Rivers Of Blood, Rivers Of Gold: Europe's Conflict With Tribal Peoples 0224038842, 9780224038843

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R IV E R S O F BLO O D , R IV E R S O F G O LD

A lso by M ark Cocker R IC H A R D M E IN E R T Z H A G E N LO N ELIN ESS A N D T IM E

RIVERS OF BLOOD, RIVERS OF GOLD Europe’s Conflict with Tribal Peoples

M ark Cocker

JO N A T H A N C A P E LO N D O N

Published by Jonathan Cape 1998 2468 109753 i Copyright C M ark C ocker 1998 M ark Cocker has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author o f this w ork This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by w ay o f trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser First published in Great Britain in 1998 by Jonathan Cape Random House, 20 Vauxhall Bridge R oad, London S W iV 2SA Random House Australia (Pty) Lim ited 20 Alfred Street, Milsons Point, Sydney, N ew South W ales 2061, Australia Random House N ew Zealand Limited 18 Poland R oad, Glenfield Auckland 10, N ew Zealand Random House South Africa (Pty) Limited Endulini, 5A Jubilee R oad, Parktown 219 3, South Africa Random House U K Lim ited R eg. N o. 954009 A C 1P catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISB N 0-224-03884-2 Papers used by Random House U K Lim ited are natural, recyclable products made from w ood grown in sustainable forests. The manufacturing processes conform to the environmental regulations o f the country o f origin. Typeset by S X Com posing D T P, R ayleigh, Essex Printed and bound in Great Britain by M ackays o f Chatham P LC

For M iriam Lucy

Contents

Illustrations Acknowledgements Preface Author's N ote Introduction All Christendom will here have Refreshment and Gain Part I: The Conquest o f M exico 1 The March 2 The Kidnap 3 The Night o f Sorrow 4 The Siege 5 The Besieging 6 Gold —The Castration o f the Sun Part II: 7 The 8 The 9 The 10 The i i The

The British in Tasmania Bones o f King Billy Black Crows Black War Conciliator Last Tasmanian

ix x xv xiii

3

27

36 53 61

73

86

115 127 140 154 169

Part III: The Dispossession o f the Apache 12 The Tiger o f the Human Species 13 The Enemy and the People 14 Am erica’s Greatest Guerrilla Fighter 15 Gerónimo - The Last Renegade 16 The Caged Tiger

187 205 224 233 252

Part IV: The Germans in South West Africa 17 A Freshly Slaughtered Goat 18 A Darkness That M ay Be Felt 19 A Place in the Sun 20 The Empire Builders 2 1 Cruelty and Brutality 22 Never Must We Allow the Negroesto Prevail

269 273 284 294 314 343

23

358

They Built N o Houses and D ug N o Wells

Select Bibliography Notes Index

371 378 403

M aps

M exican Empire British Tasmania Apacheria German South West Africa

26 114 186 268

Illustrations

T he market place at T htelolco, from a mural by Diego Rivera (Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, M exico) M octezum a addressing his people (Government Art Collection) An eighteenth-century engraving o f Hem an Cortés (R are Books and Special Collections Division, Library o f Congress) Cortés, from R ivera’s mural (Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, M exico) Slaughter at a religious festival (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid) A M exican death mask (British Museum) M ary Ann and W alter George Arthur W illiam Lanney Truganini The last Tasmanians The Fum eaux Islanders Sir George Arthur George Robinson Gerónimo (National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution) Nana (courtesy Fort Sill Museum, U .S. Army) V ictorio (National Archives, USA) George C rook (Arizona Historical Association) Peace conference at the Cañón de los Embudos (Arizona Historical Association) John Gregory Bourke (Nebraska State Historical Society) Gerónimo with Chiricahua holdouts (National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution) Hendrik W itbooi (National Archives, W indhoek, Namibia) Samuel M aharero (National Archives, W indhoek, Namibia) Theodor Leutwein (National Archives, W indhoek, Namibia) Lothar von Trotha (National Archives, W indhoek, Namibia) Nikodemus before his execution (National Archives, W indhoek, Namibia)

Acknowledgements

T

his book started life in 1992 and its com pletion during the intervening six years has been a long and com plicated process. Y e t it w ould undoubtedly have taken m uch longer had I not received invaluable support and assistance from a great m any people. In the m atter o f travels, w h olly or partly related to the project, I must express m y deepest gratitude to the personnel o f the Society o f Authors and the panel o f judges for the K . Blundell Trust Aw ard. T h eir generous m onetary grant enabled m e to travel in Southw est U S A - an invaluable experience in attem pting to unravel the histori­ cal, cultural and geographical background to the struggles o f the Apache people w ith the region’s first w hite setders. I am also espe­ cially gratSfid to D ave M ills o f N aturetrek w h o, during the period o f the book’s preparation, provided me w ith opportunities to visit N am ibia, Botswana and elsewhere in southern and central A frica, and also Spain and Ecuador. Needless to say, most o f the w ork was far less exciting than these geographical ventures and involved m ainly a mental slog through a large body o f literature. T his could never have run so sm oothly w ith­ out the kind assistance from the personnel o f a num ber o f official organisations, including T h e Australian Institute o f Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (Canberra), T h e M inority R igh ts G roup (London), T h e W ilderness Society o f Tasm ania (Hobart, Tasmania) and Survival International (London). T h e largest and most im portant contribution o f this nature was made by the staff at N orw ich Central Library. Tragically, this building burnt dow n m idway through the project and the fire destroyed most o f their stock. Y e t the staff seemed

Acknowledgements to cope as calm ly w ith this larger crisis as they did w ith the w eekly barrage o f requests that I inflicted upon them over four years. I must have been helped by at least tw enty different staff mem bers, yet all show ed the same unfailing courtesy and fo r this they have m y deep respect and sincere thanks. In addition to these conventional channels fo r inform ation, a range o f people have provided individual assistance on particular subjects, either teasing out facts unknow n or inaccessible to m e, o r passing on their expertise o r relevant w ritten m aterial, cornering specific details and generally m aking the w riter’s life a little less isolated. T his list includes m y m other and father, Peter and Anne C ocker, G ill C oleridge, G erald C row son, C am ille D avis, D an Franklin, Brenda Ferris, Jason H ook, Peter H ulm e, D avid Lovatt Sm ith, R o d M artins, Jan M orris, D r M ichael O ccleshaw , T o n y Stones, Alan W ood and A ndy Soutter. A ndy also read about a quarter o f the book’s first draft and made valuable suggestions fo r im proving the text. G erald C row son and Jo h n M otley both gave freely o f their tim e, reading and m aking helpfiil comments on other sections. T o all three o f them I am deeply grate­ ful. Jo h n M orley and M oira W arland also listened patiently as I gave full rein to m y view s and ideas, w hich was invaluable in shaping the text, especially the final chapters. M y great friends D r T o n y H are and Am anda G reatorex played that same role o f sounding board, then offered m any valuable suggestions. T h ey also gave m e regular accom ­ m odation in London, w hile T o n y provided typically stim ulating com ­ panionship in Spain. For all o f these things I thank them both. In the later stages o f production, the manuscript passed into the hands o f the late Jo h n Blackw ell, w ho quickly fulfilled his reputation as a brilliant editor and publisher. Sadly Jo h n died suddenly w hile w e w ere finalising the text, but he had already brought to bear upon it his great intellectual rigour and editorial insight. For his expertise, his good hum our, tact and thoroughness, I ow e him an enorm ous debt, and it is one o f the few regrets o f the book that I am not able to thank him personally at its publication. Charlotte M endelson o f Jonathan Cape skilfully excavated all the various layers o f amended text and has also been extrem ely helpful in seeing the book through to com pletion. I wish to thank her for this contribution, as I do Ann H obday fo r the preparation o f her excellent maps. M y agent, G ill C oleridge, and m y editor, D an Franklin, have played an enorm ous part in the project, encouraging m y initial interest

xi

R ivers o f W ood, R ivers o f G old

in the subject, helping to define an approach, reading and m aking invaluable com m ents on the text, som e parts several tim es, then w ait­ ing patiendy as the book crept forw ard. For their support, intelligent advice and professional tact I am deeply indebted. Finally I com e to the part played by m y partner, M ary. She has helped me in too m any ways fo r them all to be listed here. She has been m y first critic, reading chapters as they w ere drafted and then also in a final stage, and always balancing her patient encouragem ent w ith perceptive and clear-headed advice. D uring the course o f the book’s preparation she has also cared for our tw o daughters during m y long absences, both physical (am ounting to m ore than nine months over­ seas) and mentad. For her infinite patience and support I am eternally grateful. I need only add that w ithout all these people this book w ould have been im possible. Its com pletion is due in large measure to them , yet any failings are m ine alone.

xu

Preface

E

urope’s encounter w ith and treatment o f the w orld’s tribal peoples is an immense them e, sprawling over ñve centuries and across all the inhabited continents. Y e t it is also a phenom enon w hose outline retains a fundamental clarity. In essence it is the story o f h ow a handful o f small, highly advanced and w ell-populated nation­ states at the western extrem ity o f Eurasia em barked on a mission o f territorial conquest. And how in little m ore than 400 years they had brought w ithin their political orbit most o f the diverse peoples across five continents. It is in equal measure a tale o f extraordinary human achievem ent in adversity, conferring on the victors possession o f m uch o f the w orld ’s physical resources, and a tragedy o f staggering proportions, in volvin g the deaths o f m any m illions o f victim s and the com plete extinction o f num erous distinct peoples. In fact, w hen view ed as a single process the European consum ption o f tribal society could be said to represent the greatest, m ost persistent act o f human destructiveness ever recorded. T he most obvious challenge that faces any inquirer into this subject is the sheer mass o f m aterial. C learly, no single volum e can hope to docum ent every episode. N o r is the book’s purpose an exhaustively detailed overview . Y e t I believe it is im portant to attem pt to convey the w hole picture betw een tw o covers, since one can at least suggest both its full tim e-scale and its international em brace. T h e m ethod I chose for this purpose is a detailed exam ination o f four w idely spaced episodes — the Spanish conquest o f M exico, the British near-exterm i­ nation o f the Tasm anian Aborigines, the w hite Am erican dispossession xw

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

o f the Apache, and the Germ an subjugation o f the H erero and N am a o f South W est A frica. These four portraits have several critical and interlocking fonctions. M ost obviously, they im ply the global picture, illustrating four differ­ ent European powers in four separate regions. T h ey span a 400-year period, from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, and involve the first and last phases o f European m ilitary expansion. T h ey also serve as separate close-focus lenses through w hich I could explore the human story in detail. T h ey convert the abstract theory o r idea into concrete reality, they show the generic process as specific incidents and they transmit statistical data as a clear and em otionally engaging, sometimes harrow ing story. Y e t, the underlying structure o f the book enabled me - to continue the cinem atographic analogy — to m ove backwards sometimes from these close-up images to a panoram ic vision. It was a balance o f tw o com plem entary perspectives that I intended to create. I have also sought to provide in the geographical and tem poral spaces betw een m y four portraits a connective tissue o f parallels, o f recurrent echoes and reverberations, and o f linkages both partial and overt. In the confrontation betw een the civilised and the savage the repetitions are seldom truly exact, but a failure to learn from the past is one indisputable thread running through the m any tragedies o f this w hole saga.

XIV

A uthor’s N ote

I

n a com parative w ork such as this, figures present a particularly obstinate problem , and it seems better to spell out the general approach rather than to enter a caveat in every instance cited. Estimates o f population sizes or losses and o f casualty figures, espe­ cially from campaigns as distant as the Spanish conquest o f M exico, are always problem atic. O ften the only reliable principle is that the larger the figure, the less accurate it is likely to be. E ven in the w ar betw een the Germans and the H ereto and N am a o f South W est A frica, a con­ flict o f less than a century ago and in an age o f telegraph and railways, the assessments o f dead and w ounded differ w idely from source to source. In all four histories I have invariably tried to find and use the most w idely accepted numbers. In cases w here the variation is itself signifi­ cant, the m atter is m ore frilly aired. In other instances, w here a range o f estimates exist and each has achieved roughly equal validity I have invariably opted for the m ore conservative figure. In this tragic story there is no need for exaggeration to indicate its massive scale. Another problem atic area is m oney, especially w hen trying to estab­ lish m odem equivalents for historical sums. O nce again, this is especially the case in sixteenth-century Spain, w hen a num ber o f cur­ rencies w ere in circulation, exchange rates w ere arbitrary and volatile, and the Spanish econom y subject to serious inflation. W here a useful m odem equivalent could be found then I have tried to include it, but have not attempted to im pose a table o f values over­ all. T h e im portant point is that the value o f the treasure trove o f the Am ericas must have been as stupefying to the scribes w ho first tried to

xv

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

calculate it, as it is irretrievable to the m odem im agination. In the less contentious m atter o f distances, weights and other mea­ surements I have used the m etric system, except in quotations. This makes for som e m ild incongruities on occasion, but these seemed a w orthw hile price for ease o f com parison.

xvi

Introduction

A ll Christendom w ill here have Refreshm ent and G ain

I

n the arid hills o f N am ibia one o f the first sounds to register the passing o f the African night is the loud, ringing call o f the b okm akierie, a bird closely related to the shrikes or butcher-birds o f Europe. Against the soft pastel-washed skies and sepia tones o f the m orning landscape, its notes are so clear and distinct they seem chis­ elled from the crisp dawn air, and the song acts on the aw akening consciousness like an alarm. O n the dawn o f 12 A pril 1893, the bokm akieries w ere singing as 200 Germ an soldiers, new ly arrived from Europe, took up their posi­ tions around the small setdem ent o f H om kranz. T h e village was the hom e o f an African tribe, the W itbooi, and, although barely 100 kilo­ metres from W indhoek, the fledgling capital o f Germ an South W est A frica, H om kranz’s occupants had successfully resisted the encroach­ ing im perial pow er. H ow ever on that A pril m orning their village was at peace. M ost o f its residents w ere sleeping. T h eir chief, H endrik W itbooi, the man w ho had inspired a bold defiance o f the Germ ans, was quiedy seated outside his hom e, enjoying coffee w ith his fam ily. T aking advantage o f the tranquillity, the Germ ans surrounded the setdem ent and w aited for their orden. O nly the o fficen had been told in advance the purpose o f the exercise. N o w the com m anding officer repeated his message to his troops. T h eir intention that calm , songawakened m orning was ‘to destroy the tribe o f the W itboois’.* T h e Germ an soldiers, part o f one o f the largest and most pow erful land armies in the w orld, started firing from three directions, and w ithin thirty m inutes 16,000 rounds had been expended by 200 rifles. B y the tim e this torrent o f bullets had ceased it had w rought a dread-

3

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

fill carnage. Blood-stained bodies and the remains o f slaughtered animals w ere strewn around the setdem ent. Surveying the aftermath, one eye-w itness noted random fragments o f the shambles, like the seven W itbooi corpses pressed tighdy together in the hollow beneath an overhanging rock, or the shattering reports o f am m unition, aban­ doned in their huts by fleeing W itbooi m en, and now exploding as the huts w ere torched by the Germ ans.2 A nd amidst this deafening noise he recalled the silent, incongruous tableau o f tw o children play­ ing in the dust by the corpse o f their m other. In front o f the entire panorama o f death the European troops m ethodically assembled the spoils o f their victory, a collection they recorded w ith all the fastidious attention o f a clerk to a colum n o f figures. T h e list included 2 12 stirrups, 74 horseshoes, 25 tin cups, 12 coffee-grinders, 12 coffee pots, 9 tin plates, 44 sets o f dentures, 3 vio ­ lins, one harm onium , a pair o f opera glasses.3 T h e Germ an captain’s official report im m ediately follow ing the massacre suggested that the W itbooi w ere neutralised as a fighting force. O ne cable to Berlin m ore than a m onth after the raid suggested that fifty W itbooi soldiers had been killed. Gradually, how ever, it began to em erge that the attack had not been as effective m ilitarily as had been claim ed. In particular, it transpired that able-bodied men constituted only a small portion o f the approxim ately ninety dead. O ne Germ an participant in the slaughter becam e particularly incensed by the ‘hateful and lyin g m anner’ in w hich som e British newspapers ‘alleged that our soldiers spared neither w ife nor child’. H ow ever, as one subsequent English com m entator noted, had w om en and children not been targets w h y had the Germ ans attacked a sleeping village w ithout w arning, w hen both w ere bound to be present?4 W hen it did eventually em erge that m any o f the victim s w ere, in feet, w om en and children — seventy-eight according to die W itbooi them­ selves —and Germ an officialdom was forced to make what it termed ‘an undesirable revision’, it struck upon a brilliantly inventive reply to the accusations. There had been heavy casualties amongst non-combatants, conceded the D irector o f the Germ an Colonial Department, but this was ow ing to the cowardice o f the W itbooi m en, w ho took cover behind their wom enfolk when fired upon.s T h e H om kranz massacre is a unique event in the history o f a people. It is also a fragm ent com pletely typical o f Europe’s w ider conflict w ith tribal peoples. O ne representative ingredient is its smallness, its per­

4

A ll Christendom w ill here have Refreshm ent and G ain

ceived insignificance in the broader sweep o f European history. A nother com m on elem ent is the dispute over the precise nature and num ber o f victim s. Casualty statistics in this global w ar have seldom been a straightforward matter. O ne o f the m ajor problem s is the sheer size o f the numbers involved. For out o f those small, ‘insignificant’ massacres like H om kranz arises an aggregate o f monstrous proportions. And this, in turn, has bred its ow n com plications. Those attem pting to assess the total num erical cost o f Europe’s colonial em pire have often prefaced any figures w ith warnings about the dangers o f statistical evidence. T o concern ourselves, they argue, w ith converting historical experience into an auditor’s colum n runs the risk o f our losing any relationship to the individual tragedies w hich those numerals so distandy convey. In striving for the O lym pian perspective, any real human m eaning dis­ appears from view . A nd yet how ever distant from any scale w e m ight recognise in our daily lives, it is the cum ulative statistics o f Europe’s conflict w ith tribal peoples w hich m ost im m ediately convey its m agnitude. It is valuable to repeat that eleven m illion indigenous Am ericans lost their lives in the eighty years follow ing the Spanish invasion o f M exico. In the Andean em pire o f the Incas the figure was m ore than eight m illion. In Brazil the Portuguese conquest saw Indian numbers dw indle from a pre-Colum bian total o f almost 2,500,000 to ju st 225,000. A nd to the north o f M exico it has n ow been w idely accepted that N ative Am ericans declined from an original population o f m ore than 8,000,000 to ju st 800,000 by the end o f the nineteenth century. For the w hole o f the Am ericas som e historians have put the total losses as high as one hundred m illion.6 From the other continents em erge statistics every bit as chilling. In A frica, fo r exam ple, perhaps the most w idely know n figure concerns the European traffic in black slaves, o f w hom eleven m illion w ere transported for sale in the Am ericas. H ow ever, less w ell appreciated are the vast numbers killed en route o r abandoned to die before they could be processed as the visible cargo crossing the Atlantic. D uring the course o f its 300-year history, possibly as m any as an additional fourteen m illion Africans foil victim to the slave-trade.7 E ven less fam iliar are the figures that relate to colonial policies during the first fifty years o f European rule: statistics like the 325,000-375,000 inhabitants w ho died betw een 1904 and 1907 in Germ an East A frica (m odern-day Tanzania) and Germ an South W est

5

R ivers o f B lood, R ivers o f G old

A frica (Nam ibia), either in wars o f resistance o r during episodes o f fam ine resulting from these conflicts. Less precise but m ore dam ning is the evidence for the hundreds o f thousands, and probably m illions o f Africans w ho died in the Belgian C ongo as a consequence o f the Belgian K in g Leopold’s frenzied quest for rubber and ivory.8 In O ceania, i f the population collapse did not involve d ie absolute num bers o f the other continents, then certainly the pattem o f decline was replicated w ith extraordinary consistency. T ypically, Australia’s Aborigines slum ped from a pre-colonial total o f at least a m illion to ju st 30,000 by the 1930s, outnum bered even by the 40,000 people o f m ixed A boriginal-European descent. Sim ilarly, the M aoris o f N ew Zealand dw indled from m ore than 250,000 at the tim e o f first European contact to 42,000 by 1890. T h e Polynesian inhabitants o f T ahiti, w hich had served eighteenth-century Europe as a paradigm o f tropical paradise, had gone from an original 40,000 in 1769 to ju st 6,000 by the 1840s: from Eden to Arm ageddon in a single lifetim e.9 N o t surprisingly the assessment o f these victim num bers, given their scale and im plications for European civilisation, has involved an acad­ em ic feud com m ensurate w ith the historical struggles themselves. A single exam ple o f the huge discrepancies in the figures accepted by different parties w ill have to stand for the w hole com plex debate. It concerns the extinct A raw ak populations on the Caribbean island o f H ispaniola (com prising the m odem -day states o f the D om inican R ep u b lic and H aiti). O f tw o im portant historical w orks on European conquest o f the Am ericas published in the early 1990s, one author accepted 8,000,000 as the original indigenous population, the other could only suggest that it ’m ay have been over 100,000’ . B oth, how ­ ever, could agree that w ithin a quarter o f a century m ore than ninety per cent o f the A raw ak w ere dead, largely as a consequence o f Spanish brutality.10 U sing only the most w idely accepted estimates o f population loss, one can m ake projections about the total losses suffered by tribal peoples during their conquest by whites. These d w arf the entire sum o f deaths during the First W orld W ar and w ere certainly greater than all European losses during the Second W orld W ar. Incidents like H om kranz, so unm em orable to their European victors, add up to a truly global straggle w ith a casualty list o f m ore than fifty m illion human names. ★ 6

A ll Christendom wiU here have Refreshm ent and G ain

A nd yet, it had not started out like that. W hen Christopher Colum bus first made landfall in the Caribbean on 12 O ctober 1492, his initial reports on Am erican hum anity w ere filled w ith a sense o f w onder and excitem ent. In a letter to his royal sponsors, K in g Ferdinand and Q ueen Isabella o f Spain, he w rote o f a ‘people w ithout num ber’ : [They] all go naked, m en and w om en, ju st as their m others bore them . . . T h ey have no iron or steel o r weapons, nor are they fitted to use them ; not because they are not w ell built and o f hand­ some stature, but because they are extraordinarily tim orous . . . It is true that, after they becom e reassured and lose this fear, they are so guileless and so generous w ith all that they possess, that no one w ould believe it w ho has not seen it. O f anything they have, i f they are asked for it, they never say no, on the contrary they invite the person to share it and display as m uch love as i f they w ould give their hearts . . . " T h e m eeting on the Caribbean shoreline o f tw o such radically differ­ ent branches o f the human fam ily was for both a psychological m om ent o f overw helm ing m agnitude. Am idst the exchanges o f hand gestures, o f m im e and aw kw ard laughter, h alf the w orld was obliged to em brace its other h alf in an instant revolution o f the im agination. For the Caribbean Araw ak it was an encounter as profound as it w ould be for m odem Europeans to receive aliens from outer space. In fact, Colum bus w rote, 'w herever I w e n t . . . the others w ent running from house to house, and to die neighbouring tow ns, w ith loud cries of, “ C om e! C om e! See the people from the sky!’’ So all cam e, m en and w om en alike, as soon as they w ere confident about us, not one, small o r great, rem aining behind . . ,’ 12 Elsew here in the Am ericas that same deep confusion characterised the indigenes’ first notions about Europeans. In the case o f the three m ajor pre-Colum bian societies - the M exica, M aya and Inca — each referred to the w hite invaders initially in terms that suggested super­ natural origins. T h e best-know n instance concerned the M exican em peror, M octezum a, w ho entertained notions that his Spanish con­ queror, Hernán C ortés, was the returning M exican culture god, Q uetzalcoad. N o r w ere such m isidentifications peculiar to the Am ericas. In nine­ teenth-century Australia, Aborigines explained the sudden arrival and

7

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

strange, pale-skinned appearance o f w hites w ith the idea that they w ere the returned ghosts o f their deceased kin. T h e nineteenthcentury colonial pioneer G eorge G rey w rote o f an occasion w hen a tearful old A boriginal w om an approached him exclaim ing, ‘Y es, yes, in truth it is him ,’ threw her arms around G rey and rested her head upon his breast. A t last the old w om an, em boldened by m y submission, deliberately kissed m e on each cheek . . . and assured me that I was the ghost o f her son, w ho had som etim e before been killed by a spear w ound in his b rea st. . . M y new m other expressed almost as m uch delight at m y return to m y fam ily, as m y real m other w ould have done, had I been unexpectedly restored to h er.13 As late as 1926, w hen increasing num bers o f w hite colonists arrived on the island o f M alekula, one o f the Vanuatu archipelago in the South Pacific, the indigenous inhabitants consoled themselves w ith a m yth about pale-skinned hero-gods w ho w ould restore the island and its people to a new golden age. T h ey continued to cling to this b elief even as the Pandora’s b ox o f W estern ailments drove them rapidly towards extinction.14 T h e idea that they should be received as god-like beings, w hich initially flattered the pioneers, was later incorporated into a body o f im perial m yth as further confirm ation o f Europe’s superiority. Y e t it is easy to folget that explorers like Colum bus w ere equally capable o f m ingling extravagant fantasy w ith their em pirical accounts o f indige­ nous peoples. W ithout a flicker o f incredulity he passed on to his royal patrons reports about humans w ith dogs’ faces and only a single eye, o f humans w ith tails and an island inhabited by a martial race o f w om en - the Am azons o f legend. M ore than h alf a century later, the Spanish conquistador Bem al D iaz recalled how on entering the M exican capital, Tenochtidan, the sight o f the great stone temples and building? seemed ’like an enchanted vision from the tale o f Am adis. Indeed, som e o f our soldiers asked w hether it was not all a dream .’ 15 H ow ever, once the first great gush o f excitem ent and em otion had spent itself, the encounter betw een natural and civil man was an experience triggering tw o basic responses in Europeans. O n the one hand, as colonists gazed at the naked prim itive w ith his sim ple weapons and rudim entary technology, they w ere brought to an appre­ ciation, by contrast, o f their ow n culture's enorm ous achievem ent. 8

A ll Christendom m il here have Refreshm ent and G ain

From this fundamental reaction it was but a small step to assume that the prim itives thereafter must m ove inexorably out o f their backward state, towards the tw in blessings o f W estern science and the Christian faith. O n the other hand, in the elegant sun-bronzed form o f the savage, som e Europeans beheld a m irror-im age o f them selves, but an im age unencum bered b y the m any accretions o f European civilisation. Looking at the A raw ak in the luxury o f his Caribbean garden, o r the Australian A borigine amidst an infinity o f outback, they w ere offered a vision o f Europe’s ow n past. It was a response that w orked along the same axis as the earlier reaction, but it led in com pletely the opposite direction. W hile one predicted how the savage must gain on the road to civilisation, the other envisioned w hat Europe had lost in its ow n jo u rn ey out o f the wilderness. T h e notion that m ankind had som ehow filien aw ay from an earlier social ideal was a tradition em bedded in European culture. From the G reco-R om an w orld it had inherited in a variety o f forms the m yth o f a golden age - either an era or a location w here humans had existed free from want, strife and from restraint. T h e H om eric legend o f the Lotus-eaters, for instance, depicted a society abundantly supplied by the fruits o f the lotus-tree, w ithout cares and indulging a life o f forgetful ease. T h e R om an poet V irgil recreated Arcadia as a rustic paradise o f virile shepherds and sylph-like maidens, sim ple, virtuous and happy. From the Judaeo-C hristian tradition Europe had inherited the m yth o f the garden o f Eden, an original terrestrial paradise whose principal constituents, apart from its human pair, w ere blissful inno­ cence and earthly fecundity. W hen Europeans em barked on their global exploration in the fifteenth century, their earliest descriptions o f tribal peoples w ere pro­ foundly influenced by this com plex o f ideas. O ne o f the most obvious associations was betw een the tropical luxuriance o f the Am erican environm ent and the exotic foliage entw ining Europe’s visual repre­ sentations o f Eden. T h e natural abundance o f the Caribbean was amongst the first things Colum bus noted. H e w rote o f islands that w ere ’fertile to an excessive degree’ and ‘filled w ith trees o f a thousand kinds and tall, seem ing to touch the sky.’ 16 T h e tribal peoples themselves also deeply impressed som e o f the early explorers by their physical grace and clear-skinned com plexion, free from the signs o f disease that so often disfigured European features. T h e Indians’ lifestyle, w ith its com m unally based approach to

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resources, its instinctual reciprocity, the apparent absence o f social hierarchy or m oral restraint upon the physical aspects o f life all made a strong im pact on the sexually repressed and class-bound conscious­ ness o f the visitors. Ju st like the sun and water, ran one com m entary on Caribbean society, 'the land belonged to all’ . T h ey live in a golden age, and do not surround their properties w ith ditches, walls o r hedges. T h ey live in open gardens, w ithout laws or books, w ithout judges, and they naturally follow goodness and consider odious anyone w ho corrupts him self by practising e v il.17 Equally appealing was the fact that tribal societies had hitherto man­ aged their econom ies w ithout m oney. E ven the M exica, a vigorous m ercantile nation w ith highly developed trade networks both inter­ nally and at an international level, had no m onetary system com para­ ble w ith that in Europe. T his led som e to conclude that since tribal society had avoided m oney, it had also escaped m oney’s corrosive potential. A ccording to one com m entator on the Indians o f Brazil, they lived 'free from the greed and inordinate desire fo r riches that are so prevalent am ong other nations.’18 Such conclusions, draw ing as they did on the strong currents o f association in European culture betw een natural landscape and natural innocence, presented only a highly selective version o f the first Am ericans. Y e t in assessing European view s o f tribal society it w ould be w rong to overlook these idealised portraits com pletely, in favour o f the deeply negative, racist attitudes that cam e to dom inate, and equally w ron g to underestimate their profound im pact on European intellec­ tual life. U ntil the m om ent o f first contact, Christian Europe’s study o f hum ankind had been sim ply a question o f reflecting upon itself, its classical antecedents and — m ore rarely — its alien tw in, the w orld o f Islam. A t the end o f the fifteenth century, how ever, Europeans w ere forced to confront the existence o f human beings fundam entally iden­ tical to them selves, yet w hose lifestyle, culture, even civilisation w ere radically other than their ow n. In the h alf m illennium since Colum bus’ first encounters in the Caribbean, tribal peoples have served constantly as an im aginative resource for Europeans, as an assemblage o f values and ideas, w hich has evolved in relation to the changing concerns o f Europe itself. That fundamental oscillation

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betw een their sameness and radical difference, w hich operated in almost all W estern attitudes towards indigenous peoples, presented opportunities for im plicit com m entary upon European conditions. A classic exam ple is Thom as M ore’s Utopia, the m odel for any ideal vision o f human society and a long-established part o f Europe’s polit­ ical lexicon. W ritten in i $ i 6 , it described a fictional com m unity w hose experiences o f enduring harm ony unburdened b y w ant, inequality or excessive w ork represented conditions radically different from and obliquely critical o f those in M ore’s ow n society. In order to recreate his hypothetical U topians, the English humanist and statesman drew partly on contem porary accounts o f indigenous Am erican society. O ne o f die key conditions for their social concord was the absence o f m oney, by w hich ’all nobility, m agnificence, w orship, honour, and m ajesty, the true ornaments and honours . . . o f a com m onwealth, utterly be overthrow n and destroyed.’ 19 Inverting the norm s o f Renaissance Europe, w here gold was the ultim ate insignia o f pow er, Utopians used it to m ake ’vessels that serve for most vile uses’ like cham ber pots, or restricted it for the adornm ent o f children, crim inals and slaves.20 T his indifference to the precious m etal echoed almost perfectly Colum bus’ historical reports o f crew members w ho exchanged worthless leather straps fo r substantial quantities o f Caribbean gold.21 T h e fact that Utopians held ’virtue to be life ordered according to the prescript o f nature’ also questioned the conventional Christian dogm a on original sin.22 I f allow ing w hat was natural in man could result in such an adm irable com m unity, then it was perhaps not his inherent sinfulness that produced w ar and crim e, but die operation o f society itself. Another author w ho expressed the idea even m ore pow erfully and was sim ilarly inspired by his research into pre-industrial society was the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. W here M ore had selected facets o f pre-Colum bian Am ericans to invent his U topians, in A Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau used the methods o f com parative anthropology. D raw ing from early accounts o f Caribbeans, N ative Am ericans and the K hoikhoi (some o f the original inhabitants o f southern Africa and ancestors to the W itbooi), he recreated the famil­ iar idealised portrait o f pre-civil society. B u t it assumed new potency and popularity under the guise o f R ousseau’s ‘noble savage’ . A ccording to the author, natural man lived in harm ony w ith him self

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and his surroundings, ‘a free being w hose heart is at peace and w hose body is in health.' W ith this as a first principle, Rousseau then pre­ sented a radical aetiology for the social ills o f eighteenth-century Europe. Ju st as factors w ithin civilised existence itself w ere the cause o f physical disease, so the uneven and distorted arrangements o f civil society had poisoned m an’s prim itive inclinations towards goodness and happiness. E ven today such stereotypes o f indigenous people continue to re­ surface in W estern society as a means o f advancing certain political and cultural view s. O ne m odem reincarnation is the feather-crow ned, crim son-anointed Yanom am i Indian from Brazil, endlessly reproduced b y the conservation com m unity both as an eloquent reproach against environm ental destruction, especially o f the rainforest, and as an icon sym bolising sustainable use o f such resources. Although these sym pathetic stereotypes have had a generally posi­ tive effect on relations w ith tribal society, they tended to circulate only in an intellectual m ilieu. M oreover, their influence was greatest w ithin Europe, but it dim inished as they drew closer to the place o f actual contact betw een the tw o com m unities. A t the frontier itself such stereotypes could even have adverse consequences. For w hen the people they w ere m eant to describe failed to live up to the claims o f human perfection, the result could be a kind o f post-coital disappoint­ m ent. Ideas like the 'noble savage’ then supplied the sharp edge to a deepening cynicism . Y e t Europe’s positive stereotypes concerning indigenous society cannot be blam ed fo r the massacre at H om kranz, o r the diabolic con­ flagration w hich consum ed the Caribbean in the quarter-century after Colum bus, or indeed for any o f the destruction w hich subsequently unfurled across four continents. T h e attitudes that launched the tragic developm ents described in this book revolved around a reverse im age —an evil tw in —o f the idea o f the noble savage. A nd the only charac­ teristic it shared w ith its opposite was that it drew on ancient myths w hich loom ed in the European subconscious w ith enorm ous potency. E ver since the tim e o f the G reeks, Europeans had been accustom ed to a binary vision o f human societies. O n the one hand w ere the original classical cultures o f the M editerranean and their successors in a w ider Europe. These w ere the ordered realms w hich civilisation naturally inhabited, but beyond the pale o f this rational interior, Europe was besieged by the forces o f human darkness or, to use the w ord o f G reek

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origin, the barbarians — a sound im itative o f their unintelligible lan­ guages. I f the com m onwealth o f civilised nations was the province o f rational governm ent and m oral order, then it follow ed logically that the exterior was a province o f irrational savagery and im m oral w icked­ ness. A nd w hen Colum bus reported progress on his search fo r dog­ faced m en and other ‘human m onstrosities’ , he was articulating Europe’s persistent b elief in this threatening penum bra at the margins o f civilisation. C oupled w ith this bipolar view o f m ankind w ere Christian Europe’s deeply am bivalent attitudes towards the natural w orld. W hile the pastoral scenes o f V irgü’s Arcadia m ight carry associations w ith innocence, the realm o f physical nature was equally the habitat for m an’s instinctual drives —a panic landscape o f procreation and fertility. T h e earth m ight yield up her bountiful harvests, but i f she w ere not regulated by som e intervening hand, nature w ould riot and turn the civilised products o f m ankind back into chaos. N ature was fruitful but she was also w ild and threatening, w hich carried profoundly negative im plications for those humans w ho lived closest to her. T h e fret that indigenous Am ericans or aboriginal Africans and Australians often w ent naked was confirm ation for the W est o f their deep intim acy w ith nature and o f an un-Christian openness towards the physical body. E ven the sultry clim ate or tropical fertility o f their hom e environm ent could reinforce the idea o f this closeness to the physical earth. These factors led m any Europeans to view tribal peoples as having retained the m enacing characteristics o f w ild animals as m uch as the natural qualities o f fellow m en. T im e and again, Christian Europe defended its transgressions against tribal society on die grounds o f the latter’s subhuman condition. It is perhaps as m uch a measure o f the prevalence o f such attitudes in the fifty years after Colum bus’ historic voyage, as it is o f papal con­ cern, that Pope Paul III issued a bull in 1 5 3 7 giving the C atholic C hurch’s official judgem ent that Indians w ere indeed ‘true m en’ , not beasts. It is equally a measure o f h ow ineffectual such official state­ ments w ere in challenging attitudes that as late as 1902 a m em ber o f the Com m onw ealth Parliam ent in Australia felt able to announce that 'T h ere is no scientific evidence that the A borigine is a human being at all.’23 Sim ilarly in Germ an South W est A frica, w hen the im perial adm inistration ordered setders to curb corporal punishm ent o f African w orkers, the setders petitioned the colonial department w ith the plea that ‘A n y w hite man w ho has lived am ong natives finds it almost 13

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

im possible to regard them as human beings at all in any European sense.’24 V iew in g aboriginal society as beyond the pale o f hum anity had legal and political im plications that w ere deeply sinister for its constituents. It was an axiom o f Christian thought, propounded in the opening portion o f its most sacred text, the B ible, that all organic life on earth was arranged in a hierarchy, at w hose apex stood Christian man. As its appointed masters, Christians could look dow n upon this entire phys­ ical realm as a G od-given field for their use and enjoym ent. I f the savage w ere not differentiated from the natural environm ent, then it follow ed that he too could be incorporated in that utilitarian prospect. Since he was outside the fellowship o f Christian civilisation, he w ould enjoy no greater legal or m oral status than any other flora and fauna. It was in part this ideology w hich inform ed Colum bus’ sweeping announcem ent in his first letter from the N ew W orld, that ‘all Christendom w ill here have refreshm ent and gain.’25 And it was on premises like these that he based E urope’s earliest m oves to dispossess the savage, and claim the Caribbean islands in the name o f his Spanish masters. Alm ost 300 years later, com parable view s perm itted British colonists to declare the Australian continent an em pty land - a terra nullius - and dismiss in a single Latinate phrase forty m illennia o f Aboriginal occupation. E ven w hen it was acknow ledged that indigenous occupants w ere indeed human, from the sixteenth century onwards Europeans con­ ceived a theory o f m ankind’s social and historical developm ent w hich helped them to bypass any legal or political rights that tribal society m ight be presum ed to possess. T h e doctrine held that human beings w ere accessible to a hierarchical arrangem ent com parable w ith that in the O ld Testam ent w hich ordered all other organic life. Each new ly encountered tribe could be assigned to a particular stratum o f this pyram id, according to its level o f technological and cultural achieve­ m ent. N aturally, the colonists view ed themselves as having long since progressed through these interm ediate stages, w hile Christian civilisa­ tion was the obvious apex and term inal point to w hich all m ankind must inexorably aspire. A w hole battery o f specious legal and theological devices w ere soon advanced that both expressed this determ inist schema and reinforced its m oral validity. In 1494, for instance, tw o years after Colum bus’ first voyage, the Spaniard R o d rig o Borgia, both the father and lover o f Lucretia B orgia, had approved the T reaty o f Tordesillas in his capacity H

A ll Christendom w ill here have Refreshm ent and G ain

as Pope A lexander V I. A t a stroke he had granted to the Spanish and Portuguese crow ns, as the tw o tem poral agents o f the C atholic Church, the right to divide the N ew W orld betw een them selves. In the eyes o f the conquistadores, G od had given the Am ericas to them . O ne o f the m ore ingenious justifications for European conquest is w orth recalling, i f only to demonstrate that the Araw ak, w ith their theory o f Colum bus' descent from the sky, had no m onopoly on the absurd. T h e Spanish historian G onzalo Fernandez de O viedo advanced the thesis that, since the Caribbean islands w ere really the Hesperides, the fabled Islands o f the Blest thought to exist at the west­ ern extrem ity o f the earth, and since 3,193 years ago these had belonged to Hesperus, the tw elfth K in g o f Spain, Colum bus’ action had not been a fresh annexation but a reclam ation o f lost territories. H ow ever, this ecum enical vision o f human societies carried hidden com plications. I f it was in the furtherance o f a divinely ordained progress that the conquistadores claim ed the right to seize and displace in the N ew W orld, their fellow theologians at hom e claim ed on b eh alf o f the subjected peoples their right to be absorbed into the bosom o f the Christian Church. In 1 5 1 2 this privilege was encoded in the Laws o f Burgos, requiring o f the colonists that they convert Caribbean peoples to Christianity. Indigenous Am ericans w ere to be offered the eternal blessings o f baptism and burial, Christian education (for the sons o f chiefs) and com pulsory attendance at church. T h e European frith eventually becam e for tribal peoples w orldw ide both an im portant solace against, and a social bridge into, the alien w orld o f their colonisers. M oreover, the arm y o f genuinely humane missionar­ ies w ho travelled out to the colonies to evangelise often served as im portant political champions fo r their indigenous flock. Y e t the methods o f enforced conversion could be a stark violation o f the beliefs they w ere intended to propagate. T ypically, in 1 5 1 3 there was a further addition to the Laws o f Burgos, know n as the Requerimiento. O n the occasion o f fresh conquests, Am erican com m u­ nities w ere to be read a proclam ation, providing the audience - albeit in a language and conceptual fram ework incom prehensible to them w ith an outline o f Christian history and a request fo r their form al sub­ mission to European authority. Supposedly a means o f avoiding bloodshed b y allow ing Am ericans to surrender gracefully, it was a statement o f Europe’s m onum ental presum ption. In practice it usually served as litde m ore than a grotesque subterfuge. W ishing to spare them any possible opportunity fo r misunderstanding, the conquistadores 15

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often read the Requerimiento from a position w here it was inaudible to the hapless people they had always intended to despoil and enslave. A com pelling revelation o f the m eaning o f the Christian message fo r m any tribal peoples is contained in the death-scene o f an Araw ak chief, H atuey. Captured in Cuba by the Spaniards in i $ i i , H atuey was asked to convert before being executed. H is apostasy w ould have reaped the rew ard o f death by decapitation, rather than being burnt alive. A ccording to an eyewitness: T h e lord H atuey thought fo r a short w hile, and then asked the friar w hether Christians w ent to H eaven. W hen the reply cam e that good ones do, he retorted, w ithout need fo r further reflection, that, i f that was the case, then he chose to go to H ell to ensure that he w ould never again have to clap eyes on those cruel brutes.26 Apart from their religion, the other great benefit Europeans sought to bestow upon tribal peoples was the opportunity to participate in an increasingly global econom y. T h e m atter o f w ork had always been a key elem ent in W estern attitudes towards pre-civil society. Initially, the deep im pression made by A m erica’s natural abundance led many explorers to conclude that its inhabitants w ere free from the constant hard labour w hich ground dow n such a large proportion o f European hum anity. T h e Araw ak, surrounded by his lush gardens and the warm , fish-crow ded waters o f the Caribbean, had m erely to reach out to acquire his daily needs. For European audiences, the leisure im plicit in this tropical idyll was a source o f both envy and adm iration. And it is striking that in Thom as M ore’s m odel society, the U topians laboured for ju st six hours a day to acquire their healthy surpluses. Y e t it is rem arkable, as the original European sense o f w onder gave w ay to disdain, h ow any applause for the indigenes’ love o f leisure quickly turned to scorn for their irresponsible sloth. A seventeenthcentury judgem ent on the southern African K hoikhoi could serve as a universal statement o f Europe’s contem pt for the w ork capacity o f tribal peoples: T h eir native inclination to idleness and a careless life, w ill scarcely adm it o f either force o r rewards fo r reclaim ing them from that innate lethargick hum our. T h eir com m on answer to all m otives o f this kind, is, that the fields and w oods afford plenty o f necessaries for their support, and nature has am ply provided fo r their subsis-

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tence, by loading the trees w ith plenty . . . So that there is no need o f w ork . . . And thus m any o f them idly spend the years o f a use­ less restive life.27 Disgust at such apathy soon offered a means to challenge tribal society's m uch-lauded indifference to wealth. T his had not arisen out o f the innate virtue o f the noble savage: ‘their contem pt for riches/ w rote one French com m entator on the K hoikhoi, ‘is in reality nothing but their hatred o f w o rk .’28 Another author pointed towards equally sinister conclusions w hen he noted what a ‘great pittie that such creatures as they bee should injoy so sweett a country.’29 Statements like these on the lazy, undeserving savage soon cohered in another general principle o f Europe’s right to dispossess him . Jo h n Locke, the seventeenth-century British philosopher, argued in The Second Treatise o f Government that i f tw o equal portions o f land w ere subjected, one to good English husbandry, and the other to the con­ trol o f N ative Am ericans, the first w ould produce crops a thousand times m ore valuable than the products derived by the occupants o f the second. ” T is labour,’ Locke suggested, ‘w hich puts the greatest part o f value upon land,' w hile ‘labour, in the beginning, gave a right o f property.’30 From there it was a sim ple step for colonists in Am erica and Africa to conclude that since hunters and gatherers, like the Indians, or pastoralists, like the K h oikh oi, did not actually w ork the land in the form o f cultivation, they w ere not therefore in possession o f it. T h e answer was to take it from them. T h e answer to the indige­ nous aversion to w ork itself was to force them to it. E ver since the classical period, Europe had acquired the historical precedents and cultural beliefs to legitim ise this step. G reece and R o m e had both been slave econom ies, and even their most hallowed philosophers had accepted the necessity o f slaves. In his Politics, Aristode had reasoned that since the various human races differed ‘from one another by as m uch as the soul differs from the body or a man from a w ild b e a st. . . these [inferior] people are slaves by nature, and it is better for them to be subject to this kind o f control.’31 B y the tim e the N ew W orld had been discovered, slavery was endem ic in parts o f m edieval European society - as indeed it was in Islamic and African society. B y 130 0, Italians in Cyprus w ere running sugar plantations w ith im ported forced labour, including som e black 17

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Africans. B y the eaily fifteenth century, mainland Italian merchants w ere doing a flourishing business in Slavs — the origin o f the w ord ‘slave’ —acquiring their raw human materials from the Black Sea ports o f the Tartars. In V enice alone ten thousand slaves w ere sold between 1 4 1 4 and 1 4 23.32 In the same period the Portuguese had started to fill their boats w ith human cargoes as part o f their new ly acquired com ­ m erce w ith W est A frica. These slaves, in com bination w ith sugar and cash-crop production m ethods, soon m oved out to the Portuguesecontrolled islands o f M adeira and the Azores, w hile the Spaniards fol­ low ed suit in their ow n Atlantic toehold, the Canaries. Thus, w hen Colum bus em barked upon the seizure o f the Araw ak to do the labour o f his new -found colony, he was only follow ing a w ell established tradition. Y e t it is deeply ironic that it should have been the great explorer w ho initiated the enslavem ent o f indigenous Am ericans, w hen only a few years earlier he had trum peted the N ew W orld as Europe’s opportunity to create a new Christian paradise on earth. H ow quickly he had exchanged the role o f herald for that o f serpent in his proclaim ed Eden. W ithin a generation o f his actions, the first slave-grow n sugar from the Am ericas was being sold in Europe. H ow ever, the Spaniards had soon found ‘the effem inate native o f H ispaniola’ — ‘loitering aw ay his hours in idle pastimes under the shadow o f his bananas’ —poor material for slavery.33 As A raw ak num­ bers collapsed, so the transatlantic trade in black Africans began. Slavery was the final step in Europe’s ideological debasement o f tribal society. N o t only w ere slavery’s victim s considered subhuman, they had assumed m uch o f the inanim ate status o f chattels. Slaves w ere objects that could be traded, exchanged, given aw ay, sexually violated, dism em bered or destroyed w ith im punity. Equally, they could be insured against possible loss like any other physical possession. Som e o f the most shameful im plications o f this com m odity status are illustrated by the actions o f one o f the slave-traders plying the Atlantic. In 17 8 1 Luke C ollingw ood, captain o f the Zottg, a vessel ow ned by a Liverpool com pany, was anxious about the disease carrying o ff a num ber o f his human cargo. A w are o f the laws governing m aritime insurance, C ollingw ood told his officers that ‘i f the slaves died a natural death, it w ould be the loss o f the owners o f the ship; but i f they w ere throw n alive into the sea, it w ould be the loss o f the under­ w riters.’34 O n the pretext that food and w ater supplies w ere insuffi­ cient fo r the full com plem ent o f slaves, the captain spurred his crew to sling 1 3 1 o f them overboard to drow n.

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Surprisingly, perhaps, the afiàir did eventually com e before the courts. H ow ever, w hile the m achinery o f the British legal system had been set in m otion, it was not to deliver punishm ent fo r the cold­ blooded m urder o f 1 3 1 Africans. It involved the insurers’ refosal to underwrite the losses o f the ship’s ow ners, and was to setde a dispute about property and m oney. It was not ju st the inhum anity o f the slave system, w hich was denounced even at the tim e o f the Zong incident, but also its massive wastage o f human potential that was so destructive. In parts o f Britain’s N orth Am erican colony o f V irginia, for instance, a quarter o f all African slaves died in the first year after transportation. In the W est Indies one in three died w ithin three years.35 H ow ever, w h ile this m ight have been shocking extravagance in terms o f human life, on purely econom ic grounds it was not necessarily inefficient. In the words o f R o b ert Fogel, slavery provided European manufacturers w ith a labour force stripped o f every right that could im pede their indus­ trial designs. A s nearly as the law could bring it about, slaves w ere to be as com pliant a factor o f production as the mills that ground the cane o r the mules that pulled the carts. Planters had the license to establish w hatever institutions and to use w hatever force they deem ed necessary to achieve that goal.36 O nce reduced to the condition o f econom ic automata, tribal society made a contribution to the w ealth o f European nations w hich is o f incalculable m agnitude, and even a single exam ple can give som e sense o f its scale. W hen they had im posed control on the form er em pires o f the M exica and the Inca o f South Am erica, the Spaniards discovered underground silver deposits o f awesom e fertility in both regions. Although the form al enslavem ent o f inhabitants was supposedly out­ law ed in Spain’s Am erican possessions, the im perial authorities insti­ tuted systems o f obligatory labour barely distinguishable from slavery. T h e w ork was so dangerous that an eyewitness to one o f the Andean m ines noted that i f ’tw enty healthy Indians enter on M onday, h alf m ay em erge crippled on Saturday’.37 O n the approaches to som e M exican silver m ines, the dead m iners’ bones and rotting corpses Uttered the ground as in the environs o f some grotesque human slaughterhouse.38

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B y 1600 the precious metals flow in g from these sumps o f m isery into Spain's coffers had an average annual value o f 40,000 ducats - a vast reservoir o f w ealth that for centuries served as a critical supply for the national econom y and as a pow erful stimulus to all European trade. For som e historians, die silver and gold taken from the Am ericas, in conjunction w ith the later, fabulous profits accruing from A frican-slave-grow n sugar and tobacco, w ere the essential precondi­ tions o f the industrial revolution and a foundation o f Europe’s m odem w orld suprem acy.39 I f Europe’s sw eeping m ilitary conquests across four continents rep­ resented the first phase o f defeat for tribal society, then the seizure o f their possessions, like the Germ an looting at H om kranz — right dow n to the sets o f dentures and the pair o f opera glasses — sym bolises a second phase. European dispossession o f colonial subjects, the absorp­ tion o f their most valuable resources and o f so m uch o f the product o f tribal labour, as w ell as the orientation o f colonial econom ies towards a Eurocentric goal, are m ajor reasons for the T hird W orid status o f m uch o f A frica and South Am erica. Equally, they help explain the massive disparities in w ealth and prosperity betw een the first peoples o f Australia o r N orth Am erica and their largely w hite neighbours. Y e t, rather than confront the realities o f their behaviour, the master races o f Europe m arched forw ard sheathed in an im penetrable arm our o f intellectual self-justification. A com plex language o f projection and inversion has exonerated Europeans for five centuries. These misrep­ resentations w ere a vital elem ent not ju st during the initial m ilitary conquest, w hen they inspired European combatants w ith a sense o f m oral crusade and ensured its w idest possible sanction by the hom e audience, but they w ere equally im portant in the ensuing centuries o f political control and econom ic exploitation. F or in order to maintain tribal peoples and their descendants at the brutal m argin o f European civilisation it was necessary to reassemble, almost on a daily basis, the fabric o f untruths w hich ju stified their institutionalised inferiority. O nce again, the events at H om kranz described in the opening para­ graphs exem plify this process o f falsification, w hich amounts to an intellectual conquest and a third phase in Europe’s trium ph over tribal society. O ne m odem historian, fo r instance, as i f to suggest the W itbooi massacre’s prophylactic character, referred to it as a ’preven­ tive raid’ .40 Preventive? Certainly it prevented the future life and w ell-being o f a significant num ber o f the W itbooi people. B u t since the tribe, until 20

A ll Christendom w ill here have Refreshm ent and G ain

that m om ent, had not lifted a hand in anger against the Germ ans, except to w rite letters o f defiance at their encroachm ent, and since the principal consequence o f the slaughter was to stir them into armed opposition, paralysing the colony and forcing the rem oval o f the com ­ m anding officer, it was anything but a preventive raid. E ven m ore preposterous w ere the claims o f the contem porary B erlin authorities, w ho suggested that it was not the Germ an soldiers w ho w ere respon­ sible for the cold-blooded slaughter o f so m any w om en and children. It was actually the fault o f the W itbooi them selves, hiding beneath the skirts o f their w om enfolk. T h e ubiquity and m agnitude o f these falsehoods w ere so great that eventually anything could be laid before a European audience and m ight be believed. W ithin the stereotypic im age o f the savage sw irled a miasma o f random violence, sexual depravity, clod-like inertia and infantile incom petence. T here was little profit in applying the rational faculties o f Europe to this vague and inexplicable creature, for it was almost beyond logical analysis. It is only in the context o f this m ental clim ate that one can com ­ prehend the nineteenth-century notion that a m other from the now extinct Yahgan people o f T ierra del Fuego w ould sell her child fo r a button; or the judgem ent on the Araw ak extinctions in Hispaniola by the nineteenth-century Am erican historian W illiam Prescott. In The Conquest o f M exico, still regarded as a classic w ork on its subject, he w rote: T he Indians w ould not labour w ithout com pulsion, and . . . unless they laboured, they could not be brought into com m unication w ith the whites, nor be converted to Christianity . . . T h e sim ple people, accustomed all their days to a life o f indolence and ease, sunk under the oppressions o f their masters, and the population wasted aw ay w ith even m ore frightful rapidity than did the aborigines o f our ow n country, under the operation o f other causes.41 T h ey faded aw ay, not before a Spanish regim e com parable, fo r its unlicensed rapacity, to that o f N azi Europe, but before the sim ple demands o f an honest day’s w ork. These w eak and ’effem inate’ beings — Prescott’s favoured adjective - w ere infants in a m an’s w orld, sadly but inevitably doom ed, a feet clearly confirm ed by their defenceless­ ness before the ailments o f childhood, like measles and the com m on cold. 21

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

W illiam Prescott, o f course, lived in the nineteenth century, the period o f the W est's greatest geographical expansion and political dom inance, and as a w riter he was naturally influenced and unsighted by that massive trium ph. Som e m ight w ish to argue that at the close o f the second m illennium his w ork represents no m ore than an anachronism , a set o f W estern attitudes that has long ceased to have any m eaning. T h ey m ight further point to the fact that the last third o f this century has seen radical changes in W estern treatment o f tribal peoples and their m odem descendants. In Australasia and throughout N orth Am erica there has been a w ide-ranging restoration o f indigenous lands and a redefinition o f the legal and m oral status o f tribal society. In A frica the continent has been returned, from the M editerranean to the C ape o f G ood H ope, to the political control o f its indigenous inhabi­ tants. Elsew here, in the last refuges o f pre-civil hum ankind, such as the Zairean jungles o f the E fe 'pygm ies’ o r the Brazilian rainforests o f the Yanom am i, the tribal hunter-gatherer has never enjoyed a higher international profile or greater assistance and protection. A ll o f these developm ents, it m ight be argued, demonstrate how W estern society has long since recognised its past injustice and taken a path, i f not o f penance, then at least o f proper adjustment. Y e t, w hile academic histories m ay have re-evaluated Europe's relationship w ith tribal peoples in a m anner less pleasing to the form er, there is still strong evidence to indicate that at m any levels, Europeans remain resistant to aspects o f their ow n past and have retained som e o f their most ancient ideas about the savage. E ven the most popular revisionist histories have not been entirely able to penetrate these recesses. A classic exam ple is D ee B row n ’s influential and majestic account o f the Am erican Indian wars, Bury M y Heart at Wounded Knee. W hile presenting the story from the perspec­ tive o f the defeated Indians and w hile galvanising W estern sympathies like no other book on w hite-tribal conflicts, B row n ’s text portrayed indigenous Am ericans very m uch in the im age o f the noble savage - a proud and tragic people inexorably doom ed and long since vanished (for consideration o f the function o f Europe’s m yth o f tribal extinction see Chapter n ) . E ven had the author intended a m ore nuanced and rounded portrait, and there is m uch evidence that he did, m any o f his readers missed this version in favour o f the older pre-existing stereo­ type. Y e t this inadvertent consequence o f B row n ’s book is o f m inor sig­

22

A ll Christendom urill here have Refreshm ent and G ain

nificance com pared w ith the levels o f distortion encountered else­ w here. O ne exam ple w ill have to suffice. English-speaking encyclo­ paedias, som e o f the most w idely disseminated sources o f inform ation and presenting a corporate w orld view fo r their audiences, offer a per­ fect dem onstration o f these pernicious historical myths. O ne w ould search in vain, fo r instance, in most o f these books for a people entitled the Araw ak, o r for a pre-Colum bian population in Hispaniola. T h ey and their extinction at European hands are facts exorcised from the sum o f general know ledge. Sim ilarly, on the island o f Tasm ania the presence o f an Aboriginal population is seldom adm itted, w hile their decim ation by British settlers is far less likely to be noted than that o f the island’s strange marsupial predator, the Tasm anian w olf. I f one looks at actual entries, rather than the equally eloquent om is­ sions, then the accounts o f the M exica, o r Aztecs as they are m ore w idely know n, are highly instructive. In most encyclopaedias, usually w ithin a handful o f lines, one encounters phrases like ‘great and pow erful despotic state’ , and invariably a sentence such as this: ‘T h ey sacrificed human victim s, captives o f warfare, by ripping out their hearts w hile they still lived .’42 T h e M exica’s frenzied religious blood lust was m ore than ju st a cultural feature or historical fret, it is still for m any Europeans the sole and critical measure o f their entire civilisa­ tion. Y e t, conversely, in the entry for their Spanish conquerors, there is no sim ilar account o f their com parably violent persecution o f Central Am erican hum anity. N o r, indeed, is there any reflex associa­ tion o f these Iberian people w ith human sacrifice, w hich the six­ teenth-century Spanish Inquisition practised w ith equal relish in the guise o f exposing heretics. It goes w ithout saying that an évent so small as the m urder o f ninety W itbooi Africans at H om kranz w ould never find its w ay into any European com pendium o f frets. B u t m ore significant is the almost universal om ission o f the overall Germ an slaughter in South W est A frica, a total a thousand times greater than the H om kranz figure. E ven m ore com pelling still is the fret that in none o f these w orks could one locate the raw data to assemble the statistics o f mass death inflicted by European invasion upon its tribal subjects. (Y et w hen one notes that in almost every w ork, the Black H ole o f Calcutta — for Britons a paradigm o f brutality involving the deaths o f few er than fifty o f their countrym en and w om en at Indian hands - is a constant, one begins to realise how m uch these com pendia respond to m ythic por­ traits o f national life.)

23

R ivers c f Blood, R ivers o f G old

These books suggest that for large num bers o f Europeans and those o f European descent, tribal peoples rem ain a defeated and im material branch o f hum anity entom bed in a conspiracy o f silence and m isrep­ resentation. Either as rich and vital human societies o r even sim ply as numbers o f historical victim s, they remain outside o f our vision. E ven now , in m any parts o f the w orld their past experiences at European hands continue to be denied. T ribal peoples have a right to know their ow n history and w e have a duty to m ake their story a part o f our ow n.

24

Part I The Conquest o f M exico ‘T h ey thirsted m ightily for gold; they stuffed themselves w ith it; they starved for it; they lusted for it like pigs.’

MEXICAN

EMPIRE

1

The M arch

oday, from a vantage point on the slopes o f the volcano Popocatepetl, all that the m odem visitor can norm ally m ake out o f M exico C ity, sixty-five kilom etres aw ay on its hinter­ land o f fertile plain, is the m uffling cloud o f sm og. H ow ever, on i N ovem ber 1 5 1 9 the w ould-be sightseers w ere foiled by the weather. And it was only on the follow ing m orning w hen the clouds lifted and the sun cam e out that the Spanish soldiers, gathering on a spot now know n as the Paso de Cortès, becam e the first Europeans ever to have gazed dow n on this scene. B elow , ju st sixteen kilom etres aw ay, b y the first in a large highaltitude com plex o f connecting lakes. Beyond, the Spaniards could m ake out the outline o f a city. A city built on water, the largest city in the Am ericas and the heart o f its most pow erful m ilitary people, the M exica. T h eir new capital was im mense. Its 108 districts housed a popukbon o f some 225,000, bigger than those o f Pans and London com bined. T h e largest city o f w hich the new ly arrived visitón could boast was Seville w ith 70,000 inhabitants, at most ju st a third the size o f the M exican capital. Across the w hole o f Europe only N aples com ­ pared. In b et, Tenochtitlan, the name o f this Am erican m etropolis, stood amongst the greatest artefacts on earth; and w hen H em an Cortés, the Spanish com m ander gazing dow n on that m orning in N ovem ber 15 19 , com m itted his small arm y to its conquest, he carried his nation across a historical threshold o f m om entous im portance. In the half-century before that day Iberian sailors, circling the w orld’s oceans, had enm eshed the globe w ith their routes like the ten­ tacles o f som e fantastically enlarged m onster from the deep. E ven as 27

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

Cortés and his forces entered the outskirts o f Tenochtitlan, Ferdinand M agellan, sailing under the Spanish flag, was negotiating the straits at the tip o f South Am erica that w ere to bear his name. A nd only days after the Spanish arrival in the M exican capital, the great sailor entered the waters o f a vast new ocean, w hich he named the Pacific, before em barking on the first circum navigation o f the planet. Y e t, in the great Renaissance surge for geographical know ledge, it was not the Spaniards w ho had best profited from all this activity. It was the small sea-fàring nation on their western border, the Portuguese, w ho had gained most. It was they w ho had pioneered navigational routes dow n the west coast o f A frica, and one o f their countrym en w ho had rounded its southernm ost tip at the Cape o f G ood H ope. W ith this discovery in 1488, Bartolom eu Dias had opened up the prospect o f an all-w ater passage to the orient, bypass­ ing the m onopoly-holding merchants on the old land routes through Persia, Arabia and Egypt. O riental luxuries like spices, perfum es, silks, opium , gold and gems could now be acquired at a discount, and the Portuguese lost little tim e in taking advantage. W ithin a decade another countrym an, Vasco de Gam a, had reached India. Another ten years and Alfonso de Albuquerque, taking up his post as governor o f Portugal's oriental possessions, captured G oa on India’s west coast, then Aden at the south-western tip o f Arabia. T o these he added M alacca, on the M alayan peninsula, the centre o f the eastern spice trade. From this one port alone, Albuquerque sent hom e riches w orth $25 m illion in current values.1 W hile the Portuguese had established im m ensely profitable routes to the east, the Spaniards had elected to explore in a w esterly direc­ tion. O n the eve o f their entry to Tenochtitlan, it still looked as i f their choice had been a poor one. Although their transatlantic jo u r­ neys had uncovered vast territories representing the greatest geograph­ ical discoveries by any European nation, for years the driving Spanish am bition was not to locate Am erica, but to capture the same fabled oriental riches that had inspired their Portuguese rivals. Colum bus, in his four lengthy journeys w andering the islands o f the Caribbean or along the eastern shores o f Central and South Am erica, could never quite rid him self o f the hope that he had found som e outlying region in the em pire o f the G reat K han, C hina’s fabled ruler. W hen it finally dawned on the Spaniards they they had not landed in Asia, but had uncovered tw o continents o f w hose existence Europe had not even dream ed, it seemed poor com pensation. 28

The M ardi

B y 1 5 1 6 Portugal’s rapidly expanding trade netw ork em braced A frica’s south-eastern littoral, as w ell as ports in India, the M alayan peninsula, the Celebes, the M oluccas, Thailand, southern Vietnam and even mainland C hina herself. T h e Spaniards, m eanwhile, had located varied and richly self-sufficient com m unities amongst the archipelagos o f the Caribbean and on the mainlands o f both Am ericas. A t each o f these new ly encountered localities, they had hoisted the flags o f Castile and Aragon. In 1 5 1 3 one o f their explorers, Vasco N úñez de Balboa, hacking his w ay through the forests o f m odem -day Panama, had w aded into the su rf on its (as yet unnamed) Pacific shore and, brandishing his sw ord, claim ed even the ocean in the name o f his sov­ ereigns. Despite such gestures, the Spaniards’ genuine rewards for all their enterprise w ere few . G old ornaments had been found amongst the neolithic Araw ak o f the Caribbean, but the quantities w ere only m oderate and rapidly exhausted. C ertainly, Colum bus’ effusive claims o f great m ines o f gold in these Am erican islands, or his prophecy that most o f the rivers w ould be found to flow w ith it, had proved hollow . D uring all his travels he had made litde hard profit to ju stify even the capital spent on the fust and most modest o f his expeditions. Y e t in 1 5 1 6 there w ere signs that the tide o f fortune m ight have turned in Spain’s direction. Expeditions sent out that year and the fol­ low ing w inter, from C uba to the N orth Am erican mainland, brought back incontestable p ro o f o f cultures far m ore advanced than anything the Spaniards had previously know n. Encountering first the M aya o f the Yucatan peninsula and then the Totonacs, a coastal people w ithin the political orbit o f the M exican em pire, the explorers w ere deeply impressed w ith their large stone building?, their tem ples, highly de­ veloped agriculture, fine cotton clothing. H ow ever, Spanish attention was particularly absorbed in other achievem ents o f these M esoam erican peoples - the abundance o f their gold ornam entation and the high quality o f its workm anship. T h e second expedition returned w ith precious metals valued at 16,000 pesos. A t last Spain seem ed to have found potential sources o f w ealth to rival those o f the Portuguese and to ju stify their costly explorations. In tim e, how ever, the Spanish encounter w ith the M exican em pire w ould have a significance fir greater than these sim ple econom ic benefits. O n a purely sym bolic level it represented a point o f inter­ section o f tw o com m unities, w hose parallel evolutions had continued in mutual ignorance fo r thousands o f years. A t the m om ent o f their 29

R ivets o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

convergence, Spain and M exico had achieved fresh heights in their independent developm ent and w ere the dom inant pow ers in their respective hemispheres. I f it was not the first then it was the m ost sig­ nificant confrontation o f the O ld w ith the N ew W orld. For Europe to collide in this m anner w ith any civilisation o f such radically different orientation is virtually w ithout parallel. In recent history one o f the few encounters that bears any resem blance is the British forced entry in 1902 o f the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, a place pre­ viously seen by only three Europeans. Y e t this later m eeting on the high plateau o f Central Asia was the culm ination o f decades o f inter­ m ittent com m unication. T h e surprise o f final encounter was m uch m ore m uted, and in the labyrinth o f Asian politics the Tibetans w ere a marginal people. T h eir confrontation w ith Europe brought no im m ediate, radical transformation o f Tibetan society. N o r did it initiate a m ajor realignm ent in the w orld o f human afikirs. In contrast, the w ealth and pow er gained from M exico — Europe’s fust m ajor colonial conquest — w ould set Spain on a new , dazzling trajectory as the great European superpow er o f the sixteenth century. A t a stroke the Spaniards had cancelled any initial econom ic lead established by Portugal in its nascent oriental em pire. In the Am ericas, M exico’s discovery and seizure constituted a pivotal event, propelling the Spanish into a career o f headlong conquest. M uch o f this outburst w ould be inspired by the fabulous riches that accrued to the new master o f M exico, H em an C ortés. T h e gold and other sources o f w ealth gained by his victory w ould change him from a Castilian noble o f negligible status into one o f the richest princes in the Spanish em pire. It was a transform ation that captivated not ju st his com ­ patriots, but the w hole Christian w orld. As one com m entator has noted, ‘C ortés’ success was the loadstone w hich drew to the Am ericas the iron m ight o f E urope.’2 Another historian suggested it had an even w ider significance: that the m anner o f his conquest, relying as m uch on frise prom ises and exploitation o f tribal division as on force o f arms, ‘provides us w ith a m odel fo r all subsequent red/w hite relations in the N ew W orld’.3 C ertainly, w ithin ju st forty years o f C ortés’ personal trium ph, the Spaniards w ould hold territories spanning thousands o f kilom etres on both continents. B y 1560 they had explored the Pacific coast o f N orth Am erica to a point north o f the current C alifom ia/O regon state borders. O ther expeditions penetrated to the Grand Canyon and along the course o f the M ississippi. Parts o f Florida w ere setded. M exico, 30

The M ardi

most o f m odem -day Central Am erica, large portions o f the contem ­ porary states o f Venezuela, C olom bia, Ecuador, Pern, B olivia, C h ile, U ruguay and Argentina w ere all w ithin the Spanish dom ain. I f it was not die largest European em pire, it was one o f the most rapidly estab­ lished. Spain's victory over the M exica was the m ajor catalyst for these his­ torical developm ents, but today it retains a pre-em inence amongst all the exam ples o f European conquest fo r other reasons. First, it raises, as it did at the tim e o f the events them selves, m ajor questions concern­ ing the m orality o f such an invasion. In their previous victories in the Caribbean o r parts o f South Am erica, the conquistadores had been for­ tified by the idea that they had subjugated rude savages barely one rem ove from the beasts o f the ju n gle —people presum ed to be lacking in the higher ideals o f a developed religion, in legal and political organisation, in the arts, in technologies com m onplace for Europeans; in fret, lacking in all the refinem ents o f civilised existence. H ow ever, M exico was a com pletely different case. H ere the Spaniards m et a people w ho could trade w ith them almost b low for blow in technical and organisational ability. Although retaining some characteristics from their tribal antecedents, the M exica had carried forw ard the flam e o f civilisation that had been burning in M esoam erica for thousands o f years. W hile M uslim forces had con­ fined tenth-century Christian Spain to a m ountainous strip along the northern coastline, the M exican V alley, through w hich C ortés and his m en w ere even now m arching, had been hom e to a flourishing urban society celebrated for its religious innovation, its artistic and architec­ tural achievem ent. In N ovem ber 1 5 19 , as the Spaniards advanced on Tenochtidan’s centre, they could appreciate that the capital’s construction on a huge, brackish lake was im m ediate and pow erful p ro o f o f M exican capabili­ ties. T h e com plex o f causeways connecting the city to the mainland, along w hich the Spanish horses could ride eight abreast, was an out­ standing feat o f engineering. So too was a sixteen-kilom etre dyke that they had erected to prevent flooding. A t the city's outskirts the Spaniards studied the agricultural innovations, especially the chinampas, the inigated floating gardens — w ith their orchards, fishponds and intensively m anaged crops o f m aize, beans, squash, tom atoes — w hich ensured year-round produce for Tenochtidan’s population. O ther striking exam ples o f organisational ability w ere the city’s public steambaths and the system o f ceram ic pipes w hich supplied it 31

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

w ith sw eet-w ater fountains. M ore prosaic, perhaps, but no less impres­ sive was the cityw ide netw ork o f latrines and the organised collection o f waste and refuse, w hich constituted a sanitation system far superior to anything in Europe until the end o f the eighteenth century. E ven further in advance o f any European equivalent w ere the frequent telpuchcalli and calmease, the tw o school systems, w hich provided a uni­ versal education for M exican children. Finally, at the end o f the cause­ w ay along w hich the Spaniards tramped, they w ould eventually find them selves in a huge plaza — the city's adm inistrative and cultural heart, holding no few er than seventy-eight civic buildings, temples and palaces. D espite the abundant evidence o f a civilised existence com parable w ith the Spaniards’ ow n, w ithin eighteen months o f that famous m arch the European newcom ers had reduced Tenochtidan’s skyline and m uch additional evidence o f M exican sophistication to a platform o f rubble. T h ey had slaughtered probably h alf the population. T h ey had reduced the most form idable m ilitary force in the Am ericas to a docile peasantry, notorious amongst Europe’s later generations as the epitom e o f hopeless lassitude. O f all European confrontations w ith a tribal people, the Spanish destruction o f the M exica seemed the least m orally defensible. Far from advancing the cause o f hum anity, they had accom plished its opposite, assassinating an entire civilisation in its prim e. R ath er than confront the ethical questions that seem to haunt this tale o f destruction, the Europeans w ho perpetrated the deed, and those w ho inherited its fruits, preferred a different line o f inquiry. T h e question for them was not h ow such a thing could be justified, but h ow had it been physically accom plished. For the arm y that had inflicted such a massive defeat upon the m illions o f inhabitants o f the M exican em pire had never num bered m ore than 1,50 0 Europeans at any one tim e. H ow could they have w on such an im possible victory against such apparently overw helm ing odds unless they had received the highest possible support? V iew ed from this angle, all the m anifold evidence o f M exican achievem ent and pow er ceased to be a m oral reproach upon the vic­ tors. It becam e the evidence for Spanish vindication. Like no other tale o f im perial conquest, the lightning overthrow and capture o f the M exican em pire seemed freighted w ith proofs o f European greatness, the technological mastery and heroism o f its soldiery, the pre­ 32

The March

em inence o f Christian civilisation. C ortes’ achievem ent was passed on to subsequent generations o f Spaniards, not as historical evidence for their rapacity, but as a m yth substantiating their right to subdue and dispossess tribal society. For four centuries it was a received truth that victory in the teeth o f such num erical superiority had been an act o f divine justice. E ven in our ow n tim e, w hile its theological im plica­ tions have fallen from view , the conquest has rem ained evidence o f Europe’s invincible superiority. C ortés, the exem plar o f that racial suprem acy, was identified b y one recent biographer as a N ietzschean Superm an.4 Another British author o f a popular w ork on the conquis­ tadores w rote that ’Cortés, a man w ho never filtered , never despaired even w hen the outlook was utterly hopeless, must rank as one o f the greatest m ilitary leaders in history.’s It is for all these reasons that the Spanish conquest o f M exico remains an event o f perpetual fascination and controversy. As an example o f Europe’s clash w ith tribal society it also has one additional importance. Either because pre-Colum bian Am ericans had no written language, or because the process o f exterm ination was com pleted so quickly, there are few instances in die early European conquests w here the events w ere recorded from the perspective o f the defeated. H ow ever, in M exico a num ber o f sources describe the Spanish invasion as it appeared to the vanquished Americans. O ne o f the most important o f these was by the sixteenth-century Spanish cleric Bernardino de Sahagún, w ho learnt the M exican language, Nahuad, and transcribed native eyewitness accounts o f the w ar and its immediate aftermath. K now n as the Florentine Codex, it is one o f the most important docu­ ments on the period, providing rare first-hand insights into how the bearers o f European civilisation first appeared to their victim s. Sahagún’s informants could recall die pervasive atm osphere o f dread w hich oppressed Tenochtidan as the small Spanish caravan made its w ay dow n from the slopes o f Popocatéped and through the M exican V alley, before its entry through the capital’s gates: Everyone was gready terrified. T here was terror, astonishment, expressions o f distress, feelings o f distress. T here w ere consultations. T here w ere form ations o f groups; there w ere assemblies o f people. T here was w eeping —there was m uch w eeping, there was w eeping for o d ien .6 E ven then the large M exican crowds lining each side, as the Spaniards 33

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

breasted the m ain causeway o f Tenochtitlan, could never have know n that in that strange colum n pushing on relentlessly betw een them , m any w ere confronted by their ow n assassins. Before their eyes was passing almost every one o f the technological, cultural and biological advantages the Europeans possessed. M ost conspicuous in the Spanish procession w ere their m agnificent horses. O riginally brought to Spain by the Arabs o f N orth A frica, these Barb—Arab mounts w ere then shipped out to the Caribbean w here the English explorer, W alter R aleigh , later ju dged them as the best horses he had ever seen in his life. Cortés still had about thirteen w hen he entered the M exican capital and they made an enorm ous im pression, galloping back and forth, paw ing the ground, m ouths foam ing, their flanks glistening w ith a sour sheen o f sweat. T h e Spaniards also had huge dogs, w olfhounds or mastifls, w hich slobbered and strained at the leash. Each was capable o f dispatching a human and trained for the task. T h e only canid fam iliar to the residents o f Tenochtidan was a hairless m iniature bred for the table, ancestor o f the Chihuahua. T h e M exica w ere initially shocked and m ystified by the Spanish cannon — ten culverins and four falconets — assembled from separate short bronze sections and dragged in on w heeled carts, the first wheels to touch Am erican soil. T h e insistent staccato rhythms o f the Florentine Codex capture perfbcdy their sense o f bewilderm ent at the im pact o f these strange devices: . . . h ow it resounded as i f it thundered w hen it w ent off. It indeed bereft one o f strength; it shut o ff one’s ears . . . Fire w ent show er­ ing forth; sparks w ent blazing forth. And its sm oke sm elled very foul; it had a fetid odor w hich verily w ounded the head. And w hen [the shot] struck a m ountain, it w ere as i f it w ere destroyed, dis­ solved. A nd a tree was pulverised; it was as i f it vanished; it was as i f som eone blew it aw ay.7 Equally perplexing to the crowds, thirty-tw o o f the Spanish infantry­ m en carried crossbows w hile tw elve o f them shouldered arquebuses, the sixteenth-century muskets w hose im pact on the M exica w ould be as m uch psychological as physical. T hen there was the w hole shining panoply o f metal weapons and equipm ent synonym ous w ith European warfare: chainm ail, helm ets, arm pieces, greaves, heavy steel-tipped lances, swords, daggers, knives. Forem ost amongst the Spanish 34

The March

weapons w ere their solid-hilted T oled o swords, famous for their quality throughout Europe. It was a peculiar m isfortune o f the Am erican people then scrutinising this m ilitary caravan that they had developed techniques for w orking the pliant ores o f gold o r silver to inflam e Spanish greed, but they lacked die necessary m etallurgical skill w hich w ould have em pow ered them to m eet the steel w eaponry o f the Spaniards w ith steel o f their ow n. T h e form idable parade o f European m ilitary technology finally cam e to a halt before the Utter o f the M exican em peror. T h e tw o leaders then greeted one another. C ortés attempted to em brace M octezum a, but was restrained by the M exican attendants. T hen he placed a necklace o f pearls around M octezum a’s neck, and in return received a string o f red shells, adorned w ith eight shrimps deUcately fashioned from gold. W hen M octezum a com pleted his speech o f greeting, C ortés is reported to have said: 'B e assured [M octezum a], have no fear. W e love you greatly. T od ay our hearts are at peace.’8

35

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The K idnap

he Spaniards' cam paign to defeat the M exica can be divided roughly into three stages. T h e first eight months, occupied by the conquistadores’ march to the capital from a base camp on the coast, was largely a period o f political m anoeuvring, as Cortés sought to discover the nature and potential o f the Am erican state and also to probe for possible weakness. T h e second eight-m onth period, cover­ ing the Spanish stay in Tenochtidan, was m arked by a breakdown in relations betw een the Europeans and the Am ericans and ended in a m ajor m ilitary victory fo r the M exica at the outskirts o f their capital. T h e third, final phase was a period o f all-out w ar and, follow ing the Spaniards’ recovery from initial disaster, saw their eventual triumph after a long and bitter siege. I f the first stage was initiated by C ortés’ bold decision to m arch to the very heart o f the M exican pow er-base, then its clim ax was the even m ore audacious kidnap o f the em peror. U sing as a pretext a clash betw een a M exican force and the Spaniards’ rearguard at the coast, Cortés sought an audience w ith M octezum a less than a w eek after his arrival in the capital. T h e em peror duly obliged his guests in his ow n throne room , only to find him self accused o f treachery and sur­ rounded by forty heavily armed m en. Faced w ith increasingly violent threats, M octezum a finally capitulated and returned under armed escort to the palace in w hich he had accom m odated the conquistadores. W hile most Eurocentric historians have characterised it as a political m aster-stroke, today the w orld’s m edia w ould describe the Spanish action as a terrorist coup d'état. T h e seizure o f their head o f state m om entarily paralysed effective

T

3 r him .'31 B y 1875 the prospects for racial harmony in the Southwest had never been better. In central Arizona there were three reservations based on the U S military posts at Cam p Verde, Fort Apache and San Carlos. In the far south, peace had even come to the Chiricahua. M uch against C rook’s better judgem ent he was keen to prove him self a military match even for the great Cochise — they had been con­ firmed in possession o f their old haunts between the Dragoon and Chiricahua Ranges. O n their eastern flank, V ictorio’s people, the W arm Springs Indians, over whom Mangas Colorado had once presided so skilfully, setded down on a reservation in their beloved homeland in south-western N ew M exico. Further east still were two other reservations for additional discrete communities within the Apache nation. There remained undoubted problems, some o f them serious, such as the Apache raids. The Chiricahua o f Cochise, for instance, con­ tinued to penetrate deep into M exico with impunity and despite their ch iefs disapproval. H ow ever, the foundations o f a lasting setdement were in place. The various Apache tribes had been confirm ed in at least a portion o f their favoured territories. C rook had implemented a viable programme for the reservations, and although it reflected the conventional views o f the age - that o f the savage doomed inexorably either to the white man’s path or to extinction - the general him self was both honest and well-m eaning. ‘Crook was a true friend o f ours,’ recalled Jason Betzinez. ‘He was a hard fighter . . . But he played fair with us afterwards and did what he could to protect the Indians. W e actually loved General Crook, and even today think o f him, and talk o f him, with genuine affection.'32 T he process o f mutual trust that he had initiated could have carried w hite-red relations forward into a period o f co-existence. Tragically, amongst the region’s w ider American community the desire for a just setdement o f the Indian-white conflict had never taken root. As soon as C rook and Bourke were removed from the scene in 1875 (to the northern plains, where they w ould help subdue the gathering Lakota storm), the ancient pattem o f European behaviour towards tribal people resumed. T he keenest exponents o f these methods were the leading merchants o f the Southwest, known

219

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genetically as ‘The Tucson R in g ’ , who had grown accustomed to the fat profits produced from their army contracts. Inevitably, they had litde to gain from peace. Hostile Indians were their bread and butter. N or did they have much enthusiasm for C rook’s project o f Apache self-sufficiency, as Bourke noted with characteristically biting sarcasm: Had the Apaches had a little more sense they would have perceived that the w hole scheme o f Caucasian contact with the American aborigines — at least the Anglo-Saxon part o f it — has been based upon that fundamental maxim o f politics so beautifully and so tersely enunciated by the N ew Y ork alderman - 'T h e boys are in it for the stuff.’ The 'Tucson R in g ’ was determined that no Apache should be put to the embarrassment o f working for his own living; once let die Apache become self-supporting, and what would becom e o f ‘the boys’?33 The Tucson R in g was not the only group profiteering. A number o f agents on the reservations were swindling both their government and the Apache. C rook alleged that one o f these officials had left Arizona having made $50,000 in only a short time, while on some reservations they had so reduced rations it had actually caused starvation amongst the inmates.34 W riting specifically o f the San Carlos agency, Bourke believed that the corruption ‘extended all the way to W ashington, and infolded in its meshes officials o f high rank’.35 Although he worked on the reservation during a later period, Britton Davis, a scrupulously honest military officer, described the kinds o f manoeuvres he unearthed. Checking the meat rations delivered to his Indians, Davis found that a fraudulent set o f scales meant a contractor was being paid each w eek for 680 kilos o f b eef that he never delivered.36 The Apache were deeply aware o f this exploitation, and their sense o f grievance only exacerbated the festering atmosphere o f discontent on the reservations. Y e t the mixture o f hatred and contempt for Indians that underpinned white abuses also made it extrem ely difficult for Apache complaints to be aired. M ore than perhaps any other inci­ dent, the aftermath o f the Cam p Grant Massacre illustrates the prevail­ ing attitudes that blocked justice for reservation Indians. This tragedy had occurred in April 18 7 1, when two leading citizens o f Tucson led a group o f 140 Papago Indians and M exicans on an Indian hunting foray. The justification for the expedition was a set o f attacks 220

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falsely attributed to Apaches living in the vicinity o f a U S military sta­ tion at Cam p Giant. Disregarding the small matter o f proof for their allegations, the raiders struck without warning and caught the Apache setdement while most o f the men were absent. In fact, only eight o f the 144 Indians ‘ravished, wounded . . . clubbed to death, hacked to pieces or brained by rocks* were male.37 It was typical o f the murderous mood in the American W est that in their coverage o f what one historian has called ‘the blackest page in the Anglo-Saxon records o f Arizona*, the D enver News congratulated the killers 'on the fact that permanent peace arrangements have been made with so many, and w e only regret that the number was not double’.38 Eastern opinion, however, was far from sympathetic to the action and at President Grant’s insistence, the ringleaders were eventually brought to trial. After a five-day hearing it took just nineteen minutes’ deliber­ ation for the ju ry to find the murderers not guilty.39 Recalling other instances o f incurable bias, Britton Davis noted the occasion he arrested a man for illegally selling whisky and ammunition to San Carlos Apaches. H e took him to be imprisoned in Tucson, only to find the culprit back on the street within thirty minutes.40 Y et whisky dealers could have a devastating impact on reservation life. The classic example was an incident in 1876, two years after Cochise’s death and only four years after his Chiricahua had been confirm ed in possession o f their favourite territory. The affair began when the deeply respected agent to this group o f Apaches rebuked and threat­ ened a station-keeper for peddling booze amongst his Indian charges. H ow ever, having continued the trade in defiance o f the agent’s authority, the station-keeper reaped the tragic rewards o f his crime: his Apache clients murdered him during their drunken stupor. T he same Tucson citizens w ho would later so blandly reprove the whisky trader arrested by Britton Davis, now weighed in on behalf o f the dealer murdered by the Chiricahua. ‘T he kind o f w ar needed’ for such Indians, railed the Tucson newspaper the Arizona Citizen, ‘is steady, unrelenting, hopeless, and undiscriminating war, slaying men, wom en, and children . . . until every valley and crest and crag and fastness shall send to high heaven the grateful incense o f festering and rotting Chiricahuas.’4, Even worse than this genocidal blather was the fret that the U S authorities, with this incident as their pretext, now shut down the Chiricahua reservation and sent Joh n Clum in on his round-up operation. The dishonest behaviour that obliterated the best efforts o f men like 221

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General C rook, and w hich culminated in the policy o f concentrating the Apaches at San Carlos, was not exclusive to this particular theatre. It was symptomatic o f an entire pattern o f relations between whites and Indians across the United States. Even in the 1770s, as settlers poured through the Appalachians, grabbing the territory around the O hio R iver, die governor o f Virginia, Lord Dunm ore, wrote in sup­ port o f the westering setders: D o not conceive that government has any right to forbid their tak­ ing possession o f a vast tract o f country . . . which serves as a shel­ ter to a few scattered tribes o f Indians. N or can they be easily brought to entertain any b elief o f the permanent obligation o f treaties made with those people, whom they consider as but litde removed from the brute creation.42 A century later, Francis W alker, the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs, w riting o f the northern plains, expressed the same ideas with even greater candour when he suggested that ‘There is no question o f national dignity . . . involved in the treatment o f savages by a civilized pow er.’ W alker went on to explain the reservation system as the reduction o f ‘wild beasts to the condition o f supplicants for charity’ .43 As a continuation o f these views and methods, the policy o f Apache concentration is particularly revealing. For the unwanted geographical territory on which they planned to corral all the Indeh was the physi­ cal embodiment o f that cramped mental space to which white Americans had assigned Indians in their imaginative world. This interior design pictured native peoples and their political claims upon the American continent as a m inor distraction raised by beings unwor­ thy o f human status. W here they could not be eliminated by immedi­ ate destruction or physical removal, they might be held at bay by written agreement. But these contracts functioned only as expedients without binding significance. Like the documents establishing the Chiricahua and W arm Springs Apache reservations, they could be cancelled unilaterally or at short notice. They were usually empty words that echoed with four centuries o f false white promises, right back to the smooth assurances o f Hernán Cortés. Inbuilt into such a set o f prescriptions was its own justification. For when Indians responded with force to such injustice, they merely con­ firmed the savagery in which they had always been imprisoned in the white American conscience. C rook identified the syndrome with 222

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characteristic clarity: 'T h e American Indian commands respect for his rights only so long as he inspires terror from his rifle.’44 The Chiricahua Apaches, dispossessed, discontent, herded on to the arid wasteland o f San Carlos to squabble and be cheated by their white overseers, were soon to inspire respect for their rights in a manner that was as devastating as it was ultimately hopeless.

H America's Greatest Guerrilla Fighter

lthough it was Gerónim o w ho would later acquire renown amongst a white audience as the last great renegade against U S domination, he was not the only Apache to challenge the reservation system at San Carlos. N or were his exploits unrivalled in the annals o f their resistance. In fact, it is another Chiricahua leader, Victorio, who has been unequivocally identified as ‘Am erica’s greatest guerrilla fighter’ by Dan Thrapp, his biographer and one o f the prin­ cipal white keepers o f the Apache story.1 After Mangas Colorado’s death in 1863, Victorio slowly earned the chieftaincy o f the W arm Springs section o f the Chiricahua. The mur­ dered Apache statesman could not have had a more fitting successor. An approximate translation o f V ictorio’s Apache name is ‘The Conqueror’, while one o f his people later recalled that he was ‘the most nearly perfect human being’ he had ever seen.2 O nly a single photograph o f him exists, but it is almost enough. Except for the piercing directness o f the gaze, the face and shoulder-length hair appear like a bronze mask clamped within a frame o f coarsely weath­ ered timber. It registers the resolve and intelligence common to the frees o f all Apache leaden. But in addition to these, one senses some­ thing o f the qualities that marked V ictorio’s subsequent careen the military flair, the courage, determination in the free o f hopeless odds, a capacity for ruthless violence. Y et when reviewing the details o f his individual case, one cannot help concluding that o f all Apache leaden, Victorio was amongst those most unjusdy victimised by the policy o f concentration. Thrapp described him as being ‘badgered, “ rem oved” , bullied, stolen from . 224

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shifted about, lied to and betrayed, separated from his family, starved, threatened, cajoled*, until he was forced to respond in the campaign that w ill be for ever associated with his name.3 Ultim ately, this was a conflict rooted in the land from which he and his people had sprung. For they had always shown a passionate affin­ ity for the Mimbres and Black Range Mountains o f south-western N ew M exico, and especially for an area known as O jo Caliente - a region o f upland forest and wide lush valleys at the headwaters o f the Alamosa R ive r on the west bank o f the R io Grande. It was a geo­ graphical attachment that accounted for the designations by which the group was variously known, such as the Mimbres, or the Mímbrenos, the W arm Springs or O jo Caliente Apaches, the last two names being inspired by die sacred fountain at the heart o f their territory.4 Tragically, almost from the outset o f hostilities in the Southwest, the idea that this Indian group must leave its cherished sanctuary seems to have been an unquestioned and irremovable fixture o f American policy. As Thrapp has pointed out, few ever considered acceding to their simple request to remain where they were, in their traditional homeland . . . whose moun­ tains, valleys, deserts, and canyons they knew and loved. T hey must be moved. W hy? Search the records from end to end, the thou­ sands upon thousands o f documents, and you w ill discover no valid reason. There was no reason. It was simply that, since they desired to remain, they must be m oved.5 During V ictorio’s leadership the Warm Springs Apaches had no record o f violence to compare with that o f Cochise or Mangas Colorado. In fret, almost until the date o f his final challenge to U S authority there was no evidence to link his name to a single white death. The ch ief’s one overriding wish seems to have been for his people to be left in peace in their homeland. Even after he had been roused to a state o f antagonism, his whole w ar policy, except to express implacable oppo­ sition to removal, seems to have been a simple, physical reoccupation o f O jo Caliente’s hallowed valleys. Thus, when John Clum set out for south-west N ew M exico in April 1877, to capture Gerónim o and then shut down the W arm Springs agency on the pretext that they had harboured such a rene­ gade, the fires o f war were already starting to glow . Although Victorio agreed to leave with the agent for San Carlos, the realities o f life on 22$

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the sun-baked, malarial flats at the Arizonan reservation quickly proved too high a price for peace. Just three months later, and only weeks after Clum him self had resigned, Victorio roused over 320 o f his people, they rustled together every mule and horse they could find and rode o ff into the darkness towards their old hunting-grounds. B y the end o f September they had arrived back at W arm Springs, after losing more than thirty o f their number, as captives or casualties in a string o f indecisive skirmishes. Victorio then set about trying to re-establish his claim to the W arm Spring? territory, negotiating with army officers stationed to the north o f his old reservation. For almost a year an uncertain i f peaceful stalemate obtained, but behind the scenes tragedy was struggling to be bom . In O ctober 1878, the U S government in W ashington eventually arrived at its final decision. It reaffirmed a commitment to the policy o f concentration and sent in the troops to do its bidding. As one historian has concluded, ‘The m yopic obstinacy o f the government almost defies credibility.’6 Later that month about 170 o f the wom en, children and the elderly were loaded on to wagons for the 660-kilo­ metre journey back to San Carlos. But just as Victorio had warned when rejecting the U S demands, almost none o f his warriors was amongst the transportées. Throughout the winter, the outlawed band now pursued a life o f silent raids amongst the farmsteads and ranches o f southern N ew M exico. Then Victorio, his patience and faith in their word waning inexorably, made a final appeal to the white men to be allowed to remain at O jo Caliente. W hile Washington remained invincibly deaf to the wishes o f a band o f homesick savages, it did offer them a compromise: they might set­ tle on a reservation occupied by another band o f Indeh, the M escalero Apaches, in the Sacramento Mountains 200 kilometres further to the east. It was not W arm Spring?, but nor was it San Carlos, and V ictorio presented him self at the agency in June 1879. Then blind fate took a hand in shaping the next act o f the drama. As Victorio waited nervously at his new home for confirmation o f the U S decision and the arrival o f his wom en and children, a judge and prosecuting attorney happened to pass close to the reservation on a hunting and fishing excursion. B y sheer chance, the Warm Springs Indians had got wind o f news that they had been indicted on charges o f horse-stealing and murder elsewhere in N ew M exico. Victorio put these unrelated coincidences together and assumed that the judge’s holiday party was actually out hunting for him. R um our became panic 226

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and panic led, inexorably, to violence. As Thrapp put it in Yeats-like rhythms: In a passion, Victorio jerked the agent’s beard, whistled in his horse herd, ordered the wom en into action, hurriedly packed his ponies, and with his fellows scampered toward the westward mountains once more. It was September 4, 1879. T hey were through with reservation life; from now on forever it would be war.7 Immediately Victorio returned to the Warm Springs area, slew the guard to an army horse herd and remounted his grow ing band o f fighters. He had actually embarked on war with the United States o f Am erica supported by just forty warriors, but he quickly drew recruits from other Apache groups and at its largest his band numbered about 450 people. Their first major confrontation with the troops pouring in from Arizona and across N ew M exico to intercept them was a carefully planned ambush in the Black Range close to O jo Caliente. Although fierce fighting continued all day, American casualties w ere relatively few — ten according to Thrapp —but the Apaches withdrew in good order and with a number o f army horses and large amounts o f booty. Skirmishes recurred, but inconclusively, as Victorio made his cir­ cuitous route through the Black Range then south towards M exico. W hile the army trailed them through the desert sands and lava beds towards the border, the Apaches worked in concert with the terrain and the climate to exact their toll. O ne water hole they repeatedly rode through until it assumed the consistency o f thin mortar. Another they fouled with the entrails o f a coyote. Eventually thirst began to undermine the pursuing force. ‘The number o f animals killed by the rearguard increased,’ recalled one participant, ‘the sun seemed to beat down hotter and hotter. There was no singing, no joking, no conver­ sation, no smoking in the column, and the banjo o f a colored man that used to enliven the men was silent.’ In seventy-six hours, on just half a pint o f water per man, they had ridden 200 kilometres. Y et, before these heroes could drink and give up the chase, they were ambushed by moonlight in old M exico.8 Victorio stayed in the mountains for the first half o f winter, then rode north in the new year. Troops were massed dose to the border ready to block his passage, and one newspaper announced that the U S army ‘have the renegades about where they want them’ .9 Victorio 227

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then waltzed past, heading once more for the Black Range. It was claimed that the Apaches had killed as many as a hundred American civilians in the previous year’s campaign. N ow the casualties increased and M ajor M orrow , the officer who had chased Victorio throughout the previous fall, made a determined effort to get his man. Four further engagements ensued as the Apaches were hounded between the Black R ange and the San Andreas Mountains, and although none was conclusive, the balance o f success b y heavily in V ictorio’s favour. And throughout the contest the Apaches had had no guaranteed supply o f matériel whatsoever, except the little they could steal or capture. T he same was also true for horses. They had always to mount themselves on stolen stock and, i f necessary, they rode them to exhaustion, at which point they were always killed and often con­ sumed. Betw een 600 and 1,000 was the estimated total by the spring o f 1880. These tactics had ground M orrow 's men to a temporary standstill. His commanding officer, General Hatch, reported that the hones were ’mere shadows* w hile the men’s spirits, like their boots and outfits, were in shreds.10 It seemed incredible that, as the w ar with Victorio m oved towards its clim ax and as the Americans, according to Thrapp, bunched ’the greatest manhunt in the history o f the Southwest’, the W arm Springs Indians had remained ahead o f them all.11 But then the wonder b y in the nature o f the Apache warrior. A ll the American participants w ho wrote an account o f the wars attested to the Indians’ legendary sta­ mina. Britton Davis thought ’T hey were the most perfect specimens o f the racing type o f athlete that one could wish to see’: T hey were o f medium height, few over five feet eight, but propor­ tioned like deer. Small hands and feet; small bones; thin arms and legs, the btter sinewed as though with steel cords, so taut were the sinews and devoid o f fat. Chests broad, deep, and full, the heritage from generations o f m ountain-dwelling ancestors, they m oved along the trail with a smooth, effortless stride that seemed as tireless as a machine and as rhythmical. The thought o f attempting to catch one o f them in the mountains gave one a queer feeling o f helpless­ ness, but I enjoyed a sensation o f the beautiful in watching them.12 Bourke wrote d u t campaigning Apaches could maintain 12 s kilo­ metres a day for three or four days, until any pursuer was com pletely thrown o ff the scent and in temperatures that would kill white m en.13 228

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John Clum , when he was heading towards the Warm Springs agency to arrest Gerónim o, recounted how his Apache militia indulged in a tw o-hour w ar dance after completing a fifty-kilom etre march through ‘dust, cactus and a broiling sun*. As their ch ief ‘smilingly explained, “ they thought they were not getting sufficient exercise.“ *14 Although fighting warriors unencumbered by family and possessions were undoubtedly the most formidable opposition, Apache wom en were hardly less capable than their men. ‘There is no tiger more dan­ gerous than an infuriated squaw,* exclaimed Joh n Bourke. ‘She’s a fiend incarnate.*15 Davis described an occasion when a patrol was fired on after a skirmish, only to discover a young woman with a bullet wound just above the knee. She and her six-m onth-old infant were carried for almost two hours across a rugged, near-perpendicular canyon. As she waited to be operated upon by U S surgeons a storm o f freezing hail soaked her and the child to the skin. The next day they cut the leg o ff without anaesthetic or even a little whisky to numb the pain. The woman withstood the ordeal without a murmur, then was made to ride mule-back for another week to an army depot. Months later at San Carlos, Davis saw her again, running with the aid o f crutches.16 A tale o f even greater physical and spiritual resource was the odyssey performed by five Apache wom en w ho had been transported to M exico C ity. After three years o f slavery these Amazons escaped from their owners. Sleeping by day and walking by night, they covered more than 1,600 kilometres through country they had never seen before. They were able to cook food only once, but eventually arrived in Apacheria barefoot, armed with one knife and a single blanket.17 W ithout question the most celebrated o f all Apache wom en in the late nineteenth century was V ictorio’s own sister, Lozen. Although it was not common in Indian society, Lozen was a fighter on equal terms with the male members o f her band. She could withstand all the customary hardships o f the Apache at war, and was skilled with both horse and rifle. H er most remarkable talent, known amongst her people as her ‘power’, was a capacity to locate the whereabouts o f an enemy. Turning in a dervish-like trance she detected their presence through the palms o f her hands, which were said to turn purple if attack were im minent.18 M any members o f the tribe believed implic­ itly in the existence and effectiveness o f these mystical gifts. Indeed, they were the hallmark and currency o f the Apache shaman. As w e 229

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shall see, Gerónim o him self claimed extraordinary powers, which were subsequently confirm ed by the eye-witness testimony o f other Apaches. Beyond Lozen’s mystical equivalent o f an early warning system, Victorio had few other genuine advantages to offer his 160 warriors. Y et with these men he had maintained him self in the field for almost ten months against an enemy that outnumbered him by more than ten to one, including three cavalry regiments, two o f infantry, a contin­ gent o f Texas rangers and a large number o f M exican troops. M oreover, V ictorio’s opponents enjoyed the benefits o f a supply net­ w ork entirely dedicated to their support. Even more incredible, per­ haps, than this m ilitary achievement, itself an extraordinary feat o f escapology engaging the entire complement o f Apache war skills, was V ictorio’s ability to hold his people together, men, wom en and children, protecting and supplying them throughout the fighting. Despite all their hardships, none o f his group seems ever to have doubted his decision to fight, nor his right to lead. Given these facts, it seems difficult to resist Thrapp’s judgem ent o f unparalleled Apache greatness. W hile his record cannot be disputed, V ictorio’s life was destined to encompass all the elements o f the tragic hero. He could keep m oving and stay ahead o f the lum bering American units, but time was not on his side. The simple process o f attrition was beginning to count and he had also to contend with the rival talents o f the U S army’s Apache guides. Eventually these forces caught up with him in his beloved Black R ange, where he was surprised and savaged in a blind canyon by a party o f Indian auxiliaries. In the midst o f the fighting the scouts taunted that they had wounded the W arm Springs ch ief himself. Responding to the boast, one o f the squaws shouted back that i f their leader should die, they would eat him rather than let his body fall into enemy hands.19 O ne more time the Apaches struggled free o f the trap, then headed again for the sanctuary o f M exico. This time, however, M exico was waiting. Victorio had now lost some o f his best men. Each was irre­ placeable. For three more months he zigzagged across northern M exico and western Texas, short o f ammunition and desperate for a place to pause and rest his band. Eventually, in O ctober 1880, he made the w rong choice. W hile waiting for a small raiding party to acquire the ammunition 230

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they desperately needed, the Apache was taken by surprise at a place called Tres Castillos. Troops under a M exican general, Joaquin Terrazas, completely surrounded the W arm Springs Indians. B y coin­ cidence, Lozen was absent, which for some Apaches explained the dis­ aster. The defending force expended its limited ammunition then faced an onslaught from over 250 M exican soldiers. Seventy-eight Apaches were slain, most o f them warriors. A similar number o f wom en and children were captured and enslaved. A M exican soldier, a Tarahumara Indian, received the 2,000 pesos reward for killing Victorio, although this is rejected still by the Apaches themselves, w ho claim the great chief died by his own knife. Looking at the bronze and weathered oak in Victorious only photographic portrait, one would not lightly disagree. In Washington the M exican victory was heralded as a ’noteworthy feat o f arms which w ill exert so great an influence over the tranquility o f both frontiers’.20 As usual with regard to the Apaches, the bigwig? w ere o ff target. The tragic and unnecessarily violent tale o f Victorio had run its course, but an equally violent epilogue was just then beginning. From the bloodbath at Tres Castillos had emerged seventeen survivors. Amongst these was a ch ief called Nana. O ne U S army officer once dismissed this elderly and lame Indian as ’palsied . . . and d ecrepit. . . barely able to accompany the squaws and children in their forays’.21 It was indeed true that Nana was revered ’for his tenderness to the young, his consideration o f the wom en, his courtesy to his follow warriors and his complete devotion to his tribe’ .22 But his people also knew him as die fiercest and most implacable o f all Apaches, shrewdest in military strategy and surpassing even Victorio himself.23 Certainly, Victorio had always sought his advice and inspiration. In the ensuing few months, Nana was to show why. Driven by a passion for vengeance that seems biblical in outline and intensity, Nana embarked on a raid across M exico and the American Southwest that has few parallels. Thrapp called it ’legendary’, while another Southwest historian, David Roberts, wrote that o f all deeds o f w ar performed by the Chiricahua it ‘was arguably the most brilliant’ .24 It began in June 1881, Nana gathering recruits and momentum as he rode. His average was 80 kilometres a day, although on some this rose to 120. So fast and so great were the distances covered that some newspapers reported the depredations as being committed by the 231

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entire M escalero section o f the Apache. About 1,400 Americans took the field, 1,000 o f them regular troops, as Nana’s force swept in and out o f the Black R ange. Few , however, had the misfortune to make any sort o f contact. Those who managed to engage them, like the twenty-strong cavalry patrol that caught them in a last fierce gunfight before the Apaches regained their M exican sanctuary, often reported such encounters in the official record as U S victories. Typically, this last engagement resulted in the death o f the cavalry officer, half his force being killed or wounded, w hile the Indians remained in com­ mand o f the field. In truth, the Apaches had fought and w on seven serious fire fights, had ridden 5,000 kilometres, killed between thirty and fifty Americans, wounded many more and captured no few er than 200 horses and mules. A t the outset Nana’s men had numbered fifteen. They had never been more than forty. Nana him self was about seventy-five years old. Palsied and decrepit he might have seemed; the old warrior had only just started.

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A

fter the tragedy o f his family’s massacre in M exico during the 1850s, Gerónim o claimed to have received a shaman’s vision informing him o f his invulnerability to the weapons o f his enemies. Given the many gunshot wounds he survived during his long life, one is almost persuaded to believe in some protective ‘power’ . And never did it appear more effective than when he returned to San Carlos as Clum ’s prisoner in 1877. Despite the Indian agent’s avowed intention to see his captive speedily hanged, Gerónim o was curiously reprieved soon after, then set free. Subsequent Chiricahua testimony suggested that Clum was pressured by other Apache leaders to release him, although this is not entirely certain.1 Even Gerónim o him self in his autobiography, was unable to give a precise reason for his liberation. N or did he know in the autumn o f 1880, as he bided his time on the San Carlos flats, that the torch o f Apache opposition would pass to him in the wake o f V ictorio’s death. Y et Gerónim o was destined to carry that flame to the end o f his people’s military resistance, and then endure almost a quarter o f a century o f exile and imprisonment. That record alone was testimony to his stamina and resilience. H ow ever, it also bring? into focus the deep character differences that separated him from the Chiricahua leader killed at Tres Castillos. Although the actions and motives o f Victorio were never so folly documented, one gains clear insight into his character from a variety o f clues. W e know, for instance, that he was an abstemious man and was never known to be drunk, exceptional amongst a people so famously vulnerable to the white man’s stimulants.2 Throughout his 233

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life he was also loyal to a single w ife, when polygam y was the custom for Apache chiefs. H ow ever, it is the overall shape o f his career as the Warms Springs leader that speaks most eloquendy o f V ictorio’s per­ sonality. That final fourteen months o f w ar against insuperable odds, and his unwavering commitment to hold his beleaguered band together right until the tragic denouement, proclaim loudly an essen­ tial loyalty to the Apache life-w ay and an overriding unity o f purpose. In contrast to V ictorio’s spartan simplicity, Gerónim o seems a bag o f contradictions. There was, for sure, a similar passionate resistance to the white man, yet he oscillated between famous outbreaks and periodic attempts at setded reservation life, w hile in captivity he showed a willingness for at least partial assimiladon, dabbling briefly in Christianity and developing a good grasp o f hard Anglo-Saxon busi­ ness. He was undoubtedly committed to his people, but he was never form ally accepted as chief. He was blamed by some factions for the Chiricahua’s later misfortunes. On one occasion, during a desperate M exican ambush, he was accused o f wanting to abandon the wom en and children to the enemy - an idea that seems unthinkable in V ictorio.3 W here the W arm Springs ch ief was monogamous, Gerónim o had nine wives and outlived many* o f these and his children. W here Victorio was never known to have been intoxicated, Gerónim o displayed a periodic reliance on alcohol which, as w e shall see, played a large part in his life and in his death. Gerónim o was the most photographed Apache ever, yet this has hardly helped resolve the question o f his true nature. In the case o f Indians like Cochise and Crazy Horse it is the absence o f any photo­ graph that fires the imagination. W ith Gerónim o it is the sheer abun­ dance o f images. Although there are several constants - the downward steel clamp o f the scarred mouth and his brilliant eyes — the face always retains a sense o f mystery. Perhaps for people o f European cul­ ture the enigma lies in the sheer otherness o f the Apache culture, which can only be understood by years o f intimate contact. Is it for this reason that the various contemporaneous accounts by his white opponents take us no closer to the inner man? Y et these sources do have a certain predictable consistency - they all condemn him as a demon. Naturally, Clum was the most inventive and vocifer­ ous, calling his bête noire surly, defiant, relentless, crafty, tricky, resourceful in wrongdoing, a renegade and trickster. For Britton Davis, one o f the military officers succeeding Clum ’s regime, he was ‘a thoroughly vicious, intractable and treacherous man . . . his w ord

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no matter how earnestly pledged was worthless.’4 The overriding, cumulative impression is a baffling paradox — a character both deeply inflexible yet unpredictable. For his subsequent interpreters, notably Angie D ebo, his most meticulous biographer, and David Roberts, his most insightful, the qualities assume a more posi­ tive gloss, but the discrepancies remain. T o the latter, for instance, he was: Crafty, highly intelligent, a bom manipulator, he gained a reputa­ tion even among warriors devoted to him for not always telling the truth. Gerónim o was a worrier, a man tom by dark internal debates; there was a streak o f the paranoid in him even before Janos . . . R ather than Cochise's iron purposiveness [and w e could also add V ictorio’s] Geronim o’s characteristic state was vacillation . . .5 W hile Debo similarly acknowledges the high intelligence, hardheadedness and practicality, she also argues that ’i f one can follow his reasoning, he is seen as a man o f essential integrity. H e was deeply religious, and when a promise was made with oath and ceremony mere poetic trimmings to the white man - he kept his pledge.’6 Perhaps the key word to help understand the apparent contradic­ tions, and to supply an adhesive ingredient that binds together the dif­ fering assessments, is survival. Gerónim o was above all a survivor. H e was also a deeply curious and deeply alert man. These qualities went with the distrustfulness that characterised all Apache warriors. Y e t his tragic personal history, especially the early loss o f his mother, his w ife Alope and their three children, had made distrust a condition o f Geronim o’s soul. W hen blended with his relentless w ill to survive (and no Apache face expressed the quality more com pletely), his hyper-suspicion made him approach every new situation with a M achiavellian rigour. And whatever suited the dictates o f the moment governed his immediate responses. Such methods, o f course, infuriated the Americans w ho came up against him (by and large, the officers fighting Gerónim o were honourable men) and explain their universal verdict on him as a twister. It also makes him appear a less noble figure than Victorio, who seemed to take the stoic’s path to tragedy from the moment o f his final breakout. Y et Geronim o’s endurance beyond the vicissitudes o f his tumultuous career supplies the overarching sense o f unity, and repre­ sents no less an achievement. His indomitable commitment to survival *35

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- the dodges, the famous outbreaks, the equally celebrated surrenders, even his shrewd financial dealings once the prison door had closed — is as important a legacy for the contemporary Apache as is V ictorio’s heroic legend. These things require consideration before w e go on to examine his final years o f resistance, for along w ith the achievements w e must take account o f the extremes o f violence that accompanied his record. Although in old age he was filled w ith sadness for some o f his deeds, Gerónim o, unlike V ictorio, never paid w ith his own life for the death and suffering he inflicted on others. As Stephen Trim ble has suggested, ‘Today young Apaches must make sense out o f Geronim o’s violence, while honoring his skills.’7 So, indeed, must all Am ericans, ju st as they must acknowledge the injustice w hich bunched the final years o f conflict. W ith Clum ’s departure from San Carlos in 1877, the administration o f the reservation had becom e a virtual paradise for embezzlers. Rations were manipubted to yield huge profits for both contractors and agents, the so-called Tucson R in g, w hile the supposed recipients themselves were almost starving. A single cup o f flour was an indi­ vidual’s ration for a week. A small shoulder o f b eef was meant to last a family o f twenty for the same period.8 T o see them through until the next inadequate hand-out, some Apaches were living o ff rats or rab­ bits. A subsequent inquiry into the San Carlos regime reported a course o f procedure at the . . . Reservation . . . which is a dis­ grace to the civilization o f the age and a foul blot upon the national escutcheon. Fraud, pecubtion, conspiracy, larceny, plots and coun­ terplots seem to be the rule o f action . . . The Grand Ju ry little thought when they began this investigation that they were about to open a Pandora's box o f iniquities seldom surpassed in the annals o f crim e.9 D ire though the conditions had been, they were m erely the tinder o f rebellion. The spark was provided by a completely separate incident that has resonances w ell beyond the story o f the Apache and closely parallels aspects o f the conflict in the African Southwest (described in the follow ing section). T he crisis centred on a frail, ascetic figure called N och-ay-delklinne. This Apache shaman claimed to have communed w ith the 236

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spirits o f their dead leaders, and prophesied a revival o f Indian fortunes with the disappearance o f the w hite men. His teachings, closely related to the ghost dance movement that was even then giving renewed hope to the demoralised Indians o f the northern plains, also included a doctrine o f non-violence. H ow ever, the setders and military sur­ rounding San Carlos view ed the prophet and his message in a very d if­ ferent light. N och-ay-del-klinne’s capacity to attract a follow ing from amongst all sections o f the Apache filled them w ith fears o f a coordi­ nated and unified uprising. Y et it is surely indicative o f the w ay the Euro-Am erican image o f die savage was filled with the shadows o f the white subconscious, that they should now respond w ith such disproportionate force and aggres­ sion to this peaceful mystic, this messenger from the Apache’s own dream world. Seeking to halt his growing influence, the San Carlos agent sent a contingent o f over a hundred soldiers and scouts to his camp, with instructions for him to be arrested or killed. W hen this small army arrived to take its sole prisoner, the medicine man readily agreed to go quiedy, but a number o f Indians followed the posse, fear­ ing for his safety. As the escort stopped for the night a tense situation slowly degenerated into a hostile standoff, and all that was needed was a single stray shot to ignite the fuse. W ithin seconds o f the first gunshot there was a general exchange o f fire. The commanding officer screamed ‘K ill the M edicine M an’ and N och-ay-del-klinne received a bullet through the leg. As he crawled away, another would-be assassin pushed his pistol barrel in the prophet’s mouth and fired. W hen he survived this, a third guard smashed in his forehead with an axe and the terrible dreamer was dead. Eight soldiers and another eighteen Apaches were also killed in the battle. Gerónim o, his hair-trigger nerves jangling in the aftermath o f the violent explosion, soon made ready to leave with seventy-three other men, wom en and children. It was 30 September 18 8 1. Less than a year after V ictorio’s death, war had returned to the Am erican Southwest. In die breakout Gerónim o, the Chiricahua shaman, was accom­ panied by another noted chiefs Ju h , and in the Sierra Madre Mountains o f M exico they linked up with Nana, after the old man’s meteoric raid across the Southwest. Each o f these tw o leaders was married to Geronim o’s sisters, and the three brothers-in-law formed a formidable triumvirate. For a while their free band remained undetected in the M exican range, but by April 1882 they were back *37

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on American soil. The incursion was conceived and led by Gerónim o himself, who was keen to bolster the Indians* fighting strength in the light o f M exican military manoeuvres against them .10 Throughout the previ­ ous winter the free Apaches had sent word to relatives at San Carlos requesting that they jo in them in the Sierra Madre. W hen this failed to inspire a general exodus, Gerónim o set out to recruit them. Ghosting past the soldiers set to guard the border, his party first assem­ bled at a sheep farm south o f the reservation, where Gerónim o perpe­ trated the most infamous and best-documented o f his many alleged murders. He and his warriors massacred a group o f about sixteen M exican men, wom en and children, stabbing and shooting them one by one, then apparently beating the infants to death with stones. A newspaper account recorded that one child had been roasted alive, while the head shepherd was mercilessly tortured until his skull was split open with an axe.11 After these brutal atrocities Gerónim o moved north to a position just o ff the reservation, cut the telegraph wires to the San Carlos agency, then made his m ove on the morning o f 19 April. Almost all o f the surviving Warm Springs Apaches were amongst the 400 to 500 men, wom en and children who were stampeded into flight and w ho then straggled in a long and ill-concealed line towards the M exican border. M any had been herded against their w ill. H ow ever, once the various raiding parties under Gerónim o had slaughtered about fifty settlers, including a number o f policem en, all o f the Apaches realised that there was no going back. Unfortunately, going forward was barely any easier. M any Indians had lost their customary stamina during years o f meagre San Carlos charity, and they had few supplies, weapons or horses. Although the Apache leader dispatched additional foraging parties, the resulting flow o f supplies was insufficient to feed the hundreds o f hungry Indians as they trudged southwards. A largely unmounted Indian group was also doomed to the pace o f the weakest amongst them. A t one point the whole band even had to stop to per­ form a puberty ritual for a girl w ho had just completed her first menses. That they could delay their tense and dangerous flight to honour the maidenhood o f a single young female is a measure o f the rite’s critical importance in their religious and social calendar, and also provides a rare glimpse o f the softer, more feminine aspect o f Apache character. Despite a number o f forced night marches by the Chiricahua, the 238

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pursuing U S cavalry and loyal Apache scouts closed relendessly on their quarry, and, ju st before the border, engaged them in a b rief exchange. The retreating Indians emerged largely unscathed from this but in old M exico, disregarding international law, the Americans strack again in a fierce ambush during a rare lapse in Apache vigilance, as they danced to celebrate their successful escape. A later investigation revealed that they left behind fourteen dead warriors. A number o f wom en and children had been killed or wounded, w hile another important loss was that o f almost all their horses and possessions. Fearing a third American assault, the men concentrated at the rear o f the column as it straggled on towards the Sierra Madre. But in escaping one scene o f misery, the vanguard o f wom en and children ran headlong into a new and greater danger - a waiting force o f M exican soldiers. These troops had apparently been forewarned o f the impending Apache exodus and had set out to catch them before they could reach their impenetrable mountain retreat. The M exicans’ timing could not have been better, their attack cutting broadside into a line o f dispirited and w eary refugees. Gerónim o, described by one o f those he had coerced into flight as ‘the most intelligent and resourcefill as w ell as the most vigorous and farsighted’ o f the leaders, tried to organise a desperate defence.12 W ith about thirty other men he dug in and held o ff the M exicans for the rest o f the day, giving most o f his people time to reach the sanctuary o f higher ground. Then as darkness fell someone lit the surrounding bush and under the resulting smoke­ screen the Apaches were able to wriggle free o f the trap. Follow ing Tres Castillos and now this second disaster - the Indian dead numbered at least seventy-five, the greater proportion being wom en and children, while a further twenty had been captured —the W arm Spring; people o f Victorio had virtually ceased to exist as a separate community. Those remaining now trudged on unhindered into the mountains and joined the other Apaches, a combination that represented the largest gathering o f free Chiricahua since the 1870s. Despite the numbers their position was hardly secure. A few months after the enforced exodus from San Carlos, the Apache’s most form i­ dable American opponent, Nan tan Lupan, the Tan W olf, as the Chiricahua called General C rook, was back in the Southwest. Washington was intent on a final solution to the Apache ‘problem ’ . W ith characteristic thoroughness C rook set about reorganising the system that had disintegrated into chaos since his departure. Blam ing 239

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the Apache outbreak on gross maladministration at San Carlos, C rook placed the reservation under military control, w hile the corruption o f its previous administrators was investigated and exposed by a grand ju ry. Indian police were reinstated and the management o f affairs was placed in the hands o f officers o f high integrity, like Britton Davis. The Apache were allowed to m ove back to the high country on the reservation, which was better for grazing and held more o f their tradi­ tional harvests and game. M eanwhile C rook met and spoke to all the male occupants at San Carlos, listening to their grievances and re­ establishing his old policy o f self-administration and self-reliance for the peaceful Indians, and ruthless pursuit for any antagonists. W ith the Indians re-adjusted to a settled life and loyal to their pact o f cooperation with Crook, the Chiricahua in the Sierra Madre were cut o ff from a vital source o f supplies and recruits. T hey could hunt and trade with surrounding M exican communities, but any raiding was bound to stir the authorities into a military response. Equally, raids north o f the border —especially for the ammunition essential for their American-made rifles —would lead them into inevitable conflict with the U S military and eventually with C rook himself. The Apaches in the Sierra Madre apparently recognised their fate. According to Nana’s own grandson, ‘M any were expressing the fear that reservation life was inevitable and that further resistance could result only in the extermination o f our people.* O n another occasion he suggested that ‘Since Tres Castillos our people had known the out­ come. Nana knew w ell how the struggle would end. His litde band had fled so offen, starved so offen, slept so little, and suffered so long that death had no terrors.’ 13 Both the old ch ief and Gerónim o apparently preferred such a fate to captivity. Y et the Apaches had not been without their successes. In March 1883 came one o f those devastating Apache raids that plunged the white communities o f the Southwest into terror. In less than a w eek the raiding party, questing for all-important ammunition, had left a trail o f destruction, slaughtering twenty-six whites and seizing horses almost at w ill. And before the army could begin to find them, the Indians had vanished into M exico. Just a single Apache had been killed. In terms o f speed and intensity - its leader had apparently only ever slept on horseback during more than 1,000 kilometres — the raid rivalled the famous onslaught led by Nana. Bourke later judged that the Indians had passed through settled country occupied by 5,000 troops. N one o f these soldiers had even clapped eyes on their oppo240

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nenes.14 Small wonder perhaps that the American settlers, in the great barrage o f newsprint unleashed by the raid, frequently portrayed themselves as com pletely surrounded by savages as Custer himself. Unknown to these white victim s, however, the raiders had included amongst their number at least one who would prove an invaluable ally. H e was an Indian called Tsoe. H e was described by John Bourke as ‘one o f the handsomest men, physically, to be found in the w orld.’ 15 Tsoe was an Apache, but he was related only by mar­ riage to the Chiricahua, and m idway through their ride he decided he had had enough o f the renegade’s free-ranging existence and had broken away, to slip back into San Carlos reservation a few weeks later. There he was promptly arrested by Britton Davis and taken to Crook. For the Tan W olf, this solitary Apache was the last piece in a com­ plex jigsaw over which the general had mused for the last few months. N ew international agreements had finally been signed between M exico and the U SA , giving C rook an opportunity to penetrate deep into the southern mountains, and make direct contact with the Chiricahua. T o find Apache, however, in the most desolate, inacces­ sible portion o f their range would be almost impossible without a complete understanding o f the terrain. Tsoe, or Peaches as he was known to the troops for his rosy com plexion, had precisely that kind o f detailed knowledge, and he readily agreed to lead C rook there. O n i M ay 1883, just weeks after the Apaches’ last slashing raid, C rook’s column was on the m ove towards the Sierra M adre. Both the plan and the force employed to execute it, which was heavily reliant on Apache scouts, typified C rook’s methods and his gift for innova­ tion. For the free Chiricahua never thought that the Americans would either dare or be able to track them to their final sanctuary. N or was that b elief ill-founded. D uring their struggle through the mountains to the Chiricahua camp, Bourke wrote that ‘T o look upon the country was a grand sensation, to travel in it, infernal.’ 16 The American soldiers toiled upwards through the M exican range, each man trapped in an airless pocket o f self-generated misery and heat, w hile the mules occasionally stumbled to their deaths along the precipitous ravines. For Tsoe, however, and the other Indian auxil­ iaries, who scaled the heights like deer, it was as i f the excursion were all in a day’s w ork. Bourke suggested that their guide ‘never knew what it meant to be tired, cross or out o f hum or', and went on to adjudge the Apache ‘the perfect, the ideal, scout o f the whole

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w orld’ .17 T h ey could keep up a pace o f seven kilom etres an hour for a distance o f tw enty-five, and w hen they stopped, Bourke eulogised, they could strike a fire w ith tw o sticks in ju st eight seconds.18 It was the kind o f stamina and bushcraft w hich enabled C rook to reach his target in ju st a fortnight but, unfortunately, the general was absent w hen the vanguard first struck the enem y encampment. Aroused by the sudden contact the scouts instinctively attacked, Apache firing upon Apache as they rushed amongst the Chiricahua bivouacs, burning and looting, killing nine and rounding up their entire horse herd. O nly after the skirmish had ceased did C rook him­ self eventually arrive, w hen the scouts rolled into the U S camp loaded w ith spoils and a handful o f captives. T he prisoners w ere quickly enlisted as go-betweens w ith the spokesmen for the renegade force. H ow ever, one o f their most im por­ tant leaders, G erónim o, was 200 kilom etres away on a M exican raid. Y e t he was not com pletely out o f touch w ith proceedings back in the mountains. Jason Betzinez, accom panying Gerónim o on this particular expedition, later testified that the w hole raiding party was seated around a fire, w hen the Apache shaman suddenly chopped the knife he was holding and announced: ’M en, our people w hom w e left at our base camp are now in the hands o f U S troops! W hat shall w e do?’ Betzinez published his account in 1959 after a lifetim e absorbing the w hite man’s ways and shedding the superstitions o f his people. B u t he dun g tenaciously to die story o f G eronim o’s clairvoyance, claim ing that ‘it came to pass as true as steel’.19 Gerónim o and his party hurried back to the Sierra M adre, w here they found affairs m uch as he had prophesied. H e quickly conferred w ith his fellow leaders and together they opened negotiations w ith C rook himself. As the tw o sides assembled to discuss their grievances and possible terms for surrender, Bourke sized up the opposition. ‘In muscular developm ent, lung and heart pow er,’ he w rote o f the general corps o f warriors, ’they w ere, w ithout exception, the finest body o f human being? I had ever looked upon.’ O f the actual Chiricahua chiefs, he thought they w ere ’men o f noticeable brain pow er, physi­ cally perfect and m entally acute - ju st the individuals to lead a forlorn hope in the face o f every obstacle.’20 Just how forlorn their cause had becom e was brought hom e to the Chiricahua by the Americans’ capacity to locate and storm their M exican inner sanctum. Equally alarming w ere the constant reports o f M exican troop movements in die region. M any o f the renegade band, 242

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especially the W ann Springs people, w ere weary o f liberty and its end­ less draining trials. After a w eek’s patient negotiation they finally agreed to return to San Carlos. C rook him self gave safe conduct to a party o f 325, including a number o f prominent Chiricahua like the elderly Nana. Typically, Gerónim o pledged to return to the reservation but requested more time to gather his people together, then vanished back into M exico. Y e t even the last renegade finally succumbed to the inevitable and, although it was nine months after C rook’s expedition, he kept his w ord and headed back towards Arizona and civilisation. According to the mindset in W ashington, what civilisation entailed for the Apache was the abandonment o f their hunter-gatherer past and their induction into the w orld o f setded agriculture. This despite a dearth o f fertile, w ell-irrigated land at San Carlos, and the fact that some o f the best reservation country had already been parcelled out to w hite setders.21 E ver the realist, Gerónim o had returned to Arizona w ith a large herd o f stolen M exican livestock to launch his people as cattle ranchen, w hich w ould better have suited their free-ranging traditions. B ut W ashington, intent on beating the w arrior’s w ar lance into a ploughshare, confiscated the cattle and supplied the Apaches w ith pick, shovel, seed, harness and draught pony, then packed them o ff to becom e peasant farmers. For almost tw o years, the Indians made genuine attempts to adjust to this alien w ay o f life. E ven Gerónim o once proudly displayed a small blister on his palm as a badge o f his new -w on status as veteran sod-buster. In his 1884 report C rook w rote that ‘for the first tim e in the history o f that fierce people, every m em ber o f the Apache tribe is at peace.’22 Y et beneath the surface o f calm, discontents w ere brewing. These w ere partly rooted in Am erican intervention in tw o longestablished Apache customs. T he first was the m aking and drinking o f tiswin, a crude, m ildly alcoholic beer prepared from fermented com . T he ritual Saturnalia associated w ith this brew was invariably a riotous, and often violent, affair and the authorities wished to ban or, at least, curb its production. T he second cause o f friction was the established Apache methods o f punishing their w ives w hich, in cases o f adultery, extended to cutting o ff the tip o f the wom an’s nose. Sexual restraint was expected o f both sexes in this conventionally chaste com m unity and breaking its taboos was punished w ith corresponding severity. B y themselves the issues w ere not a casus belli. In fret, many Apaches recognised the harmful and repugnant aspects o f both these

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old customs and wished to control them, but they equally resented w hite intrusion into their ow n social arrangements. And given the w ider and traumatic assault upon the Apache’s political, cultural and spiritual traditions - for the coercive attentions o f Christian missionar­ ies w ere another fleet o f life on the reservation - it is hardly surpris­ ing that such issues became matters o f principle. Another source o f discontent was the habit amongst the Am erican soldiers o f trying to pick out the most infamous o f the Chiricahua, when they came to the depot for their rations. Then, when their officers w ere not looking, the soldiers w ould point to the Indian and draw their hands slow ly across their throats as a crude form o f jo k e. For the Apaches this barrack-room needling had sinister implications. W ere these soldiers possibly good men attempting to let the Indians know what lay in store? Apache suspicions w ere further aroused w hen the ch ief scouts on the reservation took to m aking the same m orbid gesture. Exercised by its constant repetition, some o f the Chiricahua became paranoid that they w ere soon to be arrested, perhaps impris­ oned or even worse. T h e most susceptible to the barrage o f innuendo and rum our was the most suspicious and untameable bronco o f them all, Gerónim o. Eventually, goaded to distraction by their taunts, he lashed out and broke free once m ore. W ith io i wom en, eight half-grow n youths and thirty-five m en, old Nana amongst them, he set o ff into the night o f 17 M ay 1885. In one breathless ride they covered 200 kilometres. T he only people to see them before they vanished into M exico w ere those they killed en route. Y e t i f one thing had been proved by the last big Chiricahua exodus when their numbers had been far greater and m ore easily selfsupporting —there was now no place left in old Apacheria, neither in M exico nor in the Am erican Southwest, for a band o f free-roam ing Indians. G eronim o’s fourth and last outbreak was a w ild and reckless coda to the history o f N ative Am erican resistance. It had no future. Its conclusion was all but inevitable, and w e need consider it only in b rief outline. Y e t even the bare statistics o f his final fling make com pelling reading. It lasted for eighteen months and centred on an area o f some 640 by 320 kilom etres. T he Indians had no base o f supplies, no w ay o f guar­ anteeing food or transportation. B y the end they w ere being pursued by 5,000 regular and irregular Am erican soldiers, 3,000 M exican 244

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troops and about 1,000 other civilian vigilantes, scouts and Indian auxiliaries, m any o f them Apache - about 9,000 in total. D uring the period Geronim o’s band killed about 100 Am ericans and Apache scouts and an unknown num ber o f M exicans, but a figure thought to exceed the casualty list north o f the border. Losses amongst the Apaches amounted to eleven, including three minors and tw o wom en. N one o f these was inflicted by regular troops. T h e w hole adventure was punctuated by bizarre incidents and stag­ gering escapades, one o f the most extraordinary o f w hich follow ed the Am erican capture o f a third o f all the w om en and children, including Geronim o’s ow n fam ily. Setting out to retrieve his loved ones, the sixty-year-old Gerónim o rode w ith four companions straight through C rook’s dense screen o f guards and patrols, slipped back into San Carlos and, under the noses o f the troops in Fort Apache, collected his w ife and daughter and returned to M exico. N ot a single soldier had seen them com e or go, not ’even from a distance’ .23 W hen, at last, Am erican troops did make contact w ith the rene­ gades, Gerónim o finally promised to rendezvous w ith Nantan Lupan after a further tw o moons, at a place known as the Cañón de Embudos. T he site’s Spanish name passed into English-speaking legend as meaning the Canyon o f Tricksters, possibly for what occurred there tw o months later. C rook set out on his m ule one m ore time and found the Chiricahua group at the canyon ju st as Gerónim o had pledged. T h ey then sat facing each other and talked. The historic moment was even recorded for posterity, a Tombstone photographer, C .S. Fly, som ehow managing to wangle his w ay on to the American expedition. T he resulting images, some o f the most extra­ ordinary in the Southwest’s history, i f not in all the American Indian wars, showed just how far the age-old European-tribal conflict had m oved towards the kind o f multi-media clash so familiar to the twenti­ eth century. A t last Gerónim o and all the others agreed to surrender. W ith as much poetry as die arch-strategist could muster, he said: O nce I m oved about like the w ind. N o w I surrender to you and that is a ll. . . M y heart is yours, and I hope yours w ill be mine . . . W hatever you tell me is true. W e are all satisfied o f that. I hope the day may com e when m y w ord shall be as strong w ith you as yours is w ith m e.24 H e tried desperately to convince die Am ericans o f the deep, genuine 245

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fears that had precipitated his last ride. G iven the oral traditions in Apache culture, honesty was an essential and cardinal virtue in their society. O nce found out, no liar could ever be entrusted w ith im por­ tant tribal business. These qualities w ere acknowledged and praised by men like Britton Davis and Bourke. Unfortunately, Gerónim o him self was now seen as largely outside that tribal pattem. G iven C rook’s w earying sense o f déjà vu, it is perhaps not surprising he did not believe a w ord the Apache shaman had spoken. And the next day Gerónim o had bolted. A lcohol, in the form o f cheap w hisky sold by an Am erican low life called Tribollet, had inveigled its w ay into the Apaches’ camp like an uncorked genie. N o w the booze, in conjunction w ith the bootlegger’s dire prophecies o f im minent hanging, cast its evil spell and Gerónim o was spooked into flight one last tim e. Enraged at his malign im pact, Bourke wanted to hang Tribollet, a suspected agent for the Tucson R in g , as ‘a foe to human society’ .25 But the damage was already done. W orse still, the m ilitary high command, vexed by this setback and by their ow n dis­ tant im potence, rejected the T an W o lfs proposed surrender terms to the Apaches and goaded the already w ar-w eary C rook to tender his resignation. This made w ay for General N elson M iles, a soldier w ith little genuine knowledge o f Indians and a deep ignorance o f the Apache. H e rapidly got rid o f C rook’s scouts, thinking he could do the jo b quicker w ith w hite Am ericans. V ery soon there w ere 5,000 troops in the field - about a third o f the combat strength o f the army —chasing tw enty m en and twenty w om en and children. H ow ever, General M iles was not one o f those commanders w ho lost sight o f the overall picture by venturing forth himself. H e was, in fact, a career soldier w ith an eye to his place in history, and the achievem ent w hich seemed most likely to secure that glory was the capture o f Gerónim o. Unfortunately, such a possibility looked as unlikely as ever. Gerónim o and his reduced band now ran the army ragged. In some parts o f M exico the country was so stark it took the Am ericans thirtysix hours to get out o f one ravine to its summit, and tw elve pack animals w ere lost in the clim b. And although the pursuing forces had managed to seize the renegades’ entire equipment and horses on seven different occasions during the eighteen-m onth chase, each tim e the Indians had re-equipped themselves w ithin days. W hen, after five m ore months, they w ere no nearer securing the ultimate prize, M iles eventually setded, like C rook before him , on a negotiated surrender 246

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brought about through the service o f Apache scouts. T he only differ­ ence was that M iles, unlike C rook, made promises to Gerónim o that he never intended to keep. Lured in by old Apache friends, the renegades prom ised to meet M iles at an agreed rendezvous. Like the location for G erónim o’s m eeting w ith C rook, the name o f the spot seemed to hold a clue to the outcom e: Skeleton Canyon heralded the death o f Apache resis­ tance. Soothed by M iles’ frise promises, the renegades w ere prom pdy packed on to a train and whisded away to the east, few o f them ever to return. This was itself a betrayal o f his surrender terms to Gerónim o, but M iles’ treachery extended frr w ider than this. W hile the general was being honoured for his great victory by the citizens o f Tucson, his presentation sword studded w ith a fifty-seven-carat star o f India sapphire and w ith a hilt made o f solid gold (public subscriptions foiled to cover the full price, so M iles m et some o f it him self), most o f the Chiricahua population, including the Apache scouts without w hom the surrender w ould never have been secured, w ere languish­ ing in prison in Florida at the start o f twenty-seven yean captivity.26 A n outraged Jo h n Bourke suggested that there was ’no m ore dis­ graceful page in the history o f our relations w ith the Am erican Indians than that w hich conceals the treachery visited upon the Chiricahuas w ho remained frithful in their allegiance to our people.’27 T his m uch, how ever, M iles’ treachery had changed. T he killing had stopped in the Am erican Southwest, w hile in the east Apache dying had ju st begun. W ithin three and a h alf years, almost a quarter o f the 498 Chiricahua transported into exile had succumbed to disease. Before going on to consider aspects o f this long incarceration, w e should pause to make a num ber o f comparisons w ith the tribal con­ flicts discussed earlier and also to attempt a final assessment o f Apache resistance. T he most obvious conclusion to be drawn was the extrem ely arduous nature o f w hite conquest in Apacheria. Dan Thrapp believed it was ‘the most costly, in human lives, o f any in the history o f Am erica.’28 O ne m ight even add that it involved more casualties on the European side than the com bined Spanish conquests o f the M exica and the Inca. T his says much about the martial qualities o f the Apache w ho, it should also be emphasised, as a people num­ bered no m ore than the Tasmanians. G iven these statistics one begins to see the Apache much as their eulogists have suggested - as one o f the most skilful and courageous tribal opponents that any European 247

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pow er confronted anywhere on earth. H ow ever, over the likes o f the Tasmanian Aborigines they had one enormous advantage. T hey w ere never confined to a finite space like an island. M oreover, Apacheria - a m ixture o f desert and precipitous sierra - was even m ore inimical to European presence than w ere the damp forests and mountains o f Van Diem en's Land. W ith his custom­ ary insight, Bourke noted the importance o f human ecology in the w hite-tribal w ar o f the Southwest: the ‘two great points o f superiority o f the native or savage soldier over the representatives o f civilized dis­ cipline are his absolute knowledge o f the country and his perfect ability to take care o f him self at all times and under all circumstances.*29 I f anything, die Apaches' advantages over the M exica o f the six­ teenth century w ere even greater. M ost important o f all was the fret that the Indeh had no tradition o f open, pitched batdes. Indeed, had they attempted to confront Am erican forces in that manner they w ould have been as quickly annihilated as w ere the inhabitants o f Tenochtidan. It was Bourke, once again, w ho summed up precisely the Apache approach to warfare: In batde he is . . . the antithesis o f the Caucasian. T he Apache has no frise ideas about courage; he w ould prefer to skulk like the coy­ ote for hours, and then kill his enem y, or capture his herd, rather than, by injudicious exposure, receive a wound, fatal or otherwise. B ut he is no coward; on the contrary, he is entided to rank am ong the bravest. T he precautions taken for his safety prove that he is an exceptionally skillful soldier.30 Just as the M exica must have despised the alien methods o f the Spanish conquistadores as brutally dishonourable, so did many w hite Arizonans, incapable o f Bourke’s w ide and sympathetic reflection, view the guer­ rilla tactics o f the Apache as a kind o f ‘dirty* war. Snakes, serpents, coy­ otes, wolves and tigers form the basis for most white im agery on the tribe’s combat style. That the military commanders o f Tenochtidan w ould have understood this bitter judgem ent expressed by the white Arizonan setders on an unmanly and ungallant foe exposes one o f the m ore interesting ironies o f the Indians o f the Am erican Southwest. T he fighting unit that bears closest comparison w ith the Apache is not to be found among the tribal people previously discussed, but in one o f their European opponents: the conquistadores o f the sixteenth century. Like the Spanish knights, the Apache had long-standing traditions 248

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o f enm ity towards foreigners that programmed them for w ar from the very outset. Apaches distrusted not only whites, but anyone w ho lay outside the boundary o f the tribe. T he invasion o f Apacheria by Europeans thus involved no disorienting culture shock for them as it had done for the M exica. T he Irtdeh’s Ishm ael-like b elief that every man's hand was against them was an important strategic benefit. It made them cautious, elusive, inaccessible, com m itted, ruthless. D uring their contests in the Southwest, the Apache had another advantage, like the armies o f Cortés or Pizarro, in not seeking primar­ ily to defend territory. For the M exica, by contrast, a m ajor restricting consideration was their defence o f the land, the granaries, the settled resources that underpinned their arm y's effectiveness. T he conquering Spaniards had no such initial lim itation. Like the Apache, they w ere plundering units. T h ey could, and did, sim ply seize resources as required, w ithout regard for any immediate consequence. T he Apache likewise raided w hite and M exican farmsteads almost at w ill and this ubiquitous, i f enforced, commissariat was the key to their legendary m obility. Another point o f comparison was the Apache’s superiority as indi­ vidual fighters to the mass o f their opponents. T rue, they did not have the concrete technological advantages enjoyed by each conquistador over his indigenous Am erican foes, and they never enjoyed m ore fire­ pow er than their M exican or Am erican opponents. B ut what the Apache lacked in terms o f hardware they made up for in fieldcraft and natural resilience. C rook once noted that you could engage Apaches in a fire fight w ithout ever once actually seeing them. So often it was a case o f a smaller but élite voluntary corps facing conscript EuroAm erican forces, many o f w hom w ere coerced into service. These dif­ ferences in part neutralised the whites’ advantages o f num ber and arms technology and ensured the longevity o f Apache resistance. T he final similarity between Apache and Spaniard was their jo in t use o f extrem e brutality and terror. Torture o f captives, as w e have seen, was a regular feature o f Apache methods. The wom en w ere known to have beaten prisoners to death w ith stones, and to have impaled the bowels o f living victim s with wooden sticks.31 D uring their flight into M exico, some Apache raiders impaled a local girl and left her to die hanging from a meat hook through the back o f her head. . It was this kind o f episode that explained their monstrous reputa­ tion. It makes the likes o f Sugarfoot Jack understandable and it also makes the Apache seem the least sympathetic o f the three tribal 249

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peoples considered here. T hey had litde o f the vulnerability and general innocence o f the Tasmanians, and unlike the m etropolitan M exica or the im perial Inca, the Apache had no readily visible cultural achievements to expose, by contrast, the scale o f Spanish rapacity. Y e t it cannot be ignored that the Apache w ere a people fighting for survival against a foe w ho was not just anxious to create his ow n living space in the region. N o r w ere white settlers simply embarked upon a furious but righteous quest for justice after Indian atrocities. T heir policy towards the Apache was often genocidal in scope, as the U S Board o f Indian Commissioners acknowledged w ith remarkable com ­ placency in 18 7 1: ‘the attempt to exterminate them [the Apache] has been carried on at a cost o f from three to four m illion dollars per annum, w ith no appreciable progress being made in accomplishing the exterm ination.02 It was only after the failure o f a policy o f total m ilitary annihilation that the authorities gave consideration to any alternative. Y e t even w hen this was officially adopted, w hite appetites remained largely undiminished, intent on a conquest o f both the Apaches’ geographical territory and o f their internal landscape — their lifestyle, culture and belieft. Such ethnocide was m otivated throughout by the relentless, unforgiving logic o f the savage stereotype. This European outpouring, w hich had been in full spate on the N orth Am erican continent ever since the time o f Cortés, washed on through Arizona and N ew M exico in the nineteenth century: a deep and com plex fear not ju st o f N ative Am ericans but even o f the landscape itself. Such ingrained atti­ tudes made bloodshed inevitable in a w ar o f equally aggressive com ­ batants. But it also led to violence in times o f peace. T he systematic abuse o f the Apaches, even after they had acquiesced in reservation life, was typical o f the institutionalised hatred and injustice to w hich Indians w ere subjected across the U SA . G iven this background to the Christian conquest, one begins to see the efforts o f the Apache diehards — V ictorio, Nana, Gerónim o - as a desperate and justifiable last stand for the survival and integrity o f their ow n w ay o f life. And in the last quarter o f the twentieth century this is precisely the shift in focus that has occurred in Southwest his­ toriography. A later generation o f writers has initiated a process o f revision that has resulted in a m ore positive interpretation o f the Apache and their conflict w ith w hite settlers. O n the one hand, anthropologists like M aurice O pler and a num ber o f remarkable female authors, E ve Ball and Angie D ebo most notably, have dis­ 250

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interred that part o f Apache culture w hich was buried by the tumul­ tuous violence — the rich, fem inine, ritual life o f an earth-bound, earth-hallowing people. A t the same tim e, m ilitary specialists like Dan Thrapp and D avid R oberts have rehabilitated the marauding raids o f V ictorio and N ana and found in them a legitim ate purpose denied by their w hite adversaries. These new soundings o f the Southwest’s past have in turn taken hold amongst a w ider audience. As indeed they should. I f a m odem pluralist Am erica wishes to understand and commemorate its country’s founders, then it must also recognise those other Am ericans w ho opposed that process and also understand w hy drey did so. I f society wishes to honour the exploits o f a Custer and recall his tragic end, then it must honour in equal measure the heroic fell o f a V ictorio. I f it seeks to celebrate General G eorge C rook as the greatest Indian fighter in its history, dien it should at least seek to know his principal file, Gerónim o, not as a tiger, nor even the greatest tiger, even less die greatest Indian, but sim ply as an Indian and as a man. This indeed sug­ gests the com plexity o f truth.

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t is a measure o f G erónim o’s representative status that even in exile and defeat he continued to illustrate important facets not ju st o f his ow n nation's w ider experience, but o f the w hole relationship between Christian whites and tribal people. In this final chapter on the Apache w e should consider in detail tw o aspects o f his period in cap­ tivity: the evolving nature o f his reputation and his use o f alcohol. H ow ever, it is impossible to overlook a feature o f the Chiricahua's collective fete that was equally typical o f N ative Am erican experience —their dispossession. M any o f the Apaches exiled in Florida, then Alabama and, finally, in Oklahom a w ere those reservation Indians w ho had never partici­ pated in renegade outbreaks. A good num ber, indeed, w ere scouts and families o f scouts, w ho had either knuckled down to the life o f peasant farmers or served loyally in the U S forces. O fficers like C rook and Bourke knew that Gerónim o and his last companions in resistance w ould never have been brought to surrender w ithout the services o f their fellow Apaches. Small w onder that they condemned the Horida exile as an act o f gross betrayal. W hen General M iles oversaw the final round-up and herded the Chiricahua into railway box-cars - itself a traumatising experience, since most had never seen a train —these San Carlos Indians lost all their land, their stock and non-portable posses­ sions w ithout compensation. B y coincidence the year o f this eviction also saw the proposal o f a bill that w ould eventually inflict massive territorial losses upon almost all N ative Americans. T he Dawes A ct, w hich passed into few in 1887, only months after the Chiricahua had been incarcerated at tw o old 252

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Florida forts, was supposed to aid the Indians’ absorption into the w ider Am erican com m unity. Clearing the tribes o ff their land and on to reservations had made w ay for w hite settlement, but there w ere drawbacks to the system. For the Indians’ isolation in diese ghettos had actually fostered old group identities, allowed a continuation o f their communal approach to resources and encouraged a resistance to the w hite man’s higher civilisation. It was the age-old problem faced by European conquistadors every­ where. H aving defeated the savage, how could they then turn him into a prim itive replica o f themselves. For the Spaniards in sixteenthcentury M exico part o f die answer was the encomienda system. ’As everyone know s,’ w rote one encomendero, ’the Indians are w eak by nature and are satisfied w ith having enough to get along on from day to day. And i f there is any w ay to bring them out o f their laziness and carelessness, it is to make them help the Spaniards in their com m erce.’ B y labouring for their European bosses, the Am ericans w ould gain the benefit o f wages, and w ould in time ‘becom e fond o f com m erce and profits’, thus being drawn into the w hite capitalist ethos.1 For the British in Tasmania the answer had been preparatory schooling at R obinson’s Aboriginal camp on Flinders, w ith its educa­ tional m ix o f Victorian cleanliness and Evangelical Christianity. For nineteenth-century w hite Am ericans the solution lay in the principle o f severalty: splitting reservations into separate parcels o f land so that the new private owners w ould acquire the industry and self-interested individualism o f the dominant culture. Unfortunately, the ’severalty law operated as most whites had hoped and most Indians had feared.’2 There w ere supposed safeguards to prevent the Indians’ rapid loss o f their ’new ’ lands - the allotments could not be sold, leased or w illed for tw enty-five years — but many N ative Am ericans w ere total inno­ cents in the w orld o f property management. Som e squandered their tides recklessly, w hile others w ere persuaded into unfavourable deals or lease agreements. In the first third o f the twentieth century about h alf o f all allotments passed from Indian hands, most o f them sold o r forfeit for non-paym ent o f taxes.3 M oreover, once portions o f the reservation had been divided up for all those Indians eligible, the surplus becam e available for sale to whites. B y the 1930s and the end o f severalty, the Indians had lost about tw othirds o f their total land holding, their territories dwindling from 139 to 48 m illion acres. T h e price they had paid to ow n property like a w hite man was an area o f land greater in size than Belgium , the *53

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Netherlands, Switzerland and the U nited Kingdom com bined. Gerónim o and his people did not even have the opportunity to face the challenge o f land ownership. As they boarded the train in Septem ber 1886 everything had been stripped from them. This much the guards let them keep the w hole journey: the degrading stench o f vom it and excrem ent in the insanitary wagons. Another item the Indians most probably acquired in transit was the tuberculosis bacillus that killed a quarter o f them in less than four years. In return, what most whites wanted was a quick glimpse o f the Chiricahua as they passed through on their w ay to Florida, and especially o f Gerónim o and his band o f renegades. W hen the tiger o f the human species was finally brought to bay, the newspapers w ent into a frenzy. As Angie D ebo noted, 'N ever w ere so m any headlines ow ed by so many to so fe w .'4 Gerónim o had becom e the most infamous Indian in the W estern hemisphere, eclipsing even the great Sitting B u ll. A t San Antonio in Texas, w here his train was delayed w hile the authorities decided on his final destination, the town 'held a R om an holiday, w ith hawkers selling photographs and souvenirs’ .5 A fter a Florida congressman had apparendy made a strong pitch for his ow n neighbourhood, the coastal town o f Pensacola w on the right to serve as G erónim o’s gaoler, at the nearby Fort Pickens. T he tow n's promoters are said to have been exultant. H e m ight have been the worst Indian in the w orld, but he was definitely good for business. Even the other, innocent San Carlos Apaches w ere a focus for travelling sightseers. W hen plans w ere m ooted to m ove these Indians from their separate Florida prison the need for secrecy was underlined. T h e railroad bosses and their political lobbyists w ere bound to try and block the measure, because o f the loss o f business it w ould entail. H ow ever, Gerónim o him self was undoubtedly the star attraction. B y February 1887 Fort Pickens was seldom receiving few er than twenty visitors a day and, on some occasions, this rose to over 450.6 Typically, the arch-realist made the best o f a bad situation. H e made and sold bows and arrows, quivers, or canes. In a slow , conscientious hand he leam t to print his name in capitals, and signed the items to further increase their value. H e charged artists to pose for their paint­ ings, w hile signed photographs w ere an old stand-by. Initially his autograph sold at ten to the dollar, but by the twentieth century and w ith inflation they w ere fifty cents a piece. Another o f G eronim o’s ingenious scams was to rem ove the buttons from his coat, or the hat 254

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from his head, and sell them to the punten gathered at railway stations to see him . W hen the train pulled away, the w ily old shaman w ould sew m ore buttons back on and take out a fresh hat, w hich he had brought especially for the occasion.7 Gerónim o reached his widest audiences towards the end o f the century, and after the Chiricahua’s rem oval from the east in 1894, to a new , semi-permanent establishment in Fort Sill, Oklahom a. From here he was allowed to travel under escort to a num ber o f m ajor pub­ lic exhibitions and shows, the first being the Trans-M ississippi and International Exposition at Omaha in the fill o f 1898. A ll w ent extrem ely sm oothly except for one small alarm. Gerónim o and some other Apaches had got thoroughly lost w hile out for a jaunt in the country and by the time they got back they found local headlines screaming: G E R O N IM O A N D N A C H E E E SC A P E APACH E M U R D E R E R S TH O U G H T TO BE O N T H E IR W A Y B A C K T O A R IZ O N A .8 A t the tim e o f this rumpus, G erónim o was in his m id-seventies. B u t his explosive reputation was by now as relentless as the w arrior him­ self had been in his prim e, and w ould endure to his death. In his 'home* state o f Oklahom a it was a legend that was said to generate an audience o f ten thousand at any single event and kept him in constant local demand.9 T he clim ax to G eronim o’s show business career was an event o f global significance - the inauguration parade o f President Theodore R oosevelt in W ashington in 1904. T h e old Apache was part o f a larger Indian display that was divided into tw o groups and meant to sym bol­ ise die before and after o f w hite conquest. In the lead w ould ride a con­ tingent o f w ild savages resplendent in traditional costume. Behind came a post-conquest group, educated at special Indian schools and sprucely decked out in W estern suits. Seeing these civilised Indians, die spectators w ere meant to reflect on their achievem ents and the benefits to them o f w hite culture. U nfortunately that was not quite h ow the audience reacted. T h e Apache shaman was naturally one o f the old contemptibles in d ie lead, but w hen he hove into view the crowds threw their hats into the air, shouting 'H ooray for Gerónim o*. T h e man whose norm al billing was 'the tiger o f die human race’ or 'the Apache terror* m ay 2 SS

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have been a savage, but by the twentieth century the savage was acquiring cult chic, and G erónim o stole the show. O nly R oosevelt, apparendy, attracted m ore attention.10 T he sight o f the great Chiricahua riding w ith quiet dignity through the concrete and steel canyons o f the Am erican capital m ay have allowed some spectators to gloat w ith satisfaction on their w hite victory, but there was also m ingled w ith that triumphalist response a new , unfamiliar, m ore posi­ tive feeling towards the old w arrior. H itherto, the fledgling U S superpower had derived much o f its ethos and national identity from the culture o f its western frontier, a place w here decent, ordinary w hite Am ericans created order and pros­ perity out o f a wilderness peopled by savages. That sense o f the nation’s political and moral expansion, o f its limidess potential for greatness, was bound up w ith its constant outward thrust into an unknown geography. Y e t im plicit, i f half-hidden, in that crusade was a contradiction. In order for Am erican civilisation to progress yet further, it needed som ewhere to progress to. B u t where w ould the westering pioneer advance once the continent had been conquered all the w ay to the Pacific? As the setders pushed on, the paradox became ever clearer. T he Am erican frontier had not ju st involved a simple triumph o f light over darkness, setded over unexplored, civilisation over savagery. In the forging o f the nation’s soul each had required the other — light and darkness, setded and unexplored, civilisation and savagery - an essential, indivisible w hole. W ith the taming o f the last w ild spaces, it was not only the native inhabitants w ho w ere van­ quished. In all frontiersm en, w hite and red, som ething w ould die. Gerónim o lived on the cusp o f this new development, and w hile he may have been the final symbol o f how the W est was w on, he was also among the first icons for Am erica’s lost wilderness. N o wonder so many photographers rushed to catch a glimm er o f his indomitable flame. M oreover, it was a response rippling around the globe and w hich strengthened as the century unfolded. It was weakest o f course where tribal peoples retained some autonomy or seemed to represent some form o f political threat, as w e shall see in German South W est Africa. Partly its antecedents were in the ‘noble savage’ stereotype that had existed since the Renaissance, but it was also rooted in a w ider change o f attitudes towards nature and the importance o f nature in humah afiàirs. This in turn arose from a reaction against what was seen as thfe dull utilitarianism and banausic secularity o f the industrialised W est. 2$6

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N on-hum an inhabitants o f the natural w orld w ere equally affected by the change. T he essential innocence o f the large herbivore was nat­ urally ripe for rehabilitation long before any savage predator like a w olf, or indeed an Apache, and in the late nineteenth century the sur­ vival o f the Am erican bison became a national priority for pioneer conservationists. And i f the passenger pigeon had slipped too close to extinction for rescue, at least its final going — the death o f an indi­ vidual called Martha at Cincinnati Z o o in Septem ber 19 14 - was recorded w ith due detail and solem nity. T hirty yean before the inau­ guration parade o f Theodore R oosevelt, the U S governm ent had created the country's fust national parks and w ildlife sanctuaries. U nder the sympathetic direction o f the new hunting-and-fishing pres­ ident, the conservation o f w ildlife and natural landscapes became an important social and political m ovem ent. Like G erónim o, tribal peoples generally were beneficiaries o f the new passion for wilderness. T h ey gained econom ically. A new i f often mistaken value came to be attached to their indigenous customs. T hey acquired an unfamiliar respect in the w orld o f whites, especially amongst academics. There w ere also new opportunities to be exploited, like the selling o f one's buttons, or one’s hat. Y e t there was also a m ore com plicated side to the relationship. For the ethic that had created the Indian reservation had also created the nature reserve. Tribal people w ere accorded a different worth but they remained essentially an adjunct to the w orld o f the dominant whites. Ju st as national parks preserved a parcel o f wilderness as a spiritual and recre­ ational valve for the pressures o f urban society, so w ere tribespeople often seen as adding that dash o f savage pageantry, o f atavistic colour, to the m onotone o f m odem life. T he tribesman could even becom e, like Gerónim o in his W ild W est shows, a living entertainment, a peepshow, the stuff o f glossy brochures. E ven today that same pattem recurs. In m odern-day N am ibia, holiday safari advertisements aimed m ainly at w hite Euro­ pean and Am erican clients treat and celebrate the Him ba village or the lion pride w ith the same voyeuristic enthusiasm. In its prom otional gush for a tour entided ‘Papua N ew Guinea: Birds o f Paradise and Bushm en', a contem porary w ildlife-holiday outfit suggests that N ew Guinea represents the ultimate birding dream . . . U ntil recently, the island’s remoteness and lack o f tourist infrastructure prevented this dream from becom ing reality. N o w , how ever, w ith

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the help o f three beautifully appointed forest lodges, all connected by internal flights, w e can explore the Papuan rainforest . . . in com fort and safety . . . W e w ill also be able to observe m any o f Papua’s colourful peoples, w ith their distinctive tribal dress and custom s.11 T h e island’s feather-decked aborigines, its extravagantly plum ed birds, its damp enfolding forests, are all accorded a rough equality - three parts o f an exotic fantasia - tantalisingly dose and offering the authen­ tic w h iff o f excitem ent, but all to be enjoyed ’in com fort and safety’ like an al fresco opera. Such values and attitudes do not represent genocide, nor even ethnocide, but they reduce the tribesman to an artefact and a visual experience, to be substantiated by a photograph or through a tourist’s souvenir. T h e W estern appetite for wilderness can and does have a deeply destructive impact on tribal societies — a fret illustrated by the frte o f an African people w hose reputation bears some resemblance to that o f the Apache. T he nomadic pastoralists o f East Africa know n as die Maasai w ere view ed by early European colonists as the black aristo­ crats o f the open savannahs, feared or secretly admired for their war­ rior traditions and cultural integrity. T he region’s exceptionally rich m egafruna, involving som e o f the largest concentrations left on the planet, had lived alongside these cattle-rearing people for hundreds o f years. In the twentieth century this happy co-existence o f big game and Maasai was honoured by the creation o f a series o f w ildlife paries in the heart o f their territories. Initially established by the British colonial m asten and largely w ith the consent o f the local people, some o f these sanctuaries, like Am boseli and Maasai M ara, eventually became w orld famous and form ed the basis o f a tourist industry that was critical to the econom y o f independent K enya. Y e t in 1974, die country’s governm ent, ever anxious for a larger inflow o f W estern tourist dollars, created new w ildlife areas and evicted the Maasai from parts o f their form er grazing lands. Initial promises o f compensation w ere never properly honoured and relations w ere further strained by the deep corruption amongst the local administration. T h e Maasai have lost, according to one com m entator, several important dry-season grazing and watering areas in order to make w ay for eco-tourism .12 Confined to the inadequate grasslands around the edges o f die w ildlife reserves, the M aasai’s ever expanding catde herds have 2$8

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becom e too large for the available pasture and have overgrazed the land, converting the celebrated national parks into 'islands o f bio­ diversity in a sea o f degradation’ .13 M oreover, the Maasai people, often deeply embittered by the priority given to w ildlife and w ildlife tourists, slaughtered some o f the rarest and most sought-after animals, poisoning the Hons and spearing rhinos.14 T hey have been forced to trade their w arrior culture for Kenyan shillings, putting on displays in fake villages and haggling w ith the W estern visitor over the value o f their dance routines once converted into video footage. In Apacheria itself in die late 1990s a sim ilar conflict o f interests has arisen over the proposed réintroduction o f the M exican w olf. W estern ecologists and conservationists, anxious over this creature’s near­ extinction, talk o f 'the most biologically appropriate means o f re­ establishing w ild populations and ensuring its long-term survival.’ 15 T he M escalero Apache, m eanwhile, w ho actually live close to the areas where Canus lupus baileyi w ill be set free, are w orried about w olves devouring their cattle. T he w ild man and the w ild beast are no longer, it seems, the soul-mates that the Christian W est once assumed. T he internal and physical landscapes imposed by European dominance placed other social and psychological strains upon tribespeople that w ere as acute as they w ere often intangible. Frequently it was m uch easier to measure the symptoms than to identify their cause or assess their precise nature. Even G erónim o, whose crafty exploitation o f most circumstances tends to disguise the massive adjustments demanded o f him , was susceptible to these hidden pressures. O ne manifestation o f his ow n troubled state was his regular refuge in strong alcohol. U nlike most N ative Am ericans north o f M exico, som e o f the tribes o f the Southwest, including the Apache, had their ow n traditional drinks such as the nourishing tipple, tiswin. T he recipe and custom w ere probably acquired from Mesoam erican Indians, w ho had enjoyed a greater range o f alcoholic beverages even in the pre-Colum bian period. Tiswin was not a very strong brew , but Apaches ritually fasted before indulging and relished the full effects o f a long binge. G iven this habit it is not surprising that they welcom ed the m ore potent, dis­ tilled alcohols that Europeans introduced to Am erica. T he impact o f these stimulants upon the Apache has been almost uniform ly baleful right until the end o f the twentieth century. A t Fort 259

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Apache and San Carlos, for instance, eighty-five per cent o f all m ajor crimes still involve drink.16 N o r is alcohol ju st a problem in the Southwest. Statistics published in 1986 suggest that amongst all N ative Am ericans the level o f alcohol-related crim e is very sim ilar to that among the A pache.17 Although these statistics can easily be distorted by a small num ber o f repeat offenders, rates o f suicide and hom icide, both o f w hich are strongly linked to drink, are about tw ice as high amongst Indians as amongst whites. T he incidence o f sclerosis o f the liver is four times higher.18 These social problems may not have been so pervasive amongst the Apache in the first h alf o f the nineteenth century, but when Gerónim o was a young man the negative effects o f alcohol w ere still dramatic. It had becom e almost standard practice, for exam ple, amongst the com m unities o f northern M exico to try to deal w ith raid­ ing Apaches by inducing bands to enter their town and to ply them w ith die products o f civilisation, including liberal quantities o f tequila or mescal. Then, w hen the Indians w ere sleeping o ff their hangovers, the M exicans w ould slaughter the befuddled enem y. Despite their leg­ endary wariness, Apaches regularly fell for the ploy, w hich suggests a deep and reckless craving for the bait. Even during his penultimate outbreak, Gerónim o him self and Ju h w ere caught in such an ambush. Both Apache leaders escaped on that occasion, but a couple o f years later, after another drinking bout, Ju h collapsed into a river and drowned, apparently drunk on mescal (although his son and other Apaches have denied that alcohol played any part in his death).19 W hile Apaches may have had their drinking traditions prior to the advent o f Europeans in Am erica, and although w hite Americans could not be held responsible for the bingeing pattem o f Apache consump­ tion, nevertheless the deep cultural shock inflicted by w hite conquest was undoubtedly, as the academic and author Elliott W est has argued, a factor in the Indians’ craving for alcohol’s anaesthetic properties. W hite immigrants drank to relieve the tensions grow ing from the initial isolation and the heavy labors o f pioneering. As for the Indians, there m ay have been some biological basis for their habits, but their drinking seems m ainly a response to — and a cause o f — their deteriorating position. In alcohol they found b rief escape from dispossession and cultural disruption. Ram pant drunkenness worsened problems o f disease and sped the unraveling o f social structures, w hich in turn gave Indians m ore reason to drink. It was 260

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a brutal cycle helped along by traders, w ho understood that the demand for alcohol, unlike that for awls or blankets, increased w ith the product’s use. So frontier drunkenness am ong whites and natives told o f different tensions. O ne habit expressed the trials o f conquest, the other the despair and dependence o f the conquered.20 R ecognising this shattering impact and die often violent consequences o f drink, the U S governm ent outlawed the sale o f strong liquor to Indians - an act that remained in force until 19 53. Y et, as w e have seen, unscrupulous dealers like Tribollet, whose drunken whisperings had inspired G eronim o’s final flight, ignored these restrictions. N o r did local law officers m uch care to punish trangressions when they w ere discovered, as the testimony o f Britton Davis has earlier shown. W hite conquistadors had long understood the offensive capability o f this subtle weapon and at times exploited it ruthlessly. In the late eighteenth century, M exico’s Spanish viceroy w elcom ed the Indians’ taste for drink and openly advocated that it be spread to die still innocent Apache, both for the profits that w ould result and because it created ‘a new need w hich forces them to recognize very clearly their obligatory dependence with regard to ourselves’.21 It was a policy that echoed a long Spanish tradition w ith regard to native drug use and went back to the very beginnings o f their conquest in the Am ericas. In pre-Cortesian M exico alcohol had been strictly controlled by the masters o f Tenochtidan. T h e M exican em peror him self had once inveighed against his ow n people’s favourite drink, pulque, as being ’like the w hirlw ind that destroys and tears dow n everything’ .22 N either the young nor ordinary workers w ere meant to touch it, and only those over seventy years o f age w ere given slightly m ore licence to indulge in a litde festive drinking. Y e t anyone found guilty o f a second offence o f drunkenness m ight be punished w ith death.23 G iven these severe restrictions on alcohol, it is not surprising that the M exican populace should take the opportunity to im bibe once the Spaniards assumed control. Y e t the appetites unleashed by the con­ quest, and w hich the Spaniards actively prom oted, suggest som ething far m ore joyless and desperate than the celebratory toast to a lost taboo. T he M exican practice was to drink to satiation, induce vom it­ ing, then start again. Governm ent laws w ere enacted banning pulque, but these had only a temporary im pact.24 In fret pulque became one o f 261

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the m ajor products o f the Spanish haciendas, w hile state revenues from the drink w ere equal to h alf their incom e from the silver m ines.25 Follow ing the Spanish conquest o f the Incan em pire a very sim ilar pattem o f alcohol abuse ensued there. A nd in both the Andes and Central Am erica, Spanish authors, attempting to explain die massive population losses, cited drunkenness as a m ajor cause o f m ortality.26 Another addiction that rose dramatically in the post-conquest Andes was the chew ing o f coca leaves, the raw product from w hich m odem cocaine is derived. C oca had enjoyed magical and religious associa­ tions before the Spanish invasion and its use had been restricted, like alcohol, to the priesdy and aristocratic classes. But once this prohibi­ tion was lifted coca production and consumption becam e important elements o f the Andean econom y. O nce again, although the addiction was almost exclusively amongst the native Am ericans, the huge finan­ cial profits made from the drug w ere m ainly controlled by Spanish entrepreneurs. It was a situation hardly calculated to engender crosscultural sympathies. T he Europeans coerced the inhabitants o f the Andean highlands to descend thousands o f metres to w ork in the coca plantations, w hich flourished on the edges o f tropical forests. T he resulting change in alti­ tude and clim ate, together w ith the labour itself, had a devastating im pact on the workers. M any developed a condition know n as ‘mal de los Andes’ that inflicted a gruesome death as it ate away the nose, lips and throat. Som e authorities estimated that between a third and a h alf o f those workers involved in coca production died during their five-m onth service. E ven the Spanish king him self condemned this profligate consumption o f human resources.27 B ut, as one contempo­ rary author noted, in the coca plantations there was ‘one disease worse than all the rest: the unrestrained greed o f the Spaniards.’28 C oca was sim ply too profitable for the coca magnates ever to trouble themselves unnecessarily about production methods. M ore­ over, coca w orked neatly in rhythm w ith the other great source o f Andean profits, the silver mines. T he m ildly narcotic lea f deadened feelings o f pain o r hunger and thirst in the over-w orked miners and was thus in constant demand. O ne Spanish authority estimated that the total coca traffic to Potosi was w orth 500,000 pesos annually. Besides this obvious econom ic incentive there w ere other ancillary pressures driving its production and sale. W ithout the continued use o f this stimulant, the coca barons insisted, the miners could never sustain their high levels o f silver production. T h ey also argued that their

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harvest was die only item that the Inca people really craved, and rep­ resented the best means to draw them into the European m onetary econom y. As one Spanish authority w rote, ‘w ithout coca there w ould be no Peru.’29 In Europe’s w ider colonial em pire, there w ere m any other instances where stimulants w ere embraced by the native populations in almost exacdy the same fatal fashion. T he Caribs o f the W est Indies w ere slaves to British rum, w hile the French trappen and merchants o f Canada, in order to guarantee a steady supply o f fu n from their Indian collaboraton, plied tribes like the H uron and Ottawa w ith French brandy. In the Pacific the degenerate Aborigine dressed in European m otley and slumped in a drunken stupor at the outskirts o f tow n, as he w hiled away his race’s final days, was a standard im age o f colonial Australia. N o r was it a stereotype w ithout justification. Aborigines showed and continue to show a sim ilar propensity towards alcohol as the indigenous peoples o f N orth Am erica. T h ey are the most arrested and imprisoned group in Australia, w ith arrest rates twenty times the non-Aboriginal population. In W estern Australia this rate m ore than doubles again, and a third o f all these arrests are alcohol-related.30 G iven the almost universal character o f alcohol abuse amongst tribal peoples, one is tempted to a num ber o f speculative generalisations. T he most obvious is that the tribal w orld’s outer experience o f social and cultural disintegration wrought by the European incursion found its inner corollary in the slow -m otion chaos o f alcoholic stupor. Drunkenness both expressed and m om entarily released them from the loss o f meaning in their lives. And it continues to do so. T he inci­ dence o f alcohol abuse amongst N ative Am ericans is closely correlated to those tribes w ho are experiencing, even now , the highest levels o f cultural change.31 In the Am erican-dom inated Marshall Islands, w here the U S superpower tested its nuclear arsenal, suicide rates amongst indigenous males aged between fifteen and nineteen years are tw elve times higher than they are in Am erica itself. Studies on other M icronesian islands w ith even higher rates o f suicide have shown that h alf the victim s had consumed alcohol prior to their deaths.32 T he second obvious conclusion is that alcohol was a m ajor contrib­ utory factor in the cycle o f disintegration, a fret o f w hich the Europeans often took full and cynical advantage. Few , how ever, had put it quite so crudely as the Germ an General von Trotha w hen he justified his w ar o f annihilation against the inhabitants o f South W est Africa: ‘Conquered the colonies have to be, nothing o f that can be 263

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withdrawn. T he natives have to give w ay . . . Either by the bullet or via [the Christian] mission through brandy.’33 Although few m ight say it, brandy was as effective a weapon in the clash w ith tribal society as the M auser or the M axim . In some ways it was better, since it had the added advantage o f turning a handy profit. W hatever the pressures imposed by w hite conquest, tribal peoples had some share in their ow n alcoholic downfall. It was they ultim ately w ho chose to uncork the bottle. M any tribal leaders recognised and understood its deleterious impact and tried to set a different example. In fact temperance was often the mark o f a great tribal champion. T h e Shawnee prophet Tecum seh, the Apache ch ief V ictorio, and Hendrik W itbooi, the form idable Nam a leader o f South W est Africa, are all exemplars o f that tradition. It should equally be recognised that tribal society was not the only loser in this cross-cultural exchange o f drugs. T he conquered may have been susceptible to the bottle, but the con­ querors w ere soon hooked on their ow n new vice. Tobacco, one o f the tw o great m odem W estern addictions, was a habit acquired from the N ew W orld in the sixteenth century. Am ongst indigenous Am ericans, how ever, tobacco had been placed under sim ilar restrictions to their ow n hom e-produced alcohols, and enjoyed much the same cultural status —an adjunct to religious ritual, taken sparingly and w ith discrimination. G erónim o, for instance, used cigarettes and tobacco as a cerem onial feature o f his w ork as a shaman. B ut for Europeans it had none o f this spiritual context and becam e a simple nicotine habit to be satisfied as the craving demanded. This reverse addiction displayed by Europeans suggests that it was not just the drug itself - tobacco or alcohol - that was so destructive, but its use in the com plete absence o f any long-standing tradition, the cul­ tural and ritual associations that contained the stimulant and gave m eaning to its effects. O ne final speculation emerges from the pattem o f widespread alcohol abuse amongst conquered tribespeople, but it has implications not so m uch for the latter as for the m odem m ulti-racial W estern societies o f Europe, Am erica and the South Pacific. I f w e can presume that the excessive use o f a stimulant borrow ed from another culture is an index o f pervasive social alienation amongst the abusers, then what lessons can w e possibly draw from the current figures concerning production and traffic to the W est o f cocaine, heroin and other hard drugs? W hat seismic cultural disorders do w e infer from the estimated $200 billion

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worth o f illegal narcotics annually im ported into the U SA ?34 W hat malaise in post-industrial British society can explain the country’s 34,000 registered addicts - m ainly using heroin and cocaine - or the eighty per cent increase in heroin seizures in 1995, to 1 ,1 1 8 kilos? W hen w e know that this quantity breaks down to 658 m illion injections, whose pain and whose loss o f life’s meaning should w e envisage?35 In the context o f the individual tribal Uves featured in this book alco­ hol constantly resurfaces, almost like an artist’s visual m otif, symbolis­ ing the m oment o f decay. W hen W illiam Lanney, the K in g o f the Tasmanians, slipped into his final illness in the D og and Partridge, the bottle was naturally on hand to quicken his going. W hen the great hope o f the last Aborigines, W alter G eorge Arthur, overturned his boat and disappeared w ithout trace, he had drowned as much in the booze as in the Tasman Sea. Samuel M aharero, the paramount ch ief o f South W est Africa's H erero tribe, was a hopeless alcohoUc whose con­ sumption rose at times to almost a bottle o f strong spirits a day. Like other tribal chiefs in the region, M aharero’s cardinal sin was not that he drank, but rather that he often drank and conducted his land nego­ tiations at the same tim e. And i f he did not always personally have a bottle available, it was a regular Germ an courtesy to make sure that he did. Num erous land deals to the detriment o f Africans w ere smoothed in this fashion. Alcohol also had its place in Geronim o’s last days. D uring his exile in Oklahoma the Chiricahua w arrior w ould often recount to those com ing to visit him how his Pow er had protected him from the bullets o f his white enemies and he w ould strip down to show them the numerous old scars, slipping pebbles into the holes left by som e.36 Even as an old man he retained his sturdy good health, defying the ailments that carried o ff so many o f his family and friends one by one. In 1896 Nana died, then N ana’s w ife, Geronim o’s ow n sister, in 1907. Since his capture he had also buried tw o m ore w ives and three children. Notwithstanding this resilience he remained susceptible to the w hite man’s ow n more subtle pow er and found ways to obtain it despite the prohibition on liquor on die reservation. Perhaps during the final yean alcohol served as a foil for the rage w hich rose periodically within him — to his death he regretted his surrender — but the w hite authorities took his binges as a sign o f his continued intransigence. Secrecy, therefore, surrounded his drinking habits. In February 265

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1909 he had to inveigle a young Apache friend into obtaining him some w hisky through a w hite soldier. Arm ed w ith the botde, the shaman rode out to get drunk and then tried to find his w ay hom e in the dark. D uring the return jou rn ey Gerónim o, now in his mid­ eighties, fell o ff his horse and collapsed half-submerged in a small creek. A severe cold turned inexorably to pneumonia and the war­ rior’s spirit finally began to ebb away. Sensing his end, he sent for his tw o rem aining children, but the w hite authorities had one last small defeat to inflict. Instead o f w iring the summons they posted it, and the Chiricahua died a day before their arrival. B u t even at the last Gerónim o had been thinking ahead, planning for contingencies, and he requested that on his death, his horse be tethered to a certain tree close to the site o f burial. His final belong­ ings should also be left hanging on the east side o f the grave, w here they could easily be found. And in three days, announced the indom itable old w arrior, he w ould com e back to collect them.37

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B R IT ISH C A P E C O LO N Y

17

A Freshly Slaughtered Goat

he affair that arose in the village o f W armbad in late O ctober 1903 seemed, on the face o f it, a trivial matter. Jan Abraham Christian was a m inor tribal ch ief in the recently established colony o f Germ an South W est Africa. H is people, know n as the Bondelswarts and num bering litde m ore than a thousand souls, occu­ pied the dry bush country in the southernmost portion o f the colony, between the Karas M ountains and the O range R ive r. According to one African eyewitness account, the fracas started when Jan Christian wanted a goat to m inister to the needs o f a young niece. T he infant was apparendy suffering from some form o f inflammation, and tradition demanded that the warm stomach o f a freshly slaughtered animal be used as m edicine. Unfortunately, the Bondelswarts’ ow n herds w ere grazing some w ay o ff in this harsh, hot, waterless semi-desert, w hile goats belonging to members o f a neigh­ bouring tribe, the H erero, happened to be passing through W armbad. W hen Jan Christian asked the H erero to provide one o f these they refused, at w hich point the ch ief ordered his men to seize the required animal. T h e offended goatherds then took the matter to the local Germ an official, a Lieutenant Jobst, and com plained o f the Bondelswarts’ behaviour. Jobst im mediately sent w ord to Jan Christian demanding that compensation be offered to the H erero. In return the ch ief dis­ patched a payment o f eighteen shillings, w hich was accepted by the aggrieved party. W ith this financial settlement the sleepy village o f W armbad, as w ell as the office o f the Germ an magistrate, should have lapsed back into its habitual, heat-induced quietness. 269

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Unfortunately, Jobst, incensed by the ch iefs behaviour, pressed on w ith the affair, ordering Christian to account for his actions in person. W hen he declined and sent six councillors to explain matters instead, they w ere arrested and w hen Christian ignored a second summons Jobst set o ff for W armbad w ith at least eight men to arrest him . T he young officer had not considered his actions in any depth. N ot only was he in contravention o f a treaty signed by his ow n colonial govern­ ment, w hich granted Jan Christian jurisdiction over matters solely between African pam es, he was bursting in upon the main setdement o f a w ell armed and martially skilled people w ith the purpose o f seizing their leader by force. It was an illegal, foolish and, ultim ately tragic, course o f action. Its dénouem ent came after Jobst's men had entered Christian's house and dragged him struggling and humiliated into the full view o f his people. T he unanimous testim ony o f the Bondelswarts subse­ quently confirm ed that w hen the ch ief tried to wrench him self free o f his captors, the Germ an sergeant present drew his revolver and sum­ m arily shot Christian through the head. T he tribe's response was equally unhesitating, equally irrevocable. W ithin seconds Lieutenant Jobst, his sergeant and another Germ an soldier slumped to the ground w ith fatal w ounds.1 Like so much violence bom o f ignorance and crass bravado, it had been out o f all relationship to its immediate cause. It m ight have been possible to locate a grotesque hum our in the fret that four men had lost their lives over an eighteen-shilling goat, but it was an outcom e void o f rational purpose. W orse still, it could only result in further unreason. W hile the sound o f those half-dozen gunshots m ight dis­ solve into the everyday hubbub o f W armbad life — the cries o f children playing, the calls o f birds, the barking o f indifferent dogs —no exchange o f this nature, especially when view ed across the racial and cultural g u lf w hich separated Bondelswart from Germ an colonists, could be forgiven or left to evaporate unnoticed. In Germ an South W est Africa in 1903 such meaningless violence w ould lead to - w ould demand - further violence. And even as the blood o f those four men m ingled w ith the African dust, the encircling crow d must have recognised that their actions w ould bring dow n upon themselves a larger retribution from Europe's most powerful m ilitary nation. Equally, when the acknowledged leader o f a proud and independent tribe had been unjustly murdered, the Germ an settlers and their administration could have anticipated little but 270

A Freshly Slaughtered Goat further armed resistance. H ow ever, no one foresaw the great w ave o f slaughter that rose up in that frenzied m oment and w hich swept out­ wards to engulf the entire country. Even a m onth later, after the W armbad incident had steadily drifted into a w ider, i f som ewhat desultory, inconclusive armed struggle between the colonial forces and the Bondelswarts, the Germ an gover­ nor o f South W est Africa, M ajor Theodor Leutw ein, was in no des­ perate hurry to leave the capital, W indhoek, and travel south to the theatre o f conflict. D uring his ten-year period in office, the governor had overcom e a succession o f tribal revolts. T here probably seemed litde reason to assume that this uprising w ould demand greater atten­ tion or resources than the others he had successfully quelled in the past. Y e t this relaxed approach was not shared by som e o f his superiors in the Fatherland. W hen a report detailing the matter arrived on the desk o f his Imperial M ajesty, Kaiser W ilhelm II, the response was loud and violent. .For the Germ an Em peror the Bondelswarts affair was a 'w ar', an ‘em ergency’ demanding ‘large-scale reinforcements*. H e railed at both the lack o f data on ‘developments, dispositions, terrain, etc.* and what he perceived as political interference in exclusively m ilitary m atten. ‘In such a situation,* he fum ed, ‘die Foreign O ffice and the Colonial O ffice have the tem erity to propose a reduction o f our colonialforce to save m oney! Instead, they must be brought to battalion strength lest w e lose all our colonial possessions!* Since the report documented a relatively m inor disturbance involving a small tribe in only a minuscule fragment o f one o f Germ any's four w idely separated African colonies, the Kaiser's forebodings about the loss o f his nation’s entire overseas possessions must have seemed to his staff unnecessarily shrill, i f not hysterical.2 Y e t within weeks o f the Kaiser’s declamation, Germ any w ould stand on the brink o f losing its second largest and most w idely setded over­ seas colony. A n affair that had started w ith a commandeered goat w ould lead to a conflict w ith greater casualties than die B oer W ar. It w ould be the first serious military campaign o f W ilhelm inian Germ any and the greatest armed struggle for this young nation since die Batde o f Sedan in 1870. It w ould cost m ore than $00 m illion Maries, w hile casualty lists that ran into thousands w ould bring personal tragedy into villages and towns throughout the country. In the words o f one commentator, it was ‘Germ any’s bloodiest and most protracted colonial war’.3

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For h alf the indigenous peoples o f South W est Africa, the threeand-a-half-year conflict was little short o f a cataclysm. It w ould decimate several important tribal populations and destroy for ever the basis o f their traditional Uves. For almost all the tenitory’s black inhab­ itants, once the m ilitary crisis had subsided, it w ould lead to an exploitative w hite colonial regim e whose iron grip w ould not be released for almost ninety years.

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A Darkness That M ay B e Felt

hile for Kaiser W ilhelm II the Bondelswarts rebellion pre­ cipitated a vision o f im perial collapse, for his principal officer in Germ an South W est Africa, it triggered a more parochial set o f thoughts. M ost pressing amongst Theodor Leutw ein’s narrow concerns, as he rode southwards to oversee operations, was a determination to ensure that public blame for the W armbad shoot-out attached not to the German officer but to the Africans themselves. Privately, how ever, Leutw ein was in no doubt that Lieutenant Jobst had been at fruit. ’This is not the w ay to treat a native [chief)/ he com plained to the Colonial O ffice. ’R ather w e ought to do our utmost to strengthen his authority.’ 1 It was a view shared by others among Leutw ein’s political officers, like the Germ an magistrate at the politically important settlement o f G ibeon, w ho w rote to his superior o f the delicate balance o f relations between the administration and the tribes in the colony’s southern region, known as Namaqualand.

W

Incidents like that at W armbad damage us in every respect, eco­ nom ically in Europe, in our prestige and w ith the natives . . . I sin­ cerely hope that it can be definitely established that at W armbad the first shot came from the side o f the Bondels. That w ill create a pos­ sibility that he may be convinced that all the blame rests with the Bondels.2 T he he in question whose reaction so exercised the Germ an staff was one Hendrik W itbooi, a tribal leader, little m ore than five feet tall and in 1903 approaching his sixty-sixth year. Despite this advanced age and 273

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dim inutive stature he is unquestionably the dominant African figure in the history o f Germ an South W est Africa. From the numerous photo­ graphs o f the man there seem to radiate the qualities w hich made him m ore pow erful and influential than any ch ief in Namaqualand. M ost striking are the iron-hard set o f his mouth and ja w and the crystalline fixity o f his stare. T he universally acknowledged m odesty, the quiet delivery and econom y o f speech, even the smallness o f his physique, seemed to confirm , by contrast, the sense o f inner control from w hich emanated his unquestioned public authority. In his ow n political memoirs Leutw ein depicted W itbooi as ‘never departing from what he felt to be right or his duty’; full o f understanding o f the superior civilisation o f the Europeans, yet not always loving its bearers; a bom leader and ruler . . . [He] w ould have certainly becom e an im mortal name in w orld history i f fate had not caused him to be bom on a m inor African throne.3 Like most o f the African tribes in the colony in the early part o f the nineteenth century, the W itboois had enjoyed contact w ith European missionaries. For the young H endrik, the R everend O lpp o f the Rhenish M issionary Society had been a particularly important influ­ ence in his life. O lpp him self w rote that ‘I f there is anyone . . . w ho is really earnest it is this young man. U p to now he has been one o f m y best scholars. H e reads Dutch and Ñam a fairly readily and is tak­ ing enormous pains to learn to w rite a fair hand.’4 As important as his technical education was the deeply puritanical frith that the Germ an teacher inculcated in his favourite pupil. It was a frith based less on the messages o f the N ew Testament than on the language, tone and stories o f the O ld, from which H endrik was accustomed to draw in illustration o f his ow n actions and those o f his political opponents. According to D r H einrich Vedder, him self a mis­ sionary, and author o f the most important account o f the territory’s pre-colonial history, South West Africa In Early Times, H endrik was subject to pow erful visions and dreams, and spent long hours meditat­ ing at the grave o f his grandfather, K ido W itbooi.5 Y e t in harness w ith this mystical side o f his character, Hendrik was also a deeply practical man. Unusually, in the eyes o f his European contemporaries, he was both hard-working and abstemious, vehe­ m ently opposed to the strong alcohol that did so much to undermine the traditional life o f his people. In his grasp o f the region’s politics, 274

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particularly die many implications o f German m ilitary presence, he w ould later show a perspicacity unequalled by any other African leader. From 1880 onwards H endrik W itbooi had set about the consolida­ tion o f his position amongst his ow n Nam a people and then waged a relendess campaign against the other tribes o f South W est Africa, w ith the intention o f establishing him self as an unchallenged ruler. H ow ever, despite his exceptional qualities, his right to the status o f paramount chief, even in his ow n region o f Namaqualand, let alone in South W est Africa in general, was based on nothing m ore substantial than superior m ilitary force. For, w hile W itbooi him self had been bom in the territory, both his father, M oses, and his revered grand­ father, K ido, had been newcomers to the area in the first decades o f the nineteenth century. N one o f the three generations, therefore, had long-standing political claims on the territory. H endrik's personal ambition for pow er was part o f a w ider historical clash between rival African forces that had m oved into the south-west region from opposing directions. W itbooi’s ow n pow er base lay am ong the m any related tribes that had pushed north across the O range R iv e r from lands incorporated into the British Cape C olony. K now n to Europeans as ‘Hottentots’ (a name now considered racist and offensive), these tribes w ere descended from the Cape’s original inhabitants, the K hoikhoi, but had com e to define themselves as a people called the Nam a. T h ey w ere o f the same basic ethnic stock as the San, the indigenous ‘Bushm en’ , the first people o f Africa w hom the K hoikhoi had them­ selves displaced. Together these ancient Africans form ed a single racial fam ily known as the Khoisan. T he tw o share a num ber o f linguistic features, notably a variety o f distinctive click sounds in their speech, as w ell as a range o f physical attributes - the slight build and small size, a light yellow -brow n skin colouration and distinctively M ongoloid facial characteristics. H ow ever, the Nam a represented a significant social advance on their San neighbours, acquiring the use o f iron tools and weapons, and exchanging a hunter-gatherer existence for one o f nomadic pastoralism based on sheep. T he various Nam a clans pushing across the O range R iv e r had easily dislodged their San relatives, but their progress did not go unchal­ lenged. R unning in opposition to their northward thrust was the southward m igration o f peoples o f Bantu origin. Believed to have originated in the great lakes region o f East and Central Africa, these

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taller, darker-skinned, iron-using tribes had steadily pressed into the southern portion o f the continent and reached m odem -day N am ibia possibly as early as the seventeenth century. T h eir southward migra­ tions involved tw o distinct groups. T he m ore numerous o f these w ere called die O vam bo. Although possessing herds o f goats, sheep and catde, they w ere essentially an agricultural people and occupied the hot fertile land straddling tw o o f only three permanent watercourses in N am ibia, the Kunene and O kavango R ivers, w hich today form large sections o f the country’s northern border w ith Angola. D uring the period o f German rule it was a region that remained largely outside effective governm ent, and was certainly ignored as a location for w hite setdement. After die First W orld W ar, however, when the German colony was replaced by a South African administration, the O vam bo came increas­ ingly under European control and w ere recruited as the main source o f labour in the colony’s mines and other industrial developments. Representing m ore than h alf the present population o f Nam ibia, they also became a m ajor force in the establishment o f an independent African state. (Typically, the country’s current president in 1998, Samuel N ujom a, is him self o f O vam bo origin.) Y et in the pre-colonial period, the Ovam bos’ numerical superiority and undoubted m ilitary potential, coupled w ith their occupation o f an unattractively hot and highly malarial region, ensured that they remained unchallenged and self-contained masters o f their fertile territories. In the period im m ediately before Germ an occupation it was the far less populous Bantu tribe, inhabiting the high plateau to the south, w hich w ould occupy a central position, both geographically and polit­ ically, in South W est African history. T he H erero, unlike their O vam bo cousins, w ere prim arily a cattle-herding people, whose staple diet was sour m ilk and cow ’s blood. T hey w ere considered to have a lighter skin and finer fecial features than most other Bantu tribes, and w ere renowned for a w ell-developed sense o f their ow n physical and cultural superiority. It was a b elief for w hich they had at least some justification. Charles Andersson, a Swedish explorer and trader during the pre­ colonial period, described them as ‘an exceedingly fine race o f men . . . T h eir features are, besides, good and regular and m any m ight serve as perfect models o f the human figure. T h eir air and carriage, m ore­ over, is very graceful and expressive.’6 Andersson later w rote that one group o f H erero accom panying an important ch ief was ‘the finest 276

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body o f men I have ever seen before or since*. Then as an immediate and damning rider he added that ‘T h ey w ere all arrant knaves.’7 A t the centre o f the H erero sense o f self-w orth, in fact at the heart o f their society, w ere their herds o f cattle. A key m yth in the tribe’s story o f its ow n origins proclaim ed that the first H erero had been given a bull and a cow by the Creator, w hile other peoples had to be content w ith inferior endowments. It was a legend that revealed the core o f the H erero Weltanschauung. W hen this was challenged once by a Germ an setder, one proud herdsman is reputed to have answered: ‘Everyone is greedy. T he European is devoted to dead metals. W e are m ore intelligent, w e get our jo y out o f living creatures.’8 T ypical o f this jo y was the extrem ely rich H erero vocabulary to describe the various markings and colours on their stock, totalling m ore than a thousand words. T he Germ an missionary, H einrich Vedder, w rote that T he H erero man devoted his entire tim e, strength, and personal attention — his very life in feet - to his cattle. In dry years he dug wells untiringly w ith a pointed stick hardened in the fire, and drew water from a depth o f fifteen feet and m ore, pouring it into w ooden troughs for his thirsty animals. A ll his efforts w ere directed to increasing the herd; his catde w ere the sole object o f his thoughts; his greatest pride was die condition o f his oxen; his dig­ nity and influence increased or declined in proportion to the num ber o f stock w hich he ow ned; even his religion stood or fell in accordance w ith these possessions.9 B y the m id-nineteenth century die H erero’s immense catde wealth was already legendary. In 1854 Charles Andersson described a single herd belonging to one ch ief that started to arrive in a broad flock early one day and was still arriving on the evening o f the next.10 T he paramount importance that the H erero attached to their catde, and the ecological factors which shaped the limits o f viable pasture in South W est Africa, also determined the pattem o f their encounters w ith the region’s other tribes. Since the country’s rainfall was unpre­ dictable it meant that the H erero w ere obliged to follow its erratic course to satisfy their herds. O ne result was their repeated encroach­ ment upon the lands o f the Nam a. In die com peddon for good pasture the H erero’s numerical superiority and physical powers gave them an initial advantage over

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the Nam a. O n the other hand, their unwillingness to slaughter live­ stock even during periods o f the most severe drought, coupled w ith an unparalleled capacity to rebuild their stock once better times returned, ensured that their herds w ere the constant envy o f less frugal neighbours. It was a frequent occurrence for both the Nam a and also the displaced San to make predatory attacks on H erero catde. B y the early nineteenth century a climate o f deep enm ity had developed between these Khoisan and Bantu peoples, w hile the pattem o f raid and counter-raid had becom e both an integral part o f the region’s econom y and a central dynam ic in South W est African affairs. H ow ever, this pattem was decisively altered by the northward m igration o f five further tribes between 18 15 and 1830 - the final such arrival o f African peoples from beyond the O range R iv e r. T he new­ comers w ere all detribalised Nam a, invariably refugees from bonded labour and other oppressive treatment in the British colony to the south. A ll five, known collectively as Orlams (‘the overland people’) and including the W itbooi, tilted the balance o f relations between Nam a and H ereto in favour o f the form er. Although they w ere refugees from the Cape C olony, they brought w ith them from their form er m asten a knowledge o f the Dutch lan­ guage and the Dutch R eform Church, as w ell as a fam iliarity w ith B o er custom and dress. M ost important o f all, they had developed great skills in horsemanship and the use o f firearms, often in m ilitary service for their European overlords. W hen a severe drought in 1833 led to H erero incursions into the territory o f their southern neigh­ bours, it was these form idable m ilitary assets that the Nam a had in mind when they requested Orlam assistance. T he Nama—O rlam alliance, w ith its key m ilitary advantages, was the foundation for fifty years o f Khoisan ascendancy in pre-colonial N am ibia. Am ongst Europeans that half-century has regularly been characterised as a dark age o f unceasing m urder and violence, from w hich the Africans themselves w ere only delivered by the arrival o f Germ an colonists. It is a judgem ent for w hich there was certainly some evidence. T o take ju st one exam ple, an Orlam raid on the important H erero settlement at Okahandja, in August 1850, escalated into a bloody massacre in w hich m en, w om en and children w ere indiscrim inately murdered. Charles Andersson claim ed that wom en had their hands and feet cut o ff in order to rem ove their decorative coils o f copper w ire, w hile children’s bowels w ere ripped open ‘to gratify a savage thirst for blood’ .11 278

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T he H erero unlucky enough to be taken captive could expect no better treatment. ‘I f one goes from Berseba further into the interior o f the country/ w rote one missionary, 'one comes across masters w ho are really monsters. T hey do not hesitate to thrash a poor wretch w ith a sjambok until the skin breaks w ith every blow , exposing raw flesh, and sometimes, indeed, the place o f chastisement is covered w ith blood, ju st as i f a sheep w ere slaughtered there/ Another Germ an mis­ sionary described some o f the H ereto slaves belonging to the Nam a as 'nothing m ore than living skeletons . . . whose bodies bore innumer­ able marks o f the sjam bok/12 As one m ight have expected, such attitudes and behaviour w ere not the exclusive preserve o f the Nam a. A H erero confession reproduced in a Germ an colonial newspaper o f 1900 is a gruesome measure o f the tribe’s habitual, almost casual brutality towards their southern neigh­ bours. 'R eturnin g from H om kranz/ declared one unabashed murderer, 'w e came across a few Hottentots [Nama] whom o f course w e killed/ I m yself helped to kill one o f them. First w e cut o ff his ears saying to him , ‘Y o u w ill never again hear the [Herero] oxen low ing.’ Then w e cut o ff his nose saying, 'Y o u shall never again smell [Herero] oxen.’ Then w e stabbed his eyes saying, 'N ever again shall you see [Hereto] oxen.* And w e cut o ff his lips, saying 'Y o u w ill never again eat [Herero] oxen.’ And then finally w e cut his throat.13 T he Orlams’ introduction o f rifle and hone in the early nineteenth century unquestionably precipitated an intensification o f die Nama—H erero conflict, but ultim ately it was another o f their cultural imports w hich w ould have far greater impact on the lives o f South W est A frica’s inhabitants. Before the O rlam exodus from the Cape Province they had com e into close contact w ith Christianity and had subsequendy encouraged missionaries to jo in them once they had established themselves north o f the Orange R ive r. Throughout the half-century o f warfare follow ing O rlam ascendancy, members o f both the W esleyan and Rhenish M issionary Societies had been active amongst many o f the Nam a and H erero communities and, apart from a handful o f European traders and explorer-hunters, w ere the main source o f inform ation on this period. For m any o f them it 279

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was an arduous existence. Isolated and incapable o f exerting strong influence on an unruly flock, one despondent W esleyan residing w ith the Orlam spoke for m any o f his compatriots when he w rote: Alone w ith m y small fam ily, in want o f the conveniences, and sometimes, o f the necessities o f life; a barren land, a stupid, ignorant and yet conceited people; missionaries far off, friends further still; no tidings from afar and those from neighbouring tribes, discourag­ ing. Souls are perishing. Plunder, m urder, and a darkness that may be felt.14 Europeans stationed w ith the H erero sensed that they too w orked an infertile soil. ‘M urder, im m orality, lying, the three banners o f Satan's em pire w aved freely here,’ com plained one missionary resident in the country for almost thirty years. ’T he Hereros from C h ie f to servant, from rich to poor, are unashamed beggars and thieves. Polygam y, adultery and w horing are regarded as perfectly natural.’ 15 Although the missionaries had played a consistent and beneficial role in attempting to broker a truce in the Nama—H erero wars, their efforts, according to another eyewitness account, did litde to im prove matters. N ot only did the tw o sides persistently renege on die cease­ fire, but as soon as the external threat was eliminated they ’fought all the m ore fiercely amongst themselves’ . E very small [Herero] ch ief w ho had a few catde plundered and murdered the others w ho had rather m ore, and everyone w ho had been despoiled looked for a third at whose expense he could recoup his loss. Bloodshed and m isery, m urder and horror, w ere so prevalent throughout the land . . .16 W hile the pre-colonial years are consistendy portrayed by the mis­ sionaries as a period o f dem onic anarchy, their position as unbiased chroniclers o f South W est A frica’s affairs cannot be taken entirely on trust. For as representatives o f an alien, m ilitarily aggressive culture and w ith their ow n powerful contacts at the heart o f European decision­ m aking, the missionaries w ere in a strong position to influence the im perial appedte o f their respecdve nations. And this is precisely the role they played. R epeated images o f ’Bloodshed and m isery, m urder and horror’ gave impetus to their lobbying, and then justified their political interference in South W est Africa once it had borne fruit. 280

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Theodor Leutwein acknowledged that ‘W ithout the fact o f a German mission . . . w e w ould not have been able to take possession o f the country w ith as litde means at our disposal as was actually the case.’ 17 As early as 1864 the R henish M issionary Society had hoisted the Prussian flag over one o f their establishments amongst the H erero, and in 1868 had asked for protection from the Prussian governm ent. W hen this was not forthcom ing and the British sent a representative in 1876 to explore the possibility o f annexing South W est Africa for themselves, the Society even lent support to this proposal as one offer­ ing them greater security and influence over their African charges. A fter this had com e to nothing and Britain confined its acquisitions to the important port at W alvis Bay, the Society’s ow n Inspector, D r Friedrich Fabri, took up the cause o f European occupation. His book Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? (Does Germany Need Colonies?) trig­ gered a w ave o f agitation for an im perial policy, and from 1880 the Society openly called for German intervention in South W est Africa. M any Germans believed overseas colonies w ere a precondition o f their status as a m ajor European pow er. T he budding Germ an im ­ perialists looked towards the huge territories o f the British and con­ cluded that it was this em pire that brought Britain’s great industrial strength, failing to appreciate that it was actually the other w ay round. Y e t Fabri and his supporters w ere unw illing to be disabused and for­ tunately for the imperialists their dream o f a place in the sun had caught the Zeitgeist o f late-nineteenth-century Germ any. Prince O tto Edward Leopold von Bism arck, architect o f the greater Germ an nation and chancellor o f the unified state since 18 7 1, had long been opposed to overseas adventures as a distraction from Germ any’s overriding need to consolidate its position in Europe. H ow ever, by 1883, swayed partly by public clam our, Bism arck had swung round to the idea o f colonies, particularly i f they could be acquired and developed under the charter com pany system w hich Britain had used to create its great Indian em pire. B y this m ethod the Germ an state w ould theoretically be freed from financial and administrative respon­ sibility for its overseas possessions, but could still enjoy all the prestige they w ould bring. T h e burdens o f im perial management, m eanwhile, w ould devolve on the companies w hich w ere com m ercially involved in the colonies. Bism arck’s increasing sympathy for a Germ an em pire ran in parallel w ith the efforts o f a Germ an tobacco and guano merchant, A d o lf

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Liideritz, to acquire legal tide to sections o f the South W est African coastline. O n 25 August 1883 Liideritz follow ed up an initial acquisition o f the southern port o f Angra Pequeña w ith the purchase o f a stretch o f coast from the O range R iv e r northwards for over 300 kilom etres. For this massive tract Liideritz paid one O rlam ch ief 260 W esley Richards rifles and £ 6 0 0 sterling, the last to be paid in goods. H ow ever, since the supplier was allowed to define the value o f the goods provided, the African owners w ere considerably short-changed. M oreover, both Liideritz and Bam , the R henish M issionary w ho helped arrange the deal, deceived the Africans over the meaning o f the term , *20 geographical miles’ , that was used to define the extent o f the Germ an purchase inland from the coast. Since a geographical m ile was the equivalent o f 7.4 kilom etres — a fret o f which the Africans w ere ignorant - the chief, Jo se f Frederiks, had signed away h alf his tribe’s entire territory. Barn’s part in the affair was doubly reprehensible since, by his ow n admission, he had helped conduct negotiations w hen Frederiks had been made drunk by the German agent.18 T he role o f the R henish M issionary Society in a deal that involved the transfer o f so many arms to the territory was itself highly suspect. T his behaviour —not to m ention the fret that the Society’s ow n trad­ ing com pany had been heavily involved for a number o f years in sup­ plying arms to the region - casts an oblique and ironic light on the missionaries’ collective im age o f a pre-colonial dark age. I f the country had been plunged into darkness then it was in part the shadow cast by Europe’s encroachm ent.19 Liideritz w ent on to cap his first successful deception w ith further treaties, this tim e for the coastline running northwards to the border w ith the Portuguese colony o f Angola. In one agreement he secured title to a 700-kilom etre stretch for only ¿ 20. Since he had again used the *20 geographical m iles’ figure to define the depth o f his holding he had, in effect, swindled the tribe o f its entire territories.20 Alarm ed by the intense Germ an interest in the African territories bordering its ow n colony in the Cape, the British governm ent sought to assert its ow n claim to South W est Africa. H ow ever, by the tim e officials in Cape T ow n and the Colonial O ffice at W estminster had coordinated their policy o f acquisition, a Germ an warship o ff South W est Africa had already landed a party, planted the flag, and claim ed the country in the name o f the Kaiser. As a kind o f second tier to the process o f legal appropriation initiated by Liideritz, a colonial official, C .G . Büttner, him self a for­ 282

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m er missionary, set about acquiring treaties o f protection w ith die various communities in South W est Africa. B y 1885 many tribes, including the H erero and a num ber o f Orlam and N airn clans, had entered into an agreement w ith the Germans. Although these ex­ pedient documents w ere framed in conciliatory and innocuous terms, what their African signatories had acquired was not their ow n right to defence, but the intruder’s right to assault and dispossess, once the opportunity should present itself. I f the indigenous Africans had had any hope o f preventing their ow n gradual subjection to a European pow er, then political and m ilitary leadership o f the highest order was essential. O f all South W est Africans in the late nineteenth century, only one man was equipped to m eet the threat o f European aggression: H endrik W itbooi. H e was one o f the first to recognise the ultimate im plica­ tions o f Germ an protection and w ould be the last ch ief to accede to their suzerainty, and then only after a long period o f armed conflict. Y e t in tandem w ith his rare perspicacity, H endrik em bodied the classic and Altai flaw o f all tribal society. R ath er than building a uni­ fied front amongst the various communities o f the region, H endrik showed an unwavering com m itment to the age-old Khoisan—Bantu struggle. It was the key weakness in his political vision. Although his repeated assaults on the H erero w ould eventually yield the customary booty o f stolen cattle, this hardly compensated for the strategic advan­ tage available to both tribes had they form ed an alliance in the free o f the fledgling European colony. B y the time the old O rlam w arrior had set about m ending fences w ith his Bantu enem y, and by the tim e he had realised fully the menace presented by the Germans, their troops w ere ashore and garrisoned. Before too much longer they had trained their sights on him.

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s an exercise in im perial rapacity nothing quite overshadows Spain’s ruthless dissolution o f Am erican civilisations in the early sixteenth century. H ow ever, for sheer speed coupled with the scale o f its territorial consumption, the ’Scramble for A frica’, in w hich seven European nations swallowed up the w orld’s second largest continent, was equally staggering. Alm ost the entire process was com pleted w ithin a tw enty-year period. In 1876, when H endrik W itbooi was already in his late thirties, the largest European pow er in Africa was still ostensibly the Ottom an empire. B y 1896, how ever, and before W itbooi’s star had reached its zenith in the south-west, the continental carve-up was nearing com pletion. In a single generation the British, the m ajor beneficiaries o f the scramble, had hacked out a swathe almost the entire length o f Africa. O nly Germ any’s colony in East Africa (later Tanganyika, then Tanzania) interrupted the broad red strip that stretched all the w ay from the M editerranean shores to the South Atlantic coast. R unning them a poor second w ere the French, w ho had acquired virtually the w hole o f A frica’s north-western bulge including the ancient Islamic kingdom o f M orocco. Even the small-time players, like the Portuguese and Belgians, had com e away from the territorial feast com pletely sated. Just three o f their land holdings - the Portuguese colonies o f m odem -day Angola and M ozam bique, w ith the Belgian territories around the great river system o f the C ongo - w ere between them almost h alf the size o f the entire U nited States o f Am erica. T h e new owners o f the C ongo had acquired lands seventy-six times greater than their ow n European nation. 284

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Although late starters in the scramble, Germ an imperialists could also be w ell pleased w ith their haul by the end o f 18 8 s. From being a country w ithout any overseas possessions they had progressed to an African empire o f m ore than 2.5 m illion square kilom etres, not to m ention a large chunk o f the Pacific territories now know as Papua N ew Guinea. W ith their African dominions had com e nominal suzerainty over 14,000,000 indigenous inhabitants. That m any o f these w ere still unaware o f the fact was beside the point. Germ any seized a total o f four colonies — tw o smaller states in the m ore populous, cul­ turally advanced west, called Togoland and Cam eroon, and the larger territories o f Germ an East and South W est Africa on each coast o f die continent’s southern half. W ith these possessions, Europe’s nouveau imperialists had staked their claim to a place in the sun, and the other scramblers accepted it largely without complaint. Even W illiam Gladstone, the British prime minis­ ter whose governm ent the Germans had so successfully outflanked in their seizure o f the south-west, seemed to bear no grudge. O nly days after Bism arck's coup, Gladstone announced to his Scottish con­ stituents that he looked ’w ith satisfaction, sympathy and jo y upon the extension o f Germ any in these desert places o f the earth’ .1 T he remark m ight easily have been construed as ironic. For after the first flush o f success had faded and the Germans surveyed their new ly acquired territory in the harsh light o f day, they could see far less cause for celebration. T h eir extension into the desert spaces o f South W est Africa had certainly given them a place in the sun. And that, in a nutshell, was the problem . T he great star rising in the austral dawn was not the golden source that warm ed the vineyards o f Rhineland or shimmered on the lakes o f Bavaria. Into the country’s cloudless African skies rises a dazzling ball whose rays beat down w ith Saharan intensity. B y m id-m orning the glare radiating o ff the bleached desert landscapes obliges humans to shutter their gaze to a narrow and painful squint. B y midday the thirstland can liquefy in its ow n savage heat haze, and to step out into this atmosphere can be as enervating as m otion against a heavy tide. Lying between latitudes 17 and 29 degrees south, the country is bordered to the east by the Kalahari Desert and to the west by the coastal Nam ib Desert. T he latter, almost 2,000 kilom etres long, is nourished by a southerly airstream w hich wells upwards in the deep Antarctic waters o f the South Atlantic. C old and dry, the Benguela 285

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Current deposits under fifteen millimetres o f tain on the N am ib’s shoreline. T he desert’s northern stretch, lying between W alvis B ay and the form er Portuguese border on the Kunene R iv e r, is still know n today as the Skeleton Coast. It is apdy named. Even now its long w hite beaches are dotted w ith the remains o f half-decayed ships, wrecks w hich once gave this coastline a reputation as one o f the most inhospitable in Africa. It was and, indeed, largely remains a w orld devoid o f human presence, but partly for that reason it supports a rich marine ecosystem. In w inter, penguins and long-w inged albatross drift northwards w ith the Benguela Current, and in summer the white-sand beaches are crow ded w ith fur-seals, w hich com e ashore to mate and pup. Breeding cormorants form even greater congregations, and it was their stinking nesting-grounds that w ere the source o f guano for traders like Liideritz. As one travels inland from the coast the land gradually climbs and, before descending again towards the Kalahari Basin in the east, it forms a central plateau. These highlands themselves rise again to an intermittent sequence o f rugged mountains. Lying on a north-south axis and continuing for almost the country’s entire length, they are the physical spine o f m odem -day N am ibia, and it was the areas around these massifs that supported the main human populations. T h ey also provided some o f the country’s best grazing pasture, particularly in the w etter, northern areas, w hich form ed the H erero heartland. This region sustained not ju st the vast African cattle herds, but also large numbers o f gam e, like kudu, springbok, zebra, elephant, rhino, giraffe. These, in turn, w ere the mainstay o f the hunting San and, in times o f hardship, also the Nam a. H ow ever, even this healthier, better-watered land was no Eden. T h e rains w ere certainly heavier than in the coastal region, but they w ere still unpredictable and could fail com pletely. A classic climatic indicator is Eragrostis denudata, the eight-day grass, w hich can com plete its cycle o f germ ination, flow ering and seed production in ju st a w eek, to ensure its survival until the next uncertain rains. Everything that thrived in this land had to be drought-adapted, even the Nam a and H erero, whose system o f partial transhumance was itself a response to the jo in t vagaries o f rainfall and pasture. In their assessment o f the colony’s econom ic potential the Germans w ere obliged to take account o f these adverse factors, as w ell as the severe transportation problems that prevailed in the region. T he dense thorn bush that nourished the thick hides o f the elephant and

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rhinoceros was h r less kindly to human occupants. Pointing out the early hazards o f bush travel, Charles Andersson w rote: T h e fish-hook principle on w hich most o f these thorns are shaped, and the strength o f each, make them most form idable enemies. A t an average, each prickle w ill sustain a w eight o f seven pounds. N o w , i f the reader w ill be pleased to conceive a few scores o f these to lay hold o f a man at once, I think it w ill not be difficult to im agine the consequences.2 I f travel on foot was difficult, journeying w ith a wagon and team was probably worse. ‘T o give a faint idea o f the obstructions o f this kind o f travelling/ Andersson continued, ‘w e w ill suppose a person sud­ denly placed at the entrance o f a prim eval forest . . . the haunt o f savage beasts, and w ith soil as yielding as that o f an English sanddown; to this must be added a couple o f ponderous vehicles . . . to each o f w hich are yoked sixteen to tw enty refractory, half-trained oxen /3 It was hardly surprising that the 300 kilom etres from W alvis B ay to W indhoek involved a ten-day journey. As an alternative to such ineffectual locom otion, one optimistic settler brought a steam engine ashore in 1896. H aving taken three months to cover the thirty kilom etres from W alvis B ay, the engine com pleted a few short journeys in the vicinity o f Swakopm und, and was eventually abandoned on the outskirts o f the tow n, w here its use­ less hulk still stands today - a national monument to the early trans­ port difficulties. N o r w ere these the only challenges for a successful colony. A rid and almost waterless, South W est Africa allow ed few agricultural choices. T he Germans could follow the exam ple o f the H erero and adapt themselves to die region's rainfall, pursuing the system o f sem inomadic pastoralism w hich m any o f die Dutch Boers had embraced south o f the O range R iv e r. H ow ever, even after taking a decision to rear catde, they had then to confront other obstacles. Forem ost was die feet that an the best land feU within the territories o f either the H erero or the Nam a. Equally problem atic for European setders was die acquisition o f livestock, since the H erero w ere unw illing to trade anything but small numbers o f their poorer-quality beasts. In his book South-W est Africa under German R ule 18 9 4 -19 14 , H elm ut B ley suggested that: 287

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T he H erero based their cattle-farm ing entirely on the size o f their herds, and had no idea o f building up the quality o f their breedingstock or husbanding their land. This meant not only that they occupied unnecessarily vast tracts o f grazing-land but also that the Europeans w ere hampered in their efforts to establish a profitable catde industry. T h e size o f the H ereto herds kept the price and quality o f stock uneconom ically low .4 Such a statement entirely overlooked die fact that the Africans had never conceived o f themselves as participating in a ‘profitable catde industry*. T h eir animals w ere not com m odities in an exchange econom y, but a self-sufficient regim e fulfilling all the tribe’s spiritual, social and nutritional needs. That the H erero w ere so unw illing to sell their best catde — behaviour that infuriated the early setders — was a measure, not o f their inadequacy as European-style catde firm en , but o f the integrity o f their ow n system. I f both livestock and land w ere initially unavailable, the early colonists could at least speculate about the region’s m ining potential. T h ey w ere certainly aware o f the huge diamond fields located in die 1870s at Kim berley in the adjacent and geographically related Cape Province. M oreover, the copper mines at O tavi and Tsum eb in the north had long been know n and exploited by the O vam bo to furnish themselves w ith the metal for tools and weapons. In time the country w ould indeed prove rich in diamonds and other valuable com m odities like lead, zinc and uranium. As Lüderitz and his agents travelled the country m aking land purchases from the various tribes, they w ere literally w alking over a fortune. Lüderitz at least had hoped as m uch and w ent to great lengths to acquire m ining concessions to tribal land. *1 should be pleased,’ he once w rote, ‘i f it turned out that the entire [colony] is a colossal m ineral deposit, w hich, once it is m ined, w ill leave the w hole area one gaping hole.*s H e w ould never com e to realise the profits o f these operations himself. H aving run out o f capital he was obliged to sell his entire South W est African stakes very shortly after the initial purchase. It was not ju st lack o f capital that restricted the early developm ent o f m ining. Another lim iting ficto r was the absence o f labour. Both the Nam a and H erero w ere at relatively low densities and had all the resources necessary to maintain an independent lifestyle. T h ey had little reason or incentive to becom e paid em ployees o f the Germans. Besides, the earliest setders in South W est Africa took a dim view o f 288

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their w ork capacity. Charles Andersson reflected the general European attitude towards the Nanta w hen he w rote that ‘ [they] are an exces­ sively idle race. T hey m ay be seen basking in the sun for days together, in lisdess activity, frequently almost perishing from thirst or hunger.’6 W riting several generations later, the missionary Vedder agreed that the Nam a ‘always deemed labour beneath his dignity’ , blam ing it on ‘his w eak limbs and delicate physique’, w hich disquali­ fied ‘him for hard w ork’ .7 I f the lazy Nam a w ere not going to convert easily into the dustcaked, lung-infected proles w ho w ould dig out the fortunes o f future Germ an m ine owners, Charles Andersson was equally doubtful about the labour potential o f the H ereto. ‘T h ey are idle creatures,’ he noted. ‘W hat is not done by the w om en is left to the slaves, w ho are either im poverished members o f their ow n tribe o r captured bushm en.’8 In their assessment o f the colony’s human materials the Germans had at least some assets they could w eigh in the balance against the long list o f negatives. T he first was a small com m unity know n as die Basten or Bastards. T hey w ere the ofispring o f relationships between European, predominandy Boer, men and Khoisan wom en. Invariably disowned by their w hite fathers, the Basten m oved northwards as a body and setded at the tow n o f R ehoboth in 1870, after negotiating an agreement w ith the surrounding Nam a. Despite European mal­ treatment, including enslavement even by their ow n fàthen, the Basten clung to their European heritage, speaking Afrikaans and embracing Christianity. W hen the new colonists arrived and claimed the country for the R eich , the Basten readily hitched their wagon to the rising Germ an star. In all the colony’s m ilitary clashes between African and European, the Germans could count on active Baster support or, at least, their sympathetic neutrality. O nly w ith the arrival in 19 15 o f the conquer­ ing South African forces did the Basten abandon allegiance to their German overlords. T he other com m unity which found grounds for mutual self-interest w ith the invading Europeans w ere a people called the Bergdamara or Damara. O f rather mysterious origins, but probably som e o f the earliest inhabitants o f the region, these people divided into tw o com ­ munities: some w ere em ployed, often forcibly, by the Nam a and H erero, for w hom they served as cowherds, shepherds and menials. Those escaping this servitude lived among the mountains in small hunter^-gatherer bands in the manner o f the San. Pioneer Europeans 289

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accused both the H erero and N airn o f indiscrim inately killing inde­ pendent Damara com m unities, w hom they apparently referred to as ’baboons’, w hile the Nam a name, Chou-daman, loosely translatable as ’shitty blacks’ , was supposed to reflect their indifference to personal hygiene. G iven this inter-tribal antagonism, Damara willingness to cooperate w ith the Germans, although hardly bom o f deep affection, was not difficult to understand.9 Hahn suggested that the Damara received their full freedom only upon the m ilitary defeat o f the Nam a and H erero, when they w ere given their ow n reserve and rights o f self-regulation by the colonial governm ent. H ow ever, an indication o f the new status accorded them by their European allies is provided by Hahn’s sweeping conviction that die Damara was ’happiest when under a firm hand, w hich rules his daily conduct and nips desires for insubordination and im perti­ nence in the bud.’ 10 O ne statistic illustrating the firmness o f that German hand is the estimated 10,000 Damara — one-third o f the tribe’s entire population —w ho, despite their neutrality or support for the European cause, died in the w ar between 1904 and 1907. These deaths came about because the Germ an troops w ere unw illing to dis­ tinguish between hostile and friendly African com m unities.11 O nce the Germans had com pleted their inventory o f the country’s natural resources, it is difficult to see how they could have avoided the obvious implications o f any audit. A sun-drenched, drought-afflicted land enveloped by desert, w ith a non-existent transport network, highly restricted agricultural opportunities, unknown mineral re­ sources and a sparse, w ell-arm ed indigenous population living at sub­ sistence level, South W est Africa was hardly E l Dorado. O r, rather, one m ight say that it was a classic E l Dorado, and the fret that the Germans persisted w ith their colonial adventure was a clear indication o f the ineradicable fantasies at w ork in most European empires. It is w orth exam ining the cherished notions w hich propelled Germ any’s im perial policy, and measuring these aspirations against the bare statistics eventually produced by their colonial effort. For their econom ic experience in South W est Africa was highly symptomatic o f most o f the European colonies in Africa. Sim ultaneously, such a com ­ parison reveals a fundamental shift in European attitudes towards over­ seas territory from those that had launched fifteenth-century Spain into the N ew W orld. T he tw o main arguments that had initiated a Germ an drive for 290

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em pire-provision o f Lebensraum for the R eich 's expanding hom e population and the securing o f a protected overseas trade - w ere to prove almost com pletely hollow in South W est Africa, as, indeed, in all their overseas territories. B y 1 9 1 1 only 11,14 0 setders had emigrated to the country, and this was the most popular destination o f all the colonies. B y the same year the total Germ an population that had started a new life in the em pire was under 17,000, a paltry figure when compared w ith the 981,000 w ho had departed for Russia by 1867, or the 128,000 leaving annually for the Am ericas during the 1870s.12 B y the start o f the First W orld W ar, thirty years after Germ any's im perial adventure had begun, die colonies as a w hole had hardly proved their supposed econom ic advantages. As a going concern they w ere hopeless. N ot one o f the main colonies was financially selfsupporting, and by 19 13 the entire colonial trade amounted to only £ 1 3 m illion, h alf o f one per cent o f the Fatherland's total com m erce.13 Belgium alone im ported eighteen times m ore Germ an goods than did South W est Africa, and five times m ore than did all the African colonies together.14 In 19 12 colonial exports had com e to exceed imports by £ 3 ,17 0 ,0 0 0 ; but this was hardly an impressive return, given the £ 1 0 0 m illion that the Germ an taxpayer had eventually invested in the empire between 1884 and i9 i4 .ls T he best that could be made o f these figures m ight be to present Germ any’s empire as an item o f conspicuous consumption, an expen­ sive luxury whose principal value was sym bolic — a m uch-desired badge o f im perial status for the w orld’s most pow erful m ilitary nation. Although this m ight have been typical o f much o f Europe’s experience in Africa, it contrasted strongly w ith earlier periods o f expansion. In feet, the German position in South W est Africa was the inverse o f that o f the Spaniards in the Andes. There w ere no rooms filled w ith gold to defray the conquistadors’ initial expenses, let alone bullion fleets to dazzle the hom e nation and bankroll its state policy. There w ere no get-rich-quick stories to lure in w ave after w ave o f fresh adventurers. For the Germans in the nineteenth century, im ­ perialism had becom e a cultural and ideological im perative, but it had very litde foundation in hard-nosed, practical com m on sense. W hat was equally noteworthy about the new Germ an imperialism was the manner in w hich - in order to give the colony a vague sem­ blance o f econom ic viability - they seized lock, stock and barrel from its indigenous people w hatever small subsistence resources there were in South W est Africa. Although these Germ an tactics involved no 291

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departure whatsoever from the methods o f earlier conquistadors, what was striking was the manner in w hich they flouted totally the moral expectations o f their age. For, far m ore than any o f its predecessors, the new industrial Europe o f the late nineteenth century saw itself in the business o f colonies at least partly for the good o f the colonised. Em pire was now a field for philanthropists, and the slogan issued to his fellow whites by the great British explorer D avid Livingstone — ‘Civilisation, Christianity and Com m erce’ - had becom e the clarion call for many colonists in Africa. W ith the establishment in late-eighteenth-century Britain o f a m ovem ent for the abolition o f the African slave trade, Europeans had finally begun to awaken politically to their past exploitation o f tribal societies. In 17 9 1, W illiam Pitt, the same prime minister w ho five years earlier had unleashed upon the Aborigines o f Australia a policy o f British penal setdements, spoke o f'th e shame and guilt w ith w hich w e are now covered* as a result o f Britain’s long tradition o f African slave labour.16 O nce that specific batde had been w on, firstly w ith the abolition o f the trade in 1807 and then w ith the Slavery Abolition A ct o f 18 33, humanitarian concerns widened to embrace the treatment o f all Britain’s im perial subjects. Humanitarian groups like the Aborigines Protection Society and Christian missionary organisations w ere increasingly seeking to influence colonial policy by awakening w ider public concern on issues o f political freedom and social justice. Despite this background o f humanitarian interest in colonial Africa, Germ any, in an imperial career spanning ju st thirty years, embarked on tw o m ajor colonial wars. As a result o f these conflicts or the social dislocation they engendered, approxim ately 330,000 Africans lost their lives. It was an unenviable record. T o be fair to the Germans much o f it was barely m ore than representative o f w ider European practice in Africa. A ll seven powers used violent methods both to im plem ent political control and in seizing A frica’s resources. Com pared w ith the ruthless system o f extortion operating in K in g Leopold’s private fiefdom o f the C ongo, the econom ic regim e in South W est Africa was positively amateurish. Belgian policies o f torture and amputation for failure to meet econom ic targets, especially in w ild-grow n rubber, eventually led to the deaths o f hundreds o f thousands o f Africans, w hile the royal profits accruing from these atrocities ran into m illions o f francs. Y e t there was one dimension to the policies in South W est A frica that seemed both distinct and uniquely Germ an. O nce relations 292

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between die Teutonic colonists and their African subjects had descended into a state o f open conflict, the crisis opened the w ay for Germ an officers whose view s on race and on Africans in particular gave rise to policies o f outright genocide. R ath er than suggesting some process o f im perial atavism, the deliberate, almost clinical methods and detached attitudes towards the issue o f racial exterm ination contained a deeply m odem element. R ath er than a return to the anarchic bru­ talities o f the Spanish conquistadores, Germ an atrocities in Africa seem to anticipate the radical, systematic inhum anity o f a later holocaust — that against the Jew s during H ider’s T hird R eich .

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lthough the final, irrevocable breakdown in Euro-A frican rela­ tions did not occur until twenty years after the Germans’ first occupation o f South W est Africa, the period before this w ar could hardly be characterised as a time o f peaceful co-existence. From 1884 until that fateful confrontation in the Bondelswarts village o f W armbad, there w ere tw o decades o f constant political acrim ony and intermittent fighting. T he tw o Germ an figures dom inating this period o f pre-w ar rancour w ere the colony’s administrator, Captain C urt von François, and his eventual successor as governor, M ajor Theodor Leutw ein. A t first glance the tw o characters could not have seemed m ore contrasting. W hile François was rash and confrontational, his successor appeared hesitant and conciliatory. W here one seemed bellicose, the other was pacific, and w hile the captain sought instant m ilitary answers to colonial problems, the m ajor aimed to achieve his objectives through long-term political m anoeuvring. Superficially, Leutw ein, w ho held office in the colony tw ice as long as von François, from 1894 to 1904, seemed the m ore successful tacti­ cian. It was certainly during his decade in pow er that the German colony was transformed from an entity existing largely only on paper into a concrete political reality. W hile this was in part ow ing to Leutw ein’s greater personal qualities, a good deal o f the achievem ent could be traced to the substantially increased resources com m itted b y the hom e governm ent. T he records o f the tw o men had m ore in com m on than their per­ sonalities m ight initially suggest. N either could ultim ately be consid294

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ered a success in South W est Africa, since the careen o f both ended in a form o f dismissal. E ven m ore striking was the fact that both ulti­ mately found that their radically different policies in South W est Africa produced an outcom e that was the exact reverse o f what they had intended. V on François, pursuing a line o f m ilitary aggression towards the Nam a, was to find him self politically and strategically out­ m anoeuvred by his ch ief opponent, H endrik W itbooi. O n the other hand, Leutw ein’s plan to overaw e the indigenous inhabitants through largely peaceful political means eventually forced the H erero and Nam a to launch an all-out w ar upon the Germans. Although C urt von François never enjoyed the level o f men or matériel that Leutw ein eventually commanded, his ow n appointment in 1889 was an expression o f Berlin’s grow ing awareness o f the need to com m it physical resources to uphold its im perial authority. O nly months after Germ an marines had plunged the national flag into the hot Nam ibian sands - and despite Chancellor Bism arck’s hopes o f empire on the cheap through a policy o f im perial chartered companies —it was obvious that no colonial offshoot o f the Fatherland was going to blossom on these waterless shores com pletely unaided. A d o lf Lüderitz, the guano merchant w ho had helped sow die seeds o f Germ an em pire, was him self forced by insolvency to sell his ow n dubiously acquired lands to the Deutsche Kolonialgeselleschaft fiir Sudwestafrika. This new ly form ed corporate enterprise, although involving some o f the wealthiest men in Germ any and holding, on paper at least, 240,000 square kilom etres o f African territory, had com ­ mitted only 468,000 Marks (about £24,000) to im perial developm ent.1 O ne Germ an econom ist suggested that trying to achieve anything w ith ’such ridiculously small w orking capital, [was] about as absurd as the idea o f a man w ho w ould try to cut a tunnel through the Alps w ith a pickaxe.’2 H ow ever, the com pany’s derisory input into the colony was barely less than the Germ an governm ent’s ow n initial investment. In 1888 there w ere still only three officials present in the country, including D r H einrich G oering, the colony’s im perial com m issioner (and hither o f the future N azi leader Hermann Goering). W ith such a skeleton staff the Germans w ere in no position to press their authority upon their African subjects. In fret, only four years after the im perial adven­ ture had been launched, G oering, freed w ith the threat o f H erero vio­ lence, was forced to withdraw to British protection at W alvis B ay, and the Germ an colony collapsed amidst general hum iliation. 295

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W ith this final exposure o f the charter system by w hich Bism arck had hoped to build his colony, the Germ an chancellor was obliged to adopt a m ore expensive policy to restore national honour. As a pre­ lim inary this involved the dispatch o f tw enty-one Germ an troops under the command o f von François — a force w ell short o f the 400-500 that G oering had actually requested. H ow ever, the captain’s arrival in South W est Africa marked a change o f emphasis in the colony’s administration. A traditional Prussian soldier to his finger-tips, von François was also a violent racist w ho saw little m erit in his official orders to avoid any kind o f confrontation w ith the Africans. ’T he Europeans have foiled to give the black man the tight kind o f treatment,’ was his ow n opinion. ’N othing but relentless severity w ill lead to success.’3 In con­ firm ation o f these methods he m oved the German m ilitary head­ quarters to W indhoek, brushing aside all H erero objections. H aving fortified his new stronghold, he undertook the additional recruitment o f Baster and Damara levies, w hile requesting reinforcem ents from Germ any, w hich increased his European troop to fifty men by January 1890. W ith D r G oering’s support von François set about im plem enting his policy o f relentless severity, w hich involved tw o key objectives: firstly to strengthen the Germ an position and prevent any com bination o f African forces against the revitalised but vulnerable colony; sec­ ondly, to oblige each o f the different African communities to com ­ plete treaties o f protection w ith the Germ an authorities. In von François’ narrow m ilitary m ind both these goals eventually interlocked in a single violent purpose: the destruction o f the W itbooi tribe. T he unwillingness o f their leader, H endrik W itbooi, to consider a protection treaty, and his persistent raids upon H erero livestock, had repeatedly exposed the ineffectuality o f German rule in the colony. Captain von François had finally concluded that there could be no peace in South W est Africa w ithout inflicting a decisive defeat upon him . And in 1892 there w ere other pressing reasons to bring him to book. In that year Germ an colonists had started to arrive in the country and w ould need peaceful conditions i f they w ere to prosper. M ore important still was the fret that despite W itbooi’s recent attack on the H erero, he had not entirely abandoned his offers o f a ceasefire w ith his Bantu neighbours. Through the agency o f the Baster leader, Hermanus van W yk, W itbooi and Samuel reopened negotiations and these w ere finally concluded in a peace agreement in N ovem ber 1892. 296

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V on François recognised the inherent dangers for the European position in a united African front, and he im m ediately initiated plans for an attack on W itbooi’s stronghold at Hom kranz. A visit to the settlement in Ju ly 1892, ostensibly a final attempt to persuade H endrik into a treaty w ith the European governm ent, had already given von François a chance to look over the country and plan his secret raid. T he arrival o f a further 2 15 Germ an soldiers and tw o batteries o f artillery in M arch o f the follow ing year was the signal for its im medi­ ate implementation. T he H om kranz massacre that follow ed on 12 A pril 1893, and w hich forms the opening scene o f this book’s introductory chapter, constitutes a m odel o f Europe’s treachery towards tribal peoples, o f its capacity for unprovoked violence and the ensuing self-justification. In the colony itself, how ever, it took far less time to expose the g u lf between the Germ ans' official version and what had actually taken place at Hom kranz. Even the boasts o f overwhelm ing m ilitary success w ere quickly deflated. O nly hours after von François’ achievements w ere feted in W indhoek, it was reported that the W itbooi had cap­ tured forty Germ an hones. T he captain im mediately negotiated pur­ chase o f 120 replacements from a Germ an trader, only to learn subsequently that these too had been taken. H aving dismounted the Germ an cavalry, the W itbooi w ere able to ride up to the walls o f W indhoek jeerin g at the enem y’s im potence. T h ey then severely disrupted the capital’s supplies by taking charge o f a convoy o f over twenty o x wagons. T w o months later, having drawn to his banner Nam a from all over the southern region, H endrik strack again, this tim e w iping out a European experim ental farm that had previously been established on W itbooi land w ithout tribal consent. T he Africans' haul included 2,350 M erino sheep, 125 oxen and 28 horses. B y the end o f 1893, only eight months after the H om kranz raid, the tables had been com pletely turned.4 In the colony itself trade was paralysed. V on François was unable to guarantee European safety except in W indhoek itself. Stunned by the phoenix-like resurrection o f a tribe he believed he had destroyed, the captain’s only response was to call for artillery and m ore reinforce­ ments. H ow ever, von François’ final bolt had been fired. In Germ any, Prince Arenberg announced in the R eichstag that ’M ajor François is not the rightrman in die right place and must be replaced by som eone else . . . W itbooi is the real master o f the country, and François is no match for him .’5 297

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T he H om kranz massacre marked a natural caesura in South W est African a ffa ir s. It brought to a close the militant policy o f its author and terminated his career in the colony on an ignom inious note. W itbooi, by contrast, had escaped death, remained at large and resumed mastery o f the situation. H ow ever, the idea o f his final sub­ mission had not been abandoned in Germ any. A speech by Bism arck’s replacement as im perial chancellor, C ount Leo von C aprivi, delivered to the Reichstag in M arch 1893, signalled a fresh departure from the lackadaisical approach o f his predecessor. ’South W est Africa is ours . . .’ C aprivi announced. ’This is not the moment for retrospection. H ow it all happened and whether it was a good thing or not is irrele­ vant now . It is ours, Germ an territory, and it must remain so.’6 T he man sent out to ensure that it did w ould prove a fir m ore shrewd, effective and enduring agent o f Germ an imperialism than anyone the Africans had previously encountered. Theodor Leutw ein, the son o f a Lutheran pastor, was bom on 9 M ay 1849 at Strampfelbronn, close to Germ any’s south-western border w ith France. H aving studied law in Freiburg, he had then embarked on a m ilitary career, and by the tim e o f his new appointment in South W est Africa the recently prom oted m ajor was forty-four years old w ith little experience o f active soldiering. H e was, according to Helm ut B ley, ’trained and sophisticated, self-assured but not over­ confident, versed in H egel and M oltke, “ silent in seven languages’’, and yet w ith an amazing store o f political naivety.’7 H ow ever, Leutw ein was not going to repeat the errors o f his pre­ decessor. Instead o f bludgeoning the Africans into submission as von François had intended, Leutw ein aimed to com pel them to an accep­ tance o f Germ an rule by a m ixture o f political m anoeuvre and, i f necessary, a cautious display o f force. H e claimed to be a student o f British colonial history and sought to emulate the methods used by its administrators, especially the tim e-honoured policy o f divide and rule. As long as he could ensure that the Africans failed to unite amongst themselves he w ould be able to pick o ff his opponents one at a tim e. Shortly after his arrival in the country he gave a demonstration o f his intended approach in his rapid suppression o f the Khauas, the Nam a tribe occupying the region to the west o f W indhoek. T h ey, like the W itbooi, had long refused to sign a protection treaty, w hile their chief, Andreas Lambert, had recently been accused o f killing a Germ an trader called Krebs. H aving made a forced march from 298

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W indhoek w ith a hundred troops and seized the tribe in a surprise attack, Leutw ein then agreed to w aive the m urder charge against Lambert, i f he signed a treaty w ith the Germ an governm ent. O n his agreement to these forced demands the ch ief was released, w hen he im mediately attempted to flee. H e was prom ptly recaptured, courtmartialled, found guilty o f Krebs’ m urder and executed. T his despite a general acknowledgem ent, even by the Germans themselves, that Krebs’ actual killer had been a W itbooi —a survivor o f the H om kranz massacre and a man w ith considerable grounds for hostility towards w hite colonists. Even though he had reported the death and returned the Germ an’s effects to W indhoek, Lambert was found guilty by association. Follow ing the execution, Lam bert’s brother was unw illingly appointed acting ch ief in contravention o f the Khauas custom on succession and, despite the fact that most o f the tribe had fled, he and the rem aining members w ere coerced into accepting Germ an ‘protection’ and stripped o f their arms and horses.8 Em boldened by such success, the governor soon felt able to take on the only tribe rem aining outside his control, the W itbooi. It was clear from the outset that ‘the Lord o f the W ater and K in g o f Great Namaqualand’ , as H endrik styled himself, was not going to be over­ awed by the bullying tactics used against the Khauas Nam a. Cautiously, Leutw ein opened ‘negotiations’ w ith H endrik in early M ay 1894, and when these had proved as fruitless as ever, the Germ an leader offered a strategic tw o-m onth truce - the time required to ensure the arrival o f 250 reinforcem ents from Europe. W ith these fresh troops at his back Leutw ein was finally in a position to embark on a decisive engagement, w hich he opened on 27 August. Outgunned and starved o f both food and amm unition, the W itbooi still maintained a fierce resistance. T h e N aukluft M ountains into w hich they had retreated w ere a forbidding wasteland o f soaring red clifls, jagged waterless peaks and treacherously narrow defiles. T h ey proved perfect terrain for the W itbooi’s guerrilla tactics and the Germans suffered severe casualties before their opponents w ere bom ­ barded into final submission in Septem ber 1894. From the moment o f his arrival in South W est Africa Leutw ein had achieved a string o f m inor successes against indigenous opposition. H ow ever, w ith his triumph in the N aukluft M ountains he had scored a crucial victory. H endrik had always been the m ajor obstacle to 299

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dom inion in South W est Africa and w ith his defeat, the final plank o f Germ an m ilitary policy had been hammered into place. A t the con­ clusion o f a protection agreement w ith the W itbooi, Leutw ein’s stock should have soared. Instead, w hen the terms o f the agreem ent w ere published in W indhoek and elsewhere, there was a storm o f protest. T he W itbooi, far from losing their illustrious leader and his foremost troops to a firing squad, w ere free to return to the lion’s share o f their form er lands. M oreover, they had been allow ed to keep their arms and ammunition, w hile the ‘treaty o f protection and friendship’ stressed the voluntary nature o f future cooperation. In Germ any the principal critic o f the peace settlement was Captain von François, w ho com plained that ‘the w ar against W itbooi has cost the Germ an Em pire approxim ately four m illion M arks. T he damage it has caused in the colony is at least as great. But . . . his tribe remains united . . . and he [W itbooi] receives a salary o f 2,000 M arks.’9 In defence o f his measures Leutw ein had pointed out to the Colonial O ffice in Germ any that H endrik had not been forced into uncondi­ tional surrender, but had sim ply accepted the peace terms offered. T otal m ilitary defeat o f the W itbooi tribe w ould have involved months and possibly years o f further fighting, w hich Leutw ein had no resources to undertake. T he treaty he had got was the best that the Germ an governm ent could have hoped for in the circumstances. Leutw ein’s critics, how ever, distant from the realities o f South W est African conditions, or unw illing to acknowledge that he had suc­ ceeded w here others had failed, w ere unconvinced. T hey accused Leutw ein o f leniency, a charge that was to becom e a constant refrain throughout his decade in office. M uch later, when his career in the colony had ended in the same kind, o f official censure that had doom ed von François, Leutw ein w rote an account o f his governorship, E lf Jahre Gouverneur in DeutschSüdwestafrika. Addressed to the intensely racist w orld o f Germ any’s colonial establishment at the turn o f the century, it was intended in part to rebut the accusation that he had been too soft on blacks. Considered from the vantage point o f the late twentieth century, Leutw ein’s concern to prove him self as indifferent to African w elfare as the most extrem e o f his colonial colleagues can make parts o f his book seem like a deliberate and perverse act o f self-indictm ent. Typical was his boast to have made ‘the native tribes serve our cause and to play them o ff one against the other. Even an adversary o f this policy,’ he added, ‘must concede to me that it was m ore difficult, but 300

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also m ore serviceable, to influence the natives to kill each other for us than to expect streams o f blood and streams o f m oney from the O ld Fatherland for their suppression.’ 10 W hile he was often as unfeeling as he frequently claim ed, Leutwein was by no means the most extrem e amongst Germ an officials active in die country. D r Paul Rohrbach, an adviser on the colony’s econom ic developm ent, was die proponent o f an utterly ruthless brand o f racism. ’T he decision to colonise in South W est A frica,’ he w rote, in a pas­ sage notorious for its brutal justification o f Germ an policy, ’could mean nothing eke but this, namely that the native tribes w ould have to give up their lands on w hich they have previously grazed their stock in order that the w hite man m ight have the land for the grazing o f his stock.’ W hen this attitude is questioned from the moral law standpoint, the answer is that for nations o f the ’Kultur-position’ o f the South African natives, the loss o f their free national barbarism and their developm ent into a class o f labourers in service o f and dependent on the w hite people is prim arily a ‘law o f existence’ in the highest degree . . . B y no argument whatsoever can it be shown that the preservation o f any degree o f national independence, national prosperity and political organisation by the races o f South W est Africa, w ould be o f a greater or even o f an equal advantage for the developm ent o f mankind in general or o f the Germ an people in particular, than the m aking o f [such] races serviceable in the enjoym ent o f their form er possessions by the w hite races.11 B y this same chilling logic R ohibach could later conclude that i f the Africans had any inalienable rights as human beings, it was the right ‘to the possession o f the greatest possible w orking efficiency’ : the sole freedom , in short, to be the slaves o f Europeans.12 N otions like these created the ideological m atrix in w hich the colo­ nial governor operated, and even had Leutw ein wished his policies to reflect a greater concern for the country’s indigenous occupants, men like Rohrbach w ere ever alert to deviations from their prescribed norms. In most expositions o f their view s, their touchstone was the inexorable logic o f what European colonists w ere doing in Africa, the sheer scientific inevitability o f Germ any’s triumph. B y contrast, any 301

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expression o f em otion was stigmatised as the colonist’s cardinal sin - a view classically conveyed by the armchair imperialist, D r Karl D ove, when he urged his view s on Leutw ein after one clash w ith Nam a. ’It is to be hoped,’ D ove w rote in a Germ an newspaper, ’that the Imperial G overnor w ill not be prevented by the sentimental humanitarianism o f certain quarters from sending all the [Nama] falling into his hands to the gallows . . . There is no place for sickly sentimental­ ism !’ 13 W hile Leutw ein could never have been charged w ith any excess o f feeling for Africans, he did evince some sense o f concern at his governm ent’s conduct. H e showed a desire to stem the worst abuses o f his fellow Germans, avoided unnecessary loss o f lift and, by a dis­ play o f leniency after the Ñam as’ m ilitary defeat, w on the respect o f no less a figure than H endrik W itbooi. M oreover, Leutwein at least conceded that the Germ an position in Africa did involve some degree o f ethical conflict. ’Colonisation,’ he once w rote, ’is always inhumane. It must ultim ately amount to an encroachment on the rights o f the original inhabitants in favour o f the intruders. I f this is unacceptable then one must oppose all colonisation, w hich at least w ould be a log­ ical attitude.’ 14 In the final decade o f the nineteenth century Leutw ein was the nearest that the Germ an South W est African governm ent came to a m oral conscience. And when he stood amongst the ruins o f his ow n failed policies that awareness w ould confer on him a near-tragic status. Tragic not because he had failed but because, unlike most o f the other Germ an officials in South W est Africa, he glimpsed the injustice o f the system over w hich he presided, he had an insight into its moral impli­ cations, but in the final analysis he lacked the qualities to m ount any serious reform or propose an alternative course. For most o f Leutw ein’s governorship, o f course, there seemed no reason to change tack. T he Germans’ superior physical force was usually sufficient to flatten immediate signs o f opposition in the colony, w ithout Leutw ein having to question the justice o f his actions, or to consider the subterranean discontents that lingered amongst the Africans once he and his soldiers had returned to W indhoek. W hat mattered to him , as he him self cynically acknowledged, was that ’H ow ever ruthless one’s colonial policy, it is necessary to give one’s actions a semblance o f legality.’ 15 Just how indifferent he could be to achieving the genuine article was shown by his treatment o f the Bondelswarts in 1897—98. 302

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This Nam a tribe had expressed deep dissatisfaction at a Germ an directive to identify all rifles - a measure seen as the first step towards com plete disarmament o f the Africans. Seeking to quell any rebellion, Leutw ein im mediately headed southwards w ith a hundred men and four guns, and placed the Bondelswarts and another tribe o f Nam a allies on trial. W ith Leutw ein acting as both ju dge and prosecuting counsel they w ere found guilty and condemned to cover the cost o f the Germ an expedition. Since the Bondelswarts had no means to pay the fine they w ere forced to make compensation w ith their ow n land, w hich was what Leutw ein had sought all along. This fresh surrender o f territory intensified a process o f im poverish­ ment that the Bondelswarts had suffered since 1890, when their alco­ hol-soaked ch ief had signed away die better portion o f their domain to a British land and m ining syndicate. B y 1894 a num ber o f w hite farms had already been carved out o f their territories, and the Bondelswarts took steps to depose their incompetent leader. Leutwein im m ediately responded, rushing to the defence o f the 'best friend w e [have] in the south o f the Protectorate' and intim idating the w ould-be rebels w ith an artillery display.16 T o the British land com pany, Leutw ein counselled dispossession by stealth, and upheld their request not to have the land-cession contract made public. His notion o f colonial justice was clearly illustrated by his remarks on approving the non-publication o f the contract: I consider this a legitimate request because by die tim e the syndicate has selected the 5 12 farms o f 10,000 Cape acres apiece to w hich it is entided in 15 years from now , there w ill not be much left for the natives. I f they learn about this now , revolution is inevitable, but i f they are familiarised w ith it by and by it w ill be possible to satisfy them, [author’s italics]17 For Leutw ein the w ord 'legitimate* had com e to connote, not what was equitable and right in a given situation, but what best suited European self-interest irrespective o f its impact on African lives. T he governor’s step-by-step approach to dismantling African pow er in the Germ an colony was facilitated, in the case o f the N am a, by the fragmentary nature o f their tribal society. Because o f their w ide dis­ persal in the country, Nam a discontent was geographically isolated and invariably confined to a single small population. Except in the case o f

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the W itbooi, a m oderate-sized detachment o f European troops and a few guns had always been sufficient to suppress any act o f defiance. H ow ever, die m uch larger and m uch m ore pow erful H erero nation could not be overawed in the same w ay. Y e t it was obvious to the Germ an governor that i f any viable European colony was going to develop, then the H erero’s econom ic dominance and large grazing territories w ould have to be wrested from them. N othing better demonstrates the suppleness o f Leutw ein’s methods, nor the deep cyn­ icism that b y at the root o f his policies, than his m anipulation o f this people. It had been a godsend to him d u t at the outset o f his governorship the Hereros had been distracted by a succession dispute. T heir new ch ief w ould becom e, alongside Hendrik W itbooi, one o f the tw o key African figures in the tragic drama which overtook the country only a few years bter. H ow ever, Samuel Maharero w ould provide his people w ith a leadership as vacillating and short-sighted as W itbooi’s was strong and decisive. Educated by missionaries and a convert to Christianity, Samuel represented the new generation o f European-influenced Africans. B y the time o f his election to the chieftaincy he had already travelled by ship to Cape T ow n, had m ixed in British society, met the governor o f the colony, and had adopted m any o f the outward customs o f the colonising powers. His dwelling was a comfortable W estern-style house, w hite tropical suits were a mark o f his chiefly rank, while brandy, w ine and schnapps w ere all part o f his expensive taste in European luxuries. V on François thought him vain and sensual, w hile Leutwein considered him a drunkard and a wom aniser.18 T h e W esternised and m anipubble Samuel m ight have been the natural choice for the Germans - indeed, their open support for him was to prove a decisive factor in his election — but w ith his ow n people he was far from popular. U nder the traditional H erero system o f inheritance the candidacy o f his cousin, Nikodem us, w ho was both a traditionalist and a proven leader, took precedence over that o f Samuel. Although Samuel eventually prevailed in the election, the feet that he did so in the teeth o f substantial opposition meant that he looked increasingly to the new European pow er in the land in order to bolster his position w ith his tribe. T his collusion w ith the colonists, w hich was to becom e a constant feature o f his leadership, w ould in time have catastrophic consequences for the H erero people. It w ould leave them preoccupied w ith internal politics and badly divided at a critically threatening m om ent in their history.

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Gerónim o the Chihcahua shaman at San Carlos in 1884, aged about sixty.

Despite U S army officers' dismissiveness, Nana at seventy-five performed one o f the most brilliant deeds o f the Apache wars.

A classic portrait o f General George Crook on campaign - mounted on his mule, Apache, and in civilian dress.

V

O nly a single photograph o f Victorio exists, but it is almost enough.

The peace conference at the Cañón de los Embudos, March 1886. Gerónim o faces the camera with Nana to his left; C rook and Bourke are second and third on the right hand side.

Gerónimo with some o f the last Chiricahua holdouts, including Naiche, the son o f Cochise, to his left.

Hendrik W itbooi, the formidable Ñama leader.

Vain, complacent and an alcoholic, the Herero leader Samuel Maharero was an unlikely rebel against the might o f the German Empire.

Colonel Theodor Leutwein, Governor o f German South West Africa, 1894-1904.

The Herero leader, Nikodemus, before his execution for armed rebellion against the Germans.

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Leutw ein im mediately set about exploiting these divisions, fust by acknowledging Samuel M aharero as the paramount ch ief and then supporting his rival N ikodem us in his ow n bid for recognition as a leader largely independent o f M aharero’s authority. Congratulating him self on the shrewdness o f this tactic, Leutw ein laboured the point to the Germ an chancellor C aprivi: ‘It is self-evident that a politically divided H erero nation is m ore easy to deal w ith than a united and coherent one.’ 19 W ith the new European pow er in the land apparendy at his back, Samuel’s paramountcy among the H erero looked unassailable. And, indeed, during his decade o f close cooperation w ith Leutw ein the ch ief was able to exploit his position both to defeat his H erero oppo­ nents and to build his ow n internal em pire, often w ith land and possessions taken from his rivals. H ow ever, the office o f paramount ch ief was a deeply ambiguous sym bol o f African authority, serving, in the final analysis, not to uphold H erero self-governm ent, but to enable a gradual German ero­ sion o f the tribe’s autonom y. E ven the tide’s pedigree was highly questionable. H ugo von François, brother to the form er m ilitary com ­ mander in South W est Africa, and w ell versed in the country’s affairs, believed that it was sim ply an invention o f the whites designed for their own ends, but w ithout any ‘factually existing legal status amongst the natives*.20 M oreover, it was w idely recognised amongst experienced setders that tribal authority, even that o f a so-called supreme ch ief like Samuel, was by its very nature both consensual and dem ocratic. There was no single leader invested w ith outright authority to dictate H erero policy. T he feet that older colonists knew this indicates a deep and persistent hypocrisy in Germ an dealings w ith the tribe. T h ey under­ stood the divided nature o f H erero command structures, and yet simultaneously insisted on the paramount ch iefs capacity to control all his people w henever they called upon him to do so. As the point at w hich die colonists exerted pressure on tribal af&irs, M aharero became a m ajor focus for his people’s gathering discontent. I f during his decade o f em pire building Leutw ein seemed the Cortés o f German South W est Africa, then Samuel was undoubtedly his kidnapped em peror. From the outset his rôle as paramount ch ief placed him in a virtually impossible position, and it w ould be unfair to suggest that his self-serving machinations w ere com pletely responsible for the decline

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in African fortunes between 1894 and 1904. H ow ever, his persistent willingness to consider his ow n interests and his personal position w ithin the tribe above the larger strategic concerns o f his people was a critical factor in the relentless haemorrhage o f H erero strength. Leutw ein him self acknowledged that Samuel’s friendship ‘enabled us to remain masters o f Hereroland despite our modest protective force. In order to please us, he did m ore harm to his people than w e could ever have done by relying on our strength alone.’21 Although his leadership during the Africans’ tragic rebellion w ould go some w ay to compensate, it did not atone com pletely for his earlier role in the nation’s downfall. A typical example was his willingness to enter into an agreement w ith Leutwein in Decem ber 1894 that delimited the southern bound­ ary o f Hereroland. O n the free o f it, a demarcation o f respective territories seemed a sensible means o f avoiding possible conflict. Unfortunately, neat lines drawn on a map took no account o f the region’s actual ecological conditions or the traditional but fluctuating H erero needs for good grazing and surface water, wherever they might be. W hile the very ink was drying on the paper, Herero cowherds w ere violating the provisions o f a treaty o f w hich they knew litde and comprehended less. T he H erero language did not even possess a w ord for a ‘boundary’. M aharero knew this, but had other m otives for offer­ ing consent, like his governm ent salary o f 2,000 Marks for policing the agreement. M oreover, the H erero land that Samuel blithely signed away for German setdement was largely at the expense o f the eastern H erero, whose ch ief was Samuel’s arch opponent, Nikodem us. As it stood in its original form the treaty was both short-sighted and unworkable, and it took very litde time to expose its flaws. T he eastern H erero, deeply resentful o f Samuel’s presumption in taking decisions on their behalf, continued to graze their stock w ell south o f the agreed line. Even the Herero supposedly under Samuel’s direct authority refused to be bound by the treaty’s terms. A fter m ore than tw elve months o f repeated transgressions Leutwein sought a final resolution o f the boundary question. A t a m eeting in January 1896 the German governor granted a southward extension o f Herero territory to a line ju st west o f W indhoek. This fulfilled Samuel’s wishes and regu­ larised his people’s de facto occupation o f all die intervening territory. W hile this seemed a pure concession to African demands, it was also a clever ploy by Leutw ein to divide the H erero leadership once again. For w hile the governor had been seen to accede to Sam uel’s 306

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wishes, he deliberately rejected Nikodem us’ request to have the south-eastern tow n o f Gobabis and its hinterland o f prim e pasture for­ m ally ascribed to his ownership. B y favouring one and spum ing the other Leutw ein had breathed fresh life into the old Sam uelN ikodem us dispute, w hich was exacerbated by the paramount ch iefs voluble insistence on punishment for any w ho violated the new terms o f the agreement.22 W ithin three months o f sowing the seed o f discord, Leutwein reaped its violent harvest. Galled by the obvious bias in the boundary treaty and impelled by the demands o f a severe drought, the eastern H erero simply ignored the agreed border in the interests o f their cattle. T he fret that they were denied access to the Gobabis area at this critical tim e, and were increasingly squeezed by an influx o f white setders, only served to worsen relations. Eventually it was a m ixed force o f eastern Hereto w ith a group o f aggrieved Nama that wiped out a German patrol and advanced on the government military post at Gobabis. Despite this coalition o f Bantu and Khoisan forces, the rebellion was doom ed almost from the outset. E ven w ithin the eastern H erero, the rebels w ere isolated from the com m unity’s Christian members, w ho refused to fight, and w ere actively opposed by H endrik W itbooi and Samuel M aharero, w ho join ed forces w ith the Germans. W hile the attack on Gobabis was only narrowly defeated, at a subsequent batde the eastern H erero under their chief, Kahim em ua, w ere com ­ pletely crushed. W ith a price on their heads, N ikodem us and Kahim em ua finally gave themselves up and w ere taken for trial. W hile most o f the Eurocentric historiography has never questioned the tw o leaders' com plicity in the uprising, Gerhard Pool, author o f a recent biography o f Samuel M aharero, has pointed to the contradic­ tory nature o f the evidence concerning Nikodem us, and demonstrated that even some prom inent whites w ell placed to form an accurate judgem ent, like the Germ an missionary at Sam uel’s headquarters, Okahandja, were deeply unhappy about a guilty verdict. U nfortu­ nately for the accused, their individual testimonies during the trial tended to w ork against the possibility o f a jo in t acquittal. For w hile N ikodem us pleaded his innocence throughout, Kahim em ua based his defence on the assertion that, as a subordinate, he was sim ply carrying out the other ch iefs orders.23 W hatever the truth, their conviction was certainly the most con­ venient verdict. For Leutw ein it presented an opportunity to demon­ strate the smack o f firm governm ent, w hile simultaneously elim inating

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the main rival to Germ any’s principal H erero ally. For his ow n part, Samuel wasted no tim e in calling for N ikodem us’ execution, nor did Leutw ein’s deputy, Friedrich von Lindequist, w ho, as prosecuting counsel, seemed animated by a deep hostility to the accused man. Finally, on the m orning o f 13 Ju n e 1896, amidst an atmosphere o f H erero bitterness that persisted for generations, both Nikodem us and Kahim em ua w ere shot by firing squad at a place that came to be know n subsequently as N ikodem us M ountain. O ther rebels w ere sent to W indhoek as forced labour, w hile some o f their w om enfolk w ere pressed into service as prostitutes for the Germ an troops. O n top o f a fine o f 12,000 catde, the eastern H erero also incurred losses o f large areas o f good pasture, w hich w ere handed over for w hite setdement. A t the close o f the ’W ar o f the Boundary’ , as the conflict came to be know n, the H erero w ere in no doubt that they had suffered a m ajor defeat. N o r did it mark the end o f their misfortunes. O nce again, Samuel was at the centre o f an issue that probably did m ore to inflame A froGerm an relations than any other - the controversy over credit-trade and land sales. T he H erero had long been accustomed to a few pio­ neer Europeans w ith wagonfuls o f consumer goods trading in their midst. In fret, the supplies o f arms brought by men like the Swedish explorer Charles Andersson had been critical to their overthrow o f Orlam dominance. H ow ever, this form er situation bore litde relation­ ship to the large pack o f setders w ho took to trading w ith Africans during the 1890s as a prelude to the developm ent o f their new landholdings. Germ an anxiety to acquire African livestock tan up against the H erero’s deep religious attachment to their herds and their widespread unwillingness to sell any but the poorest-quality beasts. It was a poten­ tial cultural impasse that drove some Europeans to unscrupulous methods, w hile a general African unfrm iliarity w ith m oney laid them open to easy exploitation. T o illustrate ’the ignorance o f the veld­ living H erero’ , one Germ an observer recalled a typical scenario: A trader camps near a H erero village. T o him are driven oxen w hich the H erero wishes to sell. ’ H ow much do you want for the oxen?’ says the trader. ’Fifty pounds sterling,’ replies the H ereto. ’G ood ,’ says the trader, ’here you have a coat valued at ¿ 2 0 , trousers w orth £ 1 0 , and coffee and tobacco w orth £ 2 0 , that is in 308

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all £ 5 0 .' * * * dûs sort o f trading is exceptional and quite original; it requires to be learned and the new com er w ill have to pay for his experience, before he is able to emulate the dodges and tricks o f the old traders.24 O ne o f the most invidious o f European dodges was the offering o f goods on credit. Such a measure inevitably involved the cooperation and at times the downright cupidity o f the Africans themselves to take effect, but there is no doubt that some traders abused the system. A profit margin o f a hundred per cent or m ore was customary amongst the veld traders, not to mention the seventy per cent imposed on goods by the merchant suppliers.25 And these charges took account neither o f the interest levied on outstanding debt, nor the w hites' habitual undervaluing o f the H erero’s main currency - their livestock. O ne trader openly boasted that for every 3,000 Marks ow ed to him by Africans, he obtained 4,000 to 4,500 M arks’ w orth o f cattle.26 A graphic description o f this type o f malpractice was offered by one H erero ch ief in a statement to British officials: O ften, when w e refused to buy goods, even on credit, the trader w ould simply off-load goods and leave them, saying that w e could pay when w e liked, but in a few weeks he w ould com e back and demand his m oney or catde in lieu thereof. H e w ould then go and pick out our very best cows he could find. V ery often one man’s cattle w ere taken to pay other people’s debts. I f w e objected and tried to resist the police w ould be sent for and, what w ith the flog­ gings and the threats o f shooting, it was useless for our poor people to re sist. . . T hey fixed their ow n prices for the goods, but w ould never let us place our ow n valuation on the cattle. T hey said a cow was worth 20 M arks only. For a bag o f meal they took eight cow s . . . For a pair o f boots a cow was taken . . . O ften when credit had been given, they came back and claim ed what they called interest on the debt. O nce I got a bag o f meal on credit, and later on the trader came and took eight cows for the debt and tw o m ore cow s for what he called credit; thus it cost me ten cows altogether.27 N ot all the traders w ere dishonest: it was estimated by one contem po­ rary observer that o f the fifty men trading in 1904, about a third w ere guilty o f serious m isconduct.28 N o r w ere all these misunderstandings over trade the fruit o f the Europeans. A m yopic im providence was

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widespread amongst the H erero, w hile the profligate squandering o f resources by their paramount ch ief set the w orn possible example to his people. O ne indication o f the expensive tastes Samuel maintained on credit was his alcohol bill w ith a single trading com pany in the m onth o f D ecem ber 1896, w hich included 1 1 bottles o f beer, 57 botdes o f w ine and 27 bottles o f assorted spirits. T h e total for the w hole o f that year amounted to 74 botdes o f beer, 73 botdes o f w ine and 104 o f hard liquor, including 37 botdes o f brandy. N ot only did Samuel borrow heavily to support his ow n habits, but his people often took purchases from traders in his name and then neglected to pay. T he European merchants, unable to locate the individual responsible for an outstand­ ing bill, sim ply debited Sam uel’s general account.29 G iven these factors and his ow n spendthrift lifestyle it is hardly surprising that the supreme ch ief ow ed 70,000 M arks by 19 0 1.30 In order to cover these debts Samuel soon embarked on a reckless sale o f tribal lands - behaviour that was not only misguided, but in contravention o f tribal tradition, w hich decreed Hereroland the inalienable property o f the people. T h e Germans knew the H erero custom on this issue but, as on the question o f the powers attaching to the paramountcy, ignored it as long as land titles continued to w ind up in European hands. A fter 1897 the pace o f territorial transfer quick­ ened in the wake o f a severe rinderpest epidem ic that decimated the H erero’s uninoculated herds. W hile estimates o f Germ an cattle loss vary between five and fifty per cent, H erero losses w ere put at eighty to ninety per cent.31 In the quest for m oney to pay for vaccinations, the Africans w ere com pelled to part w ith their only remaining asset land. As i f these torments had been insufficient, the H erero w ere then struck again like biblical victim s o f some M osaic curse. This time it was an outbreak o f typhus, w hich swept through a com m unity that had been deprived o f its traditional m ilk diet. And as the century came to its dreadful close the H erero suffered tw o further visitations, a swarm o f locusts and then one o f the region’s recurrent periods o f drought. T he impact o f these successive plagues was appalling. An estimated 10,000 H erero died, w hile those precious herds w hich had once been the envy o f South W est Africa w ere largely gone.32 A census taken in 1902 revealed that 1,0 5 1 European ranchers now held as m any cattle as the entire H erero nation o f over 80,000 people.33 Throughout these terrible yean o f hardship the downward spiral o f 310

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credit-trade, debt and land sale whirled inexorably on. A t the heart o f this maelstrom was the pathetic figure o f the paramount ch ief w ho, like some bewildered sorcerer’s apprentice, gazed on im potendy as the forces o f destruction he had helped to summon steadily devoured his people. Y et his only reaction was to take refuge in alcohol and to con­ tinue to sell land w ith casual abandon. H erero headmen w ould literally wake one m orning to find European setders new ly arrived and erecting homesteads in their midst. W hen challenged, the colonists w ould show the African occu­ pants a sale agreement acquired in W indhoek, but sanctioned origi­ nally by the hand o f their drunken ch ief in Okahandja. Then die tables w ould be turned com pletely, and the H erero, now confused and betrayed, w ould themselves be ordered to vacate properties w hich had been tribal land for generations. A focal point for this type o f sale was the extensive H erero territory crossed by the recendy constructed railway between Swakopm und and W indhoek. These areas o f prime grazing w ere much sought after by whites for their new transport facilities, and Samuel was only too happy to com ply. B y 1902 it was estimated that in the previous tw o or three yean about 100,000 hectares had been lost in this fashion.34 B y 1903 the total area that had been transferred to w hite ownership amounted to 3,500,000 hectares - m ore than a quarter o f all Hereroland.35 T he grow ing crisis over land sales precipitated tw o main responses from the government. Pressed by concerned missionaries and other observen, Leutwein considered restrictions on credit-trading. A n initial effort to control it was abandoned in 1899 only weeks after its intro­ duction, because o f the how l o f protest from the traders themselves. T he next attempt to bring order into the realm o f African debt took over four yean to implement. O nly after a commission o f inquiry from Berlin had investigated the problem in 1902 was a definite procedure agreed upon. This ordinance decreed that traden had tw elve months (after a deadline o f N ovem ber 1903) in which to settle all debts, after which period the debt w ould be cancelled. Backed by police and even soldiers, and sometimes resorting to violence, the traden punued these outstanding debts w ith ever greater urgency — 'like a pack o f ravenous w olves’, in the words o f one British commentator. T he Credit Ordinance’s announcement led to 106,000 claims, a good number o f them false or usuriously inflated, and in the long run it served m erely to increase the abuses it was supposed to check.36

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T he other colonial measure to safeguard die H ereto from the com ­ plete loss o f their territories was the creation o f a ‘reserve’ . In the eyes o f the governm ent this w ould be a core area o f inalienable land. H ow ever, it was never intended that this should represent the w hole o f the African holdings, nor w ere the H erero com pelled to live there. T h ey w ould have free m ovem ent outside its boundaries, w hile the non-reserve lands could be grazed or leased or even sold as they wished. Unfortunately, m any did not frilly grasp the governm ent's intention, but saw the reserve scheme as yet another device to prise them o ff their traditional homeland. This misunderstanding persisted until the latter part o f 1903, w hen the strains in Afro-Germ an relations w ere m oving rapidly towards com plete breakdown. Already assailed by rapacious debt-collectors, the H erero chiefs w ere confronted in Septem ber by a further bomb­ shell — an announcement o f the proposed borders o f the reserve. Excluding important tribal areas, poor in grazing and lacking sufficient water, the reserve was im m ediately condemned by the m ore tradi­ tional H erero leaders as far too small. Then came a final shock - news o f governm ent plans to build an additional railway, this tim e cutting north right through the heart o f Hereroland to the copper mines at O tavi. R eflectin g on the huge and critical losses they had already incurred in the vicinity o f the W indhoek line, the H erero could only contemplate the worst. As early as M arch 1903 the H erero leaden may have started to dis­ cuss the calamitous impact o f w hite encroachment and to consider a decisive response. H ow ever, it was probably not until early D ecem ber 1903 that Samuel M aharero him self had been convinced o f the need to abandon his pleasure-seeking existence at Okahandja and take up arms against the ‘friend', whose em pire-building in South W est Africa had been so closely interw oven w ith Sam uel's ow n. As the year came to its close, circumstances had conspired to ensure that the individual concerned, Theodor Leutw ein, w ould be too distant to influence decisions being taken against him at Okahandja. A m inor fracas con­ cerning the seizure o f a goat at the small southern town o f W armbad had escalated into a gun battle between a hot-headed Germ an officer and members o f the Bondelswarts tribe. N o w came reports that a rebellion had ensued. As Christmas approached it was not the news the governor had hoped for. Instead o f a happy period in W indhoek amongst friends and col­ leagues on his tenth Christmas in the colony, he could look forward 3 12

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to long dusty rides in the hottest season. Instead o f a round o f cele­ brations, he w ould have to put on his m ilitary uniform and ride out w ith his troops, as he had done so many times in the previous decade. W hat Leutwein did not consider on his tenth Christmas in German South W est Africa, and what he had never seen —blinded by his white supremacist values and his perception o f Africans as subhuman creatures important only as units o f colonial labour - was that his per­ sonal em pire had been riveted down on top o f the aspirations o f its tribal inhabitants and over their w elling sense o f injustice. As Leutw ein plodded endlessly southwards, covering h alf the length o f a colony he had done so much to construct, he still did not detect the great sub­ terranean forces that w ere about to break through its frise foundation. B y the tim e he saw W indhoek again, Germ an South W est Africa w ould be consumed by a terrible w ar, in w hich his ow n career, his policies and hundreds o f Germ an soldiers and setders w ould all be destroyed.

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>n so many occasions in Samuel M aharero’s life, it was çely external circumstances that had forced him to act in the it days o f 1904. W ith the position o f his people deteriorating almost w eekly and w ith so many young warriors baying for Germ an blood, the paramount ch ief had either to respond im mediately or be swept aside by the strength o f H erero feeling. O nce he had finally decided to lead his people, events then also had a hand in choosing the precise m oment o f his call to arms. T h e Bondelswarts uprising, w hich itself had hinged on the ludicrous dis­ agreement over a goat, was the pivot on which the H erero revolt swung into action. In late Decem ber Leutw ein, unable to effect a speedy resolution o f the southern unrest, had ordered a third o f the colony’s four field companies to jo in him at W armbad. This left only 232 men in W indhoek capable o f bearing arms. There w ould never be a m ore favourable m om ent, and the paramount ch ief seized it w ith both hands.1 H ow ever, propelled on to centre stage in the unlikely role o f rebel leader, Samuel opened w ith a remarkable gesture o f clem ency. ‘T o all the headmen in m y country,* he w rote on 1 1 January 1904, ‘I have ordered all m y people to refrain from touching any o f the follow ing: M issionaries, English, Bastéis, Bergdamaras, Ñamas, Boers. W e do not touch them. D o not do this. I have sworn an oath that this decision w ill not becom e know n, not even to the missionaries. Enough.’2 Like the H erero decision to spare wom en and children, the ch iefs edict was humane, but it also showed a grasp o f strategy, since it sought to lim it the Germans* allies in the com ing conflict. Unfortunately, what 314

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Samuel had not bargained for was the instinctive loyalty o f the Baster com m unity for their European overlords. O n receipt o f M aharero’s letters requesting m ilitary assistance both from him self and H endrik W itbooi, the Baster leader Hermanus van W yk passed the documents straight on to Leutwein. A t first the Germ an governor, like m any in the colony, could hardly believe that a man w ho had been as supine as Samuel could now have taken up arms against them. Indeed, in the initial stages o f the uprising, Sam uel's track record o f com pliance was one o f the Africans’ main assets. Despite a num ber o f signs — increasingly belli­ cose H erero behaviour and their feverish purchase o f horses, saddles, arms and other equipment - the w ar took the Europeans com pletely unawares. Just as they w ere stunned by its outbreak, so the Germans w ere m ystified by its causes. But radier than confront the overw helm ing evidence o f their systematic assault upon H erero life, the whites in South W est Africa lashed out in all directions in their search for a scapegoat. T h eir choices are worth analysing, not only for their be­ w ildering inaccuracy, but also for their revelations about the colonial psyche. T he first target was the Germ ans' im perial rivals to the south - the British. Both the captain o f a Germ an gunboat, whose crew w ould play a role in com bating the H erero, and initially Leutw ein him self gave support to the notion that British agents provocateurs had helped incite the hostilities. W hen, in the absence o f any genuine evidence, the anti-British campaign collapsed, die colony found a ready substi­ tute in their ow n missionaries. That the missionaries had been exem pted from hostilities on Sam uel's orders, and had then refused - unlike all other whites in the colony - to take up arms against the Africans, w ere now offered as p ro o f that they had made com m on cause w ith the H erero. T he furore o f slander fed on the weakest evidence. W hen, for exam ple, the mis­ sionaries had failed to bury dead Germ an soldiers during a siege o f Okahandja this was taken as evidence o f their traitorous behaviour. That they had actually been prevented from reaching the corpses by a hail o f Germ an bullets seemed to count for very litde. In fret, nothing could have been further from the truth than die charge o f missionary involvem ent in the H erero uprising. As Horst D rechsler has pointed out, 'E ven their much reviled “ neutrality” was a m yth. T h e plain fret 315

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was that the missionaries never missed an opportunity to intervene in favour o f their fellow -countrym en.’3 Like m any aggressors the Germans projected the greatest blame onto the actual victim s o f their violence: the Africans themselves. It was a given in the colony that to explain H erero unrest one need look no further than the ignorant conceit and savagery o f the prim itive. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that an official German inquiry ascribed the causes o f w ar ’to the arrogance o f the natives and to their confidence in their superiority over the Germans’ .4 It was a m orally convenient Une to take, since Africa could be blamed on tw o counts, first for the outbreak o f ’m otiveless’ bloodshed and later for the hys­ terical retribution w hich was brought down upon it by the Germans. Leutw ein himself, towards the close o f the fighting and after he had been rem oved from miUtary command, concluded that the ’freedom loving H erero’ had been increasingly pressurised by the ’progressive extension o f German rule . . . B ut, and this is decisive, they had the impression that in regard to this rule o f the German they w ere in the last resort the stronger side.’5 Leutw ein had good reason to blame the H erero, i f only to deflect attention from his ow n part in the war, and as he cast around for further excuses he aUghted on one that is especially illum inating o f European attitudes. Prior to H endrik W itbooi’s decision to lead the Nam a in revolt in late 1904, it came to Ught that a follow er o f the Ethiopian M ovem ent had been active in the region. This black ‘prophet’, called Sheppert Stiirmann, was part o f an African Christian com m unity that opposed foreign missionaries for their role in the advance o f imperialism and w hich preached African redemption from colonial oppression. Incapable o f follow ing the well-m arked trail o f soUd, rational evidence w hich guided the w ay to W itbooi’s decision, Leutw ein seized upon Stiirmann as a providential deus ex machina to explain away the N am a’s mysterious sense o f grievance. W hat better key for unlocking the ways o f Africa - that black, benighted land o f unreason - than the fanatical hand o f the reUgious mystic? ‘T he rising,’ Leutw ein let it be know n, ’ [was] “ unquestionably” to be attributed to the machinations o f this m an.’6 It was symptomatic o f this classic European distortion o f ‘the dark continent’, itself a fragment o f the same m ythology, that the Germ an press should describe W itbooi as South W est A frica’s ‘M ahdi’ — a figure w ho have been for a genera­ tion o f Europeans the archetypal im age o f savage black madness.7 N o matter how much Leutw ein m ight have wished to deflect 316

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blame, it was inevitable that in their scramble to absolve themselves o f responsibility others w ould pass the burden on and upwards. H ow ­ ever, it was the old charge o f excessive leniency towards Africans w hich form ed the main thrust o f their accusations against him. 'Throughout the country/ railed one colonial organisation, ‘the natives w ho . . . have for years been pampered and made immoderate in their demands through the G overnor’s blandishments are now in a state o f ferm en t. . .’ From the twisted logic o f these statements it was only a small step into com plete madness: it was not the years o f colo­ nial abuse that had provoked the H erero into a desperate revolt - in fret, the revene —the uprising had been caused by 'unreasonable treat­ ment o f the colonists’ themselves.8 Africa had risen as a result o f abuses inflicted not upon itself, but on its w hite oppresson by their ow n colonial administration. In addition to these accusations from fellow whites, the outpouring o f H erero hatred and violence towards Germans forced Leutw ein to confront his most cherished illusions about the fairness o f his adminis­ tration. According to Helm ut B ley, the governor had genuinely endeavoured to have him self accepted as the representative o f a legit­ imate governm ent, taking 'care to emphasise to the Africans that a normal state-system, bound by its constitution and statutes, was in control’, and was attending equally to the interests o f both black and w hite.9 W hen a trader once referred to the administration as 'his governm ent’, Leutw ein admonished him for his presum ption.10 Y et, w hile he had often claim ed, in disputes w ith African parties, that his actions w ere in strict accordance w ith the legal processes o f the legiti­ mate state, Leutw ein had only ever insisted on the letter o f the law when w hite self-interest was served by so doing. As B ley also pointed out, 'Leutw ein had never contemplated equip­ ping the Africans to defend their rights in the court o f law ’, and invariably they had to endure a profound bias in the colony’s judicial processes.11 Part o f the reason for the Bondelswart uprising, for instance, was the settlers’ published demand that all Africans regard whites as superior beings and that in court only the testimony o f seven African witnesses could outweigh evidence presented by a single w hite person. O ne o f the most important sources o f evidence on the denial o f African rights is provided by the judicial records during Leutw ein’s office. These reveal that the m urder o f six Europeans by Africans 3 17

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resulted in the im position o f fifteen death sentences and a single prison sentence. T he courts in w hich whites w ere tried for m urdering three Africans handed down terms o f imprisonment for tw o yean, one year and three months respectively. These cases give no indication o f the m any instances when setden sim ply took m atten into their ow n hands and administered beatings (euphemised as ‘paternal chastisement') at their ow n whim . ‘O ur people w ere com pelled to w ork on farms,’ testified one H erero ch ief after the revolt, ‘and the farmers had them chained up by the police and flogged without m ercy for the slightest little thing.’ 12 In his assess­ ment o f the causes o f hostilities, one missionary suggested that ‘the average Germ an looks down upon the natives as being about on the same level as the higher primates (baboon being their favourite term for the natives) and treats them like animals.’ 13 W hen the German R eichstag sought to criticise the settlers’ arbitrary and violent behaviour, they responded w ith a petition in w hich they argued: From time im memorial our natives have grow n used to laziness, brutality and stupidity. T he dirtier they are, the m ore they feel at ease. A ny w hite man w ho has lived among natives finds it impossi­ ble to regard them as human beings at all in any European sense. T hey need centuries o f training as human beings, w ith endless patience, strictness and justice . . .w Part o f the ‘training’ offered by the setden to African w om en, at least, was sexual violation, w hich was seldom reported, let alone punished. Exacdy w hy such offences carried so litde risk o f retribution is indi­ cated by the fate o f an African whose w ife was raped by three Germans. W hen he tried to intervene he him self was maltreated and dragged o ff to the police, w ho gave him fifty lashes for assaulting a w hite m an.ls It is a measure o f the enduring colonial attitudes towards African wom anhood that the missionary w riter R everend Vedder claim ed a quarter o f a century later that for D amara w om en ‘to have a child by a w hite man is . . . considered an honour and distinction’ .16 O ne case involving sexual misconduct that did eventually reach the law courts occurred only months before the H erero uprising, and involved a Germ an trader named D ietrich and a young African couple celebrating the birth o f a new baby. Both the offspring o f H erero chiefs, Barmenias and Louisa Zerua w ere approached by D ietrich for a lift w hile travelling hom e in their wagon. A fter they had stopped for 318

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the night, Barm enias was disturbed by screams then gunshots and rose to find Louisa dead, their baby injured and the Germ an running o ff into the darkness. It was later revealed that D ietrich, after plying her husband w ith alcohol, had made advances to Louisa and shot her w hen she refused to submit. A t his trial the judges accepted D ietrich’s defence that he started shooting under the drunken impression that he was being attacked, although even Leutw ein admitted that this was a total fabrication.17 O n his acquittal, a furore o f protest led to a retrial and the Germ an was eventually sentenced to three years’ imprison­ ment. Conveniently for the convicted m urderer, the w ar intervened and he was released and recruited as a non-com m issioned officer.18 These abuses o f the judicial process had a far-reaching im pact upon the H ereto. Later they w ould cite the m urder o f Louisa Zerua and D ietrich’s exoneration as a factor in their decision to take up arms. In his ow n letter to Leutw ein giving the reasons for w ar, Samuel referred to the absence o f legal redress: ’H ow many Hereros have been killed by w hite people, particularly traders, w ith rifles and in the prisons. And always when I brought these cases to W indhuk [sic] the blood o f the people was valued at no m ore than a few head o f small stock.’ 19 In conjunction w ith their losses o f cattle and land, their exclusion from the processes o f justice left the H erero w ith the conviction that they w ere fighting for the preservation o f their national life. T h e Germ an charge that the H erero w ere m otivated by an arrogant pre­ sumption o f their ow n martial superiority is not borne out by their leaders’ ow n assessments. In his letters to other African chiefs request­ ing support for the uprising, Samuel suggested an awareness o f their desperate plight. T o H endrik W itbooi he w rote: ’Let us die fighting rather than die as a result o f maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calam ity.’20 T o the Baster leader, Hermanus van W yk, he announced his wish ‘that out w eak nation[s] all over Africa should stand up against the Germans, let them rather finish us o ff and let them live alone in our country.’21 C h ie f Zacharias Zerua, father-inlaw to the wom an m urdered by D ietrich, was even m ore pessimistic. According to his son, ’H e knew that i f w e rose w e w ould be crushed in battle . . . W e w ere driven to desperation by the cruelty and injus­ tice o f the Germ ans.’22 H ow ever they m ight have rated their prospects, the H erero’s open­ ing advances w ere sw ift and decisive, m om entarily paralysing the colony. Betw een 12 and 18 January 1904 parties o f Africans entered 319

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isolated and undefended w hite farmsteads, sometimes seizing the occupants w hile they slept. O ccasionally settlers w ould be confronted by their ow n farmhands. Possibly, in those moments o f stunned con­ fusion, some o f the old Germ an masters had time to reflect that the brutal beatings they had administered and dismissed as ‘paternal chastisement’ had converted their assailants into killers, w ho now bludgeoned them to death and crudely mutilated their corpses. Traders w ere also killed. Schröder, the man w ho had boasted he could get 4,000-4,500 M arks for every 3,000 ow ed by a H erero, was amongst those w ho paid the ultimate price for greed. Y e t Sam uel’s instruction to leave unharmed all wom en, children and non-Germ an whites was largely obeyed. O nly the Okahandja contingent violated the order, m urdering six Boers, including w ives and a single m inor. O f all those slaughtered in the first phase o f the war, estimated at between 12 3 and 150 , seven w ere Afrikaans-speaking and three w ere fem ale.23 T he total secrecy that had accompanied these opening attacks pre­ cluded any defensive measures by the Germans and gave the H erero the bulk o f European cattle and small livestock. Y e t Samuel and his other chiefs had lost some important strategic opportunities. T he need for com plete surprise, for instance, robbed them o f the assistance o f 600 H erero men w orking on the O tavi railway, w ho w ere im medi­ ately interned at the outbreak o f war. T he Africans had also failed to strengthen their position w ith regard to arms and am m unition, w hich they desperately lacked. Although some estimates put their arsenal at 4,000 guns, Leutw ein thought it included only 2,500, w ith little ammunition. M oreover, by fading im mediately to seize the capital, W indhoek, the H erero missed the chance to solve their shortage at one fell swoop. This left them at a grievous disadvantage from the outset. O ne historian has suggested that the Germans’ five M axim s alone almost equalled the H erero’s total firepow er.24 W hile the main fortified settlements w ere all surrounded, the H erero failed to overrun them. Typically, the town o f Okahandja was seized on the first day o f fighting and its stores looted and burnt. H ow ever, apart from a few settlers caught o ff guard, most whites took refuge in the fort, w hich was isolated from the outside w orld w hen Samuel had both the railway and telegraph lines cut. T he H erero, unlike their form idable Bantu cousins to the east, the Z ulu, w ere unw illing to attack at night, and disdained the notion o f fighting amongst buildings as unmanly. Lacking the necessary equipment to 320

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breach the walls, they w ere probably also reluctant to face the com ­ bined fire o f the besieged garrison. Seventy-one men thus held o ff the Africans during the ensuing days, and w hile Germ an troops from W indhoek w ere driven back on 12 and 13 January, a relief force o f a hundred men w ith 50,000 rounds o f ammunition broke through tw o days later. Okahandja had been reinforced, but it remained to Captain V iktor Franke o f the Second Field Com pany, w hich had been on its w ay south to assist the suppression o f the Bondelswarts, to wrest the initia­ tive firm ly away from the Africans. B y 15 January Franke had reached G ibeon, the headquarters o f the W itbooi, when he heard the news from W indhoek. R ealising the seriousness o f the fighting to the north, he im mediately turned his men around. T hey covered 380 kilometres in the next four and a h alf days, and after finding W indhoek shaken but not challenged, they pressed on to Okahandja. Franke’s troops relieved the town on 27 January, the Kaiser’s forty-fifth birthday. And again they m oved north, this time for the important H erero settlement o f Omaruru. Thus far, the Germ an ride from Gibeon had been w ithout violent incident. N o w they freed serious opposition. First was Sam uel’s rear­ guard, covering his retreat into the O njati Mountains to the west o f Okahandja. O nly after a six-hour batde w ere Franke’s men able to continue the march for Omaruru. B y the time they relieved the tow n on 4 February the Germans had had a full taste o f H erero resolve. T he men they had jeered at as baboons had held them in another fierce eight-hour fire-fight. H erero losses w ere heavy, estimated at a hun­ dred, but almost a fifth o f the Germ an troops were also dead or wounded. T he H erero, in failing to capture and destroy W indhoek and Okahandja, had lost their one serious opportunity to deal the Germans a m ajor blow . M oreover, the railways w ere quickly restored, a large force o f marines had reinforced Leutw ein’s troops, and the governor himself, after negotiating a hasty ceasefire w ith the Bondelswarts, had returned by ship to take command in the north. H e and the other colonists could thank Franke’s ride for restoring the European posi­ tion. T he official Germ an historians w ent further, claim ing it had ‘taught anew how frr men can surpass the boundaries o f human endurance when a strong and unbendable w ill rules.*25 W ith an additional 1,34 0 troops ashore by 1 M arch, Leutw ein put into effect his plans to bring the conflict to an end. His three princi­

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pal objectives w ere to clear die Africans from around his main lines o f com m unication w ith the outside w orld (the railway to the port o f Swakopm und); to prevent the H erero and their large numbers o f cap­ tured livestock from escaping across the border into Bechuanaland; and to keep the different H erero forces from uniting and to engage and defeat them one by one. In order to achieve his objectives he divided his force into four sections. B y 4 M arch tw o o f these units had successfully cleared the areas south and west o f Okahandja, having engaged the H erero in three heated but indecisive exchanges. T he fust true victory celebrations w ere reserved for the tongue-twisting batde o f Otjihinamaparero, after troops under M ajor von E storff had ridden north to engage the west­ ern section o f the H ereto. Since the force o f about a thousand Africans had suffered, at their enem y’s reckoning, only fifty casualties, and had then retreated eastwards toward the main H erero concentration, E storff had not inflicted a resounding defeat, nor had he maintained the western H erero’s isolation as Leutw ein had wanted. But the Germ an press and their Kaiser w ere not to be balked. T he newspapers enlarged the significance o f Otjihinam aparero, w hile EstorfFs ow n report made it ‘sound vaguely like a second Sedan* and W ilhelm ’s message o f congratulation spoke o f ‘the brave and steady behaviour o f m y soldiers and marines’ .26 Then came a m ore euphonious-sounding battle — O w ikokorero. O nly this one was not such a cause for jubilation. This one was an African victory. Leutw ein’s eastern section was under the command o f M ajor von Glasenapp, new ly arrived from Germ any w ith a force com pletely unfam iliar w ith African conditions. T he colony’s veterans looked w ith dismay at its inexperienced and com placent officers, w ith their cases o f champagne, boxes o f cigars and their hunting rifles. V on Glasenapp’s allotted task was to coordinate w ith the garrison at Gobabis and block the H erero’s route to Bechuanaland. H ow ever, since the Africans had risen in order to preserve their national life, fleeing across the desert was not likely to be a part o f their immediate strategy. Nevertheless, the m ajor, not content w ith his unglamorous role, straightaway exceeded the orders and set out in search o f the leader o f the eastern H erero, T jetjo. Undeterred by the increasing exhaustion o f his troops and their lack o f horses - there w ere only 80 among 4 12 m en - he divided them into tw o units and gave chase across arid 322

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waterless country, averaging thirty-three kilom etres a day for a month. For his new ly arrived soldiers, supported only by interm inably slow wagon transports, ‘the scarce waterholes and the great distances between them w ere a nightm are/27 B y 12 M arch disease resulting from the polluted water had begun to take its toll. Y e t von Glasenapp, impatient o f victory, left his main contingent to make camp and pushed on w ith a patrol o f forty-six men and eleven officers. O n the follow ing day they caught up w ith a handful o f Africans in charge o f a large num ber o f cattle. W hen these cowherds fled, the Germans took control o f the stock and rode on through the dense bush until m id-afternoon. Then, as they emerged from the thorn scrub to cross a large clear­ ing, they came under unexpected attack. T he Germans, scrambling for the little natural cover available, w ere under the mistaken impression that they had caught up w ith only a small group o f stragglers. In fret, they had ju st run into a trap carefully laid by T jetjo ’s rearguard. W hen von Glasenapp attempted to retrieve their position and ordered their one M axim to be m ounted, the Africans intensified their fire, ripping through the broken line. T he m achine-gun was never brought into operation and it was only when the surviving Europeans reached their supply wagon that they w ere able to organise an effective retreat. In h alf an hour, nineteen men and seven o f the officers, including H ugo von François, had been killed.28 For the Germans, O w ikokorero had been a reverse as significant as their victory at Otjihinamaparero. A shaken von Glasenapp now ordered an immediate halt. N ot that this was the end o f his tribulations. For the next three weeks his men were carefully watched by T jetjo ’s scouts, and w hen the Germans pulled back towards Leutw ein’s main force, the un­ detected H erero shadowed their movements. O n the m orning o f 3 April, w ith the 237 German troops strung out over tw o and a h alf kilom etres, a small H erero party suddenly appeared to draw the European fire. W hile the rearguard was thus distracted, the Africans surrounded it on three sides, cutting o ff h alf the force. O n realising that he was under attack, von Glasenapp raced back and threw his entire unit into the battle, bom barding the Africans w ith tw o field pieces. O nly after four hours o f heavy fighting did the H erero break o ff their frontal assaults and melt back into the bush. It had been a ferocious contest. T he Africans left forty-tw o o f their men at Okaharui, w hile forty-nine, a quarter o f the Germ an force, w ere either dead or wounded.

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M any o f diese troops had only been in South W est Africa for a m atter o f weeks, and as the wagons full o f wounded rattled away over the desert sands they carried o ff the original Germ an boast that the w ar against the H erero w ould be litde m ore than a glorified game shoot. N o r was morale the only casualty. According to one com m entator Okaharui 'heralded the collapse o f the eastern detachm ent'.29 For what the H erero had started, typhus com pleted. From the original contin­ gent o f 534, only 15 1 w ere still on their feet, and on 5 M ay 1904 it was decided to disband it.30 T he com m unication difficulties w hich had been in part responsible for von Glasenapp’s problems now spared Leutw ein news o f these reverses until he him self had faced the H erero in battle. H e had initially been reluctant to confront them until he could m obilise all the reinforcem ents pouring into the colony during February and M arch. W ith the arrival o f 1,56 7 troops, 1,000 hones, 10 artillery pieces and 6 m achine guns he was eventually able to field a force o f 2,500 m en.31 B y the tim e he gave his orden to attack Samuel’s main force, the Germans had m ore armed combatants than the Africans. O n paper the odds w ere overwhelm ingly in favour o f the Europeans. Y e t Leutw ein had great difficulties m aking his technical superiority count, and o f his three initial objectives he had achieved only one: the H erero had not escaped to Bechuanaland w ith most o f the colony’s livestock. But since this had never been their intention, it could hardly be considered a m ajor Germ an triumph. M oreover, i f they ever had tried to leave, the Germans had scarcely shown them­ selves capable o f preventing it. W hen Leutw ein set out from Okahandja on 7 A pril w ith 800 Germans and 160 African auxiliaries he was almost as keen to quell the grow ing w hite opposition to his command as he was to defeat his African opponents. T w o days later at the battle o f Ongandjira he was offered an opportunity to do both. A bout 3,000 H erero, bolstered by news o f T jetjo ’s victory at O w ikokorero, had grouped in a loose sem i-circle at the foot o f a series o f steep ridges. W hile Samuel directed the African right, the left was commanded by Assa R iarua, the form idable son o f Samuel’s great rival R iarua, and the man con­ sidered central to the H erero decision to fight. His forces waited w ith great discipline, protected behind a thick thorn hedge three metres high and stretching almost tw o kilometres. O nly when the Germans had approached to w ithin 200 metres did Assa R iarua order a barrage on the exposed German left flank.

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Repeatedly Leutw ein had to reinforce his left to check this attack, bringing up both m achine-guns and artillery, w hich w ere used to great effect. Even so, the Africans made tw o desperate charges at the European positions, urged on by H erero wom en hurling abuse at the enem y and chanting to their warriors: ‘W ho owns Hereroland? W e ow n Hereroland!’32 Gradually superior Germ an firepow er began to tell and the Africans pulled back, scaling the slopes behind them. W hen a third H erero m ounted force, watching the battle's progress from the African right, rode down to try to intervene, the Germans charged furiously to pre­ vent any reinforcem ent. H ow ever, by the time they had clim bed to the ridge tops form erly held by Sam uel’s men they w ere surprised to find them already evacuated. G iven the large number o f combatants, Ongandjira involved relatively few casualties - African losses were about a hundred and the Germans’ under twenty —w hile both sides had grounds for disappoint­ ment. Samuel apparendy executed some o f his men, accusing them o f cowardice. Leutwein captured Herero letters inform ing him for the first time o f the defeat at O w ikokorero. It was an added vexation for the governor just when he had failed to achieve the sweeping victory which the armchair generals in Berlin believed was easily within his grasp. Opposition to his conduct o f the w ar was growing. Leutwein badly needed a quick, decisive conquest to silence his critics. Unfortunately, at the Batde o f O vium bo four days later, the result was about as inconclusive as at Ongandjira. W orse, that elusive, m uch-needed victory had com e w ithin a hair's breadth o f being achieved. B ut not by Leutw ein; by Samuel. T he Germ an governor’s skilful extrication o f his men from what m ight have been a com plete catastrophe was not the kind o f triumph the Berlin top brass had in mind. A fter the outcom e on that exhausting, unlucky 13 April, Leutw ein’s fate in South W est Africa was largely sealed. O vium bo had taken place on terrain that favoured the H erero, and, as at Ongandjira, they arrayed themselves in an arc around important waterholes. O n this occasion, Samuel neutralised the impact o f Germ an artillery by fighting on level, densely vegetated ground, where the enem y w ere unable to see their target or establish range on the highly m obile African force. B y the afternoon, the Germans were com pletely surrounded and compressed into a rectangular defensive form ation. Towards evening, unknown to Samuel, they w ere also seriously short o f ammunition. H ow ever, instead o f pressing hom e a 325

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m ajor advantage, the H erero leader slipped away under cover o f dark­ ness w hile snipers kept the Germans pinned down. N ot surprisingly, Leutw ein was equally relieved at the onset o f nightfall and the oppor­ tunity to retreat. N o w badly shaken, he returned to Okahandja to await yet further reinforcem ents and the intense criticism that his failure was bound to draw. H e had already been reprimanded in February for his attempts to open negotiations w ith Sam uel, and had been told then by the direc­ tor o f the Colonial Departm ent that only unconditional surrender w ould be acceptable to Berlin. In defence o f his measures, Leutw ein had argued that consideration for the future o f the colony should have a bearing on m ilitary conduct. 'I do not concur,' he w rote, 'w ith those fanatics w ho want to see the H erero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a people o f some 60,000 to 70,000 is not so easy to annihilate, I w ould consider such a m ove a grave mistake from an eco­ nom ic point o f view . W e need the H erero as cattle breeders . . . and especially as labourers.’33 Harsh and cynical as it m ay have been, Leutw ein’s attitude came increasingly to seem like the voice o f sweet and kindly reason when com pared w ith the m ilitary policy subsequendy endorsed by his superiors. Backed by the Germ an em peror himself, the C h ie f o f General Staff, Count von Schlieffen, took over direction o f the war. N o w both he and the Kaiser had becom e convinced o f the need for a replacement com m ander-in-chief in South W est Africa. T he officer they eventually chose to succeed Leutw ein reflected the dominant m ood both o f the Germ an people and the settlers w ithin the colony. E ver since those fateful days in January when m any o f their neigh­ bours had been clubbed and horribly mutilated on their ow n ranches, the setders had been consumed by an overwhelm ing desire for revenge. ‘A ll you hear these days,' w rote one missionary, 'is words like “ make a clean sweep, hang them, shoot them to the last man, give no quarter". I shudder to think what m ay happen in the months ahead. T h e Germans w ill doubdess exact a grim vengeance.’34 T he fret that in the follow ing five months they did nothing o f the kind was, in a sense, the worst possible outcom e. For the H erero’s successes in the field w ere deeply hum iliating to a nation reputed to possess the w orld’s most pow erful and efficient m ilitary machine. Germ an anger and frustration increased almost daily, and in the absence o f concrete results, the w ar was fought all the m ore furiously 326

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on paper. W hat amounted to a national propaganda campaign included frequent allegations o f H erero atrocities on Germ an wom en and children. Typical was a passage in Gustav Frenssen’s Peter Moor’ s Journey to South West Africa, written to generate national feeling for a conflict which had been overshadowed by reports o f the R ussoJapanese W ar then raging in M ongolia. ‘In South W est A frica/ announced one o f the novel’s characters, ‘the blacks, like cowards, have treacherously murdered all the farmers and their w ives and children.’35 That these words, like so much o f contem porary w riting on the w ar, w ere an exaggeration was beside the point. Fact or fiction, they fuelled an anxiety to retrieve the nation’s honour and inflict a savage retribution. Representative o f this was an extraordinary letter, found amongst W ilhelm II’s correspondence, from an enraged m em ber o f the public offering advice on how to vanquish the unexpectedly difficult African foe. Its author suggested ‘that our soldiers, w henever they withdraw, thoroughly poison their water supplies.’ A fter all, w e are not fighting against an enem y respecting the rules o f fairness, but against savages. N ever must w e allow the N egroes to prevail. T he consequences o f such a victory w ould be dire indeed since even now the N egroes believe that Africa belongs to them, rather than to the Lord above.36 G iven the dramatic urgency surrounding the Germ an need for victory, the stage was set for the appointment o f a commander capable o f im plem enting the most ruthless measures. In Adrian D ietrich Lothar von Trotha, the German high command had found a man w illing to do their bidding - and m ore. B om in 1848, von Trotha was the scion o f an old aristocratic fam ily w ho, in the classic Junker tradition, had follow ed his father into the Prussian army. H e had experienced armed combat as early as 1866, in the Seven W eeks W ar against Austria. H ow ever, his tin t encounter with non-European opposition had not com e until 1894 w hen, as m ilitary commander in Germ an East Africa, he had successfully sup­ pressed the W ahehe revolt. A fter further years in Germ any and pro­ m otion to the rank o f m ajor-general by 1900, von Trotha commanded the First East-Asiatic Infantry Brigade in the com bined European sup­ pression o f the Chinese B o xer Uprising. In M ay 1904, the date o f his appointment as commander in South 327

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W est Africa, von Trotha was a pow erfully built 55-year-old w ith heavy Kitchener-like whiskers. In photographs from the period his free expressed firmness to the point o f severity, and was matched by a reputation, earned during his colonial years, for iron-fisted brutality and a deep disdain o f ‘rebellious natives*. ‘I know enough tribes in Africa,* he w rote som e months after his arrival in Germ an South W est Africa. 'T h ey are all alike. T hey only respond to force. It was and is m y policy to use force w ith terrorism and even brutality. I shall anni­ hilate the revolting tribes w ith riven o f blood and rivers o f gold. O nly after a com plete uprooting w ill som ething em erge.’37 It was a chilling indication o f what Theodor Leutw ein, w ho had retained his position as the colony’s civil governor, could expect from the new commander. C old, inflexible, narrow-m inded, von Trotha had jettisoned all considerations but outright victory. H e had no tim e to question what had sparked the uprising, nor whether the H erero should have a role in the colony once w ar had ended. His only con­ cern was their im minent destruction. Even Leutw ein him self was hardly given m ore consideration. O n reading the reports o f the w ar up to the time o f his arrival, von Trotha sneered: ‘T o me it seems like the aimless running around o f a lot o f rats w ith their tails entangled in the vicinity east o f Okahandja.’38 W hile sailing to Africa, von Trotha had forbidden Leutw ein to pro­ ceed w ith a proclam ation offering amnesty to all innocent H erero. H e had then ordered a general disengagement until preparations for a final showdown could be implem ented. For tw o months follow ing his arrival on 13 Ju n e 1904, he oversaw the establishment o f an elaborate communications system and supply dumps for the units w hich he now ringed around the H erero positions in the W aterberg Mountains. T he dinosaur footprints that are stamped into the ancient sandstone o f these relict mountains are testimony to their great age and to the m il­ lions o f years o f vertebrate occupancy. In places brick-red clifls rise sheer out o f the earth to form plateaux topped by rich vegetation. Dense stands o f trees - silver terminaba, w eeping wattle, w ild syringa, flame acacia and mimosa - hold the rainfall like a sponge, converting it at times into a green haven high above the region’s parched bushveld. It had been, and indeed remains, a natural focus for w ild gam e, and for centuries it was a H erero stronghold, a w elcom e retreat in times o f hardship, both environm ental and m ilitary. N o w Samuel and his people, possibly num bering as m any as 50,000, 328

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had gathered there to await the Germ an onslaught. O ver 200 kilom e­ tres north o f W indhoek, the H erero’s W aterberg encampment stretched the enem y’s supply lines to the lim it and took them into an area w ith w hich few w ere acquainted. T o the H erero, how ever, the W aterberg area was deeply fam iliar and provided the best possible grazing at a moment o f gathering crisis. Exacdy how extrem e this crisis was becom ing was apparent to Samuel as his patrols brought in report after report o f the massive build-up o f German forces. V on Trotha now had an army approach­ ing 5,000 m en, w ith 10,000 horses, thirty artillery pieces and tw elve m achine-gun units. His plan was to surround the H erero position at the southern edge o f the mountains w ith six detachments, co-ordinat­ ing movements through a signal post stationed on the top o f the W aterberg. T he encircling units w ere to prevent any H erero escape w hile the massively superior firepow er o f the Germans was ’to annihi­ late these masses w ith a simultaneous blow ’ .39 Stations w ould then be set up to com plete a search-and-destroy operation against those w ho had slipped the net. H ow ever, von Trotha’s plan had one strategic anomaly that others had not failed to notice. T o the south-east he had deployed only a com paratively small unit under M ajor van der H eyde. Later Leutw ein’s son claimed that his father and M ajor von E storff had both warned von Trotha o f the dangers inherent in this battle form ation. In the event o f a H erero breakthrough in this quarter, both men argued, the Africans w ould be forced to retreat into the jaw s o f a vast water­ less expanse known as the Om aheke. Unless they could som ehow cross this wasteland and continue into Bechuanaland it w ould be cer­ tain death for the w hole tribe. B ut von Trotha was adamant. So too w ere the general staff in Berlin, w ho folt that ’such an outcom e o f the battle could only be even m ore desirable in the eyes o f the Germ an Com m and because the enem y w ould then seal his ow n frite, being doom ed to die o f thirst in the arid sandveld.’40 This was a possible outcom e w hich von Trotha, bent on annihilation, seemed happy to contemplate. O n i i August 1904, the day chosen for attack, the general’s plans started to go aw ry almost im m ediately. B y early m orning Sam uel’s forces w ere engaged in fierce fighting against the main Germ an section, w hich had attacked from the south. Y e t neither o f the tw o flanking units, including that under M ajor van der H eyde, was able to support von Trotha as had been intended. A fter hours o f combat the 329

Rivers o f Blood, Rivers o f Gold Germ an artillery and m achin e-guns even tu ally began to impose them­ selves on the batde, a n d w ith von T ro th a’s eventual seizure o f the main waterholes — w h ich Sam uel had stubbornly defended and w ith­ out w hich his people w ould be unable to maintain resistance — the H erero position was critical. Assailed from three different directions and w ith von T rotha’s unit controlling the south, the $0,000 Africans and their catde w ere squeezed into a rectangle, sixteen kilom etres by eight, that was now being hammered by Germ an cannon. M ajor van der H eyde, m eanwhile, had had no im pact on the course o f the day’s fighting. O n the night before the battle he had got com ­ pletely lost in the dense bush and only stumbled on the right route w hen he heard the sound o f Germ an artillery pounding the H erero positions. B y the afternoon it was less a case o f him engaging the H erero, than them confronting him — the only link in the Germ an chain w ithout the strength to contain their headlong flight. As the retreating H erero swept south-eastwards it was only nightfall that saved van der H eyde’s section from com plete annihilation. T otally exhausted by a com plex m anoeuvre that had hardly achieved greater success than those com m anded by Leutw ein — H erero casualties w ere apparendy relatively light — the Germ an forces could now relax for the next tw enty-four hours.41 For, although they had not inflicted a m ajor defeat and although the enem y had escaped, they had m erely leapt straight through the trapdoor into the trap. T o Horst D rechsler, von T rotha’s deliberate disposition o f his forces to perm it such an outcom e was a calculated act o f genocide.42 H ow ever, for sym pathetic historians it was at w orst an oversight, and at best an expression o f the professional soldier’s self-justifying precept that all w ar was brutal. W hichever interpretation com es closest to von T rotha’s initial intentions, it cannot be doubted that w hen the Germ ans w ent in pursuit on 13 August they inflicted dreadful slaugh­ ter upon their opponents. Gustav Frenssen, com piling his fictional account from the first-hand experience o f Germ an soldiers, gave a graphic picture o f the H erero exodus. In the path o f their flight lay . . . catde and m en, dead and dying and stating blankly . . . A num ber o f babies b y helplessly bnguishing by m others w hose breasts hung dow n long and flabby. O thers w ere lying alone, still living, w ith eyes and nose frill o f flies . . . A ll this life b y scattered there, both man and beast, broken in the

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knees, helpless, still in agony or already m otionless . . . A t noon w e halted by the waterholes w hich w ere filled to the brim w ith corpses. W e pulled them out b y means o f the o x teams from the field pieces, but there was only a litde stinking bloody w ater in the depths . . ,43 T h e official history o f the cam paign, w hile acknow ledging that von Trotha ordered the execution o f all male combatants, claim ed that he gave instructions for w om en and children to be spared.44 Gerhard Pool also, stressing the im pact o f H erero suffering on even the m ost hardened troopers, described h ow the general found an abandoned infant at a w aterhole and put the child in the care o f a H erero wom an; how another tw o-year-old girl was discovered by Germ an soldiers and fed on goat's m ilk before they took her along in a w agon.45 Y e t these humane gestures must be set against other, less endearing incidents. A Baster interpreter, fo r exam ple, recalled on oath an occa­ sion w hen von Trotha was present at the discovery o f tw o old H erero w om en w ho had fallen behind through exhaustion. B oth w ere shot at the waterhole w here they rested. Another young w om an was first questioned by the general him self, then bayoneted on his instruction. T hen there was the testim ony from another Baster guide, w hich told how Germ an soldiers found a baby b oy in the bushes, and proceeded to throw the terrified infant from one to the other like a ball. A fter they had tired o f this form o f torture, one o f them fixed his bayonet and asked for the child to be tossed in his direction, w hen he trans­ fixed its body w ith the blade. A s the youngster w rithed in his death agony the other troopers greeted the feat w ith guffaws o f laughter.46 O ther eyewitnesses, som e o f them European, gave evidence con­ firm ing this new phase o f unopposed slaughter: o f young girls and w om en raped before being bayoneted; o f an elderly lady gathering w ild vegetables, shot through the forehead at point-blank range; o f old w om en, som e o f them blind, burnt alive in the hut w here they lay; o f a large body o f w arriors, disarmed and herded into a kraal, then slaughtered to a m an; o f another large group, lured in under truce for negotiations, and m ow n dow n w ith rifle and cannon; o f H erero men slow ly strangled w ith fencing w ire, and left hanging in row s like crow s; o f m en, w om en and children packed into a high thorn and log enclosure, doused w ith lamp oil and burnt to a cinder.47 V on T rotha’s policy o f no prisoners and no quarter, a violation o f 331

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international law , gradually becam e know n in Germ any through let­ ters hom e from his troops. B u t the general excused him self on the grounds that he had neither the supplies to feed prisoners, nor could he allow captive Africans to infect his m en w ith disease. And in the R eich stag the colonial director freed dow n allegations o f Germ an mis­ conduct w ith righteous indignation, claim ing that 'cruelty and brutal­ ity are alien to the Germ an character . . A 48 In fret, cruelty and brutality w ent on and on until the Germ ans could follow the retreating H erero no further. For the choking dust, bitterly cold w inter nights, the sheer desiccating emptiness o f the O m aheke spared no livin g creature, neither African nor European. Eventually the Germ ans’ horses and mules, exhausted by the chase, collapsed beneath them. T hen the m en, forced to drink at stinking waterholes littered w ith human and animal carcasses, started to die from typhoid. O n 30 Septem ber, von Trotha order the pursuit to be called off, but not before he had put into effect the recom m endations o f W ilhelm II’s anonym ous correspondent, and poisoned the w aterholes. R egu lar Germ an units stationed along 250 kilom etres o f the desert’s western fringe form ed a chain to prevent any return. T h e H erero, m eanwhile, im prisoned in the O m aheke, dug desperately in its lifeless sands for water. In som e places the Germans found a hundred separate holes, each tw o to three metres deep. In their craving for m oisture som e had drunk at the w om en’s breasts, or slit the throats o f their catde and drunk the blood. O thers had disem bowelled oxen and squeezed the stomach contents in the hope o f a few final drops o f fluid. These measures had given about a thousand, including Sam uel M aharero, the strength to reach British territory in Bechuanaland, but m ost sim ply succum bed to their exhaustion and lay dow n to die. A lucky few turned north and escaped to O vam boland. Those w ho tried to break through back towards the east w ere confronted by the Germ an troops. In his diary, von Trotha recorded an occasion w hen w om en and children had com e to him begging fo r water. H e had ordered them to be forced back into the bush at gunpoint. Alarm ed b y the ceaseless carnage, som e o f the old African officers like M ajor von E sto rff asked von Trotha to negotiate, but the general demanded that the slaughter go on. Gerhard Pool recorded that 'vo n E sto rff was so dissatisfied w ith this answer, that, rightly or w rongly, he labelled von Trotha a poor statesman and a cold-blooded person.’49 Had any doubt on the issue rem ained, the general laid it to rest a

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w eek later. O n i O ctober 1904, he put out the proclam ation w ith w hich his name w ill be fo r ever associated. It was his Vemichtungs Befehl, his ‘Exterm ination O rder’ , and in its dozen or so lines von Trotha offered the w orld a sum mation o f his genocidal hatred o f A frica and Africans, a life-negating testament to N am ibia’s darkest hour: I, the great general o f the Germ an troops, send this letter to the H erero People. H ereros are no longer Germ an subjects. T h ey have m urdered, stolen, they have cut o ff the noses, ears, and other bod­ ily parts o f w ounded soldiers and now , because o f cow ardice, they w ill fight no m ore. I say to the people: anyone w ho delivers one o f the H erero captains to m y station as a prisoner w ill receive 1,000 M arks. H e w ho brings in Sam uel M aharero w ill receive $,000 M arks. A ll the H ereros must leave the land. I f the people do not do this, then I w ill force them to do it w ith the great guns. A ny H erero found w ithin the Germ an borden w ith or w ithout a gun, w ith o r w ithout cattle, w ill be shot. I shall no longer receive any w om en or children; I w ill drive them back to their people o r I w ill shoot them. T his is m y decision for the H erero people. T h e G reat General o f the M ighty K aiser50 N ot surprisingly, a num ber in the old colonial governm ent w ere deeply disturbed by the general’s m ethods, but for Leutw ein, von Trotha’s hateful vision o f a tabula rasa was a total negation o f every­ thing he had sought to achieve in South W est A frica. Initially side­ lined by the general, he was then stripped o f most o f his political responsibility. T his was m ore than Leutw ein w ould endure, and he now asked to be relieved o f his duties. B u t von Trotha was undeterred. In a report to the general staff he placed the H erero’s destruction in the context o f his w ider vision for A frica. ’T his uprising,’ he w rote, ‘is and remains the beginning o f a racial struggle, w hich I foresaw for East A frica as early as 1897 in m y reports to the Im perial C hancellor.’51 T h e H erero w ar had represented m any things, but it had never been explicidy a racial w ar. O ccasionally, at great risk to them selves, the Africans had ensured the safety o f Germ an w om en and children, w hile Sam uel had even for­ bidden his m en to harm Germ an traders w ith w hom he had long and friendly relations. V iolence was specifically targeted at those identified as the authors o f colonial oppression. V on T rotha’s assessment was, 333

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therefore, a gross over-sim plification. Y e t, by virtue o f this crude analysis and his brutal m ethods, the general had steadily changed the nature o f the conflict. T ypically, the Germans now slaughtered Africans w ithin the w ar zone - H erero, Dam ara, even San — w ithout attem pting to distinguish friendly from hostile parties. Those not im m ediately assaulted, like the N am a, w ere nevertheless threatened w ith violence in the very near future. Sensing the indiscrim inate nature o f Germ an vengeance, the N am a chose to pre-em pt the inevitable. Forty-eight hours after the publica­ tion o f the Versnichtungs Befehl, the news came through that H endrik W itbooi had declared w ar on the Germ ans. T here was a double irony in this heroic and pathetic gesture by the ageing N am a leader. W hile it had fulfilled General von T rotha’s frise prophecy o f racial struggle, it had exposed the fallacy on w hich he had based his policy o f geno­ cide. For rather than submit m eekly to the Germ an terror, as the general believed they must, the Africans had risen up bravely and recklessly to confront it. T he reasons for the N am a’s belated decision to fight, although obscure to a European com m unity intent on scapegoats, w ere not dif­ ficult to fathom . For tw enty yean they had suffered the encroachm ent o f European pow er, and by January 1904 m any com m unities had been tricked or squeezed o ff large portions o f their land, w hile all w ere in the same state o f virtual rightlessness endured by the H erero. Y e t since the outbreak o f w ar, a num ber o f Germ ans had made no secret o f the fret that they w elcom ed the crisis as an opportunity to advance this process even further. Settlen called fo r the N am a to be disarmed, their tribal organisation dissolved and the people confined to reserves. Such proposals w ere w idely repeated in the colony’s newspapers and w ere hardly likely to be overlooked by Germ an-speaking Nam a. W hile Leutw ein condem ned this public speculation as both danger­ ous and prem ature, in private he was in agreem ent w ith the erosion o f N am a independence. ’O nce the H erero are defeated and disarm ed,’ he w rote to Berlin, ’w e w ill disarm the south. D estruction o f the tribal organisations, the institution o f locations and pass laws, w ill take place after the H ereros have been defeated.’52 As always w ith Leutw ein, his ultim ate objectives w ere barely distinguishable from those o f the most extrem e colonists. T h e only significant difference was his concern to attain his goals a little at a tim e. Y e t to the Africans Leutw ein’s methods had at least represented 334

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som e kind o f brake on the m ore aggressive im perialists. It was he, fur­ therm ore, w ho had established cordial relations over the years w ith a num ber o f the N am a captains, especially H endrik W itbooi. H is replacem ent by General von Trotha in late 1904 had broken that per­ sonal link. Sim ultaneously, and in apparent confirm ation o f the rum oured crackdown in Nam aqualand, the Germ ans had increased the size o f their southern garrison. It seemed to W itbooi that the w riting was on the w all. T hen cam e m ore disconcerting news. H endrik had earlier sent a hundred soldiers to act as scouts for the Germ ans against the H erero part o f a contingent he had traditionally provided during the previous decade, to assist Leutw ein at times o f A fro-G erm an conflict. O n this occasion, how ever, a num ber o f the m en had deserted and returned hom e w ith news o f the atrocities com m itted by von T rotha’s forces, o f the systematic elim ination o f the H erero, and o f the abuses inflicted on the W itbooi auxiliaries themselves. T h e last o f these allegations, acknowledged and lam ented by the Germ an governor him self, was a violation o f the tribe’s status as an ally. H endrik was horrified. Already susceptible to the dicta o f his inner voice, he was now further swayed (as Leutw ein was later to over-em phasise) by the fighting talk o f the Ethiopian M ovem ent ’prophet*, Sheppert Stürmann. In his letter to the governor justifying the decision to fight, W itbooi expressed deep rem orse that he had for so long cooperated w ith the Germ ans. N o w was his m om ent to redeem him self from past follies. T o the other N am a captains, H endrik urged that now was the m om ent to redeem A frica fo r Africans. M ost responded. T h e Bondelswarts, w ho had triggered the entire w ar, w ere one o f the few tribes that w ere split. A num ber o f them w ere seized im m ediately by the Germ ans before they could answer the call to arms. Y e t one o f their leaders, Jacob M orenga, had been involved in hostilities ever since the original conflict had ignited back in N ovem ber 1903. W hen Leutw ein had patched up relations w ith the tribe to enable his departure fo r the w ar in the north, this ‘rene­ gade* Bondelsw art was outlaw ed and a price placed on his head. M orenga, in fret, was o f m ixed blood, the offspring o f a H erero N am a union, and considered by Leutw ein to com bine the martial virtues o f both peoples. Before the w ar he had been w orking at a copper m ine in the British C ape, but had returned on hearing o f the hostilities. H e had enjoyed an excellent m ission-school education, was 335

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fluent in English, Germ an and Afrikaans and proved a brilliant guer­ rilla tactician. I f W itbooi has becom e in m ore recent times a heroic m odel for the country (indeed, H endrik’s unforgiving eyes gaze out on contem porary N am ibian life from all denom inations o f its cur­ rency) then M orenga should at least be honoured as an em bodim ent o f African unity for the new ly independent state. For he was, as the Germ an historian Horst D rechsler pointed out, the first indigenous leader in South W est Africa to be untouched by the old inter-tribal rivalries.53 H is vision o f m ilitary resistance to the Germans did not fade at the borders o f Bondelsw art territory, but em braced the w hole nation, w hile his partisan arm y com bined elements from m any tribes, including the H erero. That his defeat and death could only be engi­ neered through Germ an and British co-operation in som e ways reflected the threat that this ’new m an’ posed to the im perial policies o f both nations. B y the tim e o f W itbooi’s decisive call to arms, M orenga had already established him self as a focus for resistance, vilified in the European newspapers as ’an elusive brigand’, but acknowledged by indigenes and colonists alike as a type o f African R o b in H ood.54 Like Sam uel, he forbade his m en to harm non-com batants and also took and paroled prisoners. A fter successfully storm ing one m ilitary post he inform ed the authorities so they could give m edical attention to d ie w ounded. W henever he raided European farms and disarmed the occupants, he provided them w ith detailed requisition orders for the item s taken. His style o f com bat also included a sense o f hum our. A fter an ambush that deprived a Germ an com pany o f all its horses, he w rote a note to the im m obilised com m ander requesting that he lo o k after his nags better, to ensure they w ere w orthy o f theft. Such exploits earned the respect not only o f his European adversaries, but o f a flock o f African recruits. H is guerrilla force grew from only eleven at the tim e o f W aterberg, to about 400 by early 190$. M orenga’s m en represented about a fifth o f an entire N am a force o f ju st 2,000 soldiers, and theoretically it should have been a d eep ly uneven contest, a b rie f epilogue to the tale o f slaughter in H ereroland. Shortly after H endrik’s declaration, the Germans had m ore than 15,000 m en, 500 officers, 60 artillery and m achine-gun units, 20,0 00 horses, not to m ention almost lim idess reserves o f reinforcem ents, am m unition and equipm ent. T h e final outcom e was always, in a sense, a foregone conclusion. Y e t the w ar in the south lasted th re e times as long as that in H ereroland, and involved m ore than 2 0 0

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engagements. It w ould account for as m any Germ an lives and cost the taxpayer considerably m ore. It w ould defeat von Trotha’s m ilitary im agination, w hile his career in Germ an South W est Africa w ould end in the same am biguous m anner as Leutw ein’s. W hile the N am a lacked the num erical superiority enjoyed by the H erero, they benefited from a range o f logistical and tactical advan­ tages. T h e Germ ans had no railw ay in the south to supply themselves. Provisions to the only port at Liideritzbucht had then to be lugged by w agon across the N am ib’s shifting sands, a tortuous jou rn ey o f 250 kilom etres that could take three and a h alf w eeks. Nam aqualand was also hotter, drier and m ore broken by mountains and steep-sided gorges, o f w hich the Nam a made full use in their hit-and-run tactics. T h eir deep know ledge o f the country paid another crucial dividend. ‘ In the interior/ w rote one frustrated officer, ‘there w ere . . . num er­ ous waterholes, but they w ere know n to the natives and not to us. H endrik W itbooi can Uve w ith his people for months on end out in the Kalahari D esert and yet our maps showed the area to be com ­ pletely w aterless/55 N ot only was the terrain better suited to the Africans, the type o f com bat was also in their favour. Nam a methods w ere fundamentally different from those o f the H erero. In any conflict, the latter had always to take their catde herds into strategic consideration, fighting only in areas w here they could w ater and graze their animals. A t the end o f an engagement they needed to hold their ground to make their slow and cattle-hindered exit. For these reasons, and also to utilise their num erical strength against the Germans, they favoured pitched battles, in w hich European firepow er and discipline had eventually carried the day. T he N am a, how ever, operating in small groups unencum bered by Uvestock or fam ily units, w ere elusive, m obile and flexible. M obiUty and flexibiUty w ere not the Germ ans’ m ajor assets, nor was im agination von Trotha’s strongest suit. H e had been favoured earUer by a style o f warfare that suited his ow n forces, and the fret that he could call freely on the resources o f an embarrassed, i f not in­ furiated, Germ an state. B u t in Nam aqualand, w here the Africans sim ply m elted aw ay before his m en could lum ber out to find them , the general was at a loss to know what to do. H is instinctive reaction was to call for further massive support, requesting the construction o f a railw ay line to the southern interior. W hen this was turned dow n he called for a suspension o f operations, w hich was read as a signal in Berlin that the ideas had run out. T h e D irector o f the C olonial 337

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Departm ent w rote: ‘It is difficult to interpret this as anything else but a statement o f bankruptcy on the part o f General von Trotha . . . C oun t von Schließen and his associates largely share m y opinion.*56 B y 1905 widespread disillusionm ent w ith the w ar had set in amongst the Germ an troops. W hen their grievances started to appear in the Germ an press, the m ilitary authorities responded w ith a num ber o f executions amongst the ranks and dismissed the criticism as the w ork o f a few troublem akers. B u t the protests continued. T h e R eichstag heard com plaints that parents and relatives w ere notified o f combatants* deaths by open postcard.57 T h e local press also began to carp at von Trotha’s inability to bring hostilities to a close. In O ctober one Germ an correspondent reported that the general’s effort to repeat his encircling tactics o f the W aterberg had resulted in 1,20 0 Germ an troops closing in on nothing but the dry, clear, sparkling ether o f Nam aqualand, w hile W itbooi and his m en w ere 200 kilom etres further to the south. T h e correspondent w ent on: T his w ar is being conducted against a people w ho possess neither m oney nor resources o f their ow n. T h e greater portion o f the material w ith w hich they w age w ar against us they have captured from ourselves. T h e cattle w ith w hich they replenish their stock they have taken from us, and m any o f their weapons are our ow n arm y rifles. U p to date w e have not succeeded in capturing even one o f their ch ief leaders. T h e losses w hich w e have inflicted upon them are m ore than outw eighed by our ow n casualties, w hich have upon almost every occasion been greater than the enem y’s. That is the result o f one year’s cam paigning w hich has already cost 200 m illion M arks.58 It was not difficult to draw the unspoken conclusion. N o r w ould v o n Trotha have disagreed. H e did, how ever, w ant to depart w ith honour, and only days after the correspondent had filed his copy, fortune sm iled on the general. O n 29 O ctober, w hile leading an attack on a Germ an supply c o n v o y , H endrik W itbooi was w ounded. T h e old w arrior, then in his six ty eighth year, had inspired his m en to fight for over tw elve m onths, constantly eluding the Germans and raiding at w ill. H ie re w ere n o signs that he had intended to give up the struggle. That chance b u lle t, how ever, in the absence o f m edical attention, was a decisive b lo w 338

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against the N am a’s determ ination to continue. O ne British source gave W itbooi a hero’s burial on the field o f battle: ‘ H is only requiem was the screeching o f shells and the w histling o f Germ an bullets/59 A ccording to this account, H endrik’s son and a few follow ers laid him in a shallow grave disguised to avoid Germ an detection, w hile the rest o f the W itbooi force held o ff the European advance. Less than a m onth later, the Germ an com m ander, w ho had described the news o f H endrik’s death as a ‘beautiful message’ , felt he now had grounds to retire in the m anner he intended.60 T o cap it all he had received further great tidings. In the same year that one o f his countrym en had published the special theory o f relativity and a fellow Germ an speaker issued his Jokes and their Relations to the Unconscious, the general him self had earned the renow n o f his nation. Ju st days before his embarkation on 19 N ovem ber 1905, he leam t that his legacy to South W est Africa —a thousand African dead for each o f his sixty steps up the gang plank —had w on him the order Pour le M érite from the Kaiser. T h e honour, how ever, carried the slightest o f taints. O n the occasion o f his award, a low ly captain and a m ajor w ere dec­ orated w ith the same m edal. T h e first o f these, Captain Franke, the man w ho had led the re lief o f W indhoek, was acknowledged as the true ’popular hero o f the South W est Africa W ar'.61 T h e four principal players in the w ar - T heodor Leutw ein, Sam uel M aharero, Lothar von Trotha and H endrik W itbooi - had all now vanished from the scene. W ith Sam uel’s exile in Bechuanaland his nation had been reduced to a shattered remnant, w hile H endrik's death had robbed the N airn o f their outstanding leader, and his ow n W itbooi people o f the w ill to continue. A large body o f them capitu­ lated w ith one o f their sub-chiefs only a w eek after the Germ an general’s departure. Although the colony w ould remain on a w ar foot­ ing for a further eighteen months, it was the beginning o f the end o f the Nam a rising. B y February 1906 the W itbooi diehards had also had enough. O nly a few small bands rem ained at large and the w ar was closing m uch as it had opened. T h e men o f W arm bad, w ho had watched in grow ing anger as their c h ie f had been seized by the im pulsive Lieutenant Jobst almost three yean before, and w hose retaliatory action had sparked the African revolt, w ere now am ong the last in the field. Forem ost amongst them was M orenga. In 1905 the Germ ans had lost tw o m ajor battles to his forces and even the general staff conceded 339

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that 'H is conduct o f the w ar has som ething grand about it and is in its form far superior to that o f all the other native leaders. A ll in all, an outstanding soldier, to w hom w e as the enem y do not w ish to deny our respect/62 T h ey did, how ever, neglect to respect international borders, and w hen M orenga’s m en retreated into the territory o f British South Africa in M arch 1906, the Germ ans follow ed, launching a surprise attack in w hich the African leader was w ounded. W hen M orenga gave him self up to British police tw o months later, the Germ an authorities w ere euphoric. T h e w ar had ground on fo r far too long. E ven von Trotha’s stomach fo r the fight had w eakened before his exit. From the blood and thunder o f his Exterm ination O rder, he had shifted to a position w here the N am a w ere offered food and em ploym ent i f they gave themselves up. A fter his departure the Germ an m ilitary authorities abandoned the hard line altogether, and w hen one Bondelswarts group finally laid dow n their arms in D ecem ber 1906, a negotiated truce allow ed them 1,50 0 head o f catde, the retention o f their lands as free people and 300 sheep together w ith a team o f oxen for their captain. From a position w here, over the heads o f a civil adm inistration, the com m anding officer had dem anded the Africans’ total submission o r annihilation, m atten had com e full circle. N o w it was the colony's governor, Friedrich von Lindequist (the man w ho had prosecuted N ikodem us a decade earlier), w ho called for the N am a’s unconditional surrender, w hile the m ilitary offered to negotiate. T hree yean o f costly fighting had forced the learning curve to rise steeply and they intended to end the w ar by political m anoeuvre. O ne N am a force under their leader Sim on K ooper was punued deep inside British territory by a Germ an detachm ent three times the size o f their ow n and ambushed, in violation o f international law . A fter K ooper had fought this attack o ff w ith huge losses amongst his m en, the Germ ans finally bought him o ff in 1908. K ooper setded in Bechuanaland until his death in 19 13 , draw ing £ 6 0 o f Germ an gold a year, disguised as a British pension in return for good behaviour. Although K ooper had been the last N am a leader to abandon the struggle, fo r the Germ ans his rem oval had been a subordinate goal. A fter H endrik W itbooi, M orenga had always represented the greatest threat. W hile his seizure by the C ape police had been balm fo r Germ an nerves, his release m ore than a year later, in Ju n e 190 7, brought the colony once again to fever pitch. T he governor described 340

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it as 'like an electric shock, causing great excitem ent am ong the natives, all the w ay to the north’.63 Although the state o f w ar had been lifted three months earlier, news o f his return led to the cancellation o f troop ships to Germ any, and a large force, including tw elve com ­ panies, three field batteries, four platoons o f m ountain artillery and four m achine-guns, was assembled in the south. O ne man w ho seemed to have learnt nothing from the years o f fighting was the Kaiser. H e now ordered his m en to 'put a price o f 20,000 M arks on M orenga’s head and to w ipe out the w hole bunch w ithout m ercy’.64 Germ an soldiers had been attem pting to achieve this w ithout any suc­ cess since 190 3, and at least then M orenga had been in the colony. N o w they needed subder m ethods. T h e new Germ an governor, therefore, w rote to his opposite num ber in the C ape, playing on the m utual benefits o f M orenga’s elim ination, w hile a Germ an staff officer was duly attached to the British border police. W hen the A frican leader made a break for the border, the Europeans w ere given their opportunity. M orenga was trailed to the southern edge o f the Kalahari, and after a four-hour gun batde on Friday 20 Septem ber 1907, he, his brother and tw o o f his cousins w ere shot dead. It rem ained only to square K ooper in his Bechuanaland lair, and the fire o f rebellion was finally out. T h e South W est African w ar could never have been in any sense a close-run thing. Like the Apache, the people o f South W est A frica could field only a small, irreplaceable force, w hile their subsistence resources could only dw indle, unless enlarged by further capture. T h e Germ ans, on the other hand, had only to w ait for the massive build­ up o f troops and matériel to enjoy an overw helm ing superiority in all areas. T im e, therefore, had always been on their side. H ow ever, i f victory had never been in doubt, it had certainly been dearly bought. G erm any’s 'bloodiest and most protracted colonial w ar’ had lasted four years, involved 17,000 European troops, wasted the Uves o f 2,000 and cost 600 milUon M arks, the equivalent o f £ 2 0 milUon sterling. And, had they but know n, w ithin seven years o f M orenga’s death the Germans w ould surrender their bitterly contested colony to the invading forces o f British South Africa. For the losing side, the w ar was nothing short o f a catastrophe. It was, according to one historian, 'on e o f the five great revolts against early colonial rule in A frica’ .65 It was also the last m ajor w ar in the scramble fo r A frica and it had cost the colonised peoples everything.

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T h e N am a and the H erero lost betw een a h alf and three-quarters o f their total numbers. T h ey w ere reduced to a landless proletariat, ground under by one o f the most oppressive colonial regim es on the continent. E ven ‘liberation’ by the British forces o f 19 14 w ould bring little change in their fortunes, and it w ould take a further seventy-five years o f struggle, latterly on the field o f com bat, before their rights w ere genuinely restored.

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~ it it had becom e apparent to General von Trotha that the erero’s com plete extirpation was a goal im possible o f attainent, he had been forced to seek assistance from a com m unity he had consistently reviled. T h e R henish M issionary Society, retaining some o f the credibility enjoyed in peacetim e, was charged w ith traw l­ ing H ereroland to locate rem aining African bands and to encourage their assembly at special reception stations. B y M ay 1906 these camps held 14,769 people — a rump population, largely reduced to skin and bone, that was then subjected to a second phase o f persecution. A w ork-force o f 2,200 H erero m en, w om en and children had already been deployed by the colony’s administrators on the O tavi railway. T h e rest o f the camps’ inmates now join ed them in a system o f virtual slave labour, w hile the camps themselves w ere closed in August 1906 on the pretext that such a concentration o f H erero rep­ resented a threat to die colon y.1 B y the end o f 1905 the Germ an authorities had prepared the legislation to underpin the process o f enslavem ent. Central to this was an Expropriation O rder w hich W ilhelm II, taking tim e out amidst the royal fam ily’s Christm as celebrations, brought into effect on 26 D ecem ber. It was an ill-tim ed expression o f Christian heartlessness, legitim ising the seizure o f the ’entire m oveable and fixed property o f the tribe* - their land and cattle.2 A resolution passed b y the R eichstag, w hich called for the H erero’s retention o f pasture sufficient to maintain their traditional econom ic life, was circum vented by the C olonial Departm ent and the colony’s adm inistration. Since the H erero had no cattle, ran the callous and dishonest solecism , they had 343

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no need o f any land. In M ay 1907 d ie w hole o f N airn territory, except that o f the Berseba tribe, jo in ed H ereroland as governm ent property. In the early days the colonists’ treatment o f their captive labour force was litde short o f a continuation o f von Trotha’s policy o f anni­ hilation by other means. T ypical w ere the cruelties inflicted on those sent to w ork in Swakopm und. ‘T h ey suffered greatly from the cold,’ w rote the m issionary H einrich Vedder: T h eir clothing had long since been tom to tatters. M en and wom en w ithout w ent about in sacking, their only protection from the cold. M any got inflam m ation o f the lungs and died. D uring the w orst period an average o f 30 died daily. It was the w ay the system w orked.3 W hen V edder and others questioned the system, they received evasive replies. T h e Okahandja commandant in charge o f prisoner distribu­ tion, w hile acknow ledging that Africans ‘should be strong and healthy in the interests o f labour and also o f hum anity’, refused to lim it service to those capable o f perform ing it. T h e old, the lam e, the sick had to go to m ake up numbers. It was also difficult, he argued, ‘to send back the w eak H ereros interned in Swakopm und as suggested . . . because there are no replacem ents for them .’4 Absent from this m oral non sequitur was any concern to safeguard the w ork-force, even sim ply as a non-renew able resource. In its place was the logic o f E l D orado - an all-consum ing mania for the satisfaction o f im m ediate European needs, irrespective o f its human cost. For the N am a, i f anything, matters w ere w orse. Paul R ohrbach, the colony’s econom ic adviser, accurately reflected settler attitudes w hen he w rote that ‘the Hottentots are generally regarded . . . as useless . . . providing no justification fo r the preservation o f the race . . . [This] led to their losses being regarded w ith indifference, i f not w ith satis­ faction.’5 B y M arch 1907 die Germans must have been w ell pleased w ith their adm inistration’s progress in this field. In holiday guidebooks to contem porary N am ibia, Shark Island receives notice usually as the site o f a plaque com m em orating the Germ an m erchant w ho gave his name to the port opposite, Lüderitz. Perhaps the guidebooks' w hite authors considered it too insignificant, too macabre o r too shameful to record that Shark Island was also the Germ ans’ chosen location for N am a internm ent. W ithin w eeks o f 344

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their transfer in Septem ber 1906, itself a violation o f the agreed sur­ render terms, Shark had becom e a mass grave fo r the im prisoned N am a. Starved, overw orked, and susceptible to its cold clim ate, their numbers dwindled daily. In ju st one four-w eek period, 276 perished. V on EstorfF, the Germ an officer opposed to von T rotha’s merciless policies, now w rote a report recom m ending the return o f at least w om en and children to a m ore wholesom e clim ate. W ith all the frozen inhum anity o f an SS officer or, indeed, o f a British official in charge o f concentration camps in the B o er W ar (the exam ple cited by the Germ an bureaucrat to ju stify his ow n actions) the request was turned dow n, on the grounds that it endangered secu­ rity in the colony. B y A pril 1908, seven months after the N am a’s deportation, 1,0 32 o f 1,79 5 had died. O f the 24$ m en still alive by that date, only tw enty-five w ere in a condition to w ork. These methods w ere replicated w herever prisoners w ere held. A ccording to the Germ ans’ ow n report, m ore than forty-five per cent, 7,682 o f approx­ im ately 17,000 H erero and N am a, had died betw een 1904 and 1907.6 T h e exact scale o f the tragedy inflicted on the people o f South W est A frica betw een these yean has been an issue o f vigorous and recurrent debate. C learly, the greater the num ber o f casualties, the m ore firm ly could G erm any’s accusen press the charge o f genocide. H ow ever, any accurate assessment depends on the reliability o f tw o other statistics: the before and after censuses o f H erero and N am a populations. O nly one o f these — an official estimate from 1 9 1 1 , giving figures o f 15 ,13 0 H erero and 9,781 N am a - has been accepted as the num ber o f sur­ vivors.7 D ebate centres, therefore, on the tribes’ pre-w ar totals. Various counts had been done before the conflict and w ere acknowledged in their tim e as reliable. In 1874 die R everen d Irle, a missionary amongst the H erero, suggested betw een 70,000 and 80,000 for that tribe, and 20,000 Nam a. In his ow n book, Leutw ein accepted these figures as an accurate reflection o f tribal populations on his arrival in 1894. A further Germ an estimate, published by Captain Schwabe a decade later, also supported diese totals.8 In 1905 the British newspaper The Times, using Germ an m ilitary inform ation, suggested a H erero population o f between 60,000 and 80,000, and possibly as high as 100,ooo.9 E ven in 1908, w hen international questions over Germ an methods had already started to arise, the novelist Frenssen w rote o f a ‘savage furious people num bering sixty thousand’ .10 W hy should a range o f estimates all in general agreem ent and 345

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acceptable at the tim e o f publication suddenly cease to be valid for subsequent authors on South W est African history? W hat deep and unspoken anxieties com pelled the R everen d V edder to such extra­ ordinary circum locution w hen discussing H erero numbers in the 1 920s? ‘O ne w ould not be w ron g/ he w rote after his estimate o f 33,000, ‘in assuming that in ancient times they w ere double this num ber/ [author’s italics]11 W hy should Israel Goldblatt w rite: ‘It is im possible to arrive at any reliable figure o f the num ber o f H ereros w ho w ere killed or w ho died during the cam paign and it is therefore im possible to be able to state . . . that only one tenth o f the popula­ tion survived’?12 W hy should Gerhard Pool suggest ‘the historian is unable to give accurate figures concerning the num ber o f H ereros at the outbreak o f the w ar, the num ber w ho w ere present at W ateiberg in August, those w ho died during the w ar and the num ber that sur­ vived ’?13 W hy? Because it was a w ay o f deflecting attention from and o f blurring the w hole issue o f Germ an atrocities. For V edder it was almost as i f to have stated a num ber outright w ould have been to utter the hated charge o f genocide itself. And, in a sense, it was. For, to offer any ante-bellum figures for H erero and Nam a populations is to indicate the scale o f their decline as a result o f Germ an policies W hat m any historians wanted to avoid acknow ledging was that approxi­ m ately three-quarters o f the H erero and m ore than h alf the N am a died in the three-year period. Perhaps even m ore dam ning was the sixty per cent reduction o f the Damara: they had not even been party to the conflict. A total o f about 75,000 African inhabitants perished in the w ar.14 E ven i f one accepts that the precise num ber o f African casualties was uncertain, there is little doubt that a policy o f exterm ination enjoyed w ide Germ an support. Leutw ein had w ritten in the early stages o f the w ar ‘o f those fanatics w ho want to see the H erero destroyed altogether’ - a statement closely echoing the m issionary w ho had noted the settlers’ constant boast to ‘M ake a clean sw eep , hang them , shoot them to the last man*.15 Significantly, Leutw ein h ad countered such view s, partly on the grounds ‘that a people o f som e 60,000 to 70,000 is not so easy to annihilate’ .16 It is apparent from b o th o f these sources that von T rotha’s announcem ent o f his Vemichtungs Befehl reflected a general m ood amongst settlers and was the articula­ tion o f their ow n pre-existing objectives. T h e general’s extrem e methods also enjoyed support in Berlin, e v e n 346

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at the highest levels. As w e have seen, the possibility o f die H erero’s desert exodus had been anticipated w ell before the Battle o f W aterberg and approved b y the general staff. M oreover, the official report concerning events after the batde positively crow ed over the subsequent Germ an thoroughness: T his bold enterprise shows up in the most brilliant light the ruthless energy o f the Germ an com m and in pursuing their beaten enem y. N o pains, no sacrifices w ere spared in elim inating the last remnants o f enem y resistance. Like a w ounded beast the enem y was tracked dow n from one w ater-hole to the next, until finally he becam e the victim o f his ow n environm ent. T h e arid O m aheke was to com ­ plete what the Germ an arm y had begun: the exterm ination o f the H erero nation . . ,17 W hen it came to assessing the m orality o f such an outcom e the authors w ere com pletely resolute. H ow could the Germ ans be in any w ay culpable, w hen they and the Sandveld had served m erely as agents in som e divine ju dicial process? ‘T h e court had now concluded its w ork o f punishm ent/ the report continued. 'T h e H ereros had ceased to exist as an independent tribe/ Although von T rotha’s Vemichtungs Befehl was eventually counter­ manded by his superiors, von Schlieffen, the C h ie f o f G eneral Staff, had initially upheld it. It was only the furore o f opposition in the Reichstag, from Leutw ein, the missionaries and sections o f the Germ an public, that forced him to reconsider. B u t in a subsequent assessment o f the general's measures, it was not any m oral im plication that troubled Schlieffen. 'G eneral von T rotha’s intention is adm irable/ he w rote. 'U nfortunately he does not have the pow er necessary to im plem ent his plans. H e must rem ain at the edge o f the O m aheke and cannot drive the H ereto out.’ 18 Schlieffen’s w orries centred on its practical feasibility. Since he recognised that von T rotha’s plan 'could not be carried through successfully in the free o f the present opinion’ , he yielded to the view s o f the Germ an chancellor, Prince von B iilo w , w ho w rote to the K aiser asking fo r the order to be rescinded.19 W ilhelm II was apparendy ‘extrem ely reluctant* to abandon his general. O nly after thirteen days’ delay was von Trotha finally ordered to reverse his policy.20 It is clear that there had been an im portant lobby throughout all 347

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layers o f Germ an society predisposed to a policy o f exterm ination, but w h y should this have been the case? T h e question is all the m ore intriguing in view o f the fact that at the outset o f the Germ an im per­ ial career in 1884, Bism arck had him self convened a conference in B erlin , attended by the colonising pow ers o f Europe, w hich had agreed new standards o f humanitarian conduct. H ollow as these pub­ lic statements m ay always have been, the Germans had not sim ply overlooked the m oral and physical welfare o f Africans, but pursued policies that w ere an absolute negation o f their proclaim ed intention. T h e reason for this lies only partly in their axiom atic perception o f Africans as inferiors. Paradoxically, the critical factor driving them towards a genocidal policy was a concern that these tribal peoples had shown potential w ell beyond their allotted station. T ru e, until the out­ break o f w ar, the Germ ans had acted, like all European colonists, on the assumption that they w ere not dealing w ith equals. Ju st as the em bryonic science o f anthropology envisioned a gradual pattem o f historical im provem ent amongst the human species, culm inating in w hite European, industrial m an, so livin g African society must obey that same rigid teleological process. A t each step, the rough slouch o f its prim itives w ould be m odified, until it had m etam orphosed totally into the buoyant march o f tw entieth-century civilisation. And i f it was necessary to use violence in order to cram this perceived scheme o f m illennial change into ju st tw enty years o f colonial activity, then so be it. T h e settlers’ petition defending their use o f whips was a classic expression o f that coercive ideology. T he Africans, they argued, had grow n used to laziness, brutality and stupidity from ’tim e im ­ m em orial'. So m uch so that ’any w hite man . . . finds it almost im pos­ sible to regard them as human beings.’ T he answer was ’centuries o f training as human beings’ . Since no individual Germ an had the luxury o f such a tim e span, they must force the tem po like jo ckeys in a race, w ith constant use o f the sjam bok, the hippo- or rhino-hide w hip. Germ an setders excused their brutal behaviour by placing it w ithin the context o f an intrinsic ’law ’ (’the natural right o f the strongest’ w as h ow one W indhoek editorial put it), so that w hen they applied the accelerator to social change, w hen they thrashed Africans into accept­ ing European m odels o f land-ownership and land-use, they w ere sim ply acting as autom atic cogs in determ inist m achinery.21 B y spurring on only what was inevitable, they w ere absolved from an y

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m oral debate. Fused w ith these social D arw inian notions was the quasi-religious, and deeply contradictory, conviction that evolution did, in fact, fulfil a m oral purpose: the developm ent o f the most pow erful, the most advanced, most intelligent civilisation on earth. Europeans w ere at once the apex o f a determinist process, but also the free agents o f their ow n superiority. It was their duty to im pose themselves on the rest o f the w orld. As one o f the characters in Frenssen’s w ar novel announces: ‘T o the nobler and m ore vigorous belong? the w orld. That is the justice o f G o d /22 V iolence to Africans and to African society, in the cause o f their assimilation into European society, had a m oral im pera­ tive — it was being cruel to be kind. A W indhoek official, the inap­ propriately named K arl D ove, expressed it in inverse form w hen he w rote ‘Leniency towards the natives is cruelty to the whites*23 — an eerie pre-echo o f another Germ an w riting in justification o f a m ore radical program m e o f social change: ‘Kindness here . . . w ould be ju st about the greatest cruelty to our ow n people* — the w ords o f A d o lf H ider on the eve o f the final solution.24 H ow ever, in South W est Africa there was an additional elem ent that helps explain the Germans* recourse to a genocidal policy. For tw enty years European expropriation had gone on unabated and largely unchallenged. Although there had been armed responses, notably by H endrik W itbooi, there had been nothing to halt, let alone reverse, colonial encroachm ent. T here had been, therefore, no serious challenge to the ideas on w hich G erm any’s nascent im perialism had been founded. W ith the w ar o f 1904 all this was suddenly throw n into confusion. T h e H erero’s uprising occasioned a deep sense o f outrage, w hich operated on tw o distinct levels. B y m urdering scores o f farmers and cutting o ff their testicles, the Africans had violated in the most direct, brutal fashion the physical and political body o f the Germ ans. H ow ever, this they could perhaps understand. It was at least behaviour that fitted the Europeans’ a priori vision o f Africans. W hat w ere they i f not savages, devoid o f m oral standards, barbarous devourers o f human flesh? W hat was m ore difficult to com e to terms w ith was the w ay in w hich the H erero had violated the roles the Germ ans had allotted them in their im aginative schema. E very system o f com m unication had reaffirm ed an im age o f blacks as inferiors, h alf humans, cow ardly, ignorant baboons, bom to suc­ cum b to a higher civilisation, to labour and toil in the interests o f a 349

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superior Germ an race. Y e t the H erero had had the tem erity to renounce these fictive stereotypes, to assert their ow n reality and inde­ pendence, inflicting grievous losses on Germ an populations and then holding their ow n on the field o f com bat. T h e H erero uprising, m inor in terms o f its m ilitary challenge to the Germ an state, was the most profound threat to the conceptual fram ew ork on w hich they had based their im perialism . And the longer Germ an soldiers failed to sub­ due these half-naked savages, the deeper was the trauma for a people w ho had been constantly reassured that they w ere the greatest m ilitary nation on earth. T h e resulting confusion, though never acknow ledged, was im plicit in m uch that the Germ ans said o r did. It was, for instance, classically illustrated in the letter sent to the K aiser and quoted in the previous chapter, w hich recom m ended the poisoning o f their w ater supply. T his should be done, argued its author, ‘in order to give that race an idea o f the pow er w e w ield over them .' I f such a stratagem w ere an expression o f the Germ ans' overw helm ing superiority it was also, surely, an indication o f m ilitary insecurity, resorted to out o f deep fears for an opponent w ho had suddenly revealed new , unexpected pow ers. And that precise anxiety was acknow ledged, w hen he added: ‘N ever must w e allow the N egroes to prevail.’25 T h e provision o f von Trotha w ith such overwhelm ingly superior forces was itself an expression o f their unstable oscillation between p re­ sumed dominance and vulnerability. O n the one hand, it demonstrated the Germans’ invincible m ilitary strength, yet it also im plied the per­ ceived magnitude o f threat posed by the H erero. V on Trotha made even m ore explicit that polarity in the Germ an response w hen he w rote: ‘there could be no question o f negotiations . . . unless w e wanted to betray our im potence and confusion.*26 According to this logic, killing had developed its ow n im perative, out o f the Germ ans' neurotic fears o f insecurity. Schlieffen echoed the refusal to negotiate, because, as he put it, ‘A fter what has happened the co-existence o f whites and blacks w ill be very d ifficu lt. . . R ace war, once it has broken out, can only be ended by the destruction o f one o f the parties.’27 N egotiation was out o f the question because it w ould have dem anded that the Germ ans perm it the truth about Africans to perco­ late through the lifeless crust o f prejudice and m isconception on w hich they had based their treatment. T h ey w ould have had, literally, to re-im agine w ho they w ere fighting and their entire relationship to these other people. Em otionally and intellectually that w ould have 350

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been too costly and too painful. Better to soldier on, pouring in resources - to a total equivalent in m odem values o f U S $ 1 .5 billion until the bitter end, until the object that had occasioned such inner turm oil was rem oved altogether. South W est A frica Should be ju st that colony,* w rote von T rotha, the man w ho personified the Germ an identity crisis, 'w here the European him self can w ork . . . w ith a fair amount o f security.’28 That inner state could only be predicated on the com plete elim ination o f the H erero. T h e refusal to renegotiate their im age o f the African helps explain m uch about the nature o f the Germ an cam paign. It sheds light on the obsessive search for excuses and scapegoats: anything that enabled the a priori version o f Africa to remain intact; anything that released them from any painful self-exam ination. It helps account for the persistence in a m ilitary policy that was com pletely disproportionate either to the m ilitary threat o r to the econom ic value o f the colony itself. For to have allow ed the N egro to prevail w ould have underm ined Germ any’s entire im perial adventure. Finally, it helps clarify w h y the Germans refused to discrim inate hostile from ’friendly’ A frican, H erero from Damara. Better to get rid o f them all than to engage in any com plicated sifting o f their ow n black stereotypes. T h e subsequent instability in the Germ an im age o f their A frican opponent resulted also in a num ber o f extraordinary ironies, o f w hich the Germans remained determ inedly unaware. O ne o f the most strik­ ing arose from their portrayal o f the fighting H erero as bestial cow ­ ards: 'I saw a black, half-naked figure like an ape, holding his gun in his m outh and clim bing w ith hands and feet into a tree’ ; ’the blacks, like cowards, have treacherously m urdered all the farmers, and their w ives and children’ (Frenssen); ’they have m urdered and robbed and cut o ff the ears and noses and other parts o f the body o f w ounded soldiers, and now out o f cow ardice they refuse to fight’ (von Trotha).29 Y e t a European nation at w ar required its form al infrastructure o f praise to support and validate the deeds o f its soldiers. A nd so there w ere the custom ary distribution o f medals, the necessary w ords o f com m endation. A fter O tjihinam aparero, for instance, there was W ilhelm U’s message o f congratulation extolling the bravery o f his soldiers and marines. In January 1905 The Times, in its audit o f m ilitary honours, reported that ‘So far 39 officers and 286 men have m et a hero’s death.’30 Y e t until that point nobody seemed to question h ow one becam e a hero by fighting ignorant, cow ardly baboons. W hen the

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General S taff eventually addressed the contradiction and conceded the corollary o f Germ an valour — that die Africans had been a brave and intelligent opposition - they hit on a novel form ula for expressing their regard. T h e H erero had not been as brave as Germ ans, but m ore form idable enem ies than the Boers.31 It was a highly revealing com ­ parison, suggesting an adversary that by no means dim inished the rep­ utation o f the Germ an troops. Y e t by choosing the Boers, a w hite people w idely regarded as having gone native (but also, incidentally, a nation that had almost fought o ff the m ight o f the British em pire), the General Staff had fallen short o f offering the H erero martial parity w ith a European nation. T h e m ore central and tragic irony o f the w ar is that nothing had m ore com pletely blurred the presum ed m oral and intellectual distinc­ tions betw een the tw o races. Y e t never had the tw o been m ore com ­ pletely and ruthlessly separated than in the w ar's aftermath. T h e events betw een 1904 and 1907 im posed a psychological chasm betw een the black and w hite peoples o f South W est A frica w hich has only been allow ed to heal towards the close o f the tw entieth century. O n an ethical plane, the H erero and N am a had clearly sought to prove a general m oral w orth and the justice o f their case through the m ilitary standards they adopted. Alm ost w ithout exception they spared w om en, children, non-Germ an whites and non-com batant Africans. T h e charges o f indiscrim inate m urder that form ed a part o f the Germ ans’ anti-African propaganda seem all the m ore vicious in view o f the considerable efforts taken by H erero and Nam a figh ten to separate out the innocent from am ong their opponents. In fact, leaden like Jacob M orenga adopted standards m ore rem iniscent o f m edieval chivalry than o f m odem warfare. In justification o f their ow n m ethods, von Trotha had made great play o f the Germ ans’ deep abhorrence o f the H erero’s castration o f the dead. It was singled out for specific emphasis in the Vemichtungs Befehl as a practice that made forfeit any subsequent right to humane treat­ m ent. Y e t as the m issionary Irle pointed out, the castrations had often been done 'in the case o f whites w ho have raped their [African] w om enfolk in the most brutal m anner.’32 I f the m oral case was generally in the Africans’ favour, the distinc­ tions betw een their respective mental capacities, as expressed through m ilitary com petence, was at least blurred. T he Germ ans had certainly w on the w ar against the H erero convincingly, but victory had not relied on outstanding generalship. N either Leutw ein nor von T rotha

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had show n exceptional tactical suprem acy over the H erero. A t O vium bo, im plem enting the lessons learnt at O ngandjira, Sam uel had carefully neutralised Germ an firepow er by exploiting the terrain and dense bush, and had com e w ithin a w hisker o f a m ajor victory. A t O w ikokorero and O kaharui other commanders had successfully exploited the tactics o f ambush. B efore von T rotha’s arrival both casu­ alty figures and m ilitary successes w ere almost equally divided betw een the tw o parties. T h e Ñ am a, i f anything, had shown themselves to be tactically in advance o f their opponents. Far few er in num ber, they had inflicted as m any losses, sustained the w ar for longer and exhausted m ore Germ an resources than the H erero. T h ey had proved themselves masters o f guerrilla warfare, skilfully exploiting their know ledge o f the environ­ m ent and surprise tactics. Because o f the H erero’s reliance upon their cattle herds and Sam uel's apparent concern to surround him self w ith his people, von Trotha had been allow ed to bring his enorm ously superior firepow er to bear on the cam paign. T h e N am a, by contrast, never gave the opportunity for a pitched battle and in those circum ­ stances the general was at a loss to know how to confront them. For the people o f South W est Africa the w ar had involved the most dramatic assertion o f their rights and qualities as human being?. B y their actions — their civilised treatment o f the innocent, their tactical com petence, not to m ention their courage - they had blurred the racial distinctions w hich the colonists had so cherished and w hich had form ed the basis o f their im perial ideology. Alm ost as i f shattered by such an assault on their Weltanschauung, the Germ ans reacted w ith a policy o f rigid racial segregation once victory was secured. Although all land had been legally transferred to w hite ownership by the Expropriation O rder o f 1905, provision had been made for the governor to grant permission for land rights at his discretion. In the event, the governor never exercised this prerogative during the period o f Germ an rule. T h e right o f Africans to rear cattle o r horses was only allow ed exceptionally after 19 12 .33 These measures w ere supported b y a ban on m ore than ten families o r individual labourers living on a single plot. ‘E very tribal organisa­ tion,’ w rote the deputy governor, ‘w ill cease. W erfe [settlements] deep in the bush w hich try to avoid political supervision w ill not be toler­ ated. T h ey w ould provide focal points for m em ories o f tribal life and days w hen the Africans ow ned the land.’34 T his systematic coercion fulfilled a double objective: it sought to elim inate com pletely indige­ 353

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nous culture and gave the Africans only one option for survival. H ow ever, as the R everen d V edder put it, w ith staggering com pla­ cency: ‘T h e com pulsion to w ork was not regarded as an injustice, for having lost their form er possessions o f catde they realised the necessity to earn their livin g by manual labour.’35 Ju st in case they failed to appreciate the necessity, pass laws w ere instituted m aking it an offence to be w ithout a recognised means o f livelihood — in effect a jo b on a Germ an farm . Those w ithout such a w ork contract w ere w ithout legal rights and could be arrested for vagrancy. Eventually every indigenous male over the age o f eight had to carry an identity card. W ithout it he could receive neither food nor lodging. Although these prescriptions appear to anticipate later Germ an treatment o f N azi-reviled m inorities, in feet, they drew upon legal precedents initiated in British South A frica as early as 1807, an ideological debt that shows that there was nothing peculiarly Germ anic about this brand o f racism .36 A nother rem inder o f ‘the necessity and dignity o f labour* — as one leading British im perialist, Joseph Cham berlain, liked to talk o f African servitude —was the ubiquitous sjam bok.37 T h e use o f this heavy w hip m ushroom ed enorm ously after the w ar. T h e adm inistration’s records show ed a nine-fold increase in cases betw een 1907 and 19 12 . These docum ented incidents represented only a fraction o f the total, since only the most notorious cases o f unofficial punishm ent ever cam e to public attention. O ne such case, against a psychotic ferm er called Ludw ig Cram er, involved whippings so severe that tw o w om en died and tw o other pregnant victim s, their backs a mass o f pustulant scars, m iscarried. For these crim es Cram er received tw enty-seven m onths’ im prisonm ent.38 In a colony that suffered in 1903 from a male to fem ale ratio o f over five to one, it was inevitable that the Germ ans w ould use African w om en to satisfy less abnorm al urges. H ow ever, in 1907 this Schmutzwirtschaft — dirty w ork — as it was called, was eventually for­ bidden by colonial legislation. T h e governm ent outlawed m ixed mar­ riages, w h ile the governor condem ned any sexual relations betw een black and w hite as ‘not only a crim e against the purity o f the Germ an race . . . but [they] could also be a severe threat to the w hole position o f the w hite man in SW A .’39 T here was, how ever, an even greater threat to the Germ an position, w hich w ould reveal itself ju st eight years after the H erero and N am a 354

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uprisings. In 19 14 South W est A frica was unw illingly em broiled in a second, larger conflict. W hen Britain and Germ any w ent to w ar in Europe, w hite troops from South Africa invaded the neighbouring colony and quickly swept aside all resistance, holding the territory for the next four years. T hen in 19 19 , at the Paris Peace C onference, Germ any was legally stripped o f its colonies w hich, under the terms o f the new Covenant o f the League o f N ations, w ere designated as man­ dated territories. O ld Germ an East Africa becam e Tanganyika under an Anglo admin­ istration, w hile Togoland and Cam eroon w ere each divided between the French and British. G iven Germ an South W est A frica’s contiguity w ith the U nion o f South Africa, it was to be placed under the super­ vision o f its w hite neighbours. H ow ever, the Germ an territories w ere not intended as spoils o f w ar for the victors. R ath er than symbols o f European prestige, they w ere to be expressions o f Christian conscience and humane W estern values. Since the mandated territories w ere, in the words o f the League o f N ations, ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions o f the m odem w orld, there should be applied the principle that the w ell-being and developm ent o f such people form a sacred trust o f civilization.’40 From the very beginning, the allied forces had view ed themselves as liberators in the land o f the H erero and N am a, and proclaim ed to its inhabitants a new era o f freedom . In a spirit o f justice they had also exposed the w orst aspects o f the Germ an regim e, cataloguing them in a docum ent entided Report on the Natives o f South- West Africa and their Treatment by Germany, w hich gained notoriety as the 'B lu e B o o k ’ . It was a devastating account o f their colonial methods and o f the real causes o f the H erero and N am a uprisings. It remains to this day one o f the most im portant English-language accounts o f the period and easily convinced its readers o f the underlying subtext: that Germ any was unfit to be an im perial pow er. Based partly on its findings, the repa­ triation o f 6,000 Germ an setders was quickly im plem ented. T o suggest the fresh start that was to be given to South W est A frica, the South African prim e m inister General Jan Smuts announced that the ‘manda­ tory state should look upon its position as a great trust and honour, not as an office o f profit or a position o f private advantage for it o r its nationals.’41 Then the new w hite rulen, secure in their new possessions, started to reveal an older set o f attitudes behind the rhetoric. B y 1926 the w hite population had doubled, despite the Germ an expulsions. 355

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Africans w ere eventually given inalienable reserves, but these repre­ sented the driest, least productive sandveld, often short o f w ater and poor in grazing. T h e vast m ajority o f this African territory com prised the areas - the K aokoveld, O vam boland and O kavango - clim atically least hospitable to w hite setdem ent. T h e rem ainder, essentially d ie old areas once occupied by the H erero and N am a, was declared a police zone in w hich Africans w ere only perm itted by virtue o f a w ork per­ m it - the Germ ans' old pass laws by a new name. Eventually 260,000 black Africans enjoyed sixteen m illion hectares, com pared w ith the forty m illion hectares held by ju st 73,000 w hites.42 In other areas o f adm inistration the m andatory nation gradually revealed the deep continuities betw een its ow n objectives and those o f its European predecessors. B y the 1940s only ten per cent o f the country’s total expenditure w ent on the native areas, and the m ajority o f this was on adm inistration. O ne other representative sample o f its racially divided priorities was that w hile fifty-three governm ent schools catered for the educational needs o f 38,000 w hites, a third o f a m illion black Africans had to m ake do w ith ju st five establishments.43 P er capita expenditure on education for w hite and black children was allocated at a ratio o f 1 1 2 to one.44 A nd even as late as the 1970s the average w hite incom e was 3,000 rands, w hile that for blacks was ju st 12 $ , and h alf o f all the econom ically active Africans w ere in subsis­ tence agriculture w ith a cash incom e o f ju st thirty rand a year. T h e new European pow er in South W est Africa had quickly recog­ nised that in order to control the country’s future developm ent, they needed also to dictate its past. Thus, the old im age o f Germ an m isgovem m ent underwent deep revisions. In m any ways the fate o f the B lue B o o k , that record o f vüe colonial aggression drawn up by British arm y officers, sym bolised the w id er struggle for South W est A frica itself. R eversin g the opinions so forcefully expressed in the B lu e B o o k ’s pages, General Sm uts soon announced that the ’Germans o f South W est Africa, w hose successful and conscientious w ork I highly appreciate, w ill m aterially help in building an enduring European civ­ ilization on the African continent, w hich is the main task o f the U n ion .’45 T h e Germ ans them selves, o f course, had im m ediately dis­ missed the B lu e B o o k as noxious propaganda, countering its allega­ tions in 19 19 w ith their ow n parallel exposé o f British colonial atrocities. It was also system atically ignored by later Germ an historians. In 1926 the w hite legislative assembly in W indhoek added their voice to the chorus o f B lu e B o o k condem nations. T h e methods and 356

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atrocities it recorded had becom e a severe embarrassment not ju st to the Germans but to all the European colonists, and it was decreed that die heretical text should be treated accordingly. Thereafter all copies o f the report in the territory’s official files and libraries w ere to be burnt, w hile recom m endations w ere made to the British and South African governm ents that all copies in their public libraries should also be rem oved and destroyed.46 N o t content w ith an ideological rehabilitation o f the old colonial pow er, South African administrators paid the Germ ans the ultímate com plim ent by repeating their m ethods. In 19 22 the Bondelswarts, exasperated by the frise prom ises and their continued dispossession at the hands o f the new regim e, had rebelled once m ore. T his tim e, how ever, it was South African m en and technology that w ent to crush them. W hen 150 Bondelsw art men rode o ff to the hills to renew their fifty-year struggle, they w ere subjected to aerial bom bardm ent. O ne hundred w ere killed before being bom bed into submission. W hite fatalities num bered ju st tw o.47 T h e disproportion o f black to w hite losses suggested once m ore that note o f heroic futility w hich had characterised African resistance ever since the tim e o f H endrik W itbooi. And for a further six decades both heroism and futility w ould resurface in equal measure on the battle­ fields o f South W est Africa. It was not until 1990 that N am ibia, the last African colony but one to achieve independence from its European rulen, was finally created.

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I

n a book that docum ents som e o f the bleakest episodes in Europe's relationship w ith tribal societies there is a risk o f engendering in readers what Frederick T urner III has called ‘a counter-productive orgy o f racial self-hatred'.1 Before attem pting any final conclusions in this chapter w e need first to recall the reasons w h y such a response w ould be m isguided. M ost significant and, certainly, most depressing is that genocide, attempted genocide and ruthless dispossession are policies w ith a long pedigree, recorded in the histories o f the Greeks and Rom ans and even further back in the O ld Testam ent. Mass brutality and m echanised slaughter have been amongst the defining characteristics o f this present century. In the First W orld W ar the Turkish governm ent o f the O ttom an Em pire, pursuing a policy that inspired A d o lf H itler to his ow n nightm are excesses, forcibly deported its m inority population o f Arm enians. A t least 600,000 o f them died during the violent purges, w hile as m any m ore w ere perm anendy exiled from their ancient hom eland. Even in the final quar­ ter o f the century, Pol Pot’s fanatical K hm er R o u g e demonstrated in Cam bodia that the prospect o f a human tabula rasa has never lost its hideous appeal. As m any as 2,000,000 o f the country’s inhabitants per­ ished in ju st five years as a result o f disease, starvation and outright massacre. Sim ilarly in Central Asia, m ore than 1,000,000 Tibetans are believed to have died and continue to die under Chinese occupation (and this is only a fraction o f the 32—64,000,000 dead credited to the com m unist regim e betw een 1949 and 19 7 1).2 In A frica since Europe’s decolonisation, m ilitary conflict, often inter-tribal in character, has brought almost perennial catastrophe to 358

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som e part o f the continent. D uring the N igerian civil w ar o f the late 1960s, the developed w orld was stunned by its first television pictures o f African children starving helplessly to death in the self-styled repub­ lic o f Biafra. T h e total num ber o f victim s from the conflict and its resulting famine m ay have been as m any as a m illion.3 Y e t thirty yean later, W estern countries have becom e almost habituated to the im agery o f African disaster. T ypically, in the m assive, m ulti-ethnic state o f Sudan, the forty-year-old civil w ar, despite involving m ore casualties than Biafra - an estimated 1.3 m illion dead - and die dis­ placem ent o f m any m ore m illions, has continued almost unnoticed by the outside w orld.4 N o t so the R w andan massacres o f 1994, w hich emphasises how far popular perception o f these horron can be almost a question o f chance or fashion. Y e t even the inter-ethnic strife betw een the Tutsis and Hutus, in both R w anda and the neighbouring state o f Burundi, has a history o f mass slaughter stretching back over three decades that has been m ore o r less unreported. These episodes o f violence — and there are others, like the Indonesian atrocities in East T im or and Irian Jaya — put into perspec­ tive any European crim es against tribal society. T h ey crow d die dock w ith a w elter o f other offenders. T h ey demonstrate that form er tribal peoples, once incorporated into the m odem nadon state and equipped w ith the latest weapons technology, can ju st as easily inflict mass slaughter on each other and even on their ow n. Although in R w anda and Zaire the only technology required for genocide, once unleashed by m odem methods o f political propaganda, was a tw o-dollar m achete. T here is also an additional com plication w ith over-em phasising Europe’s exclusive guilt: it perpetuates a one-dim ensional im age o f tribal peoples as helpless victim s — innocent and sym pathedc, but also w eak, passive and incom petent. W hat D avid Stannard has w ritten o f pre-Colum bian Am erica could be extended to all tribal societies: ’the very plain fret is that the m any tens o f m illions o f people w ho lived in the Am ericas prior to 1492 w ere human - neither subhuman, nor superhuman —ju st hum an.’5 W hen pre-industrial tribes responded to the threat o f European encroachm ent they invariably demonstrated that they w ere also creative, determ ined and courageous human beings. I f the last tw o in the quartet o f portraits presented here show anything, they reveal the severe difficulties in Europe’s m arch towards victory. 359

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T h e Apaches resisted w hite intrusion for 300 years and w ere only finally defeated after a quarter-century o f concerted warfare w ith U S forces and the expenditure o f m any m illions o f dollars. In the conflict fo r South W est A frica, the H erero and N airn campaigns endured for longer than the struggle o f D utch colonists against the British in the neighbouring B o er W ar. Y e t, equally, i f the Apaches are to be liberated from the one­ dim ensional im age o f the innocent victim , then w e must accept all that this entails. I f w e are to recognise the m ilitary brilliance o f V ictorio or the granitic resolve o f N ana, w e need also to acknow ledge Apache excesses, w hich w ere both abom inable and m ilitarily pointless. W e must take account o f incidents like the death o f G eorge T aylor, a 2 1 -year-old Scotsm an, out w alking to see a friend one spring evening in 18 73. A n Apache band captured him unarm ed and took him to a sheltered spot w here they stripped him , tied his lim bs, and started fir­ ing w ith their bow s. T aking care not to hit a vital spot they eventu­ ally shot over is o arrows into his body. W hen the arm y found him , the grass was flattened w here he had rolled over and over in agony. A s he did so the arrow shafts broke off, leaving the heads buried deep w ithin his flesh. Loss o f blood eventually caused him to lapse into unconsciousness w hen the Apaches finished him off, probably by cas­ tration. T h e U S officer recording his death thought the m ethod too ‘beasdy’ to disclose.6 T h e fret is that tribal peoples w ere often capable o f methods ju st as brutal as those inflicted upon them by their European conquerors. T h e classic examples w ere the M exica. T h eir ow n use o f ruthless force in campaigns against their tribal subjects was w ell recorded and left Tenochtidan in hated isoladon w hen C ortés broke in amongst them . In N orth Am erica the 'C ivilised Tribes’ like the C herokee, Chickasaw and C hoctaw w ere perfectly happy during the early part o f the nine­ teenth century to borrow the insdtudon o f black slavery from their European neighbours, along w ith other elements o f w hite civilisadon. Sim ilarly, the Iroquois, w hile their dem ocratic polidcal arrangements w ould serve as an inspiration for those o f the fledgling Am erican state, w ere another tribe equally content to adopt the w hite m an’s gifis and use them against their Indian rivals. D uring the eighteenth century they maintained their dom inance in the Am erican fur trade w ith European firearms and participated in the m ilitary devastation o f the H uron and Illinois, w ho lacked the new weapons. As w e have already noted, these rivalries, w herever they occurred — 360

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M exica versus Tlaxcalans, T onto Apaches versus Chiricahua Apaches, N airn versus H erero —w ere critical to the European trium ph. O n the low er horizon visible to m any tribal people their ancient enm ities loom ed larger than the relatively new threat from whites. I f they w ere heroic and creative agents in their ow n defence, they w ere often equally resourceful participants in their neighbour’s downfall. T h eir repeated failure to reconcile inter-tribal political differences and to harm onise access to econom ic resources are almost as constant factors in their defeat as European num erical and armed suprem acy. T here is further evidence o f w hich w e need to take account in pre­ senting Europe’s defence. O ne inescapable fret in M exico was the regular offering o f human life to the Am erican gods. N o m atter what degree o f detachm ent w e m ight bring to the practice, it is hard to conceive o f it as an adornm ent to any human society. It is equally and indubitably true that the Tupinam ba and Tupinikin tribes o f coastal Brazil regularly ate each other follow ing capture in batde. T h e Caribs o f the Antilles w ere also anthropophagous, and gave their name to the habit’s m ore usual label — ’cannibalism ’ . Inhabitants o f the Belgian C ongo in the late nineteenth century could Uve out to the letter Europe’s savage stereotype for them. In one famous incident a British explorer unw ittingly paid for a dem onstration o f cannibalism. A t a price o f six cotton handkerchiefs som e members o f the W acusu tribe happily brought forw ard a victim , a ten-year-old girl, dispatched, dis­ m em bered and washed the flesh ready for the table, all in a m atter o f seconds.7 T his type o f behaviour shattered critical European taboos. It ju sti­ fied W estern conquest and emphasised the higher code o f their ow n Christian culture. T h e reUgion o f the colonists propounded a set o f core values w hich placed at the heart o f human relations a num ber o f unassailable ideals. Follow ing the violence o f their conquests, and how ever m uch coercion m ay have been used in die process o f dis­ sem ination, these values and beliefs w ere spread and took root amongst m any o f the subjected tribal peoples. A nd it is difficult not to see the transplanted ideals o f Christianity as an advance on a reUgion that reUed on gouging out the hearts o f sacrificial victim s w ith obsid­ ian blades. These ideals w ere part o f the Europeans’ understanding o f themselves and o f their great gift to the tribal w orld. T h e problem was that across four continents, European colonists used their civilisation as a pow erful shield for their actions. T h e con­ quistadors behaved as i f they w ere representatives o f the essential values 361

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preserved at Europe's heart, in its places o f scholarship, in its centres o f spiritual, cultural and artistic achievem ent. Y e t at the im perial periph­ ery - in Peru o r in M exico, o r on the Am azon, or the C on go, o r the Australian outback, or on the hinges o f the O m aheke, o r in the deserts and sierras o f the Am erican Southw est —this sense o f superior­ ity could am ount to litde m ore than a capacity to exert the European w ill through m ore advanced w eaponry. It was often technology w ith­ out m oral guidance, pow er w ithout responsibility. Som etim es the sum o f Europe’s greater achievem ent was the opportunity to treat tribal societies as animals w ithout masters, o r as a worthless species to be elim inated like verm in. T h e Europeans’ higher technology was m uch m ore than sim ply the physical means o f their conquest. It shaped their intellectual and m oral w orld, inform ing their com parative understanding o f society and re­ assuring them how far they had advanced over their tribal subjects. In fact technological achievem ent coloured Europe’s entire perception o f what it meant to be human. Technological and cultural progress was seen as a measure o f the distance betw een man and his sim ian origins. It separated him from the apes o f the forest. It was his trium ph over the lim itations o f nature and tim e, and carried im plications o f m oral and spiritual im provem ent. A nd in almost every source o f im agery in the W estern canon these abstract notions o f cultural progress w ere expressed in the language o f physical, linear m ovem ent. (The very w ord itself, progress, exem plifies that conflation o f m oral and physical advance.) European society was perceived as being on a jo u rn ey aw ay from its prim itive past, towards a m ore enlightened future. Im perialism , that great outward thrust upon the geographical w orld, was naturally incorporated into this cluster o f ideas. For the partici­ pants, their physical expansion over the globe assumed m oral and cultural qualities. It was itself an indicator o f Europe’s forw ard m om entum . Conquest was progress. And it was a positive self-im age that em braced even its darkest manifestations, like the search fo r E l D orado. T his m yth resulted in som e o f the w o n t excesses in Europe’s colonial record, yet it was seen in its day —and continues to be treated — as a noble quest, w hose main m oral lesson was the heroic effort and exam ple o f the doom ed European exploren, rather than the iniquities they com m itted in its name. E urope’s ingrained perception o f human culture as a linear de­ velopm ent had deeply sinister im plications for those w ho seemed n o t 362

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to be m aking the same progressive jou rn ey. For tribal societies w ere invariably orientated towards a different set o f goals. In their religious myths and beliefs, the principal jo u rn ey undertaken by humans was circular in nature. T h e tribe and its ancestors w ere often held in a per­ manent, ongoing cyclical relationship w ith the earth and the totality o f other life form s. A classic indicator o f this cyclical orientation was the calendar system o f the pre-Colum bian M aya. These Central Am erican people w ere mesmerised both by tim e’s operation and by its measurement, and in their long history had evolved three form s o f calendar. B y the tim e o f Pedro de Alvarado’s bloody cam paign o f subjugation in the 1 520s the M aya em ployed a system involving a cycle o f katuns, a span o f 260 yean that broke dow n into thirteen tw enty-year periods. These com plex arrangements offered a com pelling insight into M ayan scien­ tific attainment. A t the m om ent o f Spanish conquest, for instance, they could calculate the solar year m ore accurately than the invaden and could ’measure tim e precisely over m illions, even billions o f yean ’ .8 Y e t it also expressed their view o f tim e as a recurrent phe­ nom enon. As the great stretches o f tim e unfolded, the M aya believed that the events o f the past w ould eventually return in the future. In feet, their preoccupation w ith tim e’s mysteries was an index o f their entire cultural and spiritual developm ent. Sm all w onder that w hen they attempted to express the m eaning o f E urope’s ruthless destruction o f their w orld, they characterised it as tim e gone m ad.9 T h e Spaniards, i f they w ere ever aware o f M ayan attitudes at all, w ere indifferent to the circular dynam ic in their beliefs, view in g their society instead as physically and spiritually static. A m ajor elem ent in the European onslaught upon M ayan society was a violent desecration o f their art, literature and scientific records. T his m yopic bigotry was replicated w orldw ide. As w e have seen in Australia, w hite colonial officials even in this century believed the Aborigines had failed to achieve full hum anity.10 T h e black savages w ere locked w ithin a developm ental sump, incapable o f progress. In the case o f the M exica, matters w ere, i f anything, even w orse, since they had m oved into the channels o f human developm ent, but w ere not destined for the for­ w ard spiritual jo u rn ey made by Europeans. T h ey w ere headed back­ wards — a declension into the bloody pools o f corruption left by their ghastly sacrifices. T h e challenge perceived by Europeans once conquest was achieved was to erase these felse notions and inculcate that forw ard-looking, 363

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linear and progressive m entality enjoyed by themselves. Hard labour was seen as the param ount rem edy, and had the added advantage o f w ringing profit from the defective subjects. In fact econom ic exploita­ tion was usually the real goal o f putting tribal people to w ork, but its vaunted ideological purpose was to im plant that rational, goaloriented, acquisitive mindset by w hich European hum anity func­ tioned. T his rationalisation was perfecdy expressed by W illiam Prescott in his description o f the Spanish holocaust on Hispaniola: T h e Indians w ould not labour w ithout com pulsion, and . . . unless they laboured, they could not be brought into com m unication w ith the w hites, nor be converted to Christianity . . . T h e sim ple people, accustom ed all their days to a life o f indolence and ease, sunk under the oppressions o f their masters, and the population wasted away w ith even m ore frightful rapidity than did the aborigines o f our ow n country, under the operation o f other causes.11 G one from this description is the A uschw itz-like inhum anity o f Spanish methods. Instead, the Araw aks’ inability to w ork is charac­ terised almost as a failure to assume full human characteristics. T h ey sim ply could not be lured from their idle stasis. H ere, in nineteenthcentury form , is a justification o f the N azi slogan, Arbeit macht frei. Y e t, i f tribal people could not be given access to the colonists' superior m indset through w ork, if, in short, they show ed resistance, politically, m ilitarily or ideologically, to European subjugation, then the gap betw een their respective material cultures served as a justifica­ tion for colonial methods. Gustav Frenssen, in his w ar novel Peter M oor’s Journey to South West Africa, articulated this attitude w ith a com ­ pelling accuracy and insight that seems almost outside the author’s ow n intention. Speaking o f the H erero, one o f his Germ an characters announces: ‘These blacks have deserved death before G od and man, not because they have m urdered tw o hundred form en and have revolted against us, but because they have built no houses and dug no w ells.’ 12 In m any parts o f the European em pire this was close to a uni­ versal truth. T echnological inferiority equalled m oral inferiority and, at tim es, m oral worthlessness. European peoples should acknow ledge that the num ber o f tribal peoples w ho died because they built no houses and dug no w ells amounts to one o f the great acts o f human destruction, com parable to

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the N azi H olocaust, o r the Stalinist purges o f the Soviet U nion, or the mass slaughters o f com m unist C hina. T h e exact num bers can never genuinely be know n and most attempts at calculation, since they carry such w eighty political im plications, are quickly buried beneath the counter-claim s o f rival assessors. N evertheless, the most w idely acknow ledged estimates for Am erica north o f M exico, fo r large parts o f Central and South Am erica, espe­ cially the M exican and Incan em pires, for Australia and N ew Zealand indicate population losses o f betw een eighty and ninety per cent. Although even these calculations, it should also be stressed, are regu­ larly and spectacularly ignored. W hile D avid Stannard argues that ‘few inform ed scholars any longer contend that* there w ere not roughly 8,000,000 to 12,000,000 people livin g in pre-Colum bian Am erica north o f M exico, Sir M artin G ilbert, one o f Britain’s most celebrated historians, feels free to do so. In The Routledge Atlas o f American History he uses a figure o f ‘approxim ately one m illion Indians’ . T o put this figure in context, it represents a human population density for N orth Am erica at the end o f the fifteenth century that is less than tw ice that for m odem -day Greenland, a country w hich is m ainly covered by polar icecap, in parts over 4,000 metres thick, and w hich is ninety-five per cent uninhabitable.13 H ere, in m icrocosm and in its most apparendy innocent but pernicious form , is Europe’s denial o f tribal history and tribal achievem ent. Another o f the frets that few w ould dispute is that w h ile most o f the deaths m ay have been inflicted by d ie original inhabitants o f Europe, these particular genocidal Europeans w ere m icrobial. Tribal losses throughout the w orld w ere significandy or m ainly caused by European disease, to w hich the colonised tribes had almost no im m u­ nity. E ven the com m on cold could have a devastating im pact. In the Am ericas, how ever, indigenous populations w ere swept by successive epidem ics o f real killers, such as sm allpox, measles, tuberculosis, influenza, malaria, typhoid, sometimes even before the physical arrival o f the colonists themselves, as in Inca Peru. Y e t w hile it is beyond dispute that disease was the prim ary agent in the dem ographic collapse, and w hile the role o f European colonists in this process was usually inadvertent (but not always: the diseaseim pregnated blanket som etimes becam e one m ore potent w eapon in the W est’s arm oury), it is equally indisputable that these consequences m arched in tune w ith European wishes. Colonists wanted the land and resources previously ow ned by its indigenous inhabitants. Disease

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w rought havoc on indigenous Am erica's capacity to resist the conquis­ tadores. In the Inca em pire it underm ined political stability. In M exico it cut swathes through the nation’s m ilitary classes. In Australia the advancing colonists found that their invisible pathogens had cleared out the Aborigines as effectively as a bush fire m ight rid the land o f verm in. E ven w here disease decim ated those people o f som e use to the ruling Europeans - like the Andean labourers slaving in Potosi, w ho should at least have held the status o f econom ic assets - the colonists show ed a flagrant disregard for the human dim ension to the tragedy. T ypically, the Spaniards in Peru overcam e the inconvenience o f disease and its consequent labour losses by placing the same demands on an ever-shrinking pool o f Inca survivors.14 Som etim es Europeans w elcom ed disease as a G od-given blessing. It proved the savage’s worthlessness. It demonstrated that his ultim ate fate was extinction, as it reaffirm ed the w hite man in his right to rule. Y e t w hile disease m ight have served then as a sym bol o f European suprem acy, it cannot serve now as an alibi proving European inno­ cence. Another recurrent theme often used to dim inish any European sense o f responsibility is that violent abuse o f tribal subjects was behaviour confined to an age o f cruder m oral standards and now long since abandoned. O ne o f the problem s for the Tasm anian Aborigines, argued C liv e Turnbull, was the fact that V an D iem en's Land ‘was setded in the early part o f the nineteenth century, before the humanitar­ ian m ovem ent had gathered m om entum .’ 15 Y e t, as this book’s four portraits dem onstrate, Europeans from the sixteenth to the twentieth century could behave towards tribal society — and then ju stify that treatment - in an almost identical fashion. N o r should anyone cherish the notion that the present age is any exception to the pattem o f the last half-m illennium . T od ay tribal soci­ eties continue to experience the kinds o f persecution they endured hundreds o f years ago. Som etim es the com m unities suffering are descendants o f the very same people w hose lives w ere devastated by the original European conquerors. In Guatem ala, for exam ple, 470 years after Pedro de Alvarado first raised his sword to begin his assault on its people and culture, the M aya continue to endure his legacy o f Spanish persecution. These indigenous people, w ho represent fifty to eighty per cent o f the country’s current population, still use their ancestral languages, w ear their traditional costumes, celebrate ancient 366

î^ e y B u ilt N o H ouses and D ug N o W eils deities and abide by the original M ayan calendar. A nd fo r m any o f them life is still a w eary struggle against European prejudice. T h e life expectancy o f the M aya is currendy seventeen years less than their Ladino neighbours (those o f m ixed and Spanish descent). In the early 1980s tw o-thirds o f all M aya lived in poverty. B y 1987 the same pro­ portion lived in extrem e poverty, w hile the overall figure for those in poverty had risen to eighty-three per cent. A report com piled in 1979 show ed that o f all the countries in Latin Am erica, Guatem ala had the w orst land distribution record, w ith ninety-eight per cent o f the M ayan population either landless or w ith insufficient land to support them selves.16 A n insurgent m ovem ent, largely drawn from and supported by rural M aya com m unities, gathered m om entum in the late 1970s in response to the inequalities in Guatem alan society. T o counter this indigenous unrest, a Ladino m ilitary dictatorship seized pow er in 1978 and insti­ tuted policies that eventually resulted in a state o f virtual civil w ar. M ost notorious was a system o f death squads, secret param ilitary units w hich roam ed the countryside seizing and m urdering M ayan people presum ed to be sym pathetic to the guerrillas. T h e num ber o f those assassinated since 1980 was put at 50,000, w hile those displaced from the largely M ayan highland region o f Guatem ala at the height o f the violence w ere estimated at over 1,000,000.17 In other parts o f Latin Am erica the same pattern o f discrim ination and abuse is w idely replicated. In Venezuela, o f the country's 315,0 0 0 Indians, only one per cent have legally binding tide to their forest lands. A nd even these deeds are flagrantly ignored. T ypically, a tribe o f 850 members called the K ari’na o f M onagas state was declared 'extinct* by a m unicipal council w hich w ished to sell their land to oil and cattle-ranching interests. Another tribe, the Y ukpa, w ho wished to establish legal tide to their ow n lands, w ere ruled by die presiding ju d ge to have no rights even to a law yer’s services in the case. In the state o f Estado B olivar, the Indians have been forbidden to engage in sm all-scale m ining operations on the grounds that they w ould pollute w ater supplies, yet over sixty foreign com panies have been granted concessions and operate w ith im punity in the same area.18 In Brazil the persecution o f Am azonia’s indigenous com m unities has becom e virtually a m etaphor fo r all tribal suffering. And w ith good reason: in the early part o f this century eighty-seven different Indian groups w ere w iped out during contact w ith the colonial frontier.19 Although today som e tribes have becom e the focus o f high-profile 367

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campaigns, such as the establishment o f a 16o,ooo-square-kilom etre park for the Yanom am i in both Brazil and Venezuela, there are still m ajor threats to indigenous Indians and their ancestral forests. Thus, in January 1996 the Brazilian governm ent passed decree 17 7 5 , w hich per­ mits a legal challenge to the status o f any Indian reserve, even those based on agreem ents that are hundreds o f years old. So fir it is thought that logging, catde-ranching and m ining com panies have registered nearly 2,000 claims on over eighty indigenous areas.20 In N orth Am erica the same dual process continues. O n the one hand, there has been a heart-searching re-evaluation by som e w hite Am ericans o f their historic im pact upon the continent’s first inhabi­ tants, coupled w ith a material im provem ent in the lives o f some N ative Am erican com m unities. T he legal entidem ent, for exam ple, o f m any tribes to have casinos on their reservation lands has led to Indian-run gam bling operations w orth $5.4 billion in 1992, w hich represents one in every fifty dollars wagered in the U S .21 Y e t this new source o f revenue, largely launched after the Indian G am ing and R egulatory A ct o f 1988, has to be laid alongside less favourable statistics. In 1990 N ative Am ericans as a w hole had the highest levels o f poverty and unem ploym ent o f any ethnic or social group in the U S .22 E ven the most positive developm ents in w hite-tribal relations carry w ithin them elements o f an older, m ore confrontational and exploita­ tive ethos. T h e H ollyw ood film Dances With Wolves classically illus­ trates this com plex o f issues. In 1990 K evin C ostner’s epic W estern, about a nineteenth-century U S officer and his unfolding relationship w ith a group o f Lakota Siou x, was an enorm ous critical success that w on seven Oscars. Part o f its popularity, in addition to its leading star’s H ollyw ood appeal, lay in the highly sensitive and sym pathetic por­ trayal o f Indian culture, especially the philosophical and spiritual dim ensions to the Lakota’s hunter-gatherer lifestyle. T h e film was also a m ajor b ox-office hit, m aking over $500,000,000, w hile C ostner him self was believed to have netted $50,000,000. Y e t the heroes o f the piece, the Lakota Siou x, remain grindingly poor. T h eir reservations include seven o f the country’s most im poverished thirty-tw o counties, and Shannon county on the Pine R id g e reservation is the very poor­ est in all the U nited States. A n even m ore acute irony was the fact that Costner sought to cap his m ovie profits by developing a m ulti-m illion-dollar luxury resort on 368

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lands bought from the Lakota, and named after his character from the film , Jo h n Dunbar. A n elem ent in this developm ent was an attempted purchase o f part o f the Black H ills, w hich are lands sacred to the Lakota and the subject o f the tribe’s ongoing legal battle fo r com pen­ sation and territorial restitution after the U S governm ent seized them in 18 77. (The Black H ills, one o f the richest m ineral areas in the w orld, w ith enorm ous deposits o f gold, silver, copper, iron, tungsten, coal, graphite, lithia, m ica, tantalite, beryl, caesium , andalucite, sul­ phur, quartz, topaz, zircon and uranium , have already yielded $250 billion in gold alone, o f w hich the Indians have received not a single penny.) Costner’s efforts to acquire and build a g o lf course on ground hallowed by the Lakota and still considered their ow n is view ed by some in the tribe as an act o f gross betrayal.23 Y e t Dances With Wolves and the story surrounding it also contains a num ber o f m ore positive elements. N o t least is the fact that the Lakota Siou x have maintained a legal batde for the return o f the Black Hills for over a century, dem onstrating an unshakable b elief in the justice o f their case and typifying the w ider endurance o f tribal resistance and culture almost w orldw ide. T h e Lakota use o f Am erican legal proce­ dures, despite decades o f official obstruction, also illustrates a capacity to master aspects o f the dom inant culture and to turn them to their benefit. T h e Lakota, for exam ple, have been offered a com pensation settlement o f $400,000,000 for the loss o f their 7.3 m illion acres.24 N otw ithstanding Costner’s later business project, his film Dances With Wolves was itself an attempt from the other side to m ake a posi­ tive adjustment in w hite-tribal relations. It exposed the m oral ambi­ guities o f Am erican colonial politics and reversed a num ber o f classic m ilitary stereotypes that had been previously ingrained in the H ollyw ood W estern. H ere, the part o f the mindless savage was taken not by the painted R edskin, but by m arauding U S soldiers w ho scalped and butchered their Lakota victim s. I f only in cinem atic terms, history was rew ritten, and that alone contained a seed o f genuine hope in the w hite-tribal conflict. For the events o f this history, even those most distant in tim e, are not an inert tale w ithout consequence. T h ey should not be ignored o r as has m ore usually happened — buried under a w elter o f self-serving distortion. O ver five centuries Europeans, armed w ith a set o f invin­ cible stereotypes, devoured tribal society across four continents. T h e im age o f the bestial and pitiless savage w hich licensed this onslaught

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was never m ore a portrait o f the M exica, or the Inca, o r the N airn , the H erero, the Tasmanians, o r even the tigers o f hum ankind, the Apache, than it was an im age o f Europe’s ow n destructive capacity. It is a prevailing irony o f this story that as the tide o f European conquest engulfed tribal peoples, so the colonists' civilisation succum bed to a savage w hom they had so violently condem ned. B u t the savage was w ithin themselves. T o continue to deny this truth w ill only ensure that the past remains a dark and fetal shadow in the present and fo r the future.

370

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The Conquest o f M exico Arzans de O rsúa y V ela, B ., Tales o f Potosí, Ed. R . Padden, Providence, 19 75. Bakew ell, P J . , Silver M ining and Society in Colonial M exico, Zacatecas 1546 -170 0 , Cam bridge, 19 7 1. Bazant, J ., A Concise History o f Mexico, Cam bridge, 19 77. Bethel, L ., Central America since Independence, Cam bridge, 19 9 1. Blanco, H ., Land or D eath: The Peasant Struggle in Peru, London, 19 72. C ieza de Léon, P. de The Incas o f Pedro de C ieza de Léon, N orm an, 1959. Clendinnen, L , Aztecs, Cam bridge, 1993. C ollis, M ., Cortès and Montezuma, London, 1994. C o o k , N .D ., Demographic Collapse, Indian Peru, 1520 -16 20 , Cam bridge, 19 8 1. C ortés, H ., Letters o f Hernando Cortés, 15 19 -15 2 6 , T r. J . Bayard M orris, London, 1928. D iaz, B ., The Conquest o f N ew Spain, T r. J . M . C ohen, London, 19 6 3. Elliott, J.H ., Imperial Spain 14 6 9 -17 16 , London, 1970. Fernández-Arm esto, F ., Columbus, O xford, 19 9 1. Friede, J . and K een, B . (eds.), Bartolomé de Las Casas in H istory, D eK alb, 19 7 1. G ibson, C ., The Aztecs under Spanish R ule, Stanford, 1964. H am ilton, E .J., American Treasure and the Price R ise Revolution in Spain, Cam bridge, M ass., 1934. H anke, L ., The Imperial C ity o f Potosí, T h e H ague, 1956. Hassig, R ., M exico and the Spanish Conquest, London, 1994. H em m ing, J ., The Conquest o f the Incas, London, 1970. H em m ing, J ., The Search fo r E l Dorado, London, 1978. H em m ing, J ., R ed G old: The Conquest o f the Brazilian Indians, London, 1978. Hyam s, E . and O rdish, G ., The Last O f The Incas, London, 1963. Innés, H ., The Conquistadors, London, 1969. Las Casas, B . de, A Short Account o f the Destruction o f the Indies, London,

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1530 -178 0 , N ew Y o rk , 19 7 1. N aipaul, V .S ., The Loss o f E l Dorado, London, 1969. Sahagún, B . de, Florentine Codex (General History o f the Things o f N ew Spain), Book 12 , T r. A .J.O . Anderson and C .E . D ibble, U tah, 19 75. Prescott, W .H ., The Conquest o f M exico, London, 19 6$. Salm oral, M .L ., America 149 2: Portrait o f a Continent 500 Years Ago, O xford, 1990. Sim pson, L .B ., The Encomienda in N ew Spain, B erkeley, 1966. Soustelle, J ., The D aily U fe o f the Aztecs: On the E ve o f the Spanish Conquest, London, 19 6 1. Stannard, D .E ., American Holocaust: The Conquest o f the N ew World, O xford, 1992. Stem , S .J., Peru*s Indian Peoples and the Challenge o f Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640, M adison, 1993. Thom as, H ., The Conquest o f M exico, London, 15)93. T od orov, T ., The Conquest o f America, N ew Y o rk , 1984. Tow nsend, R .F ., The Aztecs, London, 19 9 2. Vaillant, G .C ., The Aztecs o f M exico, London, 1930. von H agen, V .W ., The Ancient Sun Kingdoms o f the Americas, London, 19 6 2. von H agen, V .W ., The Golden M an: The Quest fo r E l Dorado, Fam borough, 1974. W achtel, N ., The Vision o f the Vanquished: The Spanish Conquest o f Peru through Indian Eyes 1530 -137 0 , Hassocks, 19 77. W hitaker, A .P ., The Huancavelica Mercury M ine, Cam bridge, M ass., 1941W hite, J.M ., Cortés and the D ownfall o f the Aztec Em pire: A Study in a Conflict o f Cultures, London, 19 7 1. W right, R ., Stolen Continents: The Indian Story, London, 1992.

The British In Tasmania Bates, D ., The Passing o f the Aborigines, London, 1938. B on w ick, J ., D aily U fe and the Origin o f the Tasmanians, London, 1870. British Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence and Papers Relating to the Government and the Affairs o f the Australian Colonies, 18 30 -18 36 , D ublin, 1970. Calder, J.E ., The N ative Tribes o f Tasmania, H obart, 19 72. Carter, P ., The Road to Botany Bay, London, 1987.

373

R ivers o f B lood, R ivers o f G old

C lark, M ., A History o f Australia, Ed. M ichael Cathcart, London, 1993. D avies, D ., The Last o f the Tasmanians, London, 19 73. G iblin, R .W ., The Early History o f Tasmania, 16 42-180 4, London, 1928. Harris, S ., It’s Coming Yet . . . A n Aboriginal Treaty W ithin Australia Between Australians, Canberra, 1979. H ughes, R ., The Fatal Shore, London, 1987. Livingston, W .S. and Louis, W .R . (eds.), Australia, N ew Zealand and the Patific blonds since the First World War, Austin, 1979. M oorehead, A ., The Fatal Impact, London, 1966. M orris, J ., H eaven's Command: A n Imperial Progress, London, 19 73. Plom ley, N .J.B ., Friendly M ission: The Tasmanian Journal and Papers o f George Augustus Robinson, 18 29 -18 34, H obart, 1966. R eece, R .H .W ., Aborigines and Colonists: Aborigines and Colonial Society in N ew South Wales in the 1830s and 1840s, Sydney, 1974. R eyn old s, H ., The Other Side o f the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion o f Australia, London, 1982. R obson , L ., A History o f Tasmania. Vol. I, O xford, 1983. R y an , L ., The Aboriginal Tasmanians, St Lucia, 19 8 1. Sutton, P. (ed.), Dreamings: The A rt o f Aboriginal Australia, V ictoria, 1988. Travers, R ., The Tasmanians: The Story o f a Doomed Race, M elbourne, 1968. Turnbull, C ., Blade War, London, 1948. W alker, J.B ., Early Tasmania, H obart, 19 14 .

The Dispossession o f the Apache Adams, A .B ., Gerónimo: A n Illustrated Biography, N ew Y o rk , 19 7 1. B all, E ., In the Days o f Victorio, London, 19 73. B all, E ., Indeh: A n Apache Odyssey, U tah, 1980. Barrett, S.M . (ed.), Gerónimo: H is Own Story, London, 1970. Betzinez, J . (with W .S. N ye), I Fought With Gerónimo, Lincoln, 19 8 7. B o lt, C ., American Indian Policy and American Reform, London, 1987. Bou rke, J.G ., On the Border with Crook, C hicago, 1962. Bourke, J.G ., A n Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre, N ew Yode, 1958. B rill, C ., Conquest o f the Southern Plains, O klahom a C ity , 1938. Brogan, H ., Longman History o f the United States o f America, London, 1985. B row n , D ., Bury M y Heart at Wounded Knee, London, 1975.

374

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C rem ony, J .C ., L ife Among the Apaches, N ew Y o ik , 19 9 1. C lum , W ., Apache Agent: The Story o f John P . Clum , Boston, 1936. C onner, D .E ., Joseph Reddeford W alker and the Arizona Adventure, N orm an, 1956. C rook, G ., General G eo rg Crook: H is Autobiography, Ed. M .F . Schm itt, N orm an, 1946. D avis, B ., The Truth About Gerónimo, N ew H aven, 1929. D ebo, A ., Gerónimo: The M an, H is Tim e, H is Place, London, 1993. D iinnon, R ., Facing W est: The Metaphysics o f Indian-H ating and Em pire Building, M inneapolis, 1980. Falk, O ., The Gerónimo Campaign, N ew Y o rk , 1969. H oism an, R ., Race and M anifest D estiny: The Origins o f American Racial Anglo-Saxonism , Cam bridge, M ass., 19 8 1. Jacobs, W ., Dispossessing the American Indian, N ew Y o rk , 19 72. Jahoda, G ., The Trail o f Tears: The American Indian Removals 18 3 1—1855, London, 1976. Joseph y, A .M . Jr , N ow That the Buffalo's Gone: A Study o f Today's American Indians, N orm an, 1984. Joseph y, A .M . Jr , $00 Nations: A n Illustrated History o f North American Indians, London, 1995. K elly, L .C ., The Assault on Assim ilation: John C ollier and the Origins o f Indian Policy Reform , Albuquerque, 1983. Lockw ood, F ., The Apache Indians, Lincoln, 1987. M atthiessen, P ., In the Spirit o f C razy Horse, London, 1992. M ilner II, C .A ., O ’C onnor, C .A ., and Sandweiss, M .A . (eds.), The Oxford History o f the American West, O xford, 1994. O pler, M .E ., A n Apache Life-W ay: the economic, social, and religious insti­ tutions o f the Chiricahua Indians, N ew Y o rk , 1965. O pler, M .E ., Apache O dyssey: A Journey between Two Worlds, N ew Y o rk , 1969. Porter, J .C ., Paper M ediane M an: Joh n Gregory Bourke and H is American West, N orm an, 1986. R oberts, D ., Once They M oved Like the W ind: Cochise, Gerónimo and the Apache Wars, N ew Y o rk , 1993. Slotkin, R ., Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology o f the American Frontier, 1600-1860, M iddletow n, 19 73. Thrapp, D .L ., Conquest o f Apacheria, N orm an, 1967. Thrapp, D .L ., Victorio and the Mimbres Apache, N orm an, 1974. Trim ble, S ., The People: Indians o f the American Southwest, Santa Fe, 1993. U nruh, J.D ., The Plains Across: Emigrants, Wagon Trains and the

375

Rivers o f Blood, Rivers o f G old American West, London, 1992. W atts, T .D . and W right R . Jr , (eds.), Alcoholism in M inority Populations, Springfield, 1989.

The Germans in South West Africa A du Boahen, A . (ed.), General History o f Africa V II: African under Colonial Domination 18 8 0 -19 3$, London, 1985. Andersson, C .J., Lake Ngam i, C ape T ow n , 1967. B ley, H ., South-W est Africa under German R u le 18 9 4 -19 14 , Evanston, 19 7 1. Bridgm an, J.M ., The Revolt o f the Herero, Berkeley, 19 8 1. C alvert, A .F ., South West Africa during the German Occupation 18 8 4 -19 14 , London, 19 15 . C alvert, A .F ., German African Em pire, London, 19 16 . C lin e, C .E .D ., E .D . M orel 18 73-19 24 : The Strategies o f Protest, Belfast, 1980. D avidson, B ., Africa in History, London, 1992. D rechsler, H ., Let Us D ie Fighting: The Struggle o f the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (18 8 4 -19 13), London, 1980. First, R ., South West Africa, London, 1963. Frieslich, R ., The Last Tribal W ar: A History o f the Bondelswart Uprising Which Took Hace in South West Africa in 19 22, C ape T o w n , 1964. Frenssen, G ., Peter Moor’s Journey to South West Africa, Boston, 1908. Gann, L .H . and D uignan, P ., The Rulers o f German Africa, 1887—19 14 , Stanford, 19 77. G ifford, P. and Louis, W .R ., Britain and Germany in A frica: Imperial R ivalry and Colonial R ule, London, 1967. Em erson, B ., Leopold II o f the Belgians: K ing o f Colonialism , London, 1979. Goldblatt, L , History o f South West Africa, C ape T o w n , 19 7 1. G orges, E .H .M ., Report on the Natives o f South-W est Africa and Their Treatment by Germany, London, 19 18 . H ahn, C .H .L ., V edder, H . and Fourie, L ., The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa, London, 1966. H enderson, W .O ., Studies in German Colonial History, London, 1962. K ibodya, G . (ed.), Aspects o f South African History, D ar es Salaam, 1968. M ostert, N ., Frontiers: The Epic o f South Africa’s Creation and the Tragedy o f the Xhosa People, London, 1992.

376

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O got, B ., Zam ani: A Survey o f East African History, N airobi, 1974. Pakenham, T ., The Scramble fo r Africa, London, 19 9 1. Pool, G ., Sam uel Maharero, W indhoek, 19 9 1. Steer, G .L ., Judgem ent on German Africa, London, 1939. T aylor, A .J.P ., Germany’s First B id fo r Colonies, London, 1938. Tow nsend, M ., The R ise and Fall o f Germ any’s Colonial Em pire, N ew Yode, 1966. T roup, F ., In Face o f Fear: M ichael Scott’s Challenge to South Africa, London, 1950. Vedder, H ., South West Africa in Early Tim es, London, 1966. W ellington, J ., South West Africa and Its Human Issues, O xford, 1967.

377

Notes

Introduction: A ll Christendom m il here have refreshment and gain 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 .

D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 70. G orges, Report on the Natives o f South-W est Africa, pp. 2 6 -7. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 7 0 -7 1. G orges, Report on the Natives o f South-W est Africa, p. 27. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 7 1. Stannard, American Holocaust, pp. 266-8. W alvin, Blade Ivory, pp. 36 -7 , 3 17 - 18 . Pakenham , The Scramble fo r Africa, p. 622; G orges, Report on the Natives o f South-W est Africa, p. 35; Adu Boahen, General History o f Africa V II, pp. 4 75-6 . Suter and Stearm an, Aboriginal Australians, M inority R igh ts G ro u p R ep o rt, N o . 35, p. 4; M acdonald, The M aori o f Aotearoa-N ew Zealand, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, N o . 70, p. 5 ; M oorehead, The Fatal Impact, p. 88. See Stannard, American Holocaust, p. 72, for the higher estim ate, and Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 67, fo r the low er. H uhne and W hitehead, W ild M ajesty, p. 12 . H uhne and W hitehead, W ild M ajesty, p. 13 . R eynolds, The Other Side o f the Frontier, p. 34. Blackburn, The W hite M en, p. 10 1. D iaz del C astillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 185. H uhne and W hitehead, W ild M ajesty, p. 10 . H em m ing, R ed G old, p. 15 . H em m ing, R ed G old, p. 15 .

378

D ig itize d by

Google

O rig in a l fro m

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

N otes

19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 4 1. 42.

M ore, Utopia, p. 136 . M ore, Utopia, p. 79. H ulm e and W hitehead, W ild M ajesty, p. 12 . M ore, Utopia, p. 85. Harris, It’s Coming Yet, p. 36. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 97. H ulm e and W hitehead, W ild M ajesty, p. 15 . de Las Casas, A Short Account, p. 28. M ostert, Frontiers, pp. 10 7 -8 . M ostert, Frontiers, p. 1 1 7 . M ostert, Frontiers, p. 108. Locke, Political Writings, pp. 2 8 2 -3. W iedem ann, Greek and Roman Slavery, pp. 18 - 19 . Calder, Revolutionary Em pire, p. 7. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 39. W alvin, Black Ivory, p. 16 . W alvin, Black Ivory, p. 64. Fogel, Without Consent, p. 37. W iedner, T o rced Labor in C olonial Peru’ , The Americas, W ashington D C , 16 , no. 4, pp. 35 7 -8 3; H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 372. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, p. 138 . Braudel, C ivilization and Capitalism , V olum e III, p. 429. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 3 1. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, pp. 139 -4 0 . T h e com pendia exam ined are the Cambridge Encyclopedia, the Cambridge Fact Finder, the Collins Paperback Encyclopedia, the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Guinness Encyclopedia 19 9 s, the Hutchinson Encyclopedia 1996, the Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia, the Macmillan Encyclopedia 1997, the Readers Digest Book o f Facts and the Readers Digest Illustrated Dictionary o f Essential Knowledge. T h e Encyclopaedia Britannica is the only one to give any data on the w ar in Germ an South W est A frica, suggesting the H erero population fell from 70,000 to 16,000 and that the N am a w ere reduced by tw o-fifths (volum e 27, p. 8 71). T h e Readers Digest Book o f Facts is exceptional in not having an entry fo r the Black H ole o f Calcutta, but then nor does it have one for Calcutta itself. T h e tw o quotations on the M exica are from the Cambridge Encyclopedia (p. 96) and the Macmillan Encyclopedia 1997 (p. 103) respectively.

379

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

i

The March 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

2

M anchester, A World L it O nly by Fire, p. 240. Vaillant, The Aztecs o f Mexico, p. 24. T urner, Gerónimo, p. 16 . W hite, Cortés, p. 64. Innés, The Conquistadors, p. 7$. de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, p. 25. de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, p. 19 . de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, quoted in W right, Stolen Continents, p. 29.

The K idnap

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 .

Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 307. Soustelle, D aily U fe, p. 244. Soustelle, D aily U fe, pp. $ 2 -3 . D iaz del C astillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 199. C ortés, Letters, p. 95. Vaillant, The Aztecs o f M exico, p. 149. Soustelle, D aily U fe, p. 68. Soustelle, D aily U fe, p. 84. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, pp. 6 15 —17 . Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 647, note 14 . Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 188. Vaillant, The Aztecs o f M exico, pp. 19 6 -7 . T here are now w idely diverging opinions on the levels o f sacrifice and on die specific practice o f cannibalism in pre-C ortesian M exico. H ugh Thom as, fo r exam ple, suggests that sacrificed victim s w ere regularly eaten by the M exican nobility. See T he Conquest o f M exico, p. 25. H ow ever, R on ald W right and D avid Stannard represent the m ore sceptical w in g o f opinion, and suggest that the im age o f a country swim m ing in blood was largely an exaggeration that served the propaganda interests o f the original conquistadores. See Stolen Continents, p. 25 and American Holocaust, pp. 79-80. 14 . Soustelle, D aily U fi, p. 99. 15 . von H agen, The Ancient Sun Kingdoms, p. 56. 16 . Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, pp. 2 5-6 .

380

N otes

17 . Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. xii. 18 . Stannard, American Holocaust, p. 80. 19 . Soustelle, D aily U fe, p. $>9. 20. W right, Stolen Continents, pp. 25—35. 2 1. lim es, The Conquistadors, p. 19 5. 22. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 283. 23. Cortés, Letters, p. 24. 24. D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 35. 25. de Las Casas, A Short Account, p. 15 . 26. Sim pson, Encomienda, p. 28. 27. C ortés, Letters, pp. 2 3 -3 3 . 28. C ortés, Letters, p. 129 . 29. D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 75. 30. D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, pp. 68, 126 . 3 1 . C ortés, Letters, pp. 2 12 -2 4 . 32. lim es, The Conquistadors, p. 124 . 33 - W right, Stolen ^ontrnents, p. 3 1.

3

The N ight o f Sorrow 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

4

D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, pp. 2 35 -6 . Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 40. de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, p. 55Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 50; also Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 386. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 39 1. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 4 1 1 . Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 104. de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, p. 72. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 4 1 1 .

The Siege 1. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 286. 2. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 282. 3. For a detailed consideration o f the com plex subject o f the M exican population at the m om ent o f its encounter w ith Europe, see Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, pp. 6 0 9 -14 . Stannard accepts 381

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

2 1.

an estimate o f 25,000,000 for M exico at the tim e o f Colum bus* first jou rn ey; see American Holocaust, p. 33. Soustelle, D aily U fe, p. 207. D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 12 5 . Vaillant, The Aztecs o f M exico, p. 49. Braudel, C ivilization and Capitalism , V olum e I, pp. 38 3-8 . C ortés, Letters, p. 12 3 . Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 3 2 1. D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 130 . D iaz del C astillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 18 7. C ortés, Letters, p. 48. C ortés, Letters, p. 124 . C ortés, Letters, p. 43. For a detailed analysis o f the m ilitary advantages enjoyed b y the Europeans see Hassig, M exico and the Spanish Conquest. W right, Stolen Continents, p. 44. C ortés, Letters, p. 196. D iaz del C astillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 346. D iaz del C astillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 345. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, pp. 2 7 7 -8 ; also Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 528. W hite, Cortés, p. 267.

5

The Besieging

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20.

1. Branigan and Jarrett, The Mediterranean Lands, London, 19 7 5 , p. 2 0 1. 2. Litvinoff, Fourteen N inety-Tw o, p. 50 . 3. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 108. 4. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 13 . 5. Braudel, The Mediterranean, pp. 3 2 1- 5 . 6. Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 2 4 1. 7. de Las Casas, A Short Account, p. x xii. 8. Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 280. 9. Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 532. 10 . D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 68. 1 1 . C ortés, Letters, pp. 23, 68, 80. 12 . Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 16 1. 13 . D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 108.

382

N otes

14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Thom as, The Conquest o f Mexico, p. 2 13 . D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 56. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, p. 42. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 17 2 . D iaz del C astillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 77. W right, Stolen Continents, p. 19 . D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, pp. 3 1, 73, 83, 95, 182. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 156. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, p. $9. C ortés, Letters, p. 53. Hassig, M exico and the Spanish Conquest, p. 146. Cortés, Letters, pp. 16 7 , 209. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 363. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e II, p. 3 17 .

6

G old —The Castration o f the Sun

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18. 19 . 20. 2 1.

Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 3 18 . Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 334. C ortés, Letters, p. 95. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e I, p. 2 13 . C ortés, Letters, p. 2 1. de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, p. 3 1. Stannard, American Holocaust, p. 80. D iaz del Castillo, The Conquest o f N ew Spain, p. 349. C ortés, Letters, p. 279. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 29. von H agen, The Ancient Sun Kingdoms, p. 248. de Léon, The Incas, p. 138. Braudel, C ivilization and Capitalism , V olum e I, p. 424. von H agen, The Ancient Sun Kingdoms, p. 292. de Léon, The Incas, p. 144. de Gam boa, History o f the Incas, p. 10 . de Léon, The Incas, p. 158. M eans, Fall o f the Inca Em pire, p. 1 1 . M eans, Fall o f the Inca Em pire, pp. 1 0 - 1 1 . W right, Stolen Continents, p. 73. M eans, Fall o f the Inca Em pire, pp. 17 , 29.

383

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32.

H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 43. Friede and K een (eds.), Bartolomé de Las Casas, p. 36. von H agen, The Ancient Sun Kingdoms, p. 320. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 8 1. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 46. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 8 1. de Léon, The Incas, p. 157 . H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 56. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 70. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 39. de Aguado, Historia de Venezuela, quoted in H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, pp. 2 0 -2 1. 33. Federm ann, Historia indiana, quoted in H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 29. 34. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 10 7. 35. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 47. 36. von H agen, The Golden M an, p. 283. 37. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 50. 38. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, pp. 14 2 -3 . 39. von H agen, The Golden M an, p. 104. 40. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 127 . 4 1. Brian Inglis, Roger Casement, London, 1974, p. 49. 42. Inglis, Roger Casement, p. 74. 43. M cLynn, Stanley: The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, p. 104. 44. H em m ing, The Search fo r E l Dorado, p. 70. 45. Fernández-Arm esto, Columbus, p. 139. 46. G ibson, The Aztecs, p. 78. 47. G ibson, The Aztecs, p. 78. 48. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, p. 134 . 49. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, p. 13 5 . 50. H anke, The Imperial C ity, p. 1. $ 1 . H am ilton, American Treasure, p. 33. 52. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 370. 53. M eans, Fall o f the Inca Em pire, p. 180. 54. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, pp. 36 9 -73. 55. Stem , Peru’s Indian Peoples, p. 85. 56. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 409. 57. H anke, The Im perial C ity, p. 19 . 58. Padden, Tales o f Potosí, p. x x. 59. H anke, The Im perial C ity, p. 25.

384

N otes

60. Stannard, American Holocaust, p. 2 15 . 6 1. H am ilton, American Treasure, p. 189. 62. T od orov, The Conquest o f America, p. 13 3 ; see also Hassig, Mexico and the Spanish Conquest, p. 15 2 , and C o o k , Demographic Collapse, p. 1 14 . 63. Friede and K een (eds.), Bartoloméde LasCasas,p.32. 64. Friede and K een (eds.), Bartoloméde LasCasas,p.13 . 65. Friede and K een (eds.), Bartoloméde LasCasas,p.13 . 66. W achtel, The Vision o f the Vanquished, p. 202.

7

The Bones o f K ing B illy

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 .

Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 220. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 424. R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp. 216-^7. W alvin, Blade Ivory, p. 9. W alvin, Black Ivory, p. 8. W alvin, Black Ivory, p. 8; H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 40. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 77. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 72. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 83. C lark, History, p. 15 . H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 100. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 10 2. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 4 14 . R obson , A History o f Tasmania, V olum e I, p. 46. Calder, The N ative Tribes, p. 6. Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 89.

8

The Black Crows 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

B on w ick, D aily U fe, p. 100. R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 2 14 . R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 14 . Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 62. Harris, It’s Coming Yet, p. 3 1. B on w ick, D aily U fe, p. 17 ; Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 22. W alker, Early Tasmania, p. 238.

385

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 1$ . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 2 3. 24. 2 $. 26. 27. 28. 29.

R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 10 . W alker, Early Tasmania, p. 243. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 2 3 3 -4 . Calder, The N ative Tribes, p. $4; Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 13 5 . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 16 . Carter, The Road to Botany Bay, p. 64. Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 1 1 7 . R eyn old s, The Other Side o f the Frontier, p. 7 1. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 23. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 357. R obson , A History o f Tasmania, V olum e I, p. 230. R obson , A History o f Tasmania, V olum e I, p. 230. R obson , A History o f Tasmania, V olum e I, p. 234. R y a n , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 77. Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 109. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 6 2-8 . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 62; H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 4 14 . Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 109. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 230. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, pp. 26-8. Turnbull, Black War, p. 67. Turnbull, Black War, p. 60.

9

The Black War

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 139 . Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 14 7. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 346. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 346. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 65. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 6 1. R y a n , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp. 13 5 - 7 ; Plom ley, Friendly M ission, pp. 18 1- 2 . 8. R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 99; Calder, The N ative Tribes,

p. 23 9. British Parliamentary Papers, p. 2 10 . 10 . Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 14 5 . 1 1 . Calder, The N ative Tribes, pp. 8 - 13 .

386

N otes

12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Calder, The N ative Tribes, pp. 8—9 Calder, The N ative Tribes, p. 75. R eynolds, The Other Side o f the Frontier, p. 136 . de Gam boa, History o f the Incas, p. 27. Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 149. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 89 R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 107. Turnbull, Black War, p. 118 . Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 148. Hughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 3 7 1. Hughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 377 Travers, The Tasmanians, pp. 1 1 2 - 1 6 ; Turnbull, Black War, p. 27. R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp. 10 7 -10 . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 70. British Parliamentary Papers, p. 228. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 64-6. de Las Casas, A Short History, p. 1$ . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 6 6-7. Harris, It’s Coming Yet, p. 36. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 47. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 67. R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp. 9 9 -10 2 . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 119 . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 1 1 7 . Turnbull, Black War, p. 119 . See Travers, The Tasmanians, pp. 16 7 -7 8 ; D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 1 1 1 - 3 2 ; R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp. i 10 - 12 . 38. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 293.

10 The Coruiliator 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 276. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 66. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 89. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 332. Plom ley, Friendly M ission, p. 287. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 174 . de Las Casas, A Short Account, p. xiii.

387

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 .

B ourke, On the Border, p. 1 12 . Bates, The Passing o f the Aborigines, p. xi. British Parliamentary Papers, p. 253. British Parliamentary Papers, p. 248. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 19 5 -6 . R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, pp. 18 7 -9 . D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, pp. 2 3 3 -4 . Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 200. R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 186. D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 194. R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 19 3. R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 190.

1 1 The Last Tasmanian 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1.

D avies, The Last o f the Tasmanians, p. 202. R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 203. Calder, The N ative Tribes, p. 43 R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 2 12 . Travers, The Tasmanians, pp. 2 1-8 ; R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 2 12 . Travers, The Tasmanians, pp. 2 13 - 14 ; Davies, The Last o f the Tas­ manians, p p . 200-202. Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 36. Calder, The N ative Tribes, p. 1 1 . Calder, The N ative Tribes, p. 8. B o n w ick, D aily U fe, p. 18 . W alker, Early Tasmania, p. 2 3 1. Travers, The Tasmanians, p. 36. Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e I, p. 36. Bates, The Passing o f the Aborigines, p. 67. G orges, Report on the Natives, pp. 9 5-6 . R y an , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 3. H ughes, The Fatal Shore, p. 275. R eyn old s, The Other Side o f the Frontier, p. 1 2 1 . R ee ce , Aborigines and Colonists, pp. 2 3 -4 . Suter and Stearm an, Aboriginal Australians, M inority R igh ts G ro u p R ep o rt, p. 5. R e e ce , Aborigines and Colonists, p. 54.

388

N otes

22. Livingston and Louis, Australia, N ew Zealand and the Pacific blonds, p. 150 . 23. M acdonald, The Maori o f Aotearoa-New Zealand, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 6. 24. Livingston and Louis, Australia, N ew Zealand and the Pacific blonds, p. 170 . 2 $. M acdonald, The Maori o f Aotearoa-New Zealand, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 13 . 26. K ircher, The Kanaks o f N ew Caledonia, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 6. 27. K ircher, TheKanaks, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 6. 28. K ircher, TheKanaks, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 14 . 29. K ircher, TheKanaks, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 16 . 30. W eingartner,The Padfic: Nuclear Testing and M inorities, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep ort, p. 16 . 3 1. W eingartner, The Padfic, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 20. 32. W eingartner, The Padfic, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 20. 33. Turnbull, Black War, introduction. 34. R yan , The Aboriginal Tasmanians, p. 224.

12 The Tiger o f the Human Spedes 1. C onner, Joseph Reddeford W alker, p. 1 5 1 . 2. C onner, Joseph Reddeford Walker, p. 268. 3. C onner, Joseph Reddeford Walker, pp. 26 6 -7. 4. C rem ony, L ife Among the Apaches, p. 3 13 . 5. C rem ony, L ife Among the Apaches, p. 266. 6. C rem ony, L ife Among the Apaches, pp. 33—4. 7. B ourke, On the Border, p. 1 1 3 . 8. C lum , Apache Agent, pp. 4 1, 12 . 9. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 256. 10 . C lum , Apache Agent, p. 292. 1 1 . Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 108. 12 . B all, Indeh, p. 29. 13 . Barrett (ed.), Gerónimo, p. 64. 14 . Barrett (ed.), Gerónimo, p. 64. 15 . Josephy, 500 Nations, p. 3 19 ; W right, Stolen Continents, p. 2 12 . 16 . D .R . W rone and N elson, W ho's the Savage?, G reenw ich, C on n ., 1973 PP* 2 3 2 -3 ; R .S . W right, Stolen Continents, p. 47.

389

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

17 . W right, Stolen Continents, p. 2 13 . 18 . Jahoda, The Trail o f Tears, p. 78. 19 . Barrett (ed.), Gerónimo, p. 73. 20. Barrett (ed.), Gerónimo, p. 75. 2 1. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apadteria, p. 40. 22. T rim ble, The People, p. 266. 2 3. R oberts, Once They M oved, p. 108. 24. D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 88. 25. W hite, Cortés, p. 3 18 . 26. Bryant, ‘Entering the G lobal Econom y* in M ilner II, O ’C on n or and Sandweiss (eds.), The O xford H istory o f the American West, p. 2 13 . 27. Horsm an, Race and M anifest D estiny, p. 16 7. 28. R ich ard Fitter, W ildlife fo r M an, London, 1986, p. 18 7.

13

The Enem y and the People

1 . M atthiessen, In the Spirit o f C razy Horse, p. 12 . 2. D ippie, ‘T h e Visual West* in M ilner II, O ’C on n or and Sandweiss (eds.), The Oxford History o f the American West, pp. 676-80. 3. Joseph y, 500 Nations, p. 3 9 1. 4. M atthiessen, In the Spirit o f C razy Horse, p. 12 . 5. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apadteria, p. 270. 6. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 99. 7. C lum , Apache Agent, pp. 2 2 1-4 . 8. B all, Indeh, p. 15 . 9. C rem ony, L ife Among the Apadtes, p. 28. 10 . O pler, A n Apache Life-W ay, p. 354. 1 1 . D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 4; R oberts, Once They M oved, 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 .

P- 54D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, pp. 3 0 - 3 1. Q uoted in B all, In The Days o f Victorio, p. 65. Betzinez, I Fought With Gerónimo, pp. 6 7-8 . Thrapp, Conquest o f Apadteria, p. v ii; see also Bourke, On the Border, p. 1 1 3 . C rem ony, U fe Among the Apaches, p. 267. R oberts, Once They M oved, p. 89; see also Thrapp, Victorio, p. 72. C rem ony, U fe Among the Apadtes, p. 17 7 . C onner, Joseph Reddeford Walker, p. 39.

390

N otes

20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

C onner, Joseph Reddeford Walker, pp. 34 -4 2. Barrett (ed.), Gerónimo, p. 10 2; T rim ble, The People, p. 259. B all, In the Days o f Victorio, p. 29. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apathetic, p. 18 . C lum , Apache Agent, p. 12 2 . Porter, Paper M ediane M an, p. 12 . Porter, Paper M ediane M an, p. 12 . M atthiessen, In the Spirit o f C razy Horse, p. 1 1 . Bourke, On the Border, p. 14 5. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 126 . Porter, Paper M ediane M an, p. 19 . Bourke, On the Border, p. 445. Betzinez, I Fought With Gerónimo, pp. 12 0 - 2 1. Bourke, On die Border, p. 437. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 146. Bourke, On the Border, p. 442. D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 42. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 90. Lockw ood, The Apache Indians, p. 17 8 ; R oberts, Once They M oved,

p. 74 39. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 92. 40. D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 60. 4 1. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 97. 42. Josephy, 500 Nations, p. 260. 43. Q uoted in M atthiessen, In the Spirit o f C razy Horse, p. 9. 44. Bourke, On the Border, p. 234.

14 Am erica's Greatest G uerrilla Fighter 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

Thrapp, Victorio, p. ix . R oberts, Once They M oved, p. $5. Thrapp, Victorio, p. ix . See D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. $»-12; D ebo argues that the M im bres and O jo Caliente or W arm Springs Chiricahua w ere distinct sections o f die tribe. Thrapp, Victorio, p. 99. R oberts, Once They M oved, p. 174 . Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 18 1. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 18 7. 39 1

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24.

Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 190. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 19 3. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 203. D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 80. Bou rke, On the Border, p. 134 . C lum , Apache Agent, p. 207. Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 107. D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 25. B all, In The Days o f Victorio, p. 188; D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 2 3 0 - 3 1. Thrapp, Victorio, p. 374. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 2 0 1. Thrapp, Victorio, p. 308. R oberts, Once They M oved, p. 19 3. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 73. Ball, In The Days o f Victorio, p. 87. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 2 1$ ; R oberts, Once They M oved, p . 19 4 .

15 Gerónimo —The Last Renegade 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 .

Ball, Indeh, pp. 39-40. Thrapp, Victorio, p. 58. D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 1 5 1 - 2 . D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 14 2. R oberts, Once They M oved, p. 1 2 1 . D ebo, Gerónimo, p. x i. Trim ble, The People, p. 267. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 258. Bourke, On the Border, p. 439. D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 13 8 -9 . Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, pp. 2 3 7 -8 ; D ebo, pp. 13 9 -4 1Betzinez, I Fought With Gerónimo, p. 58. Ball, In the Days o f Victorio, pp. 16 3, 19 5. Porter, Paper M edicine M an, p. 1 5 1 . Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 52. Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 83. Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, pp. 52, 38. B ourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 42.

392

Gerónim o,

N otes

19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32.

Betzinez, I Fought With Gerónimo, p. 1 1 5 . Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, pp. 10 2 , 1 1 8 - 1 9 . D avis, The Truth About Gerónimo, p. 10 2. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 2 33. R oberts, Once They M oved, pp. 2 6 2 -3 . D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 262. Bourke, On the Border, pp. 4 8 0 -8 1. Falk, The Gerónimo Campaign, p. 160. Bourke, On the Border, p. 483. Thrapp, Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 366. Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 46. Bourke, A n Apache Campaign, p. 50. R oberts, Once They M oved, pp. 44-6. C lum , Apache Agent, p. 18 7.

16 The Caged Tiger 1. 2. 3. 4. $. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 .

G ibson, The Aztecs, p. 13 2 . B o lt, American Indian Policy, p. 100. B o lt, American Indian Policy, p. 100. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 3. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 32$. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 326. D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 4 00 -$. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 407. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 423. D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 4 16 -19 . O m itholidays brochure 1997, p. 7 1. M onbiot, N o M an's Land, London, 1994, p. 8 1. M onbiot, N o M an's Land, p. 83. Affairs in Maasailand have im proved recently, especially near Am boseli w here the local Maasai have themselves converted their pastures into private game sanctuaries. Cattle are grazed in these areas only in extrem e and life-threatening conditions. O therw ise the principal source o f revenue is from tourists on photographic safaris. T h e current Maasai practice o f culling som e gam e species fo r their meat and skins m ay eventually be replaced w ith licensed tourist hunting — an innovation that could open up new and im portant econom ic opportunities fo r the M aasai. See D avid

393

R ivers c f Blood, R ivers c f G oU

Lovatt Sm ith, ‘T h e Maasai and their role in the past and future o f Am boseli N ational Parie', in Swara, M arch-A pril 1996, pp. 18 - 2 1. 15 . Jonathan O w en, B B C W ildlife, D ec. 1996, p. 6 1. 16 . T rim ble, The People, p. 285. 17 . M ay, ‘A lcohol Abuse and Alcoholism A m ong Am erican Indians: A n O verview ' in W atts and W right (eds.), Alcoholism in M inority Populations, p. 108. 18 . M ay, ‘A lcohol Abuse and Alcoholism A m ong Am erican Indians: A n O verview ’ in W atts and W right (eds.), Alcoholism in M inority Populations, p. 10 $. 19 . D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 19 4 -5 . 20. W est, ‘Am erican Frontier’ in M ilner II, O 'C o n n o r and Sandweiss (eds.), The O xford History o f the American West, p. 14 1. 2 1. Braudel, C ivilization and Capitalism , V olum e I, pp. 248-9. 22. Soustelle, D aily U fe, p. 156 . 23. Thom as, The Conquest o f M exico, p. 18 . 24. G ibson, The Aztecs, p. 150 . 25. Braudel, C ivilization and Capitalism , V olum e I, p. 248. 26. Friede and K een (eds.), Bartolomé de Las Casas, p. 13 ; W achtel, The Vision o f the Vanquished, p. 98. 27. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the huas, p. 368. 28. H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 369. 29. W achtel, The Vision o f the Vanquished, p. 146. 30. H unter, Aboriginal Health and History, p. 90. 3 1. M ay, ‘A lcohol Abuse and Alcoholism A m ong Am erican Indians: A n O verview ' in W atts and W right (eds.), Alcoholism in M inority Populations, p. 108. 32. H unter, Aboriginal Health and History, pp. 13 6 -7 . 33. Pool, Samuel Maharero, p. 248. 34. R obinson, The Laundrymen, pp. 17 3 -4 . 35. Independent, 25 Ju ly 1995, 19 M arch 1996. 36. D ebo, Gerónimo, p. 384. 37. D ebo, Gerónimo, pp. 440-42.

17

A Freshly Slaughtered Goat

1. G orges, Report on the Natives, pp. 9 2 -3. 2. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 108. 3. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 144.

394

N otes

18 A Darkness That M ay B e Fett 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 1$ . 16 . 17 . 18 .

Drechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 10 7. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 93. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 39. V edder, South West Africa, p. 473. Vedder, South West Africa, p. 477. Andersson, Lake Ngam i, p. 49. Andersson, Lake Ngam i, p. 14 3. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 17 . Vedder, South West Africa, p. 47. Andersson, Lake Ngam i, p. 1 1 $ . Andersson, Lake Ngam i, pp. 1 2 1 - 3 . W ellington, South West Africa, pp. 15 3 -4 . W ellington, South West Africa, p. 148. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 23. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 2 1. Vedder, South West Africa, p. 2 5 1. P ool, Samuel Maharero, p. 64. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 2 3 -4 ; Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 10 2. 19 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 18 . 20. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 2 4 -5 .

19 A

Place in the Sun

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Q uoted in Pakenham , The Scramble fo r Africa, p. 2 16 . Andersson, Lake Ngami, p. 15 2 . Andersson, Lake Ngami, p. 15 7 . B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 58. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 22. Andersson, Lake Ngami, p. 335. H ahn, V edder and Fourie, The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa, pp. 12 7 -8 . 8. Andersson, Lake Ngam i, p. 2 3 1. 9. Hahn, V edder and Fourie, The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa, PP- 39- 44 10 . H ahn, V edder and Fourie, The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa, P- 77 -

395

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

1 1 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 2 14 . 12 . Henderson, Studies, p .13 2 and Tow nsend, The R ise and F a ll o f Germ any’s Colonial Em pire, pp. 36 -7 . 13 . Henderson, Studies, p. 38. 14 . Gann and D uignan, The Rulers o f German Africa, p. 26. 15 . Henderson, Studies, p . 53. 16 . Q uoted in M ostert, Frontiers, p. 286.

20 The Em pire Builders 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 18 . 19 . 20. 2 1. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 30. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 15 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 43. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 7 1 - 3 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 73. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 69. B ley, South- West Africa, p. xiv. G orges, Report on the Natives, pp. 79 -8 2. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 78. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 10 . G orges, Report on the Natives, pp. 18 - 19 . W ellington, South West Africa, p. 196. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 93. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 68. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 8 1. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 82. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 83. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 42. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 84. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 97. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 87. G orges, Report on the N atives, p. 4$. Pool, Samuel Maharero, pp. 13 8 - 5 1. G orges, Report on the N atives, p. 47. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 166. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 166. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 47. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 16 7. P ool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 168.

396

Notes

30. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 176 . 3 1 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 98; Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 50. 32. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 98. 33. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Hereto, p. 50. 34. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 18 1. 35. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Hereto, p. 5 1 36. G orges, Report on the N atives, pp. $ 0 -5 1.

2 1 Cruelty and Brutality 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11. 12 . 13 . 14 . 15 . 16 .

P ool, Samuel Maharero, p. 19 7. P ool, Samuel Maharero, p. 202. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 140. The Times, 6 D ecem ber 1904. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 138 . The Times, 12 N ovem ber 1904. The Times, 18 O ctober 1904. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 14 2. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 7. B ley, South- West Africa, p. 43. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 10 2 . G orges, Report on the N atives, p. 54. Bridgm an, The Revolt < f the Herero, p. 62. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 97. Drechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 134 . H ahn, V edder and Fourie, The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa,

P- 5317 . Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Hereto, p. 62. 18 . G orges, Report on the N atives, pp. 5 4 -5 ; D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 135 19 . G orges, Report on the N atives, p. $6. 20. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 14 3. 2 1. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 204. 22. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 58. 23. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 74. 24. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 67. 2 $. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 8 1. 26. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, pp. 9 6 -7 .

397

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

27. 28. 29. 30. 3 1. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 4 1. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 5 1. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 6 1. 62. 63.

P ool, Sam uel M aham o, p. 2 2 1. P ool, Sam uel M aham o, p. 224. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 149. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 148. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 87. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 10 2. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 148. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 14 5. Frenssen, Peter M oot’sJourney, p. 6. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 14 7. Im perial C olonial O ffice, File N o . 2089, pp. 10 0 -10 2 , von T rotha to Leutw ein, 5 N ovem ber 1904, author's ow n translation. Pool, Sam uel M aham o, p. 245. Pool, Sam uel M aham o, p. 2 5 1. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 15 5 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 156 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 15 5 -6 . Frenssen, Peter Moor’s Journey, p. 189. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Hereto, p. 12 5 . Pool, Sam uel M aham o, p. 264. G orges, Report on the Natives, pp. 6 3 -5 . G orges, Report on the N atives, pp. 6 4 -7. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 1 5 1 . P ool, Samuel M aham o, p. 270. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Hereto, p. 128 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 16 1. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 130 . D rechsler, 'Jacob M orenga: A N ew K ind o f South-W est A frican Leader’, in W . M arhov (ed.), African Studies, 1967, pp. 9 5 -10 5 . The Times, 25 M ay 1905. Bridgm an, The Revolt < f the Hereto, p. 12 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 18 7. The Times, 14 January 1905. The Times, 20 O ctober 1905. G orges, Report on the N atives, p. 96. Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 15 3 . The Times, 7 N ovem ber 1905. D rechsler, ‘Jacob M orenga: A N ew K ind o f South-W est A frican Leader', in W . M arhov (ed.), African Studies, 19 6 7, p. 100. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 2 0 1.

398

N otes

64. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 2 0 1. 65. Jo h n Iliffe, ‘T h e H erero and N am a R ising?: South-W est A frica, 19 0 4 -7 ’, in G . K ibodya (ed.), Aspects o f South African History, 1968, P- 95 .

22 N ever M ust We A llow the Negroes to Prevail 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 . 11.

D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 208. B ley, South- West Africa, p. 166. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 146. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 146. Goldblatt, History o f South West Africa, p. 14 7. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 2 12 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 2 14 . G orges, Report on the N atives, pp. 33—4. The Times, 4 D ecem ber 1905. Frenssen, Peter M oor's Journey, p. 189. H ahn, V edder and F ou iie, The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa, p. 156 . 12 . Goldblatt, H istory o f South West Africa, p. 13 3 . 13 . P ool, Samuel M aham o, p. 280. 14 . G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 35. N ote, how ever, that D rechsler accepts a sm aller figure than Gorges fo r the num ber o f Bergdam ara casualties, resulting in a low er overall total o f about 75,000 A frican victim s. See D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 2 14 , 2 19 , note 189. 15 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 14 5. 16 . D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 148. 17 . B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 1 6 1 - 3 . 18 . B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 166. 19 . B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 16 $. 20. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 164. 2 1. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 2 2 1. 22. Frenssen, Peter M oor's Journey, p. 2 33. 23. G orges, Report on the N atives, p. 49. 24. Alan B u llock, H itler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, London, 19 9 1, p. 89$. 25. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 14 7. 26. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 16 1. 27. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 16 5 . 28. Pool, Sam uel Maharero, p. 248.

399

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old

29. Frenssen, Peter M oor's Journey, pp. 98 and 6; Bridgm an, The Revolt o f the Herero, p. 128 . 30. The Times, 18 January 1905. 3 1 . The Times, 2 1 M arch 1906. 32. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, p. 146. 33. B ley, South- West Africa, p. 17 2 . 34. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 223. 3$. H ahn, V edder and Fourie, The N ative Tribes o f South West Africa, p. 16 2. 36. M ostert, Frontiers, pp. 348-9. 37. Tow nsend, The R ise and F all o f Germ any's Colonial Em pire, p. 286. 38. G orges, Report on the Natives, p. 16 2. 39. B ley, South-W est Africa, p. 2 12 . 40. T roup, In Face o f Fear, p. 58. 4 1. T roup, In Face o f Fear, p. 60. 42. First, South West Africa, p. 14 2. 43. T roup, In Face o f Fear, p. 72. 44. Fraenkel and M urray, The Namibians, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 8. 4 $. First, South West Africa, p. 49. 46. D rechsler, Let Us D ie Fighting, pp. 9 -10 . 47. First, South West Africa, p. 10 1.

23 They B u ilt N o Houses and D ug N o Wells 1. Barrett (ed.), Gerónimo, introduction, p. 26. 2. R . H icks, Hidden Tibet: The Land and Its People, Shaftesbury, 1988, p. 63. 3. K uper, International Action Against Genocide, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep ort, p. 6. 4. V em ey et al, Sudan: Conflict and minorities. M inority R ights G roup R ep o rt, p. 9. 3. Stannard, American Holocaust, p. 5 1. 6. Thrapp, The Conquest o f Apacheria, p. 134 . 7. F. M cLynn, Stanley: The Sorcerer's Apprentice, London, 19 9 1, p. 237. 8. W right, Stolen Continents, p. 50. 9. W achtel, The Vision o f the Vanquished, p. 3 1. 10 . Harris, It's Coming Yet, p. 36.

400

N otes

1 1 . Prescott, The Conquest o f M exico, V olum e I, pp. 139 -4 0 . 12 . Frenssen, Peter M oor’s Journey, p. 233. 13 . Stannard, American Holocaust, p. 268; G ilbert, The Routledge Atlas o f American History, London, 1993, p. 2. 14 . H em m ing, The Conquest o f the Incas, p. 409. 1$ . Turnbull, Blade War, introduction. 16 . W eam e, The M aya o f Guatemala, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 17 . W eam e, The M aya o f Guatemala, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep o rt, p. 23. 18 . O liver T ickell, ‘Land Fever C ould W ipe O ut Indians', B B C W ildlife, January 1996, p. 59. 19 . G ray, The Amerindians o f South America, M inority R igh ts G roup R ep ort, p. 8. 20. Dam ien Lew is, ‘Indians Set T o Lose Forest Lands', B B C W ildlife, Ju n e 1996, p. 7 1. 2 1. R o gers W orthington, ‘ . . . and w here it stops, nobody know s’ , Chicago Tribune M agazine, 22 August 1993. 22. Sharkey, ‘ Indian giver', Guardian Weekend, 8 A pril 1995, p. 32. 23. Sharkey, ‘ Indian giver’, Guardian Weekend, 8 A pril 1995, pp. 2 7 -3 2 . 24. Sharkey, ‘Indian giver’ , Guardian Weekend, 8 A pril 1995, p. 30.

401

Index

Aborigines see Australia; Tasmanian Aborigines Aborigines Protection Society 292 Adelaide, Australia 176 Aden 28 Africa 22 British colonies 17 5 ,17 8 ,17 9 ,2 8 2 , 284 population losses j-6 and Portuguese 28, 29, 87 slave trade 5 ,1 8 - 1 9 ,1 1 8 - 1 9 , 292 see Belgian Congo; German South West Africa; South Africa; Tanzania Aguilar, Gerónimo de 79-80 Alabama 19 7 -8 ,2 32 Alamo, battle o f the (1836) 199 Albany, Australia 176 Albuquerque, Alfonso de 28 alcohol and tribal peoples 3 7 ,2 2 1,2 4 3 , 246,239-62, 263-6, 282, 303, 310 Alexander V I, Pope (Rodrigo Borgia) 14 -

iS. 197 Alfred, Prince 1 1 3 Alice Springy, Australia: police brutality

148-9 Allen, Jackey 172 Almagro, Diego de 90 Alope 200,233 Alvarado, Pedro de 33-6, 37, 89,99, 366 Amazonia 12, 2 2 ,13 9 , 367-8 Amboseli, Kenya 238

America, North: Anglo-American W ar 19 4 ,19 6 British colonies 1 9 ,1 1 7 - 1 9 W ar o f Independence 1 1 8 ,1 9 3 see Native Americans; United States o f America Andersson, Charles 276, 308 Lake Ngami 276, 277, 278, 287, 289 Andes, the 8 9 .9 0 ,9 1,9 9 Angola 284 Angra Pequeña, German SW Africa 282 Apache, the 37, 188-90, 209, 2 14 -18 , 230-1 and alcohol 243, 246, 239-61 brutal excesses 249-30, 339-60 hunting skills 209-10 raids 2 1 2 - 1 3 ,2 1 9 ,2 3 1 on Mexicans 18 9 ,19 3 , 2 13 -14 , 219, 249.260 shamanism 229-30, 236, 264 skills in survival and war 193, 228-9, 247-50 w an 203-6, 2 14 -18 women 229-30 see also Bedonkohé, dre; Mescalcro, the; Mimbres Apaches; Warm Springy Apaches; Chiricahua, die; Crook, General; Gerónimo; Victorio Apacheria 192, 204, 209, 248 Appalachians, die 19 2 ,19 3

403

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old Arapaho, the 198 Anw alt, the 6 , 7 , 1 1 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 8 , 2 1 , 23. 29 . 79 . 364 Arcadia 9 , 1 3 Arenberg, Prince 297 Argentina 31 Arispe, M exico 200 Aristotle: Politics 17 Arizona 18 7 -8 ,19 9 ,2 0 4 ,2 0 6 , 209, 218 reservations 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 219 , see else San Carlos Arizona Citizen 221 Arkansas, U S A 199 Armenians 338 Arthur, Governor George 143-d, 14 7 ,14 9 , 15 4 ,15 6 ,16 6 instigates ‘Black Line* 130-3 Arthur, M ary Ann 1 7 1 - 2 , 1 8 1 Arthur, Walter George 17 1-2 ,2 6 3 Atahualpa, Inca emperor 9 4 ,9 3 ,9 6 ,9 7 Australia: Aborigines 6, 7 - 8 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 2 2 , 1 4 0 , 1 4 8 -

9. 17 5 .17 6 . 177-S. 263. 292, 363. 3 66 convict settlements 119 - 2 3 ,17 6 Axayacitl, Emperor 34 Azores, the 18 Aztecs 23, see M exica, die Balboa, Vasco Núñez de 29 Balearic Islands 76 Ball, Eve 2 31 Bam (missionary) 282 Bantu, the 17 3 ,17 6 , 307 see also Hereto, the Barnes, D r 166 Bascom, Lieutenant George 2 1 3 ,2 1 6 Bass Strait 1 2 3 ,1 2 8 ,1 6 4 ,1 6 6 sealers 134-5, » 5 7 .1*2-3 Basten (Bastards) 289, 296, 314 . 3»S. 3»9. 33»

Bates, Daisy 15 9 ,16 2

The Passing o f the Aborigines 175 Bechuanaland 322, 329, 332, 340 Bedonkohé 2 12 Belgian Congo 2 8 4 ,2 9 1, 361 atrocities 6 ,10 5 - 6 ,15 9 , 292 Benguela Current 285-6

Bergdamara see Damara, the Berseba tribe 344 Betzinez, Jason: I Fought With Gerónimo 2 1 2 ,2 19 ,2 4 2 Biafia, republic o f 359 Bible, the 14 B ig Foot, C h ief 190 B ig R iver tribe, Tasmania 149-50 Bismarck, Prince Otto von 2 8 1,2 8 5 ,2 9 5 , 296. 298, 348 bison, American 2 0 3,2 57 Black Hills, South Dakota 202, 2 1 1 , 230, 369 Black Hole o f Calcutta 23 Black Line, the (Tasmania) 150-2 Black W ar (Tasmania) 13 9 ,14 0 -5 0 ,15 7 Bley, Helmut: South West Africa under German Rsde 287-8, 298, 3 17 , 318 Bligh, Captain William 123 ‘Blue Blook’ 355, 356-7 B o en 278 ,28 7,28 9 , 314 , 320, 352 Boer W ar 345, 360 Bogotá, Zipa o f 1 0 0 ,10 1 Bolivar, Estado: Indians 367 Bolivia 3 1 ser Potosí Bondekwart tribe 2 6 9 -7 0 ,2 7 1,2 7 3 , 302-3, 3 12 , 314 , 3 »7 . 3 « . 335 . 34©, 357 Bosque Redondo reservation 210, 2 12 Botany Bay, Australia 1 2 0 ,1 2 1 Bourke, John 15 8 ,16 3 ,2 17 - 18 ,2 19 ,2 4 0 , 246.252 An Apache Campaign 229, 24 1, 242, 248 On the Bonier with Crook 16 0 -1, 217, 220,228, 246,247 Bow ie, Jim 199 Boxer Uprising (China) 327 Braudel, Fernand: The Mediterranean 76-7, *7

Brazilian tribes 5 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 2 2 , 36 1, 367-8 Britain: African colonies 2 7 5 ,2 7 8 ,2 7 9 ,2 8 2 , 284 American colonies 1 9 , 1 1 7 Australia convict settlements 1 4 ,11 8 - 2 3 , 12 6 ,17 6 and extinction o f Aboriginal Tasmanians see Tasmanian Aborigines

404

Index and Maoris 178-9 and Native Americans 19 3 ,19 4 , 195, 19 6 ,22 2 nuclear tests 180 slave trade 118 Brown, Dee: Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee 22-3 Bruny Island, Tasmania 13 4 -6 ,16 3 ‘Buffrlo Bill' (William Cody) 190 Biilow , Prince Bernhard von 347 Burgos, Laws o f (1312 ) 1 j Burundi 359 Bush, George 19 1 ‘Bushmen’ 275 bushrangers, Tasmanian 136-7, 139 Büttner, C . G . 282-3 Cajamarca, massacre o f (1332) 94-3 Calder, J . E.: The Native Tribes o f Tasmania 1 2 5 ,1 4 2 ,1 4 3 . 144, * 7 0 - 1,17 3 California, U SA 19 9,202 California Volunteers 187 Cambodia 338 Cameroons 283, 333 Camp Grant Massacre, U SA (1871) 202, 220-1 Camp Verde reservation 219 Canada 194, 209, 263 Canaries, the 18 rannihalicm j 6 l

Cape Barren, Tasmania 183 Cape Colony, British 2 7 3 ,2 7 8 ,2 7 9 ,2 8 2 Cape Grim, Tasmania 14 1-2 Cape o f Good Hope 28 Caprivi. Count Leo von 298, 303 Caribbean Islands: and Columbus 7 ,9 - 10 , II, 14, 13 , 29 and slavery 1 1 7 , 1 1 8 Spanish conquest 31 see also Anw alt, the Caribs 263, 361 Carter, Paul: The Road to Botany Bay 133 Casement, R oger 13 9 ,16 2 Cayuga, the 193 Celebes, the 29 CempoaQan, M exico 78, 88 battle (1320) 33

Cervantes, Miguel de 77 Chamberlain, Joseph 334 Charles V , Emperor 4 9 ,8 7 ,8 8 , n o Cherokee, the 193, 19 6 -7 ,19 8 , 360 Chesapeake Bay, Virginia 1 1 7 Cheyenne, the 198, 202,203-6 Chickasaw, the 193, 360 Chihuahua, M exico 200,201 Chile 31 China 29 chinampas 31 Chiricahua Apaches 206-8, 2 12 , 2 13 , 216, 2 2 1, 222, 223 breakouts from reservations 236-43,

244-7 in exile 218, 247, 252-3, 254. »55 losses 247, 234 see also Cochise; Gerónimo; Nana Choctaw, the 195, 198-9, 360 Cholulam 83 Christian, Jan Abraham 269-70 Christianity: and European conquest 14 16, 74-9. 84. *04. 361 see also missionaries Cibola, seven cities o f 89 C ie n de Léon, Pedro de ro4 The Incas 9 1 ,9 3 ,9 7 Clark, Robert 17 1 Chun, John 190, 19 1, 206-9, 2 12 , 22 1, 225-6, 229, 234, 236 Clum, W oodrow: Apache Agent 190 coca and cocaine 262-3, 264, 265 Cochise, C h ief 19 1, 2 0 6 ,2 0 7 ,2 12 ,2 15 , 2 1 9 ,2 3 4 ,23s CoDingwood, Captain Luke 18 -19 Colombia 3 1 , 9 7 , 1 0 1 , 149 Colorado, U SA 199 Colorado, Mangas 2 1 5 - 16 ,2 19 Columbus, Christopher 28, 29 ,37-8 , 74, 73. 77. 106 and the Aiawak 7 , 1 5 , 1 8 , 79 reports from die Caribbean 7, 8 , 9 , 1 1 ,

*3. *4 Comanche, the 198 conciliator figures 158-62 see also Crook, General; Leutwein, Theodor; Robinson, George

405

R iven o f Blood, R iven o f G old conquistadores 15 -16 , 73. 74. 76-7. 7*. 79. 13 a, 248, 249. 36 1-2 see éso Coïtés, Heman; P ia n o , Francisco Conrad, Joseph: The Heart o fDarkness 162 conversos 75 convicts, transportation o f 118 -2 3 Cook, Captain James 1 2 0 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 3 , 132 Cordoba, Spain 74 Coro, expeditions from 98-100 Coronado, Francisco Vázquez de 189 corroborée 13 0 ,13 8 Coïtés, Heman: background 7 6 ,9 0 ,10 3 character, methods and tactics 36, 38-9, 54 . 56, 70, 78, 79 . *0, 82-4 and La Malinche 8 0 ,16 3 and the march on Tenochndan 27-8, 3 1,6 6 meeting with Moctezuma 7, 35, 8 1-2 Moctezuma's kidnap 36-7, 38, 39 and Mexican human sacrifices 48,49, j i and Mexican treasure 30, 59,62, 87-9 and Narváez 53-$ and la Noche Triste $ 7 -6 0 ,6 1,6 2 and Salazar 107 subsequent portrayab 33, 39, 83, 85, 16 1 and Tenochdtlan siege and fill 70-2, 84 and Tlaxcalans 66-9 Costner, Kevin 368, 369 Cramer, Ludwig 354 Crazy Horse, C h ief 19 0 ,2 0 3 ,2 0 6 ,2 3 4 Creek, die 195. * 9 6 , 197 . *98 Cremony, J . C .: Life Among the Apaches 189 Crockett, Davy 199 Crook, General George: on the Apache 190, 2 19 ,2 2 2 -3 , *49 background and character 2 16 -17 , * 19 as conciliator figure 1 5 8 ,16 0 - 1,1 6 2 , 239-40 campaigns 218, 24 1-3 and Gerónimo 2 4 2 ,2 4 5 -6 ,2 5 1 use o f scouts 1 6 3 ,2 1 7 , 2 1 8 ,2 4 1 and Tucson R in g 220 Crowther, D r William 1 1 6 - 17 Cuauhtemoc, Emperor 6 9 ,72

Cuba 16, 3 8 ,7 9 .1 5 ® Cuidáhuac, Emperor 5 7 ,6 9 ,7 0 Custer, General George Armstrong 205, 2 0 5 -6 ,2 5 1 Cyprus: Italian sugar plantations 17 -18 Dakota: Black Hills 202, 2 1 1,2 3 0 ,3 6 9 Dalfinger, Ambrosius 98,99 Dam an (Bergdaman), the 289-90,296,

314. 31®. 334, 346 Dances with Wolves 368, 369 Davis, Britton 240, 2 4 1,2 4 6 ,2 6 1 The Truth About Gerónimo 2 1 1 ,2 2 0 ,2 2 1 , 228,229, 234-5 Dawes Act (1887) 252-3 Debo, Angie: Gerónimo 2 0 7 ,2 3 5 ,2 5 2 , 254 Delaware, the 193-4 Denver gold rush (1858) 202 Denver News 221 Derwent, R iver (Tasmania) 123-4 setdements 13 4 ,13 5 - 6 Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft fur Sudwestafrika 295 Dias, Bartolomeu 28 Diaz, Bemal: The Conquest o f New Spornt,

33. 4*. 4®-9. 50, 51. 5*. 64, 66-7, 7*. 78, 80, 82, 88 Dietrich (German trader) 3 18 -19 disease, death from: in the Americas 6 9 ,9 4 ,1 1 1 - 1 2 , 365, 366 Apache 254 Australian Aborigines 177-8, 366 in Europe 76 among Hereto 3 10 on Malekula Island 8 Tasmanian Aborigines 1 4 2 ,1 5 7 ,1 6 7 Dominican Republic 6 see Anwalt, die Dove, D r Karl 302, 349 Drake, Sir Francis 1 1 7 Drechsler, Horst: 'Jacob Morenga’ 336 Let Us D ie Fighting 3 15 -16 , 330 drugs trade 264-5 Dunmore, Lord 222 Dürer, Albrecht 42-3

406

Index Eaglehawk N eck, Tasmania 15a, 153 East Tim or 359 Ecuador 3 1 , 10 1 Efe ‘pygmies’ 22 E l Dorado, search for 1 0 1 - 4 ,10 5 ,10 6 Elizabeth I, Queen 103 Elliott, J . H .: Imperial Spain 7$ encomienda system 106-7, 253 Estorff M ajor von 322, 32 9 ,332 , 345 Ethiopian Movement 316, 33$ European perceptions o f tribes people: as barbarians 1 2 - 1 3 ,1 6 1 - 2 and early encounters 7 ,9 - 1 1 as inferior beings 8-9, 348, 361-4 as ‘noble savages' 1 1 - 1 2 , 22, 256 and stereotypes 12 , 2 1, 189 as wild animals 13 -14 and work ethic 1 6 - 1 7 ,2 1 , 388-9, 363-4 see also Christianity; slavery Extremadura, Spain 76 Fabri, D r Friedrich: BedarfDeutschland der Kolonien? 281 feather craft, Mexican 42 Federmann, Nicobus 99-100 Ferdinand, King o f Spain 7, 7 4 ,7 6 Fetterman Massacre (1865) 206 Five Civilised Tribes, the 19 6 ,19 7 — 8 Flinders Island, Tasmania: Aboriginal exile 1 6 4 - 8 ,1 6 9 ,1 7 1 ,1 8 1 ,1 8 2 ,2 5 3 Flinders bland Weekly Chronicle 16 5 ,16 7 , 182 Florentine Codex (Sahagún) 33, 34 ,46 , 36, 59,88 Florida, U S A 3 0 ,19 $ , 196 exiled Chiricahua 252-3 Fly, C . S. 245 Fogel, Robert 19 Fonseca, Bishop o f Burgos 76 Fort Apache reservation 219 ,259 -60 Fort San Carlos 2 1 1 Fort SiO, Oklahoma 255 Fort Thomas 2 1 1 Fox, the 19 3 -4 .19 * France: African acquisitions 284 nuclear tests 180

repression o f Kanaks (N ew Caledonia) 179-80 François, Captain Curt von 294-5,296-7, 298, 300, 304 François, Hugo von 305, 323 Franke, Captain Viktor 3 2 1,3 3 9 Franklin, Sir John and Lady 17 2 ,17 3 Frederiks, Jo se f 282 Fremantle, Australia 176 Frenssen, Gustav: Peter Moot'sJourney to South West Africa 327, 330 -1, 345,

351. 364 Fumeaux Islands, Tasmania 182-3 Gadsden Purchase 199 Gama, Vasco de 28 Gamboa, Pedro Sarmiento de: History of the Incas 144 genocide/ genocida! policies 358-9 see Arawaks; German South West Africa; Native Americans; Tasmanian Aboriginals George III, King o f England u 8 , 123 Georgia, U SA 197 German East Africa see Tanzania German South West Africa (Namibia) 285-7 African land losses 37, 28 1-2, 288, 295, 303. 310. 3 1 1 , 3 12 , 343 - 4 . 353 chartered companies 295-6 German genocidal policies 13 -14 , 289, 293. 296, 300-2, 343-52. ser abo Trotha, General von German imperial policy 28 1, 282-3, 285, 290-3 Herero-Nama Wats 2 7 1-2 ,2 9 0 ,2 9 2 ,

294. 295. 313. 314-17. 3i»-42. 351-3. see also Trotha, General von Homkranz massacre 3 - 5 ,2 0 -1, 2 3 ,1 7 5 , 297-8,299 missionaries 274 ,279-8 2,292, 314 , 3 15 16, 3 1® . 343 . 344 . 346 population losses 290, 292, 342, 345-6 reserves and camps 3 12 , 355-6 South African administration 272,276, 289, 354-7 trading practices 308-10, 3 1 1 - 1 2

407

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old tribal conflicts 2 7 5 -6 ,27S, 279 ,283, 289-90, 296 Warmbad incident 269-71, 273 see also Leutwein, Theodor Gerónimo (Goyahkla): and alcohol 2 34 ,25 9 ,26 3-6 as Apache leader 19 0 -1, 202,207-9, 2 12 , 2 13 ,2 2 4 .2 3 7 -9 ,2 4 2 -3 .2 4 4 -7 , »SO, 2 5 1,2 6 0 birth and childhood 19 2 ,19 4 -5 character 233,2 34 -6 death 266 Florida exile 252,254 -5 hatred for Mexicans 199-200,238 invulnerability 233 on Mangas’ murder 2 16 Oklahoma captivity 19 1,2 5 5 , 265 shamanism 19 1, 2 30 ,2 4 2,2 6 4 show business career 2 5 5 -6 ,2 5 7 ,2 5 8 Gibeon, German SW Africa 273, 321 Gibson, Charles: The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule 106-7 Gilbert, Sir Humphrey 1 1 7 Gilbert, Sir Martin: Routledge Atlas of American History 365 Gladstone, William E . 285 Glasenapp, Major von 322-4 Goa 28 Gobabis, SW Africa 307, 322 go-betweens, tribal 162-3 Goering, D r Heinrich 295, 296 Goering, Hermann 295 gold i i American 202, 2 1 1 Spanish quest see Spain Goldblatt, Israel: History o f South West Africa 346 Gorges, E. H . M .: Report on die Natives 308.309 Goyahkla see Gerónimo Granada, Spain 74 ,7 5 Grant, President Ulysses 216 , 221 Great Plains, U SA 202 Native Americans 198 Greeks, ancient 9 ,1 2 - 1 3 , * 7 ,1 6 1 Grey, George 8 Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty o f 199

Guaicari, the 99 Guatavita, Lake 10 1 Guatemala 89,99 see Maya Guiana 1 0 1 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 3 Gun Carriage Island, Tasmania 164 Guzman, Ñ uño de 107 Hagen, Victor von: I V Ancient Sun Kingdoms 92 Hahn, C . H. L. 290 Haiti 6 Hapsburg dynasty 98, n o Harris, S.: It’s Coming Yet 129-30 Hassig, Ross: Mexico and die Spanish Conquest 83 Hatch, General 228 Hatuey, Arawak chief 16 Hawkins, Sir John 11 7 - 1 8 Hemming, John: The Conquest o f du Incas

90 T V Searchfor E l Dotado 10 1 Hereto tribe 265,276 -7 herds 277-8, 286, 308, 310 and missionaries 2 8 0 ,2 8 1,3 15 - 16 and die Nama 278 ,279 ,2 8 0 population losses xv, 342, 345-6 territorial losses 283, 3 1 0 , 3 1 1 , 3 12 , 342 and Warmbad incident 269 w an 295, 306-8, 3 12 , 314-27, 328-32, 333 , 336, 337 . 360 and Witbooi 296 see also Mahareto, Samuel heroin 264, 265 Heyde, M ajor van der 329-30 Himba villages 257 Hispaniola 6 ,1 8 , 2 1, 23, 7 6 ,15 8

Hider, A dolf 293. 349 . 35 * Hobart, Tasmania 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 , 1 3 5 - 6 , 1 3 9 , 145 .

»57 . 17 1

Hobart Tim a 147 Homer 9 Hopi, the 209 Homkranz massacre, Namibia (1893) 3-5, 2 0 - 1,2 3 ,17 5 ,2 9 7 - * . 299 Horseshoe Bend, batde o f (1814) 196 'Hottentots' 275

408

Index Houston, General Sam 199 Howe, Michael 137, 143 Huancavelica silver mine 109 Huascar 94, 95 Huayna Capac, Emperor 94, 96 Hughes, Robert: The Fold Share 146 Huitzilopochdi (god) 40, 47, 50 human sacrifice, Mexican 23, 45-52, 63, 132, 36 1, 363 Hunkpapa, the 190 hunter-gatherers 17 , 2 2 ,12 9 -30 , 164, 209, 2 13 Huron, the 263, 360 Hums, the 359 Illinois, U SA 193 Illinois, the 360 imperialism 8, 362 British 354 French 179 German 28 1, 282-3, 285, 290-3 see dso Christianity; Spain Inca, the 90-3 coca addiction 262-3 and disease 94, h i , 366 goldwork 95, 96 population losses 5, 9 4 , 1 1 1 and Spanish conquest 5, 7, 19, 62, 8990, 94 - 7 . 1 12 Indeh 2 13 , see Apache, the India 23, 28, 29, 281 Indiana, U SA 193 Indonesian atrocities 359 industrial revolution, European 20 Innés, Hammond: The Conqubtadors 33, 47 . 5 1. 92 Inquisition, Spanish 23, 75 interpreten, importance o f 79-80, 100, 163 Irian Jaya 359 Irle, Reverend 345, 352 Iroquois, the 360 Iroquois Confederacy 193, 198 Isabella, Queen o f Spain 7, 74, 75, 76 Islam see Muslims Italians: Cyprus sugar plantations 17 -18

Jellyfish* babies 18 1 Jews: expulsion from Spain 74-5, 76 and Holocaust 193 Jobst, Lieutenant 269-70, 273, 339 Ju h, C h ief 237-8, 260 Kahimemua, Herero chief 307, 308 Kalahari Desert 285, 286, 337 Kanaks, N ew Caledonia 179-80 Kaokoveld, SW Africa 356 Kari’na, the 367 Kenya: the Maasai 258-9 Khauas, the 298-9 Khmer R ouge 358 Khoikhoi, the 1 1 , 16 -17 , 275 Khoisan, the 275, 278, 283, 307 see abo Basten Kickapoo, the 194 Kimberley diamond mines 288 King, Governor Philip Gidley 122-3, U 4 Kooper, Simon 340, 341 Krebs (German trader) 298-9 Kunene R iver 276, 286 labour, slave 99, 105, 108-10 encomienda system 106-7, 253 see abo slavery Lakota, the 19 0 -1, 202-3, 2 1 1 , 219, 368-9 and Fetterman Massacre 206 at Little Bighorn 205-6 Miniconjou 190 see abo Hunkpapa, the; Sioux, the Lambert, Andreas 298-9 Lanney, William 1 1 5 - 1 7 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 6 , 1 2 7 , 182, 265 Las Casas, Bartolomé de 4 9 ,10 3 , 106, 148, 158, 15 9 ,16 0 , 16 2 ,16 3 Launceston, Tasmania 1 3 5 ,1 3 9 League o f Nations 355 Leopold II, King o f the Belgians 6 ,10 5 , 292 Leutwein, Theodor, background and character 294-5, 298, 300-1, 302, 334-5 as conciliator figure 158, 160, 162, 163 and Herero/Nama war 3 15 , 3 16 -17 ,

319. 320, 321-2, 323, 324-6, 327. 329.

Jackson, President Andrew 196, 19 7 ,19 8

409

R ivers o f Blood, R iv e n o f G old 334 - 5. 339 . 34 «. 347 . 35 » and suppression o f uprising? 298-9, 302-

8 and von Trocha 333 and Warmbad incident 2 7 1, 273, 3 12 13» 3 *4 and Witbooi 299-300 and Hendrik Witbooi 175, 274, 299 Lhasa, Tibet 30 Lindequist, Friedrich von 308, 340, 341 Litde Bighorn, batde o f (1876) 205-6, 2 1 1 Livingstone, David 159, 162, 292 Locke, John: The Second Treatise o f

Government 17 Louis X IV , King o f Fiance 74 Louisiana, U SA 196 Louisiana Purchase (1804) 197, 199 Lozen 229, 230, 231 Lüderitz, A d olf 28 1-2, 286, 288, 295, 344 Lummis, Challes 95 Maasai, the 258-9 Maasai Mara, Kenya 258 Machiavelli, Niccolô 76 Macquarie, Tasmania: prison 146-7 Madeira 18 Magellan, Ferdinand 28 Mahareio, Samuel: alcoholism 265, 310 , 3 1 1 as Herero leader 163, 296, 304-7, 3 1 1 and Herero War 3 12 , 3 14 -15 , 319» 320, 324-6, 329 - 30 , 332, 333 » 339 . 353 Malacca 28 Malaga, siege o f (1487) 7 5 -6 Malayan peninsula 28, 29 Malekula, island o f 8 Malinche, La see Marina, Doña Manco, Emperor 95-6 Mangas see Colorado, Mangas Maoris 6 ,17 8 -9 Marina, Doña (La Malinche) 80, 163 marranos 75 Marseilles: plague 76 Marshall Islands: nuclear tests 180-1 suicide rates 263 Maryland 118

Mathinna (Tasmanian) 172-3 Matthiessen, Peter In the Spirit o f Crazy Hone 205 Maya, die 7, 29, 94, 366-7 calendar system 363 Means, Philip: Fall o f the Inca Empire 93, 94 Melanesia 179 Melbourne, Australia 176 Mescaleto Apache 226, 232, 259 metallurgy 42, 86 Mexica, the 40-1 and alcohol 26 1-2 cultural achievements 4 1-3 , 87-8 economy and trade 10, 4 4,6 2 historical records 41 human sacrifice 2 3,4 5 -5 2 , 63, 132, 36 1,

363 population losses h i and Spanish invasion 5, 7, 8 1, 86 and war 43, 62-4, 84, 248, 249 see also Moctezuma; Tenochddan Mexico: Apache raids 189, 195, 209, 214, 219, 249.260 Apache wars 200-2, 230-1 genoddal policies 201 U S W ar 199 see also Mexica, the M exico City 27 Miami, the 193-4, 198 Micronesia 179, 263 Miles, General Nelson 246-7, 252 Mimbres Apaches (Mímbrenos) 225 mines/mining: Bolivar 367 Mexican 19 -2 0 ,10 7 -8 , 201 Peruvian 108-10 South West Africa 288-9 Miniconjou Lakota 190 missionaries 15 -16 in Africa 274, 279-80, 281, 282, 292, 314 . 3 15 -16 , 3*8. 343 . 344 . 346

mita system 108-10 Moctezuma, Mexican emperor 39, 43 and arrival o f Cortes 7, 35, 45, 8 1-2 capture 36-7, 38, 39. 4«, 53. 54. 56, 57 death 58

41O

Index M ohawk, die 193 Moluccas, the 29 M oore, Lieutenant William 124-5 M ore, Thomas: Utopia 1 1 , 1 6 Morenga, Jacob 335-6, 339 - 41 . 352 Morocco 284 M orrow, Major 228 Mountgarrett, Surgeon Jacob 125-6 Mozambique 284 Muisca, the 9 7 ,9 8 - 10 0 ,1 0 1 , 105 Murray, Sir George 14 5 ,14 8 Mururoa atoll: nuclear tests 180 Muslims: and Spain 3 1,7 4 ,7 5 - 6 , 78-9 muttonbirds 1 2 2 ,13 0 Nahuad (language) 39 ,80 Nama clans 275-6 and climate 286 Dam an slaves 289-90 and Germans 283,288-9, 302, 303 and Hereto 277-8,279 population losses 342, 345 refugees 60m Cape Colony 278 territorial losses 283,287-90, 342 war with Germans 28 0 ,29 5,29 7, 303, 307. 334 - 9 . 340-1. 353, 360

see abo Khauas; W itbooi Namaqualand, SW Africa 27 3,2 74 , 335, 337

Namib Desert 285-6, 337 Namibia 257, 344, 357 see German South West Africa Nana, C h ief 1 9 1 , 2 3 1-a , 237-8,240, 243, 244. * 5 0 ,2 5 1, 265, 360 Naples, kingdom o f 76 Napoleon Bonaparte 197 Narváez, Panfilo de 54-5, 58, 5 9 ,6 0 ,6 9 Native Americans: and alcohol and drags 243, 25 9 -6 1,26 36 in the 1990s 368-9 population losses 5 reservations 2 0 6 -7 ,2 0 8 ,2 10 ,2 5 2 -4 , see also San Carlos U S genocidal policies 19 7 -8 ,20 6 ,250 see Apache; Chiricahua; Five Civilized Tribes etc.

Naukluft Mountains, SW Africa 2519 Navaho, the 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 - 1 2 Nazism 293, 354, 364 Nevada. U SA 199 N ew Caledonia: Kanaks 179-80 N ew Guinea 257-8 N ew M exico, U SA 19 9 ,20 4 ,20 7,20 8 ,

219,225 N ew South Wales 1 2 3 ,1 4 0 ,1 7 6 ,1 7 7 N ew Zealand see Maoris Newgate prison, London 11 9 Nigerian civil war 359 Nikodemus 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 340 ’noble savage’ n - 1 2 , 2 2 ,2 5 6 Noch-ay-del-klinne 236-7 NoAe Triste, la (1520) 57-6 0 , 6 1, 62-6, 86 Norfolk Island 122 Northwest Territory 193-4 nuclear tests 18 0 -1,2 0 4 , 263 Nujoma, Samuel 276 Oceania 6 Ohio, U S A 193 O hio R iver territory 222 O jo Caliente, N ew M exico 225 see Warm Springs Okahandja, SW Africa 307, 3 12 . 3 15 , 344 batde (1904) 320 -1, 323-4, 353 massacre (1959) 278 Okavango, SW Africa 356 Okavango R iver 276 Oklahoma: Apache reservation 1 9 1,19 2 , * 5». * 55 . *6 5 Olpp, Reverend 274 Omaheke desert 329, 332, 347 Omaruru, batde o f (1904) 321 ’O ne R eed ’ 8 1-2 Oneida, the 193 Ongandjira, batde o f (1904) 3* 4 - 5 . 353 Onondaga, the 193 Opler, Maurice 250 Oregon, U S A 199 Orinoco R iver 1 0 1 , 102 Oriam, die 278, 279-80, 28 2,28 3, 308 Otavi, SW Africa: copper mines 288, 3 12 railway 320, 343 Otjihinamaparero, battle o f (1904) 322,

R ivers o f Blood, R iven o f G old Prescott, William: The Conquest o f Mexico 2 1-2 , 47-8, 5 5 .6 1, 8 5 ,17 4 . 364 prison hulks 119 Promontory, Utah 202 pueblo-dwelling tribes 209, 2 1 1 Puerto R ic o 97 pulque 26 1-2

35 1-a Ottawa, the 194, 263 Ottoman Empire 358 Otumba, M exico: battle (1520) 68-9 Ovambo, the 276, 288 Ovamboland, SW Africa 332, 356 Oviedo, Gonzalo Fernandez de 15 Oviumbo, battle o f (1904) 325-6, 353 Owikokorero, battle o f (1904) 322-3, 325,

Queensland, Australia 176 Quesada, Gonzalo Jiménez 98, 100 Quetzalcoad (god) 81 Quito, Ecuador 10 1

353

Oyster Bay tribe, Tasmania 14 9 ,15 0 Oyster Cove, Tasmania 169-72, 173, 182 Pacific islands 8, 179-80 Panama 29, 94, 96 Panama C ity 90 Papago Indians 202, 220 Papua N ew Guinea 257-8, 285 Paris: Peace Conference (1919) 355 Treaty (1783) 193 passenger pigeons 203-4. 257 Paul III, Pope 13 "Peaches' see Tsoe Pensacola, Florida: Fort Pickens 254-5 Pérez, Demetrio Ram os 10 1 Perth, Australia 176 Peru 3 1, 159 see Inca Philip II, King o f Spain n o Phillip, Governor Arthur 120, 12 1- 2 Pitt, William, die Younger 1 1 9 ,1 2 0 , 292 Pizarro, Francisco 76, 90,94-6, 103, 150 Pocahontas 19 1 Pol Pot 358 Pool, Gerhard: Samuel Maharero 307, 3 3 1,

Raleigh, Sir Walter 34, 102, 103, 11 7 Reconquista 74-5, 77 R ed Cloud, C h ief 202-3, 206 Rehoboth, SW Africa 289 Rem oval Act (1830) 197, 198

Report on the Natives o f South West Africa and their Treatment by Germany ('Blue Book") 355. 356-7

Requerimiento (1513) 15 , 16, 38, 104 revisionism 22-4 Reynolds, Henry: The Other Side of the Frontier 134 Rhenish Missionary Society 274, 279-80, 28 1, 282, 343 Riarua, Assa 324-5 Risdon Massacre, Tasmania (1804) 124-6 Robbins, Lieutenant 123 Roberts, David: Once They Moved 2 3 1,

332. 346 Popocateped volcano, M exico 27 population statistics xv, 5-6, 23-4, 364-6

see spedfic tribes Porter, Joseph: Paper Mediane Man 216 Portuguese, the 5, 15, 18, 28, 120 African colonies 87, 284 potatoes 91 Potawatomi, the 194, 198 Potosi silver mines, Bolivia 108-9, n o , 366 Powley, Elizabeth 12 1

235 . 251 Robinson, George Augustus: background 15 3, 154 character 153, 155, 156 policies towards Aborigines 155-7, 158, 159-60, 163-4 returns to mainland 167, 17 1 and Truganini 16 3 ,16 7 Rohrbach, D r Paul 301, 344 Rom e: plague 76 Rongelap Island 18 1 Roosevelt, President Theodore 255, 256 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: A Discourse on Inequality 1 1 - 1 2 R oyal College o f Surgeons, London 11 6 R oyal Society o f Tasmania 116 , 182

412

Index rubber trade, Belgian 105, 292 Rwanda: massacres (1994) 359 R yan, Lyndalk The Aboriginal Tasmanians 176 R yan, M ajor Thomas 166 Sacsahuaman, fort o f 92 Sahagún, Bernardino de 33

see Florentine Codex Salazar, Gonzalo de 107 Salt R iv er Cave, batde o f (1873) 218 salt trade 100 San, the 275, 278, 334 San Cados reservation, Arizona 206, 208, 209, 210, 2 1 1, 2 12 , 2 19 ,2 2 0 , 22 1, 224, 260 Apache breakouts 223, 236-43, 244-5 Santa Marta 98 Sardinia 76 Sauk, the 19 4 ,19 8 ‘savages’ see European perceptions Schlieffen, Count Alfred von 326, 338, 347 . 350 Schröder (German trader) 320 sealers, Bass Strait 134-5, >39 . *57» 182 self-justifying ideology 20, 84-5, 16 1 Seminole, the 195, 196 Seneca, the 193 Seville, Spain: population 27 Shark Island, Namibia 344-5 Shawnee, the 194, 198 Sheridan, General Philip 218 Sherman, General William 206, 216 Sicily 76 Sierra Madre Mountains 163, 209, 212 , 238, 239, 240, 24 1-2 silver mines, South American 19-20, 10810 ,2 6 2 , 366 Simms, William 203 Sioux, the 198, 206, 368-9 Sirius (convict ship) 122 Sitting Bull, C h ief 190, 203, 206 Skeleton Coast, the 286 slavery 17 -18 African trade 5 ,1 8 - 1 9 ,1 1 8 - 1 9 , 292 Spanish 1 8 ,1 9 , 9 9 ,10 5 ,10 7 , see oho

encomienda; mita

in Tasmania 157 by tribal people 289-90, 360 Slavery Abolition Act (1833) 292 smallpox epidemics 69,94, 177 Smuts, General Jan 355, 356 Sonora, M exico 200, 201 Sorrell, Governor William 145, 146 Soustelle, Jacques: The Daily Ufe o f the Aztecs 40, 4 i v 46, 47. 261 South Africa: administration o f SW Africa 272, 276, 289, 354-7 Spain/Spanish empire: American colonies 189, 196 and die Apache 189 and the Arawaks 6, 7, 15, 18, 29 and Christianity and conversion 74-9, 80-1, 84 horses 64-5, 68-9 invasion o f M exico see Cortes; Mexica, the; Tenochtidan and Jew s 74-5, 76 mining operations 19-20, 10 7-10 and Muslims 3 1, 74, 75-6, 78-9, 80-1 population and poverty 76 quest for gold 29, 53-4. 74. 76-7. 86-90, 9 4 -10 0 ,1 1 0 - 1 1 , see also El Dorado; silver mines slave labour {encomienda) 106-7, 253 weaponry and armour 34-5, 65, 68, 70, 73

Spanish Inquisition 23, 75 Spooner, Frank 87 Stannard, David: American Holocaust 88, 359 . 365 stereotypes, tribal 12 , 2 1, 189 StokeD, D r 116 , 125 Stürmann, Sheppert 316 , 335 Sudan 359 sugar plantations 1 7 - 1 8 ,1 1 8 Sugarfoot Jack 187-8, 214 , 250 Swakopmund, SW Africa 287, 3 1 1 , 344 Sydney Cove (Port Jackson), Australia 120, 12 1- 2

Tahiti 6 deaths from cancer 180 Tanzania (German East Africa;

413

R ivers o f Blood, R iven o f G old language 80 massacre at Toxcad festival 55-7, 66 la Noche Triste 57-60, 6 1,6 2 -6 , 86 siege and fell (1521) 36, 5 1,6 9 -7 2 , 83,

Tanganyika) 5,284, 355 Tasman, Abel 123 Tasmania: Aborigines see Tasmanian Aborigines British settlements 1 2 3 - 4 ,13 2 - 3 ,13 5 , 138-9 bushrangers 13 6 - 7 ,13 9 climate 128 Committee for Aboriginal Affidis 142, 14 5 ,14 7 , 164 fauna and flora 124, 128, 13 4 ,13 8 -9 .

142 kangaroo hunting 135-6 Macquarie Harbour prison setdement 146-7 name change 1 2 3 , 1 7 1 Tasmanian Aborigines 127-9, 13 1- 2 and alcohol 170, 172 Walter George Arthur 17 1-2 , 265 and Bass Strait sealers 134-5, 157. 183 and the Black Line 150-3 Black War 139, 140-50, 157 bride-lridnap 130 and bushrangen 136-7 conversion 165 deaths from disease 142, 167 deaths from homesickness 1 3 1 , 166 exile on Rinden Island 16 4 -9 ,17 0 , 253 extinction 2 3 ,1 1 5 - 1 7 . 157. 17 1. 173-4. 176, 18 1-4 hunting skills 129 Mathinna 172-3 Oyster C ove setdement 169-71 religion and rituals 13 0 -1 Risdon massacre 124-6 and George Robinson 15 3 ,15 4 -7 , 1596 0 ,16 3-4 Truganini 163, 167, 18 1- 2 ,18 3 - 4 weapons 129 Tasman Peninsula 150, 15 1- 2 Taylor, George 360 technology: and tribal inferiority 8-9, 362-4 Tecumseh 19 4 ,19 6 , 264 Tenochddan, M exico 8, 27, 3 1-2 , 39-45. 261 and Cortés’ invasion 33-5, 8 1, 86

84. 143-4

see also Mexica, the; Moctezuma Tepeacans, the 70 Tepedaoztoca, M exico 107 Terrazas, General Joaquin 231 Texas, U SA 199 Thailand 29 Thames R iver, Michigan 194 Thesiger, Wilfred 159, 16 1 Thomas, Hugh: The Conquest of Mexico 37, 47, 60, 78, 80, 261 Thrapp, Dan 230, 251 Conquest o fApacheria 224, 227, 228, 2 3 1,

247 Victorio 224, 225 Tibet 30, 358 Tierra del Fuego 2 1 Times, The 345, 351 tiswin 243, 259 Tjetjo, Hereto leader 322-3, 324 Tlaloc (rain god) 46 Tlatelolco, M exico 44, 57 7 1, 72 Tlaxcalans, the 66 -7,68,69, 70, 82, 83 tobacco 11 7 , 264 Todorov, Tzvetan: The Conquest o f America 79 . 103 Togoland 285, 355 Toltecs, the 4 1, 4 2,63 Tombstone, Arizona 206 Epitaph 208 Tonto Basin, Arizona 218 TordesiOas, Treaty o f (1494) 14-15» 197 Torquemada, Tomas de 75 Totonacs, the 29, 39, 43, 55,6 8, 78» 82, 88 Toxcad, massacre o f (1520) 55-7, 66 T ra d o f Tears' 198 translators see interpreters Travers, Robert: The Tasmanians 174 Tres Castillos, batde o f (1880) 230-1 TriboDet 246, 261 Trimble, Stephen: The People 236 Trollope, Anthony 178 Trotha, General Adrian Lothar von:

414

Index background 327 genoridal policies 160,263-4, 328, 330*. 333 - 4 . 335 . 34 °. 343 . 346- 7 . 35®, 351 . 352 and Hetero W ar 328-3$, 337-9, 352-3 Truganini 163, 16 7 ,18 1- 2 ,18 3 - 4 Tsoe (Apache guide) 16 3 ,2 4 1 Tsumeb copper mines 288 Tucson R ing, The’ 219 -20 ,236 ,24 6 , 247 Tupinamba, the 361 Tupinilrin, the 361 Turnbull, Clive: Block War. . . 18 1, 366 Turner, Frederick, III 358 Tuscaroa, the 193 Tutsis, the 359 United States o f America: Apache wars 2 0 5 -6 ,2 14 -16 ,2 4 7 -8 , see also Gerónimo; Nana; Victorio C ivil W ar 202 environmental holocaust 203-4 gold rushes 202,204, Mexican W ar 199 Native American policies see Native Americans nuclear tests 18 0 -1,2 0 4 , 263 railways 202 reservations see Native Americans see also America, North Uruguay 31 Utah, U SA 19 9,20 2 Utopia (More) 1 1 , 1 6

death 202, 231 and Warm Springs Apaches 20 8 ,219 , 2 2 4 -3 1,2 3 9 Vietnam 29 Viracocha (god) 93 Virgil 9 ,1 3 Wachtel, Nathan: The Vision o f the Vanquished 1 1 2 , 263 Wacusu, the 361 Walker, Francis 222 Walpole (a buffoon) 1 5 1 , 1 5 2 Wahns Bay, SW Africa 28 1, 286, 287, 295 Warmbad incident, SW Africa 269-70, * 73 . * 94 , 31 *. 314 . 339 Warm Springs Apaches 2 2 5 ,2 3 9 ,2 4 3 see also Victorio Warm Springs reservation. N ew M exico 207,208, 222 Watetbetg Mountains, batde o f (1904) 328-31 336, 338, 347 Wellington, J.: South West Africa 279 Welser (banking house) 98 Wesleyan Missionary Society 279-80 West, Elliott: ’American Frontier’ 260-1 White, Edward 124, 125 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 2 7 1, 3 2 1, 322, 326, 327, 33 *. 34 1. 343 . 347 . 351 Windhoek, SW Africa 3 ,2 7 1,2 8 7 ,2 9 6 ,

297. * 99 . 300, 30*. 3 0 8 ,3 11 , 3 12 - 13 . 314, 3*0 -1. 339, 348, 349. 356 W itbooi, the i i , 278,296-300, 303-4, 3 2 1, 339

Valéry, Paul 92 Vanuatu archipelago 8 Vedder, D r Heinrich 274, 318 , 344, 346,

Homkranz massacre (1893) 3 - 5 ,2 0 -1, *3

W itbooi, Hendrik 273-$, 2 8 3,336 d e a * *75 . 33®-9 and Herero/Nama W ar 316 , 319, 334,

354

South West Africa in Early Times 274, 277,28 9 Velázquez, Diego 38, 5 4 ,7 7 -8 ,15 8 venereal disease 177 Venezuela 3 1,9 8 ,9 9 , 367, 368 Venice: slave trade 18 Vera Cruz, M exico $4-$, $ 8 ,10 7 Victoria, Australia 176 Victorio 19 1, 250, 2 5 1, 360 character 2 33 -4 ,2 35 ,2 6 4

335

and Homkranz massacre 3, 297-8 and Leutwein 299-300, 302, 307 temperance 264 and Witbooi uprising 295, 296-7 W itbooi, Kido 274, 27$ Witbooi, Moses 275 wolves, réintroduction o f 259 work: European views 16 -17 , 2 1, 288-9,

415

R ivers o f Blood, R ivers o f G old Yucatan peninsula 29,79-80 Yukpa, rise 367

363-4 Wounded Knee, batde o f (1890) 190 Wright, Ronald: Stolen Continents 47, 52, 8 1-2, 198 W yk, Hennanus van 296, 3 15 , 319

Zaire 22, 359

Zerua, Bannenias 318 , 319 Zerua, Louisa 3 18 -19 Zerua, Chief Zacharias 319 Zimbabwe: drystone citadels 144 Zong (slaver) 18 -19 Zulu, the 320-1 Zuni, die 209, 213

X ipe Totee (god) 46 Yahgan, the 21 Yale Univeirity 19 1 Yanomami Indians 12 , 22, 368

416