Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits 9780755622016, 9781845111427

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List of Tables

Table 1 Table 2

Total trade of Turkey with France and Russia 1909-1914 Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought Battlecruisers 1906-1914

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161 183

Note on Usage

When writing Russian history, a number of choices must be made about the treatment of names and dates. My transliterations follow a modified Library of Congress system. In the text and index, I generally transliterated names from the Russian. In cases where last names were not originally Russian, I used their original form; thus, Benckendorff instead of Benkendorf, Hartwig instead of Gartvig, Giers instead of Girs, Neidhardt instead of Neidgart, and so on. I left names that are familiar in English in their western forms, especially those of the tsars. In the notes, however, I based the presentation of the names on the provenance of the source. When Benckendorff is quoted from a Russian source, his name is given as Benkendorf (even if he is writing in French), while if I cite a French-, German-, or English-language publication, it is given as Benckendorff. The Russian alphabet also contains two unpronounced letters, usually rendered with a single or double quotation mark for the soft and hard signs, respectively. I have removed the single quotation from names where it comes after an ‘l’ but left it in other cases: Izvolskii instead of Izvol’skii but Anan’ich rather than Ananich. Sazonov is always Sazonov, unless noted differently in the quotation. Turkish personal and place names are rendered as they were in early twentieth-century western literature: Djemal instead of Çemal and Adrianople instead of Edirne. Imperial Russian history also requires a choice about dates. Until 1918, Russia followed the Julian calendar, which was twelve days behind the western, Gregorian equivalent in the nineteenth century and thirteen days behind in the twentieth century. Many histories of internal Russian subjects use Julian dates, but the dual systems and resulting clutter on the page are inconvenient in a work on vii

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international affairs. This work gives all dates in the Gregorian version only. In all cases, translations are mine. When versions of documents are available in English and another language, I have cited the English version unless otherwise specified. Furthermore, in giving quotations from British sources, I have not changed spellings, grammar, or capitalization unless it seemed necessary to make a passage read more clearly. Such instances are indicated by brackets in the text. The reader unfamiliar with the diplomatic history of the period before the First World War should be aware of a change in the terminology of diplomatic ranks. From the fifteenth until the middle of the twentieth century, the diplomat at the head of a country’s foreign mission could have one of several titles. Most important for our purposes, these heads of mission were usually either ambassadors or ministers, reflecting the rank and prestige of both the sending and receiving states. In 1914, Russia had ambassadors in Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and so on but had only ministers in states such as Denmark, Switzerland, and Serbia. Heads of governmental departments in most European states were also known as ministers, such as the minister of war or the minister of finance. Nonetheless, when the text refers to a minister, the diplomatic or nondiplomatic nature of his work should always be clear from the context. While the English and French languages share this ambiguity over minister/ministre, Russian does not. An ambassador is a posol; his colleague in a smaller capital is a poslannik; the minister of a governmental department is a ministr.

Acknowledgments

It is a pleasure to express my gratitude for the help and support that I have received in bringing this project to fruition. Professor Martin A. Miller, at first my advisor at Duke University and now, I’m glad to say, a friend, has patiently seen me through the whole, extended project with encouragement, advice, and good humor. He generously allowed me to find my own path, while keeping me focused on the ultimate goal. I also wish to remember the late Professor William Evans Scott, whose seminars on European diplomatic history brought my attention to Sazonov and his troubled times. Bill Scott was a caring teacher and kind man, and I am sorry that he could not see the project completed. A number of other scholars have taken time from their own work to read parts or all of some version of this text. Along with Professor Miller, the other members of my dissertation committee—Tami D. Biddle, Warren Lerner, Donald J. Raleigh, and William M. Reddy— have provided me with useful input and support. Outside of the committee, Professors encouraging support. Outside of the committee, Professors Alex Roland and Orest Pelech went beyond the call of duty to help me with this project and more. Beyond Duke, I must recognize Professor David Stevenson, my advisor at the London School of Economics, who has continued to assist me since then. He not only helped me with the intricacies of the pre-First World War period but also guided me through the complexities of diplomatic archival work. His advice and example have been invaluable. I must also thank Professors David M. McDonald, Ben Eklof, and Eve Levin for their encouragement. ix

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My parents, Bonnie Bobroff and Robert Bobroff, had their own central roles in this work. In their own ways, they helped foster my love of history and sharpen my intellectual curiosity while patiently supporting me through college and graduate school, never criticizing as I took on one distraction after another. My friends in the Durham, NC, area also contributed immensely to this project. In their own ways, Mary Jane Morrow and Sam and Stephanie Poley brought humanity, laughter, advice, camaraderie and cuisine, which helped me keep my perspective on the process. In Winston-Salem, my colleagues in the history department of Wake Forest University have given me encouragement and advice, none more so than James A. Wilson and Michele Gillespie, whose enthusiasm and belief in our mission as scholars and teachers have made my own time as a visiting professor more comfortable. In Moscow, Geli and Galina Zemstov provided me a home away from home. The staffs of various libraries and archives have been understanding and helpful in gathering the materials required for this work. Special thanks go to the staffs of the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki rossiiskoi imperii (especially Natalia Vladimirovna Borodina), the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv voenno-morskogo flota, the Service historique de la Marine and the Public Records Office (now part of the National Archives of England, Wales and the United Kingdom). Thanks are also extended to the Archive of the French Foreign Ministry, the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, the Hoover Institution, and the manuscript division of the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library. Special thanks also to the staff of the Interlibrary Loan Offices of Perkins Library at Duke University and the Z. Smith Reynolds Library at Wake Forest University. Research for this book was supported in part by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities and the US Department of State. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed. Funding for research was also provided by the following divisions of Duke University: the Graduate School, the History Department, the Centers for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies, and the Center for International Studies. I also want to extend my appreciation to those who helped get this work across the finish line. At I.B. Tauris, they include Lester Crook,

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Kate Sherratt and Elizabeth Munns. Julie Edelson, at Wake Forest University, was a gentle but careful editor who added some well-needed clarity to my prose. Funds that assisted in the final preparation of the manuscript were provided by the Publication and Research Fund of the Wake Forest University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. Most of all, Maria Park Bobroff, my wife, has provided friendship, companionship and good sense, making the years working on this project far more survivable, and indeed enjoyable, than they would have been without her. Furthermore, she took valuable time from her own dissertation work to read this manuscript, and it has benefited in many ways from her critical eye. This project is stronger for the contributions of all these people and others whose help may have gone unmentioned here but certainly not unappreciated. The weaknesses of the work remain my own. Jamestown, North Carolina December 2005

For Maria And to the memory of Bill Scott

INTRODUCTION

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central question in European international relations before the First World War concerned the ownership, control, and fate of the Turkish Straits. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles connect the Mediterranean with the Black Sea and serve as a crucial route for commercial and naval traffic to and from the southern Russian coast. Indeed, their importance lives on, as oil is exported from the Caspian basin. A century ago, however, the Straits Question was inseparable from a larger set of problems known as the Eastern Question.1 In that context, the European powers—especially Russia, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, and France, followed by Germany—struggled for influence in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Peninsula. Each nation sought an advantageous position from which to absorb or to control parts of the “sick man of Europe,” as the Ottoman Empire was known on account of its apparently failing strength. The Straits served as a center around which the wider challenges of the Eastern Question revolved. The Turkish Straits have been both underappreciated and misunderstood in the study of Russian foreign policy and history. This book examines imperial Russia’s policy toward the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles during a critical transitional period. Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov’s appointment as foreign minister in late 1910 heralded an important shift in Russian attitudes toward the region. After a century of seeking mostly bilateral arrangements with Constantinople to protect Russian interests, St. Petersburg moved to a multilateral approach. Sazonov, like most of his predecessors, believed that as long as Russia was not strong enough to force its will upon Turkey, it should cooperate with the other Great Powers of Europe to preserve the status quo at the Straits. Sazonov also guided Russia into the First World War and oversaw the most important Anglo-Franco-Russian diplomatic

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discussions about the region’s future. One of his most significant achievements was their collective agreement in the spring of 1915 that after the Allies won the war against the Central Powers, Russia would be granted possession of the Turkish Straits. After Sazonov’s forced retirement in July 1916, imperial Russian diplomacy failed to see the fulfillment of this promise before the regime was overthrown. This study will show that Russia followed a consistent policy toward the Turkish Straits until the conclusion of the Straits Agreements of March and April 1915. Maintaining the status quo at the Straits underpinned everything that Sazonov did before and during the early months of the war. Russia opposed any other power aside from Turkey and itself having any physical influence over the waterway. At the same time, Russia never allowed its own interests there to interfere with the containment of, or the fight against, German expansionism. The consistency and conduct of this policy in the larger context of Russian government and society have been misunderstood until now. Perhaps more important, the real meaning of the Straits Agreements has been missed. Although many consider these accords Sazonov’s greatest victory and a solid achievement for Russian diplomacy, I argue that this “prize” proved a great tragedy, complicating the Russian war effort and contributing to the demise of the very state for which he labored so hard. Sazonov’s continued pursuit of this goal as the war sharpened internal Russian unrest is symptomatic of a changed view of the public sphere among a number of Russian officials and officers. These men understood that the government would have to become more closely tied to public opinion, perhaps by creating a government responsible to the national legislature, the State Duma. As vocal members of the Duma demanded that Russia gain possession of the Straits as reward for its sacrifices, Sazonov tried to comply, even if he was officially still responsible only to the tsar. Thus, he refused to consider a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire, even if it might have provided the Allies with a crucial extra margin of strength against the Central Powers. On this decisive mistake rests the historical judgment of Sazonov’s place in Russian and European history and, by extension, the system within which he worked. When Peter I came to power in Muscovite Russia at the end of the seventeenth century, Turkey possessed the whole of the Black Sea and its shores. The Ottomans were not long past the height of their power, but in the ensuing centuries, their borders receded. Peter struggled to establish Russia on the Black Sea, and by the end of the eighteenth

INTRODUCTION

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century, Catherine II ensured its permanent presence. In the nineteenth century, the balance between St. Petersburg and Constantinople shifted further in Russia’s favor, especially after its defeat of Napoleon. As Balkan peoples, such as the Greeks and then the Serbs, Rumanians, and Bulgarians, began to throw off Turkish control, Russia fashioned itself as protector of those Slavic and Orthodox populations; the ideologies of Slavophilism and pan-Slavism fostered a strong interest in the fate of the Slavic peoples Russian society saw as its brethren.2 The Balkans became a flashpoint for Russian conflicts not only with the Turks but also with the Austrians, who were increasing their influence in southeastern Europe as the Ottomans weakened. While the AustroRussian rivalry lay quiescent in the 1890s, its flare up in the early twentieth century helped to spark the First World War. The Balkans were important to Russia not only as a place to raise its prestige and safeguard its security but also as the antechamber to the Turkish Straits. Indeed, the regime at the Straits became a central focus of Russian policy because the region’s strategic and economic importance grew more complex before the outbreak of World War I. Strategically, neither Russian nor foreign warships could access Russia’s southern coast from the open ocean without passing through the Turkish Straits; a series of nineteenth-century international agreements barred entry to non-Turkish warships without the sultan’s permission, and this regime protected Russia’s southern coast from attack, save when Russia and Turkey were at war.3 Throughout the nineteenth century, St. Petersburg believed that Great Britain posed the greatest threat, as it sought to protect lines of communication with its Indian empire via the Mediterranean Sea. However, from the RussoJapanese War in 1904-1905, the inability to send warships through the Straits more hindered than helped the Russians; St. Petersburg could not dispatch reinforcements from the Black Sea to the Pacific. Afterward, the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente reduced traditional fears of a British attack on Russia, but technological advances and renewed Turkish interest in naval armaments complicated Russia’s situation. The invention of the dreadnought-class battleship—faster, betterarmed, and better-armored than anything else afloat—quickly made every other vessel on the Black Sea obsolete. When reformist officers known as the Young Turks began to rule Turkey in 1908, they ordered new warships from foreign shipyards and were allowed by international law to bring them into the Black Sea. The same regulations forced the Russians to build their Black Sea Fleet in southern ports, but they had no capable shipyards there until 1911-1912, and even when they did,

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the slow pace of construction could not compete with the efficiency of western and central European shipyards.4 The Straits regime thus critically influenced Russia’s national security. From an economic perspective, the Turkish Straits rivaled northern shipping routes from St. Petersburg. By Sazonov’s time, their economic value had increased significantly, especially as southern Russian export of oil, manganese ore, and coal grew.5 Between 1906 and 1913, the southern ports averaged 26.1 percent of total Russian international trade, while the Baltic ports averaged 30.4 percent. More crucially, while most imports came through the northern ports, the Black Sea ports were the gateway largely for exports at a time when the government was attempting to export as much as possible in order to afford critical technological imports. Turkish closure of the Straits to all shipping for about a month in April and May 1912 in reaction to an Italian attack at the Dardanelles during the Italo-Turkish War (see chapter 2) made the Russians even more protective of this vulnerable connection to the Mediterranean. The growing economic significance of the Straits captured the attention not only of governmental observers but of societal groups. The constitutional changes after the 1905 revolution gave parts of society a new voice in the affairs of state. Russian society had long been interested in the fate of Constantinople, the seat of Eastern Orthodoxy and site of one of its most revered buildings—the Church of St. Sophia, which the Turks, centuries earlier, had turned into a mosque. It was a Russian religious dream to capture Constantinople, to place the Orthodox cross once again atop the church, and to secure itself as successor to the Byzantine Empire. With the growth of commerce through the southern ports, the Straits themselves took on more meaning. After 1905, those involved in commerce and finance could and did make their opinions known from the tribune of the new representative assembly, the State Duma, and in the freer and bolder press that developed in the years before the outbreak of the First World War. They pressured the government to protect the waterway when it appeared threatened, and once the war began, they demanded that Russia claim both the Straits and Constantinople as its reward for the sacrifices of the war and the protection of Russia’s future interests.6 The other Great Powers of Europe were also interested in the Straits. Great Britain was Russia’s traditional opponent in the area, but by the beginning of the twentieth century, new factors were decreasing its concerns about Russian influence over its connections to India. The Franco-Russian Alliance now meant that war with Russia would bring

INTRODUCTION

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war with France. This new strategic balance reduced the value of the Turkish Straits, since even if they were closed, the French fleet could threaten the Royal Navy. Furthermore, increasingly sophisticated naval thinking and a stronger position in Egypt reduced the Admiralty’s concern about its ability to protect access to Britain’s Asian empire. A few members of the Foreign Office were already linking the British position in Persia with the Russian position at Constantinople, but readiness to make a quid pro quo would come only once World War I had begun.7 For their part, French policymakers were more concerned with Turkey’s financial situation and their interests in what are now Syria and Lebanon.8 Decades of investment had given them large and often controlling stakes in a variety of Ottoman agricultural and industrial ventures, mining, and infrastructure. Thus, Paris was very anxious to avoid offending the Turkish government enough to threaten its influence or the return on investments, especially if Germany would benefit. The French also hoped that the Straits would remain closed to the Russian fleet, preventing any change in the balance of naval power that would come if Russia could bring its warships out of the Black Sea.9 France—Russia’s ally in the twenty years before World War I—proved a bigger obstacle than Russia’s old rival, Great Britain. For Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire represented a possible partner in containing Russian expansion and limiting its pan-Slav activities, since all three states stood to lose from Russian success. Turkey was also an arena for German colonial activity, as its dreams of an African empire faded. Germany invested heavily in railway projects, most notably the Berlin-to-Baghdad line, which would serve as a means of economic penetration, spreading its influence through the weakening Ottoman Empire.10 Austria-Hungary felt far more ambivalent about the Turks than did Germany. It opposed partition of the Ottoman Empire, in large part because Russia was likely to gain more through annexing the Straits and Armenia than it would through acquisitions elsewhere. Turkey’s ability to help contain the Balkan states was what interested Austria most.11 Thus, any step that Russia took was fraught with possibly violent consequences. Historiographies While the influence of the Turkish Straits on Russian policy has rarely been a focus of study, many works on the origins and course of the First World War refer at least in passing to the Straits Question. Partly because of the strident debate over German war guilt and partly

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because diplomatic concerns seemed less relevant once the war began, most discussions of Russian foreign policy deal with the prewar period, although the interesting and important diplomatic activity that took place during World War I has found its historians as well. Very rarely have scholars covered both periods—prewar and wartime. By not doing so, they have missed the important continuities and discontinuities illustrated in this investigation.12 In the first decades after World War I, western and Soviet scholarship used the Straits as a clear example of Russian imperialist desires, even if the two sides understood imperialism differently. In the West, the most forceful trend developed in reaction to the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which indicted Germany as instigator of the war. In their attempt to refute those charges, German historians, with support from foreign scholars, sought to prove that either other nations or all nations were at fault or, in some cases, that no one at all was culpable, but, instead, systemic factors drove Europe to the cataclysm. The most vocal revisionist in the United States, Sidney Fay, closely but incorrectly tied Russia’s aspirations at the Straits to its readiness to commit to general mobilization in July 1914, the step that pushed Germany to declare its own mobilization and Europe into war.13 His clearest opponent was B. E. Schmitt, who acknowledged the Straits’ importance to Russia but insisted that it would not have created a crisis in order to capture them.14 While these monographs treated the Straits Question only briefly, article-length studies by William L. Langer and Robert J. Kerner addressed the problem head on.15 They concentrated on the diplomatic aspects, however, leaving the larger context of the creation of Russian policy-making untouched. The battle between the revisionists and antirevisionists continued into the 1930s. By that time, previously released, heavily edited German documents as well as early Bolshevik disclosures were supplemented by many newly released documents from British, French, and Austrian archives, as well as more complete collections from the Soviet Union. As a consequence, new works, such as that by Harry N. Howard, possessed a broader evidentiary base, less dependent on the subjective memoir literature but retaining the tight focus on diplomacy.16 In the Soviet Union, the first wave of Bolshevik historians depicted imperial Russia in an overwhelmingly negative light, even though they disagreed over what sort of imperialist power Russia had been.17 The early dean of Soviet historians, M. N. Pokrovskii, presented the Russian desire to capture the Straits as one of the biggest factors behind the outbreak of the war.18 Other scholars, such as E. A. Adamov and Ia.

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Zakher, held a more moderate view of imperial Russia’s immediate intentions, not seeing the Straits Question as provoking the war.19 Nonetheless, the scope of their works was limited and cast within the ideological framework of Leninism. In the more nationalist Soviet writings of the 1930s and 1940s, the Straits slipped from the center of attention. Stalinist studies stressed Russia’s lack of preparation for the First World War and the exploitation of Russia and its resources by the more advanced capitalist nations to its west. This period of writing proved relatively barren, because of both the ideological requirements, which led to relatively one-sided works, and the difficulty, even for Soviet scholars, of gaining access to the necessary materials.20 In the wake of the post-Stalinist thaw, differences of interpretation and emphasis reminiscent of the disagreements in the 1920s emerged again. Because most studies until the end of the Soviet period were characterized by a strong archival base, they were valuable to western scholars, regardless of the authors’ interpretive baggage.21 Notable among them are the works of A. V. Ignat’ev, I. V. Bestuzhev, V. I. Bovykin, V. O. Diakin, V. A. Emets, Iu. A. Pisarev, and A. Ia. Avrekh.22 Most useful for this study was K. F. Shatsillo’s 1968 work, Russkii imperializm i razvitie flota (Russian Imperialism and the Development of the Navy).23 Shatsillo considered both Russian diplomacy and its effect on the rebirth of the Russian fleet after its destruction in the RussoJapanese War and cast attention on the State Duma’s role in this reconstruction. Furthermore, he explained the relationship among the Foreign Ministry, Naval Ministry, and the tsar, showing how the departments worked together to advance their common interests. On the other hand, he misunderstood the link between the formulation of foreign policy and nongovernmental groups, overstating outside influence on state policies. He also failed to show the changing nature of the civil-military relationship, based, as it was, upon varying circumstances. Most recently, post-Soviet studies of imperial Russian foreign policy have begun to move beyond the straitjacket within which scholars chafed for so long. Recent compendia reveal how Russian historians are considering wider factors like personality, demographics, and geopolitics in interpreting critical events. The most specific statement on Russia’s Straits policy came in a chapter by V. C. Vasiukov, which clearly describes the diplomatic path leading to the spring 1915 agreements that promised Russia the Straits. While Vasiukov brings the tsar, the armed services, the Duma, and the press into his story, he

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neglects to mention the effect of Sazonov’s policy on the wider war effort. By ending his account with the conclusion of the agreements on the Straits with Great Britain and France, he incorrectly evaluates their meaning for Sazonov and Russia.24 Partly because of the slow demise of diplomatic history in the United States since World War II and, to some extent, restricted access to archival resources, less has been written about imperial Russian foreign policy by western than by Soviet scholars in the postwar era. As the Cold War began, studies were especially affected by ideological considerations, and many comparisons were made between imperial and Soviet foreign policies in an attempt to determine whether Soviet behavior was based more on Communist ideology or long-standing Russian traditions. These histories usually focused exclusively on external relations, continuing the prewar academic trend and adding little to the existing understanding of the role of the Straits in Russian policy.25 Fritz Fischer shook the post-World War II historical world by changing the playing field in two ways. First, he cast the onus of guilt for the First World War back on imperial Germany.26 While his theses were once sharply critiqued both inside and outside West Germany, his general argument that Germany carried the greatest responsibility for the outbreak of the war has become widely accepted. As one historian suggested, “one no longer needs to go on an extended tour of Europe’s capitals in search of those responsible; scholars today can concentrate on the documents from the files that piled up in Berlin and Vienna.”27 Second, Fischer forced historians to look at the domestic roots of the kaiser’s foreign policy. His seminal books, together with the growth of social history in the turbulent 1960s, spurred similar examinations of all the Great Powers’ pre-1914 activities. Russian history was not immune to this reexamination. Dietrich Geyer’s Russian Imperialism stresses “the primacy of domestic politics,” highlighting not only the role that fear of revolution played in the elites’ worldview but also how attempts to modernize helped to define Russia’s relations with the outside world. Geyer made one of the strongest arguments for the influence of internal factors in Russian expansion and foreign relations. He takes the German pattern too far, however, and imposes behavioral interpretations more suited to imperial Germany than its neighbor to the east.28 Dominic Lieven also examines the role of internal factors in Russia and the Origins of the First World War, which has become the standard introduction to the problem of Russia’s involvement with the war. Providing a generally well-balanced account

INTRODUCTION

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of the decision-making process in St. Petersburg, Lieven touches only lightly on the Straits and so misses their role in Russian policy-making. Many works continue to overstate the effect of the wider social debate on foreign policy formulation within the Russian government. Andrew Rossos on the Balkan League and Wars, Martyna Fox on Russia’s broader relationship to the Eastern Question, and E. C. Thaden on Russia’s policy toward Serbia all mistakenly endeavor to show great domestic influence upon Sazonov’s policy choices.29 In contrast, this book takes its lead from work by David M. McDonald on the post-1905 governmental system. One of his most significant contributions to the study of Russian foreign policy and government is his analysis of the increasing centralization of authority in the hands of Pëtr Stolypin, president of the Council of Ministers (thus prime minister) from 1906 until his assassination in 1911.30 Although the new Fundamental Laws after the 1905 revolution left foreign affairs and the armed services under the personal control of the tsar, Stolypin was able to use a 1908-1909 foreign policy fiasco to bring even this side of policy under his relative control. It was under this system that Sazonov began his work as foreign minister, and it was out from under this umbrella that he emerged—though more than McDonald suggests—during the tenure of Stolypin’s successor, V. N. Kokovtsov. McDonald’s second contribution is his explication of the governmental elites’ perceived sense of superiority to the views expressed in the society around them. Grounded in the works of scholars, such as B. V. Anan’ich, Roberta T. Manning, Walter Pintner, Don Karl Rowney, Richard Wortman, and George Yaney, McDonald describes the effect of gosudarstvennost’, which represented the elites’ belief in the “cultural and political exclusiveness” of the affairs of those running the state.31 Officials, such as Sazonov, paid little heed to and, indeed, resented the storm of criticism from outside government that so often assailed their decisions. Ironically, Zara Steiner has found a similar pattern in the Foreign Office of Great Britain, where not only the permanent staff but also the politician at its head thought that foreign policy was better formulated away from the pressures of Parliament and press.32 This is not to say that the foreign secretary could completely disregard domestic political realities and risk losing the next election, but regardless of their differences in domestic policies, the foreign policy of the British Liberal Party was nearly identical to that of the Conservative Party, whose last government had fallen in 1905. Russian governmental ministers were aware of domestic attitudes, but the only arbiter of their fates was the tsar, who retained the right to

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dismiss them at will. Furthermore, according to the Fundamental Laws established after the 1905 revolution, the tsar retained personal control over foreign, military, and naval policy.33 Even here, however, the new State Duma, through its role in approving budgets, gave Russian society some voice. Any increases in funding had to be approved by Duma deputies, and they used this right as a means to influence governmental policy indirectly, especially in the rearmament and enlargement of the nation’s armed forces in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War and in the face of the armaments races under way in Europe.34 Another study most useful to understanding civil-military relations in Russia is the work of William C. Fuller, Jr.35 While he does not address the Foreign Ministry or the navy directly, he sheds light on the wider issues of defense and bureaucracy in imperial Russia. He shows how the conflict in institutional priorities between the army and the Finance Ministry affected not only the credits available to the Ministry of War but the army’s professionalization and modernization, since it sought to keep up with military trends in Europe while, at the same time, minimizing the amount of internal policing expected of it. These domestic distractions kept the Russian army from its task of guarding the empire from external threats. Studies in political science and international relations provide insights into the operation of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Paul A. Papayoanou’s important systematic analysis theorizes that the ebb and flow of commercial and financial ties affect the interdependence of the nations involved and the likelihood of their cooperating or conflicting.36 Although he concentrates on the economic origins of both the FrancoRussian Alliance and the collapse of European peace in 1914, his theory has relevance for the Straits Question. He shows that economic relations between Russia and Germany were stronger from 1906 to 1912, when their wider relations were friendlier; likewise, as those economic relations worsened in the years before the war, their diplomatic rapport deteriorated. He hypothesizes that the continuing strength of Anglo-German economic relations was an important factor behind the British government’s reluctance to indicate clearly its readiness to go to war to defend France. While this theory is inadequate because of its oversimplification of the forces at work in the Great Powers’ decisions, it does call valuable attention to the role of economics in the Franco-Russian relationship within the confines of the Ottoman Empire. While the French supported the Russians against the Germans just before and, of course, during the war, the two allies

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disagreed repeatedly over policy toward Constantinople and the Straits right through to the collapse of the Russian Empire. Following Papayoanou, this phenomenon of intra-alliance competition is less surprising when we examine France and Russia’s very different economic ties with Turkey. Throughout the period from 1909 to 1914, the volume of Franco-Turkish trade averaged twice that between France and Russia, although the difference was decreasing.37 Financial relations, however, have far more significance in explaining Turkey’s place in the Allies’ economies. While the French held more Turkish debt than any other nation and French capital controlled the Ottoman Imperial Bank (which ran Turkish finances), Russia’s investments in Turkey were minimal, and St. Petersburg had no seat on the board controlling Turkish debt.38 French involvement in the Turkish economy inspired Paris’s interest in the continuing health and, indeed, existence of the Ottoman Empire. Since Russia was far less exposed to economic distress in Turkey, it was more prepared to risk damage to investments in it. This conflict of interests introduced significant friction into Franco-Russian diplomacy in the years under review. Sources A word should be said about the evidence used here. Occasionally in European diplomatic history, works that examine one state’s foreign policy employ documentary material only from that state’s archives.39 Furthermore, works on French and British relationships with Russia almost always cover the western partners well but are weak on Russia, either due to lack of time to work in extra archives, lack of access to Russian archival sources, or lack of command of the Russian language.40 In contrast, I have made extensive use of the archives in all three Entente states, resulting in a more balanced analysis of Russian activity. Such comparative research is critical to a more complete understanding of the activities and thoughts of the actors involved. The extensive Russian documents used here, both archival and published, provide a fuller internal description of their intentions and plans than we have hitherto been able to obtain. At the same time, non-Russian sources have proven critical in confirming accounts of meetings held either with Sazonov or his ambassadors. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s records of Sazonov’s meetings are not verbatim and sometimes rather abbreviated. Similarly, the telegrams and letters relaying such meetings sometimes omit material or fail to capture the emotion in the room. The best external accounts of Russian behavior

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come from Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg. He arrived at the Russian capital soon after Sazonov became foreign minister, and the two, by their own accounts, became good friends.41 Nonetheless, this amity did not interfere with Buchanan’s obligations, as his reports back to London were frank and informative. Adding to the international breadth of the documents, this book contains materials from a variety of archival sources. The materials of foreign ministries, armed services, cabinets of ministers, other civilian ministries, and legislatures have been consulted. Media materials have been consulted less frequently than the reader might expect, because internal sources indicate that such groups were less influential than has been posited elsewhere. In the title of his 1992 article on the treatment of the Straits Question during the First World War, V. C. Vasiukov cited a 12 March 1915 memorandum that communicated British acquiescence to Russian possession of the Straits. The document’s author describes the Straits as the “richest prize” or, in Vasiukov’s translation, the glavnyi priz, or main prize, of the war.42 Neither the British authorities at the time nor Vasiukov in his work used those terms with any irony. In the eyes of contemporary actors and subsequent analysts, this agreement was one of Sazonov’s biggest successes.43 In contrast, this study will show how the tenacious Russian demand for the Straits through the worsening war was an opportunistic and unfortunate alteration of Sazonov’s usually wiser policy. The Russian foreign minister had for almost five years consistently sought to protect Russia’s position in this vital area, but his policy never interfered with the containment of, and fight against, German and Austrian aggression—that is, until March 1915. From that point on, Sazonov allowed himself to be distracted from Russia’s main goal in the war—the defeat of the Central Powers—and thereby hastened the end of the empire that he tried to serve so faithfully.

1 STOLYPIN AND A POLICY OF AVOIDING CONFRONTATION, 1908 TO MARCH 1911

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he summer of 1910 found the Russian Foreign Ministry in transition. Sergei D. Sazonov, intelligent and hard-working but mercurial, with little experience of St. Petersburg politics, would assume control once an ambassadorial post became available for the current, lame-duck foreign minister, Aleksandr P. Izvolskii. Izvolskii, highly intelligent but burdened with a tremendous ego, was leaving Pevcheskii Most1 because of a 1908 fiasco he had caused. Seeking a way both to advance Russian interests at the Turkish Straits and to burnish his own image, he met with Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal at the latter’s estate in Buchlau. The two appeared to agree that Russia would accept Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if Austria would support an alteration in the regime at the Straits. Vienna had been administering the provinces for thirty years as a result of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which reworked the resolution of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War. The Turkish Sultan remained the nominal sovereign during this time. In October 1908, however, Austria went ahead with the annexation before Izvolskii could gain broader acceptance for a change at the Straits. Russia dragged its heels in accepting the Austrian action, but a March 1909 German ultimatum forced it to cease opposition. This blow was considered by many the diplomatic equivalent of the naval catastrophe inflicted by Japan in the Straits of Tsushima in 1905.2 The injury to Russian prestige was all too clear, and not long after the ink had dried

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on the Austrian annexation proclamation, the search for a new foreign minister began. The second factor behind Sazonov’s selection lies in wider political considerations related to his position vis-à-vis the real decisionmaker in Russian foreign policy—Pëtr A. Stolypin, the nation’s prime and interior minister. Examinations of Stolypin mostly concentrate on his domestic policies, notably his agricultural reforms and unsuccessful fight to extend local self-government to western Polish provinces.3 Uniquely, David M. McDonald focuses on Stolypin’s role in changing the nature of centralization in the Council of Ministers and its consequences for foreign affairs.4 The 1905 October Manifesto and subsequent Fundamental Laws altered imperial institutions to provide for not only a representative assembly, the State Duma, but also a prime minister,5 who would coordinate government activity through the Council of Ministers. These founding documents, however, clearly state that foreign, military, and naval affairs were to be left under the tsar’s personal control. McDonald shows that Stolypin took advantage of the Foreign Ministry’s damaged prestige in the wake of the 1908 Bosnian Crisis to bring foreign affairs under his purview. Nicholas II, momentarily humbled by his own complicity in both the military and diplomatic Tsushimas, stepped back, as Stolypin expanded his authority. Stolypin sought to subordinate Russia’s foreign policy to his domestic agenda of reconstruction and rejuvenation in the wake of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War and the revolution of 1905.6 Russia had to avoid involvement in any international conflicts like the Bosnian controversy while its internal recovery continued. From the moment of Sazonov’s selection as assistant foreign minister in 1909, debate has raged over the reasons. Contemporary observers disagreed. Sazonov and Finance Minister V. N. Kokovtsov both suggested in their memoirs that he was Izvolskii’s choice.7 Sazonov pointed to his years of service as Izvolskii’s assistant in Russia’s legation to the Vatican. Many contemporaries, however—the majority of whom opposed Stolypin’s policies overall as well as Stolypin and Izvolskii’s rapprochement with Great Britain—surmised that Sazonov was Stolypin’s choice. Some charged Stolypin with nepotism, since Sazonov was his brother-in-law.8 Stolypin was smart enough, however, to know that their relationship as brothers-in-law did not in and of itself guarantee community of views. Indeed, the political views of one of their other brothers-in-law, Dmitri B. Neidhardt, brother of their wives, were much farther to the right, and the two sides often found themselves in disagreement.9 Others accused Stolypin of seeking to

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15

become as influential as the once-powerful grand viziers of the Ottoman Empire. This idea had a kernel of truth, as he used his position as prime minister to bring some consistency to government policy. Sazonov’s theory that he was simply Izvolskii’s choice is oversimplified since, when Sazonov was selected, Stolypin was ascendant over Izvolskii, whose influence was gravely weakened. Indeed, his vulnerable position lends weight to Kokovtsov’s recollection that Izvolskii chose Sazonov to please Stolypin.10 Moreover, Sazonov was a relatively junior diplomat with a small power base and few connections on which to rely in St. Petersburg.11 He had served at only two diplomatic posts, London and the Vatican, and only at the latter had he finally become head of the mission. This relative inexperience left him even more dependent on Stolypin than he might have been otherwise.12 His patron had good cause to anticipate that Sazonov would be more willing to follow his line than Izvolskii had been. The tsar played a relatively minor role in setting policy at this time but retained ultimate control through his choice of ministers. He could have refused to approve Stolypin’s choice and pressed for someone else, such as the pro-German Pëtr S. Botkin or the virulently anti-Austrian, anti-British Nikolai G. Hartwig, both of whom were rumored to be under consideration. Instead, Nicholas II inclined toward improved relations with Great Britain and France, with which Sazonov agreed. McDonald makes it clear that Nicholas felt chastened by two recent attempts to take foreign policy into his own hands that contributed to the Russo-Japanese War and the Bosnian Crisis.13 The tsar still preferred to leave the actual direction of foreign policy to his deputies. Although throughout Sazonov’s time in the national capital, Nicholas regularly perused the most important diplomatic communiqués and received regular personal reports from the foreign minister, subsequent chapters will show that his degree of involvement waxed and waned. One memoirist recounts how, during the world war, sometimes decisions were made in opposition to the tsar’s wishes, if members of the ministry decided that they did not correspond with political reality. Sometimes, the tsar was pressed to adopt an alternative view, and sometimes an action taken was concealed from him.14 Given the lack of transcripts of Sazonov’s personal reports to him, knowing the full extent of the tsar’s direction is impossible, but clearly Nicholas II left Stolypin the primary policy-making role at this time. Behind Stolypin’s policy of avoiding international confrontation to concentrate on internal reconstruction and development lay a concern

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that if Russia became involved in a new war within the decade, revolution would reignite.15 His goal in international relations was balance. While preserving the alliance established by 1894 with France and the 1907 entente with Great Britain, he also sought to improve relations with Germany. This effort appeared to succeed in the RussoGerman talks held in Potsdam in October 1910, where the two empires worked to accommodate their intentions in Persia.16 Sazonov understood the need to act with great caution in this rapprochement. He delayed the official commencement of his service as minister until after the Potsdam meetings, so that his first official foreign visit would not be to Germany, which would have alarmed the French and British. Nonetheless, these Russo-German discussions confirmed (incorrectly) for some in Russia and Germany that Sazonov was a pro-German minister, his denials notwithstanding.17 Paris and London, on the other hand, warily accepted Russian explanations of the meetings. This emphasis on peace did not mean neglect of Russian security needs or its armed forces. The latent fear in France and Great Britain of improved Russo-German relations played into Stolypin's hands because the British and French strove to make the Triple Entente sufficiently attractive to prevent Russia's departure for a revived Dreikaiserbund.18 The Germans also felt encouraged in their incessant attempts to detach Russia from France. The collapse of the Franco-Russian Alliance would have immensely improved the Germans' strategic position by eliminating the threat of a two-front war if they had a conflict with France. Stolypin was accordingly willing to consider limited increases in the armed forces’ budgets. In February 1908, chairing an interministerial conference, Stolypin agreed that the growing crisis along the Persian border demanded a stronger Russian military presence in the Caucasus.19 Concerned about Russia's sea defenses and its attractiveness as an ally, Stolypin also supported strengthening the navy.20 At an August 1909 conference of the heads of the armed forces, finance, and foreign affairs ministries (Sazonov in Izvolskii’s absence), Stolypin clearly stated that Russia required an “active combat fleet” made up of more than destroyers and submarines. It would require capital ships, since smaller vessels would not be enough to resist Russia’s more powerful rivals. Wisely bucking the navalist trend, however, he repeatedly cautioned that the fleet would have to be defensive, since Russia had no offensive intentions.21 Stolypin’s policy toward Turkey and the Straits reflected a similar balance. Diplomatically, he hoped to quiet the Near East by improving

STOLYPIN

17

bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire or even bringing Turkey into some sort of pan-Balkan alliance or alignment.22 Such an arrangement would, first, lessen the chances of conflict arising between the Turks and the other Balkan peoples. A new war in the region could destroy the wider European peace and threaten Russia with new revolutionary complications. Second, a Balkan alliance or federation created under Russia’s aegis might block the expansion of AustroHungarian and German influence in the Near East and raise Russia's prestige at the same time. Finally, the Russians hoped that by enmeshing Turkey in a wider, supportive structure, the Ottoman Empire would be preserved from disintegration or further partition. Its collapse seemed inopportune as long as Russia was not strong enough to protect its own interests in the region.23 Militarily, though Stolypin preferred to devote attention to internal needs, events around the Black Sea forced him to increase the resources devoted to Russian security. He believed that Russia’s Baltic Fleet must be larger than those on the Black Sea and the Pacific Ocean, but that its Black Sea Fleet must always be stronger than that of Turkey.24 From mid-1909 through early 1910, the Foreign Ministry and the navy heard rumors and then increasingly concrete news that Turkey was seeking either to buy a dreadnought already under construction for another state or to order one of its own.25 Russia had no ships that strong, so its security would be threatened, and the Foreign Ministry protested Russian naval inactivity on the Black Sea to Admiral S. A. Voevodskii, the navy minister.26 When these entreaties went unanswered, Izvolskii, still foreign minister, turned to the tsar. Nicholas II had spoken for years of the need for similarly strong fleets in the north and south, and he now directly addressed vital interests in the Black Sea.27 Even Nicholas’s intervention had little effect on the navy’s attitude. The naval leadership remained convinced that until the Baltic Fleet was rebuilt, nothing could be done about the Black Sea Fleet. In late spring of 1909, the navy suggested that Russia preemptively purchase the ships in which Constantinople was interested, preventing Turkey from increasing its strength on the Black Sea and immediately increasing the size of Russia’s Baltic Fleet.28 It expressed no intention of devoting more resources to the Black Sea. Voevodskii suggested to Stolypin on 10 May 1910 three possible responses to Turkish rearmament. A diplomatic option would demand an indemnity from the Turks for this change in the correlation of forces. The military option would strengthen land forces in the Caucasus region and prepare for an amphibious landing operation somewhere on the Black Sea.

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Finally, the admiral fancifully suggested that, from a financial point of view, Russia could place orders so that no shipyards would be free to take the Turkish orders.29 Such frivolity shows how the navy tried to shirk responsibility for coping with the Turks. On receiving further information about Turkey’s orders in Great Britain and Germany, however, Stolypin and his supporters insisted with new vigor that Russia had to make a more substantial addition to the Black Sea Fleet. On 2 August 1910, Stolypin sent a letter to Voevodskii, pressuring the navy to respond effectively to Turkish armament. He wrote that: the Russian Government . . . cannot remain a spectator to such a significant strengthening of Turkey’s naval power, which reduces us to a subordinate position (polozhenie) and even a dangerous one for our whole Black Sea coast. Obviously, it is necessary for us to set to work most urgently on measures which can equalize our military position on the Black Sea with the projected growth of the Turkish fleet.30 Only then did Voevodskii send the tsar a proposal for the construction of three dreadnoughts on the Black Sea; they would not be completed until 1915.31 Thus, even with Stolypin's success in bringing foreign policy under his review, military and naval policy remained difficult to influence, much less control. Sazonov signaled the importance of the Turkish situation in an 8 August 1910 conversation with H. A. de Panafieu, the French chargé d’affaires at St. Petersburg. The assistant foreign minister stated that once the Russian government was able to confirm the news of the Turkish purchases, “Russia would soon be obliged to take the measures necessary so that its supremacy on the Black Sea would not be compromised.”32 The Foreign Ministry thereby reassured its ally that Russia would not allow local rivals to diminish its position in the region any further. In the wake of the diplomatic embarrassment of the Bosnian Crisis, this reassurance showed Paris that the alliance still held value.33 In the months between Sazonov’s official appointment and his leave to cope with a serious illness in March 1911, little changed in this arrangement of policies and policy-making. He and Stolypin continued trying to stabilize Russia’s foreign policy environment by avoiding

STOLYPIN

19

international complications, while standing more firmly on Near Eastern questions. Stolypin sought to force the navy to expand the Black Sea Fleet so that Russia could meet its security obligations there and not lose control of its southwestern borders. Were Russia to become too militarily and politically weak at the Straits, its ability to hold back Austrian and German expansion would be gravely compromised. The mechanics of policy-making also remained the same until March 1911. Sazonov followed the line set by Stolypin, developing, refining, and executing Russia’s foreign policy, and the two cooperated in defining Russia’s choices.34 Only during Sazonov’s convalescence did Stolypin’s authority and, by extension, that of the prime minister’s office severely weaken through his handling of domestic political questions.35 Stolypin’s assassination in September 1911 ensured that Sazonov would have to stand on his own once he returned to office. Coordination between the prime and foreign ministers declined as time passed. While always restricted by the limits set by the tsar, Sazonov would increasingly set policy.

2 POLICY DRIFT AND THE ITALO-TURKISH WAR, MARCH 1911 TO OCTOBER 1912

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he nature of Russian foreign policy and its context changed significantly over the eighteen months following the start of 1911. Its formulation was changed by two events in 1911: first, a serious, incapacitating illness almost completely removed Sazonov from diplomatic affairs for some nine months, and second, Pëtr Stolypin was assassinated in September 1911—never again would a prime minister have such control over imperial Russian foreign policy.1 At the same time, Russian diplomacy faced new complications when, also in September, Italy attacked the Ottoman domain of Libya, beginning twenty-one months of almost continuous military conflict on the European periphery.2 These wars complicated the diplomacy of each of the Great Powers, as some sought to postpone a continental war until the moment seemed propitious, while others sought to avoid it altogether. Each successive conflict drew additional attention to the Russian Empire’s increasingly exposed position at the Turkish Straits. When Sazonov returned to active direction of the Foreign Ministry in December 1911, St. Petersburg was treating the Ottoman Empire and Italy in a relatively evenhanded manner, and attempts were under way to win Turkey over to a change of rules at the Straits to Russia’s benefit. Sazonov immediately shifted to a significantly more pro-Italian approach. Much of the literature on this period has missed or underestimated the effect of this change: the emphasis on improving relations with Italy in order to weaken the Triple Alliance dominated decisions, sometimes even at the apparent expense of Russian interests

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21

at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. While ultimately his policies only partially worked the way that he wished, Sazonov labored to secure Russia’s interests at the Straits and simultaneously to improve the strategic balance between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. Diplomacy Drifts without a Captain In early March 1911, Sazonov was stricken with a combination of ailments that forced him to relinquish control of the ministry and spend a few months abroad for recuperation and treatment by foreign doctors. Never a healthy man, he appears to have had some sort of tonsillitis with a high temperature. It was hoped that he would recover quickly but soon decided that he ought to leave the harsh climate and less talented physicians of St. Petersburg for the healthier environment of Davos, Switzerland.3 Sazonov offered to resign, but Nicholas II declined, telling him to care for his health, while he and A. A. Neratov, Sazonov’s assistant, looked after affairs.4 The available evidence suggests that during his absence, Sazonov played little role in policy direction.5 He met occasionally with passing diplomats and, from September, followed events in a more detailed fashion, receiving copies of important correspondence.6 The foreign minister only reasserted his control as he began his return to Russia in December. During Sazonov’s convalescence, the growth of the Turkish navy continued to trouble the Russian government. Nikolai V. Charykov, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople and one-time candidate for the foreign minister’s post, raised the alarm again on 15 April 1911, when he informed Pevcheskii Most that Ottoman authorities had ordered two dreadnought-class battleships in Great Britain. He explained that their arrival in Turkish waters, expected in less than two years, would seriously shift the balance of strength on the Black Sea against Russia. While the Grand Vizier claimed that they were not intended to fight Russia and was ready to promise that foreign warships would not enter the Black Sea, his words did little to assuage Russian concerns.7 In early May 1911, Russian diplomat A. N. Giers illuminated how important the maintenance of control over the Black Sea was to Russia’s southern defense, especially from attacks by Turkey or any of its potential allies. He insisted that Russia must possess the first dreadnoughts in the Black Sea and extended this argument to the Straits themselves: if the Black Sea were to become the base of the whole Russian fleet, as he suggested, Russia must have the full “sovereign right of passage of its fleet in all seas.” Such a strategy required that Russia find a way to allow its ships free passage of the Straits.8

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The diplomats were not alone in their attention to these problems. The armed forces also saw the need to watch for and to counter any new Ottoman threats. In June 1911, the army and navy discussed the changes occurring in Turkey. Twenty-year-old plans for an amphibious landing on the Bosphorus were reexamined, and it was clear that “a landing expedition to the Bosphorus, under the contemporary correlation of naval forces—[Russian] and Turkish—[was] unrealizable (nevypol’nima).”9 War Minister General V. A. Sukhomlinov asked for and received the tsar’s permission to concentrate the supplies for both the navy and army that would be necessary if such an expedition were ordered. These discussions intensified after the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War on 29 September 1911. The war came at the nexus of a number of different developments. First, the Kingdom of Italy sought to shore up its domestic and international prestige. 1911 was the fiftieth anniversary of Italian unification, and Rome still sought to prove that it deserved to be considered one of the European Great Powers after its defeat by the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. Second, Italy desired to seize more territory in Africa before other European powers divided the rest up among themselves. Very little of Africa remained outside of European control by this time, and the Ottoman provinces of Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), just across the Mediterranean, had long been an object of its desire. Third, the Italian government wanted to put its long diplomatic preparation for the annexation of Libya into action by taking advantage of the other Great Powers’ distraction. France and Germany were resolving a crisis over French control of Morocco. Great Britain insisted that it had to have a say in their final decisions, while Russia and Austria-Hungary were standing by their respective allies. Fourth, a more convenient moment to seize those Ottoman provinces might not present itself. The 1908 Young Turk revolt threatened to introduce sufficient modernization to enable Constantinople to strengthen its hold over its remaining North African possessions. The dreadnoughts ordered by Turkey in Great Britain also would make an Italian invasion significantly more difficult. Furthermore, once France absorbed Morocco, it might not be as amenable to a similar Italian extension in Libya. Also, in 1912 the Triple Alliance required renewal, and the Italians feared that Austria-Hungary would demand compensation for such an Italian move be written into the new agreement. Germany was unlikely to protest, since Austria-Hungary was crucial to Germany’s strategic position.

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Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti’s government thus opened hostilities with the Ottomans in late September 1911 and quickly seized the important coastal towns, expecting the war to conclude quickly. But the Ottomans continued to fight in the interior, raising the local Arab peoples against the European invader. While Constantinople was apparently willing to settle on some face-saving means of delivering the provinces to Italy while retaining de jure sovereignty, Rome insisted on complete annexation. This the Sultan would not accept, and increasing success holding the Italians to the coastal strip encouraged the Ottomans to drag the war out.10 Within a week of the war’s outbreak, Navy Minister Admiral I. K. Grigorovich sent his reactions and thoughts to Sukhomlinov. Although it appeared by then that military action would be concentrated near the Libyan provinces, Grigorovich felt the need to keep the Black Sea Fleet in a state of combat readiness. He feared that the war might spread to the Balkans and force Russian intervention, possibly including a landing somewhere along the Black Sea coast. He recommended that army and navy officers cooperate in updating plans for an amphibious assault as soon as possible.11 Sukhomlinov’s assistant, General A. A. Polivanov, approved of maintaining fleet readiness but delayed the joint talks until he could hold some preliminary discussions with the army commander in the southern port of Odessa.12 Although the army apparently had been slow in taking advantage of Nicholas’s permission, given in June, to begin stockpiling materials, the pace of events made the navy take things more seriously. While the armed forces reviewed their capabilities, Ambassador Charykov took steps as well. He decided to use the pressure under which Turkey now found itself because of the war to negotiate a new agreement. Most important, he proposed to guarantee Turkish possession of Constantinople along with a defensible area around it so long as the Russians could have a new arrangement at the Straits—the right to send warships freely through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. He hoped to resolve any imbalance on the Black Sea by peaceful means. The course and details of the negotiations have been satisfactorily related elsewhere,13 but the most salient points should be examined. Charykov had long supported a peaceful approach, since he was confident the Young Turk government would be amenable to some agreement with Russia. His willingness to try for a bilateral solution was increased by his correct belief that Britain was less interested in the fate of the Straits than it had been during the nineteenth century and so more willing to see Russia bring about such a change.14 One other

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factor behind Charykov’s action has been unexamined by the literature—the power vacuum resulting from Stolypin’s assassination. Although David McDonald claims that Sazonov’s lack of authority gave Charykov the independence to follow his own policy, the crux of the matter seems to be Stolypin’s death, which McDonald mentions only in passing. As Edward Thaden shows, a possible approach to Turkey had been under discussion since the summer of 1911. However, Charykov chose to act only after Stolypin’s assassination, which left Russian foreign policy in Assistant Foreign Minister Neratov and Finance Minister Kokovtsov’s ineffective and inexperienced hands. By September, Sazonov’s health had improved sufficiently that he wrote hopefully of returning to Russia by mid-November, but during the delay to ensure a complete recovery, Charykov had the window of opportunity to exceed St. Petersburg’s instructions.15 Thus, when Neratov raised the possibility of such talks in October, Charykov became an overly enthusiastic participant in the process. He went beyond the instructions that Neratov sent him and certainly read what he wanted into Neratov’s correspondence, convinced that his actions had full support from St. Petersburg and, by extension, the Entente partners. His effort unsettled both of these partners, however, as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary, and neither France nor Great Britain gave Russia the support that Charykov and likely Neratov thought they would. Russia was on the verge of finding itself diplomatically isolated over this question. Sazonov Returns At this juncture, Sazonov reemerged and halted the negotiations. His first stop after leaving his Swiss retreat had been Paris, where he spent a few days in detailed discussions with the Russian ambassadors to Paris and London, Izvolskii and Aleksandr K. Benckendorff, about recent events and learned how discontented those capitals had become with Charykov’s endeavors. Feeling a sense of urgency, he did not wait for his departure to announce their end. On 9 December, he ordered Charykov to make clear to the Porte that any suggestions or proposals that he had put forward were of “a private character” and not official proposals of the Russian government.16 That same day, in an interview with the Paris paper Le Matin and in a private discussion with the French foreign minister, Sazonov denied that Charykov’s initiative had been official.17 These statements made the about-face in Russian policy obvious to all.18 While Charykov briefly tried to continue his negotiations, it was clear to others that they were over.19

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No satisfactory explanation has yet been advanced for what caused Sazonov, first, to deny that Charykov’s actions had official backing and to end them and, second, to remove Charykov from Constantinople a few months later. One level of the problem seems clear: Sazonov was trying to rein in an ambassador who had exceeded his charge. Soon after Charykov was removed from Constantinople, Sazonov told the British ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, that Charykov had ignored very specific instructions about how to carry on the negotiations in October and, “as Sazonov put it, ‘jumped over all the barriers’” set in St. Petersburg for the discussions.20 To make things worse, after Sazonov had given his own explicit December instructions, Charykov disobeyed again. He had “begun intriguing and had worked directly against his own Government. . . . [I]t was impossible to allow an Ambassador to give effect to such views when they were in opposition to the policy prescribed by his Government.”21 Sazonov could not leave Charykov in Constantinople, where he might further undermine the foreign minister’s policy. There are two problems with this understanding. First, a close examination of the documents, as Thaden shows, indicates that Charykov had not exceeded his instructions as much as Sazonov suggested to Buchanan. During the summer, Neratov and Izvolskii had been discussing a plan that resembled the one that Charykov adopted that autumn. Furthermore, Charykov had an extended correspondence with Neratov about his actions, so Pevcheskii Most was not completely in the dark about what was occurring in Constantinople. Charykov did go beyond what Neratov suggested to him, but he hardly “jumped over all the barriers.”22 The second problem with believing that Sazonov was simply reining in a rogue ambassador is that he had many more occasions to do so with other self-assertive Russian diplomats but did not. A notable example was Nikolai Hartwig, Russian minister in Belgrade from 1910 to July 1914, a rabid pan-Slav and rival for the foreign minister’s post. From 1912 on, Hartwig repeatedly pushed Serbia toward a more aggressive policy than it might have taken on its own or that the Foreign Ministry desired.23 His activity attracted so much attention that diplomats representing other nations at Belgrade complained to their governments, which, in turn, raised the issue with Sazonov.24 Sazonov consequently warned Hartwig about his behavior but with little success. Only death removed him from his post. It would seem logical that Sazonov would replace this difficult subordinate with someone more obedient to his policy, but he never did, and other high-ranking

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ambassadors and ministers followed their own lines occasionally, with few removed.25 With this pattern in mind, Charykov’s removal was clearly unusual for the Russian Foreign Ministry, so the root cause must have been something else. Instead, it appears that the winter of 1911-1912 was very much the wrong time for the Russians, whether Charykov or anyone else, to raise the issue of the Straits. Diplomatically, too much else was happening for Sazonov to be sure of support from his Entente partners. On the one hand, relations between Russia and Great Britain were plagued by continuing troubles in Persia, which Sazonov extensively discussed in Paris after his convalescence.26 As a consequence of talks with Sazonov and Benckendorff, Izvolskii feared for the Entente’s health and cautioned Neratov against letting the Persian situation worsen to the point of a break with England.27 With the position of the British uncertain, Sazonov would have been very reluctant to follow a policy that would lead to either one of two dangerous scenarios. First, if London and St. Petersburg were estranged over Persia and an aggressive policy over the Ottoman Empire enmeshed Russia in war, London would be less likely to lend it critical support. Second, even if Russia and Turkey peacefully agreed to the change at the Straits, they would have no guarantee of British sympathy or acquiescence. The British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had repeatedly given general support for Russian interests there but also insisted that he could go no farther. He implied that a great-power conference would be necessary to approve the changes, since a treaty signed by several powers had set down the previous rules for the Straits. Success at such a conference would require British support, which the Persian conflict might hinder. At the same time, the Franco-Russian Alliance was not providing its members with the support they expected. France and Germany were still sorting out the results of their most recent Moroccan conflict, known as the Agadir Crisis, which heated up in the spring and summer of 1911.28 French fears limited their willingness to approve any use of force that might compound the danger of war with Germany. Additionally, Russia’s half-hearted diplomatic support had diminished French willingness to stand behind its ally. Sazonov, making no mention of the Charykov situation’s resolution in his memoirs, instead devotes his entire attention to the resolution of the Franco-German dispute, indicating that he was far more preoccupied with Morocco than with Charykov. With French dissatisfaction palpable, to request

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that they now back up Russia in a diplomatic foray that would risk new tension with the Central Powers was nonsensical. Compounding Sazonov’s reluctance was his knowledge that the Russian army was still unprepared for large-scale war. Again, he must have feared that an exclusive Russo-Turkish agreement would spark reaction from other powers, as he did later. Although the amount of information about the state of the army Sazonov received while he was abroad is unclear, it is improbable that he had forgotten the previous year’s discussions indicating that Russia still needed several years to bring the army up to the desired strength. All of these factors, combined with the continuing debate over the funding and construction of railways in northeastern Anatolia, not to mention disagreement among the Great Powers over financial arrangements in China and the TurkoPersian border settlement, could have left no doubt in Sazonov’s mind that Russia could not yet use armed strength to secure its desires. The safer path, and the one he chose, was to defer the whole discussion of the Straits to a more propitious time. An Attack on the Dardanelles Russia did not broach the Straits Question during the Italo-Turkish War because it was reluctant to test the support of its partners or to commit its army to battle. Protecting Russia’s new Italian partner did not conflict with its interests at the Straits, as Sazonov’s evolving policy perceived them. By lending support to Rome, he hoped to shore up Russia’s diplomatic position. Sazonov’s views on Russo-Italian relations were based, in part, on the two nations’ recent contacts. An agreement between the Russian and Italian foreign ministers signed in Racconigi on 24 October 1909 was a watershed in relations. Since 1882, Italy had been a member of the Triple Alliance, binding it in a defensive alignment with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Even so, Austria-Hungary remained Italy’s main obstacle to the completion of the Risorgimento, as Vienna possessed lands, such as Trieste, Istria, and parts of the Dalmatian coast, that Rome considered its birthright.29 Austrian expansion in the Balkans threatened Italian interests along the eastern Adriatic coast and gave Rome a community of interests with St. Petersburg in hindering Austrian activity. The Racconigi agreement, which protected the status quo in the Balkans and recognized Russian and Italian interests at the Straits and in Libya, respectively, supplied both states with some measure of reinforcement there.30 By the time the Italo-Turkish War broke out, the Russian Foreign Ministry was renewing its effort to bring

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the Balkan states into an alliance under Russian aegis in order to resist Austrian expansion; Italy was an important component of Sazonov’s effort to contain Vienna’s influence. Lack of clear direction in Russia’s foreign policy during his extended absence in 1911, however, had damaged its standing in Rome.31 Consequently, to maintain and to reinforce Italy’s critical support, Sazonov opposed attempts by other Great Powers to limit Italy’s freedom of action or to conclude the Libyan conflict without Italy’s objectives being met. Soon after resuming control of the Foreign Ministry in the last weeks of December 1911, he suggested that the Great Powers jointly intercede in the conflict to convince the Porte to accept Italian annexation of Tripoli.32 This first formal proposal found little sympathy among the Great Powers, the Turks, or even the Italians,33 so Sazonov put forward a different approach. From 11 February, informally, and then from 21 February in an official aidememoire, he suggested that the other Great Powers try to mediate the conflict by first consulting with the Italians to learn what concessions they might make and only then turning to the Turks.34 While the Central Powers agreed relatively rapidly with Sazonov’s suggestion,35 the strongest resistance came from the French prime minister, Raymond Poincaré, who insisted that the powers should consult with both warring capitals simultaneously to avoid any appearance of favoritism or violations of neutrality. He was also piqued at having been the last leader to receive word of the proposal directly from Russia, even though France was Russia’s ally.36 Sazonov insisted on 1 March that consultation with Italy did not indicate favoritism, but rather the opposite, since eventually Turkey would be presented with a list of the concessions Italy might make. He saw no reason to believe that Turkey would refuse to take part in a conversation with the Great Powers only because it began in Rome.37 Although Sazonov and Poincaré appeared ready to compromise, by 3 March, Poincaré, fearing a public split within the Triple Entente, decided to accept Sazonov’s scheme in its entirety, pending British agreement.38 Discussion about specific approaches continued for some weeks, but Sazonov had won his point and allowed Italy the chance to register its desiderata first. Nonetheless, his proposals were to come to naught.39 A new dispute soon arose over Foreign Secretary Grey’s suggestion that the Great Powers should ask Italy for a pledge not to extend its theater of operations beyond Libyan waters. After an Italian raid on Beirut in late February, Britain hoped to prevent an Italian attack on or through the Dardanelles, which would provoke the Turks to close the

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Straits to all ships and cut off an important British shipping route.40 Given Russia’s dependence on trade through the Turkish Straits, similar action by its government would seem logical, but Sazonov would have no part of it. As in his earlier mediation proposals, he appeared to subordinate the sanctity of the Straits to work on the Italians’ behalf. He told Buchanan on 29 February that he did not think that the powers could ask Italy to restrict its field of operations while maintaining their own neutrality. He dismissed the possible consequences of Rome’s refusal to pledge by stating that “it was, however, one of the unfortunate consequences of war that the commerce of neutral nations invariably suffered loss.”41 He would sing a very different tune about trade with the Turks a month later. His attitude toward Italy is even more surprising in light of his subsequent stubborn opposition to the approach of the armed forces of Bulgaria and Greece, states smaller than Italy, anywhere near the Turkish capital. He would even be suspicious of British and French intentions during their 1915 Gallipoli operation. Sazonov had two good reasons for following this policy, which was actually consistent with his general views on Straits’ affairs. First, he believed that any Italian action would be more a hit-and-run attack than an extended operation. On 5 February 1912, he told the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, that he “would not be disquieted about the arrival of Italy at the Dardanelles.”42 He explained this equanimity two weeks later, stating that Italy was “the single Power which could go there without staying there.”43 Italy’s strategic position was certainly complicated. Austro-Hungarian hostility forced it to maintain troop levels at regular strength along their common border. At the same time, those forces that could be spared from Italy itself were committed to the Libyan campaign. Thus, any Italian attack near Asia Minor and European Turkey would likely have been only naval, designed, first, to show the Turks that the Italians could harry them even close to home; second, to impress them with the growing cost of the war; and, third, to convince them to agree to Italian peace terms. This sort of operation would not have threatened Russia’s vital interests at the Straits. Indeed, an Italian attack could have advanced Russia’s interests. This possibility was the second reason Sazonov condoned an Italian strike. Like other leaders of the Great Powers, he feared that if the ItaloTurkish War dragged on, the Balkan states would use an incident on the peninsula as a pretext to attack a weakened Turkey for their own aggrandizement.44 As noted above, military authorities had already

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begun contingency planning in case the war did spread to the Balkans.45 Sazonov regularly referred to such a threat but feared that Russian intervention in a Balkan conflict would quickly expand into a European conflict.46 A successful Italian foray into the Straits, demonstrating that it could attack wherever it chose, might push the Turks into signing a peace treaty before the Balkan states could attack. If the naval strike happened to sink part of the Turkish fleet, that too would have been welcome to St. Petersburg.47 Sazonov became so enamored of the idea of an Italian coup de grâce at the Straits that he told its government in the first week of April that the Ottoman Empire would not agree to its annexation of Libya, unless it won a decisive victory there. After a few words of caution about attacking the Turks at the Dardanelles, he said that if Italy “would nonetheless believe it necessary to attempt the adventure [against the Straits], she would have to use surprise, in a manner that would place Europe before a fait accompli.”48 According to Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, Sazonov “practically encouraged us in our design.”49 While Sazonov certainly hoped that such an attack would hasten the Turks’ acceptance of their loss of the Libyan provinces, these statements confirm that the makers of Russian foreign policy hoped to break the stalemate between Italy and Turkey before the Balkan states took advantage of the situation.50 The Russians desired, instead, an alliance of Balkan states that would strongly counter Austrian designs, and they hoped an entente with Italy would produce a similar effect. Sazonov tried to collaborate with the Italians as much as possible to preserve or even to enhance their cooperation in the Balkans and advanced a plan for mediation that seemed to favor them by giving them the opportunity to present their desiderata before the Turks did. He also worked against Sir Edward Grey’s proposal to ask for Italy’s pledge to restrict its military operations to the Libyan theater—and thus not to attack the Straits— even at the possible expense of commercial passage to and from the Black Sea. In trying to understand Sazonov’s warmth toward Italy, Louis first suggested on 21 February that the Russians thought the Italians could assist in achieving an Austro-Russian rapprochement. He further suggested that Russian attitudes toward Austria remained bitter after the Bosnian Crisis of 1908. He surmised that Russia sought “rapprochement” with Austria-Hungary “to observe and contain” the Habsburg Empire more easily, which Italy also apparently desired.51 Sazonov displayed this attitude once again in a conversation with Buchanan a week later, when he explained that: “[h]e was most anxious

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to avoid taking any step to which the Italian Government could possibly take exception, as he wished to keep on the friendliest terms with them. Italy . . . was a valuable counterpoise to Austria in the Balkans and ever since the Racconigi meeting the two Governments had kept in close touch with each other as regarded their policy in that peninsula.”52 Much like Louis, Buchanan believed that Russia was still very suspicious of Austrian activity in the Balkans. The French ambassador at Rome, Camille Barrère, confirmed these reports after a Russian colleague told him that Russia saw Italy as “a means to balance the Austrian influence in the Balkans.”53 While none of these ambassadors drew out the point, Sazonov did in a private letter to Izvolskii on 7 March.54 He wrote that he had taken the initiative to free Italy from any restrictions on the use of its forces, which could be useful if Vienna tried to take advantage of Italy’s distraction to seize new territory on the Balkan Peninsula. Furthermore, the hitherto warm relations between France and Italy had become quite strained, perhaps to the breaking point, partly because of France’s attempts to limit Italy’s freedom of action. Sazonov’s assessment of the situation was corroborated by a report on 25 March from his ambassador at Rome, Prince Nikolai Dolgorukii, which stated that the Italian government greatly appreciated the Russian support it had been receiving and was prepared to meet Russia’s desires in regions where it was possible.55 There is a hint of one further reason why Sazonov was interested in allowing the Italians the freedom to attack the Dardanelles: Russia may have hoped to use their penetration of the Straits as an excuse to demand that its own ships be allowed into the Bosphorus.56 While no documentary evidence from Russian sources has come to light, this concern was legitimate, and the Turks feared that St. Petersburg had such a strategy. This was not the only time that Russia would seek an excuse to send ships to Constantinople. During the Balkan Wars, the Russian government planned to take advantage of worries about the safety of European representatives and Christians in general to send troops to the Ottoman capital with the approval of the other Great Powers. During the Italo-Turkish War, they were likely searching for an excuse to legitimate an action otherwise unpopular with the courts of Europe. In any case, Sazonov’s Italian policy did not prove as successful as he hoped. While he garnered appreciation from Italy, his insistence on a policy amenable to Italy, rather than those, perhaps fairer, advanced by London and Paris, did nothing to hasten the end of the Italo-Turkish War. In fact, his meddling may have dragged it out, facilitating the very

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cataclysm that he was trying to avoid: a war between the Balkan states and Turkey. His hopes that an Italian attack at the Dardanelles would force Turkey to come to terms proved false; the attack took place, but no collapse followed. On 18 April, word flashed to the rest of Europe that Italy had attacked the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and in response, Turkey closed the Straits to all ships. The Turks had stated for months that closure would result from such action by Italy, so their reaction did not surprise the Great Powers. In November 1911, before Sazonov returned to Pevcheskii Most, Neratov had dealt with rumors of preemptive closure by taking a relatively hard line with both combatants, informing Rome and Constantinople that the rights of neutrals had to be taken into account.57 He also sent instructions to the Russian representative in Rome in the last week of November to notify the Italian government that “any such action would not be countenanced by Russia.”58 As we have seen, upon his return, Sazonov shifted pressure to the Porte. When the powers were informed by Ottoman authorities that an Italian attack on the Dardanelles would force them to close the Straits,59 Sazonov insisted on the right of Russian commercial traffic to pass through regardless.60 The stark contrast between the tone he took here with the Turks and the complacency with which he regarded Italian action at the Straits highlights the favoritism he showed Rome in pursuit of his objectives. Turkish threats to close the Straits were realized after the Italian attack of 18 April. The Italians tried to get some torpedo boats through the Dardanelles in order to assault the Turkish fleet, but they were detected by the Turkish forts along the coasts. The resulting firefight was relatively inconclusive from a military standpoint but nevertheless provoked the Turks to take long-threatened countermeasures. Sazonov’s resistance to the other powers’ demands for a pledge to limit the scope of Italian actions had helped to make this raid possible. He thus achieved one of his goals: the Turks knew that the Italians could strike them outside the Libyan theater of operations.61 He also achieved something he had not sought—Turkish closure of the Straits to all traffic. Compounding these difficulties, Sazonov’s policy aroused cries of protest from merchants whose activities were hampered and profits destroyed by the closure of Russia’s main southern trading route. They sent a barrage of telegrams calling for action to reopen the critical waterway to a number of government ministers, including the minister of trade and industry, S. I. Timashev, the prime and finance minister,

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V. N. Kokovtsov, and the foreign minister. Five days after the Turks closed the Straits, Timashev wrote to Kokovtsov that the closure was creating a critical situation for both goods and workers, to say nothing of the commercial life of the southern part of the country.62 Two weeks after passing this note along to Sazonov with his own similar exhortation, Kokovtsov wrote Sazonov again on 12 May in reaction to continuing pleas from exporters and merchants in the south.63 Never one to place much real weight on the demands of the press or other public bodies, Sazonov effectively ignored these new pleas, sticking to the pro-Italian policy in place. He also resisted suggestions from the other Great Powers to pressure Rome to pledge not to make another attack. He instructed his ambassador at Constantinople, M. N. Giers, to protest the closure and to threaten that St. Petersburg might demand some sort of indemnity from Turkey for Russian trade losses, citing the Straits Convention as the basis for ordering that the Straits be reopened whenever the Italian fleet was not near. Here began yet another divergence between British and Russian views on the subject. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs, denied that the Straits Convention forced Turkey to keep the Dardanelles and Bosphorus open in times of war and stated that it was excessive to expect an indemnity from Turkey when it was engaged in battle. Nonetheless, he sent instructions to G. A. Lowther, British ambassador at the Turkish capital, to call the Porte’s attention to the worldwide agitation over the interruption of Straits traffic and to suggest that it provide pilots to steer commercial ships through the mines in the channel.64 The two ambassadors carried out their instructions, but Giers alone among the Great Powers’ representatives called for the full reopening of the Straits. The Turks, on 25 April, stubbornly replied that if the powers could convince the Italians to take no further action at the Dardanelles, they would reopen the waterway to foreign commercial traffic.65 Sazonov remained adamant. Under strong pressure from public opinion, both commercial and political, he refused to seek a commitment from Italy “not to undertake, even for a specific period, any hostile action against the Dardanelles, so that neutral commercial ships could use this time to pass the Straits.”66 He claimed that he had “official information . . . that Italy [would] answer with a decided refusal to give such a promise,” which would not improve the situation.67 His resolve was bolstered by the attitudes of Italy and its allies. On 29 April, he learned that Italy was not inclined to attack the Dardanelles again but could in no way give a formal statement to that

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effect.68 Dolgorukii explained the Italian position by pointing out how agitated its public had become and noting that its government would see a request to refrain from attacking the Straits as a hostile act, capable of rupturing its good relations with Russia.69 Sazonov also learned from Izvolskii that the Austrian government had informed Rome that it would not request a pledge of restraint, which would be a departure from its neutrality.70 This statement could only have enhanced Sazonov’s resolve to maintain his policy and not to allow Austria-Hungary to separate Russia from Italy. Official word of the Straits’ reopening arrived on 2 May. The very next day, Sazonov received news that confirmed the effectiveness of his policy toward Italy. On 3 May, Dolgorukii reported that the English and Austrian governments had asked the Italians for a temporary pledge against military operations at the Straits. The Italians responded that they would have to check with the Russian government before answering formally.71 How Dolgorukii and Izvolskii obtained opposite information concerning Austrian intentions is unclear, but the thought that Austria might be taking a similar line to his and the subsequent news that Italy felt the need to consult with St. Petersburg would have boosted Sazonov’s confidence in his choices. The fact that the Turks reopened the Straits to commercial traffic without a pledge from Italy also made his policy appear sensible. With the reopening, discussion of practical problems associated with the Straits faded into the background. Turkish mines were not removed for another three weeks, but the powers could do little more than complain.72 Sazonov complained, of course. He made a show of frustration over the delay in free passage, and on 20 May, the Russian government published a communiqué mentioning possible compensation claims for the losses suffered during the suspension of commercial traffic. While the foreign minister played down the communiqué’s seriousness in a discussion with Hugh O’Beirne, the British chargé d’affaires at St. Petersburg, he insisted “that the delay in reopening the Straits was not wholly due to technical difficulties but to a large extent intentional on the part of [the] Turkish Government, which had wished to force [the] Powers to intervene.”73 Moves toward peace negotiations between the Italians and the Turks were already under way, and although the Italians again tried to penetrate the Straits with torpedo boats to sink the Turkish fleet on the night of 18-19 July 1912,74 their attempt did not cause a second closure. Even as tension subsided, compensation remained a topic of speculation. Quite soon after the Turks blocked the Straits, Giers had

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passed on to the Porte a vague threat that Russia would demand an indemnity. While waiting for the mines to be cleared in late May, Sazonov talked about indemnities, but he told O’Beirne that “he did not really propose to advance the claims, [the] legal basis for which he recognized to be doubtful.”75 He explained his doubt more fully to Kokovtsov on 5 June.76 Although the Straits were passable by the time he sent his letter, he felt that detailing his views on the subject was worthwhile, given the “hugely vital meaning of the general question of commercial navigation across the Straits” and the specific concerns raised by their recent closing. He referred primarily to the London Treaty of 1871, which set out vague rules regulating passage. The relevant part stated only that commercial ships of all nations had the right to pass the Straits during peace and war.77 Although he insisted that closing the Straits violated this treaty, he conceded: “it did not follow, however, that international law required the closure of the Straits to be identified as a violation of international obligations in all cases,” especially in “situations of mandatory defense and extreme necessity.” Pointing out that these latter terms were not defined nor were any guidelines for awarding compensation, Sazonov noted that some relatively vague statements in the Hague Convention of 1907 on land warfare might provide guidance. Given the lack of definition, he refused to concede that states could violate the rights of neutrals whenever war occurred, but that from a juridical point of view, it would be impossible to deny Turkey the right to close the Straits “in a moment of real and direct national danger, threatening the Straits and Constantinople.” He got around this hurdle by objecting not to the closure itself but to its inappropriate length. Although he had found what he believed to be a legitimate basis of protest, he acknowledged that contemporary political circumstances in Europe made it difficult for Russian to make a claim along these lines because it might raise two undesirable outcomes: either the powers’ outright refusal of the Russian claim or its transfer to the Hague Court, which Sazonov described as impermissible in a case involving vital state interests. In closing, he proposed that Russia ought first to exchange opinions with some of the other powers informally, to learn the legitimacy of his worries about their attitudes. What can we derive from this letter? Given his statement to O’Beirne that he did not expect to put forward such claims and the discouraging tone of the letter to Kokovtsov as well as the lack of any evidence that he asked his ambassadors to sound out other governments, Sazonov’s public talk of indemnities seems more like

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bluster to intimidate the Turks than a serious threat. Since they did not close the Straits again, it may have resonated a little with them. Such public statements might also have been meant to salve the frustration of the Russian merchants, whose letters inspired little concrete action by the government. Sazonov’s reluctance to allow the Hague Court to decide the case is more significant. This occasion was the first of a series when he would refuse to subject Russian vital interests to forces outside Russian control. His attitude betrays a mounting distrust of international bodies, conferences, and agreements that would color his decision-making until his retirement and, interestingly, mirrors that of his German and Austrian counterparts. The Central Powers were increasingly skeptical that diplomacy was serving their interests.78 With the autumn, European and Russian attention shifted from the Italo-Turkish conflict to a new one that it seemed to be inspiring—a war between the states aligned in the new Balkan system, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire on the other. Upon his return in late 1911, Sazonov had redirected Russian foreign policy from the course that Neratov and Izvolskii had been following—more balanced between Italy and Turkey—to one that better corresponded with his view of the possibilities and dangers at the start of 1912. He hoped that by allowing, even encouraging, Rome to act decisively outside the Libyan theater of operations, Turkey would see the folly of continuing the war and come to terms with Italy before the Balkan states could take advantage of its distraction. Russia, like the rest of the Great Powers, wanted to forestall a Balkan conflict that all feared might become a European conflagration. Sazonov’s approach, like those of the other powers, failed to prevent the Balkan collision, though at least the First and Second Balkan Wars did not immediately trigger wider war. If Sazonov failed to prevent the new conflict, he was successful in other areas. He put off the Straits Question while Russia was unprepared to act decisively on behalf of its own interests. In addition, the Straits were only closed once. For the rest of the Italo-Turkish War, they remained open to neutral commerce, despite the occasional scare. Other threats loomed, this time from the landward side.

3 THE BALKAN WARS: CHOOSING BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES AND THE STRAITS, 1912-19131

T

he Balkan League’s 8 and 17 October 1912 attack on Turkey drove the Ottoman Empire to make peace with Italy and introduced new threats to Russian interests. Chief among them was a surprisingly successful Bulgarian ground offensive to capture Constantinople and some of the Straits’ coastline. Russia also feared that Greece, like Italy some months before, might make a naval attack against Turkey at the Straits, leading to another closure. Furthermore, the Russian government became increasingly worried about Turkish naval development. From the autumn of 1912 to the autumn of 1913, Sazonov and the Russian government sought to preserve the status quo by whatever means they could. Given the centrality of the Straits Question, it is surprising that historical scholarship has neglected its role in Russian policy during the Balkan Wars. The good deal of attention paid to Russia’s defense of Serbian interests and its reaction to the “system of Balkan alliances” relatively excludes the Straits.2 Russian diplomacy in response was two pronged: on the one hand, it continued to resist the introduction of the Straits Question into official discussion among the Great Powers, and on the other, it sought to prevent the Bulgarians from advancing to the shores of the Straits. In the end, Turkey retained sovereignty in those areas, but Russia’s policies, yet again, had unforeseen negative consequences that call into question their value from the outset.

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Before the War: Avoiding Discussion During the summer of 1912, the Great Powers increased their pressure for an end to the Italo-Turkish War so that Turkey would look less vulnerable to the Balkan allies. In contributing to this effort, Sazonov pursued three central goals as he met with foreign leaders in July, August, and September. Most of all, he wanted to keep the powers from considering changes at the Turkish Straits. He stressed that Russia desired no alteration of the arrangement there in order to obviate the need for discussion. At the same time, he refuted any suggestion that Russia had no interest in the fate of the Turkish possessions. The first high-level encounter was to be a Russo-German meeting from 3 to 5 July 1912 in Baltic Port.3 When informed of the Russians’ intentions, the French government, especially Raymond Poincaré, serving as both prime and foreign minister, grew alarmed.4 They feared that Germany would attempt to draw Russia out of the Triple Entente or at least that the two nations would come to some bilateral agreements on any of a number of current problems to the detriment of France and Britain. Although St. Petersburg assured Paris and London that the meeting would have no political significance, the fact that German Chancellor T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Kokovtsov, and Sazonov would all be taking part greatly troubled Poincaré.5 To protect French interests, he sought a commitment from Russia not to hold any talks on Near Eastern or any other policy behind France’s back.6 On 7 June, he urged Triple Entente members to state jointly that the tsar would make no separate arrangement with the kaiser, as the partners had already agreed that the terms of any peace treaty between Italy and Turkey would be strictly limited to that conflict itself; thus, France, Britain, and Russia would all subscribe to “a general pact of disinterestedness” to which Germany and other powers could subscribe if they wished.7 Poor communication among the Russians hampered discussion of this proposal. At first, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, opposed the French proposition, since he correctly anticipated the Russian foreign minister’s hostility. Sazonov, however, was not in St. Petersburg but Moscow, where he apparently received an incomplete description of Poincaré’s idea. Thinking the French had simply suggested that the Triple Entente act in common on the Italo-Turkish War, he gave his approval on 9 June.8 Learning the details some days later, on 13 June, he telegraphed Izvolskii that the part of the statement that discussed “disinterestedness” was unacceptable.9 Meanwhile, Grey

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had accepted the French proposal, now believing that the Russians would actually accept Poincaré’s draft.10 Confusion in the Russian capital continued to hamper diplomacy, as Sazonov’s disapproving telegram to Izvolskii of 13 June only arrived in London on 15 June. Even so, Grey apparently was not informed of Sazonov’s opinions until the 17th, when he finally received clarification from Hugh O’Beirne, the chargé d’affaires at St. Petersburg. Grey then returned to his original opposition to the Poincaré plan,11 but Izvolskii, who evidently disagreed with Sazonov on disinterestedness,12 said nothing to the French government, so that Poincaré continued to send telegrams to his diplomats assuming Russian agreement.13 When Poincaré finally learned Sazonov’s true attitude late on 18 June or early 19 June, the information came not from the Russian ambassador at Paris but from his own ambassadors at London and St. Petersburg.14 At last, Paris and London gained a clear understanding of Sazonov’s opposition, which fell into three basic areas. One reason, which the British rather than the French perceived most clearly, was his refusal to countenance the suspicions implicit in the French request. O’Beirne reported on 17 June that Sazonov greatly resent[ed] the suggestion made by French Government that the three Powers should sign a protocol of disinterestedness, which suggestion he says can only be directed against Russia. He complains that [the] French Government persist in attributing to Russia designs—which she does not entertain—of obtaining advantages for herself out of Turkey’s difficulties.15 Indeed, as we have seen, the Russian government did not have designs on the Straits at this time, having halted Charykov’s attempt after Sazonov’s return to official work, and their frustration on this score is understandable. As Poincaré continued to include disinterestedness in his proposals, Sazonov wrote to Izvolskii on 18 June complaining that Russia had already shown its “lack of intention to use the present war for the achievement of self-interested goals” and instructing the ambassador to inform the French government that he was ready to agree to any formula that did not include the problematic terms.16 Still fighting, he stressed to the British chargé on 20 June that he had already told the Turkish government that if a conference took place to settle the

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peace between Italy and Turkey, Russia would leave the question of the Straits alone. In the same discussion with O’Beirne, Sazonov complained about a different French suspicion. He thought that the real inspiration for Poincaré’s proposal was a fear that, in July, the Russian and German emperors might sign agreements to the detriment of French security.17 Sazonov viewed this fear as unjustified and saw no reason to make extra statements like the one proposed, especially with terms that he deeply opposed. He insisted repeatedly to O’Beirne and Izvolskii that French anxieties were baseless, noting to the former that in the five previous meetings of the two emperors, no lasting change had come about, and there was no reason to expect anything different this time.18 He also pleaded with O’Beirne on 20 June for Grey’s help in explaining this point to Paris.19 He had been trying to get through to Louis but had little confidence that the message was heard at the Quai d’Orsay. Available sources suggest that Poincaré was indeed learning more from his ambassador at London; from St. Petersburg, Louis merely reported that any initiative Wilhelm II took would be addressed to all the Great Powers and not pursued by Germany and Russia alone to the injury of other nations.20 French Ambassador Paul Cambon’s telegrams from London made clearer both Sazonov’s position and the British government’s confidence in it. Only after Cambon relayed O’Beirne’s report of the 20 June meeting and the British worry about offending the Russians and after Izvolskii passed along a similar telegram from Sazonov, did Poincaré accept the need to remove the statement about disinterestedness and allow the discussions to move forward again.21 After concern about French suspicions, the second reason Sazonov opposed the statement of disinterestedness concerned Slav sensibilities and Russian policy in the region. In his initial protests on 18 June, he pointed out that “Russia will never declare nor allow it to be understood that she is disinterested in the East in general, or in any of the questions of the East which have for some centuries formed the base of her policy. That would be on her part an abdication . . . if she pronounced such a word!”22 Nicholas II echoed these sentiments that same day. Poincaré countered on 19 June that désintéressement meant renouncing any pretensions only during that specific conflict, not as a general principle, and that France was no less interested in Near Eastern affairs than was Russia.23 An unconvinced Sazonov replied with a reference to the Serbian and Bulgarian delegations, recently arrived in Russia to discuss their new alliance and present it to Nicholas II, who was to arbitrate their remaining territorial disputes. If Russia signed Poincaré’s

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declaration, and it were made public, these visitors would receive a “disastrous impression” and see it as an “abdication of [Russia’s] historical rôle in the Balkans.”24 He told O’Beirne that such an action would have a disastrous effect, and that it would undo at a stroke the work accomplished by Russian policy during the last two years. He regarded the suggestion as positively dangerous, and described it as ‘playing with fire’—by which I take him to mean that it is a dangerous thing to force Russia to show her hand about the Balkans, because she might have to make a declaration which would have far-reaching consequences.25 Regardless of French insistence to the contrary, the term disinterestedness could well “be construed to mean that [Russia] ceased to interest herself in Balkan affairs.”26 Such an abdication would result in significant loss of prestige and influence in the region, seriously decreasing Russia’s ability to protect its interests there, including access to the Straits from their European side. The third reason behind Sazonov’s opposition to the proposed statement was a rejection of any limit whatsoever on Russia’s options in its relations with Turkey. On 18 June, while insisting to Louis that Russia “had no intention of submitting the question of the opening of the Straits,” he refused to allow that attitude “to tie his hands” in choosing his policies.27 Although evidence is scantier, this interpretation fits perfectly with Sazonov’s larger view of Russian policy on the Straits. While he preferred to put any concrete action vis-à-vis the Straits off until Russia was better prepared, he could not foresee every eventuality and had to preserve his freedom of movement. Agreeing to a statement of disinterestedness would have implied a serious concession of Russian rights at the Straits. With pressure coming from St. Petersburg and London and time running out as the emperors’ meeting approached, Poincaré accepted on 22 June the removal of the phrase concerning disinterestedness. Within a few days, the three governments agreed on a statement very close to Poincaré’s original proposal but without the offending sentence. Although Sazonov suggested privately to Izvolskii on 25 June that the whole affair had the character of “an academic exchange of opinions,”28 his stubbornness suggests it was much more important. He had avoided an unpalatable restriction on his policy-making choices, while he tried

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to maintain healthy relations with his ally and Entente partner. The French, however, remained uncertain about Russian intentions, even after the harmless conclusion of Nicholas and Wilhelm’s meeting at Baltic Port. These Russo-German conversations in early July dealt with the state of their relations, the possibility of war in the Balkans, the effect of the continuing Italo-Turkish War, and affairs in China.29 While other subjects were broached, the Straits were not: “between us . . . no special agreement on any sort of separate subject either was concluded or even prepared,” Sazonov recorded.30 Had the Russian leadership been inclined to push for some sort of new agreement on the Straits, such an intimate occasion would have been perfect, but as it desired no change, the opportunity passed. Before the dispute over disinterestedness, a Franco-Russian meeting had been scheduled to reduce friction between them.31 Worried about the emperors’ meeting, the French requested that the date be brought forward. The Russians agreed, and Poincaré visited Russia from 9 to 16 August. In the first few days, he had long discussions with Nicholas II, Sazonov, and Kokovtsov that addressed the gamut of issues related to both their alliance and international affairs. Here again was a perfect opportunity for Sazonov to put forward any demands or expectations in regard to the Straits and Constantinople, but although the talks were extensive, especially on the Italo-Turkish War, the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, and Franco-Russian military and naval relations, the Straits received only the barest mention. In the memoranda that the two foreign ministers composed after their discussions, the Straits are not mentioned at all, nor do we find them in the relevant sections of the memoirs of Poincaré, Sazonov, Kokovtsov, or Louis.32 Luckily, Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador to Russia, noted its brief appearance, if only to say that Sazonov “assured Monsieur Poincaré that he had no intention of raising this question at present.”33 This statement clearly suggests the possibility of Russia reopening the discussion but gives no sense of when or how the French foreign minister reacted or what he made of it. Still, Sazonov was obviously minimizing attention to the issue. He took a similar approach in his third high-level meeting of 1912: a series of discussions at Balmoral Castle from 24 to 27 September 1912 with not only the foreign secretary but also the king, opposition leaders, and other members of British government. It was yet another perfect opportunity to sound out a desired and likely ally for confirmation of its attitude of cautious cooperation expressed during previous crises. This

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time, sources reveal no trace of the Straits.34 Just as in the previous meetings, he focused on more pressing topics and left the Straits Question aside. Warning Bulgaria Sazonov’s extended effort to minimize discussion of the Straits and Constantinople does not mean that he spent no time dealing with the problem. On the contrary, as the threat of war on the Balkan Peninsula grew more serious, so did the Russian fear of a Bulgarian strike against the Turkish capital. The threat was enhanced, ironically, by the Russians’ own actions—the encouragement of a system of military alliances under their aegis among Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro—which increased their chances of victory over the Ottoman Empire and reduced their hesitation to choose war.35 Adding to the irony, one of the factors behind Russian support and pressure for a Balkan alliance was protection of the status quo at the Straits and Constantinople.36 However, it grew increasingly apparent during 1912 that Bulgaria menaced Turkish control. The 1878 Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey had assigned more territory to Bulgaria than it was forced to accept after the rest of the Great Powers revised the arrangement at the Congress of Berlin. Bulgarian nationalists and others had since dreamt of recovering their state’s largest, if briefly held, size.37 Some went even further, hoping to conquer Constantinople and to make it the new capital of a resurgent Bulgaria. These aspirations were known outside Bulgaria and had for several years alarmed Russian foreign policymakers, among others.38 As signs of war in the Balkans multiplied in the spring and summer of 1912, Sazonov began warning the Bulgarian government against any plans to capture Constantinople. A first attempt to dissuade them came in early May, when Bulgarian leader S. Danev brought an official delegation to the tsar’s summer residence in Livadia on the Black Sea. There, Danev and Sazonov discussed a number of issues, including Bulgaria’s possible future growth at the expense of Turkey. According to Sazonov, Danev tried to convince him that Adrianople, the last major fortress city on the road from Bulgaria to Constantinople, ought to be included in the Bulgarian sphere of interest. Sazonov quickly refused, noting that Adrianople was outside of the Bulgarian boundaries granted by the Treaty of San Stefano and that if Bulgaria did achieve its “national aspirations, Adrianople [would] lose its present significance as a Turkish outpost, because Turkey herself will then be reduced to a power of

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second-rate importance.”39 On about 5 June, Bulgarian Finance Minister Todorov, believed to be one of his country’s more influential ministers, identified Constantinople and the Straits as a “sphere of Russian interests” in a way that implied that Sofia would not meddle there,40 but such reassurances do not seem to reflect political reality. Just two weeks later, on 20 June, the Russian ambassador at Sofia, Anatolii V. Nekliudov, wrote that King Ferdinand had twice spoken with him about Russia allowing Bulgaria to take Adrianople in the event of war. The Bulgarians clearly aimed to consume more Ottoman territory.41 During the summer of 1912, Sazonov and his representatives continued both to admonish Bulgaria against starting a war prematurely and to worry that it would seize Constantinople if the opportunity arose. Warnings of Bulgarian intentions now came from Giers in Constantinople as well. On the basis of reports from Russian diplomats in the Balkans and meetings with Balkan diplomats in Constantinople, Giers believed that war could easily break out and that Bulgaria, given the slightest chance of success, would not stop at the San Stefano borders but push onward to the Turkish capital.42 Sazonov shared this fear and emphasized that Russia would not be dragged into war by a small power: if the Bulgarians took it upon themselves to try for Constantinople, Russia would endeavor to stop them at Adrianople.43 If they defeated the Turks at Adrianople and turned to the Ottoman capital, “Russia would be obliged,” Sazonov said, “to warn them off . . . though she had no desire to establish herself at Constantinople, she could not allow any other Power to take possession of it.”44 Here, he again asserts that Constantinople must remain Turkish as long as Russia cannot control the process of change. Curiously, he told Buchanan that all Russia had to do was to “present an ultimatum at Sofia and that would suffice to arrest the further advance of the Bulgarian army.”45 His confidence is surprising and, indeed, exaggerated. How he could expect such a ploy to be effective, when he seemed almost desperate in his regular warnings to Sofia not to make war without Russia’s approval, is unclear. Such swagger was symptomatic of the larger delusion that Russia could control this alliance. Assuring Trade The hollowness of these hopes became all too apparent when hostilities began on 8 October between Turkey and Montenegro followed by Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia on 17 October. The Russian diplomatic

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situation became much more complex. Now the government not only had to continue pressuring Bulgaria to stay away from Constantinople but also to worry about Turkey closing the Straits again. Preserving commercial traffic through the Straits was its first preoccupation. Through 15 October, Sazonov concentrated on trying to keep as many states as possible out of the war while hastening its end. On that date, he received a letter from Prime Minister Kokovtsov, reminding him of the danger of a new closure and growing problems resulting from Turkish measures against Balkan shipping. The Porte had not only closed the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to commercial vessels flying Greek and Bulgarian flags but seized such ships in its waters.46 A large proportion of Russia’s agricultural exports were carried on foreign, especially Greek, vessels, so even this limited closure threatened a serious blow to the Russian economy. Conceding that Balkan ships could not be allowed through the Straits once war was declared, Kokovtsov advised that Russia protest “the illegal, in my opinion, detention of ships before the declaration of war” and said he would raise this issue at the next Council of Ministers’ meeting.47 Consequently, on 18 October, Sazonov protested to the Turkish government via its ambassador at St. Petersburg, Turkhan Pasha, and Giers in Constantinople. He told Turkhan that Russia’s economic interests made military operations in the Black Sea extremely undesirable and that given the end of war between Turkey and Italy, Turkey had no reason to restrict the passage of commercial vessels. He instructed Giers to tell the Turks that a serious new blow to Russian commerce could well put nearly irresistible pressure on the Russian government to end its peaceful stance. He expected the Turkish government to pay close attention to Russian’s legitimate interests, but to soften the warning, he had Giers note that while Russia opposed a military offensive in the Black Sea, it did not oppose and would not interfere with logistical and troop movements there.48 He also sought the cooperation of other powers. This time, Sazonov did not intend to prod only Turkey about the Straits, as he had during the Italo-Turkish War. Greece now represented the primary naval threat to the Straits and Turkey, and since it did not have the diplomatic weight that Italy had as a Triple Alliance member and was one of four combatants, in contrast to Italy’s solitary position during the Italo-Turkish War, Sazonov felt able to pressure Athens for a pledge not to attack the Straits. On 18 October, he asked the Great Powers to act with him to prevent Greece from threatening the Straits and forcing the Turks to close them.49 On his

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own, he told the Greek chargé d’affaires on 18 October that Greece should not attack the Straits because of both the risk that the Turks would defeat its navy and the harm to neutral commercial shipping from the Straits’ closure. He said that he would prefer “a positive assurance” from Athens to remove the doubt among merchants that, in itself, was hindering trade.50 Furthermore, when the Russian minister at Athens, A. P. Demidov, spoke with the Greek foreign minister on 19 and 20 October, he insisted that Greece must not encroach upon the Straits51 but could not extract any promise. Although Sazonov asked the powers for further assistance, they were unable to coerce Greece to make the sort of formal pledge that he sought.52 Nonetheless, the Greek fleet did not attack the Straits, so Sazonov’s ultimate objective was met. His diplomacy had more effect on the Ottoman government. The Turks agreed to closely follow international law, both as it affected Russian trade and Turkey’s rights to take military and naval measures against Bulgaria, and Balkan commercial vessels were allowed to pass the Straits until 21 October.53 On 20 October, both Giers and the French ambassador at the Porte, Maurice Bompard, felt that the Turkish government was trying to be sensitive to Russia’s needs.54 Sazonov was not satisfied, however. He told Giers that such declarations were insufficient; the Russian government needed a full guarantee of commercial passage through the Straits.55 That same day, Giers reported that the four-day grace period for Greek ships to pass the Straits had been extended by three more days, but the Porte insisted that this extension would be the last. While Sazonov did not receive the formal pledge on keeping the Straits open that he sought, by the end of October it was apparent that Turkish behavior fit with his expectations, as laid out in his letter of 5 June 1912, in which he allowed that Turkey had the right to close the Straits in self-defense but only for as long as its legitimate defense required.56 Furthermore, Kokovtsov with other ministers had found a means of replacing the large Greek shipping fleet that could no longer pass the Straits: Russian captains would be installed to operate foreign vessels with substantially foreign crews as Russian ships.57 With a partially satisfying solution to maintaining trade through the Straits, attention shifted to urgent issues on the ground and among the diplomatic chancelleries of Europe. Bulgarians at the Gates During its first weeks, the Great Powers searched for a way to end the Balkan War as quickly as possible while staying out of the actual fighting. Formulating an effective policy proved more difficult than they

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anticipated. Their task was complicated by the need to prevent either side from gaining a victory so great that it might threaten the status quo at the Straits and further destabilize the region. At the war’s outbreak, the Balkan armies were expected to have a difficult time against the German-trained Ottoman forces, and any territorial gains were expected to be limited. Sazonov, visiting Balmoral when the war began and feeling rather unwell while traveling, took a few days’ rest soon after returning to Russia, resuming full activity only on 22 October.58 The day before, Benckendorff had reported Grey’s proposal that peace conditions be offered to the combatants to finish the hostilities rapidly. Grey suggested that “[t]he complete integrity of Turkey in the City and District of Constantinople” be maintained, while the rest of the Ottoman Empire in Europe would retain only the nominal sovereignty of the Porte, allowing the Great Powers to oversee the introduction and implementation of serious reform in those regions.59 Betraying no sense of urgency, Sazonov fully agreed with this idea, disliking only some suggestions unrelated to the question at hand.60 This complacency was soon shattered. By the end of October, the Balkan allies were soundly defeating Turkey, and Bulgarian forces were marching quickly through Thrace.61 In contrast to Sofia’s earlier preference for intervention by the Great Powers, by 29 October, Sazonov told Buchanan that now the “Balkan States would only accept mediation on the condition that the territorial status quo should be modified.”62 The momentum of the Bulgarians’ advance on the Chatalja lines—the main defensive works before Constantinople— increasingly alarmed him. Seeking to define and to protect what he saw as Russia’s interests, on 31 October, he sent a circular to the Russian representatives in the capitals of the Great Powers and the new belligerents, setting out basic Russian policy. If the territorial status quo was to be changed, Russia felt that Constantinople and a region to its west defined largely by the Maritsa River, including the fortress city of Adrianople, “must remain under the real sovereignty of the Sultan to guarantee the security of Constantinople and of the related European and Russian interests of the first order.”63 As Sazonov noted, this demand was not new, so it should not have come as a surprise to anyone, belligerent or observer. He expected that Bulgaria would not make things difficult for itself and Russia by ignoring these facts, which could not be misunderstood. Quite revealing, Sazonov also found it necessary to inform his representatives that his activity would not be affected by the many stories that were appearing in both the Russian and Balkan press,

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inaccurately depicting and trying to pressure Russian policy. He noted that these stories could actually be useful, in that the Russian government “could use statements about apparent disorder to incline cabinets to the idea of the necessity of taking into account the difficulty of our position and to fight with the onslaught of our public opinion.” 64 He was clearly rejecting the idea that public opinion would force Russia’s policy to change. Although it could be argued that this statement tried to hide that he was, in fact, following public opinion, none of his extended writings from this period betray any sympathy for the clamor in the press but rather frustration and disgust. On the contrary, he felt that he understood public opinion better than the papers did. He wrote Izvolskii on 26 June 1913 about how difficult he had found the winter of 1912-1913, with attacks on his policy coming from all sides. He appreciated that Nicholas II had stood behind him the whole time, for which he felt Russia ought to be grateful. Furthermore, he felt that “one deeply comforting fact” had to be noted: “the government as represented by me during the Balkan Crisis more truly reflected public opinion of the country than did the nationalist press with the unscrupulous Novoe vremia at its head.”65 He continued to pay little heed to the press but at the same time used it to gain greater concessions from other states. To persuade the Bulgarians to halt their offensive toward the Turkish capital, Sazonov tried a dual approach. First, he warned them that a siege of the Chatalja works might cause riots in the capital. The powers most invested there—Britain and France—might then turn against Bulgaria, leaving it vulnerable to intervention by Austria and Rumania, which could act with impunity if western support was not forthcoming.66 This argument did not work and was not based in reality, because neither London nor Paris were so easily swayed against the Bulgarians as Sazonov intimated they might be.67 Second, he pointed out that a failure of the siege of Adrianople might seriously limit the size of the allies’ territorial acquisitions. Although this suggestion also displayed some wishful thinking, it may have been rooted in his fear that Turkish forces would overpower the Bulgarian army. Regardless of the Bulgarians’ reaction, Sazonov stressed Russia’s insistence on the Sultan keeping the land from the Maritsa River, including Adrianople, under his own real control.68 He was quite blunt with the Bulgarian minister in St. Petersburg, saying, “Be content with San Stefano Bulgaria and do not enter Constantinople under any circumstances, because you will otherwise complicate your affairs too gravely.”69

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Bulgaria was to understand that Russia was not prepared to sacrifice its interests. Less directly, the Russian foreign minister sought the cooperation of his Entente partners on 31 October and 1 November, requesting that they, too, push the Bulgarian government to halt its attacks at the Chatalja line. He told Buchanan that the borders set out for Bulgaria in the San Stefano treaty had to be the “basis of the future settlement,” but in the Adrianople vilayet, Sofia could receive nothing more. He hoped that the British and French would speak similarly at Sofia.70 In both Paris and London on 1 November, the Russian ambassadors requested that the two governments at least counsel Sofia not to occupy Constantinople.71 In stressing the point to the French ambassador that same day, Sazonov noted with some understatement that Russia was so concerned about the fate of Adrianople because “we are sensitive (chatouilleux) about Constantinople.”72 Great Britain and France agreed to the border that Sazonov suggested, but both opposed pressuring Bulgaria in the manner that the Russians desired. Grey had received information that the Bulgarians were not likely to stop at Chatalja, having won some significant victories. He felt that if the Bulgarians abandoned their pursuit, the Turkish forces would collect themselves to give further battle.73 From Paris, Poincaré protested that the sort of pressure that Sazonov advocated “could alienate the Bulgarians from the Powers of the Triple Entente” and make it easier for the Austrians “to come to their own agreement with Sofia.” He thought that it would be better to put off such a suggestion for the moment.74 Sazonov nonetheless persisted in seeking united action to halt the Bulgarians. He kept hearing that Bulgaria aimed to capture Constantinople and even that King Ferdinand envisioned a triumphal entry into the city and the great former St. Sophia cathedral, now a mosque.75 This intention increased the prospect of riots and massacres in Constantinople and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, if the Balkan allies captured the city, they would have leverage over the powers in future negotiations.76 Sazonov wanted to block them from the Turkish capital altogether, and he stressed to the powers that they had to act quickly. In case the Bulgarians did capture Constantinople, Sazonov indicated that Russia was ready to join any international naval demonstration off the capital that the powers agreed upon, with the goal of insuring that the Bulgarians’ “occupation must be of very short duration.” Anything long lasting would raise new dangers. He insisted

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to the British ambassador that the capital and the region around it “must remain either Turkish [or] become Russian and that Russia would regard any attempt made by another Power to take permanent possession of them as a casus belli.”77 In this way, he clearly affirmed how vital the location was to Russia; the only other event that might have spurred active Russian military intervention was an Austrian attack. Russia was absolutely opposed to the Bulgarians remaining at Constantinople and incorporating it into some larger Bulgarian state. Sazonov appeared ready, however, to compromise in less vital areas. He began to concede that if the Bulgarians captured Adrianople and destroyed its fortifications, “Russia might possibly consent to Bulgaria retaining Adrianople.”78 On 2 November, in a private conversation with Buchanan, he elucidated lines of policy that would define the Russian position for the rest of the Crisis: Bulgaria would be allowed to expand beyond the San Stefano borders to include even Adrianople, but the Sultan must continue to possess real sovereignty over the Straits, their shores, and Constantinople, with a sufficient zone for their defense. An opportunity for the Russians and Bulgarians to find some common ground arose on 2 November. The London Times published a communiqué that stated that the Bulgarians would not hold the Turkish capital if they captured it. They would simply make peace there and then withdraw. This claim gives weight to Hartwig and Sazonov’s fears of Constantinople becoming Sofia’s bargaining chip. Grey summoned the Bulgarian minister, M. Madjarov, who told him that the statement was his personal opinion. Grey reminded Madjarov of Constantinople’s importance to the Russians and suggested that the Bulgarian government calm their fears by informing them of its benign intentions.79 Madjarov forwarded this advice to his government, and the British minister to Bulgaria reported the next day that Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan E. Geshov had told him that his country had “no intention whatever of retaining Constantinople.” Geshov consequently sent instructions to his ambassador at St. Petersburg, S. S. Bobchev, to tell Sazonov Bulgaria’s intentions.80 Before this information arrived in the Russian capital, Sazonov’s inclination to concede Adrianople was confirmed on 3 November by a high-level meeting that included Sazonov, Kokovtsov, Admiral Grigorovich, and General Y. G. Zhilinskii, chief of the Army General Staff. Deferring to the War Ministry’s opinion that Adrianople was not essential to the defense of Constantinople, these officials decided that Bulgaria could keep the city as a fortress, but to preserve his own

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diplomatic options, Sazonov told Louis that he was not informing Sofia of this concession and stressed that it must not find its way into the French press, as so often occurred.81 As long as this decision stayed secret, Sazonov would have a stronger bargaining position with the Bulgarians. Indeed, developments suggested that he would have to negotiate the Bulgarians out of Constantinople fairly soon. On 3 and 4 November, the Turkish government pleaded with the powers for help in forcing the Balkan allies to accept an immediate armistice and preventing the Bulgarians, especially King Ferdinand, from causing riots and destruction by entering Constantinople.82 Turkhan Pasha told Sazonov that his empire’s army was in no condition to stop the attackers and that the government would flee the capital before the Bulgarians entered, which would lead unavoidably to anarchy.83 Such news only strengthened Sazonov’s desire for rapid agreement among the powers to push mediation and armistice upon the Balkan states, but the pace of events and differences among the powers made decisive action as difficult as ever. Still trying to obtain the cooperation of his Entente partners, Sazonov asked Izvolskii to tell Poincaré that if Constantinople were captured, Russia would be forced to send its entire Black Sea Fleet there at once. It would be much better if France would help to pressure Germany and Austria-Hungary to agree to a general plan, since a Russian deployment could well have pan-European complications.84 Only on 4 November had Sazonov informed Berlin of his proposals for mediation among the combatants, including his definition of the defensive zone for Constantinople. Although the Germans were given a plan in which Adrianople remained Turkish, Poincaré was finally told that Sazonov would acquiesce to the city becoming Bulgarian.85 Poincaré and Grey refused to help, believing that such pressure was pointless and might even be counterproductive, driving Bulgaria into the hands of Austria-Hungary.86 With no support from Britain and France and Sofia battling toward Constantinople, Sazonov felt obliged to reveal his concession of Adrianople to Bulgaria in hopes it would be enough to secure cooperation over Constantinople. On 5 November, Bobchev finally brought Sazonov a promise that, were its forces to capture Constantinople, Bulgaria would not remain permanently. He urged, however, that it be allowed to possess a larger portion of the Adrianople vilayet than the San Stefano Treaty had sanctioned. Sazonov revealed that Russia would permit Bulgaria to retain Adrianople, if it captured it,

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but the tenor of the conversation and the latest news from the front gave Sazonov little hope of stopping the Bulgarians before they reached the Turkish capital. His valuable bargaining chip now had little worth.87 He had become so pessimistic that on 6 November, he seemed to make the penultimate concession: he informed the French, British, and Bulgarian governments that Russia “did not want to oppose the temporary occupation of Constantinople by the allies.”88 He still feared that it would make subsequent negotiations even more difficult. Once the Turkish Army had retreated from the city, it would then regroup, “and for the Porte, the necessity would not arise of showing any particular tractability while convinced that affairs could not get worse.”89 He reminded them that if Constantinople’s occupation continued for an extended period, Russia would be forced to send its Black Sea Fleet to stand offshore until the Balkan allies departed.90 Until the attack by the overextended Bulgarian army failed at the Chatalja lines on 17-18 November, Sazonov continued to speak in this manner, and, as Louis put it on 10 November, seemed “resigned to the entrance of the Bulgarians into [Constantinople].” He still refused to concede that they might remain there.91 Although most historians have believed that Sazonov was prepared to acquiesce to a brief Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople, rarely cited documents raise grave doubts.92 The Russians were actually preparing to land troops there, ostensibly to keep order in the city and to protect the European colonies and the wider Christian population. Prompted by Izvolskii, who recalled tentative Russian plans to occupy Constantinople during disturbances in 1896-1897 and 1908,93 Sazonov, Kokovtsov, and the Ministry of the Navy began to discuss a similar expedition, should the situation require it. As the Bulgarians drew closer to the Chatalja lines, the Porte invited each Great Power to send one warship and then two to Constantinople to help to maintain order.94 An international fleet under French direction did assemble off the capital and landed troops for that purpose on 18 November.95 The Russian government decided to do more. First, between 4 and 8 November, direct telegraphic communications were established between the commander of the Black Sea Fleet in Odessa and Giers, so that warships, already on a war footing, could be summoned without waiting for approval from St. Petersburg.96 Second, Sazonov notified Giers on 6 November that the second warship headed toward Constantinople would contain two companies of soldiers, some one thousand men, which he could also call in at his discretion. Noting that it would be desirable for the troops to arrive in Constantinople before the

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Bulgarians, lest it be too difficult to maintain order, Sazonov asked Giers whether a thousand men would suffice.97 Giers informed him that a minimum of five thousand soldiers would be needed to protect the European part of the city.98 Sazonov thus increased his request, asking Sukhomlinov on 16 November for four thousand more soldiers to be readied for action, to supplement the one thousand he had just learned were now prepared for dispatch.99 By 19 November, Sukhomlinov sent orders to Odessa to prepare the extra men, now to include not just infantry but also a battalion of riflemen, with machine guns, and two light batteries of guns. The problem then became transporting this large number of troops. Although the army and navy had planned to put the thousand troops on warships to convey them to Constantinople, the supplemental men plus equipment made this arrangement impossible. The single troop transport that the navy had available at Sevastopol could carry only fifteen hundred men. To move the remaining units, Grigorovich sought via the minister of trade and industry the immediate charter of two large steamers from the Volunteer Fleet just a short distance away in Odessa. Sukhomlinov explained to Kokovtsov that haste was necessary in order to catch the two steamers before they sailed for some commercial purpose. Reserving these vessels would ensure sufficient capacity on the shortest notice. Other ships, the war minister noted, might arrive soon, but at least a week would be necessary to unload, clean, and prepare them to move soldiers. He could not risk having no ships ready when the call for troops arrived from Giers.100 However, the failure of the Bulgarian attack halted these preparations in their infancy. Amid the intense planning and preparation of November, Sazonov composed two long letters just before the Bulgarian attack on the Chatalja lines. The first, the recipients of which are unclear but were likely the service chiefs and Kokovtsov, is a long work dated 12 November. It describes his position on the current issue as a basis for further discussion and planning for action, pending the tsar’s approval.101 The second letter, from 14 November, is a shortened version of the first but with more of a directive nature, explaining to Giers in Constantinople how the ministry viewed the Straits and Constantinople problem.102 These pages provide a better understanding of not only the rationale behind the plan to land Russian troops in Constantinople but also his wider views on the Straits Question. First, Sazonov spelled out the government’s official, public explanation for dispatching troops. Given the size of the city’s Muslim population (rather larger than the Christian population), the presence of

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Macedonian refugees, and the likely presence of retreating and bitter soldiers, Sazonov wrote, the “danger for Europeans and local Christians, and also for the numerous enterprises and interests of a world center, like Constantinople, appears indubitable.”103 As further proof of the danger, he cited requests he had received from the American, Belgian, and Swedish governments for protection of their embassies and citizens and from the ecumenical Orthodox patriarch for protection of the threatened Hagia Sophia. The menace faced by these various interests was potentially so great that they called for preparation of “quick and decisive measures.”104 Since Russia was the closest Great Power and regarded as the traditional protector of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, Sazonov felt that it should be the one to send troops for this purpose. This legitimate reason masked more pressing concerns of the Russian foreign minister, his government, and his emperor. Sazonov saw this deployment as an opportunity to gain more influence over the fate of Constantinople and the Straits, if the Turks were forced to retreat to Asia Minor and then dragged out peace negotiations. A Bulgarian occupation could be prolonged, increasing the chances that the fate of the region could be decided in a fashion contrary to Russia’s interests. That is why the presence of a sufficiently meaningful force of our troops, the dispatch of whom at the present time could be conditional as the means of preserving order, would appear extremely important for us as a pledge (zalogom) and indication (pokazatelem) that Russia will possess the deciding voice in the resolution of the fate of Constantinople and the Straits.105 Here, then, was the crux of the matter: Sazonov meant to employ the legitimate needs of the local and European population for Russia’s own ends—ensuring that any resolution would accord with Russia’s interests. Here, too, was one of the earliest but rarely identified times after the Russo-Japanese War that Russia considered employing military force to support its diplomacy. Given the distances involved and the presence of ships from all the other Great Powers, Russia was forced to make these preparations quietly, in stark contrast to the open measures that it was taking along its western border with AustriaHungary, where the two nations were engaged in an armed standoff,

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defending their interests vis-à-vis Serbia.106 At Constantinople, Russia was not sure it could apply constant pressure so was forced to more subtle, if still military, steps. Sazonov then described the resolution that would best suit Russia. First, he dismissed a British proposal to internationalize Constantinople and neutralize the Straits because it contained insufficient guarantees of Russia’s key interests.107 He stressed that no sort of international treaty could sufficiently protect what Russia viewed as crucial. If the Bulgarians were given a border close to the city, they could easily enter it again and remain there with no real opposition. They could then interfere with the passage of ships through the Straits, which Russia could not allow. Second, even if there were effective guarantees during peacetime, during a crisis, Russia would be faced with even greater uncertainty than while Turkey controlled the Straits, since “any seapower will be in a condition to pass the Straits without hindrance,” given the unreliability of such guarantees during wartime. It would be even easier for someone to effectively block Russian exports through the Straits at any time.108 Sazonov concluded that Russia must not rely on written agreements but create some type of reliable security for its vital interests at this crucial waterway. Finding such an arrangement was no easy matter. The radical option was to seize Constantinople and the Straits by force. Sazonov demonstrated that such a plan would bring Russia several advantages. Besides control of a center of world trade and a “key to the Mediterranean Sea,” it would provide “the basis of an unprecedented development of Russian power” through a relatively short but very strongly fortified border with Bulgaria, complemented by equipping the Dardanelles with the “most modern fortress armaments.”109 This new strength would allow Russia to dominate the Balkan states. This is to say that for Russia would be established a global position that is the natural crown of her efforts and sacrifices over two centuries of our history. The grandeur of such a mission and the innumerable consequences of its achievement in religious, cultural, economic and political relations would bring healing (ozdorovlenie) to our internal life, [and] would give the government and society those achievements and that enthusiasm which could unite them in the service of a matter of indisputable pannational (obshchenarodnoi) importance.110

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Taking Constantinople, he suggested, would not only greatly improve Russia’s strategic position but also serve as a critical domestic balm. After raising the discussion to these lofty levels, however, Sazonov brought his readers back down to earth by turning to the dilemmas inherent in implementation. Leaving the military and financial demands to experts in those fields, he drew attention to the fact that Russian expansion along the Straits would be a “signal” for other powers to seize territory of their own. The most likely result would be Austria’s seizure of perhaps half of the Balkan Peninsula, mostly at the expense of Serbia.111 With the blow to Serbia, any chance of uniting the Balkans would be lost. In his view, only by keeping to the policy of “the Balkans for the Balkan peoples” could Russia help to bring the Balkan states together, thereby serving as “one of the most solid and natural of our buttresses (opor) against the Triple Alliance.”112 For Sazonov, if a choice had to be made between Russia immediately possessing the Straits or uniting the Balkan peoples against Austrian expansion, then the latter was the only option. When all of Russia’s interests in the region were considered, therefore, Sazonov was prepared to defer Russia’s own expansion to prevent that of Austria-Hungary, thereby preserving the independence of the peoples Russia had worked so hard to liberate over the previous decades. This analysis in no way indicated that Sazonov was prepared to abandon Constantinople and the Straits. The challenge he presented was still to move in the “radical” direction but within the limits he set out. Any sort of international guarantee would be excluded, since it could interfere with steps Russia might wish to take later. He also excluded any sort of cooperation with Austria, where the two states might attend to their own national interests at the expense of the Balkan states. After a suggestion to that effect from Vienna, Russia proposed that the Great Powers declare their disinterest in any territorial aggrandizement as a result of the current conflict, but Austria-Hungary refused. Fearing some anti-Serbian action by Austria-Hungary, Sazonov wrote that any capture of new territory by Vienna would leave Russia with “complete freedom in arriving at a decision” about subsequent action.113 His preferred option was to control the upper Bosphorus, once Turkish rule there became impossible or Austria-Hungary seized more territory in the Balkans. In this alternative, Sazonov believed it was irrelevant whether Russia received these shores as an outright possession or on a long-term lease. Most important, a fortified position

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on the Bosphorus would allow St. Petersburg to prevent any hostile ships from entering the Black Sea. Constantinople itself could be internationalized, the Dardanelles stripped of any fortifications and thus neutralized. The strengthening of its Black Sea Fleet would allow Russia freedom of passage through the Dardanelles and while occupying a minimum of territory acquire a significant change in its rights at the Straits. Russia would also have made an important first step toward acquiring the whole region. From this analysis, certain things stand out in Sazonov’s attitude toward Constantinople and the Straits. First, he believed that satisfaction on the ground would require a physical presence, for no written agreement could protect its economic, military, and cultural interests there. Second, although he was fully aware of Constantinople and the Straits’ potential importance to the Russian Empire, the current threat of Austrian expansion outweighed them, in his calculations. Here, then, was not some blind, romantic pursuit of traditional aspirations but instead a more calculated appraisal of Russia’s strategic position. Austrian expansion into the Balkans would not only destroy further hopes of containing the Germanic powers but also destroy Russia’s position as protector and leader of the southern Slavs. While the Straits were critical in his view, their immediate possession could be outweighed by other considerations—and he would make similar choices in the future. With the commencement of the Bulgarian attack on the Chatalja lines on 17 November and the initial failure of armistice talks between the Allies and the Turks, it appeared that Bulgaria might take the Turkish capital. For a moment, on 20 November, Sazonov was forced to postulate, at least to the French ambassador, internationalizing Constantinople and neutralizing the Straits but deferred a definitive statement until he could consult with the tsar and other officials.114 Although the above writings had foreseen internationalizing Constantinople, neutralizing the Straits had not. Given their importance to the Russians, however, we must wonder if their apparent acquiescence was not a ploy to attract France’s goodwill and support and to claim later that the tsar and other authorities would not allow the full neutralization of the Straits for reasons similar to those Sazonov developed above. With the failure of the Bulgarian offensive and the ebbing threat to Constantinople, St. Petersburg could devote its attention more completely to the other issues at hand. Most demanding were Serbia’s desire for a port on the Adriatic coast and the debate over convening

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conferences for the conclusion of a peace treaty that would settle the various territorial problems created by the Ottoman Empire’s nearcomplete retreat from Europe. Sazonov repeatedly averred that as long as Constantinople remained Turkish, Russia had no desire to raise the subject of the Straits at any impending peace conference.115 On 28 November, having learned of German Foreign Minister Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter’s suggestion that the fate of Constantinople be included among the subjects reserved for discussion by the Great Powers,116 and having been asked about it directly by Louis, Sazonov made it clear that Russia did not want to take the initiative on the subject. He feared a demand for compensations, especially by Austria, although he cited Russia’s cooperative attitude on Albania as a reason that Austria-Hungary ought to be amenable to a change at the Straits. While he mentioned the possibility of seeking permission for warships of the Black Sea states to pass the Straits, under the present circumstances, he did not see a need for the de facto situation to change and did not wish to propose anything at this time.117 Once the conference of ambassadors got under way in London, the fate of Constantinople and the Straits remained on the sidelines. In October and November, these questions had received significant attention. Although Russia had been pushed by early Bulgarian successes to concede on most territorial points, it remained steadfast in its opposition to permanent Bulgarian access to the Straits and possession of the Ottoman capital. Its resolve was such that it was preparing to send an expedition of troops to Constantinople to protect what it considered to be its vital interests. Not trusting any agreement on paper to defend Russian interests, Sazonov had approval from his colleagues and tsar to take military steps to ensure that its voice would be heard. Greece and the Islands near the Straits Another issue related to freedom of passage through the Straits remained on the table—the fate of Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea, captured by Greece during the ongoing war.118 Having learned that their disposition was to be discussed in London, Sazonov asked Admiral Grigorovich on 8 December which islands he thought had to remain Turkish “in order to guarantee the security of the Straits” and which could be ceded without affecting Russia’s interests.119 After obtaining the input of the Naval General Staff, Grigorovich informed Sazonov on 12 December that his ministry believed it best for the islands to remain “in the hands of a weak power” so as not to threaten the Russian fleet;

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Austria-Hungary was considered the least desirable power to gain possession of them. The navy felt that the islands of Imbros, Lemnos, Tenedos, and Samothrace were best left in Turkish hands, since they were so close to the Straits. The rest could go to any other power, save Austria, if some benefit could be derived, but otherwise the navy saw no difference between Greece or Turkey possessing them.120 Sazonov passed on this message to Benckendorff in a simplified form on 12 December, telling him that “it is undesirable for us to have a foreign power controlling the islands, whose possession would allow the threatening of the security of the Straits,” referring to the four islands Grigorovich listed above.121 At the ambassadorial conference in London on 18 December, the question of the Aegean islands arose but was not resolved to Russia’s satisfaction. Although Benckendorff put forward Sazonov’s terms, worries about the reaction of the islands’ Christian population to renewed Turkish control left the diplomats at an impasse. On Grey’s suggestion, the participants unanimously agreed for the moment simply to state that the islands would be neutralized under the powers’ protection, with no mention of whose sovereignty would be allowed. Subsequent discussions in December between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Navy resulted in a position allowing Greece to retain possession of the four islands on condition that it “destroy all types of fortifications and other military and naval armaments . . . never to erect such, not to use the islands for any military or military-related goals” nor allow other states to do so.122 While discussion about the islands continued through the winter, spring, and summer,123 Sazonov stuck to conditions he laid out on 21 December, refusing to accept Greek annexation of the four islands without its commitment to neutralization. If the Germans insisted that the Turks retain them, however, he was willing to agree, as long as guarantees were procured for the Christians.124 In either case, his minimum demand was that which satisfied his concerns about the Straits: the permanent neutralization of the four islands. Bulgarian Advance Redux The failure of the December armistice and the recommencement of fighting from 2 March 1913 sparked a renewed Bulgarian attempt to capture Adrianople and revived Russian fears about the safety of Constantinople. 125 St. Petersburg returned to the policies of the fall: on the one hand, insisting that Bulgaria must not possess Constantinople or have land access to the Straits and, on the other, preparing to send ships

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and troops to Constantinople to protect both the Christian population and Russia’s interests. On 22 March, with a new attack on Adrianople seeming imminent, Sazonov began to implement these policies in a discussion with the visiting Bulgarian general, Radko Dmitriev. Dmitriev indicated that Bulgaria wished to receive a border with Turkey that included coastline on the Sea of Marmara, including the port of Rodosto. He simultaneously threatened Sazonov that refusal could mean the replacement of the present Russophile government by another more inclined to look toward Austria-Hungary for support. His request went against one of the core tenets of Sazonov’s Straits policy—no power other than Turkey or Russia should be able to interfere with passage through the Straits—and he refused any thought of it. He reminded the general that Russia had made a serious concession by allowing Bulgaria to take Turkish Thrace up to the line from Enos to the Ergene River and on to Midia. New demands for concessions could only make the Russians suspicious of Bulgarian intentions toward Constantinople. Sazonov highlighted the value of this concession by duplicitously telling Dmitriev that the Russian General Staff had judged Adrianople crucial to the defense of the Turkish capital, even though it had been decided that it was not. Furthermore, he would not be intimidated by Dmitriev’s warning of a change in government. He informed the general that if a new government in Sofia did take a pro-Austrian line, it would show how little Russia should value Bulgaria and negate any reason for making the concession. Sazonov also refused the general’s suggestion that Sofia could give Constantinople to St. Petersburg as a gift, since the question was too complicated to be resolved through a Russo-Bulgarian bilateral agreement.126 Sazonov recognized that in the wake of the 1871 Treaty of London and the 1878 Congress of Berlin, any change at the Straits would have to be multilateral, and with the Russian army’s current state of reorganization, this moment was not the best. Additionally, the consequences of a Bulgarian occupation of the city both for the Christian population and Russian interests were potentially too disastrous to allow the Bulgarians so much influence over the pace of events. After Adrianople’s fall to the allied armies on 27 March, a Bulgarian seizure of Constantinople loomed. Sazonov responded in the same way as in November 1912: he planned to send the fleet and troops to the capital to maintain order and to protect Russian interests. On 28 March, after renewing Giers’s power to summon the Russian fleet if the

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Bulgarians threatened Constantinople,127 he informed the tsar that the justification for the dispatch of the ships was not only the necessity to take measures for the protection of the peaceful Christian population of Constantinople in times of the disorderly retreat of the Turkish army, but also the desirability, in case of an attack by the Bulgarian army on Constantinople, to place a powerful Russian force in the waters of the Bosphorus, with its arrival able to render the requisite pressure for preventing such solutions to the questions of Constantinople and the Straits which would be incompatible with the interests of Russia.128 In a manner that suggested his real intentions were otherwise, Sazonov told the tsar that if the fleet were sent to the Turkish capital, the government could preempt misunderstandings in the press by declaring that it would stay only until the final peace conditions were settled.129 Although Sazonov would repeatedly tell the powers that a Bulgarian seizure of Constantinople would produce the Russian fleet off its shore, none of the documents indicate that he told any other nation of Russia’s intention to send five thousand troops there as well. Although the troops were again prepared for dispatch in April 1913, transport was now insufficient for the number of men.130 Until a ship or ships arrived that could carry them and then be unloaded and prepared for their conveyance—a process taking several days, Russia was powerless to protect either the inhabitants or its own interests at the capital. With the Bulgarians only one set of defensive works away from Constantinople, Russia had fewer options to stop them than previously. Giers, unaware of the situation in the Black Sea ports, wrote on 1 April that if Russia were unable to send these troops, “it was extremely necessary to hasten the conclusion of peace before the fall of the Chatalja position and then to apply all of our efforts to never again be surprised by events.”131 Stripped of one of his few physical means of influencing events, Sazonov redoubled his efforts in the diplomatic arena. Even before learning how limited his options were, he attempted to satisfy the Bulgarians and head off a continuation of their military operations with one further territorial concession. On the basis of conversations with Bulgarian representatives before the renewed attack on Adrianople, he informed his ambassadors on 27 March that he had accepted Sofia’s

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request for a change in the border with Turkey. Now the line between the cities of Enos and Midia would be straight rather than following the river Ergene between them. He pressed for speed in having the powers and Turkey approve, fearing that “[a]ny delay means a serious danger for Constantinople,”132 but he insisted that this concession must be the very last. Under no circumstances would Bulgaria be allowed to obtain seashore on either the Straits or the Sea of Marmara.133 The new line met little resistance from the Great Powers and was incorporated into their terms for peace. One Bulgarian demand was thus met, but civil-military conflict clouded its value. Although its civilian leadership informed the powers on a number of occasions that Bulgaria did not intend to attack Constantinople after assurances that it would be given the straight Enos-Midia line, King Ferdinand and his army chiefs were expected to attack as soon as possible.134 Indeed, even Bulgarian Prime Minister I. E. Geshov feared that if an armistice did not come quickly, an attack on the Chatalja lines “could not be avoided.”135 The Russian minister at Sofia insisted on 29 March that to succeed in persuading the Bulgarians, remonstrations would have to be made to the king and generals, not the civilian leadership.136 While trying to temper Sofia’s expectations, Sazonov sought to gain the powers’ acceptance of a Turkish indemnity that the Bulgarian envoys had requested in St. Petersburg in mid-March along with the revised border.137 He hoped that once the powers promised this compensation, Bulgaria would accept an armistice and not attack Constantinople. Although the new border was readily approved, the indemnity was met with hostility, especially by France. France felt that these changes to the arrangements of the Ambassadorial Conference of the Great Powers in London would lead Vienna to make new, selfserving demands and that if an indemnity were imposed on the Turks, Germany and other powers would surely use their resistance to pose as better friends to the Sublime Porte.138 The French also feared that the addition to Turkey’s financial burden would directly affect their interests in the Ottoman Empire.139 France carried 45 percent of the Ottoman debt and had huge capital investments there so dreaded Turkey going bankrupt under an added burden.140 As much as Sazonov insisted on meeting the Bulgarians on this issue, the French would agree only to allow the Paris commission in charge of the Ottoman debt to examine it after the war. While he struggled with the French, Sazonov made diplomatic use of what military cards he could rely on—the dispatch of the Black Sea

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Fleet to the Straits and Constantinople. Unlike the secret preparation of troops for the occupation of Constantinople, Russia’s readiness to employ its fleet was made very clear to Britain and France. On 31 March, they learned that Russia would send a squadron of warships to Constantinople in case the Turkish army retreated. This action would be taken not only to protect the Christian population but also “in case of the Bulgarian entry into Constantinople, the presence of an imposing Russian force is necessary in the waters of the Bosphorus in order to exercise by its presence the needed pressure and to prevent solutions on the subject of Constantinople and the Straits incompatible with the interests of Russia.”141 Sazonov noted that he would inform the press that the warships would remain only until the conclusion of the peace, but the wording of the communiqué together with his earlier statements on the subject suggest that the fleet would remain in Turkish waters until Constantinople’s fate was resolved along lines satisfactory to Russia. This element of Sazonov’s policy was not lost on the British and especially the French, who sought to limit the scope of Russia’s unilateral actions. On 1 April, Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey discussed the Russian position, and their differing attitudes began to emerge. According to Grey, Cambon immediately displayed his government’s suspicions of Russian intentions, telling him that “Russia could not be left to go to Constantinople alone.”142 Grey demurred, replying that it would be better to ask all the powers to send ships somewhere near the Straits and, when the Porte agreed for them to pass, to collect off Constantinople. He agreed to consider Cambon’s suggestion that this international fleet could debark detachments of troops to prevent the Bulgarians’ entrance and keep order in the city.143 On 3 April, when Cambon, Benckendorff, and Grey met to discuss affairs, Grey said that he believed the Bulgarians had to be threatened with force to keep them from Constantinople and that his government was “not . . .prepared to do more than suggest that warships should be sent to Constantinople by the Powers.” According to his account, when Cambon directly questioned him on sending troops, he stated that the British would not take up that idea. Grey did continue, somewhat in explanation, that once terms of peace were accepted, “we could not object to any other Power taking action that they thought desirable to confine the actual terms of peace within these limits.”144 Benckendorff’s description of the meeting makes clear that he felt that Grey meant these words for Russia. He wrote Sazonov that Grey turned toward him as he uttered them, adding that the state that he

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foresaw acting was not just any country, but one “more directly interested in the maintenance of the conditions of the frontier and peace.”145 Furthermore, when Benckendorff, who was unaware of his government’s plan to land five thousand troops in Constantinople, repeated the Russian intention to have its fleet off the Constantinople shore as long as the Bulgarians remained, Grey commented that it would likely not suffice to make Bulgaria fulfill its promises and leave the coast of the Straits and Sea of Marmara. At this point, Cambon again suggested an international landing force. According to Benckendorff, Grey repeated that Great Britain would not oppose measures that the most interested powers thought necessary.146 If the Russians had any remaining doubt about the leeway the British would give them, it was quickly removed when Benckendorff met with Nicolson, the British permanent undersecretary for foreign affairs, later the same day. Nicolson said that “[i]f . . . Bulgaria decides to push to Constantinople, only the force of arms can prevent [its entry]. Russia is the only Power which can resort to this extreme. The English Government would not raise objections against such a measure if Russia believed it necessary to do so for the protection of its interests.”147 He cautioned only that Russia must be sure to inform Bulgaria of its intentions so as not to push it toward the Triple Alliance. Britain thus appeared to condone unknowingly the measures quietly being prepared in St. Petersburg.148 The reaction in Paris to the Russian intentions differed significantly. The French were suspicious of what Russia might do once in de facto possession of the Turkish capital. Cambon quickly came out against unilateral action that would place Russia in a commanding position at Constantinople. On a couple of occasions in March, he spoke of an international occupying force, not wanting to condone the Russians being there alone, and referred disparagingly to British Prime Minister H. H. Asquith and Arthur Bonar Law, the opposition leader, as “being led astray by their classical memories,” when they opposed his suggestions. The French may not have hidden their suspicions well, since even back in November 1912, Sazonov complained to Izvolskii that the French were trying to encourage the Bulgarians to take the city.149 Fear of an Austrian reaction also motivated French opposition to the Russian plan. In light of the latest allied refusal to accept the Great Powers’ terms, the new French foreign minister, Stephan Pichon, wrote to Theophile Delcassé, French ambassador at St. Petersburg, on 7 April that “[i]t seems certain to me that this despatch [of Russian ships to

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Constantinople] would have the immediate consequence of a naval action by the Triple Alliance in the same regions, if not at least a military action by Austria-Hungary.”150 The best means of avoiding this response was to include all the powers from the start, thereby removing the threat of further misunderstandings between Russia and AustriaHungary and lessening the threat of a pan-European conflict. By 8 April, the likelihood of a Bulgarian attack on Constantinople began to diminish. Cholera had broken out in the Bulgarian army in Thrace months earlier and now seemed to dampen enthusiasm for attack. On 8 April, Cambon reported that Benckendorff had told him and Grey new information about cholera in the army around Adrianople that had made “the commander in chief little disposed to march forward. He does not know the current disposition of King Ferdinand, but it is believed that he is very impressed by the epidemic.”151 On 9 April, the French foreign minister indicated that he doubted that the Bulgarians would try to enter Constantinople, and the next day, Sazonov told the French ambassador more news of cholera in Thrace, this time among the Turks, which he thought “could contribute to holding back the Bulgarians.”152 Grey had similar information and also doubted an imminent Bulgarian offensive, giving the powers time to arrange an armistice with Sofia.153 Such news confirmed information received in St. Petersburg that the Bulgarians were ready to come to terms with the Turks.154 Sazonov concealed much of what he knew about the Bulgarians’ growing reluctance to press their attack in order to gain some diplomatic leverage by following a policy that appeared more concessionary than it really was. He learned on 8 April that Poincaré, now the French president but still central to foreign policy formulation, would renounce the idea of collecting an international fleet off Constantinople, if Sazonov had “the least objection” to it.155 Believing that Sofia was about to make peace, Sazonov informed the French and British that he accepted the international fleet, as long as the Porte gave permission for its passage.156 He did so, however, in a manner calculated to convey that he was giving something up, hopefully earning diplomatic capital to use later. He also used this opportunity to develop the fiction of public influence on his policy, stipulating that the ships should be sent only if danger were imminent, and if so, the powers should arrange that the Russian squadron would not arrive after them, lest a public storm of disapproval arise in Russia.157 With the navy unable to furnish transport for the large number of troops that he wished to send to Constantinople, Sazonov’s effective options for

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strengthening Russian influence were rather limited, but given that he felt that the danger was passing, he could afford the concession. On 15 April, the need disappeared with Bulgarian and Turkish agreement to an armistice. The allied victories gave St. Petersburg hope that it would have stronger help in resisting Austrian expansion to the Aegean and protecting the back door to Constantinople and the Straits. CRESCENT MOON RISING Before the first war in the Balkans had even ended, the Allies were disputing division of the spoils. In particular, Serbia, prohibited by the Great Powers from keeping a littoral on the Adriatic Sea, felt it deserved a greater portion of Macedonia than it had been allotted in the secret 1912 treaty between Belgrade and Sofia and refused to hand over territory it occupied to the Bulgarians. This growing hostility over territory between Serbia and Greece in one camp and Bulgaria in the other came to a head at the end of June, when the Bulgarian army attacked the Serbians in Macedonia. Greece quickly came to Serbia’s aid, followed by Rumania, which was interested in taking advantage of Bulgaria’s weakness in order to obtain the compensation it felt it deserved for Bulgaria’s aggrandizement elsewhere. Although the Russian government deplored this internecine struggle, which threatened to destroy its advantageous position in the Balkans so soon after its construction, Sazonov admitted that Bulgaria’s chastening was not all bad. He wrote Izvolskii on 10 July that this development was not very disappointing, since little good was to be expected of a powerful Bulgaria. He hoped that this realignment would create a balance of power on the peninsula that would lend itself to a future alliance of these small powers.158 What he hoped against, however, soon came to pass. By 12 July, reports began arriving that the Turkish army was preparing to recapture Adrianople, as Bulgaria had few troops left in the area, after removing them for operations against its erstwhile allies. The Turks felt strongly about the reconquest because Adrianople held special historical meaning for them—it was the Ottoman capital before the capture of Constantinople in 1453. To head off the Turkish attack, Sazonov tried to rush Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Serbia into peace talks, but this effort foundered on their irreconcilable demands. He also had Benckendorff suggest at the Conference of Ambassadors in London on 15 July that the powers immediately form a border-delimitation committee in Constantinople to travel to the Enos-Midia line and raise a psychological barrier to Turkish action. Given that Turkish recapture

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of Adrianople would constitute a direct challenge to the Great Powers’ authority as embodied by the Treaty of London, all the powers were willing to protest such a move to the Porte. These plans were made irrelevant once the Turkish army crossed the Enos-Midia line on 16 July and, four days later, occupied the barely defended city. Although the Turks defended their action by pointing to treaty violations by other Balkan states already in the Second Balkan War,159 Sazonov judged it to be different. In the Turkish case, Christian populations recently liberated from Ottoman Muslim control were threatened with the reapplication of that rule. This retrogression was sure to offend not only Sazonov’s own Orthodox sensibilities but also to inflame public opinion in Russia, the Balkans, and parts of the rest of Europe as well.160 Nicholas II agreed with Sazonov’s judgment that “sentimental reasons obliged Russia to try and help Bulgaria,” even though the foreign minister still believed that “from [a] material point of view,” Adrianople ought to return to Turkey.161 As the Turks bore down on Adrianople, on 17 July, Sazonov called for a naval demonstration by all the Great Powers or at least the Triple Entente to force the Turks to return to the Enos-Midia line. He downplayed any Russian intention to act alone.162 His calls took on new urgency on 20 July under the weight of two developments. First, the Turkish government insisted to the powers on a line between Enos and Midia that followed the course of the Maritsa River, thus returning Adrianople to the Ottoman Empire. Citing the need to shore up the defense of its capital, it would not negotiate over this new demand.163 Second, the Turkish government strengthened its claim by recapturing the city.164 Sazonov told Buchanan that “if the Powers were prepared to have recourse even to coercive measures, he would associate with them. If, on the contrary, they shrank from [the] idea of coercion, in [the] last resort he would have to act alone,” with what he described as “extraordinary measures.”165 With Grey unconvinced that such an action would work, and G. von Jagow, the German foreign minister, very much against it or any other sort of coercion, the French, who conditioned their acceptance of a naval demonstration on the participation of all the powers, appeared unlikely to take part.166 Furthermore, Sazonov’s partners refused any thought of a demonstration by the Triple Entente alone, fearful that it would destroy the Concert of Europe and threaten a continental conflict.167 The possibility of some as-yet undefined unilateral Russian action seemed ripe.

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One other possibility remained to force Turkey to abandon its conquests and, by extension, to prevent Russia’s military reaction— financial boycott of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers. In theory, Turkey depended on the powers for its financial survival and could be threatened with bankruptcy, if it did not concede to their demands. While it is unclear who raised the idea, a discussion arose on 18 July in London and continued for some weeks. Sazonov embraced it; Grey was an initial advocate; Jagow later did not appear opposed; but the French strongly resisted. Indeed, the argument over a possible boycott settled into a debate between the two allied capitals, Paris and St. Petersburg. From the start, as Paul Cambon explained, France held that this strategy would have little effect on Turkey, because “the European interests engaged in Turkey are more important than the Powers realize.”168 A few days later, he observed to his Entente colleagues that “the European financial world would not permit the governments to drive Turkey to bankruptcy.”169 The French attempt to portray this problem as European, however, was met with disbelief. Both Whitehall and Pevcheskii Most had little doubt that the French government was far more concerned about the French financial world than the European one.170 This view was confirmed by French excuses for continuing to pay Turkey hundreds of thousands of francs by the Regie des tabacs, which, as the Russians pointed out, provided the funds needed for the Turks’ military activity.171 France first claimed that since these disbursements were set out in a contract with the representatives of the Regie, to renege would complicate their future position.172 Sazonov complained to the French on 1 August that the Germans were convinced that the French would continue to ignore Russian pleas about these payments, producing a very unwelcome perception of discord within the Franco-Russian Alliance of which Germany would try to take advantage.173 On 8 August, he insisted that financial pressure was the best nonmilitary means of influencing Turkey, complaining again about French funding for Constantinople. Pichon immediately cited the private nature of the contract and to shore up his argument, referred to the German and Austrian membership of the society and noted that his legal advisors informed him that the French government had no right to interfere with the contract. It would be France’s responsibility to then compensate the society for any losses incurred.174 On 9 August, however, after once more citing the legal difficulties, Pichon told Izvolskii that he would try his best to find some means of avoiding the next payment.175

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This sop did little to assuage Sazonov’s impatience, and Pichon tried a triple approach to excuse French actions on 12 August.176 On the one hand, he referred to the legitimate concern that if the boycott were not adopted by all the powers, those not participating would profit at the others’ expense. On 11 August, however, the German Foreign Ministry had expressed its readiness to join the boycott,177 and Sazonov later countered the French argument by quoting his own financial experts, who denied that either small European powers or the United States would take such advantage.178 Pichon’s second approach was to tell Izvolskii that since France made up only one-third of the votes in the society’s council, it could not cease the payments alone; it would need Austrian and German approval, which, by implication, would be hard to get.179 Thus, Russia was asking too much. But Sazonov informed Izvolskii later that he had learned from the Austrian and German ambassadors in St. Petersburg that, in fact, France held the majority of the votes on the council, and both states indicated a willingness to cooperate with Sazonov.180 This exchange, too, revealed French resistance to the Russian government’s preferred plan, while at the same time showing the Central Powers’ readiness to take advantage of the rift within the Franco-Russian Alliance. Pichon’s third approach remains more mysterious but still appears to be an attempt to convince Russia to stop pressing for a financial blockade. Izvolskii reported to Sazonov on 12 August that Pichon had heard “from private Young-Turk sources, very close to the ruling Committee,” that Turkey, desperate to keep Adrianople, would try to come to an agreement with Russia by means of great concessions, including “a resolution of the question in agreement with our desires.”181 The reliability of Pichon’s information is questionable, in large part because no other record of such “private sources” in the correspondence into Paris has been found. If it was a falsification, and the rumor originated in Paris rather than Constantinople, then it is a good indication of how hard Paris was trying to get Russia off the trail of a financial boycott. Even if the source was reliable and Turkish, Pichon ought to have known from Sazonov’s recent behavior that he would not be interested in a bilateral treatment of the Straits Question, as the source implied. Sazonov had turned away a few such opportunities, beginning with Charykov’s attempt in 1911, and Russia’s strength had not changed sufficiently since then to give him confidence that it could avoid Austrian demands for compensation from Serbia. Thus, Pichon’s third approach, like the other two, was doomed to

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failure. Sazonov would return to the idea of the boycott as long as the crisis persisted. With the French stonewalling the preferred diplomatic measure, Germany against any coercive action, and Britain and France opposed to independent action by the Triple Entente, Sazonov began to consider what Russia could do alone. He warned both the Great Powers and Turkey that Russia would act unilaterally, if necessary.182 Jagow told the British chargé in Berlin that he would accept such a mandate, as long as Russia stayed out of Armenia, but Sazonov suggested to Buchanan on 23 July that Russia might get involved exactly there. Buchanan warned him strongly against such action, which might begin the disintegration of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor. 183 Sazonov’s comment was more an initial consideration than a concrete intention, as he had not yet consulted with the emperor, prime minister, or the military and naval chiefs, all of whom he planned to see within the next few days.184 Meanwhile, the Triple Entente partners again endeavored to convince Russia not to act coercively. Although Sazonov had reassured both ambassadors that he would consult with them before any action, they took nothing for granted.185 On the one hand, they painted a more general picture of the danger, citing the possibility of a reaction from the Triple Alliance, especially Austria.186 The Austrian ambassador, in fact, visited Sazonov on 25 July and suggested that Russia could act against Turkey and Austria-Hungary against Serbia. Sazonov refused such an arrangement, which comes as no surprise, given his refusal to sacrifice Serbia for larger prizes.187 On the other hand, Britain and France pressured Russia to stay out of Armenia in recognition of Germany’s stand. As Turkish advances threatened prewar Bulgaria, the powers started to see some sort of Russian action as inevitable, which was only confirmed by Sazonov’s suggestion on 26 July that Russia would recall its two ships stationed off Constantinople as a warning to the Turks.188 While Pichon plainly stated that Europe was not prepared to answer, on 26 July, his position moderated to meet the British.189 Late that day, he told Izvolskii that as long as both Austria-Hungary and Russia were working to prevent Bulgaria’s destruction, Russia could take some sort of action. Keeping Germany in mind, he cautioned the ambassador that Russia would be much better off acting in European Turkey or along the Turkish Black Sea coast, rather than Armenia.190 These entreaties appear to have had some effect, as on 28 July, Sazonov expressed doubt that Russia would direct its effort toward

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Armenia. He still questioned why his partners insisted so strongly that Russia negotiate with Germany. He complained that “there is not a day when [Germany] does not encourage us to return to the Drei-Kaiserbund, but we make up a part of the Triple Entente and not the Triple Alliance. And it is with Paris and London, not with Berlin, that we intend to talk and examine the means and the conditions on an action, if an action cannot be avoided.”191 He was frustrated with his partners’ stubbornness and suspected Germany of ulterior motives into which he did not wish to play. On the same day, however, he received approval from Nicholas II to withdraw the two Russian warships from Turkish waters in order to warn the Turks that the Russians were in earnest.192 Over the next week, Sazonov teased out these several threads of action. While trying to convince France to join a financial boycott of the Turks, he also sweetened the pot a bit for the Turks by seeking Nicholas II’s agreement to at least strategic rectifications of the Enos-Midia line and an end to the indemnity that Turkey was supposed to pay Bulgaria, according to the Treaty of London.193 He still insisted that Adrianople must not be included in the territory exchanged, and Russia continued to prepare for an armed response. The French learned on 2 August from their consul at the Black Sea port of Odessa that the Russian navy was fully mobilized, equipped with supplies for almost a month at sea, and waiting for the signal from St. Petersburg.194 However, as rumors spread that Bulgaria and Turkey had begun to discuss an agreement, Sazonov appeared to soften his stance.195 He told Buchanan on 2 August that he was not sure what Russia could do to force Turkey to withdraw. He speculated about a package of inducements that could convince Turkey to cooperate, including the border rectifications and an increase in the tariffs that Turkey was allowed to charge. He indicated that he continued to fear that the Austrians would take action against Serbia, if Russia acted against Turkey. Now that Russia’s harvest was near, he also feared that Turkey might respond by closing the Straits, which would be an economic catastrophe and force him to take even more drastic measures.196 His indecision as the stalemate wore on is demonstrated by his inability to give a consistent account of Russian preparations. Although he told Buchanan on 2 August that he was not sure what Russia could do, he told him on 6 August that his government had settled on a firm plan, if needed.197 The next day, the British ambassador reported that Russia had not yet actually decided what it would do and that Sazonov’s meetings with Nicholas and the ministers had produced no resolution. Sazonov’s attitude had become even less stern. In addition to

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worries over Austrian treatment of Serbia and a closure of the Dardanelles, Buchanan cited continued resistance by Prime and Finance Minister Kokovtsov to any adventure that might strongly shake Russia’s finances.198 At last, on 7 August, representatives of all the powers received instructions to act together in presenting the Porte with a declaration that had been laid out back in a 24 July meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors in London. It maintained that the Enos-Midia line must serve as the basis for any future settlement of the border between Bulgaria and Turkey.199 By now, of course, this position was not news to the Turkish government, and given that the Great Powers had needed over two weeks simply to coordinate the delivery of this note, there was clearly no need to fear that they would exert any real pressure on Constantinople. While on 9 August, Sazonov informed Buchanan that the Russian military had decided definitively against an operation in Armenia since it would cause more problems than it would solve, his frustration was obvious. He believed that if the powers would cooperate and lay down a single dictate, the Turks would accept it, but “[i]t was hopeless, however, to expect anything from the Powers.” He complained to Buchanan and especially Delcassé about France’s financial relationship with Constantinople.200 During the following week, very little changed, as Russia and France sparred over the proposed financial boycott. Russia made no further military moves, as there was still hope that Sazonov might finally get some sort of agreement from the powers, and Nicholas refused the use of force except as a last resort.201 On 10 August, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Serbia signed the Treaty of Bucharest, which was not generous to Bulgaria on any of its borders with these states and spurred Russia to try to achieve at least a little something for Sofia.202 Russia seemed condemned to spin its wheels, when Turkish action on the Maritsa sparked a general flurry of action. On 13 August, Turkey informed Russia that Bulgarian troops’ atrocities against Muslims could force it to advance beyond the river to protect the threatened populations. Sazonov strongly urged Turkhan Pasha against this plan; were Turkey to restart a war with Bulgaria, “she might find herself at war with another Power”—clearly Russia.203 He immediately sought support from his partners, pointing out to Russia’s stubborn ally that this new threat showed what value they ought to give Turkish promises. In late July, Turkey had told them that it would not seize land across the Maritsa but now intended to do exactly that.204 Once again,

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with little surprise, it paid no heed to protests and sent its troops across the river. Sazonov could not allow Bulgaria, with the losses it sustained from the Treaty of Bucharest, to become even smaller than it was before the war. Bulgaria might give in for the moment, but as soon as it had recovered strength, it would seek a new war, bringing new instability to Europe and new danger at the Straits. Furthermore, he believed that the Great Powers must not allow Turkey to continue “treating Europe with contempt, more especially as her present action was in contravention of assurance which she had given,” and complained of how little support his proposals had received from all of the powers.205 Buchanan felt Sazonov’s reactions were as much about Russia’s prestige as Europe’s. Russia had stood noisily before Europe and its own people seeking redress for Bulgaria for some time, and now the Turks were headed in the opposite direction. Were a strengthened Turkey to get into the habit of openly flouting the Great Powers, Russia’s situation at the Straits could become even more tenuous. Sazonov was ready to meet this new challenge more energetically than the ongoing issue of Adrianople, which he left to the financial pressure he hoped would soon be applied to Turkey. He renewed his lapsed threat to take independent coercive action and suggested tentatively that the Triple Entente recall its ambassadors from Constantinople. If the other powers refused to cooperate, Russia would possibly recall its own representative and occupy a Turkish Black Sea port.206 On 19 August, the Turkish government denied that it was advancing farther from the Maritsa than necessary for the protection of Adrianople and its railway communication with Constantinople and said it stood by its July declaration.207 On 20 August, before he had been informed of the Turkish statements, Sazonov received Nicholas’s permission to recall Giers from Constantinople if necessary, regardless of Great Britain and France’s action. Other measures would be decided later,208 which probably indicates that Nicholas was still averse to employing force, except in case of extreme need. On hearing the Turkish promises, Sazonov thought that he would no longer have to put his plans into effect but insisted via Giers that he would not accept them, until he had news of their implementation.209 Once this word was received, Sazonov returned to the problem of Adrianople, but by now, he was prepared to consent, if tacitly, to its retrogression to Turkey. So tired from the demands of diplomacy over the previous several months, he left St. Petersburg on 24 August for a vacation, almost a week after his initially planned departure.210 In his stead, his assistant, A. A. Neratov, again ran the ministry and oversaw

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the final denouement of the dispute, but little was left to do. With the apparent end of the Turkish drive beyond the Maritsa, a German plan for Bulgaria and Turkey to negotiate the fate of Adrianople directly gained popularity.211 For Russia, which had been unable to unite the powers in any plan to push Turkey out of Adrianople, getting it to remain at the Maritsa River would have to suffice. With the direct encouragement of Italy, which was willing to play an intermediary role,212 and under pressure from St. Petersburg, which informed Sofia that it should hold no hope of effective help from the powers, Bulgaria consented to send representatives to Constantinople for negotiations.213 After a month of footdragging, unsupported by the powers, it conceded Adrianople to the Turks on 29 September. Although it continued to harbor the hope that the powers would force a review of the treaty once it was signed, the powers, literally exhausted by the previous year of Balkan War diplomacy, left this agreement, like the Treaty of Bucharest, unchanged. At the end of the twelve months from the outbreak of the First Balkan War to the conclusion of the Turko-Bulgarian agreement, Russian diplomacy had little to show for its exertions. Sazonov had tried to follow what he interpreted as Russia’s interests, but they often conflicted. The changes or limits imposed by the emperor and other factors, such as Russia’s financial, military, and naval strength and leadership made foreign policy difficult to steer. On the positive side, the Straits remained in Turkish hands, and Russia’s access to the outside world was undiminished. Maintaining the status quo allowed the Russians to believe that once they were strong enough, they could bring about changes at the Straits fully in line with their interests. Furthermore, Russia succeeded in maintaining Serbia’s independence against Austrian hostility and saw all of the Balkan states gain in territory and strength to some degree. On the other hand, Russia alienated the Balkan states by its inconsistency, sometimes supporting all of them, sometimes one or another; sometimes letting its concern for them, especially Serbia, come before its desire to see changes at the Straits, while other times forcing them to subordinate their desires to its regional interests. Most clearly and critically, Russia’s wavering affected Bulgaria. Sazonov repeatedly found it necessary to curtail Bulgaria’s aspirations, especially as it drove toward Constantinople, and when it started the second war, let it suffer losses at the hands of Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Turkey. Afterward, Sazonov tried to repair relations by limiting Turkey’s gains, but Russia did not have the financial strength or diplomatic capital with the other powers to win their support.

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Embarrassed by the losses of the Turkish army, which had been trained by German instructors for some time, Germany refused to go along with any measure too costly to the Turks, and France let its own financial interests come before those of its Russian ally. Russia’s prestige consequently suffered not only abroad but at home. Although Sazonov did not shape his foreign policy on a daily basis to meet the cries of public opinion, he was aware that success abroad could have a beneficial effect at home. The defeats he met during the Balkan Wars, following those suffered by Izvolskii in 1908-1909, increased Russia’s need to make its diplomatic will felt. Sazonov’s deep desire to see that will recognized contributed to an escalation of Russia’s use of military threats in support of its diplomacy with implications for its response to the next threat to the Straits. Continued Turkish naval growth threatened Russia’s economic and military position on the Black Sea and growing German military and political influence threatened its interests in the capital itself.

4 TURKISH NAVAL EXPANSION AND THE LIMAN VON SANDERS CRISIS, MARCH 1912 TO JULY 1914

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y the end of 1913, Russia faced a possibly even greater crisis: the appointment of General Otto Liman von Sanders as head of a German military mission that was given broad powers within Turkey, including, most alarmingly, direct command of Turkish troops in the Ottoman capital.1 This new challenge to Russia’s interests meant that the threat to Turkey’s sovereign control of the waterway no longer came from the sea, as during the Italo-Turkish War, or the land, as during the Balkan Wars, but from within the country itself, starting at the very shores of the Straits. Many histories of what has come to be known as the Liman von Sanders Crisis, however, neglect an element that is crucial to understanding the Russians’ changing view of the Straits’ importance.2 They saw new danger in Turkish naval growth that threatened Russian access to the open seas and might at any time to shift the Black Sea power balance so used diplomacy and naval construction in a desperate effort to delay or perhaps even to prevent that shift from occurring. The full urgency of the problem only became apparent with the crises of 1913. Fighting for Fleet Expansion As the strengthening of the Turkish navy picked up steam, the Russian navy had also been engaged in rebuilding. Indeed, 1912-1913 was a watershed period during which its reconstruction moved forward

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considerably, especially on the Baltic Sea, for several reasons. First and foremost, the arrival of Admiral I. K. Grigorovich as naval minister greatly facilitated the navy’s work. He brought a new spirit of hard work and energy that was perhaps rare among his predecessors and had made for, as one observer put it, “a particularly brilliant career.”3 He had commanded a variety of warships, including a battleship; served as naval attaché to London, where he closely studied the Royal Navy; and had a range of commands on land, including all of the major naval ports in European Russia plus Port Arthur in the east during the Japanese siege, where his courage and energy brought him notice. Furthermore, he introduced important organizational reforms that helped the Naval Ministry to run more efficiently.4 The new naval minister’s capabilities were not lost on the State Duma, which, for years, had refused to approve the Naval Ministry’s requests for additional funding, pointing to its departmental mismanagement and administrative incompetence. The deputies were also opposed to the navy’s emphasis on the Baltic Fleet at the expense of that on the Black Sea.5 Although upon Grigorovich’s promotion to minister in the spring of 1911, the Duma did not immediately start approving his proposals, influential members indicated greater willingness to cooperate and hoped that the new administration would prove more capable than its predecessors.6 Most notably, Pavel Miliukov, leader of the centrist Constitutional Democratic Party, ended his complete opposition, although he insisted that more attention be paid to the Black Sea Fleet.7 In late 1912, reflecting on the passage of the largest shipbuilding program since the Russo-Japanese War, the French naval attaché pointed to Grigorovich’s role in improving the administration of the navy as critical in the Duma’s collaboration in reconstructing the fleet.8 Assistance from other branches of the government also helped to convince the Duma to pass the navy’s proposals from 1912. Kokovtsov was one of the most crucial advocates and went before the Duma several times to lobby for the navy’s construction plans. Based perhaps as much on his belief that Russia needed a navy as on pressure from Nicholas II to support Grigorovich, Kokovtsov set about furthering the navy’s plan in two ways. First, as finance minister, he assured Duma deputies in the Budget Committee in early June 1912 and the entire assembly a few days later that the proposed expenditures would force no new taxes or loans nor reduce funds for cultural and educational needs or the strengthening of the army.9 Second, speaking as prime

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minister on the latter occasion, he pointed to “the political advantages for the country to be obtained by the formation of a powerful navy.”10 The foreign minister had also spoken along these lines to the June Budget Committee meeting. Sazonov warned that the political situation around the Baltic was unreliable, and Russia had to be ready to defend its interests. According to the British chargé d’affaires, “his Excellency quoted a Russian proverb to the effect that one should rest one’s hopes on one’s allies, but keep one’s own powder dry.”11 These cautious words were said to have helped to convince the committee to approve the navy’s proposals. Indeed, Sazonov was so persuasive that a number of Octobrist deputies broke ranks with a party leader on the issue.12 Also critical to the navy’s ability to accomplish this legislative feat was support from Nicholas II. In his opinion, the fleet had to be recreated with a power that corresponded with “the dignity and glory of Russia.” On it depended “both our external security and our international position.”13 He applied significant pressure on Kokovtsov to help obtain Duma approval for the navy’s proposals, allowing his prime minister to inform crucial members of the emperor’s personal interest in the matter. He even offered to speak with one himself, though Kokovtsov suggested that doing so would be impolitic, and the idea was dropped.14 Nicholas II was always very ambivalent, if not inimical, toward the Duma’s existence, so the offer indicates his seriousness. In general, his solid support gave Grigorovich more confidence to pursue his objectives in the face of resistance.15 The ground thus well prepared, the navy presented a detailed case for expansion of the Baltic Fleet, which could reach the open ocean, unlike the Black Sea Fleet, bottled up by the Turkish Straits.16 Clearly underpinning it was wholehearted acceptance of the navalist ideas of the time, most famously advocated by Alfred T. Mahan of the United States and spread broadly through Russia by Navy Captain N. L. Klado.17 Russian planners accepted that great-power status depended on having a competitive blue-water navy. With the rest of the European powers as well as the United States and some South American nations already aggressively building up their navies, Russia believed it had to act quickly before it fell too far behind.18 Naval planners felt its defense required a navy of sufficient size to deter attacks, to protect the army’s flank, and to remain an attractive ally to France. Beyond that, it should be able to seek out its enemy on the open sea.19 Wanting to make its “voice heard among the concert of powers,” Russia required a massive fleet.20

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Grand scale was indeed the intent. The June 1912 naval bill was not massive yet large enough to add impressive strength to the Baltic Fleet. The number of dreadnought-class ships under construction rose from four to eight to supplement four smaller battleships in the Baltic. Four light, modern cruisers would join four heavier and four lighter cruisers of mixed strengths and ages, with two more for both the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets. In smaller ships, thirty-six powerful destroyers were approved on top of the fifty-nine already afloat, again of varying strengths and ages, and twelve more submarines were funded to enlarge the existing Baltic force of fourteen, with six more for other seas.21 However, now that it had finally succeeded in gaining Duma approval for its broader construction plans, the navy and observers generally expected that more proposals would soon be approved.22 The British and French naval attachés were shown plans for what the Russian naval administration hoped the imperial fleet would look like in 1930: on top of the eight dreadnought-class ships (with the older ships slowly retired), twenty-six more would be added; the 1930 fleet would have twenty-four, rather than 1912’s eight, cruisers and a similar number of smaller ships.23 While the British and French naval attachés were skeptical that the Russians would be able to complete such a bold program or find the skilled crews to man the boats, both the British chargé d’affaires and the French naval attaché noted that such a fleet would certainly force Germany to reconsider its naval arrangements, which was likely to relieve some of its pressure on the Royal Navy. The French attaché also noted that, as Russia’s friend and ally, France could only rejoice at the building program’s positive effect on Russian power.24 Little, however, was done for the Black Sea. The Turkish Threat Grows The Foreign Ministry strongly supported the Naval Ministry in obtaining these funds for the Baltic Sea Fleet but never ceased seeking a greater commitment to construction on the Black Sea. Pevcheskii Most believed that the growth of the Turkish fleet demanded a Russian response that would mitigate the damage to its position on the Black Sea. This need grew with worries about war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires as a result of first the Italo-Turkish and then the Balkan Wars. Throughout 1912, the naval problem was never far from the Foreign Ministry’s attention. That February, on the basis of a report from the Russian naval attaché in Turkey, Charykov warned that, contrary to Russian hopes, the Ottoman government was seriously

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invested in training crews to man its new battleships. The ambassador warned that the Turks were likely to have a full complement ready for the first dreadnought, under construction in Britain. These men “will not only not spoil the new ship, but, on the other hand, will be able to utilize it properly.”25 Charykov then reminded his reader that Russia’s predominance over Turkey depended not just on land but also on sea forces. Once Turkey received its new dreadnoughts, Russia would lose its supremacy in the region; speeding the completion of the Russian equivalents and equipping them with high-quality crews and armaments was imperative. The Foreign Ministry made its concerns clear to the Naval Ministry in an interdepartmental conference on naval construction plans in March 1912.26 Its representative supported the general program but insisted that the first task was to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet—not just to balance Turkish strength but to exceed it. While this protest had little effect on the navy’s plans, the Foreign Ministry did not give up. In November 1912, after the start of the First Balkan War, in the long memorandum discussed in the preceding chapter, Sazonov returned to the subject. In reviewing scenarios for the region’s future, he noted that given control of the Bosphorus, “[i]n conjunction with the Black Sea Fleet, which would require strengthening, we would have at our disposal sufficient means of pressure with the goal of a real guarantee of free passage through the Dardanelles.”27 For Sazonov, increasing the power of the Black Sea Fleet remained a prerequisite to any final resolution of the Straits Question. While the Baltic Fleet continued to hold first place in the hearts of Russian navalists, Balkan instability and war throughout 1912 forced the navy to pay more attention to the situation in southern Russia. In the autumn of 1911, as the Italo-Turkish War began, Grigorovich informed the War Ministry that the new conflict might require Russian intervention, which could include naval operations and landing some troops along the Black Sea coast.28 In the context of the almost continuous planning at this time by both armed services, seapower received some attention. After an army report in January 1912 asserted that the navy could not guarantee control of the sea because of the Turkish fleet’s strength,29 the chief of the Naval General Staff, ViceAdmiral Prince A. A. Lieven countered on 25 February that in fact, for the moment, the Russian navy did have control of the Black Sea. The Ottoman navy’s capital ships, he noted, were inferior both by age and artillery to the Russian complement, with the newest Turkish battleship being two years older and rather lighter than the oldest Russian

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equivalent. Only in 1914, when Turkey took delivery of the dreadnought being built in Great Britain and before the 1915 completion of the first Russian dreadnought, would “the situation will be doubtful.”30 While Lieven conceded that the Turkish navy might be able to control the Black Sea in 1914-1915, he betrayed no alarm or impatience to prevent it from happening. In 1912 and early 1913, the navy showed more concern over obtaining permission and funding for training maneuvers to land troops somewhere along the Black Sea coast than obtaining more warships to protect them. In June 1912, Grigorovich called for maneuvers to see if the plans worked appropriately. On 16 June, just days after the Duma approved his naval law for enhanced construction mainly for the Baltic Fleet, he wrote his opposite number in the army about training. Pointing to the danger of war with Turkey and Russia’s lack of experience in such operations, he described the need for maneuvers as “very urgent” and asked for army cooperation in persuading Nicholas II to approve large maneuvers and to obtain the necessary extra credits for them.31 Officers in Odessa from both services spent much of the next year creating such plans.32 In September 1912, just before the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Sazonov encouraged them, when he warned the navy that he expected conflict soon. He thought a troop landing would be necessary to protect Russian interests at the Straits, if another power appeared to threaten Turkish control over them. The Naval General Staff, however, saw clearly that Russian forces required much more preparation.33 In June 1913, Grigorovich asked Finance Minister Kokovtsov for special secret credits for maneuvers that fall.34 Given that such funds did not appear to be a wartime exigency, Kokovtsov refused and instructed Grigorovich to apply for them through regular channels for the next spring, 1914. With the army footdragging on the navy’s pleas for information, by October 1913, the period designated for maneuvers had been delayed to the autumn of 1914.35 The threat of Ottoman disintegration before such plans could be tested greatly alarmed the Russian government, which strove to shore up Turkey’s defenses. Soon after the end of the First Balkan War, another power proposed that the Great Powers increase their control of Turkish finances. Sazonov opposed the plan because he feared it would direct money away from the armed forces toward internal reform, opening the door for a dissatisfied Bulgaria to try once more to seize Constantinople. Instructions to his representatives on 1 May repeated Russia’s refusal to allow any other power to control the Straits, addressing fears of both a

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renewed Bulgarian attack and the Straits Question arising before Russia was prepared to seize the waterway.36 He sent a copy of this letter first to Sukhomlinov, then, with the war minister’s letter of agreement, to Grigorovich.37 The admiral agreed with Sazonov’s evaluation of the Straits’ economic importance, affirming that they would inevitably be Russian one day because their control by any other power “could threaten the Fatherland with innumerable disasters.”38 The only reliable way to ensure that Russia would receive the Straits was “the rapid creation on the Black Sea of a battle fleet of such strength that it could, given the current political situation, control in wartime the waters and coasts of both Turkish straits and not allow a fleet of hostile powers to enter,” regardless of the attitudes of friendly states.39 Only in these circumstances could a landing be accomplished and the Straits acquired. He noted rather optimistically that if the navy’s building plan met no insuperable obstacles, a capable fleet could be created over the next five years. Until Russia had such a fleet, preventing changes at the Straits and allowing Turkey to rearm sufficiently to fend off Bulgaria were critical. The capabilities and condition of the Russian shipyards on the Black Sea would probably have presented Grigorovich’s insuperable obstacles. Nonetheless, Russia’s future at the Straits depended upon the construction of an even stronger Black Sea Fleet than envisioned at the time. By keeping the Straits Question from international consideration, the diplomats provided the time for the fleet to grow. Contacts between the navy and the Foreign Ministry increased, as both studied Russia’s options. Captain A. V. Nemitz, the Naval General Staff officer responsible for Black Sea affairs, supported a stronger Black Sea Fleet and had been involved with the question for some time.40 Baron M. F. Schilling, head of the diplomatic chancellery and Sazonov’s friend, was the first from the Foreign Ministry to meet with him. He told Nemitz on 17 June that the Foreign Ministry’s goal was to “guarantee Russia the possession of the Straits in case of a panEuropean or in general a large European war.”41 Nemitz then had several meetings with N. A. Bazili, Schilling’s assistant and another close friend of Sazonov. Afterward, Nemitz wrote a memorandum that broadly described the economic, strategic, historical, and political reasons for Russia’s Straits’ policy. It brought out in a way that his earlier writings had not the need to augment the Black Sea Fleet. Russia must “be prepared to accomplish [the capture of the Straits] in the” immediate future.42 Bazili’s approach was more detailed.43 Referring to the imminent loss of control of the Black Sea, he felt Russia must increase its forces

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there as soon as possible, not just by the three dreadnoughts the Duma had already approved but by three or four more, with better armament than those under way. Echoing discussions between the Russian and French naval staffs in 1912, he opined that as a temporary expedient, Russia ought to establish a Mediterranean squadron that could prevent Turkey from concentrating its heaviest ships against Russia and block ships of its potential allies from getting in. Bazili did not suggest waiting the several years until the newly approved battlecruisers were completed. Instead, he recommended that Russia purchase a dreadnought that was under construction for Brazil in England and perhaps other battleships being built for other South American states. Buying this ship was all the more important because Turkey might be trying to buy it, and if it succeeded, the correlation of naval forces would worsen even more quickly. In an appendix to this memorandum, Bazili laid out a clear description of the impending Russian loss of dominance, based on numbers and quality of ships available to the two nations. In his view, which contrasts with Lieven’s more optimistic suggestion of 1915, only in 1917 would Russia have a chance of regaining control of the seas to the south and it would be difficult, since the ships the Turks were having built would have heavier armament than those being built for Russia, and even worse if Turkey bought the South American vessels. This exchange clearly identifies the ministry’s goal for the Russian navy: continued construction of new ships in the south to minimize how long Turkey would control the Black Sea. Both the navy and the Foreign Ministry had to find a way to buy the available South American craft or at least prevent Turkey from acquiring them. These lessons were reinforced in November 1913, when Ambassador Giers sent Sazonov a dispatch from Constantinople filled with foreboding over Russia’s future position on the Black Sea. Based on recent information from the naval attaché, Giers warned that the Turks were working seriously to increase the size and strength of their fleet, both through their own orders and negotiations to buy vessels being built for others. Neither money nor crews was a problem, Giers believed. He concluded that “[i]n this way we must reckon with the possible fact of a significant—and furthermore imminent— strengthening of the Turkish battle fleet and its predominance on the Black Sea.” He noted once again “the complete inadmissibility” of such influence, which would be “unavoidably capable of inflicting a strong blow on our political predominance over Turkey.”44 While he hoped that Turkey’s rearmament was directed elsewhere, he suggested that the

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Ottoman Empire might someday join a coalition hostile and threatening to St. Petersburg. This ominous information on Turkey’s preparations and urgent tone added to the growing impatience for action at the Foreign Ministry. A detailed memorandum from Sazonov to Nicholas II on 6 December 1913 expressed that impatience.45 Based upon an analysis of the political situation in the Balkans as well as information in both Nemitz and Bazili’s July reports,46 it sought to persuade the tsar to approve a high-level interministerial meeting as soon as possible in order to ensure that Russia could face any challenges that arose, especially at the Straits, over the next several years. To highlight the memorandum’s urgency, Sazonov forwarded it with the dispatch from Giers cited above, stating in his cover sheet that he shared Giers’s opinion.47 He also noted the unsettled condition of the Balkan Peninsula and the Bulgarians’ dissatisfaction with their lot, which called into question the longevity of the Ottoman Empire and the fate of the Straits. Sazonov denied that Russia had any direct interest in acquiring territory, because the demands of its “internal development put into first place the problem of preserving peace.”48 Its inability to control the international situation, however, forced it to prepare for any eventuality, including Turkey’s collapse. He repeated the now-familiar refrain that Russia could not allow another state to inflict serious economic damage upon the Russian Empire through possession of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The state that possessed the Straits would “have in its hands not only the key to the Black and Mediterranean Seas . . . [but also] the key to forward movement into Asia Minor and for hegemony in the Balkans.”49 Russia must have a strong voice in the resolution of this question. Sazonov pointed out that after all the money and time put into the creation of a powerful force on the Black Sea, it was still insufficient. “In short,” he wrote, “at the present time one must talk not only about the impossibility of a serious active advance against Turkey, but about the insufficiency of our defensive means against the naval program that could be accomplished very soon by Turkey.”50 He called for the government to take effective action to protect its interests in the region. Listing an array of issues for the army, navy, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to tackle, he stressed his department’s role in delaying the final reckoning for as long as possible and repeated his frequent assertion that the Straits Question could only be raised in the context of a broader European crisis. For the moment, the peace depended on the attitudes of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria,

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and Russia would only have a voice if it had the force to back it up: “[l]ooking forward and being aware that the preservation of a peace so critical to us will not always be in our hands, it is necessary to give ourselves tasks not only for the more distant future, so as not to justify the often-made reproach that the Russian ship of state sails along and handles the current without a strong rudder directing its way.”51 Tired of merely reacting to events and seeing his diplomacy undermined by inadequate military force, Sazonov called for the government to take coordinated steps toward protecting its most vital interests before events completely escaped its control. Nicholas II, who had long supported the growth of his navy and was very conscious of the need to shore up Russian prestige, required little convincing. At the same time as he approved Sazonov’s request for a conference, he wrote that he continued “to believe that the very first condition for the peaceful development of the south of Russia is the absolute predominance of its Black Sea Fleet over the Turks. Thus before us stands the necessity of extreme efforts for the future achievement of this predominance on the Black Sea.”52 Implicit in Sazonov’s call for coordination, however, was a protest against the compartmentalized manner in which the tsar’s government was again making decisions. After Stolypin’s assassination, Nicholas had been content to slide back from the stress on centralized government toward the more traditional system in which he, not the prime minister, was the nexus of power, and interministerial competition preserved his own prerogatives.53 Nicholas thus preferred ad hoc assemblies, such as the one Sazonov proposed here. With the tsar’s support for his proposal and his goal, Sazonov could bring the critical people together to try to give his diplomacy some long-missing punch. A German Threat The appointment of German General Otto Liman von Sanders to command Turkish troops at Constantinople added weight to Sazonov’s argument. There had been German advisors in the Ottoman Empire since 1883, when Colmar von der Goltz led a military mission to train Ottoman army officers in the wake of the Turkish defeat by Russia in 1878.54 After the Ottoman losses during the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman government sought further improvement through a new German mission with expanded powers.55 A concerted Russian response succeeded in having the new general removed from direct command, although he continued to serve as inspector-general of the entire Ottoman army. The appointment had

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threatened Russia’s position at Constantinople and the Straits in new ways. First, it could decisively shift a regional balance of power that had been preserved for over a century in Germany’s favor. Second, German control of Turkish troops at the capital would heighten Berlin’s influence over the empire as a whole as it diminished the Sultan’s sovereignty over his dominions. No other power had ever assumed such an authoritative position in Constantinople, and, as Sazonov explained later in his memoirs, it would have put Germany in a position to seize complete control of the Turkish capital.56 Third, Germany’s encroachment in the region endangered the status quo at the Straits upon which Russia increasingly depended. Liman von Sanders would not control the troops responsible for their defense,57 but his proximity to the Straits was never far from Russian minds. Even without direct German command over the Straits’ forts, German-trained officers would quickly fill important positions, and the Germans themselves could rapidly arrive to take command. These threats, combined with Russia’s looming loss of domination of the Black Sea, made canceling or changing the appointment crucial for St. Petersburg. The difficulty of convincing the Turks to cooperate only complicated the situation. The Russians’ preferred method was a financial boycott by the Triple Entente, threatening Constantinople with bankruptcy if it did not concede to the German general’s removal. Fearing that it might be ineffectual or that the other Triple Entente powers might not go along, the option most often talked about in St. Petersburg was the seizure of some territory, especially a Black Sea port, until the Turks changed their minds. This alternative would demonstrate the Russians’ seriousness but could also threaten the Ottoman Empire’s stability, leading to partition. As would be made clear a month later in a secret February conference, the Russians did not believe that they were strong enough to dictate a resolution to the Straits problem. Thus, while this strategy had the advantage of showing the Russians’ refusal to back down on a matter so critical to them, it also heightened the risk of the very change that they sought to avoid. Fortunately for St. Petersburg, Berlin was willing to cooperate and pushed through a rearrangement that met the Russians’ immediate demands, saving them from resorting to dangerous measures. While Liman von Sanders did not take command of the troops in Constantinople, he remained in the Sultan’s service, with great influence over the Turkish officer corps. The Russians continued to fret about it, but having secured the removal of the direct threat in Constantinople, they could do little.

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As the dust from this crisis settled, concern grew over Turkish naval expansion. The combination of these problems gave Sazonov more leverage to advocate his Black Sea policies, which now encountered less resistance. The crisis was not so much a turning point in Russian policy as an intensification of policies already under consideration or under way.58 The Decision to Build on the Black Sea In the seven months before the unexpected outbreak of World War I, the Foreign Ministry had two central lines of policy concerning Turkey and the Black Sea, both of which required cooperation with the navy. The long-term policy looked toward the eventual capture of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The short-term strategy sought to preserve the status quo by parrying Turkey’s measures to strengthen its fleet, at least until Russia had the capability to seize the Straits. The long-term direction was defined at the 21 February 1914 conference called by Sazonov in his 6 December 1913 memorandum. The meeting had originally been planned for late December, but Admiral Lieven fell seriously ill. Forced to go abroad for treatment, he requested that it be postponed until his return.59 He remained too ill to resume his post or to attend the conference, so in the wake of the Liman von Sanders Crisis, the military, naval, and diplomatic leaders convened to consider their policy. A detailed account of the conference can be found in Robert Kerner’s articles on the Liman von Sanders Crisis,60 but important elements must be brought out. First, Sazonov directed efforts toward a coordinated plan to protect Russia’s interests at the Straits. He stressed that if the Straits were removed from Turkish control, Russia could not allow any other power’s fortifications on the shores and could thus find itself forced to take possession of them, in order in some form or another to establish an order of things at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles corresponding to her interests. Noting that success in this operation to a significant degree depends on the speed of its execution, the minister pointed to the necessity of providing for the resolution of the problems by means of naval actions as well as a landing operation.61

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In discussion, most agreed that since an expedition against the Straits could take place only during a wider European war, the army would not have sufficient troops; too many would be needed for the western front. Furthermore, even if troops were available, transport was insufficient. The members thus developed a number of measures to heighten Russia’s readiness. First, the army was to give more men and stronger artillery to the forces earmarked for the assault. Second, the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, and the navy were to find transport for the troops. Third, the navy was to construct a second squadron of the most modern dreadnoughts for the Black Sea Fleet as soon as possible. Finally, railroads crucial to communication within the Caucasus region, hitherto dependent on the sea, would be built as quickly as possible.62 If Russia followed all these recommendations and succeeded in avoiding a pan-European conflict until their completion, it would stand its best chance ever of capturing the Straits. This plan, which the tsar approved on 5 April 1914, now depended on two, shorter term prerequisites: avoid continental war and attempt to prevent naval forces on the Black Sea from shifting too far in Turkey’s favor as it strengthened its fleet. Keeping the peace was complicated. Although the Liman von Sanders incident had ended with a small retreat by Germany and the satisfaction of Russia’s immediate demands, Sazonov saw behind the affair greater German aggressiveness and a larger threat of war. He had long insisted that Russia, France, and Great Britain had to cooperate more closely and present a more solid front against Germany, if Berlin were ever to reconsider its expansionist goals. While the Franco-Russian Alliance had complicated Germany’s strategic picture, Sazonov firmly believed that only a new Triple Alliance, formed by the members of the Triple Entente or some arrangement more cohesive than the entente, could hold Germany back.63 In his view, “world peace will only be assured on the day when the Triple Entente, whose real existence has not been more proven than that of the Serpent of the Sea, will be transformed into a defensive alliance, without secret clauses and made public by all of the world’s newspapers.”64 He recognized that British politics prevented London from agreeing to a full, binding, military alliance in Europe during peacetime and instead sought a closer understanding with Britain along the lines of the Anglo-French naval agreement of November 1912, in which the two states agreed to coordinate their coastal defenses.65 While that arrangement was not binding, it held great moral weight, perhaps overestimated in Paris and

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St. Petersburg, and Pevcheskii Most hoped to obtain something similar or deeper. Even though the agreement pursued was naval, the Russian navy played a relatively minor role in the discussions because the decision to hold them was largely political. Instead, the foreign ministers sought common ground on which to begin talks. Continuing Anglo-Russian disagreements over Persia complicated this task but also made Sazonov more impatient to see a naval agreement settled.66 The Russians decided to avoid political discussions about the fate of the Straits if the topic arose while planning for measures in the Mediterranean Sea.67 Although some rough agreement was proposed and conversations began in June 1914 in London, the Russian naval attaché was not empowered to hold substantive talks and the British had little enthusiasm in general.68 Prince Louis of Battenberg was scheduled to visit Russia in August 1914, and Sazonov and Nicholas II hoped that the London conversations would produce something that could be signed during Battenberg’s visit. Serious progress was not made, and expectations focused on the prince’s arrival.69 The outbreak of war obviated the need for the visit. In contrast to this slow diplomatic dance, Russia also sought to protect its position at the Straits through a plan containing three related elements. It worked, first, to slow or to halt Turkish efforts to expand their navy; second, to supplement its own building either by laying down new battleships in Russian yards or, for the first time, acquiring some abroad, especially those already being built for other countries; and, third, to speed the building of those under way or being laid down in Russia. We are already somewhat familiar with the Russian effort to contain Turkish naval expansion, and, in 1914, as the Turkish search for ships intensified, so did Russian countermeasures. In January, Grigorovich finally communicated to Sazonov his own understanding of the threat and his change of heart. Right up to that moment, he had doubted whether the Turks could actually find the money for the rumored expansion plans and was content to leave the Black Sea Fleet at the force level then planned.70 Now, the navy had received clear indications that the Turks had not only ordered two dreadnoughts to be built for them in England but bought a third under construction for Brazil, also in England, and was trying to buy yet another under construction for Chile. Thus, it appeared that by the end of 1914 or, at the latest, the middle of 1915, Turkey would possess three or four dreadnoughts and, by the admiral’s calculations, have six times Russia’s

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strength on the Black Sea. With the completion of the first of the Russian dreadnoughts only expected at the end of 1915, several years would pass before Russia could regain control. The consequences spoke to the problems with which the February conference would grapple. It was a crisis for Russian interests at the Straits and the Eastern Question overall. The larger Turkish fleet would prevent any offensive against the Straits; it would worsen the situation for the army in the Caucasus, which still depended on the navy for transport; it would allow Turkey to make its own landings, either on the right flank of the Caucasian forces or the left flank of Russia’s western front; it would threaten Russia’s internal order, struck by new defeats of the navy; and altogether affect Russia’s weight in the Concert of Europe.71 For Grigorovich, “[i]n this case, only the cooperative efforts of the naval department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can guard the Fatherland (Otechestvo) from the heavy fact of the loss of supremacy on the Black Sea.”72 The Foreign Ministry had to try to find some diplomatic means of preventing Turkey from obtaining the Chilean ship or any other and also to delay the delivery of those being built in England for Constantinople. Grigorovich hoped that the British government might cooperate by delaying the completion of these ships, pointing out that the British were as concerned as the Russians that their arrival might greatly complicate ongoing negotiations over possession of islands in the Aegean Sea, disputed by Greece and Turkey since the Balkan Wars.73 Sazonov fully agreed and sought a means to interfere.74 On 8 and 21 May, he had Benckendorff communicate to Grey Russia’s alarm over the growth of the Turkish navy. The Russians stressed that, at the very least, it must not grow more quickly than its Russian rival, which was limited to construction from its own yards.75 On 1 June, Sazonov pointed to information about an order for a third dreadnought by Turkey, despite its weak financial condition, and hoped that the British government might do something to impede it.76 London claimed that it had no legal means of interfering with work in private shipyards,77 but, in fact, it was able to slow final preparations of the two dreadnoughts closest to completion so that when war broke out, they were still in the shipyards and confiscated for the Royal Navy.78 Less successfully, Sazonov complained about continuing French loans to the Turks, claiming they were facilitating the new acquisitions. The French denied that these transactions were having an effect, short-sightedly noting that Turkey had to use its first tranche to pay off its debt from the Balkan Wars, while the payment of the second would depend on maintaining the peace.79 The French were also convinced that if they held their

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funds back, the Germans would step in, gaining even more influence over the Porte.80 Sazonov had never succeeded in obtaining French financial support for his external policies, and this case was no exception. The second way that St. Petersburg sought to avoid losing control of the Black Sea was to enlarge its own fleet. In Grigorovich’s correspondence of January 1914, he suggested that Russia try to buy the dreadnoughts under construction for Chile and Argentina before Turkey (or Greece, for that matter) could obtain them.81 This action would slow the Turkish fleet’s growth, while more quickly increasing the Russian Baltic Fleet, which, once large enough, could be divided, with one squadron sent to the Mediterranean Sea, forcing the Turks to divide their forces. Grigorovich’s suggestion was unusual because, until that time, the Russian government insisted on building its ships at home, at greater cost and delay, in order to develop and use the domestic infrastructure.82 Nonetheless, Sazonov quickly replied, indicating his full agreement with Grigorovich’s proposal.83 Although this willingness to buy the ships indicated, to some extent, the navy and Foreign Ministry’s impatience to augment the fleet, they were primarily interested in denying the ships to the Turks and maintaining control over the Black Sea. As Sazonov described his efforts: “our main goal is not allowing the sale of battleships under construction for Argentina into other hands.”84 Nicholas approved these ideas on 20 February, allowing concerted efforts to move forward.85 By January 1914, the Russian Foreign Ministry was exploring the possibility of securing any ships that Chile and Argentina might sell.86 Sazonov’s representative to Argentina was charged with obtaining Argentina’s promise to sell the ships to Russia, if it decided to part with them. Through February and March, the Russian representatives at Buenos Aires and Washington, DC, regularly discussed with their Argentinean counterparts and the shipyards the purchase of their vessels being built in the United States.87 The Argentineans repeatedly denied any interest in selling, regardless of the offered price.88 In April and May, Russia concentrated on trying to obtain one or both Chilean dreadnoughts under construction, but these too appeared unavailable, especially as long as Argentina held onto its own.89 Sazonov, in consultation with Grigorovich, even asked the British to help to persuade Chile to sell Russia its ships. In March 1914, the British Admiralty asked about a new airplane that the inventor I. I. Sikorskii had built and the Russian government recently bought. Sazonov told London that the navy would allow the information to be delivered in

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exchange for cooperation in obtaining the two Chilean dreadnoughts under construction in Great Britain. The Foreign Office could only relay the message that the Chileans had no desire to sell their ships.90 Meanwhile, as representatives abroad sought to stymie Turkish efforts, at home, the navy obtained new funds from the Duma for additional construction. On 30 March 1914, it submitted a new request for ships on the Black Sea, including funds for a fourth dreadnought, citing in its supporting materials the threat posed by Turkish construction in England.91 After some debate in committee over whether the addition would be sufficient, the Duma approved the funds.92 To insure that the conclusions of the February conference were implemented, Sazonov queried the navy minister on 30 June about the strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet.93 In mid-July, Grigorovich replied that he proposed to go to the Council of Ministers and the Duma to seek money to add another dreadnought to the original three laid down in 1912, noting that funds for the last two would depend on either Austria-Hungary or Turkey adding yet more ships to their fleets.94 When war caught up with them, a huge addition to the Black Sea Fleet was forecast, though not guaranteed. External evaluations of this program were mixed. The British naval attaché tended to be skeptical, believing, first, that the navy’s goal of completing the original plan by 1917 was farfetched; and, second, that the quality of the personnel could not sufficiently improve by that time to make the best use of the ships.95 The French naval attaché, however, with slightly better access to officers and shipyards, felt that the crews were being trained well.96 He expected that the fleet Russia was assembling in the north would force the Germans not only to divide their fleet between the North and Baltic Seas but also to keep more troops on the Baltic coast, in case of a Russian landing. If these rearrangements occurred, the Royal Navy would benefit in the North Sea, and the French would face fewer hostile troops on their German border, at least initially. He was convinced that by 1917, Russia would have sufficient force on the Black Sea to keep Triple Alliance fleets from any attempt at the Straits.97 Beyond seeking to slow or to stop Turkish growth and to supplement their own construction, as a third measure the Russians hastened their naval construction, which was notoriously slow. The French naval attaché noted in March 1914 that the efficiency of the shipyards had greatly improved over the previous year. The number of workers had doubled, according to his information, and with other improvements over the past few years, he felt that the Russians were now building boats as fast as foreign enterprises could.98

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While these intensive efforts were under way to strengthen the navy, Russia had one more significant diplomatic encounter with Turkish authorities. As had become rather a tradition, when the tsar made his regular trip to the Crimea for several weeks in May 1914, the Turks sent a delegation to greet him. This year, the delegation was headed by Mehmet Talaat Bey, minister of interior, who was near the center of the Young Turk leadership. At the farewell banquet, after two days of desultory talks, Talaat took Sazonov aside and proposed an alliance between the two empires. Taken completely by surprise, Sazonov answered noncommittally but did not turn him down. Instead, he suggested that Giers would continue to discuss the idea in Constantinople. Sazonov’s response to this opportunity was measured. On the one hand, he had received no indication yet that Great Britain or France would welcome a new, bilateral Russian action with the Turks, much as they had not been enthusiastic in 1911 about Charykov’s negotiations. He also knew that Germany and AustriaHungary, which would only lose influence through such a turn of events, would oppose it. The Central Powers might respond by applying pressure to Russia in some unforeseen quarter. On the other hand, even though Liman von Sanders did not have direct control over Constantinople and the Straits, German influence in the Ottoman army and Empire was clearly growing. A formal agreement with Turkey would have greatly improved Russia and the Triple Entente’s position, containing German expansionism. However, German and Austrian pressure prevented the Turkish government from pursuing this new direction very far. Nonetheless, for a brief time, a flicker of expectation rippled across Europe that some new alignment might be developing in the east.99 These diplomatic attempts to strengthen Russia’s position failed, and efforts to build a powerful navy came too late to help St. Petersburg: World War I erupted before its rearmament was even close to being complete. On 1 August, Russia was at war with Germany and with Austria-Hungary soon thereafter. Sazonov had identified the new threats to Russia’s position at the Straits relatively early, but he failed to marshal sufficient forces either to ensure Russian control of the Black Sea or to neutralize the growth of German influence at Constantinople. He did succeed in one task: limiting the growth of the Turkish navy. Turkey failed to take delivery of its dreadnoughts, missing collection of the first by only hours. It sent sailors to Great Britain to take delivery early, but on 1 August, His Majesty’s Government sequestered the vessel.100 Furthermore, Sazonov had helped to push

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Russia toward a higher level of naval readiness with, by the end of July, twelve dreadnought-class warships under construction, eight in the north and four in the south. He succeeded, in part, because of a very cooperative relationship that he had built not only with Naval Minister Grigorovich but also between the navy and Foreign Ministry, which worked increasingly closely from late 1913 until the outbreak of war. Unlike the usual adversarial relations among Nicholas II’s ministries,101 these two came to realize that they shared the same ends—protection of Russia’s interests in the south and the increase of its prestige as a Great Power—and saw the same, if mistaken, means—the development of a first-class fleet. Without such cooperation, it is unlikely that Russia would have had a respectable naval force on the Black Sea as soon as it did, if ever. In the event, however, Russia had precisely zero dreadnoughts commissioned when the war broke out, and only seven of those under construction would enter service with the Imperial Fleet. Russia was vulnerable to attacks from the south, which came a few months into the war. Unable to project power across the Black Sea, its weakness at the Straits was compounded by Germany’s relatively new influence at Constantinople, greatly assisted by the presence of its military mission. Russia thus began the First World War with the weakest position it had held at the Straits for at least half a century. More generally, after the Liman von Sanders Crisis had passed in early 1914, the Straits Question had no direct effect on the deterioration of Russo-German and Russo-Austrian relations that led to the decisions to go to war that summer. It did help to spoil the atmosphere between the two sides and made Sazonov very suspicious of German intentions in the region. The Austro-German threat to Serbia in July and August 1914 looked like one further step in the Central Powers’ drive south toward the waterway that was so crucial to the Russian economy. This collection of factors makes it obvious that Russia was not searching for war in 1914. It was certainly planning to seize the Straits sometime in the future but not for years to come. On a number of occasions, Sazonov assured or agreed with his interlocutors that such a capture could only happen in the context of a wider war and only once Russia had trained sufficient forces for the job. Preparations were still several years from completion, even if everything went according to the navy’s ambitious schedule. Much as the Russian army’s expansion would not have been completed until 1917-1918, the navy would have reached its desired minimum strength in 1917 at the earliest. A world

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war was thus very undesirable in principle, though when faced with the direct challenge of Austria’s aggression against Serbia, Russia chose to fight. Russia’s interests at the Straits did not inspire it to provoke a war, but the Central Powers’ action threatened Russia’s interests, including the vital ones at the Turkish Straits.

5 WAR DEFERRED: DIPLOMACY DOMINANT DURING TURKISH NEUTRALITY, JULY 1914 TO OCTOBER 1914

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or the first three months of World War I, Russian maintained its prewar policy on the Straits Question. Even though Turkey secretly signed an alliance with Germany on 2 August 1914, it stayed out of the war until the end of October 1914, when units of its fleet, under German command, attacked the Russian Black Sea coast. Distracted by both the magnitude of events occurring along the western and eastern fronts of continental Europe and negotiations that started in November to give Russia possession of Constantinople and the Straits, historians have only superficially examined Russia’s policy toward the Turkish Straits and related decisions in these early months. Moreover, those works that do consider the problem take an almost exclusively diplomatic and political point of view, neglecting its effects on civilmilitary relations. Some scholars have debated the wider problem of whether military leaders gained ascendancy over civilian decisionmakers once mobilization began, but little has been written about Russian policy-making, even though differing opinions between civil and military agencies—in this case, the navy and the Foreign Ministry—serve as a crucial backdrop.1 During the first few months of war, the Foreign Ministry put aside the navy’s preferences to decide Russia’s stance on the Black Sea. Sazonov sought to avoid any action that might encourage Turkey to drop its neutrality in the European conflict, even if it meant that Russia would not obtain the Straits during the war, to protect Russia’s wider political and strategic position.

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The Fight for Turkish Neutrality The Russians placed a high value on Turkish neutrality for several reasons. First, economically, their trade through the Straits was even more crucial now that they had to finance their war effort. Similarly, their western allies, cut off from Central European grain suppliers, relied more on the cereals that they could furnish.2 Second, they had military interests in the Straits remaining open and neutral. Their Black Sea Fleet was in the early stages of growth, with the completion of the first of its dreadnoughts some months away. Given that the Turkish government could choose the warships that it allowed through the Straits during wartime, the Russians feared that powerful Austrian or German vessels might enter the Black Sea. That access would threaten not only the safety of their ports and fleet but also their communications and transport with the Caucasus region, still thinly linked by rail with metropolitan Russia. The Russian government also wanted to send as many troops as possible to the western front—the main theater of operations—rather than divide its forces for a two-front war.3 Its leaders understood that forcing Berlin to keep more military strength on the Russian frontier could weaken the drive against France. The improved correlation of forces gave the French a greater chance of surviving the initial German onslaught and initiating its counteroffensive.4 Indeed, soon after hostilities broke out, the Russian army moved forces from the Turkish border in the Caucasus to the European theater. Both sides were now competing for the allegiance of the neutral states, especially Italy and the rest of the Balkan states. Each had its own complex calculus for deciding if, when, and on what side to enter the war, which was affected by Turkey’s participation. One of the main factors was the possibility of acquiring territory. For Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria, such gains could come directly out of remaining Ottoman lands but only if they joined the winning camp. The earlier a neutral state joined the conflict, the greater value its entrance would have, and the greater the concessions it could demand from the leading powers, but the less certain it could be of which side would win. Turkey’s continued neutrality thus appeared critical to Entente leaders. If it joined the Central Powers, it would close the southern shipping lanes to Russia and greatly compromise the Entente’s military and economic position. This weakening would be obvious to neutral observers, who might then follow Turkey into the enemy camp. Even though the Turks declared their neutrality from the outset of the conflict, the Russian government suspected them of playing a

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double game.5 Their army began to mobilize in early August, and while it would not be ready for aggressive action for a few months, the Russians were still concerned about how it might be used, especially since the German military mission remained in Turkey.6 Turkish leaders tried to calm them by insisting that the mobilized forces would not be concentrated along the Caucasian border but in Thrace. Nevertheless, the Russians knew of German and Austrian attempts to persuade Turkey to enter the war on their side.7 St. Petersburg’s concerns first focused on the immediate safety of its Black Sea ports. On 6 and 7 August, worried that the Porte might allow Austrian warships, perhaps reinforced by German vessels, into the Black Sea, it sought British and French cooperation.8 London and Paris were concentrating on protecting the transports carrying French colonial forces from North Africa to France but assured Russia that their combined fleet would be sufficient to blockade the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic Sea.9 While, in fact, the Austrian navy saw little action outside the Adriatic during the war,10 a new alarm rose by 8 August, when two German ships were reported heading for the Dardanelles. The Goeben, a dreadnought-class cruiser, stronger than anything the Russians possessed on the Black Sea, could sway the regional balance of naval power in favor of Russia’s enemies. The British Royal Navy’s efforts to intercept the ships failed, and the Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau entered the Dardanelles on 11 August.11 The Grand Vizier’s promise to Giers on 8 August that the ships would not pass the Straits was one in a long series that proved false and showed his decreasing power over the Turkish government.12 That same day, Sazonov declared that if the ships entered the Straits flying the German flag, the Entente should insist upon their being immediately sent out or disarmed, as dictated by international agreements on the treatment of belligerent vessels taking shelter in a neutral port. Referring to their superiority to Russian assets, Sazonov wrote that their hoisting the Turkish flag would “make the situation serious”; he preferred that they be sent away or disarmed.13 Though the Turks immediately announced that they were buying the ships from the Germans, the Entente remained skeptical. St. Petersburg, London, and Paris insisted that the German officers and crews be disembarked at once, both as a matter of international law and as proof of Turkey’s neutrality. The Grand Vizier assured Giers on 13 August that the German crews were being taken off the ships,14 but, in reality, they never left, only concealing themselves. The American ambassador at Constantinople described the scene:

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The German officers and crews greatly enjoyed this farcical pretence that the Goeben and Breslau were Turkish ships. They took delight in putting on Turkish fezzes, thereby presenting to the world conclusive evidence that these loyal sailors of the Kaiser were now parts of the Sultan's navy. One day the Goeben sailed up the Bosphorus, halted in front of the Russian Embassy, and dropped anchor. Then the officers and men lined the deck in full view of the enemy embassy. All solemnly removed their Turkish fezzes and put on their German caps. The band played “Deutschland über Alles,” the “Watch on the Rhine,” and other German songs, the German sailors singing loudly to the accompaniment. When they had spent an hour or more serenading the Russian Ambassador, the officers and crews removed their German caps and again put on their Turkish fezzes. The Goeben then picked up her anchor and started southward for her station, leaving in the ears of the Russian diplomat the gradually dying strains of German war songs as the cruiser disappeared down stream.15 Such an arrogant display only confirmed for the Triple Entente that the Germans maintained a strong presence in Turkey and that Turkish neutrality was a farce.16 The allies’ attempts to have the two ships neutralized were quickly blocked. The Ottoman Empire had a credible reason for purchasing them; while its leaders may have entertained few illusions about the degree of control they had over the Goeben and Breslau, the reported purchase was met with a great outpouring of popular acclaim, heightened by the fact that one of the ships sequestered in Britain had been paid for by public subscription.17 Germany now appeared to be righting this wrong, further weakening the Entente’s position, and since they had indeed seized the two ships under contract, the British were reluctant to pressure the Turks to send the German vessels away. Benckendorff informed Sazonov on 12 August that the Foreign Office found that after the sequestration, international law made protesting the purchase of the Goeben and Breslau difficult. Looking for a silver lining, the British ventured that having the two ships in the Sea of Marmara as part of the Turkish navy instead of in the Mediterranean Sea as

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German combatants would improve the naval situation. They added that if the Germans were not removed from the vessels, they would remove their naval mission from Turkey.18 Sazonov strongly disagreed on a couple of fronts. First, he evaluated the threat of the German ships differently, pointing to the danger they posed to the weaker Russian fleet. Second, on consultation with the navy, he counseled London to keep its naval mission in Turkey; otherwise, the Germans might fill the vacant posts and extend their control over the Turkish armed forces. Sazonov also expressed his frustration with the British.19 He saw no redeeming features in the new Ottoman naval situation, and while wishing to maintain pressure on the Turks to observe their declared neutrality, he did not want to make it any easier for the Germans to enhance their control over events in Constantinople. The outcome was all the more disappointing since the British had missed their opportunity to keep the warships out of the Dardanelles. Hoping for Neutrality, Playing for Time Russian naval authorities shared Sazonov’s alarm over the arrival of the Goeben and the Breslau. Even before the two ships seemed a threat, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A. A. Ebergard, informed Sazonov that if war with Turkey broke out, he would immediately mine the exit of the Bosphorus.20 Until the Turkish attack on the Black Sea coast in October, Ebergard continually sought permission to take precautionary measures, but by 9 August, he was ordered to avoid direct action against the Turks lest he provoke them to enter the war.21 While the navy's action was thus limited over the short term, pressure for more tangible preparations would rise again after a few weeks. Nevertheless, Sazonov's policy toward the Ottoman Empire did not waver—he wanted to avoid any action that might push it to enter the war on the opposing side. In this decision, he was supported by the army, which sought to concentrate its forces against the Central Powers, drawing as many units as it could from the Caucasian theater without exposing it to exaggerated risk.22 This view translated into policies governing both naval and diplomatic measures. As concerned the navy, Sazonov repeatedly insisted that Russia limit its military activities on the Black Sea. On 6 August, as St. Petersburg was still trying to determine what sort of threat Turkey would become and whether the Austrian or German fleet might be allowed through the Straits, Sazonov noted that “any preventive measures taken by us in the immediate vicinity of the

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Bosphorus, would take on a character hostile to Turkey, which would be very desirable to avoid, because this would only induce the Turks to join with our enemies.”23 If the Austrian fleet clearly meant to come through the Straits, Ebergard would be quickly warned, but nothing would be done “without the agreement of the Turks,”24 even if they were complicit in any Austrian passage. Again, on 9 August, Ebergard received orders to avoid, “unless in extreme necessity, measures directed right at Turkey.”25 Preventing premature naval measures was a crucial part of Sazonov's initial approach. As concerned Russian diplomacy, Sazonov instructed Giers to be firm with the Porte against the Goeben and Breslau entering the Dardanelles but cautioned him not to press too hard. The ambassador was to seek either the departure of the two ships or their disarmament but “not to drive affairs to a rupture.”26 Sazonov emphasized caution by ensuring that both Ebergard and Giers received the cautionary instructions sent to the other. Sazonov's goal was, as he put it, “playing for time,” which meant delaying Turkish entry into the war against the Entente for as long as possible.27 He, Giers, and General Leont’ev, the Russian military attaché in Constantinople, all agreed on this goal. They saw a new chance to delay war with the Porte in a Turkish proposal of alliance with Russia. The first hints came on 5 August from Ismail Enver Pasha, the minister of war, and one of the most powerful men in the Turkish government, known—correctly—as a strong supporter of the Central Powers. As Leont’ev summarized on 13 August, the Ottoman authorities proposed a military alliance with the Russians “for a period of 5 or 10 years.”28 Under this agreement, Turkey would furnish Russia with military assistance in the ongoing war, if Russia would “take into account Turkish interests and desires,” including the reacquisition of the Aegean islands it had lost to Greece and the territory in western Thrace lost to Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars.29 Enver insisted that Turkey had no aggressive intentions against Russia, was mobilizing solely because of worries for its own safety, and was not bound to the Triple Alliance. This last statement was an outright lie; Turkey and Germany had signed an alliance on 2 August. Enver suggested that once Russia and Turkey were friends, the Straits would cease to cause friction. He claimed not to fear retribution from Germany if it won the war, since it did not have land access to the Ottoman Empire. While acknowledging that the German and Austrian representatives at Constantinople as well as forces within the Turkish government and the

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public would oppose the agreement, he and his supporters would insist on concluding it, once Russia met Turkey's desires. Neither the Russian government at that time nor subsequent historians have known how to evaluate this proposal. Some historians have seen it as Enver’s attempt to confuse and to deflect the Russians— to play for time himself—in order to complete the Turkish mobilization without Russian interference or attack. If he had lulled them with the prospect of Turkish cooperation in the war, he could have significantly enhanced his country’s military position. Other historians have seen it as an honest attempt to keep options open, even with a German alliance already signed. If Constantinople could have extracted approval for Balkan border modifications from a Russia desperate to shore up its own weak military position, it would have less reason to go along with German plans.30 Sazonov, Giers, and Leont’ev all wanted to use the proposed alliance to gain time. Giers and Leont’ev strongly advocated going along with almost any deal that would keep Turkey out of the war. While Leont’ev expressed some initial doubts, both he and Giers urged their superiors to find a way to accept the offer. On 9 August, after Enver made a concrete proposal, Leont’ev had the impression that the Russian government could gain its ends, if it acted quickly.31 Giers seconded this opinion and suggested that Greece and Bulgaria could be compensated elsewhere for sacrificing the isles and Thrace. If it fell through, he predicted the inevitable alignment of the Turks with Berlin.32 A day later, he described this opportunity as “an historic moment” during which Russia could greatly bolster its position in the Near East.33 Even after the arrival and purchase of the Goeben and Breslau on 11 August, contradicting the Grand Vizier’s promises, Giers advocated pressing forward on Enver’s alliance, arguing that the ships made heading off rising German influence even more imperative.34 Sazonov was far more suspicious of Turkish intentions but sought to use these discussions to delay their entrance into the war against the Entente. Their military preparations conflicted with their claims of neutrality, and rumors increased that Turkey, either alone or in conjunction with Bulgaria, was already linked to the Central Powers.35 On 5 August, Giers reported that the Bulgarian minister to Constantinople had told him that the Turks and the Germans already had “an agreement about community of action against” Russia.36 Leont’ev had different information that suggested that the Turks and Bulgarians were negotiating an alliance with German support.37

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Sazonov noted on 8 August that the combined Turko-German effort to prepare the Turkish army for war left “little doubt” that Turkey would act, when convenient, under German direction.38 The arrival and “purchase” of the Goeben and Breslau only reinforced his skepticism over the Turkish proposals. In a telegram to Giers laying out the legal bases for his opposition to the purchase, Sazonov cited the unratified but generally accepted 1909 Naval Declaration of London, which regulated the transfer of ships between combatants and neutrals and prohibited the sort of maneuver the Turks were undertaking. He insisted on 11 August that the Turkish purchase only assisted Germany, which might lose the ships if they remained in the Mediterranean, where the British and French fleets were prowling.39 The next day, he had the Turks informed of the obvious: taking possession of these ships “at the time when they have begun negotiations with us, in no way eases the task of our rapprochement (sblizhenie).”40 Still, given Sazonov’s clearly stated desire to continue discussions and play for time, breaking off talks was not an option. Other counsels also colored Sazonov’s attitude toward a RussoTurkish alignment. On 10 and 11 August, Izvolskii informed him that members of the French Foreign Ministry, including Minister Gaston Doumergue, had heard that the Ottoman government feared that Russia would take advantage of a victory in the war to seize Constantinople and the Straits. Doumergue suggested that Russia might quiet Turkey by guaranteeing its territorial integrity. Conscious of Russia’s intense interest in the Straits area, however, he noted that giving such a pledge would not interfere with the resolution of “the Straits Question in agreement with [Russia’s] views” at the end of the war.41 On 12 August, Sazonov learned that the Turkish chargé d’affaires in St. Petersburg had spoken of an alliance with Russia in slightly different terms than Enver’s. Fakhreddin stated that Turkey was not seeking any territory but wanted in return for its cooperation control of the German concessions in Asia Minor as well as assurances that Russia would not support Armenian nationalism within the Ottoman Empire. While Sazonov was unsure of the seriousness of these ideas, he informed Giers that save for ignoring the Armenians, the other proposals were acceptable to him.42 Proposals Rejected Taking stock of these recommendations, Sazonov began to elucidate a concrete counterproposal to Enver’s. He told Fakhreddin on 13 August

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that Russia was prepared to come to an agreement with Turkey not on territorial acquisitions but to guarantee Turkish territorial integrity; in other words, a pledge that Russia would not take advantage of Turkey’s weakness to attack it. Sazonov told the chargé that the Turks would find it more worthwhile to gain control of German interests in their empire than to gain new territory of dubious value. These ideas were largely the same as those that Fakhreddin had put forward the day before, so he needed little convincing. The Turkish leadership, of course, would be a different story. Only on 15 August did Sazonov inform the allied capitals of his plans: he wanted to ask the Turks to demobilize as a sign that their neutrality was authentic. As compensation for this measure, which would effectively leave Turkey defenseless before a fully mobilized Russia, he proposed that the Entente Powers jointly guarantee Turkey’s territorial integrity. As a further enticement, Turkey was to be offered possession of all the German concessions and enterprises in Asia Minor.43 To emphasize his own good will, Sazonov pointed out that even in the face of Turkish mobilization and provocation through the purchase of the German warships, Russia was not returning troops to the Caucasus and remained concentrated on Germany.44 Sazonov had another opportunity to indicate his willingness to guarantee Turkish territorial integrity the next day, 16 August. Buchanan presented him with information from Constantinople that, suspicious of Russian intentions, it would accept the guarantee only if it came from all three Entente Powers. Sazonov again referred to the removal of troops from the Caucasus frontier and Russia’s readiness to join in pledging Turkish territorial integrity as evidence against any hostility.45 Giers had advised him a few days earlier that the Turks would require territorial concessions substantive enough to placate opinion both in the army and among the public. He told Giers to be ready to reassure the Turks of the guarantee and that Russia would turn over German concessions. He suggested to his allies a possible additional concession⎯the island of Lemnos, now in Greek hands and of strategic value to the Straits.46 Additional options included the Aegean islands and western Thrace.47 The British, however, were opposed to any talk of territorial concessions at this juncture, especially from Greece, which they were particularly worried not to offend and drive to the Germans. They had supplied an advisor to the Greek navy and built good relations with this strategically located state. If the Turks did enter the war against the Entente, the Greek navy could provide critical support against the Turkish fleet.48 While Giers hoped that

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Sazonov would press for the Greek concession, Sazonov let it drop, hoping that others would suffice.49 Sazonov’s attention to the islands in the Aegean may have had another motive. While he did not address it directly, he may well have been considering the future Russian position at the Straits when advocating the return of Lemnos to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government devoted a great deal of attention to the ownership of the islands closest to the Straits, eventually conceding them to Greece due to the pace of events. If the Turks now reacquired Lemnos, Russia would benefit later, when it was able to seize the area. Greek possession of the island would seriously compromise the Russians’ strategic position at the Straits. In late 1912, Prince Lieven, then chief of the Naval General Staff, noted that once Russia expanded into this area, “it [will be] necessary for Russia to take a strong point for itself in the Mediterranean Sea. The best would be the island of Lemnos.”50 Another indication that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had its position at the Straits in mind at this time is a 20 August letter from Prince Grigorii N. Trubetskoi, director of the Near Eastern Department, to Ambassador Giers.51 In describing what Russia stood to gain from the war, Trubetskoi noted that although Russia might acquire some land on its western borders, it had to think about the spectrum of options at the Straits. If Turkey remained neutral, with its territorial integrity guaranteed by the Entente Powers, the powers on the Black Sea would have to seek the right to bring warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. If Turkey entered the war against Russia or the Balkan states, “it would be desirable to define a guarantee of our control over the Straits which would meet with the least resistance from England and would appear in general the most realizable.” Russia might destroy all the Turkish fortifications along the Straits, establish its own fortified points at the exits of both, or find places close by to base its fleet to preserve its freedom of passage. Trubetskoi was more reticent to speak about the fate of Constantinople, the question which he described for the moment as “academic,” and he cautioned prudence so that Russia would not, like Germany, arouse suspicion and provoke other states to arm against it in order to preserve the balance of power. While territorial changes at the Straits had not yet been officially discussed, policymakers were certainly aware of them. As the British were sinking the idea of territorial concessions, the French were stripping away another of Sazonov’s proposals: giving the German concessions to Constantinople. Paris had, at first, acquiesced to yielding them to the Porte, but Maurice Bompard, the French

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ambassador to Turkey, was very opposed to the idea and carried the day.52 When the Entente ambassadors finally made their joint statement to the Porte on 18 August, all that remained of Sazonov’s original proposal was the joint guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity. He was again frustrated and protested Paris’s lack of cooperation in regard to the Ottoman Empire.53 The Turkish government, unsurprisingly, was dissatisfied with this lackluster Entente offering. Factions competing for control of policy saw an opportunity to make big demands on the Entente and sway the majority against Enver.54 Finance Minister Djavid Bey told Giers that they wanted the Entente to commit in writing to a guarantee of integrity for 15 to 20 years; complete economic independence from the powers; and an end to the system of capitulations.55 In speaking with the British and French ambassadors, Djavid and Ahmed Djemal Bey, the naval minister, made their fear of Russian intentions clearer, insisting that the territorial guarantees come from each of the powers individually.56 A tripartite guarantee would protect Turkey only as long as all three guaranteeing countries participated. If one signatory became an aggressor, the other two would have no obligation. However, if the commitments were individual, then each agreement would remain effective, regardless of any one state’s action. Once again, Sazonov was far more willing to agree with Turkish demands than his western allies, reflecting his strong desire to keep Turkey out of the war for as long as possible. But Russia had the least to lose from an end to the capitulatory system, since its economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire had been so shallow. Great Britain and France had much more to lose and opposed such broad concessions.57 At most, they were willing to pledge to review the Turkish claims after the war “in a liberal spirit.”58 By 28 August, the Entente was ready to state that it would guarantee Turkey’s territorial integrity as well as friendly consideration of its economic and judicial concerns as bound up in the capitulations, if Turkey observed strict neutrality.59 Still dissatisfied, the Turkish government declared on 9 September that it would unilaterally end the system of capitulations. It had maneuvered the warring powers on both sides into a position of weakness, at least on this subject, and their protests were to no avail. Within a week, both began to negotiate the practicalities of ending the capitulations, while creating some system to protect foreigners within the Ottoman Empire.60

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Preparing for Turkish Entry By this time, the Triple Entente was becoming pessimistic about ever convincing Turkey to shed its German cloak, to say nothing of actually joining the anti-German coalition. Throughout the middle of August, Giers, Leont’ev, and consular officials in Asia Minor reported back to the Russian capital about the decreasing power of the Grand Vizier and the strengthening of the party around Enver, which was inclined to war against the Entente. Now, Turkish deployments on the Caucasus frontier also appeared threatening. Combined with the continuing presence of German sailors on the Goeben and Breslau, the situation looked bad enough by 22 August that Sazonov brought it up in the Council of Ministers. A. V. Krivoshein, minister of agriculture, declared that he would be happy if the Turks moved against Russia, because then either Russia could attack or the problems in Asia Minor would end.61 While no other ministers’ comments were recorded, their general assent was likely. Sazonov wrote to his representative at Stavka (General Headquarters) that he found the situation with Turkey increasingly alarming, so much so, that he and the Council of Ministers now believed that the army should remove no more forces from the Caucasus to the western front but reinforce the southern theater with troops from Turkestan. The tsar indicated his agreement the next day.62 The ensuing week saw new reports of more Germans arriving in Turkey and equipment for the Goeben sent from Austria to Constantinople.63 Finally, on 27 August, information began to surface that the Goeben and Breslau were probably being sent into the Black Sea, contrary to the Grand Vizier’s promises.64 The Russian military and naval authorities considered preemptive measures once again and sought Sazonov’s agreement on 28 August. Admiral Ebergard requested Stavka’s permission to take all necessary measures, including mining the Bosphorus, if the Goeben and Breslau entered the Black Sea, and the Foreign Ministry was to warn Turkey of these intentions. General N. N. Ianushkevich, chief of the General Staff, asked that Sazonov inform Stavka when he thought war was imminent so that the navy might take appropriate measures, including, time permitting, mining the area.65 Sazonov, however, was still opposed to doing anything that might pull Turkey into the war, especially in these first, uncertain weeks. As he saw it, the Goeben’s entrance into the Black Sea would not, by itself, indicate a rupture in relations. War with Turkey was especially inopportune at the moment because negotiations were under way to convince Serbia and Greece to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria to prevent it from siding with Turkey against

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the Entente. Ultimately, Sazonov noted that the Entente Powers wanted Constantinople to be held responsible for the rupture in relations so that neutrals would join the Entente. Consequently, he opposed the measures that Stavka sought and warned it that if the navy decided to engage these vessels, it had to be sure of success, since the loss of its strongest units on the Black Sea would have serious consequences for regional policy.66 The generals and admirals were unconvinced and continued to press him to agree to strong measures. Ianushkevich told Sazonov that he still thought that the Foreign Ministry should warn Turkey that sending the Goeben into the Black Sea would force military repercussions.67 Ebergard followed up with another request to warn the Turks that Russia did not recognize the Goeben and Breslau as Turkish vessels; therefore, their emergence into the Black Sea could result in a collision.68 Sazonov shrank from this saber-rattling because he felt it would hasten the break in relations. He conceded that Ebergard be allowed to take what measures he felt necessary since Turkey had not met the Entente’s wishes for removing the German crews from the ships.69 Moreover, in the wake of a telegram from Giers, reporting an agreement that apparently committed Turkey to eventual participation in the war on Germany’s side, Sazonov instructed him on 10 September to tell the Grand Vizier that the Goeben and Breslau venturing into the Black Sea could bring a conflict between the two states.70 In an effort to coordinate their views on policy toward Turkey, Sazonov and other Foreign Ministry officials met on 10 September with the chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral A. I. Rusin, and other naval staff officers. In this meeting, Sazonov emphasized his desire to keep Turkey out of the war. Repeating his written opinions, he told them he feared that a belligerent response by the Russian Black Sea Fleet to the emergence of the Turko-German vessels would ignite the wider conflict, even though, in his view, the majority in Turkey was against it. His position was reported: . . . in the event of an unfavorable outcome for our fleet in a clash with the Turks, strengthened both by German ships and German personnel, there would arise not only immediate danger to our southern coast, almost completely devoid of forces, and to the Caucasus, where we have only one corps against three Turkish ones, but our defeat at sea would [also] be reflected in the most serious form on the general

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political situation which is still very favorable for us, compelling wavering powers to join our enemies and even annul all of the military successes that have been achieved.71 Not sure that the Russian fleet would succeed, Sazonov did not feel able to take upon himself “the moral responsibility” of committing it to battle. He thought that if the Turkish fleet entered the Black Sea, the Russian fleet would be better off remaining in the port of Sevastopol.72 Rusin bristled before such a suggestion. In his view, once a number of factors had been taken into account, the two fleets were of about equal strength. He and the other officers asserted that sheltering in port while the enemy ranged freely in the open sea would deliver a strong blow to the fleet’s morale and look like a defeat to all observers, even if the two sides did not actually meet. Given that the Porte had been warned against sending out its fleet and that the Germans would only lead it into the Black Sea to seek a decisive battle with the Russians, Ebergard must have the freedom to take the required measures, including, if necessary, attacking it. The staff officers further suggested that Sazonov inform Ebergard of the political situation and the government’s goals, so he could act accordingly. In this way, if the Turkish fleet emerged but stayed in its own territorial waters, the Russian Black Sea Fleet could leave them unmolested, but if the Turks and Germans moved toward Russia, then Ebergard could take the necessary countermeasures. Events took this course. On 11 September, Sazonov informed Ebergard of the uncertain situation in the Ottoman capital and the Balkan Peninsula. Telling the admiral that he would have “freedom of action, as soon as the Goeben enters the Black Sea,” he reminded him of the consequences of a loss.73 A few days later, Rusin followed this telegram with a letter detailing the interdepartmental meeting of 10 September and explaining the suggestion that hostilities commence only if the Turkish fleet left its territorial waters.74 Over the next week, the Entente Powers heard a series of warnings that the Turks’ warships would enter the Black Sea. Finally, on 20 September, the Breslau entered for some maneuvers and returned to port that same day, while the Goeben remained at anchor. The Russian fleet did nothing, but Giers and Louis Mallet, the British ambassador at Constantinople, protested to the Porte strongly.75 As the Entente’s negotiations over the conditions of the changes to the capitulations sputtered along, it became steadily more pessimistic

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about ever convincing the Porte to observe strict neutrality. Both Great Britain and Russia reacted in tangible ways. London decided to increase pressure on the Turks by stationing units of the Royal Navy off the Dardanelles. They would prohibit any ship flying the Turkish flag from exiting, since the British could not be sure that it was not under German command and thus a danger to its vessels. On 26 September, a Turkish torpedo boat did attempt to exit the Straits and was promptly stopped by the British fleet. Although the Straits had until this time remained open to commercial traffic, this action resulted in their immediate and complete closing to almost all vessels. The Entente naturally protested with vehemence. The Grand Vizier tried to blame the British, but Entente ambassadors insisted that as long as the Germans retained their influence in the Ottoman Empire, they had no choice.76 When he then tried to convince the British at least to pull their ships back a little from the Dardanelles, they refused, having little patience left for Turkish temporizing and little trust in their claims.77 Mallet’s summary of the situation on 5 October was that the STRAITS are now effectively closed by mines, [the] position of which is said to be unknown to [the] Turks, so that [the] question of reopening is no longer a practical one. I am taking a line that our interests are not primarily affected, as our trade had already been stopped by relinquishing and other measures. My French and Russian colleagues are of the same opinion.78 These circumstances explain why the Russian government was so quiescent over the Straits’ closure, especially compared with its reaction to the threats and actual closures in 1912. Russian attitudes toward minorities within the eastern districts of the Ottoman Empire followed a similar track of caution then action. As advocates for, and protectors of, the Armenian minority, Russia had for decades concerned itself with the lands just across its Caucasian border.79 Many of those peoples, especially the Armenians, turned to the Russians for help. Soon after the outbreak of war in Europe, a Russian consul in eastern Anatolia reported that he had been approached by representatives of the local peoples, who offered to fight the Turks, if the Russians would arm them.80 On 15 August, Sazonov informed Sukhomlinov of these approaches but, following the same principles that guided his other policies toward Turkey, noted that it

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was premature to take them up, while Turkey’s position was still unclear. Arming these peoples could well push Turkey and Russia toward collision. Nevertheless, he suggested gathering and planning for the distribution of arms and other needed materials in case such a course became desirable.81 On 6 September, the viceroy for the Caucasus region, Prince I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, told Sazonov of more proposals along these lines from the Kurds, Assyrians, and Armenians but also opined that it was too early to use them. He did think that the time was right to identify possible leaders among them and requested that Sazonov ask Sukhomlinov to send him arms for them.82 Sazonov pledged to help.83 With more reports in hand on the local peoples’ readiness to fight alongside the Russians, he wrote to the viceroy on 18 September that the time had come to arm those in Persian border regions. He still held back from recommending the same for those within the Ottoman Empire. Two days later, VorontsovDashkov relayed to Sazonov his plans to prepare the Armenians for a rising when the Russians judged it opportune.84 Sazonov’s quick reply sprang from the deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations related above. He told the viceroy that Giers feared an imminent break with Turkey, and he concluded that it was time to prepare the forces for action.85 Although the supply problems that plagued the whole of the Russian war effort slowed this process, Sazonov’s change of mind on 20 September is the crucial watershed.86 In contrast to the previous weeks, when he was reticent to take steps with the minorities of the eastern Ottoman Empire that could have pushed the Turks into breaking off relations with the Russians, he could now countenance more aggressive responses, providing another example of how Entente leaders were giving up any serious hope of gaining Turkish cooperation. War Aims and Waiting for the Break By this time, the political tone of the war was changing. On 5 September, the Entente Powers had signed a pledge neither to make a separate peace with the Central Powers nor to offer peace conditions to any enemy power without general agreement.87 On 12 September, Russia was the first to come forward with a version of its war aims. These concentrated only on central Europe and did not discuss the problem of the Ottoman Empire, still ostensibly neutral.88 As pessimism grew in late September, however, members of the Russian government began to discuss the Ottoman problem with the allied ambassadors in Petrograd. Krivoshein, who, anticipating war with Turkey, had spoken out in the Council of Ministers in August, now conferred with

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Buchanan and Maurice Paléologue, the French ambassador at Petrograd. He was believed to reflect the general mood. Buchanan reported on 25 September that Krivoshein remarked to me yesterday that he personally would be glad if the Turks declared war on Russia, as then the Turkish question would be finally settled. Opinion seems to be gaining ground that it can only be at the expense of Turkey that Russia can obtain any material advantage as the result of the war, for it is not regarded as adding to her strength that she should acquire territory on her western frontier in Posen and Galicia. Turkey will therefore be made to pay for her openly hostile attitude in one way or another in the long run, though Russia will do nothing provocative of such a war. M. Sazonof’s references to the Dardanelles question in his conversations with me have been merely academic, but they left the impression that the Russians will insist on settling this question once and for all, though they will not raise the question of the status of Constantinople.89 Paléologue also noted how “the menacing Turkish attitude provokes a rather lively emotion in Russian opinion,” including the government. He wrote that Krivoshein foresaw the retreat of Turkish power to Asia Minor, leaving Constantinople an international city along the lines of the Tangiers of that time, and that the Straits should be neutralized.90 Paléologue’s accounts of his meetings with Russian statesmen on war aims have received some well-deserved criticism and suspicion, given his habits of exaggeration and invention.91 His 26 September description of Krivoshein and Sazonov’s views, however, when compared with their and others’ statements elsewhere on the Straits problem, suggests that the essence was correct, if perhaps not literally accurate.92 As shown above, however, Krivoshein was already hankering in August for a battle with the Turks, and Buchanan’s account of his talk with him corresponds with these opinions. Sazonov, according to Paléologue, did not completely agree with his colleague. In a tone suggesting to Paléologue that the Foreign Ministry would brook little discussion on the issue, Sazonov stated that his opinion was similar to Krivoshein’s: Russia “must be assured once

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and for all of free passage of the Straits.” However, he also believed that the Turks ought to remain in Constantinople and its region, that no fortifications should be erected along the Dardanelles, that a commission with a naval force should police the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, and that Russia should have a coaling station somewhere within the Bosphorus. As to the veracity of Paléologue’s account, the next chapter will make clear that Sazonov was not enthusiastic about forcing the Turks from Constantinople, so this comment rings true. His conditions listed above do not differ significantly from those that Trubetskoi had sent to Giers a month earlier and, in fact, are a bit more limited. Certainly, once Turkey had entered the war, Sazonov’s demands would increase dramatically, but at this time, he was holding to a moderate tone, befitting the current political situation. Until that point, the Entente still had one more month of tedious negotiations over the capitulations regime. Sazonov sought to hold off the break with Turkey as long as possible, even as Petrograd increasingly heard it was imminent. On 27 September, for example, Buchanan learned that Sazonov wanted the Entente to moderate its protests over the Turks’ unilateral changes to the capitulations so as not to provoke a rupture. Sazonov, “while fully realising that there was but little chance of maintaining peace, thought it important not to precipitate events, in hopes that were military situation to take a marked turn in our favour Turkey might reconsider her attitude.”93 Through the end of September and all of October, Giers relayed to Petrograd deciphered copies of telegrams sent by the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople to Vienna. They clearly indicated the heavy pressure that the Central Powers were applying to get the Turks to enter the war. Although Giers saw a power struggle within the Turkish government, especially as the German offensive in France was blunted, and trench warfare commenced, he felt there was little chance of having Enver removed. He believed that it was only a matter of time before Enver and his German collaborators used some incident to provoke war.94 As this process unfolded, Russian foreign policymakers held the line on the Straits. In a 13 October conversation, Prince Trubetskoi tried to convince the Turkish chargé d’affaires that Germany was just trying to use Turkey to distract Russia from its battle with the Central Powers, and later, the Turks would pay the political price. He reassured Fakhreddin that Russia did not intend to dismember the Ottoman Empire and that an alliance with Russia would guarantee Ottoman

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territorial integrity; Russia would prefer such an arrangement over “a border with a whole range of states, that is, of course, unprofitable for us.”95 Trubetskoi very clearly indicated that Russia wanted free passage of the Straits for its warships but as part of an alliance that would protect Turkey’s borders. On 24 October, the Italian ambassador, Carlotti, visited Trubetskoi seeking information on Russia’s plans for the Straits.96 Perhaps fearing an Italian attempt to begin bargaining for pieces of the Ottoman Empire, Trubetskoi simply noted that the time was not right to resolve the question diplomatically. Everything would depend on the course that Russia felt it necessary to take. Not wishing to delve further, he changed the subject. By now, the Entente capitals had learned that Germany had agreed to a large loan for Turkey, and they believed that once the money arrived, the Turks would enter the war.97 On 20 October, Sazonov warned Ebergard of this transaction and its implication of imminent war.98 On 22 October, Entente ambassadors began sending back reports of the arrival of German gold for the loan and feared the worst.99 The worst finally came on 29 October, when the Turkish fleet, under German command, sortied from its bases and bombarded a number of Russian ports, torpedoed a few ships, and laid some minefields. The responding ultimatum from the Entente demanded that the Turks send away all the Germans or face war. Delivered to the Porte on 30 October, it had a period of twenty-four hours. Even here, however, Sazonov dragged his heels, hoping peace might be preserved. Although he assented to giving Ebergard full freedom to execute whatever measures he thought necessary, Sazonov still requested that Vorontsov-Dashkov delay his ground offensive until the reply to the ultimatum was received.100 Only on the direct orders of the tsar on 2 November did Sazonov have the declaration of war issued.101 Sazonov’s efforts to keep Turkey out of the war so that Russia could concentrate on the main theater of battle were over. From August to October, he had deflected Turkey from reasons to enter the war and tried to calm its strong suspicions, stoked by the Germans, of Russian intentions. In doing so, he retained civilian direction of Russia’s Turkish policy in the face of requests from military and naval authorities to make highly provocative preparations and in contrast to Germany, where the military assumed increasing control of the nation and its policies. While some concessions were made, the main thrust of his policy was not altered by internal forces. Only the efforts of Enver Pasha and the German leadership in Turkey, abetted by Turkish suspicions, finally defeated him. Ultimately, the Germans were in a

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position to offer the Turks more than the Entente ever could. Enver’s August proposals, even if meant seriously, were unacceptable to a coalition trying to win the allegiance of the Balkan states as well. There was little that the Russians, British, or French could have done to keep Turkey neutral, save driving the German armies back into Germany. That failing, Turkish hostility was virtually inevitable. While Sazonov recognized the value of the Straits, he firmly believed that Russia’s war effort must not be distracted from the Central Powers. After the war was won, a new arrangement at the Straits could be established. Once Turkish neutrality was no longer achievable and its belligerence became a fact, Russian attention focused on a new topic: concrete war aims at the Straits and Constantinople.

6 WAR ENGAGED: ALLIED AND DOMESTIC DISPUTES OVER THE FATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE STRAITS, NOVEMBER 1914 TO JULY 1916

I

n contrast to the months before Turkey’s entry into World War I, the period immediately following, starting in November 1914, has been closely scrutinized, primarily because Great Britain and France promised Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles to Russia if and when the war ended with an Entente victory. At long last, after centuries of yearning, Russia’s dreams appeared on the verge of realization. The only thing that stood in its way was defeating Germany. It was upon that rocky shore, however, that the Russian ship of state crashed, unable to reach its destination. Much has been written about the agreements that the Entente Powers made in March and April 1915, awarding possession of Constantinople, the Straits, and a region around them to the Russian Empire. Many of these works attempt to understand why Great Britain and, less easily, France came to those decisions. While historians at first believed that Sir Edward Grey was trying to keep Russia fighting against Germany, more recent scholarship suggests that His Majesty’s Government was protecting its position elsewhere—the Persian Gulf region—and sought to trade the Straits area for the oil-rich lands to the east. France, on the other hand, was evidently pushed into the decision

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by the British and the Russians. While wanting to ensure continued Russian participation in the war, Paris increasingly feared that afterwards, Russian strength would be as menacing as that of prewar Germany. Possession of the Straits appeared to provide St. Petersburg, or, rather, Petrograd by then, an easy way to move its forces into regions that the French traditionally thought their own.1 Studies of this period usually isolate the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes from the wider tensions in the Russian government. Once again, the Straits Question played an important and insufficiently studied part in the civil-military relationships at work in Russia. Forces both within and outside of the government pushed ever more irresistibly for a clear definition of war aims that would justify the heavy losses that the nation was suffering in its fight against Germany. While initial aims pointed to unification of Poland under the Romanov scepter and border changes in central Europe, they did not capture the public imagination as much as the Straits did, once Turkey’s entrance into the war made their seizure a legitimate goal. Because the effect of prewar attitudes has been misunderstood, Sazonov’s growing sympathy for public opinion has been unappreciated. The stresses that Russia bore during the war increasingly necessitated some change in regime once it was over. In the public sphere, there was discussion of the need for a cabinet of public confidence, that is, one chosen by the tsar but containing ministers willing to work along lines supported by society. There was reluctance, however, to demand a cabinet responsible to the Duma. Some people inside the government thought similarly, including Sazonov. During the especially grim spring and summer of 1915, Sazonov was among the most outspoken ministers calling for some change in government to meet the expectations of society. While a few more popular ministers were appointed in the early spring, the tsar clearly had no intention of abandoning himself to these demands. He would swing back toward the right by the end of the summer. Sazonov believed that the public now ought to have a voice in governmental affairs and took far greater account of the speeches in the Duma and articles in the newspapers that talked about taking possession of the Straits and Constantinople. This reward was the one that would make the sacrifices worthwhile. Sazonov had become very frustrated with the condition of the Russian government. Like others in the government and military, his allegiance had shifted from the tsar to the state, and educated society, for him at least, was the part of the state to

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which attention had to be paid. Holding onto the prize of the Straits to satisfy their demands would be his best way to work with them. The change in his views was not immediately apparent. In the weeks following Turkish entry into the war, the Russians said little of substance about the fate of the Straits. Sazonov simply told French Ambassador Paléologue on 5 November that Russia was obliged to make Turkey pay for its aggression, which meant acquiring “solid guarantees”, as yet undefined, at the Straits. They did not include the absorption of Constantinople: “As concerns Constantinople, I personally do not wish for the Turks to be driven away.”2 While Sazonov’s words, as conveyed by Paléologue, suggest that someone else did seek to empty Constantinople of Turkish influence, no one in the Russian government spoke publicly of such a policy at this time. Privately, however, the Russians were considering incorporation of both the Straits and Constantinople into their empire. A November 1914 memorandum produced by N. A. Bazili, a member of the Foreign Ministry and friend of Sazonov, reflected on including the annexation of the Straits into the Russian position, although it also maintained a reluctance to absorb Constantinople.3 This document, an extension of the works he produced before the war,4 looked at the Straits region in the context of the war. Bazili recommended that Russia seize more than just the Bosphorus Strait and a few small islands in the Sea of Marmara because he saw this strategy as a minimal, “passive” approach to Russian security. An ideal arrangement would include possession of the Dardanelles Strait as well as the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara, with fortifications on both sides of the Bosphorus plus the European side of the Dardanelles. Russia would also acquire the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, just outside the Dardanelles, and perhaps also Lemnos and Samothrace, located just a little farther into the Aegean Sea. He also urged the acquisition of the whole of Thrace to the Enos-Midia line, preferably including Adrianople, and at least the northern, if not both, shores of the Sea of Marmara. Such a seizure would secure Russian economic and strategic needs in the area—that is, protect an increasingly important shipping route as well as the ability to project naval power from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea and beyond. Neutralizing the region was rejected because of the ease by which other powers could violate it. Germany’s treatment of Belgium, Bazili noted, had shown the hollowness of such international treaties. As for Constantinople, he sketched only broad outlines: the city would be captured but not put under “full administrative control,” unless it were threatened. “Granting self-government to the city of Constantinople

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would lessen the frictions that would be unavoidable if we were to establish a direct influence over such an important center in which so many interests—financial, national, religious, and others—are concentrated.”5 Bazili’s memo indicates an awareness of the political dangers inherent in Russia’s plans. Creating a special regime in Constantinople would reduce France and Great Britain’s opposition to Russia’s desires and reduce chances for friction among the powers later. As Russia waited to voice its demands, the British government was the first to suggest a serious change to the status quo at the Straits. On 9 November, Sir Edward Grey mentioned to Russian Ambassador Benckendorff that now “the fate of the Straits and Constantinople [could] only be decided in conformity with [Russian] desires.”6 A few days later, King George V went further, telling the Russian ambassador that “Constantinople . . . must be yours.” Benckendorff interpreted this statement as a sign that the British government had considered the problem and set this as its official position.7 He did not believe that the king would have otherwise been so definitive. Only on 15 November did a member of the Russian government address the problem of war aims, now that Turkey was in the war. Prime Minister Ivan L. Goremykin told the French ambassador that in addition to the war aims that Sazonov had set out in September, Russia would insist upon the internationalization of Constantinople, which would mean the end of Turkish control there.8 This view corresponded with Sazonov’s prewar opinion concerning the city’s fate, but it is not clear if the prime minister was aware of the new policy under review in the Foreign Ministry. At first, Sazonov added nothing to Goremykin’s comments. He limited himself to seeking clarification of the British government’s position in which he saw an inconsistent willingness to meet Russia’s expectations. The aide-memoire from Buchanan dated 14 November contained what Sazonov considered more reserved language than that used by Grey in his interview with Benckendorff. Sazonov commissioned Benckendorff to inspire Grey to have Buchanan deliver a second statement that would correspond more closely to the clarity of Grey’s words.9 To help ensure receipt of the new document, Sazonov warmly responded to an 18 November inquiry from Grey about Russia’s attitude toward the possible establishment of a British protectorate over Egypt, hitherto formally an Ottoman possession. Not only did Sazonov express his approval, but he told Buchanan that “Russia would willingly assent to [Egypt’s] annexation by England,” because of Britain’s cooperation in resolving the question of the Straits

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and Constantinople.10 Sazonov was duly rewarded—within a week, he received confirmation of Grey’s position on the Turkish question.11 Emperor Nicholas II was the next to shed light on his government’s new attitude toward the Straits and Constantinople in a discussion of war aims with Paléologue on 21 November.12 Nicholas first assured the ambassador that the destruction of German militarism remained Russia’s top priority. He then said that he accepted in advance those conditions of peace that France and Great Britain found in their own interest. Paléologue attested to his certainty that France would similarly meet Russia’s desires. Thus drawn out, Nicholas began to describe how he envisioned the future rearrangement of Europe, though he cautioned the ambassador that this opinion was his own, evolving and personal, rather than the official Russian desiderata, since he had not yet consulted with his ministers and generals. He felt that the Turks had to be expelled from Europe. The Enos-Midia line would henceforth serve as the border between Bulgaria and Russia; Sofia would take the land to its west, while Russia would annex the territory in eastern Thrace, save for Constantinople, which would become a neutral city with an international regime. The Straits and the Sea of Marmara would then be the new western border of Turkish dominions. As for the Straits themselves, Nicholas only specified the need to secure Russia’s free passage.13 Overall, these views corresponded with those set out by Sazonov in the year preceding the outbreak of the First World War, and the foreign minister confirmed the tsar’s statements a few days later.14 This comparatively relaxed attitude on display contrasted significantly with the intensifying activity within the Russian government, especially the Foreign Ministry. In the minds of many Russians, Turkey’s entry into the pan-European conflict changed everything. Sazonov felt that the time had finally come to resolve the Straits Question: in his view, it was now or never. If Russia’s allies did not agree to the fulfillment of its desires, then what it was fighting for was unclear.15 He commissioned Baron Boris Nolde, head of the Foreign Ministry’s legal section, to draw up a proposal for the resolution of the Constantinople and Straits Question. Nolde prepared maximal and minimal demands. The maximal variant foresaw complete Russian control and ownership of Constantinople, both sides of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, maintaining prohibition on foreign warships passing the Straits. The minimalist option included Russian military control of the Bosphorus and sufficient armed force on the shores of both Straits to ensure it. Constantinople would remain

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nominally Turkish under an international regime with a police force from a secondary power, while all permanent fortifications would be removed from the Straits’ shores. Sazonov embraced the first proposal and decidedly rejected the latter as not suited to the sacrifices of a world war. His revulsion toward the modest proposal was such that he carried a bitter feeling toward Nolde for some time.16 Some observers felt that Sazonov was being naive in his optimism that he could fulfill Russia’s desires now—after a thousand years of frustration, as one put it.17 While most members of the Foreign Ministry expected French support, they believed that Great Britain’s traditional opposition to Russian installation at the Straits would prove a difficult obstacle. They were only barely aware of a critical shifting of attitudes among the powers. In Great Britain, the most important decisionmakers had concluded that they must not stand in the way of Russia’s move in the Straits region. Two decades before the war, the Admiralty had decided that the Straits were no longer strategically vital to the British Empire’s defense.18 While some Britons feared that their control would give Petrograd a threatening naval base, authorities assured them that the Royal Navy could effectively blockade the Straits, if necessary. Instead, the British government feared that if it resisted Russian wishes too stubbornly, Russia might make a separate peace with the Central Powers, its September pledge notwithstanding. No longer a strategic necessity, the Straits could be dangled as a prize to keep the Russians in the war. Furthermore, as petroleum grew in importance to its fleet, some in the British government saw pledging the Straits to Russia as a way to strengthen the British position around the Persian Gulf, a tacit exchange by which Russia gained territory it believed of vital interest and Great Britain gained a freer hand in Persia.19 The French were far less enthusiastic about this proposition. On a number of occasions, Paris had allowed its financial and economic concerns to overwhelm what the Russians believed were alliance obligations to support their policy. Here again, the French were deeply concerned about their Turkish investments and feared that Russian control of the Straits region might bar their return to a commanding position. Their strategic concerns about Russia’s future military capabilities were also growing. If Russia were able to send its warships into the Mediterranean Sea at any time, then it could become a serious rival in the eastern Mediterranean, where France had important interests in Syria and Palestine. French authorities were quite aware of the naval strength represented by the new Russian dreadnoughts and,

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through their naval attachés, had copies of Russian plans for the next decades. Poincaré, president of the French Republic, wrote to Paléologue that possession of Constantinople and its vicinity would not only give Russia a sort of privilege in the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. It would introduce her, via the Mediterranean, into the concert of western nations, and this would give her, via the open sea, the chance to become a great naval power. Everything would thus be changed in the European equilibrium. Such an enlargement and such added strength would only be acceptable to us if we would ourselves receive the same benefits of war. Everything is thus inevitably linked. We can agree to the Russian desires only in proportion to the satisfactions that we ourselves receive.20 Now, French satisfaction at the growth of Russian naval strength was fading. Once the German threat was removed, Russia would have little reason to remain in the Franco-Russian Alliance, which meant that its naval expansion might no longer serve French interests. In December 1914, however, these misgivings were relatively unknown to the Russian government. Meanwhile, another internal memorandum advocating Russian possession of not only the Straits but Constantinople was drafted by Captain A. V. Nemitz, the naval staff officer responsible for policy in this area and for liaison with the Foreign Ministry.21 As with Bazili’s, this memorandum was a follow-up to one he had written in the summer of 1913.22 Nemitz pointed to the crucial economic and strategic value of the Straits as well as the political and nationalist value of Russia installed at Constantinople. He emphasized: The really vital meaning for the empire of its political position on the Balkan Peninsula and on the Straits, leading from ‘Tsargrad’ to the east and to the west has always been clear to Russia. To its best civil servants there was never a doubt that the Turks sooner or later will be driven away from this ‘world’ position, and its place must be taken by the authority (vlast’) of the new great eastern empire - the national

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authority of our fatherland. Only by grasping firmly (stav prochnoi nogoi) the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, will Russia be able to fulfill its historical calling, which includes state unification, internal conciliation, and giving ‘European’ culture to the peoples of all of eastern Europe and a large part of Asia.23 Inspired by the Byzantine Empire, Nemitz called for seizure of the Straits and Constantinople once the Central Powers were all but beaten and for immediate preparations to do so. After the area was taken, he foresaw fortresses on both sides of the Bosphorus but only on the European side of the Dardanelles, since fortifying the Asian side would be too expensive, and passage was, in any case, dominated by the opposite shore. He did not believe that wide acquisitions in Thrace would be necessary, preferring that Russia secure only enough territory to defend the fortresses. He felt that giving most of Thrace to Bulgaria and leaving the Asian side of the Dardanelles to Turkey would win Bulgarian cooperation and minimize allied opposition to Russian expansion. As for Constantinople, Nemitz included it within the Russian Empire but with special status, under a viceroy (namestnik) or consul instead of a governor. Such special treatment was necessary because of its status as a “world city”, where the interests of many nations and religions commingled and which “will never and under no conditions become a city of any one nationality.”24 He proposed that Russia maintain military control of the area but that under this umbrella, the city would be “free and neutral”, run by a municipal council organized by the victorious European powers.25 The Nemitz memo confirmed Sazonov’s preference for bringing Constantinople into the Russian Empire and presented him with different options for its administration and the distribution of Turkey’s European territory that were sensitive to the expected postwar diplomatic situation. In late December, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry first signaled that Sazonov was reconsidering his views on the Straits and Constantinople. On 21 December, he informed Ianushkevich that “from the point of view of state interests and the massive sacrifice which we have suffered in the current European war, I think that such a war must in no way end without Russian control over both Straits; i.e., without a guarantee of [Russia’s] reliable and free exit to the Mediterranean Sea.”26 Noting that the Turks would not leave Constantinople voluntarily, he wanted to know what sort of military operations had been planned to capture the Straits and the surrounding

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area. Clearly implied here was a desire to seize the Turkish capital. While Sazonov had previously spoken of having armed forces in Constantinople to influence the resolution of its eventual control, as during the Balkan Wars, he now had a more acquisitive intention. Although this letter does not directly express it, the evidence above confirms such a conclusion. Nevertheless, the military leadership at Stavka refused to divert forces from the main operations against the German and AustroHungarian armies. Ianushkevich replied to Sazonov on 25 December that “the question of detaching a special force for seizing the Straits cannot be raised before we achieve decisive success over our western enemies,” and he warned that undertaking such an operation would be very difficult.27 In several late December discussions with Bazili, General Iu. N. Danilov explained the obstacles to a Russian operation against the Straits: the mobilized Turkish army, the long lines of communication, and the inability, while fighting the Central Powers, to find the eight to ten corps he believed necessary for a landing against Turkey. Nemitz apparently agreed with his evaluation.28 Sazonov was not satisfied with these answers, perhaps still under the common prewar illusion that the conflict would not last very long. He asked Ianushkevich again for more specific information about whether the army and navy could carry out an operation against the Straits, for which the Foreign Ministry should prepare the diplomatic ground with the other states on the Black Sea. If their help would not be required in the near future, then he did not want to raise the issue with them too early.29 Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, supreme commander of the Russian forces, replied that saying anything specific was impossible, while so much was uncertain, both militarily and politically. It was clear to him, however, that under no circumstances could Russia take the Straits single-handedly. He thought it best that any further discussions with the allies over the Straits and Constantinople be purely military, leaving politics aside for the time being.30 This attempt to halt Sazonov’s incessant inquiries about diverting some forces to a Bosphorus expedition was unsuccessful. As we shall see, the resistance of the military authorities only increased his efforts.31 The Rise and Consequences of the Dardanelles Campaign The mood at Stavka was very pessimistic, as the Russian army faced defeats and shortages.32 Commanders were so worried by their situation on the western and Turkish-Caucasian fronts that Nikolai Nikolaevich

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turned to the allies for help. On 30 December, he asked the British government for a diversion in the Ottoman Empire that would relieve some of the pressure on the Russians in the Caucasus. He left it to the western allies to choose the operation and assured them that if they believed that no action would help the general cause and therefore undertook none, Russia would understand.33 No operation was specified, and no attempt made to direct the allies’ attention toward the Straits. Britain was already exploring possible alternative attacks on the Central Powers to relieve some of the pressure on its western front. Maurice Hankey, secretary of the British War Council, proposed an operation against the Dardanelles in hopes of penetrating the Sea of Marmara, forcing a Turkish surrender, and reopening the vital waterway. Winston S. Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, had been thinking of an attack on Germany’s Baltic coast, but he saw the value of Hankey’s proposal and became its biggest proponent. The factor that most interested the British at this time was economic: as long as the Straits were closed, Russian grain was inaccessible to Great Britain and France, where prices had begun to rise steeply as supplies dwindled. When the Russian request for help arrived, the British government was already exploring an action against the Turks and unsure how to present this intention to the Russians. The grand duke’s plea supplied them with a “peg to hang our communication on,” as Sir Edward Grey put it.34 Once the British Cabinet decided to go ahead with a Dardanelles operation, Churchill informed the Russians. On 20 January, they learned that in response to the grand duke’s request, the British government would undertake in late February not just a demonstration but a complete operation to penetrate the Dardanelles and, if possible, destroy the Turkish fleet, if and when the allied ships entered the Sea of Marmara. Churchill expressed the hope that once the outer forts of the Dardanelles were destroyed, the Russian Black Sea Fleet would cooperate against the Bosphorus, and Russian troops would be held ready “to seize any advantage that may be gained.”35 Sazonov’s response was not enthusiastic. He recollected later that the news affected him “painfully.”36 He wrote to his representative at Stavka, Prince N. A. Kudashev, on 21 January, calling attention to the operation’s risk and the negative political effect failure could have. He betrayed his true concerns by asking the grand duke to find out if Russia could play its “proper role” in capturing the Straits, if the allied operation went well; if not, then Sazonov suggested that it might be

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better to delay the operation against the Dardanelles, by pointing to the improving situation in the Caucasus.37 In truth, he was concerned not about the military situation in the Caucasus but Russia’s participation in seizing the Straits and preventing the allies from carrying it out themselves. Even though he had been informed by a number of sources that Russia would be unable to send troops for a landing in Turkey and that the new dreadnought in the Black Sea would not be ready for several months, he now began to press the military chiefs and the tsar for some sort of simultaneous Russian action, so the British and French would not succeed at the Straits alone. We have seen above that on a few occasions, Sazonov sought to ensure that some Russian troops would be in the Straits region and Constantinople, if a regime change there was imminent. Now that chance seemed greater than ever, and he was even more anxious for Russia to be involved. His near-panic over the possibility of an Anglo-French success at the Straits without Russian assistance indicates the extent of his mistrust for his allies. He evidently had little confidence that they would meet Russian desires, if no Russian troops were on the ground to add weight to his diplomatic pressure. Nikolai Nikolaevich did not agree with Sazonov about the need to prepare a detachment for the Bosphorus and resisted any distraction from the ongoing fighting. He repeated to the foreign and prime ministers that Russia could take military action against the Straits only after the main battle against Germany was won. After May, the Black Sea Fleet could provide some assistance but not before. He had little confidence in allied chances of success, but whether or not they got to Constantinople, he felt their attempt would help to draw Turkish forces away from the Caucasian front and thus aid the war effort. For this reason, he disagreed with any effort to dissuade the British from their intentions, regardless of the participation of Russian forces.38 Sazonov continued to fear both allied success and failure. Hearing from Buchanan on 12 February that the operation would begin within a week, he worried that defeat would reflect very badly upon the Triple Entente and affect the position of the neutral states. Buchanan took away the impression that Russian desires were still limited to control of both sides of the Bosphorus and leaving Constantinople as a neutral city,39 yet two days later, Sazonov informed his ambassadors at London and Paris that he had told Buchanan that all indications he had received about public opinion made clear that he would have to demand a broader settlement of the Straits Question.40 Across the empire, the upper and middle classes buzzed with discussions of taking the Straits. Both ambassadors remarked on how

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public opinion had taken up this cause, and other war aims were shrinking into the background. Speaking before the Duma on 9 February, Goremykin and Sazonov both made general statements about expected changes at the Straits to Russia’s benefit. Sazonov told the deputies that “[t]hese events have not only crowned our arms with fresh laurels, but will bring nearer the moment for the settlement of the economic and political problems connected with the access of Russia to the open ocean.”41 The reaction was enthusiastic—shouts of bravo! were heard—and strengthened Sazonov’s sense of the Russian people’s emotional attachment to acquisition of the Straits. The previous year, he used the public storm during the Balkan Wars to try to extract more cooperation from the other powers, while setting little store by it himself. Now, he was beginning to treat domestic forces with more regard. Six months into the world war, its scale had changed the way that he viewed several issues.42 One indication was his treatment of Nolde’s suggestion that Russia be modest in its demands. Sazonov believed that the time for moderation had passed—the seizure of the Straits had to come now or never. He also thought changes in the relationship of the Duma and the government were necessary. By late winter 1915, he was calling for a Council of Ministers responsible not to the tsar but to the State Duma, and clearer demonstrations of a new respect for the Duma would emerge over the following summer, under the pressure of fresh battlefield losses and disorganization at home. Thus, his comments to Buchanan about the weight of public opinion carried more truth than they had in previous years. Soon after British warships began bombarding the Dardanelles, Sazonov sought further advice from the military on the shape that Russia’s demands should take. Having met with resistance at Stavka, he turned to General-Adjutant A. N. Kuropatkin, commander of the Russian forces during the Russo-Japanese War, who did not yet have a command in this war.43 On 21 February, the general held a private meeting at the Foreign Ministry with Sazonov and a number of his closest associates to discuss the ideal aspirations for Russia in the Straits region. Kuropatkin described a plan similar to, but more extensive than, Bazili’s of the autumn. It foresaw Russia taking both shores of the waterway, from the Enos-Midia line in the west all the way to a series of rivers and landlines in Asia Minor set back at least two hundred kilometers from the Straits and the Sea of Marmara. Disagreement continued over the fate of Constantinople. Kuropatkin felt that it could be left outside Russia as a free city, including a free port for transit goods, while M. N. Giers, the former ambassador at Constantinople,

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objected, suggesting that neutralizing the city would make it impossible to ensure that it was administered according to Russian interests. The timing of operations was not discussed.44 With commencement of the allied attack on the Dardanelles and the tsar’s decision that the relevant departments should coordinate their preparations for Russian action at the Straits, two important interdepartmental meetings were held on 22 February. At Stavka, a meeting of army, navy, and Foreign Ministry representatives produced another relatively pessimistic report. They foresaw only the participation of the Russian fleet off the Bosphorus coast since no military forces were available for deployment to the area. This raised the spectre, they felt, of the fleets of all three allies standing off Constantinople with no one able to seize it. The Triple Entente would then be forced to conclude peace with the Ottoman Empire without ousting the Turks from the city. This outcome would greatly complicate resolution of the Straits Question in Russia’s favor, so in their view, the government should prepare public opinion for disappointment.45 In Petrograd that same day, however, the prime, foreign, navy, and army ministers met, accompanied by relevant subordinates. One line of discussion concerned the timing of a Russian seizure of the Straits in the event that the allies did not. Goremykin, generally following the rescript he had received on 14 February from Nikolai Nikolaevich, insisted that any operation at the Straits must wait until conclusion of peace with Germany. Sazonov, apparently under the influence of Nemitz’s memorandum, argued that the best time would be just after Germany was clearly defeated but before peace had been signed. Russia would then retain greater freedom to act on its interests, in case its allies proved less than cooperative. Once an armistice had been signed and military operations ceased, Russia might find it more difficult to obtain French and British agreement to continued hostilities around the Black Sea.46 Here again, Sazonov was pessimistic about the allies’ reliability, once their main enemy was vanquished. The main problem discussed was the extent of the demands that Russia should put forward in the Straits region. The naval representatives suggested a plan much like that in Nemitz’s November 1914 memorandum: possession of the Straits and a relatively narrow zone on either side for their defense. The army’s representatives, however, called for a much wider territorial strip, including the EnosMidia line in the west, echoing Kuropatkin’s design of the previous day. Sazonov supported the latter position, and the naval officers quickly fell into line. While the resulting map was not exactly the demand that

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Sazonov would advance to the French and British ambassadors, many of the details were now in place.47 He tried to resist the army representatives’ demand that Constantinople be included in the Russian desiderata, pointing to the multitude of international interests concentrated there, but these opinions, put so strongly in conjunction with other pressures on Sazonov, were forcing him to renounce his preference for neutralizing Constantinople.48 On 24 February, Kudashev sent the surprising news that Danilov had decided that one of the Caucasian corps could be sent to the Bosphorus, if operations there had some success. While it would not be strong enough to take and to hold Constantinople, it would, Kudashev suggested, have an effect on both the Turks and the allies, raising Russia’s influence in the course of events and negotiations. He still did not think that Russia could control the Straits at that time.49 Sazonov would have none of this pessimism. Stavka’s confusion over the dispatch of troops only emboldened him to push harder for troops to be prepared and sent, especially as the expectation of allied success at the Dardanelles increased. On 26 February, he informed Izvolskii and Benckendorff that Russia’s goal at the Straits remained exclusively the guarantee of Russia’s exit to the open sea whether during peace- or wartime. The recent examples of Germany’s flouting of treaties requiring it to respect neutrality, and also measures taken by Turkey in recent years at the Straits with massive injury to our trade, serve as evidence that only our solid establishment on the Straits can guarantee that we will be able to deflect any attempt to lock us into the Black Sea.50 While Russia wanted only a minimum of new land, it would demand the whole of Thracian Turkey to the Enos-Midia line and, in Asia Minor, the whole eastern shore save the Asian shore of the Dardanelles, much as Bazili had proposed in the fall. A few days later, Sazonov added that Russia must also have the islands within the Sea of Marmara as well as Imbros and Tenedos just outside the Dardanelles.51 Constantinople was not specifically mentioned but was clearly meant to be included in Russia’s gains. To achieve these ends, Sazonov again pressed the military to release some troops for operations at the Straits, if the opportunity arose. On 28 February, he asked Stavka whether the brigade earmarked

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for dispatch to Serbia could not be held back for the Straits. He insisted that “it is necessary for our troops to participate in the entry of allied forces into Constantinople.”52 Fearing a negative response from Nikolai Nikolaevich, he also hurriedly wrote to the tsar, petitioning him on 1 March about the need to have Russian troops in the advance on western Turkey. Noting that the allied forces might break through the Dardanelles earlier than expected, he rushed his request to the tsar before his already scheduled report the next day. He argued that the troops for Serbia would be much more useful in the apparently imminent siege of Constantinople, citing the allied ambassadors’ requests for the participation of Russian troops to bolster his case. If Nicholas II agreed, Sazonov requested that he inform Nikolai Nikolaevich directly of his will.53 Sazonov need not have sent this plea to the tsar. In response to Sazonov’s 28 February telegram, Nikolai Nikolaevich decided to prepare forces from the Caucasus, rather than those earmarked for Serbia, for action at the Straits. Their transport would also be prepared.54 When Sazonov met with Nicholas II on 2 March, however, the tsar agreed with the arguments against sending troops to Serbia. He resolved instead that the detachment designated for the Straits operation should be strengthened.55 In the tug-of-war with military authorities, Sazonov had succeeded.56 As allied success appeared to loom before significant Russian forces could be assembled and transported, Sazonov also felt the need to stake out new diplomatic ground with his allies, making Russia’s demands clear before things were settled on the ground. On 1 March, Buchanan reported that Sazonov had told him and Paléologue that since November, “Russian public opinion had been moving fast, and would be now satisfied with no settlement which did not give Constantinople to Russia. He had been always . . . in favour of neutralising Constantinople, but this idea did not commend itself to Russian public, and he would be obliged to yield to their demand for its actual possession.”57 Sazonov reminded them of the pledges made by King George V and Sir Edward Grey in the fall and said, “the time had come to be more explicit.”58 He wanted the British and French governments to prepare their public opinion for Russian acquisition of these territories by declaring that each of the allies was equally contributing to the larger goal of bringing the war to a successful conclusion and thus each should see its vital interests met.59 In this way, he could forestall complaints in these states that Russia did not deserve these prizes, since it had not directly assisted in their liberation.

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Nicholas II, having now spoken at length with his ministers, especially Sazonov, supported Sazonov’s efforts by discussing the problem in more detail with Paléologue on 3 March at Stavka. The tsar said that while his opinions had not changed since their discussion in November, circumstances required greater clarity. “The question of the Straits inflames, to the highest degree, Russian opinion. This is a current which becomes stronger every day. I do not acknowledge the right to impose on my people the terrible sacrifices of this war without granting them as a reward the realization of their secular dream. . . . The city of Constantinople and southern Thrace must be incorporated into the empire.”60 Paléologue noted France’s extensive interests in that region, but the tsar assured him that they would be protected. He said that given the complexity of the interests in Constantinople, it would have a special regime, indicating his adoption of Bazili and Nemitz’s views. He misunderstood his allies’ attitudes as badly as his ministers did. Referring to the British pledges of November, he said that he expected to have difficulties in working out the details with London and expressed his hope that France would help ease their resolution. As a reward for their cooperation, he expressed his willingness to give France a free hand in rectifying its German frontier.61 Russia Demands the Straits Just as Paris and London were trying to absorb this news, on 4 March, Sazonov laid out in oral and written form Russia’s demands, which were even more extensive than those that Nicholas had outlined the day before. That morning, Sazonov met with Nicholas to work out Russia’s final expectations. In the afternoon, he informed Buchanan and Paléologue of the Russian government’s new position. The three men then jointly composed an aide-memoire that the ambassadors sent to their governments, and Sazonov sent to Izvolskii, Benckendorff, and the tsar, who quickly approved it.62 On the European side of the Straits, Russia claimed the entire shore, including the Bosphorus, Dardanelles, coast of the Sea of Marmara, and Constantinople, while on the Asian side, it demanded the other shore of the Bosphorus, bounded by a line running along the Sakaria river and ending with the gulf of Ismid. It was to obtain all of Thrace to the Enos-Midia line as well as the islands in the Sea of Marmara and Imbros and Tenedos just outside of the Dardanelles in the Aegean Sea. It promised to protect Britain and France’s special interests in those regions and to cooperate with their desires in the rest of the Ottoman Empire.63 While the aide-memoire was silent on the subject, Sazonov meant for the allied governments to

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understand that Russia expected full territorial rights, including the ability to construct fortifications where it desired. The reaction was too ambiguous for Sazonov’s comfort. From Izvolskii by telegraph and Paléologue directly, the Foreign Ministry was learning that the French government expected the waterway to be demilitarized and policed by an international force, and French Foreign Minister Delcassé believed that this question had to be resolved before Russia could be promised ownership of Constantinople. He also cautioned that Russia’s installation along the Asian side of the Straits would depend upon the partition of the rest of Turkey. Sazonov again cited recent events and sacrifices that prohibited Russia from demanding any less. Paléologue continued to argue over the consequent reliability of free commercial navigation through the Straits and against fortifications along the shores, regardless of Sazonov’s stated intention to provide the most solid guarantees. Sazonov cut him off and told him and Buchanan, who was also present, most gravely, that if France and Great Britain did not accept these demands, he would immediately tender his resignation to the tsar, so Nicholas II could choose someone with the authority to obtain such promises. The implied threat was that, unlike Sazonov, another minister might be less committed to a unified war effort and more receptive to a separate-peace proposal by the Central Powers.64 The British also appeared less than enthusiastic about Russia’s proposals, preferring to put off their final resolution until Germany was defeated. They cushioned this attitude with a 6 March statement that Grey had not made any objection to Sazonov’s suggestions. They emphasized their own sacrifice in undertaking the Dardanelles expedition, even though the question was expected to be resolved according to Russia’s desires, and used this communication to ask again for Russian support in the action against Turkey.65 While Benckendorff indicated that Grey preferred the neutralization of the area, he gave Sazonov a reason for confidence in the ultimate success of his demands: Great Britain and France themselves were at loggerheads over partitioning the rest of the Ottoman Empire, and Grey preferred to put off questions about it for the time being.66 Although Sazonov insisted that the question be resolved quickly, the French government continued to temporize.67 On 8 March, Paléologue informed the Russian government that it could count on French support but noted that this and other questions concerning the allies’ interests in the Ottoman Empire would be worked out in the final peace treaty after the war.68 Similarly the French foreign minister

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insisted that the question should not be a special arrangement but part of the overall resolution of questions resulting from the war, which implied delaying resolution for some time, since the French were not yet prepared for a general discussion of peace terms.69 However, Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador to France, reported to Grey that on 10 March, he found Delcassé much less opposed than a few days before. He now seemed to accept that Russia would acquire not only the lands it had demanded in November but Constantinople as well, nor did he as strongly resist Russian fortification of these areas. The British ambassador was convinced that Izvolskii had threatened him, though no independent confirmation of that exists. Delcassé did express serious concern that British and French obstruction might “dispose [Russia] to come to terms with Germany which [the] German Emperor by every kind of offer was endeavouring to do.”70 Moreover, Izvolskii told Sazonov on 10 March that he thought that Delcassé had finally accepted Russia’s complete control of the Straits and Constantinople.71 The British were prepared to move farther and faster. Grey informed Benckendorff on 10 March that the British Cabinet was actively considering the Russian demands and ought to have a definitive attitude within a week, noting that both he and the cabinet understood that Russia’s need for security at the Straits would not be satisfied by the possession of only one side. He explained the delay by the fact that whereas Russia had presented its allies with a completely developed set of demands, British desires in the Ottoman Empire had not been fully decided. He indicated that discussions were taking place.72 Indeed, that very day, the War Council met, with the opposition leadership in attendance, to decide the British reply. It was resolved to accept the Russian demands in full, leaving only a general proviso that Great Britain and France would expect Russian assent to their desires in the Ottoman Empire when they had worked them out.73 Grey immediately telegraphed Buchanan of this decision and, on 11 March, cabled him instructions for communicating this agreement to the Russian government by aide-memoire.74 On 12 March, His Majesty’s Government delivered its historic pledge to allow Russia to acquire all that it sought, as defined by Sazonov’s memorandum of 4 March. While postponing its own complete list of desires in Turkey, London made clear that it expected unhindered commercial transit of the Straits and a free port established in Constantinople for goods in transit beyond the Russian Empire. It also informed the Russians that it would request the inclusion of the neutral zone in Persia, separating its zone of influence from Russia’s as

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set up by their entente of 1907, into the British zone.75 Since Sazonov had previously indicated his willingness to go along with Great Britain’s economic demands, he raised no objections to them nor to its as-yet undefined pretensions within the Ottoman Empire. As to the Persian neutral zone, he withheld complete agreement until certain issues were clarified, including a freer hand for Russia within its own zone and certain border rectifications between the Russian and neutral zones before the latter was handed over to the British. In a meeting with Buchanan and Sazonov later on 12 March, Nicholas II also expressed his assent and gratitude for the British terms. When the subject of Persia arose, he avoided discussing the details. Sazonov reminded Buchanan that they would have to be worked out between them.76 Meanwhile, the French appeared to be trying to avoid an analogous statement about the fate of Constantinople and the Straits for as long as possible. Delcassé employed a variety of strategies to delay delivery, surprising the Russians, who had expected their long-time ally to be more cooperative. Instead, Delcassé stalled, proposing that all three allied foreign ministers meet in Paris to discuss the whole issue of partitioning the Ottoman Empire. The idea had arisen in his discussions with Izvolskii in January 1915. Given the magnitude of the problems and the comparative success of similar meetings by the allied finance ministers, Izvolskii urged Sazonov to come to Paris to work out these details with his counterparts and thus avoid any friction that might develop as a result of misunderstandings.77 He raised the idea again at the beginning of March, as discussions about the Straits and Constantinople became more intense. He and Benckendorff made clear to Sazonov that they, Delcassé, and Grey all believed that negotiations would be eased if Sazonov traveled to Paris.78 Once Sazonov delivered his definitive memorandum of 4 March, Izvolskii felt that he had insufficient command of the Russian government’s views and again insisted that Sazonov come to Paris to carry on the talks.79 That same day, Delcassé expressed to Izvolskii “a most vivid desire to discuss personally” these questions with Sazonov, claiming that the parliamentary session prohibited him from traveling to Petrograd.80 Sazonov refused to make the journey. On 5 March, he told Buchanan that he could not leave Petrograd for so long because, as he had told Nicholas II, “he was afraid of the Military Authorities using their influence to get things done in his absence of which he might disapprove.”81 As the requests continued, he repeated, on 8 March, his refusal to leave the Russian capital until later in the war.82 Given Delcassé’s fears that pro-German voices in the Russian government

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might overcome Sazonov and others’ strong support for the allies, the French minister should have understood that Sazonov must remain at his post, especially at a time when the Russian military situation appeared rather precarious. In expressing his disappointment, Delcassé insisted that the talks would have been most useful since “two hours of talks with [the Russian] Minister of Foreign Affairs would be enough to achieve agreement on any question, the resolution of which will demand weeks of negotiations by telegraph.”83 Sazonov would not budge and forced his colleagues to continue to use their representatives to carry on the discussions. For several days at the start of March, Delcassé may have taken advantage of Izvolskii’s enthusiasm for the idea to delay clear action while waiting for Sazonov’s arrival. More significantly, Delcassé fastened on the modus operandi of Constantinople’s occupation before approving Russian possession. The question of the city’s wartime regime was important in and of itself because of the extensive French interests in it and the Turkish Empire. Delcassé appeared to want to settle it to suit these interests before he approved eventual Russian acquisition of the area. He first mentioned the problem to Izvolskii on 1 March in the context of the growing expectation that allied forces would be able to force the Dardanelles and position their warships off the city’s shores.84 Away from Russian eyes, on 8 March, he wrote to Paléologue and Paul Cambon, the French ambassador at London, that, leaving aside the definitive resolution of the Straits and Constantinople Questions, his immediate concern was to work for “the re-establishment as rapidly as possible of all the French interests [in Turkey] to the condition in which they were found” in April 1914.85 To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for as long as possible and concomitantly to protect French interests, he would propose establishment of a council of three high commissioners, one from each ally, to exercise the real authority over the city, with military forces serving simply to protect it and to preserve internal order. Its rule would be direct, if the Turkish regime abandoned the capital, or more covert, if the Ottoman rulers chose to remain. He also foresaw the re-establishment of consular authority, restoring extraterritoriality to foreigners within Turkey. He asked that the ambassadors inform the British and Russian governments of these proposals and to obtain their approval.86 He sent a memorandum to the same effect on 11 March for transmission to the governments in London and Petrograd.87 Sazonov accepted these ideas in principle on 12 March, the same day that he received London’s clear commitment to the aide-memoire he delivered on 4 March.88

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However, on 13 March, Sazonov made clear that he was not prepared to accept the French proposal in toto, and an extended negotiation began, especially between Paris and Petrograd, over the exact nature of the occupying administration in Constantinople. While from this historical distance, given the eventual failure of the Dardanelles expedition, the debate seems unrealistic and frivolous, its energy testifies both to the allies’ optimism for the operation’s success in early spring 1915 and to the vital interests that the French and Russians felt they possessed in the region. Petrograd thought that Paris was trying to establish a system that would preserve as much of the old regime as possible and impede Russia’s complete take-over of Constantinople at war’s end. Sazonov sought to construct transitional stages that could not be halted by the allies once peace came.89 The debates would run for several more months, well after the first difficulties were apparent in the allied operation. As this issue developed, the French introduced yet another prerequisite into their acquiescence to the Russian annexations. On 16 March 1915, Paléologue separately told Nicholas II and Sazonov that France would agree to Russia’s acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits as long as Petrograd agreed to the French absorption of Cilicia and Syria. The sticking point here was Palestine. On Nicholas’s request, Paléologue used a map to show that his definition of Syria included the Holy Places. On those, the tsar deferred a decision until he could speak with Sazonov. Paléologue later met with Sazonov, who also agreed to everything save granting Palestine to France. They argued emotionally over what arrangement would best protect the sacred sites and the interests of the different Christian sects, Sazonov strongly opposing the replacement of the neutral Ottoman administration by French Catholic oversight. He proposed internationalizing the region, but Paléologue balked, citing Russia’s reluctance to do the same for Constantinople. While Sazonov tried to show how the two situations differed, Paléologue stubbornly disagreed. Sazonov then reminded him that the Crimean War, which had pitted France against Russia, indicated the problems that could result from quarrels over the Holy Places, which he believed likely, if France took them over.90 The ambassador denied the link and instead referred to Russia’s pledge, given at the end of Sazonov’s aide-memoire of 4 March, to allow France the freedom to do as it wished elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Now Sazonov demurred, claiming he would have to consult with the tsar. While Paléologue met with Nikolai Nikolaevich over other issues, Nicholas II and Sazonov met to discuss his claims. Nicholas cautioned Sazonov to

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move very carefully.91 His strong Orthodoxy made him very uncomfortable with the ambassador’s proposals. Sazonov turned to the British for help. After his discussions with Paléologue, he spoke privately with Buchanan, insisting that the “question [of the Holy Land] must be treated as an international one” and that “he would be very grateful if he could count on [Buchanan’s] support.” He drew out the point that Paris’s claim had made “a very bad impression”, especially when compared with the rapidity and clarity of the British pledge on the Straits and Constantinople.92 Grey sought to delay discussing the partition of the rest of the Ottoman Empire, since the British government was still unsure of what it wished to do with the pieces of the Ottoman Empire that might fall its way, especially Mesopotamia. It was interested in the port of Alexandretta, but the French had put forward strong claims for this area.93 In an attempt to delay definitive statements on the partition until London decided what best served its interests, Grey suggested that the primary consideration at this early stage was how to replace the Constantinople khalifate with a new center for Islam elsewhere, perhaps in an independent Arab state. “Till this point has been decided it seems to us premature to discuss the possible division of Syria, Mesopotamia, or neighbouring regions amongst other Powers,” he wrote.94 This consideration not only parried French attempts to grab as much Ottoman territory as they could but also took account of British concerns for the contentment of their Muslim subjects. Sazonov quickly accepted this approach, agreeing with the need to establish a new khalifate outside of Turkey and asking once more for Grey to support him against the French on Palestine.95 Definitive resolution of the problem was put off until the Anglo-French-Russian negotiations of late 1915 into 1916 led by Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, which worked out a division of the Middle East among the three allies.96 Delcassé had one final excuse for delaying French agreement to the Russian demands: forgetfulness. While he told Izvolskii on 20 March that a written communication of French agreement would have to wait until discussions had been completed in the Council of Ministers, Sazonov was impatient. He pressed them on 23 March, directing Izvolskii to bring the discrepancies between the British and French statements to Delcassé’s attention again and to seek a more categorical reply.97 On 24 March, Izvolskii replied that Delcassé was willing to instruct Paléologue to provide a written statement equivalent to Great Britain’s.98 Hearing nothing more from Petrograd on the subject, Izvolskii followed up with a telegram on 1 April, inquiring whether

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Paléologue had handed over the expected statement. If not, he suggested that Sazonov forward a copy of the 12 March British aidememoire to the French to show how their statements lacked the British clarity.99 Sazonov replied on 3 April that Paléologue had still not received the desired instructions and provided a text that the French could use.100 A sublime moment in French diplomacy arrived on 5 April, when Izvolskii brought the matter to Delcassé’s attention again. On hearing that Paléologue had still not made his expected communication, Delcassé, in a manner perhaps reminiscent of Edvard Munch’s The Scream, “clasped his head, and, explaining it as exclusively his own personal forgetfulness, once again promised immediately to send Paléologue the necessary instructions.”101 Only on 10 April did Paléologue deliver the long-awaited pledge of French agreement to the Russian statement of 4 March in language satisfactory to the Russian authorities.102 At last, Sazonov had achieved his and Russia’s dream: if the Entente Powers won this war against the Central Powers, Russia had their agreement to take possession of the Turkish Straits and of Constantinople. Keeping Greece Away from the Straits Sazonov’s now-familiar reluctance to allow a local state⎯in this case, hitherto neutral Greece⎯to participate in operations near the Straits complicated both the diplomatic environment and the Dardanelles campaign. Even though a more conciliatory attitude might have given the allies the margin of forces necessary for success at Gallipoli or to raise the pressure against Austria-Hungary, Sazonov refused to agree to any measure that threatened to cede another power influence over either Constantinople or a part of the Straits. This behavior was consistent with his policies toward secondary powers before the First World War but inconsistent with the greater good of the war effort and ironic, given his repeated assertion that Russia would not divert forces from its effort against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Greek pretensions toward Constantinople and the Straits were foremost among Russia’s worries. Like the Russians, the Greeks had an emotional attachment to Constantinople not only because, as Byzantium, it was the ancient seat of the Greek empire but also because it contained one of the cathedrals most revered by Orthodox Christians, the St. Sophia, a mosque since its capture by the Turks in 1453. The Russians were suspicious of any Greek military or naval activity that might provide them an opportunity to seize territory to which Russia staked religious claims but, more important, that would threaten

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Russia’s sole control of the Straits. London, however, was quite keen on Greek participation in the Dardanelles operation, since the Greeks could provide significant numbers of troops and useful additions to the allied fleet.103 Thus, on 12 January 1915, Grey inquired how the Russian government would regard Greek cooperation in acting against the Ottoman Empire.104 For the next few weeks, Sazonov indicated that Russia could allow the participation of Greek forces at the Dardanelles, but they could not remain there permanently. He said that Grey’s suggestion that compensation would be found for Greece along the coast of Asia Minor around Smyrna was for Great Britain and France to decide, but the Straits and Constantinople were off-limits.105 Once the allied fleet began operations off of the Dardanelles, the Russians decided to demand more extensive and concrete concessions and to refuse Greece any participation in the attack, which in late February and early March seemed very likely to succeed. Regardless of a Greek assurance in January recognizing Russia’s predominant interest in the region, by late February, A. P. Demidov, the Russian ambassador at Athens, was reporting that the Greeks were captivated by the allied attempt to break through the Dardanelles and saw participation as a means to fulfill their own historic aspirations.106 This last point was exactly what worried Sazonov, and he replied to Demidov that “under no circumstances can we allow Greek forces to participate in the attack of allied forces upon Constantinople.” His attitude had sharpened in parallel with the escalation of Russian demands and frustrated his allies. Grey insisted to Benckendorff on 4 March that Greek forces could play an important role in naval operations against Turkey and reminded the ambassador of the great effect a victory at the Dardanelles could have on the rest of the neutral states.107 Delcassé, claiming ignorance of British opinion, stressed on 4 March that Greece could contribute to the overall war effort and should not be discouraged.108 On 6 March, better informed, he agreed that Greek help in the Dardanelles campaign would be useful and should not be refused. He reassured Sazonov that after the war, only France, Great Britain, and Russia would make the most important decisions, like that over the fate of Constantinople and the Straits.109 Prince Trubetskoi indicated that he had fewer fears about Greek participation but noted that Athens must commit to a written agreement, forgoing any claim to territory along the Straits or the Sea of Marmara.110 Sazonov moderated his position a bit, defining grounds upon which he could allow Greek forces to cooperate with the allies. In concert with Buchanan, on 6 March, he listed Russia’s conditions. First, the Greek

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government must volunteer its forces for allied use, without being invited to do so. Second, it must be made to understand that regardless of the result, it would not receive territory either in southern Thrace or near the Straits. Third, its activity would be limited to those places specified by the commander of allied forces. Fourth, its army would under no circumstances enter Constantinople. Sazonov expressed the hope that any Greek activity would be limited to the area around Smyrna but stressed that he did not wish to deprive the allied forces of help that His Majesty’s Government considered useful.111 The issue became even more complicated on 6 March, when the Greek government fell. E. Venizelos, its prime and foreign minister, earnestly wished to enter the war on the side of the Triple Entente before the allies succeeded in forcing the Dardanelles without Greek help, but he faced resistance from both neutralist groups and a proGerman party that included Kaiser Wilhelm II’s sister, Queen Sophie, wife of King Constantine.112 On 6 March, he gave the king an ultimatum to accept Greek entrance into the war or else he and his cabinet would retire. This threat had weight because Venizelos was popular, and his supporters held a majority in the legislature. Nonetheless, the king refused, and the Venizelos government resigned, succeeded by a more neutralist cabinet.113 The British government continued to insist that a Greek contribution could help to insure the success of the attack on Turkey, and Sazonov agreed, with his earlier reservations.114 In the middle of April, however, the Greek government raised demands that were not at all acceptable to the Russians or, by extension, the British and French, including the internationalization of Constantinople and permission for their crown prince or even the monarch to enter the city at the head of his troops.115 These demands were unacceptable to the allies, most of all the Russians, who saw within it “Greek megalomania.”116 In any case, they were refused, and Athens stayed on the sidelines until 1917. Russian fears of Greek pretensions to areas they themselves claimed, therefore, helped to prevent the allies from gaining cooperation in the Dardanelles when it was most enthusiastically offered, during Venizelos’s time at the head of government. While it is impossible to know if Greek assistance would have provided the crucial margin to enable the allies to seize the Straits and Constantinople, the Russian refusal made success even less likely. Here, then, was a case when Sazonov was making decisions based upon not what he thought best for the overall allied war effort but what he believed would best protect Russia’s position at the Straits. He may have acted in

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conformity with Russian tradition in not wishing to see anyone control the Straits besides Turkey or itself, but by barring Greek participation in the assault, he also decreased the chances of complications among the allies in case they actually captured by the area. Separate Peaces Rejected Sazonov also put Russian interests before those of the wider alliance with regard to the possibility of a separate peace with Turkey.117 On the one hand, bringing Turkey out of the war could have reopened the Straits, which would have had economic, strategic, and morale advantages for the Triple Entente and served as a propaganda victory that might have won the cooperation of at least some of the neutral states. On the other hand, agreeing to some form of cessation of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire before the Straits were in the Entente’s physical possession carried significant risks that Russia might not secure its ultimate goals in the area. While recognizing the advantages, the risk was one that Sazonov was loath to take. As early as mid-January 1915, he began to receive indications that elements in Turkey were considering a separate peace with the Entente. A Russian representative in Constantinople was warned that if Russia did not cooperate, they would turn to the British and French. Sazonov immediately opposed such conversations. “In view of the fact that between us and the Turks stands the question of the Straits, which contain vital meaning for Russia, and that any negotiations could hamper (zatormozit’) its resolution,” he ordered his representative to refrain from any talks and made it clear to his allies that he expected them to do likewise, although the British secretly pursued their own contacts with the Turks.118 As the date set for the Dardanelles operation approached, and information about the Turkish government’s dissatisfaction with its orientation continued to reach the allies, they were forced to consider the possibility that storming the Dardanelles or the allied fleet arriving off Constantinople might cause Turkey to seek an early end to their conflict. On consultation with Delcassé, Grey suggested on 11 February that the allies ought not to reject Turkish peace feelers out of hand but also noted that he did not foresee any changes to commitments about the Straits and Constantinople he had made in November 1914.119 Sazonov informed Buchanan that he agreed generally not to discourage these talks but was opposed to giving the Turks any guarantees. While Buchanan stressed the economic and strategic benefit that the allies would derive from a Turkish surrender, Sazonov pointed to the difficulty of satisfying the Turks without

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compromising Russia’s war aims, which, he implied, would be wider than those he had indicated in November, given their public support.120 Nonetheless, he appreciated that allied success might require concrete conditions for an agreement with Turkey. On 27 February, together with Buchanan and Paléologue, he worked out conditions for presentation to Turkey, if it sued for peace, which would only be an armistice as long as Germany and Austria-Hungary continued to fight. First, all German ships must be quickly handed over to allied authorities. Second, all German officers, soldiers, and sailors in Turkish service must be given to the allies. Third, all batteries located along the shores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles must be destroyed. Fourth, mines located in both the Straits and the Sea of Marmara must be removed. Fifth, the Turkish government must agree to allow allied warships to anchor off Constantinople. Finally, all fortified points that allied commanders considered critical for their security must be turned over to them.121 The British and French governments, however, did not immediately embrace these proposals, nor did the Russian High Command. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, citing the right of the supreme commander to conclude armistices, informed Sazonov and Nicholas II on 2 March 1915 that an armistice with Turkey would only be worthwhile if it allowed Russia to move a significant force from the Caucasus to a different theater of war. An armistice—simply an agreement to halt fighting along a front or fronts—could not sufficiently guarantee the security of the Caucasus, even if the Turks turned over or demilitarized the areas that the grand duke specified in his letter. In his view, only concluding peace—the formal signing of a peace treaty ending war between or among states along specified conditions—would enable Russia to transfer the needed troops elsewhere.122 Sazonov resisted the military point of view by downplaying the whole exercise. He replied to Nikolai Nikolaevich by first referring to the reluctance of Russia’s allies to conclude a separate peace, which would not be durable until Turkey’s allies, Austria-Hungary and Germany, were defeated as well. In this way, he suggested that the political side of the problem should take precedence over its strategic ramifications. In any case, he believed that there was no serious chance of an armistice. He noted that the conditions that Turkey would have to meet were so difficult, that “the Turks would not voluntarily agree to them.” Thus, the proposal for an armistice that he had pushed through had never been intended to achieve its stated goal. Downplaying the Turks’ willingness to seek an armistice, he reassured Stavka that if a

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more serious chance arose, he would consult with the supreme commander on desirable conditions.123 As the Dardanelles operation stagnated, the armistice question receded. Nonetheless, members of the Turkish government or their emissaries occasionally made contact with the Entente governments about the possibility of a separate peace. In April and May 1915, prominent Turks, including Djavid Bey, the francophile minister of finance who had resigned that post soon after Turkey’s entrance into the war, attempted to initiate negotiations with the French government.124 While Sazonov did not reject outright some arrangement with the Porte, he made clear that no change in the allied promises to Russia concerning the Straits and Constantinople would be allowed. As Russia captured more territory along Turkey’s eastern frontier, contacts with Turks in neutral states increased. They became so frequent by the spring of 1916 that Sazonov agreed to the request of the minister to Switzerland to send an expert on Turkey to Berne to make sense of the many varying proposals.125 A. N. Mandelshtam, a prewar member of the embassy in Constantinople, reported that talk of a separate peace more reflected Djavid Bey’s attempt to strong-arm the Germans into providing more money and material assistance to Turkey.126 Over the winter of 1915-1916, Sazonov took more seriously one contact that claimed to seek help for Djemal Pasha, another leading Turk, to overthrow the current government. Sazonov was intrigued by a promise that Djemal recognized that Constantinople and the Straits would have to be sacrificed, leaving the Turks to set up autonomous regions in their Asian possessions. As these included areas that France claimed, Paris stood in the way of any agreement.127 The British also appeared reluctant to embrace this approach, since it would contradict their policy of providing Arab nations with independence from the Turks.128 Asking his allies to give up their potential gains while attempting to reserve his own got Sazonov nowhere. From within Russia, moreover, Sazonov was subjected to unwelcome pressure to come to a separate peace with the Turks. On several occasions in late 1915 and early 1916, General M. A. Alekseev, chief-of-staff to the tsar as supreme commander of the Russian armies, made it clear that he preferred to make peace with the Turks in order to free capable troops to shore up Russia’s troubled defenses along its western border. Even the dream of possessing Constantinople should be sacrificed to the chance of success against the Germans. He stressed that their defeat had to be Russia’s primary war aim and referred to years of

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army studies, with which Sazonov was familiar, showing that Russia could not capture the Straits and Constantinople during a continental war. Alekseev suggested that once the war was won, Russia would be so influential that it could force an agreement on Turkey that would guarantee its interests in the region, like the treaties signed at Adrianople and Unkiar Skelessi in 1829 and 1833.129 He raised the topic on a series of occasions in the hope of finding a way to convince Sazonov. After Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in late October 1915, he judged the new military situation so serious that he urged a separate peace in order to redeploy troops from the Caucasus.130 Agreeing with the general, Sazonov’s representative to Stavka, Prince N. A. Kudashev, tried a different tack that same day. He suggested that if the allied fleet could force its way into the Sea of Marmara and stand before Constantinople, that moment would be the most propitious to oust the Turks from the war, keep their capital, and guarantee the freedom of the Straits for allied use.131 Once again, after the capture of the Turkish fortress-city of Erzerum, Alekseev saw in the victory the perfect psychological moment to force a peace on the Turks.132 Sazonov, however, refused all these suggestions, regardless of their logic. He had stated several times early in the war against Turkey that the war against Germany must come first, and all other theaters be subordinated to it. Here, however, with the prize within his grasp, he refused to follow the more rational choice and work for peace with the Turks, which would have provided Russia’s western front with a new supply of battle-tested, victorious troops. There was another side to these questions: would Russia be the one to conclude a separate peace and leave the field? In the wake of an abortive German attempt to convince Russia to make peace in late 1914, the Central Powers tried again in 1915.133 Negotiations were attempted with each of the Entente Powers in hopes that one might be convinced to leave the war. If not, then carefully leaking information might still make the Entente Powers suspicious of each other, leading to a decline in coordination or even making one of them more amenable to subsequent proposals.134 The Germans had decided to use diplomacy because they had been unable to win the war as quickly as they expected but were divided as to which opposing state was more likely to accept a separate peace. They thus sent feelers in all directions.135 To approach the Russians, they first worked through Danish contacts. A key middleman was Hans Andersen, an important merchant and privy councilor to the Danish king, Christian X.

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Andersen had entrée to the Russian and English courts, and the Germans used him to learn if the Russians could be persuaded to leave the war. These forays brought no positive response from Petrograd, nor did those by Christian X, cousin to the Russian empress. The Germans then tried other avenues. They approached Russian former Prime and Finance Minister Sergei Iu. Witte, who was known to have pro-German sympathies. He seemed a promising contact in Petrograd, as he publicly spoke out against the war, until his untimely death in March 1915.136 As the Germans sought other intermediaries close to the Russian throne, the Turks eased their way. In February 1915, the Turkish government informed the Germans that it would be willing to make concessions in Russia’s favor at the Straits in order to remove it from the war.137 The governments of the Central Powers, through unofficial emissaries, approached Maria Vasilchikova, a Russian noblewoman with connections to the Romanovs, who was caught on her estate in Austria by the outbreak of the war. On 10 March, she wrote letters to Nicholas II, his wife, and Sazonov at the request of these emissaries, inviting Russia to make peace.138 The men had stressed that their countries had no hate for Russia, only for Great Britain. Vasilchikova wrote that they emphasized Nicholas’s peace-loving nature, as exemplified by his instrumental role in organizing the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Vague but wide concessions were mentioned, and when Vasilchikova asked specifically about the Dardanelles, they replied that their passage would be made free for the Russians. Receiving no reply and a second visit from the three men, Vasilchikova wrote again on 30 March.139 Repeating her praise of Nicholas II, she now wrote that the Central Powers had secret information that Great Britain was protecting its own interests behind Russia’s back by preparing to establish itself in Constantinople, making the Dardanelles another Gibraltar, and encouraging the Japanese to take Manchuria. Berlin and Vienna would insure that Russian and not British interests guided the resolution of the Straits Question. The Russians sent no answer to these entreaties. Having previously not responded to another peace feeler that came through a private letter from an Austrian prince, Nicholas and Sazonov chose to ignore these letters as well.140 They were committed to their alliance with Great Britain and France and believed that Russia would be secure only by destroying German militarism, not by associating with it. They saw these letters as expressions of insecurity in the enemy states. This attitude guided their behavior as further informal inquiries were received. On 27 May, Vasilchikova sent yet another letter in

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which she described her conversations with the German foreign minister and her visit to Russian prisoners-of-war, whom she described as well cared for but longing for home.141 Russia would find its interests at the Dardanelles better served by partnership with Germany, she wrote, as Great Britain sought to dominate the Black Sea. She also suggested that the Germans try to open a channel of communication through Empress Alexandra’s brother, Grand Duke Ernest-Ludwig of Hesse.142 He obliged and on 30 April, sent his sister a letter in which he proposed that Nicholas dispatch an unofficial representative to Stockholm, where “Erni” had placed one of his own men to talk about resolving the differences between the two states.143 While the grand duke suggested that this idea was his own, it sounded very similar to those conveyed by Vasilchikova, not only stressing that Germany’s conflict was with Great Britain but also trying to play on Nicholas’s sympathy for captured Russian soldiers. Indeed, it was inspired by the Germans.144 Nicholas and Sazonov remained steadfast in their commitment to the allied cause. When Vasilchikova was allowed to return to Russia to personally plead the case, Nicholas II had her exiled and stripped of her titles. The Germans continued to tempt the Russians away from their allies. In July, the Russian ambassador at Stockholm, Nekliudov, was informed of conversations between a Russian acquaintance and a German banker, Monkewitz, who described the German people’s strong desire for peace with Russia.145 Germany, he said, was ready to give Russia the Straits and Constantinople and to compensate the Turks with Egypt, which would be taken from the British. Nekliudov derived the skeptical view that the Germans were worried about the ultimate course of the war. His skepticism was confirmed a week later, when he heard more of Monkewitz’s message.146 The banker indicated that Germany was ready to make the Straits joint Russo-TurkoGerman demilitarized territory but warned that if the Russians waited much longer, and the German army began to capture Russian cities, the German people would be less inclined to allow large concessions to be made to the Russian Empire. Nekliudov saw through this attempt to divide the Entente.147 The problem of Constantinople and the Straits lay in this contradictory position, when Sazonov was forced into retirement due to differences with the tsar and conservative members of court and government. Most immediately, Sazonov fell out of favor because of his attempts to force through a relatively liberal plan for the autonomy of Poland.148 Over the longer term, he had estranged himself from the

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tsar, tsarina, and the right wing by two efforts. First, he strongly opposed Nicholas’s assumption of personal command of the Russian armies in the summer of 1915. Second, he spoke seriously of the need for the tsar to appoint a Cabinet of Ministers that would have the confidence of the State Duma, a clear infringement of the tsar’s autocratic control over his government.149 The foreign minister did not stand alone in either of these cases, but his voice was among the most forthright. Little changed over the several months under subsequent foreign ministers, as the world war continued, and domestic order disintegrated. The condition in which Sazonov left Russian policy was positive but with significant dark spots. Making the assumption that Russia’s interests were best served by the Triple Entente rather than switching to the Central Powers, Sazonov had pushed the Entente into an alliance. Ironically, of the original three members of the new alliance, only Russia was unable to meet its obligations and concluded a separate peace, if under the administration of the revolutionary Bolshevik government. That radical change in regime may have been helped by Sazonov’s other great victory in the war: obtaining promises from Great Britain and France that Russia would possess the Turkish Straits and Constantinople after the defeat of Germany. Once he received that pledge, he clung to it desperately, at the expense of Russia’s overall war effort. His grab for a clear promise about the Straits and Constantinople forced his allies to set out their own desiderata. Once they had all set out their positions, their policy options were constricted, as each refused to give up minimum gains from the stillbreathing corpse of the Ottoman Empire. In this environment, a separate peace or even an armistice with the Sublime Porte was unattainable. Russia was then forced to fight on multiple fronts, since the terms of the September 1914 alliance forbade it from making any unilateral separate peace. The consequent division of its armed strength hampered its effort against the German and Austrian forces and quite likely helped to prolong the war long enough for the forces of hunger and war-weariness to give way to those of rebellion and upheaval. While this factor was hardly the only cause of the revolution, its contribution certainly exacerbated the problems that the Russian Empire was facing. Inconsistency plagued Sazonov’s wartime foreign policy, as he sometimes indicated that the main battle was with the Germans but, at other moments, showed clearly that his central goal remained possession of the Turkish Straits. He was able to gain the

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tsar’s support for this distraction over the opposition of the military authorities, who were much more serious about defeating the Germans first and leaving less vital threats or dreams for a time when Russia had the power and leisure to impose its views on its neighbors. Although no troops were removed for action against the Straits, the western front was deprived of forces and resources that were instead withheld for troops waiting in Odessa for transport to Constantinople, were the need to arise, and for the continuing fight with Turkey in the Caucasus. Sazonov’s policy on the Turkish Straits and Constantinople did not bring greater glory upon himself, his emperor, or his empire, but instead contributed, in a tangible fashion, to the Russian collapse.

CONCLUSION: A RUSSIAN TRAGEDY

W

ith the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, the Russian claim to the Turkish Straits and Constantinople faded behind the slogan “no annexations or indemnities!” For a time, at least, it ceased to seek expansion in the region. Sazonov’s belief that 1915 was “now or never” proved prophetic. Stalin cast his glance toward the Straits during the Second World War, but like his imperial predecessors, he could not realize his ambitions.1 Even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, extreme nationalist rhetoric emanating from the Russian Federation has spoken of capturing the Straits. In the last years of the tsars, however, that threat was real, tangible, and within a hair’s breadth of success. By April 1915, for the first time in Russian history, its allies had agreed that upon the victorious end of the war, it would be given the territory upon which it had fastened its hopes. If the relative balance of military strength on both sides had not prolonged the war and allowed Russia’s internal problems to boil over in revolution, it would likely have taken possession of the Straits, as foreseen in the agreements. Before it could do so, the Germans had to be defeated. During nearly the entire period under study here, the Russian government privileged the Austro-German threat over its dreams of acquiring the Straits. Until 1915, whenever the Russians were forced to choose between advancing their position at the Straits and holding back German and Austrian expansion, they always chose the latter. Once the war began, they expected to defeat the Central Powers before turning south.

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Military and naval weakness and poor preparation made outright seizure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles impossible both before and during the war. The navy had begun to push for training exercises for a landing operation against the Turkish Black Sea coast, perhaps at the Bosphorus, but its conversion to action came too late. The army’s contribution was slow, and Finance Minister Kokovtsov threw up financial obstacles, all of which prevented the maneuvers being held before World War I. The Russians did carry out a successful landing in the Caucasus theater during the war, but their naval authorities believed that as long as they faced the threat of German-operated submarines in the Black Sea, the lines of communication to the Bosphorus were too long to carry out an operation there. Since the armed forces could not project power into the region, Russian interests at the Straits had to be advanced and protected mainly by diplomacy. Whenever Sazonov had to parry diplomatic or military aggression by members of the Triple Alliance, he kept an eye on Russia’s position in the Straits region. For example, in the ItaloTurkish War, his policy favored the Italian side for two reasons. One was to maintain its benevolence, expressed at Racconigi, toward an eventual regime change at the Straits in Russia’s favor. The second was to increase the chances of Italy’s defection from the Triple Alliance in case of continental war. During the Balkan Wars, Sazonov worked hard to protect the Balkan allies’ victories over the Turks and to shield them from Austrian pressure. Here, again, he wanted the Balkan capitals to see Russia as the better patron, while simultaneously refusing to allow Bulgarian successes to threaten Russia’s interests in the Straits. Similarly, as the Turkish navy’s expansion became ominous, the Russian government, with heavy pressure from Pevcheskii Most, shifted resources and energy to increasing the size of its own fleet and attempting to deny the Turks the ships that they expected. When the First World War began and Turkey remained neutral, Sazonov kept his policy focused on the German threat. From August until the end of October 1914, he strove vigorously to convince the Porte to stay on the sidelines. At the risk of putting possession of the Straits out of reach for the foreseeable future, he sought to protect Russia’s fighting position against the Central Powers. During the war, he rejected all German angling for a separate peace, including offers of the Straits and Constantinople as Petrograd’s reward for betraying its allies. The defeat of Germany could not be sacrificed so perfidiously. After Turkey entered the war, however, Sazonov’s policies began to show a fatal inconsistency that seriously complicated Russian diplomacy

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and compromised the war effort. No longer did he put Germany’s defeat first. Instead of agreeing with the course of action that the military leadership thought best, he refused to consider making a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire on any terms to which it would have agreed. As a result, Russian forces remained divided rather than concentrated to the west. Had the battle-hardened and victorious troops from the Caucasus been deployed against the Central Powers, they might have raised morale and forced Berlin to shift more forces to the east, improving the strategic picture on the French and Italian fronts. By refusing to make peace with the Turks, Sazonov ensured that the Triple Entente’s supply position would remain difficult, and Russia relatively isolated. We can see an underlying consistency even in this decision. The foreign minister was simply holding true to policy memoranda that had emanated from his department for years, repeatedly insisting that the Straits Question could only be resolved within the context of a great pan-European war. Sazonov saw this war as the moment to finally secure Russian interests through possession of the Turkish Straits. He refused to accept the position of others in government that even without possession, after beating the Central Powers, Russia’s undeniable strength would give it control of affairs in the Near East, including the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. By the latter view, once Germany and Austria-Hungary were defeated, Petrograd would be able to exact any arrangement at the Straits from the Turks. We can only conjecture which of these positions might have been correct. In the latter scenario, Russia probably still would have faced opposition. While the British were resigned to changes in Russia’s favor, the French were not. Their financial power had a history of frustrating Russian plans, and with the German threat removed, they were quite likely to use it to compete for the Turks’ favor, while the Turks would then take advantage of the rivalry, as they did in so many previous cases. To determine how that balance of power would have worked out is, of course, impossible, as is to say with any certainty that the transfer of the Caucasian troops to the Russian western front would have made a critical difference or whether they also would have been ground down by the Germans. As for Sazonov’s opposing view, whether the Russian armed forces would have had the strength to take the Straits after the defeat of the Central Powers is equally unclear. The military authorities insisted that such an operation would require a huge commitment of men and materiel. There was no guarantee that they would have been available toward the end of a victorious war.

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Russia never got the chance to learn the answers. Sazonov’s policy placed the dream of the Straits before the threat from the Central Powers and kept the Russians fighting along multiple fronts, His actions undoubtedly prolonged the war, regardless of whether transferring forces from the Caucasus to the western front would have made a difference. Knowing that revolution was around the corner, we can see that his mistake was fatal. When he paid any attention to social pressures on governmental policy, he was listening to the demands from the Duma and educated society for Russian annexation of the Straits. He did not hear the appeals from the front, factory floor, and countryside for relief, which would soon become cries for land, peace, and bread. A debate over divergent policies, judged with hindsight, begs the question of whether Russia ever really needed to possess the Straits, or whether it was chasing a centuries-long pipe dream. As D. W. Spring points out, a bolstered Black Sea Fleet would have removed the naval threat to Russia’s southern shores but not reduced its economic vulnerability in case the Straits were closed.2 Their closure during the Italo-Turkish War had a tangible effect not only on exports but also on the financial markets that responded to the greater risk attached to Russia’s export earnings. The resulting higher costs of borrowing complicated Russia’s already fragile financial condition. The Turks’ decision to enter the war on the side of Russia’s enemies further compromised its regional interests. With the Straits closed, it was forced to rely on a northern shipping route that was ice-free for only part of the year and on an eastern route that sent ships across both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans to reach its allies. Both were poor alternatives, given its need for manufactured military goods and its allies’ need for its raw materials and grain. Russian policymakers now had a clear perception of the weakness that resulted from lack of control at the Straits. Not only in perception but also in tangible economic and financial flows, the Straits were the Russian Empire’s aorta. But their possession did not warrant sacrificing the empire. Sazonov and Nicholas II lost sight of this reality as the war progressed. Sazonov should have stuck to his policy and concentrated on the fight with the Central Powers. In this inconsistency lies the greatest part of his responsibility for the empire’s fate. While many of his critics blamed him for bringing Russia into the war, he did not control this step as much as the next. After the Ottoman Empire entered the conflict, he made his worst choices. Thus, what most scholars have seen as one of his greatest successes—obtaining British and French agreement for

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Russia to acquire the Straits and Constantinople at the end of the war—was, in fact, his greatest failure. It sent him into exile and contributed to the end of the Romanov dynasty. The Straits Question allows us to draw some broader conclusions about foreign affairs, policy formulation in the last years of the Russian Empire, and the imperial Russian government as a whole. First, Russia’s diplomatic relations suffered because of differences over the Straits. Its relationship with France was especially problematic. While financial ties, such as loans to fund Russian development, may have brought the allies together, the huge scale of French financial interests in the Ottoman Empire produced friction between them. Sazonov was never able to gain French financial backing for his diplomatic maneuvers against the Turks, and the Russians believed that French money was assisting Constantinople in purchasing arms that would likely be used against them. The resulting hostility gave the German leadership hope that the two allies might be pried apart and perhaps encouraged it to risk offering Austria-Hungary a blank check in 1914, after Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination by a Bosnian Serb. From the French perspective, Russia’s deeper penetration into the eastern Mediterranean basin appeared to threaten their interests. Their begrudging agreement to Russian acquisition of the Straits and Constantinople as well as both governments’ inability to cooperate in their treatment of the Sublime Porte clearly show that they were bound together mostly by their fear of German aggression. Although the Franco-Russian Alliance survived an unusually long time by nineteenthcentury European standards, it would not likely have lasted much after their victory over the Central Powers, had Russia not succumbed to revolution. With Germany gone as the cement in their relationship, the alliance would probably have collapsed under the weight of conflicts over the former Ottoman Empire and competition in the eastern Mediterranean. Britain was not likely to side with either, so a new and fluid balance of power would have arisen in Europe. The German state might have found the same freedom to recover and to rearm as it did in the years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Within the Russian Foreign Ministry, a small circle led by Sazonov made policy. Nicholas’s biggest role was in his selection of a foreign minister, who set the tone for Russian foreign policy. The tsar heard Sazonov’s reports regularly, read a great deal of diplomatic correspondence and memoranda, and even met occasionally with foreign ambassadors and heads of state. Overall, Nicholas interfered

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little with Sazonov’s work and had even less time for it once the war began. Sazonov based his policy on what he viewed as best for Russian interests at the Turkish Straits. His long-term goal was acquisition of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Until Russia was capable of capturing them, he endeavored to maintain the status quo and to ensure that no other state would take their control from the Ottoman Empire while Russia rebuilt and expanded its armed forces. The Foreign Ministry placed little trust in paper agreements. It had witnessed many violations of international treaties meant to regulate the regimes of different territories, climaxing in the German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914, and had little confidence in any treaty or agreement to protect such a vital interest.3 For Sazonov and his colleagues, the best guarantee of Russia’s position was troops on the ground, asserting its power. This view guided policy with regard to Bulgaria in 1912-1913 as well as in response to the Anglo-French operation at Gallipoli during the First World War. Public expressions of opinion in the press and the State Duma, on the other hand, played a minor role at best in his decision-making. Throughout the prewar period and during the first few months of the war, Sazonov rejected criticism of his policy. He believed that he knew better than his critics what the people of Russia wanted and the best policy for Russian diplomacy. He stuck to his position on the Straits right through to Turkey’s entry into the war, regardless of pressure to do otherwise. Only once the war was well under way and Turkey had become a belligerent, did Sazonov seem to take Duma opinion into account. Under the stress of war, he became a strong supporter of formulating a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to the Duma. As his feelings on this issue grew more intense, he may well have sought to bring policy in line with that being demanded by the Duma’s more authoritative foreign policy spokesmen, such as Miliukov. In this way, he could have covertly acted as if responsible to the Duma, even if, officially, the tsar remained his master. Certainly, such new concern for the Duma’s interest in the Straits would have reinforced his resolve to refuse a separate peace with Turkey, since it would have meant sacrificing the promises Russia had gained from Great Britain and France. This study has used the problem of the Straits as a case study of the reconcentration of policy-making in the Foreign Ministry, after Stolypin had brought even Pevcheskii Most under his authoritative umbrella. This change occurred more quickly than David McDonald has

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suggested.4 No subsequent prime minister would have the authority or Nicholas’s clear support to force Sazonov to include him in policy debates. Aside from the February 1914 conference in response to the Liman von Sanders Crisis, Kokovtsov played a decreasing role in setting interinstitutional priorities, except for the influence that his control of state financial instruments gave him. That is not to say that the prime minister stopped exercising influence on foreign policy during Sazonov’s tenure. Kokovtsov’s position as finance minister allowed him to delay navy training for a landing on the Turkish Black Sea coast, complicating subsequent efforts to carry out such operations. His financial conservatism marked Kokovtsov in another way. He appeared immune to the delusion afflicting many governments with access to the sea: that naval power brought world power. Hindsight shows that this equation was not as true as policymakers believed in the decades before the First World War. Russian naval authorities, Nicholas, and Izvolskii certainly believed it, and Sazonov agreed. While he was most concerned about the practicalities of Russian security around the Black Sea, some of the rhetoric emanating from Pevcheskii Most indicated that it also felt that a larger fleet would mean more diplomatic influence. This collaboration between the naval and diplomatic departments, supported by Nicholas II and eventually the State Duma, meant that Russia spent millions of rubles constructing warships that would serve little real purpose and have little effect on its ultimate performance in the war. While to blame the shortages faced by the Russian army on the diversion of funds to the navy would be an exaggeration, that money would have served the country far more effectively had it been used to develop the domestic civilian infrastructure and ameliorate the lives of the broader population. This agreement between the navy and the Foreign Ministry, however, was relatively unusual. Competition both within and among the ministries, both civil and military, was the tradition in Russian government. By the end of 1913, the convergence of views on the utility and necessity of a larger navy, especially on the Black Sea, meant that the naval and diplomatic establishments had cooperated with a closeness rarely seen between the civil and military sides. Working together, the two departments were able to advance a policy on the Black Sea that found wide approval and ready credits from the Duma for construction. Stolypin had worked in vain to make this sort of coordination permanent in Russian government. In this case, circumstance instead of efficiency was the driving force. Its episodic nature meant that the machinery of Russian governance continued to

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run inefficiently and often at cross-purposes, as different divisions competed for scarce resources as well as the tsar’s ear right up to the end of the empire. During the war, the military and diplomats pulled in different directions, with the diplomats retaining the upper hand virtually all the time. The situation was just the opposite in Germany, where the civilian side of the government usually shrank before the army. When the Russian navy, for example, wished to take precautionary measures at the Bosphorus to prevent the Turkish fleet from emerging, Sazonov successfully held them back so as not to jeopardize Russia’s relations with the Porte. When Anglo-French penetration into the Dardanelles seemed most likely, in March 1915, Sazonov obtained the tsar’s approval to prepare troops for dispatch to the region over the opposition of the military authorities. Later, he also held off the army’s preference for a separate peace with Turkey so that it could concentrate its troops against German and Austrian forces. Thus, he kept alive his hope of acquiring the Turkish Straits as the war dragged on. Ironically, in this supremacy of civilian rule, Russia was much more like its democratic allies, Great Britain and France, where military and naval authorities remained subordinated to civilian power, than other monarchical states, especially Germany, where the armed forces gained so much control over the direction of national policy. Sazonov’s success, however, was not a victory for democracy or even coordination but for his own personal agenda over that of others competing for the tsar’s approval. With Prime Minister Goremykin a fatigued old man, hardly up to presiding over the Council of Ministers, and the tsar distracted by commanding the army, there was no broad analysis of Russian interests during the war in the manner of Great Britain’s Committee on Imperial Defence and War Cabinet. While Sazonov did make choices that often affected the course of events, larger structural factors limited his choices and power to change the Russian context. Instead, the Russian troika jolted along, pulled in different directions, toward an unforeseen future. This lack of unity and direction contributed to the government’s loss of authority and eventual collapse.

NOTES

Abbreviations AVPRI BD BDFA CAB DDF DSI EDW FO FRO GARF GDBS GDD HI KA LN KP MAE MO PRO RGAVMF RGIA RGVIA SHM TR

Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii British Documents on the Origins of the War British Documents on Foreign Affairs Cabinet Papers (in PRO) Documents Diplomatiques Français Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis Entente Diplomacy and the World Foreign Office (in PRO) Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnoshenii za 1910-1914 gg. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914 Hoover Institution Krasnyi arkhiv Un Livre Noir Konstantinopol’ i prolivy Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma Public Records Office Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkiv voenno-morskogo flota Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv Service historique de la Marine Tsarskaia Rossiia v mirovoi voine

d.

delo (file)

158 dep. desp. f. l. ltr. n. no. op. rep. tel.

ROADS TO GLORY

depeche despatch fond (fund) list’ (page) letter note/footnote number opis’ (guide) report telegram

Introduction 1

The best review of the history of the Eastern Question remains M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (Basingstoke: 1966). 2 I am greatly simplifying two complex and diverse ideologies. For an introduction to the problem, see Andrej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford: 1979) and Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations (London: 1996). On Russian interest in the Balkans, see Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (Cambridge: 1991). 3 During the Crimean War, when Turkey, Great Britain, France, and Sardinia were ranged against Russia, the navies of all of Turkey’s allies could pass through the Straits; see David M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (New York: 1994). 4 Castelet to Ministre de la Marine, 22 December 1910, dep. 173, SHM BB7 131 d. c.; Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914: The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge: 1994), 231-32, 286, 303. By 1914, the pace of such work had significantly increased; see David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: 1996), 349. 5 See D. W. Spring, “Russian Foreign Policy, Economic Interests, and the Straits Question, 1905-1914,” in New Perspectives in Modern Russian History, ed. Robert B. McKean (New York: 1992), 217-18. The figures below are from this article, 209-10. 6 On these forces and calls, see especially Martyna Fox, “The Eastern Question in Russian Politics: Interplay of Diplomacy, Opinion and Interest, 1905-1917,” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1993); Raymond Pearson, The Russian Moderates and the Crisis of Tsarism 1914-1917 (New York: 1977); B. V. Anan’ich et al., Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii, 1895-1917 (Leningrad: 1984); V. C. Diakin, Russkaia burzhuaziia i tsarizm v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny 1914-1917 (Leningrad: 1967). 7 George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907 (London: 1963), 116-17, 294-95; Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar (Oxford: 1995),

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114-15, 233, 284; Geoffrey Miller, “Oil,” pt. 3 of Straits: British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign (Hull: 1997). 8 John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (New York: 1983), 74. 9 L. Bruce Fulton, “France and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Marian Kent (London: 1984), 14171. 10 Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in Great Powers, 111-40; J. B. Wolf, The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railway (New York: 1936). 11 F. R. Bridge, “The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, 190018,” in Great Powers, 31-51. 12 A notable exception is Fox, “Eastern Question.” Note also A. V. Ignat'ev, ed., Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii. Konets XIX-nachalo XX veka (Moscow: 1997). 13 Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: 1929), 2:304. More recent works have drawn attention away from this factor in Russian decision-making before declaring general mobilization. See D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke: 1983), chap. 5. 14 Schmitt, The Coming of the War 1914 (New York: 1930), 1:98. 15 Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League, 1908-1912,” Political Science Quarterly 43, 3 (1928):321-63; Kerner, “The Mission of Liman von Sanders,” Slavonic Review “I. Its Origin,” 6, 16 (1927):12-27; “II. The Crisis,” 6, 17 (1927):344-63; “III,” 6, 18 (1928):543-60; “IV. The Aftermath,” 7, 19 (1928):90-112. 16 Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923 (Norman, OK: 1931). 17 See Alfred J. Rieber, “The Historiography of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Survey,” in Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (New York: 1993), 360-443. 18 M. N. Pokrovskii, Vneshiaia politika Rossii v XX veke: populiarnyi ocherk (Moscow: 1926). 19 E. D. Grimm, introductory essays in Konstantinopol’ i prolivy 2 vols. (Moscow: 1926); Ia. Zakher, “Konstantinopol i prolivy,” in Krasnyi arkhiv 6 (1924):48-76; 7 (1924):32-54. 20 A. L. Narochnitskii, ed., Itogi i zadachi izucheniia vneshnei politiki Rossii (Moscow: 1981), 330-31; K. F. Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm i razvitie flota (Moscow: 1968), 11-12. 21 Rieber, “Historiography,” 388-89. 22 A. V. Ignat’ev, Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: 1962); I. V. Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki, 1906-1910 (Moscow: 1961) and “Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki nakanune pervoi mirovoi voine (1910-1914),” Istoricheskie zapiski 75 (1965):44-85; V. I. Bovykin, Iz istorii vozniknoveniia pervoi mirovoi voiny (Otnosheniia Rossii i Frantsii 19121914 (Moscow: 1961); V. O. Diakin, Burzhuaziia, dvorianstvo, i tsarizm v 1911-

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1914 gg. razlozhenie tret'eiiun'skoi sistemy (Leningrad: 1988); V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period pervoi mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po voprosam vedeniia voiny (Moscow: 1977); Iu. A. Pisarev, Veliky derzhavy i Balkany nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: 1985); A. Ia. Avrekh, Tsarizm i IV Duma, 1912-1914 gg. (Moscow: 1981) and Tsarizm nakanune sverzheniia (Moscow: 1989). 23 See Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm. 24 V. C. Vasiukov, “‘Glavnyi priz’. S. D. Sazonov i soglashenie o Konstantinopole i prolivakh,” in Rossiiskaia diplomatiia v portretakh, ed. A. V. Ignat'ev, I. S. Rybachenok, and G. A. Sanin (Moscow: 1992), 355-77; Ignat'ev, ed., Istoriia vneshnei politiki; V. L. Mal’kov, ed., Pervaia mirovaia voina. Prolog XX veka (Moscow: 1998). This last collection contains chapters not only on diplomacy but on nationalism, totalitarianism, demography, militarism, mentalities, and more. 25 Ivo Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven: 1962); C. J. Smith, Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power: A Study of Russian Foreign Policy during the First World War (New York: 1956); Alexander Dallin et al., Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe 1914-1917 (New York: 1963). A less ideological but dated account of the Entente negotiations concerning Turkey can be found in W. W. Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London: 1957), which criticizes the Anglo-Franco-Russian agreement over the Straits for arousing mutual suspicions that drove the allies apart. The problems were larger. 26 F. Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London: 1967) and War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (London: 1975). 27 Holger H. Herwig paraphrasing Volker R. Berghahn, The Outbreak of World War I (Boston: 1997), 161. 28 Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism (New Haven: 1987). 29 Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 1908-1914: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 1981); Fox, “Eastern Question”; E. C. Thaden, “Public opinion and Russian foreign policy toward Serbia, 1908-1914,” in Velike sile i Srbija pred prvi svetski rat: zbornik radova (Belgrade: 1976), 217-32. A study centered on the diplomacy of the war is Z. A. B. Zeman, A Diplomatic History of the First World War (London: 1971). Notable recent works on the war and its origins that mention the Straits in some significant way include David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford: 1988) and Armaments; David French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916 (London: 1986). Some important recent works on the First World War unfortunately barely mention Russia and the problem at hand here: Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: 1999); Georges-Henri Soutou, L’or et le sang: Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale (Paris: 1989). 30 McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia 1900-1914 (Cambridge: 1992). 31 McDonald, “A Level without a Fulcrum: Domestic Factors and Russian Foreign Policy, 1905-1914,” in Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Hugh Ragsdale

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(Cambridge: 1993), 271-72. See also Anan'ich, et al., Krizis; Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton: 1982); Yaney, The Systematization of Russian Government (Champaign-Urbana: 1973); Wortman, The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago: 1976); Pintner and Rowney, Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: 1980). 32 Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: 1977). 33 This book will employ the British usage of the term military as meaning affairs of the army instead of the collective meaning given to it by American English, since that is how nearly all of its sources use the term. 34 For a discussion of the Duma’s place in governmental policy, see Geoffrey Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914 (Cambridge: 1973); E. D. Chermenskii, IV Gosudarstvennaia duma i sverzhenie tsarizma v Rossii (Moscow: 1976); Diakin, Russkaia burzhuaziia. On the armaments races and Russia’s role in them, see Stevenson, Armaments; David Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton: 1996). 35 William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914 (Princeton: 1985). See also Norman Stone, “The Army and State in Tsarist Russia,” chap. 1 in The Eastern Front 1914-1917 (New York: 1975); David R. Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces at War,” in Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, The First World War, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: 1988), 249328. 36 Papayoanou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing and War (Ann Arbor: 1999). For an opposing but still useful view that accentuates the political, bargaining side of relations between states, see Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: 1997). Neither of these works pays close attention to the problem of the Turkish Straits. 37 The following table indicates the total volume of trade with Turkey in kurus: Table 1. Total trade of Turkey with France and Russia 1909-1914 (in kurus) 1909-1910 1910-1911 1911-1912 1913-1914 France 766,011,574

822,679,823

862,262,995

788,126,570

Russia 282,685,344

364,721,333

398,991,285

434,765,736

From Justin McCarthy, The Arab World, Turkey, and the Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook of Statistics (Boston: 1982), 239, 244. 38 Herbert Feis, Europe: The World’s Banker 1870-1914 (New York: 1965), 320-21. 39 This geographically limited archival work has been a problem, especially with Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship, as any of the books cited above will indicate, but see also Steiner, Britain and the Origins. 40 See, for example, Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Une Alliance Franco-Russe: La France, la Russie et l’Europe au tournant du siècle dernier (Brussels: 1997); Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar. The few exceptions are diplomatic histories written by either historians of Russia or scholars well versed in both nations. See Goldfrank, Origins of the Crimean War, Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and

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the Final Struggle for Central Asia (London: 2002). Now that the Russian archives are open to foreign researchers, this situation will hopefully improve. 41 On this friendship, see Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories (London: 1923), 1:92-93; Sazonov, Fateful Years 1909-1916 (London: 1928). 42 English Embassy to Sazonov, 12 March 1915, Memorandum, Enclosure No. 3 in Buchanan to Grey, 13 March 1915, ltr. 44, FO 371 2449 35812; Vasiukov, “‘Glavnyi priz,’” 355, 369. Grey himself used the expression “greatest prize” in his instructions; Grey to Buchanan, 11 March 1915, tel. 43 private and secret, FO 371 2449. 43 Ignat’ev, “Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov,” Voprosy istorii 9 (1996):39-40. Zeman describes this success as “illusory”; Diplomatic History, 82. Stevenson (First World War), French (British Strategy), and most other western commentators do not judge the result.

Chapter 1: Stolypin and a policy of avoiding confrontation, 1908 to March 1911 Pevcheskii Most is a bridge in St. Petersburg adjacent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry was sometimes referred to by the bridge’s name, in the same way that the French Foreign Ministry was (and is) known as the Quai d’Orsay or the Austrian, Ballhausplatz. 2 On the annexation crisis, see Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 33-37; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: 1991), 69-72; Luigi Albertini, Origins of the War (London: 1952), 1:190-300. 3 See M. S. Conroy, Peter Arkad'evich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Imperial Russia (Boulder: 1976); E. Chmielewski, “Stolypin and the Russian Ministerial Crisis of 1909,” Canadian Slavic Studies 6 (1967):1-38; B. V. Anan’ich, et al., Krizis samoderzhaviia v Rossii, 1895-1917 (Leningrad: 1984); and Abraham Ascher, P. A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia (Stanford: 2001). 4 McDonald, United Government, and “A level without a fulcrum,” 268-311. 5 Officially known as the president of the Council of Ministers; see Geoffrey Hosking, Russian Constitutional Experiment, chap. 1. 6 McDonald, United Government, 156. 7 Sazonov, Fateful Years, 21; Kokovtsov, Out of My Past (Stanford: 1935), 216. 8 See, for example, S. Iu. Vitte, Vospominaniia (Moscow: 1994), 3:500-1, M. de Taube, La politique russe d'avant guerre et la fin de l'empire des tsars (1904-1917) (Paris: 1928), 248-51. 9 Hosking, Constitutional Experiment, 157, 176; Alfred J. Rieber, “Russian Diplomacy and Rumania,” in Dallin, et al., Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 22. Another brother, A. B. Neidhardt, was more supportive, with his Neidhardt Group in the Imperial State Council; see Alexandra S. Korros, A Reluctant Parliament: Stolypin, Nationalism, and the Politics and of the Russian Imperial State Council, 1906-1911 (Lanham: 2002), 159, and Ascher, P. A. Stolypin, 341. 1

NOTES

163

Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 216. Bestuzhev does not mention Izvolskii’s role in choosing Sazonov. Instead, he concentrates on the sort of candidate that Stolypin would have preferred. He even goes so far as to suggest that Stolypin was seeking someone who could be “a tool in his hands”; see Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki, 1906-1910 (Moscow: 1961), 301-2. 11 In contrast, while he was minister at Copenhagen, Izvolskii became well acquainted with the tsar and tsarina because the local Russian diplomat was expected to attend to the royal family during their frequent visits. Since Nicholas’s mother was a Danish princess, Izvolskii became familiar with her as well. Their rapport was strong enough that he gained her patronage at court; see McDonald, United Government, 93. McLean notes that Izvolskii seemed likely to become foreign minister even before his appointment to Copenhagen; see Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe, 1890-1914 (Cambridge: 2001), 53. 12 Michael Hughes cites Sazonov’s sixteen-month training as assistant foreign minister and his possession of “senior diplomatic positions at such major embassies as London” as leaving him “well prepared” for the job; see Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution: Britain, Russia and the Old Diplomacy, 1894-1917 (Basingstoke: 2000), 167-68. Sazonov’s experience was not so grand as Hughes suggests. He served as the equivalent of chargé d’affaires once, in London, which was a major post, but head of mission only at the Vatican, which, compared to missions at the capitals of the Great Powers, Japan, and the United States, would not be described as major, even if important. See the personal file of Sazonov in RGIA f. 1409 op. 1 d. 185. 13 McDonald, United Government. See also McLean, Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe, chap. 1, “The Kaiser and the Tsar: German-Russian dynastic relations, 18881914.” He credits Nicholas with more agency but also notes the communality of his and Sazonov’s views. 14 G. N. Mikhailovskii, Zapiski. Iz istorii rossiiskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo vedomstva, 1914-1920 gg. (Moscow: 1993), 1:75-78. 15 McDonald, United Government, 146. 16 Siegel, Endgame, chap. 4. 17 Lieven, Origins 38; BD 10.1 chap. 89; Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, 1:94; Sazonov, Fateful Years, 40; Siegel, Endgame, 90-92. 18 The Dreikaiserbund, or Three Emperors’ League, bound Russia, AustriaHungary, and Germany together from 1881 to 1887. 19 Andrei N. Mandelstam, “La Politique russe d’accès à la Méditerrannée au XXe siècle,” Recueil des cours 47 (1934): 661. 20 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 82. 21 “Zhurnal Osobogo soveshchaniia po rassmotreniiu programmy razvitiia morskikh sil Rossii, 16 August 1909,” in Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 323, 325. Stolypin’s difficulty in bringing military and naval affairs under his purview is indicated by Kokovtsov’s protests in this meeting that he had not yet seen complete proposals for the construction of new ships for the Russian fleet. He complained that in the four-and-a-half years since Tsushima, “the United 10

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Government does not have a definitive [and] approved program for the resurrection of the fleet”; ibid., 327. 22 Panafieu to Pichon, 18 August 1909, ltr. 240, MAE Pa-ap 134 Panafieu v. 1. 23 Bestuzhev, Bor'ba, 340. 24 “Zhurnal Osobogo soveshchaniia po rassmotreniiu programmy razvitiia morskikh sil Rossii,” 16 August 1909, in Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 331. 25 Bompard to Pichon, 30 December 1909, dep. 604, SHM BB7 132 d; idem, 25 February 1910, tel. 77, MAE NS T 162 no. 31; O’Beirne to Grey, 30 August 1910, rep. 363, BDFA 1.A 6 no. 38. 26 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 128. 27 Belloy to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 30 March 1908, dep., MAE NS Russia 84; Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 129. 28 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 126. 29 Voevodskii to Stolypin, letter and attachments, 10 May 1910, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 640, ll. 1-3. 30 Stolypin to Voevodskii, 2 August 1910, ltr. 3834, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 668, ll. 5-6. 31 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 130, 134; Stolypin to Voevodskii, 24 August 1910, ltr. 4278, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 668, l. 13; Castelet to Ministre de la Marine, 1 January 1911, dep., SHM BB7 120 d. r; Castelet to Ministre de la Marine, 22 December 1910, dep. 173, SHM BB7 131 d. c. Castelet indicated in his report on the proposed naval bill that the facilities for such construction did not exist on the Black Sea nor would their construction be quick or easy. He added that, like the assistant minister [Grigorovich] and the chief of the Naval General Staff, he saw the fulfillment of this program (south and north) using Russian facilities alone as virtually impossible. See the report’s conclusion. 32 Panafieu to Pichon, 8 August 1910, dep. 245, MAE NS Russia 84 Marine. 33 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 81. 34 A. V. Zenkovskii, Stolypin: Russia’s Last Great Reformer (Princeton: 1986), 111. 35 On Stolypin’s domestic battles, see Hosking, Constitutional Experiment; Anan’ich, et al., Krizis; Ascher, Stolypin; and Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier (DeKalb: 1996).

Chapter 2: Policy drift and the Italo-Turkish War, March 1911 to October 1912 For a few months in 1916, Boris Stürmer served as both prime and foreign minister, but it can be argued that he still had less control over foreign relations than Sazonov did. Stürmer’s lack of experience in foreign relations and the demands of his work as prime minister left de facto control of diplomacy to those in the ministry and the field. See Smith, Jr., Russian Struggle for Power, 4045. 2 The most complete guide to the Libyan war is W. C. Askew, Europe and Italy’s Acquisition of Libya 1911-1912 (Durham: 1942), but see also Timothy W. Childs, 1

NOTES

165

Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya 1911-1912 (Leiden: 1990); David G. Herrmann, “The Paralysis of Italian Strategy in the Italian-Turkish War, 19111912,” English Historical Review 104, 411 (1989):332-56; David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: 1996), chaps. 3 and 4, esp. 225-29; and I. V. Bestuzhev, “Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki nakanune pervoi mirovoi voine (1910-1914),” Istoricheskie zapiski 75 (1965):57-60. On longer term Russo-Italian relations, see Albertini, Origins of the War, 1:306-11; Richard J. Bosworth, Italy and the Approach of the First World War (New York: 1983), 62-70; and Geoffrey A. Haywood, Failure of a Dream: Sidney Sonnino and the Rise and Fall of Liberal Italy 1847-1922 (Florence: 1999), 380-88. 3 Buchanan to Nicolson, 9 March 1911, private letter, FO 800 347, 50-53. 4 Sazonov, Fateful Years, 35-36. 5 Kokovtsov expressed his frustration with the lack of a strong foreign minister and the generally poor quality of the ambassadors in Europe, save for Izvolskii; see Kokovtsov to Izvolskii, 1 December 1911, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 53, ll. 8-15. 6 See, for example, Nekliudov to Neratov, 12 October 1911, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 706 d. 12, ll. 24-25. 7 Charykov to Neratov, 15 April 1911, report, EDW no. 361. 8 Girs to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1911, ltr., AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 458/477, ll. 13-14. 9 Sukhomlinov to Nicholas II, 30 June 1911, report 172, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2219, chap. 2, ll. 145-46. 10 See discussion in Herrmann, “Paralysis”. 11 Grigorovich to Sukhomlinov, 6 October 1911, ltr. 2641/218, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2219, chap. 2, l. 212. 12 Polivanov to Grigorovich, [10?] October 1911, ltr. 958, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2219, chap. 2, l. 213; Polivanov to Odessa Commander, [10?] October 1911, ltr. 959, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2219, chap. 2, l. 214. 13 The best account of the “Charykov Kite” remains the article by Edward C. Thaden, “Charykov and Russian Foreign Policy at Constantinople in 1911,” Journal of Central European Affairs 16 (1956/57):25-43. See also the briefer accounts in Askew, Europe, chap. 5; P. E. Mosely, “Russian policy in 1911-12,” Journal of Modern History 12 (1940):68-86; Alan Bodger, “Russia and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Marian Kent (London: 1984), 76-110; and I. S. Galkin’s more Marxist approach in “Demarsh Charykova v 1911 g. i pozitsiia evropeiskikh derzhav,” in Iz istorii obshchestvennykh dvizhenii i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: 1957), 633-56. Langer’s “Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League” is interesting for its place in the historiography of the event but otherwise has been superseded by works, such as those above, that profited from published and archival documents that became available later.

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14 Charykov to Izvolskii, 8 December 1909, ltr., EDW no. 576. On the shifting British view of the Straits, see G. Miller, Straits, pt. 3; and Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, 114-15, 233, 284. 15Sazonov to Savinskii, 14 September 1911, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 706 d. 18, ll. 239-42; see also McDonald, United Government, 166. 16 Sazonov to Neratov, 9 December 1911, tel. 188, MO 19.1 no. 186. 17 De Selves to P. Cambon and Bompard, 9 December 1911, tels. 858 and 542, DDF 3.1 no. 326. 18 A later discussion of this shift can be found in Bompard to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 13 January 1912, report 17, DDF 3.1 no. 465, though he finds it more extreme than it was in reality. 19 Lowther to Grey, 10 December 1911, tel. 339, BD 9.1 no. 344. 20 Buchanan to Nicolson, 21 March 1912, private ltr., BD 9.1 no. 563 and FO 800 354, 56-64. 21 Ibid. 22 See Thaden, “Charykov,” 27ff. Regardless of what version of the situation Sazonov tried to put forward, some observers knew that Charykov had not been so out of line. See Bompard to de Selves, 10 December 1911, tel. 576, DDF 3.1 no. 332. 23 Hartwig had acted similarly in his previous post at Teheran. See Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 40-41; Siegel, Endgame, 31, 39-41. 24 See, for example, Paget to Grey, 10 October 1912, tel. 30, BD 9.2 no. 11; idem., 19 October 1912, ltr. 69; ibid., no. 48; Grey to Buchanan, 31 March 1913, tel. 284, ibid., no. 764; idem. 8 April 1913, private tel., ibid., no. 819; Buchanan to Grey, 9 April 1913, private tel., ibid., no. 821. 25 Others accused of recalcitrance were Izvolskii in Paris and Nekliudov in Sofia, but this problem was not only Russian: Sir Francis Bertie, Britain’s ambassador to France, did not always obey orders from London (see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914. [Cambridge: 1969]), and a number of French ambassadors pursued their own lines of policy, such as Camille Barrère and Maurice Paléologue. See M. B. Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 18981914 (Oxford: 1993), chap. 4 and 118, 294-301; and Jean Stengers, “1914: The Safety of Ciphers and the Outbreak of the First World War,” in Intelligence and International Relations, ed. C. Andrew and J. Noakes (Exeter: 1987), 29-48. 26 For background, see Siegel, Endgame; Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism. (New Haven: 1968); and David McLean, Britain and Her Buffer State: The Collapse of the Persian Empire, 1891-1914 (London: 1979). 27 Izvolskii to Neratov, 7 December 1911, ltr. 170, MO 19.1 no. 170. 28 On this crisis, see Geoffrey Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon: Anatomy of a Crisis (London: 1982). 29 Bosworth, Italy and the Approach, 54-57.

NOTES

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See Albertini, Origins, 1:306-8. The French had their own special understanding with the Italians, which linked French interests in Morocco and Italian interests in Tripoli and Cyrenacia. They had pledged neutrality in case the other was attacked or provoked to attack; see John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (New York: 1983), 56-57. 31 Rodd to Grey, 28 November 1911, ltr. 260, BD 9.1 no. 327. 32 For the details of these early diplomatic moves, see Askew, Europe, 164-77; Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy, 108-12; Panafieu to de Selves, 25 December 1911, DDF 3.1 no. 393; Buchanan to Grey, 26 December 1911, BD 9.1 no. 350; Sazonov to Izvolskii, Benckendorff, Osten-Saken, N. Girs, and Dolgorukii [sent first to Kokovtsov for his review], 28 December 1911, ltr. 799, MO 19.1 no. 275; G. Giolitti, Memoirs of My Life (London: 1923), 289-90. Childs mistakenly sees a second attempt at mediation on 27 January, but it was only a follow-up to the December proposal; see Sazonov circular, 27 January 1912, ltr. 19, MO 19.2 no. 394. 33 See Barrère to de Selves, 4 January 1912, tel. 4 and 5, DDF 3.1 no. 432; Sazonov to Izvolskii, Benckendorff, Osten-Saken, N. Girs, and Dolgorukii, 11 January 1912, tel. 2267, MO 19.1 no. 336; N. Girs to Sazonov, 12 January 1912, tel. 106, MO 19.1 no. 340; Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy, 110. 34 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 11 February 1912, tel. 187, MO 19.2 no. 445; Sazonov to Buchanan, 21 February 1912, aide-memoire no. 77, MO 19.2 no. 506; Buchanan to Grey, 21 February 1912, tel. 73 BD 9.1 no. 369. Childs (ItaloTurkish Diplomacy, 118), not examining the documents in Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia or apparently British Documents on the Origins of the War, describes Sazonov’s behavior here as “mendacious” and “misleading.” A comparison of his findings in the Ottoman archives with the published documents suggests that, in fact, the British were not being honest with the Turks. While Sazonov would find other opportunities to be economical with the truth, this time was not one of them. 35 Rodd to Grey, 29 February 1912, tel. 29, BD 9.1 no. 371. 36 Poincaré to Barrère, et al., 26 February 1912, tel. 236 et al., DDF 3.2 no. 103; Poincaré to Vieugué, 28 February 1912, tel. 204, ibid., no. 120. 37 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 1 March 1912, tel. 316, MO 19.2 no. 566; Vieugué to Poincaré, 1 March 1912, tel. 105, DDF 3.2 no. 131. Sazonov repeated his conviction that both warring parties would accept such mediation in a private letter of 7 March 1912, Sazonov to Izvolskii, AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 9, ll. 710. 38 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 2 March 1912, tel. 328, MO 19.2 no. 578; Vieugué to Poincaré, 2 March 1912, tel. 108, DDF 3.2 no. 141; Poincaré to Vieugué, 2 March 1912, tel. 214, DDF 3.2 no. 140. 39 See Askew, Europe, 181-85. 40 Grey to Bertie, 28 February 1912, tel. 78 [as tel. 169 to Buchanan], BD 9.1 no. 370; Benkendorf to Sazonov, 28 February 1912, tel. 47, MO 19.2 no. 549. An editor’s note to the latter indicates that the Russians had deciphered earlier 30

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British telegrams on this subject, threatening to mine the Straits, but they are not published in the BD series. 41 Buchanan to Grey, 5 March 1912, tel. 74, BD 9.1 no. 377; Giolitti, Memoirs, 297. 42 Louis to Poincaré, 8 April 1912, tel. 181, DDF 3.2 no. 308. 43 Ibid. 44 See Sazonov’s early comments to the French chargé d’affaires in St. Petersburg in Panafieu to de Selves, 25 December 1911, report 345, DDF 3.1 no 393. This report was circulated to the cabinet and Foreign Ministry leadership. Also, Sazonov to Izvolskii, Benckendorf, Osten-Saken, N. Giers, and Dolgorukii [sent first to Kokovtsov for his review], 28 December 1911, ltr. 799, MO 19.1 no. 275. 45 Grigorovich to Sukhomlinov, 6 October 1911, ltr. 2641/218, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2219, chap. 2, l. 212. 46 Sazonov to Kokovtsov, 23 January 1912, ltr. 16, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 47,1 ll. 32-39; Louis to Poincaré, 30 January 1912, tels. 31 and 32, DDF 3.1 no. 566; Sazonov to Izvolskii, 7 March 1912, ltr. 113, MO 19.2 no. 596. 47 Louis to Poincaré, 8 April 1912, tel. 181, DDF 3.2 no. 308; Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 1908-1914: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 1981), 34-36. Rossos draws important attention to the role of the Italo-Turkish War in the plans of the Balkan states but neglects the place of Italy in Sazonov’s consideration of Balkan policy. Italy is almost nonexistent in his book on the subject. 48 Poincaré to representatives in London, Rome, Constantinople, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Sofia, 7 April 1912, tels. 291, 327, 199, 130, 297, 204, 50, DDF 3.2 no. 306. 49 Giolitti, Memoirs, 295. 50 Despite his statements to the contrary; e.g., Buchanan to Grey, 18 September 1912, ltr. 283, BD 9.1 no. 722. 51 Louis to Poincaré, 21 February 1912, tels. 73, 74, 75, DDF 3.2 no. 71. 52 Buchanan to Grey, 5 March 1912, ltr. 74, BD 9.1 no. 377. 53 Barrère to Poincaré, 26 March 1912, tel. 247, DDF 3.2 no. 264. 54 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 7 March 1912, private ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 39, ll. 8-9ob. 55 Dolgorukii to Sazonov, 25 March 1912, ltr., MO 19.2 no. 686. 56 Lowther to Grey, 20 March 1912, ltr. 233, BD 9.1 no. 385. 57 Buchanan to Grey, 22 November 1911, tel. 292, BD 9.1 no. 316. 58 Rodd to Grey 28 November 1911, ltr. 260, BD 9.1 no. 327. 59 Note de M. Poincaré, 20 February 1912, DDF 3.2 no. 69. 60 Louis to Poincaré, 22 February 1912, tel. 79, DDF 3.2 no. 81. 61 Barrère to Poincaré, 19 April 1912, tel. 285-86, DDF 3.2 no. 365; Albertini, Origins, 1:360. 62 Timashev to Kokovtsov, 23 April 1912, ltr. 3636, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, l. 43, sent on to Sazonov as ltr. 2204 on 25 April 1912.

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63 Kokovtsov to Sazonov, 25 April 1912, tel. 2188, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, l. 42; Kokovtsov to Sazonov, 12 May 1912, tel. 2662, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, l. 56. 64 P. Cambon to Poincaré, 23 April 1912, tel. 117, DDF 3.2 no. 376. 65 Bompard to Poincaré, 25 April 1912, tel. 167, 168, DDF 3.2 no. 385. 66 Sazonov to Benkendorff, 1 May 1912, tel. 790, MO 19.2 no. 838. 67 Ibid. 68 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 29 April 1912, tel. 58, RGIA f. 560 op. 26 d. 939, l. 71. 69 Dolgorukii to Sazonov, 30 April 1912, tel. 51, MO 19.2 no. 830. 70 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 29 April 1912, tel. 58, RGIA f. 560 op. 26 d. 939, l. 71. 71 Dolgorukii to Sazonov, 3 May 1912, tel. 55, RGIA f. 560 op. 26 d. 937, l. 47. 72 Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the Great War (London: 1979), 188. 73 O’Beirne to Grey, 21 May 1912, tel. 198, FO 418 51 21744. 74 G. Miller, Straits, 113; Giolitti, Memoirs, 304. 75 O’Beirne to Grey, 21 May 1912, tel. 198, FO 418 51 21744. 76 Sazonov to Kokovtsov, 5 June 1912, ltr. 358 [538?], RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, ll. 68-71. The quotes in the rest of this paragraph are from this letter. 77 Article 3 of the 13 March 1871 Treaty of London reads: “La Mer Noire reste ouverte, comme par le passé, à la marine marchande de toutes les nations.” This quote and the entire text of the convention can be found in Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers 1870-1871 (London: 1877) , 7-12. 78 Stevenson, Armaments, 276-8; 348; Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the Frist World War (New York: 1991), 155-6; Berghahn, Outbreak, chap. 10.

Chapter 3: The Balkan Wars: Choosing between the Balkan States and the Straits, 1912-1913 1 A condensed version of this chapter appeared as “Behind the Balkan Wars: Russian Policy toward Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, 1912-13,” Russian Review 59, 1 (January 2000):76-95. 2 The phrase “system of Balkan alliances” is from Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, chap. 2. 3 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 7 July 1912, tel. 1260, MO 20.1 no. 273n2. 4 Sazonov to Benkendorf and Izvolskii, 4 June 1912, tels. 1061 and 1062, MO 20.1 nos. 131 and 132; Bertie to Grey, 8 June 1912, tel. 77, BD 9.1 no. 409. 5 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 6 June 1912, ltr., MO 20.1 no. 145. 6 Poincaré to Louis, 7 June 1912, tel. 442, DDF 3.3 no. 78; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 7 June 1912, tel. 97, MO 20.1 no. 151. 7 Bertie to Grey, 8 June 1912, tel. 77, BD 9.1 no. 409; Poincaré to P. Cambon, 7 June 1912, tel. 458 and 459, DDF 3.3 no. 79; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 8 June 1912, tel. 99, MO 20.1 no. 158. 8 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 9 June 1912, tel., MO 20.1 no. 160. Sazonov had gone to Moscow for the unveiling of a monument to Alexander III; see no. 160n3.

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See telegrams in note 8. Grey to Bertie, 10 June 1912, ltr. 292, BD 9.1 no. 410; idem, 18 June 1912, tel. 254, ibid., no. 416. 11 Grey to Bertie, 18 June 1912, tel. 254, BD 9.1 no. 416. 12 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 14 June 1912, tel. 102, MO 20.2 no. 179; O’Beirne to Grey, 23 June 1912, ltr. 191, BD 9.1 no. 424, where O’Beirne wrote that Izvolskii “was just now particularly anxious to fall in with the wishes of the French Government but that he had not expressed the views of the Russian Government and that he had now been set right on that point.” 13 See, for example, Poincaré to P. Cambon, 14 June 1912, tel. 469, DDF 3.3 no. 100; Poincaré to Louis, 18 June 1912, tel. 461, ibid., no. 115. 14 P. Cambon to Poincaré, 18 June 1912, tel. 188, DDF 3.3 no. 119; Louis to Poincaré, 19 June 1912, tels. 298-299-300, ibid., no. 121. Cambon’s telegram arrived in Paris only at 9:45 P.M. on the 18th, so Poincaré had quite possibly left the Quai d’Orsay without seeing it. The first of Louis’s telegrams began to arrive in the ministry at 5:45 the following morning so was probably waiting for Poincaré when he arrived. Most likely, if Poincaré had seen Cambon’s telegram on 18 June, he would have telegraphed Louis and Cambon for confirmation immediately, not waiting for 1:50 P.M. on 19 June to begin his inquiries. For the timing of the latter, see Poincaré to Louis (also sent to Cambon at 11 P.M. as tels. 482 and 482 bis), 19 June 1912, tel. 464 bis, DDF 3.3 no. 122. 15 O’Beirne to Grey, 17 June 1912, tel. 217, BD 9.1 no. 414. 16 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 18 June 1912, tel. 1146, MO 20.1 no. 194. 17 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 25 June 1912, personal and confidential letter, AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 39, ll. 27-28; O’Beirne to Grey, 24 June 1912, ltr. 193, BD 9.1 no. 579. 18 O’Beirne to Grey, 20 June 1912, tel. 219, BD 9.1 no. 419; idem, 23 June 1912, ltr. 191, ibid., no. 424; Sazonov to Izvolskii, 20 June 1912, tel. 1167, MO 9.1 no. 207. Lasting here was the key word, since some of the tsar’s encounters with the kaiser had produced a variety of agreements that threatened French security or financial interests, such as at Bjorkö in 1905 and the Potsdam arrangements in 1910, but they were never actually carried out. 19 O’Beirne to Grey, 20 June 1912, tel. 219, BD 9.1 no. 419. 20 Louis to Poincaré, 19 June 1912, tels. 298-299-300, DDF 3.3 no. 121. In O’Beirne’s letter 193 to Grey, 24 June 1912 (BD 9.1 no. 579), the chargé suggests that not Louis but officials in Paris were to blame for misunderstanding Sazonov’s policy, as in private conversations, Louis told O’Beirne that he had no illusions on that score. Minutes by FO staff indicate that London shared that view, especially with regard to Paléologue. 21 P. Cambon to Poincaré, 21 June 1912, tel. 194, DDF 3.3 no. 129 (received in Paris at 8:35 P.M. that day); Poincaré to Louis and P. Cambon, 21 June 1912, tels. 472, 487, DDF 3.3 no. 130; ibid., 22 June 1912, tels. 473, 488, DDF 3.3 no. 132. 22 Louis to Poincaré, 19 June 1912, tels. 298-299-300, DDF 3.3 no. 121. 9

10

NOTES

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Poincaré to Louis, 19 June 1912, tel. 464bis, DDF 3.3 no. 122. O’Beirne to Grey, 20 June 1912, tel. 219, BD 9.1 no. 419; O’Beirne to Nicolson, 27 June 1912, ltr., BD 9.1 no. 582. 25 O’Beirne to Nicolson, 27 June 1912, ltr., BD 9.1 no. 582. 26 O’Beirne to Grey, 21 June 1912, tel. 220, BD 9.1 no. 422. 27 Louis to Poincaré, 18 June 1912, tel. 296, DDF 3.3 no. 118. 28 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 25 June 1912, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 39, ll. 27-28. 29 See Sazonov, Fateful Years, 46-48; T. von Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on World War (London: 1920), 71-72. 30 Sazonov to Nicholas II, 8 July 1912, report, MO 20.1 no. 277; in a less complete version, Sazonov to Benckendorff, 8 July 1912, ltr., EDW no. 735. See also O’Beirne to Grey, 7 July 1912, tel. 242, BD 9.1 no. 433; idem, 8 July 1912, ltr. 212, ibid., no. 584. 31 Raymond Poincaré, Au Service de la France: Neuf années de souvenirs (Paris: 1926), 2:99-100. 32 See Sazonov’s report on the meeting, 17 August 1912, MO 20.2 no. 489, and a very partial translation in EDW no. 743. For Poincaré’s report, see “Notes de M. Poincaré sur ses entretiens de Saint-Péterbourg,” DDF 3. 3 no. 264. See also Sazonov, Fateful Years, 52-56, Poincaré, Au Service, 2:105-65, Georges Louis, Les Carnets de Georges Louis (Paris: 1936), 2:32-35; Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 334-35. 33 Buchanan to Grey, 18 August 1912, BD 9.1 no. 620. 34 See Sazonov, Fateful Years, 59-62; Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (London: 1925), 1:286-89; and the ministers’ reports on the meetings in BD 9.1 nos. 803-05 and MO 20.2 no. 1034, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 323/327. 35 The Russians and Sazonov, in particular, were very aware of this possibility at the time. See O’Beirne to Grey, 14 October 1912, ltr. 416, BD 9.1 no. 193. 36 For discussions of the Russian role in the formation of the Balkan League, see Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, chaps. 1-2; Ernest C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge: 1938), chaps. 1-4; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (University Park, PA: 1965) chaps. 3-4, Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League”; Galkin, “Demarsh Charykova”; George B. Zotiades “Russia and the Question of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits during the Balkan Wars,” Balkan Studies 11, 2 (1970): 281-98. 37 See Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, chap. 1; Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, chap. 5. 38 See Bax-Ironside to Grey, 24 February 1912, ltr. 22, BD 9.1 no. 554; Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 87-90. 39 Sazonov to Nekliudov, 23 May 1912, ltr. 299, MO 20.1 no. 64; close translation in Sazonov to Nekliudov, 30 May 1912 [according to editor’s note in MO, letter 299 was forwarded to London and elsewhere on this date], ltr., EDW no. 405. See also Sazonov’s memorandum to the tsar of 10 May 1912 in MO 19.2 no 878 for a simpler listing of issues raised by Danev. 23 24

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Izvolskii to Sazonov, 6 June 1912, ltr., EDW no. 406. Nekliudov to Sazonov, 20 July 1912, ltr., MO 20.1 no. 216; A. V. Nekludoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences before and during the World War (London: 1920), 116-20. 42 M. Girs to Sazonov, 29 July 1912, ltr., MO 20.1 no. 385. A relevant extract of this letter is also published in EDW, no. 427, but the piece is misdated August 29. 43 Doulcet to Poincaré, 14 September 1912, tels. 443, 444, DDF 3.3 no. 402. 44 Buchanan to Grey, 18 September 1912, ltr. 283, BD 9.1 no. 722. 45 Ibid. 46 Elliot to Grey, 15 October 1912, tel. 63, BD 9.2 no. 31. 47 Kokovtsov to Sazonov, 15 October 1912, ltr. 5523, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, ll. 94-95. 48 Sazonov to M. Girs, 18 October 1912, tel. 2224, AVPRI f. 151 2 op. 482 d. 3699, l. 3, and in a draft version in AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, l. 20. 49 See Sazonov to Demidov, Izvolskii, and Benkendorf, 19 October 1912, tel. 2240, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, l. 28; Sverbeev to Sazonov, 19 October 1912, tels. 149 and 150, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3699, ll. 16 and 15; Poincaré to P. Cambon et al., 18 October 1912, tels. 757 etc., DDF 3.4 no. 195. 50 Grey to Buchanan, 25 October 1912, ltr. 355, BD 9.2 no. 63. The date of this meeting is approximate because Grey’s letter only states when Benckendorff spoke with Nicolson about it, the 19th. 51 Demidov to Sazonov, 20 October 1912, tel. 99, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3699, l. 42. 52 See, for example, Grey to Buchanan, 22 October 1912, ltr. 354, BD 9.2 no. 56. 53 Girs to Sazonov, 20 October 1912, tel. 887, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3699, l. 47; Girs to Sazonov, 22 October 1912, tel. 916, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, l. 114. 54 Girs to Sazonov, 20 October 1912, tel. 887, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3699, l. 47. 55 Sazonov to Girs, 20 October 1912, tel. 2285, AVPRI f. 1512 op. 482 d. 130, l. 43. 56 See Izvolskii’s reference to this letter in Izvolskii to Sazonov, 19 October 1912, tel. 264, LN 339. 57 Kokovtsov to Sazonov, 21 October 1912, ltr. 5570, RGIA f. 1276 op. 7 d. 469b, l. 112. 58 Both Nicolson and Grey wrote of their concern over his health after the Balmoral talks. See Nicolson to Grey, 30 September 1912, ltr., BD 9.1 no. 806; Grey to Buchanan, 8 October 1912, ltr., BD 9.1 no. 810. On his return, see Buchanan to Grey, 22 October 1912, tel. 383, BD 9.2 no. 53. 59 Benckendorff to Sazonov, 21 October 1912, tel. 267, EDW no. 432. 60 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 23 October 1912, ltr. 671, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, ll. 47-50. Sazonov sought a couple of small editing changes to the negotiating point and, more important, could not agree to Grey’s suggestion that Russia 40 41

NOTES

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and Austria speak for the other Great Powers when communicating these points, preferring action by more states. 61 Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 196-200; and Rossos, Russian and the Balkans, 82-86. 62 Buchanan to Grey, 29 October 1912, tel. 393, BD 9.2 no. 74. 63 Sazonov to Izvolskii, Benkendorf, Sverbeev, et al., 31 October 1912, ltr. 678, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, ll. 78-81; and the same in KA16 no. 45, though in the latter, the number in mistakenly given as 6782. 64 Ibid. 65 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 26 June 1913, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 39, ll. 35-36. 66 Sazonov to Nekliudov, 31 October 1912, tel. 2403, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3699, l. 273. A translation of this telegram in the version forwarded to Benckendorff can be found in EDW no. 443 but without a note written by Nicholas II on the former document, referred to below. The copy of this telegram in KA 16 no. 46 also lacks the tsar’s notation. 67 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 88. 68 Sazonov to Nekliudov, 31 October 1912, tel. 2403, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3699, l. 273. 69 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 87-88. 70 Buchanan to Grey, 1 November 1912, tel. 401, BD 9.2 no. 85. 71 Fleuriau to Poincaré, 1 November 1912, tel. 326, DDF 3.4 no. 307; Poincaré to Fleuriau, 1 November 1912, tel. 801, in note 1 to Fleuriau to Poincaré, 2 November 1912, DDF 3.4 no. 320; Benkendorf to Sazonov, 1 November 1912, tel. 288, KA 16 no. 47; Grey to Buchanan, 1 November 1912, ltr. 365, BD 9.2 no. 91. 72 Louis to Poincaré, 2 November 1912, tel. 505, DDF 3.4 no. 311. 73 Grey to Benckendorff, 1 November 1912, ltr., BD 9.2 no. 92; Benckendorff to Sazonov, 2 November 1912, tel. 295, EDW no. 448; and, in less detail, Grey to Buchanan, 2 November 1912, ltr. 368, BD 9.2 no. 102. 74 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 1 November 1912, tel. 314, KA 16 no. 49; Bertie to Grey, 2 November 1912, tel. 189, BD 9.2 no. 97; Poincaré to Louis, 2 November 1912, tel. 804, DDF 3.4 no. 313; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 3 November 1912, tel. 324, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, l. 49. Poincaré’s telegram 804 was sent before he learned of Sazonov’s concession on 2 November, discussed below. 75 Gartvig to Sazonov, 2 November 1912, tel. 262, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, l. 9; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 2 November 1912, tel. 316, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, l. 16. 76 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 2 November 1912, tel. 2437, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, l. 37; Sazonov to Benkendorf, Sverbeev, et al., 2 November 1912, tel. 2439, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, ll. 39, 40; Sazonov to Izvolskii, Benkendorf, et al., 2 November 1912, tel. 2423, RFO 293, as(?) Sazonov to Benckendorff, tel. 2423, EDW no. 447; the same can be found with the wider

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circulation as tel. 2483 in LN, 565. The numbering of the latter is incorrect, given the telegram’s date and content. 77 Buchanan to Grey, 2 November 1912, tel. private, BD 9.2 no. 98. Brackets original. 78 Buchanan to Grey, 2 November 1912, tel. 405, BD 9.2 no. 100. 79 Grey to Bax-Ironside, 2 November 1912, tel. 139, BD 9.2 no. 99; Grey to Bertie, 3 November 1912, tel. 658, BD 9.2 no. 107; Benckendorff to Sazonov, 2 November 1912, tel. 295, EDW no. 448. 80 Bax-Ironside to Grey, 3 November 1912, tel. 120, BD 9.2 no. 109. Bobchev had only recently arrived at his post, having left Bulgaria on 17 October, the day before its entry into the war. His initial instructions were to work for a quick intervention of the Great Powers, since the Bulgarians shared the wider worries that the Allies’ chances were limited against the Turks; see Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 82. 81 Buchanan to Grey, 4 November 1912, tel. 408, BD 9.2 no. 119; Louis to Poincaré, 4 November 1912, tel. 511, DDF 3.4 no. 343. On the relationship of the French Foreign Ministry to the press, see Hayne, French Foreign Office, chap. 2, and idem, “The Quai D’Orsay and the Influences on the Formulation of French Foreign Policy, 1898-1914,” French History 2, 4 (1988):427-52. 82 Girs to Sazonov, 4 November 1912, tel. 982, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700 no. 92, in the Russian case. 83 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 4 November 1912, tel. 2451, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, l. 94. 84 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 4 November 1912, tel. 2455, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, ll. 96-97 and EDW no. 449. 85 J. Cambon to Poincaré, 4 November 1912, tel. 393, DDF 3.4 no. 333. 86 Poincaré to J. Cambon and Fleuriau, 5 November 1912, tels. 624 and 810, DDF 3.4 nos. 348 and 349; Fleuriau to Poincaré, 4 November 1912, tels. 331, 332, DDF 3.4 no. 337; Grey to Buchanan, 5 November 1912, ltr. 371, BD 9.2 no. 133. In a letter to Buchanan on 5 November, Nicolson made clear that he believed more than Grey in the serious threat of massacres of Christians, if Bulgaria captured the Ottoman capital. It was not in the capital as much as in Asia Minor that he thought “very serious massacres” were a grave danger. He agreed that the powers ought to do everything possible to keep Ferdinand from entering Constantinople. Nicolson to Buchanan, 5 November 1912, ltr., BD 9.2 no. 135. 87 Buchanan to Grey, 5 November 1912, tel. 412, BD 9.2 no. 130. 88 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 6 November 1912, tel. 2474, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, l. 104 and same in EDW no. 452. The latter, however, contains a critical mistranslation, printing “We wish to oppose the temporary occupation,” missing the negation of the verb in the original document. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid.; see also Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 89. 91 Louis to Poincaré, 10 November 1912, tels. 517, 518, DDF 3.4 no. 411.

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92 On this concession, see Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 89; Iu. A. Pisarev, Veliky derzhavy i Balkany nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: 1985), 113-15. Note that Helmreich does not mention either Sazonov’s concession or what follows below; Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 200-1. 93 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 23 October 1912, ltr., FRO 289-91 and EDW no. 430. 94 See note in BD 9.2 p. 89; Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 201. 95 Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (London: 2000), 33. 96 Sazonov to Girs, 2 November 1912, tel. 2426, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, l. 30; Sazonov to Nicholas II, 4 November 1912, telegram, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, l. 57; Nicholas’s approval on telegram of same date, ibid., l. 58; Grigorovich to Nicholas II, 8 November 1912, tel. 320; Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” KA (1924), 6:51. Zakher suggests that Nicholas was panicked by this last telegram, since he answered it within only 9 hours of its dispatch. This conclusion is highly unlikely. First, on a matter of relative importance like this one, a quick reply would not be unusual. Second, four days earlier, Sazonov had already received permission from Nicholas for the direct communication between Giers and Odessa, so that would have come as no surprise. Finally, the increase in ships that Grigorovich suggested should also not have been alarming, given that Nicholas was kept abreast of events by the regular stream of telegrams that the Foreign Ministry sent to the tsar. 97 Sazonov to Girs, 6 November 1912, tel. 2473, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, l. 103. For Zhilinskii’s instructions to Odessa of that same date to prepare one thousand troops for passage to Constantinople upon request by Admiral Ebergard, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, see Zhilinskii to Vasiliev (?), 6 November 1912, tel. 2634, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220, chap. 3, l. 247. 98 Girs to Sazonov, 7 November 1912, tel. 1000, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700 l. 182. 99 Sazonov to Sukhomlinov, 16 November 1912, ltr. 751, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220, chap. 3, l. 270. Sazonov informed Giers of the thousand troops prepared for his request and the four thousand supplementary now requested in Sazonov to Girs, 16 November 1912, tel. 2599, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 131, l. 9. 100 Sukhomlinov to Kokovtsov, 19 November 1912, ltrs. 1735 and 1736, RGIA f. 1276 op. 8 d. 465, ll. 4 and 18-19; Grigorovich to Kokovtsov, 19 November 1912, ltr. 3630/396, RGIA f. 1276 op. 8 d. 465, l. 5. Kokovtsov sent his approval of these propositions to Sukhomlinov four days later in his 23 November 1912, ltrs. 6295 and 6296, RGIA f. 1276 op. 8 d. 465, ll. 20, 21. 101 Sazonov to [Kokovtsov and service chiefs], 12 November 1912, ltr., AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3700, ll. 242-49; hereafter Service. 102 Sazonov to Girs, 14 November 1912, ltr., AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 459/478, ll. 22-24; hereafter Girs. 103 Service, 242. In 1914, Constantinople’s population was approximately 49% Muslim, 22% Orthodox, 25% Armenian Christian, and 4% Jewish, from a total

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of 1,020,000. Today, Istanbul is 99.99% Muslim. See Philip Mansel, Constantinople: City of the World’s Desire, 1453-1924 (New York: 1995), 437. 104 Service, 243. 105 Service, 244. 106 On this standoff and Russia’s increasing readiness to use the military to support its diplomacy, see Stevenson, Armaments, 232-46; 253-66. 107 See Izvolskii to Sazonov, 6 November 1912, tel. 340, FRO, 294; Fleuriau to Poincaré, 6 November 1912, tel. 334, DDF 3.4 no. 364; G. Miller, Straits, 126; Service, 244. 108 Service, 245. 109 Service, 246. 110 Service, 246. 111 On Austria-Hungary’s plans, see Goleevskii to Russian General Staff, 14 August 1912, Report 108, MO 20.2 no. 468, which was sent in abbreviated form to the Foreign Ministry as Zhilinskii to Sazonov, 5 November 1912, ltr. 2455, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3717, ll. 43-44. 112 Service, 247. 113 Girs, 23. 114 Louis to Poincaré, 20 November 1912, dep. 330, DDF 3.4 no. 506. Zotiades also takes note of this intimation by Sazonov but makes more of it than is warranted by the context of Sazonov’s writings in November, the full text of the dispatch, and the military and naval preparations on the Black Sea; “Russia and the Question,” 292. 115 Buchanan to Grey, 22 November 1912, tel. 446, BD 9.2 no. 254. 116 Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28 November 1912, tel. 349, EDW no. 349. 117 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 29 November 1912, ltr. 787, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 131, ll. 110-13, and EDW no. 491, though with omissions; idem, 30 November 1912, tel. 2764, AVPRI f. 151 f. 482 d. 131, l. 56, and EDW no. 490. 118 See also Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 114. 119 Sazonov to Grigorovich, 8 December 1912, ltr. 832, in Ia. Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy.” 120 Lieven to Grigorovich, 10 December 1912, rep. 301, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 5538, ll. 1-2, sent on as Grigorovich to Sazonov, 10 December 1912, ltr. 3964/442, in Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy.” 121 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 12 December 1912, ltr. 837, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 131, ll. 91-94. 122 Neratov to Lieven, 23 December 1912, ltr. 884, in Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 6:61. 123 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 114, cites French influence as crucial to bringing the Russian Foreign Ministry around to this position, but Zakher more conclusively shows the influence of the navy through a discussion between the chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral A. A. Lieven, and the chief of the chancellery of the Foreign Ministry, a close friend of Sazonov’s, Baron M. F.

NOTES

177

Schilling. See Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 6:61; see also Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, chaps. 10-16. 124 See Sazonov to Benkendorf, 1 February 1913, tel. 168, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3714, l. 55; Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 6 April 1913, tel. 860, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3714, l. 348. 125 Rossos notes that the documents do not make clear whether Sofia intended to attack Constantinople or not. In either case, Russia could not afford to assume the Bulgarians would not do so; Russia and the Balkans, 120-21. 126 Sazonov to Nekliudov, 22 March 1913, ltr. 262, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 318/321, ll. 4-5. Radko Dmitriev realized in the course of this conversation that he had not been made fully aware of his government’s diplomatic activity on this subject before being sent on this mission. He served in the Russian army when Bulgaria remained neutral at the outbreak of World War I; see Stone, Eastern Front, 21. 127 Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 6:62. 128 Sazonov to Nicholas II, 28 March 1913, report, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 721/780, ll. 58-59. This letter was approved by Nicholas on 29 March and then sent on to Kokovtsov for his information in Sazonov to Kokovtsov, 30 March 1913, ltr. 288, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 600, l. 1. Also Sazonov to Sukhomlinov, 2 April 1913, ltr. 297, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 600, l. 4. 129 Ibid. 130 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 102. 131 Girs to Sazonov, 1 April 1913, tel. 218, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 600, l. 5. 132 Sazonov to Giers, 27 March 1913, tel. 723, DSI 3 no. 789. 133 Sazonov to Benckendorff, 27 March 1913, tel. 724, DSI 3 no. 790. 134 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, chaps. 4, 7. 135 Panafieu to Pichon, 29 March 1913, tels. 95, 96. 136 Nekliudov to Sazonov, 29 March 1913, in communication of Etter to Grey, 1 April 1913, BD 9.2 no. 786; Panafieu to Pichon, 29 March 1913, tel. 97, DDF 3.6 no. 111. 137 Sazonov to Benckendorff, 22 March 1913, tel. 680, DSI 3 no. 783. 138 Ibid. 139 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 31 March 1913, tel. 139, LN 2 59. 140 Note de Directeur des Affaires politiques (Paléologue), 7 April 1913, DDF 3.6 no. 222. 141 Note de l’ambassade de Russie, 31 March 1913, DDF 3.6 no. 127; Benckendorff to Sazonov, 31 March 1913, tel. 287, GBDS 3 no. 931. See also communication from Etter, 1 April 1913, BD 9.2 no. 788. In Benckendorff and Etter’s communications, the Russian desire to use the fleet to affect any subsequent resolution of the Straits Question is not mentioned. From the British statements that follow, however, it is clear that they were aware of this rationale for the dispatch of the fleet, either because of something a French or Russian diplomat said or wrote to the Foreign Office or because they divined it. For Sazonov’s telegrams informing his representatives of this position, see Sazonov

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to Giers, 30 March 1913, tel. 766, DSI 3 no. 927; Sazonov to Benckendorff, 30 March 1913, ibid., no. 777. Cambon’s suggestion of landing troops in Constantinople seems to have been his own, given that the telegram in which Foreign Minister Pichon requested Cambon speak with Grey on the subject contains no mention of putting soldiers ashore and that Benkendorf describes this idea as Cambon’s own in a meeting two days later. See Pichon to P. Cambon and Delcassé, 31 March 1913, tels. 420-21, 356-57, DDF 3.6 no. 130; Benkendorf to Sazonov, 3 April 1913, tel. 298, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 600, l. 6. 142 Grey to Bertie, 1 April 1913, ltr. 232, BD 9.2 no. 783. 143 Ibid. 144 Grey to Bertie, 3 April 1913, ltr. 235, BD 9.2 no. 800. 145 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 3 April 1913, tel. 298, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 600, l. 6. 146 Ibid. 147 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 3 April 1913, tel. 301, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 600, l. 7. 148 Ignat’ev views the British reaction to the Russian plans in a more negative light; see Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia, 165-66. 149 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 8 November 1913, tel. 2502, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 130, l. 110. 150 Pichon to Delcassé, 7 April 1913, tel. 393, 393 bis, DDF 3.6 no. 217. Pichon had become foreign minister in a cabinet change on 18 March (DDF 3.6, 68). Delcassé was named ambassador to Russia on 21 February 1913 to replace the ailing Georges Louis. Sazonov met his appointment with some misgiving, but by the time of Delcassé’s departure several months later, he was sorry to see him go, having developed a strong rapport with him. If ambassadors of this quality had been sent more regularly from France to Russia, Franco-Russian relations may well have been somewhat smoother. Sazonov to Izvolskii, 18 March 1913, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 39, ll. 31-32; Sazonov, Fateful Years, 56. 151 P. Cambon to Pichon, 8 April 1913, tel. 111, DDF 3.6 no. 234. 152 Bertie to Grey, 9 April 1913, tel. 46 (by post), BD 9.2 no. 822; Delcassé to Pichon, tels. 188, 189, 190, DDF 3.6 no. 254. 153 P. Cambon to Pichon, 10 April 1913, tel. 118, DDF 3.6 no. 262 with content passed along by Izvolskii to Sazonov, 11 April 1913, tel. 171, LN 69. 154 Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, 127. 155 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 8 April 1913, tel. 165, LN 66. 156 Sazonov to Benckendorff, 9 April 1913, tel. 897, DSI 3 no. 832; Note de l’ambassade de Russie, 10 April 1913, DDF 3.6 no. 252; Delcassé to Pichon, 10 April 1913, tels. 188, 189, 190, DDF 3.6 no. 254. 157 Buchanan to Grey, 13 April 1913, tel. 147, BD 9.2 no. 843. 158 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 10 July 1913, ltr., AVPRI f. 340 op. 835 d. 39, ll. 37-38. 159 Boppe to Pichon, 16 July 1913, tel. 347, DDF 3.7 no. 378.

NOTES

179

160 Buchanan to Grey, 21 July 1913, tel. 269, BD 9.2 no. 1163; Delcassé to Pichon, 22 July 1913, tel. 469, DDF 3.7 no. 440; idem, 26 July 1913, tels. 488, 489, DDF 3.7 no. 477; Buchanan, My Mission, 1:145. 161 Buchanan to Grey, 14 August 1913, tel. 302, BD 9.2 no. 1235. 162 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 17 July 1913, tel., DSI 3 no. 959; Buchanan to Grey, 18 July 1913, tel. 268, BD 9.2 no. 1160. 163 Rifaat Pacha to Pichon, 20 July 1913, ltr., DDF 3.7 no. 427. 164 Delcassé to Pichon, 21 July 1913, unidentified tel., DDF, 3.7 no. 429n 3. 165 Buchanan to Grey, 21 July 1913, tel. 269, BD 9.2 no. 1163. 166 Grey to Cartwright, 21 July 1913, desp. 151, BD 9.2 no. 1165; Granville to Grey, 22 July 1913, tel. 117, BD 9.2 no. 1169; Pichon to Delcassé et al., 18 July 1913, tels. 770 et al., DDF 3.7 no. 410; Pichon to Delcassé, 23 July 1913, tel. 789, DDF 3.7 no. 446. 167 Note of Russian embassy, 24 July 1913, DDF 3.7 no. 460 with notes; Grey to Bertie, 25 July 1913, desp. 467, BD 9.2 no. 1179; Pichon to Delcassé, 25 July 1913, tel. 804 DDF 3.7 no. 466; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 25 July 1913, tel. 362 no. 1, FRO, 393; LN 2 111-12. 168 P. Cambon to Pichon, 18 July 1913, tels. 199, 200, DDF 3.7 no. 412. 169 P. Cambon to Pichon, 21 July 1913, tels. 204, 205, DDF 3.7 no. 433. 170 Bertie to Grey, 26 July 1913, tel. 101, BD 9.2 no. 1180 and minutes. 171 Delcassé to Pichon, 8 August 1913, DDF 3.7 no. 574. 172 P. Cambon to Pichon, 24 July 1913, dep. 436, DDF 3.7 no. 465. 173 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 1 August 1913, tel. 2194, FRO, 396; LN 2,. 116. 174 Pichon to Delcassé, 8 August 1913, tel. 848, DDF 3.7 no. 575. 175 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 9 August 1913, tel. 392, FRO, 397; LN 2, 118. 176 Buchanan to Grey, 11 August 1913, tel. 299, BD 9.2 no. 1231; Sazonov to Benckendorff, 11 August 1913, tel. 2278, DSI 3 no. 1000. 177 Bronevskii to Sazonov, 11 August 1913, tel. 201, AVPRI f. 151 op. 482 d. 3715, l. 107. More than a willingness to put pressure on the Turks, with whom the Germans were trying to gain favor, this cooperative gesture toward St. Petersburg is another case of Berlin attempting to use the differences within the Franco-Russian Alliance to draw Russia out. 178 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 20 August 1913, tel. 2338, LN 2 136-37, incorrectly numbered as tel. 2238 in FRO, 410-11. 179 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 12 August 1913, tel. 396, FRO, 398-99; LN, 2 120. See also Pichon to Delcassé, 12 August 1913, tel. 860 and 860 bis, DDF 3.8 no. 13 and the departmental source for Pichon’s note in Note du Département, 11 August 1913, DDF 3.8 no. 1. 180 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 21 August 1913, ltr. 777, FRO, 411; LN, 2 137-38. In contrast, Germany showed less willingness to follow such a course when speaking with other powers. See Goschen to Grey, 20 August 1913, desp. 301, BD 9.2 no. 1248; Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 401, does not consult the Russian document so misses the double game that the Central Powers

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appear to play here and that Sazonov detects, as he notes in this letter to Izvolskii. 181 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 12 August 1913, ltr., FRO, 399-402; LN, 2 122-24. 182 P. Cambon to Pichon, 21 July 1913, tels 204, 205, DDF 3.7 no. 433; Lichnowsky to Jagow, 21 July 1913, tel. 285, GP 35 no. 13567; GDD 3 184-85 (in extract); Pourtalès to Jagow, 22 July 1913, tel. 204, GP 35 no. 13569. 183 Granville to Grey, 22 July 1913, tel. 117, BD 9.2 no. 1169. 184 Buchanan to Grey, 23 July 1913, tel. 273 BD 9.2 no. 1173; Delcassé to Pichon, 23 July 1913, tel. 473 DDF 3.7 no. 473. 185 Delcassé to Pichon, 22 July 1913, tel. 470, DDF 3.7 no. 441; Buchanan to Grey, 11 August 1913, tel. 299, BD 9.2 no. 1231. 186 Pichon to Delcassé, 23 July 1913, tel. 789, DDF 3.7 no. 446; Grey to Granville, 25 July 1913, BD 9.2 tel. 281; Pichon to Delcassé, 25 July 1913, tel. 804, DDF 3.7 no. 466 and notes; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 25 July 1913, tel. 362 no. 1 FRO, 394; LN, 2, 111-12; idem, tel. 362 no. 2, FRO, 394; LN, 112-13; Buchanan to Grey, 26 July 1913, tel. 276, BD 9.2 no. 1184. 187 Delcassé to Pichon, 25 July 1913, tels. 484, 485, DDF 3.7 no. 470. 188 Grey to Granville, 25 July 1913, tel. 281, BD 9.2 no. 1176; Grey to Bertie, 25 July 1913, tel. 467, BD 9.2 no. 1179; Buchanan to Grey, 26 July 1913, tel. 276, BD 9.2 no 1184. 189 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 25 July 1913, tel. 362 no. 2, FRO, 394; LN 2, 112-13. 190 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 26 July 1913, tel. 363, FRO, 394; LN 2, 113. Pichon received confirmation of this stand when Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Berlin, informed him that Jagow saw no problem with an independent Russian action, as long as it 1) took place in Europe, 2) was temporary, and 3) Russia informed the powers first. Interestingly, Jagow also cast doubt on fears that Austria might follow a Russian action with its own, saying that he did not believe that Vienna would put such threats into effect. 191 Delcassé to Pichon, 28 July 1913, tels. 495, 496, 497, 498, DDF 3.7 no. 487. 192 Delcassé to Pichon, 28 July 1913, tel. 494, DDF 3.7 no. 484. 193 Delcassé to Pichon, 28 July 1913, tels. 495, 496, 497, 498, DDF 3.7 no. 487. 194 Savoye to Pichon, 2 August 1913, dep. 14, DDF 3.7 no. 524. 195 Boppe to Pichon, 3 August 1913, tel. 394. DDF 3.7 no. 530. The Bulgarians denied any such activity a couple of days later. See Panafieu to Pichon, 5 August 1913, tel. 270, DDF 3.7 no. 544. 196 Buchanan to Grey, 3 August 1913, tel. 285, BD 9.2 no. 1198. 197 Buchanan to Grey, 6 August 1913, tel. 288, BD 9.2 no. 1205. 198 Buchanan to Grey, 7 August 1913, desp. 242, BD 9.2 no. 1218. 199 Boppe to Pichon, 6 August 1913, tel. 401, DDF 3.7 no. 555; P. Cambon to Pichon, 24 July 1913, desp. 436, DDF 3.7 no. 465. 200 Buchanan to Grey, 9 August 1913, tel. 295, BD 9.2 no. 1228; Delcassé to Pichon, tels. 538, 539, 540, DDF 3.7 no. 589. 201 Buchanan to Grey, 14 August 1913, tel. 302, BD 9.2 no. 1235. 202 Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 403-4.

NOTES

181

Buchanan to Grey, 14 August 1913, tel. 302, BD 9.2 no. 1235; note de l’ambassade de Russie, 14 August 1913, DDF 3.8 no. 27. 204 Note de l’ambassade de Russie, 15 August 1913, DDF 3.8 no. 33. See also Rifaat Pasha to Pichon, 20 July 1913, ltr., DDF 3.7 no. 427. 205 Buchanan to Grey, 18 August 1913, tel. 307, BD 9.2 no. 1242; Delcassé to Pichon, 18 August 1913, tels. 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, DDF 3.8 no. 44. 206 Buchanan to Grey, 19 August 1913, desp. 253, BD 9.2 no. 1244; Sazonov to Izvolskii, 20 August 1913, tel. 2338, LN 2 pp. 136-37. 207 Bompard to Pichon, 19 August 1913, tels. 419, 420, DDF 3.8 no. 48. 208 Buchanan to Grey, 20 August 1913, tel. 308, BD 9.2 no. 1247. 209 Ibid.; Delcassé to Pichon, 20 August 1913, tel. 578, DDF 3.8 no. 53. 210 Doulcet to Pichon, 30 August 1913, DDF 3.8 no. 104; Delcassé to Pichon, 19 August 1913, tel. 576, DDF 3.8 no. 47. 211 Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 405. 212 See Pichon to Doulcet et al., 27 August 1913, tels. 899, etc., DDF 3.8 no. 86; Pichon to de Billy, 28 August 1913, tel. 860, DDF 3.8 no. 90; Bompard to Pichon, 28 August 1913, tels. 428, 429, DDF 3.8 no. 91. 213 Panafieu to Pichon, 29 August 1913, tel. 291, DDF 3.8 no. 96. 203

Chapter 4: Turkish naval expansion and the Liman von Sanders Crisis, March 1912 to July 1914 For discussions of this crisis, see Albertini, Origins of the War, 1:471-87, Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary, 151-56. 2 See the standard accounts of the Liman von Sanders Crisis in Kerner, “Mission”; Albertini, Origins, 540-50; Lieven, Russia and the Origins, 47-48. Works that do make some connection are Stevenson, Armaments, 348-49, Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 144-48. 3 Gallaud to Minister of Marine, 19 November 1912, rep. 17, SHM BB7 121 k. There is no scholarly biography of Grigorovich, but see his memoir, Vospominaniia byvshego morskogo ministra (St. Petersburg: 1993), which is filled with his work as minister to improve the navy, though his accounts are more technical and administrative than political. 4 Grenfell to Buchanan, 8 January 1913, desp. BDFA 1.A 6 no. 133. Grigorovich introduced a general staff structure along the lines of those in western Europe. In 1909, with Grigorovich as assistant minister leading the reform, the naval administration had tried to introduce a general staff, but the tsar vetoed it because he felt that a mistake in the draft law allowed the Duma too much influence over the navy. See Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 219-24; Chmielewski, “Stolypin.” 5 Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament, 137. 6 Smith to Buchanan, 20 May 1911, desp. BDFA 1.A 6 no. 71. 7 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 191-96. 8 Gallaud to Minister of Marine, 19 November 1912, annual report, SHM BB7 121 e. 1

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Zakliuchenie biudzhetnoi komissii Gos. Dumy, 7-8 June 1912, RGIA f. 1278 op. 2 d. 2287, l. 72; Zhurnal zasedaniia biudzhetnoi komissii Gos. Dumy, 7 June 1912, RGIA f. 1278 op. 2 d. 3203, l. 797; Louis to Cruppi, 8 June 1912 desp. 156, MAE NS R 84; Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 302, 305, 311, 315-16. See also O'Beirne to Grey, 12 June 1912, desp. 180, BDFA 1.A 6 no. 101. Commander H. G. Grenfell, the British naval attaché, raised the possibility, in his review of events, that Kokovtsov had initially opposed the plans, partly for financial reasons and partly out of distrust of the admiral in charge of distributing contracts. The former would certainly have been in character for Kokovtsov, who repeatedly stood in the way of military measures that he found too expensive. His memoirs betray no trace of hesitation, though his declaration of belief in the need for a navy is tepid at best. "I recognized that Russia needed a navy and therefore was in sympathy with the naval program, but I knew also that the project could be carried through the Duma only after the removal of all financial obstacles" (305; and Grenfell to O'Beirne, 22 June 1912, desp., BDFA 1.A 6 no. 104). Shatsillo, however, recounts Kokovtsov’s overt and covert resistance to these plans during the winter and spring of 1912; see Russkii imperializm, 73-76. On the budget balance, see Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 460; Durand to Minister of Marine, 12 June 1912, rpt., SHM BB7 121 L. 10 Grenfell to O'Beirne, 22 June 1912, desp. BDFA 1.A 6 no. 104. 11 O'Beirne to Grey, 12 June 1912, desp. BDFA 1.A 6 no. 101. Budget committee records do not preserve Sazonov’s comments in detail. See Zhurnal zasedaniia biudzhetnoi komissii Gos. Dumy, 7 June 1912, RGIA f. 1278 op. 2 d. 3203, l. 797. 12 O'Beirne to Grey, 12 June 1912, desp. See also Louis to Cruppi, 8 June 1912 desp. 156, MAE NS R 84. 13 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 77. 14 Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, 311. 15 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 63-78. 16 This case is most clearly presented in two contemporary documents: 1) "Imperial Russian Navy Law and Programme of Increased Shipbuilding," 1911, in translation, BDFA 1.A 6 no. 105, which was an enclosure in Grenfell to O'Beirne, 22 June 1912, desp. BDFA 1.A 6 no. 104; and 2) Gallaud to Minister of Marine, 26 March 1913, report 96, SHM BB7 122 b, which passes along parts of a larger document given to him by the Naval General Staff. While the two items are not identical, the latter is clearly more developed than the former, while retaining many of the same justifications. Quotes from both or additional information from other sources will be noted below. While the first item is dated 1911, according to Grenfell, this material was distributed confidentially in the Duma as the June 1912 bill was put forward. 17 Dieter Matthei, “Russia’s Struggle for Maritime Prestige during the Era of Navalism,” Naval War College Review 32, 5 (1979):22. 18 The Russian navy was very slow in getting its dreadnought fleet built. The following table indicates the extent to which it had fallen behind. 9

NOTES

183

Table 2. Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought Battlecruisers, 1906-1914 Key: numbers below are for Battleships and (Battlecruisers) and cumulative in each half Finished Finished Finished Laid Laid Laid by 12 by 30 by the down by down Country down October war by the July by 12 30 1911 1909 October war July 1911 1909 Austria0 2 4 0 0 3 Hungary France 6 8 18 0 8 10 Great 9 (4) 18 (8) 32 (9) 5 (3) 10 (4) 20 (7) Britain Germany 8 (3) 16 (2) 19 (5) 0 13 (2) 14 (4) Italy 1 4 6 0 0 3 Japan 4 5 7 1 4 5 Russia 0 4 4 (4) 0 0 0 Baltic Russia 0 1 4 0 0 0 Black Spain 0 2 3 0 0 1 Turkey 0 1 2 0 0 0 United 6 10 14 0 6 10 States From Anthony Preston, Battleships of World War I (London: 1972), 214-18; René Greger, Battleships of the World (Annapolis: 1997), 190-93; Fred T. Jane, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships (London: 1914, rpt. New York: 1969), 338-39. The dates represent key moments in the construction of the Russian fleet: on 13 July 1909, the Russian dreadnoughts on the Baltic Sea were laid down (Preston, Battleships, 214), and on 30 October 1911, the first of the Russian Black Sea dreadnoughts was begun (Greger, Battleships, 192). Dreadnought-class battlecruisers are included here since those laid down just before the war were already stronger than the earliest dreadnought-class battleships. 19 Shatsillo exaggerates when he describes this reason as the center of tsarism’s calculations, but his view that the construction of a large navy was “not so much against some probable enemy, as for some future ally” has some legitimacy (Russkii imperializm, 82). The literature on the Franco-Russian Alliance is still surprisingly thin, though it does find its place in wider analyses. At the moment, there is no book on the alliance for its entire existence. On its origins, the classic remains George Kennan's The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War (New York: 1984), while the much more recent work by I. S.

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Rybachenok, Soiuz s Frantsiei vo vneshnei politike Rossii v kontse XIX v. (Moscow: 1993) adds to our understanding of the Russian context. A more recent western view can be found in Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Une alliance Franco-Russe. See also V. I. Bovykin, “The Franco-Russian Alliance” History 64, 210 (1979):20-35; D. N. Collins, “The Franco-Russian Alliance and Russian Railways, 1891-1914,” Historical Journal 16, 4 (1973):777-88; and D. W. Spring, “Russia and the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1905-1914: Dependence or Interdependence?” Slavonic and East European Review 66, 4 (1988):564-92. 20 Gallaud, report 96. 21 For details of the additions, see Grenfell to O'Beirne, 22 June 1912, desp., BDFA 1.A 6 no. 104; Durand to Minister of Marine, 12 June 1912, rep., SHM BB7 121 l and 20 June 1912, rep., SHM BB7 l. On the details of the ships, new and old, see also Jane's Fighting Ships 1914, 338-59. Additional information in Preston, Battleships, 204-18. While the four dreadnought-class ships added were formally battlecruisers, Preston notes that they were more correctly fast battleships, as they were bigger, stronger, and faster than the Gangut-class dreadnought battleships laid down a few years before (Battleships, 218). 22 Durand to Minister of Marine, n.d., 1912 Annual Report, SHM BB7 121 e. 23 Gallaud to Minister of Marine, 26 March 1913, rep. 96, SHM BB7 122 b; 12 April 1913, report 107, SHM BB7 122 b. 24 Gallaud, Annual Report for 1912, 19 November 1912, SHM BB7 e; Grenfell to O'Beirne, 22 June 1912, desp., BDFA 1.A 6 no. 104; O'Beirne to Grey, 25 June 1912, desp. 194, BDFA 1.A 6 no. 103. 25 Charykov to Sazonov, 22 February 1912, ltr. 17, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 461/480, ll. 1-2. 26 Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 75. 27 Emphasis added. Sazonov to [Kokovtsov and service chiefs], 12 November 1912, ltr, AVPRI f. 151. op. 482 d. 3700, ll. 242-49. 28 Referred to in Zhilinskii to Sukhomlinov, 23 January 1912, rep. 5, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 2, ll. 131-32. 29 Zhilinskii and Danilov to Sukhomlinov, 23 January 1912, rep. 6, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 2, ll. 133-37. 30 Liven to Zhilinskii, 25 February 1912, ltr. 351/29, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 2, ll. 148-49. 31 Grigorovich to Sukhomlinov, 16 June 1912, ltr. 2056/204, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 3, ll. 237-38. 32 On the preparations, see, for example, journal of special meeting on the organization of a landing expedition, 26 July 1912, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 2, ll. 191-95; Zarubaev to Sukhomlinov, 14 December 1912, ltr. 91, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 2, ll. 114-15; Vernand to Grigorovich, 16 January 1913, ltr. 35, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2221, l. 14; Liven to Zhilinskii, 31 May 1913, ltr. 2094/148, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 784, l. 2; Vasiliev to Danilov, 10 June 1913, ltr. 23, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2221, l. 43.

NOTES

185

33 Liven to Grigorovich, 19 September 1912, rep. 222, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 5537, ll. 85-86. 34 For the correspondence between Grigorovich and Kokovtsov, see RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 784 for the navy's copies and RGIA f. 1276 d. 9 op. 533 for Kokovtsov's copies; pages given as RGAVMF/RGIA: Grigorovich to Kokovtsov, 20 June 1913, ltr. 2376/178, ll. 5-6/l. 1; Kokovtsov to Grigorovich, 25 June 1913, ltr. 4211, ll. 11-12/ll. 4-5. See also Report to Grigorovich on Kokovtsov's conclusion, 2 July 1913, rep. 231, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 784, ll. 13-14. 35 Zhilinskii to Liven, 30 October 1913, ltr. 2097, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 784, l. 23. On army delay, see, for example, Liven to Zhilinskii, 20 October 1913, ltr. 3849/283, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 784; Grigorovich to Sukhomlinov, 31 October 1912, ltr. 3227/540, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 2220 chap. 3, l. 241. 36 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 1 May 1913, ltr. 381, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 318/321, ll. 6-10; same letter attached to Sazonov to Sukhomlinov, 2 May 1913, ltr. 392, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3845, ll. 10-15; an incomplete translation is in EDW, no. 493; excerpts can also be found in Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 62-63. 37 Sukhomlinov to Sazonov, 4 May 1913, ltr. 3977, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3845, ll. 19-25; excerpted in Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 63. 38 In Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 64. 39 Ibid. 40 D. N. Alkhazashvili, “Bosfor i Dardanelly v voenno-morskoi strategii Rossii nachala XX v.” Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 8 Istoriia 2 (2000):109. For a biography of Nemitz, see V. G. Lebed’ko, “‘Nedavnee proshloe russkogo flota...’ (svidetel’stvuet admiral Nemitts),”Gangut 10 (1996). During the period of the Provisional Government, Nemitz was given command of the Black Sea Fleet. After the Bolshevik revolution, he chose to serve the Communist state and rose to the rank of vice-admiral in the Soviet navy. 41 Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 66. 42 Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 54-57, 66; Shatsillo, Russkii Imperializm, 104. 43 “O neobkhodimosti uveliseniia nashikh morskikh sil v Chernom more,” Bazili, July 1913, memorandum, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 461/480, ll. 13-18. 44 Girs to Sazonov, 27 November 1913, desp. 189, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 461/480, ll. 21-23. 45 The following discussion and analysis of this report is based on the copy found as Sazonov to Nicholas II, 5 December 1914 [so dated, although not delivered until the following day], rep., AVPRI f. 138 op. 467, d. 718/777, ll. 14-19, hereafter referred to as Report. 46 Zakher, “Konstantinopol’ i prolivy,” 67. 47 Sazonov to Nicholas II, 6 December 1913, cover sheet, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467, d. 461/480, l. 20.

186

ROADS TO GLORY

Report, 14. Report, 16. 50 Report, 17. 51 Report, 19. 52 Sazonov to Nicholas II, 6 December 1913, cover sheet, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467, d. 461/480, l. 20. 53 See McDonald, United Government, chap. 8. 54 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I,” Belleten 68 (2004): 705. 55 Ibid., 712. 56 Sazonov, Fateful Years, 118. 57 Note d’Ambassade de Russie, DDF 3.8 no. 595, 18 December 1913. 58 Along these lines, see Stevenson, Armaments, 348. 59 Schilling diary, 23 December 1913, GARF f. 813 op. 1 d. 127, ll. 10-12. 60 See Kerner, “Aftermath,” 104-6; also the meeting transcript in MO 3.1 no. 295. 61 Zhurnal osobogo soveshchaniia, 21 February 1914, MO 3.1 no. 295. 62 Kerner, “Aftermath,” 104-6. 63 Sazonov, Fateful Years, 128-32, 180; BD 10.2, 774-814; Sazonov to Izvolskii, 2 April 1914, ltr. 23, MO 3.2 no. 137, Buchanan to Nicolson, 16 April 1914, ltr, FO 800 373, 45-54. 64 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 19 February 1914, ltr., AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 323/327, ll. 6-7. 65 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 25 April 1914, ltr., MO 3.2 no. 224; Sazonov to Benckendorf, 28 May 1914, ltr. 47, EDW no. 850. On this Anglo-French agreement, enshrined in the Grey-Cambon letters of November 1912, see Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War 2nd ed. (New York: 2003), 105-11; John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins, 110-16; and Williamson, Jr., Politics of Grand Strategy, chap. 12. 66 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 24 June 1914, ltr., MO 3.2 no. 343; idem, 25 June 1914, ltr., MO 3.2 no. 361. See also Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914 (New Haven: 1968), 676-77; Buchanan, My Mission, 1:114-16, 183-87. 67 Zhurnal soveshchaniia u nachalnika morskogo general’nogo shtaba, 26 May 1914, MO 3.3 no. 86. 68 Churchill to Grey, 7 July 1914, ltr., BD 10.2 no. 559; Volkov to Rusin, 6 June 1914, rep. 182, MO 3.3 no. 175; EDW no. 851. 69 Buchanan to Grey, 25 June 1914, ltr., FO 800 74 no. 285-89. 70 Schilling diary, 23 December 1913, GARF f. 813 op. 1 d. 127, ll. 10-12; Grigorovich to Sazonov, 19 January 1914, ltr 39/7, MO 3.1 no. 50. 71 Grigorovich to Sazonov, ibid. On 1 January 1914, the Naval General Staff had brought these matters again to the attention of the naval minister, based upon new information about Turkish naval purchases, suggesting a number of courses of action, including asking the Foreign Ministry to find some way of 48 49

NOTES

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getting Britain to delay the completion of the ships under construction there. They also discussed using any ships that Russia bought for duty in the Mediterranean Sea. These ideas would be picked up in Sazonov’s memoranda to the British government in the spring. Unrepeated in further correspondence was an interesting suggestion that Russia might agree to the Liman von Sanders mission, if Turkey allowed two heavy warships to pass the Straits into the Black Sea. Whether this suggestion originated in the navy or the Foreign Ministry is unclear. Neniukov to Grigorovich, 1 January 1914, rep. 470, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 5551, ll. 115-16. 72 Grigorovich to Sazonov, 4 January 1914, ltr. 5062/343, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 461/480, ll. 32-33. 73 Ibid. 74 Sazonov to Grigorovich, 20 January 1914, ltr. 12, MO 3.1 no. 55. 75 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 8 May 1914, ltr., MO 3.2 no. 384; memorandum of Russian government to British government, 21 May 1914, FO 371 2114 23121/115. 76 Memorandum of Russian government to British government, 1 June 1914, FO 371 2114 25026/115. 77 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 12 June 1914, tel. 149, EDW no. 853. 78 G. Miller, Straits, 200-01. 79 Doumergue to Paléologue, 23 April 1914, tels. 193, 194, DDF 3.10 no. 147. 80 Boppe to Doumergue, 25 January 1914, tels. 56, 57, DDF 3.9 no. 152. 81 Grigorovich to Sazonov, 19 January 1914. 82 Stevenson, Armaments, 150; Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament, 27177. 83 Sazonov to Grigorovich, 20 January 1914, ltr. 12, MO 3.1 no. 55. 84 Sazonov to Bakhmetev, 23 March 1914, tel. 538, MO 3.2 no. 64. 85 Grigorovich and Neniukov to Nicholas II, 20 February 1914, rep., RGAVMF f. 418 op. 2 d. 195, l. 71. 86 Foreign Office Minutes by A. N. Nicolson, 26 January 1914, FO 371 2090 4239/4239. 87 Sazonov to Shtein, 25 February 1914, tel. 340, MO 3.1 no. 325; Bakhmetev to Sazonov, 26 February 1914, tel. 8, ibid., no. 341; Sazonov to Shtein, 10 March 1914, tel. 431, ibid., no. 408. 88 Bakhmetev to Sazonov, 10 March 1914, tel. 11, MO. 3.1 no. 418. 89 Buchanan to Grey, 12 April 1914, tel., FO 371 2090 with minutes 370-71; idem, 16 April 1914 tel. 90, FO 371 2090 with minutes 373-76. 90 For the details of this attempt, see Admiralty to Foreign Office, 13 March 1914, ltr. M.0398/14, FO 371 2092. 11277/11277; Buchanan to Grey, 17 March 1914, tel. 72, ibid. 11964/11277; Buchanan to Grey, 12 April 1914, tel., FO 371 2090 16083/4239; Grey to Buchanan, 15 April 1914, tel., ibid.; Buchanan to Grey, 16 April 1914, tel. 90, ibid. 16760/423; Grey to Buchanan, 21 April 1914, tel. 185, ibid.; Buchanan to Grey, 22 April 1914, tel. 96, 16788/4239; Sazonov to Grigorovich, 27 April 1914, ltr. 35, MO 3.2 no. 306.

188

ROADS TO GLORY

The limits of Anglo-Russian friendship are shown in this exchange: on Buchanan’s tel. 90 of 16 April 1914, one member of the Foreign Office minuted that His Majesty’s Government knew that Turkey had already paid £80,000 for an option for one of the ships but would not tell Russia about it. London was convinced, however, that Chile had no intentions of selling, so the value of the information is moot. 91 “Zakonoproekt, predstavlennyi morskim ministerstvom v Gosudarstvennuiu dumu,” 30 March 1914, MO 3.2 no. 123. See also memorandum submitted along with this request for funds, “On the assignment of the means for the quick strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet in the period 1914-1917,” 30 March 1914, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 492, ll. 381-88, sent to the Council of Ministers that day by Grigorovich, 30 March 1914, ltr, RGIA f. 1276 op. 9 d. 492, l. 381. These two documents confirm Stevenson’s deduction in Armaments, 349, that this new proposal asked for one additional dreadnought, instead of the 3 that the French reported. See also Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm, 158. 92 See Zhurnal zasedanii Komissii po voprosam voennym i morskim delam, 31 May 1914, RGIA f. 1278 op. 5 d. 445, ll. 195-97; Stenograficheskii otchet Gos. Dumy, 23 June 1914, RGIA f. 1278 op. 5 d. 194, ll. 150-53, 323. 93 Sazonov to Grigorovich, 30 June 1914, ltr. 459, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 33, l. 139. 94 Grigorovich to Sazonov, 10 July 1914, ltr 3929/284, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 33, ll. 140-42; MO 3.4 no. 170. 95 Grenfell to Buchanan, 19 March 1914, desp., BD 10.2 no. 531 encl. 96 Gallaud to Gauthier, 7 April 1914, dep. 269, SHM SS Ea 157. 97 Paléologue to Doumergue, 27 May 1914, dep. 136, DDF 3.10 no. 290. 98 Gallaud to Gauthier, 7 April 1914, dep. 269, SHM SS Ea 157; Stevenson, Armaments, 349. 99 G. Miller, Straits, 197; Howard, Partition of Turkey, 70-75; Sazonov, Fateful Years, 133-38; Girs to Sazonov, 18 May 1914, desp. 57, MO 3 no. 26; Girs to Sazonov, 18 May 1914, ltr., MO 3 no. 27; Buchanan to Grey, 17 May 1914, tel. 114, BD 10.1 no. 365; Mallet to Grey, 2 June 1914, desp. 400, BD 10.1 no. 370 and minutes in FO 371 2135 25458/25458. 100 G. Miller, Straits, 219-24. 101 See Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict for the best exposition of the norm in the imperial government.

Chapter 5: War deferred: Diplomacy dominant during Turkish neutrality, July 1914 to October 1914 A. J. P. Taylor, War by Timetable: How the First World War Began (London: 1969); Stevenson, First World War, 72-75, 102-3; Holger H. Herwig, The First World War (London: 1997), 130-35; Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War (Cambridge: 1998), 60-65; Gerhard Ritter, Sword and Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany 3 vols. (Coral Gables, FL: 1969-73); Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (Oxford: 1955). 1

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Boris E. Nol’de, Russia in the Economic War (New Haven: 1928). Sazonov, Fateful Years, 227; G. N. Trubetskoi, Russkaia diplomatiia 1914-1917 gg. i voina v Balkanakh (Montreal: 1983), 61; and journal of 21 February 1914 Special Conference in MO 3.1 no. 295. 4 On this strategic outlook and the French Plan XVII, see Stevenson, Armaments, chap. 5; Paul Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914 (London: 1979); Jean Doise and Maurice Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire 18711991 (Paris: 1987), chap. 5. 5 Girs to Sazonov, 1 August 1914, tel. 604, MO 3.5 no. 439. 6 Girs to Sazonov, 3 August 1914, tel. 618, MO 3.5 no. 509; Leont’ev to Otdel general-kvatirmeistera general’nogo shtaba [Quartermaster General, hereafter OGKGS], 4 August 1914, tels. 245 and 246, MO 3.5 nos. 561,562. 7 Leont’ev to OGKGS, 1 August 1914, tels. 232 and 236, MO 3.5 nos. 440, 441; Girs to Sazonov, 2 August 1914, tel. 611, ibid., no 478; idem, 3 August 1914, tel. 617, ibid., no. 508. 8 Ebergard to Sazonov, 6 August 1914, tel. 7016, AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 391, l. 3; Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 6 August 1914, tel. 1703 MO 6.1 no. 13; Sazonov to Girs, 7 August 1914, tel. 1712, ibid., 14n1. 9 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 10 August 1914, tel. 1776, ibid., 30n5; Delcassé to Paléologue, 8 August 1915, tel. 16, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1914 (Paris: 1999), 1:no. 185. 10 P. Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1914-1918 (Annapolis, MD: 1987). 11 On the escape of the Goeben and Breslau, see G. Miller, Superior Force: The Conspiracy behind the Escape of the Goeben and Breslau (Hull: 1996); E. W. R. Lumby, ed., Policy and Operations in the Mediterranean, 1912-1914 (London: 1970), pts. 2, 3. 12 Girs to Ebergard, 8 August 1914, tel. [639], MO 6.1, 30n. 13 Sazonov to Girs, 8 August 1914, tel. 1746, MO 6.1 no. 33. 14 Girs to Sazonov, 13 August 1914, tel. 684, MO 6.1, 80n3. 15 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY: 1926), 79. 16 Admiral Souchon, the German officer in command of the vessels, declared that “the cruisers, though flying the Turkish flag, were German vessels; he would not receive orders from the Turks.” Karpat, “Entry,” 718. 17 While the money was supposed to be collected from voluntary contributions, Morgenthau relates incidents of coercion, especially against non-Muslims (Ambassador, 76-77). See also G. Miller, Straits, 238. 18 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 12 August 1914, tels. 303 and 304, MO 6.1 no. 76 and n1. 19 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 13 August 1914, tel. 1873, MO 6.1, 68n1. 20 Ebergard to Sazonov, 7 August 1914, tel. 7035 AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 391, l. 4. 2 3

190

ROADS TO GLORY

I. K. Grigorovich, Vospominaniia byvshego morskogo ministra (St. Petersburg: 1993), 144-45; Sazonov to Girs, 9 August 1914, tel. 1748, MO 6.1 no. 38. 22 Trubetskoi, Russkaia diplomatiia, 61. 23 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 6 August 1914, tel. 1703, MO 6.1 no. 13. 24 Sazonov to Girs, 7 August 1914, tel. 1712, MO 6.1, 14n1. 25 Sazonov to Girs, 9 August 1914, tel. 1748, MO 6.1 no. 38. 26 Sazonov to Girs, 8 August 1914, tel. 1746, MO 6.1 no. 33. 27 Sazonov to Girs, 6 August 1914, tel. 1705, TR no. 16. 28 Leont’ev to OGKGS, 13 August 1914, rep. 313, MO 6.1 no. 94. 29 Ibid. 30 W. W. Gottlieb (Studies in Secret Diplomacy, 38-9) refuses to commit to either side. F. A. K. Yasamee ("The Ottoman Empire," in Decisions for War, 1914 [London: 1995], 243n47), following Howard (Partition of Turkey, 96-102), leans toward insincerity, though noting that a positive response from the Entente might have pulled Turkey toward them. C. J. Smith sees a lack of Turkish selfconfidence, leading Enver to seek a way to avoid fighting the Entente powers, while perhaps gaining some territory as well (Russian Struggle, 69-70). V. A. Emets sees the proposal as a simple maneuver to gain time to prepare the Turkish army for war against Russia (Ocherki, 110). Ulrich Trumpener agrees with this point of view, noting that Turkey kept the Germans informed of the talks (Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 [Princeton: 1968], 24-25). The most recent works on the war as a whole (Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History [New York: 1994]; Spencer G. Tucker, The Great War, 1914-18 [Bloomington, IN: 1998]; and John Keegan, The First World War [New York: 1999]) ignore the question. See also G. Miller, Straits, 235-36, who suggests that Enver actually wanted the Russians to think that Turkey had an agreement with Germany in order to make them hesitate to attack the Ottoman Empire. This point is moot. It would have been obvious to Enver that the Russians would realize that the Germans could provide no extra help to the Turks on land since they were already heavily committed on the western and eastern fronts. Naval assistance could have been more tangible and was, once the Goeben and Breslau arrived, but early on, Enver probably did not know that the warships would head for Constantinople. 31 Girs to Sazonov, 9 August 1914, tel. 650, MO 6.1 no. 48. 32 Girs to Sazonov, 9 August 1914, tel. 652, MO 6.1 no. 49. 33 Girs to Sazonov, 10 August 1914, tel. 653, TR no. 25. 34 Girs to Sazonov, 12 August 1914, tel. 674, MO 6.1 no 84. 35 On Russia’s position on Bulgarian neutrality during the war, see James M. Potts, “The Loss of Bulgaria,” in Dallin, et al., Russian Diplomacy, 194-234. 36 Girs to Sazonov, 5 August 1914, tel. 632, MO 6.1 no. 13. 37 Girs to Sazonov, 5 August 1914, tel. 630, TR no. 11. 38 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 8 August 1914, tel. 1747, MO 6.1 no. 34. 21

NOTES

191

Sazonov to Girs, 11 August 1914, tel. 1810, TR no. 27. Sazonov to Girs, 12 August 1914, tel. 1846, MO, 49n. 41 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 10 August 1914, tel. 259, LN 3.1, 2 (with Ponceau); Izvolskii to Sazonov, 11 August 1914, tel. 264, MO 6.1 no. 65. Note that C. J. Smith incorrectly interprets the former document as a French demand, Russian Struggle, 71. 42 Sazonov to Girs, 12 August 1914, tel. 1855, MO 6.1 no. 72. 43 Sazonov to Benkendorf, 15 August 1914, tel. 1896, MO 6.1 no. 100. 44 Sazonov to Benkendorf and Izvolskii, 15 August 1914, tel. 1912, TR no. 38. 45 Buchanan to Grey, 16 August 1914, tel. 288, BDFA 1 no. 61; Beaumont to Grey, 15 August 1914, tel. 545, BDFA 1 no. 58. Beaumont’s telegram contained the information that Buchanan relayed to Sazonov. 46 Sazonov to Girs, 16 August 1914, tel. 1925, TR no. 43; Sazonov to Benkendorf, 16 August 1914, tel. 1924, MO 6.1 no. 110; Paléologue to Doumergue, 16 August 1914, tel. 445, DDF (1999) no. 69. 47 Girs to Sazonov, 13 August 1914, tel. 690, TR no. 32. 48 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 17 August 1914, tel. 331, MO 6.1 no. 118; Grey to Bertie, 17 August 1914, tel. 415 (and to Buchanan as tel. 548), BDFA 1 no. 69. Note that the Greek queen was Kaiser Wilhelm II’s sister, both grandchildren of Queen Victoria. 49 Girs to Sazonov, 19 August 1914, tel. 782, MO 6.1 no. 138. 50 Lieven to Grigorovich, 10 December 1912, rep. 301, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 1 d. 5538, ll. 1-2. Grigorovich marked this document to be forwarded to the Foreign Ministry. 51 Trubetskoi to Girs, 20 August 1914, ltr., KP 1: 1. 52 Girs to Sazonov, 18 August 1914, tel. 753, TR no. 48; Mallet to Grey, 18 August 1914, tel. 562 BDFA 1 no. 76. 53 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 20 August 1914, tel. 2028, TR no. 53. 54 Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 247. Note that G. Miller (Straits, 282) thinks these approaches were directed by Enver to distract the powers. 55 Girs to Sazonov, 19 August 1914, tel. 780, MO 6.1 no. 137. 56 Girs to Sazonov, 20 August 1914, tel. 791, TR no. 52; Mallet to Grey, 20 August 1914, tel. 575, BDFA 1 no. 82. 57 Sazonov to Girs, 23 August 1914, tel. 2090, TR no. 55. 58 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 25 August 1914, tel. 364, MO, 131n1. 59 Sazonov to Izvolskii, Benkendorf and Girs, 28 August 1914, tel. 2210, MO 6.1 no. 173. 60 Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” 249-50. 61 Institute of Russian History RAN, St. Petersburg branch. Sovet ministrov rossiiskoi imperii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny (St. Petersburg: 1999), 43. 62 Sazonov to Bazili, 22 August 1914, tel. 2068, MO 6.1 no. 147. Echoing this sentiment, H. H. Asquith, the British prime minister, wrote to King George V on 23 August that the British Cabinet was nearly out of patience with Turkey; see Asquith to George V, 23 August 1914, ltr., CAB 41/35/47. 39 40

192

ROADS TO GLORY

63 Mallet to Grey, 26 August 1914, tel. 628 FO 438 2 no. 795; Grey to Buchanan, 27 August 1914, tel. 611, FO 371 2170 43607/38537; Bompard to Delcassé, 27 August 1914, tel. 369, MAE Guerre 1914-1918 Turquie 845, 153; Girs to Sazonov, 27 August 1914, tel. 858, AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 391, l. 21. 64 Girs to Sazonov, 27 August 1914, tel. 858, AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 391, l. 21; Mallet to Grey, 27 August 1914, tel. 632, FO 438 2 no. 798. 65 Bazili to Sazonov, 28 August 1914, tel. 33, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 355/357, l. 16. 66 Sazonov to Bazili, 29 August 1914, tel. 2248, MO 6.1 no. 182; Sazonov to Bazili, 30 August 1914, tel. 2271, AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 355/357, l. 19. 67 Bazili to Sazonov, 31 August 1914, tel. 34, MO 6.1, 169n. 68 Bazili to Sazonov, 1 September 1914, tel. 38, MO 6.1, 169n. 69 Sazonov to Bazili, 1 September 1914, tel. 2 [sic], AVPRI f. 138 op. 467 d. 355/357, l. 23. In MO, the ordering of this telegram and Bazili’s no. 38 implied that Bazili’s preceded Sazonov’s no. 2[sic]. In fact, the archival copy of Sazonov’s telegram indicated that he was responding to Bazili’s communication. 70 Girs to Sazonov, 9 September 1914, tel. 1028, TR no. 72; Sazonov to Girs, 10 September 1914, tel. 2528, MO, 169n. 71 Rusin to Ebergard, 14 September 1914, let. 6699/153, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 2 d. 267, ll. 82-84. 72 Ibid. 73 Sazonov to Ebergard, 11 September 1914, tel. 2564, MO 6.1 no. 245. 74 Rusin to Ebergard, 14 September 1914, ltr. 6699/153, RGAVMF f. 418 op. 2 d. 267, ll. 82-84. 75 G. Miller, Straits, 309; Girs to Sazonov, 21 September 1914, tel. 1150, AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 391, l. 39. 76 Girs to Sazonov, 27 September 1914, tel. 1230, TR no. 79. 77 G. Miller, Straits, 312-13; Mallet to Grey, 28 September 1914, tel. 885, FO 438 3 no. 372; Benkendorf to Sazonov, 29 September 1914, tel. 532, MO, 340n3; Grey to Mallet, 30 September 1914, tel. 615, FO 438 3 no. 386; Mallet to Grey, 1 October 1914, tel. 904, FO 438 3 no. 398. 78 Mallet to Grey, 5 October 1914, tel. 932, FO 438 3 no. 434. 79 Ultimately, Russia’s interest in these peoples served its own security interests. During the war, Petrograd planned to annex the region with few special privileges for the Armenians. Richard G. Hovannisian, “The Allies and Armenia, 1915-18,” Journal of Contemporary History 3, 1 (1968):163-65. 80 Vvedenskii to Sazonov, 3 August 1914, tel. 496, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3851, l. 18. 81 Sazonov to Sukhomlinov, 15 August 1914, ltr., 585, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3851, l. 17. 82 Vorontsov-Dashkov to Sazonov, 6 September 1914 [?], tel. 445, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3851, l. 66 and same in AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 386, l. 20.

NOTES

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Sazonov to Vorontsov-Dashkov, 8 September 1914, tel. 2479, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3851, l. 14. 84 Vorontsov-Dashkov to Sazonov, 20 September 1914, tel. 760, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3851, l. 69; AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 386, l. 18. 85 Sazonov to Vorontsov-Dashkov, 20 September 1914, tel. 2780, AVPRI f. 133 op. 470 d. 386, l. 19. 86 Iudenich to OGKGS, 5 October 1914, tel. 1321, RGVIA f. 2000 op. 1 d. 3851, l. 48. 87 See Stevenson, First World War, 110, 118. 88 See William A. Renzi, “Who Composed ‘Sazonov's Thirteen Points’? A Reexamination of Russia's War Aims of 1914,” American Historical Review 88, 2 (1983):347-57; Stevenson, First World War; Smith, Russian Struggle. 89 Buchanan to Grey, 25 September 1914, tel. 456, FO 438 3 no. 324. 90 Paléologue to Delcassé, 25 September 1914, tel. 663, MAE Guerre 19141918 Turquie 846, 177. 91 For the criticism, see Renzi, “Thirteen Points.” Related criticism of Paléologue can be found in Hayne, French Foreign Office, esp. chap. 11, “The Quai d’Orsay and the July Crisis of 1914.” For an excusal of Paléologue’s July 1914 behavior, see Jean Stengers, “1914: The Safety of Ciphers and the Outbreak of the First World War,” in Intelligence and International Relations, ed. C. Andrew and J. Noakes (Exeter: 1987), 29-48, esp. “Maurice Paléologue,” 33-38. 92 The full text of these accounts is given in Paléologue to Delcassé, 26 September 1914, tel. MO 6.1 no. 318, which is the version that the Russians deciphered. Crucially, in the discussion with Krivoshein, the Russian intelligence officials were unable to decipher the word that described the fate of the Straits and put in libres? for what they thought it could be. The translated version in Livre Noir 3.1, 17-18, lost the question mark, leaving it simply libres. In fact, the documents in the archives of the French Foreign Ministry indicate what I have put in the text, neutralisés, which is a less vague term than the libres guessed by the Russians. See Paléologue to Delcassé, 23 September 1914, tel. 666bis, MAE Pa-ap 211 Delcassé, 25:83. See also idem, 26 September 1914, tel. 666, MAE Pa-ap 211, Delcassé 25:83. The recently published volume of French documents for the period also gives neutralisés. Paléologue to Delcassé, 23 September 1914, tel. 666bis, DDF (1999), no. 302. 93 Buchanan to Grey, 27 September 1914, tel. 460, FO 438 3 no. 350. 94 Girs to Sazonov, 3 October 1914, tel. 1314, MO 6.1 no. 354. 95 “Conversation of Prince Trubetskoi with the Turkish chargé d’affaires,” 13 October 1914, MO 6.1 no. 383. 96 “Record of a conversation of advisor of the Second Political Department Trubetskoi with the Italian Ambassador to Petrograd Carlotti,” 24 October 1914, MO 6.1 no. 410. 97 On the loans, see G. Miller, Straits, 316-17. 83

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98 Girs to Sazonov, 19 October 1914, tel. 1506, MO, 413n1; Sazonov to Ebergard, 20 October 1914, tel. 3370, MO 6.1 no. 401; Buchanan to Grey, 20 October 1914, tel. 538 FO 438 3 no. 601. 99 Mallet to Grey, 22 October 1914, tel. 1027 FO 438 3 no. 628; Bompard to Delcassé, 26 October 1914, tel. 503, MAE Guerre 1914-1918 Turquie 847 no. 180. 100 Sazonov to Kudashev, 30 October 1914, tel. 3543/3544, TR no. 99. 101 C. J. Smith, “Great Britain and the 1914-1915 Straits Agreement with Russia: The British Promise of November 1914,” American Historical Review 70, 4 (1965):1015-34.

Chapter 6: War engaged: Allied and domestic disputes over the fate of Constantinople and the Straits, November 1914 to July 1916 The earlier trend in the historiography is characterized by such works as William A. Renzi, “Great Britain, Russia, and the Straits,” Journal of Modern History 42, 1 (1970):1-20, and C. J. Smith, “Great Britain and the 1914-1915 Straits Agreement,” 1015-34, which show Grey manipulating Sazonov to achieve his policy objectives. More recent trends on the question can be seen in G. Miller, Straits, and Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Money, Oil and Power (New York: 1991). 2 Paléologue to Delcassé, 5 November 1914, tel. 837, MAE Guerre 1914-1918 Turquie 848, 98. 3 “Our goals in regard to the Straits,” November 1914, memorandum, in Nicolas Basily [Bazili], The Abdication of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia (Princeton: 1984), 161-94. A Russian version of the document can be found as ‘Pamiatnaia zapiska vitse-direktora kantseliarii Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del N. A. Bazili,’ in Konstantinopol’ i prolivy po sekretnym dokumentam ministerstva inostrannykh del (Moscow: 1925), 1:no. 2. 4 See the discussion of the memoranda in chaps. 3 and 4. 5 Basily, “Our Goals,” 187. 6 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 9 November 1914, tel. 649, MO 6.2 no. 484. 7 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 13 November 1914, tel. 663, MO 6.2 no. 506. 8 Paléologue to Delcassé, 15 November 1914, tel. 919, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1914, vol. 1 (Paris: 1999). no. 535; MO 6.2 no. 518. 9 Aide-memoire of the British embassy to Sazonov, 14 November 1914, MO 6.2 no. 511; Sazonov to Benkendorf, 16 November 1914, tel. 3802, MO 6.2 no. 523. 10 Aide-memoire of the British Embassy to Sazonov, 18 November 1914, MO 6.2 no. 533; Buchanan to Grey, 18 November 1914, tel. 661, MO 6.2 no. 535; Sazonov to Benkendorf, 18 November 1914, tel. 3861, MO 6.2 no. 534. 11 Etter to Sazonov, 19 November 1914, tel. 680, MO 6.2 no. 538; Diary of Foreign Ministry, 23 November 1914, MO 6.2 no. 552. Etter also informed Sazonov in tel. 680 that the British government only had in mind a protectorate 1

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for Egypt, not annexation. Emets misses the subtlety of British diplomacy here (Ocherki, 118-19). 12 Emets plausibly suggests that Nicholas II had this conversation with Paléologue as a result of a memorandum written by Minister of Justice I. G. Shcheglovitov on behalf of a group of ministers. It called on the tsar to get more specific French and British commitments to Russia about the Straits. Emets, however, assumes that it was composed and delivered to the tsar before his 21 November meeting with the French ambassador. Taube states only that it was signed “toward the end of November” and draws no connection with the tsar’s interview. This memorandum has not been published, nor did it appear in my research, so its chronology cannot yet be accepted without question. Emets, Ocherki, 119; de Taube, Politique russe, 397-98. 13 Paléologue to Delcassé, 21 November 1914, tels. 958 and 959, HI Basily MSS. 14 Paléologue to Delcassé, 23 November 1914, tel. 969, MAE Pa-ap Paléologue, 1:157. 15 G. N. Mikhailovskii, Zapiski. Iz istorii rossiiskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo vedomstva, 1914-1920 gg. (Moscow: 1993), 1:87. 16 Ibid., 1:86-87. 17 Ibid., 1:87. 18 Steiner and Neilson, Britain, 87. 19 See especially G. Miller, Straits. 20 Poincaré to Paléologue, 9 March 1915, ltr., Documents Diplomatiques Français 1915 (Brussels: 2002), 1:no. 320. 21 A. V. Nemitts, “Pamiatnaia zapiska nachal’nika chernomorskoi operativnoi chasti morskogo general’nogo shtaba. Predvaritel’nye soobrazheniia konstantinopol’skoi operatsii,” 14 December 1914, KP, 1:no. 3. 22 See chap. 5. 23 Nemitts, “Predvaritel’nye soobrazheniia,” 182. 24 Ibid., 191. 25 Ibid., 195. 26 Sazonov to Ianushkevich, 21 December 1914, ltr. 863, MO 6.2 no. 675. 27 Ianushkevich to Sazonov, 25 December 1914, ltr. 1064, KP, 2:no. 2. 28 Bazili to Sazonov, 28 December 1914, ltr. MO 6.2 no. 705. 29 Sazonov to Ianushkevich, 29 December 1914, ltr. 902, KP, 2: no. 5. 30 ‘Pamiatnaia zapiska direktora diplomaticheskoi kantseliarii pri shtabe verkhovnogo glavnokomanduiushchego kn. N. A. Kudasheva,’ 31 December 1914, KP, 2:no. 6. 31 Emets, Ocherki, 126. In his memoir, Sazonov claims that there was “no arguing with the General Staff on questions of strategy.” His very insistence belies this assertion. In general, the memoir’s discussion of the Straits problem during the war is very incomplete (Fateful Years, chap. 10).

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32 Bazili to Sazonov, 27 December 1914, ltr., KP, 2:no. 3. See also Stone, Eastern Front. On the military supply problem, see Jones, “Imperial Russia’s Forces.” 33 ‘Pamiatnaia zapiska direktora diplomaticheskoi kantseliarii pri shtabe verkhovnogo glavnokomanduiushchego kn. N. A. Kudasheva,’ 31 December 1914, KP, 2:no. 11; J; Hanbury-Williams, The Emperor Nicholas II as I knew him. (London: 1922), 23-24. 34 Churchill to Grey, 16 January 1915, ltr; Grey’s minute, Martin Gilbert, ed., Winston S. Churchill, vol. 3 Companion, pt. 1 (Boston: 1973), 423. Also G. Miller, Straits, 347-415. The following discussion of British deliberations on the Dardanelles campaign is based upon Miller’s reconstruction. 35 “Pamiatnaia zapiska angliiskogo posol’stva v Petrograde ministru inostrannykh del,” 20 January 1915, MO 7.1 no. 43. 36 Sazonov, Fateful Years, 255. 37 Sazonov to Kudashev, 21 January 1915, ltr. 12, KP, 2:no. 13. 38 Kudashev to Sazonov, 25 January 1915, ltr, MO 7.1 no. 79; Nikolai Nikolaevich to Goremykin, rescript 1468, MO 7.1 no. 196. 39 Buchanan to Grey, 12 February 1915, tel. 168, FO 438 5 no. 290. 40 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, tel. 592, MO 7.1 192. 41 Sazonov’s speech before the State Duma, 9 February 1915, Stenograficheskie otchety Gos. Dumy 4th soz., sess. 3, zased. 1, 27 January 1915 [old style], (Petrograd: 1915) col. 17; Paléologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs (London: 1924), 1:273-74; BDFA no. 481. 42 Another individual who saw the war as a great chasm dividing the past from the future was General M. A. Alekseev, who would be Nicholas’s chief of staff when the tsar took command of the army later in the year. Alekseev had said in April 1916 that in the Russian government, “there are so few people who understand that an abyss separates what was before the war from that after.” Bazili to Sazonov, 24 April 1916, ltr., AVPRI, f. 138 op. 467 d. 361/363, ll. 2528. 43 Emets, Ocherki, 134. 44 “Zapiska, sostavlennaia v ministerstve inostrannykh del,” 21 February 1915, MO 7.1 no. 232. 45 Kudashev to Sazonov, 23 February 1915, ltr. 334, MO 7.1 no. 245. 46 Emets, Ocherki, 135. 47 Ibid., 135-36. 48 Ibid., 136. 49 Kudashev to Sazonov, 24 February 1915, ltr, KP, 2:no. 31. Emets suggests that Danilov changed his mind because of the arrival of Sukhomlinov from Petrograd soon after that meeting chaired by Goremykin on the 22nd (Ocherki, 138). In a report he delivered on 27 February, Danilov returned to the thesis that an operation at the Straits would have to await the end of the fight against Germany. Much of the rest dealt with the operational details of such an

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operation. “Zapiska s osnovnym polozheniiam . . .,” 27 February 1915, MO 7.1 no. 265. 50 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 26 February 1915, tel. 815, MO 7.1 no. 258. 51 Sazonov to Benkendorf and Izvolskii, 2 March 1915, tel. 879, MO 7.1 no. 258 no. 1. 52 Sazonov to Kudashev, 28 February 1915, tel. 861, MO 7.1 no. 268. 53 Sazonov to Nicholas II, 1 March 1915, report, MO 7.1 no. 271. 54 Murav’ev to Sazonov, 1 March 1915, tels. 92, 94, 96, KP, 2:nos. 39-41. 55 Diary of Foreign Ministry, 2 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 280. 56 Emets incorrectly sees Sazonov’s maneuver as having failed (Ocherki, 139). 57 Buchanan to Grey, 1 March 1915, tel. 235, FO 438 5 no. 384. 58 Paléologue to Delcassé, 1 March 1915, tels. 347-8, MAE Pa-ap 211 Delcassé, 25:83-84. 59 Sazonov to Benkendorf and Izvolskii, 2 March 1915, tel. 887, MO 7.1 no. 278. 60 Paléologue to Delcassé, 4 March 1915, tel. 361, MAE Pa-ap 211 Delcassé, 25:93. 61 Paléologue to Delcassé, 4 March 1915, tel. 367, MAE Pa-ap 211 Delcassé, 25:94. 62 Diary of Foreign Ministry, 4 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 301; Sazonov to Nicholas II, 4 March 1915, report, MO 7.1 no. 298; Paléologue to Delcassé, 4 March 1915, tel. 367, MAE Pa-ap Delcassé, 25:99-100; Buchanan to Grey, 4 March 1915, tel. 249, FO 371/2481/25969. 63 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 4 March 1915, tel. 937, MO 7.1 no. 299. 64 Diary of Foreign Ministry, 5 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 312; Paléologue to Delcassé, 5 March 1915, tel. 374, HI Basily MSS.; Buchanan to Grey, 5 March 1915, tel. 257, FO 371/2481/26072. Bertie related to Grey on 7 March that Delcassé felt that the best resolution would be the demilitarization of the Straits and that absorbing Constantinople could well “lead to Russia falling to pieces.” Had Sazonov known of these attitudes, he might have been even more severe with the French. Bertie to Grey, 7 March 1915, ltr, FO 800/177, 146-52. 65 “Pamiatnaia zapiska angliiskogo posol’stva v Petrograde ministru inostrannykh del,” 6 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 321. 66 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 7 March 1915, tel. 159, MO 7.1 no. 307n1. 67 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 7 March 1915, tel. 993, KP, i:no. 60. 68 “Pamiatnaia zapiska frantsuzskogo posol’stva v Petrograde ministru inostrannykh del,” 8 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 330. 69 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 9 March 1915, tel. 127, KP, i:no. 69. 70 Bertie to Grey, 10 March 1915, tel. 87, FO 371/2449/25014/28338; Bertie to Grey, 11 March 1915, tel., FO 371/2449/25014/28458. 71 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 10 March 1915, tel. 129, MO 7.1 no. 343. 72 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 10 March 1915, tel. 170, MO 7.1 no. 340.

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Asquith to Stanley, 10 March 1915, ltr.; H. H. Asquith, Letters to Venetia Stanley, ed. M. and E. Brock (Oxford: 1982), 469. Anglo-French discussions on the partition of the Ottoman Empire culminated in the Sykes-Picot talks of late 1915. See, for example, Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923 (Cambridge: 1999), chap. 15. 74 Grey to Buchanan, 10 March 1915, tel. 329, FO 371/2481; Grey to Buchanan, 11 March 1915, tel. 43, FO 371/2449/25014. 75 “Aide-memoire communicated to Russian Government,” 12 March 1915, BDFA no. 548 and MO 7.1 no. 351; Memorandum [to Russian government], 12 March 1915, BDFA no. 548 and MO 7.1 no. 352; see also enclosures in Buchanan to Grey, 13 March 1915, ltr. 44, FO 371 2449/35812. 76 Buchanan to Grey, 13 March 1915, tel. 54, FO 371/2449/25014; Buchanan to Grey, 13 March 1915, ltr. 44, FO 371 2449/35812 (which indicates that tel. 54 should be dated 12 March); Diary of Foreign Ministry, 12 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 355. 77 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 25 January 1915, tel. 16, LN 3, 48. 78 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 2 March 1915, tel. 107, MO 7.1 no. 284; Benkendorfto Sazonov, 6 March 1915, tel. 155, KP, i:no. 59. 79 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 4 March 1915, tel. 113, MO 7.1 no. 305. 80 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 4 March 1915, tel. 115, MO 7.1 no. 307. 81 Buchanan to Grey, 5 March 1915, tel. 254, FO 371 2450 25971. 82 Buchanan to Grey, 8 March 1915, tel. 275, BDFA no. 502. 83 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 9 March 1915, tel. 128, MO 7.1 no. 334. 84 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 1 March 1915, tel. 106, MO 7.1 no. 273. 85 Delcassé to P. Cambon and Paléologue, 8 March 1915, tel., MAE Guerre 1914-1918 Turquie 850, 44. 86 Ibid., 44-46. 87 Delcassé to P. Cambon and Paléologue, 11 March 1915, tel. 756-58, MAE Guerre 1914-1918 Turquie 850, 72-73. 88 Paléologue to Delcassé, 12 March 1915, tel. 409, MAE Guerre 1914-1918 Turquie 850, 74. 89 Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 124-26. 90 Sazonov made a similar threat to Paléologue on 18 April 1916 over French meddling in Russian plans for the reunification of Poland within the Russian Empire; see Bobroff, “Devolution in Wartime: Sergei D. Sazonov and the Future of Poland, 1910-1916,” International History Review 22, 3 (2000):521; Dallin, “The Future of Poland,” in Dallin et al., Russian Diplomacy, 39. 91 Diary of Foreign Ministry, 16 March 1915, MO 7.1 no. 381; Paléologue to Delcassé, 17 March 1915, tels. 426, 427, 428, MAE Pa-ap Delcassé, 24:65, 66, 67; Buchanan to Grey, 17 March 1915, tel. 314, FO 371/2449/25014. Note that in his memoirs, Paléologue states that on being shown the map of France’s expectations in the Middle East, Nicholas said simply, “I agree to all you ask.” Paléologue’s contemporary telegrams belie this simplification. See Paléologue, Memoirs, 1:303. 73

NOTES

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Buchanan to Grey, 17 March 1915, tel. 314, FO 371 2449/25014. Marian Kent, “Asiatic Turkey,” in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: 1977), 442-43; French, British Strategy, 82-83. 94 Grey to Buchanan, 19 March 1915, tel. 380, FO 371 2449/31923 and resulting aide-memoire of 20 March in MO 7.1 no. 398. 95 Buchanan to Grey, 20 March 1915, tel. 344, FO 371 2449/32920. 96 On the Sykes-Picot agreements, see Stevenson, First World War, 128-33; Dmitri L. Shevelv, “K istorii zakliucheniia soglasheniia o razdele aziatskikh territorii osmanskoi imperii 1916 g.” Vostok 5 (2001): 39-43. 97 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 23 March 1915, tel. 1315, KP, 1:no. 88. 98 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 24 March 1915, tel. 168, KP, 1:no. 89. 99 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 1 April 1915, tel. 189, KP, 1:no. 94. 100 Sazonov to Izvolskii, 3 April 1915, tel. 1518, KP, 1:no. 95. 101 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 5 April 1915, tel. 197, KP, 1:no. 97. 102 “Verbal’naia nota frantsuzskogo posol’stva v Petrograde ministru inostrannykh del” 10 April 1915, MO 7.2 no. 506. 103 On British interest in Greek participation, see G. Miller, Straits, 408-10; Christos Theodoulou, Greece and the Entente, August 1, 1914-September 15, 1916 (Thessaloniki: 1971), chap. 4. 104 Grey to Buchanan, 12 January 1915, tel. 39, FO 438 5 3601. 105 Buchanan to Grey, 13 January 1915, tel. 47, BDFA no. 417; Paléologue to Delcassé, 13 January 1915, tel. 61, MAE Guerre Turquie 1914-1918, 849,135; Buchanan to Grey, 17 January 1915, tel. 62, FO 438 5 6224; Buchanan to Grey, 24 January 1915, tel. 92, BDFA no. 435. 106 Buchanan to Grey, 17 January 1915, tel. 62, FO 438 5 6224; Demidov to Sazonov, 27 February 1915, tel. 72, KP, ii:no. 97. 107 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 4 March 1915, tel. 153 MO 7.1 no. 302. 108 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 5 March 1915, tel. 116, MO 7.1 no. 308. 109 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 6 March 1915, tel. 120, MO 7.1 no. 322. 110 Trubetskoi to Sazonov, 4 March 1915, tel. 231, KP, 2:no. 106. 111 Buchanan to Grey, 6 March 1915, project tel., KP, 2:no. 111; Sazonov to Benkendorf, 7 March 1915, tel. 990, KP, 2:no. 112. 112 On this division, see Theodoulou, Greece and the Entente, 47-51. 113 Demidov to Sazonov, 6 March 1915, tel. 84, KP, 2:no. 109. 114 Grey to Buchanan and to Bertie, 3 April 1915, tels. 511 and 755, FO 438 6 39192. 115 Benkendorf to Sazonov, 17 April 1915, tel. 255, KP, 2:no. 135; also, Prince George’s trip to Paris, KP, 2:210s; Benkendorf to Sazonov, 26 April 1915, tel. 277. 116 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 21 April 1915, tel. 1800, KP, 2 :no. 142; Mandelstam, “ Politique russe,” 771. 117 On relevant separate peace proposals during the war, see Stevenson, “War Aims and Peace Negotiations” in The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World 92 93

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War, ed. Hew Strachan (Oxford: 1998); Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, chap. 5. 118 Sazonov to Benkendorf and Izvolskii, 20 January 1915, tel. 115, MO 7.1 no. 44; French, British Strategy, 79. 119 Grey to Buchanan, 10 February 1915, tel. 206, KP, 1:no. 32, Benkendorf to Sazonov, 11 February 1915, tel. 85, KP, 1:no. 33; “Pamiatnaia zapiska velikobritanskogo posol’stva ministru inostrannykh del,” 12 February 1915, MO 7.1 no. 182. French states that the Foreign Office knew by mid-January that the Turks would accept no peace that required the loss of territory, making Grey’s position here self-contradictory (British Strategy, 81). 120 Buchanan to Grey, 12 February 1915, tel. 168, BDFA no. 469; Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 14 February 1915, tel. 592 MO 7.1 no. 192. 121 Sazonov to Izvolskii and Benkendorf, 28 February 1915, tel. 850, MO 7.1 no. 267; Buchanan to Grey, 27 February 1915, tel. 225, BDFA no. 483; Paléologue to Delcassé, 27 February 1915, tel. 337, MAE Pa-ap 211 Delcassé, 25:87. 122 Ianushkevich to Sazonov, 2 March 1915, tel. 98, KP, 2:no. 260; Nikolai Nikolaevich to Nicholas II, 2 March 1915, tel. 8455, MO 7.1 no. 287. 123 Sazonov to Ianushkevich, 3 March 1915, tel. 911, MO 7.1 no. 289. 124 Zeman, Diplomatic History, 63; Bakherakht to Sazonov, 9 April 1915, tel. 139 KP, 2:no. 264; Sazonov to Izvolskii, 21 May 1915, tel. 2365, KP, 2:no. 265, Izvolskii to Sazonov, 23 May 1915, tel. 332, KP, 2:no. 266; Izvolskii to Sazonov, 28 May 1915, tel. 344, KP, 2:no. 267. 125 Bakherakht to Sazonov, 7 February 1916, tel. 75, MO 10 no. 155; Bakherakht to Sazonov, 27 June 1916, tel. 379, KP, 2:no. 275. 126 Bakherakht to Sazonov, 27 June 1916, tel. 379, KP, 2:no. 275. 127 Izvolskii to Sazonov, 22 March 1916, tel. 196, MO 10 no. 397. See also Cabinet Ministre des Affaires Étrangers, à destinataires non désignés, 26 December 1915, Mem. s. n., Documents Diplomatiques Français 1915 (Brussels: PIE – Peter Lang, 2004), 3:no. 692; Briand to Barrère, P. Cambon, and Paléologue, 29 December 1915, tels. no. 2245-2246, 4569-4570, 2262-2263, ibid., no. 706. 128 On this “Djemal Pasha Intrigue,” see Smith, Russian Struggle, 354-58. 129 Kudashev to Sazonov, 18 February 1916, ltr., KA 28, 29-32. 130 Kudashev to Sazonov, 21 October 1915, ltr., KA 28,. 8-10. 131 Kudashev to Sazonov, 21 October 1915, ltr., KA 28, 11-12. 132 Kudashev to Sazonov, 18 February 1916, ltr., KA 28, 29-32. 133 Zeman, Diplomatic History, 83-87; Stevenson, First World War, 91-93; idem, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York: 2004), 113. For a treatment of the war-long German attempt to convince one of the Entente to accept a separate peace, see L. L. Farrar, Divide and Conquer: German Efforts to Conclude a Separate Peace, 1914-1918 (Boulder, CO: 1978). 134 Gottlieb, Secret Diplomacy, 104-18. 135 Farrar, Divide and Conquer, 5-12. 136 Ibid., 13-17.

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U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 142-51. Vasilchikova to Nicholas II, 10 March 1915, ltr., KP, 2:no. 331; Farrar, Divide and Conquer, 18. 139 Vasilchikova to Nicholas II, 30 March 1915, ltr., MO 7.2 no. 454. 140 Daily Journal of Foreign Ministry, 28 March 1915, MO 7.2 no. 441. Note that Alexandra had stopped sending letters to Vasilchikova before this time, even though they were old friends. See Alexandra to Nicholas II, 22 March 1915, ltr. no. 286, The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra: April 1914-March 1917 (Westport, CT: 1999), no. 213. 141 Vasilchikova to Nicholas II, 27 May 1915, ltr., KP, 2:no. 332. 142 Farrar, Divide and Conquer, 19. 143 Alexandra to Nicholas II, 30 April 1915, ltr. no. 310, Complete Correspondence, no. 268. 144 Farrar, Divide and Conquer, 19. 145 Nekliudov to Sazonov, 20 July 1915, tel. 234, KP, 2:no. 333. 146 Nekliudov to Sazonov, 28 July 1915, tels. 260 no. 1 and 2, KP, 2:nos. 335, 336. 147 See also Nekliudov to Sazonov, 23 July 1915, tel. 241, KP, 2:no. 334; Nekliudov to Sazonov, 31 July 1915, ltr., KP, 2:no. 337. 148 See Bobroff, “Devolution,” 505-28. 149 A. N. Iakhontov, Prologue to Revolution, ed. Michael Cherniavsky (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1967), and idem “Tiazholye dni,” in Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii 18 (1926), 15-136. See also Alexandra’s letters of September 1915, especially 19 September 1915 no. 346, Complete Correspondence, no. 440, 17 March 1916, no. 892, ibid., no. 464. 137 138

Conclusion: A Russian tragedy Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven: 1999), esp. 58-66. 2 Spring, “Russian Foreign Policy.” 3 This attitude toward written agreements puts other Russian diplomatic concessions in a clearer light. Sazonov’s willingness to allow the establishment of an international regime in charge of a railway proposed to connect Serbia with the Adriatic Sea indicates how distant the problem of Serbian access to the sea was from the center of Russian interests. 4 McDonald, United Government, chaps. 8 and 9. 1

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SS Ca 14 SS Cb 13 SS Ea 157-58, 160-61, 163 Great Britain Public Record Office (London) ADM 1 Admiralty Board In-Letters ADM 116 Admiralty Board Cases CAB 41 Photographic Copies of Cabinet Letters in the Royal Archives FO 371 General Correspondence, Political FO 372 General Correspondence, Treaty FO 418 Russia Confidential Print FO 438 Confidential Print FO 800 Papers of Foreign Secretaries and Diplomats Grey Nicolson FO 881 Confidential Print Russia Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow) f. 133. Kantseliariia f. 134. Arkhiv "Voina" f. 135. Osobyi politicheskii otdel f. 137. Otchety MID f. 138. Sekretnyi arkhiv ministra f. 151. Politicheskii arkhiv f. 161. St. Peterburgskii glavnyi arkhiv

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f. 323. Diplomaticheskaia kantseliariia pri stavka f. 340. Kollektsia dokumentov i materialov chinovnikov MID op. 584. N. G. Gartvig op. 597. A. A. Girs op. 610. B. Nol'de op. 611. M. A. Taube op. 706. A. I. Savinskii op. 807. A. A. Neratov op. 808. A. M. Petraev op. 812. Sergei D. Sazonov op. 835. A. P. Izvol'skii op. 837. V. Svatkovskii op. 839. I. Ia. Korostovets op. 840. A. M. Onu op. 899. V. N. Murav’ev op. 902. G. N. Trubetskoi Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv voenno-morskogo flota (St. Petersburg) f. 410. Kantseliariia morskogo ministra f. 417. Glavnyi morskoi shtab f. 418. Morskoi general’nyi shtab f. 420. Kantseliariia morskogo ministra f. 701. I. K. Grigorovich f. 1335. A. I. Rusin Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow) f. 1. f. 68. Ia. G. Zhilinskii f. 89. A. A. Polivanov

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f. 151 f. 2000 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (St. Petersburg) f. 23. Ministerstvo torgovli i promyshlennosti f. 560. Ministerstvo finansov f. 696. Tolstoi family f. 1016. Palen family f. 1038. R. R. Rozen f. 1062. M. A. Taube f. 1162. f. 1276. Sovet ministrov f. 1278. Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskii otchet f. 1282. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del f. 1358. S.-Peterburgskoe telegrafnoe agenstvo. 1902-1917 f. 1409. Sobstvennaia ego imperatorskogo velichestva kantseliariia f. 1542. Shakhovskii f. 1569. P. P. Izvol'skii f. 1571. A. V. Krivoshein f. 1617. M. M. Andronnikov f. 1622. S. Iu. Witte f. 1642. D. N. Kulomzin f. 1649. A. B. Neidgart f. 1660. N. K. Svechinskii f. 1662. P. A. Stolypin Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow) f. 543. Kollektsia rukopisei tsarskosel’skogo dvortsa f. 555. A. I. Guchkov

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f. 559. A. P. Izvol’skii f. 564. A. F. Koni f. 568. V. N. Lamsdorf f. 570. A. A. Makarov f. 577. A. A. Neratov f. 578. Miasoedov f. 579. P. N. Miliukov f. 596. M. A. Taube f. 601. Nikolai II f. 604. P. N. Struve f. 605. Rodzianko f. 627. B. V. Stiurmer f. 642. Maria Feodorovna f. 670. Nikolai Mikhailovich f. 671. Nikolai Nikolaevich f. 724. N. A. Maklakov f. 813. M . F. Shilling f. 887. Geiden f. 892. A. A. Girs f. 1126. Benkendorf f. 1467. Cherezvechainaia sledstvennaia komissiia State Public Library im. Saltykov-Shchedrin (St. Petersburg) f. 124. A. A. Savinskii f. 422. L. V. Vasil’ev f. 1000. V. B. Lopukhin

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United States Hoover Institution Archive (Stanford) Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bazili Collection Sergei D. Sazonov Collection Published Documents and Statistical Sources Adamov, E. A., ed. Evropeiskie derzhavy i Turtsiia vo vremia mirovoi voiny, Konstantinopol’ i prolivy. Moscow: 1925. Anderson, M. S. The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923. New York: St. Martin’s, 1970. Cherniavsky, Michael, ed. Prologue to Revolution: Notes of A. N. Iakhontov on the Secret Meetings of the Council of Ministers, 1915. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Dugdale, E. T. S., ed. German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914. 4 vols. London: Methuen, 1928-1931. France. Ministrère des Affaires Etrangères. Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914) 2e et 3e série. Paris: 1929-1954. New unnumbered series for the years of the First World War, 1999-2005. Fuhrmann, Joseph T., ed. The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra: April 1914-March 1917. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999. Geiss, I., ed. July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War. London: Batsford, 1967. Golder, Frank A. Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917. New York: Century, 1927. Gooch, G. P., and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. 11 vols. London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1926-1938. Great Britain, Foreign Office. British and Foreign State Papers 1870-1871. London: 1877.

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Lepsius, J., et al., eds. Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes. 40 vols. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-1927. Lettres des Grands-Ducs à Nicolas II. Translated by M. Lichnovsky. Paris: Payot, 1926. Lumby, E. W. R., ed. Policy and Operations in the Mediterranean, 1912-1914. London: Navy Records Society, 1970. Marchand, René, ed. Un Livre Noir: Diplomatie d'avant guerre d'après les documents des archives russes, novembre 1910-juillet, 1914. 3 vols. in 6 parts. Paris: Librarie du Travail, 1922-1934. Materialy po istorii franko-russkikh otnoshenii za 1910-1914 gg. Moscow: 1922. McCarthy, Justin. The Arab World, Turkey, and the Balkans (1878-1914): A Handbook of Statistics. Boston: G. J. Hall, 1982. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. 2d and 3d series. Moscow: Gos. sots., 1931-1940. Preston, Anthony. Battleships of World War I. London: Stackpole, 1972. Russia. Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie Otchety. St. Petersburg: Gos. tip., 1906-1917. Russia. Sovet Ministrov. Osobyi zhurnal Soveta ministrov tsarskoi Rossii 19061917 gg. 6 vols. Moscow: Institut istorii SSSR AN SSSR, 1988. Schreiner, G. A., ed. Entente Diplomacy and the World: Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909-1914. London: Knickerbocker, 1921. Schilling, Baron M. F., ed. How the War Began in 1914. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925. Shchegolev, P. E., ed. Padenie tsarskogo rezhima: Stenograficheskie otchety doprosov i pokazanii dannykh v 1917 g. v Cherezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo pravitel'stva. 7 vols. Leningrad: Gos. izd-vo, 1924-1927. Siebert, B., ed. Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel. 3 vols. Berlin: W. de Groyter, 1928. Stieve, Friedrich, ed. Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis 1911-1914, Aus dem Geheimakten der Russischen Staatarchiv. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, m.b.H., 1926.

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Autobiographical and Memoir Material Abrikossow, D. I. Revelations of a Russian Diplomat: the Memoirs of Dmitrii I. Abrikossow. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Alexander, Grand Duke of Russia. Once a Grand Duke. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1932. Alexandra Fedorovna, Empress. Letters of the Tsartisa to the Tsar, 19141916. Edited by Sir Bernard Pares. Hattiesburg: McBride, 1970. Andrassy, Count. Diplomacy and the War. London: Bale, 1921. Andrei Vladimirovich, Grand Duke. Dnevnik za 1915. MoscowLeningrad: 1925. Asquith, H. H. Letters to Venetia Stanley. Selected and edited by Michael and Eleanor Brock. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. ___. Memories and Reflections, 1852-1927. 2 vols. London: Cassel, 1928. Bark, P. L. “Vospominaniia P. L. Barka.” Vozrozhdenie nos. 43, 48, 15770, 172-84. 1957-67. Bartholomei, Michel de. Les memoires d'un ambassadeur russe. Paris: np, 1963. Basily, Nicolas de. Diplomat of Imperial Russia 1903-1917. Stanford: Hoover, 1973. Bazili, Nikolai Aleksandrovich. Nicolas de Basily, Diplomat of Imperial Russia, 1903-1917: The Abdication of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia: a Memoir. Princeton: Kingston, 1984. Bertie, Francis. The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame. 2 vols. London: Dornan, 1924. Bethmann Hollweg, T. von. Reflections on World War. London: Butterworth, 1920. Bing, Edward J., ed. The Letters of Tsar Nicholas and Empress Marie. London: Nicholson and Watson, 1937. Blondel, Jules François. Entente cordiale: Fifty True Stories, mostly from Diplomatic Experience. London: Caduceus, 1971. Bock, M. von. Reminiscences of my Father. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1970.

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Bogdanovich, A. V. Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa: Dnevnik A. V. Bogdanovich. Moscow and Leningrad: np, 1924. Bok, Mariia. P. A. Stolypin: Vospominaniia o moem ottse. Sovremennik, 1992.

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Bompard, Maurice. Mon ambassade en Russie, 1903-1908. Paris: Plon, 1937. Brusilov, A. A. A Soldier's Notebook 1914-1918. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970. Bubnov, A. V tsarskoi stavke. New York: Izd-vo imeni Chekhova, 1955. Buchanan, George. My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories. 2 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1923. Bülow, Prince von. Memoirs. 4 vols. London: Putnam, 1931. Buxhoeveden, Baroness Sophia. The Life and Tragedy of Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress of Russia London: Longmans, Green, 1930. Cambon, Paul. Correspondance 1870-1924. 3 vols. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1940-1946. Clemenceau, Georges. Grandeur and Misery of Victory. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930. Curzon, George W. Persia and the Persian Question. 2 vols. London: Frank Cass, 1966. Czernin, O. War Memoirs. London: Cassell, 1919. Danilov, Yu. N. Rossiia v mirovoi voine, 1914-15. Berlin: “Slovo,” 1924. Denikin, Anton I. The Career of a Tsarist Officer: Memoirs,, 1872-1916. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975. ___. The Russian Turmoil: Military, Social, and Political. London: Dutton, 1922. Djemal Pasha, Ahmed. Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919. London: Hutchinson, 1922. Epanchin, N. A. Na sluzhbe trekh imperatorov. Moscow: Nashe nasledie, 1996. Fedotoff White, D. Survival Through War and Revolution in Russia. London: Milford, 1939.

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Giolitti, G. Memoirs of My Life. London: Chapman and Dodd, 1923. Golovine, Nicholas N. The Russian Army in the World War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931. Grey of Fallodon, Viscount. Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916. 2 vols. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925. Grigorovich, I. K. Vospominaniia byvshego morskogo ministra. St. Petersburg: Deva, 1993. Guchkov, A. I. Rechi po voprosam gosudarstvennoi oborony i ob obshchei politike, 1908-1917 gg. Petrograd: np, 1917. Gurko, V. I. Features and Figures of the Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1939. ___. Memories and Impressions of War and Revolution in Russia. London: J. Murray, 1918. Gwynn, S., ed. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1929. Hanbury-Williams, Sir J. The Emperor Nicholas II as I Knew Him. London: Humphreys, 1922. Hardinge of Penshurst, Charles. Old Diplomacy: the Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. London: J. Murray, 1947. Hopwood, D. The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Howard, C. H. D., ed. The Diary of Edward Goschen 1900-1914. London: Royal Historical Society, 1980. Ignat’ev, A. A. A Subaltern in Old Russia. London: Hutchinson, 1944. Izvol’skii, A. P. Vospominaniia. otnosheniia, 1989.

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Jäckh, Ernst. Kiderlen-Wächter: Der Staatsmann und Mensch. Briefwechsel und Nachlass. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1924. Kalmykov, Andrei Dmitrievich. Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Kizevetter, Aleksandr A. Na rubezhe dvukh stoletii (Vospominaniia 18911914). Prague: Obris, 1929. Knox, Major-General Sir Alfred. With the Russian Army, 1914-1917. 2 vols. London: Hutchinson, 1921. Kokovtsov, V. N. Iz moego proshlogo. Vospominaniia 1903-1919 gg. 2 vols. Paris: Illustrirovannaia Rossiia, 1933. ___. Out of My Past. Hoover War Library Publications. Translated by Laura Matveev. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935. Krivoshein, K. A. A. V. Krivoshein, ego znachenie v istorii Rossii nachala XX veka. Paris: np, 1973. Lemke, Mikhail K. 250 dnei v tsarskoi stavke. Petrograd: Gos. izd-vo, 1920. Liman von Sanders, Otto. Five Years in Turkey. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1927. Louis, Georges. Les Carnets de Georges Louis: Directeur des Affaires Politique au Ministrre des Affaires Etrangères, Ambassadeur de France en Russie. Paris: F. Reider, 1936. Marie, Grand Duchess of Russia. Education of a Princess, a Memoir. New York: Viking, 1931. Mikhailovskii, G. N. Zapiski. Iz istorii rossiiskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo vedomstva, 1914-1920 gg. 2 vols. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1993. Miliukov, P. N. Political Memoirs, 1905-1917. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967. ___. Vospominaniia, 1859-1917. 2 vols. New York: Izd-vo im Chekhova, 1955. Morgenthau, H. Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1926. Mosolov, A. A. At the Court of the Last Tsar. London: Methuen, 1935.

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Solov’ev, Yu. Ya. 25 let moei diplomaticheskoi sluzhby. Moscow: Gos. izd-vo, 1928. ___.Vospominaniia diplomata 1893-1922. Moscow: Izd-vo sots-ekon. 1939, 1959. Stolypine, Arcady. De l’Empire à exil. Paris: Albin Michel, 1996. Sukhomlinov, V. A. Vospominaniia. Berlin: Russkoe universalnoe izd-vo 1924. Taube, M. de. La politique russe d'avant guerre et la fin de l'empire des tsars. Paris: Leroux, 1928. Tcharykow, N. V. Glimpses of High Politics. London: Macmillan, 1931. Trubetskoi, Prince E. N. Iz prozhlogo. Vospominaniia iz putevykh zametok. Sofia: Knigoizd-vo “Rus”, 1921-1926. Trubetskoi, Prince G. N. Russkaia diplomatiia, 1914-1917 gg. i voina na Balkanakh. Montreal: Editions "R.U.S.," 1983. Vitte, Sergei Iu. Vospominaniia: tsarstvovanie Nikolaia II. Tallinn: Skif Aleks, 1994. Voeikov, V. N. S tsarem i bez tsaria. Moscow: Terra, 1995. Secondary Works Books and Theses Abbot, G. F. Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922. London: Methuen & Co., 1922. Adams, Michael C. C. The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. Adamthwaite, Anthony. Grandeur and Misery: France’s Bid for Power in Europe 1914-1940. London: Arnold, 1995. Adelson, Roger. London and the Invention of the Middle East; Money Power and War, 1902-1922. London: Yale University Press, 1995. ___. Mark Sykes, Portrait of an Amateur. London: Jonathan Cape, 1975. Ahmad, F. The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914. Oxford: Clarendon, 1969.

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Origins

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INDEX

Abyssinia, 22 Adamov, E. A., 6 Admiralty, Great Britain, 5, 121 Adowa, 22 Adrianople, 65 Attack on, 59, 60, 61, 66, 67 Possession of, 43, 44, 47-51, 60, 67, 69, 71, 73-74, 118 Aehrenthal, Alois Lexa von, 13 Agadir Crisis, 22, 26 Albania, 58 Alekseev, M. A., 143-44, 196n. 42 Alexandra, Empress (of Russia), 145-46, 147, 201n. 140 Alexandretta, 137 Ambassadors Conference (London, 19121913), 58-59, 62, 66, 72 Anan’ich, B. V., 9 Andersen, Hans, 144-45 Anglo-Russian Entente, 3, 16, 134 Argentina, 91 Armenia, 5, 70-72, 103, 110-11, 180n. 190, 192n. 79 Asquith, H. H., 64, 191n. 62 Assyrians, 111 Austria-Hungary, 6, 36, 84, 93, 95, 145 Balkans and, 1, 3, 28, 56 Balkan Wars and, 48-49, 51, 58, 60, 62, 64, 71-72, 74, 150 Bosnian Crisis and, 13-14 Italy and, 22, 27-29, 34 Ottoman Empire and, 68-69, 93, 101 World War I and, 98, 101, 107, 113, 138, 142, 153

See Central Powers; Fleets, Austrian; Russia, Relations with AustriaHungary Avrekh, A. Ia., 7 Balkan league or alliance, 9, 17, 28, 30, 37, 43, 56, 66 Balkans, 1, 3, 5, 17, 27, 31, 41, 45-46, 56, 84, 97, 115, 122 Fear of war in, 23, 29-32, 36, 38, 42-44 Balkan Wars (1912-1913), 29, 31, 36, 44, 46-47, 70, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 90, 101 124, 127, 150, 174n. 80, 174n. 86, 176n. 123, 180n. 190 Bulgarian campaign in Thrace, 47-53, 57, 59-61, 63-66, 150, 175n. 96, 177n. 126, 177n. 141 Balmoral Castle meeting (1912), 42-43, 47, 172n. 58 Baltic Sea, 21, 78, 92, 125 Russian trade on, 4 Baltic Port meeting (1912), 38-42 Barrère, Camille, 31, 166n. 25 Bazili, N. A., 82-84, 118, 122, 124, 127, 129, 131 Beirut, 28 Belgium, 54, 118, 154 Benckendorff, Aleksandr K., 24, 26, 47, 59, 63-65, 66, 90, 99, 119, 126, 129, 131-34, 139 Bertie, Sir Francis, 133, 166n. 25 Bestuzhev, I. V., 7, 163n. 10 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 38 Black Sea, 1-3, 17, 107-9, 118, 124, 146, 155 Balance on, 3, 17-18, 21, 75, 76, 79-81, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90-91, 93-94, 98

244

ROADS TO GLORY

Black Sea, continued Naval operations on, 17, 23, 45, 70, 73, 81, 86, 96, 100, 109, 150 Trade on, 4, 30 See Fleets, Russian, Black Sea Fleet Bobchev, S. S., 50, 51, 174n. 80 Bompard, Maurice, 46, 105 Bonar Law, Arthur, 64 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 13, 14 Bosnian Crisis, 9, 13-14, 15, 18, 30, 75 Bosphorus, 80, 118, 120 German warships and, 99, 100, 107 Russian attack on, considered, 124-26, 128-29, 150 Russian plans for forces on, 22, 31, 5657, 61, 63, 113 Russian plans to mine, 100-101, 107, 156 See Turkish Straits Botkin, Pëtr S., 15 Bovykin, V. I., 7 Brazil, 83, 89 Breslau, 98-103, 107-9, 190n. 30 Buchanan, Sir George, 12, 25, 42, 44 Balkan Wars and, 47, 49-50, 67, 70-73 Interprets Russian action, 31, 73, 112, 126 Italo-Turkish War and, 29, 30 Straits Question and, 112, 119, 129-34, 137 World War I and, 104, 113, 126-27, 139, 141-42 Buchlau, 13 Bulgaria, 29, 37, 40, 42-44, 45-46, 64, 7174, 82, 84, 120, 123, 154 Desires Constantinople, 43-45, 50, 74, 81 Desires Straits coastline, 60 Dispute with Balkan allies, 66 World War I and, 97, 101-2, 107, 144 See Balkan Wars Cambon, Jules, 180n. 190 Cambon, Paul, 40, 63-65, 68, 135, 170n. 14, 178n. 141 Carlotti, 114 Catherine II, Empress (of Russia), 3 Caucasus, 107, 111, 150 Dardanelles campaign and, 125-26, 130 Naval Weakness on Black Sea and, 17, 90, 97 Need for strengthening, 16, 88, 108

Source of troops for Russian western front, 100, 104, 142, 144, 148, 15152 Central Powers, 2, 12, 27, 28, 36, 69, 9395, 97, 100, 101-2 113, 115, 121, 123-25, 132, 144-45, 147, 149, 15053 Charykov, Nikolai V., 21, 23-26, 39, 69, 79-80, 93, 165n. 13 Chatalja lines, 47-49, 52, 53, 57, 61-62 Childs, Timothy W., 167n. 34 Chile, 89-92, 188n. 90 China, 27, 42 Christian X, King (of Denmark), 144-45 Churchill, Winston S., 125 Cilicia, 136 Cold War, 8 Congress of Berlin (1878), 13, 43, 60 Constantine, King (of Greece), 140 Constantinople, city of, 37, 148, 175n. 103 Bargaining chip, 50 Bulgarian desire for, 43-45, 50, 74, 81 Fate of, discussed, 23, 47, 49-50, 53-57, 61, 63-64, 103, 105, 112, 116-123, 126-38, 139-40, 143-44, 146 Foreign troops in, 31, 52, 135 Russian desire for, 4, 56, 117, 122-23, 131, 149 Unrest in, 49, 51, 52, 54, 60-61 See Balkan Wars, Bulgarian campaign Council of Ministers, Russia, 9, 14, 45, 92, 107, 111, 127, 137 Crimean War, 136, 158n. 3 Dalmatia, 27 Danev, S., 43 Danilov, Iurii N.,124, 129, 196n. 49 Dardanelles, 72, 145-46 Anglo-French attack on (1915), 124-32, 135-36, 138-40, 141-43, 154, 156 German warships and, 98, 100-101, 110 Italians attack on, and closure, 4, 27-34, 36, 45, 72, 110, 152 Russian plans for, 55, 57, 80, 112-13, 118, 120 See Turkish Straits Davos, 21 Delcassé, Theophile As ambassador to Russia, 64, 70, 72, 178n. 150 As French foreign minister, 132-35, 137-38, 139, 141, 197n. 64

INDEX Demidov, A. P., 46, 139 Diakin, V. O., 7 Disinterestedness, 38-42, 56 Djavid Bey, 106, 143 Djemal Bey, Ahmed, 106, 143 Dmitriev, Radko, 60, 177n. 126 Dolgorukii, Prince Nikolai, 31, 34 Doumergue, Gaston, 103 Dreadnought-class battleships, 3, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 79-82, 88, 89-93, 97-98, 121, 126, 155, 182n. 18 Dreikaiserbund (Three Emperors’ League), 16, 71 Duma, State, see State Duma Eastern Question, 1, 9, 90 Ebergard, A. A., 100-101, 107-9, 114 Egypt, 5, 119, 146, 195n. 11 Emets, V. A., 7, 190n. 30, 195n. 11, 195n. 12, 196n. 49, 197n. 56 Enos-Midia Line, 60, 62, 66-67, 71, 72, 118, 120, 127-29, 131 Enver Pasha, Ismail, 101-3, 106-7, 113-15, 190n. 30 Ergene River, 60, 62 Ernest-Ludwig, Grand Duke, 146 Fakhreddin, 103-4, 113 Fay, Sidney, 6 Ferdinand, King (of Bulgaria), 44, 49, 51, 62, 65, 174n. 86 Fischer, Fritz, 8 Fleets Austrian, 92, 97, 98, 100-101, 183n. 18 French, 5, 98, 103, 183n. 18 German, 79, 92, 97, 100, 150, 183n. 18 Greek, 46, 104 Italian, 28-30, 32, 33, 183n. 18 Japanese, 183n. 18 Ottoman, 3, 17-18, 21, 30, 32, 34, 37, 75, 76, 79-81, 83-84, 87-93, 96, 97, 99, 104, 109, 114, 125, 150, 156, 183n. 18, 186n. 71, 188n. 90, 189n. 16, 189n. 17 Royal Navy, 5, 77, 79, 90, 92, 98, 103, 110, 121, 183n. 18 Russian, 5, 7, 16, 21, 58, 78-79, 94, 121, 150, 155; Baltic Fleet, 17, 77-81, 91, 183n. 18; Black Sea Fleet, 3, 5, 17-19, 23, 51-52, 57, 60-63, 71, 77-80, 8285, 87-89, 91-92, 94, 97, 100, 105, 108-9, 125-26, 152, 177n. 141, 183n. 18; Mediterranean squadron, 83, 91,

245

187n. 71; Pacific Fleet, 17, 79; Volunteer Fleet, 53 Spanish, 183n. 18 United States, 183n. 18 See Dreadnought-class battleships; Russian navy, Expansion; Shipyards Fox, Martyna, 9 France, 1, 6, 156, 158n. 3 Balkan Wars and, 48-49, 51, 62, 67, 71, 73 Concern of, about balance of power in Mediterranean, 5, 117, 121, 153 Financial interests of, in the Ottoman Empire, 5, 11, 62, 72, 90-91, 105-6, 121, 131, 135-36, 151, 153 Quai d’Orsay (Foreign Ministry), 40, 113, 162n. 1, 170n. 14, 193n. 92 Quality of ambassadors in Russia, 40, 170n. 20, 178n. 150 Relations with Germany, 22, 26, 38 Relations with Great Britain, 5, 10, 22, 38, 68, 88, 131 Relations with Italy, 31, 167n. 30 Relations with Russia, 15, 16, 18, 24, 38-42, 62-64, 68, 78, 88, 90-93, 116, 131-38, 153, 197n. 64 Resistance to financial penalties of, 62, 68-71, 75 On the Russian naval buildup, 79, 92 War aims of, 120, 122, 131-33, 137, 139, 143, 147, 198n. 91 World War I and, 125, 141, 143 See Delcassé; Fleets, French Franco-Russian Alliance, 4, 10, 18, 26, 42, 88, 122, 153, 183n. 19 Germany seeks to divide, 16, 68-69, 71, 153, 179n. 177 Fuller, William C., Jr., 10 General Staff, Army, Russia, 50, 60, 107, 195n. 31 General Staff, Navy, Russia, 58, 80, 81, 105, 108, 181n. 4, 186n. 71 George V, King (of the United Kingdom), 42, 119, 130 Georges-Picot, François, 137 Germany, 1, 36, 93, 153, 156 Alliance with Ottoman Empire, 96, 101-2, 108, 115, 143 Balkan Wars and, 51, 59, 62, 70, 74 Forces Ottoman Empire into the war, 96, 114

246

ROADS TO GLORY

Germany, continued Military mission to Ottoman Empire of, 75, 76, 85-86, 88, 93-94, 98, 187n. 71 Ottoman Concessions and, 103-4, 105, 106 Ottoman finances and, 5, 68-69, 75, 91 Relations with France, 22, 26, 68, 117 War guilt question and, 5, 6, 8 Warships of, in Turkey, 99-100, 103-4, 107-10, 114, 142, 189n. 16 World War I and, 97-98, 100, 116, 118, 120, 122, 128-29, 132, 138, 142, 144-46, 154 See Central Powers; Fleets, German; Russia, Relations with Germany; Triple Alliance Geshov, Ivan E., 50, 62 Geyer, Dietrich, 8 Giers, A. N., 21 Giers, Mikhail N., 33, 34, 44-46, 52-53, 60-61, 73, 83, 84, 93, 98, 99, 101-9, 111, 113, 127 Giolitti, Giovanni, 23, 30 Goeben, 98-103, 107-9, 190n. 30 Goltz, Colmar von der, 85 Goremykin, Ivan L., 119, 126-28, 156 Gottlieb, W. W., 190n. 30 Grand Viziers Hakki Pasha, Ibrahim, 21 Halim Pasha, Said, 98, 102, 107-8, 110 Great Britain, 6, 28, 34, 156, 158n. 3 Balkan Wars and, 48, 52, 70, 73, 177n.141 Dardanelles campaign and, 125-30, 132, 136, 138-40, 141 Eastern Question and, 1 Foreign Office, 5, 9, 92, 99 German warships in Turkey and, 98-99, 110 Naval mission in Turkey, 100, 104 Relations with France, 5, 10, 22, 38, 68, 88, 131 Relations with Germany, 10, 22 Relations with Greece, 58, 104, 138-40 Relations with the Ottoman Empire, 1, 5, 31, 90, 93, 106, 110, 141, 191n. 62 On the Russian naval buildup, 79, 92 View of Straits regime, 12, 23, 26, 6364, 105, 119, 121, 131-33, 147, 151, 194n. 11

War aims, 120, 131-134, 137, 139, 143 See Fleets, Royal Navy; Russia, Relations with Great Britain; Ship building, British Greece, 90, 91 Balkan Wars and, 37, 43-46, 58-59, 66, 72, 74 World War I and, 29, 97, 101-2, 104-5, 107, 138-41, 146 Grey, Sir Edward, 42, 90 Balkan Wars and, 47, 49-51, 59, 63-65, 67-68, 172n. 58, 172n. 60, 174n. 86 Baltic Port meeting and, 38-40 Dardanelles campaign and, 125, 139 Italo-Turkish War and, 28, 30-31 On the Straits and Constantinople, 26, 116, 119-20, 130, 132-34, 137, 141 Grigorovich, I. K., 128, 164n. 31, 181n. 3 Balkan Wars and, 50, 53, 58-59, 81, 175n. 96 Italo-Turkish War and, 23, 77 Relations with Duma, 77-78, 181n. 4 See Fleets, Russia Hagia Sophia, 4, 49, 54, 138 Hague Convention (1907), 35 Hankey, Maurice, 125 Hartwig, Nikolai G., 15, 25, 50, 166n. 23 Holy Land, see Palestine Howard, Harry N., 6, 190n. 30 Hughes, Michael, 163n. 12 Ianushkevich, N. N., 107-8, 123-24 Ignat’ev, Anatolii V., 7, 178n. 148 Imbros, 59, 118, 129, 131 India, 3, 4 Italo-Turkish War, 4, 20, 22-36, 37-40, 42, 45, 76, 79, 80, 150, 152, 168n, 47 Italy, 46, 74, 97, 158n. 3, 183n. 18 Relations with France, 31, 167n. 30 See Fleets, Italian; Italo-Turkish War; Russia, Relations with Italy Izvolskii, Aleksandr P., 14, 16, 17, 155, 163n. 10, 163n. 11, 165n. 5. 166n. 25, 170n. 12 Balkan Wars and, 48, 51, 52, 64, 66, 68-70 Baltic Port meeting and, 38-41 Bosnian Crisis and, 13, 75 Charykov and, 24-25, 26 Italo-Turkish War and, 31, 34, 36 Loss of ministerial portfolio by, 13, 15

INDEX World War I and, 103, 126, 129, 13135, 137-38 Jagow, G. von, 67-68, 70, 180n. 190 Kerner, Robert J., 6, 87 Khalifate, 137 Kiderlen-Wächter, Alfred von, 58 Klado, Nikolai L., 78 Kokovtsov, Vladimir N., 9, 14, 15, 24, 38, 42, 165n. 5 Armed forces and, 77-78, 81, 150, 155, 163n. 21, 182n. 9 Balkan Wars and, 45, 46, 50, 52-53, 72 Italo-Turkish War and, 33, 35 Krivoshein, Aleksandr V., 107, 111-12, 193n. 92 Kudashev, Prince N. A., 125, 129, 144 Kurds, 111 Kuropatkin, A. N., 127-28 Langer, William L., 6, 165n. 13 Lebanon, 5 Lemnos, 59, 104-5, 118 Leninism, 7 Leont’ev, 101-2, 107 Libya, 20, 22-23, 27, 30, 167n. 30 Lieven, Prince A. A., 80-81, 83, 87, 105, 176n. 123 Lieven, Dominic, 8-9 Liman von Sanders Crisis, 76, 85-87, 88, 94, 155, 187n. 71 Liman von Sanders, Otto, 76, 85-86, 93 Livadia, 43, 93 Louis, Georges, 42, 170n. 14, 178n. 150 Balkan Wars and, 49, 51-52, 57, 58 Baltic Port meeting and, 40-41, 170n. 14, 170n. 20 Italo-Turkish War and, 29-30, 31 Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 89 Lowther, Sir G. A., 33 Macedonia, 66 Madjarov, M., 50 Mahan, Alfred T., 78 Mallet, Louis, 109-10 Mandelshtam, A. N., 143 Manning, Roberta, 9 Maritsa River, 47, 48, 67, 72-74 Matin, Le, 24 McDonald, David M., 9, 14, 15, 24, 154, 163n. 13 Mediterranean Sea, 1, 3, 4, 5, 22, 55, 84, 89, 91, 99, 103, 105, 118, 121-23, 153, 187n. 71

247

Mehmed V, Sultan (of the Ottoman Empire), 23, 86, 99 Miliukov, Pavel N., 77, 154 Miller, Geoffrey, 190n. 30 Monkewitz, 146 Montenegro, 43, 44 Morocco, 22, 26, 167n. 30 Munch, Edvard, 138 Napoleon (Bonaparte) I, Emperor (of France), 3 Naval demonstrations, 49, 63-65, 67, 125 Neidhardt, Dmitri B., 14 Nekliudov, Anatolii V., 44, 62, 146, 166n. 25 Nemitz, A. V., 82, 84, 122-24, 128, 131, 185n. 40 Neratov, Anatolii A., 21, 24-26, 32, 36, 73 Nicholas II, Emperor (of Russia), 7, 21, 22, 23, 40, 42, 48, 88, 89, 93, 94, 156, 163n. 11 Authority of, 9, 10, 14, 15, 19, 85, 117, 147, 153-55, 163n. 13, 181n. 4 Balkan Wars and, 58, 61, 67, 70-74, 175n. 96 Duma and, 78 Navy and, 17, 77-78, 81, 84-85, 91, 155 On war aims, 120, 131, 134, 136-37, 195n. 12, 198n. 91 World War I and, 107, 114, 126, 128, 130-32, 134, 142, 145-46, 148, 152 Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 33, 64, 172n. 58, 174n. 86 Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Duke, 124-26, 128, 130, 136, 142 Nolde, Baron Boris, 120-21, 127 Novoe Vremia, 48 O’Beirne, Hugh, 34, 35, 38-41, 170n. 20 October Manifesto (1905), 14 Odessa, 23, 52, 53, 71, 81, 148, 175n. 96 Ottoman Debt, 11, 62 Ottoman Empire (Turkey), 1-3, 10, 13, 15, 16-17, 84, 90, 93, 154, 158n, 3 Agreement with Russia of, 23-24, 27, 101-4, 114, 190n. 30 Alliance with Germany of, 96, 101-2, 108 Balkan Wars and, 37, 43, 44-46, 47, 49, 51-52, 57, 58-59, 62, 65-74, 150 Finances of, 5, 11, 62, 68, 81, Minorities in, 54, 67, 103, 110-11

248

ROADS TO GLORY

Ottoman Empire, continued Partition of, 5, 17, 81, 113-14, 86, 97, 122-23, 127-38, 139-40, 147, 153 War between Italy and, 20, 22-23, 26, 28-34, 37, 38, 40, 79 World War I and, 105-6, 113, 116-20, 125, 128-29, 152; Mobilization, 98, 102, 104; Neutrality, 97-100, 106, 109, 111; Separate peace, 141-44, 147, 151 See Fleets, Ottoman; Germany, Military mission; Great Britain, Naval mission; World War I Ottoman Imperial Bank, 11 Paléologue, Maurice, 112-13, 118-120, 122, 129-32, 135-38, 142, 166n. 25, 170n. 20, 193n. 91, 198n. 91 Palestine, 121, 136-37, 198n. 91 Panafieu, H. A. de, 18 Pan-Slavism, 3, 5, 25 Papayoanou, Paul A., 10-11 Patriarch, Orthodox, 54 Persia, 16, 26, 27, 89, 111 Linked with Russian interest in Straits, 5, 116, 121, 133-34 Peter I, Emperor (of Russia), 2 Pichon, Stephan, 64-65, 68-70, 178n. 141, 178n. 150, 180n. 190 Picot, François, see Georges-Picot, François Pintner, Walter, 9 Pisarev, Iu. A., 7 Poincaré, Raymond, 42 Baltic Port meeting and, 38-41, 170n. 14 Balkan Wars and, 49, 51, 65 Italo-Turkish War and, 28 War aims and, 122 Pokrovskii, M. N., 6 Poland, 14, 112, 117, 146, 198n. 90 Political Parties Conservative Party (Britain), 9 Constitutional Democratic Party (Russia), 77 Liberal Party (Britain), 9 Octobrist Party (Russia), 78 Polivanov, A. A., 23 Potsdam, 16 Public opinion, 67 British, 9 German, 146

Russian, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 33, 36, 48, 65, 67, 75, 117-18, 126-28, 130-31, 142, 152, 154 Ottoman, 99, 102, 104, 189n. 17 Racconigi, 27, 31, 150 Railways, 5, 27, 73, 88, 97, 201n. 3 Regie des tabacs, 68 Rodosto, 60 Rossos, Andrew, 9, 168n. 47, 176n. 123, 177n. 125 Rowney, Don K., 9 Royal Navy, see Fleets Rumania, 3, 48, 66, 72, 74 Rusin, A. I., 108-9 Russia, 1, 2, 5, 14, 38-39, 55, 83, 105, 158n. 3 Backwardness of, 7, 8 Cabinet of public confidence in, 2, 117, 147, 154 Charykov kite and, 23-27, 39, 69, 93 Economic interests of, in the Ottoman Empire, 11, 106 Foreign policy of, and Russian armed forces, 19, 61, 65, 69, 74, 76, 80, 82, 85, 86, 88, 93, 108, 123, 130, 150, 155 Fundamental Laws of (1906), 9, 10, 14 Interests, 4, 21, 37, 47, 49, 54-56, 60, 74, 76, 84-85, 87, 141, 150-51 Ministry of Finance, 10, 88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10, 11, 13, 14, 25, 27, 84, 119-21, 123, 153-54, 162n. 1; And Naval Ministry, 7, 17, 59, 79-80, 82, 90, 94, 96, 108-9; 151 Ministry of the Navy, 10, 77, 88 Ministry of Trade and Industry, 84, 88 Ministry of War, 10, 50, 80 Press in, 4, 7, 33, 47-48, 61, 63, 64 Prestige of, 3, 13, 17, 41, 73, 75, 78, 85, 94 As protector of Slavs and Christians, 3, 5, 17, 37, 40-41, 43, 57, 60, 63, 67, 110-11, 136, 150 Public of, interest in the Straits and Constantinople, 2, 4, 9, 48, 117, 12627, 154 Public of, role in foreign policy making, 7, 9, 32-33, 36, 48, 75, 117, 130-31, 149, 154;

INDEX Relations with Austria-Hungary of, 3, 5, 12, 17, 24, 30-31, 34, 54, 56, 57, 59, 65-66, 94-95 Relations with France of, 10-11, 15, 22, 26, 38, 39, 40, 42, 51, 62-63, 68, 71, 78, 88, 98, 128, 131, 134-38, 143, 145, 153 Relations with Germany of, 2, 5, 12, 13, 16, 24, 38, 40, 42, 68, 71, 85-86, 88, 92, 94, 128, 133, 138, 142, 144-46, 153, 156 Relations with Great Britain of, 3-5, 1416, 23-24, 26, 38, 42-43, 51, 63-64, 71, 88-93, 98, 100, 105, 116, 119, 128, 131, 133-34, 137, 143, 145, 153, 167n. 34, 188n. 90, 194n. 11 Relations with Greece of, 58-59, 138-41 Relations with Italy of, 20, 27-34, 36, 150, 168n. 47 Relations with the Ottoman Empire of, 17-18, 27, 36, 39, 41, 45-46, 59, 73, 76, 79, 81, 83-84, 86, 89, 93, 97-98, 100-104, 107, 109-10, 114, 116, 190n. 30 Religious factors in, 4, 138 Revolution in (1905), 4, 9, 10, 14 Revolution in (1917), 2, 12, 147-48, 149, 152 Role of the Turkish Straits in policy making of, 8-9, 38, 41, 150-54; preWWI, 16-17, 19, 20; Charykov kite, 23-26, 69; Italo-Turkish War, 27, 2930, 32, 34, 36; Balkan Wars, 37, 41, 50, 53-59, 61, 73-75, 81-82; as Turkish strength grows, 76, 84, 86-88, 90, 92, 94-95; during WWI, 12, 9697, 100-101, 105, 113-15, 117-18, 122-24, 126-29, 131-3, 136-41, 143, 147, 193n. 92, 197n. 64 Shifts of diplomatic policy of, 1, 2, 14, 20, 24, 32, 87, 96, 117, 123, 127, 129, 147, 149, 150-52 Trade of, 1, 4, 29, 32-36, 45-46, 55, 71, 75, 82, 84, 97, 110, 118, 122, 125, 127, 129, 141, 152, 161n. 37 War aims of, 2, 82, 103, 111-13, 115, 117-23, 126-38, 139-43, 147, 198n. 91 Willingness of, to use armed force before WWI, 50, 52-54, 58, 60-64, 67, 70, 72, 73, 75, 86

249

See Balkan Wars; Public opinion, Russian; Sazonov; Separate peace; State Duma; Triple Entente Russian Army, 2, 7, 53, 84, 125 Division of forces among WW1 fronts, 97, 100, 107, 124, 126, 128-30, 14244, 147, 151-52, 196n. 49 Modernization of, 10 Planning in, 23, 80-81 Preparedness of, 22, 27, 60, 150 Strength of, 16, 88, 94, 124, 150 See Sazonov, Disagrees with army Russian Navy, 7, 77, 89, 92, 108 Expansion of, 10, 16-19, 76-83, 87-89, 91-94, 122, 150, 164n. 31, 182n. 9, 182n. 18, 183n. 19, 184n. 21, 186n. 71 Planning in, 23, 52, 79, 80-81, 109, 123, 128 Preparedness of, 22, 53, 61, 65, 71, 79, 84, 88, 93, 150, 155 Priorities of, 18, 78, 80-81, 89-91, 155 See Fleets, Russian; Grigorovich; Sazonov, Restrains navy Russo-Japanese War, 3, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 54, 77, 127 Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), 13, 85 Samothrace, 59, 118 Sazonov, Sergei D., 1, 11, 12, 18, 41, 164n. 1, 145, 150-56, 169n. 8 Background and career of, 13, 14-15, 163n. 12 On Balkan peoples, 40-41, 55-57, 60, 66, 67, 69-72 Balkan Wars and, 45, 47-55, 57-58, 66, 67-74, 172n. 60, 175n. 96 Baltic Port meeting and (1912), 38 Charykov and, 24-26, 39, 69, 93, 166n. 22 Defers discussion of the Straits, 26-27, 36, 37-39, 42, 43, 58, 89, 96, 154 Disagrees with army on policy, 53, 61, 80-81, 87-88, 124, 126, 129-30, 14244, 148, 151-52, 156, 195n. 31 Distrusts international treaties and bodies, 36, 55-58, 121, 154, 201n. 3 Duma and, 2, 78, 117-18, 127, 147, 152, 154 On fate of Constantinople, 44, 49-57, 60, 61, 63, 113, 118-21, 123-24, 12938, 139-40, 147-48, 150

250

ROADS TO GLORY

Sazonov, Sergei D., continued On fate of the Straits, 8, 12, 53-57, 61, 63, 81, 84, 94, 105, 112-3, 118, 120, 121, 123-29, 131-38, 142, 147-48, 150-56 Fear of war expanding, 30, 36 Financial measures in diplomacy and, 35, 62, 68-73, 74, 86, 91, 153 Frustration with France, 38-40, 51, 62, 64, 68-72, 90-91, 106, 136-38, 151, 153, 197n. 64, 198n. 90 On governmental changes, 117, 127, 147, 196n. 42 Health of, 18-19, 20-21, 47, 73, 172n. 58 Multilateralism and, 1, 60, 69, 93 Naval expansion and, 78, 80, 84-85, 87, 91-94, 155, 187n. 71 Press and, 33, 47-48, 51, 61, 63, 117-18, 154 Restrains navy during WW1, 96, 100101, 107-9, 114, 156 Retirement of, 2, 146 Seeks to keep other armed forces away from Straits and Constantinople, 29, 81, 87, 154; Anglo-French, 126; Bulgarian, 37, 43-44, 47-53, 55, 6063, 65, 74, 150; Greek, 45-46, 58-59, 138-41 Stolypin and, 9, 14-15, 19, 163n. 10 On Turkish neutrality, 100-101, 102-4, 107, 109-10 See Balkan Wars; Public opinion, Russian; Russia; World War I Schilling, Baron M. F., 82, 176n. 123 Schmitt, B. E., 6 Separate peace, 2, 111, 121, 132, 141-146, 147, 150-51, 154, 156, 200n. 140 Serbia, 9, 25, 37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 55, 56, 57, 66, 69-72, 74, 94-95, 107, 130 201n. 3 Shatsillo, K. F., 7, 182n. 9, 183n. 19 Shipyards, orders, 4, 18 American, 91 British, 18, 21, 22, 80, 81, 83, 89-90, 92 German, 18 Russian, 3, 82, 91, 92, 164n. 31, 182n. 18 Sikorskii, I. I., 91 Slavophilism, 3 Smith. C. J., 190n. 30, 191n. 41

Smyrna, 139-40 Sophie, Queen (of Greece), 140, 191n. 48 Spring, D. W., 152 Stalin, Joseph, 149 State Duma, Russia, 14, 181n. 4 Decides navy budget, 7, 10, 77-79, 81, 83, 92, 155 On Russian war aims, 2, 4, 127, 152, 154 And systemic change, 117-18, 127, 147 Stavka, 107-8, 124, 127-29, 131, 142, 144 Steiner, Zara, 9 Stolypin, Pëtr A. Assassination of, 20, 24, 85 Centralizes authority, 9, 14-15, 18, 154, 155, 163n. 21 Foreign policy of, 15-19 Role in Sazonov’s selection, 14-15, 163n. 10 Straits Agreements (March 1915), 2, 5, 7, 12, 116, 131-38, 147, 149, 152-54 Stürmer, Boris, 164n. 1 Sukhomlinov, V. A., 22-23, 53, 82, 110-11, 128, 196n. 49 Sweden, 54 Sykes, Sir Mark, 137 Syria, 5, 121, 136-37 Talaat Bey, Mehmet, 93 Tenedos, 59, 118, 129, 131 Thaden, E. C., 9, 24-25 Three Emperors’ League, 16, 71 Timashev, S. I., 32-33, 53 Times of London, 50 Todorov, 44 Treaties Adrianople (1829), 144 Bucharest (1913), 72-74 London (1871), 33, 35, 60, 169n. 77 London (1913), 67, 71 San Stefano (1878), 43, 44, 48-51 Unkiar Skelessi (1833), 144 Versailles (1919), 6, 153 Trieste, 27 Triple Alliance, 20, 21, 22, 27, 45, 56, 64, 65, 70, 71, 92, 101, 150 Triple Entente Before WWI, 1, 16, 21, 24, 26, 28, 38, 49, 67, 70, 71, 73, 86, 93 Decision to give Russia the Straits, 2, 116, 138, 147, 149, 154, 160n. 25

INDEX During WWI, 97-99, 101, 107-10, 111, 113-15, 126, 128, 140, 141, 143-44, 146 Guarantee to Turkey, 104-106 Sazonov desires it work more closely together, 71, 88, 147 Trubetskoi, Prince Grigorii N., 105, 11314, 139 Trumpener, U., 190n. 30 Tsushima, 13, 14 Turkhan Pasha, 45, 51, 72 Turkish Straits, 103, 145-46, 149, 152, 154 As cause of World War I, 6 Closure of, 4, 29, 32-36, 45-46, 71, 110 Economic significance of, 4, 29, 30, 3233, 35, 45, 82, 84, 94, 97, 122, 125, 132-33, 136, 141, 151-52 Islands near, 58-59, 104-5, 118, 129, 131 Place in history of, 1, 82 Regime at, 3, 4, 23, 55, 112, 114, 118, 120-21, 150 Russia only raise question of, during continental crisis, 84, 88, 94, 144, 151 Strategic significance of, 3, 5, 21, 55, 78, 82, 84, 97, 117, 121-22, 136, 141 See Bosphorus; Dardanelles; Russia, Role of the Turkish Straits; Straits Agreement

251

United States, 6, 8, 54, 69, 78, 91, 163n. 12, 183n. 18 Vasilchikova, Maria, 145-46, 201n. 140 Vasiukov, V. C., 7, 12 Vatican, 14, 15, 163n. 12 Venizelos, E., 140 Voevodskii, S. A., 17-18 Volunteer Fleet, Russia, see Fleets Vorontsov-Dashkov, Prince, I. I., 111, 114 Wilhelm II, Emperor (of Germany), 8, 99, 140, 191n. 48 Baltic Port meeting and, 38, 40, 42 Witte, Sergei Iu., 145 World War I Causes of, 3, 6, 10, 94, 95 Competition for neutral states during, 97, 107-8, 126, 138-40, 141 Sazonov tries to keep Turkey out of, 96, 100-104, 106-11, 113-4, 150 Start, 93 See Constantinople; Germany; Ottoman Empire; Russia; Triple Entente; Turkish Straits World War II, 8, 149 Wortman, Richard, 9 Yaney, George, 9 Yasamee, F. A. K., 190n. 30, 191n. 54 Young Turks, 3, 22, 23, 69 Zakher, Ia., 7, 175n. 96, 176n. 123 Zhilinskii, Y. G., 50