Routledge Handbook of Imperial Chinese History 1138847283, 9781138847286

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Routledge Handbook of Imperial Chinese History

The resurgence of modern China has generated much interest, not only in the country’s present day activities, but also in its long history. As the only uninterrupted ancient civilization still alive today, the study of China’s past promises to offer invaluable insights into understanding contemporary China. Providing coverage of the entire Imperial era (221 bce–1912 ce), this handbook takes a chronological approach. It includes comprehensive analysis of all major periods, from the powerful Han empire, which rivalled Rome, and the crucial transformative period of the Five Dynasties, to the prosperous Ming era and the later dominance of the non-Han peoples. With contributions from a team of international authors, key themes include: • • • •

Political events and leadership Religion and philosophy Cultural and literary achievements Legal, economic, and military institutions

This book transcends the traditional boundaries of historiography, giving special attention to the role of archaeology. As such, the Routledge Handbook of Imperial Chinese History is an indispensable reference work for students and scholars of Chinese, Asian, and World History. Victor Cunrui Xiong is Professor of History at Western Michigan University, USA. His recent publications include From Peasant to Emperor: The Life of Liu Bang (2018) and Luoyang: A Study of Capital Cities and Urban Form in Pre-modern China, 1038 bce to 938 ce (2016). Kenneth J. Hammond is Professor of History at New Mexico State University, USA. His recent publications include The Sage Returns: Aspects of the Confucian Revival in Contemporary China (2014) and Pepper Mountain: The Life, Death and Posthumous Career of Yang Jisheng (2007).

Routledge Handbook of Imperial Chinese History

Edited by Victor Cunrui Xiong and Kenneth J. Hammond

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Victor Cunrui Xiong and Kenneth J. Hammond; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Victor Cunrui Xiong and Kenneth J. Hammond to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Xiong, Victor Cunrui, editor. | Hammond, Kenneth James, editor. Title: Routledge Handbook of Imperial Chinese History / edited by Victor Cunrui Xiong and Kenneth J. Hammond. Other titles: Imperial Chinese History Description: London; New York: Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018016531 | ISBN 9781138847286 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315726878 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: China—Civilization—221 B.C.-960 A.D. | China—Civilization—960-1644. Classification: LCC DS749.3 .R68 2019 | DDC 951—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018016531 ISBN: 978-1-138-84728-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-72687-8 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra

Contents

List of maps viii List of tables ix List of contributors x Introduction 1 Bibliography: general 2 Bibliography: historical novels 3 Part I

Early Imperial China (Qin–Five Dynasties) 5 Section 1

The Qin-Han Empire 7 1 The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce) Charles Sanft

12

2 The Western Han 25 Liang CAI 3 The Eastern Han 39 Rafe de Crespigny Bibliography: Qin and Han 54

v

Contents Section 2

The Six Dynasties 56 4 The Three States (Three Kingdoms) 62 J. Michael Farmer 5 The Jin and the Sixteen States 77 KAWAMOTO Yoshiaki Translated by Yoon-rim KIM 6 The Southern and Northern Dynasties 93 Andrew Chittick Bibliography: Six Dynasties 108 Section 3

The Sui-Tang Empire and the Five Dynasties 110 7 The Sui dynasty 115 Victor Cunrui Xiong 8 The Tang dynasty I (618–756) 126 SEO Tatsihiko Translated by Victor Cunrui Xiong 9 The Tang dynasty II (756–907) 144 Anthony DeBlasi 10 The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 157 Peter Lorge Bibliography: Sui-Tang and Five Dynasties 173 Part II

Late Imperial China (Song–Qing) 177 Section 4

The age of Song, Liao, and Jin 179 11 The Northern Song 182 Yongguang Hu

vi

Contents

12 The Southern Song dynasty 197 Robert Foster 13 The Kitan-Liao and Jurchen-Jin 213 Valerie Hansen Bibliography: Song, Liao, and Jin 229 Section 5

The Yuan and Ming Empires 232 14 The Yuan dynasty 235 Michael C. Brose 15 The Ming dynasty (pre-1521) 249 Peter Ditmanson 16 The Ming dynasty (post-1521) 259 Harry Miller 17 Cultural history from the Yuan through the Ming 271 Kenneth J. Hammond Bibliography 282 Section 6

The Qing Empire 285 18 The Qing dynasty (pre-1800): growth and stagnation 287 Yangwen Zheng 19 The Qing dynasty (post-1800) 301 Nancy Park 20 Qing culture 316 Richard Smith Bibliography: Qing 333 Glossary-Index 337

vii

Maps

1.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 6.1 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 10.1 11.1 12.1 14.1 15.1 18.1

The Qin Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 2, 3–4.) 13 Western Han. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 2, 13–14.) 26 The Eastern Han. (By Rafe de Crespigny.) 40 The Eastern Han and Its Neighbors. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 2, 40–41.) 42 The Three States (Three Kingdoms). (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 3, 3–4.) 66 The Western Jin. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 3, 33–34.) 78 The Eastern Jin and Sixteen States. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 4, 3–4.) 88 The Jiankang Empire under the Chen, Northern Zhou, and Northern Qi. (See Tan ­Qixiang, vol. 4, 23–24.) 94 The Sui Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 5, 3–4.) 115 Migrations in the Old World, Fourth to Eighteenth Centuries. (By Seo Tatsuhiko.) 128 The Tang Empire and Its Neighbors. (By Seo Tatsuhiko.) 129 Capital Cities in East Asia, 7th–8th Centuries. (By Seo Tatsuhiko.) 132 The Five Dynasties Period. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 5, 82–83.) 166 The Northern Song and Liao. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 6, 3–4.) 182 The Southern Song and Jin. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 6, 42–43.) 197 The Yuan Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 7, 5–6.) 235 The Ming Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 7, 40–41.) 249 The Qing Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 8, 3–4.) 287

viii

Tables

13.1 Jin-dynasty Census Data 223

ix

Contributors

Michael Carl Brose is Associate Professor of History at the University of Wyoming, USA. He is the author of Subjects and Masters: Uyghurs in the Mongol Empire (2007) and, with Morris Rossabi, of The Mongol Construction of China (forthcoming), as well as numerous articles on Mongol and Yuan dynasty history. Liang Cai is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame, USA. She is the author of Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire (2014). Andrew E. Chittick  is Leslie Peter Professor of East Asian Studies at Eckerd College, USA. He is the author of Patronage and Community in Medieval China: The Xiangyang Garrison, 400–600 ce (2010). Rafe de Crespigny is Adjunct Professor at the Australian National University, Australia, and Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. He is the author of numerous books, including Imperial Warlord (2010), A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23–220 ad) (2007), and Fire over Luoyang: A History of the Later Han Dynasty 23– 220 ad (2016). He is the translator of Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling: Being the Chronicle of Later Han 157–189 (1989), and To Establish Peace: Being the Chronicle of Later Han for the Years 189 to 220 ad (1997). Anthony DeBlasi  is Associate Professor of Chinese Studies at the University at Albany, USA. He is the author of Reform in the Balance: The Defense of Literary Culture in Mid-Tang China (2002). Peter Ditmanson is research fellow, National Central Library, Taipei, Taiwan. He is the author of several articles on Ming dynasty history, and has been lecturer in Chinese History at the University of Oxford. J. Michael Farmer is Associate Professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Dallas, USA. He is the author of The Talent of Shu: Qiao Zhou and the Intellectual World of Early Medieval Sichuan (2008). x

Contributors

Robert Foster is Professor of Asian Studies and History at Berea College, USA. He is the author of numerous articles on Song dynasty Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism, and Confucianism in contemporary China. He is the translator of the Classic of Go. Kenneth J. Hammond is Professor of History at New Mexico State University, USA. He is the author of Pepper Mountain: the Life, Death and Posthumous Career of Yang Jisheng, 1516– 1555 (Routledge, 2010), and is co-editor, with Jeffery Richey, of The Sage Returns: Aspects of the Confucian Revival in Contemporary China (2014). He is associate editor of the Journal of Chinese History, and past-president of the Society for Ming Studies. Valerie Hansen is Stanley Woodward Professor of History at Yale University, USA. She is the author of The Silk Road: A New History (2012), The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600, second edition (2015), Negotiating Daily Life in Traditional China: How Ordinary People Used Contracts, 600–1400 (1995), and Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127–1276 (1990). Yongguang Hu is Associate Professor of History at James Madison University, USA. He is the author of several articles on the history of the Northern Song and is an expert on edu­ cational reform in that dynasty. Kawamoto Yoshiaki 川本芳昭 is Professor Emeritus of History at Ky ū sh ū University 九州大学, Japan. He is the author of Gi-Shin Nanbokuch ō jidai no minzoku mondai 魏晋 南北朝時代の民族問題 (1998), Ch ū gokushi no naka no sho minzoku 中国史のなかの諸民族 (2004), Ch ū goku no rekishi Chuka no h ōkai to kakudai (Gi-Shin Nanbokuch ō ) 中国の歴史 中 華の崩壊と拡大 (魏晋南北朝) (2005), and Higashi Ajia kodai ni okeru sho minzoku to kokka 東アジア古代における諸民族と国家 (2015). Peter Lorge is Assistant Professor of History at Vanderbilt University, USA. He is the author of War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China (Routledge, 2005), The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb (2008), Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century (2012), The Reunification of China: Peace Through War under the Song Dynasty (2015). He is the co-editor of Chinese and Indian Warfare: From the Classical Age to 1870 (Routledge, 2014), and the editor of Debating War in Chinese History (2013), Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (2011), and Warfare in China to 1600 (2005). Harry Miller is Professor of History at the University of South Alabama, USA. He is the author of State versus Gentry in Late Ming Dynasty China, 1572–1644 (2009), State versus Gentry in Early Qing Dynasty China, 1644–1699 (2013), and The Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals (2015). Nancy Park is lecturer in History at California State University, East Bay, USA. She is the author of several articles on Qing dynasty political and legal history. Charles Sanft is Associate Professor of History at the University of Tennessee, USA. He is the author of Communication and Cooperation in Early Imperial China: Publicizing the Qin Dynasty (2014). Seo Tatsuhiko 妹尾達彥 is Professor of History at Chūō University 中央大学, Japan. He is the author of Chōan no toshi keika 長安の都市計画 (2001); the co-author of Iwanami kouza sekai xi

Contributors

rekishi 9: Chūka no bunre to saisei 岩波講座世界歴史9:中華の分裂と再生 (1999), “Toshiteki” naru mono no genzai: bunka jinruigakuteki kenkyū ＜都市的＞なるものの現在－文化人類学的研究－ (2003), and Shiri–zu toshi, kenchiku, rekishi 1: kinenteki kenzōbutsu no seiritsu シリーズ都市•建築• 歴史1: 記念的建造物の成立 (2006); and the editor of Toshi to kankyō no rekishigaku 都市と環境 の歴史学, vols. 1–4 (2009–2016). Richard Smith is Professor Emeritus of History at Rice University, USA. He is the author of numerous books, including Fathoming the Cosmos and Ordering the World: The Yijing (I-Ching, or Classic of Changes) and Its Evolution in China, (2008), The Qing Dynasty and Traditional Chinese Culture (2015), Mapping China and Managing the World: Cosmology, Cartography and Culture in Late Imperial Times (Routledge, 2013), and The I Ching: A Biography (2012). Victor Cunrui Xiong is Professor of History at Western Michigan University, USA. He is the author of Chang’an (583–904): A Study in the Urban History of Medieval China (2000), Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life, Times, and Legacy (2006), Heavenly Khan: A Biography of Emperor Tang Taizong (Li Shimin) (2014), Luoyang: A Study of Capital Cities and Urban Form in Pre-modern China, 1038 bce to 938 ce (Routledge, 2016), A Historical Dictionary of Medieval China, enlarged and revised edition (2017), and From Peasant to Emperor: The Life of Liu Bang (forthcoming). He is the translator of the Shitong 史通 (A Thorough Exploration in Historiography) (forthcoming). Yangwen Zheng is Professor of Chinese History at the University of Manchester, UK. She is the author of The Social Life of Opium in China (2005) and Ten Lessons in Modern Chinese History (forthcoming).

xii

Introduction

After decades of economic reform, China has become an economic powerhouse, challenging the dominance of the United States as the world’s largest economy. The resurgence of China has generated much interest not only in the present conditions of that country, but also in her past. Since China is the only uninterrupted ancient civilization that is still living today, the study of her past can be inherently rewarding, and offers tremendous benefit to anyone who wants to gain an in-depth understanding of her present. Perhaps more than anywhere else, in China, the present is intricately linked with the past. Take Mao Zedong 毛澤東, the founder of the PRC, for example. When China was attempting to take on the United States and the USSR in the late 1960s, he issued a call to his people: “Dig tunnels deep, store grain extensively, and do not seek hegemony.” This call is actually modeled on the slogan, “Build walls high, store grain extensively, and put off claiming the throne,” which emanated from Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, the rebel leader who founded the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Before his death, Mao commented on his heir Hua Guofeng 華國鋒 as someone who was “respectful and loyal but lacks refinements” and “could pacify the world.” Mao here was paraphrasing Liu Bang 劉邦 (r. 202–195 bce), who said similar things about one of his potential successors Zhou Bo 周勃. Obviously it may not be too difficult to make the case about the importance of ­Chinese history. However, anyone engaged in studying it may find themselves confronted with daunting challenges: the heritage is too long; the geographic area is too vast; and the language is too difficult. This is particularly true of the Imperial era. This volume, Routledge Handbook of Imperial Chinese History (hereinafter Handbook), attempts to address these issues, with a particular focus on recent research trends in the field. As is indicated by the title, the Handbook gives coverage to the entire Imperial era of more than 2200 years (221 bce–1912 ce). It consists of two parts: Early Imperial and Late ­Imperial in a total of 18 chronologically chapters and two thematic chapters. Each chronological chapter deals with such key areas as politics, the history of ideas, the economy, the military, religion, and others. The Handbook is intended for those in the West who want to acquire a better knowledge of the Imperial era of China. Specifically, it can be used by college undergraduates studying Imperial Chinese history in class or on their own; it may appeal to graduate students and scholars specializing in a given period of Chinese history who are interested in broadening their scope of study; and lastly, it may be a helpful tool for educated laymen who want to explore Chinese history in general. 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY General

Bei shi 北史 (History of the Northern Dynasties). By Li Yanshou 李延壽 (Tang). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974. de Bary, William Theodore, et al. Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 1, 2nd Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Dillon, Michael. China: A Cultural and Historical Dictionary. London: Routledge, 1998. Ebrey, Patricia Buckley, ed. Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2nd Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Free Press, 1993. Ebrey, Patricia Buckley. The Cambridge Illustrated History of China, 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Gernet, Jacques. A History of Chinese Civilization, 2nd edition. Translated by J. R. Foster and Charles Hartman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Graff, David. Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300–900. New York: Routledge, 2002. Hansen, Valerie. The Open Empire: A History of China to 1800, 2nd Edition. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2015. Hou Han shu 後漢書 (Book of the Later Han). By Fan Ye 范曄. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965. Hucker, Charles O. 1985. A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. Stanford, CA: Stanford ­University Press. Keay, John. China: A History. New York: Basic Books, 2011. Leslie, Donald D., Colin Mackerras, and Wang Gungwu, eds. 1975. Essays on the Sources for Chinese History. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Lewis, Mark Edward. China Between Empires: The Northern and Southern Dynasties. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. Mote, Frederick W. Imperial China 900–1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2000. von Glahn, Richard. The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century. ­Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Wilkinson, Endymion. Chinese History: A New Manual, 5th Edition. Published by Endymion ­Wilkinson, 2017. Xiong, Victor Cunrui. Historical Dictionary of Medieval China, 2nd edition. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017. Xiong, Victor Cunrui. Capital Cities and Urban Form in Pre-modern China: Luoyang, 1038 BCE to 938 CE. London: Routledge, 2016. Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (Comprehensive mirror for aid in government). By Sima Guang 司馬光 et al. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Historical novels

1. Qin-Han Levi, Jean (Author), Barbara Bray, tr. The Chinese Emperor (about the First Emperor). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1987. Loewe, Michael. Bing (about the Eastern Han). Hackett, 2011. Tjoa, Hock G. The Battle of Chibi (Red Cliffs) (about the famous late-Han battle prior to the beginning of the Three Kingdoms period). Kindle edition, 2010. Xiong, Victor Cunrui. From Peasant to Emperor: The Life of Liu Bang. Airiti Press, 2018. 2. Six Dynasties Luo Guanzhong (Ming dynasty); Moss Roberts, tr. Three Kingdoms (a historical novel about late-Han and Three Kingdoms China loosely based on history). Foreign Languages Press, 1991. Yep, Laurence. Lady of Ch’iao Kuo: Bird of the South, Southern China, A.D. 531. Scholastic, 2001. Powell, Goran. A Sudden Dawn (about Bodhidharma’s travel to 6th-century China). Kindle edition, 2006. 3. Sui-Tang Cooney, Eleanor, and Daniel Altieri. The Court of the Lion (about Tang Xuanzong and the An Lushan rebellion). William Morrow & Co, 1988. Cooney, Eleanor, and Daniel Altieri. Iron Empress (about Judge Dee [Di Renjie] and Wu Zetian). ­William Morrow & Co, 1993. Lin, Jeannie. The Jade Temptress (The Pingkang Li Mysteries, #2) (about the red light district of Tang Chang’an). Harlequin, 2014. Shan Sa; Adriana Hunter, tr. Empress (about Wu Zetian). Harper, 2006. van Gulik, Robert, tr. Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee (18th centuries Qing “detective stories” about Di Renjie). Dover Publications, 1976. van Gulik, Robert. The Emperor’s Pearl (about Di Renjie). Bantam Books, 1965. van Gulik, Robert. The Haunted Monastery: A Judge Dee Mystery (about Di Renjie). University of ­Chicago Press, 1997. van Gulik, Robert. The Red Pavilion (about Di Renjie in 668 ce). University of Chicago Press, 2005. Wu Cheng’en (Ming dynasty). Xiyou ji. 1. William John Francis Jenner, tr. Journey to the West. Foreign Languages Press, 1982–1984. 2. Anthony C. Yu, tr. The Journey to the West. University of Chicao Press, 1977–1983. (A novel about Xuanzang’s travel to India). Xiong, Victor Cunrui. Heavenly Khan: A Biography of Tang Taizong (Li Shimin) (a “faction” about the second Tang emperor). Airiti Press, 2014.

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Bibliography: historical novels 4. Song-Yuan Iggulden, Conn. Conqueror (about Kublai Khan). Bantam Books, 2013. Mah, Adeline Yen. Chinese Cinderella: The Mystery of the Song Dynasty Painting (about Zhang Zeduan’s famous painting of Song Kaifeng). Puffin Books, 2009. Shi Nai’an, Luo Guanzhong (Ming dynasty) / John Dent-Young, Alex Dent-Young, tr. The Marshes of Mount Liang, five volumes (about rebels in Northern Song). Chinese University Press, 1994–2002. 5. Ming-Qing Bosse, Malcolm J. The Examination (about the White Lotus Society in Ming China). Sunburst Books, 1996. Buck, Pearl S. Imperial Woman (about Empress Dowager Cixi). Moyer Bell, 2004. Cao Xueqin (Qing dynasty). Honglou meng. 1. Yang Hsien-yi, Gladys Yang, tr. A Dream of the Red Mansions, three volumes. Foreign Language Press, 1978–1980. 2. David Hawkes, John Minford, tr. The Story of the Stone, five volumes. Penguin Classics, 1974–1986. (About Qing China.) Cheng, François; Timothy Bent, tr. Green Mountain, White Cloud (a novel of love in the Ming ­D ynasty). St. Martin’s Press, 2004. Clavell, James. Tai-Pan (about Hong Kong in the 1840s). Dell, 1986. Min, Anchee. The Last Empress (about Empress Dowager Cixi). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007. Rahme, Laura. The Ming Storytellers (about early Ming China). Kindle edition, 2013. See, Lisa. Peony in Love by (about Hangzhou in early Qing China). Random House, 2008. Wu Ching-tzu (Wu Jingzi) (Qing dynasty); Yang Hsien-yi, Gladys Yang, tr. The Scholars (a satirical portrayal of the life of degree candidates and scholar-officials in Ming China). Foreign Languages Press, 2000.

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Part I

Early Imperial China (Qin–Five Dynasties)

Section 1

The Qin-Han Empire

In 221 bce, Ying Zheng 嬴政, king of the state of Qin, upon unifying the realm, declared himself huangdi 皇帝 (august emperor; known as the First Emperor in history), creating the first ever imperial dynasty in Chinese history. Not long after the death of the First Emperor (210 bce), the mighty empire began to fall apart. Traditionalists, especially the Han scholars, faulted the tyrannical rulership of the Qin emperors as the root cause for the downfall, and the Qin became a poster-child for evil government. Recent scholarship based on excavated materials has shed light on the existence of a relatively well-regulated Qin society with its cultus that seems to have escaped the attention of the Han scholars. Although it should by no means exonerate the First Emperor for the drastic actions he took, including the burning of the books, the execution of the scholars, and the building of costly public works, it does show that Qin history is necessarily much more nuanced than the traditionalists would have us believe. Following the fall of the Qin, the Han empire, the first part of which was based in Chang’an 長安 in the Wei valley, arose to coincide, apart from a brief interruption, with the last two centuries of the Roman Republic and the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. While condemning the harsh Legalist ( fajia 法家) rule of the previous regime, the Han leadership retained much of the Qin government system. The early Han sovereigns such as Emperors Gaozu (Liu Bang 劉邦), Wen 文, and Jing 景 adopted a Daoist governing philosophy. But Emperor Wu 武帝, Jing’s successor, made Confucianism (rujia 儒家) the state ideology, a tradition that would live on for the next two millennia. In the Eastern Han, the second half of the Han empire arose following the Xin interregnum, and the capital was set up in Luoyang 洛陽 to the east in the Central Plains. Throughout this period, Confucianism was in ascendancy. In the second century, the first Daoist religion debuted as the Way of Five Pecks of Rice (wudou mi dao 五斗米道). At court, two powerful groups, the waiqi 外戚 (consort relatives) and the eunuchs, competed for control of the throne. Following the outbreak of a Daoist-inspired Yellow Turban rebellion (184), regional military commanders emerged as the new power-holders, whose struggle for dominance tore China asunder. Chronology 1: Qin–Eastern Han The Qin (based in Shaanxi) sovereign enfeoffed as Duke, posthumously known 770 bce:  as Duke of Xiang of Qin 秦襄公. 7

The Qin-Han Empire

359–338 350 284

Shang Yang 商鞅 carries out reforms under Duke Xiao of Qin 秦孝公. Qin moves its capital to Xianyang 咸陽 (at Xi’an, Shaanxi). Five states invade Qi (based in Shandong) and sacks its capital; Qi begins to decline. 278 Invaded by Qin, Chu (based in Hubei and Hunan) moves its capital to Chen 陳 (Huaiyang, Henan). The last Eastern Zhou king Nan 赧 dies; the Eastern Zhou dynasty ends. 256 230 Hann 韓 (based in Henan and Shanxi) is conquered by Qin. Wei 魏 (based in Henan and Hebei) is conquered by Qin. 225 223 Chu is conquered by Qin. Y  an (based in Hebei and Liaoning) and Zhao (based in Hebei) are con222 quered by Qin. Qin dynasty 221–207 221 Qi is conquered by Qin. The First Emperor, the unifier of China, founds the Qin dynasty; standardizes the currency; divides the realm into 36 jun (commanderies; more will be added later). Q  in dislodges the Xiongnu from Henandi 河南地 (the Ordos Loop, Inner 214 Mongolia) and builds the Great Wall. The First Emperor orders the burning of books. 213 212 The First Emperor orders a large labor force to build palaces in Guanzhong 關中 and elsewhere, among which the Epang 阿房 Palace (in Xi’an) is the most famous; and executes 460-plus scholars. The First Emperor dies. His son Huhai 胡亥 is placed on the throne by 210 Li Si 李斯 and Zhao Gao 趙高. Prince Fusu 扶蘇 is ordered to commit suicide. 209 Chen Sheng 陳勝 and Wu Guang 吳廣, two peasant farmers, rebel; Chen declares himself king. Liu Bang 劉邦 rebels in north Jiangsu; Xiang Yu 項 羽 (Xiang Ji 項籍) and his uncle rebel in south Jiangsu. Liu Bang enters Xianyang; the Qin falls. 207 206 X  iang Yu has emerged as the first among equals. He enfeoffs various warlords as kings, including Liu Bang as the King of Han. 206–202 T  he post-Qin War between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu. 202 bce–8 ce Western Han dynasty 202 bce Liu Bang (Gaozu of Han) founds the (Western) Han dynasty with Chang’an (Xi’an) as its capital. 200 L  iu Bang is nearly captured by the Xiongnu near Pingcheng 平城 (Datong, Shanxi). The Han adopts an appeasement policy toward the Xiongnu. 195 Liu Bang dies. Power is now in the hands of Empress Lü 呂后. 183 K  ing of Nanyue 南越 (Guangdong, Guangxi, northern Vietnam) Zhao Tuo 趙佗 declares himself emperor. E  mpress Lü dies. Male members of her clan are purged. Emperor Wen 文 180 帝 succeeds. During his and his successor Emperor Jing’s reigns, the Han implements a policy of “non-action,” with low taxes and little government interference in the economy. Emperor Wen dies, succeeded by Emperor Jing 景帝. Emperor Jing will 157 adopt the proposal from his top adviser Chao Cuo 晁錯 to reduce the size and power of the feudatories.

8

The Qin-Han Empire

154

 hao Cuo is executed. The rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms (headed by the C kings of Wu and Chu) begins and ends in the same year. 141 Emperor Jing dies, succeeded by Emperor Wu, who will make Confucianism the state ideology. 139–126 Zhang Qian’s 張騫 first mission to the Western Regions. 133–71 The Han-Xiongnu War. Emperor Wu abandons the appeasement policy toward Xiongnu. The Han army defeats the Xiongnu repeatedly, especially in the 124, 123, 121, 119, and 71 (under Emperor Xuan 宣帝) campaigns. 119–115 Zhang Qian’s second mission to the Western Regions. 111 Annexation of Nanyue. 108 The four commanderies of Lelang 樂浪 are set up in northern Korea and Liaoning. 102 The Han brings Dayuan 大宛 (Fergana, Uzbekistan) to submission. 91–90 The witchcraft scandal (wugu zhihuo 巫蠱之禍). 87 Emperor Wu dies. 87–68 The ascendancy of Huo Guang 霍光 who dominates the court under Emperors Zhao 昭帝 (r. 87–74) and Xuan (r. 74–49). 57–56 Xiongnu is weakened significantly due to internal strife. 51 X iongnu chanyu 單于 (leader) Huhanye 呼韓邪 visited the Han court as a vassal. 1 bce–8 ce Wang Mang 王莽 is the true power-holder at court. 8–23 ce Wang Mang’s Xin dynasty, an interregnum between the two Han dynasties. 9 Wang Mang implements the well-field system. 17 Multiple rebellions break out. 22 A mong the rebel armies, the Chimei 赤眉 (Red Eyebrows) and Lülin 綠林 (Green Woods) are the most powerful. 23 Liu Xuan 劉玄 (Gengshi更始) is placed on the throne, with Yuan 宛 city (Nanyang, Henan) as his capital. Wang Mang 王莽 is killed as Chang’an is captured by loyalist rebels. 25–220 Eastern Han dynasty 25 Liu Xiu 劉秀, Emperor Guangwu 光武, takes the imperial title and makes Luoyang his capital. Red Eyebrows rebels kill Emperor Gengshi at Chang’an. 26–29 G  uangwu forces the Red Eyebrows to surrender and conquers the warlords of the North China plain and the middle Yangzi. Dou Rong 竇融 in the northwest allies with Guangwu. 30 A  bolition of compulsory military service for the inner commanderies (neijun 内郡) of the empire. 32–33 Defeat and death of the northwestern warlord Wei Ao (Xiao) 隗囂. 35–36 The rival emperor Gongsun Shu 公孫述 is destroyed in Shu (Sichuan). Guangwu is the undisputed sovereign of a restored Han empire. 37–45 Xiongnu attacks along the northern frontier. 40–43 Rebellion of the Trung sisters in northern Vietnam. 48–50 Split of the Xiongnu into Northern and Southern Xiongnu; the northern frontier territories are restored 57 Death of Emperor Guangwu, succeeded by his son Emperor Ming 明帝. 69 Submission of the Ailao 哀牢 people in the southwest.

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73–75

Expedition against the Northern Xiongnu; failed establishment of a Protectorate-­ General for the Western Regions. 75 Death of Emperor Ming, succeeded by his son Emperor Zhang 章. 77–101 Wars against the Shaodang Qiang 燒當羌. 88 Death of Emperor Zhang, succeeded by his son Emperor He 和 under the regency of Empress Dowager Dou 竇太后. 89–91 Dou Xian 竇憲 destroys Northern Chanyu. 91 Ban Chao 班超 dominates the Western Regions and is named Protector-General. 92 An imperial coup destroys the Dou clan. 93 D  eath of Southern Chanyu Tuntuhe 屯屠何 is followed by a revolt among the surrendered Northerners. 94 Ban Chao completes his control of the Tarim basin. 97 Ban Chao sends Gan Ying 甘英 on a mission to Daqin 大秦/Rome. 100 Surrendered Qiang are settled within Liang province 涼州. 102 Ban Chao retires as Protector-General of the Western Regions. 105 Death of Emperor He, followed by the regency of Empress Dowager Deng; she brings Emperor An 安 to the throne but continues to rule until her death. 106 Rebellion in the Western Regions. 107 Orders are given to abandon the Western Regions. 107–118 The Great Qiang rebellion devastates the northwest. 121 Death of the Dowager Deng; Emperor An accedes to power. 125 Death of Emperor An; his dowager Yan 閻 takes power, but a coup by palace eunuchs brings the former heir Liu Bao 劉保, Emperor Shun 順, to the throne. 135 L  iang Shang 梁商, father of Emperor Shun’s empress, is appointed Generalin-Chief and head of the administration. 140–144  Rebellions among the Qiang and Xiongnu; much of the northwest is left without effective government. 141 Liang Shang dies, succeeded as General-in-Chief by his son Liang Ji 梁冀. 142 Zhang Daoling 张道陵 founds the Daoist movement, known as the Way of Five Pecks of Rice (wudoumi dao 五斗米道). 144 Death of Emperor Shun; aided by Liang Ji, Empress Dowager Liang holds regency power for a series of minor emperors. 146 Empress Dowager Liang and Liang Ji bring Liu Zhi 劉志, Emperor Huan 桓, to the throne. 147 Liu Zhi is married to Liang Nüying 梁女瑩, younger sister of the empress dowager. 150 Death of Empress Dowager Liang; Liang Ji continues to dominate the government; vast expansion of the imperial harem. 159 Death of Empress Liang; aided by palace eunuchs, Emperor Huan destroys Liang Ji and takes over the government; Deng Mengnü 鄧猛女 is appointed empress; five eunuchs are enfeoffed. 159–166 Zhang Huan 張奐 and Huangfu Gui 皇甫規 maintain a measure of security in the north. 160 Execution of Li Yun 李雲 and Du Zhong 杜眾. 163 Some eunuch associates are punished for excessive conduct in the provinces. 166 Arrest and execution of anti-eunuch officials. 167 First Faction Incident. 167–169 Duan Jiong 段熲 slaughters the Qiang.

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The Qin-Han Empire

168

Following the death of Emperor Huan, the regent Dowager Dou and her father Dou Wu 竇武 bring the young Emperor Ling 靈 to the throne.  Eunuch forces led by Cao Jie 曹節 overthrow the Dou group and thereafter control the government. 169 Second Faction Incident and the beginning of the Great Proscription (danggu 黨錮). 170s Raiding by Xianbei commanded by Tanshihuai 檀石槐. 172 Purge of the University (Grand Academy). 175 Commissioning of the Stone Classics project (Xiping shijing 熹平石經). 177 Failed expedition against the confederacy of Tanshihuai. 178 Endorsement of the School at the Gate of the Vast Capital (Hongdumen xue 鴻都門學) as a route for entry to the imperial service; Emperor Ling introduces a program for the sale of offices. 184  Yellow Turban religious rebels commanded by Zhang Jue ( Jiao) 張角 ravage eastern China; they are defeated by imperial forces with heavy loss of life. Mutiny and rebellion in Liang province in the northwest. 188 The Southern Chanyu is killed by rebels and the Xiongnu state falls into disorder. 189 Death of Emperor Ling; his son Liu Bian 劉辯 is brought to the throne under the regency of his mother Empress Dowager He and her brother He Jin 何進; He Jin is assassinated by eunuchs; his troops attack the imperial palaces and kill the eunuchs.  Seizing control, Dong Zhuo 董卓 deposes Liu Bian (Emperor Shao 少) and sets Liu Xie (Emperor Xian 獻) upon the throne. 190 Y  uan Shao 袁紹 and other loyalists raise troops against Dong Zhuo and establish warlord states.  mperor Xian is forced to abdicate in favor of Cao Pi 曹丕, son of the warlord Cao 220 E Cao, who founds the Wei (Cao-Wei) dynasty.

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1 The Qin Dynasty (221–206 bce) Charles Sanft

The state of Qin before 221 bce The Qin dynasty was the foundational dynasty for the entire imperial period, if for no other reason than it established the structures and processes that were the starting point for all that followed.1 There were, inevitably, changes to all aspects of these systems over time. Yet there was a degree of continuity, stretching perhaps even to the present. The state of Qin was prominent throughout the Warring States period of disunity in the area that would become China. The story of the Qin dynasty, however, begins in the fourth century bce, well before its founding ended the Warring States. The coming together of political figures and practices beginning in the fourth century bce had a synergistic result that in the third century propelled the Qin past its competitors. In many ways the Qin emergence is typical of all historical development, in that it grew out of broad and long-term changes (Map 1.1). The idea of political unification was not exclusive to the Qin. It grew out of long-­standing philosophical discussions and debates about the nature of rulership and governance.2 The military potency of the Qin has long been at the center of that dynasty’s historiography. This is largely a result of Han writers’ portrayals, which sought to define the dynasty in terms of violence and warfare. This belies the foundational position of the Qin dynasty in the history of imperial China. While the Qin systems grew directly out of and adapted preceding practice, they were in fact innovative. Real innovation in historical terms always has roots in what goes before. Focusing on military might is a way to minimize the achievement of the Qin. For their unique contributions came not in combat. Every dynasty fights; every historical period sees warfare. Few indeed sow the seeds of institutions that endure for millennia. The Qin did. The rise of the Qin dynasty was an intellectual triumph more than a battlefield one. The thinker Shang Yang 商鞅 (d. 338 bce) made fundamental contributions to this revolution in the conception of government in the fourth century bce, while Qin was still only one of many competing states. Better known as Lord Shang, a name that gives the text associated with him its title, The Book of Lord Shang 商君書, Shang Yang articulated an ­information-centered approach to governing a state. He summarized the most important of the data sets as the “Thirteen Figures,” which encompass the state of the state in its various aspects, especially the numbers of various population segments.3 12

The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce)

Map 1.1  The Qin Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 2, 3–4.)

Based on The Book of Lord Shang and his biography in Sima Qian’s Grand Scribe’s Records (Shiji 史記), Shang Yang is generally credited with changes in several areas. Aspects of his proposals are chronologically complicated, and the most important of the developments associated with him—a system of population registration—had previously been proposed. But all accounts indicate that, as chancellor under Duke Xiao of Qin 秦孝公, Shang Yang made influential changes to governmental policy. The old hierarchy of noble and commoner was done away with and in its place the Qin established a series of social ranks. Every male member of the population held one of these ranks and could move up for a variety of acts in the interest of the state, particularly success in battle: taking an enemy head in battle, for instance, would add one level. The Qin grouped households into sets of five. The component households were supposed to both keep watch on the others members of the set and to help them if the need arose. Like other aspects of Qin governance, these acts have often been criticized, yet no few of the innovations Qin carried out in the fourth century bce continued into subsequent dynasties. Indeed, a system of household registration functions in China still today. Despite the obvious value of its insights, The Book of Lord Shang expresses its ideas in an absolutist tone that belies their true function. It is impossible to know to what degree Shang Yang’s rhetoric derived from its context and how much resulted from later editing. But careful analysis of his proposals suggests much more than simple totalitarianism. Later 13

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historiography has heaped criticism upon the Qin, yet objective consideration suggests that the changes they carried out—changes connected with Shang Yang—likely improved social cohesion and function.4 Shang Yang did not live to see the results of his theories. He was a firm favorite of Duke Xiao. But when that duke died and his son King Huiwen 惠文王 ascended the throne, things changed for Lord Shang. The new ruler received and believed reports that Shang Yang was disloyal. Shang Yang tried to flee, but was soon executed and his corpse dismembered. The stature of the Qin state was improving toward the end of the fourth century bce. King Huiwen received at his coronation embassies from some of the most important states; even more tellingly, the following year, the Zhou king himself sent congratulations. Still clearer indication of Qin’s growing power, though, came a few years later, when a number of states, including some that had paid their respects previously, banded together with steppes-dwelling groups from the north to wage an unsuccessful attack on Qin. The remaining years of the fourth century bce were replete with military activity as the Warring States contended with each other. Another major thinker to contribute to the Qin’s rise was Xun Kuang 荀况, commonly known as Xunzi 荀子 or Master Xun. He was born in the late fourth century bce, and his long life spanned most of the third century. Master Xun combined the strands of argument in favor of a single polity under a single ruler to make the philosophical case for unification. Master Xun most famously argued that human nature is bad and requires control—the sort of control that a comprehensive legal system could provide. Master Xun also propounded a method of rule that was based on virtue, not as an abstraction but rather as a strategy for improving political standing. Making the ruler’s reputation for virtue known inside the state would improve his standing and the obedience of the population. Over time, the ruler’s reputation could even spread beyond the borders and induce other states’ populations to wish to join him. The eventual Qin state combined the many sides of this proposition to create a state that was both all-penetrating and virtuous—by its own standards—and known throughout the realm. On the political side, the Qin dynasty’s final ascent to hegemony traces its beginning to the middle of the third century when King Zhuangxiang 莊襄王 (r. 249–247 bce) took the throne. During his short time in power, Zhuangxiang demonstrated a mix of public relations savvy and decisive action much like that which would serve his son so well. He marked his coming to power by granting beneficence to the common population, his ministers, and his relatives. The ruler of the decrepit Zhou house, for his part, banded together with the lords of other states to attack Qin. Zhuangxiang responded by dispatching his chancellor Lü Buwei 呂不韋 against the Zhou, and the Qin destroyed the last vestiges of that house’s political power in 256 bce. King Zhuangxiang subsequently sent a general to attack the state of Hann 韓, which responded by ceding territory. After that, and in the following year, the same general captured some dozens of walled towns in the states of Wei 魏 and Zhao 趙. An army drawn from five states and sent to preserve Wei met and defeated Qin forces. They chased the Qin to Hangu Pass, which guarded the entrance to the Qin homeland, then turned back. Later that year, King Zhuangxiang died and his son, the future First Emperor, ascended the throne to rule as King Zheng 政. It was 246 bce, and he was but twelve years old. The new monarch inherited not only the title of king but also the fruits of his predecessors’ expansionist ambitions. Qin territory already encompassed lands to the north, south, and east of the original Qin state. These possessions provided resources that supported the further ambitions of the Qin. For Qin, however, intellectual power was at least as important 14

The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce)

as any of these. And the Qin brain trust in the third century bce was formidable. Lü Buwei had made a fortune through trade, a part of which he invested in the successful pursuit of philosophy. He was an active supporter of the future emperor, and became first his regent, then chancellor. One of Master Xun’s students, Li Si 李斯, was an official, still minor then, though destined for the heights of power. Another of Master Xun’s students, Han Fei 韓非, would deeply influence the emperor through his essays. Lü Buwei wielded power until the ninth year of the new king’s reign, 238 bce, when King Zheng underwent the rituals for entering formal adulthood. Squalid tales dominate accounts of King Zheng’s ninth year on the throne. But as the new power dynamics at court developed, Lü Buwei and others were eventually repudiated and King Zheng came to exert power himself. The king did not rule without advice, as events of the following year reflect. Presumably inspired by the negative and excessive influence of outsiders like Lü Buwei, members of the Qin ruler’s clan persuaded him to issue an order expelling those men from other states who had come to give service to Qin. Li Si was one of those, and he wrote a letter in response to his ejection. In it he listed previous Qin rulers who had employed men from outside the state and thereby achieved success. Li Si pointed out that the intellectual underpinnings of the Qin project were no more autochthonous than were the imported jewels that adorned its king. Li Si added, by way of closing, which seems like an unsubtle threat: sending away talented men is pushing them into the service of competing states, which would have no xenophobic scruples about putting their talents to use. As soon as he read Li Si’s arguments, King Zheng reversed himself and vacated his previous command. He re-appointed Li Si and subsequently followed his advice. Li Si advocated a sophisticated plan to undermine competing local rulers and remove their troublesome underlings. Men who could be subverted by bribes would be; those impervious to corruption would be killed. Only when this weakening was complete would military action follow to complete what would be, by that time, practically a fait accompli. The Song dynasty historian Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086) credits this course of action as the most important aspect of Qin strategy and the one responsible for its success.5 Qin ascendency arose from an intellectual approach to conquest and leadership that subordinated military force to other means, though it did not do away with it. The rapid sequence of battlefield victories that came in the last dozen or so years of the Warring States period and culminated in the unification of China in 221 bce can be passed over quickly. It suffices to say that none could stand against the Qin. The activities of the new Qin dynasty upon defeating their enemies show that what came after unification was more important than the battles that preceded it.

The founding of the Qin dynasty The flurry of activity that followed the Qin military victory reflects their understanding that success in battle is something quite different from creating a lasting polity. In Sima Qian’s account in the Grand Scribe’s Records, the earliest extant history of Qin, changes to government at Xianyang (near modern Xi’an, Shaanxi), the new capital, predominate. The emperor adopted a new title and new terminology. He even decreed in advance the title by which he would be known posthumously. He was to be the First Emperor, and his successors would be known in terms of their distance from him: next would come the Second Emperor, then the Third Emperor, and so on, into the future. It might be easy to doubt the efficacy of vocabulary changes beyond the confines of the center, but paleographic sources confirm at least some of this sort of changes were put in place beyond the capital.6 15

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Arguably the most significant text in Chinese history, the announcement of unification came into being around this same time. It was an inscription on measuring vessels that appeared across the Qin realm. Its text employed and publicized the ruler’s new title, among other things: In the 26th year of his reign (221 bce), the emperor unified all the lords of the realm. The common people had great peace, and he established the title of emperor. Now he commands chancellors Zhuang and Wan: “In all cases clarify and unify those laws and units of measure that are disparate or doubtful.” 7 No received historical source recorded this text. Perhaps early historians, like many historians today, perceived this command mainly in terms of the institutional change it ordered, imposing a standardized system of weights and measures. But to focus on that alone is to miss its more enduring message of unification. For unlike the specifically Qin system of weights and measures, the notion of a unified polity expressed here became and remained the ideal ever since. Archaeologists have found examples of this inscription in many places and in various forms: it was pressed into clay, mounted on steelyards, and cast into weights. We can safely assume that what we have is only a small portion of the examples that existed at the time. This announcement of unification and the emperor’s claim that he had brought peace to All Under Heaven must have been nearly ubiquitous in its time. In this way and others, and although they did not invent the idea, the Qin and their ruler disseminated across the realm knowledge of the existence of the new, single polity under one sovereign. It was the effective communication of both the fact and the idea of unification that makes this text, without hyperbole, likely to have been the most important in premodern Chinese history. The aspects of the edict that command a new set of weights and measures invite skepticism. It is obvious that there is no way any government could simply do away with existing units of measure. Even today, China functions with multiple systems of weights and measures, the metric system alongside local units such as the jin (catty). Yet the media by which the wide dispersal of the proclamation of standardization across the realm took place suggests widespread contact with the new system. Many instances of the inscription appear to have come from official measures used for grain. This suggests that the payment of taxes in kind, at least, would have used the new units. Sima Qian says that the Qin chose six as their numeral, and used it to set certain standards: carriage width (six Qin feet, about 138.6 cm), the official pace (also six Qin feet), and the number of horses that drew the imperial chariot.

The administration of the new empire In his proclamation of the new polity, the First Emperor juxtaposed the elimination of local lords with the peace he claimed to have brought to the population. In doing this, the First Emperor hinted that the divided form of Zhou rule was the cause of disorder. When it came time to organize governance in the new state, his high officials made this same connection. In place of the Zhou system of granting nobles power in specific areas, they proposed a new form of governance that placed the entire realm under a central, bureaucratic administration. The largest administrative units were to be regions or commanderies ( jun), variable in size but comparable to US states; under the commanderies were counties (xian). Sima Qian says the Qin established 36 commanderies and scholars long tried to create a definitive list of them. The task proved impossible, and no wonder: excavated materials indicate there were 16

The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce)

in fact more than 36 commanderies. In early texts the number 36 can mean simply “many,” and that now seems the best understanding of the phrase in this context. There are various words in classical Chinese to denote many; perhaps Sima Qian or his source(s) chose this one because of Qin numerology and its focus on 6, 36 being, of course, the result of 6 times 6. There were official positions of responsibility at each level of these divisions. At the top of the bureaucracy was the chancellor, who reported directly to the emperor. Every commandery had a governor and every county a prefect (ling 令 or zhang 長), each with a staff of supporting officials. The commanderies and the counties were the primary nodes for gathering information and submitting it to the central authorities. Below the counties were townships (xiang 鄉), neighborhoods (ting 亭), and villages (li 里). Within the villages, households were grouped into sets of five. Residents of these groups were required to assist each other and to report on each other’s misdeeds. While each group of five had its leader, the present evidence does not indicate that person was an official; it seems each was instead simply designated from among householders.8

Administrative details from Liye and beyond Thanks to archaeological finds in recent years, we have far more detailed information about Qin governance than was available to historians at any point since the early imperial period. The largest find of Qin administrative documents to date comes from the town of Liye 里耶 in Hunan.9 Sometime in the late third century bce, someone dumped into a well there a mass of governmental records from Qianling 遷陵 county, in Dongting 洞庭, one of the previously unknown Qin commanderies. The anaerobic environment at the bottom of the well preserved many from decay. These wooden and bamboo strips and slats bring us firsthand information about the functioning of local government in the Qin. The publication of photographs and transcriptions is ongoing and promises to last years. But new understandings about Qin administrative structures are emerging from the information already available. Much of the material records matters such as taxes, grain distribution, the provision and disposal of materiel, the passage of documents between offices, and so on. Records of the population are an important part of the Liye materials. The Qin enforced a system of population registration that organized and recorded the entire population. In this system, at least as it was supposed to work, a complex of three pieces of information identified each person, male or female, adult or minor, free or slave: name, rank, and place of registration. It was every individual’s responsibility to maintain a place of registered residence, and failure to do so brought legal sanction. That much was already known. What the Liye strips make newly clear is that the system allowed the government to track specific people across distances and to pursue them, albeit slowly, for their obligations to it.10 These documents also attest to another sphere in which the Qin government interacted with its population, namely religion. They record that the county bureaucracy provided materials for ritual sacrifices of food: meat, grain, salt, and beer. The officials recorded the types and amounts of the provisions they dispensed from their stores. When the proceedings were complete, they also recorded the sale of the leftovers, a process subject to layers of supervision. Officials in Qianling carried out these sacrifices in honor of certain spirits, including the First Farmer (Xiannong 先農). Their records name at least one other spirit, too, but there remains disagreement among scholars about identification. Directions for individual prayer to the First Farmer at a grain storage building, which archaeologists recovered from a Qin official’s grave at Zhoujiatai 周家台, add still more information about contemporary religion 17

Charles Sanft

and suggest that officials may have been involved in broader religious practice, too, and not only directly government-sponsored observances.11

Law and legal practice under the Qin The Qin legal system has long been famous and has, in many respects, defined basic perceptions of the dynasty. For Han historians, its supposed excesses resulted in the Qin’s downfall, and later historians followed those early interpretations. But archaeologists upended our notions of the Qin legal system in the 1970s, when they discovered a set of Qin legal materials in a tomb of the late third century bce.12 Much of the find consists of legal statutes. These include sections forbidding the sorts of offenses that one would expect: theft, murder, and assault were all punishable, as was plotting to commit an offense. Unauthorized sacrifices were also against the law. While magistrates were required to adhere to the content of the law closely, the statutes do not provide an exhaustive list of crimes. Rather they specify certain crimes and establish categories that permitted legal officials to determine the appropriate punishments for other delicts.13 The punishments for violations included fines, beatings, imprisonment combined with labor service, and physical mutilation. One of the most surprising aspects of Qin law was its criminalization of “unfilial” behavior. Filial piety is, of course, commonly considered a “Confucian” virtue, while the Qin are, conventionally, the epitome of “Legalist” practice. Some scholars have tried to argue that the presence of this crime is evidence of “Confucian” influence on Qin society, but the strained nature of that approach is obvious. It is much preferable to recognize that filiality was a social value that people in early imperial China shared generally, and was not the exclusive property of one or another group.14 A sizable portion of the statutes concerns civil matters. Agriculture is prominent, including the recording and management of fields, the reporting of weather, and the care of government draft animals and implements. Another matter that receives much attention in the statutes is the actions of officials, including legal officials, who, in case of error or malfeasance, stood to suffer the same sorts of punishments as ordinary criminals. The Qin were clearly interested in enforcing a fair application of the law. The same group of grave texts also records the processes officials used to interrogate those suspected of crimes. The picture that emerges is of a ritual that served not merely to determine facts per se, but rather to establish a functional truth about events. This worked to counter a fundamental unease concerning the fallibility of legal processes, a broad theme in early legal thought.15

Imperial publicity A series of imperial progresses punctuated the decade of the First Emperor’s reign over All Under Heaven from 221 until 210 bce. Historians have offered various explanations for these travels: inspections, ritual observances, and even religious observances. Sima Qian’s account in the Grand Scribe’s Records, the main source for the period, portrays these events as a flurry of disconnected activities. There is nevertheless a thread tying them together: a conspicuous interest in attracting attention and generating publicity emerges at every turn. This is not to say that the other aspects were absent; they were, however, subordinate to the still larger aim of consolidating battlefield achievements into a functional polity. The same emperor that announced the unification of the realm under him (alongside his alteration of the system of weights and measures) with an inscription communicated the same essential message when 18

The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce)

he traveled in great pomp through the new state. It may be noted that, as in so many things, the Qin ruler did not so much invent the progress—his predecessors made conceptually similar trips—as expand its scope and effect.

The First Emperor’s four progresses The first of the First Emperor’s journeys occurred already in his second year on the throne (220 bce). On this tour, he did not go outside the territory of the original Qin state. The relatively modest scale of this trip does not reflect any flagging in the Napoleonic ambition that had brought him to power. That same year, the Qin began construction of two palaces and a series of enclosed ways connecting them to the capital. They also began to make highways. The following year (219 bce) saw the second tour, which went further afield. The First Emperor ascended three mountains (all in Shandong), Mt. Zouyi 鄒嶧, Mt. Tai 泰, and Mt. Liangfu 梁父, a foothill of Mt. Tai. In all cases, religious observances were part of the activities on site, and the First Emperor caused a stele to be put up at each place. In connection with the visit to Mt. Zouyi, the emperor engaged in a discussion about these observances with ritual specialists before making offerings. At Mt. Tai, the offerings were followed by a storm. The Mt. Tai stele, inter alia, reminds the reader of unification and proclaims the First Emperor’s resolution to continue his activities: The August Thearch [Emperor] embodies sagehood, And after having pacified all under heaven He has not been remiss in rulership. He rises early, retires late at night; He establishes and sets up enduring benefits.16

The First Emperor continued traveling, following the seacoast and ascending more mountains, including Mts. Cheng 成 and Zhifu 芝罘, placing at the latter yet another stele. The group then proceeded further south until arriving at Langye 琅琊 (in Shandong), where the emperor constructed a terrace. Here, too, he erected a stele, which bore a message still more ambitious than the previous one: Wherever human traces reach, There is none who does not declare himself [the Thearch’s] subject. His merits surpass those of the Five Thearchs.17

This sort of vainglory, ranking himself above the sage kings of antiquity, is perhaps to be expected from the ruler who had united the realm. Yet the placement of this text in historical accounts draws attention to a shift in the portrayal of the First Emperor. A distinct note of hubris extending to absurdity marks the Grand Scribe’s Records accounts of this progress and the First Emperor’s later acts. Thus, after the stele is set up, so the accounts go, vague reports of immortals on islands in the sea occasioned the dispatching of thousands of young people to seek them. The First Emperor seeks (unsuccessfully) to rescue fabled Zhou dynasty tripods from the bottom of a river. He encounters more bad weather after another sacrifice and decides to punish the spirits he made the offering to by denuding their mountain abode of its tree cover. Faced with this sort of narrative, the historian has a choice. Many scholars in the past, operating under the pervasive influence of Han historiography, have looked upon these stories as evidence of Qin arrogance blending into insanity. More recent historians often dismiss these accounts as unverifiable. There is something to this, of course: at the distance of more 19

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than two millennia, any sort of exaggerated tale deserves skepticism. Some scholars have reacted by shifting away from text to concentrate on material remains, in essence moving away from history. Others have taken a more antiquarian approach of cataloging. Most of these approaches tacitly accept in essence the form of the account in the Grand Scribe’s Records, which presents the First Emperor’s actions as a scattershot series of actions devoid of logic. Yet there is, in fact, something that connects them: their publicity value. Considering these actions as creating widespread knowledge of the emperor and, by extension, his power, either by marking the landscape or by putting up an inscription, gives them a logic that argues against casual dismissal. The next year (218 bce) saw still another imperial journey to the east. The entourage ascended Mt. Zhifu, where they again left an inscription, which again manifests the themes of pride and ambition. A fourth progress occurred in 215 bce, when the First Emperor visited Jieshi 碣石 (in Changli, Hebei) where he left still another inscription. He then went to Jiuyuan 九原 commandery (in Baotou, Inner Mongolia and nearby areas) on the northern border of the realm. The emperor dispatched an army with General Meng Tian 蒙恬 at its head after his return. The Grand Scribe’s Records attributes this course of action to a misunderstood augury that seemed to predict the Qin would fall to barbarian invasion. Only in retrospect does the message appear to become a correct, if ambiguous, prediction of events. Getting needed reinforcements to the border could as well explain why the emperor sent troops there. This interpretation becomes more convincing when one notes accounts of the following year (214 bce). General Meng Tian pushed the Xiongnu, a nomadic people, out of sections of the border regions, which were turned into counties and defended by a long series of fortifications—predecessors of the Great Wall. This reportedly overawed the Qin’s northern neighbors. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the First Emperor sent a body of convicts and other undesirables as soldiers to the south, where they conquered territory that became new commanderies. The Qin colonized both areas that year and the next with convicts.

The burning of books and execution of scholars One of the central pillars of the critical historiography of the Qin is that they “burned books and buried scholars [alive].” This has become metonymic shorthand for the supposed totalitarianism and barbarism of the dynasty. While this account is famous, there are many problems with it, which are enough to raise serious doubts about whether the events occurred as early histories depicted them. The basic storyline is simple and divides into two parts. The burning of books is said to have happened in 213 bce, occasioned by a memorial from Li Si. He complained that ancient texts were used to criticize the Qin dynasty and proposed, and the emperor approved, banning the ownership of all sorts of texts except those of practical use. The banned books were to be turned in to the authorities, who would burn them. The execution of scholars supposedly followed the flight of two “masters of techniques” the following year. They had advised the First Emperor on how to avoid demons, on longevity, and on similar matters. The emperor had treated them generously, but they criticized him before their abrupt departure. When word of their criticism reached the emperor, he ordered an investigation into the many scholars around the court, which allegedly ended in the execution of more than 460 men. The execution of scholars and the burning of books have come to stand for a thoroughgoing and violent opposition of the Qin to the previous intellectual tradition. Yet there is reason to question the interpretation of these events. That the First Emperor executed scholars who displeased him is entirely plausible. Emperors in imperial times exercised power over 20

The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce)

life and death, and no few of them put opponents and critics to death. But to see this as some sort of determined attempt to alter the intellectual landscape of the Qin dynasty or an expression of particular opposition to traditional culture is uncertain. There were learned men throughout the imperial government. Li Si, himself a former student of the scholarly Master Xun, is a perfect example of this. Killing a small portion of the intelligentsia necessarily left many more behind who were imbued with the writings and thought of earlier ages. The burning of books is at least equally questionable. Evidence indicates that many of the extensive texts purporting to relate preimperial matters probably came into being only during the Han period. They simply did not yet exist during the Qin period. For instance, the available evidence indicates that the Analects of Confucius was created only after the Qin dynasty—during the Western Han dynasty—from various shorter accounts. The enforcement of a ban on texts would require not merely locating and doing away with something as noticeable as books. It would entail finding and identifying short texts that referred to the material in question, and, by the way, differentiating them from the pragmatic texts that were legal to possess. It is hard to imagine that a government with the limited technological capabilities of the Qin would have been able to identify owners of texts. A medieval historian (Sima Guang) makes this point by implication. It relates that a descendent of Confucius who responded to an acquaintance’s worries about the destruction of books by pointing out how little danger he was in, saying that instead of surrendering his texts, he would simply hide them. Just as killing a small number of scholars could not be expected to alter the intellectual landscape, an unenforceable ban on certain texts would likely be pointless and without widespread impact. The First Emperor was not a particularly beneficent ruler, nor one whose model one would like to see emulated in the present. But to propose a series of actions that were simultaneously violent and futile would have been a waste of resources and counterproductive. It would have been crazy. And that was probably the point. The Han historians painted the Qin dynasty as power-mad and hubristic, the antithesis of the Han dynasty that succeeded them, a depiction that later scholars repeated and elaborated upon.

The First Emperor’s final years The year 212 bce brought with it another round of construction projects. One of the most famous was a stretch of highway known as the Direct Road. This road linked the region of the capital with Jiuyuan on the northern border. The assertions of archaeologists and local chauvinists notwithstanding, much of the highway’s route is unknown. Roads in early China were made of packed earth, which does not age well. Sections of the road still exist, though, particularly in the arid Ordos region of the northwest.18 Two other famous Qin building projects date to this same time. One of these is the tomb of the First Emperor, a mausoleum known as Mt. Li 驪山. The contents of this artificial hill are legendary in both senses of the word. It is, of course, itself renowned. And the tomb was supposedly filled with treasures. But archaeologists have not opened it, and no one knows what is—or was—inside. Mythology seems likely to be at work. Accounts of another famous Qin undertaking strengthen the latter impression, and that is the Epang Palace. According to the Grand Scribe’s Records, the Qin planned the Epang Palace as the front section of a new imperial palace complex outside Xianyang. It was intended to have space within it to seat thousands, presumably in an expansive open courtyard, and its opulence became a byword for Qin profligacy. Because of ambiguity in the descriptions, scholars since early on thought that the Epang Palace was mostly completed and then 21

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destroyed around the time of the Qin dynasty’s end. Modern archaeology has destroyed these notions. We know the location of the palace and the giant rammed-earth platform that was to hold it. But excavations have shown that construction never got much further than that. Pictures of its supposed extravagance resulted from literary imagination that embellished ambiguous accounts.19 The Grand Scribe’s Records says the Emperor built numerous palaces, which were linked by walled walkways. The idea was to hide the emperor’s whereabouts by making it difficult to determine his location at any particular time. Sima Qian attributes this to paranoia, although a reasonable interest in personal security could also explain it. The Grand Scribe’s Records reports several attempts on the First Emperor’s life, and there were doubtless more. In the winter of early 210 bce, the First Emperor began his fifth and, as it turned out, final progress. Chancellor Li Si and the emperor’s youngest son Huhai 胡亥 both joined the entourage. This progress began in a manner like the others, as the emperor and his companions traveled southeast from the capital, visiting Yunmeng 雲夢 (in Hubei), and sacrificing to one of the semi-mythological sage emperors at Mt. Jiuyi 九嶷. This portion of the tour is the only one of the five imperial progresses that finds independent confirmation. The terse chronicle of a local official’s life records the visit, which must have been a major event throughout the region.20 The emperor and his party traveled further on the Yangzi and by land, offering more sacrifices and installing one more inscription praising the Qin. They followed the seacoast up to revisit Langye and Zhifu. Shortly afterward, they went north to Shaqiu 沙丘 (in southern Hebei), where the First Emperor became sick. We have no details about his illness. The First Emperor was not a young man, and a natural death would not have been extraordinary. Yet the dubious succession that followed his decease in the autumn of 210 bce allows for suspicion of a plot. At his death, the First Emperor had ruled the realm he brought into being for just over ten years. It was a decade of relative peace and stability that was all the more remarkable because it followed centuries of warfare. Whatever the First Emperor was, or may have been, his governance was effective.

The successor History records that the First Emperor was averse to discussing death. But as his impending death became certain, he wrote a letter to his son Fusu 扶蘇. The text that comes to us does not include any explicit transfer of power. Its orders—to put Meng Tian in charge of the army and to hold his funeral at Xianyang—nevertheless leave no doubt that Fusu was the intended successor. After sealing the missive, the emperor passed it to the eunuch Zhao Gao 趙高. But instead of having it delivered, Zhao Gao conspired with the emperor’s son Huhai to put the latter on the throne. In place of the emperor’s orders, Fusu received a forged command to commit suicide. The conspirators concocted a document appointing Huhai the heir designate. When they arrived back at the capital and announced the death of the First Emperor, Huhai duly became the new ruler, the Second Emperor. The Second Emperor began his rule with every appearance of filiality. He expanded the cults of the First Emperor, increasing both the number of sacrifices in the Ancestral Temple to the First Emperor and the number of ritual offerings to nature spirits. In acknowledged imitation of his predecessor, the Second Emperor undertook an imperial progress in 209 bce. He visited two of the steles his father had put up and added his own inscriptions. 22

The Qin dynasty (221–206 bce)

Behind this, however, lurked the eunuch Zhao Gao, who had maneuvered himself into the new emperor’s confidence. When the Second Emperor appealed to him for advice about dealing with recalcitrant high officials and imperial clan members, Zhao Gao responded with a proposal to carry out a purge, which the Second Emperor ordered. Officials who argued against this course of action were treated as criminals. The resulting deaths of high officials and imperial relatives sent shock waves throughout the country. Not long afterward, the emperor commanded the resumption of the construction of Epang Palace, and summoned tens of thousands of men to the capital. This expanded population of non-farmers needed food. Orders to the hinterlands to provide provisions notwithstanding, the populace of the capital region was left without sufficient food. Rather than consider relaxing its demands or feeding the populace, the Second Emperor’s government doubled down on enforcement of the law. It is no surprise that organized, or at least semi-­ organized, insurgency arose around this time. The insurrection under Chen She 陳涉 (Chen Sheng 陳勝) in the area of the former Chu state is the most famous of these early movements. It inspired more uprisings that sprung up independently in different places. When reports of rebellion reached the palace, the Second Emperor responded by punishing those who relayed the news. This had the predictable result that subsequently only assurances that things were under control came to his ears. Such was the case even as the rebels enjoyed successes, and as armies under increasingly able commanders, including the future Han founder, Liu Bang 劉邦, emerged. The Second Emperor was as a result caught off guard when an army dispatched by Chen She reached the area of the capital. Facing a large invading force without enough troops to protect himself, the emperor followed the advice of a courtier to free convict laborers across the realm to fight. This led to a temporary reprieve for the Qin as their expanded forces scored scattered victories, including routing the force closest to the capital and killing Chen She. Yet at the capital, the weakness of the Second Emperor’s rule took its toll. Zhao Gao persuaded him to avoid exposing his shortcomings in discussions with ministers by withdrawing further from active rule, leaving Zhao as middleman. Predictably, unrest increased anew. In a belated attempt at saving the Qin dynasty, three high officials, including Li Si, remonstrated with the Second Emperor. They pointed out that the Qin had failed to successfully counter the rebels, whose ranks swelled with those dissatisfied with the government’s demands for taxes and labor service. The Second Emperor’s response was so disjointed that reading it gives the distinct impression that he was drunk or otherwise disordered. He began by quoting the philosopher Han Fei to support the notion that the ruler of the realm ought to be able to fulfill his desires, and then criticized the alleged asceticism of the sage kings as unworthy of emulation. He defended his construction projects as symbols of the imperial enterprise—symbols that were yet to be completed. And he ended his tirade by blaming the remonstrators for failing in their duties. All three were sent down for trial; two committed suicide rather than face that humiliation, and Li Si was executed. From this point on, the historical narrative focuses on two aspects. Outside the capital, the various insurrections grew. Eventually, two rival camps emerged under Liu Bang and his nemesis, Xiang Yu 項羽, respectively. Inside the capital, the story devolves into a tale of murder and machinations. Zhao Gao saw doom approaching and tried to preserve himself. He arranged the death of the Second Emperor and proclaimed that Qin would revert to its former status of kingdom. The final ruler of Qin was consequently a king, not an emperor, and known to posterity by the name Ziying 子嬰 rather than the Third Emperor. Well aware of Zhao Gao’s perfidy, Ziying killed the eunuch in short order after taking the throne. 23

Charles Sanft

In early 206 bce, Ziying went on an unadorned cart pulled by a white horse, his neck bound to signal submission, and surrendered to Liu Bang. The Han founder spared him. But when Xiang Yu arrived just over a month later, he put Ziying to death, along with others of the former ruling house, and ravaged the Qin capital Xianyang. That was the end of the Qin dynasty. Its legacy persists.

Notes 1 The historical overview I present here draws from Shiji 5.173–221 (“Qin benji”), 6.223–294 (“Qin Shihuang benji”), 87.2539–63 (“Li Si liezhuan”); Zizhi tongjian esp.1–3.186–295 (“Qin ji”). See also Sanft, Communication; Charles Sanft, “The Qin Empire,” in The Routledge Handbook of Early China, edited by Paul R. Goldin (London: Routledge, forthcoming). 2 Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire. 3 Jiang Lihong 蔣禮鴻, Shangjun shu zhuizhi 商君書錐指 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 34. 4 On the changes credited to Shang Yang and an analysis of their likely effects, see Sanft, “Shang Yang,” 174–91. On Shang Yang’s rhetoric, see Pines, “Alienating Rhetoric,” 79–110; on the textual history of the Book of Lord Shang, see Yuri Pines, “Dating a Pre-Imperial Text: The Case Study of The Book of Lord Shang,” Early China 39 (2016), 145–84. 5 Sima Guang, Zizhi tongjian, 218. 6 Zhang Chunlong 張春龍 and Long Jingsha 龍京沙, “Xiangxi Liye Qin jian 8–455 hao” 湘西里 耶秦簡 8–455 號, in by Wuhan daxue jianbo yanjiu zhongxin, ed., Jianbo 簡帛, no. 4 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2009), 11–5; Hu Pingsheng 胡平生, “Liye Qin jian 8–455 hao mufang xingzhi chuyi,” 里耶秦簡 8–455 號木方性質芻議 in Jianbo, no. 4, 17–25; Sanft, Communication, 59. 7 Sanft, Communication, 59. 8 Sanft, “Qin Government,” 118–29; Sanft, “Shang Yang”; Charles Sanft, “Population Records from Liye: Ideology in Practice,” in Ideology of Power and Power of Ideology in Early China, ed. Yuri Pines, Paul R. Goldin, and Martin Kern (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 249–69; Chen Wei 陳偉, “Qin Cangwu Dongting erjun chulun” 秦蒼梧、洞庭二郡芻論, Lishi yanjiu 歷史研究 5 (2003), 168–72. On the senses of the word “sanshiliu” 三十六 (i.e., thirty-six), see Hanyu dacidian 漢語大辭典 (Luo Zhufeng 羅竹風 et al. eds. Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1997). 9 This discussion of Liye draws upon Robin D.S. Yates, “The Qin,” 291–329. 10 Sanft, “Population Records,” 249–69. 11 Yates, “The Qin Slips,” 318–26; Sanft, “Paleographic Evidence,” 327–58. 12 Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu 睡虎地秦墓竹簡整理小組, ed., Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian 睡虎地秦墓竹簡 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1990); these texts are translated and introduced in Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law. 13 Miranda Brown and Charles Sanft, “Categories and Legal Reasoning in Early Imperial China: The Meaning of Fa in Recovered Texts,” Oriens Extremus 49 (2010), 283–306. 14 Charles Sanft, “Dong Zhongshu’s Chunqiu jueyu Reconsidered: On the Legal Interest in Subjective States and the Privilege of Hiding Family Members’ Crimes as Developments from Earlier Practice,” Early China 33–4 (2010–11), 158–67 and passim. 15 Charles Sanft, “Notes on Penal Ritual and Subjective Truth under the Qin,” Asia Major (third series) 22.1 (2008), 35–57; Charles Sanft, “Concepts of Law in the Shangshu,” in Origins of Chinese Political Thought: Studies in the Classic of Documents, ed. Martin Kern and Dirk Meyer (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). 16 Martin Kern, The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Imperial Representation (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2000), 21. 17 Kern, The Stele Inscriptions, 33. 18 Sanft, “Debating the Route,” 323–46. 19 Sanft, “The Construction and Deconstruction of Epanggong,” 160–76. 20 Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian zhengli xiaozu, ed., Shuihudi Qinmu zhujian, 7.

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2 The Western Han Liang CAI

The founding of the Western Han and the rise of the upper ruling elites Among the several rebel leaders who vied for primacy at the end of the Qin dynasty, Liu Bang 劉邦 distinguished himself on the battlefield. Defeating his major rival, Xiang Yu 項羽, he established the first of the two consecutive Han dynasties, the Western Han. The narrative presented by Han scholars has until recently portrayed the Qin as a cruel empire that betrayed the social values and political legacy of the Zhou dynasty. By contrast, the Han dynasty was regarded as the orthodox heir of traditional Zhou culture. New studies show, however, that the founding of the Han dynasty saw the loss of influence of the old nobilities but created a new upper ruling elite (Map 2.1). Both Xiang Yu and the imperial house of the Qin belonged to an aristocratic class whose origins can be traced back before the Warring States period (475–221 bce). Liu Bang, by contrast, came from a peasant family and was serving as a neighborhood head at the end of the Qin dynasty. Almost all his subordinates in the rebellion—from major advisors to strategists and military commanders—rose from humble circumstances. When the Western Han was established, these meritorious officials were rewarded with leading posts in the ­central court and ennobled as kings and marquises. Under Liu Bang, later known as Emperor Gaozu (r. 202–195 bce), 100 percent of the top officials—the Three Dukes and Nine Ministers (sanggong jiuqiu 三公九卿) in the central court—were meritorious men who had helped to establish the regime. Under Gaozu’s successors, Empress Dowager Lü 呂太后 (Emperor Hui 惠), Emperor Wen 文 (r. 180–157 bce), and Emperor Jing 景 (r. 157–141 bce), the ­percentage of meritorious officials in the central court decreased to 90 percent, 62 percent, and 46 ­percent of the recorded high officials, respectively. Their positions were filled by their children, relatives of the emperors’ concubines, and military leaders who had distinguished themselves in the recent campaigns. A few men from obscure background reached the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy by demonstrating administrative merit. This newly created ruling group saw another rupture at the midpoint of the dynasty. In 91 bce, Emperor Wu 武 (r. 141–87 bce), who had been on the throne for half a century, was tortured by illness and old age. He grew convinced that his sickness was caused by black magic and dispatched Jiang Chong 江充, a trusted official, to track down those who 25

Liang CAI

Map 2.1  W  estern Han. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 2, 13–14.)

communicated with evil spirits. During the five-year-long witch hunt that ensued, Empress Wei 衛皇后，the crown prince, and another prince all met their death. In the midst of the bloodshed, prominent high officials, marquises, and their families were accused of practicing sorcery and were promptly eliminated. The massacre in the central court created a power vacuum during the transition between Emperor Wu and Emperor Zhao 昭 (87–74 bce). Replacing those who had occupied the top of the power pyramid for several generations was a group of officials from obscure backgrounds who had no family history of official service. Among them were a number of ru scholars. They saw to it that their descendants and disciples also won positions in the central court, becoming an essential component of the new upper elites and shaping Western Han politics until the throne was usurped by Wang Mang 王莽 (r. 9–25 ce).

Imperial house, kingdoms, and consort families While the Western Han saw the creation and renewal of the upper stratum of the ruling elite, the imperial house, though it encountered several crises over its 200-year history, generally sustained its legitimacy and secured the loyalty of the whole empire. The challenges it faced were the rebellions of local kings, and the risk of usurpation by the powerful empress dowagers and their relatives. When founding the new dynasty, Emperor Gaozu faced two kinds of political legacies: the centralized bureaucratic system established by the Qin and the feudal system that was the heritage of the Zhou dynasty. The centralized bureaucracy organized the vast territory into administrative districts in a hierarchical order. The emperor served as the head of both the empire and the bureaucracy, appointing the officials who oversaw his people. In the feudal 26

The Western Han

system, the emperor shared his territory and his people with various kings, who had independent administrative, financial, and military powers. The centralized bureaucracy had helped Qin end the bloody rivalries among the various states and unify China. But the Qin soon collapsed. Some put it down to the First Emperor’s failure to enfeoff his own sons. Without kingdoms established by the imperial family members, the last emperor of the Qin had no one to turn to when nationwide uprisings broke out. Granting sons and brothers of the emperor the title of king and allowing them to rule their own territories would help secure the survival of the imperial house. However, it turned out that the existence of the Western Han’s independent kingdoms was a serious threat to the emperor and the empire. Independent regimes were the root cause of the century-long conflicts of the Warring States period. Furthermore, Liu Bang defeated Xiang Yu precisely because the latter had divided the empire into kingdoms, providing his former allies opportunities to challenge his hegemony. Due to those considerations, the rulers of the Han dynasty carefully combined the two political systems, finding a balance that contributed to the longevity of the imperial house. Only two groups of men were eligible to become kings in the Han: the meritorious military commanders who greatly contributed to establishing the dynasty, and sons of the emperors (except under Liu Bang, the founding father of the Han, who enfeoffed some Lius as kings who were not his descendants). To grant the most accomplished military generals the title of king was to compromise power by rewarding those most likely to challenge the throne. Quickly, Emperor Gaozu and Empress Lü took steps to wipe out potential enemies through conspiracies, wars, and political maneuvering. As the emperor came to believe that death was drawing nigh, he ordered his ministers to swear to make war against any granted kingships who were not members of the royal house of Liu ( fei Liushi er wang, tianxia gong ji zhi 非劉氏而王，天下共擊之). Well known as the “White Horse Covenant” (baima zhi meng 白馬之盟), the pact served as a basic principle in establishing kingdoms and was generally obeyed throughout Western Han. The tradition of establishing royal sons as kings was consistently followed by later dynasties and continued until the Qing (1644–1911). However, even though all subsequent kings had blood ties to emperors, they still presented major threats to the throne. Several rebellions were attempted by these powerful kings throughout Western Han. The most famous of them was the Rebellion of the Seven Princes in 154 bce. Several reforms were introduced to contain the power of kingdoms under Emperors Wen, Jing, and Wu, such as reducing the size of kingdoms by dividing them among all of a king’s male children and granting administrative power to chief administrators (xiang 相) appointed by the central government. By the end of Emperor Wu’s reign, reduction of the size and power of the kingdoms means they no longer presented serious threats to the imperial house. While kingdoms presented external challenge to the emperor, imperial confidants and relatives, especially the empress dowagers, were particularly threatening when the emperor was mentally or physically infirm. Over the course of the Western Han, the imperial house experienced three major crises. The first crisis saw the emergence of the first female ruler in Chinese history, Empress ­Dowager Lü; the second was the abovementioned witchcraft scandal; and the third triggered a usurpation by a consort relative and the collapse of the Western Han. The first crisis happened after Emperor Gaozu died, his son Liu Ying 劉盈 (210–188 bce), posthumously known as Emperor Hui 惠, succeeded to the throne, and Empress ­Dowager Lü, his mother, who was named regent, became the source of real power. She consolidated her position by promoting the male members of the Lü clan to high positions 27

Liang CAI

and enfeoffed them as kings. When Emperor Hui died, Empress Dowager Lü managed to control the empire by selecting and deposing baby emperors at will. But after her death, her clique was quickly eliminated by a coalition of high ministers and disgruntled imperial princes. ­Emperor Gaozu’s other son, Liu Heng 劉恆, the king of Dai 代王, was summoned back to the capital to assume the throne; he was posthumously known as Emperor Wen 文 (r. 180–157 bce). The transfer of power from Emperor Wen to Emperor Jing and to Emperor Wu was generally smooth. As mentioned earlier, late in his reign, Emperor Wu came to believe that conspirators at court were using black magic to harm him, prompting him to unleash a fiveyear-long witch hunt, which was the second crisis. As various factions accused one another of practicing the black arts, a political massacre was carried out. The crisis significantly weakened the central leadership and the royal house. After Emperor Wu’s death, all significant political power was controlled by Huo Guang 霍光, a formerly unknown confidant to Emperor Wu. Designated as regent to the boy Emperor Zhao 昭, Huo dominated the court until the emperor died without an heir. Huo enthroned and later deposed King Changyi 昌邑, eventually choosing Liu Bingyi 劉病已 (Emperor Xuan 宣帝), the grandson of former crown prince Wei, to assume the throne. While the imperial house survived those two crises, it ended in 9 ce, around 60 years after Empress Dowager Wang Zhengjun 王政君 and her family came to dominate the realm. As the mother of Emperor Cheng 成 (r. 33–7 bce), the empress dowager ennobled her brothers as marquises and appointed them to the highest official posts. As Emperor Cheng did not produce an heir, the empress dowager chose a cousin of his to succeed him, posthumously known as Emperor Ai 哀, who died at a young age, also without an heir. Eventually, the empress dowager’s cousin, the ambitious Wang Mang, usurped the Han throne and established the Xin 新dynasty (9–23 bce), putting an end to the 200-year-old dynasty. The Western Han started the tradition of enfeoffing the sons of the emperor as kings who ruled territories far from the capital. Powerful independent kingdoms were serious threats to the emperor. By suppressing rebellions and reducing the size and power of these territories, the Western Han successfully resolved the challenge. Existence of kingdoms helped to preserve the line of the imperial house, as keeping princes at a remove from the capital protected them from the bloody strife in the court, and their lineages could provide legitimate potential heirs to the throne when an emperor failed to produce male children.

Bureaucracy, and its recruitment and promotion system The emperor reigned over his empire through a complex bureaucracy. In Han times, while there were court deliberations (chaoyi 朝議) to discuss major affairs among officials at court in the presence of the emperor, the throne communicated with the bureaucracy through ­various kinds of paperwork, which were handled primarily by the Imperial Secretariat (shangshu tai 尚書臺). Emperor Wu replaced it with the Palace Secretariat (zhongsu 中書) headed by eunuch officials. With power second only to the emperor’s, the Three Dukes—the Chancellor (chengxiang 丞相), Commander-in-chief (taiwei 太尉), and Grandee Secretary (yushi dafu 御史大夫)— were at the top of the Han bureaucracy. The Chancellor was in charge of general administration; the Commander-in-chief in charge of military matters; and the Grandee Secretary exercised censorial power over officials and generally served as successor to the Chancellor. The Nine Ministers constituted the second highest stratum of the central government, 28

The Western Han

which included the Grand Master of Ceremonies (taichang 太常), the Superintendent of the Imperial Household (guanglu xun 光祿勳), the Commandant of the Guards (weiwei 衛尉), the Grand Coachman (taipu 太僕), the Commandant of Justice (tingwei 廷尉), and others. Those leading officials had their own offices staffed with subordinate officials and functionaries. In addition to their administrative titles, officials in the Han court were also ranked in terms of the bushels of grain, ranging from 10,000 bushels down to 100 bushels. It is said that the Three Dukes were ranked at 10,000 bushels nominally, while the Nine Ministers and leading officials of the metropolitan area at 2,000 bushels. The empire employed about 130,000 people by the end of the Western Han dynasty, a number that included officials and functionaries. Han officials generally came from three groups, namely, marquises (hou 侯), gentleman-attendants (lang/langli 郎/郎吏), and functionaries known as li 吏. The noble title of marquise was granted to those who had helped establish the Han dynasty, family members of favorite imperial concubines, those with extraordinary military accomplishments, chancellors (xiang) without noble titles, and those who had killed major rebel leaders. Gentleman-attendants constituted a special group in the bureaucracy. Primarily serving the emperor and the imperial family, they sometimes were regarded as personal employees of the throne. In the Western Han, around one-fourth of the recorded gentleman-­attendants came from powerful official families and had received appointments because of their hereditary privilege (yinren 蔭任; namely, the privilege to appoint one’s sons or brothers to be gentleman-attendants). The second way of getting gentleman-attendant appointments involved the official recommendation system (chaju 察舉) and the Imperial Academy (taixue 太學), but becoming gentleman-attendants via this avenue generally emerged after Emperor Wu. Other ways to become a gentleman-attendant included buying the position, accumulating military merits, being directly appointed by the emperor, and being recommended by powerful officials. Different from the gentleman-attendants who have drawn much attention from scholars, the functionary group is treated sporadically in traditional sources. Recently, archeologically excavated administrative archives began to shed light on the group. As a component part of the bureaucracy, the functionary group provided the major pool of official candidates throughout the Western Han. Functionaries were differentiated from officials in two major characteristics: first, they were directly employed by an official as assistants, whose appointments did not necessarily require approval of the central government; second, their ranks thereby were below 200 bushels, and they carried no official seals, nor did they have a guard of honor when traveling. Officials, ranging from the magistrate of a small county to the most powerful bureaucrat, all had their own functionaries. According to the Hanguan jiuyi 漢官 舊儀 (Old protocols of Han officials), the office of the chancellor under Emperor Wu had a staff of 382 men, of whom 162 were functionaries at the rank of 100 bushels. As men who directly dealt with daily administrative affairs, functionaries were the de facto operators of the intricate machinery of the imperial bureaucracy. Candidate pools for functionaries can be generally divided into four categories. The first were military veterans, especially those awarded low ranks and those with more than 10 years of service. They usually served as prison clerks (yuli 獄吏), local police officers (qiudao 求盜), or postmen (youren 郵人). The second were those familiar with administrative regulations, legal statutes and precedents, and institutional procedures. Most of them acquired technical training through apprenticeship or attending the special training school called xueshi 學室. The third were those who distinguished themselves in martial arts. In order to maintain the security of the local community, these functionaries were as needed as the civil 29

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clerks. The fourth were those who specialized in the Five Classics (ru) or established their reputation by their moral conduct. The Imperial Academy was designed by Gongsun Hong 公孫弘 and Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 to train official candidates. But its graduates were first recruited as gentleman-­ attendants and functionaries. Those with excellent examination scores from the Imperial Academy were appointed as gentleman-attendants or functionaries for important officials, while those with average scores were appointed as functionaries in local government. Military veterans were also an important source for official candidates, and they were generally absorbed into the three groups as well. Those with extraordinary military merit were sometimes ennobled as marquises and directly became candidates for high office. Those with remarkable achievements were appointed as gentleman-attendants, while those with an ordinary track record, but sufficient years of service, became functionaries. It was common for civil officials to assume military duties, and for military commanders to serve as civil officials. The three groups—marquises, gentleman-attendants, and functionaries—provided candidates for offices at different levels. Enjoying hereditary privileges, marquises were direct candidates for middle- and high-level office. We know of cases in which descendants of those who had helped to establish the Western Han had inherited their forbears’ noble titles and were chosen as chancellors, and low-level functionaries serving in county governments were ennobled as marquises and directly promoted to positions of the Nine Ministers after they had captured top rebel leaders. Gentleman-attendants, after years of service, could become candidates for low- to ­m iddle-level offices. They would serve as administrative officials such as magistrates and chief clerks in the provinces, and as members of the emperor’s retinue, including erudites, messengers, and gentleman-attendants at the palace gate (huangmen shilang 黃門侍郎). Functionaries had two tracks of advancement: transfer from the office of low-ranking officials to that of high-ranking officials; and transfer from functionaries to government-­ employed officials. Functionaries, gentleman-attendants, and other officials were subject to the same promotion regulations that had been institutionalized. The most typical means of career advancement was to accumulate both seniority and administrative merit, as officials and functionaries’ performances were documented and evaluated monthly and annually. Generally known as ji gonglao 積功勞 (accumulation of merit and seniority), this avenue for promotion has long been ignored by scholars. But archeologically excavated administrative archives show that accumulating seniority and merit was much more significant than the recommendation system for promotion. Interestingly, in light of this new knowledge, numerous similar cases have been identified in the traditional sources. For example, the Hanshu (Book of the Han) records that Bing Ji 丙吉, a prison functionary in the Lu 魯 region (Shandong), having gained merit and seniority ( ji gonglao), was promoted to left inspector in the office of the Inspector of the Right (tingwei youjian 廷尉右監, at the rank of 1,000 bushels). Second, both officials and functionaries advanced themselves through the recommendation system. In a considerable number of cases, the beneficiaries of the recommendation system were functionaries, officials promoted from functionaries, or gentleman-attendants. Oftentimes, if the recommended ones had held no positions in the officialdom before, they were first recruited as gentleman-attendants before further appointments. Officials and functionaries often got promoted to higher positions after they were placed in such categories as “filial and honest” (xiaolian 孝廉), “flourishing talent” (maocai 茂才), “able and virtuous” (xianliang 賢良), and “honest functionary” (lianli 廉吏). The recommendation system served as only one of the mechanisms in helping officials advance their careers. 30

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The conventional view holds that the recommendation system helped ru rise to power. But the system itself could never grant ru any special competitive edge, let alone guarantee a high position in officialdom. First, the recommendation system primarily targeted current officials and functionaries, whose performance was evaluated on their administrative merit, not on their knowledge of the classics. Second, the recommendation system could only help one climb a single step in an intricate hierarchical system, for example, ascending from a commoner to gentleman-attendant or from senior functionary to magistrate. The success of an official usually involved decades of experience in bureaucracy. The third way that enabled officials and functionaries to climb the ladder of bureaucracy was through personal nomination or recommendation ( jian 薦, jin 進, and ju 擧), an institutionalized practice often known as “sponsorship” (baoju 保舉). Although scholars have not paid much attention to this means of promotion, the sources preserve more than 60 cases of sponsorship in the Western Han, a figure that clearly exceeds identifiable cases of those who got promoted through the recommendation system. The positions men achieved through personal nomination or recommendation covered every level of the bureaucracy, ranging from clerkship to the positions of the Three Dukes. Officials usually nominated their subordinates or colleagues to their superiors or directly to the emperor. Some extraordinary candidates enjoyed nomination from several powerful officials, and sometimes a nomination was made collectively as in the cases of those “recommended by various ru” (zhuru jian 諸儒薦) or “by multiple people” (zhongren jian 衆人薦). Personal nomination could be made in an informal manner (for example, one could orally recommend a person to a superior), or in a formal way (for example, one could make a recommendation in a confidential memorial submitted to the emperor). The fourth way for advancement was through direct promotion by the emperor to the middle or upper ranks of the bureaucracy. Obviously, this avenue was only open to those who had both the access and the ability to impress the man on the throne.

The law, ranks of honor, and daily operation of the empire The registered population of the Western Han empire in 2 ce is recorded at more than 59 million, unequally distributed in different commanderies ( jun). According to the Hanshu, Runan 汝南, a large commandery, had 37 counties and a population of 2,596,148. By contrast, Dunhuang 敦煌 comprised only six counties with a population of 38,335. While there were several commandaries ( jun 郡) with populations surpassing one million, they were primarily located in the Yellow River and Huai River valleys. Sparsely populated commanderies were generally located in the frontier areas, some of which had recently been incorporated into the Han empire. Although officials were praised for their competence in controlling local magnate families, both the transmitted sources and archaeologically excavated manuscripts show that the nuclear family consisting of between four and eight people was the building block of the empires. The government used three major means—registration of households, bestowal of ranks of honor, and collective responsibility—to control the people and extract revenue and labor from them. Governments at the commandery and county levels assumed the responsibility of registering the population and the farmland—including both cultivated and uncultivated. The population was calculated in the form of the household, a unit that usually included an adult couple, their children, and sometimes grandparents and servants. The household registration also indicated the ages of the members of the household and their property. 31

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These records served as the basis for the collection of both the land tax and the poll tax. Those under seven sui—roughly six years old in Western terms—were exempted from the poll tax, and the poll tax levied on children over seven sui was small. Besides these taxes, the government required all healthy males in their prime age to serve in the army for two years and to provide one month’s corvée labor to the state every year. It seems that it was during the Han, not before, that the unit of the household came to play a crucial role in administration. The Han perpetuated the Qin practice of relying on a system of collective responsibility to control the population and maintain order. A single collective group consisted of 5 or 10 households. Within each group, members were responsible for reporting to the government any misconduct or crimes committed by one of their own. Filing such reports was rewarded, while failing to do so could result in punishment meted out to all members of the group. Such practices were also applied to the bureaucracy. If an official was found to have committed a crime, anyone who had recommended him was punished; senior officials received penalties if their subordinates failed to fulfill their duties. The Qin adopted the system of ranks created by Shang Yang 商鞅 (395–338 bce), and the Western Han followed suit. Of the 20 ranks, the highest, that of marquis, belonged to the noble class. Rank was an indicator of social status. Different ranks entailed different tax obligations and legal privileges; holders of high ranks were entitled to receive allocations of land and dwellings. Household registration records and other government documents recorded people’s ranks of honor. Men could either earn a rank through killing enemies in the battlefield or purchasing it from the government. To show his generosity, the emperor, on the occasion of his birthday or that of a newborn heir, might bestow ranks on men throughout the empire. Sometimes the imperial house awarded ranks to elders as well. Convicted criminals could be stripped of their ranks. People could also use their ranks to redeem the penalties they or their relatives had received. Thanks to a large number of government archives excavated from tombs, pits, and wells, we know that the daily operation of the empire was subject to complicated regulations and legal statutes. The Western Han legal system was inherited from the Qin. It was not derived from any abstract ideas of rights or freedom nor was it of divine origin; it was created through the deliberations of officials and sanctioned by the emperor. The legal regulations prescribed the duties of bureaucrats, ranging from monitoring the granaries to hiring government functionaries and investigating crimes. The daily life of commoners was also carefully prescribed. To give a few examples, there was a specific penalty for forging a certificate for owning a horse; before traveling a great distance, one needed a passport (zhuan 傳) attesting to a clean criminal record and to the fulfillment of various duties; and a pregnant woman who suffered a miscarriage after engaging in a physical fight with others might receive a penalty. Actions carried out by the officials followed detailed procedures and were carefully documented; following the regulations endowed the officials’ actions and judicial decisions with authority.

Ru learning and state ideology: correlative thinking and omen politics Conventionally, it was believed that the Qin dynasty was a cruel empire whose brutal legal system caused its collapse. Liu Bang, when founding the Han, announced the three-article code—those who kill shall be killed, those who hurt others shall be punished accordingly, and those who commit robberies shall receive penalties—that would be used instead of the complicated legal regulations of the Qin. Significantly, the early Han empire enjoyed a revival under the guidance of Huang-Lao thought. When the ambitious Emperor Wu came to 32

The Western Han

power, he declared war against what he saw as a prevailing laissez-faire attitude, abolished the so-called Hundred Schools of Thought, and made ru learning the state ideology. This narrative has served as an influential paradigm in understanding the Western Han. But new scholarship—based on the archeologically excavated manuscripts and new ­methodologies—has obliged us to revise our understanding of early imperial China. In the Qin dynasty, filial piety and other moral values made appearances on imperial steles, as do instructions to low-level functionaries (for example, see the archeologically excavated text “Wei li zhi dao” 為吏之道). Instead of simplifying the legal system, the Han took over most of the Qin’s administrative institutions and legal regulations. Under Emperor Wu, officials labeled ru by their contemporaries were a powerless minority, and men who specialized in the Hanfei zi and Huang-Lao thought achieved high positions; state cults practiced in various shrines and sacred places drew on heterodox religious practices. After the witchcraft scandal had subsided, the Western Han gradually evolved into a ru empire. This fundamental change was revealed by (1) a remarkable increase in the number of ru scholars who served as high officials, as they became a powerful political force in the central court; (2) the flourishing of learning communities devoted to the Five Classics; (3) exploitation of teacher-disciple networks by ru scholars to get access to political power; and (4) the appearance of correlative cosmology as a prominent element of political discourse, frequently referred to in memorials and imperial decrees. Correlative cosmology (tianren ganying 天人感應) was a powerful tradition with a pedigree stretching back to stories recorded in the Documents (Shangshu 尚書) and poems in the Classic of Songs (Shijing 詩經). It involved two conceptual constructions. The first ­regarded Heaven as a moral agent constantly responding to human society. If society was in ­order, Heaven would send down auspicious signs such as exotic animals; if society was in chaos, Heaven would create natural catastrophes and blizzards as warnings. The emperor, as the primary agent connecting human society with cosmic power, was primarily responsible for grasping Heaven’s signs and acting accordingly. The second theory assumed resonance between Heaven, Earth, and Man. Human activities, especially those of the emperor, generated energies that could disrupt the ideal balance of yin and yang, the fundamental powers of cosmology. The imbalance of the cosmic powers in turn precipitated calamitous or simply extraordinary natural events. Therefore, human beings, especially the emperor, were charged with identifying the source of the disturbance and eliminating it. During the first half of the Western Han dynasty, auspicious omens were reported and celebrated. Although solar and lunar eclipses were documented and viewed as inauspicious, few political discussions on these phenomena have been preserved in the sources. The philosopher Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒, who might be called the father of “omen politics,” barely escaped from death under Emperor Wu when he characterized a fire in an imperial shrine as an omen sent down by Heaven. By contrast, after the witchcraft scandal, with ru occupying high positions in the bureaucracy, interpreting the political significance of natural disasters became a standard practice. Emperors were supposed to issue edicts to apologize for disasters and offer remedies in the form of policy changes, a tradition that thereafter persisted throughout Chinese imperial history. Resonating with omen politics was the idea of the Mandate of Heaven. Invented during the Zhou dynasty to justify the conquest of the Shang, this discourse was centered on the idea that a benevolent ruler received a legitimating mandate to rule from Heaven. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, constant warfare led men to pursue military prowess and economic growth. Documents produced during this time rarely mentioned the 33

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Mandate of Heaven. Although bronze vessel inscriptions made in the early Qin state claimed that their rulers had received the mandate (see, for example, the Qin zhong 秦鍾 (bells) and the Qin Gong gui 秦公簋), after unification the Qin emperors never worshipped Heaven or defended their legitimacy by invoking the mandate. As in the Qin, during the first decades of the Han, the emperors seldom offered sacrifices to Heaven. But after the witchcraft scandal, when Emperor Zhao assumed the throne, officials started to mention receiving the mandate to rule (shouming 受命). When Emperor Cheng produced no biological heir and the survival of the dynasty was in doubt, the Mandate of Heaven was frequently referred to by both scholars and high officials. More conspicuously, when Wang Mang founded the Xin dynasty, he claimed that he had received the mandate to replace the Western Han; the contenders for power who arose after Wang’s demise did likewise. The discourse became entrenched during the Eastern Han and persisted as the rationale for dynastic change for centuries to come.

Religions: ancestor worship, state cult, and local practices Perpetuating the cult of ancestor worship that can be traced back to the Shang dynasty, the Han imperial house built shrines in honor of the founding father and the succeeding emperors. Han people believed that one’s deceased ancestors controlled many elements of this world and their happiness in the afterworld was contingent on the offerings filial descendants provided. Regular offerings were made at the ancestor shrines throughout the empire. By 40 bce, there were 167 imperial ancestral shrines in the commanderies and 176 in the capital. According to Ban Gu 班固, these shrines saw 24,455 offerings per year and employed 67,276 people as guards, musicians, dancers, and other personnel. Since these activities entailed an economic burden, ru scholars such as Kuang Heng 匡衡 suggested some of the ancestral shrines be demolished according to rituals prescribed by the classics. This suggestion triggered a heated debate. (Besides imperial ancestral shrines, it seems likely that rich families also erected shrines devoted to their ancestors, but sources are scanty.) In addition to worshipping in their ancestral shrines, the Han people also built sophisticated tombs which offer clues to their understanding of the afterlife. Rich archaeological discoveries inform us about the mortuary practices of the emperors, kings, marquises, and commoners. While Emperor Wen carved mausoleum chambers by hollowing out a mountain, most of the emperors and men of privilege constructed horizontal chamber-style tombs capped with grandiose, towering mounds of rammed earth. Generally, the tombs were designed to imitate the palaces or the mansions people had lived in in this world. It was believed that the deceased continued their life in the Yellow Spring (the underworld). Not only did they need many of the goods used in daily life, but they were also subject to the rules and regulations of the underworld’s bureaucracy. Rich burial objects were found in Mawangdui 馬王堆 and Marquis Haihun’s tomb 海昏侯墓, among which manuscripts on medical issues, astrology, the classics, and Daoism have attracted the attention of modern scholars. Although valuable objects were found in the tombs, there were large numbers of spirit artifacts (mingqi 冥器), cheap imitations of costly originals in most cases. Those included sculpted figures intended to serve and entertain the tomb owners. While Han people believed in the potency of their ancestors and sought their blessings, they also tried to sever their connections with the deceased, using various ritual techniques to prevent the dead from wandering around the world of the living. A genre of manuscripts called “daybook” (rishu 日書) was often found buried with local officials. They were almanacs that indicated the appropriate days and hours for certain 34

The Western Han

activities. We are not sure how closely officials followed these manuals in performing their duties, but the frequent discoveries of “daybook” in Han tombs indicate that men believed that the cosmic force defined by time and space affected human activities. The abundant presence of written almanacs also suggests that communicating with the otherworld could be mastered by literary men, which posted a challenge to the monopoly traditionally held by intermediaries such as shamans. Archaeological finds also show that worshipping local spirits and performing divinations were part of the function of local officials. On founding the Han, Emperor Gaozu established state altars to worship She 社 (the god of the soil) and Ji 稷 (the god of grain). The Western Han adopted the practices of the Qin, offering regular sacrifices to four (later five) directional Di 帝, the Green Di of the east, the Red Di of the south, the Yellow Di of the center, the White Di of the west, and the Black Di of the north. Like First Emperor of Qin 秦始皇, Emperor Wu performed Feng 封 and Shan 禪 sacrifices, especially on the peak of Mount Tai, declaring to gods and men sovereignty over the territory. It was also said that Feng and Shan rituals would help the emperor to achieve immortality. Emperor Wu also introduced several new cults, most important of which was the worship of the Great Unity (Taiyi 太一), which probably had originated in the state of Chu, and the Sovereign Earth (Houtu 后土). The worship of Heaven at the annual suburban ( jiao 郊) sacrifice was not introduced until much later, in 32 bce, 40 years before the fall of the Western Han; under Wang Mang, it was established as the primary state cult. When the Eastern Han founder, Guangwu 光武, resumed the Feng and Shan sacrifices, he interpreted them as a ritual announcing the restoration of order to Heaven.

The Silk Road, the frontiers, and the others Within the territory of the Western Han, different regions enjoyed distinct cultures. But the geographical borders of the empire provided a physical boundary to integrate those different peoples into one unity and differentiate them from outsiders. The peoples surrounding the Chinese empire can be roughly divided into two categories. To the north and west were various nomadic groups. The construction of a single system of the Great Wall under Qin and the emergence of the frontier zone separated the sedentary Han Chinese from their nomadic northern neighbors. To the south and southeast there were sedentary non-Sinitic peoples, who gradually adopted many traits of Han culture. With the submission of the various political regimes in the Western Regions (Xiyu 西域) and in the South, the ideal of an all-encompassing empire came into being, an empire of tianxia 天下(all under Heaven)—one with military prowess and imperial virtue—that drew tribute and commanded obedience from surrounding states.

Nomads and the emergence of the Xiongnu empire Within the vast territory of the Mongolian steppe and the Gobi desert, various nomadic tribes had flourished during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770–221 bce). Living on horseback, the nomads migrated in pursuit of pasture for their livestock according to seasonal changes. Due to the harsh environments and fragile socioeconomic basis, trading with oasis agriculture centers and with Chinese border cities was an essential part of their existence. Their hunting and pastoral life sharpened their riding skills and made them excellent soldiers on horseback. The political power of nomadic tribal leaders was generally based on the ability to defend the tribe from rivals and to secure booty by plundering sedentary communities. 35

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China had a long history of contact with nomads. With the establishment of the Qin empire, General Meng Tian 蒙恬 drove nomadic groups far from their homes at the great bend in the Yellow River, who fled far into the Mongolian Plateau. During the transition from Qin to Han, Modu (Maodun) 冒顿 unified formerly competing tribes on steppe and established a Xiongnu 匈奴 empire, whose territory extended from western Manchuria to the Pamirs and covered much of present-day Siberia and Mongolia. Whereas Sima Qian 司馬遷 described the Xiongnu as a hierarchical society with power descending from the royal family to various hereditary kings and tribal leaders, it was probably more of a confederation of tribal leaders. Although they acknowledged a supreme lord—known as Chanyu 單于—— tribal leaders enjoyed independent political, economic, and military powers. The founding father of the Western Han, Liu Bang, had a disastrous military encounter with the Xiongnu in 200 bce, when he was surrounded by the fierce nomads for seven days at Pingcheng 平城 (near Datong, Shanxi). Consequently, the Han empire signed a peace treaty with the Xiongnu, and a tribute (silk diplomacy) and marriage diplomacy (heqin 和親) was formulated to mediate the relationship between the two neighbors. Silk diplomacy provided the Xiongnu with an annual gift of luxurious commodities such as silk cloth and gold, as well as staple foods the grasslands lacked. The annual tribute was supposed to exchange for peace. In addition, “marriage diplomacy” provided a Western Han princess as the wife of Chanyu, so as to, Han officials claimed, transform the children of the Xiongnu leader into the grandsons of a Han emperor and thereby assimilate a potential threat into the Chinese kinship structure. Those policies failed to bring long-term peace to the empire. As the tribute sent to the Xiongnu was mostly enjoyed by the royal family, the tribes in the confederation did not benefit. Chanyu did not have absolute authority to control his people either, and Xiongnu raids on Chinese cities were frequent. Han emperors treated Chanyu as their equals, renegotiating their peace treaty repeatedly during the first 70 years of the Western Han. Emperor Wu fundamentally changed the Western Han policy toward the Xiongnu, making war on them in several large-scale campaigns from 119 to 134 bce. While he successfully pushed the Xiongnu into Central Asia, the military effort put a considerable economic burden on the empire. Furthermore, because the vast territory formerly occupied by the Xiongnu suited only a nomadic lifestyle, the sedentary Han empire could not translate its victory into an enduring occupation of the steppe. Starting in 57 bce, the Xiongnu empire was torn apart in a civil war. Eventually, it was split into two parts: an eastern horde, which submitted to the Han emperor when the Chanyu visited the capital and sent his son to live there as a hostage; and a western horde, which was driven into Central Asia.

The Western Regions and the Silk Road Modern-day Xinjiang and Central Asia—jointly referred to during the Han dynasty as “the Western Regions”—were inhabited by nomads such as the Wusun 烏孫 and the Yuezhi 月氏, as well as some oasis states. With the emergence of the Xiongnu empire, the Western Regions fell under its influence. In order to subdue the Xiongnu, the Western Han sent an emissary named Zhang Qian 張騫 to form an alliance with the Xiongnu’s former rival, the Yuezhi (138 bce). Zhang Qian was captured by the Xiongnu twice but managed to complete his mission and returned to China in 126 bce. He provided the most detailed information on the Western Regions until that time. After defeating the Xiongnu, Emperor Wu went on to forge an alliance with the Wusun, subdue Loulan 樓蘭 and Jushi 車師 (Turfan), and send a military expedition to conquer Ferghana. 36

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The Han triumphs obliged various Central Asian states to send tribute and hostages to the Chinese court and eventually led to the establishment of the protector-generalship of the Western Regions in 60 bce. Garrisons at Dunhuang and Juyan 居延 left behind a large number of administrative records on wooden strips, offering much information on life on the frontier. Chinese products, especially silk, entered into the Central Asian markets, from which they were transported further west. They traveled along the transcontinental trade routes, later known as the Silk Road, which consisted of several regional trade networks connecting present-day Xinjiang to Afghanistan and India, Persia, and finally the eastern provinces of the Roman Orient. While the Romans referred to those who supplied silk as “Seres,” literally, “Silk people,” China envisioned a mysterious empire called Great Qin 大秦 in the far west. The Silk Road facilitated the diffusion of products, religions, and technologies between East and West. Probably no single merchant was ever able to travel from China to Rome or the other way round during the Western Han, and those who used the Silk Road may have only been aware of one or two regional routes.

Southern neighbors While the number one foe of the Western Han was Xiongnu, the non-Han peoples to the far south were, from the perspective of the ruling class, relatively insignificant. What today we call Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, and northern Vietnam were all part of the greater Chinese territory, though Chinese influence was mostly concentrated on the military garrisons. The administration of the populace was left to local chieftains, who symbolically submitted to the Han court by receiving titles granted by the emperors and presenting as annual tribute exotic local products. The emperors welcomed these rare objects from distant regions, as they believed, in line with ru correlative cosmology, that a virtuous ruler could attract people from far away; rare goods were also auspicious signs of the emperor’s power.

The imperial capital Different from the natural development of various urban centers, the capital of the Western Han, Chang’an, was built in the heartland of the Qin from scratch. Located three kilometers northwest of modern Xi’an, the capital demonstrated the power of the emperor with magnificent palaces and imposing towers as well as marketplaces and residential quarters. With a registered urban population of nearly 250,000 in 2 ce, this planned city was also the economic and cultural center of the country. Not only was Chang’an the transportation hub where major roads converged, it was also the most important commercial center of the Silk Road. The sacred places and altars devoted to state cults were set in and around the capital. Emperor Wen established the cult of the five di north of Chang’an, and Emperor Wu constructed a massive sacrificial center to the southeast. The mausoleums of most emperors were located in the capital’s suburbs, north of the Wei River. Following the example of the First Emperor of Qin, the Western Han court ordered powerful local families to relocate to areas around the mausoleums. While this disconnected the magnates from their power bases in the local regions and thereby removed the threat to the central government, these relocated families often provided candidates for offices in the central government. Towns that grew up around the mausoleums had populations ranging from 170,000 to 270,000. 37

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Literature Liu An 劉安, king of Huainan 淮南, active at the beginning of Emperor Wu’s reign, recruited talented men to reside at his court and compile an encyclopedia called The Master of Huainan (Huainanzi 淮南子). This work attempted to combine different schools of thoughts and technical traditions. Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145–ca. 87 bce), a towering figure in Chinese historiography, produced the Grand Scribe’s Records (Shiji 史記), a comprehensive history from the origins of Chinese civilization to his own day. The major genres Sima Qian created to structure his narrative set the standard for all dynastic histories to come. Sima Xiongru 司馬相如 (179–117 bce) and Yang Xiong 楊雄 (53–18 bce), both from Sichuan, won fame as the finest composers of fu 賦 (rhapsodies). Their rhapsodies centered on court life, and their grandiose language was said to cast a spell on audiences. The Music Bureau (yuefu 樂府), an organ of the central government, collected and refined folksongs and provided lyrics for court music. Most poems of this age that survive were oftentimes either written by anonymous authors or attributed to rulers, military generals, or their concubines. In the Western Han, writings on childhood and women also appeared. Jia Yi 賈誼 (200–168 bce), Dong Zhongshu, and Liu Xiang 劉向 (79–8 bce) wrote “fetal instructions,” holding that a woman’s behavior and environment would shape the personality of the child she was conceiving. Liu Xiang also wrote the Biographies of Exemplary Women (Lienü zhuan 列女傳), a collection that was devoted to ideal or extraordinary females. On the one hand, didactic teaching asked women to yield to the authority of men—their fathers before marriage, their husbands after marriage, and their sons after the death of the husband. On the other hand, the promotion of filial piety allowed women to exercise power in the family or even control the court. The social status and economic strength of a woman’s parents often affected the power she had in her marriage. Toward the end of the Western Han, the court called on Liu Xiang 劉向, his son Liu Xin 劉歆, and their colleagues to organize the imperial library. For the first time, the knowledge of the world was systematically structured into different branches. Jing 經, the Five Classics (or Six Classics when the Classic of Music is counted), were regarded as the highest teachings that preserved the essential message of the world. Masters of thought (zhuzi 諸子) include various schools, such as ru, Daoism, and fa 法. Poems and rhapsodies (shifu 詩賦) made up another category. Technical categories include military treatises (bingshu 兵書), numbers and divination (shushu 術數), and formulas and techniques ( fangji 方技). Those categories provided the basic framework that the Chinese people would rely on to organize their knowledge for the next 2,000 years.

38

3 THE EASTERN HAN Rafe de Crespigny

Foundation and the first rulers 23–88 ce Under the regime of Wang Mang 王莽, the former imperial Liu 劉 clan had lost many of its privileges, and in the winter of 22 ce, members of the family in Nanyang 南陽 rose in rebellion. While the armies of the “usurper” were distracted by the need to defend the northern frontier against the newly hostile Chanyu 單于 Yu 輿 of the Xiongnu 匈奴, the insurgents received support from large troops of people driven from their lands by floods ravaging the North China plain. On March 11, 23 ce, Liu Xuan 劉玄 was proclaimed emperor of a new “Gengshi” 更始 reign period; Liu Xuan’s cousin Liu Bosheng 劉伯升 had been first leader of the rebellion, but he was eliminated soon afterward. On October 6, the rebels captured Chang’an 長安, Wang Mang was killed, and Liu Xuan took up residence. Liu Bosheng’s brother Liu Xiu 劉秀, however, had retained a following and was permitted to act as an agent of the new government in the North. When Liu Xuan came into the hands of the Red Eyebrows (Chimei 赤眉) rebels in 25 ce, Liu Xiu claimed the throne for himself and set his capital at Luoyang 雒陽. There were a number of rival chieftains, some of whom also took the imperial title, but by 30 ce, Liu Xiu had destroyed his opponents in the basin of the middle Yangzi and in the southeast. Northwest in present-day Gansu, he was faced by the warlords Wei Ao 隗囂 and Dou Rong 竇融, but Dou Rong agreed to an alliance and Wei Ao was destroyed in 33 ce. A final campaign in 36 ce saw the defeat and death of Gongsun Shu 公孫述 in present-day Sichuan, and Liu Xiu, best known by his posthumous title as Emperor Guangwu 光武帝 (r. 25–57), was master of China (Map 3.1). In 29 ce, toward the conclusion of the first stage of civil war, Guangwu ordered the end of the Former Han system of military service. Up to this time, all subjects had been required to undergo training, but this was now required only in frontier regions. Within the empire, men could be called up in emergency, but it was considered that untrained rebels would be less dangerous to the government, while the elite Northern Army (beijun 北軍), based at the capital and forming the central reserve of the empire, was sufficient to control most local trouble. In the far south, a rebellion led by the Sinicized Trung sisters (徵氏姐妹) affected the Red River basin of present-day Vietnam, but was put down by Guangwu’s general Ma Yuan 馬援; the sacred bronzes of the local people were melted down to form the statue of an ideal horse to 39

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Map 3.1  The Eastern Han. (By Rafe de Crespigny.)

adorn the imperial palace. And in Wuling commandery 武陵郡, west of Dongting Lake on the middle Yangzi, the non-Han people of the hill country were a source of continuing trouble. More dangerously, the Chanyu Yu of the Xiongnu, old enemy of Wang Mang, maintained hostility in the North, with raids and constant pressure against the frontier, so that the newly restored empire was forced onto the defensive and obliged to cede ground. In 46 ce, however, the death of that long-lived ruler brought a succession of quarrels, and the unsuccessful prince Bi 比 sought refuge in the Ordos region within the loop of the Yellow River. Recognized as Southern Chanyu, he and his followers were granted settlement and became vassal allies of Han. So the Xiongnu were divided and weakened, and much of the lost territory was regained. North of present-day Beijing, a stretch of land about present-day Chengde lay now beyond the former frontier, but otherwise the Eastern Han empire was largely coterminous with its Western predecessor. Though member of a cadet branch, the new emperor descended from the sovereigns of Western Han, so he gained authority from that connection and was able to claim that his 40

The Eastern Han

government represented a continuation and indeed a “restoration” (zhongxing 中興) of the former dynasty. Confirming his position, he established an Ancestral Temple to the founding Emperor Gao at Luoyang, together with the altars to Heaven and Earth and to the Gods of the Soils and Grains (Sheji 社稷). The Imperial University (Grand Academy) (Taixue 太學) was established soon afterward, and further sacred sites and buildings were added during the course of his reign. Despite formal denunciations of Wang Mang, many ceremonies and rituals of Eastern Han followed precedents he had established and emphasized the same Confucian moral principles as its predecessor. Apart from the new arrangements for military service, the government of Emperor Guangwu was organized on much the same pattern as that of Western Han. The major difference was at the head of the administration, where the office of Imperial Chancellor was replaced by the Three Excellencies (Dukes) (sangong 三公): the Grand Commandant (­defender-in-chief ) (taiwei 太尉), the Excellency over the Masses (minister of education) (situ  司徒), and the Excellency of Works (censor-in-chief ) (sikong 司空). There was some sense of seniority among the three, but Guangwu held control of his government, and the system was designed for personal rule. One consequence was that the Imperial Secretariat (shangshu 尚書), controlling the receipt of official reports and the issuing of imperial orders, had a central role in administration; another was that personal rule required a mature and competent ruler—this became a problem later. Early in 56 ce, 30 years after taking the imperial title, Guangwu traveled east to Mount Tai and carried out the Feng 封 and Shan 禪 sacrifices, highest manifestations of universal peace and good order. He died the following year, succeeded by Liu Zhuang 劉莊 or Emperor Ming 明 (r. 57–75). Though he was the fourth son of his father, Liu Zhuang was the eldest by his current empress Yin Lihua 陰麗華. Born in 28 ce and appointed heir or crown prince (taizi 太子) in 43 ce, he had taken an active part in discussions on policy at court, and he came to the throne at the age of 30. Emperor Ming died in 75 ce, and he in turn was succeeded by a mature-age son, Emperor Zhang 章. The inheritance, however, would change thereafter.

Non-Han peoples: Xiongnu, Qiang, Central Asia, and the South 58–118 ce The empire of the Eastern Han extended from the borders of Inner Mongolia to the northern part of present-day Vietnam, but the imperial government had limited interest in the lands beyond the Yangzi and had no effective presence in the southeast—present-day Fujian and southern Zhejiang. While southern China was controlled by commanderies and counties in much the same fashion as the North, the distance and difficulty of communication over mountainous territory meant that the region as a whole received little attention (Map 3.2). One strange exception was the far southwest, where in 69 ce, the Ailao 哀牢 people acceded to the empire. Their territory was claimed to extend from the west of present-day Yunnan into the upper reaches of the Irrawaddy in Burma/Myanmar, and their number is given as half a million. A new commandery, Yongchang 永昌, was established to govern the new territory, and was maintained until the end of the dynasty. On the other hand, while the region produced many minerals, including iron, copper, and gold, and there may have been prosperous trade with India, it is doubtful Han authority was effective over so many people at such a distance. Closer to home, the North and the northwest—present-day Gansu—were of more immediate concern. In the early 70s, Emperor Ming sent an expedition against the Northern Xiongnu and also attempted to establish a position in the Western Regions (Xiyu 西域), 41

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Map 3.2  The Eastern Han and Its Neighbors. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 2, 40–41.)

present-day Xinjiang, with garrisons about Turfan. Both ventures failed: the armies sent north gained no success, and the garrisons were destroyed by the local city-states and their Xiongnu allies. Emperor Ming died at this time, and his son Emperor Zhang 章 (r. 75–88) was less ambitious. Following his death, however, the government of Emperor He 和 (r. 88–106), first of a series of rulers who came to the throne as minors, was controlled by the regency of Empress Dowager Dou 竇. As the Northern Xiongnu suffered the effects of a prolonged drought, and their Chanyu was defeated and killed by the Xianbei 鮮卑 people from the east, the Southern Chanyu proposed another attack. The Dowager’s brother Dou Xian 竇憲 was given command of a major army: the majority of the troops were provided by the Southern Xiongnu and other non-Han allies, but they were supported by the Northern Army, by local militia, and by troops under the General on the Liao (du Liao jiangjun 度遼將軍), whose base near present-day Baotou guarded the Ordos loop of the Yellow River. The combined force was 50,000 men, some three-quarters of them non-Han. The enterprise was a complete success. As the forces of the Han and its allies ravaged their homeland, the new Northern Chanyu and the remnants of his people were driven northwest beyond the Altai Mountains. The Southern government, however, proved quite incapable of extending its rule, as conflict between the men of the South and their former enemies was exacerbated by rivalries within the ruling family. So the regime was weakened, and the northern steppe was left open to the expansion of the Xianbei, less organized, less controllable, and more hostile to the Han than the Northern Xiongnu had been. In the Western Regions, Dou Xian’s success enhanced the authority of the Han, and the enterprising agent Ban Chao 班超, with little direct support but with remarkable skill in 42

The Eastern Han

diplomacy, united the city-states of the Silk Road about the Tarim basin under a general hegemony. He was named Protector-general (xiyu duhu 西域都護) in 91 ce, but although he had restored the authority formerly held by Western Han, his achievement lasted only a few years after he left office in 102 ce. In 106 ce, a rebellion against Han influence persuaded the court that the benefits of empire in Central Asia were not worth the effort, and orders were given for withdrawal. Closer to home, the Qiang 羌 people of the northwest had caused occasional trouble since the beginning of the dynasty, and there had been incursions and frontier war from the time of Emperor Ming. Peace was largely established by the turn of the century, but the government had brought many non-Han to settle within imperial territory as a means to control them. The program, however, was not a success, for the tribespeople were treated badly by Han officials. In 107, the signs of weakness shown by withdrawal from the Western Regions inspired a massive rising of the Qiang, As the insurgents turned against their neighbors, the leader of the rebellion, Dianlian 滇零, established a headquarters on the Yellow River just south of present-day Ningxia. In 108, he proclaimed himself emperor, and for the next 10 years the northwest was devastated by internal warfare. Communication along the Gansu ­Corridor was broken, imperial armies were defeated, and rebel forces approached Chang’an and ­Luoyang and reached even to the North China plain. Dianlian died in 112, but his successors—including renegade Han—maintained themselves for another six years. They were finally killed by treachery, and a form of peace was restored. The court considered whether the whole northwest should not be abandoned, but emotive arguments about sacred tradition and ancestral territory carried the day, and civil administration was restored. Han farmers, however, had been forced from their homes either by the rebels or by a scorched-earth policy of the government, and many were reluctant to return. In sad juxtaposition, the triumph of Han over the Northern Xiongnu had overextended and eventually broken the Southern regime, while success in the Western Regions under Ban Chao was countered by the devastation of the Qiang, far closer to home. Ban Chao’s son Ban Yong restored a brief authority in Central Asia during the mid-120s, but the overall effect of these expansionist policies weakened the frontier position of the Han.

Young emperors and regency families 88–147 ce When Emperor Zhang, third sovereign of the Eastern Han, died in 88 ce, he was just over 30 years old. His son Liu Zhao 劉肇, known posthumously as Emperor He 和, was nine, and the widowed Empress Dou 竇, now Empress Dowager (huang taihou 皇太后), took regency power; she was in her mid-20s. The arrangements for the minority of an emperor had been established by the Western Han: the dowager ruled on his behalf and, should an emperor die without appointing an heir, she could select any male of the imperial clan to take the throne. Naturally enough, she often allowed her kinsmen to assist her, but the dowager attended court (linzhao 臨朝) and held the regency. The Dowager Dou was not the natural mother of Liu Zhao (Emperor He), for he had been born to Honored Lady Liang 梁貴人, a first-rank concubine. Honored Lady Song 宋 had previously given birth to an imperial son, Liu Qing 劉慶, and he was initially named as heir. The Empress Dou, however, had the Lady Song charged with witchcraft. Song died in prison, her son’s appointment was canceled, and Liu Zhao took his place. The Liang family 43

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of his mother was then accused of treason. As the Lady Liang was either killed or committed suicide, the empress took over official care of the new heir. This was a remarkable set of conspiracies, all based within the imperial harem and centered upon young women in their teens or early 20s. Having survived—or arranged—the political turmoil, Empress Dowager Dou brought her four brothers to share the fruits of power. The eldest, Dou Xian, arrogant and violent, was accused of murdering an imperial kinsman who had appeared to be a rival for his sister’s favor. Despite his high position, Dou Xian was in danger of imprisonment or execution, but just at that time the Southern C ­ hanyu of the Xiongnu proposed the great expedition against his Northern rivals. The Empress Dowager swiftly approved, and Dou Xian departed to military glory. Dou Xian returned in triumph to the capital in the summer of 92 ce, but while he was on campaign, Emperor He had taken the Cap of Manhood ( jia yuanfu 加元服). Although he was only 12, through this ritual he was formally of full age and was entitled to rule in his own right. The Empress Dowager was reluctant, but the young emperor ran a coup, which placed her under arrest and killed her brothers. Despite his youth, he appears to have taken some initiative, and he was aided by his half-brother, the former heir Liu Qing 劉慶, but critical support came from the eunuch Zheng Zhong 鄭眾 and his fellows within the palace. This model of conflict and resolution would be followed over generations to come. Emperor He died in early 106 at the age of 27, and his consort Deng 鄧, now Empress Dowager, took power. No heir had been named, and the Empress Dowager chose one of his two sons. When that boy died, she claimed his brother was unfit and selected Liu You 劉祐, a son of Liu Qing; he became Emperor An 安. Empress Dowager Deng maintained her regency regime largely independent of her family, and continued to exercise power after Liu You came of age. Faced with the great Qiang rebellion and growing financial problems for the empire, she was evidently a competent ruler with broad acceptance. Unlike Empress Dowager Dou, she faced few internal challenges or threats. One of the great female sovereigns of Chinese history, she died in 121 after 16 years’ government. But soon after her death, Emperor An had the members of the Deng family executed, exiled, or disgraced. Influenced by his empress Yan 閻, Emperor An 安 dismissed his only son Liu Bao 劉保 from his position as heir, and when he died in 125, Empress Yan brought the five-year-old Liu Yi 劉懿 to the throne. His relationship was distant, and the Yan family planned a long regency. Liu Yi died at the end of that year, however, and palace eunuchs led by Sun Cheng 孫程 took the opportunity to destroy the Yan group and bring Liu Bao, Emperor Shun 順, to power. The new ruler had taken no action of his own, but his accession was well received, and during his reign there was a period of Confucian reform. The eunuchs had now intervened on two occasions, and their leaders were rewarded, but they played no role in regular politics at this time. In 132, the emperor appointed his concubine Liang Na 梁妠 as empress. She was one of four favorites, but a major factor in her selection was that she came from a distinguished family of the northwest and was related to the mother of Emperor He. Emperor Shun had little interest in government, and in 135, he appointed his father-in-law Liang Shang 梁商 as General-in-chief (da jiangjun 大將軍) with authority over the Imperial Secretariat (lu shangshu shi 錄尚書事) to control the administration of the empire. When Liang Shang died in 141, he was succeeded by his son Liang Ji 梁冀. Three years later, Emperor Shun died. He too had failed to reach the age of 30, and his only son Liu Bing 劉怲 was barely a year old. His consort Liang took the regency as Empress 44

The Eastern Han

Dowager and continued to grant power to her brother Liang Ji. When the infant emperor died a few months later, the Empress Dowager and Liang Ji replaced him with a distant cousin, Liu Zuan 劉纘, aged seven. This young man showed some resentment at his tutelage and died in suspicious circumstances in 146. A few days later, another kinsman, Liu Zhi 劉志, was brought to the throne at age 14, and in the following year he was married to Liang Nüying 梁女塋, younger sister of the Empress Dowager, who continued her regency. Through an unfortunate set of mortalities, over a period of 60 years, eight emperors had commenced their reigns as minors, and each was subject to the regency government of a former consort and her family. Though the process followed precedent, it was inherently unstable, as each regency ended with a political coup or purge, two carried out by eunuchs of the palace. Thanks to the initial favor of Emperor Shun and their own arrangements since, the Liang family had gained a dominant position over the court and the government. This too was based upon a special situation, however, and its future was uncertain.

Population, local government, communications, and migration The empire of the Eastern Han was organized into 12 provinces (zhou 州), with subordinate commanderies ( jun 郡) and kingdoms (guo 國), which were in turn divided into counties (xian 縣). Each of these was required to present an annual report to the capital, with details of finances and population. There was no formal census, but households and individuals were registered, and the information was checked each year. The Han shu 漢書 (Book of the Han), the official history of the Western Han, provides details of the situation in 2 ce, and Hou Han shu 後漢書 (Book of the Later Han) has parallel figures for the Eastern Han in the first half of the 140s. The total number of registered imperial subjects at the end of the Western Han in 2 ce was just under 59 million, and in the mid-2nd century it was 49 million. The difference may be accounted for by loss of territory in the North at the beginning of the Eastern Han, by a fall of population among the northern frontier commanderies during the course of the dynasty, and by migration to the South—where many subjects escaped the full control of government. The number was nonetheless impressive, comparable to that of the contemporary Roman Empire in the west. Outside the capital—Luoyang in present-day Henan—the basic units of administration were the counties, with population averaging some 10,000 households or 50,000 people; and each county was headed by a magistrate (ling 令 or zhang 長) appointed by the central government. Below this level were village headmen and locally appointed junior officers, while the counties were controlled by commanderies headed by Administrators (governors) (taishou 太守), or by kingdoms, nominally ruled by a member of the imperial house but in fact governed by a chancellor (xiang 相). And each commandery and kingdom was supervised by the Provincial Inspector (zhou cishi 州刺史). In an elegant balance, the inspector was of lower rank than the head of a commandery unit. He could report wrongdoing to the throne, but could take no executive action; in the same manner it was ordered that no man should hold office in the territory of his own family or that of his wife’s. The imperial government maintained a broad network of roads, with some remarkable engineering across the great mountain ranges of the west, while the major rivers and man-made canals in the east aided bulk transport. There were posting stations for official communication, official granaries for storing tax grain, and the network of the Vast Canal (Honggou 鴻溝)—forebear of the Grand Canal—which brought supplies to the capital from the Huai valley and the south of the plain. There was sea traffic along the coast, supported 45

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by way-stations in present-day Fujian, but the general territory of that modern province was beyond imperial control, and most communication in the South followed the Yangzi River and its tributaries. Further afield, trade in rare and luxury goods from Southeast Asia and even India was carried in both foreign and non-Han ships, but the central government had limited control. To the west, on the other hand, the so-called Silk Road followed caravan routes through the present-day Gansu Corridor and across Central Asia, reaching eventually to the Mediterranean. For two periods in the late first and early second centuries, the Eastern Han established a short-lived hegemony over the oasis city-states around the Tarim basin of Xinjiang—the Western Regions—but most trade was likewise in private hands. Besides the eponymous silk, it also included Roman glass. As mentioned earlier, however, during the course of the dynasty, there was a steady decline of the numbers of people along the northern frontier of the empire, and a concomitant increase in the lands south of the Yangzi. Throughout the first and second centuries ce, the northern commanderies were affected by frontier raiding—first from the Xiongnu, and later from the Qiang in the west, and then the Xianbei approaching from the east. Imperial armies were generally able to defeat the invaders, but such military activity was itself disruptive. Although people were forbidden to move away from the North, the legislation was largely ineffective. The great rebellion of the Qiang from 107 to 118 saw widespread devastation in the northwest of the empire. Although the insurgency was eventually put down, vast numbers of people had been driven from their homes and many would not return. Subsequent attempts at resettlement had little long-term effect, and the problem was compounded by increasing trouble with the Xianbei and by the quiet expansion of Xiongnu tribes within the Ordos loop of the Yellow River. The figures from the mid-second century show a dramatic reduction: registrations in the 10 commanderies along the northern frontier had fallen from almost three million in 2 ce to less than 500,000, and in the near northwest about present-day Gansu, they had gone from 1.5 million to fewer than 250,000. In many regions, the population which remained was too small to support traditional peasant agriculture, and the ground was held not by civilian settlement but by military garrisons. As the process continued, imperial sway became increasingly tenuous, and when the central government collapsed in civil war at the end of the second century, the Ordos and great areas on the northern frontier elsewhere were lost to any Han control. In the South, by contrast, there was dramatic expansion of registered imperial subjects in the basins of the middle and lower Yangzi. In present-day Jiangxi, numbers rose from 350,000 in 2 ce to 1.7 million in the mid-second century; in Hunan, three commanderies on the Xiang River saw comparable growth from half a million to 2.5 million, while changes elsewhere were not so extraordinary but were nonetheless impressive. Local administration, however, did not keep pace: the commandery borders remained the same, and few new counties were established, so government control was slightly more relaxed in the expansive South than in the settled heartland of the empire. Some of this development can be attributed to physical migration from the North and some to intermarriage with local people, while several local officials encouraged Sinicization: attacking local cults and emphasizing marriage and other civilized rituals. It was a continuing process of colonization and integration, which, combined with growing weakness in the North, was altering the demographic balance of China. By the early third century, the population south of the Yangzi was strong enough to support the separate warlord state of Three Kingdoms Wu 吳, and a 100 years later the region would serve as a place of refuge for the exiled dynasty of Jin 晉. 46

The Eastern Han

Great families, society, and government Though traditional China was based on farming, there has been considerable debate on the percentages of the Han population that were free-holders and tenants. It is generally accepted, however, that by the beginning of the first century ce, large numbers were working the lands of others, and that the process continued through the Eastern Han. Great landed families, with large numbers of dependents, became the norm rather than the exception. There were several reasons for this. Official exactions of taxation and corvée pressed most firmly on the individual farmer, whereas a tenant could look for protection through the local influence of his lord. Again, a small farmer would find it difficult to hold the reserves of cash or grain to cope with a time of poor harvest, and once he had entered into debt it was difficult to extract himself. A large landowner, on the other hand, storing grain and maintaining credit, could lend to those in need and later demand payment or take over their properties. The Simin yueling 四民月令 (Monthly Ordinances for the Four Classes of People), an ­estate-owner’s manual compiled by Cui Shi 崔寔 of the second century, describes how the wise man buys low in time of plenty and sells high when profit can be made. As the core economy of the Han was agriculture, the basis of government was the landed gentry. In a simple syllogism, administration of a vast territory and a large population required the ability to read, write, and calculate; acquiring such knowledge required leisure; few but the sons of a wealthy family could afford that leisure; and the administration of a great estate required similar skills. Since men engaged in trade, handicraft, or other professions were broadly prohibited from entering the imperial service, moreover, the vast majority of officials were members of the landlord class. The standard procedure was nomination from the commandery or province, sometimes followed by a period of probation; also, there was no formal examination system as in later times. The commissioned official was then appointed either to an office at the capital or as head of a county or larger unit in the provinces. In the latter case, he was dealing with gentlemen of similar background to his own, while his junior staff likewise owed local allegiance. Apart from natural sympathy, any official would recognize that any leading families that he treated too harshly might have kinsmen or allies who could hold office in his own country and take revenge upon his family. So government in the empire was strongly influenced by the landlord gentry, protecting their dependents and clients, and themselves from excess taxation. The imperial budget was measured in the billions of cash (qian 錢 or bronze coin, the basic monetary unit), but much potential revenue was withheld in private hands, and some families became vastly wealthy. Commentators of the time tended to distinguish worthy men or good officials from those who sought only to profit from their positions and to oppress their neighbors. However, though some might choose to play a role in national politics and administration, while others devoted their time to scholarship or philosophy, and many had no more than local interests, all were based upon landed property and privilege. In that regard, there is limited value in debate about the difference between “cultured gentlemen” (shi 士) and local men of power (haozu 豪族): they may have spread along a spectrum of conduct and opinion, but they came from the same background. A feature shared by these gentry was the search for prestige and occasion of display. During the Western Han, great monuments and tombs had been prepared for the emperors and their kinsmen, but in the later dynasty an increasing number of such shrines and burial grounds were created by private families. Decorations and inscriptions were designed to emphasize the virtues and prowess of the family, and social occasions such as weddings and 47

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funerals provided opportunities for a show of wealth and for a gathering of the broader clan and its network of allies. There were also numbers of public stelae, celebrating the works both of government officials and of local worthies. One aspect of this power in private hands was the vendetta. Taken to logical conclusion, Confucian virtues of family duty could call for conflict and murder. Although faction and disruption of the imperial peace was a crime against the state, by the second century ce, violent action—including the slaughter of an enemy’s innocent family—was often endorsed by the leaders of opinion. When Su Buwei 蘇不韋 broke into the house of his father’s enemy and killed his concubine and their newborn child, the respected moralist Guo Tai 郭泰 praised the courage with which he had defied and humiliated a powerful opponent. From this point of view, the countryside was less peaceful than one might expect under the benevolent rule of a unified empire. Beneath the surface of official control, the Simin yueling tells of the need to maintain weapons in good condition for protection against brigands or jealous neighbors, and many magnates gathered retainers or recruited tenants to support them in private warfare. The imperial relatives by marriage, the consort families (waiqi 外戚), comprised another group, distinct from the gentry of the provinces. In theory, any woman of respectable background could enter the emperor’s harem through the annual recruitment—and many were indeed chosen by this open method. In practice, however, a limited number of clans provided the senior concubines and possibly the empress. There were a few cases of “outsiders” reaching such high position, but the Ma 馬, Dou 竇, Deng 鄧, and Liang 梁 lineages, all associated with the founding Emperor Guangwu, were regarded as the most suitable. Though these “aristocratic” families may have had formal connection to a territory in the provinces and received income from fiefs or from private land-holdings, they were in fact based at the capital and were chiefly concerned with affairs at court. Whereas men of the gentry who joined the imperial service retained links with their provincial background and regarded government policy from that perspective, members of the consort families—who seldom took regular civil office and more often held military positions—were more likely to identify with central authority and imperial power. Despite their differing points of view, both groups sought the support of clients and were prepared to form political alliances, and when a consort family gained access to regency power it could look for acceptance and support from the gentry-based bureaucracy. It was a complex relationship, not always working to the best interests of the emperor himself; in the year 159, it became a matter of critical importance (see Section on Eunuch power 147–189).

Scholarship, philosophy, and religion In 25 ad, soon after he had claimed the throne and set his capital at Luoyang, Emperor Guangwu established there the Southern Suburban Altar to Heaven (Nanjiao 南郊), the Altars to the Gods of the Soils and Grains (Sheji 社稷), and an ancestral temple for Gaozu (Exalted Progenitor) Liu Bang. These were central to the imperial cult and gave authority to his rule. Further places of worship were added later, including the Northern Suburban Altar to Earth (Beijiao 北郊), sites for seasonal sacrifices in the suburbs, and a Sacred Field where ritual plowing was carried out to ensure good harvest throughout the empire. In 56 ce, toward the end of his long reign, Guangwu performed the Feng 封 and Shan 禪 sacrifices at holy Mount Tai in present-day Shandong, confirming his achievement and the unity of the civilized world. In addition, he inaugurated the Spiritual Terrace (Numina Estrade) (Lingtai 靈臺), the Sacred Hall (Hall of Brilliance) (Mingtang 明堂), and the Circular 48

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Moat (Biyong 辟雍) at Luoyang. Like the altars, these Three Enclosures (Sanyong 三雍) were the scenes of annual ceremonies, including the Great Archery (dashe 大射) and Entertaining the Aged (yanglao 養老), while the court astronomer (grand astrologer) (taishi ling 太史令), who supervised the Spiritual Terrace, advised on celestial and mundane portents and maintained the imperial archives. Guangwu was similarly swift to re-establish the Imperial University (Taixue 太學) and took an active interest in its teachings; an emperor was expected to be a patron of learning. Based on New Text Confucianism, official scholarship emphasized filial piety but was also strongly influenced by mystical theories of yin-yang 陰陽, the Five Powers (Five Phases) (Wuxing 五行) and the Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes). Over time, the New Text scholarship became notorious for lengthy but pointless treatises. Whereas Emperor Ming had published a treatise on the Five Powers, his son Emperor Zhang sought to promote the Old Text. In 79 ce, he called a conference at the White Tiger Hall (Baihu guan 白虎觀) to debate the matter, but the imperial preference was embarrassingly ignored and New Text theories were endorsed more strongly. So official learning suffered, and the Imperial University entered a period of decline and neglect. There was revival and expansion under Emperor Shun and the Liang regency, but the teachings were irrelevant. As leading scholars maintained private academies with thousands of students, Emperor Ling found it necessary to engrave the classics on stone so that academics of the Imperial University could not forge alterations to suit their arguments. In the broader community, beliefs in afterlife followed long-established tradition, with emphasis on the realm of the Queen Mother of the West (Xiwangmu 西王母) and her counterpart the King Father of the East (Dongwanggong 東王公), with magical mountains, plants, dragons, and other creatures, all of which could be reached by the soul with the aid of cosmic forces and appropriate patterns—notably those of “TLV mirrors” (guiju jing 規矩鏡), the obverse of which was engraved with special symbols and placed with the dead in the tomb. As in other cultures, grave goods accompanied the dead: clothing and jewelry, weapons and armor, dishes with food and drink, and models of everyday items, from houses to personal servants. Many tombs were decorated with scenes of daily life, and some officials were buried with books, maps, and other documents related to their work. All are valuable to archaeologists and historians. Beside the formalities of official and traditional religion, there were many superstitions, frequently involving the Five Powers and occasional threats of poison and witchcraft. More generally, people of every rank were influenced by sects of the so-called popular Daoism, of which the most important was that of Huang-Lao. This held that the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝) and Laozi 老子 represented two manifestations of an eternal sage-deity, and that later generations would be blessed by further incarnations. The concept is attested in the Western Han and was accepted at all levels of society in the later dynasty. The first century ce, moreover, saw the first references to Buddhist belief in China. The doctrine appears to have come by sea route from India through Southeast Asia, and the earliest mention is in an edict of Emperor Ming in 65 ce to his cousin King (Prince) of Chu Liu Ying 楚王劉英 in the valley of the Huai, north of the mouth of the Yangzi—he appears to make specific reference to monks (sangmen 桑門; śramaṇa) and to the community of the faithful. By the second century, Buddhism was established at the capital, benefiting greatly from the work of An Shigao 安世高, a man from Parthia, who published renderings of Buddhist texts. They were not very accurate, but they did allow some concepts and teachings of the religion to enter Chinese discourse, and they gained influence among students and minor officials. 49

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Many conflated the teachings of Buddhism with those of Daoism, seeing the Buddha as just one aspect of the Huang-Lao deity, while Daoists claimed that the new religion was no more than a re-importation from India of the original Chinese. Imperial endorsement came in 166, however, when Emperor Huan, seeking to counter and subvert the criticisms he faced from orthodox Confucianists, held formal sacrifice and worship to Huang-Lao and the Buddha. Emperor Huan died soon afterward, and his initiative was ignored by his immediate successors, but elsewhere in the empire there were renewed movements of popular religion, some of which developed into rebellion. According to the theory of the Five Powers (Five Phases), the Han dynasty ruled by virtue of Fire, but Fire should eventually be succeeded by Earth, and numbers of people looked for signs of that change. From the middle of the second century, a variety of rebel leaders, particularly in the south of the North China plain, took such titles as Yellow Emperor and sought to overthrow the imperial authority. All were put down, most without great difficulty, but the popularity of such movements continued to grow, and even those which were not openly hostile to the imperial regime were nonetheless outside the official orthodoxy. From the 160s onward, moreover, Chinese records describe frequent outbreaks of sickness with a high rate of mortality. Details of the nature and incidence of the disease are scanty, but it was very likely related to the Antonine Plague which ravaged the Roman Empire at the same period. One consequence of the epidemic was a widespread interest in faith-healing, with different sects in different parts of China. They appeared to have shared some common ground: magical charms and potions; some form of public charity; and particularly a belief that ill health was a consequence of wrongdoing, so sufferers were required to confess their faults and purge themselves of sin. The two most important groups were the Way of the Five Pecks of Rice (wudoumi dao 五斗米道) in present-day Sichuan—probably named from the contribution demanded of followers—and the Yellow Turbans of eastern China. The Rice Sect would play a role in the early years of the Three Kingdoms period, and its leaders are regarded as the first in the lineage of Daoist popes. The Yellow Turbans would have more immediate impact (see section on Rebellion and collapse).

Eunuch power 147–189 The section on “Young emperors and regency families 88–147 ce” describes how the Liang family acquired regency power following the death of Emperor Shun and his short-lived successors. Having brought Emperor Huan 桓 to the throne in 146, Empress Dowager L ­ iang and her brother Liang Ji married him to their younger sister in the following year. The emperor came of age in 148 and the empress dowager died in 150, but Liang Ji continued to exercise power: his sister was an effective agent within the palace and the young ruler spent most of his time with the women of his harem. In 159, however, the death of the Empress Liang deprived Liang Ji of one of his chief supporters. The emperor was then attracted to the Lady Deng Mengnü 鄧猛女 and intended to appoint her as his new consort. Liang Ji planned to re-establish and confirm his influence by adopting the Lady Deng. When her family objected, he had her brother-in-law killed and sent assassins to attack her widowed mother. Though the attempt was foiled, the danger was apparent and the emperor himself felt threatened. So Emperor Huan called five trusted eunuchs to assist him, and with their aid he issued the necessary edicts to arrest Liang Ji and his allies, strip them of their appointments, and have them variously done to death or exiled. Liang Ji’s people had been well entrenched in 50

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the ministries, the guards, and the regiments of the Northern Army, but the emperor’s authority was overwhelming and the coup was carried out with surprising ease. Emperor Huan began his personal rule. Despite his authority as head of state, Emperor Huan faced major problems, for the long hegemony of the Liang family meant that associates and clients could be found at every level of the court and the bureaucracy. So the emperor relied upon his eunuch attendants rather than upon the officials who were supposed to serve him, but the difficulty was greater because members of the gentry tended to admire such aristocratic families as the Liang, while regarding eunuchs as mean-spirited and inadequate. Emperor Huan tried to establish good relations with his officials, but he naturally rewarded the eunuchs who had aided him. When two junior officials, Li Yun 李雲 and Du Zhong 杜眾, made ill-advised protest, he took personal offense and had them executed. For their part, the eunuchs took advantage of the imperial favor to provide their kinfolk with offices and land, and to acquire large estates in their home countries. There was naturally a degree of resentment at the connections of such imperial favorites holding influence and office in government, and the incursion of these newcomers into the gentry-controlled lands of the provinces caused even greater indignation. There were constant complaints about the corruption of eunuch associates, and after a series of serious and justified attacks, Emperor Huan was obliged to acknowledge their failings and approve their punishment or dismissal. On the other hand, the conduct of the local gentry, particularly some energetic local officials, was equally violent, and when alleged wrongdoers were killed in defiance of an imperial amnesty, the heads of the relevant commanderies were arrested and executed. In 167, the eunuchs claimed that the general opposition to their position was evidence of faction—and such partisan pressure was lese-majesty. The emperor agreed, and a 100 senior officials were sent to prison. Though they were later released, they were proscribed from holding further office. Just at this time, however, Emperor Huan died. His Empress Deng had been dismissed and replaced by the Lady Dou, who was now empress dowager. Guided by her father Dou Wu 竇武, she brought a distant cousin, the boy Liu Hong 劉宏 (Emperor Ling 靈), to the throne, and governed as regent. Dou Wu was closely connected to the opponents of the eunuchs. He prepared for a purge, but in 168, the eunuchs persuaded the young emperor to have their enemies dismissed. Dou Wu sought to rally the Northern Army, but the well-known frontier general Zhang Huan 張奐 was persuaded to face him and the soldiers took his lead. As Dou Wu and his allies were executed, the eunuchs renewed the charges of faction against their opponents. Further executions and exile followed, the Imperial University was purged in 172, and a process of proscription denied the survivors and their kinsmen entry to the imperial service. As the young emperor continued to accept their advice, the palace eunuchs controlled the government for the next 20 years. Before his accession, Liu Hong (Emperor Ling) had held a petty fief in the North China plain, and he had no other contacts at the capital. Influenced also by his mother, who sought to make up for previous poverty by corruption and extravagance, he was in any case glad of the opportunities afforded by the imperial harem and paid little attention to the government carried on in his name. Despite the proscription, there were others willing to join the imperial service, and official families such as the Yang and the Yuan were respected for their high rank and acquired numbers of former subordinates and other associates. Personal loyalty, indeed, became a greater factor in bureaucracy than disinterested concern for the public good. On the one hand, gentlemen would refuse nomination or appointment if they considered their potential patron 51

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unworthy—fei qiren 非其人; on the other, there were men who sought anxiously to attract the favor of a powerful figure and claimed status as his client or “student” (mensheng 門生). The situation was further confused when Emperor Ling introduced a broad system of purchase for official positions and also established his own school at the Gate of the Vast Capital (Hongdumen xue 鴻都門學), offering swift entry to the imperial service based upon a largely non-Confucian curriculum. Both measures were widely disapproved, but purchase at least allowed the government to extract some wealth from ambitious men who had avoided taxation; Cao Song 曹嵩, for example, adopted son of a eunuch and father of the future warlord Cao Cao 曹操, paid the enormous sum of a hundred million cash to become Grand Commandant (Defender-in-chief ). Cao Song and other high-ranking colleagues, however, held their positions for only a few months. There was little stability or coherence at the notional head of government; policy depended upon personal favor and decisions were based upon short-term interest. Given the threats faced by the empire, it is remarkable how well it dealt with them, but the credit was owed largely to men outside the court and the capital.

Rebellion and collapse After some years’ uneasy peace in the North, in 140, there was a second great rebellion of the Qiang, supported by the Southern Xiongnu. The trouble was put down, but imperial control of the northwest was now tenuous. The frontier generals Zhang Huan and Huangfu Gui 皇甫規 maintained a degree of stability, and in the late 160s, Duan Jiong 段熲 attacked the Qiang of present-day Shaanxi, killing thousands and claiming the region had been settled. In fact, the frontier was becoming a wasteland: few settlers remained and the Southern Xiongnu state was disintegrating. So the territory was largely occupied by non-Han tribes, while the lack of civilian population meant that frontier armies became self-sustaining, loyal to their own leaders, and effectively independent of the imperial state. Spreading east along the steppe, the Xianbei regularly raided the northern frontier, and from the early 170s, the war-leader Tanshihuai 檀石槐 held suzerainty and coordinated their attacks. A punitive expedition by the Han in 177 was disastrously defeated, and though Tanshihuai died in the early 180s and his short-lived state broke up, the embarrassment to Han arms was remembered and the empire was generally on the defensive. Just at this time, moreover, widespread sickness saw the growth of sects based upon faith-healing, and the millennial preacher Zhang Jue 張角 gained adherents across eastern China. In 184, he called his followers to overthrow the Han dynasty; they wore yellow cloth about their heads as a badge and sign of the new era to come, and are known as the “Yellow Turbans” (Huangjin 黃巾). Though Zhang Jue’s supporters in Luoyang were quickly eliminated, the insurgency affected the whole North China plain and the region of the capital. The government had been taken by surprise, but its forces responded remarkably swiftly, and the conflict became concentrated about Zhang Jue’s headquarters near present-day Beijing, and Yuan 宛 city, the capital of Nanyang 南陽 commandery in the south of present-day Henan. Fighting was ferocious, with no quarter and an enormous death toll on both sides. Despite their quarrel with the eunuchs and the court, local gentry refused to join the fanatical rebels, but the proscription was ended in case they did so. By the end of the year, professional troops aided by local levies had destroyed the last resistance, and imperial success was celebrated with the new reign-title Zhongping 中平 “middle peace.”

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The damage, however, was immense, and even as trouble was being settled in the east, a new rebellion appeared in the west. Beginning as a mutiny among tribal auxiliaries in Liang Province 涼州, it soon acquired a Han leadership, and within a few months a large army was approaching Chang’an. The enemies were held and eventually driven back, but the upper valley of the Wei River was disputed ground, and imperial control of the further west was gone. Regardless of these misfortunes, however, and the consequent loss of tax revenue from regions which had been either devastated or removed from government control, Emperor Ling and his intimates continued their extravagance and even demanded new levies to pay for rebuilding palaces and for new public works at Luoyang. The emperor had a large harem and sired two sons, Liu Bian 劉辯 born of Empress He 何, and Liu Xie 劉協, whose mother Lady Wang 王 was murdered by the empress. Emperor Ling mourned her deeply, and was barely dissuaded from dismissing the empress. But although Liu Xie was his favorite, he did not name him as heir. The emperor died in 189, again was in his early 30s, and Empress Dowager He 何 placed the teenage Liu Bian on the throne. Her brother He Jin 何進 took charge of the government under her regency, but the He family came from humble origins and He Jin was impressed by those of noted lineage. Chief among these was Yuan Shao 袁紹, an energetic young man who persuaded him to eliminate the eunuchs. Less bloodthirsty, Empress Dowager He demurred. In an attempt to pressure her into agreement, He Jin called the frontier general Dong Zhuo 董卓 to the capital. Before any action could take place, however, the eunuchs discovered He Jin’s intentions and, waylaying him as he visited his sister, they killed him. As on previous occasions, they sought to have the Secretariat issue edicts in their favor, but they did not have the emperor with them, and He Jin’s troops broke into the palace to exact revenge. Amidst fighting, looting, burning, and massacre, a small group fled with the two imperial sons, but they were caught and killed and the boys were brought back. By this time, however, Dong Zhuo had brought his army into the capital, ostensibly to restore order but in fact taking control of the government. Seeking to confirm his new powers, he forced the young emperor Liu Bian to abdicate in favor of Liu Xie, known by his posthumous title as Emperor Xian 獻; he would be the last sovereign of Han. Dong Zhuo’s dictatorial conduct, however, weakened his regime and the legitimacy of the dynasty. Yuan Shao escaped to the east, where he gathered an army of self-proclaimed loyalists, and in 190 he embarked upon an open civil war. Dong Zhuo and the puppet court were driven away to Chang’an. As the allies in the east then quarreled amongst themselves, each leader recruited men and seized territory. Though Liu Xie was formally recognized as emperor, he held no power of his own and came under the control of the great warlord Cao Cao 曹操. In 220, with the empire divided among warring territories, Cao Cao’s son Cao Pi 曹丕 compelled his abdication and declared his own dynasty of Wei 魏. The history of the last 30 years of the Han, however, is best considered as part of the Three Kingdoms period, dealt with by the next entry.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Qin and Han

Barbieri-Low, Anthony, and Robin D.S. Yates. Law, State, and Society in Early Imperial China: A Study with Critical Edition and Translation of the Legal Texts from Zhangjiashan Tomb No. 247, 2 vols. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015. Barbieri-Low, Anthony. Artisans in Early Imperial China. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007. Bielenstein, Hans. The Restoration of the Han Dynasty [4 volumes]. Stockholm: Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 26, 31, 39, 51, 1954–1979. Brindley, Erica Fox. Ancient China and the Yue: Perceptions and Identities on the Southern Frontier, c. 400 BCE–50 CE. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Cai, Liang. Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2014. Chang, Chun-shu. The Rise of the Chinese Empire, volume 1: Nation, State, and Imperialism in Early China, ca. 1600 B.C.–A.D. 8; volume 2: Frontier, Immigration, and Empire in Han China, 130 B.C.–A.D.157. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2007. Dawson, Raymond, tr., and K. E. Brashier, preface. First Emperor: Selections from the Historical Records. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. de Crespigny, Rafe. A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23–220 AD). Leiden: E J Brill, 2007. de Crespigny, Rafe. Fire Over Luoyang: A History of the Later Han Dynasty. Leiden: E J Brill, 2016. Di Cosmo, Nicola. Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Dongguan Hanji 東觀漢記 (The Han Record of the Eastern Pavilion). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju [Sibu beiyao 四部備要 edition], reprinted, Taipei, 1970. Dubs, Homer H., tr. The History of the Former Han Dynasty, 3 vols. Baltimore: Waverly, 1938–55. Durrant, Stephen W. The Cloudy Mirror: Tension and Conflict in the Writings of Sima Qian. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995. Hou Han ji 後漢紀 (Chronicle of Later Han). By Yuan Hong 袁宏 (fourth century). Shanghai: Commercial Press [Wanyou wenku 萬有文庫 edition]. Hou Han shu 後漢書 (Book of the Later Han). By Fan Ye 范曄 (fifth century). It includes treatises (zhi志) from Xu Han shu 續漢書 by Sima Biao 司馬彪 (third century). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965. Hulsewé, Anthony François Paulus. Remnants of Ch’in Law: An Annotated Translation of the Ch’in Legal and Administrative Rules of the 3rd Century B.C. Discovered in Yün-meng Prefecture, Hupei Province, in 1975. Leiden: Brill, 1985. Hulsewé, Anthony François Paulus. Remnants of Han Law, vol. I: Introductory Studies and an Annotated Translation of Chapters 22 and 23 of the History of the Former Han Dynasty. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955.

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Section 2

The Six Dynasties

Strictly speaking, the “Six Dynasties” (liuchao 六朝) is an imprecise term. It covers a time period that began when the state of Wu moved its capital from Wuchang 武昌 down the Yangzi River to Jianye 建業 (Nanjing, Jiangsu) in 229. But, in reality, the period had officially started in 220 when the last Han sovereign Emperor Xian 獻 abdicated in favor of Cao Pi 曹丕, the son and heir of Cao Cao 曹操, who ascended the throne as the founder of the Wei (Cao-Wei) dynasty in the North. From then on until 589, at Jianye (later Jiankang 建康), a total of six regimes set up their capital, hence the term “Six Dynasties.” However, the term itself suggests a southern orthodoxy, which is not quite justifiable. Neither was the occupation of Nanjing as capital continuous. There was a lacuna of 37 years when the national capital was at Luoyang in the North while Jiankang was reduced to a regional city. Nevertheless, the “Six Dynasties” is the most inclusive traditional term available that covers most of the period in question. Also known as “Early Medieval China” or controversially as “China’s Dark Age,” this period opened at a time when China proper was divided into three political entities, with Cao-Wei in the North, Wu in the South, and Shu (Shu-Han) in the southwest (there was a fourth regime, that of Yan 燕 by Gongsun Yuan 公孫淵 in the northeast, which was of short duration). The leading power Cao-Wei annexed Shu in 263 before the Simas 司馬 usurped power from within and replaced Wei with their own Jin dynasty in 265/266. The newly founded (Western) Jin proceeded to conquer Wu in the South in 280, bringing about the reunification of the realm. But China did not stay united for long. By the early 300s, internal strife among the royals greatly weakened the Jin power base. When some non-Han ethnic groups revolted, they touched off a firestorm that engulfed the entire realm. Soon the capital Luoyang was sacked and razed by the Xiongnu 匈奴, and another Jin court was set up in Jiankang in the South in 317, which marked the beginning of its second phase, known as “Eastern Jin.” China would remain divided for more than 200 years. In 420, a new Southern dynasty replaced the Eastern Jin at Jiankang (Nanjing), with “Song” (or Liu-Song) as its dynastic title. It would be followed by three more dynastic regimes (Qi, Liang, and Chen) consecutively. The North, starting in the early fourth century, was itself split into smaller political entities mostly founded by non-Han peoples such as the Xiongnu 匈奴, Xianbei 鮮卑, Qiang 羌, Di 氐, and Jie 羯. In all, there were no less than 20 such regimes. Sixteen of these were 56

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relatively of more importance, hence the name of the “Sixteen States” or “Sixteen Kingdoms.” By 439, as the Xianbei (Tuoba 拓拔)-dominated Northern Wei conquered the northwestern power of the Northern Liang 北涼, the North was once more united. Thereafter, a new phase of North-South rivalry began, which is also known as the “Southern and Northern Dynasties” (nanbeichao 南北朝) (or “Northern and Southern Dynasties”) (420/439–589). The evolution of power in the North and South took different courses. The Northern Wei of the Tuoba split into two northern regimes, Eastern Wei and Western Wei, in 534/535, which in turn evolved into Northern Qi (550) and Northern Zhou (557). The eastern regime (Eastern Wei-Northern Qi) was under the Gaos 高, a Xianbeinized Han lineage, whereas the western regime (Western Wei-Northern Zhou) was under the Yuwens 宇文, a Xianbeinized Xiongnu lineage. While a similar split did not happen in the South, the South was torn apart by a vicious rebellion led by Hou Jing 侯景, a renegade general from the North, in 548–552, against the Liang at Jiankang. Surviving the rebellion, the new southern regime of Chen was possessed of a greatly reduced territory. A tiny power of Later Liang based in the middle Yangzi spun off to become a client state of the northwest and North. Initially, both North and South cherished the dream of unification. Revanchist generals under the Eastern Jin invaded the North on several occasions to recapture “lost” territory. Such campaigns eventually lost momentum. By Chen times, the dream all but vanished. The North, on the other hand, had kept the dream of unification alive. After its conquest of the Northern Qi in 577, the Northern Zhou intended to launch a southern invasion, which did not take place due to the untimely death of the sovereign. And the reunification of the entire realm would not be accomplished until 589 under the Sui dynasty. Chronology 2: The Six Dynasties 189–220 Late Han Warlords. 189–192 Dong Zhuo 董卓 takes control of court; deposes Emperor Shao 少 (Liu Bian) and establishes Liu Xie 劉協 as Emperor [Xian 獻]; relocates court to Chang’an 長安. 196 Cao Cao 曹操 takes custody of Emperor Xian and relocates court to Xu 許. 200 Cao Cao defeats Yuan Shao 袁紹 at Battle of Guandu 官渡. 208 Allied forces of Sun Quan and Liu Bei defeat Cao Cao at Battle of Red Cliffs. 214 Liu Bei 劉備 takes control of Yi province. 220–265 State of Wei (265–280, see Western Jin). 220 Wei: Cao Cao dies. Succeeded by Cao Pi. Emperor Xian of Han abdicates to Cao Pi. Wei dynasty established. 221–229 Kingdom of Wu 221–263 State of Han (Shu; Shu-Han). 221 S hu: Liu Bei proclaims himself emperor of Han in Chengdu. Sun Quan 孫權 accepts appointment from Cao Pi as King of Wu. 223 Shu: Liu Bei dies. Succeeded by Liu Shan 劉禪, under the regency of Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮. Peace treaty between Shu-Han and Wu. 226 Wei: Cao Pi dies. Succeeded by Cao Rui 曹叡 (Emperor Ming 明). 229–280 State of Wu 229 Wu: Sun Quan proclaims himself emperor of Wu in Jianye 建業. 234 Shu: Zhuge Liang dies. 239 W  ei: Cao Rui dies. Succeeded by Cao Fang 曹芳, under regency of Cao Shuang 曹爽 and Sima Yi 司馬懿. 57

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249 252 254 258 260 263 264 265 266–316 266–290 266 279 280 290–307 290 291–306 291 300 304–439 304 307–313 311 313–316 315 316 317–420 317–322 319

322–325 322–324 325–342 327 329 333 334 335 337 342–344 344–361 347

Wei: Sima Yi takes control of government in Wei. Wu: Sun Quan dies. Succeeded by Sun Liang 孫亮. Wei: Sima Shi 司馬師 deposes Cao Fang. Establishes Cao Mao 曹髦 as emperor. Wu: Sun Liang dies. Succeeded by Sun Xiu 孫休. W  ei: Cao Mao dies in attempted overthrow of Sima Zhao 司馬昭. Cao Huan 曹 奐 placed on throne. Shu: Liu Shan surrenders to army of Wei. Wu: Sun Xiu dies. Succeeded by Sun Hao 孫皓. Wei: Sima Zhao dies. Succeeded as chancellor of Wei by Sima Yan 司馬炎. Western Jin Jin: Sima Yan’s 炎 (Emperor Wu) reign. Jin: Cao Huan abdicates throne to Sima Yan. Jin dynasty established. Jin attacks Wu. Wu: Sun Hao surrenders to the Jin invading army and the state of Wu falls. Emperor Hui’s 惠reign. Yang Jun 楊駿 assumes regency. The War of the Eight Princes. Empress Jia Nanfeng 賈南風 kills regent Yang Jun. Sima Lun 司馬倫 kills Empress Jia. Sixteen States X iongnu: Liu Yuan declares himself king of Han 漢. Ba-Di: Li Xiong 李雄 declares himself king of Chengdu 成都. Emperor Huai’s 懷 reign. Sima Yue died. Shi Le wipes out the main force of the Western Jin. Liu Yao and Wang Mi sack Luoyang. Emperor Min’s 愍 (Sima Ye) reign. Xianbei: Tuoba Yilu is made king of Dai 代by the Western Jin court. Emperor Min in Chang’an surrenders to the Xiongnu. The Western Jin falls. Eastern Jin Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Yuan 元 (Sima Rui 司馬睿). X iongnu/Former Zhao: Liu Yao makes Chang’an his capital and renames the Han dynasty as (Former) Zhao 趙. Later Zhao: Shi Le declares himself king of (Later) Zhao. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Ming 明. Eastern Jin: Wang Dun 王敦 rebellion, which starts in Wuchang 武昌 (Ezhou, Hubei) in 322. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Cheng 成. Eastern Jin: Su Jun 蘇峻 rebels. Later Zhao: Shi Le captures Liu Yao at Luoyang in early 329 and has him killed later. Shi Hu takes Chang’an and destroys the Former Zhao. Later Zhao: Shi Le dies. Shi Hu dominates the court. Later Zhao: Shi Hu kills Shi Hong to usurp power. Later Zhao: Shi Hu moves the capital to Ye. F  ormer Yan: Murong Huang 慕容皝 of Xianbei declares himself king of (Former) Yan. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Kang 康. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Mu 穆. Eastern Jin: Huan Wen 桓溫 conquers Cheng-Han and enters Chengdu 成都. 58

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349 350 351 352 353 354 356 357 361–365 361 365–371 369 370 371–372 372–396 373 375 376 383 384 385 386–534 386–409 386 394 395 396–418 398 399–402 402 404 409–423 410 416 417 418–420

Later Zhou: Ran Min 冉閔 carries out an ethnic cleansing, killing more than 200,000 Hu and Jie people. Ran-Wei: Ran Min declares himself emperor. Former Qin: Fu Jiàn declares himself Heavenly king of the (Former) Qin. F  ormer Qin: Fu Jiàn declares himself emperor. Former Yan: Murong Jun 慕容 儁 kills Ran Min, takes Ye 鄴, declares himself emperor. Eastern Jin: Yin Hao 殷浩 leads a northern expedition that ends in failure. E  astern Jin: Huan Wen defeats the Former Qin in Guanzhong 關中, then withdraws. Eastern Jin: Huan Wen seizes Luoyang. Former Qin: Fu Jian 苻堅 declares himself heavenly king. Former Yan: Murong Jun moves the capital to Ye. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Ai 哀. E  astern Jin: Huan Wen defeats the Yan and takes Xuchang 許昌 (northeast of Xuchang, Henan). Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Fei 廢. Eastern Jin: Huan Wen is defeated by Murong Wei at Xiangyi 襄邑 (Suixian, Henan). Former Qin: Qin troops enter Luoyang and Ye, conquering the Former Yan. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Jianwen 簡文. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Xiaowu 孝武. Eastern Jin: Huan Wen dies. Xie An 謝安 dominates the court. Former Qin: Chief Minister Wang Meng 王猛 dies. Former Qin: Fu Jian unites the North by conquering the Former Liang and Dai 代of the Xianbei. Eastern Jin: Xie Shi 謝石 and Xie Xuan 謝玄 trounce the Qin’s invading army in the battle of the Fei River 淝水. Former Qin: Murong Chui 慕容垂 rebels and declares himself king of Yan. Later Qin: Yao Chang 姚萇 of the Qiang declares himself king of Qin. Former Qin: Fu Jian is captured and killed by Yao Chang. Northern Wei dynasty at Pingcheng and Luoyang. Northern Wei: reign of Tuoba Gui 拓跋珪. N  orthern Wei: the Tuoba state is revived under Tuoba Gui. Later Qin: Yao Chang declares himself emperor in Chang’an. Later Qin: conquers the Former Qin. Northern Wei: Tuoba Gui 拓跋珪 defeats the Later Yan army at Canhepi 參合陂 (east-northeast of Liangcheng, Inner Mongolia). Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor An 安. Southern Yan: Murong De 慕容德 declares himself king of Yan. Eastern Jin: Sun En 孫恩 rebellion. Eastern Jin: Huan Xuan 桓玄 sacks Jiankang 建康. Rebel Sun En dies. Eastern Jin: Liu Yu 劉裕 defeats Huan Xuan. Northern Wei: reign of Tuoba Si 拓拔嗣. Eastern Jin: Liu Yu conquers the Southern Yan. E  astern Jin: Liu Yu launches a campaign against the Later Qin. Jin troops enter Luoyang. Eastern Jin: Liu Yu enters Chang’an and conquers the Later Qin. Eastern Jin: reign of Emperor Gong 恭. 59

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418 420–589 420–479 420–422 423–452 424–453 430 431 436 439 444–452 446 450–451 465–467 467–469 471–499 479–501 479 483–493 485 493–495 494–495 495–498 499–501 501–557 501 506–509 523 524–527 525 526 528 534–550 534–535

Eastern Jin: Jin troops retreat from Chang’an. Southern and Northern Dynasties (Nanbeichao) Liu-Song dynasty at Jiankang. L  iu-Song: reign of Liu Yu 劉裕 (Emperor Wu 武), founder of the Liu-Song dynasty. Northern Wei: reign of Tuoba Tao 拓拔燾 (Emperor Taiwu 太武). Liu-Song: reign of Liu Yilong 劉義隆 (Emperor Wen 文) Liu-Song: Luoyang is lost to the Northern Wei. Xia: conquered by Tuyuhun 吐谷渾. Northern Yan: conquered by the Northern Wei. N  orthern Wei: conquers the Northern Liang and controls the eastern end of Silk Road. The North is unified. Northern Wei (Tuoba Empire): suppression of Buddhism under Tuoba Tao. L  iu-Song ( Jiankang Empire): invades and plunders Linyi 林邑 (Cham in central Vietnam). Northern Wei: major Wei invasion of the Liu-Song ends with little gain. Liu-Song: civil war (the “War of Uncles and Nephews”) weakens the South. Liu-Song: Wei invasion takes most of the territory between the Yellow and Huai Rivers. Northern Wei: reign of Tuoba (Yuan) Hong 拓拔(元)宏 (Emperor Xiaowen 孝文). Qi dynasty at Jiankang. Q  i: Xiao Daocheng 蕭道成 (r. 479–482) (Emperor Gao of the Qi dynasty) ­a ssumes the throne. Qi: reign of Xiao Ze蕭賾 (Emperor Wu); Yongming 永明 poetic flourishing. Northern Wei: implements the equal field system. Northern Wei: moves its capital to Luoyang. Qi: Ruthless succession struggle at Jiankang leads to rise of Xiao Luan 蕭鸞 (­Emperor Ming 明; r. 494–498). Qi: Major Wei invasions of the South along the Huai frontier and at Xiangyang 襄陽. Qi: Succesion battle at Jiankang. Liang dynasty at Jiankang. L  iang: Xiao Yan 蕭衍 (r. 501–549) (Emperor Wu 武 of the Liang dynasty) takes the Jiankang throne. Liang: campaigns against the Northern Wei along the Huai frontier, without success. Northern Wei: start of the rebellion of the Six Garrisons along the northern frontier. L  iang: engages in several ultimately unsuccessful attacks against the Northern Wei. Northern Wei: Du Luozhou 杜洛周 starts a rebellion in north Hebei; one of his followers is Gao Huan 高歡. Northern Wei: Ge Rong 葛榮 rebels in north Hebei. Northern Wei: succession struggle at Luoyang; Erzhu Rong 爾朱榮 seizes control, launching major crisis. Eastern Wei dynasty at Ye. N  orthern Wei: splits into Eastern Wei (534) backed by Gao Huan and Western Wei (535) backed by Yuwen Tai 宇文泰. 60

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535–557 Western Wei dynasty at Chang’an. 537 Western Wei: Yuwen Tai decisively defeats Gao Huan in the battle of Shayuan 沙苑 (south of Dali, Shaanxi). 543 Eastern Wei: Gao Huan defeats Yuwen Tai of Western Wei at Luoyang. 548–552 Liang: Hou Jing 侯景 rebels (548), seizes Jiankang (549), controls and then overthrows the Liang rulers (causing Emperor Wu’s death), leading to widespread civil war. 550–577 Northern Qi dynasty at Ye. 550 Northern Qi: Gao Yang 高洋 (son of Gao Huan; Emperor Wenxuan 文宣 of the Qi) takes the Eastern Wei throne. 552 Liang: death of Hou Jing. 553 Liang: Western Wei seizes Sichuan. 554 Western Wei: Yuwen Tai captures Liang Emperor Yuan 元, Xiao Yi 蕭繹, at Jiangling 江陵, who is later killed (555); and seizes much of the central Yangzi region. 555 Later Liang (Xiao): Liang prince Xiao Cha 蕭詧 declares himself emperor in Jiangling. His regime (Later Liang) is a client state of Western Wei. 555–557 Northern Qi: seizes control of the territory between the Huai and Yangzi Rivers. 557–581 Northern Zhou dynasty at Chang’an. 557 Northern Zhou: Yuwen Jue 宇文覺 (Emperor Xiaomin 孝閔 of the Zhou) takes Western Wei throne. 557–589 Chen dynasty at Jiankang. 557 Chen: Chen Baxian 陳霸先 (Emperor Wu 武 of the Chen) takes the Jiankang throne; begins to reconquer the empire (in the central Yangzi and southern regions). 574–578 N  orthern Zhou: Yuwen Yong 宇文邕 (Emperor Wu 武) engages in several proscriptions of Buddhism and Daoism. 577 Northern Zhou: conquers the rival Northern Qi. 581 Sui: Yang Jian 楊堅 takes throne at Chang’an as Emperor Wen 文 of the Sui. 588–589 S ui: launches massive invasion of the South, destroying the Chen dynasty and leveling the city of Jiankang.

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4 The Three States (Three Kingdoms) J. Michael Farmer

The Three States period marks the end of the Han dynasty and the beginning of nearly four centuries of political fragmentation in China. Encompassing the final three decades of the Han dynasty and another 60 years of autonomous rival states (Wei, Shu, and Wu), the era was characterized by warfare and diplomacy, the continuation of various Han political and social institutions (though with notable innovations), and the rise of new strains of literature and thought. Despite an abundance of historical sources, the period is best known from later literary and popular accounts of the warriors and statesmen of the time.

Eastern Han warlords, c. 189–220 The end of Han imperial rule, for all practical purposes, came when General Dong Zhuo 董卓 entered the capital city of Luoyang 洛陽, removed the young, recently enthroned Liu Bian 劉辯 (176–190; Emperor Shao 少), and replaced him with a half-brother Liu Xie 劉協 (181–234; Emperor Xian 獻) in the ninth month of 189. Immediately, various parties rose up to oppose Dong Zhuo and assert their own interests. With the emperor a captive, the Han imperial family held no effective power, and while Liu Xie held the title of emperor until 220, the Han dynasty was actually over. The scramble for territory and authority had begun and continued for 30 years. Resistance to Dong Zhuo came from all corners. Troops were raised by local elites and mid-level officers. In 191, the army of Yuan Shu 袁術 (d. 199) drove Dong Zhuo from ­Luoyang westward to Chang’an 長安, where Dong was killed in 192. Following Dong Zhuo’s death, a number of powerful elites, provincial officials, military officers, and soldiersof-­fortune staked out regional strongholds. Some professed to defend the Han imperial house, though most were seeking personal benefit. A number of these warlords came from established families, including both Yuan Shu and Yuan Shao 袁紹 (d. 202), whose ancestors had held high-level appointments at the Han court. Other contenders, such as Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220), came from more middling backgrounds, possessing sufficient resources to build private armies. Several officials, who had been initially appointed by the Han court to administer the provinces—such as Liu Biao 劉表 (142–208) governor (shepherd; mu 牧) of Jing 荊 province, Liu Yan 劉焉 (d. 194) and his son Liu Zhang 劉璋 governors (shepherds) of Yi 益 province, and Tao Qian 陶謙 (132–194) governor (shepherd) of Xu 徐 province—sought 62

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to increase their power and authority in the chaotic times. Others like Lü Bu 呂布 (d. 199), Sun Jian 孫堅 (155–191), and Liu Bei 劉備 (161–223) were mercenaries, basing their claims to authority on personal charisma and martial successes. During this turmoil, alliances between warlords were fluid, and territorial control shifted quickly. In the early 190s, Yuan Shao controlled a vast expanse of territory north of the Yellow River. Between the Yellow and Huai Rivers, Yuan Shu, Cao Cao, Tao Qian, Lü Bu, and Liu Bei fought for control of the region. By 198, Cao Cao was in possession of south-central China; moreover, he had also gained custody of Emperor Xian in 196. Cao Cao moved the emperor to Xuchang 許昌 in Yu 豫 province and established an imperial court there. By 199, Yuan Shao and Cao Cao were the dominant powers in North China. The balance of power in the North shifted in favor of Cao Cao in the summer of 200, as his troops withstood a siege by Yuan Shao’s army at Guandu 官渡 (northeast of Zhongmu, near Kaifeng, Henan), then drove Yuan’s troops back to the north. Following Yuan Shao’s death in 202, and Cao Cao’s victory over the Wuhuan 烏桓 tribe in 207, Cao Cao was left in control of the North China Plain and about half of the population of the late Han Empire. With his consolidation of power in the North complete and the emperor under his control, Cao Cao turned his attention to the South. Power in the South was concentrated in two camps. Liu Biao controlled Jing province, while the Sun family occupied the lower Yangzi region. Sun Quan 孫權 (182–252) expanded his family’s territorial base, gaining control of the middle Yangzi area in 208, and commanding a powerful and effective naval force along the middle and lower reaches of the river. In the autumn of 208, Liu Biao suddenly died. His younger son, Liu Cong 劉琮 succeeded him as governor, and with Cao Cao’s forces approaching from the North, Liu Cong surrendered to Cao Cao. Cao Cao thereupon took control of Jing province, luring a number of scholar-officials from Liu Biao’s inner circle to his own. Liu Bei, a former supporter of Liu Biao, however, attempted to defend the Yangzi from Cao Cao. Defeated by Cao Cao, Liu Bei sought assistance from Sun Quan in the east. The forces of Cao Cao, Liu Bei, and Sun Quan staked out positions along the Yangzi. Liu Bei was burdened by a large company of non-fighting personnel. Liu Bei’s lieutenant, Guan Yu 關羽 (d. 219), controlled the Han River 漢水 with a strong naval fleet. Meanwhile, Cao Cao possessed the former Jing province fleet, stationed upriver at Jiangling 江陵. In the east, Sun Quan wavered, but eventually sent troops led by Zhou Yu 周瑜 (d. 210) west to join Liu Bei and engage Cao Cao at Red Cliffs (Chibi 赤壁) along the middle reaches of the Yangzi. Cao’s troops were exhausted and sick; moreover, many of his naval troops had formerly been employed by Liu Biao and may have been conflicted in their loyalties. Cao Cao launched the initial attack across the river, but his troops were repelled. Then, the wind shifted, and Zhou Yu responded with an attack using fireships, resulting in great panic on the part of Cao’s soldiers, who beat a hasty retreat northward. Troops left behind by Cao Cao at Jiangling were defeated the following year by Zhou Yu, leaving the allies Sun Quan and Liu Bei in full control of the Yangzi River basin. However, Cao Cao’s power still reached as far south as Xiangyang 襄陽 in the Han River basin. The alliance between Sun Quan and Liu Bei originally cast Sun as the dominant figure; however, after the Battle of Red Cliffs, Liu Bei asserted his independence. In 209, Liu Bei seized control of territory in the Xiang River 湘水 basin, straining the alliance, and the following year, Sun Quan ceded the area around Jiangling to Liu Bei, retaining control of the eastern portions of Jing province for himself. Now in control of the western reaches of the middle Yangzi, Liu Bei set his sights on the territory upriver to the west: Yi province. The province had been controlled by another branch 63

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of the Liu family since 189, when Liu Yan 劉焉 arrived in the region as governor (shepherd) and army supervising commissioner ( jianjun shi 監軍使; appointed by Emperor Ling). Hoping to establish himself as emperor, Liu Yan began producing court regalia and ritual objects, and planned to attack Emperor Xian’s court in Chang’an, but died of ulcers on his back in 194. His son, Liu Zhang 劉璋, assumed his father’s post and continued feuding with the local elites, including Zhang Lu 張魯, the leader of the Celestial Masters Daoist community. Liu Zhang invited Liu Bei into Yi province, hoping to use his troops to attack Zhang Lu in Hanzhong 漢中 and quell uprisings throughout Yi province. Liu Bei entered the province in 211, and was greeted warmly by Liu Zhang and many of the local elites, but Liu Bei’s refusal to attack Zhang Lu in 212 soured the relationship. The following year, Liu Zhang dispatched troops to attack Liu Bei, but they were defeated. In 214, Liu Bei laid siege to Chengdu, forcing Liu Zhang to surrender, leaving Liu Bei in control of the Chengdu Plain and the western half of Jing province. As Liu Bei consolidated his authority in Chengdu, his rivals to the North and east each expanded their own territories and took action against his position in the west. Sun Quan extended his control over non-Han peoples in the South, and in 215, dispatched troops to attack the southern commanderies/regions of Jing province held by Liu Bei. The resulting stalemate led to a settlement, with Sun recovering some middle Yangzi territory and the establishment of the Xiang River as a boundary between Liu and Sun. In the North, Cao Cao attacked Sun Quan, but was unable to gain ground in the Yangzi basin. Cao then established agricultural garrisons in the Huai River basin. In 215, Cao Cao campaigned in Hanzhong 漢 中, resulting in the surrender of Zhang Lu, which provided Cao with a direct route to attack Liu Bei in Yi province. In addition to solidifying his position in the Huai River basin and occupying Hanzhong, Cao Cao strengthened his control on the Han court. Cao had held the title of chancellor (chengxiang 丞相) since 208, and his titles increased in prestige over the next several years: Duke of Wei 魏公 in 214, and King of Wei 魏王 in 217. After being named King of Wei, Cao Cao appointed his eldest son, Cao Pi 曹丕 (187–226), as heir apparent. By 218, the three rivals had each established their territorial bases and secured administrative control therein. The year 219 was a pivotal year. Early that year, Liu Bei defeated and killed Cao Cao’s commander in Hanzhong and took control of the area. Cao Cao was unable to retake Hanzhong, and retreated north of the Qinling Mountains. Shortly thereafter, Liu Bei proclaimed himself King of Hanzhong, and professed his loyalty to the Han court. With Cao Cao on the retreat in Hanzhong, Sun Quan again attacked Cao’s positions in Hefei 合肥 (in Anhui), but was unsuccessful. Similarly, Liu Bei’s lieutenant Guan Yu launched an attack up the Han River, laying siege to Fancheng 樊城 (in Xiangfanshi, Hubei). As Guan Yu harassed Cao’s troops at Fancheng, Sun Quan made a significant policy change. Previously, Sun Quan had given priority to maintaining a good relationship with Liu Bei, viewing Cao Cao as the greater threat. As Liu Bei’s strength grew in the west, however, Sun Quan feared that Liu, and in particular, the garrison of Guan Yu at Jiangling, would become a bigger threat than Cao Cao. As Guan Yu campaigned against Fancheng, Sun Quan’s commander Lü Meng 呂蒙 attacked Jiangling. Guan Yu was killed and a large part of his army surrendered to Lü Meng, leaving Sun Quan in control of the middle and lower Yangzi, and most of Jing province. As 219 ended, the three rivals now held what was to be the core of their heirs’ autonomous states with boundaries largely fixed for the next 60 years. Early in 220, Cao Cao died. He had controlled the Han court for nearly 25 years, and bequeathed command of most of North China to his son, Cao Pi, who inherited his father’s offices, 64

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including chancellor and King of Wei. In the tenth month of 220, Cao Pi accepted the abdication of Liu Xie (Emperor Xian), thus formally ending the Han dynasty. Cao Pi proclaimed himself to be the second Emperor of Wei 魏, granting posthumous imperial status to his late father. In the fourth month of 221, upon receiving a false report that the Han emperor had been killed, Liu Bei went into mourning and declared himself to be the next emperor of Han. Later historians tend to refer to his state as “Shu” 蜀, after the early bronze age state and Han administrative name of the region, or as “Shu-Han” 蜀漢. Sun Quan recognized Cao Pi’s claim to the throne, and Cao Pi appointed him as King of Wu 吳 in 221, though he continued to act independently of the Caos.

Chronological history of the Three States (Three Kingdoms) Following the establishment of Wei by Cao Pi in 220, “Han” by Liu Bei in 221, and Sun Quan’s acceptance of the title King of Wu from Cao Pi (also in 221), the three rival states continued diplomatic posturing and military action against one another. In 222, Liu Bei attacked Sun Quan, seeking to avenge the death of Guan Yu and recover territory in western Jing province, but was defeated and forced to retreat west of the Yangzi River gorges. The following year, Liu Bei died. He was succeeded by his son, Liu Shan 劉禪 (r. 223–263), and a peace treaty between Shu-Han and Wu was quickly negotiated. In 226, Cao Pi died and was succeeded by his son, Cao Rui 曹叡 (r. 226–239; Emperor Ming 明). The following year, the Wei general Sima Yi 司馬懿 (179–251) led an attack against Shu, but was unsuccessful. In 227, Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181–234) of Shu campaigned in Hanzhong against Wei forces. While some territory exchanged hands during these campaigns, Shu held firm in the Chengdu Plain, while Wei was secure north of the Qinling Mountains. In the east, Sun Quan upgraded his title by proclaiming himself Emperor of Wu in 229 (Map 4.1). While the Cao family claimed the mantle of political legitimacy by virtue of accepting the abdication of the last Han emperor, and the Lius in Shu asserted their genealogical connections to the Han imperial family as the basis for their own claim to the Mandate, Sun Quan justified his claim to the imperial title on the grounds that the Caos were unworthy usurpers and the time allotted the Liu clan to rule had ended. In the early 230s, Zhuge Liang continued his campaigns against Wei in Hanzhong, establishing agricultural garrisons to provision his armies. In 234, however, Zhuge Liang died, leaving both the civil and military leadership of Shu in flux. Squabbles between lieutenants led to defections and losses of territory. The appointment of Jiang Wan 蔣琬 (d. 246) as head of civil and military affairs in 234/235 offered a brief period of stability, and the general territorial stalemate between Shu-Han and Wei continued. In 239, Cao Rui died and was succeeded by his seven-year-old adopted son Cao Fang 曹芳 (r. 239–254; king of Qi 齊王), with Cao Shuang 曹爽 and Sima Yi as co-regents. Cao Shuang held power at court, while Sima Yi focused on military affairs. In 247, Cao Shuang instituted several legal and administrative changes designed to secure his own position at court as Cao Fang approached maturity. In early 249, Sima Yi attacked the imperial entourage, killing Cao Shuang, his supporters, and kinsmen. The Sima clan now held complete power in Wei. Meanwhile, in Shu, Jiang Wan fell ill in 243 and Fei Yi 費褘 (d. 253) was placed in charge of civil and military affairs. After Jiang Wan’s death in 246, Fei Yi was forced to share power with the general Jiang Wei 姜維 (202–264). Liu Shan was generally inattentive to matters at court. Changes in top leadership positions in Wei, Wu, and Shu in the 250s led to an increase in military conflict between the Three States. 65

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Map 4.1  The Three States (Three Kingdoms). (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 3, 3–4.)

In 251, Sima Yi died and his 43-year-old son Sima Shi 司馬師 (208–255) took charge of civil and military affairs in Wei. In late 252, he attacked Wu, but was unsuccessful. Facing opposition from the Cao family over his military failures, Sima Shi deposed Cao Fang in 254 and established Cao Fang’s cousin, Cao Mao 曹髦 (r. 254–260; Township Duke of Gaogui 高貴鄉公), aged 13, as emperor. In 260, Cao Mao attempted to rid himself of his overlord, Sima Zhao 司馬昭 (211–265), but was killed in the uprising. Sima Zhao then established Cao Huan 曹奐 as emperor (r. 260–265; Emperor Yuan 元). In 252, the Wu ruler Sun Quan died, leaving the throne to the eight-year-old Sun Liang 孫亮 (r. 252–258; King of Kuaiji 會稽王). The following year, Wu attacked Wei positions at Huainan 淮南, but were defeated. Also in 253, Sun Liang ordered the assassination of his regent Zhuge Ke 諸葛恪, leaving his cousin Sun Lin 孫林 as the dominant power at court in Wu. In 258, Sun Lin deposed Sun Liang and replaced him with the 23-year-old son of Sun Quan, Sun Xiu, who, shortly thereafter, orchestrated a successful overthrow of Sun Lin and gained full control of the throne. In Shu, Fei Yi was murdered in 253, leaving Jiang Wei in control of the military. Subsequently, the court came under the control of the eunuch Huang Hao 黃皓 and a low-level official named Chen Zhi 陳祗. Meanwhile, the court appointed Jiang Wei as general-in-chief in 256. Jiang launched a series of attacks against Wei, but was defeated in each campaign in 256 and 257. 66

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In 263, Wei troops led by Deng Ai 鄧艾 and Zhong Hui 鍾會 defeated Jiang Wei and marched unimpeded to the Shu capital at Chengdu. After a heated debate at the court, Liu Shan surrendered, preventing what would certainly have been a rout, and secured a comfortable benefice for himself and his family near Luoyang. In 264, the Wu sovereign Sun Xiu died and was succeeded by the 22-year-old son of the former heir apparent Sun He, Sun Hao 孫皓. In 265, the Wei chancellor Sima Zhao died and was succeeded by Sima Yan 司馬炎, who also took the title of King of Jin 晉王. In the 12th month (early 266), Cao Huan abdicated the throne to Sima Yan, who established himself as emperor (r. early 266–290; Emperor Wu 武) of Jin. The matters of Jin from this point onward will be covered in the next chapter. Now, with two states left standing in the post-Han landscape, military efforts to unify the realm increased. In 268, Wu attacked Jin at Xiangyang, while Jin launched an attack on Wu at Hefei 合肥. Neither side gained significant ground. In late 279, Jin launched a major offensive against Wu. When the action was not immediately successful, factions at the Jin court called for the execution of the leaders of the campaign; but on May 1, 280, the Wu sovereign Sun Hao surrendered to the Jin commander Wang Rui 王濬. The empire had become united again under Jin, thus ending the Three States period.

Three States: Wei Emperors and top leaders The groundwork for the establishment of the state of Wei was laid by Cao Cao while ruling under the nominal banner of the Han dynasty, and following his death and the abdication of the last Han emperor, the Cao family ruled Wei for almost half a century. The early years saw direct control of the state by Cao Pi. Later rulers were often young and under the authority of regents selected from members of the extended Cao family and later the powerful Sima family. Cao Cao (155–220) was the son of Cao Song 曹嵩 (d. 193), who was the adopted son of a high-ranking court eunuch, Cao Teng 曹滕. While the Cao family was not counted among the old great families of the Han, they did possess sufficient resources and social position to recruit and command troops. Cao Cao came to prominence for his military success against the Yellow Turban uprising, and his power and influence continued to grow thereafter. Upon gaining custody of Liu Xie (Emperor Xian) in 196, Cao Cao consolidated his own power under the pretext of protecting the Han emperor. As a military commander, Cao Cao secured control over the vast territory of North China, defeating all major rivals in the North by 207. Efforts to expand control into the South, however, were less successful, with Cao’s defeat at Red Cliffs in 208 effectively establishing the boundary between North and South. From this time onward, Cao Cao focused on the establishment of parallel administrations. Cao Cao held official Han titles and presented himself as a loyal subject of the emperor, yet he also maintained unofficial civil and military organizations under his own direct command. Many of the institutional innovations that are the hallmarks of Wei were implemented by Cao Cao. By the time of his death, the foundation for the establishment of a new dynasty had been laid. Nine months after the death of Cao Cao, Cao Pi (r. 220–226; Emperor Wen 文帝) forced the abdication of Han Emperor Xian and established the Wei dynasty. During his six years on the throne, Cao Pi implemented a number of policies designed to strengthen the imperial office against potential threats. First, he embarked on a wide-ranging policy of exclusion, 67

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removing his siblings and other kinsmen from the capital and prohibiting them from holding positions of real power. Additionally, Cao Pi restricted empress dowagers from playing any role in government, and decreed that members of the in-law families could not hold posts as regents to under-age emperors. These policies were implemented with an eye to both the practices of the past that contributed to the Han imperial family’s demise, and to the future when subsequent Wei rulers might take the throne as minors. Outside of the palace, Cao Pi continued the system to recruit officials into the bureaucracy originally put in place by his father. Following the death of Cao Pi in 226, the full effect of his policies attempting to limit the power and influence of various factions at court became apparent. The reigns of the remaining Cao rulers, Cao Rui, Cao Fang, Cao Mao, and Cao Huan, were characterized by power struggles between appointed regents and outright dominance by members of the Sima family (outlined in Section 2). In early 266, the King of Jin, Sima Yan, deposed Cao Huan, thus ending the Cao rule of Wei and establishing the Jin dynasty. Based in Henei 河內 commandery, the Simas were a large and influential family, and had been long-time supporters of the Caos. Sima Lang 司馬朗, the elder brother of Sima Yi, was an early supporter of Cao Cao, and Sima Yi joined the ranks of Cao Cao’s administration in 208. In 217, Sima Yi joined Cao Pi’s cohort, and the two were purportedly close friends. Following Cao Pi’s accession to the throne, Sima Yi’s stature increased, and by 225, Sima Yi was in charge of civil affairs in Wei. During the reign of Cao Rui, Sima Yi’s authority as a military commander grew, and he led successful campaigns in the northeast, expanding and securing territory on the frontier. Following a brief retirement during the regency of Cao Shuang, Sima Yi seized control of the Wei court. His authority was passed on to his younger brother, Sima Zhao, and his nephew, Sima Yan, the founding emperor of the Jin dynasty.

Political, social, and economic institutions Even after the formal establishment of Wei, the general framework of the state closely resembled that of its predecessor. This included two innovations introduced by Cao Cao in the 190s. In 196, Cao Cao established agricultural garrisons (state farms) (tuntian 屯田) near the newly established capital at Xu 許 (east of Xuchang, Henan). The impetus for these garrisons was twofold. First, the military required food, and second, North China had a large refugee population in the wake of the Yellow Turban uprisings of the 180s. Under Cao Cao’s program, individuals and families received land to farm, along with critical supplies such as tools, seed, and oxen. These farmers were exempt from the standard taxes and duties; their sole responsibility was to produce food. In exchange, they paid the state between 50 percent and 60 percent of the produce. This share-cropping system incentivized higher production, provided a steady supply of food to the military, and allowed the farmers to avoid the cycle of debt common under the late Han tax and land tenure system. Moreover, it reduced private interests and tax fraud, and helped to instill a sense of loyalty toward the state. Most agricultural garrisons (tuntian) were located between the Yellow and Huai Rivers, while the old Han land tax system remained in force north of the Yellow River. In an effort to combat corruption, nepotism, and cronyism in staffing governmental positions, Cao Cao reformed the traditional Han recruitment practice. In the Han, persons entered the bureaucracy on the basis of personal recommendation, typically by the administrator of each commandery (region), resulting in the widespread appointment of local elites to governmental office without regard to skill or aptitude. Cao Cao’s reforms created a 68

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system of Nine Ranks and Categories ( jiupin 九品) by which a local official appointed by the court, the rectifier (impartial judge) (zhongzheng 中正), would assess prospective candidates for office by means of formal ranking and written summary of each candidate’s ability. In theory, the system would eliminate the influence of local elites on the recruitment process by having the rectifier report directly to the court. In practice, however, little changed. Rectifiers were overworked and unable to properly assess candidates. Moreover, the opportunities for local elites to influence the rectifiers’ rankings and recommendations remained, and as such, the administration of the Caos, both during the last years of the Han and throughout the Wei period, remained staffed by members of the great families of the empire. The social and economic institutions of the late Han were also perpetuated under Cao rule. The Wei state continued to employ the household registration system, including a category for “military households” (shijia 士家), a class of hereditary soldiers and their families. Under Wei rule, the restrictions on military households increased, including prohibitions on marrying outside of their registered social category. Tennant farmers continued to make up a large portion of non-elite society. Outside of the Wei agricultural garrisons, the Han system of land and textile taxes remained in effect. Population estimates for Wei in the year 260 project 663,400 registered households, with over 4.4 million individuals.

Religion Daoism and Buddhism continued to develop during the Cao-Wei period. Following Zhang Lu’s surrender to Cao Cao in 215, the Celestial Masters Daoist community was relocated to the North, where its influence gradually spread throughout the Wei-controlled ­territory. Buddhism also strengthened its position in the North during the third century, with translation efforts concentrated in Luoyang. One monk, Zhu Shixing 朱士行, left Luoyang in 260, heading westward in search of original texts. Zhu settled in Yutian 于闐 (Khotan, ­X injiang), at that time an important hub of Buddhist activity, where he obtained and translated ­portions of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Fangguang bore jing 放光般若經). Zhu Shixing died in Yutian, and is regarded as the first Chinese monk to travel to the west.

Literature and scholarship A large part of the cultural legacy of Wei was based on the Cao rulers’ ability to attract and support intellectuals at their court. Cao Cao and two of his sons Cao Pi and Cao Zhi 曹植 (199–232) were talented poets. Cao Cao and Cao Pi actively sought out like-minded individuals for their entourages. The so-called “Seven Masters of the Jian’an,” a literary circle centered on the then-heir apparent Cao Pi, included Kong Rong 孔融 (d. 208), Chen Lin 陳琳 (d. 217), Wang Can 王粲 (177–217), Xu Gan 徐幹 (170–217), Ruan Yu 阮瑀 (c. 167–212), Ying Yang 應瑒 (c. 170–217), and Liu Zhen 劉楨 (c. 170–217). At gatherings in Ye, members of the group composed short fu 賦 (rhapsodies), often praising rare and precious objects in the possession of the Cao family, and thematic shi 詩 (poetry) on the occasion of their gathering, typically banquets. In addition to the creation of verse, the Cao salon also facilitated both the discussion and circulation of literature. Essays and epistles by and between members of the group are among the earliest documents of literary criticism in China and provide evidence on the manner in which literary manuscripts were circulated in the early medieval period. Additionally, the Wei imperial court also hosted a number of prominent scholars who specialized in Mystery Learning (xuanxue 玄學). Mystery Learning was a scholastic movement closely linked to the Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Yang Xiong’s 揚雄 (53 bce–18 ce) Supreme 69

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Mystery (Taixuan 太玄), infusing mystical elements of these texts into classicist scholarship. While Mystery Learning originated in Chengdu 成都 (in Sichuan) during the early years of the Eastern Han, it flourished in Jing province under the administration of Liu Biao, and was brought to the Wei court when a number of the intellectuals attached to Liu Biao’s office allied with Cao Cao in 208. Prominent Mystery Learning scholars at the Wei court included He Yan 何晏 (195–249; commentary on the Lunyu 論語), Wang Bi 王弼 (226–249; commentary on the Laozi), Ruan Ji 阮籍 (210–263), Xi ( Ji) Kang 嵇康 (223–262), Xiang Xiu 向秀 (c. 223–275), and Guo Xiang 郭象 (252–312; commentary on the Zhuangzi). With their emphasis on “naturalness” and “spontaneity,” Mystery Learning scholars were often regarded as “libertines” by old-guard classicists, and the movement was closely related to the “Pure Conversation” (qingtan 清談) trend and the quasi-historical group of eccentrics known as the “Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove,” headed by Ji Kang and Ruan Ji. The Cao court was home to several famous medical practitioners. Zhang Zhongjing 張 仲景 (150–219) compiled the first scientific compendium of illness and treatments, Shanghan zabing lun 傷寒雜病論 (Treatise on cold damage disorders and miscellaneous diseases). Hua Tuo 華佗, a holistic practitioner of internal, external, women’s and children’s treatment, and acupuncture/moxibustion, was noted for his innovative “Five Animal Exercises” (wuqinxi 五禽戲) pulling (daoyin 導引) techniques as a method of cultivating good health.

Foreign policy In addition to the diplomatic and military engagements with its rivals Shu-Han and Wu, Wei foreign policy was also concerned with a vast northern frontier. Threats along this border included the Wuhuan in the northeast, and the state of Koguryǒ on the Korean peninsula. Cao Cao’s successful campaign against the Wuhuan in 207 gave him control of all of the North China Plain at a critical stage of the late Han civil war, and provided some respite on the northeastern frontier. However, as the Cao family consolidated their power on the Central Plains and engaged with their rivals to the south, new threats emerged in the northeast. The Gongsun family established a base of power in the far northeast (present-day Heilongjiang). In 238, Sima Yi led a campaign against Gongsun Yuan 公孫淵, defeating the rival and securing the region. In 244–245, the Wei general Guanqiu Jian 毌丘儉 led a series of attacks on Koguryǒ, thus firmly establishing the northeast as secure territory for Wei. In addition to these military encounters, diplomatic envoys from Japan were regularly received at the Wei court. However, these exchanges with the peoples on the northern borders and beyond did not occupy a significant amount of attention from the Wei rulers. Their focus was fixed on the task of reuniting the empire.

Three States: Shu-Han Emperors and top leaders The reign of the Liu family in the southwest began with Liu Bei’s coup that deposed Liu Zhang in 212, and continued as an independent state from 221 to 263 under the rule of Liu Bei (r. 221–223; Zhaolie 昭烈 Emperor) and his son Liu Shan (r. 223–263). Even with the early death of Liu Bei, the state of Shu-Han enjoyed an initial period of stability, followed by three decades of flux among the ranks of top civil and military officials. 70

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Liu Bei claimed descent from a distant branch of the Han imperial family. Though his own natal family was poor, he was charismatic and gained support from kinsmen and local elites, allowing him resources to gather a large entourage, including the martial talents Zhang Fei 張飛 (d. 221) and Guan Yu. Liu Bei and his cohort gained fame as soldiers of fortune, first fighting against the Yellow Turbans in the 180s, and later serially allying with various warlords of the late Han. After the Battle of Red Cliffs in 208, Liu Bei moved westward up the Yangzi, eventually taking control of Yi province in 212. After Liu Xie abdicated to Cao Pi in 220, Liu Bei took the title of emperor for himself, and shortly thereafter launched a campaign against Sun Quan in Jing province. This campaign was unsuccessful. Liu Bei died of illness in the field in 223, and was succeeded by his son Liu Shan, with Zhuge Liang as regent. Liu Shan assumed the throne at the age of 16 and ruled for nearly 40 years. His reign should be divided into two periods: the regency of Zhuge Liang (223–234), and the postZhuge Liang era (234–263). In neither period did the emperor take a personal interest in the affairs of government, leaving civil and military matters in the hands of officials while he spent his time sightseeing and frolicking with the women of the inner palace. The leading official of the early years of Shu-Han was Zhuge Liang. Zhuge Liang was a noted recluse who came out of retirement to serve Liu Bei during Liu’s sojourn in Jing province prior to the Battle of Red Cliffs in 208. The early years of his regency focused on providing relief to the common folk by reducing taxes and punishments, and reorganizing the bureaucracy. His main objective, however, was to fulfill a deathbed promise made to Liu Bei to assist Liu Shan in unifying the empire. Thus, military activity occupied much of his attention. In 225, Zhuge Liang led a campaign in Nanzhong 南中 (southern Sichuan and Yunnan) against non-Han tribesmen, and from 227 until his death in 234, he campaigned against Wei in Hanzhong. Following the death of Zhuge Liang, civil and military leadership in Shu-Han was fluid. The office of chancellor, held by Zhuge Liang, remained unfilled, and a series of officials controlled civil and military matters. General-in-chief Jiang Wan, along with Fei Yi 費禕 (later director of the Imperial Secretariat [shangshu ling 尚書令]), Commandant of the Palace Guards (huangmen shilang 黃門侍郎) Dong Yun 董允 (d. 246), governed Shu for the next 18 years. The early years of Jiang Wan’s administration were stable, with no major campaigns. The deaths of both Jiang Wan and Dong Yun in 246 led to major changes in Shu-Han policy. Jiang Wei 姜維 was promoted to the office of general of the guards (wei jiangjun 衛將軍) and began a series of campaigns against Wei beginning in 249. The murder of Fei Yi in 253 allowed the Chen Zhi-Huang Hao faction to take control at court. Jiang Wei remained in the field, engaging in five unsuccessful campaigns against Wei between 253 and 258. In 258, Jiang Wei dismantled long-standing defensive outposts in the mountain passes of Hanzhong, resulting in an invasion by the armies of Wei in 262, and the surrender of Shu in 263.

Political, social, and economic institutions Upon seizing Yi province in 212, Liu Bei established a provincial governmental administration, assigning top positions to his earliest supporters, including Zhuge Liang, along with a few newfound allies who held posts under Liu Zhang. After the establishment of Shu-Han, the bureaucracy was only modestly expanded, and in the end, it still more closely resembled the structure of a province rather than an imperial bureaucracy. Zhuge Liang was appointed chancellor, and men of war were appointed to concurrent civil and military offices. Significantly, most of the top officeholders were, like Liu Bei, outsiders to the Chengdu region, 71

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a fact that caused no small amount of resentment from local scholars and elites who were largely relegated to low-level posts. Liu Bei’s, and later Zhuge Liang’s, top priority was the conquest of Wei and Wu, and thus the civil side of governmental affairs was neglected, apart from those offices that aided the war efforts. During the regency of Zhuge Liang, a concerted effort was made to include local scholars and elites in the bureaucracy, both at the court and in the commanderies. Men of local origins rose to higher posts, and in the south, local tribal leaders were given official titles and administered on behalf of the court. The inclusion of local talent helped to defuse tensions that had arisen under Liu Bei’s policy of appointing his close confidants—mostly outsiders to the region—in positions of authority. The state of Shu-Han had a modest population and abundant natural resources. Estimated census figures for 263 ce indicate 280,000 registered households, or about 940,000 individuals. In addition, some 40,000 were registered as officials, while 102,000 were soldiers. The Chengdu Plain was a well-watered and warm area, and as such, agriculturally rich. Moreover, salt, natural gas, and iron reserves allowed for industrial production necessary for a warlord state. In Nanzhong to the south, the land was forested and provided the state with a supply of timber, as well as large numbers of non-Han peoples available for duty as troops or laborers.

Religion The Celestial Masters Daoist community formed in the Chengdu Plain in 143, after Zhang Ling 張陵 was purportedly visited by the deified Laozi, the Most High Lord Lao (Taishang Laojun 太上老君). The Celestial Masters settled in Hanzhong and operated as a theocracy, managing civil and spiritual affairs of its adherents. Local leaders, called libationers ( jijiu 祭酒), had charge over troops, and, above them, great libationers (da jijiu 大祭酒) managed parishes. Each parish included a “house of charity” (yishe 義舍) where travelers could partake of free food. In 215, Celestial Master Zhang Lu surrendered to Cao Cao, who then relocated the community north to Tianshui 天水 commandery and the area near Luoyang and Ye.

Scholarship Liu Bei was regarded as a ruler who recognized and valued men of talent; thus, a large number of individuals sought to enter his service. As he established his imperial administration, he attempted to revive the academy and other scholarly institutions. To staff these posts, he drew on two distinct pools of talent. The first group included scholars trained in the Mystery Learning tradition who had accompanied Liu Bei from Jing province in 211. The other group of scholars included locals who approached the classics from the perspective of the mantic arts. The two most noted practitioners of this local tradition were Qin Mi 秦宓 (d. 226) and his student Qiao Zhou 譙周 (c. 199–270), who both produced important works of classical commentary and historiography. Regardless of origin or academic approach, the scholars of Shu-Han were initially drawn to the Liu court in hopes of advancing through the bureaucratic ranks to posts with political power and influence, but few rose above clerical or tutorial positions. In stark contrast to the Wei court, Shu-Han produced little in the way of literature. Only one shi (poem) attributed to Qin Mi remains extant.

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Foreign policy Shu-Han foreign policy was dominated by conflicts with Wei to the north and Wu to the east. The alliance between Shu-Han and Wu was strained, and each viewed the other as a rival to be conquered at some undetermined time. Diplomatic envoys regularly called on the courts at Chengdu and Jianye 建業 (Nanjing, Jiangsu), exchanging greetings, gifts, and subtle barbs. Shu-Han had no such diplomatic relationship with Wei, who was seen as a greater threat to unification than Wu. Zhuge Liang’s campaigns against non-Han tribesmen in Nanzhong may also be seen as a type of foreign policy. The lands south of the Chengdu Plain had been nominally under Han administration since the time of Emperor Wu, but were beyond the reach of the Han government and ruled by local tribal leaders. Native uprisings against local officials sent by the Han and Shu-Han courts were not uncommon, and given the abundance of natural and human resources in the region, bringing it under the control of the court in Chengdu was an early priority. Zhuge Liang’s success in quelling an uprising and securing the loyalty of a powerful local chieftain named Meng Huo 孟獲 in 225 resulted in not only increased stability in the area, but an influx of 10,000 households of crack warriors to the Shu-Han army, and a supply of material resources for use by the military and court. Shu-Han’s extension of control into Nanzhong did not result in colonization of the area. Nanzhong remained firmly under the control of locals, albeit locals who received favor in the form of titles and seals from the Shu-Han court. In the end, however, the additional stability and resources were insufficient to facilitate success in Shu-Han’s obsessive campaigns against Wei in the North.

Three States: Wu Emperors and top leaders Sun Quan controlled the lower Yangzi area and the state of Wu for 50 years, providing a long period of stability for the region. Groomed for leadership by his elder brother, Sun Ce 孫策, Sun Quan took control in the year 200 upon Sun Ce’s sudden death, and did so with the support of most of his brother’s closest advisers. With territorial lines largely set between rival warlords after the Battle of Red Cliffs, Sun Quan expanded his control in the Yangzi basin and deeper into the lands of the South by means of conquest of indigenous peoples (Shanyue 山越) and colonization. Moreover, by allying with Liu Bei to the west and accepting investitures and titles from Cao Pi in the North, Sun Quan protected his holdings in the southeast. In 229, he proclaimed himself emperor of Wu, ruling over a state comprising local elites who controlled village and commandery life, and a bare-bones imperial court. Sun Quan’s long tenure on the throne led to problems with succession, as his initial heir apparent died and a second appointed heir was deposed, leaving the throne to the eight-year-old Sun Liang when Sun Quan died in 252. The reigns of Sun Liang (r. 252–258) and Sun Xiu (r. 258–264) were plagued by factional politics. Regents and kinsmen manipulated the throne, deposing Sun Liang and attempting to control Sun Xiu. Though initially placed on the throne under the authority of Sun Lin, Sun Xiu quickly took control for himself. His reign, however, was brief and unremarkable. Upon his death in 264, he was succeeded by his nephew, Sun Hao (r. 264–280), then in his early 20s. Sun Hao held the throne in Wu for 16 years, but failed to restore the vitality of the reign of Sun Quan. Real power in the state was held at the local levels, and the court was unable

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to marshal the human or material resources of the land to defend itself from the newly consolidated Jin in the North and west. In 280, Sun Hao was forced to surrender to the forces of Jin, thus ending the first post-Han period of division. In the early years of Sun Quan’s rule, he relied upon the support of his deceased brother’s advisors, but over time, he developed his own cadre of supporters. The office of chancellor was initially held by Sun Shao 孫邵 (r. 221–229), and then by Gu Yong 顧雍. Sun Quan’s early military leaders were Cheng Pu 程普 and Zhou Yu 周瑜. After the establishment of Wu as a state, Lu Xun 陸遜 held the top military position for many years. In later years, members of the extended Sun family dominated affairs at court, while the elite families of the villages and commanderies held sway in the localities.

Political, social, and economic institutions The political administration of Wu was decentralized. Local elites maintained control over local political, social, and economic activities, even after the establishment of the Wu imperial court in 229. These great families accepted positions in the villages and commanderies, essentially receiving court recognition of the authority they already held in the outlying areas. In return, the local administrators offered up minimal tax revenues (based on quota rather than percentage of produce) to the court, and continued their own dominance of local affairs. Local economics functioned on a barter and exchange system, with few records for the court to audit. Most local elites held little interest in the affairs of the Wu court, and were generally concerned with maintaining their own power and wealth. The Wu court was unable to achieve any real degree of centralized power, nor establish much more than a skeletal administrative structure. The Sun rulers largely did away with the old Han model of the imperial bureaucracy, and concentrated on maintaining a military organization capable of defending the borderlands with Wei and Shu-Han, and expanding southward acre by acre. Expansion into the South was, in fact, the most distinguishing feature of early Wu administration. After the death of Sun Quan, court politics devolved into factional rivalries between members of the extended imperial family, leaving the court in an even weaker position vis-à-vis the local elites of the state. Southern expansion brought new territory under Wu control and added manpower and tax revenues from non-Han peoples to aid in the Wu military efforts. As Wu expanded southward, conquered non-Han peoples were registered as subjects, making them available for taxation and military and labor duty, including further expansion. These new areas were organized into counties, with the number of counties in the South doubling from 160 at the end of the Han to 322 in 280. Territorial expansion from the lower Yangzi spread southward, bringing areas in present-day Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and northern Vietnam under nominal Wu control. By 280, Wu had a population of 523,000 registered households, with 2.3 million individuals. In addition, some 32,000 were listed as officials and 230,000 as soldiers. While Wu was unable to fully exploit the natural and human resources of these new lands, after the Jin court moved south in 317, the new territory proved essential to the survival of it and the Southern Dynasties.

Religion By the third century, there was an active Buddhist community in the lower Yangzi region, and several important Buddhist figures were welcomed to the Wu court. Sun Quan was a patron and supporter of the translation efforts of the layman Zhi Qian 支謙. Additionally, 74

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the celebrated monk Kang Senghui 康僧會, born in Jiaozhi 交趾 commandery (seat: near Hanoi), came to Sun Quan’s court in 247, where he expounded on sutras and spread goodwill, leading to imperial support for Buddhist institutions within the borders of Wu.

Literature and scholarship In general, literature and scholarship in Wu was not highly developed. Scholars in Wu produced works of canonical exegesis, but these scholars were generally relegated to tutorial roles at court. Mystery Learning was not well represented in Jianye. The most important literary and scholarly figures of Wu were the brothers Lu Ji 陸機 (261–303) and Lu Yun 陸運 (262–303), grandsons of the Wu military commander Lu Xun. Though both were young at the time of the Jin conquest of Wu, the brothers were regarded as the most talented writers in Wu, and they were soon granted posts at the Jin court. Each brother wrote both fu (rhapsodies) and shi (poetry) that were highly regarded at the time and by later critics. Fifty-two of Lu Ji’s shi poems are included in the Wen xuan 文選 (Selections of Refined Literature) anthology, the largest selection by any single poet. Moreover, Lu Ji’s “Rhapsody on Literature” (Wenfu 文賦) stands as an important early work of literary criticism.

Foreign policy In addition to the diplomacy and conflict between Wu and its rivals Wei and Shu-Han, and its colonization of the South, Wu maintained diplomatic relations with other foreign states in the region, including Linyi 林邑, Funan 扶南, and Tangming 堂明 (all located in present-day Indochina), as well as Japan. Additional efforts were made to establish military alliances with the Gongsun family who briefly held territory on the Wei northern frontier, but this mission was unsuccessful. South sea trade increased during the period, enriching the elites who continued to dominate the local markets, with little revenue reaching the court itself. In the end, the Wu state, which had begun as a vigorous expansionist warlord enterprise, stagnated into a factionalized court atop a network of semi-autonomous local magnates who controlled the political, social, and economic structures of the villages, counties, and commanderies of the South.

Legacy of the Three States (Three Kingdoms) The Three States period left a rich and complex legacy in history, literature, and popular culture. The official historical account of the period, Chen Shou’s 陳壽 (233–297) Sanguo zhi 三國志 (Records of the Three States; Treatises on the Three Kingdoms), was compiled during the Western Jin while Chen served as a minor official of that state. Chen Shou was a native of the Shu region, and was a student of the historian-scholar-official Qiao Zhou. It is generally regarded that Chen Shou began compiling the Sanguo zhi after the fall of Wu in 280, and completed it by 290. The work treats each of the three rival states in separate sections, but adopts the official calendar and titles of Wei, signifying the legitimacy of Wei as successor to the Han. Whether or not Chen Shou accepted Wei as legitimate, he likely had little choice in his presentation of the material. Since he served under the Jin dynasty which based its own legitimacy on having received the Mandate from Wei, to have presented either Shu-Han or Wu as the legitimate successor to the Han would be to deny the legitimacy of his own rulers—a dangerous proposition. The Sanguo zhi was not originally an officially sanctioned work, but was promoted to official status after Chen Shou’s death. The work follows 75

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the Annals-Biography format set by Sima Qian’s Shiji and Ban Gu’s Hanshu, though it lacks the treatises found in its predecessors. Despite criticisms of the work for its positive bias toward Wei, and treatment (or omission) of certain individuals, the Sanguo zhi is well-written and stands as the most important source for the period. In 429, Pei Songzhi 裴松之 submitted his imperially commissioned commentary on the Sanguo zhi to Emperor Wen of the Liu-Song dynasty. Pei’s commentary quotes over 150 works from the period, including local and regional histories, gazetteers, and unofficial biographies that provide supplemental accounts of events and personages treated in Chen Shou’s base text. While some of the quoted materials are of questionable accuracy, Pei typically presents all surviving versions of an episode, and often adds his own view of which account should be regarded as credible. Pei’s commentary has circulated with the base text of the Sanguo zhi since the fifth century, and is a valuable resource for the study of the history of the Three States period. The history of the period is also included in Sima Guang’s 司馬光 (1019–1086) Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (Comprehensive mirror for aid in governing) and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) later abridgment of the text, the Zizhi tongjian gangmu 資治通鑑綱目 (Outline of the comprehensive mirror for aid in governing). These two accounts present the events of the Three States period in an accessible chronological fashion. Accounts of events and persons of the period had begun to spread outside of traditional historical writings by the Tang dynasty. Stories, plays, and vernacular accounts gained popularity, with the rulers and martial heroes of the third century morphing into archetypes of bravery, loyalty, wit, and treachery. The most influential of these later retellings of Three States history is the novel attributed to Luo Guanzhong’s 羅貫中 Sanguo zhi yanyi 三國志 演義 (earliest edition dated 1494), literally, The Extended Meanings of the Records of the Three States, but popularly translated as Romance of the Three Kingdoms. While there are serious questions in regards to the authorship and dating of the text, its role in shaping later views toward the Three States period is significant. The novel takes great liberties with the historical record and promotes Shu-Han as the legitimate successor to the Han, presenting the state of Shu-Han and its founder Liu Bei as the heroes, with Cao Cao and Wei as the villains in an extended adventurous moral tale about duty (yi 義). Illustrated versions of the novel appeared in the Ming, and new media adaptations of the novel have continued to be produced, including comic books, television series, movies, and video games. As a result of these popular culture adaptations, the Three States period is one of the most well-known yet misunderstood eras in Chinese history.

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5 The Jin and the Sixteen States KAWAMOTO Yoshiaki Translated by Yoon-rim KIM

In the last years of the Eastern Han dynasty, two enormous problems arose. The first problem was the stratification of the populace. At the top was the bureaucracy dominated by hereditary aristocrats, followed by magnate lineages (haozu 豪族) and then by village commoners. In consequence, the Han imperial system, where a single sovereign reigned over the entire population, was weakened while economic inequality became increasingly evident. The second problem, related to the first one, was that the neighboring ethnic groups, who were subjected to the enormous cultural, political, and economic impact of the Han (thanks to the long duration of the dynasty) had migrated to and invaded China proper. After the fall of the Han dynasty and the division of the realm, in the ensuing Wei-Jin period, these problems loomed large. Meanwhile, to unify China became the goal for the sovereign. The hope of achieving that goal was realized after the establishment of the Jin dynasty (early 266), which went on to unify the realm (280). But at the beginning of the fourth century, turmoil broke out as China was plunged again with greater intensity into a prolonged period of confusion and division, reminiscent of the era of the Three Kingdoms. Unification continued to be an elusive goal until the end of this chaotic period, almost 300 years later, when the Sui-Tang period arrived. In this chapter, I deal with the first half of the period, in which the Western Jin first achieved unification, which soon dissolved, replaced by chaos brought about by self-destruction and by invasions by the various ethnic groups, until the trend toward unification emerged.

The Western Jin Sima Yan and his time Since 249, the Cao-Wei dynasty had been dominated by the Simas. After the death of the power-holder Sima Zhao 司馬昭 in the eighth month of 265, his son Sima Yan 司馬炎 took over power. On the 17th day of the 12th month (February 6, 266), he accepted the abdication of the last Cao-Wei sovereign, and ascended the throne as the founder of the (Western) Jin dynasty. He is known in history as Emperor Wu. 77

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In the realm of politics, a most noticeable phenomenon in the early reign of Emperor Wu was that many important officials were prominent men of learning and well-versed in ritual. That was greatly different from Cao Cao’s policy of focusing more on ability than on virtue. Immediately after his enthronement, Emperor Wu revived the practice of granting honorific ranks (minjue 民爵, commoner ranks) to commoners, which had been interrupted during the chaotic period of the Three Kingdoms. On these occasions, at village shrines (she 社), sacrificial rites would be conducted. And a sense of commonality and order would be forged, it was expected, between the commoners below and the emperor above. Around the founding of the Jin dynasty, this generous gift given by Emperor Wu in the form of commoner ranks seems to have achieved the goal of winning the hearts of the people. As a new form of government that valued ritual took shape, memories of the cruelty of the late Eastern Han and the Cao-Wei faded away (Map 5.1). In the month immediately following his enthronement in early 266, Emperor Wu enfeoffed 27 members of the royal Sima lineage as commandery princes ( junwang 郡王) with a tremendous amount of administrative and military power. The royals were not only allowed to assume government office, including high office, they were also highly favored in officialdom. These policies set the Jin apart from the previous Cao-Wei dynasty. The Cao-Wei founder Emperor Wen (Cao Pi 曹丕) forbad members of the Cao royal lineage, who were constantly placed under the surveillance of the central government, from assuming government office (the situation somewhat mitigated under Emperor Ming 明).

Map 5.1  The Western Jin. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 3, 33–34.)

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The Southern State of Wu In 241, when Sun Quan 孫權, head of the state of Wu based in the lower Yangzi valley, was in the last phase of his reign, his Crown Prince Sun Deng 孫登died. Sun He 孫和 was then appointed crown prince. However, Sun Quan’s favorite son was Sun Ba 孫霸. Supporters of Sun He and Sun Ba formed rival factions and fought bitterly against one another. In 250, Crown Prince Sun He was deposed and Sun Ba was ordered to kill himself. In 252, Sun Quan himself died. The feud between the Sun He faction, now led by Zhuge Ke 諸葛恪, and the Sun Ba faction, now led by Sun Jun 孫峻, Sun Lin 孫崊, and others, intensified, while the Wu dynasty began to move toward autocracy and self-destruction. Under these circumstances, in 264, Sun Hao 孫皓, grandson of Sun Quan, became emperor. Ignoring the imminent danger of collapse his state of Wu faced, Sun Hao indulged in a building spree of palatial structures and displayed cruel behavior toward his people. Eventually, Sun Hao would become the first of a slew of tyrannical “bad last” emperors of the Southern Dynasties. The age of Sun Hao coincided with that of Emperor Wu of the Jin. For the latter, a golden opportunity to unify China had arrived. His confidants such as Yang Hu 羊祜 and Du Yu 杜預 (whom Yang Hu had asked to carry out his behest) urged him to launch an expedition against Wu. In the 11th month of 279, Emperor Wu issued the edict to attack Wu. An army of 200,000 strong marched south from Huainan (the area in the lower Huai valley) and Hubei, while a naval force was dispatched from Shu—which had been under Jin occupation for quite some time—to sail down the Yangzi River. By the second month of the following year (280), the Jin troops had sacked Jiangling of Wu. Soon they began to assault Jianye 建業 (Nanjing, ­Jiangsu), the capital of Wu. Following the ritual for someone whose state had fallen, Sun Hao, with his arms bare and his hands tied behind his back, surrendered to the Jin army. By then, the state of Wu, which had existed for four generations in a total of 52 years, was no more, and China was once again unified, under the Jin.

Sima Yan’s policies Upon unification, Emperor Wu decisively implemented two key policies. The first one was disarmament. With a few exceptions, soldiers under the control of provinces (zhou) and regions ( jun) were demobilized, and returned to farm life. This helped the Jin transition from war to peace. In future times of war, the central forces in Luoyang and other key points would be deployed. This policy aimed at eventually reducing the military power held by the provinces. The second policy was the introduction of the land-owning system (zhantian zhi 占田制) and the land-based taxation system (ketian zhi 課田制) as well as other taxation measures. Under the land-owning system, an adult male owned up to 70 mu (1 mu is about 5 ares) of arable land and an adult female up to 30 mu. Every household declared its land under cultivation to the state. Officials owned much larger shares of land, ranging from 50 qing (1 qing = 100 mu) for those in the first rank, to 10 qing for those in the ninth rank. It set the upper limit for the rank-based land ownership, which actually restricted unlimited land ownership by individuals. As a parallel system, the land-based taxation system levied taxes on 50 mu of land per adult male and 20 mu per adult female. As early as 196, Cao Cao introduced the civilian state farm (tuntian 屯田) system at Xu (near Xuchang, Henan) where he was based. State farmers were obliged to give up 60% of their 79

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harvest as tax if they were provided with an ox by the government, or 50% of their harvest if they used their own oxen. Military state farms ( juntun 軍屯) were also set up near border areas in Wu and Shu. They were abolished in the Wei-Jin transition period. Civilian state farms were abolished after the Jin conquest of the Wu (280).

The succession problem and the War of the Eight Princes In the last years of Emperor Wu’s reign, Yang Jun 楊駿, a member of the powerful Yang lineage, took control of power at court. After Emperor Wu died in 290, he became de facto head of the court. This was reminiscent of the last phase of the Eastern Han when the court was dominated by the consort relatives (waiqi 外戚; male relatives of the imperial consorts). The prince who succeeded to the throne was Sima Zhong 司馬衷 (Emperor Hui 惠). He was a most fatuous sovereign. Once he was told that people were starving (because war had caused a severe food shortage). Surprised, he asked, “Why didn’t they eat meat porridge?” That is comparable to Marie Antoinette’s “Let them eat cake.” The emperor’s wife, Empress Jia ( Jia Nanfeng 賈南風), was a strong-willed woman, who loathed to live under the dominance of Yang Jun. Through the hands of Sima Liang, prince of Runan 汝南王司馬亮, and Sima Wei, prince of Chu 楚王司馬瑋, she had Yang Jun executed, only to have Sima Liang and Sima Wei themselves killed and seize power for herself. For close to 10 years, when Empress Jia held power, the political situation was relatively stable while famous personages such as Zhang Hua 張華 and Pei Wei 裴頠 served as top leaders. In the 12th month of 299, Empress Jia had Crown Prince Sima Yu 司馬遹 deposed and killed. That caused widespread outrage at court and beyond. The situation began to get out of control. In the fourth month of 300, Sima Lun, prince of Zhao 趙王司馬倫, killed Empress Jia and pushed out her faction, and in the first month of the following year, incarcerated Emperor Hui and ascended the throne himself. This move incurred the opposition of all the princes. Sima Lun was attacked and killed, but the internecine struggle among the princes dragged on as the Central Plains was thrown into complete chaos. Known in history as the War of the Eight Princes, this mayhem continued until the 12th month of 306, when Sima Yue, prince of Donghai 東海王司馬越, set up Sima Chi 司馬熾 (Emperor Huai 懐) as the new emperor. In the meantime, forces defying central authority had begun to carve out their turfs, as the Western Jin declined and fell. Then, Sima Yue, prince of Donghai, who had tried very hard to prop up the Western Jin, died in 311. With that, the second phase of the mayhem in North China began. At that time, Liu Yuan 劉淵, head of the Xiongnu in Shanxi, employed Shi Le 石勒 of Jie 羯 descent and Wang Mi 王弥, leader of Han refugees, to seize control of the Henan and Shandong areas. Shi Le attacked the Jin army, capturing and killing over 100,000 of its officers and men. By then, Liu Yuan already died, and his son Liu Cong 劉聰 succeeded. He took the opportunity to dispatch his subordinate generals Liu Yao 刘曜 and Wang Mi to launch a large-scale assault on the Jin capital Luoyang (east of Luoyang, Henan). Having sacked the city, they went out of their way to plunder and destroy it in the sixth month of 311. As a consequence of this tragic event, known in history as the “Troubles of Yongjia” (named after the reign title), the city of Luoyang was burned to the ground, while tens of thousands of people lost their lives. Emperor Huai himself was taken to Pingyang 平陽 (Linfen, Shanxi), the capital of Xiongnu. Emperor Hui’s consort Empress Yang 羊 was taken as the wife of Liu Yao. By then the Western Jin had in fact fallen. When Emperor Huai was killed in Pingyang one year later, Sima Ye 司馬鄴 (Emperor Min 愍), the grandson of Emperor Wu, ascended 80

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the throne in Chang’an. When the city eventually fell to attacks by the Xiongnu in 316, Emperor Min, just like his predecessor, was taken to Pingyang, where he met the same tragic fate in early 318.

The Five Barbarian Groups and the Sixteen States The Five Barbarian Groups and the states they founded In 304, the Xiongnu, who played a main part in the Troubles of Yongjia, founded the state of Han (Former Zhao later). In the same year, the Ba-Cong 巴賨 (Ba-Di 巴氐) people entered the Sichuan area, founded another state of Han (renamed Cheng later). One hundred and thirty-five years later, in 439, the Northern Liang, another state founded by the Xiongnu, was destroyed by the Northern Wei of the Xianbei, and North China was once again united. This period is known as the age of the Five Barbarian Groups and the Sixteen States. These Five Barbarian Groups refer to five non-Han ethnic groups. They are the Xiongnu, Jie, Xianbei, Di, and Qiang. Strictly speaking, during this period, there were a total of 19 states. Of these, the Dai (later renamed [Northern] Wei), the short-lived Western Yan, and the even more ephemeral Ran-Wei are generally excluded. The remaining Sixteen States are: the Former Zhao, Later Zhao, Former Yan, Former Qin, Later Yan, Later Qin, ­Southern Yan, Northern Yan, Western Qin, Former Liang, Later Liang, Southern Liang, Northern Liang, Western Liang, Cheng-Han, and Xia. Those Five Barbarian Groups did not intrude into North China all at once during the chaotic late Western Jin period. They had already come into close contact with China through in-migration and invasion in the late Eastern Han to the Three Kingdoms period. The Xiongnu were the earliest. Those who had submitted themselves in the early Eastern Han lived in an area extending from north Shaanxi to central Shanxi during the Cao-Wei period. During the Western Jin, many of them settled in the Fen River valley in Shanxi. They worked for the Han people and engaged in farm work. The so-called Jie were a branch of the Xiongnu. They too lived in Shanxi, and their situation was similar to that of the Xiongnu. The Xianbei were divided into several sub-groups such as the Murong, Yuwen, Duan, and Tuoba. They inhabited an area from the upper valley of the Liao River to north Hebei and north Shanxi. Starting in the late Eastern Han, the proto-Tibetan Di and Qiang had been living in Shaanxi and Gansu. North China found itself in this kind of chaotic situation when the War of the Eight Princes was still unfolding. In 304, Liu Yuan 劉淵 assumed the title da chanyu 大單于 for the supreme leader of the Xiongnu, and adopted “Han” as the title of his state. He enfeoffed his kinsmen and meritorious officers such as Shi Le 石勒 of the Jie in regions and counties. In 309, he set up his capital at Pingyang, which showed his intention to move south. In the following year, Liu Yuan died, and his son, Liu Cong 劉聰, ascended his throne. Liu Cong sent Shi Le and Liu Yao 劉曜, one of his kinsmen, to attack Luoyang. After they sacked the city and captured Emperor Huai 懷 of the Western Jin, Liu Cong ordered Liu Yao to attack Chang’an (Xi’an, Shaanxi). When Liu Yao took the city and captured Emperor Min 愍, the Western Jin fell (316). In 318, Liu Cong died, and his son Liu Can 劉粲, who succeeded, was killed in a revolt that threatened to throw the Lius out of power. Both Liu Yao and Shi Le played a part in suppressing the revolt. Liu Yao then seized power, set up his capital at Chang’an, and renamed 81

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his state as Zhao (Former Zhao). Shi Le, however, went independent, set up his capital at Xiangguo 襄國 (Xingtai, Hebei), and founded another Zhao (known as “Later Zhao” in history) state, as a rival power to the Former Zhao. In Chang’an, Liu Yao set up the Ancestral Temple and built palace structures; he settled a large of number of people from the outside to strengthen the city. He promoted education, lending support to the Grand Academy (taixue 太學) and elementary schools (xiaoxue 小學). These policies show that he had a profound understanding of Chinese culture. According to the sources, he was a reader of Chinese books (including the Confucian Classics, histories such as Mr. Zuo’s Commentary to the Chunqiu, and books in the Masters’ category such as the Art of War by Master Sun), a good prose writer in Chinese, and a skillful calligrapher good at cursive and clerical scripts. The perception that as the sovereign of a non-Han state, he was almost completely ignorant of Chinese culture, as evidenced by his barbaric behavior, shows a lack of understanding and is contrary to the fact. Liu Yao’s son Liu Cong was known for his intelligence and was well versed in the classics, history, and books in the masters’ category when he was a child. He was a skillful ­calligrapher and an excellent writer of poetry and rhapsodies. This tradition in which a non-Han sovereign was familiar with Chinese scholarship passed on to later rulers such as Fu Jian 苻堅 of the Former Qin and Tuoba Hong 拓跋宏 of the Northern Wei (Emperor Xiaowen 孝文). The powerful Later Zhao that took over Guandong (the Central Plains, Hebei, and ­Shandong) destroyed the Former Zhao based in Guanzhong (Xi’an and surrounding areas in south Shaanxi) in 329. Its founder Shi Le was born to a Jie tribal chieftain living in Wuxiang 武鄉 (in Shanxi). His people, the Jie, derived from the Qiangqu 羌渠 branch of the Xiongnu. When Shi Le was 20 (19) years old, Shanxi was hit by a famine, and he was abducted and sold into bondage in Shandong. His experience reminds us of what Liu Xuan 劉宣, one of Liu Yuan’s kinsmen, once said, “The Jin are immoral and treat us like slaves.” But here he used the expression “slaves” more as a trope in describing what the Xiongnu felt like under the Han. However, Shi Le actually fell victim to slavery. When he and a large number of non-Han people were being transported through Shandong, they had to wear cangues on their necks. This gives us a glimpse into the miserable condition some of the non-Han people found themselves in. Later, Shi Le formed a bandit group with other slaves and became their leader. When Liu Yuan rebelled against the Western Jin and established the Han, the Central Plains was thrown into mayhem. After an analysis of the situation, Shi Le led his followers to join Liu Yuan. Soon he won the trust of Liu Yuan and was entrusted with a plan to conquer ­Guandong (the Central Plains, Shandong, and Hebei). This, however, led to his rapid rise in power, as he drifted away from the control of the Han. As the Han (Former Zhao) remained focused on Guanzhong in the west, Shi Le, following the advice of his strategist Zhang Bin 張賓, adopted a gradual approach while based in Xiangguo to build his power base in Guandong in the east. In 319, Liu Yao had moved his capital to Chang’an in Guanzhong and renamed his state from “Han” to [Former] “Zhao.” It was then that Shi Le declared his independence and, with 24 commanderies under his control, established the state of Zhao, and assumed the titles of “king of Zhao” and da chanyu. The state is known as “Later Zhao” in history. Thereafter, Shi Le began to advance steadily westward until 329 when he vanquished the Former Zhao. In the following year, he ascended the imperial throne. As ruler of the Later Zhao, he extended some protection to the Han people and severely punished those non-Han people who maltreated them. In addition, he showed much respect 82

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for Chinese culture and strictly banned certain non-Han customs abhorred by the Han, for instance, levirate and holding weddings while still in mourning. At that time, the non-Han and Han distrusted each other. This kind of mentality often led to severe confrontation between them. Murder and pillage were widespread. The policies Shi Le adopted aimed to resolve conflicts between the non-Han and the Han. Viewed in the context of later development, these were of profound significance, because they were attempts to move from conflict to harmonization and integration.

The spread of Buddhism The harmonization policy of Shi Le was strongly influenced by Buddhism. Of special importance was monk Fotucheng 佛圖澄, who converted him. Fotucheng came from Qiuci 亀茲 (Kucha) in the Western Regions. He received ordination in Oḍḍ iyāna 烏萇 (in north India) and studied Buddhism in Jibin 罽賓 (Kashmir). At that time, H ī nayāna Buddhism was in vogue in north India and Qiuci. It seems that Fotucheng also brought H ī nayāna Buddhism into China. In 310, he arrived in Luoyang and was horrified by the massacre committed by Shi Le’s army. He criticized it as unjust, taught enlightenment, and convinced Shi Le to become a believer. In this period of endless war, traditional values had fallen by the wayside. People fervently embraced Buddhism, which promises salvation in the next life. The presence of Fotucheng and later monks (for example, Kumārajīva in the Later Qin, famous for translating the Lotus Sutra), equipped with magic and fresh knowledge, in the North was nothing short of extraordinary. The fact that Shi Le protected Buddhism was not only a result of his own faith in the religion, but also of his realization that Buddhism was a powerful way to win the hearts of the people.

The rise of Xianbei In 337, Murong Huang of the Xianbei, one of the Five Barbarian Groups, set up his capital at Longcheng 龍城 (Chaoyang, Liaoning) in Liaoxi, and assumed the title of king of the [Former] Yan, poised for an advance south. The term Xianbei appeared in history for the first time at the end of the Western Han. The Book of the Later Han (Hou Han shu 後漢書), the standard history of the Eastern Han, says that the Xianbei were descendants of the Donghu 東胡, who had thrived in the Warring States period in Mongolia. The state of Donghu was destroyed by the Xiongnu ca. 206 bce. The Xianbei came under the control of the Xiongnu in the Xar Moron River valley, where they led a nomadic life. With the decline of the Xiongnu in the early first century ce, the Xianbei began to gradually assert their independence. Around the middle of the second century, ­Tanshihuai  檀石槐 assumed power (166 ce), uniting all Xianbei tribes and taking control of entire Mongolia. When the Xianbei were strong enough, Tanshihuai led them in invading the Eastern Han. Subsequently, in the early third century, the Xianbei tribes, consisting mainly of the Murong 慕容, Yuwen 宇文, Tuoba 拓跋, and Qifu 乞伏 branches, became the dominant power across Inner Mongolia. As the Western Jin went into decline, they began to migrate into North China. During the reign of Tanshihuai, the name of Murong appeared as one of the Xianbei tribes. The Murong led a nomadic life in the area between Youbeiping 右北平 and 83

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Shanggu 上谷 (north and northeast of Beijing). By the early third century, they had migrated from the Daling River valley to Liaoxi and their lifestyle had become pastro-agrarian. In 337, Murong Huang 慕容皝, son of Murong Hui 慕容廆 (head of the Murong branch of the Xianbei), founded the [Former] Yan, one of the Sixteen States, which was to become the dominant power in Northeast Asia. In 342, he defeated Koguryǒ and sacked its capital Wandu 丸都 (Hwando; Ji’an, Jilin). In 344, he trounced the Yuwen. In 348, Murong Huang died and his son and successor Murong Jun 慕容儁 continued the expansion. Taking advantage of the disorder in the Later Zhao, he seized hold of ­Hebei. Having vanquished the Ran-Wei in 352, he moved his capital to Ye in 357, where the Later Zhao had been based. By then, the Former Yan had become a great power of the Central Plains. About the same time, to the west, there was another power center in North China: Guanzhong, dominated by the proto-Tibetan Di 氐 and Qiang 羌. At a time when the Later Zhao was sinking into chaos, the Di chieftain Fu Hong 苻洪 and the Qiang chieftain Yao Yizhong 姚弋仲 were engaged in a power struggle. Eventually, Fu Hong’s son Fu Jiàn 苻健 arose to establish the Former Qin in Chang’an in 351, ushering in a new era in which two great powers—the Former Qin of the Di in the west and the Former Yan of the Xianbei in the east—rivaled each other in North China. Not long afterward, Fu Jian 苻堅, nephew of Fu Jiàn and one of the great rulers of the Sixteen States period, ascended the throne of the Former Qin, vanquished the Former Yan (370), and forcefully implemented the non-Han-Han integration policy attempted by Shi Le. That marked a great turning point in the annals of Sixteen States history. After the demise of the Former Yan, four Murong states would emerge: the Later Yan (384), Western Yan (384), Shandong-based Southern Yan (398), and Hebei-based Northern Yan (407; founded by a Han with a Murong figurehead).

Confrontation between the non-Han and the Han In the aforementioned War of the Eight Princes, Sima Ying 司馬穎, prince of Chengdu, having been trounced by Wang Jun 王浚, governor of You Province 幽州, turned to Liu Yuan of the Xiongnu for help. Liu Yuan’s top adviser Liu Xuan remonstrated strongly against it. On the other hand, many of the Han at that time opposed it as well, arguing, “They are not like us, and thus must be at odds with us at heart,” showing a strong sense of hostility. Thus, during the Western Jin and the Sixteen States, both the non-Han and Han maintained a sharp distinction between what they considered “us” and “them.” Each had a strong notion of belonging to a unique, exclusive group. As the non-Han and the Han, guided by this notion, fought a sanguinary struggle, some meaningful, contrasting opinions on what kind of person would be suitable to rule over the Chinese world emerged. Once, Liu Kun 劉琨, a Western Jin loyalist of Han descent, sent a letter to Shi Le of the Jie, requesting a rescue army, which said, “Since antiquity, there has not been a single nonHan who became emperor. But there were non-Han who were famous court officials with great accomplishment… With your military talent, General, wherever you turn, you will be invincible.” In other words, although Liu Kun of Han descent asked Shi Le for help, he sounded rather superior, making clear that as a non-Han he would have no chance of ascending the throne. During the Troubles of Yongjia, a multitude of heroes came to the fore. One of them was Wang Jun 王浚, who coveted the imperial throne. Shi Le even attempted to persuade him 84

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to ascend the throne. But Wang was suspicious of Shi Le’s personal ambitions. Shi Le’s envoy answered, using the same language Liu Kun used in his letter to Shi Le, Since antiquity, indeed there have been famous court officials of non-Han descent, but never has there been a non-Han emperor. Not that General Shi (Shi Le) hates to be emperor so much that he yields his chance on purpose to the brilliant lord (Wang Jun), but that he is concerned that if he takes the throne, it will not be sanctioned by Heaven and man. The cases of Liu Kun and Wang Jun show that, although the Han acknowledged the military prowess of the non-Han when their own survival was at stake, there was a widely accepted prejudice among them against a non-Han becoming emperor. At the opposite end of the spectrum, there was Liu Yuan of the Xiongnu, who said, “Emperors and kings—do they always come from the same source? Great Yu of Xia came from the Western Barbarians (Rong); King Wen of Zhou was born among the Eastern Barbarians (Yi). What they had was given by virtue.” Murong Hui, father of the Former Yan founder Murong Huang, once said, “Great Yu of Xia came from the Western Barbarians (Qiang); King Wen of Zhou was born among the Eastern Barbarians (Yi). What is most important is will and vision.” As non-Han sovereigns, Liu Yuan and Murong Hui argued against the assertion that “under no circumstances would a non-Han become emperor.” However, not all non-Han leaders wanted to be emperor. In the Former Zhao-Later Zhao transition period, Yao Yizhong 姚弋仲, of the Qiang in Guanzhong, father of Yao Chang (the founder of the Later Qin), regarded the Eastern Jin as the legitimate regime. Viewed from a board historical perspective, Yao’s view may well have been a result of his inferiority complex toward Han culture. The high level of accomplishment of Han culture in comparison with non-Han culture, which was being abandoned, was probably the root cause (conscious or unconscious) of such a mentality. It would seem that Yao Yizhong and Shi Le shared the same view. Shi Le once acknowledged his own inferiority by referring himself as “a small-time non-Han (xiaohu 小胡) and a descendant of the Western Barbarians (Rongyi 戎裔).” In reality, however, Shi Le coveted the throne, and eventually went it alone and declared himself emperor.

Ran Min and his time Upon ascension to the throne, Shi Le’s nephew Shi Hu moved his capital to Ye 鄴 (southwest of Linzhang, Hebei). Although he was a talented military commander, Shi Hu was notorious for his excessive use of corvée labor, extreme extravagance, and tyrannical rule. Consequently, many of his people were driven to rebellion. As soon as he died, a palace coup took place, in which Ran Min 冉閔, Shi Hu’s adopted grandson and a Han, came to power. Under Ran Min, the kind of interethnic hatred that was common during the Sixteen States period reached its peak. Ran Min was born to a Han warrior family. After his father became an adopted son of Shi Hu, the Jie founder of the Later Zhao, Ran Min himself adopted the Jie family name Shi. Known for his bravery and tactical skills, Ran Min became a favorite with Shi Hu and a top general. Upon Shi Hu’s death, he helped Shi Zun 石遵, one of Shi Hu’s sons, to gain the throne. However, since Shi Zun failed to keep the promise that he would make Ran Min heir apparent, Ran Min had him killed, and placed Shi Jian 石鑒, Shi Zun’s brother, on the throne. 85

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After Shi Jian made a failed attempt on his life, Ran Min carried out a genocide of the non-Han. It was reported that more than 200,000 of their corpses were scattered outside the city and devoured by wolves. As it happened, those with tall noses and barbarian-style mustaches were killed indiscriminately. Millions of non-Han refugees fled west and most died of hunger, disease, and slaughter. In the Central Plains, farming came to a standstill, while robbery and famine ran rampant. When Ran Min seized the throne in 350, he adopted “Great Wei” as the state name and continued to use Ye as his capital. This was one of the rare cases in which a Han regime was born in the North in the Sixteen States period. Soon, Ran Min’s army was thoroughly defeated by the Yao Xiang’s Qiang army, with over 100,000 dead. In 352, having being worsted by the Former Yan, Ran Min was captured and killed and his regime collapsed. After the fall of the Ran-Wei, the intense ethnic hatred-induced misery that had been experienced in North China began to fade. Chaos gradually gave way to a trend toward unification. A new age emerged in which there was a move toward non-Han–Han integration. The Former Yan founded by the Murong replaced the Wei as the dominant power in the east. It was rivaled by the Former Qin of the proto-Tibetan Di entrenched in Guanzhong.

Fu Jian and his time The Di, as one of the Five Barbarian Groups, were a proto-Tibetan people living in ­present-day Shaanxi and Gansu. Based in Wudu 武都 (seat: south of Xihe, Gansu) and Lueyang 略陽 (east of Tianshui), they were led by such magnate lineages as the Yangs, Fus 苻, and Lüs. The Di tribal chieftain Fu Hong 苻洪 founded the Di state in 350 when he declared himself king. But he was soon killed. His son and successor Fu Jiàn 苻健 led his father’s followers into Guanzhong. In 351, he declared himself Heavenly King and adopted “[Former] Qin” as the state name and made Chang’an his capital. After the collapse of the Later Zhao, the Former Qin in the west and the Former Yan in the east became the two dominant powers in North China. The truly influential leader of the Former Qin was Fu Jian 苻堅 (b. 338) (nephew of Fu Jiàn and grandson of Fu Hong), who came to power in 357. He set up a legal system, restrained trade and handicraft, and promoted agriculture. He strengthened state power and built a road system that connected Chang’an with the provinces. He promoted culture, encouraging and protecting learning. Fu Jian was an accomplished student of Han learning. During his reign, he adopted the traditional Han way of government. Fu Jian made significant territorial gains. He crushed the dominant eastern power, the Former Yan, in 370, destroyed the Former Liang in 376, and subdued the state of Dai founded by the Tuoba branch of the Xianbei, who had grown increasingly powerful in the North. Thus, North China was unified. In the process of conquering the North, Fu Jian was aided by a talented Han literatus, Wang Meng 王猛, who was a most formidable general and the top court official. But Fu Jian did not always follow Wang’s advice. When the Former Qin was engaged in a decisive war for supremacy in the Central Plains against its old enemy the Former Yan, the Yan royal Murong Cui 慕容垂 came over to seek refuge (369). Wang Meng advised Fu thus, “Murong Chui and his son are like dragons and tigers, not tamable. If they rise again, they can’t be controlled. They should be eliminated as soon as possible.” To that Fu Jian answered, “I am now in the process of recruiting heroes to pacify the Four Seas, why should I kill them?” So the Murongs were taken in. With their help, Fu Jian defeated and annexed the Former Yan. He then made a great effort to tear down the barrier between the Qin and Yan peoples. 86

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Fu Jian’s vision After Fu Jian assumed power, traditional Chinese rites were introduced and performed. He set up a Hall of Brilliance (mingtang 明堂) (a sacred ritual structure with roots in antiquity), carried out the most sacred sacrificial rite in honor of Heaven in the south suburb of the capital, and conducted in person the sacred field ( jitian 籍田) rite while his empress took part in the sericulture rite. After the Former Qin became the hegemonic power of the North following the conquest of the Former Yan, Fu Jian began to develop his state based on the Confucian ideal and reform customs at a feverish pace. In an effort to win the hearts of the educated elite, the court registered the households of those belonging to the literati class during Wei-Jin times. People of the dominant Di ethnic group were settled in recently conquered territories, often in the outlying areas, while the conquered peoples, such as Xianbei, Qiang, and Jie, were moved to areas surrounding the capital; some of them came into favor with the court. Buddhism became highly respected at court. One of Fu Jian’s most trusted advisers was Dao’an 道安, an influential Buddhist monk, a pupil of Fotucheng, and mentor of Huiyuan 慧遠, who would be revered as the first patriarch of Pure Land Buddhism. The implementation of these policies, however, tended to weaken support from the Di, on which the Former Qin regime relied, giving rise to the danger of decline and fall. On several occasions, key court officials of Di descent remonstrated with Fu Jian about the issue. Fu Jian’s youngest brother Fu Rong 苻融 once said to his brother, Your Majesty favor the Xianbei, Qiang, and Jie. They live in the capital’s suburbs while our own Di people are banished to faraway places…. The Xianbei, Qiang, and Jie, who gather in large numbers, are the enemies of the state. This kind of criticism Fu Jian simply brushed aside. The difference in opinion between Fu Jian and his senior officials came into focus at a time when the Southern Expedition was being discussed. The court officials were opposed to the idea. They argued that the Eastern Jin was well run and full of talents like Xie An 謝安; the Yangzi River, which was then controlled by the Jin, as a natural barrier was easy to defend and hard to attack; the Qin troops, who had recently conquered the Central Plains, had yet to recover from fatigue; and the fact that the Xianbei and other ethnic groups were favored while the Di were neglected made the country vulnerable. Even his most trusted top official, Wang Meng, of Han descent, advised against the attack on the Eastern Jin. All this was to no avail. Fu Jian rejected the opinion of his officials and raised an expeditionary army, allegedly one million strong, consisting of a hodgepodge of people of different ethnicities. The expedition that followed ended at the battle of the Fei River in 383, which was a disastrous defeat for the Former Qin. The various ethnic groups seized this opportunity to rebel, as the Former Qin itself, a country of many ethnicities, disintegrated. In the midst of the mayhem, Fu Jian himself was killed by the Qiang chieftain Yao Chang 姚萇. Among the factors that led to the disaster at the Fei River, apart from chance and bad luck, the most important was the fact that the people Fu Jian favored were not the Di, but the Han and Xianbei. By adopting this policy, Fu Jian risked losing support from his own people who had helped him to power. While his empire was a paragon of diversity, the people of various 87

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ethnicities had yet to integrate into the society. It was impossible for the Qin army, composed of these people, to achieve a significant degree of cohesiveness, a necessity for victory. In the wake of the battle of the Fei River, North China was again plunged into a chaotic period of division. Different ethnic groups vied against one another in setting up their own states. One of them was the Northern Wei, which was the revived state of Dai, under a different name. Founded by the Tuoba branch of the Xianbei in 386, the Northern Wei would strive for territorial expansion and vanquish the eastern power of Later Yan (436), and achieve unification in the North in 439, more than a century after the outbreak of chaos since the Troubles of Yongjia, when its third sovereign Emperor Taiwu 太武 annexed the northwestern power of Northern Liang,

The Eastern Jin South China and the founding of the Eastern Jin As the turmoil in North China that accompanied the War of the Eight Princes and the invasion by the Five Barbarian Groups intensified, refugees continued to pour into the South. The arrival of these northerners challenged the dominant position of the magnate lineages of the South. But there was not much they could do without royal power. It was then that Sima Rui, a middle-aged man with impeccable royal pedigree, was appointed as area commander in charge of the military affairs of the entire South. After Chang’an was lost, he ascended the throne (Emperor Yuan 元) in 317. On the advice of Wang Dao 王導, a powerful adviser from the North, he came to rely on the power of the magnate lineages of the South (Map 5.2).

Map 5.2  The Eastern Jin and Sixteen States. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 4, 3–4.)

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For their part, the magnate lineages lent support to the emperor. Their leader Gu Rong 顧榮 did his utmost to raise the authority of the regime. All this happened as refugees continued to arrive in the South in large numbers as they attempted to escape war and chaos in the North. As the northerners were being absorbed into Emperor Yuan’s government, Wang Dao came to play an extraordinary role in raising the morale of the northerners, and urged them to take part in the great cause of reconquering the Central Plains. Among the southern magnate lineages themselves, there was a major distinction between those famous lineages that had produced intellectuals generation after generation, and those newly rising magnate lineages. Many of the growing number of northerners were Jin aristocrats whose status was above that of the southern magnate lineages. Before the founding of the Eastern Jin, a southern magnate named Zhou Qi 周玘 (son of the famous Western Jin general Zhou Chu 周处) had emerged as an active supporter of the Jin government, suppressing local rebellions led by Shi Bing 石冰 and Chen Min 陳敏. However, eventually, he loathed the fact that people from the Central Plains dominated the court. Before his death, he said to his son Zhou Xie 周勰, “It is those northerners who kill me!” The son then started a rebellion. If the southern magnate lineages then became united, they would have a great impact on the Jin government. However, in reality, they were not; even the Zhous, the top-rated great magnate lineage, could not achieve unity among themselves, so the rebellion was easily crushed by Wang Dao. Whereas the advanced culture the northern aristocrats brought with them had a strong impact on the “countrified” folks of the southern magnate lineages, the most powerful northern official Wang Dao treated those of famous southern lineages in Wu and Kuaiji very well. He appointed them commandery impartial judges ( jun zhongzheng 郡中正; top judges of the Nine Ranks system) and used them to push the values of the Central Plains. A main holder of military power under Emperor Yuan then was Wang Dao’s ambitious cousin Wang Dun 王敦. Under Wang Dun were southern generals Tao Kan 陶侃 and Zhou Fang 周訪. It was through their help that Wang Dun was kept in check. However, gradually, Wang Dun became too powerful to be ignored by the court, which gave rise to the saying “The Wangs and Simas jointly rule the world.” Emperor Yuan also put much power in the hands of Liu Wei 劉隗 and Diao Xie 刁協, both from the North, using them to strengthen the throne and check the power of the Wangs. In the name of purging Liu Wei and Diao Xie, Wang Dun, then based in Wuchang (in Hubei), moved down the Yangzi River to attack Shitoucheng, the defensive outpost of Jiankang. Emperor Yuan sent him a letter to sue for peace. Eventually, the court had to give away much military power. Liu Wei escaped, but Diao Xie was caught and killed. The emperor, broken by the incident, passed away in 322.

The Eastern Jin after Emperor Yuan Coming to power after Emperor Yuan was Emperor Ming 明 (Sima Shao 司馬紹), who was known for his courage and decisiveness and was hated by Wang Dun and company. Inevitably, tensions between the court and Wang Dun rose again. There was strong objection to the reprehensible behavior of Wang’s generals. In the course of the war that followed, Wang Dun died of disease. Overcoming difficulties, the court gained the upper hand and eliminated Wang Dun’s followers (324). In 325, Emperor Ming died. Wang Dao, Yu Liang 庾亮, and Wen Jiao 温嶠 were named as bulwark ministers (regents) to assist the young Emperor Cheng 成 (Sima Yan 司馬衍). 89

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Of these, Yu Liang had been lecturer-in-waiting (shijiang 侍講) when Emperor Ming was crown prince; his sister was Emperor Ming’s empress. As Yu was gaining ascendancy, consort relatives came to dominate court politics. In contrast with Wang Dao’s easygoing way of government, Yu Liang’s hardline approach was very unpopular. Su Jun 蘇峻, a top general instrumental in suppressing the Wang Dun rebellion, voiced his resentment and was deprived of military power, which was given to Yu’s brother. This prompted the Su Jun rebellion of 327. Before long, Su Jun took over the capital Jiankang. Yu Liang was able to break through Sun’s defense line, and joined forces with Wen Jiao in Jiangzhou江州 and Tao Kan in Jingzhou 荆州. Prefect of Xuzhou 徐州 Xi Jian 郗鑒, who had been the leader of refugees, also joined the fray. In the battle that followed, Tao Kan advanced into the west suburb of Jiankang, and Sun Jun himself perished (328). The rebellion in his name was crushed in 329. Surviving this chaotic age, the Eastern Jin regime came to rely on the support of two powerful military forces—the Northern Command (Beifu 北府) and the Western Command (Xifu 西府). The former was based in Yanzhou 兗州, north of the lower Yangzi River, and Jingkou 京口 (Zhenjiang, Zhejiang), east of Jiankang. The latter was based in Jingzhou 荆州 in the middle Yangzi valley. However, from the late Eastern Jin to the end of the Southern Dynasties, the Western Command with its base in Jingzhou (Hunan and Hubei) came to challenge the court based in Jiankang and backed by the Northern Command.

The rise of Huan Wen 桓溫 In 345, General Huan Wen was appointed prefect of Jingzhou (head of the Western Command). His father Huan Yi 桓彝 had been awarded for merit in the war against Wang Dun and died defending a city in the war against Su Jun. Huan Wen would soon become the most powerful commander of the Eastern Jin. Among his many accomplishments were the conquest of the Cheng-Han (one of the Sixteen States) and the recovering of Shu (347). With both Jingzhou and Shu under his control, Huan Wen dominated the upper and middle Yangzi. The court became concerned about the Huan Wen’s power and ordered Jin Hao 殷浩, Huan’s childhood friend, to keep him in check. In North China, in the bedlam after the death of Shi Le and Shi Hu, many of the nonHan and the Han under the Later Zhao wanted to submit to the Eastern Jin. Under these circumstances, Huan Wen submitted a request for a northern invasion. When the court decided to launch the invasion, it gave the command of the operation to Yin Hao, much to the chagrin of Huan Wen. When the invasion ended in total defeat, Huan Wen impeached the commander Yin Hao, who was subsequently sent into exile. Huan took over his military power in the Yangzi River valley, and went on to launch three Northern Expeditions. In the first one, he went as far as the suburbs of Chang’an (354). In the second one he moved into the Central Plains and captured Luoyang, where he had the Jin imperial tombs repaired. As Huan Wen amassed real power on the strength of military merit, he carried out domestic reforms such as “naturalization” of northerners. In 369, he launched his third ­Northern Expedition (after Luoyang was lost again in 365), which ended disastrously. Both the Former Yan of the Xianbei and the Former Qin of the Di now pushed south. Against this background, Xie An 謝安 rose to the occasion. Xian An was from a famous lineage in Yangxia 陽夏 (Taikang, Henan) in Chenjun 陳郡. He was appointed adjutant of Huan Wen, when he was already 40. 90

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Huan Wen appreciated Xie An’s talent and tried to promote him. But Xi An was against Huan’s imperial ambitions. When Emperor Jianwen 簡文, who had been placed on the throne as a puppet, died (372), his testamentary edict was issued. On Xi An’s advice, it named the emperor’s son Sima Yao 司馬曜 (Emperor Xiaowu 孝武) as successor instead of Huan Wen, as had been expected. In 373, Huan Wen died without realizing his ambitions.

The battle of the Fei River After Huan Wen’s death, Xie An dominated the Eastern Jin court. His style of government was reminiscent of Wang Dao. He strove to keep a balance among various forces and rule benevolently. After he promoted his nephew Xie Xuan 謝玄 to head the Northern Command, Xie Xuan wasted no time in planning for the defense of the capital. This appointment was not only a counterweight against the Western Command, but also, importantly, aimed at addressing the increasingly urgent situation north of the Yangzi River. Previously, when Huan Wen was launching his Northern Expeditions, he came into conflict with the Former Qin of the Di. In Xie An’s time, the Former Qin came into its prime. Under the brilliant leadership of Fu Jian, it began to encroach into the territory of the South. Faced with this threat, Xie Xuan recruited brave generals Liu Laozhi 劉牢之, He Qian 何謙, and others, strengthening the Northern Command. Times and again, the Northern Command army worsted the Former Qin invaders. That eventually prompted Fu Jian to launch a massive invasion in 383 with an army allegedly one million strong. After its main force sacked Shouyang 壽陽 in Anhui, the Former Qin army seemed unstoppable. However, at the next major engagement, along the Fei River, something unexpected happened. The invading army of the Former Qin, comprised of diverse ethnic groups, was thrown into total confusion. Fu Jian himself, wounded by arrows, narrowly escaped on horse. The Eastern Jin army had scored a stunning victory. However, in spite of this great merit, Xie An, after the battle, was marginalized by the aristocrat Sima Daozi 司馬道子, whose star was rising. Two years later, Xie An died, and the Eastern Jin was entering into a period of decline and dictatorship under Sima Daozi. Because of the disinterest of Emperor Xiaowu in politics, Sima Daozi, as member of the royal family, came to be entrusted with court affairs. Both Sima Daozi and the emperor indulged in wine and used power for their own benefit. As disillusion with court politics grew, society started descending into instability.

The Sun En rebellion and the rise of Liu Yu Toward the end of the fourth century, the Way of Five Pecks of Rice Religion (Tianshi dao 天师道 or the Way of the Celestial Masters), a native Daoist religion dating back the Eastern Han, was thriving in the lower Yangzi valley. It was led by Sun Tai 孫泰. Trained by his mentor Du Zigong 杜子恭, Sun Tai used magic to attract people and asked believers to give up their property and sons and daughters to the religion. As the ranks of the believers grew markedly, even Sima Yuanxian 司馬元顯 (son of the power-holder Sima Daozi), a top Jin leader, became one of them. In 398, Sun Tai started a rebellion. Sima Daozi got wind of it and had Sun killed. But the incident did not end there. Treading in Sun Tai’s footsteps, his nephew and follower Sun En took up arms. In 399, Sun En gathered an army of hundreds of thousands of believers. Death-defying, they believed that after death they would rise up to heaven as transcendents. The rebels 91

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invaded the Sanwu 三吴 area in the lower Yangzi. Some of his female believers brought babies with them. The babies were put in sacks or baskets and thrown into water while Sun En said, “Congratulations! You will enter the hall of transcendents first. We will soon follow.” When the capital Jiankang was threatened, a Jin officer called Liu Yu 劉裕 (a subordinate to the Northern Command general Liu Laozhi) played an active role in defending it and repelling the attackers. This afforded the Jingzhou-based Huan Xuan 桓玄, who inherited his father Huan Wen’s ambitions, an opportunity to send his army along the Yangzi toward Jiankang. On the surface, Huan Xuan’s move aimed to protect Jiankang from Sun En’s threat. In reality, by then, the main force of Sun En had been scattered by Liu Yu, and Huan Xuan’s true intention was to usurp power. But Sima Daozi and his associates did not have the power to repulse Huan Xuan’s forces and had to rely on Liu Laozhi and his Western Command forces. However, despite Liu Yu’s opposition, Liu Laozhi went over to Huan Xuan’s camp. Huan Xuan then eliminated Sima Daozi and Sima Yuanxian and their followers and went on to declare himself emperor, with “Chu” as the name of his state. He then deprived Liu Laozhi of his military power. Abandoned by his generals, Liu committed suicide. Eventually, Liu Laozhi’s former general Liu Yu rose against Huan Xuan and killed him in 404 before seizing power as the founder of the Song dynasty in 420, the first of the Southern Dynasties.

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6 The Southern and Northern Dynasties Andrew Chittick

During the Southern and Northern Period (420–589), the East Asian mainland was dominated by two powerful empires. The Jiankang 建康 Empire, with its capital at the city of Jiankang (Nanjing, Jiangsu) in the Yangzi delta area, ruled over the regions south of the Huai River and the Qinling Mountains, extending all the way to what is now central Vietnam. The Sino-Xianbei Empire under the Tuoba Wei 拓跋魏 regime (386–534) ruled the area north of the Huai-Qinling frontier as far north as Inner Mongolia, with its first major capital on the northern steppe frontier, at Pingcheng 平城 (at Datong, Shanxi), and then at the traditional Han imperial capital of Luoyang 洛陽 (494–534). The Tuoba Wei regime fell into an east-west civil war in the mid-sixth century between Eastern and Western Wei regimes, which were succeeded by the Northern Qi (550–577) and Northern Zhou (557–581) regimes, respectively. The South meanwhile suffered a more catastrophic collapse during and after the Hou Jing 侯景 crisis (548–552), losing all of its territory north of the Yangzi River and west of the Three Gorges. The political and territorial instability created the opportunity for new leadership to reunite the Sino-Xianbei Empire, found the Sui dynasty ­(581–618), conquer the South, and create the largest East Asian empire since the Jin (Map 6.1). The literate ruling classes of these empires all used Sinitic script and saw themselves as succeeding in some faashion to the legacy of the Han Empire. However, they were culturally, ethnically, and politically quite different. Linguistically, subjects of the Jiankang Empire spoke languages from at least four different major families (Sinitic, Austro-Asiatic, Tai, and Miao-Yao), with much cross-blending; subjects of the Sino-Xianbei Empires spoke both ­Sinitic and Altaic tongues, with the latter dominating within the military and ruling class for most of the fifth century. The two empires had equally remarkable differences in agricultural systems, diet, social habits, and political culture among their ruling classes, and even greater diversity in their outlying regions. And they understood these differences to have deep historical and even ecological roots. In traditional Chinese and modern Western historiography, the period has been framed as a North-South rivalry between two dynasties that each sought to reunify “China,” meaning the empire originally founded by the Qin and Han. The “reunification” by the northern-based Sui dynasty in 589 ce is described as putting an end to this incessant warfare and ushering in centuries of peace and prosperity. The two empires are also seen as culturally complementary; for example, the North is characterized as “martial” (wu 武) but 93

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Map 6.1  The Jiankang Empire under the Chen, Northern Zhou, and Northern Qi. (See Tan ­Qixiang, vol. 4, 23–24.)

lacking in cultural sophistication, while the South is described as more “literary” (wen 文) but lacking in military strength and assertiveness. This symmetrical North-South binary has pleasing parallels to similar binaries of yang and yin, or masculine and feminine, and the reunification into one whole thereby appears to be a desirable, natural, and even inevitable development. In fact, the idea of the two empires’ complementarity and their inevitable reunification was heavily influenced by the ideology of the subsequent Sui-Tang period. It masked the legacy of the violent conquest and destruction of the city of Jiankang and ongoing northern prejudice against the South (which the southerners often reciprocated), and thereby helped to facilitate the integration of the southern elite into the Sui-Tang empire. In later dynasties, and in modern times, the idea has continued to serve as a means to highlight the inviolable unity of the “Chinese nation” as one political entity, and contrast it with the 94

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partial, divided, chaotic, and weakened nature of the polities that existed between the Han and the Sui. This chapter takes a different perspective, one which relies on ample written evidence from the period that educated people did not necessarily believe it was inevitable, for the two regimes to be ruled as a single people or a single state, nor that they were “complementary.” The two empires often shared ideas and texts and were sometimes pitted against one another, but they primarily developed their own separate political and cultural trajectories. Their governance will therefore be discussed in two separate sections. Economic and cultural developments will be discussed together, but with a continual effort to compare and contrast the differences in the two regime’s developments.

Jiankang Empire: court and governance The empire based at Jiankang had persisted since the founding of the Three Kingdoms state of Wu in the early third century, with only a brief 37-year interregnum (280–317) of rule by the North under the Western Jin dynasty. The relocation of the Jin dynastic house to ­Jiankang, as the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420), had brought with it a large population of émigrés from the northern court, and a wealth of expertise, resources, and legitimacy. However, it was only with the rise of the southern general Liu Yu 劉裕 (363–422) that the empire was consolidated into a strong, assertive regime. Liu Yu was an illiterate military man from Pengcheng 彭城 (Xuzhou), in what is now northern Jiangsu province. The area was in the heart of the eastern Chu cultural region (also known as Huai-Chu), which straddled the frontier zone between the Jiankang regime and the various regimes of the central and northern plains. Men from eastern Chu had long been valued for their fighting prowess, and they formed the backbone of the Northern Command (beifu bing 北府兵) in the run-up to its pivotal victory against the northern-based Former Qin ruler Fu Jian 苻堅 at the battle of the Fei River in 383 ce. Liu Yu joined this force in the following generation, and he and his compatriots fought valiantly in the wars against the rebel Sun En 孫恩 (399–403). Liu Yu subsequently led the overthrow of the usurper Huan Xuan 桓玄 in 404 and became the power behind the weak, young Eastern Jin monarch (Emperor An 安, r. 396–419). Over the following 16 years, he extended his power within the military and political system of the Jiankang court until he could take the throne in his own name (posthumously known as Song Emperor Wu 武, r. 420–422), thereby displacing the Jin dynastic house with a new one based both on a native southern lineage and with deep roots in the southern military. A period of uncertainty and a short civil war followed his death in 422, leading to the further consolidation of the new regime under the long reign of his third son, Liu Yilong 劉義隆 (Song Emperor Wen 文, r. 424–453), which is considered the Jiankang Empire’s first golden age. Several administrative reforms helped to secure the dominance of the military and its control over the key frontier garrisons. The system of prefectural administration was reorganized, making the prefectures (zhou 州) (the highest-order territorial administrative unit) smaller and more numerous, and creating a series of new ones with their headquarters along the Huai river, the key line of defense and resupply for the frontier garrisons further to the north. The civilian Inspectors (cishi 刺史) of each prefecture served simultaneously as military field commanders, and the governors of lower-tier administrative districts were their subordinate generals, so that the entire system of civilian administration was effectively subordinated to a more explicitly hierarchical military administration. The key prefectural commands were then allotted to imperial princes or to a trusted member of a collateral 95

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family. This secured control by the Liu household and its close allies over the military and civilian infrastructure of the core regions of the empire in the lower and central Yangzi and the Huai frontier. However, the system also had considerable weakness. Most importantly, it was highly reliant on personal ties between the emperor, his clan members, and their military clients. Census registers were very unreliable and captured for the court the tax and labor resources of only a small proportion (in some regions perhaps as little as ten percent) of the empire’s population. Despite numerous efforts to reform the system, the registers remained inadequate throughout the remainder of the empire. Meanwhile, most subordinate generals had considerable numbers (hundreds or even thousands) of their own personal troops whom they brought with them into service, but whom they also took with them in times of rupture. As a result, the Jiankang Empire’s military system tended to be brittle and quick to fracture due to personal and political disputes, especially at times of imperial succession. Another important development during this first golden age was the avid court sponsorship of Buddhism. This followed from trends already present in the later years of the Eastern Jin, and was to some extent modeled on the court sponsorship of Buddhism of northern regimes such as the Later Qin (384–417), which Liu Yu had conquered. Emperor Wen (Liu Yilong) styled himself as a latter-day cakravartin (the wheel-turning emperor), or Buddhist universal ruler in the manner of the ancient Indian monarch A śoka (Ayuwang 阿育王; r. 268–232 bce). He supported major translation projects under monks from India such as Buddhajiva (Fotuoshi 佛陀什), Gunavarman (Qiunabamo 求那跋摩), and Gu ṇ abhadra (­Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀羅), and instituted a system of closer court control over the sangha. He also hosted numerous diplomatic missions from fellow Buddhist monarchs in South and Southeast Asia. The empire engaged in only modest military campaigns, primarily targeting marginalized peoples (the “Man” 蠻) in the interior hill country and one major attack in 446–447 on the Cham, in central Vietnam. These efforts were about gaining war captives, land for expansion of cultivation, and (in the case of the Cham) gold, silver, and other valuable materials. Skirmishes along the northern frontier were common, but offensive efforts were primarily targeted at securing the garrisons that made up the extended defensive line along the Yellow River. The fallback defensive line along the Huai River was also strengthened and regularized, and proved able to withstand a massive invasion by the Northern Wei in 450–451 ce. Despite deep penetration by northern forces, several strategic garrisons held out to harass the enemy’s rear, and the North withdrew with little gain. The decades of relative peace saw considerable achievements in literary fields, especially historiography and poetry, which are detailed later. Succession problems arose soon after the end of the 450 war, as Emperor Wen was assassinated in 453 in a plot by his two eldest sons. They were in turn overthrown by the third son, Liu Jun 劉駿 (Song Emperor Xiaowu 孝武, r. 454–465), who staged a short, fierce military campaign down the Yangzi River to seize control of the court. While formal policies did not change greatly, Emperor Xiaowu trusted his family members less, and began to rely on powerful military clients from other clans more, a pattern that eventually brought ruin to the dynasty. Upon his death in 465, a much more destructive succession battle broke out. Called the “War of Uncles and Nephews,” it pitted a cluster of forces at the capital allied with several of Xiaowu’s brothers against a wide scattering of prefectural commanders who raised the standard of one of Xiaowu’s minor-age sons. The eventual victor, Xiaowu’s younger brother Liu Yu 劉彧 (Song Emperor Ming 明, r. 466–472), purged many of the military men who had opposed him, as well as most of his own family members, thereby greatly 96

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weakening both the ruling house and the empire’s defensive system. The Northern Wei took advantage by seizing the wide swath of territory between the Yellow and Huai Rivers, which the Jiankang Empire had controlled since Liu Yu’s time. The weakened imperial house was now ripe for a dynastic challenger. The eventual ­v ictor, Xiao Daocheng 蕭道成, was from a family with marital ties to the ruling Liu clan and had been raised in similar military-administrative circles. He had emerged as a leading figure during the 466–467 civil war and went on to manipulate the court, place weak minor children on the throne, and consolidate the allegiance of the military. He took the throne himself in 479 (Qi Emperor Gao 高, r. 479–482), founding the Qi dynasty, and was succeeded peacefully by his eldest son Xiao Ze 蕭賾 (Qi Emperor Wu 武, r. 483–493), who had assisted him throughout the process of usurpation. This ushered in a second, much briefer “golden age,” known as the Yongming 永明 decade. Emperor Wu signed a peace treaty with the Northern Wei, and he and several of his sons sponsored literary salons, which engaged in innovative and lasting experiments with poetry. Two major challenges, one internal and one external, led to a severe crisis of the Qi regime. Internally, the death of Xiao Ze with a minor grandchild as heir opened up the opportunity for a distant cousin, Xiao Luan 蕭鸞, to manipulate and eventually assassinate all of the more legitimate heirs and take the throne himself (Qi Emperor Ming 明, r. 494–498). Part of Xiao Luan’s appeal was his substantial support among the military rank and file, who were faced with a serious external threat: the Northern Wei, which had just relocated its capital to Luoyang, was gearing up for a major invasion, which came first in 495 ce, and then again, more seriously, in 497–498. Only the death of the ambitious Tuoba Wei Emperor Xiaowen 孝文 ended the threat, by which time the Jiankang Empire had entered into yet another sustained succession crisis of its own. This was once again resolved by a military campaign sweeping down the Yangzi and forcefully dominating the court. The new emperor, Xiao Yan 蕭衍, also a distant cousin of the current ruling house, chose to found a new dynasty and is known as Liang Emperor Wu 武 (r. 502–548). The near half-century of Liang Emperor Wu’s reign is widely considered the pinnacle of the Jiankang Empire, the final extended “golden age” of relative peace and prosperity. Emperor Wu engaged in numerous substantial political innovations. He reaffirmed and greatly expanded the Buddhist aspects of court ritual and policy, sponsoring powerful monks and important translation and scholarly projects. At the same time, he developed the evolving tradition of lay persons taking bodhisattva precepts, including taking them himself, thereby circumventing the traditional monastic order while also asserting primacy over it. He appealed directly to the bourgeoning lay Buddhist community at the capital and in the extended network of merchants in peripheral urban centers and abroad. He and his sons were strong sponsors of scholastic work in both Buddhist and Confucian materials (which were widely seen as complementary), and they were also active patrons of poetry. Emperor Wu engaged in major administrative reforms, greatly increasing the number of administrative districts and enlarging the imperial training academy in order to bring more lower-status prefectural men into central administration and undercut the sinecures of the Jiankang elite. In military affairs, while he claimed to rule as a universal cakravartin in the mold of A śoka, he proved much more willing than his predecessors to back up the claim with aggressive campaigns against the North, seeking to take advantage of their civil war. However, these were of little avail, and in 537 ce, he signed a peace treaty with the Eastern Wei regime that lasted a decade. Emperor’s Wu’s prosperous and confident regime was rapidly brought to its knees, however, by the rebellion of Hou Jing, a renegade general from the North who led an extended 97

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assault on the city of Jiankang in 548–549. Once he had conquered the inner palace, he imprisoned the elderly emperor and his heir apparent and eventually eliminated them in favor of his own direct rule. The remaining Liang imperial princes who held prefectural military commands were unable to work together on a counter-strategy, and instead warred with one another, jockeying for position in a widening and increasingly bitter civil war. Hou Jing was killed in 552, and Xiao Yan’s seventh son, Xiao Yi 蕭繹, claimed the throne (Emperor Yuan 元, r. 552–554) from his base Jiangling 江陵 ( Jingzhouqu, Hubei) in the central Yangzi. However, his claim was contested, and his hold on the city of Jiankang was never secure. After only two years, he was killed by the forces of the Western Wei regime, which sacked Jiangling and seized control over the upper and much of the central Yangzi regions. The civil war left Jiankang and its imperial administrative system in ruins, and the wider empire fragmented into militarized prefectures. Eventually, Chen Baxian 陳霸先, a military commander from the southern reaches of the empire, succeeded in eliminating his rivals and took the much-diminished imperial throne at Jiankang (Emperor Wu of Chen, r. 557–559). Territorially, he controlled little more than the lower Yangzi region; it was left to his heirs, notably Emperors Wen 文 (r. 560–566) and Xuan 宣 (r. 569–582), to re-assert military control over part of the central Yangzi and all of the South (the regions of modern Fujian, Guangdong, and northern Vietnam). The empire had nonetheless lost all of the critical Huai frontier garrisons to the Northern Qi regime, and it remained greatly shrunken in size and weakened in structure. It proved unable to defend itself against the massive and well-planned invasion by the Sui Empire in 588–589. Sui Emperor Wen (r. 581–604) ordered Jiankang leveled and returned to farm fields, thereby bringing an end to one of the world’s great cities.

Sino-Xianbei Empires: court and governance Like the Liu-Song regime of the Jiankang Empire, the Sino-Xianbei Empires had their dynastic origins in the rise of a military leader during the very fluid political situation following the death of Fu Jian in 385 ce and the breakup of the Former Qin Empire. In the following year, Tuoba Gui 拓拔珪 (posthumously known as Wei Emperor Daowu 道武. r. 386–409) seized control of the northern steppe borderland domain of Dai, an early Tuoba state, which had been crushed by the Former Qin in 376, and changed its name to Wei. (The surname “Tuoba” or “Toba” is also written as “Tabgatch,” to approximate the Xianbei pronunciation.) Over the following two decades, Tuoba Gui succeeded in subduing numerous other steppe tribes, absorbing their armies into a hereditary military caste, and completed the conquest of all of the Central Plains down to the Yellow River. He also relocated the capital of his domain to Pingcheng (at Datong, Shanxi), located in a high valley well situated both to rule the neighboring steppe lands and to dominate the northern Yellow River plains below. Compared to Jiankang, Pingcheng was a very raw new city, and indeed the entire Northern Wei was a new creation that at first did not seem any more likely to survive than its many ambitious but short-lived predecessors. Emperor Daowu’s legacy was consolidated and expanded upon by his grandson, Tuoba Tao 拓拔燾 (Emperor Taiwu 太武, r. 424–452), whose long reign closely tallied that of Emperor Wen of Song in the South. Taiwu personally engaged in aggressive campaigns of expansion, ­ uanzhong  關中 (the beginning with a major one against the Xia regime that controlled G Wei River valley in south Shaanxi) and the Ordos Loop (in modern Shaanxi, Ningxia, and part of Inner Mongolia). He subdued the Avars (Rouran 柔然), a rival steppe confederation, and resettled many of their members along the steppe frontier east and west of P ­ ingcheng; these settlements would form the nucleus of the “Six Garrisons” (Liuzhen 六鎮) that 98

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defended the Wei court but also eventually contributed to its downfall. In 436, he routed the last of the Murong (another branch of the Xianbei) regimes in Manchuria, and three years later completed the conquest of the northwest frontier by seizing the state of the N ­ orthern Liang (in modern Gansu). The urban elite of each of these regimes was transported to ­Pingcheng, swelling its population and straining its resources. Because the Guanzhong region and the Northern Liang regime had both been strongly Buddhist, the transport of their urban populations also brought significant new Buddhist influence into the capital. Late in his reign, in 450–451 ce, Emperor Taiwu undertook his only major invasion of the Jiankang Empire, at least in part in response to Jiankang’s own efforts to contest their frontier along the south banks of the Yellow River. As in his other campaigns, Taiwu sought to move rapidly to the enemy’s capital and defeat their imperial army and their ruler in one swift campaign. The Wei troops’ advance in the open field went almost entirely unchecked; however, the Jiankang regime maintained an extensive network of fortified garrisons throughout the frontier, and the Wei troops were unable or unwilling to slow down and besiege each of them. They advanced all the way to the north bank of the Yangzi River, but were unable to muster the naval strength to cross it. Endangered by harassing attacks from the rear and beset by diseases endemic to the subtropical southern climate, they soon withdrew, taking many captives and leaving much destruction in their wake, but making no substantive territorial gains. The campaign was the largest sustained effort to conquer the South in this period prior to the Sui conquest in 589 ce. Under Emperor Taiwu’s long reign, the Wei regime proved highly eclectic in its adoption and adaptation of rituals for legitimating its rule. The ruling group was of Xianbei descent and spoke an Altaic language quite different from the Sinitic tongues that dominated the Central Plains and highlands of the Yellow river. The court and its officials routinely communicated orally in the Xianbei language, deployed Xianbei traditions like the worship of the steppe god Tengri (Tianshen 天神), and sometimes used the title of qaghan. However, the ruler also aligned himself with Han imperial precedents by calling himself “emperor” (huangdi), conducting the ceremonial worship of Tian (heaven) and other rituals, and using literary Sinitic for all written business. For a period in the 440s, the court experimented with an innovative (but ultimately short-lived) effort to develop a Daoist utopian model of empire under Kou Qianzhi 寇謙之 (365–448), a Daoist prophet. Taiwu was generally distrustful of Buddhism, and actively purged monastic institutions in the years 444–452, which is remembered as the first proscription campaign against the religion. Under the subsequent two emperors, Wencheng 文成 (r. 452–465) and Xianwen 獻文 (r. 465–471), Buddhism came back into favor, at least partly due to the influence of transported peoples from the northwestern conquests. Various court officials and imperial family members began to sponsor the building of cave temples at Yungang 雲崗, just outside of Pingcheng. While both rulers were much less inclined toward military expansion than their vigorous predecessor, the Tuoba forces did take advantage of civil war in the South to seize the territory between the Yellow and Huai Rivers in 466–469, their single most successful advance against the southern frontier. One noteworthy political development in this period was the rise of palace women as an important force at court. The founding emperor had established the practice of executing the mother of the heir-apparent, precisely in order to prevent the prospect of powerful women manipulating the throne. However, Wencheng elevated his wet-nurse as empress dowager, and she in turn arranged to have his first wife (and the mother of Xianwen) executed and a confidant of her own, Madame Feng 馮 (known in history as Empress Dowager Feng), installed as empress. Though only an imperial stepmother, and a step-grandmother to Tuoba 99

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Hong 拓拔宏 (Emperor Xiaowen 孝文, r. 471–499), Empress Dowager Feng would go on to dominate the court for several decades until her death in 490 ce. Under Empress Dowager Feng’s regency, Xiaowen was placed on the throne when he was not yet four, and received a thorough education in the traditional Chinese classics. The Empress Dowager then oversaw an initial wave of decisive reforms focused on improving rural administration, agricultural productivity, and land tax revenues. Most important and innovative was the “equal fields system” ( juntian zhi 均田制) in which the court claimed ownership of all agricultural land and allotted it to households based on head count. One intent was to guarantee land to every farm household, thereby bringing them out from under the control of powerful estates and into the state’s household registration, tax, and corvée labor system. In theory, the system was also supposed to limit the size of estates, but this was much less successful. Following the death of Empress Dowager Feng, the 22-year-old emperor completed two full years of mourning and then proceeded with a far more radical reorganization. Inspired by Han imperial history and textual traditions, he sought to remake the empire more closely in line with the illustrious Han legacy. The centerpiece of the reforms was the relocation of the capital from Pingcheng, which had outgrown its limited agricultural base and constricted transport network, to Luoyang, the site of the old Han imperial capital. Court ritual was altered to more scrupulously follow Han precedents, eliminating the eclectic mix of steppe practices. Sweeping military reforms drafted the sons of farm families into new infantry units, shifting away from reliance on professional cavalry forces. The imperial lineage was reorganized to sharply restrict its membership, and the family-ranking system was reformed to reduce the dominant rule of older lineages of steppe-based military origins, and make rank more closely tied to recent service to the court. Numerous cultural reforms required changes such as the use of Sinitic rather than Xianbei speech and dress at court. Finally, the Emperor engaged in several, ultimately unsuccessful campaigns against the South prior to his death in 499 ce, partly to secure the greater hinterland of Luoyang, but also as a way of demonstrating his ambition to reconquer all of the lands of the Han Empire. Not surprisingly, many of the older Xianbei lineages and active fighting men on the northern frontier were deeply unhappy with Xiaowen’s reforms and resisted them from the start. The city of Luoyang prospered greatly for the next three decades and saw a remarkable efflorescence of Buddhist piety and temple construction. But the internal tensions that had been wrought by Xiaowen’s reforms increasingly began to overwhelm the functioning of imperial administration and, more importantly, the imperial army. In 523 ce, the “Six Garrisons” along the northern steppe frontier began to actively revolt. The rebellious frontier inflamed the bitter court struggles between the factions of Empress Dowager Hu 胡 (aka Ling 靈) and her husband Emperor Xuanwu 宣武 (r. 499–515) and son, Emperor Xiaoming 孝明 (r. 515–528). When Empress Dowager Hu had Emperor Xiaoming poisoned in 528, a frontier commander named Erzhu Rong 爾朱榮 moved on the capital to “save the dynasty,” execute the Empress Dowager, and install his own puppet on the throne. This led to a complex, multi-sided civil war which wholly undermined the Tuoba dynasty and eventually led to the military division of the Sino-Xianbei Empire into two halves. In the eastern Yellow River plains, the dominant commander was Gao Huan 高歡, while the Guanzhong region to the west was controlled by Yuwen Tai 宇文泰. When the Wei emperor fled to Guanzhong in 534, Gao Huan installed a rival scion of the ruling house, leading to a full-blown schism between east and west and the creation of two rival regimes: the Eastern Wei and Western Wei. Both Wei rulers were puppets, and were eventually displaced by their military masters: the Gao clan began ruling in its own right as the Northern Qi 100

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in 550, while Yuwen Tai’s heir declared himself Emperor of the Northern Zhou regime in 557. The civil war continued, with regular fighting between the two regimes for two more decades. During this period, the Jiankang Empire had also fallen into disarray as a result of the Hou Jing rebellion, leaving the military and political situation in East Asia far more fluid and violent than at any time since the fourth century. The eastern regime under the Gao clan was larger and more populous than the western; however, the western regime proved more innovative, developing a new military organization which drew in local strongmen from the Guanzhong region and gave them ­X ianbei-styled names, titles, and equipment. In some ways, this was the reverse of Emperor Xiaowen’s effort to “Sinicize” the military; instead, fighting men of any and all ethnic backgrounds were “Xianbei-ized.” Equally important, they were directly recruited by the court and then parceled out to 24 top military commanders, thereby avoiding some of the problems of personalized military commands which had plagued both the Tuoba Wei and the Jiankang Empires. Building on this strong base of recruitment and command, and the stable and competent rule of Yuwen Yong 宇文邕 (Emperor Wu of Northern Zhou, r. 560–578), the Northern Zhou armies defeated the Northern Qi regime and seized all of its territories in 577 ce, thereby refounding a regime on the scale of the Sino-Xianbei Empire. Within a few years, however, the throne fell under the sway of Yang Jian 楊堅, father of the empress, who took over as regent in 580. He went on to seize the throne as Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty (r. 581–604). After several years of further preparation, the Sui armies staged a massive campaign against the weakened Jiankang Empire in 588–589 that ended the Chen regime, leveled the once-great city of Jiankang, and established Emperor Wen of Sui as the unquestioned ruler of the largest empire East Asia had seen since the fall of the Western Jin more than two and a half centuries earlier.

Economy and agriculture In 420, the Jiankang Empire was at its greatest extent, and probably had a significantly greater population than the Sino-Xianbei Empire, though census data for the entire period from the Han to the Sui are notoriously poor. At this time the frontier zone between the two empires lay just south of the Yellow River, so Jiankang controlled an area which, in the second century (the last reliable census), had contained 25–30 million persons, about half the population of the Han Empire. Since that time, the North had suffered grievous warfare, pestilence, and emigration, while the South had been relatively peaceful and taken in a considerable number of northern migrants; it probably had at least as high a population, while the territory under the Northern Wei regime had considerably less. However, territorial gains and brisk population growth would have made the united Sino-Xianbei Empire considerably larger than its southern rival by the late sixth century. Southern urban development was especially spectacular. Jiankang was already an impressive city in the fourth century, but it probably grew to be one of the world’s largest in the fifth and sixth centuries. It formed the nexus for an extensive long-distance trade network that reached across the empire, driven by the concentration of wealth among its upper classes and the low transport costs along the Yangzi River and its major tributaries. Overland trade from Central Asia along the “Silk Road” was able to drop south into Sichuan or the valley of the upper Han River (a northern tributary of the Yangzi) and link up to the Yangzi ­ uangzhou 廣州 replaced Jiaozhou 交州 (in River network. In the far south, the port of G north Vietnam) as the primary hub of a long-distance maritime trade network that brought 101

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in goods from all over Southeast Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf. These goods were then transported overland, with a portage over one of the Nanling passes to gain access to the southern tributaries of the Yangzi River network. As a result, river towns throughout the empire flourished as gathering points for commodities from the hinterland, and as transshipment points for longer-distance exchange. Jiankang itself was also an important port of call for sea-going ships, serving as the primary entry point to the continent for vessels coming from the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese islands. The North in the early fifth century was by comparison much less commercially vibrant. The centrally-located Han capitals of Chang’an and Luoyang had been badly damaged and depopulated; the new Tuoba Wei capital of Pingcheng rose to become a major urban center, but it had very weak transport links to the Central Plains, and the North in general lacked the easy availability of river transport that drove commercial prosperity in the South. However, as the empire grew to encompass the eastern terminus of the “Silk Road” route to Central Asia (in modern eastern Gansu province), it also expanded its overland transport links. Its territorial gains from the South in 466–469 included fertile regions between the Yellow and Huai Rivers which had once supported considerable population (though by this time they would have been considerably diminished by warfare). They also gained the empire’s first decent seaports in the Shandong peninsula. The equal fields system encouraged farmers to settle on uncultivated lands and bring them back into production, helping to swell population and tax revenue. By the early sixth century, the Sino-Xianbei Empire was substantially more prosperous, as evidenced by the phenomenally rapid rebirth of the city of Luoyang following its designation as an imperial capital in 493. In little more than three decades, it swelled to a population of perhaps 700,000 and covered an area of 75 km 2, rivaling the size of Jiankang in both measures. The city became a magnet for commodity trade stretching to Central Asia and India. It was home to over a thousand Buddhist monasteries, including the tallest pagoda in the world, at Yongning si 永寧寺, which was visible for over 30 miles; it was reputed to be 136 meters high, though this is surely an exaggeration. The extensive Buddhist carvings and sculptures at Longmen, just south of the modern city of Luoyang, remain as a testament to the wealth and vigor of the era. In agriculture the Jiankang Empire likewise saw a smooth and consistent path of expansion compared to the crisis-ridden North. The South was able to rely on the warm climate, long growing season, and ample rainfall to grow relatively dense amounts of crop. Rice had long been the predominant grain, though winter wheat was also widely planted in the northern reaches of the Yangzi drainage. Some new crops rose to prominence as tradable commodities in the fifth and sixth centuries, notably citrus and most especially tea, which came into widespread fashion during this period due to the influence of Buddhism, where it was initially prized as an aid to meditation. Grown and sold for profit, the successful spread of these commodity crops relied on access to good transport links and a vibrant commercial economy. The southern regimes also emphasized the internal colonization of new lands. The Eastern Jin period had already seen considerable effort to subdue the peoples living in the hilly regions of the lower Yangzi delta (in modern south Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang) and bring those areas into denser settlement and cultivation. Under the Liu-Song emperors, the policy was extended into the middle Yangzi, with campaigns against the “Man” peoples in the Dabie Mountains that divide off the Yangzi drainage from the upper Huai River drainage. There was also considerable settlement in the Nanling Range that divided the far

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southern reaches of the Yangzi drainage (along the upper Xiang and Gan Rivers in modern south Hunan and Jiangxi) from the West River drainage (in modern Guangdong). These developments brought new land under cultivation and led to a tradable surplus in some areas. The northern agricultural economy relied on grains such as wheat and millet, and was generally less productive than the South per acre due to shorter growing season and less abundant rainfall. Stockbreeding of cattle, sheep, goats, and horses was widespread, however, and formed an important part of the agricultural economy. Some new crops were introduced from Central Asia, such as apricots, almonds, and sesame. An excellent record of mostly northern agricultural practices has survived in the Essential Techniques for the Common People (Qimin yaoshu 齊民要術) by Jia Sixie 賈思勰 (fl. c. 530–544), an agricultural treatise based on conditions in southern Shandong. In general, however, agricultural progress came more from re-expansion than from innovation, as the North had been severely depopulated during the fourth century. The equal fields system encouraged landless farmers to bring formerly productive land back to the tiller, which eventually brought both the economy and the imperial treasury to a much more stable and prosperous footing. The Tuoba Wei regime also gained considerable new lands through military conquest at the expense of the South.

Religious literature and practice The most important developments in religious thought continued to be driven by the ongoing translation of Sanskrit literature into literary Sinitic. The work of Kum ā rajīva 鳩摩 羅什 (334–413) and his collaborators at Chang’an had set a new standard for the linguistic quality of translations. This legacy was carried forward initially at Jiankang, where the court actively sponsored Buddhist monastic institutions and projects. Monks from South and Southeast Asia settled at Jiankang beginning in the early fifth century and undertook further translations of important texts, such as the Flower Garland (Huayan 華嚴) sutra, the A śoka sutra, and a variety of texts on monastic regulations (vinaya or lü 律), meditation practices (dhyāna or chan 禪), and the lay adoption of bodhisattva precepts. They also officially ordained East Asia’s first order of Buddhist nuns. During the Luoyang period (494–534), the Tuoba Wei court undertook the vigorous sponsorship of sutra translation by Indian monks such as Bodhiruci 菩提留支, which had substantial influence on the development of the Pure Land and Chan schools. In addition, despite two brief periods of general suppression, the Sino-Xianbei regimes did not seek to supervise private Buddhist textual and ideological production, allowing for the spread of “indigenous” scriptures, such as the Sutra of Trapuṣa and Bhallika (Tiwei boli jing 提謂波利經), which were not translated from Sanskrit, and which reflected a more popular approach to Buddhist religious practice. The late fifth and sixth centuries saw considerable efforts at textual consolidation and standardization. The first efforts to unify and standardize Daoist literature and practice came in 471 ce with the presentation to the Jiankang court of the Catalog of the Scriptures and Writings of the Three Caverns (Sandong jingshu mulu 三洞經書目錄) by Lu Xiujing 陸修靜 ­(406–477). This and other work by Lu sought to systematize the various schools of D ­ aoism, placing the relatively new Lingbao tradition as the highest and relegating the older Celestial Masters school to the lowest category. In the following generation, Tao Hongjing 陶弘景 (456–536), an especially powerful and politically well-connected proponent of the ­Shangqing tradition, consolidated the records of the mid-fourth-century revelations to the adept Yang Xi 楊羲 into the Declarations of the Perfected (Zhengao 真誥).

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The first catalog of Buddhist translations had been completed by the fourth-century monk Dao’an 道安, but the most lasting influence in this field came from the monk Sengyou 僧祐 (445–518), a close advisor to the Jiankang monarch, Emperor Wu of Liang. He authored the first collection of Buddhist apologetic literature, the Hongming ji 弘明集, in 513, as well as the earliest surviving annotated catalog of Buddhist scriptures, the Collected Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (Chu sanzang jiji 出三藏記集). The latter work included the first known collection of monk’s lives written as formal biographies in the style of traditional Sinitic historiography, though some individual accounts, such as that of Faxian 法顯 (c. 337–422), are known to have been based on earlier materials which are still extant. The genre of monks’ biographies was greatly expanded with the publication of two further biographical collections, the Accounts (Biographies) of Famous Monks (Mingseng zhuan 名僧傳) by Baochang 寶唱 (fl. 495–529) and the Accounts (Biographies) of Eminent Monks (Gaoseng zhuan 高僧傳) by Huijiao 慧皎 (497–554). Efforts at making a complete catalog of scriptures were also undertaken under the Sino-Xianbei regimes in the sixth century, but none of them has survived. Creative approaches to religious and philosophical literature flourished throughout the period. Collections of “anomaly accounts” (zhiguai 志怪) explored the realm of supernatural encounters, sometimes eclectically but often with Buddhist themes, as in the late fifth-­ century Records of Miraculous Omens (Mingxiang ji 冥祥記) by Wang Yan 王琰 (fl. 450–500). The traditions of “dark learning” (xuanxue 玄學) and “pure conversation” (qingtan 清談) continued, with much of their energy occupied by dealing with the still somewhat exotic and challenging notions from Buddhist materials. One example of the evolution of such philosophical debates is the extended discussion of the Discourse on the Perishability of the Soul (Shenmie lun 神滅論), written by Fan Zhen 范縝 (c. 450–515) in 507 ce. In response, Emperor Wu of Liang sponsored the composition of over 70 philosophical essays in opposition to Fan’s argument, mostly from a Buddhist perspective. These sorts of philosophical treatises and debates, often conducted as a result of court sponsorship and with a clear religious agenda, were common throughout the era. The fifth and sixth centuries were also a high point for religiously inspired construction. The Record of the Monasteries of Luoyang (Luoyang qielanji 洛陽伽藍記), written in 547 by Yang Xuanzhi 楊衒之, indicates that there were 1,367 Buddhist establishments in Luoyang, more than twice as many as in Jiankang. While all of these edifices have succumbed to time, the major cave temple complexes built outside of the northern capitals, at Yungang (near Pingcheng) and Longmen 龍門 ( just south of Luoyang), survive and are a major source for research on early medieval art and piety. The realm of religious practice stretched far beyond the written accounts left to us in scriptures and philosophical essays, or the grand architecture of imperial cities. One of the most influential religious movements of the medieval period was the Celestial Masters, a hierarchical millenarian sect, which formed relatively tight local communities. It had its origins in Sichuan in the late second century but was initially propagated in the North. By the fifth century, it was well established throughout the South and had many practitioners among the lower-level military and the ruling class of the Jiankang Empire. The aforementioned Shangqing and Lingbao traditions grew out of these communities and were an effort to rejuvenate and systematize their teachings on a new footing. Much of this was a response to the inroads made by Buddhism, which appealed particularly to local merchants and those who sought patronage relations with the court. However, the Jiankang court sought to exercise considerable control over religious orthodoxy by prohibiting the erection of stelae, repressing heterodox writings and movements, and limiting the development of local religious associations. By the sixth century, the Jiankang court began to actively suppress 104

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most Daoist sects and some “unorthodox” Buddhist ones in preference for its own preferred interpretations of Buddhism. As a result, there is little evidence of popular religiosity from the South. By comparison, there is rich evidence for the development of popular Buddhist piety under the Sino-Xianbei empires. Local Buddhist societies (yishe 邑社) sponsored small local monasteries (estimates suggest there were 30,000 of these, more than ten times as many as in the South) and financed the production of stelae, statues, inscriptions, and entire cave temples. The major cave temple complexes at Yungang and Longmen are well-known, but the North is also dotted with many smaller, humbler, but no less interesting evidences of these religious associations.

Historiography and poetry The greatest output of non-religious prose writing during the northern and southern period was unquestionably in the genre loosely understood as “history.” The golden age of Emperor Wen of Song saw an especially sustained output of traditional imperial historiography, including the now-standard Book of the Later Han (Hou Han shu 後漢書) by Fan Ye 范曄 (398–445); the copiously annotated version of the Accounts of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo zhi 三國志) by Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (372–451); the compilation of early versions of the Book of the Jin ( Jinshu 晉書) and various other titles; and the documents which would contribute to the Book of the Song (Songshu 宋書). This body of imperially sponsored work sought to establish an orthodox interpretation of the major political events of the preceding 400 years. Later products of the Jiankang imperial history office followed these precedents. Shen Yue 沈約 (441–513), though more famous for his poetry (see later in the chapter), also compiled the official account of the Book of the Song in 488, and he continued to work on its comprehensive and detailed monographs (treatises or zhi 志) right up to his death. The Book of the Southern Qi (Nan Qi shu 南齊書) was compiled by Xiao Zixian 蕭子顯 (489–537), grandson of the dynastic founder Xiao Daocheng. The Sino-Xianbei Empire also had an imperial history office, but its only important surviving product is the Book of the Wei (Weishu 魏書) by Wei Shou 魏收 (506–572), who was working under the auspices of the Northern Qi court. The official histories of the Jin, Liang, Chen, Northern Qi, and Northern Zhou dynasties were not compiled in their extant official versions until the Tang period. A good deal more historical work was produced outside the court’s immediate purview. One very popular genre of quasi-historical writing was anecdote collections, which reflected the aristocratic interest in pure conversation, character assessment, and witty repartee. The classic in this genre, A New Account of the Tales of the World (Shishuo xinyu 世說新語), was compiled and edited by Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 (403–444), a prince of the Song imperial house, in the early fifth century. Local history writing, already a vigorous genre in the fourth century, saw continued output in the fifth and sixth centuries, with an emphasis on locality stories (historical and contemporary tales tied to a particular place) and tales of the supernatural. They were usually organized around imperial administrative districts, though accounts of important mountain regions, often with religious objectives, also gained importance. One of the most substantial local accounts, the aforementioned Record of the Monasteries of Luoyang, was less a ­Buddhist tract than a lengthy, nostalgic memoir for the built environment and lively society of L ­ uoyang in its glory years from 494 to 535. 105

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By the sixth century, there was an increasing effort to compile disparate materials into more comprehensive, encyclopedic collections, paralleling trends in religious literature. This is evidenced especially in Jiankang, where several universal compendia of biographical and geographical materials (now no longer extant) were published early in the Liang period. However, the best extant example comes from a northern author, Li Daoyuan 酈道元 (d. 527), whose Annotated Classic of Waterways (Shuijing zhu 水經注), a classic of geography, compiled a vast number of locality stories and descriptive passages, using river systems as its universal organizing framework. Two other important and original late sixth-century works from the North shared this comprehensive focus: the aforementioned Essential Techniques for the Common People (Qimin yaoshu) and the Family Instructions for the Yan Clan (Yanshi jiaxun 顏氏家訓) by Yan Zhitui 顏之推 (c. 531–591). Both books are generically similar to the treatises of the official histories, but with a greatly expanded level of detail. The early fifth century was a major watershed in the Chinese poetic tradition due to the works of two southern poets in particular: Tao Qian and Xie Lingyun. Tao Qian 陶潛 (c. 365–427), styled Yuanming 淵明, was noted for retiring from public life and living on his private farm in a state of penury. His poems, which combine pastoral detail with reflections on personal, familial, and philosophical themes, are some of the most widely read and appreciated poems in the entire Chinese corpus. Xie Lingyun 謝靈運 (385–433), from a prominent aristocratic family, is considered the father of landscape poetry, and wrote in a more formal style with many Buddhist elements. Another important development during the fifth and sixth centuries was the widespread popularity of yuefu 樂府 or “Music Bureau” poems. These purported to be the lyrics to popular ballads, though most were written by court officials and have considerable literary embellishments. Bao Zhao 鮑照 (414–466), a contemporary of Xie Lingyun, was especially noted for his poetic adaptations of popular southern songs, though he wrote in many other genres. Southern yuefu poetry, often categorized into Wu songs (from the Yangzi delta region) and Western songs (from the central Yangzi), remained a highly influential genre into the Liang dynasty; they were often performed at court accompanied by dancing ladies. Northern yuefu poetry, frequently emphasizing martial themes, is rougher and generally less well regarded as well as less plentiful. However, the northern tradition produced the single most well-known poem in the genre, the “Ballad of Mulan” (Mulan shi 木蘭詩). The late fifth century saw another groundbreaking development with the introduction of tonal prosody. During the Yongming reign period (483–493) of Emperor Wu of Qi, the imperial prince Xiao Ziliang 蕭子良 sponsored an influential literary salon that included several famous poets, among them Shen Yue, Xie Tiao 謝朓 (464–499), and Wang Rong 王融 (467–493). Having been sensitized to comparative linguistics due to the influx of Sanskrit literature and the challenges of translation, they began to analyze the tonal structure of spoken Sinitic, primarily the Jiankang vernacular. From this they developed tonal rules for poetry composition that were much more sophisticated and formal than anything prior. Tonal prosody was controversial at the time, and some criticized the movement, but most poets were strongly influenced by the new style, and it guided poetic composition throughout poetry’s golden age under the Tang Empire. A final major development in poetry was the rise of the “palace style” in the sixth century, under the auspices of several princes of the Liang ruling house. Lushly sensual and descriptive, often with a focus on love and court ladies, the palace style was frequently criticized as decadent by later commentators. However, it also carried a strong Buddhist undercurrent emphasizing the ephemerality of sense impressions. The most representative anthology is the New Songs from the Jade Terrace (Yutai xinyong 玉臺新詠), compiled by Xu Ling 徐陵 106

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(507–583) at the behest of his patron, Xiao Gang 蕭綱, an imperial prince who would go on to serve briefly as the puppet Liang Emperor Jianwen 簡文 (r. 550–551) during the Hou Jing crisis. As in other scholarly fields, the Jiankang elite in the sixth century made substantial efforts at anthologizing and critiquing the entire poetic tradition up to that time. Of surviving works, the earliest is the Ranking of Poets (Shipin 詩品) by Zhong Rong 鍾嶸 (469–518), which assessed 123 poets from Han times to the present and assigned them into three grades, with commentary. Still more influential is the Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons (Wenxin diaolong 文心雕龍) by Liu Xie 劉勰 (fl. early sixth century), an extensive series of essays on literary theory that has been highly regarded up to the present day. Finally, the anthology Selections of Refined Literature (Wenxuan 文選), compiled under the auspices of the Liang prince Xiao Tong 蕭統 (501–531), assembled what his literary coterie considered the very best and most representative writings in 37 prose and verse genres, including 761 different pieces from 130 different writers. Though certainly not the first such anthology, it is the earliest one to have survived intact, and remains the single most important source for the study of pre-Tang literature.

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SECTION 3

The Sui-Tang Empire and the Five Dynasties

In 581, a leading member of the Northern Zhou aristocracy usurped power in the capital Chang’an and founded the Sui dynasty, which went on to annex the South in 589, and evolve into a prosperous empire. Under the Sui, major reform measures were introduced to improve the political institutions and restructure the central and local governments. Two world-class cities (Daxingcheng 大興城 [Chang’an under the Tang] and Luoyang) were constructed, and a nationwide waterway network (the Grand Canal) linking North and South was set up. The registered population stood at 46 million in 609, the largest since the Han. But, not long afterward, the Sui dynasty collapsed in consequence of excessive construction projects, reckless and costly foreign wars (against Koguryǒ in the northeast), and the wanton abuse of the labor force during the second reign. The Tang that succeeded to the Sui managed to restore peace, while inheriting the ­institutions, government structures, and infrastructure of the previous age, in a way that was analogous to the post-Qin situation, where the Han kept the Qin government structures essentially intact. A major point of difference was the conspicuous presence of people of non-Han (especially of Xianbei) and of mixed descent in the upper echelon of the central and local governments in the Sui-Tang empire even though the empire itself was essentially Sinitic in culture. Traditionally, the Tang dynasty comprised two subperiods, with the start of the An Lushan 安祿山 rebellion (755–763) as the demarcation line. The two (pre-rebellion and post-rebellion) subperiods are in turn divided into four phases: Early Tang (618–712), High Tang (712–756), Middle Tang (756–820), and Late Tang (820–907). Looked upon from a different angle, the rise of the Zhou dynasty (690–705) under Wu Zetian 武則天 that briefly replaced the Tang can be regarded as the interregnum that cuts the Tang into two halves. In the pre-rebellion subperiod, the Tang had a dominant presence in East, North, and Central Asia and was noted for its openness to outside, especially “Western,” cultural influence. In the Early Tang, the first two reigns, those of Gaozu 高祖 (Li Yuan 李淵) and Taizong 太宗 (Li Shimin 李世民), founded and consolidated the empire, laying a solid foundation for its growth in future generations. Although the third sovereign Gaozong 高宗 was weak in personality, and the reign of his wife Wu Zetian that followed did much harm to the Li royal house, the empire continued to function remarkably smoothly. In the High Tang phase under Xuanzong 玄宗, widespread prosperity arrived that marked the apogee of the dynasty. 110

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In the post-rebellion subperiod, foreign influence, generally speaking, was receding, as China turned increasingly inward and the extent of her territory shrank. At the start of the Middle Tang (Mid-Tang) phase, the An Lushan rebellion came close to destroying the dynasty for good. A restored Tang court thereafter lost control of the northwest and had a hard time reining in the recalcitrant military commissioners (in their defense commands) in Hebei and the Huai valley. In the Late Tang phase, members of the eunuch group, who had been gaining power since the Middle Tang, came to dominate the court and to play the role of emperor-makers, especially in the latter half of the ninth century. The most popular religion, Buddhism, was proscribed, together with other foreign religions (such as Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism). Toward the end of the Tang, China drifted into another chaotic period, that of the Five Dynasties and Ten States (Kingdoms) in 907. The Five Dynasties were five consecutive, short-lived northern regimes based in the Central Plains (with four based in Kaifeng 開封 and one in Luoyang). Of these, except for the first and last ones, all were founded by nonHan (especially Shatuo 沙陀 Turk) generals. However, in this period, ethnicity was never a major issue. The Ten States were less powerful regimes mostly in the South and southwest. The only exception was the Northern Han based in Shanxi in the North. This transitional period ended in 979 when the state of Northern Han was brought into the fold by the Northern Song, the successor state of the Later Zhou, the last of the Five Dynasties. Chronology 3: The Sui-Tang Empire and Five Dynasties 578–579 Northern Zhou: Xuandi’s 宣帝 reign. 579–581 Northern Zhou: Jingdi’s 靜帝 reign. 580 N  orthern Zhou: Yang Jian 楊堅 the de facto holder of power in the Northern Zhou. 581–618 Sui dynasty 581–604 Emperor Wen’s 文帝 (Yang Jian) reign. 581–600 Kaihuang 開皇 reign period. 581 The Five Departments (wusheng 五省) and 11 Courts (si 寺) introduced. 582–589 Chen: Houzhu’s 後主 reign. 582–583 Building of Daxingcheng 大興城 (Xi’an, Shaanxi). 584 The Guangtong Canal 廣通渠 dug. 587 The Later Liang (Xiao) annexed. 588–589 The Southern Expedition against the Chen in the South. 590 Rebellions in former Chen territory crushed by Yang Su 楊素. 592 The equal-field system carried out nationwide. 598 Emperor Wen’s unsuccessful campaign against Koguryŏ. 599 Tujue civil war; Tuli 突利 (Qimin 啟民) qaghan’s flight to the Sui. 600 Yang Guang 楊廣 named crown prince, replacing Yang Yong 楊勇. 601–604 Emperor Wen’s Renshou 仁壽 reign period. 604–618 Emperor Yang’s 煬 (Yang Guang) reign. 605–618 The Daye 大業 reign period. 605–606 The building of Sui Luoyang. Work on the Grand Canal begins. 605 607 Gao Jiong 高熲 and others executed for libel against the court. 111

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609 611 612 613 614 616 617–618 617

618–619 618 618–907 618 618–624 624 626 627–649 630 640 641 645 648 649 658 663 665 668 682 683–684 690–705 690 705 712 713–741 742–756 751 755–763

Poet Xue Daoheng 薛道衡 killed by Emperor Yang. The first major, anti-Sui rebellion in Shandong by Wang Bo 王薄. Emperor Yang’s first campaign against Koguryŏ. E  mperor Yang’s second campaign against Koguryŏ; the Yang Xuangan 楊玄感 rebellion; widespread turmoil. Emperor Yang’s third campaign against Koguryŏ. Emperor Yang’s move to Jiangdu for good. Reign of Yang You 楊侑 (set up by Li Yuan). L  i Mi 李密 with the largest rebel force (the Wagang Army 瓦崗軍) active near Luoyang. Daxingcheng taken by Li Yuan 李淵 who rebelled in Jinyang 晉陽 (southwest of Taiyuan, Shanxi). Wang Shichong 王世充 sent by Emperor Yang from Jiangdu to Luoyang. R  eign of Yang Tong 楊侗 (set up by the warlord Wang Shichong 王世充) in Luoyang. Emperor Yang killed. The Sui falls. Tang dynasty at Chang’an Li Yuan (Gaozu 高祖; r. 618–626) founds the Tang dynasty. T  he war of unification, in which the Tang forces under Prince Li Shimin 李世民 and others defeat a number of warlords in North and South. The zu yong diao 租庸調 tax system is implemented. The Xuanwumen 玄武門 incident, in which Li Shimin (Taizong 太宗; r. ­626–649) seizes power. The Zhenguan 貞觀 reign, a period of prosperity. Eastern Tujue conquered. Gaochang 高昌 (Turfan, Xinjiang) conquered. Princess Wencheng 文成 married to King Srong-brtsan-sgam-po of Tubo. Taizong leads an unsuccessful campaign against Koguryŏ. Wang Xuance 王玄策 captures the king of Kanauj in India. Taizong dies, succeeded by Gaozong 高宗. Western Tujue (early 658) defeated. Paekche vanquished. Wu Zetian becomes the de facto ruler (early 665). Koguryŏ conquered. Later Tujue arises. Gaozong dies, succeeded first by Zhongzong 中宗, Ruizong 睿宗 (684), then by Wu Zetian who starts ruling in her own right. Zhou dynasty under Wu Zetian at Luoyang. Wu Zetian declared herself “emperor” (empress regnant) of the Zhou dynasty. Wu Zetian is dethroned, and dies (706) not long afterward; Tang rule restored. Ruizong’s son and Gaozong’s grandson Li Longji  李隆基 (Xuanzong 玄宗; r. 712–756) assumes the throne. The Kaiyuan 開元 reign period, the height of the Tang dynasty. The Tianbao 天寶 reign period, in which prosperity continues but things go wrong eventually. Tang forces defeated by the Arabs at Talas and Tang influence in Central Asia wanes. The An Lushan 安祿山 rebellion.

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756 757 763 780 780–785 806–819

Luoyang and Chang’an fall to rebels. An Lushan assassinated, but rebellion continues under subordinates. An Lushan rebellion ends. Sack of Chang’an by Tubo forces. Double Tax System implemented under Dezong 德宗 (779–805). M  ilitary governors (commissioners) rise against Tang Dezong. T  ang Xianzong 憲 宗 (r. 805–820) restores authority over most of the North China Plain. The origins of the factional struggle between Li Deyu 李德裕 and Niu Sengru 821 牛僧儒 that plagues the court until the late 840s. The Tang-Bo huimeng bei 唐蕃會盟碑 (Stele of the Tang-Tubo alliance) set up in 823 Lhasa. The Sweet Dew (Ganlu 甘露) incident, in which a failed attempt is made to 835 eliminate the eunuchs by Wenzong 文宗 (r. 826–840). W  uzong 武宗 (r. 840–846) placed on the throne by the eunuchs. Uighur goes 840 into decline in the aftermath of a civil war. 842 Tubo begins to decline after the death of Dharma 達磨. 842–846 Suppression of Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, and especially Buddhism under Wuzong. 848–861 Z  hang Yichao 張義潮 rebels against the Tubo and expels them from Gansu, east Xinjiang, and Qinghai (mostly in 651). 868–869 The Pang Xun 龐勛 rebellion. 874 The Wang Xianzhi 王仙芝 rebellion. 878 Wang Xianzhi dies, and Huang Chao 黃巢 takes over his forces. 878–884 Huang Chao rebellion rages across the empire. 883–912 Z  hu Wen 朱溫 (military commissioner in 883), an increasingly important force, but challenged by other military commissioners, especially Li Keyong 李克用, a Shatuo Turk. 886–903  The eunuchs exercise a great influence on the throne, but are challenged by the military commissioners. 902–937 Wu 吳 (one of the Ten States) 903 The court eunuchs are killed off by Zhu Wen. 904 Zhaozong 昭宗 (r. 888–904) killed in Luoyang by Zhu Wen. 907 Zhu Wen forces Tang abdication, declaring himself emperor of the Later Liang. 907–979 Five Dynasties and Ten States 907–923 Later Liang at Kaifeng 開封 (in Henan) 907–925 Former Shu 前蜀 907–951 Chu 楚  907–978 Wuyue 吳越 909–945 Min  閩 917–971 Southern Han 南漢 923–936 Later Tang with capital at Luoyang (from 924) 924–963 Jingnan 荊南 925 Later Tang conquers Former Shu (in Sichuan). 934–965 Later Shu 936–947 L ater Jin dynasty with Khitan-supported Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 as emperor. Shi and Khitan conquer Later Tang. 937–975 Southern Tang

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945 Southern Tang conquers Min. 947–951  L ater Han at Kaifeng. Founder Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 assumed the throne at ­Taiyuan first. 947 Later Jin falls under attack by Khitan (early 947). Khitan renamed Liao. Liao troops plunder Central Plains cities. 951–960 Later Zhou dynasty at Kaifeng. Southern Tang annexes Chu. 951–979 Northern Han  954 Battle of Gaoping 高平 at which the Later Zhou trounced the joint forces of the Northern Han and Liao (Khitan). 960 Northern Song replaces Later Zhou 963 Jingnan conquered by Song. 965 Later Shu conquered by Song. 971 Southern Han conquered by Song. 975 Southern Tang conquered by Song. 978 Wuyue conquered by Song. 979 Northern Han conquered by Song.

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7 The Sui dynasty Victor Cunrui Xiong

The Sui was a pivotal period in Chinese history that marked the transition from division to reunification. It lasted only two reigns for a total of 37 years, during 29 of which China was united. Still, it laid the groundwork for the success of the brilliant Tang dynasty that followed. The rise of the Sui had as much to do with a confluence of historical forces—political, military, geographic, demographic, and others—as with a select few key decision-makers who changed the course of history through their action (Map 7.1).

Map 7.1  The Sui Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 5, 3–4.)

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The emperors and top leaders Of the great historical figures of the late sixth century, none was more influential than Emperor Wen 文 (né Yang Jian 楊堅) (541–604) in changing the course of history. Born into one of the most prominent families of the North, he became the Duke of Sui through inheritance at the time of his father’s death in 568. As a commanding officer, he followed the Northern Zhou Emperor Wu 武 (Yuwen Yong 宇文邕) on the military campaign that conquered the Northern Qi to the east and unified the entire North in 577. Taking advantage of the incompetence of Emperor Wu’s successors, he usurped power to found his own Sui dynasty (581). On his way to the throne, Emperor Wen squelched rebellions against him organized by Northern Zhou loyalists such as Yuchi Jiong 尉遲迥 (in Hebei) and Wang Qian 王謙 (in Sichuan). As emperor, he was immediately faced with a fragmented political landscape, with the Tujue 突厥to the north and northwest, the Chen to the south, and the Later Liang on the middle Yangzi. In economic and demographic terms, his state of Sui was only the primus inter pares. With vision, strategy, and forceful leadership, he pacified the Tujue and annexed the Later Liang (traditionally a client state of the Northern Zhou). By conquering the Chen in 589, he accomplished the dream of reunification that had eluded dynastic rulers for more than 200 years. But his effort to exercise hegemonic power in the Manchuria and Korea in 598 proved unsuccessful. Domestically, he pursued policies that contributed to political stability, rising prosperity, and population growth. He reformed the cumbersome system of three-level local administration and reorganized the central government consisting mainly of the ­Departments (sheng 省), Boards (bu 部), and Courts (si 寺). He enhanced the garrison militia ( fubing 府兵) and the equal-field ( juntian 均田) systems adopted by previous regimes. They helped strengthen the military and the economy. He went out of his way to promote Buddhism, making it possible for it to recover from the devastation inflicted by Emperor Wu, and to become the most prominent religion under the Sui. He undertook a number of costly public works projects, including the building of the new capital, Daxingcheng 大興城 (Xi’an, Shaanxi), and the Renshou Palace 仁壽宮 to the west, and the digging of the Guangtong Canal 廣通渠 that linked the capital to the Yellow River. To guarantee the safe transfer power to the next generation, he selected his eldest son Yang Yong 楊勇 as crown prince, and posted Yang Yong’s four brothers to the provinces with extensive civil and military power. Eventually, overcome with suspicion, he replaced Yang Yong with his second son Yang Guang 楊廣 (Emperor Yang 煬) as heir. That, it turned out, was a fatal mistake that led to his own death by the hand of one of Yang Guang’s minions. Following the patricidal regicide, the overambitious Emperor Yang (né Yang Guang) ascended the throne in 604. Unimpressed with his father’s military misadventure against the Koguryǒ, he launched three wars against them. While it was true that he continued his father’s pro-Buddhist policy, he did not extend the same preferential treatment to the Buddhist clergy. Although his Eastern Capital at Luoyang was smaller than his father’s Daxingcheng, it was more extravagantly built. And his Grand Canal, a waterway system consisting of three long sections that linked North and South, was many times more extensive and costly than Emperor Wen’s Guangtong Canal. Along the Grand Canal and in key strategic points he added dozens of secondary and touring palaces. Similar projects by his father paled by comparison. While both father and son built sections of the Great Wall on the northern frontier, Emperor Yang mobilized a far larger labor force: in excess of a million. Apparently, in carrying out these moves, Emperor Yang defied parental authority or deliberately challenged his father’s 116

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accomplishments, which was probably a delayed response to his father’s draconian parenting. Indeed, under his father’s watchful eyes, he had been forced to constantly put on his best behavior. With his father’s death, he acted out his repressed impulses, often to excess, which eventually brought about his own downfall. Among the nonroyal top leaders who helped Emperor Wen seize and consolidate power, none was more important than Gao Jiong. He cast his lot with Yang Jian (Emperor Wen) before the latter founded the Sui dynasty, and was instrumental in the suppression of the Yuchi Jiong rebellion. Upon ascending the throne in 581, Emperor Wen appointed Gao Jiong to head the bureaucracy as chief minister. From then until 599, Gao Jiong was closely involved in carrying out some of the most crucial decisions for the court, including the building of the first capital Daxingcheng and the war against the Chen in the South. He was also responsible for recommending some of the most capable military and civil leaders to the court: Sui Wei, Yang Su, Heruo Bi, and Han Qinhu 韓擒虎. With an unconditional trust in him, Emperor Wen allowed his eldest son, the crown prince, to marry Gao’s daughter. But toward the end of the sixth century, Gao’s luck ran out after he incurred the displeasure of Empress Dugu 獨孤(Emperor Wen’s wife), who was not only the mother of Emperor Wen’s five sons, but also an influential voice on her husband and his policy. With the empress moving against him, Gao Jiong was dismissed from office, and Crown Prince Yang Yong was replaced with his younger brother Yang Guang (Emperor Yang). Gao Jiong survived Emperor Wen’s death to be reinstalled as president of the Court for State Ceremonies (­taichang qing 太常卿). But before long, Emperor Yang, upon hearing his critical remarks on the court, had him executed for libel, together with two other top officials of the previous reign, ­Yuwen Bi 宇文㢸 (a Board president) and Heruo Bi 賀若弼 (a top general) in 607. Next to Gao Jiong in power and prestige was Yang Su 楊素, another nonroyal top leader. Although a chief minister himself, he was better known as a soldier. He had established his reputation as a great general under the Northern Zhou. Under Emperor Wen of the Sui, he played a vital role in winning the war against the Chen in 589 and was essential in crushing the Southern rebellion against Sui rule. He went on to trounce the mighty Western and Eastern Tujue 突厥. After the fall of Gao Jiong, he took his place as the leader of the bureaucracy and had a hand in replacing Crown Prince Yang Yong with Yang Guang (Emperor Yang). Under Emperor Yang, he was even given the most powerful post, president of the Department of State Affairs (shangshu ling 尚書令). But Emperor Yang, who felt increasingly threatened by him and his extensive clan, soon took steps to limit his power. And Yang Su died not long afterward after he had stopped taking medication for a debilitating disease he was suffering from. The third influential top leader was Su Wei 蘇威. A talented administrator, he was appointed to chief ministerial posts early in Emperor Wen’s reign. Although he was the only top leader of the first reign who continued to serve in the inner circle of Emperor Yang and survived him, his lack of tack often placed him in disfavor. Less powerful than Gao Jiong and Yang Su, he was never considered a real threat to the throne. So oftentimes he was restored to power not long after his disgrace. However, his unsavory advice to Emperor Yang in 607 led to his permanent dismissal.

Political institutions During the first reign, Emperor Wen of the Sui undertook a thorough overhaul of the political institutions in an effort to counteract the archaic reform introduced under the previous Northern Zhou. At the center, the Five Departments were designated as the top echelon of the government. Of these, three, namely, the Department of State Affairs (shangshu sheng 尚書省), the 117

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Secretariat (neishi sheng 內史省, or zhongshu sheng 中書省 under the Tang), and the Chancellery (menxia sheng 門下省), were the top decision-making bodies. Of these, the Department of State Affairs with its Six Boards (liubu 六部), each headed by a Board president (shangshu 尚書), was by far the most important. So much so that the presidency of the Department (shangshu ling 尚書令) was essentially left vacant (except for a brief period when it was filled by Yang Su). Two vice presidents (puye 僕射) served as its actual co-presidents. The puye and the heads of the other two Departments were by default the chief ministers (xiang 相), who were the most powerful decision-makers, whose advice the emperor relied upon. The remaining two of the Five Departments, namely, the Palace Library (mishu sheng 秘書省) and Palace Administration (diannei sheng 殿內省), in spite of their high status, were much less powerful—responsible, among other things, for the compilation of historical and academic works and the management of palace affairs. Ranking lower than the Departments were the 11 Courts (si 寺) headed by their chamberlains (qing 卿) with functions often parallel to those of the Six Boards. The surveillance arm of the government consisted of the Censorate (yushi tai 御史台; lit., the Terrace of Censors). In local administration, Emperor Wen attempted to undo the situation of the previous age, where “for every 10 sheep there are nine shepherds,” by eliminating the mid-level administration called jun 郡 (commandery) so that only two levels of local government remained: zhou 州 (prefecture) and xian 縣 (county). Emperor Yang made a few important changes to the administrative structure he inherited from his father. He converted two of the 11 Courts to Inspectorates ( jian 監). The remaining Nine Courts, although matching the Nine Chamberlains ( jiuqiu 九卿) of Qin-Han times in number, were made much less powerful. Emperor Yang demoted all but one of the heads of the Nine Courts to a rank lower than the presidents of the Six Boards, while boosting the power of the Boards’ other top leaders. All this pointed to a bureaucratic subornation of the Courts to the Boards, a practice that would continue under the Tang. While Emperor Yang did not bother to tinker with the all-important Three Departments, he abused a previous administrative practice by appointing de facto chief ministers as the only true power-holders at court. And that seriously weakened the power of the top echelon of the central government. Normally, de facto chief ministers were of much lower status than the traditionally appointed chief ministers, and were much less likely to oppose the emperor’s decisions. To the Censorate (Terrace of Censors), Emperor Yang added two more Terraces to create the Three Terraces, which was in keeping with an age-old tradition. However, they did not necessarily add to the power of the surveillance arm of the central government. In local administration, Emperor Yang renamed the top local government, zhou (prefecture), as jun (commandery); he abolished a large number of commandery and county governments, and created a large number of new ones. But the two-level structure of the previous reign remained intact. The Sui military readopted the fubing 府兵 (garrison militia) system of the previous age. Under Emperor Wen, it consisted of the Twelve Garrison Commands ( fu 府), which constituted the main fighting force for the central government. Each Garrison Command was headed by a general-in-chief (da jiangjun 大將軍) (rank 3a). Fubing troops were responsible for their own equipment and were called to duty on a rotational basis. The fubing garrisons were stationed in and around the capital and other strategic areas. Emperor Yang created a system of the Sixteen Garrison Commands, 12 of which were fubing commands, also known as the Twelve Guards (shi’er wei 十二衛). The remaining four non-fubing garrison commands were in charge of palace security. 118

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During the first reign, local military forces were under the control of area commands (zongguan 總管) under area commanders (also called zongguan). Each zongguan was in charge of a number of prefectures. Emperor Wen grouped the zongguan into four gigantic superior area commands (da zongguan 大總管), each of which was led by a superior area commander (also called da zongguan), and put his sons in charge most of them. During the second reign, Emperor Yang abolished the zongguan system altogether.

Religion Subjects of the Sui dynasty were familiar with the Three Teachings (sanjiao 三教)—­ Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism—three belief systems that rivaled and complemented one another. While the term sanjiao can also be translated as “three religions,” strictly speaking, Confucianism was primarily a code of ethics, rather than a religion, even though Confucian state ritual had strong religious elements. On the other hand, Buddhism and Daoism, one imported and the other indigenous, were bona fide religions that had come of age.

Daoism During the Sui, Daoism experienced sustained growth. Two Daoist schools, Louguan in the North and Shangqing in the South, were great beneficiaries of this growth. The Louguan school had a mysterious beginning. Allegedly, it started with Yin Xi 尹 喜, the Eastern Zhou petty official who built a multistory belvedere (louguan 樓觀) to watch stars and auras in the Zhongnan Mountains 終南山 south of Xi’an. That, it was believed, marked the founding of the Louguan school. But, in reality, Louguan did not have a significant beginning until the Northern Dynasties. It was not until the Northern Zhou that it came into its own. Under Emperor Wen of the Sui, in the new capital Daxingcheng, two religious institutions, one Buddhist and one Daoist, were set up south of the Imperial City as the national centers of the two religions. Wang Yan 王延, the leading proponent of the Louguan school, was appointed to head the Daoist institution, the Xuandu Abbey 玄都觀. That showed the high status Louguan enjoyed at the Sui court. The religious focus of this school was on the Daode jing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and virtue) because of the special connection it had with the classic itself. Allegedly, it was Yin Xi, the first Louguan patriarch, who received the first copy of the Daode jing from Master Lao 老 子 himself. In addition, it embraced the claim that Master Lao and Yin Xi had made a trip to India to convert the barbarians. The claim was found in a group of controversial, apocryphal works, especially one entitled Huahu jing 化胡經 (Classic of the conversion of the barbarians). As the most prominent Daoist school in the South, Shangqing 上清 was particularly favored by Emperor Yang. It was also known as the Maoshan 茅山 school, because its early practitioners were based in Maoshan (Mt. Mao), southeast of Jurong, Jiangsu. Its scriptures consist of revelations from the Perfected (for example, the Zhengao 真誥 [Declarations of the Perfected]). It worshiped Yuanshi Tianzun 元始天尊 (Celestial Venerable of Primordial Beginning) above other divinities. Through the work of Wang Yuanzhi 王遠知, his successors Pan Shizheng 潘師正 and Sima Chengzhen 司馬承禎, and others, Shangqing was to become the dominant Daoist school in the Early Tang. The Sui emperors, although devout believers in Buddhism, patronized Daoism. Emperor Wen sponsored the building of 36 Daoist abbeys in and around Daxingcheng the capital. In the principle hall of the Palace City inside the capital, Emperor Wen, of his own volition, went through a quasi-ordination ceremony presided over by Wang Yan himself. 119

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Emperor Yang, for his part, built 24 Daoist abbeys in the Eastern Capital Luoyang. Holding the Shangqing patriarch Wang Yuanzhi in high esteem, Emperor Yang went through a ritual ceremony to become Wang’s disciple. One of the main reasons for this royal patronage was the magical powers associated with the religion. Emperor Wen sought help and protection from Daoist ritual when he fought the pro-Northern Zhou loyalist Wang Qian. Emperor Yang set aside an entire neighborhood in Luoyang to settle occultists of Daoist and other traditions, which was appropriately named Daoshu fang 道術坊 (Ward of Daoist Techniques).

Buddhism Far more popular than Daoism, Buddhism in Sui times was, beyond a shadow of a doubt, the dominant, de facto state religion. Emperor Wen himself was born in a Buddhist convent and brought up by a nun. When Northern Zhou Emperor Wu launched the anti-Buddhist proscription campaign nationwide, Emperor Wen, at great risk to his career and himself, took her under his wing. As soon as he seized control of power, Emperor Wen took steps to promote the revival of the religion that had been underway. In fact, no sovereign in Chinese history came close to the record he set in patronizing Buddhism in terms of the number of monasteries built (3,792) and the number of ordinations (230,000) made during his reign. Inside the capital, he had the only Buddhist national monastery, Daxingshan Monastery 大興善寺, built, which was the Buddhist counterpart of the Xuandu Abbey. Following an age-old tradition, Emperor Wen set up a national office headed by a datong 大統 (controller-in-chief ) to take charge of Buddhist affairs. Appointees to the post, always prominent members of the clergy, functioned like archbishops in Catholic Church, whose responsibility it was to spread and protect the religion. While still the Prince of Jin 晉王 based in the southern city of Jiangdu 江都 ­( Yangzhou, Jiangsu), Emperor Yang (Yang Guang) set up and patronized the Huiri Monastery 慧日寺, which would become the center of Buddhist learning in the South. As crown prince, he founded monasteries inside the capital Daxingcheng, including the Riyan Monastery 日嚴寺, where he settled monks he brought from Huiri, and the Dachanding Monastery 大禪定寺, one of the two largest in the city located in its southwest corner. Near the ­Palace City of the capital, he had four religious centers set up, known as the four Places of ­E nlightenment (daochang 道場), two Buddhist and two Daoist, which apparently served as accessible venues for his religious services. In the Eastern Capital Luoyang, another Huiri Monastery was set up inside the palace, known as the “palace monastery” or “interior place of enlightenment” (nei daochang 內道場), which must have served the same purpose. Emperor Yang patronized a number of famous Buddhist monks, and cultivated close ties with some of them, particularly Zhiyi 智顗, the greatest Buddhist master in the South and the founder of the Tiantai 天臺 sect of Buddhism. He sponsored the translation of Buddhist works and founded an Institute for Sutra Translation in Luoyang. In addition, he showed an intensive interest in occult practices associated with Buddhism. In Luoyang’s Huiri Monastery alone, he kept and supported over 2,000 Buddhist occultists. However, in spite of his strong religious conviction, Emperor Yang took measures to control the clergy and carried out a major campaign to reduce the number of Buddhist monasteries in and around the capital. During the Sui, no great Buddhist sects came to the fore except for two: the Three Stages (Sanjie jiao 三階教) and Tiantai. The former with its millennial and apocalyptic messages 120

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was not to the liking of the Powers That Be and was eventually suppressed by Emperor Wen. The latter supported by Emperor Yang flourished and blossomed into a great religious sect under the Tang.

History and literature We know little of Sui historians, because of none of their works survive. At least two of them deserve to be mentioned: Niu Hong 牛弘 and Wang Shao 王劭 (zi Junmao 君懋). Niu Hong was the foremost ritual scholar and president of the Board of Rites. His now-lost History of the [Northern] Zhou (Zhoushi 周史) was the basis for the Book of the [Northern] Zhou (Zhoushu 周書). Since Niu strove to imitate the ancients in style, he probably put in the mouths of his characters, some of whom were poorly educated, too many elegant phrases. Niu’s contemporary Wang Shao wrote the Qizhi 齊志 (Treatises on the [Northern] Qi) and the Suishu 隋書 (Book of the Sui). They were condemned by contemporaries for being “vulgar,” since they were full of colloquialisms, slang, and vulgarities current in the North. But that was precisely the author’s intention. The Sui created a vibrant literary tradition that helped lay the groundwork for the advent of Tang literature. When the Sui dynasty was founded in 581, it was essentially the inheritor to two traditions: Northern and Southern. During the previous age of division, the North had had to constantly come to grips with the cultural dominance of the South. The literature of the pre-Sui South was distinguished from other ages in style and content. Stylistically, Southern litterateurs came to adopt parallelism in prose and poetry and tended to write in a flowery language, which could become ornate or turgid. In content, they seemed to be enamored of the effete, and the sensual, with a sensibility that borders on the “decadent.” Under the influence of the South, Northern writers often wrote in parallel (pianwen 駢文) style as well. However, they wrote few rhapsodies ( fu 賦) and more political essays. There was little interest in the observation of things and the expression of sentimentalism. In poetry, Northerners, where they were different from the Southerners, tended to be expansive, masculine, simple, and less burdened by an ornate vocabulary. That tradition continued under the Sui in the hands of such writers as the historian Niu Hong, whose historical writing was essentially in non-parallel prose. His fellow historian Wang Shao, on the other hand, cultivated a unique style that was not only removed from Southern parallelism but also noted for its emphasis on realism. The first great Sui poet of Northern extraction was Lu Sidao 盧思道 (535–586), who spent his most productive life under the Northern Qi. Although his best-known poem “The Song of a Soldier” (Congjun xing 從軍行) is about a woman pining for her husband in the army, it gives much coverage to northern landscape, frontier sceneries, and military life. Somewhat younger than Lu Sidao, but living a much longer life, was Xue Daoheng 薛道衡 (540–609). His fame as the greatest Sui poet rests on a number of poems on different themes, ranging from frontier life, poetic dialogue, his personal experience as attendant of the emperor, to sentimentalism. The best-known of them is the “Xixi yan 昔昔鹽” (Nocturnal song), a melancholy love poem from the perspective of a woman separated from her husband. Xue was eventually killed for his unsavory remarks on Emperor Yang’s reign. The order to end his life was given by Emperor Yang, who resented Xue out of literary jealousy. But Emperor Yang himself was a formidable literary figure. Exposed to much Southern influence through his wife, his own experience in the South, and his mentor Liu Bian 柳䛒, he wrote palace-style poems with great skills. However, some of his works are distinguished by a grandiose vision and a sense of august majesty, and his stylistic simplicity evokes a Northern literary heritage. 121

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The last great poet of the Sui was Yang Su, known mainly for his successful military career. His poetry stands apart from that of the palace style of the South, a style that, with its effete themes and florid phraseology, was all the rage in Sui times. Instead, it is characterized by a fusion of passionate emotionalism, expansiveness, and expressive vigor that heralded the arrival the poetic greats of the Early Tang.

Foreign relations As Emperor Wen was founding his Sui dynasty, a powerful nomadic power posed an immediate threat to its existence. This was the Eastern Tujue (Turkic) qaghanate that stretched from Manchuria across the Mongolian steppe to Turkistan. Previously, both the Northern Qi and the Northern Zhou had held the mighty Tujue in awe. The Northern Zhou even married off Princess Qianjin 千金公主 (Emperor Xuan’s cousin) to the Tujue qaghan Tuobo 佗鉢. Tuobo soon died, and Qianjin eventually married his successor Shabolue 沙鉢略, following the practice of levirate (580). At the urging of Qianjin, Shabolue launched a massive invasion against the Sui, which had overthrown the Northern Zhou (582); however, it soon fell apart because of effective Sui resistance and internal strife among the Tujue. Throughout his reign, Emperor Wen was able to soften the Tujue challenge by playing off one qaghan against another. This allowed him to shift attention to the South. In 587, Emperor Wen sent an army to occupy the middle-Yangzi kingdom of Later ­Liang, which paved the way for his next strategic move, the war against the Chen based in the lower Yangzi. A propaganda campaign was carried out to vilify the Chen sovereign (Chen ­Shubao 陳叔寶), and his regime before the Southern Expedition, led by Emperor Yang (Yang Guang) and Gao Jiong, was launched. It soon crushed Chen resistance and reunified China proper in 589. The conquest of the South by the Sui signified its rise as a hegemonic power. Soon it found itself on a collision course with Koguryǒ, a rising power in the northeast and in Korea. When the Koguryǒ king refused to follow Emperor Wen’s orders not to infringe upon his neighbors and intruded into Sui territory, Emperor Wen launched a full-scale war. But his fleet was practically wiped out by storm and his land forces made little headway because of disease. So Emperor Wen called a stop to the operation. Instead of starting another war, he was sensible enough to accept a face-saving apology from the Koguryǒ king. Throughout his reign, Emperor Wen pursued a foreign policy that aimed to support his long-term goal of reunification and pacifying the northern borders. After the ill-fated expedition against Koguryǒ, he scarcely ventured beyond the realm. Emperor Yang, however, had much more ambitious foreign policy objectives. He dispatched a military force on a predatory expedition against Linyi 林邑 in central Vietnam in early 605, and invaded northern neighbors beyond the realm: Tuyuhun 吐谷渾 (in ­Qinghai and east Xinjiang) and Yiwu 伊吾 (Hami, east Xinjiang) in 609, and Koguryǒ in 612, 613, and 614. He sent his men to far-off places: three missions to Liuqiu 流求 (Taiwan?) ­(607–610), a mission led by Chang Jun 常駿 to Chitu 赤土 in the Malay Peninsula (608), and a mission led by Pei Shiqing 裴世清 to Yamato 倭 ( Japan) (608). Lying to the west of China proper was the Western Regions (Xiyu 西域), a vast area which, in a narrow sense, encompassed Xinjiang. The most influential person in formulating and executing Emperor Yang’s aggressive Xiyu policy was Pei Ju 裴矩, who had a vision for the Sui empire to dominate the northwest, Central Asia, and beyond. Guided by this vision, the Sui army conquered both Tuyuhun and Yiwu (608), while Gaochang 高昌 (in Turfan, Xinjiang), the most important oasis state, was pressured to accept the Sui’s dominance. 122

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Under Emperor Yang, relations with the Tujue underwent noticeable changes. Of the three Tujue qaghanates—the Eastern, the Abo branch of the Eastern Tujue, and the ­Western—the Abo branch came to an end when its last qaghan, Chuluo 處羅, submitted to the Sui (611). Although Chuluo’s rival in the Western Regions, Shegui 射匱, qaghan of the Western Tujue, dominated the area, he remained on friendly terms with the Sui. Qimin 啟民 qaghan of the Eastern Tujue owed his rise to the Sui, so he was loyal to Emperor Yang until his death in 611. But Pei Ju’s dishonest schemes against the Eastern Tujue eventually backfired, and Qimin’s successor was to become an implacable foe. Before the relations with the Eastern Tujue soured, Emperor Yang was preparing for a large-scale invasion of Koguryǒ, more out of a desire to excel his father than to avenge his defeat. In a span of three years, he fought three wars against the northeastern neighbor. In the first war (612), he mobilized an armed force in excess of 1.1 million, but it ended ignominiously after the Sui main force suffered devastating defeats on the Sa River. In the second war (613), Emperor Yang went to the front to direct military operations in person. But he was forced to end the campaign prematurely when one of his top officials, Yang Xuangan 楊玄感 (Yang Su’s son), rebelled in the Central Plains. In the following year (614), he started his third war. After he made some initial progress, the Koguryǒ king sued for peace. And Emperor Yang soon pulled back his invading army. By then “all under heaven” was embroiled in rebellion.

Economy Population and urban centers For most of its 37 years, the Sui period saw a steady rise in population. It is necessary to point out that the population figures provided by the sources are those of registered subjects. They may undercount total populations by as much as one-quarter to one-third. When the Sui was founded in 581, its population is estimated to be slightly under 33 million. It grew to approximately 38 million after the annexation of the Chen in 589, and peaked at over 46 million in 609. Thereafter, it began to decline precipitously. By the ­Zhenguan period of the Early Tang (627–649), the population was estimated at 15 million, which indicates a population loss of close to 70% in a few decades. Apparently, the decline was caused by the socioeconomic upheaval that started in the last years of the Sui dynasty and continued into the first few years of the Tang. Although most of the population lived in the countryside, there were a number of large cities. The greatest of them were Daxingcheng and Luoyang, two world-class cities. Da­x ingcheng (Xi’an, Shaanxi) in Guanzhong 關中 was the capital built from scratch in 582–583, with an urban area of 84 km 2 and a population well over half a million. In the north-central part of the city were located its enclosed palace and administrative areas, and to the south were the two enclosed markets. The rest of the city was divided up into closed neighborhoods called fang 坊 or li 里 (wards) on a gridiron plan. The first part of Luoyang (Luoyang, Henan), the Eastern Capital, was built in the Central Plains in 605–606. It included the enclosed palace and administrative area in the northeast corner and the area to the east north of the Luo River. Only later was the vast area south of the river developed. When the city was finally completed, it had a walled area of 47 km 2. Its population too exceeded half a million. It had three enclosed markets and more than 100 wards, usually smaller than their Daxingcheng counterparts. Both Daxingcheng and Luoyang were the national political, economic, religious, and cultural centers. Throughout the Sui, Daxingcheng, where the imperial Ancestral Temple 123

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was located, served as the principal capital. But Luoyang assumed greater importance during the second reign because Emperor Yang made it his preferred domicile. Toward the last years of his reign, Yangidi shifted his focus to Jiangdu 江都 (Yangzhou, Jiangsu), the most important urban center in the South, which became his de facto capital from 616 until his death in 618.

The land tenure and taxation systems The dominant Sui land tenure system was that of juntian 均田 or “equal field.” When it was first implemented under Emperor Xiaowen 孝文 of the Northern Wei, the Tuoba state was transitioning from a nomadic to an agrarian economy. The new system was intended to accommodate that change. In the subsequent Northern Dynasties, the system continued to be used. Under the Sui, new junitan statutes were promulgated as early as 582. Essentially, two types of land grants (yongye tian 永業田 [inheritable lands] and lutian 露田 [open fields]) were allotted to adult male and female recipients. Inheritable lands were not subject to return. Open fields, however, were returnable when one reached 60 (59) and became “elderly” (lao 老). The Sui added a new population category, zhongnan 中男 (adolescent male), with a legal age range of 11–17 (later the upper limit of this group was extended first to 20, then to 21). That would afford a significant economic advantage to households with adolescent males, because they were not liable for taxation or corvée duties. A juntian household paid a fixed amount of grain (millet or rice) and textile (silk or hemp) as taxes each year. Even though recipients of juntian land were very rarely granted the maximum share of land as stipulated in the statutes, their taxes were by no means heavy. The real crushing burden was the demand for corvée duties. While the standard period of corvée labor was 30 or 20 days, it was frequently ignored as the emperor imposed ad hoc corvée assignments. Assignments like these were not light under Emperor Wen, and became increasingly oppressive under Emperor Yang as he pursued public works projects of extraordinary magnitude, including those of Luoyang, the Great Wall, the Grand Canal, and the palaces.

Money The monetary system had been in disarray following the fall of the Eastern Han. Briefly, under the Cao-Wei, bronze coins were withdrawn from circulation. Grains and textiles functioned as commodity monies. Throughout the early medieval period, coins played a much more diminished role in the economy compared with the Eastern Han dynasty. At the beginning of the Sui, a variety of coins of Northern Zhou and Northern Qi mintage were in circulation. Under Emperor Wen, with the issuance of the Sui wuzhu 五銖 coin, the coinage was finally unified. However, under Emperor Yang, especially during his last years, coin debasement became widespread as commodity prices soared in a runaway inflation.

Rebellion In 609, not long after Emperor Yang succeeded his father as emperor, the Sui empire reached the pinnacle of its power. With a registered population in excess of 46 million, it was more populous than ever since the fall of the Eastern Han dynasty. Its Grand Canal, running from Hangzhou, Zhejiang, in the South, to Beijing in the North, provided a vital transportation link between the Yellow and Yangzi River valleys for the first time in history. 124

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Within two years, however, ominous signs began to emerge. The first major anti-­ government rebellion led by Wang Bo 王薄 broke out in Shandong, just as preparations for Emperor Yang’s first war against Koguryǒ were underway. As the fire of rebellion spread, more and more rebel groups made their appearance. While Emperor Yang was still fighting his second war against Koguryǒ in 613, the Yang Xuangan 楊玄感 rebellion, one of extraordinary scale, erupted in the Central Plains. Although the rebellion itself was soon suppressed, other rebellions of vast magnitude soon sprang up in both North and South. Toward the end of Emperor Yang’s reign, China was engulfed in a total civil war of warlords fighting against one another as well as the Sui court. By 617, Emperor Yang had moved the court to Jiangdu in the middle Yangzi valley. In the North, Luoyang was in imminent danger when Li Mi 李密, leading the mightiest rebel force in the realm, the Wagang Army 瓦崗軍 (which he claimed to be one million strong), captured the Luokou Granary 洛口倉, the lifeline of Luoyang. Emperor Yang dispatched his most trusted general in Jiangdu, Wang Shichong 王世充, with a rescue army, to Luoyang, in an attempt to prevent the fall of the city. Wang’s arrival complicated the situation in the North, where there were already more than half a dozen powerful warlords with their own numerous armies, including Dou Jiande 竇建德 in Hebei, Li Yuan 李淵 in Daxingcheng, and Liu Wuzhou 劉武周 in north Shanxi, Xue Ju 薛舉 in west Shaanxi, and Liang Shidu 梁師都 in north Shaanxi. In addition, there was Tujue in Mongolia, ready to lend its might to any rebel forces that would do its bidding. The Yangzi valley was divided up by such warlords as Xiao Xian 蕭銑, Du Fuwei 杜伏威, and Li Zitong 李子通. While Emperor Yang’s court in Jiangdu was not immediately threatened by rebel attacks, the departure of Wang Shichong had compromised the security of the palace. In early 618, Yuwen Huaji 宇文化及, a general of the Sui palace security forces, started a coup in which Emperor Yang was killed. Thereupon, the Sui empire fell. What were the causes of the turmoil that led to the collapse of the Sui empire? First, Emperor Yang’s abuse of the labor force for horrendously costly projects ruined the lives of his subjects by the millions; second, the incessant warfare he waged against Koguryǒ with massive casualties drove the laboring masses further into despair; third, in times of turmoil, he chose first Luoyang, then Jiangdu, as his base, abandoning the much more defensible Guanzhong; fourth, he surrounded himself with sycophants, who kept him in the dark about the seriousness of the situation until it was too late.

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8 The Tang dynasty I (618–756) SEO Tatsihiko Translated by Victor Cunrui Xiong

The political character of “Tang” The first thing we should notice about the Tang dynasty that arose in North China and lasted from the early seventh to the early 10th centuries is the political character of its name. By adopting the designation “Tang,” its rulers purported to make its existence orthodox and permanent. “Tang” (or Li-Tang) as a dynastic name derived from the noble title of Li Yuan 李淵 (r. 618–626), who had been named the “state duke of Tang” during the Sui. The name gave a sense of orthodoxy to the new dynasty on the basis of the Confucian concept of dynastic change. While subjected to enormous internal and external pressure, the self-styled Tang regime continually enhanced this aura of orthodoxy, which dissipated with the founding of the Zhou dynasty (690–705) under Wu Zetian 武則天, which broke the continuity of the Tang regime. The founding of the Tang by Li Yuan took place amidst a large-scale war that broke out at the end of the Sui and embroiled all of China. In 618, the territory directly under Tang control was confined to the Guanzhong area with Chang’an at its center. It was a period when more than 40 separatist regimes existed. In 17 of them, the leader adopted his own reign title and declared himself emperor. Under these circumstances, the Lis, the creators of the Tang, owed their eventual success not so much to inevitability as to good fortune. One key factor for success was their bloodless conquest of the Sui capital Daxingcheng 大興城 (Xi’an, Shaanxi; later called Chang’an) ahead of all others. By setting up their capital in this city built by Emperor Wen of the Sui, the Tang would have an easier time laying claim to the legitimacy of their dynasty than their rivals based in Luoyang and other cities, and would become direct inheritors to Sui civilization and its institutions. Notable among the key factors for the successful founding of the Tang was the support by a group of Sino-Xianbei noble warlords to which Li Yuan belonged and by the powerful Daoist and Buddhist churches. In addition, there was cooperation with non-Han peoples, such as the Tujue, the mightiest military power, and the Sogdians with their control of trade in the Hexi Corridor. The unification of China proper under the Tang had to be achieved with the help of the military forces positioned in various bases in the pastoral and agro-pastoral zones. As a result, the military forces instrumental in the founding of the Tang continued to exercise a 126

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strong influence on the regime, as the diplomatic policy of the Tang evolved with a focus on relations with Tujue and other powers in the pastoral zone. Soon the court was plagued by a power struggle involving succession, often fueled by opposing views on diplomacy, which led to the Xuanwu Gate 玄武門 Incident of 626 as well as other incidents in the Early Tang. Power struggle among top leaders in the Early Tang also made it possible for Wu Zetian to depose her sons Zhongzong 中宗 and Ruizong 睿宗 and found the Zhou dynasty (690–750), which interrupted Tang rule. Just as the Han dynasty was divided into the Western Han (to 2 bce) and Eastern Han (25–220 ce) by Wang Mang’s 王莽 Xin dynasty, the Tang dynasty was divided into two parts, “the former Tang” (618–690) and “the latter Tang” (705–907), with Wu Zetian’s Zhou between them. Thanks to the continued existence of the old Tang forces that asserted Tang orthodoxy, Zhongzong and Ruizong were restored to power. Based on the Confucian concept of royal authority, the forces that negated the interruption of the Tang rejected the Zhou dynasty ruled by a female emperor. However, this cannot deny the historical fact that the Tang was divided into two parts with the founding of the Zhou. Until 755, Tang China was the largest country in East Asia in both area and population. It was rivaled only by the Umayyad Caliphate (to 750). However, nomadic powers such as Eastern Tujue (Turkic) (the First Tujue Qaghanate [552–630] and the Second ­Tujue Qaghanate [682–744]), Huihe (Uighur) (744–840), and Tubo (Tibet) (early seventh ­century–842), with military power that could post a threat, challenged the Tang continually. Meanwhile, neighboring states such as Koguryǒ (37 bce–668 ce), Paekche (18 bce–660 ce), Silla (57 bce–935 ce), Japan (seventh century–), Nanzhao (mid-eighth century–902), and others, while coming under the cultural influence of the Tang, asserted their independence and existence. After China proper was unified in 628 and Eastern Tujue was conquered in 630, both under Taizong, and after Western Tujue was placed under the “loose-rein” system in 657, and Paekche and Koguryǒ were conquered, respectively, in 660 and 668, the Tang became an unprecedented great empire in Chinese history that took up both the pastoral and agricultural zones of Eastern Eurasia. However, just about half a century after the Tang had emerged as a colorful, international empire, the revival of Eastern Tujue in 680 began to encroach upon its territory. Following the An Lushan Rebellion (755–763), it was reduced almost by half, and essentially only the agricultural zone remained. Consequently, the post-rebellion Tang was quite different from the pre-rebellion Tang in territory, government, and culture, undergoing unthinkable, fundamental changes, even though the dynastic name and the ruling house remained the same. In the post-rebellion period, the capital cities were time and again sacked by hostile forces, and the orthodoxy of the dynasty was called into question by the state of Yan (756–763) set up during the An Lushan Rebellion, the regime set up by Tubo (763) (which had taken advantage of the much weakened western defenses because of the rebellion and sacked Chang’an), the Qin-Han regime (783–784) set up by Military Commissioner of Jingyuan 涇源 Zhu Ci 朱泚, and the Qi regime (881–884) set up by Huang Chao 黃巢. They rejected the legitimacy of the Chang’an- or Luoyang-based Tang dynasty. In the ninth century, the international relations in East Asia were dominated by the Tang, Tubo, and Huihe. The relative diplomatic advantage the Tang had enjoyed in the seventh to eighth centuries had disappeared. It is true that international relations in seventh to ninth-century East Asia cannot be dealt with without taking China into consideration. But we also have to bear in mind that international relations in East Asia were often in flux and at times served as a key factor for constant changes in domestic politics. 127

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The birth of a “world power” during the first half of the Tang The Tang as an agro-pastoral state and its local administration system From the fourth to the seventh centuries, major shifts occurred in land under cultivation by nomads across the Eurasian continent (Map 8.1). Under the influence of these shifts, in various regions on the Eurasian continent, agro-pastoral states, which were in control of vast pastoral and agricultural land, were born. Here the agro-pastoral state refers to a state, founded by a small number of equestrian leaders with great military skills; it had under its control a population the majority of which were farmers, set up political and military centers in the agro-pastoral border area, and exercised systematical control over both the agricultural and pastoral zones. The prototypical agro-pastoral state in East Eurasia was the Northern Wei, which unified North China as it went through important political changes in the fourth to the sixth centuries. After the Sui, it reemerged under the Tang, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing. The Tang, inheriting the nomadic heritage of the Northern Wei and later regimes, in a space of half a century starting in 630, evolved into the first agro-pastoral state that not only encompassed the pastoral zone on the Mongolian Plateau but also the agricultural zone in North China and the South. In the agricultural zone, the prefecture-county local administrative system was adopted, which coexisted with a parallel “loose-rein” system in the pastoral zone. This was a unique characteristic of the Tang government system. Tang civilization exerted a strong influence on contemporary neighboring states and later dynasties. The most important reason for this was that the Tang comprehended a vast space

Map 8.1  M igrations in the Old World, Fourth to Eighteenth Centuries. (By Seo Tatsuhiko.)

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Map 8.2  T  he Tang Empire and Its Neighbors. (By Seo Tatsuhiko.)

with both the pastoral and agricultural forms of living, where, for the purpose of reuniting a China which had been divided into rival regimes in North and South for almost 300 years, universal institutions that transcended history, race (ethnicity), language, and culture were created. Map 8.2 shows Tang territory at its largest extent. The process of territorial expansion started with the conquest of Eastern Tujue in 630. As a result, the “loose-rein” administrative system was implemented on the Mongolian Plateau. This was followed by expeditions against Tuyuhun and Tubo and the conquest of the state of Gaochang in 640, where Xizhou or Western Prefecture was set up at its former capital. A distant area that extended from the east slopes of the Tianshan ranges to the Hexi Corridor was now incorporated into the ­prefecture-county administrative system, with Chang’an at its center. In 657, with the conquest of Western Tujue and the capture of its qaghan Ashina Helu 阿史那賀魯 (–659), the former territory of Western Tujue was now included in the “loose-rein” system. With the subsequent conquest of Paekche in 660 and Koguryǒ in 668, the Tang became the strongest country in East Asia. To govern its vast territory more effectively, the Tang set out to build a transportation network with Chang’an as its hub, while making use of both the ­prefecture-county system of direct governance and the loose-rein system of indirect governance. The system was challenged by the revival of Eastern Tujue (the Second Tujue Q ­ aghanate) in 682. After the An Lushan Rebellion, there was a shift toward a different system of indirect governance, where local (oftentimes hereditary) warlords were appointed as military commissioners ( jiedu shi 節度使). This would become the basis for Tang local administration. Tang Taizong, who was called “Heavenly Qaghan” by tribal chieftains under Tiele 鐵勒 in the pastoral zone and was called emperor in the agricultural zone in China proper, ruled over a composite agro-pastoral country with the prefecture-county and loose-rein systems. In agricultural areas and the oasis cities in Xizhou, prefectures and counties were set up to be governed by officials sent by the central court. In the agro-pastoral border and pastoral 129

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areas, mainly loose-rein prefectures and area commands (dudu fu 都督府) were set up and local hereditary magnates were entrusted with its governance. Above loose-rein prefectures and area commands were six protectorates (duhu fu 都護府) (Map 8.2), with officers and men sent by the court. Through the prefecture-county system and loose-rein prefectures, area commands, and protectorates, the composite ruling system was implemented, which conformed to the agro-pastoral state that the Tang was. The agro-pastoral border area and the middle and lower valleys of the Yellow River where main granaries were located were two vital sources the government relied upon. The steady stream of income from the agricultural zone and the fast horses raised on grazing land in the agro-pastoral border area were both indispensible for the maintenance and security of the regime.

Chang’an: the capital of a world empire Among countries that lay outside the Tang prefecture-county and loose-rein systems were those that expected to establish tributary relations; with them the Tang formed lord-subject ties through granting investiture. In other words, the world order from Tang perspective had as its center the Son of Heaven/emperor, surrounded by prefectures, counties, looserein prefectures, countries with Tang investiture, and countries without regular diplomatic relations (those in “inaccessible areas”) in a political space resembling a concentric circle. The capital Chang’an (Sui Daxingcheng) occupied the central point of this Tang world order and served as the stage for the visualized Tang concept of the world. In the first part of the Tang, conspicuous cultural diversity and ethnic amalgamation were concentrated in the urban space of Sui-Tang Chang’an. In various aspects, including military defense, urban security and fire-prevention enhanced by a network of ward walls, the symbolism of the city layout, religious establishments, and cultural and religious diversity, Chang’an was a metropolis that absorbed many changes in the Eurasia continent since the fourth century. Some of the major changes in urban space that had taken place between Han and Tang become apparent when Han Chang’an and Tang Chang’an are compared. In terms of functionality and symbolism, the two cities were completely different. Seen from the perspective of the history of the entire Eurasian continent, the differences between Han and Tang were greater than between Tang and Song. Compared to Han Chang’an, Sui-Tang Chang’an was a much more fortified city, with the Palace City (the emperor’s residence) as the focus of defense. The basilicas (dian) inside the Palace were protected by two lines of defense: the Palace Guard troops stationed in the Forbidden Park to the north and in the Imperial City to the south. This kind of deployment derived from a defense concept prompted by massive Tujue cavalry attacks in the late sixth century. In terms of symbolism, Sui-Tang Chang’an was, based on traditional yin-yang theory, penetrated by a north-south axis, which corresponded to the celestial meridian. Centered alongside the axis were key structures of the palace and the city at large that mirrored the order of heaven. Above all, Chang’an was an expression of great pride in the Tang as the orthodox dynasty that reunified China after a period of division that had lasted for almost 300 years. In the area of the history of thought and culture, Buddhism occupied a unique place. It was the main reason why the Tang was so different from the Han. In urban Sui-Tang Chang’an, there were more than 100 Buddhist monasteries, whereas in Han Chang’an, there was none. Sui-Tang Chang’an played host to establishments for other religions as well, including Nestorianism, Manichaeism, and Zoroastrianism. It was the capital city that represented the eastern part of those world-religion realms that had taken shape on the Eurasian 130

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continent in the sixth and seventh centuries, and the multi-racial and multi-cultural metropolis that had absorbed many cultural elements from abroad. In the context of Chinese urban history, Sui-Tang Chang’an was an early city in a China where the agro-pastoral borderland played a vital role. Over time, China’s capital system evolved from one of the two metropolises of the west and east (Chang’an and Luoyang) to one of the two metropolises of the North and South (Beijing and Nanjing), with Kaifeng as a transitional capital. Among the possible factors for this change were the following: (a) nomadic powers moved their bases from the northwest to the northeast (for military and diplomatic reasons); (b) main granaries were moved from North China to the South (the economic reason); and (c) the main mode of transportation on the African-Eurasian continent shifted from land transportation to transportation along coastal lines (the transportation reason).

International relations and the birth of the age of capital cities in East Asia (seventh–eighth centuries) The birth of Tang China, which was a result of a political transformation in the eastern part of the Eurasian continent, exerted a strong political, military, and economic impact on the same area. In the face of the rise of China, in present-day Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese archipelago, Tibet, southwest China, and Southeast Asia, traditionally scattered tribes joined forces and a number of countries were founded. East Asia international relations that took shape in the eighth and ninth centuries have continued to this day. In the late sixth century, the Sui unified a China that had been divided for a long time, and following the Sui, the Tang began to form an extensive empire in 630 that comprehended both the pastoral and agricultural areas. Subsequently, a new age dawned, an age in which a number of countries with their walled capitals came into being in succession. Specifically, in 583, the Sui built Daxingcheng, a new city southeast of Han Chang’an, which marked the beginning of a new wave of capitals, including Luoyang (605), Lhasa (early seventh century) in Tubo (618–842), Ōmi-kyō 近江京 (667), Fujiwara-kyō 藤原京 (Aramashinomiyako 新益京) (694), Heij ō -kyō 平城京 (710), Kuni-kyō 恭仁京 (740), (Later) Naniwa-kyō 難波京(744), Nagaoka-kyō 長岡京 (784), and Heian-kyō 平安京 (794) in Japan (seventh century–). Taihecheng 太和城 (738) and Yangxiemiecheng 陽苴咩城 (Dali) (779) in Nanzhao 南詔 (738–937); Ordu-Baliq (Karabalghasun) in 744 by the Uighurs (Huihe 回紇 or Huihu 回鶻; 744–840); Jiuguo 舊國 (in Jilin) in the late seventh century; and the Five Metropolises (wujing 五京: Shang jing 上京, Zhong jing 中京, ­Dong jing 東京, Nanjing 南京, and Xijing 西京) in eighth-century Bohai (Parhae) (698–926). On the Korean Peninsula, Paekche (18 bce–660 ce) built a new capital with a Palace City with a gridiron layout (the Iksan Wanggung-ri 益山王宮里 site) in North Jeolla Province in 600. After the unification of the peninsula in 676, Silla (57 bce–935 ce), following Tang Chang’an’s model, remade the capital Kŭ msŏng 金城 (Sŏrabŏl王京). Based on Map 8.3, some of the features of capitals in seventh- to eighth-century East Asia are identified: 1 Most of them were set up in the interior as part of its transportation network. 2 Most were multiethnic, international cities with rich cultural diversity. 3 All were home to Buddhist monasteries. 131

Map 8.3  Capital Cities in East Asia, 7th–8th Centuries. (By Seo Tatsuhiko.)

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4 Most of the cities located in the agricultural zone had a gridiron pattern. However, the Tubo and Nanzhao capitals were different; they were built in accordance with the terrain. 5 These walled cities can be further divided into two types: those with a walled outer city (Chang’an and Luoyang of the Tang; Lhasa of Tubo; Shangjing, Zhongjing, and ­Dongjing of Bohai; and Taihecheng and Yangxiemiecheng of Nanzhao), and those without a walled outer city (Ordu-Baliq, with an inner city wall); Kŭ msŏng of Silla; and ­ ajōmon the Japanese capitals [although both Heijō -kyō and Hei’an-kyō 平安京 had a R 羅城門 (Outer City Gate)]. The spatial designs of these diverse capital cities embodied the visualization of the concept of royal authority in different countries. Take, for example, the Japanese capitals. Under the strong influence of Tang Chang’an and Luoyang, they were created as the capitals of an emperor whose lineage would allegedly continue for 10,000 generations; yet their internal structures were fundamentally different from those Chinese capitals predicated on the concept of regime-change and dynastic cycles. At the Japanese capitals, the Southern Suburban Altar based on the Five Phases Cyclical Theory did not exist, nor did the Ancestral Temple in the urban area. At the Silla capital, another city subjected to the influence of Chang’an when it was built, it was the Moon City, based on a long-standing local tradition, that housed the ritual centers. Based on the Confucian concept of royal authority, China had to be the center. And yet the capitals elsewhere in East Asia all aimed to become Buddhist cities; to blend Buddhism, a religion that came from outside China and was to become a world religion, with the concept of royal authority, probably suggested an effort at rivaling the power of the Tang. Thus, as China proper was unified by military force under the Tang and as the Tang administrative city network with the capital Chang’an at its center and the Tang territorial extent expanded, tensions were on the rise in neighboring areas, where rival states with administrative and diplomatic functions were founded. They set up their capitals in imitation of Chang’an and established diplomatic relations with Tang China, which helped maintain peace and order. In view of the fact that before the seventh century, East Asian countries, except for those in China and the Korean Peninsula, did not have walled capital cities, the previously cited developments signified a major change in East Asia. Following the setup of capital cities, transportation networks came into being, with the capital cities as their hubs. That gave birth to the East Asian transportation system. The setup and maintenance of the capital made it necessary for the setup and maintenance of an administrative city network for the purpose of receiving tribute and foreign envoys. Countries with capitals and a network of administrative cities occurred simultaneously in East Asia while a tributary system that funneled tribute to the capital was maintained; thus began diplomatic relations between various countries, with their capitals as the main stage of diplomacy. After the ninth century, the main mode of transportation gradually began to shift from land to sea while the political bases of the main nomadic peoples moved from northwest China to the northeast, and North China yielded its role as the country’s grain basket to the South. Consequently, in China, the interior city network with Chang’an as its hub was replaced by the coastal city network with Beijing as its hub. This shift from the interior to the coastal region was also linked to changes in city networks in Southeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and the Japanese Archipelago. In the Japanese Archipelago, there was the move of the power base from the aristocratic government’s Heian-kyō to the warrior regime’s Kamakura to Tokugawa Ieyasu’s Edo. 133

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The political institutions A periodization of political history Traditionally, the Tang dynasty is broken up into four periods: Early Tang (618–712), High Tang (712–756), Middle Tang (756–820), and Late Tang (820–907). Here I will divide the first two periods (Early Tang and High Tang) into three phases: Phase 1: from Gaozu 高宗 to Ruizong 睿宗 (I) (681–684); Phase 2: Wu Zetian 武則天 (684–705); and Phase 3: from Zhongzong 中宗 (II) to Xuanzong 玄宗 (705–756). In the 20th century, the Chinese historian Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 put forward the influential thesis of the “primacy of the Guanlong 關隴 clique.” It argues that, from the Western Wei, Northern Zhou, and Sui through the Early Tang, the central government was continuously dominated by a group of upper-class people with choronyms in Guanzhong and Long (Gansu). The thesis still has much currency, but it is controversial. During Phase I, in government, the various Sui institutions were inherited and continued; in foreign relations, from Taizong to Gaozong, the Tang conquered Eastern Tujue, Western Tujue, Paekche, and Koguryǒ, and greatly expanded its territorial extent. During Phase II, under the Zhou, Luoyang was declared the Divine Capital, and a ­Buddhist-based sacred state was created. During Phase III, the Tang was revived. Under Xuanzong, a policy was introduced to negate the Zhou’s heritage, and, in line with that policy, an attempt was made to restore the political system of the Early Tang. Phase I (618–690): The Initial Stage: Gaozu, Taizong, Gaozong, Zhongzong (I), and Ruizong (I). The initial aim of the Tang government was to establish the orthodox position of the dynasty, which was of symbolic importance, and, as the territorial extent expanded, set up an agro-pastoral synthetic system in the area of financial administration. The Tang made Chang’an the imperial capital where all sorts of ritual ceremonies were held, created a Chang’an-centered financial system, and developed a transportation network. Having witnessed the great turmoil in the late Sui and the collapse of the Sui, the Early Tang rulers strove to create a lenient governing system that recruited various magnates and literati active in the Sui, and men of influence from the South and the Northern Qi. The Tang inherited most of the Sui administrative and financial agencies—such as the Three Departments and Six Boards and the prefecture-county system—and the examination-based official recruitment system. It continued to use Sui Daxingcheng (now renamed Chang’an) as its capital and enhanced its claim to orthodoxy by going through the ritual of accepting the abdication of the Sui sovereign. In the initial phase, the Tang sovereigns were all members of the Li royal house, including Gaozu 高祖 (r. 618–626), Taizong 太宗 (r. 626–649), Gaozong 高宗 (r. 649–683), Zhongzong 中宗 (r. Jan. 3–Feb. 26, 684), and Ruizong 睿宗(r. Feb. 27, 684–Oct. 16, 690). However, during Gaozong’s reign, after Wu Zetian was appointed empress, she became the de facto power-holder. The Lis had been key members in the Hu-Han group that consisted of warlords of ­X ianbei, Han, or mixed descent from the Western Wei and Northern Zhou to the Sui dynasties. The powerful members of the Tang leadership were participants in the Taiyuan uprising in 617 started by the Lis. Dominated by these officers, the Tang, from Taizong to Gaozong, as it became an agro-pastoral state of unprecedented size, conquered Eastern and Western Tujue, Paekche, and Koguryǒ, and implemented the prefecture-county system in the agricultural zone and the loose-rein system in the pastoral zone. 134

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At the Xuanwu Gate Incident of 626, where two of his brothers were killed, Taizong ascended the imperial throne. By 628, he had put an end to the kind of warlord separatism that had started in late Sui times and continued under the Tang for 15 years, and succeeded in bringing North and South China together. Taizong went on to conquer Eastern Tujue in 630 before advancing into Central Asia, greatly expanding the Tang’s territory. Emperor Taizong ruled wisely, and his reign came to be known as the “good government of Zhenguan” 貞觀 (his reign title). His words and deeds are recorded in a Tang book entitled the Zhenguan zhengyao 貞觀政要 (Essentials for government during the Zhenguan reign). After his conquest of Eastern Tujue, Taizong was offered another title, that of “­Heavenly Qaghan,” by the tribal chieftains of the various Tiele tribes, which was of great significance. It signified the Tang’s rise as a “world empire.” Under Gaozong, Taizong’s successor, Taizong’s diplomatic policy continued. Allied with Silla, the Tang conquered Paekche in 660, and Koguryǒ in 668, eventually solving the Koguryǒ problem that had plagued the court since Sui times. Phase II (690–705): The Reign of Wu Zetian. The only sovereign in this phase was Wu Zetian (624–705), who was also the only female emperor in Chinese history. After she was appointed empress of Gaozong in 655, she became the decision-maker at court. After Gaozong’s death in 683, she became the real holder of political power. She forced her sons Zhongzhong and Ruizong off the throne, one after another, and ascended the throne herself as emperor in 690. She gave herself the title of “sage and divine emperor” (shengshen huangdi 聖神皇帝) and changed the dynastic name to Zhou. She reigned continuously as emperor for 15 years. Having failed to set up a crown prince of the Wu lineage, the Zhou dynasty lasted only one generation. Nevertheless, it was of great significance, because it cut the continuity of the Tang. Wu Zetian had taken political measures that eventually helped her to power. After becoming empress, she gradually moved the capital function of Chang’an, a militarized city where the old forces were entrenched, to Luoyang, an economically focused city, successfully seized military power through employing newer but capable people, and mercilessly eliminated or elbowed aside Chang’an-based, powerful men of the old regime. She also made some moves that were of great ideological importance. In the seventh century, East Asian society was permeated with the Buddhist concept of royal authority. Under Wu, the concept of the female sovereign was also afoot. It was based on the claim that Wu Zetian was identified as the Maitreya Bodhisattva reincarnate who would bring salvation to all creatures; and on the concept of the Chakravartin (the wheel-turning king) that the dharma-promoting lay sovereign was the ideal ruler. Probably, this type of Buddhist concept then surpassed the Confucian idea of royal authority to become the widely accepted basis for political power. Among the Chakravartin kings, Wu Zetian was the last one and occupied the highest position, that of the Sage King with the gold wheel. Different from the Confucian concept of the Son of Heaven-emperor that focused only on males, this concept did not discriminate based on gender, class, choronym, and history. Luoyang, Wu Zetian’s Divine Capital, became one of the holy sites of Buddhism in East Asia. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the Buddhist concept of royal authority could be used to justify the rule of female sovereigns in Silla and Japan. On coming to power, Wu Zetian also changed the religious policy of the state from “Daoism first, Buddhism second” to “Buddhism first, Daoism second,” which was indispensible for justifying rule by a female sovereign. Had it not been for the spread of Buddhism in East Asia, the dynastic change from Tang to Zhou by Wu Zetian would have been impossible. Phase III (705–756): Zhongzong (II), Ruizong (II), and Xuanzong. This phase began with the restoration of the Tang. After a brief period of chaos, following Wu Zetian’s 135

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death in 706, the High Tang arrived during the reign of Xuanzong (r. 712–756). With the revival of the Tang, Zongzong (r. February 23, 705–July 3, 710) and Ruizong (r. July 25, 710–September 8, 712) were restored to power, and political measures were taken to negate Wu Zetian’s heritage. Nevertheless, the Wu lineage continued to hold on to power, and Zhongzong’s empress Wei even made another attempt to overthrow the Tang dynasty once again. Politics at court continued to be unstable. Then, out of a dizzying power struggle, Xuanzong emerged as the victor and ascended the throne in 712. Under the restored Tang, the policy-makers did their utmost to erase the existence of the Zhou from history, which had cut the continuity of the Tang. They stressed the point that Wu Zetian was merely the empress of Gaozong and the mother of Zhongzong and Ruizong. Emperor Xuanzong, grandson of Wu Zetian, supported this undertaking, shifted the religious focus from Buddhism to Daoism, and promoted various cultural enterprises. However, Xuanzong actually continued some of the reforms started by Wu Zetian, actively employing capable personages through the examination system à la Wu, which paved the way for the prosperous age of High Tang. Our impression of brilliant Tang culture often derives from the creative ages of Kaiyuan 開元 (713–741) and Tianbo 天寶 (742–756) under Xuanzong. In this sense, the Zhou founded by Wu Zetain paved the way for the “good government of Kaiyuan” and Tang cultural effervescence. Prior to and after the transfer of the capital from the Wu-Zhou’s Luoyang back to Chang’an, some major political developments took place in East Asia—the revival of Eastern Tujue as Later Tujue, the ascendency of Uighur, the rise of Tubo, and advances by Parhae (Bohai 渤海) and Khitan in Manchuria. Chang’an soon found itself on the frontline of national defense against the nomadic forces in the northwest and the west. To beef up national defense, Xuanzong adopted a policy of placing nomadic non-Han officers (non-Han generals) in commanding posts, eventually giving rise to the practice of replacing protectors-­ general (duhu 都護; heads of protectorates) sent by the court with military commissioners ( jiedu shi 節度使) as heads of defense commands ( fanzhen 藩鎮). One of them was An Lushan 安祿山, a Turko-Sogdian who would start a devastating rebellion.

The formulation of laws, statutes, and ritual Law (lü 律) and statutes (ling 令) were key components of the legal system of pre-modern China that served as the foundation for governance by the state. Law refers to the law code that served as the universal basic law centered on penal law. Statutes were general administrative rules that lay outside the laws. There were also regulations (ge 格) (law supplements and amendments and provisional laws) and ordinances (shi 式) provisions concerning the enforcement of laws. In addition, there was ritual, which served as the moral norms that constituted the foundation of Tang society. On the basis of the law code and statutes, the land tenure system in the form of the equal-field law ( juntian fa 均田法); the taxation system in the form of grain tax (zu 租), labor corvée (yong 庸), and cloth tax (diao 調) or tax and corvée; the military system centered on the garrison-militia ( fubing 府兵) system; and the township-ward system based on the village network were formulated. So the law and statutes were the fundamental laws that governed the military, finance, administration, and taxation of the state. The Code Subcommentary (Lüshu 律疏) in 30 juan (initially released in 653 as the Yonghui lüshu 永徽律疏 (Subcommentary to the Yonghui Code), revised in 737, and later known as Tanglü shuyi 唐律疏議 (Subcommentary and explications of the Tang Code)); the Yonghui ling 永徽令 (Yonghui statutes) in 30 juan released in 651; the Datang Kaiyuan li 大唐開元禮 136

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(Rites of the Great Tang during the Kaiyuan period) in 150 juan completed in 732; and the Tang liudian 唐六典 (Tang institutions of six administrative divisions), which was the standard book on the Tang bureaucratic system, were model works on institutions for later dynasties and were accepted by various East Asian states in the Chinese-language sphere. Japan, Korea, Parhae, and Dai Viet 大越 all compiled their law codes based on the Tang law and statutes. However, whereas the Tang law and statutes were a legal system that underpinned the order of the imperial system predicated on dynastic change, the Japanese code based on the law and statutes provided the basis for the one-lineage-for-ten-thousand-generations tennō (heavenly emperor or emperor) system that did not recognize dynastic change. The ways different states adopted the law and statutes varied because these states differed from one another in terms of historical development and tradition. Because the Tang statutes are no longer extant in China, efforts have been made to reconstitute them based on the articles in the Yōrō Statutes 養老令of Japan. Moreover, the 1999 discovery of the Tiansheng Statutes 天聖令 (completed in Tiansheng 7 or 1029), which were based on the Tang statutes, heralded a new age in the studies of Tang statutes.

The power of cultural guidance: the compilation of the standard histories and the Wujing zhengyi (Righteous explications of the Five Classics) A focus of Early Tang politics was on how to establish the power of cultural guidance. Like various dynasties in the past, the Tang too, at the time of its founding, implemented the law and statutes, set up state-run schools, compiled the standard histories, edited the classics, and promulgated and adopted calendars, weights and measures, and standard music scale. Particularly worthy of attention is the fact that the Early Tang saw the compilation of the largest number of the standard histories. In addition to the histories of the five dynasties completed in 636—the Liangshu 梁書 (Book of the Liang), Chenshu 陳書 (Book of the Chen), Bei Qi shu 北齊書 (Book of the Northern Qi), Zhoushu 周書 (Book of the Northern Zhou), and Suishu 隋書 (Book of the Sui), there are the Jinshu 晉書 (Book of the Jin) completed in 648, and the Nanshi 南史 (History of the Southern Dynasties) and Beishi 北史 (History of the Northern Dynasties) completed in 659. Very importantly, these works, written from the standpoint of the Tang, which had arisen after the short-lived Sui dynasty, clearly indicate which dynasties were orthodox in the period from the Jin to the age of division, and are suggestive of the role of unification and continuity by the Tang. The Wujing zhengyi 五經正義 (Rectified interpretation of the Five Classics), the compilation of which began in Taizong’s time, was released under Gaozong in 653. This collection of previous explanations of the classics would serve as the fundamental work for the civil service examinations and help to popularize the scholarship of the intelligentsia. The Tangyun 唐韻 (Tang rhymes), completed under Xuanzong, is the revised version of the Qieyun 切韻 (Cut rhymes) by the Sui scholar Lu Fayan 陸法言 in 5 juan (completed in 601), which includes pronunciations of different regions dating back to the age of division. As such, it would become a model for later books on rhymes.

The economy and society Early Tang transportation network and the Grand Canal In the first half of the Tang, with the revival of the Grand Canal, a land and water transportation network was at work. That stimulated the two-way trade, with tribute from the 137

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provinces and foreign countries coming into Chang’an and Luoyang and with presents from the court going in the opposite direction. The economy of China proper was thus integrated into the economic sphere of Eurasia. The expansion of the territorial extent that encompassed the agricultural and pastoral zones and the completion of a communication/transportation system both contributed greatly to the expansion of the city network, the recovery of productivity, population increase, and the diversification of production, distribution, and consumption, resulting in the thriving of various industries inside China. Of special importance was the digging of the Grand Canal. It was the unprecedented transportation trunk line in China proper that penetrated both North and South; as such it transformed the spatial structure of not only China but also Eurasia. Because of the construction of the Grand Canal, the transportation trunk line in Eurasian shifted its focus from land to coastal sea, to become the carrier of business and intelligence between east and west on the continent. Meanwhile, the Sogdians from the hinterland of Central Asia in the fourth to the seventh centuries gave way to Arab merchants from the Persian Gulf in the eighth century and later. The construction and operation of the Grand Canal stimulated the exploration of the Yangzi delta area, connecting various key cities of the South into a city network. S­ outhern cities such as Jiankang 建康 (Nanjing), Yang zhou 揚州, Runzhou 潤州 (Zhenjiang), ­Changzhou 常州, and Suzhou 蘇州 in Jiangsu; and Huzhou 湖州, Hangzhou 杭州, Yuezhou 越州 ­(Shaoxing), and Mingzhou 明州 (Ningbo) in Zhejiang, were linked with the Chang’an- and Luoyang-centered city network of the North. Thanks to this linkage between cities North and South, the sophisticated urban culture of the South, noted for its art of garden design and literary tradition, began to exert a strong influence on its northern counterparts, starting in the seventh century. Meanwhile, northern migrants moved by the Grand Canal to the South in large numbers, as a new episode in the migration history of China had begun in earnest.

Land tenure and taxation The equal-field system ( juntian zhi 均田制) was used in the first half of the Tang. It was a land tenure system that served the purpose of producing grain and cloth taxes and levying corvée duty. It strove to equalize the distribution of state-owned land based on status. It started under the Northern Wei and continued under the Sui and Tang. The Tang inherited the Sui system, and stopped making land grants for wives, bondsmen and bondswomen, and oxen. An adult male (aged 20–59) was entitled to 80 mu (1 mu = 580 m 2) of uninheritable land (koufen tian 口分田) and 20 mu of inheritable land (yongye tian 永業田). Uninheritable land had to be returned to the state when the recipient lost his status because of age. Inheritable land was not returnable and could be passed down in the family. There has been much research on the equal-field system. In spite of its purported aim of making equitable land grants by the state to its subjects, it served the purpose of systematically taking control of land. The Tang tax and corvée system (zu yong diao 租庸調) required an adult male to pay 2 shi (1 shi ≈ 59.4 L) of grain as grain tax (zu), and 2 zhang (1 zhang ≈ 3.11 m) of silk cloth of 1.8 chi width (1 chi ≈ 3.11 cm) and 3 liang (1 liang ≈ 37.3 g) of silk floss as cloth tax (diao) (alternatively, 2.5 zhang of hempen cloth and 3 jin [1 jin ≈ 597 g] of hemp). In addition, he had to perform 20 days of corvée duty as yong, which could be converted to additional cloth tax at the rate of 3 chi of silk cloth or 3.75 chi of hempen cloth per day. In addition to corvée duty levied by the court (yong, aka zhengyi 正役 or regular corvée), there was miscellaneous corvée levied by

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local governments that involved public works and the storage and transportation of tax grain. Miscellaneous corvée targeted adult males; its length was limited to 40 (or 50) days per year. The equal-field system and the tax and corvée system such as the zu yong diao system were operative when extensive surplus lands were available and labor as a human resource was greatly valued. Meanwhile, the expansion of the Tang city network led to exploration of lands and population increase. According to statistics, the number of households in the Early Tang was just shy of 3 million, which contrasts with the number at the end of the Tianbao reign period (mid-eighth century)—8,914,709 when the national population was 52,919,309. However, as the registered population increased, per-capita arable land gradually shrank, as did per-capita yield. Consequently, within the tax system, there was a shift of focus from man to land. Corvée duty, which had been levied directly on people, was converted to payment in silk and hempen cloth; in the procurement of labor, the emphasis shifted to employment. Attention shifted from compulsory labor to land tax as was instantiated by the dual tax system introduced at the end of the eighth century. Meanwhile, the tax system was increasingly relying upon direct taxes such as those on salt monopoly and commerce, which rivaled the directly imposed dual taxes in revenue.

Money The first part of the Tang was a period of commodity money. In the second part, a kind of promissory note known as feiqian 飛錢 was in circulation, which is considered the prototype of paper money. For large sums of money, silk and gold and silver were used; bronze coins (translated as “cash”) were used in daily transactions. The Tang in 621 issued the Kaiyuan tongbao 開元通寶 coin to replace existing coins, bringing an end to the monetary chaos that had started in the last years of the Sui. The circulation of the Kaiyuan tongbao impacted various states in East Asia. The Japanese coins Fuhosen 富本銭 and Wadō kaihō 和同開珎 were modeled on the Kaiyuan tongbao. In the third–sixth centuries, the economy in China proper contracted due to political fragmentation and warfare; it was revived under the Sui and Tang dynasties when China was again unified. In the eighth century under Xuanzong, large cities connected by the transportation trunk lines became commercial centers where the money economy permeated society.

Religion, thought, and literature Buddhism From the chaotic fourth–seventh centuries to the eighth century, in the temperate and tropical zones of the northern latitudes, there arose three world religion spheres: Christianity in the west part of Eurasia, Islam in the west and central part of Eurasia, and Buddhism in the east part of Eurasia. The birth of these world religion spheres coincided with the rise of agro-pastoral states in Eurasia. These world religions acted as a kind of guarantee for the existence of the agro-pastoral states, which, fundamentally different for classical states, had a complex ethnic/racial composition and diverse languages and cultures; they also gave rise to transportation zones and commercial zones that spread east-west across the Afro-Eurasian continent. Thanks to the formation of the world religion spheres, world history entered a new era. Christianity and Islam, with their belief that everyone is equal before God, and Buddhism, with its concept of dharma as truth, created such supramundane values as godhead 139

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and dharma, which, as universal theories, brought people of different backgrounds together. In the east part of Eurasia, a cultural sphere was slowly taking shape for the first time in history, under the influence of the imported ecumenical religion, Buddhism. The teaching of Buddhism with its focus on the supramundane nature of dharma believes in the universality of humanity, which is independent of blood relations, geography, gender, modes of production (agricultural, nomadic, wheat-growing, rice-growing, etc.), family background, and race. Confucianism, by contrast, aimed at the salvation of a limited group of people, and it was encroached upon by a Buddhism that had never existed in China proper before and that taught a kind of systematic personal salvation. In the fourth to the seventh centuries, Buddhism spread in China and eventually conquered the Chinese world of thought. While rivaling the thought system of Buddhism, the conventional belief system was reorganized, which gave birth to the modern world of thought in East Asia today. With the spread of Buddhism, the so-called Three Teachings— Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism—that dominated the Chinese world of thought, having taken definite shape, coexisted. Consequently, in China, both the breadth and width of thought expanded and the variety increased. The Sui-Tang emperors, different from their Han predecessors who relied on the Confucian concept of royal authority, turned to Buddhism, which came from outside China, for support. After the Tang, the Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing regimes (which were founded by the nomadic non-Han), to relativize the ­Confucian-based cultural tradition of the agricultural zone, consistently placed Buddhism at the center of the concept of royal authority; under these regimes, Buddhist monasteries were important venues for ritual ceremonies for royal authority.

Confucianism Amid the disintegration of consanguineous and geographical communities as a result of political chaos and war since the late Eastern Han, the authority of Confucianism collapsed. With the reunification of China under the Sui and Tang, as the political philosophy royal authority relied upon, Confucianism came back to life. Confucianism stresses that the essence of a ruler is to use intellectuals to criticize the abuse of power. For the ruler no political theory is more powerful than Confucianism, a statecraft for rationally managing society. Under Confucianism, political management in accordance with the Mandate of Heaven brings peace to people, while the power of capable Sons of Heaven or emperors is limited to that of sovereigns. It argues that politics can bring salvation to groups of people. However, under the influence of Buddhism with its aim of personal salvation, in the ninth century, there was a gradual shift away from group salvation to personal salvation, and to a trend toward exploring the ideal way of the world, paving the way for the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty. The utilitarian-based examination system finalized under Wu Zetian also played a role in bringing about change in Confucianism.

Daoism Faced with the strong impact of Buddhism, Daoism took definite form in the fifth century as a religion, which was founded on a centuries-old popular religion and preached the universality of the Dao (the way). The Tang paid particular homage to Daoism because the imperial Li house identified Laozi 老子 (Li Er 李耳, the founder of Daoism) as its progenitor. However, although the legitimacy of Daoist activities, subject to the court’s management and regulation, were recognized, in society at large, Buddhism far surpassed Daoism in 140

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popularity and influence. The strong political power of Daoism was rejected by Wu Zetian, whose rule was based on the Buddhist concept of royal authority, before it was revived and promoted by Xuanzong. Daoism criticized Buddhism as the religion of the “barbarians,” and asserted that Daoism was the only “Sinitic” religion, which gave rise to Buddho-Daoist debate. In the wake of the An Lushan Rebellion, isolationism in international relations and Sinocentrism were on the rise; in the ninth century when Buddhism had reached its peak, the Daoists were instrumental in persuading Emperor Wuzong 武宗 to launch the Huichang 會昌 proscription against Buddhism. However, thereafter, Buddhism and Daoism merged into a popularly practiced, highly eclectic religion.

Nestorianism, Zoroastrianism, and Manichaeism Nestorianism was a Christian sect. Officially, it began to spread in China in 638, when Emperor Taizong gave permission to Abraham (Aluoben 阿羅本), leader of a missionary group from Sassanid Persia, to build a Persian Monastery (later renamed “Daqin Monastery”) in Chang’an. In 781, followers erected the Monument to the Spread of Nestorianism in China (Daqin jingjiao liuxing Zhongguo bei 大秦景教流行中國碑). The inscription is in Chinese and Syriac. The Chinese part gives an account of how Nestorianism arrived and spread in China. Zoroastrianism was the state religion of Sassanid Persia. Many Sogdians who came to China were believers. In Tang times, as they broadened their range of activity, Zoroastrian monasteries were set up in Chang’an and elsewhere. Manichaeism was founded by Mani in Sassanid Persia. It was a dualist religion that borrowed extensively from other religions such as Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Toward the end of the seventh century, it spread to China and set up its monasteries in Chang’an and elsewhere. Through the Sogdians, it spread to the Uighurs. After their qaghan was converted, it became their state religion. These three foreign religions (known as the “three barbarian religions”), together with Buddhism, were subjected to persecution in the Huichang proscription campaign, which reached its peak in 845. However, the followers of these foreign religions were not many compared with their Buddhist counterparts. Their influence on society was rather small. Believers tended to live in designated areas in cities in their own religious communities. Their contact with local Tang subjects was limited.

Literature When talking about literature, the Ming literatus Li Panlong 李攀龍 says, “The prose of the Qin and Han and the poetry of the High Tang [are the best].” Indeed, Tang literature, known especially for its poetry, was highly developed. The fact that the jinshi 進士-degree examination required composition of shi 詩-poetry and fu 賦-rhapsodies contributed to this phenomenon. In Early Tang times, poetry, under the influence of the South, tended to be delicate and brilliant in style. The best-known poets of the day were the Four Eminences of the Early Tang—Wang Bo 王勃, Luo Binwang 駱賓王, Lu Zhaolin 盧照鄰, and Yang Jiong 楊 炯. They attempted to break away from that mold. Under Wu Zetian, Shen Quanqi 沈佺期, Song ­Zhiwen 宋之問, Chen Zi’ang 陳子昂, and others criticized the brilliant style of the South in vogue and promoted the simple style of the Han and Cao-Wei period. Their work was the forerunner to the poetry of the High Tang and Middle Tang. 141

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The height of Tang literature arrived during the reign of Xuanzong. It was the time when the poet-immortal Li Bai 李白 and the poet-sage Du Fu 杜甫 were at the peak of their creativity. The literary achievement of this age epitomized the past traditions going back centuries and laid the groundwork for a new literature in the future. The poetic greats Li Bai and Du Fu both had gone through the vicissitudes of life. By contrast, the poets of the Middle Tang were oftentimes jinshi-degree holders and elite courtiers. The poetry of Li Bai and Du Fu attests to the principle for artistic creation that only those talented men of letters who faced difficulties in life were able to produce great original work that will live forever.

Conclusion: the significance of Tang historical research To understand today’s world, knowledge of Tang history is indispensable, because much of the East Asia of today is rooted in the Tang period. In the fourth through the seventh centuries, the Eurasian continent experienced massive migration of nomadic people. In the seventh century, at the east end of Eurasia, there arose a unified China under the Sui and Tang. In the face of this, various tribes in East Asia formed confederations and founded states. The international relations in East Asia that arose as a consequence in the eighth and ninth centuries have continued down to this day. The civilization of various regions in East Asia today, including institutions and lifestyle habits such as dress, food, residence, and others, derives directly from this period. In today’s East Asia, a gigantic economic zone has taken shape, and various countries have entered into exchange relations with one another. All this was adumbrated by the gradual formation of the cultural zone through Buddhism in the seventh and eighth centuries, which will in turn continue to impact future developments in the world. Doubtless, that adds another level of significance to Tang history. In the first part of the Tang, the Tang state belonged with the same type of agro-pastoral states one found elsewhere in Eurasia. After the An Lushan Rebellion, however, the Tang lost its pastoral zone; government control was now limited to the agricultural zone. Meanwhile, various institutions were developed that would pass down to posterity. Changes that started both in the government and private sectors during Xuanzong’s reign in the eighth century became interconnected in the ninth century to bring about major transformations, including: 1 in politics, the agro-pastoral state evolved into an agrarian state. 2 in government, the loose-rein and prefecture-county systems of the agro-pastoral state gave way to the defense command and prefecture-county systems based in the agricultural zone. 3 in military affairs, non-Han generals and militia garrisons were replaced with eunuch commanders and conscript armies; the cavalry-based tactic evolved into the tactic of using both cavalry and infantry. 4 in finance, the North-focused tax-and-corvée system (zu yong diao) was replaced with the South-focused dual-tax system and a number of indirect taxes (on salt, tea, wine, commerce, etc.). 5 in economy, there was a move from the luxury trade by land routes through the agro-pastoral borderlands to the general trade; and from local markets to the national market.

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6 in society and culture, cosmopolitanism gave way to Sinocentrism; a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society gave way to a utilitarian society under the influence of the civil service examination with an increasingly discriminatory view on gender. The contraction of territory that occurred as the Tang was transformed from an agro-­pastoral state in the seventh century to an essentially agricultural state became a pattern for territorial shrinkage. To some extent that pattern would be followed repeatedly by later dynasties.

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9 The Tang dynasty II (756–907) Anthony DeBlasi

The 750s initiated a series of complex changes with profound implications for China’s developmental arc in subsequent centuries. As one would expect, characterizing the period from 755 to the end of the dynasty in 907 raises tricky historiographical challenges. The most important of those is how to deal with a period of “transition.” As the discussion here shows, the final century and a half of the Tang laid the foundations for the emergence of a new economic, social, cultural, and political order in the Chinese imperium. But for all the drama of its beginning during the An Lushan Rebellion, it was not a radical break with what came before. It is necessary then to recognize that the late eighth and ninth centuries were simultaneously the culmination of one set of developments and the beginning of a new set. In emphasizing the latter, it is important to acknowledge the former. The simple fact is that Tang officials and elites remained committed to the continuity of Tang power, looked back to its earlier reigns for guidance, and were unaware of the future to come. The most common interpretations of the Tang Dynasty’s final 150 years generally fall within the paradigm of the “Tang-Song Transition.” The idea of such a transition was first advanced by the Japanese scholar Naitō Torajirō 内藤虎次郎 in the early twentieth century.1 He argued that a number of interrelated changes occurred between the middle of the eighth century and the eleventh century that initiated China’s modern era. While details of Nait ō’s thesis have been challenged and modified, scholars have generally accepted his insight that Chinese society and culture changed fundamentally during these centuries. The following account attempts to sketch out the interwoven processes that remade the civilization and yet connected it to the earlier traditions of the Tang.

The political and military context The challenges of managing an empire with a population approaching 50 million that extended from the Pacific Ocean to beyond the Tarim Basin in Central Asia required a number of institutional innovations early in the eighth century. Specifically, defending such far-flung frontiers was beyond the practical capabilities of the Early Tang militia-based military establishment, the so-called fubing 府兵 system. Beginning in the 720s, it was replaced by a string of military commissionerships ( jiedu shi 節度使) created along the northern and northwestern frontiers. Professional armies garrisoned these under the command of men with military 144

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experience. This shift toward professionalization enabled the dynasty to secure its fractious border with the non-Tang tribal groups on the other side without the inefficiency of the militia system and the logistical disruptions entailed by moving inexperienced militiamen far from their homes and the capital region.2 This solution brought with it a danger, however. Using professional armies on long-term service with a single commander risked the creation of alternative power bases that could support anti-dynastic rebellion. Managing this danger required vigilance by the court and careful personnel management. The emperor and his officials attended to this initially, but in the 740s, the court’s attention to the issue waned. The result was the gradual accumulation of military authority by a general named An Lushan 安祿山 (d. 757), a part-Sogdian commander with long experience on the northeastern frontier and remarkably close relationships with the Emperor and his favorite consort Yang Guifei 楊貴妃 (719–756). By 755, An Lushan had been given concurrent command of three contiguous commands. Such a threat inevitably rose to the attention of court officials even as Emperor Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712–756) remained unconcerned with the situation. The political maneuvering to neutralize the threat posed by An eventually persuaded him that his interests were best served by challenging the court directly. Consequently, on December 16, 755 (in the eleventh month of the Chinese calendar), he rose in rebellion, declaring himself emperor of his own Yan Dynasty, and launched a military campaign against the Tang’s twin capitals, Chang’an and Luoyang. An’s military strength enabled him to defeat the imperial armies placed in his way and capture Luoyang (in modern Henan province) in January of 756. Although the next stage was more challenging, his forces took the main capital of Chang’an in July forcing Emperor Xuanzong to flee to Sichuan.3 That was the high point of the rebels’ success. An Lushan himself was assassinated the next year, and internal divisions among the rebels kept them from capitalizing on their early victories. Nevertheless, a seven-year struggle that ranged across much of the empire’s heartland resulted in the fracturing of the pre-rebellion order. The historical forces that initiated the Tang-Song Transition emerged in that changed environment. The loss of imperial control, the paralysis of ordinary administrative mechanisms, and the disruption of provincial communications during the military campaigns ironically required the court, now in the hands of Xuanzong’s successor Tang Suzong 肅宗 (r. 756–762), to rely more on ad hoc commissionerships to defend against rebel incursions and protect the flow of resources needed for imperial operations. Such commissionerships were no longer restricted to the frontiers. In the context of the widespread internal rebellion, the entire empire was the frontier. Commissionerships therefore came to cover the entire territory of the empire, and the court granted the commissioners extraordinary autonomy in the administration of their jurisdictions, which even included playing a role in the appointment of subordinate officials. The levels of autonomy, however, varied widely across the empire. One of the tactics used by the court to undermine rebel commitment was targeted amnesties and the granting of commissionerships to surrendered rebel generals in the North China plain and the rebel heartland on the northeastern frontier. Those military commissioners were particularly independent. Whereas commissioners in the South reliably submitted taxes to the court, a number of wealthy ones in the North China Plain did not submit taxes for decades after the suppression of the rebellion in 763. The proliferation of commissionerships was one symptom of a larger phenomenon that characterized Tang government in the late eighth and ninth centuries: a persistent decentralization of authority combined with institutional innovation through which the court could address new foreign and domestic challenges. Besides territorial administration, the 145

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other sector where this was most obvious was in the fiscal administration. The interruption of regular tax submissions was the immediate prod for improvisation in the fiscal system, but some of the need predated the An Lushan Rebellion. The premise of the taxation system implemented in the early years of the dynasty, the so-called Equal Field ( juntian 均田) System, was the periodic redistribution of land to the farming population which was thereby liable for the supply of a grain tax in kind (zu 租), a corvée labor obligation (yong 庸), and a cloth tax in kind (diao 調).4 Although this system, which had been inherited from earlier dynasties, had the advantage of breaking the aristocracy’s hold over local land ownership and forging a direct connection to the population, it required diligence in maintaining population registers and suffered as the population attempted to evade taxes. Already in the 730s, the government faced the significant problem of a growing unregistered population that had fled the tax rolls. The destruction of government records during the rebellion and the mediation of the commissionerships meant that the dynasty lost the mechanisms to reliably implement the equal field system. In response, the financial official Yang Yan 楊炎 (727–781) proposed, and the court adopted, a new Double Tax law (liangshui fa 兩稅法) in 780. Although so named because the taxes were collected in two installments, one in the autumn and one in the summer, the real significance of the innovation lay elsewhere. First, it shifted the basis of taxation from a per head basis, which required detailed knowledge of the individual taxpayer, to a per wealth basis. As long as assets were known, collection was possible. Second, it gave the commissionerships a direct role in the collection of taxes. The court negotiated a quota that a given commissioner would submit from his jurisdiction, which relieved it of the need to directly monitor and enforce local financial operations.5 Its need for revenue, however, was not solely satisfied by the receipts from the Double Tax system. It also fell back on a tried and true method of finance: the Salt Monopoly. In fact, the monopoly became so important that its jurisdiction expanded to a general supervision of the financial operations in much of the South. At the same time, these financial changes shifted the center of gravity within the central government ministries. The Ministry of Finance (hu bu 戶部), one of the traditional Six Ministries of the central government, was gradually eclipsed by one of its subordinate offices, the Bureau of General Accounts (duzhi si 度支司), which came to dominate the dynasty’s financial operations in the northern portions of the empire.6 It was this latter bureau that eventually became one of the central constituents of the subsequent Northern Song dynasty’s State Finance Commission (san si 三司) system. Institutional improvisation and financial restructuring were ultimately designed to accomplish a restoration of the kind of court sovereignty that had characterized the Tang imperium during the first half of Xuanzong’s reign. The suppression of the rebellion had left the northeast under the control of military men with little inclination to subordinate themselves to direction from Chang’an. Although they nominally accepted Tang authority, over time, a number of them sought to have relatives, especially sons, succeed them in their commissionerships. Such hereditary appointment naturally threatened the primacy of the court and raised the specter of further rebellion. As a result, post-rebellion emperors devoted themselves to reining in the recalcitrant commissioners, with mixed results. The first serious attempt was made early in the reign of Tang Dezong 德宗 (r. 779–805). Beginning in 780, he took a decidedly confrontational approach to the commands in the North China Plain, provoking a cascading rebellion that nearly unseated him and almost ended the dynasty. Nevertheless, although he had been temporarily driven from the capital, the residual loyalty of capital officials and staff officers among the rebels enabled him to survive the challenge. 146

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While Dezong’s experience was a sobering indication of the difficulty in reasserting administrative control over the entire empire, his grandson was more successful. Tang Xianzong 憲宗 (r. 805–820) was able to gradually bring most of the recalcitrant provinces to heel, but that effort required thirteen years, from 806 until 819, and a series of military confrontations. Even then, although he was from then on credited as the quintessential “restoration ruler” (zhongxing zhi jun 中興之君), his successors could not sustain his achievement. Control over the independently minded commissionerships once again began to slip from court control after his death. Yet, Xianzong and his officials had laid the foundation for sustained court political relevance for decades to come. This last point is an important one if we are to avoid a common pitfall in assessing the final century and a half of Tang history. Much of the historiographical treatment of the post-755 period, the foundation for which was laid in the eleventh century by Northern Song historians, has emphasized the decline of Tang power and interpreted this decline as the result of three intertwined forces. The first of those forces was the drive for autonomy in the northeastern commands. The reasons for that desire are complex and need not detain us here, but to later historians, its persistence placed the dynasty always on the defense. Their efforts to understand the problem led them to the second two forces: eunuch influence and bureaucratic factionalism. The increasingly public role of eunuchs in dynastic affairs was the more sensational of these two, and there was long historiographical precedent for interpreting the spread of eunuch influence as a sign of political decline going back to the Han Dynasty (202 bce–220 ce). The manipulation of the imperial succession by eunuchs during Eastern Han era in the first two centuries of the Common Era was a natural analog to what Song historians, and even ninth century commentators, saw in Tang political life. In some ways, the blurring of the roles between the “inner court” (i.e. the imperial household establishment, from which the eunuchs came) and the “outer court” (the regular bureaucracy) was a natural temptation to emperors suspicious of self-interested officials. The eunuchs, given their dependence on imperial support, seemed like the perfect surrogates to emperors like Dezong and Xianzong who worried about the loss of direct imperial control. As a result, from initial emergency appointments as imperial representatives to palace armies, eunuch activity spread to include actual command of armies. One powerful example of this was Tutu Chengcui 吐突承璀 (d. 820), who commanded a campaign against a recalcitrant military commissioner in 810. Besides their role in military affairs, eunuchs also took up management roles in various financial organs, especially the emperor’s personal treasury, which allowed them to influence imperial finances, independent of ordinary fiscal oversight. Not surprisingly, their proximity to the throne and their increased political role led them to ever more active efforts to control the imperial succession. Traditional sources even accuse some eunuchs of engineering the assassination of emperors. Whether true or not, these accusations speak to a perception of the eunuchs as a central force in the political life of the late eighth and ninth centuries. While civil officials may have chafed at eunuch political involvement, they recognized the reality of the situation and attempted to work with the eunuchs while minimizing their intrusion into realms they believed the rightful preserve of the bureaucrats. The 835 episode known as the Sweet Dew Incident made evident the difficulty of achieving this, even with the backing of an emperor. In the event, the emperor Tang Wenzong 文宗 (r. 827–840) conspired with trusted advisors to ambush and eliminate powerful eunuchs when emperor’s entourage left the palace grounds to observe the auspicious omen of “sweet dew” that had appeared on a fruit tree. Unfortunately for the conspirators, the eunuchs discovered the plot 147

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and outmaneuvered them resulting in increased eunuch power at court after the slaughter of the plotters and their sympathizers by troops under eunuch control. Traditional historians pointed to the third force, bureaucratic factionalism, as a further explanation of why momentum to restore dynastic power waned and the court grew impotent after Xianzong’s reign. The existence of bureaucratic patronage networks and rivalry for political power was an ever-present feature of Tang institutions, certainly predating the An Lushan Rebellion. But later commentators found the prolonged rivalry between Li Deyu 李德裕 (787–850) and Niu Sengru 牛僧儒 (780–849) particularly significant. It began in earnest in 821 (though some historians have sought earlier roots), and was marked by an acrimonious struggle that saw each alternating in and out of power as Grand Councilors while their supporters were periodically promoted or demoted and sent to provincial postings. There have been many attempts in the past century to find explanations for the struggle, either social or ideological. None has proved completely persuasive. Instead, it was probably fed by multiple considerations, including institutional culture, social change, material interests, and intellectual differences, that interacted in complex ways that scholars are still working to untangle. These accounts of the Late Tang, by focusing on the court and its relationship with the recalcitrant commands in the North China Plain have, however, obscured a larger truth. Historians from the Song dynasty on already knew that the Tang had fallen, and culturally the event that resonated most for traditional literati was the tragedy of Tang Xuanzong and the calamitous end of his glorious reign with the An Lushan Rebellion. It has therefore been easy to cast the final century and a half of the Tang imperium as the story of the Tang collapse. Yet, we might switch the question from “Why did the Tang fall?” to “Why did the Tang last so long?” One hundred and fifty-one years (from 756 to 907) is not a short time, and the ability of the Tang court to withstand the problems and changed circumstances wrought by the rebellion and its aftermath is testament to the resilience of the Tang system and its evolving institutions. Evidence compiled by Nicolas Tackett and others has demonstrated that the court did actually play an active role in making appointments of senior officials, including military commissioners, in most parts of the empire into the 870s, even in such strategically crucial places as Bianzhou 汴州 (present-day Kaifeng in Henan province), a crucial transportation hub that controlled access to the vital tax base in the southeast and stood as a protective barrier for movement from the northeast to the capital region. Beyond the functioning of the appointment mechanisms, the continued engagement of the civil elite, as evidenced by the intensity of their factional struggles and their willingness to lay their personal safety on the line, shows that they retained a commitment to the Tang dynasty and a belief in its continuing legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Tang did end, and the question of why is one of import for China’s political history. The precise mechanism of that end derived from the political changes discussed earlier. The emergence of semi-autonomous commissionerships did determine the pathway that the final collapse of the Tang followed, but the chain of events began more narrowly in the mid-870s with yet another empire-shattering rebellion. This was the Huang Chao 黃巢 (835–884) Rebellion, which raged for several years, and, unlike the An Lushan Rebellion, devastated wide swaths of the South as well as the North. As a result, the court lost its remaining grasp on military and political power, which now fell into the hands of powerful generals with regional commands. The two most important, Zhu Wen 朱溫 (852–912) and Li Keyong 李克用 (856–908), engaged in their own protracted struggle that ended with Zhu taking control of the court, relocating it to his base at Bianzhou 汴州, and ultimately forcing the abdication of the last Tang emperor, Emperor Ai 哀帝 (r. 904–907). 148

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He then declared himself emperor and founded his own dynasty, the Later Liang 後梁 (907–923). Li Keyong, ethnically a Shatuo 沙陀 Turk, died before mounting an imperial challenge, but his descendants created the Later Tang 後唐 (923–937) which overthrew the Later ­Liang and became the second of the Five Dynasties, for which the period following the Tang is named. The final end of the Tang then, as perhaps is always the case with long-lasting dynasties, was a confused and humbling affair, whose contrast with the remembered glory of the early eighth century continued to resonate in later cultural memory. But while 907 marks the political end of the Tang dynasty, the years from 755 to 907 initiated processes that continued well past that date and are central to the Tang-Song Transition.

The social basis of empire after 755 The establishment and stabilization of the Tang dynasty in the early seventh century depended largely on its ability to harness the support of a few dozen aristocratic clans that traced their ancestry back to the second century ce, controlled great wealth through landed estates, and had dominated government office during the Northern and Southern Dynasties through their command of the cultural canon. Tang rulers had to balance recognition of the Great Clans’ social dominance with the penetration of local society to extract the resources needed for a stable imperial government. By the middle of the eighth century, however, the Great Clans had become completely committed to the Tang project. Most of the clans, regardless of their regional origins, had made the important move of acquiring residences in the capital regions (in Chang’an or Luoyang). In many cases, this included the crucial step of moving clan graveyards to the capital corridor. Ritually and politically, then, the Great Clans had identified their interests with the Tang, and service in the Tang government proved lucrative for them in return. By inducing the Great Clans to accept their authority, the Tang rulers subtly changed the terms of the relationship between the social elite and political authority. As Peter Bol has argued, once the authority to determine the suitability for office was controlled by the dynasty, instead of by family status, it became possible for those not from the most elite clans to aspire to office by acquiring the knowledge and cultural refinement that the clans used to justify their political power.7 The elaboration of the civil service examination system provided an institutional mechanism for demonstrating that mastery. Of course, the Great Clans continued to hold the advantage in the competition for office. The vast majority of Tang officials qualified for office via the so-called “protection privilege” (yin 蔭) whereby the sons of high-ranking officials were automatically eligible for appointment to office.8 Moreover, the curriculum for the examinations and the qualities assessed in the selection evaluations were those on which the Great Clans had prided themselves for centuries. And they had the resources, both material and temporal, to pursue the education necessary to compete for office. Nevertheless, the narrow pathway left for less prominent families to enter the service had a profound impact after 755. One measure of the changing environment was the increasing number of Great Clan scions who chose to compete directly in the examinations. The increasing prestige of the examinations among those with other institutional avenues open to them clearly implies that demonstrating their intellectual qualities was more advantageous than relying solely on their clan status. After 755, these trends accelerated. Although mid-twentieth-century scholarship attempted to locate the significant transformation in the composition of the Tang social elite in the initial expansion of the examination system under the Empress Wu Zetian 武則天 149

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(r. 690–705), both during her regency and then during her reign as Empress Regnant, that moment was, at most, a preparatory stage. There is no evidence of a large enough influx of non-Great Clan members into officialdom to significantly alter the social basis of the government. After the An Lushan Rebellion, however, other dynamics, namely, institutional, cultural, and social, reinforced the social leveling potential of the examinations in a way that resulted, over the long term of two centuries, in the emergence of a new social elite, often referred to as the shidafu 士大夫, or literati, by the eleventh century. Scholars have long known that the Tang society was more complexly stratified than a simple division between aristocrats and non-aristocrats, or even the traditional functional differentiation of the population into the educated (shi 士), the farmers (nong 農), the artisans (gong 工), and the merchants (shang 商). Leaving aside ethnic communities and regional variations for the moment, we know that between the farming population, which formed the basis of the equalfield system, and the Great Clans, there was certainly a spectrum of locally prominent families who had not achieved the ranks of the aristocracy, but who had acquired some wealth and had invested some of it into educating sons in order to place them in government service. The relocation of the Great Clans to the Chang’an-Luoyang capital corridor likely created the social space necessary for this lower-rung elite to fully emerge, but essential to its development was the institutional environment following the suppression of the rebels in 763. The proliferation of military and surveillance commissionerships throughout the empire created administrative staff positions that could absorb the newly qualified talent when the regular organs of the central government were filled. Two other considerations reinforced this institutional opportunity. First, throughout the Tang, institutional culture favored capital service, and specifically court service, over service in provincial areas. This bias meant that even high-ranking provincial appointments were often treated as though they were demotions. The best connected individuals therefore preferred to stay in the capital in order to remain politically relevant. In the late eighth and ninth centuries, the sources attest to the role of provincial and staff service in career development for those who had difficulty securing a position in the capital. The most famous case is probably that of Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824) who finally took service on the staff of Dong Jin 董晉 (724–799), the Military Commissioner in Bianzhou, when even his extraordinary gambit of appealing directly to the Grand Councilors yielded no post.9 The second consideration was the nature of commissioner’s staff work. Although there was certainly plenty of administrative work to be done in the capital, work on a commissioner’s staff was very much practically oriented, dealing with personnel issues, tax collection, and often military matters. Although many of the men appointed to staffs were identified for the same skill set that was the mark of all Tang bureaucrats, commissioners tended to be less status-conscious and therefore more willing to appoint a talented individual who had mastered the administrative culture regardless of whether or not he was a member of a Great Clan. By the late ninth century, provincial commissioner’s staffs were more socially diverse, just as the court was becoming more dominated by members of the Great Clans. As David ­Johnson has argued, the clans seem to have sacrificed their connection with the provinces and committed completely to the Tang and its court.10 When it was devastated during the Huang Chao upheaval and then fell in the usurpation of Zhu Wen, they ceased to have the economic or political resources to sustain themselves, but the provincial commissioner administrations had already developed a more diverse pool of officials that could step into national politics when the conditions allowed.11 By 907, the Early Tang aristocratic empire had given way to a fractured polity with a wider social elite but a shared cultural legacy. 150

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Economic development in the decentralized empire Periodization is always a complex problem, and a single scheme is rarely sufficient for marking transitions. The relationship between the political and economic histories of the Tang dynasty is a good example. When the Tang dynasty reached its political end in 907, economic changes central to the “medieval commercial revolution” had just begun and would not run their course until well into the Southern Song dynasty. Those economic developments, however, depended on the decentralization of power and institutional experimentation that took hold after the rebellion. The upswing in economic activity during this period is another indicator that, as chaotic as the official histories made the second half of the dynasty look, there was sufficient stability to allow for economic development. The medieval commercial revolution that took hold in these centuries did not alter the base of the economy. That remained agriculture, but to this agrarian foundation was added a much more dynamic and nationally integrated commercial network. The work of Mark Elvin and Richard von Glahn shows that during the Tang era, the agrarian economy witnessed the introduction of new seed varieties and new farming methods beginning in the eighth century that ultimately paid dividends by increasing the carrying capacity of the land and producing surplus wealth that could be channeled into new forms of commercial activity.12 This growth was particularly strong in the southern portions of the empire, which were relatively insulated from the areas most affected by the struggles with recalcitrant commissioners in the North China Plain and with states along the northern and western frontiers. The institutional decentralization and the shift of court priorities after 755 created space for various forms of economic experimentation. Early Tang commercial and sumptuary regulations placed serious constraints on the exercise of commerce in the empire, and these were more stringently enforced in the capitals. Commerce was restricted to specific market spaces on a fixed schedule, while walls separated residential wards and city-wide curfews limited the times when individuals could move between them. From the 760s onward, however, the court found it increasingly difficult to enforce these restrictive regulations, and the merchant community responded by expanding market activities. Even in Chang’an, a more organic commercial life took hold as the old restrictions relaxed.13 Political distraction and the consequent neglect of regulations provided a space for commercial development, but contemporary conditions also created incentives to encourage merchant prosperity. The court relied on the merchant distribution network in the operation of its salt monopoly, and once the Double Tax system uncoupled the ownership of land from the taxation of wealth, the rigid focus on the agricultural sector weakened.14 At the same time, the regional administrations recognized the potential resources available from increased mercantile activity and therefore competed to attract merchants to their jurisdictions.15 In this environment, commercial hubs developed around the empire in places such as Bianzhou, Yangzhou 揚州, and Chengdu 成都. The movement of large quantities of agricultural commodities had long been a feature of the imperial tax system. The sources indicate that already in the seventh century, agricultural production in the region around Chang’an could not support the capital’s expanding population, which probably reached a million individuals by the early eighth century. In addition to supplying the needs of the capitals, since taxes were largely collected in kind, the government had to move commodities to other places where needed. This inevitably drove the development of transportation infrastructure including roads and canals to facilitate the transfer of tax goods. The most famous, and most massive, of those projects was the Grand Canal system. Begun under the Sui Dynasty (581–618), it linked the capital corridor to the grain producing 151

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areas of the North China Plain and the Lower Yangzi. Once the regulatory brakes on commercial activity eased, long-distance commerce could take advantage of this infrastructure.16 Monetary innovation was a natural corollary to increased interregional trade. The Tang currency system, as had been the case with earlier dynasties, relied on a combination of bronze coins and commodity money. For larger transactions, the bronze coins were theoretically denominated in strings of one thousand coins, while the most common commodity money was silk measured in bolts of approximately 40 feet by 2 feet.17 Such a currency system worked for relatively short-distance trade and tax collection in kind, but both bronze coinage and cloth bolts made poor choices when resources had to be transported. They were heavy and bulky, which meant that transport costs reduced the profitability of commerce. In this situation, provincial authorities developed a paper instrument called “flying money” ( feiqian 飛錢) that dramatically lightened the load. These were paper certificates of deposit denominated in “strings” that enabled merchants to deposit currency in the capital in exchange for certificates of equal value and redeem them at their final destination.18 In this way, transport costs derived entirely from the trade goods themselves. These developments—an increasingly permissive regulatory environment, a more convenient monetary system, and a developing interregional transport system—continued after the political demise of the Tang. But the coming sophistication of the Song dynasty economy depended on this foundation laid during the Tang.

Cultural change after 755 It would be remarkable if an intellectual and cultural reorientation had not accompanied the aforementioned changes. From the perspective of the pre-rebellion court, the basic intellectual and cultural networks were fundamentally altered after 755. At the same time, the specific ideas that came to the fore began an intellectual exploration that had profound implications for the subsequent late imperial period. Taken together, these trends—the alteration of intellectual relationships and the unfolding of new ideas—constitute yet another dimension of the Tang-Song Transition. Thinking about the shift of elite relationships along different axes helps to clarify the mechanisms by which new ideas and modes of inquiry could develop and spread through the educated elite. Three decades ago, David McMullen mapped the intellectual component of the pervasive decentralization that followed in the wake of the An Lushan Rebellion.19 The seventh-century Tang court was a commanding force in a politically essential intellectual project: the reintegration of a divided intellectual culture following the political reunification of the empire in the late sixth century. This process drove both the production of official histories of the pre-Tang dynasties and a court-sponsored, standard edition of the Confucian Classics with sanctioned commentaries. The court’s officials continued to refine its ritual code into the early eighth century to express the coherence of the moral order that the imperial Li family had given the empire. Besides these inherently political projects, the centrality of the court in the intellectual imagination gave it a wider cultural significance. Stephen Owen, for example, has extensively documented the way writers located in proximity to the court developed styles that led ultimately to the poetic brilliance of Tang Xuanzong’s reign so admired by critics in later centuries.20 After 755, the court lost influence as more immediate political concerns rendered intellectual projects secondary. At the same time, the increasingly diverse social background of the educated class and the growing importance of provincial service during the formative stages of political careers shifted the initiative away from formal court positions and into a new network of personal relationships forged in the course of shared institutional experience. 152

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Anna Shields’s work on evolving notions of friendship in the mid-Tang period demonstrates how individual, non-kin relationships, such as that between the famous officials Bai Juyi 白居易 (772–846) and Yuan Zhen 元稹 (779–831), became culturally compelling and remade the entire range of literary genres.21 As the Great Clans and the imperial court became more isolated, these personal connections became the conduit for the development of a broad range of philosophical, religious, historical, and literary ideas. The development of these ideas shows clearly how the conscious commitments of thinking individuals and the long-term significance of their ideas can diverge dramatically. The thinkers who followed each other on the historical stage for more than a century after the An Lushan Rebellion had the singular goal of restoring the dynasty to greatness. That they also laid the foundation for a world in which the Early Tang system was irrelevant does not diminish their dedication. Yet the catastrophe of the rebellion forced them to face a difficult reality: the classical tradition had proposed that good government led to a harmonious society and a culture that reinforced the moral order, but the rebellion was proof that Tang government had not guaranteed the “moral edification” ( jiaohua 教化) that the Sages of antiquity had promised. Already during the rebellion and continuing through the rest of the dynasty, intellectuals called for cultural and political reform, identifying the ills they saw in both. These calls ranged from a moderate approach that sought to ground an inclusive culture in a morally serious tradition that would place political power in the hands of educated men, to more extreme positions that no longer trusted the tradition to guide values and instead saw the need for a radical reconnection to a reconstructed “antiquity.”22 The former was represented by successful officials such as Quan Deyu 權德輿 (759–818) and Bai Juyi, while the more radical position is well known under the banner of the “Ancient Style” (guwen 古文) movement. Its practitioners were the group associated with Han Yu that emphasized the need for a personal connection to the sages of antiquity and thereby shifted the conversation from collective engagement in the cultural tradition to individual moral exploration. Although a marginal position in their time, this “individual turn” ultimately culminated in the reorientation of intellectual culture in the Northern Song and the rise of Daoxue 道學 (often referred to as Neo-Confucianism) in the Southern Song. The contrast between mainstream reform efforts and Han Yu’s circle threatens to suggest a binary debate over what constituted the relationship between morality and culture, so it is important to recognize that these were simply the most visible aspects of a complex intellectual scene. Although the production of private commentaries on the Confucian classics is rightly associated with the Song dynasty and periods thereafter, the shift of initiative in classical commentary away from the court and bureaucracy had already begun in the late eighth century. A circle of thinkers interested in the lessons of the Spring and Autumn Annals that included Dan Zhu 啖助 (b. 723), Zhao Kuang 趙匡 (766–779), and Lu Chun 陸淳 (d. 805) had achieved some fame by the beginning of the ninth century. Moreover, beyond classical scholarship, a number of statecraft thinkers began to think more systematically about the nature and evolution of institutions. Chief among these at the turn of the ninth century was Du You 杜佑 (735–812), whose massive Comprehensive Institutions (Tongdian 通典) set the pattern for a new tradition of institutional histories.

Cultural identity and empire after 755 One important aspect of the changed situation in the post-755 empire involves a complicated nexus of geopolitics, cultural identity, and religion. Given the scope of these individual elements, it is not surprising that a simple and persuasive account has thus far eluded scholars. 153

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Nevertheless, more sophisticated approaches are appearing, so our picture is becoming clearer, although more complicated than earlier interpretations suggest. The geopolitical context is the simplest part of the equation. As noted earlier, prior to the An Lushan Rebellion, Tang power extended into Central Asia (as far as Transoxiana well beyond the Taklamakan desert to the west). Although this marked the limit to which the Tang had projected power into Central Asia, the scope of the empire changed drastically following An Lushan’s revolt. During the course of the rebellion, the court was forced to withdraw from the Tarim Basin, essentially shifting the boundary of the dynasty eastward into what is today eastern Gansu. Furthermore, the strategic relationship between the Tang and its frontier neighbors was permanently altered. Not only did the dynasty come to rely on the military support of the Uighur states to the north in suppressing the rebels, the Tang capital was sacked on a number of occasions by both the Uighurs and a newly emboldened Tibetan state. The late eighth century therefore marked a shift, with the Tang dynasty losing the strategic initiative and assuming a defensive posture on its frontier. The change in the geopolitical situation between the dynasty and what Tang officials saw as barbarian peoples has led to a long tradition of interpreting other events in the post-­ rebellion period in ethnic terms, specifically the positing of a binary relationship between “Chinese” and “non-Chinese.” Hugh Clark and others have pointed out, however, that the notion of what constituted “Chinese” was still a developing concept. The South itself was still a diverse area marked by significant cultural distinctiveness.23 When considering the relationship of the empire and its people to ethnic groups beyond its borders, it is important to keep the cultural variation within the empire firmly in mind. Recognizing the diversity of the empire and the danger of anachronistic understandings of ethnic identity is necessary because a common misinterpretation of post-Tang history is that China lost a cultural cosmopolitanism that had marked the Tang culture prior to the mid-eighth century and witnessed the development of a xenophobia after 755 that continued to define China’s relationship with the world thereafter. Buddhism is often the focus when considering evidence for such an inward turn in the latter part of the Tang period. By far the most famous examples cited are two polemical texts by Han Yu. His “Memorial Discussing the Buddha Bone” (Lun Fogu biao 論佛骨表), in which he criticized Emperor Xianzong for personally welcoming a procession for a relic of the Buddha, was so confrontational that it led to his demotion to a post in the far south and almost resulted in his execution for lèse-majesté. Han Yu’s opening line dismissively asserted that Buddhism was a late addition to China that had been unnecessary when the sages of antiquity had guided society. Almost a decade earlier, in his “Approaching the Origin of the Way” (Yuandao 原道), Han argued that one of the problems with contemporary society was the emergence of parasitical segments of the population, especially the large number of Buddhist and Daoist monastic communities. While the critique here was not exclusively a critique of foreignness—Daoism after all was an indigenous tradition—it connected the Buddhist consumption of resources to its role in distracting people from the values of the Confucian sages. The middle of the ninth century saw the demonization of the Buddhist monastic community raised to the national political level. In the early 840s, the Emperor Wuzong 武宗 (r. 840–846) issued a series of edicts targeting Buddhist and other non-indigenous religious establishments. These culminated in a general suppression in 845, the terms of which required the destruction of Buddhist shrines, confiscations of monastic estates, and the laicization of all Buddhist monks and nuns. Although the opportunity to confiscate the wealth of the religious establishments and return clergy to the tax rolls was certainly a dimension 154

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of the initiative, the most comprehensive edict issued by the emperor in the eighth month of 845 made the same connection to values and social stability that Han Yu had articulated four decades earlier. No doubt that the Buddhist establishment suffered damage during the episode, but the suppression was reversed by his successor soon after Wuzong’s death in 846. Although scholars once argued that the suppression drove Chinese Buddhism into a long decline thereafter, recent scholarship has emphasized the continued vitality of the tradition, both during the final decades of the Tang and in the centuries following. In this light, critiques such as those by Han Yu and Wuzong were rare expressions of the cultural angst and fiscal insecurity of the post-An Lushan environment that drew on a strain of critique that went back to the earliest arrival of Buddhism in China. But by the mid-ninth century, Buddhist ideas were so ingrained that isolated polemics and a brief political suppression could not trigger a collapse of the tradition. In other ways, however, Later Tang Buddhism echoes the broader changes highlighted earlier. Although the wealth of monastic establishments had continued to draw the attention of cultural critics and fiscal officials, those establishments were subject to the same economic trends that were reshaping the rest of the Tang economy. Economic developments had certainly reduced the centrality and self-sufficiency of all types of manorial estates, be they Great Clan estates or monastic estates. By the twelfth century, Buddhist establishments would rely much more on their provision of religious services to the wider society and the patronage of local elites to support their continued existence. More broadly, as the court played a less determinative intellectual role and private social networks came to dominate the culture, Buddhist thinkers similarly reoriented themselves toward personal relationships that highlighted the individual in the moral universe.24 Although scholarship since the 1980s has shown that the idea of a separate, institutionalized Chan 禪 ( Japanese: Zen) school during the Tang was largely an anachronistic creation of Northern Song writers, they have also demonstrated the continuing appearance of new approaches to the textual tradition and the growing importance of master-disciple transmission in various schools of Buddhist philosophy.25

Conclusions It is perhaps true that all historical periods are transitional since they begin from an inherited legacy and set the stage for subsequent developments. The latter half of the Tang was “transitional” in a more profound way. It was the launching pad for the complete restructuring of Chinese society and culture known as the Tang-Song Transition. That transition was not complete when the Tang dynasty came to an end in 907, but it ultimately led to a China that was almost unrecognizable in the twelfth century from what it was in the early eighth century.

Notes 1 For an account of Naitō’s views, see Joshua Fogel, Politics and Sinology: The Case of Nait ō Konan, 1866–1934 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). 2 Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 205–223. 3 Pulleyblank, The Background of the An Lu-shan Rebellion. 4 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 24–29. 5 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 39–48. 6 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 99–100, 110–120. Note the translation of office titles remains inconsistent among scholars. I have used translations that indicate the duties of the offices without following any scholar consistently.

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Anthony DeBlasi 7 Bol, “This Culture of Ours,” 44–46. 8 Twitchett estimated that the examination system produced only about ten percent of Tang officials: Denis Twitchett, “Introduction” in Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 3, 21. 9 Hartman, Han Yü, (1986), 30–35. 10 Johnson, “Last Years of a Great Clan,” 99–102. 11 Tackett, The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy, 187–234. 12 Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), 118–24 and von Glahn, An Economic History of China, 218–25. 13 Twitchett, “Merchants, Trade and Government,” 77. 14 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 51–52 on the salt monopoly; and “Merchants, Trade, and Government,” 78–79. 15 Twitchett, “Merchants, Trade, and Government,” 79–80, on local government commercial taxation; Twichett, “The T’ang Market System,” 240–41, on the encouragement of local commercial activity. 16 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past, 131–32. 17 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 70–71. 18 Twitchett, Financial Administration, 72–73. 19 McMullen, State and Scholars, 28. 20 Owen, The Great Age of Chinese Poetry, 1981. 21 Shields, One Who Knows Me, especially, 82–132. 22 DeBlasi, Reform in the Balance. 23 Clark, The Sinitic Encounter. 24 Peter Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 25 See, for examples, Griffith Foulk, “Myth, Ritual, and Monastic Practice in Sung Ch’an Buddhism,” in Patricia Ebrey and Peter Gregory, eds., Religion and Society in T’ang and Sung China (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1993), 147–59; and John McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism. (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1983).

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10 The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Peter Lorge

The period known as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (Ten States) is conventionally described as running from 907, when the last emperor of the Tang dynasty abdicated his throne, to 960, when the first emperor of the Song dynasty established the Song. It is therefore a period of interregnum between the Tang and Song dynasties. These simple chronological facts, however, mask a far more complicated history that goes to the heart of traditional Chinese historiography, political philosophy, Chinese identity, and territorial imagination. Chinese historians writing during the Song dynasty were acutely aware of all of these problems, and their responses, while deeply integrated into their accounts of the period, were also informed by their own cultural and political biases. Song dynasty histories of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period were often as much about the Song dynasty as the preceding period. The decline of the Tang dynasty laid the groundwork for the Five Dynasties period, shaping the nature of the political and military struggle, often shaded with ethnic concerns, for the first half of the tenth century. Arguably, the Sino-Türkic struggle that was finally played out in the tenth century had been built into the founding of the Tang dynasty from its inception. Many of the aristocratic lineages that rose to prominence in the centuries before the Tang dynasty were culturally mixed, including the family of Li Yuan 李淵 (566–635), the Tang founder. Aristocratic lineages dominated the Tang court, as well as their local bases. Their power even persisted after the upheavals of the An Lushan Rebellion (755–763) temporarily destroyed the power of the central court. It was only after the Huang Chao Rebellion (874–884) that these aristocratic lineages lost power.1 As the previous stabilizing forces, both political and cultural, collapsed, the struggle for power became acute and the Tang fell. The southern and western parts of the Tang Empire became peripheral to the struggle for power in North China by the end of the ninth and beginning of the tenth centuries. The Tang Empire broke apart along the North-South fault line, emphasizing the separateness of the North from the group of southern polities. Where the North passed mostly as a unit from the control of one ruling house to another, the South fragmented into many smaller units. The North-South split also marked the very different geopolitical situations the disparate regimes faced. Northern regimes contended with Steppe involvement in their political and military power struggles. Southern regimes fought amongst themselves without much concern for the North. 157

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Perhaps because there was no northern threat, the South encompassed a number of warring regimes. While the kingdom of Shu in Sichuan had a history, due to its encircling ring of mountains, of separation, the reason for the splits within the rest of the South is less clear. The different polities were more culturally developed than the northern regimes, having inherited much of elite Tang culture. They also continued the trend that began in the Tang of faster population growth and greater economic development. At the same time, southern armies would prove much less effective than northern ones. The territory of the South fostered political fragmentation, at least under the political and cultural conditions of the early tenth century. The North was tightly bound to the Steppe and its politics. Steppe groups had been active in North China for centuries before even the Tang Dynasty was founded. The cradle of Chinese civilization along the Yellow River was not isolated from the Steppe. Steppe groups interpenetrated the Central Plains of North China, with the Yellow River, rather than a mythical “Great Wall boundary” marking the southernmost point of Steppe influence by the tenth century.2 North China was also conducive to cavalry forces, unlike in the South, leading to far more developed and effective armies. Ultimately the struggle to control the legitimate government of North China in the tenth century wore down the elites, Sinitic, Steppe, and Sino-Steppe, who emerged from the Tang dynasty. The establishment of the Song dynasty in 960 marked not only a changing of the guard with respect to elites, but also a dramatic shift in military and political fortunes for the central government of North China. While from a historiographical perspective the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period ended in 960, the culture of the period took longer to subside. It is still an open question as to when Song culture truly started, or at least became distinct from what preceded it. Indeed, defining what came before as “Chinese” in some pure sense is only practical from a retrospective, selective, and elite perspective. In any case, there was no sharp break as there was in the political sphere, where a new dynasty was declared. At a minimum, it was not until several decades after the Song founding that a new culture was apparent. Indeed, it is the issue of the emergence of Song culture that marks the historiography of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. From the perspective of eleventh-century Song historians, the preceding period was very different from their own, a benighted time in contrast to the Song. The three main histories that cover this period——, The Old History of the Five Dynasties (Jiu Wudai shi 舊五代史, by Xue Juzheng 薛居正 and others), The New History of the Five Dynasties (Xin Wudai shi 新五代史, by Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修), and the last 29 chapters (266–294) of The Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governing (Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑, by Sima Guang 司馬光 and his collaborators), present somewhat different views. The Old History was written in the late tenth century, before the Song conquest was complete. The New History and the Comprehensive Mirror were written after the conquest ended, in a period of cultural efflorescence but deep anxiety about what was perceived to be a flawed dynastic founding. Our received understanding of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms comes from the eleventh-century perspective and the pivotal historiographic enterprise based in that time. Fundamentally, Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang portrayed the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period as a time of chaos caused not only by contending military factions, but also by the breakdown of Confucian political mores. While Ouyang and Sima disagreed on many aspects of history, both saw the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms as a disorderly time in between two great dynasties, the Tang and the Song. Both men also agreed that the political legitimacy of the Tang dynasty was transmitted to the Song through the northern regimes. This generalization requires a bit of nuance, however, because although Ouyang Xiu created the designation “Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms” that suggests that the sequence of five northern imperial houses were legitimate dynasties in contradistinction to the illegitimate 158

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southern kingdoms, Ouyang explicitly stated that he, and he alone, regarded only the Later Liang as legitimate, and not the following four regimes.3 The historiographical implications of this are fairly complex, particularly because Ouyang’s argument in favor of Later Liang legitimacy is both technical and not very convincing. Perhaps as a consequence of these historiographical conventions, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period has not been well studied. Seen merely as an interregnum between the regular operations of Chinese dynasties, it had little to offer historians except for limited sources, complex and incoherent narratives, and a lack of important developments. Conversely, looked at as a period without a unifying political cloak, it reveals the naked structure of the underlying social, economic, cultural, and political milieu of the tenth century. More significantly, the structures revealed for the tenth century are examples of what existed throughout most, if not all, of Chinese history. The very idea that localized Chinese cultures always existed, while always tacitly acknowledged by modern scholars, has hitherto had relatively little impact on the study of China before the Ming dynasty. It is only in later imperial Chinese history that regional studies have flourished.4 A significant bias of the eleventh-century reading of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period is the assumption of a natural division of loyalties between Chinese and non-Chinese people. Song scholars expected that ethnic identity would determine political loyalty. But as Naomi Standen has shown, this was not a tenth-century expectation.5 Not only were regions and localities not inherently drawn to an imperial center, people were not naturally fixated on following other members of their own ethnic group. Political loyalties were based on politics until the end of the tenth century. There were no natural boundary lines or borders separating peoples and polities. This fact runs contrary to the usual portrayal of imperial Chinese history. The overemphasized idea that some sort of “natural” division between Sinitic and Steppe people existed approximately where the Ming dynasty Great Wall was constructed has long confused a broad band of militarily contested territory with a cultural separation. The rough, but usually unmarked, borders of the major dynasties were lines of military equilibrium between contending polities. During the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, these also existed within the Chinese ecumene, emphasizing their general lack of coincidence with culture or ethnic identification. The reality on the ground before, during, or after a major dynasty like the Tang or the Song did not fully match imperial historiographical conventions. The history of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period is thus not an aberration but a reality check.

Late Tang and the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms At root, the study of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period highlights the tension between the idea of a strong, unifying central government ruling over China and strong, distinct regions only nominally under central authority. The course of Tang history and the dynasty’s collapse exemplified these issues since the causes of its decline were primarily internal. This is a key difference between the Tang and Song dynasties; internal forces destroyed the Tang, but external forces destroyed the Song. Arguably, as the narrative of many Song historians in the eleventh century and after suggested, in solving the Tang’s internal weakness, the Song made itself externally vulnerable. The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period was therefore the ultimate expression of the failed Tang system that the Song had to overcome to create a new unifying dynasty. The Tang ruling family emerged from the mixed Chinese-Steppe military aristocracy of northern China in the seventh century. This mixed heritage, which was pervasive in North 159

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China among many of the elites, contributed to a cosmopolitan capital culture. Steppe military commanders leading Steppe cavalry forces were prominent in the Tang army, but many Chinese officers were hardly distinguishable in their martial culture. Most of the infantry remained Chinese, based upon a regular system of required military service for adult male farmers (the fubing system). This worked extremely well in establishing and expanding the dynasty when campaigns were intermittent and limited in duration and distance. Once the borders were more stable, and the security threat more consistent and low level, circumstances called for standing border commands with generals given broad civil and military authority in their areas of responsibility. This worked well as long as the border generals were on good terms with the central court. When relations between the court and the border commanders (military governors) broke down, however, the consequences proved disastrous. In 755, as a result of just such a break, the military governor (commissioner) of Lulong in northern Hebei, An Lushan 安祿山, rebelled. In short order, An Lushan, swept down from the border and captured the capital at Luoyang in 756. Although An Lushan would be killed in 757, the rebellion would continue until 763. The rebellion not only forced power holders at every level of society, and within every institution of the Tang government, to choose sides, it also forced them to consider how loyal they were to anyone. Someone who wanted to be loyal to the Tang might be forced to choose between life and death if he were in the path of a rebel army. A more distant would-be loyalist would have to balance his current and future needs against sending aid to the court. More ruthless men might simply take advantage of the weakness of the center to strengthen their grip on local power. After the rebellion was fully suppressed, the court focused on regaining central control over the empire. Central control was most clearly demonstrated in ritual and economic terms, but there were also less obvious yet equally important areas like loyalty and cultural orientation. In general, the Tang court was able to reestablish its control on every level, as the recent work of Nicholas Tackett has demonstrated.6 Elites were still interested in being part of the Tang dynasty. Certainly, there was no good alternative available in the eighth century, and the prospects of life without a central court were unpleasant, as the rebellion had demonstrated. The Tang court’s painstakingly reconstructed power was dealt a mortal blow by another rebellion, this time led by a man named Huang Chao 黃巢. The Huang Chao Rebellion (874–884) (initially started by Wang Xianzhi 王仙芝 and others) was different from the An Lushan Rebellion insofar as the leadership began as salt smugglers, rather than as generals. In that sense, An Lushan was really a mutiny and Huang Chao a rebellion. The Tang court struggled to bring sufficient military force to bear to suppress the An Lushan rebellion. In the wake of the An Lushan Rebellion, the court had been forced to balance out its military power regionally in order to prevent any one general from gaining enough power to threaten the court. Any military force around the court and based at the capital was primarily for defensive purposes, to prevent a repeat of the capital being captured and the court being forced to flee. Not only did this make the capital garrisons unavailable for campaigning, it also tended to leave them less effective than real field armies. The Tang court actually offered Huang official positions to bring him into the government and end the rebellion, but required him to disarm first. Although Huang rejected these terms, he was unable to defeat Tang forces defending the Central Plains and marched south. The court continued simultaneously to fight and bargain with Huang, as both sides sought an agreeable settlement based on changing circumstances. Meanwhile, Tang generals and officials tried to advance their own positions by fighting Huang Chao and seeking rewards from the court. A significant number of Tang officials and generals required extraordinary rewards to do more than defend their own districts. Competition for rewards among the 160

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successful commanders created increasing friction within the Tang army. It became impossible for the court to placate or maintain cooperation among ambitious men who all expected to be placed in charge for defeating the rebellion. Two men emerged as the most effective military leaders in the suppression of the rebellion, Zhu Wen 朱溫 (852–912) and Li Keyong 李克用 (856–908). Despite their effective cooperation against the rebels, Zhu attempted to murder Li in 884. While the failed assassination was the proximate cause of the decisive break between the two men, it was unlikely that they would have willingly and amicably divided power. At least initially, both men were loyal to the Tang government. Zhu was Chinese and Li was a man of the Steppe. Yet since their followers did not break down neatly along ethnic lines, there was no sense of a specifically ethnic struggle for dominance. The struggle for power was simply that, a struggle for power. There were, however, some shades of ethnic identification, whether through built-up networks of relationships or through the inclinations of the leaders of the respective groups. Li Keyong drew more support from Steppe groups and maintained a strong base in the North bordering on the Steppe, around the provincial city of Taiyuan. He tended to have more Steppe cavalry at his disposal than Zhu, who was based more around Bianzhou on the Yellow River. Chinese forces were generally stronger in infantry and siege warfare, though there were many instances where this was not the case. A number of rulers in the North struggled to balance their Steppe and Chinese cultures within themselves, for political and personal reasons. The struggle between Zhu and Li was instrumental in separating North and South China. Since both of them built up their power serving the central government it was natural for them to struggle for control of the emperor and the capital. Given that ultimately the Song dynasty would build its empire from the north Chinese remnants of the Tang dynasty and then move south, Zhu and Li were politically and militarily correct in seeing North China as the key to controlling the Tang Empire. South China could and would be conquered from the North once control of the North was decided. While they struggled in the North, however, the southern and western regions detached themselves from central control. The tension between Steppe and Chinese culture, or at least the power holders who developed in that mixed environment, was resolved on the battlefield in the closing years of the Tang and into the Five Dynasties period. Both of the major players in the Late Tang struggle for power would disintegrate under decades of war and internecine strife. The Sino-Steppe aristocracy consumed itself in the struggle for control over the Tang Empire, opening up a space for new, mostly Chinese, men to take over.

The North and the South The North-South split was far more than a military or political rupture. Economically, the South began to outperform the North during the Tang, a trend that would continue until the present day. Yet it is the cultural split, perhaps linked to the economic split, that would prove even more dramatic. North China retained the military, and thus political advantage during the period. South China absorbed and then developed Tang high culture, which seems to have withered in the North. Partly this was the result of the destruction of many elite lineages in the North and partly the flight of many elites to the South. The southern shift of culture was most obvious in the physical movement and retention of culture in the South. When the Song dynasty centralized its control over culture, it brought libraries, paintings, calligraphy, historical records, and scholars from the South to the North. Some of the objects had been moved to the South to avoid war, while others had been there before the Tang dynasty broke up. The cosmopolitan culture of the Tang capitals was no 161

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longer a northern Chinese enterprise. At least in elite cultural terms, the remnants of the Tang were in the South during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, particularly in the Southern Tang and Shu states. A second aspect of the move of Tang culture to the South was its transformation from a cosmopolitan culture to a purely Chinese culture. Tang culture was always predominantly Chinese, but, particularly before the An Lushan Rebellion, it had been open to outside influences. Whatever Tang elite culture was left or moved to the South became, by definition, Chinese culture. Cosmopolitan aspects of Tang imperial culture were thus functionally Sinified by their sojourn in the South. Despite the foundational ties to cosmopolitan culture, Tang culture came to be seen as purely Chinese. In this sense, the Five Dynasties period “laundered” Tang culture, making it into legitimately Chinese culture. Less clear is how much northern Tang culture was influenced by Southern Tang culture in the South. Certainly, the Tang culture that the Song would draw from the South was not the same as the Tang culture that existed in North China during the Tang dynasty. The largest of the southern regimes, the Southern Tang, was highly developed culturally and economically, as were the succession of Shu regimes in Sichuan. Despite their respective economic strengths, however, neither the Southern Tang nor Shu demonstrated the ability to project military power outside of the South. None of the southern regimes, in fact, managed to do more than maintain their respective borders, hinting at a surprising measure of military equilibrium. It is not clear why this was the case. The South lacked a good supply of horses suitable for warfare, but maintained extensive riverine navies. These separate military environments did not equal out. With the notable exception of the Ming dynasty ­(1368–1644), dynastic conquests in China moved from North, where there was strong cavalry, to South, where there were strong navies. Northern regimes had the advantage even when their cavalry was Chinese rather than Steppe. This North-South split had always existed in the Chinese ecumene, as, indeed, it existed to the end of imperial Chinese history. But the contrast between the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period and the Six Dynasties period (220–589), another period of mostly divided China, is instructive. During the Northern and Southern Dynasties period, it was northern China that was often fragmented and southern China that was usually unified. This was due to Steppe groups contending with each other in North China and a stable regime at Jiankang in the South. In the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period the South was fragmented, though somewhat stable in that fragmentation, and the North remained unified. While there are some nuances to this characterization, which will be discussed later, it points to an important general shift in Chinese history. Chinese regionalism became a more pronounced feature of southern China during the tenth century. North China, by contrast, would stay far more cohesive as a politico-cultural unit. Since these features persisted after the tenth century, arguably until the present, the shift is significant. There are three interrelated reasons for the change from the Northern and Southern Dynasties period. First, the Chinese population in the South began to grow as immigration and acclimation to local diseases improved. Second, the southern economy began to exceed that of the North probably at some point during the Tang dynasty. Third and finally, the Grand Canal tying North to South was extended all the way to the South during the Sui dynasty. Functionally, the Grand Canal allowed for greater segmentation of the Chinese economy and laid the groundwork for what would later become a fully reticulated market system during the Song dynasty. Northern China became dependent upon southern China for food, luxury goods, and taxes. The Grand Canal thus undermined northern economic development, particularly because the North bore the brunt of the military struggle with the Steppe. It was no accident 162

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that the main exception to northern economic decline was the Song capital of Kaifeng in the eleventh and early twelfth century (though Luoyang recovered by the eleventh century and Yanjing was prosperous until the fall of the Liao). Kaifeng was the northern hub of the Grand Canal. When Kaifeng fell to the Jurchen Jin in 1127, the northern economy declined sharply. The Grand Canal itself broke down in the Late Tang due to lack of maintenance. Without the Grand Canal as a conduit of goods north and troops south, North and South began to function in separate geopolitical realms. That flow of goods and services in both directions tied the Tang Empire together. Governments centered in the North needed the Grand Canal to project military force into the South. Zhou Shizong 周世宗, the second emperor of the Later Zhou, the last of the Five Dynasties, reopened the connection between the Huai and Yangzi Rivers as he campaigned south. Without the Grand Canal it was difficult, though not impossible, to conquer the South. Northern China remained mostly under the control of a single regime throughout the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. This territorial and even central government consistency supports the later idea of continuity between the Five Dynasties connecting the Tang and Song dynasties. Significant pieces of land around the edges did fall out of the control of the central government, most obviously the Sixteen Prefectures (the area around modern Beijing) and northern Hedong centered on the city of Taiyuan (the northern part of modern Shanxi Tuoba Tao 拓拔燾 province). Yet why the territory of the series of northern regimes remained intact is unclear. Earlier Chinese history suggests that the east-west struggle for unity at the beginning of the Han dynasty, focused on the Yellow River valley and the Central Plains, was resolved and the Han military problem shifted to its northern and southern borders. The North did not remain undivided during the Six Dynasties Period, however, so northern integration may well have been an effect of Tang dynasty governance. Conversely, southern China was politically fragmented. Again, any explanations for this circumstance must be tentative. Most basically, the terrain of southern China is more divided by mountains and waterways. Of course, waterways were transit links as much as barriers, but this points to a reality of warfare. While most of the North was open to cavalry and more cavalry was available in the North, in the South armies were mostly infantry and riverine navies were crucial. Armies had to work in conjunction with navies to project power through waterways and then out from the ships. The pace and operations of conquest were very different from northern practice, though given that northern powers like the Later Zhou and Song were able to conquer the South, it does not appear the difficulties were insurmountable. Southern political fragmentation was an effect of military capabilities more than terrain. Military capabilities are not simply a measure of men, materiel, and terrain, however, but also of the political will of governments. Politics is manifest in military capability both as cause and effect. The southern regimes, despite the great wealth of several of the states, were unable or unwilling to develop and use military force to unify the South, let alone attempt to capture the North. Several campaigns within the South were effectively prosecuted, but without more generally changing the overall fragmentation. It would appear that the southern regimes were not culturally driven to conquer China and recreate the territorial extent of the Tang Empire. Interestingly, a similar lack of southern interest in the North was also manifest during the Southern Song in the twelfth century, when southern elites were reluctant to go to war to retake North China from the Jurchen Jin. States like the Southern Tang had strong cultural reasons for claiming legitimacy and continuity with the Tang dynasty without requiring the corresponding physical borders. Fundamentally, southern fragmentation was a manifestation of cultural attitudes. Elites focused on their local and regional interests rather than on an imagined unified China. All 163

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of the southern states resisted the Song conquest because Chinese “unification” was not a compelling ideology. Southern fragmentation was thus not just a military problem in the historiography of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms but an ideological challenge to imperial orthodoxy. There was something wrong with those states not trying to conquer each other as well as the North.

The South The southern Sinitic states were not equal in their size, power, or significance. Several of them were short-lived, and others experienced changes of name, ruling family, and borders. Critically, they created and maintained distinctive cultures that persisted long after they had been conquered or subsumed by the Song dynasty. The obvious expression of fragmentation in the form of separate states not only revealed the underlying regionalism of Tang China but also pointed toward the future development of localities. Economic development amplified local differences, with southern economic development beginning to outstrip northern development during the Tang dynasty. Key in all of this was the diversity of people and places that were unequivocally “Chinese.” Almost all of the southern states developed out of Tang administrative or military districts. Local strongmen gradually distanced themselves from the Tang court, achieving de facto independence even before the dynasty officially ended. By the time the Tang center was gone, the South had already been functionally separate for years. In the wake of their “official” independence in 907, the southern states groped for a stable order, predicated on a military and political equilibrium. The large states of Wu/Southern Tang and Former and Later Shu both maintained territorial stability during internal political change. Several of the smaller states were also geographically stable. Curiously, the internal politics of these states were less stable than their geographies, implying that the respective courts had less bearing on their borders than the structure of the states themselves. The kingdom of Wu grew out of the military governorship of Yang Xingmi 楊行密, and was overthrown in 937 by Li Bian 李昪, becoming the Southern Tang. The Southern Tang then proceeded to conquer smaller states like Chu (951) and Min (945). Yet Chu was revived in 952, gaining independence until the Song captured it. Similarly, the state of Shu in Sichuan is broken up into the Former Shu (907–925) and Later Shu (934–965), with the earlier state captured in 925 by the Later Tang dynasty from the North, and then reemerging in 934. There was a considerable measure of geographic sense to the coherent separateness of Shu in Sichuan and Chongqing since it was clearly demarcated by a ring of mountains. Despite those impressive natural defenses, Shu was regularly conquered by powerful northern regimes. Shu was able to maintain an independent existence when the northern power was preoccupied, but was mostly insulated from the southern states (though the Later Shu was captured by the Song armies in 965, advancing from the North and up the Yangzi). An ambitious general sent to Shu could set himself up as a warlord if his home regime got distracted. Sichuan and Chongqing were not, however, a good base from which to conquer China. At the same time, Shu retained a considerable cultural store of books and scholars throughout the tumultuous political and military events of the tenth century. Two other powers, the Wu/Southern Tang and Wuyue, are good examples of the peculiarities and distinctiveness of southern regimes. The state of Wu began coming into its own as a large, wealthy kingdom in 907. It was by far the wealthiest polity in China in the first half of the tenth century. After its change of ruling house, the new Tang (Southern Tang) state launched some successful campaigns of conquest in the South, while avoiding direct 164

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conflict with the North. The Southern Tang was also a haven for preserving and nurturing elite Chinese culture. Song culture owed an enormous debt to Southern Tang libraries, scholars, calligraphers, and painters, as well as the beginnings of foot binding at the Southern Tang court. Some Song moralists would, nevertheless, cast aspersions on the purportedly decadent Southern Tang elite lifestyle that supported its impressive cultural products. The Wu/Southern Tang encompassed much of the most productive areas of tenth-century China. Its rulers referred to themselves as emperors despite not controlling any of the historical capital cities of northern China. At least from their own perspective, they were the inheritors of Tang culture and political legitimacy. Their culture was a continuation of Tang culture, so they had a good claim to political legitimacy. The Southern Tang foundation of Song culture was an uncomfortable issue for eleventh-century Song literati who sought to distinguish themselves and their (non-decadent) refined culture from that of the Southern Tang. The Wuyue was a small state on the southern coast oriented to international trade. This, combined with its rulers’ great interest in Buddhism, transformed it into a sort of Buddhist powerhouse. Wuyue’s rulers undertook the revival of Tiantai Buddhism, which had suffered badly under the Tang’s Huichang Suppression (842–846). Using their access to Korea and Japan, Wuyue’s rulers gathered missing Buddhist texts. In the 950s, the Wuyue ruler ordered the production of 84,000 miniature pagodas, at least 500 of which were taken to Japan. Edmund Worthy has argued that Wuyue’s broader strategy, aided by its strong Buddhist orientation, was to maintain diplomatic relations with as many powers as possible in order to balance out the threat of the Wu/Southern Tang.7 The relative stability of the South requires some explanation. Edmund Worthy suggested that the southern powers reached a de facto agreement maintaining the power balance. In his view, the southern states left the issue of a unified empire to the northern powers and chose on several occasions not to annihilate an opponent. Unfortunately, we do not know why major states chose not to destroy a neighboring polity. At least in early modern Europe, balancing power between states took considerable effort and there was the explicit acknowledgment of that as a goal. There is no evidence that the southern states chose not to destroy their opponent as a preferred option to destroying them. The Southern Tang did, in fact, conquer and absorb some very small territories, suggesting that any perceived restraint with respect to the other states was probably driven by other considerations. Military “restraint” by southern states was most likely the involuntary product of military, political, and economic constraints. The Southern Tang or any other state did not restrain their actions, but rather recognized their severe limitations. When the Later Zhou and then Song armies invaded the South, they consistently defeated the southern states’ armies and navies.

The North Li Keyong 李克用, a Shatuo 沙陀 general, and Zhu Wen 朱溫, a former rebel under Huang Chao who had turned coat and joined the Tang side, cooperated in defeating Huang Chao in 884. Their relationship was ruined, however, when Zhu tried to assassinate Li as he was passing through Zhu’s stronghold at Kaifeng (Bianzhou). Li escaped the attempt and fell back to his own base at Taiyuan. Caught in the middle of a dispute between two of its most powerful generals, the Tang court refused to take sides. Although Huang Chao was dead, parts of his rebellion lived on and even captured Luoyang, one of the Tang capitals. Zhu was now on his own, though under the Tang banner. The Tang court had no help to send him, and Li Keyong was no longer fighting the rebels. After much desperate fighting, and repeated promotions by the Tang emperor, Zhu Wen managed to defeat 165

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the remaining rebels. This was only the beginning of widespread conflict among all of the warlords. The Tang emperor was only peripherally important to the conflict, mostly acting to sanction the actions that powerful warlords who gave him nominal allegiance desired (Map 10.1).

Map 10.1  The Five Dynasties Period. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 5, 82–83.)

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Zhu managed to conquer a large section of central China, leaving areas to the North and southern China in the hands of other warlords. Li Keyong, his great rival, was based in Shanxi further to the North. Although Zhu controlled the Tang emperor and the Tang court, their value was quite limited at the beginning of the tenth century. In 904, he killed one emperor and installed another, and by 907, he concluded that the Tang emperor was more an impediment to his power than an asset. Accordingly, he forced the last Tang emperor to abdicate in his favor. Zhu then founded the Liang dynasty, known in Chinese history as the Later Liang dynasty (907–923). The abdicated emperor was killed in 908, and Zhu was himself assassinated by his own son in 912. Li Keyong died in 908, and was succeeded in command of the Shatuo Türks by his extremely able son Li Cunxu 李存勗. When his father died, Li Cunxu’s military and political positions were not very good, having suffered repeated setbacks and defeats. He reversed this decline, and by 923, defeated and overthrew the Later Liang dynasty to reestablish the Tang dynasty (what would be known in Chinese history as the Later Tang dynasty). Meanwhile, independent regimes in southern and western China had sprung up or more openly threw off real allegiance to a northern imperial court. Central and northern China became battlegrounds for the many warlords connected with Türkic or other Steppe polities, or the Han Chinese warlords fighting against them. Although the split between Zhu Wen and Li Keyong played out through the first three of the Five Dynasties, we should not overstate the significance of ethnicity on loyalty. As Naomi Standen has recently pointed out, loyalties were personal, not ethnic or cultural in this period. It was not until after the Song dynasty was established, and the Song-Liao conflict settled with a firm border, that loyalties to an individual’s identified group were assumed. During the Five Dynasties period, individuals might move back and forth between various overlords seeking for a good position. Moreover, ethnic and cultural identity was not racial or genetic.8 Apart from transfrontiersmen who lived in areas of mixed cultural practice, identity was defined by practice, whether language, custom, or lifestyle. Southern China was uniformly Chinese in every aspect of practice, but even there some men journeyed north to take employment with non-Han overlords. This is not to say that there was no racial/cultural chauvinism, but rather that ambitious or desperate men were willing to move wherever they thought might be advantageous for their fortunes. Li Cunxu confronted many of the same problems faced by Zhu Wen. Simply declaring the restoration of the Tang dynasty could not ritually restore the Tang Empire any more than the founding of the Liang dynasty could. Real political power relied upon real military power, and military power was now widely distributed across the former Tang Empire. Local and even regional leaders had no reason to support an imperial court in Luoyang or Kaifeng that could neither punish nor protect them. At the same time, the Later Tang dynasty’s military was stronger than almost any other military within the former Tang Empire. Li Cunxu sent a force to conquer the Shu kingdom in Sichuan in 925. The Later Tang army successfully captured Sichuan, and Li left the commanding general Meng Zhixiang 孟知祥 in charge of the territory. True to tenth-century form, however, when Li Siyuan 李嗣源, Li Cunxu’s successor, died in 934, Meng Zhixiang declared himself emperor of the Shu. The Shu would remain an independent kingdom until the Song conquered it in 965. The Later Tang dynasty was itself overthrown in 936 by Li Siyuan’s son-in-law, Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 (892–942). Shi Jingtang obtained military support for his coup from the Kitan (Khitan) emperor. The Kitan Empire itself was founded in the wake of the Tang fall as a northern Steppe empire with some Chinese ideas of imperial government. Kitan and Chinese cultures were not entirely compatible, of course, leading to a split administration with 167

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the Northern Court dealing with Steppe people and their affairs, and the Southern Court dealing with the Han Chinese population. Most of the Han population, and, eventually, the largest part of the new empire’s economy, was based around the area near modern Beijing. Shi Jingtang ceded these so-called Sixteen Prefectures of Yan 燕 and Yun 雲 to the Kitan as payment for their assistance in putting him on the throne. The Sixteen Prefectures later became a critical issue between the Song and (Kitan) Liao empires, and a cause for much lamentation among Chinese historians and statesmen. Shi Jingtang, it is argued, could not legitimately cede Chinese territory to the Kitan because it was sovereign Chinese territory. Of course, the very fact that he did belies the anachronism of such an argument. Shi Jingtang ceded the territory because it was the price of achieving his goal of becoming emperor. It is also an important marker of the goals of Kitan security policy. Kitan support for Shi not only gained them a client state in the Central Plains, it also helped bolster their claims to the Sixteen Prefectures. Moreover, the territory contained the strategic passes controlling the north-south routes from Kitan territory into the plains of Hebei. Kitan influence at the Later Jin court was strong, and an irritant to many there. Shi Jingtang understood and accepted the bargain he had made; after his death, it all fell apart. His successor was convinced to expel the Kitan. In response, the Kitan emperor invaded in 946, and overthrew the Later Jin dynasty the following year (947). Once set up in Kaifeng, the Kitan emperor entertained the idea of simply extending Kitan rule over the former territory of the Later Jin. It is uncertain if he contemplated conquering the rest of China. At a minimum, he performed ceremonies to inaugurate a Kitan dynasty now called “Liao.” Notwithstanding whatever the Liao emperor’s larger plans, his immediate military position was unsustainable. The subject population was not amenable to Liao rule, and his army was effectively isolated in Kaifeng. This would prove to be greatest territorial extent of Kitan rule. The Liao emperor looted the city and withdrew back to Liao territory, dying soon after. Of course, the retreat of the Liao army left a power vacuum. The Later Jin dynasty had been destroyed, the Liao army had left, and the Liao court was occupied with an imperial succession. Kaifeng was looted and open. Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 (895–948), a Shatuo Türk military governor of the region around Taiyuan, Shanxi, seized the moment and established a new dynasty, the Han. His dynasty, which would later be called the Later Han, was the fourth dynasty to control North China since the fall of the Tang, and the third in a row to be ruled by Shatuo Türks (although, Shi Jingtang, the founder of the Later Jin, according to his epitaph, descended from Shi Le 石勒 of Jie 羯). It is worth noting that no one questioned the legitimacy of these dynasties because their ruling families were not Han Chinese. To have raised such questions during the Song dynasty, of course, would have not only vastly complicated the already challenging aspects of legitimating the Song through the Five Dynasties, but also have forced a reconsideration of the legitimacy of the Tang dynasty as well. Thus, despite an often deep-seated ethnic or racial chauvinism on the part of Chinese historians, a polity that chose to rule China as a Chinese dynasty could still be portrayed as inherently legitimate. At the same time, this also created historiographical problems with respect to the Kitan Liao dynasty and the Jurchen Jin dynasty. Liu Zhiyuan died after only a year on the throne, leaving the new dynasty to his teenage son. Infighting within the court undermined the loyalty of the generals. One of them, Guo Wei 郭威, returned to the capital with his army purportedly because of reports that a hostile faction had taken control at court and his family was in danger. Most resistance collapsed as his border force approached, and Guo quickly took control of the emperor and the court. 168

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The emperor was almost immediately murdered, but Guo did not take the throne. Guo was loyally awaiting another member of the Liu family to come south from Taiyuan and take the throne when he received a report of a Liao invasion. It was only when Guo set out with the army to defend the kingdom from the Liao that his troops demanded he take the throne. Bowing to his troops’ will and making sure a Liu successor was blocked from reaching the capital, Guo set up a new dynasty, the Zhou. The remnants of the Liu regime fell back to Taiyuan where the rump Later Han government became the Northern Han court.

The end of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms and beginning of the Song The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period began and ended in North China. Between the beginning and ending points, however construed, the turning point in military and political terms that moved the northern regimes from breakdown and toward unity, and eventually to recreating the Tang Empire, was the Battle of Gaoping 高平 (in Shanxi) in 954. Until the Battle of Gaoping, the Later Zhou dynasty appeared to be no different than the four dynasties that preceded it. Zhou Shizong’s 周世宗 (Chai Rong 柴榮, Guo Wei’s successor) victory secured his own throne and changed the course of his dynasty. It also laid the groundwork for the Song dynasty. The battle took place not long after the Later Zhou founder died in 954, and the Northern Han ruler saw an opportunity to take control over the regime at Kaifeng that had been denied to him. Accordingly, he obtained direct military support from the Liao dynasty and marched south from Taiyuan toward Kaifeng. The newly installed second Zhou emperor marched north and the two armies clashed at Gaoping. The Northern Han army was on the verge of victory when Shizong personally led a force into battle, not only winning decisively, but also legitimizing his position on the throne. Shizong’s generals formed the core of his power and, after his death, became the founders of the Song dynasty. Both Shizong and his generals were examples of the new men who had moved into the northern government’s central armies. These new men were at least a partial break with the previous patterns of elite military intermarriage. Politically they left behind the contest between Zhu Wen’s and Li Keyong’s remnants. After crushing the Northern Han army, Shizong immediately followed up with an attack on Taiyuan, the Northern Han capital, in an effort to completely extinguish that threat. Although the siege failed, the Northern Han and its Liao patron were temporarily dissuaded from further serious incursions. Shizong had secured his political place and his northern border giving him the opportunity to expand the territory under the control of the northern regime. Shizong successfully struck west and south, capturing land from the Later Shu and a much larger area from the Southern Tang. The Southern Tang campaign took over a year and at several points seemed on the verge of failure. Success in the South significantly expanded Shizong’s territory, and thus his revenue and prestige. In the process of campaigning against the Southern Tang, the Later Zhou military developed a navy and opened up waterways north and south from Kaifeng. Shizong then turned his attention to the Liao, but fell ill soon after the campaign began. He died shortly afterward, leaving a young son on the throne. The coup d’état that overthrew the Later Zhou and established the Song in 960 ended the Five Dynasties period, yet left the issue of the Ten Kingdoms untouched. Of course, the Song only succeeded in ending the Five Dynasties retrospectively because it succeeded over the next 20 years in conquering the South. And it was not until 979 that the Song finally conquered the Northern Han. The Song founding itself was not completed until the 169

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resolution of another 25 years of war with the Liao initiated by an invasion of Liao territory immediately following the fall of Taiyuan and the Northern Han. Politically and militarily, even the Ten Kingdoms were not completely gone until 979. There were several reasons that the Song was able to conquer southern China and establish a stable regime. First, it built upon the military and political success of the Later Zhou following the Battle of Gaoping. If Shizong had lived longer, the Later Zhou might have become a stable dynasty and conquered southern China. Certainly, Shizong had the military capability to achieve that political end. Yet creating a stable dynasty was not simply a ­m ilitary task nor was the political stability that followed the initial Zhou and later Song military successes a given. The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period was not fragmented only for military and political reasons. Early Song rulers also had to establish unity and uniformity as the normal condition. The second reason the Song was able to end the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period was cultural. While Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms culture persisted into the Song dynasty for a time, the simple fact of a single, central court that ruled over the empire created a unified cultural focal point. The Song court determined what cultural products were imperially endorsed and what sort of scholarship would lead to a government job. All elites seeking government support quickly oriented their intellectual and cultural pursuits toward that focal point. Culture became a dynastic tool for fostering loyalty among local, regional, and imperial elites. During the Song conquest, the promotion of imperial cultural norms acted as a force-multiplier for the military and political campaigns to win over rulers and elites. The Song army was the instrument of an orthodox dynastic project that would reify the political power of conventionally educated and socialized elites. Finally, the third reason the Song did not become the sixth northern dynasty of the tenth century was imperial intermarriage with the families of the founding generals. This social tie among the military elites reduced or eliminated the centripetal tendencies of a dynasty in its early stages. Military men founded every dynasty in Chinese history, making managing the ambitions of generals a key survival issue. In the case of the Song, the way it successfully managed its founding generals was by marrying them into the imperial family. Crucially, this policy tied these generals to the central government rather than apportioning them independent regional power. The Song government was highly centralized as a direct response to the diversity of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. This extended all the way into the marriage practices of the imperial clan and the descendants of the founding generals.

Conclusion Historiographical issues necessarily and reasonably dominate any discussion of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, at least as a preamble to considering specific historical events. The political and military importance of different regions of China was neither entirely unique nor an aberration. While traditional historiography assumed, at a minimum, that a unified empire was obviously a better way to run China, more peaceful, orderly, and better able to defend itself, and more usually that such a unified polity was the “natural” state of China, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period was more structured than such a tradition predicted. The North held the military, and therefore the political, initiative to overturn the stable multistate environment of the early tenth century. As a consequence, efforts to recreate the Tang Empire had to await the resolution of the struggle for power in the North. That struggle played out as a continuation of the Chinese-Türkic factional conflict that grew out 170

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of the suppression of the Huang Chao Rebellion, though it was factional rather than ethnic. The Kitan Liao dynasty also played an important role in the resolution of that battle, but was much less significant than the mutual exhaustion of the two sides. Indeed, the Kitan invasion of North China in 946–947 had little influence on that narrative, as the Later Han dynasty that took control of Kaifeng after the Kitan left was related to the same cast of characters. It was the break-up of the Later Han dynasty and the creation of the Later Zhou dynasty that brought new players into the game. All of them had served in earlier dynasties, so they were not outsiders, but they were much less tightly connected to the previous regimes. When the Later Zhou displaced the Later Han, leaving a rump regime at Taiyuan, the Late Tang dynasty rivalry was marginalized. The remnant Northern Han court in north Shanxi was only finally crushed in 979, almost 20 years after the establishment of the Song dynasty. In that sense, at least, the full narrative underlying the fall of the Tang dynasty and the trajectory of the five northern Chinese dynasties was nearly a century from inception in 884 to denouement in 979. The military and political events in the century from 884 to 979 were one of the main lines of development in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, but they were not the only events affecting the shift from Tang to Song cultures. Economic trends, like the growing productive capacity of the South, that began in the Tang continued through the Five Dynasties period into the Song. The arts also advanced, and may well have benefited at least in diversity with multiple courts. Southern Tang painting, for example, was truly exquisite. Yet the destruction of warfare, which was most acutely felt in the North, was deeply intertwined with most of the changes of the Five Dynasties period. War was not just central to the period in the eyes of later historians, it was central to elites and commoners who lived through the time. A farmer may not have cared much what dynasty he lived under, but the demands on manpower, food, and other resources to support the wars, let alone if an army moved through his locality, were of immediate concern. Culture still flourished in this tumultuous time, at least in the South. This was a historiographical paradox, though it shouldn’t have been. It was often the periods of political and military struggle that produced great culture in China as happened in the Warring States period, the Northern and Southern Dynasties, and the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. Centralized political authority as well as its accompanying centralized historical writing stifled much creativity even while promoting a select part of artistic production. The tenth century was rich in military history and cultural accomplishments. Although the writing of tenth-century history was well under way before the end of the century, what would become the dominant historiographical traditions of the period were formed during the very different eleventh century, a time that Song historians felt had little in the way of military accomplishment but far more in the way of cultural achievements. Ouyang Xiu portrayed the first half of the tenth century as a time of moral decadence, cultural decline, and military predominance. In that light, the creation of the Song and the cultural efflorescence of the eleventh century were a break with the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. Ouyang’s perspective was eventually accepted, though recently historians less invested in the Song dynasty’s separateness have begun to emphasize the cultural and economic continuities of the tenth century. Song elite culture grew out of Ten Kingdoms culture, and Ten Kingdoms culture, the culture of the South, was not just a static reservoir of preserved Tang culture. Southern cultural diversity was the foundation of eleventh-century Song cultural diversity. It was only in the second half of the eleventh century that diversity began to trouble some thinkers, and intellectual unity grew in attraction. That diversity was in many ways a holdover from Ten Kingdoms culture. 171

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Notes 1 Tackett, The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy. 2 On the history and myth of the Great Wall, see Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); for a shorter overview, see Peter Lorge, “The Great Wall,” in Naomi Standen (ed.), Demystifying China (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), 25–32. 3 Johannes Kurz, “A Survey of the Historical Sources for the Five Dynasties and Ten States in Song Times,” in Journal of Song Yuan Studies 33 (2003), 187–224, 190. For Ouyang Xiu’s validation of the Later Liang, see Ouyang Xiu, Xin Wudai shi 新五代史 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974) 2.21. 4 The obvious exception to this is the work of Hugh Clarke on the Song dynasty. His work on Fujian province, for example, amply demonstrates the rich possibilities of local or regional studies. See most notably, Hugh Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks: Southern Fujian Province from the Third to the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Portrait of a Community: Society, Culture and the Structures of Kinship in the Mulan River (Fujian) from the Late Tang through the Song (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2007). 5 Standen, Unbounded Loyalty. 6 Tackett, The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy. 7 Edmund Worthy, “Diplomacy for Survival,” 17–44. 8 Standen, Unbounded Loyalty.

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Abramson, Marc S. Ethnic Identity in Tang China. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. Adshead, Samuel Adrian M. T’ang China: The Rise of the East in World History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Barrett, Timothy Hugh. Taoism under the T’ang: Religion and Empire during the Golden Age of Chinese History. London: Wellsweep, 2006. Benn, Charles. China’s Golden Age: Everyday Life in the Tang Dynasty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Bol, Peter. “This Culture of Ours”: Intellectual Transitions in T’ang and Sung China. Stanford, CA: S­ tanford University Press, 1992. Clark, Hugh. The Sinitic Encounter in Southeast China through the First Millennium CE. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2016. Davis, Richard L. From Warhorses to Ploughshares: The Later Tang Reign of Emperor Mingzong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015. DeBlasi, Anthony. Reform in the Balance: The Defense of Literary Culture in Tang China. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002. Dudbridge, Glen. A Portrait of Five Dynasties China: From the Memoirs of Wang Renyu (880–956). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Ebrey, Patricia and Peter Gregory, eds. Religion and Society in T’ang and Sung China. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1993. Gregory, Peter. Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. Hartman, Charles. Han Yü and the T’ang Search for Unity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. Ikeda On 池田温. Tōshi ronko: shizokusei to kindensei 唐史論攷－氏族制と均田制－. Tokyo: Ky ū ko shoin, 2014. Iwami Kiyōhiro 石見清裕. Tōdai no kokusai kankei 唐代の国際関係. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2009. Johnson, David G. “Last Years of a Great Clan: The Li Family of Chao chün in Late T’ang and Early Sung,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 37:1 (1977), 5–102. Kobayashi Masayoshi 小林正美. Tōdai no D ōkyō to Tenshidō 唐代の道教と天師道. Tokyo: Chisen shokan, 2003. Kurz, Johannes L. China’s Southern Tang Dynasty (937–976). London: Routledge, 2011. La Vaissière, Étienne de / James Ward, tr. Sogdian Traders: A History. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Lewis, Mark. China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty. Boston, MA: Belknap Press, 2012. Liu, James T.C. China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century. ­Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. Lorge, Peter, ed. Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011.

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Part II

Late Imperial China (Song–Qing)

Section 4

The age of Song, Liao, and Jin

The period of the Song, Liao, and Jin dynasties saw China divided among different governments. The Song dynasty can itself be divided into two periods, the Northern (960–1127) and Southern (1127–1279). During the Northern Song, the dynasty controlled most of the territory of China proper, with the exception of the Sixteen Prefectures, a narrow strip along the southern edge of the Great Wall, which was under the administration of the Liao dynasty. This state was founded in 907 by a non-Han people called the Kitans. After the collapse of the Tang dynasty, the Kitans created a new state in what is now northeastern China, and managed to gain control of a small territory south of the Great Wall. This became an ongoing source of tension and conflict with the Song once that dynasty was stabilized in the 960s. In the early twelfth century, a new group of non-Han people began to aspire to power in the north. The Jurchen first challenged the power of the Kitan, then having destroyed the Liao state they sought to conquer China itself. A war with the Song eventually yielded a Jurchen state based in the northeast, which controlled the northern half of China, and a remnant Song state, the Southern Song, which retained power in China south of the Huai River valley. This period of division continued until the Mongol conquests in the thirteenth century, when first the Jin fell, in 1234, and then the Southern Song in the 1270s. The Song dynasty represented a period of great change and development for China. The turmoil at the end of the Tang and through the period of the Five Dynasties had largely destroyed the institutional infrastructure of the aristocratic order which had characterized the empire from the Han through the Tang. The founders of the Song sought new ways to staff their administration, and developed the Confucian examination system as a way of recruitment for officials. This became the dominant means by which educated gentlemen came into government service for the rest of imperial history, with short breaks in the Yuan and Ming periods. Examination culture became central to the lives of the literati elite, the dominant group in social and economic life as well as political affairs. The rise of the Confucian examination system was accompanied by changes in Confucian thought. The Northern Song saw many important thinkers discussing and debating the nature of the Way and the foundations for human values. By the Southern Song, a new school of thought, known as Daoxue 道學 (Learning of the Way), often referred to as NeoConfucianism, became widely influential under the leadership of Zhu Xi 朱熹.

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The Song dynasty was also a period of dynamic change in the economy of imperial China. While the country remained a predominantly agricultural economy, commercial activity flourished. Market towns proliferated, especially in the Jiangnan region of central coastal China. Long-distance trade, within China and internationally, expanded. Many areas began to specialize in various kinds of production. When northern China was lost to the Jurchen in the twelfth century, the growth of the market economy continued in the south, with the Jiangnan region becoming the center of wealth and trade. While the areas under Song rule were undergoing these changes in social and economic life, the regions ruled by non-Chinese states carried on more in line with earlier Chinese norms. Both the Liao and Jin states developed hybrid forms of government, blending elements from their pre-dynastic practices with Chinese administrative routines. When the Jurchen ruled much of northern China, intellectual life there among the Han literati retained many features from the Northern Song, and the new Daoxue movement did not flourish. Through these centuries of political division, the social and cultural world of the Chinese also underwent divergence, which would only be overcome with the reunification of the empire under the Mongols. Chronology 4: The age of Song, Liao, and Jin ca. 907–1125 ca. 907–926 926–947 938 960–1127 960–976 976–997 979 997–1022 1005 1008 1022–1063 1038 1040–1042 1043–1045 1063–1067 1067–1085 1069–1085 1072–1073 1085–1093 1093–1100 1100–1126 1102–1120 1115–1234 1115–1123 1120–1121 1124–1218

Liao Dynasty Reign of Liao founder, Abaoji 阿保機. Regency of Empress Chunqin 淳欽. T  he Liao acquire the area around Beijing and the royal seal from the Later Jinn. Northern Song dynasty Taizu’s 太祖 reign. Taizong’s 太宗 reign. The conquest of the Northern Han kingdom. Zhenzong’s 真宗 reign. Treaty of Chanyuan 澶渊. The fengshan 封禪 sacrifice performed by Zhenzong at Mount Tai 泰山. Renzong’s 仁宗 reign. Founding of the Xixia 西夏 Empire. The First Song-Xia War. The Qingli 慶曆 Reforms. Yingzong’s 英宗 reign. Shenzong’s 神宗 reign. Wang Anshi 王安石 Reforms (the New Policies). Wang Shao’s 王韶 conquest of Xihe 熙河 and Qingtang 青唐. E  mpress Dowager Xuanren’s 宣仁 reign; the abolishment of the New Policies. Zhezong’s 哲宗 personal rule; the restoration of the New Policies. Huizong’s 徽宗 reign. Cai Jing’s 蔡京 regime. Jin Dynasty Reign of Jin founder, Aguda. Fang La’s 方臘 Rebellion. Western Liao, Successor State in Central Asia. 180

The age of Song, Liao, and Jin

1125 1126–1127 1126–1127 1127–1279 1127–1162 1138 1141 1155 1160 1161–1189 1161 1162 1162–1189 1163 1165 1173 1190–1208 1180–1208 1187 1189 1189–1194 1194 1194 1194–1224 1195–1207 1195–1199 1200 1202 1206 1207 1207–1233 1208 1215 1217 1224 1224–1264 1233 1234 1241 1253 1264 1264–1274 1279

Jin armies defeat the Liao and conquer their territory. Jin armies conquer north China. Qinzong’s 欽宗 reign. Southern Song dynasty Gaozong’s 高宗 reign. Qin Gui 秦檜 appointed chief councilor. Treaty with Jin; death of Yue Fei 岳飛. Qin Gui dies. Printed money declared a state monopoly. Reign of Jin Emperor Shizong 世宗. Jin invasion. Gaozong abdicates. Xiaozong’s reign 孝宗. Song attacks Jin. Treaty with Jin. First civil service examinations in Jurchen. Master Dong 董 writes The Romance of the Western Chamber Reign of Jin Emperor Zhangzong 章宗. Retired Emperor Gaozong dies. Xiaozong abdicates. Guangzong’s reign 光宗. The Yellow River shifts course, destabilizing the Jin. Xiaozong dies; Guangzong abdicates. Ningzong’s reign 寧宗. Han Tuozhou 韓侂胄 in power. “Spurious Learning” campaign against Daoxue 道學. Zhu Xi 朱熹 dies. The Jin claim to be the legitimate successors of the Northern Song. Song attacks Jin. Han Tuozhou assassinated. Shi Miyuan 史彌遠 in power. Treaty with Jin. Mongols conquer Beijing. Jin attack Song. Ningzong dies. Lizong’s 理宗 reign. Song alliance with Mongols against Jin. Mongols take Kaifeng, conquer North China, and the Jin dynasty ends. Daoxue adopted as state orthodoxy. Mongol campaign against Song. Lizong dies. Duzong’s 度宗 reign. Last Song emperor dies.

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11 The Northern Song Yongguang Hu

Map 11.1  The Northern Song and Liao. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 6, 3–4.)

The Northern Song (960–1127) was a pivotal period that witnessed a number of key transitions in Chinese history. The state adopted the principle of meritocracy and promoted scholar-officials to manage the bureaucracy. Its society benefited from agricultural growth, the expansion of handicraft industries, and the development of trade. At the same time, the court suffered from severe factional conflicts in its last five decades, and the dynasty 182

The Northern Song

constantly faced military threats from non-Chinese regimes in the north and northwest. The Northern Song eventually fell to the invasion of the Jurchen in 1127. The Song 宋 dynasty (960–1279) ruled China for more than three centuries and was the longest reigning dynasty in the last millennium. Historians usually divide the Song into two time periods: the Northern Song 北宋 (960–1127) and the Southern Song 南宋 (1127–1279). During the former period, its territory covered China proper, but not including a narrow region to the south of the Great Wall. The Northern Song coexisted with two nomadic regimes on the steppe in Central and North Asia: the Kitan Liao 遼 Empire (907–1125) and the Tangut Xixia 西夏 Empire (1038–1227). The people of Jurchen established the Jin 金 Empire in Manchuria in 1115 and then conquered the Liao one decade later. The Song court could not defend itself against the Jurchen invasion in the winter of 1126–1127, and two of its emperors were captured by this enemy. In mid-1127, one of the Song imperial princes successfully escaped to the south, and his Southern Song regime continued reigning as the imperial house for another one and half centuries. By this time the court only controlled two-thirds of its former territory. In the thirteenth century, the nomadic Mongols established their own state and subsequently occupied the Xixia and Jin. The Southern Song managed to withstand Mongol invasions for more than four decades before its complete collapse in the late 1270s. The Northern Song was a critical period in Chinese history. First proposed by the acclaimed Japanese historian Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866–1934) in the early twentieth century, the Tang-Song Transformation theory has been largely accepted by Japanese and Western historians in the last century. This theory argues that China experienced a number of significant transitions between the Tang 唐 (618–907) and Song dynasties, especially in the Northern Song period. Politically and socially, the Song rulers entrusted Confucian scholar officials to administer the state, not members of aristocratic families who used to enjoy privileged positions in the previous centuries. Powerful family members or regional military governors could no longer monopolize government posts because the state utilized the Civil Service Examination System (keju 科舉) to recruit talented men for official positions. This surely helped to promote the social status of the literati. The Northern Song court also actively used fiscal and taxation policies to promote a cash economy, in which the government functioned as a collection of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, political stability, peaceful international relations, and new technologies all contributed to a prosperous economy. The population grew to more than 100 million, the highest number to that point in Chinese history. The state underwent a large wave of urban growth, and city residents created an energetic urban culture. Vibrant long-distance continental and oversea trade connected the Northern Song to other regions in Asia, representing an early version of globalization. Facing the intellectual challenges of Buddhism and Daoism, prominent Northern Song thinkers introduced innovative ideas to reform Confucianism in the eleventh century and laid a solid foundation for the establishment of the Neo-Confucian school. Today, some Chinese historians still have reservations about the Tang-Song Transformation theory, as they tend to focus more on the continuities between these two dynasties. Yet it is still accurate to say that the Northern Song, and the Song at large, brought numerous key changes to Chinese society and strongly influenced the future of the imperial era.

The emperors and top leaders Taizu 太祖 (né Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤) (927–976), the founder of the Song dynasty, was from a military family in Hebei 河北, North China. He became an army officer when he was 21 years old and was gradually promoted to be the highest commander of the Palace Army in 183

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Kaifeng 開封 when the last emperor of the Later Zhou 周 dynasty (951–960), a six-year-old boy, inherited the throne in 959. Half a year later, Taizu and his followers fabricated news of Kitan invasions and used the ensuing turmoil to organize a coup d’état, proclaiming himself to be the new emperor. The child emperor was forced to abdicate, and on February 4, 960, Taizu formally established the Song dynasty, with Kaifeng as its capital. As a military commander, Taizu had witnessed the ebb and flow of dynastic powers in the previous decades in North China. No dynasty lasted more than two generations, and regional warlords would assert their dominance by easily wielding military power. Taizu sought to end this chaotic cycle by upholding the principle of rule by civil officials. He gradually ended the regional control of warlords and took away the commanding power of his own generals, preventing any of them from replicating what he had done in 960. He promoted Confucian scholar officials in the government and ensured a relatively open environment for policy discussion. Eunuchs, emperors’ in-laws, and imperial clan members were no longer allowed to hold high-level government positions. He also forbade his successors to execute literati simply for their opinions, teachings, or policies. Taizu then started a series of wars to conquer small kingdoms in the south. His goal was not accomplished when he died mysteriously in 976. Rumors often associate his death with his younger brother, who ascended to the throne to become emperor Taizong 太宗 (né Zhao Guangyi 趙光義) (r. 976–997). The succession choice is suspicious since it does not follow the traditional practice of agnatic primogeniture in Chinese history, especially considering the fact that Taizu himself had two grown sons. Nonetheless, over the next two decades, Taizong continued the initiatives of civil governance and successfully unified China in 979 when his army defeated the Northern Han 漢. In an aftermath battle, Taizong was wounded by an arrow near Yanjing 燕京 (Beijing 北京) as he led his army to invade the land of the Kitans. He died in 997 from that injury, and his throne was inherited by his son, not one of his two nephews. The two decades of Zhenzong’s 真宗 (né Zhao Heng 趙恆) (r. 997–1022) reign were a transitional period in Northern Song history. Unlike his uncle and father, Zhenzong was not a confident, powerful ruler who had total control over state affairs. Yet since domestic conquest was no longer an urgent priority, his indecisiveness helped to empower the chief councilors and establish a stable government guided by the principles proposed by Taizu and Taizong. Structured bureaucratic procedures replaced ad hoc decisions, and the expansion of civil service examinations insulated government from military dominance. The court also solved the issue of border conflicts with the Kitans by signing the Treaty of Chanyuan 澶淵 in 1005, eliminating wars between these two empires for more than a century. The last ten years of Zhenzong’s rule were infamous in history as Zhenzong became infatuated with Daoist teachings and extravagant ritual ceremonies. Accompanied by more than 22,000 officials, monks, and servants, Zhenzong visited Mount Tai 泰山 in 1008 to perform the fengshan 封禪 sacrifice, a ritual ceremony demonstrating Heaven’s endorsement of the emperor as the chosen ruler of the land and people. During this period, encouraged by Zhenzong’s religious zeal for Daoism, officials frequently reported the discovery of “heavenly books” (tianshu 天書) and auspicious signs, both of which showed how he was a reincarnation of a Daoist immortal and destined to bring stability and prosperity to the state. Zhenzong died in 1022, leaving the throne to his 13-year-old son and Empress Liu 劉 (r. 1022–1033), who acted as the regent of the regime for the next 11 years. Renzong 仁宗 (né Zhao Zhen 趙禎) (r. 1022–1063) began his personal rule in 1033 after Empress Dowager Liu’s death, and his reign was the longest in the Northern Song dynasty. Traditional Neo-Confucian historians often praised Renzong’s three decades of rule as the heyday of the Song and attributed numerous Confucian virtues to him. By doing so, they 184

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aimed to contrast Renzong’s conservative policies with Shenzong’s radical reforms in the 1070s and 1080s. Ironically, the reforming spirit that prevailed during the late Northern Song was actually first cultivated in the 1040s. Two acclaimed Confucian politicians led this change: Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052) and Ouyang Xiu 歐陽脩 (1007–1072). Both of them clearly understood the political, military, and fiscal issues beneath the surface of a shallow prosperity. First, in order to protect itself from northern enemies and ensure domestic order, the government had to maintain large standing armies, a policy that brought a heavy financial burden to the state because it had to pay salaries to more than one million soldiers, in addition to the other costs associated with construction, provision, recruitment, training, and mobilizing for wars. More than 80 percent of the government’s annual budget was directed to military related spending, and the Imperial Army still suffered humiliating losses along the northwest frontier when the Tanguts launched several invasions in the 1040s. Second, thanks to the expansion of examinations, the court had recruited degree holders at an unprecedented scale. There were not enough posts for everyone, and candidates had to spend years waiting for a vacancy. Yet many of them still had official titles and received stipends. Some records indicate that the bureaucracy quadrupled in size between Zhenzong’s and Renzong’s reigns. Third, the inefficiency and widespread corruption within the government further eroded the quality of leadership. Apparently, a superficial knowledge of Confucian classics would not elevate one’s moral standing. Commoners’ interests were often ignored, exploited, or manipulated by the privileged. In 1043, Fan Zhongyan submitted a lengthy memorial for ten initiatives, aiming to increase administrative efficiency, reduce corruption, promote education, stimulate the economy, and strengthen the military. Although this Qingli 慶曆 Reform only lasted for one and half years due to the fierce conservative backlash, it helped to construct a new vision for later reformers and became a precursor to the full-fledged reforms that would occur 30 years later. As Renzong died heirless in 1063, one of his nephews ascended the throne and became known as Yingzong 英宗 (né Zhao Shu 趙曙) (r. 1063–1067). Although he appeared promising, he was soon afflicted by an unknown health issue and died less than four years into his reign. Shenzong 神宗 (né Zhao Xu 趙頊) (r. 1067–1085) succeeded his father to be the sixth emperor of the Northern Song. His reign was probably the most studied and most controversial in the entire dynasty. Facing the same issues as during Renzong’s reign, Shenzong was determined to restructure the state and revive its military, bringing back the glorious days of Chinese domination over “all under Heaven.” He enlisted the prominent reformer Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086) to design and promulgate a dozen New Policies (xinfa 新法) during the next one and half decades, and these reforms fundamentally changed all aspects of the Song dynasty. The first and foremost component of Wang’s New Policies was economic reform. Aiming to ease the burden of high interest debt that peasants had to assume when borrowing from usurious moneylenders in the countryside, the court enacted the Green Sprouts Act (qingmiao fa 青苗法) in 1069. Under this law, every year the government would provide loans with interest rates of only 10 to 20 percent to peasants in the spring and receive cash payments after the harvest in the fall. The state thus established a rural credit system, providing peasants more affordable ways to buy seeds, tools, and fertilizers before the cultivation season. To further monetize the economy and relieve peasants’ burdens, Wang Anshi introduced the Service Exemption Act (mianyi fa 免役法), under which peasants no longer needed to perform labor service in order to fulfill their taxation duty. The government would instead collect a service exemption fee assessed on the basis of family property and use that income to hire 185

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laborers to accomplish the same tasks. This policy was popular nearly everywhere because even the rural rich had been suffering from unrealistic service commitment for centuries. In a number of major cities the court implemented the State Trade Act (shiyi fa 市易法) to regulate commodity prices through the operation of the Ever-normal State Trade Agency (changping shiyi si 常平市易司). This office purchased goods from traveling merchants at generous prices and then sold them to consumers at relatively affordable prices in urban markets. It prevented urban rich merchants from hoarding commodities and monopolizing the trade with traveling merchants. The government agency acted as a giant trading company, which brought advantage to both small merchants and city consumers, while still being able to generate good returns for the state. Another important component of Wang’s reforms was its military policies. Throughout the empire, the government established a mutual security system (baojia 保甲), in which every five to ten households formed a small guard, every five small guards formed a large guard, and every five large guards formed a superior guard. At every level, these guards were headed by local capable landowners. Qualified families needed to supply at least one adult male to receive basic military training and maintain social order of the locality. The ultimate goal of this reform was to replace existing incapable standing armies with newly recruited and trained militia and to bring the former conscription system back to the state. Although such a goal was never achieved in the Northern Song period, the social organizational method of the mutual security system largely survived in late imperial China. Wang’s regime further issued the Horse Raising Act (baoma fa 保馬法), encouraging families in the mutual system to raise horses for military use. Before this reform, only government stud farms could raise horses in limited numbers, and this became a critical issue constraining military mobility. The new regulation enhanced the productivity of the society and increased the horse supply to the Song military in the following decades. The New Policies faded away with the death of Shenzong in 1085. His successor Zhezong 哲宗 (né Zhao Xu 趙煦) (r. 1085–1100) was too young to rule this vast empire, so Empress Dowager Xuanren 宣仁 (1032–1093), the mother of Shenzong and grandmother of Zhezong, acted as the regent for the next eight years. She was never a supporter of the New Policies even during Shenzong’s reign. Wasting no time, Xuanren brought Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019–1086), a renowned historian and a long-term conservative leader, back to the court and made him the chief councilor. In the following year, Sima Guang adamantly abolished nearly all the reforming policies; even some of his anti-reformist allies believed that he went too far. Nevertheless, all the efforts to save the New Policies failed, and previous reformist leaders were banished from the capital. The victory of the conservatives did not bring harmony back. With no common enemy around, they themselves engaged in never-ending factional conflicts at court until the empress dowager died in 1093. Zhezong, who had felt manipulated as a puppet, was now eager to use his personal rule to change the course of history. Young and ambitious, he admired the reforming legacy of his father and he packed his government with reformers again. This time, it was the conservatives who were purged from Kaifeng and lined up on the road leading to noxious places in the tropical south. In the last two decades of the eleventh century, the political winds shifted, and the political culture could be labeled as anything but stable. The deep gulf between the two camps could never be bridged as both reformists and anti-reformists constantly abused their power and persecuted rivals whenever possible. Zhezong died unexpectedly in 1100 when he was only 24 years old, and one of his younger brothers became the next ruler. Huizong 徽宗 (né Zhao Ji 趙佶) (r. 1100–1126), the penultimate emperor of the Northern Song, was a controversial figure in history. Similar to his brother, Huizong also had 186

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strong interest in his father’s reform agenda and appointed Cai Jing 蔡京 (1047–1126), a third-­generation reformist leader, to be his chief councilor in 1102. Determined to continue Wang Anshi’s legacy, Cai Jing quickly started to persecute hundreds of conservative figures and promulgate a new wave of reforms, focusing on educational and social welfare policies, many of which were bold experiments without precedent in world history. For example, the court established numerous free poorhouses ( juyangyuan 居養院), charity clinics (anjifang 安濟坊), public pharmacies (hejiju 和濟局), and cemeteries (louzeyuan 漏澤園) across the empire. All of them were supported by public finance. Huizong was an ambitious monarch, a highly accomplished calligrapher and painter, and an avid art patron and collector. He was fascinated with Daoist teachings and repeatedly invited Daoist masters to his palace for holding ceremonies and compiling a Daoist canon. Often encouraged by Cai Jing, Huizong was obsessed with luxury entertainment activities. In Kaifeng, he ordered the building of a magnificent pleasure park, filled with artificial rocks, exotic animals, and rare plants found in the South. In order to transport rocks and plants to the capital, the government operated a notorious transportation network, often referred to as the “flower and rock network” (huashigang 花石綱). It added enormous expense to the local government and created widespread misery among peasants. In 1120, Fang La 方臘 (d. 1121), a charismatic Manichaean leader in Zhejiang 浙江, gathered hundreds of thousands of followers to rebel against the court. They attacked six prefectures and were responsible for approximately one million deaths in the most prosperous region of the empire before the insurrection was suppressed a year later. Probably the biggest failings of Huizong and his ministers were in the areas of the military and diplomacy. In Manchuria, the newly risen Jurchen established the Jin state in 1115, and quickly expanded into Liao territory. Huizong and some of his advisors considered this new change a perfect opportunity to weaken the Liao and retake the Sixteen Prefectures (yanyun shiliu zhou 燕雲十六州) that had been occupied by the Kitan since 938. They negotiated with the Jurchen, and both parties agreed to attack the Liao from different fronts and divide its territory after victory. However, to their great surprise, the fragile Liao army managed to defeat the Song invasion near Yanjing again, whereas the Liao were dealt a fatal defeat from the Jurchen in the north. The incompetence and vulnerability of the Song military were plainly exposed to everyone. After conquering the Liao state in 1125, the Jurchen leaders wasted no time directing their armies southward. Kaifeng was besieged twice in the next two years. Never facing such severe challenges in his life, Huizong voluntarily abdicated his throne and made his eldest son the new emperor, whose temple name would be Qinzong 欽宗 (né Zhao Huan 趙桓) (r. 1126–1127). Yet it was too late to organize any meaningful resistance. One year later, in the winter of 1126–1127, the capital fell into the hands of the Jurchen. Both Huizong and Qinzong were taken into captivity, then transferred to the remote north in Manchuria, and never had a chance to return to their homeland. Accompanying them were hundreds of thousands of civilians, officials, servants, court ladies, maids, and soldiers, along with their family members. With countless tragic stories, the “Humiliation of Jingkang” ( Jingkang zhichi 靖康之恥) marked the end of the Northern Song.

Political institutions The Song political system was probably the most complicated one in imperial Chinese history. Not only did it inherit many contradictory practices from the Tang and Five Dynasties, its own focus on civilian rule and the increasing numbers of officials and clerks also created new issues and problems. 187

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The central government resided at the capital of Kaifeng. The ruling entity was the Council of State, comprising chief councilors and military directors. Usually there were two to four chief councilors. Their official title changed over time. Between 960 and 1080, it was Joint Manager of Affairs with the Secretariat-Chancellery (tong zhongshu menxia pingzhang shi 同中書門下平章事). Shenzong himself promulgated an institutional reform for the government in 1080, after which the primary chief councilor became the Left Director of the Department of State Affairs and Concurrent Vice Director of the Chancellery (shangshu zuo pushe jian menxia shilang 尚書左僕射兼門下侍郎), and the secondary chief councilor became the Right Director of the Department of State Affairs and Concurrent Vice Director of the Secretariat (shangshu you pushe jian zhongshu shilang 尚書右僕射兼中書侍郎). In the early twelfth century, Huizong further invented two new titles, which were only used for two decades. All of these names implied a transition from the Three Department System (sansheng zhi 三省制) in the Tang period to the eventual One Department System (yisheng zhi 一省制), in which a small number of chief councilors could make all the decisions for the entire bureaucracy. The previous famous Six Ministries (liubu 六部) in the Tang period, namely, the Ministries of Personnel (libu 吏部), of Revenue (hubu 戶部), of Rites (libu 禮部), of Defense (bingbu 兵部), of Justice (xingbu 刑部), and of Public Works (gongbu 工部), had only nominal roles at court before Shenzong’s institutional reform in 1080. After this reform, their functions were largely restored, so were the Nine Courts ( jiusi 九寺) and Six Directorates (liujian 六監), all of which were responsible for a variety of tasks, including, but not limited to, imperial affairs, government education, ritual ceremonies, and public maintenance. The power of the chief councilors was constrained by the Bureau of Military Affairs (shumi yuan 樞密院), the highest military command center of the empire. This bureau was not directed by military generals, but civil officials. The purpose of setting up this agency was to weaken the power of the chief councilors, so they would have no access to military affairs. In practice, an official would be promoted to be the Commissioner (shi 使) of the Bureau first before he became a chief councilor. The State Finance Commission (sansi 三司) was another independent office in the central government. Its main responsibilities were managing taxation, census, salt and iron monopolies, and transportation. The head of the Commission (sansi shi 三司使) was often called the Fiscal Councilor ( jixiang 計相), enjoying a slightly lower status than the members of the Council of State. During the Wang Anshi Reforms, he created a separate body, the Finance Planning Commission (zhizhi sansi tiaoli si 制置三司條例司). This office differed from the State Finance Commission in that the former was used by Wang to skip regular political procedures in order to implement his reforms. Two other important offices of the central government were the Censorate (yushi tai 御史臺) and Remonstrance Bureau ( jianyuan 諫院), both of which were responsible for overseeing the entire bureaucracy and impeaching corrupted officials. The former was headed by the Vice Censor-in-Chief (yushi zhongcheng 御史中丞), and the latter was staffed with Remonstrators (sijian 司諫) and Exhorters (zhengyan 正言). These officials were intended to maintain their organizational independence in order to constrain the power of the chief councilors. Yet they were often manipulated by the court and became vassals of powerful ministers. For example, in late Northern Song, both the reformists and anti-reformists wanted to monopolize the positions of censors and remonstrators, and mobilize these positions of power to attack the other faction. Local administration was divided into three levels. At the bottom was the county (xian 縣), headed by a county magistrate (xianling 縣令), often a jinshi degree holder who had to 188

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rely on the cooperation of local subofficial clerks (li 吏) to govern his region. Above the county was the prefecture or its equivalents (zhou 州, fu 府, jun 軍, or jian 監). Usually it was headed by a prefect (zhizhou 知州, zhifu 知府, zhijun 知軍, or zhijian 知監) and comprised two to ten counties. And over the prefecture was the circuit (lu 路), a geographic jurisdiction similar in size to a province (sheng 省) in the Ming 明 and Qing 清 dynasties but lacking many key functions that its later counterparts had. There was no circuit governor who could manage affairs in local prefectures or counties. Each circuit rather had four commissioners, responsible for fiscal, judicial, military, and supply affairs. The central bureaucratic government directly appointed circuit commissioners, prefects, and county magistrates in the empire.

Foreign relations Traditional narratives often criticize the Northern Song as a “poor and weak” ( jipin jiruo 積貧積弱) dynasty. It is true that this regime, compared to its predecessors and successors, probably controlled the smallest territory of any dynasty which claimed the unification of China. During its entire time span from 960 to 1127, it was threatened by three non-Chinese states from the north, namely, the Kitan Liao (907–1125), the Tangut Xixia (1038–1227), and the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234). Eventually, the Jurchen Invasion of 1126–1127 directly led to the fall of the dynasty. On the other hand, the Northern Song had an inherent geographical weakness and faced unprecedented challenges from within and without. It did make numerous strategic mistakes, sometimes grave, but it also managed to achieve certain success during a number of border conflicts. The “poor and weak” label cannot accurately reflect its true military and diplomatic capacity in history. From the very beginning, the Song encountered the Liao in the north. The founder of the Liao was Abaoji 阿保機 (872–926), who unified Kitan tribes in 907 and established a new state in Manchuria. Over the next five decades, the Liao promoted a divided China to expand its influence southward. In 936, Taizong 太宗 of Liao (r. 927–947) installed Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 (892–942), a regional military governor in north China, as a new emperor and helped him to found the Later Jin 後晉 dynasty (936–947). In exchange, Shi agreed to cede the famous Sixteen Prefectures to the Liao. Upon receiving this strategically important region along the Great Wall, the Liao had the capacity to control the entire Chinese defense line, and the North China Plain would be directly exposed to any northern invaders during the next two centuries. When Zhao Kuangyin established the Song in 960, he decided not to immediately provoke his northern neighbor, but to wait for a better time in which all the southern kingdoms would be conquered by his army. The direct clash between the Song and Liao started in 963 when several Song troops attacked the Northern Han kingdom (951–979), a client state of the Liao Empire in Taiyuan 太原. In the next one and a half decades, Song and Liao armies clashed repeatedly over the fate of the Northern Han, yet no one enjoyed an overwhelming victory. After Taizu died, Taizong continued his brother’s mission and finally captured Taiyuan in 979, a bitter defeat for the Liao. The fall of the Northern Han did not result in a peaceful coexistence of the two empires. Immediately following the conquest of Taiyuan, Taizong mobilized his troops to enter Liao territory, hoping to capture Yanjing and restore Song rule of the Sixteen Prefectures. In the seventh month of 979, the Song army was smashed at the Battle of Gaolianghe 高梁河, and Taizong barely escaped from the battlefield. The Kitans organized more invasions of the Song in the 980s and 990s, but they could not hold on to the newly occupied land in North China either. 189

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The turning point of Song-Liao relations was the Treaty of Chanyuan signed by both states in 1005. This treaty was the result of a six-day negotiation following a Liao invasion in late 1004. Probably considering the tremendous costs of war, officials from the two sides reached a peace agreement. They acknowledged the current Song-Liao border, and the Song would permanently give up its sovereignty claim on the Sixteen Prefectures. Along the border they would open frontier markets to facilitate trade relations. The Song also agree to pay an annual tribute of 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels of silver to the Liao to show its peaceful intention. (The amounts were later increased to 300,000 bolts and 200,000 taels, respectively, in the mid-eleventh century.) Interestingly, in the text of the treaty, they used the term “brother states” (xiongdi zhi guo 兄弟之國) to describe their mutual relations. Clearly, under such arrangement, the Chinese ruler was no longer the only Son of Heaven (tianzi 天子) in the world. Ever since the treaty was enacted, it has been a point of contention among Chinese historians. Confucian scholar-officials constantly viewed it as proof of humiliation. They could not accept the fact of Chinese paying tribute to “barbarians;” the policy of pacification simply violates the universal Sinocentric order. In the next millennium, generations of Chinese literati considered the Treaty of Chanyuan as evidence of a “poor and weak” Song and criticized the Song court for its choice of surrender. Yet from a retrospective view, this treaty might not signify a lamentable failure of Song policies. The yearly tribute paid by the Song only amounted to two or three percent of its fiscal income and helped the court to avoid expensive war costs in the long run. After the Kitans received the payments, they still needed to turn to Chinese merchants at those frontier markets to purchase commodities for their daily life. The Northern Song state actually generated more income through their trading relations with the Liao than they forfeited by their tribute payments. Moreover, the Treaty of Chanyuan is a unique international arrangement created in world history as it acknowledges the existence of multiple states in East Asia. Both the Song and Liao followed the terms of their treaty and avoided wars for more than 100 years. This proved to be more beneficial to both states than a scenario of constant conflicts. Another challenge that the Song faced was from the northwest—the Xixia, a regime that was gradually built by a semi-nomadic people called the Tanguts in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. Situated in the Ordos (Hetao 河套), a steppe region to the south of the Yellow River loop, this regime had already acquired a somewhat autonomous status for one and half centuries before the leader Weiming Yuanhao 嵬名元昊 (né Li Yuanhao 李元昊) (1003–1048) declared its formal separation from the Song and established the Xixia Empire in 1038. Over the next few years, the Song failed to halt the southern expansion of the Xixia and suffered three disastrous losses on the battlefield. Realizing its geopolitical weakness as being a small state situated between two larger powers, the Xixia agreed to sign a truce in 1044. This time the Song court would send an annual tribute of 130,000 bolts of silk, 50,000 taels of silver, and 20,000 catties of tea to the Tanguts in exchange for peace. Yet unlike the peaceful Song-Liao relations in the eleventh century, the violent clash between the Song and Xixia did not end after the truce. The Song never gave up its plan to reoccupy the Ordos, which used to be part of the formal Tang Empire. Under Shenzong’s reign, Wang Anshi cited the Xixia as the reason to initiate his military reform. In 1068, a middle-level officer Wang Shao 王韶 (1030–1081) submitted a memorial to the court, proposing a western expedition to annex the regions of Xihe 熙河 and Qingtang 青唐 (both in Qinghai 青海 and Gansu 甘肅 provinces) before a full scale war with the Xixia. This grand strategy asked the court to conquer the Qiang 羌 people first in the northwest and then use them as allies to engage the Tanguts from another direction. In 1072, Wang Anshi’s 190

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administration accepted Wang Shao’s plan and appointed him as the commander to implement this strategy. Within only three years, the Song successfully entered the Xihe and ­Qingtang regions and recovered five prefectures through this conquest. When the conservatives took power under Empress Dowager Xuanren in 1085, they decided to give up four frontier garrisons near the Song-Xia border, hoping to make peace with the Tanguts. Zhezong’s personal rule reversed the course again, and Song troops actively entered the Xihe and Qingtang regions to confront the Tanguts in the 1090s. This expansionist policy was adopted by Huizong and his ministers in the early twelfth century until the fall of the dynasty. Although the Song sometimes suffered great human and financial losses in its numerous battles, its military mission against the Xixia finally achieved relative success.

Economy China experienced impressive economic expansion in agriculture, handicraft industry, and commerce during the Northern Song period. Agriculture was the backbone of the Song economy. Similar to other imperial dynasties throughout history, the Song state depended on taxing agrarian production and assets to support its operations. Since its inception, the court had been eager to promote land reclamation, encouraging exiled peasants to either return to their home villages or open new land near their current residence. By the 1080s, the total acreage under cultivation reached roughly 410,000 square kilometers, a number that would not be surpassed until the late sixteenth century. Thanks to an efficient household registration system, the government had the capacity to extract revenues from more than 70 percent of the land and thus enjoyed a steady source of income. Major staple crops in this period included wheat, rice, millet, barley, and soybeans. Peasant families were also eager to invest in economic plants to increase their income. Typical products were vegetables, cotton, hemp, silk, tea, sugar cane, flowers, fruits, and herbs. New seeds, fertilizers, and technologies also facilitated agricultural growth. One example was the introduction of Champa rice (zhancheng dao 占城稻) in the early eleventh century. It was a drought-resistant species from present-day southern Vietnam, which could be grown in mountainous regions. Realizing that Champa rice could be double-cropped under warm climate conditions, the state actively promoted its cultivation in the south. By the end of the eleventh century, almost every peasant family in the Lower Yangzi was harvesting this rice. Scholarly accounts in the Northern Song also mention different types of fertilizers and their application methods. Farmers understood how to use them to regenerate soil and increase yields per unit of land. Labor-intensive rice cultivation stimulated the invention of new tools and technologies. Curved moldboard plows made of cast iron were widely used, and sometimes steel blades were attached to the plows to further increase their efficiency. Some accounts mention the popularity of yangma 秧馬, probably a movable cart for either transplanting or lifting seedlings in rice paddy fields. Both water wheels and water mills were common in the Northern Song. The former could transport water to agrarian fields in a higher place, and the latter utilized hydropower to grind grains or other materials, providing services to both agriculture and the handicraft industry. Mining and metallurgy grew rapidly in the Northern Song period. Copper, iron, silver, lead, and mineral coal were dug from underground mines, which were often controlled by the government. The production of iron reached 150,000 tons per year under Shenzong’s reign, which is triple the highest output in the Tang period. Copper production also reached an unprecedented level of 700 tons per year, a record that would not be broken until 1952. 191

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The distribution and sale of all these mineral resources were monopolized by the government, which regulated price and levied taxes on mine owners. This remarkable expansion of mining activities thus efficiently increased tax revenue for the government. Driven by the rising demand in a prosperous economy, numerous handicraft workshops began to emerge across the empire. Owned and managed by either government agencies or private owners, these places manufactured goods and commodities in all sectors of the economy. One notable example is textile production, a highly organized industry in the Northern Song. It is estimated that there were at least 100,000 private workshops producing large quantities of cotton and hemp cloth in the mid-eleventh century; some of them hired dozens or even hundreds of workers on a daily basis. North China and Sichuan 四川 were the centers of sericulture and silk production. In scholarly accounts, fine silk made in these regions could be as light as thin mist. In addition to the textile industry, oil pressing, sugar making, food packing, porcelain making, lacquer work, woodwork, lumbering, architecture, ship building, paper making, and printing all experienced impressive growth in this period. The demographics of the empire were also changing dramatically. In an 1110 census, there were more than 20 million households in the empire, and the total Song population might have reached 110 million. This figure easily makes the Northern Song the most populous state in pre-modern world history. Half of the population lived in the Lower Yangzi Valley, indicating a major shift in terms of population distribution. North China was no longer the only economic and social center of the empire, and the south would become more and more influential in the coming centuries. Migrants settled in new places and created new towns and cities. Forests were cleared for new settlements and communities, and mountains were converted into paddy fields. Urbanization also characterized Song socioeconomic change. Kaifeng, the capital of the empire, had a population of more than one million and was the largest city in the eleventh-century world. Unlike the Tang capital Chang’an 長安, a planned city with rigid grid pattern, walled wards, and enforced curfew, Kaifeng was an irregular shaped commercial center and key transportation hub from its first days. Four rivers flowed through the city, transporting every kind of good and commodity to the capital. The functions of Kaifeng were not designed according to political needs, but rather gradually defined by commercial interests. Business was highly specialized and consumer-oriented as the city was filled with thousands of restaurants, inns, bookstores, wine taverns, theaters, clinics, drugstores, pawnshops, hardware workshops, and grocery stores. In addition to the capital, there were also regional economic centers with populations ranging between one hundred thousand to half a million. Notable examples include Luoyang 洛陽, Jinling 金陵 (Nanjing), Hangzhou 杭州, Suzhou 蘇州, Yangzhou 揚州, and Chengdu 成都. Another important consequence of commercialization was the development of trading networks within and beyond the empire. Because of the Wang Anshi Reforms, economic activities became more and more monetized. Peasants needed to sell their harvest in order to generate cash income for their families. Local and intra-regional markets thus spread quickly throughout the empire. Urbanization and state monopolies on certain commodities drove the growth of inter-regional or even international markets. The new technologies and inventions in ship building further facilitated the use of waterways and maritime routes in the Northern Song. Every year, thousands of ships from West Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia arrived at major seaports such as Quanzhou 泉州 and Guangzhou 廣州 to trade with Chinese merchants. At the same time, economic development and international trade aggravated the problem of “Coin Famine” (qianhuang 錢荒) that had been bothering the government for decades. The explosion of Song copper production still could not meet the 192

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demand of a cash-based society. For the first time in world history, authorities started to issue paper notes as a new monetary form. Invented in the early eleventh century, paper money began to be widely used in the Southern Song and became the only legal form of currency in the Yuan dynasty.

Examination, education, and social changes The Civil Service Examination System was the dominant recruitment method in the Song. This institution was first created in the Sui 隋 (581–618) and expanded in the Tang. In the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, the Song court expanded its scope and enacted several policies to ensure fairness. Examinations were held every three years at different levels: prefectural ( jieshi 解試), departmental (shengshi 省試 or libushi 禮部試), and palace (dianshi 殿試). Those who eventually passed palace examinations received the prestigious jinshi 進士 (“advanced scholars”) degree and became government officials. This was a highly competitive process. In the late Northern Song, sometimes up to 200,000 students would attend prefectural examinations in a given year, with only 400–500 of them receiving the jinshi degree next year. The examinations focused on Confucian classics, literature, history, and contemporary affairs. In the beginning, students needed to compose poems (shi 詩), poetic expositions ( fu 賦), expositions (lun 論), and policy response essays (ce 策) to demonstrate their learning. Among these, poems were often considered the primary indicator for academic performance. In 1071, the Wang Anshi regime abolished this poetry track (shifu ke 詩賦科) and established a Classics track ( jingji ke 經義科) to recruit talented men. Under this new arrangement, poems and poetic expositions were replaced by questions on Confucian classics, and policy response essays became the most important criteria for passing examinations. Students usually spent ten years or more in schools for literacy training and examination preparation. Although there were a number of private academies led by highly regarded scholars in the Northern Song period, government schools were the dominant form of education. In the mid-eleventh century, the Imperial University (taixue 太學) at Kaifeng gradually replaced the Directorate School (guozixue 國子學) as the leading center of higher education in the empire. Wang Anshi further introduced the Three Hall System (sanshefa 三舍法) in 1072, aiming to expand education to the entire empire. This goal was accomplished by Cai Jing in 1102, when his court ordered every county and prefecture to establish a government school. Cai Jing’s version of the Three Hall System was probably the most radical experiment in educational history in the pre-industrial world. It attempted to realize the goal of universal male education. Schools were divided into halls (she 舍), a concept similar to “grades” in modern society. Students studying there needed to take monthly, seasonal, and annual examinations; those who performed well would be promoted from county schools (xianxue 縣學) to prefectural schools (zhoufuxue 州府學), and then to the Imperial University. This was the world’s first hierarchical government educational network. Students enrolled in these schools received a monthly stipend of 700–1,000 copper coins. This was made possible by the rent income of school land (xuetian 學田) that was allocated by the government or donated by local well-to-do families to local schools. Although the Three Hall System was abolished in 1121 and never restored in the Southern Song, its design and spirit could still be found in later centuries in China. The expansion of examinations and education inevitably brought a major structural shift to Northern Song society. Between the second and eighth century, a small number of prominent families monopolized government posts in China, and commoners had little hope of becoming members of the political and social elites. These powerful families comprised 193

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high-level officials, important landowners, imperial clan members, and notable aristocrats, and often relied on the Recommendation (chaju 察舉) or Nine-Rank ( jiupin zhongzheng 九 品中正) recruitment methods to reproduce themselves in the civil service. Their social status gradually declined after the An Lushan Rebellion (An-Shi zhiluan 安史之亂) (755–763) as political unrest and socioeconomic dynamics destabilized the foundation of their power. When the examination system became the dominant model of government recruitment in the early Song, formally powerful families lost their stakes completely. The Chinese bureaucratic system was finally transformed into a practice of scholarly meritocracy, based on individual mastery of classical learning. Yet at the same time, it would be exaggeration to argue that Song examinations were fair and impartial, always being able to find most talented men from the population, regardless of their social background. Well-to-do families could easily afford to educate their children and were eager to invest wealth on their sons. School education and examinations could further provide precious cultural and social capital for those students. Once they passed the examinations, their official positions would surely bring ample returns to the family or even clan. On the contrary, peasant families urgently needed all their males to earn incomes, mainly through agricultural work. Leaving home and spending years in school was an unimaginable privilege to most of the families in the empire, not to mention the additional costs associated with multiple examinations in one’s later life. Even though there were numerous examples of poor hardworking students gaining success through examinations, official families and local elites were more likely to produce degree holders than commoners. Nevertheless, Song society was no longer dominated by dozens of powerful aristocratic families, but by thousands of less prominent elites. The impact of meritocracy on social mobility was significant, even if limited.

Philosophy The Song was an age of Confucian revival. Unlike those intellectuals drawn to Buddhism and Daoism in the previous centuries, Song literati were eager to reestablish principles of Confucianism and introduce new ways of thinking based on creative interpretations on the classics. They often focused on metaphysical questions, upheld the importance of rational logic, and demonstrated their individual responses to the challenges posed by competing ideologies. An early intellectual breakthrough occurred in the mid-eleventh century when Ouyang Xiu and Fan Zhongyan, the two famous leaders of the Qingli Reform, rejected the Buddhist and Daoist philosophies pervasive in that society and stressed the value of Confucian rites and education in shaping daily customs. They also directed their cultural attention back to the ancient sage-kings ruling the Three Dynasties (sandai 三代), and away from the political and military achievements of the Han 漢 and Tang dynasties, both of which pursued their hegemonic goals through coercion and lacked the true spirit of rites and righteousness. Neither Ouyang Xiu nor Fan Zhongyan developed a coherent framework of Confucian ideas, but their teachings were the precursors to later vibrant intellectual movements in the Northern and Southern Song and new philosophical foundations constructed over the next two centuries. One example was the Learning of the Way (Daoxue 道學), a Neo-Confucian movement initiated by a number of Northern Song thinkers and then transformed into a fullfledged philosophy by Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) in the Southern Song period. Traditional accounts of its intellectual genealogy hold great esteem for the “Five Masters of the Northern Song” (Beisong wuzi 北宋五子), namely, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), Shao Yong 邵雍 194

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(1011–1077), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), as each of them was believed to have made unique contributions to the formulation of the Learning of the Way doctrine. Yet the construction of this lineage is a teleological assumption, in which all of the aforementioned “masters” were predestined to recover the long-lost “transmission of the Way” (Daotong 道統), preparing for the coming of Master Zhu Xi, who would synthesize their ideas and establish a new foundation for the revival of Confucianism in the late twelfth century. In reality, the teachings of these five figures were not always compatible, and only Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi viewed themselves as belonging to this glorious tradition. Zhou Dunyi borrowed the Daoist concepts of “Ultimateless” (wuji 無極) and the “Supreme Ultimate” (taiji 太極) to explain the origin of the Cosmos, creating an ontological layer for the Confucian doctrines. Shao Yong was interested in using numerology to understand the physical world, stressing the uniformity of the underlying principles in the universe and in the human heart. Zhang Zai was a pragmatic scholar, and the range of his interests was vast: mathematics, astronomy, agriculture, politics, and military. The most important legacy he left to Neo-Confucian intellectuals was probably the idea of qi 氣 (vital energies), the force that flows freely in the universe and from which concrete entities, including human beings, are formed. Later, qi became one of the theoretical foundations for the process of self-cultivation in Neo-Confucianism: one can pursue goodness since his or her nature (qi) is always good. Natives of Luoyang 洛陽, Cheng Hao and his younger brother Cheng Yi were the most influential thinkers among the five. Both of them were prominent conservatives and strongly opposed the New Policies of Wang Anshi in Shenzong’s reign. During the 1070s and early 1080s, they taught at private academies in Luoyang and devoted themselves to philosophy and education. The foundational concept advocated by the Cheng Brothers is li 理 (principle, pattern, or reason), the ultimate, transcending reason for all existence. It is the unchanging principle that determines the course of the universe and the rational basis that exists prior to human life. They further borrowed qi from Zhang Zai’s teaching and presented it as the physical counterpart of the metaphysical li. In this way, qi is the manifestation of li, and all the myriad things (wanwu 萬物), including human beings themselves, are the manifestations of qi. This is the famous idea of “one principle with many manifestations” (li yi fen shu 理一 分殊), the foundation of Zhu Xi’s thoughts in the twelfth century. The Cheng Brothers also believed in the goodness of human nature and constructed corresponding relations between xing 性 (human nature) and li, and qing 情 (feelings or emotion) and qi. Therefore, xing is always good, just as the eternal, perfect li, and qing can be complicated since qi could display itself in multiple forms. Following this logic, the goal of learning is to achieve self-cultivation, in which one’s heart and mind can be unified with xing and eventually li after one apprehends his or her own good human nature. There are several methods of self-cultivation, including living with composure ( jujing 居敬), investigating things (gewu 格物), and extending one’s knowledge (zhizhi 致知). Both of the Cheng Brothers viewed themselves as the key transmitters of the Way that had been lost since the death of Mencius. They believed that they rediscovered the teachings of ancient sage-kings, Confucius, and Mencius. Their works, especially those of Cheng Yi (since he outlived his brother by 22 years), greatly influenced the thoughts of Southern Song literati. For example, most of Zhu Xi’s ideas can be traced back to Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao, and the Learning of Way movement is also called the “Cheng-Zhu School of the Principle” (Cheng-Zhu lixue 程朱理學) in Chinese intellectual history. Another influential school of Confucianism in the late Northern Song is the Learning of Wang Anshi (wangxue 王學 or xinxue 新學). Wang was not only an ambitious and talented politician, but also a famous poet, writer, and philosopher. For more than four decades in the 195

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late eleventh and early twelfth centuries when the reformists were in power, his teachings prevailed as the state ideology, and his New Commentaries of Three Classics (Sanjing xinyi 三經 新義) and his Character Dictionary (Zishuo 字説) were assigned to be the official curriculum for the civil service examinations and government schools. One major difference between his learning and that of the Cheng Brothers is the choice of classics included in the Confucian Canon. Both Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi valued the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋), one of the Five Classics and a concise chronicle covering the history of the Lu 魯 state in the Eastern Zhou 周 from 722 to 481 bce. The Cheng Brothers hoped to use its moral teachings to strengthen imperial authority and regulate a proper social order. On the other hand, the Learning of Wang Anshi tends to focus on pragmatic topics such as government administration and Confucian statecraft, so he and his followers highly appreciated the idealized picture of governance portrayed in the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli 周禮), a pre-Qin text that contains detailed descriptions of positions and functions in an imagined government. The Rites of Zhou was useful to them because it provided a grand design for political institutions and was ambiguous enough to accommodate flexible interpretations, so the reformers could easily find evidence from this classic to legitimize the New Policies. Wang Anshi and his followers were also eager to advocate an ideological conformity (yidaode 一道德), under which the learning of Confucianism would be standardized throughout the empire. This is the rationale behind the establishment of the Three Hall reform in Shenzong’s and Huizong’s reigns. The reformists made Wang’s commentaries the official curriculum, hoping that the literati would embrace the themes presented therein and conservative resistance would be eliminated. In addition to the aforementioned figures, there were other scholars actively exploring the Confucian world in the Northern Song. Examples include Sun Fu 孫復 (992–1057), Hu Yuan 胡瑗 (993–1059), Shi Jie 石介 (1005–1045), Li Gou 李覯 (1009–1059), Sima Guang, Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101), and Su Zhe 蘇轍 (1039–1112). Unlike their Han and Tang predecessors who usually spent a great deal of effort on annotating the meanings and origins of individual terms in the classics (zhushu 注疏), most of the Northern Song intellectuals focused on the philosophical meanings (yili 義理) of the classics. Their readings and interpretations of Confucian classics reflect their sociopolitical questions. They often applied exegesis to these texts to produce new meanings, arguments, and ideas. To them, the classics were no longer sacred texts that should be revered, but intellectual treasures that can be revised, reinterpreted, and transformed at will.

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12 The Southern Song dynasty Robert Foster

Map 12.1  T  he Southern Song and Jin. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 6, 42–43.)

The loss of the North and the capture of retired emperor Huizong 徽宗, reigning emperor Qinzong 欽宗, nearly the entire imperial family, and much of the court in 1127, was a shock. With the move of the capital south to Lin’an 臨安, the newly enthroned Gaozong 高宗 was able to stabilize the dynasty, which continued for another 152 years. During that time, the dynasty spent heavily on the military, while the court debated the wisdom of trying to retake the North. The economy could support military spending as commerce flourished. The market economy and the burgeoning printing industry led to social and cultural changes that many consider the foundations for later imperial China. The status of women changed, too, 197

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influenced by the economy and expanding literacy. Although the period is famous for the rise of Neo-Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Popular Religion continued to be important. And while the Northern Song elites focused on large-scale empire-wide agendas (such as Wang Anshi’s New Policies), Southern Song elites tended to narrow their focus to local projects.

Emperors and leading figures Huizong’s ninth son, the Prince of Kang 康王, Zhao Gou 趙構, was able to re-establish the court and stabilize the dynasty, becoming Emperor Gaozong (r. 1127–1162). This was no easy task. Despite early attempts to negotiate for the release of Huizong and Qinzong, the Jurchens continued to press the Southern court. At one point in 1129, Gaozong had to take ship and flee further south. The Jurchen’s pursuit bogged down, and their attempt to cross the Yangtze back to the north proved exceedingly costly. While the border settled along the Huai River, the Yangtze became the main line of defense for the Southern Song. However, by 1132, the situation had stabilized enough that Gaozong established a new capital at Lin’an 临安 (modern Hangzhou). To gain this stability, Gaozong brought rebellious troops, local warlords, and bandits into the military through amnesties. From Lin’an, Gaozong pursued a policy of peace with the Jurchens. This did not sit well with a number of civil and military officials, who urged the emperor to recover the North. Gaozong ignored their pleas, believing (probably correctly) that the Song was not yet strong enough to challenge the Jurchens. To oversee the peace process, Gaozong relied upon his chief councilor, Qin Gui 秦檜, whom he appointed in 1138. Qin used his position and connections within the Censorate to purge many pro-war officials from the bureaucracy. The treaty was concluded in 1141, with Song paying annual tribute and the emperor accepting lower diplomatic ranking than the Jin emperor. In that same year, the three top generals were promoted, effectively removing them from field command of their armies, and the most successful general, Yue Fei 岳飛, a strong critic of Qin Gui, was arrested and died in prison. Qin Gui continued as chief councilor until his death in 1155. He is emblematic of the Southern Song trend of growing autocratic power wielded by the emperor and one or two personal favorites. The peace held for nearly twenty years, until a major Jurchen invasion in 1161. The invasion was repelled. Perhaps believing he had secured peace, Gaozong abdicated in 1162. Xiaozong 孝宗 (r. 1162–1189) began his reign by rehabilitating many of the pro-war officials purged by Qin Gui and bestowing posthumous honors on Yue Fei. Against the advice of the retired Gaozong and many officials, Xiaozong ordered Song forces to attack the Jin in 1163. Xiaozong had bypassed the normal bureaucratic channels in declaring war, leading one historian to single him out as the peak of Southern Song authoritarianism. The campaign was a failure. Neither side could gain the upper hand, and peace was negotiated in 1165. Although the Song regained equal diplomatic status, the annual tribute payments continued unabated. While many were critical of his autocratic style, Xiaozong was a capable and successful ruler. He further centralized authority in the hands of his chief councilors, but never allowed one to wield the same power as Qin Gui had under Gaozong. In fact, from 1175–1178, Xiaozong did not appoint a councilor, preferring direct control. Xiaozong is credited by many with shoring up the Song economy by promoting agriculture and requiring official budget reports in 1167. Xiaozong was deeply affected by the death of his adoptive father, Gaozong, in 1187. Insisting on carrying out the full three years of mourning for Gaozong, Xiaozong turned over court responsibilities to his adoptive heir, Zhao Dun 趙盾. By 1189, it was clear that the situation was untenable. Over the protests of many officials and Zhao Dun, Xiaozong abdicated and Zhao Dun was crowned. 198

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Guangzong 光宗 (r. 1189–1194) struggled to match the example of Xiaozong. Xiaozong’s autocratic style worked as long as the ruler was capable and willing. Guangzong was neither. He relied heavily upon members of the inner court and his wife, Empress Li 李. The empress had a troubled relationship with Xiaozong. The retired emperor still commanded respect. Xiaozong was critical of Empress Li’s arrogance, selfishness, and nepotism. Perhaps owing to this animosity, Xiaozong blocked Guangzong’s son by Empress Li from being named heir apparent. From this point on, Guangzong saw Xiaozong less and less. When Xiaozong died in 1194, Guangzong refused to participate in any of the funeral rites, delegating that responsibility to his son. After Xiaozong’s death, court politics became fractious. Guangzong appointed a number of unqualified palace favorites to high offices. Chief councilor Liu Zheng 留正, frustrated with being bypassed, joined with Zhao Ruyu 趙汝愚, a top official and imperial clansman, and Han Tuozhou 韓侂冑, a minor functionary who oversaw access to the inner court, to persuade the Empress Dowager to support asking Guangzong to abdicate in 1194. Guangzong was succeeded by Ningzong 寧宗 (r. 1194–1224). Characterized as another weak emperor, Ningzong’s reign was marked by his dependence on two powerful chief councilors: Han Tuozhou and Shi Miyuan 史彌遠. Han had played a part in Guangzong’s abdication and was a trusted member of the inner court; he was not, however, respected by the outer court. Early in Ningzong’s reign, Zhao Ruyu, who had also effected the abdication, was appointed chief councilor. He was opposed to the influence of the inner court and allied himself with officials who subscribed to the Daoxue (道學, Learning of the Way) school of moralistic Confucianism. This brought him into direct conflict with Han Tuozhou. Ultimately, Zhao was unable to gain enough support to oust Han and was dismissed in 1195, on the grounds that imperial clansmen were not supposed to hold councilor-level office. After Zhao’s dismissal, Han rose steadily in power and influence. However, he did not have a scholarly background and so, despite shaping policy, he was never appointed chief councilor. In 1195, Han began to attack Daoxue teachings as “spurious learning” (weixue 偽學) and was able to ban Daoxue leaders from the metropolitan bureaucracy. This was extended in 1198 to a broad ban directed at fifty-nine leading Daoxue figures. However, the ban only lasted until 1199. One of the consequences was that men on the blacklist rose in moral stature as righteous officials. Sensing that the Jurchens were weakened by natural disasters and distracted by the rise of the Mongols in the north, Han Tuozhou moved to attack in 1206. The campaign gained nothing, as the Jin quickly stabilized and seized the advantage. One of the stipulations for peace was delivering Han Tuozhou’s head to the Jin. Han was assassinated in 1207 and his head duly delivered by Shi Miyuan. Shi succeeded as chief councilor and was in power from 1208–1233. Though he was a stabilizing figure and not unsympathetic to Daoxue, his autocratic rule with the approval of Ningzong was heavily criticized by court officials. Shi’s staunch maintaining of peace with Jin also drew ire; but the 1206 war had been an economic disaster. Shi focused on rebuilding the coffers. However, Jin declared war in 1217. As with the 1206 war, neither side gained an advantage. Ningzong died in 1224 and was succeeded by his adopted son, Lizong 理宗 (r.  ­1224–1264). Shi Miyuan continued to dominate the court for the first nine years of Lizong’s reign, until Shi died in 1233. In that same year, Song agreed to aid the Mongols who were pushing Jin further and further south. In 1234, the last Jin emperor committed suicide. This left the Song confronting the Mongols. Believing the Mongols were overstretched, Song launched an attack to recapture the northern capitals of Kaifeng 開封 and Luoyang 洛陽. The invasion was not well planned and the forces found themselves short 199

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of supplies as the Mongols counter-attacked in 1235. Song troops were forced back to the original border, and hostilities continued, although Mongol power was focused on the campaign in Russia. To underwrite military costs, the court printed more paper currency than it had metal to back it. This led to rampant inflation, criticism at court, and public discontent. Perhaps to rally some officials to the court’s side, in 1241, the court enshrined the four Northern Song ­Daoxue masters (Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤, Zhang Zai 張載, Cheng Hao 程顥, and Cheng Yi 程颐) and Zhu Xi 朱熹 in the Confucian Temple. In 1253, the Mongols began to campaign against Song in earnest and succeeded in capturing western Sichuan before the campaign was suspended due to the death of the khan, Ögödei, in 1259. Upon Lizong’s death in 1264, he was succeeded by Duzong 度宗 (r. 1264–1274), the last adult male to rule Song. Duzong was not suited for wartime leadership. He was criticized for living extravagantly and for bypassing the normal bureaucratic channels to appoint favorites to office. This conflict was acute since Duzong’s habits during economic and political crisis ran counter to the growing moralist influences of Daoxue at court. Duzong relied upon Jia Sidao 賈似道, who had been chief councilor since 1259. Like Qin Gui, Han Tuozhou, and Shi Miyuan before him, Jia Sidao was a polarizing figure. Given the centralized structures created during the first part of the Southern Song, Jia wielded power almost single-handedly. As the Mongol threat loomed, other officials argued Jia was not doing enough. When the key city of Xiangyang 襄陽 fell in 1273, many blamed Jia. Ultimately, he was removed in 1274, but there was little the Song could do at that point. When Duzong died in 1274, he left three young sons. The three-year-old Zhao Xian 趙縣 became Emperor Gongzong 恭宗. The emperor’s grandmother, Dowager Empress Xie 謝 (Lizong’s widow) acted as regent and recalled Jia Sidao. Jia personally oversaw a massive counter-attack in 1275. However, the Mongols decisively defeated the Song forces. In retreat, Jia recommended the court abandon Lin’an. After further defeats, Jia was removed from office. The Mongol advance led to a number of defections, surrenders, and conflict at the court. Jia was assassinated in 1275. The Mongol advance continued, but the Dowager Empress believed staying in Lin’an would encourage Song troops to fight. This proved ill founded, and in March 1278, the ­Mongol general Bayan entered Lin’an once the surrender was negotiated. The Zhao family, including the Dowager Empress and Gongzong, was transported north. Duzong’s two other sons, Zhao Shi 趙是 and Zhao Bing 趙昺, were sent south before Lin’an fell. They were accompanied by officials, family, and guards. Over the course of three years, they fled further and further south, unable to establish a stronghold. Zhao Shi was named emperor in 1276 (Duanzong 端宗), but died of illness in 1278, at the age of ten. Zhao Bing was enthroned at age five. He reigned for less than two years. Making a last stand on the extreme southern island of Yaishan in 1279, the Song navy was defeated. Chief councilor Lu Xiufu 陸秀夫 picked up Zhao Bing and jumped into the ocean, drowning both of them and ending the Song dynasty.

Political institutions Once the fluid situation following the loss of the north in 1127 settled down, the Southern Song continued the political institutions established during the Northern Song. However, there were two major trends during the Southern Song. The first was the transfer of power into the hands of chief councilors, which permitted the autocracies of Xiaozong, Qin Gui, Han Tuozhou, Shi Miyuan, and Jia Sidao. At the same time, the government intruded less in 200

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daily life. Southern Song saw no overarching attempts to reform society that were central to Northern Song politics. There was no equivalent of Wang Anshi’s New Policies. However, from 1127 to 1132, no one was certain that Song would survive. Gaozong was confronted by rebellions, warlords, and instability in the south. He co-opted local leaders and ceded a great deal of local military and political control to governors-general ( jiedushi 節度使). To ensure that local defense was properly funded, the government allowed local officials to keep more tax revenue, as well as to create new taxes to raise revenue. This led to the outer court’s lasting concerns about the power of military leaders. The five major armies were initially not under unified control, but under personal commands of individual generals such as Yue Fei. The Imperial Defense Command (yuying si 御營司) was established to coordinate resistance with the mostly independent armies. The court also appointed four General Commissioners of Supply (zongling shi 總領使), equal in rank to the governors-general, to oversee the military’s spending of government funds. When the situation stabilized in 1130, the responsibilities of the Imperial Defense Command were subsumed under the regular Bureau of Military Affairs (shumi yuan 樞密院). In an attempt to return military oversight to civil officials, the Bureau of Military Affairs was put under control of the chief councilors. While there was early decentralization for the military, the bureaucracy was streamlined. The Three Departments (Secretariat [zhongshu sheng 中書省], Chancellery [menxia sheng 門下省], and State Affairs [shangshu sheng 尚書省]) were merged into a single Department of State Affairs. In 1167, centralization of authority was completed when the chief councilors were also given the title Controller of National Finance (zhiguoyongshi 制國用使). This arrangement facilitated the imposition of autocratic rule that was contentious throughout the Southern Song. By late Southern Song, the decision to allow regional fiscal control meant that the government did not draw as much revenue as it could have at a time when the government most needed to fund military defense.

International relations Until the fall of the Jurchen Jin dynasty in 1234, international relations were dominated by the Jin. On the whole, emperors and their chief councilors maintained peace, but also spent a great deal on the military to ensure the safety of the South. The Song maintained an army of around one million, but perhaps only half of them were ready for combat. The 1141 treaty with Jin set the border at the Huai River and forced the Song ruler to refer to himself as a “subject” of the Jin “emperor” and to pay an annual tribute of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk. In return, the coffins of Huizong and Qinzong, who had both died in captivity, and Gaozong’s mother were returned to Song. Song developed both fresh- and salt-water navies for security and transportation. This proved crucial when Jin launched another campaign in 1161. Song armies were routed in the east, but the navy was able to hold the Jin’s advance, while Song forces in Sichuan actually gained territory. Against the advice of Gaozong and leading officials, his successor, Xiaozong, ordered a counterattack in 1163. After an initial month of success, Jin regrouped and routed Song forces. Peace negotiations were concluded in 1165. The new treaty gave Song emperors equal status with Jin emperors, but Song returned territory gained in 1161 and continued annual payments of silver and silk at the reduced amount of 200,000 units each. Song greatly expanded the navy after 1164. In 1130, the navy consisted of 3,000 sailors; by 1174, it had 21,000; and by 1237, 52,000. Since 1127, vessels engaged in overseas trade were required to give nearly 46 percent of their goods to various government offices to supply and 201

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underwrite military costs. The navy represented the strongest force in the East China Sea, but Song did not use it for aggressive military action against neighboring states, other than Jin, and, later, the Mongols. After the treaty of 1165, Song and Jin emperors maintained the peace for several decades. This peace policy was controversial at the Song court. Many officials and public figures urged the government to take back the north, as some linked dynastic legitimacy to holding the north. Despite such pleas, Song did not attack, and the peace policy led to greater domestic stability and economic growth. The rise of the Mongols under Chinggis Khan changed the complexion of the international order in China. Around 1200, Jin bolstered their northern border against the Mongol threat. At the same time, natural disasters had afflicted Jurchen territory and reduced their wealth. Believing Jin was weak, the imperial favorite, Han Tuozhou prepared for war. In 1206, Song forces attacked, but were unable to secure anything other than an initial victory. Within six months, Jin had stabilized and gained the upper hand. The conflict weakened both sides, but was particularly costly for Jin. In 1207, Han Tuozhou was assassinated—a rare act of internal political violence. His head was sent to the Jin court as part of the peace process. Song also agreed to pay a one-time indemnity of three million taels of silver and to increase the annual tribute payments of silver and silk to 300,000 units each. With these concessions, peace was achieved in 1208, but did not last long. In 1211, the Mongols attacked Jin. This led to a crisis at the Jin court and a wave of assassinations. The Mongols took Jin’s Central Capital (Zhongdu 中都, modern Beijing) in 1216, forcing the Jin court to flee south to the former Northern Song capital of Kaifeng 開封. Perhaps hoping to compensate for the loss of its northern territory to the Mongols, Jin attacked Song in 1217, leading to nearly two decades of low-grade conflict. Hoping to outflank Jin, the Mongols asked permission to cross Song territory in 1231. This request was denied and the envoy assassinated. The Mongols responded with a punitive attack on Sichuan before withdrawing. In 1233, Song agreed to cooperate with the Mongols against Jin. In return, the Mongols promised to return some of the northern territory Song coveted. The combined forces defeated Jin, with the last Jin emperor committing suicide in 1234. With Jin gone, the Song sent an expeditionary force to retake the northern capitals of Kaifeng and Luoyang. Though initially successful, the forces found supplies scarce after twenty years of war in the north. Mongol counterattacks forced the troops back south. The Mongols responded with a retaliatory force in 1235 that continued to harass and attack the border until 1238, when the Mongols offered a truce, perhaps because the great khan, Ögödei (r. 1229–1241), wanted to focus on the campaign in Russia. Song refused and hostilities continued. Neither side was able to gain the advantage because Mongol cavalry was superior in the open lands of the north, but Song had the upper hand along the waterways and in the mountainous south. Möngke (r. 1251–1259) delegated the conquest of Song to his brother Khubilai. In 1253, Khubilai began his campaign by defeating Dali 大理, a kingdom in modern Yunnan 雲南. In 1258, the Mongols attacked Sichuan, capturing Chengdu 成都, the main city of the region. However, when Möngke joined the campaign, he fell victim to an epidemic in the Mongol camp in 1259. Khubilai broke off the campaign to return to Karakoram, where the khuriltai elected him khan in 1260. Khubilai changed tactics, first building a navy manned mostly by Chinese. Mongol troops shifted their point of attack to the center of Song territory, striking at the strategic cities along the rivers leading to the Yangtze. The key city of Xiangyang fell in 1273. Though Song put up strong resistance, the Dowager Empress, acting as regent for a child emperor, surrendered the capital of Lin’an in 1276. 202

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Members of the refugee court made their last stand in 1279, on the island of Yaishan, just south of Guangzhou 廣州.

The economy The growth of markets, the use of paper money, and the relatively high standard of living have led some historians to see parallels with the early modern period in European history and to “enlightened modern capitalism.” The Song state encouraged commerce as no other dynasty before or after. Song leaders understood the benefits of trade and commercial taxation. The problem for the Southern Song, in particular, was that much of the state’s revenue was drawn off either to buy peace with northern neighbors, or to pay for a large and technologically sophisticated military. In fact, by the late-twelfth century, state revenues matched those of the highest years of the Northern Song, even though the court ruled over half the territory. The loss of the north in 1127 was economically devastating. Song lost nearly a third of its territory, nearly half of its 320-odd prefectures, two-fifths of its households, over half of its summer land tax, over three-fifths of its fall land tax, nearly half of its commercial tax, and most of its valuable metals.1 Before retreating, the Jurchens destroyed the countryside and cities of the Yangtze. However, the south soon recovered. Millions of migrants fleeing the north repopulated devastated areas. While Song lost around half of its agricultural revenue, it retained the territories that accounted for five-sixths of Song’s non-agrarian revenue in silk, silver, and cash. There were advantages to having the new capital in the heart of the wealthiest area of China, saving the government in transportation costs. The middle of the twelfth century was marked by bountiful harvests and few natural disasters. This encouraged the growth of markets and commerce along southern waterways and the sea. Wealth generated by trade was invested in new technologies. Textile and ceramic production improved and Song products were sought after from Japan to the east coast of Africa. At home, the expanding publishing industry supplied the growing demand in the marketplace of ideas. The capital had around one million residents, requiring four million bushels of rice per year. Urbanization required better transportation to move food and goods from the countryside. This pushed the development of maritime technology, which was aided by the use of the compass for navigation—first documented in 1090. Along land routes, networks of inns and storehouses sprang up to serve the needs of merchants, facilitating trade across regions. While there may not have been a true national market, in which all regions were connected to each other, Southern Song clearly was heading in that direction as specialty goods moved from one region to another. A series of poor harvests and natural disasters from 1163 to 1210 led to famine, zero population growth, and inflation. One historian notes, “over the course of the dynasty, from approximately 1000 to 1220, the prices for rice and silk increased by 2,500 percent and 400 percent, respectively.”2 Four decades of unusually cold weather from 1221 to 1260 reduced the growing season, leading to further stresses on the economy. In response, the government overprinted money, which led to rapid devaluation and loss of confidence in it as a market instrument. Despite these issues, people in the Southern Song probably enjoyed the highest per capita standard of living in the world. The government adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward the 203

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economy, but also developed a fiscal administration that efficiently extracted wealth through taxation. Song government revenue was 10 to 15 percent of national income—more than either the Ming or Qing. Despite the importance of commerce, agriculture was still the economic foundation. In some areas, agricultural production during Song would not be matched until the twentieth century. Champa rice, which grows nearly twice as fast as other varieties, facilitated increased production. Farmers could double-crop their rice during the growing season and, in some areas, plant a third crop after rice harvests. This, plus migration from the north, led to the southern population doubling by 1162. As transportation infrastructure improved and markets developed, more areas specialized in specific products for market, rather than on local subsistence. Farmers in the Yangtze delta grew high-quality rice for market and then purchased cheaper Champa rice for their own consumption. Other areas focused on mulberry trees and silk production, relying on the markets for their foodstuffs. One reason for the flexible use of land is that the government allowed private ownership and sale of land. There were concerns about “engrossers” ( jianbing 兼并), wealthy families who owned large tax-free estates. At times, the fiscal administration attempted to limit landholding to bring land back onto the tax registers; however, many of the engrossers either were officials, or were related to them, so the problem persisted until 1263, when Jia Sidao pushed through limits. Wealth was also invested in industrial production of ceramics. Where Tang used metal tableware, Song encouraged ceramics so metal could be used as money. During the Southern Song, ceramics became a large-scale industry with hillside “dragon kilns” capable of firing 20,000 to 30,000 pieces at once. This production more than met local demand and fed an international market. Chinese merchants supplanted Arab merchants in maritime trade. Recent scholarship demonstrates that Song merchants actively traded throughout South and Southeast Asia and the Indonesian archipelago. The growth of maritime trade was probably a response to reduced access to Central Asian trade and was fostered by the navigational compass; printed maps and charts of stars, tides, currents, and foreign countries; and by advanced ship-building techniques. In Southern Song, revenues collected from overseas trade doubled to two million strings of cash per year. Overseas markets sought Chinese ceramics, silks, and metals. The latter was problematic, since Chinese coins were in high demand in Korea and Japan. In return, Song markets sought “aromatics” (xiangyao 香藥)—spices, perfumes, and medicinal goods. The government encouraged Chinese merchants to trade abroad and foreign merchants to come to Song, as the government greatly benefited from commercial taxes of around 10 percent of the value of goods. Assessment could climb as high as 30 percent, depending upon the specific good and current need for revenue. The government also generated revenue monopolies on key resources, namely, salt, alcohol, tea, alum, and metals. The salt monopoly alone accounted for nearly half of government revenues by 1170. Other revenue was extracted through a highly efficient tax system. The main tax was the biannual tax on agriculture, paid in summer and fall. The summer tax was based on expected production of all fields and usually paid in cash, silk, or other approved goods. The fall tax focused on the expected grain harvest. Assessment was around 10 percent of production, but this varied by area. Song subjects also paid a poll tax on males between 20 and 60 years old, labor service, and miscellaneous taxes assessed by region and need. Urban dwellers paid a house tax and tax on any land they owned. There were two main commercial taxes: a sales tax of 3 percent and a transit tax of 2 percent on the value of goods; however, the transit tax could be much more due to additional taxes assessed for vehicle or vessel size and type. All this meant that Song was less dependent upon agricultural tax than 204

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dynasties before or since. Song annual tax revenues may have been as much as seven times larger than Tang. Money also freed wealth from agriculture. Northern Song developed new techniques for extracting copper, which led to a massive increase in minting. The average number of coins in circulation rose from seventeen per person in 995, to 212 by 1080. During Northern Song, around 200 million strings were in circulation, or about 145 billion coins. This led to the monetization of the economy. Taxes could be commuted from products to coins, meaning farmers used coins as well as barter. Coins facilitated trade and made living in cities easier, since wealth was easier to transport and store. The dependence upon coins did have a downside. Due to destruction of mines by the Jurchens and to shrinking supplies of copper ore, by the twelfth century, copper production was 10 percent of what it had been in the eleventh century. One solution was to put more lead in coins, but this reduced their real value and led some to hoard purer coins, removing even more from circulation. Merchants also exported coins, much to the displeasure of the government. In 1133, ships were inspected for coins; in 1171, more regulations were placed on trading coins; and in 1199, Korean and Japanese were forbidden to trade in coins. The issues with bronze coins led to the world’s first successful paper money. Paper money developed first as private certificates in Sichuan, where copper was scarce and iron coins were minted. One historian estimated that a Sichuanese would need 1.5 pounds of iron to buy one pound of salt. People took to depositing goods with merchants and receiving “deposit certificates” ( jiaozi 交子) in return, which could then be used for other purchases. Another type of paper currency, “check medium” (huizi 會子), was used by private brokers in Lin’an. The government made paper money an official monopoly in 1160, and banned the private issues. For the remainder of the twelfth century, paper money successfully circulated and facilitated economic growth. This was mainly due to restrained printing of currency. In 1167, fearing that too much paper money was in circulation and that people were losing their faith in its value, Xiaozong used two million taels of silver to buy back notes, which were then burned. Another type of printed currency employed by Southern Song were monks’ certificates (dudie 度牒). Originally, monks who passed a state ordination examination received the certificates to avoid labor service and other tax obligations. In Northern Song, the government began to sell blank certificates to raise money for Wang Anshi’s New Policies. In order to pay for its navy, Southern Song expanded the sale. Functioning as money, blank certificates were bought and sold for 500 to 800 strings of cash. After Xiaozong’s reign, subsequent emperors were less prudent. In the thirteenth century, the government overprinted money in response to the continued loss of bronze coins and to underwrite conflicts with the Jin and Mongols. Paper currency steadily lost value as more notes circulated without metal reserves to back them. In 1168, a paper note with a face value of one string of cash (770 coins) bought the market equivalent. By 1208, the value had dropped to 600 coins, and to 240 coins by 1236. By the end of the Song, the devaluation of the currency ruined the once prosperous economy. The influence of commerce and money extended throughout society. While some Confucian scholars decried the pursuit of profit, members of all classes were engaged in commerce. Wu Zimu wrote that Lin’an is the ‘place of temporary residence’ [of the court], where everything is available. And if one views all the guilds and the hundred markets which line up from outside the roadblock at the Gate of Tranquility to the Bridge of Inspection there is not a single family which is not in the trading business.3 205

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Members of the literate elite (shidafu 士大夫) also participated, showing less disdain than their peers in later dynasties. One literatus published a book in 1172 about maintaining and increasing wealth outside of officeholding, for which competition had increased. Commercial ideas and vocabulary proliferated. The Northern Song poet, Su Shi, used commercial language to describe poetry as an exchange of ideas, words, and meaning. Painters not only benefited from the markets to sell their works, they also made markets and commerce acceptable subjects, most famously in “Along the River During Qingming Festival” (Qingming shanghe tu 清明上河圖). Religion, too, was affected. The idea of paying a spiritual debt through good works or burning spirit money appeared in the 1170s. Southern Song faithful were also influenced by commercial bookkeeping. One kept account of one’s actions, totting up merits and demerits at the end of the day, month, and year in mass-­ produced moral ledgers.

Culture Three intertwining aspects of culture greatly influenced Southern Song society: the imperial examinations, education, and printing. Since the late tenth century, the imperial examinations dominated the intellectual world. The examinations created a shared intellectual culture for the elites, promoted Confucian ideology, and expanded education and literacy. We often only think of candidates and examiners, but it is more useful to use the term “examination field” to cover the broader range of people involved in the system. This field included political officials, private teachers, examination candidates, students in public and private schools training for the examinations, and publishers. Passing the jinshi 進士 examination was the fast track to power, wealth, and influence. Zhou Mi 周密 wrote of the procession of successful candidates: From the Gate of Eastern Flowers to the banquet hall, [people] at the noble estates of powerful families crowd about their colored curtains to view [the graduates], and those who are young and unmarried are often selected as sons-in-law at this time.4 Participation in the examination field grew prodigiously in Southern Song. In Northern Song, an estimated 200,000 men took the examinations. In Southern Song, with half the territory, around 400,000 men did. This meant that two to 7 percent of the adult male population took the exams. This does not take into account all of those who trained at some level, but did not sit the examinations. Passing rates were incredibly low. In Southern Song, around 6.5 percent of candidates passed the examinations. Another source puts the chances of passing at one in three thousand. Men participated because the rewards of passing were so great. Even if unsuccessful, pursuing examination education raised a young man’s prospects for marriage and patronage. His education made him conversant with elite culture and opened other possibilities as a tutor, teacher, legal advisor, or other non-official position that required literacy. However, as Song progressed, more and more men entered the bureaucracy through “protection privilege” (yin 蔭), which gave senior officials the power to grant title to junior relatives. At times, this led to tensions in the court, between those who passed the exams, such as Zhao Ruyu, and those who had benefited from protection privilege, such as Han Tuozhou. By 1213, 45 percent of officials entered through protection. Even those who entered through protection privilege would have benefited from the expansion of education in Song. In Northern Song, decrees in 1044 and 1102 established 206

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schools in all counties. Extended families set up schools for the sons of family members. Investment in education could pay huge rewards in wealth and social status. The Northern Song government sponsored a number of printing projects to disseminate official versions of the classics and their approved commentaries. These imperial projects set the standards for ideology and publication. The Northern Song New Policies attempted to impose a narrow interpretation of the Classics, which led to decades of factionalism at court. The Southern Song court attempted to avoid this divisiveness by adopting ideological impartiality. While Confucianism was still the core of the exams, no single interpretation was favored until late in the dynasty. This allowed competing interpretation, and, with the expansion of printing and commerce, the horizons of the marketplace of ideas opened. Alongside state-sponsored schools, some 200 private academies (shuyuan 書院) sprang up teaching classical exegesis. Some academies relied upon official commentaries, but a growing number emphasized personal engagement with the original texts, rather than the commentarial tradition. This view was particularly important for Daoxue thinkers. As examination success became less likely, Daoxue teachers stressed education not for public success, but for self-cultivation. Zhu Xi famously noted that a student should spend 70 percent of his study on self-cultivation and 30 percent preparing for the examinations. It was not that these teachers rejected government service; rather, in an era where autocratic figures dominated the court, teachers stressed the need for cultivated individuals to foment change locally. These men needed to be conversant with the ideas and models of the classics and to develop the moral capacity to be local leaders. The spread of education and literacy in Song went hand-in-hand with the rise of commercial printing. Whereas previous scholars depended upon hand-copied texts on scrolls to fill their libraries, Song publishers mass-produced texts for elite and popular consumption. Some complained that printed books encouraged lazy reading habits. Rather than unrolling and re-rolling scrolls, or even better, memorizing texts, students simply bookmarked pages. Others worried that typographical errors would lead to textual misinterpretation. Be that as it may, texts in Song were about one-tenth the price that they were in the middle of the Tang dynasty. The Northern Song court-sponsored publications encouraged private publishing houses to produce the same texts, as well as differing interpretations. Collections of successful examination essays were popular, as were how-to manuals for learning essay forms, memorizing texts, and general examination preparation. When the Southern Song pulled back from such imperial projects (due to cost and choice), private publishing filled the gap. It is estimated that there were seventy-five publishing centers in Northern Song, but two hundred in Southern Song. With the growth of publishing, schools used the commercial publications to disseminate their interpretations, gain an audience, attract students, and influence society at large. Print culture was not just the realm of the elite. There are examples of “proto-newspapers” that digested court matters for public consumption. There were broadsheets publicly posted to air grievances, popularize satirical songs, and advertise businesses. This suggests that literacy, at various levels, spread beyond the elite engaged in examination education. Printing and literacy meant that ideas, agricultural techniques, designs for improved silk-weaving frames—a whole range of things—were now widely available and cheap.

Social change The loss of the North affected Southern Song society in three main ways: there was growing skepticism of government activism; the bureaucratic elite was absorbed into the literati class, 207

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whose identity was not solely linked to government service; and the lower Yangtze region became the economic, political, and cultural center of China until the sixteenth century. Although government at the top level became more autocratic, paradoxically there was less oversight at the local level. The government no longer tried to control private commerce, as it had under the New Policies; in Southern Song, prefectures shaped laws and taxes to local realities; oversight of the salt and tea monopolies was licensed to merchants; local elites participated in decisions to enshrine local gods; private scholars mapped the empire; and local elites funded and organized local charities. Literati, though they may still have aspirations for high office, often turned their energy to local issues. As elite social status depended less upon government service, and as more families engaged in commerce and education, the literati class grew during the Southern Song. Wealth, status, and political position were all still important, but the stress on office diminished. Marriage patterns for Northern Song officials indicate a strategy to search across the empire for marital matches to enhance and maintain status. This strategy was less prominent in Southern Song. Although some families did engage in long-distance marriages in the truncated empire, more often elites sought ties with other local elites. In the Tang dynasty, and to a certain extent in Northern Song, marriage ties focused on matching the pedigrees of families. The expansion of the examinations, commerce, and literacy promoted new criteria. A young man from humble background might marry the daughter of a powerful family, if they knew he had a good chance of passing the examinations; or an official’s family might overlook the livelihood of a merchant’s daughter, provided she brought wealth or land to the marriage. Dowries (the property a woman brought to a marriage) increased in Song. Whereas a Tang bride’s dowry roughly matched the bride-price paid by the groom, Song dowries were usually higher. However, Song women enjoyed better property rights than women before or after in dynastic China. Once married, a woman controlled her dowry and any wealth generated from it. If a woman was widowed or divorced, she took her dowry with her. Only if she died while married did her sons inherit. While there was growing pressure for the dowry to become the husband’s property, there was also greater legal recognition for daughters’ rights to their mothers’ dowry. This relatively strong economic standing meant that women could be involved in commerce. Not only did they engage in textile production at home, women also ran shops, guesthouses, and restaurants. Not until the thirteenth century were Song women urged to stay home. In fact, their commercial activities were seen to benefit the family as a whole. Wives were encouraged to manage family wealth, to oversee property, and purchase homes. Literacy undoubtedly aided commercially active women. Female literacy was common among elite families. Daughters had greater access to the books their brothers were studying, because books were plentiful and cheap. Furthermore, an educated wife was desirable for educated men, not only as a companion, but also as teacher of their children. Some women parlayed their literacy into public fame. Li Qingzhao 李清照 (1084–1151) was the daughter of a scholar official and rose to fame as a poet in the aftermath of the loss of the North, in which her husband was killed. Many still consider her China’s greatest female poet. Although Song women benefited from Song property law and trade, other trends triggered the decline of women as public figures. The spread of literacy and publishing also led to studies in science and medicine. Song doctors developed the new field of “women’s medicine” ( fuke 婦科). Previously, men and women were thought to have basically similar constitutions. Song doctors came to believe that women were more “vulnerable” to illness than men. Women were now considered biologically weaker than men, providing medical grounds to protect or even cloister women. 208

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The market economy also negatively influenced the status of women. Women were marketed as concubines and maids. Not all of these situations were permanent. A poor family might sell a daughter’s service for a limited period. Even so, the commodification of women increased in Song. In Tang, a man usually would take a concubine only if his wife did not bear a son. Possession of one concubine or more became the norm for Song men who could afford them. This commodification is connected to the spread of foot-binding. Foot-binding began in the tenth century among dancers and courtesans. Though still rare in the eleventh century, the practice was widespread among elite families by the thirteenth century. Why would this fashion jump from dancers to elite women? Concubines competed directly with wives for their husband’s affections. As this competition became common, more women bound their daughters’ feet to make them more attractive to prospective husbands. There does not seem to have been general female protest against this practice. Nor does there seem to have been much sympathetic camaraderie among wives, concubines, and maids. Instead, social role trumped gender identity. Women acknowledged that their success lay in working within the social system that placed the family structure and its prescribed roles above individual aspiration. One might also ask why these trends in medicine, commerce, and fashion, along with a growing thirteenth-century call for women to remain in the household, happened in Southern Song, at the same time that women were engaging in commerce and becoming literary figures and property owners. The trends to narrow the scope of female activity responded precisely to the more liberal atmosphere in Song. The ideal Song man was educated and socially engaged, but he was not expected to be physically robust in the way his Tang predecessors were. Commercially minded, socially active, literate women blurred gender lines, and female autonomy was, perhaps, a threat to male identity.

Religion Religion, in its many forms, pervaded Southern Song culture. The emperor sacrificed to heaven and earth to establish human order mirrored on celestial order. One metaphor for religion in this period is three linked mountain peaks rising from the same plain. The peaks represent the three organized traditions of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. The broader plain below them is traditional popular religion. The three peaks shared some similar features (meditation, stress on lineal transmission, canonical texts, sacred mountains, and veneration of past masters), while popular religion tended to be localized, non-textual, and non-hierarchical. In Southern Song, commercial and political forces also influenced religious practice. The marketplace of ideas led to competition between sects and schools for the patronage and devotion of followers. The state tried to gain local support by incorporating local gods into the state-sanctioned pantheon. Widespread printing of canonical texts meant they were no longer the domain of officials and priests. These trends stimulated religious laity—individuals devoted to a sect or school, who became expert in their chosen tradition, without necessarily joining the monastery, or seeking ordination, or sitting for the examinations. Popular religion was localized with adherents from all social strata. People who participated in local cults did not separate themselves from Buddhist, Daoist, or Confucian practices. Rather, different schools served different purposes. The three organized traditions made universal claims about how the world worked and the human condition. Popular religion did not. Local cults lacked canonical texts or clergy, but grew out of local traditions, usually associated with demons and nature spirits in zoomorphic form. In Southern Song, 209

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local cults developed around the spirits of deceased individuals who responded to prayer and offerings. The spread of bureaucratic government and the desire to bring local cults under state control led to official enfeoffments of local gods, often at the behest of local elites. As these spirits were brought into the divine bureaucracy, they lost their zoomorphic forms and were anthropomorphized. Official recognition meant the state contributed to shrine upkeep and regular sacrifices. There were other motivations for seeking imperial recognition for local cults. Shrines could become economic centers. The faithful paid to pray, shrines paid taxes to the state, and markets sprang up during festivals—with some becoming permanent. Traditionally, Buddhist scholarship points to the Tang as the apex of Buddhism and the Song as a period of decline. This was not the case. Prior to the Song, following a campaign against Buddhism in 955, of 30,336 monasteries only 2,694 were left. However, institutional Buddhism thrived in Song. Where there had been 260,000 registered monks and nuns in 845, during the Tang, by 1221, there were 400,000 monks and 61,000 nuns. Yet the nature of Buddhism changed as lay followers came to dominate. The ordained clergy only made the upper and smallest layer of Buddhists in Song. Lay believers comprised another, larger layer of the community. These believers supported the monastic community and lived according to Buddhist doctrine. A third group, which may have been larger still, was made of those who did not identify as Buddhist but occasionally engaged in Buddhist rituals, festivals, or prayers for worldly success (such as praying to Guanyin for smooth childbirth.) The injection of worldly concerns into practice is linked to the stress on Mahayana ­Buddhism’s concept that ultimate liberation can be found in this world, once one sees through false dichotomies of real and unreal. More often than their Tang predecessors, Song writers injected worldly social and political critiques into commemorations commissioned by temples. The royal family also used Buddhism as a political tool. By sponsoring masses for war dead and imperial birthdays, and by sending imperial calligraphy and portraits to temples, the imperium used Buddhism as a reminder of authority. Three-quarters of imperially recognized Buddhist monasteries in Song were linked to the Chan (禪: Jpn.: Zen) lineage. Chan fit the Song ethos that emphasized individual engagement with this world. Chan also shared a number of characteristics with the Neo-Confucian movement, such as the stress on teacher-student connections, veneration of past masters, and meditation. Yet, Buddhism was geared toward individual salvation, rather than Confucianism’s social responsibility. This does not mean that Buddhists were not socially concerned, nor that Confucians were indifferent to personal fulfillment; simply put, the ultimate goals differed. Song cults of Guanyin, the Bodhisattva of Mercy, and Maitreya, Boddhisattva of the Future, made the object of veneration more approachable. Guanyin, originally a male figure, was feminized and associated with Pure Land Buddhism’s salvation doctrine. Maitreya came to symbolize wealth and contentment in this world. It is not surprising that lay practice grew during Southern Song in conjunction with expanding wealth and printing. Lay practitioners now had access to Buddhist texts and had disposable income to support the monasteries and festivals and to pay for rituals. In this atmosphere, Buddhists competed with Daoists and Confucians for the patronage of literati. Imperial patronage during Northern Song enhanced Daoism’s stature. In 1009, a divine letter to Emperor Zhenzong 真宗 revealed his ancestral link to the Yellow Emperor of the Daoist pantheon. Zhenzong thereupon promoted the expansion of Daoist temples throughout Song and enfiefed new gods in the pantheon. Toward the end of the Northern Song, Emperor Huizong recruited occult masters ( fangshi 方士) from all corners to protect his empire. These moves both spread Daoism to localities and brought local gods into mainstream 210

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Daoism. Following the rationalizing trends of Song thought, popular gods were brought into the Daoist pantheon creating a spiritual bureaucracy that mirrored the human Confucian bureaucracy. Zoomorphic figures merged with the spirits of dead heroes and officials. In this way, Daoism, which accepted state authority, worked with the state to control local cults that did not accept state authority. While Buddhism saw the expansion of lay practice—especially lay societies living in quasi-monastic settings, there was no comparable laicization in Daoism. People continued to hire ordained practitioners to conduct rituals. For practitioners, there were three levels of ordination corresponding to the three main scriptural traditions on the Daoist canon: first, the Celestial Masters (zhengyi 正一), then the Numinous Treasures (lingbao 靈寶), then the Supreme Clarity (shangqing 上清). Daoist adepts learned which divine forces were associated with which bodily organs, allowing them to tap into spiritual power during meditation to promote health and longevity. Each level of ordination permitted the practitioner to perform specific rituals and gave him access to new spiritual forces to accomplish his goal. In conjunction with wider availability of legal texts and the bureaucratization of the spiritual realm, Daoist priests incorporated judicial processes. Demons and spirits that afflicted people were interrogated, tried, and punished to heal the sick. Ultimately the adept hoped to join the spiritual bureaucracy upon death. In most histories of China, the Song period is best known for the revival of Confucian thought powered by the examinations. Often referred to as Neo-Confucianism in English, this movement culminated in the Southern Song adoption of one strain, the Learning of the Way, or Daoxue 道學, as state orthodoxy in 1241. This orthodoxy held until the abolition of the imperial examinations in 1905. Daoxue profoundly shaped Chinese culture over the centuries. Consequently, Song histories often focus on Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), the man whose work eventually became synonymous with Daoxue. The reality is that Southern Song Confucian scholarship, here broadly referred to as Neo-Confucianism, encompassed a number of figures with varying interests and interpretations of the Confucian tradition. All Neo-Confucians believed that as the government was pulling back from local society, it was incumbent upon morally trained individuals to lead local efforts to reform society and ultimately the world. The Southern Song Neo-Confucian perspective flipped the locus of Northern Song Neo-Confucian thought, which encouraged top-down empire-wide reform. This did not mean that Southern Song Neo-Confucians did not aspire to government positions. However, they recognized that the fierce competition in the examinations made such aspirations unlikely. Therefore, Neo-Confucians urged their students to study both for the examinations, but also for themselves. Neo-Confucians argued that classical Confucian texts contained the templates for social and political transformation. This took many forms in the Northern Song. Some argued for a focus on statecraft, others on literary traditions, others on history, and others on morality. These schools continued into the Southern Song, but Daoxue moralism grew more persuasive, with Zhu Xi’s interpretation of it ultimately dominating. Daoxue responded to cosmological and spiritual challenges of Buddhism and Daoism by grounding the concept of a moral cosmos in classical texts. Two things pervaded the cosmos. One was a principle of coherence (li 理)—everything in the cosmos cohered to this order-giving pattern. The other was psychophysical stuff (qi 氣)—the matter from which everything, spiritual or physical, in the cosmos is made. At the heart of the moral universe was the moral individual. Once a man (and here the focus was very much upon men) understood the patterns of the moral universe through his study of classical texts, he could perceive what human actions would bring about order and disorder. 211

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Zhu Xi was a prodigious scholar. His brilliance lay in creating an integrated system of education and activism that resonated with the changes in Southern Song society. His academy’s curriculum narrowed the focus from all classics to the Four Books: the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), and two chapters from the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記): the “Great Learning” (Daxue 大學) and the “Doctrine of the Mean” (Zhongyong 中庸). This made the canon less intimidating. Zhu Xi also created a ritual compendium, entitled Family Rituals ( Jiali 家禮), to guide the daily actions of his followers. These rituals were a Confucian response to the rituals of Buddhists, Daoists, and local cults. The text also ascribed specific social roles to family members. In particular, women’s public role was circumscribed. Responding to the commercial and literary activities of women, Zhu Xi did not try to ban them, but channel them into a family role. Women would manage family finances and literate women would educate their children. With Daoxue, women were further sequestered and their success firmly anchored to the role of wife and mother. For other Neo-Confucians, Daoxue appeared pretentious, at best, and the school was often a political target, since it conflicted with the peace policies often pursued by the court. However, it appealed to the literati of the southeast. It gave them a role in creating stability and prosperity through their education, even if they did not pass the examinations and become officials. It may be that the court installed Zhu Xi’s version of Daoxue as state orthodoxy in 1241, to win over local elites who were less dependent upon the state precisely when the state needed them to organize resistance to the Mongols. Whatever the reason, this orthodoxy shaped Chinese education, society, gender roles, and politics until the twentieth century.

Conclusion The Southern Song period began in chaos and uncertainty, but laid the foundation for the remainder of the imperial period. Strong leadership from early emperors and their chosen top officials, though autocratic, preserved the dynasty. Although the peace policy vis-à-vis the Jurchen Jin dynasty was not universally popular and, at times, led to divisive factionalism at court, it allowed Song to rebuild its economy. Regions in the truncated empire became more interdependent and interconnected through commerce and printing. The explosion of printing helped the examination system grow even as chances for successfully passing the examinations and gain office diminished. Due to this competition, elite families also engaged in commerce to ensure longevity. Women, too, were commercially active, running businesses and investing their dowries to support their families and themselves. Yet the growing practice of foot-binding, the commodification of women, and the increasing influence of Daoxue thought, which tethered a woman’s activities to serving the family, were also eroding the public participation of women. Daoxue appealed to literati families who invested in examination education, but often had to settle for non-official local leadership roles. Daoxue also ultimately linked social and political stability, even cosmic order, to a moral emperor. In this way, Daoxue fit the increasingly autocratic nature of ruling.

Notes 1 Chaffee and Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part 2, 389. 2 Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, 243. 3 Quoted in Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule, 207–208. 4 Quoted in Chaffee and Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part 2, 316.

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13 The Kitan-Liao and Jurchen-Jin Valerie Hansen

Introduction After the Tang dynasty collapsed in 907, some fifty years of disunity followed until the Song dynasty reunified China in 960. Many historians of China skip from the Tang dynasty to the Song dynasty, and so pay no attention to either the Liao dynasty of the Kitan peoples (ca. 907–1125) or the Jin dynasty of the Jurchens (1115–234). These two non-Chinese dynasties, however, developed a successful blueprint that allowed them, both tiny minorities greatly outnumbered by their Chinese subjects, to govern successfully. Their innovations paved the way both for Mongol rule of China—first in the north, from 1234 to 1276, and then over the entire empire from 1276 to 1368—and for Manchu rule over the entire empire, from 1644 to 1911. This article uses the word Liao to refer to the dynasty and to the country and the culture of the various peoples—Kitan, Chinese, and other—governed by the Liao. The term Kitan refers more specifically to the Kitan people, and the Liao to the imperial family. Similarly, Jin refers to the dynasty and to the country and the culture of the peoples—Jurchen, Chinese, and other—governed by the Jin dynasty; the term Jurchen refers to the Jurchen people and the Jin ruling house. The Kitans were a nomadic group who spoke a language related to Mongolian and tended herds as their basic way of life. The founder of the Liao dynasty, a leader named Abaoji 阿保幾 (872–926), saw himself as the legitimate successor to the Tang. He dated the start of the dynasty to 907, the final year of the Tang, even though his grip on power was not yet fully secure. The Kitan homeland straddled the modern provinces of Inner Mongolia and Liaoning. Due to their powerful cavalry, the Kitans conquered much territory. At its largest extent, the Liao controlled the modern cities of Beijing and Datong in Shanxi province, as well as the provinces of Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and Jilin, sections of southeastern Russia, and a stretch of grasslands across much of Mongolia. The Kitan rulers created a government with two branches, one for its Kitan subjects, and the other for its Chinese subjects. This innovation of dual administration was particularly important because it served as a model for the Mongols, whose founders recruited many Kitans to serve as their advisors just before they conquered North China.

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The Liao dynasty established by Abaoji lasted until 1125, when it was succeeded by the Jin dynasty. The founder of the Jin, Aguda 阿骨打 (1068–1123), formed a powerful confederation of different tribes in Manchuria, which was under Liao rule at the time. After overthrowing their Kitan overlords, the Jurchens conquered North China in 1126, and forced the Song dynasty to retreat south of the Yangzi River. For this reason, after 1127, the Song dynasty came to be known as the Southern Song (1127–1276). The Jurchens embraced Chinese language and customs so enthusiastically that almost no Jurchen-language records survive. The Jin dynasty recruited officials via separate exams in the Jurchen and Chinese languages. When the Jin dynasty surrendered to the Mongol conquerors in 1234, the Mongols adopted many practices from the Jin, including holding separate examinations. The Jurchen legacy was especially important for the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), because the Manchus were descendants of the Jurchens. For reasons of both nationalism and linguistic competence (they read Chinese sources more easily than those in other languages), Chinese historians have generally neglected the history of non-Chinese dynasties, particularly those like the Liao and the Jin, who ruled over only a section of the eighteen provinces of central China and never succeeded in reunifying the entire empire. Interestingly, when historians of the time debated which dynasties were legitimate and which were not, some found the Liao claim to succeed the Tang persuasive. And in the early 1200s, one group of historians even argued that the Jin dynasty—and not the Southern Song—was the legitimate successor to the Song dynasty, showing that many Chinese literati believed that a non-Chinese ruler could rightfully rule the empire. In recent decades, historians have used new sources to gain a much greater understanding of the Liao and Jin dynasties. A small group of dedicated researchers has been working to decipher the two Kitan scripts, and they now can make sense of Kitan-language epitaphs or biographies of the deceased on tombs. Historians of the Liao have also begun to consult Japanese-, Turkic-, Persian- and Arabic-language sources that provide information not available in Chinese or Kitan sources. In addition, a series of spectacular archeological finds has challenged earlier prejudices about the backward Kitans; Kitan tombs contain exquisite gold and silver objects that are just as beautiful as anything made by Tang or Song craftsmen. In contrast to the Kitan sources, hardly any materials survive in the Jurchen language from the time of the Jin dynasty. Nor have archeological finds prompted the same type of reassessment as for the Liao dynasty. The most important new materials for Jin history are inscriptions in Chinese carved on stone tablets throughout northern China. Some of these texts have been published partially or in full; others have survived and can be seen even today on stone tablets, and intrepid historians have visited remote areas to photograph and transcribe them. These inscriptions vividly capture life in North China under Jurchen rule. Although widely used, the term Sinicization poses many problems for those working in this field. For one, it assumes that Chinese and non-Chinese cultures constitute two fixed, unchanging entities. The term implies that all change went in only one direction: as the non-Chinese—whether Kitan or Jurchen—adopted Chinese ways. But the opposite certainly occurred: some Chinese learned to read and write Kitan or took Jurchen spouses. The term Sinicization also implies that someone who had become more Chinese could not return to his or her native identity. This, too, is not accurate. As we will learn, some emperors of the Jin dynasty implemented measures to revive the Jurchen language and Jurchen cultural identity. A final flaw with the term: Sinicization does not specify which specific cultural practice a given person or group adopted. Where one non-Chinese person might learn to speak Chinese, another might eat Chinese food, and a third might choose Chinese-style 214

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burial. For these reasons, this essay will not use the term Sinicization or the related terms Kitanification or Jurchenification. Instead, it will provide specific examples of cultural adaptation and explain why the individuals in question made the changes they did.

The Kitans before 907 and the formation of a confederation by Abaoji The Kitans practiced pastoral steppe nomadism. The Chinese pronounced the tribal name as Qidan, which scholars have reconstructed as Kitan (also spelled Khitan). Little is known about the origins of the Kitans, but they claimed descent from the Xianbei, who had ruled China in the fourth and fifth centuries as the Northern Wei. Initially, the Kitans had no permanent settlements; they lived in tents and moved from site to site with their herds of horses, sheep, and camels. The Kitan men’s distinctive hairstyle set them apart from the Chinese. The men shaved the tops of their heads, leaving a fringe going along the hairline from one ear to the other. They allowed the hair in front of the ears to grow into braids. When they conquered another group, they usually required them to change the way they wore their hair as a sign of submission. One dynamic leader, known by his Chinese name, Abaoji, unified a loose grouping of Kitan tribes in the years immediately after the collapse of the Tang. Later histories claim that he first unified the Kitans in 907, the last year of the Tang dynasty, and Abaoji was fully aware of the significance of the timing. While he may indeed have been named leader in that year, he was only able to consolidate his power nine years later in 916. The Kitans determined their leader by selecting the aspirant who prevailed over the others, in a method of selection called tanistry or, in Joseph Fletcher’s words, rule by “the best qualified member of the chiefly house.” When a leader died, those hoping to succeed him fought with each other in a free-for-all; when the victor emerged, the tribesmen gathered to acclaim the new leader, whom they believed the gods had guided to victory. Most nomadic tribes held that only certain families were qualified to rule, and they chose their leaders from the sons of these families. Unusually, Abaoji was not a member of the Kitan ruling clan, but he proved an especially effective leader.

The Liao dynasty Unlike other tribal peoples who selected a new leader only on the death of the previous one, the Kitans gathered every three years at a khuriltai meeting either to choose a new leader or to reaffirm the current one. This method of selection differed from the Chinese tradition of a dynastic ruler who did not have to secure the approval of those under him. Abaoji was sufficiently powerful that he skipped the usual selection process in 910 and in 913, each time antagonizing his brothers, who organized unsuccessful rebellions against him. In 916, rather than risk another uprising, he organized a formal ceremony in which he assumed the throne and gave himself a reign title, in the Chinese tradition, and so claimed to inherit the mantle of the Tang. He also abolished the triannual khuriltai meeting.

Abaoji’s innovations Abaoji and his descendants merged Chinese and Kitan traditions when he restructured the Kitan government. They replaced tribal rule with a new type of government called dual administration: the north-facing section of the government governed the Kitans, while the 215

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south-facing half served their Chinese subjects. Initially, officials were appointed to the northern government on the basis of family ties, while those in the southern government had to pass civil service examinations conducted in the Chinese language. As time went on, the differences between the two governments became more pronounced. By the mid-tenth century, officials of the northern administration wore Kitan clothing and spoke only Kitan, while those in the southern wore Chinese clothing and spoke both Chinese and Kitan. Some of the Liao emperor’s most trusted advisors were originally Chinese but learned to speak Kitan and adopted so many Kitan customs that they came to be accepted as Kitan. The northern administration officials used Kitan titles, while the southern administration borrowed their titles from Chinese dynasties. Twice a year the emperor scheduled meetings with the officials of both the southern and northern administrations, but because the officials of the northern administration always traveled with the emperor, they had year-round access to him. Also, the northern administration controlled the military, making it more powerful than the southern administration. Although the tribal Kitans had not lived in cities, they began to build them in the tenth century when the Chinese and other peoples flocked to Kitan territory to escape the multiple civil wars occurring in North China. The Kitans constructed cities for their Chinese subjects, built on a grid, complete with walls, gates, and drum and bell towers, but they also left large open spaces for the Kitans to pitch their tents. Because the Kitan ruling family continued to live in tents and to move from city to city, there was no fixed palace. Oxen pulled wagons carrying the royal household’s goods each time it moved. There were five different capitals, which the emperor visited at different times of the year. Inspired by written Chinese characters, Abaoji ordered the introduction of a large script in 920, and a small script in 924. Both scripts contain a mix of elements that are pictorial and phonetic, representing sounds. Scholars have made considerable progress in deciphering epitaphs written in the small script, which has some 400 different elements, but they cannot yet understand the large script, which probably uses a different graph for each word and has a larger number of pictorial elements. Today, only one book in the large script survives, in St. Petersburg, where scholars are currently working on its decipherment. Preliminary analysis suggests that the one-hundred-page-plus manuscript is a chronicle of events compiled by court historians, similar to the veritable records compiled by later dynasties. Inscriptions in the small script document that the Kitans called their state the Great Kitan between 907 and 938. In 938, when the Later Jinn dynasty (spelled differently to distinguish it from the Jurchen dynasty) ceded the territory around modern Beijing to them, the Kitans began to refer to the Chinese-speaking regions as the Liao (the name of a river running through Kitan territory), but used Great Kitan for the Kitan heartland. In 983, the name Great Kitan indicated both halves of the empire, and then in 1066, under the rule of an emperor who deeply respected the Chinese, the unified empire came to be called the Great Liao. Historians cannot yet account for these changes, which we know about only because of the ongoing decipherment of the small script.

The regency of Empress Chunqin, 926–947 Abaoji was the greatest leader the Kitans had, and his innovations in governance, urban planning, and script all continued after his death in 926. Hundreds of men were killed so that they could be buried in the imperial tomb, and tradition held that his widow should also have died. A Chinese source reports a conversation the Empress Chunqin 淳欽 (878–953), 216

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who took the name Yingtian 應天 at Abaoji’s death, had with a high-ranking Chinese official at the time. A powerful leader, she commanded 200,000 troops. She asked, “You were very close in serving the deceased emperor. Why don’t you go?” The minister replied: “As far as intimacy, no one equaled Your Majesty. If Your Majesty goes, I will follow.” The empress dowager said, “I am not unwilling to follow the deceased emperor underground. But my sons are young and the country has no ruler. I cannot go.” She then offered to cut off her arm so that it could be buried with the emperor. When the court officials protested, she then cut off only her hand, which was then placed in Abaoji’s coffin. As successful as Abaoji was, he did not succeed in naming his favorite son as his successor. Both tribal leaders and his widow opposed the designated heir because he was not a powerful enough fighter. The empress Chunqin named a different son to succeed Abaoji, Deguang (r. 926–947). She retained enormous influence over the new emperor, ruling de facto as regent. Empress Chunqin initiated a century of successful Kitan attacks first on the different regional kingdoms of China before the Song founding in 960, and then on the unified Song empire. The Liao controlled a swath of grasslands across Eurasia that was greater in area than the Song realm, but the Song had a much larger population, probably around 100 million versus an estimated 3–4 million living in Liao territory, of whom 1 million were Kitans. Still, the skilled Kitan cavalry often bested the Chinese armies. In 938, the founder of the Later Jinn dynasty (936–947) overthrew the Later Tang dynasty, with considerable support from the Liao ruler. To express his gratitude, the ruler of the Later Jinn presented the Liao with a seal taken from the Later Tang that was believed to signify the legitimate rule of the Chinese emperor. He also granted the Liao the region of modern Beijing. The Kitan ruler proceeded to name Beijing one of the Kitans’ five capitals because the swan hunting in the early spring was good there. This marked the first time in Chinese history that Beijing served as a dynastic capital.

Kitan-Chinese relations, 947–1005 In 947, Empress Chunqin lost power to her grandson. He conquered Kaifeng but withdrew after three months because the Liao had not developed the administrative apparatus to govern such a large territory. In 979, after completing the unification of the empire, the Song emperor attacked the Kitans. The Kitans triumphed once again, and the Song emperor, hit by an arrow, barely escaped with his life. In 982, Dowager Empress Xiao took over the regency when she was 30 (her son the emperor was only 16) and ruled until 1009. She proved to be as powerful a leader as Empress Chunqin. The Song and Kitan forces continued to skirmish regularly, but in 1004, the Kitans launched a successful blitzkrieg invasion of North China, gaining control of much of the Yellow River valley. The Chinese sued for peace. A former advisor to the Song emperor represented the Kitans in the negotiations. After being taken captive, he had switched sides, as did many high-ranking prisoners of war. The resulting Treaty of Chanyuan (also spelled Shanyuan) 澶淵 stipulated that the Kitans retreat from the conquered territory—but not the region around modern Beijing—in exchange for annual payments of 200,000 bolts of silk (each bolt was 50 cm wide and 12 m long) and 100,000 Chinese ounces (nearly 4 metric tons) of silver. To the Chinese, the payments were less than one or two percent of the cost of waging war, which seemed a reasonable price for peace. The Song was able to earn back everything it paid in war indemnities through trade. 217

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The multistate system of East Asia, 1005–1120 The Treaty of Chanyuan established the Liao as the preeminent military power in East Asia. The treaty also marked the formation of a multistate system, in which the Song state was simply one among several in the region, including the Goryeo dynasty in Korea (918–1392), the Heian rulers of Japan (794–1185), the Xixia realm governed by the Tanguts in modern Gansu province (1038–1227), and the various Khanates of the Uighur peoples in modern Gansu and Xinjiang. The Kitans clashed with the rulers of Goryeo Korea three times, in 993, 1010, and 1018. In 1020, the Liao successfully defeated the Goryeo armies, and in 1022 the Goryeo formally acknowledged their inferior role as a tributary of the Liao. While the Song emperor also exchanged envoys with neighboring countries, more East Asian countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Liao than with the Song, which makes perfect sense given that Liao armies had defeated the armies of both the Song and the rulers of Goryeo. The objects in one Liao-dynasty tomb dating to 1018 testify to the Liao contacts with different rulers all over Eurasia. Originally, the Kitans had not buried their dead. They placed the corpse in a tree for three years, and after the bones had been cleaned of flesh, they burned them. But after the founding of the Liao dynasty, the rulers chose to build Chinese-style tombs for the emperor and all the imperial family. The Princess of Chen 陳 (1001–1018), the granddaughter of Emperor Jingzong 景宗 (r. 969–982), died in 1018, and was buried with her husband. Because robbers never removed anything, the intact tomb is one of the most important Liao-dynasty archeological finds. As is typical of all Chinese tombs, a sloping stairway led to the central chamber containing the bodies of the princess and her husband. In addition, the tomb had two small chambers on either side, one filled with saddles and horse-tack. The princess and her husband were buried with gold masks, gilded silver filigree crowns, and gilded silver boots. The archeologists who discovered the main chamber were unprepared for the beautiful craftsmanship of the Liao-dynasty objects. Seeing themselves as the rightful successors to the Tang, the Kitan royal house commissioned Chinese craftsmen to produce art that drew heavily on Tang-dynasty prototypes. Many objects in the tomb came from very distant places, most likely gifts from envoys of neighboring rulers who attended the funeral of the princess. The lead content of the glassware points to its manufacture in either Syria or Egypt. These were probably gifts from neighboring Islamic powers like the Qarakhanids who had conquered the far west of Xinjiang. The tomb contained plentiful objects crafted from amber: beads, pendants, animalshaped containers, hand-held amulets, and a knife handle. Chemical tests show that the amber originated in the Baltic; the amber traveled from lands under Viking control to the Islamic world and from there to the Kitan realm. The main form of diplomatic relations in East Asia at this time was the exchange of envoys. The ruler of one country would initiate relations with another country by sending an envoy who carried gifts and a letter to its ruler. The envoy could observe the behavior of the ruler and everyone at court in the other country; on his return, he relayed this intelligence to his own ruler. Rulers in such relationships often sent their daughters and other female relatives to marry a male relative of the ruler of an allied country. Sometimes the young men came to live in the court of the bride’s father as a hostage. The Kitan rulers exchanged both envoys and brides with the Qarakhanid rulers to the west. The Qarakhanids, in turn, had exchanged brides with the Ghaznavid rulers in modern Afghanistan. In 1024, the Liao emperor Shengzong (982–1031) sent an envoy carrying a letter to the Ghaznavid court to establish diplomatic relations. No evidence of this overture 218

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survives in either Chinese or Kitan; we know about this only from the writings of the geographer al-Marwazi (1056/57–1124/25) who translated the emperor’s letter into Arabic (we do not know the language of the original letter). Shengzong 聖宗 asked that the Afghan ruler send an envoy to him, but the Ghaznavid ruler refused on the grounds that the Kitans did not share his Islamic faith. In addition to the deities they had worshipped traditionally, the Kitan rulers also patronized Buddhism, building tall pagodas throughout their realm and carving a full set of printing blocks for the Buddhist canon, which contained several thousand texts. Intriguingly, the Kitans never translated Buddhist texts into Kitan; they read them in Chinese. They also maintained contacts with Japanese Buddhists. Both Kitan and Japanese Buddhists carved Buddhist texts on stone and buried treasures in preparation for the coming of a new age, or kalpa, in 1052, a date not recognized by Chinese Buddhists.

The Jurchens as a subject people The peace between the Song and the Kitans, established by the Treaty of Chanyuan, held throughout the eleventh century, but everything changed when a challenger to Kitan rule appeared at the beginning of the twelfth century. Like Abaoji, Aguda used extraordinary leadership ability to unite a large group of different peoples living under Kitan rule in the Liaoning peninsula. Many of his supporters were Jurchen and lived on the eastern edge of the Liao territory. The Jurchens spoke a language related to Kitan and Mongolian but had no alphabet of their own. The first surviving dated example of Jurchen script (and not the Kitan small script, which they used sometimes as a prestige language) dates to 1185. The Jurchens differed from the Kitans. They were not nomads and did not tend herds. They resided in the forests of Manchuria, where they hunted and fished. In the winter they lived in round, partially subterranean wooden and earthen houses with a central chimney hole. In the summer, they shifted to round tents. All Jurchen men participated in group hunts, and all served as soldiers in wartime. The largest groups in Jurchen society were the clans, which consisted of several lineages, each headed by one man. The basic unit of Jurchen society was the village, a group of Jurchens who farmed together during peace and fought together during war. Over time, the people living in Jurchen villages came to believe that they shared common ancestors and belonged to the same clan, even though they originally came from different places and spoke different languages. The Chinese called the Jurchens who adopted more Chinese customs “cooked,” and those who had changed less, “uncooked.” During the course of the eleventh century, the Wanyan 完顏 clan, one of the so-called uncooked clans, gained control of the region around the city of Harbin. The threat to Kitan rule emerged during the First Fish Festival of 1112, an occasion in the early spring, where the Kitan emperor hosted the Jurchen leaders. The drunken Kitan ruler ordered the leader of the Wanyan clan, Aguda, to dance, and Aguda refused. Even more aston­ itan ruler. In ishing, when asked again, he refused a second time, an overt challenge to the K 1113, Aguda launched the first of many successful rebellions against the Kitans.

The founding of the Jin dynasty and the fall of the Liao dynasty In 1115, after conquering all of Manchuria, Aguda proclaimed himself the ruler of the Jin (“gold”) dynasty. He named the dynasty after the Ashi River, a tributary of the Sungari, where gold had been found and where his clan had originated. The Song rulers were quick 219

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to recognize Aguda, because they thought they could ally with him, defeat the Kitans, and take back the territory around Beijing that they had never governed. That view proved to be utterly mistaken. Prior to the conquest of North China, the Jurchen state was basically egalitarian and tribal, as shown by the following description of Jurchen decision-making: From the commanding general down to the soldiers, everybody… had millet gruel and roast meat for food, and there was no difference in quality high and low. When their country is involved in great affairs [war] they all go out into the wilderness and sit down in a circle, drawing in the ashes. Then they deliberate, starting from the lowest one present. When the council has come to an end, they wash away the charcoal and not a human voice is heard—such is their secrecy. When the army is about to march, a great reunion with a banquet is held, at which strategic proposals are offered. The generalissimo listens and then selects among those what is appropriate; then immediately a special leader is appointed for its execution. When the army returns after a victory another great reunion takes place, and it is asked who has won merits. According to the degree of merit, gold is handed out; it is raised and shown to the multitude. If they think the reward too small, it will be increased.1 This passage shows that ordinary soldiers and the leaders of the most powerful clans of the Jurchens were almost equal. Eating the same rations, they participated in decision-making councils, with their faces smeared with charcoal to hide their identity. When the council divided the plunder among the fighters, it did so on the basis of each man’s actual performance in battle, not his social position. This council became the main body of Aguda’s new government. In 1116, Aguda conquered the Kitan heartland of the Liao River. With each victory he recruited the defeated Kitan forces into his army, which was divided into units of three hundred men (mouke 謀克), but in fact often numbering fewer. Several of these units formed a larger unit of one thousand (meng’an 猛安), the basic building block of Aguda’s army. The leaders of the meng’an units served as the governors of newly conquered regions. In 1120, the Chinese and the Jurchens formed an alliance and agreed to attack the Kitans simultaneously; the most important Kitan capital, the Supreme Capital (Shangjing 上京), fell to the Jurchens in that year. After his armies occupied Beijing in 1123, Aguda died in the same year. His younger brother succeeded him, and the war against the Kitans continued. In 1124, the Jurchens captured the Kitan emperor, and the Liao dynasty fell in 1125. After their defeat, most of the Kitans remained within Jurchen territory, but a small group of nobles moved west to Xinjiang. This group, the Western Liao (1120–1218), was particularly significant because the Mongols encountered them before they conquered either North China, then in the hands of the Jurchens, or Song, South China. They recruited some of their most influential advisors, such as the renowned advisor to Chinggis Khan, Yelü Chucai 耶律楚材 (1190–1244), from among these Kitans. These advisors introduced the Mongols to the Kitan innovation of dual administration.

The Jurchen conquest of the Song, 1126–1141 In 1125, with the collapse of the Liao, the alliance between the Jin and the Song fell apart, and war broke out between them. The Song suffered a decisive defeat, their forces being no match for the Jurchens’ powerful cavalry. 220

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In 1126, after conquering north China, the Jurchens issued an order requiring all men in the conquered territories to shave their foreheads, braid their hair down their back, and wear Jurchen-style clothing to display their status as subordinates of the Jurchens. The Jurchens canceled these orders after just a few months because they proved so difficult to enforce. In 1127, the Jurchens crossed the Yellow River and occupied the Song capital of Kaifeng. In a final attempt to fend off Jin conquest, Emperor Huizong 徽宗 (r. 1100–25) abdicated in favor of his young son, Qinzong 欽宗 (r. 1126–27), but even so, the Song army proved powerless to hold back the Jurchen forces. After subjugating north China, the Jurchen forces took the two monarchs prisoner and forced them to march north. A novel that was recorded in the 1270s on the basis of earlier storytelling traditions, Proclaiming Harmony (Xuanhe yishi 宣和遺事), recounts the sorry end of the two Song emperors. It describes the wide variety of people they encounter as they traverse the north, indicating the many different groups living under Jin-dynasty rule: the Kitans, Han Chinese, Mongols, and Korea-influenced Parhae (Chinese: Bohai 渤海), among others. At one point, a man dressed in green offers the two former rulers some food and water. He explains: “I was once Chinese. My father Zhou Zhong 周忠 served your majesty’s throne during the Yuanfu 元符 era (1098–1100) and was captured. So at that point we were of the Xixia kingdom. During the Xuanhe 宣和 period (1119–1125), Xixia sent me with the troops who went to aid the Kitan tribe. We attacked the Jin, and I was captured and surrendered. Now I am commanding officer at Lingzhou 靈州. I beg your majesty not to reveal my background.” As he explained, this man had begun life inside Chinese territory as a Chinese, been captured by the Tanguts, and joined their army. When taken prisoner for the second time by the Jurchens, he joined the Jin forces. His account provides a vivid reminder of the mixed composition of the Jurchen forces and the Kitan armies; they included people of different ethnicities who, like the man in green, could take on and shed ethnic identities as quickly as they could learn to speak a new language. As Proclaiming Harmony recounts, the Jurchens delighted in humiliating the two Song emperors. The former rulers were degraded to commoners in 1127, and the Jurchens gave them new and humiliating titles—the Marquis of Muddled Virtue and Doubly Muddled— showing their mastery of Chinese naming practices for emperors. Jurchen forces continued to pursue the Song armies south of the Yangzi River for fifteen years, and they took the major cities of the lower Yangzi—Nanjing, Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Ningbo—in succession. Once the Jin had conquered north China, they formed a government to rule the new territory. In 1137, they established the Mobile Presidential Council, which was in charge of all civil and military matters, including the recruitment of new officials. This council created a new unit of regional government, the circuit, which was the forerunner of the modern province. The Jurchen leaders also made a conscious decision to encourage migration from their Manchurian homeland into north China. The rulers granted new lands to villagers, who then moved en masse. The Jurchens who settled in north China gradually adopted different Chinese customs, learning to speak Chinese and eventually intermarrying with the Chinese. Jurchen did not yet have an accessible script. Although the Jurchen ruler had ordered the creation of a large script based on the Kitan large script in 1120 and a Kitan-based small script in 1138, only a few examples of the large script survive from before 1185. If these scripts actually existed—and the small script may not have—they did not receive much use. Instead, most Jurchens used the Kitan small script, which was much more manageable. In 1141, when the fighting stopped and the two sides finally signed a peace treaty, annual payments were set at 250,000 ounces of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk. The drafters of the 221

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treaty cast aside all the euphemisms maintaining the fiction of Song power. The Song, an “insignificant state,” paid tribute to the Jin, a “superior state.” The treaty explicitly stated the outcome of fifteen years of war: the Song had become the subject state of a non-Chinese dynasty, the Jin.

Jin dynasty rule, 1141–1205 Once peace had been achieved with the Southern Song, the Jurchens faced the challenge of governing a society of more than forty million in which they remained a minority of four million. The emperors of the twelfth century took different approaches: some adopted Chinese-style governance completely, while others tried to strengthen traditional Jurchen customs. The period from 1141 to 1205 marked the high point of Jin-dynasty rule; the Jin controlled north China, and they faced few challenges to their power except for sporadic battles with the Southern Song.

The reign of the Prince of Hailing One Jurchen ruler, known as the Prince of Hailing 海陵王, seized power in 1150. He loved everything Chinese and even drank Chinese-style tea, prompting some of his subjects to give him the nickname “aping the Chinese.” He embraced the dynastic model from China because it allowed him to consult less with his nobles than did traditional Jurchen governance. To this end, the Prince of Hailing established a more traditional bureaucracy modeled on the Chinese state, complete with the traditional Six Boards (Revenue, Civil Appointments, Rites, Works, Punishments, and War) and the Secretariat. The most powerful body remained the Presidential Council, which included the prime minister and many members of the imperial clan. Like the Liao, the Jin recruited Chinese and Jurchen officials on different tracks. Before 1183, the Chinese sat civil service examinations while the Jurchens were appointed to office, often on the basis of their father’s position. The Jin also followed the Liao practice of having five capitals, which the emperor visited over the course of the year. Hoping to conquer South China, the Prince of Hailing attacked the Southern Song in 1159. He established a navy, a first for the Jurchens, staffed by some 30,000 Chinese. His land army consisted of 120,000 Jurchen troops on horseback and 150,000 Chinese soldiers on foot. Initially, the army conquered the Huai River valley, but the Song forces managed to drive them back. While the Prince of Hailing was at the front, one of his cousins overthrew him, showing the enduring tradition of tanistry. Hailing was so unpopular that later historians never called him emperor, just prince.

Emperor Shizong Because the Chinese had gained a superior military position, the new emperor Shizong 世宗 (r. 1161–1189) had to renegotiate the terms of peace with the Chinese. Although the Song continued to pay the same amount of silk and silver to the Jin dynasty, they no longer used the ignominious word “tribute” for their payments. In 1183, Emperor Shizong ordered the first in a series of censuses that provide unusually detailed information about the Chinese living in north China. Unlike most population

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The Kitan-Liao and Jurchen-Jin Table 13.1  J in-dynasty Census Data Year

Households

Individuals

Persons per household

1187 1190 1195 1207

6,789,499 6,939,000 7,223,400 8,413,164

44,705,086 45,447,900 48,490,400 53,532,151

6.59 6.55 6.71 6.33

surveys of China, the Jin enumeration provided both the number of households and, unusually, the size of the population (Table 13.1). The census did not distinguish ethnicity, but a leading scholar of the Jin dynasty, the late Herbert Franke, suggests that four million people, or less than ten percent, were Jurchen or Kitan in a total population of over forty million. Almost everyone else was Chinese. Although the census does not break the population down by group, in other proclamations, the government divided everyone into two groups: the Jurchens and those of “various types,” a category that included north Chinese, South Chinese, Kitan, and other non-Jurchen groups like the Parhae and the Mongols. These households contained more people than the five people typical of Chinese households at this time. The larger household size may have been due to the high number of slaves in Jin society. Jin documents show a wide range of wealth, with some families owning large estates and others being forced to work the land. Because the census takers had reported the existence of large estates, the emperor ordered the distribution of free food to the Jurchens with much less land. He saw the disparity in wealth as a sign of the decay of Jurchen society, which he hoped to remedy by giving direct aid to the poor. As part of his effort to revive Jurchen identity, Emperor Shizong, who himself had received a Chinese education in the classics, barred the Jurchens from adopting Chinese names and wearing Chinese-style clothing. He ordered all those at court to speak only Jurchen. Although Shizong encouraged the Jurchens to use their native tongue at court, it was already a dying language, which even the emperor’s own son refused to study. The emperor professed great pleasure when a grandson spoke to him in Jurchen, but evidently the boy, who would succeed his grandfather to reign as Emperor Zhangzong 章宗 (1189–1208), could say only “thank you.” As part of his efforts to strengthen Jurchen, Emperor Shizong revived Jurchen as a language for recruitment via the civil service examinations. In 1164, the emperor ordered the translation of the Confucian classics and the creation of a Jurchen-language school system where some 3,000 students could study Jurchen. In 1173, the government held Jurchen-­ language examinations for the first time; its goal was to recruit not Jurchen-speaking officials but instead teachers who could impart knowledge of the Jurchen language to future generations. This year marked the completion of Jurchen-language translations of two dynastic histories, a guide to government attributed to the Tang founder, and a collection of model exam essays from the Tang dynasty. Not surprisingly, the first Jurchen-language exams asked questions that candidates could answer on the basis of these four books. By 1181, more books had been translated into Jurchen, and candidates had to pass three rounds, at their locality level, the provincial level, and the capital level, before they could be appointed as officials. The earliest surviving Jurchen-language texts carved onto stone date to 1185 and 1186, a sign that the government’s efforts to increase the use of the Jurchen language were succeeding.

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(Some paper manuscripts with Jurchen script predate 1185, but their date is not certain.) The main texts of both inscriptions carved onto the front of the stone were in Chinese; the Jurchen texts accompanied those main texts, showing that the government envisioned the use of Jurchen alongside Chinese—not separate from it. Emperor Shizong’s policies did not seek to revive Jurchen as a spoken language. His goal was to make Jurchen a literary language like Chinese, complete with a literary canon of texts translated from Chinese, that could be tested on the civil service examinations. Everyone embraced the traditional Chinese emphasis on classical learning. No officials saw any contradiction between serving a Jurchen emperor and striving for a full knowledge of the Chinese classics, whether in the Chinese original or the Jurchen translation. The Chinese-language examinations expanded greatly under Emperor Shizong. In the 1150s, only some sixty or seventy candidates passed the exams every three years, but the number leapt to 500 successful candidates every three years in the 1180s. The pass rate fluctuated between 25 and 33 percent, which was extremely high, and the ease of the civil service examinations had a major impact on local society. This was the one time in the history of north China when northerners did not have to compete with southern Chinese for positions in the government, and it marked a golden age for north Chinese scholars. Never again could they obtain government posts so easily. Emperor Shizong’s efforts to expand the civil service examinations contributed to the flourishing of Chinese scholarly culture in the late 1100s. Chinese scholars living in Jin territory saw no contradiction between serving an alien dynasty—which grew less and less alien over time—and the lifestyle of a scholar, which was richly described in a new literary form, “all-keys-and-modes” plays (zhugongdiao 諸宮調). These plays alternated passages of prose with stretches of poetry, which were written so they could be sung to preexisting tunes, which playwrights frequently switched—the reason for the name of these plays. Later generations who looked down on these plays did not preserve them, and only three all-keysand-modes plays survive today from an original 700 or so. The new dramas found a large audience immediately. Some fans were so enthusiastic that they included models of stages in their tombs, and the walls of one woman’s tomb are decorated with verses from the latest play and nothing else. One of the surviving plays is a rewrite of a Tang-dynasty story about the abortive love affair of an examination candidate named Zhang with a girl named Oriole. Because only the playwright’s last name is known, he is usually referred to as Master Dong 董, and he wrote The Romance of the Western Chamber (Xixiang ji 西廂記) sometime between 1190 and 1208. The play was printed in the city of Pingyang in Shanxi province, which became a major publishing center during the Jin dynasty. The play introduces the hero by saying he “Vies with the paragons of old”: Passionately fond of poetry and calligraphy, An expert painter and musician, He’s an impeccable prose-writer (and a scrupulous man) as well.

This description shows how much the subjects of the Jin valued traditional Chinese skills. The popularity of the Chinese-language civil service examinations led to a revival of Chinese learning in the second half of the twelfth century. The teachings of the northern Song thinker, Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101), gained a great following as students and officials alike embraced Su’s emphasis on learning and culture. Strikingly, few people in north China studied the Confucian teachings of Zhu Xi 朱熹, so influential in South China at this time, although they first became available in Jin territory during the 1190s. 224

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Complete self-realization Daoism The Confucian emphasis on filial piety, or children’s obligations to their parents, resonated with the population living under Jin rule and led to the growth of a new Daoist sect called the Complete Self-Realization (Quanzhen 全真) school, which arose in north China. The sect’s founder, Wang Zhe 王喆 (1112–1170), consciously combined elements of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism to form a new belief system. Wang Zhe was born to a Chinese family in Shaanxi and survived the Jurchen conquest of north China. After receiving a traditional Chinese education, but failing the civil service examinations, he abandoned his studies and lived off of his family’s wealth. The three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism were three legs of the same tripod, he taught, with the tripod representing the Dao, or the Way. Wang selected three texts, one from each tradition, for his followers to study: the Classic of Filial Piety from the Confucian tradition, the Daodejing from Daoism, and the Heart Sutra from Buddhism. Borrowing freely from the different traditions, he encouraged his followers to be celibate, to fast regularly, to follow a vegetarian diet, and to avoid alcohol. Wang modified traditional Daoist promises of immortality to offer his followers a kind of inner peace—or self-realization in his terms—to be achieved through meditation. If his followers were able to practice meditation correctly, then they could achieve detachment from this world even as their physical bodies remained here. Even though Wang’s teachings asked a great deal of his followers in their attempts to become fully realized beings, or to attain true self-cultivation, the teachings proved increasingly popular after his death. A ban on them in 1190 seems only to have encouraged their further spread.

Confucian learning under Emperor Zhangzong When Emperor Shizong died in 1189, he was succeeded by his grandson who reigned until 1208. The new emperor Zhangzong 章宗 continued the civil service examinations, both in Chinese and Jurchen, and the pass rate in the 1200s was 600 successful candidates every three years, even higher than during Emperor Shizong’s reign. Emperor Zhangzong issued a new law code, the Taihe Code 泰和律, which was the final product of a century of changing law. Aguda had presided over a society with a traditional law system whose underlying principle was an eye for an eye. If they had sufficient funds, criminals could pay penalties and forego punishment, although their ears or nose would be cut off to show that they had broken the law. The Taihe Code drew heavily on the Tang Code, but it did make some concessions to Jurchen customs. It gave masters more power over their slaves and allowed Jurchen sons to establish their own households separate from their parents, a practice contrary to the Chinese ideal but consonant with Jurchen tradition. Even more significant than the promulgation of a Chinese law code was Emperor Zhangzong’s decision to select one of the five elements as the symbol of his dynasty. The Chinese believed in an ongoing cycle of five elements, and a dynasty’s choice indicated which dynasty it saw itself as succeeding. In 1193, Emperor Zhangzong asked his advisors to choose the appropriate element. Depending on which element they chose, they could claim to be the legitimate successors of the Tang, the Liao, or the Northern Song. In 1202, the emperor and his advisors decided that earth was the appropriate element for the Jin. In doing so, they were making the claim that the Jin, and not the Southern Song, was the legitimate successor to the Northern Song. One leading Confucian scholar of the time, Zhao Bingwen 趙秉文 (1159–1232), saw this decision as one of the emperor’s greatest accomplishments. In an essay praising the emperor, he wrote “The virtue of the earth was 225

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amplified so that the Central Plains was unified.” This was an extraordinary claim for an official in the service of a non-Chinese dynasty to make (and of course, as the Jin dynasty ruled only north China, the Central Plains—meaning the Chinese empire—was anything but unified). But by the year 1202, Zhao Bingwen saw nothing unusual in his statement. Still, however great its cosmological significance, the choice of a ruling element could not solve the recurrent problems the Jin faced at the turn of the century.

The last years of the Jin Since the 1120s, the Yellow River had been flooding over its dikes, and in 1194, it shifted its course dramatically from north of the Shandong peninsula to south of it. Because the flooding continued for thirty years after the river had changed course, and because the floods wiped out crops over a large area, many cultivators could not pay the agricultural taxes that they owed the Jin government. The shortfall coincided with problems in currency. The Jin faced a shortage of bronze coins, but they had no copper deposits to exploit. Finance officials experimented with different currencies—iron, silver, paper money backed by silver—but they continued to issue paper notes with lower and lower purchasing power, which created a complicated and unstable financial situation. Just as the Jin government was struggling with these financial problems, they faced enemies on both the north and south. In 1206, the Southern Song decided to launch an attack. The chief minister Han Tuozhou 韓侂冑 (1152–1207) led a force of some 160,000 against the Jin forces of 130,000, hoping that the Chinese living in Jin territory would shift allegiances, but they did not. The opposite actually occurred. When a Chinese general in Sichuan who commanded 70,000 troops defected to the Jin, many Song troops deserted to his side. After several decisive Jin victories, it was clear to both sides that the Song were unable to reconquer the north, and Han Tuozhou was murdered after being dismissed from office. The Jin demanded Han Tuozhou’s head, which the Song lacquered and sent north in a box, a gesture embodying their humiliating defeat. Pressed financially, the Jin rulers were eager to sue for peace and to resume payments from the Song, which they raised by 50,000 ounces of silver and 50,000 bolts of silk. In 1214, the Jin requested twice the annual payment from the Song to make up for alleged shortfalls, but the Song refused to pay anything at all. The Jin desperately needed the revenues from the settlement to mount a force against a new enemy to their north, the Mongols, who first attacked in 1206, and continued to do so thereafter. Continued flooding in the Yellow River coincided with a drought across most of north China, and the Jin emperor decided to retreat to the southernmost of the five capitals, Kaifeng. The Mongols interpreted the retreat as further preparation for war, and they drove the much-weakened Jin south to just a sliver of land between the Yellow and Huai River valleys. In 1215, the Mongols took the Jin capital of Beijing. The Jin managed to hang on until 1234, when their capital at Kaifeng fell, but the once-powerful dynasty was reduced to a minor regional power for the last twenty years of its existence.

Conclusion: the legacy of the Kitans and the Jurchens The Kitans designed the dual administration, the crucial innovation that allowed a non-­ Chinese minority to govern a mixed population. The Kitans, under Abaoji’s leadership, established a north-facing administration for the Kitans and a south-facing administration for the Chinese. They were fully capable of conquering the area north of the Yellow River, as 226

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they showed in 947 and again in 1004, but they could not administer such a large area in the long run. After the Treaty of Chanyuan, they retained control over a huge band of grasslands to the north of China and of the area around Beijing. The Kitans succeeded in protecting their traditional way of life and their language even as they adopted many Chinese customs. Between 938 and 983, they used the word Kitan for their own realm and referred to the conquered Chinese territories as the Liao. This distinction presages the later Qing innovation of constructing an empire with different sections, each with its own language and governmental system. The successors to the Kitans, the Jurchens, succeeded where the Kitans failed. They not only conquered north China but also ruled it for over a century. The Kitans required their conquered male subjects to shave their heads in the Kitan hairstyle as a sign of their submission. Similarly, after conquering north China in 1126, the Jurchens ordered Chinese men to shave their foreheads, wear their hair long down their backs, often braided, and put on Jurchen-style clothing to display their subordinate status. Because of difficulty enforcing these orders, the Jurchens canceled them after just a few months, but when the Manchus took over the empire in 1644, they successfully imposed the same requirement of shaving the forehead and wearing a long braid, called a queue. This policy provided a visible reminder for the conquered Chinese of their subject status. The Jin government also distinguished two groups: the Jurchens and those of “various types,” a category that included north and South Chinese, and other non-Jurchen groups like the Kitans, Parhae, and Mongols. After they conquered China, the Mongols divided the population into four groups: the Mongols, the north Chinese, the South Chinese, and the people of “various types,” showing how useful this new way of thinking of their subjects was to non-Chinese rulers. The Jurchens took the Liao innovation of dual government an important step farther. They adopted the structure of Chinese bureaucracy and the means of recruiting for it via examinations, while reserving the highest positions in the government for native Jurchens. They selected those Jurchens more often on the basis of recommendation than via the Jurchenlanguage civil service examinations, which were held for the first time in 1173. The Jurchens created a new mid-level administrative unit, the circuit, between the locality and the emperor. All later provinces, the administrative unit in use even today, were based on the circuits of the Jin. The Liao were the first to name Beijing as a capital, and the Jurchens did so as well. The modern visitor to Beijing will still find traces of the Liao and Jin presence but none of the Song because the Song never ruled the city. Both the Mongols and the Manchus built their capital at Beijing. The Jurchens made an important breakthrough in Chinese history. They modified the Liao system of dual government so that the best-educated Chinese scholars, men like Zhao Bingwen, could serve a non-Chinese ruler and still feel that they were advancing the values of Chinese civilization. Chinese scholar-bureaucrats cooperated with the Jurchens by teaching them how to govern Chinese-style and by helping them to design a bureaucracy along Chinese lines. Assisting the Jurchen emperors in gathering legal precedents, they drafted the Taihe legal code. These Chinese scholars also explained the theory of the five elements and participated in the debates in Zhangzong’s court over which element best signified the Jin dynasty’s place in history. The Jin formulated their claim to succeed the Northern Song just a few years before the Mongols attacked them in 1206 and irrevocably weakened their dynasty. The Jurchens, in concert with their Chinese advisors, devised the formula that allowed subsequent non-­ Chinese dynasties—the Mongols and then the Manchus—to rule China. In the twentieth 227

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century, nationalistic Chinese historians did their best to argue that Chinese civilization under non-Chinese rule broke from the norm, but in fact, for much of the last thousand years of Chinese history, and particularly in the north, non-Chinese rule was the norm.

Note 1 Franke and Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, 265–66 [citing Beifeng yangsha lu 25.25b].

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Bibliography Song, Liao, and Jin

Biran, Michal. The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History: Between China and the Islamic World. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Bol, Peter K. Neo-Confucianism in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008. ———. “This Culture of Ours”: Intellectual Transitions in Tang and Sung China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992. ———. “Seeking Common Ground: Han Literati Under Jurchen Rule.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47:2 (1987), 461–538. Chaffee, John W. The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China: A Social History of Examinations. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995. Chaffee, John W., and Denis C. Twitchett, eds. The Cambridge History of China: Volume 5, Part 2: Sung China, 960–1279. Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Chan, Hok-lam. “Chinese Official History at the Yuan Court: The Composition of the Liao, Chin and Sung Histories,” in John D. Langlois, ed., China Under Mongol Rule (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 56–106. Chen, Li-li. Master Tung’s Western Chamber Romance. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Chen, Yuan. “Legitimation Discourse and the Theory of the Five Elements in Imperial China.” Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 44 (2014), 325–364. Chen Zhen 陳振. Song shi 宋史 (History of the Song Dynasty). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2003. Chen Zhie 陳植鍔. Bei Song wenhuashi shulun 北宋文化史述論 (A Study of Northern Song Cultural History). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992. Crossley, Pamela Kyle. The Manchus. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997. ———. “Outside In: Power, Identity, and the Han Lineage of Jizhou.” Journal of Song-Yuan Studies 43 (2013), 51–89. De Weerdt, Hilde Godelieve Dominique. Competition over Content: Negotiating Standards for the Civil Service Examinations in Imperial China (1127–1279). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007. Ebrey, Patricia B., The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Sung Period. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993. ———. “The Dynamics of Elite Domination in Sung China.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 48 (1988), 493–519. Ebrey, Patricia B., tr. Family and Property in Sung China: Yüan Ts’ai’s Precepts for Social Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Fletcher, Joseph. “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 46:1 (1986), 11–50.

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Section 5

The Yuan and Ming Empires

With the rise of the Mongols under Chinggis Khan in the early thirteenth century, and their successful conquest of all of China by 1279, the long era of division came to an end. China was first reunified as one component of the vast Mongol empire. From 1260, ­K hubilai became the ruler of China, and proclaimed the founding of the Yuan Dynasty in 1272. The Mongols distrusted the Han literati elite, and created a system of administration which sought to subordinate the Chinese through the use of Mongol and foreign administrators. They suspended the Confucian examinations until 1315. Many members of the literati elite sought ways to maintain their livelihoods and to express their resentment at Mongol rule through cultural activities, from painting to the writing of plays. The Mongols presided over an era of international trade and communication. Travelers and merchants came to China by sea and across the vastness of Inner Asia, with figures such as Marco Polo returning to the West to bring news of the wealth and grandeur of Khubilai’s realm. The Mongol economy flourished, and they introduced new measures such as the use of paper money to promote commerce. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the Yuan state had become less resilient, as weak emperors and powerful officials were increasingly concerned with court politics and less with effective administration. When major disasters struck central China, the Mongol government did not respond effectively. Mass rebellions broke out which eventually led to the collapse of the Yuan and the retreat of the Mongols to their traditional home in the grasslands beyond the Great Wall. The Ming dynasty emerged from the rebellions and chaos of the end of the Yuan. Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 rose from humble beginnings to become the first emperor of the Ming in ­ uanzhang 1368. Initially, the Ming carried on many aspects of Yuan administration, as Zhu Y had a tense and mistrustful relationship with his Confucian officials. But by the middle of the fifteenth century, the literati elite had returned to political center stage. Their revival contributed to a new era of intellectual and cultural development in the later part of the dynasty. In 1402, the throne was seized by Zhu Di 朱棣, the Yongle 永樂 emperor, whose reign is sometimes seen as a second founding of the Ming. He launched the famous voyages of exploration to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Through his use of the Grand Secretariat, he 232

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also played a key role in the return of the literati to political influence. Later emperors were generally not as dynamic as Yongle, and court politics were often dominated by powerful ministers or eunuchs from the Inner Palace. From the later fifteenth century onward, the Ming economy underwent impressive expansion. The commercial economy, which had initially arisen in the Song, revived and grew even more dynamic. The influx of silver helped fuel rapid growth, and the ensuing emergence of a wealthy merchant elite created conditions in social and cultural life which challenged the traditional hegemony of the literati. These forces found expression in ­intellectual life and in the arts. Although the Mongols had fled to the grasslands, they remained as a potential and sometimes actual threat to Ming security. Mongol assaults were especially intense in the 1440s and 1550s. During the latter period, the central and southern coast was also threatened by pirate raiders. These security issues caused major conflicts within the imperial system as well as disruptions to economic and social life. The prosperity of the middle Ming carried within it the seeds of serious problems. By the early seventeenth century, the dynasty was on a downward trajectory. Political conflicts at court and in the bureaucracy weakened the government, while the uneven economic benefits of commercial growth produced increasing suffering in parts of the empire. Popular rebellions began to spread, and the state was ineffective in dealing with these. The dynasty was toppled by a peasant revolt in the spring of 1644, and then replaced by the invading Manchus later that summer. Chronology 5: The Yuan-Ming Empires Buddhist-Daoist debates sponsored by Khubilai. K hubilai proclaimed Grand Khan of the Mongol Confederated Tribes. First issue of paper currency. 1267 Construction on Yuan capital city Dadu 大都 begins. 1271–1368 Yuan dynasty 1271 Finalization of four-level population classification scheme. 1274 Khubilai’s first attempted invasion of Japan fails. 1279 Final conquest of Song completes; first reunification of China since 907. 1275–92 Marco Polo in China. 1281 Khubilai’s second attempted invasion of Japan fails. 1287 Second issue of paper currency. Campaign against Annam. Campaign against Java. 1295–97 Period of unusual number of droughts and floods. 1309 Third issue of paper currency. 1315 Civil service examinations restarts. 1324–30 Period of unusual number of droughts, famine, locusts. 1330s Red Turban sectarian religious movement begins in central China. 1342–45 Period of unusual cold, drought, famine, flood, epidemics. 1351 Rechanneling of Yellow River. First White Lotus uprising. Fourth issue of paper currency. Copper coins are revived for circulation. 1354 Dismissal of Chief Minister Toghto. 1360 Chinese Confucian masters join Zhu Yuanzhang’s 朱元璋 movement. 1364 Zhu Yuanzhang declares himself Prince of Wu. 1368 Flight of last Yuan emperor from Dadu 1368–1644 Ming dynasty 1368–98 Zhu Yuanzhang reigns as Hongwu 洪武. 1258 1260

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1380 1399–1402 1403–24 1405–33 1436–49 1449 1450–56 1457–64 1465–87 1472–1529 1483–1541 1488–1505 1506–21 1522–66 1526–90 1527–1602 1549–65 1550–1617 1567–72 1567 1571 1572–1620 1572–82 1574–1646 1592–97 1604 1618 1620–28 1628–44 1644

Purge of Hu Weiyong 胡惟庸, abolition of the post of Grand Councilor. Reign of the Jianwen 建文 emperor Zhu Yunwen 朱允炆. Zhu Di 朱棣 usurps throne and reigns as the Yongle 永樂 emperor. Voyages of Zheng He 鄭和. Reign of the Zhengtong 正統 emperor Zhu Qizhen 朱祁鎮. Battle of Tumu 土木; the Zhengtong emperor captured by Mongols. Reign of the Jingtai 景泰 emperor Zhu Qiyu 朱祁鈺. Reign of the Tianshun 天順 emperor Zhu Qizhen (restored). Reign of the Chenghua 成化 emperor Zhu Jianshen 朱見深. Life of Wang Yangming 王陽明. Life of Wang Gen 王艮. Zhu Youtang 朱祐樘 reigns as the Hongzhi 弘治 emperor. Zhu Houzhao 朱厚照 reigns as the Zhengde 正德 emperor. Zhu Houcong 朱厚熜 reigns as the Jiajing 嘉靖 emperor. Life of Wang Shizhen 王世貞. Life of Li Zhi 李贄. Wokou 倭寇 pirate raids on east coast; Mongol attacks on northern border. Life of Tang Xianzu 湯顯祖. Zhu Zaihou 朱載垕 reigns as the Longqing 隆慶 emperor. Chinese permitted to engage in foreign trade. Spain establishes colonial capital at Manila. Silver trade with China expands. Zhu Yijun 朱翊鈞 reigns as the Wanli 萬曆 emperor. Zhang Juzheng 張居正 as Chief Grand Secretary; Single Whip fiscal reforms. Life of Feng Menglong 馮夢龍. Imjin War in Korea. Founding of Donglin Academy 東林書院. Revolt of the Manchu chieftain Nurhaci. Dominance of the eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢. Chongzhen 崇禎 reign of Zhu Youjian 朱由檢, last emperor of the Ming. Capture of Beijing by Li Zicheng 李自成.

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14 The Yuan Dynasty Michael C. Brose

The Yuan Dynasty is unique among Chinese dynasties because it was but part of a larger empire, and because it was the first time that non-Chinese ruled all of China. The hybrid state that the Mongols eventually constructed was not part of Chinggis’s original plan of conquest, and it took the Mongols about sixty years to conquer all of China and make it, at least in theory, the center of their unified world empire. Yuan is often treated as a low point in Chinese imperial history, but the Mongols introduced many new institutions and practices that set the stage for the emergence of later states (Map 14.1).

Map 14.1  T  he Yuan Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 7, 5–6.)

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Yuan China in the Mongol Empire When Chinggis Khan first began his assault on northern China in the early thirteenth century, he did not plan to conquer all of China. Rather, he was focused on conquering the Jurchen Jin state (1115–1234). His enmity toward Jin came from the fact that Chinggis and the Mongol tribes were vassals who were obligated to pay annual tribute to the Jin court. Once he had unified the Mongol tribes under his leadership and had dealt with his tribal rivals, he turned naturally to subduing Jin. He did not attack Jin directly, but started with a campaign against the smaller Tangut state of Xixia in present-day Gansu in 1209. That provided a staging ground and the promise of additional military troops for his larger goal of defeating Jin. The initial campaigns went quickly, with control of the Jin capital and most of northern China by 1216. By that time Chinggis had turned his attention ­westward, and the smaller occupying force of Mongols left in North China never completely vanquished the Jin court, which retreated further south beyond immediate reach. The Mongols only consolidated their rule of North China in 1234 under Chinggis’s son and successor Ögödei. The Mongols were unlike earlier nomadic dynasties that ruled North China because they did not have any experience in ruling settled populations. Some Mongols wanted to turn northern China into grassland for their herds, and this made sense if they wanted to maintain their traditional ways of life as nomads. That suggestion was countered by the Jurchen advisor Yelu Chücai 耶律楚材 (1190–1244), who argued that the Mongols would reap far greater and longer benefits if they left the local farming communities intact, since they could extract taxes and manpower from them. By that time, Ögödei had replaced his father as Grand Khan. He agreed with Yelu’s argument and revived Jin and Chinese administrative practices and local infrastructure. Ögödei may have thought about continuing on south of the Yangzi River, but his attention was also drawn west to the evolving campaign by Mongols into the Rus area and Eastern Europe. The conquest of China was once again left in a holding pattern until the early 1250s when the Grand Khan Möngke returned to the mission of completing the conquest of all of China. By the 1250s, the Song court had been pushed south of the Yangzi by retreating Jin forces, and the natural next step for Möngke was to continue the momentum of conquests south, bringing all of China under Mongol dominion. Möngke also understood China’s importance to his empire to provide new revenue and material resources. Thus, he took pains to rebuild the infrastructure in the north and revived old Jin and Chinese administrative systems and practices such as the census. Möngke had ambitious plans to consolidate his rule across both China and Persia, and he engaged his younger brothers, Princes Khubilai and Hulegu, to help lead the campaigns. Khubilai went first south and west across the key province of Sichuan to gain control of the independent state of Dali (present-day Yunnan). He needed to control that frontier area to establish a jumping-off point for future military campaigns east against Song, and also south and southeast into Southeast Asia. Khubilai’s campaign was quick and efficient. ­Unfortunately, his brother Möngke died in 1259 while on campaign, which set off a battle for succession between Khubilai and his younger brother Ariq Böke. Only after Khubilai was “elected” to succeed Möngke as Grand Khan in a dubious meeting of select members of the Mongol imperial clan did he resume the campaign to conquer Song. But that took another eighteen years. Khubilai adopted a different attitude toward southern China than his predecessors had taken earlier in the north, such as forbidding all rapacious and violent actions against the 236

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local population by his troops, and refusing to grant appanage estates to Mongols there. After all, if Khubilai were to rule China as a legitimate emperor, he needed the cooperation of officials who had served the Song as well as the loyalty of this large population, his new southern subjects. The differential status of South China vis-à-vis the north was in part a natural outcome of the long separation of the two parts of China until that time, and it was one of the defining features throughout the Yuan period.

Grand Khans and emperors The divisions between north and south also provided a natural context for the evolution of the distinctly hybrid nature of Khubilai’s new state and dynasty, visible at once in the identity of Khubilai and his successors as, simultaneously, Grand Khan of the united ­Mongol Empire and Chinese Emperor. Even though the notion of a united Mongol Empire had become something of a fiction even before Khubilai, he and all of his successors took that dual identity seriously. The hybrid nature of Yuan China is also visible in the back-and-forth debate between Mongol nativists and those who favored more accommodation to Chinese ways. The Yuan court after 1307 was riven by regular cycling between those two positions, and that ongoing dispute contributed in no small part to the rapid decline of Yuan a mere sixty years later. Khubilai replaced his elder brother Möngke as Grand Khan in 1260 and immediately began to consolidate his identity as a Chinese emperor. Khubilai is sometimes portrayed as almost more Chinese than Mongol, but this is a misreading, since he never lost sight of his own culture and background as a Mongol. He always viewed China as the center of the Mongol Empire. But he also saw himself as the legitimate successor of the Mandate of Heaven which Song had lost. One of Khubilai’s first actions in 1260 to set the stage for his emergence as a legitimate emperor of China was to adopt a Chinese-style reign title “Zhongtong,” (“pivotal succession” or “moderate rule”). Done almost two decades before he completed the conquest of Song China, it illustrates Khubilai’s intention to complete what Möngke started, and build a reunited Chinese state around Mongol rule. Four years later, he followed with the even more radical step (in the eyes of some Mongols) of moving the Mongol central capital city from its first location in the steppe down into northeast China. He also changed his reign title in that same year, 1264, to “Zhiyuan” (“arriving at the origin or proper beginning”). Finally, in 1272, he took the final step in becoming a true Chinese-style emperor when he adopted the title “Great Yuan” for his new state. Khubilai also adopted Chinese imperial administrative practices when he created the six traditional bureaus or ministries in his government that focused on revenue collection, personnel management, imperial ritual practices, war, punishments, and public works. Khubilai naturally understood the importance of these acts to his identity as a Chinese emperor since he was taught by Chinese tutors from a young age, and he surrounded himself with Chinese advisors when he was a prince on his own landed estate in northern China. Khubilai died in 1294, and since his son Jingim had predeceased him (one of the great misfortunes that colored Khubilai’s last years of life), he selected his grandson Temür (r. 1294–1307; temple name Chengzong) to succeed him. Temür continued his grandfather’s vision of the Yuan state. He is also considered by most historians to be the last effective Yuan emperor because of the infighting and violent swings between nativist Mongol and pro-Chinese camps that surfaced after his death. Temür was quite unlike his grandfather in two ways; first, he stopped military campaigns of conquest. This was an important decision 237

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since the authority of all Grand Khans to lead the confederated Mongol tribes starting with Chinggis had rested on their ability to provide booty as a result of successful campaigns. Temür’s decision acknowledged what had already become clear with Khubilai’s series of failed campaigns against Japan and Southeast Asia, that the days of the expanding empire were past, even though sporadic attempts to reclaim lost territory in the western ends of the empire were made later. It also affirmed the reality of a divided empire. This did not mean, however, that Temür and his Yuan successors stopped claiming the identity as Grand Khans. Temür also concluded the long-running civil war between his branch of the imperial family and his cousins in the Ögödeid and Chaghadai lines that started with Khubilai’s accession to power. Now Central Asia was clearly outside of the purview of the Grand Khan. Unfortunately, Temür died without an heir at age forty-one, and the third Yuan ­Emperor, Khaishan (r. 1307–11; temple name Wuzong 武宗), came to the throne only after a violent dispute between two factions of the imperial Mongol clan. Khaishan was supported by Mongol nativists who wanted him to reassert Mongol cultural values, and he took a much different view to ruling China than Khubilai and Temür. This may have been because he grew up in the saddle as a military man leading troops and did not put much faith in bureaucratic niceties. Khaishan relied mainly on his close group of fellow military commanders as advisors during his reign. One problem was his custom, in good nomadic fashion, of distributing lots of honorary titles and positions to people loyal to him. Since these titles came with financial and material benefits, they cost the state huge sums. Unfortunately, he tried to address this problem by constantly raising tax rates and frequency of collections, and in the end he gained powerful enemies among the Mongols and the Chinese. Khaishan’s successor, the fourth Yuan Emperor, was his younger brother Ayurbarwada (r. 1311–20; temple name Renzong 仁宗) and he returned Yuan China to a pro-Chinese attitude. This is best seen in the fact that he restarted the Chinese civil service examination system, which also contributed to his mission to limit or counter the traditional Mongol method of ­appointing people to office based on heredity or recommendation. The civil service examinations never became routinized in Yuan the way they had been in earlier and later dynasties. They were also limited in their effectiveness as a means of equitable social mobility across the entire population because there were strict quotas that guaranteed spots for Mongols and ­Central Asian personnel, with different exams than their Chinese counterparts. But they did provide an avenue for more Chinese, especially from the south, to enter into the administration. Ayurbarwada was less successful in reforming other parts of the Yuan bureaucracy, especially the rights and grants of titles to Mongol imperial princes that had been lavishly doled out by his predecessor Khaishan. And ironically, Ayurbarwada’s dedication to Confucian economic principles contributed to the state’s deteriorating financial health since his main plan to revive the economy was to lighten taxes and try to encourage better agricultural production. His reign was also marked by ongoing fighting between pro- and anti-­Chinese factions, and he died at the young age of thirty-five without curbing the power of the ­Mongol and Central Asian elites. Ayurbarwada was succeeded by his 18-year-old son, Shidebala, notable because it was the only peaceful and normal succession of Yuan emperors following the Chinese norm of primogeniture. Since Shidebala (r. 1321–23; temple name Yingzong 英宗) had been educated by Chinese tutors, he followed in his father’s footsteps in promoting the Confucian agenda at the court. He appointed like-minded officials who carried out reforms aimed at curbing the power of the Mongol nobility. His Mongol countrymen most hated his cancellation of the annual stipends that the government paid to Mongol princes. Unfortunately for Shidebala, a 238

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large cohort of discontented Mongol and Central Asians joined forces and assassinated him only three years into his reign. He was only twenty at the time, and it was the first act of regicide among the Mongols. Yesun Temür (r. 1323–28; temple name Jinzong 晉宗) came to power at thirty-one, and, like Khaishan, grew up commanding Mongol troops in the steppe. He recruited and ­promoted many Muslims, and minimized Chinese influence at his court. But unlike Khaishan, Yesun was not interested in replacing Chinese bureaucratic systems with nomadic ones. He returned to the policy of awarding imperial titles and landed estates to large numbers of Mongol princes. He also revived some long-ignored Chinese ideological bureaus to the court, especially the imperial Colloquium of Classic Texts ( jingyan 經筵) that was staffed by noted scholars who lectured the emperor on Confucian texts and how those ideas could be applied to governance. One interesting aspect of this bureau was the appointment of a number of Central Asian scholars as staff lecturers. Yesun also brought Muslims into his ­administration and sponsored the construction of several new mosques in important cities. He died from natural causes at age 35. Yesun Temür was succeeded for a short time by his young son Arigibag (r. 1328), but a coup was in the making to restore Khaishan’s line to the Yuan throne. As a result, Khaishan’s eldest son, Khoshila (r. 1329, temple name Mingzong 明宗), reigned for a short six months before he was murdered in 1329. He was replaced by Khaishan’s younger son, Tugh Temür (r. 1329–32; temple name Wenzong 文宗), who started his reign by promptly purging all of Yesün Temür’s supporters. In order to gain legitimacy, he outdid his successors in granting privileges to Mongol princes. Even so, he was widely viewed as an illegitimate successor, and several Mongol princes and their collaborators plotted at least eight separate times to take him down. One notable accomplishment was his founding of a new imperial academy to train Mongols in Confucian culture (called the Academy of the Pavilion of the Star of ­Literature). Over one hundred noted Chinese and Central Asian writers, artists, calligraphers, and translators were appointed to this bureau, and its existence, while short-lived, was unprecedented both in Mongol and Chinese imperial history. Unfortunately, it was abolished shortly after Tugh Temür’s early death in 1332 at 28. Since Tugh Temür’s son had predeceased him, the throne next went to Khoshila’s second son, Irinjibal (r. 1332; temple name Ningzong 寧宗). Only six years old when enthroned, he reigned a short fifty-three days before dying unexpectedly. That paved the way for the long reign of his elder brother, Toghön Temür (r. 1333–70; temple name Huizong 惠宗), who proved to be the last Yuan emperor. He assumed the throne at age thirteen, and continued his rule from Mongolia two years after the overthrow of the Yuan Dynasty in China. His long reign was characterized by a seesawing of pro- and anti-Chinese policies about every five years that were led by his chief ministers of state. The central court’s authority eroded in that period, exacerbated by a series of unusually cold winters, floods, droughts, and resulting famines. The court was simply powerless to tamp down the sharp rise in local disturbances and banditry across China, and Toghön was driven out of Dadu 大都 in 1368 by Zhu Y­uanzhang 朱元璋, who founded the new Ming Dynasty.

Political institutions One of the most important features of the Yuan state was the high level of administrative duplication at both the central court and in the provinces. The other feature that distinguishes Yuan from other Chinese dynasties was the relatively high level of decentralization between the central court and the provinces, both ascribed to the ongoing vitality of Mongol 239

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nomadic views of property and inheritance patterns in China. Those values and institutions created a unique situation in China whose influence can be seen even today in the system of the provinces as the largest administrative unit. Even more interesting, the growth of Beijing and other super-urban areas into their own administrative regions separate from the provinces in present-day China could be seen as a return to the system the Mongols instituted across the China that they ruled. All of Mongol China was considered to be part of the Grand Khan’s ulus (patrimony or inheritance) that was passed on to Khubilai when he became Grand Khan. But this also meant that, technically, all princes in Chinggis’s extended clan had a share in China and could demand to be represented in the government because it was part of the larger Mongol Empire. The Yuan administrative bureaucracy was thus a hybrid affair that incorporated some Mongol elements into the otherwise largely Chinese system, such as the practice of granting landed estates already mentioned. We also see this nomadic imprint in two new institutions that were created in the Yuan administration, the Bureau of Imperial Clan ­Administration (Da zongzheng fu 大宗正府) and the system of “moving” provinces (xingsheng 行省). The first included officials who controlled the award of titles and appointments in the Yuan government, and revenue streams, especially taxation. The second was actually a holdover from the earlier Jurchen mode of administering the southern part of their steppe empire. Yuan China was divided into a central province ­(zhongshu sheng 中書省) at the capital, and eleven subsidiary provinces (xingsheng). The province was originally instituted across northern China by the Jurchens, who needed local representatives of the central court that were viewed as temporary and who were expected to accompany the emperor and his retinue on his annual trek moving among his several capital cities (seen in the first part of its name “xing” to “go or travel”). When Ögödei consolidated his rule of North China, they became permanent bureaus based in specific strategic locations and ruled by officials who were assigned from the center. The other unique aspect of Yuan governance was the routine supervision of officials by Mongols. The overseer (darughachi) system began after the Mongols conquered northern China, when they appointed special military agents to maintain control over newly conquered cities and territories. The darughachi position is illustrative of the larger lack of differentiation in the early Mongol empire between civilian and military duties and authority. Khubilai changed that after his enthronement; all darughachi became salaried members of the administration in 1261, and they were appointed at all levels, from the circuit, prefecture, and subprefecture down to the level of the county. At each level they were paired with the regular administrator and shared administrative duties. Neither the regular administrator nor the darughachi official could act independently, and both had to apply their seal to any order, decision, or report. Khubilai’s goal was that Mongols or Central Asians would staff the darughachi office at each level, while the regular administrators at each level would be staffed by northern Chinese, Khitans, Jurchens, and other people who had lived in northern China at the time of the conquest. All this might give the impression that the Mongols had centralized power into their own hands. In fact, several nomadic customs, especially the practice of giving land grants to members of the Mongol imperial clan, limited any centralizing of power in the court’s hands. None of the Yuan rulers could afford to disenfranchise the Mongol princes by breaking up landed estates or stopping the practice of giving annual gifts. The decentralized nature of Yuan China is best seen in the gap between the central court and the provinces. The provinces related to the central government somewhat as vassals or subject territories that surrounded and were loyal to the emperor’s domain, which was exactly how a typical 240

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nomadic khan related to subordinate tribes and grazing areas. Provinces had their own administrative structures, called Branch Secretariats that mirrored the Central Secretariat at the imperial capital. They operated relatively autonomously, and only a few key court bureaus such as the Censorate transcended that gap down to the local level. In addition, not all provinces were treated the same way by the court; the provinces in the most distant frontier zones in the northeast (Korea), northwest (Gansu), and southwest (Yunnan) were treated almost as separate states, much more autonomous than provinces located in central China. By way of example, in Yunnan, the Mongols gave a lot of power to local chieftains (tusi 土司) to maintain control of their own tribes for the Mongols. The court settled a large number of Central Asian troops into permanent military garrisons, and the provincial center was staffed mainly by Muslims.

Society Social order The ordering of society was a more acute problem for the Mongols than most other Chinese dynasties faced. Not only did a non-Chinese people now rule all of China, but their conquest also brought large numbers of other foreigners into China in unprecedented numbers. To keep everyone sorted out, if not “in their place,” the Mongols organized people based on the order and nature of their inclusion into the new empire. As early as 1229, the first year of Ögödei’s reign, the basic annals record his concern over how to tax three specific groups of people, Mongols (Menggu ren 蒙古人), the people who lived in northern China (called Hebei Hanmin 河北漢民), and people from west of China (Xiyu ren 西域人). By 1247, the sources reveal the existence of another category of people all from the west (semuren 色目人). This term was a catch-all, meaning “various kinds of people,” but really applied to all of the people from central and western Asia who had joined the Mongols, willingly or by force. Most of them were steppe-dwelling Turkic groups such as the Uyghurs, but also included long-settled populations from Persia, among others. They ranked just below the Mongols in terms of real power. Once Khubilai concluded the conquest of southern China he added a fourth category, “Southerners” (nanren 南人), that included all people who lived under the southern Song. This group occupied the lowest level in the social scheme and enjoyed the least amount of real power under the Mongol administration. While this scheme appears on its face to have been ethnically driven, it was primarily an administrative scheme based on relative proximity to the Mongol cause, the people of southern China thus being the least trustworthy because they held out the longest and joined the growing empire late, and only after an extended campaign of conquest.

Law Law in Yuan China, like other aspects of that society, was a hybrid that combined nomadic and Chinese customs and practices. Most innovations in law were the result of the effects of Mongol customary law on existing Chinese legal codes and practices. In the north, the old Jin law code was retained until 1271, although Khubilai had already requested his Chinese advisors to prepare a new legal code back in 1262. After Shidebala was appointed emperor in 1321, he requested another compilation of ordinances, which was titled the “Comprehensive Institutions of the Great Yuan (Da Yuan tongzhi 大元通 制). It was praised by Chinese scholars across the land because it included many important Chinese customs such as the five 241

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degrees of mourning. The third extant Yuan legal code also comes from Shidebala’s reign, the Yuan dianzhang 元典章. This large corpus is divided into ten sections, and includes many entries transcribed directly from earlier Mongol texts in vernacular style alongside more formal Chinese codes. Finally, a documentary survey of various institutions that followed earlier Chinese huiyao 會要 pattern was completed in 1331, the Jingshi dadian 經世大典.

Technology and material culture The Mongols were responsible for introducing or fostering the development of many new material and technological advances in China, including such things as the extensive use of a circulating paper currency and banking system; Western astronomical, medical, and dietary techniques and customs; and writing systems, to name but a few. First, printing and circulation of paper currency had been introduced into China by the Song state, so this was not an altogether new institution. The Mongols’ signal contribution here was to its wide adoption by the state as the monetary system across China and the backing of that currency by silver. This interest in the economy is not surprising since the Mongols were intensely interested in promoting international trade (see later). Of course, the Yuan system was also prone to the same kinds of problems that modern monetary systems suffer, especially inflation, and the temptation to print more currency.

Diet, medicine, astronomy The Mongols who settled in China were also clearly interested in expanding their diet and material life beyond their own customary nomadic ways. An interesting example is a dietary manual that was compiled by a Central Asian man who presented it to the Yuan emperor Tugh Temür in 1330. The book, Proper and Essential Things for the Emperor’s Food and Drink, includes a lively mixture of traditional Mongol, Chinese, and Western food and medicinal recipes, especially Persian. It is clear from this compilation that the Mongol elite wanted to live the good life in China, including staying healthy. If the recipes are any indication of how the Mongol elite lived, then they also illustrate an extensive trade network across their empire, since many of the formulas relied on ingredients found outside of China. As masters of an empire that stretched across Eurasia, this should not surprise us. Mongol preference for Western science is especially evident in the Muslim astronomical, medical, and pharmaceutical bureaus and personnel at the Yuan court. These bureaus operated in conjunction with traditional Chinese imperial bureaus of astronomy, pharmacy, and medicine, but they had large independent staffs of professionals and clerical support, and catered almost exclusively to the Mongol ruling elite. But Chinese astronomers, physicians, and pharmacists were also sponsored by the court, with separate bureaus and personnel. Chinese medical and pharmaceutical knowledge was taught in private academies, mainly in southern China, and handed down within families in traditional custom.

Communications The rulers of Yuan China faced a unique problem of written and spoken communications: how to communicate imperial decrees and keep order among the various cultural and linguistic groups that lived in their empire. Chinggis understood the need for a written form of spoken Mongol if he was going to extend his rule over peoples outside of the steppe zone. He addressed this issue early when he asked a Uyghur administrator to create the first written 242

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form of Mongol using the Uyghur writing system. Khubilai eventually adopted Tibetan writing to replace the first script, and the Mongols routinely issued written orders in several different languages (see the example of Arghun’s letter). Khubilai’s court included a very large bureau of translators and interpreters. The other important development in communications infrastructure was the postal relay system. Earlier Chinese states had had postal relay systems, but the Mongols expanded and improved it. Of course, they needed it because their empire spanned such a large expanse of territory. By the end of Khubilai’s reign, there were more than 1,400 postal stations in China alone, and the system was designed for the rapid communication of imperial orders and transit of officials on business. Merchants were initially expressly forbidden to use the system, but they nonetheless came to dominate it, which benefited international trade and commerce across the empire and linked China in new, more efficient ways with the rest of Eurasia as never before.

High culture Painting, poetry, calligraphy The intersection of nomadic and Chinese values is particularly evident in the three core art forms of traditional Chinese high culture: painting, poetry, and calligraphy. One of the most innovative contributions to Chinese literature in the Yuan was dramatic literature (zaju 雜劇), which actually first appeared in the late Jin period. Yuan dramas were often written in a vernacular style that would never have been tolerated in earlier periods. The performative aspect of dramas also generated a new poetic style (qu or sanqu 散曲), originally arias that were sung during a dramatic performance. Many Yuan poets continued to use styles that reached back to the Tang Dynasty, especially standard verse (shi 詩) and lyric poetry (ci 詞). Many non-­Chinese people became highly regarded poets and writers in the Yuan, with reputations equaling the most talented Chinese artists of the time. The Mongols’ taste for realistic depictions of life, especially horse culture, brought about a new trend in painting that was executed by Chinese and non-Chinese artists alike. These paintings are also important because they provide a rare glimpse into real life at the time.

Material arts The Mongols also greatly loved gold and silk and other luxury items. Gold, in particular, was one of the most important markers of status among the Mongols. Khubilai’s capital cities are reported to have had lavish use of gold as a major decorative element in the imperial complex. Gold even found its way into royal clothing, in the special silk brocade that the Mongols prized for special royal occasions called nasīj. That cloth had gold thread woven into the weft, and often also featured pearls basted onto it. The Mongols also supported ceramic production across their empire, and Chinese production benefited by their introduction, from Persia, of cobalt blue as a new underglaze style. Jingdezhen became the center of ceramic production.

History writing One of the greatest accomplishments of the Mongols in China was their compilation of the standard histories of the Song, Liao, and Jin dynasties. The fact that they produced all three histories in three years (1343–45) was, in itself, remarkable and unprecedented in Chinese history. Even more remarkable, however, was the fact that the Mongols had no literary 243

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culture or tradition at all before they conquered China, and their interest in this project illustrates their genuine interest in Chinese cultural tradition, but also the fact that they wanted to secure a place for themselves in China’s long dynastic history as legitimate rulers of China. The last point is obvious when you consider that the main reason that any dynasty compiled the standard history of its predecessor was to confirm its own legitimacy as the inheritor of the Mandate of Heaven. The Chinese concept of Heaven’s Mandate has a curious overlap with Mongol notions of political legitimacy as springing from Tengri (Heaven).

Religion and thought The Mongols were highly religious people who practiced and were influenced by a shamanistic tradition that emphasized the role of nature in life, along with Heaven’s guidance. But they were also pragmatic, and with the exception of some late figures all of the Mongol Grand Khans not only allowed people to practice their native religion but encouraged it, as long as loyalty to the Mongols was maintained. Yuan China is noteworthy in terms of religious history in China for several trends such as the marked multiplicity of religions practiced, the importation of Islam as a religious system into China for the first time on a wide scale, and the active cooperation of prominent Chinese Confucian thinkers with religious Daoists to promote a distinct form of Daoist belief, practice, and culture in China.

Daoism The story of the sponsorship of the southern religious Daoist movement (Xuanjiao 玄教) by the Mongol ruling elite is especially interesting because it developed entirely in the Yuan, and was part of the larger trend of the elevation of Daoist religion in Yuan China compared to earlier periods. This southern Daoist religious movement was, in effect, seen as a way for southern Chinese literati to preserve their culture in the face of the Mongol conquest of the south. It is also interesting because this was a rare conjoining of efforts by Confucianists and Daoists; the normal position of Han Chinese Confucianists was to look down on Daoism as a type of heterodox teaching. It is also interesting because Khubilai had weighed in on the side of Buddhism in a debate he sponsored in 1258 between Buddhists and Daoists. Yet, Khubilai’s conquest of the south caused him to look anew at the religion, and from that time on, religious Daoism, especially proponents of the Xuanjiao sect, enjoyed high status among the Mongol elite. This was by no means the only school of Daoism that thrived in Yuan China, and the larger social and cultural division between the north and south that we have described for Yuan China was also manifested in religious Daoism, which was divided into a northern and southern branch. While their specific teachings differed, all had close ties with Chinese Confucian literati throughout the Dynasty.

Islam We also need to mention the influx of Islam into China along with the Mongol conquests as one of the important long-term impacts of the Yuan period, for it was indeed at that time that it became situated within China’s larger religious landscape as one of the major religions. This was due to the move into China of many Muslims in service to the state. We have already noted the problems that Muslim merchants caused in their early service as tax farmers in the north. The seesawing of politics that rent the last decades of Yuan emperors was also caused, in part, by their alternating defense or castigation of Muslim personnel at the high 244

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levels of the court. But many Muslims settled into communities across China, and some Yuan emperors built or rehabilitated important mosques. The strong presence of Chinese Muslims across China today is one of the enduring legacies of that time.

Buddhism Finally, Tibetan Buddhism became closely associated with the Mongol elite starting with Khubilai, who had been interested in Tibetan teachings from his period when he lived as a prince on his imperial appanage estate in the north. Khubilai invited the renowned Phags-pa lama (1235–80) to come to his appanage and advise him. After he built his new capital, Khubilai invited the lama to live permanently at Dadu. This was certainly out of genuine interest in Tibetan Buddhist teachings, but Khubilai’s sponsorship of that group was also a convenient way for him to control the Tibetan political scene without having to commit lots of Mongol troops there. Tibetan Buddhism was favored by the Mongols, but the Chinese population practiced Chan, and there was a heightened emphasis on temple building and an overall increase in the numbers of Buddhist monks and nuns in China.

Western religions The other new aspect of Yuan China was the proliferation of Western religions, especially forms of Christianity. One of the most famous tales of communication going from China to the West is the story of the Nestorian Christian monk Rabban Sauma (c. 1220–94). His story provides an interesting window onto the flourishing Nestorian community that existed across northern China, especially at the Yuan capital Dadu. Of course, Nestorians had lived for many centuries earlier west in the area known today as Xinjiang, where they had fled in exile after being labeled as heretics.

Confucianism Confucian doctrine had been reenergized in the Song period by Zhu Xi (1130–1200), who emphasized attaining harmony with the underlying principle of the universe; nature and phenomena as well as human relations were now equally important as subjects of study. His school, Daoxue, or the Learning of the Way, often known in the West as Neo-­Confucianism, gained enormous popularity in the Yuan. When the civil service exams were restarted in 1315, Zhu Xi’s teachings and central texts were designated as the official line that all examinees needed to know. One of the interesting social aspects of Yuan China was the fact that a good many non-Chinese also became learned Neo-Confucian masters, and served in ideological bureaus at the Yuan court as well as teaching students in their own private academies.

Economy Land One of the most important changes that the Mongols brought to China was the practice of giving landed estates (appanages) to members of the Mongol imperial clan and other loyal retainers. The appanage estates included the land and the people who lived there, and the grantee was awarded full control of the estate, including the right to administer the land and gather taxes from the residents. This system has been described as nomadic-feudal, and over 245

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time it created a big economic problem for the Yuan state by the diversion of tax revenue into the hands of the appanage holders. Once Khubilai conquered the south, he forbade the granting of appanages there, with the exception of former Song government land. The Mongols created four categories of land in China: government lands, appanage lands, temple lands, and private lands, and each had its own set of laws and practices for taxation. Yuan, like Song, saw the rise of large landowners over time, and the concomitant rise in tenancy, gradual impoverishment of farmers, and overall decline in the standard of living of the peasantry. Yuan emperors tried, from time to time, to reverse those trends, but they never really succeeded.

Taxes The other institution that the early Mongols introduced into northern China was tax farming by Muslim merchants. Chinggis had used Central Asian Muslims to trade on his behalf, and Ögödei engaged them in a partnership (ortogh) to collect taxes and silver tribute that they would either use to purchase luxury goods for the Mongol elite or lend back to the local taxpaying population at exorbitant rates. They also loaned money to the Mongols. While Ögödei retained the old Jin tax rates and schedules, the Mongols also collected all kinds of irregular taxes on the population of North China, based on ad hoc needs fueled by their military campaigns and outright greed. After Khubilai was enthroned, he put many measures in place to limit the rapacious system, including regularizing the tax system in the provinces to annual grain and head taxes and volunteer labor for state projects. Most important, he ended the practice of tax farming. At the same time, Khubilai doubled down on the role of the Muslim merchants as the official agents conducting international trade on behalf of the court. One very practical reason for Khubilai’s need to conquer South China was because it was China’s breadbasket, and the Mongol raids across the north before his time had brought agricultural productivity in the north to historic lows. Khubilai addressed that problem early in his reign by creating peasant communities (she 社) that were placed under the control of the Bureau of Agriculture. The community head supervised taxation, local policing, local ­education, and planning and planting of crops and land reclamation. This was an especially important initiative in the north, and it did a lot to cement Khubilai’s status as a benevolent ruler.

Commerce Yuan China enjoyed healthy domestic and international trade, due both to its connections to other parts of the larger empire but also to foreign trade outside that realm. Khubilai created a new bureau, the Directorate General of Merchant Corporations, that employed trusted Muslims as state agents of international trade. The state loaned Muslim merchants funds at low interest, and the merchants invested the funds in trade caravans that yielded handsome profits for the Mongols as well as a regular influx of luxury goods for consumption by the court. The same system applied to maritime commerce; the state provided merchants with capital and ships, and profits were split 7:3 between the state and merchants. A lot of that international trade consisted of staples, rather than luxury goods, going both in and out of China. For example, sources record ships carrying loads of grain in the amount of 8,000 shi (approximately 1,200 tons). The fleet of thirteen ships that Marco Polo took from southeast China to Persia each carried 5,000–6,000 shi of pepper and up to 200 passengers. 246

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Military We must not lose sight of the fact that Yuan was a conquest society, and all of the Mongols who ruled China thought primarily in terms of military power. They maintained the original Mongol organizational structure, and their practices set patterns that were followed later, especially in the system of hereditary military families and the decimal and banner systems. The multi-ethnic nature of the Yuan military is one unique feature of the time, as was the large and regular gifting of landed estates to members of the Mongol nobility and important affiliated tribes from the steppe and the west. The other important feature of the Mongol military was its organization into a decimally based command structure, with the ideal highest level unit comprising 10,000. The imperial guard (kesig) was the core of the Yuan military establishment. Earlier ­Chinese dynasties had imperial guard systems, but this one reflected its nomadic origins in that it remained the most important career route into the Yuan administration, and it continued to operate under the principle of personal dependence on the Grand Khan. The other important feature of the Yuan military was the extensive system of permanent military garrisons throughout the country. Mongol troops were concentrated in North China, while South China was garrisoned mainly by Han Chinese and other tribal armies (denoted as “newly adhered troops”). These garrisons were controlled by a series of Pacification Bureau offices at regional levels. As in the system of Branch Provinces (discussed earlier), decentralization of military control was the norm.

Disintegration of the Yuan As should be clear from the brief history of Yuan’s emperors, there were critical fissures embedded in the Yuan state from the start, including, but not limited to, the highly inefficient dual administrative structure, the drain on the economy from ongoing demands by members of the Mongol elite, and the disruptive pattern of contesting factions at the court over the value of Mongol nativism versus Chinese values. In fact, disruption and growing ineffectiveness of rule was the norm for half a century starting in the 1330s. Social order started to break down with the revolts of local Yuan military units and rebellions of state laborers on big public works projects. Banditry became more common and open in the 1340s, especially attacks on large towns that were repulsed by locals who organized for self-protection. By 1350, spiraling inflation and adverse weather combined with the court’s shrinking authority. Conditions were ripe for larger rebellions, as, for example, with the White Lotus-led movement of some 150,000 state tax laborers and 20,000 imperial troops in Hebei who were rerouting the Yellow River. This was but the largest of several millenarian-inspired rebellions that occurred in several parts of China. By the late 1350s, anti-Yuan power was concentrated in three large, rival groups located along the lower Yangzi River. At the same time, infighting among rival Mongol princes in northern China broke out. The emperor’s chief minister at the time, Toghto, had that rebellion under control when he was dismissed in 1355 as a result of intrigue by his enemies at court. He was the one man able to organize and coordinate resistance by the remaining imperial army. When he was forced out of power, most of his staff officers in the field and their troops defected to rebel forces. Zhu Yuanzhang was based at present-day Nanjing where he led the sectarian Red Turban rebels, an offshoot of the earlier White Lotus sect. As he gradually consolidated his power over his rivals, he started to think about building his own dynasty. To accomplish that, he brought in several leading Confucian thinkers to advise him. As a result, he 247

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gradually eschewed the Red Turban program and violence. He chose his new dynastic name, Ming, some argue, as a way to hold onto his erstwhile followers who were still devoted to ­m illenarian ideology. Meanwhile, the last Yuan emperor Toghon Temür continued to rule from the steppe after he fled Dadu in 1368 for two more years until his death in 1370. The Yuan took a bit longer on its northeast and southwestern frontiers to die. The Mongol prince Naqachu (d. 1388) was captured by Zhu Yuanzhang in 1355, but was released in the hope of gaining the goodwill of the Mongols. He ruled Liaodong for some 20 years. Another Mongol imperial prince, Basalawarmi (d. 1382), was a viceroy of Yunnan in the 1350s. After Dadu fell, Basalawarmi stayed in Yunnan as a Yuan loyalist until the 1380s when it was brought under Ming control. The Yuan Dynasty had a number of critical fault lines that prevented it from lasting longer than it did. But it also brought about many new changes to China, some of which established patterns and precedents that shaped all subsequent Chinese states down to the present. What some see as a low point in China’s imperial past was, in fact, one of the most innovative, creative periods of that long history.

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15 The Ming dynasty (pre-1521) Peter Ditmanson

Over 276 years, the Ming dynasty spanned a remarkable period in Chinese history, marked by dramatic economic growth, the emergence of a vibrant urban culture, and the dawn of relations between China and Europe. The dynasty was established upon the ashes of the crumbling Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), in which much of the realm was devastated by wars, epidemics and natural disasters. Under these desperate conditions, the ­founding warlord, Zhu Yuanzhang, sought to create a new stable order, based upon an idealized agrarian economy with trade and mobility tightly controlled. The subsequent evolution of the Ming society, economy and polity went far beyond what he imagined and strained the framework that he left behind. This chapter summarizes the original designs of the Ming founder and the evolution of Ming society and institutions over the century after his death (Map 15.1).

Map 15.1  The Ming Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 7, 40–41.)

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Foundations of the empire Zhu Yuanzhang was born in 1328 into desperate poverty in what is now Anhui province in central China. This region saw some of the worst of the volatile conditions of famine, epidemics and warfare in the late Yuan period, with the forces of the dynasty unable to quell the fighting of rebel groups and local bandit strongmen. Orphaned in his teens when his tenant-farmer parents and other family members died from disease, he survived as a novice monk in the care of a local monastery for several years, begging for food and gaining a rudimentary education. Over the course of his life, he reflected on his humble background and railed against the forces of greed, exploitation and neglect that he saw as the root causes of suffering among the peasantry. In his mid-twenties, Zhu joined a rebel group affiliated with the widespread millenarian Red Turbans. His intelligence and talents soon brought him important connections with local rebel leaders, and it was also here that he found a wife, a young woman surnamed Ma who eventually became his empress and lifelong confidant. By the 1350s, he was the head of a force of several hundred men, leading campaigns of his own. In 1356, he conquered Nanjing, a city of historical significance and economic importance near the mouth of the Yangzi River. Here, he began to create an administrative apparatus, courting local scholars and establishing the groundwork for his own government. In 1364, he declared his regional sovereignty with the title of Prince of the state of Wu (Wuwang 吳王), and in 1368, he ­established himself as emperor of a new dynasty called the Ming, meaning “Brilliance.” The significance of the name was perhaps linked to religious elements of his millenarian past. He chose the reign-title of Hongwu, “Grand Martiality,” which indicated his warrior orientation and his ongoing campaigns to pacify the realm. Zhu Yuanzhang’s dramatic rise from orphan to emperor shaped his outlook and policies in important ways. In his desire to remedy all the ills of the world in which he grew up, he insisted that the hallmarks of his new dynasty would be stability, accountability and morality. Over the course of his reign, however, his zealous pursuit of an idealized order descended into frustration and paranoia, with massive purges of those whom he perceived to be evil obstacles.

Succession and the structure of the imperial clan The first priority of the new Hongwu emperor (r. 1368–98) was to establish and organize the imperial clan. He formalized the rites of venerating his ancestors, and arranged for the proper burial of his peasant parents. He then began to establish plans for his progeny, his twenty-six sons and numerous daughters and their offspring, laying out his specific instructions in a document called the “Ancestral Admonitions” (Zuxun 祖訓), compiled in 1373 and revised several times afterward until 1397. The Admonitions spelled out the protocols, privileges and responsibilities of the male and female members of the clan in extensive detail. Hongwu declared that succession to the throne would be by primogeniture, from eldest son to eldest son, so that the Ming could avoid the battles for succession that had beset the ­Mongol Yuan. In a significant departure from preceding dynasties, Hongwu then established a network of noble hereditary domains across the empire for the rest of the male clansmen and their progeny, with the intent that they would provide a loyal bulwark of security. In establishing this system, the emperor saw himself as restoring the political order of the ancient Zhou dynasty.

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Within these domains, primogeniture was again the rule of succession, with the younger offspring granted lesser titles and domains of their own. These ever-growing enfeoffed estates dotted much of the landscape of the empire, and by 1600, there were over 100,000 claimants to descent from the founder. The emperor was uncertain about his designs for the imperial clan and therefore revised the “Ancestral Admonitions” several times. His plans for stable rule by a succession of emperors and a bulwark of imperial clansmen began to falter even in his own lifetime. ­Malfeasance and criminal behavior were reported in some of the princely establishments, and this was complicated by the fact that the emperor had placed these establishments outside the purview of the legal authorities of the realm. Some of these princes, such as Zhu Youdun 朱有燉) (1379–1439) and Zhu Quan 朱權 (1378–1448), established themselves as men of culture and learning. The former was a noted dramatist, calligrapher and painter. The latter had widely ranging interests in horticulture, music, drama, literature and history, as well as an impressive grasp of Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist teachings. Other princes, however, abused the power and wealth that was granted them, preying upon the populace who had little recourse. The idealized pattern of succession was troubled as well. The first crisis came when Zhu Biao, the first heir-apparent, died unexpectedly of illness in 1392. After some debate, the founder declared that the throne would then pass to his oldest grandson. Within two years of the founder’s own death in 1398, the tensions between the clansmen erupted into civil war, as the powerful prince assigned to the state of Yan (the environs around modern B ­ eijing) marshaled his military forces and launched an attack that ultimately placed him on the throne as the Yongle emperor (r. 1403–24). After his military victory, the new emperor rewrote the records of his father to legitimate his own succession and eliminated his nephew’s reign from the historical records. Yongle’s grandson, the new Xuande emperor (r. 1426–35), faced a similar coup in 1426 by his uncle Zhu Gaoxu (1380–1429), Yongle’s second son, ­a lthough this was quickly put down. The ascent of the eight-year-old Zhengtong emperor (r. 1436–49) to the throne in 1435 brought a problem to the court, for there were no provisions in the “Ancestral Admonitions” for the enthronement of a minor. Under the guidance of the empress dowager Zhang, an uneasy regency was established among the leading civil, military and eunuch officials at the court. From this point on, tensions between civil officials and eunuchs remained a flashpoint in the politics of the dynasty. Succession was again a problem in 1449, when the Zhengtong emperor was captured as he led an ill-advised campaign against the Oirat Mongols. Court officials quickly placed the Prince of Cheng, the emperor’s half-brother, on the throne as the Jingtai emperor (r. 1450–56). This solution became complicated, however, when Zhengtong was released the following year and returned to the capital. Jingtai refused to cede the throne, appointing his own son as heir-apparent. Finally, in 1457, when Jingtai was mortally ill, a hasty and bloodless palace coup restored Zhengtong to the throne with the new title of Tianshun (r. 1457–64). In the Chenghua reign (1465–87), the establishment of an heir became a matter of dramatic intrigue and contention among his wives. Despite the efforts of the founder to ensure an ordered structure to his family and a clear protocol of succession, such problems plagued the imperial clan. These crises of succession and tensions with the princely domains presaged further political disruptions in the sixteenth century.

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The Ming military The Ming founder was a warrior at heart with a close affinity to those who had fought alongside him in his rise to power. In the 1370s, his leading generals were awarded hereditary noble titles and revenue from grants of land in gratitude. Several family members of these military figures were intermarried with the imperial clan, forging close alliances. These men were placed in charge of the military campaigns that continued after the dynasty was founded. Sichuan was conquered in 1371. In 1372, Ming campaigns deep into Mongolia were halted, bringing an end to territorial expansion in the north. To the south, the nonHan territory of Yunnan was brought under tenuous Ming control in 1382. Soldiers in the Ming armies were drawn from families that were assigned a hereditary military obligation to provide men to serve in the military. These families were therefore not subject to the tax and corvée obligations of ordinary civilians. Under the weisuo 衛所 system, garrisons around the empire were intended to be largely self-sufficient military colonies, provisioned by large farms. The majority of those assigned to the garrisons worked on the farms, while the rest served in military capacities. In the 1390s, the top echelons of the military were crippled in a series of purges launched by the increasingly suspicious and capricious Hongwu. He charged several leading generals with sedition, implicating large numbers of their associates. Numerous experienced men were executed or removed from their command. Some historians have argued that these purges had a lasting debilitating effect upon the imperial armies, leading to their defeat in the civil war with Yongle’s forces from the north. The Yongle emperor reconfigured the military posture of the Ming Empire in several ways. He removed the independent military guards assigned to the princely domains, his own usurpation having proven the dangers of princes accruing too much power against the throne. Over the course of his reign, the capital was moved to Beijing, leaving Nanjing as a secondary capital. This move signaled a more intensive engagement with the northern frontier than that of the Hongwu emperor. A significant portion of the military forces was stationed around Beijing, redirected there from Nanjing and from the princely establishments. To consolidate resources and shorten military supply lines, Yongle dismantled the garrisons that his father had established in the steppe (with the exception of those in Manchuria), re-establishing them further south. A military man like his father, Yongle personally led a series of five costly campaigns onto the northern steppe to further assert Ming authority. As part of his expansive vision of the empire, Yongle also followed the earlier Mongol attempt to incorporate Vietnam into the empire, sending large numbers of troops to the south. Yongle’s military endeavors took a significant toll on the imperial treasury, and his leading officials frequently petitioned him to reduce the scale of these campaigns. Although the military garrisons were intended to be self-sufficient, the productivity of the military farms required significant supplements of grain requisitioned from throughout the realm. In order to provision his garrisons and to feed the new capital at Beijing, Yongle ordered the refurbishment of the Grand Canal that had fallen into neglect over the previous century. The weisuo system of military colonies declined quickly in the decades after Yongle’s death. Desertion and deterioration of the military farms led to shortages of manpower and a further burden of grain taxes. In 1427, financial pressures led to the decision to abandon the conquest of Vietnam. Ming control over Yunnan remained tenuous with tribal uprisings that disrupted the imperial administration. Large military campaigns in the 1440s were dispatched to the region. While these operations succeeded to a degree, the region remained restive well into the sixteenth century. 252

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Yongle’s decision to withdraw the line of northern military garrisons had long-term consequences for the defenses of the dynasty. Without the powerful leadership and campaigns of the Yongle emperor, the capital at Beijing was more vulnerable to attack from the north. Fortified though it was, the city was surrounded by the forces of the Mongol Oirat in 1449 after the disastrous capture of the Zhengtong emperor. The loss of the emperor and the siege of the capital were clear signals that the era of expansion of the Ming Empire had come to an end and that the military would maintain a defensive posture. Concerns about the northern border (Beijing was once again under siege a hundred years later) led to the expansion and fortification of the northern boundary and the rebuilding of the Great Wall in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Aside from these tensions along the northern border, the fifteenth century saw several large-scale internal uprisings that taxed the military resources of the empire. A rebellion among the Yao aboriginal peoples engulfed several provinces in the south in the 1460s, requiring several tens of thousands of troops to suppress it. Disturbances among the Yao, Miao and other minority peoples remained a persistent problem over the course of the dynasty and beyond. One of the largest internal rebellions took place in northeastern Huguang (modern Hubei province) from 1465 to 1476. This restive region had been destabilized by an influx of refugees from other parts of the empire. The ensuing insurrections required several largescale military interventions, until the area was finally pacified by administrative reorganization, land reallocation and relief from tax burdens.

Eunuch staff In earlier dynasties, eunuchs were often employed within the imperial palace to attend to the needs of the imperial clan. Otherwise, areas of the palace where court women resided were off-limits to men outside the imperial family. In the past, notably in the Han and the Tang dynasties, eunuchs had been known to exploit their position as palace insiders to develop their own power bases. With their special access to the court, eunuchs were often regarded with suspicion and contempt by the scholarly elite, and therefore historical sources were strongly biased against them. The Ming founder was suspicious of their potential influence and restricted their employment. Beginning in the Yongle reign, however, eunuchs were increasingly employed to carry out special tasks on behalf of the emperor and his family, particularly in the areas of foreign diplomacy and the imperial household revenue, but also in the supervision of state-owned operations (such as the famous porcelain kilns at ­Jingdezhen) and in the military. Eunuchs were entrusted with the directorship of several important agencies, including the notorious Eastern Depot (Dongchang 東廠), charged with investigating and incarcerating those deemed to be a threat to the court. One of the most famous of eunuchs in the early Ming was Zheng He (1371–1433), who was appointed as admiral of the fleet to explore the Indian Ocean in a series of six voyages between 1405 and 1433, personally representing the Yongle emperor at courts along the way and collecting tribute. Some eunuchs rose to significant heights of power and influence as close confidants of the emperor forging powerful relationships within the court, the military and the bureaucracy. In the fifteenth century, Wang Zhen was the most famous of these, a scholar who underwent castration to serve as a teacher in the palace. From the influential post of Director of Ceremonial (sili jian 司禮監), he played a major role in the regency of the young Zhengtong emperor, dominating the court with influential ties in the military and civil administration. 253

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It was under his guidance that Zhengtong personally led his disastrous military campaign against the Oirat Mongols in 1449, leading to the capture of the emperor and the death of Wang himself. Over the course of subsequent reigns, eunuchs continued to exert significant influence at court and across the administration. The eunuch-led Directorate of Ceremonial controlled the imperial household staff and oversaw most written communication between the emperor and the bureaucracy. Eunuchs often forged close alliances with powerful palace women, the grandmothers, mothers and wives of emperors who played a significant role behind the scene. They frequently served as important go-betweens negotiating imperial patronage of Buddhist and Daoist temples. The eunuch directors of the Eastern Depot, and later the similar Western Depot (Xichang 西廠), wielded considerable powers of surveillance and ­punishment over their political enemies. And eunuchs entrusted with oversight of the imperial household treasury were granted the authority to collect special taxes across the empire and to oversee tributary transactions from foreign countries. Civil officials within the  bureaucracy often forged working alliances with members of the emperor’s eunuch staff, although many resented their dominance at court and across the realm, criticizing their abuses in scathing memorials to the throne and in lurid stories circulated among the reading public.

The scholar elite and civil administration Elite society in the early Ming was heavily invested in scholarly learning, continuing traditions that had developed in Song times (960–1279), when the Confucian civil service examination system developed as the primary route to government service and social advancement. The examination system ended with the fall of the Song in 1279 and was restored on a small scale by the Mongols in 1315. Nevertheless, South China saw a proliferation of private academies in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Much of this learning was centered upon the Neo-Confucian scholarship that emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with a focus on individual moral autonomy that was based upon scholarly pursuit and ritual practice. However, this Neo-Confucian conservatism was tempered by a range of eclectic interests throughout much of elite society, and among those recruited into the early Ming court were specialists in Buddhism, Daoism, medicine and art, as well as practical men with skills and experience in law, warfare and governance. In biographies of members of the elite, men were often praised for their literary skills, their administrative talents and their breadth of learning. In many cases, women were honored for their learning as well and especially for the guidance and direction of their children. In more conservative circles, wives were praised for practicing Confucian virtue, even though they remained unlearned. Elite communities in the early Ming had been strained by the harsh economic conditions of the mid-fourteenth century and disrupted by the warfare of contending forces in the collapse of the Yuan dynasty. Some scholars chose to serve under local strongmen and warlords, while others sought to remain in seclusion, writing or teaching. Writers noted the destruction of academies and libraries in the wars and battles of the fourteenth century and complained of the difficulty of acquiring, borrowing and copying books. The early Ming was a low point in the trajectory of Chinese publishing, and the production of new volumes was greatly limited. While a few private publishers existed, the court dominated the cultural resources of the empire. The library of the Secretariat (neige 內閣) in the Forbidden City was the most extensive book collection in the realm. 254

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Restoring the civil service examination system As the Ming founder began to assemble a bureaucracy, he did so with a profound distrust for civil officials, based upon the exploitation and abuse of power that he saw in the rural misery and abject poverty of his youth. Throughout his reign, he wrestled with the problem of how to train and discipline an effective governing bureaucracy. Initially, he relied upon a system of recommendation to recruit scholars into his service. In the early years of the dynasty, he established a system of government schools across the empire and restored the civil service examination system, with the first triennial imperial examinations taking place in 1371. The Neo-Confucian curriculum was chosen as the basis for the examinations, as the emperor was persuaded that these teachings would draw the upright, moral and competent from among the scholarly community. Frustrated with the results of the examinations and suspicious of those who served, he cancelled the examinations in 1373 and returned to a system of recommendations. The examinations were restored again in 1385 and continued with few interruptions until 1905.

Court-sponsored projects The Ming founder and his descendants followed the precedent of earlier dynasties by engaging literati in large-scale literary enterprises. Early in his reign, Hongwu arranged for the compilation of the Yuan dynastic history, a compendium of phonetic standards and numerous collections of moral admonishments from historical precedents. After his usurpation of the throne, the Yongle emperor made extensive overtures to the literati community by dramatically expanding the scope of these imperial projects, commissioning the compilation of editions of the Confucian classics with authoritative commentaries and a compendium of Neo-Confucian writings. These were printed and distributed to schools across the realm for use in the civil service examination curriculum. He also ordered the compilation of the largest print encyclopedia in world history, the Yongle dadian 永樂大典, or Great Compendium of the Yongle Era, in 11,095 volumes completed in 1408. These projects required the recruitment of thousands of scholars from across the realm. Yongle’s primary wife, Empress Xu (1362–1407), similarly commissioned works, including a set of biographies of virtuous women, a book of women’s admonitions and a collection of moral stories gleaned from history. Yongle’s grandson, the Xuande emperor (r. 1426–35) commissioned the production of the Wulun shu 五倫書, or Book of the Five Relationships, a 62-chapter collection of historical anecdotes illuminating the cultivation of Confucian moral virtues, completed in 1447. And in 1461, a vast empire-wide gazetteer, the Da Ming yitongzhi 大明一統志, the Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Ming, was completed.

Abolition of the secretariat In 1380, the emperor grew suspicious that his grand counselor, Hu Weiyong 胡惟庸, the pinnacle figure in the civil bureaucracy, was plotting to overthrow him. After executing the counselor and thousands associated with him, Hongwu decided to eliminate the central administrative apparatus that he inherited from the Mongol Yuan: the secretariat, the central military command and the central censorate office. He left instructions that there would be no more grand counselors in the Ming, a change that left the bureaucracy without an official head and a coordinating center. The emperor intended these maneuvers as measures to consolidate his own power over the government, but the effect was to destabilize and 255

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weaken the bureaucracy. The emperor’s fears and suspicions of his officials led him to make repeated changes to the institutions of the government. Over time, Hongwu eventually drew upon a few trusted top-level officials of the bureaucracy to advise him as “grand secretaries” ­(daxueshi 大學士). This informal body gradually became formalized in the subsequent decades, providing guidance to the sovereign and functioning as a central liaison between him and the bureaucracy. The continuing escalation of Hongwu’s paranoia and caprice in his last years disrupted and endangered the lives and careers of the scholar elite class, both inside and outside of the bureaucracy. The Jianwen reign (1399–1402) of Hongwu’s grandson appears to have been a little more amenable to the civil officials who served him, but his reign was short-lived and became embroiled in civil war less than two years after the founder’s death. The war once again took a severe toll on the literati community, with significant numbers of officials at all levels of the government facing persecution, many opting to die resisting Yongle or to go into hiding.

Stabilizing civil government The Yongle emperor inherited his father’s bad temper, imprisoning or executing some court officials who offended him, but his reign generally brought a degree of stability and order to civil government. A collection of talented officials was appointed to prominence, several of them remaining in post until the 1440s, offering thoughtful guidance to emperors of four reigns. These men oversaw the appointment of talented and capable officials in the bureaucracy, and also played a dominant role in the literary culture of the day. The “Chancellery” literary style (taigeti 臺閣體) of these leading court statesmen in the first decades of the fifteenth century epitomized many of the literati values and ideals of that era. Chancellery referred to a writing style of urbane and polished elegance that valorized the emperor and his court in florid classical allusions. The hallmark of such writing included the poems and pieces written to commemorate events at court, often commissioned by the emperor himself. By the mid-fifteenth century, the civil service became further regularized. Whereas recommendation had played a significant role in recruitment in the early years of the dynasty, the examination system now became the only route to an important civil service career. The examinations became increasingly competitive, with total quotas of more than 100,000 graduates at the provincial examination level, vying for positions in a bureaucracy of 15,000 to 25,000. With the increased pressure of competition, the prescribed examination essays became more formulaic. The famous “eight-legged essay” came to predominate from the last decades of the fifteenth century onward, a very precise form in which arguments were developed in a highly rigid sequence of “legs.” While this essay form had a straitening effect upon the culture of the examinations, it also cultivated generations of writers of supreme literary discipline and talent.

Diversifying culture The middle of the fifteenth century saw gradual improvements in the economy and the restoration of literati communities, especially in the south. Greater resources and increasing participation in the examinations led to increased literacy and the beginning of an expanded publishing industry that came to dominate Ming culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With these developments, literati culture began to shift away from the court-­ centered focus of the early Ming, toward a more diverse array of cultural centers, especially 256

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in the wealthier areas of the lower Yangzi River region, in cities like Nanjing, Suzhou and Hangzhou. The polished chancellery style fell out of fashion, giving way to a wider range of poetry and prose styles, many favoring more personal and authentic sentiments and more vernacular diction. By the end of the fifteenth century, early editions of the famous popular novel, Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi 三國演義) were published, along with chantefable that drew upon popular dramatic traditions. The use of vernacular language signaled not only a shift in stylistic preferences, but also a broadening readership beyond the scholarly community narrowly trained for the examinations. Such popular literature was often advertised as suitable reading material for ordinary men and women. The publication and circulation of “miscellaneous jottings” (biji 筆記) or notebooks filled with anecdotes, gossip and ranging observations testify to a growing public readership with diverse interests. Scholarship of the late fifteenth century expanded beyond the limited resources and scale of the early years of the dynasty. The official records of the court were supplemented and often challenged by independent writings on political events and personalities. Historiography and statecraft emerged as increasingly important topics. As later Ming rulers lacked the forceful vision, effectiveness and charisma of the Hongwu and Yongle emperors, scholars wrote extensively on Confucian ideals of rulership and statecraft, examining and analyzing historical precedents. The most famous such work was Qiu Jun’s 邱浚 (1421–95) large Supplement to the Expanded Meaning of the Great Learning (Daxue yanyi bu 大學衍義補), completed in 1487, which built upon the writings of the influential Song-dynasty statecraft scholar Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 (1178–1235). Qiu’s work combined an emphasis on the moral cultivation of the ruler with an extensive explication of practical knowledge of political protocols and institutions. The later fifteenth century saw increasing challenges to the Song dynasty Neo-Confucian teachings upon which the civil service examinations were based, paving the way for more diversified interpretations of doctrine.

Ming society and economy Population estimates are difficult for the Ming dynasty. The population of the empire was roughly 60–80 million around the time of its founding, significantly lower than the estimates for the Song and Yuan dynasties that preceded it, a testament to the ravages of warfare, famine and disease in the fourteenth century. By 1500, the population had roughly doubled to somewhere between 135 and 155 million people, reflecting the relative stabilization of social and economic conditions over the course of the fifteenth century. The Ming founder sought to restore the pastoral fabric of the empire with low tax rates and tight constraints upon the size and structure of his institutions of government. The Yongle emperor, on the other hand, abandoned his father’s notions of fiscal austerity with costly projects like the move of the capital to Beijing and his military campaigns on the steppe and in Vietnam. The revenue for these ventures came not from increased taxes, but rather from direct requisitions and added surcharges upon the tax requirements, as well as expanded corvée obligations imposed on the populace. To facilitate the transfer of grain from the south to the new capital in Beijing, the Grand Canal was refurbished in 1415. Dredging and the addition of new locks made the canal operable again after decades of neglect and disuse. Yongle’s son and grandson sought to once again reduce government expenditures and to reduce the tax burden upon the populace. Peasants nevertheless sought ways to avoid or reduce their taxes, by attaching their lands to those of tax-exempt examination scholars or imperial domains, or by splitting households into smaller units. The tax allocation system was based upon land surveys conducted in 1386. No further surveys were conducted, meaning that 257

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over time, the tax system became increasingly detached from the actual land-tenure arrangements and the economic realities of the realm. The Hongwu emperor also devoted considerable effort to the structure and regulation of local society. People were organized into communities (li) of 110 households. The most prosperous 10 households were appointed as community-heads (lizhang 里長), each over a neighborhood ( jia 甲) of 10 households. Community-heads were charged with keeping order and with the collection and delivery of taxes. The emperor intended that local society be self-governing, and in his last year, he promulgated a “Placard of Instructions for the People” ( Jiaomin bangwen 教民榜文), to be posted in communities throughout the realm. Community-heads were to memorize the items on the placard, which exhorted moral rectitude, urged the resolution of local conflict and crime and warned against corruption and malfeasance by villages or by the officials who oversaw them. There is much debate about the actual implementation and effectiveness of the lijia 里甲 system and the impact of imperial regulations on local society. Clearly the Ming court did not have the power or the resources to impose such a rigid order upon the populace, and certainly local conditions and power structures shaped its implementation. By the late fifteenth century, writers complained about the fracturing of local society and reformers attempted to restore order through community compacts and other types of instructional innovations. In the mid-fifteenth century, agricultural life in Ming China was further disrupted by a series of global climate fluctuations, leading to large-scale regional famines, droughts, floods and plagues from the 1430s to the 1460s. These disasters led to large-scale remissions of taxes by the court and the provision of relief measures to devastated parts of the empire. Conditions improved in the latter decades of the century, although environmental problems persisted. The Yellow River flooded severely on several occasions over the course of the century, causing repeated bursting of its dykes and significant loss of life and destruction across the countryside. In the 1490s, the court directed considerable resources toward the ­redirection of the river and the construction of further reinforced dykes along its banks.

Textiles and growing monetization The fifteenth century saw some trends toward the expansion of interregional markets. The restoration of the Grand Canal, for example, allowed for the movement of some private mercantile goods between the north and the south. The Yangzi River was also an important ­corridor for trade. Textile production began to expand in the lower Yangzi River region over the course of the fifteenth century, with expanded cultivation of cotton and silk. During this period, the production process became increasingly specialized, as cultivators increasingly sold their raw materials in the market, rather than weaving it themselves as earlier generations had done. This specialization drew farmers and craftsmen further into a monetized economy. Cotton cloth had been part of the tax obligation for the region for decades, but by the 1480s, tax officials were beginning to accept payments in silver instead. Demand for cotton and silk products continued to grow, and textile production continued to expand in other regions as well. These developments set the stage for the extensive expansion of the Ming economy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

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The maturation of Ming society Population growth By the sixteenth century, Ming dynasty China had grown into a thriving and populous realm. The disease and warfare that had marked its founding generation was far in the past, and the long peace, disturbed only by a small number of localized revolts, ensured a sustained recovery. Not since the Song dynasty, at least, had China enjoyed such growth and prosperity; and one contemporary observer, a well-traveled governor who had reflected much on China’s demographics, believed the Ming situation to be unprecedented: “During a period of 240 years when peace and plenty in general have reigned,” he wrote, “people have no longer known what war is like. Population has grown so much that it is entirely without parallel in history.” Though household registers compiled by the Ming government notoriously underreported population (for local officials were loath to note any increase in population that might have added to their taxation responsibilities), it is generally accepted that China’s population more than doubled over the course of the Ming, from around 65 million at the time of the founding to at least 130 million by 1600, and it may even have reached 150 million. It is easy to imagine symptoms of “overpopulation” in such numbers, and references in Ming sources to infanticide and vagrancy might reinforce notions of population pressure and scarcity of food. However, the fact remains that no amount of occasional dearth or natural disaster was sufficient to alter China’s course of steady population growth. Even the incidence of vagrancy can be taken as evidence not of a scarcity of food but of a surplus of it, for China’s floating population was able to bring new acreage under cultivation or simply to remain landless and to rely on others to produce food. In either case, it is clear that the agricultural sector became productive enough to excuse more and more people from participation in it and to continue to support them nonetheless. The essential increase in productivity resulted from a more extensive use of different crops and farming techniques that had fueled population growth in the past and would do so again in the future. Chief among the relatively new strains of crops was early-ripening rice, called Champa rice for its origin in that Indo-Chinese country. Champa rice had 259

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been introduced to China during the Song dynasty, but its planting had been limited to the Yangzi River valley. During the Ming, the cultivation of Champa rice spread to the Huai River area and to upland Nanjing Province (present-day Anhui), as well as to Huguang Province (modern Hunan and Hubei), which became the leading food-producing region of the empire. Requiring less water than native strands, Champa rice could thrive in these higher elevations, in paddies fed only by a spring or by rain and not necessarily by a river. This greater adaptability enabled Chinese rice agriculture to expand beyond the lowland regions where it had traditionally been confined. In addition to bringing more land under cultivation, the use of Champa rice also opened up more months of the year to cultivation. As it ripened early – in as few as 60 days after transplantation from nursery to paddy, as opposed to the earlier norm of 150 days – it was, at the least, ready to eat earlier, sparing the farmer from going hungry while waiting for later crops to come in. More significantly, the early harvesting of Champa rice left enough time for a second planting of some kind in the same fields, a practice commonly known as “double-cropping.” Either a winter crop such as wheat could be sown, or another seeding of rice could be attempted. By the turn of the seventeenth century, double-cropping and even triple-cropping were common. Other experiments in agriculture yielded further arithmetic growth. Dry agriculture, based on wheat and barley and other crops, was gradually disseminated from North China to central and southern regions, in some cases supplementing rice agriculture there, resulting in greater diversification and sophistication. Finally, toward the end of the dynasty, American crops such as peanuts, maize, and sweet potatoes began to appear. The Portuguese introduced the peanut around 1516, and it began to be cultivated in the lower Yangzi region, near Shanghai. Maize became somewhat common in southwest China, and the sweet potato showed up in Yunnan and Fujian. The American crops permitted the exploitation of hills and mountains that were too dry even for Champa rice, and they also increased the productivity of sandy areas that had never been much good for farming of any kind. In sum, the development of China’s agricultural base during the Ming dynasty laid a sound foundation for continuous population growth throughout the period. The general sufficiency of food permitted not only the increase of the population’s numbers but also the broadening of the scope of the population’s endeavors. The vibrancy, the richness, and the novelty of Ming life proceeded apace from the agricultural and demographic revolution.

The development of commerce The Ming minister and economic theorist Qiu Jun 邱浚 (1420–1495) wrote that as little as 30 percent of the population grew their own grain, leaving 70 percent to rely on others, via the market, for food. The modern historian Timothy Brook suspects that Qiu was exaggerating things a bit, out of concern that over-reliance on the market exposed the non-­producers to potentially catastrophic disruptions of the food delivery network. That such a network existed, however, was an acknowledged fact. Based on the transportation infrastructure established in the early Ming, the interconnected market of grain and other commodities became national in scale. With the provinces of Huguang and Guangxi producing most of the empire’s grain, the populations of other regions soon turned to textile production; yet even the latter became regionally specialized, with Shandong and Henan provinces contributing raw cotton, and households in the Jiangnan region (meaning “south of the River” or the lower Yangzi valley) weaving these into finished fabrics. In fact, Jiangnan seems to have changed its regional specialty more than once over the course of the dynasty, as rice production gave way to cotton production – so much confidence did Jiangnan residents have in imported food 260

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that they abandoned their paddy irrigation works – and as cotton production then gave way to textile finishing. The process did not really end there, for some Jiangnan farmers took the plunge into sericulture (silk production), devoting their fields entirely to mulberry bushes (silkworms eat mulberry leaves). Brook describes this system as a true commodity economy, for the people involved were not simply selling occasional surpluses. They were producing entirely for the market. Supplementing the internal regional trade upon which this specialized market system was based was a growing foreign trade. Seafaring merchants from Fujian Province plied trade routes to Southeast Asia, where they sought spices and sappanwood (a medicinal plant also used as a dye). The trade was lucrative and consequently a bit lawless and dangerous, ­especially after Portuguese traders sought to dominate the sea lanes by force. The Ming government outlawed foreign trade for much of the sixteenth century, though it continued illegally, catalyzing the problem of “Japanese” piracy, which was really a transnational phenomenon, in which rogue traders operated along the coasts and sometimes raided inland. By the time outside trade was legalized again (in 1567), the Portuguese had been granted a treaty port at Macao, and the Spanish had consolidated their empire in the Philippines and begun trading with the Chinese at Manila. Ming China soon became part of a sophisticated world trade system, to which China contributed exotic foods, live animals, furniture, porcelain (which became known to outsiders as “china”), metal work, gunpowder, a plethora of textiles and fabrics, and a nearly endless catalogue of miscellaneous produce. In return, the Chinese imported South American and Japanese silver, one of the few commodities they wanted, but one that they sorely needed, for unminted silver was becoming the chief measure of value in China, used as the leading means of exchange for expensive purchases and for paying taxes. The foreign silver pouring into China attests to the tremendous productivity of its domestic economy, which obviously created enough material wealth to satisfy native demand first. Jacques Gernet has written that Chinese silk could be sold in Japan at five to six times its Chinese price, highlighting this general reality. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Chinese cities and towns became bustling emporia in which nearly everything seemed to be for sale, not only goods like textiles, foods, curios, artworks, and books, but also services like storytelling, music-making, and other forms of entertaining. Fashion and style emerged as commodities too, as the newly wealthy consulted various manuals of taste, to determine what luxuries should be acquired and how they should be displayed to the best advantage. Late-Ming China was fabulously opulent. It is clear that its inhabitants were a prosperous people.

The effects of money on society The participation of more and more people in China’s market economy made their separation into discrete social categories quite difficult. The traditional conception of Chinese society as consisting of four tiers – scholars, peasants, artisans, and merchants, in descending order of moral purity – had never been more than a vague nostalgia, though a persistent one. By the sixteenth century, at the latest, Chinese society had become extremely complex, as every citizen played a specialized part in economic life, such as rice farmer, cotton weaver, and book publisher. At the same time, though, all the members of this complex social ­system, in the performance of their myriad tasks, sought a single, simple, reward – money – which had the effect of reducing them uniformly, as Adam Smith later theorized, to the status of merchant. Everyone was also a consumer, graded on no formal social scale but only by the amount of his cash on hand, his ability to consume. When Wang Shizhen 王世貞 261

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(1526–1590) listed the elites of Jiangnan and of Shanxi Province by income level and not by any other criteria such as pedigree, record of government service, or cultural attainment, he was recognizing a society that was based on money and nothing else. (The fact that Wang was not too happy with such a reality will be dealt with later.) There were three chief ways in which money worked to dissolve, or at least to lower, all identifiable social barriers in the late Ming. The first was by encouraging conspicuous consumption itself. The second was by providing the literacy and education that enabled individuals to enter the scholar-official elite. The third was by encouraging newly wealthy persons to appropriate the cultural repertoire of the elite, without formally entering its ranks.

Conspicuous consumption Wealth became increasingly visible in the sixteenth century, owing to the non-enforcement of sumptuary laws that had been designed to keep wealth from becoming a measure of social status. Whereas earlier in the dynasty the state had greater success in prescribing simple styles for commoners and regulating the dress of officials according to rank, in later years, the incidence of civilian and official dress transgression increased. Some evidence suggests that sumptuary discipline began to go lax among officials first, as they began to sport colors and emblems they were not entitled to wear. Encouraging this misbehavior was the Jiajing emperor (r. 1522–1567), who often bestowed inappropriate attire upon his favorites. Soon, the tendency to overdress became general. It was reported from the marketplaces of Yangzhou in the 1570s that “Brokers and the common run of insignificant and base people wear gentry hats, while actors, lictors, bankrupts, and peddlers wear courtiers’ shoes.” In the Songjiang area, meanwhile, “Everyone, no matter whether rich or poor, has used horsehair [hats]. The prices are…very cheap.” The “extravagance of custom” in Songjiang 松江 extended also to furniture, as “Every family, though they be servants or errand boys, have used fine wood pieces.” As a result, it was no longer possible to tell anyone’s social class from his appearance or from the furnishing of his house.

The entrance of the newly wealthy into the official class Money could also propel commoners formally into the official class. Ming officials were chosen by a set of civil service examinations, based on the Confucian canon. Those able to afford a Confucian education, therefore, found official careers theoretically within reach. “There can be little doubt,” wrote the historian Ping-ti Ho, “that traditional Chinese society considered entry into the ruling bureaucracy the final goal of upward social mobility.” In addition to prestige, official status simply conferred too many practical advantages to be ignored. Perhaps the most significant of these advantages was a partial exemption from taxation that greatly facilitated the consolidation of land. The fact that China’s hybrid scholar-official elite were often prominent landowners as well has led both contemporary and modern observers to describe them as “gentry.” No fewer than three academic milestones – the securing of stipendiary student status (shengyuan 生員), the winning of the provincial ( juren 舉人) degree, and the earning of the metropolitan ( jinshi 進士) degree – generally marked the path to power, affluence, and social importance. A family of reasonable means would select one of its sons to pursue an education and sit for the exams, while its other members would carry on with business as usual. If this son did not reach the metropolitan level quickly or at all, his family would have to content itself with his stipendiary or provincial status for a while, hoping that its basic privileges 262

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(such as the aforementioned tax shelter) might make education more affordable for a later generation. One Ming writer compared this process vividly to the turning of a wheel, with its alternating spokes representing the successive generations of a striving family, alternately engaged in commerce and study. The metaphor characterizes Ming families as occupational combines, with different members dedicated to money-making or scholarly or official pursuits. It also suggests that several generations – several turns of the wheel – would often be required for a family to reach its goal of power and prestige. Ping-ti Ho’s authoritative study, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, found that the Ming dynasty “created a chapter of social mobility probably unparalleled in Chinese history,” with a high proportion of metropolitan degree winners coming from families who had never (in three generations) achieved even stipendiary status. Ho did note that, toward the end of the sixteenth century, the proportion of new blood in each metropolitan cohort began to trend lower, as “members of successful families naturally had various competitive advantages [to help them] prevail over the humble and poor in the competitive examination.” Still, though, when families who had earned only stipendiary status (for three prior generations) are added into the mix, Ho’s statistics show that the proportion of new blood in each cohort of metropolitan degree winners never fell below 41.6 percent, through the end of the dynasty. In these relative terms, the Ming ruling class was astonishingly open. Ho attributed this high rate of social mobility to the widely prolific publishing industry, which made classics and reference books readily available to anyone with money, as well as to the institution of private educational academies, which likewise enjoyed tremendous growth in the Ming. Ho also credited the individualist and popular philosophy of Wang Shouren 王守仁 (a.k.a. Wang Yangming 王陽明, 1472–1529), which will be discussed immediately.

The popularization of philosophy and culture The most influential philosopher of the Ming dynasty, Wang Yangming, was a fully accredited official, who passed the metropolitan exam in 1499. His approach to the Confucian philosophy tended to reduce emphasis on the external investigation of principle and to encourage instead the recognition and cultivation of the moral knowledge inherent in each individual. “How can the signs of sagehood be recognized?” Wang asked. “If one clearly perceives one’s own innate knowledge, then one recognizes that the signs of sagehood do not exist in the sage but in oneself.” Indeed, sagehood might theoretically be found anywhere. “If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong,” Wang made clear, although they have come from the mouth of Confucius, I dare not accept them as correct. How much less those from people inferior to Confucius! If words are examined in the mind and found to be correct, although they have come from the mouth of ordinary people, I dare not regard them as wrong. How much less those of Confucius! One of the ordinary people who claimed to speak with the authority of Confucius was Wang Gen 王艮 (1483–1540), a salt merchant who never sat for the civil service exam. He studied the classics while on business trips, and later, as his economic situation improved and required less of his attention, made time to study and ponder in private. A visit to Confucius’s tomb in Qufu 曲阜 convinced Wang of the Sage’s accessible, human nature; soon Wang began dressing and traveling by cart like Confucius, claiming to have a special insight into Confucius’s teaching. Significantly, he inserted himself into the scheme of the transmission of sagely lore, bestowing upon himself an anointed, nearly holy status. As he inscribed above 263

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his door, “My teaching comes down through [the ancient sage kings], the Duke of Zhou, and Confucius. To anyone who earnestly seeks it, whether he be young or old, high or low, wise or ignorant, I shall pass it on.” While many laughed at the presumption, many others were intrigued by his rather populist message. In his hometown of Taizhou 泰州, Wang attracted a number of disciples (for which reason, his following is known as the Taizhou School), and he also traveled around, addressing the assembled crowds on his philosophy. Wang Gen’s practice of drawing large audiences to hear Confucian discourse went by the name of jiangxue 講學, and it was an extremely important historical phenomenon, copied by many. The literal translation of jiangxue, “lecture and discussion,” is very inadequate at capturing its truer essence as a mass gathering, rally, or movement. Considering also its charismatic leadership and tendency toward spiritual enthusiasm, “evangelism” is probably the best way to express the full meaning of jiangxue in English. Wang Gen did in fact see himself as a prophet saving the world, reporting to have dreamed that he literally kept the sky from falling, transforming a people crazy with panic to one nearly crazy with joy and gratitude. Jiangxue evangelism symbolized the new inclusiveness of Ming society, as well as the infiltration of commoners into philosophical and cultural realms heretofore dominated by scholar-officials. A description (though not a first-hand one) survives of an enthusiastic gathering presided over by Han Zhen, a potter and associate of Wang Gen’s brother: Farmers, craftsmen, and merchants amounting to more than a thousand, they all came to study under him. In the autumn, during the slack season for farming operations, he traveled to village after village, gathering all students and discussing philosophy with them. [Wherever he gathered a crowd,] the sound of book-chanting was spontaneous; one started saying [the words] at the front, and the others picked them up at the back. The wider implications of jiangxue will be discussed more fully later. As for the themes of individualism and subjectivity also suggested by Wang Yangming, they were fully realized in the person of Li Zhuowu 李卓吾 (a.k.a. Li Zhi 李贄, 1527–1602), who wrote, “What people consider right and wrong can never serve as a standard for me. Never from the start have I taken as right and wrong for myself what the world thinks right and wrong.” Those who attempted to impose any form of fixed standard were ignoring what Li called the “childlike mind” (what Wang Yangming might have called “innate knowledge”) and were therefore in Li’s eyes “phony men speaking phony words, doing phony things, writing phony writings.” What made them so phony was that they failed to admit that the true social relations currently prevailing – and prevailing among phonies as well – were material ones, which Li all but identified as those of the marketplace. As he explained in a personal letter, To wear clothing and eat food – these are the principles of human relations. Without them there are no human relations….The scholar should learn only what is real and unreal in respect to these relations and not impose other principles of human relations on top of them. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, things did not end well for Li Zhi. An officially incited mob burned him out of the temple where he lived in 1600, and two years later, he was accused by a central government official of publishing dangerous books, of questioning the judgments of ­Confucius, and of “inviting wives and daughters of respectable people to come to a temple to listen to his discourses – some of whom went so far as to bring bedding and pillows to spend the night there.” (This last part of the indictment should probably be taken with a grain of salt.) 264

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He was accordingly taken into custody. It is not clear whether he was formally tried, but he was certainly not tortured. Requesting a shaving razor, he sent the barber away, cut his own throat, and died two days later.

The question of reaction The suicide of the free-thinking Li Zhi may conjure up visions of a Chinese Socrates, bravely trying, and failing, to revolutionize a conservative, repressive regime. The analogy is problematic, for it seems that Li Zhi simply wanted to die before or because he got old, with as much heroism as possible, “just to give vent to my resentment,” as he said in a last statement. Nevertheless, since everything about the late Ming suggests a prosperous, socially mobile, and intellectually innovative civilization, the fact of its fractious collapse in 1644 might lead us to suspect that the Ming fell not merely in spite of this progress but because of it. Somehow, as this theory goes, Ming China just wasn’t able to metabolize those same incipient forms of progress that were transforming Western Europe at the same time. Instead, it proved almost allergic to them, and succumbed to an implosive convulsion of reaction. The theory is mostly false. The first aspect of it that can be ruled out is that of simple social reaction, for the Ming social revolution was never reversed. The reader will recall Ping-ti Ho’s assertion that new blood continued to permeate the elite for the duration of the dynasty. If this onslaught of new blood or new wealth was considered by anyone at the time to have been a problem, no practical solution was ever proposed. The late Ming period saw no craze for genealogies or for prefixing surnames with native places that would be evidence of a reactionary preoccupation with pedigree, and, emphatically, nothing like the class re-segregation or the revival of sumptuary regulations that occurred in Japan at the same time ever occurred in China. True, there was no shortage of curmudgeonly complaint about the nouveau riche in Ming China, but it only thinly camouflaged the nouveau origins of the complainers themselves and thus was only a hypocritical ritual common to every changing society in history. Wang Shizhen’s lamenting about the decadent influence of wealth on society did not prevent him from writing a eulogy of the merchant Xu Fu 許鈇, who Wang welcomed into the gentlemanly class on the grounds of his Confucian education and bearing; and lest Wang’s acceptance of social mobility seem too dependent on elitist Confucian trappings, it should be pointed out that others in the late Ming were more fully appreciative of social amalgamation on its own merits. Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道 (1568–1610) celebrated in his poem “Making Fun of Myself on People Day” what Katharine Burnett has called “the remarkable freedom and openness for social identification and cultural expression available to individuals in late Ming China”: This official wears no official sash, This farmer pushes no plow, This Confucian does not read books, This recluse does not live in the wilds. In society, he wears lotus leaves for clothes, Among commoners, he is decked out in cap and jade. His serenity is achieved without closing the door, His teaching is done without instruction. This Buddhist monk has long hair and whiskers, This Daoist immortal makes love to beautiful women. One moment, withering away in a silent forest, The next, bustling through crowds on city streets. When he sees flowers, he calls for singing girls: When he has wine to drink, he calls for a pair of dice.

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Harry Miller His body is as light as a cloud Floating above the Great Clod. Try asking the bird, flying in the air: “What clear pond reflects your image?” How free! the dragon, curling, leaping, Liberated, beyond this world or on it….1

The second argument against reaction in the late Ming is that the influence of Wang Yangming’s individualism was pervasive and was never eradicated. Of the copious superficial condemnation of Wang Yangming’s followers, there can be no doubt, but, as is the case with the upstart condemners of upstarts in the social realm, even the critics of Wang Yangming’s individualist doctrine displayed a remarkable propensity to indulge in it. He Liangjun 何良俊 (1506–1573), a gentleman of Songjiang Prefecture, criticized Wang’s thought as overly speculative and insufficiently grounded in the classics, but as a supposed antidote, he favored the bohemian and barely Confucian sensibilities of the Jin dynasty (265–420), an extremely unorthodox and idiosyncratic preference. The philosophers of the so-called Donglin movement, considered by modern scholars to have led a reaction against at least the excesses of Wang Yangming’s subjectivism, were nonetheless rather eclectic in their own beliefs, with founder Gu Xiancheng 顧憲成 (1550–1612) approving of Wang’s method of cultivation – “to realize the inborn knowledge” – and friend Gao Panlong 高攀龍 (1562–1626) believing himself to have experienced a sudden enlightenment, in spite of his more orthodox stress on cultivation. Of course, the blind follower of tradition is something of a straw man, for everyone must exercise at least some individual judgment as to which traditions to follow, but the point is that the late Ming thinkers, in spite of anything they might have said against Wang Yangming, Wang Gen, or Li Zhi, were all innovative and quirky philosophers themselves. Indeed, it could be said that Wang Yangming won the debate by opening it, for even someone such as Gu Xiancheng determined to oppose what he took to be the nihilism of Wang’s followers was more or less compelled to improvise, choosing his own truth to counter or coordinate with the truth of others. The third, related bit of evidence against reaction in the late Ming is the fact that, in spite of what happened to Li Zhi, China’s cultural and intellectual atmosphere remained vibrant and unrestrained. Late Ming painters exuberantly explored every frontier of their art, celebrating and never deploring the new freedoms. Nanjing-based Gong Xian 龔賢 (c. 1619–1689) boasted that Paintings by other artists are all of places where people have gone. They cannot paint places where no one has ever gone. This painting of mine greatly resembles a place where no one has ever gone – or at least, where people do not ordinarily go. Representing the fresh optimism of his age, Gong wrote, “The world has many wondrous and inaccessible places…. But it is not necessarily a matter of these very places actually existing in the world – anything that exists in the minds of artists also exists in the world.” In the realm of letters, the playwright and novelist (and publisher) Li Yu 李漁 (1610/11–1680, ­active mostly in the early Qing) was irrepressibly innovative and subversive. Weaving plots that gleefully inverted literary and moral stereotypes, Li urged his readers to “persistently seek the new, changing not only the things that can be changed but also tampering with those that absolutely must be preserved, in order to display their novelty.” Elsewhere, he declared, “I claim this merit – I haven’t copied the ancients,” and he evinced in general a striving, insatiable drive for novelty: “Not only is the work of past authors now obsolete, there is a 266

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gulf even in my own writing between what I wrote yesterday and what I am writing today.” In sum, there was no nostalgia for a simpler world in late Ming creative arts, nor was there any trace of repression. Given that no general reaction against social and intellectual progress occurred in the late Ming, it does seem, however, that the specific phenomenon of evangelical jiangxue was deemed threatening enough to elicit a response, first from the gentry class and then from the Ming state. The gentry resented the presence of commoners at the head of evangelical movements, for they seemed to be challenging the gentry for the position of social leadership. As Wang Shizhen summarized: During the Jiajing and Longqing eras (1522–1572), the proponents of jiangxue flourished throughout the land. They relied on their lectures and teachings to cover their gatherings as ‘heroic braves’ and used this image to indulge their perverse lusts. Their doctrines were fundamentally unable to move men [to the good], and their misguided intentions and presumptuousness led them to beat drums and blow horns, gathering and scattering as quickly as lightning, nearly leading men into the evils of the Yellow Turbans or Five Pecks of Rice [rebellions]. As it turned out, though, jiangxue was not allowed to develop as a populist movement, ­either a constructive or destructive one. Instead, it was co-opted by the official class, which employed it as a bureaucratic and grass-roots networking tool. The first master of this “political jiangxue” was the rising minister Xu Jie 徐階 (1503–1583), who staged a series of philosophical gatherings as a means of countering the influence of his powerful rival Yan Song 嚴嵩 (1480–1567). Supposedly ambivalent (or perhaps coy) about the exploitation of philosophical gatherings for political purposes, Xu sponsored annual or semi-annual gatherings of several hundreds of people, which would last for weeks or months, in the suburbs of Beijing, from the early 1550s to 1565, by which time Xu had become chief grand secretary (de facto prime minister). Naturally, Xu’s tactics aroused suspicion, with one contemporary calling it “grandstanding, greatly disruptive of government.” As though realizing he’d gone too far, Xu belatedly toned down his jiangxue activity, claiming distress at its tendency to promote cliques, but by then, the damage had been done. In 1570, the court prohibited local education officials from engaging in jiangxue themselves, in a move that seems to have been aimed at Xu Jie’s constituency. The issue, however, was far from settled, for Xu had introduced the specter of philosophical faction to late Ming government, and no one was ever able to exorcize it. The most notorious practitioners of political jiangxue after Xu Jie were the members of the socalled Donglin 東林 faction, led by Gu Xiancheng and named for the Donglin Academy he founded in 1604. Whereas, in the days of Wang Gen and Han Zhen, evangelical jiangxue had been synonymous with mass gatherings of common people, Gu Xiancheng imagined jiangxue to be the means by which the gentry would both reconstitute and preside over the other classes. “From the gentry,” he claimed, “no farmer, artisan, or merchant shall not ­receive jiangxue.” Gu’s Donglin Academy became the next great venue for jiangxue gatherings, with unprecedented numbers of gentry and others meeting there. Meanwhile, assemblies outside the Donglin’s purview were discouraged by others in Gu’s circle, such as the powerful regional official Li Sancai 李三才 (d. 1623), who went so far as to ban “Taizhou”style agitation on the part of stipendiary students. In sum, by the turn of the seventeenth century, jiangxue, perhaps the most vivid manifestation of social amalgamation in the late Ming, had been transformed into a tool of reaction, a means for the gentry class to reassert its general dominance and leadership. 267

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In fact, it was the appropriation of jiangxue by ambitious, class-conscious gentry, not the mass rallies of commoners that so disturbed Wang Shizhen, that triggered attempts at suppression on the part of the Ming state, such as the abovementioned prohibition of 1570. Many of these campaigns to bring discipline to self-asserting gentry-officials were authored by Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582), who was chief grand secretary during the minority of the Wanli emperor, from 1572 to 1582. Motivated by strong Legalist tendencies (another product of Wang Yangming’s individualization of the search for truth), Zhang sought to compel obedience from gentry-officials serving in the state’s bureaucracy and to thwart the engrossment and tax evasion of gentry-officials building their estates in the countryside. His efforts to “build respect for the sovereign power” of the Ming state ran headlong into the desires of the righteous gentry that came to be led by Gu Xiancheng; and he seemed to hate the gentry as personally as Gu exalted them chauvinistically. Zhang’s administration marked the beginning of the bitter factional rupture that would characterize the rest of the dynasty. Its chief dynamics were the claim by some gentry-officials to wield the evangelical power of jiangxue and the revulsion of others by their claim. It would leave the Ming dynasty politically disrupted and less capable of meeting the military and other challenges that began to appear at the turn of the seventeenth century.

Military challenges, political ferment, and collapse Mongols and pirates The Ming dynasty began to face pressure on its northern frontier as well as on its southeastern coast, just as the controversies about jiangxue began to come to a head. Indeed, the military crises might have catalyzed the politicization of jiangxue by introducing a sense of unease and increasing desperation. The Mongols, who had been displaced by the Ming after 1368, remained a constant source of anxiety, though they were usually mollified by trade. In 1550, Altan Khan, ruler of the Chahar Mongols, invaded the country surrounding Beijing, hoping to extract permission to trade horses for textiles. The Ming government granted the privilege only grudgingly and haltingly, and a permanent settlement remained problematic. At the same time, the aforementioned problem of “Japanese” piracy flared up along the coast. As might be imagined, these violent encroachments raised much alarm. Xu Jie ­believed that the government’s response to its frontier difficulties was in fact hampered by the ­wooden-headedness of the Jiajing emperor and by the complacency of Yan Song, who refused to recognize unpleasant facts that would have reflected unfavorably upon his administration. It was Xu’s impatience with Yan that might have compelled him to turn to jiangxue as a means of organizing against him. Both the Mongol and pirate threats were removed through the liberalization of trade under Xu Jie’s leadership in the 1560s and early 1570s, as both the Mongolian horse markets and overseas trade were reopened. However, the sense of crisis would remain, making it more likely that the leaders of subsequent years would turn to increasingly desperate political expedients.

The Japanese and the Manchus The Wanli period (1573–1620) saw more serious military challenges, resulting in further political disruptions. In the 1590s, the Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉 (1536/37–1598) invaded Korea, hoping to use the peninsula as a bridge to attack China. 268

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Wanli committed about 140,000 soldiers in 1592 and in 1597 and managed to save Korea, though at tremendous cost. Finding his treasury depleted and the government under the influence of the recalcitrant Gu Xiancheng, Wanli dispatched eunuch-led “mine tax commissioners” to attack the gentry economically and neutralize them politically. Some of the latter, who soon organized under the Donglin banner, bitterly opposed Wanli’s policy (which he himself called off, when it became clear that his commissioners were keeping most of what they stole) and sought to ensure the Ming state would never be so bold again. In 1618, the Manchu chieftain Nurhaci (1559–1626) revolted against the Ming, presenting the latter with another costly, defensive war. The Ming government began levying a number of special surtaxes, which tended to affect only the poor, as the gentry class continued to exempt itself from fiscal burdens. The Donglin partisans then holding the political initiative offered few solutions to the frontier problem and seemed rather fixated on purging the bureaucracy of rivals. A group of these would-be victims, finding protection under the court eunuch Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢 (1568–1627), turned the tables and violently suppressed the Donglin; but their dubious victory was short-lived, for another coterie of moralists, soon to be called the Restoration Society, deposed Wei’s faction and overspread the empire with an ever-wider network of jiangxue. Ming politics were deplorably stalemated as the military crisis continued unabated.

Natural disaster and roving banditry As had frequently happened in China’s past, natural disaster made a bad situation worse. Flood, famine, and disease struck different areas with sometimes considerable ferociousness, and the overburdened Ming state was hard pressed to meet the additional challenges. The Ming’s famine relief capability may have been declining even before 1618 (the year the Manchu revolt began) and seems to have become negligible after that. The aggregate of popular misery, a combined result of natural calamity and increased taxation, soon led to desperate uprisings, which became yet more problems the Ming state couldn’t solve. By the 1630s, among numerous renegades, the bandit leaders Li Zicheng 李自成 (1605?–1645) and Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠 (1605–1647) had emerged, and although government forces occasionally defeated them, they were too preoccupied with other threats to finish them off. It was Li Zicheng who established himself in Henan Province in 1640, enlarged his army with famine and disease survivors, and marched on Beijing in 1644. With Li’s rebels having entered the city on April 24, the Chongzhen emperor (r. 1627–1644) summoned his officials the next morning – and nobody came. It was a fitting testimony to the political dereliction that had crippled the Ming from within. Leaving a final note, in which he blamed his officials not just for abandoning him in his final hour but for obstructing him during the whole of his reign, Chongzhen tried to dispatch his daughters and concubines with his own sword (two survived wounded) and hanged himself on Coal Hill, behind the palace. Through a series of vicissitudes, the Manchus would wind up in control of Beijing that summer and would proceed to consolidate their regime, the Qing, over the next several years, a task that would require them (and their Chinese adherents) to eliminate the rebels Li and Zhang and also to finish off Ming remnants in the south. The Qing would also have to deal with many of the problems that had plagued the Ming, chiefly those of taxation and security. Perhaps most significantly, the Qing would solve the problem of jiangxue by making it a prerogative of the throne, specifically, the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661–1722). Although all of the Ming dynasty’s other achievements – economic, social, and intellectual – would endure, it was only jiangxue, located at the nexus of these three fields, that had triggered such 269

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a reaction. Serving in the mid-sixteenth century as the means by which commoners could justify their economic gains and legitimize their new places in society, jiangxue, by the end of the century, had become a tool for the new elites among them to assert their dominance over it. This claim to preeminence could not be reconciled with those of the imperial state – neither the Ming state, which fell before it, nor the Qing state, which appropriated it for itself. Thus did jiangxue fully devolve, from a force that empowered the many, to a force that empowered the few, to a force that empowered the one. If there is any sense in which the Ming dynasty seems to have fallen short of its promise, it is this one.

Note 1 Chaves, Pilgrim of the Clouds, 39. Reproduced with the kind permission of White Pine Press.

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17 Cultural history from the Yuan through the Ming Kenneth J. Hammond

The cultural history of the Ming dynasty unfolds along a trajectory of revival and development, first in the reassertion of cultural hegemony by the Chinese literati elite in the wake of the fall of the Mongol Yuan dynasty, and then through a dialectic of transformation and persistence between the traditional concerns of literati intellectual and aesthetic production and the emergence of new modes of thought and artistic expression in the context of rapid ­expansion of the commercial economy and the social dynamism to which this contributed. Art, literature and thought all underwent significant changes in complex and sometimes contradictory movements. Toward the end of the dynasty, the intellectual and cultural sphere was further affected by the beginning of the period of ongoing contact and ­interaction ­between Europe and China, which brought ideas and information from Europe into sometimes fruitful interplay with established Chinese understandings and practices.

The Yuan-Ming transition For the Chinese literati, especially in the south, the era of Mongol rule was a time of marginalization and/or accommodation. In the realm of thought and in the arts the establishment of a single state governing the whole of Chinese territory after the long period of north-south division led to a renewed interaction between scholars, writers and artists across the empire. The flourishing of Confucian thought in the Daoxue 道學 movement, often referred to as Neo-Confucianism, which had characterized southern China in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, had contrasted with the persistence in the north of intellectual concerns linking back to the Northern Song. While the Mongols called upon Chinese scholars in the north for assistance in the consolidation of their rule after the conquest of the Jurchen Jin state in 1234, southern literati were viewed with a much more jaundiced eye after the final extension of Yuan rule to the south in the 1270s. The suspension of the civil examinations until 1315 is perhaps the clearest sign of Mongol disregard for the Confucian elite and its intellectual and cultural concerns. Literati who did serve in official positions under the Yuan found themselves subject to supervision by non-Chinese overseers, the darughachi appointed to co-administer local and provincial level administration. Nonetheless, the long century of Yuan rule saw growing convergence between the literati communities in northern and southern China, though regional distinctions 271

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continued. Neo-Confucianism was increasingly embraced by the Mongols, and this facilitated the integration of northern and southern intellectual activity. In aesthetic culture, especially the classical arts of the brush, painting, calligraphy and literature, the Yuan saw a wide range of responses on the part of the Chinese elite. Zhao Mengfu 趙孟頫, a scion of the Song imperial family, and his wife, the painter Guan Daosheng 管道昇, represented one pole of accommodation, accepting employment at the Mongol court and producing a corpus of painting, poetry and calligraphy which has been seen as embodying a literati orthodoxy, even while he was criticized for serving the alien regime. By contrast Qian Xuan 錢選, one of the “Eight Talents of Wuxing” declined to enter into an official position and devoted himself to a life of retirement, supporting himself through the sale of his art. In the sphere of the arts of the brush, the Yuan saw an intensification of the “amateur” ideal, as Chinese painters and calligraphers produced works with strong personal and literary meanings and allusions which were directed at an audience of like-minded gentlemen (and a small number of women). Images of rocks and bamboo, embodying the qualities of persistence in adverse circumstances, proliferated. Painters such as Ni Zan 倪瓚 or Huang Gongwang 黃公望 created images of retreat and retirement from the world of official life which made a virtue of necessity. Much of this aesthetic ­activity was ­concentrated in the Jiangnan region, the wealthiest and most sophisticated area within the empire, which was also subject to punitive taxation under the Mongols. Perhaps the most significant development in literary life under the Yuan was the flourishing of drama. While dramatic performance had antecedents going deep into the Chinese past, such as skits and acrobatic displays at the Tang court, it was under the conditions of Mongol rule that the writing and performance of plays became a major component of literary and popular culture. Members of the literati elite who were excluded from official employment could support themselves by writing and producing plays, and a dynamic world of theatrical productions emerged. Some 800 plays were written during the Yuan, about 200 of which survive. Writers such as Guan Hanqing 關漢卿, Wang Shifu 王實甫, Bai Pu 白朴 and others wrote tales of injustice and revenge, romance and other personal and ­social concerns. These often involved the use of historical allegories to criticize aspects of Mongol rule through the retelling of events from earlier times. Much of this activity took place in the Yuan capital Dadu 大都, where sanqu 散曲 (colloquial songs) and zaju 雜劇 (variety plays) were the most common forms. A separate tradition of nanxi 南戲 (Southern drama), with its origins in Wenzhou late in the Song, became prominent in Hangzhou later in the Yuan. Another development in the literary field was the early stages of the rise of the novel. Late in the Yuan, two works which would become more fully elaborated during the Ming appeared: Sanguo yanyi 三國演義 (Romance of the Three Kingdoms) and Shuihu zhuan 水滸傳 (Water Margin). Attributed respectively to Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中and Shi Nai’an 施耐庵, these works recounted tales of heroes and adventures from Chinese history in multiple chapter forms, and became widely popular in print editions. Sanguo yanyi was set in the third century, during a period of division following the collapse of the Han dynasty. It focused on military conflicts and strategy, with historical figures such as Cao Cao 曹操, Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 and Liu Bei 劉備 fighting and scheming to outwit each other. Shuihu zhuan was based on popular stories of outlaws in the Song dynasty whose exploits, set in the marshes and mountains of Shandong, expressed the frustrations of many Chinese under Mongol rule and created idealized fighters for justice.

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Thought The founding of the Ming dynasty by Zhu Yuanzhang in 1368 did not initially lead to new developments in intellectual culture and philosophy. Zhu Yuanzhang had assembled a team of Confucian scholars as advisors in the years immediately preceding his proclamation of the new dynasty, to legitimate his claims to be a worthy founding emperor. Song Lian 宋濂, Liu Ji 劉基 and others associated with the Jinhua area in Zhejiang continued the traditions of Daoxue orthodoxy which had developed during the Song and been further institutionalized under the Yuan. The new dynasty made the Cheng-Zhu interpretation of Confucianism the standard for the civil examinations which, after a brief interruption in the 1370s, remained the principal means of recruitment into government service and provided a center of gravity for literati intellectual culture. This Learning of the Way continued as the mainstream of elite thought throughout the dynasty. New ideas did arise within the broad field of Confucian thought, however. The Ming was a period of great dynamism in China’s commercial economy. By the later fifteenth century and through the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Chinese society was dramatically affected by the spread of market relations, commodity production and the increasing monetization of economic life, as Peter Ditmanson and Harrison Miller have discussed in their chapters. The growth of the commercial economy influenced developments in cultural life as well. As Miller has noted, the ideas of Wang Yangming 王陽明 launched a new phase of philosophical innovation at the turn of the sixteenth century. Yang’s views on the innate knowledge of the good (liangzhi 良知), which he saw as part of every human’s natural endowment, and the unity of knowledge and action (zhixing weiyi 知行為一) placed new ­emphasis on the subjectivity of the individual. Followers of Yangming’s thought such as Wang Gen 王艮 and He Xinyin 何心隱, associated with the Taizhou School (Taizhou xuepai 泰州學派), elaborated these ideas in ways which foregrounded individual moral agency and responsibility. The life of Li Zhi 李贄 pushed these attitudes to the extreme. These developments in some ways parallel contemporary currents in European thought associated with the Protestant Reformation. The emergence of philosophical views emphasizing individual agency in Ming China and early modern Europe may be seen at least in part as comparable responses to the spread of market relationships and ideas of economic agency. While Yangming’s ideas became powerfully influential through the sixteenth century, and continued to form an important school within the broad stream of Confucian discourse thereafter, they were not universally embraced, and did not displace Cheng-Zhu thought as the foundation of examination orthodoxy. As the Ming weakened in the early seventeenth century and collapsed by the 1640s, some late Ming thinkers turned strongly against what they saw as the subjective speculations of Yangming’s thought. Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 and others began to emphasize the need for demonstra­ angming’s ble evidence to support intellectual arguments, rather than what they viewed as Y excessive reliance on intuition. This school of Evidential Scholarship (kaozheng 考證) would be much further developed in the Qing, as Richard Smith relates in his chapter. These late Ming thinkers developed powerful critiques of political institutions and practices, and propounded sometimes radical solutions to the problems of government and society. Gu Yanwu argued for changes in the organization and function of the imperial state, while Wang Fuzhi and Huang Zongxi also emphasized different conceptions of political order. Chinese scholars in the later Ming were not only concerned with philosophical endeavors, but were also often engaged with technological and scientific activities. Benjamin

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Elman has explored the ways in which the Chinese concept of gewu 格物, the investigation of things, articulated an approach to knowledge not dissimilar to the “natural philosophy” of early modern Europe. Scholars such as Li Shizhen 李時珍 pursued studies based on the critical interrogation of received knowledge and the experimental verification of hypotheses. His encyclopedic treatise on pharmacology, the Bencao gangmu 本草剛目 (General Pharmacopaeia), was published in the 1590s and remained a basic reference work into the nineteenth century. Others, such as Song Yingxing 宋應星, promoted the compilation and circulation of technical knowledge and innovation through publications such as his Tiangong kaiwu 天工開物 (Creations of Men and Nature). Both books circulated widely as part of the overall flourishing of commercial publishing in China from the late fifteenth century onward. In the final decades of the Ming, Chinese intellectual life was also influenced to a certain degree by the expansion of regular contact with Europe. The arrival of missionaries, especially the Jesuits, in the late sixteenth century led to the introduction into China not only of their religious teachings, which did not gain much traction or become widespread in the Ming, but also of new repertoires of knowledge in fields from astronomy and cartography to painting and handicrafts. Jesuits like Matteo Ricci managed to find employment at the imperial court in Beijing largely through their deployment of Western knowledge. Ricci, for example, collaborated with Chinese cartographers to produce the first map of the world in China incorporating information from European explorations and portraying the Celestial Kingdom as one country among the many scattered around the planet. Jesuits at the Ming court became consultants on artillery for the imperial army, and competed with Chinese and Muslim astronomers in the prediction of eclipses. But Western knowledge did not assume a significant role in Chinese intellectual life overall, and the novelty of European artifacts and gadgets did not fundamentally transform scientific thought or material life.

Literature Literati movements The literary history of the Ming can reasonably be understood as a sequence of movements or groupings among writers who shared certain ideas and practices. These groupings sometimes competed with each other for prominence, and sometimes arose in reaction to the dominance of an established school of thought. Each period or movement in Ming literary life can be represented by key figures, but the field of cultural production was much larger than these few iconic individuals. All educated gentlemen, the members of the literati elite, aspirants to and holders of examination degrees, wrote poems, essays and other kinds of texts. Beyond the realm of literati poetry and prose, fiction, both short stories and longer novelistic works, also flourished in the Ming, as did forms of drama pioneered in the Yuan but raised to new heights in the expanding commercial theatrical world. At the beginning of the dynasty, as in the realm of philosophy, there was continuity with the literary practices of the Yuan. Poets such as Gao Qi 高啟 from the Jiangnan commercial center Suzhou carried on the style of “townsmen poetry” which had arisen in that region as long ago as the Southern Song. Song Lian and Liu Ji, already mentioned as part of Zhu Yuanzhang’s Confucian brain trust, were also noted poets who bridged the dynastic divide. Though these men were close to the founding emperor, they had to manage their relationships with him carefully. As the Hongwu emperor, Zhu was often suspicious of his scholarly officials, and the chronically tense relationship between the ruler and literary elites did not encourage new developments in written expression. As Ming political life stabilized after 274

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the Yongle emperor usurped the throne in 1402, the literati began to reassert their role as the governing elite. One expression of this was the emergence of a literary grouping associated with the highest offices in the imperial administration. Peter Ditmanson has mentioned the “Chancellery style” (taige ti) which arose in the early fifteenth century. This was characterized by the writings of the “Three Yangs”, the Grand Secretaries under Yongle and his immediate successors who happened to share surnames with similar pronunciations. Most prominent among them was Yang Shiqi 陽士奇, while Yang Rong 楊榮 and Yang Pu 楊溥 were somewhat lesser lights. The Japanese historian of Chinese poetry Yoshikawa Kojiro dismisses the works of the Chancellery style as “tedious” and appropriately “relegated to oblivion”, yet at the time their writings dominated Ming literary circles. Poetry at the Ming court gained a new lease of life toward the end of the fifteenth century with the work of Li Dongyang 李東陽. Li was praised for combining a mastery of styles from earlier eras, including the Tang and the Song, with his own individual voice. This encapsulates what were to become key concerns in literary debates through the rest of the Ming. The period of his preeminence also saw important writings from the brushes of Shen Zhou 沈周 and Zhu Yunming 祝允明, each perhaps more famous as a painter, and who will be mentioned in that regard later in this chapter. But the group which came to dominate literary life at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century was the archaist movement known as the Former Seven Masters (qian qizi 前七子) of Old Phraseology (gu wenci 古文辭). Old Phraseology as a literary movement promoted the emulation of poetry from the High Tang and prose from the Qin and Han periods. Works from after these idealized eras were considered to be decadent and unworthy of reproduction. The most prominent among these writers were Li Mengyang 李夢陽 and He Jingming 何景明. In essence, the advocates of Old Phraseology promoted writing that was energetic and straightforward. They held up the simplicity of exposition in the Han dynasty historical masterpiece Shiji 史記 as their ideal, and looked to the emotional directness of Tang poets such as Li Bai 李白 and Du Fu 杜甫. A second generation of writers embracing the ideals of Old Phraseology, known as the Later Seven Masters (hou qizi 後七子), emerged in the middle and later years of the sixteenth century. The initial leader of this group, Li Panlong 李攀龍, was soon eclipsed by his protégé Wang Shizhen 王世貞, who was to become one of the most dominant literary figures of the Ming. Like their predecessors, these writers advocated emulation of Qin-Han prose and High Tang poetry. But Wang Shizhen also admired the writing of the Song literatus Su Shi 蘇軾, and wrote that what really mattered in literature was not the slavish imitation of certain models, but the creation of works which manifested a similar directness and simplicity, and did not become bogged down in stylistic fetishism and elaborate effects. The Old Phraseology masters, especially during the later phase, explicitly positioned themselves in opposition to another literary grouping, the Tang-Song school (Tang-Song pai 唐宋派). Literati such as Tang Shunzhi 唐順之 and Wang Shenzhong 王慎中 held up figures such as the Tang scholar-official Han Yu 韓愈 and Song writers like Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 and Zeng Gong 曾鞏 as models for prose writing, while sharing the enthusiasm of the archaists for High Tang poetry. Wang Shizhen engaged in extended polemics against these men, dismissing their literary ideas as mere self-promotion, and accusing them of using excessively flowery language rather than the kind of direct style he endorsed. The clashes between the archaists and the Tang-Song school were also embedded in contemporary political conflicts. The imperial court in the middle decades of the sixteenth century came to be dominated by the Grand Secretary Yan Song 嚴嵩. Tang Shunzhi was 275

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an ally of Yan’s, while Wang Shizhen and others in his circle opposed his policies and what they saw as his corrupt practices. Indeed, Wang’s political career suffered significantly from his antagonism for Yan Song. Literary groupings were one means through which members of the scholarly elite could join forces to promote not only their intellectual concerns, but their political interests as well. By the end of the sixteenth century, and into the early decades of the seventeenth, a reaction against the dominant position of Wang Shizhen and the archaists set in. The most important figures in this were the brothers Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道, Zongdao 宗道 and Zhongdao 中道, who became the core of the Gong’an school (Gong’an pai 公安派). The Yuan brothers and their followers came to view the Old Phraseology writers as mere imitators, perhaps even plagiarists, who simply copied the styles and techniques of their idealized models. By contrast, the Gong’an school advocated a literary style which emphasized “expression” (shu 抒) and “authenticity” (zhen 眞), which basically meant the expression of individual, subjective feelings rather than the emulation of models. As the seventeenth century progressed and the Ming dynasty drew to a close, the ideas of the Gong’an school achieved a hegemonic position in literary thought, and the views of Wang Shizhen and the archaists were largely eclipsed.

Fiction The poems, essays, occasional jottings and works of historical scholarship, which were the main concerns of the scholar-officials (shidafu 士大夫), were not the entirety of the Ming literary world. Fiction and drama both flourished and underwent significant development in the course of the dynasty. Popular works circulated widely as the commercial printing industry prospered and innovations in print technology made the range of publications available both greater in volume and more diverse in quality and cost. This process accelerated especially from the middle of the sixteenth century through the end of the dynasty in 1644. Short stories (xiaoshuo 小說) were an important genre in the Ming. Such stories had been told and re-told by oral performers for many centuries, but in the Ming they were increasingly recorded in writing, which gave them fixed and stable forms. Toward the end of the dynasty, two writers and compilers of stories produced major collections that were published and assumed a dominant role in both popular and elite culture. Feng Menglong 馮夢龍 put together three large sets of stories, 120 altogether, collectively known as the Sanyan 三言 (lit. Three Words), while Ling Mengchu 凌濛初 produced two collections, including old tales as well as works of his own composition, known together as the Er pai 二拍 (Lit. Two Claps, perhaps from the use of clappers in recitation). These stories tell of people high and low, of the realm of spirits and ghosts, of intrigues at court and the complexities of romance. Scenes of everyday life in the streets and behind the walls of palaces, mansions and ordinary homes proved settings which made these stories resonate with the interests and concerns of ordinary folk as well as members of the elites. Longer works of fiction also became more important, especially in the second half of the dynasty. Four great novels can represent this phenomenon. Two of these were further refined versions of works already evolving in the Yuan, Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin. These books assumed more stable forms as they were published in large print runs from the mid-sixteenth century. Their stories of heroes and villains drawn from earlier times provided entertainment and offered strategic and moral insights into China’s past which might also be relevant to contemporary concerns. Two new works appeared in the middle and late sixteenth century. Journey to the West (Xiyou ji 西遊記) was the story of a real pilgrimage to 276

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India by the Tang dynasty Buddhist monk Xuanzang 玄奘, given exciting fictional expansion through the inclusion of a magic monkey, a talking pig and a flying horse. Written by Wu Cheng’en 吳承恩, this became one of the most popular books in Chinese history, and remains a staple of popular culture to this day. The exotic locations and heavenly excursions of the characters have been reproduced in plays, pictures and even comic books in the modern era. The last of the great Ming novels was Jinpingmei 金瓶梅 (Plum in the Golden Vase), which appeared at the very beginning of the seventeenth century. Its authorship was long attributed to Wang Shizhen, but that has been discounted by modern scholarship. Jinpingmei is a powerful critique of the decadence of late Ming social and political life, which is portrayed as being thoroughly rotted by wealth and ambition. The novel is rich in the detailed description of things: food, clothing, jewelry, buildings and furnishings. It also contains scenes of sexual behavior rendered in pornographic detail. The story relates the prospering and ultimate destruction of Ximen Qing 西門慶, a corrupt merchant who rises to become a powerful official before succumbing to his destructive moral and physical weaknesses. It has been seen as a tale of karmic justice, enticing the reader with images of sensual indulgence and material opulence before revealing the ultimate emptiness of these things and the inevitability of a retributive reckoning.

Drama Short stories and novels were paralleled by the continuing development of drama. Theatrical productions took place within the imperial palace as well as in popular venues in cities and towns, and were presented by traveling troupes across the empire. Local traditions of theater flourished in many areas, including the Jiangnan region, in Sichuan and in the capital. Two plays can serve to suggest the accomplishments of Ming drama. The Pipa ji 琵琶記 (Story of the Lute) was written late in the Yuan by Gao Ming 高明, who died in 1368, the year the Ming was founded. The play recounts the travails of Zhao Wuniang 趙五孃, a woman whose husband is forced to marry another woman and who is left destitute, then undertakes a multi-year quest to find her lost love. Set in the Han dynasty, and based on earlier versions of the tale in which Zhao and her husband both perish, Gao Ming gave the story a happy ending when the couple is finally reunited. The portrayal of Zhao Wuniang through the course of her wanderings and sufferings helped make the play popular among ordinary people, as it was spread both through theatrical performances and as a printed text. Pipa ji emerged from the tradition of Southern Drama, mentioned in the section on Yuan drama earlier in this chapter. The other play to consider was in the Kunqu 崑曲 tradition in the Jiangnan region. Mudan ting 牡丹亭 (Peony Pavilion) was written by Tang Xianzu 湯顯祖 in 1598. The story is an example of a motif called Caizi jiaren 才子佳人 (Scholar and Beauty), romances between young men of scholarly talent and beautiful young women. Mudan ting tells the story of Liu Mengmei 柳夢梅, a young man traveling to the imperial capital to take the Confucian examinations, and Du Liniang 杜麗娘, a lovely young woman living in seclusion at her father’s home. They do not meet in real life, but encounter each other in dreams. After a series of dramatic misadventures, including Du Liniang’s death and Liu Mengmei’s arrest, the couple is finally united when Du is resurrected by the God of the Underworld, and Liu passes first in the imperial exams and is pardoned by the emperor. In its full form the play contains 55 scenes, and can take more than 20 hours to perform. Like many Chinese dramas it was later often presented in abridged form, with only select scenes being staged. Audiences were assumed to be familiar enough with the story to fill in the narrative gaps. 277

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Art Arts of the brush Painting and calligraphy were the principal artistic forms pursued by educated gentlemen and a small number of elite women, throughout the Ming, as they had been in earlier periods. Professional painters were employed at the Ming court, but this was a much less dynamic and significant arena that it had been under the Song or the Yuan. Court painters were constrained by strict guidelines on how images should be produced, and could be punished or dismissed from office for even minor violations of these rules. A famous painter of landscapes, birds and flowers, Dai Jin 戴進 was rejected by the Xuande emperor for having painted the cloak of a fisherman red, a color reserved for officials at imperial audiences. ­A fter being dismissed from court, he returned to his home in Zhejiang province and pursued a highly successful career as an artist, becoming the focus of what was known as the Zhe school 浙派, which carried on traditions of landscape painting from the Southern Song. For court painters, the primary concern was not the expression of personal feelings or talents, but the careful following of proper technique. This essentially meant the emulation or imitation of the styles of court painters from the Song and Yuan. The real dynamism in painting and calligraphy in the Ming was in the works of literati artists who espoused an ideal of amateur self-expression, even as they often worked to produce and sell their creations. Literati artists lived and worked in many places across the empire, but the center of gravity for this class was the Jiangnan region, with Suzhou as its heart. This is indicated in the use of the name Wu school 吳派 to characterize the most famous artists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Not all important artists can be subsumed under this heading, but most of the top talents have been grouped this way. Two painters are traditionally seen as the greatest representatives of these: Shen Zhou 沈周 and Wen Zhengming 文徵明. These artists produced long panoramic landscapes, tall scrolls of mountain scenes and small album leaves in ink monochrome or with the precise use of color. They were also calligraphers, with Wen Zhengming being especially renowned for his regular script (kaishu 開書). Shen Zhou was noted for landscapes in the style of the Yuan master Ni Zan, though he developed these in ways which gave them his own distinctive flair. Wen Zhengming tried many times to pass the Confucian exams, but eventually settled into a comfortable life in his native Suzhou, where he produced ink paintings expressing some of the core values of literati culture. His works were so popular in the emerging art market of the middle Ming that he, like other artists of the time, sometimes employed a daibi 代筆 (substitute brush), in his case his son, to produce works in his style which were sold to eager collectors. Wen ran a kind of studio academy where many ambitious young painters trained. While in many ways embodying the amateur ideal of literati art, Wen was in many ways a consummate professional presiding over a large and successful enterprise. Two other painters, Tang Yin 唐寅, like his friend Wen Zhenming, a pupil of Shen Zhou’s, and Qiu Ying 仇英, fill out the ranks of the most important artists of the first half of the sixteenth century. Their work did not fall into either the Zhe or Wu schools, in some ways combining elements from both with the elaboration of their own styles. Both were known for large hanging landscape scrolls, and for the use of colored inks. Both also painted on commission, while managing to retain their status as literati artists and embodiments of the amateur ideal. Tang Yin had passed the imperial exams as a young man, but was later banned from official service because of a scandal. His poetic skills as well as his painting 278

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allowed him to remain part of the gentlemanly elite in Suzhou. Qiu Ying, by contrast, came from humble origins and may have been illiterate. His success and entrée in to elite society was based entirely on the quality of his artistic production. Toward the end of the sixteenth century and through the first third of the seventeenth century, one figure came to dominate the arts of the brush, not only in terms of his aesthetic creations but through his development of a theory of Chinese art history. This was Dong Qichang 董其昌. Dong achieved high office under the Wanli emperor, which gave him great prestige and visibility among the literati across the empire. His calligraphy was widely admired, and he painted large hanging landscapes in monochrome, deploying a mastery of the styles of many of the masters of earlier eras. But it was his elaboration of an understanding of the history of painting based on the persistence of Northern and Southern schools which gained him the most notice. These were not geographic categories, but derived from the division of Chan Buddhism into two schools with the same names. It was actually a fifteenth-century painter, Du Qiong 杜瓊, who had first proposed the recognition of Northern and Southern schools of painting, but Dong Qichang developed these ideas into a more complete system. He characterized the Southern School as including all the literati painters, those who espoused the amateur ideal and generally emulated the masters of the Song and Yuan landscape tradition. The Northern School encompassed court painters and other overtly professional artists. This conceptual framework became powerfully influential in the last 300 years of imperial history. Dong Qichang was not the first thinker to address issues of art history. Wang Shizhen, who we have already encountered as a major literary figure, developed an account of the development of painting from the fourth-century master Gu Kaizhi 顧愷之in his Yiyuan zhiyan 藝苑卮言, written about 1560. Wang focused on presenting an overview of which painters he felt best exemplified various aspects of the development of painting, and did not use the Northern/Southern framework. His primary emphasis was on painting in the Ming, understood as the culmination of the contributions of masters from the long sweep of ­Chinese artistic history. One final development of note in Ming painting was the increasing sophistication in portrait painting, and the emergence of self-portraiture, toward the end of the dynasty. The art historian Michael Sullivan has suggested that the influence of European images which were brought to China by Jesuit missionaries may have influenced the use of shading in the painting of faces, making portraits of officials, or images in ancestor scrolls, more subtle and nuanced. The artist Zeng Jing 曾鯨 was particularly noted for this in the early seventeenth century. Around the same time, painters such as Chen Hongshou 陳洪綬 began to produce self-portraits. Chen often painted himself in a state of inebriation, presenting an image of himself as a creative spirit worthy of recognition with all his personal foibles. Autobiography had also begun to be more common in the later Ming, both developments perhaps reflecting the influence of the market economy on cultural life, as we have seen earlier in the rise of Taizhou school individualism.

Decorative arts Gentlemen of the literati elite not only produced and collected painting and calligraphy, but also were interested in decorative arts, including ceramics, cloisonné, lacquer and enamel wares. These kinds of objects had long been valued by wealthy sophisticates, but in the Ming, with the rapid expansion of the commercial economy, the collecting of rare and precious objects took on new intensity with the growth of an art market. Members of the traditional 279

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shi 士 landed elite of educated gentlemen found themselves competing for purchases with art consumers from the merchant class, whose increasing wealth allowed them to build important collections of both arts of the brush and decorative objects. This competition gave rise to the publication of manuals of connoisseurship, setting out criteria by which potential buyers could evaluate the worth of the goods on offer by professional dealers. The imperial kilns at Jingdezhen 景德鎮 produced many more pieces than were ­ordered for the court in Beijing. Blue and white wares were among the most highly prized ceramics sought by collectors. These wares were also major export objects, reaching markets in Southeast Asia, India, the Ottoman Empire and East Africa. Europeans came to value ­Jingdezhen blue and white ceramics most highly, but it was not until the eighteenth century that potters in Dresden were able to begin to produce porcelains themselves. Dehua 德化 wares were also quite popular in the Ming. These were plain white porcelains produced in Fujian province. Especially desirable were figural objects such as representations of the bodhisattva Guanyin. By contrast, tea sets from the kilns at Yixing 宜興 in Jiangnan were especially prized by many scholarly gentlemen. These were often made in either geometric or organic forms, and considered to be more subtle and sophisticated than the imperial ceramics of Jingdezhen. Cloisonné was a new product in the Ming. Colorful designs with enamel-filled spaces defined by raised metal edges included the imitation of ancient ritual objects or representations of birds or fantastic beasts. This art form became increasingly popular and underwent ongoing technological development throughout the dynasty. Lacquerware, an ancient craft dating at least from the Warring States period, was generally produced in red, with carved images, during the Ming. Japanese craftsmen became adept at imitating Chinese styles, and many lacquer pieces came into Chinese collections from Japanese manufacturers, often being presented as local Chinese goods.

Gardens The construction of private gardens as both productive resources and as escapes from the concerns of official life and the outside world has origins going back to the Han dynasty. Emperors and high officials built important gardens in the Tang, and many literati had famous retreats at their homes in Luoyang or Kaifeng during the Northern Song. But it was in the Ming that literati gardens became what Joanna Handlin Smith has called “a veritable mania”. This activity was especially prominent in the Jiangnan region, with Suzhou becoming famous for the number and splendor of the gardens there. But gentlemen built gardens in many towns and cities across the empire, some of which survive to this day, though often with significant later additions and modifications. Gardens were meant to create an idealized version of nature, yet everyone understood that they were human constructions. Indeed, during the Ming, designers and builders of gardens, what we would today call landscape architects, became famous and often wealthy through their efforts. The garden designer Zhang Nanyang 張南陽 was hired by patrons such as Pan Yunduan 潘允端, for whom he built the Yu Garden 豫園 in Shanghai, and Wang Shizhen, for whom he constructed the Yanshan Garden 弇山園 at Wang’s home in Taicang 太倉. Gardens incorporated natural elements like water and rocks, and were laid out with wandering paths which led the visitor or resident to scenic spots, often attuned to the seasons, to view blossoms or other vistas. Gardens were often relatively small enclosed spaces, and a practice known as “borrowing views” developed, through which designers took advantage of scene elements outside the garden itself, such as a nearby hill or pagoda, to create prospect which blended the built environment of the garden with outside attractions. 280

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Gardens where generally portrayed, in poems and paintings, as places where the scholarly gentleman could find quiet and retreat from the concerns of the outside world, and this was no doubt one of the main motives for their construction. Yet gardens also served as places for social and even political gatherings. Groups of like-minded friends could gather to drink wine, gaze at the moon and write poems, collections of which form significant portions of the works of many literati. These gatherings could sometimes morph into conversations which concerned the political affairs of the day, and even for discussions of strategies for political actions and for the advancement of individual and collective ambitions. Wang Shizhen’s literary circle, which has already been noted as involved in the political conflicts around Grand Secretary Yan Song in the 1550s, would have come together for such intersections of culture and politics in the Yanshan Garden. The building and enjoyment of gardens was something which only the wealthy elites of China could afford. But on occasion, gardens were opened to the public, when ordinary people, at least those with modest resources which would allow them to pay a small entrance fee, could wander for a day in the elegant precincts of a space normally off limits to them. The display of wealth embodied in a garden could thus be extended beyond the view of other members of the social elite, and could serve as well to reinforce understandings of social hierarchy articulated through cultural vehicles.

Conclusion Cultural life and cultural production in the Ming were not limited to members of the literati or newly rising commercial elites. Commercial publishing and innovations in print technology made both textual materials and graphic images more available and accessible to increasingly larger numbers of ordinary Chinese people. Urban theaters and traveling troupes brought dramatic performances to wide audiences. Popular culture was no doubt rich and varied in communities around the empire, with local forms and traditions that allowed farmers, artisans and others to express their feelings and yearnings in words and in the creation of images or other material forms. Much of this more popular material was ephemeral, and our understanding of Ming popular culture lags far behind our knowledge of the practices and products made by and for the wealthy and powerful. The literati elite, whether scholarly gentlemen or gentry on their country estates or in their urban mansions, largely retained a hegemonic position in terms of cultural values, while they also faced increasing competition for status with nouveau riche elements eager to establish their cultural claims to elite legitimacy. The flourishing of the art market and the elaboration of a discourse of taste and connoisseurship testify to the dynamism of cultural production, especially in the second half of the dynasty. Culture in the Ming was a blend of continuity with earlier times and of great innovation, within established traditions, and in the context of China’s dramatic early modern commercial transformation.

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Section 6

The Qing Empire

In the final decades of the sixteenth century, a new political and military force arose to the northeast of the Ming frontier. Under the leadership of Nurhaci, a new ethnic identity was forged, bringing together several distinct groups, with the Jurchens forming the central component. This new entity, organized around eight military formations known as Banners, adopted the name Manchu. As the seventeenth century advanced, the Manchus challenged Ming power first in areas just outside the Great Wall, then along it. When the Ming collapsed in the early months of 1644, Manchu forces were allowed through the pass at Shanhaiguan 山海關 and advanced to Beijing. They routed the rebels who had seized the city, then proclaimed their intention to stay and establish their Qing 清 dynasty as the new rulers of all of China. Under the rule of the three great emperors, Kangxi 康熙, Yongzheng 雍正 and Qianlong 乾隆, the dynasty subdued China proper and went on to expand its frontiers deep into Inner Asia, building a multi-ethnic empire double the size of the Ming. After the disruptions of the dynastic transition, the Qing oversaw a great revival and expansion in the economy. The imperial administration was well run, and the Manchu emperors sought to become true Confucian monarchs, patronizing literati learning and culture while also promoting Buddhism as a unifying force among the many ethnic communities within their borders. By the late eighteenth century, this golden age began to wane. Unbeknownst to the Qing, the Industrial Revolution was giving rise to new dynamics of power and production in Britain and Europe, which soon brought the West into conflict with the existing Chinese conceptions of a properly ordered world. Western demands for greater trade and access to Chinese markets, exacerbated by the illegal importation of opium, led to war and humiliation for the Qing. Conditions worsened as massive rebellions shook the empire through the nineteenth century. Efforts at reform and adaptation to new realities were undertaken but were insufficient to overcome inertia in the political system. The Qing dynasty became the last of the imperial era, and was swept away in 1911–1912 by military mutinies and popular uprisings.

285

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Chronology 6: The Qing Empire 1636–1912 1636–1661 1644 1662–1722 1673–1681 1689 1723–1735 1736–1795 1757 1757–1842 1785–1850 1793 1796–1820 1796–1804 1809–1874 1811–1872 1812–1885 1813–1864 1821–1850 1823–1901 1833–1898 1835–1908 1839–1842 1842 1856–1860 1851–1861 1851–1864 1853–1868 1855–1873 1858 1858–1927 1862–1875 1860s–1870s  1866–1925 1873–1929 1875–1908 1894–1895 1895 1898 1898–1900 1905 1909–1911 1911 1912

Qing dynasty Shunzhi 順治 reign. Fall of Beijing. Kangxi 康熙 reign. Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (Sanfan 三藩). Treaty of Nerchinsk (Nibuchu 尼布楚). Yongzheng 雍正 reign. Qianlong 乾隆 reign. Destruction of the Zhungars 準格爾. The Canton system. Life of Lin Zexu 林則徐. Macartney Mission. Jiaqing 嘉慶reign. White Lotus (Bailian jiao白蓮教) Rebellion. Life of Feng Guifen馮桂芬. Life of Zeng Guofan 曾國藩. Life of Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠. Life of Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全. Daoguang 道光 reign. Life of Li Hongzhang 李鴻章. Life of Prince Gong 恭親王. Life of Cixi 慈禧. Opium War (First Opium War). Treaty of Nanjing. Arrow War (Second Opium War). Xianfeng 咸豐 reign. Taiping Rebellion. Nian 捻 Rebellion. Muslim Rebellion. Treaty of Tianjin 太平. Life of Kang Youwei 康有為. Tongzhi 同治 reign. Self-Strengthening Movement Life of Sun Yatsen 孫逸仙 (Sun Zhongshan 孫中山). Life of Liang Qichao 梁啟超. Guangxu 光緒 reign. First Sino-Japanese War. Treaty of Shimonseki 下関. Hundred Days of Reform. Boxer Uprising (Yihetuan 義和團). Abolition of the Confucian Examination system. Xuantong 宣統 reign. Xinhai 辛亥 Revolution. Abdication of Puyi 溥儀.

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18 The Qing dynasty (pre-1800) Growth and stagnation Yangwen Zheng

Map 18.1  The Qing Empire. (See Tan Qixiang, vol. 8, 3–4.)

For the first century and a half of their rule, the Manchus gave China good government and strong leadership, so that Chinese life flourished in every regard. In the eighteenth century, China attained the last golden age of the imperial tradition and very likely was the most awe-inspiring state in the world.1 287

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Charles Hucker delivered this famous verdict on the reign of the first few Qing emperors: Shunzhi, Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong, from 1644 to 1796. These emperors enlarged the map of China, consolidated its position of power, grew its economy and population and patronized arts and letters. This chapter sketches out the economic life of the early Qing to see what constituted the “last golden age”. It does so from several perspectives. Although historians have used “dynastic cycle” to describe succession in Chinese history, this does not always sit comfortably with the economic past, as, despite the change that a new dynasty can bring, its wealth and fortune often depends on and builds upon that of the old regime. Understanding the early Qing will help us see the successes and failures of the first few emperors; it will also help us better comprehend the contrast with the late Qing where China became the “sick man of Asia” and sitting duck of European and Japanese imperialism. The Manchus had prepared for their conquest of China since 1616, when the Later Jin dynasty was founded, if not earlier. They learned from the Ming and modeled their civil administration after the “six ministries” despite the fact that the Eight Banners were more or less their entire apparatus. They knew they had to be functional immediately once they entered China, a country much larger than their homeland, a people with a very different culture and an economy based on agriculture, trade and commerce. Hunter-gatherers living in the vastness of Manchuria, with long and harsh winters, some Manchus moved with the seasons as their animals needed green pastures; others were becoming more settled as they began to expand southwards toward Ming China, and as Chinese captives and migrants joined them. Ruling was different from conquering; they first needed to restore not only order but also the economy as years of rebellion and conquest had devastated the land and its people. Let us see what they did in order to establish themselves as rulers after they conquered Ming China.

“Rest for the People” [yumin xiuxi 与民休息] When the Eight Banners entered China in 1644, the Shunzhi emperor (reign 1643–1661) allowed land enclosure so that banner troop-families, both aristocratic and ordinary, could settle with their army and livestock and later make a living. These were fertile lands around the capital Beijing region and around the country as they marched down the Central Plains to conquer China proper. The effect of this policy was devastating as it reduced the Chinese farmers who owned these lands to tenants and even beggars. Many banner men and ­families did not till the land they were allotted; they rented it out – making them not just alien conquerors but also landlords, some very large. This was not a policy that would earn the Manchus support when they needed it in the early days of conquest. The Kangxi emperor (reign 1662–1722) knew the importance of land to peasants and social stability; he reversed his father’s policy and abolished land enclosure in late 1660s. Enclosed lands were returned to Chinese owners and peasants. Kangxi also laid his hands on land that belonged to the Ming court. The Ming had granted a large chunk of land to its blood princes scattered around the country; this was tilled by peasants. Kangxi simply granted tenure to those who tilled the land by changing the name of the owners. This “name change” mechanism was a popular move as it pleased Chinese peasants who would help raise productivity on the land. To make more land available for cultivation, the Kangxi regime encouraged migration. Rebellions at the end of the Ming and conquest in early Qing had depopulated many areas, the province of Sichuan being a good example. Kangxi issued edicts that encouraged, facilitated and even rewarded migration to the province. This was a most important policy as it relieved overpopulated areas in coastal and South Central China where people fled as a result 288

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of Manchu conquest; it made land available to many and helped buttress frontier towns as their conquest moved down to southern China. “Huguang filled Sichuan” is a saying that described large-scale migration from Hunan-Hubei and Guangdong-Guangxi provinces to the Sichuan region. This wave of government-sponsored migration filled the Sichuan basin and spilled beyond to eastern Tibet, making Sichuan the most populous province during the late Qing, a position it still holds today. This was indeed “state-directed colonization” and it was not limited to Sichuan. This policy was adapted and promoted locally around the country; in some provinces, peasants simply went to open up hilly and less populated areas of their own accord. Taiwan was also a destination for migrants, as many had moved there during waves of Chinese resistance during the late Ming – so were areas in Southeast Asia such as Malaya and Siam. This would have consequences for both the region itself and Qing China. “Moving people to buttress the frontier” 移民實邊 was not a new policy under the Qing; it was invented 2,000 years ago as the Han dynasty moved people to newly conquered frontiers to buttress the border region. With the Manchu conquest of Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, the Qing opened up the northwest and southwest for Han Chinese settlement, hence agricultural and economic activities. This helped ease population growth as conquest gave way to peace and life returned to normal; it expanded cultivable land and encouraged diversification that would soon play a vital role in feeding the increasing population. Thus, the Sinicization of peripheral China began more than 2,000 years ago; it intensified during the early Qing. The only place they barred the Chinese from settling was their homeland, Manchuria, which the Qing court kept as their own hunting ground. But increasing Russian encroachment in the mid-­n ineteenth century saw a change of heart as the late Qing court encouraged Han Chinese migration; many from such northern provinces as Shandong went to Manchuria. This was a smart move. Han Chinese settlement helped deter Russian advance and the Chinese were well entrenched before the Japanese invasion and colonization in 1930s. This was a lesson that the Communist regime would learn as they further buttressed frontier regions with migration and agriculture after 1949. Kangxi also set about repairing and restoring important waterways such as the Yellow River, River Huai and the Grand Canal. This was important as these were the major highways of Qing China which transferred goods from southern to northern China, or, more precisely, to Beijing. Water management had always been a major political task as it measured the success or failure of a regime. With good administration, it would enhance irrigation and reduce the frequency of natural disasters. Kangxi’s undertaking was followed up by his son the Yongzheng emperor (reign 1723–1735) who oversaw the construction of dikes along the eastern seaboard in Jiangsu-Zhejiang provinces to protect farmland. These set examples for further development as local officials cleaned up and repaired many rivers and built reservoirs in their provinces. These initiatives were vital to the agriculture and transportation system without which the empire could not function; they regulated water flow and distribution in an agrarian economy and prevented flooding. Knowing the importance of precipitation to agriculture and its potential to trigger disasters, Kangxi and Yongzheng demanded reports on rainfall, natural disasters and crop failure from local officials; the early Qing has left us a wealth of sources on weather, ecological and agricultural change. They also sent spies to check on local situations secretly, keeping a close eye on the vast empire and its fleet of officials in an effort to guard against disasters of all kind. Making land available to peasants, encouraging migration to open up more land and managing water were part of a policy which aimed to restore the agriculture-based economy. This was the age-old strategy, “rest for the people”, which many previous dynasties/ 289

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regimes used in their early years of conquest and also at times of crisis. However, this was not enough for Kanqxi, who also undertook fiscal reforms to reduce the economic burden on peasants. Peasants had to pay many different kinds of taxes. They included those paid in silver according to the number of people in the household, the so-called “head tax”, as well as land tax, levies on grains and tariff due in service. Kangxi adopted the so-called “single whip law” fashioned by the Ming statesman, Zhang Juzheng, which put all taxes under a single payment. This abolished the head tax; in other words, one’s taxation would not increase with each new birth in the household. Tax collection thus became easier to manage and the burden on peasants was reduced. Kangxi sometimes abolished taxation ad hoc depending on the situation. At times of natural disaster, this was most important as it relieved peasants of their usual levy and helped them recover. This was also applied at special occasions, for example, in Kangxi’s 50th year (1712), and for three years, he canceled the one-week grain levy. Yongzheng would go ­f urther by making banner men work to earn a living, rather than relying on imperial handouts and privileges earned by their ancestors who had helped to conquer China. This was not a popular move among the early Qing aristocracy. However, these measures do suggest that Kangxi and Yongzheng were vigilant, hardworking and effective emperors who in their effort to establish the dynasty did their best to restore and grow the economy. Their successor Qianlong more or less continued with the same kind of policy in his long reign in the eighteenth century (in theory lasting 1736–1796, but in practice until 1799).

Food, diversification and cash cropping Did the policy of “rest for the people” improve production and feed the increasing multi-­ ethnic population as conquest gave way to peace and stability? Mainland economic historian Jiang Jianping has done much work on the price of rice which can help us gauge food supply in the early Qing. Rice was sold at about 2 silver taels per dan (a Chinese unit of measurement) when the Manchus came in 1644. This price serves as a benchmark as it began to drop, hitting 0.8 taels during the second year of Kangxi’s reign in 1663. This was when the Manchus pushed down into the Central Plains to conquer China proper as many people, not just Ming soldiers, died or fled to southern China or even Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Less demand made the price drop. This low price remained more or less stable for four decades until the early eighteenth century when it began to climb as life returned to normal, the population increased and the demand for rice, the main staple in the Chinese diet, grew. The increase in prices became sharp during Qianlong’s reign, reaching 3.5 taels in the 1780s. Population growth had driven up the price of rice; it was outgrowing existing capacity. The price of peace and stability had begun to take its toll on China’s food supply. Feeding China was not an easy task. Economic historians like R. Bin Wong have written about the shortage of rice during the long eighteenth century. When the challenge first appeared in the early Qing, Kangxi allowed rice imports from Southeast Asian countries like Siam; this was especially important in disaster-stricken years, and Yongzheng and Qianlong also followed this policy. Although they feared that imports might jeopardize the security of the empire as it could bring in unwanted people, goods and ideas, the need to feed the increasing population was urgent and took precedence. Officials in coastal provinces even invented a mechanism where local Chinese would be awarded for the amount of rice they imported. Hence locals received various official titles and even positions that could only be procured after years of learning, examinations and service to the regime. This was not 290

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unprecedented in Chinese history, but it reveals how desperate the regime was and how pragmatic they were. The emperors’ fear ultimately materialized as the rice trade saw the return of overseas Chinese who had settled in Southeast Asia; it also enabled mainland ­Chinese to sojourn there. They returned with rice, but they also returned with other goods and cultures, including the habit of opium smoking. Opium would soon change the course of Chinese history. But why did the price begin to drop after 1780, when population growth was increasing, some might say exploding? We can measure the Qing’s productivity, the need for foreign imports and the reasons for agricultural diversification. Neither home-grown nor Southeast Asian rice could feed the increasing population. What else was there to feed the Chinese people? The answer lies in what the Chinese called zaliang 雜糧 or “miscellaneous grains”, which included maize and sweet potatoes, labeled as “jade rice” and “foreign yam”. Alien to China, they were brought in by either foreign traders or sojourners to Southeast Asia during the late Ming and early Qing. Although people in the coastal region had cultivated maize and foreign yam ever since they had arrived in China, production was piecemeal and familybased, rather than large-scale, and these crops only served as a supplement to human diet, as they were used in feeding domestic animals as well. The situation changed after the 1780s as maize and foreign yam were cultivated by nearly all rural households. These crops are easy to grow and can be cultivated everywhere, especially in hilly and poor lands; they neither take the best land, nor need much care or labor. Not only are they filling and can be consumed in different ways, they can also be cooked easily in and with other foods. They make wines and great snacks. From a lowbrow dietary supplement, they were transformed into staples on the Chinese dinner table and fed millions. Without “jade rice” and “foreign yam”, the Chinese population could not have increased in the eighteen and early nineteenth centuries. Without them, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and Southeast Asia would have seen more migrants and refugees from China. The result of prolonged peace and stability is clear to see as it put pressure on food supply. How much did the Chinese population grow? It is important for us to see that the origin of the ­ hengming later population explosion lay in increased food production. Xu Dixin and Wu C believed that the population increased from 120 million during the late Ming to 300 million at Qianlong’s reign (1736–1796) and 400 million during the Daoguang emperor’s time (r. 1820– 1850). China’s population more than doubled during the early Qing. The ­result of this was clear to see by the late eighteenth century and has plagued China ever since. From increased land which produced more grains, to imports from Southeast Asia and diversification, the early Qing regime was able to not only feed but also grow China’s population. In addition, it was able to weather natural disasters that began to hit the empire more often than ever ­before. Disaster relief is another indicator of abundant food supply and effective leadership, and has generated much scholarship in recent years. However, it also exposed the consequences of overcultivation, land exhaustion and deforestation as the destruction of the environment led to natural and sometimes man-made disasters. The early emperors watched the empire carefully as their officials reported weather and harvest diligently; they were able to troubleshoot effectively, thanks to the supply of food and their able officials. This changed after these emperors left the scene in the nineteenth century, when China became the “land of famine”. The Chinese economy diversified in the early Qing; it also saw increased cash cropping in a variety of agricultural products, but this was not new. The cultivation of silk as a cash crop began during the Qin-Han era, supplementing household income and helping pay taxes, while early imperial regimes used silk to trade with the Mongols and Central Asians for the horses China needed. This was the same with cotton during the Yuan-Ming dynasties. The 291

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Mongols needed cotton for their increasingly sedentary lifestyle and their ever-growing military machine. The Yuan regime encouraged cotton cultivation and procured it from farmers as “tax in kind”. Although the Mongols were driven out of China by 1368, they still needed the cotton Ming China produced. The Ming regime used both “mandatory fiats and incentive measures” to promote cotton cropping as it used cotton to buy horses from the Mongols and even to pay officials’ salaries. Cotton cash cropping turned the lower Yangzi River delta region into the center of an industry that specialized in dyeing, weaving, wholesale and retail. Thanks to the Yangzi River and the Grand Canal, this industry gave birth to other businesses and galvanized the early Qing economy. Historians have labeled cotton cash cropping China’s “capitalist sprouts” and have used it as evidence for China’s early industrialization. Many of these small-scale household or village-based industries were in the hands of women who worked to support their family and supplement its income. Women would continue to be the driving force of Chinese industrialization in the century after the Opium War, when they worked in modern textile factories. Dwight H. Perkins stated that “cotton was and is China’s most important agricultural crop” during the Ming-Qing dynastic era, and “the raw material for China’s largest handicraft industry and later for China’s first major modern i­ndustry”. 2 Cash cropping had supplemented national as well as individual household income; it defined China’s trade and diplomacy. Cotton played the same role as silk did in early imperial China, but there were other cash crops in the early Qing, some even more significant than cotton. Tobacco was relatively new in comparison to silk and cotton. It appeared in Fujian province during the latter half of the Ming and quickly spread as far north as Manchuria. The Manchus were such heavy smokers that the last emperor to rule from their homeland before they entered China in 1630s, Hong Taiji 皇太極 (1626–1643), issued edicts banning its cultivation and consumption. Tobacco was widely cultivated all over China by the early Qing. What makes tobacco different from cotton is that it was so diversified and commercialized that different localities fashioned their own brands, such as Yunyan 雲煙 or Yunnan tobacco. Chinese tobacco mainly met domestic demand and set the precedent for opium. Fujian, Guangdong and Taiwan were centers of sugar cultivation and production. Blessed by the natural environment, sugar production supplied not only China but also other Asian countries. The coastal province of Fujian seems to be prominent in the story of tobacco and sugar, but it was Fujian’s tea that would change the course of history, not just for China but also for Europe and America. The most important cash crop in the early Qing was tea, as it not only supplied the ­domestic market but also Southeast Asia, Europe and North America. Fujian was the leader in this as the Wuyi Mountain 武夷山 area grew the brands preferred by Europeans. The weather and mountainous environment made Fujian perfect to grow tea, and it was the only livelihood in the region. There were both large farms and small holdings, the latter run mostly by families, clans or village cooperatives. Some only grew and sold fresh tea while others processed it, and local buyers shipped and marketed them in towns and cities, where Wuyi tea exchanged hands among professionals at various guildhalls and occasions in the province and around the country. From producer to consumer, commercial guilds to foreign traders, the mechanism of buying and selling tea was well-established with its own rules by the early Qing. Foreign demand was growing rapidly by the early eighteenth century, and Europeans were beginning to purchase large quantities. Tea to a great extent defined China’s foreign trade during the early Qing. This takes us to the most important aspect of the early Qing economy which would ultimately lead to the First Opium War and the Qing’s decline. 292

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Foreign trade and finance Tea takes us to the early Qing’s export trade, a most important aspect of its economic life. Just as silk and porcelain defined China’s foreign trade during the Han-Tang and Song-Yuan eras, tea rose to characterize China’s foreign relations during the early Qing. The Kangxi emperor relaxed foreign trade after Taiwan was brought into the orbit of the Qing Empire in the 1680s, setting up four maritime customs along the south and eastern seaboard. The court appointed its own agents, hong (hang 行) merchants, to manage foreign trade, who headed gonghang 公行, or cohang, which can be translated as public companies. These companies are more often called yanghang 洋行, which can be translated as Foreign Company, as they served as liaison and security for foreign traders, working directly under the governor-general of the Guangdong-Guangxi region. They procured for the Imperial Household Department, with profits going to imperial coffers. This way, the court had control over foreign trade and its profits, establishing a monopoly of the imperial kind. But the early Qing’s foreign trade was subject to policy change. Kangxi closed it in 1717 due to the “rites controversy”, the Vatican’s quarrel over “dual worship” on the part of Chinese converts to Christianity. Yongzheng reversed his father’s policy in 1727, but this move was overturned by his son, Qianlong, in 1757, who limited foreign trade to only one port, Guangzhou (Canton). This father-and-son tug of war over foreign trade policy did not really matter as imports not only increased in volume but also diversified. Opium is a good case in point as it grew steadily ever since Yongzheng issued the first edict banning its trade and consumption in 1729. Conniving with local officials, the hang merchants found ways to import whatever would make money; they were flexible and resourceful. This exposed problems within the system, and shed light on corruption as merchants bribed officials of different levels and functions. A more powerful testimony to the increased trade and diversification comes from the English East India Company (EIC), which came more often and bought more tea from the 1760s, after the one-port restriction was placed. This testified to the growing volume of foreign trade, hence profit which went directly to the treasury of imperial and local governments. Britain was the largest buyer of tea. It had become addicted to tea and dependent on China for the drink by the mid-eighteenth century when the British government passed the so-called Commutation Act in 1784 in order to ensure its availability. This act required the EIC to provide a year’s stock and reduce its tax from 119 percent to 12.5 percent. High taxation had encouraged smuggling; ending it increased revenues through legitimate sales. The tea trade employed “direct from England 20,000 tons of shipping, and nearly three thousand seamen”, bringing “into the Exchequer annual revenue of about three millions sterling” by the 1780s. The only problem for the EIC was that tea could only be procured from China before the 1860s, when the monopoly was broken as British India began to grow tea, and China only accepted silver for payment and bought little in return from the British except European-made clocks, which the early Qing emperors enjoyed and collected. The imbalance in the trade of tea led to a deficit. This caused problems for Britain, which found it increasingly hard to obtain the large quantities of silver required by its long-distance trade with China. By this point, China had become silver-rich through foreign trade. The British looked for things the Chinese would buy with silver, and they found hope in opium. As China bought more opium toward the mid-late eighteenth century, more silver left China; this outflow would intensify in the early nineteenth century as the demand for opium grew inside China, depleting the country of its stocks of silver and leading ultimately to the First Opium War. Historians have debated the amount of silver brought into China through 293

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foreign trade. Despite disagreement between scholars, we can gauge the early Qing’s silver stock: first, from the amount the regime extracted as tax or contribution from rich merchants, and second, from the outflow of silver in the opium trade by the early nineteenth century: 74 million taels between 1801 and 1826, and 133 million between 1827 and 1849. Tea export highlights the role of foreign trade in the early Qing economy; it also reveals what sustained contact with the outside world would do to the domestic Chinese economy. We have seen the consequences in terms of silver inflow, but there are more important lessons. The early Qing’s foreign trade was closely linked with the Chinese Diaspora, which had been instrumental in the economic life of China since the Ming at the very latest. The Chinese diaspora served as translators for Europeans. They were also the middlemen buying goods from the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia and China, and then selling them on to Europeans, as they could not go into China before the First Opium War. They sent muchneeded rice to the mainland and also brought home new consumer goods and cultures, such as opium smoking. Soon, the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asian countries came to grow whatever goods China demanded, opium being a clear example, turning the region into an “offshore production zone for China”. This process continues today. Recent scholarship has pushed for a more nuanced economic history by integrating maritime trade and diaspora studies into mainstream Chinese history. The early Qing is a watershed in the longue durée as it saw increased trade with the outside world. The early Qing was the turning point in China’s foreign trade which, from the Han dynasty, had been limited to luxurious and exotic items destined for the court and princely/ elite households. This pattern of trade remained until the latter half of the Ming as two new categories appeared after the usual luxury sorts: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7



Fragrances and spices Rare birds and animals Exotic and precious things Herbs and herbal medicines Weaponry Handicraft raw materials Handicrafts, textiles and household appliances.

The first four categories had been stable imports from the Han-Tang era. But categories six and seven were new, beginning with the Ming. For the first time in Chinese history, ordinary consumer and household items entered the privileged list of foreign imports. This process would intensify during the early Qing and become the norm by the early nineteenth century. Xiamen Gazetteer (Xiamen zhi 廈門志) and History of Guangdong Customs (Yue ­haiguan zhi 粵海關志), both published in the early nineteenth century, recorded imports taxed by these two customs and their records included only textile and garments, foodstuff and sundry goods, household items and raw materials. Exotic luxury goods such as fragrances and spices disappeared from the inventory of import by the early nineteenth century. The early Qing is significant in the story because it was during this period that change occurred – China’s foreign trade was transformed as it became driven by consumer needs, rather than by those of the court and elite. This was a milestone in the history of maritime trade, as consumers for the first time dictated the gist of foreign trade. What propelled this change and what does the change tell us? First of all, the change indicates that there was probably demand for imported ordinary consumer and household goods, or at least a market which could be exploited. This in turn 294

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leads to the following obvious questions: Does it mean that China could no longer meet its own demand when it came to such basic consumer goods as textiles, foods and household items? Did population growth outstrip the Qing’s capacity or had Qing technology fallen behind, thus making Chinese goods less competitive? One cannot answer these questions without more research, but some preliminary conjectures can be made with the facts we already know. The rapid expansion of China’s population, from 120 million during the late Ming to 300 million in the early Qing, would have undoubtedly put pressure on food supply as we have seen in the case of rice; this would be extended to other ordinary consumer and household items. If new technology did not emerge to increase production, existing supply could not meet the increasing demand. As in the case of rice, foreign import became one source of supply and the hang merchants were more than happy to facilitate this as they themselves profited from it enormously; the hang were not, of course, the only beneficiaries of increased demand for foreign goods as we shall see in the following section. Secondly, this increased demand for foreign goods points to a consumer trend where consumers simply preferred goods, the so called yanghuo 洋貨 or “foreign stuff”, from outside of China. This is not therefore a question simply of demand but about taste and socio-cultural distinction. In turn, it points us to the increasing sophistication of Qing’s consumer culture. In other words, China’s own foodstuff and textiles, among other goods, might not have been sufficiently fashionable or able to guarantee status for rich consumers and those willing to pay in order to “keep up with the Joneses”. Tobacco and opium provide good examples and contrasts. Tobacco had been indigenized by the late Ming and widely cultivated during the early Qing; it was something ordinary that everyone could afford. But opium was different; it was new, foreign and trendy, and it could only be procured through foreign trade, making it more expensive and indicative of status. Other popular “foreign stuff” included clocks, exotic and costly imports that only the emperors and ranking officials could afford. Some yanghuo would transform from court and elite luxuries to popular consumer goods, but this depended on a few important variables without which their consumption could not translate into mass demand. This leads us to the internal trade and commerce that worked in tandem with foreign trade.

Urbanization and mass consumption Taste alone does not provide an opportunity for trade and cannot translate into demand if there is no supply chain able to meet it and turn it into a market. The hang merchants put in charge of foreign trade in Guangzhou could not function without the commercial networks that bought from them and transported foreign goods to all corners of the far-flung empire. These networks were long established and specialized organizations that were controlled by the various shangbang 商帮 or Commercial Consortiums, business operators that originated from a common locality and engaged in long-distance trade and haulage. The study of business history might be new in the West, but the existence and power of local Commercial Consortiums has a long story in China. Mainland historians agree that they flourished during the Ming-Qing dynastic era as a result of rapid commercialization and there are a dozen notable consortiums such as Shaanxi shangbang or Shaanxi Commercial Syndicate. Although they originated from Shaanxi, they conducted businesses and built guildhalls in big cities like Beijing and Guangzhou. Their guildhalls were not just places of business for members but also hotels for students who journeyed to the capital for imperial examinations and officials who traveled on business. Similarly to home-town associations, they provided support and a venue for networking of all kinds. 295

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Without commercial consortiums and their affiliates working around the country, foreign goods like clocks and opium would not have reached China’s big cities, small towns and even villages. Their business was to trade and transport goods from one place to another for wholesale or retail. But they could not have operated smoothly without such agencies as biaoju 鏢局 or the Escort Bureau. The Qing inherited the Ming mechanism to use silver for large transactions, but carrying large quantities of currency in long journey put merchants at risk of theft and attacks of all kind. The need for protection gave rise to security companies, who acted as merchants’ warriors, as those with martial skills and weapons protected merchants and their goods during prolonged travel. Although the Escort Bureau has a long history in China, as many businesses and rich families used its service, its commercialization and professionalization intensified during the early Qing as inter-regional long-­d istance trade increased and security became a major issue. Why did security become an issue during the Qing? Early Qing land enclosure, the outbreak of many natural disasters, increasing population and poverty – China’s changing social environment, in a nutshell – were major factors. Inter-regional long-distance trade also demanded a financial system that could facilitate large transactions in silver. This led to the emergence of piaohao 票號 or Notes Hall, which were banks where the earnings could be deposited in one city and cashed in another with a note from a bank. This reduced the risk of carrying and moving silver, which was heavy and bulky, and it brought down the cost of transaction and enhanced the circulation of both goods and money. Bank notes or paper money emerged in the Song and were used during the Yuan dynasty as the extended Mongol empire demanded a monetary mechanism that facilitated global trade. These were products of increasingly long-distance and foreign trade since Yuan-Ming times, when they became institutionalized. Their prominence in the early Qing is a powerful testimony to the augmentation of foreign as well as domestic trade. Among the most enduring of these banks were those from Taigu or the Shanxi bankers who operated until modern banks emerged in the early twentieth century. Taigu 太谷 has been called China’s Wall Street. Commercial consortiums, escort bureaus, and banks initiated, protected and facilitated large, cross-regional long-distance trade; they were testimony to increased trade, money circulation and specialization in the early Qing economy. Commercial guilds, escort companies and banks all operated in towns and cities where merchants converged and where goods were advertised, bought and sold, either wholesale or retail. Many historians agree that Ming-Qing China saw increased urbanization and some have written about individual cities that were centers of commerce and culture. What marks the early Qing is that small towns grew into cities and old cities grew into regional and national metropolises. They grew not because they were seats of governments but because they were hubs of commerce and finance, of mass consumption and industry such as handicrafts. The economic center of life permanently shifted from the countryside to towns and cities, something which can be seen from the emergence of new institutions and, with it, new ­professions, consumer goods and trends (as mentioned above). Some towns and cities became pillars of the early Qing economy. Beijing was not just home to the Manchu court and national government but also residence to nearly 200 Commercial Consortiums that specialized in different kinds of goods. Their guildhalls were not just places for business and hotels; they were also restaurants and theaters for those from the same town or province, a home away from home which allowed students, officials, merchants and bankers to mingle and network. They spread provincial food and culture to the capital, and also advertised new fashions in their home towns and 296

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provinces. They spread news, intelligence and gossip of all sorts as they traveled across the whole country. Even more important were cities like Hankou. Sitting on the Yangzi River which connects to the Grand Canal and on the spine of the country from Beijing to Guangdong passing through many strategic towns and cities along the way, Hankou literally sits in the heart and crossroads of China. It was absolutely vital as the depot and transit station for both people and goods from many directions. Its geographic location contributed to its rising importance during the early Qing, which continued in the late Qing as many foreign countries established consulate offices in the city. The railway from Beijing to Guangzhou passes through Hankou, and the retreat during the Anti-Japanese War from the capital, Nanjing, to the wartime capital, Chongqing, was greatly facilitated by the city and its waterways. Increasing urbanization since the Ming turned the lower Yangzi River delta region, known as Jiangnan, into China’s capital of commerce and culture of consumption. ­Suzhou, China’s “heaven on earth”, was the most developed city in early Qing not just because of its geographic location on the Grand Canal and at the heart of the delta region connected to Nanjing, old capital and seat of regional government. It was also where the royal manufactory, Suzhou Textile Bureau, was located and the heart of the textile trade. Its sophisticated taste and culture defined royal style and set the trend for the nation. Shanghai would take over that role after the First Opium War when Western culture and style began to invade China. Guangzhou, which foreign traders and missionaries called Canton, was another regional hub, as it was the destination of all export goods and arrival port of foreign goods. This ancient maritime region was quietly replacing Suzhou and Jiangnan region to become the source of exotic foreign goods, such as European-made clocks that were sought after by the Qing court and the rich, and foreign cultures of consumption, such as opium smoking. Consumer taste and culture were changing in the early Qing. There were many important towns and cities in the economic life of the early Qing, such as Yangzhou, capital of China’s salt trade, and Foshan, capital of the country’s iron industry. Towns and cities were not just commercial and financial hubs, they were also cultural centers where taste was fashioned and trend was set. Regional metropolis like Hankou, Suzhou and Guangzhou were where the rich and the educated elite lived; they had the taste and capital for new exotic foreign goods. This Chinese desire for “foreign goods” has been labeled “wind of the West Ocean” (Xiyang feng 西洋風). It began to blow during the Ming and intensified and became a trend during the early Qing. The fashion for “foreign goods” discriminated against local Chinese goods in preference for foreign imports, which were rare, expensive and status symbols. European-made clocks were a clear example. Introduced by Jesuit missionaries during the late Ming, clocks became a status symbol in the early Qing and were highly sought-after. The Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors were enthusiastic collectors, and their palaces were filled with these exotic, expensive and indulgent timepieces. The emperors set the example as the elite and soon the upper middle classes began to covet clocks as well. Otter fur offers another example. Manchus used to be proud to wear mink fur, native to Manchuria. In the early Qing, however, sea otter of North Pacific Ocean became the fashion. China’s demand led to a race among Russians, Canadians and Americans with devastating consequences for the animal. In addition to clocks and fur, opium offers a great example of changing tastes and new consumer culture. Opium was initially smoked with tobacco, an ordinary commodity available to everyone, as rice imports brought many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia home to the coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong during the early Qing. But when China’s 297

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urban elite picked up opium in the eighteenth century, they reinvented it and transformed it into a fashionable consumer item. This can be seen from the fact that opium smoking first emerged in taste-making and trend-setting cities like Guangzhou and Yangzhou long before the opium wars in the mid-eighteenth century, and from the industries that opium was integrated in: restaurants, teahouses and brothels. Elite consumption does not necessarily translate into a general consumer trend, as can be seen from the case of clocks. Opium smoking would not have flourished without keen-eyed market operators who saw its potential and quickly set up shops to facilitate and promote its consumption. These market operators included overseas Chinese who would soon cultivate opium in Southeast Asia, supplying the mainland market. They were emulated by peasants on the mainland who switched to grow opium as they had with tobacco, turning it into a cash crop, and they would be followed by the various “opium regimes”. Without the foundations laid in the early Qing, opium smoking would not have spread with such speed in the late Qing.

Industrialization and concluding thoughts When central-eastern China became the center of commerce and culture, the northern plains and southern-western China saw early industrialization in mining. The provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, Guangxi and Guangdong were home to a wide range of minerals, metals and other natural resources, such as phosphate, tin, zinc, lead, copper, antimony mine, iron and natural gas. Salt mining, for example, began in what is today Sichuan more than 2,000 years ago before the Middle Kingdom existed. It had always been a profitable, specialized and complex industry licensed and taxed by the government. The salt industry had its investors, and there were many guild merchants; there were also small holdings made up of friends and family who were entitled to dividends. There were guilds that specialized in wholesale, those that specialized in long-distance transportation and those that specialized in retail. Salt merchants were the richest before opium came along. One estimate suggests that there were 6,116 mines during Yongzheng’s 9 (1731); this increased steadily in the following century to 8,832 mines in Jiaqing 25 (1820). These figures do not include private and illegal mines, which managed to dodge regulation and taxes. Copper mining began in Yunnan during the Han-Tang era and intensified during the Song-Yuan period as China’s copper coins became the currency of transaction in many countries in Asia and beyond, as a result of intensified regional-global trade. Anyone who controlled the region would benefit from the enormous profit copper generated and could control money supply. The province was in the hands of General Wu Sangui 吳三桂 in the early Qing. After the Qing pacified the “three feudatories”, who included Wu in the late 1680s, the Kangxi emperor banned all kinds of mining in south-western China. Mining, like maritime trade, was subjected to policy change. Despite prohibition, mining went on in many areas, and the Qing regime finally realized that it was better to keep it under its own regulation, rather than leaving it to local control, not just because they needed copper but also because as Yunnan was a vital frontier. The region concerned national security, as it bordered foreign countries and could easily harbor rebels, as it had in the late Ming and early Qing. Guizhou and Hunan also mined copper, as did Jiangxi. Guangdong was home to iron ore, another important material for the production of household utensils and more importantly weapons. Foshan 佛山 was the capital of ­China’s iron industry during the Ming as it was licensed by the government to produce both domestic utensils and military equipment. This continued during the early Qing, when Foshan was dotted with furnaces employing tens of thousands of workers. Iron made the 298

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town famous, and it led to early industrialization. But this was not limited to Foshan and Guangdong, as neighboring Hunan was also mining and producing iron. Where southern China was blessed with minerals and metals, northern China was blessed with coal. The province of Shanxi had the largest coal deposits. Written records suggest that mining began at least in the Northern Wei period (386–534). This intensified during the Song when gunpowder was invented and regimes fought for to control coal, which was used to derive sulfur, the major ingredient for making gunpowder. Like its predecessors, the early Qing regime and the Qianlong emperor in particular, encouraged and regulated coal-mining. Coal was transported to many parts of the country for military, industrial and domestic uses. I end my discussion of the early Qing with industrialization for a good reason. Iron and coal defined the Industrial Revolution which enabled Britain to race ahead, and they have been at the heart of the academic debate centered on the “Great Divergence” that has tried to explain how and why China fell behind Western Europe, and behind Britain in particular, in the eighteenth century. Even before this debate had begun, historians of China were aware that the Middle Kingdom was endowed with everything that Britain had and more, and that it was more advanced technologically and richer, due to the influx of the world’s silver from the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, as we have seen in this c­ hapter. Although the “Great Divergence” is not the focus of this chapter, it can help us see the stagnation of the early Qing. The early Qing regime was able to restore the economy and feed the increasing population through an array of mechanisms: making land available and encouraging migration, diversification and foreign imports. But these mechanisms were established under the leadership of vigilant and able emperors, rather than technological innovation and increased productivity. Once they left the scene, the consequences of land exhaustion and overpopulation began to hit the country; in the absence of effective leadership, these turned China into the “land of famine”. Although increased foreign trade brought a massive influx of silver, making the early Qing rich, the regime limited foreign trade despite its pragmatic policy on rice import. This restriction contributed to the growth of opium imports. Had Chinese emperors maintained an open policy where foreign traders could sell according to demand, Chinese consumers might well have bought more clocks rather than opium. The case of opium makes a mockery of the Qing’s policy, as its regulation never worked – the 1729 prohibition only saw its growing popularity and consumption in subsequent years. It also points to the fact that the early Qing regime had no control on the economy as opium smoking grew into a fashionable consumer culture under its nose. Historians have traditionally underestimated the role of China’s foreign trade in the early Qing economy; this chapter has tried to address that. Population and cultivable land grew, as did foreign trade, commerce, consumption, towns and cities. It would seem that the early Qing saw growth. Nonetheless, this growth was accompanied by stagnation and it was not sustainable, to use contemporary jargon, for several key reasons. (1) It relied heavily on the leadership of able emperors whose departure would and did see a difference. (2) Its foreign trade was dependent on currency over which the regime had no control and on a single commodity which could be replaced once a solution was found, as Britain began to grow its own tea in India since the 1860s. (3) The seeming growth came at the cost of the natural environment, the consequences of which were already manifesting in the early Qing. (4) Despite the commercial guilds and banks, commerce and industry were operated by family on the micro level, limiting capital accumulation and investment. (5) Worst of all, there was no innovation as dated technology continued to 299

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function. Once the effective leadership and foreign demand that had generated wealth were gone, the backwardness of China’s technology and the consequences of environmental destruction began to plague the Qing. The early Qing was crucial in the making and our understanding of the late Qing. It also helps put the comparative success of Western Europe in perspective. Historians have often contrasted the early Qing where China appeared to be rich and powerful with the late Qing where she was reduced to the “sick man of Asia”. But the “seeds of destruction” were already sown in the “last golden age”.

Notes 1 Hucker, China’s Imperial Past, 296. 2 Quoted in Chao, The Development of Cotton Textile Production in China, 16.

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Qing maritime trade in the age of imperialism For the first 40 years of Manchu rule, the rulers of the Qing dynasty prohibited coastal trade to decrease the likelihood of a seaborne attack by supporters of the vanquished Ming. In 1684, however, after having extinguished the last sparks of Ming loyalism, the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661–1772) authorized the opening of four cities in South China to direct maritime trade with Europe. For the next 75 years, trade was conducted freely at these ports. On the European side, trade was fueled by a voracious demand for Chinese tea, silks, and porcelain. On the Chinese side, population growth, wealth accumulation, and increasing specialization encouraged the steady expansion of maritime commerce. Although the government’s formal policy remained anti-commercial, in keeping with the traditional Confucian ideology deprecating trade, the mid-Qing rulers were open to pursuing commercial relations with other countries as long as there was no threat to China’s internal stability.

The Canton System, 1757–1842 The multiport trade system continued until 1757, when the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735–1796) placed greater controls on maritime trade in response to perceived political and economic threats from abroad. To limit Westerners’ movements and influence in China, the emperor established a single-port commerce policy (yikou tongshang 一口通商) known as the Canton System, which restricted maritime trade to the southern coastal city of Canton (Guangzhou) in Guangdong province. Under the Canton System, European merchants were required to live in foreign enclaves known as “factories” (a derivation of “factor,” a type of mercantile agent). The factories were located outside the city walls of Guangzhou and combined the functions of trading post, warehouse, and living quarters. From 1758 until the collapse of the Canton System in 1842, the factories were the only places that foreigners could legally live and work in China. Within the restrictive and monopolistic framework of the Canton System, all maritime commerce was handled by a dozen or so officially licensed Chinese brokers (hang 行, Anglicized as “hong”). Collectively known as the Cohong (gonghang 公行), these officially authorized merchants were responsible for controlling all foreigners and their vessels, and had monopoly over all imports and exports – similar to the monopolistic rights that had been 301

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granted to the British East India Company and Dutch East India Company by their home governments. They had sole responsibility for buying and selling goods, negotiating prices, establishing tariffs, and controlling smuggling. They also supported militia and educational institutions, managed the factories, and acted as intermediaries between foreign merchants and the Qing government. During the heyday of the Canton System, the hong merchants wielded enormous influence, allowing some – most notably, Houqua (Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑, 1769–1843), a leading hong merchant who was once one of the richest men in the world – to amass huge personal fortunes. Taxes on foreign trade were paid to the Superintendent of Maritime Customs, better known to Westerners as the “Hoppo” (most likely a distortion of Hubu 戶部, the Chinese term for “Board of Revenue,” which was the central government office in charge of state finances). The Hoppo was a representative of the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu 內務府), a Beijing-based agency whose primary role was to manage the internal finances and household affairs of the imperial family, but which also played an important role in Qing foreign relations. The Hoppo was responsible for controlling shipping, collecting tariffs, and maintaining order in Canton, as well as for ensuring that the profits from trade would not be handled through the normal bureaucratic channels, but would be sent directly to the Imperial Household Department – which also operated as the emperor’s privy purse.

Problems with the Canton System Although foreign merchants chafed at the restrictions on their movement and autonomy, the Canton trade was extremely lucrative for Chinese and European merchants alike. ­According to a number of Western traders, Canton was one of the best ports in the world in the 1820s and 1830s, offering relatively convenient access to Chinese goods at a single port of call, without having to travel to the interior. Moreover, the Cohong system offered such immense profits that European traders and their home governments were willing to accept its inconveniences and let well enough alone. However, as European demand for Chinese goods ­increased and the Industrial Revolution led them to seek more markets for their manufactures, the disadvantages of the one-port system became more apparent. Merchants began agitating for an expanded and freer system of trade, and felt that the Canton System, which emphasized containment of international commerce, was ill-equipped to provide it. Contributing to European frustration with the status quo was the chronic trade imbalance with China. Before the 1800s, European demand for tea, silk, and chinoiserie (­ lacquer, porcelain, and other novelties) outpaced Chinese demand for European manufactures. Much of the imbalance can be attributed to rising exports of tea, which increased from 2.6 ­m illion pounds in 1761 to more than 23.3 million pounds by 1800. Lacking a product that the Chinese were willing to purchase in comparable amounts, foreign merchants paid for the balance of their imports with silver from continental Europe and Mexico. During the ­1722–1723 season, silver made up at least 90 percent of the cargo en route to Canton. From the mid-seventeenth century, around 28 million kilograms of silver poured into China, principally from European powers, in exchange for Chinese goods. By the late eighteenth century, British traders began lobbying their government to sponsor an embassy to China to promote their commercial and diplomatic interests. In 1793, King George III appointed Lord George Macartney, a colonial administrator and statesman, to lead a mission to China to negotiate greater access to the Chinese market and to request a permanent British embassy in Beijing. Although Macartney was granted an audience with the reigning Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–1796), the mission achieved none of its official 302

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objectives. Similar embassies were launched by the English peer Lord Napier in 1834, and by the Dutch in 1794 and the Russians in 1805, but these too ended in failure. When diplomacy proved unsuccessful, European governments began exploring other strategies to resolve their balance of payments deficit and to broaden their economic and political footprint in China.

The opium trade Opium, a highly addictive narcotic that was small in bulk, but high in value, proved to be the solution to Europe’s trade dilemma. A derivative of the poppy, opium had been used for medicinal purposes since the Tang dynasty (618–907). By the seventeenth century, ­Chinese from the coastal areas of Fujian and Guangdong had begun mixing it with tobacco and smoking it, and in the eighteenth century, it became popular to burn opium extract over a lamp and inhale the fumes through a pipe, a practice that continued well into the twentieth century. To meet the growing demand, the British invested in the cultivation of Indian opium for export to China. Opium soon became an integral part of the triangular ­British-Indian-Chinese trade network, in which Britain exported cotton manufactures to India and India exported raw cotton and opium to China in exchange for silver, which was later used to purchase Chinese tea and silk for the British market. Opium exports to China steadily expanded during the nineteenth century, largely through the efforts of the British East India Company. However, since the Company was not allowed to participate directly in the opium trade, beginning in 1729, it began licensing private traders to smuggle opium into China. British merchant firms like Jardine, M ­ atheson & Company, and its primary rivals Dent & Company and Russell & Company, emerged as key players in the “country trade,” referring to the traffic in products between India and China by private traders. Other European countries and the United States soon joined the opium trade, forming their own agency houses and earning fortunes in the process. Over the next century, these companies expanded their coastal traffic, invested in new and faster clipper ships, and extended the traffic farther north and farther inland. As early as 1787, opium provided over half the funds required for the purchase of tea. By 1804, the European trade deficit with China had turned into a surplus, with some seven million silver dollars flooding out of China to India, and from there to Britain, between 1806 and 1809. According to economic historian Lin Man-houng, the annual average of opium imports was 4,600 piculs (dan, approximately 133.3 pounds) in 1811–1820; 10,400 piculs in 1821–1830; 26,000 piculs in 1831–1840; 40,500 piculs in 1841–1850; and 68,000 piculs in 1851–1860. The opium traffic was so lucrative that Eliza Morrison, the widow of Robert Morrison, writing in 1839, claimed she knew of only one foreign trader in Canton who did not engage in the opium trade.

Gunboat diplomacy and self-strengthening The reverse flow of silver and rising number of addicts caused alarm within the Qing court and bureaucracy, prompting a search for solutions to the opium problem. Between 1813 and 1815, concern over the worsening balance of trade led the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796–1820) to prohibit further opium imports and to enact new regulations to punish users and suppliers of the drug. Despite these policies, the opium trade continued to expand, particularly after the 1830s when the British East India Company’s monopoly ended, sparking increased competition and a rapid growth of the country trade. In 1838, the Daoguang emperor (r. 1820–1850) appointed Lin Zexu 林則徐, an official known for his scholarly brilliance and moral rectitude, 303

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to the post of Imperial Commissioner with the task of eradicating the opium trade. To help him suppress the opium traffic, Lin was granted plenipotentiary powers and supreme command of Canton’s naval fleet.

Lin Zexu and the Opium War The task of eradicating the opium trade was daunting because it not only involved dealing with foreign merchants, but also in fighting native vested interests, including sellers, buyers, and users of the drug as well as the officials charged with its interdiction. Lin’s multipronged strategy to halt the illegal importation of opium into China included a direct appeal to the reigning British monarch Queen Victoria (1837–1901). In an open letter to the British monarch, which was later published in the Times of London, he urged her to halt the trade, writing: “There are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making a great profit…. By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people?”1 There is no evidence that the queen received the letter, but even if she had it is questionable whether she would have taken action to stop the opium trade, which had brought wealth and prosperity to British merchants and the government. Lin also cracked down on suppliers and users of the drug. In 1839, he arrested more than 1,700 Chinese opium dealers and confiscated some 70,000 opium pipes. He banned further sales of opium and demanded that foreign merchants hand over existing supplies of the drug to the Chinese government without compensation. When they refused, he closed the channel to Canton and held fifteen of the most notorious opium traffickers, including members of the Jardine, Matheson, and Dent families, under virtual siege in their factories. Lin then directed Chinese troops to board British ships anchored in international waters, outside Chinese jurisdiction, where their cargo was still legal, and destroy the opium stores. Over a 23-day period, more than 20,000 chests of opium, valued at 2.66 million pounds, were destroyed. The British government, although not officially denying China’s right to control imports of the drug, objected to the seizure and demanded compensation. The Chinese government refused, a decision that triggered the First Opium War (1839–1842). Open hostilities ­between China and Britain began in 1839. British gunboats, armed with the latest in firepower, inflicted a decisive defeat over the Qing navy, ravaging China’s coastal defenses in a series of battles. This strategy, later referred to as “gunboat diplomacy,” culminated with the signing of ­ uropean the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, the first of many “unequal treaties” through which E governments received major concessions from China while granting nothing in return.

The new treaty system The Treaty of Nanjing ended the Canton System and ushered in an era of foreign intervention and domestic decline, popularly referred to by modern Chinese as the “Century of Humiliation.” According to the terms of the treaty, Britain gained the right to establish a diplomatic presence in China and British subjects were granted extraterritorial privileges. Under the system of extraterritoriality, foreigners were not bound by local laws, but by the civil and criminal laws of their home country. In addition, China was forced to open five additional ports to foreign trade, cede the island of Hong Kong to Britain “in perpetuity,” unilaterally fix Chinese tariffs at a low rate, and pay an indemnity of 21 million silver dollars to compensate for Britain’s war losses. The Treaty of Nanjing was followed by similar agreements with the United States, France, and other nations, further undermining China’s traditional mechanisms of foreign relations and trade. 304

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The Qing government was again humiliated in the Arrow War (1856–1860), which began as a minor diplomatic disagreement and developed into a multi-year conflict pitting China against Britain, the United States, France, and Russia. The catalyst was an alleged insult to the British flag, purportedly perpetrated by Chinese officers during their seizure of a merchant vessel called the Arrow on suspicion of piracy. Because the vessel formerly had been registered in Hong Kong, Harry Parkes, the acting British consul in Canton, asserted that it was entitled to fly the British flag and claim British protection. The facts of the incident were disputed by the Chinese side; however, the British and their imperialist allies used the event as justification for the use of force in order to press for greater diplomatic and trade rights in China. The Arrow War ended with defeat for China and the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858 (ratified by the Convention of Beijing in 1860), which resulted in the further opening of the country to Western diplomats, merchants, and Christian missionaries; the legalization of the opium trade; and the exaction of a crippling 16 million tael indemnity. These indignities culminated with the flight and subsequent death of the Xianfeng emperor (r. 1850–1861) and the destruction by British and French troops of the Yuanming Yuan 圓明園 (Garden of Perpetual Brightness), a complex of palaces and gardens on the outskirts of Beijing. During the second half of the nineteenth century, European powers and the Empire of Japan – which China had traditionally considered to be a vassal state – continued their strategy of using gunboat diplomacy to gain political and economic advantages, which they enforced through a succession of unequal treaties. As a result of the treaty provisions, Christian missionaries were allowed to move freely and openly proselytize throughout the empire, increasing tensions between resident foreigners and the native population. The number of treaty ports continued to expand – by 1917 there were ninety-two of them – and some were placed under outright foreign administration. Making matters worse for China was the “most favored nation” clause, which guaranteed that any privilege given to one imperialist power would be shared automatically with the others, further undermining the government’s authority.

Reform and reaction The political unraveling of the Qing dynasty at the hands of the imperialist powers led to increased calls for change. Progressive reformers like the scholar-official Feng Guifen 馮桂芬 (1808–1874) advocated building upon a foundation (ti 體) of traditional Confucian ­values and institutions, but modifying them with Western techniques (yong 用) for achieving wealth and power. More conservative thinkers, such as the Mongol bannerman and statesman Woren 倭仁 (1804–1871), opposed the introduction of “Western methods,” claiming that the goals of Western science and technology were incompatible with Chinese values and ideals. True to his Confucian training, Woren argued that the only way to raise the Qing Empire from its state of decline was to reject foreign techniques and learning and reaffirm the supremacy of China’s traditional moral principles. The accession of a new emperor in 1861 helped to determine the direction of the reform movement. After the death of the Xianfeng emperor (r. 1850–1861), his 5-year-old son, the Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1861–1875), ascended the throne. Following a brief struggle for power, Prince Gong (half-brother to the Xianfeng emperor and uncle to the T ­ ongzhi emperor) was appointed co-regent, serving partnership with the two dowager empresses: Ci’an 慈安 (primary consort to the former emperor) and empress-mother Cixi 慈禧 (mother of the reigning emperor). As de facto head of state, Prince Gong launched a “Self-­Strengthening” movement emphasizing diplomatic cooperation, industrial development, and military strength. To 305

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this end, in 1861, the government established the Zongli Yamen 總理衙門 (lit. “Office of General Management”), a new central government office in charge of foreign affairs. The inauguration of the Zongli Yamen signaled a new era in Sino-foreign relations, with a greater emphasis on diplomatic cooperation and mutual understanding. The new office oversaw many of China’s self-strengthening efforts, including the sponsorship of foreign language schools and translation bureaus, as well as the promotion of Western learning, scientific knowledge, military modernization, and industrial development. The office also took the lead in sending Chinese students to foreign universities so that they could gain a broader understanding of the outside world. Upon their return, many of these students made significant contributions to China’s modernization efforts. Another emphasis of the Self-Strengthening movement was improving China’s defense, which required a concurrent investment in military industry, training, and communications. Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811–1872), a highly respected statesman and military hero, established an ironworks in Shanghai that later became the Jiangnan Arsenal, a major manufacturer of armaments in the 1860s and 1870s. In developing the arsenal, he relied at first on machinery purchased from abroad and the advice of Western experts, who were employed to instruct Chinese in the manufacture and use of arms. The arsenal also had a translation bureau, which translated foreign works into Chinese. Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1902), a military general who became one of China’s leading industrialists, founded the Tianjin Military Academy, staffed by German officers, which taught military tactics, science, foreign languages, and technical subjects. He also established arsenals in Nanjing and Tianjin, and created an industrial empire of railways, factories, and mines, many of which were run by Western experts. Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 (1812–1885), a military leader who participated in the campaign against the Taipings, established a naval academy specializing in the teaching of foreign languages, navigation, and shipbuilding, and oversaw the construction of the Fuzhou Dockyard, which began operations using machines purchased from France. For a time it appears that the reforms might be successful at halting the Qing decline. ­Foreign governments, including Britain, France, and the United States, favored a ­conciliatory policy toward the dynasty, believing that a peaceful, prosperous, and stable China was in their common interest. However, their enthusiasm faded as it became clear that the reformers were not looking to fundamentally change China’s political and economic institutions, but only wanted to borrow elements of Western science and technology to help strengthen the existing system. Moreover, as Mary Claybaugh Wright has discussed, many Westerners were looking for quick results, and when progress did not come about quickly enough, they became less supportive of China’s reform efforts. However, the greatest obstacles to reform did not come from outside forces, but rose up within the Qing court. Even the gradual modernization program advocated by Prince Gong and his allies was opposed by conservatives within the court, who were suspicious of foreign influence and wary of change. Leading the conservative faction was the Empress Dowager Cixi, who had begun her palace life as a minor concubine to the Xianfeng emperor, but who had risen to prominence when her son acceded to the throne. For 14 years she served as co-regent for the emperor, and as her power and status grew, her support for Prince Gong and his reforms waned. Increasingly, she began to undermine Prince Gong’s influence, leading to his removal from power in 1884. Cixi continued to dominate her son – and through him the Qing court – until his death at the age of nineteen. She then manipulated events so that her 4-year-old nephew, the Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875–1908), would succeed him, allowing her to continue functioning as de facto ruler of China and principal obstacle to reform for another 34 years. 306

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Domestic challenges and the rise of rebellion In addition to the imperialist threat, the late-Qing government also had to deal with internal crises including natural disasters, crumbling infrastructure, and widespread poverty and famine, the effects of which were exacerbated by a demographic surge. Between the late seventeenth century and the end of the eighteenth century, the population more than doubled from nearly 150 million to over 300 million. By 1850, it had risen to 430 million, placing an enormous strain on already scarce resources. Despite agricultural advances such as better irrigation, improved fertilizers, the development of faster-growing and higher yielding varieties of rice, and the introduction of new crops such as maize, sweet potatoes, and peanuts from the Americas, food production could not keep up with the population explosion. Historian Ho Ping-ti writes that by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Chinese economy could no longer sustain an ever-increasing population without overstraining itself.

A time of crisis As land parcels shrank, peasants tilled marginal lands and cleared forests in search of arable land, but these short-term gains often led to longer-term problems of soil erosion and flooding. Adding to the peasants’ suffering was a succession of natural disasters during the nineteenth century. In 1855, the Yellow River broke out of its channel, causing a series of floods and tens of thousands of deaths. Between 1873 and 1879, three years of drought and subsequent famine in five northern provinces led to an additional 9.5 million deaths, and devastating flood of the Yellow River in 1887 killed nearly two million more. The impact of these natural disasters was intensified by the failure of the Qing government to maintain vital infrastructure, such as the Yellow River dike system, and a dearth of funds for disaster relief, much of which had been misappropriated by corrupt officials. Changes in the Qing economy further burdened the Chinese populace. An extravagant imperial court, bureaucratic corruption, heavy taxes, and rampant inflation (as much as 300 percent during the eighteenth century) resulted in falling incomes and a rise in real prices for many people. Further economic challenges stemmed from ongoing increases in the price of silver in the first half of the nineteenth century, the result of rising imports of opium, a relatively sluggish market for Chinese exports, and a global decrease in silver production. According to Lin Man-houng, the market price of silver rose from 1,040 copper cash (wen) per 1 liang of silver ingots in 1808 to 1,637 in 1838, an increase of 600 wen in 30 years. Over the next decade, the rate increased even faster, increasing another 600 wen to 2,355 in 1849. The rising price of silver led to a rise in real prices for many Chinese. China had a ­bimetallic monetary system in which taxes and other large transactions were paid in silver, while other transactions were paid in copper coins. Commoners, who were paid in copper but whose tax payments were pegged to the price of the silver, saw their incomes decline and their costs rise in real terms. Even though many household items could be bought with copper coins, their real prices were affected by the silver’s appreciation relative to copper, because merchants generally purchased these products using silver and passed on the cost increases to consumers. The increasing cost of silver relative to copper also affected government finances. When commoners could no longer afford to convert their copper cash to silver in order to pay their taxes, the government received less revenue. However, even as government revenues fell, administrative costs continued to rise, since taxes were paid in copper and most public 307

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expenditures were paid in silver, which the government had to purchase at the market rate. Some Qing scholars have argued that the early nineteenth-century silver crisis may have reduced China’s wealth by one half.

The rise of rebellion The confluence of demographic pressures, natural calamities, economic woes, and a weak and corrupt bureaucracy created an explosive situation throughout much of China in the mid- and late-nineteenth century. Many peasants resorted to female infanticide, slavery, trafficking, and cannibalism to survive, while others turned to banditry, piracy, smuggling, and kidnapping, or joined secret societies to earn their livelihoods. The problem was particularly acute in southern and western China, where the ravages of flood, famine, and disease had been the most widespread. Frustration with the status quo led many poor peasants, the chronically unemployed, and others without adequate means of support to rise up against the Qing dynasty, which they blamed for their plight. Joining them were other disaffected ­Chinese, including unemployed scholars, drifters, and unmarried men known as “bare sticks” (guanggun 光棍), who participated in rebel activities as a way of venting their anger against the government, banding together for mutual support, and securing their economic survival. The White Lotus Rebellion (1776–1804). One of the largest uprisings to threaten the Qing dynasty was the White Lotus Rebellion, a millenarian revolt that engulfed much western China from 1776 to 1804. The uprising first broke out in western Hubei in 1796, in a mountainous region separating Sichuan, Hubei, and Shaanxi provinces, where corruption and poverty were acute. White Lotus rebels were skilled in using guerilla tactics, and at its height the movement had spread into four other central-western provinces: Henan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Gansu. Led by disciples of the White Lotus movement, a millenarian sect of Amidist Buddhism, the rebellion began as a protest against excessive taxation, but developed into a more generalized attack against Manchu rule. Followers were attracted to White Lotus ideology (which combined elements of Daoism, Buddhism, and Manichaeism) and religious practices, which included meditation, martial arts exercises, mantra recitation, divination, and other ceremonial activities. White Lotus leaders encouraged their followers to “oppose the Qing and restore the Ming” ( fanqing fuming 反清復明), promising personal salvation in return for their involvement. To combat the rebels, the dynasty adopted a combination of pacification strategies that included removing all food from the countryside, resettling the populace into armed stockades, offering amnesty to deserters, and organizing captured White Lotus fighters into a­ nti-rebel militias, charged with pursuing and exterminating their former comrades. Although Qing forces eventually were able to put down the rebellion, the effort cost the government an estimated 100 million taels, or 30 percent more than its annual revenue. Moreover, the dynasty’s dependence on locally organized militia groups (tuanlian 團練) to help quash the uprising, a government strategy that also was adopted during subsequent rebellions, ultimately weakened the Qing state. As Philip A. Kuhn has argued, the development of semi-independent regional militia shifted power into the hands of local elites at the expense of the central government, contributing to a diminution of imperial control over the rural administration of China. The Nian Rebellion (1851–1868). While the Qing was still reeling from the economic devastation and human tragedy of White Lotus Rebellion, another armed uprising broke out 308

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in North China. Known as the Nian Rebellion, possibly referring to the bits of twisted cloth or paper (nian 捻) soaked in oil and ignited during their nocturnal raids, the movement began in the late 1840s as a generalized protest against Qing rule. Despite its lack of a coherent ideology, the Nian movement gathered momentum in response to a series of natural disasters that engulfed the North China region. In 1851 and 1855, the Yellow River burst its banks, killing thousands of people and devastating hundreds of thousands of square miles of land. The scale of the disaster and the government’s inability to provide effective relief prompted the Nian to launch attacks against Qing troops and carry out raids in search of land and plunder. As Elizabeth J. Perry has explained, the original goal of the Nian movement was not to bring down the Manchu state. Rather, it was a survival strategy of the weak and downtrodden, who turned to banditry and revolt as a source of livelihood. Supporters of the movement were a loose affiliation of poor peasants, unmarried men, and disaffected scholars, whose numbers were augmented by scattered followers of earlier rebel movements such as the White Lotus uprising. Over time, however, the Nian evolved from isolated bandit gangs, to coordinated armies of families, clans, and entire communities. Despite its relatively small size – an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 troops – the Nian Army was a fierce fighting force known for its mastery of mobile warfare, effective firepower, and successful use of guerrilla warfare. By the mid-1850s, Nian rebels had succeeded in capturing large tracts of land in north and central China, crushing government forces in the countryside, and devastating large areas within Jiangsu and Hunan provinces. To put down the rebellion, the Manchu leadership again was forced to rely on aid from regional militias, a strategy that helped to crush the rebels, but which contributed to a further devolution of state power. Also supporting the Qing was the Ever Victorious Army, a 5000-strong corps of Chinese soldiers who were trained and led by American and European officers under the command of Frederick Townsend Ward (1831–1862), an American sailor and mercenary, who molded the Ever Victorious Army into a well-equipped, highly trained, and mobile fighting force that became a model for later ­Chinese armies. Even with this support, Qing government was unable to achieve victory over the Nian until 1868, after years of fierce fighting and an immense loss of life and property. The Muslim Rebellions (1855–1873, 1862–1877). During the mid-nineteenth century, several Muslim-led rebellions broke out in multi-ethnic areas of southern and western China. Muslims had lived in northwest and southwest China since the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), but in many areas they still formed distinct religious communities. In 1853, a conflict between two different ethnic groups, the Han and the Hui, broke out in the southwestern province of Yunnan. In the ensuing turmoil, existing religious and ethnic tensions between the Muslim Hui and non-Muslim ethnic minorities were brought to the fore. This sparked a multi-ethnic uprising that engulfed the entire province, which eventually developed into an anti-Manchu insurgency. Alternatively referred to as the Panthay Rebellion (1855–1873), after the Burmese term for Muslim Chinese, or the Du Wenxiu 杜文秀 Rebellion, after the anti-Manchu leader of the movement, the revolt resulted in the loss of up to a million lives. In the northwestern provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, the Dungan 東干 revolt (1862–1877), an uprising of Muslim Hui and other Muslim ethnic groups, led to an additional tens of millions of deaths.

The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) Far more destructive than the White Lotus, Nian, and Muslim Rebellions was the Taiping Rebellion, one of the bloodiest wars in human history. Although Taiping means “Great Peace,” the movement devastated much of South China, and resulted in the loss of 20–30 309

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million people and the displacement of millions more. According to some estimates, by the rebellion’s end, the population in many cities and towns in the lower Yangzi region had fallen by half. The war was fought over 14 years, primarily in the provinces of Jiangsu, ­Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Hubei. Even by the 1950s, some parts of central China had not yet fully recovered from the destruction of the Taiping era. The founder of the movement was Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全 (1814–1864), a disappointed scholar and self-proclaimed prophet, who believed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus. Hong was a member of the oppressed Hakka minority who had initially aspired to a career in the civil service, but was unable to pass the government examinations. After his third failed attempt, he fell into a 40-day coma and experienced a series of visions, which became the foundation of the quasi-Christian ideology of the Taipings. Hong’s political doctrine incorporated elements of Confucian tradition, Christian theology, and anti-­Manchu rhetoric. Opium, alcohol, adultery, gambling, and foot-binding were banned, while gender equality, communal property, and social equality were supported. Sometime after 1844, Hong began collecting followers, and in 1851, he proclaimed himself Heavenly King of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (Taiping Tianguo 太平天國). He assembled an army of followers, and in 1853, captured the city of Nanjing, which he established it as the capital of the Taiping movement. Defeating the Taiping was beyond the resources of the regular Qing military forces, so the government turned to elite activists in the provinces for help. One of the prominent militarists who responded to the call was Zeng Guofan, who organized the Xiang Army, a provincial fighting force recruited from existing village and regional militias across the Hunan region. Others who came to the dynasty’s aid were Li Hongzhang, commander of the Anhui-based Huai Army, and Zuo Zongtang (1812–1884), an official and military leader who coordinated Qing forces to fight the rebels with the support of British and French troops. Together, these groups were able to defeat the Taipings, temporarily restoring the stability of the dynasty, but accelerating the devolution of political power away from the central government to the provinces. Although the Qing emerged victorious over the Taipings and other rebel groups, the dynasty was so weakened by these conflicts that it was unable to effectively reestablish control over the empire. The upheavals affected every region across China, causing tens of millions of deaths, countless displacements, and untold destruction of property. The enormous cost of putting down these uprisings drained government treasuries, forcing it to raise taxes on the already embattled poor, and exacerbating China’s difficulties in dealing with its external challenges.

The Sino-Japanese war and its aftermath While the Manchu leadership struggled to deal with its internal challenges, the imperialist powers continued to expand their influence within China. Despite earlier efforts by the Self-Strengtheners to modernize and industrialize, meaningful change had been stymied by the Empress Dowager and her conservative allies. By contrast, Japan had made rapid progress under the newly established Meiji government, presenting an additional threat to Chinese autonomy and influence within the Asian region. In 1868, a group of Japanese reformers wrested control from the military clan that had ruled Japan since 1600. They “restored” authority to the 15-year-old Meiji emperor, establishing him as the nominal leader of a group of oligarchs whose mission was to modernize Japan. The Meiji oligarchs shared a common vision of the imperialist threat and the painful 310

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measures required to achieve their modernization goals, summarized in the motto: “Rich country, strong military.” Acting in the emperor’s name, the oligarchs introduced a series of revolutionary policies that would help Japan become the first non-Western nation to successfully industrialize. By the early 1890s, Japan had put in place a new Western-style constitution and elected its first national assembly; established a new standardized currency and a modern banking system; promoted strategic and military industrialization; developed a national railway system and modern communications; and invested in a well-equipped and Western-trained army and navy.

The clash over Korea The success of the Meiji reforms fueled Japanese ambitions for expansion within the Asian region in search of raw materials, untapped markets, and enhanced international standing. Japan first sets its sights on Korea, attracted by the country’s strategic location and abundant natural resources of coal and iron. Korea, a leading tributary state during Ming and Qing times, had long been dominated by China. In the late 1880s, however, Japan began challenging the status quo to increase its influence in the region. In 1875, Japan forced Korea to declare itself an independent state and to open itself up to foreign trade. When an armed revolt by Korean peasants broke out in 1894, both China and Japan sent in troops to protect the Korean king and reestablish order. The ensuing rivalry over dominance over the region resulted in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The war ended in a decisive victory for Japan, quashing any doubts about the superiority of the Japanese war machine over China’s aging military. For two decades, Japan had invested in modern ships and arsenals, supported by Western naval training and tactics. By contrast, much of the funding that had been allocated to rebuild the Chinese navy had been diverted by the Empress Dowager to build herself an extravagant summer palace northwest of Beijing. Following the destruction of China’s ill-trained and poorly equipped Beiyang 北 洋 fleet by the Imperial Japanese Navy, Japanese troops overpowered Chinese forces on the Korean peninsula and the southern part of Manchuria. As Japanese forces closed in on Beijing, the Qing was forced to surrender. China’s ignominious defeat after 30 years of Self-Strengthening was followed by the ­additional humiliation of the peace agreement. Under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), China was forced to recognize the total independence of Korea and ceded the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria, the island of Taiwan, and Penghu Islands to Japan “in perpetuity.” The Qing government also signed a commercial treaty permitting Japanese ships to navigate the Yangzi River, operate manufacturing factories in treaty ports, and open four more ports to foreign trade. In addition, the Qing Empire had to pay Japan 200 million silver taels in war reparations.

The scramble for concessions To the West, the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese conflict signaled a shift in regional dominance from China to Japan. Taking advantage of China’s weakness, imperialist powers demanded territorial concessions: enclaves within key cities or regions in which a single European nation and/or the Empire of Japan were granted special privileges. In the ensuing free-for-all to extract diplomatic and trade privileges from the ailing Qing dynasty – ­metaphorically described as “cutting up the Chinese melon” – the Russians obtained economic and territorial rights in Manchuria and negotiated a 99-year lease on Port Arthur (now Lüshun) on the Liaodong 311

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Peninsula. To the south, Germany seized the Chinese port of Qingdao, in Shandong province; Britain was granted concessions along the Yangzi River and in the New Territories opposite Hong Kong; and France obtained railway and mining privileges in South China, adjacent to their colonial holdings in Indochina. The scramble for concessions divided China into quasi-colonial “spheres of influence,” which were governed and policed by the imperialist powers. What saved China from complete partition was the 1899 Open Door Policy, a non-binding declaration that was c­ irculated by the United States, with British backing. The goal of the policy was to discourage individual powers from securing exclusive – “closed door” – concessions within their independent spheres of influence, allowing all powers to benefit from equal – “open door” – commercial opportunities anywhere in China. Although the Open Door Policy was merely a statement of intention and not a formal course of action, it helped to preserve what was left of China’s territorial and administrative integrity. While the Open Door Policy may have saved the Qing Empire from immediate collapse, the domination of entire provinces by imperialist powers dealt a devastating blow to the prestige and power of the Qing Empire. The division of China into foreigner-directed spheres of influence, whose non-native residents were granted near complete immunity from local laws and jurisdiction, contributed to public resentment toward foreigners and hostility toward the Manchu leadership. Many educated Chinese blamed the Empress Dowager and her conservative allies for the government’s failure to adopt policies to help China stand up to the imperialist threat. However, despite widespread agreement about the need for change, there was little consensus about what nature the change should take.

The reform movement of 1898 Even among reform-minded officials, there were concerns about the negative effects of modernization. The Confucian scholar-official Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1813–1909), for example, was an avid supporter of railway and mining development, but wanted to ensure that China’s traditional values would not be sacrificed in the process. By comparison, the classically trained scholar and political activist Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) argued that economic development and social change was not necessarily at odds with traditional values. In his 1898 essay “A Study of Confucius as a Reformer” (Zongzi gaizhi kao 孔子改制考), Kang wrote that Confucianism was not incompatible with progress, and that the government could institute reforms while upholding its fundamental values. In 1895, Kang and his student Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) submitted a memorial discussing their ideas for reform, which was signed by more than 1200 provincial graduates, who had gathered in Beijing to sit for the metropolitan ( jinshi 進士) examinations. Although the Guangxu emperor (r. 1875–1908) seems to have supported many of the proposals, he made no attempt to implement them until 1898, when the Empress Dowager announced her retirement from public life. Taking advantage of her departure, Kang and Liang persuaded the 23-year-old emperor to launch an ambitious program of economic, industrial, and administrative reforms, following the Meiji example. Over a period of three months, the emperor enacted new laws to modernize the civil service exams to include more practical subject; revitalize the military with better firearms, artillery, and Western-style training; support new industries through targeted investment, technical education, and infrastructural improvements; and clean up the bureaucracy through the abolition of sinecures and the end to governmental waste and corruption. 312

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Afraid that the new policies would jeopardize the Manchu hold on power and her own interests, the Empress Dowager took decisive action to crush the reform effort. With the help of her loyal supporters, she staged a military coup and placed the Guangxu emperor under house arrest, where he remained until his death in 1908. Reformers who fell into her clutches were executed; however, movement leaders Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao escaped her wrath by fleeing to Japan. For the next decade, they traveled widely, visiting overseas Chinese communities to gather support for their vision of a constitution monarchy. With the reactionaries back in control and the reform movement in disarray, China fell further into decline.

Collapse of the imperial order The Empress Dowager’s coup d’état crushed the nascent reform movement and gave greater rein to conservative and xenophobic forces at court and among the populace at large. The proliferation of international concessions, within which the imperialist powers enjoyed special privileges and immunity from Qing law, contributed to the rise of anti-foreignism. Some critics drew a connection between foreign activity and the frequency of natural disasters, suggesting that the construction of railroads, mines, and other infrastructure had disturbed the harmonious balance between men and nature, leading to drought, floods, and famine. Further fomenting public anger was the presence of foreign missionaries, who in 1860 had gained the right to proselytize and build churches throughout the empire. Some C ­ hinese claimed that Christian missionaries had offended the spirits by propagating a heterodox religion that conflicted with traditional Confucian values, while others opposed the often heavy-handed tactics that missionaries used to attract converts. Helping to fan the fire were anti-Christian pamphlets that disseminated scurrilous rumors about missionaries and converts, accusing them of engaging in cannibalism, sexual perversion, and other vile acts. As the century ended, popular anger against the missionaries and other foreigners had reached a fever pitch, exploding into violence during the Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1900.

The Boxer Rebellion The Boxer Rebellion was led by members of a secret society known as the “Righteous ­Harmonious Fists” (Yihequan 義和拳), whom Westerners dubbed the “Boxers” because of the style of martial arts that they practiced. Economic hardship and political instability contributed to the growth of the Boxer movement, which was particularly active in the provinces of Shandong, Honan, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhili. The movement’s early spread was fueled by resentment against the Manchus, whom many Chinese blamed for the country’s worsening economic and political condition. Beginning in the 1890s, however, the Boxers abandoned their anti-dynastic emphasis in favor of an anti-foreign message, reflecting their belief that Western imperialists and Christian missionaries posed a greater threat to China than did the Manchu court. The Boxers’ new pro-Manchu and anti-imperialist stance – embodied in their slogan “support the Qing and destroy the foreigner” – drew support from the Empress Dowager and her conservative allies. Resisting foreign pressure to quell the Boxer threat, the court took little or no action against rebels who attacked Christian missionaries or their Chinese converts. When the Boxers besieged the foreign legation quarter in Beijing in June of 1900, the court backed the insurgents and declared war on the foreign powers. In response, the Eight-Nation Alliance (a military coalition of eight imperialist powers with interests in 313

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China, led by Britain and Germany) sent in 30,000 troops to put down the rebellion, decimating Boxer armies and compelling the Empress Dowager to flee for her life. In defeat, the Empress Dowager attempted to convince her former adversaries that she had not backed the Boxers. Although this was demonstrably untrue, the imperialist powers decided to go along with the fiction because the restoration of order under Qing rule allowed them to continue exploiting China’s weakness. The end of the rebellion led to the occupation of Beijing by foreign troops for more than a year and spelled disaster for China, which again had to make reparations to foreign governments. Under the terms of the Boxer Protocol of 1901, signed between China and members of the Eight-Nation Alliance, the imperialist powers had the right to post troops in major Chinese cities. In addition, the settlement not only called for the execution of suspected Boxers and the government officials who had supported them, but also imposed war reparations of 450 million silver dollars on China, nearly twice the government’s yearly revenues. In a 1901 essay attacking the immorality and rapaciousness of the imperialist powers, the American humorist Mark Twain satirically described the lopsided terms of the Protocol as: “Taels I win, Heads you lose.” The indemnity was to be paid in gold over a period of 39 years, with annual interest rate of 4 percent. When the interest on existing foreign loans was added, the combined debt absorbed all the customs revenue, forcing the government to borrow money from foreign banks in order to service the debt. In a gesture of goodwill, the United States agreed to return its share of the indemnity money to China on the condition that it would be used to send Chinese students to study in American institutions. The education of significant numbers of future leaders in the United States was one of the few positive results of China’s disastrous defeat.

The Qing “New Policies” Following the Boxer catastrophe, even diehard traditionalists were forced to acknowledge the need for substantive change. After decades of opposition, the Empress Dowager called on central and provincial officials, and envoys stationed abroad, to propose reforms to help China become more competitive in the modern world. Many of the suggested improvements were similar to policies originally put forth during the Self-Strengthening and the Hundred Days’ Reform movements. The important difference was that the post-Boxer policies were supported by Chinese conservatives, who had stood in the way of progress for over 40 years. Between 1901 and 1905, the court enacted a series of “New Policies” to revitalize the bureaucracy through the abolition of obsolete offices and creation of new ones; modernize the military by scrapping the traditional military examination and embracing Western training and tactics; and transform society by prohibiting foot-binding and opium use and loosening the marriage laws that disadvantaged women. The policies also supported study and travel in Japan, the United States, and Europe so that young Chinese could learn more about foreign institutions and methods for obtaining wealth and power. In 1905, the government abolished the traditional examination system, which for hundreds of years had evaluated official ­a spirants based on their understanding of Confucian values, replacing it with a modern curriculum that emphasized science and technology, foreign languages, and international affairs. The response to these policies was mixed. Some of the measures taken, such as the increase in taxes to fund the New Policies, spurred unrest in the countryside. Other critics argued that reforming the existing system did not go far enough to resolve China’s problems. 314

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Frustrated by what they viewed as the corruption and intransigence of the Manchu regime, many activists called for a complete dismantling of the imperial system and the establishment of a republican government based on constitutional principles.

From empire to republic One of the most prominent revolutionaries was Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (Sun Yixian (1866–1925), who played an instrumental role in the overthrow of the Qing state. Sun believed that the Manchu leadership had been ineffective in its efforts to confront foreign aggression and modernize China. He wanted to replace the dynastic system with a republic based on the “Three Principles of the People.” This was the political philosophy that he had developed, which emphasized the principles of “nationalism” (independence from foreign domination), “democracy” (representative government), and “livelihood” (economic security). Sun Yat-sen visited the United States, Europe, and Japan, and regions of southeast Asia where large concentrations of overseas Chinese resided to gain political and financial backing for his revolutionary program. While Sun was traveling abroad in support of the revolution, anti-Qing activists were working within China to destabilize the dynasty by disseminating revolutionary ideas and carrying out acts of insurgency. On October 10, 1911, a group of rebels led a military uprising in the city of Wuchang in Hubei province. The uprising began as a protest against the handling of a railway crisis, but rapidly escalated into an empire-wide revolt that eventually toppled the Qing dynasty. The Revolution of 1911, also known as the Xinhai Revolution (because within the 60-year cycle of the traditional Chinese calendar, 1911 is referred to as the xinhai 辛亥 year), culminated with the abdication of 6-year-old Puyi 溥儀, the last Qing emperor, on February 12, 2012. The end of more than 2,000 years of imperial rule marked the beginning of a new future for China. However, the establishment of republican government did not resolve China’s domestic and foreign challenges. Natural calamities, famine, and poverty continued to plague the countryside, which was still reeling from the effects of the Taiping rebellion and other peasant uprisings. In regions throughout the former Qing Empire, warlord generals rose to dominance, and imperialist powers continued to take advantage of China’s weakness to gain economic and political benefits for themselves. Meanwhile, internal dissent and factionalism within the newly formed republic undermined its effectiveness, giving rise to popular discontent among the military and populace. During the early twentieth century, the negative consequences of over a century of imperialist encroachment and domestic strife, legacies of the Qing dynasty, were compounded by the scourges of warlordism, civil war, and Japanese aggression. Just as the fall of the Qing had been a long and complex process, so too was the rise of modern China from a weak nation wracked by poverty, corruption, and war, to the global power it is today.

Note 1 “Lin Tse-hsü’s Moral Advice to Queen Victoria, 1839,” in Ssu-yü Teng and John King Fairbank, eds., China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 24–28.

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20 Qing culture Richard Smith

Introduction Interpretations of Qing dynasty culture, like broader interpretations of the Qing dynasty’s place in Chinese and world history, tend to revolve around the issue of “sinicization” (Hanhua 漢化 or 華化)—that is, the process by which non-Chinese conquest regimes adopted and assimilated certain aspects of traditional Chinese culture.1 By “traditional Chinese culture,” I mean the basic institutions, linguistic practices, philosophies, religions, artistic and literary traditions, and social customs of the self-styled “Han people” or Hanren 漢人, who comprised approximately 95 percent of the population in China Proper (neidi 內地; i.e. the agricultural area below the Great Wall) during most of the imperial era. The best known of these dynasties of conquest are the Northern Wei 北魏 (386–534 ce), the Liao 遼 (907–1125), the Xi Xia 西夏 (1038–1227), the Jin 金 (1115–1234), the Yuan 元 (1206–1368), and the Qing 清1636–1912. In each case, to varying degrees under varying circumstances, these regimes appropriated certain features of Chinese culture—especially the classical written script, rituals, institutions, religious practices, and artistic and literary traditions. The Qing is generally considered to be the largest consolidated empire in Chinese history and by far the most successful dynasty of conquest. But what were the reasons for its phenomenal success? Some scholars, notably Ping-ti Ho and Pei Huang, have argued that the principal reason was the dynasty’s self-conscious adoption and promotion of traditional Chinese culture, which appealed to both local and national elites. Others, identified as the “New Qing Historians,” and including scholars such as Pamela Crossley and Mark Elliott, maintain that the key to the political success of the Manchus was their hierarchically conceived multiculturalism—in particular, their ability to exploit cultural links with the nonHan peoples of Inner Asia and to differentiate the administration of the non-Han regions from the administration of China Proper. Obviously, there is a productive middle ground between these interpretive poles, which this essay seeks to identify. In the following discussion, I shall devote comparatively little attention to Qing politics and economics, since they have already been ably discussed by my colleagues, Yang-wen Zheng and Nancy Park.

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Language The “official” written languages of the Qing dynasty were Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian (and to a degree, Tibetan). Each of these languages became a political instrument, a convenient and effective means of communicating with different constituencies in a vast and diverse empire. The use of multiple languages also enabled the Qing rulers to gain access to different cultural traditions, thus enhancing their cultural repertoire without diminishing their own strong sense of ethnic identity. This is one place where arguments about “sinicization” often go awry. The Manchus did not become “Chinese” in any simple sense; they did, however, readily draw upon aspects of Chinese tradition that they found useful and/or appealing. It is true that over time, most Manchus in Banner garrisons eventually lost their ability to speak or write Manchu, but this does not mean that they abandoned all other aspects of their own culture. Comparatively little research has been done on exactly how Chinese and the other languages of the empire evolved under the Qing, but we do know that, as in earlier periods of Chinese history, the Han people under foreign rule borrowed a number of words and expressions from other languages, both within and outside of China’s borders. Similarly, transliterations of Chinese words and terms became a part of spoken and written Manchu, especially in places affected by Chinese commerce and/or settlement. This latter process was facilitated by the early work of the famous translator Dahai 達海 (d. 1632), who, prior to the Qing conquest, modified the Manchu written script in order to take into account certain prevalent Chinese sounds. ­ hinese The importance of the Chinese script to the unity and continuity of traditional C culture can scarcely be overestimated. Although the spoken Chinese language was fragmented into at least a half dozen mutually unintelligible regional dialects (diqu fangyan 地區方言), each of which had any number of local variants (difang hua 地方話or tuhua 土話), the standard written language could be understood by anyone who had mastered it, regardless of the dialect he or she spoke. Thus, there was no linguistic development in China comparable to the decline of Latin and the rise of national vernaculars in early modern Europe. Moreover, since the ancient classics and contemporary documents were all written in the same basic classical script (see the following), a Qing scholar had complete and essentially unmediated intellectual access to anything written in China during the past 2,000 years. The most prestigious form of written Chinese was the classical script (wenyan wen 文言文; lit. “patterned words”), also known as “literary Chinese.” The other major form of Chinese writing, known as the vernacular script (baihua wen 白話文), was much easier to learn than classical Chinese—primarily because it replicated, to greater or lesser degrees, the words and grammatical structures of the spoken language. Although the written vernacular was employed primarily in works designed for literate non-elites—in particular, certain kinds of short stories, plays, and novels—many of these “popular” writings were enjoyed by all literate sectors of Chinese society, including scholars (see “Literature”). As indicated earlier, the great prestige of the classical language throughout the imperial era derived primarily from the fact that it was not accessible through everyday speech. Learning it, in other words, was not simply a matter of replacing spoken sounds with written characters; classical texts had to be memorized. Students of classical Chinese began with specially designed Confucian primers such as the Sanzi jing 三字經 (Three-character classic), reciting passages aloud in rhythmic fashion, with no initial understanding of their meaning. These rudimentary texts were then carefully explained by individual tutors or classroom

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teachers, and, by stages, students advanced to more complicated and difficult materials. The process of memorization, regurgitation, and explication eventually culminated in a complete mastery of the hallowed Four Books (Sishu 四書) and Five Classics (Wujing 五經) of ­Confucianism—a total of about 430,000 characters. These works, together with state-­ approved commentaries on them, were the foundation on which the Chinese civil service examination system was based. By memorizing enormous amounts of classical literature in this way, Chinese children (and the children of many Manchu and Mongol Bannermen) attained the necessary skills to pass the exams, provided, of course, that they also had excellent calligraphy and had mastered a variety of poetic forms and the notoriously demanding eight-legged essay (bagu wenzhang 八股文章). To be sure, the memorization of Chinese texts was facilitated by the rhythm and balance of the classical script. Each character, when pronounced, was monosyllabic, and each occupied the same amount of space in a text, regardless of the number of strokes it contained. Thus, each character became a convenient rhythmic unit. This naturally encouraged the Chinese, perhaps more than any other culture group, to think and write in terms of polarities. In the words of the world-famous linguist Y. R. Chao (Zhao ­Yuanren), “I venture to think that if the Chinese language had words of such incommensurable rhythm as male and female, heaven and earth, rational and [ab]surd, there would never be such far-­ reaching conceptions as yin [and] yang.” The terms yin 陰 and yang 陽 were used in three main ways in imperial China: (1) as cosmic forces that produced and animated all natural phenomena; (2) as terms used to identify recurrent, cyclical patterns of rise (yang) and decline (yin), waxing and waning; and (3) as comparative categories, describing dualistic relationships that were inherently unequal but almost invariably complementary. Virtually any aspect of Chinese experience could be explained in terms of these paired concepts, ranging from such mundane sensory perceptions as dark (yin) and light (yang), wet (yin) and dry (yang), to abstractions such as unreal (yin) and real (yang), non-being (yin) and being (yang). Yinyang relationships involved the notion of mutual dependence and harmony based on hierarchical difference. Yin qualities were generally considered inferior to yang qualities, but unity of opposites was always the Chinese cultural ideal. Moreover, the logic of yinyang thinking included the relativistic idea that something that was yin in one set of relationships could be yang in another. Thus, for instance, a wife might be considered yin in relation to her husband but yang in relation to her children. Much that is most distinctive about traditional Chinese culture can be explained by reference to yinyang conceptions and to the elaborate correlative thinking associated with these ideas. Yinyang polarities and their many linguistic equivalents appear explicitly or implicitly in the description or evaluation of nearly every area of traditional Chinese life, from politics, cosmology, aesthetics, symbolism, and mythology to ancestor worship, divination, ­medicine, science, and sex. All classes of traditional Chinese literature employed yinyang terminology and/or symbolism, from the exalted Confucian classics to popular proverbs. In fact, good poetry and prose could not be written without them. Two things seem especially significant about yinyang-style polarities. The first is that for most of them, descriptions such as antithesis, contradiction, and dichotomy are misleading, since the terms involved usually imply either complementary opposition or cyclical alternation. The second is that the widespread use of such polarities—especially in classical prose and formal philosophy—suggests a distinctive attitude toward abstraction—one in which abstract ideas tend to be expressed in concrete terms, without dialectical resolution into a new abstract term, as in the Indo-European linguistic tradition. 318

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One other point about the classical Chinese language is worthy of note. Because written characters had the same basic set of meanings, regardless of how they might be pronounced, the classical Chinese script became a convenient medium for expressing ideas not only in China but also in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Thus, well into the nineteenth century (and in some cases beyond), Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese elites all continued to use classical Chinese as their principal means of written communication. This, of course, only fed China’s already well-nourished sense of cultural superiority.

Philosophy As in previous periods of late imperial China, Confucianism (sometimes identified as Ruxue 儒學 or the Learning of the Scholars) was the dominant philosophy in Qing times. Although the boundaries of Qing Confucianism shifted significantly under Manchu rule, we can identify several basic patterns of affiliation within which these shifts took place. As had been the case during much of the Ming dynasty, the Qing emperors generally supported Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200 ce) School of Principle (lixue 理學)—also known as the Cheng-Zhu 程朱 School—as their official orthodoxy. Emphasizing loyalty to the sovereign, moral cultivation, and the power of positive example, Cheng-Zhu Learning was distilled in the highly influential examination syllabus known as the Xingli jingyi 性理精義 (essential ideas of nature and principle), commissioned by the Kangxi emperor in the early eighteenth century. The so-called Tongcheng 桐城 School, centered on a county by this name in Anhui province, embraced Zhu Xi’s moral idealism, but placed particular emphasis on ancient prose literature as a “vehicle of Confucian faith.” Proponents of this approach, like other less literarily inclined advocates of Cheng-Zhu Confucianism, were suspicious of, if not actively hostile toward, the School of Evidential Research (kaozheng xue 考證學), whose iconoclastic advocates emerged as a “national elite” from the prosperous Yangzi River delta during the latter half of the seventeenth century. These imaginative kaozheng scholars—armed with sophisticated philological techniques and passionately committed to “seeking truth from facts” (shishi qiu shi 實事求是)—­devoted themselves primarily to textual criticism, although a number of them also engaged in broader scientific inquiry as well. Their research challenged certain orthodox interpretations of the Confucian classics, and even called into question the authenticity of some received texts. Although the overall “subversive” effect of kaozheng scholarship is a matter of debate, there can be no doubt that this school transformed Qing intellectual life in significant ways. During the eighteenth century, Qing scholars routinely identified the School of Evidential Research with Han Learning—so named because its intellectual progenitors rejected SongMing sources in favor of earlier materials dating from the Han dynasty (206 bce–220 ce). These writings from the Song and Ming eras—identified by most Western scholars as “Neo-­ Confucian”—included not only the Cheng-Zhu School of Principle but also the far more intuitive “School of the Mind” (Xinxue 心學), associated with Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1192) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529). Strictly speaking, however, Han Learning refers to a separate intellectual movement identified with individuals who focused primarily on materials from the latter part of the Han. Those who gravitated to sources from the earlier Han came to be identified as members of the New Text School (Jinwen xue 今文學). The New Text School, also called the Gongyang 公羊 School, stood on the intellectual frontier between Song and Han Learning. It grew out of a late eighteenth-century revival of a much earlier controversy over the authenticity of certain versions of the Confucian classics written in an ancient form of Chinese characters known as guwen 古文 (“old-style script”). 319

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These “old text” versions had been considered orthodox since the Later Han dynasty, when they replaced a set of the classics written in the “new-style script” ( jinwen) of the Early Han. But Qing kaozheng scholars began to uncover systematic evidence of forgeries in some of these Old Text versions of the classics, leading to a fierce debate over issues such as the place of Confucius in Chinese history and the role of institutional change within the Confucian tradition. The School of Statecraft ( Jingshi xue 經世學), as its name implies, took practical administration as its central concern, avoiding the moralistic extremes of Song Learning as well as the scholastic extremes of Han Learning. Although already an active intellectual force in the eighteenth century, Statecraft Learning rapidly gained momentum in the nineteenth century, as dynastic decline underscored the need for practical solutions to China’s pressing problems. Some statecraft-oriented scholars, including Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794–1856) and Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 (1792–1841), also had a deep and abiding interest in New Text scholarship, but it was not until the late nineteenth century that the progressive potential of New Text Confucianism became fully apparent. At that time, reform-minded exponents of New Text learning—notably Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) and his able student, Liang Qichao 梁啓超 (1873–1929)—moved to center stage in Qing political and intellectual life. A central feature of Kang’s spiritually inspired New Text approach was a “socio-moral pragmatism,” which favored a free “ideological” interpretation of Confucianism over a literal and prosaic understanding. Many other schools of Confucian thought arose during the Qing dynasty. Some were inspired by idiosyncratic individualists such as the avowedly anti-scholastic Yan Yuan 顏元 (1635–1704) and his famous disciple, Li Gong 李塨 (1659–1733). Other schools developed from the eclectic thought of renowned scholars such as Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764–1848) and Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811–72). The syncretic tendencies of Chinese thought made it possible for a scholar-official like Zeng to esteem the literary and moral concerns of the ­Tongcheng School, and yet at the same time to recognize the merits of Han Learning, to gravitate toward the School of Statecraft in seeking solutions to the dynasty’s administrative problems, and even to employ essentially Legalist (Fajia 法家) methods in order to achieve the idealistic aims of Mencius 孟子 (372–289 bce). A distinctive feature of Zeng’s thought, like that of many kaozheng scholars of his time and earlier, was an emphasis on li 禮—by which he meant not only rules of social usage, rituals, and ceremonies, but also laws and institutions—as the common denominator of China’s complex Confucian tradition. During the Qing period, as in earlier times, one’s intellectual posture was ordinarily a function of several major variables: (1) personality and family background, (2) educational experience, (3) personal and dynastic fortunes, and (4) career concerns. Political factors were especially important in determining the popularity of a certain school of thought at a particular time, but the attachment of any individual to a given point of view might well hinge on career concerns. Thus, for example, young students and gentry awaiting official appointment could be expected to emphasize Song idealism, if only because a mastery of Zhu Xi’s thought brought the possibility of personal advancement. Officials, on the other hand, might publicly espouse Neo-Confucian moral principles only to seek administrative guidance from the School of Statecraft. And retired officials might find satisfaction in pure scholarship and the contemplative life, studying the Yijing and perhaps also investigating the officially disparaged but still attractive ideas of Wang Yangming, the Daoists, and even the Buddhists. For the Qing elite, the yang of Confucian social responsibility was balanced by the yin of Daoist escape into nature. Unlike Confucianism, which for virtually all Qing scholars was a way of life, if not a living faith, Daoism—at least in its philosophical form—was essentially a 320

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state of mind. It provided an emotional and intellectual escape valve for world-weary Confucians, trammeled by social responsibility. The writings of Daoist philosophers such as Laozi 老子 (tradit. sixth century bce) and Zhuangzi 莊子 (tradit. fourth century bce) were fresh and poetic, often playful, and almost always paradoxical. They admired the weak, accepted the relativity of things, advocated spiritual release, and above all sought communion with nature. The concrete symbols of Daoism were yin: water, the female, the child, the emptiness of the valley, and the uncarved block of wood (pu 樸). For the most part, Chinese scholars have distinguished sharply between “philosophical” Daoism (Daojia 道家) and “religious” Daoism (Daojiao 道教). A number of Western scholars have resisted this dichotomy, arguing that Daoist thought is part of a continuum that encompasses both orientations, and there is, of course, a point to their arguments. Certainly the corpus of “Daoist” texts known as the Daozang 道藏 (Repository of the Dao) makes no clear distinctions of this sort. Moreover, practices such as Daoist “alchemy” (see next section), which were directed toward achieving longevity and immortality, have antecedents in early Daoist philosophical texts. These alchemical works involve what might be described as “magic,” but they also involve meditation and moral cultivation—not unlike Confucianism and Buddhism. Nonetheless, there are, I believe, valid heuristic reasons for separating “philosophy” (as thought) and “religion” (as practice), as long as we recognize that religion embodies thought and philosophy may entail practice. ­ aode jing The essence of philosophical Daoism is reflected in two famous early works: the D 道德經 (The Way and its power) and the Zhuangzi 莊子 ([The words of ] Master Zhuang). The basic Daoist idea is simply to do what comes naturally—no striving and no over-­exerting (wuwei 無為; lit. “doing nothing”). “No action is taken,” Laozi asserts, “and yet nothing is left undone.” Sustained by this viewpoint, the Daoist “sage” declares: I take no action and the people of themselves are transformed. I love tranquility and the people themselves become correct. I engage in no activity and the people of themselves become prosperous. I have no desires and the people of themselves become simple. Daoist notions of relativity also undermined the seemingly absolute value system of Confucianism. Listen, for example, to Zhuangzi discussing “right” and “wrong:” It is because there is right, that there is wrong; it is because there is wrong, that there is right. . . . According to the other, there is one kind of right and wrong. According to the self there is another kind of right and wrong. But really are there such distinctions as the self and the other, or are there no such distinctions? When the self and the other [or the “this” and the “that”] lose their contrariness [mutually exclusive opposition] we have the very essence of the dao 道. In many ways, then, Confucianism and Daoism were at odds. Where Confucianism stressed others, Daoism tended to stress self. Where Confucians sought wisdom, Daoists sought ­blissful ignorance. Where Confucians esteemed ritual and self-control, Daoists valued spontaneity and freedom from artificial constraints. Where Confucianism stressed hierarchy, Daoists emphasized equality; and where Confucians valued refinement (wen), Daoists prized primitivity. What to Confucians were cosmic virtues were to Daoists simply arbitrary labels. And yet there was just enough affinity between Confucianism and Daoism to ensure an enduring philosophical partnership. Both schools of thought cherished the ideal of harmony and oneness with nature (although one posited a moral universe and the other, an amoral 321

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one); each shared a sense of the interrelatedness of all things; and each, in its own way, advocated humility, passivity, simplicity, and, above all, the avoidance of selfish desires. In short, Confucianism gave Chinese life structure and purpose, while Daoism encouraged freedom of expression and artistic creativity.

Religion Religious life in the Qing period was especially rich and varied, owing in part to the multiculturalism of the Manchus. Probably at no other time since the Mongol-dominated Yuan dynasty had China’s rulers evinced such a wide-open and tolerant attitude toward religion. Evelyn Rawski has discussed at length the various forms of religious activity engaged in by the Manchus, from official state sacrifices modeled on Ming practices, to imperially ­sponsored state shamanism and patronage of Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism, to “private rituals” within the Qing inner court, which combined “shamanic, Daoist, Chinese B ­ uddhist, ­Tibetan Buddhist, and popular religious traditions.” These three forms of worship had ­d ifferent but related purposes. In Rawski’s apt formulation: “If sacrifices at the state altars were about rulership, and Qing religious patronage was about politics, the private rituals were about the court as a household, a family writ large.” Arthur Wolf has written: “Assessed in terms of its long-range impact on the people, . . . [the Chinese government] appears to have been one of the most potent governments ever known, for it created a religion in its own image. Its firm grip on the popular imagination may be one reason the imperial government survived so long despite its failings.” There is much to commend this view. To a remarkable extent, the organization of traditional Chinese religion mirrored the fundamental assumptions of Chinese bureaucratic behavior. This was true not only of official state sacrifices (sidian 祀典), as might well be expected, but also of institutional Buddhism, religious Daoism, and even popular religion. Aside from the exclusively Manchu shamanistic observances undertaken by the Imperial Household Department (Chinese: neiwu fu 內務府; Manchu: dorgi baita be uheri kadalara yamun), official state sacrifices took place at three administrative levels—Beijing, provincial capitals, and county seats. They were designated, respectively, great sacrifices (dasi 大祀), middle sacrifices (zhongsi 中祀), and common sacrifices (qunsi 群祀 or xiaosi 小祀). At each administrative level, designated civil officials performed elaborate ceremonies in accordance with long-standing ritual prescriptions. These included ritual bathing, fasting, prostrations, prayers, and thanksgiving offerings of incense, lighted candles, precious objects, fruits, and food and wine together with music and ritual posturing or dancing. According to the Collected Statutes of the Qing (Da Qing huidian 大清會典), official religious ceremonies had several specific purposes. Some deities were worshipped for the simple purpose of expressing gratitude and veneration, others for the beneficial or protective influences the deities were supposed to exert, and still others for their outstanding civil virtues and/or military services. Some spirits were worshipped for fear that they would bring calamities to the people if not suitably appeased. But behind these rather specific purposes lay a more general goal: to undergird the prestige and political authority of the state. Of the two major non-governmental religions of imperial China—Buddhism and ­Religious Daoism—Buddhism had by far the greater intellectual appeal, as well as a greater institutional visibility and a larger number of both clerics and identifiable lay adherents. ­A lthough Religious Daoism enjoyed substantial imperial patronage in the late Ming period, it suffered some discrimination at the hands of the Qing emperors, who were ardent advocates of Tibetan Buddhism as well as traditional Chinese Buddhism. Under the patronage 322

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of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors, a total of thirty-two Tibetan Buddhist temples were renovated or built in Beijing, and, in other parts of the empire, dozens of ­Chinese Buddhist monasteries were converted into Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. In addition, the Manchus established more than 1,000 monasteries and temples in Mongolia, Xinjiang, and other areas on the Chinese periphery. These religious sites became the de facto centralized state institutions of a decentralized nomadic society. According to some estimates, more than 30 percent of the males in Mongolia during the Qianlong reign (1735–96) were lamas living in monasteries. The school of Tibetan Buddhism patronized by the Manchus was known as the dGe lugs pa (aka Gelukpa) or “Yellow Hat” sect. This sect, which developed in Tibet during the fifteenth century, focused in particular on Mādhyamika or “Middle Doctrine” Buddhist teachings. Philosophically speaking, the goal of this school was to reconcile notions of “conventional reality” (suti 俗體) and “ultimate reality” (Chinese: zhenti 真體) by denying, in effect, any meaningful distinction between them. In practice, Tibetan Buddhism entailed not only the worship of deities in shrines, but also the use of Vajrayāna (Tantric) rituals. These esoteric exercises, which involved meditation and deity-visualization techniques, were designed to allow adherents to gain access to cosmic powers, and to achieve mental and physical transformation, thus providing a direct route to Nirvana. Under Qing imperial sponsorship, elements of Mongol and Chinese religious practice were added to Tibetan Buddhism over time; thus, for instance, the Chinese God of War (the deified historical hero known as Guan Yu 關羽) came to be added to Tibetan Buddhist altars during the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns. The four main sects associated with Chinese (as opposed to Tibetan) Buddhism in Qing times were: (1) the Tiantai 天台or Lotus (Fahua 法華) School; (2) the Huayan 華嚴 (lit., Flowery Splendor) School; (3) the Pure Land School ( Jingtu 淨土); and (4) the Chan 禪 or Meditation School, known also as Zen (the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese character chan, meditation). Indicative of both the syncretic capacity of traditional Chinese thought and the accommodating outlook of Mahayana Buddhism, the Chinese had a common saying: “The Tiantai and Huayan Schools for [metaphysical] doctrine and the Jingtu and Chan Schools for practice.” The scriptural common denominator of most Chinese B ­ uddhist schools was the so-called Lotus Sutra (Miaofa lianhua jing 妙法蓮華經), a fascinating dramatic work blending elements of philosophy, theology, pageantry, and popular fable. In the fashion of the Yijing, the ideas of the Lotus Sutra were presented not in abstract terms but in concrete images and living symbols. The most popular school of Chinese Buddhism in Qing times was the Pure Land School. On the whole, this eclectic teaching avoided both the intense mental discipline of Chan and the scriptural and doctrinal emphasis of Tiantai and Huayan. The central focus of the Pure Land School was on salvation through faith and good works. The reward was rebirth in the Western Paradise (Xitian 西天), presided over by Amitabha (Chinese: Amituo Fo 阿彌陀佛)—the “Buddha of Immeasurable Radiance” (Wuliang guang Fo 無量光佛). Chinese descriptions of this beautiful, enchanting, and serene land are as enticing as the descriptions of the bureaucratic purgatory known as the Courts of Judgment (diyu 地獄) are terrifying. These “courts” are sometimes described as “hells,” since the “soul” of the departed is subject to various tortures before being reborn, depending on the sins committed in the previous life (for instance, lack of filial piety and/or lack of respect for elders). As is well known, Religious Daoism owed much to institutional Buddhism. Wing-tsit Chan goes so far as to describe it as “a wholesale imitation of Buddhism, notably in its clergy, temples, images, ceremonies and canon.” But despite Religious Daoism’s profound cultural debt to 323

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Buddhism, it was not simply a pale reflection of the “sinicized” Indian import. Not only did formal Daoist ritual and symbolism differ significantly from that of institutional Buddhism, but the major thrust of Daoist religion ran counter to the conventional Buddhist emphasis on reincarnation. For all the diversity of Religious Daoist beliefs and practices, the aim was not primarily to break the chain of causation through the elimination of consciousness, but rather to achieve a special kind of transcendence, manifest in the ability to know and manipulate the supernatural environment. And although Religious Daoism shared with philosophical Daoism an organic view of man and the universe, the goal of Religious Daoist ritual and personal regimen (meditative, dietary, pharmacological, gymnastic, and sexual) was not merely to find one’s niche in the cosmic order, but to acquire a form of cosmic power. Religious Daoism offered more than psychic release; it held the promise of longevity, invulnerability, and perhaps immortality. Two main schools of Religious Daoism flourished in late imperial times: the so-called Northern School, or Quanzhen 全真 (Complete Reality) Sect, and the Southern School, or Zhengyi正一 (True Unity) Sect. The Complete Reality Sect arose during the Song dynasty in response to Chan Buddhism. Like devotees of Chan, members of this Northern School preferred the rigors of monastic discipline. Theirs was a life of celibacy, vegetarianism, and abstention from alcoholic drinks. The spiritual headquarters of the Complete Reality Sect were located in Beijing, at the White Cloud Monastery 白雲觀. The True Unity Sect, which traced its spiritual origins to the late Han period, had its headquarters in Lunghua Mountain 龍華山, Jiangxi province. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the True Unity Sect enjoyed what amounted to “liturgical hegemony” among the various schools of Religious Daoism in Qing times, and continued to receive a measure of support from the imperial court. The Qing government’s approach to Buddhism and Religious Daoism was at once ­supportive and suspicious. On the one hand, the state recognized that Buddhist and Daoist monasteries and temples provided social services and gave local communities a sense of religious solidarity that transcended local cults. Moreover, the value systems of both Buddhism and Religious Daoism reflected heavy Confucian influence. Indeed, all orthodox religious sects in China, and a good number of countercultural groups as well, admired the Confucian virtues of loyalty, faithfulness, integrity, duty, and filial piety. The curriculum in Buddhist and Daoist monasteries often included works from the classical canon, and Confucian values found their way to the popular masses in the form of vernacular religious tracts such as shanshu 善書 (“morality books”) and baojuan 寶卷(“precious scrolls”). On the other hand, the Qing government remained suspicious of all organizations outside the system of official sacrifices, including monasteries and temples. As a result, the state imposed legal limits on the size of the Buddhist and Daoist clergy, the number of officially sanctioned monasteries and temples, and the scope of their regular religious activities. Abbots, priests, and nuns were always subject to indirect state supervision and remained at the beck and call of the emperor and his agents. Yet state control of religion in China was never complete. At the community level in particular, members of the Buddhist and Daoist establishment, as well as ritual specialists of all types, played a major role in local festivals and related rituals virtually independent of the state. In ­Chinese villages, towns, and cities, unauthorized popular sacrifices (minsi 民祀) often competed successfully with official sacrifices (guansi 官祀), much to the dismay of bureaucrats and the throne. Popular religious temples (miao 廟, ci 祠, etc.) in urban and rural areas were often linked with corporate common-interest organizations, including neighborhoods, guilds, and societies (hui 會or tang 堂) based on ties of kinship, common surname, home area, profession, scholarly interest, religious outlook, or simple mutual aid. Like Buddhist monasteries, Daoist 324

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temples, and lineage organizations, many of these ritually cohesive units performed valuable social services, including education and welfare; but from the Qing government’s standpoint (and often in fact), a thin line separated “legitimate” associations and lodges from the subversive “secret societies” that went by the same generic names. Even clan and lineage ritual activities were cause for concern. Although the state recognized the positive role of kin groups in promoting orthodox values, providing social services, and maintaining local control, it feared all well-organized, but non-official, corporate entities, especially those with particularistic loyalties and substantial economic resources and manpower. From the Qing government’s standpoint, heresy was less a matter of ideology per se than of practice. Although some officially sanctioned sources defined “heretical teachings” (xiejiao 邪教) as anything “outside the Five Classics and Four Books” (that is, outside of Confucianism), what the state feared most was the usurpation of its prerogatives through the manipulation of orthodox ceremonial forms and symbols. Hence, we find that Qing law prescribed severe penalties for activities deemed subversive (or potentially subversive) of the existing ­r itual system, including destroying sacred altars or shrines, publishing unauthorized calendars, privately worshiping Heaven or the North Star (the exclusive prerogatives of the emperor), keeping at home astronomical instruments and charts, and so forth. Yinyang ­fortune-tellers (yinyang shushi 陰陽術士) were prohibited from entering the houses of civil and military officers and “falsely” (wangyan 妄言) prophesying fortune or misfortune. Magicians, shamans, and other ritual specialists were forbidden to summon “heretical spirits” (xieshen 邪神), write charms, carry idols, pray to saints, offer incense, hold night meetings, perform “heretical arts” (xieshu 邪術), write books on sorcery (yaoshu 妖書), or promote “heretical formulas” (xieyan 邪言). Although these and other heretical crimes were seldom rigorously defined and the laws not always enforced, their statutory existence, together with evidence from other sources, suggests the state’s preoccupation with matters of ritual legitimacy.

Art One of the most important themes in the history of Qing visual and material culture is the role of the state. In the first place, the Manchus saw patronage of Chinese art as a means of demonstrating their cultural legitimacy, and as a way to “glorify” the dynasty. Hence, most Qing emperors became avid collectors of Chinese-style arts and crafts (according to one estimate, the Qianlong emperor owned “more than a million objects”), as well as practitioners of traditionally esteemed Chinese artistic activities such as painting and calligraphy. They also used Buddhist art and architecture to sustain their image as Cakravartin (“universal”) rulers, and commissioned an enormous number of art works and craft productions to decorate their palaces and to present as gifts to officials, loyal subjects, and foreign emissaries. Furthermore, they employed court painters to produce impressive imperial portraits, and to document their court-sponsored civil and military activities—from campaigns against rebels and other enemies, to imperial tours and the receipt of tributary envoys and products. Traditionally, Chinese scholars considered two types of art worthwhile: that which they enjoyed but did not create, and that which they created and therefore esteemed most. The former included the work of skilled craftsmen, from elegant ancient bronzes to colorful ­contemporary ceramics; the latter embraced the refined arts of the brush—painting and calligraphy. Occupying a fluid middle ground were decorative textiles, often executed in exquisite detail by talented elite women. Popular art—from temple paintings and religious icons to folk crafts such as basketwork, fans, umbrellas, toys, and paper cuts—flourished throughout the Qing period, but Chinese connoisseurs seldom took it seriously’ 325

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The Qing dynasty has been characterized as “an antiquarian age when, as never before, men looked back into the past.” This impulse was known as fugu 復古—lit., “the restoration of antiquity.” But during the first century and a half of Manchu rule, there was, in fact, considerable experimentation in the arts. Part of the impetus may have been the traumatic effect of the Qing conquest, which provided loyalist painters such as Gong Xian 龔賢 (1620–1689) with the tortured artistic theme of “a world gone corrupt.” Another factor, unsettling in a different way but also encouraging innovation, was the rapid growth of commercial wealth, particularly in the lower Yangzi region. There, the blending of literati and merchant culture produced new fashions. The result was an enormous demand among consumers for innovative forms, colors, styles, and textures. Finally, there was the expanding foreign market for Chinese arts and crafts, especially porcelain. Although many of these goods came to be designed explicitly for export to the West, their production unquestionably influenced Chinese tastes. Among the most accomplished painters of the early Qing were the so-called Six Masters (Qing liujia 清六家): Wang Shihmin 王時敏 (1592–1680), Wang Hui 王翬 (1632–1717), Wang Jian 王鑒 (1598–1677), Wang Yuanqi 王原祁 (1642–1715), Wu Li 吳歷 (1632–1718), and Yun Shouping 惲壽平 (1633–1690). The works of each artist reveal great skill, decorum, and a deep knowledge about both their subject matter and the complex history of literati painting (wenren hua 文人畫). Although the Kangxi emperor patronized two of the p­ ainters— Wang Hui and Wang Yuanqi—the others remained loyal to the memory of the Ming dynasty and refused to serve the throne. In any case, identification with the “orthodoxy” of the Qing imperial court did not stifle creativity. Indeed, Wang Yuanqi was probably the most original of the Six Masters. His brilliant interpretations of past models and styles, and his “passion for pure form” put Wang on a plane with the best “Individualist” painters of the Qing period. The most famous and creative of the early “Individualist” painters were Zhu Da 朱耷 (also known as Bada Shanren 八大山人, 1626–c. 1705), Kuncan 髠残 (also known as Shixi 石谿, c. 1610–c. 1670), Shitao 石濤 (also known as Yuanji 原濟, 1641–c. 1710), and Gong Xian. Sherman Lee summarizes the distinctiveness of their work: Kuncan’s hairy and tangled landscapes; Zhu Da’s abbreviated but firm brushwork recalling that of another, earlier eccentric, Xu Wei; Yuanji’s brilliant usage of wash, unusual compositions, and directly observed images, recalling the approach of Zhang Hong; and Gong Xian’s deep and somber ink-play of light and shade; all justify their unusually high place in Chinese art history. The most various of the four was certainly Yuanji and that variety endears him particularly to modern critics and collectors. These “free spirits”—like the Six Masters and virtually all other Qing painters—­ acknowledged a debt to tradition. Shitao, for example, in his Huayu lu 畫語錄 (record of talks on painting) admits that for many years he had painted and written, declaring his independence of orthodox methods, only to discover that the way he thought was his own, was actually “the dao 道of the ancients.” The Qing period may well have been the heyday of women painters and calligraphers in China. Most of them were the literate wives or concubines of Chinese scholars, and a number made their mark in poetry as well as painting. Some sold their artwork, while others gave instruction to friends and family or to empresses, princesses, and concubines at court. Among many distinguished women painters of the Qing period was Chen Shu 陳書 (1660–1736), who was once described as surpassing the renowned male painter from Suzhou, Chen Chun 陳淳 (1483–1544), in the vigor and originality of her brushstrokes. 326

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The Qing court’s patronage of painters, calligraphers, and craftsmen naturally affected Chinese artistic developments, usually for the better. But the acquisition of artworks from previous periods by the Qing monarchs—particularly the Qianlong emperor—had the negative effect of depriving artists in the provinces of the opportunity to study them. Financial strains during the latter part of the Qianlong reign caused the emperor to cut back on his sponsorship and collection of artwork, however, and by the end of the eighteenth century at the latest, the dominant influence on Chinese art was private patronage, together with the ever greater commercialization of production. Meanwhile, so-called vernacular painting flourished. It was produced primarily by ­urban-based Chinese artists for everyday domestic and other uses. These works, including a new genre called “beautiful women paintings” (meiren hua 美人畫), were executed in the “academic” manner of fine-line drawing and colors known generally as gongbi 工筆, as ­opposed to the more calligraphic style of painting known as xieyi 寫意 (lit., “the writing of ideas”). Vernacular paintings of this sort, which often drew upon Western elements of style and devices of representation, have been misguidedly underappreciated by Chinese connoisseurs and collectors, both now and in the past. During the nineteenth century, Qing painting and calligraphy seem to have lost a ­considerable amount of vigor and vitality. Part of the problem was lack of inspiration, an unfortunate consequence of the Qianlong emperor’s aggressive campaign to acquire local artworks for his imperial collection. Another difficulty was financial exigency, which diminished the court’s support for painting, calligraphy, and craft production. Meanwhile, many “independent” Chinese artists and calligraphers went to one of two extremes—either they surrendered to the demands of patrons and other customers for hastily produced paintings, or they became overly academic in their artistic approach. Increasingly, we find late Qing works that were simply paintings about painting, “art-historical art.” Too often the artists’ inspiration was not nature but the tradition itself. Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that the late Qing was not nearly as artistically sterile as it has often been portrayed. During the nineteenth century, for example, several bold regional styles either emerged for the first time or acquired new life, and cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou (Canton) became centers of vibrant artistic activity.

Literature The Chinese literary tradition shared with the Chinese artistic tradition many fundamental assumptions about past models, aesthetics, ethics, and cosmology. Chinese literature was, however, much more wide-ranging in its subject matter, and, by Ming-Qing times at least, more obviously the province of women writers than it had been in previous periods. As was the case during the Ming, the majority of woman writers in Qing times wrote poetry in classical Chinese. The reason is that poetry was viewed as an exalted literary form, deemed appropriate for elite women, whereas vernacular fiction of almost any sort was socially disesteemed. It should be noted, however, that from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, a number of talented women writers created popular and influential works of fiction using a special form of rhymed narrative known as tanci 彈詞. Although a great stylistic gap separated popular vernacular literature from more orthodox classical-style writings, there were certain affinities. In the first place, both kinds of literature tended to reflect elite values. Second, popular equivalents existed for nearly every kind of elite literature. Third, in truth, the elite enjoyed certain types of popular literature (such as novels) as much as, if not more than, the less privileged masses. Thus, from the standpoint 327

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of both content and appeal, vernacular literature provides us with a valuable perspective on life in late imperial China—and not just for the Han people. It is clear that the Manchus and Mongols also enjoyed vernacular Chinese literature in translation—novels in particular. In fact, all major Ming-Qing novels, several major plays, and a large number of more minor fictional works were rendered into Manchu. Manchu culture found its way into Chinese vernacular literature not only through borrowed terms and borrowed historical motifs but also in the form of a genre known as “youth books” (zidi shu 子弟書), which flourished in the Beijing area from the mid-eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth. In literature, as in art, the Qing was a period of considerable vitality, especially in genres such as song lyrics, classical poetry, parallel prose, classical prose, classical tales, and novels. Material prosperity, the expansion of mass printing, and the growth of popular literacy under the Manchus produced an unprecedented demand for, and supply of, books. At the same time, a consuming interest in all aspects of traditional Chinese culture led Qing scholars (including some Manchus and Mongols) to produce great numbers of antiquarian studies, critical essays, histories, biographies, and gazetteers. More ambitious projects, such as encyclopedias, collections of essays, and literary anthologies, were also undertaken, both by the throne and by energetic private individuals. In theory, these works were designed to provide inspired guidance for the present and the future based on a glorious past; but in practice, they often betrayed narrow scholarly prejudices and sometimes led to destructive factional rivalries. An outstanding feature of many Chinese scholars in late imperial times was their astonishing productivity and literary versatility. Take, for example, Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582–1664), a famous Jiangsu literatus “not untypical” of the Ming-Qing transition era, who had a preliminary version of his collected works published in 1643 in 110 juan. This collection included p­ oetry (21 juan), prefaces and postfaces (17), biographical and genealogical sketches (10), obituaries and epitaphs (20), funeral odes and eulogies (2), essays (6), historical annotations (5), ­critiques of poetry (5), memorials (2), other official documents (13), and letters and miscellany (9). To this corpus, Qian eventually added a supplement in 50 juan. In addition, he produced an anthology of Ming poetry in 81 juan, a draft history of the Ming dynasty in 100 juan, and annotated editions of several Buddhist texts. The Qing monarchs also aspired to such productivity and versatility—most notably the prolific, but at times rather pedestrian, Qianlong emperor. Poetry was the highest achievement in Qing literary life. As indicated earlier, the classical Chinese language was for poetic expression. Even ordinary prose had an evocative, ambiguous, rhythmic quality. Poetry—which as a generic category should include not only the various types of shi 詩 and lyric verse (ci 詞) but also “song-poems” (qu 曲) and rhyme prose or “rhapsody” ( fu 賦)—gave full scope to the creative potential of the language. The grammatical flexibility of classical Chinese, as well as the multiple meanings and subtle ambiguities of each character, allowed Chinese poets to express a wide range of ideas and emotions with vividness, economy, grace, and power. Although the Qing was not, on the whole, known as a period of poetic invention, there were a number of talented male poet-critics of the era who kept previous traditions alive and well. In the early years of the dynasty, Ming loyalists such as Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610–95), Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613–82), and Wang Fuzhi (1619–92) performed this function. Later, during the Kangxi era, individuals such as Zhu Yizun 朱彝尊 (1629–1709) and Wang Shizhen 王士禛 (1634–1711) exerted enormous influence in Chinese poetic circles. In the High Qing, Shen Deqian 沈德潛 (1673–1769), Zheng Xie 鄭燮 (1693–1765, Yuan Mei 袁枚 (1716–1798), Zhao Yi 趙翼 (1727–1814), Weng Fanggang 翁方綱 (1733–1818), and Yao Nai 姚鼐 (1732–1815) did the same. And in the late Qing period, poets such as Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 (1792–1841), Wei 328

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Yuan 魏源 (1794–1857), Jin He 金和 (1819–1885), Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲 (1848–1905), and Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) developed substantial reputations. On the whole, Qing women poets (whether Chinese, Manchu, or Mongol), like their counterparts in art, found it necessary to employ the tools and techniques of the dominant male culture. It has therefore been said that women writers in the Qing dynasty were largely dependent on a language they did not create. But the more we find out about these women, the more evident it is that they commanded the language rather than simply submitting to it. They wrote powerfully in a wide variety of genres, including not only verse of all sorts (their principle focus), but also parallel prose, plays, tanci, and even novels. Moreover, the subject matter of these writings ranged broadly and had wide appeal. It may be true, as some have claimed, that Chinese women writers found their most important audience in each other. But the biographical material included in works such as Kang-i Sun Chang and Haun Saussy, eds., Women Writers of Traditional China (1999) and Wilt Idema and Beata Grant, eds., The Red Brush: Writing Women of Imperial China (2004) indicates clearly that many women authors reached a wider appreciative audience. Several of these authors are worth ­mentioning by name here: Xu Can 徐燦 (c. 1610–c. 1677), Wang Duanshu 王端淑 (1621–c. 1706), Li Yin 李因 (1616–85); Wu Qi 吳琪 (mid-17th century), Lin Yining 林以寧 (1655–c. 1730), Mao ­X iuhui 毛秀惠 (fl. 1735), Wang Yuzhen 汪玉軫 (late 18th century), Wu ­Guichen 吳規臣 (eighteenth century), Sun Yunhe 孫雲鶴 (late eighteenth to early nineteenth ­centuries), Wang Duan 汪端 (1793–1839), Gu Taiqing 顧太清 (1799–c. 1876), and Wu Zao吳藻 (1799–1863). I have singled out these individuals not only because they were excellent poets, but also because—with the partial exceptions of Wang Duan and Wu Zao, who had particularly spectacular literary gifts—they were well known for their painting and/or calligraphy as well as their poetry. Although no major literary figure in China after the first century ce attempted to write his or her principal works in a language consonant with the spoken language, the written vernacular still enjoyed considerable popularity throughout much of the imperial era—­ especially from the Tang period onward. During the Qing dynasty, a variety of vernacular works circulated widely, reflecting, as well as contributing to, the growth of basic literacy in China—estimated by some to be as high as 45 percent for males and 10 percent for females. Although not as succinct, exalted, or aesthetically pleasing as classical Chinese, the vernacular was comparatively easy to learn, direct, colorful, and often extremely forceful. The vast majority of vernacular writings in Qing China, including short stories, plays, and novels, reflected conventional elite values, including such popular Buddhist and Religious Daoist tracts as the Taishang ganying pian 太上感應篇 (Tract of Taishang on action and response) and the Bufeiqian gongde lu 不費錢功德錄 (Meritorious deeds at no cost). Although based on the idea of divine retribution and buttressed by other religious notions, these works employed a great deal of elite symbolism and had a decidedly ethical, this-worldly cast. Perhaps the most famous play of the Qing period is Taohua shan 桃花扇 (Peach blossom fan; 1708). Written by a descendant of Confucius named Kong Shangren 孔尚任 (1648–1718), Peach Blossom Fan ranks as one of the greatest plays in the Chinese language by virtue of its historical vision, dramatic construction, and literary quality. Among the several outstanding novels of the Qing period are Rulin waishi 儒林外史 (The scholars) by Wu Jingzi 吳敬梓 (1701–1754), Rou putuan 肉蒲團 (Carnal prayer mat), attributed by some to the idiosyncratic dramatist Li Yu 李漁 (1610–80), Jinghua yuan 鏡花緣 (Flowers in the mirror) by Li Ruzhen 李如珍 (c. 1763–1830), Lao Can youji 老殘遊記 (The travels of Lao Can) by Liu E 劉鶚 (1857–1909), Ershi nian mudu guai xianzhuang 二十年目睹之怪現狀 (Bizarre happenings eyewitnessed over two decades) by Wu Woyao 吳沃堯 (1867–1910), and, of course, the supreme 329

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achievement of vernacular literature in the Qing period, Honglou meng 紅樓夢 (Dream of the red chamber; aka Dream of red mansions). The first 80 chapters of this massive and elegant work, commonly known as Shihtou ji 石頭記 (Story of the Stone), were written by Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹 (c. 1715–1763), a Chinese bondservant in the Banner organization and a talented painter; the last 40 chapters are generally attributed to Gao E 高額 (fl. 1791), a full-fledged Bannerman and a degree-holding scholar. Some versions of the full 120-chapter work consist of nearly 1,300 pages and about 700,000 words. The novel contains at least thirty major figures and some 400 minor ones, ranged all along the Chinese social spectrum. Yet, as numerous as these characters are, Fang Chao-ying rightly observes that they intermingle in a wonderful unity, each individual constituting an integral member of a large family group, sharing its glory and its shame, contributing to its prosperity or its ruin. Some, taking it for granted that the family fortune is irreversible, spend their days in emotional excesses or in sensual pleasures. Some, who are avaricious, contrive to profit by mismanagement of the family estate. Some foresee the dangers and so plan for their own futures; others voice warnings, but their words go unheeded. Such a panorama of complex human emotions, involving tens of masters and hundreds of servants, constitutes source-material of supreme value for a study of the social conditions in affluent households of the early Qing period. As this summary suggests, the major story line of the novel revolves around the fortunes of the Jia 賈 family and a complex love affair involving various individuals living in the family compound—notably Jia Baoyu 寶玉, the “hero” (one might say anti-hero) of the book, and his talented female cousins, Lin Daiyu 林黛玉 and Xue Baochai 薛寶釵. Much of the novel is strongly autobiographical, for like Baoyu, Cao Xueqin was a sensitive, well-educated individual whose wealthy and established family experienced financial reverses and other difficulties during his lifetime. The book has several different layers of meaning, and it is written in several different literary modes—realistic, allegorical, and narrative. Like The Scholars, Dream of the Red Chamber is in part a critique of early Qing political and social life, and like Flowers in the Mirror, which was heavily influenced by Cao’s brilliant narrative, it can be seen as a celebration of women. Chinese and Western scholars alike have identified Dream of the Red Chamber as a microcosm of traditional Chinese culture. In both its elaborate structure and its exquisite detail, the novel evokes a mood of completeness and authenticity. Furthermore, in a very real sense it represents the culmination of China’s entire premodern literary tradition. The novel includes every major type of Chinese literature—including philosophy, history, poetry, and fiction. We find in it quotations from Confucius and Zhuangzi, Tang poets, and Yuan dramatists. Throughout the Qing period and up to the present, Dream of the Red Chamber has inspired countless plays, poems, games, and sequels, as well as a huge body of critical scholarship. The cultural breadth of the novel is perhaps most evident in its vivid portrayal of ­Chinese society. In both its psychological realism and encyclopedic scope, it is unparalleled in the history of traditional Chinese literature. As Fang Chao-ying has indicated, Dream of the Red Chamber sheds light on virtually every aspect of Chinese life and covers a vast social spectrum. It highlights the importance of popular religion and family ritual, the values of filial piety and respect for age and authority, and the tensions and conflicts of role fulfillment at various levels of society. In addition, it provides a wealth of detail on Chinese aesthetics, 330

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housing, clothing, food, amusements, festivals, sexual life, and popular customs. Perhaps most important, it illustrates the gap between social theory and social practice so often neglected or downplayed in official documents and other orthodox sources.

Concluding Remarks Returning to the issue of Sinicization, it is evident that a significant gap separated the ­Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese Bannermen from the non-Banner Han majority in China Proper. The Banners lived in special walled compounds with Manchu-style decorations in their homes (for example, bows and arrows on display); they celebrated their own martial traditions and common legends, engaged in shamanistic religious practices, and, for much of the Qing period, spoke the same non-Han language. They observed different forms of greeting, and they wore distinctive clothing (Qing official and non-officials styles both ­reflected this sartorial influence). Elite Manchu women were especially unlike their Han counterparts: they did not generally bind their feet, wore their hair differently, and had different styles of clothing and jewelry. They enjoyed more substantial property rights than Han women, and they had a generally higher status in the Banner world than Han women had in theirs. Manchu policy toward the remarriage of women was also more forgiving than in the dominant Han culture. Nonetheless, prolonged interaction with the Chinese had an effect on many Manchus, both men and women—particularly after the Qianlong emperor sanctioned the policy of allowing permanent Banner residence in the provinces (1756). By stages, first, it seems, in Beijing and then later in the provinces, the Manchus succumbed to certain so-called “evil Chinese habits.” Apparently, Chinese Bannermen often took the lead in these activities, which included an early attraction to Chinese-style entertainments and a growing neglect of their military heritage. The process also involved the increasing use of the Chinese language as opposed to Manchu; by 1800 at the latest, the Qing court had lost its battle to preserve Manchu as the spoken language among the majority of Bannermen. From that time onward, even the “jottings” (biji 筆記) designed to celebrate Manchu culture “were written, not in workaday Manchu, but in elegant literary Chinese.” In other ways, too, Chinese culture proved alluring. As we have seen, many Manchus, and certainly all of the Qing emperors from Kangxi onward, found Chinese art and literature attractive. In terms of life-cycle rituals, the Manchus at all levels celebrated a number of Han Chinese festivals, including the lunar New Year. Manchu cities, although clearly distinguishable from their Chinese counterparts, had Chinese-style religious temples, including those for the City God, the God of Literature, the God of War, and the Gods of Wealth and Fire. And although foot binding was discouraged among Banner women, some engaged in the practice, and a large number surrendered to the idea that a “horse-hoof ” extension on their shoes (matidi xie 馬蹄底鞋) might look as if their feet had been bound, or at least produce an apparently attractive foot-bound type of gait. An additional problem over time was declining financial support for the Banner garrisons, which encouraged Banner families to interact more substantially with Han Chinese in an effort to enhance their economic ­prospects—increasingly by investing in Chinese commercial enterprises. In all, then, the political success of the Manchus can be explained by their multicultural flexibility—in particular their ability to exploit cultural links with the non-Han peoples of Inner Asia (Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria, and Xinjiang), and at the same time to present themselves as the protectors of China’s cultural heritage to their Han subjects below the Great Wall. In so doing they created a continuum between the sedentary agricultural world 331

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of China Proper and the pastoral world of Inner Asia. In the process, the Manchus managed to keep far more of their ethnic identity than many early accounts of Sinicization have suggested, despite their genuine admiration for many aspects of traditional Chinese culture. These ethnic differences would become all too obvious in the waning years of the Qing, when claims to be the protectors of Chinese culture rang hollow in the face of modern ­Chinese nationalism.

Note 1 Much of the material in this essay has been drawn from my book, The Qing Dynasty and Traditional Chinese Culture (Lanham, Boulder, New York, and London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015) with the permission of the publisher.

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Glossary-Index

Abaoji 阿保機, founder of the Kitan Liao dynasty 189, 213–17, 219, 226 Abo 阿波 branch of the Eastern Tujue 123 Abraham (Aluoben 阿羅本), Christian missionary 141 Accounts (Biographies) of Eminent Monks (Gaoseng zhuan 高僧傳) by Huijiao 慧皎 (Liang) 104 Accounts (Biographies) of Famous Monks (Mingseng zhuan 名僧傳) by Baochang 寶唱 (Liang) 104 agriculture 102–3 agro-pastoral state 128, 130, 142 Aguda 阿骨打, founder of the Jurchen Jin dynasty 214, 219–20 Ailao 哀牢, non-Han people in the southwest in Eastern Han times 9, 41 al-Marwani, Afghan geographer 219 “all keys and modes” (zhugongdiao 諸宮調), drama form in Jurchen Jin 224 American crops, introduced in the Ming 260 An Lushan rebellion 110–12, 127, 129, 141–2, 144–5, 148, 152–3, 157, 160, 162, 194 An Lushan 安祿山, a Turko-Sogdian who rebelled in 755, 113, 136 An Shigao 安世高, Parthian Buddhist 49 Analects of Confucius 21 ancestor worship 34 Ancestral Admonitions (Zuxun 祖訓), household regulations of Ming imperial family 250–51 Ancestral Temple 41, 48, 82,123, 133 Ancient Style (guwen 古文) movement, started by Han Yu 153 anjifang 安濟坊, charity clinics 187 Annotated Classic of Waterways (Shuijing zhu 水經注), a classic of geography 106 anomaly accounts (zhiguai 志怪) 104 Antoinette, Marie 80 Antonine Plague 50

appanages, landed estates of Mongol nobles 245 “Approaching the Origin of the Way” (Yuandao 原道) 154 Arabs 138; Arab merchants 204 area commands (dudu fu 都督府) 130 area commands/commanders (zongguan 總管) 119 Arigibag, Mongol khan 239 Ariq Böke, Mongol prince 236 aromatics (xiangyao 香藥) 204 Arrow War 305 Ashina Helu 阿史那賀魯 (–659), Western Tujue qaghan 129 Aśoka (Ayuwang 阿育王), ancient Indian ruler 96–7 Aśoka sutra 103 Avars (Rouran 柔然) 98 Ayurbarwada, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Renzong 仁宗 238 axis, in city-planning 130 Ba-Cong 巴賨 (Ba-Di 巴氐), non-Han people 81 Bai Juyi 白居易 (772–846), Late Tang poet 153 Bai Pu 白朴, Yuan dynasty writer 272 Baihu guan 白虎觀 (White Tiger Hall) 49 baihua wen 白話文, vernacular Chinese, vernacular script 317 baima zhi meng 白馬之盟 (White Horse Covenant) 27 “Ballad of Mulan” (Mulan shi 木蘭詩) 106 Ban Chao 班超, Eastern Han general active in the Western Regions 10, 42–3 Ban Gu 班固, Eastern Han historian 34 Ban Yong 班勇, Eastern general active in the Western Regions 43 Bao Zhao 鮑照, Liu-Song poet 106

337

Glossary-Index baojia 保甲, mutual security system 186 baoju 保舉, recommendation through sponsorship 31 Basalawarmi, Mongol prince 248 basilicas (dian 殿) 130 Battle of Canhepi 參合陂 (east-northeast of Liangcheng, Inner Mongolia) 59 Battle of Gaoping 高平 (in southeast Shanxi), between the Later Zhou and Northern Han with the former victorious (954) 114, 169 Battle of Gaolinghe 高粱河 189 Battle of Guandu 官渡 (northeast of Zhongmu, near Kaifeng, Henan) 57, 63 Battle of Red Cliffs (Chibi 赤壁) 63, 57, 67, 71, 73 Battle of Shayuan 沙苑 (south of Dali, Shaanxi) 61 Battle of Talas 怛羅斯 (751), between the Tang and the Arabs in Transoxiana, resulting in the Tang’s defeat 112 Battle of the Fei River 淝水 59, 87, 91, 95; impact of 88 Bayan, Mongol general 200 Bei Qi shu北齊書 (Book of the Northern Qi) 137 Beijiao 北郊 (Northern Suburban Altar to Earth) 48 Beishi 北史 (History of the Northern Dynasties) 137 Bencao gangmu 本草綱目 (General Pharmacopaeia) 274 biji 筆記 (miscellaneous jottings) 257 Bianzhou 汴州 (Kaifeng in Henan) 148 Bing Ji 丙吉, Western Han official 30 bingshu 兵書 (military treatises) 38 Biyong 辟雍 (Circular Moat) 48–9 Bodhiruci 菩提留支, Indian Buddhist monk at Luoyang 103 bodhisattva precepts, taking (Buddhist ceremony) 97 Book of the [Northern] Zhou (Zhoushu 周書), by Linghu Defen 令狐德棻 121 Book of the Jin ( Jinshu 晉書) 105 Book of the Later Han (Hou Han shu 後漢書) by Fan Ye 范曄 (Liu-Song) 105 Book of the Song (Songshu 宋書) by Shen Yue et al. 105 Book of the Southern Qi (Nan Qi shu 南齊書) by Xiao Zixian 蕭子顯 (Liang) 105 Book of the Wei (Weishu 魏書) by Wei Shou 魏收 (Northern Qi) 105 books, classification of, by Liu Xiang 劉向 and Liu Xin 劉歆 38 Boxer rebellion 313–14 bronze coins 124, 139, 205 “brother states” (xiongdi zhi guo 兄弟之國), diplomatic language in Treaty of Chanyuan 190

bu 部 (Boards; Ministries), central government agencies under the Department of State affairs 116 Buddha 50 Buddhajiva (Fotuoshi 佛陀什), Indian Buddhist monk at the Song court 96 Buddhism 49–50, 83, 96, 102, 104; 113, 120, 154, 183 209–11, 219, 245 254, 279, 285, 308, 321–24; in Cao-Wei 69; at Fu Jian’s court 87; merger of Daoism and 141; sponsorship of 105; in Wu 74; suppression by Tang Wuzong (Huichang 會昌 proscription) 120, 141, 154–5; suppression under the Northern Wei 60, 99; used to justify rule by females 135 Buddhist societies (yishe 邑社) 105 Bufeiqian gongde lu 不費錢功德錄 (Meritorious Deeds at No Cost), Qing Buddhist tract 329 Bureau of Imperial Clan Administration (Da zongzheng fu 大宗正府) 240 Bureau of Military Affairs (shumi yuan 樞密院) 188, 201 Burma/Myanmar 41 cakravartin, wheel-turning emperor 96 Cai Jing 蔡京, Song statesman 187, 193 caizi jiaren 才子佳人 (Scholar and Beauty), literary motif 277 Canton System, foreign trade system in the Qing 301–2, 304 Cao Cao 曹操, late Eastern Han warlord 52–3, 57, 62–3, 67–8, 70, 272; campaign against the Wuhuan 70; as King of Wei 魏王, 64, and literature 69 Cao Fang 曹芳 (king of Qi 齊王), Cao-Wei sovereign 57, 65–6, 68 Cao Huan 曹奐 (Emperor Yuan 元), Cao-Wei sovereign 58, 66, 68; abdicates 67 Cao Jie 曹節, Eastern Han eunuch 11 Cao Mao 曹髦 (Township Duke of Gaogui 高貴鄉公) 58, 68; Cao-Wei sovereign 66 Cao Pi 曹丕 (Emperor Wen of the Cao-Wei 魏文), founding emperor of the Cao-Wei 11, 53, 56–7, 67–8, 73; founds Cao-Wei dynasty 65; heir apparent 64; and literature 69; restrictive policy on royals 78 Cao Rui 曹叡 (Emperor Ming 明) 57, 65, 68 Cao Shuang 曹爽, Cao-Wei sovereign 57, 65 Cao Song 曹嵩, Eastern Han adopted son of a eunuch 52, 67 Cao Teng 曹滕, late Eastern Han eunuch 67 Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹, Qing novelist 330 Cao Zhi 曹植, brother of Cao Pi曹丕: and literature 69 Cao-Wei, dynasty and state in the North 56–7; taxes 79–80 capital city types: with or without an outer city 133 capital system 131

338

Glossary-Index capitalism 203, 292 Carnal Prayer Mat (Rou putuan 肉蒲團), Qing play 329 Catalog of the Scriptures and Writings of the Three Caverns (Sandong jingshu mulu 三洞經書目錄) 103 Cavalry 160 Celestial Masters, a hierarchical millenarian sect 69, 72, 103–4 Censorate (yushi tai 御史台; Terrace of Censors) 118, 188 Central Asia 45, 238 Central Plains 102, 123 Century of Humiliation 304 Chaghadai, Mongol Khan in Central Asia 238 chaju 察舉, official recommendation system 29 chakravartin (the wheel-turning king) 135 Cham, state in central Vietnam 96 chamberlain (qing 卿), head of a Court (si 寺) 118 Champa rice (zhancheng dao 占城稻) 191, 204, 260 Chan 禪 ( Japanese: Zen) Buddhism 103,155, 210, 245, 279 Chancellor 41; staff of 382 men 29. See also xiang 相 Chancellory style (Taige ti 臺閣體), literary movement in Ming 256, 275 Chang Jun 常駿, Sui emissary 122 Chang’an 長安 (Han) (Xi’an, Shaanxi) 57, 62, 81, 90, 102–3; 316 sack of 81; mausoleums near 37; population 37; Western Han 39, 53 Chang’an 長安 (Sui-Tang) (Sui Daxingcheng) 113, 131, 134, 146, 151; Buddhism in 130; falls to An Lushan 145; and Han Chang’an compared 130; influence on Japan 133 Changzhou 常州 in Jiangsu 138 Chanyu Yu 單于輿 39–40 Chanyu 單于, head of Xiongnu 36 Chao Cuo 晁錯, adviser to Emperor Jing 景帝 of the Western Han 8 chaoyi 朝議 (court deliberations) 28 check medium (huizi 會子) 205 Chen Shubao 陳叔寶, last sovereign of the Chen 122 Chen Baxian 陳霸先 (Emperor Wu 武 of the Chen) 98; founder of the Chen 61 Chen Chun 陳淳, Ming painter 326 Chen dynasty at Jiankang 57, 61; conquered by the Sui 98 Chen dynasty, founded by Chen Baxian 陳霸先 116; conquered 122 Chen Hongshou 陳洪綬, Ming painter 279 Chen Lin 陳琳, late Eastern Han literary figure 69 Chen Min 陳敏, Eastern Jin rebel 89 Chen Sheng 陳勝 (Chen She 陳涉), Qin rebel 8, 23 Chen Shou陳壽, Western Jin historian 75

Chen Shu 陳書, Qing painter 326 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, modern historian 134 Chen Zhi 陳祗, Shu official 66, 71 Chen Zi’ang 陳子昂, Early Tang poet 141 Cheng Hao 程顥, Song philosopher 195–96, 200 Cheng Pu 程普, top Wu general 74 Cheng Yi 程頤, Song philosopher 195–96, 200 Cheng-Han (Han), dynasty and state in Sichuan 90 Cheng-Zhu School (Cheng-Zhu lixue 程朱理學) or Cheng-Zhu Confucianism 195, 273, 319 Chenghua 成化, Ming emperor. See Zhu Jianshen 朱見深 chengxiang 丞相 (chancellor), one of the Three Dukes 28. See also xiang 相 Chenjun 陳郡, Eastern Jin commandery 90 Chenshu 陳書 (Book of the Chen) 137 chief minister (xiang 相), one of the leaders of the bureaucracy 117–8 chief councilor (zaifu 宰輔) 188 Chimei 赤眉 (Red Eyebrows), rebel group 9 China proper in 589 122 Chinese diaspora 294 Chinese scholarship, loved by non-Han leaders 82 Chinggis Khan, Mongol leader 202, 220, 232, 236, 242 Chitu 赤土 in the Malay Peninsula 122 Chongzhen 崇禎, Ming emperor. See Zhu Youjian 朱由檢 choronym ( junwang 郡望), one’s ancestral place, often an indicator of prominence 134 Chu 楚 (951), state in Hunan and others 164 Chuluo 處羅, Eastern Tujue qaghan (Abo branch) 123 cishi /zhou cishi 州刺史 (provincial inspector; prefect) 45, 95. See also prefect, province civilian state farms 80. See also tuntian 屯田, juntun 軍屯 classification of people into four groups 150 cloth tax (diao 調) 136 Cohong, see gonghang coin famine (qianhuang 錢荒), shortage of copper coins in Song which led to printing of paper money 192 Collected Notes on the Translation of the Tripitaka (Chu sanzang jiji 出三藏記集) 104 Collected Statutes of the Qing (Da Qing huiduan 大清會典) 322 collective responsibility 32 Colloquium of Classic Texts ( jingyan 經筵) 239 commandery impartial judges ( jun zhongzheng 郡中正) 89 commandery. See jun 郡 Commentary to the Sanguo zhi 三國志 by Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (Liu-Song) 105 commodity monies 124

339

Glossary-Index Complete Self-realization School (quanzhen 全真), Daoist sect 225, 324 Comprehensive Institutions (Tongdian 通典) 153 Comprehensive Institutions of the Great Yuan (Da Yuan tongzhi 大元通制) 241 Confucianism (rujia 儒家) 7, 140, 209, 245. See also ru 儒 Confucianists 50 Confucius as a Reformer, A Study of (Kongzi gaizhi kao 孔子改制考) reformist text by Kang Youwei 312 consort relatives (waiqi 外戚; male relatives of the imperial consorts) 80, 90 Controller of National Finance (zhiguoyongshi 制國用使) 201 Convention of Beijing 1860 305 copper 41, 152, 191–93, 205, 226, 298 correlative cosmology (tianren ganying 天人感應) 33, 37 corvée (yong 庸) 124, 136 corvée, Western Han 32 cosmopolitanism 154, 162 cotton 191–2, 258, 260–1, 291–2, 303 Council of State, Song government body 188 county, Eastern Han: average population 45. See also xian 縣 Courts (si 寺), one of the nine or more government second- or third-tier agencies:118. See also Nine Courts Cui Shi 崔寔 : Eastern Han scholar 47 da jijiu 大祭酒 (great libationer), official of the wudoumi dao 72 Da Ming yitong zhi 大明一統志 (Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Ming) 255 Dachanding Monastery 大禪定寺, Buddhist monastery in Daxingcheng 120 Dahai 達海, Manchu translator and linguist 317 Dai Viet 大越 137 Dai 代, Xianbei state 59 Dai Jin 戴進, Ming painter 278 daibi 代筆 (substitute brush) 278 Daling River 大凌河, in west Liaoning 84 Dan Zhu 啖助, Tang Confucian scholar 153 danggu 黨錮 (Great Proscription), Eastern Han campaign 11, 51 Dao’an 道安, Buddhist monk and Fu Jian’s adviser 87, 104 Daode jing 道德經 (Classic of the Way and virtue) 119, 225 Daoguang 道光, Qing emperor 291, 303, 323 Daoism 38, 49–50, 140, 154, 183–184, 209–11, 225, 254, 308, 320; in Cao-Wei 69; in Jurchen Jin 225; in Mongol Yuan 244 Daoshu fang 道術坊 (Ward of Daoist Techniques), in Luoyang 120 Daotong 道統 (Transmission of the Way) 195

Daoxue 道學 (Learning of the Way, sometimes referred to as Neo-Confucianism) 153, 179, 194, 199, 207, 211, 245, 271, 273 daoyin 導引 (pulling) techniques 70 Daqin 大秦 (Roman Orient) 10 dark learning (xuanxue 玄學; Mystery Learning) 104 darughachi (daluhuachi 達魯花赤; overseers), nonHan administrators under the Mongol Yuan 240, 271 dashe 大射 (Great Archery), ceremony 49 Datang Kaiyuan li 大唐開元禮 (Rites of the Great Tang during the Kaiyuan period) 136–37 datong 大統 (controller-in-chief ) who took charge of Buddhist affairs 120 Daxingcheng 大興城 (Xi’an, Shaanxi), Sui capital 110–1, 116, 119, 124, 126, 131; building of 123. See Chang’an (Sui-Tang) Daxingshan Monastery 大興善寺, top Buddhist monastery in Sui Daxingcheng 120 Daxue 大學 (Great Learning), one of the Four Books 212 Dayuan 大宛, state in Central Asia 9 de facto chief ministers, Sui-Tang officials charged with chief ministerial duties without official appointments 118 Declarations of the Perfected (Zhengao 真誥) 103 defense commands ( fanzhen 藩鎮) 136 Dehua 德化, kiln site in Fujian 280 Deng Ai 鄧艾, Cao-Wei general 67 Deng Mengnü 鄧猛女 (Empress Deng), empress of Eastern Han Emperor Huan 10, 50, 51 Dent & Company, British opium traders 303–04 Department of State Affairs: see shangshu sheng 尚書省 deposit certificates ( jiaozi 交子) 205 dharma (truth; law) 140 Dharma 達磨, last tsenpo 贊普 (king) of Tubo (d. 842) 113 Di 氐 84; origins of 86; proto-Tibetan 81 Dianlian/Dianling 滇零, Qiang 羌 leader 43 Diao Xie 刁協, Eastern Jin official 89 Direct Road (zhidao 直道) 21 Directional Di 帝 (celestial emperors) 35 Directorate General of Merchant Corporations, Mongol international trade bureau 246 Directorate of Ceremonial (silijian 司禮監), eunuch office in the Ming 253–54 Directorate School (guozixue 國子學) 193 Discourse on the Perishability of the Soul (Shenmie lun 神滅論) by Fan Zhen 范縝 (c. 450–515) 104 Divine Capital, Luoyang under Wu Zetian 135. See Luoyang (Sui-Tang) Dong Jin 董晉 (724–799), military commissioner in Bianzhou 150 Dong Qichang 董其昌, Ming painter 279

340

Glossary-Index Dong Yun 董允, top Shu official 71 Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒, Western Han scholar 30, 33, 38 Dong Zhuo 董卓, late Eastern Han warlord 11, 53, 57; death of 62 Donghu 東胡 83 Dongjing 東京, one of Parhae’s capitals 131, 133 Donglin 東林movement/academy, Ming literary-political movement 266–7, 269 Dongting 洞庭, Qin commandery ( jun) 17 Dongwanggong 東王公 (King Father of the East) 49 Dou Jiande 竇建德, Sui rebel leader in Hebei 125 Dou Rong 竇融, early Eastern Han warlord 9, 39 Dou Wu 竇武, Eastern Han politician, waiqi 10–11, 42; campaign against Northern Chanyu 44; death of 51 double/dual tax law (liangshui fa 兩稅法) 113, 146, 151 dowries 208 Dream of the Red Chamber. See Honglou meng Du Fu 杜甫, Tang poet-sage 142, 275 Du Fuwei 杜伏威, Sui rebel in the South 125 du Liao jiangjun 度遼將軍 (General on the Liao) 42 Du Liniang 杜麗娘, heroine of Mudan ting 277 Du Luozhou 杜洛周rebellion 60 Du Qiong 杜瓊, Ming painter 279 Du Wenxiu 杜文秀 rebellion, anti-Qing uprising 309 Du You 杜佑, Mid-Tang scholar of institutional history 153 Du Yu 杜預, senior Western Jin official 79 Du Zhong 杜眾, Eastern Han critic 51 Du Zigong 杜子恭, Eastern Jin Daoist 91 dual administration, ruling system developed by Kitans to govern Chinese and Kitan territories 213, 215–6, 226 dual-tax system and indirect taxes (on salt, tea, wine, commerce, etc.) 142 Duan Jiong 段熲, Eastern official 52 Duan 段, a branch of the Xianbei 81 Duke of Xiang of Qin 秦襄公, Qin sovereign 7 Duke Xiao of Qin 秦孝公, Qin sovereign 8, 12–3 Dungan (Dong’gan 東干) revolt, anti-Qing uprising 309 Dunhuang 敦煌, Han region/commandery 37; population 31 duzhi si 度支司 (Bureau of General Accounts) 146 Duzong 度宗, Song. See Zhao Qi 趙禥 Early Medieval China 56 Early Tang 110, 134, 141 East India Company (EIC) 293, 302–3 Eastern Barbarians (Yi) 85

Eastern Capital at Luoyang (Sui): building of 116. See also Luoyang (Sui-Tang) Eastern Depot (Dongchang 東廠), secret police in the Ming 253 Eastern Han, dynasty founded by Liu Xiu at Luoyang 9, 35, 39ff., 147; end of 62; eunuchs 50–2; founding 40–1; great families 47–8; local government 45–6; and non-Han peoples 41–3; population 45; regency families 43–45; scholarship 48–50; young emperors 43–5 Eastern Jin, dynasty founded by Emperor Yuan at Jiankang 56, 58; founding of 88 Eastern Tujue, eastern Tujue qaghanate, mostly in Mongolia and Siberia 112, 122, 127, 129. See also Tujue Eastern Wei, dynasty founded by Gao Huan at Ye 57, 60, 100 Eastern Zhou, pre-Qin dynasty: end of 14 Eight Banners, Manchu military and social organization 288 Eight-legged essay (baguwenzhang 八股文章), examination literary form 256, 318 Eight Nation Alliance, foreign powers’ military expedition against the Boxer rebellion 313–4 elementary schools (xiaoxue 小學) 82 Emperor Ai 哀of the Eastern Jin 59 Emperor Ai 哀 of the Eastern Han 28 Emperor Ai 哀 of the Tang 148 Emperor An 安 (Liu You 劉祐), Eastern Han 44 Emperor An 安 of the Eastern Jin 59, 95 Emperor Cheng 成 of the Eastern Han 28, 34 Emperor Cheng 成 of the Eastern Jin (Sima Yan 司馬衍) 58–9 Emperor Deguang 德光, Kitan ruler 217 Emperor Dezong 德宗 of the Tang 146 Emperor Fei 廢 of the Eastern Jin 59 Emperor Gao 41. See also Gaozu 高祖 Emperor Gaozong 高宗 of the Tang 110, 112, 134 Emperor Gong 恭 of the Eastern Jin 59 Emperor Guangwu 光武 (Liu Xiu 劉秀), founding emperor of the Eastern Han 9, 35, 39, 41, 48 Emperor He 和 (Liu Zhao 劉肇) of the Eastern Han 42–4 Emperor Huai 懐 (Sima Chi 司馬熾) of the Western Jin 58, 80–1 Emperor Huan 桓 (Liu Zhi 劉志) of the Eastern Han 45; coup against Liang Ji 50–1; endorses Buddhism 50 Emperor Hui 惠 (Liu Ying 劉盈) of the Western Han 25, 27 Emperor Hui 惠of the Western Jin 58, 80 Emperor Jianwen 簡文 of the Eastern Jin 59, 91 Emperor Jing 景of the Western Han 8, 25, 27 Emperor Jingzong 景宗, Kitan ruler 218 Emperor Kang 康 of the Eastern Jin 58

341

Glossary-Index Emperor Ling 靈 of the Eastern Han 11, 49, 52–3 Emperor Min 愍 (Sima Ye 司馬鄴) of the Western Jin 58, 81 Emperor Ming 明 (Liu Zhuang 劉莊) of the Eastern Han 9, 41, 49 Emperor Ming 明 (Sima Shao 司馬紹) of the Eastern Jin 58, 89, 90 Emperor Mu 穆 of the Eastern Jin 58 Emperor Ruizong睿宗* of the Tang 112, 127, 134. *He had two separate reign periods which are indicated as (I) and (II) Emperor Shao 少 (Liu Bian 劉辯) of the Eastern Han 53, 57, 62 Emperor Shengzong 聖宗, Kitan ruler 218 Emperor Shizong 世宗, Jurchen ruler 222–4 Emperor Shun 順 (Liu Bao 劉保) of the Eastern Han 44, 49–50 Emperor Suzong 肅宗 of the Tang 145 Emperor Taiwu 太武 of the Northern Wei 88 Emperor Taizong 太宗 (Li Shimin 李世民) of the Tang 110, 134; and Christianity 141 Emperor Wen 文 (Liu Heng 劉恆; King of Dai 代王) of the Western Han 8, 25, 27–8; mausoleum 34 Emperor Wen 文 of the Chen 98 Emperor Wen 文 of the Sui (né Yang Jian 楊堅) 119, 122; as patron of Buddhism 120; unifies China 116 Emperor Wencheng 文成 of the Northern Wei 99 Emperor Wenzong 文宗 of the Tang 113, 147 Emperor Wen文 (Liu Yilong 劉義隆) of the Liu-Song 96 Emperor Wu 武 (Yuwen Yong 宇文邕) of the Northern Zhou 116, 120 Emperor Wu 武 of the Western Han 25, 27–8, 32–3, 35; witch hunt under 26; and Xiongnu 36; Emperor Wu 武of the Liang 104. See also Xiao Yan 蕭衍 Emperor Wu 武 (Sima Yan 司馬炎) of the Western Jin: disarmament and the land owning system 79; enfeoffs royals 78 Emperor Wuzong 武宗 of the Tang 113, 141, 155 Emperor Xian 獻 (Liu Xie 劉協) of the Eastern Han 11, 53, 57, 62, 67; abdicates 56, 65 Emperor Xianwen 獻文 of the Northern Wei 99 Emperor Xianzong 憲宗 of the Tang 113, 147–8, 154 Emperor Xiaoming 孝明 of the Northern Wei 100 Emperor Xiaowen 孝文 (Tuoba Hong拓拔宏) of the Northern Wei 97, 101 Emperor Xiaowu 孝武 (Sima Yao 司馬曜) of the Eastern Jin 59, 91

Emperor Xuan 宣 of the Chen 98 Emperor Xuan 宣 (Liu Bingyi 劉病已) of the Western Han 28 Emperor Xuanwu 宣武 of the Northern Wei 100 Emperor Xuanzong 玄宗 (Li Longji 李隆基) of the Tang 110, 136, 145 Emperor Yang 煬 (Yang Guang 楊廣) of the Sui, Prince of Jin 晉 119, 122, 124; ambitious foreign policy objectives 122; and Daoism 120; killed 125; as patron of Buddhism 120; as poet 121; relations with Tujue 123; wars against Koguryǒ 123 Emperor Yuan 元 (Sima Rui 司馬睿) of the Eastern Jin 58, 88 Emperor Yuan 元 (Xiao Yi 蕭繹) of the Liang, at Jiangling 江陵 61 Emperor Zhang 章 of the Eastern Han 41–3, 49 Emperor Zhangzong 章宗, Jurchen ruler 223, 225 Emperor Zhao 昭 of the Western Han 26, 28 Emperor Zhongzong中宗* of the Tang 112, 127, 134. *He had two separate reign periods which are indicated as (I) and (II) emperors, Eastern Han: minors as 45 Empress Chinqin 淳欽, Kitan regent 216–7 Empress Deng 鄧 (Empress Dowager Deng 鄧太后) of Emperor He 10, 44 Empress Deng 鄧 of Emperor Huan 51. See also Deng Mengnü 鄧猛女 Empress Dou 竇 (Empress Dowager Dou 竇太后), Eastern Han Emperor Zhang’s consort 10, 42–4, 51 Empress Dowager Ci’an 慈安, Qing regent 305 Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧, Qing regent 305–6 Empress Dowager Feng 馮太后, Emperor Wencheng’s 文成 consort, grandmother of Emperor Xiaowen 孝文 99–100 Empress Dowager He 何太后, Eastern Han Emperor Ling’s 靈 consort 11, 53 Empress Dowager Hu 胡 (aka Ling 靈), Emperor Xuanwu’s 宣武 consort 100 Empress Dowager Liang 梁太后 44, 50. See also Liang Na 梁妠 Empress Dowager Lü 呂太后 25. See also Empress Lü Empress Dowager Wei 衛皇后 (Wei Zifu 衛子夫) of Western Han Emperor Wu 26 Empress Dowager Xiao, Kitan leader 217 Empress Dowager Xuanren 宣仁, regent for Song Zhezong 186, 191 Empress Dugu 獨孤, Emperor Wen of the Sui’s consort 117 Empress He 何 53. See also Empress Dowager He Empress Jia ( Jia Nanfeng 賈南風), Western Jin Emperor Hui’s 惠 consort 58, 80

342

Glossary-Index Empress Li 李, wife of Song Guangzong 199 Empress Liu 劉, regent for Zhao Zhen, Song Renzong 184 Empress Lü 呂后, consort of Liu Bang 劉邦 8, 27 Empress Yan 閻, Eastern Han Emperor An’s 安 consort 44 Empress Yang 羊of the Western Jin, consort of Emperor Huai 懷 80 engrossers ( jianbing 兼并), owners of tax free estates 204 Epang Palace 阿房宮 (Qin), built by the First Emperor at Xianyang 21–23 equal field law ( juntian fa 均田法) 136 equal field/fields system ( juntian zhi 均田制) 111, 116, 146, 138; Northern Wei 60, 100 Er pai 二拍 (Two Claps), Ming short story collection 276 Ershi nian mudu zhi guai xianzhuang 二十年目睹 之怪現狀 (Bizarre Happenings Eyewitnessed over Two Decades), Qing novel 329 Erzhu Rong 爾朱榮, Northern Wei frontier commander 60, 100 Escort Bureau (biaoju 鏢局), commercial transport service 296 Essential Techniques for the Common People (Qimin yaoshu 齊民要術) 103, 106 eunuchs 44, 50–3; in the Eastern Han 7; influence in the post-rebellion period 147; power in the Tang 111 Eurasia 142, 217, 243 Ever Normal State Trade Agency (changping shiyi si 常平市易司) 186 Ever Victorious Army, foreign troops used to fight the Nian rebels 309 evidential scholarship. See kaozheng examination system, civil service 140, 149, 179, 183, 193–4 206–7, 254–5, 262; classics track ( jingyi ke 經義科) 193; poetry track (shifu ke 詩賦科) 193; under Jurchens 222, 224–5; suspended and revived under Mongols 238 extraterritoriality, in Unequal Treaties 304 fa 法 38 See also Legalist factional fight between the Li and Niu factions 148 Family Instructions for the Yan Clan (Yanshi jiaxun 顏氏家訓) by Yan Zhitui 顏之推 (Northern Qi–Sui) 106 Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹, Song statesman 185, 194 fang 坊 or li 里 (wards) 123 Fang La 方臘, Song rebel leader 187 Fangguang bore jing 放光般若經 (Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrik ā-prajñ āp āramit ā Sūtra) 69 fangji 方技 (formulas and techniques) 38 Faxian 法顯, Buddhist traveler 104

fei Liushi er wang, tianxia gong ji zhi 非劉氏而王, 天下共擊之 27 fei qiren 非其人(unworthy) 52 Fei Yi 費褘, top Shu official 65–6, 71 feiqian 飛錢 (flying money) 139 Feng Guifen 馮桂芬, Qing official 305 Feng Menglong 馮夢龍, Ming writer 276 Feng Shan封禪 (Feng and Shan sacrifices) 35–6, 41; by Guangwu 48 filial piety 33 Finance Planning Commission (zhizhi sansi tiaoli si 制置三司條例司) 188 First Emperor (Shi Huangdi 始皇帝; Qin Shihuang 秦始皇; Ying Zheng 嬴政; King Zheng), founding emperor of the Qin dynasty 7, 14ff., 35; announcement of unification 16; burning of books 20; death of 22; execution of scholars 20; four tours 19; inscriptions of 16; mausoleum at Mt. Li 驪山, 21; unifies China 8; First Farmer. See Xiannong 先農 First Fish Festival, Kitan ritual celebration 219 Fiscal Councilor ( jixiang 計相), head of the State Finance Commission in the Song 188 Five Barbarian Groups 81, 88 Five Classics (wujing 五經) 30, 33, 38, 137, 196, 318, 325 Five Departments (wusheng 五省), five top-tier Sui government agencies, especially the sansheng 三省 117–8 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (Ten States) (Wudai Shiguo 五代十國) 157ff., 171; end of 169–70; North 165–8; North and South 161–4; South 164–5 Five Masters of the Northern Song (Beisong wuzi 北宋五子), Northern Song thinkers leading to Zhu Xi’s synthesis of Daoxue 194 Five Metropolises (wujing 五京), of Parhae 131 Five Phases Cyclical theory 133 Five Powers (Five Phases) 50. See also wuxing 五行 Flower Garland (Huayan 華嚴) sutra 103 Flowers in the Mirror ( Jinghua yuan 鏡花緣), Qing play 329 flying money ( feiqian 飛錢) 152 foot binding 209 Forbidden Park, in Chang’an 130 foreign trade 246, 261, 291–7, 299, 302–4, 311 Former Liang 前涼, dynasty and state in the northwest founded by the Han 59 Former Qin, dynasty and state founded by the Di 59, 98 Former Seven Masters (Qian qizi 前七子), Ming literary grouping 275 Former Shu (907–925), state in Sichuan and Chongqing 164

343

Glossary-Index Former Yan, dynasty and state founded by the Murongs 58; defeats Koguryǒ 84 Former Zhao趙, formerly, Han (Xiongnu), dynasty and state founded by the Xiongnu 58; conquered by Later Zhao 82; territorial extent 82 Fotucheng 佛圖澄, Buddhist monk at Shi Le’s court 83 Four Books (sishu 四書) 212, 223, 318, 325 Four Eminences of the Early Tang (chu Tang sijie 初唐四傑) 141 Fu Hong 苻洪, Di chieftain 84, 86 Fu Jiàn 苻健, founder of the Former Qin 59, 84, 86 Fu Jian 苻堅, Former Qin sovereign 59, 82, 86, 91; conquers the Former Yan 84; favors the Xianbei, Qiang, and Jie 87; and rituals 87; unites the North 59 Fu Rong 苻融, Fu Jian’s younger brother 87 fu 賦 (rhapsodies) 38, 69, 75, 141 fubing 府兵 116, 118, 144, 160. See garrison militia Fuhosen 富本銭, Japanese coin in imitation of the Kaiyuan tongbao 139 Fujiwara-kyō 藤原京, in Nara, Japan 131 Funan 扶南, Southeast Asian state 75 functionaries 30. See also li 吏 Fusu 扶蘇, eldest son of the First Emperor 8, 22 Gan River, in Hunan 103 Gan Ying 甘英, Eastern Han emissary 10 Gansu Corridor (Hexi Corridor) 45 Gao E 高額, Qing novelist 330 Gao Huan 高歡, true founder of the Eastern Wei 60–1, 100 Gao Jiong 高熲, top Sui official 111, 117, 122 Gao Ming 高明, Yuan writer 277 Gao Panlong 高攀龍, Ming scholar-official 266 Gao Qi 高啟, Ming poet 274 Gao Yang 高洋 (Emperor Wenxuan 文宣), founder of the Northern Qi 61 Gaochang 高昌 (Turfan, Xinjiang) 112, 129 Gaozong 高宗, Song. See Zhao Gou 趙構 Gaozu 高祖 (Exalted Progenitor), Han 26–8, 35, 48. See also Liu Bang 劉邦 Gaozu 高祖 (Tang) (Li Yuan 李淵), founder of the Tang 110, 134 gardens 280–1 garrison militia ( fubing 府兵) system 116, 136 Ge Rong葛榮 rebellion 60 General Commissioners of Supply (zongling shi 總領使) 201 general-in-chief (da jiangjun 大將軍): commander of a fubing garrison command 118; commanding officer of the army 44, 71 gentleman-attendants 30. See also lang/langli 郎/郎吏

gentry, landowning elite 262 George III, King of Great Britain 302 gewu 格物 (investigation of things) 274 Ghaznavids 218–19 gold and silver 139 gong 工 (artisans) 150 gongbi 工筆, fine line painting technique 327 Gong Xian 龔賢, late Ming–early Qing painter 266, 326 Gong Zizhen 龔自珍, Qing statecraft scholar and poet 320, 328 Gong’an School (Gong’an pai 公安派), Ming literary movement 276 gonghang 公行 (cohong), trading company/public company, in Qing foreign trade 293–5, 301–2 Gongsun Hong 公孫弘, Western Han scholar 30 Gongsun Shu 公孫述, early Eastern Han warlord in Shu (Sichuan) 9, 39 Gongsun Yuan 公孫淵, head of Yan 燕 in the northeast 56, 70 Gongsun 公孫 family, in the northeast 70, 75 Goryeo (Koryŏ), Korean kingdom 218 grain tax (zu 租) 136. See also zu yong diao Grand Academy (taixue 太學) set up by Liu Yao 劉曜 82 Grand Canal 45, 110, 116, 124, 137–8, 151, 162, 252, 257–8, 289, 292, 297; breakdown and revival by Zhou Shizong 163 Grand Councilors: chief ministers (xiang 相) 148 Grand Scribe’s Records (Shiji 史記) 15, 18–20, 38; on First Emperor’s palaces 22 Grand Secretariat (neige 內閣), chief administrative body in the Ming 254 grand secretary (daxueshi 大學士; neige shoufu 內閣首輔), top officials in the Ming 256 grave goods 49 great clans (in the Tang) 149, 153 great families (in the Eastern Han) 47 Great Qin 大秦 (Daqin; Roman Orient) 37 Great Wall 8, 35, 124, 159, 179, 183, 189, 232, 285 Great Yu禹 of Xia, ancient leader 85 Green Sprouts Act (qingmiao fa 青苗法) 185 Gu Kaizhi 顧愷之, fourth century painter 279 Gu Rong 顧榮, Eastern Jin representative of the magnate lineages 89 Gu Taiqing 顧太清, Qing poet 329 Gu Xiancheng 顧憲成, Ming scholar-official 266–69 Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, Ming kaozheng thinker 273, 328 Gu Yong 顧雍, top Wu official 74 Guan Daosheng 管道昇, Yuan dynasty painter 272 Guan Hanqing 關漢卿, Yuan dynasty writer 272 Guan Yu 關羽, Liu Bei’s 劉備 top general 63, 71; lays siege to Fancheng 樊城 (in Xiangfanshi, Hubei) 64; as God of War 323

344

Glossary-Index Guandong 關東, vast area east of Guanzhong 關中 82 guanggun 光棍 (bare sticks), drifters and unmarried men 307 guanglu xun 光祿勳 (Superintendent of the Imperial Household) 29 Guangtong Canal 廣通渠, Sui canal that linked Daxingcheng to the Yellow River 111, 116 Guangxu 光緒, Qing emperor 306, 312–3 Guangzhou 廣州 (in Guangdong) 101 Guangzong 光宗, Song. See Zhao Dun 趙盾 Guanlong 關隴 clique, primacy of the: a thesis offered by Chen Yinke 134 Guanlong 關隴: Guanzhong and Gansu to the west 134 Guanqiu Jian 毌丘儉, Cao-Wei general 70 Guanzhong 關中, Wei River valley in south Shaanxi 59, 82–84, 98, 100–1 guiju jing 規矩鏡 (TLV mirror) 49 Guṇabhadra (Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀羅), Indian Buddhist monk at the Liu-Song court 96 Gunavarman (Qiunabamo 求那跋摩), Indian Buddhist monk at the Liu-Song court 96 gunboat diplomacy 303–5 Guo Tai 郭泰, late Eastern Han scholar 48 Guo Wei 郭威, founder of the Later Zhou 168 Guo Xiang 郭象, Western Jin xuanxue scholar 70 guo 國 (kingdom): Eastern Han 45 guwen 古文* (Old Text; Archaic Text) 49. *One of the two textual traditions in Confucianism, based on the classics in archaic script. See jinwen 今文 Hall of Brilliance (mingtang 明堂) 87 Han Fei 韓非, Legalist scholar based in Qin 14, 23 Han Qinhu 韓擒虎, top Sui general 117 Han River 漢水 63 Han Tuozhou 韓佗冑, Song official 199–200, 202, 206, 226 Han Yu 韓愈, leading prose writer of the Middle Tang 150, 153–5, 275 Han 漢 (Cheng 成; Cheng-Han 成漢), state in Sichuan 81 Han 漢 (Xiongnu) (Former Zhao), dynasty and state in Guanzhong 81 Han 漢dynasty, founded by Liu Bang 劉邦 21, 25, 52, 127; Fire virtue of 50. See Western Han, Eastern Han Han-non-Han tensions 84 Hanfei zi 韓非子, work of Han fei 33 Hangu Pass 函谷關, strategic pass linking Guanzhong 關中 and the Central Plains 14 Hanguan jiuyi 漢官舊儀 (Old protocols of Han officials) 29 Hangzhou 杭州in Zhejiang 138

Hanshu 漢書 (Book of the Han) 30, 45, 76 Hanzhong 漢中 64, 71 haozu 豪族 (local men of power; local magnates) 47, 77. See also great families He Jin 何進, Eastern Han general-in-chief, brother of Empress Dowager He 何太后 11, 53 He Jingming 何景明, Ming writer 275 He Liangjun 何良俊, Ming thinker 266 He Qian 何謙, Eastern Jin general 91 He Xinyin 何心隱, Ming philosopher 273 He Yan 何晏, xuanxue scholar 70 Heaven 34, 99 Heavenly Qaghan, title given to Emperor Taizong of the Tang by the non-Han nomadic peoples 129, 135 Hedong 河東 (Shanxi) 163 Hefei 合肥 (in Anhui) 64 Heian-kyō 平安京 (794) (Kyoto, Japan) 131, 133 Heijō -kyō 平城京, in Nara, Japan 131, 133 hejiju 和濟局, public pharmacies 187 Henandi 河南地 (in Inner Mongolia) 8 Henei 河內 commandery 68 heqin 和親, marriage diplomacy 36 hereditary privileges 30. See also yinren 蔭任 Heruo Bi 賀若弼, top Sui general 117 Hexi Corridor 126, 129 High Tang 110, 134, 136, 141 H ī nayā na Buddhism 83 Hinduism 141 History of the [Northern] Zhou (Zhoushi 周史) by Niu Hong牛弘 121 Hong Kong 304–5, 312 Hong Taiji 皇太極, Manchu leader 292 Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全, leader of the Taiping rebellion 310 Hongdumen xue 鴻都門學 (school at the Gate of the Vast Capital) 11, 52 Honggou 鴻溝 (Vast Canal; Hong Conduit) 45 Honglou meng 紅樓夢 (Dream of the Red Chamber), aka Shitou ji 石頭記 (Story of the Stone), Qing novel 330 Hongming ji 弘明集, collection of Buddhist writings 104 Hongwu 洪武, Ming emperor. See Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 Honored Lady Liang (Liang Guiren梁貴人), Eastern Han Emperor He’s mother 43, 44 Honored Lady Song (Song Guiren宋貴人), Eastern Han, mother of Liu Qing劉慶 43 Hoppo, foreign term for Superintendant of Maritime Customs at Canton 302 horse markets, trade with Mongols in the Ming 268 Horse Raising Act (baoma fa 保馬法) 186 Hou Han shu 後漢書 (Book of the Later Han) 45 Hou Jing 侯景 rebellion 57, 61, 97, 101 hou 侯 (marquis) 29

345

Glossary-Index Houqua 浩官(Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑), Qing merchant 302 household registration 31; in the Western Han 32 Houtu 后土 (Sovereign Earth) 35 Hu Weiyong 胡惟庸, Ming official 255 Hu Yuan 胡瑗, Song thinker 196 Hu-Han group 134 Hua Tuo 華佗, late Eastern Han physician 70 Huahu jing 化胡經 (Classic of the conversion of the barbarians) 119 Huai River 淮水 102 Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Master of Huainan), book by Liu An and others 38 Huan Wen 桓溫, top Eastern Jin official and commander 59, 91; conquers Cheng-Han 58; rise of 90 Huan Xuan 桓玄, top Eastern Jin official 92, 95; sacks Jiankang 建康, 59 Huan Yi 桓彝, Eastern Jin general, Huan Wen’s father 90 Huang Chao Rebellion 157, 171 Huang Chao 黃巢, Late Tang rebel 113, 148, 150, 160 Huang Gongwang 黃公望, Yuan dynasty painter 272 Huang Hao 黃皓, Shu eunuch 66, 71 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, Ming kaozheng thinker 273, 328 Huang Zunxian 黃尊憲, Qing scholar and poet 329 Huang-Lao 黃老 32–3, 49 huangdi 皇帝 (august emperor) 7 Huangfu Gui 皇甫規, Eastern Han general 52 huangmen shilang 黃門侍郎 (gentlemanattendants at the palace gate; Commandant of the Palace Guards) 30, 71 Huayu lu 畫語錄 (Record of talks on painting), painting manual by Shitao 326 hubu 戶部 (Board of Revenue; Ministry of Finance) 146 huashigang 花石綱 (flower and rock network), Song state transport system 187 Huhai 胡亥, second Qin emperor 8, 22–3 Huhanye 呼韓邪, Xiongnu chanyu 單于 9 Huichang Suppression of Buddhism 165. See also Buddhism Huihe 回紇/Huihu 回鶻 127, 131. See also Uighurs Huiri Monastery 慧日寺, one of two monasteries (in Jiangdu and Luoyang) patronized by Emperor Yang 120 Huiyuan 慧遠, Buddhist monk 87 Huizong 徽宗, Song. See Zhao Ji 趙佶 Hulegu (Xuliewu 旭烈兀), Mongol prince 236 Humiliation of Jingkang ( Jingkang zhi chi 靖康之恥, fall of Kaifeng to the Jurchen) 1127 187

Huo Guang 霍光, Western Han politician 9, 28 Huzhou 湖州 in Zhejiang 138 Imperial Academy 30. See also taixue 太學 Imperial City in Chang’an 119, 130 Imperial Defense Command (yuying si 御營司) 201 Imperial University 193; purged 51. See also taixue 太學 India 45, 49, 102 Industrial Revolution 285, 299, 302 infantry 160 inflation 124 inheritable land (yongye tian 永業田) 138. See also equal field law inner court (neichao 内朝) 147 inspectorates ( jian 監) 118 Institute for Sutra Translation in Luoyang 120 Irinjibal, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Ningzong 寧宗 239 Islam 244 Japan 75, 102, 127, 137, 165, 203–5, 218–9, 238, 265, 280, 305, 310, 313–5, 319 Japanese imperialism 288 Japanese “pirates” (wokou 倭寇) 261, 268 Jardine, Matheson & Company, British traders 303 Jesuits 274 ji gonglao 積功勞 (accumulation of merit and seniority) 30 Ji Kang/Xi Kang嵇康, xuanxue scholar 70 Ji 稷 (the god of grain) 35. See also Sheji Jia Baoyu 賈寶玉, protagonist of Honglou meng 330 Jia Sidao 賈似道, Song official 200, 204 Jia Sixie 賈思勰, Eastern Wei writer 103 Jia Yi 賈誼, Western Han scholar 38 jia yuanfu 加元服 (Cap of Manhood), comingof-age ritual 44 jian 薦, personal nomination 31 Jiajing 嘉靖, Ming emperor. See Zhu Houcong 朱厚熜 Jiaqing 嘉慶, Qing emperor 298, 303, 323 Jiang Chong 江充, Western Han Emperor Wu’s henchman 25 Jiang Wan 蔣琬, top Shu official 65, 71 Jiang Wei 姜維, top Shu official 65–6, 71 Jiangdu 江都 (Yangzhou, Jiangsu) 112, 120, 124–5 Jiangling 江陵 ( Jingzhouqu, Hubei) 63, 98 Jiangnan 江南, the area south of the Yangzi, esp. the lower Yangzi River valley 180 jiangxue 講學 (lecture and discussion), Ming intellectual movement 264, 267–70 Jiangzhou江州, Eastern Jin prefecture 90 jianjun shi 監軍使 (army supervising commissioner) 64

346

Glossary-Index Jiankang 建康 (Nanjing, Jiangsu) 56–7, 61, 101, 103, 138, 162; leveled 61 Jiankang 建康 Empire 93ff.; population 101 Jianwen 建文, Ming emperor. See Zhu Yunwen 朱允炆 Jianye 建業* (Nanjing, Jiangsu) 56–7, 79. *Renamed Jiankang 建康 under Western Jin jiao 郊 (suburban sacrifice) 35 jiaohua 教化 (moral edification) 153 Jiaomin bangwen 教民榜文 (Placard of Instructions for the People) 258 Jiaozhi 交趾, Wu region/commandery (seat: near Hanoi) 75 Jiaozhou 交州, province/prefecture (in northern Vietnam) 101 Jibin 罽賓 (Kashmir) 83 Jie 羯, non-Han people living in the North 80–1; origins of 82 jiedu shi 節度使, military commissioner/ governor and the defense command under his control, appearing first in the early eighth century:129 Jieshi 碣石 (in Changli, Hebei) 20 jijiu 祭酒 (libationer), wudoumi jiao official 72 Jin Hao 殷浩, Eastern Jin official and commander 90 Jin He 金和, Qing scholar and poet 329 jin 斤 (catty) 16 jin 進, personal nomination 31 Jin 金 (gold), Jurchen dynasty and state 128, 163, 183, 187, 189, 205 Jin 晉 see Western Jin, Eastern Jin jing 經 (Confucian classics, esp. the Five Classics or Six Classics) 38 Jingdezhen 景德鎮, imperial kilnsite in Jiangxi 280 Jingim, Mongol prince 237 Jingkou 京口 (Zhenjiang, Zhejiang) 90 Jingshi dadian 經世大典, Mongol documentary compendium 242 Jingtai 景泰, Ming emperor. See Zhu Qiyu 朱祁鈺 Jingzhou 荆州, Eastern Jin prefecture in the middle Yangzi valley 90 Jinpingmei 金瓶梅 (Plum in the Golden Vase), Ming novel 277 jinshi 進士(presented scholar), most advanced Sui-Tang degree 141 Jinshu 晉書 (Book of the Jin) 137 jinwen 今文* (New Text; Current Text) 49. *One of the two textual traditions in Confucianism, based on the classics in current script. See guwen 古文 Jinyang 晉陽 (southwest of Taiyuan, Shanxi) 112 Jiu Wudai shi 舊五代史 (Old History of the Five Dynasties) by Xue Juzheng 薛居正 and others) 158

Jiuguo 舊國 (in Jilin), Parhae capital 131 jiupin 九品 (Nine Ranks) 69 Jiuyuan 九原 (in Baotou, Inner Mongolia), Qin commandery 20–21 Joint Manager of Affairs with the SecretariatChancellery (tong zhongshu menxia pingzhang shi 同中書門下平章事), Song chief councilor 188 Journey to the West (Xiyou ji 西遊記), Ming novel 276 ju 擧, personal nomination 31 jun 郡 (region; commandery),* highest local administrative division, introduced by the First Emperor 16, 31, 79, 118; in Eastern Han 45; number of 17. *The jun was used throughout the Early Imperial period. Jun from Qin through Western Jin were relatively large. Starting in the Eastern Jin, they shrank in size significantly. It is suggested “regions” be used for the earlier ones, and “commanderies” for the later ones. But scholars prefer to use “commanderies” for all of them junitan 均田(equal field): in Sui 124; statutes of 582 124 juntun 軍屯 (military state farms) 80. See tuntian 屯田 junwang 郡王 (commandery princes) 78 Jurchen, non-Han people in the northeast, established the Jin 金 (Gold) dynasty 179, 183, 189, 198, 201, 213–28, 236 Jurchen Jin: dynasty founded by the Jurchens. See Jin 金 (gold) Jurchen script 219 Jushi 車師, oasis state in Xinjiang 36 Juyan 居延, wooden strips 37 juyangyuan 居養院, free poorhouses 187 Kaifeng 開封 111, 113, 163,169, 171, 184, 186 Kaishu 開書, calligraphic style 278 Kaiyuan tongbao 開元通寶, Tang currency 139 Kaiyuan 開元, a reign period (713–741) of Xuanzong 玄宗 112, 136 Kanauj, king of: in India 112 Kang Senghui 康僧會, Buddhist monk 75 Kang Youwei 康有為, Qing reformer 312–3, 320, 329 Kangxi 康熙, Qing emperor 269, 285, 288–90, 293, 297–8, 301, 319, 323, 326, 328, 331 kaozheng 考證 (evidential scholarship), Qing intellectual movement 273, 319–20 kesig (Imperial Guard), Mongol military establishment 247 ketian zhi 課田制 (land-based taxation system) 79 Khaishan, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Wuzong 武宗 238–9 Khoshila, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Mingzong 明宗 239

347

Glossary-Index Khubilai, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor 202, 232, 237–8, 241, 243, 245–6 khuriltai, meeting of tribal leaders to choose a chief leader 215 King Changyi 昌邑 (Liu He 劉賀), Han Emperor Wu’s grandson 28 King Huiwen 惠文王, Qin sovereign 14 King Nan 赧, Eastern Zhou sovereign 8 King Wen of Zhou 周文王 85 King Zheng 15. See also First Emperor King Zhuangxiang 莊襄王, Qin sovereign: attacks Hann 韓, Wei 魏, and Zhao 趙, 14; and the end of the Eastern Zhou 14 Kitan/Khitan 契丹, non-Han people in Mongolia and Manchuria who set up the Liao 遼 dynasty 113, 136, 168, 179, 213–28; Liao 171, 183 189; Northern Court and Southern Court 167–8 Kitan scripts 214, 216, 221 Koguryŏ, state in Manchuria and north Korea 70, 111–2, 116, 127, 129; Emperors Wen’s and Yang’s campaigns against 112 Kong Rong 孔融, late Eastern Han literary figure 69 Kong Shangren 孔尚任, Qing playwright 329 Korea 70, 102, 116, 122, 131, 137, 165, 204–5, 218, 221, 241, 268–9, 291, 311, 319 Kou Qianzhi 寇謙之, Daoist prophet 99 Kuang Heng 匡衡 34 Kum ā rajīva鳩摩羅什, Buddhist monk at the court of the Later Qin 83, 103 Kŭ msŏng 金城 (Sŏrabŏl 王京), Silla capital: 131, 133 Kuncan 髠殘 (Shixi 石谿), Qing painter 326 Kunqu 崑曲, dramatic form 277 landed gentry 47 lang/langli 郎/郎吏 (gentleman-attendants) 29 Langye 琅琊 (in Shandong) 22; stele 19 lao 老 (elderly) 124. See equal field law Laocan youji 老殘遊記 (Travels of Lao Can), Qing novel 329 Laozi 老子 (Li Er 李耳, the founder of Daoism) 49, 69–70, 72, 140, 321 Late Tang 111, 148, 171 Later Jin, Manchu state 1616–1636, 288 Later Liang 後梁 (Xiao), middle Yangzi River valley state founded by Xiao Cha 蕭詧 116, 122 Later Liang 後梁, dynasty and state founded by Zhu Wen 149, 159, 167 Later Qin, dynasty and state in the northwest founded by the Qiang 59, 96 Later Seven Masters 後七子, Ming literary grouping 275 Later Shu (934–965), state in Sichuan and Chongqing 164, 169

Later Tang, dynasty and state, founded by Li Cunxu李存勗 164 Later Tujue 112 Later Yan (384), Murong state in Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Henan, and others 84 Later Zhao, dynasty and state in North China 58, 82; capital at Xiangguo 襄國 (Xingtai, Hebei) 82; territorial extent 82 Later Zhou, dynasty and state founded by Guo Wei 郭威at Kaifeng (951) 111, 114, 169, 171 law (lü 律) 136 law codes in East Asia 137 Left Director of the Department of State Affairs and Concurrent Vice Director of the Chancellory (shangshu zuo pushe jian menxia shilang 尚書左僕射兼門下侍郎), Song primary chief councilor 188 legal system, Western Han: Qin influence 32 Legalist/Legalism ( fajia 法家) 7, 320. See also fa 法 Lelang 樂浪, commandery in northern Korea 9 levirate 122; banned under Later Zhao 83 Lhasa (early seventh century) in Tubo 131, 133 Li Bai 李白, Tang poet-immortal 142, 275 Li Bian 李昪, founder of the Southern Tang 164 Li Cunxu 李存勗, founder of the Later Tang dynasty 167 Li Daoyuan 酈道元, Northern Wei geographer 106 Li Deyu 李德裕, Late Tang top official 113, 148 Li Dongyang 李東陽, Ming writer 275 Li Gou 李覯, Song thinker 196 Li Gong 李塨, Qing scholar 320 Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, Qing official, SelfStrengthening Movement leader 306, 310 Li Keyong 李克用, Late Tang Shatuo 沙陀 warlord 113, 148–9, 161, 165, 167 Li Longji 李隆基 (Emperor Xuanzong 玄宗 of the Tang) 112 Li Mengyang 李夢陽, Ming writer 275 Li Mi 李密, Sui rebel leader 112, 125 Li Panlong 李攀龍, Ming scholar 141, 275 Li Qingzhao 李清照, Song poet 208 Li Ruzhen 李如珍, Qing writer 329 Li Sancai 李三才, Ming official 267 Li Shimin 李世民 (Emperor Taizong of the Tang) 112 Li Shizhen 李時珍, Ming pharmacologist 274 Li Si 李斯, Qin chancellor 8, 14, 21–2; and the burning of books 20; death of 23 Li Siyuan 李嗣源, Later Tang emperor 167 Li Xiong 李雄, king of Chengdu 成都, founder of the Cheng-Han 58 Li Yin 李因, Qing poet 329 Li Yu 李漁, Ming-Qing writer 266, 329

348

Glossary-Index Li Yuan 李淵 (Gaozu 高祖; r. 618–626), founder of the Tang dynasty 112, 125–6, 157; in Daxingcheng 125 Li Yun 李雲, Eastern Han critic 51 Li Zhi 李贄/Li Zhuowu 李卓吾, Ming philosopher 264–6, 273 Li Zicheng 李自成, Ming rebel leader 269 Li Zitong 李子通, Sui rebel in the South 125 li 吏 (functionaries:, 29 li 里 1) village 17; 2) ward. See fang 坊 lijia 里甲system, Ming mutual security system 258 Liang 梁dynasty, founded by Xiao Yan at Jiankang 57, 60, 97–99, 104, 106–7; campaigns against the Northern Wei 60 Liang Ji 梁冀, Eastern Han powerful courtier, waiqi 10, 44–5, 50 Liang Na 梁妠, Eastern Han Emperor Shun’s consort 44–5 Liang Nüying 梁女塋, Eastern Han Emperor Huan’s consort 10, 45 Liang province 涼州 (in Gansu), Eastern Han administrative division 10, 53 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Qing reformer 312–3, 320 Liang Shang 梁商, Eastern general-in-chief, waiqi 10, 44 Liang Shidu 梁師都, Sui rebel leader in north Shaanxi 125 Liang 梁family 50 Liangshu 梁書 (Book of the Liang) 137 liangzhi 良知 (innate knowledge of the good) 273 lianli 廉吏 (honest functionary) 30 Liao River 81 Liao 遼, Kitan dynasty and state founded in 907, 114, 128, 168–9, 179 Liaoxi 遼西, Wei-Jin region/commandery in northeast Hebei 83–4 Lienü zhuan 列女傳 (Biographies of exemplary women) by Liu Xiang 劉向 38 Lin Daiyu 林黛玉, character in Honglou meng 330 Lin Yining 林以寧, Qing poet 329 ling 令 (magistrate; prefect), leader of a large county, Han 45; Qin 17. See also zhang 長 Ling Mengchu 凌濛初, Ming writer 276 Lingbao 靈寶, Daoist tradition 103–4 Lingtai 靈臺 (Spiritual Terrace; Numina Estrade) 48 Linyi 林邑, state in central Vietnam 60, 75, 122 linzhao 臨朝 (to attend court) 43 literary (wen 文) 94 Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons (Wenxin diaolong 文心雕龍) by Liu Xie 劉勰 (Liang) 107

Liu An 劉安, Western Han king of Huainan 淮南 38 Liu Bang 劉邦, founding emperor of the Han 23, 25, 36; and Ziying 24. See also Gaozu 高 祖 Liu Bei 劉備, founder of Shu 57, 63, 72, 272; alliance with Sun Quan 63; birth 71; deposes Liu Zhang 70; founds Shu (Shu-Han蜀漢) 65; and Yi province 64 Liu Bian 劉辯 (Emperor Shao 少), Eastern Han emperor 11 Liu Bian 柳䛒, Emperor Yang of the Sui’s mentor 121 Liu Biao 劉表, late Eastern Han governor of Jing 荊 province 62–3, 70 Liu Bing 劉怲, Eastern Han prince 44 Liu Bosheng 劉伯升 (Liu Yan 劉縯), brother of Eastern Han Emperor Guangwu 39 Liu Can 劉粲, Han (Xiongnu) sovereign 81 Liu Cong 劉琮, late Eastern Han governor of Jing 荊 province 63 Liu Cong 劉聰, Han (Xiongnu) sovereign 80–2 Liu Hong 劉宏 51. See Emperor Ling 靈 Liu Ji 劉基, Ming philosopher 273–4 Liu Jun 劉駿 (Emperor Xiaowu 孝武 of the LiuSong) 96 Liu Kun 劉琨, Western Jin loyalist 84 Liu Laozhi 劉牢之, Eastern Jin general 91–2 Liu Mengmei 柳夢梅, hero of Mudan ting 277 Liu Qing劉慶, Eastern Han crown prince 43–4 Liu Shan 劉禪, Shu sovereign 57, 65, 70–1; as emperor 71 Liu Wei 劉隗, Eastern Jin official 89 Liu Wuzhou 劉武周, Sui rebel leader in north Shanxi 125 Liu Xiang 劉向, late Western Han scholar 38 Liu Xin 劉歆, late Western Han scholar 38 Liu Xiu 劉秀. See Emperor Guangwu Liu Xuan 劉宣, Liu Yuan’s adviser 82, 84 Liu Xuan 劉玄 (Gengshi 更始), cousin of Eastern Han Emperor Guangwu, sovereign 9, 39 Liu Yan 劉焉, late Eastern Han governor of Yi 益 province 62, 64 Liu Yao 刘曜, Han (Xiongnu) sovereign 58, 80–1; reader of Chinese books 82; renames his state [Former] Zhao 82 Liu Yi 劉懿, Eastern Han sovereign 44 Liu Yilong 劉義隆 (Emperor Wen 文 of the Liu-Song) 60, 95 Liu Ying劉英, Eastern Han King (Prince) of Chu楚王 49 Liu Yu 劉彧 (Emperor Ming 明 of the LiuSong) 96 Liu Yu 劉裕 (Emperor Wu 武), founder of the Liu-Song dynasty 60, 92, 96; birth 95

349

Glossary-Index Liu Yuan 劉淵, founder of the Han (Xiong) (Former Zhao) 80, 84; ambitions of 85; as da chanyu 大單于, 81; declares himself king of Han 漢, 58 Liu Yu 劉裕 (Emperor Wu 武), founder of the Liu-Song 59 Lin Zexu 林則徐, Qing Imperial Commissioner for Opium 303–04 Liu Zhang 劉璋, late Eastern Han governor of Yi 益 province 62, 64 Liu Zhen 劉楨, late Eastern Han literary figure 69 Liu Zheng 劉正, Song official 199 Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 (895–948), Shatuo Turk founder of the Later Han 114, 168 Liu Zuan 劉纘, Eastern Han sovereign 45 Liu-Song dynasty founded by Liu Yu at Jiankang 60; civil war (the “War of Uncles and Nephews”) 60; invasions by the Northern Wei 60, 96; succession problems 96 liubu 六部 (Six Boards/Six Ministries), six top government agencies under the shangshu sheng 尚書省 118 Liuqiu 流求 122 Liye 里耶, modern place in Hunan: wooden and bamboo strips found in 17 Lizong 理宗, Song. See Zhao Yun 趙昀 local history writing 105 Longcheng 龍城 (Chaoyang, Liaoning) 83 Longmen 龍門 (south of Luoyang), cave temples 104 loose-rein ( jimi 羈縻), in reference to non-Han territories loosely controlled by the court 128, 130, 142 Lotus Sutra 83 Louguan 樓觀, Daoist school based in the Zhongnan Mountains 終南山 south of Xi’an 119 Loulan 樓蘭, oasis state in Xinjiang 36 louzeyuan 漏澤園 (cemeteries) 187 Lü Bu 呂布, late Eastern Han warlord 63 Lü Bu-wei 呂不韋, Qin chancellor 14–5 Lu Chun 陸淳, Mid-Tang Confucian scholar 153 Lu Ji 陸機, Wu–Western Jin literary figure 75 Lü Meng 呂蒙, Sun Quan’s general 64 lu shang-shu shi 錄尚書事, general manager of the Imperial Secretariat 44 Lu Sidao 盧思道 (Northern Qi–Sui), poet 121 Lu Xiangshan 陸象山, Song philosopher 319 Lu Xiufu 陸秀夫, Song official 200 Lu Xiujing 陸修靜, Daoist adept, scholar 103 Lu Xun 陸遜, top Wu general 74 Lu Yun 陸運, Wu-Western Jin literary figure 75 Lu Zhaolin 盧照鄰, Early Tang poet 141 Lueyang 略陽 (east of Tianshui, Gansu) 86 Lülin 綠林 (Green Woods), rebel group 9

Lunyu 論語 (Analects of Confucius) 212 Luo Binwang 駱賓王, Early Tang poet 141 Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中, Ming author 76, 272 Luokou Granary 洛口倉, near Zhengzhou, Henan 125 Luoyang 洛陽 (Eastern Han[雒陽], Wei-Jin, Northern Wei) 59, 60, 62, 72, 81, 90, 100; Buddhist monasteries (N. Wei) 102; Eastern Han capital 41, 39, 48–9, 53; Northern Wei 60, 93; population (Northern Wei) 102; Western Jin 311 sacked by Xiongnu 56, 58, 80 Luoyang (Sui-Tang) 111–3, 120, 124–6, 131, 160; building of 110, 123; Luoyang falls to An Lushan 145; during the Five Dynasties 111; influence on Japan 133; as Wu Zetian’s capital 135 Lüshu 律疏 (Code subcommentary) 136 lutian 露田 (open fields) 124 Ma Yuan 馬援, Eastern Han general 39 Macartney, Lord George, British envoy to China 302 magnate lineages (haozu 豪族), Eastern Jin 89 Maitreya Bodhisattva, the future Bodhisattva 135 Man 蠻, southern non-Han “barbarians” 96 Manchus, non-Han ethnic group, rulers of the Qing dynasty 214, 285, 287–90 Mandate of Heaven 33, 34, 140 Mani, founder of Manichaeism 141 Manichaeism, dualist religion that first rose in West Asia 113, 130, 141 Manila, Spanish trade at 261 Mao Xiuhui 毛秀惠, Qing poet 329 maocai 茂才(flourishing talent) 30 Maoshan 茅山 119. See also Mt. Mao; Shangqing 上清 maritime trade 102, 204, 294, 298, 301 market economy 209 market towns 180 markets: growth of 203 Marquis Haihun’s tomb 海昏侯墓, Western Han 34 marquis 30 marriage 208 martial (wu 武) 93 Master Dong 董, playwright 224 Master Lao (Laozi老子) 119 Master Xun 15, 21. See also Xunzi 荀子 Mawangdui 馬王堆 (in Hunan) Han tombs, Western Han 34 meditation practices (dhyāna or chan 禪) 103 Mediterranean 45 meiren hua 美人畫 (beautiful women paintings), Qing painting style 327 “Memorial Discussing the Buddha Bone” (Lun Fogu biao 論佛骨表) 154

350

Glossary-Index Meng Huo 孟獲, tribal leader in Nanzhong 73 Meng Tian 蒙恬, Qin top general, and Xiongnu 20, 36 Meng Zhixiang 孟知祥, founder of the Later Shu 167 meng’an 猛安, Kitan military unit 220 Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) 212 mensheng 門生 (student) 52 menxia sheng 門下省 (Chancellery), one of the sansheng 三省 118 Middle Tang/Mid-Tang 111, 142 military commissioner/governor (jiedu shi 節度使) 113, 136, 144–5, 160 Min 閩 (945), state in Fujian 164 Ming dynasty, founded by Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元 璋 at Nanjing 249–81 mingqi 冥器 (spirit artifacts) 34 Mingtang 明堂 (Sacred Hall; Hall of Brilliance) 48 Mingzhou 明州 (Ningbo) in Zhejiang 138 Mingzong 明宗, Yuan. See Khoshila minjue 民爵 (commoner ranks; honorific ranks) 78 miscellaneous corvée (zayi 雜役) 139 Mobile Presidential Council, Jurchen ruling body 221 Modu 冒顿 (Maodun) 36 monastic regulations (vinaya or lü 律) (Buddh.) 103 money and monetization 258, 261–2, 273 Möngke, Mongol khan 202, 236–37 Mongols 180, 200, 202, 205, 214, 220, 232–3, 235–48, 268, 271–2 monk’s certificates (dudie 度牒), ordination documents used as currency 205 monographs/treatises (zhi 志) in standard histories 105 Monument to the Spread of Nestorianism in China (Daqin jingjiao liuxing Zhongguo bei 大秦景教流行中國碑) 141 Moon City, in the Silla capital 133 mouke 謀克, Kitan military unit 220 “moving” provinces (xingsheng 行省), administrative units under the Mongol Yuan 240 Mt. Cheng 成 19 Mt. Jiuyi 九嶷 22 Mt. Liangfu 梁父 19 Mt. Mao/Maoshan 茅山 (southeast of Jurong 句容, Jiangsu) 119. See also Shangqing 上清 Mt. Tai 泰 184; stele 19 Mt. Zhifu芝罘 19–20 Mt. Zouyi鄒嶧 19 mu 牧 (shepherd), governor of a zhou 州 (province or prefecture) 62 Mudan ting 牡丹亭 (Peony Pavilion), Ming drama 277

Murong Chui 慕容垂, founder of the Later Yan 59 Murong De慕容德, Southern Yan sovereign 59 Murong Huang 慕容皝, founder of the Former Yan 58, 83–4 Murong Hui 慕容廆, head of the Murong branch of the Xianbei 84–5 Murong Jun 慕容儁, Former Yan sovereign 59, 84 Murong Wei 慕容暐, Former Yan sovereign 59 Murong 慕容, a branch of the Xianbei 81, 83 Music Bureau (yuefu 樂府) 38 Muslims 239, 242, 246 Muslim rebellions, in the Qing, aka Panthay rebellion 309 Mystery Learning (xuanxue 玄學; dark learning) 72, origins of 70 Naitō Torajirō 内藤虎次郎/Naitō Konan 湖南, modern Japanese historian 144, 183 Nanjiao 南郊 (Southern Suburban Altar to Heaven) 48 Nanjing 南京, one of Parhae’s five capitals 131 Nanshi 南史 (History of the Southern Dynasties) 137 nanxi 南戲, Southern style drama 272 Nanyang 南陽, Qin-Han region/commandery 39 Nanyue 南越, post-Qin state in the far south 8 Nanzhao 南詔, state in the southwest 127; capitals 133 Nanzhong 南中 (southern Sichuan and Yunnan) 71 Naqachu, Mongol prince 248 naturalization (tuduan 土斷) 90 nei daochang 內道場 (interior place of enlightenment; palace monastery) 120 neijun 内郡 (inner commanderies/regions) 9 neishi sheng 內史省 (zhongshu sheng 中書省 under the Tang) (Secretariat), one of the sansheng 三省 118 Nestorianism, heretical Christian sect that rose in the eastern Mediterranean 130, 141, 245 New Account of the Tales of the World, A (Shishuo xinyu 世說新語), Liu Yiqing 劉義慶 (Liu-Song prince) 105 New Policies (xinfa 新法) 185, 201, 207–8 New Songs from the Jade Terrace (Yutai xinyong 玉臺新詠), compiled by Xu Ling 徐陵 (Liang) 106 New Text School (aka Gongyang 公羊 School), Qing intellectual movement 319 Ni Zan 倪瓚, Yuan dynasty painter 272, 278 Nian 捻 rebellion, anti-Qing uprising 308–9 Nine Chamberlains ( jiuqiu 九卿), heads of the Nine Courts 118 Nine Courts ( jiusi 九寺), nine second- or thirdtier government agencies 118, 188

351

Glossary-Index Nine Ministers (Nine Chamberlains; jiuqing 九卿) 28, 30; rank at 2,000 bushel 29 Nine Ranks system ( jiupin zhongzheng 九品中正) 89, 194 Ningzong 寧宗, Song. See Zhao Kuo 趙擴 Ningzong 寧宗, Yuan. See Irinjibal Niu Hong 牛弘, top Sui official, historian 121 Niu Sengru 牛僧儒 (780–849), Late Tang top official 113, 148 non-great clan members 150 non-Han peoples in the North (Xiongnu 匈奴, Xianbei 鮮卑, Qiang 羌, Di 氐, and Jie 羯) 56 nong 農 (farmers) 150 North as key to controlling China 161 North-South rivalry 94 North-South split 161–2 Northern Army (beijun 北軍), based at the capital 39, 42 Northern Command (Beifu 北府) 90–1, 95 Northern Expeditions by Huan Wen 90 Northern Han, state founded by Liu Chong 劉崇 in Shanxi 111, 169, 170–1, 184 Northern Liang 北涼, Xiongnu state in the northwest 57, 60, 99; conquered by the Northern Wei 81 Northern Qi at Ye, dynasty and state founded by Gao Yang 高洋, successor to the Eastern Wei 57, 61, 100 Northern Song, dynasty at Kaifeng 111, 114, 179, 182–96 Northern Wei, Tuoba dynasty and state founded by Tuoba Gui 拓跋珪 57, 59, 128; founding 88; reforms by Emperor Xiaowen 孝文, 100; splits into the Eastern Wei and Western Wei 60, 100; unifies the North 60, 81 Northern Xiongnu 42–3 Northern Yan, dynasty and state based in Hebei, founded by a Han with a Murong figurehead 84; conquered by the Northern Wei 60 Northern Zhou, Yuwen dynasty and state at Chang’an, successor to the Western Wei 57, 61, 101, 122; annexes the Northern Qi 101; conquers the Northern Qi 61 Notes Hall (piaohao 票號), banking system 296 Nurhaci, Manchu leader 269 occult practices 120; occult masters 210 Oḍḍiyā na 烏萇 (in north India) 83 Ögödei, Mongol khan 200, 202, 236, 238, 241, 246 Old Phraseology (gu wenci 古文辭), Ming literary movement 275–6 omen politics 33 “one principle with many manifestations” (liyi fenshu 理一分殊) 195 Open Door policy, American diplomatic initiative 1900 312

opium 285, 291, 291–9, 303–5, 307, 310, 314 Opium War 292–4, 297–8, 304 Oppose the Qing, Restore the Ming ( fan Qing fu Ming 反清復明), anti-Qing rebel slogan 308 ordinances (shi 式), provisions concerning the enforcement of laws 136 Ordu-Baliq (Karabalghasun), set up in 744 by the Uighurs, near Karakorum, Mongolia 131 ortogh (partnership), Mongol economic and tax institution 246 outer court (waichao 外朝) 147 Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修, Northern Song historian 158–9, 171, 185, 194, 275 Paekche, state on the Korean Peninsula 112, 127, 129; capital 131 Palace Administration (diannei sheng 殿內省) 118 Palace City (the emperor’s residence) 130 Palace Guard 130 Palace Library (mishu sheng 秘書省) 118 palace style (gongti 宮體) 106 Pan Shizheng 潘師正, leading Tang Shangqing Daoist 119 Pan Yunduan 潘允端, Ming garden owner 280 Pang Xun 龐勛 rebellion, a Late Tang rebellion prior to the Huang Chao rebellion 113 paper money 203, 205. See also money parallel/parallelism (pianwen 駢文) 121 Parhae (Bohai 渤海), state in Manchuria and northern Korea 136–7 Parkes, Harry, British diplomat 305 passport (zhuan 傳) 32 Peach Blossom Fan (Taohua shan 桃花扇), Qing play 329 Pei Ju 裴矩, Sui strategist: vision to dominate the northwest, Central Asia, and beyond 122–3 Pei Shiqing 裴世清, Sui emissary to Yamato 倭 ( Japan) (608) 122 Pei Songzhi 裴松之, Liu-Song author of a commentary to the Sangguo zhi 三國志 76 Pei Wei 裴頠, top Western Jin official 80 Pengcheng 彭城 (Xuzhou, Jiangsu) 95 Persian Gulf 102, 138 Persian Monastery (Bosi/Daqin si 波斯/大秦寺), Nestorian monastery in Chang’an 141 Pingcheng 平城 (near Datong, Shanxi), city 8, 36, 59, 93, 100, 102 Pingyang 平陽 (Linfen, Shanxi), capital of Xiongnu 80, 81 Pipa ji 琵琶記 (Story of the Lute), late Yuan drama 277 Places of Enlightenment (daochang 道場) 120 poetry (shi 詩) 121, 141 Polo, Marco, Venetian traveler to Yuan dynasty China 232, 246 popular religion 209

352

Glossary-Index population, in Cao-Wei 69; in the Eastern Han 45; in Shu-Han 72; the Western Han 31; in Wu 74; in Jurchen Jin 223; in the Ming 259–60 porcelain 192, 253, 261, 280, 293, 301–2 Portuguese 261 post-rebellion emperors in Tang times 146 postal relay system, Mongol 243 prefecture (zhou 州)* 95. *From the Eastern Jin onward, a zhou州 is translated as a prefecture. See province, zhou 州 prefecture-county system 128, 134, 142 Prince Bi 比, Xiongnu 40 Prince Gong 恭親王, Manchu nobleman, Self-strengthening Movement leader 305–6 Prince of Hailing 海凌王, Jurchen ruler 222 Princess of Chen 陳, Kitan noble 218 Princess Qianjin 千金公主 (Emperor Xuan’s cousin), married to Tujue’s Shabolue 122 Princess Wencheng 文成, married to Srongbrtsan-sgam-po 112 printing and print culture 207 private academies (shuyuan 書院) 207 Proclaiming Harmony (Xuanhe yishi 宣和遺事), Yuan period novel 221 Proper and Essential Things for the Emperor’s Food and Drink, Central Asian dietary text for Mongol rulers 242 protectors-general (duhu 都護; head of a protectorate) 136 province* 45. *From the Western Han through the Western Jin, a zhou州 is translated as a province. See prefecture, zhou 州 publishing, commercial 281 pure conversation (qingtan 清談) 70, 104–5 Pure Land Buddhism 87, 103 puye 僕射 (vice presidents), co-presidents of the Department of State Affairs 118 Puyi 溥儀, last Qing emperor 315 qaghan (khan): leader of a northern nomadic power, for example, Tujue Qarakhanids 218 qi 氣, psycho-physical stuff 195 Qi 齊/Daqi 大齊 (881–884), state set up by Huang Chao 黃巢 127 Qi dynasty at Jiankiang, founded by Xiao Daocheng 60, 97; invasions by the Northern Wei 60 Qian Qianyi 錢謙益, Qin scholar 328 Qian Xuan 錢選, Yuan dynasty painter 272 Qiang 羌, proto-Tibetan people in the northwest 41, 43, 52, 81, 84, 190; the great rebellion of 45; raids by 45 Qiangqu 羌渠, a branch of the Xiongnu 82 Qianling 遷陵, Qin county 17

Qianlong 乾隆, Qing emperor 285, 288, 290–1, 293, 297, 299, 301–2, 323, 325, 327–8, 331 Qiao Zhou 譙周, Shu scholar 72, 75 Qidan, Chinese rendering of Kitan 215 Qieyun 切韻 (Cut rhymes) by Lu Fayan 陸法言 (Sui) 137 Qifu 乞伏, a Xianbei branch 83 Qimin 啟民 (Tuli 突利), Eastern Tujue qaghan 123 Qin Gong gui 秦公簋, Qin ritual vessel with an inscription 34 Qin Gui 秦檜, Song chief minister 198, 200 Qin Mi 秦宓, Shu scholar 72 Qin zhong 秦鍾, Qin bronze bells with inscriptions 34 Qin 秦, dynasty and state. See Former Qin, Later Qin Qin 秦, dynasty: agriculture in 18; administration 16–17; finial piety in 18; founding 15; law in 18 Qin 秦, state 12–15 Qin-Han 秦漢* regime (783–784), set up by Jingyuan 涇源 diedu shi Zhu Ci 朱泚 127. *It was first called “Qin,” then “Han.” Qing dynasty/Manchu dynasty, founded at Beijing 128, 285–33 Qing “New Policies”, late Qing reforms 314–5 Qing women poets 329 Qingli 慶曆 Reform 185 Qingming shanghe tu 清明上河圖 (Along the River During the Qingming Festival), painting of Song Kaifeng 206 Qinzong 欽宗, Song. See Zhao Huan 趙桓 Qiu Jun 邱浚, Ming scholar 257, 260 Qiu Ying 仇英, Ming painter 278–9 Qiuci 亀茲 (Kucha, Xinjiang) 83 qiudao 求盜 (police officers) 29 Qizhi 齊志 (Treatises on the [Northern] Qi) by Wang Shao 王劭 121 Quan Deyu 權德輿 (759–818), Mid-Tang top official 153 Quanzhen. See Complete Realization school Queen Victoria, British monarch during the Opium War 304 Rabban Sauma, Mongol envoy to Europe 245 Rajōmon 羅城門 (Outer City Gate) 133 Ran Min冉閔, founder of the Ran-Wei 85; ethnic cleansing 59, 86; killed 86 Ran-Wei, state founded by Ran Min 冉閔 in the North 59 Ranking of Poets (Shipin 詩品) by Zhong Rong 鍾嶸 (Liang) 107 ranks, Western Han 32 recommendation (chaju 察舉), mode of recruitment for civil administration 194

353

Glossary-Index Record of the Monasteries of Luoyang (Luoyang qielanji 洛陽伽藍記) by Yang Xuanzhi 楊衒之 (Eastern Wei) 104–5 Records of Miraculous Omens (Mingxiang ji 冥祥 記) by Wang Yan 王琰 (Qi) 104 recruitment system 134, 194 Red Eyebrows 39. See also Chimei 赤眉 Red Turbans (Hongjin 紅巾), rebellion against Mongols 247, 250 Reform Movement of 1898: 312–3 regionalism 162 regulations (ge 格), law supplements 136 religion 17, 34, 48, 103 Remonstrance Bureau ( jianyuan 諫院) 188 Renshou Palace 仁壽宮, Sui palace to the west of Daxingcheng 116 Renzong 仁宗, Song. See Zhao Zhen 趙禎 “rest for the people” (yumin xiuxi 与民休息), administrative policies to ease popular suffering 288–90 rhapsodies ( fu 賦) 121 Revolution of 1911. See Xinhai geming Right Director of the Department of State Affairs and Concurrent Vice Director of the Secretariat (shangshu you pushe jian zhongshu shilang 尚書右僕射兼中書侍郎), Song secondary chief councilor 188 rishu 日書, daybook 34–5 rites controversy, with the Vatican 293 Riyan Monastery 日嚴寺, Buddhist monastery in Daxingcheng 120 Roman glass 45 Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi 三國演義) 257, 272, 276 Romance of the Western Chamber (Xixiang ji 西廂記, play written during the Jurchen Jin 224 royals, Western Jin, power of 78 ru 儒 (Confucian; Confucianism; classicist) 30–1, 37–8; learning 33, scholars 26 Ruan Ji 阮籍, xuanxue scholar 70 Ruan Yu 阮瑀, late Eastern Han literary figure 69 Ruan Yuan 阮元, Qing scholar 320 Runan 汝南, Han region, population 31 Runzhou 潤州 in Jiangxu 138 Russell & Company, American opium dealers 303 Russia 200, 202, 213, 289, 297, 303, 305, 311 sacred field ( jitian 籍田) 48, 87 “sage and divine emperor” (shengshen huangdi 聖神皇帝) 135 salt 17, 72, 142,160, 188, 204–5, 263, 297–8; salt monopoly 139, 146, 151, 204, 208 sanqu 散曲, poetic aria form originating in the Mongol Yuan 243, 272 Sanyan 三言 (Three Words), Ming short story collection 276

sangmen 桑門 (śramaṇa), Buddhist monk 49 sangong 三公 (Three Excellencies; Three Dukes) 41 Sanguo zhi yanyi 三國志演義 (Extended Meanings of the Records of the Three States; Romance of the Three Kingdoms), Ming novel 76 Sanguo zhi 三國志 (Records of the Three States; Treatises on the Three Kingdoms) 75–6 Sanskrit literature 106 Sanwu 三吴, area in the lower Yangzi 92 Sanyong 三雍 (Three Enclosures) 49 Sanzi jing 三字經 (Three Character Classic), literary primer 317 Sassanid Persia 141 Scholars, The (Rulin waishi 儒林外史), Qing play 329 School land (xuetian 學田) 193 School of Statecraft ( Jingshi xue 經世學), Qing intellectual movement 320 Second Emperor. See Huhai 胡亥 Selections of Refined Literature (Wen xuan 文選) 107 Self-Strengthening (ziqiang 自強), late Qing reform movement 303, 305–6, 311, 314 semuren 色目人(people with colored eyes), central and west Asians who joined the Mongols 241 Sengyou 僧祐, Buddhist monk 104 Seres, silk people 37 Service Exemption Act (mianyi fa 免役法) 185 Seven Kingdoms/Seven Princes, rebellion of the (Western Han) 9, 27 Seven Masters of Jian’an ( Jian’an qizi 建安七子), late Eastern Han literary circle 69 Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove (Zhulin qixian 竹林七賢), Cao-Wei qingtan group 70 Shabolue 沙鉢略, Tujue qaghan 122 Shang Yang 商鞅, Qin reformer 8, 12–14, 32 shang 商 (merchants) 150 shangbang 商帮, commercial syndicates 295 Shanggu 上谷 (north and northeast of Beijing), Western Jin region 84 Shanghan zabing lun 傷寒雜病論 (Treatise on cold damage disorders and miscellaneous diseases) 70 Shangjing 上京, one of the Parhae capitals 131, 133 Shangjun shu 商君書 (Book of Lord Shang) 12 Shangqing 上清 Daoist school based on Mt. Mao 茅山,119; Daoist tradition 103–4 shangshu ling 尚書令: director of the Imperial Secretariat 71; president of the Department of State Affairs 117–8 shangshu sheng 尚書省 (Department of State Affairs), top-tier government agency in charge of the liubu 六部 (Six Boards/ Ministries) 117

354

Glossary-Index shangshu tai 尚書臺 (Imperial Secretariat), government agency 28, 41 shangshu 尚書 (Board president; Minister), leader of a Board/Ministry 118 Shangshu 尚書 (Classic of Documents; Documents), book 33 Shanhaiguan 山海關, pass where the Great Wall meets the sea 285 Shanyue 山越, indigenous peoples in Wu 73 Shao Yong 邵雍, Song philosopher 194–5 Shaodang Qiang 燒當羌, a Qiang branch in Qinghai 10 Shaqiu 沙丘 (in southern Hebei), locale of a Qin palace 22 Shatuo 沙陀 Turks, a branch of the Western Tujue 111 She 社 (the god of the soil) 35 she 社 (village shrines) 78 Shegui 射匱, Western Tujue qaghan 123 Sheji 社稷 (Gods of the Soils and Grains; Altars to Sheji) 41, 48 Shen Deqian 沈德潛, Qing scholar and poet 328 Shen Quanqi 沈佺期, Early Tang poet 141 Shen Yue 沈約 (441–513), historian and poet 105 Shen Zhou 沈周, Ming painter and writer 275, 278 sheng 省 (Departments), top-echelon government agencies 116 Shenzong 神宗, Song. See Zhao Xu 趙頊 Shi Bing 石冰, Eastern Jin rebel 89 Shi Hong 石宏, Later Zhao prince 58 Shi Hu 石虎, Later Zhao sovereign 58; capital at Ye 鄴 (south-west of Linzhang, Hebei) 85 Shi Jian 石鑒, Shi Hu’s 石虎 son 85 Shi Jie 石介, Song thinker 196 Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 (892–942), founder of the Later Jin 113, 167, 189; descendant of Shi Le 石勒 of Jie 羯, 168 Shi Le 石勒, founder of the Later Zhao 58, 81–2, 84–5; ambushes the Jin main force 80; attempts at easing Han-non-Han tensions 83; birth 82; converted to Buddhism 83; as ruler 82; Shi Miyuan 史彌遠, Song official 199–200 Shi Nai’an 施耐庵, Yuan dynasty writer 272 Shi Zun 石遵, Shi Hu’s son 85 shi 士 (cultured gentlemen) 47; (the educated; literati) 150 shi 詩 (poetry) 69, 75, 141 shidafu 士大夫 (literati) 150, 206, 276 Shidebala, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Yingzong 英宗 238 shifu 詩賦 (poetry and rhapsodies) 38 Shiji 史記 (Grand Scribe’s records) 76, 275 shijia 士家 (military households) 69 shijiang 侍講 (lecturer-in-waiting) 90 Shijing 詩經 (Classic of Songs) 33

Shitao 石濤 (Yuanji 原濟), Qing painter 326 Shitoucheng 石頭城, defensive outpost of Jiankang 89 shouming 受命, receiving the mandate to rule 34 Shouyang 壽陽 in Anhui 91 Shu 蜀 (Shu-Han 蜀漢), dynasty and state in the southwest 57, 65, 57, 72; foreign policy 73; surrender to Jin 58, 67 Shu 蜀, Eastern Jin area 90 Shu 蜀: Former Shu and Later Shu, both state 162 Shunzhi 順治, Qing emperor 288 shushu 術數 (numbers and divination) 38 si 寺 (Courts), central government agencies that became less important than the bu 部 in SuiTang times 116 sikong 司空 (Excellency of Works; Censor-inchief ) 41 Silk Road 35, 37, 43, 45, 60, 101 silk 36–37, 46, 124, 138–39, 152, 190–2, 201–4, 207, 217, 221–2, 226, 243, 258, 261, 291–3, 297 Silla, state in the Korean Peninsula 127 silver 96, 139, 190–1, 201–3, 205, 214, 217–8, 221–2, 226, 233, 242, 246, 258, 261, 290, 293–4, 296, 299, 302–4, 307–8, 311 Sima Chengzhen 司馬承禎, leading Tang Shangqing Daoist 119 Sima Daozi 司馬道子, top Eastern Jin official 91–2 Sima Guang 司馬光, Northern Song historian 76, 158 186, 196; on the burning of books 21; on the rise of Qin 15 Sima Lang 司馬朗, elder brother of Sima Yi 68 Sima Liang司馬亮, Western Jin prince of Runan 汝南王 80 Sima Lun 司馬倫, Western Jin prince of Zhao 趙王司 80; kills Empress Jia 58 Sima Qian 司馬遷, Western Han historian 15–16, 18, 36, 38 Sima Rui司馬睿. See Emperor Yuan 元 of the Eastern Jin Sima Shi 司馬師, top Cao-Wei official 58, 66 Sima Wei司馬瑋, Western Jin prince of Chu 楚王 80 Sima Xiongru 司馬相如, Western Han literary figure 38 Sima Yan 司馬炎 (Emperor Wu 武), founder of the Western Jin 58, 67; ascends the throne 77; as emperor 68. See also Emperor Wu of the Western Jin Sima Ye 司馬鄴 (Emperor Min 愍 of the Western Jin) 80–81 Sima Yi 司馬懿, top Cao-Wei official 57–8, 65–6, 68; campaign against Gongsun Yuan 公孫淵, 70 Sima Ying 司馬穎, Western Jin prince of Chengdu 成都王 84

355

Glossary-Index Sima Yu 司馬遹, Western Jin crown prince 80 Sima Yuanxian 司馬元顯, top Eastern Jin official 91–2 Sima Yue 司馬越, Western Jin prince of Donghai 東海王 58; death of 80 Sima Zhao 司馬昭, top Cao-Wei official 58, 66–8, 77 Sima Zhong 司馬衷 (Emperor Hui 惠 of the Western Jin) 80 Sima 司馬 family 68 Simin yueling 四民月令 (Monthly Ordinances for the Four Classes of People) 4, 47–8 Sinicization (Hanhua 漢化) 46; under the Northern Wei 101; under the Kitans and Jurchen 214–15; under the Manchus 289, 316–7, 331–2 Sinitic vs. Steppe 159 Sino-Japanese War 310–1 Sino-Steppe 158 Sino-Xianbei Empire 93ff 101; historiography 105 Sino-Xianbei warlords 126 Sinocentrism 141, 143 situ 司徒 (Excellency over the Masses; Minister of Education) 41 Six Boards. See Six Ministries Six Directorates (liujian 六監) 188 Six Dynasties (liuchao 六朝) 56, 162 Six Garrisons (Liuzhen 六鎮) 98; rebellion of the 60, 100 Six Ministries/Six Boards (liubu 六部) 146, 188 six protectorates (duhu fu 都護府), set up in the Early Tang to govern non-Han areas: five in the north and northwest, one in Vietnam 130, Sixteen Garrison Commands (shiliu fu 十六府), main fight forces of the Sui 118 Sixteen Prefectures of Yan 燕and Yun 雲 (the area around modern Beijing) 163, 168, 179, 187, 190 Sixteen States (Sixteen Kingdoms) 57–8, 81 small-time non-Han (xiaohu 小胡) 85 Smith, Adam 261 Sogdians 138, 141 Song (or Liu-Song) dynasty founded at Jiankang by Liu Yu, one of the Southern Dynasties 56, 92. See Liu-Song dynasty Song dynasty at Kaifeng 157–8, 161–2, 164, 167–9. See Northern Song Song Lian 宋濂, Ming philosopher 273–4 “Song of a Soldier” (Congjun xing 從軍行) by Lu Sidao 盧思道 121 Song Yingxing 宋應星, Ming scholar and technical writer 274 Song Zhiwen 宋之問, Early Tang poet 141 Southeast Asia 45, 49, 102 Southern and Northern Dynasties (nanbeichao 南北朝) 57, 60

Southern Chanyu 11, 40, 42 Southern Song 1127–1279, 179, 183, 197–212 Southern Suburban Altar 133 Southern Tang, state in the South founded by Li Bian 李昪 162, 169, 171; and elite Chinese culture 165 Southern Xiongnu 43, 52 Southern Yan, Murong state based in Shandong (398) 84 Spring and Autumn Annals, a Confucian classic 153 Srong-brtsan-sgam-po 松贊干布, king of Tubo 112 State Finance Commission (sansi 三司) in the Northern Song 146, 188 State Trade Act (shiyi fa 市易法) 186 statutes (ling 令) 136 Steppe 158 Su Buwei 蘇不韋, Eastern Han avenger 48 Su Jun 蘇峻, a top Eastern Jin general driven to rebellion 58, 90 Su Shi 蘇軾 (Su Dongpo 東坡), Song poet and official 196, 224, 275 Su Wei 蘇威, top Sui official 117 Su Zhe 蘇轍, Song thinker 196 Sui dynasty, founded by Yang Jian 楊堅 at Daxingcheng (581) 115ff.; causes of the collapse 125; conquers Chen 61; economy 123; falls 125; money 124; population 110, 123–124; rebellion 124; unifies China 57; wuzhu 五銖 coin 124 Sui-Tang empire 94 Sui-Tang, impact on East Asia 131 Suishu 隋書 (Book of the Sui) 1) by Wang Shao 王劭 121; 2) Wei Zheng 魏徵 et al., 137 Sun Ba 孫霸, Wu prince 79 Sun Ce 孫策, Sun Quan’s brother 73 Sun Cheng 孫程, Eastern Han eunuch 44 Sun Deng 孫登, Wu crown prince 79 Sun En 孫恩 rebellion 59, 91–2, 95 Sun Fu 孫復, Song thinker 196 Sun Hao 孫皓, Wu sovereign 58, 67; 73–4; “bad last” emperor 79; surrenders to the Jin 58 Sun He 孫和, Wu heir apparent 67, 79 Sun Jian 孫堅, late Eastern Han warlord based in the South 63 Sun Jun 孫峻, top Wu official 79 Sun Liang 孫亮 (King of Kuaiji 會稽王), Wu sovereign 58, 66, 73 Sun Lin 孫崊, top Wu official 66, 79 Sun Quan 孫權, founder of the state of Wu 63–4, 65–6, 74, 57, 79; as Emperor of Wu 65; in Jing province 71; as leader of Wu 73; turns hostile to Liu Bei 64 Sun Shao 孫邵, top Wu official 74 Sun Tai 孫泰, Eastern Jin Daoist 91 Sun Xiu 孫休, Wu sovereign 58, 66–7, 73

356

Glossary-Index Sun Yatsen (Sun Yixian 孫逸仙), anti-Manchu leader 315 Sun Yunhe 孫雲鶴, Qing poet 329 superior area commands/commanders (da zongguan 大總管) 119 Supplement to the Expanded Meaning of the Great Learning (Daxue yanyi bu 大學衍義補) 257 Supreme Mystery (Taixuan 太玄) 69–70 Sutra of Trapuṣa and Bhallika (Tiwei boli jing 提謂波利經) 103 Suzhou 蘇州 in Jiangsu 138 Sweet Dew (Ganlu 甘露) incident, a failed attempt to eradicate the eunuchs (835) 113, 147 Syriac 141 taichang qing 太常卿 (president of the Court for State Ceremonies) 117 taichang 太常 (Grand Master of Ceremonies) 29 Taihe Code 泰和律,Jurchen legal code 225 Taihecheng 太和城 (738) in Nanzhao 南詔 131, 133 taiji 太極, Supreme Ultimate 195 Taiping rebellion, Taiping tianguo 太平天國, anti-Qing uprising 309–10, 315 taipu 太僕 (Grand Coachman) 29 Taishang ganying pian 太上感應篇 (Tract of Taishang on Action and Response), Qing Daoist text 329 Taishang Laojun 太上老君 (Most High Lord Lao) 72 taishi ling 太史令 (court astronomer; grand astrologer) 49 taishou 太守 (commandery administrator/ governor) 45 taiwei (Commander-in-chief; Grand Commandant; Defender-in-chief ), one of the Three Dukes 28, 41, 52 taixu 太學 (Taixue; Imperial Academy; Imperial University, University; Grand Academy) 11, 29, 41, 49 Taiyi 太一 (Great Unity), god 35 Taiyuan 太原 (south of Taiyuan, Shanxi), capital of the Northern Han 169–70 Taizhou School (Taizhou xuepai 泰州學派) 264, 267 Taizong 太宗, Song. See Zhao Guangyi 趙光義 Taizu 太祖, Song. See Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤 Taklamakan, desert in Xinjiang 154 tanci 彈詞, fictional form using rhymed narrative 327 Tang 唐 dynasty, founded by Li Yuan 李淵 at Chang’an: 126ff. (pre-755) 144ff. (post-756); Buddhism 139–40; bureaucratic factionalism 148; cultural change 152, 162; decline and fall 148, 157; economic development 151; founding of 126; historiography

137; institutional decentralization 151; literature 141; military 144–5; money 152; periodization 110, 134; population 123, 139; religion 139; ritual 136; taxes 138; territorial expansion 129, 154; territorial extent 127; transportation network 137; unifies China in 628, 127; war of unification 112; world empire 128, 135 Tang liudian 唐六典 (Tang institutions of six administrative divisions) 137 Tang Shunzhi 唐順之, Ming writer 275 Tang Xianzu 湯顯祖, Ming playwright 277 Tang Yin 唐寅, Ming painter 278 Tang-Bo huimeng bei 唐蕃會盟碑 (Stele of the Tang-Tubo alliance) 113 Tang-Song Transition 144, 152, 155, 183 Tang-Song School (Tang Song pai 唐宋派), Ming literary movement 275 Tanglü shuyi 唐律疏議 (Subcommentary and explications of the Tang Code) 136 Tangming 堂明, Southeast Asian state 75 Tanguts, non-Han people who established Xixia empire (1038–1227) 183, 189–91, 218, 236 Tangyun 唐韻 (Tang rhymes) 137 tanistry, method of succession by conflict between potential heirs 215 Tanshihuai 檀石槐, Xianbei leader in late Easter Han times 11, 52, 83 Tao Hongjing 陶弘景, eminent Daoist master 103 Tao Kan 陶侃, Eastern Jin general 89–90 Tao Qian 陶潛 (Tao Yuanming 淵明), Eastern Jin-Song poet 106 Tao Qian 陶謙, late Eastern Han governor of Xu 徐 province 62–3 Tarim basin 45 taxes 124, 136. See also zu yong diao 租庸調 tea 102, 142, 190–91, 204, 208, 222, 280, 292–4, 298–9, 301–3 Temür, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Chengzong 成宗 237–8 Tengri (heaven), Mongol spiritual figure 244 Tenn ō 天皇 (heavenly emperor), emperor of Japan 137 textiles 124, 258, 261, 268, 294–94 thearch (emperor) 19 Three Departments (sansheng 三省), three top-tier government agencies in Sui-Tang times 188 Three Departments and Six Boards 134 Three Dukes and Nine Ministers (sanggong jiuqiu 三公九卿) 25 Three Dukes 28, 31; rank at 10,000 bushels 29. See also sangong 三公 Three Hall System (sanshefa 三舍法), Song educational reform 193 Three Principles of the People, book by Sun Yatsen 315

357

Glossary-Index Three Stages (Sanjie jiao 三階教), Buddhist sect suppressed by Emperor Wen of the Sui 120 Three States/Three Kingdoms (Sanguo 三國), Cao-Wei, Shu, Wu 62ff Three Teachings (sanjiao 三教): Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism 119, 140 Three Yangs, grand secretaries in the early Ming 275. See Yang Rong, Yang Pu, Yang Shiqi three-article code 32 Tianbo 天寶 (742–756), a reign period of Xuanzong 玄宗 112, 136 Tiangong kaiwu 天工開物 (Creations of men and nature), Ming technical manual 274 Tianshen 天神 (Tengri), sky god worshipped by the Xianbei 99 Tiansheng Statutes 天聖令 (completed in Tiansheng 7 or 1029), based on the Tang statutes 137 Tianshu 天書 (heavenly books) 184 Tianshui 天水, commandery 72 Tianshun 天順, Ming emperor. See Zhu Qizhen 朱祁鎮 Tiantai 天臺 sect of Buddhism, founded by Zhiyi 智顗 120 tianxia 天下 (all under Heaven) 35 Tibet 81, 84 86, 127, 131, 154, 243, 245, 289, 317, 322–3, 331. See also Tubo Tiele 鐵勒, Turkic people in Mongolia, Siberia, and others 129, 135 ting 亭 (neighborhood), Qin grassroots organization 17 tingwei youjian 廷尉右監 (Inspector of the Right) 30 tingwei 廷尉 (Commandant of Justice) 29 tobacco 292, 295, 297–8, 303 Toghön Temür, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Huizong 惠宗 239, 248 tonal prosody 106 Tongcheng 桐城 School, Qing philosophical movement 319 Tongzhi 同治, Qing emperor 305 township-ward system 136 Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉, Japanese warlord 268 Transoxiana, area in west Central Asia 154 transportation system in East Asia 133 Treaty of Chanyuan 澶淵, between Song and Liao 1005: 184, 190, 217–9, 227 Treaty of Nanjing: ends Opium War in 1842, 304 Treaty of Tianjin 1858: 305 Treaty Ports 305, 311 Troubles of Yong jia 永嘉之亂 79, 80–1, 84, 88 Trung sisters (Zhengshi jiemei 徵氏姐妹), rebel leaders in Vietnam 9, 39 tuanlian 團練, local militias in the Qing 308

Tubo 吐蕃, non-Han nomadic people active in Tibet and Qinghai 113, 127, 129, 136; sack of Chang’an 127. See also Tibet Tujue 突厥, Turkic nomadic people active in Mongolia and Central Asia, initially with two khanates: Eastern Tujue and Western Tujue (starting in early Sui times) 116, 126; cavalry 130; in Mongolia 125 Tugh Temür, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Wenzong 文宗 239, 242 Tuli 突利 (Qimin 啟民), Eastern Tujue qaghan 111 tuntian 屯田 (agricultural garrisons; state farms) 68 Tuntuhe 屯屠何, Xiongnu chanyu 10 Tuoba Gui 拓拔珪 (Emperor Daowu 道武), founder of the Northern Wei 59, 98 Tuoba Hong 拓拔宏 (Yuan Hong 元宏; Emperor Xiaowen 孝文 of the Northern Wei) 60, 82, 100 Tuoba Si 拓拔嗣 (Emperor Mingyuan 明元 of the Northern Wei) 59 Tuoba Tao 拓拔燾 (Emperor Taiwu 太武 of the Northern Wei) 60, 98–9 Tuoba Wei 拓跋魏, Northern Wei 93 Tuoba Yilu 拓跋猗盧, leader of the Tuoba, created king of Dai 代by the Western Jin 58 Tuoba 拓拔 (Toba; Tabgatch), a branch of Xianbei 57, 81, 83, 98 Tuobo 佗鉢, Tujue qaghan 122 tusi 土司, local chieftans 241 Tutu Chengcui 吐突承璀 (d. 820), eunuch officer 147 Tuyuhun 吐谷渾, non-Han nomadic people active in Qinghai and eastern Xinjiang 60, 122, 129 Twelve Garrison Commands (shi’er fu 十二府)/ Twelve Guards (shi’er wei 十二衛), twelve of the Sixteen Garrison Commands that commanded fubing forces 118 Uighurs (Huihe 回紇/Huihu 回鶻; Weiwuer 維吾爾), Turkic people active in Mongolia in Tang times, moving west later 113, 136, 141, 154, 218, 243 Umayyad Caliphate 127 unequal treaties 304–5 uninheritable land (koufen tian 口分田) 138. See equal field urbanization 192, 203, 295–97 Vietnam 252 Wadō kaihō 和同開珎, Japanese coin in imitation of the Kaiyuan tongbao 139 Wagang Army 瓦崗軍, rebel army under Li Mi 112, 125

358

Glossary-Index waiqi 外戚 (consort families; consort relatives) 7, 48 Wandu 丸都 (Hwando; Ji’an, Jilin) 84 Wang Anshi 王安石, Song statesman 185–7, 190, 192–3, 195, 201 Wang Bi 王弼, xuanxue scholar 70 Wang Bo 王勃, Early Tang poet 141 Wang Bo 王薄, first major Sui rebel leader 112, 125 Wang Can 王粲, late Eastern Han literary figure 69 Wang Dao 王導, powerful adviser of the Eastern Jin 88–9 Wang Duan 汪端, Qing poet 329 Wang Duanshu 王端淑, Qing poet 329 Wang Dun 王敦, top Eastern Jin official who challenges the court 89; rebellion 58 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Ming kaozheng thinker 273, 328 Wang Gen 王艮, Ming philosopher, founder of Taizhou School 263–4, 266–7, 273 Wang Hui 王翬, Qing painter 326 Wang Jian 王鑒, Qing painter 326 Wang Jun 王浚, governor of You Province 幽州 84–5 Wang Mang 王莽, founder of the Xin dynasty 9, 26, 28, 34, 39, 127 Wang Meng 王猛, top Former Qin official 59, 86 Wang Mi 王弥, Han (Xiong) general 58, 80 Wang Qian 王謙 (in Sichuan), Northern Zhou loyalist 116 Wang Rong 王融 (467–493), Yongming poet 106 Wang Rui 王濬, Western Jin general 67 Wang Shao 王劭 (zi Junmao 君懋), Sui historian 121 Wang Shao 王韶, Song official 190–1 Wang Shenzhong 王慎中, Ming writer 275 Wang Shichong 王世充, top Sui official, warlord 112, 125 Wang Shifu 王實甫, Yuan dynasty writer 272 Wang Shimin 王時敏, Qing painter 326 Wang Shizhen 王世貞, Ming scholar and official 261, 265, 267–8, 275–6, 279–80 Wang Shizhen 王士禛, Qing scholar and poet 328 Wang Xianzhi 王仙芝 rebellion 113, 160 Wang Xuance 王玄策, Tang emissary to India 112 Wang Yan 王延, Daoist; Sui leading proponent of the Louguan school 119 Wang Yangming 王陽明/Wang Shouren 王守仁, Ming official and philosopher 263–4, 266, 273 Wang Yuanzhi 王遠知, leading Sui Shangqing Daoist 119

Wang Yuanqi 王原祁, Qing painter 326 Wang Yuzhen 汪玉軫, Qing poet 329 Wang Zhe 王喆/Wang Chongyang 王重陽, Jurchen Jin Daoist master 225 Wang Zhen 王振, Ming eunuch 253 Wang Zhengjun 王政君, empress dowager 28 Wanli 萬曆, Ming emperor. See Zhu Yijun 朱翊鈞 Wanyan Aguda 完顏阿骨打, founder of the Jin dynasty 219 War of the Eight Princes, late Western Jin 80, 88 War of Uncles and Nephews, in the Liu-Song in the late fifth century 96 Ward, Frederick Townsend, American military leader against Nian rebels 309 Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan 水滸傳), novel 272, 276 Way of Five Pecks of Rice Religion (wudoumi dao 五斗米道; Tianshi dao 天师道 or the Way of the Celestial Masters) 91 Wei Ao (Wei Xiao) 隗囂, early Eastern Han warlord 9, 39 wei jiangjun 衛將軍 (general of the guards) 71 “Wei li zhi dao” 為吏之道, unearthed Western Han text 33 Wei River 37 Wei Yuan 魏源, Qing scholar 320 Wei-Jin: Cao-Wei and Western Jin Wei: Cao-Wei Wei Yuan 魏源, Qing scholar and poet 329 Wei Zhongxian 魏忠賢, Ming eunuch 269 Weiming Yuanhao 巍名元昊, founder of Tangut Xixia empire 1038: 190 weisuo 衛所, military garrison system 252 weiwei 衛尉 (Commandant of the Guards) 29 weixue 偽學 (spurious learning), anti-Daoxue accusations in Southern Song 199 wen 文 (literary; refined; civilized). See literary Wen Jiao 温嶠, top Eastern Jin official 89–90 Wen xuan 文選 (Selections of refined literature), literary anthology 75 Wen Zhengming 文徵明, Ming painter 278 “Wenfu” 文賦 (Rhapsody on literature) by Lu Ji 陸機 75 Weng Fanggang 翁方綱, Qing scholar and poet 328 wenyan wen 文言文, literary Chinese 317 West River (in Guangdong) 103 Western Barbarians (Rong 戎) 85 Western Command (Xifu 西府) 90 Western Depot (Xichang 西廠), secret police in the Ming 254 Western Han dynasty at Chang’an 25ff.; capital 38; consort families 28; court bureaucracy 28–30; kingdoms under 26–7; law 31–2; population 31; ru (Confucian) learning 32–4;

359

Glossary-Index religion 34–5; southern neighbors 37; taxes 32; Western Regions 36–7; Xiongnu 35–6 Western Jin dynasty at Luoyang founded by Sima Yan 司馬炎 56, 58, 77, 81; taxes 79 Western Liao, dynasty founded in Central Asia by survivors of the fall of Kitan Liao 220 Western Regions (Xiyu 西域) 35–6, 41, 45, 122 Western Tujue, western Tujue qaghanate that dominated Xinjiang and west Central Asia 112, 123, 127, 129 Western Wei dynasty at Chang’an founded by Yuwen Tai, successor to the Northern Wei 61, 57, 98, 100 Western Yan, dynasty and state founded by the Murongs in Chang’an (384); it later moves to Shanxi 84 White Cloud Monastery (Baiyun guan 白雲觀), Daoist headquarters in Beijing 324 White Lotus movement, millenarian rebellion against Mongols 247; against the Qing 308 witchcraft scandal 33. See wugu zhihuo 巫蠱之禍 women’s medicine ( fuke 婦科) 208 Woren 倭仁, Manchu nobleman 305 wu 武. See martial Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑. See Houqua Wu Cheng’en 吳承恩, Ming novelist 277 Wu Guang 吳廣, Qin rebel 8 Wu Guichen 吳規臣, Qing poet 329 Wu Jingzi 吳敬梓, Qing novelist 329 Wu Li 吳歷, Qing painter 326 Wu Qi 吳琪, Qing poet 329 Wu Sangui 吳三桂, Mng general who defected to the Qing 298 Wu School (Wu pai 吳派), Ming painters grouping 278 Wu Woyao 吳沃堯, Qing writer 329 Wu Zao 吳藻, Qing poet 329 Wu Zetian 武則天, Emperor Gaozong’s empress, female emperor of her own Zhou dynasty 110, 126–7, 134, 140–1, 149; favors Buddhism over Daoism 135; founder of the Zhou 112; as ruler 135 Wu-Southern Tang, two consecutive states based in southern Jiangsu:164–5. See Southern Tang Wu 吳, dynasty and state in the South 56–8; barter economy 74; conquered by the Western Jin 79; falls 67; relations with foreign countries 75; Southern expansion 74; taxes 74 Wuchang 武昌 (Wuhan, Hubei) 56 wudoumi dao 五斗米道 (Way of Five of Pecks of Rice), Eastern Han Daoist group 7, 50; founded 10 Wudu 武都 (seat: south of Xihe, Gansu) 86 wugu zhihuo 巫蠱之禍 (witchcraft scandal) 9 Wuhuan 烏桓 63, 70 wuji 無極 (Ultimateless) 195

Wujing zhengyi 五經正義 (Rectified interpretation of the Five Classics) 137 Wuling 武陵, Han commandery (west of Dongting Lake on the middle Yangzi) 40 Wulun shu 五倫書 (Book of the Five Relationships) 255 wuqinxi 五禽戲 (Five Animal Exercises) 70 Wusun 烏孫, non-Han nomadic people 36 Wuxiang 武鄉 (in Shanxi) 82 wuxing 五行 (Five Powers; Five Phases) 49. See also Five Powers Wuyue 吳越, state in Zhejiang and part of Jiangsu 164; Buddhism in 165 Wuzong 武宗, Yuan. See Khaishan Xar Moron River valley 83 xenophobia 154 Xi Jian 郗鑒, Eastern Jin prefect of Xuzhou 徐州 90 Xia 夏, the first dynasty 85 Xia 夏, Xiongnu state in Guanzhong (407–31) 60 xian 縣 (county), local administrative division (lower than jun 郡) introduced by the First Emperor 16, 118; in Eastern Han 45 Xianbei 鮮卑, non-Han people in the northeast in Eastern Han times 11, 42, 52, 57–8, 134, 215; different branches of 81; origins of 83; raids by 46; tribes 83. See also Tuoba 拓拔, Murong 慕容, Yuwen 宇文 Xianbei-ization, under the Eastern Wei-Northern Qi 101 Xianfeng 咸豐, Qing emperor 305–6 Xiang River 湘水 63, 103 Xiang Xiu 向秀, Wei-Jin xuanxue scholar 70 Xiang Yu 項羽 (Xiang Ji 項籍), post-Qin rebel leader 8, 23, 25, 27; and the killing of Ziying 24 xiang 相 1) chancellor/chief minister at the central court (see chengxiang 丞相); 2) chancellor/chief administrator of a Han kingdom 27, 45 xiang 鄉, township 17 Xiangyang 襄陽 60, 83 Xiangyi 襄邑 (Suixian, Henan) 59 xianliang 賢良 (able and virtuous) 30 Xiannong 先農 (First Farmer), god 17 Xianyang 咸陽 (north of Xi’an, Shaanxi), Qin capital 8, 15, 22; ravaged by Xiang Yu’s troops 24 Xiao Cha 蕭詧, founder of the Later Liang (Xiao) 61 Xiao Daocheng 蕭道成 (Emperor Gao 高 of the Qi), founder of the Qi 60, 97 Xiao Gang 蕭綱 (Emperor Jianwen 簡文 of the Liang), patron of literature 107

360

Glossary-Index Xiao Luan 蕭鸞 (Emperor Ming 明 of the Qi) 60, 97 Xiao Tong 蕭統, Liang prince, patron of literature 107 Xiao Xian 蕭銑, Sui rebel in the South 125 Xiao Yan 蕭衍 (Emperor Wu 武), founder of the Liang 60; as emperor 97; and Buddhism 97; peace treaty with the Eastern Wei 97 Xiao Yi 蕭繹 (Emperor Yuan 元 of the Liang) 98 Xiao Ze 蕭賾 (Emperor Wu 武 of the Qi) 60, 97 Xiao Ziliang 蕭子良, Qi prince 106 xiaolian 孝廉 (filial and honest) 30 xiaoshuo 小說 (short stories) 276 Xiaozong 孝宗, Song. See Zhao Shen 趙昚 Xie An 謝安, top Eastern Jin official 59, 87, 91; rise 90 Xie Lingyun 謝靈運 (385–433), Liu-Song poet of landscape poetry 106 Xie Shi 謝石, Eastern Jin general 59 Xie Tiao 謝朓 (464–499), Yongming poet 106 Xie Xuan 謝玄, Eastern Jin general 59, 91 xieyi 寫意 (writing of ideas), painting technique 327 Xijing 西京, one of Parhae’s capitals 131 Ximen Qing 西門慶, protagonist of Jinpingmei 277 Xin dynasty 127 Xin Wudai shi 新五代史 (New History of the Five Dynasties) by Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修) 158 Xin 新 dynasty at Chang’an, founded by Wang Mang 王莽 28, 34 Xinhai geming 辛亥革命 (Xinhai Revolution), overthrow of the Qing dynasty and imperial system 1911–12: 315 Xingli jingyi 性理精義 (Essential ideas of nature and principle), examination syllabus 319 Xinxue 心學 (School of the Mind), Confucian philosophical school 319 Xiongnu匈奴, northern nomadic people 35–6, 39, 41–2, 58, 81; raids by 45; split into Northern and Southern Xiongnu 9 Xiping shijing 熹平石經 (Stone Classics) 11 Xiwangmu 西王母 (Queen Mother of the West) 49 “Xixi yan” 昔昔鹽 (Nocturnal song), by Xue Daoheng 薛道衡 121 Xixia 西夏 (Western Xia) Tangut state founded at Xingqingfu 興慶府 (Yinchuan, Ningxia) 183, 188, 190–91. See Tanguts Xiyang feng 西洋風 (wind of the West Ocean), desire for Western goods 297 xiyu duhu 西域都護 (Protector-general of the Western Regions) 43 Xizhou 西州 (Western Prefecture), set up by the Tang with its seat near Turfan, Xinjiang 129

Xu Can 徐燦, Qing poet 329 Xu Fu 許鈇, Ming merchant 265 Xu Gan 徐幹, late Eastern Han literary figure 69 Xu Jie 徐階, Ming official 267–68 Xu 許 (east of Xuchang, Henan) 57, 68, 79 Xuande 宣德, Ming emperor.See Zhu Zhanji 朱瞻基 Xuanwu Gate 玄武門 Incident (626) 112, 127, 135 xuanxue 玄學 (Mystery Learning; dark learning) 69 Xuanzang 玄奘, Tang Buddhist monk who traveled to India 277 Xuchang 許昌 (northeast of Xuchang, Henan) 59; in Yu 豫 province 63 Xue Baochai 薛寶釵, character in Honglou meng 330 Xue Daoheng 薛道衡, Sui poet, executed 112, 121 Xue Ju 薛舉, Sui rebel leader in west Shaanxi 125 xueshi 學室, a training school 29 Xun Kuang 荀况 (Xunzi 荀子; Master Xun) 14 Yan 燕 (756–763), state founded by An Lushan 127, 145 Yan Song 嚴嵩, Ming official 267–8, 275–6 Yan Yuan 顏元, Qing scholar 320 Yang Guang 楊廣 (Emperor Yang 煬 of the Sui) 111, 116 Yang Guifei 楊貴妃, consort of Emperor Xuanzong of the Tang 145 Yang Hu 羊祜, top Western Jin official 79 Yang Jian 楊堅 (Emperor Wen), founder of the Sui dynasty 61, 101, 111 Yang Jiong 楊炯, Early Tang poet 141 Yang Jun 楊駿, Western Jin top official 58, 80 Yang Pu 楊溥, Ming grand secretary 275 Yang Rong 楊榮, Ming grand secretary 275 Yang Shiqi 陽士奇, Ming grand secretary 275 Yang Su 楊素, top Sui leader, poet 117, 122 Yang Xi 楊羲, Daoist transcendent 103 Yang Xingmi 楊行密, Late Tang warlord 164 Yang Xiong 楊雄/揚雄, Western Han literary figure 38, 69 Yang Xuangan 楊玄感 rebellion 112, 123, 125 Yang Yan 楊炎, Mid-Tang financier 146 Yang Yong 楊勇, first crown prince of the Sui 111, 116 yanghuo 洋貨, foeign stuff 295 yanglao 養老 (Entertaining the Aged), ceremony 49 Yangxia 陽夏 (Taikang, Henan) 90 Yangxiemiecheng 陽苴咩城 (Dali 大理, Yunnan) (779) in Nanzhao 南詔 (738–937) 131, 133 Yangzhou 揚州 in Zhenjiang 138

361

Glossary-Index Yangzi River 102–3 Yanjing 燕京, near modern Beijing 184, 187 Yanshan garden 弇山園, garden of Wang Shizhen 280 Yanzhou 兗州, Eastern Jin prefecture north of the lower Yangzi River 90 Yao 瑤, aboriginal people in southern China 253 Yao Chang 姚萇, founder of the Later Qin 59, 87 Yao Nai 姚鼐, Qing scholar and poet 328 Yao Yizhong 姚弋仲, Qiang chieftain, father of Yao Chang 84–5 Ye 鄴 59, 69, 72; Former Yan capital 84; Later Zhao capital 58 Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝) 49–50 Yellow Hat sect (Gelukpa), Tibetan school of Buddhism 323 Yellow River 102 Yellow Spring (huangquan 黃泉; the underworld) 34 Yellow Turbans (Huangji 黃巾) Rebellion 7, 11, 50, 52, 67, 71 Yelü Chucai 耶律楚材, Kitan advisor to Chinggis Khan 220, 236 Yesun Temür, Mongol khan, Yuan emperor Jinzong 晉宗 239 Yihequan 義和拳 (Righteous and Harmonious Fists), the Boxer movement 313. See Boxer rebellion Yijing 易經 (Book of Changes) 49 yikou tongshang 一口通商, single port commercial system. See Canton System Yin Hao 殷浩, Eastern Jin leader of a northern expedition 59 Yin Lihua 陰麗華, empress of Han Emperor Guangwu 41 Yin Xi 尹喜, Eastern Zhou petty official 119 yin 蔭 (protection privilege) 149, 206 yin-yang 陰陽, cosmological duality 49, 130 Ying Yang 應瑒, late Eastern Han literary figure  9 Ying Zheng 嬴政. See First Emperor Yingzong 英宗, Song. See Zhao Shu 趙曙 Yingzong 英宗, Yuan. See Shidebala yinren 蔭任 (hereditary privilege) 29 yishe 義舍 (house of charity) 72 Yiwu 伊吾 (Hami, east Xinjiang) 122 Yixing 宜興, kiln site in Jiangsu 280 Yiyuan zhiyan 義苑卮言 (Unrestrained words from the Art Park), work by Wang Shizhen 279 Yongchang 永昌, Eastern Han commandery 41 Yonghui ling 永徽令 (Yonghui statutes) in 30 juan released in 651 136 Yonghui lüshu 永徽律疏 (Subcommentary to the Yonghui Code) 136

Yongle 永樂, Ming emperor. See Zhu Di 朱棣 Yongle dadian 永樂大典 (Great compendium of theYongle Era) 255 Yongming 永明, reign period (483–493) of Emperor Wu of the Qi 97, 106; poetic flourishing in 60 Yongning si 永寧寺, monastery in Northern Wei Luoyang 102 yongye tian 永業田 (inheritable lands) 124. See also equal field Yongzheng 雍正, Qing emperor 285, 288–90, 293, 297–8, 323 Yōrō Statutes 養老令 of Japan 137 Youbeiping 右北平, Western Jin commandery in north Hebei 83 youren 郵人 (postmen) 29 Yu garden 豫園, Ming garden in Shanghai 280 Yu Liang 庾亮, top Eastern Jin official 89–90 Yuan dianzhang 元典章, Mongol legal code 242 Yuan Mei 袁枚, Qing scholar and poet 328 Yuan Shao 袁紹, late Eastern Han warlord 11, 53, 62–3 Yuan Shu 袁術, late Eastern Han warlord 62–3 Yuan Zhen 元稹 (779–831), Mid-Late Tang poet 153 Yuan 宛, Eastern Han seat of Nanyang 南陽 region/commandery 9, 52 Yuan dynasty/Mongol dynasty, founded at Beijing 128, 232, 235–48, 271–2 Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道, Ming literary figure 265–6, 276 Yuan Zhongdao 袁中道, Ming literary figure 276 Yuan Zongdao 袁宗道, Ming literary figure 276 Yuanmingyuan 圓明園, Qing Summer Palace outside Beijing 305 Yuanshi Tianzun 元始天尊 (Celestial Venerable of Primordial Beginning) 119 Yuchi Jiong 尉遲迥, Northern Zhou loyalist in Hebei 116 Yue Fei 岳飛, Song general 198, 201 yuefu 樂府 (Music Bureau), a type of poetry 106 Yuezhi 月氏, non-Han nomadic people active in the northwest 36 Yuezhou 越州 (Shaoxing, Zhejiang) 138 yuli 獄吏 (prison clerks) 29 Yun Shouping 惲壽平, Qing painter 326 Yungang 雲崗 (near Pingcheng), cave temples 99, 104 Yunmeng 雲夢 (in Hubei) 22 yushi dafu 御史大夫 (Grandee Secretary; Censorin-chief ), one of the Three Dukes 28 Yutian 于闐 (Khotan, Xinjiang) 69 Yuwen Bi 宇文㢸, Sui Board president 117 Yuwen Huaji 宇文化及, Sui general 125 Yuwen Jue 宇文覺 (Emperor Xiaomin 孝閔 of the Northern Zhou) 61

362

Glossary-Index Yuwen Tai 宇文泰, de facto founder of the Western Wei 61,100–1 Yuwen Yong 宇文邕 (Emperor Wu 武 of the Northern Zhou) 101; proscriptions of Buddhism and Daoism 61 Yuwen 宇文, a Xiongnu-Xianbei tribe 81, 83 zaju 雜劇, dramatic form originating in the Mongol Yuan 243, 272 Zeng Gong 曾鞏, Song writer 275 Zeng Guofan 曾國藩, Qing official, SelfStrengthening Movement leader 306, 310, 320 Zeng Jing 曾鯨, Ming painter 279 Zhang Bin 張賓, Shi Le’s 石勒 strategist 82 Zhang Daoling 张道陵, founder of the wudoumi dao 五斗米道 10 Zhang Fei 張飛, Liu Bei’s 劉備 general 71 Zhang Hua 張華, top Western Jin official 80 Zhang Huan 張奐, Eastern Han general 51 Zhang Jue (Zhang Jiao) 張角, leader of the Yellow Turbans 11, 52 Zhang Juzheng 張居正, Ming official 268, 290 Zhang Ling 張陵, late Eastern Han Daoist 72 Zhang Lu 張魯, leader of the Celestial Masters Daoist community 64, 72; surrenders to Cao Cao 69 Zhang Nanyang 張南陽, Ming garden designer 280 Zhang Qian 張騫, Western Han adventurer 9, 36 Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠, Ming rebel leader 269 Zhang Yichao 張義潮, a Han living under Tubo in Dunhuang, rebelled in 851 and brought much of the northwest to the Tang 113 Zhang Zai 張載, Song philosopher 195, 200 Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, Qing reformer 312 Zhang Zhongjing 張仲景, late Eastern Han physician 70 zhang 長 (magistrate), leader of a small county: Han 45; Qin 17. See also ling 令 zhantian zhi 占田制 (land-owning system), Western Jin 79 Zhao: dynasty and state. See Former Zhao, Later Zhao Zhao Bingwen 趙秉文, Confucian scholar under the Jurchen Jin 225–6 Zhao Dun 趙盾, Guangzong 光宗, Song emperor, r. 1189–1194: 198 Zhao Gao 趙高, Qin eunuch 8, 22; death of 23 Zhao Gou 趙構, Gaozong 高宗, Song emperor, r. 1127–1162: 197–8, 201 Zhao Guangyi 趙光義, Taizong 太宗, second Song emperor 184 Zhao Heng 趙恆, Zhenzong 真宗, Song emperor, r. 997–1022: 184, 210

Zhao Huan 趙桓, Qinzong 欽宗, Song emperor, r. 1126–1127: 187, 197, 201, 221 Zhao Ji 趙佶, Huizong 徽宗, Song emperor, r. 1100–1126: 186–7, 191, 197, 201, 210, 221 Zhao Kuang 趙匡, Mid-Tang Confucian scholar 153 Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤, Taizu 太祖founder of Song dynasty 183–4, 189 Zhao Kuo 趙擴, Ningzong 寧宗, Song emperor, r. 1194–1224: 199 Zhao Mengfu 趙孟頫, Yuan dynasty painter 272 Zhao Qi 趙禥, Duzong 度宗, Song emperor, r. 1264–1274: 200 Zhao Ruyu 趙汝愚, Song official 199, 206 Zhao Shen 趙昚, Xiaozong 孝宗, Song emperor, r. 1162–1189: 198–201, 205 Zhao Shu 趙曙, Yingzong 英宗, Song emperor, r. 1063–1067: 185 Zhao Tuo 趙佗, first king of Nanyue 8 Zhao Xu 趙頊, Shenzong 神宗, Song emperor, r. 1067–1085: 185, 191 Zhao Xu 趙煦, Zhezong 哲宗, Song emperor, r. 1085–1100: 186, 191 Zhao Yi 趙翼, Qing scholar and poet 328 Zhao Yun 趙昀, Lizong 理宗, Song emperor, r. 1224–1264: 199 Zhao Zhen 趙禎, Renzong 仁宗, Song emperor, r. 1022–1063: 184–85 Zhe School (Zhe pai 浙派), Ming painters grouping 278 Zhen Dexiu 真德秀, Song scholar 257 Zheng He 鄭和, eunuch admiral in the Ming 253 Zheng Xie 鄭燮, Qing scholar and poet 328 Zheng Zhong 鄭眾, Eastern Han eunuch 44 Zhengao 真誥 (Declarations of the Perfected) 119 Zhengtong 正統, Ming emperor. See Zhu Qizhen 朱祁鎮 Zhenguan zhengyao 貞觀政要 (Essentials for government during the Zhenguan reign) 135 Zhenguan 貞觀 reign (627–649), reign period of Emperor Taizong 112 zhengyi 正役 or regular corvée 138 Zhenzong 真宗, Song. See Zhao Heng 趙恆 Zhezong 哲宗, Song. See Zhao Xu 趙煦 Zhi Qian 支謙, translator of Buddhist works 74 Zhifu 芝罘 22. See also Mt. Zhifu Zhiyi 智顗, the greatest Buddhist master in South 120 zhixing weiyi 知行為一 (unity of knowledge and action) 273 Zhong Hui 鍾會, Cao-Wei general 67 Zhongjing 133 Zhongjing中京, one of Parhae’s capitals 131 zhongnan 中男 (adolescent male) 124. See equal field law Zhongping 中平 (middle peace), reign title 52

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Glossary-Index zhongren jian 衆人薦 (recommended by multiple people) 31 zhongshu sheng 中書省 1) Secretariat 118, 201; 2) Central Province, administrative unit under the Mongol Yuan 240. See neishi sheng 內史省 zhongsu 中書 (Palace Secretariat) 28 zhongxing zhi jun 中興之君 (restoration ruler) 147 zhongxing 中興 (restoration) 41 Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the mean), one of the Four Books 212 zhongzheng 中正 (impartial judge) 69 Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤, Song philosopher 194–5, 200 Zhou dynasty (690–750), founded by Wu Zetian 127 Zhou Fang 周訪, Eastern Jin general 89 Zhou Mi 周密, Song scholar 206 Zhou Qi 周玘, son of Western Jin general Zhou Chu 周处 89 Zhou Shizong 周世宗 (Chai Rong 柴榮), emperor of the Later Zhou 163, 169 Zhou Xie 周勰, son of Zhou Qi 周玘 89 Zhou Yu 周瑜, top Wu general 63, 74 zhou 州 (province; prefecture) 118; in Han times 45, 79. See also prefecture, province Zhoujiatai 周家台 17 Zhoushu 周書 (Book of the Northern Zhou) 137 Zhu Biao 朱標, Ming prince 251 Zhu Da 朱耷, Bada shanren 八大山人, Qing painter 326 Zhu Di 朱棣, Yongle 永樂 emperor of the Ming dynasty 232–3, 251–3, 255 Zhu Gaoxu 朱高煦, Ming prince 251 Zhu Houcong 朱厚熜, Jiajing 嘉靖 emperor of the Ming 262 Zhu Jianshen 朱見深, Chenghua 成化 emperor of the Ming 251 Zhu Qiyu 朱祁鈺, Jingtai 景泰 emperor of the Ming 251 Zhu Qizhen 朱祁鎮, Zhengtong 正統 and Tianshun 天順 emperor of the Ming 251, 253–4 Zhu Quan 朱權, Ming prince 251 Zhu Shixing 朱士行, Buddhist 69 Zhu Wen 朱溫, founder of Later Liang 後梁 (907–923) 113, 148–9, 161, 165, 167; struggle with Li Keyong 161

Zhu Xi 朱熹, Southern Song philosopher 76, 179, 194–5, 200, 207, 211–2, 224, 245, 319; Jiali 家禮 (Family ritual) 212 Zhu Yijun 朱翊鈞, Wanli 萬曆 emperor of the Ming 268–69 Zhi Yizun 朱彝尊, Qing scholar and poet 328 Zhu Youdun 朱有燉, Ming prince 251 Zhu Youjian 朱由檢, Chongzhen 崇禎 emperor of the Ming 269 Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, Hongwu 洪武 emperor, founder of the Ming dynasty 232, 239, 247–52, 255, 258, 273–4 Zhu Yunming 祝允明, Ming painter and writer 275 Zhu Yunwen 朱允炆, Jianwen 建文 emperor of the Ming 256 Zhu Zhanji 朱瞻基, Xuande 宣德 emperor of the Ming 251, 278 Zhuangzi 莊子, Warring States Daoist and philosopher 69–70, 321, 330 Zhuge Ke 諸葛恪, top Wu official 66, 79 Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮, Shu strategist 57, 71–2, 272; campaign in Hanzhong 65; campaigns in Nanzhong 73; as leader of Shu 71 zhuru jian 諸儒薦 (recommended by various ru 儒) 31 zhuzi 諸子 (Masters of thought) 38 zi 字: style; cognomen Ziying 子嬰, third Qin sovereign 23; death of 24 Zizhi tongjian gangmu 資治通鑑綱目 (Outline of the comprehensive mirror for aid in governing) 76 Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governing) by Sima Guang 司馬光 and his collaborators) 76, 158 Zongli yamen 總理衙門 (Office of General Management), Qing office for dealing with Western states 306 Zoroastrianism, dualist religion of Sassanid Persia 113, 130, 141; monasteries in Chang’an 141 zu yong diao 租庸調 (taxes and corvée) 112, 138–9, 142, 146 Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠, Qing official, SelfStrengthening Movement leader 306, 310

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