n a b o y a r fo r th irte e n o r fo u rte e n y e a r s a n d h a d b e e n in M u s c o v ite s e r v ic e fo r a t le a s t tw o d e c a d e s .67 In 1 5 2 4 tw o B e l’skii p rin c e s , D m itrii a n d Iv a n F e d o ro v ic h , to o k s im ila r o a th s .68 N e ith e r w a s y e t in th e d u m a , w h ic h c o n d itio n e d th e ir p o litics a n d e x p la in e d th e ir u n h a p p in e s s . A y e a r la te r P rin c e Iv a n M ik h a ilo v ic h V o ro ty n s k ii w a s r e ­ q u ir e d to s w e a r his a lle g ia n c e a n d p ro m is e d n e v e r to le a v e M u s c o v ite s e r v ic e .69 V o ro ty n s k ii h a d b e e n a M u s c o v ite s e rv ito r fo r th irty -fo u r y e a r s 70 a n d h e w o u ld c o n tin u e to d is p la y his m ilita ry fid e lity until his d e a th in 1 5 3 4 .71 R e q u ir e d to s e r v e fro m his e s ta te s in th e w e s t, h e w a s u n d o u b te d ly d is c o n te n te d w ith his in ab ility to ris e h ig h e r in th e s e rv ic e o rd e r. In 1 5 2 8 V a s i­ lii III fo r c e d P rin c e s Iv a n a n d A n d re i M ik h a ilo v ic h S h u is k ii to m a k e s w o rn d e p o s itio n s o f lo y ­ a lty 72 a n d h e re q u ire d th e s a m e fro m M ik h a il A n d r e e v ic h P le s h c h e e v in 1 5 3 2 .73 O n e m ig h t s u s p e c t a s p e c ific a c tio n o r s u s p ic io n a s c a u s e fo r d is g ra c e a n d th e c o n d itio n a l r e h a b ilita tio n . T h e c rim e o f th e S h u is k ie s is c le a r. B o th h a d e n te re d th e s e rv ic e o f P rin c e lurii o f D m itro v , s e e in g a n o p p o rtu n ity to b e c o m e b o y a rs o f th e a p p a r a n t h e ir .74 V a s ilii III h a d b a r r ­ e d th e m fro m his c o u n c il d e s p ite th e ir d is tin g u is h e d lin e a g e . F e a r o f fu rth e r p u n is h m e n t k e p t th e m in lin e until th e g ra n d p rin c e d ie d . T h e n A n d re i S h u is kii im m e d ia te ly u rg e d P rin c e lurii o f D m itro v to s e e k th e th ro n e , fo r w h ic h h e w a s im p ris o n e d th ro u g h o u t th e reig n o f E le n a G lin s k a ia .75 E le n a ’s d e a th in 1 5 3 8 m a r k e d th e m o m e n t o f v ic to ry fo r th e a m b itio u s b ro th ers . T h e S h u is k ie s a n d th e ir a llie s in th e d u m a s u c c e e d e d in n a m in g Iv a n a n d A n d re i S h u is kii a s b o y a r s .76 N e ith e r o f th e b ro th e rs h a d s e r v e d lo ng e n o u g h o r w ith d istin c tio n to w a r ra n t c o n s id ­ e ra tio n a c c o rd in g to th e p o lic ie s o f Iv a n III o r b y V a s ilii III in his e a r lie r r e ig n .77

Cf. the oath taken by Prince Danilo Kholmskii in 1474: S G G D , I, No. 103. S G G D , I, No. 149. 67 Appendix I. 6 8 S G G D , I, Nos. 152-153. 69 S G G D , I, No. 154. 70 R K , p. 22. 71 R K , p. 83. For his service career see p. 583. 72 O p is i ts a rs k o g o a rk iv a , p. 49; S G G D , I, No. 156. Thirty middle and lower ranking members of the dvor participated in a security bond for the good behavior of the Shuiskies. 79 S G G D , I, No. 162. 74 P S R L , XIII. 77-78; 1.1. Smirnov. O c h e r k ip o litic h e s k o iis to rii R u s s k o g o g o s u d a rs tv a 3 0 - 5 0 x g o d o v X V I v e k a (Moscow - Leningrad, 1958), p. 28; Solov’ev, Isto riia R o ssii, III, 396. The date of defection is not given in the chronicles, for the event was mentioned in the later arrest of Prince lurii Ivanovich of Dmitrov in December 1533. The chronicler indicated that the Shuiskies had tried to leave while Vasilii III was still alive. Undoubtedly their oath of 1528 placed the time in 1527/28. 79 P S R L , XXIX(Moscow-Leningrad, 1965), 10,11. 76 Zimin, "Sostav,” A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 55. Both Andrei Shuiskii and Ivan Fedorovich Bel’skii, who had been confined, received their freedom, whereupon they d e m a n d e d and r e c e iv e d promotion to boyar in 1538 ( P S R L , XII, 123; XXIX, 32) which was unprecedented in the annals of Muscovy. 77 Prince Andrei Mikhailovich served but once as a voevoda prior to his promotion and that in 1531 (R K , p. 79). Even after he became a boyar he commanded the army only once (1540): R K , p. 97. His brother Ivan had a slightly better record: 1531 (R K , pp. 77-78), 1532, (ib id ., p. 81) and 1538 (R K , p. 95).

65

66

X 92 M ik h a il A n d r e e v ic h P le s h c h e e v w a s a n e m b itte re d m e m b e r o f a d is tin g u is h e d fa m ily . H is fa th e r, A n d re i, h a d b e e n a b o y a r o f Iv a n III78 a n d his in a b ility to fo llo w in his f a th e r ’s fo o t­ s te p s p ro b a b ly d ro v e him in to o p p o s itio n . In 1 5 3 0 h e w a s o n e o f a n u m b e r o f d is g ra c e d s e rv it­ o rs p a r d o n e d b y V a s ilii III to c e le b r a te th e birth o f his s o n .79 Q u ite p o s s ib ly P le s h c h e e v , like th e b ro th e rs S h u is k ie , h a d d e c id e d to s u p p o rt P rin c e lurii in th e h o p e h e c o u ld im p ro v e his c a r e e r p ro s p e c ts . T h e P le s h c h e e v s fo u n d th e m s e lv e s b a n n e d fro m th e b o y a r c irc le . M ik h a il’s s o n , D m itrii, b e n e fite d fro m Iv a n IV ’s p o lic y to c u rb th e v ic to rs o f th e e a r lie r s ix te e n th c e n tu ry a n d b e c a m e a n o k o l’nichii in 1 5 5 5 .80 T o w a r d s th e e n d o f V a s ilii Ill’s reig n th e jo c k e y in g fo r p o sitio n h a d b e c o m e in te n s e . T h e g ra n d p rin c e s o u g h t to in s u re his h e ir s fu tu re b y n a m in g re p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e o ld e r M u s c o ­ v ite fa m ilie s to s e n io r c o u n cil p o s itio n s .81 W h ile o n e m a y in fer th a t h e p la c e d g r e a te r tru s t in th e fa m ilie s w ith lo n g e r a s s o c ia tio n w ith th e H o u s e o f M o s c o w , his c lo s e s t re la tio n s in th e d u m a a t th e tim e o f his la s t illn e s s in c lu d e d re la tiv e n e w c o m e r s w h o w e r e a ls o re la tiv e s : P rin c e D m itrii B e l’skii a n d th e n e w ly a p p o in te d g ra n d u n c le o f th e h e ir, P rin c e M ik h a il G lin s k ii. G lin s k ii h a d e n te re d M u s c o v ite s e rv ic e in 1 5 0 8 a n d w a s a rr e s te d in 1 5 1 4 o n th e c h a rg e of tr e a s o n . H e re m a in e d u n d e r re s tra in t fo r th e n e x t th irte e n y e a r s .82 G lin s k ii’s lin e a g e , his p ro v e n m ilitary a b ilitie s a n d his c o n s id e r a b le k n o w le d g e o f c e n tra l E u r o p e a n po litics h a d first a ttra c te d V a s ilii Ill’s a tte n tio n 83, bu t his u n b rid le d a m b itio n a n d s u b s e q u e n t d isillu sio n w ith th e re w a rd s h e re c e iv e d fro m V a s ilii III h a d led to his u n d o in g . G lin s k ii o w e d his lib e ra tio n to his n ie c e ’s m a r r ia g e to th e g ra n d p rin c e . T h is tim e G lin s k ii r e c e iv e d e x te n s iv e p ro p e r tie s 84, a n d s ta tu s o f a le a d in g g e n e r a l, th o u g h n o t on th e L ith u a n ia n fro n tie r.85 G lin s k ii’s g o o d fo rtu n e h a rd ly s a t w e ll w ith e ith e r th e old e lite o r w ith th e p rin c e ly n e w ­ c o m e r s . H is a p p o in tm e n t a s b o y a r in 1 5 3 3 w a s p a rtic u la rly r e s e n te d , fo r th a t g a v e a n o u ts id e r th e ra n k in g co u n cil p o sitio n . V a s ilii III in te n d e d G lin s k ii to b e c o m e th e r e g e n c y ’s s tro n g m a n 86, fo r th e ro y al re la tiv e ’s in te re s ts la y w ith th e in fa n t Iv a n a n d no t w ith th e fa c tio n s a t c o u rt. H is m a r r ia g e to a n O b o le n s k ii p rin c e s s w h o did n o t s ta n d h igh o n th e la d d e r o f p rin c e ly d ig n ita rie s p ro b a b ly in te n s ifie d th e re a c tio n o f th e la tte r g r o u p .87 T h is w a s b u t th e la te s t u n c e rta in ty in th e fin a l h o u rs o f V a s ilii Ill’s life.

Alef, "Reflections," S E E R , XLV, 114. Zimin, R o s s iia , p. 276, tried to tie Mikhail Pleshcheev to the Dmitrov appanage, allegedly because his grandfather Peter Mikhailovich had been a boyar there. Mikhail’s grandfather was not Peter but Mikhail Borisovich: V re m e n n ik , X, Materialy, pp. 260-261. 79 Smirnov, O c h e rk i, pp. 22-23; Zimin, R o s s iia , p. 367. Among those who benefited by the pardon were three duma members: the boyars Prince M. D. Shcheniatev, Prince B. I. Gorbatyi and okol’nichii I. V. Liatskoi; a d’iak, 1.1. Teleshov; a close confidant of the grand prince, I. lu. Shigona Podzhogin; and two servitors of consequence, Prince F. M. Mstislavskii and la. D. Morozov. 80 Zimin, “Sostav,” A E , 1 9 5 7 , p. 67; Mikhail's nephew, Aleksei Danilovich Basmanov became a boyar in 1555 (ib id .). For the genealogies, see R o d . kn. I, 229-300. 81 See Appendix I. 82 P S R L , XIII, 8 ,10, 21,45; Herberstein, C o m m e n ta rie s , pp. 121-125; Zimin, R o s s iia , pp. 164-165, 297-299. 83 P a m ia tn ik i d ip io m a tic h e s k ik h s n o s h e n ii d r e v n e i R o s s ii s d e r z h a v a m i in o s tra n n y m i, hereafter cited as P D S , I (St. Pet., 1851), cols. 151-154; D D G , p. 457. 84 S IR IO , XXXV, p. 775. 88 R K , pp. 74-75; P S R L , XIII, 47. 86 P S R L , XIII, 415. 87 S IR IO , XXXV, 775: the daughter of Prince Ivan Vasil evich Nemoi Obolenskii. 78

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A R I S T O C R A T I C P O L I T I C S AND ROYAL P OL I C Y

T h e g r a n d p rin c e h a d b e e n u n a b le to s a tis fy th e in te re s ts a m o n g th e o ld e r a n d n e w e r fa c tio n s o f th e e lite . P rio r to th e a n n u lm e n t o f his first m a r r ia g e h e h a d a llo w e d th e n u m b e r o f b o y a r s to fa ll to fiv e . B e tw e e n

1526 a n d 1530, w h e n

th e d e s ir e d h e ir w a s b o rn , th e n u m b e r

ro s e to tw e lv e a n d to fifte e n a t th e e n d o f th e reig n (s e e A p p e n d ix II). T h e s e a p p o in tm e n ts c a m e la r g e ly fro m th e o ld e r fa m ilie s : i. e ., th e u n title d a n d th o s e n o t tie d to s e n io r b ra n c h e s o f th e g r e a t p rin c e ly fa m ilie s . O n ly Iv a n V a s il’e v ic h S h u is kii a n d lurii P ro n s k ii q u a lifie d a s s e n io r d e s c e n d a n ts o f fo r m e r ruling g r a n d p rin c e s . It w e r e a s th o u g h V a s ilii III d e c id e d to p la c e his tru s t in th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f fa m ilie s o f p ro v e n fid elity a n d in re la tiv e s . T h e s tra te g y fa ile d . A w e e k a fte r V a s ilii’s d e a th th e re g e n ts a rr e s te d Iv a n I V ’s o ld e s t u n cle. It is n o t c le a r w h e th e r P r in c e lurii Iv a n o v ic h p la n n e d to s u p e r s e d e his n e p h e w o n th e th ro n e o r w h e th e r h e w a s v ic tim iz e d b y th e a c tio n s o f P r in c e A n d re i M ik h a ilo v ic h S h u is k ii. C e r ta in ly th e la tte r h o p e d to b e n e fit b y s u c h a c o u p . In a n y e v e n t, b o th w e r e a rr e s te d a n d th e ro y al u n c le d ie d in c o n fin e m e n t.88 S h u is k ii r e m a in e d in d e te n tio n until th e d e a th o f E le n a G lin s k a ia . T h e b o y a r a p p o in tm e n ts o f

1534 w e r e d e s ig n e d

to b o ls te r th e G lin s k ii fa c tio n in th e c o u n ­

c il.89 P rin c e Iv a n O v c h in a F e d o ro v ic h T e le p n e v -O b o le n s k ii w a s o p e n ly p a rtia l to th e G lin s k ie s a n d ru m o r h a d it th a t h e w a s E le n a ’s lo v e r.90 P rin c e Iv a n D a n ilo v ic h P e n k o v b e lo n g e d to th e s e n io r la ro s la v s k ii line; th o u g h th e s o n o f a b o y a r a n d c o n s id e re d o n e o f th e p re s tig io u s n e w ­ c o m e r s , h e o w e d his a p p o in tm e n t to his m a r r ia g e to E le n a G lin s k a ia ’s s is te r.91 P rin c e Iv a n F e d o ro v ic h B e l’skii w a s still a n o th e r ro y a l re la tiv e a n d his o ld e r b ro th e r w a s a lr e a d y in th e d u m a . T h e s e g a in s w e r e o ffs e t b y th e fa ll o f M ik h a il G lin s k ii in A u g u s t

1534. S m irn o v b e lie v e d

th a t G lin s k ii s o u g h t to w r e s t c o n tro l o f th e r e g e n c y fro m th e g ro u p a lle g e d ly d e s ig n a te d by V a s ilii III.92 A c c o rd in g to th e la te r

Tsarstvennaia kniga,

G lin s k ii a n d b o y a r M . S . V o ro n ts o v

w a n te d to g a th e r a u th o rity in to th e ir h a n d s .93 B u t V o ro n ts o v w a s n o t a rr e s te d a n d h e c o n tin u ­

1536. H e w a s , h o w e v e r , s h u n te d a s id e w ith a s s ig n m e n t to th e (1534-1S36).94

e d to h o ld his c o u n c il s e a t until N o v g o r o d ia n v ic e ro y a lty

S m ir n o v a ls o tie d th e flig h t to L ith u a n ia o f P rin c e S e m e n F e d o ro v ic h B e l’skii a n d o k o l’nichii Iv a n L ia ts k o i to th e p lo t o f M ik h a il G lin s k ii.95 T h e tw o h a d b e e n o n m ilita ry a s s ig n m e n t a t S e rp u k h o v w h e n th e y a b a n d o n e d th e ir c o m m a n d s . A c c o rd in g to th e c h ro n ic le r, th e “g ra n d p r in c e ” th e r e u p o n o r d e r e d th e a rr e s t o f th e n e w ly a p p o in te d b o y a r, P rin c e Iv a n B e l’skii, b r o th e r o f S e m e n , a n d P r in c e Iv a n M ik h a ilo v ic h V o ro ty n s k ii.96 S m irn o v h a s d a te d th e d e fe c ­ tio n a t le a s t n in e d a y s p rio r to G lin s k ii’s a r r e s t.97 W h e th e r th e tw o e v e n ts w e r e re la te d is no t

Smirnov, O c h e rk i, pp. 28 -2 9 . Zimin, “Sostav," A£, 1 9 5 7 , p. 54. 90 G. A. Vlas’ev, P o to m s tv o R iu rik a . M a te ria ly d lia s o s ta v le n iia ro d o s lo vii, 1/2 (St. Pet., 1906), 3 9 7 398; Herberstein, C o m m e n ta rie s , p. 29; N. E. Nosov, O c h e r k i p o isto rii m e s tn o g o u p ra v le n iia R u s s k o g o g o s u d a r s tv a p e r v o ip o lo v in y X V I v e k a (Moscow - Leningrad, 1957), p. 297, n. 18. 91 R o d . k n ., 1,121. For an interpretation of his role, see Nosov, O c h e rk i, pp. 292ff. 92 Smirnov, O c h e rk i, pp. 33 ff. 99 Ib id ., p. 40; P S R L , XIII, 420. 94 Along with Prince B. I. Gorbatyi (Zimin, “Spisok namestnikov,” A E , 1 9 6 0 , p. 35; R K , p. 90). For Vorontsov’s importance in Vasilii Ill’s later reign, see Veselovskii IP IK S Z , p. 224 and H. Rüss, A d e l u n d A d e ls o p p o s itio n e n im M o s k a u e r S ta a t, vol. VII in Q u e lle n u n d S tu d ie n z u r G e s c h ic h te d e s ö s t­ lic h e n E u ro p a , ed. by M. Hellmann (Wiesbaden, 1975), 100. 95 Smirnov, O c h e rk i, p. 42. 98 P S R L , XIII, 79,420. 97 Smirnov, O c h e rk i, p. 42, n. 20. 88 89

X 94 k n o w n , n o r h a s it e v e r b e e n c o n c lu s iv e ly d e m o n s tr a te d th a t G lin s k ii s o u g h t to a s s u m e co n tro l o f th e r e g e n c y c o u n c il. G lin s k ii, a s a n o u ts id e r, w a s c o rd ia lly d is lik e d b y a n u m b e r o f th e s e n io r a ris to c ra ts . A L ith u a n ia n b y o rig in , h e h a d s h o w n little fid elity to w a rd s his a d o p te d c o u n try . P ro m o te d to th e d u m a b e c a u s e o f his m a rita l c o n n e c tio n to th e c ro w n , h e a s s u m e d a p o sitio n n o rm a lly r e s e rv e d to a M u s c o v ite a ris to c ra tic fa m ily o f lo n g s e rv ic e . M o r e o v e r , a s a ra n k in g m e m b e r o f th e d u m a , h e e x e r te d c o n s id e r a b le in flu e n c e in m a k in g a p p o in tm e n ts to o ffice . N o m a tte r w h a t h e did w o u ld e a r n him h a tre d a n d m is tru s t b y th o s e p a s s e d o v e r fo r a p p o in tm e n t. H e w a s a n a tu ra l ta rg e t w h o c o u ld n o t s u rv iv e in a h o s tile a tm o s p h e re . S e m e n B e l’skii a n d Iv a n L iats k o i h a rb o re d th e ir o w n d is c o n te n ts . U n d o u b te d ly , B e l’skii s o u g h t a llie s to in c r e a s e his le v e r a g e in o r d e r to w in a b o y a r ’s ra n k . W ith tw o b ro th e rs in th e co u n cil a n d his fa m ily c o n n e c tio n h e fe lt c e rta in o f s u c c e s s . P o s s ib ly b itte rn e s s led to d e fe c ­ tio n. F o r th e n e x t s e v e n y e a r s h e e n d e a v o r e d to tu rn th e C r im e a n T a ta r s a g a in s t M u s c o v y , v e n tin g his a n g e r o v e r his ill fo rtu n e a n d h o p in g to b e in v ite d b a c k to M o s c o w o n fa v o ra b le te rm s . H is e ffo rts w e r e in v a in .989 Iv a n L iats k o i a ls o h a d re a s o n fo r d is s a tis fa c tio n . A m e m b e r o f th e d is tin g u is h e d K o s h k in fa m ily a n d w e a lth y a s a res u lt o f a n a d v a n ta g e o u s m a r r ia g e , h e h a d a tta in e d th e ra n k of o k o l’n i c h ii." F o r re a s o n s u n k n o w n , in 1 5 3 1 V a s ilii III o r d e r e d his d is g ra c e (a lo n g w ith P rin c e Iv a n V o ro ty n s k ii a n d P rin c e Iv a n O v c h in a T e le p n e v ) 100, bu t h e r e s u m e d his d u tie s b y 1 5 3 3 . 101 U n d o u b te d ly , h e b e lie v e d h e s h o u ld h a v e b e e n p ro m o te d , fo r his d is tin g u is h e d m ilita ry c a r e e r a n d b irth rig h t p la c e d him in th e fo re fro n t o f th e c a n d id a te s fo r p ro m o tio n . T h e e v e n ts o f 1 5 3 8 m o s t c le a rly d e m o n s tr a te a d e s ir e to m a n ip u la te p o w e r a n d o ffic e for p e rs o n a l b e n e fit. In e a rly A pril, ju s t six d a y s a fte r th e d e m is e of E le n a G lin s k a ia , th e b o y a r p rin c e s V a s ilii V a s il’e v ic h a n d Iv a n V a s il’e v ic h S h u is kii a rr e s te d th e ir c o lle a g u e P rin c e Iv a n O v c h in a T e le p n e v , w h o h a d in c re a s in g ly d o m in a te d th e g o v e r n m e n t in E le n a ’s la te r reig n . T e le p n e v did n o t s u rv iv e his a rd u o u s c o n fin e m e n t. A t th e s a m e tim e th e b ro th e rs S h u is kii o rd e r e d th e r e le a s e o f th e ir k in s m a n P rin c e A n d re i M ik h a ilo v ic h S h u is k ii. T o a c c o m p lis h this th e y h a d to fin d a llie s w ith in th e c o u n c il. T h is a c c o u n te d fo r th e r e le a s e o f P rin c e Iv a n F e d o r o ­ vich B e l’skii. B oth lib e ra te d a ris to c ra ts “d e m a n d e d " th a t th e y b e n a m e d b o y a rs , a w ish q u ic kly g r a n t e d .102 In a tr a n s p a r e n t m o v e to so lid ify a c o n n e c tio n w ith th e h o u s e o f M o s c o w , V . V . S h u is kii m a rrie d th e d a u g h te r o f T s a re v ic h P e te r th e fo llo w in g J u n e .103 T h e u n e a s y c o a litio n o f B e l’s k ie s a n d S h u is k ie s fell a p a rt s h o rtly a fte rw a rd s , a s e a c h s id e s o u g h t to s u b v e rt th e o th e r. T w o b o y a rs , P rin c e Iv a n B e l’skii a n d M ik h a il V a s il e v ic h T u c h k o v (M o r o z o v ) p ro p o s e d th e p ro m o tio n o f a P a trik e e v to b o y a r (P rin c e lurii M ik h a ilo v ic h G o lits y n ) a n d a D o b ry n s k ii to o k o l'n ic h ii (Iv a n Iv a n o v ic h K h a b a ro v ). B o th c a n d id a te s c a m e fro m o ld e r e s ta b lis h e d fa m ilie s a n d th e y w e r e s u p p o rte d by th e M e tro p o lita n D a n ie l a n d th e s ta te s e c r e -

98

99

100 101 102 103

O. P. Backus, “Treason as a Concept and Defections from Moscow to Lithuania in the Sixteenth Century," F z O G , XV (1970), 124-135. Backus believed that Bel'skii wanted to become the appanage ruler of Bel'sk and Riazan. Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , p. 151; Zimin, "Sostav." AE, 1 9 5 7 , p. 53: okol'nichii from 1526. First known service in 1514: S IR IO , XCV, p. 95; R K , p. 56. R K , p. 78. They were recalled from Tula, where they were on military assignment. R K , pp. 81,83, 84. P S R L , XIII, 123. Ib id ., p. 124.

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ta ry F e d o r M is h iu rin . T h e S h u is k ie s , fe a r in g th a t th e s e a p p o in tm e n ts w o u ld tu rn th e b a la n c e a g a in s t th e m in th e c o u n c il a n g rily o p p o s e d th e m o v e . R a lly in g s u p p o rt fro m o th e rs in th e d u m a th e y a r r e s te d a n d d e p o s e d B e l’skii. T h e y a ls o fo rc e d T u c h k o v to re s ig n a n d re tu rn e d h im to h is p ro v in c ia l e s ta te s . T h e n th e y o b ta in e d s u ffic ie n t s u p p o rt to c o m p e l th e m e tro p o lita n to r e s ig n . T h e s ta te s e c r e ta r y w a s e x e c u te d fo r his c o m p lic ity o n th e lo sing s id e . T h e c h ro n i­ c le r c h a r g e d th e S h u is k ie s w ith h a v in g little c o n c e rn fo r th e c ro w n o r th e la n d , b u t w ith s e e k in g a d v a n t a g e fo r th e m s e lv e s a n d th e ir r e la tiv e s .104 T h e s e e x a m p le s a r e b u t th e r e c o r d e d v is ib le tip s o f la rg e r a r e a s o f d is c o n te n t. T h e ro y al c o u n c illo rs m a y h a v e h a d in d iv id u a l a m b itio n s b u t th e y h a d to c lo th e th e ir s elfis h c o n c e rn s w ith ju s tific a tio n s a n d g o a ls th e y c o u ld s h a re w ith o th e rs . T h e y w e r e a s le a d e r s to p a rtie s , th o u g h p a rtie s in a n y re c o g n iz a b le s e n s e did n o t e xis t. T h e y re p re s e n te d in te re s t g ro u p s in o r d e r to d r a w a d h e r e n ts a n d s u p p o rte rs . T h e o ld e r s e rv ic e a ris to c ra c y fo u g h t a g a in s t th e d e e p in ro a d s m a d e b y th e n e w c o m e r s . A n in c r e a s e in th e m a le m e m b e r s o f w a rrio r fa m ilie s m e r e ly c o m p o u n d e d th e p ro b le m . T h e b o ld o u tlin e s o f “old" v e rs u s “n e w ” b e c a m e b lu rre d in m a n y c a s e s a s in te r m a r r ia g e s b e tw e e n r e p re s e n ta tiv e s o f th e tw o g ro u p s c re a te d v a ria n t p r e s s u re g ro u p s . T h e o b je c t o f e a c h g ro u p o r c liq u e w a s to p la c e s o m e m e m b e r in a p o sition w h o c o u ld b rin g b e n e fit to th e o th e rs . W h e t h e r this g e n e r a liz a tio n will b e s u s ta in e d re q u ire s fu r th e r e x a m in a tio n . O n e k e y to s u c h a p a tte rn w o u ld b e in in v e s tig a tin g th e a p p o in tm e n ts to m ilita ry a n d a d m in is tra tiv e p o s itio n s . B e tte r u s e s h o u ld b e m a d e o f th e m ilitary re g is te rs a n d th e s u rv iv in g c o u rt re c o rd s . T h e p rim a ry a r e n a o f p o litics w a s th e c o u rt, to w h ic h th e p riv ile g e d w e r e d ra w n s in c e Iv a n Ill’s d a y . T h e d v o r b e c a m e th e r e s e rv o ir fro m w h ic h th e a p p o in te e s to m ilitary o r h ig h e r c o u rt p o s itio n s w e r e s e le c te d ; th is in c lu d e d th e co u n cil itself. S in c e th e u p p e r e c h e lo n o f th e d v o r w a s c o m p o s e d o f th e w e ll-c o n n e c te d a n d th e h ig h -b o rn , all a s p irin g to b e tte r th e m ­ s e lv e s , th a t b o d y p ro v id e d th e fa c tio n s th a t s u s ta in e d th e po litics o f p riv ile g e . Iv a n III a n d V a s ilii III h a d d e s ir e d to in te g ra te th e a ris to c ra c y o f s e rv ic e a n d birth w h o o rig in a te d in th e old G r a n d P rin c ip a lity o f V la d im ir, th a t is, fro m M u s c o v y , S u z d a l’, T v e r ’, R o s to v a n d la ro s la v l’, but c o u n te rv a ilin g p re s s u re s h a d p re v e n te d th e in c o rp o ra tio n o f th e T v e ria n s . V a s ilii III did s u c c e e d in a d m ittin g th e R ia z a n ia n P ro n s k ie s to s e n io r c o u rt s e rv ic e . E v e n w ith in th e a d m itte d g ro u p s d iv is io n s c o n tin u e d a n d th e y w e r e all o p p o s e d to th e a d d itio n o f th o s e still o u ts id e th e a lr e a d y d ilu te d d v o r. In tim e th e fru s tra te d L ith u a n ia n p rin c e s in M u s c o v ite s e rv ic e , th e T v e ria ri lo rd s a n d e v e n th e d e a d - e n d e d N o v g o ro d ia n p o m e s h c h ik i w o u ld s e e k m e lio ­ ra tio n in th e ir fo rtu n e s . A t le a s t s o m e o f th e m w o u ld b e w illing to ta k e th e risk o f c o n s p ira c y o r c a b a l to im p ro v e th e ir p o s itio n s .105 W h a t th e g o v e r n m e n t n e e d e d w a s s tro n g s u p e rv is io n o f its u p p e r a ris to c ra c y fo r an e x te n d e d p e rio d o f tim e . B u t th e s u c c e s s io n a l c ris e s fo llo w e d b y a b o y a r-c o n tro lle d re g e n c y

104

P S R L , XIII, AE, 1957,

105

126,432; for the exile of Tuchkov to his village, see P S R L , XXIX, 135 and Zimin, “Sostav," p. 55. There is no record to show that he ever was permitted to return to his position or to the

court. On Novgorod, see Zimin, R e fo r m y Iv a n a G ro z n o g o (Moscow, 1960), p. 190. In 1436 Prince Andrei Ivanovich, driven into opposition to the regency council, appealed for support among the Novgorodian pomeshchiki. Some defected to his banner. In the punishments that followed, they were arrested, publicly whipped and then hanged from trees along the road between Novgorod and Moscow (P S R L , XIII, 430-431).

X 96 e n c o u r a g e d a llia n c e s fo r p e rs o n a l g a in . F o r all th e ir s e lfis h q u a rre ls , th e u p p e r a ris to c ra c y did n o t s e e k to d is m a n tle th e re a lm o r to a v o id th e c a ll o f d u ty, y e t th e c o n flic ts o v e r s e n io rity o f c o m m a n d s a n d p o sitio n s a t c o u rt, a lo n g w ith th e c o rru p tio n o f o ffic e s h a d d e le te r io u s c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s a t h o m e a n d n e w s o f d o m e s tic d is c o rd e n c o u r a g e d a tta c k b y M o s c o w ’s e n e m ie s .106 D e te r m in e d to ru le b y 1 5 4 7 , Iv a n IV s e t o u t to d e fu s e th e s e lfis h c o n flic ts th a t h a d c a u s e d so m u c h g rie f in th e p a s t. A s if to s y m b o liz e th e n e w ts a r d o m , Iv a n m a d e ro o m in his c o u n cil fo r re p re s e n ta tiv e s of th o s e d is tin g u is h e d fa m ilie s lo ng b a r re d b y p o litics o r p o lic y a n d e v e n in c lu d e d s o m e w h o s e lin e a g e w o u ld n e v e r h a v e e a r n e d th e m e n try . In a p e rio d o f fiv e y e a r s ( 1 5 4 7 - 1 5 5 1 ) h e a d d e d s ix te e n o k o l'n ic h ie a n d tw e n ty -fo u r b o y a r s .107 S in c e fiv e o f th e o k o l’n ic h ie w e r e p ro m o te d to b o y a r w ith in th e s e fiv e y e a r s , th e n e w a p p o in te e s a c tu a lly n u m b e r e d th irty -fiv e . E v e n so, n e v e r in th e lo ng h isto ry o f th e c o u n cil h a d so m a n y b e e n e le v a te d in so s h o rt a tim e . Iv a n IV a ls o b ro k e w ith th e p r e c e d e n ts o f his fa th e r a n d g ra n d fa th e r w h e n h e p ro m o te d th e fiv e o k o l’n ic h ie to b o ya r: n o t o n e h a d s e r v e d in ra n k fo r m o re th a n tw o y e a r s .108 T h is w a s a fa r cry fro m th e te n y e a r s r e q u ire d b y Iv a n III, a p ra c tic e to w h ic h V a s ilii III g e n e r a lly a d h e r e d . O f th e s ix te e n o k o l’n ich ie , o n e , F e d o r M ik h a ilo v ic h N a g o i, c a m e fro m a fa m ily o f u n c e rta in o r ig in .109 H is fa th e r h a d b e e n a ro y al h u n ts m a n in V a s ilii Ill’s e a r lie r r e ig n 110, w h ic h m a y h a v e a c c o u n te d fo r his s o n ’s e v e n tu a l g o o d fo rtu n e . A n o th e r, A n d re i A le k s a n d ro v ic h K v a s h n in , b e lo n g e d to a n old b u t u n d is tin g u is h e d s e rv ic e fa m ily .1111n th e lo ng h isto ry o f a s s o c ia tio n w ith M o s c o w , A n d re i K v a s h n in w a s th e first of th a t lin e a g e to a tta in e v e n s e c o n d -s te p c o u n cil ran k. M o s t o f his fa m ily c o n te m p o r a rie s r e m a in e d p ro v in cial s e rv ito rs . B y th e la te r 1 5 5 0 s a n u m b e r o f his k in s m e n w o u ld b e n e fit b y Iv a n IV ’s s u b s e q u e n t r e fo rm s .112 F e d o r G rig o re v ic h A d a s h e v u n d o u b te d ly o b ta in e d his a p p o in tm e n t th ro u g h his s o n ’s in flu e n c e w ith Iv a n IV . U ntil th e n th e A d a s h e v s b e lo n g e d to th e m a s s o f lo w e r le v e l s erv ito rs . V e s e lo v s k ii s u g g e s te d th a t th e y “p o ssib ly" d e riv e d fro m a K o s tro m a fa m ily .113 Iv a n ’s o th e r s e le c tio n s c a m e fro m th e b e tte r k n o w n g ro u p s . T h e fo u r M o r o z o v s ra is e d to s e c o n d -le v e l co u n cil p o sitio n s c a m e fro m th e fa m ily b ra n c h e s th a t h a d o p p o s e d th e r e g e n ts

Zimin, R e fo rm y , pp. 271 -272. Appendix III. Cf. Zimin s identification of those promoted (“Sostav," A E , 1 9 5 7 , pp. 5 9 -64) differs from Smirnov’s (O c h e r k i, p. 186). In part, there are differences of date of appointment and also there is variance over the period covered. >°8 Appendix III: i.e., G. V. Morozov, I. V. Sheremetev, D. R. lur’ev, V. M. lur'ev and M. la. Morozov. 109 Veselovskii, IP IK S Z , p. 10 identified the Nagies as a n o v y i rod. n0 R K , p. 44. For the family genealogy, see V re m e n n ik , X, Materialy, p. 186. The genealogy was hurriedly manufactured. This version dates from the reign of Tsar Fedor, wherein the Nagies sought to invent a distinguished ancestor, which was a common manifestation among the untitled clans by the sixteenth century. No one wanted to be known as being originally Russian. Even the tsar claimed descent from the imperial pagan Roman line. At first the Nagies claimed as progenitor a legendary German ancestor (/z N e m e ts ). By the middle of the seventeenth century they substituted a Dane as their founding father {R o d . kn ., II, 378). m V re m e n n ik , X, Materialy, p. 92. The family progenitor, Ivan Kvashnia, had been a boyar of Dmitrii Donskoi (S. B. Veselovskii, Is s le d o v a n iia p o is to riio p ric h n in y (Moscow, 1963|, p. 394). His descend­ ants did not fare well. ' 12 T y s ia c h n a ia k n ig a 1 5 5 0 g. i d v o ro v a ia te tr a d ' 5 0 x g o d o v X V I v ., ed. A. A. Zimin (Moscow - Leningrad, 1950), p. 318. "3 IP IK S Z , p. 10. 106 107

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a fte r th e d e a th o f G r a n d P rin c e s s E le n a .114 T h e O s te e v s h a d n o t d o n e w e ll in th e e a rly s ix ­ te e n th c e n tu r y . Iv a n C h e b o to v ’s g r a n d fa th e r h a d b e e n a n o k o l’nichii o f Iv a n III bu t his fa th e r a p p e a r e d ju s t o n c e a s a m ilita ry o ffic e r in 1 5 2 1 -115 T h e tw o lu r’e v s w e r e re la te d to Iv a n IV ’s w ife a n d th e ir lo y a lty w a s u n q u e s tio n e d . A n u m b e r o f th e o th e rs c a m e fro m d is tin g u is h e d old s e r v ic e fa m ilie s b u t fro m b r a n c h e s th a t h a d no t y e t c o n trib u te d m e m b e r s to th e c o u n c il.116 U n d e r th e o ld ru le s th e y w o u ld h a v e b e e n p a s s e d o v e r. In m a k in g a p p o in tm e n ts to th e s e n io r c o u n cil p o sitio n s, Iv a n IV d e c id e d n o t to ig n o re a lto ­ g e th e r th e p o w e rfu l m a g n a te s w h o h a d c a u s e d him a n d his fa m ily so m u c h g rief. Y e t h e re too h e s o u g h t to b r o a d e n th e b a s e o f his s u p p o rt a m o n g th e e lite fa m ilie s . O n ly o n e S h u is kii b e c a m e a b o y a r d u rin g th e s e y e a r s 117 a n d s o m e o f th e S h u is kii s u p p o rte rs w e r e a ls o ra is e d to s e n io r c o u n c il p o s itio n s .118 O n th e o th e r h a n d , Iv a n in vited a n u m b e r o f p rin c e s fro m th e b a r re d g ro u p s . T h is in c lu d e d o n e T v e r ia n , P r in c e S e m e n Iv a n o v ic h M ik u lin s k ii a n d tw o fro m fo r m e r L ith u a n ia n fa m ilie s : P rin c e s Iv a n F e d o ro v ic h M s tis la v s k ii a n d V la d im ir Iv a n o v ic h V o r o ty n s k ii. T h e ir s e le c tio n re fle c te d b o th th e c h a n g in g s ta tu s o f th e fo rm e r “s e rv ic e prin ce s " a n d a d e s ir e to d im in is h th e in flu e n c e o f th e c liq u e s th a t h a d d o m in a te d c o u rt po litics du rin g th e r e g e n c y p e rio d . A t th e s a m e tim e , th e e ffe c t o f th e s e a p p o in tm e n ts w a s to retu rn to Iv a n Il l’s p la n to in te g ra te th e v a rio u s s e g m e n ts o f th e u p p e r a ris to c ra tic s tra ta . T h e n , to d e m o n s tr a te th a t o u ts ta n d in g s e rv ic e c o u n te d fo r m o re th a n n e p o tis m , h e in clu d ­ e d a s b o y a r s s o m e in d iv id u a ls w h o la c k e d th e c u s to m a r y tie s . P rin c e D m itrii Iv a n o v ic h K u rlia tiv , th o u g h a n O b o le n s k ii, w a s a q u a s i-n e w c o m e r . W h ile his r e la tiv e s h a d p r e c e d e d him a s c o u n c illo rs s in c e th e m id d le o f th e fifte e n th c e n tu ry , h e b e lo n g e d to th e fa m ily ’s s e n io r b ra n c h w h ic h h a d n o t c o n trib u te d a s in g le m e m b e r to th a t b o d y .119 V a s ilii lu r’e v ic h T r a k h a n io t did no t e v e n b e lo n g to th e o ld e r e lite . H e d e s c e n d e d fro m a G r e e k w h o h a d first c o m e to M o s c o w in 1 4 7 2 w ith Z o e P a la e o lo g u s . H is fa th e r, lurii D m itrie v ic h M a lo i, b e c a m e a tru s te d co u rt fu n c tio n a ry , firs t a s Iv a n Ill’s k e e p e r o f th e s e a l a n d th e n a s V a s ilii Ill’s t r e a s u r e r .120 M ik h a il Ia k o v le v ic h N a g o i, w h o s e c lo s e r e la tiv e h a d b e c o m e a n o k o l’nichii prio r to M ik h a il’s pro m o tio n to b o y a r, b e lo n g e d to a fa m ily w h o s e c o u rt s e rv ic e w a s n e w e r e v e n th a n th a t o f th e T r a k h a n io ts. T h e r e m a in d e r o f th e s e n io r c o u n c illo rs c a m e fro m th e o ld e r e s ta b lis h e d e lite fa m ilie s , b o th title d a n d p rin c e ly , w h o h a d n o t d o n e p a rtic u la rly w e ll a fte r E le n a G lin s k a ia ’s d e a th . T h e ir in te re s ts a n d c o n s e q u e n t lo y a ltie s w e r e u n q u e s tio n e d . A t le a s t fiv e o f th e m w e r e re la te d to th e t s a r .121 C h a n g in g th e p e r s o n n e l o f th e c o u n cil w a s n o p e r m a n e n t so lu tio n w ith o u t dilu tin g th e c o m p o s itio n o f th e c o u rt p e r s o n n e l. In 1 5 5 0 Iv a n d e c r e e d th e a d d itio n o f o v e r 1 ,0 0 0 n e w -

114

118 116 117 118

119

120

121

The brothers Grigorii, Vladimir and Peter Vasil evich, whose father was a deposed boyar. The fourth was Mikhail Iakovlevich, whose father had been an okol’nichii in the 1530s. Alef, “Reflections,” S E E R , XLV, 119; R K , p. 65. F. V. Sheremetev, a Koshkin; 1.1. Umnoi Kolychev, a Kobylin; and la. S. Saltykov, a Morozov. Peter Ivanovich, son of boyar Prince Ivan Vasil’evich Shuiskii (1532-1542). Prince lurii Ivanovich Temkin-Rostovskii, Prince Ivan Ivanovich Turuntai-Pronskii and probably Ivan Petrovich Fedorov: Zimin, R e fo rm y , pp. 300-310. For his service career, see Vlas'ev, P o to m s tv o R iu rik a , 1/2,377-378. His mother was a Pleshcheev (ib id ., p. 376). A. A. Zimin, “O dvortsovykh uchrezhdenii russkogo gosudarstva kontsa XV i XVI v.t” IZ , LXIII (1958), 187 and 204; Herberstein, C o m m e n ta r ie s , p. 28. Prince D. F. Bel’skii (1527-1550/51), Prince M. V. Glinskii, I. M. and D. R. lur'ev and G. lu. Zakhar’in.

X 98 c o m e r s ( 1 0 7 8 b y a c tu a l c o u n t)122 to th e c o u rt. T h e s e w e r e to b e a d d e d to th e 5 0 0 - 6 0 0 w e ll­ b o rn m e m b e r s o f th e old d v o r - a c c o rd in g to V e s e lo v s k ii’s e s tim a te - w h o w e r e s e le c te d for m ilitary , a d m in is tra tiv e a n d c e r e m o n ia l d u tie s .123 E a c h o f th e n e w e r re c ru its w a s to r e c e iv e a s e r v ic e -c o n n e c te d p a rc e l o f la n d w ith in a ra d iu s o f 7 0 v e rs ts fro m th e c a p ita l, s o lo n g a s h e p o s s e s s e d n o la n d s o f his o w n w ith in th e a rb itra rily d r a w n c irc u m fe r e n c e . A s e le c te d m a n ’s s e rv ic e s ta tu s w a s to d e te rm in e th e s iz e o f th e g ra n t. B o y a rs , o k o l’n ic h ie a n d ju n io r b o y a rs o f th e first r a n k w e r e to re c e iv e 2 0 0 c h e tv e rti ( 2 6 6 .6 a c re s ); ju n io r b o y a rs o f th e s e c o n d ra n k , 1 5 0 c h e tv e rti ( 1 9 9 .5 a c re s ); a n d 1 0 0 c h e tv e rti ( 1 3 3 a c r e s ) fo r th o s e in th e th ird r a n k .124 Z im in h a s q u e s tio n e d th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f th is 1 5 5 0 re fo rm , a fte r e x a m in in g th e e x is tin g la n d h o ld in g re g is te rs fo r th e s e c o n d h a lf o f th e s ix te e n th c e n tu r y .125 F o r th e p u rp o s e o f th is p a p e r th a t is s u e n e e d no t b e re s o lv e d ; in te n t is th e m e a s u r e . T h e ts a r a n d his a d v is o rs s o u g h t to d ilu te th e in flu e n c e o f th e v yin g g ro u p s in th e e x is tin g d v o r b y flo o d in g th e c o u rt w ith o u ts id e rs . A c u rs o ry e x a m in a tio n o f th e id e n titie s o f th e in s c rib e d p e rs o n n e l in th e 1 5 5 0 list in d ic a te s th a t v irtu a lly all w h o w e r e to re c e iv e 2 0 0 c h e tv e rti o f la n d (a t le a s t s ixty p e rs o n s ) w e r e w e ll­ b o rn m e m b e r s o f th e e x is tin g d v o r, w h o h a d c u rre n t o r p re v io u s m ilita ry o r a d m in is tra tiv e s e r v ic e .126 L e s s th a n th r e e d o z e n o f th e s e c o n d -r a n k e d ju n io r b o y a rs w e r e in s c rib e d in th e m ilita ry re g is te r a s h a v in g h e ld m ilita ry c o m m a n d s o f lim ited re s p o n s ib ility p rio r to 1 5 5 0 . P re s u m a b ly , th e y s e r v e d fro m th e ir p ro v in c ia l b a s e s r a th e r th a n th e d v o r .127 F o r th e 6 0 9 m e m b e r s o f th e third ra n k a n d th e 3 2 7 N o v g o ro d ia n p o m e s h c h ik i c h o s e n to jo in th e “th o u ­ s a n d ” th e r e is n o re c o rd of h o ld in g o ffic e s o f re s p o n s ib ility p rio r to 1 5 5 0 .128 S o m e te n ta tiv e c o n c lu s io n s m a y b e in o rd e r. R u s s ia n ru le rs s o u g h t to c r e a te a c o m p lia n t a n d h o m o g e n e o u s a n d lo yal e lite , c a p a b le o f s ta ffin g th e m ilita ry c o m m a n d s a n d th e a d m in is ­ tra tiv e o ffic e s . Iv a n III h a d in te n d e d to g a th e r th e flo w e r o f th e a ris to c ra c y a t his c o u rt, le a v in g th e le s s im p o rta n t s e rv in g m e n o n th e ir e s ta te s . H e e x c lu d e d th e fo r m e r L ith u a n ia n p rin c e s , w h o re ta in e d bo th la n d s a n d s u z e ra in rig h ts a fte r th e y o p te d fo r M u s c o v ite s o v e re ig n ty . T h e ra p id ity o f e x p a n s io n in th e la te r fifte e n th c e n tu ry a n d th e s elfis h in te re s ts m a n ife s te d b y th e d is tin g u is h e d in birth a n d s e rv ic e , b e tw e e n n e w c o m e r a n d old s e rv ito r, te m p e r e d th e d e s ir e s o f th e ru le rs . A n o rd e rly a s s im ila tio n o f th e n e w e r a ris to c ra c y w o u ld h a v e r e q u ire d a s tro n g c o n tro llin g h a n d o v e r a c o n s id e r a b le p e rio d o f tim e . B u t th e c e n tu ry o f tra n s itio n , fro m 1 4 5 0 to 1 5 5 0 , b o rn

122 123

T y s h ia c h n a ia k n ig a 1 5 5 0 g .,

p. 10.

I (Moscow - Leningrad, 1947), 320. R. Hellie, (Chicago-London, 1971), p. 36, took Veselovskii’s statement to mean that “the Muscovite government [previously] had at its immediate disposal no more than five or six hundred men." But Veselovskii earlier (1940) believed that the entire dvor of 1550 had close to 3,000 persons: Is s ie d o v a n iia p o isto rii o p ric h n in y , p. 79. 124 T y s ia c h n a ia k n ig a 1 5 5 0 g ., pp. 53-54. A chetvert was equivalent to roughly 1V 3 acres: R. E. F. Smith p e a s a n t F a r m in g in M u s c o v y (Cambridge, 1977), p. xii. 125 R e fo rm y , pp. 366ff. and particularly in “Kizucheniiu reform ‘izbrannoi rady'," isto riia S S S R , 1976, No. 4, pp. 154-159. 126 These included boyars, okol nichie, senior court officials of the first rank: cf. T y s ia c h n a ia k n ig a 1 5 5 0 g . , pp. 5 4 -5 7 and the index of those named with their service as found in R K . Almost all were mentioned as having had military assignments prior to 1550 or at court. 127 T y s ia c h n a ia k n ig a 1 5 5 0 g ., pp. 57-61. 128 I b id . , pp. 61 -1 03. For the precise count of personnel in these categories, see ib id . , p. 1 0. F e o d a l ’rto e z e m le v la d e n ie v s e v e r o -v o s to c h n o i R u s i,

E n s e rfm e n t a n d M ilita ry C h a n g e in M u s c o v y

X A R I S T O C R A T I C P O L I T I C S AND ROYAL P OL I C Y

99

in d y n a s tic u p h e a v a l, w a s p la g u e d b y s u c c e s s io n a l a n d m in o rity g o v e r n m e n ta l p ro b le m s fo r fu lly h a lf th a t p e rio d . T h e a tte n d a n t u n c e rta in tie s p r e v e n te d o rd e rly p ro c e s s; in d e e d , th e p o litics o f th e m o m e n t e n c o u r a g e d ta m p e r in g w ith th e s y s te m o f jo u r n e y m a n s h ip , a p p o in t­ m e n ts a n d p r o m o tio n s . T h e a c tio n s o f th e b o y a rs d u rin g Iv a n IV ’s m in o rity w e r e b u t a n e x te n s io n o f a lo n g d e v e lo p m e n t. T h e s e c o n c lu s io n s la c k m o d e lin g a n d m a y r e q u ire a lte ra tio n . M u c h o f th e s to ry is still m is s in g , d e s p ite th e v is ib le c o n to u rs . W e n e e d to k n o w m o re a b o u t th e lo w e r e c h e lo n po litics in th is a r e n a o f p o w e r a n d p riv ile g e . F o r th e e a r ly s ix te e n th c e n tu ry w e la c k a stu d y o f th e c o u rt p e r s o n n e l, th e e x p a n s io n o f th e p o m e s t’e s y s te m a n d th e re la tio n s h ip s b e tw e e n th e po litics o f s u rv iv a l a n d id e o lo g ic a l is s u e s .

Mestnichestvo

is a n o th e r v e x in g q u e s tio n a v o id e d in this

p a p e r . T h e d iffic u ltie s a tte n d in g s u c h a n in v e s tig a tio n a r e a p p a r e n t to all w h o h a v e d e lv e d into fa c e ts o f th is p ro b le m . T h e lite ra tu re o n th e s u b je c t is s tu d d e d w ith fa c ile g e n e r a liz a tio n s a n d a h o s t o f e x a m p le s . C o n flic ts c o n c e rn in g s e n io rity in s o c ia l ra n k o r c o m m a n d p o sitio n s - b a s e d u p o n w h o s e a n c e s to r a lle g e d ly s e r v e d in a h ig h e r po sitio n - in m a n y in s ta n c e s w e r e fig m e n ts o f o v e ra c tiv e p a rtis a n im a g in a tio n s . In d e e d , w e la c k fu n d a m e n ta l k n o w le d g e a b o u t th e p e c k in g o r d e r o f a ris to c ra tic fa m ilie s in th e la te fifte e n th a n d e a r ly s ix te e n th c e n tu rie s . A c a r e fu l e x a m in a tio n o f th e m ilita ry r e g is te rs w o u ld r e v e a l w h e th e r th e c ro w n a c c e p te d m e s tn i­ c h e s tv o p rin c ip le s in m a k in g a s s ig n m e n ts .129 In s h o rt, m e d ie v a l M u s c o v ite h isto ry c a n b e s e r v e d b e tte r b y m o r e s y s te m a tic s tu d ie s w e h a v e h a d to d a te .

i 29 The provocative paper presented by Professor Kleimola, included in this volume, was unavailable to me at the time of writing.

Appendix I

Boyars 1505-1533 Dates of service Source of information as boyars

Marriage information

Comments

nothing in sources

1475-1515

Z, p. 45

m. d. of Pr. Ivan Vas. Gorbatyi Shuiskii

Grandson of boyar Prince lurii Patrikeevich. Nephew of boyar Pr. Ivan lur. Patrikeev. Younger brother of boyar Prince Ivan Bulgak. Cousin of boyar Prince Vas. Kosoi Patrikeev. Son, Mikhail and two grandsons, boyars.

Iakov Zakhar’ich Koshkin

nothing in sources

1479-1510

Z, p. 45

Descended from boyaral family of Fedor Koshka. Brother, lurii, b. Son Peter: b.; son Vasilii, o. Descendants in Ivan IV’s duma.

Dmitrii Vlad. Khovrin

1489: S IR IO , XLI,pp.8385

5yrs.

1494-1509

Z, p. 46: 1495-1527. First mention: S I R I O , XXXV, p. 123; last: ib id ., p. 489.

Father, b. of Vasilii II and Ivan III. Re­ lated to Patrikeev by marriage, as well as to Morozovs and Gorbaties.

Prince Vasilii Dan. Kholmskii

1495: p. 25

5

1500-1508 (deposed)

Z, p. 48: 1504-1508; see Alef, “Reflections," S E E R , XLV, 91, n. 73

m. d. of Ivan III.

Father, Danilo, b. of Ivan III.

Prince Peter Vas. Nagol Obolenski!

1469; P S R L , VI, 188-89

31

1500-1509

Z, p. 47

mother: Princess Evpraksiia Mikh. Bel'skaia

Father and three brothers: boyars.

Name

First known service

Prince Danilo Vas. Shchenia

RK,

Service prior to boyardom

1503-1521

Z, p. 48: 1507-17: First men.: S IR IO , XXXV, pp. 350,376; last: pp. 5 9 5605

Father, Fedor Davydovich, b. of Ivan III. Brother, Peter, okol'nichii. Nephew, Ivan Petr. Fedorov will become boyar.

12/13

1505-1521

Z, p. 48: from 1511. First men.: R K , p. 35.

First, since great grandfather, to be­ come a boyar. Sons, Mikhail, Ivan and Fedor will become boyars.

1491/92: p. 22

14/15

1506-1522

Z, p. 49: from 1509. First men.: S IR IO , XXXV, p. 480

First of family in duma. Nephew, Andrei Dm. will become boyar in 1542.

Prince Fedor Vas. Telepen’ Obolenskii

1491/92: R K , pp. 21 -2 2

15/16

1507-?

Not in Z. XXXV, p. 483

Father and three brothers boyars.

Prince Vasilii Vas. Nemoi Shuiskii

1491/92: p. 22

16/17

1508/9-1538

Z, p. 50: 1512-38. First men.: S IR IO , XXXV, pp. 488-489

m. Anastasia, d. of Ivan III in 1438

First of family in duma. Had no male children. Brother, Ivan, and second cousins, Andrei and Vasilii Mikh. will be in duma of Vasilii III and in minority gov’t of Ivan IV.

Ivan Andr. Cheliadnin

2/3

1508/09-1514 (captured)

Z, p. 49

S IR IO ,

m. Elena, sister of Prince Ivan lur. Patrikeev

Great-grandfather, grandfather, father and brother, all boyars. Only son, Ivan, boyar. End of line: no children.

8

1509-?

Z, p. 49

d. m. Vasilii III

Grandfather and two uncles, boyars. Father not in duma.

1495: p. 25

Semen Ivan. Vorontsov

1492/3: p. 23

Prince Aleksandr Vlad. Rostovskii

RK,

RK,

RK,

RK,

1506/07:

S IR IO ,

XXXV, p. 483 lurii Konst. Saburov

1501 : R K , p. 32

ARISTOCRATIC POLITICS AND ROYAL POLICY

8

Grigorii Fed. Davydov (from okol.)

X

1509-1514 (captured) 1552-1554

Z, p. 49

Descended from Pr. lurii Patrikeevich. Father, uncle and cousin, boyars. Sire of Golitsyn branch of family. Son, lurii, will be boyar.

1488/89: 21

23/24

1512-1534

Z, p. 50

Junior Suzdal’ line. First of family in duma. Son will be boyar of Ivan IV.

Prince Mikhail Dan. Shcheniatev

1511 : P S R L , XIII, 23

1

1512-1531

Z, p. 50

d. m. Pr. I. F. Only son of Pr. Danilo Shchenia (see Bel’skiiabove). Sons, Vasilii and Peter, boyars.

Prince Ivan Mikh. Repnia Obolenskii

1491: P S R L , XIII, 263

21

1512-1513

Z, p. 50

Sire of Repnins. First of this branch of Obolenskies to become boyar. Son and grandson, boyars. First cousin to Princes Fedor and Peter Vas. Obolenskii.

Vasilii Andreevich Cheliadnin

1509: dvoretskii RK, p. 44

unknown; adm. 1513-1516 route

Z, p. 50

m. d. of Fedor Brother of Ivan Andr. Cheliadnin (see Telepen’ above). No children. Obol. d. m. F. I. Bezzubtsev 2nd d. m. Pr. Ivan Osip. Dorogobu zhskii; then Ivan Petr. Fedorov

1495: p. 25

Prince Boris Ivan. Gorbatyi

RK,

RK,

Prince Peter Vas. Velikoi Unknown Shestun-laroslavskii (from okol.) Prince Dmitrii Vlad. Rostovskii

1501 : R K , p. 31

16

1514

Not in Z. See S IR IO , XCV, p. 96

Only member of his branch to make the duma.

1517

Z, p. 50

Younger brother of Aleksandr Vlad. Rostovskii (see above).

102

14

Prince Mikhail Ivan. Golitsa Bulgakov

X

1495: RK, p. 25

28

1523-1533

Z, p. 52: 1523/241533; First men.: 1523, Sept.: PSRL, XIII, 44

m. Evdokiia, d. of Dm. V. Khovrin d., Irina, m. Prince Andrei Dm. Rostovskii

Descended from Dobrynskies. Grand­ father and father, boyars. Son Ivan, also boyar. Disgraced in 1554. Last of line.

Mikhail lur. Zakhar'in (from okol.)

1495: RK, p. 26

30

1525-1539 (deposed)

Z, p. 52. Possibly boyar by 1523: P S R L , XXVI, 312

Mother: Irina Ivanovna TuchkoMorozov

Descended from Koshkins. See Iakov Koshkin, above. Father, lurii, boyar. Son and grandson, boyars.

Prince Semen Dmitr. 1500: RK, Serebrianyi (Obolenskii) p. 42

18

1526

Z, p. 52

Prince Ivan Vas. Nemoi Obolenskii Telepnev

1508/09: XXXV, p. 486

17/18

1526

Z, p. 52

S IR IO ,

Peter Iakov. Zakhar’in (from okol.)

1495: RK, p. 26

32

1527-1533

Z, p. 52

Ivan Grig. Poplevin (Morozov) (from okol.)

1494: S I R I O , XXXV, p. 134

29

1523-1554

Z, p. 52: 1527-1554; First mention: S IR IO ,

XXXV, p. 672

Prince Ivan Ivan. Shchetina Obolenskii

1506: R K , p. 36

21

1527-1532

Z, p. 52

First of this branch to make duma. Two sons will become boyars. d. m. Prince Mikhail L. Glinskii

Grandfather and four uncles, boyars. Father not in duma. Son, Dmitrii, boyar.

Son of boyar Iakov Koshkin (see above). Son, Zakharii became a boyar. Brother, Vasilii, was an okol’nichii. Eldest of 5 sons of boyar Grigorii Popleva Morozov. Brother Vasilii will be okol’nichii and boyar. Brother Iakov became okol’nichii. Nephews also in duma. Son, Semen will become okol'nichii of Ivan IV; last of line.

m. Stepan­ ida, d. of Ivan Konst. ZubatoiMorozov

Fourth son of boyar Prince Ivan Vas. Striga Obolenskii. Grandfather, father and four uncles had been boyars. First cousin to boyar Pr. Ivan Vas. Nemoi Obolenskii.

103

mother: d. of Iv. Iv. Kosh­ kin. m. Agrafena, d. of. D. V. Khovrin. (Z).

ARISTOCRATIC POLITICS AND ROYAL POLICY

Ivan Khabar Vas. Obraztsov (from okol.)

X

First Pronskii in duma. Younger brother Danilo will be boyar of Ivan IV.

1506: R K , p. 37

23

Prince Mikhail Vas. Kislyi Gorbatyi

1508: p.43

21

1529-1534/5

Z, p. 52

m .d.ofD. V. Khovrin; sister-in-law m. to 1. G. PoplevinMorozov

Prince Dmitrii Fed. Bel'skii

1519: P S R L , XIII, 32

8

1527-1550

Z. p. 52: 1530-1550. First mention: SGGD, 1, p. 429

mother: Anna Only son. Dmitrii. boyar of Ivan IV Vas. Riaszanskaia d. of Vas. II m. Marfa, d. of 1. A. Cheliadnin. daughter, Anastasija m. to Vasilii Mikh. lur’ev-Zakh. daughter, Evdokiia, m. to M. la. Morozov

Vasllii Grig. Poplevin (Morozov) (from okol.)

1495: p. 25

36

1531-1544 (deposed)

Z. p. 52

mother: Agrafina, d. of Dmitrii V. Khovrin

RK,

RK,

Not in Z.; XXXV. pp. 786, 801, 813,823,825. Probably b. in 1527: ibid., p. 760; last mention: P S R L , XIII. 77-78. S IR IO ,

First cousin of Boris Ivanovich Gorbatyi

Brother of Ivan Grig. Poplevin (see above). Brother Iakov will be okol'nichii.

104

1529-1534

Prince lurii Dmitr. Pronskii

36

1531-32

Z, p. 52

Grandfather, Fedor Sabur, father and uncles (Ivan and Mikhailo Fedorovich) boyars

Mikhail Sem. Vorontsov

1512: RK. p. 48

19 .

1531-1536

Z, p. 52: 1532-36; First men.: RK, p. 75

Son of boyar Semen Ivan. Vorontsov. Brother will be okol'nichii and boyar during regency (Ivan Sem.). Brother Fedor also will be boyar. Sons lurii and Ivan will be boyars.

Prince Ivan Vas. Shuiskii

1501/2, RK, 33

30/31

1532-1542

Z, pp. 52. 57; possibly boyar from 1520: "boyar and namestnik of Smolensk,” S I R I O , XXXV, p. 574

Brother of boyar Pr. Vasilii Vas. Shuiskii. Son Peter and grandson Ivan, boyars of Ivan IV.

Mikhail Vas. Tuchkov (Morozov) (from okol.)

1501, Zimin, "Spisok nam." AE, 1960, p. 29

32

1533

Z, p. 52

Son of boyar Vasilii Borisovich Tuchko. Uncle, Ivan, also boyar. Vasilii Grig. Morozov was second cousin. Aunt, Irina, married lurii Zakhar. Koshkin and she was the mother of Roman lur. Zakhar’in.

Prince Mikhail Lvov. Glinskii

1508: PDS, 1, cols. 151-54; mil. May 1508: RK, p. 39; arrested 1514: P S R L XIII, 21; released: 1527: P S R L , XIII, 45

1533-34 (arrested)

Z, p. 52

Prince Aleksandr Andr. Khokholkov Rostovskii

1495: RK, p. 25

1533-1538

Z, pp. 52 -53

38

niece m. Vasilii III; m. d. of Prince Ivan Vas. Nemoi Telepnev

Lithuanian immigrant. First Glinskii in duma.

First of his branch in duma. Brothers Ivan Katyr and lurii also boyars.

105

1495: S IR IO , XXXV, p. 163

ARISTOCRATIC POLITICS AND ROYAL POLICY

Andrei Vas. Saburov (from okol.)

X

X 106 Appendix l/b

Okol’nichie, 1505- 1533 Prince Peter Vas. Shestun-Laroslavskii (to boyar)

1489-1513

Z, p. 49: 1509. See Alef “Reflections," S E E R , XLV, p. 83, n. 27

Grigorii Andreev. Mamon

1500-1509

Z, p. 49: about 1509. First mention: 16

Peter Fedor. Davydov

1501-1509

Z, p. 48

Afanasii Stepan Sakmyshev

1501-1509

Z, p. 48

Ivan Vas. Shadra Vel'iaminov

1503-1509

Z, p. 48

Konstantin Grig. Zabolotskii

1503-1512

Z. p. 48

Ivan Grig. Poplevin (Morozov) (to boyar)

1507-1523

Z, p. 49:1507-1527. First mention; S IR IO , XXXV, p. 672

Prince Vasilii Ivan. Nozdrevatyi

1509-?

Z, p. 49

Prince Vasilii Vas. Romodanovskii

1509-?

Z, p. 49

Ivan Andreev Zhulebin

1509-1520

Z, p. 49

Ivan Vas. Khabar Obrazets (to boyar)

1509-1523

Z, p. 49: 1509-1523/24. First mention as boyar: P S R L , XIII, 44

Andrei Vas. Saburov (to boyar)

1509-1531

Z, p. 49

Mikhail Konst. Bezzubtsev

1509-1519

Z, p. 49

Mikhail. Vas. Tuchkov (Morozov)

1511-1533

Z, p. 51

Prince Konstantin Fed. Ushatyi

1512-1514

Z, p. 50

Peter Iakov. Zakhar’in (to boyar)

1512-1527

Z, p. 50

Vasilii Iakov. Zakhar’in

1515-1526

Z, p. 51

Ivan Konst. Saburov

7-1517/18

Z, p. 51. No mention in chronicles, military registers or dipl. papers. Veselovskii iden­ tified him as pisets in Pskov (1510) and dvoretskii in Nov. (1524). Died in 1548 on Kazan campaign (IP IK S Z , p. 191).

Mikhail lur. Zakhar’in (to boyar)

to 1520-1525

Z,p. 51

Vasilii Grig. Poplevin (Morozov)

1522-1531

Z, p. 53

RK,

p.

X ARISTOCRATIC POLITICS AND ROYAL POLICY

107

Ivan Vas. Liatskoi (Koshkin)

1526-1534 (fled to Lith.)

Z, p. 53

Fedor Ivan. Karpov

1527-1539

Z, p. 53: 1527-1537

Iakov Grig. Poplevin (Morozov)

1529-1537

Z, p. 53: 1526-1537. 1526 was a typo­ graphical error.

Andrei Nikitich Buturlin was included as an okol’nichii in Z, p. 51:1514-1531. Later Zimin admitted that inclusion of this name was an error: “Istochniki po istorii mestnichestva," AE, 1968 (1970), p. 115, n. 597.

24 23 22 21

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

X ARISTOCRATIC POLITICS AND ROYAL POLICY

109

Appendix III Boyars: 1547-1551 Source for identifications: Zimin, “Sostav," pp. 59 -64. *: T y s ia c h n a ia k n ig a , pp. 5 4 55.

Boyars 'Pr. M. V. Glinskii *Pr. 1.1. Turuntai-Pronskii Pr. D. D. Pronskii •1. P. Fedorov 1.1. Khabarov G. lu. Zakhar’in F. A. Bulgakov-Kurakin *D. R. lur’ev *G. V. Morozov Pr. lu. 1. Temkin-Rostovskii 'Pr. V. S. Serebrianyi (Obol.) Pr. D. 1. Kurliatev (Obol.) Pr. 1. V. Pronskii M. la. Nagoi 1. V. Sheremetev Bol shoi *V. M. lur’ev *Pr. 1. F. Mstislavskii *M. la. Morozov *Pr. S. 1. Mikulinskii *Pr. P. M. Shcheniatev *Pr. P. 1. Shuiskii 'Pr. V. 1. Vorotynskii V. lu. Trakhaniot

1547-1559 1547-1568 1547-1551 1547-1568 1547-1555 1547-1555 1547-1566 1548-1564 okol: 1548-1551 okol: 1549-1563 1549-1567 1549-1562 1549-? 1549-1550 (ejected) 1549-1564 okol: 1549-1567 okol: 1549—? 1550-1573 okol: 1550-1558/9 1550-1565 1550-1564 1550-1553 1550-1567

1547-1548 1547-1548

1547-1549, Dec. 1549, Apr.-Dec. 1549-1550, June

(Pr. D. F. Paletskii is omitted from this list, though Zimin (“Sostav,” p. 60; R e fo rm y Iv a n a G ro z n o g o , 412) claimed he became boyar in 1547. But he was already a boyar in 1546: P S R L , XIII, 148). Okol’nichie: 1547- 1551 promoted to boyar

Okol’nichie D. R. lur'ev *F. M. Nagoi *F. G. Adashev G. V. Morozov 1. V. Sheremetev Bol shoi V. M. lur’ev M. la. Morozov *1.1. Umnoi Kolychev 1. F. Karpov A. A. Kvashnin S. K. Zabolotskii la. S. Saltykov *D. F. Karpov *S. D. Peshkov-Saburov *P. V. Morozov *V. V. Morozov 1. la. Chebotov

1547-1548 1547-1559 1547-1553 1547-1548 1547-1549 1549, Apr.-Nov. 1549-1550 1549-1553 1549-1551 1547-1560 1550-1552 1550-1558 1550-? 1550-1560/61 1550-1553 1551-1561/2 1551-1558

1548-1564 1559-1560 1553-1557 1548-1551 1549-1564 1549-1567 1550-1573

1552-1557 1558 - end of reign

1553-1580 1561/2-1564(7) 1558-1570

XI

D IA S P O R A G R E E K S IN M O S C O W

B y z a n tin e G r e e k s b e g a n t o a rriv e in M o s c o w a f te r th e fall o f th e e m p ir e , t h o u g h t h e i r n u m b e r n e v e r e x c e e d e d a h a n d f u l. A m a jo r ity o f th e re fu g e e s o p t e d f o r I ta lia n r e s id e n c e , w ith a c o n s id e ra b le n u m b e r c o n g r e g a tin g in V e n ­ ic e , w h ic h h a d h is to r ic tie s w ith th e M e d ite r r a n e a n E a s t .1 T h e re v iv e d i n te r e s t in c la s s ic a l le a r n in g in I ta ly h a d a c te d as a m a g n e t f o r re fu g e e G r e e k s c h o la r s .2 H o w m a n y c h o s e t o v e n tu r e n o r t h o f th e A lp s is s till la rg e ly u n k n o w n , f o r s u c h in v e s tig a tio n s h a v e n o t b e e n o f m u c h in te r e s t to h is to r ia n s .3 T h a t s c h o la rs , m e r c h a n ts , a n d s e a m e n w o u ld p r e f e r Ita ly w a s n a tu r a l. T h e a t t r a c t i o n s o f t h e in te lle c tu a l a n d p h y s ic a l c lim a te s a n d t h e I ta lia n p r o x i m i t y to t h e se a a re t o o o b v io u s t o w a r r a n t f u r t h e r d is c u s s io n h e r e . B u t n o t all w h o e m ig r a te d b e lo n g e d t o th e s e e s s e n tia lly m in o r i t y o c c u p a tio n s . L o n g a g o P e te r C h a ra n is r e m in d e d u s t h a t w a r a n d re lig io n w e re th e p r im a ­ ry c h a r a c te r is tic s o f B y z a n tin e h i s t o r y . I f t h e p e a s a n ts w e re t h e m o s t n u m e ­ r o u s o f B y z a n tin e s u b je c ts , t h e y w e re t h e le a s t c a p a b le o f f lig h t. N e x t in te r m s o f n u m b e r w e re m e m b e r s o f th e c le rg y a n d t h e w a r r io r a r is to c r a c y . C le ric s , t o o , h a d l i ttle c h o ic e b u t to r e m a in w ith t h e i r f lo c k s . T h e lo n g - s ta n d in g a n i­ m u s a g a in s t C a th o lic is m a n d t h e W e st h a d b u t r e c e n tly b e e n e x a c e r b a te d b y t h e im p e r ia l

Realpolitik

t h a t le d to t h e F l o r e n tin e U n io n a n d t h e s h a rp r e a c ­

t i o n in t h e E a s t. E v e n th e s e n io r c le r ic s , u n le s s th e y w e re w illin g t o a c c e p t th e R o m a n p r im a c y , w o u ld h a r d ly s e e k re fu g e in th e la n d s o f t h e s p ir itu a l e n ­ e m y . B u t w h a t o f t h e w a r r io r - a r is to c r a ts , p a r tic u la r ly f r o m t h e a re a s m o s t re ­ c e n tly c o n q u e r e d b y t h e O t t o m a n T u r k s ? T h e y h a d lo s t t h e ir la n d s a n d liv e li­ h o o d . S u re ly s o m e fle d w e s t a n d s o u g h t p o s itio n s c o m m e n s u r a te w ith t h e ir p r o f e s s io n as f ig h tin g m e n . H o w m a n y s o ld th e ir s w o rd s e ls e w h e re is n o t w e ll k n o w n , in p a r t b e c a u s e s c h o la rs in o u r tim e h a v e c e n te r e d t h e ir a t t e n t i o n u p ­ o n t h e m o r e v isib le c u ltu r a l a n d in te lle c tu a l c o n t r i b u ti o n s o f th e é m ig ré s . If

1. See D.J. Geanakoplos, Byzantine East and Latin West. Two Worlds o f Christendom in Middle Ages and Renaissance. Studies in Ecclesiastical and Cultural History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), pp. 112 ff. and particularly pp. 136-37. 2. A.E. Vacalopoulos, Origins o f the Greek Nation. The Byzantine Period, 1204-1461, Rutgers Byzantine Series (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), ch. 16. 3. Ibid., p. 250.

XI DIASPORA GREEKS IN MOSCOW

27

the testimony of Michael Maroullos Tarchaniotes (1453/54-1500) was not clothed in hyperbole, the Greek exiles were numerous and their prospects bleak. In a poem dedicated to King Charles VIII of France, Tarchaniotes asked “. . . will you be moved by the piteous conditions of so many exiles who throw themselves at your feet.. . ?”4 If opportunities did not exist for the many who had sought refuge in the West, few availed themselves of the possibility of service at the Muscovite court. At first glance, this reluctance appears surprising. Muscovy by the end of the sixth decade of the fifteenth century had become a significant power in Eastern Europe. By the end of that century it had annexed virtually all of the neighboring principalities and was encroaching westward in Lithuanianheld areas. Muscovy, moreover, had remained steadfastly Orthodox, even re­ fusing to follow its Byzantine religious suzerains into union with Rome. With the fall of Byzantium, the one-time northern eparchy of the Constantinopolitan church had become the only major Orthodox territory free of non-Christ­ ian foreign domination. One might suspect that the attraction of Muscovy for the East Roman coreligionists would have been considerable. Since so few of the exiles came, the disadvantages obviously outweighed the attractions. Despite the religious affinities, Muscovy was an unknown land to most of the émigrés. For those who learned of its existence and features, the reaction was still negative. The land was distant, the climate intemperate, and the opportunities limited. The low level of Russian culture was hardly the magnet to attract émigré scholars. The grand princes of Moscow did not seek to recruit Greeks in their service. Instructions given envoys sent to Italy generally dealt with skilled architects, artisans, and specialists in the creation of material goods. Nor did the few Greeks who came to the Russian northeast encourage their countrymen in Italy to seek their fortunes in Moscow. The Greeks in Muscovite service may have tried to dissuade others from follow­ ing them. Not a single scholar of the Greek emigration sought to resettle in that land of religious kinship. Moscovy was more geared to elemental survival than to the luxury of civi­ lization. Wealth there could hardly compare to the affluence found in the West. Novgorod and Pskov, which had already seen their eras of trading prosperity, were the only cities bom of trade; all the other towns were princely seats, mi­ litary strong points, or administrative centers. By Italian, French or English standards, only the grand prince and a few *of his favorites could be considered rich. In a land of marginal agricultural productivity and devoid of natural re­ sources, where economic activity was limited, if not rudimentary, manpower was the only surplus commodity. Moscovite royal power was founded upon the exploitation of human resources and the grand prince used his subjects

4. Ibid. y p. 261.

XI 28

hard. Increasingly penurious and forced into military service, the Russian no­ bility received no regular compensation but could be summoned at the plea­ sure of the ruler.5 Senior court positions, that is, appointment to the royal council, required an average of twenty-five years of service for the rank of boiar. Generally, these offices were reserved to scions of competing aristocra­ tic families-for those either long in the employ of the Muscovite princes or those who descended from the highest princely elite.6 In all of the fifteenth century only one Greek family, the Khovrins, placed several members in the royal council; in the sixteenth a Tarchaniotes (Vasilii Iur’evich Trakhaniotov) became a boiar. Despite these exceptions, the system barred Greeks from en­ try into the inner councils of the prince. The Khovrins were not refugees from fallen Byzantium. Early in the fif­ teenth century a Stepan Vasilievich and liis son, Grigorii Khovra. came to Mos­ cow from the Crimea. According to Muscovite genealogical registers of the se­ venteenth century, Stepan had been a prince with properties in Surozh, Mangup, and Caffa.7 In all probability he had been nothing more than a merchant. Grigorii Khovra8 followed in his father’s profession and prospered in Moscow. Khovra’s son, Vladimir, continued in the family business and his support of Vasilii II in the dynastic crisis earned him appointment to the office of state treasurer and to a seat on the royal council.9 Toward the end of the century, Vladimir’s fourth son, Dmitrii, succeeded his father in both offices. The Khov­ rins had become fully Russianized, intermarrying with the most influential service families and they contined to contribute members to the higher court positions well into the seventeenth century.10 Some Byzantinists believe that the Khovrins descended from the Byzantine princely family of Gabras, more specifically the branch that fashioned a prince­ dom in the Crimea.11But Veselovskii and Tikhomirov have rightly questioned

5. G. Alef, “ Muscovite Military Reforms in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century,” Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 28 (1973), 73-108, particularly pp. 81 ff. 6 . G. Alef, “ Reflections on the Boyar Duma in the Reign of Ivan III,” Slavonic and East European R eview , 45 (1967), 76-123, particularly pp. 91 ff. 7. PodocnoeH O H KHuea KHSi3eu u d e o p j i m poccuücxuxb ebie3 xcu xb , 2 vols. (Mos­ cow: Bi»yHHB. Twn. y H. HoBHKOBa, 1787), I, 270, 304, and 396: and BpeMCHHUK Ü M n ep a ro p c K a e o M ocxoecxaeo oômecrea ucm puu u d p e e ho cre u p o c c u u c x u x . 8 vols, in 25 books (Moscow, 1849-57), X .M a r e p u a A b i, 89. 8 . Khovra was a nickname meaning clumsy, unintelligent, old woman, or daydreamer: S. B. Veselovskii, H c c n e d o e a H u n n o u c r o p u u x n a c c a cjiyxcu jib ix 3eM jieejia d ej\b u ee (Mos­ cow: “ Hayna,“ 1969), p. 443, n. 2 . 9. IJoAHoe coôpauue pyeexux Jiemnuceù (hereafter /7C/V7) (St. Petersburg, 1846-), XXIII, col. 154; 1450: “ Merchant and boiar of the grand prince” ; see also Veselovskii, Hccaedoeahun, pp. 444-45. 10. Ibid., pp. 4 4 2 4 9 . 11. See A. A. Vasiliev, The Goths in the Crimea, Monographs of the Mediaeval Aca­ demy of America, no. 11 (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1936), pp. 153, 158, and 198-99; and A. A. M. Bryer, “A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades, c. 979-c. 1653,“ University of^Birmingham Historical Journal, 1 2 , No. 2 (1970), 164-87.

XI DIASPORA GREEKS IN MOSCOW

29

that allegation.12 The untitled aristocracy assumed fictional family origins in sixteenth-century Muscovy as a means of combating the princely competition for offices. Some, for example, claimed Prussian or imperial Tatar ancestry, while others manufactured convenient princely antecedents.13 The initial Khovrin good fortune may be attributed less to allegations of origin than to their coveted expertise. They possessed skills indispensable to an officer of the treasury and a knowledge of record-keeping not known to members of the Russian aristocracy. These they passed down to succeeding generations. The Khovrins were not “mainland” Greeks, but their history in Muscovy suggests that special knowledge was required for initial success in that new land. A similar pattem will be noted for some of the Greeks who came later and made the grade. The first of the diaspora Greeks to arrive after the conquest was the aristo­ cratic Nicholas Ralli. When he arrived and from what land are not recorded, but he undoubtedly spent time in Italy before he went to Moscow. For in 1461 Grand Prince Vasilii II sent him as envoy to Milan. The purpose of the mission is not to be found either in the Milanese or Muscovite archives, though I suspect that Vasilii II desired to obtain recognition as the new east­ ern emperor. Francesco Sforza, on the other hand, became quite excited when he learned of the existence of a powerful Moscovy on the East European pe­ riphery. He immediately sought to involve the grand prince of Muscovy in a coalition against the Turks threatening Europe.14 If Nicholas Ralli was the first of the émigrés to obtain a position in Mos­ cow, other Greeks were not particularly sought out. Grand Prince Ivan III (1462-1505) showed an initial preference for skilled Italians. A fellow named Jacobo became master of the mint by the early 1460s.15 His compatriot, Gi­ an Battista della Volpe, a native of Vicenza, succeeded him. Gian Battista be­ came Ivan's principal intermediary in the negotiations for the hand of Zoë Palaeologus, then a papal ward. While della Volpe employed some of his Italian relatives for the ongoing interchanges, Cardinal Bessarion sent as his own en­ voy in 1469 a Georgios the Greek (“Iurii Grek”) to Ivan III.16 This was cer-

12. Veselovskii, HccnedoeaHun, p. 443; M. N. Tikhomirov, CpedneeeKoeaaM oot­ ed e X IV -X V ee xa x (Moscow: H 3 fl3 TejibCTeo Mockbckoix) y HHBepcHTeTa, 1957, p. 155. Sec also W. Knackstedt, Moskau. Studien zur Geschichte einer mittelalterlichen Stadt, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, Heft 8 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1975), p. 112. 13. G . Alef, “The Crisis of the Muscovite Aristocracy: A Factor in the Growth of Monarchical Power,“ Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 15 (1970), 23-24. See also Podoaioeuafi Khuea, II, 281 ff. 14. G. Barbiéri, Milano e Mosca nella politica del Rinascimento, storia dette relazioni diplomatiche tra la Russia e il Duccato di Milano nelVepoca sforzesca (Bari: Adriatica éditrice, 1957), pp. 19-21 and 79-81. 15. See the letter of 1463 sent by Francesco Sforza to Jacobo, “ Monetario mortet e auri et argenti,” in Ibid., pp. 83-84. 16. IICPJI, XII. 120: and XXVI, 225.

XI 30

tainly Georgios Tarchaniotes, chamberlain to Zoé’s late father.17 Gian Battista della Volpe reached the pinnacle of his career as an ambas­ sadorial broker in arranging Ivan Ill’s betrothal to Zoé, but in the process he paved the way for his ruination. While representing Ivan openly, he also served the Venetian Signory secretly, devising a scheme to put the Venetian government in touch with the khan of the steppe Horde, then Ivan’s sworn enemy. The purpose was to fashion an anti-Turkish alliance, utilizing the Ta­ tars as the eastern arm of a military nutcracker. His involvement with Venice came to light in 1472 when members of Zoë’s suite, then in Moscow, divulged his activities.18 An angered Ivan III deprived him of his life’s savings and freedom.19 Never again would he take Italians into his confidence and employ them as envoys to Italy. The development of contacts with the Italian states had begun immediate­ ly after the fall of Byzantium and the utilization of Italians had been a natu­ ral concomitant. After 1472 Ivan still required trusted envoys to Italy who knew the language. Greeks who had lived there previously were now prefera­ ble. A number had come with Zoé (now called Sofia), who decided to stay in Moscow.20 Of these, only a “Dmitrii Grek” is mentioned as the representa­ tive of Sofia’s brothers.21 This Dmitrii was probably a Ralli. Georgios Tar­ chaniotes also came at this time and remained in Moscow. Both remained as honorific “boiars” of the new grand princess, for in 1500 they and a “Iurii the Younger” attended Sofia when her daughter Feodosiia wed Prince Vasilii Kholmskii.2223Manuel Angelos was the fourth Greek who took part in that marriage ceremony.22 The Lascarids arrived in 1495.24 According to a seven­ teenth century genealogy of the family, Theodore Lascaris and his son Dmi­ trii came directly from Greece,25 but an earlier version indicated that they had served the king of Hungary before coming to Moscow.26 These Greeks were co-religionists, men in search of a country and anxious

17. Barbieru, Milano e Mosca, pp. 46-47. 18. For the details of the Italian negotiations preliminary to the marriage and della Volpe’s involvement with Venetian affairs, see P. Pierling, La Russie et le Saint-Siège. Etudes diplomatiques, 5 vols. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et ce, 1896-1912), I, 130-63. 19. IICPJI, XII, 151-52; Pierling, La Russie, I, 176 ff. 20. nCPJJ, XII, 151 ; and Bapôapo u Konrapunu o Poccuu. K ucropuu Htosiq-Pycc k u x cem3 eu e X V e ., ed. E. Ch. Skrzhinskaia (Leningrad: H 3 n a T e /ib C T B 0 " H a y K a ” J le H HHrpaflCKOe OTfleneHHe, 1971), p. 203. Contarini noted that “ etiam molti greci da Constantinopoli, ehe arano andati de li con despina. .. .” 2 1 . nCPJl, VIII, 176. H.PaipndHasi KHuea, 1475,1598 e d . V. 1. Buganov (Moscow: H3 flaTe/ibCTBO ” Hay n a” , 1966), p. 16. 23. Ibid. 24. nCPJl, VI, 40; and XV, 502. 25. BpeMeHHUK,X, 176-78. 26. Ib id .,p . 1 2 1 .

XI DIASPORA GREEKS IN MOSCOW

31

for honorable employment. They might be less susceptible to collaboration with Westerners. What made them indispensable was their knowledge of Ita­ lian. and perhaps some knew Latin. Nicholas Ralli undoubtedly was conver­ sant with Italian, as was Georgios Tarchaniotes. Tarchaniotes remained with Sofias's entourage but served Ivan III. In 1486 he became the Moscovite en­ voy to Italy27 and then became the principal envoy to the Habsburgs in the negotiatons of the 1490s. Though he knew no German, he conversed in the ‘‘Lombard” tongue with a specially appointed Habsburg official.28 He served on his last mission to the king of Denmark in 1500, which probably demand­ ed a knowledge of Latin.29 The other Greeks used by Ivan III for contacts with the rulers of the Ital­ ian city-states were undoubtedly versed in some of the Italian dialects. The chiefs-of-mission towards the end of the fifteepth century were Dmitrii and Manuel Ralli in 1488-90,30 Manuel Angelov (Angelos) in 1493-94,31 and Dmitrii Ralli again in 1499.32 And in 1514 Dmitrii Lascaris went as envoy to the Western emperor.33 These immigrants had special skills that made them indispensable in the opening of Moscovite negotiations with the West, but they never enjoyed the latitude permitted to the Italians prior to della Volpe’s betrayal. After 1472 no envoy journeyed to a Western court unless accompanied by a second ranking member of mission. The second was invariably a state secretary (d’iak) who knew no other language but his own. This practice was not aimed parti­ cularly at the Greeks, but became a standardized procedure even when Rus­ sians eventually became chiefs-of-mission. The object was to guard against be­ trayal, even if it was the consequence of loose talk occasioned by excessive drink. Greeks were not employed as envoys to Constantinople or to the Crimea, where a knowledge of Greek would have been advantageous. Even within the north Russian sphere of influence or in the frequent contacts with Lithuania the grand princes used the émigrés sparingly and almost never for important ventures. Some became occasional messengers for Ivan III. Such were the as-

27. E. F. Shmurlo, Poccun u H toaum. CöopuuK ucropunecKux Marepuanoe u U3caedoeanuu, xacaùmux cnoiuenuu Poccuu u Mmaueü, III/l (St. Petersburg, 1911), 25. 28. K. V. Bazilevich, Bueiunaji no/iunirca pyccxoeo iieHTpaAU3oeaHHOZO eocydapcrea. Bropan no/ioeuna X V eexa (Moscow: IfoflaTenbCTBO MocKOBCKoro YioiBepcHTeTa, 1952), pp. 265-66. 29. nCPJJ, VI, 44; and XXVI, 292. 3 0 .Ibid., XU, 219. 31. /*>/ Thii. n . O ta-hhä Co6ctbchHOft E. B. KaHueJiHHpHH, 1851-71), I, 176.

XI 32

signments to a “Peter the Greek” and Manuel Angelov.34 However, they con­ tinued to serve at court, occasionally acquiring positions of some respectabi­ lity. The same Manuel Angelov became keeper of the seal for Vasilii III by 1509.35 The Lascarids and Trachaniotes attained Muscovite nobility via service in the sixteenth century and thus were included in the register of distinguished families. Dmitrii Laskirev’s son, Michael, followed his father’s example and en­ joyed something of a court career.36 But it was Michael’s eldest son, Fedor, who became the family’s success'. He became a military commander of consi­ derable distinction by the later sixteenth century.37 His third born, Ivan, is mentioned but once in the military register as an officer in 1591.38 The Tarchaniotes were the most successful of the émigrés in Moscow. They were certainly the most numerous. Dmitrii and Georgios, sons of Man­ uel Tarchaniotes, had come to Moscow with Sofia, but Dmitrii is alleged to have died without issue.39 An “Andrei Trakhaniotov” came to Moscow from Italy in 1506, but the document identifying him did not indicate his mission or whom he served.40 Zimin identified “Nil the Greek,” bishop of Tver’, who died in 1521, as a relative, rodich, of the treasurer of Vasilii III, Iurii Maloi Trakhaniot.41 But his cited evidence does not reveal the connection. Even the treasurer’s name (Iurii Maloi) does not appear in the preserved Russian ge­ nealogies of the family. Only that Georgios (Iurii Manuilovich) who came with Zoé and who served Ivan III so well as a diplomat is mentioned.42 The two are not to be confused, for Georgios the envoy was known to his contempora­ ries as “Iurii Manuilovich Staryi Grek.”43 Since staryi means old, senior, or

34. See CôopnuK HMneparopcKa2 0 pyccxaeo ucropunecKaeo odmecrea, 148 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1867-1916),XXXV, 211 and 239. Manuel Angelov served as a permanent member of Ivan Ill’s court (Pa3pndHan KHuea, 1475-1598 ee., p. 26). In 1500 Ivan III sent him with orders to the Pskovian authorities commanding them to prepare their troops for an attack on Lithuania i(IJcKoecKue Jieronucu. ed. A. Nasonov, 2 vols. (Mos­ cow-Len ingrad: H 3 fl. A K afleM M H H a y n CCCP, 1941-55 J, 1,841) and in August, 1487, Angelov had brought news to the bishop of Perm of the Muscovite conquest of Kazan’. The chronicler identified him as “ Mikula Maloi Angelov syn Grechinov” (IJCPJI, XXXVI 279). 35. Pa3 pndnan KHuea, 1475-1598 p. 144. 36. E.g., 1554: Ibid., p. 144. 37. Ibid., pp. 269, 272, 284, 312, 320. 348, 359, 377, 381, and 385. Last mention in 1590." 38. P