Rivonia, Operation Mayibuye: A Review of the Rivonia Trial

This book on the Rivonia trial, deals with the facts that aim to remove all excuse from those who through malice or culp

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OperationMayibuye RILCDE VILLINS

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RIVQNIA OPERATION HAYIBV YE A review of the Rivonia trial

by the Honourable

H. H. IV. DE VILLIERS Judge of the Supreme Court of South Africa 1945-1955. Judge of the Appeal Court 1955-1957. Judge President of the Fmtvrn Cape Division of t he

Supreme Court 195v ' .J2. Chairman of The Prem Board of Reference of the News. pape~ . sess Union of South Africa.

with a Foreword by The Honourable FRANCIS NAPIER BROOSIE retired Judge President of the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa.

Afrihaanse Pere-Boekhandel Johannesburg

COVER DESIGN AND TYPGSRAPRY: NIIRC ACRLEITNER. PAINTING AND SINDING EY RAYNE AND GIBSON, JORANNESSUEG, SOUTH APEICA

TRIS SOON IS SET IN • Pt ROYAL

ONIA — OPERATION 51ATIBUYE Foreword

Preface CHAPTER I: Eleventh July, 1983 1- 9 CHAPTER 8: Goldreich and Wotpe Escape 10 21 CHAPTER IH: The Charges 22- 30 CHAPTER IV: Eleventh June, 1984 31- 51 CHAPTER V: Reactions . 52. 80 CHAPTER VI: Operation bfaylbuye 61- 81 CHAPTER VIH: Rivonla and the A f r ican States 82- 88 CHAPTER VIB: Rivonia and the Communists 89.102 CHAPTER IX: Our Tough Problem 1%-113 X: Af ter R i vonia 114 118 Appendix 11%120

ForeworiI 1 welcome the appearance of th is book, so sum after the events tchick i t d escribes. While we i n South Africa do not fear the fmal verdict of history, the interests of f airness, truth and j ushce require that there shall be available at once this authoritative o»d graphic account of fhe Rivonia tr ia L The authorship guarantees its factual accuracy and the weightiness of the commenL No fewer than nine members ot t he de Villiers elan have sat on the Supreme Court Bench in South Africa. Of t hese two have been Chief Justices of South Africa and two pre-union Chief Justices (one Colonial an d o n e R epublican): t h ree have been Judges of Appeal and three Judge Presidents.The earliest of these, Baron de ViNers, was a judge for 4I years, taking time off to preside over the National Convention which led to the Unum of South Africa, whose first Chief Justice he became. Fleinrich, the author, was leader of the Pretoria Bar before becoming successively a puisne Judge, a Judge of Appeal and Judge President of the Eastern Cape. Fle retired in 1961. The opinions which the author expresses are of course his ourn. 1 do not necessarily share them. But whether 1 share them or not, 1 commend them to the reader as the opinions of one whose background, professional qualifications and p e rsonal m tegrity entitle him to speak with authority. Two recent overseas comments on the Rivonia triat indicate the need for a b ook such as this. Both related to the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the presiding Judge instead of senuntce of death. One comment ascribed the Judge's letdency to gov-

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Preface RIVONIA: OPERATION AFRIKA MAYIBUYE. Article I V o f t h e V n ited Nations (1958) draft International Code o( Ethics for journalists reads:

"It is the duty of those who describe and comment upon events relating to a foreign country to acquire the necessary knowledge of such country which will enable them to report accurately and fairly thereon." This article, in my view, could with benefit have

had added to it after the words "such country" the words "and of the circumstances surrounding the eventsdescribed or commented upon." Judged by t h i s standard j ournalists and other reporters whether by the written word or in picture

form fall sadly by the wayside, where South Africa is concerned. Some of the distortions of events and conditions in South Africa that have been published abroad are so flagrant, that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that t h e p r inciple contained i n ar ticle IV of the Draft Code was deliberately ignored, and that there was a deliberate failure to report "accurately

and fairly". tlutte recently the Government of South Africa was compelled to remonstrate with the Secretary General of the U nited N ations for i g noring tb e salutary admonition contained in that article read with the

logical corollary suggested above. This book on the Rivonia trial, in so far as it deals

with the facts, ls intended to remove all excuse

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CHAPTER I

SevenO JuIy, 1963 About ten miles north of Johannesburg, but well within its outskirts, there is a peri-urban area of somewhat exclusive small-holdings known as Rivonia. In a secluded, wooded holiow of this Rivonia area lies a farm by the name of "Lilliesleaf", an extensive farm, as small-holdings go, o f s ome t wentywight a cres of some of t h e most productive land in t h e Transvaal. This was a well equipped and developed farm with a large, modern, high stungleroofed main building such as a well.todo retired bus)ness-man might put up in a semi-rural area for his privacy and retire-

ment. This was no runoff.the-mill farm house, but a residence redolent of financial resources and exclusiveness such as might be seen in the pattern of the quieter and more select outskirts o f A f r ica's most prosperous city.

Behind the main building was a considerable n umber of outbuildings as might be used for t h e housing of servants, workrooms, storerooms, fuelsbeds and the like. Amongst these outbuildings was a rather commodious and imposing thatch-roofed cottage which, as events proved, housed most of the dramatis personae who figured in the South African

cause celebre to become internationally known as the Rivonia Trial. Although within the lindts of South Africa's most heavily populated area, the farm "Lilttesleaf' somehow remained off the beaten track and away from

the r outes w hich J ohannesburg motorlsts taking customary Sunday afternoon drives would traverse, As was revealed later,elaborate steps had been taken to ensure the complete isolation of the farm "LiUiesleaf". Tradesmen and other people, casual visitors, were not encouraged. The Bantu servants on the farm, of whom seven were found there on the 11th July, 1963, namely six Bantu men and one Bantu woman, peremptorilyordered away each and everyone whom they found encroaching on th e environs of this property, whether by way of the dirt road leading to the farmhouse, or across the veld. On the afternoon of the 11th July, 1963, things were quiet at the Rivonia homestead as tbe farm "Lilliesleaf" c ame t o b e k n own; even t h e f i eld labourers who gave "Lilliesleaf" its verisimilitude of a farm minding its own business as a farm were not in evidence. July is midwinter on the Transvaal high. veld where Rivonia is situated, and it was a bleak and chilly afternoon, with bleak surroundings, dry

yegow grass, and most of the trees leafless. From somewhere off tbe main tarred road to Johannesburg, a van bearing the name of a well. known Johannesburg laundry f ir m n osed its way along th e R i vonia f armroads on t h e a pparently innocent mission of picking up and delivering laundry and perhaps finding a new customer or two in that

select area. The laundry van meandered around severalturn. ings and finally turned into the road which brought it, unchallenged, to tbe "Lilliesleaf" homestead. Here the driver of the van was stopped by a Bantu e mployee who p eremptorily ordered hi m t o t u r n back.The European driver of the van, appropriately dressed in a w hite dustcoat, as was his companion

on the front seat, disarmingly explained that they were calling on t h e off+hence of contacting some new laundry customers in that area. Behind the two dustcoated men on the driver' s seat a rug screened the interior of th e l a undry van. Behind t h is r u g there were intently listening ears. Lieutenant W. P. J. van Wyk of the South African Police was behind the rug in the interior of the van, together with nine

other detectives and constables, including a constable with a police dog. This was a time for decision — whether to withdraw on the employee's peremptory instructions to leave because the master was not at home and trades. men were not permitted to call there, or openly and immediately to test the police suspicion that there was more at "LIIIiesleaf" than met the eye. T he employee's d etermined a t titude t ha t t h e laundry van must remove itself convinced Lieutenant van Wyk that their suspicions were welt founded. The raiding squad, for t hat was what the company of policemen were, bad been well drilled for lust such a motnent as this. The driver reversed reluctantly as if to obey the order to depart, and thus brought the rear of the vehicle about mid-way between the main house and the outbuildings. "Ons Slaan Toe", called out Lieutenant Van Wyk In Afrikaans, (whIch, translated, means "We Close

fn") and the laundry van's unsuspected contents, including the police dog, erupted to close in on the house and the outbuildings. From tbe police point of view, this raid provided unexpected results, For Detective Warrant Officer C. J. Dirker, Lieutenant Van Wyk's second in corn. mand, it turned out to be something of a r eunion: for twelve years he had been keeping "tabs on". S

trailing, and arresting persons suspected of endanger. ing the security of South Africa, and here he saw some very familiar faces.Even a few clever disguises did not deceive Dirker's eye, In the thatch-roofed cottage which the pohce firstentered, there were six men in a huddle examining a document. Of the sixmen, three were Bantu, two were Whites and one was an Indian. Somebody shouted a warning, when the police burst into this cottage and three of the occupants of t h e r oom j umped t hrough a b ack window — and straight into the arms of the police. 'fhese three were the two Bantu males, Walter Sisulu and Govan hfbeki,and the Indian, Ahmed Kathrada. Inside the cottage the police arrested two Whites, Lionel Bernstein and Bob Hopple, and a third Bantu, Raymond Mhlaba The document that they had evidently been studying had been taken out of a stove, where it had been hidden, by the Bantu Govan Idbeki. It transpired afterwards at t h e t r ial t hat t h e contents of t h is document were going to be discussed later in t he afternoon when a certain Arthur Goldreicb, who was the reputed lessee of this property, returned home. This document that the people in the thatch-roofed cottage bad open in f ront of t hem was a six-page document entitled "Operation Mayibuye". In the main building the police arrested another White, Dennis Goldberg, The raiders who had arrived camouflaged as laundrymen, were joined by other members of the

poflce force arriving openly in police cars, as prearranged. The police now had in their hands six of the seven Whites and Non-Whites who were to be later tried in the Supreme Court on criminal charges. They

were members of a band of conspirators known as the National High Command. This body, the National High Command, was the body which master-minded and directedthe programme of sabotage and preparation for violent revolution that was being carried out by an organisation known as "Umkhonto weSizwe".

Translated from the Bantu, these words mean "Spear of tbe Nation". The evidence in tbe trial showed that

members of the High Command who were arrested on theafternoon of the 11th July on the farm "LiUiesleaP' were the Non-Whites, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, and the Whites, Goldberg and Bernstein.

The police, who were now present in force on this smallholdings farm, had given instructions to permit cars to approach the homestead,but to prevent a departure of all cars not recognised as police cars. The reputed tenant of tbe farm "Lllliesleaf", Arthur Goldreich, who lived there with his wife and three children, had left the farm before the police arrived, and had not returned when the raid took place. Towards dusk of the same evening he returned by

car. He drove unsuspectingly along the last short leg of the winding dirt road that led to his front door. Here, spotting the police cars, he smelled disaster and hurriedly reversed to the corner he had just turned, but the police, plus the police dog, stepped out ofthe shadows of early dusk and arrested him.

After securing their prisoners, the police searched the premises and discovered a large number of documents and articles which afterwards figured as exhibits in the trial, and revealed a complete plot for eventual seizure of the Republic and its Government after preliminary softening operations of extensive sabotageand guerilla warfare. The plan, as revealed

in these exhibits, envisaged that after the preliminary

softening process had been completed, the final coup would be the landing of foreign troops by air aad by sea to join the guerillas in the final assault on the cities of South Africa to make the conquest of the country and the overthrow of its Government corn. piete.

At Rivonia,as I shallhereafter callthe "IJUiesleaf '

farm, the police impounded over two hundred docu. ments, the majority of these being of the most revealing and incriminating nature. Several of the men arrested at Rivonia on that afternoon of the l i th July had, during their undercover sojourn there, attempted to disguise themselves. Sisulu, the normally unmistakeable Bantu, was now fair complexioned with straightened hair and a Hitler.

type moustache, and might have passed for a Cape Coloured person. Kathrada, the Indian, had been regroomed under the artistic hands of Goldreich, by calling a commercial artist, and, with hair dyed and complexion reddened, might have passed for a White

man. Dennis Goldberg, the former clean shaven civil engineer who had found the Cape Town Security Police too attentive to his liking, now sported a black beard and moustache, while Mbeki, the Port Elizabeth Bantu journalist and one-time schoolmaster, wore a blue boiler suit topped by a balaclava cap and was now ostensibly a farm labourer. Kathrada the Indian,

it is related, laughed when one of the arresting officers asked: "Who is this White man?" From information gleaned from the many documents seized by the police as a result of the raid,

they later arrested James Kantor, a Johannesburg solicitor practising in partnership with a listed Communist, Harold Wolpe, his brother.ln-law. Wolpe, when

e became av are of the arrest of these people at Rivonia, tried to make a get-away from the Republic, but was arrested near the Bechuanaland border on the 17th July. Tvro more arrests of conspirators who eventually stood trial, were made in Johannesburg. These were the Bantus Elias Motsoaledi and Andrew Miangeni. The latter turned out to be members of the socalted

Johannesburg Regional Command, a command subsidiary to the National High Command. They were engaged in the handling of esplosives for sabotage purposes and the reception in Johannesburg and despatch across the border of t r ainees in guerilla warfare.

Apart from the Bantu servantswho had been detained for questioning, the police now held thirteen men for indictment, They were Nelson Mandela who was already serving a sentence, Walter Sisulu, Dennis Goldberg, Govan l f beki, A hmed Kathrada, Lionel Bernstein, Raymoad M hlaba, K antor, bfotsoaledi,

Mtangeni, Hepple, Goldreich and Wolpe. Of the thirteen whom the police now had in custody as a result of the raid on the 11th July, ten

were indicted in the Supreme Court before the Judge President, Mr. Justice Q. de Wet. Hepple, Goldreich and Wolpe were not joined as accused. Hepple had agreed to turn State's evidence and had s upplied th e police w it h a s t atement, typed b y

himself. On this be was released. He never gave evidence for the State as, soon after his release, he

fled the country and vanished across the border, There is a very strong suspicion that in his case also, as in so many other cases, he fled the country ause his life was threatened by fellow conspirators. Some of these threats were in other cases actuaBy

carried out. Three men were sentenced to death by Mr. Justice O'Began in t h e E astern Cape Division of the Supreme Court for murdering a witness whom the State proposed calling against them on a charge

of committing acts of sabotage. It is in respect of these three accused that U Thant, the Secretary General of tbe United Nations Organi. sation.made a request to our Government for their release and pardon. It is this episode that I refer to in m y p r eface to t his book. Goldreich and Wolpe escaped after bribing a young police warder in the

police cells at Marshall Square, Johannesburg. The remaining ten were indicted on various counts before the Supreme Court, The charges were based on the evidence discovered in the raid on Rivonia, especially the documentary evidence. A great many of these documents were in tbk handwriting of the accused persons who admitted that the documents were genuine and that they were the authors of these documents. A considerable number of these exhibits were proved at the trial to be in the handwriting of Goldreich (eud hfandeta). Among the discoveries by the police at Rivonia was a radio transmitter in one of the outside rooms, and u buried cable leading to a radio mast. In addition to th e h ideout at Rivonia, the conspirators had acquired two other properties for use in their planned campaign of armed revolution. The one property was a n u r ban small-holding near Krugersdorp, a mining city some twenty miles west of Johannesburg, and famous for its connection with the Jameson Raid i n 1 89R T his property c alled

Travall yn, was bought for use as the arsenal and arms and ammunition m anufactory of Op e ration Mayibuye.

The situation of this property was reported to the olice by the father of the seller, who went there to collect an instalment on the purchase price of the place. On finding the house locked and the premises deserted he gained admission through a window and inside found documents and other articles which roused his suspicion, The police found at T ravaByn a large collection 'a! apparatus and various articles that could be used for the manufacture of bombs and hand grenades

d other armament equipment. The other property was a secluded cottage behind

house at Mountain View, a southern suburb of ohannesbutg. This place was intended to be used as hideeut and the conspirators' publishing house or t h e p r i nting and d i stribution o f p r opaganda eaf lets and other literature. The location of this cottage, which at various times 'beltered a number of t h e conspirators, including tdreich and Wolpe after their escape from the police cells at MatshaB Square, was revealed to the police by the coconspirator Bob Hepple. Pieces of clerical cloth similar t o t h e cloth of t h e p r iestly

robesdonned by Goldreich and %olpe when they fled in disguise to Swariland, were fouml here, In the grounds of this cottage the police also found traces of a Large quantity of documents burnt i n a h ole in the ground.

CHAPTER II

Eleventh August, 1963 Celdreich andWelile Escalle Alter having made this sensational haul of arch

conspirators, including Goldreich, at Rivonia on lith July, it was a bitter blow for the Security Police whe . a month later, on the night of l i t h August, Goldrei

and Wolpe plus two Indian detainees, escaped from the police cells at Marshall Square Police Station the heart of Johannesburg.

They effected their escape by bribing a nineteen yearold warder, named Greeff, who was in financial trouble. They obtained bis keys and then tied him up to lend support to his ptoposed story that he had been knocked out by Goldreich. The Sunday morning after the escape saw the

organisa tion of what has been regarded as one of the biggest man.hunts in the annals of the South African

Police. Evidence in the possession of tbe police showed that Goldreich, the thirty. three-year+id comi'

mercial artist, was particularly deeply involved in' the conspiracy for the overthrow of the South African

Government by armed revolution. Wolpe (36), the attorneywho handled the moneys reaching Johannes

burg from foreignsources for aiding and abetting the conspiracy, was equally deeply involved. Tbe two Indian detainees who escaped with Goldreich and

Wolpe were Moose Moota, secretary of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress, and one Abdulbay Jasset. The police faced two alternatives: the fugitives were either making for one of t h e t h ree British

High Commission Territories bordering on the Repu 10

lic, Basutoland, Swaziland or B echuanaland, with which South Africa has no extradition agreement, or they were in hiding somewhere in Johannesburg. Acting on the first assumption — that the fugitives would make for the border — the police alerted the

border guards and set up road blocks on the routes to the High Commission Territories. On the other

assumption — that the men were lying low in or near Johannesburg — the police appealed to the public to help in the search and gave descriptions of the wanted men.

GoMreicb's published photograph showed him w earing a b lack beard w hich, together w it h h i s piercing eyes, gave hi m a n a ppearance strongly

reminiscent of the old-time classic depiction of an anarchist. Wolpe's normally black hair was still red. tinted from a previous attempt to disguise himself. S everal days passed without any n ews o f t h e wanted men, and in the meantime the young warder, Greeff, was charged before a Johannesburg magistrate with accepting a bribe and helping the prisoners to

escape and was remanded without bail. It was apparent t hat

t h i s was not a n e scape

effected on a chance opportunity but one that had been carefull y planned and cleverl y executed with outside help. It was apparent, too, that public feeling was running strongly against the escaped men and that they would exercise the greatest care to avoid detection. As the massive man-hunt was intensified, rumours were current that tbe fugitives were hourly expected at Dar es Salaam. Other reports had it that they had succeeded in crossing the border into Swaziland and were hiding there. Rewards were offered for infor-

mation leading to the arrest of the escapees who were 11

now generallyregarded as the "hottest" and most wanted political fugitives from South Africa for many years.

Seventeen days passed before ihe news broke on

28th August that Goldreich and Wolpe had arrived in Bechuanaland by l i ght p lane from Swaaland and that they were expected to make an almost immediate departureby air for Dar es Salaam. They were, however, fated to have many anxious hours before thev felt themselves safely beyond the reach of the South African law.

The story,as it was pieced together afterwards, was thatGoldreich and Wolpe, both elean-shaven and disguised as priests, had managed to make their way by car t o Swaziland where they appeared in their clericalgarb as the Reverend hlr. Shippon and the Reverend Mr. Mitchell.They abandoned their car

there and were ferried in a private plane to Lobatsi, the Bechuanaland town nearest to the Western border of the Transvaal. At Lobatsi they jumped out of the plane and with

their clerical robes flapping about their legs, ran towards some Bechuanaland police, shouting that

they had never been happier to see policemen. Their clerical robes were evidently tailored at the M ountain View c ottage hideeut r evealed t o t h e

policeby coconspirator and later escapee Bob Hepple. Here Goldreich and Wolpe went into h i ding after

their escape from Marshall Square and here the police found black cloth material of the fabric fro

whichclericalrobes are fashioned. Goldrelch and Wolpe did not tarry long at Lobatsi It was too near the South African border. When night fell on the day of their arrival they were taken

by car by an official of the African National Congress

to Francistown, a town lying more to the north in Bechuanaland.Moolla and Jassetreached Francistown independently.

Francistown proved to be an uneasy and insecure refuge for the fugitives. To begin with, many of the

local people, among them a number of South Africans, showed open hostility towards them. At a local hotel where they had found accommodation the "regulars" made it pointedly clear that they were unwelcome

and a group of young South Africans were warned away from the hotel by the pohce. A disguised voice told the Johannesburg STAR over th e t elephone: "We will get Mr . Goldreich aud Mr. Wolpe. They will n o l onger be on t h e face of the earth after thirty-six hours".

Goldreich and Wolpe soon found themselves in the

disquieting situation of fearing not only that physical violence would be done to them but also that attempts would be made to kidnap them aud return them to t he Republic. T hey a ruuously awaited n ews o f arrangements by the African National Congress in Dar es Salaam to provide them with air t r ansport to EastAfrica. News came in the shape of an East African Airways D akota which landed at Francistown to pick up a "parcel" o f e scapees - "parcel" being t h e code word used by the conspirators in respect of batches of young Bantu recruited in the Republic for training in African countries in sabotage and guerilla warfare. The Dakota was to remain at Francistown over. night and t o leave with Goldreicb and Wolpe the next morning. During the night of 30th August it was destroyed by f ir e and i t was later r umoured that the f i r e was caused by an i ncendiary bomb

planted inside the aircraft. The people in Bechuana. 13

land believe that a tracer bullet was fill in t oa petrol tank of the aeroplane. The airfield where the plane was destroyed was fenced and the Bantu watchman at t h e gate saw nobody iu the vicinity of the plane, He had, however, heard an explosion in the plane.

This mysterious explosion and fire deepened the anxiety of the fugitives who now cast about feverishly for means to put a greater distance between themselves and the Republic. The local climate of public opinion grew more hostile towards them, many of t he Fraucistown public b ebtg i ncensed b y t h eh presence.Rumour had it,too, that the South African

police had considerably increased the reward origin. ally offered for their recapture. As they were being intimidated by members of the public and feared assault, or, worse still, ab d u. tion back t o South A f r ica, Goldreich and W olpe asked for protection and gratefully accepted accom. modation in the local gaol. Here they were reported to have enjoyed their first comfortable night for

weeks. The tranquijlislng influence of the Franclstown gaol was, however, rudely shattered for Goldrelch and Wolpe when news came a week after the destruc. tion of the Dakota at Francistown that another plane reportedly chartered by the African National Congress in Der es Salaam to fetch them had crash. landed atMbeya in Southern Tanganyika.

'Their situation now caused the fugitives extreme anxiety. Rumours spread of i ntensified African N ational Congress activity i n D a r e s S alaam t o

"rescue" the escapees, and these were coupled with

allegations that the South African Government was maldng it d i f ficult fo r t h e British Government to

handle the situation in Bechuanaland. From London it was reported that two Labour members of Parlia. ment had asked the British Government to send a Royal Air Force plane to "rescue" them. There were,for Goldrelch and Wolpe, even more strongly disquieting rumours that a number of White men had made an offer to the police to abduct them from Bechuanaland. Their t r ibulations, it may be noted, were borne with understandable equanimity by South Africans who hoped to see them brought to triaL P inaUy, with th e underground assistance of t h e rican National Congress and suspected assistance

from other quarters, Goldreich and Wolpe made anothernocturnal departure on 9th September. From Francistown they were driven to Palapye, 102 mUes south of Francistown. Here a singleengined aircraft landed briefly in the dawn hours to pick them up and to ferry them to ElizabethviUe in Katanga, the first leg of t h e j ourney to Dar es Salaam and the welcoming arms of the African National Congress.

Goldreich was later heard of f rom Israel and Wolpe from London. It appeared from the exhibits produced by the State in the Rivonia trial and from evidence concern. ing the persons identified with the Rivonia and other

hideouts that Goldreich and Wolpe were deeply involved in the conspiracy which the State prosecutor described as "high treason par excegence". To begin with, Goldreich was the lessee of the farm "LIUiesleaf", though he was sometimes referred to ss its "caretaker" and had intimate first-hand knowledge of the members of the underground clientele he was accommodating in his spacious outbuildings. 15

Then there were the reveaUng documentary and other exhibits found at Rivonia which pointed to Goldreich as the arch~onspirator in the motley gang which planned the overthrow of the South African Government by violence and foreign military intervention. Among the State's exhibits there were no fewer t han fifteen documents which were either i n t h e handwriting of Goldreich or were found in his car on the day of the raid. Also found in his car were sections of aluminium piping. At the Mountain View hidewut his fingerprints were found on two brandy bottles and a coffee tin. According to the servants employed at Rivonia he and bis family occupied the main building and he w as frequently seen visiting the occupants of t he thatched. roof cottage. He was seen assisting in the erection of the radio aerial mast and practising target shooting with Mandela before Mandela was arrested for leaving the country without permit and inciting to strike. The manner ofhis escape from the Marshall Square police cells in Johannesburg, together with Harold W otpe and two i n dian detainees, was told i n t h e trial of the young warder Johannes Greeff who con. nived in the escape of these prisoners. Wolpe, a listed communist, was a junior partner in the firm of James Kantor and Partners, and was Kantor's brother-in.law. Here h e m anipulated the firm's trust account to receive and disburse monies received from foreign sources to finance the conspir. acy against the Government of the Republic of South Africa as planned by tbe National High Conunand. This plan was l argely blueprinted b y Goldreich, generally regarded as author of " Operation Mayi18

buye" which envisaged the eventual occupation of South Africa and the overthrow of its Government

by local saboteurs and guerillas assisted by foreign invading forces,

ln gaol or escaped. In addition to Goldreicb and Wolpe a number of persons nained as coeonspirators with the accused in the Rivonia case were not brought to trial,either because they had already been sentenced for sabotage or other offences against the State in other divisions of the SupreioeCourt, or because they had secretly left the Republic.

Among those in gaol was Harold Strachan, sent. enced in Port Elizabeth in 1962 for sabotage. Also in gaol was Benjamin Turok, former member of t h e T ransvaal Provincial Council an d n ational secretary of the banned South African Congress of Democrats. At the Rand Criminal Sessions he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment under the Explosives Act of 1956 for attempting, in February, 1962, to cause an explosion in tbe Judges' Bench of the Votive Appeal Court in the old post office build. ing in Rissik Street, Johannesburg. H odgson, listed communist and chairman of t h e Emkhonto wegizwe's regional command in Johannesburg, travelled the country with Strachan to instruct trainee saboteurs in the manufacture of explosives. He disappeared, together with his wife, while be was under house arrest. This couple were for some timo unwelcome and embarrassing guests of the British authorities i n B echuanaland and were eventually ordered to leave the Territory. 17

Michael Harmel, listed communht who, under the name of Jacobson, initiated the negotiations which led to the purchase of the Rivonia hidewut, had been charged under the Suppression ofCommunism Act. He secretly left the Republic in March, 1963, while he was on baU.

Bob Alexander Hepple, Johannesburg advocate, confessed member of the Communist Party and son of a former Labour member of Parliament was among t hose arrested at Rivonia on 11th July, 1963. A s mentioned earlier he was released on his undertaking to turn State Evidence and then fled the country. Other persons suspected of subversive activities

who escaped in time toavoid arrestwere: Joe Slovo, Johannesburg advocate and Usted communist who was alleged to be one of the founders

of the Umkhonto weSizwe; J. B. Marks, an active communist and secretary of the Native Mineworkers' Union;

Duma Nokwe and Moses Ketone, prominent office. holders in the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party. Young Warder Duped ln South Africa, meanwhile, the misguided young w arder, Greeff, was in gaol awaiting t rial for t h e

part he had played in Goldreich and Wolpe's escape from the police cells at Marshall Square, his application for bail having been refused. On 23rd September, after several remands, he appeared for t r i al i n t h e J ohannesburg Regional

Magistrate's Court on charges o! bribery (accepting 18

a bribe),and assisting four prisoners to escape from MarshallSquare. The prosecutor was Dr. Percy Yutar who later appeared for the State in the Rivonia Trial. Greeff, tall and athletically built, was only eighteen when he completed a course at the Pretoria Police Training Depot and was posted to Marshall Square. He turned nineteen while he was in gaol awaiting trial. His parents were in poor circumstances. Dr. Yutar, outlining the case for the State, said Graaff was a young policeman who fell to the evil machinations of t h e t w o t r aitors, Goldreich and Woipe, and others who plotted a "violent and hellish revolution i n t h i s country, planned on a m i l itary basis . . . Th e y d oublecrossed the policeman who

helpedthem to escape from MarshallSquare." Greeff,short of money, had undergone a process of softening up . T h e p risoner Moosa Moola had

arranged for him to receive a pair of shoes, a suit and a tie, and later threatened him with exposure as tbe recipient of bribes if he did not render certain

services. Greeff,itfurther appeared from the Court proceed-

ings, had borrowed a colleague's car. He had an accident and did not have the R90 needed to pay for the damage, "One night," h e t ol d th e Court, "Goldreich asked me wby I was not smiling. I replied t hat I could not smile with the worries I had. I

xplai ned about the damage to the car." Goldreich said he could let Greeff have the money and asked to be allowed to use tbe telephone in the warder's office t o t al k t o h i s b r otherin.law, Dr.

enstein. The following morning Greeff, in plain

lothes, collected R100 from Goldreich's sister, Mrs.

Arenstetn, and paid his colleague for the damage to his car.

a bribe), and assisting four prisoners to escape from MarshallSquare. The prosecutor was Dr.Percy Yutar who later appeared for the State in tbe Rivonla Trial. Greeff, tall and athletically built, was only eighteen when he completed a course at the Pretoria Police Training Depot and was posted to Marshall Square. He turned nineteen while he was in gaol awaiting

trial. His parents were in poor circumstances. Dr. Yutar, outlining the case for the State, said Greeff was a young policeman who Cell to the evil machinations of th e t wo t r a itors, Goldreich and 1Volpe, and others who plotted a "violent and hellish revolution in this country, planned on a military basis. . They doubiecrossed the policeman who .

helpedthem toescape from MarshallSquare." Greeff,short of money, had undergone a process of softening up, The prisoner Moosa Moota had

arranged for him to receive a pair of shoes, a suit and a tie, and later threatened him with exposure as the recipient of bribes if he did not render certain

services. Greeff,it further appeared from the Court proceed. ings, had borrowed a colleague's car. He had an accident and did not have the R90 needed to pay for the damage, "One night," he told the Court, "Goldreich asked me wby I was not smiling. I replied t hat I could not smile with the worries I had. I

explained about the damage to the car." Goldreich said he could let Greeff have the money and asked to be allowed to use the telephone in the warder's of fice t o t alk t o b i s b r otherin.law, Dr. nstein. The following morning Greeff, in p l ain lothes, collected R100 from Goldreich's sister, Mrs.

Arenstein, and paid his colleague for the damage to his car. 19

Goldreich then offered Greeff R4,000 if he helped

the four of th em to escape, while Moose Moolla threatened him that, if he refused, a charge of bribery would be brought against him. Graaff,under threat of exposure, and greedy for the money, succumbed to the offer o f t h e R4,000 bribe to let the prisoners go. "I did not realise how

serious my decision was to let them loose," he afterwards told the Magistrate. He took the keys to the cellsfrom a drawer in the charge office and bad himself tied u p t o g ive the appearance of having been knocked cold by the prisoner Goldreich. Goldreich, in posses-ion of the keys, unlocked the cells of t h e other t hree detainees, and the doors leading to freedom. Graaff told a n i nvestigating superior that about

1.30 a.m. on the night of the escape he bad hoked through the spy-hole of Goldreich's cell which appeared to be empty. He went in and Goldreich struck him on th e head with a p iece of i r on . H e l o st consciousnessand when he came to,he found that his hands were tied. Goldreich's spectacles were on a table and he broke these to cut the rope with which he was tied. He then gave the alarm. The police doubted this story, and medical evidence showed that Greeff had suffered no head injury which could have caused bim to lose consciousness. The manner in which he had been deceived and doublecrossed dawned on t hi s unfortunate young man when he went to a given address to collect the R4,000, only to find that he had been sent on a fool' s errand. He bad ruined bis career for R100, a new suit, a pair of shoes, and a false promise. In mitigation i t was pleaded that Greeff was a mere youth who had been placed in a posi tion of 20

great responsibility. The Court held, however, that Greeff had held a posit>on of special trust, that he had undermined tbe safety of the State, and that the work of t h e Security Branch had been seriously impaired by his action. Greeff was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The beneficiaries of his wrongdoing, the men wbo should have stood trial for what was the equivalent of h igh t reason against South Africa — as claimed by the prosecution at the Rivonia trial — were free to conduct their treasonable activities against the Republic of South Af rica from across the seas. Greeff, their aide and dupe, was in

gaol. It was very r emiss cf t h e police to leave such

dangerous and important prisoners to be guarded by a recent police fledglin», as Greeff was, and that during night time. After their brilliant coup in the raid on Rivonia the lapse of someone in authority i n t heir r anks must have been a severe blow to the police.

great responsibility. The Court held, however, that Graaff had beld a position of special trust, that he had undermined the safety of the State, and that tbe work of the Security Branch bad been seriously impaired by his action. Greeff was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The beneficiaries of his wrong. doing, the men wbo should have stood trial for what was the equivalent of high treason against South Africa — as claimed by the prosecution at the Rivonia trial — were free to conduct their treasonable activities against the Republic of South Africa from across the seas. Greeff, their aide and dupe, wa- in gaol It was very remiss of the police to leave such dangerous and important prisoners to be guarded by

a recent police fledgling, as Greeff was, and that during night time. After their brilliant coup in the raid on Rivonia the lapse of someone in authority in their ranks must have been a severe blow to the police.

The Charges The indictment on w hich t h e accused were arraigned and tried reads as foaows: "IN THE SUPREIIE COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA.

(Transsooi Provincial Division.) RUDOLF ~ REIN, A t torney-General for the Province of the Transvaal, who promcutes for and on behalfof the STATE, presents and gives the Court to be informed that: 1. NELSON MANDELA 2. WALTER SISULU 3. DENNIS GOLDBERG 4. GOVAN MBEEI 5. AHMED MOHAMED KATHRADA 6. LIONEL BERNSTEIN 7. RAYMOND ~ 8. JAMES KANTOR 9. ELIAS MOTSOALEDI and 10. ANDREW MLANGENI

hereinafter caaed the accused, are guilty of the of fences of: SABOTAGE, in contravention of section 21(1) of Act No. 78 of1992 (two counts), Contravening section 11(a), read with sections 1 and 12,of Act No. 44 of 1950,as amended, and

COUNT l. SABOTAGE in contravention of Section Contravening Section 3(1)(b), read with Section 2,ofAc tNo. 8 of1953,as amended. 21(1) of Act No. 76 of 1962. In that, during the period 27th June, 1962,

to 11th July, 1963, and at Rivonia, TravaByn and Mountain View in the Province of the Transvaal,

as tvell as at other places within the Republic of South Africa,the accused Nos. I to 7 personally and by virtue of their being members of an association of persons, within the purview of section381(7) of ActNo. 56 of 1955,as amended, hnown as the NATIONAL HIGH COMMAND, the

accused No. 8 personally and by virtue of his being a member of an association of persons within the purview of Section 381(7) of Act No. 56 of 1955, as amended, styled JAMES KANTOR AND PARTNERS under which name

he conducted his profession in partnership with HAROLD WOLPE, aad the accused Nos. 9 and 10, together with ARTHUR JOSEPH GOLDREICH and HAROLD

WOLPE, who were also members of the NATIONAL HIGH COhlMAND, VIVBL'0 EZRA, J ULIUS FIRST, MICHAEL H A M E 4 BO B ALEXANDER HEPPLE, PERCY JOHN (JACK)

BOD GSON, RONALD (RONNIE) KASRILS, MOSES KOTANE, ARTHUR LETELE, TENNYSON MAKIWANE, JOHN JOSEPH MARKS, JOHANNES M ODISE, GEORGE N A ICKER, B ILLY NAIR, IANKSM AR T SAULW A N D LE NGUDLE, PHILLEMON D U M A N 0 K W E, JAMES JOBE RADEBE, ROBERT RESHA,

JOSEPH (JOE) SLOVO, HAROLD SIRACHAN,

OLIVER TAMBO, BENJAMIN TUROK, CECIL GEORGE WILLIAMS, as well as the persons named ln paragraphs B.S and B.9 of the particulars furnished in Annexure "A", attached hereto, and THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNISF PARTY, THE A FRICAN N A TIONAL CONGRESS, and the UMKHONTO W ESIZWE

(The Spear of the Nation), as well as other persons unknown to the Prosecutor, did, acting in concert and in the execution o a common purpose, wrongfully and unlawfully, through their agents and servants, commit the

following wrongful and wilful acts, namely: (i) the recruitment ol persons for instruction and training, both within and outside the Republic of South Africa, in

(a) the preparation, manufacture and use of explosives — for the purpose of committing a cts of v i olence and destruction i n t h e

aforesaid Republic, and (b) the art of warfare, including guerilla warf are, and military training generally + ; for the purpose of causing a violent revo lution in t h e aforesaid Republic, and (ii) the acts parttcularised and numbered 40 to 193 in Annexure "B", attached hereto,

w hereby the accused,injured, d a m a g e d , destroyed, rendered useless or unserviceable put out of action, obstructed, tampered with or

endangered: (a) the health or safety of the public; (b) the maintenance of law and order; (c) the supply and distribution of light, power or fuel;

24

(d) postal, telephone or telegraph services or installations;

(e) the free movement of traHlc on land, and (f) the property, movable or immovable, of otherpersons or of tbe State,"'

On the second count they were charged under the e section and the wording of the charge ts almost

identical with that on th e f i rst count, except that they were not charged with committing the wrongful acts enumerated, but that "they did wrongfully und unlawfully conspire each with the other and mth" ( the same cloconsptrators as sere listed under

e first count) " to aid or procure the commission of or t o commit the following wrongful and wilful acts,

namely: (i) the further recruitment of persons for instruction and tr aining, both within and

outside tbe Republic of South Africa, in (a) the preparation, manufacture and use of explosives — for the purpose of committing acts of violence and destruction in t he aforesaid Republic, and (b) the art of warfare, including guerilla warfare, and military training generally — for the purpose of causing a violent revolution

in the aforesaid Republic, (ii) further acts of violence and destruction of tbe nature descri bed in Annexure "B", attached hereto, ' (iii) acts of guerilla warfare in the aforesaid Republic, rl) fo r oo rdred ot teloreor eocuoee ol lble Act eee effendis.

25

(iv) acts of assistance to military units of foreign countries when invading the aforesaid Republic, and (v) acts of participation in a violent revolution in the aforesaid Republic, The third count was laid under the Suppression of Communism Act (1950) and charged the accused w ith c oaunitting acts c alculated t o f u r t her t h e

achievement of the objects of communism as defined in the Act,', In the fourth and last counts the accused were c harged with contravening Section 3 ( 1) (b ) o f t h e Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 which pro-

hibits any person from soliciting, accepting or receiving from any person or body of persons, whether within or outside South Africa or offers to

any person,or body of persons,any money or article for the purpose of (b) "enabling or assisting any person to commit any offence by way of protes against a law or in support of any campaign for th repeal or loodification of any law, or the variation or limitation of the application or administration n

any law". In case of a convicUon under the two main count of sabotage, the death sentence is a prescrib penalty because the penal section of the Act state that the same penalty as is provided for high treaso can be imposed in a case of conviction under the Act

The prosecution furnished the defence with ful and detailed particulars in respect of all the counts The defencerequested a large number of furthe particulars,and these were supplied, ill to e aoralss ol relesoal seceloasol cols scs seo sppeasls,

Dr. Percy Yutar

( S.C.),t t h e Deputy A t torney

General who led for the State, was assisted by Advocate A. J. Krog and Messrs. T. B. Vorster and E, Klusman, public prosecutors, He opened the case for the State in these terms:

"As the indictment alleges, and evidence in support thereof will show, the accused deliberately and maliciously plotted and engineered the commission of acts of violence and destruction throughout the

country directed against the offices and homes ol state and municipal officials, as well as against all

lines and manner of cominunications. "The planned purpose thereof was to bring about in the Republic of South Africa chaos, disorder and

turmoil, which would be aggravated, according to their plan, by the operation of thousands of trained

guerilla warfare units deployed throughout the

country at various vantage points, These would be joined in the various areas by local inhabitants, as well as specially selected men posted to such areas. Their combined operations were planned to lead to confusion, violent insurrection and rebellion, followed at the appropriate juncture by an armed invasion

of the country by military units of foreign powers. "In the midst of the resulting chaos, turmoil and

disorder it was planned by the accused to set up a Provisional Revolutionary Government to tahe over the administration and control of this country. Expert

evidence will be led to show the fearful consequences which would inevitably have flowed from such action." li l s c st ands lot senior counsel and U equivalent to the Q.c, oi tha slillsh conuaonnealln.

Dr. Yutar's statement that the evidence would show that the accused deliberately and maliciously plotted and engineered the commission of acts of violence and destruction throughout the country as alleged in the Indictment was fully borne out at the trial.

For the defence appeared Mr. Advocate Braam (Abraham) Fiscber (S.C.) assisted by Mr. V. G.

Berrange and Advocates G. Bhos and A. Chaskelson.

The trial commenced on the 9th day of October, 19$3, and, except for a few adjournments. the longest being over the Christmas and New Year Court recess, concluded with the passing of sentence on tbe 12th June, 1964. At the conclusion of the case for the

State, application was made for the discharge of James Kantoron the ground that there was no evidence against him on which a reasonable man could convict him. After hearing argument by Counsel on both sides, the learned Judge President discharged him and stated that he would give his reasons later. These reasons were given in the final judgment. In bis closing address, Dr. Yutar for the State sub m i tted to the Judge that the evidence led

disclosed "a classical case of h igh treason par excel lence". In passing sentence the learned Judge made the following remark, inter alia: "The crime of which the accused have been convicted, that is the main crime, the crime of con-

spiracy,is in essence one of high treason." I asked Dr . Y utsr wh y t hey h a d i ndicted the

accused in the mala counts under the Sabotage Act and notfor high treason under the Common Law. His reply was that in view of the previous abortive marathon treason trial of 1958.1981, in which aB the

accused were acquit ted, and the stricter proof

required by lsw, it was considered wiser to charge the accused under the Sabotage Act, and not for common law high treason. I pointed out to Dr. Yutar that, in my view, that

was not a sound reason, nor one that should have influenced the Attorney General. Where the State has prima facie evidence that a person has committed high treason, it should charge him with high treason. The fact that a prior charge of high treason had failed even if it hsd failed ignominiously, is no reason for "abrogating" the crime of high treason. l f ur ther pointed out t hat t h e prosecution laid

itself open to the suggestion by South Africa's enemies and critics that the accused were indicted under suppressive laws. If the Attorney General bad any reason to fear that he might not bring home a charge of high treason, a fear which was not wellfounded in the light of the documentary evidence alone, which the police seized at Rivonla, he could

have charged the accused with high treason and in the alternative, under the Sabotage Acts, as they were actuaRy charged. The reason for not charging the accused of high treason did not have the desired result.

Reports appeared in the London Press, particularly The L ondon Sunday T imes o f

t h e 6t h O ctober,

1963, suggestbuf that the State was going to use the Rivonia trial as a showpiece and rely on faked, fabricated and falsified documents. Following the arrest of th e accused, the South African Communist Party issued a printed pamphlet which included these paragraphs: "We may now eryect the biggest frame.up in South Africa — not eachahng seen the marathon Treason Tria of fggg to 1961. And let there be 29

no mistake, such a 'trial' would take place m conditums infinitely worse than were then the case. Since that t im e t h e South Af rican White Supremacy State has taken long strides towards a Nazi-type police dictatorship of naked lawlessness

and te r r o r i s m . With o Press that has been effect ively muzzled or suppressed, a cowed and subsenrient judiciary, and armed arith 'huvs' that contradict the very concept of legality. Nazi Vorster uritt no doubt go out to make the trial o d emonstration to whip up to hysterio the fear and panic of the White population and to terrorize the Non.

Whites into submission to slavery.

'The lund tmagination of the special bronch of

the police urill be given a free rein — certainly they are already hard at work fabricating 'evidence' of fantastic plots in Court proceedings, which witt be nothing but the travesty of those in civilised countries."

To meet these extravagant and unfounded allege. tions and conunents, each accused who went into the witness box was invited in cross. examination to point to any document or exhibit put in by the State,

which hecontended was faked, fabricated or falsi. fied, They were unable to do so, and admitted that

the documents, many of them ln their own hand. writing, were genuine. Moreover,the accused, aad in particular Govan Mbeki, when confronted with t hese allegations in the pamphlet, admitted that the present trial could

in no way be described as a frameup, or that the judici ary was cowed and subservient, The style of this pamphlet would betray its corn. munistic origin. There is oi course no truth in any

of the allegations. 30

HAPTER IV.

leventh June, 1964 The Rivonia trial which developed into one of the

most sensational cases in South Africa's legal history seldom caused more than a ripple on the placid surface of everyday life in P retoria where it t ook place. During the eight months of the trial compare. tively little public interest was shown in the story

of conspiracy which quietly unfolded in the historic alace of Justice. Nevertheless all the trappings of drama were there as thescope of this conspiracy was being revealed in the very heart of the State which the accused h ad plotted t o

o v erthrow b y v i olence and t h e

assistance of foreign invading forces.

As the State case proceeded, a public which had grown largely indifferent to newspaper reports of

sporadiccases of sabotage became more and more aware of the threat the activities and projects of the Rivonia conspirators held to their national peace and security. The damning nature of the documentary and other exhibits produced in Court, as revealed

i n newspaper accounts, the r evelations of c o conspirators who secured indetnnity by giving evi.

dence for the State, and above all the admissions m ade bycertain of the accused themselves,gradually high-lighted the significance and gravity of a plot which aimed at the destruction of the centurienotd and normally peaceful and democratic way of life in South Africa's multi-national society.

Public awareness of the national significance of 31

the plot unravelled in Pretoria's Palace of Justice grew slowly during the eight months of the trial until it became not only a national cease cdfdbre but also attracted, for

a j u d icial p r oceeding, unpre-

cedented Press and political attention abroad. The Palace of Justice, which houses the Criminal Court in which the trial took place, is one of South Africa's oldest public buUdlngs. Bugt during the last term of office of Paul Kruger, President of the

old Transvaal, or more correctly, South African Republic, it was completed shortly before the outbreak of the Anglo. Boer War in 1 899. It was then,

and has remained, a symbol of judicial integrity in South Africa which has been internationagy tributed.

The tri ple.storeyed greystone facade of the Palace of JusUce, with its slighUy ornate skyline, looks south over Pretoria's equaUy historic Church Square. Across the Square, facing it is the Rsadsaal, seat of t he old T r ansvaal Republican Government, In t h e

centre of the Square is the massive bronze statue of President Kruger whose thoughtful gaze is directed to the North.

On the balcony of the Palace of Justice overloohing Church Square Mr. Charles Robberts Swart, the first President of the new Republic of South Africa, was presented to the pubffc after hfs induction in the "Groote Kerk" on the 31st bf a, 1981. The Criminal Court in the Palace of JusUce is a

moderately large, highmiUnged room. Its architecture is somewhat old. fashioned though it retains an air of massive dignity. Acoustically lt leaves much to be desired despite microphone aids, For many of the public on the benches behind the dock the proceedings were seldom more than a murmur from the weU of the Court where advocates and witnesses 32

wentthrough the quiet processes of this unhurried trial. Of all the participants the apparently quietest figure was the presiding Judge, Judge President Quartusde Wet, whose scarletrobed presence under the Bench's imposing carved canopy held the lawyers, the accused and the public in constant aware. ness of tbe solemn and dignified processes of lsw and justice. There were no trial histriotccs here, no deciamations by prosecuting counsel, so fiery interruptions or protests by defending Counsel, no murmur from the dock which had been reconstructed into an

elongated bay to accommodate all the accused. The only demonstration which the accused permitted themselves, and to which the police turned a blind eye, was to wave to relatives and friends on the public benches as they entered or left the dock. It was, on the surface, all orderly and quiet. But to the informed observer it wss clearly patent that

the police were taking extraordinary precautions to keep things that way. Uniforms were not over. much in evidence, but in and around the courtroom quietlydressedand athletic.looking young men were present in numbers not explaiaed by casual public interest in the Court's proceedings. Senior members of the Security Pohce became famihar figures in the well of the Court.

Public interest in the trial was seldom demonstrative. On most days the benches available to the public were not fully occupied, Whites and NonWhites attending in about equal numbers. Among the latter were wives and relatives of the accused who, on occasion, decked themselves in the green and black colours of the African National Congress. The mother and the wife of two of the White accused

were frequently in attendance. International interest in the trial was revealed more sharply by the number

of foreign correspondents who from time to time crowded the Court's inadequate Press accommoda. tion. "Very important Persons", foreign embassy

representati ves and other special observers were accommodated in the disused jury bos to the right of the Bench. Observers here at different times included a United States Supreme Court Judge and a

woman professorof political history from a famous United States University.

The eleventh June, 1994, eleven months to the day after the Rivonia raid of 11th July, 19tt3, and eight months after the commencement of the trial, saw

the end of the hearing with the discharge of one of the accused and the pronouncement of the Judge's verdict finding the eight remaining accused guilty. Sentence of life itnprisonment of these eight was passed on the fallowing day which witnessed a public

demonstration against the verdict by African National Congress and South African Communist Party sup. porters and assorted White and Non-White "liberals".

This demonstration took place on Church Square across the road from the Palace of Justice where some hundredsof persons, demonstrators and sightseers. assembled while pleas in mitigation of sentence were being heard inside the court. In front of the Palace of Justice the police, some with riot. breaking police dogs on leash, were preseat ln an impressive displayof force. The hubbub in this crowd swelled to a roar when news of the sentence same from the Court but it was anyone'sguess whether this was not as much a demonstration of approval as of disapproval. There was some conunued shouting, shaldng of clenched

' ts and anthem singing. There vvere also a few uff les. But firm and tactful bandhng of the situa-

on by the police kept the situation well in hand and

e crowd eventual ly dispersed without serious

ncident. Inside the Palace of yustice the eight men had card their sentence without any sign of emotion. they turned to descend the stairs to the cells they ared with apparent cheerfulness to their relatives nd friendsat the back of the CourL The State called one hundred and seventy-three vitnesses and the prosecutor for the State handed n numerous exhibits. At the dose of the case for the State, Mr. Fischer, the leader of the defence team,

handed in a list of admissions. In respect of accused Ko. 1, Nelson Mandeia, it was conceded by the defence at in his statement from the dock, Mandela had admitted the following. 1. that he was one of the founders of "Umkhonto

wegizwe" (Spear of the Nation);

2. that he was a member of the National Executive of the African National Congress; 3, that he toured Africa during the erst half of 1982 and during his tour: a. he underwent mihtary training; b, he made arrangements for Umkhonto recruits to receive military training; and c. he solicited and received financial help for Umkhonto. 4 . He retiuested the National Executive of t h e African National Congress to assist Umkhonto in

the transportation of recruits, and approved of its decision to allow its secretariat and exterral

missions to be used for this purpose. He reported to his colleagues in the African National Con-

gress an Umkbonto on the results of his trip.

One of the reports which he made was to the Regional Command in NataL It was admitted that on his own statement he was guilty on counts two, three and four. It was not admitted that he was guilty on count one, because it was argued that he was ln prison from 5th August, 1982.

The learned Judge found, however, that hfandela was one of the leaders of Umkhonto, that he had set c ertain machinery i n m otion aad had at n o t i m e

dissociated himself from the conspiracy. He was consequently found guilty on all four countx Accused No. 2, Walter Sisulu, went into the witness

box and gave evidence under oath.In the course of his evidence he made the following admissions: 1. that he was at all mateiial times a member of the National Executive of the African National

Congress (A.N.C.); 2. thathe was consulted on, and approved of the decision to "allow" members of the A.N.C. to set up Umkhonto. The learned Judge, however, found that it was not a case of the executive athnsrsg the formation of Umkhonto, but rather of sponsoring its formation; 3. that he agreed with the decision of the Execu-

tive t o allow it s secretariat and external m issions to co-operate with Umkbonto i n t h e

transportation of recruits; 4. that he was a member of the national secre. tariat of the AN.C. which attended to the Umkbonto external correspondence. 5. that he was not a member of the High Com-

mand, but was kept informed of its decLdons, 38

and on occasions attended its meetings and took part therein. On these admissions it was conceded by the defence that he was guilty on counts two, three and four. The learned Judge found on the evidence that the

African National Congress retained the political guidance of Vmkbonto. authorised its members with

its approval to embark upon a policy of sabotage and also authorised its secretariat to assist Umkhonto. The learned Judge held that oa the evidence it was idle to contend that Umkhonto and its members were

not agents or servants of tbe National Executive: Sisulu bad to take full responsibility for the actions of Umkhonto. He was found guality on all four countn AccusedNo. 3 — Dennis Goldberg,Itwas conceded by the defence that Goldberg was guilty on counts two and three.He also gave evidence under oath and made certain admissions during the course of bis evidence, viz. (I) that he undertook inquiries in

regard to matters dealt with in the production requirements (i.e. of explosives and equipment) (2) thathe prepared sketches and reports in connection with the erection of a furnace for making castings for hand grenades and in connection with boxes suitable for land mines, and also sketches for a proposed workshed (3) that he had purchased and furnished TravaUyn, knowing that this was for the Umkhonto organisation. It w a s proved against Goldberg, inter ago, that he was the "comrade commandant" of a camp at a place called Msmre in the Cape province.The learned Judge found on the evidence that this camp was run on m0itary lines, and was established for training young Bantu in the science of guerilla warfare. The evidence proved the 37

accused's guilt under the first and fourth counts. He was found guilty on all four counts. Accused No. 4 — Govan bibeki,also gave evidence underoath,and in the course of his evidence he made admissions which proved his guilt as was conceded by thedefence, on allfour counts. Accused No. 5 — Ahmed Mohamed Kathrada. This accused is an Indian. He was a frequentor of "Lillies. leaf" farm at Rivonia, He roneoed pamphlets and literature exhorting to revolution and overthrow of the "White oppressors"; he disguised himself as a Portuguese, or was disguised with the aid of Arthur

Goldreich,and assumed the name of Pedro Perreira. In 1953 he joined the Communist Party. This accused

admitted that he learnt, during his association with the other accused, that Rivonia had been purchased by the Communist Party as a h i deout for leaders of the " L iberation Movement" who required cover from time to time. He admitted working on behalf of the South A f rican Communist Party, and w as

closely associated with the African National Congress. He admitted that he was the author of the pro. posed broadcastto the Indian peopleof South Africa, The text of this proposed broadcast was found by the police hidden under the coal in a roofless coal shed. Under crossexamination it was put to Kathrada that

this was a vicious document. He was not prepared to concede this description, but he did concede that the language was "somewhat immoderate". Kathrada a dmitted also that h e w a s a l oyal member and follower o f t h e South A f r ican Communist Party

whose aim and object it was and still is to secure freedom for the "oppressed" people m this country, To that purpose he fully and unequivocally sub. scribed and was determined to see the fulfilment of

the aims of the Communist Party, whose policy involves the overthrow of tbe Government of South Africa by force and violence, if that should become n ecessary. After a n exhaustive analysis of all t h e evidence against Kathrada, and after a consideration of the law on the basis of the liability of an accom-

plice, the learned Judge found Kathrada guilty on count two, but not guilty on counts one, three and four. Accused No, 6 — IJonel Bernstein. This accused admitted that he was a Communist, a Marxist and a pacifist. He joined the Communist Party in 1929 and remained a member until it was banned in 1950. After reviewing the evidence against this accused,

the learned Judge came to the conclusion that his guUt had not been proved and he was acquitted

on all counts.

Immediately on his discharge he was re-arrested, and it is understood that he is being arraigned on other charges. Accused No. 7 — Raymond Mhlaba. He gave evidence under oath and denied all complicity in the affairs of Umkhonto. The evidence disclosed that he

was a frequent visitor at Rivonla, and that he was regarded as one of the leading members of the African National Congress in Port E lizabeth where

he lived,There was evidence that Mhlaba on one occasion, together with the accused Mbeki and some other Bantu men and boys, received certain material from a White, Harold Strachan, who is named in the indictment as one of the coconsptrators with the accused:that this material included sand,and pipes contai ning black powder. The evidence dearly showed that this material was for the purpose of manufacturing petrol bombs, and very shortly after, these 39

petrol bombs were used in an attempt to destroy the Labour Bureau and a transformer station in Port Elizabeth. The explosion there was proved to have been the work of saboteurs. There was further evidence that hMaba started

the socatled "IF' (Mandela) Plan in the Cape; that he had worked for the Communist Party from 1943 to 1953. He came to Rivonia farm on the fateful 11th July for the meeting of the general secretariat to which he had to make a report,and he admitted

that he knew about "Operation Mayibuye", and was studying it when the police swooped down on them. The "3!V' Plan provided for a central authority (or High Command) at Rivonia and for regional and

sub-regional commiitees (or commands) throughout the country.

The learned Judge found Mtlaba to be untruthful and unreliable, and accepted the evidence against him.

He was found guBty on allfour counts. Accused No. 9 — Elias Hotsoaledl, did not give evidence but made the following, admissions in an unsworn statement from the dock: 1. that he joined Umkhonto towards the eml of 1962;

2. that he was on the technical committee of the Johannesburg Regional Command; 3. that he knew of acts of sabotage committed by Umkhonto units. and reported the results to

Hodgson,one of the caconsptrators named in the indictment, from information received from the perpetrators; and 40

4. that he assisted in accommodating recruits. He was found guilty on all four counts. Accused no. 10 — Andrew Mlangeni, also made an unsworn statement only. In this statement from the dock, he admitted: 1. that he agreed with one Modesi, in March, 1963, to actas a messenger carrying messages snd instructions for Umkhonto;

2. that he delivered • message from Modesi to Hodgson; 3. that he arrayed with one Sallmau to bring two Kombis (small motor buses) to a garage at Orlandoand drove Modesi to this garage,named the Morabi Garage, where trainees were loaded to be taken to Lobatsl in Bechuanaland; 4. that he assisted the witness X to get in touch

with Modesi through the witness Y, and gave X money obtained from Modesi for food and train fare; 5 . that a t t h e end o f A p r il, 1963, he went t o

Durban to carry a message from the High Command to the Regional Command; 6. that in June, 1963, he obtained a false certifi.

cate describing himself as a minister of the A postolic Church i n

o r der t o f a cilitate h i s

travels, and 7. that he brought a motor car from Durban to Johannesburg.This car was obtained from one Naickeraad presumably bought for the use of Umkhonto. It was admitted that Miangeai was guilty on countstwo and three, but the Judge considered that this admtndon did not go far enough. 41

After an exhaustive review of atj the evidence against Mtangent, tbe Judge accepted the evi. dence of the state witnesses and was satisfied

that this accused was implicated in the transport of trainees and sabotage activities. He was found guilty on counts one and four in addition to counts two and three, on which it was conceded that be should be found guilty.

The hearing was concluded on the 3rd June, 1964. Counsel for the State had prepared large bound volumes which contained their concluding address.

The concluding address which referred to the evidence in great detail, both oral and documentary, coveredfour of these volumes,each about 175 pages long. On account of the many admissions made by the

defence,the argument for the accused was considerably shortened. Mr. Fischer and his team traversed the evidence

against each accused, and presented the defence sub. mission with the same thoroughness as Dr. Yutar and his team did for the Crown. T he Judge reserved his judgment and on the l i t h June he handed in a w r itten judgment covering 72 pages of typed foolscap, and announced his verdict in respectof each accused. He then adjourned the C ourt until the next day to give Counsel for t h e defence an opportunity of studying the judgment in

case they wished to lead evidence in mitigation of s entence and t o a d dress him o n t h e m atter o f sentence. On the 12th June blr. Harold Hanson, a leadiog

SeniorCounsel of the Johannesburg Bar, appeared for the accused, and his opening remarks were:

"May it please Your Lordship. I have been approached by the attorney appearing for the delence to address Your Lordship in mitigation of sentence. It i s f elt that my colleagues who have conducted this case, have been so intimately bound

with the issues which have been canvassed for so many months past, and with the accused, and with their personalities, that it wiII be better if a mind possibly a l i t tle more objective were brought to bear on the difficult problem which now confronts Your Lordship, and I have agreed to do so." He called Mr . A lan Paton t o g ive evidence in

mitigation of sentence. klr. Paton was the principal of t he Dtepkioof Reformatory, Johannesburg, from 1935 to 1948. This

Ls a reformatory for delinquent Bantu youth. He was an able and successful principal. In 1948 he wrote the best. seller "Cry the Beloved Country", which deals with the fortunes and failures,

trials and tribulations of a young Bantu male who had come to "Goldie" ("Goli") to work. The Bantu usually refer to Johannesburg as "Goli" ("Goldie"). The Whites sometimes refer to Johannesburg as the City of Gold", Paton was a foundation member of the South African Liberal Party when it was formed in 1953, He became the National Chairman, and on his retirement from that position, he became the National President.

The Liberal Party has not succeeded in winning any Parliamentary election and it is generally susected of having leftist leanings. In the only election contested by the Liberal Party, l.e. in 1958, its candidates polled so few votes that 43

they forfeited the deposit which every candidate must furnish and loses if he fails to poB 20 per cent or more of the total votes east. In that election tbe Liberal Party candidates poBed 2,934 votes out of a totalof 1,156,069 cast.

In his evidence Paten gave it as his opinion that the lowliest and humblest of the Bantu people are most concerned with their "economic position; with their low wages, with their desire to give education to their children, and to dress better and to have a better house, and to have furniture, these are their aspirations", and many o f t h e m f eel t hat t h ese

aspirations can only be realised if they have some kind of p olitical representation. Mr. Paton further

stated that the Bantu in the higher scale of intelli. gence and development feel more strongly on these ruatters, Paton then went on to say that although he was opposed to violence and that, in his opinion, nothing could be gained by resorting to violence, but much

could be lost, be could understand what caused the abortive conspiracy to overthrow the Government by armed revolut ion. The cause, according to him, was that the Bantu had lost faith ln the power of persuasion; they felt f r ustrated and in desperation were adopting desperate measures. As their grievances, he mentioned the laws on work reservation, influx control, restriction of movement

and travel, and group areas. I t h in k M r . P aton i s r e f erring t o t h e u r b an

detribalised Bantu and not to the mass of the Bantu people who Bve in the country, in their homelands and in the territories. I.nder the Government'spolicy the urban Bantu

have Bantu cities, which they largely build them-

community h alls, sports f i elds, swimming b aths,

churches, schools, etc, Examples of these ate Orlando and hleadowlands In tbe Johannesburg area. Work reservat ion (job reservation) laws are neces. sary to see that labour opportunities are equably and jusOy distributed amongst the various sections of the inhabitantsof South Africa. In a brochure prepared at the direction of the Minister of Labour, Senator De Klerk, by hi s department, work reservation is explained or defined as follows: "Work reservation is merely the m aintenance of t h e t r aditional labour patterns which progressively develop between the

different racial groups in South Africa according to, and based on their respective standards of living. background and spheres of employment."

"It i s a pr o tective m easure f o r t h e W h i tes, Coloureds and other Non-White groups, against racial competition, consequently a positive measure ensur-

ing the orderly coexistence of the different races." I n h i s s t atement o n t h e d evelopment o f t h e

Coloured community, issued on the 7th December, 1960, the Prime I!Iinister said the following regarding rk reservation: "Work re servation is us ed in t h e in terest of the race fWhita or Non-Whtteh ivhich requires protection. The Government fully realises that all races are entitled to their rig htful pbtce i n t h e ivorhl of labour and that work reservation cannot be lightly applied tsithout taking into consideration

established rights and economic effects.

"The Government's main consid«ratios is th a t all races must be given the opportunity to contribute their shore to the economic mul social develop. 45

ment of the country mal the population. With this purpose in mind, it is the task of the Minister oj Labour to maintain industrial peace. It is mainly

achieved by means of mage determining regulations and the ehmination of friction benvosn races. 1Vork reservation is thus regorded as a positive method of promoting the orderly Hving together

of the various races. Influx control and the curbing of i ndiscriminate movement cannot today be avoided without creating

the greatest chaos io the labour world, and severe friction, I r emember towards the turn o f t he last

century, when I was a small boy in Pearl, the town in which the r iots and murders took place a few years ago, a Bantu man was a novelty. They were

seldom seen, and I remember that as small boys we heard that at my father's factory there was a Bantu, and we went down on our bicycles to look at this strange being. Today the whole o f t h e Western Province, including Paarl, is swarming with Bantu who have spread from other parts of tbe Republic, even into this remote southern point of South Africa, and they create problems — they createproblems of l abour, they create problems of f r i ction with t h e Coloured people whose natural habitat the Western

Province is, and they deprive the Coloured people of their t r aditional fields of l abour by competing unfairly with them. As for the poverty of the Bantu, judged by Eur pean standards the average Bantu ispoor Judged h their own standards before the advent of the Whi man, and the upsurge in the industrial field whe they had to fend for themselves, they are welloff. As far as the Bantu is concerned, not only in th

Republic, but in Africa as far as Nyasaland an 48

enya, South Africa is a welfare state. Our problem s to keep the foreign Bantu out, not to keep our owo antu in. For the latter we need no Berlin wall. As far as opportunity for political expression and "'consultation is concerned tbe Bantu today have far ore scope than ever before.The almost three million

antu in the Transkei already have their own parlia. ment and an ever-growing measure of self-govern. ent. This will be the position in every one of the arious Bantu homelands as they develop and organise '. h eir i n t ernal administration as e nvisaged in t h e policy of separate national development. Already there is a country~de network of over 00 territorial, regional and community authorities functioning in the Bantu homelands. In addition there

''pre numerous advisory boards, school boards and

.,«pchool conunittees in which thousands of Bantu play "'hn active role in shaping the destinies of their people. is quiet, constructive work which overshadows e destructive activities of a handful of agitators. No, I t hink the real reason for Rivonia must be ought elsewhere. It pussies me that the defence did ot call a s ingle Bantu w itness in m i t igation of sentence to say that tbe real cause of the conspiracy In his opinion, was the feeling of desperate frustration pnd hopelessness among the Bantu masses, if that as the case. There are many prominent, inteUigent, ell.todo Bantu i n o u r m i dst. Men wb o ar e n ot litical agitators, but who enjoy the respect of their wn people, and of the Whites.

This Rivonia conspiracy was not caused by the overnment's policy of separate development, or partheid, if you will: by a feeling of oppression or uppression and a desire on the part of t h e Bantu

o free themselves of the "White man's yoke".

In my judgment tbe real cause is disclosed in tbe evidence in t h e Rivonia case. The revolt was inspired by th e Communists. The pattern is copybook communist strategy:

Create chaos by sabotage, by riots, by uprisings. Paralyze the public services, create terror and confusion. When the time is r i pe, invade, overthrow the Government and set up a socialist state. For ail this they manipulate and use a section of the indigenous population, preparing them beforehand by magnifying theh "grievances", and holding before their eyes the advent of a real Utopia with bounty for the "oppressed", luxury, ease — a real kind of

Shangri-la.

Doesn't that spell — A lgeria, Cuba, South East Asia, the Congo, Zanzibar and states in South America, and in every part of the tvorld where loday there are uprisings, riots, revolutions and civil war? It is difficult t o say which one is more active in Africa — Russia or China? Are they competing for the ripe apple when it falls? And quite clearly, South A f r ica i s t h e biggest apple of all and also the biggest stumbling block for the Communists in their striidng for African domination as an important step towards world domination, which is their ultimate goal, A nd th e C ommunists have a f r u i tful f i eld i n Africa, in which to sow. Uhuru to the African is a magic word that spells freedom from everythingwant, as well a s work. I n 1 960 while t ravelling through Uganda, native picannins would raise two fingersof their right band to us as we passed by,

and shout:"Uhuru"! The masses of the people have 48

as little conception what this means and what oblige. tions "independence" brings with it, as the picannin shouting "Uhuru" alongside the country road. I do not think that the rank and fge of the Bantu people care a fi g f o r t h e vote in a W h ite man' s Parliament or for political representation on behalf of themselves. The Bantu is still at the stage where the Roman people were at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire when the populus shouted "Give us bread and the Circus" ! In Nairobi today the Bantu are demonstrating and shouting: "Give us food and work"! The position may be otherwise with the Coloured and Indian community. Their development and civtlisation is far advanced beyond that of the Bantu. But th e self. appointed leaders of t h e c oloured communities have a handy weapon in their hands w ith which to incite their people and to co mi c s them that if they got rid of the White man everything i n the garden would be rosy, aud Utopia will b e theirs.

Compare the pamphlet quoted in another part of "For higher wages and freedom and equality." this book -

The Bashee River Bridge murders were perpetrated by members of Poqo, a terrorist organisation which isa resurrection of the banned Pan African Congress whose batt!eery i s " A f rica for the Af ricans", with

the explicit intent that the White man must go or be destroyed. Events subsequent to t h e Rivonia t rial i n dicate that White Communists are behind the whole plot. I shall deal with these events later. In trying to solve our tough problem of race relations in aR its ramifications, we must perforce make

mistakes. This programme will be fraught with teeth-

ing troubles and very painful ones at that. As the accused have decided not to appeal to our highest Court, the Appellate Division, I shall quote the last words said in t b e Rivonia Trial, i.e. the

remarks of the learned Judge President, in passing sentence: .. . I h ave heard a great deal during the course of this case, about the grievances of the Non-Europeanpopulation. The accused have told "

m e, and their Counsel have told me, t hat t h e

accused,who are all leaders of the Non-European population, had been motivated entirely by a desire

to ameliorate these grievances. I am by no means convinced that the motives of the accused are as altruistic as they wish the Court to believe. People who organise a revolution usually plan t o t a ke

overthe Government, and personalambition cannot be excluded as a motive.

"The function of this Court, as is the function of a court in any country, is to enforce law and order and to enforce the laws of tbe State within

which it functions. The crime of which the accused have been convicted, that is the main crime, the crime of conspiracy, is in essence one of high treason. The State has decided not to charge the crime i n t his f orm. Bearing this i n m i nd, and

giving the matter very serious consideration, I have decided not to impose the supreme penalty, which in a case like this, would usually be the proper penalty for the crime. But consistent with my duty, that is the only leniency which I can show. The

sentence in the case of aH the accused will be one of life imprisonment. In the case of the accused SO

who have been convicted on more than one count, thesecounts willbe taken together for the purpose of sentence."

CHAPTER V

Reactions One thing about the Rivonia Trial that must strike

everybody forcibly is the complete conflict between tbe reactions abroad and in South Africa to the ver-

dict and sentence. With few exceptions, the reaction overseas, especially in Britain, was one of condemnation of the trial, o f t h e verdict and o f t h e sentences. These

reactions are reflected in press comments on the triaLMany newspapers and many important persons put the blame for the acts that gave rise to the trial. on the South A f rican Government and i t s r acial policy.Some papers went so far as to say the South African Government should have been in the dock instead of the accused. In South Africa the Press was unanimous in the view that the trial bad been conducted in accordance uith the high tradition and reputahon of Supreme Court justice and the South African judiciary — a reputation which is i n al l quarters admitted to be second to nooe in the world. Public opinion in South Africa, as expressed in newspaper articles, mostly leading articles,was that the accused had been found guilty of the most serious crimes because. although they were charged under various statutes, as the

prosecutor stated and the learned Judge President found, they were actually guflty of high treason. As

is to be expected, the Nationalist progovernment

press and the English Opposition press differ on the causes that gave rise t o t h e abortive attempt at 52

ngineering an armed revolution in South Africa, d the steps that should be taken to avoid similar occurrencesin the future. In a leading article in The Rand Daily Mail one of the most vigorous and outspoken of the Opposition ewspapers in South Africa, the Editor wrote on the 7th June, 1964:"The sentences pronounced by Mr. Justice De Wet in Pretoria yesterday at the conclusion of the

Rivouia Trial tvere both sire ond just. The trnais seen at its best u:hen there is firmness tinged tvith mercy, and this tees the case yesterday. The sentencescould not have been less severe than those passed. The m e n fo u rul g u ilty ha d or g onised sabotage on o aide scale,and had plotted armed revolution. As the Judge pointed out, the crime of tchick they secre found guNy tvas essentially high treason. Th e d e ath pe nalty w o uld ha ve b een justified." The scale and intensity of the condemnatory reaction overseas, including Great Britain, have caused rise to all sections of the South Af rican corn. munity. In an article in the Rand Deity Mail of the 18th June, 1964, this reaction is referred to in the follow-

ing terms:-

"All th is hos caused much betvtfderment and anguish here, especially in N a tionalist quarters. Was it not plainly a fair t r ial? Couhi men found guilty in re spect of hi gh t reason have ezpected tight sentences? Would they not ha re been sum. mmiiy sh ot i f t h i s had b een an i r o n C u rtain country?And tvould there then have been such an outcry as there is now? These are the pained and angry questions thai are note being osked."

My impression, gathered from contacts in Non. Nationalist circles is t hat t h e " bewilderment and anguish" referred to in the above article is equally intense in all quarters, and not more so in National.

ist quarters. On Tuesday, the 15th June, Mr. Butler, Britain' s

Foreign Secretary, is reported to have said in the H ouse ofCommons that he deplored the arbitrary nature of the laws under which the accused in the R ivonia case had been brought t o t r ial, and t h e absence of the opportunity of expression for political

(Non-White) leaders in South Africa, In an

e arlier c hapter I ha v e dealt w i t h t h e

Attorney4eneral's failure to indict the accused for high treason. It is, however, abundantly clear that although the Attorney-General preferred to indict the accused under certain statutes which have also been dealt with earlier in this book, the crimes with which the accused were charged included the essence of high treason.

A study of the evidence, moreover, indicates clearly that tbe Conununlst Party was behind the planned revolt and that it was, in part at least, financed by

foreign Communist Powers. If Mr. Butler was correctly reported, be could not have been aware of the true facts.

The main charges, although under the provisions of A cts o f P arliament, cover common la w h i gh

treason.The Judge President,for the purposes of sentence, treated all th e charges as one, and that essentially of high treason. There is nothing arbitrary in the law relating to high treason. "Salus rei-publicae

suprema est lex" (The safety of the State is the highest law) is of universal application in all civil-

ised countries. 54

O n th e 1 6t h J u n e t h e P r im e b i i nister, D r . erwoexd, made s statement in Parliament on the voniaTrial snd the reactions overseas. The remarks e made were approved by the whole House, sn5 I ave not heard n single dissentient voice anywhere rom any South African, or any dissentient note anyhere in the South African press. The Prime Minister's statement was reported ln e Rand Daily Mail of the 17th June. I have comared the report in the newspaper with the official est of t h e P r ime blinister's statement. It i s a n ccurnte summary thereof, snd contains sll the salient features. I quote the Rand Daily Mail report "Opposition members agreed with t h e P rime Minister when he sahf yesterday that if the accused tsho had appeared at the Rivonia Tnal had succeeded in t h e ir ai m s, a co m munisooxtentated government would have been estabtished in Sxrxth Afnca, and eQ race groups would have lost their freedom. "When the third reading debate on the Appro priation Bill neared its end, Dr. Verwoerd rose to make a statement on the Rivonia verdict and the reactions to it i nside and outside South Africa. "He asked the xvorld to realise that the people comfcied were 'communistic criminals' who had plotted against the safety of the State, but that they had had a f air t rial and had not been shot out of hand as had happened to similar elements in other countnes. He said a great measure ot sympathy had been shoum to the accused, ln fact, the reactions u ere to make heroes and martyrs of them. The tendency wos to make out th at these people had been concerned only arit re sistance to the Government's poficy.

"There had aiso been attempts to construe the facts in such a umy that people al! over the world

would be fustffied fo interfere in the offairs of South Africfs "He wanted to emphasise that South Africa had to do here with an aspect of the Cold Wor. It was not uaged against South Africa s o much, but Communists regarded fhe opportunity as the han. diest tool urifh uihfch to get at t he pmver of th e West. " 'I want to state clearly and unequivocally that in this case we have not got to do urith opposition against the South Africon Gouernment's policy, or a championship of th e f r e edom and r ig hts o f people. We hatw to do with a communist uprising which uould have been brought about in South Africa,' the prime Minister said. "'Those who tried to organise this uprising are either t hemselves Communists or ar e w o rking tvillingly and k nouringly i n c l osest cooperation arith people who are Communists. The source of their money is partly communistic.' "Further proof that South Africa had fo do with o communist. inspired attack aimed at causing dis. order and chaos in the country, was that now for the first time Communist States and Governments had openly expressed support for t hese people. "Dr. 1'erwoerd said that shoufd these Riuonia accused haue succeeded, then a communist~ientaled gouernment — whether W hife, Black o r mixed — would haue been established." As I show in another chapter in this book, srbere I deal inter alia with the exhibits in the trial, the Prime fltintster's assessment ol communist backing 56

and inspiration of the abortive revolution, is fuUy

supported. In addition to the bewilderment that I share with the almost three and a half million White South Africans at the reaction abroad, especially in Wes tern countries who speak the same language and subscribe to tbe same vray of life as we do, I am shocked at the suggestion that pressure could be brought to bear on a South African Supreme Court Judge, or that i t c ould be thought that anyone in South Africa. from the Prime Minister downward, would stoop to exert such pressure in an attempt to influence him in his finding or sentence.

Pressure was attempted from abroad and the

Judge President received several appeals and corn. , munications from groups and associations of people, i including trade unions, protesting against the trial and demanding that the Judge should stop iL The Supreme Court was first established in South Africa under the Charter of Justice in the Cape Colony in 1828.

Since then the Supreme Court Bench had been graced by many illustrious jurists and men of the highest character. In more recent times one need only think of such names as Lord De Villiers who became Chief Justice of the Cape Colony at the age of 29. Sir James Rose Innes, Sir WiBiam Smith, Sir WiUtam Solomon, Sir John Kotzo, Jacob de Villiers, J S. Curlewis, etc., etc. They and their predecessors have laid the foundation for the high reputation of i the South African judiciary. Since time immemorial

' the judges have enjoyed security of tenure. A judge can be removed from office by the State President only on an address by both Houses of Parliament in

the same session, and only on the mund of mis. 57

behaviour or incapacity. There has been no such case. I f i n d i t s hocking and indecent that t he Lo ndon

Guardian should on the 13th June, in commenting on. the trial, say this of th e Judge:"He has shoran before nmo that he is not Dr.

Vervsoerd' s office boy — he makes up his mind."

The insinuation is dear.

"On the li t h J une, 1984, Sir De Viltiers Graaff the Leader ot the of f i cia Oppositum in the Sou Africon Parliament, stated that South Africa had a free Parliament and a free Press, and it i s crime to oppose apartheid. Yet the Government', had no success in it s overseas propaganda cern pmgn to convince the u orld." The reason for this, he said, was that the majorit of those opposed to the Government's policies, ha no means of p olitical expression, Sir D e V i l liers Graaffs statement about a free Parliament and free Press and the absence of any sanction for oppos

ing apartheid or any of tbe Government's racia policies by speeches or representations or meetings was to meet the suggestion abroad that people ar

being punished here for expressing opposition to the Government's racial policy. It is clear, and it should be emphatically stated that South Africa is a democratic country where f

speech prevails in its enure ambit and spirit. The opposition parties, the U nited Party, t h e o f ficiak

Opposition, the Progressive Party which has ona member, Mlr. Helen Suzmsn, who is a whole opposiv tion ia herself; and the Liberal Party, although it has

no representation in Parliament, are constantlp

crltlclsing and a t tacking th e Government's racta)

policy and its plan for independent self-governing Bantustans, in Parliament and outside Parliament, at political meetings and on other occasions. The opposition Press likewise freely and vigorously attacks Government policy and its letter columns are available to all, and often contain criticism of that

policy. There is today a Bantu Press ln South Africa which enjoys the same freedom as the White Press. Judgment ln th e Rivonia Trial was delivered on the 11thJune, 1964, and sentence was passed on the 12th June. Reactions to tbe trial, verdict and sentence, here and abroad, followed immediately. Since the 12th June, 1964, the evidence, the judgment, verdict and sentence were avagable. I am not aware ofany expressed moderation of the condemnatory tone of t h e f oreign press to date. With one exception. The Chicago Tribune of the 6th August, 1964, contained a leading article headed, "Red plot in South Africa". Passages from this article read as follows:"Seven members of the United Natt'ons Security Council have adopted a resolution ca!Bug on the Republic of South Africa to fr ee aR prisoners, including those under death sentences, charged with vtohutng apartheid ( race separation) la ws. "The United States, Britain, France and Brazil abstained f rom vo ting. T hose in f a vour of t h e resolution were Bolivia, Nationalist China, Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Norway and Russia "One of the things the world, in its present state of confusion, does uot want is the United Nations, many members of which are p rone to be b usy-

bodiesand mischief-makers, trying to i nfluence the 59

Courts, and ot herwise sticidng its n ose into th e

internal af fairs of nations. The accused were c h arged wi th d eliberately plotting and engineering acts of violence,sabotage and de struction wi th th e ob jechve of c a using revolution and overthrms of th e G overnment. "Evidence brought out of t he Tr ial seem indisp utable that the accused were taking part i n a crntspiracy plotted by the South African Commun. ist Party with t he tuR knouledge and support of

Moscmv.

"Severalof the documents" (which the accused adnutted were genuine) "disclosed uot only Moscms's tmefvement but also that t he conspirators were consutting wi th Communists in C rechoslo. vakio, East Germany and Red China. "The evidence uvutd seem to indicate that the Communists are seeking to use South Africa's racial troubles os means of creating eswn more turmoil and confusion and eventuaBy capturing the Govern. ment. This puts the trials in an entirely different

perspective". With t hi s exception, the silence of th e h ostile foreign Press and its failure to modify or correct its i nitial condemnatory statements, l end support t o South Africa's complaint that everything concerning

its policy derogatory to this country, often completely untrue and generaUy distorted, is published «Wile everything in it s favour is suppressed.

There are a few welcome exceptions lor which we are thankful.

60

Operation Mayibnyo Operation Mayibuye means "Operation Return" or "Operation Come-back". The full title is "Operation Afrika Mayibuye", that is "Operation for the Return of A f rica", which th e R ivonia conspirators represented to the masses as having been stolen from the Bantu by the White man. This claim is also put f orward in th e slogan of the P.A.C.: "Africa for the Africans". There is no foundation for t his claim either on

histori cal or moral grounds, When Van Riebeeck landed the first White settlers at tbe Cape in 1652, he found onlysmall bands of nomadic Bushmen and Hottentots whe had no permanent dwelling place and no semblance of nationhood. There were at that time no settled Bantu in what is now the Republic of South

Africa. At about the same time as Van Riebeeck landed. the Amazulu (o r M atabole) were moving south, and reached what is now South Africa. In their trek south they destroyed weaker tribes. Cheka alone is reported to have destroyed directly or indirectly two million souls. Fierce tribal wars led to de-population on a large scale and to the shrinking of the Bantumcupied portions of South Africa. This

area was further reduced by the exodus of three strongtribal units,one migratlag to Portuguese East Africa, one to East Africa and one to Rhodesia. The European settlers moved into areas not yet reached by the Bantu invaders, or as was the case in the northern provinces, deserted by them. At no time dl

did European settlers exterminate Bantu t ribes to

rob them of their lands.' After about 150 years from Van Riebeeck's lasdlng the marauding bands of Bantu had only reached the Fish River, about 500 miles from Cape Town as the crow flies. With the advent of the White man the slaughter

gradually ceased. The Bantu began to multiply to their present eleven million in South Africa. HistoricaBy, therefore, the Bantu have no claim t o South African territory beyond the Kei River and perhaps some indefinite area between the Kei and the Fish Rivers. On moral grounds, if the Bantu immigrants claim any land by right of conquest, then the White man can claim the whole of Southern Africa by conquest. Professor Edgar Brookes, onetime representative of the Bantu in t h e Union Senate, wrote: "Taking South Africa as a whole, what right have the Bantu to it which the Europeans have not? They are not the Aborigines,as so often termed: they are conquerors as foreignto South Africa in 1500 as Europeans were. If force confers rights on them as against Bushmen and Hottentots, it c onfers rights on Europeans as against them. The same argument applies to occupation.As far as beneficial occupation goes, Europeans have the stronger claim; their superior ability and civilisation would have warranted the subjugation even of the Aborigines". Mr. B. K. Long. the well known English journalist, and one. time Editor of the Cape Times, who sat for

years in the South African Parliament, made the same point in his book, "In Smuts' Camp". "The land, t staw ot soulb huaca Yewavoa tssL

62

in Southern Africa," he wrote, "was not the land of the Bantu who were the ancestors of our Natives. The Bantu invaded Southern Africa from the north overland, just about at the same time as the burly Dutch settlers invaded it from the south by sea. The Bantu attacked the original native inhabitants, the Bushmen and the Hottentots, put most of them to the sword and enslaved a few survivors. Native title to Southern Africa is no better and no worse than White titlethe title of the assegai or the rifle. Native title dates little, if at all, further back than %qute title: and if the validity of title by conquest were to depend at all upon the treatment of the genuine aboriginal population, then White title is on the whole considerably more valid than the Native title. Again, the White conquest of Southern Africa was distinctly more advantageous to the less martial tribes among the Bantu native occupiers themselves, than the permanent domination of the warrior Bantu tribes could have been. The Bantu tribes lived in perpetual internecine warfare. It was awarfare of extermination and enslavement, waged mercilessly and ceaselessly by the stronger against the weaker tribes. If it had continued. the Bantu tribes would have committed suicide by steady mutual extermination. White conquest spared them that." Although the d aim asserted in th e ba ttle-cry "AfrikaMayibuye" is unfounded, the exhortation can have a sinister stimulating effect on the primitive Bantu. The primitive Bantu is still a killer. The Zulu

war cry "Bulala" (kill) can still stir them into a frenzyof uncontrolled aggression and murder,They ean so easily be persuaded that to kill the White man or drive him into the sea, is a crusade that must be carried out.There is proof of this in the Bashee

River and Pearl killings. One must always remember that we have to do with a primitive people: even higher education does not eradicate their superstitious beliefs in a generation or two. The document Operation Mayibuye is a d etailed and comprehensive blueprint for achieving the object of tbe Rivonia conspirators to seize control of South

Africa by violent and military means. The detailed plan is a lengthy one, so I quote only some salient features. Tbe plan set out in this document is divided into six parts. Part I in troduces the plan in the following

words:

"The White State has thrown overboard erery pretence oi rule by democratic process. Armed to the teeth it hos presented the people with only one choice, that is i t s overthrow by f o r ce and uiolence. It can now truly be said that very little, if any, scope exists for the smashing of White supremacy other than by means of m ass reootutionmy action, the main content of w h ich is armed resistance leading to 6 ctory by mi litary means."

The next paragraph concludes with the sentence:

"We are confident that the masses udtt respond in overwhelming numbers to a lead which holds out a real possibility of successful armed struggle. "In the light of th e existence of certain ingredients dealt arith just before this paragraph, the prosecution of m i l itary struggle depends for i t s

successon tw o further factors: a the strength of the enemy; b. the existence of clear leadership tcith material resources at its disposat to spark off and sustain military operations.

"Rather os in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked off by organisedand rsell.prepared guerdta operations during the course of which the masses of the people witt be drmrn in and armed. "We iunw no igusions about the difffcuf ties which

faceus in launching and successfully prosecudng guerilla operations leading to military victory. Nor

do we assume that such o struggle witl be over swiftly. We have taken into account and carefully weighed numerous factors,and we mention some

of them: "a We are faced with a powerfully armed modern State. with t remendous industrial resources which can, at least in the initiat pened, count on the support of t hree mitlion Whites. At the same time the State is isolated practically

from the rest of the world, and if effective tcork is done, ueH have to rely in the main on its msn resources." The document then proceeds to state that the

ould.be insurgents are unarmed and lack training, but that the proper organisation of the almost unlimited assistance that can be obtained from friendly Governments, will counter-balance this disadvantage. The plan then sets out the steps that should be taken and proceeds as follows: "Although we must prepare for a protracted war, we must not lose sight of the fact that the political isolation of South Africa from the worhf community of nations, and particularly the active hostility towards it from almost the whole of the African Continent araf the socialist uorhf, may result i n such massive assistance in venous fornw that the

State structure wiff coffapse for sooner than we can at the moment envisage. 85

"We are not unmvare that there are pouerfzd

external monopoly interests uho witt attempt to bolster up the White State. With effective work they can be isolated and neutralised. The events of the htst few years have shown that the issue of racial discnmination cuts across world ideological conflict albeit that the West proceeds from oppor. tunistic premises. "ln the initial period and for a short mhile the military advantage uill be ours, the plan envisages a massive onslaught on prese)ected targets uhich mill create nuuimum havoc aad confusion in the e nemy camp and u h ich u e sld i nject i nt o t h e masses of the people and other friendly forces a feeflng ot confidence that here at last is an army of hberation equipped and capable of leading them to victory. In this period the cornerstone of guerilla operations is 'shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly flee from the strong'. "We are convinced that this plan is capable of fulfilment. But only if the u;hale apparatus of the movement both here and abroad is mobilised for its implementation and if every member nmv prepares to make unlimited sacrifice for the achievement of our goal. The time for small thinkmg is over because history leaves us ao choice." Part II th en sets out the areas for this operation: "I. Port Elizabeth to Vmzimkulu. IExtreme North

East Cape bordering on Natalh 2. Port Shepstone to Swaziland. 3. North Western Transvaal, bordering respectively on Bechuanaland and the Limpopo. 4. North Western Cape to South West."

66

Part III is headed "Plan", and proceeds asfollows inthelirst paragraph: "I. Simultoneous landing of four groups of 30 based on our present resources either by ship or

air, arm ed mul properlyequipped in such a way as to be self sufficient in every respect for at least a month. "g At t h e initial stages it is proposed that the 30 are split up into ptatoons of 10, each to operate more or less within a contiguous area and linking their activities anth pre-arranged local groups. "3. Simultaneously a;ith the landing of the groups

of 30 arel thereafter, there shouht be a supply of arms and other war materud to arm tbe local p opulations which become i ntegrated usth t h e guerilla umts. v4 On landing, a detailed pion of attack on pre. selected targets with a view to taking the enemy by surprise, creating the masimum impact on the populus,creating as much chaos and confusion for the enemy as possible. "S. This paragraph deals uit h t he choosing of suitable areas. "8. Before these operations take place, political authority wi ll ha ve been set up in s ecrecy in a friendly territory ari t a vi n o to s uperswing the struggle both in its internal and externat aspects. "lt is vi suaysed that this authority witt in du e

course of time develop into a provisional revolutionary government." Then fol low a large number of paragraphs which are not of much importance or interest. Then para-

graph 7(h) states: 87

"In order to facilitate the imptementation of the military aspect of the plan, it is proposed that the National High Command appoint personnel to be quartered at Dor ( Darwsyalaam) under the aus-

pices of the office there." Psst IV deals with internal orgsntsatlon and states in the preamble: "In preparation for the commencement of opera. tions uhen our e xternal team lands, intensioe as teeR as extension work uiR hme been done. For instance, guerilla units mill iun;e been set up in the main areas mapped out in part I abooe,as tsett as in other areas atsay from the immediate scene of

operation.

Paragraph I of this section states:

"Our target is that, on arrive the external force

shouhl find at le ast 7,000men in th e four main areos ready to join the gtmrttta army in the initial osstaught.These unR be altocated as joyous: a. Eastern Cope Tronskei — 2,000 b. Natal Zulutand — 2,000 c. North Western Tranststal — 2,000 d. North Western Cape — l,000" Part IV, Clause IV: "It is proposed that auxiliary guerilla sabotage umts in the four main areas be set «p before and alter the commencement of operationa" The document further states that: ln order to drms in the masses of the population, the political t cing should arouse the p eople to aatitiia te in th e struggles that are designed to create an upheaoat throughout the country.

Part V "Detailed Plan of Implementation" contains the following passages: "Points along the coast which would be suitable

for landing of men and supplies and how these are going to be transferred from the point of kmding

to the area of operations, will be the work of a committee of the socalled Intelligence Department, and the In telligence Department witt also be re. quired to s tudy and re port on, in ter a l ia, t h e

situation of enemy forcesin each area "Selection of t a rgets to be t a ckled in i n i t ial

phase of gueri!Is operations with a Sew to causing

mazimum damage to the enemy, as ttell as prevent ing the quick deployment of reinforcements In it s study, the committee should bear in mi n d t h e

forewing main targets: Strategic road, railway and other communications; 2. Power Stations; 3. Police Stations, camps and miTitary fo rces;

4. Major industrial installations, and S. Irredeemable Covernment stooges."

Then the document deals with political authority, and under that head it is stated: "We make a s t rong reeommendstuni that t h e foint sponsoring organisations should immediately set about creating a p oBticat machinery f or t h e direction of the revolutionary struggle, as set out in numbers 6, 7 and 8 of P art II, and to set u p a special committee to d i r ect g ueriga, political

education." The sponsoring organlsations referred to in this paragraph are in the main the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party.

The scheme then deals with the "Transport Committee", which will be responsible for the organisation of transport facilities, a logistics department, a technical and supply committee. The functions of t his department should be, inter alia, to manufacture and build up a stock of arms, atnmunition and explosives

from internal sources. Also to organise the reception, distribution and storage of supplies from external sources. Then follows Part V l w h ich i s headed "Miscel. laneous" and deals with the immediate duties of the National High Command in relation to the guerilla areas. These immediate duties are stated to be to map out regions in each area with a view to organising regional and district commands and ht.K. units. (M,K. stands for Umkhonto weSizwe, „Spear of the

Nation.")

"To achieve this ue strongly recommend the em. ptoyment oj te n fu tl.time orgonisers in each area The orgenisers shaB be directty responsible to the

High Command." The National High Command is directed to recruit and arrange for the external training of at least 300 men in the next two months. The High Command of t h e N ational Liberation Movement, as they called themselves, also organised the recruitment of young Bantu men for training in

sabotageand gueriBa warfare. Some ofthese recruits were openly told the object of sending them to other

countries. Others were offered scholarships in African States to the north. They were aB instructed not to tell their parents or other relations, but simply to leave home without

saying anything. 70

In this recruiting two of the accused, Elias Motsoaledi, a named Communist, and A ndrew Mlangeni, played a prominent part. ln this way, numerous young Bantu males were secretly recruited and sent across the borders of the Republic in small batches under the leadership of trusted agents and servants of the accused. The

recruit s were given false names and addresses,and furnished in advance with various excuses they were to give to the South African police, should they be stopped en route. biaps found by the police in the cottage at Mountain View indicate some of the escape routes which were used. There svas apparently no lack of money or transrtation for sending these recruits abroad. Once o ver the border, they were transported by air t o Tanganyika at a cost,according to the evidence, of R30.000 per plane load of 26 or fewer. From Tanganyika they were sent to various countries, including Algeria, Egypt and Ethiopia. There they received extensive military t r aining, especially i n sabotage

.and guerilla warfare. Among the mass of documents which were seized by the police at Rtvonia, and which were handed in at e trial as exhibits, there was one in these terms: "Production R equirements: 2 10,000 h andgrenades: 48,000 anti-personnel mines; 1.500time devices for bombs: 144 tons of ammonium nitrate;

21.6 tons of aluminium powder and 15 tons of black powder." In the opinion of experts these quantities were sufficient to blow up a city the size of Johannesburg. The nature of some of the other " requirements" 71

listed by the High Command was revealed in the State's case against Goldberg.

Acting on Goldreich's instructions, Goldberg under the alias '1). WiUiams" and u sing several postal

addresses,wrote a number of letters to timber and other merchants on the subject of the conspirators' supply requirements. He, infer alia, asked quotations for the supply of "Boxwood Shooks",and, according to the response from one of those firms, the quantities of wood specified in Goldberg's inquiry were suf. ficientfor the manufacture of 48,000 boxes as weU as an additional 48,000 tops. The f ir m i n q uestion pointed out t o " W illiams" that the order was quite a large one involving the

preparation and conversion of a large volume of timber, and that i t must have a f irm order. " It i s understood," added the letter, "that the box is to be closed aU round and that th e shocks need not be planed, but we would like t o record that the mill may wish to plane one side*'.

It appeared during the trial proceedings that these boxes were required for the manufacture of land mines. Another reply. headed 'Your Box Shook Requirements" and produced in evidence. stated: "We regret to advise that we have today received a reply from our principals stating that they were fully booked and regretthat they cannot quote for your inquiry".

According to tbe documentary exhibits produced at the trial other "requirements" listed to be furnished by Goldberg included cast-iron for grenade.heads, a furnace,a cupola (a small type of furnace), a mould,a fan, bricks,sand and cement.and the construction of a work-shed (for the manufacture of explosives.)

In his defence evidence Goldberg said hc conducted all his activities in Johannesburg at the request of Goldreich. He thought guerilla warfare was not practi cable but nevertheless continued t o c arry out a detailed investigation. If guerilla warfare was eventually embarked upon his contribution would have been most valuable. The evidence showed that no mentionable quantity of explosives was manufactured at Travallyn, origin. ally planned to be the conspirators' arsenal, but that explosives were manufactured and used in acts of sabotage, in various parts of the country in accordance vdth the directions of the travelling instructors

of the High Command, including Stracban and Hodgson. In addition, the sabotage squads and Um. khonto wegiswe were told by their leaders to steal from explosives magazines and the extensive stocks of explosives in the various mines. The National High Command's targets for destruction covered practically the whole of the Republic of South Africa. At Rivonia alone, 106 maps demarcating proposed targets were found. These targets included, tater olio, police stations, post offices, Bantu Admini. stration offices, the houses of Bantu policemen and administrators, electric power stations and power lines, pylons, railway l ines and signal boxes, and telephone lines and cables. The architects for the preparation, manufacture and use of the explosives listed for the High Com-

mand's requirements for their policy of sabotage were four White men: Arthur Goldreich, who escaped beyond the borders of the Republic, and Percy John Hodgson, who fled the country. The third was Harold Strachan, who appeared before me in 1962, while I was still Judge President of the Eastern Cape Division 73

of theSupreme Court,on a charge of sabotage and the training of Bantu in the arts of sabotage and explosives.After the close of the case for the State, Harold Strachan pleaded guilty and was sentenced by me to six years' imprisonment, of which three years were suspended — a sentence which was criticised by my colleagues in other Divisions for its alleged

leniency. It is interesting to note that, in sentencing Strachan who was also convicted under the Sabotage Act, I told him that his crime was akin to high treason. The fourth "architect" was the accused Dennis Goldberg. In the particulars to the indictment furnished by the prosecution, there were listed 193 acts of sabotage in the form of damage by explosives and incendiary bombs and material to public installations and public buildings. The State proved almost all of these 193 cases of sabotage in South Africa. Of the 193 cases which were tabulated in Annexure B of the particulars to the indictment, thirteen took place before the 15th December, 1961. The 16th December,1961, was the date fixed by the Umkhonto for a real effort to cause destruction by means of sabotage on a large scale. T he 16th December is a N a tional Day in t he Republic. It is called "The Day of the Covenant", On the 7th December, 1838, the Voortrekker, Sarel Ciiiiers, in a religious ceremony in the laager solemnly pledged that if the Almighty assisted them in punishing the treacherous Dingaan for his murder of Piet Retief and his followers under circumstances of great tragedy and shamelessness,the Afrikaans Voortrekker

nation would always hallow that day and observe lt as a r eligious day. Dingaan was defeated and destreyed on the 16th December, ILtg. 74

The publicholiday of the 16th December was for many years known as "Dingaan's Day". Later the appeRation of this public holiday was changed to 'Tbe Day of the Covenant". The Umkbonto chose this day because of its importance in tbe history of the White man in South Africa. Between the 16th and 18thDecember, 1961, seventeen acts of sabotage were

committed by the Umkbonto and tbe people inspired by the conspirators under this Operation Mayibuye. Of the thirteen acts of sabotage that were committed before the 16th December, 1961, the most serious was the destruction ofa corner tower near Johannesburg by sawing off two outside legs, on the 8th October, 1961, at 9.15 p.m. As a result of this damage to the tower it toppled over, and the cost of repairs amounted to R8,000 (f4,000). After the mid-December, 1961 upsurge of sabotage activity, the African National Congressissued a rather boastful statement headed "Umkhonto weSizwe" — ' Army of the Liberation Movement: "UMKHONTO WESIZWE — ARMY OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMEN T *

U k I HHONTO IS FOR ACTIVISTS We have struck against tfie White state more than 70 times (boldly yet methodicallyh We are trained and practised. We shall be mors so.

*

U h IKHONTO IS ORGANISED Our organisation is nation-wide. We can strike anywhere.

75

* U M K H O NTO TRALVS THE YOUTH

We are ceaselessly, thoroughly, trai ningan Army of Liberation * UbIKHONTO HAS POWERFUL ALLIES The African states and the democratic world are

four. square behind us. We have allies among other races in South Africa

UMKHONTO HAS A PLANNED STRATEGY Umkhonto can analyse the revolutionary situotion. It knows hmo to use soldiers where they

are most effective. *

I D I KHONTO HAS LEADERSHIP

Our leaders are brave, intelligent men They work together. * U M K H O NTO HAS NO NEED TO BOAST The people are with «s. We are for the peopla

Our words are deeds. Three POQO men are due to hang. Hundreds

are in fait, many for life. Who knmcs hms many witt be rounded up after the Lebayo

fiasco? THESE ARE THE CASUALTIES IN THE FREF DOM STRUGGLE. WE QUARREL NOT WITH BRAVE MEN BUT WITH BAD LEADERSHIP. WE ATZACK PAC — LEBALLO POLICY NOT OUT OF PEITY RIVALRY BUT BECAUSE IT TAKES US BACK, NOT FORWARD ALONG THE FREEDOM ROAD.

*

Ge n uinefreedom. fighters must find a tsay to

fight together, in UNITY, in unbreakable strength.

*

Th ere is room in the freedomstruggle for aRbrave men —and women.

WE A R E PREPARED TO TALK UNITY TO WORK FOR UNITY: TO FIGHT UNITED WITH THE CORRECT POLICY AND THE CORRECT FIGHTING SIRATEGY. WITH YOUR SUPPORT WE WILL WIN hlA N D L A N GA W E T H U ! BE CAREFUL — BUT LET OTHERS SEE THIS

Issued by: African Nationa! Congress." After th e murder of f ive Europeans on the 4th

ebruary,1983, at the road bridge over the Bashee River between Butterworth and Umtata in the Trans. kei, the African National Congress issued two further hoastlul statements. The first one is headed "After the Transkei Killings

;s- Listen White bien", This is the text: "AFTER THE TILANSKEI IGLLINGS LISTEN, WHITE MAN LITICAL VIOLENCE HAS BECOME THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAY OP UFE. 1VHY? W H AT CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT! 77

"Five Whites were murdered in th e T ranskek another hacked to death at Langa Police arestill not sure whether t he murders were political or nof. Perhaps they were not poRtically organised. There have been grievance murders before, of

course,only now they become more frequent.Like the raid on Pearl fast year, when seven people died, the motive is a massive political wrong, fury, fnutration and contempt for what Whifes do, BLACK, COLOURED AN D ASIAN ARE SICK TO DEATH OP WHITE SUPREIIACY. "Sabotage eruptsevery other week fhroughouf the country, nmv here, now there. The Whites ore turning vicious and panicky. Already we see the sinister birfhpangs of the lynch gang, the vigihnte and the O .A.S, a rmed Whites — on fy ' c fvgian protection' groups, fsomen's pistol clubs, a proliferation of ne oNazi secret societies. At t h is r ote, within a year or two South Africa wfff be embroQed in the second — b loodier, more funous Afgerfan WHILE APARTHEID LEADS TO WAR THE GOVEIINMENT SIUKES THE SIRES. "All Yerwoerd can do is tighfen oppression, He doesn't dare relax. The Anny build.up, police reorgamsation, the Special Branch, anne factories and the Sebofage Act aresupposed to make you safe. Yet the harder the Govenfment tries fo sttfle resistance to apartheid, the stronger, more determined it has become. Despite Vorster's promised

death penalty,

SABOTAGE AND MURDERS MULTIPLIED Lqgl" YEAR."

The reference is to the Transkei killing on the night of 4th — 5th February, 1963. At about 2.30 a,m. five persons, Mr. Norman Grobbelaar, his wife Eliza.

beth and their two children Edna and Dawn, and one Derek Thompson, were attacked by a large number of Bantu men while they were in bed in their respec. tive caravans in a road camp at the Bashee River Bridge in the Umtata district, and brutaBy done to death. The attacking party of Bantu were members

of the socalled Poqo organisation which was a resurrection of the banned Pan Afncan Congress. They approached these people, road workers sleeping peacefully in their caravans. and threw lighted bottles of petrol,the necks of which were stuffed with cloth, through the tvindows of their caravans. When the victims tried to escape from the holocaust caused by the petrol bombs, they were viciously and brutallv

battered to death. Thompson, who was sleeping in his caravan about a hundred yards away, was like»ise attacked and as he tried to escape from his burning

caravan he was struck down, picked up bodily and hurled back into his blazing vehicle where the police found his charred body the next day. This murder was perpetrated with the sole object of killing off the White man in Southern Africa so as to get Africa back for the Africans.

Another statement issued by the African National Congressis headed "Vorster's threatsdeter nobody". Itreads as follows:

"VORSTER'S THREATS DETER NOBODY. SABO. TAGE AND MURDER 1VILL NOT CEASE." (The reference is to Mr. B. J. Vorster, the present Minister of Justice of South Africa.)

These sensel ess and brutal murders, like the murder of young people in the Pearl riots, illustrate how the conspirators in the Rivonia Trial, with the full knowledge of their actions, played with fire when they practised their propaganda on the raw African Bantu. The masses of the A f rican Bantu, especially the rural Bantu, notwithstanding the sustained efforts by the White South Africans to raise their standard of education and civilisaUon, are still r i dden with belief i n w itch+raft and sorcery, indulge in r i tual murder and other supersti tious excesses. They are still extremely primitive. Under the veneer of civilisation one still finds "Darkest Africa". Umkhonto weSitwe (The Spear of the Nation), was formed under the auspices of the National Liberation Movement, which included the African National Con. gress and the South African Communist Party, It was to be the military wing of Operation Mayibuye and the spearhead of the programme of sabotage which was to merge later into guerilla warfare. Composed mostly of young urban Bantu who had lost their t r ibal connections, their allegiance to a t ribal chief, and had f r eed themselves from t he restraint of their t ribal lavvs and customs, this was for them an adventure. Not the stick fights of their youth, but war on a higher plane, where their pro.

gretaand success would be watched and applauded

by the Afro. Asians and Communists in ih e United Nations who today largely control that body. Their exploits would be watched and their success

in mussier and sabotage applauded or justified by South Africa's enemies overseas, who include people who should kaow better, or who could be expected to orientate themselves to the true facts and the festers

and forces behind this Rivonia conspiracy. Regrettably, some clergymen in England side with our enemies, The Anglican Church has taken sides with those who attempted to overthrow the South African Government by milimry revolution, under the inspiration of the Communists and with their aid and

support.

Rhfe aia and the African States After the African National Congress abandoned its pacifist attitude and created the militant Umkbonto iveSizwe in 1981 it was decided to send Mandela on a tour of the African States with a view to enlisting their support in the project to overthrow the South African Government bfandela left for Lobatsi, in Bechuanaland, on 11th January, 1962, after discussing his proposed tour w ith ex-Chief A l bert L u thuli a n d o btaining h i s approval. From Lobatsi Mandela went to Tanganylka where h e h a d d i scussions wit h v a rious A f rican nationalist leaders, including Julius Nyerere, now President of Tanganyika, and Rachidi Kawawa, then Tanganyika's Prime Minister. He continued his journey via Lagos to Addis Ababa to attend the conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, C entral an d S outhern A f r ica ( P A ~i CSAL and addressed the conference on behalf of the African National Congress of South Africa. Mandela nor d i n his diary that the A.N.C. delegation from South Africa made "a definite impression

and our address was warmly received. The speech was published in f ul l b y t h e Ethiopian Press and PAFMECSA intimated that they would use the speech as the basis of plans for action against South Africa". The speech, delivered o n 3 r d F e bruary, 1982, sketched conditions in South Africa as follows:"South Africa is mno a land nded by the gun. The Government ts increasing the size of its army,

of the navy, of its air force and the police. PN hoses and road blocks are being built up att os' the counlry. Armament factories are being set «p in Johannesburg and other cities. Officers of the South Af rican a rmy h m ~ v i sited A l geria a nd Angola where they were briefed esclusively on methods of s u ppressing popular s t ruggles. Ail

opportunities for peaceful agitation and struggle have been closed. Africans no I ottger hate t h e freedom even to stay peacefully in their houses in protest against the oppressive poHcies of the Gov. e rnment. . . A crisis is developing in earnest in South Africa. However, no High Command ever announces beforehand what its strategy ond tactics trill be to meet o situation . . . B u t a leadership commits a crime against its mvn people if it hesi. tates to sharpen its political weapons taken they

(strikes, demonstrations, eta) have become lass effectwe." Tbe resolution adopted by the conference read in

part:-

"THIS FOURTH P A F M ECSA C O N FEREIVCE, aware of t h e s i nister i mplications of t h e n ew 'unholy alliance' in Southern Africa between the fascist governments of Dr. Verwoerd, Sahuar and W elensky;. . . "Condemns the 'Defence' pacts and common mili.

tery offensives of the member countries of this

'unholy aRiance' against the African patriots; . . . "Draws the attention of alt the African States to this 'unholy athance' with i ts ev3 in tentions to

suppressand sabotage the independence movement i n Africa;.. .

"Salutes the freedom fighters in t hese countries 83

tcho continue to f i g ht a gainst great odds;. . . "Utterly r ejects the gr onting of s o c atfed 'setfgovermnent to the Transkei' as o cynical fraud ond a calculated insult to the African peoples through out A f rica te ho ar e d e manding complete mu l

genuinefreedom and independence in respect of the u:hole of South Africa; "Calls on African States to apply immediate poli. tical, economic, diplomatic and cultural sanctions

against the Republic of South Afrfca and to secure the adoption of t h ese measures by th e U n ited N ations Organisation;. . .

"Calls on oil African States to give practicol and material support to the peopleof South Afnca in their struggle for freedom, and

"Demands the li f t ing o f t h e ba ns on t h e tr so major political organisatums, vis. the A.N.C. and the P.A.C." blandela urged the African States to intenstify their

boycott campaigns against South Africa to sap the country's economic strength. His real aim, however,

was to secure financial support and promises of outside military assistance and his speech, which was accepted by the conference as a basis for action against South Africa, called on the African States "to give practical and material support to the people of South Africa in their struggle for freedom". bfandela noted in his diary the names of tbe Heads of State and other high ranking officials of African States and foreign embassies with whom he discussed conditions in South Africa, After a preliminary meet. ing w it h President T ubman of L i beria i n L agos, Nigeria, on the 28th January, Mandola met him again

in April and noted: "He (Pres. Tubman) informs me

that the people of L iberia would do everything in their power to help our people in their struggle for selfdetermination". He had discussions with Kenneth Kaunda, now Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, w ith E m peror H a il e S elassie o f Et h iopia a n d Mohamed Fayek, Head of tbe Department of Africa Affairs of t h e United Arab Republic. On the twohour discussion with Fayek. he noted in his diary: "He stressed importance of unity between AJI.C. and P.A.C. and pledges full support of bts Government for the people of S.A." He received a pledge of full support from the Cuban Ambassador to the United Arab Republic in Cairo where he also bad discussions with t b e Czechoslovakian, East German and Indonesian Ambassadors to the U.A.R. Mandela made a point of putting his case to almost every personality o f c onsequence in t h e political sphere in A f r ica. These included President Bourguiba of Tunisia; Dr. Mostefai, Chief of the Algerian delegation in Morocco; Jacques Verges, the personal adviser of the Moroccan Minister for Africa Affairs. Of the latter discussion, Mandela noted: "He (Verges) h ints that ou r d emands will b e m et, even if n ot fully", On 10th April he met President Modibo Keita of Mali, and j otted dovm in hi s diary: "We have an hour's discussion on the present political situation at home and on my mission. He advises that there is

coordinating machinery between Mali, Guinea and Ghana on this matter and that the matter would be referred there". During th e next month, hfandela discussed the uestion of o utside support w it h P resident Sekou Toure of Guinea; Jaja Wachuku, Nigerian Minister of Foreign AHairs and his staff; President Senghor

of Senegal and General Aboud of the Sudan. His diary contains the following comments: "He (Pres. Senghor of Senegal) tells us . . . t h at Senegal will do everything in i t s power to assist us i n j ust struggle against apartheid". Referring to General Aboud of the Sudan, he added: "He is extremely cordial and pledges full support to the African People in their struggle for freedom". These pledges clearly left Mandeia with no doubt that he had all the moral support of these States he could bare hoped for. In most instances they also bore histransport and personal expenses, and several also contributed substantial amounts to his "freedom fund" — one of the main aims of his mission. In hi diary he listed the following amounts under the

heading of "Funds":"E10,000 from Nigeria, ES,000 from Tunisia, E3,000 in gforroco, E2,000 in liberia svonld be yearly amount; E5,000 in E thiopia and defini promisesfrom Senegat and the Sudan."

However,for tbe large.scale operations enrisaged by the A,N.C, more funds would be needed and Mandela recommended that a mission should be sen to the socialist countries for this purpose. Mandela also took advantage of his African tour to gain as much military tr aining and experience as possible and seized various opportunities to discuss matters of strategy, sabotage and guerilla tactics. He visited military installations in E thiopia where h e met Lieutenant-General Kebbede Guerre, Chiefwf-Staf of the Imperial Armed Forces of Ethiopia, In Algeria he attended military parades and manoeuvres and met Ben Bega on one of these occasions. On a return visit to Addis Ababa, Mandela started 86

his own military training. With Lieutenant Befikadu W ondomu as i nstructor, h e r e ceived training i n demolitions, attended a demonstration of mortar fire, spent several hours on the rifle range, devoted a day to field instruction, asd completed a route march of 26 kilometres in t hree hours. He was particularly interested in the poUtical aspects of warfare, especially guerilla warfare, and inter alia made a detailed study of the revolutions in Algeria, the Cameroons, Malaya and Angola. Wherever possible, he had discussions wit h o f ficers actively i nvolved i n t h ese operations. In accordance with t h e instructions of

Umkhonto,blandela aim concfuded arrangements with several North African States for the training of re. cruits from South Africa. In fact, when he returned to South A f r ica after completing his mission, he actually met a batch of recruits in Tanganyika. It is clear from his diary that lNandela established for himself a sound background as a future organiser o f guerilla warfare. From the point of view of t h e A V.C. his t our was a complete success. He had obtained the moral, financial and, if needs be, the military support of t he A f rican States: he himself hsd been thoroughly trained in guerilla and political warfare, and the A.N.C. now had bases outside South A frica where r ecruits could b e t r ained fo r t h e planned overthrow o f t h e G overnment o f S outh Africa by violence. Indicative of thc motive behind the conspiracy and "Operation Maytbuye". and the attitude of Af rican States towards the proposed revolution are, in addi. tion, statements by two African leaders. Nana hfahomo, a member of the Executive Council of the Pan African Congress in a New York television 87

discussion stated:

"The resourcesof South Africa wdt be used to deoelop other parts of Af r ica which are not a s rich in mineral resources as South Africa i s . . . are then enter an era of coordinated p hmning.. . where the whole of the resources of Africa are utilised on a continental basis,"

At Cairo during the recent "Summit" Conference of African States Dr. Vkrumah is reported by Reuter-

AssociatedPressto have said: e must recooer our mineral wealth in South

Africa". In addition, reference should be made to Ben Bel. la's impassioned and sanguinary exhortation to the conferees at Addis Ababa to establish a "blood bank" to aid their brothers elsewhere in Af rica i n t heir

struggle. One wonders, if its members read this book, whether the United iVations Organisation will t ake

action against the African States, referred to in this Chapter,for threatening world peace.

CHAPTER Vill

Rivonia anti the Comm unists In dealing with accused No. 1, Nelson Mandela, the

learned Judge President in his judgment, said:

'The only question of fact in issue on the evidence which merits consideration, onses from the evidence of the w i tness X. T h e l a tter s aid t h at w hen h e addressed the Natal Regional Command, Mandate said that persons of the African National Congress ond Vmkhonto, who visited other Afncan countries, should

be careful not to admit that they mere Communists, or sympathised urith the Communists, and instanced

the case of one Mtcholi, who mas cotdshoufdered because he saut he was a Communist. Mandelo wos at great pains to deny that he tsar a Communist. had communist sympathies, or that he has said this, but it is interesting to compare what he mites in his report on th e P afmesca Conference under Se he a ding 'Political Climate', namely, 'Clear that in this area there are great reservations about our policy, and there i s o m i de-spread feeling t hat t h e A f r ican National Congress is a communist dominated organisatton." (P afmesca stands for Pan African Freedom lfovement for Eastern, Central and Southern Africa.

The conference referred to,was the conference held by African States at Addis Ababa.)

"I may add that I share this feeling after hearing

aQ the evidence in the present case, In addition, there is a lengthy eshibit in the writing of accused No. I entitled 'How to be o good Communtst'. I have no

doubt that the evidence of the witness X is correct" 89

The South African Communist Party was founded in 1921 and was banned in 1950, under tbe Suppressionof Communism Act, 1950. At that date its membership was 2,009. It went

underground and continued its activities, and used London as the place for printing and publishing and distributing its propaganda.

Paul Grimes reported in the New York Times of the 25th January, 1964: "in South Africa, stringent pohce action has supIwessed overt antMmwrnment agitation, but there is evidence of strong underground communist act. toity totth Sosv'et support. There also have been recent reports that South Africans" fBantu) "were undergoing training in Cuba" The official communist organ in the United States, The Worker, on December 9th, 1962, contained a message from the South African Communist Party that it was "fighting side by side with the 'oppressed',

to overthrow the South African Government." In regard to the small membership of the Communist Party in comparison with the reputed membership of 120,000 of the African National Congress at the time it was banned under the Unlawful Organisa-

tions Act of 1960, the passagesquoted in a paper read at the National Convention on Communism in Pretoria

earl ier this year,are very apposite.

"Communism illustrates the truth that the discipgned, dedicated, scientific, tntethgent and organtsed few tsttt be able to exp/oit and direct, deceive and conquer the selfish, undisciplined, disorganised nlut tt tudes. "Communism is not o mass movement. That is the secret of its success. It has attsags been a

tightly. knit, rigidly d i sciplined, and nu merictdty small cmupiracy of h ighly talented, utterly dedicated and totally vicious criminals. The conspiracy captures nations by boring from within. It t herefore needs nor tvants numbers. It does not enlist masses, it manipuiates them."

In a three page stencilled document entitled "Out-

lines of t h e Syllabus for Co urse on t r a ining of

Organisers", which the police found in Goldreich's car, appears tbe foBowing passage: "(c) Alignment of Forces. What are the opposing forcest 1. On the one band are: (1) V erwoerd's Nationalist Government; (2) Supporters of the policy of White Supremacy. 2. On t h e o t her h and: ( I ) T h e A f r ican

National Congress; (2) South African Com. munist Party; (3) South African Indian Congress; and (4) Coloured People's Congress." In Goldreich's studio at Rivonia the police found

a document of 90 pages in Goidreich's handwriting entitled "C. Mansbiha on problems of transport." The following are excerpts from this document: "No problem of giving materiaL

"Considerable traffic of arms as normal trade "We don't have any rekttions with Verwoerd's Goswrnment in any w ay. So don't care what he says, Safest and su rest way, tr a nsfer o f ar m s through country where they hare normal rei'ations. G overnment agreement. WNingness of t h i s Gotwrnment to us. Government give us armaments,

and Soviet compensates. Ifost convenient Tangan. 01

yike. "Neg (negotiate) arith Tanganyika, not with Communists. It would be better to make African National Congress officials conduct business «rith Tanganyiku Best person to discuss here — man nearto us but not one of us. "Transfer of armaments, of arms on high seasdifficult to speak of neutral waters. International regulations 3 to 12 miles, this is r a ther formal. 1Vill realise with techniques used today, re-loading on high seas are located very quicldy. And here when discovered — serious entanglements; particularly for us and comrades involved, general climate not favourable,e.g.becomes public knouledge when African State supports democratic movement i n South Africa. But if Moscow is inrolved — inter-

national r amifications.

"One further point. Not all our r equests relate to armaments. Normal equipment is also required. Radio parts, radio, intelligence equipment, possibilities do exist for legal import to South Africa For

example, of printing machines from G.D.R. IGerman Democratic Republic), Sactu, ( which siands for the South African Congress of Trade Unions), set up company to import G.D.R. shipped to llamburg, marked 'Made in Germany'. R came through. These queshons shouhl be raised arit German comrades. We must investigate how Soviet supplies can Bnk up tvith German comrades. We are sure German comrades urill help, but must be discussed tvith

them.

'%'e then moved to the discussion of what and hots much. "We agreed t o p r esent a m e morandum and

request for specified quantities of arms, etc.

"This was done, and left with the Smriet com-

82

rades to be decided upon and discussed on our terms. "The Yugoslav display desire to come closer. To reject this unit be a mistake. Their economy basically socialist. No capitalists, no l andlords. There are stiR many socially hostile to socialism. Mistake to think t hey dominate. Important point C. M . visit Yugoslavia" ( I t h ink th e C. M. stands for

C. Manshiha.) The document then bas the following paragraph headed "First meeting with Chinese". "Preliminary discussion ot programme. Questions relming t o gu e rillo to orfare. L i st o f te c hnical questions. "Outline of th e po sition in So u th A f r ica" Another document in Goldreich's handwriting found at Rivonia bears the title "First Discussion — C. Lee, Ministry of Defence,China" This is a v er y l engthy document and evidently consists of notes taken by Goldreich in conversations with, or lectures by, C. Leo of the Chinese Ministry

of Defence and C. Yang Ching of the War Department The docutnent is a detailed plan for conducting a successful revolution. It deals with: (a) the general history, establishment and rise of the revolutionary forces in China, (b) The establishment and develop.

meot of guerilla bases, (c) The influence and control ol the armed forces by the Communists.

On another page olthis document appears the following: "Ny questions: (i) how does one organise field i n telligence in rural areas and their correlation tcith intetligence in urban areas. 93

(ii) What part doessabotage play in the initial stagedtn (I) urban areas; (2) rural areas; (iti) How doesone train in rural and urban oreas; (io) What is the relationship between protrochon and quick decision." "Rest fogowed list

Relationship of part and national movement in the united front.

(I) Army must be under absolute party leadership, (2) Army must operate at will of the party and must not at any time be divorced from the

party leadership. "Answera Main training of cadres Is through tbe experiences of war. China had noexperience of sabotage units in urban areas.Main force of sabotage against landlords, etc," Towards the end of the document is the following:

"Suppliesof materiaL We are solving problem of transport Like to meet comrades

with regard to problem of transport.

List

Plast! c explosives. Fuses, Detonators.

Gadgets for gence.

i n telli.

(a) We have seen Chech comrades.Problems explained. No further action until discussion with Soviet

comrades. (b) Imports through Hong Kong of traditional forms

of trade; dolls, toys: reason for visit to China, Algeria, Tanganyika." It is clear the intention here is to import explosive

aterial, like fuses and detonators from China, packed traditional forms of trade, like dolls and toys. "We would like assistance and knowledgeof Soviet omrades on disposition and number of South African Armed Forces and weapons and everything else necessary for full intelligence." Among the exhibits seized by the police and banded in at the trial was a document of 89 pages in the bandwriUng of N elson htandela, the f irst accused,

and headed as to Part I, "How to be a good Com. munist" . Excerpts from this document read as follows:-

"In our own country, the struggles of the op. pressed people are guided by the South African Communist Party and inspired by its pobcies". "We Communist Party members are the most

advanced revolutionaries in modern history and are the contemporary fighting and driving force in changing the society and the tcorld". "The aim of studying Marxist philosophy is t o

enable us to direct more effectively revolutionary mass struggles. To put it in a nut.sheB,Marxism is a guide to action." "In South Africa a Communist Party member must take part in mass struggles initiated by the South Af rican Communist Party, t h e Congress Movement or by other political bodies within the liberation movement." . The Communist Movement still faces power-

fut enemies u:hich must be completely crushed and wiped out from the face of the earth before a Communist World can be realised. Without a hard, bitter and l ong struggle agmnst capitalism and exploitation, there cen be no Communist WorhL" "Every Cmnmunist Party member must possess 95

the greatest courage and revolutionory determina-

tion and must be prepared to play his part and carry out all p olitical tasks without fear or hesi. tation." "Finally, we must tizw and develop in reality in fighting to change the world, we must start from tlu. eery people in close contact with us. We must thoroughly study our own situation and problems, understand them completely and work out appropriate solutions." 'To sacrifice one's personal interest and etwn one's life trtthout the sfightest hesitation to t he cause of the party, is the highest manifestation of Communist ethics." In another exhibit seized by the police at Rivonia, there appear references to the policy of the South African Communist Party and to the need to discuss certain matters with both their German and Soviet comrades. coupled with a warning that the interven-

tion of Moscow should not become public property as this vvoutd lead t o i n ternational ramifications. There are also references to the programme of the Communist Party, the need for their working amongst t he peasantry, and greetings are conveyed t o a Chinese communist leader f rom the Central Committee of the South African Conununist Party and all Communists. Another exhibit seized at Rivonia was an 18 page document on a Croxley writing pad in the writing of Nelson Mlandel, and Chapter II was

headed "Dialectical!materialism". On page 11 appears the following: "The people of South Africa led by t he South African Cmnmunist Party wi R destroy capitahst society and build in its place, socialism," 96

nd on pages 12 and 13, the following is found: "Hence the transition from capitalism to sociolism and the liberation ot the tsorhing class from

the yoke, cannot be effected by shno chongesor by reforms, as reactionaries and liberals often adsise, but by rnmlutton. One therefore must be a revolutionory and not a reformist."

Another exhibit, under the heading "Birth of tbe o South African Freedom" and purporting to be the rogramme of the South African Communist Party. On page 55 of this booklet appears the following: "The Communist Party unreseroedty supports and participates in the struggle for national liberation headed by the African National Congress and in agiance with the South African Indian Congress, the Congress o f T r ade U nions, t h e C ohmred People's Congress and other patriotic groups of democrats — u: omen, peasants aml yo uths. For them it dematufs the immediate summoning of a soueretgn national coneention t o d r aw up a n d promulgate a constitution of o State of Nationat Democracy in South Africa. It considers that it is important and urgent for alt the forces and mes+ments of f reedom to agree upon aQ their main goals and aims at this time." Another exhibit, under the heading "Birth of the

bl.K." (which stands for Umkhonto wegizwe) includes a paragraph which reads: 1. "The African National Congress; 2. South African Communist Party; 3. South African Indian Congress;

.4. Coloured People's Congress." Then follow these words: 97

"These are the alignment of forces as opposed to: l. Ve rwoerd's Nationalist Government,

2. Supporters of the policy ol White supremacy." A notherdocument seized was headed "Statement by the Central Committee of the South African Com.

munist Party". In this document the following quotation appears: "No desperation, no adcenturism, but firm resolute revolutionary action, planned on local initiative in coordination with the nationat leadership of the Liberation M oeement, heeded b y t h e A f r ican National Congress arui its fighting wing, Vmkhonto weSizwe. This m ust be t h e w a tchword o f th e Western Cape ami att other parts of the country. This is the poBcy of the Communist Party."

A furtherpassage in this document reads:

"ln theseconditions" (that is, alleged suppressioe conduct to preseree White supremacy at att costsi, "carelessness,loose talk aad recklessness on the partof members of the underground organisations such as the Communist Party, the Afrtcan National Congress and Vmkhonto weStrwe, become serious crimes against their c omrades, and against the

people as a whole." The document proceeds: "ln th is situation, a t r emendous responsibility rests upon the s houlders of t h e S outh A f r ican Communist Party. ln th e s trengthening aed the leadership of ou r o r gamsation rests the key t o oictory. Our p arty i s t he most experienced and seasoned in underground uork. li is guided by and imbued with a scientific theory of Mani s mLeninism u:hichhas been prosed time and again to be the only correct resolutionary ideotogy."

In addition to the documentary evidence showing the dominating part played by Communism in the proposedrevolt,there was viva voce evidence. Inter aBa, there was the evidence of the witness "X" who ts descri bed by the Judge President as being a reliable and trustworthy witness. He was a coconspirator and therefore an accomplice, but under circumstances of long, interrupted cross. examination. he stood up to it and was accepted by the Judge as a credible witness without any hesitation. In another case in Natal, the Judge President, Mr. Justice Milne,

had the same witness before him in a similar case, and formed the same impression of him as a reliable and truthful witness. This witness, for safety reasons remained anonymous during the trial, as "X". This witness stated that the A I L ( U mkhonto we-

Sizwe) was looked upon as the military wing of the African National Congress. Communists were en)oined to carol with tbe African National Congress in order

to assume controlthereof. Mandela, when reporting to the Natal Regional Connnand early in August 1962, warned against the African States getting to

know thatthey were Communists,because,so Mandela said, „they would help us but not the Communists." Mandela further reported that the M.K. would go

through two phases, (I) of sabotage followed by (2) guerilla warfare. Another witness, Cyril Davids, testified to the asso ciation of the Communist Party with the conspiracy, and also the African Youth League, of which the African National Congress is the parent body. Thereis a m ass offurther evidence,both documentary and tive ence, to show that fbe Communists were the real planners and instigators behind this pro. osed revolution and overthrow of the Government

and seizure of the country. It seems to me clear, therefore, that the Judge President's finding that the African National Congress, which posed as the main organisation i n t h e r evolutionary movement, was c ommunist dominated, was fully supported by t h e evidence. Equally, it seems to me, there was full support for the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament that the people behind the proposed revolution

and rape of the country were communist criminals. I have dealt elsewhere in this book with the con. dition of the eleven million Bantu who inhabit South Africa. It is a fact well-known to all historians and students of ethnology that the masses of the Bantu are still in an extremely primitive and undeveloped state. Although the percentage of l iteracy has in. creased by the endeavours and efforts of the White man to a figure much higher than among any of the other Black inhabitants of A f rica, the mass of the Bantu are still r i dden by belief in witchcraft and sorcery. They still practice twin murder under the belief that the birth of twins is due to witchcraft and is unnatural. They still have smoking-out ceremonies to name a witch suspected of causing sickness and death ina neighbouring kraal,and they are generaUy centuries behind us in development and civilisation. To suggest to, these people that the communist principles vvill give them all th e freedom, liberty, a bsence of want, all t h e f ood they want, al l t h e leisure they want, all the education they want, simply

by the magic name of "Uhuru", and that the Communists are tho people to provide this for them, is to put fire to highly inflammable material. Of the eight accused who were sentenced to life imprisonment, two, namely Mandela and Sisulu, were convicted Communists, and four, Mbeki, Kathrada,

100

laba and Motsoaledi, were listed Communists. Of e other two Goldberg was a very active member of the Congress of Democrats and Mlangeni was a very active member of the banned African National Congress. Goldberg admitted that his parents were Communists. Bernstein, who was acquitted, was a 'sted Communist.' Among the ctH.onspirators Harold Wolpe, Michael Harmel and Percy John Hodgson were listed Communists. Bob Hepple was a member of the Communist Party.

In condusion I give an example of the kind of propaganda put out by the Communist Party in an attempt to reach the Bantu masses. This was a document seized by the police and handed in as an

exhibit at the Trial. It is in the, English language on the one side and in two Bantu languages on the other

side. It reads:

"For Higher wages, Land, Freedom and Equoltty — 44 years of the great October Socialist Revolution. Free bread, free public transport, free education, free medical services, free holidags, free meats

at work, no rents. SoundsHke o dree', doesn't it? That is what communism is bn nging to th e 200

million people of the Soviet Union." Under a f urther sub-heading, "What it means to us", appears the following: "What a great Msson there is for us here. The great October Socialist Revolution has taught u s that it is possible for the people of even the most backward country to put an ead to poverty, disease,

and ignorance and to catch up with the economically advanced nations within the Hfetime ot one generatuna. u ssmsww sussequenar aes Ibe cosnlry

101

This exhibit, a st