Routledge Contemporary China Series; No. 114 The Uyghur Lobby: Global Networks, Coalitions and Strategies of the World Uyghur Congress 2003517041, 2003560844, 2003536749

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The Uyghur Lobby

An upsurge in violence between Uyghur and Han in China’s far western region of Xinjiang has gained increased media and academic attention in recent years as was evidenced in the July 2009 riots. Numbering over eight million, the Uyghur are China’s fifth-largest minority nationality, and their mounting aspiration for obtaining more autonomy has contributed to the recent ethnic conflicts in the region. This book looks at those who are seeking to preserve the Uyghur identity, and support the secession of Xinjiang from China in order to create their own independent state by exploring the global operations and sister groups of the Uyghur diaspora umbrella organization, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). It examines the networks of the WUC, the coalitions it has formed, the strategies the organization pursues to raise public awareness about Uyghur issues around the globe, and looks at the actors that have emerged as key players in the contemporary WUC network. Further, this book shows that the Uyghur lobby is not a unified movement, but that the local groups that it consists of are highly constrained by the broader domestic politics of their host countries, a fact which has a significant impact on the lobby’s ability to realize its strategic and political ambitions. In turn, Yu-Wen Chen gauges the impact of the WUC on public opinion and policymakers in the world’s democracies, and shows how since Uyghur organizations have been given legitimacy by liberal democracies and international governmental organizations, they can no longer be considered merely splintered members of a far-flung diaspora locked in a one-sided struggle with Beijing. Indeed, Uyghur activists can and do use their hard-won legitimacy as legal migrants and asylum-seekers to influence politics in their host countries. This unique and timely study reveals how an issue concerning a Chinese minority has been catapulted onto the wider global political stage, and as such, it will be of great interest to students and scholars working on Chinese politics, the Uyghur issue, and minority and ethnic politics, social movements, human rights, and international politics more broadly. Yu-Wen Chen is a Lecturer in Government at University College Cork, Ireland.

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The Uyghur Lobby Global networks, coalitions, and strategies of the World Uyghur Congress

Yu-Wen Chen

Routledge I

Taylor &. Francis Grou p

LONDON AND N EW YORK

First published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 Yu-Wen Chen The right of Yu-Wen Chen to be identified as the author of this work, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Chen, Youwen. The Uyghur lobby: global networks, coalitions and strategies of the world Uyghur congress / Yu-Wen Chen. pages cm – (Routledge contemporary China series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Uighur (Turkic people)–Politics and government. 2. Uighur (Turkic people)–Ethnic identity. 3. Uighur (Turkic people)–Government relations. 4. Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)–Politics and government. 5. Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)–Ethnic relations. 6. Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)–Social conditions. I. Title. DS731.U4C43 2014 305.894’323–dc23 2013025930 ISBN: 978-0-415-70964-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-88542-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Deer Park Productions

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1

Introduction

xiv xv xvi xviii xix 1

1.1 Questions, purposes, and significance 6 1.2 Methodology 8 1.3 Outline of chapters 9 Notes 11 2

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

13

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5

Birth of the WUC 13 The operation of the WUC 20 The world of competition for the WUC 21 External patrons 24 To act as if it were the real umbrella organization 26 2.6 The legitimacy question 27 2.7 Summary 30 Notes 31 3

International networks 3.1 Method and data 33 3.2 Patterns 36 3.3 Centrality 44

33

xii Contents

3.4 Regional networks 45 3.5 Summary 50 Notes 50 4

Online networks 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

5

6

Method and data 53 Macro similarities and differences 55 Micro similarities and differences 58 Summary 64 Notes 65

A minor but rising influence in America 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

52

67

The rise of the Uyghur lobby in America 69 The campaign to rescue Rebiya Kadeer 71 Congressional support 72 Further actions 75 Campaigns to save prisoners 78 Summary 79 Notes 80

Struggling for attention in Germany

82

6.1 Patterns 84 6.2 Strategies and impacts 85 6.3 Summary 90 Notes 91 7

Uyghur networks in Japan 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

8

93

Method and data 95 Patterns 96 Strategies and impacts 104 Summary 106 Notes 107

China’s competing discourses and strategies 8.1 China’s framing of the Uyghur issue 110 8.2 China’s strategies 118 8.3 Summary 122 Notes 123

109

Contents

9

Conclusions

xiii

124

9.1 The niche perspective of the Uyghur lobby 124 9.2 Contributions to social sciences studies and limits 129 Notes 131 Appendix: Uyghur-relevant US legislations (January 1989–March 2011) Bibliography Index

132 137 147

Figures

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Political prisoners in China 2 Proportion of “Uyghur” or “Uighur” mentioned in the US legislation 4 Rebiya Kadeer 7 Locations of the WUC member organizations (I) 14 Locations of the WUC member organizations (II) 15 The boomerang pattern 17 The WUC networks (October–December, 2006) 37 The WUC networks (January–December, 2007) 38 The WUC networks (January–December, 2008) 39 The WUC networks (January–March, 2009) 40 2007 ego networks of Uyghur Australian organization 47 2008 ego networks of Uyghur Australian organization 48 Uyghur online networks (March 12, 2010) 54 Uyghur online networks (August 31, 2010) 60 Uyghur online networks (April 14, 2013) 63 Refugees entering US from China (1990–2010) 68 2007 UAA and IUHRDF’s ego networks 70 Congressional support network 73 Centrality comparison of Uyghur supporters in Congress 74 Joint rally to welcome Xi Jinping’s visit to the US 77 2007 World Uyghur Congress’s ego networks 85 2008 Anti-Olympic demonstration in front of the Brandenburg Gate 87 2008 ego networks of Japan Uyghur Association 95 Uyghur networks in Japan 96 Ilham Mahmut in Taipei, May 11, 2013 101 Uyghur march in Tokyo, May 17, 2012 106

Tables

2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 6.1 7.1 9.1

NED financial support for Uyghur organizations (US dollars) 23 The Uyghur right to national self-determination: three kinds 28 Overview of offline network data sets 34 Betweenness among actors in Uyghur offline networks (2006) 45 Top ten actors in Uyghur offline networks (betweenness) 46 Betweenness among actors in the online networks (March 12, 2010) 58 Betweenness among actors in the online networks (August 31, 2010) 61 Top ten actors in Uyghur online networks (betweenness) 64 Asylum-seekers from China to Germany (2008 to 2011) 83 Political activism of Japan Uyghur Association and its affiliates 104 Comparison of cases 126

Preface

In today’s world, many peoples and communities face anxiety that is existential in scope, most often as a result of oppression from what they consider to be an indomitable political power. These groups have in turn developed a variety of ways of making their plights and demands known to the outside world. In the globalized age, the need for further research into the methods these groups use to communicate with, inform, and influence policy-makers in the countries they reside is the motive for writing this book, and has been the focus of my attention for the past six years. This academic exploration has resulted in a number of publications, including a book on the lobbying efforts of Taiwanese Americans on Capitol Hill, and another that compares the transnational activism of 57 ethnic groups from 31 European countries. These studies cover a diverse set of sub-disciplines in the political sciences, such as ethnic conflict, interest-group politics, social movements, and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). By drawing together threads from my previous empirical examinations of Uyghur movements in Europe, the United States, Asia, and Australia, it is my hope that we will deepen our knowledge on what works for Uyghur-minded activists in terms of influencing public opinion and policy-makers around the globe. From a normative point of view, it is vital to uncover and study cases that are less popular in the public eye, to give us a fuller picture of the types of peoples and communities that face abuse and oppression. Furthermore, while human rights activists and journalists have their reasons for labeling one stakeholder the victim and another the oppressor, in order to aid conflict resolution, researchers must examine each situation with detached analysis. Only by examining the perceptions and feelings on both sides of each narrative will a more accurate and more inclusive picture emerge. The focus of this work, the global Uyghur lobby, is an ideal case for examining these issues and enabling us to understand better how groups representing oppressed minorities are not only able to function but to thrive on the global stage. Further, it sheds light on why other groups emerge and then disappear with little more than a whimper. The relative success and failure of different Uyghur groups reveals the competition between activists and their organizations. Far from being a unified force,

Preface xvii the global Uyghur movement is in fact divided along many fault lines in terms of political ideology, strategy, and resources. That being said, there are also motives for activists with different interests, ideologies, and beliefs to cooperate from time to time; in this case, to present the image of a unified Uyghur movement and universal goal when fighting for their rights. An anonymous observer used to tell me a joke believed by his Uyghur friends to be a true story. I think this joke depicts the ultimately divided but somewhat united Uyghur lobby I discovered during this project. The story takes place before the founding of the proclaimed Uyghur umbrella organization, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). Two major Uyghur organizations in Europe sent representatives to a conference to discuss which organization should represent Uyghur interests. Although the two representatives loathed each other due to their divergent aspirations for the Uyghur cause, they had to share a hotel room in order to save money. The day before the conference, they were told that registration would be fairly early the next morning. One of the Uyghur representatives tended to oversleep. He was worried he would miss the registration, but he did not want to ask his roommate directly to wake him up. Instead, he left a note by the side of his bed saying: “Tell me when it is seven a.m.” The next morning, he woke up to find the other Uyghur had gone. It was already nine a.m. He then saw a note by his bed that read: “It is now seven a.m.” Tensions and disagreements among Uyghur activists do not prevent cooperation. As this example demonstrates, despite schisms, Uyghurs have to come together to foster an image that they are all working for the interests of their collectively conceived people. This book explores how certain organizations and individuals work together to become the spokespersons for Uyghur political interests while other lobbying efforts fade into oblivion. This essentially involves exploring what divides and unites the Uyghur lobby in international politics, as well as in the domestic politics of their host states beyond China. While research on the Uyghur diaspora has grown as its global activism has turned into a controversial political issue over the last decade, no other book systematically explores the Uyghur movement or the Uyghur lobby. The Uyghur Lobby is the first comprehensive and contemporary examination of the Uyghur movement. Also, most existing studies approach the issue from a historical perspective. Unlike existing work, this book uses a political science approach. It canvasses the Uyghur movement through the lens of political science theory, including an examination of how interest groups and TANs operate. Hence, The Uyghur Lobby will not only appeal to those interested in the Uyghur issue, but to students and scholars throughout the political science and China-research communities.

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support of the Institute for Human Security at La Trobe University in Australia, the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics at the University of Virginia in the United States, the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia at the University of Tokyo in Japan, and the Institute of Political Science at the Academia Sinica (IPSAS) in Taiwan. During my work at these academic institutions I profited greatly from the provision of research materials for this study. I would also like to thank the RSIS Center for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies and the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, the Sumitomo Foundation in Japan, the Institute of Political Science at the Academia Sinica in Taiwan, and the Taiwan National Science Council (NSC) for helping fund this research. I also express my most sincere appreciation to James Leibold, Christine Mahoney, Matsuda Yasuhiro, Gerhard Hoffstaedter, Delia A. Pop, Maike Schneider, Jan Hendriok, Coen Blaauw, Joey Ying Lee, Ika Ko, Shu-Min Chyou, Ling-Chih Kao, Simon James, and David O’Brien for their assistance during different phases of this research. I am also heavily indebted to the experts, interviewees, and volunteers who contributed their time, energy, and views in helping conduct this research, which I hope contributes to a better understanding not only of the tools utilized by the many exiled diasporic networks that exist in today’s world, but ways of measuring their effectiveness and use of these tools. Below are my research papers that have been utilized in the making of this book: Chen, Yu-Wen (2011) ‘Transporting Conflicts via Migratory Routes: A Social Network Analysis (SNA) of the Uyghur International Mobilization,’ NTS-Asia Research Paper No.5. Singapore: RSIS Center for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies for NTS-Asia. Chen, Yu-Wen (2012) ‘The German Debate over the Intake of Uyghur Guantanamo Inmates: A Research Note,’ Asian Ethnicity 13(2): 153–60.

Abbreviations

AI CECC CIA CPPCC ETGE ETIM ETLO ETR ETUE HRWF ICT INGOs IUHRDF MRG NED NGOs PPD PRC RFE/RL SCO SNA TANs UAA UNPO UHRP VOA WUC WUYC

Amnesty International Congressional-Executive Commission on China Central Intelligence Agency Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference East Turkestan Government-in-Exile Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement East Turkestan Liberation Organization East Turkestan Republic Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe Human Rights without Frontiers International Campaign for Tibet International non-governmental organizations International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation Minority Rights Group International National Endowment for Democracy Non-governmental organizations Political Prisoner Database People’s Republic of China Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Shanghai Cooperation Organization Social Network Analysis Transnational advocacy networks Uyghur American Association Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization Uyghur Human Rights Project Voice of America World Uyghur Congress World Uyghur Youth Congress

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1

Introduction

This study explores the global operations and sister groups of the Uyghur diaspora umbrella organization, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). We will examine the networks of the WUC and the coalitions it has formed, as well as the strategies the organization pursues to raise public awareness about Uyghur issues around the globe. This work also gauges its impact on public opinion and policy-makers in the world’s democracies. The Uyghurs (or Uighurs) share the ethnic lineage of, broadly defined, the world’s Turkic peoples. The term “Uyghur” essentially means “unity” or “alliance” (Kaltman, 2007: 1–3). Although part of the WUC mission is to create a unified force around the globe capable of advancing the political interests of Uyghurs, as our scholarly study of the Uyghur lobby progresses in this book, it will be understood that Uyghur people are far from being unified on the goals and demands made by the WUC in pursuit of its wider interests. Even the WUC’s strongest sympathizers are divided regarding how these political ambitions should be achieved. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the government has officially declared that the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu) is composed of “one Han majority and 55 ethnic minorities,” although many ethnologists would contend that taking into account “linguistic, religious, demographic, and social differences,” there is far more diversity than the Chinese government would like to admit (Olson, 1998: ix; Shih, 2002: 4).1 According to China’s 2001 national census, the total Uyghur population is 8.7 million (Shichor, 2003: 284), making them China’s fifth-largest minority nationality (Kaltman, 2007: 1–3), and the largest nationality in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region where they make up nearly 50 percent of the population.2 Uyghurs also live in other regions of China, and some are well assimilated into China’s system, having no salient aspirations for a radical change in their status. The focus of this research are those Uyghurs who do have salient aspirations – to preserve the Uyghur identity, more generously support the secession of Xinjiang from China, and create their own independent state. These will be difficult if not impossible desires to achieve from within their perceived homeland, which is now firmly under Chinese government control. The PRC government considers such efforts subversive and separatist, and has endeavored to counter any further development in this direction. For instance,

2 Introduction according to the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) of the Washington-based Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), there are approximate 148 Uyghurs who are/were imprisoned in China for political offenses (Figure 1.1).3 Uyghur political prisoners constitute the third-largest ethnic grouping of political prisoners, after Tibetans (3,082) and Hans (812).4 At the core of this conflict is a clash of identity in which the Uyghurs have refused to switch their loyalty from their kinship networks to a unified Chinese state (Shih, 2002: 11). The result is a collision of Han inclusive nationalism and Uyghur exclusive nationalism. Some Uyghurs have fled the country to escape persecution and repression.5 By and large, according to my research, Uyghurs emigrate in anticipation of a better quality of life, not for the most part to escape political persecution.6 Nevertheless, a significant number of Uyghurs have fled to escape political persecution.7 But whatever drove them to leave China and begin new lives under alien skies, the plight of Uyghurs in China gives them few tools for winning the sympathy of people in other countries, facilitating the acquisition of refugee status and speeding their acceptance as citizens of their host countries. As an anonymous member of the Uyghur diaspora shared during this study, most in the Uyghur diaspora feel more patriotic outside their homeland than they do in it. The fact that so many Uyghurs are refugees struggling to begin new lives in foreign lands bonds them, as does shared concern about their kin back in Xinjiang.

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Figure 1.1 Political prisoners in China. Source: Political Prisoner Database (PPD), Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Introduction

3

“Some might characterize this as a sense of responsibility or patriotism. While not all can take tangible part in serious political campaigning, moral support for Rebiya Kadeer and other key leaders is never far from their minds,” the anonymous Uyghur explained.8 As Uyghurs settled in various parts of the world, some began to contemplate influencing politics in their new host countries in order to build support for their kindred in China. As the aforementioned anonymous Uyghur interviewee expressed, “being part of the battle against the Chinese government enables the Uyghur diaspora to solidify an identity within countries they currently reside and among themselves overall, creating a sense of self-awareness that cannot be obtained within Xinjiang.”9 Coupled with China’s opening up to the world, which has exposed the country to unprecedented criticism from foreign governments and NGOs over its human rights record, members of the Uyghur diaspora began to believe they could organize themselves more effectively in pursuit of having their voices heard by a global audience. In particular, the progress of communication technology over the last decade has facilitated the realization of their ambition. In today’s world, members of the Uyghur diaspora are able easily and inexpensively to communicate and coordinate collective plans without needing to be in the same country. Within the Uyghur diaspora, there are factions that hold differing views about how to preserve the Uyghur identity (Tyler, 2003: 231). My focus here is in the operation and coalition-building of Uyghur diasporic organizations in democratic countries (e.g. Germany, Japan, the US, Australia). The intent is to outline how they articulate the aspirations of their kin in China and measure the effectiveness of these initiatives.10 Over recent years, the tip of the spear of these operations has been the WUC and its numerous member organizations (e.g. Uyghur American Association, Uyghur Canadian Association). Occasionally, scholarly literature and even Chinese government documents have noted the global operations of the WUC, but up to now no systematic mapping of their politically active member organizations has been undertaken. This work is intended to fill that gap. An investigation of resolutions proposed, debated, and passed in the United States House of Representatives and Senate from January 1989 to March 2011 provides an indication of whether and how much Uyghurs have been noticed and supported by policy-makers in the US, one of the few contemporary actors with the ambition and capability to go up against China politically. A content analysis of the Library of Congress website, examining pieces of proposed US legislation, including binding and non-binding resolutions dating back to 1989, and that contain the words “Uyghur” or “Uighur,” turns up 46 legislative discussions. Figure 1.2 looks at the frequency of the words “Uyghur” or “Uighur” as mentioned in discussions on these 46 pieces of legislation – some of which passed and some of which did not. The X-axis shows the 46 pieces of legislation discussed (Appendix), while the Y-axis shows the frequency of the word “Uyghur” or “Uighur” in each legislative text. It is assumed that when the words “Uyghur” or “Uighur” are mentioned, issues relevant to the Uyghurs have become more salient and thus are being taken note of by American law-makers.11

Source: US Library of Congress (January, 1998 – March, 2011)

Figure 1.2 Proportion of “Uyghur” or “Uighur” mentioned in the US legislation.

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Introduction

5

As Figure 1.2 reveals, the words “Uyghur” or “Uighur” were mentioned only infrequently during the late 1990s. The frequency of use of these words was extremely low – nearly zero. The first resolution (HR 2095) to mention the Uyghurs appeared in 1997 (introduced in the House). HR 2095 stressed that US-sponsored Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA) should provide continuous 24-hour broadcasting in multiple languages and dialects which shall include Uyghur.12 This bill did not directly promote Uyghur rights in China, which is what Uyghur activists care most about. However, when a proposed law supported the creation of a service dedicated to Uyghurs, it signaled the growing importance of Uyghur interests within the minds of American legislators (Chen and Pop, 2011). The next discussions appeared in 1998 during the 105th Congress (HR 2431), when four legislative actions (i.e. bills that were reported in the House, introduced in the House, passed by the House, and placed on the calendar in the Senate) were put forward to discuss the enactment of the Freedom from Religious Persecution Act (Figure 1.2). In this proposed legislation, quite a number of religious groups facing oppressive governments (e.g. Jews) were mentioned, and the Uyghurs were noted as one of these. Even though the Uyghurs were just one “example,” their appearance in the bill indicates that their situation had been taken into account by US law-makers, which may have been the result of intentional efforts at advocacy. This will be further explored in Chapter Five. Uyghurs begin to be mentioned much more frequently after 2007. Note that the frequency of the keywords “Uyghur” or “Uighur” decreased at times, such as in HR 1140, as the bill was aimed at recognizing the 10th anniversary of the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act, which treated Uyghurs as one of a large number of religious groups suppressed by their governments. This drop in frequency, however, did not in any way signify an overall drop in the visibility of Uyghur issues in the US Congress. Furthermore, the Uyghur issue has attained a status significant enough during legislative deliberations to warrant entire pieces of legislation.13 For instance, HR 497, which was passed in the House, specifically expresses the opinion of the House of Representatives that “China should recognize the rights of the Uyghur people.” My content analysis of these US legislative discussions demonstrates the increasing saliency in America of the Uyghur issue. Since the WUC is headquartered in Germany, this study also examines how the Uyghur issue has surfaced in the German political debate. In the case of Germany, we will first examine legislative developments at the regional level, then proceed to the federal level. There are 16 regions in Germany. At the regional level, we will examine the Bavarian State Parliament (Bayerischer Landtag) archives, as most Uyghurs in Germany reside in Munich, the state capital of Bavaria. For Germany, our search period spans from 1986 to 2010, or from the 11th to the 16th legislative sessions.14 The search shows that only non-binding parliamentary requests, proposals, and statements were included in the minutes of parliamentary debates regarding Uyghurs or Xinjiang – and that the Uyghur issue is not mentioned in any binding legislation.

6

Introduction

Similarly, we will examine how the Uyghur issue emerged in the German federal parliament (Bundestag). For this study, the keyword “China” was searched from January 1, 1989 to January 1, 2010. As with the situation in the Bavarian State Parliament, issues concerning Uyghurs and Xinjiang were debated, but failed to produce anything binding. By comparison, Uyghur issues seem to be more actively taken note of by politicians in America than Germany. But in both countries, one observes an incremental rise in discussions of Uyghur issues in legislative settings. What is less clear, however, is whether this is as a result of Uyghur advocacy, or how much the Uyghur lobby has contributed to the trend. This is a central topic of this manuscript.

1.1 Questions, purposes, and significance Throughout this book, the Uyghur lobby is also referred to as the Uyghur diasporic movement or the Uyghur movement. A more accurate depiction of the current situation might be to use the plural form “Uyghur movements” as the Uyghur diaspora is in no way unified. Many factions and sub-groupings exist. For convenience, we will use the singular form as shorthand for a far more complicated reality. That said, while there is no unified Uyghur diasporic movement, there is one diasporic group that stands out as the most prominent, having garnered far more global notoriety and, arguably, influence than any other Uyghur organization: the WUC led by Rebiya Kadeer (Figure 1.3). As its central mission, the WUC promotes the Uyghur right to national self-determination around the world. The central purposes of this book are, first, to ask why certain actors have emerged as key players in the contemporary WUC network. We will discuss the factors of “framing” and “resources” in making certain actors more prominent than others. Second, we will examine the WUC coalition: who are its friends and foes? Why is it that some organizations ally themselves with the WUC, while others oppose it? Third, we will explore the factors that create divisions and factions within the international Uyghur movement, including factors that originate from within the Chinese government. Since up to now no academic text has extensively explored the Uyghur lobby in world politics, this book also includes a general descriptive analysis of the Uyghur lobby’s influence. Ultimately, analytically introducing the Uyghur case to readers is the overarching purpose of this work. Part of this effort is to explore the Uyghur case through the lens of leading interest group and other relevant social science theories. These theories provide the conceptual and analytical backbone for this study. They allow the formulation of hypotheses to answer this work’s central research questions. Finally, a social network analysis (SNA) and interviews are employed to test the hypotheses of the study and answer outstanding questions. WUC resources acquired from the US-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the way activists frame their cause in terms of human rights have put the WUC at the center of contemporary Uyghur affairs. The

Introduction

7

Figure 1.3 Rebiya Kadeer. Note: Rebiya Kadeer spoke up in a training seminar in Berlin in April, 2008. The event was sponsored by the US-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and co-organized with the Netherlands-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).

variables of “resources” and “framing” of Uyghur issues have opened up a niche for the survival of the Uyghur lobby, enabling it to maintain its influence and endure as an entity. These two variables will be shown to have played major roles in influencing which actors are and are not drawn into WUC networks. This study of the Uyghur issue offers a clear empirical example of the spillover effect, which is so often utilized in conflict studies. Since Uyghur organizations have been lent notable legitimacy by liberal democracies and international governmental organizations, they can no longer be considered merely splintered members of a far-flung diaspora locked in a one-sided struggle with Beijing. Uyghur activists can and do use their hard-won legitimacy as legal migrants and asylum-seekers to influence politics in their host countries. And while they pose no direct security threat to the countries they presently reside in, their use of democratic channels in their host countries serves to extend the Uyghur conflict into nations around the world. This study is also a timely one, as it shines a light on how an issue concerning a China minority has been catapulted onto the wider global political stage. For instance, Uyghur organizations have seized on the Obama administration’s pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison to boost global awareness of Uyghur issues and call on countries like Germany, Switzerland, and Australia to take in

8

Introduction

Uyghurs who they argue were “unjustly” detained at Guantanamo Bay. Whether the Uyghur lobby is capable of influencing these decisions, which are matters that can only be decided by sovereign states, is less important than the fact that Uyghur groups are able successfully to use the issue to raise their visibility.15

1.2 Methodology A diversity of qualitative methods is used. While these methods will be more formally introduced where they are applied in later chapters, here is a summary. To begin, qualitative analysis of secondary literature (e.g. policy documents, academic papers, public records) and focused interviews with political activists and observers are extensively used. Most scholars working on the Uyghur political issue are keenly aware of the paucity of available data. Existing documents oftentimes fall short, being biased, false, or invalid due to the hidden political agendas of their authors. Inevitably, since this is a book that discusses WUC operations and strategies, quite a lot of information provided by the WUC, its member organizations, and allies is used. While the use of WUC materials is necessary, this work does not speak to the organization’s political positions. As this is a study in political science, its documents are analyzed and its activism elucidated through the prism of social science theory and hypotheses. In the past, whenever delivering a speech on this research, there are inevitably audience members who ask me whether I speak for any particular political interest or position. I am neither employed nor directed by any government or nongovernmental organization. The interviews that form part of this study represent a variety of opinions. A wide spectrum of people shared their thoughts and documentation, which are used as items for academic analysis. Since I am a political scientist who specializes in interest group politics and ethnic mobilization, the main focus of this work is diasporic activism: the networks they use and the strategies they employ. This is not a policy monograph nor will this manuscript provide suggestions for resolving the conflict between Uyghur nationalists and the Chinese state. Furthermore, as will be noted, the WUC’s target audience is a potentially sympathetic West. Hence, most WUC materials are available in English, although one can also find relevant documentation in German, Uyghur, Chinese, Turkish, French, Japanese, etc. English, however, remains the working language of political activism for the WUC. Therefore, the majority of material used in this project is in English, with small percentages in German, French, Chinese, Uyghur, and Japanese. For the language tasks required of this study, I relied on my own German and French capabilities. As for Uyghur, an anonymous Uyghur native speaker assisted greatly in translating and clarifying these documents. To clarify points raised in the Japanese material, I relied heavily on colleagues, friends, and my assistant Ika Ko. Due to the need to draw a line under how much material to include, materials in Turkish, Russian, and other languages, which may have formed part of this study, will have to be addressed by future researchers.

Introduction

9

Regarding the interviews, unless otherwise noted they were conducted off the record, as most Uyghur interviewees and their international observers are reluctant to speak candidly without a guarantee of anonymity. Members of the Uyghur diaspora are not often eager to speak to researchers. In large part, this is a consequence of the fact that many hold refugee status in their new host countries. This contributes to an inherent insecurity that renders them tight-lipped about their experiences. In short, because of potential complications involving China, they fear jeopardizing their presence in their new host countries. Then there are those Uyghurs who remain Chinese citizens (Radio Free Asia, 2010). For them, in the event that they one day return to China, it is not wise to talk to investigators about their political views and experiences. There is also concern about the safety of their families in China. Nevertheless, with guarantees of anonymity and a period of confidence-building, it is possible to conduct interviews with Uyghurs. These interviews further underpin and enrich this book’s assertions on a number of qualitative analyses, among which social network analysis (SNA) plays a leading role. I use a variety of primary SNA data sets in Chapters Three to Seven. In Chapter Three, we will look at the international networks that the WUC has knitted together. An SNA of four data sets that chronologically record WUC political activities from 2006 to 2009 is carried out to this end (Chen, 2012a). In Chapter Four, offline Uyghur networks are analyzed and the results compared to those of an SNA of websites that promote Uyghur interests online. Chapters Five, Six and Seven respectively employ primary SNA data sets to look into the Uyghur coalition in the US, Germany, and Japan. SNA data sets are quantified by nature. But the way I employ these data sets for my analysis is still largely descriptive and qualitative.

1.3 Outline of chapters We have now introduced the Uyghur movement, provided the leitmotif for the book, and summarized the study’s methodology. The rest of this volume is organized as follows: Chapter Two uses the niche perspective to discuss the rise and operation of the Uyghur lobby. The theoretical arguments provided are inspired by literature on interest groups, transnational advocacy networks, and ethnic politics. Ultimately, this book stresses that the WUC’s successful emergence as the recognized umbrella organization for the global Uyghur movement is a direct result of financial support from the US-based NED – and NED support for the peaceful, incremental, human rights-centered approach taken by the WUC in promoting the Uyghur cause. This study also posits that resources and framing of the Uyghur issue as a human rights concern further influence which actors become affiliated with the WUC and which do not. In Chapter Three, social network analysis is utilized to map out which actors are involved in Uyghur international networks. The results empirically confirm the widely perceived notion that the WUC and Rebiya Kadeer, the most widely recognized Uyghur leader, are central to mobilizing Uyghur communities in democracies around the world. When it comes to persuading new actors to support

10

Introduction

the positions of the WUC, this study demonstrates that framing plays a far more important role than resources. Chapter Four offers a comparison of Uyghur-relevant actors in the offline world to those in the virtual world. For instance, the Uyghur American Association (UAA), which is active offline, also appears to be a key informationprovider about Uyghur issues in cyberspace. Data will also demonstrate that the WUC’s offline role is more prominent than its online one. Chapters Five, Six and Seven deal with Uyghur network supporters in the US, Germany, and Japan respectively. Chapter Five tests how the interplay of framing and resources divide potential Uyghur supporters in the United States. As noted earlier, the example of the US is chosen because, as a great power, it is one of the few contemporary actors with the ambition and capability to tackle China politically. Earlier on, I mentioned 46 US legislative actions from 1989 to 2010 that contain the word “Uyghur” or “Uighur.” Using SNA to examine the politicians who introduced these pieces of Congressional legislation offers insight into the Uyghur lobby’s political allies in the United States. The results show that key Uyghur supporters tend to be staunchly anti-China, and that they tend to affiliate with and speak for Uyghurs as part of a preference for bashing China. Germany is singled out in Chapter Six because the WUC, the recognized umbrella organization for all Uyghurs, is located in Munich. It is also here that the largest Uyghur community in Europe can be found. The Green Party’s ideological backing of suppressed minorities has led it to sympathize with the Uyghur cause. Resources play a relatively less important role than framing when it comes to Green Party advocacy of WUC interests. Although the Uyghur issue has received gradually more attention from German law-makers, the efforts of the Uyghur diaspora have relatively little to do with it. Rather, it has been the willingness of sympathetic parliamentarians to offer Uyghurs opportunities and venues to operate in that has played a determining role. By examining the debates over whether Germany should accept former Guantanamo detainees of Uyghur origin, the book takes a measure of how effective the Uyghur lobby is when it comes to achieving hard and fast policy goals. On that score, the Uyghur lobby is found wanting. Party politics and reservations on the part of the executive branch have kept Berlin from accepting any Guantanamo detainees of Uyghur origin. In Chapter Seven, the book runs an SNA of actors promoting Uyghur issues in Japan. Japan was selected for this study because of the relatively recent emergence of the WUC in the country: the Japan Uyghur Association (JUA) was formed in 2008. The Association, given the short time it has had to mature, is less active and less well-known than its more established WUC sisters in the US and Germany. There is as yet a small coterie of JUA activists and politicians. Its effectiveness is further weakened by disagreements about approaches and strategies among potential Uyghur sympathizers. The JUA’s network was formed largely on the basis of a shared anti-China sentiment. However, a complete picture must also include people like Naoko Mizutani, who, given her professional background as a scholar of Uyghur issues, and not out of any anti-China sentiment, wishes to

Introduction

11

help the group. Theoretically speaking, the Japanese analysis supports the case for the impact of framing on dividing groups of supporters. No book on the Uyghur lobby would be complete without a discussion of China’s competing discourses and strategies. As this has been widely dealt with in other publications, Chapter Eight offers a brief summary of the issue. While it is unlikely that the Chinese regime would concede to Uyghur demands simply because Uyghurs have been able to mobilize internationally and amass a certain degree of international leverage, there are a range of strategic responses between concession and suppression that the Chinese regime deploys to manage such challenges. This book examines these strategies as well as the arguments and talking points Beijing has developed to counter the Uyghur lobby. Chapter Nine summarizes the book’s findings in light of the earlier theoretical discussion. It also discusses the implications of this project for political scientists – and this study’s limits. These include a lack of additional country comparisons that would provide a more nuanced picture of the Uyghur lobby, and in general further enrich the current research.

Notes 1 Ethnologists have found it difficult to collect data on China’s minorities, and if there is such data, it is compiled only by the Chinese state. Ethnologists tend not to trust the accuracy of such data (Kaltman, 2007: 2; Olson, 1998: vii–ix; Wang, 2001: 191). 2 The Qing Dynasty successfully invaded the Uyghur kingdom in what is now Northwestern China in the mid-eighteenth century. Uyghurs failed to defend their homeland, which in 1884 resulted in its formal incorporation by the Chinese Empire as a province. China’s then rulers called the area “Xinjiang,” meaning in Mandarin “new territory” (Shichor, 2003: 281). 3 As stated on the CECC website, the PPD focuses on “persons imprisoned since the Communist Party-led crackdown against the June 1989 Chinese democracy protests. The PPD also contains information about prisoners who were sentenced before June 1989. Records for Tibetan prisoners, for example, begin in September 1987.” For more information, see http://ppd.cecc.gov. 4 There are no accurate official statistics that document political prisoners in China, although CECC compiles estimates by gathering unofficial information from “multinational, national, and non-governmental organizations specializing in human rights and political prisoners” as well as through its own staff research. It is not possible for the PPD to cover all cases of political prisoners in China, but at least it provides a starting point for researchers. 5 For a detailed account of how some Uyghurs went into exile, see Tyler (2003: 222–7). 6 This is gleaned from email correspondence with an anonymous Uyghur in Australia and a number of anonymous Uyghurs in America in May 2011. See also Wüst (2009). 7 Email correspondence with anonymous Uyghur observers based in the US in May 2011. 8 An anonymous Uyghur in Australia exchanged various email correspondence with the author in 2011. This is garnered from our communications. 9 Ibid. 10 Due to the difficulty of conducting field trips in countries other than liberal democracies, this book focuses on Uyghur activism in liberal democracies. 11 Yoshikoder, a computer-assisted content analysis software program, is used to calculate the frequency. http://www.yoshikoder.org/.

12

Introduction

12 RFA and VOA were created based on the conviction that domestic broadcasters in many countries, including in Asia, failed to provide balanced reporting. Their raison d’etre is to fill this critical gap. Take the RFA, for example. Created by the US Congress in 1994, its stated mission is to supply a variety of opinions and voices from within Asian countries that lack full and free news media. Beijing has often complained that RFA content indicates sympathy for groups or individuals hostile to the Chinese government. Accordingly, RFA broadcasts are regularly jammed by Beijing (Epstein, 1997). 13 For our purpose, legislative deliberations refer to committee hearings on proposed legislation, talks held during mark-ups for bills, and final bills that may or may not have been passed into law. 14 The first legislative session in the Bavarian State Parliament was from 1946 to 1950. Afterwards, each session was held either every four or five years. The 11th session was from 1986 to 1990. The most recent election to the Bavarian State Parliament was held on September 28, 2008. The current session is the 16th, which spans from 2008 to 2013. 15 Interview with an anonymous leader of the Australian Uyghur Association in Sydney, November 5, 2010, and interview with a spokesperson of the World Uyghur Congress, Alim Seytoff, in Washington, DC, April 7, 2011.

2

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

Chapter Two, in political science parlance, is a theoretical section that generates hypotheses for answering the book’s two research questions: first, what leads certain actors to become core players in the WUC network; and second, what leads to divisions within the WUC network? I use an ecological – or niche – perspective, which is a construct I utilized in a previous work to illustrate generalized ethnic mobilization (Chen, 2009). Having adopted this perspective, the importance of both “framing” and “resources” in placing certain actors at the center of the Uyghur movement and in sharpening the divisions among potential Uyghur supporters are postulated. These hypotheses will be tested in subsequent chapters. The process of generating these hypotheses begins with analyzing the emergence and operation of the WUC, and examining how it earned its reputation as the umbrella organization of today’s Uyghur movement. Other studies have touched on this (e.g. Shichor, 2006: 12–14) from a largely historical perspective. Here we build on these studies by examining the issue through the lens of classic political theory, paying particular attention to discourses on interest groups and transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Because of its work raising awareness about the Uyghur issue in countries beyond China, and because it consists of 29 member organizations (as of January 2012) scattered across the globe (see Figures 2.1.1 and 2.1.2),1 the WUC can be analyzed within both frameworks.

2.1 Birth of the WUC The niche concept comes from the ecological or niche perspective of ethnic mobilization which I proposed in 2009 (Chen, 2009). Ethnic politics constitute a distinctive ethnic “ecology” in which one ethnic group struggles to survive and maximize its interests in relation to other ethnic groups and stakeholders. The simplest model of ethnic politics is composed of three types of key players – the ethnic group, its agent organizations, and a political power (often the decisionmakers in a host state) – interacting within a triadic relationship (Conversi, 1995: 75; Jenne, 2004: 729–54; Chen, 2012b: 52). With this basic model at the starting point of a continuum, we soon encounter variants.2 The most interesting arises when a population belonging to a collectively

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16

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

conceived ethnic group is itself divided up along the lines of the group’s interests. Political entrepreneurs that represent different voices in the population begin to associate and establish agent organizations for expressing their positions. As a result, state representatives hear demands from different sources, all claiming to speak on behalf of the same ethnic group. These demands sometimes bear a resemblance to one another, and at others they are radically different – or even contradictory. Another variant arises when a country is composed of more than one ethnic group. In such cases, we would anticipate more forms of interaction occurring both within and beyond any single ethnic group. In other words, there might be intra-ethnic group competition and cooperation, as well as inter-ethnic group competition and cooperation. The state, in a large number of cases, is dominated by only one of such ethnic groups.3 The advantage of the niche perspective is therefore that it recognizes the potential for heterogeneity within an ethnic population. Agent organizations do not face potential competition from social contenders that speak only for other ethnic groups or on completely different issues; but they do face “internal” challenges. A comprehensive study of ethnic politics should include analyses at the individual level (i.e. a person with a specific ethnic origin and identity), at the population level (i.e. a collectively conceived ethnic group), and at the organizational level (i.e. agent organizations) (Hannan, 1977: 933–4). In the case of China, the ethnic groups most commonly heard advocating autonomous rights are the Tibetans and Uyghurs. Certain Mongols in Inner Mongolia have also aspired to greater autonomy, but they are relatively disorganized and their aspirations are not well known internationally (Han, 2011: 66–7; Radio Free Asia, 2011; Chen, 2011a).4 In recent years, agent organizations like the WUC have spoken on behalf of Uyghurs and have made their grievances more widely known than ever before. So what is it that Uyghur activists want? The history of this part of the world is full of Uyghur revolts, but the root of the contemporary Uyghur movement can be traced to China’s tumultuous Republican period. Despite the Chinese government’s intention to force Uyghurs to switch loyalties from kinship networks to a unified Chinese State (Shih, 2002: 11), Beijing’s relatively ineffective and weak governance of the Xinjiang region encouraged Uyghurs to found their own separate states in 1933 and 1944. Both states were, however, short-lived. The first, the Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan, lasted only a few weeks (Shichor, 2003: 281–2). The second, the Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR), lasted for about five years. When Chinese communists “peacefully liberated” Xinjiang in 1949, ETR leaders were either persecuted or fled to Central Asia, India, and Turkey, and later to other parts of the world, taking their nationalist sentiments with them (Gladney, 2003; Clark and Kamalov, 2004: 169; Kanz, 2006: 134–6; Keller, 2002: 10–16).5 One can use Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) interpretative framework of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to conceptualize the efforts of the Uyghur diaspora to revive Uyghur nationalism abroad. TANs engage in a boomerang

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

17

pattern in which access to the articulation of interests is blocked in one country, prompting political entrepreneurs to bypass domestic channels and seek international allies in order to push forward transformation at home. Articulating Uyghur nationalist aspirations was forbidden after the communist Chinese established control over Xinjiang in 1949. And so the voice of the people was channeled abroad, as depicted by “Path A” in Figure 2.2. Establishing “Path A” requires significant time and effort. In this regard, the leadership of two Uyghur exiles – Mehmet Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin – is worth noting (Besson, 1998: 4).6 Both settled in Turkey in the early 1950s, having found the country to be a sympathetic safe haven thanks to its cultural, religious, and ethnic parallels (Mizutani, 2007: 153). Moreover, Ankara did not recognize Beijing. Indeed, it had actively fought China “alongside the forces of the United Nations (UN) and the US in the Korean War” (Shichor, 2006: 12–14).7 Bugra and Alptekin encouraged political activism through their “entrepreneurial” personalities and behaviors (Salisbury, 1969: 12; Besson, 1998: 6), using Turkey as a base to discuss the Uyghur situation, hoping that, although their nationalist aspirations were shunned in China, they might be more appealing in a foreign land. By informing world leaders in petition letters and through news reporting about what had occurred in their homeland (Shichor, 2006: 12–14) and by expressing their political aspirations, Bugra and Alptekin paved the way for “Path B” in Figure 2.2 (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). At first glance, the boomerang concept of Keck and Sikkink well depicts the Uyghur case: suppression in China leads to a growth in the number of Uyghur diaspora efforts in Turkey and rising hopes on the part of Uyghur leaders for acquiring international leverage against China in support of Uyghur self-determination.8 However, at the time, such leverage (“Path C” in Figure 2.2) was not easily established or acquired. Pressure Path C

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18

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

For one thing, communist China was relatively isolated in the world, making it largely immune to foreign pressure. Furthermore, there was difficulty mobilizing support for the Uyghur diaspora because so many Uyghurs were living in Central Asia under the control of the Soviet Union. At the peak of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Moscow did attempt to manipulate the Uyghurs as a way of destabilizing China, but this signified no change in the ability of Uyghurs to initiate a more formal organization for fighting for the political cause Bugra and Alptekin had so energetically espoused (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). It was not only impossible to mobilize the entire mass of the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia, it was nearly as difficult to garner Western support, as the Occident had more pressing issues of concern during the Cold War than protecting the human rights of a minor oppressed nationality (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). In brief, although Bugra and Alptekin spearheaded efforts to make the Uyghur issue more widely known, Realpolitik at the time was not conducive to further mobilization. “Path B” and “Path C” did not create the boomerang effect that scholars of TANs had envisioned. However, over the last ten years or so, the winds have begun to blow a bit more favorably for the Uyghur nationalist movement. As it opens up to the rest of the world, China finds itself more exposed as well as more sensitive to international criticism of its human rights practices. Unlike during the Cold War, today’s China is less able to excuse itself from the norms embraced by most members of the global village. One of these norms is to respect human and minority rights – something Uyghur activists have capitalized on. Wishing to find more resonance and thus support from the international community, they strategically frame their nationalist aspiration as a struggle for human and minority rights. In contentious politics, the strategic framing of an issue is vital. While it is beyond the scope of this study, international norms and values can be easily attacked as concepts lacking universality, strongly shaped and adhered to by certain Western countries, with the United States as their leading proponent. The international atmosphere has at least to some extent shifted in favor of Uyghur activism. In the terminology of social movement scholarship, the current “opportunity structure” at the international level is more open to activism. To help get their message out, Uyghur diasporic leaders now find willing allies around the world, ranging from individuals to international non-governmental and governmental organizations. Taking advantage of this trend, diasporic leaders have fostered the idea of creating an international body to represent Uyghurs. Hence in December 1992, they convened the Eastern Turkestan World National Congress in Istanbul. The idea was to produce an effective body to collectively condemn Beijing’s suppression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and advance the establishment of an “East Turkestan” state.9 Although this initial attempt was unsuccessful, they tried again in 1998 and mobilized “over 40 Uyghur leaders and some 300 representatives from 18 countries” to support the founding of the Eastern Turkestan National Center (ETNC) in Istanbul (Shichor, 2006: 12–14; Tyler, 2003: 233). They anticipated that the ETNC could serve as the umbrella organization for Uyghur agencies around the

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world and as a “de facto Eastern Turkestan government-in-exile” (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). However, there was apparent inter-ethnic competition between Uyghur groups in different countries. Extremist groups in Central Asia did not agree with the ETNC’s non-violent approach and so refused to join (Shichor, 2003: 294; Keller, 2002: 15). Although the passing of time has seen more opportunity for Uyghur mobilization, Turkey has become a less attractive base for the Uyghur movement. China’s soaring economic and political clout has drawn Turkey closer to its side, leading Uyghur expatriates and organizations to move out of Turkey and resume their activities elsewhere.10 Their preferred destinations were Western countries in which citizens and governments were more inclined to sympathize with their pursuit of human rights.11 Within a year, ETNC headquarters moved to Germany. Munich was chosen because Erkin Alptekin, son of Isa Yusuf Alptekin (who died in 1995), lived and worked there (Besson, 1998: 12–14; Shichor, 2006: 12–14). While working at the US-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Alptekin endeavored to promote the Uyghur cause, and in 1991, he founded the Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe (ETUE) and became its first chairman. The ETUE still exists and is located in the same Munich building as the WUC. However, unlike the WUC, whose members include Uyghur diasporic organizations both in and out of Germany,12 ETUE membership is limited to the 700 or so Uyghur individuals living in Germany. This amounts to roughly 100 to 200 Uyghur families. In the same year that Erkin Alptekin founded the ETUE, he also became one of the founders of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in The Hague (Besson, 1998: 15). The UNPO is an international non-governmental organization (INGO) founded on a vision of empowering and assisting peoples or nations not recognized by the international community and thereby excluded from participating in major international fora like the UN. The UNPO is one of the key players in the Uyghur movement. Most UNPO members are ethnically-based groups struggling with issues of national identity. They do not identify with the nation-states they reside in and endeavor to cultivate their own political identities. Some are indigenous peoples or minorities, such as the aboriginals of Australia, who aspire to the right to self-determination. Others have a more radical agenda, including outright independence or the unification of an ethnic group currently divided by international borders. The UNPO has a highly political agenda, contending that these peuples oubliés deserve international recognition and that their right to self-determination or independence should be taken seriously by the international community. Alptekin’s motivation in founding and working for the UNPO is therefore self-evident. After relocating to Munich, the ETNC incorporated some of the other Uyghur organizations already established in Germany, and hence the WUC was officially founded in 2004, with the aim of serving as the umbrella organization of the various Uyghur associations around the world and with Alptekin as its first president.

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2.2 The operation of the WUC Most WUC leaders, including Alim Seytoff, Omer Kanat, and Dolkun Isa, are fluent in foreign languages and consciously moderate their language to emphasize the non-violent nature of their campaign to their international target audience. Attracting attention in other countries is the first step for Uyghur activists who wish to persuade external actors to side with them (“Path B”) and to pressure the Chinese government (“Path C”). Transnational advocacy is still at a very early stage, and the main task facing activists today is to spread Uyghur-related news and make their issues more widely known outside China. The WUC and its member organizations have employed information politics on the Internet as well as in offline fora, focusing on discrimination against and oppression of Uyghurs in China, as well as on the need for a homeland, and framing these issues in terms of basic human rights and the right to self-determination. As one informant observes, Even though the content of Uyghur diasporic media has the characteristics of insularity, it also reflects the universal values of human rights and freedom of communication, which are ingrained in the modern nation state. Hence, there is complexity in the content of Uyghur diasporic media. There is pandering both to the diaspora and the broader international public. Since one of the major purposes of Uyghur diasporic media is to gain more influence and recognition on the international stage, media content becomes a combination of issues reflecting both the universalist and particular interests of their global audiences.13 What is more difficult for researchers to verify is whether the voices of Uyghur organizations abroad do in fact echo the aspirations and views of the estimated eight to ten million Uyghurs still residing in China.14 In Smith’s (2002: 173) study on Han-Uyghur relations, she concludes that Uyghurs’ attitudes toward Han settlers in Xinjiang have become increasingly resentful since the latter’s influx in the 1990s. However, this does not necessarily imply that Uyghurs in China aspire to the political autonomy that diasporic organizations have been advocating. How capable are Uyghur exiles of communicating with their kindred back in China and thereby conveying their voices abroad? This is a largely unanswerable question. Although Uyghurs are generally able to contact their families and friends in China,15 the government’s continuous monitoring of telephone and email exchanges results in self-censorship – even of communications that are largely apolitical.16 If this is the case, one wonders how Uyghur diasporic organizations obtain accurate updates on feelings and developments in China: information that they then pass on. As one anonymous Uyghur intellectual explained, “the majority of Uyghurs in Xinjiang do not really care about the activities of the WUC. That may be due to the Chinese government’s long-standing program of brainwashing, which makes people so frightened that they don’t even think about freedom.”17 “Since one can

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do little about it [government suppression] in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, more information sometimes simply translates into more pain.”18 This informant further notes that, since no research has been done on the attitudes of Uyghur people living in Xinjiang, it is difficult to say how many of them actually share the WUC’s aspirations. This view echoes Petersen’s (2006) observation that the so-called Uyghur lobby led by the WUC tends to portray a monolithic Uyghur identity and offers only one-sided perspectives on Uyghur issues. Nor, as the same anonymous Uyghur interviewee confessed, is the so-called Uyghur aspiration shared by the entire diaspora: “The more I dig into this area, the more I find it hard to feel passionate about the Uyghur cause. I feel like it is all about the political game they are playing.”19 At this early stage of Uyghur diasporic activism, the Uyghur lobby has yet to garner sufficient leverage either to force the Chinese government to concede to its demands (“Path C”) or consolidate Uyghur unity within China. Too little pressure from above (“Path C”) or below (“Path A”) – both requirements for the boomerang pattern – has been generated. Meanwhile, the Chinese regime has chosen to counter this Uyghur mobilization (see Chapter Eight). Ironically, this counter-mobilization has created a competitive dynamic that could compel some Uyghur individuals to contribute more to Uyghur diasporic efforts. Such counter-mobilization impulses therefore justify Uyghur diasporic efforts, sustaining their work against the Chinese regime. At the same time, though, the Chinese government can use these to legitimize its quashing of Uyghur “separatists and terrorists.” Uyghur dissidents and the Chinese state both claim to seek a resolution, but both face the likelihood of an escalating conflict. Hence scholars and policy-makers should continue to observe the nascent Uyghur diasporic mobilization to see how it expands internationally.

2.3 The world of competition for the WUC Returning to the ecological perspective of ethnic mobilization, the WUC, like any interest group, was immediately confronted with the question of how to continue operating. Certainly, many potential factors will determine the WUC’s survival. First, it must fight for resources. “Resources” can be as concrete as the capital that supports its daily operations, or as intangible as access to the networks that secure the organization’s unique social standing and provide the audiences to which they direct their appeals. Because resources are finite, the WUC must compete with and even accommodate the interests of different and even opposing sponsors in order to secure its survival. To explore the success of the WUC in obtaining a sustainable resource stream, we must first consider its competitors. Indeed, other organizations also seek to define a kind of “we-ness” among the Uyghur diaspora, but each adopts a different ideology as a foundation for its activity. However, potential competition does not necessarily equate with actual competition. Two or more organizations may have overlapping niches, but as long as they are sufficiently resourced, they need

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not compete. However, when demand for resources exceeds availability, the organizations must either modify their activities or compete, and therefore one, the other, or both risk failing. This dynamic process is called “partitioning” (Popielarz and Neal, 2007: 69). One such division is between moderate and radical Uyghur organizations (Debata and Tian, 2011: 36–7). In October 2004, Anwar Yusuf Turani founded the Washington-based East Turkestan Government-in-Exile (ETGE). Turani had previously played a role in the ETNC, the forerunner of the WUC; however, political wrangling over leadership positions led him to leave the organization.20 While the ETGE argues that a moderate approach toward Beijing is ineffective, the WUC points out the likely reluctance of friendly governments to deal with a self-proclaimed government-in-exile or acknowledge an independent East Turkestan state (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). Moreover, as Hoshino (2011: 148–71) points out, the ETGE’s list of government officials includes people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Although most once lived in Xinjiang, they are not only Uyghur, but also of Kazakh and Uzbek descent. He therefore concludes that the ETGE’s vision for an East Turkestan state would be multi-ethnic, and would encompass the interests of all indigenous inhabitants of Xinjiang. This is in contrast to any vision for ultimate statehood entertained by the WUC, which would be predominantly Uyghur. This is an interesting but ultimately unconvincing observation. First, WUC documents specifying who should legally inhabit and rule a potential East Turkestan are either rare or non-existent. It does not appear that the WUC considers this the right time to push a statehood agenda. But just because the WUC has no specific plan for governing institutions and officials for a future East Turkestan state, it does not mean that its activists reject the notion of having an ethnic equality in Xinjiang. Enver Tohti Bugda, a Uyghur activist, shares the view that although the WUC uses the term “Uyghur” as part of its official name, that in no way implies that WUC activists and supporters mean to neglect other ethnic inhabitants of Xinjiang.21 Returning to our focus on WUC predominance, it was resources that determined the success of the WUC and the demise of the ETGE, which disbanded within two years and currently exists only online.22 “Resources” can be broadly defined as material (i.e. hard currency, labor, expertise, networks) and moral support. Three of my interviewees attribute the ETGE’s lack of support from the Uyghur community to the cost of establishing, maintaining, and promoting its status as a government-in-exile.23 In terms of human resources (i.e. membership support), it appears that the ETGE is currently a one-man show, with only a virtual presence in the form of a website run by Turani.24 Despite its online presence, as we will see in Chapter Four on Uyghur online networks, the website itself plays almost no role in raising the visibility of the Uyghur cause. Furthermore, Turani’s government officials in waiting, rather than being in Washington, are scattered throughout the world, and a good number of them lack any legitimacy as leaders, having contributed nothing to the movement and garnered no recognition from the wider Uyghur community.25

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Financial resources (i.e. hard currency) are also vital. Not long after its founding in 2004, the WUC obtained funding from the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Founded in 1983, the NED is an NGO aimed at strengthening democratic institutions around the world. It receives financial support from the United States Congress and then distributes resources to NGOs around the world. The NED’s first grant to the Uyghurs was actually allocated to Uyghur activists in the US to launch the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP). Three more Uyghur organizations, including the WUC, also subsequently obtained NED funding (Table 2.1).26 As the NED states on its website, it has sponsored Uyghur projects that enable Uyghurs in free societies to serve as a ‘voice for the voiceless’, to raise awareness of the human rights situation for Uyghurs in China and promote democratic solutions to the concerns of the Uyghurs as a distinct ethnic group in China. (Greve, 2009) The NED’s overt distribution of money to support groups that echo American interests is often deemed, by journalists and even scholars, as a substitute for the covert operations formerly pursued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and is generally deemed a success (Sun, 2011a: 343–4; Ignatius, 1991). The NED has helped topple “countries from Eurasia to Myanmar, backing opposition groups and global public relations campaigns” (Sun, 2011a: 343–4). The NED continues to sponsor WUC activities around the world, including Uyghur leadership-training workshops in Germany in 2008, in Australia in 2011, and in Japan in 2012. Its support of the WUC signals that America favors a moderate approach toward promoting Uyghur rights. Unlike the WUC, the ETGE failed to obtain significant funding, and the organization was disbanded (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). In the competition with the ETGE, the WUC seems to have won. Table 2.1 NED financial support for Uyghur organizations (US dollars) Years

Uyghur World American Uyghur Association Congress

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total

74,890 126,000 215,000 237,335 263,466 249,000 259,442 280,000 1705,133

90,000 136,000 146,000 186,000 195,000 195,000 948,000

International Uyghur Human Rights & Democracy Foundation

90,000 124,805 159,805 (covering 2008–2009) 226,804 (covering 2009–2010) 246,804 (covering 2010–2011) 848,218

Source: National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

International Uyghur PEN Club

20,300 20,300 69,502 115,000 73,399 298,501

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The WUC’s victory suggests that it has successfully created a survival niche that is attractive to grant-givers. With its focus on general human rights and its relatively patient and moderate approach, the WUC has garnered superior support; whereas the ETGE’s more radical and hasty approach created counterproductive tension: almost immediately after the ETGE was established, the US State Department announced publicly that it did not recognize any so-called East Turkestan government-in-exile. Omer Kanat, a senior Uyghur activist based in Washington, confirms this tendency among American politicians to favor a moderate approach.27 In a talk with Louisa Greve of the NED, she also suggested that ETGE claims of statehood were unrealistic, and confirmed that she had little contact with the ETGE.28 One wonders whether WUC activists would take a harder line toward Uyghur independence if they did not depend so heavily on NED funding. To a certain extent, NED money has had a locking-in effect: that is, the WUC must maintain its current, moderate approach in order to secure continued NED financial support. The NED will not fund Uyghur organizations that directly promote independence. Political scientists are primarily interested in identifying the causal relationships between factors at play in politics. In this case, are resources the dependent variable (i.e. effect), with the independent variable (i.e. cause) being “the tendency to frame political interests in terms of human rights matters?” My research suggests that the real-life interplay between these two sets of variables makes it hard to discern which factor precedes the other. What can be said with certainty is that there is an interactive dynamic between these two factors. In the next section, we will delve into this discussion further, exploring how external supporters like the NED may have reshaped the Uyghur movement. To examine such outside influences, this study borrows Christoffersen’s (2002) term, “external patrons.”

2.4 External patrons The NED and the Uyghur organizations it sponsors represent the Western liberal force, which advocates peaceful and democratic means to promoting individual, political, and religious rights. For the most part, the Uyghur lobby shares this Western liberal vision, and the central actor in this force is the WUC. When it comes to Uyghur diasporic activism, this grouping is the most visible and audible – and certainly the most frequently noted by international media. There are in fact at least two more movements in the world that aim to reinvigorate Uyghur “we-ness” outside China.29 They are called pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic forces (Christoffersen, 2002; Hao and Liu, 2012: 219). Readers should understand that what is provided below is only a summary,30 but it is sufficient to allow us to further grasp the fault lines that divide the Uyghur diasporic movement.31 Let us begin with the pan-Turkish force. Since the demise of the Ottoman Empire, there has been a pan-Turkish force that has sought to promote a collective right for the broadly defined Turkic peoples to found a unified homeland extending from Northern Cyprus to Northwestern China. This idea was revived in the 1990s

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following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some activists in the newly independent Central Asian countries aspired to promote pan-Turkish nationalism to counter the influence of Russia in the region (Hao and Liu, 2012: 219). At the same time, “the Uyghurs, the Tartars and the Salars became the only Central Asian Muslims in Xinjiang without an independent country named after their respective ethnic groups” (Smith, 2002: 173–4), which likely contributed to their tendency to support independent nationhood (Hao and Liu, 2012: 219). In Central Asia, however, because there are different kinds of nationalism and nationalist movements, this ambition to create a pan-Turkish world appears elusive. By the end of the 1990s, the movement had achieved little success (Christoffersen, 2002; Hyman, 1997: 350; Landau, 1988: 1–5). Nonetheless, probably because of their ethnic bonds, many Uyghurs remained sympathetic to the pan-Turkish vision, seeing it as linked to the Uyghur struggle for selfdetermination (Hao and Liu, 2012: 219). Many overseas Uyghur organizations – moderate and radical alike – were created as a direct consequence of this: among them, the relatively moderate Germany-based East Turkestan Information Center, the relative radical ETGE, and the radical Uzbekistan- and Kyrgyzstanbased Xinjiang Liberation Organization, also known as the Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO). Some of these radical wings have resorted to violence, seeking to assassinate assimilated or sinicized Uyghurs in China and Central Asia in order to coerce more Uyghurs to become politically active and fight for the pan-Turkish vision (Christoffersen, 2002).32 The other aforementioned movement is the pan-Islamic force, which is composed of a number of militant wings that share a vision of an alliance stretching across the Middle East, Central Asia, Northwest China, and Southeast Asia (Christoffersen, 2002). An example of one such wing is the Islamic Party of Turkestan, which has tried to recruit Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Chechens, and others to join its radical operations. It is unclear how many Uyghurs have links to this militant wing, but experts believe the number to be quite small (Christoffersen, 2002). Sometimes Uyghur groups are influenced by more than one external force (i.e. Western liberal, pan-Turkish, pan-Islamic). For instance, most members of the pan-Turkish Uyghur diaspora that advocate non-violent political activism are based in Germany, the US, and Turkey. But due to their location, they are simultaneously influenced by the third external force: Western liberalism. Hence we can conclude that the fault lines dividing the Uyghur movement are often unclear. These external patrons can have a fairly strong impact on Uyghur groups because Uyghurs have only a tenuous basis for ethnic identity (Gladney, 2003). Ironically, Uyghurs cannot define themselves without reference to externally identified “markers” (Conversi, 1995: 79). Finding markers to demarcate the boundaries between different groups is common to ethnic politics around the world, because in the absence of competition from other social contenders, ethnic groups require fundamental niches in order and in which to maintain their existence and take collective action (Stern, 1999: 94). One fundamental niche would be an identity that buttresses the collective being of an ethnic group. The process of fostering and maintaining this identity is one of definition. If an ethnic group or

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nation is to be defined, “it must be bound and delimited, that is to say, tied to a previously-established space” (Conversi, 1995: 77). That is why we see so many stateless nations attempting to “defend” their ethnic borders on the basis of ethnic markers (Conversi, 1995: 78–9; Brubaker, 2004: 7–27). Some of the literature on the Tibetan diasporic movement takes note of a form of “neo-Orientalism” and “even latent cultural imperialism” (Sun, 2011a: 350) in Western support for the Tibetan movement – something that can also be seen in attempts by the three aforementioned external forces to impose their ideas on Uyghur identity and aspirations. When Uyghur diasporic groups follow a certain external force, they are adopting the agenda of that force. But that is not to say that Uyghur diasporic leaders passively accept these external forces. In fact, many have worked tirelessly to accommodate the preferred strategies of their patrons and to turn them to their own tactical ends. This is clearly the case with the WUC’s adoption of the Western liberal approach. This is particularly true when it comes to the American-defined version of the Uyghur self-image. Despite the fact that Uyghur organizations approach their perceived rights differently in different parts of the world, the WUC promotes itself as the Uyghur umbrella organization, speaking for the majority of – if not all – Uyghurs in the world. While one can say that the WUC has been chosen by an external patron, the NED, to speak for Uyghur interests within today’s international arena, that is not to say that it has been coopted by the NED. In allowing itself to be chosen by the NED, the WUC has itself decided to follow the Western liberal type of political activism. Furthermore, it is vital for the WUC to stick by this decision, for, as the next section outlines, “to act as the sole umbrella organization” is essential for its long-term survival. Whether it is in fact the sole umbrella organization is less important.

2.5 To act as if it were the real umbrella organization Uyghur organizations compete for members, who are intermediate sources of financial and other resources (Stern, 1999: 93). Members give Uyghur organizations the legitimacy to act and negotiate with NGOs and government representatives. Inevitably, some Uyghur organizations have more members than others. However, regardless of the number of actual members, it is not uncommon for a given Uyghur organization to proclaim that it truly represents the majority of voices within the ethnic group, and that this majority is strongly susceptible to mobilization. As Uyghur exile leader Rebiya Kadeer is famous for saying, “I consider myself the voice of millions of Uyghur people. I consider myself as their tears” (Montgomery, 2009). The frequency with which this tactic is employed makes it easy for observers to overlook its existence and significance. So why is it so crucial for the WUC to claim that it represents the majority (or even all) Uyghurs? First and foremost, this is a basic element of interest-group representation. The WUC must inform or at least signal to policy-makers that it has the backing of its members. Members are important because, theoretically speaking, if two agent

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organizations have identical niches, the potential size of one organization is reduced “by one member for every member claimed by the other organization” (Stern, 1999: 95), and of course, there is a finite number of individuals who belong to that particular ethnic group. In the competition for members between the WUC and ETGE, since most Uyghurs prefer a slow and non-radical approach to achieving their political objectives, the WUC appears to have won. Secondly, the WUC must make this claim, because the struggle for national self-determination is in essence a demand for collective rights – the rights of a particular people to self-determine its own future (Resler, 1997: 89–90). If the WUC fails to represent those collective rights, meaning there is no substantial constituency behind its operations, it would undoubtedly fail. Essentially, by acting as if it is the Uyghur umbrella organization, the WUC can work to consolidate its existing constituency and attract additional sympathizers. Sustaining and expanding its membership is vital to its future success because this will ultimately affect the “true nature” of the organization, and thus will influence external actors like the NED when they decide whether or not to continue supporting the group.

2.6 The legitimacy question Having considered the WUC’s ambition to act as the umbrella organization for the Uyghur movement, let us now consider whether it has the legitimacy to do so. There are two dimensions of legitimacy that we should examine. The first concerns the right of Uyghurs to self-determination. This right entails three different but interconnected meanings. Based on these definitions, we will discuss whether the aspiration of Uyghurs for self-determination is legitimate. The second concerns just how representative Uyghur diasporic organizations are. In other words, who are the people working for Uyghur diasporic organizations, and who do they represent? These questions are the first that all decision-makers must ask when confronted by advocates or activists from any diasporic group. The legitimacy of the right to self-determination: three types Archibugi (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the concepts relating to the right to self-determination, taking into account how each draws on various legal bases and what potential pitfalls are associated with each of these. The following discussion is based on his thesis. According to Archibugi, the right of a people to self-determination can be broken down into three categories. The first is related to the self-determination of colonial peoples. Today, this right is less controversial, and the global community generally countenances the liberation of colonized peoples. A country may have no specific domestic law to guarantee this right, but it is safeguarded in the UN Charter and other contemporary international conventions. Both the aforementioned pan-Turkish force and the UAA33 have referred to this first category (Vergani and Zuev, 2011: 216).

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Table 2.2 The Uyghur right to national self-determination: three kinds Categories

Organizations making the claim

Chinese state law

Supra-state law

Some organizations Non-existent Charter of the United Right of the in the pan-Turkish Nations, pacts on civil Uyghurs as and Western liberal and political rights, pacts a colonial forces on economic, social people to and cultural rights, and establish subsequent developments a state Right of the Some organizations in Non-existent; in Non-existent Uyghurs to the pan-Islamic, panplace, however, secede from Turkish, and Western is an antiChina liberal forces secession law Right of the Some organizations Mostly focuses Non-existent Uyghurs as in the Western on the economic a minority liberal force right of the region inside China to development Source: Modified from Archibugi (2003: 501)

The second category of self-determination is associated with secession, supporting the right of minorities to break away from states in which they currently dwell. The pan-Islamic force, pan-Turkish force, and some in the Western liberal branch (e.g. UAA) have referred to this second category.34 Of the three categories, this is most at odds with traditional concepts of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed many movements laying claim to this category of self-determination. Few states would legalize such a right. China is certainly opposed and has even passed an antisecession law to curb separatist development in this direction. There are no international laws countenancing this category. Interestingly, demands associated with the first and second categories may actually complement one another. For example, the East Turkestan movement, which pines for independence (the second category), often contends that their homeland has been colonized (the first category). The third category argues that the collective rights of certain ethnic and cultural groups should be protected, provided that they remain a part of the state in which they currently reside (Archibugi, 2003: 487). In China, there are stateled initiatives to protect these rights, but most focus on fostering economic rights, such as the development and modernization of the Uyghur homeland (Szadziewski, 2007). Internationally, there is no specific law for this third category. Various international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) like Amnesty International (AI) have tried to fill the gap. These INGOs mostly share the Western liberal vision of the Uyghur right to self-determination and are hence linked to Uyghur diasporic organizations in the Western liberal branch (Chen, 2011b). Although we can discuss these three categories, in practice it is not easy to discern them (Archibugi, 2003: 493). The way it plays out on the ground, we can see

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

29

diasporic organizations both asserting Uyghur collective rights (the third category) and demanding the establishment of a sovereign East Turkestan state (the second category). In sum, the right to Uyghur national self-determination is not legally protected in China, nor is it safeguarded by any formal international law. But INGOs and Uyghur diasporic organizations try to fill the gap. I would observe that whereas Uyghur diasporic organizations, with their implied support for Xinjiang’s unique and independent status, are more favorable to the first two categories, INGOs are more open to the third category, which accepts Xinjiang’s continued inclusion within China provided there is protection for Uyghur collective rights as an ethnic group. Of course, whatever definition non-governmental actors prefer to use, they lack the influence to impose guarantees for such rights. The legitimacy of representing the Uyghurs: three types Setting aside the legitimacy of the right to national self-determination, one must discern whether diasporic organizations and their international non-governmental supporters actually represent the voices of Uyghurs in China and abroad. In this vein, the most fundamental questions we need to answer are: who works for Uyghur diasporic organizations, and who do they represent? Three aspects are worth investigating. First, if there is a discrepancy between the aspirations of Uyghurs in China and Uyghur diasporic activists, the legitimacy of diasporic activists claiming to speak on behalf of “their” people in China will be challenged. Second, if there is a discrepancy between the interests of overseas Uyghurs in general and members of Uyghur diasporic organizations in particular, then again, the legitimacy of Uyghur diasporic organizations is open to challenge. Third, when the legitimacy of diasporic organizations is challenged, one can inquire further: who else supports these diasporic organizations, which is to say: who, either directly or indirectly, is providing legitimacy to these organizations and allowing them to continue to operate? These three questions are important, but are difficult to answer because so few academic studies have addressed the relevant issues in any comprehensive manner. First, concerning Uyghurs in China and Uyghur diasporic activists, although the WUC and its member organizations argue that they represent most Uyghurs in China,35 they do not necessarily share the same aspirations.36 The majority of Uyghurs in China want some vaguely conceived autonomous right for Uyghurs as an indigenous people of the place today known as Xinjiang. They do not entertain much of a pan-Turkish, pan-Islamic, or Western liberal vision of Uyghur rights. We can therefore reasonably doubt the legitimacy of any diasporic force or international alliance claiming to speak on behalf of Uyghurs in China. The second question concerns the discrepancy between overseas Uyghurs and members of Uyghur diasporic organizations. Few overseas Uyghurs are interested in becoming active members of a diasporic organization. This is an interesting issue that holds great potential for further research. But given the difficulty of interviewing members of the Uyghur diaspora, particularly politically inactive ones, researchers

30

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

may have to opt for in-depth case studies of a few select individuals. This book will proceed to demonstrate that diasporic communities in the US and Germany have relatively more support for WUC member organizations, while the community in Japan is relatively uninvolved in the Japan Uyghur Association (JUA). The above two questions deal with internal legitimacy. The third question deals with external legitimacy: that is, apart from constituents and members, who else supports these diasporic organizations? In the pan-Turkish case, it is Turkey; in the pan-Islamic case, it is mostly al-Qaeda and Pakistan. In the Western liberal case, it is the support of a number of democracies (Christoffersen, 2002). Since most Uyghur organizations covered by this study have been granted legal status by liberal democracies and international governmental organizations, they are no longer mere diasporic activists calling for support in a one-sided conflict originating in China. Their activists can use their legitimate status as normal migrants or asylumseekers to influence the politics of their host countries. External legitimacy has several implications for Uyghur diasporic operations, including new (financial) contributions. Again, NED support for the WUC is a typical example, signaling a belief that the WUC’s approach is viable and should be reinforced. Also, with respect to Uyghur activists, external legitimacy brings external leverage. It permits a diasporic organization to signal to Chinese policy-makers that the Uyghur issue has reached the international level: their political requests are not mere noise and the Chinese government should consider conceding the issue. In later chapters on Uyghurs in America, Germany, and Japan, more empirical evidence in support of this argument will be presented. In reality, we know that the Chinese government is unlikely to back down, but this is just as unlikely to stop diasporic advocates from urging external supporters in their quest for additional leverage. The final advantage of having the support of external actors is that it signals to Uyghurs in and out of China that they have a voice in other parts of the world. As discussed earlier in this chapter, within the Uyghur community this strengthens belief in nationalist causes, generates more solidarity among constituents, and galvanizes support from latent sympathizers (Shichor, 2003: 288).37

2.7 Summary The ecological perspective of ethnic mobilization highlights the importance of resources for the emergence and sustained operation of organizations like the WUC. In order to access resources, Uyghur organizations must first decide how to frame their interests and appeal to potential sponsors. Essentially, is the organization more closely allied to pan-Turkish, pan-Islamic, or Western liberal ideologies? Is it violent or non-violent? Is its aim the promotion of statehood or the addressing of human rights grievances? These are the questions that enable each Uyghur group to demarcate itself. Now recall the research questions posed at the outset of this book. The first asks: what leads certain actors to become key players in the contemporary WUC network? This then gives rise to another question: what creates other players on the periphery of the WUC network? In other words, why does the WUC make

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress

31

friends of some actors and enemies of others? Based on the theoretical discussion elaborated above, it is logical to propose the following hypotheses: H1. Actors that tend to frame their issues to echo the Western liberal view are central actors in the international WUC network. H2. The more resources actors have, the more central those actors are to the international WUC network. H3. Differential framing and resources serve to sharpen the distinctions between factions within the wider movement. We will soon empirically examine the Uyghur movement within the United States, Germany, and Japan respectively. In the following chapter, the first two hypotheses concerning the central players in the international WUC network are put to the test.

Notes 1 The leaders of the 29 WUC member organizations play a variety of roles within the WUC. For example, Alim Seytoff, spokesperson for the WUC, is also head of the Washington-based Uyghur American Association (UAA). 2 Some scholars indicate that there might be societies in which ethnic conflicts occur between groups without the involvement of the state. However, most ethnic conflicts in the contemporary world involve the center of power, with the state apparatus being more or less controlled by a dominant and/or majority ethnic group (Stavenhagen, 1998: 435). 3 This is what Barth (1969: 16) calls “a poly-ethnic society.” 4 See also Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, http://www.smhric. org/index.htm (accessed April 7, 2013). 5 For more information, see Benson’s (1999) paper on the Ili Rebellion. 6 For more information of the life stories of Mehmet Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin, see for example Tyler (2003: 224–5). 7 For more information about Turkey’s involvement, see Shichor (2003: 286–90). 8 Interview with the WUC Secretary General, Dolkun Isa, by Yu-Wen Chen and research assistant Delia A. Pop, in Munich, Germany, March 9, 2010. 9 As Hao and Liu (2012: 211) explain, “historically Central Asia was called ‘West Turkistan’, and Xinjiang was called ‘East Turkistan’ by the Western colonists.” 10 For instance, see the WUC Secretary General Dolkun Isa’s story of moving from Turkey to Germany (Mizutani, 2007: 65–70). 11 Email correspondence with anonymous Uyghur observers based in the US in August 2011. 12 Interview with the WUC Secretary General Dolkun Isa by Yu-Wen Chen and research assistant Delia A. Pop, in Munich, Germany, March 9, 2010. 13 From personal email correspondence with an anonymous Uyghur in Australia in 2011. 14 According to Montgomery (2009), an estimated eight to ten million Uyghurs live in China and approximately two million live outside China. 15 Only in exceptional situations, such as after the Xinjiang uprising in summer 2009, have telecommunications and Internet communications with the outside world been temporarily cut off by Chinese authorities. 16 The interview with WUC Secretary General Dolkun Isa was conducted by Yu-Wen Chen and research assistant Delia A. Pop in Munich, Germany, March 9, 2010. Interview with an anonymous Uyghur in Tokyo, May 18, 2012. 17 From personal email correspondence with an anonymous Uyghur in Australia in 2011. 18 Ibid.

32 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32

33 34 35 36 37

The rise of the World Uyghur Congress Ibid. Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, March 12, 2011, in Washington, DC, USA. Phone interview with Enver Tohti Bugda, April 22, 2012. Website of the ETEG, http://eastturkistangovernmentinexile.us. Email correspondences with an anonymous Uyghur observer based in the US on April 25, 2012; phone interview with Enver Tohti Bugda, April 22, 2012; interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF in Washington, DC, March 12, 2011. Phone interview with Enver Tohti Bugda, April 22, 2012. Ibid. This table would not have been completed without the assistance of Louisa Greve and Sinchang Chiu of the NED. I wish to express my sincere appreciation of their help. Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, in Washington, DC, March 12, 2011. Interview with Louisa Greve of the NED, in Tokyo, May 18, 2012. Ibid. There are also internal factors that help foster and consolidate Uyghur “we-ness” in China. These are, however, not the focus of this book. For examples of these internal factors, see Smith (2002: 157). Space and budget limit the scope of this book to a focus on the operation of and influences on organizations that promote the Western liberal vision of Uyghur rights. Nonetheless, a brief overview of other organizations is provided, not only to empirically demonstrate the fragmented and factious nature of the Uyghur movement, but to give readers a more comprehensive and unbiased view of political actions relating to the Uyghurs. Some (albeit small) factions support the use of violent means to achieve their aims, while others are more peaceful. Our focus is on those emphasizing non-violent means, but one should keep in mind that there are radical elements that are more than willing to employ more militant approaches. Readers can find more information on the pan-Turkish and pan-Islamic forces in Christoffersen (2002), Hyman (1997), and Landau (1988). The ETGE also harbored this pan-Turkish ideology. There is a picture repeatedly shown on the ETGE’s website (http://eastturkistangovernmentinexile.us). One can still find this image at the upper left side of the homepage of the ETGE. The original image, which is widely used by pan-Turkish nationalists, symbolizes the many battles that took place during the struggle for Turkish nationhood, from Central Asia in the East to Turkey in the West. The ETGE has modified the original graphic to depict the movement from West (left) to East (right): an indication of its ambition to revive panTurkism and march into East Turkestan. Outside of the ETGE, this deliberate linkage of the Uyghur cause to pan-Turkish nationalism is often considered ham-handed. One Uyghur observer directly criticized this change in marching direction as “over-the-top.” Email correspondences with an anonymous Uyghur observer based in the US on April 25, 2012; phone interview with Enver Tohti Bugda, April 22, 2012. Email correspondence with the representatives of the Uyghur American Association (UAA), Japan Uyghur Association (JUA), and the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) in June 2011. Email correspondence with the representatives of the Uyghur American Association (UAA) in June 2011. Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. From personal email correspondence with an anonymous Uyghur in Australia in 2011. Some Uyghur diasporic organizations in the Western liberal branch tend to believe that the US would condone Uyghur armed struggles within Xinjiang, and perhaps include further humanitarian intervention therein. However, this is nothing more than wishful thinking, and is not part of the liberal vision (Christoffersen, 2002). The US is supportive of peaceful and democratic means of safeguarding individual rights, such as those of the Uyghurs, but it has many other, more significant, national interests of concern when dealing with China. It does not support either the outright secession of Xinjiang or an armed uprising by Uyghurs (Kan, 2010).

3

International networks

As we focus on the Uyghur lobby, which is led by the WUC and its member organizations around the world, it is necessary to empirically identify the key actors and map out their global networks. In section 3.1, we introduce the data sets for our study and its methodology. In section 3.2, SNA is used to visualize the transnational linkages of the WUC. Section 3.3 investigates which actors are the most central and which are more marginal in networks of the WUC. Section 3.4 examines Uyghur organizations in Australia to demonstrate that the WUC is indeed the umbrella organization of Uyghur organizations around the world. Section 3.5 presents a summary of findings.

3.1 Method and data Social network analysis (SNA) is a tool widely used in sociology, organizational studies, information science, and other disciplines. Its use in political analysis, particularly conflict studies, arose only in recent years when a number of papers using this method were published in leading publications like the Journal of Conflict Resolution. SNA differs from conventional statistical analysis in the sense that it explores the relationships between actors and not merely their attributes (Wasserman and Faust, 2007). Accordingly, in the study of politics, scholars use SNA to observe the relationships and interactions of political actors, as it is assumed that only through interactions can political influence be exerted, thus shaping the development of whatever politics are under study.1 This chapter was inspired by the work of Hämmerli et al. (2006), in which the actors in the Chechnya conflict are identified, and their most conflictive and cooperative ties are followed. Given the fact that the Chechen conflict has been long studied, why is it necessary to use a new method to identify the actors, particularly when they have been so widely noted in preexisting literature? The sound scientific development of conflict studies continues to require a network approach. This is because network analysis may or may not generate conclusions similar to those reached by existing conflict studies. When SNA identifies the same key actors and patterns of interaction among actors, it empirically and scientifically confirms existing conclusions. If it does not, then it gives researchers an opportunity to reflect on existing conclusions. In their paper,

34

International networks

Hämmerli et al. uncover that SNA both confirms and invalidates the roles of certain actors in the Chechen conflict. In this project, SNA is used mainly to map out WUC networks, illustrating which actors are most central to these networks and which operate on their periphery. As will be shown, SNA helps confirm the roles of existing actors, and deepens our understanding of their embedded ties to the Uyghur diasporic network as a whole. Following Hämmerli et al., primary actor–event data sets were created by coding existing documents (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The original source for the SNA data sets is WUC activity reports. Since its foundation in 2004, the WUC has documented its activities. To date, the WUC has published two activity reports. For the most part, the one documenting 2004 to 2006 contains press releases, while the one documenting October 2006 to March 2009 includes a chronologically recorded list of Uyghur diasporic activities. The latter activity report contains information most suitable for coding into SNA data sets. Using the second WUC activity report, four data sets were created to record the actors and events that occurred in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. This is a form of content analysis, as it involves coding WUC report information into quantifiable data. The data sets for 2006 and 2009 are smaller, as the activity reports only include information from October to December 2006 (42 events and 56 actors) and from January to March 2009 (35 events and 53 actors).2 Insofar as data sets for the years 2007 and 2008 are concerned, all events that occurred in these two complete years were recorded. The 2007 data set contains 146 events and 166 actors, while the 2008 data set includes 94 events and 133 actors (Table 3.1). As each data set contains actors and events, they can be referred to as twomode data sets. They can also be termed affiliation data sets, as they allow for the study of the affiliations of actors, as evidenced in the events that actors concurrently participated in. Analyzing this data, we can construct a picture of the macro structure within which Uyghur-relevant actors are nested. The initial coding is straightforward. If an actor is documented in the activity report as being involved in an event, that actor gets a 1; if not, that actor gets a 0. Thus, a binary data set is generated. For example, on February 5, 2007 the WUC sent a representative, Asgar Can, to deliver a speech on the Uyghur situation during an event called GermanTurkish cultural week in the Bavarian Parliament (World Uyghur Congress, 2009). In the 2007 data set, a piece of information for the date is offered: February 5. Two actors, the WUC and the Bavarian Parliament, are coded 1, as Table 3.1 Overview of offline network data sets Year ! ctober–December 2006! O !January–December 2007! !January–December 2008! !January–March 2009!

Number of events

Number of actors

42 146 94 35

56 166 133 53

International networks 35 they were recorded as having been involved in the same event (i.e. GermanTurkish cultural week). There are a handful of ways to tackle a two-mode data set. This study opted to convert the four data sets into four actor-by-actor one-mode data sets, recoding the strength of the relationships in terms of the number of actors present at common events. In brief, we will seek to understand the relationship of actors by determining how often they meet. This information can then be processed into a graphic visualization of the Uyghur networks by SNA software programs such as UCINET or VISONE.3 The merit of these data sets and this network approach is that they present the opportunity to attempt an empirical confirmation of the existing “beliefs” of international networks disseminating information on Uyghur issues to various international audiences. This “belief” is widely shared by the Chinese government and some Uyghur observers alike (Shichor, 2006: 12–14; Clarke, 2010: 214). Although the data sets we use cover only Uyghur activities from 2006 to 2009, which tell us little about Uyghur networks before 2006, they do offer a snapshot of these earlier Uyghur activities, since the WUC, the Uyghur umbrella organization, was established in 2004. As this analysis will show, the WUC is indeed central to coordinating Uyghur events around the globe. It is thus crucial to know its status within contemporary Uyghur networks of the time and thus justifies the use of these data sets. SNA is not meant to replace case studies and conventional qualitative analysis, but to empirically strengthen current findings. To interpret properly and explain why the networks appear as they do in Figures 3.1 to 3.4, a sound knowledge of SNA, the Uyghur case, and constant reference to existing literature are required. One caveat of the data sets is that they fail to inform on the importance of the linkages between actors. Using qualitative case studies or, even better, using a new set of SNA data that does measure the importance of connections, it is hoped that future studies redress this shortcoming. Another caveat worth mentioning is the origin of the data sets. Existing documents are insufficient to be systematically coded for comparison over a long period of time. The most systematic information available is WUC reports. The downside of their use is the potential bias inherent in reports the WUC compiles about itself. And as the WUC has more comprehensive records of its activities than any other Uyghur organization, it is hard to compare and validate the quality of its reports. One can only point out this potential bias. To a certain extent, the SNA of Uyghur online networks in the next chapter, which use different data sets, may be helpful in cross-validating. Of course, the more cross-validation and “triangulation” of data sets and findings, the better. When future researchers take on this network approach, they would be well advised to conduct surveys among relevant actors, asking them to evaluate their connections with others; as well as how frequent, strong, and important their linkages to others are. But even then, concerns about the quality of such a self-report survey could be raised. The reality is that all methods of studying Uyghur networks have their shortcomings. The methods demonstrated and proposed in

36

International networks

this chapter seek only to offer an empirical grasp of the Uyghur networks (Wasserman and Faust, 2007; Hämmerli et al., 2006: 159–75). In the following section, the networks are visualized. One might suggest that network analysis has moved beyond the study of organizations, and is used today only to examine the interactions of organizations on an abstract level (Olesen, 2004: 89–107). To avoid this potential problem and enrich our discussion, concrete examples gleaned from secondary literature reviews are utilized in addition to SNA.

3.2 Patterns There are free and commercial SNA software programs capable of processing data sets like those presented in this manuscript. The Netdraw package in UCINET was used here to visualize Uyghur networks (Borgatti, Everett, and Freedom, 1999 and 2002). Figures 3.1 to 3.4 represent the networks of actors that have, because of their presence at Uyghur-relevant events, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, contributed to disseminating information on the Uyghur issue. “Directly or indirectly” and “consciously or unconsciously” are emphasized, as actors may not have taken an active role in participating in Uyghur-relevant events. They may be pure information-receivers, such as government or UN agencies. And they may have been approached or even lobbied; hence they are recorded in the Uyghur network. In the forthcoming analysis, while the more simplified term, “the Uyghur network,” is used, the network(s) is (are) not only composed of core Uyghur diasporic organizations and their sympathizers. Actors can and are at times involuntarily drawn in. As the data sets for the years 2006 and 2009 are smaller, the networks shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.4 are naturally less complex. Figures 3.1 and 3.4 can be considered “simplified” versions of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, as all four figures in fact tell similar stories about the Uyghur networks; the difference is only that Figures 3.1 and 3.4 are less complicated. In several instances, node labels overlap, rendering them difficult to read. This is as a result of the way Netdraw processes and presents relationships among actors in such a large data set. The problem is particularly pronounced in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, as the data sets cover so many actors and events. This has no impact on the analysis. The central issue for us is to capture most of the key actors in the figures. Let us begin by observing both Figures 3.1 and 3.4, as they can be considered “simplified” versions of Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Different symbols are used to categorize the types of actors involved in the Uyghur network. These are the five types of actors that are most relevant for our purposes. The first type consists of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), represented as circle nodes. The advocacy of many of these organizations focuses solely on the cause of Uyghur self-determination (e.g. the Uyghur Australian Association, the Uyghur Canadian Association) as well as actors with a more general human rights focus, such as Human Rights without Frontiers (HRWF), Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Rafto Foundation, Minority Rights Group International (MRG), Amnesty International (AI), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

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'orld Uyghur Congress (WUC) Zuericher Zeitung

x '''

1

t Bayern 3 Radio

Note: circle = non-governmental organizations (NGOs); square = governments, parliaments, international non-governmental organizations Note: (INGOs), and universities; up triangle = news organizations; diamond = individuals; down triangle = political parties.

Figure 3.4 The WUC networks (January–March, (January-March, 2009).

I

, , \ ^.BelgianUvahurAssociation ^Berliner Zeitung/' / ^«N etherlands East Turkestan Foundation V / University of Erciyes ~ \ / \\ / I M Id L ■ Antenna Bayern Radio \ / 0Society for Threatened Peoples Inter Press Service ARD TV (Germany)

arajevo City Government

\

Alim Seytoff ' , Ґ \ ' ,■^ . '.T’^ U yg h u r Australian Association Uyghur Canadian Association^ i Australian Parliament ■torwegian Uyghur Association lapan Uyghur A s s o c ia tio n ''\ '\ §Munich City Governmenr'arliament ^ . ··:··. ··· \ Tibet Support Group (TSG) ast Turkestan Culture and Solidarity Association (Turkey)

Bosnian Education Ministry'

|Bosnian Interior Ministry;

^■Bayerisches Fernsehen

Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization (UNPO) ►Guenter Nooke (Human Rights Special Envoy of the German Government) Jnited Nations [German Parliament ■ // a w ; ....... ^Turkish Solidarity Association (UK) j Deutsche Welle Human Rights Watch II ^.Deutschland Radio Kultur\ Tribune (Swiss media) t La Vanguardia (Spanish newspaper) Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) Rebiya Kadeer German Foreign Ministry Amnesty International ^Focus (German magazine) om Lantos Human Rights Commission iUyghur American Association (UAA^

•Islamic Human Rights Commission

■Turkish Parliament

^ Radio Gong

■Swiss Parliament Conscience Foundation

International networks 41 In 2000, HRW honored Rebiya Kadeer as a global rights defender, and in 2004 the Norwegian Rafto Foundation for Human Rights awarded her the Rafto Prize for human rights. The NED, as stated previously, is also of great importance. This US institution has supported a huge portion of WUC operations. This first type of actor is quite pervasive in all four figures. This confirms a commonsense understanding shared by Uyghur observers and the Chinese government, which is that human rights NGOs and Uyghur diasporic organizations are active in advocating the Uyghur cause (Amnesty International, 1999 and 2002; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2009). Human rights NGOs may not necessarily agree with the independence of Xinjiang, but they are generally sympathetic to the human rights problems that Uyghurs face there (Clarke, 2010: 226; Millward, 2004:17; Millward, 2009: 348). Many actors are linked to the WUC. This confirms the widely accepted fact that the WUC is the umbrella organization of the Uyghur diaspora. A word of caution to the reader: the frequency with which the WUC is linked to other actors may be slightly exaggerated in the figures. The reason is again that the source data was gleaned from an activity report published by the WUC. Although this report attempts to cover all political activities of the Uyghur diaspora, the research makes clear that the WUC has more detailed documentation of its activities than those of other Uyghur-minded organizations. This brings to mind an issue raised in the methodology section: all methods for studying Uyghur networks have shortcomings. Concerns regarding the subjectivity of the data are always present. This problem exists in almost every type of social science study. Hence the “triangulation” of sources and methods are suggested in order to add validity to the findings, such as creating new types of self-report surveys. While all of these methods have an inherent bias, triangulation helps cross-validate the findings gleaned from other methods. Again, it should be stressed that no research has yet been carried out creating a different type of quantitative data. Hence, crossvalidation cannot be presented in this work. That must await further quantitative efforts (Wasserman and Faust, 2007; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The second type of actor encompasses individuals, such as political activists, politicians, and scholars. These are represented as diamond nodes in the figures. In the four figures, particular attention is paid to the role of the self-proclaimed Uyghur leader, Rebiya Kadeer. When constructing the data sets, it was hard to miss how often the activity report mentions the name of Kadeer, referring to her variously as representing the WUC or the UAA. There are also times that her affiliation (or the organization she represented) is not mentioned. Whenever her name is mentioned, she is treated as an individual actor. This is for the purposes of examining how politically active this proclaimed “Dalai Lama” of the Uyghurs actually is. As all four figures reveal, Kadeer has a very high frequency of links to other players. This pattern is most obvious in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, where she has clearly germinated her own circle – comparable to the circle created by the WUC. What is not clear from the figures, however, is how much effort she has had to exert personally to build her circle. Kadeer was head of both the Germany-based WUC and US-based UAA. Hence, it is possible that most of her activities were arranged or

42

International networks

coordinated by staff of the WUC or UAA. Therefore, it is unclear how autonomous Kadeer has been as an individual activist spearheading the Uyghur cause. The third type of actor includes news organizations (e.g. CNN, Voice of America, Free Tibet Radio, Taiwan Central News Agency), as represented by the up triangle. They are quite prevalent in all four figures. These news agencies are shown in the maps because their journalists have interviewed Uyghur representatives. Most of the interviews were published, thus contributing to the dissemination of information on Uyghur issues. Most news agencies are neutral and balanced when it comes to the Uyghur issue, although what is regarded as neutral is sometimes also subject to debate. For instance, the Chinese government often blocks reports of the Uyghur service of Radio Free Asia (RFA), accusing it of providing separatist views, while the RFA insists it is simply following its mission of providing a diversity of views, including voices shunned by China. Although Uyghurs in China have periodic and limited access to the RFA’s Uyghur broadcast, one anonymous Uyghur interviewee revealed that many Uyghurs in China are hesitant to listen to such media for fear of punishment by the Chinese government. Even if they do listen to these programs – even accidentally – talking about the experience with peers is regarded as “dangerous.”4 “You never know whether or not the person beside you is a government informant. Because of widespread rumors that the authorities have hired a large number of spies to monitor people, Uyghurs are quite guarded with one another.”5 But this interviewee added that she doubted a majority of Uyghurs in China considered the contents of RFA broadcasts “American propaganda.” “While suffering from Chinese oppression, since you are aware of how the authorities treat you, one is less likely to doubt anti-government voices, wherever they may come from.”6 Square nodes represent the fourth type of player: government agencies, parliaments, international governmental organizations (IGOs), and universities. These may not be as pervasive as NGOs (circle nodes) and news agencies (up triangle nodes), but they are involved in the Uyghur network because they were approached (e.g. lobbied or petitioned) by Uyghur activists or because they have cooperated in hosting Uyghur-relevant events. Take the Bavarian Parliament (Bayerischer Landtag) in Germany, for instance. It can be spotted in the lower left corner of Figure 3.4. The Bavarian Parliament is involved because its regional capital, Munich, harbors the largest Uyghur community in Europe, and because the WUC is based there. To repeat an example given earlier, on February 5, 2007 the WUC sent a representative, Asgar Can, to give a speech in the Bavarian Parliament (World Uyghur Congress, 2009). The fifth type of actor is the least common in the four figures. They are political parties, as represented by down triangle nodes. Let us examine again the region of Bavaria in Germany. Regional factions of the federal parties, such as the Bavarian branch of the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party, have initiated discussions on the Uyghurs in Bavarian legislative debates (Green Party, 2010). Their presence is most clearly manifested at the bottom of Figure 3.1. Both parties have

International networks 43 worked together to submit direct proposals, explicitly calling for German reception of Uyghur inmates at Guantanamo. The Uyghur-Guantanamo issue arises from US President Barack Obama’s promise to close the detention camp in Cuba. There were originally 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay. The US administration wishes to find countries willing to offer asylum to these Uyghur inmates (Reed and Raschke, 2010: 80). For instance, Albania gave five Uyghurs political asylum, Bermuda took in four and El Salvador took in two (Tia Belau, 2009; Savage, 2012).7 Whether Germany should accept Uyghur inmates was raised during German parliamentary discussions (Chen, 2012c: 155–7). Chapter Five takes a closer look at this. In addition to paying attention to different nodes, one can observe the lines linking the nodes. These imply that “there is a relationship that ties the nodes at opposite ends of a line together” (Wasserman and Faust, 2007; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). First, we see that government actors (square nodes) and news organizations (up triangle nodes) are often tied to NGOs (circle nodes), particularly the WUC. One way to interpret this pattern is that the WUC has reached out to other types of actors, as it is keen to connect with government representatives (square nodes) and journalists (up triangle nodes). Second, there is quite a variety of linkages among NGOs (circle nodes). This reveals that key players in the Uyghur networks, Uyghur organizations, and human rights NGOs are spearheading the coordination of events and the exchange of information in order to advance their shared interests. Take the 2008 Olympics, for example. Beijing’s successful bid in 2001 to host the event gave various actors new momentum and an opportunity to make their voices heard. For example, the International Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong in China (CIPFG) boycotted the Olympics under the banner of protesting China’s repression of Falun Gong members. The New York-based Human Rights in China (HRIC) did not oppose the 2008 Olympic Games, but repeatedly stressed how the Chinese regime has repressed dissent in the name of creating stability for the Olympic Games, and called for the improvement of China human rights practices before the Games began. Some environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace (Greenpeace, 2007), raised concerns over pollution the Games may have generated and called for preventative measures, but did not oppose the Games as such.8 Within the context of the Olympic Games, Uyghur activists also sought to seize the opportunity to express their views toward China. In August 2008, the WUC initiated protests around the world, and some human rights NGOs joined in. For instance, in Germany there was a public discussion organized by the Green Party at the Bavarian State Parliament on April 29, 2008, in which Kadeer, AI’s General Secretary in Germany, Barbara Lochbihler, Green Party parliamentarian Margarete Bause, and others were present to discuss why China did not deserve to host the Olympics.9 On August 7, 2008, at a joint demonstration in front of the PRC embassy in Washington, DC, Kadeer, Elisa Bermudez (of Reporters without Borders), Doma Norbu (of the Tibetan movement), and others delivered public speeches amid the protest (World Uyghur Congress, 2009).

44

International networks

Linkages among news organizations (up triangle nodes) also exist. These are most obvious among news organizations situated in the same country. A representative example is observed in the upper right corner of Figure 3.2, where German press and media have shown interest in reporting Uyghur news. For instance, during Kadeer’s visit to Germany between May 19 and 21, 2007, many German journalists seized the chance to interview her. She was questioned by Deutsche Welle, RBB Cultural Radio, Die Welt, Focus Journal, and others (World Uyghur Congress, 2009). In comparison with NGOs (circle nodes) and news organizations (up triangle nodes), linkages among government or government-sponsored institutions (square nodes) are rare. This is understandable, because each government institution is lobbied separately by Uyghur activists in the country in which the institution resides. In other words, each host country has its own domestic structure(s), policies, and attitudes toward its Uyghur inhabitants. Hence, Uyghurs living in different host countries have different ways of influencing policy-makers of those countries. The likelihood of exchanges between governments concerning how to tackle each country’s Uyghur demands is relatively low. In sum, SNA of offline actors empirically proves the central role of NGOs in giving voice to Uyghur concerns. They also confirm the widely perceived notion that the WUC and well-known Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer are central in mobilizing Uyghur communities around the world. It should be kept in mind that due to their respect for sovereignty, the cause of national self-determination is not often encouraged by government actors or international governmental organizations. Interestingly, such aloofness often arouses a backlash from non-state actors (Millward, 2007: 335). Nevertheless, government actors and international governmental organizations do at times demonstrate sympathy to the cause of national self-determination, at least in the sense that they believe there is a human rights element behind such causes. The network typology presented here empirically demonstrates this point.

3.3 Centrality The concept of how “central” an actor is can be measured with SNA. The information provided in Table 3.2, for instance, looks at a “betweenness centrality,” which studies how actors can mediate and perhaps control communication between all pairs of actors in the international WUC network. The more actors rely on one particular actor to connect to other players, the more central this particular actor becomes. We can also norm this measure by expressing it as a percentage of the maximum possible betweenness that an actor could have had, as shown in the right column of Table 3.2. Table 3.2 lists the actors with the top ten scores of betweenness in 2006. There is great variation in actor betweenness (from zero to 759.336). The network centralization index is 49.78, which is not very low, and shows that some actors in this network can only make connections through certain other actors. Because there is dependency on others to form connections, there is an inequality of power relations among the actors, which is that some actors have relatively more power

International networks 45 Table 3.2 Betweenness among actors in Uyghur offline networks (2006) Top ten actors

Types

Betweenness

Normed betweenness

World Uyghur Congress (WUC) Rebiya Kadeer Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) Human Rights without Frontiers (HRWF) Alim Seytoff International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) Uyghur American Association (UAA) European Parliament (EP) Amnesty International Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization (UNPO)

NGO Individual NGO NGO Individual NGO NGO Parliament NGO NGO

759.336 382.231 365.36 144.125 118.665 25.576 20.263 15.07 11.683 11.073

51.134 25.739 24.603 9.705 7.991 1.722 1.365 1.015 0.787 0.746

Note: mean = 33.357, std dev = 121.769, network centralization index: 49.78%.

than others. In the 2006 networks, for instance, the WUC and Rebiya Kadeer appear more powerful than other actors in the networks. Mathematical calculation of actor centrality confirms our previous visual observation of the central roles of the WUC and Kadeer. Similar conclusions can be made when examining the betweenness centrality of actors in the 2007, 2008, and 2009 networks. Table 3.3 provides a comparison. As the centralization index rises with the years, we learn that the power differential between actors increases over time. The central role played in the international network by the WUC and Kadeer is on the rise. Recalling Chapter Two, we hypothesize that actors that are more central are those with the most resources, and those that support the Western liberal view. Although it is true that resources are necessary for political activism, a comparison of the top ten central actors in Table 3.3 shows that resources do not necessarily lead actors to be in the most central positions. In fact, many news organizations in the networks certainly have more financial capacity than the NGOs in the center. For instance, the most central actor, the WUC, received $186,000 from the NED to operate in 2009. The Qatari-owned news organization Al-Jazeera, which is relatively less central than the WUC within the network in 2009, had an annual budget of at least $120 million (Weisman, 2005). More valid is the hypothesis about the tendency of actors to frame issues that echo the Western liberal line. All top ten central actors listed in Table 3.3 share a kind of Western liberal spirit, be it a human rights-focused NGO (e.g. AI, Human Rights without Frontiers), an Uyghur-focused NGO (e.g. Uyghur Australian Association, Uyghur American Association), or a media actor (e.g. Deutsche Welle).

3.4 Regional networks In this section, Uyghur organizations in Australia are used as an example for showcasing WUC outreach.10 The method employed remains largely SNA, but

European Parliament

Amnesty International

8

9

Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization Mean 33.357 Std. Dev. 121.769 Centralization 49.78%

10 108.524 727.835 59.84%

68.85 518.012 67.72%

Wei Jingsheng

World Uyghur Congress Rebiya Kadeer Falun Gong Amnesty International Uyghur Swedish Association East Turkestan Union in Europe

2008

World Uyghur Congress Rebiya Kadeer United Nations Uyghur American Association East Turkestan Union in Europe Amnesty International

2009

24.37 139.034 73.76%

East Turkestan Culture and Solidarity Association European Parliament Norwegian–Uyghur Committee Human Rights without Frontiers Society for Threatened Peoples East Turkestan Australian Uyghur Australian Association Association Human Rights without Frontiers Swiss Parliament Al-Jazeera

World Uyghur Congress Rebiya Kadeer Alim Seytoff Amnesty International Deutsche Welle Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization Human Rights Watch

World Uyghur Congress Rebiya Kadeer Uyghur Human Rights Project Human Rights without Frontiers Alim Seytoff International Campaign for Tibet Uyghur American Association

1 2 3 4 5 6

7

2007

2006

No.

Table 3.3 Top ten actors in Uyghur offline networks (betweenness)

International networks 47 with a focus on the linkages of Uyghur organizations based in Australia. In SNA terminology, one talks of looking at the ego network. Ego-centered networks can reveal patterns of local (Australian) structures, as well as their embeddedness in the Uyghur global networks. The focal egos presented here are Australia-based Uyghur organizations, such as the Uyghur Australian Association and the East Turkestan Australian Association. The goal is to discover which players they are connected to. In this section, only the results analyzing the 2007 and 2008 data sets are shown, because these are larger and contain more “stories” and patterns for discussion. The results are presented in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. It is obvious that Uyghur activities in Australia are embedded within the global Uyghur network. For one thing, many are linked to the WUC. In other words, most of these activities in Australia can be likened to “seeds” of the WUC. The WUC may have coordinated these events, or its representatives may have joined Uyghur-relevant events. This study relies on a qualitative review of the WUC activity report, a semi-structured interview with an anonymous Uyghur representative in Australia, as well as news material to take in more in-depth information.11 Let us begin with Figure 3.5, which maps out the ego network of Australiabased Uyghur organizations in 2007. There is one particularly good example which shows how Uyghur communities in Australia coordinate with the WUC jflkU yghur Canadian A ssociation

jj

% ^ ^ < S 3 | K a2akhstan uyghur Youth Unity avaria Refugee Committee Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Association

Organization (ETYO ) Turkish C ivil S e rva n t A ssociation

•(W orld Uyghur Congress (W UC)—

I

^

Culture and Solidarity Association

\"^Єт0СГаС^ ^ 'η05θ ^SS'^eritS orwegi an Committee Austral i an Association

JJyghur American Association (UAA)

Л тр Н и luman т а п Rights W ithout Frontiers (H (HR RW F)

^ ^ ^ A m n e s ty International Iriternatioi ■ Sydney Municipal Governm ent

^ A ustralian Parliam ent

Figure 3.5 2007 ego networks of Uyghur Australian organization. Note: circle = non-governmental organizations (NGOs); square = governments, parliaments, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and universities; diamond = individuals.

48 International networks

r ld

U jg lw C o n g r ^ (W U C

Tj)^,Rebiya Kadeer h u r American Association (UAA) Australian Parliament О й И іт Seytoff Australian Uyghur Committee

II

New South Wales State Parliament (Australia) AustraJjan SBS

/New Era Newspaper (Australia)

/ \ — ij^ABC (Australia) ustralian Ministry of Immigration East Turkestan Australi n Association ^ A u stralian p & r l i a m e n ^

^ A u stra lia n fbreign Ministry

^ S y d n e y Morning Herald

4 # u Yghur Australian Association

Figure 3.6 2008 ego networks of Uyghur Australian organization. Note: circle = non-governmental organizations (NGOs); square = governments, parliaments, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and universities; up triangle = news organizations; diamond = individuals.

and other Uyghur communities around the world in pursuit of their cause. For the Uyghur diaspora, February 5 was the tenth anniversary of the Ghulja incident (also known as the Yining incident).12 On this date in 1997, according to the WUC (World Uyghur Congress, 2009), a march by Uyghurs in Ghulja city in Xinjiang, during which demands for human rights and equality were made, was suppressed by the Chinese regime (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 2007). The WUC took the lead by urging Uyghur communities around the world to commemorate the event. Marches and ceremonies were organized in Germany, Turkey, France, Belgium, Norway, the US, Canada, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (Amnesty International, 2007; Skibinsky, 2007; Al Jazeera, 2007). In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Association organized a public feast (Nazir) for “the souls of the perished” (World Uyghur Congress, 2009). Likewise, in Sydney, Hussein Hessen, Chairman of the Uyghur Australian Association and the WUC representative in Australia, organized a march. Not only Uyghurs, but also local sympathizers and pro-democracy Chinese dissident

International networks 49 groups, joined the event. It was reported that over 150 people were present (Amnesty International, 2007; Skibinsky, 2007; Al Jazeera, 2007). Besides mobilizing Uyghur sympathizers, human rights NGOs, and other proChina democracy NGOs, the Uyghurs in Australia reached out to policy-makers. In Figure 3.5 we see ties between the WUC, the Uyghur Australian Association, the Australian Parliament, and the Sydney municipal government. For instance, on April 8, 2007 an Uyghur Soccer Competition and Uyghur Cultural Night took place in Sydney. The participants included Uyghur soccer teams and fans from around Australia, some Australian parliament members, and Sydney municipal government representatives (Amnesty International, 2007; Skibinsky, 2007; Al Jazeera, 2007). Government representatives did not just passively attend the event, but made speeches on current Uyghur issues. Uyghur communities also organized the serving of Uyghur cuisine and the performance of traditional Uyghur dances and music to entertain attendees. Their tactics often involved raising awareness about the cultural identity of Uyghurs as well as addressing their political needs. A similar pattern can be observed in the 2008 ego network (Figure 3.6). Figure 3.6 more clearly depicts the role of the WUC as the leading organization for facilitating Uyghur activism in Australia. This is because most nodes have ties to the WUC. Also, in comparison with Figure 3.5, more actors from the press and media were drawn into this network. An excellent example would be Kadeer’s visit to Australia in February 2008. Accompanying Kadeer were core leaders of the WUC, such as US-based Alim Seytoff and Germany-based Dolkun Isa. The WUC representative in Australia and president of the Uyghur Australian Association, Hussein Hessen, was responsible for coordinating events at the local level.13 Kadeer’s delegation was able to meet Australian parliament members, government officials, representatives of international organizations, foreign diplomats in Australia, journalists, and members of the local Uyghur diaspora. For example, the delegation visited the South Australian Parliament on February 26, 2008. Kadeer made a report on the Uyghur situation, and over 300 Uyghur demonstrators, wearing traditional Uyghur clothes, staged a demonstration against the PRC government in front of the parliament building.14 At a press conference in Australia hosted by AI on February 28, and with more than 100 people in attendance, Kadeer made a presentation. Afterwards, she was interviewed by a number of Australian journalists from ABC News, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), New Era newspaper, and others (Amnesty International, 2008; SBS, 2008). This explains the appearance of this network in Figure 3.6. In Chapter Eight, the issue of counter-mobilization will be more fully addressed. But to enrich our understanding of Uyghur activism and the PRC countermobilization in Australia, let us briefly examine one counter-mobilization example. The case occurred in 2009, when an international film festival was scheduled to take place in Melbourne. The decision of the organizer to show The 10 Conditions of Love, a documentary by Kadeer, faced severe obstruction from China representatives and China supporters in Australia. The festival’s website was even

50

International networks

hacked by China supporters, leading Australian police to investigate the case. Various Australian news-providers covered the incident, resulting in a strong public backlash in Australia (The Guardian, 2009). While most of the general public in Australia was displeased with Chinese intervention in an Australian festival, some pro-China individuals continued to side with the PRC government, accusing the festival of inviting a “terrorist” to the event (Callick and Sainsbury, 2009). Not surprisingly, the Uyghur diaspora in Australia reacted in defense of their interests.15 For instance, staff of the Uyghur Association of Australia, Kadeer’s soon-to-be host, pressed for a meeting with Foreign Minister Stephen Smith to discuss Kadeer’s upcoming visit to attend the festival and other events (Sydney Morning Herald, 2009; Toy, 2009). At the international level, reports of this incident by major news agencies, such as in the Los Angeles Times and by the BBC, further helped sway international public opinion against the Chinese government’s intervention (Frank and Demick, 2009; BBC, 2009). In the end, the documentary was not only screened, but in a more prominent location, the Melbourne Town Hall, and with a larger audience, among them a sympathetic public and many Australian supporters of the Uyghur cause. Although this was originally just a cultural event initiated by the Australian film festival, its implications called on Uyghur supporters, opponents, and bystanders to defend their positions. Both mobilization and counter-mobilization occurred, thus making the issues of concern to China-born Uyghurs more widely known in Australia.16 This “Melbourne incident” demonstrates that Uyghurs have learned to capitalize on symbolic events or crises. The incident gave Uyghur diasporic organizations a chance to play symbolic politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 16–23), and served as a catalyst for persuasion, through which Uyghur organizations created awareness and expanded their networks.

3.5 Summary SNA empirically proves that most actors central to WUC networks share the Western liberal ideology of preferring a non-violent approach and emphasizing the human rights aspect of the Uyghur cause. Central players, however, are not necessarily the wealthiest. This implies that “agreeing on the framing of the Uyghur cause” plays a more important role than “resources” in drawing certain players to support WUC positions.

Notes 1 For instance, Maoz et al. examine the types of international connections maintained among states, which they term “affinity” (Maoz et al., 2006: 664–89). That study found that different kinds of affinity affect the likelihood that conflict between states will emerge (Maoz et al., 2006: 664–89). In a paper by Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006), the relationships among states reflected by their membership in international governmental organizations (IGOs) are examined. Using SNA, it was shown that membership in such organizations creates the uneven distribution of power within the international system, thus affecting the conflicts that occur between states.

International networks 51 2 The WUC activity report does not always provide detailed information on which actors were engaged in particular events. For instance, rather than offering the name of a particular organization which took part in a protest, the WUC report states vaguely that participants were “supporters from Turkey.” In such cases, the data set does not include this particular piece of information. In addition, the reports only mention the most important participants at an event. This presents no obstacle to the current analysis. Since for our purposes, what is most important are the networks of the key players, the names of the core participants are sufficient. 3 The operational procedure of converting two-mode data sets into one-mode actor-byactor data sets can be obtained at http://www.yuwenjuliechen.com/research. 4 This is gleaned from email correspondences with an anonymous Uyghur in Australia and a number of anonymous Uyghurs in America in May 2011. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Testimony of Jason Pinney before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight. Hearing on ‘Chinese Interrogation vs. Congressional Oversight: The Uighurs at Guantanamo,’ July 16, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_ hr/uighurs.pdf (accessed April 7, 2013). 8 See the website of Human Rights in China, http://www.hrchina.org (accessed December 20, 2010). 9 This information is gleaned from the author’s interview with Green Party parliamentarian in Bavaria, Margarete Bause, on March 9, 2010. Margarete Bause is the most active parliamentarian in Germany to advocate for the Uyghurs. 10 The Uyghurs began immigrating to Australia around 1917, and through family reunions and marriages, their population grew. After the 1997 Ghulja incident in China, some Uyghurs obtained refugee status to settle in Australia. For a historical background of Uyghurs in Australia, see the website of the East Turkestan Australian Association, http://etaa.org.au/HTML%20Files/About%20ETAA.html (accessed October 7, 2010). 11 Interview with an anonymous representative of the Australian Uyghur Association, in Sydney, November 5, 2010. 12 Millward (2007: 329–34) has a more neutral and comprehensive account of the Ghulja incident. For the purposes of this research, the Ghulja incident is used only to show perception and framing by Uyghur activists and sympathizers in the West. 13 Interview with an anonymous representative of the Australian Uyghur Association, in Sydney, November 5, 2010. 14 Ibid.; East Turkestan Australian Association, ‘Ms Rebiya Kadeer and Delegates of World Uyghur Congress Arrived to Australia,’ February 19, 2008, http://www.eastturkistan. org.au/en/news/20080219001.htm (accessed September 2, 2010). 15 Interview with an anonymous representative from the Australian Uyghur Association, in Sydney, November 5, 2010. 16 I wish to thank James Leibold for strengthening my argument here.

4

Online networks

Before the late 1970s, Uyghurs were constrained by a lack of media access. The growth of the Internet substantially boosted Uyghur diasporic advocacy efforts by acting as a forum and venue for easier and cheaper communication between Uyghur diasporic groups and like-minded activists (Gladney, 2004: 383–94). Digital communication has reinforced the force of the rhetoric and shared images that support a continuation of the Uyghur nationalist struggle in all its forms. The formation and growth of Uyghur diasporic websites has acted as a key component in transforming Uyghur diasporic activism. Uyghur diasporic websites are often multi-lingual, mostly including the Uyghur language and the language of the host country (Reyhan, 2012: 12). It is important to note that English, the contemporary lingua franca, is also widely used on these websites. The choice of language reflects that the target audience is English-speaking individuals, policy-makers and Uyghur émigrés in liberal Western societies, whom Uyghur diasporic organizations believe will be most receptive and sympathetic to their cause. Uyghur activists have long understood that a generalized suspicion of China exists among politicians and journalists in the West. It is a complex issue: while most contemporary Western states anticipate the rise of China and plan to seize any opportunity they can to profit from it, most elites in these Western societies continue to have an underlying suspicion toward its rise. China-bashing in Western media abounds. Any hint of ethnic turmoil in the PRC is quickly seized on by Western media and politicians as being a result of government suppression, human rights violations and the internal colonization of ethnic groups in China (Sun, 2011b). Uyghur activists have picked up on this generalized Western sympathy toward ethnic groups in China (Hagan, 2010: 565), and understand that it is a useful tool for applying pressure to the Chinese government. Over the past three years, by observing Uyghur websites such as that of the Washington, DC-based Uyghur American Association (UAA), it has been possible to track the increasingly sophisticated nature of their websites. Today, such sites contain more than just press releases and position statements. Through hyperlinking, one can easily find and participate in online fora where like-minded supporters share the views of leading and not-so-leading Uyghur organizations.

Online networks 53 The UAA, for instance, has an online forum that allows Uyghur émigrés to use English in addition to Uyghur in order to share and discuss their concerns. This interconnectivity, which has both technological and psychological impact, is most notable for reaching beyond national borders. One Uyghur, who like most was only willing to talk on condition of anonymity, said that Uyghur diasporic media in general, such as websites and radios: play an important role in educating and mobilizing people throughout the Uyghur diaspora.1 Moreover, they create a sense of community, provide information about future events, and create links to anti-China movements nationally and internationally. Given their strong sense of alienation in China, fostering the feeling of closeness and a sense of shared time and spatial proximity is very important to members of the Uyghur diaspora. The people of the Uyghur diaspora are minorities both in China and wherever else they reside, and Uyghur diasporic media offer them a sense of connection and belonging to a larger community.2 Reports that the China government has taken strong measures to block Internet access to inhabitants of Xinjiang are perhaps a testament to the effectiveness of the Uyghur movement’s online outreach. In this regard, an interesting question is whether there is a discrepancy of actors involved between Uyghur networks that function exclusively offline and those that are largely present online. In order to approach this question, URLs that have posted Uyghur-relevant information can be examined. This is referred to as hyperlink analysis, which is a part of the general SNA (Chen, 2010). Let us begin with an introduction to this data set.

4.1 Method and data Unlike in many other types of research, as the focus of our attention here is on relationships, the actors cannot be sampled independently. Instead, a full network method is utilized, and a census is taken of connections in a population of actors. We begin with the WUC data. The WUC lists these organizations because of their prior support of the Uyghur cause. Some of these organizations have their own websites. A very recent check of these Web links reveals that some are no longer active, which leaves us with 15 organizations on our list. The list helps to draw a boundary around organizations that are known, a priori, to be part of the Uyghur online network. In this analysis, the URLs of these organizations are called “starting points.” These were pasted into the online hyperlink analysis software IssueCrawler. IssueCrawler harvests URLs, capturing the outlinks from their starting points and returning all co-linked sites.3 The result is a binary matrix of the relationships between the sites. Thus, 82 nodes with 323 linkages were retrieved from IssueCrawler. This information was then processed into a graphic visualization of Uyghur online networks, as demonstrated in Figure 4.1.4

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Online networks 55

4.2 Macro similarities and differences As with the figures for offline networks in Chapter Three, the different types of online actors are discerned by shape. The categorization of shapes and types is comparable to that used for the offline networks. However, for the purposes of analytical expediency, please note that some actors have not been assigned a shape. This is not to imply that such actors are unimportant, but that given the need to limit the amount of data under study, a discussion of these actors is not covered by this manuscript. Most actors that have been assigned shapes are either commonly known or have appeared in the offline networks. It is these which we will focus on and analyze. A number of “macro” differences exist between online and offline networks. First of all, more players exist in the offline world, and they seem to cover a wider scope geographically. As opposed to online, for example, in the offline world there are actors from Turkey (e.g. the Ankara representative of the East Turkestan Culture and Cooperation Society) and Central Asia (e.g. the Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Association). This confirms previous qualitative studies on the existence of Uyghur diaspora communities in these regions (Mukhamedov, 2002). The method employed and the data set collected reflect the fact that some actors exist only in the offline reality. These organizations either entirely lack an online presence or their websites are not well-functioning. Hence, the automated IssueCrawler could not detect them. Nevertheless, these organizations continue to operate in the offline world, as shown in the Figures presented in Chapter Three (Gladney, 2003: 15; Petersen, 2006: 63–73). The absence of Uyghur websites in certain Central Asian countries provides empirical evidence of the hypothetical nexus between ethnic mobilization and modernization raised in current literature (Chen, 2009; Olzak and Tsutsui, 1998; Linstroth, 2002). That is, modernization (e.g. the development of the telephone and the Internet), while having an uneven impact on different countries, has to a certain extent stimulated cross-border exchanges. Organizations from more affluent and advanced countries (e.g. the US) have a higher degree of online activism, because their countries are more integrated into the global economic and political system. Benefiting from these benign conditions, such organizations therefore have easier and better access to the world and can use modern technologies to advance the causes of the organization. Conversely, the less developed political and social conditions (e.g. limited nationwide Internet infrastructures) of Uyghur organizations in Central Asian states diminishes the employment of online tools for fostering the Uyghur cause among these organizations (Petersen, 2006: 66). Another stark difference between the two types of networks is that, in the offline world, we see almost no actors originating in China engaging directly with the Uyghur networks. PRC government officials certainly do not want to contribute to Uyghur offline networks, although there could be a few occasions in which, by happenstance, Chinese representatives have attended international conferences and have met Uyghur sympathizers. It is anything but common, though, for the two sides to talk or exchange views – even in foreign lands.

56

Online networks

In the online world, however, we see some (albeit few) URLs originating in China. Furthermore, these are only peripheral, in that for the most part they are posts from state-owned news agencies (e.g. news.xinhuannet.com). Their isolation among actors in Figure 4.1 implies that they are not actual contributors to the dissemination of information on Uyghur issues. Rather, these state-owned news agencies are spreading a type of propaganda about the Uyghur cause. In Chapter Eight, we will delve further into the Chinese perspective. Third, in the offline world Uyghurs have cooperated and met with representatives of the Tibetan and Taiwanese independence movements, as well as overseas Chinese dissident networks, although each of these movements has a different historical connection with China, and each works toward a different political objective. For instance, in Figure 3.1 we can see the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) at the center-right edge. However, the URLs of it and its sister organizations are not shown in Figure 4.1. Later, in Figure 4.2, another map of Uyghur online networks displays a Tibetan website, “Save Tibet” (savetibet.org). But by and large we see little presence of other potentially anti-China movements. One possible explanation is that, even though activists in these movements have exchanged views and information offline, they do not extensively cooperate online by linking their websites to each other.5 Why so? These actors are willing to exchange views offline because of their agreed-on anti-China attitudes. But ultimately, actors in each movement have different aims concerning their relationship with China.6 For instance, those promoting Uyghur self-determination have doubts about the Taiwanese movement for self-determination because, in their view, Chinese and Taiwanese “ultimately share a common cultural heritage.”7 Uyghur activists also remember well the experience of dealing with the “autocracies of the Kuomintang party” in Xinjiang.8 As for Tibetans, “Uyghurs feel themselves closer to Tibetans than Taiwanese,” but activists of the two movements still harbor “deep discomfort with the political aims of the other.”9 As one interviewee in Australia points out, For Uyghurs, Tibetan demands for greater autonomy may seem unrealistic in terms of finding a solution to the Minzu (ethnic) issue in China; whereas for Tibetans, Uyghur calls for self-determination or outright independence may be detrimental to their cause, given that it would harden China’s position and make it more difficult to once-and-for-all resolve the Minzu issue.10 In brief, while activists in these movements are open to the possibility of cooperating online, reservations about these parallel movements prevent them from establishing a consistent shared online discourse. Fourth, it must be pointed out that the Uyghur international presence is not just a story about an oppressed minority’s struggle for living space. The majority of Uyghurs today also perceive themselves as Sunni Muslims, and many Uyghurs have attended international meetings where Muslims conducted cultural, economic, and political exchanges. For instance, the WUC sent a delegation to

Online networks 57 attend the 17th International Muslim Nations Congress (at the center-left edge in Figure 3.3) in Turkey in May 2008 (World Uyghur Congress, 2009). Although Uyghurs have Islamic ties, there are very few Muslim actors in Islamic countries playing key roles in the Uyghur movement. Ilham Mahmut, head of the Japan Uyghur Association (JUA), for instance, mentions that Muslimdominant countries such as Malaysia have even cooperated with Beijing to send Uyghurs seeking political asylum back to China.11 An anonymous Uyghur observer stresses that the “global” Uyghur network is largely Western oriented – and not truly global. The likely explanation is that the Uyghur leadership lacks influence among Muslim religious leaders, and at the same time, Western-based Uyghur leaders tend to portray themselves as secular, and therefore remote from Islam, especially after the United States designated the ETIM [Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement] a terrorist group. Indeed, it is interesting to note that among overseas Uyghur leaders are Christian Uyghurs. In time, this will likely prove disastrous for the Uyghur movement in terms of influencing Muslim Uyghurs in China.12 While we observe the presence of Muslim ties in the Uyghur offline network, linkages to Islamic groups are not evident in the online network (Figure 4.1). One would assume that Uyghurs do join other, broader online networks that focus on the Islamic cause, but such questions require further investigation. As far as “making the Uyghurs a distinct issue of debate online,” linkages to Muslim networks did not appear to contribute to this effort in March 2010. But this has gradually started to change. As will be shown in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3, the Turkish and Arabic editions of CNN have gradually become central in the Uyghur online networks. This might pave the way for additional Muslim audiences to learn about the Uyghur issue. Researchers should continuously monitor whether a clear Muslim linkage develops over time. Let us now return to the macro difference between online and offline networks. One interesting commonality between the two types of networks should be noted. That is, how is it that we see no terrorist elements or terrorist organizations in either type of network? And why is this worth discussing? It must be mentioned that although some human rights organizations have attempted to separate Muslim connections among Uyghurs so as not to group them among those tending to Islamist terrorism, the governments of the US and China have identified some terrorist elements in Uyghur communities, such as the ETIM (Sheives, 2006; Chen, 2010; Ministry of Public Security of the PRC, 2003). This potential linkage to terrorist groups is not readily understood by examining either online or offline networks. This is not surprising, since the WUC activity report can hardly be expected to reveal such a linkage (even if one existed) in the offline world. For Reed and Raschke (2010: 72), who have delved more deeply into the question of the militant side of the Uyghur global presence, very few documents have been found illustrating interactions between the

58

Online networks

Uyghur diaspora and the ETIM. For all of these reasons, both in the offline data and the visualized offline networks, there is an absence of terrorist groups. The reasons for the lack of online terrorist linkages are less clear. In Reed and Raschke’s work (2010: 77–8) on the ETIM, websites that have been used by the terrorist groups (e.g. http://tipislamawazi.com) are specified. However, most of these are now defunct and, as such, they cannot be tracked by hyperlink analysis.

4.3 Micro similarities and differences After examining the macro picture, let us proceed to observe the players (i.e. nodes) in both “realities.” As mentioned in Chapter Three, the more an online actor relies on one particular actor to link to others in the virtual space, the more central the depended-on actor becomes. This is the concept of “betweenness centrality.” Table 4.1 selects the top ten actors with the highest betweenness in the March 12, 2010 networks. Table 4.1 confirms that in the Uyghur online networks there is great variation in actor betweenness. The betweenness of actors ranges from zero to 230.417, revealing plenty of variation (std. dev. = 42.7 relative to a mean betweenness of 18.72). This shows the fragmented nature of the online actors involved in popularizing the Uyghur issue. In comparison with offline networks, due to this extreme variation, it is much more difficult to observe power relations between online actors. The overall network concentration is very low. On March 12, 2010 the concentration index is 1.92 percent. This is understandable, as most connections can be made in this network without the aid of an intermediary – hence we would not expect to find a lot of betweenness. We observe few power differences between players in this online network. As in the offline situation, NGOs (circle nodes) are the center of attention in the online network. For instance, AI and the NED are both present in online and offline networks. In the March 12 networks, when we measure betweenness Table 4.1 Betweenness among actors in the online networks (March 12, 2010) Top ten actors

Websites

Betweenness Normed betweenness

The Frog in a Well Blog Amnesty International Uyghur American Association The New Dominion Committee to Protect Journalists Danwei China Digital Times EastSouthWestNorth Blog CNN The Chronicle of Higher Education

froginawell.net amnesty.org uyghuramerican.org thenewdominion.net cpj.org danwei.org chinadigitaltimes.net zonaeuropa.com Edition.cnn.com chronicle.com

230.417 206.233 157.333 147.5 143.417 115.833 112.417 105.417 72.517 62

Note: mean = 18.72, std dev = 42.7, network centralization index: 1.92%.

2.07 1.853 1.414 1.325 1.289 1.041 1.01 0.947 0.652 0.557

Online networks 59 centrality, AI and the UAA also appear to be relatively more powerful than others (Table 4.1). The UAA, which is active offline, also appears to be the main Uyghur informationprovider in the online world. In Reyhan’s (2012) empirical study, she reaches a similar conclusion: the UAA’s website serves as a kind of “bridge website” that links politically focused websites to other Uyghur-relevant websites exploring issues such as culture and education (Reyhan, 2012: 11). While the WUC is active in the offline world, it seems less so in cyberspace. In an interview, WUC Secretary General Dolkun Isa confirmed that the organization’s URL had been attacked by hackers (possibly from the PRC). Although servers for WUC web domain were originally located in Canada, after being attacked the domain servers were relocated to Germany. The likelihood is that this change and the unreliability of the WUC’s URL prevented IssueCrawler from identifying the WUC’s online presence and linkages.13 In order to examine the question of whether the result in Figure 4.1 is unrepresentative due to an intermittent outage of the WUC website, a second round of IssueCrawler data collection was conducted from August to September 2010. The operational procedure was the same as that used for the first round. Figure 4.2 shows the online network on August 31, 2010. Although Figures 4.1 and 4.2 appear different (which is natural because the links between websites are constantly changing), the general patterns depicted previously are similar. It is clear that the UAA is indeed a larger information-provider than the WUC. If we also calculate betweenness centrality of actors on August 31, we see that the UAA once again is confirmed as a relatively more powerful actor in the networks. In both Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we can see that other websites, such as Save Tibet (savetibet.org) and The New York Times (nytimes.com), are also sizable informationproviders. They appear on the online maps because during the period of this research, they have been linked or have attempted to link to other Uyghur-relevant websites. Hence, they are embedded in this overall network that treats the “Uyghurs” as an issue in cyberspace. The reasons for linkages among these to Uyghur-relevant websites vary case by case, of course. Hyperlink analysis does not tell us the reasons, but we can draw some sound hypothesis. For instance, Save Tibet has posted a link to the America-based Uyghur Human Rights Project (www.uhrp.org) on its website. The purpose is to show that it is supportive of the UHRP’s agenda.14 Also, as in the offline world, news agencies (up triangle nodes) are common in the online network. These news providers are mostly based in North America and Western Europe, such as The Washington Post and BBC. News agencies (up triangle nodes) most often obtain information from NGOs (circle nodes), thus further disseminating Uyghur issues to the public (Bruns, 2007). Even more so than in the offline world, government websites (square nodes) are rare in the online network. Vase nodes represent newly developed social networking websites (e.g. Facebook), information-sharing websites (e.g. Flicker), and various blogs. They are non-existent in offline networks, but do appear online (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Although such channels are not the types of formal institutions

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Online networks 61 Table 4.2 Betweenness among actors in the online networks (August 31, 2010) Top ten actors

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The New York Times China Digital Times Far West China Laogai Research Foundation Uyghur American Association The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations EastSouthWestNorth Blog The Washington Post Council on Foreign Relations

nytimes.com 1078.412 chinadigitaltimes.net 516.819 farwestchina.com 484.78 laogai.org 454.86 uyghuramerican.org 407.021 ohchr.org 399.633

9.161 4.39 4.118 3.864 3.458 3.395

un.org zonaeuropa.com washingtonpost.com cfr.org

3.355 3.324 3.173 2.431

394.967 391.266 373.526 286.217

Note: mean = 67.1, std dev = 153.739, network centralization index: 8.67%.

scholars of conventional social movements are accustomed to analyzing, the informality and accessibility of these venues is what has attracted so many individuals to these websites. For instance, Frog in a Well was the number one blog for spreading Uyghurrelevant issues online on March 12, 2010. Frog in a Well is a scholarly blog where graduate students and professors studying China contribute their views and observations online. The New Dominion – the fourth most important actor – is another blog focusing on the sociopolitical developments of Xinjiang and Uyghur issues. English is the main language used in both blogs, fostering awareness and discussions of Uyghur issues in the English-speaking world. Interestingly, one anonymous Uyghur interviewee offered a word of caution about the limits of these social-networking and information-sharing platforms. Since the Chinese government has tried to constrain access to Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other platforms in China, any discussion on these platforms of the Uyghur issue is read for the most part by readers outside China, and not Chinabased Uyghurs. This impediment makes it exceedingly difficult for the Uyghur diasporic movement to connect with Uyghurs within China.15 As the study of the impact of social-networking and information-sharing platforms has been growing rapidly in recent years, it is interesting to continue observing the roles of these platforms in the Uyghur movement. Using IssueCrawler to observe the spread of Uyghur-relevant issues online has been carried out throughout the years since I began this Uyghur project in 2009. Depending on the research focus every year, I do not regularly run IssueCrawler as the Uyghur project is only a part of my research. But every year, I do spend a certain period of time collecting new data to see if new patterns have occurred. One interesting pattern, as demonstrated by Figure 4.3 which documents the most recent (2013) online network, reveals the rising centrality of Twitter and CNNrelevant websites in spreading the Uyghur issue. CNN-relevant sites such as

62

Online networks

cnnturk.com are located in the left side of Figure 4.3. Twitter is in the central-left side of the figure; it also appears to be a hub of spreading Uyghur issues. The Uyghur American Association (UAA) still plays a role, but as revealed in the lower right corner, it is not as central as Twitter anymore. WUC disappears again in this figure, most likely due to Chinese hacking. Table 4.3 compares the top ten online actors in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. As mentioned, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present online networks on March 12, 2010 and August 31, 2010, while Figure 4.3 shows online networks in the most recent time (i.e. April 14, 2013). Because it is not possible to show readers all the daily changes throughout those years, I arbitrarily use these three dates as examples to show changes across time. Table 4.3 confirms our visual observation of Figure 4.3, where offline NGOs (e.g. UAA) that used to play leading roles have become less prominent. Social networking platforms, particularly Twitter and news organizations, have often been crucial in spreading Uyghur-relevant issues. With the relatively decreasing importance of the UAA online, they are becoming more and more central. In fact, the UAA was no longer in the top ten central actors online in April, 2013. Despite the decreasing role of the UAA’s website in disseminating the Uyghur cause, it is important to note that UAA activists and supporters have in fact adopted social networking platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to advance their work. Henryk Szadziewski of the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), for instance, expresses that he tweets nearly every day. He observes that Twitter has helped to distribute the work of the UHRP and provide a news feed of recent events and analysis. He has used Twitter to inform journalists of events not in the public domain, such as the imminent deportation of Uyghurs from Cambodia. While Twitter helps to distribute news and build networks quickly, Szadziewski recognizes that sometimes the brevity of tweets can lead to misunderstanding, and that it has to be used carefully.16 It is also worth mentioning that China-based websites appear to increase in 2013 compared with the situation in 2010. Examples include ebeijing.gov.cn and chinadaily.com.cn. Chinese websites are mostly government-controlled outlets which provide a different discourse regarding the Uyghur issue. The increase of China-originated websites in the Uyghur online network shows well that the visibility of the Uyghur issue is rising, pushing the Chinese government to counter the Uyghur lobby’s discourse online. Uyghurs’ international mobilization and China’s counter-mobilization do not just appear in the offline world. It has expanded to the virtual world, escalating the conflict between the Chinese regime and the Uyghur lobby. Lastly, I should mention the website of the East Turkestan Government-inExile (ETGE), founded by Washington, DC-based Anwar Yusuf Turani. In Chapter Two, it was noted that most observers disparage the ETGE as a “oneman show” that fails to motivate any actual activism or create any tangible impact. Enver Tohti Bugda comments that this Uyghur movement is an entity existing only in cyberspace.17 The insignificance of the ETGE can be further demonstrated using hyperlink analysis. Even if the ETGE has a semblance of a

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A minor but rising influence in America

69

states of Virginia and Maryland (Uyghur American Association, 2008). Others have settled in Los Angeles (Debata and Tian, 2011: 35). Anonymous Uyghur observers based in Washington say that the local Uyghur population is relatively young and less religious than their elders. As one observer commented, “some even eat un-halal food.”6 In fact, most Uyghurs in the Washington area carry on a largely secular lifestyle. Some even have converted to Christianity. And compared to Uyghurs elsewhere in the US, they are also relatively well-educated, and include “chemical engineers, lawyers, small business entrepreneurs, tradesmen, and information technology specialists” (Uyghur American Association, 2008). And most if not all of these received their educations in the US, Europe, or the former Soviet Union. Such a high concentration in and around the nation’s capital is likely political: even if not all Uyghurs are politically active, most are politically savvy. This chapter examines how their presence in the nation’s capital has politically energized Uyghurs and American politicians in Washington. Here we will use both offline data sets presented in Chapter Three and an additional SNA data set called “Congressional network data set.” The former allows for an examination of the Uyghur lobby’s international ego networks, while the latter allows for an examination of the connections among supporters at a more local level (i.e. American politicians). The “Congressional network data set” comprises 46 Uyghur-relevant Congressional legislative actions mentioned in Chapter One (also see Appendix) and documents which legislators initiated them. The coding is similar to that utilized for offline Uyghur worldwide networks. If a given law-maker introduced a legislative resolution, that individual receives a 1, and law-makers who did not introduce such a resolution receive a 0, thus generating a binary data set. Such a data set is called a two-mode data set in SNA. I have converted it into an actorby-actor, one-mode data set. This will contribute to an understanding of the Uyghur organizations and their sympathizers in Congress by determining how often they have cooperated in the introduction of Uyghur-relevant bills.7

5.1 The rise of the Uyghur lobby in America Chapter Three highlighted how the Uyghur Australian Association, the leading Uyghur organization in Australia, is connected to WUC member organizations around the globe, with the WUC as the hub. Uyghur lobbying activities in the US are driven mainly by the UAA and the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF), whose ego network shows patterns similar to those seen in Australia (Figure 5.2). However, whereas most of the Uyghur Australian Association’s ties are to entities outside of Australia, most of those maintained by Uyghur networks in the United States are with domestic actors. In other words, comparatively speaking, the leading Uyghur lobby in America has a more wellbalanced composition of domestic and international linkages than the one in Australia. The UAA was founded in May 1998. Its constituency can be defined first as Uyghur people or people of Uyghur origin (i.e. Uyghur Americans), and second,

70 A minor but rising influence in America as those Uyghur Americans who identify themselves as Uyghurs and not as Chinese.8 The fact that 90 percent of Uyghurs in America are UAA members lends significant legitimacy to its claim to represent the wider US-based Uyghur diaspora. Private donations comprised the UAA’s initial source of funding, and the affairs conducted by UAA activists were conducted in the domicile of activists and supporters in the United States. However, realizing that greater financial support was vital to the organization’s sustainability and growth, Alim Seytoff and Omer Kanat sought the assistance of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED),9 submitting a grant application in late 2002. Given the UAA’s extremely political mandate, the NED classified it as a lobbying organization,10 so it chose to sponsor the group indirectly through the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP, lower right corner of Figure 5.2) (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2004; National Endowment for Democracy, 2009). Starting in 2004, the UAA was able to hire full-time staff and rent offices at 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, for the carrying out of its activities.11 Pennsylvania Avenue is a vitally important street that connects the White House and the US Capitol, so establishing an office there was a tremendous boost for Uyghur activists. Without the NED, they could never have been able to do so – a fact that will be elaborated on in section 5.4. JM Jycjhur Canadian Association Ш Kazakhstan Uyghur Youth Unity A B a v a ria Refugee Committee7 ^

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5.2 The campaign to rescue Rebiya Kadeer During the early years of the UAA, activists were persuaded by American sympathizers to adopt a strategy emphasizing human rights issues, which is a less controversial objective than the creation of an independent Uyghur state. Amnesty International activists (lower left corner of Figure 5.2) were particularly instrumental in advising Uyghur activists on how to formulate appropriate and effective arguments.12 As political activist Omer Kanat explains, it took time to learn how to approach the American public and politicians, and Uyghur activists soon realized that simply suggesting that they have grievances was too vague for persuading policy-makers and the public to support them.13 The playing out of information politics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 16–25) – gathering credible information about the situation in Xinjiang and disseminating it to potential sympathizers – is vital. The events and facts of life in China’s Uyghur community and elsewhere in the world can be difficult for non-Uyghurs to grasp. In this regard, rather than simply informing foreign supporters of the fact that Uyghurs in China are suppressed, Uyghur diasporic activists learned that they needed to gather information about specific Uyghurs imprisoned or killed by Chinese authorities. A general lack of awareness about the situation in Xinjiang has given Uyghur activists an opportunity to define or “spin” the issue in a way most favorable to their cause. The more specific the information, the more valuable and credible it is, particularly for reporters and politicians.14 For instance, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) has relied on UAA and UHRP press releases for the compilation of annual reports it submits to the US President and Congress.15 The campaign to secure the release of Rebiya Kadeer from a China prison well illustrates the learning curve and human rights repertoire of the Uyghur lobby in America. Kadeer rose to prominence during the 1990s among people in Uyghur and Turkish communities. She was renowned for her success in both business and politics, having been appointed to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1992 (Shichor, 2006: 12–14). However, her previously apparently healthy relationships with Xinjiang and Chinese authorities turned sour around the end of the decade (Mizutani, 2007: 29). After publicly criticizing China in 1997, she was barred from traveling abroad, and in 1998 she lost her government post when she refused to denounce her US-based husband, Sidik Rouzi, for inciting separatism in China. On her way to meet a US Congressional delegation on August 11, 1999, she was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison for releasing state secrets and intelligence to foreigners, on the grounds that she had sent local newspaper clippings to her husband in America. In March 2004, her sentence was reduced by a year for good behavior.16 For five years, from 2000 to 2005, Uyghur activists worked to draw attention to Kadeer’s case, focusing on her as a political victim (Witteborn, 2011: 269). Leverage politics, a common transnational advocacy networks (TAN) strategy proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998: 16–25), underpinned their campaign. In fact, their tactics were effectively an effort to generate the boomerang effect discussed in Chapter Two. By shaping American understanding of Kadeer’s case

72

A minor but rising influence in America

(and, thereby, the wider Uyghur cause), they hoped to encourage the US government to engage China politically and to pressure it into releasing her. Among the 46 US Congressional legislative actions mentioned in Chapter One, all those between 2000 and 2003 were related to the call-for-release of Kadeer, her secretary, and her son (e.g. SCONRES8117; also see Appendix). On March 17, 2005, just three days before the first visit to Beijing by newly appointed US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Kadeer was released on medical parole. On the same day, Kadeer fled to the United States.18 After her release, Washington immediately announced that it would not pursue a resolution concerning China’s human rights violations at the (former) UN Human Rights Commission’s annual meeting in Geneva, as the US had done the year before (Halpin and Hogrefe, 2006). In a report by congressional staff, it is said that while both the Chinese and American governments denied a quid pro quo, “the timing of the event leaves the impression that a deal for Ms. Kadeer’s release had been struck” (Halpin and Hogrefe, 2006).

5.3 Congressional support Between 1989 and 2010, 158 US members of Congress helped to introduce bills relevant to the Uyghur cause in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Eighty nine (56.3 percent) were Republicans (R) and 69 (43.7 percent) were Democrats (D). When a number of legislators co-sponsor a bill, it is assumed that they have a shared interest. Figure 5.3 illustrates these working relationships. Many factors contribute to the decisions politicians make about whether to champion a given cause. These include, in part, the opinions of constituents, campaign contributions, party policy, and personal conviction. The opinions of constituents matter most when they indicate strong and uniform preferences. However, if constituents are uncommitted or divided on a proposal, then lawmakers are likely to be less constrained in the way they vote. The importance of campaign contributions to politicians should also be taken into serious account. Constituents capable of injecting relatively large amounts of money into electoral campaigns are more likely to mobilize legislators to work in favor of their interests than those that do not. Money and resources certainly bolster the influence of constituents and interest groups (Kollman, 1998: 155–62). Politicians may also be influenced by the Party line and their own convictions (derived from personal ideology and beliefs). It is important to note that personal preferences on a particular issue are often strong enough to outweigh all other inputs from either constituents or other organized interests (Lowery and Brasher, 2004: 154–6). But which of these factors leads them to support Uyghur-relevant bills? Congressman Dana Rohrabacher’s (R-CA) well-known anti-China ideology has led him to actively support many Uyghur-relevant bills (Figure 5.3).19 Coming from notoriously conservative Orange County, California, he is relatively certain of being re-elected and so can be bolder than most law-makers about advancing his own anti-China ideology. Nicknamed the “bull in the China shop,” Rohrabacher has offered strong support to the Uyghur, Tibetan, and Taiwanese causes of self-determination. In his case, the old adage about your “enemy’s enemy being your friend” is particularly apt.

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While Figure 5.3 illustrates the Congressional network in support of the Uyghur issue, Figure 5.4 illustrates the centrality of the individual actors shown in Figure 5.3. There are a number of ways of calculating the centrality of actors, depending on the analytical aspect of the network that the researcher intends to delve into. In Chapters Three and Four we utilized the measure of “betweenness centrality,” which essentially says that when most actors depend on a particular actor to associate with others, the more power and importance this latter actor has accrued. In that analysis, the WUC and Rebiya Kadeer stand out as key players that demonstrate great betweenness centrality. Another way to gauge centrality is to measure “degree centrality,” where actors with more ties to other actors are less dependent on any specific actor than those with fewer ties. Hence, actors with more ties are more powerful. Figure 5.4 depicts both degree and betweenness centrality and should be considered alongside Figure 5.3. Figure 5.4 appears hard to comprehend because the majority of legislators are clustered in the lower left corner, signifying their low degree of involvement in terms of betweenness centrality and thus their relatively low importance as far

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as the congressional support network for Uyghurs is concerned (Figure 5.3). In other words, they do not often assist in the introduction of Uyghur-relevant bills. In contrast, Rohrabacher stands out as a uniquely enthusiastic Uyghur supporter. He has connections to many legislators (i.e. high degree centrality) and many depend on him for reaching out to others (i.e. high betweenness centrality) when pushing Uyghur-relevant actions forward. But Rohrabacher is certainly not alone in his anti-China crusade. Republicans like Frank Wolf (R-VA) and Chris Smith (R-NJ) have also worked with like-minded lobbyists to advance their strongly held anti-China ideology, and on August 3, 2007 the three worked together to introduce HRES610, calling for a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, “unless the Chinese regime stops engaging in serious human rights abuses against its citizens.” Uyghur political prisoners were mentioned as examples of those being detained without charge or trial. These legislators are so entangled in the network depicted in Figure 5.3 that they are hard to make out, but in Figure 5.4 they clearly stand out. Interestingly, Wolf and Smith’s lower betweenness centrality and higher degree centrality in Figure 5.4 echo their network positions in Figure 5.3: they have connections to many other legislators in the network, but they are not vital bridges in the way Rohrabacher is. Of course, legislators that co-sponsor one bill are likely to cooperate in sponsoring others. The relationships illustrated in Figure 5.3 therefore reflect two possible realities: that the legislators work together to co-sponsor Uyghur-relevant bills, and that they tend to work together to co-sponsor other types of bills – something that Figure 5.3 does not illustrate.

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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 also indicate a bridging role for Joe Lieberman (I-CT). Although he does not have high “degree centrality,” he does have relatively high “betweenness centrality,” meaning that other actors depend on him. As an Independent, he is positioned between Republicans and Democrats, and when gridlock emerges on issues before the Senate, he is often part of the bi-partisan committees and factions that emerge to address them. His generally centrist role in Congress is reflected in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. This centrist role further affects his involvement in Uyghur-relevant bills. It is important to note, however, that Lieberman is less concerned with the Uyghur issue specifically than with the issue of democracy in China in general. In SRES405, on which he worked with a number of senators in 2010, he called for the “centrality of freedom of expression and press freedom as cornerstones of United States foreign policy.” China’s action of shutting down 50 Uyghur-language Internet fora was noted as an example of China’s violation of such freedom. However, the only Uyghur-specific bill Lieberman directly co-introduced was SCON81 in 2000, which was related to the release of Kadeer.

5.4 Further actions When Rebiya Kadeer moved to the US, Beijing warned her not to engage in political activism (Halpin and Hogrefe, 2006). However, she soon used her reputation in the Uyghur community to promote the Uyghur lobby’s cause (Mackerras, 2011: 27). Part of her work included collecting donations, which, together with other activists, including Omer Kanat, she used to co-found the IUHRDF. The IUHRDF has a mandate similar to that of the UAA. One could even say that the IUHRDF is an extension of the UAA. In interest group politics, it is not unusual to see the creation of new organizations that either partly or completely inherit the objectives of existing organizations (Salisbury, 1969: 14–15). However, the IUHRDF has its own sources of funding it keeps separate from the UAA. Also, unlike the WUC, the IUHRDF is not composed of member organizations – only member individuals. Learning from the experience of the UAA and UHRP, leaders of the IUHRDF understood the urgency of securing sustained financial backing and so successfully applied for an NED grant in 2006 (National Endowment for Democracy, 2009). The NED has generously sponsored three interrelated Uyghur organizations, the WUC, the UHRP (of the UAA), and the IUHRDF, effectively accelerating the operation of the Uyghur diaspora’s political activities in the global arena.20 In fact, if we refer back to Table 2.1, we see that since 2007 the NED has also sponsored the International Uyghur Pen Club (IUPC). Kadeer is not a member, so one might say that this fourth organization is relatively less connected to the Uyghur political movement.21 The IUPC has no office, and its members are a collection of writers, historians, poets, and others who publish in Uyghur. The NED helps cover travel expenses in anticipation that the IUPC will help promote “freedom of expression for writers creating work in the Uyghur language” (National Endowment for Democracy, 2009).

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As this study asserted earlier on, the success of Kadeer’s incremental and moderate approach allows her to claim that her group is the true representative Uyghur diasporic organization in the international arena and that the rise of the Uyghur lobby is largely thanks to the generous and purposeful cultivation of the lobby by the NED. Louisa Greve of the NED does not completely agree: The NED does not conceive of its support as support for Kadeer’s groups or affiliates, although she is clearly an important leader in three organizations that the NED supports.22 The NED does not appear to want to be too closely tied to Kadeer. However, the NED does not offer financial support by happenstance, and hence must have chosen to back Uyghur organizations that best reflect its own advocacy of democracy and human rights in defiance of authoritarian regimes. Scholars have long debated the actual impact on grantees of grant-giving. Some argue that it professionalizes the efforts of grantees, helping them both politicize and radicalize their cause; while others argue that it simultaneously diverts grantees from their original goal and siphons off part of the collective power of the overall movement. With respect to the NED, both effects can be seen. By offering financial support, it helps professionalize and empower the Uyghur lobby. However, its largesse is not without conditions. The three organizations must go through the application and selection process on an annual basis, each time persuading the NED that they continue to be worth funding, and it is here that that co-optation can most clearly be seen as occurring. The organizations know that the NED supports the repertoire of human rights, and so they adjust their own agendas accordingly. It is in this vein that the Uyghur lobby is induced to “de-radicalize.” It knows that to follow in the footsteps of more militant groups would be detrimental to NED funding, and hence, its survival. Having for the time being jettisoned the idea of an exile government or East Turkestan statehood, Kadeer and her organizations continue to approach their political cause in an incremental and moderate way, working with other human rights organizations while also emphasizing the need to win the sympathy of Han Chinese (National Endowment for Democracy, 2009). Indeed, the recruitment of additional supporters is vital to the continued operation and success of the Uyghur lobby (National Endowment for Democracy, 2009). The inclusion of Chinese in the process greatly increases the credibility of the Uyghur lobby, as it signals to both the Chinese state and foreign observers that the Uyghur cause is backed by other ethnic groups (National Endowment for Democracy, 2009). This is necessarily a gradual process, given the persistent suspicion between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. Nonetheless, there are several groups that the Uyghur lobby might potentially ally itself with. Yang Jianli of the Initiative for China asserts that he has participated in several Uyghur events in an effort to understand better the Uyghur voice.23 Meanwhile, staff at the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a Washington-based organization promoting the Taiwanese right to self-determination, have observed exchanges between Uyghurs and various

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24

Taiwanese and Tibetan groups. As mentioned in Chapter Three, these latter movements espouse different political objectives with regard to China. However, their common critical stance gives them a basis for exchange and cooperation. Neither FAPA nor the Initiative for China appears in any of the offline data sets. This is due to their more local focus and connection with the UAA rather than the WUC. Hence, neither do they appear in Figure 5.2 However, interviews with activists in Washington did confirm that staff at the UAA, the IUHRDF, FAPA, and the Initiative for China have met and exchanged views on their work.25 For instance, on February 14, 2012 there was a joint rally by Uyghur, Tibetan, and Taiwanese activists at Lafayette Square in front of the White House when President Barack Obama was scheduled to meet the then Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping during his US visit (Figure 5.5). The adoption by Uyghur moderates of the human rights discourse, as well as their willingness to cooperate with other China-focused organizations, initially caused concern within the Uyghur diasporic community, with some members arguing that with this initiative, the moderate wing had betrayed Uyghurs (Radio Free Europe, 2011).26 However, as the moderate wing continues to attract support from INGOs and the American government, discontented Uyghur members have come to realize that the soft approach is the most effective. The success of the moderate strategy also makes the Uyghur issue more likely to be picked up by Western media. Whereas past news reports only used the term “Xinjiang,” they now often also use the term “Uyghur.”27 This is significant given the media’s role in disseminating information to the public, as well as in shaping and reflecting “stories of interest” to the government (Mahoney, 2008: 13–14). Increased media attention is a boost for Uyghur activists eager to raise the profile of their agenda within the public arena.

Figure 5.5 Joint rally to welcome Xi Jinping’s visit to the US. Note: Uyghur and Tibetan protestors at Lafayette Square in front of the White House on February 14, 2012. President Barack Obama was scheduled to meet the then Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping. Photograph by Coen Blaauw.

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5.5 Campaigns to save prisoners The successful campaign to obtain Rebiya Kadeer’s release led Uyghur activists and their sympathizers to believe that by applying the same strategies, the release of additional Uyghur prisoners in China could be achieved. In other words, while continuing to promote Kadeer’s image as an Uyghur leader in exile, activists and their supporters are simultaneously looking for new iconic Uyghur individuals to feature in ongoing campaigns. In terms of consolidating Kadeer’s iconic status, the Uyghur lobby has frequently compared her to the Dalai Lama (Hagan, 2010: 572). Western politicians and activists sympathetic to her story have invited Kadeer to testify before major government agencies, supporting her activism throughout Europe and North America (Mizutani, 2007: 44). In terms of publicizing recent Uyghur victims of political persecution, Kadeer’s three sons, Kahar Abdureyim, Ablikim Abdureyim, and Alim Abdureyim, who have been imprisoned in China since 2006,28 have been brought to the attention of American politicians. In Urumqi in October 2006, members of a visiting delegation of the House International Relations Committee staff mentioned to Chinese representatives the imprisonment and beatings of Kadeer’s relatives (Kan, 2008: 6; Halpin and Hogrefe, 2006). This encounter won the support of the American administration. For example, when George W. Bush met with Kadeer in Prague in June 2007, he also criticized China’s detention of her sons. Before going to the Olympic Games in Beijing in August 2008, Bush expressed similar support for the sons of Kadeer (Kan, 2008: 7; White House, 2007, 2008b and 2008b). Another Uyghur prisoner who has been repeatedly mentioned in Uyghur-relevant bills is Huseyin Cecil (also known as Huseyincan Celil). Cecil is a Uyghur imam with dual Chinese and Canadian citizenship. In 2006 he was arrested in Uzbekistan, extradited to China and sentenced to life in prison on charges of terrorism.29 The case of Huseyin Cecil differs from the case of Kadeer’s children because Huseyin Cecil has Canadian citizenship. The UAA has played leverage politics by calling on the Canadian government to be more active in regard to Huseyin Cecil’s case. For instance, on April 6, 2006, in a letter to Canada Ambassador to the US Michael Wilson, the then UAA President Nury Turkel wrote, “Because Mr. Celil is a Canadian citizen, we understand it is the right of Canadian government representatives or officials in Tashkent to impress upon the Uzbek authorities their duty of care to Mr. Celil.” As Hagan (2010: 576) points out, in its attempt to free Cecil, the Uyghur campaign has included “threats” in its arguments. If Canada does not assist with this case, the Uyghur lobby claims, Beijing could try any Chinese Canadian anytime. Such arguments aim to attach a sense of urgency and significance to the issue (Hagan, 2010: 576). It is also interesting to note the campaigns to rescue Christian Uyghurs. As stated previously, the Uyghur political campaign is in essence a secular one, and activists are keenly aware of the generally negative views Western societies

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currently hold of Muslims. Rescuing Christian Uyghurs impresses on the public that the Uyghur cause is not just a Muslim cause. A good case in point is that of Osman Imin (Chinese name: Wusiman Yiming), who in September 2007 was sentenced to two years of re-education through labor for “revealing state secrets” and “illegal proselytizing” (Shan, 2009: 215–16). Sources say that, in fact, the reason he was sentenced was his boldness as a Christian and his role as a leader in the Christian church in Xinjiang. The campaign to release Imin adopted the tactics used in the case of Kadeer. Imin was depicted as having aged dramatically in the labor camp and his health deteriorating as a result of harsh conditions. The issue of the legality of the case was emphasized when, in June 2008, Imin’s lawyer appealed the sentence. The result of this campaign was also effective, as his sentence was shortened and he was released after serving his revised term.

5.6 Summary The UAA and IUHRDF have been able to carve out a unique niche for themselves, having the finances, membership base, specialized expertise and access to American politics required for pursuing their missions. This has heightened their chances of surviving and realizing their ambition to act as the voice of Uyghurs in the United States. Fringe or transient forces, such as the East Turkestan Government-in-Exile (ETGE), demonstrate the evolutionary process of group survival or failure within ethnic politics. The niche perspective permits researchers to circumvent a pitfall commonly seen in ethnic research, which is an overemphasis on established groupings and organizations, and a disregard for unstable and transient contending groups (Salisbury, 1969: 20; Sandell, 2001: 672). The current approach establishes a more nuanced and balanced picture of the Uyghur movement. Gaining access to the policy-making apparatus as well as cooperating with the appropriate domestic actors has a great impact on the campaign outcomes of interest groups (Risse-Kappen, 1999: 20). The US has a multitude of access points for organized interest groups, and the Uyghur lobby has obtained access to its central target, the US Congress. The question therefore does not rest on whether or not the Uyghur lobby has the ability to gain access, but rather on its capacity to mobilize members of Congress to support its agenda. The key is to seek a champion for one’s cause in Congress, or even better, on important or relevant committees (Lowery and Brasher, 2004: 151–2). SNA of the congressional network data set points out again the importance of framing in fostering certain groups of legislators willing to support the Uyghur cause. The leaders of these groupings tend to be ardent anti-China advocates. They affiliate with and speak for Uyghurs out of their tendency toward China-bashing. Conversely, the factor of resources does not appear important in this case. While the first part of this chapter dealt with the types of alliances formed in America to support the Uyghur cause, a good portion of the end of the chapter directs us to ponder what it is that makes the Uyghur lobby effective. As the Uyghur campaigns in the US and in the forthcoming chapter on Germany show,

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activists have well understood the importance of framing their issues to involve corporal harm or the denial of legal equality (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 27–8). They are all utilizing the human rights repertoire, which allows their cause to resonate with or be compatible with preexisting collective identities and beliefs among politicians that they seek to influence (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 887–917). As a result, the question of the nature of a campaign issue becomes constant in achieving campaign success. A most interesting aspect demonstrated by both the American case and, later in this study, the German case is how much domestic politics matter. To be more specific, the capacity to ally a cause or movement with powerful actors in the local political arena can make or break a local campaign. And in the US case, allies have not only come from within Congress, but also include presidents and their administrations. In the campaign to release Kadeer, the US administration played a vital role in negotiating with Beijing and ultimately securing Kadeer’s release on medical parole to the United States.

Notes 1 As for why 10 percent of Uyghurs in America are not members of the UAA, the reason is unclear. Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011. 2 Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011. 3 Email correspondence with anonymous Uyghur observers based in the US in August 2011. 4 Although we do not know the exact numbers of Uyghurs among refugees arriving from China, the US government has confirmed that some asylum-seekers are Uyghurs. See an overview of the US refugee policy in the 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom issued by the US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ irf/2010/index.htm (accessed April 8, 2013). 5 Ibid. 6 Email correspondence with anonymous Uyghur observers based in the US in August 2011. 7 The procedure for converting two-mode data sets into one-mode actor-by-actor data sets can be found at http://www.yuwenjuliechen.com/research/the_uyghur_lobby. 8 Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011. Omer Kanat went to the US in 1999. He initially served as UAA general secretary and then, in 2002, UAA vice president. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid and interview with Amy Reger of the UHRP, in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011. The UHRP moved to K Street in May 2010. K Street is home to a large number of think tanks and advocacy groups, but as Reger noted, the move was purely practical: the rent is cheaper at the new location on K Street than on Pennsylvania Avenue. 12 Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 As stated on the CECC’s website, the CECC “was created by Congress in October 2011 with a legislative mandate to monitor human rights, the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit annual reports to the president and Congress,” http:// www.cecc.gov (accessed April 8, 2013). 16 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, http:// ppd.cecc.gov.

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17 SCONRES81 was a concurrent resolution calling for the release of Kadeer passed by both the Senate and House on July 24, 2000. 18 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database, http:// ppd.cecc.gov. 19 R-CA means republican from California. 20 Apart from the financial support of the NED, the WUC also encourages donations from exiled Uyghurs. This call for donations is voluntary. The suggested monthly donation for individuals aged 18 or older is €3 or $5 for Uyghurs living in Western countries or $1 for those residing in less-developed countries like Kazakhstan. As noted in previous chapters, NED support for the WUC, the UAA/UHRP, and IUHRDF has two important implications. The first and most obvious is financial; the other is political, signifying a preference for the activities of the Uyghur diaspora’s moderate wing, leaving the radical wing of Uyghurs short of resources and on the wane. Although both wings aspire to an eventual East Turkestan state, the moderate wing holds that this can only be achieved incrementally. The moderates recognize that the US government will not currently accept an East Turkestan government in exile, but will endorse peaceful advocacy of Uyghur rights in democratic systems. 21 According to Louisa Greve of the NED, it “began funding for both the UAA and the WUC long before Kadeer was released from prison,” and that “Kadeer has never been involved in the Independent Uyghur PEN Center:” email correspondence with Louisa Greve of the NED, August 15, 2011. However, other staff from WUC member organizations have attended IUPC activities. For instance, Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association attended the 3rd Uralic-Altay PEN Solidarity Network Conference held in Mongolia July 2–8, 2011: interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. See also http://www.uyghurpen.org/ event-id11.html (accessed April 8, 2013). 22 Email correspondence with Louisa Greve of the NED, August 15, 2011. 23 Interview with Yang Jianli of the Initiative for China in Washington, DC, USA, April 12, 2011. 24 Interview with Coen Blaauw of FAPA, in Washington, DC, USA, March 9, 2011. 25 Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011; interview with Yang Jianli of the Initiative for China, Washington, DC, USA, April 12, 2011; email correspondence with Coen Blaauw of FAPA, February 9, 2012. 26 Interview with Coen Blaauw of FAPA, in Washington, DC, USA, March 9, 2011. 27 Interview with Omer Kanat of the IUHRDF, in Washington, DC, USA, March 12, 2011. 28 Ibid. 29 In Chapter One, the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) is cited as showing that there are 148 Uyghurs who are/were imprisoned in China, the third-largest ethnic grouping of political prisoners, after Tibetans (3,082) and Hans (812). Among the Uyghurs detained by Chinese authorities, only Kadeer, her secretary, her children, and Cecil have been named in American legislative actions. Kadeer was released in 2005, while her three children and Cecil remain imprisoned.

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Struggling for attention in Germany

We begin Chapter Six with an empirical analysis of the Uyghur lobby in Germany. Given that of the approximately 700 Uyghurs in Germany (Wüst, 2009; Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009), 500 to 600 are in Munich where the WUC has its headquarters, Germany is an ideal location to examine the development of the Uyghur lobby. There are two reasons Germany, and particularly Munich, capital of the Bavarian state, has become home to most of the Uyghur exiles arriving in Europe. The first relates to the general influx of “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) – many from Turkey – to help with the post-war German labor shortage during the 1960s and 1970s (Tyler, 2003: 230).1 Some Uyghur exiles had lived in Turkey because of their cultural, historical, and ethnic ties (Hayashi, 2010), and some guest workers from Turkey were therefore of Uyghur origin, although no official statistics exist to offer precise numbers (Sen, 2009).2 Guest workers were expected to stay temporarily, and so were not initially considered immigrants. However, most never left and eventually many brought their families over to Germany. As a result, immigrants of broadly defined Turkic origin have settled there, and so have their second, third, and even fourth generations of offspring (Alba, Schmidt, and Wasmer, 2003: 1–2; Rommelspacher, 2004: 115–26). As noted previously, prominent Uyghur exile leader Erkin Alptekin was employed by the US-sponsored, Munich-based Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s (Tyler, 2003: 230). His broadcasting efforts reassured Uyghurs that there was an already-existing kindred population in Munich (Wüst, 2009). As previously noted, this group bond is essential to Uyghurs. As Uyghur exile Ilham Mahmut explains, the Uyghurs have a strong group mentality. Wherever they go, the first thing they ask is: “Are there Uyghurs here?”3 Those already living in a given place help newcomers settle in and find work, thereby creating a self-sustaining population. Hence, Munich continues to attract more Uyghurs than any other place in Europe. In 2008, an Uyghur man recounted to me the story of how he came to seek asylum in Germany. He arrived in the northern port city of Hamburg without a visa or even a passport after two months hiding in a ship from China to Europe.

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By illegally taking the Deutsch Bahn train, he quickly reached Munich. He had no idea what lay ahead of him. Having heard that there were other Uyghurs there, he simply hoped that there would be people that would assist him. On arriving in Munich, his extremely pale features and nervous state attracted the attention of police, and he was immediately arrested. However, through the efforts of the German authorities and the local Uyghur population, he obtained refugee status and later became a German citizen. It is not clear how many Uyghurs came as normal immigrants and how many as asylum-seekers. The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) keeps some elementary statistics for immigrants and asylum-seekers from the PRC.4 Generally speaking, Uyghur asylum-seekers constitute less than 10 percent of all asylum-seekers from the PRC (Table 6.1).5 However, in 2010 there was a relatively larger number of firsttime asylum-seekers of Uyghur origin. In fact, in 2010 only one Uyghur from China was not a first-time applicant of asylum to Germany. One might surmise a link to the 2009 riot in Xinjiang, which may have prompted a slight surge in Uyghur asylum-seekers the subsequent year. But this is only conjecture, as the German government, in order to protect asylum-seekers, does not disclose additional information about them. In what follows, we will examine the actors that support the Uyghur cause in Germany using the offline data sets mentioned in Chapter Three. Section 6.2 examines the strategies and impacts of Uyghur supporters using the example of the German debate about accepting Guantanamo inmates of Uyghur origin. This campaign to help Guantanamo inmates shares characteristics with the campaigns to save prisoners in China noted in the preceding chapter: all Uyghur inmates are depicted as “victims” as a direct result of PRC suppression. This gave Uyghur activists an opportunity to define or spin the issue in a way most favorable to their cause. With its relatively large Uyghur population, and as the country that hosts the WUC, we would have expected Germany to be one of the countries to accept Uyghur inmates. Germany has accepted two Guantanamo inmates, but they are of Arab origin, not Uyghur. It is intriguing to ask why this should be the case, and Table 6.1 Asylum-seekers from China to Germany (2008 to 2011) !Categories!

!2008! !2009! !2010! 0!1.2011–06.2011!

A. First-time applicants from China as a whole 299 B. First-time Uyghur applicants from China 9 C. Not-first-time applicants from China as a 57 whole D. Not-first-time Uyghur applicants from China 9 E. Total applicants from China as a whole (A+C) 356 F. Total Uyghur applicants from China (B+D) 18 Percentage of Uyghur applicants among all 5.1% applicants from China (F/E) Source: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

371 10 53

367 21 59

170 14 55

6 1 0 424 426 225 16 22 14 3.8% 5.2% 6.2%

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whether it is attributable to a failure on the part of the Uyghur diaspora in Germany. Section 6.3 summarizes this chapter’s findings, and discusses how the German case can help us understand this manuscript’s central hypotheses on the influences of framing and resources.

6.1 Patterns The aforementioned offline data sets allow us to examine the ego networks of the main Uyghur lobby group, the WUC. As the 2007 and 2008 data sets cover entire years and are hence more complete than the 2006 and 2009 data sets, we will use the 2007 data set for analysis here. In Figure 6.1, actors are arranged according to the locations of their headquarters. Those based in Germany are represented as round nodes and fall roughly within the circle. Those based outside Germany, but still within Europe, are represented as vase-shaped nodes and lie outside the circle. Square nodes represent actors outside Europe. In addition, all Germany-based actors are arranged to appear visually closer to the WUC, while other actors appear further away. By arranging the nodes this way, we see quite graphically that the Germanybased WUC is not only connected to numerous local actors, but is the umbrella organization of the worldwide Uyghur movement. This renders the ego network of the WUC much more complex (i.e. with more ties and nodes) than either the ego network of the Uyghur Australian Organization shown in Chapter Three or the ego network of the UAA and the IUHRDF shown in Chapter Five. Because WUC international connections have been elaborated on in Chapter Three, the following discussion focuses on its linkages with Germany-based players. In Figure 6.1, they are shown as circle nodes in the center. In Bavaria, parliamentarians from both the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and center-left Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) have spoken out for the Uyghur cause.6 (Recall that most Uyghurs in Germany are concentrated in this region.) The Green Party is known to advocate multiculturalism and has often openly demonstrated its support for neglected minorities, including Uyghurs in China and Roma in Europe (Green Party, 2010). In March 2010, I interviewed Margarete Bause, who holds a Green Party seat in the Bavarian State Parliament and is one of the best-known Uyghur sympathizers in German politics. Bause observed that she was personally motivated – not lobbied – to introduce Uyghur issues into Bavarian parliamentary debates, after which Uyghurs began to become visible. Bause, having had personal experience dealing with Chinese officials in Germany, had come to the conclusion that the Beijing government has spied on her correspondence between German parliamentarians and Uyghurs residing in Germany. As an example, she told of how a Chinese representative knew of an invitation she had received to an Uyghur event in Germany. After the incident she felt the need to research the Uyghur issue and make contact with the Uyghur diaspora in Germany.7 After attending a number of Uyghur events, she eventually decided to bring their case to the attention of parliament. Capitalizing on Bause’s actions, Uyghur activists were granted legitimate and favorable (albeit

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Figure 6.1 2007 World Uyghur Congress’s ego networks. Note: circle = actors based in Germany; vase = actors based non-German European countries; round square = actors based outside Europe; no shape = location unidentifiable.

limited) access to German political debates, in the form of directly contacting Bause to report their grievances and inform her of their concerns. Bause and her Green Party colleagues in Bavaria then passed on this information during relevant parliamentary discussions. For example, Bause and her Green Party associates raised the issue of whether Germany should grant political asylum to Uyghur inmates from the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay. This issue is ideal for exploring the strategies and impacts of Uyghur supporters in Germany.

6.2 Strategies and impacts The Guantanamo debate arose in 2006, when the Bush administration asked German Chancellor Angela Merkel to take in Uyghur inmates being held at the Guantanamo prison camp (Reuters, 2006). Not only did Barack Obama come to office promising to close the prison, but two US federal courts have ruled that the 22 Uyghur detainees pose no threat to the United States. Now the task for Washington is to deport them to countries willing to accept them and offer them asylum.8 The Chinese government has insisted that Uyghur detainees are terrorists linked to separatist groups in Xinjiang and that they should be returned to China to face

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trial. China has also warned that any country offering sanctuary to Uyghur inmates is sheltering terrorists (Richter, 2009; Deutsche Welle, 2010; BBC, 2010). How the Obama administration tackles the Uyghur issue could therefore have a significant impact on its relationship with China. Other Western countries, including Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and Sweden, face similar dilemmas. While welcoming Obama’s determination to close the prison, they worry that their acceptance of Uyghur inmates as asylum-seekers would jeopardize their respective ties with China. Under German law, there are two procedural paths that Uyghur Guantanamo inmates can take to be accepted into Germany. First, the inmates could be treated as asylum-seekers. The usual legal procedure for granting asylum would be conducted through the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, implementing bills adopted by the German Parliament (Bundestag). Second, law-makers could call for a bill allowing for the acceptance of Uyghur prisoners. If the proposal were to be passed,10 inmates could be received in Germany, provided that at least one of the 16 German federal states agreed to accept them. But whatever the path adopted, much wrangling would ensue between competing interest groups in the legislature and executive branch. In what follows, we examine parliamentary actions that illustrate the opportunities and constraints that passing such a bill would entail on both federal and regional levels. Furthermore, we will clarify the role of the WUC in facilitating public awareness and parliamentary debates, as well as its relationships with German politicians. Strategies When it comes to attitudes toward China, the interests of German politicians and businessmen revolve around trade and economics rather than the issues of human and minority rights, which are so often raised rhetorically (Möller, 1996: 706–25). Without the sponsorship of sympathetic legislators, Uyghur activists would be incapable of getting any Uyghur-related issue onto the agenda during legislative debates. Thus, linkages to the Green Party and the SPD are vital. Both alone and together with the SPD, the Green Party in Bavaria has submitted proposals explicitly calling for welcoming the Uyghur detainees. However, at the federal level there has been no direct parliamentarian proposal expressing support for allowing Uyghur Guantanamo inmates to be taken in. Given the geographic clustering of Uyghur sympathizers around Munich, this is not surprising. As a logical consequence, developments at the Bavarian regional level are more tangible than at the federal level. Nonetheless, at the federal level the Green Party maintains its position as a supporter of the Uyghur cause. Legislative discussions at both the federal and regional levels reveal “issue linkages” made by parliamentarians and factions of political parties. This is another example of the use of the human rights repertoire. For instance, at the federal level, parliamentarians have tried to introduce Uyghur issues into general debates on China’s human rights record. While the Green Party is often first to raise the Uyghur issue, other parties have also incorporated it into their public discourse. These serve to reinforce the urgency of the Uyghur situation

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and underline the imperative of giving aid to Guantanamo detainees originating in China. Most parliamentarians in favor of granting asylum to these Uyghurs point to the human rights situation in China – particularly human rights violations against minorities – as reason enough to prevent having Uyghurs held in Guantanamo returned to China, where they could face torture or even execution. The utilization of symbolic events like the Beijing Olympics also helps raise the profile of the Uyghur agenda. In 2001, spurred on by the opportunity to advance their interests and make their voices heard, Beijing’s successful bid to host the 2008 Olympics gave Uyghur activists new momentum. While the Olympic movement promotes the universal spirit of friendship, solidarity, and fair play, those opposing the Beijing Olympics, such as Uyghur activists and their German Green Party sympathizers, reminded people of China’s repeated violations of human rights, therefore highlighting the failure of the Chinese regime to live up to this spirit. By exposing the discrepancy between China’s commitment to the Olympic spirit and its actual performance in terms of its human rights record, Uyghur activists sought to shame the Chinese government and bring outside pressure to bear for it to improve. As part of this campaign, on April 29, 2008 the Green Party organized a public debate at the Bavarian State Parliament. WUC President Rebiya Kadeer, General Secretary of Amnesty International in Germany Barbara Lochbihler, and Green Party MP Margarete Bause, among others, met to outline why China did not deserve to host the Olympics.11

Figure 6.2 2008 Anti-Olympic demonstration in front of the Brandenburg Gate. Source: Photograph taken by the author. Rebiya Kadeer is standing in the middle

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Not only did the WUC participate in public debates on this issue, but on several occasions it spearheaded the campaign. In April 2008 it hosted a training seminar in Berlin for Uyghur leaders from around the world. This event was sponsored by the NED and co-organized with the Netherlands-based UNPO. The WUC also staged a protest in front of the Brandenburg Gate, calling for a boycott of the Olympics (see Figure 6.2). A Green Party presence at the protest (i.e. Ms. Frances Eqerer, a representative of Margarete Bause) demonstrates the cooperative relationship between the Uyghur diaspora and German parliamentarians. In 2001, after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) chose China to stage the Olympics, the chances of changing the decision were slim. The issue here is not that there was ever much hope of keeping the Olympics from being staged in China, but that these actors both perceived and capitalized on this symbolic event to raise public awareness about the Uyghur cause. Symbolic politics is an essential part of the human rights repertoire. Activists argue that China fails to live up to the Olympic spirit of equality and freedom for all, thereby exposing the gap between discourse and practice. This strategy and others like it, as examined by Keck and Sikkink (1998: 205–6) in a number of studies on transnational campaigns, have proven quite effective in generating resonance. To return to the role of the WUC in the Guantanamo Bay issue, as WUC spokesman Alim Seytoff explained, whether or not Uyghur inmates are deported to new countries depends exclusively on talks between the American government and the governments of potential receiving countries. All the WUC and its supporters can do is try to raise public awareness and generate discussion on the issue.12 While public awareness is not our central focus of analysis, it is worth briefly expanding on it as we conclude this chapter. Impacts Despite Bause’s efforts, the power of the Green Party in German politics is limited, making it a major challenge for her to advance the Uyghur cause in parliament. We will now examine these limits. Though German parliamentarians and Uyghur activists have linked the Uyghur issue to broader human rights issues, they have not managed to garner enough parliamentary support to see any pro-Uyghur bills passed. It appears that the wholesomeness of an advocacy issue or the tactful play of issue linkage does not determine the success or failure of a campaign. As is often the case, in Germany, party politics are determinant. For the most part, pro-Uyghur arguments have been initiated by opposition parties, not ruling ones. Such dramatic behavior may stem from having relatively little to lose by siding with the Uyghurs. Ruling parties have more pressing economic and political concerns and stand to lose more by speaking out in this way. The Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V., CSU) holds the majority of seats in the Bavarian State Parliament. However, the call to accept Uyghur inmates into the Bavarian state was proposed by the opposition – namely, the Green Party and the SPD.13 Margarete Bause has championed the Uyghur cause,

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but given that the Greens play only a minor role in the Bavarian State Parliament (with 19 seats, as opposed to the 92 seats of the ruling party), she and her party are a mere minority voice within a regional parliament. In sum, the CSU has been fairly dominant at the regional level, and the opposition parties are relatively powerless in terms of pushing forward pro-Uyghur legislation. One reason for the opposition to welcoming Uyghur detainees is that members of the CSU are afraid that the inmates kept at Guantanamo may not be innocent, even if US federal courts ruled that the 22 Uyghur detainees posed no tangible threat to the US. The question of whether these inmates were radicalized during their stay at the Guantanamo prison is a concern. The majority of the CSU do not want to risk threats to Bavarian or German national security, and Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann has sought clarification in regard to whether the intake of these inmates could endanger Bavarians specifically and Germans in general (Spiegel Online, 2009). The documented legislative debates also reveal a disagreement among Bavarian parliamentarians regarding who should assume responsibility for the Uyghur inmates. Some CSU members argue that because Washington is primarily responsible for resolving the Guantanamo issue, it should also accept responsibility for the rehabilitation and compensation of the released detainees.14 On February 4, 2009, the issue of accepting Guantanamo Uyghurs was debated in the Bavarian State Parliament. A few days later, the Social Democrat Mayor of Munich, Christian Ude, signed a letter with the agreement of all political parties in Bavaria, and submitted it to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, asking her to support the proposal to accept the Uyghurs. The response was negative. At the federal level, the CDU and SPD had formed a governing coalition (2005–9) and were more cautious on this issue than the opposition parties.15 For instance, in early 2009, then-Foreign Minister FrankWalter Steinmeier (SPD) said publicly that Germany would respond to such requests “only after they [had] been made.”16 Later in 2009, the American government did indeed make such a request. At the federal level, then-Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) was one of the main opponents of admitting Uyghur Guantanamo detainees. Not only was he worried about national security, but he also saw no legal foundation for accepting the Uyghurs. Interestingly, Steinmeier, who at that time was running for the German chancellorship, spoke in favor of accepting Guantanamo inmates. While this can be regarded as a strategic statement to win votes,17 it also manifests the importance of party politics. Since September 2009, there has been a new governing coalition comprising the CDU and the Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP). The Liberals had previously voted with the Greens in support of protecting minority rights in China.18 But when it came to the specifics of receiving Uyghur Guantanamo inmates, the Liberals were not in favor, arguing that Washington was responsible for indemnification and needed to answer for the injustices that had occurred at Guantanamo. Furthermore, since becoming part of the ruling coalition in 2009, the Liberals have refrained from touching on the issue of accepting Uyghur inmates.

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6.3 Summary The German example suggests that the potential success of the Uyghur diaspora depends on finding sympathetic law-makers to echo their views in government. Many factors contribute to whether a particular law-maker champions an interest group’s cause. In terms of speaking up for the Uyghurs, Margarete Bause is the most active parliamentarian in Germany. Legislators care mostly about the views of constituents because these are a vital component of their electoral success. In Bause’s case, however, it was personal experience with Chinese government officials that led her to side with the Uyghurs and promote their cause. The empirical case of the Uyghur networks in Germany supports the overarching importance of framing. The ideological support of the Green Party and SPD for suppressed minorities has led them to sympathize with the Uyghur cause. But, just by virtue of this, one cannot say that other German political parties are insensitive to minority or human rights. Ideologically speaking, however, one could certainly say that the Green Party is closer to the Uyghur lobby. Unfortunately for the Uyghurs, the Greens have failed to build alliances with most other domestic actors, including the political heavyweights in the executive branch who may have the potential to change German policy in this regard. Uyghurs are therefore constrained by the country’s broader political institutional arrangements, and so are unlikely to be successful in convincing Germany to accept Uyghur Guantanamo detainees. Although actual WUC impact on German politics is minimal, it must be stressed that influencing German politicians is not the only purpose of the Uyghur lobby. While the lobby’s impact on politics is the focus of this book, it is worth mentioning the rise in coverage of Uyghur issues in German media. In Chapter Three, it was noted that Germany’s national broadcaster, Deutsche Welle, has been a leader in making Uyghur issues more widely known around the world. Deutsche Welle has broadcast several reports on the Guantanamo Uyghurs alone. While this manuscript does not seek to provide data for quantifying the rise in public awareness of Uyghur issues as a result of WUC efforts to promote and disseminate its cause in media, an example of its effectiveness is worth mentioning. In Hamburg, I encountered a German artist named Christoph Faulhaber. Faulhaber has been inspired by the predicament of Uyghur Guantanamo inmates and, with the sponsorship of the Hamburg local government, had presented his artwork, The Guantanamo Allocation Center (Guantanamo Aufnahme Lager), in one of the city’s vacant lots. The “Center” is itself an artistic concept that asks whether Germany should provide such a home for Uyghur inmates whose futures are indeterminate.19 The work reveals the artist’s belief that the country should assist them. Faulhaber also visited Palau to produce a documentary, Palau Blue Sky, about the Uyghur detainees who have found shelter there. The documentary shows that even detainees who have left Guantanamo face many hurdles to integrating into their new host countries.20 Christoph Faulhaber’s work is an example of grassroots activism, initiated by a non-WUC affiliate illustrating the Uyghur issue. As a German who is inspired

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by German news coverage, he tells German audiences how he, as a German outsider, sees the Guantanamo Uyghur issue. This type of soft power is accidental in the sense that it emerged spontaneously – the Uyghur lobby did not plan it or see it coming. But it is part of Uyghur lobby intentions to reach into the hearts of its target audience, be it by planned, accidental, or opportunistic means. Delving deeper into how the various players talk about Uyghur grievances, and how their audiences imagine the Uyghur story, would provide a more nuanced and complete picture of Uyghur diasporic activism, and is a fascinating area that should be further investigated.

Notes 1 Guest workers also included Italians, eastern Europeans, and others. 2 For example, Ascar Can, a well-known Uyghur activist, first migrated to Turkey and later moved to Germany (Steinbauer, 2009). 3 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 4 In Shichor’s 2013 paper on Uyghur activism in Germany, he mentioned that “no asylum has been granted to Uyghurs in Germany since 1998” (Shichor, 2013: 5). 5 I wish to thank staff at the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees for providing this data. 6 Interview with Green Party parliamentarian Margarete Bause in Bavaria on March 9, 2010. 7 Ibid. 8 Supreme Court of the United States (2010) Jamal Kiyemba, et al., Petitioners v Barack H. Obama, President of the United States of America, et al.: On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. No. 08–1234; United States Court of Appeals (2008) Huzaifa Parhat, Petitioner v Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, et al., Respondents: On Petition for Review of an Order of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. No. 06–1397. 9 There has been no evidence that Uyghurs in Germany are related to any extremist or separatist activities in Xinjiang, China. See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Entscheiderbrief, 9/2009, No. 16. 10 Proposals can be introduced by a party or a faction, and if enough votes are obtained (often the majority vote of two-thirds of members is necessary), the proposal then must be implemented. The procedure is the same at both the regional and federal levels. 11 This information can be found on Margarete Bause’s website, http://www.margaretebause.de (accessed April 8, 2013). 12 Interview with an anonymous leader of the Uyghur Australian Association in Sydney on November 5, 2010; interview with Alim Seytoff in Washington, DC, on April 7, 2011. For more accounts of the US negotiation with other countries, see Pinney (2008: 139–56). 13 See records in the Bavarian State Parliament, 16th period, protocol, priority requests 16/317, 16/340, 16/346, 16/1262, and 16/1264. 14 See parliamentary record at the federal level, protocol 16/11, February 4, 2009, p.42. 15 Another useful example of the impact of party politics is the difference in positions that the SPD took at the federal level and the regional level in Bavaria toward Uyghur demands between 2005 and 2009. At the Bavarian level, the SPD was an opposition party and was more outspoken in favoring of accepting Uyghur detainees; whereas at the federal level, the SPD was a key member of the governing coalition (2005–9) and had to stand with its CDP partners in opposing this agenda for fear of jeopardizing national security. This is a normal part of the workings of the German federal system.

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16 See parliamentary record at the federal level, protocol 16/11, February 4, 2009, p.42. 17 Interview with Ulrich Delius of the Society for Threatened Peoples (Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker, GfbV), in Göttingen, Germany, May 22, 2013. 18 See parliamentary records at the federal level, reports on the request from the committee for human rights and humanitarian aid, February 13, 2009, No. 16/11980. 19 Official website of the Guantanamo Allocation Center, http://www.gac-web.org. Interview with Christoph Faulhaber, in Hamburg, October 29, 2011. 20 Interview with Christoph Faulhaber, in Hamburg, October 29, 2011.

7

Uyghur networks in Japan

Compared to its operations in the United States and Germany, WUC activity in Japan is quite a recent phenomenon, having only begun in 2008. So it is not surprising that Uyghurs in Japan have fewer activists and supporters, and are less organized than Uyghurs elsewhere. The aim of this chapter is to investigate empirically the Uyghur networks in Japan, as well as to assess the effectiveness of the Japan Uyghur Association (JUA) in light of its early state of maturation and diminutive membership. Just as there is a lack of demographic data on the Uyghur situation in Germany and the US, there is a similar lack of data for Uyghurs in Japan. According to a 2010 report by the Asahi Shimbun, the number of Uyghurs in Japan is about 1,000 (Hayashi, 2010). Ilham Mahmut, head of the JUA, has said that based on his communications with other Uyghurs in the country, there are in the neighborhood of 500 Uyghurs in the greater Tokyo area.1 Most Uyghurs in Japan today came as students. As Mahmut recalls, only a handful of Uyghurs came to the country after being hired by Japanese companies which then provided them with work visas. An estimated 90 percent of Uyghurs who arrive in Japan from China as students choose to remain after their studies, with an estimated 10 percent preferring to return to China. Those who choose to leave are generally Uyghurs with good connections to local officials in Xinjiang. More often than not, when they return to Xinjiang they have guaranteed positions in government or important sectors of the economy. It is fair to say, given the difficulty of establishing a stable livelihood in Japan as a foreigner, that those who leave regard returning to China as the better option. Mahmut is one of those who came to Japan as a student, and his reasons for coming had nothing to do with launching an Uyghur organization. What motivated Mahmut were concerns for the future of his son, born in 2000. He was looking for a place that his family could survive and thrive in without fear. Leaving China appeared to be his only option. With the assistance of his brother, who was already living in Japan, he moved to Tokyo in October 2001, first to take language courses, and later to study at a vocational school, which he believed would appeal to potential employers and enable him to secure a proper job. His plan bore fruit, and after years of separation his family was able to join him in Japan in 2005.

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Although his central motive for coming to Japan was personal, Mahmut’s concern for the future of China’s Uyghurs was never far from his thoughts. The idea of “doing something for my people” had been fermenting in his mind for years.2 In November 2007, this aspiration was further stimulated when Rebiya Kadeer came to Japan to give a talk. Kadeer was invited to the country by the Japan branch of Amnesty International (Mizutani, 2007: 44). As the WUC (2009) records in its activity report, she gave more than 20 lectures in eight cities and met with members of Japan’s parliament (the Diet), government officials, and members of the business community. At one of Kadeer’s public events, Mahmut volunteered to interpret for her, when in his opinion, the Uyghur interpreter accompanying her failed to properly translate her comments. After the event, he expressed an interest to Kadeer in founding an Uyghur organization in Japan.3 Before Mahmut became an active member, WUC representatives had been to Japan to promote their cause. In November 2007, Kadeer embarked on a speaking tour across the country. Even earlier, in November 2006, Dolkun Isa, a WUC activist based in Germany, gave a lecture at the Tokyo Foundation at the invitation of the Foundation and the Japanese Business Association. More than 50 Japanese businessmen, professors, and media people were in attendance (WUC, 2009). When Mahmut expressed an interest in becoming part of the WUC, the organization saw an opening, as it had as yet no official representative resident in the country. In April 2008, Dolkun Isa attended several meetings with Uyghurs in Japan to discuss more effective ways of introducing Uyghur issues to the Japanese public and government. The potential benefits of establishing an Uyghur Association in Japan were also discussed. Ultimately, a committee of seven members was formed to lead the effort to establish an Uyghur Association in Japan (WUC, 2009). After months of preparation, on June 15, 2008 the committee founded the Japan Uyghur Association. The WUC’s Turkey-based vice president, Seyit Tumturk, came to Japan to host the opening ceremony, and Mahmut was elected president.4 Figure 7.1 maps out the ego network of the Japan Uyghur Association in 2008 using the 2008 offline dataset mentioned in previous chapters. As the JUA was just founded, one can see that apart from its linkage to the WUC and a few local and international actors, the JUA was not well-connected in comparison with the complicated ego networks of the WUC or of the Australia-based Uyghur organizations mentioned in previous chapters. In 2011, Japan’s Sumitomo Foundation sponsored this project, funding a field trip to collect the SNA data and conduct interviews in Japan. The following pages will outline the SNA data collected, which reflects the as-yet rudimentary structure of the Uyghur Association in Japan, and the small number of embedded actors, namely friends of the group, in the association’s outreach network. In section 7.2, the Japan network is analyzed and the ways potential Uyghur supporters in Japan cooperate and bicker are discussed. In section 7.3, the strategies being pursued by Uyghurs in Japan and the impact they are having are examined. Section 7.4 presents a summary of findings.

Uyghur networks in Japan 95 ITokusoku University •W orld Uyghur Congress (W U C )

^ Ja p a n e s e Parliament • Ja p a n Uyghur Association

►The Dalai Lama ^*ORF2 (Austrian TV )

^Organization for Industrial and Cultural Advancement (Ja p a n )

Figure 7.1 2008 ego networks of Japan Uyghur Association. Note: circle = non-governmental organizations (NGOs); square = governments, parliaments, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and universities; up triangle = news organizations; diamond = individuals.

7.1 Method and data In studying Uyghur-relevant networks in Japan, a snowball method is used to trace the linkages. The snowball method is effective for the study of elite networks and sub-sets of people within a larger community. Following the snowball method, the Japan Uyghur Association, which is the leading advocate of Uyghur self-determination in the country, is the focal actor. It is the only WUC member organization in Japan. Using this as a starting point, let us investigate the organization’s linkages in Japan. First, a representative of the JUA was asked what other organizations it has ties to. Attempts were then made to contact these organizations and ask their representatives to reveal their ties as well. The central question asked was: “When discussing Uyghur issues, what organizations or individuals do you usually contact?” The data gleaned from their responses reveal the key actors working on Uyghur issues in Japan. A common challenge to using the snowball method is the difficulty of demarcating boundaries or relevant actor sets. There are essentially two ways of handling this: either to continue tracking until no new actors are identified; or continue tracking until the research budget and/or time run out (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The research grant from the Sumitomo Foundation allowed for a month-long field trip to collect data, which took place in August 2011. During this time, it was possible to track actors until no new ones were named. As shown in Figure 7.2, only five actors in the network were identified, all of them non-government actors. This confirms our assumption that the Japan network is a diminutive one. The reason for the ease with which the boundary of the network was identified is

96 Uyghur networks in Japan • Ja p a n Conference

iT aiw an u s.n et

■ Japan Uyghur Association

■ Free Tibet Japan

■Ganbare-Nippon! National Comm ittee

Figure 7.2 Uyghur networks in Japan. Note: circle = non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

self-evident: the relationships between this small number of actors are most often reciprocal, so they usually identified the very actors contacted for this survey (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Hence, the snowball method is indeed an effective way to track such linkages. However, the snowball method does not come without caveats. A commonly cited concern is its inability to identify actors that are not well-connected (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). These might be isolates who have acted on the Uyghur issue, but who for one reason or another “prefer” to be left out by the main actors. There will be an empirical discussion in the forthcoming section where this limit is redressed. Another commonly cited problem with the snowball method is whether the starting points are logically justifiable. In the Japanese case, the WUC in Japan is represented by the JUA. It is therefore appropriate and logical to use the JUA as our starting point. As was said, the snowball method is an effective one for capturing the elite networks of the WUC in Japan.

7.2 Patterns The main actor is the JUA. As of August 2011, it had about 30 members. Only two (including Mahmut) are Uyghur. The rest are Japanese. Why does an Uyghur diasporic organization contain only two Uyghur members? Does this challenge the basic legitimacy of an organization that claims to represent the rights of Uyghurs in China, Japan, and elsewhere in the world? In other words, does this indicate a problem of legitimacy as discussed in Chapter Two? The scarcity of Uyghur members in the JUA arises from Uyghur fear of the PRC government – even when Uyghurs are abroad. Mahmut admits that most

Uyghur networks in Japan 97 Uyghurs he knows wanted nothing to do with him after the JUA came into being. And among Uyghur exiles in Japan, there is criticism of Mahmut’s leadership. Some think he lacks the educational background necessary for the task.5 Others contend that he founded the organization for personal gain, simply to advance his own career.6 Some Uyghurs, on the other hand, agree with his cause, but dare not say so publicly. There is a lack of trust and unity among Uyghurs themselves.7 Mahmut admits, “even brothers suspect brothers.”8 And the Chinese government has often used Uyghurs to spy on their own.9 This situation is not unique to Japan. Similar fears are often expressed among members of the Uyghur diaspora in Australia and Germany. One reason Uyghurs are so willing to spy on their own when abroad is that some receive scholarships or other financial inducements from the Chinese government. Such support is often vital to the survival of these students. Fearing the loss of financial support, some cooperate with the Chinese government and monitor their kindred. So in Japan, most of those who openly support the JUA are not Uyghur exiles, but Japanese. And one cannot claim that the 30 or so Japanese members represent a desire on the part of the general public to support the Uyghur cause. After all, events in Xinjiang are hardly hot topics of conversation in Japan, let alone advocates of Uyghur self-determination. Japanese are more familiar with the Tibet issue because of the large number of Buddhists in the country. Some Japanese might also know something about the fight for self-determination among Inner Mongolians because, comparatively speaking, Japan has historically had more connections with Mongolia. Similarly, due to Japan’s historic connection with Manchuria, there is relatively more public awareness of the Manchu people as an ethnic group in China.10 But while it is true that 30-or-so Japanese members in no way represent the whole of Japanese society, such support of the JUA should not be dismissed as inconsequential. Even this level of backing is essential for interest group operations, since members like these contribute material and moral support vital to the survival of the organization. Whenever the association holds activities, the voluntary assistance of these Japanese members is extremely important for an association lacking the resources to hire employees. According to Mahmut, even non-member Japanese donate money and offer other types of support. Although they may not attend meetings or participate in public activism, their contributions are extremely important. For instance, Mahmut’s residence is provided rent-free by a sympathetic Japanese supporter. Friends of the Japan Uyghur Association Hideki Nagayama, a diehard activist of the Friends of Lee Teng-Hui Association, a pro-Taiwan independence group in Japan, aided Mahmut in his efforts to contact Japanese politicians in the run-up to the launch of the JUA. Nagayama is a living example of Japan’s conservative right wing, which is staunchly opposed to communist China. Right-wing communities in Japan are easy bedfellows for

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nationalist Taiwanese and the Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Uyghur movements, as they all share an antipathy toward China (Sun, 2011a: 346; Womack, 2007: 453; Wu, 2010: 287). While a narrative of this historical nexus deviates from the focus of this book, in a nutshell, right-wing groups in Japan have long been a breeding ground for the Taiwan independence movement (Lee, 2009). The aforementioned Hideki Nagayama is a standing secretary of the right-wing nationalist group GanbareNippon! National Committee (see Figure 7.2). In addition, he runs a Japanese website called the Taiwan Research Forum, where he shares his thoughts on and support for Taiwan national sovereignty. In Figure 7.2, one can see Taiwanun.net, which is a gateway institution that links to various pro-Taiwan independence entities around the world, including pro-Taiwan organizations in Japan in which Nagayama plays a key role. These right-wing forces also have ties to the movement for Tibetan selfdetermination, the roots of which were planted in Japan in 1976 (Lee, 2009; Wu, 2010: 286).11 Since the movement for Uyghur self-determination led by the WUC only came into existence in 2008, it jumped on the anti-China bandwagon at a very late stage (Lee, 2009). Japan’s nascent Uyghur movement benefits from long-established anti-China forces in the country, attracting allies in the Japanese right. Lacking experience and connections at the outset, Mahmut considers the assistance offered by Nagayama as having been critical to his initial foray into politics. They met at a Falun Gong gathering in Tokyo in 2008, just after the JUA had been formed. At the time, the two men traded ideas about how to promote Uyghur issues in Japan. Three years later, Mahmut felt he could finally act independently of Nagayama. According to Mahmut, “Now that they know me, I can phone the offices of Diet members without Nagayama’s help.”12 To put it another way, three years of assiduous lobbying has gradually familiarized Japanese law-makers with the Uyghur cause, and they are now willing to offer Mahmut a certain degree of access to Japan’s policy-making apparatus. Today, Mahmut can boast of twice-monthly meetings with Japanese law-makers. Another example of how Nagayama assisted Mahmut is the way he connected him with sympathizers in Taiwan. Nagayama has ties to a number of anti-China groups in Taiwan. In October 2011, Nagayama brought Mahmut to Taiwan – Mahmut’s very first visit to the island. During his short stay, the Uyghur activist was invited to speak to Taiwan Friends of Tibet. In addition, the Taipei Times, an anti-China English daily, interviewed Mahmut, giving him the opportunity to make his case to the wider Taiwan public and Taiwan’s English-speaking community (Loa, 2011). Recalling his efforts to promote the Uyghur issue with Mahmut, Nagayama says he considers disseminating positions through media (e.g. websites, magazines, TV) vitally important, since Japanese are generally unaware of causes like his. Nagayama often begins his talks by recounting for Japanese the story of the Silk Road. As earlier noted, Xinjiang and the Uyghurs are not widely familiar to Japanese. However, Japanese are somewhat familiar with the term “Silk Road.”

Uyghur networks in Japan 99 Oftentimes they equate the term with China’s entire far west. Hence, “Silk Road” is often the opening theme of his public talks. Nagayama’s methods are regarded as effective by Nenshu Shiraishi, who was once active in the Japan Silk Road Club and later became a supporter of the JUA.13 In addition to the Uyghur issue, Tibet is a major focus of advocacy for Nagayama. For instance, along with Tibetan groups, he has tried to inform visitors to Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo that pandas are not originally from “China,” but “Tibet.”14 Beijing’s “panda diplomacy,” which involves donating and loaning pandas to countries around the world as a symbol of friendship, has been a tremendous success. With people around the world generally under the impression that pandas are from China, Tibetan groups have endeavored to change the narrative and, as part of their political agenda, argue that pandas are from an entirely different country – Tibet. Hence, in Figure 7.2 we see that Free Tibet Japan is part of the Uyghur network.15 This organization is run and sponsored largely by Japanese.16 So as Japanese members are vital to the JUA, they are just as important to Free Tibet Japan. It is interesting to observe the arrows between actors in Figure 7.2. They indicate that the JUA initiated communication with Taiwanus.net and Ganbare-Nippon! National Committee, while these two organizations also sought communication with the JUA. They have frequent interactions. Nagayama is active in helping all of these organizations exchange views and coordinate activities. Another well-known conservative nationalist group is the Japan Conference. The SNA data shows that the JUA almost always initiates communications with the Japan Conference, whereas the Japan Conference is a passive informationreceiver: it is rarely pro-active in its communications with the JUA (Figure 7.2). The same can be said of the JUA’s relationship with Free Tibet Japan. The SNA data suggests that the JUA attempts to convey its Uyghur-relevant messages to Free Tibet Japan, whereas Free Tibet Japan initiates no Uyghur-relevant messages. The SNA data suggests that for the JUA, there exists varying degrees of friendship with the four actors that link to it. Based on their level of communications, the friendships the JUA has with Taiwanus.net and Ganbare-Nippon! National Committee are relatively intimate. This finding echoes those drawn from interviews conducted with activists, which suggest that the activism pursued by Nagayama is an important bridge, making possible Mahmut’s introduction to pro-Taiwan and anti-China groups. Free Tibet Japan may not be active in initiating communications with the JUA, but whenever it suits its interests, it naturally gravitates toward participating in collective actions with Uyghur activists. Hence, one observes that in Japan these groups coordinate their demonstrations. Cultivating political entrepreneurs is a task in itself. Even though Nagayama offered assistance, Mahmut, lacking the open support of his Uyghur kindred in Japan, had to struggle to learn how to operate mostly on his own. After his organization was founded in 2008, he told me how difficult it was to get his points across when he began giving speeches to Japanese audiences. Uyghur observers who spoke on condition of anonymity shared a similar impression of Mahmut’s early days as leader of the movement. As Mahmut admits, he lacked eloquence expressing himself in public. It was only by trial and error that he accustomed himself to public speaking.

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When I asked him what he thought would help further popularize the Uyghur issue in Japan, Mahmut said he had been repeatedly asked that question after delivering speeches, and that it is something he never stops asking himself. When he first took up the mission of promoting the Uyghur cause, for the most part he acted out of pure inspiration. Gradually, he came to realize the need to turn inspiration into tangible activism. He candidly admits that with only a few years of experience on the political scene, it would be naive to think he could create a sea change in the Uyghur situation. For now he has a more modest goal: to help preserve the Uyghur culture and language in Japan. For instance, by offering Uyghur language courses and translating Uyghur literature into foreign languages. Mahmut’s responses reflect a realistic approach for dealing with a very complex situation. Like most activists in the WUC movement, Mahmut aspires to independence from China. However, like the WUC, Mahmut and his organization hold that a moderate and incremental approach is the only viable way to achieve that goal. Mahmut believes that a gradual process is necessary, starting with the accumulation of resources and then attracting as many sympathizers as possible. When the time is ripe, Mahmut says he will ask Uyghur supporters in Japan to sign petitions for submission to the Diet, the UN, the EU, and other important fora.17 One pattern worth raising is the absence of the WUC in Figure 7.2. This is due to the method of data collection. SNA data sets that were used in Chapter Three were large enough to capture the worldwide allies of the WUC. Hence, indeed in Figure 7.1, we did see the connection between the JUA and the WUC on a global scale. In this survey of Uyghurs in Japan, however, I have sought to capture the connections of the JUA by using the organization as a starting point in the snowball process. The data show that for Mahmut, local connections trump international connections in terms of political advocacy in Japan. Hence, in his answer he listed only Japan-based connections. It was also necessary to ask Mahmut to identify his sources of Uyghur-relevant information. He responded that the WUC and Radio Free Asia (RFA) are crucial sources of information. He further explained that each Uyghur diasporic organization must operate according to the laws and political milieu of the country in which it operates. Therefore, exchanges with local actors are relatively more frequent. Contacts with the WUC and its member organizations are less frequent. On average, they hold telephone conversations twice a month.18 Apart from the reasons given by Mahmut, another is the evident language barrier. While now fairly fluent in Japanese, Mahmut is not yet proficient in English. Hence, his main stage is not a global one. Having said this, there are JUA members with relatively better English ability, and they assist Mahmut and the organization in communicating with foreign observers and researchers. In February 2012, for example, when the JUA initiated a petition for submission to the Japanese government that urged Asian countries to stop deporting Uyghur asylum-seekers and refugees, the website of the organization simultaneously provided an English translation of the petition and additional information on the issue.19 This is a relatively new innovation for the JUA website.

Uyghur networks in Japan 101 The English version, although far from professional, reflects an attempt by the group to create greater international awareness of Uyghur activism in Japan. It should be mentioned that although Mahmut cannot speak English, he and Nagayama speak Chinese quite well. With Nagayama’s introduction, Mahmut gradually built up a small circle of supporters in Taiwan. By April 2013, he was able to find supporters to help co-found Taiwan Friends of Uyghurs, based in Taipei (Loa, 2013; Yang, 2013).20 Mahmut has also been invited to speak in Taiwan’s legislature and on some Taiwanese radio stations (Yang, 2013. See also Figure 7.3). Lastly, in 2012 the NED sponsored WUC leadership-training seminars in Japan. Previously, such seminars were held in Sydney, Berlin, and other Western locations. But in 2012 the seminar was held for the first time in East Asia, giving the JUA more opportunities to learn how to network and cooperate with international actors. There is a process of empowerment taking place, enabling activists to learn more about transnational activism. JUA’s outreach to Taiwan illustrates its ambition to create and garner international support beyond Japan. As policy

Figure 7.3 Ilham Mahmut in Taipei, May 11, 2013. Note: In a conference, entitled “Don’t Let Taiwan Become a Vanished Country – Implications from South Mongolia, East Turkestan, and Tibet” in Taipei, Ilham Mahmut (the third from the left) joined Southern Mongolian activist Temtselt Shobstuud (the third from the right), Tibetan activist Lukar Sham Atsock (the second from the left), as well as representatives from the Taiwan Friends of Tibet, World United Formosans for Independence, Taiwan Association of University Professors, Taiwan Society, and other anti-China groups to express their respective nationalist interests against Beijing’s recalcitrant cling to sovereignty.

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entrepreneurs, Mahmut and Nagayama do not just rely on the WUC’s worldwide connections and resources, but they also seek their own “market.” As Taiwan is a liberal democracy, in principle Uyghur activists can benefit from Taiwan’s open domestic opportunity structure to further their political cause. However, given Taiwan’s own complicated relationship with the PRC, Uyghurs have faced obstacles in Taiwan. This was evidenced in 2009 when two Uyghur activists were denied entry into Taiwan (Lao, 2013). Taiwan was then governed by the relatively Chinafriendly President Ma Ying-jeou (see Wang, 2012). The Taiwanese government’s decision to deny Uyghur activists entry was widely regarded as Taiwan’s following of Beijing’s policy to blacklist Uyghur activists on the grounds that they were terrorist suspects. This caused backlashes from anti-China activists in Taiwan. As Uyghur activists gradually establish their own circle of supporters in Taiwan, one would expect that the Uyghur issue will slowly become more visible on the island, most likely adding one more dimension of uneasiness to Taiwan’s relationship with Beijing. This is a nascent phenomenon worthy of further observation. Distant friends and uneasy competitors As indicated in the section on methodology, the snowballing method has its limits. Researchers need to bear in mind that while certain actors may not be represented in the SNA map, they nevertheless exist and may indicate cleavages and frictions. First, pro-Mongolian groups are not mapped in Figure 7.2, but my interviews with activists confirm the linkage between nationalist Mongolian and Uyghur activists. An anonymous Japanese pro-Taiwan supporter with close ties to Hideki Nagayama and Ilham Mahmut has introduced them to Mongolian activists in Japan. On my field trips to Japan in 2011 and 2012, I collected some English pamphlets by Japanese nationals sympathetic to the Uyghurs. The texts of these pamphlets call for people to support Tibet and Taiwan. But it is interesting to note the hand-written slogans and symbols for East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia. The cognitive imagery of these groups makes it evident that they have experienced a similar trauma. These shared grievances have united them in various forms of collective action. Next, legislative support for Mahmut’s cause is bipartisan, but legislative linkages are not mapped in Figure 7.2 either. A majority of backers are central-right liberal democrats (e.g. Makino Seishu) who tend to be conservative and more reserved toward China than social democrats. Most social democrats look more favorably on building good relations with Beijing. Nevertheless, a small number of social democrats believe strongly in the necessity of democratic change in China, so are more sympathetic to Tibetan and Uyghur causes of achieving self-determination. The Mongolian group and legislative linkages are not mapped in Figure 7.2 because they are “distant friends” of the JUA. In addition to distant friends, I should specify uneasy competitors of the JUA. Understandably, the snowball method fails to map out competitors, because it is hard to imagine the JUA wanting to initiate dialogue with a competitor. During an interview with Naoko Mizutani, a Chuo University lecturer specializing in the Uyghur issue, I got the sense that she aspires to be the Uyghur

Uyghur networks in Japan 103 spokesperson in Japan. Mizutani used to be involved in helping Uyghur drugusers and Uyghurs with HIV/AIDS in China simply out of compassion. Her academic writings on the Uyghurs have also made her known as one of the few Uyghur experts in Japan. Naoko Mizutani has repeatedly stressed her ties to Rebiya Kadeer, and has complained to Kadeer about Ilham Mahmut’s “problematic” right-wing connections, which in her view have a negative image in Japan and reflect badly on Uyghurs.21 It is fair to say that the right-wing influence does nothing to help the Uyghur group’s reputation, and may limit Uyghur outreach to the wider public. A number of Japanese scholars who spoke to me on condition of anonymity generally agree with Mizutani’s observations. However, the divisions among potential Uyghur supporters in Japan, given that the Uyghur cause is quite a peripheral one in the country, may lessen Uyghur significance within Japanese society, but has little impact beyond Japan. Moreover, Mizutani argues that Ilham Mahmut’s activism is opportunistic and centered on securing a career and remaining in Japan. Mizutani has not only studied in China, but she regards herself as someone with a profound understanding of Uyghur issues. In effect, she appears to see herself as the natural spokesperson for Uyghur interests in Japan. Nenshu Shiraishi, a senior Japanese observer and participant in the Uyghur community, suggests that the conflict between Naoko Mizutani and the Uyghur Japan Association began just after the official launch of the association in 2008.22 It is apparent that the association’s existence poses a challenge to Mizutani’s perception of herself as the most authoritative Uyghur spokesperson in Japan. Mizutani’s personal interest in maintaining her authority on the Uyghur issue, her concern about right-wing influence on the Uyghur movement, and her perceptions about Ilham Mahmut’s background have strained her relationship with the JUA. She even called the Sankei Shimbun newspaper to suggest that their reporters no longer talk to the “unrepresentative” JUA.23 In previous chapters, I indicated that the WUC competes with more radical Uyghur groups to be considered the umbrella organization for Uyghur interests around the world. This chapter demonstrates that competition for the right to speak for Uyghurs also exists at the local level. Support for the Uyghur cause, which is limited to begin with, is further minimized by activists who disagree on strategies for raising the profile of their cause. This is clearly reflected in Japan, where as leader of the WUC, Kadeer seems unable to mend the existing rifts. For Kadeer, it is enough that Uyghur representatives exist in Japan, but not being part of Japanese society and being unfamiliar with the structural opportunities there, she can do little to mend the schism. At the aforementioned 2012 WUC conference in Tokyo, the JUA and its right-wing Japanese connections arranged for Kadeer to visit the internationally controversial Yasukuni shrine (Want China Times, 2012). Paying a visit to the shrine that honors Japan’s war dead, including convicted war criminals, is often seen as paying respect to the war crimes Japan committed in the Second World War. This is a sensitive issue that often sours Sino-Japanese relations. Kadeer’s visit to the shrine apparently strengthened the image of the WUC’s connection to right-wing forces in

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Japan, exacerbating the WUC’s relationships with Japanese Uyghur sympathizers who do not want to be associated with right-wing radicals.

7.3 Strategies and impacts The actors in Figure 7.2 were invited to report their political involvement. The results are summarized in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Political activism of Japan Uyghur Association and its affiliates !Never! 1!–3 times 4!–6 times !More than 6 a year! a year! times a year! Participating in the work of government agencies in Japan Formal contact with civil servants/ ministers in Japan Formal contact with members of the Diet in Japan Formal contact with representatives and staff of political parties in Japan Mobilizing public opinion in Japan, such as advertising and asking people to sign petitions, etc. Participating in demonstrations in Japan Cooperating with non-governmental organization(s) in Japan Formal contact with officials at international governmental organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) Formal contact with Uyghur diaspora organizations/communities in Japan Formal contact with Uyghur diaspora organizations/communities in other countries Participating in or (co-)organizing international conferences, workshops, and meetings Participating in or (co-)organizing demonstrations in other countries Receiving funds from organizations in other countries Receiving funds from organizations in Japan Giving funds to organizations in other countries Giving funds to organizations in Japan Note: org means organization

2 orgs 2 orgs

1 org

2 orgs

1 org

2 orgs

1 org

2 orgs

1 org

1 org 1 org

1 org

1 org

1 org

1 org

1 org

3 orgs

1 org 2 orgs

1 org

2 orgs

1 org

2 orgs

1 org

3 orgs 2 orgs 3 orgs 3 orgs

1 org

Uyghur networks in Japan 105 These actors were asked: “What kind of action has your organization taken to promote the Uyghur cause, and how often?” The results show the frequency of specific actions taken by these organizations (i.e. never, 1–3 times a year, 4–6 times a year, more than 6 times a year). In interest-group politics, scholars often discern two types of strategies that groups use to influence processes and policies. One is known as an “inside” or “access” strategy. Employing this strategy, interest groups seek to participate in the policy-making process, or at least be invited into the process. Through more direct communication with key decision-makers, groups seek to set and mould Japan’s policy priorities. The second often-used type of strategy is known as an “outside” or “voice” strategy. In this approach, the actors attempt to mobilize individuals in the wider society who wish to join a collective effort to persuade the government to attend to their needs (Beyers, 2004; Kollman, 1998). Table 7.1 reveals that even though Ilham Mahmut has a degree of access to Japanese law-makers, he employs more outside strategies than inside ones. This tendency applies to most NGO actors in Japan’s Uyghur networks. This is because outside or voice strategies are necessarily used by actors lacking full access to decision-makers. For instance, every year on August 15, dozens of Japanese politicians pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine. August 15 is the day Japan surrendered in the Second World War. Right-wing politicians and civil groups are the main participants. Because the JUA and its affiliates are for the most part right-wing conservatives, they participate in the event, which honors soldiers who died in Japan’s wars. This is an act that most Chinese regard as homage to Japan’s history of militarism. Every year, China protests the controversial event, in which numerous pro-China and anti-China actors participate. Apart from demonstrating, the dissemination of voices in public constitutes an outside strategy. For instance, in 2009 Jun Takada, a professor specializing in nuclear radiation at the Sapporo Medical University, published a book entitled Chinese Nuclear Tests: Disasters Caused by Nuclear Explosions along the Silk Road. Scientific research into radiation damage done to residents in Xinjiang by the Chinese government has often been of value to human rights and anti-China groups. China is said to have conducted nuclear tests between 1964 and 1996 in Xinjiang (Merali, 2009: 16–20), which resulted in many deaths and have had an impact on every generation born in the region since (Merali, 2009: 16–20; Takada, 2009a; Takada, 2009b). The JUA is naturally interested in the issue. This book was published both in English and Uyghur. On March 18, 2009, capitalizing on the opportunity to provide solid evidence of acts of inhumanity perpetrated by the Chinese regime in Xinjiang, the JUA organized a conference in Tokyo entitled The Devastation Caused by China’s Nuclear Tests along the Silk Road and the Role of Japan. More than 250 people attended. Jun Takada spoke and presented evidence of the damage China’s nuclear tests caused the Uyghur homeland. It is interesting to note that Jun Takada’s affiliation with the JUA and the Association’s right-wing connections are the basis of Takada’s uneasy relationship with Naoko Mizutani. Both scholars have sympathy for the Uyghur cause,

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but disagree on what approach to take. One might say that in Japan, the Uyghur conflict has spilled over into academia – a phenomenon not observed in Germany or the United States.

7.4 Summary In comparison with Germany and the US, Uyghur activism in Japan is less organized and smaller in scope. Of the three, it is, after all, the most recent country to see the movement’s emergence. Hence, the movement in Japan is far from what could be considered mature. During my field trip in 2011, the movement was still relatively local to Japan and only loosely tied to the transnational elements of the Uyghur movement. However, the fact that the 2012 leadership-training seminar took place in Japan implies an intention on the part of the WUC to cultivate and empower its nascent affiliate in Japan, and more effectively connect it to Uyghur supporters in other parts of the world (Perduca, 2012) (Figure 7.4). Schisms and competition among potential Uyghur supporters occur in a number of contexts. For instance, first of all, there are inter-group schisms. The fact that there are only two Uyghurs in the JUA suggests that the Uyghur community is fragmented and internally divided. Hence, the JUA does not necessarily reflect the

Figure 7.4 Uyghur March in Tokyo, May 17, 2012. Source: Photograph taken by the author. International Uyghur representatives came to Japan to take part in the WUC’s general assembly and leadership training seminar. Amid this international meeting, they organized a march to the Chinese embassy

Uyghur networks in Japan 107 interests of the entire Uyghur community in Japan, although WUC recognition lends it legitimacy as its representative in the country. Second, there is schism and competition between organizations or individuals who are not necessarily Uyghur, but who crave to be spokespersons for Uyghurs in Japan. These inter-group and external schisms serve to weaken the global WUC campaign. The JUA network is formed on the basis of a shared anti-China sentiment. However, a fair picture should include Naoko Mizutani, who wishes to help the Uyghurs – but given her background, not within an anti-China context. Theoretically speaking, the Japanese case supports the hypothesis of the impact of framing on dividing supporting groups.

Notes 1 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 2 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 3 Interview with Nenshu Shiraishi of the Japan Silk Road Club, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 4 Ibid. 5 Interview with Nenshu Shiraishi of the Japan Silk Road Club, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 6 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011; interview with Naoko Mizutani, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 7 Interview with Nenshu Shiraishi of the Japan Silk Road Club, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 8 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 9 Interview with Nenshu Shiraishi of the Japan Silk Road Club, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 10 Interview with Hideki Nagayama of Japan’s Taiwan Research Forum, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. I also wish to thank Prof. Matsuda Yasuhiro for introducing Japanese perceptions of ethnic conflict in China during my stay at the University of Tokyo in August 2011. 11 In fact, both left-wing and right-wing forces are linked to the Tibetan movement. But this is not the focus of this book, so I do not discuss further here. Interview with Yoshi Osada of the Free Tibet Palden, in Tokyo, May 17, 2012. 12 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 13 Interview with Hideki Nagayama of Japan’s Taiwan Research Forum in Tokyo, August 17, 2011; interview with Nenshu Shiraishi of the Japan Silk Road Club, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 14 Ibid. 15 Although Ilham Mahmut has a generally congenial relationship with nationalist Taiwanese, Tibetan, Inner Mongolian, and Uyghur groups, he recognizes that if and when China falls apart, these groups are likely to compete among themselves, with each seeking its own share of power and benefits under the new regime. Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 16 Interview with Yoshi Osada of the Free Tibet Palden, in Tokyo, May 17, 2012. 17 Ibid.

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18 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 19 Japan Uyghur Association’s website, http://uyghur-j.org/news_20111003e.html (accessed April 8, 2013). 20 Taiwan Friends of Uyghurs is not a WUC member organization. However, one of the key motivators for the birth of Taiwan Friends of Uyghurs, Ilham Mahmut, is the head of the JUA, a WUC member organization based in Tokyo. In late 2012, Paul Lin and Marie Yang of the Taiwan Youth Anti-Communist Corp helped set up a preparatory group for the establishment of a Taiwan Friends of Uyghurs. There was a press conference for the establishment of the preparatory group in Taipei on September 29, 2012. The organization was further officially established in 2013. Conversation with Paul Lin, Marie Yang, and Ilham Mahmut, in Taipei, May 11, 2013. 21 Interview with Naoko Mizutani, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 22 Interview with Nenshu Shiraishi of the Japan Silk Road Club, in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 23 Ibid.

8

China’s competing discourses and strategies

This chapter provides a brief overview of the reaction of the Chinese state to the Uyghur movement. While the issue has been extensively examined in China-related political science literature, Beijing’s handling of the WUC and the Uyghur diaspora in general is necessarily an essential element of any study of Uyghur mobilization. By using qualitative content analysis of relevant magazine articles published in the PRC, we will now offer a brief overview of the ways China has sought to frame the Uyghur issue and pursue what it perceives as its interests in relation to their movement. A keyword search of “World Uyghur Congress” in the database of the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) renders 19 relevant Chinese articles, mostly published in 2009.1 The concentration of articles discussing the Uyghurs in 2009 is likely attributable to the 2009 riot, which prompted the Chinese government and government-paid writers to recognize the need to offer information and perspectives on the Uyghur issue and the July riot favorable to the Beijing government. Just as the Uyghur-mounted public relations campaign self-servingly frames each Uyghur cause as a matter of advancing human rights, China’s campaign just as self-servingly frames its opposition to Xinjiang secession as one of safeguarding territorial integrity (Hoshino, 2009b: 98–9). The stark difference between Beijing and the WUC in terms of discourse is not a matter of comparing fact and fiction. Both use facts to substantiate their positions, but while doing so, they highlight different facts which they believe will win the maximum amount of sympathy and support from their target audiences. For Beijing, its prime audience and mass of potential supporters are citizens of China, the patriotic sentiments of which can be aroused. For the Beijing government, Chinese nationalism translates into supporting a strong and unified Chinese state. Memory of the “century of humiliation” has made safeguarding its territorial integrity into something of a meme for the Chinese state. The regime tends to portray the Han–Uyghur issue as a zero-sum game, depicting it as a clear-cut choice between protecting national unification and splitting the motherland. According to Beijing’s narrative, losing Xinjiang would result in, first of all, the exposure of people in Xinjiang to the influence of other countries, thus reducing

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direct communication and cooperation between China and other Central Asian states. It is asserted that China’s status in Eurasia would thus decline (Hao and Liu, 2012: 211). In addition, should Xinjiang successfully secede from China proper, Tibet and Inner Mongolia could follow suit. If that were to occur, more than half of China’s territory would be lost, which would be a tremendous blow not only to its territorial integrity, but to its real and imagined national power (Hao and Liu, 2012: 211). But beyond the ideological and emotional issues, the economic and strategic importance of Xinjiang also weighs heavily on the Chinese regime. With its ample resources, Xinjiang accounts for an estimated two-fifths of the nation’s oil, 40 percent of its wool, and large percentages of other valuable resources found in the country, such as gold and copper (Sun, 2011b; Millward, 2007: 300–1). It is believed that Xinjiang’s oil reserves amount to “three times as much as those found in Saudi Arabia, and that exploiting these could free China of the need to import oil from the Middle East” (Bhattacharya, 2003). One easily detects expressions of Chinese nationalism in government documents, civilian and scholarly writings, statements in the public sphere, and in other places. Existing literature (e.g. Culpepper, 2012: 187–203) refers to government documents and online forum exchanges as evidence of Chinese nationalism resulting as a reaction to Uyghur separatism. In section 8.1, we will explore articles in Chinese magazines. The target readers of such publications range from people of average intelligence and education to the very educated. We will examine the types of messages PRC writers wish to convey to their Chinese readers regarding the WUC. Some of these writings include policy-making recommendations. Given that all publications require, in one form or another, central government approval, by examining how such writings frame these issues,2 we can expose the core interests and values that underlie Beijing’s thinking. Based partly on our discussion in section 8.1, in section 8.2 we will then be able to discern the types of policies and strategies Beijing has pursued in tackling the Uyghur question.

8.1 China’s framing of the Uyghur issue Our CNKI search generated 19 results; all magazine articles published by writers in the PRC. As often happens in China, since media is state-run, among these 19 magazine articles, three are identical, having been published in three different journals.3 There were also five articles that were first published by the Xinhua News Agency, which were then published in five different magazines – either identical or nearly identical to the original source.4 Contents of articles about the WUC invariably follow the same pattern. It is therefore logical to assume that China’s government orchestrates the publication of these articles to more effectively make the public aware of the government’s stance and view of the WUC. These articles all similarly reflect on a number of key issues: 1) Rebiya Kadeer’s background and character; 2) Kadeer’s role in the Uyghur movement; 3) the WUC and the East Turkestan movement for self-determination; 4) the

China’s competing discourses and strategies 111 July 5 incident. Below is an exposition of how such issues are reflected in literature originating in China. China’s depiction of Kadeer’s background and character While the WUC has sought to depict Rebiya Kadeer as a woman fearless about advancing her dream for an East Turkestan homeland, Chinese writers tend to depict Kadeer’s involvement in the separatist movement as being a radical result of her second marriage. Writings originating in China once highly praised Kadeer’s success in business and politics, but they now depict her career as being marred by allegations of financial fraud and illegal activity. Chen (1994: 45) in Reporters’ Notes showed that before Kadeer began publicly criticizing China during a session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1997, she was widely hailed by the authorities as a successful Uyghur businesswoman and philanthropist. She was not only appointed to the CPPCC, but in 1995 she was a member of China’s delegation to the United Nation’s 4th World Conference on Women. When she showed up at the CPPCC wearing 21 pieces of jewelry – gold necklaces, rings, and bracelets worth of 50,000 RMB (about $8,000) – she explained to media that wearing such jewelry was a way of illustrating the ethnic and cultural difference between Han and Uyghurs. For Uyghurs, “wearing such jewelry is not for the purpose of showing off one’s wealth. This is simply how Uyghur women pay respect to the fact that this is an important occasion” (Chen, 1994: 45). Han Chinese culture interprets this in a completely different way. So the story of how Kadeer obtained her wealth was originally pointed to as a point of inspiration and pride for Xinjiang and the Uyghur people. She was described as “diligent,” “tenacious,” “with a brilliant business mind,” and as possessing “eyes of wisdom” that epitomize Uyghur woman (Chen, 1994: 45–6). At the time, glowing accounts were offered of how she invested 14 million RMB ($2.2 million) of her own money in building a department store which provided jobs to local women and young people, and her operation of trading companies all over Central Asia (Chen, 1994: 45–6). But later, she was labeled a traitor and terrorist, and questions were raised about how she obtained and managed her wealth. She was described as a greedy opportunist. A number of Chinese writers even suggested that the way she sold merchandise pertaining to the era of the Cultural Revolution was illegal, and assertions were made that this was the reason her first husband divorced her (Wang, 2009: 6–7; BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 50).5 After the narrative on Kadeer turned negative, Chinese writers also pointed to the unusually rapid rise of her business empire, making her the eighth-wealthiest person in China at the time. Suddenly, her wealth was attributed to tax evasion, financial fraud, and other illegal activity (Wang, 2009: 6–7; BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 50). There were allegations that she used her cross-border businesses as a front for drug-smuggling. She was accused of tax evasion totaling 4.8 million RMB (about $755,000) and with cheating vendors to whom she rented and sold

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space in her commercial buildings, which was followed by several law suits that are now pending, according to an unsigned article in BingTuanJianShe (Corps. Construction Magazine) (2009: 50). Chinese authors comment that Kadeer’s fear of being discovered may have pushed her into joining the separatist movement. According to current accounts, Kadeer remains greedy and is constantly inventing every kind of pretext for seeking donations from overseas Uyghurs. Thus, as Wu (2009: 24) in World Affairs notes, aspersions are cast on her motivations for involving herself in a splittist movement. Some Chinese authors also comment on Kadeer’s marriage. “She was once a legend in Xinjiang and pride of the Uyghur people, having gained political influence. But her political status took an unfortunate turn after she married her second husband, Sidik Rouzi, a notorious separatist,” according to Chen’s (2009: 33) article The Changing of Rebiya published in BaoKanHuiCui (News Essence Magazine). Chinese authors assert that while some separatists hold to the ideal of achieving Xinjiang independence, Kadeer came from a modest family free of any such notions. When she first married at age 14, she was not ideological in her thinking and dreamed only of having a happy family life. According to these accounts, it was not until she married her second husband that she became interested in the separatist cause. Many speculate that Kadeer, though a shrewd businesswoman, was blinded by a love that altered her character (Wu, 2009: 24). According to Wu (2009: 24), this once popular individual was on a fast track to wealth and power. But in 1999, she became a prisoner charged with selling national security information overseas. During her incarceration from 2000 to 2004, she depicted herself as a model prisoner who swore never to act against her country. But in 2005, after she was released on medical grounds and exiled to the US, she transformed in Western eyes into a political exile and human rights activist. In 2006, she emerged as WUC president, and now she is branding herself “leader and Spiritual Mother of the Uyghurs” and the “Uyghur Dalai Lama” (Wu, 2009: 24; NanFengChuang, 2009: 15). Overall, China’s depiction of Kadeer’s life story seeks to raise questions about her credentials and motivations for assuming a leadership role within the Uyghur separatist community. In Beijing’s version of events, the leader that the WUC works so assiduously to legitimize is a traitor and a criminal. It is interesting to note that there is much evidence suggesting that the depiction of Kadeer by the PRC government is having a diametrically opposite effect to that sought by Beijing. For instance, while calling Kadeer the “Dalai Lama of Uyghurs” may be considered criticism among Chinese nationalists, such a comparison does little but burnish her credentials outside China. Perceptions of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Dalai Lama are overwhelmingly positive around the world. Indeed, the WUC touts this comparison as assiduously as the PRC government. In short, labeling Kadeer the “Dalai Lama of Uyghurs” serves only to boost her image in the West and around the world. Similarly, when Chinese writers liken the problem of Xinjiang to that of Tibet, it also tends to have the opposite effect of that sought by Beijing, as the West tends to be suspicious and critical about China’s handling of the Tibet issue.

China’s competing discourses and strategies 113 Chinese depiction of Kadeer’s role in the Uyghur movement Writers in China, again necessarily state-sanctioned writers, discuss Kadeer’s involvement in the overseas Uyghur movement. Wu (2009: 6) notes that an article widely circulated on the Internet, Deciphering Rebiya: The Uyghur Dalai Lama, states that like the Tibetan leader, Kadeer wanted to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, and that because her background would be well received in the West, she was appointed as the spiritual leader of the Uyghurs (Wang, 2009: 6). Chinese authors tend to downplay her significance to the diasporic movement. Wu (2009: 24) writes that “although in 2006, as an ordinary housewife and businesswoman, she was elected WUC president, she is merely a puppet or front for the WUC. As a latecomer in the East Turkestan movement, Kadeer has less experience than her colleagues, is less well-educated and is not proficient in any foreign language” (Wu, 2009: 24). According to this account, her lack of credentials disqualifies her for the role of WUC president. But simply because of her legendary background – successful businesswoman, a Muslim woman, a politician, a convicted political prisoner, a political exile, a human rights award-winner – she was elected WUC president and is regarded as spiritual mother of the Uyghurs (Wang, 2009: 6–7; Wu, 2009: 24; Chen, 2009: 33). China-based writers acknowledge that these conditions boosted her popularity among Western countries and placed her at the forefront of separatist groups. They also assert that such groups made her their pawn, scattered as they are around the world, desperately needing to project an image considered positive in the West. As with the items mentioned previously, sympathetic Western countries also consider Kadeer’s persona worthy of cultivation, encouraging her image as the face of WUC solidarity and a figure comparable to the Dalai Lama (Wang, 2009: 6–7; Fan, 2009: 71). As Wang (2009: 6–7) in News Universe opines, “However, her language is inconsistent, which implies that she has no core ideology, and is just a front who plays a leadership role, while someone behind the scenes pulls the strings.” Chinese authors also discuss Kadeer’s autobiography, Dragon Fighter: One Woman’s Epic Battle for Peace with China. Kadeer’s autobiography shows that she genuinely sees herself as a warrior, and that the enemy is the “dragon” (Chen, 2009: 33). As far as China-based writers are concerned, her autobiography is an attempt to strengthen her position within the Uyghur movement (Wu, 2009: 51); and it is part of the strategy of the overseas movement to portray her as a bold fighter – regardless of whether there is any truth to the claim. Lastly, some China-based authors point out that Kadeer is not without critics – even within her own diasporic group. Wang (2009: 6–7) and Wu (2009: 51) suggest that among her fellow East Turkestan splittists, she has acquired an unfavorable reputation thanks to her “whimsical character, greed, and nepotism” (Wang, 2009: 6–7; Wu, 2009: 51). Overall, Chinese writers seek to diminish her as an Uyghur leader.

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How China depicts the WUC and East Turkestan self-determination movement The China government asserts that the WUC has terrorist ties. According to Beijing, the WUC was behind the July 5 incident, which it regards as a terrorist activity. It also asserts that WUC Secretary General Dolkun Isa is a terrorist, since he was a member of the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), which are both on China’s terrorist group blacklist. China-based writers suggest that since the WUYC is deemed a terrorist group, so are its counterparts like the ETIM. There are also allegations that the “terrorist activities” of ETIM, their leader Hasan Mahsum, and its alleged ties to al-Qaeda form a direct link to the WUC (Wu, 2009: 25; Fan, 2009: 73). And according to this account, such separatist activities all originate abroad. The PRC angle is that East Turkestan groups abroad are known to use terrorist means and have been cracked down on around the world. The logic here is that after Kadeer was elected WUC president, the organization became the ideal tool for rejuvenating and unifying East Turkestan separatist groups and those of a more Islamist persuasion. According to Fan (2009: 71), many of the Xinjiang separatist groups scattered around the world have since become WUC affiliates. Wu (2009: 23) and Fan (2009: 71) suggest that the newly founded WUC learned from the mistakes of its predecessors and expertly catered to the interests of Western politicians. They adopted a narrative of promoting peace, human rights, and democracy for Uyghur people and the quest for ethnic and religious freedom, which won them popularity and support from Western countries (Wu, 2009: 23; Fan, 2009: 71). And they obtained funding from the US-backed NED. They followed in the footsteps of the Tibetan independence movement, and sought to make the situation in East Turkestan an international issue (Wu, 2009: 23; Fan, 2009: 71). While terrorist groups such as the ETIM were marginalized in the post-9/11 era, the WUC strategically seized the opportunity to take their place. “Perhaps it is time to update China’s terrorist group blacklist (to include the WUC),” suggests Wu (2009: 23) in World Affairs. China-based writers also base assertions that the WUC has close ties to al-Qaeda on the types of terrorist activity they charge the WUC with pursuing. According to this line of reasoning, the bombings and terrorist attacks plotted by the WUC share characteristics with al-Qaeda attacks: they are well organized; they first strike areas of high population density and then less populated areas; they both target innocent civilians; and they both employ methods that are “brutal.” This was pointed out by Fan (2009: 73) in Practical Political Combat Training. After the July 5 incident, a number of al-Qaeda affiliates announced that they would attack construction sites in Northwest Africa, where there are large concentrations of Chinese workers. According to Fan (2009: 73), they sought revenge for the casualties inflicted on Uyghurs in Urumqi during the July 2009 incident (Fan, 2009: 73). As mentioned earlier, WUC Secretary General Dolkun Isa is also widely discussed in China-based writings. According to the Beijing-approved narrative,

China’s competing discourses and strategies 115 Isa plotted to commit terrorist acts including robbery, theft, and bombing, and has supported East Turkestan terrorists (Wu, 2009: 25; Fan, 2009: 72). He is occasionally described as one of the top three terrorists on the PRC wanted list and has been the subject of an Interpol red notice submitted by the Chinese government (Wu, 2009: 25; Fan, 2009: 72). “Dolkun Isa is a violent zealot who has promoted, supported and planned terrorist activities of every type. He also calls for cooperation between overseas Tibetan and Uyghur activists in plotting against the China government,” comments Wu (2009: 51) in GongChanDangYuan (Community Party Members). China-based writers also discuss another important figure: Erkin Alptekin. Wu (2009: 51) asserts that Alptekin, a chief WUC advisor, is good at advancing Uyghur human rights, democracy, and religious freedom, and has established a number of organizations in which he has assumed key positions (Wu, 2009: 51). But Chinese accounts are that Alptekin is on bad terms with Kadeer, because the two are rivals for the role of Uyghur spiritual leader (Wu, 2009: 51). Chinese depiction of the July 5 incident According to China-based writers, the WUC, its leaders, other East Turkestan separatist groups, and terrorist groups are all said to be the invisible hands behind the July 5 incident (Wang, 2009: 13; Chen, 2009: 33; BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 49; Wang and Ho, 2009: 49; Fan, 2009: 71). This is a classic example of the “three evil forces” at play – separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism (Fan, 2009: 71; Wang, 2009: 6–7; Wu, 2009: 51). The origin of the riot in Xinjiang is also explored. A number of Chinese writers indicate that the WUC and other East Turkestan-related groups used the aforementioned Shaoguan incident in Southeast China’s Guangdong province as a rallying cry for protests in Xinjiang (BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 49; Wang and Wang, 2009: 27). China sources claim that the Shaoguan incident prompted subsequent protests in Xinjiang, which is thousands of miles to the west. Not surprisingly, WUC and Chinese accounts are at odds when it comes to accounts of the protests, which escalated into violence culminating in the July 5 protest. The WUC claims that the demonstration was peaceful, but that a brutal government crackdown led to rioting. Beijing, however, claims that the bloody Xinjiang rioting was the result of a premeditated WUC plot. The PRC government claims it has proof that Kadeer and other WUC officials called a meeting to plan strategy in regard to the incident. According to Beijing, they plotted to escalate tensions at the event, organize similar protests in other countries, and foster international support and sympathy for protesters. They are also accused of mobilizing Uyghurs at home and abroad through Internet fora and telephone calls to join the cause. Thus, after the demonstration began, violent chaos quickly ensued and the event turned into a riot. The PRC government claims to possess recordings of international phone calls containing instructions for the rioters from aboard (BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 49; Wang and Wang, 2009: 27). These are said to be recordings of Kadeer orchestrating the July 5 incident prior

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to the event. She is said to have called her brother to inform him that something might happen in Urumqi. She then reportedly made another call with instructions for participants to “be brave” and “make it bigger,” according to Wu (2009: 23) in World Affairs. Xinjiang authorities are said to have deployed police according to wellestablished regulations for dealing with illegal gatherings. Police wore anti-riot helmets, and carried police batons, chili spray, and other non-lethal weapons, and were outnumbered by the rioters (Wang and Wang, 2009: 27–8). One hundred fifty six people were reported killed and 1,700 injured. Among the dead, 134 were Han and 10 were Uyghur (Fan, 2009: 71). Not surprisingly, China-based magazine articles mirror the language found in Chinese government documents. For instance, in 2011, searching the keywords “World Uyghur Congress” on the website of the PRC government6 one noted only nine government documents mentioning the WUC – and all were issued in 2009 during the rioting in Xinjiang. Like the aforementioned Chinese magazine articles, all nine consistently point to Kadeer’s WUC as masterminding the Xinjiang rioting. Aside from the July 2009 riot, according to Wu (2009: 51), China claims to have proof that Kadeer and her associates were the unseen perpetrators of three other violent crimes that occurred in 2008. Such narratives are a clear attempt to persuade Chinese citizens and foreign observers that Uyghur emigres are the cause of domestic instability and are actively inciting violence in China. For the Chinese government, the influence of the WUC is inextricably linked to separatism, terrorism, and extremism, all of which should be outlawed as posing a grave threat to China’s security. Most scholars outside China (e.g. Hoshino, 2009b: 32–9) are skeptical of this nexus – and the narrative China’s government is attempting to establish. This is due to a lack of transparency on the part of the PRC government in terms of allowing independent confirmation of the number of casualties mentioned as well as their causes. Outside observers simply lack any corroborative proof of China’s claims. For example, the images made public by Beijing emphasize the Han victims. The lopsided nature of China’s documentation of events suggests a manipulation of the facts, leading independent observers to question Beijing’s unequivocal message that the victims of the event were almost entirely Han. A Japanese Uyghur expert, Hoshino (2009b: 32–9) points out that if Beijing really had evidence of Kadeer’s involvement, the US government would have felt obliged to extradite her immediately. In Hoshino’s view, this has not occurred because “the evidence is weak, resulting in a loss of international backing for China” (Hoshino, 2009b: 32–9). The Chinese narrative on how to tackle the Uyghur problem In addition to discussing the “problematic” nature of Rebiya Kadeer and the WUC, China-based writers also propose mechanisms and policies for curbing the influence of the overseas Uyghur movement. The reasoning and strategies to adopt can be summarized under four key topic headings.

China’s competing discourses and strategies 117 Safeguarding Xinjiang University In the pages of China Newsweek, Wang and Wang (2009: 26–7) suggest that East Turkestan separatists have infiltrated the campus of Xinjiang University, the leading university in China’s western region. According to this account, the “three evil forces” from abroad in the form of East Turkestan separatists have been lurking on campus, even as the university administration has imposed a crackdown on the separatist group, destroying its networks and curbing its attempts to infiltrate (Wang and Wang, 2009: 26–7). This narrative emphasizes the fact that in the past, a number of intellectuals attached to Xinjiang University “betrayed the country and fled aboard,” becoming East Turkestan terrorists, and that the university authorities have long been battling the influence of Western ideology on their students (Wang and Wang, 2009: 26–7). Wang and Wang (2009: 26–7) also indicate that prior to the July 5 incident, a known separatist from the WUYC called Erkin Sidik delivered a presentation in Uyghur. “The university administration had approved the event titled Minority Youth Entrepreneurship and Business, but were unaware that in fact the content of the speech touched on sensitive ethnic issues and served to incite splittist elements responsible for the July 5th riot” (Wang and Wang, 2009:26–7).

Curbing rumors Chinese writers often suggest the importance of curbing “rumors,” using the example of the Shaoguan incident in Guangdong as a way of backing up their assertions. In this view, the Shaoguan incident was triggered by the Internet rumors, which they claim ignited the violent July 5 riot in Xinjiang. In this vein, the argument is made that to fan hatred among ethnic groups, the WUC and other Uyghur separatists disseminated edited videos of Han people beating Uyghurs, using the Internet as a channel. In this way, the movement was able to spread fallacious accounts and rumors at incredible speed, turning a local incident into an international crisis. China-based writers contend that biased Western media accounts of the incident were riddled with “lies.” The stories and images of the riots published in the London Evening Standard, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and Le Monde were all distortions of the truth (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). To effectively curb this spread of “rumors” regarding the riot, China authorities disconnected the Internet and local communications (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). Thus, the WUC lost its channel for “feeding lies” to the public, thereby “protecting” it from falsifications about an event of which it had no prior knowledge (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). After the rioting quieted down, Xinjiang authorities utilized cell phone text messaging to provide news and information it felt the public needed to know (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). To quote one magazine article, “It is imperative that we strengthen our internet-based counterterrorism efforts on every level” (Fan, 2009: 73). Predictably, these China-based writers express complete support for the central government’s handling of the July riot.

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In the pages of Youth Journalist, Wang and Ho (2009: 49) inform their readers that in an effort to eliminate the “asymmetric delivery” of information, the Xinjiang government was as proactive and transparent as possible, holding frequent press conferences to update the public about operations after the incident. Another way to approach a more truthful examination of the event is through major national media. The People’s Daily dedicated a full seven pages to the July 5 riot in order to “provide a thorough accounting of events” and to counteract the “fallacious portrait” provided by Western media (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). Included in the People’s Daily coverage were articles from religious and opinion leaders, and relatives and acquaintances of Rebiya Kadeer, which “exposed the criminal attempts of the separatists” (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). Reports of how peace suddenly descended on Urumqi after the riot were said to show that the region “has regained its prior serenity, suggesting the efficiency of the way the government dealt with the incident” (Wang and Ho, 2009: 49). Remaining vigilant against international interference Warnings about foreign interference in China’s Tibet and Xinjiang policies are a recurring feature of China’s state-run press. Expressions of caution in regard to international interference suggest that China’s anger is not only directed at the Uyghurs, but at the West for sheltering troublemakers like Rebiya Kadeer (Party & Government Forum, 2008: 51). Continued development of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region The need for the continued economic development of Xinjiang, agriculturally, industrially, and in the service sector, is frequently cited by China-based writers. “Reinforcing the urbanization of the region as a national backbone of industrial development is imperative for maintaining political and social stability among all ethnic groups, and for combating the ‘three evil forces’,” says Wang Lechuang (2005: 7–14) in JinRiXinJiang (Today’s Xinjiang). Wang was Communist Party chief of Xinjiang between 1994 and 2010, during which time he was famous for his hard-line handling of the region’s ethnic minorities.

8.2 China’s strategies As discussed in Chapter Two, much of the activity of WUC-led Uyghur diasporic groups is dedicated to establishing the organization’s legitimacy and asserting its claims in the international arena. We have also examined the types of legitimacy sought by Uyghur activists. Conversely, our overview of how the China government and state-controlled media depict the Uyghur movement reflects Beijing’s attempt to de-legitimize Uyghur diasporic activism by disseminating a counternarrative. We will now attempt to analytically discern China’s overall approach for dealing with the Uyghur lobby.

China’s competing discourses and strategies 119 De-legitimizing the Uyghur lobby In terms of offering any legitimacy for Uyghur national self-determination, China holds an implacable position. The only thing that might be construed as an exception to this is that China intends to continue boosting the economic development of Northwest China. One could interpret that as a way of promoting the economic rights of people – including Uyghurs – who reside in Xinjiang. But the fact is that this has nothing to do with promoting any Uyghur right to collective self-determination. In terms of de-legitimizing overseas Uyghur representation, the three subcategories mentioned in Chapter Two must be examined again, respectively. The first sub-category concerns the discrepancy between the aspirations of Uyghurs in China and Uyghur diasporic activists. China argues that Uyghur diasporic activists do not represent the interests of Uyghurs in China. For instance, an editorial in BingTuanJianShe (2009: 50) comments that The notorious WUC claimed to represent the highest interests of East Turkestan people, but in fact it is linked with East Turkestan terrorists pursuing a separatist movement against China [...] This can be seen with rumors they spread against China’s government, their constant courting of interviews with Western media in order to attack China’s human rights record, and their fanning the flames of a ‘Xinjiang independence movement’. Their actions only serve to hurt the interests of the Chinese people, including Uyghurs. (BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 50) The second sub-category of legitimacy concerns the discrepancy between the interests of overseas Uyghur individuals and member organizations that represent the Uyghur diaspora. Some overseas Uyghurs have been inhibited from joining political activities by Chinese embassies and consulates. Chinese positions and policies keep Uyghurs, who otherwise might wish to be involved with the Uyghur diasporic community, on the sidelines, avoiding political action. My own field trips well illustrate the difficulty of contacting and interviewing overseas Uyghurs. Uyghurs who have “come out of the closet” and are public activists are easier to find and interview than overseas Uyghurs who are not politically active – but only marginally. All researchers in this area face similar challenges. Among those I have spoken to or collaborated with, the consensus is that most Uyghurs are terrified about one thing: Chinese government actions that might be taken against themselves and their families, both in their host countries and in China. Hence, sharing their views with outsiders is avoided at almost all cost. Ilham Mahmut, the Uyghur activist leader in Japan, told me that he does not feel directly threatened. But from time to time, Chinese people (presumably working for the PRC government) take pictures of him after gatherings with friends in front of restaurants. This serves as a warning to Mahmut that he is being watched.7 The Chinese government has therefore achieved a high degree of success instilling fear into overseas Uyghurs and preventing them from openly espousing

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the Uyghur diasporic community. The greater the discrepancy of interests between the individuals who comprise the diasporic community and Uyghur organizations that claim to represent them, the better it is as far as the Chinese government is concerned. These inhibitions, so well instilled by the PRC government, prevent any large-scale mobilization of overseas Uyghurs. The Japanese case is a perfect example: The Japan Uyghur Organization contains only two Uyghur members, which shows that the entirety of Japan’s remaining Uyghur exile community has refrained from contacting Uyghurs who are active politically. The third sub-category of ways China seeks to de-legitimize the overseas Uyghur movement concerns the support organizations like the WUC receive from non-Uyghur organizations in the international community. The Chinese government has sought to monitor and dissuade these international actors from supporting Uyghur diasporic activism. Earlier we discussed German parliamentarian Margarete Bause, who shared her experience of how Chinese representatives in Bavaria spied on her work and correspondence with her contacts in the Uyghur, Tibetan, and Chinese dissident communities. She was also sent reports from local representatives of the Chinese government that named Uyghur activists and called them terrorists. So while Uyghur diasporic organizations do have legal status to operate in liberal democracies like Germany, the Chinese government is tireless in its efforts to shatter this legitimacy by linking Uyghur activities to militant or terrorist acts. For the Chinese government, de-legitimizing Uyghur diasporic efforts and undermining their reputation is essential (Hagan, 2010: 564). Equally important to Beijing is implementing economic, political, and foreign policies to reduce domestic grievances and instability. In the next sub-section, we examine what could be characterized as Beijing’s offering of carrots. Carrots It is an inescapable fact that Uyghurs have a conflictual relationship with the Han majority that dominates the PRC government. Uyghur activism is in part meant to serve as a signal to PRC decision-makers that the salience of Uyghur demands is mounting, with the hope that the PRC will eventually offer concessions. However, this perception of the antagonistic relationship between Uyghurs and the Chinese state is only partly illustrative and is in fact biased. The Chinese state can also be regarded as an external Uyghur patron trying to re-define the Uyghur identity in a way that it perceives in the Uyghur interest (Christoffersen, 2002). The PRC government lends legitimacy to certain people of Uyghur origin because they contribute to the stabilization of the Chinese state, even as it seeks to discredit and crack down on Uyghurs that have secessionist intentions. For example, Beijing has endeavored to cultivate Muslim scholars of Uyghur origin who support the regime. A number of institutions, such as the Islamic Institute of China, have been set up to this end (Christoffersen, 2002). Beijing holds fast to the narrative of equating the Uyghur interests with the interests of the Chinese state as a whole. We previously quoted an editorial from

China’s competing discourses and strategies 121 the BingTuanJianShe (2009: 50) which asserted that the actions of the WUC “only hurt the interests of Chinese people, including Uyghurs” (BingTuanJianShe, 2009: 50). Thus, “when overseas activists utilize international support to seek freedom, the China government advertises it as damaging to Chinese and Uyghur interests – and the ‘harmony’ which is essential to both parties,” an anonymous Uyghur observer notes.8 Another example of Beijing’s use of what could be called a carrot is its previously mentioned efforts to develop Xinjiang economically (Reed and Raschke, 2010: 82). For the Chinese government, the economic rights of Uyghurs trump any other perceived rights (e.g. human rights). This tactic is just as evident in China’s management of the Tibetan case. The government has endeavored to construct roads, rail links and telecommunications, in the hope that economic growth will preempt grievances arising from uneven development and a score of other issues in the region (Szadziewski, 2007; Szadziewski, 2009: 212; Shichor, 2003: 302). One such economic carrot was the first-ever Central Work Conference on Xinjiang convened by the Chinese government from May 17–19, 2010. China had already held five similar events in Tibet, known as the “Work Forum.” The aim of these conferences was to push forward goals for Xinjiang’s development over the next five to ten years. Growing concern in the minds of Chinese leaders over economic, social, and political development in Xinjiang is now apparent, having been reflected by the necessity of organizing a Central Work Conference. Another form of “carrot” used by the Chinese government is diplomatic and aimed at other nations. To win the cooperation of other countries in discouraging Uyghur activism, it offers economic incentives, such as investment, the importation of goods, and offers of agreements on free trade (Sun, 2011b). For instance, after the 2009 riot in Xinjiang, a number of Uyghurs fled to Cambodia via Vietnam to seek political asylum. These Uyghurs were later repatriated back to China. Two days after they were deported in December 2009, the then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visited Phnom Penh and signed trade deals worth over $800 million (Wei, 2012; The China Post, 2012; CNN, 2009). Sticks As Hoshino (2009a: 98–9; 2011: 148–71) discerns, Beijing has sought to resolve the Uyghur problem within both regional and global frameworks. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, in all cases, China’s approach has been to associate the WUC with terrorism. Furthermore, Beijing has tirelessly sought to link its own struggle against Uyghur extremists with the US-led global war on terrorism. This strategy is designed to legitimize China’s crackdown on Uyghur forces by placing it at the center of the global effort to combat terrorism. For instance, on October 11, 2001, Beijing asserted that there is evidence showing that Uyghurs associated with the ETIM are receiving training at a Taliban military school. If true, this would qualify the ETIM as a terrorist organization. At the start of the following year (2002), Beijing issued a detailed report entitled

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East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity, which claimed to document East Turkistan terrorist activity since 1990. In addition, an Anti-Terrorism Bureau was set up by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to curb East Turkistan terrorism. In the summer of 2002, the ETIM was listed by the American government and the UN as a terrorist organization. On December 15, 2003, the MPS issued the East Turkestan Organization and Terrorist List, which included members of the ETIM, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the WUYC, and the East Turkestan Information Center. Eleven Uyghurs are listed as terrorists, and eight more were listed on October 21, 2008. Regionally, Beijing has tried to resolve the Uyghur issue within the framework of the Shanghai Five established in 1996, which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Later renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), this modern and secular organization aims to counter religious fundamentalism, terrorism, and crime (e.g. selling of drugs and arms) (Christoffersen, 2002; Clarke, 2007a: 323–42; Clarke, 2007b: 261–89; Mackerras, 2001: 289–303). The SCO has given China a stage to exercise its diplomatic muscle and forge an antiterrorism coalition in Central Asia (Millward, 2007: 336). As Bhattacharya (2003: 375) observes, “with the establishment of the SCO, China not only eroded sympathy for the Uyghurs among Central Asian states, but it portrayed China as favorable toward Muslim countries” (Bhattacharya, 2003: 375). An excellent example of this is that SCO member states have shut down Uyghur publications and offices across Central Asia, and have arrested Uyghurs who criticize China (Tyler, 2003: 239). A number of these alleged Uyghur terrorists and separatists have been repatriated to China to face trial (Clarke, 2011: 166). The nationalist card As we have shown, state-controlled civilian publications have a unitary, one-sided stance toward government policies in Xinjiang – and government policy in general. It is exceedingly hard to tell whether Chinese authors are writing on their own or copying directly from government announcements. Topgyal (2011: 200) also observes similar one-sided coverage on various Chinese online fora. In Topgyal’s (2011: 200) view, this one-sidedness tends to provoke bursts of nationalistic fervor. Chinese embassies and consulates are then able to use this sentiment to mobilize Chinese communities abroad to demonstrate against Uyghurs and their supporters. This phenomenon was in evidence at the Melbourne film festival examined in Chapter Three. Ironically, the Melbourne incident highlighted both Uyghur mobilization and Chinese counter-mobilization, and their contributions to the internationalization of the conflict.

8.3 Summary In essence, China’s counter-mobilization entails a carrot-and-stick approach, both in regard to the Uyghur themselves and their international supporters, both

China’s competing discourses and strategies 123 actual and potential. The carrots involve economic development in and around Xinjiang to alleviate Uyghur grievances and prevent them from turning to separatism and extremism. The sticks include a “strike hard” campaign to clamp down on suspicious “splittist” elements. Beijing’s combination of economic and diplomatic measures along with tried-and-true repressive measures pose great challenges to the Uyghur lobby’s goal of influencing China and the international community.

Notes 1 CNKI is a huge database containing articles that discuss recent developments in Chinese politics, economics, the humanities, the social sciences, conventional science, and technology. This keyword search was conducted at the University of Tokyo on August 18, 2011. 2 According to Hatton (2013), “China’s propaganda departments have warned domestic news outlets against conducting their own independent reporting on sensitive Xinjiang stories, ordering them to reprint official stories from China’s major state news agencies.” 3 These three articles are exactly the same. I use the first article for analysis in this chapter. Chen, Yun-Chiu (2009) ‘The changing of Rebiya,’ BaoKanHuiCui 11: 33–4; Chen, YunChiu (2009) ‘The changing of Rebiya,’ China Newsweek 25: 30–1; Chen, Yun-Chiu (2009) ‘The changing of Rebiya,’ WanBaoWenCui 17: 20–1. 4 These are the same articles issued by Xinghua News Agency and published in a number of magazines. In this chapter, we use the first article for analysis. BingTuanJianShe (2009) ‘The sin underneath the surface: Rebiya’s true colors revealed,’ BingTuanJianShe 13: 49–50; People’s Congress of Xinjiang (2009) ‘The sin underneath the surface: Rebiya’s true colors revealed,’ People’s Congress of Xinjiang 8: 20–2; XianFengDui (2009) ‘The sin underneath the surface: Rebiya’s true colors revealed,’XianFengDui 15: 50–2; DangJian (2009) ‘The sin underneath the surface: Rebiya’s true colors revealed,’ DangJian 8: 52–3. Also, the article below is similar to the aforementioned article as well as to Chen Yun-Chiu’s article mentioned in the previous footnote. Wang, Yen (2009) ‘Tearing off the ugly mask of Rebiya,’ News Universe 8: 6–7. 5 Kadeer and WUC member organizations have different accounts of Kadeer’s divorce from her first husband. They claim that the Chinese government instructed her husband to divorce her. 6 http://www.gov.cn/english. 7 Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Tokyo, August 17, 2011. 8 Email correspondence with an anonymous Uyghur in Australia in 2011.

9

Conclusions

The international dimension of ethnic/identity conflict, or the ethnicization of international politics, is not new. Ethnically defined non-state actors beyond China, such as the Basques in Spain and the Chechens in Russia, have actively used international channels to advance their causes in the contemporary era, when the traditional functions and boundaries of the state have been increasingly challenged and eroded. As with other ethnically defined non-state actors, the Uyghur diaspora has opted for transnational strategies – and not simply because they are unable to make changes within China. Rather, and more importantly, transnational strategies permit Uyghurs to show the Chinese government that attention to the issue has reached the global arena. By signaling the message that “even outside China, there are people supporting the Uyghurs,” Uyghur diaspora leaders hope to force the Chinese government to drop its dismissive attitude and pay attention. From another angle, it can be said that transnational cooperation enables Uyghurs to expand the conflict onto an international battlefield. This is to serve as a warning shot to PRC leaders that if they wish to prevent the conflict from further spilling out of China proper, Beijing should consider offering concessions. In recent years, a growing number of scholars have taken note of the transnational activism of the Uyghur diaspora. This book highlights and examines those factors that have shaped the WUC’s image as the umbrella organization of the modern Uyghur movement. In league with that undertaking has been an exploration of whether these factors continue to play the role they did in the WUC’s formative years in terms of attracting supporters and alienating opponents. To conclude our study, this last chapter will be devoted to our two central questions, as well as a discussion of their implications for the niche perspective of ethnic mobilization (section 9.1) and the implications of this research on future social science studies (section 9.2).

9.1 The niche perspective of the Uyghur lobby Framing and resources for the successful rise of the WUC Until Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe founder Erkin Alptekin launched the effort to unite Uyghur groups around the globe, the Uyghur movement was a

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badly fragmented one. His strategic preference for a non-violent approach to the cause of Uyghur national self-determination is an inherent part of the human rights repertoire, which is effective in persuading potential supporters in Western societies that it is a strategy that can work. This enables Uyghur organizations to obtain financial support from the NED. Such resources equip Uyghur groups with the capacity to open offices, organize training workshops, and conduct daily operations. Since the NED is bankrolled by the American government, its support also lends credibility to such organizations as legitimate representatives of Uyghur people. Those preferring a radical and militant approach lack the funding for effective advocacy and thus perished. SNA also shows that most actors central to the WUC networks share a Western liberal framing of the Uyghur cause, favoring a non-violent and human rights focus. These central players, however, are not necessarily the wealthiest. This implies that the framing of the Uyghur cause plays a more important role than resources in drawing certain players to support positions taken by the WUC. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, we compared Uyghur movements in the US, Germany, and Japan, analyzing the importance of the factors of resources and framing. A brief comparison of these movements will assist us before a more detailed discussion of these factors.

Comparing movements in the US, Germany, and Japan Previously we discussed the emergence of Uyghur groups in the US, Germany, and Japan. This sequence was chosen based on their sequential emergence as advocacy groups. The US case was introduced first, because the Uyghur American Association was founded in 1998, predating the birth of the WUC by over five years. The Germany-based WUC was founded in 2004, at which point the UAA became a WUC member organization. And the Japan Uyghur Association, established in 2008, is the youngest of these groups. The early decision of Uyghur activists to adopt a human rights strategy, in turn securing NED financial support, set an example that its colleagues in other Western countries later followed. Hence, after it was founded in 2004, the WUC applied to the NED, successfully obtaining its first NED grant in 2006. The Japan Uyghur Association, as the youngest WUC affiliate, is not as yet directly supported by the NED or the WUC. For the moment, it survives on resources obtained by donations from Japanese members and supporters. The existence of a coherent corporate body or constituency lends an organization legitimacy to operate. Yet the issue of constituency also often raises questions and doubts. The WUC is the umbrella organization of 29 Uyghur organizations around the world, and claims to represent the political aspirations of most Uyghurs in China and elsewhere. Nonetheless, it is exceedingly difficult to confirm or disprove whether most Uyghurs actually support such assertions made by the WUC. This ambiguity is not necessarily damaging to the WUC. Hagan (2010: 560) postulates that the adoption of the human rights repertoire often benefits from “a lack of truth or knowledge.” This creates an opening into which Uyghur

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Conclusions

groups – and indeed all groups – can generate a discourse based on its convictions, and depict it as fact or truth. In her analysis, Hagan talks of how, for the most part, activists do not first see and then define (Hagan, 2010: 560). Applying Hagan’s terms, this manuscript contends that Uyghur activists, in the form of the WUC, first defined their constituency as a majority of Uyghurs in the world, and then sought to convince outsiders. The process of filling in this information thus fits into the information politics that Keck and Sikkink (1998: 16–25) observe in TANs. To signal to policy-makers how large, coherent, and strong the constituency is that the WUC represents, the WUC exercises a frequently utilized tactic of ethnic mobilization: the WUC continues to claim to speak for the aspirations of most Uyghurs in China and abroad, whether in fact it does or not. This signals to Western audiences as well as the Chinese government just how salient Uyghur aspirations are for national self-determination, that a large number of people (Uyghurs and non-Uyghurs alike) desire a policy change on the part of China in favor of Uyghurs, and the likelihood that such people will act against the Chinese state if these demands are ignored.1 The WUC and its member organizations have all adopted this tactic. But not all WUC member organizations have had the same level of success in terms of convincing the public of the veracity of this narrative. Of all WUC-affiliated groups, the organization with the most legitimacy and hence the greatest potential for success is the Uyghur American Association (UAA) (Table 9.1). While the UAA cannot and does not claim to speak for all Uyghurs in China or abroad, it has the backing of 90 per cent of Uyghurs in America. As an American NGO, this

Table 9.1 Comparison of cases US WUC member organizations

Germany

Uyghur American Association WUC (UAA) International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF) Founding year(s) UAA (1998)– 2004 IUHRDF (2005) Members 90% of Uyghurs in 29 Uyghur America (900) organizations around the world Friends in host More Republicans than Green Party, social countries Democrats democrats Political Bills introduced and passed Parliamentary developments in debate host countries Framing/issue Anti-China coalition Human rights linkage/coalition (Republicans) and human coalition type rights coalition (Republicans and Democrats)

Japan Japan Uyghur Association

2008 30 members (2 Uyghurs and 28 Japanese) Mostly right wing Recently forms a Diet support group Anti-China coalition

Conclusions

127

is vital to operating in the universe of American lobbying. American legislators prefer to support groups that can demonstrate legitimacy. In this regard, the UAA is well positioned to do so. In this respect, its US “rival,” the East Turkestan Government-in-Exile, is demonstrably weaker. The shakiest of the three movements focused on by this study is the Japan Uyghur Association. This is a group that is not demonstrably supported by the Uyghur diaspora in Japan, in part due to the fear of local Uyghurs to “come out of the closet.” The fear of retaliation from China is so great that the leader of the group, Ilham Mahmut, even admits to his own alienation among Uyghurs in Japan. Hence, he can only rely on Japanese sympathizers, who for the most part are marginalized supporters of the right wing in Japan, and who lack the influence to affect real decision-making. It is ironic that while the Uyghur movement is closely tied to right-wing groups in Japan, in Germany the WUC and its affiliates are supported by law-makers on the center-left of the German political spectrum. This was expressed by Naoko Mizutani, who told of warning Kadeer about Ilham Mahmut’s Japan Uyghur Association (JUA), which is rife with right-wing influence and reflects badly on Uyghurs within mainstream Japanese society. But Kadeer seems to have brushed off Mizutani’s warning.2 This suggests that Kadeer lacks effective control over the activities of WUC member organizations in their respective host countries. The result is quite an opportunistic strategy. In other words, whoever picks up the WUC cause and shows antipathy toward China, wherever they happen to be, is a friend. Kadeer’s reticence to act on Mizutani’s warning signals an agreement – tacit or otherwise – with the JUA’s embrace of right-wing forces in Japan. By comparison, only in the US is the movement able to affiliate with mainstream parties. Both Republicans and Democrats have introduced bills favorable to the Uyghur movement, although most leading supporters have traditionally been Republicans. Some of these bills have not only been introduced, but have been passed by Congress. In Germany, the Green Party is the most active supporter of the Uyghur cause. Its influence, however, is restricted to the local level in Bavaria. On the federal level, the Greens are not a mainstream force with the influence necessary to determine German policy toward China. While the Green Party can and does initiate parliamentary debates in support of the Uyghur cause, unlike the US case, these debates have yet to yield actual resolutions or government policies. In this context, the Japanese movement is the least successful, due to its near absence from discussions in the Diet. In Japan, Uyghur supporters depend largely on voice strategies and mobilize outside official channels to call for greater public awareness. This may begin to change because since 2012 there is a group comprised of right-wing Liberal democrats (e.g. Keiji Furuya) who support the Uyghur cause in the Diet (Perduca, 2012; Japan Times, 2012).3 It will be interesting to see whether this yields more actions on behalf of Uyghur interests in the Diet. It is essential not to disregard the impact of Uyghur transnational activism simply because as yet it has failed to exert tangible influence over government decision-making. The adoption of “expressive politics” is crucial in the context of ethnic conflict. Although participation in collective actions, such as protests

128

Conclusions

and lobbying, is no guarantee that the interests of Uyghurs will be effectively represented in the bargaining process over policy over China (Edelman, 1971: 53–64), Uyghurs continue to take part in collective actions with other groups. Strategically, just being involved in such actions allows Uyghurs to establish relationships with like-minded groups. To put it differently, there are “tangible benefits” for winners in this political bargaining and “symbolic reassurance for the rest who participate in the process” (Edelman, 1971: 53–64; Schuessler, 2000: 17–51; Salisbury, 1969: 15–16; Lowery and Brasher, 2004: 37–8). While tangible benefits appear far-fetched at present, Uyghurs need symbolic reassurance. This psychological incentive implies that in the near future the Han–Uyghur conflict will likely escalate rather than subside. So in comparing the three cases, in terms of coalition type, all these movements have attracted local supporters based on shared interests in the human rights claims brought up by Uyghur activists. But only in the case of the Uyghur movement in Japan are all human rights claims linked to anti-China ideology. In the United States, while leading Republican supporters are prone to be ideologically critical of China, the majority of legislators who have helped introduce bills, both Republican and Democrat, do not do so out of an anti-China ideology. Most simply believe in the discourses of democracy and human rights. Similarly, in Germany, support for Uyghurs does not hinge on anti-China ideology, but is focused mostly on protecting minority and human rights.4 Framing and resources for local coalitions and divisions The WUC resembles a “federal system.” Its member organizations have great autonomy, overseeing their own resources and operational strategies in their host countries. This localization of the worldwide WUC movement leads its affiliate organizations to find their own paths for survival. Interestingly, framing of the Uyghur issue plays a vital role in allowing local Uyghur affiliates to create independent alliances and bases of support. The role of framing in this process differs from case to case. But in general, people who tend to involve themselves with WUC member organizations share a belief that the cause of Uyghur self-determination can only be achieved by peaceful means, and in that context the protection of human rights in China is a prime concern. Resources also play a role, but again, this means different things to activists in different countries. In all three cases we have examined, resources appear to be an intermediate factor, and one that is secondary to framing. Certainly, resources are not the most significant factor in mobilizing the Uyghur support base. The frames used for articulating the Uyghur cause are the clearest determinant of what kind of people step forward in support of Uyghurs. Once people decide that the non-violent and human rights approach adopted by Uyghurs is agreeable, they are more likely to commit time, labor, money, and “existing accesses to politicians” as ways of assisting the Uyghur movement. In the US case, this can be seen in the way NED financial resources result from NED support for the approach and mandate of the movement. Resources come after framing. Resources can then

Conclusions

129

serve the purpose of consolidating UAA affiliates, leaving competing fringe groups like the East Turkestan Government-in-Exile (ETGE) too enfeebled to catch up or compete. The factor of resources appears even less vital in the German case. WUC financial resources come from the US-based NED and Uyghur exiles in other countries. In Germany, those who affiliate with the WUC, such as the Green Party, do not provide financial support. Their affiliation is based on agreement with the human rights repertoire. Once again, the factor of framing trumps resources. In the Japanese case, framing of the Uyghur issue, based largely on an antiChina premise, is the defining factor. Having attracted right-wing supporters, some dedicate money, while others offer contacts and access points for the nascent organization. Once more, resources play an intermediate role in consolidating the WUC movement in Japan. A second thought on the human rights repertoire The above discussion asserts that because it has adopted the right strategic approach (i.e. the winning approach) of adopting the human rights repertoire, the WUC has established itself as the global umbrella organization for the Uyghur movement. Actors that favor this approach are favorably disposed toward the non-violent, human rights-centered framing of the Uyghur cause. While it is obvious that those who prefer a more radical approach pine for the outright secession of Xinjiang from China, it is less clear that those advocating peaceful and incremental methods truly support the continued presence of Xinjiang within China. Among those favoring peaceful and incremental means are people that must be considered “latent radicals” (Mackerras, 2011: 27). For the latent radicals, the human rights repertoire is nothing more than a practical means for achieving visibility and acceptance for the Uyghur movement, as well as a way of obtaining financial resources for pursuing international political change (Mackerras, 2011: 27). For them, peaceful and incremental means are only a temporary means to an end. There is no way to tell how long such individuals will adhere to less radical means, or when they might shift toward advocating outright independence – with or without a forthrightly militant approach. This illustrates how the WUC-led movement is only superficially unified. Wide divisions exist regarding how they should promote national self-determination (Debata and Tian, 2011: 36–7; Mackerras, 2011: 27). Will latent radicals resurface in subsequent phases of the movement? Will they further divide Uyghurs? These questions are worthy of further observation and research.

9.2 Contributions to social sciences studies and limits The Uyghur Lobby investigates the Uyghur movement through the lens of political science theory, including an examination of the operations of interest groups and TANs. The Uyghur case, in terms of its theoretical contributions, supports the importance of group-based factors, such as framing tactics and resources in the

130

Conclusions

formation of coalitions. In an earlier publication on ethnic mobilization in Europe (Chen, 2009), I labeled factors in this class “micro factors,” as they are in contrast to “macro factors” that postulate the influence of domestic or international opportunity structures on group coalitions. In that quantitative survey study, it was shown that micro factors are more important than macro factors in the formation of transnational actions. In this book, which is a qualitative case study of the Uyghur movement, micro factors are indeed shown to be working to affect the emergence of the WUC, and to be continuing to shape the coalition of its potential supporters. This is not to say that macro factors have no role. In discussing the Uyghur lobby in the US, Germany, and Japan, it becomes clear that most of the coalitions cobbled together in the domestic political arena are a reflection of the political games within these countries. From the perspective of Uyghur activists, this is a battle for a closely held personal cause. For their non-Uyghur affiliates and supporters, however, they are fighting for a much broader cause. Hence, in Japan, the Uyghur lobby is welcomed by right-wing groups as part of their wider agenda of safeguarding Japan’s national interest and sabotaging China. In Germany, the WUC is embraced by the Green Party as a way of consolidating the conviction of German voters that the Green Party speaks on behalf of multiculturalism. In the US, the Uyghur lobby is embraced by Republicans and Democrats in order to help consolidate the image of domestic legislators, demonstrating a concern for democratic development and human rights in China. A qualitative case study like that presented here reflects a far more complicated interaction of micro and macro factors in Realpolitik. What really counts is the interplay of these factors. In interest-group studies, scholars concern themselves with more than how a lobby is formed and how it garners allies. Another question that intrigues scholars is the actual impact of lobbying. Pertaining to impact, our findings suggest that the domestic opportunity structure of host countries highly constrains the development of the Uyghur lobby. Having alliances with minor political players in Germany and Japan is not conducive to having an impact on policy-making. Conversely in America, the Uyghur lobby has had some success, as both Republicans and Democrats have helped introduce and pass bills in line with the interests of the Uyghur lobby. This book has adopted a political science-based approach for teasing out factors that affect the emergence, coalitional formation, and influences of the Uyghur lobby. The results are summarized above. Time and resource permitting, an ethnographic approach involving more observations from members of the diasporic community, which is a technique more often utilized by anthropologists than political scientists, will greatly contribute to the work presented in this manuscript. Given the fact that the WUC has 29 member organizations in many different countries, studying and comparing more of them would offer a more expository examination of the Uyghur lobby, how it operates, and how effective it really is as an organization that lobbies on behalf of an oppressed ethnic group.

Conclusions

131

Sustained interest in the subject will further permit the accumulation of social network data sets that might eventually be useful for a longitudinal study, which is lacking in the current literature. Future studies will help us gradually grasp the transformation of the Uyghur networks across a longer period of time.

Notes 1 Inspired by Ken Kollman’s 1998 study on outside lobbying, this book adopts his observation that interest groups tend to approach policy-makers directly, anticipating that through negotiation and persuasion it will be possible to influence policy-making in a direction favorable to them. This is called inside lobbying. Outside lobbying, on the other hand, focuses on persuading and mobilizing constituents (both public and anonymous) and the general public. Once mobilized, these constituents and supporters then approach law–makers directly in support of the policy that the interest group is advancing. Interest groups tend to believe that the more supporters who approach their law-makers, the more likely such law-makers are to be persuaded that the issue is salient, and thus help sponsor bills in favor of their interests (Kollman, 1998: 8–9). 2 Interview with Naoko Mizutani in Tokyo, August 26, 2011. 3 Japan’s current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, for instance is identified by Mahmut as a supporter for the Uyghurs. Interview with Ilham Mahmut of the Japan Uyghur Association, in Taipei, May 11, 2013. 4 While some Uyghur supporters are not necessarily propelled by an anti-China ideology when advocating for the Uyghur issue, all are prone to paranoia when it comes to China, because they often have to deal with “a face of China” with a poor human rights record.

Appendix Uyghur-relevant US legislations (January 1989–March 2011)

No Congress

Year

1.

111th

1.

Bill

Summary

Action

2010 S3104ENR

To permanently authorize Radio Free Asia

Enrolled Bill

111th

2010 S3104ES

Ditto

Engrossed in Senate

1.

111th

2010 S3104RS

Ditto

Reported in Senate

1.

111th

2010 S3104IS

Ditto

Introduced in Senate

1.

111th

2010 SR405ATS

Reaffirming the centrality Agreed to by the Senate of freedom of expression and press freedom as cornerstones of US foreign policy and US efforts to promote individual rights

1.

111th

2010 HR2701RDS

Intelligence Authorization Received in Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Senate

1.

111th

2010 HR2701EH

Ditto

Engrossed in House

1.

111th

2010 S3676PCS

Making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs for the fiscal year

Placed on Senate Calendar

1.

111th

2010 HR5349IH

To provide that Cambodia’s debt to the US may not be reduced or forgiven, and textile and apparel articles that are products of Cambodia and imported into the US may not be extended duty-free treatment

Introduced in House

Appendix No Congress

Year

1.

111th

1.

Bill

133

Summary

Action

2009 SR155IS

China should cease engaging in acts of cultural, linguistic, and religious suppression directed against the Uyghur people

Introduced in Senate

111th

2009 HR2701RH

Intelligence Authorization Reported in Act for Fiscal Year 2010 House

1.

111th

2009 SR171ATS

Commending the people Agreed to who have sacrificed their Senate personal freedoms to bring about democratic change in China

1.

111th

2009 SR167IS

Ditto

1.

111th

2009 HR624IH

Condemning all violent Introduced in repression by China of House peaceful Uighur protests

1.

111th

2009 HR953IH

Introduced in China has violated internationally recognized House human rights and legal due process standards by carrying out executions after trials marred by procedural abuses and by carrying out arbitrary detentions targeting Uyghurs and other individuals in Xinjiang in the aftermath of a suppressed demonstration and ensuing mob violence on July 5 to 7, 2009

1.

110th

2008 SR574IS

China should release the children of Rebiya Kadeer and Canadian citizen Huseyin Cecil; China should refrain from further engaging in acts of cultural, linguistic, and religious suppression directed against the Uyghur people

Introduced in Senate

Introduced in Senate

(Continued)

134

Appendix

No Congress

Year

1.

110th

1.

Bill

Summary

Action

2008 HR1370EH

Call on China to end abuses of the human rights of its citizens, to cease repression of Tibetan and Uighur citizens

Engrossed in House

110th

2008 HR1370IH

Ditto

Introduced in House

1.

110th

2008 HR1140IH

Recognizing the 10th Anniversary of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

Introduced in House

1.

110th

2007 HR608IH

The US government should Introduced in House take immediate steps to boycott the Summer Olympic Games unless China stops engaging in serious human rights abuses against its citizens and stops supporting serious human rights abuses by the Governments of Sudan, Burma, and North Korea against their citizens

1.

110th

2007 HR610IH

Ditto

Introduced in House

1.

110th

2007 HR497EH

China should recognize the rights of the Uyghur people; China should release the children of Rebiya Kadeer; China should release Canadian citizen Huseyin Cecil

Engrossed in House

1.

110th

2007 HR497IH

China should release the children of Rebiya Kadeer and Canadian citizen Huseyin; China should refrain from further engaging in acts of cultural, linguistic, and religious suppression directed against the Uyghur people

Introduced in House

Appendix No Congress

Year

1.

109th

1.

Bill

135

Summary

Action

2006 SCONRES88IS

Urging China to remove all legal and political obstacles for lawyers attempting to defend criminal cases in China, including politically sensitive cases

Introduced in Senate

109th

2006 HCONRES365EH

Ditto

Concurrent Resolution

1.

109th

2006 HCONRES365RFS Ditto

Referred in Senate

1.

109th

2006 HCONRES365IH

Ditto

Introduced in House

1.

109th

2005 HCONRES83IH

Urging the appropriate representative of the US to the 60th session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to introduce a resolution calling upon China to end its human rights violations

Introduced in House

1.

108th

2004 HR530IH

Ditto

Introduced in House

1.

108th

2004 HR530EH

US government officials and officials from other governments should continue to speak out against Chinese repression of religious and political freedom, persecution of Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, Catholics, Protestants, and Uighur Muslims

Engrossed in House

1.

108th

2003 HR477IH

Calling on China to immediately and unconditionally release Kadeer

Introduced in House

1.

108th

2003 SR230ATS

Ditto

Agreed to Senate

1.

108th

2003 SR230RS

Ditto

Reported in Senate

1.

108th

2003 SR230IS

Ditto

Introduced in Senate (Continued)

136

Appendix

No Congress

Year

1.

106th

1.

Bill

Summary

Action

2000 HCONRES249IH

China should release Kadeer, her secretary, and her son and permit them to move to the US if they so desire

Introduced in House

106th

2000 SR252IS

Kadeer, her family member, and business associate should be released

Introduced in Senate

1.

106th

2000 SCONRES81

China should release Kadeer, her secretary, and her son and permit them to move to the US if they so desire

Engrossed in Senate

1.

106th

2000 SCONRES81RS1S Ditto

Reported in Senate

1.

106th

2000 SCONRES81IS

Ditto

Introduced in Senate

1.

106th

2000 SCONRES81

Ditto

Concurrent Resolution

1.

106th

2000 SCONRES81RFH

Ditto

Referred in House

1.

105th

1998 HR2431RH

Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998

Reported in House

1.

105th

1998 HR3806IH

Ditto

Introduced in House

1.

105th

1998 HR2431EH

Ditto

Engrossed in House

1.

105th

1998 HR2431PCS

Ditto

Placed on Calendar in Senate

1.

105th

1997 HR2095IH

To provide for certain activities regarding the promotion of respect for human rights, the development of democratic government, and the development of the rule of law within China

Introduced in House

Source: US Library of Congress (search period: January, 1989–March, 2011; keywords: Uyghur, Uighur)

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Index

Amnesty International 28, 36, 41, 45–6, 48–9, 58, 64, 71, 87, 94 asylum-seekers 7, 67, 83, 86, 100 Australia 3, 7, 19, 23, 45, 47–50, 56, 69, 84, 94, 97 Bause, M. 43, 84–5, 88, 87, 90, 120 Bavaria 5–6, 34, 42–3, 82, 84–9, 120, 127; Parliament 34, 42, 84, 89; State Parliament 5–6, 43, 84, 87–9 BBC 50, 59, 64, 86 Brandenburg Gate 87–8 campaign 20, 23, 71–2, 78–80, 83, 87–8, 107, 109, 123 Central Asia 16, 18–19, 25, 55, 68, 110–11, 122 Central Intelligence Agency 23 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 71, 111 CNN 42, 57–8, 61, 64, 121 Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2, 71 counterterrorism 117 cyberspace 10, 59, 62

Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 57–8, 114, 121–2 Eastern Turkestan National Center (ETNC) 18–19, 22 Eastern Turkestan Republic 16 Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe 19, 124 Erkin Alptekin 19, 82, 115, 124 European Parliament 45–6 European Union 104 Formosan Association for Public Affairs 76 Free Tibet Japan 99 Ganbare-Nippon 98–9 Ghulja incident 48 Green Party 10, 42–3, 84–8, 90, 126–7, 129–30 Guantanamo 43, 85, 87, 89; Bay 7–8, 43, 85, 87–8; detainees 10, 89, 90, inmates 83, 86, 89, 90; Uyghurs 89, 90–1

Dalai Lama 41, 78, 112–13 Democrats 72–3, 75, 102, 126–7, 130 Department of Homeland Security 67–8 Deutsche Welle 44–6, 86, 90

human rights 3, 6, 9, 18–20, 23–4, 30, 36, 41, 44–5, 48, 50, 52, 57, 71–2, 76–7, 86–8, 90, 105, 109, 112–15, 119, 121, 125, 128–30; NGOs 41, 43, 49; repertoire 71, 76, 80, 86, 88, 125, 129 Human Rights in China 43 Human Rights Watch 36, 46 Human Rights without Frontiers 36, 45–6 hypotheses 6, 8, 13, 31, 84

East Turkestan 18, 22, 24, 28, 76, 101–2, 110–11, 113–15, 117, 119 East Turkestan Australian Association 46–7 East Turkestan Government-in-Exile (ETGE) 22–4, 27, 62, 79, 127, 129 East Turkestan Liberation Organization 114, 122 East Turkestan Organization and Terrorist List 122

Initiative for China 76–7 interest groups 9, 13, 72, 79, 86, 105, 129 International Campaign for Tibet 45–6, 56 international governmental organizations 7, 30, 42, 44, 104 international networks 9, 35 international non-governmental organization 19, 28, 37–40, 47–8, 54, 60, 63, 70, 95

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Index

International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF) 69, 70, 75, 77, 79, 84, 126 International Uyghur Pen Club 23, 75 Japan Silk Road Club 99 Japan Uyghur Association 10, 30, 57, 93–5, 97, 104, 123, 125–7 Kadeer, R. 3, 6–7, 9, 26, 41–6, 49–50, 71–3, 75–6, 78–9, 80, 87, 94, 103, 110–16, 118, 127 Kanat, O. 20, 24, 68, 70–1, 75 Kyrgyzstan 25, 48, 122 Kyrgyzstan Uyghur Association 48, 55 legitimacy 7, 22, 26–7, 29, 30, 70, 96, 107, 118–20, 125–7 Mahmut, I. 57, 82, 93–4, 96–9, 100–3, 105, 119, 127 map 9, 14–15, 33–4, 42, 47, 56, 59, 64, 94, 102 Nagayama, H. 97–9, 101–2 National Endowment for Democracy 6–7, 23, 26–7, 32, 36, 41, 45, 58, 70, 75–6, 88, 101, 125 non-violent 19–20, 25, 30, 50, 125, 128–9 Olympics 43, 87–8 online networks 22, 35, 53–4, 56–9, 60–4 pan-Islamic force 24–5, 28 pan-Turkish vision 25 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 1, 52, 57, 59, 83, 102, 109–10, 114–15, 120, 124; embassy 43; government 1, 49–50, 55, 96, 112, 115–16, 119–20 persecution of Falun Gong in China 43 political entrepreneurs 16–17, 99 Political Prisoner Database 2 self-determination 6, 17, 19–20, 27–9, 36, 44, 56, 72, 76, 95, 97–8, 102, 110, 114, 119, 125–6, 128–9 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 122 Shaoguan incident 65, 115, 117 snowball method 95–6, 102 social network analysis (SNA) 6, 9–10, 33–6, 44–5, 47, 50, 53, 69, 79, 94, 99, 100, 102, 125 Soviet Union 18, 25, 67, 69 Taiwan 98, 101–2 Taiwan Friends of Uyghurs 101

terrorism 57, 78, 115–16, 121–2 Tibet 42, 59, 97–9, 101–2, 110, 112, 118, 121 Tibetan 2, 16, 26, 43, 56, 72, 77, 98, 102, 113–15, 120–1 transnational advocacy networks 9, 13, 16, 71 Turkey 16–17, 19, 25, 30, 48, 55, 57, 68, 82, 94 Twitter 61–2, 64–5 United Nations 17, 28, 46, 61, 64, 104 United States 10, 18, 31, 57, 67, 69–70, 72, 75, 79–80, 85, 93, 106, 121, 128; Congress 23; House of Representatives and Senate 3 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 7, 19, 41, 48 Uyghur American Association (UAA) 3, 10, 13, 23, 27–8, 41–2, 45–6, 52–3, 58–9, 61–2, 64, 67–71, 75, 77–79, 84, 125–7, 129 Uyghur Australian Association 36, 45–9, 69 Uyghur Canadian Association 3, 36 Uyghur diasporic media 20, 53 Uyghur diasporic organizations 3, 19–20, 27–9, 36, 41, 50, 52, 120 Uyghur Human Rights Project 23, 45–6, 62, 59, 70 Uyghur inmates 43, 83, 85–6, 88–90 Uyghur Liberation Organization 25 Uyghur-relevant bills 69, 72, 74–5, 78 Voice of America 5, 42 White House 70, 77–8 World Uyghur Congress (WUC) 1, 3, 5–6, 7–10, 13–16, 19–24, 26–7, 29–31, 37–45, 47–9, 50, 53, 56–7, 59, 62, 64, 67, 69, 73, 75,77, 82–4, 86–8, 90, 93–6, 98, 100–4, 106–7, 109–21, 124–130; member organizations 14–15, 30, 69, 126–8; Secretary General 59, 114 World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) 114, 117, 122 Xinjiang 1–3, 5–6, 16–8, 20–2, 25, 29, 41, 48, 53, 56, 61, 64–5, 68, 71, 77, 79, 83, 85, 93, 97–8, 105, 109–12, 114–19, 121–3, 129; University 117 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 1, 118 Yang, J. 76