Risky change? Vulnerability and adaptation between climate change and transformation dynamics in Can Tho City, Vietnam 3515108769, 9783515108768

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Matthias Garschagen

Risky change? Vulnerability and adaptation between climate change and transformation dynamics in Can Tho City, Vietnam

Geographie

Megacities and Global Change Megastädte und globaler Wandel

Franz Steiner Verlag

Band 15

Matthias Garschagen Risky change?

megacities and global change megastädte und globaler wandel herausgegeben von Frauke Kraas, Martin Coy, Peter Herrle und Volker Kreibich Band 15

Matthias Garschagen

Risky change? Vulnerability and adaptation between climate change and transformation dynamics in Can Tho City, Vietnam

Franz Steiner Verlag

Gedruckt mit freundlicher Unterstützung der United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) im Rahmen des WISDOMProjektes gefördert durch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF)

Umschlagabbildung: Flooded street in Can Tho City, Vietnam. © Matthias Garschagen

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2014 Druck: Hubert & Co., Göttingen Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-10876-8 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-10881-2 (E-Book)

TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................. 8 LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................. 10 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... 13 ABSTRACT........................................................................................................... 15 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ...................................................................................... 19 1. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE ........................................................... 23 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND THEMATIC EMBEDDING.......... 30 2.1. Relevant discourses on risk in human-environment interactions.............. 30 2.1.1 Vulnerability and hazards .............................................................. 31 2.1.2. Adaptation and adaptive capacity .................................................. 52 2.1.3. Resilience in coupled social ecological systems ............................ 62 2.2. Relations between concepts of vulnerability, adaptation and resilience ................................................................................................... 69 2.2.1. Vulnerability and resilience ........................................................... 70 2.2.2. Adaptive capacity and resilience .................................................... 71 2.2.3. Vulnerability and adaptive capacity ............................................... 73 2.2.4. Coping and adaptation.................................................................... 73 2.2.5. The role of exposure....................................................................... 74 2.2.6. Taxonomies of risk and vulnerability ............................................ 75 2.3. Theoretical underpinnings of action related to vulnerability and adaptation .................................................................................................. 76 2.3.1. Deciphering action through agency, structure and structuration.... 76 2.3.2. Vulnerability as product of habitus and social fields ..................... 79 2.3.3. Relevance for this study ................................................................. 79 2.4. Vulnerability, adaptation and resilience in cities: particularities, challenges, opportunities ........................................................................... 81 2.4.1. Why do we need an urban focus? .................................................. 81 2.4.2. Cities, hazards and risk: underemphasized perspectives and knowledge gaps .............................................................................. 84 2.4.3. Urbanization as an agent of risk ..................................................... 88 2.4.4. Conceptualizing and assessing urban risk and vulnerability .......... 92 2.4.5. Specific challenges in low and middle income countries .............. 93 2.4.6. Urban potential for risk reduction and mitigation .......................... 95

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Contents

2.5. Governance and management of urban risk and adaptation ..................... 96 2.5.1. Governance and risk management concepts .................................. 96 2.5.2. Entry points for governmental urban risk management ................. 98 2.5.3. Relevance of urban governance perspectives............................... 100 2.5.4. Challenges for (urban) risk and adaptation governance ............... 101 3. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 103 3.1. Synthesis on the deficits in hitherto approaches to vulnerability and adaptation ................................................................................................ 103 3.2. Setup and structure of the advanced integrative framework ................... 105 3.3. Innovations, strengths and limits of the framework ................................ 113 4. RESEARCH CONTEXT: RISK AND TRANSFORMATION IN VIETNAM ...................................................................................................... 116 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7. 4.8.

Natural hazards and disaster risk management ....................................... 117 Projected climate change impacts and adaptation policy........................ 125 Socio-economic and political transformation: two parallel worlds? ...... 130 The political and administrative system revisited ................................... 138 State-society relations – under transformation? ...................................... 143 Urbanization in Vietnam and the Mekong Delta .................................... 147 Why focusing on Can Tho City?............................................................. 157 Current state of risk assessments in Can Tho City, remaining knowledge gaps and resulting rationale .................................................. 161

5. METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................... 164 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4.

Epistemological approach and research design ...................................... 164 Applied mix of methods for data collection and analysis ....................... 168 Selection of case study areas ................................................................... 184 Obstacles and limits of data collection ................................................... 187

6. ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY EMPIRICAL DATA ......................................... 193 6.1. Governmental risk management in Can Tho City: Achievements and deficits ................................................................................................... 193 6.1.1. Disaster risk management ............................................................ 194 6.1.2. Urban planning and management ................................................. 214 6.1.3. Formal climate change adaptation................................................ 230 6.1.4. Interim synthesis: synergies and gaps in formal risk management ................................................................................. 250 6.2. Vulnerability and adaptation at household level ..................................... 253 6.2.1. Hazard exposure ........................................................................... 254 6.2.2. Susceptibility ................................................................................ 269 6.2.3. Coping capacities and measures................................................... 282

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6.2.4. Adaptive capacity and implemented adaptation measures ........... 294 6.2.5. Interim synthesis: vulnerability, adaptive capacity and adaptation action at household level ............................................ 324 7. SYNTHESIS, DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION ...................................... 330 7.1. Empirical and contextual results ............................................................ 330 7.1.1. Governmental risk management: current and future capacities ... 330 7.1.2. Causal fabric of vulnerability and adaptive capacity at household level............................................................................. 336 7.1.3. (Dis-) integration of state and non-state adaptation action? ......... 346 7.1.4. Climate risk narratives – environmental determinism reloaded? . 348 7.1.5. Potentials and limits of hard vs. soft adaptation measures ........... 350 7.1.6. Dynamic impacts of transformation on vulnerability and adaptive capacity .......................................................................... 351 7.1.7. Implications for future vulnerability pathways ............................ 355 7.2. Epistemological and methodological approach ..................................... 358 7.2.1. Mixed method approach: usefulness and achievements .............. 358 7.2.2. Remaining limits and black spots ................................................ 359 7.3. Conceptual and theoretical contributions ............................................... 361 7.3.1. Advancing the reach and coherency of vulnerability and adaptation concepts ...................................................................... 361 7.3.2. Accommodating dynamic developments and future-oriented assessments .................................................................................. 368 7.3.3. Integrating new epistemic elements into adaptation concepts ..... 370 7.3.4. Bridging between scales and actors in vulnerability and adaptation science ........................................................................ 372 7.3.5. Linking development and adaptation agendas through generic and specific capacities .................................................................. 373 7.4. Recommendations for practitioners and policy makers ......................... 374 8. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK ............................................................... 380 9. REFERENCES................................................................................................ 388 10. APPENDIX .................................................................................................... 415 10.1. Colored maps of the Mekong Delta and the case study sites ................. 417 10.2. Pictures of research sites ........................................................................ 421 10.3. Lists of interviews .................................................................................. 425 10.4. Summary of the flood hydrology in the Mekong Delta ......................... 430 10.5. Content of digital supplementary appendix ........................................... 432

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1: Global impacts of disasters related to natural hazards between 1980 and 2009 ............................................................... 33 Figure 2.2: Figure 2.3: Figure 2.4: Figure 2.5: Figure 2.6: Figure 2.7: Figure 2.8: Figure 2.9: Figure 2.10: Figure 3.1 : Figure 3.2: Figure 4.1: Figure 4.2: Figure 5.1: Figure 5.2: Figure 6.1: Figure 6.2: Figure 6.3: Figure 6.4:

The pressure and release model ................................................... 37 The disaster risk cycle.................................................................. 39 Framework for vulnerability analysis .......................................... 43 Epistemic landscape of risk perspectives related to human vulnerability and natural hazards ................................................. 50 Key urbanization patterns in Asia ................................................ 82 Size and distribution of cities....................................................... 83 Multi-hazard risk in Southeast Asian Cities ................................ 87 Risk governance framework ........................................................ 98 Entry points for governmental urban risk management in the context of natural hazards ...................................................... 99 Advanced integrated framework for vulnerability and adaptation analysis ..................................................................... 110 Coupling of actor spheres and vertical nesting .......................... 113 Vietnam’s party-state apparatus................................................. 140 Vietnam’s urbanization in relation the political history ............ 150 Research design with mixed methods, triangulation and hermeneutic circles .................................................................... 168 Links between research objects, data needs and methods ......... 169 Planning system for Can Tho City as stipulated in the legal framework .................................................................................. 217 Climate change adaptation measures in Can Tho City .............. 250 Flooding depth in case study areas ............................................ 256 Duration of flooding in case study areas ................................... 256

Figure 6.5: Experience with extraordinary flood and storm events ............. 257 Figure 6.6: Exposure to multiple hazards ..................................................... 260 Figure 6.7: Perceived changes in hazard conditions over the last ten years ........................................................................................... 261 Figure 6.8: Trends in water levels at Can Tho gauging station .................... 262 Figure 6.9: Reasons for moving into exposed areas ..................................... 263

List of Figures

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Figure 6.10: Time of settling in exposed areas .............................................. 264 Figure 6.11: Utilization of river and canal water ........................................... 266 Figure 6.12: Water-bound residency: from opportunity to risk ..................... 267 Figure 6.13: Shop houses in the case study areas........................................... 270 Figure 6.14: Quality of housing ..................................................................... 271 Figure 6.15: Relation between quality of housing and location of house ...... 272 Figure 6.16: Figure 6.17: Figure 6.18: Figure 6.19: Figure 6.20: Figure 6.21: Figure 6.22: Figure 6.23: Figure 6.24:

Dependency ratio parameters..................................................... 275 Health effects attributed to regular flooding .............................. 277 Coverage with public health care insurance .............................. 279 Sources of early warning information ....................................... 283 Social contacts for potential financial post disaster support ...... 291 Housing location prior to resettlement....................................... 297 Flood occurrence prior to resettlement ...................................... 297 Cost balance after relocation...................................................... 300 Risk ranking before and after resettlement (selected hazards and case study areas).................................................................. 302

Figure 6.25: Figure 6.26: Figure 6.27: Figure 6.28: Figure 6.29: Figure 6.30: Figure 6.31: Figure 6.32:

Endowment with land use certificates in case study areas ........ 306 Barriers for obtaining land use certificates ................................ 308 Housing elevation as adaptation ................................................ 309 Reasons for planned housing elevation ..................................... 311 Costs for elevation of housing ................................................... 312 Sources of selected input factors for housing elevation ............ 314 Primary work force for housing elevation ................................. 316 Sources of building material for housing elevation ................... 316

Figure 6.33: Sources of financial support for housing elevation ................... 317 Figure 6.34: Perceived responsibility for disaster risk management .............. 322 Figure 7.1: Associations between selected key vulnerability indicators and livelihood assets .................................................................. 340 Figure 7.2: Associations between key adaptation parameters and livelihood assets ......................................................................... 342 Figure 7.3: Framework for the assessment of future shifts in vulnerability configurations ....................................................... 369 Figure 7.4: Tipping points in adaptation ...................................................... 371

LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1:

Main research questions and subordinate questions .................... 27

Table 2.1:

Three varying interpretations of vulnerability as outcome, agency or structure ....................................................................... 51 Resilience sub-concepts and their relevance for urban risk research ........................................................................................ 68 Differences in selected taxonomies of risk and vulnerability suggested in the literature ............................................................ 75 Definitions of key terms ............................................................ 111 Vietnam’s 10 most severe disasters between 1900 and 2012 .... 118 Impacts of selected severe flood disasters in the Mekong Delta ........................................................................................... 121 Projected direct sea level rise impact in the Mekong Delta and in Can Tho City ................................................................... 127

Table 2.2: Table 2.3: Table 3.1: Table 4.1: Table 4.2: Table 4.3: Table 4.4: Table 4.5: Table 4.6: Table 5.1: Table 5.2: Table 6.1: Table 6.2: Table 6.3: Table 6.4: Table 6.5:

Objectives and targets of the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change ...................................................... 130 Mechanisms, benefits and coverage rates of health insurance schemes...................................................................... 136 Trends in key indicators for socio-economic development ....... 137 Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey ......................................................................................... 182 Case study areas and their main characteristics ......................... 186 Administrative entities and the role of government officers in Can Tho City.......................................................................... 197 DRM measures by the local organs of the state apparatus ........ 213 Urban planning hierarchy according to the Law on Urban Planning ..................................................................................... 218 Dependency ratio parameters..................................................... 275 Statistical correlations between key variables listed in Table 5.1 .............................................................................................. 327

ABBREVIATIONS CCA CCCO CFSC CTC CTU DARD DOC DOLISA DPI DONRE DRM DUPA FDI FGD GSO HDI IPCC MARD MDI MKD MOC MONRE MPI MMR n/a NDMP NGO NTP-RCC PACCOM PC PUA SRV UNISDR UN-DESA UNDP UNFPA UNU-EHS

Climate change adaptation Climate Change Coordination Office of Can Tho City Committee for Flood and Storm Control Can Tho City Can Tho University Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Department of Construction Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affair Department of Planning and Investment Department of Natural Resources and the Environment Disaster risk management Department of Urban Planning and Architecture Foreign direct investment Focus group discussion General Statistics Office Human Development Index Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development Mekong Delta Development Research Institute, Can Tho University Mekong Delta Ministry of Construction Ministry for Natural Resources and the Environment Ministry for Planning and Investment Mixed methods research Data not available Natural Disaster Mitigation Partnership Non-governmental organization National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change People’s Aid Coordination Committee People’s Committee Participatory urban appraisal Socialist Republic of Vietnam United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Population Fund United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security

12 USD VIAP VND VNS WISDOM

Abbreviations

US Dollars Vietnamese Institute of Architecture and Planning Vietnamese Dong Vietnam News Water-Related Information System for the Sustainable Development of the Vietnamese Mekong Delta

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Writing this doctoral thesis (submitted to the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the University of Cologne and successfully defended on 23 October 2013) would not have been possible without the scientific inspiration and manifold support received from a number of people who I wish to thank here. I am very grateful for the rich scientific inspiration and practical guidance provided by my supervisor and first referee Prof. Dr. Frauke Kraas who allowed me to pursue my own scientific ideas while gently pushing my boundaries through constructive reflections and discussions – not only in deskwork periods but also during joint field campaigns in Vietnam. I also would like to emphasize my thanks to Prof. Dr. Boris Braun for his effort to co-referee the thesis and Prof. Dr. Ansgar Büschges for heading the board of referees. I am deeply thankful for the scientific and administrative support received from PD Dr. Jörn Birkmann and many other colleagues at UNU-EHS, foremost Dr. Fabrice Renaud, Dr. Zita Sebesvari, Dipl.-Geogr. Tobias Blätgen and Prof. Dr. Jakob Rhyner with whom I thoroughly enjoyed working in the WISDOM project over the last years. This project was generously funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The empirical work was greatly supported by a number of people in Vietnam to whom I would like to express my sincere gratitude: Dr. Nguyen Van Be, Dr. Tran Thanh Be, Dr. Nguyen Hieu Trung, Dr. Dang Kieu Nhan and Ms. Truong Thi Anh Dao from Can Tho University as well as Dr. Trinh Thi Long from the Southern Institute for Water Resources Research. I further wish to thank the enumerators supporting the implementation of the household survey campaigns, notably Mr. Tran The Nu Hiep. Most centrally, however, my gratitude goes to my research assistant and interpreter Mr. Tran Van Toan for his energetic work and for explaining so many facets of Vietnamese culture with his very enjoyable tweak of patience and humor. I highly appreciate the time and openness shared by all interviewees in the expert as well the household interviews. Without their interest and willingness to share their perspectives and knowledge, this work would be nothing. I am grateful for critical discussions and reviews from a number of dear colleagues, most notably Dunja Krause, Maria Schwab, Joanna Pardoe, Niklas Gebert, Dr. Torsten Welle, Neysa Setiadi, Dr. Carsten Butsch, Maximilian Mayer and Dr. Tabea Bork-Hüffer. I also owe great thanks to my parents, my sister and my friends who bore with me for being such a rare companion during the most intensive phases of my work. Foremost, however, I wish to thank my wonderful wife Anne for her rich support and enduring patience not only during my extended field visits in Vietnam but also during the times of intensive desk work.

ABSTRACT This study is motivated by the observation of surprising gaps in the current scholarship on societal risk related to natural hazards and the projected impacts of climate change. Despite the increasing body of literature on this topic, the details of how human vulnerability – as a key component of risk – but also adaptive capacity – as a key component for risk reduction – emerge and progress as part of social processes still tend to be poorly understood, both empirically and theoretically. A distinct lack of attention can particularly be observed with respect to exploring the ways in which vulnerability and adaptation are linked through causal structures and feedbacks. Rifts and conflicts in this relation therefore often go unnoticed even though they render the barriers and limits to vulnerability reduction. In addition, the dynamic pathways of the vulnerability-adaptation-nexus in highly transformative countries and emerging economies need to be analyzed much more thoroughly. Understanding the effects of wider transformation dynamics on the causal fabric of vulnerability and adaptive capacity is not only of great scientific interest but also of practical relevance in order to facilitate adequate and preventive vulnerability reduction and mitigation within the framework of risk governance. Vietnam provides a case of prime relevance in this context given its ongoing reform process and the implied changes in economic, social, cultural and political terms, while being also considered a global hot spot of exposure to natural hazards and the expected climate change impacts. Urban areas deserve increased attention in this respect given that they are typically the forefront of transformation processes with growing demographic and economic importance and with a particularly complex fabric of actors and interests. Against this background, the study presented here has a two-fold objective. Firstly, it aims to advance the conceptual framing and theoretical explanation of vulnerability and adaptation dynamics, focusing especially on the linkages and feedbacks between the two under conditions of socio-economic and political transformation and environmental change. Secondly, the study seeks to fill existing knowledge gaps on household level vulnerability profiles and the adaptive capacity of state and non-state actors towards current and projected natural hazards in Vietnam’s cities. Specifically Can Tho City, as the demographic and economic centre of the highly flood- and typhoon-prone Mekong Delta, serves as case study providing the major source of empirical data. The research process is based on a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods and building on the interaction of inductive and deductive reasoning in the process of knowledge generation and theory development. Altogether, the work draws on 14 months of field work in Vietnam. Primary empirical data was generated through 55 semi-structured household interviews, complemented by participatory urban appraisal activities, as well as two household surveys covering a total of 742 households. In addition, 71 expert in-

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Abstract

terviews were conducted with decision makers from the national to the local level in the party-state bureaucracy as well with Vietnamese researchers and stakeholders from other national and international organizations. The discussion of preliminary results and the promotion of science-policy-interaction were achieved through five stakeholder workshops in Can Tho City. The research allowed for developing an advanced conceptual model of the causal structures and processes linking vulnerability and adaptation dynamics. This model draws on earlier achievements from within the three strands of vulnerability, adaptation and resilience research but it is mainly nurtured by the identification of remaining ontological and even epistemological gaps within as well as between these schools. By bridging the divides, the model makes a contribution to connecting the existing theoretical perspectives, thereby, not only facilitating the formulation of synchronized policy recommendations but also enabling scientific engagement with the blind spots that can be identified in hitherto approaches. That is, the model allows for unpacking the black box of adaptation processes because it mirrors adaptive capacity directly to the factors constituting vulnerability, i.e. exposure, susceptibility and the lack of capacity to cope. Therefore specific and generic adaptive capacity is differentiated, depending on their reach and scope. In contrast to the normatively guided approaches predominant in the existing conceptual literature, the model allows for the analysis of internal conflicts, trade-offs and limits in adaptation processes which can result from contradictory effects on the individual vulnerability factors. Yet, the model rejects an oftapplied deterministic notion of the relationship between adaptive capacity and adaptation action. Rather, it draws on action- and structuration-theory to include agentive and structural factors which, in interaction, can enable but also inhibit the accumulation of adaptive capacity and/or its activation into adaptation action. Given this level of detail, the model facilitates dynamic analytical perspectives, focusing on the shifts in the fabric of vulnerability and adaptation along with wider societal transformation processes. This aspect is heavily neglected to date given the snapshot character predominant in most of the published vulnerability assessments. The framework, in conjunction with the mixed methods approach, allowed for an integrative empirical analysis in Can Tho City. The findings show that the ongoing socio-economic and political transformation process has ambiguous and socially differentiated effects on the potential for reducing vulnerability through adaptation. These ambiguities result from the fact that, in many respects, the country’s reform process yields contradictory effects on the different factors for vulnerability and adaptation considered in the conceptual model. The macroeconomic growth since the beginning of Vietnam’s reform process (đổi mới) has not automatically lead to a general reduction in vulnerability towards natural hazards in Can Tho City but to increasing risk disparities. The changing political economy has resulted in shifts in the way risk management is negotiated and shared between state and non-state actors. Despite the continued paternalistic rhetoric of the party-state apparatus as care-taker, considerable mismatches between state and non-state adaptation action have been found. They cause increas-

Abstract

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ing difficulties for some groups to compensate for the lack of public support through individualized risk reduction measures. Self-reinforcing effects that deteriorate vulnerability conditions can therefore be observed, especially in lowincome groups. Yet, the findings underscore that a purely neo-classical explanation on adaptive capacity assets would fall short of recognizing the agentive factors (e.g. around risk perception and prioritization) and the structural factors (e.g. around institutional security and the access to resources) that shape adaptation decisions and the question of whether and how adaptive capacity can be accumulated and turned into adaptation action. Both domains have been found to be heavily transformed by the reform process, often resulting in new barriers for effective adaptation. The findings enabled the formulation of practical recommendations which not only suggest options to improve specific adaptation measures, but which also call for adaptive changes in the deeper institutional fabric of risk governance paradigms applied in the country. Given the country’s contested political framework, these recommendations will not be easy to implement. However, the research findings clearly reveal that palliative solutions that ignore these more fundamental dimensions will not be sufficiently capable of tackling the deeper root causes that currently perpetuate and re-produce social vulnerability in Can Tho and in Vietnam’s cities more generally.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Ausgangspunkt der hier vorliegenden Arbeit ist die Beobachtung, dass trotz der rapide gewachsenen Anzahl an Publikationen und Forschungsprojekten zu sozialen Risiken im Kontext von Naturgefahren und Klimawandelfolgen beachtliche Problemfelder offen bleiben. Besondere Schwierigkeiten wirft nach wie vor die Beantwortung der Frage auf, wie sich Verwundbarkeiten in sozio-ökonomischen Systemen dynamisch fortentwickeln und wie diese Dynamiken kausal mit der Fähigkeit von Akteuren und Institutionen zusammenhängen, sich an gefahrenbehaftete Lebensbedingungen anzupassen. Forschungsbedarf besteht hier sowohl in empirischer als auch theoretischer Hinsicht. Vor allem in Transformationsländern ist ein besseres Verständnis der Effekte des ökonomischen, sozialen, kulturellen und politischen Wandels auf Verwundbarkeiten und Anpassungsfähigkeiten notwendig, um vorausschauende Handlungsempfehlungen geben zu können. Vietnam bietet mit seinem anhaltenden Reformprozess und den massiven gesamtgesellschaftlichen Umwälzungen ein höchst relevantes Beispiel. Städtische Räume sind von speziellem Interesse in diesem Zusammenhang. Sie nehmen eine Vorreiterrolle im Transformationsprozess des Landes ein und weisen daher besonders dynamische Verwundbarkeitsveränderungen auf. Zugleich konzentrieren sie zunehmend Bevölkerung und Infrastruktur in Lagen mit hoher Exposition gegenüber Hochwasser- und Taifunereignissen. Vor diesem Hintergrund verfolgt die Arbeit zwei Hauptziele. Zum einen strebt sie an, die konzeptionelle Erfassung und das theoretische Verständnis von Verwundbarkeits- und Anpassungsdynamiken zu verbessern. Im Fokus stehen hierbei die kausalen Wechselwirkungen beider Bereiche unter dem Einfluss von Transformationsprozessen. Zum anderen geht es im speziellen Hinblick auf den vietnamesischen Kontext darum, Verwundbarkeiten und Anpassungsfähigkeiten gegenüber momentanen sowie zukünftig erwarteten Naturgefahren zu ermitteln. Die Analyse umfasst dabei Anpassungsmaßnahmen staatlicher sowie nichtstaatlicher Akteure und fragt nach dem Verhältnis beider Bereiche. Die Arbeit basiert auf einem ‚Mixed Methods‘-Ansatz, in dem qualitative und quantitative Methodiken zur empirischen Analyse kombiniert und deduktive sowie induktive Herangehensweisen in der Theoriebildung berücksichtigt werden. Die empirischen Primärdaten wurden erhoben durch 55 semi-strukturierte Haushaltsinterviews, die Anwendung von ‚Participatory Urban Appraisal‘-Methoden, zwei standardisierte Haushaltsbefragungen (n=742) sowie 71 Experteninterviews mit Entscheidungsträgern aus staatlichen Behörden, nicht-staatlichen Organisationen und Forschungseinrichtungen. Vorläufige Ergebnisse wurden während des Forschungsprozesses im Rahmen von fünf ‚Stakeholder Workshops’ reflektiert und diskutiert. Insgesamt basiert die Arbeit auf 14-monatiger Feldarbeit in Vietnam.

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Zusammenfassung

Durch den ‚Mixed Methods‘-Ansatz konnte ein vertiefendes konzeptionelles Modell im Hinblick auf die Zusammenhänge und Wechselwirkungen zwischen Verwundbarkeits- und Anpassungsdynamiken entwickelt werden. Dieses Modell nimmt Bezug auf vorangehende Forschungsleistungen im Bereich der Verwundbarkeits-, Anpassungs- und Resilienzforschung. Es speist sich aber v.a. aus dem Ansporn, verbleibende Lücken zwischen den Forschungsfeldern zu schließen. Diese bestehen momentan in semantischer und taxonomischer, v.a. aber in epistemologischer Hinsicht. Die integrative Sichtweise des hier entwickelten Modells ermöglicht nicht nur eine tiefere analytische Schärfe, sondern trägt auch zur Formulierung umfassenderer Handlungsempfehlungen bei. Dies wird durch die – bisher vernachlässigte – analytische Ausdifferenzierung von Anpassungsprozessen erreicht, indem Anpassungsfähigkeit direkt mit den internen und externen Faktoren von Verwundbarkeit in Verbindung gesetzt wird, d.h. mit Exposition, Anfälligkeit und dem Mangel an Bewältigungskapazität. Solch eine Ausdifferenzierung ist von zentraler Bedeutung für das Verständnis von Anpassungsprozessen, da diese in der Realität nicht auf die abstrakte Verwundbarkeit als solche abzielen, sondern direkt auf ihre einzelnen Faktoren wirken. Das entwickelte konzeptionelle Modell ermöglicht daher die Analyse von potentiell-möglichen, inhärenten Zielkonflikten und (unintendierten) Nebenwirkungen auf andere Verwundbarkeitsfaktoren. Dieser Aspekt findet in bestehenden, zumeist normativ geprägten, Ansätzen nicht ausreichend Berücksichtigung. Aggregierte Verwundbarkeitseffekte von Anpassung sind daher oft weniger eindeutig als postuliert. Zugleich legt das Modell eine Unterscheidung generischer und spezifischer Anpassungskapazitäten nahe, die sich durch ihre Reichweite auf die unterschiedlichen Verwundbarkeitsfaktoren definieren. Der Gefahr einer (implizit) mechanistischen oder gar deterministischen Sichtweise auf den Zusammenhang von Anpassungskapazität und Anpassungshandlung wird hierdurch entgegengewirkt. Das Modell integriert Gedanken der Strukturationstheorie von Giddens und der Handlungstheorie Werlens und berücksichtigt die Wechselwirkung von individueller Handlung und strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen in Anpassungsprozessen. Beide Bereiche haben Einfluss darauf, wie Anpassungskapazitäten aufgebaut und/oder in Anpassungshandlung umgesetzt werden (können). Diese Feingliedrigkeit des Modells erlaubt es, die Dynamiken in Verwundbarkeitsmustern und Anpassungskapazitäten zu entschlüsseln und zukünftige Trends im Zusammenhang mit allgemeineren wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Wandelprozessen abzuschätzen. Letzteres ist v.a. im Hinblick auf Transformationsländer ein höchst relevanter – jedoch bislang stark vernachlässigter – Aspekt. Das Modell ermöglichte in Kombination mit dem ‚Mixed Methods‘-Ansatz eine tiefgründige empirische Untersuchung in Can Tho City. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutlich, dass Vietnams Transformationsprozess im Zuge der fortdauernden Reformbemühungen vielschichtige und sozial differenzierte Auswirkungen auf die Fähigkeit verschiedener Akteursgruppen hat, ihre Verwundbarkeiten gegenüber Naturgefahren durch Anpassung zu vermindern. Die bedeutendsten Naturgefahren umfassen in den Untersuchungsgebieten sowohl momentan auftretende Hochwasserereignisse als die zu erwartenden Klimawandelfolgen. Letztere bein-

Zusammenfassung

21

halten v.a. einen Anstieg in Häufigkeit und Intensität von Hochwasserereignissen sowie das verstärkte Auftreten von Taifunen. Uneindeutige Verwundbarkeitseffekte resultieren v.a. aus den unterschiedlichen Einflussrichtungen des Transformationsprozesses auf die verschiedenen im Modell identifizierten Faktoren von Verwundbarkeit und Anpassungsfähigkeit. Das durch den Reformprozess ermöglichte ökonomische Wachstum hat daher in Can Tho City nicht – wie häufig postuliert – automatisch zu einem all-umfassenden Rückgang an Verwundbarkeit gegenüber Naturgefahren geführt. Vielmehr ist es zu Verschiebungen in den Anpassungskapazitäten und -verantwortlichkeiten gekommen, v.a. durch eine zunehmende Individualisierung des vormals stärker staatlich ausgerichteten Risikomanagements. Sozio-ökonomisch schwächere Gruppen haben daher zunehmend Mühe, die nötigen Ressourcen für einen Abbau ihrer Verwundbarkeit aufzubringen. Gleichzeitig unterstreichen die empirischen Ergebnisse aber, dass eine rein neo-klassische Perspektive auf Anpassungskapazitäten unzureichend ist. Vielmehr zeigt die Forschung in Vietnam, dass weitere Faktoren für die Umsetzung von Anpassung ausschlaggebend sind. Diese umfassen sowohl die Parameter des individuellen Handelns (z.B. die Risikowahrnehmung und Präferenzsetzung) als auch die externen Strukturen (z.B. der institutionelle Rahmen für Landnutzungsrechte). Beide Bereiche erleben im Zuge des Transformationsprozesses tiefgreifende Veränderungen, welche in vielerlei Hinsicht zu neuen Anpassungsbarrieren führen. Aus den Ergebnissen der Arbeit werden Handlungsempfehlungen abgeleitet. Diese zielen nicht nur auf konkrete Anpassungsmaßnahmen ab, sondern zeigen die Bedeutung tiefgreifender Veränderungen in den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen von Risiko-‚Governance‘. Vor dem Hintergrund des sozio-politischen Systems in Vietnam wäre es jedoch naiv zu glauben, dass solche Veränderungen reibungslos vorangetrieben werden könnten. Dennoch zeigen die Forschungsergebnisse deutlich, dass eine Reduzierung auf oberflächliche Lösungsansätze – wie häufig in Projekten der Klimawandelanpassung zu beobachten – mittelfristig nicht in der Lage sein wird, den Triebfedern von sozialer Verwundbarkeit in Can Tho City und in anderen Städten Vietnams entgegenzuwirken.

1.

INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

Why could it be reasonable and useful to write a book that is conceptually concerned with the dynamics of vulnerability and adaptation related to natural hazards while focusing empirically on urban areas in Vietnam, being amongst Asia’s most rapidly transforming countries? One might expect that after more than two decades of vulnerability research and the more recent surge in scientific and political attention devoted to risks in the context of climate change, little room has been left for unanswered questions. Indeed, past scholarship has considerably advanced the ways how risk in human-environment interaction is framed. It is no longer explained exclusively by the characteristics of hazards in the natural or geo-physical environment but is widely conceived as being co-produced by human-made vulnerabilities. In this vein, attention has been brought to the fact that human vulnerabilities are constructed socially, politically, economically and culturally, leading to stratified vulnerability outcomes and eventually to risk differentials from global to local scales. Therefore links between vulnerability and human development have been stressed conceptually and explored empirically. On the same token, the capacity to adapt to current natural hazards as well as to the projected impacts of (global) environmental change are increasingly being framed in relation to cross-scale differentials in terms of overall asset endowments, most notably considering economic, human and institutional capital stocks. Thus, also ethical questions around the re-distribution of resources for adaptation are slowly moving into the foreground of risk debates, thereby, drawing attention to the contested arenas in which those capacities are being shaped socially, assessed scientifically and negotiated politically across different scales and stakeholders. On a global level, for example, long-term data has revealed not only an increase in the number of disasters related to natural hazards – particularly in Asia – but also a distinct pattern of impact disparities. While high income countries have been facing the highest financial losses, the so-called developing world has been experiencing by far the highest human suffering in terms of fatalities, hardship and livelihood disruption (cf. 2.1). A similar pattern is commonly being expected with respect to the impacts from anthropogenic climate change, giving the topic its sensitive ethical and political dimension. Also at lower scales, research on past disasters around the globe has shown that it is often the resource-poor or otherwise marginalized population groups that suffer the most from the impacts of natural hazards. This clearly reiterates the importance of social dimensions in the production and outcomes of risk. However, despite this knowledge and the achievements that have been made in risk research over the last decades many questions of key concern remain open or are not even being asked – and maybe the recent, climate change related, hype in scientific endeavors focusing on vulnerability and adaptation bears the risk of

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Introduction and Rationale

hastiness and the reproduction of the supposed scientific consensus rather than its critical reflection, deconstruction and advancement. The first of the observed gaps relates to the causal linkages between vulnerability and adaptation. While it is increasingly recognized that both concepts are closely coupled through the role that adaptation is ought to play for reducing or preventing current and future vulnerabilities, these relations have to date been largely covered in an idealized way through abstract and normative postulations on how vulnerability reduction and adaptation could and should work – rather than in critical empirical engagement. Therefore the ways in which adaptation can, or cannot, contribute to vulnerability reduction, depending on the given context, remain poorly understood analytically. Particularly thin remains the empirical and theoretical engagement with the challenges, barriers and conflicts that might be hidden in the deeper epistemological and normative layers of these concepts and in the nitty-gritty of their implementation. Hence, a coherent theoretical integration that would facilitate a detailed elaboration of the causal links and feedbacks between vulnerability and adaptation is largely lacking to date. Secondly, there is still a predominant view that frames future risks in humanenvironment interactions as foremost being shaped by environmental changes, particularly in the climatic sphere. In fact, it seems that with climate change discourses this dominant view currently experiences some sort of renaissance, thereby providing the main impetus for the recent surge in scientific engagement with climatic risks. It is predominantly argued in this line of thinking that that the expected increase in geo-physical hazards needs to be responded to by human adaptation which, in turn, requires scientific guidance on how societies can best adjust. This reasoning cannot be considered wrong but it rests on an imbalanced framing and neglects an important part in the equation – therewith putting the validity and usefulness of the entire perspective on the line. Besides the multi-scale environmental changes, vulnerability and adaptation needs to be conceived as being embedded primarily in the social realm and, hence, in socio-economic changes and transformation processes (see chapter 3.2. for a discussion on different interpretations of the term transformation). These processes are prone to imply not only changes in the capacities to deal with future hazards but also in the mindsets regarding soft cognitive issues related to the perception and acceptance of risks and the conception and design of considered response measures. Adding this second dimension of embededness to the framing of vulnerability and adaptation is of conceptual and analytical importance in order to capture the real life conditions of the respective actors as they enable but also restrict their approaches to dealing with risk. In addition, the acknowledgement of this double embedding constitutes an important base-layer for exploring the dynamics in future pathways of vulnerability and adaptive capacity in their relation to broader socio-economic, political and cultural transformation processes. Currently, most assessment approaches in the field of environmental change apply an implicit imbalance as they combine future projections of climatic hazards with current patterns of socio-economic vulnerability, e.g. by combining sea level rise scenarios for the year 2100 with current population distributions. In addition, the assessment of vulnerability often

Introduction and Rationale

25

tends to be reduced to an analysis of those vulnerability factors having materialized in past disaster events. Therefore, much more attention is needed to explore the potentiality of harm related to possible but not yet experienced hazard events. This aspect adds to the aforementioned need for more forward-looking and dynamic perspectives in vulnerability research. Thirdly, current scholarship on vulnerability and adaptation1 tends to be divided into, on the one hand, research focusing on state-led or formal modes of risk management and, on the other hand, vulnerability and adaptive capacity in the private or non-state spheres. While the former is often concerned with large scale adaptation measures, the latter is more commonly associated with a focus on small-scale processes most notably at household or community level. However, much less attention has been paid to the question how those two spheres interact and cross-fertilize – or hamper – each other. The study presented here draws on empirical research in Vietnam’s Can Tho City in an attempt to respond to these deficits and to advance current approaches. Vietnam serves as a highly relevant case study given that the country is undergoing a rapid socio-economic transformation related to the ongoing reform process. In addition, it has in the past suffered substantially from disasters related to natural hazards while also being discussed as becoming one of the global hot spots in terms of the projected impacts of climate change. This constellation necessitates a dynamic and potentiality-oriented analysis of vulnerability and adaptation, relating them not only to environmental changes but primarily to the cross-scale changes in the socio-economic, political and cultural domains. The question for Vietnam’s political transformation further turns it into a highly relevant case study for analyzing also the dynamic interplay between state and non-state actors in their attempt to negotiate, reduce and mitigate risk. Within Vietnam, the Mekong Delta makes for a particularly interesting case given that it is one of the country’s most hazard-prone regions, most notably related to flooding and typhoons. The study concentrates in particular on Can Tho City, the rapidly growing demographic and economic centre of Mekong Delta, located around 130 kilometers southwest of Ho Chi Minh City. Vietnam’s urban areas make for research objects of particular interest, given that urbanization can be considered a key dimension of the country’s transformation process, simultaneously being a prime driver and result of it. Choosing Can Tho City further pays tribute to the fact that in Vietnam as well as globally research on small and midsized centers remains to be largely underemphasized despite the growing demographic and economic importance of these cities. As a result, considerable deficits in terms of understanding the processes in the mid-sized urban segment can be observed. In addition, focusing an emerging economy like Vietnam also helps to 1

The concepts of vulnerability, adaptation and risk can in general be applied to a wider range of different contexts. However, given the focus of the research presented in this thesis, they are used here to refer to the context of natural hazards if not otherwise stated. For the sake of readability, this might not be specified every single time the terms vulnerability, adaptation or risk will be used throughout this document.

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Introduction and Rationale

bridge yet another gap in the current literature: Even though it has been widely shown that vulnerabilities towards natural hazards is often highest in the least developed countries, it is far less understood how the causal links between vulnerability, economic growth and human development change in emerging economies. Particularly debated remains the question whether urbanization and of the overall transformation process leads to positive or negative vulnerability effects. This question comprises two levels as it can be interpreted in terms of national or even global aggregates in vulnerability trends as well as in terms of the social stratifications therein. In combination of all these identified gaps, the thesis presented here has two-fold objective: Firstly, on a theoretical level, it sets out to review, contrast and discuss the different scholarly streams focusing on risk in human-environment-interaction and to provide an advanced integrated framework that helps to bridge existing gaps and to guide the detailed analysis of formerly neglected linkages, especially between vulnerability and adaptation. Secondly, the research aims at understanding the patterns of household level vulnerability towards current and future natural hazards in urban Vietnam, especially Can Tho City, and the capacities and measures for adaptation at household and governmental level, paying particular attention to their linkages and dynamics within the context of socio-economic transformation. This way, the research attempts to contribute to analyzing the currently contested question whether the ongoing transformation process leads to an increase or decrease in vulnerability related to natural hazards. It is argued here that due to the inflationary rise in scientific literature contributed from different directions, a careful and critical reflection and a sorted own perspective (objective 1) is needed to guide the empirical analysis (objective 2). However, the two elements are considered to co-evolve in an integrated and iterative manner throughout the research process. The research process presented here has passed through a number of such cycles, causing the interplay of inductive and deductive research elements (cf. chapter 5). Table 1.1 provides the main research questions and the sub-questions in terms of theoretical, empirical and methodological dimensions. Two main research questions: Which vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities related to current and projected natural hazards can be identified among urban and peri-urban residents in Can Tho City and how are the dynamics in these vulnerabilities and capacities influenced by state action and the ongoing socio-economic and political transformation processes in Vietnam? How can this analysis help to advance the understanding of vulnerability-adaptation-linkages in a theoretical level, in particular with regards to providing an integrated and coherent conceptual model that helps to fill current knowledge gaps? Table 1.1: Main research questions and subordinate questions (continued on the next page)

Introduction and Rationale

27

A. Theoretical and conceptual sub-questions: 1. How can risk, vulnerability and adaptation be framed conceptually; which achievements have been made and which shortcomings and gaps do remain in the current conceptual approaches? 2. How can these deficits and gaps be overcome with an advanced integrated conceptual framework? 3. How useful is the framework developed here? Which improvements does it bring? Which challenges do remain?

B. Empirical and context-specific sub-questions: 1. Which risk management and adaptation approaches are applied by state organizations in Can Tho City in the context of current and future natural hazards at meso-scale (i.e. the city scale) and micro-scale (i.e. particularly the household level)? Which opportunities but also challenges do they imply and how effective are they? 2. Which vulnerability patterns and adaptation capacities can be identified amongst the residents in Can Tho City and which differences exist between different social groups – and why? 3. Which factors shape the single components of vulnerability (exposure, susceptibility and coping capacity) at household level and which influence does the ongoing socio-economic and political transformation have on these factors? 4. Which adaptive capacity and adaptation action can be identified for mitigating the current and future vulnerability along its three components? How do these capacities and actions vary socially? How might the capacities develop in future with the ongoing transformation processes in Can Tho City and Vietnam at large? 5. How are state and non-state risk management and adaptation measures linked and how do those links change with the ongoing socio-economic and politic transformation? Where are gaps; where are overlaps; where are mismatches? 6. What can be learned from the analysis of current vulnerabilities and response mechanisms with respect to the vulnerability and the adaptive capacity of both government institutions and private actors in terms of future natural hazards expected in the context of climate change?

C. Methodological sub-questions: 1. How can not-yet manifested vulnerabilities to future hazards be assessed? 2. How can dynamic changes in vulnerability be assessed, particularly in terms of future trends? 3. Where are the epistemological and practical limits of such future-oriented and potentiality-focused vulnerability assessments? 4. How can the ‘real’ mechanisms of decision making be identified and assessed in Vietnam’s political culture? Table 1.1: Main research questions and subordinate questions (continued)

The structure of the book results from the objectives and research questions: Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and thematic embedding. The most relevant schools of thought on risk in human-environment-interaction – notably around the concepts of vulnerability, adaptation and resilience – are reviewed and reflected (chapter. 2.1) and their relations, gaps and mismatches examined (chapter 2.2).

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Introduction and Rationale

Chapter 2.3 even increases the theoretical depth by asking how social theory on action can help to understand vulnerability and adaptation of human actors in social systems. Based on this theoretical fundament, particular attention is given to exploring urban particularities of risk and vulnerability, specifically concerning the question how urbanization might contribute to amplify and/or reduce risk (chapter 2.4). Related thereto the role of urban risk management and governance will be examined and their conceptual framing reflected (chapter 2.5). Based on the identification of mismatches, gaps and deficits within as well as between these different schools, an integrative framework is developed (chapter 3) to advance the wider conceptual discourse and to structure the empirical analysis. The framework in particular aims at providing an integrative perspective on how adaptation relates to the specific structures and processes shaping the fabric of vulnerability. In addition, it frames vulnerability and adaptation in a dynamic way as being rested in environmental changes but particularly in socio-economic transformation processes from global to local scales. Accordingly, the main objective of chapter 4 is to analyze the general risk landscape of Vietnam and especially the Mekong Delta, paying particular attention to the question whether and how risk is changing with the ongoing socioeconomic (and political?) transformation of the country. Besides exploring disaster risk and projected climate change impacts and the respective policies (chapters 4.1 and 4.2), special attention is therefore given to the vulnerability effects of this transformation (chapter 4.3), to potential changes in the political system (chapter 4.4), the implications of state-society relations for local risk and adaptation governance (chapter 4.5) and the specific vulnerability-urbanization-linkages in the country (chapter 4.6). Drawing on that foundation, the relevance of choosing Can Tho City as a case study is discussed (chapter 4.7). The last sub-chapter in this section synthesizes the current state of risk assessments in Can Tho City and elaborates on the remaining gaps which contribute to the rationale for this study (chapter 4.8). These chapters are based on the analysis of secondary literature and statistical data. Subsequently, the methodology for the collection and analysis of the empirical data is provided, paying particular attention also to the limits and barriers of doing social science related fieldwork in Vietnam and the strategies that had been applied in response (chapter 5). Chapter 6 then presents the empirical findings, structured in two main parts. Firstly, state-led risk management activities, their effects and limits are analyzed, particularly in the three most relevant policy domains of disaster risk management, urban planning and management, and climate change adaptation (chapter 6.1). Secondly, vulnerability and adaptation at household level is analyzed in detail, concentrating in particular on the effects of the afore-analyzed governmental measures (chapter 6.2). Hence, particular attention is given to the interplay and feedbacks, but also inconsistencies and gaps, between governmental and nongovernmental adaptation – a highly dynamic field within the transforming Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Introduction and Rationale

29

Chapter 7 synthesis and discusses the main findings in terms of their contribution to understanding risk dynamics in Can Tho City and Vietnam (7.1); to pushing the methodological and epistemological boundaries or risk science (7.2); and to advancing the wider conceptual and theoretical discourse, related particularly to the contribution of the advanced integrative model developed here (7.3). Based on these lessons, recommendations for science and practice are drawn (7.4). The final chapter (8) distills key conclusions and provides an outlook. An integrative perspective is necessary to answer the research questions posed here. This is not only because risk is situated at the interface of environmental and social processes, but also because the topic relates more generally to different scholarly streams, which need to be understood and interpreted against their respective epistemology and methodology, e.g. climate change adaptation studies, vulnerability research, urban studies, Southeast Asian studies, transformation research etc. It is argued here that geographical research provides a powerful lens and tool-kit to achieve an integrative perspective. In fact, advancing such integrative perspectives at the interface of society-environment-research potentially constitutes one of the core capacities of geography and has even been discussed as one of the main legitimizations of geographical research more generally (Weichhart 2005).

2.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND THEMATIC EMBEDDING

As illustrated in the introduction, the topic of this thesis is situated at the interface of different streams of scholarship, notably under the umbrella-concepts of risk, vulnerability, adaptation and resilience. This chapter provides a background on these streams and elaborates how they stimulated and guided the research presented here. Thematic and theoretical dimensions are herewith on purpose discussed in an integrated manner. In contrast to many other studies which tend to present these two domains in separation, the integrated presentation is deemed necessary here as it matches the scientific morphogenesis in this field, where theoretical innovation has always gone hand in hand with innovative thematic and empirical knowledge generation. However, despite their theoretical and empirical achievements over the last decades, considerable deficits and gaps remain within, as well as between, the different schools – contributing heavily to the rationale of this study. Through unveiling the achievements but also shortcomings in the current theoretical and empirical literature, this chapter (2) provides the springboard for the advanced integrative conceptual framework (developed in chapter 3), which helped guiding the empirical analysis (cf. 6) and serves as a basis for reflecting the findings (cf. 7). The structure of this chapter has been illustrated in the above introduction (cf. 1) and shall – in contrast to later chapters – not be directly repeated in this opening paragraph.

2.1.

RELEVANT DISCOURSES ON RISK IN HUMANENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS

The overarching theme of risk resulting from the interaction of humans and their bio-geo-physical environment has, over the last few decades, been approached from different schools of thought, each with its own background in terms of disciplines of origin, guiding paradigms, scientific traditions, epistemological perspectives and applied methodologies. Three main branches can be discerned, i.e. (1) risk and vulnerability, (2) adaptation and (3) resilience approaches which shall be addressed in the three following sub-sections.

Relevant Discourses on Risk in Human-Environment Interactions

31

2.1.1 Vulnerability and hazards “Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe. […] It is the collapse of the cultural protection that constitutes the disaster proper.” (Carr 1932: 211)

2.1.1.1. Paradigm shift: from hazard focus to vulnerability Over the last decades, conceptual approaches on how to understand and deal with risk associated with human-environment interaction have undergone a considerable enhancement and paradigm shift. Until well into the 1970s, risk discourses revolving around natural hazards and disasters were largely based on physicalist perspectives (see in detail Pelling 2001: 174; Wisner et al. 2004: 10). Risk and the potential for damage were mainly understood in terms of hazard probabilities, including in particular the interplay of magnitude (or intensity) and frequency. In this line of thinking, hazards were mainly framed as harmful elements of the physical environment and caused by forces exogenous to man (Burton and Kates 1964). Disasters were, hence, predominantly perceived as the result of ‘the violent forces of nature’ (Wisner et al. 2004: 10). In terms of behavioral aspects, this school of thought was largely rooted in the human ecology theory of the 1920s which was for the first time explicitly applied to the context of natural hazards in White’s2 seminal work on floods in the United States (1945). Following an environmentally-deterministic conception, the main interest was on the human adjustments deemed necessary as people occupy hazard zones, yet, focusing largely on individual and re-active behavior in response to hazards; rather than on the wider socio-economic and political structures shaping such behavior (Pelling 2001: 174; Mitchell 1999: 42). Hewitt critiqued in his seminal work (1983) that in the ‘dominant view’ of the time the “initiative in calamity is seen to be with nature, which decides where and what social conditions or responses will become significant” (p. 5). Accordingly, attention of scientists and practitioners had for a long time been gravitating around controlling or ‘taming’ the physical environment through monitoring, forecasting and structural (engineering based) response measures3 (Hewitt 1983: 5; Pelling 2001: 174; Hilhorst and Bankoff 2004; Handmer 2003; Felgentreff and Dombrowsky 2008). This paradigm has been described as a tech2 3

Interestingly, White was a geographer, as are many influential scientists in this field quoted throughout this and the following sub-chapters, including, for example, Hewitt, Wisner, Cutter, Cannon, Liverman, Handmer, Pelling, Watts, Bohle, Alexander, Glade or Pohl. Yet, some early pioneers in human ecology-oriented hazard research – notably Gilbert White – cautioned already during the 1930s and 1940s that protection infrastructure and especially dykes can in fact have opposing effects on risk and damage levels since the implied sense of security triggers additional exposure, e.g. through new developments in the flood plains which can be flooded in case of dyke failure (White 1945; Felgentreff and Dombrowsky 2008; Pohl 2008).

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Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

nocratic approach, also referred to as ‘technological fix’. However, Hewitt reminds us that it should not be understood in too narrow terms as exclusively an “obsession” with engineering solutions, since it also implies a perspective according to which social, economic and political factors around human action and management “can be and usually are approached technocratically” (1983: 8). This paradigm yields the question whether such a control-oriented understanding of natural hazards is particularly likely to entrench itself within centrally organized state-bureaucracies, as can be found in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (cf. 4), which are often rooted in the belief that the physical as well as the social realm can be steered and managed technocratically. Chapter 6.1 therefore explores whether such a linkage can be found in Can Tho City and what the implications for risk management and adaptation ventures are. However, despite the dominance of the technocratic view until well into the 1980s, Hewitt’s influential compendium (1983) acknowledges that there had been scattered accounts of social science analyses since the early 1970s which disagreed with this ‘dominant view’ (p. 7). But Hewitt also observes that the mainstream social sciences continued to conduct fairly narrow studies concentrating on direct socio-economic and behavioral relations, e.g. on hazard-specific risk awareness or on the implementation of emergency measures. By doing so, they failed to consider the wider social conditions allowing for disasters and therewith – as Hewitt argues – they even reinforced the geophysicalist and technological reductionism of the dominant view4 (1983: 7). Importantly, also the implicit environmental determinism in the human ecology school – i.e. the conception that hazard-related human behavior is predominantly considered to be determined by the characteristics of the hazard – widely persisted despite the emerging critique (Felgentreff and Dombrowsky 2008: 17). Yet, from the mid 1970s and more intensively the 1980s onwards, scientists advocating critical social theory increasingly challenged the risk explanations of the dominant view and promoted a paradigm shift towards focusing on social vulnerabilities (e.g. O’Keefe et al. 1976; Sen 1981; Hewitt 1983; Susman et al. 1983; for more comprehensive reviews see Pelling 2001; Cutter et al. 2009; Hilhorst and Bankhoff 2004: Handmer 2003; Oliver-Smith 1999; Müller-Mahn 2005). Largely inspired by approaches from the growing schools of political economy and later political ecology, these works in essence argued that risk and disasters are not determined purely by the natural hazard but are co-produced by social, economic, political and cultural structures and processes that generate socially stratified preconditions of human populations to be harmed by natural hazards, i.e. their vulnerabilities (Blaikie et al. 1994; Mitchell 1999: 43). The fundamental risk formula of “Risk = Hazard (x) Vulnerability” was therefore coined which provides one of the most widely accepted and shared conceptions to this date (cf. Table 2.3). In addition, the previously neglected human influence on the intensification of the ‘natural’ hazards themselves (e.g. through 4

Interestingly, Hewitt did not flinch from drawing on his own earlier work for illustrating the shortcoming of the dominant view.

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33

river regulation or zero tolerance policies towards forest fires) received increasing interest (Pohl 2008). The resulting call for a comprehensive paradigm shift is best captured by the title of O’Keefe et al.’s (1976) early seminal paper “Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters” – ironically published in Nature. Despite quite notable diversity in terms of specific regional, thematic or theoretical interests, the new approaches therefore agreed on calling for increased attention to vulnerability as overarching theme. This call included to focus particularly on the structures and processes which make certain social groups (from national to local level) more prone to being harmed than others, even if exposed to comparable natural hazards. That is because next to the above-illustrated conceptual re-orientation there had been increasing recognition of the global differences in terms of impact patterns that societies experience from disasters related to natural hazards. Contrasting different impact types over the last three decades, Figure 2.1 illustrates that low income countries bear the major burden in terms of fatalities incurred by disasters, while economic losses and especially the insured economic losses are concentrated in higher income countries (see also IPCC 2012; UNISDR 2013, 2004; CRED 2013a,b). These fundamental differences in terms of impact patterns are amongst the strongest indication for the very different vulnerability constellations in the respective societies. Along with the simultaneous observation of strong impact disparities even within these countries, increased scientific efforts were therefore called for, in order to enable an improved scientific understanding of the emergence and perpetuation of these vulnerabilities that would – so the hope – allow for adequate action on vulnerability reduction.

Figure 2.1: Global impacts of disasters related to natural hazards between 1980 and 2009, own draft, based on data from Munich Re (2011a)

Hence, since the late 1970s and particularly the 1980s, an increasing number of scientists devoted attention to the contested power relations and socio-political institutions which cause inequalities in access to and distribution of resources, in turn resulting in differentiated exposure, susceptibility and response capacity with

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Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

respect to natural or man-made hazards (Chambers 1989; see below for definitions on the terms). Ground breaking contributions (conceptual and empirical) to vulnerability science were made by Marxist-influenced political ecology (notably, Hewitt 1983; Susman et al. 1983) as well as by entitlement theory, particularly in the context of famines (notably, Sen 1981), and other conceptual work on food security (notably, Watts and Bohle 1993; Bohle et al 1994). The essence of these early schools, that jointly pushed for the new vulnerability paradigm, can be inferred from Cannon (1994) who concludes that “in order to understand the relationships between humans and nature, it is more important to discern how human systems themselves place people in relation to each other and to the environment than it is to interpret natural systems” (p. 15). 2.1.1.2. Vulnerability models and frameworks On the back of these pioneering contributions, a number of models and conceptual frameworks have been developed which sketch out ontologies of the subcomponents, dimensions, structures and processes of vulnerability in order to guide its analysis and reduction. Vulnerability frameworks have thereby developed from different scientific traditions, resulting in a significant diversity in vulnerability approaches that reflects the rich multiplicity of contributions. This diversity persists even despite the numerous attempts to synchronize the different schools and come to a shared conceptual framework and lexicon that would allow for more integrated vulnerability assessments and a clearer communication of key messages to policy makers5. The variety of vulnerability approaches is not only mirrored by the increasing number of vulnerability definitions (see, for example, the glossary in Thywissen 2006). An even stronger indication is the fact that also the numerous attempts to review and categorize vulnerability approaches come to very different conclusions in terms of grouping the existing approaches along the lines of epistemology, main objectives, underlying research tradition and/or methodology (see in detail Timmerman 1981; Liverman 1990; Bohle et al. 1994; Cutter 1996; Liverman 2001; Weichselgartner 2001; Alexander 2006; O’Brien et al. 2004b, 2007; Müller-Mahn 2005; Adger 2006; Birkmann 2006a; Eaking and Luers 2006; Füssel and Klein 2006; Füssel 2007; Hufschmidt 2011; Bohle and Glade 2008; Pohl 2008; Cutter et al. 2009). Recognizing the challenges in finding a standard approach to categorizing vulnerability research, the following broad categories have been suggested in the above-cited review articles6: 5 6

One prominent example of such a forum is the establishment of the international Expert Working Group for Measuring Vulnerability which met for the first time back-to-back with the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe in 2005. This categorization of vulnerability frameworks should not be confused with approaches to risk in general. Grouping scientific schools on risk would result in a larger set. This is because additional approaches would have to be considered such as Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ and ‘World Risk Society (Beck 1986, 2008) focusing on the generation of risk in modern (West-

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(1) Approaches which interpret vulnerability in the context of ‘development, livelihoods and entitlement’ studies; (2) approaches in the tradition of ‘hazard research, disaster risk and human ecology’; (3) approaches trying to integrate the first two schools; and (4) approaches in the context of ‘global environmental change and climate change’. Given the vast amount of literature published in this field, the review of these four groups cannot be exhaustive here. It is therefore restricted to those contributions that have proved most influential for framing the research concept for this study (chapter 3). Vulnerability in the context of development, livelihoods and entitlements The first group (or lineage) of approaches is mainly rooted in two schools of thought which have developed in close cross-fertilization. Firstly, it emerged out of the, above specified, early critique of the ‘dominant view’ (Hewitt 1983) in geophysicalist approaches. This critique was advanced in particular by scientists working on development and livelihood questions from the emerging perspective of political ecology. They re-framed human-environment interactions towards an emphasis on the socio-political production of not only social but also environmental conditions that allow for the intensification of vulnerability and risk (cf. Hewitt 1983; O’Keefe et al. 1976; and for more detailed reviews Cutter et al. 2009; Felgentreff and Dombrowsky 2008; Pohl 2008). Secondly, vulnerability thinking in this lineage is in parallel grounded in food security and famine research. Sen’s entitlement theory, published in 1981, can be considered a milestone contribution in this context. Analyzing the great Bengal famine in 1943, he was able to prove that this famine was not primarily caused by a shortage of food production but rather by institutional and economic shifts which lead to a deterioration of the exchange entitlements of poor population groups (cf. Sen 1981; see for a longer review Bohle and Glade 2008). Building on Sen’s main arguments Chambers (1989) compiled his seminal work “Vulnerability, coping and policy” in which he frames vulnerability as a two-headed phenomenon having an external side of hazard-, stress- and shock-exposure and an internal side, meaning a lack of coping capacity (p.1). Watts and Bohle (1993) expanded this framing to argue that the space of vulnerability is spanned by the actors’ lack of potentiality, lack of capacity and exposure, all of which in turn depend on the wider context of entitlement, empowerment and the political economy in the given context. This causal structure of vulnerability has been widely adopted and is also of great relevance to the conceptual framing of the study presented here. This is because it emphasizes that a detailed analysis of vulnerability ern) societies – yet not making explicit use of the vulnerability concepts – or Renn’s ‘Risk Governance’ (Renn 2008).

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Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

needs to draw on different theoretical perspectives, enabling the consideration and combination of complementary causal explanations. Bohle (2001) later linked this framing even more comprehensively to different schools of social science theory and developed the widely cited metaframework of the double structure of vulnerability. Drawing on Chambers earlier work (1989), the framework suggests that the vulnerability of people can only be understood by linking the analysis of their internal coping capacities and measures (informed by action theory, models of access and conflict research) with their structural exposure to external stresses and hazards (informed, for example, by human ecology, policy economy and entitlement theory). Vulnerability is hence to be understood as a highly dynamic and relational – rather than an absolute – phenomenon (Watts and Bohle 1993). Recognizing this double structure of vulnerability provides an essential perspective for the analysis and understanding of the Vietnamese case study context presented here. It allows especially to explore how the relations between internal and external dimensions of vulnerability and response capacities change under conditions of wider socio-economic and institutional transformation – as will be shown in more detail in chapters 3, 6 and 7. Next to these causal frameworks of vulnerability, the generation and dynamic progression of vulnerability has been further investigated through the lens of the widely cited Pressure and Release Model, published in the influential book “At Risk” by Blaikie et al. (1994) and its second edition by Wisner et al. (2004). In this book, the four authors combine elements of their previous work on political ecology, development, livelihood studies and natural hazards to call for the aboveintroduced paradigm shift in which risk (and the potential for disaster) needs to be understood as the product of hazard and vulnerability (R=HxV). The Pressure and Release Model concentrates in particular on the vulnerability dimension and differentiates three components which together shape its progression (Figure 2.2). Firstly, systemic and institutional root causes can comprise, for example, limited access to resources, exploitive structures and lack of power. Secondly, dynamic pressures comprise destabilizing processes at various scales that are inadequately governed and regulated such as rapid urbanization or ecosystem degradation. In combination, root causes and dynamic pressures can lead to, thirdly, unsafe conditions, i.e. states of high vulnerability, meaning a high pre-disposition to experience harm when being exposed to a hazard. Yet, despite these conceptual claims for a long-term perspective, Miller et al. (2010) find that in practice vulnerability studies often fail to apply a dynamic perspective as they “often present a snapshot of vulnerability at a particular time, such as immediately after a disaster” (p. 11).

37

Relevant Discourses on Risk in Human-Environment Interactions THE PROG RESSION OF VULNERABILITY

1

2

3

ROOT CAUSES

DYNAMIC PRESSURES

UNSAFE CONDITIONS

Limited access to • Power • Structures • Resources Ideologies • Political systems • Economic systems

Lack of • Local institutions • Training • Appropriate skills • Local investments • Local markets • Press freedom • Ethical standards in public life Macro-forces • Rapid population change • Rapid urbanization • Arms expenditure • Dept repayment schedules • Deforestation • Decline in soil productivity

DISASTER

Physical environment • Dangerous locations • Unprotected buildings and infrastructure Local economy • Livelihoods at risk • Low income levels Social relations • Special groups at risk • Lack of local institutions

HAZARD

Earthquake Highwinds (cyclone/ hurricane/ typhoon)

Risk= Hazard x Vulnerability R=HxV

Public actions and institutions • Lack of disaster preparedness • Prevalenceof endemic disease

Flooding Volcanic eruption Landslide Drought Virus and pests

Figure 2.2: The Pressure and Release Model, Wisner et al. (2004: 51)

One of the major – and for the time of publication truly progressive – achievements of the Pressure and Release Model is its emphasis on the depth of political implications that one has to consider if taking vulnerability reduction seriously. The model underscores that while vulnerability is always context-specific, the root causes and dynamic pressures leading to specific unsafe conditions (and eventually risk or disaster) are often remote from the actual situation in question, serving as indirect drivers. Eventually, local vulnerabilities are often rooted in the very set-up of larger political and economic systems at national or even global level. The authors argue that identifying these linkages is of key relevance for risk reduction and mitigation – in other words for releasing pressures, as the model’s name suggests. However, at the same time, this insight implies that real efforts for (local) vulnerability reduction might not suffice with local palliative vulnerability reduction measures but eventually call for drastic changes in the larger political and economic systems altogether (Birkmann 2006a: 31). This makes a critical engagement with vulnerability – in the sense of a ‘critical theory’ or ‘critical geography’ – highly political and might involve practical challenges for doing vulnerability research altogether. What if, for instance, the research on Vietnam presented here revealed that, in terms of the vulnerability root causes, the government is oftentimes rather part of the problem, than a part of the solution? Which implications would this have for not only doing participatory research in the country, but also very practically for receiving the necessary research permissions or for discussing vulnerability reduction measures jointly with relevant governmental stakeholders? Chapter 5.4 and 7.2 will discuss such questions in more detail and

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will underscore the deeper social and political implications of vulnerability research as suggested in the Pressure and Release Model. Through framing risk as the interaction of hazards and vulnerabilities, the Pressure and Release Model can be considered a bridge between hazard and political ecology approaches (Adger 2006: 270). However, Cutter et al. (2009) correctly note that the model tends to treat the hazard as externally given and fails to address the interaction between human and natural systems in the production of hazards (p. 4) – which is a link that is of particular importance in urban environments, e.g. with respect to the intensification of flooding due to soil sealing or the intensification of extreme precipitation events due to the heat-island-effect (cf. 2.4). Nested in those wider perspectives on vulnerability, a number of approaches have been developed to explore the detailed structures and processes of vulnerability at smaller scales including community, household and individual levels – as is the focus of much of the empirical work presented here. Emphasis has thereby been put on the tenet that vulnerability should not be considered as something out of the ordinary but needs to be seen as an integral part of people’s everyday realities. It is hence argued that vulnerability analysis needs to be cognizant of the surrounding livelihood conditions. Therefore, many vulnerability approaches draw on the livelihood framework (Carney 1998; DFID 1999) as an additional layer for conceptual and analytic structuring (e.g. the access model by Wisner et al. 2004). The livelihood framework has its main roots in action-oriented (rural) development studies and was developed to guide the analysis of how people establish and sustain their day-today livelihood – and where deficits for doing so exist (Chambers and Conway 1992). It therefore integrates, as its name suggests, the focus on livelihoods and sustainability. Livelihoods are therein understood to comprise the “capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living” (Chambers and Conway 1992: 7). Of central importance in the framework are the five types of tangible and intangible capitals (or assets) which people use for obtaining livelihoods but which also condition the internal capacities that people have to avoid or reduce vulnerabilities and to induce adaptation to hazards: (1) Human capital (e.g. skills, knowledge, health condition); (2) Social capital (e.g. social networks, institutions, reciprocity, trust); (3) Physical capital (e.g. infrastructure, technology, equipment for production); (4) Financial capital (e.g. income, savings); (5) Natural capital (e.g. natural resources for production or recreation). The different capitals can be combined and re-combined into capital portfolios depending on the context. One of the central questions is therefore whether and how deficits in one type of capital can be substituted by other capital stocks – and how these exchange relations might dynamically change with socio-economic or institutional transformation as in the case of Vietnam. This question is of key relevance, for example, with respect to the configuration of adaptive capacity portfolios (see chapter 2.1.1.4) or the coping measures dynamically applied in a given

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hazard or stress situation which might lead to shortages in specific capital stocks and to the activation of other capitals. Importantly, the capitals (or assets) do not translate directly into livelihood strategies and outcomes but are shaped – i.e. activated but also truncated or blocked – by so-called transforming structures and processes such as legal regulations, institutional boundaries or cultural norms. It is these transforming structures and processes which regulate, for example, the access to the capital sources or influence the extent to which these assets can in fact be capitalized on. This dimension has, therefore, a considerable conceptual overlap with the aboveillustrated external side of vulnerability (Bohle 2001) and carries the potential to re-produce vulnerabilities and inhibit vulnerability reduction (Twigg 2001). However, the explanations on the internal dynamics of capital balancing and the detailed effects of transforming structures and processes remain rather abstract in the original framework (Haan and Zoomers 2005). Exploring these important questions in more detail, therefore, constitutes one of the major goals of this research, which is mirrored not only in the conceptual framework (cf. 3.2) but also in the empirical analysis (cf. 6.2). Vulnerability in the tradition of hazard research, disaster risk and human ecology While the vulnerability research in the context of development and livelihood studies applies a broad perspective and understands vulnerability as necessarily linked to larger socio-economic and political configurations, the vulnerability focus in hazard and disaster risk research is usually more narrow and largely confined to the specific hazards or disasters. This has to be seen in relation to the fact that this lineage is often more closely linked to practical disaster risk management and/or natural science approaches which place greater emphasis on the actual hazard situation and the specific disaster manifestation than focusing on the societal root causes of vulnerability (cf. Müller-Mahn 2005, 2008).

Figure 2.3: The disaster risk cycle, according to Cutter & Gall (2008: 356).

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Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

The widely-used disaster risk cycle (Figure 2.3) illustrates the key elements or stages of such direct disaster risk management approaches, i.e. response, rehabilitation/reconstruction, prevention/mitigation and preparedness (Dikau and Weichselgartner 2005; Elverfeldt et al. 2008). Vulnerability aspects can be linked to all four phases of this cycle. However, vulnerability reduction is most commonly associated with risk prevention and mitigation, thereby underemphasizing that vulnerabilities can also exist with respect to the lack of response capacities, the lack of rehabilitation/reconstruction capacities and the lack of preparedness. Yet, it is interesting to see that most of the literature on the disaster risk management cycle does not explore the conceptual links between vulnerability and the phases of disaster risk management in detail. This shortcoming certainly underscores the different traditions behind the two concepts, with the cycle being more strongly rooted in concrete disaster risk reduction which, for a long time, had been dominated by technocratic and re-active approaches to ‘managing’ disasters. In this context, the notion that the disaster risk cycle can – or should – guide disaster risk management has been criticized. It has in particular been argued that the cyclic model pays too little attention to the question of how learning from past disasters can be fostered and can lead to changes in the system so as to reduce vulnerabilities – in contrast to simply recovering and rebuilding back to the old state (Miller et al. 2010). Also, the question of how far disasters can in fact open up windows of opportunity to initiate institutional change that allows for profound alterations in the causal structures of vulnerability has been widely neglected in the traditional disaster management field (Birkmann et al. 2010a). In addition, the cycle mainly refers to sudden onset or singular events (e.g. typhoons, river floods, earthquakes) but provides little guidance for how to deal with creeping or continuous hazards and the resulting risk (e.g. sea level rise or salinization). The cycle therefore offers some conceptual guidance for parts of the empirical research presented here – particularly for the aspects directly linked to conventional disaster risk management (cf. 6.1.1) – but needs to be augmented with other conceptual streams in order to accommodate a wider context of hazards, vulnerability dimensions and adaptation processes (cf. 3). In addition to the above-referenced schools on natural hazards and disaster risk reduction, there is a broader lineage of disaster research that deals with a wide range of environmental, technical and mixed disasters. This research largely concentrates on high income countries and on the technical and organizational management of specific disaster scenarios as well as on related societal negotiations of risk-taking. Parts of this school link their research to the vulnerability concepts presented above but interestingly a review of the literature suggests that the main stimuli have diffused from the vulnerability literature into this disaster literature rather than the other way around. Therefore, this broader disaster literature will not be reviewed here in detail. Comprehensive introductions can be found, for example, in Dombrowsky (1998, 2008), Quarantelli (1995, 1998), Gilbert (1998), Porfiriev (1998).

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Connective vulnerability approaches Reviewing the first two schools, Cutter concluded with respect to her own work in the North American context that “many of the existing theoretical constructs were either too limiting or too diffuse to be of practical use to the problems examined” (1996: 535). She therefore proposed a vulnerability model which set out to bridge between the internal social construction of vulnerability and the hazard-exposure oriented explanation of vulnerability. The suggested way of achieving this bridge is to integrate causal vulnerability explanations from both perspectives into the joint analysis of vulnerability in specific locations. Hence, the linking element in her ‘hazard of place’ model is the “vulnerability of specific places and the people who live there […] for it is the place that forms the fundamental unit of analysis for any geographer” (p. 536). When reviewing the relevance of this model a number of points come to mind, especially in the context of the research presented here. Reiterating the role of spatiality and the fact that the vulnerability of people depends on the characteristics of the places they live in is important, as is the integration of the two above perspectives. The model thereby particularly allows for analyzing the exposure to multiple overlapping hazards in one place (Cutter et al. 2009; see also O’Brien et al. 2004a), as it can be observed many parts of the Mekong Delta (cf. 4.1). Yet, at the same time the model itself provides little guidance for analyzing the causal relations in peoples’ behavior in response to such hazard exposure. Particularly the link to an underlying social theory that could help to explain social action and the production of internal vulnerability seems underemphasized. In addition, the links between the model’s epistemic objects such as ‘social fabric’ and ‘geographic context’ remain rather fuzzy. Hence, while Cutter argues that the “simplicity of the hazards of place model suggests wide application” (1996: 537), it is argued here that this simplicity and vagueness may render the model itself as too diffuse to be of specific practical use. For the context of this study, the model therefore helped to direct attention to relevant questions (see above) but it is of limited use for precisely conceptualizing or even operationalizing vulnerability and adaptation. Also Alexander (2006) illustrates that risk results from the interaction of physical hazards and societal vulnerabilities and, hence, needs to be analyzed through the combination of natural and social science lenses. His framing therefore shares some major arguments with the pressure and release model (see above). However, it gives more consideration to the role of the specific hazard characteristics and allows for a more direct link to the level of (potential or materialized) harm. The model is therefore very informative for the multi-hazard context in the case study presented here since it reminds the researcher that even though the main interest may be on the social production of vulnerability, the analysis of this production process needs to be sensitive to the variations in vulnerability depending on the specific hazard – or hazard mixture – in question. In other words, Alexander’s framework urges the researches to set emphasis on the question of ‘vulnerability to what?’. Reiteration that this question should play a

42

Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

central role in any vulnerability research remains of particular importance when bringing to mind the recent surge in vulnerability studies, often applying the term in a very broad or unspecific manner without clearly defining which vulnerabilities, and to which hazards, are in focus. Vulnerability in the context of global environmental change and climate change The youngest of the vulnerability lineages reviewed here emerged in the context of global environmental change and especially climate change research (cf. Liverman 1990, 2001). Along with the predominant systems perspective in these schools of thought, vulnerability is mostly framed as a property of the system or system components in question. Timmerman (1981), for example, defines vulnerability in his early but influential review as “the degree to which a system may react adversely to the occurrence of a hazardous event” (p. 21). For him, vulnerability is closely linked to resilience, i.e. “the measure of a system’s capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a hazardous event” (ibid.)7. In a collaborative effort, key researchers within global environmental change research and sustainability science have developed a comprehensive framework for guiding the analysis of vulnerability (Turner et al. 2003; see Figure 2.4). Through its sub-categorization of vulnerability factors the framework has contributed important conceptual inspiration for the analysis presented here, especially for the conceptual framing (cf. 3.2) and empirical operationalization (cf. 5; 6). It is designed to capture vulnerability linkages in so-called coupled humanenvironment systems. Drawing on earlier work within the ‘development, livelihoods and entitlements’ tradition, the authors emphasize the need to not only consider hazard exposure – which can be defined in this context as the “degree, duration and/or extent in which the system is in contact with, or subject to, the [hazard]” (Gallopín 2006: 296). Rather, Turner et al. urge for paying increased attention also to the influence that sensitivity and resilience have on the overall vulnerability of the system or system component in question. The authors define sensitivity as “dose-response […] of the system exposed” (Turner et al. 2003: 8074) which can be understood as the “degree to which the system is modified or affected by an external disturbance or set of disturbances”, i.e. by a hazard or a set of hazards (Gallopín 2006: 195). Interestingly, resilience is, in the framework, seen as a sub-component of vulnerability – with an inverse relationship, meaning that increasing resilience can contribute to decreasing vulnerability. It is in this context defined as the “system’s ability to bounce back to a reference state after a disturbance […] and the capacity of a system to maintain certain structures and functions despite disturbance” (Turner et al. 2003: 8075).

7

Departing from these definitions, one of Timmerman’s main questions is what happens if a system has such high vulnerability and low resilience that it collapses when confronted with hazardous events of a high intensity.

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Relevant Discourses on Risk in Human-Environment Interactions

The taxonomy suggested in this framework, hence, differs from the main taxonomies used in the disaster risk research community (see above). Linked to the ideas of Cutter (1996), the framework explicitly accounts for the possible interaction and cascading of different hazards. The latter are more precisely defined to include perturbations, stresses and stressors. Stressors are considered the sources of stress, while perturbations refer to major spikes in pressure beyond the normal range of variability in which the system operates. Another strength of the framework is that it links different scales (from places to global) and the dynamics by which they are linked (cross-scale, in space and beyond space). While distinguishing between drivers or causes of vulnerability and their consequences, the framework explicitly includes feedbacks and human or environmental adjustments and adaptation responses which can take place at all scales. System operates at multiple spatial, functional and temporal scales

Dynamics cross-scale in place beyond place

World Region Place

Human influences outside the place Macro political economy, institutions, global trends and transitions

Variability & change in human conditions

Vulnerability Exposure

Sensitivity

Resilience Coping / response

Human conditions Interactions of hazards (perturbations, stresses, stressors)

Characteristics & components of exposure Environmental conditions

Impact / response

Adjustment & adaptation / response

Variability & change in environmental conditions

Impact / responses

Adjustment & adaptation / response

Environmental influences outside the place State of biosphere, state of nature Global environmental changes Drivers / causes

Consequences

Figure 2.4: Framework for vulnerability analysis, based on Turner et al. (2003: 8076)

Since its publication, the framework by Turner et al. (2003) has been widely cited and adopted as a basis for organizing the different elements within empirical vulnerability assessments (e.g. Damm 2010; Braun and Aßheuer 2011). As indicated above, it also contributes guidance to the empirical analysis and conceptual discussion presented here (cf. 3). Yet, some open questions remain such as whether the distinction between drivers and consequences can be misleading and how the conceptualization of resilience as sub-element of vulnerability can be reconciled with other resilience and vulnerability approaches (e.g. in the ecological resilience theory or within the hazard and disaster risk community) (see in detail chapters

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Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

2.1.3 and 2.2). In addition, the question to what extent the systems perspective can be combined with an actor oriented approach remains to be discussed (chapter 3). Strongly building on the above framework is the so-called MOVE framework developed by Birkmann et al. (2013). However, this framework more clearly differentiates response mechanisms into coping and adaptation, of which the former is considered to refer to the specific hazard context while the latter address strategic long-term responses. In addition the MOVE framework augments the discussion by considering different thematic dimensions related to vulnerability, e.g. social, economic, physical, cultural, environmental and institutional. However, strikingly the framework considers these dimensions only in the domain of fragility (which is defined in similar terms as the sensitivity sphere in the framework by Turner et al. 2003) but not in the domains of exposure and lack of resilience. Also hierarchies and linkages within the thematic dimensions remain rather fuzzy. Nevertheless, they provide a useful conceptual advancement through adding heuristic guidance of key dimensions that need to be considered when assessing vulnerabilities. 2.1.1.3. Vulnerability assessment and measurement Closely coupled with the development of conceptual frameworks for vulnerability have been endeavors to assess or measure vulnerability. Since the assessment of vulnerabilities is also a part of the work presented (cf. 1), it is essential to reflect on the principles of vulnerability assessment reported in the literature and to explore existing gaps as well as barriers and limits of current approaches. The assessment of vulnerability in the context of natural hazards can be argued to serve a two-fold and nested purpose (Hinkel 2011): First, it helps to better understand vulnerability through knowledge generation (e.g. the identification and comparison of vulnerable groups, communities, places, sectors or the analysis of vulnerability trends). Second, by doing so it helps to raise awareness and it provides the knowledge basis for action on vulnerability reduction (e.g. providing guidance for drafting vulnerability reduction or adaptation strategies as well as for allocating respective resources and for monitoring success). These nested objectives are also stated in important research frameworks and policy white papers of the scientific communities around development studies, global environmental change and disaster risk management. For instance, the “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities” – one of the main outcomes of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe in 2005 and a milestone agreement in international disaster risk reduction policy – stresses the need to “identify, assess and monitor disaster risks” through the development of “indicators of disaster risk and vulnerability” (UN 2005: 7). Yet, it has been argued that despite the increasing number of vulnerability assessments in different contexts (see below), the detailed specification of the objectives behind assessing vulnerability is often lacking or remains fuzzy (Hinkel

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2011: 204). As a result of this shortcoming, criticism has been raised that the term ‘vulnerability assessment’ is too often used as an unspecific proxy for addressing a wide range of research questions and topics. As a result, it has been suggested that the “one-size-fits-all label” should – where possible – be replaced or at least augmented with more precise terminology that describes the “problems and methods as specifically as possible” (Hinkel 2011: 206). Along a similar line, Bohle (2006; quoted in Birkmann and Wisner 2006: 40) urges that the each and every assessment has to begin with clarifying the questions “vulnerability of what” and “vulnerability to what?” as the answers to these questions have influence on all subsequent steps. In order to tackle the complexity of vulnerability in a given context or system, Bohle (2008b) suggests to first examine the single components of the system in detail and to concentrate on such elements that are of key interest to the issue in question (p.111). The research layout for the analysis presented here adheres to Hinkel’s and Bohle’s claims by custom-tailoring the epistemological and methodological approach as well as the wider objectives of the vulnerability assessment in Can Tho City to not only the given hazard context but also to the specific socio-economic conditions surrounding the agents whose vulnerability ought to be assessed (cf. 5). The description of the research design further matches the research sub-questions to the specific methods applied for their investigation (cf. 5). A growing number of vulnerability assessments can be found in the literature, with many of them relating to the burgeoning interest in global environmental change and climate change topics. They range from small scale assessments at community level (cf. van Aalst et al. 2008) to global assessments comparing different world regions or countries. Local vulnerability assessments often draw on qualitative methods and use the livelihood framework as an analytical guidance for exploring household level conditions (Bohle 2008a). Also the research presented here heavily draws on such perspectives, but combines them with local level assessments of how other actors, notably from within the state apparatus, influence household level vulnerability (cf. 5). Many local vulnerability studies – not all – focus explicitly on strengthening the capacity of the local actors to conduct self-assessments of vulnerabilities and coping capacities by applying participatory approaches (Wisner 2006). Such a goal is considered valuable also for the context of this study, yet, considerable challenge exist for implementing this principle comprehensively in the Vietnamese context (cf. 5). In contrast, there are a number of global approaches to measuring, comparing and monitoring disaster risk related vulnerability and/or adaptive capacity. These approaches usually apply a resolution of nation-states and are based on quantitative indicators and the development of indices. Amongst the approaches most widely recognized and quoted by scientists, policy makers and practitioners are the Disaster Risk Index initiated by UNDP (cf. UNDP 2004; Peduzzi 2006; Peduzzi et al. 2009), the Disaster Risk Hotspots project conducted by the World Bank and Columbia University (cf. Dilley et al. 2005; Dilley 2006), the Global Climate Risk Index developed by Germanwatch (cf. Hamerling 2011) or the more recently developed World Risk Index (Welle et al. 2012). On top of these global

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Theoretical Background and Thematic Embedding

assessments there is an even greater number of quantitative studies focusing either on a regional scope or on specific elements at risk. (e.g. Cardona 2006; Greiving 2006; Dasgupta et al. 2007; Nicholls et al. 2008; Hanson et al. 2011). Yet, since global assessment approaches are not in the core interest of this thesis, the aims, methods and results of these approaches cannot be presented in more detail here. The reader is referred to the literature quoted above and to the comprehensive reviews and comparisons provided by Pelling (2006) and Cutter et al. (2009). Those few regional assessments that bear direct relevance for this study are reviewed in the research context provided in chapter 5. Despite this growing number of vulnerability studies, it needs to be underscored that the assessment – or even ‘measurement’ – of vulnerability is faced with a number of substantial epistemological and methodological challenges, which can be observed in general and in the case of this study in particular. On the one hand, vulnerability is argued to be highly context specific meaning that vulnerability can only be understood in relation to the specific context of the element in question (e.g. group, community, region, sector, place, system or systemcomponent). This implies the need for detailed case studies and challenges the ability to generalize assessment tools and findings. In fact, many local level assessments even aim at capturing vulnerability in relational terms without establishing any absolute benchmarks. On the other hand, there is ample demand within science and policy making to find universal patterns and rules of vulnerability and to compare the vulnerabilities of different elements across space and time. This implies the need for generalized vulnerability indicators that can be applied across different context-settings. Throughout the research process for this study, stakeholders in Vietnam, for example, expressed their interest to learn how the vulnerability assessed in Can Tho City compares to vulnerability levels in other Vietnamese cities. This request could not be replied to with the study presented here but the opportunity for a later comparison nevertheless was considered when designing the research layout. Linked to this paradox is a second methodological challenge that relates to the question whether qualitative or quantitative methods are more suitable for examining vulnerability. In coming to grips with the context-specific nature of vulnerability and particularly with its social, cultural, psychological and cognitive dimensions, it would appear that qualitative methods are needed (see on the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative methods chapter 5). In contrast, the standardization and generalization needed for larger comparisons rather calls for a more quantitative research paradigm. That is why many vulnerability assessments in fact follow a middle-path and try to apply a mix of methods – as done in this study (cf. 5). An additional challenge exists with respect to the operationalization of vulnerability into variables and their indicators. Despite – or maybe because of – the substantial amount of conceptual work on vulnerability, it remains a rather abstract concept. Hence, there are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ indicators for assessing, let alone measuring or quantifying, vulnerability. Therefore vulnerability assessments need to tackle two challenging stages of operationalization, i.e. first providing coherent conceptual definitions and, second, translating them into concrete opera-

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tional definitions with instructions on the indicators to be assessed. Yet, a transparent description of these steps is often lacking in published vulnerability assessment. This problem becomes increasingly relevant the more (social) vulnerability is framed as the product of intangible phenomena, most importantly with regard to relational social and political processes. In addition, even if operational guidance is sufficiently provided, vulnerability assessment often has to deal with severe constraints in terms of data accessibility and quality. The documentation of the research process for this study therefore attempts to be very transparent not only in terms of the applied operationalization but also in terms of the data constraints faced (cf. 5). One of the greatest epistemological challenges of vulnerability assessment lies in its hypothetical and forward-looking nature. Since this challenge is not sufficiently tackled to date, it constitutes one of the greatest deficits in current vulnerability and risk science – providing a key objective for the study presented here. By definition, vulnerability assessment needs to explore the potential for being harmed (cf. 2.1.1.1). Hence, being prospective and projecting future vulnerability is one of the central criteria each vulnerability assessment ought to achieve (Schröter et al. 2005). This implies that vulnerability assessment also needs to examine those factors and drivers of vulnerability that may not yet have become evident in a particular disaster or crises situation. Vulnerability assessment therefore needs to differ from damage or impact assessment which is usually conducted ex-post, meaning after damages and impacts of certain hazard events have materialized and have, therefore, brought to light the inherent vulnerabilities (Birkmann 2006b: 69). However, the scientific response to recent disasters such as cyclone Nargis, the flood in Bangkok, Hurricane Katrina or the disaster of Fukushima underscore that the vast majority of vulnerability assessments in the context of natural hazards are only conducted ex-post, i.e. after disasters have already happened. Emphasizing the potential for harm related to previously un-known or unthinkable vulnerabilities is much less common. In addition, those few assessments that pay attention to such questions have in the past not received adequate attention in academic and political circles – often on the grounds of an allegedly poor base of empirical data. Hence, translating the hypothetical nature of vulnerability into adequate assessments that apply an equally forward-looking and hypothetical perspective while being grounded in solid empirical data remains one of the main epistemological and methodological challenges in vulnerability research. In order to respond to this shortcoming, it is recommendable to use case studies which supposedly have a high hypothetical vulnerability but which have not (yet) experienced major disasters in the past. The case study of Can Tho City chosen for the here presented analysis features these characteristics (cf. 4). However, assessments on such case studies often face the challenges of receiving limited attention or even being disputed, with critics arguing that they are not relevant (since no disasters have taken place) or not valid (since the results cannot be checked against actual disaster losses).

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In addition, the epistemological challenges around future-oriented vulnerability assessments become particularly evident – and pressing! – in highly dynamic context conditions like in the case of Vietnam, where both natural hazards and social vulnerability patterns are likely to experience substantial change in the near and mid-term future (cf. 4; 6). Hence, taking the objective of forward-looking vulnerability assessment serious implies not only to consider the current vulnerability to hypothetical (future) hazard events but to examine the dynamic changes in the very patterns of vulnerability, as they change along with wider socioeconomic, political, cultural and institutional transformation which significantly alters the causal relations behind the configuration of vulnerability. This aspect tends to be forgotten in the currently burgeoning number of publications on vulnerability. Particularly in the context of global climate change, assessment studies that claim to explore future risk conditions tend to apply an imbalanced perspective as they mostly combine future (projected) changes in the domain of the natural hazard while, in terms of the exposed and vulnerable elements, current socioeconomic, political or cultural characteristics are often left unchanged or are extrapolated in simplistic terms without assessing possible structural changes in detail (cf. Garschagen and Kraas 2010). In other words, these studies most often produce temporally distorted risk equations by combining future hazard conditions with the current vulnerability patterns. Prime examples in the context of climate change and natural hazards are assessments which combine projected sea level rise scenarios (e.g. for the year 2100) with current distributions of population and physical infrastructure (e.g. port cities and their current populations densities). First attempts have been made to improve the analysis of future vulnerability pathways, notably through integrating quantitative modeling on socio-economic development (i.e. integrated assessment modeling) with the participatory development of qualitative vulnerability scenarios (e.g. Tschakert and Dietrich 2010; Biggs et al. 2007; Kriegler et al. 2012; O’Neill et al. 2012; van Vuuren et al. 2012). The assessment of likely future vulnerability pathways also constitutes an element of the research presented here (cf. chapter 3). However, this is a young field that has just emerged in the very recent years. Hence, a lot of work still needs to be done, leaving ample room for conceptual and methodological innovation in the future. As Bude (1988) reminds us “theoretically interesting insights are only possible if the researcher is brave enough to leave the comfort zone of long-established methods and to break new ground” (cited in Heinze 1995: 14, own translation). Particularly the question whether and how qualitative scenarios for future vulnerability pathways can be developed and validated – apart from the afore-mentioned modeling of quantitative indicators – remains a challenge that has just been started to be uncovered. In conclusion, the assessment of vulnerability (in this study and beyond) can be considered to face a two-fold epistemological challenge in that not only hypothetical vulnerability towards future hazards needs to be captured but also the dynamic changes within vulnerability itself. The research layout presented here addresses both of these aspects. It seeks innovative ways to tackle the conundrum of examining forward-looking vulnerability conditions without being able to test the

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identified vulnerability patterns along past disaster data (cf. 5). The study therewith responds to Dombrowsky’s (1995) plea for an amended portfolio of knowledge generation in risk science. Promoting a better acceptance of new scientific paradigms he argued that “[l]ogically, we know that knowledge in advance is impossible. Future modalities (possibilities) are only likely. […] Thus the histographic logic of facts has to be supplemented with a logic of probability” (p. 249). 2.1.1.4. Interim synthesis: reframing the landscape in risk and vulnerability research The above review of the paradigms, conceptual representations and assessment approaches to vulnerability has revealed that while main conceptions seem to have experienced a consolidation (e.g. on the co-production of risk through hazards and vulnerability), there is also an increasing diversity within vulnerability research. This comprises not only different approaches from natural science and social science approaches but particularly from within the latter. Figure 2.5 synthesizes and structures the epistemic elements of interest to the different schools and disciplines discussed earlier. The illustration allows in particular identifying the large block of hazard research (on the left) which is increasingly complemented by natural science perspectives on climate change-induced shifts in hazard patters. In contrast, the large domain on social science-based research on human and social vulnerability can be discerned (on the right side). Integrative risk approaches (often conducted in transdisciplinary research projects) would fall into the interface of both fields, indicated by the circle in the middle. The figure guides through the hierarchy of questions that need to be posed in risk and vulnerability research. Starting from the questions ‘vulnerability to what?’ and ‘vulnerability of what?’ (Bohle 2008) vulnerability assessments need to move into the three sub-components of the causal fabric of vulnerability. That is, the first question that needs to be asked addresses the exposure to existent or potential hazards. If elements are found to be exposed, the question of susceptibility emerges. If these elements are then found to be exposed and susceptible, the question of coping capacities needs to be asked (for detailed definitions of these terms see Table 3.1 in chapter 3.2). This hierarchy of questions also provides the structure for the empirical analysis of household level vulnerability in Can Tho City (cf. 6.2). Interestingly, the engagement with dynamic trends – also future-oriented – in vulnerability patterns is to date much less considered and advanced than its counterpart in the natural science sphere, i.e. the modeling of future hazard trends due to climate change. This gap has been explained in more detail in the above section (cf. 2.1.1.3) and elsewhere (cf. Garschagen and Kraas 2010). It provides one of the major rationales driving the study presented here. In addition, the right part of the figure hints at another emerging research field related to vulnerability and adaptation – which is, however, not of key concern within this study. That is the

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acknowledgement that in many contexts – especially in most exposed or resourcestarved countries – perfect adaptation to the projected climate change hazards will probably not be possible, leading to residual loss and damage which cannot be avoided but which need to be addressed scientifically and politically as it poses questions around the compensation and redistribution of recovery resources from global to local scales (cf. Warner et al. 2012).

Figure 2.5: Epistemic landscape of risk perspectives related to human vulnerability and natural hazards, own draft, partly inspired by Bohle (2008b: 108)

Zooming-in on the vulnerability realm of the above figure, it is argued here that the different vulnerability schools considered in the earlier-provided review increasingly intermingle, i.e. the school focusing on vulnerability in the context of development, disaster risk and global climate change (cf. 2.1.1.2). This can be read as a positive sign, since the schools have – at least in large parts – responded to the earlier calls for stronger integration and cross-consideration of the overlapping risk factors. At the same time, the increasing hybridization of research strands poses the question whether a shift in the epistemological grouping of vulnerability approaches would be advisable. Cutting across all three fields (development, disaster risk and climate change) three distinct approaches to vulnerability can be differentiated, interpreting vulnerability primarily as (1) outcome, (2) agency or (3) structure. Table 2.1 contrasts the three different interpretations, their main focus and interest, their respective epistemological approaches and their shortcomings and blind-spots. Obviously, the table represents archetypes while real vulnerability studies published in the literature in many cases feature a certain mixture. However, the above review suggests that the vast majority of published accounts have a very clear emphasis and rooting in one or the other of these three types. Therefore, it is argued here that the below classification along the three different interpretations and their respective scientific approaches provides a much more helpful grouping of vulnerability approaches as it is based not on artificial

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umbrellas but on the actual interpretation that the respective vulnerability studies themselves apply and that can be observed in the conceptual underpinnings and methods they use. Vulnerability interpretation

Main focus and interest

Epistemological approach

Shortcomings and blind spots

Vulnerability as outcome

Interested in particular in the assessment and quantification of vulnerability outcomes in terms of vulnerable people, assets, regions, sectors or other entities.

Often measured in terms of past hazard impacts or estimated through modeling methods.

Tends to neglect the processes that generate vulnerability and the influence and diversity of human response mechanisms. Primary focus often on exposure while susceptibility and coping capacity tend to be underemphasized.

Vulnerability as agency

Interested in the action vulnerable people take to deal with their vulnerability. In other words, focusing on the agency that emerges out of vulnerability.

Often guided by social theories of action. Largely drawing on qualitative methods of the social sciences, often followed by standardized quantitative assessments.

Often underemphasizing the structural factors in social, economic and political systems which produce and re-produce human vulnerability in the first place.

Vulnerability as structure

Interested in the structures and institutional arrangements in social, economic and political spheres that place people in vulnerable conditions.

Often guided by theoretical schools of political ecology, political economy and entitlements. Drawing on a wide range of methods from economics over political sciences to human geography and anthropology.

Often drawing on (implicitly) deterministic perspectives through overemphasizing structural conditions and undervaluing the role of actors’ agency and choices for (a) generating vulnerability and (b) responding to it through coping and adaptation.

Table 2.1: Three varying interpretations of vulnerability as outcome, agency or structure, own draft based on the review provided above

The table illustrates in particular the differences between approaches that emphasize on actors’ agency vs. the larger structure shaping vulnerability (and the potential for its reduction). The difference between those interpretations and the question how the resulting gaps can be overcome will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3, embedding the discussion in the wider context of structuration theory. Particularly the framing on agency, further, leads over to questions whether and how actors adapt to risky conditions in order to reduce or compensate their vulnerability. Therefore, adaptation concepts will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

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2.1.2. Adaptation and adaptive capacity “While the questions are becoming more apparent about what adaptation is, how it can be stimulated, and what its limits are, the answers mostly remain unclear.” (Schipper and Burton 2009: 2)

2.1.2.1. Epistemic landscapes of adaptation discourses Scientific debates revolving around adaptation have over the recent years gained significant prominence, particularly in the context of environmental and climatic change, and are increasingly applied in conjunction with vulnerability concepts. Yet, the terminology builds heavily on earlier adaptation concepts which have played a major role in previous scientific discourses, especially in the natural sciences, notably biology. A critical reflection on these roots, their connotations and potential pitfalls appears an essential step before adopting adaptation terminology and concepts into the research framework for the study presented here (cf. 3.2). Since the arrival of evolution theories (notably Darwinian thinking) in the 19th century, adaptation has been used as the key concept to explain adjustments to (changes in) the natural environment that allow for the survival and reproduction of organisms (Smit and Wandel 2006; Simonet 2010). Adaptation can in this context refer to different units or scales, ranging from individual organisms to populations of species or entire ecosystems (Krimbas 2004). Throughout the 20th century, adaptation in the original Darwinian sense has been amended and challenged by scientific innovation in, for example, the fields of genetics, cybernetics and ecological organization. Moving to more integrated perspectives, research since the 1970s increasingly focused on self-organization, resilience, system complexity, stability and instability in ecosystems (e.g. Holling 1973, compare also chapter 2.1.3). However, the general epistemic focus remained on the adjustment of living beings to the external conditions, allowing for survival and reproduction (Simonet 2010). In the social sciences, the term adaptation has been debated much more controversially (cf. Bargatzky 1984). This is because the consideration of cultural adaptation, besides the biological one, not only makes the analytical landscape more complex but is fraught with diverging normative underpinnings. On the one hand, adaptation terminology has for decades been loosely used in different theoretical schools such as functionalism, human ecology or ecological economics and the related scientific discipline including cultural anthropology8 but also cultural 8

The explicit application of the term adaptation to human systems can be traced in particular to the anthropologist Julian Steward who argued in the mid-twentieth century that the environment and the available technology jointly determine the basic form of adaptation of a human group, which in turns shapes the rest of the culture (Peoples and Bailey 2000: 59). Even though being criticised for his techno-environmental determinism and cultural evolutionist thinking, Steward’s work inspired much of the following work on cultural adaptation and

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geography (see for a more detailed review, for example, Smithers and Smit 1997: 133 et sequ.). On the other hand, however, many social scientists have long since called for avoiding the term due to its disputed or negative connotations (Schipper and Burton 2009: 1). One of the major concerns has been that adaptation can be, and in fact has often been, interpreted to mean that allegedly inferior or ‘undeveloped’ social groups should follow the development path of superior other groups who are thought to have been adapting more successfully (Peoples and Bailey 2000) – an aspect which bears great relevance in the contested modernization and development debate currently being negotiated in Vietnam (cf. 4; 6). In addition, the implication of an environmental determinism with respect to the cultural adaptation and human behavior has been widely criticized (Simonet 2010). In his seminal paper on the ‘Culture, environment, and the ills of adaptationism’, Bargatzky critiques the predominant view which holds that the evolution of socio-cultural systems can to a large extent be explained as a process of adaptation to external environmental stimuli. He argues that “this ‘adaptationist model’ is inadequate for the explanation of phenomena such as differentiation, complexity, negentropy, and improbable states” (Bargatzky 1984: 413). Along a similar line of thought, Denevan (1983) argues that some cultural ecologists have failed to thoroughly focus on the question why specific options for adaptation are chosen out of the different possible alternatives. Neglecting these aspects implies the risk of becoming trapped in a neo-environmental-determinism in adaption studies (p. 405). Focusing on differences in semantics and their profound implications on the deeper meanings they carry, Ribot (2011) transfers these concerns into current climate change adaptation debates, bearing great relevance for the Vietnamese context. He argues that the recent shift from focusing on ‘vulnerability reduction’ to ‘adaptation’ in the literature and in international climate negotiations can be delusive. According to his observation, adaptation analysis tends to put less emphasis on the internal factors within social systems that cause vulnerabilities of particular group, e.g. exclusion, social stratification, or lack of entitlements. The use of the term adaptation – so he argues – places the generation of risks within the (natural) hazard rather than the society itself, therewith shifting the focus from causality to response. This shift is argued to promote “superficial palliative responses” (p. 1160) in adaptation debates and to imply connotations of social Darwinism in the sense that those who are not successful in adapting are not fit enough. Being cognizant of these roots and their pitfalls is necessary for advancing adaptation discourses and for increasing the thematic and analytic guidance they can provide for this study. However, there has been considerable work to counterbalance the above concerns by advancing conceptual framings of adaptation (cf. 2.1.2.2). Most centrally, there is wide recognition in the more recent literature that human adaptation is not determined solely by the environmental conditions but provided a basis from which many theoretical schools such as human ecology adopted, advanced, and re-shaped adaptation concepts.

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depends on the choices people make and on the options they have available – both being dynamically influenced by socio-economic transformation as it can be currently observed to take place in countries like Vietnam. Choices in turn are shaped by institutional and cultural mindsets, taking effect, for example, on risk perception and the evaluation and prioritization of different adaptation options. In addition, there is – particularly with the maturing debate around climate change adaptation – increasing recognition of the links between vulnerability and adaptation and of the fact that institutional framework parameters often lead to repression and marginalization of those in need of adaptation (Smit and Wandel 2006). In other words, most of the critical adaptation literature today has moved away from blaming those groups responsible for the failure in adaptation or the lack of adaptation resources – as Ribot (2011) suggest (see above). The heated debate around re-distribution in adaptation funding within the international climate negotiations is a prominent example of how the responsibility for adaptation is increasingly seen in the context of the larger political economy that produces vulnerabilities and restrictions in adaptive capacity. Adaptation is therefore still considered a useful concept for the study presented here, as long as the above illustrated concerns are taken seriously. The following section will elaborate in more detail on the recent advancements in terms of adaptation concepts, helping to address the above illustrated pitfalls and to respond to the specific needs in social science research – as the case here. Nevertheless, the following paragraphs will also show that significant gaps remain within the current adaptation literature which are being tackled throughout this study. 2.1.2.2. Adaptation concepts and definitions A large number of definitions and concepts for adaptation have been suggested in the literature, particularly in the context of climate change. It is impossible to reflect here on all of these contributions. The following paragraphs, therefore, set out to echo the most influential ones and to reflect on their usefulness for the research concept of this work (cf. 3). This review will show that in contrast to vulnerability approaches with their numerous conceptual frameworks and models (cf. 2.1.1.2), far less attempts have been made to capture in a concise and conceptually appealing way the causal structures and processes that constitute and describe the fabric of adaptation. Rather, the literature on adaptation represents more or less scattered accounts on normative or analytic criteria and principles of different adaptation modes and their governance implications. This observation mirrors the fact that the landscape of adaptation science can be described far less in terms of coherent schools of thought, which makes it different from the vulnerability literature. Chapter 2.2 explores these relations in more detail and chapter 3 sets out to provide a conceptually coherent bridge between adaptation, risk and vulnerability thinking – an aspect which remains underdeveloped in the current body of scholarship but is greatly needed for the study presented here.

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While the adaptation of humans to their physical environment and its changes is still a central element in many of the social science related adaptation writings, Denevan and others long since have called for considering cultural adaptation in a broader sense as the “process of change in response to a change in the physical environment or a change in the internal stimuli, such as demography, economics, and organization” (Denevan 1983: 401). This perspective is of great relevance for the context of the dynamics transformations currently taking place in Vietnam. It has also been argued that adaptation should not only be understood as a response to change. Rather, it can also mean that humans optimize earlier modes of adaptation under static surrounding conditions (i.e. in the absence of change in the natural or anthropogenic environment), thereby aiming to enhance their quality of life or to exploit perceived opportunities (Smithers and Smit 1997: 133). This aspect is of key relevance for Vietnam where many people now have increasing resources at hand to optimize their adaptation. This understanding also advances the often cited, yet problematic, framing of Yohe and Tol (2002). They argue for a nested concept where adaptation is initiated when hazards exceed the existing coping range. However, such a narrow and deterministic interpretation fails to acknowledge that adaptation can also take place where the old modes of coping would in general still be functional but where other modes are preferable and become possible, for example, through an increase in available resources. Gallopín therefore reminds us that adaptation in the human realm “goes far beyond ‘being able to live and reproduce’; it includes the viability of social and economic activities, and the quality of human life” (Gallopín 2006: 300). Furthermore adaptation can mean extending the range of natural or anthropological environments which an individual or system is adapted to (Gallopín 2006: 300), i.e. if the adaptive unit shifts from its original environment to a new environment, potentially without any changes occurring in each of the respective environments (e.g. in the case of resettlement or migration). Importantly, in contrast to animals or other organisms, humans can not only adapt reactively to changes and perturbations but have the ability to plan and manage adaptation pro-actively, deploying, for example, risk evaluations or trend assessments regarding future changes (Adger et al. 2005: 77; Smithers and Smit 1997: 133). Adaptation can, hence, happen anticipatory or reactively and can be rather spontaneous or planned (Frankhauser et al. 1999: 69; Adger et al. 2005: 77; Smit et al. 2000: 228; Smithers and Smit 1997: 133). Smit et al. (2000: 225), for example, frame adaptation in the context of climate change as “adjustments in ecological-socio-economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli, their effects and impacts”. The empirical analysis will show that all of these types are of importance in the Vietnamese context examined here but that their relationships and conditionalities are not as clear-cut as often assumed in the theoretical literature. Moreover, the term adaptation has been used to refer to the process, the action and/or the outcome in system or human communities (Smit and Wandel 2006). In this context it has been also been argued that adaptation is too often conceived as a linear process towards a determinate endpoint of ‘being adapted’. Such view-

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points implicitly assume that once the allegedly appropriate adaptation options (often considered technological in nature) are identified and implemented, the human system is shielded against the impacts of changes in its environment (Brooks and Grist 2008; Tschakert and Dietrich 2010; Pelling et al. 2008). Yet, such a conception of adaptation underemphasizes its process character including the need for iterative learning and adjustment as new information on surrounding conditions is generated (or becomes available), risks and preferences are reevaluated, new adaptation options are developed, or decision making modes change (Tschakert and Dietrich 2010: 2). Shifting the focus to this process notion of adaptation, “the goal” can be summarized as “not to be well adapted but to adapt well” (Downing, unpublished manuscript quoted in Tschakert and Dietrich 2010: 2). Linked hereto, adaptation has been described as mostly implying some sort of modification in the very configuration of the adapting system. In other words, adaptation is often thought to lead to changes in the functional and causal principals that shape and drive the system (e.g. Kasperson et al. 2005; Pohl 2008; Gallopín 2006). This notion plays a major role in the conceptual framework of this study, particularly related to the institutional templates for risk governance (cf. chapter 3 and 7). Yet, it is not always the case that such qualitative alterations in the system’s mode of functioning are considered necessary. There might also be cases, where adaptation can simply mean quantitative shifts. For example, increasing the height of existing dykes can be considered a mechanism to adapt to rising storm surge activity, but it leaves the general logic of the system unchanged. Linking adaptation to the above described concept of vulnerability, Pielke (1998) describes adaptation as “adjustments in individual groups and institutional behavior in order to reduce society’s vulnerability” (p. 159). Similarly, Ribot (2011) notes that the “terms adaption and vulnerability can be compatibly linked through the concept of risk. One is focused on generation of risk and the other on response to it” (p. 1161). Connecting adaptation conceptually to vulnerability in this way is the underlying idea also for the work presented here. However, it can be critically questioned whether the relationship between vulnerability and adaptation is as clear-cut as the two above cited authors suggest. The conceptual model developed here, therefore, critically asks for the detailed causal structures connecting both domains, thereby, emphasizing in particular the potential for inherent conflicts and contradictions (cf. 3.2). Despite all these properties of adaptation, it is of central importance to acknowledge and review the limits and barriers of adaptation. Eriksen et al. (2011) point out that not every adaptation is necessarily a positive one. Trade-offs and potentially negative outcomes over space and time can occur and have to be recognized and evaluated against the background of differing values and interests of affected population groups. Research has shown that first-order adaptation solutions to environmental hazards (e.g. dyke systems or resettlement programmes) often lead to negative livelihood outcomes among the affected population, hence

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necessitating ‘second-order adaptation’ measures (cf. Birkmann 2011). In addition, it has been argued that in many cases proposed adaptation measures can in combination imply contradictions and conflicts. Adapting to increasing flood hazards, for example, is often suggested to necessitate an upgrading of structural measures such as dyke systems – to stay with the previous example. Yet, on the other hand, adaptation calls for keeping flexibility in urban spatial planning and governance modes in order to allow for responding to new adaptation needs in the future. Yet, the long-term physical persistence and path dependencies implied by the structural measures may run counter to the intention of maintaining flexibility. Such conflicts remain insufficiently addressed in the literature and are high up on the agenda of open questions that need to be considered in the empirical analysis presented here (cf. 6). Cautioning against the notion of unlimited adaptation opportunities, Adger et al. (2009a) show for the context of climate change that, next to financial and physical limits, considerable social limits to adaptation can exist that are contingent on culture, particularly on ethics, knowledge and risk attitudes. Particularly with respect to the local level, Few (2003) cautions that “it is important to not overromanticize indigenous capacities” (p. 55). Such limits deserved increased consideration in the literature in order to link the conceptual discourses – which often revolve around the question what would, could and should be possible in terms of adaptation – to the actual reality which is usually much more messy and obfuscated by adaptation barriers and conflicts. Also questions of scale and stratified adaptation outcomes need to move into the forefront when analyzing adaptation in social systems. Individuals or system components are necessarily integrated and interlinked in cultural, social, economic, and political domains. Thus, the proposed set of three central questions for exploring anatomies of adaptation – adapt to what?; who or what adapts?; how does adaptation occur? (Smit et al. 1999, 2000) – have to be expanded. Consideration also needs to be given to questions such as: Who benefits how from adaptation in integrated social systems? In how far do the capacities to adapt differ among the members of a social system? Might there be secondary effects in integrated human systems across different groups of actors? How free are single actors (or groups of actors) within integrated systems to choose their individually preferred adaptation options? Such questions are of central importance to the research presented here (cf. 3, 5) and are closely related to the concept of adaptive capacity. 2.1.2.3. Adaptive capacity The above discourse on adaptation leads to the questions which capacities individual actors, institutionalized groups of actors, or formal organizations have to adapt. Along the same line, it urges the question which variations can be observed between different actors, sectors or regions and how those differences can be explained. These questions are of central interest in the research presented here and

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they relate to the concept of adaptive capacity which enjoys increasing popularity. A considerable number of definitions for adaptive capacity have been suggested in the literature (e.g. Gupta et al. 2010; IPCC 2007b). Drawing on these contributions, adaptive capacity is in general terms defined here as the ability of actors and institutions in social-ecological systems (1) to maintain or improve their condition in the face of changes in their natural, social, economic and political environments and/or (2) to improve their condition in relation to these environments, even if the latter do not change, and/or (3) to extend the range of environments to which they set out to adapt (partly adopted from Gallopín 2006: 300). Depending on the context, adaptive capacity has a wide range of determinants. Studies at the household or community level often draw on the sustainable livelihoods framework for structuring the analysis, particularly along the five capital types, i.e. physical, financial, human, social and environmental capital (cf. 2.1.1). This link is supported conceptually by the fact that the quality of the respective livelihoods is one of the main determinants of adaptive capacity as it is the livelihood capital portfolio from which the resources and capabilities for adaptation need to be accrued. Therefore, also the study presented here links adaptive capacity closely to livelihood capitals. Yet, it needs to be remembered that adaptive capacity is not fully congruent with these capitals stocks. Within one and the same livelihood the adaptive capacity might differ with respect to different hazards. In addition, adaptive capacity can be supported externally with resources which are linked specifically to the purpose of adaptation and can hence not be used for the general livelihood generation. Hence, also the different contributions of internally influenced and externally determined factors of adaptive capacity have to be considered in the assessment. Further, Yohe and Tol (2002) as well as Gupta et al. (2010) summarize the key factors for adaptive capacity addressed in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, also considering adaptive capacities in other institutions beyond the household. These include the patterns of risk spreading in a given system or the reliability of state organizations. In sum, these factors have much in common with the factors commonly discussed under the heading of risk and adaptation governance, which will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 2.5. Haddad (2005) finds a list of factors for so-called generic adaptive capacity in the context of climate change, i.e. those capacities that increase the potential for adaptation across the range of specific adaptation solutions. In his eyes, these factors include wealth, technology, education, information, skills, infrastructure, access to resources, and management capabilities (p. 166). Handmer (2003) as well as Brooks et al. (2005) argue that fostering such generic capacities can be considered a no-regret solution (see also Smith et al. 1996). In other words, the aspects usually considered under the label of ‘generic capacities’ have much in common with the factors commonly discussed in the context of sustainable development more generally. This linkage is therefore of great relevance in the current transformation process in Vietnam (cf. 6 and 7). Building codes, for instance, which specifically target the reduction of sensitivity and exposure towards floods or

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earthquakes are more likely to be enforced effectively if corruption is tackled which is useful in itself irrespective of any climate change consideration (Brooks et al. 2005: 153). However, one can critically ask in how far emphasis on these generic adaptive capacities is sufficient or whether and under which conditions other, more specific, capacities play an essential role for enabling adaptation processes. This is because adaptation to natural hazards may yield additional requirements which are not part of the conventional development agenda, including, for example, specific disaster management solutions. This question is often forgotten or handled rather vaguely in the current literature. Therefore, the study presented here aims to explore both generic and specific capacities needed for adaptation, focusing in particular on their relations and conditions. Focusing on the formation and activation of adaptive capacity in social groups, the concept of social capital has been receiving increased attention lately, both in conceptual and empirical terms. Emphasizing the importance of collective action in adaptation, social capital can be considered as the “norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 226) or more precisely as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam 1995: 664-665). With regards to other livelihood assets, social capital can therefore be understood as a social resources that enables access to resources or livelihood capitals which would not be available without the support of others (Braun and Aßheuer 2011: 779; see also Portes and Landolt 2000; Portes 1998). Yet, while the idea that social interaction “oils the wheel of collective action” for adaptation is intuitively appealing (Adger 2003: 391), the assumption that more social interaction generally leads to more beneficial outcomes for individuals or groups has been questioned depending on the type of interaction. Economic cartels, political clans or corrupt bureaucracies, for example, may be characterized by a high degree of social capital. Yet, they can easily have negative influence on adaptive capacity through creating, for instance, social exclusion or unequal access to resources (Adger 2003) – particularly when applying a Foucaudian perspective that frames power as being relational in nature (c.f. Pelling and High 2005). This critique is of high relevance to the context of Vietnam’s changing political economy (cf. 4) where the role of social capital and its influence to enable or restrict adaptive capacity is highly contested and insufficiently understood to date. Pelling and High (2005) as well as Fine (2001) hence argue that such controversial aspects need to be considered much more thoroughly when engaging with social capital in adaptive capacity. They argue that the debate so far rather tends to treat social capital uncritically and insufficiently conceptualized as some sort of panacea. Of particular interest for the context of transforming countries like Vietnam is the link between the concept of social capital (cf. 2.1.2.3) and the quality of governmental risk reduction and adaptation action. Adger (2003) differentiates three interpretations of this link: The first frames social capital as a phenomenon beyond the reaches of the state. In this view, social capital is often considered a sub-

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stitute for the insufficient or non-existent involvement of the state in the provision of public goods and services. In contrast, other schools attempt to bridge between state and non-state spheres. Arising from this perspective are questions that address, for example, the synergies but also conflicts between state and non-state adaptation measures and the social capital that is needed to access state support. The latter perspective is of great relevance for the case study presented here particularly when adding a dynamic perspective to it, i.e. asking how the role of the state in contributing to adaptive capacity has changed – and will change – under conditions of transformation. Despite these conceptual considerations, the factors shaping adaptive capacity under specific context conditions and for specific population groups are insufficiently understood – providing much of the inspiration for the study presented here. This current lack results, firstly, from the fact that the scientific assessment of adaptive capacity is a relatively new field. Secondly, and more importantly, there are a number of epistemological and methodological difficulties with regards to assessing and validating adaptive capacity. These will be elaborated in more detail in the following section. 2.1.2.4. Assessing adaptive capacity and adaptation It becomes clear from the above points that the assessment of adaptive capacity is as much necessary for making the concept meaningful analytically and politically as it is fraught with difficulties and pitfalls. Assessments, like the one presented here, need to consider entities at different scales (from global to local) which may include single actors, groups of actors, institutions, organizations, or networks of institutions and actors such as economic sectors or political and administrative entities. In addition, the design of the assessment critically depends on the question which condition the adapting entity sets out to adapt to (i.e. adaptation to what sort of change?; adaptation to which type of (multiple) hazards or stress?; adaptation as optimization with regards to which stable conditions? etc.). The assessment further needs to be sensitive to different adaptation modes (e.g. anticipatory vs. responsive, instantaneous vs. cumulative, autonomous vs. centrally planned, governmental vs. non-governmental, formal vs. informal etc.). Based on these considerations, the assessment of adaptive capacity is understood here as a two-tier process. In the first step, the factors influencing adaptive capacity in the specific context need to be identified and qualified. In the second step, ways for measuring or assessing these variables either directly or through proxy indicators need to be found. An additional challenge occurs when the goal of assessment is to compare the level of adaptive capacity amongst different adapting entities or regions. In those cases, the assessment methodology has to make the units and scales of adaptive capacity comparable which can be difficult given the context-specific nature of adaptive capacity, as emphasized above. On top of these challenges, a number of further, more subtle, difficulties with respect to assessing adaptive capacity have been described in the literature, of

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which the most relevant ones for the here presented context shall briefly be reflected on. Engle notes that adaptive capacity is “difficult to gauge because of its latent nature, meaning that researchers often struggle to measure it until after its realization or mobilization within a system” (2011: 653). Yet, at the same time the assessment of this latent capacity is at the core of interest for both scientific analysis as well as policy advice (cf. 2.1.2.4). Complicating the adaptation related assessments even further, Meze-Hausken (2008) stresses that people affected by similar hazards, changes or impacts may have different thresholds until they react or adapt. In addition, they do not necessarily adapt in the same way because the same hazard or stress may be perceived and judged differently by different individuals or institutions. Perceived thresholds of the same actor can also change over time as risk evaluation and other priorities change. One might suspect that this can be the case in Vietnam where socio-economic transformation can be assumed to have significant influence on changes in livelihood priorities and related risk perceptions. Therefore, subjective and internal thresholds need to be integrated into the assessment of adaptation and adaptive capacity in order to complement the currently predominant focus on external, often bio-physical, thresholds. Adger et al. (2009b) even argue that two types of thresholds need to be considered in the assessment of adaptive capacity, first, the threshold when adaptation first appears and, second, the threshold beyond which adaption ceases to be effective in reducing vulnerability (p. 6). However, apart from the conceptual description, the problems around assessing these thresholds are insufficiently addressed in the current literature, which is why the opportunities and limits of their measurement are of key concern in the empirical analysis presented here (cf. 6.2; 7). Acknowledging that the appraisal of adaptive capacity is a difficult task given the lack of sufficient yardsticks, Carpenter and Brock (2008) suggest to assess adaptive capacity by contrasting it with the opposite condition, i.e. with traps for adaptive capacity. They argue that there can be rigidity traps for social-ecological systems, meaning that institutions in these systems become self-reinforcing thereby preventing the necessary flexibility needed for adaptation. On the other hand, there are also potential poverty traps meaning that institutions or people cannot channel ideas and resources in a way to bring about change (Carpenter and Brock 2008; see also Holling 2001). This idea offers some interesting conceptual stimulus for the analysis presented here (cf. 3). Yohe and Tol (2002) as well as Tol and Yohe (2007) remind us to that the weakest link phenomenon needs to be kept in mind and tested when assessing adaptive capacity. The weakest link hypothesis suggests that “a significant weakness of any singly critical component of a system’s capacity to cope with the manifestation of an external stress, whether it worked to undermine the strength of a single element in the list of determinants or undercut the strengths of multiple determinants on such a list, would be the limiting factor of that system’s ability to adapt” (Tol and Yohe 2007: 219). This hypothesis challenges the idea that factors determining adaptive capacity can be substituted by other factors if necessary. Contrasting these two assumptions (weakest link vs. possibility of substitution)

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and asking which one is true under which conditions is, hence, of the great relevance for assessing adaptive capacity and for guiding its management. Other authors suggest that the links between actual adaptation action and adaptive capacity are much more complex than argued in much of the mainstream literature which focuses mainly on resource endowments and socio-economicpolitical factors. Increased attention is needed on the perceived risks, opportunities and own capacities in order to examine the (potential gap) between adaptive capacity and actual adaption and the influence on individual cognition for taking adaptation decisions (Blennow and Persson 2009; Burch and Robinson 2007). All the above considerations underscore that while a lot of literature has been published on adaptation, the practical assessment of adaptive capacity is far less advanced and many epistemological and methodological questions still remain open. The study presented here aims at reconciling the scattered dimensions and sets out to respond to the illustrated shortcomings through developing a more integrated theoretical framing (cf. 3; 7) that is informed by the first-hand empirical research in Vietnam (cf. 6). 2.1.3. Resilience in coupled social ecological systems “I am not afraid of storms, for I am learning how to sail my ship.” Louisa May Alcott

2.1.3.1. Epistemic evolution of resilience discourses Over recent years, resilience has become a key term in the study of humanenvironment interactions with wide-spread and rapidly increasing application not only in the scientific literature (cf. Janssen et al. 2006; Janssen 2007) but also in the language of practitioners and policy makers (cf. Brand and Jax 2007). The term covers a wide range of ideas and concepts for exploring the dynamics in ecological and/or social systems, particularly with regards to the questions how such systems navigate perturbations and change. Resilience thinking therefore bears a high relevance for the research context of this study. Yet, what is often lacking – particularly in the wide-spread application of resilience terminology in the Vietnamese context (see Garschagen 2013 for more detailed review) – is a thorough reflection of the conceptual roots and the (hidden) normative as well as analytic implications they yield for research epistemologies and policy advice. The following paragraphs therefore set out to review the epistemic evolution of resilience theory and to critically reflect on its applicability and usefulness in the specific research context presented here. Resilience theory is rooted in different scientific lineages and has been adopted and modified by a variety of epistemic schools, each with their own objectives, approaches, ontologies and methodologies. A comprehensive review within the

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European emBRACE-Project, for example, differentiates five main schools: (1) ecological and social-ecological resilience; (2) psychological resilience; (3) critical infrastructure resilience; (4) organizational and institutional resilience; (5) community resilience (cf. Birkmann et al. 2012a). Particularly schools 1, 4 and 5 are of interest here, with 1 being the most influential school in terms of shaping innovative concepts and terminology that have then travelled into schools 3, 4 and 5. Probably the most influential contributions in that context have emerged from a group of scientists around the Resilience Alliance. Their interpretation largely originates from an ecological perspective – most notably the work by Holling (1973; 1986) – which originally focused on exploring the dynamics of ecosystems related to disturbance and change. One of the most important theoretical innovations of the time – fuelled by empirical studies – was that in contrast to earlier postulations, ecosystems do not necessarily move towards a teleological state of a single equilibrium or climax. Rather, they are characterized by the fact that they are constantly in flux, are instable and are shaped by the interplay between disturbance, collapse and reorganizations, implying that the possibility of multiple states of stability. Importantly for the analysis presented here, the focus has later been increasingly expanded to include the interaction of ecological and social domains, concentrating especially on the management and (self-) regulation of socalled coupled social-ecological systems, i.e. integrated systems in which humans are closely linked with their ecological environmental through feedback relations around, for example, ecosystem services, resource extraction or hazard intensification (Holling 1986; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes et al. 2003). Even more relevant for the context of this study, there has recently been an intensive cross-fertilization between (a) the original resilience theory originating from ecology and resource management studies and (b) the risk, vulnerability and adaptation thinking, particularly in the context of natural hazards and climate change (e.g. Masten & Obradovic 2008; Janssen et al. 2006; Turner et al. 2003; Renaud et al. 2010; Adger 2000a; Smit and Wandel 2006; Bohle 2008b; Gunderson 2010; Kuhlicke 2013; Hutter 2013). The ecological connotation of resilience has therein experienced a gradual expansion. Especially the concept of ‘social resilience’ is increasingly used when exploring how social actors deal with – or ought to deal with – stress and shocks to prevent or overcome crises situations, particularly – but not exclusively – under conditions of climate change (e.g. Sivell et al. 2008; Tompkins and Adger 2004; Adger 2000a; Adger & Vincent 2005; Schipper & Burton 2009). In addition, an increasing number of authors have lately been shifting the strong rural focus of resilience research into more urban discourses for exploring adaptation and human-environment interactions in and beyond cities – contributing much of the inspiration for the work presented here (e.g. IIED 2009; Prasad et al. 2009; Bohle and Warner 2008; Pelling 2003; Moser and Satterthwaite 2008; Wallace and Wallace 2008; Butsch et al. 2009). However, resilience and its use in the context of risk management, vulnerability and adaptation can also be critically questioned for a couple of reasons. First, resilience has been used in so many different ways, that there is a considerable

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conceptual ambiguity to the point that different resilience interpretations can be contradictory, even irreconcilable (see in detail 2.2). The result is not only conceptual confusion but also a barrier to operationalizing and assessing resilience coherently, in other words, to make it useful and applicable scientifically and politically (see 2.1.3.3; Brand and Jax 2007). Second, resilience thinking has been criticized for remaining too strongly within the boundaries of natural science perspectives which potentially undermines the achievements of development and vulnerability research (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). This is because resilience theory tends to neglect that risk is created by social, economic and political conditions and it subsumes politics and economics into a realm that depoliticizes the “causal processes inherent in putting people at risk” (p. 633; see in more detail chapter 2.2.1). For those reasons and the existing ambiguity with resilience language, the conceptual terminology for this thesis is primarily provided by vulnerability and adaptation concepts; and the resilience lexicon is not the main basis for the framework developed in chapter 3. However, it is argued here that resilience nevertheless contributes important epistemic innovations and enriches the conceptual foundations of this study. 2.1.3.2. Resilience concepts and definitions Given the above-mentioned diversity in resilience lineages, it has become increasingly difficult to provide a common definition of resilience (Gallopín 2006; Folke 2006; Carpenter and Brock 2008). As it will be shown, this diversity bears significant implications for the applicability and perceived usefulness of resilience concepts for this study. Perhaps the most widely cited definition of resilience originates from a group of scientists around the Resilience Alliance where resilience is defined as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks.” (Walker et al. 2004). Following this school, resilience is a property of a system or its actors and has three defining characteristics (Berkes et al. 2003; Folke 2006): (1) the ability to maintain important system functions despite hazardous disturbances and stress; (2) the capacity to recover from shocks or crises; and (3) the ability to reorganize or adjust structures and processes to changing conditions. It has been noted that many previous publications, particularly in the field of ecology but also in civil engineering and disaster risk management, have emphasized on the first part of this definition, i.e. the ability of a system to withstand shocks (in the sense of resistance, buffer-capacity and functional redundancy) or the efficiency and effectiveness of a system to recover from shocks (in the sense of bouncing back) (Folke 2006). However, in a broader understanding resilience is more recently also argued to imply self-organization, dynamic adaptive capacity

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and learning (Smit and Wandel 2006; Folke 2006) – hence moving the concept closer to adaptation and adaptive capacity. Emphasis is in the latter understanding put on the fact that disturbances might lead to cyclic change and may create opportunities for system reorganization. While both understandings produce interesting food for thought, chapter 2.2 will explore in detail which contradictions are hidden behind both notions – making it difficult to use resilience as a guiding lens for this study without causing ambiguity and potential for misinterpretation. However, resilience theory, particularly in the ecological tradition, has yielded a number of subordinate or ancillary concepts that have been providing innovative inspiration for guiding research in other scientific fields – including research on urban systems (Solecki 2012; Bohle and Warner 2008; Garschagen et al. 2011) and especially on climate change adaptation (Gallopín 2006; Janssen 2007). Many of these secondary concepts also helped to sharpen the analytical lens applied in this study. The following paragraphs therefore introduce the themes most relevant for the research presented here. Table 2.2 at the end of this sub-section summarizes the most central epistemic elements and their relevance for urban risk research in the context of this study. Social ecological and complex adaptive systems Resilience thinking is largely based on a system theory perspective. It therewith builds on earlier work – since the 1940s – on establishing a general system theory (cf. van Bertalanffy 1945; Parsons 1951; Luhmann 1987) and complexity theory (e.g. Kauffman 1993; Costanza et al. 1993). Both emphasize the connectedness of structures, processes and actors as fundamental elements of systems and highlight the need to consider system attributes such as nonlinearity, criticality, emergence and self-organization (see for a more detailed review, for example, Egner 2010). Expanding the original focus on ecosystem (e.g. Holling 1973), resilience scientists have gradually widened their focus and are nowadays primarily concerned with so-called coupled social-ecological systems (CSESs). According to this framing, a clear separation of the social and ecological subsystems is not possible given the multiple feedbacks between human action and ecological structures and processes (Berkes et al. 2003; Gallopín 2006; Renaud et al. 2010). The question of whether or not urban systems can be considered CSESs is not yet explicitly addressed in the literature. But given the mutual feedbacks between ecological and societal processes that are equally implied by and culminating in urban areas, a framing as CSESs appears reasonable and useful – particularly for the context of the study presented here (cf. 4; 6). Also the research on so-called complex adaptive systems (CAS) is a rapidly growing field of high relevance in this context9 (Miller and Page 2007: 6). Com9

When judged against the relevance for global change and particularly urban risk research, two main lineages of CAS science can be identified (Norberg and Cumming 2008): The first one gravitates around the Santa Fe Institute (founded in 1984) which set out to bring together re-

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plex adaptive systems are characterized by their complexity which arises “when the dependencies among the elements become important. In such a system, removing one such element destroys system behavior to an extent that goes well beyond what is embodied by the particular element that is removed” (p. 9). The adaptive element of CAS is thereby referred to as “the capacity of the system to change in response to prevailing (and anticipated, where possible) conditions by means of self-organization, learning, and reasoning” (Norberg and Cumming 2008: 2). Adaptation can hereby relate to single individuals (e.g. urban dwellers), to groups of people (e.g. stakeholder groups within cities) or to entire systems (e.g. megacities). The links of CSES and CAS debates to the above introduced adaptation discourses are obvious, hence, implying some relevance of the concepts to the study presented here. In particular the notion of complexity and the connectedness of system elements is considered helpful for this study as it urges to ask for the relations of the elements in the system under scrutiny, i.e. the city of Can Tho. However, the notion of systems also bears epistemic pitfalls and conflicts with the actor-oriented perspective applied in this study. These conflicts need to be carefully considered and addressed (cf. 2.2). Hence, this study applies a nested conception in which actors are considered to be important elements in wider system; however, the principles of actor-oriented research persist to constitute the main analytic perspective. Adaptive renewal cycles The concept of adaptive renewal cycles has become a central epistemic element in resilience theory. This concept is largely based on the work of Holling who observed that adaptation processes in ecosystems pass through regular cycles consisting of four main phases (Holling 1986, 2001; Berkes et al. 2003; Walker et al. 2006): (1) exploitation of easily accessible resources; (2) consolidation of the exploitation mode but also growing rigidity; (3) collapse triggered by hazards but rendered possible through the overexploitation and the accumulated inflexibility of the system; and finally (4) re-organization and entering of a new cycle either in the same or a different (often improved) functional mode. Forest cycles have been used as a prominent example with forests going through stages of growth and maturity, followed by disturbances, such as fires, and reorganization (Holling 1986; Berkes et al. 2003). It has also been suggested that in fact the transformation of social-ecological systems in the Mekong Delta over the searchers from different disciplines that had hitherto worked on related yet separated fields of complexity and system studies in order to find cross-cutting themes in different types of CASs. The coining of the term CAS goes back to this group of scientists. The second school clusters around the above introduced Resilience Alliance. Interestingly, much of the resilience literature (explicitly or implicitly) considers CSESs to be CASs.

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last 200 years fits quite well to the dynamics ascribed to the first two phases of the adaptive renewal cycle particularly in the agricultural sector (cf. Garschagen 2010a). At the same there are a number of alarming signals of increasing overexploitation, significant rigidity and burgeoning vulnerabilities, all contributing to the risk of system collapse in the Mekong Delta – into which the case study city of Can Tho is inevitably embedded (ibid.). A key interest in resilience research has been how the so-called back-loop (i.e. phases 3 and particularly 4) takes place in an ecological system and can be managed in coupled social-ecological systems (cf. Carpenter et al. 2002; Biggs et al. 2010; Abel et al. 2006; Gunderson et al. 2010). This brings advancement to earlier scholarly work which had largely been concerned with the fore-loop and assumed predictable and stable climax states, without giving much consideration to possible disturbances or collapses. However, it can also be argued that from a policy perspective the model of the adaptive renewal cycle lacks guidance for the most pressing question, i.e. how to leapfrog into a precautionary re-organization without having to experience a system collapse and the associated harm and damage (cf. Garschagen 2010a; 2013). This question is of great relevance for the case study analyzed in this thesis where a major disaster has not yet happened but where the system nevertheless has to reorganize (phase 4 of the cycle) in order to adapt to the predicted extreme events in the future – hopefully in a precautionary manner without having to go through a major collapse (phase 3). Panarchy, regime shifts, tipping points and multi-stability Adaptive renewal cycles can be found at various scales and are often nested within one another across space and time. The term panarchy has been coined in this context to refer to the interaction between these cycles and particularly to the cross-scale impacts that the dynamics at one scale might have on structures and processes at other scales (Gunderson and Holling 2002). In contrast to hierarchical confinements, where broad and slow features regulate the small and fast ones, panarchical relations can happen in both ways, i.e. top-down and bottom-up. Surprising changes and cascading effects in system structures and dynamics can be the result. Therefore the question whether and how panarchy can be assessed (maybe even forecasted) and managed has become one of central interest within resilience research. Related to the above focus on disturbance and change, regime shifts are of key importance in resilience theory. These can be defined as “the ability of a system to internally switch between different self-reinforcing processes that dominate how the system functions” (Norberg and Cumming 2008: 2). Such shifts are related to tipping points, i.e. the threshold in a given trend which once surpassed leads to an abrupt change of the systems configuration and stability (cf. Cairns 2004; Walker and Meyers 2004; Renaud et al. 2010; Kinzig et al. 2006). Tipping points have been observed, for example, in climate and ocean systems (Scheffer et al.

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2009; Kriegler et al. 2009; Lenton et al. 2008) but are also assumed relevant, yet less understood, in social processes (cf. Lynn et al. 2010). The notion of multiple stable states hints in the same direction and provides an additional epistemic element within resilience theory. Many case studies have proven empirically that a system might have not only one stable state (or stability domain) but that there can be multiple possible stability domains within the same system (Berkes et al. 2003; Walker and Meyer 2004). Often cited examples from the field of ecology are multiple possible equilibriums in predator-prey-ratios. All three concepts (regime shifts, tipping points and multi-stability) offer important epistemic guidance for the research presented here as they caution against framing system dynamics, also in social and economic systems, as exclusively linear and moving towards single equilibrium states – as it is often the underlying assumption in Vietnam’s planning and management paradigm. In fact, the empirical analysis on small-scale adaptation processes at household level in Can Tho City (cf. 6.2) has yielded fairly surprising findings that help to advance the wider theoretical debate on these three concepts, notably on tipping points (cf. 7). Table 2.2 summarizes central epistemic elements of resilience theory and their relevance for urban risk research and especially the study presented here. Epistemic element of resilience theory

Relevance for and contribution to urban risk research

Coupling in socialecological systems

Points attention to the – often neglected – connections and feedbacks between social and bio-geo-physical processes in cities which jointly co-produce risk

Nonlinearity

Challenges the assumption that development trends and risk pathways in cities are predominantly linear – which is implicitly or explicitly underlying a lot of the urban research; especially helpful for conceiving and analyzing crises phenomena related to natural hazard events

Panarchy

Challenges the often prevailing conception that processes are coherently nested in terms of temporal and spatial scales; reiterates that processes can also be linked through panarchical (i.e. counter hierarchical) connections; the understanding that small changes at minor temporal and spatial scales can alter processes and structures at larger spatial and temporal ones (and vice versa) is important for capturing risk dynamics

Criticality; tipping points; cascading effects

Raises awareness for the analysis of instability and related thresholds within vulnerability and adaptation dynamics

Multi-stability and regime shifts

Reiterates that there can be more than one stability domain in urban systems; challenges in particular the teleological conceptions underlying Vietnam’s paradigm of centralistic urban planning (cf. 6.2); yields questions around different possible pathways, stability domains and development regimes in Vietnam’s future urban transformation (cf. 4.6)

Table 2.2: Resilience sub-concepts and their relevance for urban risk research, own draft with left column based on the literature review above

2.1.3.3. Assessing resilience Given the broad variety of resilience schools and the many different contexts in which resilience concepts are used by different disciplines there is no coherent set of approaches for assessing resilience – which is why the following section is

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comparatively short. Rather than measuring resilience as a whole, assessments in the different contexts often target the specific properties emphasized in the respective interpretation of resilience, e.g. the resistance of built infrastructure, the buffer capacity of ecological systems, return time for economic recovery after shocks or the degree of change implemented by communities or organizations in the face of stress or perturbation. As indicated above, the wide-spread use of social and social-ecological resilience concepts in the field of disaster risk and climate change is a relatively young phenomenon. In addition, its compatibility with vulnerability paradigms is often contested (cf. 2.2; Cannon & Müller-Mahn 2010) and those publications that have made use of it mostly apply it as a rather loosely defined concept with fuzzy operationalization and assessment – largely due to the remaining conceptual ambiguity (Birkmann et al. 2012b; chapter 2.1.3.1.). Also in this field, the limited number of assessment approaches mostly operationalize and measure specific conceptual sub-domains of resilience (e.g. robustness or functional redundancy) rather than overall resilience (cf. Birkmann et al. 2012b). Accordingly, there is so far no shared or commonly accepted set of criteria or methodologies for assessing resilience (for more detailed reviews the reader is referred to Sivell et al. 2008; Anderies et al. 2006). Given the remaining conceptual ambiguities (cf. above and 2.2), also the study presented here does not aim at providing a fully-fledged operationalization and measurement of resilience. Rather, vulnerability and adaption remain the guiding concepts – also for the empirical analysis – but are complemented by epistemic contributions from resilience theory reviewed above. This is because the latter are deemed highly relevant for the context of this study and for challenging more conventional vulnerability and adaptation thinking. However, rather than making wide-spread use of the fuzzy term of resilience, those epistemic elements that are used here, are named more specifically when integrated into the vulnerability and adaptation framework developed for this study (cf. 3). 2.2.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF VULNERABILITY, ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE “Terminology that is confusing or contested can lead to misunderstandings, unwanted actions or protracted episodes of intellectual wheel-spinning.” (Mitchell 2001: 88)

When contrasting the scientific traditions of vulnerability, adaptation and resilience research a number of overlaps but also mismatches can be observed in terms of epistemology and the respective grant narratives10. While some of the differ10 In this context, the sophisticated literature reviews by Janssen et al. (2006) and Janssen (2007) analyze in detail how on the one hand the number of publications in the three fields of vulnerability, resilience and adaptation have rocketed recently, notably since the beginning of

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ences might appear rather subtle or implicit, it is argued here (along with other authors, e.g. Miller et al. 2010; Turner 2010a; Gallopín 2006; Thywissen 2006; Mitchell 2001) that they can in fact imply grave rifts not only in terms of the central epistemic objects but also in terms of theory development, applied methodologies, and recommendations derived for practical planning, management and governance. At the same time, the combination of the different perspectives can contribute to developing a more holistic conceptual framework for the research presented here and, in conjunction, allows for a more profound reflection of the strengths and weaknesses implied by the different approaches (cf. chapters 3 and 5). 2.2.1. Vulnerability and resilience One of the most relevant – and confusing – questions is whether or not resilience is or should be framed (explicitly or implicitly) as the antonym of vulnerability. A prominent interpretation among leading resilience scholars is that “a vulnerable social-ecological system has lost resilience” (Folke 2006: 262) and that resilience is the “flip side” of vulnerability (Folke et al. 2002: 13; Klein et al. 2003: 40). On the other hand, many vulnerability frameworks, most notably Turner et al. (2003), consider resilience only as one out of three components of vulnerability besides exposure and sensitivity (see chapter 2.1.1, Figure 2.4; compare also Adger 2006, Pelling 2003). Therefore, high resilience can, in this framing, still impair with high vulnerability if the resilience component is (over-) compensated by high exposure and/or sensitivity. Due to this confusion and the ambiguous, often contradictory, interpretations of resilience presented earlier (cf. 2.1.3), the term resilience itself is not used in the vulnerability framework developed for this study (cf. 3.3). Rather, the different meanings behind each of the resilience interpretations (cf. 2.1.3) have – if considered appropriate – been translated into more precise terms which then have been included into the framework (cf. 3). In addition to the obvious taxonomic differences, there are a number of more subtle tensions related to the different scientific roots of the vulnerability and resilience concepts – further contributing to the reluctant application of resilience terminology in the conceptual underpinnings of this study. In very general terms resilience research has a strong rooting in natural sciences, is flavored heavily by positivist approaches and devotes major attention to analyzing biophysical processes through a systems perspective. Vulnerability research, on the other hand, originates largely from the social sciences and is linked more strongly to constructhe new millennium. Yet, this analysis also shows that the interaction and integration between the different schools has been developing at a much slower pace and shorter breath. Particularly the resilience lineage appears to have experienced little integration with the vulnerability and adaptation schools in the early years—when assessed along the lines of co-authorship, cross-citation and the spread in terms of the publications’ knowledge domains (cf. Janssen et al. 2006; Janssen 2007).

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tivist perspectives, focusing on the construction of relational power structures, actor-oriented perspectives and on the subjective domains of human perceptions, values, agency and conflict (Miller et al. 2010; Nelson et al. 2007). Tracing the implications of these different epistemologies, Sapountzaki (2007) challenges the wide-spread optimism about social resilience as a universally positive process and a panacea for dealing with social vulnerability. She cautions that the systemic argumentation underlying resilience might implicitly give priority to the resilience of entire social systems even if this might imply a transfer or vulnerability from one social actor to another and/or the shift of vulnerability away from one hazard to another. This links to the afore-mentioned argument that resilience scholarship tends to depoliticize social and economic processes that lead to marginalization and vulnerability – which, in contrast, constitute the core interest of vulnerability science (Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010; see also Miller et al. 2010; Turner 2010a). The resulting conflicts and ambiguities have not been sufficiently tackled in the literature (cf. Garschagen 2013; Brand and Jax 2007; Miller et al. 2010). Keeping these subtle controversies in mind is essential for the empirical lens used in this study (cf. 5; 6) and for avoiding pitfalls in the policy recommendations that are developed out of the findings (cf. 7) – a field in which resilience and vulnerability language is too often used interchangeably, therewith getting detached from their implied meanings and messages. It has in this context been observed that while vulnerability concepts have for many years been transferred and incorporated into practical development and disaster risk management work, there are few examples on how resilience theory has been transferred and operationalized by practitioners or policy makers outside of academia (Miller et al. 2010; Brand & Jax 2007; Garschagen 2013). 2.2.2. Adaptive capacity and resilience Resilience is increasingly being linked to adaptation discourses, particularly in the context of climate change adaptation (see for detailed reviews Janssen 2007; Gallopín 2006). Yet, despite a number of semantic and epistemic overlaps, significant ambiguities persist in the literature with respect to the relationship between the two. These need to be carefully reflected in order not to confound the conceptual framework of this study in which adaptive capacity plays a central role (cf. 3). Most confusion relates to the latest, yet currently most prominent, interpretation of resilience, i.e. the degree to which the system can build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation (cf. 2.1.3.1; Folke 2006; Carpenter et al. 2001). In fact, Smit and Wandel (2006) observe that some authors seem to equate adaptive capacity with resilience or social resilience, while other key concepts of resilience, e.g. panarchy or multistability, do no longer play a significant role in many resilience studies. Gallopín (2006) therefore comes to conclude in his synoptical review that one of the main questions or controversies is whether resilience is – and should be – considered the same as adaptive capacity (p. 299). Again, this incoherency and the potential for confusion add to the reasons for refraining from the

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integration of resilience labels in the conceptual framework developed here (cf. 3.3). In addition, the different resilience interpretations themselves (cf. 2.1.3) imply considerable ambiguity with regards to their implications for adaptation. Particularly the resilience interpretation towards robustness or resistance can in practice be at odds with the other interpretation on flexibility and change, creating an irreconcilable conflict despite the conceptually appealing framing of resilience that tries to bridge between both interpretations. While the first interpretation would, in the context of disaster risk management in Vietnam, call for the implementation of physical protection infrastructure such as dykes, the second would generally disapprove measures with such high path dependency and rigidity involved. Moreover, while leading scientists around the Resilience Alliance do not explicitly call for equating adaptive capacity with resilience, they often suggest a somewhat cyclic linkage. The third of the above illustrated resilience interpretations (cf. 2.1.3) suggests that resilience can be understood as the ability to build and increase adaptive capacity. Yet, at the same time adaptive capacity is claimed to enable resilience since “systems with high adaptive capacity are able to reconfigure themselves without significant declines in crucial functions in relation to primary productivity, hydrological cycles, social relations and economic prosperity” (Resilience Alliance 2012; see also Folke et al. 2002). Emphasizing on feedbacks and interlinkages in resilience dynamics is necessary. But the above quotes suggest that framing the relations in such ways produces fuzziness or even a closed cycle of tautological argumentation rather than providing a guiding framework that helps disentangling the causal relationships behind these concepts. Given this confusion and striving to contribute to conceptual clarity, Klein et al. (2003) suggest using resilience only in a more narrow understanding linked to its earlier roots around the ability to maintain key functions despite disturbance and to self-organize (cf. 2.1.3.1). Instead of following the current trend to use resilience as a broad umbrella concept for a wide array of system attributes that are deemed desirable but lack clear operationalization for analysis and implementation, they call for using adaptive capacity as the broader umbrella concept and to restrict resilience to the afore-mentioned more narrow meaning (compare also the discussion on resilience as a “boundary object” by Brand and Jax, 2007). A move in such a direction is in general considered very valuable for the conceptual framing of the research presented here (cf. 3). Yet, while the first interpretation of resilience is perceived to increase the conceptual clarity and hence usefulness, the second interpretation (on self-regulation) is considered less clear when combined with an actor-oriented perspective in social science. In addition, conventional concepts of adaptive capacity tend to frame adaptation as a rather linear, foreseeable and manageable development. This certainly needs to be challenged through the lens of resilience thinking, acknowledging the existence of non-linearity in adaptation processes, the importance of learning from crises, the possibility of multi-equilibrium conditions, the challenge of adapting under conditions of uncertainty and the recognition that unavoidable crises or shocks – which

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cannot be ruled out completely, even by the best adaptation – have to be navigated (cf. 3). 2.2.3. Vulnerability and adaptive capacity Diverging accounts can also be found with respect to the relationship between vulnerability and adaptive capacity (or adaptation). In many vulnerability frameworks, some sort of capacity for adaptation is seen as one of the components of vulnerability, hence, influencing its overall level. Most often, adaptive capacity is in this context framed as one sub-component within the response or resilience element of vulnerability (cf. Table 2.3 below). Turner et al. (2003), for example, include adaptation along with adjustment in the domain of hazard response. Yet, how adjustment is differentiated from adaptation in this framing is not specified in detail. Even more directly, the Fourth Assessment Reports of the IPCC framed adaptive capacity as one of the three components of vulnerability, along with exposure and sensitivity (IPCC 2001, 2007a; see also Klein et al. 2003: 40). In contrast, adaptation can also be understood as not only one component within vulnerability (usually the response component) but rather as the counterpart or counter-measure to vulnerability as a whole, i.e. as a means for reducing vulnerability across its different components such as exposure, susceptibility and lack of coping capacity (see in detail chapter 2.1.2). This understanding helps to bridge the existing gap between vulnerability and adaptation approaches (cf. Engle 2011; Adger et al. 2005; Pielke 1998; Ribot 2011) and appears very useful also for structuring the research presented here. It urges the researcher to ask how adaptive capacities and capacity needs might differ with respect to influencing the different components of vulnerability. It also urges one to explore in detail where synergies but also conflicts in adapting the different factors of vulnerability might be and how priorities might be set. Even though these questions are of high academic and practical importance, they are greatly neglected in the literature to date – which is why they play a central role in this study and have been translated into an adequate conceptual framing (cf. 3). 2.2.4. Coping and adaptation With respect to the response of actors to expected or experienced hazards, the question of how to differentiate between the widely used concepts of coping and adaptation remains open in most of the literature. Birkmann et al. (2012c: 250) observe that “the terms are […] often lumped together without clearly differentiating their specific notions and implications”. In response to this shortcoming and in consideration of interpretations suggested implicitly in the literature (e.g. IPCC 2012), coping is understood here as a short-term, often reactive, response to deal with the impacts of a hazard during or after the hazards strikes and, by doing so,

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to minimize its effect. Adaptation, in contrast, is argued to most often imply rather longer time-frames and some notion of planned, strategic, target-oriented and coordinated action. While coping measures are mainly undertaken within the boundaries and constraints of the current system and are generally not aimed at altering the principles of operation of that system as such, adaptation often – but not necessarily – implies some adjustment or change of system components, processes and structures. Coping and adaptation are closely linked and often occur in nested forms, i.e. adaptation is often initiated when the range of successful coping within the current system configuration is reached (Yohe and Tol 2002). However, as indicated above (cf. 2.1.2), adaptation might also be initiated when the coping limits are not yet reached but when new resources become available or when hazard toleration levels shift. But not all actors have the same capacities for such adaptation meaning that actors with smaller capacities are often restricted to tolerate a higher coping range. Adding these aspects to the framing of the interplay between coping and adaptation seems highly relevant in order to capture current dynamics in particular in transition and developing countries, such Vietnam analyzed in detail in this study. In reality, coping and adaptation often occur in mixed forms, meaning that it can be rather difficult to differentiate them empirically. Yet, the conceptual differentiation nevertheless – or just because of this – is considered useful here for guiding the empirical analysis and for triggering relevant questions. These include, for example, the synergies but also trade-offs between coping and adaptive capacities, the interplay of generic and specific adaptive capacities or the interlinkages between erosive coping capacities that imply a (temporary?) degradation of livelihood assets and productive coping capacities, e.g. the divestment of assets during crisis situation. 2.2.5. The role of exposure Lastly, there are different views as to whether exposure to hazards is considered a sub-component of vulnerability, a separate factor of risk on the same taxonomic level as the hazard and vulnerability, or even a property of the hazards. This question surely is of limited practical relevance but it has a number of conceptual implications, e.g. with respect to the construction of aggregate vulnerability or risk measures. The conceptual framing of this study therefore recognizes the hybrid character of exposure, i.e. exposure can be changed in two ways: Firstly, the extent and reach of the hazard can change, e.g. the flood hazard changes due to sea level rise. Secondly, people and assets can be moved into future or existing hazard zones, e.g. building new residential or industrial sites in flood plains. While the first aspect is closely associated with the hazard, the second one is rather linked to social vulnerability. Accordingly, different risk and vulnerability frameworks have placed the exposure domain differently, depending on the emphasis and message they want to

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convey. The vulnerability inspired frameworks by Turner et al. (2003), Birkmann et al. (2013) or Luers (2005), for example, consider exposure as a sub-component of vulnerability (cf. 2.1.1.2). In contrast, the IPCC’s Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), as a joint product of natural and social scientists designed for policy advice, separates the exposure from vulnerability (IPCC 2012). This is done in order to emphasis that vulnerability is not to be reduced to a measure of exposure – as often done in the literature and particularly in policy debates (cf. 2.4.3) – but that vulnerability particularly depends on internal sensitivity and insufficient response capacities. Both framings are considered important for the study presented here. However, rather than the long-term changes in the hazard characteristics through climate change, the strongest emphasis here is placed on the social generation and stratification of exposure through, for example, the short- and mid-term occupation of hazard zones in the course of economic transformation in Vietnam and the pressures for marginalized population groups to move into exposed zones (cf. 6). Therefore, the conceptual framework developed for this study acknowledges the hybrid character of exposure but especially considers it a subcomponent of vulnerability (cf. 3.2). 2.2.6. Taxonomies of risk and vulnerability Table 2.3 summarizes some of the most-cited taxonomies suggested for vulnerability and risk. Even though this is only a selection representing those conceptions most dominantly used and discussed, considerable differences and contradictions can already be observed from this small set. These link-up with the above discussed ambiguities, e.g. with regards to the role of resilience in the definition of Turner et al. (2003), the role of adaptive capacity according to the IPCC (2007a) or the question whether exposure is considered a sub-factor of vulnerability or an own factor of risk (as in IPCC 2012). This comparison underscores the need for a more coherent framework which addresses and bridges these mismatches – provided in chapter 3. Conceptual definition

Reference

Risk = Hazard (x) Vulnerability

Wisner et al. 2004

Risk = Weather and climate events (x) Exposure (x) Vulnerability

IPCC 2012

Vulnerability = Exposure (x) Coping

Bohle 2001

Vulnerability = Exposure (x) Sensitivity (x) Lack of resilience

Turner et al. 2003

Vulnerability = Exposure (x) Susceptibility and fragility (x) Lack of resilience

Birkmann et al. 2013

Vulnerability = Character, magnitude and rate of climate change (x) Exposure (x) Sensitivity (x) Adaptive capacity

IPCC 2007a

Vulnerability = Exposure (x) Sensitivity (x) State relative to a threshold of damage

Luers 2005

Table 2.3: Differences in selected taxonomies of risk and vulnerability suggested in the literature

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2.3.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ACTION RELATED TO VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION

The above sections have shown that vulnerability needs to be understood as a socially produced predisposition of actors in human or coupled social-ecological system (cf. 2.1.1). In addition, it has been shown that coping and adaption for the reduction or mitigation of vulnerability can be mainly framed in terms of human activity. Hence, both sides, the generation of vulnerability as well as the response to it, need to be understood in terms of human ‘doings’ in social systems – which leads one to ask for the ways in which human ‘action’ has been explained in social theory and how these achievements can, or cannot, contribute to the understanding of human vulnerability and adaptation. This link has for a long time been neglected in the scientific literature and is still poorly developed, particularly in the more recent discourse on vulnerability and adaptation in the climate change context. In fact, it is argued here that this lack of theoretical foundation contributes to the above indicted gaps and mismatches in current vulnerability and adaptation approaches. However, a number of attempts have been made in the recent years to link social vulnerability to social theory. Interestingly, many – if not most – of these efforts are rooted within the German development and vulnerability research. 2.3.1. Deciphering action through agency, structure and structuration It has been suggested that the Theory of Structuration, developed by Giddens (1984), provides a helpful lens for examining the production of vulnerability in social systems and especially the actions people can (or cannot) and do (or do not) take to cope with and adapt to risks (e.g. Tröger 2004; Selbach 2009). Giddens formulated his theory in an attempt to overcome the hitherto perceived dichotomy in social theories between, on the one hand, structuralist and functionalist theories and, on the other hand, subjectivist-hermeneutic as well as phenomenological approaches (Giddens 1984: 26). Giddens argued that both schools are of too limited reach to explain human practices in dynamic social systems – including actors’ responses to risks. He criticizes that the former school is prone to inherently (or even explicitly) yielding truncated explanations that reduce human practices to being determined by the functional ontology or the structural configuration in the social system. The subjectivist-hermeneutical perspective, on the other side, is argued to neglect – or at least heavily underemphasize – the important role of societal ramifications for individual action. These ramifications include, for example, norms, role-models or regulations. The larger fabric making for a society can therefore not be captured with those approaches alone (cf. Giddens 1984: 26). Hence, Giddens’ main interest is to explain how human action is shaped by the interplay of individual agency and societal structure. Much of this interest has been shared by Werlen (1993) who transferred elements of Giddens’ theory into his thoughts on “Society, Action and Space” with which he proposed to establish

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the theoretical basis for an “Alternative Human Geography” – as the title of his seminal book underscores. Following Giddens’ and Werlen’s line of thinking, action shall here be defined as “a reflexive and intentional activity: a consciously considered, ‘freely’ performed activity which is goal oriented” (Werlen 1993: 11). Action is therefore considered to be different from behavior, which has in social geography been used more narrowly – along the lines of behaviorism – to refer to observable responses to stimuli in the physical environment (ibid.: 9). The term ‘action’ on the other hand considers human activity to comprise a wider spectrum, placing particular emphasis on the possibility of conscious and goal-oriented decisions for or against doing things. Therefore, “[i]f human activity is termed ‘action’, it is not just the aspect of ‘reflexivity’, found in cognitive theories of behavior, which is considered, but also that of intentionality” (Werlen 1993: 11). This emphasis is of great relevance for the context of adaption to natural hazards, since one of the main interests here is to understand why certain adaptation action is taken or not. This is of particular interest when considering the adaptation towards projected hazards, many of which have not yet been experienced and, hence, deliver only limited sets of stimuli that would trigger reflexive action. It is also for this reason that the research presented here is rested on the tenets of action theory (as suggested by Werlen 1993), meaning that action taken by actors provides the primary epistemic entry point for examining and guiding the empirical case study research and the theory development. However, Giddens and Werlen highlight that even through their conception of action includes intentional and goal-oriented action (besides purely reflexive modes), action should not be misunderstood to only generate intended consequences. Rather, action can lead to unforeseen and unintended consequences that, however, take effect of the larger system configurations, either affirmative or transformative. For example, workshops organized by international development organizations in Vietnam on improving administrative efficiency and fighting corruption, might in the past have produced contradictory effects since many of them incentivize high-ranking participation through the issuance of monetary perdiems, in effect, propelling rather than curbing the informal economies of income generation amongst state staff. Given such consequences, Giddens argues that actors try to monitor the effects of action as much as possible, including, both, their own action as well as the action of others (1993: 5). Actors can, thus, adjust or change the direction of their action, depending on their monitoring and evaluation. However, of quite some relevance for doing empirical research is the fact that not all action is based on discursive consciousness which is actively reflected on and can easily be formulated and shared. Rather, some types of action are also linked to a practical consciousness, meaning that things are “simply done” by actors without thinking much about them (Giddens 1984: 7). In addition, there is action that is associated to unconscious motives which cannot or only with difficulties be identified, reflected on and formulated. Hence, triangulation between discursive interviews and other forms of data generation such as structured observation are of key relevance (cf. 5).

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Departing from the motives for action, Giddens defines agency – one of the central terms in this theory – as not only the “intentions people have in doing things but [as] their capabilities of doing those things in the first place” (Giddens 1984: 9). Therefore, agency necessitates power, meaning that an agent can be understood as “one who exerts power or produces an effect” (ibid.). Power is therein understood to exist in two forms, i.e. the “capability of actors to enact decisions which they favour […] and the ‘mobilization of bias’ that is built into institutions” (Giddens 1984: 15). Both these expressions of power are of high importance to understand agency in the context of risk management by governmental and nongovernmental actors in Vietnam, as the empirical analysis will show (cf. 6). In combination with the previous points, Werlen therefore underscores that action should not be understood in a deterministic way, rather it is of key relevance to acknowledge that people have freedom and choices. Nevertheless, agency cannot take effect independently from any boundaries but is tied into the structure of the respective social system, meaning the set of rules and resources constituting the properties of it. Yet, “structure is not to be equated with constraints but is always both constraining and enabling” (Giddens 1984: 25). In addition, the rules mentioned in the above definition are considered to comprise not only codified regulations but also social norms. This shows that structure is in Giddens’ theory not considered to be external to individuals but gets internalized through memory, education and social practices (ibid.). However, Giddens makes sure to emphasize that structures should not be considered as static characteristics but are socially re-produced, hence, allowing for shifts and changes. He therefore established the concept of ‘structuration’ to explore this dynamic feedback process in more detail. This concept is rested on the observation that structure features duality. On the one hand, actors draw on the rules and resources inscribed into the structure in order to enact social activities. On the other hand, the action of these actors takes effect on the structure, working either towards reaffirmation or change. Structure is therefore both “medium and [intended or unintended] outcome of the practices they recursively organize”, it is produced and reproduced socially through a process of structuration (Giddens 1984: 25). The focus on these structuration processes is of particular relevance in highly transformative context conditions, such as in Vietnam’s ongoing reform era (cf. 4). It helps exploring and understanding not only the interplay between different scales, i.e. how individual action of many in the society can take effect on the larger structure, but also on the question how diverging interests are negotiated, e.g. where forces trying to maintain old structures meet with action that is intentionally or unintentionally causing changes in the structure. However, in contrast to the emphasis put in much of the literature, it is important to reiterate that action is considered here to not only take influence on structure. Rather, it can in many cases have a comparatively direct influence on agency itself, according to the above-introduced definition. For example, a rugby player who takes action to train new strategic moves does not only advance the style of the game on a general systemic level (i.e. changing its structure) but also

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directly improves his or her very personal agency, i.e. the capability of playing the game well and to cause change, ideally towards winning the game. Similarly, in the context of vulnerability reduction, targeted actions for implementing specific adaptation measures such as evacuation drills do not only change the wider structure but can also improve the very agency of the target actors in a direct fashion. 2.3.2. Vulnerability as product of habitus and social fields In contrast to Giddens’ theory of action and structuration, other people draw on Bourdieu’s theory of social practice (1979) to examine the production and reproduction of social vulnerability (e.g. Sakdapolrak 2007). According to this theory social systems are defined by the existence of social fields which are populated by groups of actors sharing similar properties. Hence, each field is defined by a specific set of norms and rules on how to ‘play the game’ of the respective field – sticking to Bourdieu’s metaphor (1979). However, the practices of actors in the field are not entirely determined by these rules. Rather, individual action is considered to also depend on the capital endowment of the respective actor, comprising hard and soft types of capital (Sakdapolrak 2007). Therefore, differentials in these endowments and contested power relations shaping them within as well as between social fields can yield vulnerability outcomes of actors in social fields or even of entire fields. The term ‘habitus’ is broadly used in this theory to refer to the worldviews and patterns of behavior that result from the internalization of the agendas of social fields and the feedback processes of social practices of these actors in interaction with other actors either within or beyond the same social field (Bourdieu 1979, 1998). 2.3.3. Relevance for this study There is a lot of interesting inspiration in Bourdieu’s thinking also for the study presented here. Particularly his framing of ‘social fields’ contributes a relevant lens for exploring how different groups of actors in Can Tho City (e.g. hazardexposed households, state administration officials, NGOs or researchers) share and negotiate perceptions of risk, ways of dealing with it and mechanisms for (re-) distribution of resources for responding to it – both in their own field as well as in relation to other fields. The empirical chapter will show that ‘knowing the rules of the game’ will be of particular relevance, for example, for formalized organizations that need to compete for funds and other resources to acquire risk management projects and secure their own survival. However, since the focus here is less on the internalized behavior or habitus of actors in day-to-day situations, but rather on understanding why and how (or why not) conscious and reflected action is taken for adaptation, i.e. for breaking out of the ‘normal’ structure, Bourdieu’s theory is not chosen as primary approach for this study. Rather, Giddens’ theory for explaining how action is shaped by the

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interplay of agency and structure is considered to be a valuable approach that matches the research objectives of this study. Elements of his theory of structuration are therefore built into the conceptual model for vulnerability and adaptation developed here (cf. 3). However, as will be shown, some of Giddens’ postulations will need to be adjusted and amended for the context of this research, thereby, contributing to a more general applicability of his theory also in the field of risk science (cf. 3; 7). In addition, Giddens’ and particularly Werlen’s conception of action and acting agents provide the general perspective of vulnerability and adaptation related to human activity. It will be shown that particularly the range from unconscious practices to conscious, intentful and goal-oriented ones is important to consider for the different stages in the production of social vulnerability, the immediate coping with risk and the more long-term and change-oriented adaptation. In addition, the theory helps to frame action for risk reduction as both, driven by agency and conditioned by structure. Of interest for the context of this study is particularly the question how the change ongoing in Vietnam through the transformation process and the growing climate change debate takes influence on the structuration process and leads to transformations also in the societal structures relevant to adaptation and vulnerability. However, it appears necessary and helpful to amend Giddens’ and especially Werlen’s conception of agents or actors, especially with regards to their postulation of applying a strict methodological individualism. In this view, phenomena in social systems and the activity of organizations or otherwise collective institutions can only be understood through the action of the single persons therein, i.e. from the individual level of action. It is argued here – along with other authors (e.g. Hamhaber 2004; Selbach 2009) – that while such a postulation is logical and consistent from a theoretical point of view, it cannot be fully implemented in many contexts of empirical research, making some modulation necessary. However, it needs to be emphasized that such a modulation is considered not to cause any harm to the methodological and epistemological validity in the context of this study. This is because the prime interest is with the risk response action taken at the level of social and institutional entities, e.g. single households, departments in the state bureaucracy, single NGOs etc. The research presented here therefore applies a broader definition of actors, that not only accommodates single individuals but also groups of individuals who form an entity as they share a set of orientations (goals, values, norms, motives) and a social role (expressed by a joint legitimacy, rights, privileges, duties, restrictions etc.) which together leads them to take collective action into the same direction, mostly even in consciously synchronized manner (drawing in part on the ‘actor’-definition provided in Brunotte et al. 2001). Therefore, also governmental branches of administration, NGOs, international organizations such as the World Bank or even households are considered actors here, i.e. they are regarded as acting entities, even though it is acknowledged that individuals within these entities are differently important to shape the agendas and actions, but without their individual action being entirely determined by the entity itself.

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VULNERABILITY, ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE IN CITIES: PARTICULARITIES, CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES

While the above introduced discourses on vulnerability, adaptation and resilience are of general importance for global change and human development research and for providing the conceptual backdrop to the study presented here, there are a number of specific considerations that emerge from linking these concepts to the urban context. Reflecting carefully on these particularities through a joint perspective that merges empirical trends around urbanization with theoretical framings of structures and processes specific to cities is therefore of great relevance to inform the here presented urban research. In line with what has been illustrated in chapters 2.1 and 2.2, the following analysis primarily makes use of vulnerability and adaptation terminology. Resilience thinking greatly helps to complement the epistemic landscape but the term resilience itself is not taken as the main label for structuring this analysis, given its semantic ambiguity (cf. 2.1). 2.4.1. Why do we need an urban focus? Urban areas play a key role with respect to change processes at global, regional, national and local scales comprising demographic, economic, political, sociocultural and environmental dimensions (e.g. Johnston et al. 2002; Kraas 2007a,b; Hall & Pfeiffer 2000). Cities can, therein, be considered both drivers and results of such change. Statistics by the United Nations reveal that today more than half of the world’s population is living in urban areas and that cities will continue to contribute the largest part to the overall global population increase. Between, 2010 and 2050, the world’s urban population is expected to grow by 76 percent at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent which is almost twice the expected growth rate of the total global population (own calculations based on UN-DESA 2012). Yet, there are considerable differences between the different country groups or world regions. In the least developed countries (LDCs) the projected urban growth rate is far above the global average, at 3.3 percent annually during the same period of time (ibid.). This underscores that challenges related to rapid urbanization have to be seen in close connection to development and vulnerability aspects. Linking these urbanization figures to the findings on global vulnerability assessments in the context of natural hazards – most prominently the global World Risk Index (cf. 2.1.1.3; Welle et al. 2012) – one can observe a clear relationship in which countries with the highest urbanization dynamics and the lowest performance in aggregated development and income indicators, are amongst the countries facing the highest vulnerability and the greatest deficits in the capacity for adaptation (see in detail Garschagen and Romero-Lankao 2013). Figure 2.6 illustrates that Asia bears a major part of the world’s current and future urbanization. This makes it an area of key interest for research studies related to urbanization and transformation and for the emerging questions around risk dynamics, i.e. the shifts in risk profiles as society continue their urban devel-

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opment pathway. Asia is expected to host 53 percent of the projected global urban population in 2050. Southeast Asia features particularly strong urbanization dynamics, with its urban population projected to increase by 91 percent between 2010 and 2050, that is, from 262 to 500 million people (ibid). Hence, focusing this study on a country in Southeast Asia, and advancing the knowledge on vulnerability and adaption dynamics related to urbanization in this region, is of high relevance. This is true even though Figure 2.6 indicates that Southeast Asia in fact only contributes a small share to the total urban population in Asia, notably due to the large quantities in East Asia and South Asia. A detailed discussion of the urbanization patterns in Vietnam is provided in chapter 4.6.

Figure 2.6: Key urbanization patterns in Asia, own draft based on data from UN-DESA (2012)

Increasing attention has, over the recent years, been rightly paid to the growing importance of megacities11 and the specific challenges as well as opportunities they imply for larger development processes and sustainability issues (e.g. Kraas 2007a; or the comprehensive research programmes ‘Megacities-Megachallenge’, ‘Future Megacities’ and ‘Risk Habitat Megacity’12). However, the demographic and economic importance of smaller urban centers remains underemphasized. This is a remarkable situation given that small and medium-sized cities in fact host the major share of the urban population (cf. Figure 2.7). These cities also 11 Megacities are often defined in quantitative terms as cities with a minimum of – depending on the source – five, eight or ten million citizens (Kraas and Nitschke 2006). In addition, some definitions also include thresholds of population density. While most sources only consider monocentric cities, others include polycentric agglomerations as functionally integrated mega-urban areas (ibid.). 12 See www.megacities-megachallenge.org/; http://future-megacities.org/; http://www.ufz.de/risk-habitat-megacity/, respectively.

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play a key role not only for social and economic development within their own boundaries but for broader rural and regional development, particularly in developing countries (cf. Satterthwaite 2006; Tacoli & Satterthwaite 2002). This study therefore aims at contributing to increase the scientific attention given to this highly important, yet neglected, segment of the urban spectrum.

Figure 2.7: Size and distribution of cities, own draft based on data from UN-DESA (2012)

In line with the strong urbanization also peri-urban areas are of growing relevance globally and in Asia in particular. The peri-urban interface can be defined as the areas where the “city fringes intermingle with their hinterland to build hybrid mosaics of land use, economic activity, demographic density, socio-cultural dispersion, and bio-physical environments” (Garschagen et al. 2011: 43). These areas constitute some of the most dynamically transforming areas in terms of land use, economic and social changes, particularly in Asia’s rapidly urbanizing transformation countries such as Vietnam. One can hence expect that these areas also feature highly dynamic shifts in risk related to natural hazards. Not only are they the forefront of urban expansion into potentially hazard exposed areas, but the livelihood transformation of the population living in peri-urban areas is also likely to have strong impact on their susceptibility and response capacity towards natural hazards. Nevertheless these areas remain heavily neglected in terms of science and policy making. This is largely because they are hybrids in an ontologically dichotomous landscape which is aligned towards urban vs. rural archetypes used as a basis, for example, for appropriating research funding or administrative responsibilities (cf. Allen and Dávila 2002; Simon et al. 2006; Dávila 2006; Garschagen et al. 2011). The here presented study therefore includes peri-urban research sites into the case study portfolio (cf. 5) and contributes to filling the existing knowledge gaps with respect to peri-urban risk dynamics. In conjunction with their demographic importance, urban and peri-urban areas alike are nodal points of economic activity, political power, social movements, migration, trade, cultural identity, decision making, innovation and knowledge. Cities therefore play a central role in particular in countries undergoing comprehensive development processes or transformations such as the ongoing restructuring from a socialist to a market-based economy in Vietnam. As such, cities host

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key functions for larger social and economic systems far beyond the reach of their administrative boundaries. Hence, vulnerabilities towards natural hazards that might cause a break-down of these central functions bear relevance for regional, national or even global economic and social systems altogether. At the same time, the vulnerability faced in cities depends strongly on the services provided in their rural hinterland. Urban vulnerabilities can therefore be considered nested in multiple directions and teleconnected (Adger et al. 2009c) not only with regards to urban-hinterland-linkages, e.g. food supply or migration, but also in terms of global urban networks (cf. Mitchell 1999; Zingel et al. 2011; Keck et al. 2012; Huq et a. 2007). Given these dynamics around urbanization and their implications for larger global trends of sustainability and risk, it is important to remember the twofold role of cities as they “themselves present both the problems and solutions to sustainable challenges of an increasingly urbanized world” (Grimm et al. 2008: 756). This study therefore acknowledges both the challenges as well as the opportunities that urbanization bears for current and future risk pathways. 2.4.2. Cities, hazards and risk: underemphasized perspectives and knowledge gaps Resulting from these urbanization dynamics and the growing functional importance of cities are changes in the risk landscapes both within single cities and in integrated urban-urban as well as urban-rural-systems. Underlying is either the intensification of existing risks, the amalgamation and realignment of former risks into new risk constellations (emergence), or the formation of entirely new risks (see the sections below). Contrasting urban with rural risk dynamics, it can be argued that cities are of particular interest since it is in cities that the two sides of risk are most dynamically changing and directly interacting (Mitchell 1999). On the one hand, urban areas are exposed to changing natural as well as anthropogenic hazards and even intensify many of these hazards (see below; Kraas 2008, 2003). On the other hand, urbanization changes the socio-economic and institutional conditions from which social vulnerability but also adaptive capacity is produced – often in detrimental ways (see the discussion on ‘cities as agents of risk’ below). This combination produces highly complex dynamics that are fraught with uncertainty and make learning from the past increasingly difficult. However, a lot of the dynamics in the urbanization-risk-nexus are not yet sufficiently understood (Pelling 2003; Mitchell 1999: 16). This is in part due to the fact that in the past most scientific attention and resources have been devoted to rural areas. As a result, it can be observed that there is a lack of detailed assessments specifically targeting the manifold facets of urban risk (Satterthwaite et al. 2009: 16 et sequ.; Pelling 2003: 9; Mitchell 1999: 16). Current debates on urbanization are often too simplistic and stereotyped – particularly in the research and policy communities around global environmental change (cf. Satterthwaite et al. 2009: 16). In combination of these aspects, systemic risk minimization and risk

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prevention can be considered amongst the main aspects deserving increased attention in future urban development (Kraas 2007b: 19), thereby, shifting more attention to problem-, process-, and people-oriented approaches besides the current prioritization of physical and infrastructure related aspects in planning (ibid.: 22; see also Pelling 2003). Cities and natural hazards Global statistics reveal that the number of reported disasters related to natural hazards has been increasing over the recent decades (IPCC 2012; Munich Re 2011a). Even though it is difficult to separate urban from rural losses in global data sets, it needs to be assumed that cities account for a major share of the economic losses and for a considerable part of human casualties caused by disasters13 (IFRC 2010). Hurricane Katrina hitting New Orleans in 2005 (Cutter and Gall 2008) or the 2011 Bangkok floods (Kraas 2012) stand for some of the most extreme and most widely discussed examples of urban disasters related to natural hazards in recent years – yet, they are by far not the only ones. Related to overall changes in the perception of hazards and disasters (compare chapter 2.1.1), there is growing recognition that such urban disasters cannot be solely attributed to natural hazards or environmental changes. Rather, the impacts of urbanization on the vulnerability of urban social and economic systems (including dimensions of exposure, susceptibility and response capacity) are key to understanding changes in risk profiles and in the potential for disaster (Mitchell 1999; Pelling 2003). Given the importance of these effects, they will be explored specifically in the next section (c.f. 2.4.3). Climate change as emerging dimension of urban risk The projected impacts of climate change have received considerable attention lately as one additionally emerging dimension of urban risk. This field is surely related to – but not entirely identical with – the above-mentioned field of natural hazards. This is because climate change is projected to foremost imply an increase in the frequency, intensity and extent of natural hazards striking cities, e.g. floods or cyclones (IPCC 2012). In addition to the risk related to extreme events, climate change is expected to also imply creeping hazards that pose difficulties for cities, 13 The World Disaster Report 2010 with a special focus on urban risk correctly notes that while it is possible to identify certain disasters as urban disasters, it is much more difficult to assess the precise proportion that cities contribute to the total losses inflicted by disasters on a global scale (IFRC 2010). Also Pelling (2007) notes that “there is no international database of disasters loss that disaggregates data by urban and rural location” (p. 2). Nevertheless, analyzing major disasters over the last years, the World Disaster Report shows that large-scales disasters usually have a significant urban component to them – in addition to the fact that many disasters can be considered entirely urban (p. 34).

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e.g. sea level rise or water scarcity (IPCC 2007). Scientists as well as practitioners therefore increasingly recognize and address urban climate change adaptation as a new field of activity (cf. reviews and overviews by, for example, Solecki et al. 2011; Leichenko 2011; Romero-Lankao & Quin 2011; Huq et al. 2007; Hallegatte and Corfee-Morlot 2011; Romero-Lankao and Dodman 2011). Yet, what can be underlined here is that despite the rocketing scientific and political attention towards climate change issues in general, the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD) concluded in a relatively recent study (2009) that “cities and city dwellers have received too little attention in discussions of climate change impacts and adaptation” (CCCD 2009: 98). A number of reviews conclude that climate change is still primarily thought of as a rural problem, affecting agricultural production that depends on ecosystems – while urban risks are too often overlooked or (deliberately) neglected in climate change debates, both in terms of science literature and policy making (Satterthwaite et al. 2009; Birkmann et al. 2010b; Heinrichs et al. 2011; Romero-Lankao et al. 2012). Hence, there are still substantial knowledge gaps with respect to understanding the climate change challenges for specifically urban vulnerability and adaptation, contributing to the need for the study presented here. Cities as crucibles of multiple-dimensional hazard cascades The above sections point towards the rapidly growing body of literature that stresses risk related to natural hazards and global environmental change, particularly climate change. Yet, much of this literature tends to treat climate change risk as if it emerged in isolation from other risks and as if urban climate change risk was only emerging from changes in the ‘natural’ side of the hazard (see also Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010). However, cities and their inhabitants are at the same time exposed to a broad array of anthropogenic hazards such as industrial accidents, oil spills, epidemics, civil riots, economic crises, real estate bubbles and many more (cf. Kraas 2003: 10; Mitchell 1999). Urban populations and organizations hence have to deal simultaneously with natural, anthropogenic and coupled hazards, which increase the pressure on their limited portfolio of response capacity (cf. Figure 2.8 which illustrates the most important hazards in the context of Southeast Asian cities). Hence, also those studies which focus primarily on natural hazards (as the research presented here) have to be cognizant and informed about the other hazards in the given context because human vulnerability and response depends on the entirety of the hazard context. Importantly, urban hazards often not only overlap (in an additive way) but can even cross-intensify each other and can interact with the existing vulnerabilities in complex ways to form multiple risks or risk cascades. Natural hazards such as floods can, for example, evoke multiple other hazards such as epidemics, civil riots or industrial accidents. This also implies that secondary hazard impacts can transcend not only in space and extend to different geographical scales but might also transcend in time (e.g. the long-lasting cholera outbreak in

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Port-au-Prince and beyond after Haiti’s massive earthquake in 2010). The vast majority of recent studies does not sufficiently take-up or operationalize this aspect, particularly in the field of urban climate change risk assessments. This is remarkable given that the literature has for a while been calling for considering such aspects of multiple risks, risk cascades and ‘bundles of stress’ in urban risk assessment (e.g. Kraas 2008, 2003; de Sherbinin 2007: 41).

tsunami

crime

typhoons

traffic accidents

river bank erosion

economic crises

river floods

unemployement

pluvial flooding earthquakes

Multi-hazard context in Southeast Asian cities

vulcanic eruptions

industrial accidents disesase/ epidemics

war and terrorist attacks civil riots etc.

flooding caused by water logging env. pollution etc.

coupled natural—anthropogenic hazards

Figure 2.8: Multi-hazard risk in Southeast Asian cities, own draft, partly based on Kraas (2003); Mitchell (1999)

Small hazards and large disasters Related to the consideration of different risk types, it has been argued that there is an imbalance in the attention paid to large versus small disasters and the related risks – which is of great relevance for the context in this case study, as it will be shown later (cf. 6.2.1). Satterthwaite et al. (2009) observe that attention is being paid almost exclusively to large disasters reported in the global databases14 while 14 One of the most important demarcations is the definition used in the widely cited EM-DAT database provided by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). A disaster is reported in this database if it meets at least one of the following four properties: 10 or more people killed; 100 or more people affected (i.e. requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency); declaration of state of emergency; call for international assistance (CRED 2012a). The even broader but only partly accessible NatCatSERVICE data base of the Munich Re reinsurance company lists all disasters with major economic losses and any number of people severely injured or killed (Munich Re 2012). Yet, given multiple information constraints and the primary focus on ensured losses, the completeness of the latter has to be critically challenged.

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smaller events go largely unnoticed by the wider research and practitioner community. However, supposedly less harmful everyday hazards can in cities accumulate loss and harm that is higher than those experienced due to single large scale events (Bull-Kamanga et al. 2003; see also Mitchell 1999: 25; Pelling 2003). In addition, interacting everyday hazards of different types can in effect coincide and produce hazard cascades that indeed cause large scale disasters (see also above). 2.4.3. Urbanization as an agent of risk In addition to the above-illustrated co-existence of cities and hazards, it is essential to explore how urbanization itself can be an agent of risk (compare Mitchell 1999)15, i.e. how it can intensify or newly generate conditions that drive up risk, most notably through the generation or intensification of vulnerability but also through its influence on the very hazards introduced in the above section. Risk enhancing effects of urbanization are often claimed without detailed analysis of the processes, thereby, arguing in generalized terms of aggregated risk trends. However, what remains insufficiently understood to date is how urbanization takes effect on the different components of risk (i.e. hazard, exposure, susceptibility, coping capacity) and where self-reinforcing effects but also contradictory effects can be observed. The latter are of key interest since risk enhancing effects in one dimension can in principle be (partly) compensated by contrary effects in other dimensions. For example, one might suggest that increased exposure in emerging economies with growing cities in coastal areas are to a certain extent balanced by increasing capacities in these countries to invest in risk mitigation measures, e.g. dyke systems or improved building standards. The following sections therefore attempt to examine the risk and vulnerability effects of urbanization currently reported in the literature. While global literature is considered, special attention is given to literature on Asia and particularly Southeast Asia. This serves as a background for a detailed and empirical analysis of risk dynamics in Can Tho City. Exposure effects of urbanization Urbanization can have significant influence on the development of natural hazard exposure at multiple scales. On top of the high earthquake and related tsunami exposure of major global urban agglomerations (e.g. Istanbul, San Francisco or Tokyo; cf. Munich Re 2011b), a major share of the global urban development takes place in coastal or delta areas highly exposed to hydro-meteorological haz15 Mitchell (1999) talks of cities as “agents of disaster”. Yet, since increased levels of risk do not necessarily need to turn into disasters, the phrase “urbanization as agent of risk” seems more appropriate here.

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ards such as floods, cyclones, storm surges or sea level rise. Two-thirds of all cities worldwide with a population of more than 5 million inhabitants are at least partly located within the contiguous area along the coast with less than 10 meters of elevation, i.e. the so-called low elevation coastal zone (McGranahan et al. 2007; compare also Nicholls et al. 2008). This zone’s total urban population across all city classes sums up to over 360 million – yet, since this analysis was based on population data of the year 2000, the actual figure is probably much higher today (ibid.). Out of this group, Asia alone accounted for an estimated 238 million in 2000 (i.e. 66 percent of the total urban population within this zone) and 229 million (i.e. 64 percent) belonged to low- and lower-middle income nations16. Already today, large port cities with more than 5 million inhabitants feature an exposure of economic assets to a 1 in 100 years coastal flood event that accounts for 5 percent of the global GDP, with strong increases expected (cf. Hanson et al. 2011). On a meso-scale, many cities which had been founded strategically on nonexposed grounds might over time sprawl into exposed areas, particularly into lowelevation areas exposed to flooding. Storch and Downes (2011), for example, show in detail the importance of such a development for Ho Chi Minh City and predict that such human-made exposure will have a multitude of impact on future climate change related risk as compared to the actual contribution of the projected sea level rise. Similar studies revealed the influence of such developments for the disaster related to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Wilbanks et al. 2007; Cutter and Gall 2008) or the 2011 flood in Bangkok (Kraas 2012). The question, hence, arises in how far this trend can also be observed in the case study analyzed here and how this might influence the risk management discourses (cf. 4.7; 6.2). At the local level, urbanization particularly in low- and middle-income nations often implies that low-income inhabitants (often migrants) have to revert to marginal lands with high hazard exposure for their settlement due to a lack of affordable low cost housing in more secure areas (Satterthwaite et al. 2007; Wisner et al. 2004; Moser & Satterthwaite 2008; Pelling 2003; UN-HABITAT 2011). Paying particular attention to the many rising economies, notably in Asia, Satterthwaite et al. (2009) notice that “there is a tension in most cities between the need for a labor force willing to work for low wages and the way in which city land markets push up house prices beyond what much of this labor” (p. 26). Considering these three scales in conjunction, scholarship tends to focus on urbanization as a driver of exposure. In fact, research on urban exposure in the context of climate change has become so popular that many, if not most, studies reduce vulnerability as a whole to a measure of exposure. They, therewith, utterly neglect the important role of other vulnerability dimensions, which – in accordance with the vulnerability frameworks presented above (cf. 2.1.1.2) – can be labeled susceptibility and response capacity. That is why the following sections, as 16 For a description of the classification method see McGranahan et al. (2007) who in general follow the common World Bank classification (see http://data.worldbank.org/about/countryclassifications).

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well as the empirical work presented later, pay attention in particular to those other factors of vulnerability. Susceptibility effects of urbanization Susceptibility effects of urbanization are not well understood in detail given that they have to date been far less researched than exposure effects. However, a number of general relations comprising direct and indirect effects have been suggested in the literature. Linked to the above point on micro-scale exposure, poor and marginalized urban dwellers often have to make do with improvised low quality shelters for housing, leaving them with a high physical susceptibility (Moser & Satterthwaite 2008). In addition, urbanization dynamics influence baseline vulnerability in multiple ways, for example, through a lack of access to health care provision and education services in countries with high socio-economic disparities, through precarious and barely profitable income generation often being informal or even illegal in nature, through insufficient social security provisioning, through poor institutional and legal security or through insufficient land titling (e.g. Kraas 2007a; UN-HABITAT 2007). It has been observed that these issues are of particular relevance in low and medium income countries, particularly for their poorest and most marginalized population groups (Satterthwaite et al. 2007). However, beyond these generic effects, more specific susceptibility effects of urbanization, e.g. for specific natural hazards, remain insufficiently explored. The empirical study presented here contributes to filling this gap (cf. 6.2). Response capacity effects of urbanization With regards to response capacity, urbanization often implies an excessive strain on available resources both in the private and the public sector. An urban neglect has been recognized in many countries. On the one hand urban government bodies are often insufficiently capacitated with power as well as financial and human resources to conduct effective risk mitigation. On the other hand, national politicians, but also international donors, are often not particularly interested in urban development and risk response action – compared to the attention given to rural areas – and do not allocate sufficient resources to cities (Satterthwaite et al. 2009: 7). There is still a wide-spread perception in developing and transition countries that urbanization more or less automatically leads to modernization and human development, which is a grave misconception as the wide range of urban development problems in those countries underscores (e.g. UN-HABITAT 2010a). As a result of this urban neglect, public infrastructure and capacity to cope with hazards and to support coping measures in the private domain are rather limited, particularly in many low- and middle-income nations. Regarding individual and household level responses, it has been suggested that it is particularly the poorer and marginalized urban dwellers who have limited material capacities for

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risk response, which is related to their limited overall basket of livelihood asset. Yet, under certain conditions social capital that is transferred into informal support networks – for example amongst slum dwellers – has been found to partly compensate for the lack of financial capacities (e.g. Braun & Aßheuer 2011; Pelling 1997). Nevertheless, especially the potential capacity to respond to future hazards, which might not yet have been observable in the past, remains poorly understood, particularly under conditions of dynamic urban transformation as in Vietnam. Hazard effects of urbanization Next to the above exposure effects acting on human systems, urbanization can directly influence natural hazards in many ways, therewith further driving-up exposure of urban residents and assets. Most importantly for the research presented here, urbanization implies wide-spread soil sealing and the creation of impermeable surfaces, in turn reducing the infiltration capacity of the soil and increasing flood hazards (Huq et al. 2007: 6). In addition, flood retention areas are often converted into built-up area. Apart from the exacerbation of flood hazard, urbanization can produce heat island effects (Mokhov 2009) which can increase local precipitation and the intensity of heavy rainfall events. Urban block structures might further increase wind hazard as well as velocity hazards in cases of severe flooding (Pelling and Blackburn 2013). In combination with the multiple other human-induced hazards, urban areas are prone to producing complex hazard cascades (see 2.4.2). Table 2.4 summarizes the most important vulnerability effects of urbanization. It contrasts the different vulnerability-urbanization-links in low, middle and high income countries. Given the focus of this chapter, attention is therein especially given to vulnerability-enhancing effects. The urban potential for risk reduction is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.4.6. Also the geo-physical effects on the hazard are not explicitly considered given the interest on vulnerability in this study.

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Vulnerability-enhancing effects of urbanization Exposure

Susceptibility

Lack of capacity to cope and recover

High income countries*

- sub-urbanization and extreme land consumption per capita spreads exposure over large areas - generation of exposure to hazard cascades (e.g. natural hazards triggering technological hazards)

- demographic change (aging population) increases susceptibility in future - high dependence on complex high-tech infrastructure networks - high dependency of urban hinterlands on functioning of urban systems

- high persistence and lock-in of long-established urban centers increases costs for implementing new or expanding existing disaster risk infrastructure - demographic change (aging population) and shrinking cities will challenge effective and efficient coping infrastructure in future

Middle income countries

- on macro-scale, economic growth correlates with massive urban growth in highly exposed areas, most notably in low elevation coastal zones often compounded with ineffective land use planning and regulation - on micro-scale, low income groups and migrants often have to revert to highly hazard exposed but cheaply accessible locations for habitation - generation of exposure to hazard cascades (e.g. natural hazards coinciding with health hazards and technological hazards)

- cities typically feature increasing socio-economic disparities in terms of income and access to education, health care, food and water, and other goods and services

- development of urban disaster management infrastructure often cannot keep pace with urban growth - marginal population groups in cities often insufficiently equipped to cope with natural hazards

- uncontrolled urban expansion increases exposure, particularly at meso- and micro-scales - generation of exposure to hazard cascades (e.g. natural hazards coinciding with health hazards and riots)

- urban populations and governments often trapped in vicious cycle of poor socioeconomic performance, hazard impact, conflict and poor governance

- urban disaster management infrastructure usually poorly established or lacking - marginal population groups in cities often insufficiently equipped to cope with natural hazards

(including many emerging economies and transition countries)

Low income countries (including least developed countries)

*The income classification refers to national per capita averages according to the World Bank nomenclature.

Table 2.4: Key vulnerability factors of urbanization, own draft based on the literature cited in the above review

2.4.4. Conceptualizing and assessing urban risk and vulnerability Despite the growing number of scientific publications and development projects on urban risk and vulnerability, there has been surprisingly little work that tries to synthesis the specifically urban aspects around vulnerability and risk into comprehensive conceptual frameworks or models. Referring particularly to the context of climate change, Satterthwaite et al. (2009) find that “unlike other areas of climate change research (e.g. agricultural vulnerability), no systematic methodologies and studies have been developed to understand urban vulnerability in the context of

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multiple stressors, to address the determinants of vulnerability and poverty in urban areas, and to explore the constraints and windows of opportunity (e.g. innovative approaches) in order to increase the adaptive capacity and resilience of the urban poor” (p. 17). Similarly, Romero-Lankao & Qin (2011) infer from their comprehensive literature review that “notwithstanding the increasing number of studies on vulnerability there has been little research focusing specifically on the conceptualization of urban vulnerability to climate change” (p. 142). Specifically urban aspects remain therefore underrepresented (Satterthwaite et al. 2009) and the existing studies largely mirror vulnerability in the general environmental change context (Romero-Lankao & Qin 2011) – and one is tempted to add that the latter are more or less strongly rooted in rural studies. The development of indicators for urban vulnerability is therefore too often supported by “untested assumptions about the determinants of vulnerability” and standard sets of indicators and assessments might in fact not work in the urban context (Romero-Lankao & Qin 2011: 146). Bull-Kamanga et al. (2003) conclude in a similar vein the “need to ‘drill down’ in urban geography, into individual cities and districts within cities, and into individual informal settlements while, at the same time, allowing for an understanding of risk at the district, city and cityregion level” (Bull-Kamanga 2003: 202) – something that the work presented here aims to do (cf. 6.2). Yet, while a detailed look at the current urban particularities shaping risk, vulnerability and adaptation in cities is necessary, such a perspective needs to remain cognizant of an additional challenge related to future dynamics. That is, attempts to conceptualize urban vulnerability and adaptation comprehensively and cross-temporally, would need to integrate two perspectives which on first sight appear contradictory. They would firstly need to explore and incorporate the existing urban drivers of vulnerability and factors for adaptive capacity. Secondly, they would directly need to challenge the role of these causal links with regards to future dynamics and conditions and would need to explore how the causal links might develop or change with not only changes in the hazards but particularly with socio-economic transformations. One might expect, for example, that risk perception and the accepted levels of risk might change along with changing urban lifestyles and socio-economic development in Vietnam. Another example is that urban planning and management paradigms for shaping adaptation might need to be modified with time (cf. 6). The framework for urban vulnerability and adaptation assessment developed in chapter 3 sets out to respond to the above noted shortcomings and challenges, hence, providing an improved analytic lens for the empirical analysis presented in chapter 6 and its discussion in chapter 7. 2.4.5. Specific challenges in low and middle income countries A considerable body of literature suggests that urban vulnerabilities related to natural hazards and climate change impacts are particularly precarious in low- and

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middle-income countries17 (cf. Dodman and Satterthwaite 2008; Satterthwaite et al. 2009; Pelling and Wisner 2009; Moser and Satterthwaite 2008; de Sherbinin et al. 2007; Garschagen and Kraas 2010). It is in these countries that the multiple links between urban vulnerability and urban development issues take effect most distinctively. On the one side, widespread poverty limits the access to vulnerability-relevant goods and services such as health care provisioning, education or appropriate housing. On the other side, the provision with public infrastructure and services mostly tends to be low in these countries meaning that urban dwellers have to make up for this deficit with their own resources – often reverting to informal strategies and activities. In addition, the often prevailing weak institutional framework conditions and poor government practices contribute to institutional insecurity with detrimental effects on strategic vulnerability reduction and the potential for building up adaptive capacity within the private as well as the public domain (cf. Satterthwaite et al. 2009; Dodman and Satterthwaite 2008). The analysis of global data sets, hence suggests that it is in these countries that the most significant challenges in terms of vulnerability and most distinct constraints for effective adaptation are to be expected (Garschagen and Romero-Lankao 2013). In this regard the term adaptation deficit has been coined. It means that adaptation to new stressors and perturbations, such as climate change, does not start from a neutral ‘state zero’ with accomplished adaptation to the existing hazards. Rather, even the current stressors and perturbations are not adapted to, resulting in an adaptation deficit that makes adapting to future hazards even more difficult. Adaptation deficits are symptomatic particularly for cities given an often long history of urban neglect – especially in the developing countries and socialistoriented systems such as Vietnam (cf. 4.6). Besides these structural challenges, Dodman and Satterthwaite (2008) remind us that one-third of the world’s population lives in urban areas in low- and middle-income nations. Hence, the question whether adaptation to climate change and other stressors will be successful as a whole decisively depends on how effective the issue of adaptation can be negotiated in the cities in low- and middle-income nations. Yet, it has been highlighted that considerable vulnerability disparities also exist within the urban segment in low- and middle-income nations – which has to be seen in close relation to the rapid overall increase of socio-economic disparities and fragmentation processes in the cities of these countries (e.g. Coy and Kraas 2003; UN-HABITAT 2010a: 60 et sequ.). Dodman and Satterthwaite hold that particularly the urban poor within these countries can be disproportionally vulnerable due to a number of reasons. Not only do they usually have the lowest aggregate capital endowment of all urban dwellers, they also frequently receive less direct and indirect state support and have to face less legal and institutional security than other urban population groups. Yet, even though there seems to be intuitive or heuristic reason behind arguing that the poor are the most vulnerable, a number of authors caution that the 17 This nomenclature refers to the classification by the World Bank (2012).

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links are in fact poorly understood and that detailed analysis is largely lacking to date – particularly in the context of rapid urbanization and socio-economic as well as political transformations (e.g. Romero-Lankao and Qin 2011). This is in line with the more general argument that vulnerability to natural hazards and other stressors cannot be easily equated with poverty since the causal relations mostly depend on the specific hazard context (compare chapter 2.1.1). This is true in particular with regards to newly emerging hazards. The research presented here, therefore, helps to critically review and challenge the often prevailing assumption of a static relationship between urban poverty and urban vulnerability. 2.4.6. Urban potential for risk reduction and mitigation Yet, despite all the above challenges urban systems also hold significant potential for vulnerability reduction and effective adaptation which too often tend to be forgotten in the current academic and political discourse. Emphasizing on these opportunities is not only needed for a balanced analytic view but can be of great support to mobilize resources for applied urban adaptation and risk management, particularly in countries like Vietnam which are widely considered as risk hot spots (cf. 4.2) but are faced with a chronic shortage in resources for risk mitigation. Firstly, urbanization – in theory – bears high potential for fostering sustainable human development which helps to tackle the root causes of vulnerability (compare 2.1.1.2). Kraas (2007b) refers in this context to the ‘double-headed face of mega-urbanization’ – which can to a lesser extent also be transferred to urbanization in general, i.e. to smaller cities and emerging urban agglomerations. Focusing on South, East and Southeast Asia she explores ecological, economic, social and political dimensions of sustainable development opportunities implied by urbanization (cf. Kraas 2007b: 14 et sequ.). Secondly, the high density of people and physical assets can be utilized for making protection infrastructure more cost efficient and, hence, improving its financial feasibility and political acceptance (Birkmann et al. 2010b; Solecki et al. 2011). Along the same line, urban areas also have the advantage that a large proportion of the population lives is in close proximity to hazard response services (e.g. hospitals, fire-fighters) which is often not provided in more distant rural areas (Dodman and Satterthwaite 2008). Thirdly, in many parts of the world, particularly in the developing and transitional world, countries still have a large part of their urbanization ahead. This means that emerging cities could – at least in theory – still be planned and shaped in ways that accommodate the increased climate change risks (Satterthwaite et al. 2009: 5). Fourthly, from a more general perspective, urban areas are seedbeds of knowledge generation and innovation – also meaning that the respective institutions and actors are based in urban areas. One might, hence, expect that a lot of attention will be directed towards urban adaptation, resulting in innovative solutions, once the effects of climate change are felt more directly in urban areas. Fifthly, on a similar note, urban areas host significant amounts of the global eco-

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nomic value adding. In theory, there should hence be substantial financial and economic capacities, particularly in the private sector, that could be mobilized once the needs for investing in adaptation will be felt more directly. However, it is very important to underscore that these above listed opportunities have to be considered best-case conditions that emerge foremost from a theoretical and normative perspective – which can often not be realized on the ground. If and how the first-introduced challenges related to urbanization, risk and adaptation can be negotiated and the respective opportunities for risk reduction (introduced above) be capitalized on eventually depends on urban governance, more precisely on adaptive urban risk governance in the respective region, country and city. This topic is therefore addressed in the next section (cf. 2.5). 2.5.

GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF URBAN RISK AND ADAPTATION „It is at the local level that universal norms for good governance meet the messy reality of competing interests and priorities.” (UN-HABITAT 2002: 15)

Considering adaptation as the means to counteract and reduce risk and vulnerability (cf. 2.1.2.2) implies that adaptation is a dynamic process fuelled by the ideas and actions of different people and organizations. Therefore, management and governance questions are of central importance, i.e. issues around the conceptual development, mediation and implementation of adaptation measures amongst different actors and institutions. These aspects are of particular interest in Vietnam, where actor networks and power constellations are undergoing dynamic changes along with the overall transformation process (cf. 4). Therefore, a thorough review of the more general risk governance and management literature is advisable to not only sharpen the analytic lens for the empirical work in Vietnamese case study (cf. 6) but also to be able to later on reflect whether and how the global governance discourse can be advanced to accommodate specific vulnerability and adaptation questions and to inform policy advise in transformation contexts (cf. 7). 2.5.1. Governance and risk management concepts Over the last two decades, the discourse revolving around governance has gained substantial influence in both scientific and political spheres (Doornbos 2001; Elander 2002). Despite the fact that over time various different schools of thought have developed with varying analytical foci and underlying norms, epistemologies and/or ontologies (cf. e.g. Pierre and Peters 2000; Grindle 2007), some common elements can be found in almost all of these schools. Governance can thus be defined as all ways in which individuals and institutions exercise influence and manage common affairs at the interface of the state

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sector, the private economic sector and civil society (Garschagen & Kraas 2011; based on McCarney 2003: 36; Dente et al. 2005: 41; UNDP 1997). It thereby comprises both the formalized and informal mechanisms through which actors articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and/or mediate their differences (adapted from UNDP 1997). The normative advancement of good governance is understood by UNDP as “participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive” and following “the rule of law” (UNDP 1997). That is why Kraas (2005) argues that governance can be understood as the institutional roof of the typically considered three pillars of sustainability (ecological, economic and social) – an aspect that has been largely neglected until recently (p. 41). Even though governance discourses mostly originate from a national or even global focus, their transfer to local levels and in particular to local urban issues has undergone a very fruitful development in the more recent past (cf. Einig et al. 2005; McCarney 2003). Based on this general understanding, urban risk and adaptation governance can be understood as all modes and institutions by which a city’s individuals, social groups and organizations of the state sector and the private domain negotiate their interests, exercise their influence and distribute as well as act upon their responsibilities to manage and reduce urban risk and to enable adaptation across all scales and actors in a city. This understanding of governance is hence broader than the concept of risk management. The latter is often used to refer to governmental or otherwise formalized risk mitigation or response measures, or more precisely, to the drafting, implementation and monitoring of such measures (e.g. UNISDR 2004: 3). The concept of risk management often carries a strong notion of the top-down manageability and stringent implementability of formal risk reduction mechanisms. The respective measures can thereby include hard infrastructure measures (e.g. dyke systems), action-based measures (e.g. the training and commanding of emergency and disaster response units) or soft institutional measures (e.g. building regulations or land use planning). Acknowledging and analyzing governmental or state risk management is of central importance as it constitutes a key element within the larger risk governance landscape – particularly in countries like Vietnam with a dominant role of the state. However, a focus on risk management alone is insufficient to grasp the entire spectrum of processes shaping risk reduction and adaptation on the ground. Therefore, governance is broader and puts a lot of emphasis also on the societal construction of risk perception and the negotiation and communication processes behind appraising and evaluation different adaptation options (e.g. Greiving et al. 2012). It is, for example, of key interest in the Vietnamese case to analyze how this wider societal negotiation of risk perception and risk response changes not only with the emerging climate change discourse but particularly with the changing liberalization and privatization of social security mechanisms (cf. 4). The different elements in risk governance processes have been discussed and summarized by Renn (2008) in a generalized framework (see Figure 2.9). Draw-

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ing largely from work in industrialized countries, this framework underscores that risk governance is a highly discursive process in which communication is needed not only between the different actors involved (e.g. the government, the administration, the wider public, civil society groups) but also between the different phases in the process. The framing of problems, for example, is throughout the process constantly shaped and re-shaped by risk evaluation and appraisal. Risk governance is therefore also not considered a linear process but a cyclic one with intensive feedbacks between the different phases. However, the question of whether and how these risk negotiation and communication processes take place in countries with limited possibilities for public participation and freedom of expression remains largely under-researched. Therefore, the study presented here attempts to respond to this gap by exploring risk and adaptation governance at the interface of state and non-state domains in the transforming political economy of Vietnam.

Pre-assessment • Problem framing • Definition of management goals

Risk management

Risk appraisal

Implementation • Option realization • Monitoring and control

Risk assessment • Hazard identification • Exposure and vulnerability assessment

Decision-making • Option identification • Option assessment • Option evaluation and selection

Communication

Concern assessment • Risk perceptions • Social concerns • Socio-economic impacts

Risk evaluation • Judging the tolerability and acceptability • Need for risk reduction measures

Figure 2.9: Risk governance framework, adopted from Renn (2008: 365)

2.5.2. Entry points for governmental urban risk management Notwithstanding the importance of broader governance perspectives, there is a large body of literature that concentrates in particular on potential entry points that urban governments and administrations can take to formally manage and mitigate current and future risk related natural hazards. These entry points are explored by different scientific communities but the most significant contributions usually originate from the schools of disaster risk management, urban development studies and spatial urban planning. Since these contributions concentrate largely on

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formal governmental policy and action, a thorough review and a reflection of the transferability to the Vietnamese context is of key relevance given the strong role of the state in Vietnam (cf. 4). Figure 2.10 summarizes the central mechanisms discussed in the literature along their effect on key vulnerability and risk dimensions introduced in chapter 2. Hazard

Exposure

Susceptibility

Coping capacity

Entire city and beyond

Single districts or wards within city

- Hazard modeling and monitoring - Hazard mitigation through protective infrastructure, e.g. dykes or flood barriers; retention areas; green spaces for reducing heat island effects etc.

- Land use zoning and spatial urban planning in order to prevent or regulate urban developments in hazard exposed areas

- Improving the resistance of physical infrastructure through robustness and functional redundancy - Social development policies for decreasing baseline susceptibility - Promotion of insurance schemes

- Resettlement of most exposed households

- Building codes and regulations

Individual buildings or households

- Early warning and hazard forecasting - Disaster response units - Contingency planning for disaster response - Awareness raising and information sharing

- Emergency plans for critical infrastructure facilities - Contingency plans and trainings for evacuation and other coping mechanisms

Figure 2.10: Entry points for governmental urban risk management in the context of natural hazards, own draft, summarized from measures discussed in Burby et al. (1999, 2000); Jha et al. (2012); Burby and Dalton (1994); March and Henry (2007); Greiving and Fleischhauer (2006); Fra Paelo (2009); Sánchez Rodríguez (2009); Alexander (2006, 2009); Sudmeier-Rieux et al. (2013)

It can be seen that the more technically oriented schools of spatial urban planning and disaster risk management largely target the control of the hazard itself as well as the reduction or prevention of physical exposure and – to a lesser extend – physical susceptibility of the built infrastructure. The discussed measures around disaster risk management are rather re-active and concentrate on the disaster response by the time the hazard strikes. Most of them only engage superficially with the causes and deeper roots of vulnerability and the potential for disaster. In contrast to the physicalist approaches concentrating on hazard response, exposure reduction, physical susceptibility and technical coping measures, Figure 2.10 shows that far less consideration is being given to soft aspects social susceptibility. The cited literature suggests that the effectiveness and implementability of state-run risk management measures varies widely between different countries or regions, depending on the broader institutional conditions (e.g. Burby et al. 1999; Fra Paelo 2009). These include, for example, the rule of law, the level of public participation in planning and governance processes or the more general mindset with regards to the overall management paradigm (ranging from rather lose and liberal to centralistic and control-oriented modes). However, a review of the litera-

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ture also suggests that the detailed connection between the listed measures and the conditions for or against their effectiveness and implementability often remain unclear, due to a lack of studies that examine in detail the above-mentioned institutional parameters that are assumed to be decisive. Hence, detailed case studies, like the one presented here, which analyze these institutional aspects through qualitative research are urgently needed. 2.5.3. Relevance of urban governance perspectives The conceptual frame of governance is for a number of reasons particularly valuable in the urban context of risk and adaptation. These reasons go far beyond the quantitative and demographic importance of urban dynamics illustrated above (cf. 2.4.1). Firstly, one of the central entry points to many governance concepts is the critique of an exclusive focus on state-driven interventions and the acknowledgment of state-failure in terms of the sufficient provision of important services and infrastructures. Satterthwaite et al. (2009) note that particularly in low- and middleincome countries governments often do not provide sufficient infrastructure (hard and soft) for effective risk management, particularly in cities. Yet, while wealthy urban population groups can usually compensate for lacking or insufficient public risk reduction, poor and resource-starved social groups mostly do not have these opportunities. Hence, they often have to revert to informal risk reduction mechanisms (Kraas 2007b) which, however, are not always capable of compensating the lack of formal measures. Satterthwaite et al. (2009) therefore conclude that “one of the most powerful measures to the quality of urban governance is the extent to which it reduces or removes the differentials in risk […] between high- and lowincome groups” (p. 35). In this context, a wider understanding of governance allows in particular for capturing, both, formal and informal risk response measures and how they are negotiated between state and non-state actors. Yet, formal and informal modes of risk response should not be understood as distinct antipodes that can be sharply attributed to specific types of actors (Etzold et al. 2009; Bork et al. 2009). Rather, the continuum of different adaptation modes is of interest and the interplay between both domains, particularly related to the question whether and how they shift with the changes in overall state-society relations (cf. 4.5) and the (normative) re-distribution of responsibilities for risk reduction (cf. 6.1; 7). Hence, the detailed analysis on Can Tho City will explore whether the superficial equation of formal risk management with state action versus informal action being considered in the non-state-domain is in fact helpful – or whether it rather is an oversimplified transfer of the concept of informality. Secondly, a distinctively urban focus on governance is increasingly important due to the experience that the spectrum of actors who exercise influence on urban affairs has been rapidly broadening in many parts of the world. This is particularly the case in countries undergoing broader political, economic and social transfor-

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mation, e.g. in the context of late-socialist reforms as it is the case in Vietnam. This broadening of the actor spectrum results in multiple re-distributions and fragmentations of power which makes a focus solely on urban governments insufficient (cf. Garschagen and Kraas 2011). Thirdly, urban governance perspectives are particularly relevant for decentralized risk and adaptation dynamics. Being close to the problems ‘on the ground’, the activities of governmental as well as non-governmental actors at the local level facilitate context-specific adaptation solutions that are closely linked to the specific needs, wants and capacities of local communities and economies (Garschagen and Kraas 2011). In terms of governance it is at this level where the most direct and intensive engagement of different actors usually takes place given that the decisions directly affect their day-to-day realities. At the same time, it is the local urban level at which global and national risk management and adaptation policies have to be enacted – or fail. 2.5.4. Challenges for (urban) risk and adaptation governance The above discourse on vulnerability, adaptation and resilience yields a considerable number of implications and challenges specifically related to risk and adaptation governance and the political processes surrounding it. It is far from possible to review all of them here, hence, only the most relevant for framing this research will be reflected: Adaptation governance has to negotiate the great challenge of dealing with multiple uncertainties in terms not only of future hazard trends but also socioeconomic development pathways (Dessai et al. 2009; Adger and Vincent 2005). Therefore, as indicated above (cf. 2.1.2), no regret solutions have been urged, meaning adaptation and risk management measures that also contribute to general development goals and that are robust and useful against different thinkable futures (Schipper and Pelling 2006). However, the resilience-influenced call for an adaptation mode that integrates forward-looking (anticipatory) learning, on the one hand, with cyclic learning based on experience and reflection, on the other hand, poses certain questions with respect to climate related hazards that may not yet have been experienced – as it is to a certain extent the case with the analysis presented here. It has, for example, been observed that windows of opportunity for change often only open after shocks have been experienced (Birkmann et al. 2010a). This challenges the institutional implementation of pro-active transformation. Risk and adaptation governance also has to cut across different policy arenas which to date are not yet sufficiently integrated. While the synergies between adaptation, vulnerability reduction and general development have been well established conceptually (e.g. Schipper and Pelling 2006; Schipper and Burton 2009; Handmer 2003; Eriksen and Brown 2011) these domains are still often treated as separated or even competing realms in terms of policy making and the distribution

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of resources, thereby inhibiting integrative approaches (Eriksen and O’Brien 2007; Eriksen et al. 2011). However, Brown (2011) also cautions in this context that the concept of sustainable adaptation should not be co-opted – as ‘sustainable development’ has largely been – to promote ‘business as usual’ rather than to critically challenge the dominant development paradigms and to seriously address the deeply entrenched root causes of vulnerability (compare also Ribot 2011). Relating this point to climate change adaptation, Adger et al. (2009b) therefore hold that “in reality the governance of adaptation is likely to be complex and somewhat messy – a legacy of past modes of operating combined with the persistence of outdated paradigms that make it difficult to enact effective adaptations to an issue as complex and multifaceted as climate change” (p. 6). Hence, Moser (2009) firmly cautions against an illusionary prospect for pursuing perfect governance approach that promises perfect adaptation. Therefore, the notion of interplay between sustaining and reorganization in the resilience literature may be very appealing conceptually and normatively. However, in reality the two aims of preserving old structures versus changing towards new ones often represent rather irreconcilable antipodes which are difficult to negotiate. Whether and how these conceptual propositions are, or can be, implemented therefore mostly remains an open question. In conclusion, the above paragraphs underscore that there are many challenges and knowledge gaps not only in terms of conceptual questions around urban risk governance but particularly around their implementability in the real world (see also Fünfgeld 2010). Particularly thin remains the in-depth knowledge on the institutional and organizational opportunities but also barriers when adaptation concepts are transferred across different cultural and political contexts where cultural-cognitive paradigms may run counter to the propositions within adaptation theory (cf. chapter 6; Garschagen 2013). This calls for a more critical engagement with the institutional processes and contradictions involved, especially in highly dynamic and transformative contexts. The research presented here attempts to tackle this gap through closely integrating the conceptual discourse with an indepth empirical case study from Can Tho City (cf. 6; 7). The next chapter hence develops the conceptual framework necessary for guiding this integrated analysis.

3.

INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION ANALYSIS

As laid out in the first chapter, one of this study’s aims is to analyze which shortcomings exist in current conceptual approaches to vulnerability and adaptation and to explore how these deficits can be overcome by an improved conceptual framing. This chapter sets out to respond to this question. Based on the groundwork laid in chapter 2, chapter 3.1 will tackle the question’s first part by synthesizing the main deficits in hitherto approaches to vulnerability and adaptation. Chapter 3.2 then presents an advanced integrative framework developed here. While being inspired by the research on Vietnam, the framework aims at achieving a more general relevance, allowing for its application also in other regional and thematic context conditions. Chapter 3.3 discusses the opportunities arising from this framework, which has been used to structure and guide the empirical analysis presented in chapter 6. 3.1.

SYNTHESIS ON THE DEFICITS IN HITHERTO APPROACHES TO VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION

The reflection in chapter 2 has yielded the key achievements in current conceptual approaches to risk, vulnerability, adaptation and resilience, but also a high number of neglected topics, mismatches and gaps. It is in particular these deficits that drive the endeavor for conceptual advancement. They are synthesized in the following paragraphs, providing the basis for a considerate response and the development of an advanced and integrated framework (cf. 3.2): (1) Even though it has been suggested in the literature that vulnerability and adaptation can be linked conceptually through the domain of risk or rather risk reduction (cf. 2.1.2.2) the modes of how adaptation can contribute to vulnerability reduction have been only discussed in very generic and idealized terms. Conceptual frameworks linking adaptation and vulnerability in a more detailed, integrative and coherent way are lacking to date. Along the same lines, vulnerability and adaptation research communities are still divided to a certain extent and often tend to treat the two concepts as two separate scientific fields and policy domains (cf. 2.1.1; 2.1.2). (2) Related to the above point, current adaptation frameworks are not specific enough to explore how adaptation relates to vulnerability reduction in the different components of vulnerability, notably exposure, susceptibility and lack of coping capacity (cf. 2.1.2; 2.2). Therefore, internal synergies but also conflicts and barriers in vulnerability-adaptation-links remain largely neglected. This is surprising given the high amount of publications in both fields and the

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obvious importance of integrating the two in a more coherent conceptual manner. While the importance of considering multi-hazard conditions has long since been emphasized in the literature (e.g. Cutter 1996; Kraas 2003; O’Brien et al. 2004a) current vulnerability and adaptation analyzes pay surprisingly little attention to the fact that actors are usually exposed to different hazards. Many studies tend to frame the context of their research subjects as if they only have to deal with the respective natural or climatic hazard in the focus of their research project, therewith neglecting that they simultaneously are exposed to a wide range of anthropogenic hazards such as economic crises, violent conflicts or forced resettlement. These other hazards do not only influence risk perception and risk ranking but also the distribution and prioritization of adaption resources which are necessarily limited. Along with the above point, current adaptation discourses too often consider adaptation exclusively in relation to environmental or climatic changes thereby neglecting that adaptation happens simultaneously in relation to wider socio-economic changes. The latter are of central importance since they do not only generate additional anthropogenic hazards, e.g. through market liberalizations or global integration (see point 3), but can also yield new opportunities for adaptation, e.g. through an increased availability of resources (cf. 2.1.3). Integrating these perspectives conceptually and empirically is therefore essential, particularly in countries like Vietnam where socio-economic transformations are most distinct. While there has been a rapidly growing number of adaptation studies, the research landscape tends to be divided in a dichotomous way between, first, work focusing empirically and conceptually on state or government driven adaptation and, second, scholarship concentrating on non-state adaptation, e.g. under the popular umbrella of community-based adaptation. Both are relevant and important (cf. 2.1.2; 2.5). However, it is interesting to observe that the links, feedbacks, conflicts and synergies between governmental (or statedriven) and non-governmental (or non-state-driven) adaptation activities and needs remain largely neglected. The terminology of ‘informal mechanisms’ is often used to cover up this fuzziness. However, particularly in politically transforming countries like Vietnam there is a lack of understanding how these informal adaptation processes work in detail, what their limits are and how they link to the formal mechanisms. Even though one of the original theoretical pillars of vulnerability thinking is to be prospective and concerned with the potential for suffering harm in the future (cf. 2.1) it is remarkable that in fact the vast majority of vulnerability studies is concentrated on vulnerabilities that have already become apparent in the impacts of past hazard events and disasters (cf. 2.1.1.3). The assessment of latent or hypothetical vulnerabilities to looming hazards is heavily neglected to date. Going even beyond the previous point, the assessment of dynamic pathways and future trends in vulnerability and adaptive capacity are largely lacking to

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date, particularly with regards to soft factors including the institutional drivers of vulnerability or of risk management approaches. Especially in the context of climate change research, most studies tend to combine future hazard projections (e.g. on sea level rise) with current conditions in socio-economic development and vulnerability patterns. Some studies strive for projecting future population and urbanization trends to examine future hazard exposure. However, the future dynamics in other vulnerability dimensions such as susceptibility and coping capacity remain heavily neglected, in effect producing distorted assessments of future risk pathways. This shortcoming is of particular relevance in countries undergoing comprehensive and rapid socioeconomic transformation, such as Vietnam. The empirical findings presented in chapter 6 cannot respond to all these gaps in the same breadth and depth but it is argued here that there is nevertheless a scientific value in considering them when developing a more coherent framework for analyzing adaptation-vulnerability-links and dynamics. 3.2.

SETUP AND STRUCTURE OF THE ADVANCED INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK

In response to these shortcomings and gaps, an advanced and integrative framework for vulnerability and adaptation analysis has been developed here to guide the research in this study and to contribute to the wider conceptual progress in the field of vulnerability and adaptation science. This framework is presented in Figure 3.2. The corresponding own definitions of the key terms and their roots in the literature are summarized in Table 3.1. Risk is considered in an integrated way as the potential for harm and the expected levels of loss and damage that result from the interaction of one or multiple hazards with vulnerable elements (cf. 2.1). However, the framework does not only discern natural hazards – as most of the vulnerability research in the natural hazard context – but explicitly considers other anthropogenic hazards to coexist. This is because it is the entirety of the resulting risk space, spanned by multiple overlapping and interacting hazards, that matters for the actors in vulnerable conditions and that represents their realities. It is only through acknowledging this multiple hazard context that cognitive risk framings and the resulting drafting, prioritization and negotiation of risk response measures can be captured and analyzed coherently. Vulnerability on the other hand is understood as the predisposition of an element (e.g. a human individual, a social group, a city, an economic sector) to suffer harm when being affected by a given hazard. The internal as well as external side of vulnerability (Bohle 2001) is acknowledged. Vulnerability is considered the product of exposure, susceptibility and the lack of coping capacity (inspired by Turner et al. 2003; Birkmann et al. 2013). Exposure is therein defined as the extent to which an element (e.g. an individual, a social group, a city, an economic sector) is in the reach of or subject to a manifested or latent hazard. Susceptibility

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on the other hand is understood as the internal predisposition of an element (e.g. a human individual, a social group, a city, an economic sector) regulating the degree of harm that can potentially be caused by a given or latent hazard impact. At the same time the degree of (potential) harm is also regulated by the coping capacity which is defined to comprise all strengths and resources available within an exposed element (e.g. community, sector, organization) to take action that mitigates or reduces the level of harm, loss and damage experienced by a given hazard event. Coping can take place shortly before, during and after the hazard strikes. In contrast to adaptation, coping is rather short-term or reactive and does not aim at altering the larger principles of its surrounding system. The framework in general acknowledges the hybrid character of exposure which can be associated conceptually to both the hazard as well as the vulnerability part (cf. 2.2.5). However, the strongest interest in this study is not on the longterm changes in the hazard characteristics through, for example, climate change, but on the social generation and stratification of exposure through, for instance, the short- and mid-term occupation of hazard zones in the course of economic transformation in Vietnam or the pressures for marginalized population groups to move into exposure zones. Therefore, the conceptual framework includes exposure primarily as a sub-component of vulnerability. Susceptibility and coping capacity (as defined in Table 3.1) are closely linked, often in reverse terms. A child, for example, that cannot swim is lacking a central capacity to cope with a flood situation and has therefore an increased susceptibility. Nevertheless, it is considered useful here to separate the two dimensions conceptually in order to sharpen the analytical lens and the resulting policy recommendations. This is because in many cases susceptibility is not the inverse of coping capacity. The evacuation of household members during typhoon events, for example, can be considered a coping strategy but it aims at reducing the microscale exposure (cf. 2.4.3) rather than the baseline susceptibility of the respective household members, e.g. the strength of the immune system or the diversification of income. The framework links adaptation directly to vulnerability through considering adaptation as the main means for vulnerability reduction. It therefore mirrors the three-tier structure of vulnerability into the domain of adaptive capacity – which has been neglected in previous concepts. This means that adaptation can reduce vulnerability along three alleys: Firstly, through the reduction of exposure, secondly, through the reduction of susceptibility and, thirdly, through the enhancement of coping capacity. The framework therefore urges one to consider different types of adaptive capacity. Firstly, there can be generic capacities which have beneficial effects on all three dimensions. Secondly, there can be capacities which are specifically related to only one or two of these vulnerability factors. In addition, adaptive capacity can also target risk reduction through mitigating the hazard component, e.g. by providing flood retention areas that allow for mitigating the hydrological flood hazard as such. However, in reality the influence that can be taken directly on the

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hazard part is rather limited for most natural hazards (e.g. cyclones or monsoonal rains cannot be prevented or effectively manipulated). The main potential for risk reduction is thus through vulnerability reduction since the influence that humans can have on reducing vulnerability is much greater as compared to the influence that can be taken on the natural hazards themselves. The framework therefore underscores conceptually the fundamental practical role that vulnerability reduction, through adaptation, plays for risk reduction at large – a fact that unfortunately does not yet seem to have been fully recognized by decision makers in academia and practice throughout the world, as the enduring budgetary prioritization of physicalist hazard control approaches over more fundamental vulnerability reduction ventures would suggest. The framework agrees with the MOVE framework (Birkmann et al. 2013) in that vulnerability is multi-dimensional (cf. 2.1.1.2), comprising most importantly physical and economic but also social, cultural, environmental and institutional dimensions. However, a lot of emphasis is put here on the fact that these are in reality difficult to differentiate. For example, the physical harm in case of destroyed productive assets such as machinery or a shop house is inevitably linked to economic harm, in turn having implications for the social security of the respective agent. Similarly, the contamination of fresh water sources through floods or other hazard events (environmental dimension) has direct implications for the physical and economic vulnerability. Therefore, it is argued here to be of limited usefulness to spend time and energy during the vulnerability assessment trying to sort potential impacts into categories or boxes of different vulnerability dimensions. Hence, these dimensions are also not prominently placed in the graphical representation of the framework here. What is considered more important in this context is how capitals in the different dimensions can be used and configurated to bring about vulnerability reduction. Accordingly, on the adaptation side, the framework considers the five capital types from the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework a helpful entry point and heuristic guidance for analyzing the ability to accumulate and sustain adaptive capacity portfolios in households and communities (c.f. 2.1.1.2; 2.1.2.4). This focus in particular allows for analyzing how the composition of asset portfolios is changing along with socio-economic transformation and how this translates into changes in the adaptive capacity. However, the framework recognizes that adaptive capacity does not necessarily translate into actually realized adaptation measures. The question whether and how adaptive capacity is activated and turned into adaptation measures depends on internal as well as external conditions and their ramifications. The internal factors concern issues such as the risk perception, awareness or prioritization of the respective adapting entity (e.g. an individual, households, community or organization). In combination with the actual capacities, this sphere can be considered the adapting entity’s agency in the sense of the structuration theory (cf. 2.3; Giddens 1984). Agentive factors are, hence, closely linked to the notion of choices individual persons have in deciding for or against taking certain action and the ways how this action can be driven by motives from different levels of consciousness

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(cf. 2.3; Werlen 1993; Giddens 1993). In contrast, the external structural factors involve forces outside the direct influence sphere of the adapting entity, including cultural norms and ethics, political restrictions and institutional insecurities. This domain can be described as the external structure in the sense of the structuration theory, providing the external boundaries for action in the given social system. Together, both domains shape the adaptation action of the adapting actors. Yet, both domains are not static but influence each other through re-production and transformation in the sense of a structuration process (cf. 2.3). The framework hence applies Gidden’s theory to the context of vulnerability (and vulnerability reduction) in order to bridge between dualistic approaches that either concentrated on structuralist and functionalist or on behavioral explanations of vulnerability. It hence stresses that vulnerability and adaptation can only be understood through considering the interplay of both spheres. Particularly in highly transformative contexts like Vietnam (cf. 4) such a theoretical framing that is able to explain change in the interplay of agentive and structural factors is of great importance – as the empirical analysis and the discussion of the results will show (cf. 6; 7). Besides the fact that adaptive capacity is being activated in order to reduce vulnerability, the framework acknowledges that in fact the vulnerability context plays a major role for enabling or inhibiting the formation and accumulation of adaptive capacity in the first place. In line with this feedback, the effect of the adaptation measures and the development of the vulnerability conditions is constantly monitored and re-evaluated by the respective entity, thereby, providing the rationale and cognitive basis for subsequent adaptation. Vulnerability reduction through adaptation is therefore not considered here as a one-off event but as a cyclic process. It is only through this self-assessment and re-evaluation of the own vulnerability condition that conscious adaptation is initiated and perpetuated. The framework primarily considers vulnerability and adaptation as contextually embedded into socio-economic development and transformation. This is because human vulnerability and adaptation are both closely associated to the social, economic, political and cultural realm (c.f. 2.1.1; 2.1.2) and therefore are shaped foremost by the conditions and trends in these spheres. Advancing further the notion of “double exposure”, suggested by O’Brien and Leichenko (2000), it is therefore suggested here to acknowledge that people and institutions usually are performing a “double adaptation”, i.e. they have to adapt simultaneously to environmental as well as socio-economic and political hazards and changes. In fact, in highly transformative countries like Vietnam the hazards and changes in the socio-economic dimension might be considered as much more pressing than the environmental or climatic ones, hence, provoking more immediate adaptation. Adding this innovative double perspective to the conceptual framing of vulnerability-adaptation-links is considered essential here given that adapting actors necessarily have to split their resources and capacities for adaptation between the two different domains. How this distribution works in detail depends on risk perception, the setting of priorities and the external structures shaping the expected effectiveness and prosperity of capacity-activation (see the middle segment in the framework). Therefore, adaptation to environmental changes cannot be under-

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stood without examining the multiple claims charged against the entire adaptive capacity portfolio and the choices taken by actors for or against activating the capacity in relation to hazards from one or the other dimension. Remarkably, this aspect tends to be overlooked in much of the recent literature on global environmental and climatic change – often leading to an implicit environmental determinism which frames human adaptation as foremost embedded into, and constraint by, their physical environment (cf. 2.1; 2.2). The term transformation is now widely used in the literature to refer to a broad range of processes in which the internal configuration of systems is changed due to alternations in the causal fabric of system components, structures and processes. Prominent examples include ecosystem transformation or the transformation in economic systems. Recently, increased attention is particularly paid towards a normative claim for societal transformation towards less resource intensive and more sustainable consumption and production patterns (e.g. WBGU 2011). Along a similar line, an increasing number of scientists applies the term in the context of change to make societies better adaptive and able to deal with the challenges implied by climate change (e.g. Pelling 2011; O’Brien 2012). The relevance of these uses are acknowledged in this study. However, the term transformation is used here primarily in line with another school of thought to refer specifically to the economic, social, political and institutional transformation processes when socialist countries embark on a reform process to shift (partly or entirely) towards a market-based economy and, in some cases, to relax or even abandon socialist rule in the political system (e.g. Stadelbauer 2000; Ott 2000; Klüter 2000). This school of thought largely originates from research on postsocialist transformation in countries of the former Soviet Union. However, in order not to extend the discussion too far, no comparison between (urban) transformation dynamics in Vietnam and the Eastern European countries is provided here. Rather, the analysis in chapter 4 specifically concentrates on the transformation process in Vietnam.

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global national regional local

Environmental and climatic change

R i s k

Vulnerability

Hazards (natural, climatic)

External side

Exposure

Internal side

Susceptibility

Coping Capacity

Lack of

Hazards

Socio-economic change and transformation

(anthropogenic, technological etc.)

Factors conditioning adaptation action through enabling or preventing the activation and/or accumulation of adaptive capacity Hazard mitigation

Agentive factors (e.g. risk perception, evaluation and prioritisation)

Structural factors (e.g. governance regime, entitlements, cultural limits)

Capacity to reduce

Capacity to reduce

Capacity to improve

Exposure

Susceptibility

Coping

Hazard mitigation

l o c a l

Adaptive Capacity Risk

Causal influence of adaptation as it reduces vulnerability along the different vulnerability factors

r e g i o n a l

g l n o a b t a i l o n a l

reduction potential

Feedback process as it enables or restricts the formation and accumulation of adaptive capacity

Risk reduction through hazard mitigation

Coupled interaction to generate risk

Figure 3.1: Advanced integrated framework for vulnerability and adaptation analysis, own draft

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Setup and Structure of the Advanced Framework Term

Definition

Source*

Risk

The potential for harm and the expected levels of loss and damage that result from the interaction of one or multiple hazards with vulnerable elements.

Own definition, drawing partly on UNISDR 2002; Wisner et al. 2004

Hazard

A threatening event or process which carries the potential to cause harm, loss and damage and which can be described through its probability of occurrence, depending on its frequency, magnitude and extent. Hazards can comprise sudden onset events (e.g. flash-floods) or accumulating and creeping processes (e.g. sea level rise). Hazards can be of natural, anthropogenic or coupled origin.

Own definition, drawing partly on Downing et al. 2001; Kraas 2003

Vulnerability

The predisposition of an element (e.g. a human individual, a social group, a city, an economic sector) to suffer harm, loss and damage when being affected by a given hazard.

Own definition, drawing partly on Cardona 2004; Birkmann et al. 2013; Birkmann 2006a; Wisner et al. 2004

Exposure

The extent to which an element (e.g. an individual, a social group, a city, an economic sector) is in the reach of or subject to a manifested or latent hazard.

Own definition, drawing partly on Garschagen and Romero-Lankao 2013; IPCC 2012

Susceptibility

The internal predisposition of an element (e.g. a human individual, a social group, a city, an economic sector, physical infrastructure) regulating the degree of harm that can be caused by a given hazard impact.

Own definition drawing partly on Birkmann et al. 2013

Coping Capacity

All strengths and resources available within an exposed element (e.g. community, sector, organization) to take action that mitigates or reduces the level of harm, loss and damage experienced by a given hazard event. Coping can take place shortly before, during and after the hazard strikes. In contrast to adaptation, coping is rather short-term or reactive and does not aim at altering the larger principles of its surrounding system.

Own definition, drawing partly on Birkmann et al. 2012c; UNISDR 2002

Adaptation

Adjustments of system components, processes and structures to exploit beneficial opportunities or to respond to experienced or anticipated hazards in order to reduce vulnerabilities and moderate the potential for harm, loss and damage from those hazards.

Own definition, drawing partly on IPCC 2012

Adaptive Capacity

All strengths and resources available by actors or institutions that can be used for adaptation in order to moderate potential harm and to take advantage of opportunities. It includes in particular the ability of actors and institutions to maintain or even improve their condition in the face of changes in their natural, social, economic and political environments and to improve their condition in relation to these environments, even if the latter do not change.

Own definition, drawing in part on Gallopín 2006; IPCC 2007a

Realized adaptation measures

Those measures that are pursued and implemented depending on, first, the portfolio of adaptive capacity and, second, the internal agency and external structure regulation whether and how adaptive capacity is or can be accumulated and activated.

Own definition

* The provided sources refer to the specific wording only, not to the more general perspectives behind the concepts. For the latter, refer to the detailed reviews in chapters 2.

Table 3.1: Definitions of key terms

As illustrated in the list of deficits (cf. 3.1), current vulnerability and adaptation studies largely lack an integrated perspective on the interaction and feedback between formalized risk management and adaptation action (mostly implemented by state agencies) and action that is taken by non-state actors outside of formally regulated adaptation or risk management schemes. The conceptual framing developed here addresses this shortcoming and explicitly focuses on the interaction as well as gaps between the two spheres in order to help better understand the larger

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fabric of risk and adaptation processes as a whole. Figure 3.2 illustrates the coupling between these two spheres. In addition, it is essential to acknowledge that adaptation action at the local level is in both spheres tightly nested into processes at the higher regional, national and global levels (Figure 3.2). Governmental or state-induced risk management and adaptation programmes need to be contingent with national regulations and policy directives which, in turn, are influenced by global discourses and paradigms in the relevant policy fields such as disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation or urban planning and management. In developing and transition countries, these global discourses are of particular importance, given that international development assistant and other support is often being conditioned with the implementation of management principles emerging from these global debates. In addition, the opportunities as well as barriers for formal risk and adaptation action at the local level need to be understood in close connection with political and economic conditions at the national level in the respective country. In the case of Vietnam, this concerns most notably the current political and economic transformation (cf. 4) and the resulting implications for local state organs’ capacity to implement risk response and adaptation policies (cf. 2.5). Along the same line, the capacities for local level adaptation action of non-state actors, notably individual households but also neighborhood groups or other non-governmental organizations, are contingent to the socio-economic and institutional framework conditions at supra-local level up to global processes such as trade globalization or global economic crises. Again, for the case of Vietnam surely the national transformation process and the increasing integration into global change processes are of prime importance in this respect. Along with visualizing the above-explained coupling and nesting, Figure 3.2 illustrates the resulting epistemic components that need to be considered in this research. The main attention of the empirical analysis is given to examining the elements constituting the inner shell. Yet, where necessary empirical data collection also covered the outer shells, e.g. through expert interviews with stakeholders of national governmental agencies or international organizations (cf. 5). This dual structure is also mirrored in the empirical chapter and the discussion part. While chapter 6.1 concentrates on governmental risk management and adaptation (i.e. the lower three segments of the figure), chapter 6.2 focuses primarily on the non-governmental domain and looks at vulnerability and adaptation patterns at household level. Chapter 7 then bridges between the two spheres by discussing in detail the interlinkages and feedbacks.

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Figure 3.2: Coupling of actor spheres and vertical nesting, own draft

3.3.

INNOVATIONS, STRENGTHS AND LIMITS OF THE FRAMEWORK

By responding to the specific conceptual deficits listed in 3.1 as well as to more general normative and epistemological concerns illustrated in chapter 2, the framework allows for integrating and advancing vulnerability and adaptation research in multiple ways: (1) In response to deficit 1 (cf. 3.1), the framework provides an integrated frame for analyzing vulnerability and adaptation in a coherent manner, offering a conceptual lens for focusing particularly on the links and feedbacks between the two. The framework therefore not only offers analytic guidance but also helps bridging between the scientific communities on vulnerability and adaptation which despite considerable overlap still perpetuate notable conceptual and normative divides (cf. 2.1 and 2.2). Beyond science, it also can foster integrative perspectives for guiding strategy development and policy making among local to national governments as well as among non-governmental organizations and international institutions, e.g. in the context local adaptation strategies but also international climate change negotiations. (2) Through this integration, the framework also replies to earlier critique claiming that adaptation concepts tend to apply a superficial and palliative perspective, thereby neglecting the deeper social and political root causes that produce and perpetuate vulnerability (cf. 2.1.2.1). The fact that this framework directly mirrors the fabric and causal relations of adaptation to those of vul-

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Integrative Framework for Vulnerability and Adaptation Analysis

nerability underscores that successful adaptation is only possible if it addresses the deeper drivers and causes of vulnerability. In respect of deficit 2 (cf. 3.1), the framework in particular allows for analyzing in detail how adaptation links to the three individual factors configurative of vulnerability, i.e. exposure, susceptibility and coping capacity. This dual structure especially provides guidance for exploring potential trade-offs and conflicting aims within as well as between adaptation measures. This focus is of central importance, assuming that specific adaptation strategies do not necessarily push all vulnerability factors into the same direction. The same holds true for the vulnerability effects of socio-economic development more generally. While economic growth, for example, might allow to enhance coping capacity, it often also leads to increased exposure, e.g. through urbanization in coastal areas (cf. 2.4; Garschagen and Romero-Lankao 2013). In the same vein, the framework allows for analyzing how adaptation action is prioritized in a multi-hazard environment (deficit 3, cf. 3.1) and whether adaptation measures targeting one hazard might in fact drive up vulnerability towards other hazards. Such conflicts particularly gain in relevance when examining adaptation processes across times and against changes in the surrounding conditions. The framework therefore offers a dynamic perspective coherent to vulnerability and adaptation processes alike, contributing to the urgently needed advancement of future-oriented assessments (cf. 2.1.1.3). This end is achieved through two means: First, adaptation is embedded into the wider context not only of environmental change but particularly of socio-economic transformations (responding to deficit 4, cf. 3.1). Second, the iterative and feedbackdriven links between vulnerability and adaptation are considered in a two directions, i.e. adaptation aims at reducing vulnerability while the vulnerability context is, in turn, a major factor regulating whether and how adaptive capacity can be accumulated, sustained and activated. This perspective acknowledges that vulnerability dynamics are the key not only to understanding the root causes and drivers of vulnerability but also to making the entire scientific field relevant for policy making, particularly in contexts of rapidly transforming and developing countries where the main interest is on future pathways of vulnerability and adaptation, not on past ones (hence responding to deficits number 6 and 7, cf. 3.1). The differentiation between adaptive capacity and realized adaptation measures (both as defined in Table 3.1) enables an integrative perspective for examining the agentive as well as structural factors shaping adaptation processes. In that sense, the focus on the institutional and political factors that generate and perpetuate the internal and external side of vulnerability (according to Chambers 1989 and Bohle 2001; cf. 2.1.1.2) can also be expanded to the framing of adaptation processes. The framework therewith responds to the concerns raised about current adaptation debates arguing that they would neglect central achievements of vulnerability science and depoliticize adaptation debates (cf. 2.1.2; 2.4).

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(7) Despite being specific in terms of the modes how vulnerability and adaptation are linked, the framework can be applied to different adapting entities, including, for example, individuals, households and communities but also organizations such as city governments or ministries and their respective administrative units or thematic sectors. The framework can therefore provide a commonly applicable toolbox and hence a conceptual bridge for reconciling the hitherto often divided schools focusing either on formalized state-driven adaptation mechanisms or on informal modes outside the state domain (deficit 5, cf. 3.1). This conception underscores that a combined perspective is essential for grasping the important feedbacks in state-society relations and their implications for adaptation processes. (8) Linked to the previous point, the framework can be used across different scales and can guide the analysis of how vulnerability-adaptation-links are nested vertically. However, inspired by the notion of panarchy (cf. 2.1.3.3) the framework acknowledges that small scale process are not only regulated or even pre-determined by structures at higher temporal, spatial and political scales. Upward effects from small to large are also considered possible – even though there has so far not been much of empirical analysis conducted on such sort of effects (compare therefore the empirical analysis of this thesis in chapter 6). Considering these advancements, the framework proves helpful, firstly, in structuring and synthesizing the rocketing number of diverse approaches in the fields of risk, vulnerability, adaptation. It, secondly, allows for offering an enhanced conceptual model that goes beyond the current debate by addressing existing gaps and shortcomings and by providing epistemological and analytical solutions on how to tackle them. Thirdly, it proved essential for guiding the empirical work presented below (cf. 6) and for discussing the relevance and implications of the findings in empirical as well as theoretical terms (cf. 7).

4.

RESEARCH CONTEXT: RISK AND TRANSFORMATION IN VIETNAM

In line with the theoretical background provided in chapters 2 and 3, the risk landscape in Vietnam can best be understood as resulting from two interacting domains. Firstly, Vietnam in general, and the Mekong Delta in particular, is heavily affected by a range of natural hazards, many of which are expected to intensify with climate change. Secondly, and more importantly, these natural hazards have in the past triggered major humanitarian disasters which have revealed the high levels of human vulnerability and the deficits in adaptation and disaster risk reduction. Yet, at the same time the country is undergoing multifaceted transformation processes in the economic, social, cultural and – to a lesser extent – political domain, which are closely linked to the ongoing reform process. These transformation processes are so profound that they can be assumed to change central parameters of vulnerability and adaptive capacity. However, the detailed effects and the causal relationships are so far poorly understood. This is due to, first, the government’s restrictions on researching the politically sensitive topic of social vulnerabilities and, second, to the dominant natural science focus of most risk related studies in the country. Therefore, one of the most relevant questions that remains unclear analytically, despite being heatedly debated in normative terms, is whether the socio-economic transformation process leads to increasing or decreasing hazard vulnerability; for which social groups; and why. Contributing to filling this gap is one of the major motivations for this research (cf. 1). In order to explore this question a sound understanding of the different dimensions of Vietnam’s transformation as well as the concurrent trends in natural hazards is necessary, which will therefore be contributed by the following sections. They are largely based on literature reviews combined with some original analysis of secondary statistical data. Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 give an overview of the natural hazard context. The focus is particularly on the Mekong Delta’s current hazard situation (4.1) as well as on expected future changes in the hazard profile, related to climate change and the intensification of human infrastructure development (4.2). Both sections also provide basic introductions into national-level disaster risk management and climate change adaptation policies, respectively. Chapter 4.3 turns to the country’s reform venture and examines the relation between economic and political transformation processes. Chapter 4.4 then explores the political system and investigates the effects of having it not transforming with the same speed and depths as the economic and social realms. Based thereon, chapter 4.5 takes issue with state-society relations and investigates how these have been – and continue to be – changing in the country’s reform era, providing the background for understanding risk governance and adaptation at the interface of state and non-state action (cf. 3.2). Chapter 4.6 pays attention to specifically urban as-

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pects of transformation and illustrates the country’s (past, present and future) challenges of urban development. Based thereon, chapter 4.7 gives a more detailed introduction to Can Tho City and provides the rationale for choosing it as the case study. Lastly, chapter 4.8 reviews the most important existing risk assessments related to natural hazards in the Mekong Delta and Can Tho City. It elaborates on their shortcomings and the remaining knowledge gaps which provide the entry points to the case study presented here (cf. 6). 4.1.

NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

Given the country’s location and geo-physical setting, Vietnam has a long history of being exposed to natural hazards and experiencing disasters. With its long typhoon-ridden coastline and its densely populated river deltas – most notably the Mekong River Delta, the Red River Delta and the Dong Nai River Delta – Vietnam faces high exposure to natural hazards such as river-floods or typhoons. In addition, flash-floods in the mountainous areas pose further challenges (Ninh 2007). Accordingly, a number of global assessment studies identify Vietnam to be not only amongst the countries with the highest hazard exposure levels but also amongst the countries having suffered the highest disaster losses in the past. According to the World Bank’s global assessment of risk hotspots, 59 percent of the country’s area and 71 percent of its population are exposed to two or more natural hazards types, most importantly floods, cyclones and droughts18 (Dilley et al. 2005). In combination with high levels of vulnerability, this hazard exposure has in the past led to significant loss and damage from disasters, causing 9,865 casualties between the years 1989 and 2009 (Nhu et al. 2011). Flood events caused the highest number of casualties (68 percent) followed by hailstorms (7 percent), flash floods (7 percent), storms (7 percent), cyclones (3 percent) and others. In addition, a staggering 101,000 people were reported injured by these hazard events. There are obvious problems related to this classification used by the Vietnamese statistical bureaus and UNISDR because in many cases, a hazard event might be in fact a mixture of these categories. Particularly cyclones are worthwhile mentioning in this context since they often cause floods and storms. So the role of cyclones is in reality much greater than suggested by these figures. The number of affected people – defined as persons directly in need of assistance for repair, rebuilding, food supply, evacuation, loss compensation etc. – was over the same time period much larger, amounting to over 8.2 million. Similarly to the case of casualties, floods accounted for the largest share (71 percent) of affected people, with storms (18 percent) and cyclones (8 percent) contributing the largest part of the remaining numbers. Almost 700,000 houses have been de18 The study further considers earthquake hazards (virtually no relevance in Vietnam), volcano (virtually no relevance in Vietnam) and landslide hazards (of slight relevance in northern Vietnam) (cf. Dilley et al. 2005).

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stroyed and another 1.1 million damaged during these two decades, mostly due to flooding and storms. Assessing the economic losses inflicted by these disasters is very difficult, yet for the years 1997-2006 they have been estimated to range on average around 1.5 percent of annual GDP (SRV 2007). Table 4.1 indicates based on data from the EM-DAT database (covering the years 1900 to 2012) that the largest single disasters19 in the recent past have caused damages of several hundred million US dollars each. Hazard

Date

No Total

Hazard

Date

Affected

People

Hazard

Date

Killed

Damage (000 US$)

Storm

Sept. 1980

9,027,174

Storm

Sept. 1964

7,000

Storm

Sept. 2009

785,000

Storm

July 1980

6,624,710

Storm

Nov.1997

3,682

Storm

Sept. 2006

624,000

Flood

July 2000

5,000,004

Storm

Sept. 1953

1,000

Flood

Oct. 2008

479,000

Storm

Oct. 1989

4,635,762

Storm

Oct. 1985

798

Storm

Nov. 1997

470,000

Flood

Aug. 1978

4,079,000

Storm

May 1989

751

Storm

Nov. 2006

456,000

Flood

Oct. 1999

3,504,412

Flood

Oct. 1999

622

Drought

Dec. 1997

407,000

Drought

Dec.1997

3,000,000

Epidemic

Jan. 1964

598

Storm

July 1996

362,000

Flood

Sept. 1985

2,800,000

Storm

July 1996

585

Flood

Nov. 2007

350,000

Storm

Sept. 1986

2,502,502

Storm

Sep. 1983

578

Flood

Oct. 2007

300,000

Storm

Sept. 2009

2,477,315

Flood

July 2000

460

Storm

Nov. 2009

280,000

Table 4.1: Vietnam’s 10 most severe disasters between 1900 and 2012, own draft based on data from CRED (2012b)

Despite measurement difficulties that need to be considered when doing such kind of analysis, Table 4.1 indicates a general trend that can be observed over the last decades: While the largest disasters in terms of affected people and casualties have been happening throughout the second half of the 20th century, the most important disasters in terms of economic loss can be registered in the late 1990s and particularly the first decade of the 21st century. Two main lines of interpretations can be found in the literature irrespective of short term variations in the hazard frequency and/or magnitude (e.g. Ninh 2007: 5). First, human losses could over time be reduced through improved physical hydraulic infrastructure, general improvements in socio-economic development (impacting, for example, on base level nutrition and health) and improved disaster risk management. Second, the economic intensification over the most recent decades has increased the economic risk and damage potential through, for example, the introduction of triple rice cropping in the Mekong Delta and other rice production areas or the concentration of industrial production units in or around the country’s coastal and delta cities. At 19 Disasters are included into the CRED EM-DAT database if at least one of the following criteria is fulfilled: ten or more people reported killed; hundred or more people reported affected; declaration of state of emergency; formal call for international assistance (CRED 2012a).

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the same time, the overall number of reported disasters is increasing (Ninh 2007) which has been ascribed to two main factors: First, in line with population growth and economic expansion, settlements and infrastructure are increasingly placed into harm’s way (see e.g. Storch and Downes for a detailed analysis of Ho Chi Minh City). Secondly, many observers argue that there has been intensification in the frequency and magnitude of natural hazard occurrence (Ninh 2007). This is often ascribed to climate change; however, this connection is contested and needs to be carefully reviewed (cf. Merz et al. 2012). For instance, there are strong indications that the increased incidences of severe flood levels in the Mekong Delta between 2000 and 2011 are not necessarily linked to climatic variability or change but can rather be associated to land use changes including the reduction of surface infiltration capacity or the reduction of retention areas through extended embankment projects (cf. 6.1). Natural hazards and disasters in the Mekong Delta and in Can Tho City Within Vietnam, the Mekong Delta can be considered a hot spot region for natural hazard impacts, particularly related to extensive flooding events and typhoons (cf. Nhu et al. 2011). With its 40,548 square kilometers, the Vietnamese part of the Mekong Delta has around 17.3 million inhabitants and a comparatively high average population density of around 430 people per square kilometer (GSO 2012; cf. Figure 10.1 in the Appendix). With its low elevation and with the monsoonal climate affecting most parts of the Mekong River catchment, the Mekong Delta features two distinct seasons, i.e. a dry season (roughly from December to April) and a rainy season or wet season (roughly from May to November). Caused by a combination of upstream discharge and local precipitation, large parts of the Mekong Delta are therefore inundated during the rainy season, covering between 35 percent of the Delta in dryer and 50 percent in more humid years (Wassmann et al. 2004; Tuan et al. 2007: 28). Inundation depths can thereby range from several meters in the upper Mekong Deltas to a few decimeters in its central parts, usually peaking in September or October (note that the introduction to the Mekong Delta’s flood hydrology is on purpose kept very concise here; a more extended explanation is provided in Appendix 10.4). The annual floods are an important factor contributing to soil fertility and the agricultural productivity of the Mekong Delta since they deliver alluvial sediment load and wash out salinity. Yet, in order to make best agricultural use of the flood cycle and to control irrigation the Mekong Delta has seen massive waves of hydraulic engineering (cf. Biggs 2004; Biggs et al. 2009; Käkönen 2008), of which the latest one commenced with the socialist government assuming political power in southern Vietnam after 1976 (Evers and Benedikter 2009; see in more detail Appendix 10.4). Agricultural production in the Mekong Delta could, therefore, be successively extended and intensified, in effect majorly contributing to the country’s turn from being a famine-stricken rice importer until the late 1970s to becoming one of the largest rice exporters in the world today (see Garschagen et al.

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2012 for a more detailed analysis of the Mekong Delta’s agricultural transformation, which shall not be examined here in detail due to the urban focus of this study). However, while regular floods provide an integral part to life and agricultural production in the Mekong Delta, they can turn into significant hazards in extreme flood years, carrying the potential for substantial loss and damage – especially when they coincide with typhoon events. In particular, the major flood disasters between 2000 and 2002 have caused extraordinary losses. Together, the floods of these three consecutive years caused over 1,000 casualties in the Mekong Delta out of which 76 percent where children (own calculations based on CCFSC 2012). They affected over 1.5 million households, led to the evacuation of around 140,000 households and implied economic losses of around 370 million USD (ibid.). In fact, the flood in 2000 has been officially referred to as the country’s worst flood event for seven decades (SRV 2007; see in detail the colored map in Figure 10.1 in the Appendix). However, when comparing the impacts of the flood disasters in these three years in terms of casualties and economic damages (see Table 4.2), a clear downward trend can be observed which indicates that lessons have been learned and flood risk management improved. While the peak flood levels were only slightly lower in the 2001 and 2002 than compared to the year 2000, the impacts in the latter two years have been significantly lower across all categories. Even more so, with the peak flood levels only varying a couple of centimeters between 2001 and 2002, there was again a great reduction in the impacts between those two years. Hence, over these three years there has been a steady reduction in impacts across all dimensions which can be explained to a large part by adjustments in the preparation and coping mechanisms at household level as well as adaptation and improved flood risk management on the part of governmental institutions (see below)20. However, on the other hand despite these lessons and improvements, it is striking to see that the human and economic losses have still been comparatively high in the more recent floods (cf. Table 4.2). In this respect, a short reference can be also made to the severe Mekong Delta floods in the year 2011 with peak flood levels similar to the ones in 2002 (Table 4.2). Even though there have been 9 years between these two flood disasters, the 2011 event still registered severe impacts in terms of human losses and affected households – even though they were lower than in 2002. This proves that high social vulnerabilities still exist despite the overall economic growth and social progress during that decade. In addition, the economic risk potential even seems to have increased with this growth – as indicated by the fact that the economic 20 In part, the lower loss in agricultural production in 2001 and 2002 as compared to 2000 can be attributed to the fact that the flood in 2000 arrived particularly early, hence, destroying a lot of rice before harvest. However, the significant differences in other damage categories such as number of submerged houses (cf. Table 4.2) underscores that improved coping and adaptation measures after 2000 are of key importance for understanding the decreasing trend in overall impacts.

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damage in 2011 was many times higher than in 2002, even if adjusted for inflation. Year

2000 2001 2002 TOTAL

Peak flood level Chau Doc* (in meters) 4.90 4.48 4.42 --

Peak flood level Tan Chau* (in meters) 5.06 4.78 4.82 --

Casualties of which children

481 393 170 1,044

335 307 151 793

Households affected

891,519 341,614 286,660 1,519,793

Houses collapsed

4,093 3,624 960 8,677

Estimated econ. loss (million VND) 3,911,249 1,535,910 456,831 5,903,990

Estimated econ. loss (million USD)** ~275 ~98 ~29 ~370

2011 4.27 4.86 89 75 176,599 906 4,393,896 ~209 * Chau Doc is located at Hau River and Chau Tan at Tien River (the two major branches of the Mekong) at the border to Cambodia in the upper Mekong Delta. ** Calculated on the basis of the exchange rate of 01 October 2000, 2001, 2002, 2011, respectively; total sum based on the 2002 exchange rate.

Table 4.2: Impacts of selected severe flood disasters in the Mekong Delta, own draft based on data from CCFSC (2012); Tinh (2012)

The other type of severe disasters in the MKD is related to cyclones. Major cyclone events do not happen as often as severe river floods but when they strike, they have in the past led to disasters even greater in impact. The strongest cyclone related disaster of the last decades happened in November 1997, i.e. storm no. 5, also called typhoon Linda. This disaster cost 778 lives, affected almost 150,000 households and caused an overall economic damage of an estimated 7.2 trillion Vietnamese dong (i.e. around 585 million USD, around that time), mostly in the coastal provinces but also in more central areas including Can Tho City. Distinct spatial differences in terms of loss and damage resulting from the different disaster types can be observed. The highest impacts for flood related disasters can be observed in the provinces of the upper MKD including the so-called Long Xuyen Quadrangle and the Plain of Reeds which usually experience the deepest flooding levels and the longest durations of flooding (see in more detail Appendix 10.4). In contrast the coastal provinces experience higher losses in storm and typhoon related disasters. In terms of ‘rural versus urban’-differences other than the agriculture-related damages, Dasgupta et al. (2004) find based on flood impact modeling calibrated along the year 2000 flood that flood-related asset losses in the Mekong Delta are much higher in urban households as compared to rural households. While the provinces in the centre of the Mekong Delta, such as Can Tho City, have in the past not been amongst the most heavily affected areas, they are potentially exposed to both strong river floods and strong typhoons and hence face an increased risk with regards to double hazard disasters, i.e. when strong river floods coincide with typhoon events. Those scenarios are increasingly to be expected due to climate change (cf. 4.2) and the increased infrastructure development upstream, mostly embankments and hydropower dams (Hoa et al. 2007). First trends into this direction can already be observed (Tuan et al. 2007: 32). In

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addition, the central provinces of the delta feature high urban and industrial growth rates, particularly in Can Tho City (cf. Garschagen et al. 2012), and therefore feature rapidly increasing concentrations of exposed assets. Yet, despite these increased risks no detailed studies exist to analyze the potential vulnerabilities, the existing coping capacities and the capacities for adaptation in this part of the Mekong Delta, foremost in Can Tho City. Disaster risk management in Vietnam Owing to the fact that natural hazards, and particularly seasonal flooding, have always been an integral part of human activity in Vietnam and particularly the Mekong Delta, people have developed a range of coping and adaptation strategies. Rural residents, for example, often revert to elevated housing designs, seasonal migration or hydraulic infrastructure for agricultural drainage, irrigation and flood protection. In fact, human adaptation to the hazardous deltaic conditions is responsible for the Mekong Delta’s high agricultural productivity, enabling an annual paddy production of around 19 million tons (GSO 2012) and aquatic production (including shrimp and fish aquaculture as well as other catch) of between 2 and 2.5 million tons over the last years (ibid.; see for a more detailed analysis of agricultural production in the Mekong Delta Garschagen et al. 2012). Vietnam has also developed a comprehensive system of formal disaster risk management. Its coordination and implementation falls within the remit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). Its mandate defines that the Section on Water Resources Management – and within that especially the Department of Dyke Management and Flood, Storm Prevention (DDMFSC) – has to “unify the management of dyke construction and protection, headwork for prevention of floods and typhoons and efforts to prevent and combat flash flooding, floods, typhoons, drought, and landslides along riversides and coastal areas” (SRV 2009a). The assignment of these tasks to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development results from the historical link between natural hazard management and rural development, and especially from the fact that most of the hydraulic infrastructure elements (such as dykes, dams and embankments) play a double role for irrigation as well as for flood protection purposes. However, it will be seen in the empirical analysis that the assignment of disaster risk management to the sector of rural development entails a number of institutional challenges with respect to urban risk management (cf. 6.1). In order to supervise the implementation and maintenance of disaster prevention measures (such as dykes and shelters) and to organize disaster response (e.g. on-the-spot dyke repair units) MARD and its subsidiary departments are in charge of coordinating Committees of Flood and Storm Control (CFSC) of which one is in place at the national level and at every province, district and rural commune or urban ward. These committees are headed by high ranking officials of the Ministry or by leading officers of the People’s Committee of the respective level and include representatives from the different planning agencies and other relevant

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institutions such as the Red Cross or the Women’s Union. Further, in order to coordinate between the additional actors involved in disaster risk reduction and relief work at the national level, the Natural Disaster Mitigation Partnership (NDMP) was established after the experience of severe floods in central Vietnam in 1999. This partnership is set up as a government-donor-NGO platform in order to synchronize and integrate the activities of those three actor groups, to exchange knowledge and capacities and to facilitate dialogue in policy development. However, NDMP has in the past been active primarily in typhoon and flood disasters in northern and central Vietnam. Hence, how well the integration of government and NGO action would work in case of a severe disaster in the MKD largely remains an open question. The main focus of Vietnam’s disaster risk management has for decades been on a mixture of structural disaster protection measures (such as dykes systems), on-the-spot disaster management (like evacuation and dyke repair) and re-active disaster relief (e.g. governmental support for affected households) (SRV 2001). Also the current National Strategy for Natural Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020 (SRV 2007) – approved in November 2007 – largely follows this technocratic paradigm and prescribes corresponding measures and strategies such as sea dykes, flood resistant embankments or storm shelters. By doing so, disaster risk management propagates a control-oriented paradigm, assuming that natural hazards can be and need to be managed best by technical control and reacted to by top-down humanitarian response, should a given hazard event exceed the margins of the control infrastructure (Biggs et al. 2009; Garschagen 2010c). Much less attention has over the last decades been given to reducing the social vulnerabilities in a more fundamental understanding or to integrate conventional disaster risk management with other policy fields such as environmental management, social policy or broader climate change adaptation (cf. Phuc 2010; Garschagen et al. 2009). The above-said remains true despite the new ‘living with flood’-policies which have been passed after the experience of the extreme flood in the year 2000. As the name suggests, this policy paradigm puts emphasis on the need to accept the risk of flooding, yet to mitigate flood damages and to adapt to the flood hazard – in short, to live with the floods (Danh and Mushtaq 2011: 189). Yet, despite the shift in rhetoric the technocratic approach to risk management has only been changed at the surface. ‘Living with floods’-policy entailed two major adaptation measures in the Mekong Delta, particularly in its rural areas in the upper delta21. Firstly, it triggered a comprehensive extension of the dyke network in order to protect high yield rice production and allow for more secure human settlements (Pilarczyk and Nuoi 2005). Secondly, it included comprehensive resettle21 Since these measures are primarily of importance for rural areas in the Mekong Delta – and do not have such a high relevance for urban areas – the reflection presented here does not go into detail. More in-depth analysis can be found, for example, in Huu (2011); Danh and Mushtaq (2011); Tuan et al. (2007); Trieu (2009); Käkönen (2008); Pilarczyk and Nuoi (2005); Birkmann et al. (2012c).

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ment programs to relocate residents from the flood plains into newly constructed resettlement clusters, erected either on elevated grounds or on top of the high dykes (Danh and Mushtaq 2011). Between 2001 and 2005 alone, over 200,000 households with more than 1 million people have been resettled in the Mekong Delta (ibid.). However, despite having contributed to a reduction in flood losses (see Table 4.2) both measures are contested owing to their negative impacts in ecological and social terms, including livelihood challenges for resettled households and ecosystem degradation due to closed system embankments (see in more detail, Tuan forthcoming; Danh and Mushtaq 2011; Käkönen 2008; Ni et al. 2001; Tuan et al. 2007; Garschagen 2010a). In addition, Hoa et al. (2007, 2008) proofed through extensive hydrological modeling that while the new dykes built after the year 2000 flood help to reduce the flood exposure of people and assets within the embankments, they increase the flood risk or communities further downstream, such as Can Tho City, given the reduced retention function of the former floods plains that have been embanked. These shortcomings underscore the need to acknowledge and investigate the currently neglected thematic and spatial coupling processes in adaptation and risk management – which will be elaborated more closely in the empirical analysis (cf. 6.1) and the discussion (cf. 7). In addition to the main infrastructural measures, ‘living with flood’-policy also includes a number of soft measures, comprising, for example, awareness raising or improved early warning (Tuan et al. 2007; Trieu et al. 2009). Yet, the success of these measures is hard to assess and the question whether they are sufficiently implemented is hence controversially debated (Tuan forthcoming). Despite all the above criticism, the overall policy approach has repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Vietnamese government – most importantly within the National Strategy for Natural Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020 (SRV 2007). However, it needs to be underscored that the living with floods policy is mainly developed for and implemented in rural areas. A comprehensive flood management approach for the Mekong Delta’s cities is lacking to date – as it is the case for all cities in Vietnam. Most cities in the Mekong Delta do not have, for example, protective dyke infrastructure in place – neither for shielding single elements of critical infrastructure nor for sealing-off entire cities or towns comprehensively22. In addition, while resettlement happens frequently in these cities, the modes of resettlement programmes are quite different from those in rural areas (cf. 4.6; Garschagen 2010b). Today’s risk management approaches and the distribution of capacities, both governmental and non-governmental, have to be understood against the background of the country’s economic, political, social and cultural change within the larger reform context. Research in central and northern Vietnam found that transfor22 This situation is considerably different in many northern Vietnamese cities, notably Hanoi where the embankments of the Red River protect the lower lying city from flooding.

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mation in the political system has caused a reduction in collective action for risk management (Adger 1999a; Tran et al. 2008). As a result, increased vulnerabilities have been observed amongst those groups who do not have sufficient resources to substitute the formerly socialized elements of risk management with action on an individual or household level (Adger 2000b). While new nongovernmental forms of risk management have been emerged in this situation, the question remains open whether and how they will in the long run be able to compensate for the loss of governmental organization of (compulsory) collective risks management (Adger 1999a,b, 2000b). Further, it has been noted that new architectural styles and land use zoning approaches, which have been introduced particularly to Vietnam’s cities through market liberalization and globalization, have replaced some of the traditional ways to deal with flood risk and to build a city around the existing hydrological conditions – rather than trying to impose an urban morphology (cf. Shannon 2009). Tran and Shaw (2007) therefore argue that Vietnam has entered a critical phase where traditional risks remain while new ones, such as environmental degradation, are appearing, in effect putting the old ways of managing risk under pressure. It is this double pressure which creates many open questions for risk management especially in urban areas, setting the scene for the empirical research presented later. Yet, to complicate things even further, the above illustrated challenges related to natural hazards and disaster risk reduction are widely expected to intensify in future due to the effects of climate change. The next section explores this link and the resulting emergence of a new policy field on climate change adaptation. 4.2.

PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION POLICY

A number of recent studies identify Vietnam to be amongst the countries most at risk from the expected impacts of climate change (e.g. Dasgupta et al. 2007; Yusuf and Francisco 2009; Cruz et al., 2007; ADB 2009; Alliance Development Works 2012; Chaudry & Ruysschaert 2007; Carew-Reid 2008; Stern 2006; McElwee 2010). As indicated in chapter 4.5, Vietnam’s long coastline and large deltas feature high concentrations of population, agriculture and industry, while being highly exposed to climate change-sensitive hazards such as sea level rise, river floods, typhoons, storm surges or drought. Resulting from this combination is an increased potential for severe disasters as well as for creeping hazard processes and crises. A recent study based on integrated modeling even suggests that climate change is likely to have a notable – yet not overwriting – effect on economic growth and development in Vietnam altogether (CIEM and UNU-WIDER 2012). The results indicate that climate change (notably sea level rise, typhoons, changes in temperature and changes in precipitation) is likely to slow down economic growth and to imply economic losses of 8 to 21 billion USD until 2050 (real USD in 2007 value).

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In particular the country’s cities are argued to face high risks given that most of them are located in coastal or delta regions and concentrate the highest amounts of population and economic assets. Even today around 18 percent of the urban population are living within the 10 meter low elevation coastal zone, i.e. the area contiguous to the coastline up to 10 meters vertical elevation (McGranahan et al. 2007). Yet, the amount and density of population, settlements, industries and other infrastructure located in the low elevation coastal zone is even going to increase rapidly, along with the ongoing urbanizations and migration trends (chapter 4.6), potentially driving future risk even much higher. In addition, projected changes in precipitation patterns (timing, amount, spatial extent) are very likely to aggravate flooding problems in Vietnam’s cities. Daily rainfall is expected to increase by 12-19 percent in some areas by the year 2070 (MONRE 2003) resulting in higher peak discharges in rivers and canals and creating substantial problems for urban areas with high proportions of impervious surface. Furthermore, it is expected that rising air and sea temperatures will lead to an increase in the number and intensity of typhoons making landfall in Vietnam (CCFSC 2004). Also sea level rise is expected to contribute to future risk, particularly in the country’s coastal and low-lying delta cities (e.g. Dasgupta et al. 2007 and CarewReid 2008). Given that sea level rise is a slow-onset process one might expect that it is not very pressing and can, over time, be easily adapted to. However, when considering the scope of the hazard (cf. detailed figures below), the significant urban risks and the great challenges for urban adaptation become apparent – e.g. when imagining that entire cities like Ho Chi Minh City or even Can Tho City need to be adapted. Particularly the interplay between sea level rise and extreme flood events needs to be remembered, given that increased water tables can turn formidably benign river floods or pluvial floods into extreme events. Projected climate change (impacts) in the Mekong Delta and in Can Tho City Zooming into spatial differences within Vietnam, a number of modeling-based studies conclude that the Mekong Delta needs to be considered a major hot spot for climate change related risk. One of these studies found that of the entire area affected by a sea level rise of one meter in Vietnam, the Mekong Delta alone would contribute 85 percent (Carew-Reid 2008: 14). As of current population patterns, 4.7 million people would be directly affected – accounting for over almost one third of the MKD’s current population and for 82 percent of all affected people in Vietnam (p. 22). In addition, over 8,000 km of road infrastructure would be completely submerged and around 27,500 km affected in functionality (p. 30). In Can Tho City, a sea level rise of one meter is expected to inundate up to one fourth of the area and to directly affect one fifth of the population (cf. Table 4.3). While the findings of these assessments point into the same direction, considerable differences can be observed in the figures (Table 4.3) which translate into spatial differences with regards to the flooded areas.

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Projected Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Policy

Sea level rise

Mekong Delta Inundated area (%)

Population affected (%)

Cultivated land inundated (%)

as per current as per current as per current topography distribution land use 50 5.4* 5.3* cm 10.5*** 9.7*** 6.3*** 75 15.8* 14.7* cm 21.5*** 18.9*** 13.8*** 100 39.0* 34.6* cm 31.0** 26.7** 24.7** 35.5*** 31.3*** 23.2*** * (MONRE 2012); ** (Carew-Reid 2008); *** (IMHEN 2010)

Can Tho City Inundated area (%)

Population affected (%)

Cultivated land inundated (%)

as per current topography n/a

as per current distribution n/a

as per current land use n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

19.0* 24.8** 18.3***

20.8** 15.5***

20.2** 18.4***

Table 4.3: Projected direct sea level rise impact in the Mekong Delta and in Can Tho City, own draft based on data from MONRE (2012), Carew-Reid (2008) and IMHEN (2010)

Hence, while these assessments in general contribute to increasing the knowledge and awareness on the scale of sea level rise to be expected with climate change, the discrepancies in their findings imply a number of problems. The challenge to make robust adaptation decisions in the face of uncertain hazard predictions has in general been mentioned in the literature (cf. 2.5). However, it is little understood how this challenge plays out in the Vietnamese legal and administrative framework for risk management which is not only characterized by a belief in the ability to project future conditions precisely and to plan accordingly (cf. 4.1) but which is also faced with growing demands in terms of legitimizing and justifying decision making (cf. 4.4). Therefore, the empirical analysis (cf. 6.1) attempts to address these questions. In addition, all three assessment studies represented in Table 4.3 have been criticized on the grounds of scant or oversimplified hydrological modeling, further increasing the uncertainty of the results (cf. 6.1.3). They feature an inherent mismatch resulting from the combination of future sea level rise conditions with present figures for human and physical asset (see also 2.1.1). In reality, the dynamic social and economic change in the Mekong Delta implies that by the time these sea level marks have been reached, the amount, characteristics and spatial distributions of people and their physical assets will look very different from today. Similarly, future vulnerability patterns and coping capacities will be different, owing to the ongoing transformation process (cf. Garschagen and Kraas 2010; 2.1.1). This significant limitation of the current sea level rise impact assessments poses a fundamental challenge to using these assessments for more detailed feasibility and design studies of future adaptation measures. Along the same lines, these simplistic assessments only consider the direct inundation resulting from sea level rise, while wider effects of sea level rise such as soil salinization are likely to reach much further. Besides sea level rise, climate change is projected to also influence other hazards which are likely to have more immediate impact and which carry substantial potential for disasters in the short- and mid-term perspective. An increased level of variance in the Mekong’s flow, and hence an increased likelihood of extreme

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Risk and Transformation in Vietnam

flood events, can be observed in the recent past and needs to be expected to further intensify in future, along with climate change and monsoon variance (Delgado et al. 2010, 2012; Lauri et al. 2012). Furthermore, along with the overall increase in typhoon activity, it is expected that also the geographical extent of typhoon tracks will expand. Hence, the country’s south and especially the Mekong Delta and Ho Chi Minh City are very likely to register higher typhoon frequencies and intensities in the future (CCFSC 2004). Due to low typhoon experience and the lack of awareness and preparedness in this region (cf. 6), the effects of this development are potentially devastating. Further, the flood pulse in the Mekong Delta is projected to change as a result of shifts in precipitation patterns and upstream discharge. A modeling assessment by the Mekong River Commissions, for example, finds that during the rainy season the discharge in Tan Chau in the upper Mekong Delta will increase by 5.8 percent or 1.9 percent between 2010 and 2050 in an IPCC A2 and B2 emissions scenario, respectively (MRC 2010: 53). Similarly, hydrodynamic modeling by Västilä et al. (2010) suggests that average and maximum water levels and flood durations will increase between 2010 and 2049, particularly in average and dry hydrological years23. Similarly, Wassmann et al. (2004) find that the water level contour lines during the flood season will shift 50 kilometers towards the sea (i.e. beyond Can Tho City) in a 45 cm sea level rise scenario. Concomitantly, the extent of the area inundated during the rainy season is expected to expand and average water levels would rise by 27.4 cm in this scenario (ibid.). In addition, the timing and duration of floods would be altered, which potentially has effects on all three rice crops typically grown in most parts of the Mekong Delta (cf. Wassmann et al. 2004; Västilä et al. 2010; Tuan and Chinvanno 2011). Emerging climate adaptation policy in Vietnam Owing to the country’s exceptional risk from climate change, the Vietnamese government along with actors from the international cooperation community has recently pushed for a speedy formulation and promulgation of a formal climate change adaptation policy. This process was notably propelled by an influential World Bank study (Dasgupta et al. 2007), the Fourth Assessment Report of the 23 In general, this study, along with many of the modeling assessments on Vietnam and the Mekong Delta, has the shortcoming of applying and down-scaling only one global circulation model whereas a more solid assessment would need to consider the range of results emerging from the application of a broader set of different models (cf. Kingston et al. 2011; Västilä et al. 2010). It also needs to be remembered that the expected impacts of hydraulic infrastructure developments in the Mekong river basin are partly headed in the opposite direction. The cumulative impacts are not sufficiently understood so far making further research necessary (Västilä et al. 2010; see also MRC 2010). Yet, the authors note that their results are generally in line with the average changes simulated by the ensemble of 21 climate models in IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (Västilä et al. 2010: 83). The results can therefore be taken as a broad informative indication of future changes to be expected.

Projected Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Policy

129

IPCC (IPCC 2007b), and other studies (e.g. MONRE 2003; Stern 2006; Chaudry & Ruysschaert 2007), all emphasizing Vietnam’s high vulnerability to climate change related hazards. In December 2008, the Prime Minister of Vietnam therefore approved the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change (NTP-RCC) (cf. SRV 2008a). This programme officially acknowledges the importance of climate adaptation for the overall sustainable development of the country. It therefore calls for adaptation efforts of all levels and sectors and for the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into general planning processes. The Ministry for Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) and its line departments (DONREs) at the provincial level are defined to lead and synchronize adaptation efforts. Sectoral action plans for adaptation belong to the main instruments outlined. However, it can be noticed that the overwriting emphasis is on the adaptation of the physical infrastructure rather than the reconsideration of institutionalized management paradigms in a wider sense. In addition, the programme remains very vague on how adaptation is envisaged to look in detail (see for a more detailed review Garschagen 2010c). Table 4.4 summarizes the objectives of the National Target Program as well as the most important tasks and the envisaged timetable for completion. It remains to be analyzed in detail whether and how these tasks are implemented at the provincial and lower levels in a city like Can Tho City. One also needs to ask which barriers and opportunities for implementation might exist and how these can be overcome (cf. 6.1.3; Phuong 2008). In addition to the governmental adaptation activities and formal policy initiatives, Vietnam has been experiencing an increase in terms of other organizations working on climate change adaptation in Vietnam. These include in particular national and international NGOs, international governmental development agencies and scientific institutions, therewith not only adding additional perspectives on climate change adaptation but also broadening the institutional landscape of actors that want to be heard in adaptation governance. However, a lot of this work is rather based on desk studies or on rapid and superficial appraisals of changes in the hazard domain. Detailed analysis of the social dimensions of climate change vulnerability and adaptive capacity remain to be neglected. Therefore, key questions still tend to be overlooked and unanswered (cf. 4.8), contributing to the motivation for this analysis.

130 Objective

Risk and Transformation in Vietnam

24

Targets to be achieved by 2015 (selection)

Assessment of climate change impacts in Vietnam

Completion of scenarios based on existing data Pilot projects for assessment

Identification of response measures

Implementation and refinement of pilot/test projects in different sectors and locations

Establishment of scientific and practical basis for response measures

Development of a national science and technology program on climate change Completion and updating of climate change database Update of research and implement results

Consolidation of organizational structure and capacity building amongst relevant institutions

Development of framework for legal documents and mechanisms Coordination amongst ministries, sectors and localities Development of mechanisms to prioritize climate change activities

Raising public awareness and human resources development

Over 80% of population and 100% of government staff shall have acquired basic knowledge on climate change

Promotion of international cooperation and support

Establishment of bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms for implementing the national target plan

Mainstreaming into development planning (socio-economic, sectoral, local)

Guidance documents and classification of measures Mainstreaming climate change into future planning Assessessment of the implementation of hitherto climate change projects

Development and implementation of action plans and (pilot) projects

Ministries and local authorities draft and implement action plans climate change adaptation

Table 4.4: Objectives and targets of the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change, own draft based on SRV (2008a)

4.3.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION: TWO PARALLEL WORLDS?

Notwithstanding the importance of the natural hazard context in Vietnam and the to-be-expected intensification of such hazards in the course of climate change, current and especially future risk needs to be foremost understood through the multiple ways in which the current transformation of the country shapes social and institutional vulnerabilities and response capacities. This is also in line with the main tenets of the conceptual framework developed in chapter 3. Therefore, the following sections expand the perspective from the hazard and climate focus to explore the ongoing socio-economic and political transformation in Vietnam and to trace their implications for the vulnerability and the adaptive capacity of private as well as governmental actors facing those hazards.

24 For the official wording of the objectives and tasks refer to SRV (2008).

Socio-Economic and Political Transformation: Two Parallel Worlds?

131

Đổi mới: its origin, progression and vulnerability effects Since around three decades, Vietnam is undergoing a comprehensive reform process which is commonly referred to as đổi mới, meaning renovation or renewal25. In order to understand the rationale and course of the renovation process and its reform policies, a brief recap on the circumstances conditioning its genesis is necessary, since doi moi26 in principle emerged out of socialist crises in Vietnam that had formed over previous decades. The victory in the Second Indochina War27 in 1975 and the (re-)unification of North and South Vietnam into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the following year had reinforced the Communist leadership’s trust in their ideology of a centrally planned command economy28 (Luong 2003a: 6). Right after the war, the reinvigorated government started to tighten its control over production and trade and – in the south – pushed for a swift socialization of the private economy through expropriating entrepreneurs and private land-owners, nationalizing industrial enterprises and collectivizing agricultural production (cf. Boothroyd and Nam 2000: 13; Luong 2003a: 7; Porter 1993). Yet, disfunctions in the economy and a poor performance in social development soon began to show effect. The planned economy and collectivized production model – later officially referred to as the bureaucratic centralism and state subsidies system (Porter 1993: 128) – followed an orthodox Leninist paradigm that encroached on essential economic principles and yielded gravely misguiding incentives, in effect distorting the efficiency of the economic system altogether (see in detail Porter 1993: 128 et sequ.; Luong 2003a; Beresford 2003; Boothroyd and Nam 2000). As a result, the country suffered from chronic agricultural and industrial underproduction since the late 1970s and faced an impending breakdown of the centrally controlled economy, given that the state commercial system has been increasingly replaced by black markets with the purchasing power of regular salaries being in steep decline (Luong 2003a; Porter 1993). To make matters worse, the country also experienced deep cuts in its foreign aid from China and the Soviet Union since the late 1970s, due to political conflict with China and the internal difficulties in the Soviet Union (cf. Beresford 2003: 60; Fforde and Vylder 1996; quoted in Luong 2003a: 10). In addition, trade embargos with the United States and other Western countries blocked-off the access to alternative sources for foreign products. It, hence, be25 While the term đổi mới can also be used in a more general sense, the term chính sách đổi mới refers specifically to these particular reform policies. 26 In line with the other Vietnamese terminology used here (e.g. the names of the case study areas), the term đổi mới will not be spelled in the original Vietnamese script throughout the entire book but rather in its English spelling. 27 The Second Indochina War is in the Western world better known as the Vietnam War and in Vietnam commonly referred to as the American War. 28 Boothroyd and Nam (2000) elaborately show that considerable shortcomings of this system had became apparent in the north already prior to 1975. Yet, with the euphoria over having defeated the Western ‘imperialists’ the political leadership did not call the system into question in the early post-war years.

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came increasingly difficult to fill the internal production gap through imports, most notably with respect to staple food but also industrial goods and productive resources such as fertilizers, steel or petroleum (Beresford and Phong 2000). The resulting increase in the trade deficit, along with inflation and strong pressure on the Vietnamese currency (dong) further aggravated the situation as did the high costs of resolving the most important war damage. In combination, all the above problems resulted in economic stagnation and a severe socio-economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s that led to striking poverty and wide-spread hunger among Vietnam’s population (Rondinelli and Litvack 1999; Litvack 1999; Beresford 2003). In an effort to evade a complete system collapse and maintain its own power, the political leadership had to respond to the crisis and endorsed an economic renovation process (doi moi) towards a market-oriented economy allowing for more efficient and effective production (Luong 2003a: 8 et seq.; Dang 2007: 10 et seq.). While officially still adhering to the command economy, initial reformative policies had been already adopted in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s that, e.g. the ‘household contract system’ and ‘Three Plan System’ (see in detail, e.g., Beresford 2003: 60 et sequ.; Luong 2003a: 8 et sequ.; Revilla Diez 1995). However, given substantial ideological controversies within the Communist Party, the breakthrough of the reform policy only happened at the 6th Party Congress29, held in December 1986, which embraced renovation (doi moi) as official policy line. It is important to underscore that, for the time being, the renovation was not framed as a comprehensive socio-political process but was foremost focused on economic reform, i.e. the shift from a centrally-planned command economic model towards a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ (kinh tế thị trường theo định hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa) – as the official label, added later, puts it (Trong 2007: 27). A broadening of the political rhetoric towards a more general transformation and modernization of the society at large can be observed only over the following years. In this vein, the doi moi-process has been continued – in fact intensified – during the late 1980s and 1990s. Numerous additional legislative and regulative reforms have been passed which further strengthened the influence and freedom of private economic activity, most importantly liberalizing domestic and foreign investment, trade, property rights, pricing or land titling (see for a detailed overview Beresford 2003: 61 et sequ.; Revilla Diez 1995; Luong 2003a: 10 et sequ.; Fforde 1999; Kokko 2004). Considering this course of events, the reform process can be considered a pragmatic response to the economic crisis and especially to the vanishing public 29 The Sixth Party Congress also marked an extensive renewal in the political leadership with a high number of members in the Party Congress, the Central Committee and the Politburo changing from early generation political leaders to younger members who were more versed with the economic problems and leaned towards judging economic imperatives over ideological orthodoxy. Besides, this succession also meant increased representation of southerners in the political organs (Beresford 2003: 61; Porter 1998: 107). It has been suggested that without this change in leadership, the economic reforms would not have been possible – despite the serious crisis (Porter 1998: 128).

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133

support regarding the socialist movement. It has therefore been described as a struggle to maintain political legitimacy and to secure the persistence of the political system altogether (Dixon 2004). Along a similar line, it is by many outsiders not regarded as a pro-active transformation that has been triggered by the wise foresight of the Communist Party – as the political leadership still likes to frame it (cf. Beresford 2003). Resulting from these reforms has been a strong economic growth and an overall reduction in general poverty. GDP growth rates were particularly high during the first half of the 1990s (averaging around 8 percent annually), earning Vietnam international appreciation and the label of the next ‘Asian Tiger’. Implicit to this growth has been an increasing export orientation and a substantial expansion of the private business sector. Yet, from the mid-1990s onwards growth rates along with international euphoria cooled down as the overheated investment rush of the early post-doi moi-years was replaced by “more realistic appraisal of business opportunities” (McCargo 2004: 10; see also Gainsborough 2004: 40). However, even after the mid 1990s the growth rates retained a high level, even remaining above 5 percent throughout the Asian financial crisis (Luong 2003a: 11). Along with this economic growth, the country has experienced a considerable decline in general poverty rates. As shown in Table 4.6, it decreased from 58 percent in 1993 to 14 percent in 2010. In urban areas, the official poverty rate is even lower, at around 7 percent in 2010. However, despite the economic growth, the liberalization around doi moi has also caused strong repercussions for social development in general, and for vulnerability and adaptive capacity related to natural hazards in particular. As in any liberalization venture, the Vietnamese reform process initiated a substantial shift in the political economy, therewith changing the principles for economic success and social security (World Bank 2008). Efficiency and the accumulation of capital emerged as the prime engines of economic growth. However, the human capacities and the structural entitlements that allow for cashing-in on the increased freedom in the liberalized system have never been equally distributed in Vietnam. At the same time, the liberalization and privatization policies imply that economic and social risks increasingly have to be borne individually by every member of the society. The state plays a diminishing role for buffering or distributing risks. Examples range from global prices shocks, over loss of income to health care. Related to these changes in the political economy, three major trends can be observed which bear major implications for vulnerability dynamics at the local level – as chapter 6 will show: Firstly, notwithstanding the high average rates in economic growth and poverty reduction, there has been a strong increase in socio-economic disparities not only between different regions in Vietnam (cf. Beresford 2003; Revilla Diez 1995; Fforde 2004) but also within the regions (Luong 2003b). A large part of the society does not adequately participate in the economic growth and faces considerable difficulties to make for a secured livelihood base that would allow for reducing, or at least confining, existing vulnerabilities (Luong 2003b; Taylor 2004; Adger 2000b). In this respect, it also has been noted that the general decrease of

134

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people living in poverty – which is observed across different measurement approaches – has to be taken with caution as “a high percentage of the population is bunched just above the poverty line and a relatively small deterioration in living standards would be sufficient to push them below the poverty line again” (Marsh and McAulay 2006: 8). Disasters related to natural hazards can potentially cause such deteriorations and could hence turn into tipping points for long term poverty pathways. Hence, dealing with vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities related to natural hazards has, also from this perspective, wider implications for socioeconomic development in the country more generally (see also the UNUWIDER/CIEM assessment introduced in 4.2). Secondly, there is a progressing shift from public social security networks – even though scanty – towards an individualization and marketization of social security provision (Litchfield and Justino 2004). With the increasing privatization of the economy and the diminishing role of the state sector more and more people lose their right to public security or insurance schemes in terms of health insurance, pension plans, invalidity insurance etc. (see, for example, Ekman et al. 2008; Wagstaff 2007). In addition, despite the large increase in economic growth and state revenue, the relative share of government spending on social security is in considerable decline since doi moi, particularly in the fields of health care and social relief (cf. Justino 2005: 5). The question, thus, arises whether poverty describes an increasingly important factor of vulnerability towards natural hazards, since it regulates the access to an increasing basket of liberalized services and assets associated with social security. This question will be addressed in more depth in the empirical analysis (cf. 6.2). Thirdly, another important issue, especially in the rural areas but also for urban residents, is the increasing level of landlessness since the de-facto privatization of the land markets. This problem can be observed particularly in the Mekong Delta (cf. 4.6; Ravallion and van de Walle 2008a,b). Statistical surveys have, for example, shown that the number of landless households in the Delta has increased from 12,500 in 1994 to around 1,000,000 in 1998 (cf. Marsh and MacAulay 2006: 7). Tuan (forthcoming) finds that landlessness in the rural Mekong Delta is directly correlated to an increased susceptibility and reduced coping capacity with respect to natural hazards. Attention to such links in Vietnam’s urban areas has been lacking so far, but the empirical data presented in chapter 6.2 reveals that also there the lack of land title increases vulnerability and especially for the lack of adaptive capacity. In order to counteract all these trends, the government of Vietnam has since the beginning of the reform process initiated a number of policy programmes which had some impact but have not delivered on their aim to yield social development in a fully comprehensive and inclusive manner (Justino 2005; Ravallion and van de Walle 2008). General social insurance programmes have been introduced during the 1990s, comprising most importantly health insurance, retirement pensions, disability benefits and unemployment benefits. Depending on the employment condition, they are either mandatory or can be signed voluntarily. The costs are shared between the employer (when applicable) and the insured person.

Socio-Economic and Political Transformation: Two Parallel Worlds?

135

The entire system is cross-subsidized by the central government. However, the – in theory – mandatory programmes for formal employees are often not implemented to the letter and the rate of voluntary subscriptions remains very low (Justino 2005). A comprehensive analysis of the system therefore concludes that “[t]he social insurance system covers only 11 percent of the labor force and does not reach those most in need. The majority of the population covered by existing social insurance arrangements consists of people in middle income and upper income groups, notably active and retired public sector workers and formal sector employees” (Justino 2005: 7). Since particularly the issue of health insurance is of high relevance for the context of natural hazards and the questions how health impacts can be negotiated, Table 4.5 presents in more detail the different health insurance programme currently co-existing in Vietnam. As indicated above, these comprise both stateorganized and private market schemes. The table also shows that health insurance plans in principle cover a range of benefits of key importance for the context of natural hazards (e.g. the treatment of injuries or the use of medication). However, the table underscores that the coverage rates are comparatively low, leaving the largest part of the Vietnamese society without sufficient health insurance coverage. In addition, key benefits are not covered by most of the insurance programmes, which, however, are likely to become increasingly relevant in the context of climate change (e.g. malaria care or vaccinations). Similarly to the situation in terms of health care and social insurance schemes more broadly, also other policy programmes, which are designed to transfer assistance from the state to people in hardship, are of limited impact (Justino 2005; Lichtfield and Justino 2005). This is because these programmes are restricted to very specific groups and have tightly capped budgets. Amongst the most important of these schemes is the Programme for Socio-economic Development in Communes Facing Extreme Difficulties (better known as the Programme 135) and the National Target Programme on Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction. However, despite being widely applauded within Vietnam both programmes are restricted to providing infrastructure and financial support to specifically selected communes, many of which are located in remote rural areas in Northern Highlands. In addition, the programmes have been critized for providing fragmented components, hence, jeopardizing the odds for comprehensive development (Justino 2005). In conclusion, while often depicted as macro-economic success story, the reform process has not automatically brought about inclusive social development in which all segments of the Vietnamese society can participate. On the contrary, it in many respects creates new risks or intensifies the institutional and economic barriers for disadvantaged groups to participate in the socio-economic progress and to build up adequate capacities not only for securing a sustainable livelihood but also for reducing their vulnerabilities to current and future natural hazards (cf. 6.2). However, the above review also shows that the current literature addresses the socio-economic effects of the reform process in fairly generic and macroeconomic terms. The detailed implications and causal relations at household level

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remain little understood. This is true in particular for the urban context, given that the vast majority of the afore-introduced policy programmes, and hence their assessment studies, have a primarily rural focus. In line with the conceptual framework (cf. 3) one could also argue that the effects of transformation are more obvious with respect to generic capacities, while the effects on the specific capacities for adaptation (cf. 3.2) are much more difficult to identify and understand – hence calling for increased efforts of empirical analysis (cf. 6). Programme

Target group(s)

Coverage (% of national pop. in 2007/2008)

Financing

Social health insurance (SHI)

Formally employed, retirees, disabled, meritorious people

9%

4.5% payroll tax (2% employers and 1% employees)

Health care funds for the poor (HCFP)

The poor, ethnic minorities, disadvantaged communities

18%

General government revenues (75%) and provincial resources (25%)

All children under the age of 6 years

11%

Programme of free health care for children under 6 years of age

General government revenues (75%) and provincial resources (25%)

Voluntary health insurance (VHI) provided by the Government

Self-employed, informal sector workers, dependents of SHI- and HCFPmembers, students, school children

11%

Private premium contribution

Private health insurance

Principally everybody but de facto high income groups

0.5%

Private premium contribution depending on contract

Included benefits (selection)

Medical consultation, diagnosis, inpatient and outpatient treatment; Xrays; laboratory tests; selected drugs listed by the Ministry of Health; surgery

Excluded benefits (selection)*

Malaria; leprosy; tuberculosis; vaccinations; tooth; accidents at work place; home care; rehabilitation and recovery

Co-payment between 5 and 20%.

Depending on individual contract

Depending on individual contract

* some of which to be covered by other national target programmes

Table 4.5: Mechanisms, benefits and coverage rates of health insurance schemes, own draft based on SRV (2005, 2008b); Ekman et al. (2008); Castel et al. (2011); Wagstaff (2007)

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Socio-Economic and Political Transformation: Two Parallel Worlds?

General poverty a,b,c,d rate Total Urban Rural GDP per capita e (current USD) f HDI

1990

1993

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

n/a n/a n/a

58.1 25.1 66.4

37.4 9.0 44.9

n/a n/a n/a

28.9 6.6 35.6

18.1 8.6 21.2

15.5 7.7 18.0

13.4 6.7 16.1

14.2 6.9 17.4

11.1 3,9 14,7

98

189

361

402

441

558

731

1070

1224

1407*

0,4

n/a

n/a

0.53

n/a

n/a

0.58

0.59

0,61

0,61

n/a n/a n/a

0.34 0.35 0.28

0.35 0.34 0.27

n/a n/a n/a

0.420 0.410 0.36

0.420 0.410 0.37

0.424 0.393 0.378

0.434 0.404 0.385

0.433 0.402 0.395

n/a

a,c

GINI coefficient Total Urban Rural

n/a n/a

Table 4.6: Trends in key indicators for socio-economic development, own draft based on a Justino (2005); b GSO (2013); c GSO (2011); d GSO (2006); e World Bank (2013); f UNDP (2013); * year 2011

The significant reorganization of the economic sphere and the related shifts in social development parameters necessarily prompt the question how far also the Vietnamese political system as such has been changing (or will change) during the reform process. When trying to grasp this question, it is important to note that the country’s political change has received far less attention than economic transformation and has often been ignored or depicted as by-product or ‘natural’ consequence of economic change, rather than as a result of active political reforms (Dixon 2004: 24). This is, of course, in part related to the fact that the country in general maintained its political system despite the economic shift to market economy. Vietnam’s renovation therefore differs from the way of the former Soviet Union and shares more similarities with the development in China, even though considerable differences remain (cf. Luong 2003a: 12). It has been suggested that doi moi coevolved with some sort of tacit agreement between the population and the political leadership: The people have not seriously challenged the Communist Party’s quasi-monopoly over power while, in return, they have been granted more economic freedom which – in theory – shall allow them to push their own socio-economic development forward. The political leadership’s role, on the other hand, is to establish the institutional conditions for enabling this socio-economic progress and for securing political stability and peace (Wischermann 2011a). Until today, meeting these promises (and complying with this deal) probably marks the most important gauge for political legitimacy and eventually for political stability in Vietnam (Wischermann 2011a; see also Thayer 2009a). However, the questions whether this also implies the justification for upholding an authoritarian or – as some would argue – even totalitarian rule is increasingly disputed and at the margins even debated within the country (cf. Gainsborough 2012; Thayer 2009b). As the empirical analysis will show in more detail, the imbalance between profound economic change, on the one hand, and the lack of an equally profound political opening, on the other hand, results in a grave challenges. Fforde (2012)

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suggests that “[t]he lack of effective political change suited to the contemporary requirements of a dynamic, diverse, and outward-oriented society of itself posed major questions to political actors about the capacity of Vietnam’s political system to rule the country effectively” (p. 176). Part of the objective for the empirical analysis (cf. 6) is to analyze in more detail how this imbalance plays out in the field of vulnerability reduction, (disaster) risk management and (climate change) adaptation. 4.4

THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM REVISITED

The issues raised in the above section urge one to explore the internal fabric of the political system in more detail and to ask how political decision making processes take place. In particular it needs to be asked whether and how the political system has been changing with doi moi – in spite of nominally maintaining its configuration. A sound comprehension of these questions contributes to providing the context necessary for examining and eventually understanding the dynamics in urban management, (disaster) risk management and climate change adaptation, focused on in this study. Connected to the earlier provided debate around risk governance (cf. 2.5), one of the most fundamental questions seems to be how political power is shared and controlled among the Communist Party, the state apparatus, the people and other actors such as the mass organizations and non-state civil society groups. An informative entry point for answering this question is provided in the official slogan expressing the Communist Party’s idealized vision of how the political system (ought to) operate: “The party leads, the people control, and the state manages.” (Porter 1993: 64). In this line of thinking the interests of the people are politically represented largely through the mass organizations (cf. 4.5) which also play a key role in disaster risk management (cf. 4.5; 6.1). Hence, the slogan represents the official vision that each of the three main institutional components of the system – the party, the state apparatus and the mass organizations – has a clear function, keeping the overall system in control and balance (ibid). However, it has been observed that in reality the party retains a quasimonopoly on the political power and is lacking effective control since the party in effect directs the other institutional components in the system (cf. Fforde 2005). The conclusion drawn by Porter (1993), therefore, is still valid, arguing that “in practice […] the state and mass organizations have always been little more than extensions of the party’s power” (p. 64). Quite telling is also the self-description of today’s political system which is provided at the Government Web Portal of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Referring to relation between the Party and the judicial as well as executive state bodies, it explains that party boards ought to be set up at all administrative levels which have the mandate to “make other members of the [judicial and executive] bodies understand and implement the Party’s guidelines and policies”. In conclusion, “with those bodies, the Communist Party of Vietnam has a nationwide organizational system, from the central to the grass-

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roots levels, and in political- social organizations and economic entities” (SRV 2012). Accordingly, a lot of the Party’s leadership is enforced directly by party members holding key positions within the state structure (Kerkvliet 2004: 8). It is due to this hybridization of the state’s and the party’s influence that many authors refer to the system as ‘party-state bureaucracy’ (e.g. Dixon 2004; Koh 2004; Gainsborough 2010b; Vasavakul 2001, 2003; Hansson 2003; Porter 1993). This term expresses that more often than not it is in fact hard – or impossible – to differentiate between state and party organs with respect to decision making and the exercise of power. However, the state-party constellation is neither static nor monolithic since it is changing with doi moi and can play out differently across horizontal and vertical levels. Dixon (2004), for example, observes that the partystate apparatus is too often seen as a highly unified entity and an ‘old fashioned socialist regime’ (p. 15 et sequ.). Such views, so his argument, are particularly embedded in the Western (notably the American) conception of Vietnam (p. 16). However, Vietnam’s party-state rather needs to be understood as a segmented and multilayered formation featuring significant inconsistencies and breaks, due to the doi moi-reforms, local power discrepancies and the historical differences between the various parts of the country30 (Dixon 2004: 17). Using an illustrative metaphor, Koh (2001a) summarizes his comprehensive analysis by asserting that “[t]he Vietnamese state apparatus is huge and pervasive, but management problems plague it almost like Parkinson’s disease. The brain, located in Hanoi, is not always in effective control of the movements of its parts throughout the whole country. The machinery is incompetent and corrupt and often responds more to local or personal interests than to what the party-state says or the law dictates.” (p. 536). This observations bears high relevance for the research presented here as it prompts one to look closely at the ways in which higher level provisions for formal urban management, disaster risk management and adaptation play out at the local level in Can Tho City, i.e. how formal policies are modified and implemented – or not (cf. 6.1). In order to allow for a better understanding of the functioning of the partystate apparatus it is helpful to briefly portray the main characteristics of its organizational structure across vertical, horizontal and functional dimensions. This knowledge is important for understanding the role and structure of government agencies later on analyzed in the empirical part (cf. 6.1). In accordance with the focus of this study, the main emphasis is put on the sub-national and local level. Figure 4.1 summarizes main entities in the party-state bureaucracy organized along the vertical administrative levels from national to local. It party-state apparatus comprises the Communist Party, the legislative, executive and judicative organs provided by the Vietnamese Constitution and other entities including most importantly the Fatherland Front and other mass organizations (cf. Figure 4.1).

30 Dixon (2004), for example, argues that even prior to the doi moi-process the party-state system in Vietnam had less internal unity than that of China or the Soviet Union due to the fragmented history of the country (p. 16).

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It is important to note that the term ‘government’ is often used to refer to the entirety of the governing structure covering national to local organs (Kerkvliet 2004: 3). Therefore, the most common Vietnamese term for ‘local government’ (chinh quyen dia phuong) can also be translated into ‘local administration’ or ‘local authority’, meaning to not only comprise the formally designated executive organs (i.e. the People’s Committees and their sectoral planning departments) but to also include additional institutions running the state, most notable the Communist Party or the mass organizations (ibid.). Many of the household members and experts interviewed for this study have used the term ‘local government’ in this latter, broader, meaning to refer to local state authority more generally (cf. 6). Therefore, when referring to the local level the state and government have increasing overlap, hence, also both terms are used in chapter 6. Figure 4.1 also illustrates that the formal state structure with professionalized bureaucrats reaches down to the ward level. However, semi-formal state representatives are in place even at the lower levels as heads of residential blocks and groups. Table 6.1, provided in the empirical chapter (cf. 6.1.1.1), will explore in more detail the size of each of the entity in the case of Can Tho City and will examine in particular the implications of the shift from professional management at province and district levels to increasingly hybrid or lay structures towards the lower levels.

Figure 4.1: Vietnam’s party-state apparatus, own draft drawing on the literature cited in this chapter

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In theory, the executive People’s Committees at each level are in ‘double subordination’ meaning that they are bound to directives, firstly, from the legislative People’s Council at the same level and, secondly, from the People’s Committee of higher levels or the national government (cf. Figure 4.1; Kerkvliet 2004: 7). However, it has been observed that in fact People’s Councils “remain[…] firmly under the control of the People’s Committees” (Porter 1993: 80) and “in most places govern primarily by endorsing whatever is put before them, much of what comes to them from higher levels of government, the chair of the local People’s Committee, and the secretary of the local branch of the Communist Party” (Kerkvliet 2004: 8; see also Koh 2004). In other words, the principle of checks and balances (trias politica) is mostly not adhered to in the system. Decision making tends to be confined to small groups of the most influential people from (higher level) People’s Committees and most notably the Party cells who hand on decisions in a command-oriented top-down approach31. Acknowledging this fuzzy and contested decision making structure sets the scene for the detailed analysis of decision making in the field risk management and adaptation in Can Tho City (cf. 6.1). It implies the need for detailed qualitative research that goes beyond the appraisal of formal policy documents (cf. 5) and asks which impact the recommendation given by adaptation and risk management experts in the bureaucratic system can in fact have on the actual decisions taken, e.g. when it comes to deciding for or against infrastructure projects in hazard exposed areas (cf. 6.1.3). Similar mismatches between theory and practice can be found with regards to the appointment of personnel in government organs – in theory one of the key parameters for shaping (risk) governance. According to the legal framework, the members of executive People’s Committees ought to be elected by the respective Councils. However, in reality the seats are mostly filled with officials endorsed by the Party and/or the Fatherland Front (Kerkvliet 2004: 10). After being installed, particularly the chairs and vice-chairs of the People’s Committees – usually high ranking male Party cadres – can strongly influence policy lines and decisions of the entire Committee (Kerkvliet 2004: 8). That is also why interviewing these chair and vice-chair people was of particular value in the empirical research (cf. 5; 6.1). The semi-official heads at residential group level may be chosen based on ballots, yet in most cases they are appointed or at least nominated by the local Party or Fatherland Front cell. Hence, the possibilities for local residents to shape, for example, the risk management strategies in their area through the election of political representatives are fairly limited and, hence, other modes of local negotiations have been observed (cf. 6.2). People’s Committees have under them a number of sectoral departments in charge of assisting the Committee in implementing policies and programmes in 31 The same configuration has been argued to exist at the national level where fundamental decisions on key policies and reforms are commonly confined to a small group of people in the Politburo of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers, while the National Assembly, formally the highest legislative organ of the state, commonly has only rubber stamped those decisions (Porter 1993; Fforde 2012).

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their specific thematic field. Most of these departments constitute branch offices of the respective line ministries at national level (e.g. Departments of Construction in accordance with the Ministry of Construction, the Departments for the Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources etc.). Following a modified version of the ‘double subordination’ principles, these sector departments are therefore accountable to the People’s Committees at the same level but also have to follow the directives of the respective line agency at the next higher level, which is of great relevance with respect to the implementation of national disaster risk management policies, for instance (cf. 6.1). Leaders and technical staff from these departments made for a large proportion of the experts interviewed for this research. The term bureaucratic polity has been used to describe how the Vietnamese political system works (e.g. Girling 1981; Porter 1993), meaning that “major decisions are made entirely within the bureaucracy and are influenced by it rather than by extrabureaucratic forces in the society – whether parliamentary parties, interest groups, or mass movements” (Porter 1993: 101). Recent accounts of the political system suggest that such a depiction is still valid today, i.e. two and a half decades after the official commencement of the doi moi-process, even though state-party officials increasingly engage in new modes of decision making outside the partystate realm, often through informal networks in the private economy (see in detail chapter 4.5; Fforde 2010, 2012; Gainsborough 2012). Of high relevance in Vietnam is also the Leninist principle of democratic centralism (Beresford 1993; Porter 1993: 101). It postulates unconditional implementation of decisions taken at higher level organs as well as minority implementation of decisions taken by the majority. However, it has been argued that the democratic aspect can, in practice, largely be considered “a facade in which the election process legitimizes consultation and negotiations between core leadership and the higher ranks of the party” (Porter 1993: 102) – which is in line with the earlier illustrated confinement of decision making power. In the same vein, political institutions in Vietnam have been described to be focused on formalism, the collective character of decision making and the consensus principle (cf. Pike 2000; Dixon 2004; Porter 1993). Despite the bloomy language of consensus and unity – suggesting discursive agreement as one of the highest political goods – these principles are in fact geared towards muting dissent or conflict and to guarantee stringent implementation of decisions taken. In short, they are supporting authoritarian leadership (Wischermann 2011b). In theory, one could expect that these principals of political behavior, together with the interlocking of the party with the state organs (the party-state), helps ensuring the Communist Party that a coherent political line runs through all political institutions and a flawless implementation of policies can be achieved. However, it has been argued that the informal modes of decision making have in fact produced numerous policies and regulations with internal contradictions and fuzzy specifications, making a consistent interpretation and implementation across different vertical and horizontal scales virtually impossible (Porter 1993: 64; Dixon 2004). Hence, detailed case studies, like the one risk management and adaptation

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policies in Can Tho City presented in chapter 6, are needed to better understand how this heterogeneity translates into policy making and government action in a specific context. 4.5

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS – UNDER TRANSFORMATION?

Moving on from the above sections, it appears essential to ask for the relations and modes of interaction between the state (or party-state) and the society, particularly in the field of risk management. Emerging is also the question how these relations might be changing with the ongoing transformation process. It needs to be remembered that in any country, but particularly in Vietnam with its one-party political system and the far reaching state bureaucracy, distinguishing between the state and the society32 is a very perplexing problem (Kerkvliet 2003a; Koh 2001b). It is worthwhile remembering that a great number of people working in Vietnam’s copious state sector – particularly in administrative or executive positions – are representing the state while also being members of the society. In addition, non-state professionals might be members of the state-associated mass organizations (see below) or even the Communist Party. Similarly, entire institutions such as media agencies or universities can have a hybrid role as they are considered to be important elements of society while acting under the state’s strict supervision (or even at its instructions) and are dependent on state budgeting. The approach taken for this research therefore follows Kerkvliet (2003a) who argues for the case of Vietnam that “[r]ather than trying to say that one entity is part of the state and another entity is part of society, a more fruitful approach is to think of arenas in which boundaries, rights, jurisdictions, and power distribution between state and societal agencies are debated, contested, and resolved (at least temporarily)” (p. 28; see also Koh 2004). Of particular relevance to this study, such a framing promises a fruitful lens for the analysis of risk management and adaptation activities which are in the literature often differentiated – misleadingly – into clear-cut antagonisms of state vs. non-state or formal vs. informal (cf. 2.5.1). Keeping these difficulties in mind, the inquiry on state-society relations addresses a number of questions relevant to the research presented here: How can (and do) people and institutions exercise influence on the process of defining and implementing rules and policies affecting their life (including the response and adaptation to natural hazards)? How can (and do) people claim their rights? How are the degrees to which the state facilitates and supports but also constraints and 32 Society can in this context be understood as “a summary term for people in a country, including their institutions and customs, who share political and economic circumstances and environment” (Kerkvliet 2003a: 28). The term state comprises reference to its physical or structural aspects as well as to its ideological and psychological dimension and targets the “officials and institutions that make, implement, and enforce rules intended to apply across the entire society and its various parts” (ibid.).

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regulates people’s activities and voices negotiated and translated into practice. It is evident that these questions link in multiple ways to the more general discourse around risk governance introduced earlier (cf. 2.5). To start with, it has been widely observed in the literature that the political culture in Vietnam for a long time has been – and to a large extent still is – revolving around “heavy doses of elitism and paternalism” (Gainsborough 2012: 38; see also Pike 2000; Gainsborough 2010a,b). This finds strong expression in the selfunderstanding that the party and party-state officials ‘know best’ – which has far reaching implications not only with respect to ‘taking care’ of the people (e.g. in the context of natural hazards) but also in terms of stifling any criticism or organized opinion outside of the Party’s structure (cf. Gainsborough 2010a). It has been noted that traditionally this culture rests heavily on the “strong implicit belief that the goodwill and the high moral capacity of those in authority – and not the impersonal checks and balances favored by the liberal tradition – should serve as the key restraints on power” (Gainsborough 2012: 38). Yet, even though the reproduction of such cultural values plays an important role, they should not be misunderstood as being static or irresponsive to the multifaceted changes in Vietnam’s society and political economy, particularly since the take-off of doi moi-reforms. Rather, the formerly undisputable paternalistic role of the party-state as ‘care-taker’ is increasingly debated and contested – not only within the so-called civil society (see below) but also by state officials themselves. An illustrative example paying testimony to this stagger is an observation by Gainsborough (2010a) that “following severe flooding in Hanoi in 2008, the secretary of the city party committee was quoted in the media as saying that ‘the trouble with the people today is that whenever there is a problem, they expect the state to fix it’. He suggested that citizens ought to be more ready to solve problems themselves. The remarks proved controversial and he later apologized but they clearly point to the way in which attitudes in the state may be changing. (p. 483).” The empirical analysis presented in chapter 6 will come back to this contested arena and explore in more detail how risk management rights, responsibilities and capacities are negotiated in Can Tho City against the background of the changing conception with regards to the party-state’s paternalistic care-taker role. This leads one to ask how the (re-) production and preservation of the leadership’s political legitimacy is pursued in Vietnam and what the role of risk management and adaptation action is – or will be in future. This question is important because political legitimacy makes for part and parcel of state-society relations since government authority can only be considered legitimate to the extent that it functions with the general consent of the governed33 (Thayer 2009a: 48). While the struggle for national independence had been a major source of political legitimacy in the past (Thayer 2009a,b; Vasavakul 1995), it has been argued that the 33 Political legitimacy should not be confused with legality. An authority or its action can be legally sanctioned while not being considered legitimate on the part of its subordinates. Vice versa, the action of authorities can under certain circumstance be considered legitimate without being legally sanctioned (cf. Thayer 2009a).

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performance in facilitating economic growth and social development has been the strongest source of legitimacy since doi moi. However, observers also argue that the impending slow-down in this progress and especially the toleration of a large share of population that cannot participate in it (cf. 4.3) implies the largest current threat to the authority’s legitimacy (Thayer 2009a). Interestingly, while this conflict is seemingly staged in a national-level arena, it is at the local level of day-today state-society interaction that it is in fact carried out. Risk management and the adaptation to new hazards – as explored in this study – surely belong to the central aspects in this context, which is why drawing this link is of key relevance here. Many of the issues raised above point (implicitly or explicitly) to the question how the interests of comparatively marginalized or vulnerable groups in the society are represented and how action outside the embracing party-state apparatus can be advocated for. Since these topics are commonly associated with civil society, it is little surprising that the latter has developed into one of the most intensively debated issues in the literature on Vietnam’s state-society relations. Some aspects of this controversial debate are of key relevance for the analysis of (disaster) risk management and (climate change) adaptation action in Can Tho City and beyond (cf. 6). In the Vietnamese context, even the basic question what civil society should stand for is controversially debated. Views range from framing civil society as something explicitly outside the state – or even as an antagonist and corrective of the state (or the party-state) – all the way to arguing that civil society action can also be brought about by actors and institutions from within the state (Kerkvliet 2003a,b; Wischermann 2011b; Thayer 2009b; Dixon 2004). In the original logic of the Communist Party civil society outside the Party is neither necessary nor envisaged as the Party serves the people and the nation as a whole – encapsulated in the popular slogan “for the people, by the people, and of the people” (Kerkvliet 2004: 2). However, along with the increasing societal plurality since doi moi a growing number of actors do not see their interests represented in any of the conventionally established party or state organizations and therefore seek other ways to organize their voice, e.g. in the increasing number of ‘clubs’ or ‘associations’ (Kerkvliet 2003b; Wischermann and Vinh 2003; Gainsborough 2012; Dixon 2004). Yet, the agendas and strategies of these organizations can differ considerably. While many of the Vietnamese ‘non-governmental’ organizations consider themselves as “partners working in development projects in support of state policy” (e.g. in the field of disaster vulnerability in the Mekong Delta), others follow a more confrontative approach towards state institutions and might have a more explicit political agenda (Thayer 2009b: 7). Of particular relevance is in this context the question whether Vietnam’s mass organizations should be considered as civil society institutions, i.e. whether their characteristics match with the properties of civil society entities discussed in the literature. These mass organizations include most importantly the Fatherland Front, the Farmers’ Association, the Women’s Union, the Youth Union and the Veterans’ Union. They are originally envisaged to mobilize public support in the ‘masses’ for the activities around national development. The Fatherland Front, as

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the most important mass organization, is considered to be in charge of supporting national security, including the protection against natural hazards. Chapter 6 will therefore show that its plays a central role in Can Tho City’s disaster risk management mechanisms. However, since all mass organizations have close ties to the party-state structure (cf. Thayer 2009b) and, hence, cannot be understood as an independent corrective, they are here not considered as civil society organizations in the above-illustrated (cf. 2.5) interpretation rooted in Western writings. Tightly linked to the concerns of civil society is the issue of participation in policy and administration affairs – which is directly linked to the question whether and how risk reduction and adaptation measures are implanted in a participatory manner. Participation has seen some nominal strengthening since doi moi, yet, with the actual effectiveness of the reforms remaining contested. One of the central policy reforms that followed the proliferating demands for stronger participation was the grassroots democracy degree issued in 199834 which envisaged to foster the transparency in decision making and to establish channels that would allow citizens to communicate their opinion on policy issues, e.g. on dyke projects or resettlement (Kerkvliet 2004; Benedikter 2008). However, the real impact of this reform is hard to assess (cf. Kerkvliet 2004) and critical reviews conclude that the reforms have not resulted in ‘true’ participation. This is because there is still tight political control at work regarding the decisions on how participation is sanctioned to take place and which topics are open for participation and which ones are not (Rodan and Jayasuiya 2007). The case study analysis (cf. 6) will take up this issue and will explore whether this holds true also for decisions on disaster risk management and the emerging field of climate change adaptation – a field in which the theoretical literature emphasizes on the need for participatory action in order to achieve effective solutions (cf. 2.5). This leads one to focus more closely on how state-society interaction plays out at the local (urban) level, i.e. in the day-to-day interaction of urban population with lower level of state representatives. Focusing specifically on ward level administration, Koh (2004; 2001b) observes a paradox in the role of government officials and their institutional embedding. Based on empirical research in Hanoi (in 1997 and 1998) he finds that most often state departments at higher levels designate Communist Party members to hold the key positions in the ward level People’s Councils as well as People’s Committees. While such promotions suggest that central agencies and the Communist Party can get the ward level officers to strictly adhere to party and state policies, the research revealed that this is often not the case. Rather, ward officers were found to often bend or modify the directives of higher level state agencies (Koh 2004: 222). Part of the explanation is to be found in an inadequate personnel policy, a lack of competence amongst ward level officers and pervasive corruption. However, the major part of the explana34 The Degree on grassroots democracy is often interpreted as a response to pronounced demonstrations in Thai Binh province in 1996 and 1997 where large parts of the population openly showed their discontent with the poor performance and crooked leadership of their local government (cf. Kerkvliet 2001).

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tion is the intermediate or hybrid position of the ward officials. On the one hand they are the executive arm of state and the party, while at the same time they are in immediate contact with the people and are expected to be responsive to their hardship, needs and claims. Koh even underscores that “according to Vietnamese laws, ward officials are supposed to be attentive to local circumstances and accordingly make some adjustments in administrative tasks. Also, ward officials take into account cultural mores involving give-and-take, and being understanding about individual hardship and difficulties. These […] factors frequently contribute toward officials not doing, or being unable to do, what central policies and laws require” (p. 222). Koh’s conclusions have much in common with Kerkvliet’s (2003a) framing of local level state-society relations as ‘everyday politics’. The author finds that local communities and interest groups can – despite the general dominance of the top-down system – influence and shape local policy practices in day-to-day negotiation processes fuelled by collective or individual action ranging from subtle opposition or non-adherence to more or less open protest and defiance. These ‘everyday politics’ are largely performed at the level of local governance where – as Koh (2004) impressively shows – the lines between state and non-state actors become increasingly blurry and hybrid. Emerging from Koh’s and Kerkvliet’s observations is an important impulse relevant for the research presented here. Both caution against using too simplistic or dichotomous actor conceptions of ‘the state’ or ‘the government’ versus ‘the population’, particularly at lower administrative levels. In existing vulnerability and adaptation studies, these two groups are often depicted as two discrete entities with antipodal interests and action. However, more differentiated perspectives are certainly needed which is all the more important for the study presented here: Since the analysis of risk mitigation and adaptation in Can Tho City focuses on the interaction of governmental and non-governmental measures, it needs to put its core focus explicitly on the local level where governmental action interacts most intensively with the people’s lives and where these two spheres have to be matched and conflicting interests mediated by local government staff who are themselves at the same time community members of the very community they ought to ‘govern’. 4.6

URBANIZATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MEKONG DELTA

Embedded within the larger setting of transformation and risk, the following chapter discusses the specific vulnerability context in Vietnam’s cities. Particular attention is herein given to the root causes of these vulnerabilities and to the question which implications the current transformation process has for the development and progression of social vulnerabilities in urban areas. Literature on these topics is fairly sparse and has only recently begun to increase within the context of urban climate change vulnerability. Therefore, the urban implications of the transformation process and earlier development periods need to be considered more generally here.

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Urban growth and expansion – driver of vulnerability? In combination with the liberalization and industrialization around doi moi (cf. 4.3), Vietnam has over the last few decades been experiencing strong urbanization which is expected to continue and even intensify in the future. Resulting from this growth are questions not only on urban hazard exposure but also on the implied challenges and opportunities with respect to the quality of urbanization, relating directly to the other dimensions of vulnerability, i.e. susceptibility of urban residents and the state and non-state capacities to cope with natural hazards. While in 1985 (i.e. shortly before the official commencement of doi moi) less than 20 percent of the country’s population were living in cities and towns (equaling some 11.5 million people), this figure has risen to over 30 percent in 2010 (accounting for over 26 million) (UN-DESA 2012; cf. Figure 4.2). With the projected average annual urban growth rate only slowly falling from 3.0 percent between 2010-2015 to 2.3 percent between 2020 and 2025 and 1.0 percent between 2045 and 2050, Vietnam’s urban growth is expected to remain substantially above the SoutheastAsian average over the next decades (cf. UN-DESA 2012)35. Thus, an expected 43, 50 and 56 percent of the country’s population will be urban by 2030, 2040 and 2050 respectively, then equaling some 44, 52 and 58 million people (ibid.). It is expected that small, mid-sized and large cities will grow at a similar pace, meaning that not only megacities but also small and mid-sized cities, such as Can Tho, are projected to experience a rapid growth (cf. Figure 4.2). In fact, by the year 2025 cities with less than one million inhabitants are expected to host more people than the country’s larger agglomerations. Understanding the development opportunities as well as challenges specific to these cities is therefore of great importance (Pedelahore 2010). This is all the more relevant considering that small and mid-sized cities have so far been receiving far less attention than, both, the country’s largest cities, notably Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, and the rural areas. Governance processes and, for example, challenges with respect to capacities in the urban administration to deal with natural hazards are hence far less understood in those mid-sized cities, calling for empirical analyzes like the one provided here (cf. 6). Along with urbanization, Vietnam’s cities and towns will not only increase in density but will spread in their geographical extent, therewith, decreasing retention areas for river floods and precipitation drainage. In addition, urbanization is often argued to put more people and assets into harm’s way given that many cities 35 These statistics serve to show the general trends but have to be treated with caution given that they can include errors related to non-registered migrants as well as to incoherence in terms of administrative boundaries used for statistical accounting vs. the actual urban extent. Such incoherence can either lead to over-statements of urban populations, as in the case of Can Tho City, or to under-statements, as with Ho Chi Minh City, for instance. The demarcation of rural vs. urban areas is in Vietnam regulated by legislation on classifying administrative units (Decree 15/2007/ND-CP, issued in January 2007). According to this legislative framework, provinces and districts are graded into different levels, depending on their population size, land use profile, population density and particularities such as special service functions.

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sprawl into low-lying flood-prone areas (see, for example, Storch and Downes 2010 for a detailed study on Ho Chi Minh City). The vast majority of cities are further located in delta or coastal regions, hence, additionally exposed to coastal storms and typhoons. Therefore, urbanization is in Vietnam often argued to increase the exposure towards natural hazards – which is then, in turn, mostly equated with an increase in vulnerability and eventually risk. However, as chapter 2.4 has shown more generally, urbanization can also imply opportunities for counter-balancing exposure through the urban potential for susceptibility reduction and concentrated coping action. These opportunities and the inherent trade-offs in the vulnerability structure remain heavily neglected and poorly understood in Vietnam – which is striking in particular against the breadth and depth of the country’s current urban transformation and the likely cross-effects with vulnerability. Therefore, the next paragraph seeks to shed more light on this relationship, focusing particularly on the root causes and the emergence of existing vulnerability patterns. Root causes of social vulnerability in Vietnam’s cities In order to understand Vietnam’s current and future urban vulnerability context, it is important to trace the root causes (cf. 2.1.1) of urban vulnerability in the political and socio-economic history of the country. Given the context of this study, attention will be paid particularly to southern Vietnam. Figure 4.2 illustrates the most important phases of urban development and connects them to the urban population figures presented in the previous section. While in pre-colonial times the function of cities was largely limited to providing political and commercial hubs (cf. McGee 1995, 2000; Vorlaufer 2009; Naval Intelligence Division 1943), Vietnam experienced a significant urban expansion since the solidification of French colonial rule from the second half of the 19th century onwards. The result was not only the growth of the major urban centers, notably Saigon, but also the consolidation of smaller towns, such as Can Tho, for administration, military control and trade (McGee 2000). With the demise of the French colonial rule and the political separation following the First Indochina War the country’s urban development pathways split temporarily. The south experienced continued urban growth, propelled largely by the thriving private economy. It also maintained large parts of the French administration system in order to secure a continued urban administration and infrastructure development. In contrast, anti-urban socialist policies36 and economic stagnation led to slower and often precarious urban growth in the socialist north (cf. McGee 2000). 36 Yet, the socialist political elite in northern Vietnam was not as critical towards cities as the political leadership in many other socialist movements since it realized the importance of urban industries for broader development (Thrift and Thorbes 1986: 88; Turley 1977). The Viet Minh doctrine held that the “villages and the cities advance together” which Vietnamese communist writers explicitly contrasted with the Maoist Chinese doctrine of “villages encir-

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Population (millions) 120

Share of urban pop. (percent) 100% Total population

Rural

100

≥ 1 million

80%

0.5 – 1 million Urban

≤ 0.5 million

80

%

60%

40.1%

33.6%

30.4%

27.3%

24.4%

22.2%

19.6%

20.3%

18.8%

18.3%

14.7%

16.4%

13.1%

11.6%

20

19.2%

40

36.9%

60

40%

20%

0%

2025

2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

1955

1950

2007

Vietnam joins ASEAN

WTO member

End of Second Indochina War and re-unification

1995

1975/76

American involvement in Second Indochina War

Đổi Mới

1961

End of First Indochina War

1986

1954

Important events in Vietnam

Urbanization tendencies in North Vietnam

Deurbanization

in South Vietnam

Modest/strong urbanization

Stagnation to slow growth

Rapid take-off

Continued growth

Continued growth

Figure 4.2: Vietnam’s urbanization in relation the political history, own draft, layout inspired by Bork-Hüffer (2012: 86) given the comparative study between China and Vietnam provided in Bork-Hüffer et al. (2012)

While these developments provide the general context, the path dependencies contributing to current vulnerabilities grew strongest from the Second Indochina War37 onwards. During the war, the southern part of the country experienced a cling the cities” (Woodside 1971, quoted in Thrift and Forbes 1986: 88). Nevertheless, the socialist movement in Vietnam was very much biased towards rural development and lacked sufficient resources for urban infrastructure development (Drakakis-Smith and Kilgour 2001). 37 The Second Indochina War is in the West better known as the Vietnam War and in Vietnam as the American War.

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massive growth in urban population due to substantial population movements (voluntary as well as forced) from the rural combat zones into ‘strategic hamlets’ and particularly into the urban areas (Dang et al. 1997). This pattern could be observed in foremost in the Mekong Delta and especially in Can Tho City which experienced rapid population growth during that time from 49,000 inhabitants in 1960 to around 180,000 in 1975 (cf. Vinh 1996). Between 1960 and 1975, the level of urbanization therefore rose from 20 to 40 percent in southern Vietnam, leading to overcrowding and high levels of unemployment in many cities, including Can Tho City (Turley 1977; Vinh 1996). Many of the resulting slums, e.g. along canals and waste lands, constitute the nucleus for squatter settlements that persist to this day (cf. 6.2.1). In contrast, growth in the northern cities, notably Hanoi, had halted or even reversed during the war as a result of the extensive bombing and the subsequent evacuation of cities (Jones and Fraser 1982, quoted in Thrift and Forbes 1986: 96). After Vietnam’s (so-called) re-unification in 1975, urban development in the south had been challenged by a number of political and economic factors which effectively drove urban vulnerabilities. Even though official governmental documents did not explicitly employ an anti-urban rhetoric, the political leadership largely maintained an anti-urban bias, particularly with respect to cities in the south. It was argued that these cities had turned into hosts of ill-guided bourgeoisie and American imperialism which needed to be ‘cleaned’ (Laquian 1996; McGee 2000; Yeung 2007). Large parts of the urban economic and political elite were therefore persecuted and urban administrations and governments filled with socialist political carders or military commanders, often from the north and lacking any professional expertise in urban management (Turley 1977). The results were detrimental mid- and long-term effects in terms of insufficient performance of urban administrations. In line with this policy paradigm, the government strived for de-urbanizing the large urban centers, particularly in the south (e.g. Ho Chi Minh City but also Can Tho City), by re-distributing surplus population through industry- and agriculture-based resettlement programs into the countryside (McGee 2000; Murray and Szelenyi 1984; Turley 1977). Yet, despite some early ‘success’ of this strategy, its long-term effect was ambivalent since, firstly, the amount of people willing to resettle remained greatly below the envisaged quota and, secondly, many of those who had been resettled eventually returned to the cities due to their economic failure in the agricultural sector or in the new economic zones. In effect, the urban infrastructure got strained beyond capacity and social fragmentation and vulnerability was driven up in the cities (Turley 1997; Thrift and Forbes 1986). For the case of Ho Chi Minh City it is estimated that 30 percent of the relocated people eventually found their way back into the city (Smith and Scarpaci 2000: 747). This process could not be effectively counteracted since the socialist household registration system, which had been implemented in the north to retain unplanned migration and to control the people’s place of residency and work, had never been effectively implemented in many parts of the south or was effective only for a short duration before the political liberalization reforms were initiated

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in the mid-1980s (ibid.). At the same time, this meant that state-led infrastructure provisioning for those urban residents (most notably secure and affordable housing) was not implemented to the demand or was even actively restricted in access (e.g. health care), leading to a rise in baseline vulnerability and social fragmentation. Urban malaise has been further propelled by the ambiguous perspective of the political leadership regarding the envisaged role of cities in the reinvigorated Socialist Republic. The question of whether urbanization should be stimulated or prevented and how much attention should be given to funding and developing those areas had, hence, not been answered coherently for many years. The result was a poor administrative and legal framework for tackling urban development challenges, which in combination with an overall lack of financial resources (in terms of internal as well as foreign investment) led to an “urban neglect” within the first years after re-unification. In conjunction with the substantial destruction from the war this neglect aggravated the shortfall of infrastructure and housing, particularly in small and mid-sized cities like Can Tho that were often managed by state carders with a background in rural rather than urban development (Yeung 2007: 272 et seq.; Coulthart et al. 2006; Trinh and Parenteau 1991). The question which effects this ambiguous policy line has for the management of risks related to natural hazards has been heavily neglected to date but is of growing importance in view of the projected climate change impacts. Chapter 6.1 will therefore explore in more detail how risk management in Can Tho City is embedded into the larger context of development policies and whether the city’s administration is equipped with sufficient urban expertise for navigating urban risk management. The doi moi-renovation process (introduced in chapter 4.3) implied a substantial shift in the parameters for urban development, entailing also significant implications for urban vulnerabilities towards natural hazards. Effects can thereby be traced at the level of both individual households or residents and urban administrations at large. The opening and deregulation of Vietnam’s economic system in combination with the re-vitalized international relations from the late 1980s onwards allowed for a rapid rise in global integration, including especially a strong influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) seeking low production costs, particularly low labor costs. Thus, Vietnam’s urban economies, most notably in the industry and service sectors, have been experiencing strong growth and an increasing export orientation since the commencement of the renovation process (Leproux & Brooks, 2004). Yet, as a result there has also been an increasing vulnerability towards economic crises and price fluctuations. The growth of the urban economies coupled with the further relaxation of the above-mentioned household registration system (Hardy 2001) led to a strong increase in rural-urban work migration which contributed the lion’s share of the rapid increase in urban population. This trend in general continues till today, particularly in the Mekong Delta and the other Southern Provinces of Vietnam (Sang 2007; Garschagen et al. 2012). However, most migrants have been equipped with

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a low level of education and professional training and, hence, have had to revert to low-income jobs in the growing urban low-tech industries or to other precarious modes of income generation, for example in the informal construction or service sector. At the same time, the decaying socialist welfare system has not been expanded to sufficiently cater for the needs of disadvantaged population groups in the cities. Resulting has been a grave shortage of appropriate housing space especially in terms of social housing in the low cost sector (cf. Yeung 2007; McGee 2000; Lang 2006). It has, for example, been estimated that in 1990 a striking 60 percent of Vietnam’s urban population had been living in slums according to UNHABITAT’s deprivation definition38, with the figure remaining at 38 percent in 2007 (UN-HABITAT 2010b: 126). In addition, while the socialist system has catered for a basic level of urban services (e.g. basic utilities, healthcare, and primary education), most migrants have no – or only reduced – access to these services given a lack of official residency status (Hardy 2001). In the same vein, the afore-mentioned privatization and commercialization of social services (cf. 4.3) further aggravates social insecurities (see in detail 4.3). In addition, considerable vulnerability effects result from the fact that the formerly restricted land ownership got liberalized with the renovation process, most notably under the Law on Land in 1993 and its update in 2004 (see SRV 1993 and 2003a, respectively)39. Since these reforms, land use titles can be held and traded by private entities, with land prices being mainly based on the market values. However, as per the constitution of Vietnam, all land officially remains the property of the people, which technically means that it is considered state property and that the government still has the power of issuing land use titles and defining land prices (and compensation rates) in cases where individual land titles are withdrawn40. While these land reforms in theory allow for increased freedom and institutional security, e.g. for choosing and keeping a land plot outside of hazard-exposed zones, the liberalization also resulted in thriving real estate speculation and in a steep increase in urban land prices over the last two decades. This can be observed not only in the country’s largest metropolises but also in the small and mid-sized cities such as Can Tho (cf. Garschagen et al. 2011). Hence, in practice the question arises whether poor social groups are increasingly priced out 38 UN-HABITAT defines a slum household as one that lacks one or more of the following five amenities: (1) durable housing; (2) sufficient living area; (3) access to improved water; (4) access to improved sanitation facilities; and (5) secure tenure (UN-HABITAT 2010b: 121). However, only the first four indicators are used in the statistics due to a lack of data (ibid.). 39 For a detailed overview over land reforms in Vietnam since the mid 20th century see Tuyen (2010). 40 See, for example, the more recent Circular on Methods of Determining Land Prices and Assorted Land Price Bracket (114/2004/TT-BTC), or the Decrees on the Price Determination Methods and Price Frameworks for all Types of Land (188/2004/ND-CP and 123/2007/NDCP), or the Decree on the framework for Land Use Auctioning (164/2004/ND-CP), or the Decree on Compensation, Support and Resettlement when Land is Recovered by the State (197/2004/ND-CP).

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and have difficulties in finding affordable living space in urban areas and might even have to revert to hazard exposed waste-lands. Since this question is largely underemphasized in the literature, chapter 6.2.1 responds with empirical findings from Can Tho City. Similarly, it remains poorly understood whether and how institutional and economic barriers might in reality prevent marginalized population groups from securing an official land use certificate, again prompting empirical analysis presented in chapter 6.2.4. Urban upgrading projects and resettlement Given the above illustrated shortcomings in terms of social development and insufficient infrastructure in Vietnam’s cities, a number of urban upgrading projects have been advocated in the recent past, which are of great relevance for understanding the vulnerability dynamics in Can Tho City. These projects are implemented either directly through governmental upgrading schemes or in collaboration with international donors such as the World Bank. Giving a precise overview of all projects is therefore difficult since funding mechanisms range from official development assistance (ODA) to national programmes or even local initiatives. In June 2009, the Prime Minister’s approval of the National Programme on the Upgrading of Urban Centres During 2009-2020 provided the first comprehensive policy framework explicitly addressing urban upgrading (SRV 2009b). Next to ambitious targets with respect to the provisioning of clean drinking water, sanitation infrastructure, solid waste collection and improved waste water treatment, the program envisages that all houses built in areas being “unsafe or unsuitable to people’s life” will be relocated or housing conditions improved by 2020. The upgrading policy therefore has a direct link to vulnerability reduction in the context of natural hazards. It stipulates the establishment of financial mechanisms to provide households in low-income areas with loans for housing renovations. Households living in extremely unsafe conditions are intended to be resettled to resettlement clusters in safer, i.e. less hazard-exposed, places. The most comprehensive initiative under this National Programme is the World Bank financed Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project (VUUP) which covers Can Tho City, in addition to a number of other cities in the country including, for instance, Ho Chi Minh City or Hai Phong (cf. World Bank 2004; 2010a). Approved in 2004, the project is scheduled to continue until the end of 2014. It comprises hard components, including the upgrading of physical infrastructures, and soft components, including, for example, loan programmes for housing improvements, vocational training or capacity building amongst administrative staff. The majority of the activities in this project set out to upgrade existing infrastructure within the given location, meaning that the population does not have to be moved to other places. Around 600,000 people are envisaged to benefit from the in situ upgrading, notably through improvements in sanitation and drainage infrastructure or improved access to land use certificates.

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Yet, despite this successful focus on in situ upgrading, a considerable proportion of the target communities has been and will be affected by resettlement. Initial appraisals prior to the commencement of the first phase concluded the need to resettle 5,363 households in the four pilot cities during both project phases (World Bank 2004). After the completion of the first phase in 2007 and the calculation updates in preparation for the second phase, it has become evident that this number will greatly increase (World Bank 2010b). In Can Tho City alone more than 250 households needed to be resettled during the first half of the project and an expected 1,136 additional households will need to be resettled until the end of the project (World Bank 2009a,b,c). Next to the World Bank project, a number of other large-scale projects have been conducted recently or are currently ongoing. In Ho Chi Minh City alone, more than 38,000 people have been resettled in 191 projects since 2005 with another 38,500 expected to follow in 307 pending projects till 2015 (VNS, 22.01.2010). The above figures underscore the substantial relevance of not only urban upgrading initiatives but also of resettlement programmes within the transforming landscape of urban development, modernization and risk management in Vietnam. However, a review of the sparse literature on this topic suggests that the shortand long-term effects, comprising of opportunities but also constraints, for the affected population are not well understood scientifically and underemphasized politically (Wust et al. 2002; Coit 1998). Filling this gap is important, particularly since a further increase in upgrading and resettlement projects are to be expected in line with the further socio-economic transformation. In addition – and of particular interest for the research presented here – resettlement is increasingly being discussed as option for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Hence, lessons from current and past resettlement projects can be vital for informing future adaptation policies on the opportunities but also pitfalls and necessary improvements of such projects (cf. 7). The issue of resettlement as a means for vulnerability reduction was hence included into the empirical analysis of this study (cf. 6.2) and provided the major frame for one of the two larger household survey campaigns (cf. 5). Local urban risk governance under transformation The above-illustrated dynamics call for a detailed exploration of local risk governance modes. The opportunities but also constraints for local urban risk reduction and adaptation policies custom-tailored to the specific conditions in a given city or even district have been heavily shaped by decentralization reforms along with doi moi. Most important are in this context the new Law on Construction and the – already mentioned – Law on Land (both in effect since the year 2004). The former specifies that “people’s committees at all levels shall be responsible to organize the formulation of construction master plans within the administrative boundaries for which such people’s committees have been delegated administrative authority” (SRV, 2003b: Article 11, §3). These shifts are through the State

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Budget Law of 1996 and its update in 2002 (SRV 2002) accompanied by a shift in financial responsibilities and an enhanced local independence with respect to the approval of development projects and the implementation of infrastructure, e.g. flood control infrastructure. However, it has been argued that the province registered a comparatively larger increase in responsibilities and freedom than the districts and wards. Hence the national centralism can be argued to have shifted partly into a province-centralism without having lead to a considerable increase in the opportunities for grassroots authority (Benedikter 2008: 98). This poses relevant questions for this study with respect to the freedom of urban governments at district and ward level to negotiate and implement local risk management mechanisms specific to their administrative entities (cf. 6.1; 6.2). In addition, the country has in fact also seen considerable re-centralization during the 1990s due to concerns of the national leadership to lose control over the provinces (Gainsborough 2004). Nevertheless, there remain great challenges from decentralization related to the question whether the capacities (financial and human) of local urban governments in Vietnam are sufficient to negotiate the increased amount of tasks and especially the enhanced level of responsibility (Kerkvliet 2004; Garschagen and Kraas 2011). Yet, a comprehensive analysis and juxtaposition of the opportunities and challenges of decentralization for urban risk management and particularly for the emerging field of urban climate change adaptation is still lacking to date. Also the confusion that might result from the contested interplay of decentralizationrecentralization endeavors is largely neglected in the literature. Making a contribution to closing these gaps contributes to the rationale for the empirical case study presented chapter in 6. Further, liberalization has yielded a broadening of the urban actor spectrum and hence an increasing pluralism in terms of interests and leverage (political and monetary) to influence urban development directions (cf. Garschagen and Kraas 2011). Notably real estate developers have gained power to influence decisions on where, when and how new development projects ought to be built. They often work in close collaboration with international planning consultants who bring foreign development concepts to the table. Consequently, decision making in the urban context has – despite the persistence of bureaucratic centralism – become much more complex given that the interests of different stakeholders may be conflicting. This point is of particular relevance with respect to climate change as short- or medium-term perspectives in search for the fastest possible return of investment may conflict with necessary long-term planning horizons in view of climate risks. However, awareness of these problems is only slowly emerging in Vietnam (cf. 6.1.2). It therefore needs to be asked whether the current planning and management system, which despite some decentralization is still largely adhering to a socialistoriented management paradigm around technocratic planning and central command, is able to deal with the transformed power constellations shaping urban development. This question is politically sensitive and scientifically neglected;

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hence, it has provided an important frame for the empirical analysis presented in chapter 6.1.2. What can be ascertained is that urban governments have in most of Vietnam’s cities not been capable of providing public goods and services in a sufficient quality and quantity – as the data presented above has shown. In combination with the fragmented access to social goods and services, social disparities are on the rise. Large parts of the urban population therefore cannot take part in the overall socioeconomic progress of the country – at least not at a pace and breadth that is considered equitable or fair by them. Referring back to the idea of an adaption deficits (cf. 2.1.3), this renders their preconditions for successful adaptation to natural hazards particularly difficult, given that they are faced with a double burden of adaptation. Despite these challenges there is an enormous pressure on cities to maintain a strong economic growth that is able to fuel the socio-economic progress of the country, thereby supporting its political stability and the leadership’s legitimacy more generally (cf. 4.5). However, as the above cases illustrate, this primacy of strong economic growth is in many respects at odds with the requirements for achieving sustainable urban development not only in the economic but also in the social and political domain. This conflict makes for one of the most fundamental urban development challenges of Vietnam in the coming years. Risk management, including the adaptation to current and future natural hazards, is certainly going to play a key role in it, hence, deserving strong attention. 4.7.

WHY FOCUSING ON CAN THO CITY?

The dynamics of urbanization and transformation as well as the exposure to current and future natural hazards is particularly distinctive in Can Tho City, located around 130 km southwest of Ho Chi Minh City. The city is the demographic, economic and cultural urban centre of the Mekong Delta as it provides not only central services in terms of, for example, trade, higher education, specialized health or commerce but also hosts large-scale – and growing – industrial zones in its peri-urban fringe. It is therefore the Delta’s largest receiver of net-in-migration (Garschagen et al. 2012; GSO 2010). In 2009, Can Tho City has been officially transferred into a class I, which is the second highest category in the national legislative hierarchy of urban administration. This gives the city administration an increased responsibility and independency with regards to urban and economic planning and the approval of investment projects (cf. Coulthart et al. 2006). At the same time, Can Tho City is now one in only five cities in Vietnam that has its plans and policies controlled and approved directly by the national government, given the particular role it is considered to play for the national development at large. In terms of administrative boundaries, Can Tho City comprises nine districts with a total population of around 1.2 million inhabitants. However, the majority of Can Tho City’s administrative area in fact has to be considered as rural, while

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the urban core and its newly urbanizing fringe is limited to the three districts of Ninh Kieu, Cai Rang and Binh Thuy (see the colored Figure 10.2 in the Appendix). Together, these three districts account for around 450,000 inhabitants. The most densely urbanized district Ninh Kieu has a population density of 8,500 inhabitants per square kilometers (GSO 2012). This district constitutes the oldest urban core of Can Tho City and hosts most of the central infrastructure such as the city’s government buildings, the main commercial hubs, the offices of the main businesses and service providers or the university. Binh Thuy District north of Ninh Kieu also has a long-established urban to peri-urban morphology, hosting, for example, a number of extended industrial parks as well as an important power plant. Cai Rang District, locally also referred to as South Can Tho, is the most dynamically growing district – in fact one of the most dynamically transforming urban districts in entire Vietnam. While it’s peri-urban morphology hosted around 86,000 people in 2009, the current development master plan envisages the development of new residential quarters for an additional 120,000 to 150,000 people by the year 2025, covering an area of 700-800 ha. Furthermore, two industrial parks (called Hung Phu I and II) are planned, covering an area of 600-700 hectares. Implementation of these planned developments is underway, causing remarkable changes not only in the districts land use but also employment profile, mainly shifting from agriculture into non-agricultural domains. Resulting are considerable challenges for the population stemming from forced resettlement, the need to find new income sources and the disruption of social networks (cf. Garschagen et al. 2011). However, it remains under-researched how the new developments influence the land and real estate prices in Can Tho City and the opportunities for resource-poor residents to find affordable and secure (i.e. non-hazard-exposed) living space. Can Tho City’s growth is strongly linked to its increasing national and global connectedness – which couples the city’s development with transformation dynamics of the country more generally. In 2010 a new bridge crossing Hau River was opened, establishing an uninterrupted highway connection to Ho Chi Minh City without the previously necessary ferry crossing. Travelling time for goods and people has therefore reduced sharply, to approximately 2.5 hours. Also the opening of Can Tho Airport in 2010 has increased the city’s connectivity, particularly with respect to business and conference travel to Hanoi and other Asian metropolises. In addition, a new port (Cai Cui Port) is planned at Hau River in the south of Cai Rang which is conceived to become a seaport, capable of handling large size ocean freight vessels. The port is envisaged to become a major commercial gateway making the shipment of goods produced in the Mekong Delta much easier, thereby, improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and industrial producers and further increasing their integration into global markets. Given its location and geo-physical setting, Can Tho City is exposed to multiple current and future natural hazards. In comparison to the provinces in the northern Mekong Delta, the city has in the past been less affected the by extended flooding during the monsoon season (cf. 4.1). However, situated at the confluence of Hau

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River and Can Tho River, many parts of the city are subject to urban flooding during the rainy season. Even though being located around 75 km inland from the coast, flooding in Can Tho City is thereby strongly influenced by tidal effects, causing inundations particularly during the monthly tide peaks towards the end and middle of the lunar month and, within that time, especially during the daily tide peaks. Secondly, river based flooding can happen during the rainy season when Hau River and other rivers carry increased discharge. Thirdly, flooding can also be caused by heavy precipitation (pluvial flooding) given that the urban impervious surface hampers infiltration and increased surface run-off. Past measurements reveal precipitation of up to 80mm per hour in Can Tho City (Huong and Pathirana 2013). Accordingly, the strongest flooding occurs when tide peaks coincide with pluvial flooding and river floods, causing wide-spread inundation in Can Tho City through overflow, water logging and backflow from the drainage system (Huong and Pathirana 2013; Thy et al. 2011). In addition to the flood hazard, Can Tho City is exposed to storms and tropical depressions which have in the past caused considerable damage resulting from the combination of wind breakage and flooding. Further, river bank erosion is an increasing problem, particularly for people living in the numerous settlements along the river banks (cf. 6.2.1). Apart from the existing hazard conditions, Can Tho City is projected to be highly exposed to several climate change related hazards in future. This makes it an interesting case study for exploring how a dynamically growing city is dealing with the challenge of adapting to future (and new) hazards. These climate change related hazards comprise slow-onset progressive hazards such as sea level rise, an expected increase in annual river-based flooding. But they also include as irregular hazards such as typhoons and smaller storms, heavy precipitation events, rising variability in precipitation and increased tidal gauges in relation to storm surges at the coast (MONRE 2009; PC-CTC 2011). Importantly, these hazards are likely to occur in combination under conditions of climate change, leading to multi-hazard situations in which impacts can cause feedbacks in multiple ways. Resulting from this combination of hazards and the risk of concurrent or cascading multi-hazard phenomena, is a complex mix of potential secondary hazards, i.e. hazards which emerge out of the change in primary hazard patterns. The range of such secondary hazards is large, including, for example, the increased spread of water- and vectorborne diseases in slum areas with insufficient sanitation, draining or the likelihood of increased flow velocity, leading to intensified river bank erosion and the consecutive collapse of buildings and other infrastructure. These effects are discovered in more detail in chapters 6.2 and 7. However, next to climatic changes, hazard patterns in Can Tho City are also changing due to direct human intervention into the more immediate hydraulic environment. At the macro-scale, upstream hydropower dams are assessed to have a significant influence on the Mekong’s discharge – in fact being over the next 20 to 30 years more influential than the projected climatic changes (Lauri et al. 2012). On the delta-scale, Hoa et al. (2008: 1365) find that increased embankments in the upper Mekong Delta have contributed heavily to the observed upward trend in flood peaks in Can Tho City, which have risen around 30 cm over the last three

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decades. Within the city, the reduction of retention areas and the extension of areas with impervious surface have been observed to contribute to increasing flood occurrence (cf. Thy et al. 2010, 2011; cf. 4.8). As indicated in chapter 4.6, Can Tho City is currently subject to urban upgrading initiatives which entail considerable resettlement efforts. These projects target especially households with a high hazard exposure, mostly living in Can Tho City’s makeshift settlement along the river-banks (cf. 6.1.3). Originally being driven by political aspirations for achieving ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ cities, the resettlement programmes of such type are increasingly debated as climate change adaptation solutions (cf. 6.1.3), turning them into highly relevant case studies for generating lessons learned in the context of potential future adaptation strategies. There are two major projects in Can Tho City which together account for the majority of households that have been or still will be resettled within the framework of governmental urban upgrading. Firstly, Can Tho City is one of the cities covered by the above-introduced Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project (VUUP) financed by the World Bank (cf. 4.6). Secondly, there is a project for building a large erosion and flood protection wall spanning along extended segments of Can Tho River (see Figure 10.16 in the Appendix). This project is funded by the local government and has been implemented in the case study area in Hung Phu Ward where, hence, a high number of households needed to be resettled over the last years. A similar project, which sets out to combine a flood protection barrier with the upgrading of the river front, is also planned for the opposite river bank of Can Tho River where a high number of households are due for resettlement in the near future. In conclusion, the above conditions reveal that Can Tho City makes for a highly relevant case study in reference to the current research gaps in vulnerability and adaptation science (cf. 3.1) and it allows for tying together the questions emerging from the different context themes elaborated in the previous sections (cf. 4.1 to 4.6). The city has not yet experienced major disasters in the recent past along which a comprehensive vulnerability assessment could be gauged. However, this is not considered a weakness in the choice of the of the study site but – on the contrary – a distinct strength and main pillar of its relevance. This is because all projections clearly highlight an increasing likelihood of extreme hazard events and, thus, of disasters happening in the near to medium future. Therefore, studies like these are needed that assess vulnerabilities and response capacities before vulnerabilities have manifested themselves in disaster situations. Only through such knowledge generation can awareness be raised and preventive action taken. The study, hence, goes back to the roots and original rationale of vulnerability research which unfortunately tends to be forgotten and forgone – while priority is usually been given to the epistemologically less contestable assessment of manifested vulnerabilities that can be appraised along past impacts (cf. 3.1). Yet, the case study is not only relevant for future extreme events but it also allows for exploring the adaptation towards creeping hazards, notably the increase

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in ‘regular’ urban flooding during the rainy season. In that respect, it helps to enhance the much needed emphasize on subtle forms of vulnerability and risk response apart from the big mega-disasters which usually attract most of the scientific and political attention. Broadening the focus in that direction is urgently needed since these subtle and slow hazard trends will constitute a major part of the climate change challenge, apart from the more noisy extreme events – not only in Vietnam (cf. 4.2) but globally (cf. 2.2). In addition, the case study is of high value because it represents a city in the much neglected segment of small- and middle-sized cities, thereby, allowing to explore whether and how the causal structures of vulnerability and the dynamics of adaptation are specific in (Vietnamese) cities of this size – e.g. with respect to the capacity of government agencies or the interest of international players (cf. 6.2). Given that Can Tho City also is one of the most rapidly and profoundly transforming cities in the Vietnam, this case study further provides a very distinctive frame for analyzing the relationships between the wider transformation process (cf. 4.3) and the dynamics in vulnerability and adaptation – which after all is one the major overarching questions of this study (cf. 1). 4.8. CURRENT STATE OF RISK ASSESSMENTS IN CAN THO CITY, REMAINING KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND RESULTING RATIONALE Along with the increasing number of climate change studies on the Mekong Delta (cf. 4.2) there have been a small number of studies focusing specifically on emerging climate change risks in Can Tho City. The majority of these studies have been conducted either within the framework of application-oriented projects with international funding or in the scope of Vietnamese or international research projects. Huong and Pathirana (2013) apply an integrative modeling approach to assess the trends in future flood occurrence in Can Tho City resulting from the combined effects of (a) expected increase in river discharge due to climate change, (b) intensified urban run-off due to the increasing extent of impervious surfaces driven by future urban growth and densification of Can Tho City, (c) climate change related sea level rise, and (d) enhanced extreme rainfall due to a rising heat island effect. The detailed hydrological modeling considers the given surface conditions, elevations and drainage system and it covers the major urban parts of Ninh Kieu district. Their results show a clear upward trend in flood extent and maximum inundation depth. Even if considering no climatic and hydrological changes, only the projected urbanization until 2050 would cause the maximum flood depth and extent to increase by 21 and 18 percent respectively. When considering the worst case, i.e. a sea level rise of 100 cm in addition to increased river run-off for a high emissions scenario, the flood extent and depth is projected to even rise by 80 and 22 percent respectively, showing a much stronger increase in flooding depth than in flood extent. Hence, as also the authors themselves interpret their results, the findings strongly suggests that flood hazard in Can Tho City could change from

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the currently troublesome yet not life threatening incidences to potentially disastrous events – which underpins the rationale for the future-oriented and potentiality-directed vulnerability assessment presented in this study. This becomes even more relevant when considering that the analysis by Huong and Pathirana is restricted by data availability and does not consider the probability of extreme events that can happen if peak tidal flooding coincides with peak pluvial run-off and particularly with increased levels of peak precipitation that are projected with climate change (MONRE 2009). Hong and Pathirana conclude that their assessment focuses exclusively on the hazard component of risk and needs in future be supplemented by detailed vulnerability and adaptation studies – as the one contributed here. Thy et al. (2011) investigate the link between past land cover change and flood occurrence in Can Tho City between the years 2001 and 2008. Combining the analysis of satellite imagery, with a digital elevation model and governmental flood surveys from Can Tho City, they find a steep increase in incidents of flood inundation and the depth of flooding in these events. Focusing specifically on the central urban district and the newly urbanizing fringe district Cai Rang, they argue that the increasing flood occurrence can be explained by the filling-up of ditches and canals and by the transformation of previously vegetated land in to impervious built-up area. At the same time, they observe that the development of the drainage system has not kept pace with the rapid land use change through urbanization. Thus, they argue that particularly the rapidly urbanizing fringe districts are at risk of increasing future flood occurrence, should better planning procedures not be applied soon. However, they do not analyze in detail why current planning is insufficient and where the institutional causes of such deficits lay. Can Tho City is also one of the ten pilot cities for vulnerability assessment and resilience planning within the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN). A report published in 2009 presents the findings of the assessment in Can Tho City. Based on households and expert interviews in different wards of the city, the authors argue that education, health care, environmental conditions, livelihoods and housing conditions constitute major factors for shaping vulnerability. However, the analysis remains on a very generic level concentrating largely on general poverty and development issues rather than on the specific vulnerability links towards natural hazards. Also adaptation mechanisms, constraints and conflicts are not tackled in detail. Recommended solution therefore read fairly palliative and follow the conventional tenets for the party-state’s development jargon, e.g. to monitor environmental pollution or to attract more foreign investment in the industrial sector in order to generate employment opportunities. Given the initial character and the limited number and scope of these studies, considerable black spots remain in the acknowledgement and understanding of the different facets of risk and vulnerability in Can Tho City, contributing to the rationale for the study presented here:

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Firstly, the studies have for the largest part concentrated on physical hazards; yet, much less attention has been given to the analysis of socio-economic vulnerability in the human system. Therefore, the study presented here focuses its attention clearly on the vulnerability side of risk. Secondly, those few aspects that have been considered in terms of socioeconomic vulnerabilities largely draw on static perspectives to produce snapshot assessments. The root causes and dynamic past, current and future trends of vulnerability along with socio-economic transformation are not emphasized, thereby limiting the relevance of the analysis for future policy advice. The analysis presented here thus emphasizes the dynamic character of vulnerability and explores its links to the overall transformation process. Thirdly, in line with the above point, particularly the ACCCRN study concentrates on hazard impacts that can already be observed. A stringent analysis of vulnerabilities towards future hazard conditions in Can Tho City is therefore largely lacking – despite the fact that such a perspective in fact is the most relevant one when exploring climate change related risk. That is why in the here-presented study the potentiality of vulnerability is highlighted, both in the empirical data analysis and the conceptual framing. Fourthly, most of the assessments apply a fairly apolitical perspective, meaning that the findings and recommendations remain at the surface and address vulnerability symptoms but do not tackle the deeper institutional root causes of vulnerability that might be hidden in the transforming political economy of the country. Therefore, this study draws heavily on the theoretical notion of vulnerability root causes to sharpen the perspective in that direction. Fifthly, the existing analyses therefore do not address in detail the interplay of state and non-state action for risk response and adaptation – probably because these question are widely considered to be politically very sensitive. Barriers and gaps between the two spheres therefore go largely unnoticed. Similarly, contested dimensions in which state action might in fact increase the vulnerability of certain social groups remain largely unaccounted for. Hence, the study presented here links empirical findings from both domains and explores the feedbacks and interaction from an integrative perspective. Sixthly, on top of the above epistemic shortcomings, large parts of the current assessments in fact concentrate on the rural districts in Can Tho City and, hence, mainly capture agriculture based livelihoods and the related vulnerabilities. This applies in particular to the ACCCRN study as well as a number of other assessments, mainly from NGOs, that have therefore not been covered in the more detailed review above. The focus of the existing assessments thereby often gets blurred, obscuring the clear view on the specifically urban patterns of vulnerability and adaption. For this reason, the research presented has focused all its efforts and resources on urban and peri-urban case study areas (cf. 5.3). Departing from this case specific set of rationales, the next chapter elaborates on the methodology and research design used for the empirical case study analysis in Can Tho City.

5.

METHODOLOGY “Đi một ngày đàng, học một sàng khôn.” [Go out for a day, get a full basket of knowledge.] Vietnamese Proverb

5.1.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to achieve a strategic, goal-oriented and appropriate selection and implementation of research methods, it is a prerequisite to reflect carefully on the epistemology underlying the research endeavor and the resulting implication in terms of methodology (e.g. Lamnek 2005: 47; Bernard 2006: 3). This reflection can be best launched with a short recap on the general objective of science, which is the generation and formulation of valid knowledge about the questions or epistemic elements of interest based on scientifically rigorous investigation (Lamnek 2005: 47). Hence, the general epistemological question what knowledge is and how it can be achieved in principle, has specific implications for the subsequent question of how knowledge generation can be systematically planned and conducted in a specific scientific context. The research object and epistemic focus of the work presented here is, firstly, on the structure, behavior and action that make actors vulnerable to the effects of natural and other hazards. Secondly, it is about understanding the capacities and constraints for adaptation and, related to that, the underlying cultural-cognitive (risk) perceptions of different actors as they enable and/or restrict their behavior and action (cf. 3.2). In contrast to many of the research endeavors in the natural sciences, the epistemological rationale is therefore not on discovering generally applicable laws of nature which are perceived to be part of the existing reality and only have to be brought to light in a positivist, and allegedly objectivist, fashion. However, the research presented here neither follows a purely or radical constructivist approach. While constructivist elements are considered important in this study for the formation and understanding of social institutions, such as shared risk perception, risk response mechanisms or entire risk management paradigms, it is also argued that the assessment of other research objects such as the to-beexpected typhoon frequency or the physical resilience of buildings needs to be complemented by realist perspectives. An approach that acknowledges the interplay of both the objective existence of phenomena as well as their social interpretation and the construction of, first, their meaning and, second, the social modes to deal with them is therefore essential. Hence, the philosophical approach taken for this study can be best described as a hybrid sharing many of the assumptions and propositions of critical realism

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while maintaining elements of social constructivism. In more detail, critical realism accepts the existence of an independent and contingent reality, or what Bhaskar calls the “intransitive objects of knowledge” (2008: 11) – hence the ‘realism’ in the name, which can also be read as an ontological realism (Bhaskar 1998: x). However, it is ‘critical’ in that it is not content with the positivist explanation and the direct empiricism-based uncovering of reality but argues that reality is filtered and deciphered depending on judgmental rationality and the relativity of knowledge, in other words the transitive epistemological dimension (ibid.). The approach for this study follows this argumentation. Yet, in addition, it reverts to the ideas of social constructivism in order to explore in detail how this judgmental rationality and the relativity of knowledge is constructed by science at large and particularly by the different actors in a specific context. In accordance with the above, a mixed approach needs to be applied also with respect to the role and relation of theorizing and empirical analysis: The conceptual structure and research design is, to a certain extent, guided by previous theoretical and empirical work in the field of natural hazard and vulnerability research (cf. 2). Hence, there are theory-driven as well as deductive elements in the research presented here, since the previous scientific literature has inspired the identification of research questions and the conceptual (cf. 3.2) and empirical research design. However, in this study deductive reasoning has been taken to provide only broad frames and inspiration; it did not serve to pre-establish a static raster for the analysis or specific explanatory hypotheses which would then only be tested topdown through the empirical research. Rather, it has been considered of key importance to make sufficient room for an open and inductive research process which is sensitive to the identification and integration of new epistemic elements which have previously not been considered in theoretical approaches. Hence, the general direction of this inductive path is to move from the collection of specific empirical cases to more generalized and abstract statements that can inform theory-building. Such inductive conduct of research is also necessary to critically reflect on and challenge the accuracy, validity and completeness of previous theoretical findings and assumptions. The latter aspect is of particular relevance when transferring theoretical knowledge into cultural or thematic context conditions different to those considered in the original work – which is of great relevance for the case presented here. By combining the two paradigms, the research has been guided and inspired by previous scientific work but the detailed observations, causal hypotheses and explanations have emerged from within the research process through an integrated and iterative process of data collection, analysis, conceptualization, abstraction, and hypothesizing. Through repeating such sequences in iterative loops – combining elements of understanding, interpreting and explaining41 – the research pro41 In the German-speaking literature the philosophical terms ‘verstehen’ (i.e. understanding or grasping the observed circumstances, structures and processes in a hermeneutical sense and to trace the meaning that is ascribed to them) and ‘erklären’ (i.e. to explain or elucidate structures, processes and causal relations and to formulate more abstract and generalized models

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cess can be framed as a cyclic process, often called hermeneutic circle. This process allows to dive deeper and deeper into the analysis, making the produced knowledge increasingly precise as the research process progresses (Lamnek 2005: 62 et sequ.). This cyclic approach has been mirrored in the concrete research design and the sequencing of fieldwork and desk work phases (see below). Through this process, theory-building is enhanced and developed closely along the research object. Theoretical axioms have hence been emerging from the empirical base and are strongly grounded in the matter of interest. The theory building in this thesis has, therefore, largely been conducted in line with the principles of what has been labeled ‘grounded theory’ in the literature (cf. Glaser and Strauss 1999). In order to match the data collection and analysis with the philosophical approach presented above, the research design needed to combine different types of methods which are in the literature commonly grouped into qualitative and quantitative methods – even though this distinction features some ambiguity when turning to the specific methods (cf. 5.2). Combinations of qualitative and quantitative methodologies – based on hybrid philosophical research paradigms – have been discussed widely in the literature under the label of ‘mixed methods research’ (MMR)42 (e.g. Tashakkori and Teddlie 2002; Johnson et al. 2007). The reasons for applying mixed method designs in this research are very much in line with the rationale discussed in the literature more generally, i.e. MMR’s potential to complement the strengths of the different research paradigms and their methodological tool-kits through triangulation and multiple operationalization in order to achieve a broader, more complete, more precise, more robust and more valid scientific knowledge than it would be possible by drawing on only one research paradigm or methodological school (Johnson et al. 2007). This rationale is partly rooted in Denzin’s seminal work (1978) in which he argued that triangulation can be defined as the act of combining different methods and broader scientific approaches in the study of the same phenomenon in order to increase the knowledge gain and to overcome the biases, shortcomings and blind spots of single methods (p. 300 et sequ.; see also Flick 2009; Mayring 2002: 147; Diekmann 2005: 451; Kardorff 1995: 8). Yet, Denzin considers not only method-triangulation (i.e. the application of different methods or different varieties within one method) but also datatriangulation (e.g. different points of time, different places, different informants or sources of information), investigator-triangulation (different investigators working on the same topic), and theory-triangulation (approaching a topic from different theoretical perspectives and checking the explanatory value of the results against the consistency with other theoretical schools) (Denzin 1978: 330). In the study presented here, method, data and theory triangulation could be implemented in a comprehensive manner while the adherence to investigator triangulation proved more difficult. Yet, it was partly achieved through close discussion and the exor rules) are in this context widely used – sometimes even in the English-speaking literature (see also Schweizer 1998: 57; Bernard 2006). 42 There is, for example, an entire peer reviewed journal called ‘Journal of Mixed Methods Research’ which was launched in 2007.

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change of reflections with other researchers in the project as well as with the longterm interpreter (see below). In both umbrella concepts (MMR and triangulation) the combination of qualitative and quantitative paradigms and methods is seen as particularly productive and necessary in the face of increasingly complex research objects (Flick 2009, 2008; Heinze 1995: 10; Atteslander 2006: 5). According to Kardorff (1995: 4) the objective and strength of qualitative social science43 is to generate in the best possible manner a comprehensive and detailed representation of the parts of reality under scrutiny. An important element of this is to produce what Geertz has coined a ‘thick description’, i.e. a careful qualitative description of exemplary cases of human behavior and the specific context in which it becomes meaningful (Geertz 1973). In order to achieve this aim, the qualitative social science researcher needs to consider himself/herself as a learner who observes and asks without a rigidly pre-defined analytic corset (Lamnek 2005: 86 et sequ.) in order to achieve the highest possible relevance and accuracy of the findings (Kardorff 1995: 8; Kvale 1995: 429). The links to afore-introduced concept of grounded theory are immediately evident. Also in this study, the highest knowledge gain stems from the more qualitative research elements. However, tapping the strengths of quantitative approaches to complement this knowledge was essential. This is because the quantitative steps helped to test key factors and patterns of vulnerability and adaptive capacity identified in the qualitative research steps against their wider relevance and to compare them along, for example, different variables such as social group affiliation or asset endowment. Therefore, the quantitative research elements provided an important indication for supporting or refuting the hypotheses and causal relationships. In turn, they also helped to identify unexpected patterns or correlations in the wider data that needed to be explored and explained through the qualitatively oriented follow-up research. Figure 5.1 gives a comprehensive overview of the research steps and the integration of the above-discussed methodological and epistemological principles. The following sections then provide a more detailed account of the different methods used and their triangulation.

43 Contrasting the use of this term in the anglophone science community, it seems that in German academia the synonymous term ‘Qualitative Sozialforschung‘ represents a much more conventionally used concept capturing a common set of approaches and epistemological perspectives that are widely shared by scholars. This might be explained by the strong German academic history in related fields of sociology, human geography, social psychology, anthropology and pedagogy (e.g. Mayring 2002).

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Literature research

Phenomenon of interest

Concepts and theories vulnerability, risk, resilience etc.

Preliminary understanding Problem definition, development of research question, scoping research sites Choosing / developing

Increase in standardization; moving from more qualitative to rather quantitative methods; but also evoking qualitative follow-up reserach

Data collection

Method-triangulation

Data-triangulation

interviews, household survey etc.)

Analysis and interpretation

Quality check

Conceptualization / theorizing

e.g. validity, accuracy, precision

Theory-triangulation

Documentation

Empirical data collection and analysis

research methods

Compiling thesis / papers / reports Theory

Main workflow

Methodology

Secondary feedbacks

Empirics

Triangulation in the empirical analysis

Figure 5.1: Research design with mixed methods, triangulation and hermeneutic circles, own draft inspired partly by Mayring (2002: 14); Lamnek (2005: 62); Hamhaber (2004: 55)

5.2.

APPLIED MIX OF METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Originating from the Greek word methodos, which means to follow a path, a method can be defined as a systematic and goal-oriented approach for fulfilling a given task. A scientific method can hence be defined as a systematic approach for the generation of knowledge through applying a structured, transparent and trace-

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able technique (or a stepwise set of techniques) for data acquisition (amended from Atteslander 2006: 5). Hence, the salient link to the previously discussed epistemological perspective is obvious since it has direct implications on the type and combination of methods applied. In addition to the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, the research design targeted a combined collection of primary and secondary data. Primary data included first-hand accounts of actors, mainly on their perception, action and behavior, collected through the belowdescribed methods. Such data proved the most important source of information and contributed the largest knowledge gain. Secondary data includes data which has not been produced or formulated specifically for this research but which is nevertheless of key relevance to it and can be evaluated and analyzed in a scientific manner. These data comprise, for example, governmental reports, advisory papers, draft plans, statistical data, or meeting reports. Documents of such kind are often classified information in Vietnam and are therefore difficult to get access to. The choice of methods inevitably depends on the type of data that needs to be collected which, in turn, depends on the research objects. Figure 5.2 integrates these three components based on the research elements of this research, which have been developed in chapter 3. The methods used for collecting primary data can be grouped into two main types: interviewing and participatory urban appraisal (PUA). The below paragraphs present the main techniques, strengths and weaknesses of these method types and describes how they were used in during the research process of this study.

Figure 5.2: Links between research objects, data needs and methods

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Fieldwork procedure The research has been conducted over a time period of roughly three years, including the core periods of data collection which altogether comprised 14 months of field work in Vietnam, most importantly in Can Tho City but also in Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi. Out of these 14 months, the longest field work phase spanned 10 months in 2009. The remaining field work was conducted in late 2008 (6 weeks of preparatory field work during the rainy season), early 2010 (midMarch to mid-May) and late 2010 (one week in October). The main elements of data collection are described in the following paragraphs. They have to the largest part not been conducted in strict separation but dynamically interlaced in the iterative research process (see Figure 5.1). Open and semi-structured household interviews The term interview can be defined in the scientific context as a systematic method for obtaining information and disclosing the emic perspective of a respondent triggered by strategic sets of questions and additional stimuli such as provocative statements or non-verbal gestures (Diekmann 2005: 375; Schlehe 2003: 71). Many different taxonomies of interview modes can be found in the literature, ranging from very open interviews, to semi-structured or semi-standardized interviews, and finally to fully standardized interviews (cf. Lamnek 2005: 383; Flick 2009: 150 et seq.; Schlehe: 77 et sequ.; Bernard 2000: 189 et sequ.). Within the research presented here, a number of open interviews were conducted in the early phase of the data collection in order to enhance the general understanding of the research context and objects. Following the open interviews, sets of semi-structured household interviews were conducted. Interview guides were used in these interviews (Leitfadeninterview) in order to structure the main topics and questions to be covered in the interview and to specify a lose order. These guides contained, firstly, key questions of high priority and, secondly, contingent questions (Eventualfragen) which were also of interest but were only asked under specific conditions, for example, to stimulate a stalling interview (cf. Atteslander 2006: 125; Schnell et al. 2005: 387; Lamnek 2005: 362; Bernard 2006: 212; Schlehe 2003: 78). This type of interviewing facilitated sufficient flexibility and responsiveness (cf. Hopf 1995: 177; Diekmann 2005: 447) while still allowing for a strategic sequencing and a systematic inquiry on the topics most relevant to the researcher (Schnell et al. 2005: 387; Lamnek 2005: 345). Around 55 qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted at household level in the 9 case study areas (see Appendix 10.3). Respondents included either heads of household (mostly male) or other members of the households. In the latter group, female adult household members were explicitly targeted as respondents in order to assure that also the women’s perspectives and knowledge is captured. In many cases, the interviews were not conducted with one respondent only, but developed into small group discussions as other household members or

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neighbors joined in to discuss the questions. The interviews were conducted with an interpreter who translated the questions from English into Vietnamese and the responses back into English. The duration of the interviews ranged from 15 minutes to 2.5 hours with the majority of the interviews taking between 50 and 80 minutes. These interviews mainly took place in two waves during the research process: Firstly, the largest part of interviews were conducted in the early phase (first and second fieldwork block) in order to generate an understanding of general livelihood patterns, flood-related exposure conditions, coping mechanisms, susceptibility parameters, and adaptation measures. Interview guides were developed, refined and concretized throughout this process while interviews still retained a flexible design that allowed for taking on board newly emerging topics and questions. The selection of the households to be interviewed was mainly based on judgment sampling (also called purposive sampling) meaning that such households were selected that seemed to be of particular interest given their location or other observable or conjectural characteristics, e.g. with regards to housing quality or flood marks (Bernard 2000: 176 et sequ.). The list of households was further expanded through snowball sampling (cf. Bernard 2000: 179). The information generated in these interviews contributed important knowledge for the development of the questionnaire for the standardized household survey. Secondly, semi-structured interviews based on interview guides were again conducted after the implementation of the standardized household survey and the preliminary analysis of its results. This second wave of semi-structured interviews, during the second and third fieldwork block, focused on clarifying contradictory or otherwise inconclusive results of the household survey. It further allowed for finding or confirming causal relations behind the correlations observed in the data. Therefore, these interviews were conducted based on a purposive sampling, meaning that households of particular interest were deliberately targeted, including, for example, outlier cases or households which did not match some expected characteristics of their peer group and where the divergence could not be explained on the basis of the household survey data alone. Depending on the scope of open questions, the interviews ranged from 20 to 90 minutes. These interviews were not recorded but interview minutes for later analysis were taken by me and the translator. Both sets of minutes were compared and cross-complemented after the interviews. Qualitative content analysis has then been conducted, mainly drawing on coding systems (cf. Mayring 2008). Semi-structured expert interviews Altogether 71 semi-structured expert interviews were conducted with key informants in governmental agencies, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research institutions. These interviews largely applied the principles and techniques introduced in the above section on the semi-structured household interviews. A complete list of all interviews is provided in Appendix

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10.3. The majority of them targeted institutions active at City, District or Ward level. A smaller part addressed experts working on national and sub-national level, for instance, within ministries or international organizations such as the Red Cross or UN-HABITAT. Many of the interviews were conducted not with only one key informant but with two to six people delegated by the respective institution. In general, the interviews aimed at capturing the perspectives and activities of these actors who have strong influence on shaping vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities at the household level and wider scales. In addition, the awareness and perceptions of risk related topics have been addressed and the priorities for action investigated in cases where, for example, governmental policies are not implemented to the letter. Further, the interviews allowed for gathering information on policy drafts that have not yet been officially issued but may play a central role in the future. Depending on the expertise, professional background and position of the respective key informant the interviews concentrated on specific topics including, for example, official disaster risk management approaches, climate change adaptation policies, civil society activities or social policy. The mix of state bureaucracy agencies, non-governmental organizations and research institutions helped to contrast and triangulate different viewpoints of the most important players shaping the broader political debate on issues of interest, e.g. on urban upgrading or climate change adaptation policy. Considering the lack of opposition within the political system as well as the official media (cf. 4.4), these viewpoints further helped to capture critical views on government action and its vulnerability implications. There have been follow-up meetings with many of the key informants in order to intensify the discussion initiated in the first interview. In most cases, these follow-up meetings were held in an informal context, e.g. outside the official work place. This proved beneficial in particular for debating controversial or politically sensitive topics which mostly were not, or only to a very limited extent, addressed during the formal interview-setting at the work place. The interviews with staff of Vietnamese governmental bodies were mostly conducted in Vietnamese and translated into English by the translator. The other interviews (researchers, NGOs, international organizations etc.) were usually conducted directly in English (compare for a detailed overview Appendix 10.3). If the interviewees agreed, the interviews were recorded in order to be fully transcribed. This procedure applied to most of the interviews within the research organizations, NGOs, planning consultancies and international organizations. Recording was usually not agreed to – or not even asked for – in the interviews with governmental staff. In these cases hand-written protocols were taken during the interviews by the translator and myself, which we cross-complemented and computer typed immediately after each interview. All minutes and transcripts were then analyzed along the principles of qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2008; Steigleder 2008) for which MaxQDA software was used as a technical support tool. The developed coding system comprised 143 codes which together produced more than 1,000 coded text segments

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considered for the detailed analysis. In the empirical chapter of this book (cf. 6) a coding system is used to refer to the different interviews. ‘KI’ stands for ‘key informant interview’. The numbers are given in chronological order. The last letters of the code indicate the group of experts the respective interviewee belongs to: ‘GON’= government organization at national level; ‘GOP’= government organization at province level; ‘GOD’= government organization at district level; ‘GOW’= government organization at ward level; ‘NGO’= small nongovernmental organization; ‘IO’= large international organization; ‘RO’= research organization; and ‘IP’= independent consultant. Standardized household surveys In addition to the open and semi-structured interviews, household surveys with standardized questionnaires were conducted in a face-to-face oral interview style. The advantage with this type of interviewing is that large numbers of respondents can be captured and the results compared due to the standardization. In the research presented here, the standardized household survey was used to test and explore patterns and correlations that seemed to be emerging from the data of the open and semi-structured interviews. In addition, unexpected patterns and correlations could be identified which then called for further qualitative investigation in order to achieve causal explanations. Two survey campaigns were conducted during the research process. The major survey covered a total of 588 households in the seven main case study areas throughout the city (cf. 5.3). It focused on vulnerability patterns as well as on the past, present and future capacities and mechanisms for coping with and adapting to natural hazards. The second survey covered 154 households which had been relocated into two resettlement sites in the framework of the city’s largest urban upgrading project (cf. 4.6). The focus here was on the mid- and long-term vulnerability effects of the resettlement which had been implemented as part of a risk reduction measure. The two surveys applied two different questionnaires; however, a number of identical modules were used in both versions to enable the integration and comparison of the results. The questionnaire development had been informed by the findings of the previous research steps as well as by the conceptual framework for the assessment of vulnerability and adaptive capacity (cf. 3.2). The questionnaire was structured into thematic blocks which were designed in a modular fashion and introduced by filter questions where appropriate, so that entire blocks could be skipped if they were not applicable to the respective household. A full version of the Vietnamese questionnaire as well as its English translation is provided in the digital Appendix (cf. 10.5). The questionnaire design and its practical implementation followed the basic principles for standardized surveys discussed in the literature (cf. Bernard 2000: 227 et sequ.). For example, sophisticated scientific terminology was avoided. In order to break the ice and to develop a comfortable environment for the interview-

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ees, the first questions asked were designed to cover non-sensitive subjects, such as the household composition or the duration of residency. Most questions were provided in closed format, yet, some open questions were included. The questionnaire was restricted to an interview length of 40 to 70 minutes; and up to 90 minutes in exceptional cases. In order to avoid misinterpretations and to cater for interviewees with low reading and writing competencies, the interviews were conducted orally whereby the interviewers strictly followed the given questions and response options wordby-word in order to allow for later comparability of the results. Before starting the interview a general introduction to the research topic and objectives was provided, also explaining why the contribution of the household member’s perspectives is a central element to the entire research undertaking. Following close consultation with senior researchers from Can Tho University, 70,000 Vietnamese dong (i.e. around 2.50 Euros) were paid to every respondent as compensation for time expenses and income loss. Prior to the main survey campaigns, two rounds of pre-testing were conducted in the different case study areas in order to eradicate sources of misinterpretation and adjust the accuracy of response options. Both surveys were conducted by a team of 15 interviewers, recruited from three partner institutes within Can Tho University. All of them were staff members of the university with a relevant thematic background and previous experience in conducting household surveys. Two days of training were given by myself prior to both survey campaigns in order to teach the background of the research and the detailed interviewing methodology. The selection of households to be covered was based on a stratified random sampling (cf. Bernard 2000: 154). Firstly, areas of main interest were identified within the case study areas, e.g. close to a canal or river and further away from it or inside vs. outside of an urban upgrading project (cf. Table 5.2). Then, households within this subset were chosen based on systematic random walks (cf. Bernard 2000). After the completion of the survey, data questionnaires were manually checked for errors. A limited number of faulty or disputable questionnaires had to be excluded from the analysis. In order to support the data input, a Microsoft Access Data Base with a specific data entry mask has been custom tailored to the questionnaire. This even included a number of control algorithms, for example, for blocking implausible data entries such as percentage values that did not sum up to 100. After the completion of data input, all questionnaires were again checked manually against the digital data input in the data base. The data was then transferred into SPSS format. The responses to the open questions were translated into English by the translator and inserted into the data base in both languages. The data input was performed by myself and three qualified staff members of the survey team. The development of the Access Data Base was supported by one team member with extensive experience in data base development. The analysis of the survey data followed a two-tier approach: The first step focused on descriptive statistics in order to identify and explore general trends and

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patterns in the data. SPSS software was applied and the main tools for analysis included cross-tabulations, pivot-tables, frequency tables, pairwise comparisons, boxplots, scatter-plots, pie-charts and data filter functions. In order to visualize the findings, stacked bar-charts, pie-charts, box plots, scatter plots, tables and maps were used where considered appropriate (cf. 6.2). The second step comprised bivariate correlation analysis. In response to subresearch questions B1 to B4 (cf. Table 1.1) this step aimed to identify and analyze correlations and indications for potential causal relations (a) between the different dimensions of vulnerability and adaptive capacity (exposure, susceptibility, coping capacity, adaptive capacity), (b) between vulnerability factors within these dimensions and (c) between these factors and broader variables for socioeconomic conditions. The goals of the second step could best be achieved by testing the data for bivariate correlations using the corrected contingency coefficient44 (Sakoda 1977). The contingency coefficient (C)45 was chosen given that the data comprised a mixture of nominal and ordinal variables and yet the measure of association should remain comparable over the entire set of pairwise correlations. However, since the variables had different numbers of categories (see Table 5.1), the contingency coefficient needed to be corrected (C*)46 in order to allow for the comparability of the strength of the correlation. This is also why the otherwise often applied measure of Cramér’s V was not applied here, because interpreting its results is difficult if variables with different numbers of categories are compared. In order to support and triangulate the interpretation of the C*-values, the Chisquare test was applied and its results included in the interpretation (Bortz & Schuster 2010: 180), grouped along the commonly applied significance levels of 5 percent, 1 percent and 0.1 percent (Bahrenberg et al. 2010). The Chi-square test allowed for analyzing how statistically significant the correlations of the C*measure are, which proved necessary and helpful given that suggested benchmarks for interpreting C*-values differ quite considerably in the literature, depending on the type of data and the context of research. C*-values range from 0 to 1 with 0 meaning no correlation and 1 complete correlation. In accordance with the observed range of associations, the following benchmarks for interpreting the C*-values were applied for this study: 0.20.7 = very strong correlation. Furthermore, the standardized adjusted residuals were computed in order to substantiate the analysis in cases where significant correlations have been found, i.e. to explore in detail which combinations of variable values scored above or 44 Note that technically the statistical relations measured by the corrected contingency coefficient are not correlations but associations given that they are (partly) based on nominal variables. However, in order to avoid confusion amongst the wider readership the term correlation is used here. 45 C=√(χ²/(n+χ²)) 46 C*=√(q/(q-1)) C=√(q/(q-1)) √(χ^2/(n+χ^2 )) with q = min(n categories column; n categories row)

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below the statistically expected results. The values of the residuals indicate the strength of deviation from the stochastically anticipated results (Bahrenberg et al. 2010). They can be positive and negative, telling the direction of correlation. In order to comply with the data requirements for the contingency coefficient test, it was necessary to re-group or aggregate a considerable part of the household survey data into new categories or even new variables. Bahrenberg et al. (2010) suggest that the interpretation of C values is most valid when the data frequency in each category is not lower than 5. The variables used for the analysis, therefore, have been pre-processed and re-grouped where necessary into an applicably low number of categories (see Table 5.1). In many cases aggregated indices or other synthesized indicators have been calculated, e.g. a housing quality index, a household asset index, a household income index, a dependency ratio, educational attainment value or a multi-hazard exposure index (see in detail Table 5.1). The benchmarks for grouping were largely based on theoretical considerations. In some cases, statistical grouping has been applied, based either on natural breaks in the data or on equal intervals. Particularly for the index variables, percentile groups have been calculated (see Table 5.1). For some variables, principal component analysis was tested as an option for reducing the number of categories in the variables, e.g. for the household asset index. However, this approach was dropped due to the difficult re-interpretation of the abstract factors or components. Given the aspired policy relevance of the assessment tools, the more direct methods were preferred (see Table 5.1). The results of the correlation analysis are summarized in Table 6.5 at the end of chapter 6. Interpretations and explanations of the single correlations – or the absence of expected correlations – are provided in the respective sub-sections throughout the empirical part (cf. 6).

177

Applied Mix of Methods

Abbreviation

Variable

Explanation (rationale, method of calculation, aggregation and categorization)

Categories

Area

Case study area

Seven case study areas for the main household survey

See Table 5.2

House Loc.

Housing location

Location of house in relation to river and/or canal

“completely on stilts”; “partly on stilts and partly on land”; “completely on land but directly next to water”; “5-10m away from water”; “10-20m away from water”; >20m away from water”

HH Size

Household size

Total number of persons living permanently in the respective household

“1”; “2”; “3-5”; “≥6”

Depen. Ratio

Dependency ratio

The dependency ratio is a widely used indicator for the age structure of a household, region or country. It measures the ratio of the number of household members in working age (15-64) to the number of children (≤14) and elderly (≥ 65 years). The ratio is calculated by dividing the number of elderly and children by the number of household members in working, multiplied by 100. Hence, a value of 100 means that the number of household members in working age matches the combined number of elderly and children. Higher values indicated that there are more children and elderly; lower values that the number of working aged persons is higher. The grouping for the categories follows the thresholds applied in the official Vietnamese Population and Housing Census 2009 (see GSO 2010: 42).

“0-49”; “50-99”; “100-199”; “≥200”

Literacy HH

Literacy rate

Percentage of illiterates amongst the households members aged 15 years and older

“all illiterate”; “some illiterate or only rudimentary skills”; “all fully literate”

High Education

Highest educational attainment

Highest educational attainment achieved within the household

“secondary school completed or lower”; “high school completed”; “vocational training completed”; “Bachelor completed or higher”

High Prof.

Highest professional level

Highest professional attainment achieved within the household. Three levels have been differentiated: Low level includes unskilled worker, street vendor, waiter, security staff etc. Medium level comprises skilled labourer, skilled driver, accountant, salesperson etc. High level comprises head of a company, professor, district officer etc. The grouping follows the clusters identified in the semi-structured household interviews prior to the household survey.

“low level”; “medium level”; “high level”

Gov. Staff

Governmental staff

Number of household members who are governmental or state staff (local authorities, policy, military etc.)

“0”; “1”; “2 or more”

Table 5.1: Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey (cont. on next page)

178

Methodology

Mem. Org.

Membership in organizations

Total number of memberships held by household members in party-state organizations such as the Communist Party, Fatherland Front, Women’s Union, Veteran’s Union etc.

“0”; “1”; “2”; “≥3”

Health Ins.

Public health insurance

Ratio of household members covered by public health insurance

“none”; “some”; “all”

Challenges HH

Physical and mental challenges

The absolute number of mentally or physically challenged household members has been counted. For the focus of this research (e.g. evacuation in disaster situations) the absolute number is of greater relevance than the ratio.

“0”; “1”; “2”; “3 or more”

Pov. Cert.

Poverty certificate

Whether or not the household holds a poverty certificate

“yes”; “no”

Assets

Household asset index

The household asset index has been calculated based on 15 marker assets for different welfare levels identified through the indepth interviews and strategic observation. They are clustered in four groups: 1. basic household assets: radio (small); ventilator (stand-alone), ventilator (ceiling); bicycle; 2. advanced household assets: TV; mobile phone; refrigerator; old motorbike (‘Honda 50’; ‘Honda Family’ or similar); 3. assets indicating a raised standard of living: computer (desktop), computer (laptop), DVD player; internet access; air conditioning; new motorbike; 4. luxury assets: car for private use. The survey inquired whether a household had one (or multiples) of each of the marker assets. Weightings according to the respective asset group (1-4) were applied and the values aggregated into the household asset index. The asset index is not normalized by household size and composition. In order to avoid distortions caused by household size – yet while still keeping the strong marker character of the assets – each asset was only counted once even though it might occur multiple times in the household, such as mobile phones, bicycles or ventilators. This is because the strongest signal is in the fact whether or not a household can afford a certain asset at all, e.g. air conditioning. In contrast to other more comprehensive poverty or welfare indices, additional criteria such as education or housing quality are not included in this index. This is because they are analyzed separately here in order to increase the analytical sharpness. Hence, this index should not be mistaken as an overall welfare index. It captures – as the name tells – the material household assets only. In general, the computation of the index follows the literature which reveals the strengths of and methods for household asset measures in Vietnam (e.g. Sanh & Stifel 2003; Vu & Baulch 2010). However, since no recent or appropriate household asset index exists for urban households in Vietnam, this new index has been developed.

5 quintiles (with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest)

Income

Income index

The average monthly income (over the last year prior to the survey) of each household member was summed up and normalized by the total number of household members. A normalization only by household members in working age had been considered but was dropped based on expert discussions. While elderly and children might have smaller needs for food and consumables, they often necessitate special expenditures for school material, clothing, mediation etc. Hence, they were fully accounted in the calculation of the index on available income. The answers “I do not know” and “I do not want to tell” (together n=101) had to be excluded from the analysis – which underscores the difficulty to appraise income data and the need for supplementary variables such as the household asset index.

5 quintiles (with 1= lowest income/poorest to 5= highest income/richest)

Table 5.1: Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey (continued)

179

Applied Mix of Methods

Remit In

Inbound remittances

Average monthly amount of remittances received from relatives in Vietnam and/or overseas

“none”; “some, but do not want to tell how much”; “0-1 million dong”; “> 1 million dong”

Remit Out

Outbound remittances

Average monthly amount of remittances sent to relatives in Vietnam and/or overseas

“none”; “0-1 million dong”; “> 1 million dong”

Land Cert

Land use certificate

Ratio of land with land use certificate

“completely without certificate”; “mixed land”; “completely with certificate”; “rented”

House Qual.

Housing quality index

The index in principle follows the structure of the housing quality index calculated in the Vietnam Population and Housing Census which is jointly implemented by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). However some changes in the computation have been made. Three main components of the building were considered: the walls, the roof and the foundation of the house. The latter is an amendment to the official statistics due to the research context and the high relevance of houses built partly or entirely on stilts onto or next to the river and being exposed to erosion, flooding and strong winds (see above). Yet, in order not to produce an overwriting effect of the foundation works (e.g. when comparing a stilt house to a house built on solid ground) a modular two step approach is chosen here: Firstly, an index for the quality of the walls and the roof is calculated; secondly, this index value can then either be combined with the quality of the foundation or analyzed in isolation. The index for the walls and the roof is based on the observation that the roofs are mostly made of one homogenous material per house while the different materials are often used for the walls within the same house. Hence this index is sensitive to a primary, secondary and tertiary material for the walls while it only considers one material for the roof. It is therefore more sophisticated than the GSO/UNFPA index which only considers one building material per building element. The data has been gathered in the household interviews and triangulated through observation by the interviewer. In accordance with the UNFPA/GSO index, the materials for the walls have been classified into stable (bricks) and non-stable (leaves, wood planks, corrugated iron sheets). Also the material for the roof has been recoded into stable (tiles, concrete) and non-stable (corrugated iron sheets, wood planks, leaves). Stable materials were re-coded into the value ‘1’ and unstable ones into ‘0’. The index has then been calculated based on the following formulas: In case of only one wall material: Index value = (roof material) + (wall material); in case of only two different wall materials: Index value = (roof material) + (0.75 x primary wall material) + (0.25 x secondary wall material); in case of three different wall materials: Index value = (roof material) + (0.5 x primary wall material) + (0.25 x secondary wall material) + (0.25 x tertiary wall material). The resulting index values were then manually classified into the following groups: 0 = fully makeshift (simple house); 0.25-0.75 = largely makeshift (temporary); 1-1.75= semi-solid (semi-permanent); 2 = solid (permanent).

“fully makeshift”; “largely makeshift”; “semisolid”; “solid”

Table 5.1: Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey (continued)

180

Methodology

Multi Haz.

Exposure to multiple hazards

Multiple exposure to different hazards (regular flooding; extreme events, erosion); categories according to number of hazard types exposed to

“0”; “1”; “2”; “3”

Reg. Flood

Exposure to regular flooding

House affected regularly by flooding during the rainy season (tidal flooding, rain-fed flooding, water logging, river flooding)

“no”; “yes, parts of the house”; “yes, the entire house”

Ext. Haz.

Exposure to extreme hazard events

Household experienced extreme floods and/or storms in the past that were considerably stronger than regular floods and/or storms

“no”; “yes, once”; “yes, twice or more often”

Erosion

Exposure to erosion

Household directly affected by river bank erosion

“yes”; “no”

Swimming

Ability to swim

Percentage of household members in age group 15-64 who can swim. This age group was chosen in order to exclude children and elderly for which the ability to swim might be linked to age and other factors – which are rather captured by the dependency ratio or the variable on physical and mental challenges.

“none”; “some”; “all”

Repair Ext. Haz.

House repair extreme hazard event

House repair necessary due to extreme hazard events in the past considering repair of the following element: floor, walls, stilts/poles, doors, roof, other

“no”; “one element”; “two elements and more”

Repl. Ext. Haz.

Replace assets extreme hazard event

Furniture or household appliances needed to be replaced due to loss and damage experienced in an extreme flood or storm event. The following elements have been included: chairs, tables, TV, radio/stereo system, PC, laptop, refrigerator, kitchen equipment, other.

“no”; “one asset”; “two assets and more”; “three assets and more”

Supp. Rel.

Support from relatives

Household received support from relatives for recovery from extreme hazard events

“no”; “yes”

Health Ext.

Health impact extreme event

Number of household members suffering from health impacts due to extreme hazard events: fever, cough, diarrhoea, skin disease, injuries, other

“none”; “one”; “two”; “three or more”

Elev. Asset

Elevation/evacuation of assets

Elevation and/or evacuation of household assets in case strong floods or storms are expected

“no”; “elevate inside house”; “also evacuate out of house”

Evac. People

Evacuation of people

Evacuation of household members in case strong floods or storms are expected

“no”; “only children/invalids/ elderly”; “all household members”

Health Reg.

Health impacts regular flooding

Any household member suffering health impacts from regular flooding

“yes”; “no”

Gov. Supp.

Government support for house fortification

Ever received any support from any governmental fund for house fortification in case strong flood or storm was forecasted; only 10 households altogether ever received such support, hence the statistical associations are only of limited validity; but this result is remarkable as such.

“yes”; “no”

Elevat.

Elevation of house elements

Occurrence and frequency of house elevation in the past

“never”; “once”; “twice or more often”

Table 5.1: Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey (continued)

181

Applied Mix of Methods

Elem. Elev.

Elements elevated

Structural elements of the house that have been elevated (floor, windows, door frames etc.), measure across all elevation actions

“only floor”; “also other elements”; “none”

Height Elev.

Height of elevation

Vertical elevation gain of floor elevation; categories according to natural breaks and manual classification

“none”; “1-30cm”; “31-60cm”; “>60cm”

Gov. Elev.

Governmental support for elevation

Governmental support for elevation, including the provision of building material; the provision of labour force; the provision of financial support; categories according to aggregated support across all types

“no”; “yes”; “did not elevate”

Stilt New

Stilt renewal

Occurrence and frequency of stilt/pole renewal over last years for those households having the house partly or entirely built on pole structures

“no”; “yes”

Gov. Stilt

Governmental support for stilt renewal

Governmental support for stilt/pole renewal, including the provision of building material; the provision of labour force; the provision of financial support; categories according to aggregated support across all types

“no”; “yes”; “did not renew poles”

Roof Upgr.

Roof upgrading

Occurrence of roof upgrading over last years

“no”; “yes”

Gov. Roof

Governmental support for roof upgrading

Governmental support for roof upgrading, including the provision of building material; the provision of labour force; the provision of financial support; categories according to aggregated support across all types

“no”; “yes”; “did not upgrade roof”

Plan Elev.

Plans for elevation

Plan to elevate the floor of the house within the next years

“yes”; “no”

Plan Roof

Plans for roof upgrading

Plan to upgrade the roof of the house within the next years

“yes”; “no”

Plan Stilts

Plan for stilts/poles upgrading

Plan to upgrade or replace the stilts/poles of the house within the next years

“yes”; “no”

Plan Wall

Plan for wall upgrading

Plan to renovate the walls of the house within the next years

“yes”; “no”

Wat. Reas.

Rising water as reason for renovation

Rising water levels are reason for planned renovation

“yes”; “no”

Wind Rea.

Stronger winds as reason for renovation

Stronger winds are reason for planned renovation

“yes”; “no”

Supp. VN

Potential support recovery in Vietnam

Potential support available from relatives within Vietnam for recovery after a disaster

“no”; “we have relatives but they could not support us”; “yes”

Supp. Int.

Potential support recovery overseas

Potential support available from relatives from overseas for recovery after a disaster

“no”; “we have relatives but they could not support us”; “yes”

Table 5.1: Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey (continued)

182

Methodology

Resettl.

Resettlement in future

Household lives in project area of urban upgrading project or other development projects and will be resettled in future

“no”; “yes”; “I heard different things and I am not sure”

Risk Job

Risk loss of job

Perceived risk with regards to losing the job. Risk score from 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest (first priority risk)

“5”; “4”; “3”; “2”; “1”

Risk Dis.

Risk disease

Perceived risk with regards to suffering from disease or injury. Risk score from 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest (first priority risk)

“5”; “4”; “3”; “2”; “1”

Risk Flood

Risk flooding

Perceived risk with regards to flooding. Risk score from 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest (first priority risk)

“5”; “4”; “3”; “2”; “1”

Risk Acc.

Risk accident

Perceived risk with regards to experiencing a traffic accident. Risk score from 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest (first priority risk)

“5”; “4”; “3”; “2”; “1”

Risk Typh.

Risk typhoon

Perceived risk with regards to being affected by a strong typhoon and/or storm. Risk score from 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest (first priority risk)

“5”; “4”; “3”; “2”; “1”

Fund Past

Past contribution to disaster funds

Contribution of the household to the CFSC fund (cf. 6.1) or other disaster related funds in the past

“no”; “yes”

Fund Pot.

Potential contribution to disaster funds

Willingness and capacity of the household to contribute a higher amount to the CFSC fund or other disaster related funds (cf. 6.1) in case of a strong storm or flood

“no”; “would like to spend more but cannot afford”; “yes”

DRM Gov.

DRM responsibility local government

Responsibility for flood protection and storm preparation ascribed to local government, from 4 (most responsible actor) to 1 (only fourth most responsible actor) and 0 (not mentioned) The response options also included other actors such as the Fatherland Front, the Red Cross or other international organizations.

“4”; “3”; “2”; “1”, “0”

DRM HH

DRM responsibility individual households

Responsibility for flood protection and storm preparation ascribed to individual households, from 4 (most responsible actor) to 1 (only fourth most responsible actor) and 0 (not mentioned). The response options also included other actors such as the Fatherland Front, the Red Cross or other international organizations.

“4”; “3”; “2”; “1”, “0”

Table 5.1: Variables for the analysis of associations in the household survey (continued)

Focus group discussions Next to the semi-structured expert interviews, five focus group discussions (FGDs) were held with experts from state bureaucracy and research institutions. The groups comprised between five and twelve participants and the meetings were mostly held back-to-back with other workshops or seminars related to the WISDOM project47. Three discussions were held in an early stage of the project in order to explore and discuss basic issues around risk, vulnerability and adaptation in Can Tho City, e.g. past hazard impacts, risk perceptions and government priorities for adaptation through mapping exercises, free-list approaches and compara47 See for more detailed descriptions of these workshops, for example: http://wisdom. eoc.dlr.de/en/content/unu-ehs-mdi-expert-meeting-vulnerability-climate-change-risk-andadaptation-can-tho-city and http://wisdom.eoc.dlr.de/en/content/expert-working-group-ewgvulnerability-jointly-organized-unu-ehs-university-can-tho-and-wisd

Applied Mix of Methods

183

tive risk rankings. Two discussions were held in later stages of the project in order to validate and triangulate earlier research results. The discussions proved helpful for grasping the discourses – and potentially controversial opinions – of different actors in Can Tho City. However, apart from rather general insights, there remained substantial challenges with regards to the usability of the results since the respective government offices often sent comparatively inexperienced junior staff members or officers of different, i.e. thematically less relevant, units within their agencies. Therefore, the results are not specifically presented in a separate block in the empirical analysis (chapter 6). Participatory Urban Appraisal The empirical data collection was in some cases complemented by participatory urban appraisal (PUA) methods. Building on the long history of literature on rapid rural appraisal and later participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (cf. Kumar 2002, 1996), the younger and less discussed field of PUA can be understood as a growing family of approaches and methods to enable urban residents, researchers and decision makers to share, enhance and analyze their knowledge and to plan, act, monitor, and evaluate action based on that knowledge (partly adopted from Kumar 1996 in Narayanasamy 2009: 26). PUA puts a lot of emphasis on participation and empowerment48 of disadvantaged community members who play an active role in analyzing and solving the problems in question (Kraas 2010). The methods are often rooted in PRA but have been adjusted for the urban context (cf. Moser and Stein 2010; Mitlin and Thompson 1994). They use a wide range of visualization techniques and other tools to collect and organize information and to stimulate discussion (ibid.). Selected PUA methods were applied along with the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions in order to explore complex or diffuse issues that could not be fully clarified or where misunderstandings or ambiguities could not be entirely ruled out in the oral interviews. Time lines were used to investigate complex historical developments including, for example, the sequencing of events or cascading effects and feedback in past hazard situations or in adaptation processes. Score-cards and pile-sorts were used to generate risk perception rankings. Participatory mapping was conducted in order to map out, for example, flood extent and exposure, locations of storm shelters, informal dyke-systems in the periurban areas, or administrative borders. Venn-diagrams were tested to explore, for instance, social networks and governmental programmes for supporting flood response. Yet, the latter method proved too confusing and discouraging for most of the respondents. Also the idea to distribute disposable photo cameras so that household members and local government officers could document flood situations as anchors for later discussions unfortunately did not yield usable results. 48 See Korf (2002) and von Freyhold (2002) for a critique on the concepts of participation and empowerment and their implementation.

184

Methodology

Overall, these methods were helpful for acquiring a general knowledge on the context in the case study sites and for clarifying otherwise ambiguous information (e.g. on timelines or mappings). However, the question in how far these methods also allowed the participating actors to reflect on their situation and, particularly, to increase their empowerment cannot be answered for certain here, given that openly reflecting on empowerment questions proved very difficult due to the overall research context and the tight supervision by party-state organs (see in detail below). Secondary data collection and analysis The analysis of the primary data has been complemented by selected secondary data. The collection and analysis of secondary data took place throughout most of the research process as new information was published or become available via new contacts. Most of the data was collected on the occasion of the expert interviews. This data mainly comprised governmental reports, statistics and legal documents. Some of that data was in English language, yet the majority of it was in Vietnamese. Therefore, the most relevant documents have been translated by the interpreter. The governmental documents were analyzed largely with a qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2008). This information helped in particular to understand the legal and administrative framework and to amend detailed information on topics discussed in the expert interviews, e.g. on the statistics of governmental vulnerability reduction programmes and the legal parameters of resettlement policies. 5.3.

SELECTION OF CASE STUDY AREAS Theoretical innovation is based on ‘good ideas’, for good ideas you need interesting cases. (Heinze 1995: 14, translated by the author)

In line with the general focus of this study, the empirical fieldwork concentrated on nine selected areas in the urban and peri-urban districts of Can Tho City, i.e. in Ninh Kieu, Binh Thuy and Cai Rang (cf. Table 5.2; Figure 10.3 in the Appendix). For the main research on vulnerability and adaptive capacity, the first seven case study areas were selected based on criteria developed during the explorative fieldwork phase at the beginning of the project. Firstly, areas with different observable exposure profiles, covering the range of potential hazards, have been included so that the influence of exposure on the overall risk could be singled out in the later analysis (compare the conceptual framework in chapter 3) and the conditions of different exposure profiles compared. Secondly, different socioeconomic groups were covered allowing for the analysis of the linkages between socio-economic development status and vulnerability, or the capacity for vulnera-

Selection of Case Study Areas

185

bility reduction. However, since the detailed analysis was yet to come, this criterion called for the use of proxy measures including statistical poverty data at ward level as well as key informant interviews and the structured observation of household assets. Thirdly, areas with different infrastructure and building morphology were included in order to be able to explore the linkages between housing quality and vulnerability, e.g. comparing households in makeshift settlements along the river-bank to neighborhoods with houses of more solid building quality and more comprehensive infrastructure endowment. In particular, this choice allowed for critically scrutinizing a popular proposition in the literature, i.e. many studies assume rather uncritically that the allegedly homogenous neighborhoods in terms of building morphology also imply homogenous vulnerability and capacity patterns of their residents. Yet, the explorative analysis during the first fieldwork phase had suggested that this might in fact not be the case. Fourthly, given the existence and rationale of urban upgrading projects in Can Tho City (cf. 4.7), the case study areas were designed to include areas that have already been undergoing upgrading, other areas that are earmarked for future upgrading projects but also areas not affected by upgrading at all. In this way, the links between upgrading and vulnerability dynamics could be analyzed. Fifthly, since the rapid sprawl of Can Tho City leads to comprehensive transformations in its peri-urban fringe (cf. 4.6; Garschagen et al. 2011), a limited number of case study areas covering peri-urban areas was considered useful, besides the areas in the inner city. Resulting from the combination of these criteria, seven case study areas were selected for the major household survey and the bulk of the semi-structured household interviews. In accordance with the fourth of the above criteria, two additional case study areas were added for the second household survey focusing on households resettled within the urban upgrading projects. These two case study areas cover the two main resettlement sites. Table 5.2 provides an overview and a synopsis of the main characteristics. Figure 10.3 in the Appendix illustrates their geographical location along with the GPS-based locations of the 742 interviewed households in the two standardized surveys.

Main survey on vulnerability and adaptive capacity

Mainly makeshift housing along the riverbank, often partly or entirely on stilts on the water

Mainly stone houses, some makeshift houses built of wood and metal sheets

Mix of makeshift housing along the river and semi-solid to solid houses further inland

Solid houses and new public infrastructure

Solid houses and new public infrastructure

Mainly lower income households; income generation typically through trading, handcrafts or wage labor in the informal sector Mainly middle income and lower-middle income households; mixed income earning activities, mainly in the secondary and tertiary sector Mainly lower income households; income generation typically through trading, handcrafts or wage labor in the informal sector Mainly lower income and lower-middle income households; mixed income earning activities, mainly in the secondary and tertiary sector Mainly lower income and lower-middle income households; mixed income earning activities, mainly in the secondary and tertiary sector Mainly lower income and lower-middle income household; often disrupted income earning due to resettlement Mainly lower income and lower-middle income households; often disrupted income earning due to resettlement

Immediate proximity to Rach Ngong Canal; exposure to river flooding, tidal flooding, pluvial flooding and river bank erosion

No immediate proximity to rivers or canals; but exposure to pluvial flooding, tidal flooding and water backlog Immediate proximity to Can Tho River; exposure to river flooding, tidal flooding, pluvial flooding, water backlog and river bank erosion Immediate proximity to Hau River and Binh Thuy River; exposure to river flooding, tidal flooding, pluvial flooding and river bank erosion Immediate proximity to Hau River and Can Tho River; exposure to river flooding, tidal flooding, pluvial flooding, water backlog and river bank erosion No immediate proximity to rivers or canals; exposure to pluvial flooding

No immediate proximity to rivers or canals; exposure to pluvial flooding

An Nghiep Ward (river-bound parts)

An Lac Ward (inland parts)

An Lac Ward (river-bound parts)

Hung Phu Ward*

An Khanh Ward* resettlement site

Hung Phu Ward* resettlement site

Binh Thuy Ward*

Mainly stone houses, some makeshift houses built of wood and metal sheets

Mainly middle income and lower-middle income households; mixed income earning activities, mainly in the secondary and tertiary sector

No immediate proximity to rivers or canals; but exposure to tidal flooding, pluvial flooding and water backlog

An Nghiep Ward (inland parts)

Mainly makeshift housing along the riverbank, often partly or entirely on stilts on the water

Mainly makeshift housing along the riverbank, often partly or entirely on stilts on the water

Mainly stone houses of higher quality, mostly two to four storeys

Mainly middle income and upper-middle income households; mixed income earning activities, mainly in the secondary and tertiary sector

Immediate proximity to Rach Ngong Canal and Rach Ngong Reservoir; exposure to tidal flooding, pluvial flooding, water backlog

An Cu Ward

Physical morphology and housing conditions

Socio-economic condition of population

Exposure to natural hazards

Case study area

* Not the entire administrative area of the ward has been considered as case study area. A limited part has been selected based on settlement morphology. ** Number of interviewed households in standardized survey per case study areas

Second survey on resettlement

Resettlement cluster of a governmental upgrading and flood protection project

Resettlement cluster of the World Bank Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project

Erosion and flood protection wall implemented; no other major upgrading implemented or planned

No major upgrading implemented or planned

Upgrading and resettlement planned within next four years (People’s Committee Initiative); no erosion or flood protection infrastructure

Periurban

Periurban

Periurban

Periurban

Innerurban

Innerurban

Innerurban

Major upgrading and resettlement planned within the next two years (World Bank Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project); no erosion or flood protection infrastructure Minor upgrading implemented in the past, yet not within a comprehensive project; no major upgrading planned for future

Innerurban

Innerurban

Location

Some upgrading implemented over last years (World Bank Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project)

Major upgrading completed over last three years (World Bank urban upgrading Project); new upgraded promenade serving as erosion and flood protection

Coverage by past or future urban upgrading

70

84

90

83

74

113

59

83

86

n in survey**

186 Methodology

Table 5.2: Case study areas and their main characteristics, own draft based on semi-structured interviews, observation and statistical analysis

Obstacles and Limits of Data Collection

5.4.

187

OBSTACLES AND LIMITS OF DATA COLLECTION

Doing fieldwork-based empirical research related to critical social science in Vietnam is inflicted with a number of considerable difficulties, particularly for Western scientists (e.g. Scott et al. 2006). Challenges especially stem from the centralist and control-oriented political framework (cf. 4.4) as well as from differences in terms of socio-cultural conventions (including, but not limited to, the domains of communication, knowledge sharing and open discourse). These challenges need to be considered as boundary conditions which shape the possibilities and limitations of research in Vietnam. The following paragraphs explore these challenges in greater depth and explain the strategies that have been applied in this study to mitigate or counteract them. Research permissions and access to the field Conditioned by the overall political system in Vietnam, social science research – and empirical data collection in particular – is still tightly controlled or, depending on the sensitivity of the topic, even actively repressed by the party-state apparatus (Scott et al. 2006). In particular, those social sciences having a tradition in critical theory and following sub-altern or even action-based paradigms in order to raise the voice for and of disadvantaged and marginalized population groups are eyed critically and only tolerated at the margins, despite almost thirty years of renovation policy. The political elite still considers itself as having a righteous monopoly to frame, interpret and evaluate social processes and structures and to restrict the production and dissemination of other perspectives that could yield substantial – or even scientifically substantiated – critique on the social policies of the partystate system. Accordingly, permissions to conduct social science (empirical) research in the country are restricted thematically and administratively. Acquiring the permissions for my research therefore proved to be a complex and tedious process. Firstly, an official research visa had to be obtained which was only issued on the basis of an officially approved research invitation from a governmental academic institution in Vietnam. Such invitations are linked to strict regulations in terms of research funding, the choice of topics and the expected benefits for the Vietnamese side. Secondly, specific research permissions had to be requested for the particular research activities in Can Tho City. For this purpose, a detailed research plan had to be handed in to the administration of the local partner university. This plan had to cover one month and had to list day-byday the envisaged appointments or fieldwork activities. In addition, the objectives of each activity and the main topics envisaged to be addressed in individual interviews had to be laid out. These research plans were checked by the administration of the university. From there they were – if approved – either forwarded to the International Relations Department of Can Tho City’s People’s Committee or handed directly to the respective institutions requested for a meeting. These institutions could then accept the requested meeting or reject it and bounce back the

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request. This workflow indicates that obtaining research permissions has been a time-consuming process with many administrative hurdles and possibilities for obstructions along the way, particularly regarding the expert interviews in official agencies. Further, the actual work flow in many cases differed from the standard procedure, which however, could only be discovered during the process, again delaying the entire procedure. In addition, defining and sequencing in detail not only all research steps one month ahead but also the detailed objectives and topics of each interview posed a great challenge to the rather inductive and hermeneutic research approach, particularly in the early explorative phase. On the other hand, posting overly generic objectives also was not an option as it would have come with the risk of being rejected in the grounds of an insufficiently clear focus of the requested interview. Hence, intermediate research objectives and interview foci sometimes had to be sought. This latter point was also of high relevance, particularly when it came to discussing politically sensitive topics such as resettlement or social security policies with either governmental agencies or households directly. Despite these administrative and political challenges, it has been possible to obtain all research permissions requested apart from a few follow-up expert interviews. All major research components could hence be conducted as planned even though the administrative organization of the permissions took a lot of time and energy. However, political constriction remained a challenge even if research elements had eventually been permitted – as the following section shows. Political control and the difficulties of open discourse Related to the tight political control, the research had to confront the fact that an open discourse on topics which could be perceived as politically sensitive was, in general, very difficult, both with household members but particularly with key informants in the governmental administration or – to a lesser extent – even formal research institutions. Before interviewing households in the case study areas, personal meetings had to be held with local People’s Committee officers at district and ward level in order to explain the research objectives and to describe the types of households envisaged for the interviews. In many cases these officers then wanted to select some ‘interesting’ households. However, since it was difficult to tell how these offers were motivated and what the selection criteria would be, such offers were kindly refrained from and it was explained that for methodological reasons the households had to be chosen by myself. Yet, even though politically pre-defined sampling lists could successfully be averted and own sampling lists applied, the semi-structured household interviews were mostly accompanied by one or more local People’s Committee officers from the ward or residential block level. In some cases, the interviewees seemed to have been informed by the local officers prior to the interview. Therefore, it was often hard to tell whether the household members had been briefed by the local officers and had been told how to respond to certain questions. However, after

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sensitizing the translator to integrate subtle test questions into the interview and small talk, we could be quite certain that this was not the case. Nevertheless, the attendance of the officers still evoked some noticeable response effects amongst the respondents, particularly when it came to sensitive or politically controversial topics such as the effectiveness of governmental support for disaster risk mitigation or the compensation rates in relation to resettlement. In interviews with attendance of People’s Committee officers the interviewees seemed on average to be less critical and more content with controversial policies. In response to this challenge, the first round of interviews was focused on fairly ‘boring’ and uncontroversial issues such as the family history and profile. Hence, after building some trust with the local officers we could then work much more independently. We still had to inform the officers when we intended to do interviews and in most cases they made a quick round through the selected households to introduce us. But in most cases, the officers then left and did not stay for the actual interview. Hence, the semi-structured household interviews could in most cases be conducted without direct supervision. This proved beneficial for the discussion of more controversial or sensitive topics. However, it must be assumed that many respondents still felt too intimidated to speak their mind entirely openly. Also the two household survey campaigns have been subjected to tight political control. On top of the generally tedious process for obtaining the monthly research permission (see above), most district and ward level officers wanted to receive a copy of the questionnaire upfront before approving the survey from their side and starting with detailed planning of its implementation. Similarly, the sampling list – prepared by myself earlier according to a stratified random sampling – was checked carefully and only approved after lengthy discussions in some of the wards. In each case study area one team member had to be named who had to keep in close contact with the ward level officers and the officials at residential group level. At the beginning of every survey day, this team member had to discuss the detailed procedure for the day with those officials. In some cases, the residential group officers accompanied the interviewers to the households and introduced them. In most cases they left shortly after the interview had commenced. The interviewers had been trained to look out for influence potentially exercised by the officials who could lead to recognizable intimidations on the part of the interviewees. Respective notes have been included in the questionnaire in order to have the possibility of excluding arguable questionnaires from the analysis. Despite this tight control, all households included in the sampling list could be approached and access has not been denied to any region or households. However, as with the semi-structured interviews, a subtle intimidation of the interviewees emerging from the official character of the entire survey and the control of the government authorities could not be pre-empted entirely. Therefore, the test and triangulation questions in the questionnaire (e.g. combining negative and positive assertion options in evaluation questions) proved extremely helpful and necessary.

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Even more problematic was the tight political control in the semi-structured expert interviews with governmental staff. Once an interview request had been officially approved the head of the respective agency usually received orders to comply with the request and to appoint staff members to hold the meeting. The appointed officers were mostly vice-heads of the departments or heads of the subsections within the departments. Yet, resulting from this system of top-down orders, it was not necessarily given that all interview partners were intrinsically motivated to participate in the interview. While some interview partners seemed interested in the topic and engaged actively in the discussion, others seemed irritated or gave the impression that the meetings were a burden either due to the high overall workload or the perceived irrelevance of the topic. In addition, it seemed that many of the key informants were uncomfortable with the interview situation, in particular when the interviews shifted towards topics that are widely considered as politically sensitive, e.g. the public dissent with compensation mechanisms in the case of resettlement. In this context, it is important to mention that the vast majority of interviews have been protocolled by attending staff members for the purpose of internal reporting. Many interviewees therefore responded in short and very generic terms or simply reproduced, or even read out, official governmental documents related to the topic in order to avoid statements outside of the official policy line. In this context, it proved helpful to approach such topics clearly from the ‘objective’ fact-oriented perspective – and only from there move to the individual judgment of the interviewees in those cases where the respondent seemed to be feeling comfortable with it. It also proved helpful to use existing policy documents or official data sets as foundation for more critical reflection wherever possible. For example, I sometimes quoted speeches or interviews of high ranking political cadres which had been published at ministry websites or newspapers and in which these cadres had hinted at problems related to topics of my interest. Other anchors where often provided by official statistics showing, for example, the non-achievement of envisaged goals in the collection of local disaster risk management funds. These sources provided ‘objective facts’ published by governmental bodies and hence safe foundations for the individual interviewees. Nevertheless, it remained highly important not to constrict the response space of the interviewees and to ensure that enough room was provided to opt out of any topic without losing face. As indicated above, several follow-up meetings were held with many of the key informants. These meetings proved very important for building trust and talking openly about perceived problems. In this context, it seemed important that my extended stay in Can Tho City signaled a strong and lasting engagement with the research and an honest interest in the country – in contrast to many other projects currently conducted in the Mekong Delta where project teams fly in for workshops or rapid assessments of a couple of days and then disappear back to their home offices. In this regard, I also emphasized that the experts are seen not primarily as sources for extracting knowledge but as cooperation partners for jointly transferring scientific findings into application and policy making. Conveying this message convincingly and supporting it not only by words but by action – e.g.

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through workshops on fostering the policy-science-interface within the WISDOM project – proved to open up the discourse because the respondents realized the interviews are not about judging their work or testing their knowledge but about being interested in their knowledge, perspectives and judgments. Language barriers and translation Probably the most obvious challenge for conducting empirical social science research in Vietnam as a native German speaker is the language barrier, particularly when referring to qualitative methods. Vietnamese belongs to the Vietic branch of the Austro-Asiatic languages and is hence a tonal language. Taking individual lessons from the very beginning of my stay in Vietnam, I was able to learn some basic Vietnamese that allowed me to have some small-talk about, for example, my likes and dislikes about Vietnam or my family situation – which is an important early element in socializing and building relations, particularly in the expert and household interviews. However, given the complexity of the language and my time constraints I was not able to learn Vietnamese up to a standard that would have allowed me to conduct my interviews entirely in Vietnamese and to analyze other data sets such as governmental reports in detail. At the same time, the vast majority of the people in Vietnam, and especially in the Mekong Delta, cannot or only to a very limited extent speak English. This is particularly true for people with a low background in formal education – which applies to large parts of the households interviewed during the field work. Yet, even amongst the key informants in leading governmental positions at province or district level, the English skills were mostly not sufficient for conducting the interviews in English. Resulting from this two-directional language barrier, I had to revert to a translator for most of my interviews. A suitable candidate could be identified and hired based on an extensive recruitment process including written exercises and interviews. Luckily, this person joined me for the entire length of the field work which meant that it was worthwhile to substantially invest time into his intensive training in terms of the topic, the research methodology and cultural barriers – the latter also focusing on his pro-active engagement to teach me where necessary49. In addition to the translation work, the interviewer also had the role of a research assistant, for example, for supporting the translation and administrative handling of the research permission requests. Despite this training and the professional skills of the translator, some limitations inevitably remained. Most importantly, the translation limited my opportunities for directly shaping the communication on a fine resolution, including, for example, semantics or even non-verbal aspects of communication. I tried to over49 See Turner (2010b) for a detailed reflection on the importance of mutual communication and understanding regarding perceptions, social behavior and cultural limits of both, Vietnamese interpreter and Western researcher, for doing fieldwork in Vietnam.

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come this shortcoming by always keeping eye contact to the respondent and addressing him/her directly. This way, at least the gestures and main emotions could directly be communicated. Secondly, translation adds an additional layer of interpretation, in both ways, which can potentially mean that slight deviations in the meaning are build into the communication. However, given that the interview content was mainly on hard facts, this caveat did not challenge the results too significantly. Thirdly, translation simply takes up a lot of time meaning that less ground could be covered than with direct communication. This was particularly challenging if key informants were in high ranking positions with very limited time available. Fourthly, confidential issues, that would have been preferred to be discussed in a private conversation only with foreigners, may have been avoided due to the fact that the translator also had to report back to the university. Yet, this latter point is mainly speculative and could not be tested or confirmed beyond doubt. Quality and trustworthiness of secondary data In addition to the restrictions in terms of interview data, also the quality, scope and validity of secondary data, collected usually on the occasion of expert interviews, proved problematic for a couple of reasons. Firstly, legal documents and governmental reports are often very vague in language and content. In addition, they often paint a picture of normative visions of how the reality should and could appear, e.g. the five-year-plans for socio-economic development (cf. 6.1.2). However, they are largely lacking a critical assessment of problems in the status quo and a realistic appraisal of barriers for implementing the envisaged goals. Therefore, such documents are helpful to trace the normative debate in the party-state system; but they are of limited value as a basis for assessing the real conditions on the ground. Secondly, quantitative statistics have to be questioned. In many cases inconsistencies could be found between and even within statistical data sets (e.g. across years or vertical and horizontal units). Often statistics seemed to rather represent the goals stated in earlier plans than the actually accounted figures, e.g. with respect to the numbers on poverty reduction. In addition, statistical reports did not include data on particularly sensitive topics, e.g. the lack of statistics on resettled households who cannot sustain their livelihood in the resettlement clusters and have to move out (cf. 6.2.4). These shortcomings of secondary data are in general confirmed by findings of other studies in Vietnam and the Mekong Delta in particular (e.g. Reis 2012). Their implications for the knowledge generation in the scope of this research are reflected in retrospective in chapter 7.2.

6.

ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY EMPIRICAL DATA

Based on the theoretical and thematic background provided in chapter 2 and the specific context of risk and transformation examined in chapter 4, the following chapter sets out to present the empirical findings stemming from the different field work elements introduced in chapter 5. This chapter thereby particularly responds to the main research question and the sub-questions B1 to B6 (cf. 1), i.e. it will elaborate on the vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities amongst urban and periurban residents in Can Tho City in relation to the current and projected natural hazards and it will examine how these vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities are dynamically influenced by governmental risk management action and urban governance more generally as well as by the ongoing socio-economic transformation process. In line with Figures 3.2 and 5.2, the chapter is therefore split into two parts. Firstly, chapter 6.1 analyzes state policy and action for risk management in Can Tho City and it examines how it shapes the residents’ vulnerability and adaptation. Chapter 6.2 then explores in detail the vulnerabilities, adaptive capacities and adaptation action at household level. Both chapters put a particular emphasis not only on the role of environmental changes in this set-up but particularly on the influence of changes in the human and social system. The conceptual framework developed in chapter 3 provides analytical guidance for this analysis. As indicted in chapter 3, such perspectives which integrate (a) state and non-state domains, (b) vulnerability and adaptation as well as (c) environmental and socio-economic spheres are currently underemphasized. The findings will be synthesized and discussed in chapter 7 against their contributions to the wider empirical, theoretical and methodological discourse. 6.1.

GOVERNMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN CAN THO CITY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND DEFICITS

The research has shown that governmental risk management in Can Tho City relates to different fields of policy and administration. Three main domains need to be considered: (1) urban disaster risk management; (2) general urban planning and management; (3) urban formal climate change adaptation. Each of these fields determines relevant framework conditions for the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of individual households in Can Tho City. At the same time, the governmental activity in Can Tho City depends heavily on the broader institutional framework at national level and beyond – which is of high relevance considering the rather centralistic state bureaucracy in Vietnam (cf. 4.4). There-

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fore, the analysis, firstly, has to focus on the institutional set-up, legal situation, official policy formulation and underlying management paradigms in each of the three policy domains. But it also has to go deeper and needs to explore, secondly, the ways in which these policy frameworks are in fact – or are not – implemented in Can Tho City and how far they prove effective. It, thirdly, also has to apply an integrated perspective and needs to ask for synergies but also conflicts between the different policy domains and for the barriers to integrative policy implementation. 6.1.1. Disaster risk management The analysis of the state’s disaster risk management (DRM) capacity and action in Can Tho City will commence with a short review of the organizational and financial arrangements related to DRM, before analyzing in detail the institutional capacity related to the individual phases of the disaster risk management cycle (cf. 2.1.1.2), i.e. prevention and risk perception; preparedness and early warning; response; relief and recovery. Thereafter the implications for future trends in governmental DRM capacity are appraised. 6.1.1.1. Organizational and regulative arrangements of DRM in Can Tho City In line with the country’s overall DRM framework (cf. 4.1), also Can Tho City and its districts and wards are fitted with the risk management institutions stipulated in the country’s legal framework. The city’s Department for Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) is in general in charge of hydraulic infrastructure planning, development and maintenance, including flood related infrastructure such as dykes and embankments. The DARD at city level and its subsidiaries at district and ward level are also in charge of coordinating the city’s Committees for Flood and Storm Control (CFSC) at province and district levels. The CFSC at province level is formally headed by the vice-chairman of the People’s Committee in Can Tho City and vice-headed by the director of DARD in CTC. Besides, most of the other line departments, such as the Department of Natural Resources and the Environment (DONRE), the Department of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (DOLISA) or the Department of Construction (DOC), on province level are asked to delegate one representative into the CFSC. In most cases these are directors or vice-directors of the departments or of the most relevant bureaus within the departments. In addition, the committee includes, amongst others, one representative of each the police, the military, the Red Cross, the Fatherland Front, the People’s Council, and the television and radio stations in Can Tho City. DARD’s Section for Water Resources takes over key operational and organizational duties of the

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CFSC (KI-02-GOP: 26-32)50. Major strategic decisions, e.g. on financial budgets, new protective infrastructure or training exercises, are taken by the CFSC at the province level, while the role of the district level CFSC’s is largely limited to the practical implementation of these decisions. In accordance with the general tasks and responsibilities of the CFSC (chapter 4.1) three major types of meetings are held by province and district levels committees in Can Tho City (KI-03-GOD: 26-29): First, there is a regular meeting held before the rainy season in May or June. This meeting is used for assessing the vulnerabilities within the district with respect to the upcoming rainy and storm season. On the basis of this assessment, action plans are developed and responsibilities and tasks delegated amongst the different departments at province, district and ward level. These tasks include repair and renovation works of infrastructure, awareness raising and the assembling of disaster response units. These meetings also serve for discussing and preparing the long-term plans for disaster risk management, i.e. particularly the 5-year and the 10-year plan. Secondly, the CFSC in most of the administrative units – not in all – hold a meeting in late August or early September in order to assess the situation in the ongoing rainy season and to discuss necessary measures for the remainder of the season. Thirdly, special occasion meetings are held as soon as storms or severe floods are forecasted to potentially affect the respective area. Based on the specific hazard, the committee then decides which alarm level (set-out in the action master plan developed in the annual meeting) is proclaimed and what the necessary steps are. These steps can, for example, include intensified storm warnings in the area, the evacuation of particularly vulnerable people or the fortification of physical infrastructure. In terms of the formal policy development and implementation, the city government has in 2008 passed its Action Plan on Implementing the National Strategy for Disaster Mitigation and Management in Can Tho City to 2020 (KI-02GOP; cf. PC-CTC 2008b). This action plan is developed pursuant to the respective strategy at the national level which requests each province to draft and implement its own strategy in accordance with the national guidelines (cf. 4.1). It is therefore little surprising that CTC’s plan closely resembles the national strategy in terms of the general structure and content. It reaffirms that flooding and river bank erosion have been the most important hazards for Can Tho City. Yet, the action plan also underscores that an increasing typhoon occurrence in Southern Vietnam has been recorded and that a further intensification of typhoon activity is to be expected in Southern Vietnam and, hence, Can Tho City. The plan urges that there is a substantial risk emerging from these trends given that the population as well as the local level disaster risk managers in Can Tho City do not have experienced many typhoons in the past and hence have only low awareness of typhoon risk and limited knowledge on how to cope with typhoon events. The plan, therefore, calls for increased efforts to awareness raising and preparation in that direction. However, the below analysis will show that little of these efforts have in fact 50 See chapter 5.2 in the methodology chapter for an explanation on the codes of the expert interviews.

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been implemented to date and that the awareness for typhoon risk is still very low amongst Can Tho City’s residents (cf. 6.2). In this respect, it is also interesting to note that the strategy urges for the mobilization of community resources and the socialization of disaster risk management efforts. It therewith paves the way for shifting increasing parts of the responsibility for disaster risk management into the domain of private households and businesses, while governmental resources and tasks are cushioned. This point will play a major role in the integrated discussion of future pathways in risk management and adaptation action more generally (cf. 7). Besides some very general postulations to improve institutional capacities in the field of DRM and to mainstream DRM aspects into other policy fields, such as socio-economic development planning or construction planning, the plan suggests a number of more concrete measures. These include the resettlement of people from highly exposed areas into residential clusters in less exposed areas. The latter provide the political backing for the increasing resettlement activity – the implications of which are analyzed in detail in chapter 6.2 and have proven to yield some considerable problems. In addition, the plan stipulates that those households requiring evacuation and shelter in case of typhoons need to be identified and respective evacuation contingencies developed. This includes the expanding the system of evacuation shelters. Also, concrete targets with respect to the training of local officials specialized in DRM measures are provided in the plan. Similarly, the inclusion of disaster prevention knowledge into school curricula is explicitly provided for. Apart from the DRM policy development at province level, the actual DRM strategies and measures need to be implemented by the officers and representatives of the state bureaucracy at all levels. The most intensive interaction between the state apparatus and the residents happens at the local level, i.e. with state officials at the level of ward (Phưởng) and residential block (Khu Vực) level as well as with the lowest level of residential groups (Tổ). Throughout chapter 6 the detailed modes of negotiating and implementing risk management and adaptation measures at the interface of formal and informal spheres will be analyzed which engage mostly the state representatives at the lowest levels. In order to understand their responsibilities but also the institutional role, Table 6.1 summarizes the key attributes of the different administrative levels and the positions in the respective executive government bodies.

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Disaster Risk Management English name

Vietnamese name

Number of households (on average)

People per entity

Workload of People’s Committee officers

Professional level

Payment of People’s Committee officer

Mode of appointment

Duration of appointment

City*

Thành Phố

n/a

Ca. 450,000*

Full time

Professional

Full payment

Appointed top-down

Repeated 5-year terms

District

Quận

n/a

80,000230,000

Full time

Professoinal

Full payment

Appointed top-down

Repeated 5-year terms

Ward

Phưởng

3,300 – 4,000

8,00027,000

Full time (ca. 1.5 million VND/month)

Semiprofessional

Full payment

Appointed top-down

Repeated 5- year terms

Residential block

Khu Vực

50-100

1,2005,000

Mostly halftime (only in exceptions full-time)

Lay

Allowance (roughly half of the ward-level payment)

Voted by local people but strong political control

Mostly 2 years, can be extended

Residential group

Tổ

18-25

50-200

Part-time (strongly fluctuating)

Lay

No regular payment but gifts on holidays

Voted by local people but strong political control

2 years, can be extended

* While Can Tho City comprises nine districts, some of them need to be considered as rural (cf. 4.7). Hence, only the urban and peri-urban districts Ninh Kieu, Binh Thuy and Cai Rang are considered here.

Table 6.1: Administrative entities and the role of government officers in Can Tho City, own draft based on KI-17-GOW: 21-22; KI-18-GOW: 21; KI-20-GOW: 28; KI-23-GOD; KI-25-GOD: 25; KI-39-GOR: 23; Koh (2004)

While all of the DRM institutions envisaged in the legal provisions are installed in Can Tho City (e.g. the CFSCs, the strategy plan to 2020 etc.), their effectiveness and the quality of their implementation are being critically questioned by many of the interviewed key informants. The most pronounced critique has thereby been issued by experts outside the party-state structure. One of the most central concerns addresses the top-down command within the country’s DRM set-up. Many of the tasks handed down to the local levels in fact exceed the implementation capacities at those levels – the below-presented analysis on e.g. vulnerability assessments or the formulation of local DRM action plans supports this concern. At the same time, the top-down command also implies the risk that the order and provisions for DRM do not match with the needs and wants at the local level in Can Tho City – thereby obstructing the realization and effectiveness of the national DRM policies and measures. A leading programme manager of Can Tho’s Red Cross organization summarizes these issues as follows: “[T]he national level cannot know if the local level will be able to implement all the instruction […]. When a hazard strikes, there is, therefore, a big problem as the local level may not be – and in many cases is not – able to deal with the situation. That is the general problem stemming from the top-down planning in Vietnam. The Red Cross in Can Tho City would, therefore, favor a bottom-up planning. So, if you go to the planning departments in Can Tho City and ask them for their tasks, they will just know the things that are in the plan of the Committees at the higher levels.” (KI-06-IO: 61)

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Analysis of Primary Empirical Data

Other challenges are seen in the fact that some agencies which would be of high relevance for vulnerability questions in fact only play a minor role in the de facto DRM decision making structure. Most notably, DOLISA (i.e. the Department for Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs) has been reported to have a very weak voice in the CFSC at province level (KI-11-GOP). While DONRE (i.e. the Department for Natural Resources and the Environment) and DARD (i.e. the Department for Agriculture and Rural Development) approach DRM rather from an engineering or natural science perspective the leverage of DOLISA – which would in theory advocate for a stronger consideration of social vulnerabilities – is perceived to be much weaker (ibid.). The implications of this mismatch for the overall fabric of risk management will be discussed in more detail in chapters 6.1.4 and 7. In addition, the interviews in combination with a review of the policy documents reveal that the above-introduced DRM strategy to 2020 remains very vague as to how the suggested measures should be implemented. In particular, the time lines envisaged for implementation are often left open and no clear guidance can be found as to how the responsibilities ought to be shared between the different agencies across sectors and administrative levels. Also the budgetary questions remain rather unresolved in the action plan therewith impairing the prospects for stringent implementation. In fact, the plan concludes with an extended petition towards the national government for increasing their financial support. It is argued that the city is not capable of bearing the costs of all the measures envisaged in the plan and, hence, requires additional financial support from the central level. However, detailed cost estimations or specifications of the single measures are lacking. The following section therefore takes a closer look at the mechanisms for financing current and future DRM in Can Tho City. 6.1.1.2. Financial mechanisms for DRM in Can Tho City In general, the financial budget for the tasks and measures envisaged in Can Tho City’s strategy for DRM are envisaged to come from a mixture of sources including governmental funds from the central level, governmental funds from the province level, contributions by the local population and private businesses through a flood and storm protection fund, and domestic and international donations. Since a comprehensive overview over these funds is lacking in the literature, the empirical research helped to understand and compare the different funds. This step can be considered necessary in order to allow for appraising whether and how governmental agencies in Can Tho City have (or would have) sufficient financial capacity to secure a successful DRM in the face of current and potential future hazard events.

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Governmental contingency budget The State Budget Law requires that all local governments at province and district level allocate and reserve between two and five percent of their total budget for “preventing, combating and overcoming the consequences of natural disasters and for other important tasks of national defense and security which may arise beyond estimates” (SRV 2002: Article 9). In Can Tho City, this so-called contingency budget has been around 100 billion Vietnamese dong annually in the last years according to information from the Department of Finance51 (KI-09-GOP). The largest part of this money is usually used for disaster response and relief in the most impacted rural districts upstream of Hau River (especially Thot Not and Vinh Thanh) and particularly for repairing dyke breaches and for reconstructing destroyed houses (KI-09-GOP). Preventive measures, on the other hand, are only partly covered by this fund as they often fall within other more general infrastructure development projects (ibid.). Since also the national level is required to have a contingency budget there is theoretically the possibility that Can Tho City could receive additional contingency resources from the national level should the province level budget not suffice in case of extreme disasters (KI-09-GOP). Moreover, the so-called Financial Reserve Funds at national and provincial level could be used to pay for additional financial needs to overcome crises situations. These are funds that are fed by surplus and savings in the national and provincial budgets. However, the option of using resources from these funds was not mentioned in any of the key informant interviews, neither was it mentioned in any of the collected policy documents issued at province or district level, which suggests that the current endowment of this fund is very limited. This assumption is also backed by a World Bank report which holds that while in general the situation of the Financial Reserve Funds at national level are not well known, it can be said quite certainly that the surplus revenue allocated to disaster-related purposes has been very restricted (World Bank 2010b: 24). Flood and Storm Protection Fund In addition to the governmental budgets there is a regular fund that is collected from the local residents and private businesses in Can Tho City. This is the Fund for Flood and Storm Protection – which has in the interviews also been referred to as the “CFSC Fund” given that it is managed by the Committees for Flood and 51 This equals around 5.6 million USD at the time of the interviews. However, this figure has to be taken with caution. It was repeatedly mentioned in an expert interview with leading staff of the Department of Finance (see KI-09-GOP). Yet, written accounts have not been disclosed as this type of information has been argued to be highly sensitive and confidential. Also other departments – such as DARD – did not disclose figures on this contingency budget, probably because it would allow for drawing interferences about the city’s total budget. Hence, it has been very difficult to triangulate and validate this figure.

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Storm Control at province and district level (KI-23-GOD). In theory this fund is considered to be the main source for financing governmental DRM measures – however, whether the amount is sufficient and the fund reliable needs to be critically questioned, as the following paragraphs will show. As per decision of Can Tho City’s People’s Committee and the People’s Council (decisions 16/2005/QD-UB and 38/2005/QD-UB) all Vietnamese citizens aged 18 to 60 for males and 18 to 55 for females are required to contribute 1,500 Vietnamese dong per person and year in agriculture-based households and 3,000 dong in non-agricultural households. This amount is calculated from the equivalent of 1 and 2 kilograms of rice respectively (i.e. 8 and 16 cent USD, respectively, at the time of the interviews, indicating its symbolic rather than practical value, see discussion below). Households holding poverty certificates (cf. 6.2.4) are excepted form this duty. Private sector enterprises have to contribute 0.02 percent of their annual revenue, yet, capped at 5 million dong per year (i.e. around 280 USD at the time of the interviews). The collection of this fund is organized by the officers at ward level, specifically the tax officers, but the actual collection is often supported by the semiofficial representatives at of the People’s Committee at residential block or even group level (KI-23-GOD: 34-35). Yet, despite of – or maybe just because of – this direct mechanism involving the government representatives at the lowest administrative level, the financial targets could not be met in the last years in Can Tho City, meaning that not all people or businesses comply with their duty to pay. A chairperson of the CFSC explains the situation as follows: “The target for Can Tho City has been around 1.6 billion Vietnamese dong per year over the last years [i.e. around 90,000 USD at the time of the interviews]. However, the actual collection has usually only summed up to around 500 to 600 million dong. It has not been possible to collect more.” (KI-28-GOP: 24-26)

The failure to reach the target quota has been explained to result from the high work load of the officers as well as form the fact that the local officers oftentimes do not enforce the collection as stringently as provided in the law. That is because they usually have close ties to the residents and are expected to be responsive to the financial pressure and hardship put forth by them and to show a certain level of flexibility in the execution of their duty (KI-20-GOW). The local level collection of the storm and flood prevention fund therefore serves as a prime example of the complex state-society relations at the very local level and the hybrid role of local state representatives (cf. 4.4; 4.5). Resulting from this lack of collection, internal reports on the CFSC fund suggest that some districts in Can Tho City are faced with a considerable deficit. O Mon District, for example, has not even achieved 5 percent of its quota in 2008 and Phong Dien District just above 30 percent. In contrast other districts achieved much higher quotas, more precisely, 119 percent in Cai Rang and 83 percent in Binh Thuy – partly contributed by the stronger private industry sector there (PCCTC 2008a). These differences show how widely the implementation of the national laws might differ locally, depending on local negotiation processes. This

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obviously can have great implications for the question which funds would be locally available in case the districts of Can Tho City need to navigate a crises situation emerging from natural hazard impacts (cf. 7). In terms of the amounts of contribution at household level, the survey reveals moderate correlations between the contribution to the CFSC fund and the overall endowment of a household with physical, financial and human assets. A higher share of the households in the higher asset index quintiles, for example, contributed to the fund than those in the lower quintiles (C*=0.364 with p≤0.001). Similarly, moderate correlations can also be observed to the professional level of household members (C*=0.319 with p≤0.001) and the highest educational attainment in the household (C*=0.300 with p≤0.001). However, all these correlations are only comparatively weak and the analysis of the residuals shows that also in the higher income groups, a considerable number of households has reported not to contribute to the fund regularly. The collected money in the fund is distributed between the ward, district and province level (as codified in the government decision 38/2005/QD-UB; KI-23GOD). Five percent of it remains in the ward in order to cater for the administrative costs of the collection. Out of the remainder, 40 percent remain with the CFSC of the respective district and 60 percent are handed to the province level CFSC. Usually, these funds are envisaged to remain in the respective districts and provinces where they shall be spend on disaster risk prevention and relief. The 60 percent share that goes to the province usually is ought to be redistributed to the single districts according to their needs (KI-19-GOW: 26-27). However, in case of severe disasters in other provinces, the national government can request the province to pass that money to other provinces. This is of course an interesting question for Can Tho City given that it did not experience severe disasters in the past but might have an interest to hold on to these funds in order to promote disaster prevention measures. One of the chairpersons of Can Tho City’s CFSC reports that this in fact happens quite regularly: Interviewer: “Can it happen that the central government asks the leaders of Can Tho to pass this 60 percent on to the central government or to other provinces in case strong natural hazards strike in other parts of the country, for example, in the centre or the North?” Key informant: “Yes, the government sometimes asks to hand on money in order to support those areas. This year, for example, Can Tho has passed on around 500 million dong […].” Interviewer: “So last year you sent almost everything of the 60 percent to the central government?” Key informant: “Yes, that is correct.” Interviewer: “Was that only last year or does this happen often? Is this the usual situation?” Key informant: “This happens quite often, whenever there is a serious flood or storm in other parts of the country, mainly in the centre or North of Vietnam.” (KI-28-GOP: 35-41)

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Similar to the governmental contingency budgets (see previous section), the money collected in the flood and storm protection fund are largely used for re-active disaster response and relief rather than for preventive measures. Even though the legal framework would also cater for using the funds for disaster prevention, interviews with leading bureaucrats in the DARD and the People’s Committee show how closely the fund is in fact perceived to be linked to reactive measures (KI-28GOP; KI-23-GOD), as the following quote illustrates: “The CFSC […] fund is mainly used after a natural hazard has stricken in order to repair and rebuild houses and infrastructure.” (KI-28-GOP: 88)

Donation-based funds for disaster relief In addition to the governmental flood and storm protection fund, there are a number of voluntary funds based on donations collected in case of disasters. Most important are the funds raised domestically by the Fatherland Front as well as the international donations collected by the Red Cross. In case of a serious damage inflicted by natural hazards in Can Tho City or in other provinces, the Fatherland Front initiates a donation campaign targeting households, overseas Vietnamese and private companies. Hence, this fund is clearly geared towards disaster relief, not towards preventive risk mitigation. The collected money is passed upwards to the province or mostly the central level from where it gets redistributed to the most affected areas (KI-67-GOP; KI-24-GOD). According to information from the Fatherland Front in Can Tho City, there were in 2008, for example, around 1.5 billion Vietnamese dong collected in this fund (i.e. around 84,000 USD at the time of the interviews) which got transferred to the central level (KI-28-GOP). In the same year, around 1,300 households affected by flooding in Can Tho City received support out of this fund for rebuilding and repairing their houses, most notably in the rural and peri-urban districts Vinh Thanh, Thot Not, Co Do and Cai Rang (KI-67-GOP). The funds collected by the Red Cross are much smaller but the figures are hard to compare since these funds are only collected in very few cases. A leading programme officer of the Red Cross in Can Tho City describes the differences in terms of collection and utilization as follows: “The amount collected by the Fatherland Front is higher than the amount collected by the Red Cross. But if the government realizes that the situation is very serious they will ask the Red Cross to also collect money internationally. But this happens only in cases of serious disasters.” (KI-22-IO: 51-52)

Hence, the Red Cross fund can be a potential source for supporting relief should a serious disaster happen in Can Tho City – which is of quite some relevance with regards to the projected intensification of hazards in the future along with climate change (cf. 4.2). But assessing the potential volume and appraising the reliability of such funds is very difficult.

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Funds for risk prevention measures While the above financial mechanisms are – with respect to household level risk management – largely geared towards reactive disaster response and relief, there is a small number of financial mechanisms which target preventive measures for vulnerability reduction at household level. Most of the interviewed key informants considered the improvement of housing quality as most important in this regards (e.g. KI-67-GOP: 29; KI-23-GOD; KI-11-GOP). This is because poor housing very often implies not only increased hazard exposure but also aggravated physical susceptibility, as will be explained in more detail in chapter 6.2.2. The different financial mechanisms in this group of funds can be concisely summarized with the words of a People’s Committee officer in one of the case study areas who is in charge coordinating these funds in his district: Interviewer: “Which are those […] funds for improving the houses of poor people?” Key informant: “This is a specific programme which belongs to the DOLISA at district level. The DOLISA issues poverty certificates to those households that meet the definition of a poor household. Those households are then eligible of receiving support for improving their houses. […] In addition, the Fatherland’s Front mobilizes funds […] in Cai Rang in order to improve or rebuild the houses of poor households. Last year, for example, Toyota donated 100 million VND in Cai Rang for rebuilding the houses of poor families. Moreover, the district level sometimes takes money from other budgets in order to improve the housing structure of poor households.” (KI-23-GOD: 49-52)

In addition, a chairperson of the DOLISA adds one more mechanisms which is considered of great symbolic importance in the eyes of the many government representatives: “In addition there is the ‘poor day’ where government officials spend a one day salary for supporting the poor.” (KI-21-GOP: 88-91)

In contrast to the afore-mentioned disaster related mechanisms, these more general funds are collected on a constant basis. Further, most of these locally collected funds do not have to be handed to the province or even central level but can be used directly in the district of collection (KI-24-GOD: 21). For those funds collected by the Fatherland Front, officers of DOLISA and the local People’s Committee do formally not have a direct influence on how the funds shall be spend. However, it has been mentioned in the interviews that they can suggest beneficiaries from their areas. Usually these suggestions are considered and adhered to (KI11-GOP; KI-21-GOP). In terms of redistribution they can include small scale loans or even grants as well as the direct support with building material and labor force. In many cases, direct support through purchasing building materials or hiring craftspeople is preferred in order to prevent that the money is used for other purposes (KI-21-GOP). However, a question that remains to be critically analyzed is how many households in fact get to benefit from all these support mechanisms and whether the support is effective and sufficient – or whether it rather has to be understood as political symbolism (see in detail the discussion in chapter 6.2 and 7).

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6.1.1.3. Disaster risk management measures Based on the above analysis of the organizational, regulative and budgetary framework of DRM in Can Tho City, the focus can now be turned to the specific DRM measures, including soft and hard measures. This analysis will be organized according to the different domains of the disaster risk management cycle (cf. 2.1.1). General risk prevention and perception In order to understand the disaster risk prevention measures in Can Tho City it is important to explore the underlying risk perception amongst the relevant decision makers and practitioners. The DRM strategy documents for Can Tho City call for raising awareness and preparing for potentially new or underestimated hazards in the city, notably strong typhoons (cf. 6.1.1.1). However, the research has shown that the prevention measures taken in Can Tho are strongly influenced by the local stakeholders’ risk awareness which is in largely based on hazards regularly experienced in the past. Potential other hazards that according to climate change models might to be expected in the future are far less considered. This perception can be observed from ward to province level. Responding to the question how the people in An Nghiep Ward, for example, have dealt with extreme events in the past and what the governmental agencies have learnt from such events, a chair person of this ward’s People’s Committee holds that: “The ward does so far not have any experience with repairing heavy damages because there have so far not been any of those very severe floods or storms which could have caused heavy damage. So, response strategies are pending in the moment and we just ‘wait and see’ how the situation will be and then decide how we can overcome the damages. The forces are available, but they have been waiting for the decision of the province level on the specific things to do with respect to rehearsing.” (KI-18-GOW: 29-30)

Similarly, a People’s Committee chairperson of another ward argues that there is no need for contingency plans for strong storms or typhoon events since they have rarely happened in the Can Tho in the past: Interviewer: “What do you tell the people in the case of urgent storm warnings? Which messages or advice to you give to them?” Ward level chairman: “Usually the people don’t need to move out of their houses because severe storms only happen very rarely here in this area. […] So storms are not a very serious issue here. That is also why we do not have a plan [meaning a contingency plan] for evacuations.” (HH-32-BTW).

In other words, the current contingency planning at the local level is mainly based on hazard events experienced in the past while more intensive hazards are not considered and response measures for such hazards not developed.

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As per the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and its Action Plan for Implementation in Can Tho City (cf. 6.1.1.1) the CFSCs in each district of Can Tho City are requested to conduct a vulnerability assessment for their area each year prior to the beginning of the rainy season. The primary goal of these assessments is – in theory – to guide prevention measures to reduce vulnerability and risk. The key informant interviews and the documents collected suggest that these assessments are in most cases conducted. A leading bureaucrat working for the CFSC at city level and, hence, being responsible for coordinating and synchronizing the district level assessments explains the methods and procedures of these assessments as follows: “The vulnerability assessment is based on a good knowledge of the area [of the respective officer] and on observations in the field. The main indicators are the elevation of buildings and their proximity to water. […] This research has to be repeated every year. The CFSC also assesses the vulnerability of special infrastructure like transportation routes and industrial sites. If vulnerabilities are detected, the CFSC asks the respective departments to improve the structures accordingly. If improvement measures are considered to be insufficient, the CFSC asks the departments to completely replace the structures.” (KI-02-GOP: 33-36)

While this description appears coherent and logical at first glance, it also hints at the fact that the assessment strongly depends on the personal judgment of the respective servant conducting the research. A standardized assessment methodology, with a set of pre-defined criteria and standards for operationalization, does not exist. Also, the assessments depend strongly on institutional memory nurtured by previous reports. Reviewing several consecutive years of the official documents reporting the assessed vulnerabilities in Can Tho City suggests that the assessments are mostly a listing and fairly un-reflected re-production of what is perceived to be common-sense exposures. A critical engagement that tries to illuminate blind spots in the current disaster risk management approaches can in most cases not be found (KI-06-IO; KI-22-IO). That means that the vulnerability reports present mainly the counting of houses with weak structures close to rivers or canals while the engagement with broader set of factors for vulnerability and response capacity at household level – including soft and institutional factors – is largely lacking. As a result, a number of key informants from outside of the government structure critically questioned how useful the collected information is and how effectively it is transferred into vulnerability reduction measures (KI-22-IO; KI-06-IO). A leading programme officer of Can Tho’s Red Cross branch summarizes the situation as follows – and the assessment provided in chapter 6.2 will refer back to the addressed comparison: “[O]ne thing can be said for sure: The reports and planning documents of the localities and sectors are wrong in many cases. This means that the results stated in the official vulnerability assessments are often not true. Often vulnerabilities are found to be much higher in reality.” (KI-06-IO: 67-68)

Also, it was quite interesting to see that the responsible leaders of the CFSC at province level could only give very limited information on the results and implications of the vulnerability assessments which have been reported to them by the

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districts. In fact they referred to the respective local offices for obtaining detailed information (KI-02-GOP). This triggers the question how relevant these assessment reports are for any governmental action. For all of these reasons, the Can Tho City’s Red Cross organization had initiated a training programme for local officials entrusted with conducting the vulnerability assessments. The following quotes from a leading expert of Can Tho City’s Red Cross organization illustrate and substantiate the criticism on the hitherto assessment procedure and reflect on the difficulties in reforming these approaches: “[L]ocal authorities are trained [in our training] to assess vulnerabilities and risks using a bottom-up approach; which is quite different to the top-down approach that has been prevalent so far. […] However, in reality it is very hard to change the behavior of the officers meaning that it is very hard to make them accept the new measures. […] After this experience [of our training], they realized that changing to a bottom-up approach would bring them many benefits. They are able to assess and understand the situation of the local people much better and also they understood that policies of the government will be more accepted if a bottom-up approach is used. Most of the officers who joined the training had done the reports on the vulnerability assessment already for a long time. But their reports had no real content because they were lacking some fundamental, very important information and issues that, however, are of high importance to the local people, for example, freshwater, healthcare, food etc.” (KI-22-IO: 24-43)

In this context, it is also interesting to see that the Red Cross acts very much in line with the characterization of NGOs working in Vietnam more generally (cf. 4.5): Rather than openly criticizing or opposing against Can Tho City’s local government and the agencies behind the vulnerability assessments, the Red Cross explicitly sees its role in the support of the local government through training and capacity building; however, not fundamentally questioning the larger institutional set-up or the governance mode of risk management (KI-06-IO: 67-70). Notwithstanding the above illustrated shortcomings of the vulnerability assessments, they have for years been providing the basis for risk prevention measures undertaken by the authorities at the province, district and ward level, particularly shortly before the commencement of the rainy season. These measures include in particular the maintenance and fortification of dyke systems, the rehearsal of flood response contingencies by the response units (military, police, Fatherland Front, local authorities other local branches of mass organizations), the implementation of awareness raising campaigns, the inclusion of DRM education into school curricula, and the preparation and propagation of evacuation procedures for typhoon events (e.g. KI-16-GOW; KI-18-GOW). A lot of these activities have been reported to be implemented by the local officers at the levels of the ward and below. These officers have been reported to receive special training on these topics, with, in fact, the training of the local officers being one of the main actually implemented activities (KI-17-GOW). In addition to these trainings and awareness raising campaigns, the interviewed local officers of the People’s Committees and CFSCs at district and ward level argued that amongst the most important of the prevention measures is the

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governmental support given to poor households for upgrading their houses and for making them flood and storm proof. This activity has been emphasized in a high number of interviews with local authorities (e.g. KI-16-GOW; KI-17-GOW; KI18-GOW). As presented above (cf. 6.1.1.2), there are in general a number of different funding mechanisms for that by different organizations. If the special fund for supporting households holding a poverty certificate is not sufficient, money from the flood and storm protection fund is requested to supplement this task (KI17-GOW: 33-34; KI-19-GOW). A ward leader in one of the case study areas explains the procedure for obtaining support from the governmental poverty related funds as follows: “People’s Committee officers usually go the households in question and assess how much money the household would need. For this, mostly the households along the river bank are approached […]. So in detail, the ward officers send the residential block officer to estimate the costs and needs of the household. The residential block bureau then reports that up to the ward level. The ward level sends a craftsman to estimate the price. Then the ward – if the price is agreed on – pays the craftsmen and they repair the house. Fourteen or fifteen households are covered by this measure per year in An Lac [i.e. one of the case study wards].” (KI17-GOW: 35-36)

However, while the interviewed representatives of the party-state apparatus reiterated the importance of these measure and argued in favor of their broad reach and high effectiveness, it needs to be critically questioned to which extent these preventive measures in fact reach the households most in need and whether they are perceived to be of support for effective risk mitigation. This question will be tacked through the juxtaposition with the perspective of affected households (cf. 6.2) and the synthesis of the two perspectives, investigating synergies but also mismatches and gaps (cf. 7). Preparedness and early warning In addition to the above illustrated generic risk prevention and mitigation provisions there is a second set of governmental measures which are taken in preparation of specific hazard events. First, there are a number of early warning measures in case a storm or flood event is forecasted. The key question for the focus of the research presented here is thereby not on how meteorological information is collected and processed in the hydro-meteorological departments at national and provincial level. Rather, it shall be asked which information is reaching to the local state agencies in districts, wards and residential blocks, how this information is processed there, and – last but certainly not least – how the information is communicated to the local residents. Eventually, this leads one to ask which preparedness action is taken locally upon this information. According to the legal framework, storm and flood warnings are issued by the Central Hydro-Meteorological Forecasting Center and are then published in the media as well as – more importantly – handed down through

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the authorities in provinces, districts and wards to be communicated directly to the households by the ward and residential block officers. However, according to experts with long experience in disaster risk management in Vietnam there are in reality notable problems in this information chain, particularly towards the local levels. A project manager of a big international NGO, for example, shares the following concerns: “Our experiences show that, for example, […] if there is a kind of information on typhoon the central government know[s] well, they inform the province, the province know[s] well. Down to the district losing some information, to the community – to the commune level is losses a lot and to the [residential block] level it will run out and they learn something from television better than from the officials or information from government.” (KI-50-NGO: 46)

In other words, even the local decision makers are often better informed through the general information in the mass media than through the formal channels which in theory would be in place to transfer more specific information and – coupled therewith – recommendations and orders on preparedness action. This constellation is even reported by district level officers of the state apparatus, as the following quote exemplifies: “Most importantly, the information of weather and natural hazards such as storms in East Sea comes from the television and other media.” (KI-27-GOD: 40)

However, interestingly the interviews showed that action towards warning the residents and supporting them with preparation measures only happens after the official order has been handed down through the formal channels (KI-16-GOW; KI-19-GOW). This is in line with the centralistic decision making approach (cf. 4.4) and underscores that even if local officers receive the information on upcoming floods and storms on channels other than the formalized chains of warnings (e.g. television), they feel intimidated to take action independently without the order from higher levels. One informant therefore suggests that in many cases crucial time can be lost and action be delayed (KI-19-GOW). According to local government staff the official face-to-face communication of warnings to the residents is necessary, given that there is often low trust in the forecasts issued over the mass media. The chairman of one of the case study districts therefore reports the following: Key informant: “One big problem is that the weather forecast is not very exact. People, therefore, tend to ignore the announcements made by the weather forecast and refrain from taking any measures of preparation or protection. The [People’s Committee in Cai Rang], therefore, tries to improve the communication to the people in order to increase the perception of storm warnings and make them more effective.” […] Interviewer: “How is this done?” Key informant: “Firstly, the People’s Committee in Cai Rang has initiated to use the radio in the wards to issue and broadcast storm warnings and to give instructions on necessary measures. Secondly, other sections [governmental agencies] within Cai Rang and all officers are […] asked to propagate the warning word to mouth to the citizens.” (KI-03-GOD: 46-51)

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This personal issuance of early warnings has – according to government officials – a direct link to governmental support for storm or flood preparation measures, following very much the logics of communal care-taking according to social principles. In many interviews, the officials have emphasized that the local representatives of the People’s Committee, i.e. the chairpeople of the wards and the heads of the residential blocks and groups, provide direct practical support to the households who need to take flood or storm preparation measures. One of the ward leaders explains in an interview that: “In cases of upcoming storms and floods the residential block leaders then order the residential group leaders to support the households […] to prepare for upcoming floods and storms and to fortify their houses.” (KI-17-GOW: 26)

However, what this support includes – or should include – in reality, how it is organized and in how far the local leaders can be held accountable remains open and is not specified in any of the plans or instructions by the higher level agencies. Another ward leader, for example, reports in a rather informal interview (which was first set up as a simple household interview) about conflicts in the implementation of local support following actual flood or storm warnings: “[W]e have to inform the people in the ward about storms and floods and how they should prepare. […] However, in this situation the problem is that also the leaders of the residential blocks and groups are usually very busy with securing and preparing their own houses for the storm. They therefore usually do not have time to go around and warn the people or help them. […] Only after the storm, the leaders of the residential groups go around and check the damage at the other households and help them to repair their houses if necessary.” (HH-32BTW)

Therefore, the official narrative on the local state support for preparation following flood or storm warnings has to be critically contrasted with the perspective of households in the respective areas in terms of the question whether and how they have in fact been receiving such support. This will be explored in detail in chapter cf. 6.2.3 and discussed in chapter 7. Response In addition to the activities around preparedness, there are a number of governmental measures at the local level that are undertaken to respond to hazardous situation during the actual storm or flood event takes place. Most importantly, these include evacuation measures, anti-burglary patrols, repair of dykes and other protective infrastructure, the mobilization of disaster response units, and the coordination of these response measures. While the province and the district level agencies are largely concerned with coordinating these activities, the actual work on the ground is mainly ought to be implemented by the officials at ward and residential block level as well as by additional volunteers, for example from the local branches of the mass organizations (KI-17-GOW: 26).

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According to the local government officials in Can Tho City, the evacuation of the residents at high risk of being injured or even killed by strong storms (notably typhoons) or severe floods is considered to be amongst the top priorities within governmental disaster risk management (KI-26-GOP; KI-19-GOW; KI-22-IO). Along with this, particularly the training of local officers on how to plan for the evacuation and how to implement in an emergency situation has been frequently mentioned in interviews with the corresponding key informants (KI-17-GOW; KI22-IO; KI-19-GOW; KI-26-GOP). However, apart from these official statements the actual implementation and effectiveness of evacuation measures needs to be reviewed critically. The household survey data clearly reveals that there are a number of severe caveats. These will be explored in detail in chapter 6.2. In addition to the evacuation policies, on-the-spot dyke maintenance and repair during flood peaks is usually one of the main response measures by the state. However, while this is of great relevance in the rural areas of the Mekong Delta, it does not play a significant role in urban Can Tho City given the absence of large scale dyke systems (cf. 4.7). Those few smaller dyke systems that do exist in the city, particularly in the peri-urban areas are predominantly maintained by individual households or neighborhood groups (cf. 6.2). When very extreme hazards are projected or in the midst of striking, the CFSC can decide to request the mobilization of disaster response units consisting of the police, the military, the Red Cross. In 2007, for example, these forces were mobilized in some wards of Can Tho City, including An Lac, when typhoon Lekima (storm #5) was forecasted to hit the city – which in the end turned out to be much less severe than predicted (KI-17-GOW: 39). However, the mobilization of these forces has to be approved and officially ordered by the central and provincial level (KI-03-GOD). In general, many of the interviewed officials emphasized that disaster response action in Can Tho City follows the general national policy principles according to which the local governments are required to have four elements in place: leadership on-the-spot; human resources on-the-spot; materials on-the-spot; and logistics on-the-spot (KI-27-GOD: 38). The CFSC is requested to prepare the ground through the above introduced coordination. In the absence of strong disasters in the past it is hard to assess directly how well prepared the government agencies in Can Tho City are to provide those elements should a severe disaster strike. However, the interviews yielded a number of relevant indicators for appraising the actual capacities – which will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.2.3. Relief and recovery Lastly, there are a number of governmental measures for relief and recovery in order to overcome the damage and loss inferred by hazard events. The local relief and recovery measures can be differentiated into financial support measures, direct support with physical assets, and support in man-power for reconstruction

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work. Depending on the context of the respective household, mixed sets of measures can also be applied. In addition, measures coordinated at the national level (in case of large-scale disasters) can be differentiated from relief and recovery action that is coordinated at the provincial level or lower. As indicated above, Can Tho City has not experienced extended typhoon or flood disasters in the past with wide-spread destruction of physical assets and extensive humanitarian crisis that would have made large-scale relief and recovery action necessary. Hence, the experience with relief and recovery action is limited in Can Tho City. Nevertheless, as chapter 6.2 will show in detail, there are high numbers of households in urban Can Tho City which are significantly impacted by the localized natural hazards and which suffer damage and harm in a magnitude that exceeds their own capacity for recovery. Hence, these households are then – in theory – in need of external (governmental) relief and recovery support. Learning whether and how loss and damage is overcome in these cases is therefore of great relevance also for future hazard events – which are project to increase in number and intensity (cf. 4.2). The most important mechanism was reported to be the financial support out of the storm and prevention fund or the funds collected by the Fatherland Front (cf. 6.1.1.2). In case the funds at ward and district level are not sufficient, support from the province level funds is requested (cf. ibid.). The CFSCs and DOLISA usually collaborate with the officers at ward and residential group level to compile a survey of households in need of financial support (KI-11-GOP). In addition to the financial support, the CFSC routines envisage that practical support is given to affected households in need of assistance for housing repair or reconstruction. This means that local officers from the ward or the residential group level are sent to the households and help them repair their damages. A vice-head in one of the case study wards describes the main mechanisms how affected households can benefit from the fund for flood and storm protection or the other funds by the Fatherland Front. “[I]t works like this: in case a household is very heavily affected by storms or floods, the People’s Committee will send somebody to help to repair the house. This is usually organized at the ward level. The officers at the more local level are trained for such things. If this support is not sufficient, they will inform the district level. The district level will then provide money out of the flood and storm fund to support the household.” (KI-20-GOW: 31)

Interestingly, while this description gives the impression, that the procedure is highly standardized and works reliably in all wards, the juxtaposition with the household interviews (cf. 6.2.3) will show that there are in fact significant local derivations depending on the specific social capital and networks of the respective household or local officials in charge of the process. Hence, also the number of people actually receiving this support has been found to vary widely in the case study areas – again underscoring the importance of the specific negotiation processes at local level (cf. 6.2.3). In addition, the available budget for giving financial support has also been criticized for not being sufficient or for causing some ambiguity in relation to expected long-term commitments by the local govern-

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ment. This point relates back to the shifting interpretation with respect to the question in how far the government is still considered to be in charge of guaranteeing an encompassing care-taking or whether this responsibility is increasingly attributed to the individual level (cf. 4.5). The following quote by a district level bureaucrat illustrates this aspect which will be discussed more deeply in chapter 7: “[T]his assistance only has the purpose of helping the people to overcome difficult times […]. The money does not have to be paid back to the government. However, many people misunderstand this scheme and expect a long-term support or even claim that this should be considered a compensation for the loss of the house. For example, for a house that is worth about 20 million VND the government would provide 5-6 million VND.” (KI-03-GOD: 35-37)

Further, the access to support is heavily regulated and restricted for certain groups. For example, households having access to other sorts of support within their private networks are mostly exempted from such support mechanisms. Most importantly, the access to remittances from overseas relatives has been mentioned in this context (HH-37-ANW). Yet, interestingly those rules are not well codified in the respective legal documents or government decisions and clear regulations or judgment criteria are largely lacking. These examples, again, underscore the great importance of governance at the local level, at which government representatives reach deep into household affairs and have to make sensitive decisions – while often being themselves integral parts of the community (cf. 4.5). This aspect will be revisited and more closely discussed in chapter 7 once the household perspectives on those negotiation processes have been presented in chapter 6.2. In addition to these rather small-scale mechanisms of relief and recovery assistance in Can Tho City, it has been repeatedly suggested in the key informant interviews that a lot can be learned from past relief and recovery campaigns following large scale disasters in other parts of Vietnam. While immediate disaster response is almost exclusively organized by state agencies, other actors such as the Red Cross or NGOs and INGOs play a great role for the phase of disaster relief and recovery. One of the key instruments for coordinating and synchronizing amongst these actors is a so-called joint rapid assessment campaign which is launched during or shortly after the hazard impact. This work is closely controlled by the central government’s People’s Aid Coordination Committee (PACCOM). The identification of disaster losses and, hence, relief requirements is thereby usually identified through rapid assessments which are jointly conducted in the affected areas by the respective donor NGOs and PACCOM (KI-51-GON: 33-35). Yet, while these assessments have been conducted frequently in typhoon and flood disasters in northern and central Vietnam, the experience is limited in the southern part and notably Can Tho City (KI-51-GON). In accordance with the legal framework one can expect that disaster relief funds contributed trough NGOs or INGOs would need to be centralistically approved and managed by the province level focal agency. The latter would be named by PACCOM and would – according to the interview with the PACCOM

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leadership in Hanoi – most probably be DARD or DONRE (KI-51-GON: 36-37) Hence, the INGOs would have only a limited influence on how the contributed funding would be spent, e.g. in the case of a strong typhoon disaster. The main responsibility for the dispersal would be handed to organizations of the partystate, most notably the Fatherland Front. In addition, the Fatherland Front would also organize the collection and distribution of its own donation fund (cf. 6.2.2). 6.1.1.4. Preliminary synthesis on disaster risk management Table 6.2 summarizes the above introduced DRM measures of the local state bureaucracy. The table differentiates into hard, soft and hybrid measures and is organized along the main phases of the disaster risk cycle (cf. 2.1.1). Phase in risk cycle

Hard measures

Hybrid measures

Soft measures

General risk prevention and perception

- maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure - support for house fortification

- preparation of flood and storm response contingency plans - training of flood and storm response units

- CFSC regular management meetings - annual exposure assessment to guide risk reduction - awareness raising campaigns - integration of DRM education into school curricula

Preparedness and early warning

- support to prepare houses for upcoming floods and storms

- early warning communicated directly through local authorities

- specific CFSC meetings to prepare for upcoming storms and floods - early warning issued through the media

Response

- evacuation of vulnerable households - patrols to secure evacuated buildings - mobilization of disaster response units - repair of protective infrastructure

- on-the-spot meetings for CFSC to command response units

- standing committee of the CFSC and local authorities to coordinate the response measures

Relief and recovery

- direct support for repair and recovery for most affected households

- financial support for most affected households

- coordination of relief and recovery measures by local authorities and PACCOM

Table 6.2: DRM measures by the local organs of the state apparatus, own draft based on expert interviews and field observations

In conclusion, the above presented findings show that in principle a considerable number of measures and institutional arrangements for DRM are in place in Can Tho City in accordance with the wider legal provisions at national level. The interviews clearly revealed that also the political leadership, particularly at province and district level, finds it important to emphasize the breadth of activities and the

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numerous committees and plans addressing this topic. On the other hand, the empirical data suggest that the real impact of many of these measures is comparatively low – or at least highly uncertain in case of extreme disasters (e.g. the very tight scope of the financial mechanisms for preparation, relief and recovery). This prompts the question whether many of these measures are not primarily being cherished for their political or symbolic character while the actual reach towards households most at risk remains limited. This question needs to be tackled by juxtaposing the above findings with the household level perspective presented in chapter 6.2. Emerging are also questions related to the increasingly contested arena of political legitimacy and the state-society relations in risk governance. In particular, it needs to be asked whether the existing DRM provisions are adequate and sufficient to deal with the expected increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme hazard events. In this respect, the following sections in particular need to explore how well the current DRM strategies are integrated with the other two relevant policy fields of climate change adaptation and general urban planning and management, both shaping risk and development in Can Tho City. 6.1.2. Urban planning and management Besides the specific policy and action under the umbrella of disaster risk management, the findings suggest that general urban planning and management plays a significant role for understanding whether and how risks are managed and prevented more generally. In line with the overall interest of the research presented here, the focus on urban planning is of particular relevance with regards to future risk dynamics which are driven not only by changes in hazard patterns (e.g. the expected extent of flood zones) but also by socio-economic developments including especially the urban growth in Can Tho City, potentially into highly flood exposed areas. Hence, the question arises whether or not urban planning is considerate of future risks and is capable of avoiding future exposure and vulnerability. In order to explore this question, the general mechanisms that drive urban planning in Can Tho City need to be understood and its dynamics assessed. The following chapter is therefore split in two parts. First, the legal and regulative framework for urban planning in Can Tho City is explored. Thereafter, shortcomings in the system and gaps between its theory and implementation are examined, paying particular attention to the resulting implications for risk management and adaptation governance. 6.1.2.1. Legal and regulative framework for urban planning and management Urban planning and management in Can Tho City involves tasks and responsibilities of a wide array of governmental organizations across vertical and horizontal levels. According to the more general legal and regulative framework, three main

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branches of planning and policy making can be differentiated (e.g. KI-42-RO: 55): (1) general socio-economic development planning (including the general directions of development planning and providing the backbone of the entire planning architecture), (2) spatial planning (including land use planning, urban master planning and construction planning), (3) sector planning (including, for example, the domains of industry and trade; transportation; agriculture and rural development; labor, invalids and social affairs; science and technology). In theory there are a number overarching principals in the formal planning system in order to integrate and align the three different domains of planning thematically, vertically, horizontally and temporally. One of the reasons behind these synchronization principles is to find locations with suitable geo-physical characteristics for each of the envisaged land uses. Hence, these principles are, in theory, of relevance for avoiding that future development projects in Can Tho City, particularly in the rapidly sprawling peri-urban interface, are built into areas currently exposed to flooding or projected to be flood-prone in future (cf. 4.8). However, as in the case of DRM, it needs to be asked carefully, whether and how these principles are implemented in Can Tho City. This is because it needs to be understood how the planning’s de facto political economy works, which might – as in other policy fields (cf. 4.4; 6.1.1) – differ from the theoretical framework. Providing a basis for this comparison, Figure 6.1 illustrates the formal planning architecture for Can Tho City. It summarizes the most important types of plans as well as the mechanisms for formulating, evaluating and approving them at the different administrative levels. In addition, the figure allows for tracing the three main principles in the planning procedure: Firstly, provincial and local plans should – in theory – be integrated and synchronized through upward aggregation within the same thematic planning domain. Suggestions and drafts are ought to be reported upwards while expectations, targets and requirements are handed down from higher levels within the same sectorline (i.e. from the respective ministry to the district level) or from the executive political bodies at the same level (e.g. the People’s Committees and Communist Party branches). Depending on the context these requirements are more or less binding for the technical party-state organs in charge of drafting the plans, e.g. the DONREs or DOCs at province level. Secondly, with respect to temporal integration and time horizons most domains have one-year plans, five-year plans, and ten-year strategies which are ought to be developed in nesting. The planning pulse is expected to follow the rhythm set by the national level plans. Yet, interestingly the legal planning framework does not provide any detailed provisions on how the planning pulse at provincial and lower levels can be synchronized, e.g. through harmonized deadlines for plan formulation, evaluation and approval. Thirdly, and most interestingly, the legal architecture envisages that spatial plans are subordinate to the socio-economic development plans and the other sec-

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tor plans from higher or equivalent administrative levels (e.g. the special sector strategies on industrial development or transportation infrastructure). This sequencing yields some key questions in relation to hazard exposure – as the below analysis will show in detail. For the case of Can Tho City, this means that, for example, the socio-economic master plan includes the general decision to develop massive new quantities of residential and industrial estates in Cai Rang District (cf. 4.7). The spatial plans for Cai Rang therefore have to implement these provisions and need to find appropriate locations within the district. Spatial planning is, however, not considered an adequate platform for challenging in principle the suitability of the district for these development projects. The below sections will explore the resulting challenges in terms of hazard exposure in more detail. The figure also shows that in terms of spatial planning there are currently three lineages of plans that are relevant for Can Tho City, each under a different law. The detailed empirical analysis presented below therefore allows for exploring how the currently overlapping postulations from the different laws play out to shape the planning process on the ground. In theory the recently promulgated Law on Urban Planning (SRV 2009c) is envisaged to synchronize the many different plans stipulated in the various other laws (cf. Table 6.3). Being in effect since January 2010 this law also for the first time pays tribute to the need for having a planning procedure and planning instruments that are specifically tailored towards urban areas, meaning to acknowledge particularities of development dynamics and requirements in cities. However, the below analysis will ask in detail whether and how this transition and reconciliation in planning procedures has already been implemented in Can Tho City. Besides, the new planning architecture, one of the main innovations in the law is its consideration and reinforcement of the responsibilities that can be handed to planning consultants – thereby also widening the scope of relevant actors who potentially shape risk related planning and adaptation in Can Tho City. Such planning consultancies or institutes are either state-owned, partly stateowned or entirely private (KI-14-IP). Many of them are in fact direct spin-offs of the older planning sections within the DOCs and can therefore revert back to their established expertise and networks into the planning system under the People’s Committees (KI-14-IP; KI-15-IP; KI-13-GOP; KI-53-RO). The Department for Urban Planning and Architecture (DUPA) is a prime example of such a spin-off, being of key relevance in the context of Can Tho City. As the below analysis will show, the opening towards external planners bears some key relevance also for the question, which paradigms on risk management and hazard consideration find their way into current planning drafts in Can Tho City.

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Socio–Economic Development Planning (mainly MPI and DPIs; largely based on 92/2006/NDCP & 04/2008/ND-CP)

Spatial Planning Land Use Zoning and Planning

Construction Master Planning

Urban Planning

(mainly MONRE and DONREs; largely based on 13/2003/QH11)

(mainly MOC and DOCs; largely based on 16/2003/ QH11 & 04/2008/QD-BXD)

(mainly MOC, DOCs, consultancy organizations; based on 32/2009/QH12)

Sector Planning (different line ministries and departments; various respective legislations )

Five-year socioeconomic development plan for the country

Land use plan for country

Land use zoning for country

National sector plans

Regional interprovincial construction master plans

province

Province Level PC & Departments

Five-year socioeconomic development plan for province

Land use plan for province

Land use zoning for province

Urban general master plan for construction

Provincial sector plans

General Plan

district

District Level PC & Departments Zoning Plan Five-year socioeconomic development plan for districts

Land use plan for district

Land use zoning for district

Detailed master plans for urban construction

District Sector Plans

Ward Level PC & Departments

ward

administrive level targeted by respective plan

central

Central Level Government & Ministries

Detailed Plan Detailed land use planning

Detailed land use zoning

Legend Evaluation and Approval of Plans approved by General Assembly

Formulation of Plans ministry synchronizes provisions and drafts and formulates plan

evaluated by national line ministry and approved by Prime Minister

provincial department synchronizes provisions and drafts and formulates plan

evaluated by the provincial line department and approved by provincial PC

district department synchronizes provisions and drafts and formulates plan

evaluated by line department at district level and approved by district level PC

consultancy organization synchronizes provisions and inputs and formulates plan

Requirements and Input top-down communication of general and specific expectations, strategies, targets and requirements which the plans have to be compliant with

bottom-up reporting of past and current developments as basis for planning as well as the provision of input and drafts

evaluated by line ministry and approved by Prime Minister if the area is of special national interest; otherwise evaluated by provincial line departments and approved by provincial PC

Figure 6.1: Planning system for Can Tho City as stipulated in the legal framework, own draft based on key informant interviews and legal documents

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Type of Plan

Purpose

Drafting

Evaluating and approving agency

Time-frame

Scale

Review period and approving agency

General plan

Providing broad orientation on the envisaged development trends of the city (demography, economy, function etc.) and their spatial realization; serves as basis for specialized urban infrastructure planning and zoning

Consultancy organization, selected through designation or competition

Prime Minister

20-25 years with a vision for 50 years

1: 25,000 or 1 : 50,000

Once every 5 years; evaluated and approved by People’s Committee at province level

Zoning plan

Determining spatial organization, spatial boundaries, land use, expected population densities, social and technical infrastructure; based on conformity with general planning and strategic environmental assessment; serves as a basis for identifying construction investment projects and detailed planning

Consultancy organization, selected through designation or competition

Prime Minister in case of areas with special national political, socioeconomic, cultural, historical importance; otherwise People’s Committee at province level

Determined by general plan and urban management and development requirements

1 : 5,000 or 1 : 2,000

Once every 5 years; evaluated and approved by People’s Committee at province level

Detailed plan

Determining detailed infrastructure, urban design and architecture guidelines; based on zoning plan; serves as a basis for construction permits and detailed financial planning

Consultancy organization, selected through designation or competition

Prime Minister in case of areas with special national political, socioeconomic, cultural, historical importance; otherwise People’s Committee at province level and investors of projects

Determined by zoning plan and urban management and development requirements

1 : 500

Once every 3 years; evaluated and approved by People’s Committee at province level

Table 6.3: Urban planning hierarchy according to the Law on Urban Planning, own draft based on the Law on Urban Planning (SRV 2009c)

However, apart from providing a coherent framework that merges formerly scattered stipulations around urban planning, a detailed analysis is needed that explores how the new law in fact influences the actual planning procedures on the ground and which implications for vulnerability and adaptation emerge from this de facto fabric of urban planning and management in Can Tho City. The next chapter will turn to this issue. 6.1.2.2. Urban governance in theory and practice: mismatches, shortcomings and implications for vulnerability After having explored the general framework conditions of urbanization in Vietnam under conditions of transformation (cf. 4.6) and the formal legal architecture that applies to urban planning and management in Can Tho City – i.e. how planning is supposed to work in theory – the key informant interviews focused in a second step on the actual implementation of this framework as well as on the evaluation of its opportunities but also shortcomings for enabling effective risk management and climate change adaptation in Can Tho City. Ten major fields of

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concern could be identified which will be analyzed in more detail in the following sections. Technical and procedural shortcomings The interviews have revealed that it is often not clear to the actors in the system how far new legislations (such as the Law on Urban Planning) entirely replaces old legislation or exists in parallel to it. This is of particular relevance for those cases in which stipulations are overlapping, ambiguous or even contradictory. One of the most important sources for confusion and inconsistency in this context seems to be the interplay of land use and construction planning, both of high relevance from the perspective of future risk dynamics. Even though the Law on Urban Planning in theory voids this distinction by introducing the new planning typology, the old system of land use planning and construction planning was still in effect in Can Tho City at the time of the interviews. One expert at a national planning institute who has also work experience in Can Tho City summarizes the following concerns and observations: “So mostly there are two important plans: One land use plan by DONRE and one land use plan by DOC. So this is often causing a lot of confusion because the plans are often different or are published not at the same time. This is making planning very complicated and is often causing problems and conflicts if the plans tell different things. […] Hopefully people are wise enough in future to not do two plans.” (KI-52-GOS: 37)

As a result of this continued overlap, the actual procedures prescribed by the different laws are often perceived as creating a very complicated planning landscape which is – according to many of the interviewed experts – hard to grasp by the planners and political decision makers. Hence, also the potential entry points for integrating climate change adaptation most effectively into urban planning are difficult to identify. An urban planning expert from an international organization which has worked with a number of small- and medium-sized cities in the Mekong Delta shares his concern about this complexity. His response to the question how decisions are in fact made in the light of such an ambiguous and incoherent framework mirrors the perceived confusion amongst many actors in this field and the disadvantages resulting for effective risk management: “I think actually nobody not even, for example, […] the Vietnam Institute of Architecture and Rural and Urban Planning would be able to answer that question and I think that is already the key – the key crux […] that the planning system is so complicated. […] The sad thing that is related to that is that as such it is very easy to […] abuse the system – because the process is so confusing. It allows for people to go through the cracks – I mean to be able to develop projects which are maybe not completely in line with what is good for a city.” (KI-08-IO: 27)

Another significant concern relates to the question whether the laws sufficiently stipulate the responsibilities for implementation, which is of high relevance, for example, with respect to the implementation of physical infrastructure projects such as dyke systems. The chairmen of the Vietnamese Construction Federation,

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for example, criticized in an interview that even the new Law on Urban Planning does not stipulate the specific duties of urban planners and the prescribed steps in the planning process (MONRE 2009). This concern was shared by a number of the interviewed key experts (KI-08-IO; KI-69-IO; KI-58-IP), as the following quote illustrates in a very clear language: “Now, [a] second weakness related to this master-planning approach is that […] master-plans almost never have a document related to it or a process related to it, which specifies the resources and the enforcement and institutional and legal structure in order to ensure that the plan can be implemented. Of course, on paper it indicates – you know – what you have in the master-plan and should be implemented. But […] wherever you develop a plan it should be crisping clear about who, what and when! As long as the resources are not allocated in order to make sure that this plan can be implemented and it is not clear who should bring in these resources then the plan is due to fail which in the end makes that many plans are hanging on the wall and are not being processed.” (KI-08-IO: 28)

In other words, while the master plans in Can Tho City (as in many other Vietnamese cities) copiously propose numerous and voluminous projects, most of them do not or only insufficiently stipulate how the necessary resources for their implementation should be provided and how the responsibilities and work assignments should be distributed in detail (KI-08-IO; KI-69-IO; KI-58-IP). This shortcoming seriously challenges the usefulness and effectiveness of the entire planning system. Chapter 6.2 will revert back to this argument and explore in detail its implications for the development of physical hydraulic infrastructure and urban upgrading projects in Can Tho City which are currently envisaged in order to reduce disaster risk – but which are not coherently implemented given the above-indicated weakness in the planning system to realistically allocate responsibilities, time plans and financial resources. The last point of this section will provide insight on the explanation of this lack. Limited effect of national reforms at local level Besides the above illustrated shortcomings that are perceived in terms of the coherency of the legal documents, challenges are also perceived with respect to translating the reformative elements postulated in the laws into practice at the local level (e.g. in terms of strengthening decentralized planning and participation or formulating integrated spatial plans according to the new Law on Urban Planning). One of the above-introduced experts working for an international project on urban development in the Mekong Delta, for example, expresses his concern as follows: “The question is of course this trickle-down-effect to the local governments level, where the actual planning takes place and I think that is a very big weakness […] because the people at the local level are still the same and they are used to a certain way of planning and a certain way of doing things and the introduction of new laws don’t come with a - an effort which a bit helps them to change the attitude, change their skills and change their knowledge which is very important. So a complementary development of capacities on local level is often forgot-

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ten or is not proceeded and that – I think – is one of the things I’m quite surprised by.” (KI08-IO: 32)

These concerns are indirectly supported by numerous statements of governmental staff members in the People’s Committee offices and sector departments at province and district level in Can Tho City who repeatedly stated not to be aware of any major changes in the planning and management procedures since the legal reforms were promulgated. The following statement by one of the directors of the Department of Construction in Can Tho City exemplifies this to the point: “The law [Law on Urban Planning] did basically not change anything in terms of responsibilities. The law only provides the convention for all levels from the central government to the local.” (KI-10-GOP: 33-34)

In conclusion, one of the key informants formulates comprehensive concerns with regards to the imbalance between the innovations prescribed in the legal reforms and their actual implementation. In his eyes, this gap translates into an intensifying challenge due to the fact that this quasi-stagnation in de-facto management and planning is faced with increasing development pressures on urban planning and management – with the intensifying risk around natural hazards being one prime example: “I think the unfortunate conclusion […] is that the real impact of what many had hoped for […] – the real impact on local governments – is unfortunately limited. The processes […] the local government level are still very much the same and the level or the capacity of the people who are running the process are also are still very much the same – while the pressure to develop has increased immensely and the pressure to address issues like climate change, […] and urban expansion and so on – they are intensely growing.” (KI-08-IO: 32)

This observation bears high relevance for risk management and particularly for urban climate change adaptation in Can Tho City. According to the adaptation literature (cf. 2.2), adaptation to climate change calls for specific institutional principles, in many contexts implying the need for fundamental institutional change (cf. 2.2; 2.4). However, the recent reforms on urban planning would suggest that in Can Tho City, deeper change below the surface of issuing new legal documents has been difficult to enact, as long as it is not supported by changes in the capacity and awareness of stakeholders at the very local level. The discussion in chapter 7 will explore this point in more detail. Technocratic and mechanistic planning bureaucracy One of the most fundamental concerns raised is that urban planning and management in Can Tho City follows an overly technocratic and self-perpetuating bureaucratic approach (e.g. KI-08-IO). Planning and management activities – that is the concern – gravitate largely around mechanistic and politically ritualized procedures in which instructions and drafts are reported upwards and downwards in an attempt to comply with the formalized regulations of the state bureaucracy. Yet, at the same time the planning process is – in the eyes of its critics – not used

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as a tool for engaging into broader discourses on the directions of urban developments in general. It is, for example, not used as a vehicle for a broader discussion on the question how a comprehensive response to the projected changes in Can Tho City’s hazard patterns (cf. 4.8) could look like and whether and how such an response strategy could be integrated with the conventional paradigm of economic growth which rests greatly on urban sprawl into flood-prone areas in Cai Rang and Binh Thuy districts. Climate change adaptation in a highly transformative environment like Can Tho City will imply numerous of such conflicts which therefore would need to be addressed and negotiated in urban planning processes. Yet, the research findings reveal that an open debate on the potential conflicts between different planning objectives is, even today, hardly taking place in Can Tho City. Rather, the political procedures around planning often seem to be prioritized over critically scrutinizing its content. One key informant who has worked with Can Tho City’s urban administration for many years summarizes his concerns as follows. “The plan itself is just one step, but the process in order to get to the plan is probably more important. […] It seems to be for me almost impossible, but the plan making process has been reduced to authority – totally emptied. As long as the plan is there, that’s fine. […] So at the end of the day there is a book or a document. […][T]this output is then ‘wonderful, ok finished’ and ‘we hang it on the wall or we put it in a cupboard’ – that’s nice, but it’s not very helpful – not a helpful process.” (KI-08-IO: 28-36)

In addition, the inflated planning apparatus (cf. Figure 6.1) leads to timeconsuming procedures which in turn necessitate frequent revisions of plans since they are often outdated by the time they get finally approved (KI-14-IP; KI-08-IO: 28; KI-55-GOS). Yet, this does not lead to questioning the approach, but rather to a constant cycle of producing new plans and revisions and, hence, keeping the planning machinery running – often with the result that there are no approved plans for extended periods of time (KI-55-GO: 123). Cross-sectoral integration Insufficient cross-sectoral integration has emerged from the key informant interviews as another shortcomings of the current system of urban planning and management – with strong implications for the odds of integrative risk management and adaptation. On first sight, this appears to be a rather striking finding given that virtually all of the above discussed legal documents on urban planning and management urge for integrating the different domains of planning and for collaborating across different bureaucratic sectors not only in the planning process but also in the implementation of plans. In fact, the interviews revealed that the principle of consensus-decision making and bureaucratic participation (cf. 4.4) is also affirmed by the bureaucrats and political leaders in Can Tho City (e.g. KI-01-GOP; KI-10-GOP; KI-15-IP). However, a closer look shows that these principles are often only enacted in rather shallow terms. It is by many of the interviewed key informants perceived

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rather as a symbolic ritual. Actual decisions, on the other hand, are in fact made by the top political leaders and are often not produced within bureaucratically participatory (hence, cross-sectoral) processes but more or less exclusively decided within single agencies or external consultancies (KI-31-RO; KI-04-GOP; KI53-RO; KI-42-RO). Resulting is a strong fragmentation of planning between the different sectors in the state bureaucracy. The two following quotes serve as illustrative examples for this criticism: “In the moment, land use planning, construction planning, urban planning and environmental planning are all done separately in Vietnam without a lot of interaction.” (KI-31-RO: 22) “I find it still [long pause] quite amazing that – this very harsh interpretation of laws and responsibilities is still making it almost impossible for people to look over their fences and to say what can we do in order to synchronize these efforts we are doing.” (KI-08-IO: 36)

In particular the integration of land use planning (primarily under the mandate of the DONREs) and construction planning (primarily under the DOCs) can be considered problematic – even though integration between these two fields is of high importance, particularly for preventing exposure towards current and future natural hazards. Interview statements by leading officials of Can Tho City’s DOC reveal that mutual administrative assistance between DONRE and DOC is given; however, more rigorous collaboration in terms of joint and integrated planning is largely lacking (KI-10-GOP: 72). As a result inconsistencies can often be observed between the land use plans and the construction plans (KI-53-RO). A leading Vietnamese researcher captures this challenge in the following ironic statement: “You know in Vietnamese there is a saying: ‘Let’s run, and then we arrange!’ ” (KI-42-RO: 74-76)

Closely linked to the critique on the limited cross-sectoral integration is a widespread concern that more general issues of socio-economic development are not adequately considered in the planning process. As chapter 6.2 will show in more detail, this issue bears high relevance for questions around social vulnerability and adaptive capacity with regards to natural hazards. Urban planning in Can Tho City is largely concerned with physical structures but lacks consideration of the linkages to economic and institutional root causes of vulnerability, e.g. in the case of resettlement programmes (cf. 6.2.1). A number of key informants see this problem rooted in the too narrow and inadequate professional background of the bureaucrats and technical planning staff, which applies not only to Can Tho City but is argued to be a more general problem in Vietnam. The following quote of a leading planner at one of Vietnam’s large planning institute exemplifies this critique: “In Vietnam sustainable urban development mostly means architecture development only. So this is not good. […] Planners in Vietnam do not get enough training in actual urban planning. And in addition we do not have enough planners anyhow.” (KI-52-GOS: 31)

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Lack of horizontal integration In addition to the shortcomings in cross-sectoral integration, significant caveats also exist with respect to the insufficient level of horizontal integration of planning between Can Tho City and its neighboring provinces as well as between the different districts within the city. This poses challenges not only for Can Tho’s urban planning but also for its risk management and adaptation policies. Horizontal integration is going to be of increasing importance in the context of climate change adaptation, for example, for dyke systems which have to be planned and implemented across horizontal administrative units or for resettlement programmes across district boundaries. Yet, as in the rest of Vietnam, effective regional planning is largely lacking or ineffective, despite the fact that such plans are in principle envisages in the planning architecture (cf. Figure 6.1; 6.1.2.1): “The level of the region is missing in Vietnam in terms of planning and administration. There is no platform to discuss the common problems of a region. We do not have a strong link between different provinces for doing such joint planning.” (KI-63-RO: 47)

Economic and political reasons for this deficit have been raised in the interviews. The political leaders of each administrative entity have to compete with the other entities at the same level for resources, including governmental funding and particularly private investments (KI-63-RO; KI-05-GOD). Promoting one’s own province or district therefore does not only improve the chances for social and economic success but – at the same time – can be taken as proof of the abilities and skills of the political leaders, hence, being an important tool for advancing their own political careers (KI-05-GOD). While such behavior and its underlying motivations might not be surprising and can probably be found in many different governance types around the globe, key informants in Vietnam criticized that the larger political framework does not effectively constrain and regulate these individual agendas which are – from a systemic point of view – contributing to ineffective and inefficient resource allocations at the larger scale across provinces or districts (KI-63-RO; KI-58-IP). Data availability and exchange Going hand in hand with the above illustrated shortcomings in cross-sectoral and horizontal integration are problems of data exchange between different planning agencies. Even though the formal planning framework envisages an intensive cross-feed of data for drafting plans and for reporting (cf. Figure 6.1), the interviews reveal that in reality, data is often not or only insufficiently exchanged. For the context of hazard-sensitive urban land used and construction planning, this means that important information, e.g. flood risk data or future inundation scenarios, are not sufficiently shared and can therefore often not be considered in the planning process. Chapter 6.1.3 will show that this problem is of particular relevance for climate change related data in Can Tho City, which is partly available

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but has been developed only recently and remains poorly distributed amongst the city’s planning agencies. The reasons for this lack of exchange can be manifold and are extremely difficult to explore. However, the interviews suggest that knowledge and information is used as strategic resource by many government agencies. Data sets, such as the digital files of a land use plans for GIS analysis, are hence valuable assets that can be traded and used for demonstrating the power of the respective agency – specifically in direct competition to other line departments within the state bureaucracy (KI-53-RO; KI-08-IO; KI-55-GOS; KI-60-GOS). In addition, with the increasing amount of international research and developing projects in Can Tho City, many data sets can be turned into hard cash. Hence, restricting their availability on the ‘free market’ can be a vital interest for the holder of such data. A third reason has been suggested in relation to the political sensitivity of many of the data sets. Draft plans, for example, that have not yet been officially approved are not easily shared in order to avoid political conflicts with higher institutions (KI-10-GOP; KI-14-IP). Yet, at the same time, it is such draft reports that would need to be exchanged in order to keep the entire architecture of the planning and management system functioning (see above). Resulting from this lack of exchange and integration is that the planning agencies or consultants have to make up for the missing data or have to use diverging data sources which can lead to problems with the coherency and synchronization of the produced plans (KI-53-RO: 44). This shortcoming has also been observed with regards to climate change related data (cf. 6.1.3). Public participation As argued in a lot of the risk management and adaptation literature, public participation is of central importance when designing urban development plans in general and adaptation measures in particular (cf. 2.5). Participation is essential for ensuring that governmental measures fit to the reality of the residents. It therewith generates not only acceptance and legitimacy of governmental development and adaptation projects but also enables their functionality and effectiveness. However, the interviews revealed a significant lack of public participation in the urban planning and management process. On the one hand, the new legislations (cf. 4.6; 6.1.2.1) are officially argued to have increased the level of public engagement and influence. A leading officer in Can Tho City’s DONRE, for example, argued in an interview that options for direct and indirect participation have been implemented in the city. Direct participation is said to mean that government officers ask residents directly for their opinion (e.g. through community meetings or face-to-face visits). Indirect participation is said to mean that representative groups such as the Women’s Union are invited to give their opinion to draft plans (KI-01-GOP: 75-78). However, the interviews have also revealed that the public participation through these modes is – if implemented at all – often described as a political cer-

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emony rather than a real platform for critical and open discussion on viewpoints and controversies. Also the household interviews support this finding, e.g. in the context of information sharing and public engagement in the planning of resettlement programmes or other development projects (cf. 6.2.1). Therefore, when appraising the real effect of participation policy (cf. 4.4; 4.6), a large number of the interviewed key informants agree that it is lagging far behind the official goals (e.g. KI-53-RO; KI-08-IO; KI-63-RO) as the following quote by one of Vietnam’s leading urban studies scientists exemplifies: “Up to now we don’t really ask for the opinion of […] the people. But we should do that. The task it not only to ask people after we are finished, but to invite their opinion beforehand.” (KI-63-RO: 46)

Political repression has been argued to be the main reason why residents do not push for more participation (KI-53-RO; KI-08-IO: 44). One of the leading Vietnamese participation researchers phrases this concern to the point: “The system to protect community participation is lacking […]. [T]here is no law to protect them if they have a different idea, or if they have a controversial idea. So who will protect them? That is why people [are] afraid.” (KI-53-RO: 77)

In addition, the difficulties of bridging between expert and lay knowledge and between abstract plans on paper and concrete implications on the ground have repeatedly been mentioned as barrier for public participation (see also 6.2). This is because even if residents wanted to raise their opinion, they often find it hard to decipher the technical language and content of the draft plans and strategies (KI55-GOS: 73). Chapter 6.2 will get back to this point and will explore in detail, whether climate change is widely considered a highly technical problem for which expert knowledge is needed – and whether the risk of such a perception might even widen the gap for integrating different knowledge types into urban risk management and adaptation planning in Can Tho City. Lack of capacity at the level of local urban governments Linking the analysis back to the earlier discussion on decentralization (cf. 4.6) and local risk management (cf. 2.5; 4.6), the interviews revealed that Can Tho City’s urban planning and management institutions are largely lacking sufficient resources and capacities to fulfill all tasks and responsibilities assigned to them by the (new) legal framework. This is particularly true for the district and lower levels which have gained in tasks and responsibilities with the recent decentralization policies. Yet investments in their human and financial resources have not been augmented accordingly (KI-08-IO; KI-38-RO; KI-42-RP; KI-52-GOS): “[I]t’s almost a not spoken rule, but there is no borrowing, no real investment in the capacities of these local government officials besides a kind of regular training which more relates to being a very good bureaucrat and complying with the laws and regulations of the Communist Party – and that is of course quite sad. […] I mean as long as this is not combined with an in-

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vestment in the people who are running the city, or planning for the city, or managing the city – yes, than it’s – [long pause] quite difficult!” (KI-08-IO: 32)

Limits are therefore in particular seen with respect to the professional qualification of the technical and administrative staff, therewith rendering the drafting and implementation of effective risk management and adaptation strategies very difficult given that the latter will even increase set of tasks considerably (cf. 6.1.3). Can Tho City can be even considered a particularly problematic case given that its administrative boundaries in fact comprise a larger number of rural districts besides the urban ones, meaning that a lot of the technical staff have a background in rural rather than in urban development (KI-52-GOS). When discussing questions related to governmental flood adaptation measures in Can Tho City, many of the key informants particularly in DARD and DONRE reported exclusively on agriculture related measures such as shifts in cropping cycles. Distinctively urban measures – for the districts Ninh Kieu, Cai Rang and Binh Thuy – were in many cases not, or only to a very limited extent, considered (cf. 6.1.3). In addition, under-staffing, under-resourcing and the time-consuming bureaucratic procedures within the party-state apparatus further strain the overall capacity of the urban authorities in Can Tho City. A senior planning consultant with ample experience in collaborating with state agencies in Can Tho City therefore summarizes his concerns as follows: “I personally feel that for many of the planners indeed they are faced with so much day to day disturbances and day to day challenges and day to day priorities they need to address that anything which is beyond time duration of more than – you know – of five years is very difficult for them to grasp.” (KI-08-IO: 28)

This observation bears great relevance for Can Tho City’s climate change adaptation endeavors (cf. 6.1.3). Adaptation calls for considering long-term time horizons of several decades in the planning perspective, e.g. with respect to the question whether developments currently built in the urban fringe areas will need flood protection infrastructure in the future or whether the future flood trends and the projected damage potentials will challenge their economic feasible altogether (cf. 6.1.3; 7). Vertical integration Closely related to the above problems around local capacities, the interviews revealed that the modes of vertical integration in urban planning and management are quite contested in Can Tho City. As mentioned in chapters 4.4 and 6.1.2.1, the recent reforms implied some decentralization, hence, the shift of tasks and responsibilities but also rights to the province and district level. Yet, in combination with the centralistic and hierarchical structure of the party-state system the question in how far the influence of Can Tho City’s local government really has been strengthened remains disputed.

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This question is of high relevance for the context of risk management since it determines which freedom Can Tho City has to independently plan and implement locally customized adaptation measures, e.g. in collaboration with international development organizations or in accordance with guidelines provided by potential donor agencies such as the World Bank or climate change adaptation funds. Reflecting on these issues a member of Vietnam’s UN-HABITAT office concludes the following: “The trend towards decentralization in urban planning does mostly exist on paper. We have the feeling that in reality the country’s urban segment is rather experiencing a trend towards centralization because all the important documents, master plans and so forth have to be approved by the Ministry or even the PM [Prime Minister] in Hanoi. So in particular for those cities like Can Tho which are climbing up the ladder of administrative levels, they do now need to have their plans and strategies approved as they are now centrally-run cities. They did not have this requirement when they were smaller cities of lower administrative level in the past.” (KI-33-IO: 22).

However, at the same time being a class I city (cf. 4.7) implies for Can Tho that the threshold up to which the government of Can Tho City can approve new investment and development projects independently from Hanoi has increased (KI42-RO: 61). Hence, decentralization could nevertheless provide some opportunity for testing and implementing small scale adaptation projects rather independently from the centralist bureaucracy. The discussion in chapter 7 will link these aspects to other elements of this study in order to achieve a more comprehensive evaluation of the needs, opportunities and limits of decentralized risk management and adaptation options. Mismatch between centralized master planning philosophy and liberalized market forces One of the most fundamental critiques shared by a large number of the key informants goes even beyond the above concerns and addresses the very core of the entire master planning philosophy. In essence, it is argued that the planning and management system by-and-large still follows the principles and logics of socialist master planning while the markets have been largely liberalized. The result is an irreconcilable mismatch that becomes particularly apparent in rapidly growing cities like Can Tho (KI-64-IP; KI-60-GOS; KI-08-IO; KI-52-GOS; KI-38-RO; KI-58-IP; KI-33-IO; KI-53-RO). Along with the liberalization new actors in the private business sector have become very powerful to shape urban development – in addition to the influence exercised by the state bureaucracy. However, the interviews suggest that the old planning system is not sufficiently capable of mediating between the – often divergent – interests of the new actors. It further is not equipped to effectively regulate land and real estate markets and to align them with the multiple dimensions of sustainable urban development, including the long-term risk prevention with regards to current and future natural hazards.

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In addition, the poor fit between planning and real urban developments on the ground is further aggravated by unrealistic planning goals, nurtured by the leadership’s contested conception of modernization and growth. The interviews reveal that the developed urban master plans in Can Tho City, as in many other cities in Vietnam, represent an idealized political vision or a ‘dream’ of a ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ city rather than a realistic planning that is based on a thorough assessment of the demands as well as the capacity of the state and other actors to implement the envisaged projects. The locally coined term quy hoạch treo, meaning ‘hanging plan’, expresses that maps of such master plans are – even within the city administrations – often perceived as ‘beautiful visions’ that can decorate office walls but that are not considered realistic or relevant for de-facto planning (KI-69-IO). In other words, it is an open secret that the real developments of a city often divert from these plans and that many actors do realistically not expect that the plans will be implemented, especially not one-to-one (ibid.). In turn, this situation of course calls the entire master planning paradigm into question (KI-08-IO). These shortcomings also prompt the question how effective the planning for risk mitigation and climate change adaptation measures can be under such framework conditions. Adaptation measures need to be effective and cost efficient in order to be politically accepted and financially feasible. Hence, they need to be designed along realistic scenarios of future development trends, e.g. to assess the size of potentially needed embankment projects in Can Tho City’s Cai Rang district. Development master plans with artificially inflated numbers of future residents, for instance, are fairly counter-productive in this context. In addition, these vision-oriented plans bear the potential of aggravating social vulnerabilities in many respects. Chapter 6.2, for example, will elaborate in detail that in Cai Rang District high numbers of former residents (mostly peri-urban farmers) are pushed out of their land in order to make room for copious new projects of upper and mid market residences. However, it is highly questionable whether there is in fact sufficient demand for these new projects since the majority of migrants moving into Can Tho City is rather in need of low cost living space (KI-64-IP). The farmers who had formerly lived in Can Tho City, however, are evicted from their land anyhow and in many cases are forced to move into innercity makeshift settlements with high flood and storm vulnerability (cf. 6.2). Hence, unrealistic planning that is fuelled by visions of modernization and by the pressures from real estate markets can be considered one of the prime root causes of new vulnerability in Can Tho City. This is certainly an unintended effect of the recent transformation process but surely one that is worthwhile considering. 6.1.2.3. Preliminary synthesis on urban planning and risk management The above findings reveal that there are a number of severe institutional challenges for effective risk management and adaptation governance in Can Tho City which are hidden in the more general set-up of urban planning and management. The links to mid- and long-term dynamics of vulnerability and adaptive capacity

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at household level might be less direct than in the afore-introduced policy field of disaster risk management. However, the findings underscore that linking these fields in a more integrative perspective is urgently needed as the future boundary conditions for disaster risk management and adaptation policy largely depend on current planning decisions. This is particularly true with respect to risk-sensitive land use planning and the prevention of exposure. Yet, links can also be drawn to other dimensions of susceptibility and coping capacity, e.g. with regards to the question whether or not urban planning sufficiently considers the provisioning of adequate low cost housing in order to prevent the potential development future slums in hazard-exposed waste lands. Despite Vietnam’s economic opening (cf. 4.3), the key informant interviews in combination with the review of policies and legislative documents, have clearly revealed that the country’s formal framework of urban planning and management still heavily adheres to principles of bureaucratic formalism and centralized planning, which is tightly linked to a highly technocratic and mechanistic paradigm. Resulting are a number of challenges for risk and adaptation planning, which in theory needs to concentrate on the integration of risk management measures across sectoral divides and on the harmonization of short-term interests with longterm perspectives. At the same time, the private economy has sufficiently gained in influence to shape not only urban development processes but also the very planning procedures. Yet, the findings from the expert interviews show that the current planning architecture is in many respects not capable of effectively regulating the market forces along the precautionary principle of risk prevention, e.g. through hazard sensitive land use zoning that withstands the pressures exercised by the real estate markets. The question therefore arises in how far the emerging policy field of climate change adaptation leads to a bridging of these gaps and to changes in the planning architecture so as to improve its responsiveness to the requirements of urban climate change adaptation in Can Tho City. The following chapter hence provides the necessary analysis of current climate change adaptation policy in the city. 6.1.3. Formal climate change adaptation Urban climate change adaptation in Can Tho City is a rather young field of policy and action; however, it is a rapidly growing one with rocketing numbers of involved stakeholders, with new concepts or paradigms and – last but not least – with sprouting volumes of domestic and international funding for research, policy consultation and practical implementation. For these reasons, it is highly meaningful to ask how the climate change adaptation discourse influences de facto policy making, budgeting and action in the field of Can Tho City’s urban development – regardless whether or not one considers climate change itself to be amongst the most pressing challenges and the top priorities for policy, research and action. This sub-chapter therefore analyzes the institutional mechanisms for climate change adaptation which have been recently introduced into Can Tho City’s state

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bureaucracy apparatus. It further examines how adaptation needs are framed and which adaptation paradigms and measures are currently implemented and/or debated in response to that. Based thereon, the chapter explores how the current institutional set-up in the fields of urban planning and disaster risk management might produce conflicts with the requirements for climate change adaptation. 6.1.3.1. Institutional framework for climate change adaptation In line with the requirements from the National Target Programme to Respond to Climate Change (NTP-RCC) (cf. 4.2) the provincial government of Can Tho City has implemented a number of regulations, action plans and organizational mechanisms for climate change adaptation. Most notably there is the Action Plan of Can Tho City on Implementing the NTP-RCC and the establishment of the Climate Change Coordination Office of Can Tho City (CCCO) (PC-CTC 2011, based in part on PC-CTC 2010a,b). In addition, climate change aspects have been tenuously inserted into some regulations and directives of related policy domains. The Action Plan follows closely the structure and content of the NTP-RCC. In fact, much of the action plan reads more or less identical to the national programme, only with having the central level responsibilities (cf. 4.2) replaced by the subsidiary line agencies at province and district level. In terms of organizational arrangements and responsibilities, the action plan makes a number of stipulations. It mandates the implementation of climate change response activities in Can Tho City to be coordinated by the newly established CCCO. This office had been established in 2009 and consists of a standing director and a non-standing board of experts from governmental agencies in Can Tho City (including DONRE, DARD, DOC, DOH) and from other organizations such as the Red Cross (PC-CTC 2009; KI-68-GOP). The full board convenes every three months to review tasks and orders from higher levels and discuss their implementation (KI-01-GOP: 52). According to its director, the main activities of the office so far have been to prepare the action plan for implementing the NTP-RCC (see above), to raise awareness and distribute information on climate change (e.g. through a newly established website), to establish and solidify networks with international donors in the field of climate change adaptation research and action and to develop plans for more concrete adaptation research and action in the city (cf. 6.1.3.3) (KI-68-GOP). In addition, the action plan appoints DONRE to provide practical support to the CCCO and to guide and assist the other departments, agencies and district governments in implementing their action plans. DPI (i.e. the Department for Planning and Investment) is explicitly requested to expedite the mainstreaming of climate change aspects into general socio-economic development planning (cf. Figure 6.1). Moreover, all departments and agencies are mandated to develop and implement specific adaptation action plans for their sectors, e.g. for transportation networks, industry, agriculture etc. Also each district is instructed to draft and enact action plans for their district. Lastly, the strategy document also calls on the

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mass organizations and even on NGOs and private sector companies to actively engage in climate change response activities. Despite the wide range of organizations addressed in the adaptation strategy and integrated in the CCCO, a closer review reveals that there is a strong predominance of actors and organizations with a technical or environmental focus while economic and particularly social perspectives are far less represented. For example, it is quite interesting that neither DOLISA nor the Fatherland Front are directly represented in the board of the CCCO (KI-11-GOP; KI-68-GOP: 74) – despite their important role in supporting socio-economically weak members of the society to overcome the risks and impacts related to natural hazards (cf. 6.2). Leading officials of these institutions also reported not to be aware of the CCCO or its tasks (KI-11-GOP; KI-04-GOP). This already hints at the fact that climate change is perceived rather as an environmental than a social problem and – even more important – that the responses to climate change effects are primarily thought of as technical and natural science-related which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Yet, it is interesting to see that the CCCO in Can Tho City has in fact been amongst the very first offices of its kind that became operational in Vietnam. The interviews suggest that this has been motivated by a mixture of arguments, including the perceived opportunities for acquiring funding as well as the engagement and interest of a group of people working on climate change related issues in Can Tho City and the Mekong Delta at large (KI-66-GOP; KI-49-GOP). In addition, the co-financing of the CCCO by the American Rockefeller Foundation was probably one of the prime drivers for a swift implementation. However, despite the establishment of the CCCO and the formulation of the adaptation strategy the research findings suggest that there are reasons to critically ask which real impact the adaptation strategy can have and whether and how its stipulations can be effectively implemented – or whether it just adds yet another layer to the proliferating system of producing rather hollowed reports and policy documents and circulating them within the state apparatus (cf. 6.1.2). The strategy makes copious provisions and passes numerous new tasks to a wide range of governmental agencies (see above). Yet, the expert interviews underscore that to date these tasks do not match with the awareness and knowledge in the mandated agencies (e.g. KI-11-GOP). In addition, it is striking to see – and yet fully in line with the general legal landscape of Vietnam – that the plan is kept extremely vague and allows for ambiguities with respect to the key questions of (a) how the broad goals shall be broken down and reached, (b) which costs are expected, (c) how the financing of adaptation activities is ought to be borne and distributed, (d) which benchmarks are set for evaluating whether or not tasks have been sufficiently completed, and (e) whether and which sanctions are thought to guarantee that the addressed agencies accomplish their tasks and duties. Hence, a number of chair people in those agencies that are envisaged to prepare their specific sectoral adaptation action plans, for example in DPI or DOT, have stated their confusion about the process and are

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waiting for more specific orders before getting active (e.g. KI-04-GOP; KI-07GOP). Surely, it is too early to make a final judgment here but these concerns – which clearly emerged out of the expert interviews and critical review of the regulations – are to be taken seriously and call for a critical follow-up. 6.1.3.2.

Risk perception and adaptation paradigms

The interviews in Can Tho City confirmed the theoretical hypothesis that the question which adaptation paradigms and measures are conceived by adaptation agents inevitably depends on the perceived and expected hazards – in other words on the central question ‘adaptation to what?’ (cf. 2.1.2). In the same vein, this perception also determines the weighting or ranking of different risks and in turn the prioritization of adaptation action as well as the distribution of limited adaptation resources. Irrespective of the ‘objective’ climate change simulations for the Mekong Delta and Can Tho City (cf. 4.2) it is therefore essential to analyze the risk perception of those stakeholders in charge of taking adaptation decisions within the state bureaucracy in Can Tho City. The risk perception shared by the members of the CCCO is probably the most important entry point in this respect. Accordingly, the director of the CCCO summarizes his and CCCO’s appraisal and ranking of future risks as follows: “The most dangerous changes are to be expected in the field of flooding. This domain is highly influenced by sea level rise. These two issues will affect the infrastructure as well as the livelihoods of many citizens in Can Tho City. Normal storms are not so important for Can Tho City and will not be very important in the future. But typhoons have to be considered an increasing challenge in future.” (KI-01-GOP: 49)

Hence, a lot of weight is put on extreme natural hazards and their potential for causing disasters. In addition, changes in average climatic conditions have been repeatedly mentioned (e.g. KI-49-GOP). In combination, the four most important changes currently discussed in Can Tho City’s state bureaucracy are: (a) increased flood occurrence; (b) sea level rise and increasing overall water levels; (c) increased typhoon activity; (d) changes in temperature and precipitation patterns. These changes are perceived to interact and possibly occur in conjunction (KI-01GOP; KI-49-GOP). However, it has also been emphasized by a number of key informants that high uncertainties remain with respect to the future development of these hazards (e.g. KI-01-GOP; KI-03-GOP). In contrast, the perceived secondary effects that could result from increased flooding, sea level rise and increased typhoon intensity are more diverse and depend heavily on the thematic background of the respective interviewee. Interestingly, this question has often been directly used to justify claims in terms of the distribution of adaptation resources. A high-ranking staff of Can Tho City’s Department for Agriculture and Rural Development, for example, argued that along with the changes in rainfall and temperature the impacts will be most directly felt by the agricultural-based population. Therefore, agricultural adaptation, hence his

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department, deserves the most resources for adaptation measures in his eyes (e.g. KI-GOP-04; KI-06-IO). This view is contested by other voices which rather hint at the high damage potential in Can Tho City’s urban and peri-urban areas, as a the following quote by one of Can Tho City’s leading officers in the CCCO illustrates: “The most important regions are those with the most population and economy. The other districts with fewer people are less important. […] For Can Tho, therefore, Ninh Kieu and Binh Thuy are high priority areas. […] And it is important to define those priorities because the resources are very limited.” (KI-01-GOP: 60)

A leader of the city’s Department of Health appraises the situation yet differently: “The biggest challenge is likely to be found in the field of epidemic diseases. So the biggest problem will be how to deal with certain diseases quickly and how to prevent their spreading.” (KI-26-GOP: 49)

These examples underscore that the link between, on the one hand, the perception and framing of risks and, on the other hand, the design, prioritization and financing of adaptation strategies is of key importance for understanding the current debates around adaptation strategies and measures in Can Tho City. Yet – similarly to the vulnerability assessment in the field of DRM – a coherent and comprehensive analysis and judgment framework for assessing, juxtaposing and ranking the different climate change related risks is so far lacking in Can Tho City. Therefore, rather than drawing from an integrated information base, the different actors base their policy suggestions for adaptation on their individual or institutional – but often eclectic – views. This also has implications for the set of adaptation strategies and measures currently envisaged and advocated, as the next section will show. 6.1.3.3.

Debated adaptation measures

One of the key priorities reinforced in Can Tho City’s above introduced adaptation strategy (cf. 6.1.3.1) is the identification of concrete measures to respond to climate change. At the time of the interviews the leadership of the CCCO underscored that climate change is a very new topic and that the identification of concrete adaptation options is still in a very early stage (e.g. KI-01-GOP; KI-49GOP). Therefore, there has been hitherto no coherent adaptation framework in Can Tho City in which a full set of complementary adaptation measures is integrated. The discourse to date is rather dominated by an assemblage of the singular measures suggested by the most active players and the leading figures in CCCO’s board of experts and beyond. These suggested or debated measures and strategies can be differentiated into structural adaptation targeting the built environment and non-structural adaptation measures targeting the adaptive capacity of actors and institutions. Both domains comprise measures which are based on direct action by the government as well as measures for regulating the action of private actors. Figure 6.2 at the end of this

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chapter summarizes the measures referred to in the expert interviews and local adaptation documents as well as their status in terms of debate and implementation, which will be elaborated in the following paragraphs. Land in-fill and elevation of infrastructure In terms of structural adaptation, four main measures have been mentioned in the key informant interviews including the construction of dykes, the improvement of drainage system capacity, the elevation of physical infrastructure and the adjustment of building regulations. Out of these, the elevation of buildings and infrastructure has by the majority of key informants been reported to be the most relevant measure for Can Tho City (e.g. KI-66-GOP; KI-49-GOP; KI-68-GOP; KI15-IP; KI-14-IP). This approach builds on already existing regulation in the current Vietnamese Building Code on Regional and Urban Planning and Rural Residential Planning (04/2008/QD-BXD, see SRV 2008c) and prescribes a minimum threshold for surface height which land developers have to ensure for new developments through land in-fill. A leading expert of Can Tho City’s Department for Urban Planning and Architecture (DUPA) therefore holds that: “For DUPA, the most important method to take floods, tides and rain into account in urban planning is the height of areas, infrastructure and buildings and to change the elevation of those accordingly. […] Areas that are too low will be elevated through land filling.” (KI-15IP: 39)

Yet, despite being presented as a climate change adaptation measure, the current thresholds for the heights do not yet consider projected changes in the flood levels with climate change. “The flood level of [the year] 2000 serves as reference scenario or reference elevation for the calculations in the current master plan which was approved by the Prime Minister in 2006. Following this calculation, the approved reference height for buildings and infrastructure is 2.4 meters referred to Hai Phong, which is an elevation in northern Vietnam and serves as reference height for elevation calculations in entire Vietnam. 2.4 meters is chosen because this was the highest flood peak of the year 2000 flood. And with this standard height the city will not be flooded anymore.” (KI-15-IP: 40)

However, even this current level is often not met in reality due to poor implementation or measurement errors: “But now, you can also see that in some of these places in theory both should be 2.4. But in reality you can see that one area is much lower than the other area. Maybe even 1 meter difference.” (KI-14-IP: 88)

In response to these two shortcomings an adjustment of the threshold has been urged by some of the key informants ranging up to 4 meters above the reference elevation, i.e. 1.6 meters above the current height (KI-14-IP: 216). Interestingly this adjustment would need to be made also in the national legislation since the current Vietnamese Building Code on Regional and Urban Planning and Rural Residential Planning (SRV 2008c) only stipulates that civil land must be in-filled

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up to a minimum level of 0.3 meters above a 100 year flood event and industrial land to 0.5 meters, respectively (paragraph 3.1.4 in the code). However, concerns have also been raised that the information base for designing new threshold levels is still lacking to date: “So in the moment DUPA has a lot of experience with the rain and the tidal as well as flooding situation in Can Tho. Therefore, drainage and elevation of infrastructure and buildings is based on the current situation and past experiences […]. However, DUPA cannot take into account future weather and climate because it does not have any information on that – nobody knows the weather in the future; how shall we know it?” (KI-15-IP: 37-38) “Yes, […] it could also be higher water levels. But there is not much of information coming to the applicable level of regulation here. Until now, every design and every large project, they are planning on the basis of the ordinary information system – that is the annual flood – that means the water level in the big river.” (KI-14-IP: 96)

In addition, it has been suggested that it would be difficult to elevate the entire city – particularly the already existing infrastructure – to a climate-change-proof level (KI-49-GOP: 49). Therefore, it has been proposed that the regulation should concentrate on selected assets in the city and should make provisions for differentiated height thresholds depending on the expected life cycle and the function of the respective building or infrastructure. Experts from the Department for Urban Planning and Architecture in Can Tho City have suggested that, for example, governmental buildings, policy stations, hospitals etc. should in future have a higher minimum elevation requirement. A list with respective infrastructure has been prepared by DUPA and this so called “Step Level Approach” has been presented at workshops in Can Tho City. However, so far no concrete regulation in that direction is underway (KI-15-IP). Apart from the minimum level one of the key experts – interestingly with a background in environmental studies and a leading figure in the CCCO – rather calls for an upper threshold, i.e. a maximum level up to which individual land users are allowed to do land in-fill (KI-68-GOP: 49-54). The reason given for this request is that already today many land users implement land in-fill for which they use alluvial sediments from the riverbed or the riverbanks. As a result valuable soil is ‘wasted’ and river bank erosion intensified (ibid.). The suggested maximum height is 2.4 meters, which equals the currently prescribed maximum level. In the eyes of this expert “more is not going to be necessary” (KI-68-GOP: 51). Exposure sensitive land use planning and zoning One could expect that in close connection with the elevation regulation, also an adjustment in land use planning and zoning would be amongst the key instruments discussed in Can Tho City. Indeed, while climate change impacts had not been considered in the current master plan to 2020 (KI-10-GOP; see SRV 2006), it is envisaged to be included in the next plan (ibid.). However, questions around how climate change should in fact be included, which methods for impact assessment

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could be used, and how planning mechanisms as such might need to be changed, remains largely open to date amongst the stakeholders in Can Tho City. A team of international consultants has been hired to review the existing plan and to adjust it for climate change. Yet, the first drafts suggest that this review will be rather generic and no comprehensive institutional recommendations in terms of land use planning will be inserted. In addition, even if such zoning plans would exist, there are a number of considerable barriers for their effective implementation. These barriers are deeply rooted in the current political economy of urban development and are hence likely to persist (see in detail 6.1.2). Building codes and regulations In addition to the regulations targeting the city scale, a number of key informants addressed the need for regulations at the building scale, more precisely building codes, in order to reduce the level of physical susceptibility, particularly with respect to flood and typhoon risk: “[T]hey need to say that the house needs to be more durable … they have some norms for constructions which are considered to be durable more than 50 years, they need to have some specification … how many brick walls and how the roof is built et cetera.” (KI-14-IP: 217)

Yet, interestingly leading officials in the Department of Construction, who would be in charge of drafting and implementing such regulation, argued in an interview that one does not have to be worried about typhoons in Can Tho, particularly not in the urban parts where, as they argued, the buildings are quite strong anyhow and where the existing regulations can be considered sufficient (KI-10-GOP: 6164). This perspective is in grave contrast to the findings of the household survey, showing the high susceptibility especially of makeshift housing (cf. 6.2.4). However, the survey data also underscores that better housing quality cannot be ordered top-down through tighter regulations as long as the household level capacities to implement more durable housing structures are not strengthened. Dyke systems Remarkably, the question whether or not dyke systems would be a good measure for adapting, or rather protecting, Can Tho City in the future is contested amongst the interviewed experts. On the one hand, many of the interviewees hint at the disadvantages of dyke systems, notably because flood risk can be even increased through river regulation and embankments (e.g. KI-66-GOP: 32). In addition, it has been repeatedly doubted that a dyke system would be feasible and effective in a city like Can Tho with its numerous internal rivers and canals. These conditions would rather call for larger scale systems spanning entire provinces or the Mekong Delta at large (KI-49-GOP: 49). Yet, it has also been argued that depending on the magnitude of climate change hazards the other measures such as land ele-

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vation might not be sufficient, in effect necessitating a dyke system for Can Tho City in spite of the aforementioned challenges and downsides (KI-01-GOP: 61; KI-68-GOP: 56). However, no concrete assessment or feasibility studies for dyke systems only covering Can Tho City or even specific infrastructure elements in Can Tho City, e.g. the industrial parks in Tra Noc, have been conducted to date. This probably also needs to be seen in the context of the predominant mindset in Can Tho City – and Vietnam at large – in which dykes are mainly associated with rural agricultural areas (cf. 4.1). Resettlement In general, resettlement surely belongs to the key strategies considered for reducing peoples’ risk to flooding in Can Tho City. Being explicitly mentioned as a key priority in the Action Plan on Implementing the National Strategy for Disaster Mitigation and Management in Can Tho City to 2020 (cf. 6.1.1) it is also increasingly discussed as a potential climate change adaptation option (KI-49-GOP; KI46-GOP). However, resettlement with the primary objective of reducing flood risk has in the past been mainly conceived for the rural parts of Can Tho City (cf. 4.6). In contrast, the resettlement in urban areas has been implemented in the framework of urban upgrading projects in which the reduction to flood exposure has been only one among many objectives (cf. 4.6). A leader of the city’s Committee for Flood and Storm Control, for example, explains that: “The [upgrading and resettlement] projects were mainly developed for the sake of getting a ‘beautiful city’ but not for flood and storm control in the first place. However, reducing the flooding of certain areas and streets was certainly amongst the motivations for introducing those projects. In particular keeping in mind that Can Tho was by that time intended to become a class I city, there was the argument that a class I city should not have any streets that are flooded.” (KI-28-GOP: 51-54)

Yet, in the context of climate change, resettlement particularly of residents along the rivers and canals as well as in low lying parts is increasingly debated also as an explicit adaptation strategy. Hence, learning from past resettlement programmes can be essential for improving future initiatives – which is why explicit attention is being paid to this issue in chapter 6.2. But in contrast to the hitherto implemented programmes with forced resettlement at a certain reference date defined by the project management boards, it has been suggested that resettlement in future should rather be conceived and designed as gradual and voluntary process. Government agencies should in this thinking only provide incentives and support should not dictate the time, location and type of resettlement: “I think […] that resettlement should be handled differently. I think that the government should focus on a gradual movement by the people themselves. So, alternative places should be prepared with good infrastructure and good conditions so that the people actually would like to move there. But the people should have the choice and then they will gradually move there – out of the areas with a lot of flooding – if they think that this improves their situation.

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But it should not be handled like today when people are pushed out forcefully.” (KI-52-GOS: 41)

Further, a number of key informants took issue with the hitherto set-up of resettlement projects, claiming that they had neglected the social and economic challenges following resettlement (KI-49-GOP; KI-11-GOP; KI-21-GOP; KI-15-IP; KI-14-IP; KI-41-RO; KI-42-RO). Hence, in the eyes of the CCCO members, the detrimental livelihood effects which can be caused by resettlement need to be prevented in future through “increased attention” on the respective social dimensions (KI-49-GOP: 64). However, the interviews also suggest that detailed ideas how to transfer this claim into concrete policy and action seem to be lacking to date. In addition to the above measures which are more or less substantiated by concrete suggestions or even implemented measures in the past, a number of other measures have been suggested for Can Tho City which are in a hypothetical stage and have not yet been underpinned with concrete suggestions or actual steps towards implementation. Flood retention areas In terms of structural adaptation, the need for integrating small-scale flood retention areas into Can Tho’s urban topography and to limit the extent of impervious surfaces has been stressed by a leading member of CCCO, e.g. in the following quote: “So, one solution would rather be to dig up the land in some parts and create retention basins for the water so that the flood water can be stored there and does not flood the city. […] Also, parks and gardens should be used as retention areas. […] In addition, we need a policy which prohibits that courts and gardens attached to houses are built of concrete. Households that go for such an option should have to pay tax according to area.” (KI-49-GOP: 51-53)

However, no concrete steps towards codifying such regulations have been made so far (ibid.). Neither has there been a serious engagement with the question whether such a technical approach could be stringently implemented and whether or not rich-enough residents could simply buy their way out. Increasing the awareness and the scientific knowledge base In terms of non-structural measures the need for increasing the knowledge base and hence for doing more research on the expected impacts of climate change has been emphasized (KI-49-GOP; KI-01-GOP; KI-05-GOD; KI-06-IO). Particularly the need for enhancing the knowledge on diseases and other health impacts to be expected with climate change has been emphasized in this context (KI-49-GOP). Secondly, knowledge on the impact on freshwater resources and its availability particularly during the dry season is seen as insufficient to date, calling for enhanced research. This is perceived to be of particular relevance in the context of

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urban and especially industrial groundwater extraction (ibid.). In the context of the latter, also the issue of land subsidence in Can Tho City has been identified as one of great relevance for climate change adaptation, yet, on which no sufficient knowledge and data exists so far. Importantly, it also has been suggested to critically review the hitherto prevalent paradigms and strategies to deal with flood risk in Can Tho City: “So far, in the MKD there have always been three solutions: First, dyke systems; second, living with flood, including changes in livelihood patterns; and third, moving people to higher grounds. So, I think there needs to be some special research in future on the question which of these strategies works under conditions of climate change in future. Those studies should include feasibility studies, cost-benefit-analysis et cetera.” (KI-49-GOP: 54-58)

The below section on institutional shortcomings to climate change adaptation policy will come back to this point since it can be critically asked whether such a linear understanding is helpful. One can argue that it is trapped in a fallacy as it propagates waiting for ‘perfect’ scientific knowledge and rests on the illusion that this knowledge then only has to be transferred into adequate action by ‘rationale’ decision-makers in the party-state bureaucracy. The previous analysis on the motivation for policy-making and urban planning, in contrast, paints quite a different picture (cf. 6.1.2). Lastly, officials within CCCO have suggested to establish a welfare or adaptation fund (KI-68-GOP: 32) for supporting poor people in Can Tho City with a low adaptive capacity. Yet, this measure seems to be conceived primarily for the agriculture-based population of Can Tho City. In addition, no clear concept of how such a financial mechanism should work and where the necessary resources would come from has been developed yet (ibid.). 6.1.3.4.

Institutional conflicts and shortcomings

In consideration of the above presented visions and goals for climate change adaptation in Can Tho City the question arises how far Can Tho City’s current institutional set-up for DRM and urban planning – or urban risk governance more generally – will be able to facilitate climate change adaptation and where institutional shortcomings and mismatches might be. This analysis will therefore link up with the previous two sub-chapters 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Temporal mismatches and conflicts Differences in time horizons or temporal scales can be considered amongst the key institutional mismatches between the requirements for climate change adaptation and the current mechanisms of urban management. More precisely, the current power constellation in which short term interest of private investment frequently overrules strategic master planning (cf. 6.1.2) is potentially at odds with

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the need for long-term land-use planning and restrictive zoning which has been identified as a necessary adaptation measure for Can Tho City (cf. 6.1.3.3). The following excerpt from one of the key informant interviews illustrates this conflict to the point: Interviewer: “So in the end it might be that there is a very nice climate change plan of zoning which says ‘we cannot build here because this is very exposed to sea level rise’ … but then what happens if a private investor comes in says ‘I do not care, I still want to build there because sea level rise may happen only in 30 years but in the next 10 year I will buy the land, I will build the houses, and I will sell them on and I will have a big profit.’ ” Key Informant: “Yes, yes, totally right!” Interviewer: “Do you think that this is a problem?” Key Informant: “Yes, that is what I want to tell you! You say the same what I think!” (KI-41-RO: 113-116)

Yet, conflicts do not only exist between the private sector and the governmental planning machinery but also within the state apparatus itself, as a department head of the Vietnamese Institute for Architecture and Planning (VIAP) points out in an interview: “People in Vietnam do not yet seriously think about how to prepare for climate change. You know, this is also because of our system of periodical governments. Each leader is nominated for 5 or 10 years. So they are not very much engaged in long-term problems. Maybe they are also too tired because they are so busy with engaging in the short-term daily problems. So […] it is very hard to raise awareness for the long-term problems.” (KI-52-GOS: 36)

This point closely relates to the shortcomings in the urban bureaucracy explored in chapter 6.1.2. Lack of knowledge and capacity at local level Tightly linked to the above point – and to the discussion on urban planning and DRM in the previous chapters – the lack of capacity and knowledge at the level of local urban governments also implies a great challenge for developing and implementing local action plans for climate change adaptation. One part of the problem is that the resources and professional expertise at provincial and district level are to date not sufficient to accomplish the task that are handed to them by the NTP-RCC and by the local implementation strategy in Can Tho City. Two experienced social scientists who have been engaged with numerous urban development projects in Can Tho City therefore share the following opinion: “You know, at the provincial level or district level we do not have the experts. We do not know how to make the plan to deal with climate change. So it is a very complicated, and very difficult. And we just think about this at the national level and there is just a very limited number of people to deal with this.” (KI-41-RO: 128) “The national government talks a lot about climate change, but [the local governments at city level] do not have any plan to implement even something for five years.” (KI-42-RO: 87)

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Next to the limited local capacity, the other part of the problem is that the available information on potential climate change impacts is, on top of being sparse in general, poorly communicated to the departments at province level and to the government bodies at district level (KI-06-IO). In addition, the limited amount of information that is available has been characterized as being too generic and of too low resolution to provide sound references for designing concrete adaptation measures at city and district scale (ibid.). For the case of sea level rise, contradictory assessments even add to the difficulties (cf. 4.8; 4.2). Some key informants stated that there are now so many different sea level rise assessments that there is quite some uncertainty and confusion on the part of the decision makers as to which of the assessments should be used as a basis for planning. This is of particular importance when recalling that they in fact have produced partly contradictory results (cf. 4.2; 4.8) therewith producing a legitimacy conflict for decision makers and, hence, disincentives for political action altogether (KI-04-GOP: 5556). A well connected Vietnamese consultant working for numerous climate change adaptation projects in Can Tho City summarizes these concerns as follows: “No, there is no climate change scenario or no sea level rise scenarios that can be applied in the applicable form in Can Tho. Why? Because until now there is a lot of different speech in the scenarios and nothing is considered the official one to be referred to.” (KI-14-IP: 90)

(Dis-)Incentives for innovation The above argument – that decisions cannot be taken until a common agreement in the climate change hazard assessments is reached – might be understandable against the political background (cf. 4.4). However, it runs counter to one of the major imperatives hammered down by the conceptual climate change adaptation literature, i.e. the need for implementing no-regret solutions based on the precautionary principle despite the remaining uncertainties with regards to future climate hazards (cf. 2.5). This would mean to start implementing adaptation policies now, even though the knowledge base is not perfect; but to design the policies and measures in ways that they can be adjusted once new knowledge becomes available. Contrary to this principle, the predominant view amongst state agency decision makers and technical staff in Can Tho City seems to be that the agencies need to wait until ‘perfect’ knowledge on the expected hazard changes is available before adaptation policies can be initiated. The following quote by a chairperson of Can Tho City’s DPI nicely illustrates this perception: “Can Tho City has to wait for the results of the DRAGON project and for the results of other climate change research projects. So far we do not know what to expect; which changes, which impacts.” (KI-04-GOP: 55-56)

In addition, while the theoretical climate change literature calls for open management and governance modes that allow actors to develop and test new approaches even if they might turn out to be dead ends (cf. 2.1.3), the conducted interviews

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suggest that such behavior would be politically difficult in Can Tho City and Vietnam at large. Even though not having been spelled out explicitly, the interviews with local government officers and technical staff at province and district level strongly suggest that advocating for innovative approaches off the beaten track of conventional and long-established paradigms can turn into political minefields. This is because any new approach or measure comes with the risk of being (mis-) understood to challenge the existing set-up and, hence, the directions issued by higher organizational levels. In effect, that implies notable disincentives to push for new approaches which might bear the risk to fall into disgrace in the political hierarchy. Also the NTP-RCC and its local implementation strategy in Can Tho City do little to encourage the development of off-the-box approaches which might be at odds with current paradigms for managing environmental or even social affairs. The following quote by one of Vietnam’s leading experts on local urban governance issues spells out this challenge: “I think in Vietnam sometimes we need to prove people that something will really work – so that it is reflected in the policy. […] Only when people see its evidence very clear and even if it’s practiced somewhere else and integrated it can have an impact on the policy.” (KI-55GOS: 99)

Organizational integration and synchronization Next to the above aspects around knowledge, capacity and innovations, a number of concerns exist with regards to the horizontal, vertical and cross-sectoral synchronization of government agencies but also of other actors beyond the state, notably the donor organizations for research and development projects. Firstly, there seems to be a lack of integration between policy making at national level and the involvement of local level government organs in Can Tho City. While the governments at province and district can be considered the forefront of the actual (governmental) climate change adaptation action, the case of Can Tho City reveals that their options for communicating their judgment and contribution to adaptation policies upwards is very limited (KI-41-RO: 124; KI32-IO: 60). Rather, they have to comply with the framework handed down from the top and have to utilize it according to their own needs. A leading climate change advisor to the national government in Hanoi phrases his perspective as follows: “Provinces are far removed from […] playing any sort of role in this national policy making process. They get consulted – they say nothing – they have nothing to say. So, here is a mismatch – maybe not a mismatch – but there is a huge – is a very limited link between the national policy making process and what provinces say and do. I’m not saying that policies are inappropriate – in fact many are quite appropriate, it seems – but it’s alien to a lot of provinces, it is out there, it is something you get on your desk at some point … then what do you do … and only those provinces who can play the game in Hanoi well, manage to use it as an argument for getting a larger claim on resources.” (KI-32-IO: 60)

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Secondly, there are increasing challenges to synchronize the work and funding of the rising numbers of international and national actors working on urban development and climate change adaptation in Can Tho City. In order to understand this point it is important to reiterate the fact that Vietnam – and especially Can Tho City – records a vast number of bi- and multilateral initiatives in the field of development assistance and the party-state apparatus is very eager to tap these resources: “Yeah, Vietnam is of course very, very good […] in the lingo – in terms of, you know, it’s one of the donor darlings, it […] has really shown progress as the donors are requiring.” (KI08-IO: 56)

With climate change and with the Mekong Delta and Can Tho City being widely recognized risk hot spots (cf. 4.2), the influx of additional organizations, projects and funding has drastically risen in the recent past and is expected to further accelerate in future (KI-08-IO; KI-32-IO; KI-01-GOP): “The bandwagon idea that everybody wants to be in on it in the country – sure – that’s true.” (KI-32-IO: 82)

With Can Tho City serving as an important hub for most of the projects not only on the province itself but also for initiatives on other parts of the Mekong Delta its government agencies, university institutes and other organizations perceive this attention as a great opportunity for tapping into international adaptation and research funds, thereby securing resources for their own institutions (KI-01-GOP). However, this situation also increases the competition between different actors in Can Tho City and even the higher levels in Vietnam. There is also increasing competition between the international donor organizations. This is because many of them seem to be racing a search for the most beneficial strategic partners on the Vietnamese side in order to satisfy their needs in terms of reputation, impact-sellwell and the satisfaction of political expectations. In effect, this competitive landscape on the side of Vietnamese actors as well as the international donor community causes barriers for cooperation and for synchronized, let alone, holistic efforts. The below quote by a experienced senior manager of a large-scale, EUfunded, urban development project in the Mekong Delta and particularly Can Tho City illustrates this problem to the point: “One of the things of course with Can Tho is that it is very much under the attention of many donors coming in, which on the one hand is good for Can Tho. […][O]n the other hand they do run from one project to another and from one opportunity to another and that makes it difficult to do anything more comprehensive.” (KI-08-IO: 60)

The same key informant further indicates how far this process has already progressed in Can Tho City and what the effects are in terms of the motivation and engagement amongst many of the state actors in the city: “I think personally that […] there are a number of good people in Can Tho who are really open to new ideas and maybe that’s also why so many donors are coming there, because they know that there is a certain vibe […]. But still I think of all the cities we worked in, in the ten Mekong Delta provinces, Can Tho […] we had the smallest impact and it was also the most

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difficult to work in because in the smaller cities they were really welcoming us with open arms and they said ‘this is something really very new and useful’. Well, in Can Tho it’s more – ‘ah there’s another project coming by, we’ve seen this all before and these guys they have just their own interest in mind, these donors they need to get this done in a certain time frame and then they need a certain output – let’s give them what they need and take the money and run with it’. […] [S]o for all the ten […] projects as far as I understand this [i.e. Can Tho City] was probably the one which had – you know – maybe the most difficulties and they had the least impact.” (KI-08-IO: 60)

Structurally similar problems in terms of synchronizing and coordinating the multiple efforts in the Mekong Delta have also been identified at the national level. A leading UN policy advisor for the UN in Hanoi with good insights on the processes at ministry level, for example argues that: “From my perspective here is completely bewildering what’s happening in the Mekong Delta. Everybody talks about it [i.e. climate change], every ministry, every donor […] proclaims that they want to coordinate but nobody is really doing it, because the incentives in their systems are not lined up. […] At the mid level of the different departments and ministries and localities there are actually incentives for having their own project and having their own partnership. […] [T]herefore they have incentives to dis-coordinate. The same is true for donors. Donors are supposed to hold up their flags one way or another. So, coordination at hand will continue by both the government and the UN and some donors contribute to it in actual terms. But it will always be very imperfect. That is the reality.” (KI-32-IO: 42-48)

Particularly challenging is in this context the competition between MARD and MONRE and their respective subsidiary departments at province level in Can Tho City (KI-57-IO; KI-61-IO). Both are potentially of great relevance for climate change related projects, MARD through its coordinating role in terms of disaster risk management (cf. 6.1.1.1) and DONRE through its coordinating role in terms of climate change response activities (cf. 6.1.3.1). A leading UN advisor for disaster risk management policy who works closely with MARD in Hanoi and who has an insight perspective to MARD describes the current situation as follows: “There are in the moment tremendous tensions between MARD and MONRE. [O]verall there is the concern within MARD that original work of disaster risk reduction will now be renamed into climate change adaptation and that the funding will shift into MONRE accordingly. […] MARD feels already that their turf is being eroded. So this competition exacerbated the existing tensions between MARD and MONRE.” (KI-57-IO: 37)

Thirdly, as illustrated above, a severe shortfall in horizontal coordination of climate change response across provinces can be ascertained which results from the fact that Vietnam’s planning and governance architecture lacks an effective regional level of coordination (cf. 6.1.2.2). Hence, no institutionalized exchange and coordination on a joint climate change adaptation strategy between the Mekong Delta provinces is seriously discussed at the moment (KI-68-GOP). This is by international experts perceived to be in stark contrast with the imperatives of successful climate change adaptation (KI-32-IO: 39).

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Framing adaptation and thematic integration The expert interviews and the review of the policy documents reveal that adaptation in Can Tho City and beyond is considered mainly a technical or environmental issue. Only limited attention is put on the need to adapt social and economic systems and to challenge cultural and institutional mindsets and the way how things have been done in these domains. This can be seen not only in the set of debated adaptation measures (cf. 6.1.3.3) but also in the political rhetoric used in the official documents and in the majority of the above cited interviews. In addition, the level of engagement and responsibility of the different sector departments is a clear indication: Even though the NTP-RCC and its implementation strategy for Can Tho City both call for mainstreaming climate change aspects into all sectors of state management, the interviews in Can Tho City have shown that this has so far not happened. Even more relevant, they suggested strongly that also in future, climate change adaptation will remain to be ascribed to DONRE’s responsibility and sometimes to the DARD and the CFSC, but not the other line departments (KI-16-GOP). Particularly striking is in this regard the earlier indicated fact that the leadership of DOLISA shows very low engagement with climate change questions: Interviewer: “Is there a section or a staff member in this department [DOLISA] working on the assessment of climate change impacts on poor, invalids and social affairs in general?” Key informant: “This is mainly the task of the CFSC in Can Tho City, not especially of this department. […] [A]ssessing the impact and vulnerabilities belongs to the irrigation section of DARD. It is like this: Every department has its own responsibilities and duties.” (KI-16GOP: 62-63)

Yet, this challenge cannot only be found in Can Tho City but has to be understood against the background of systemic conditions ranging through all governance levels. A leading climate change advisor of the United Nations in Hanoi therefore links this issue to the national level governance structure: “There is a national target program on climate change – it nicely allocates sectoral responsibilities to different ministries, which is all a major improvement – and we support it strongly, but that program cannot give away with the reality that different ministries have their given mandate and individual civil servants have the responsibility to implement those. That is not a mandate for an integration with, say, city development, or, say, rural development.” (KI-32IO: 35-38)

Financial mechanisms The scenarios of increasing hazards hitting Can Tho City and the above aspects around adaptation prompt the question of how the costs for adaption can and shall be borne and by whom. In this context the interviews in combination with the above analysis (cf. 6.1.1.2; 6.1.3.1) strongly suggest that the current financial mechanisms for disaster prevention and response will not be sufficient to cater for

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the additional requirements under climate change conditions. The situation in Can Tho City is in this context tightly rendered by ambiguous financial trends at the national level, which have been summarized in the following way by the aforementioned UN advisor: “In terms of international finance […] Vietnam becomes a middle income country and therefore they will have less access to ODA [Official Development Assistance]. […] [A]ny ODA in the future of Vietnam will get a climate change tag. The new ODA is only climate change because the rest is drying up. And the bit that is not drying up, it will be relabeled – partially.” (KI-32-IO: 81)

However, the question whether and how much Can Tho City can profit from international climate change adaptation funds handed to Vietnam is more than questionable. A number of experts expect that the central government will rather incorporate as much of the international climate change adaptation money into the regular budget, leading to the situation that “the province has no place to go and claim that money” (KI-32-IO: 52). This leads the political leadership in Can Tho City from various departments and the People’s Committees to conceive quite remarkable shifts for raising adaptation money – which are of great relevance for the analysis of shifting responsibility of state vs. non-state actors, discussed in detail in chapter 7 (KI-28-GOP; KI-01-GOP; KI-66-GOP): “The budget of the state government is limited. So the government [in Can Tho City] also needs support from the people, they have to contribute money. In addition we need public private partnerships, new taxes, and new fees. Additionally, international donors will be very important.” (KI-66-GOP: 33-34)

In addition, particularly the locally initiated direct cooperation with international donors is underscored in this context (KI-01-GOP: 35). However, also here it is expected that the national government will exercise tight control over project funds and will in fact channel most of the projects, at least the larger ones, through the national accounts (e.g. KI-32-IO; KI-01-GOP). As a result, high uncertainties remain with regards to the actual amount of funds available for adaptation measures in Can Tho City. The mismatch between financial needs and the available means becomes even more important when considering that the current level of risk acceptance might shift in accordance with socio-economic and human development in the country. This will likely necessitate an adjustment of the security levels within the design of adaptation measures, entailing an extreme leap in the costs of adaptation. International experts overseeing the climate change adaptation discourse in Vietnam doubt that the Vietnamese government or international donor community have already realized this challenge, not to mention the breath of its implications. The following quote nicely illustrates this point by jointly discussing the case of Can Tho City with the example of Ho Chi Minh City: “[W]e are not talking about safety and coping with climate change as we know it, but […] over the period of a few decades in which the city needs to become as safe as Rotterdam now – or Hamburg – which is a far larger investment than the additional bit of climate change. […] How can you not talk about the city becoming – let’s say as safe as Rotterdam is now –

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Analysis of Primary Empirical Data if you want to become an industrialized, developed country by let’s say 2030 – 40 – 50. […] So [another institute’s] Ho Chi Minh City report talks about solving Ho Chi Minh City’s problem with 700 million dollars – at least its drafts did – that is nonsense – that is at least one order of magnitude wrong – probably two. […] But it has so many implications – where they are building, what they are doing, what they are planning now. Because to start thinking about this in 2050 is not an option, after all.” (KI-32-IO: 31-95)

Apart from these investments for general adaptation, also the relief and recovery support for future extreme disasters remains an open question. Chapter 6.1.1 has revealed that the current financial mechanisms for supporting disaster-affected residents and businesses in Can Tho City are quite limited (e.g. the CFSC fund). The household survey data presented in chapter 6.2 further suggests that no significant increases are to be expected in the micro-scale financial support in such disasters. Hence, the research underscores that also the levels of contingency and emergency funds for disaster risk reduction and relief need to be adjusted to the expected increase in likelihood of extreme hazard events and disasters (cf. 4.8). Power and influence of CCCO on decision making Last, but certainly not least, a critical question is how much leverage the CCCO can in fact have on influencing policy and decision making of the government in Can Tho City and beyond. It is too early to answer that question based on experiences but certain indications can be drawn from the interviews and the above analysis. The following answer, for example, hints at the fact that the CCCO only has the mandate to consult the legislative bodies at the city and the national government. Hence, its proposals on adaptation action are not necessarily implemented and can be turned down by higher authorities in the party-state apparatus: Interviewer: “So, the decision on which actual adaptation measures will be implemented for Can Tho City is not taken yet? Key informant: “No, we only set out possible solutions so far. The final decision is then taken by other people.” (KI-49-GOP: 59)

An integrated perspective on, first, the above analysis on climate change adaptation rhetoric in Can Tho City and, second, other research findings on the rigidity of decision making mechanisms in the Vietnamese political system (cf. 4.4) would suggest that – to a certain extent – the new concepts of climate change adaptation are only superficially implemented and do often not influence de facto decision making. The political leadership in Vietnam and particularly in Can Tho City seems to have realized the great potential behind adopting the language of international climate change discourses and establishing institutional framework conditions – e.g. through the CCCO – which make it easy for international donors to interact and to tie into. In fact, the government of Can Tho City even seems to see the imperative of pushing for the above mentioned re-tagging of former development initiatives with the climate change label and for using climate change adaptation rhetoric as a vehicle for legitimizing and securing international fund-

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ing. Providing these institutional connectors and showing openness and adaptability in terms of new conceptual discourses has, therefore, greatly contributed to the fact that Can Tho City has become such a popular destination for international climate change projects and can be considered as a ‘donor darling’ (see above). However, on the other hand it remains to be seen whether and how the actual postulation behind the concepts and paradigms of climate change adaptation – and related discourses such as resilience – can and will really penetrate decision making processes. This question is in fact of quite some relevance, considering that many of the postulations made in those conceptual debates (cf. 2.1.3; 2.4) run counter to current decision making processes and political rhetoric in Vietnam, e.g. the call for flexible management mechanisms, local participation, selforganization, equitable governance etc. (these points have been discussed in more theoretical depths, applying neoinstitutional organizational theory, in Garschagen 2013). 6.1.3.5. Preliminary synthesis on formal climate change adaptation The above analysis has shown that formal climate change adaptation in Can Tho City is, despite being a comparatively young field, a rapidly growing policy domain which increasingly shapes wider risk management debates in the city. This influence has co-evolved with the establishment of new institutions in the state bureaucracy and with the promulgation of specific policy documents in line with national level provisions. However, Can Tho City’s action plan for climate change adaptation does not yet include a comprehensive set of adaptation strategies and largely lacks clear guidance on how to make successful adaptation work institutionally and financially. Rather, the debate comprises a loose collection of adaptation measures which have been codified to a varying degree (cf. Figure 6.2). Most of the measures target hard aspects of adaptation, largely in relation to physical infrastructure, but the majority of measures aim at taking indirect influence through regulations rather than having state organs directly build or manipulate physical infrastructure. Yet, even though being limited in numbers, the direct hard measures are likely to imply high costs for the state apparatus.

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Figure 6.2: Climate change adaptation measures in Can Tho City, own draft based on key informant interviews and legal documents

However, the analysis has shown that there are considerable institutional challenges with regards to the realization of adaptation measures and, more generally, the implementation of fundamental principles for adaptation governance, currently discussed in the theoretical literature (cf. 2.2). Considerable institutional barriers also remain for integrating climate change adaptation policy with the other two domains of disaster risk management and urban planning. Most importantly, the review of the climate change policy raises questions as to whether and how the formal adaptation strategies currently discussed in the state bureaucracy cater for the needs of the most exposed and vulnerable households in Can Tho City who will feel the impacts of climate change most directly and are, hence, at the frontline of adaptation action (cf. 6.2). Therefore, the household level capacities for adaptation need to be analyzed in detail (cf. 6.2.4) and potential synergies but also gaps and conflicts between with the set of state-driven adaptation measures are to be examined (cf. 7). 6.1.4. Interim synthesis: synergies and gaps in formal risk management Based on the three above sub-chapters on state-organized urban risk management, a number of intermediate conclusions can be drawn. The analysis has shown that formal risk management touches on three main policy fields each with a distinct set of regulations and institutional responsibilities. However, while the principles of risk management (cf. 2.5) would call for a close integration of these three fields in order to apply a common paradigm and a clear distribution of competencies and

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responsibilities, the findings reveal that there are in fact considerable institutional barriers between the three fields that hamper a close synchronization and an integrative approach to wider risk management in Can Tho City. This comprises not only a weak integration of the key policy documents (most notably the province level action plan for implementing the NTP-RCC versus the action plan for implementing the National Strategy for Disaster Mitigation and Management) but also key management boards (most notably the province level CFSC and the province level CCCO). Also the distribution of the primary responsibility for disaster risk management and climate change adaptation into the hands of the anyhow competing DARD and DONRE, respectively, has been suggested by the interviewees to hamper effective synchronization. This institutional divide yields challenging questions particularly with regards to the distribution of future responsibilities and resources between the two departments. On the one hand, it can be expected that with the Mekong Delta being widely considered one of the global climate change hot-spots (cf. 4.2), Can Tho City will experience an increasing influx of adaptation funds, either channeled through the national government or directly to the city government. Wearing the climate change name-tag, DONRE can be expected to strongly focus on keeping political power over how this money is spent. On the other hand, climate change adaptation in Can Tho City in fact means disaster risk management for a large part, hence, giving rise to claims from DARD. In effect, this institutional constellation bears the risk that energy is wasted in political competition rather than being used for integrative risk management with a coherent and transparent set of criteria for the prioritization and distribution of risk management resources – which is lacking to date. Even more problematic with regards to mitigating future vulnerability in the rapidly growing City of Can Tho is that risk prevention principles suggested in the risk management literature, e.g. exposure-sensitive land use planning or hazard specific building codes (cf. 2.5), are not mainstreamed, i.e. they are not implemented or stringently considered within the more general urban planning and management regulation. Climate change adaptation and risk mitigation related to natural hazards are largely not considered among the tasks of the Department of Construction or the Department of Urban Planning and Management. This matches with the observation yielded by the interviews that the institutional responsibilities are in general very fragmented despite the political ceremony of crosssectoral consultation and consensus decision making superficially staged in the many management meetings and cross-agency boards. To make matters even more challenging, those few regulative elements that have been suggested by some actors are largely oriented along past extreme events (cf. 6.1.3.3); hence, not taking into account the project intensification of the magnitude of floods and typhoons in future (cf. 4.2). The findings further lead to the conclusion that risk management is, across the different policy domains, approached in a fairly technocratic manner. This is rested on the belief that risk can best be responded to by controlling or taming the natural hazard, which finds expression, for example, in the set of currently implemented or debated risk reduction measures favoring physical infrastructure

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solutions (cf. 6.1.1.3; 6.1.3.3). Also the distribution of institutional responsibilities within the party-state apparatus underscores this technocratic paradigm, particularly when considering the comparatively minor role of social-policy-oriented agencies like DOLISA, in comparison to the major actors such as DARD and DONRE with their natural science or engineering profile. A more extensive critique of the technocratic approach and its implications for vulnerability at household level will be substantiated in chapter 7.1.1. In addition, the entire risk management set-up is characterized by a relatively re-active orientation. Officially the city government has adopted the guiding slogan “Be active to respond, respond timely, overcome promptly and effectively; among them prevention is the key point” (which is iterated in the official local documents and was mentioned in several interviews). However, the empirical data demonstrates that in fact the largest share of human and financial resources are employed for reactive response measures to recover from disaster situations rather than on risk prevention and vulnerability reduction in the wider sense. This goes hand in hand with the afore-mentioned technocratic approach, as it applies a very narrow understanding of palliative risk reduction measure rather than concentrating on the deeper root causes of vulnerability which would need to be tackled for achieving a more sustainable vulnerability reduction – as postulated in the Pressure and Release Model (Wisner et al. 2004, discussed in 2.1.1.2) and the institutional framing developed for this study (cf. 3). In addition, the analysis indicates that with the ongoing transformation process an increasing proportion of the responsibilities and tasks around risk management are shifted from state bureaucracy into the private domain, e.g. the in terms of the organization of infrastructure maintenance or the financial support for recovery after natural hazard strikes. Therefore, cross-triangulation with the household level perspective is necessary to analyze this point in more depth (cf. 6.2; 7.1.7). In combination, the analysis of all three policy domains also shows that consideration of the specifically urban requirements for risk management is sparse in Can Tho City. Given that in administrative terms Can Tho City comprises even more rural than urban districts (cf. 4.7), the work on disaster risk management in the province level party-state apparatus – notably the CFSC and DARD – is largely focused on rural risk reduction and the protection of agricultural production, particularly in the city’s northern rural districts. On the same token, the interviews revealed that the number of state officers with a specifically urban professional background is sparse in the respective state agencies in charge of disaster risk management, notably DARD. Can Tho City is surely not the only mid-sized city in Vietnam featuring such administrative inconsistencies and institutional gaps. However, being a recently nominated class I city and the economic and demographic centre of the entire Mekong Delta, this urban neglect in large parts of the state bureaucracy apparatus is particularly striking. The question therefore arises whether and how this entire framework of risk management in Can Tho City – made by all three policy domains – is in conjunction capable to cater for the vulnerabilities of urban and peri-urban households in

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Ninh Kieu, Cai Rang and Binh Thuy and to enable them to reduce their vulnerability through effective adaptation. Therefore, the above analysis of the legal, regulative and institutional set-up for formal risk management and of the suggested and already implemented measures provides the necessary frame to now turn to the specific analysis at household level and to explore how the two spheres interact. 6.2.

VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL

The following sections will explore household level vulnerability and adaptation with regards to current and future natural hazards in Can Tho City. In accordance with the conceptual framework outlined in chapter 3, the analysis is structured along the main factors of vulnerability, i.e. exposure (chapter 6.1), susceptibility (chapter 6.2) and lack of coping capacity (chapter 6.3). Adaptive capacities – i.e. the capacity to reduce vulnerabilities – and realized adaptation measures will be examined in chapter 6.4, also structured along the different vulnerability components. However, in accordance with the epistemological approach of this study and its grounded theory perspective (cf. 5), the analysis mainly follows the signals emitted by the empirical data, rather than deductively pursuing a list of predefined indictors for each of the vulnerability and adaptive capacity subcomponents. Hence, the conceptual frame (cf. 3.2) functions as a check-list for addressing relevant question and as a guide for analyzing possible causal relations between vulnerability and adaptation components. Yet, it is not translated into a rigid corset for this chapter. Rather, the actual vulnerability patterns and adaptation measures observed in the case study areas provide the structure for presenting the findings. The re-integration of the empirical results with the conceptual discourse will be provided in chapter 7. This chapter largely draws on the household surveys and the semi-structured household interviews but also uses the expert interviews and the PUA for triangulation (cf. 5). In line with the research questions (cf. 1), the analysis is based on both (a) given disaster impacts, which have been experienced in the past and which therewith reveal existing vulnerabilities, as well as (b) the appraisal of vulnerabilities that have not yet been manifested in actual loss or damage events. Throughout the analysis, links will be drawn to the afore-examined body of state policies and activities in the three analyzed fields of disaster risk management, urban planning and climate change adaptation. A dynamic perspective will be applied that asks whether and how recent policy reforms and the wider socioeconomic transformation process contribute to the production or re-production of vulnerability. Yet, attention will in particular be paid to the effects of state action for enabling, but also restricting, households in Can Tho City in their efforts to prevent or reduce their vulnerability towards natural hazards. This integrative perspective prepares the ground for a detailed discussion of risk and adaptation governance at the interface of state and non-state action (provided in chapter 7).

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6.2.1. Hazard exposure Tightly embedded into the Mekong Delta’s hydrological, meteorological and geomorphological hazard profile (cf. 4.1), chapter 4.7 has elaborated in some detail how Can Tho City is affected by a mixture natural hazards which overlap and cross-fertilize in multiple ways. The urban and peri-urban case study districts (cf. 5.3) are exposed to several types of flooding resulting from heavy local precipitation, tidal peaks and peaks in river discharge, notably from Hau River, Can Tho River and Binh Thuy River. Flooding is thereby conditioned by the low topography of Can Tho City, by its high concentration of extended areas with impervious surfaces and by an insufficiently sized and poorly maintained drainage and canalization system, allowing for overflows and water backlogs in many parts of the city. During the rainy season, large parts of the city can be inundated for several hours at high tide, sometimes up to a depth of one meter. These flooding events are strongest at the peak of the rainy season, hence, coinciding with increased overall water levels in the rivers and canals. Pluvial flooding happens more irregularly during the rainy season, also with the extent and depth varying greatly (see below). In the past, peak discharges in extreme flood years (cf. 4.1) have lead to river-based flooding, most heavily affecting low lying areas connected to riverbank overflows. Typhoons and strong wind storms are an additional hazard for Can Tho City, in most cases accompanied by strong precipitation and flooding. Thus, all or some of the above hazards coincide at times, causing hazard cascades and the most extreme flooding in the city. In addition, river bank erosion is an important hazard in Can Tho City. In fact, erosion has been increasing due to changed velocity influenced by hydraulic infrastructure and increasing boat traffic in the rivers and canals (see below). Depending on the location, the soil and the hydraulic conditions, erosion can range between a few centimeters and several meters per year. Apart from the current hazard context, the hydro-meteorological drivers of natural hazards are expected to increase with climate change, leading to an increased likelihood of more frequent and more extreme hazard events in the future (cf. 4.7; 4.8). Next to the increased likelihood of extreme peaks in river discharges and local precipitation also the typhoon risk is expected to rise due to climate change (cf. 4.2; 4.8). Hence, while Can Tho City has not yet experienced any large-scale flood or typhoon disaster in the past, it makes for a highly relevant case study against the background of future shifts in hazard exposure, thereby prompting the question whether and how the residents of the city take adaptive action, even though they lack sufficient reference experience. However, apart from these general hazard patterns at city scale, exposure can vary greatly on a micro-scale given the fine-gridded variance of topographic and hydraulic conditions. Hence, empirical analysis at household level is essential to understand exposure patterns in detail – which tends to be neglected in the existing risk assessments in Can Tho City (cf. 4.9). The latter point also hints at the highly important fact that exposure is not only shaped by the hazard characteristics but particularly by the ways in which humans shape their built environment

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and position themselves in relation to hazards. This causal driver of exposure is also emphasized in the conceptual framing of this study (cf. 3). Hence, household level analysis is necessary to explore the generation and/or mitigation of exposure. Against this background the following sections examine in more detail the exposure profiles in Can Tho City and their causal linkages to wider vulnerability and adaptation dynamics. 6.2.1.1.

Flooding

Figure 10.4 in the Appendix illustrates that a considerable proportion of the interviewed households in the case study areas is affected periodically by flooding in their house, mostly during the rainy season. The share of households that are completely affected (i.e. the entire house or land lot gets flooded; represented by the red segments) or partly affected (i.e. parts of the house and lot are flooded; represented by the yellow segments) range roughly between one third and two thirds of all households interviewed in the respective case study area. Hence, flooding is already today a wide-spread problem – yet, with an increasing trend as will be shown below. Figure 10.5, also in the Appendix, further underscores the type of flooding experienced by the interviewed residents. Flooding during the rainy season often results from a combination of different factors. However, certain differences could be detected which are of relevance for advancing flood mitigation measures. The figure shows that the households in areas close to water bodies are predominantly affected by river-based or tidal flooding while the households living further inland predominantly experience pluvial flooding, often combined with water backlogs. Mixed types of flooding are registered in all study areas, yet occur more often in inland locations. Flooding depth and flooding duration are positively correlated when excluding extreme outlier cases with flood duration of more than 30 hours52. In total, the reported duration of flooding ranged from 30 minutes to four days, with 80 percent of the households reporting their average duration of flooding between one and three hours. The most commonly reported flooding depths ranged up to 60 centimeters. In special cases, flood depth was stated to reach up to 1.5 meters. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the reported flooding depths and durations in the seven case study sites. Not surprisingly, the overall variation between the case study sites seems to be rather small, given that they all share a similar hazard profile. Nevertheless, some considerable differences can be noticed. Above-average flooding depths occur in the river-bound areas of An Lac Ward – which are earmarked for slum-upgrading and partial resettlement in the future. Also Binh Thuy Ward is characterized by higher flooding depths for the affected households, coupled with very long durations due to its morphology favoring water backlogs (compare Table 5.3 for a detailed description of the case study areas). In addition, 52 Spearman correlation is significant with a correlation coefficient of 0.378 at the 0.01 level.

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the colored pictures Appendix 10.2 provide a visual impression of regular floods in the case study areas.

Figure 6.3: Flooding depth in case study areas53, own draft based on household survey data

Figure 6.4: Duration of flooding in case study areas54, own draft based on household survey data

53 The box plots represent the range between the first and third quartile. Hence, 50 percent of the cases are within the box. The line within each box plot indicates the median. Stars represent outliers which are further off than three times the extent of the box. Circles show smaller outliers with a distance of more than 1.5 times the size of the box. T-bars show the last minimum and maximum cases before the outliers.

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6.2.1.2. Extreme flood and storm events Apart from the exposure to regularly occurring flooding, households in Can Tho City are exposed to extreme hazard events. Most importantly, these are severe floods of extraordinary intensity (i.e. of flooding duration and depth considerably above the range of ‘regular’ tidal or pluvial flooding) as well as strong storms or even typhoons. 48 percent of the 588 households covered by the main household survey, reported to have been directly affected once or multiple times by extraordinary hazard events at their current place of living in Can Tho City. Figure 6.5 represents these reports, separated into the categories of extraordinary severe flooding, extreme winds and/or storms, combined flood and wind hazard, and other hazards. The disastrous typhoon Linda in 1997 (cf. 4.1) can be clearly identified as the most important single event also for the households living in Can Tho City.

Figure 6.5: Experience with extraordinary flood and storm events, own draft based on household survey data

In addition, Figure 6.5 suggests a trend towards the increasing occurrence of extraordinary flooding and storm events over the four years prior to the survey. At first sight, this trend might appear to be caused by memory response effects amongst the interviewees, attributing more weight to events in the recent past. Yet, the reported increase in fact matches with other sources of information such as expert interviews in the governmental agencies which monitor natural hazard trends (KI-27-GOD; KI-36-GOW). The figures on reported extreme events have also been cross-checked with the duration of residency in Can Tho City in order to rule out response effects related to the fact that households might only live in the 54 In order to allow for readability, the box plot for Binh Thuy Ward has been capped due to a high number of outliers of up to 96 hours.

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city since a short while and hence report only recent hazard events: of all the households that reported to have been affected by extreme events in the past, 75 percent have been living in their current location since longer than 1985, and even 90 percent since longer than 1998 – i.e. much longer than the low-event-years in the early 2000s. In terms of the intensity, flood depths of the extreme floods events were reported to reach up to 200cm with more the 20 percent of the affected households having experienced depths of more than 50cm. The reported durations of flooding ranged up to 5 days. Over 27 percent of the affected households reported durations of 5 hours or more and still 12 percent of at least 24 hours. In addition to flooding, the research revealed that exposure to storms and strong winds is considered a severe problem for the residents in Can Tho City. Around 32 percent of the interviewed households reported to have in the past experienced strong winds and storms of such intensity that they caused damage to the house or were perceived as a serious risk (see below). The interviewees also reported that strong storms are becoming more frequent and more intensive: More than 75 percent of the households have reported to experience increasing wind speeds over the last 10 years. The same impression was reported in many of the in-depth household interviews (e.g. HH-02-HPW). Asking for such perceptions in general bears the risk of yielding distortive memory effects or other response effects due to the upfront communicated focus of the research project. However, in this case the trend towards increasing storm activity could be soundly triangulated – despite the lack of hard wind speed data – with other data sources, e.g. the investments in de facto repair and renovation works (see below) and the expert judgment with staff members of the Environmental Monitoring Station under DONRE (KI-02-GOP; KI-01-GOP). 6.2.1.3. River bank erosion Exposure to river bank erosion is a serious problem Can Tho City, particularly for a large share of the households living directly along rivers or canals. Almost 30 percent of the households living on stilt-houses, on semi-amphibic houses or in the first line next to the waterfront reported that their house and/or parcel of land is directly affected by erosion. The most severe occurrence can be observed in peri-urban Hung Phu Ward as well as makeshift settlements along the riverbank in An Lac Ward and An Nghiep Ward. 29 percent of those households directly affected by erosion reported that the erosion in their location exceeded one meter in horizontal extent over the last year prior to the survey. 12 percent of the affected households even had to deal with more than 3 meters of horizontal erosion over the same period of time. In terms of trends in erosion, 58 percent of the affected households observed an increase in erosion over the last years, These figures underline the judgment expressed in several expert interviews that erosion makes on aggregate for a severely increasing problem but that the specific erosion profile at micro-scale can vary quite significantly depending on

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the hydraulic conditions as well as on place-specific counter-measures. Given that erosion causes many houses per year to collapse one of the leading officers in the city’s CFSC counts erosion amongst the most dangerous hazard in the city (KI02-GOP). Besides the general hydraulic dynamics, two main reasons are considered to cause the erosion. 67 percent of the interviewees hold strong floods with particularly high velocity to be a prime driver. In addition, heavy boat traffic is considered a key reason, also being mentioned by 67 percent of the affected respondents. One of the interviewees explains this aspect in more detail: “In the past, the river was also wide but there were by far not so many boats like today. Today the boats are also bigger and faster and they cause a lot of waves which is a big problem in terms of erosion.” (HH-18-ALW)

This perception matches the judgments stated in a number of expert interviews (KI-02-GOP; KI-19-GOW). Yet, the experts also mentioned additional reasons which are not or only to a much lesser extent represented in the households’ responses. These include in particular excessive construction activity along the river, causing instability of the banks. In addition, they include the expansion of hydraulic infrastructures upstream, notably dyke systems in the upper Mekong Delta, which are argued to lead to increased velocity downstream in Can Tho City (e.g. KI-02-GOP; KI-19-GOW). 6.2.1.4. Exposure to multiple hazards The importance of considering multi-hazard exposure and hazard cascades has been discussed above (cf. 6.2.1; 2.4). Therefore, the three main types of natural hazards (regular flooding, river bank erosion and singular extreme events) have been aggregated for the analysis. Figure 6.6 summarizes the key results, showing the percentage of households exposed to zero, one, two or even three hazard types, respectively. The figure is organized along the seven case study areas of the main household survey (cf. 5.3). Three key findings can be singled out: Firstly, the percentage of households being exposed to any of the hazards is very high, amounting to 69 percent over the total sample and even up to 85 percent in the makeshift settlements along the riverbanks in An Lac Ward. Secondly, also multiple exposure to two or even three hazards is quite common, affecting more than one quarter of the total sample and almost half of the population in parts of An Lac. Thirdly, despite the fact that all case study areas share the same hazard profile at meso-scale, remarkable differences can be identified between the case study areas. The households in the to-be upgraded An Lac Ward as well as in the periurban areas are most exposed to hazards. Along the same line, these areas also have the highest exposure to double or triple hazards. Interestingly, the already upgraded An Cu Ward shows the lowest exposure, indicating that the urban upgrading caused a reduction in overall hazard exposure of the population still living in the ward. Hence, the statistical analysis confirms a highly significant correla-

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tion between the exposure to multiple hazards and the case study areas (C*=0.366 with p≤0.001; see also Table 6.4, provided at the end of chapter 6.2, which gives an overview of the pairwise cross-correlations of all variables considered in Table 5.1).

Figure 6.6: Exposure to multiple hazards, own draft based on household survey data

The multiple exposure conditions have great influence on the overall vulnerability of the affected households and need to be matched with substantial capacities for coping and adaptation. The below chapters (6.2.2; 6.2.3) will therefore draw on these exposure profiles and ask how they relate to susceptibilities and response capacities. Furthermore, the natural hazards described above are accompanied by other environmental hazards, most importantly a decrease in water quality in Hau River, Can Tho River and other ditches and canals in Can Tho City. 85 percent of the interviewed households perceive a decrease in water quality arguing that the water has become “more polluted and more dirty” over the last ten years (with 5 percent perceiving no change, 5 percent an improvement and 5 not being sure). In order to explore how serious of a problem the pollution is considered, the interviewees were further asked whether or not they would allow their children to play in the water. An astonishing 81 percent stated not to allow that since they are afraid of health impacts. Another 7 percent only allow swimming for short periods of time. This perception matches the results of ongoing water quality assessments in Can Tho City, conducted within the framework of the WISDOM project which found considerable levels of pollutants, notably from agricultural and domestic sources (cf. Hoa 2011; Toan et al. 2013). These findings clearly suggest that, in flooding situations, it is not only the physical damage caused by flood waters that matters, but also the exposure to

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hazardous pollutants in the water which carry the potential to cause health impacts. Chapter 6.2.2 will explore this vulnerability aspect in more detail. 6.2.1.5. Trends in hazard intensity The survey and the in-depth interviews have revealed that the vast majority of Can Tho City’s residents have over the last 10 years been experiencing an intensification of the predominant hazards (cf. Figure 6.7). Three quarters of the interviewees have experienced an increase in wind speeds and storm occurrence. In addition, 68.5 percent of the respondents reported to have experienced an increase in extremely strong precipitation events and even 80 percent a rise in water levels (Figure 6.7). In addition, changes in temperature patterns and the sequencing of seasons have been reported in the in-depth household interviews as well as the expert interviews (e.g. HH-14-ALW; KI-03-GOD: 54-58). However, they shall not be explored in detail here, since they are not in the central focus of this research. Water levels

Wind speeds

Heavy precipitation

6%

10% 10%

7%

19% 24%

69%

75%

80%

n=588

increase

no change

I do not know

decrease

Figure 6.7: Perceived changes in hazard conditions over the last ten years, own draft based on household survey data

The observed shifts in hazard conditions (cf. Figure 6.7) contribute to changes in hazard exposure in Can Tho City. As indicated above, a rise in extreme events has been noticed (Figure 6.5). Yet, as a result of these trends, the vast majority of the interviewees also reported to experience an increase in frequent flood occurrence, as the following quote illustrates: “In the past the flooding was not as serious as in the last years. But in the last years, my house has been flooded around 20 to 30 centimeters in the rainy season.” (HH-25-BTW)

These perceived changes are in line with other data sources, such as the water levels measurements or the judgment of governmental authorities in DONRE’s Environmental Monitoring branch (KI-01-GOP). Figure 6.8 illustrates that the average and maximum water levels of the Hau River measured at Can Tho gauging station have significantly risen over the last years, hence, contributing to high-

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er and more frequent flood events in the city – particularly during high tide in the rainy seasons. The reasons for this increase are disputed given the absence of longitudinal monitoring or modeling assessments. But experts interviewed for this study, have suggested that the rise in water levels can to a large part be explained by the growing network of embankments infrastructure upstream in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta which has been massively extended following the floods in 2000, 2001 and 2002, thereby substantially reducing the retention area upstream of Can Tho City (cf. 4.1).

Water level, Can Tho Gauging Station (cm above/below sea level)

250 200 150 100 50 0

-50 -100 -150 -200 1980

1985 Average

1990

1995

Maximum

2000

2005 Minimum

Figure 6.8: Trends in water levels at Can Tho gauging station, own draft based on data from DONRE (2009)

These trends underpin the rationale behind choosing Can Tho City as a case study area (cf. 4.7): While most of the environmental changes expected with climate change have not yet happened, there is nevertheless significant change taking place which in effect has a lot of similarity with the hazard trends expected under climate change conditions, notably sea level rise. Can Tho City’s residents and government bodies need to respond and adapt to these ongoing changes, regardless whether they are caused by climate change or other (anthropogenic) manipulations of the environment. Hence, understanding current response and adaptation mechanisms in Can Tho City (cf. 6.2.4) can serve important lessons for exploring future climate change adaptation capacities and activities. 6.2.1.6. Social production of exposure The above illustrated exposure patterns prompt the question how this exposure has developed. As illustrated in chapter 2.2 exposure can be driven by two factors: Firstly, by a change on the part of the hazard, thereby, expanding its reach; secondly, by humans moving their settlements or other assets into reach of the hazard. While the above section has addressed the changes in hazard patterns, this section takes issue with the latter process, i.e. it addresses the question why

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households have moved into the exposed places. Understanding the underlying incentives and/or imperatives is of key relevance for discussing and evaluating the acceptance and/or feasibility of any counter-measure or adaptation solution. Therefore, those households living close to the water ways have been asked for the reason or motivation to choose this location when they moved there. Patterns identified in the semi-structured interviews have been provided as response options in the questionnaire. Yet, it has also been open to additional responses. Figure 6.9 presents the results grouped along the specific location of the house in relation to the waterfront of the respective river or canal, where the top six bars represent households living within 20m from the river-front. The bottom bar displays a control group further away.

Figure 6.9: Reasons for moving into exposed areas, own draft based on household survey data

Particularly for those households living in dwellings entirely build on stilts onto the water (see pictures in Appendix 10.2), economic pressures made for the primary reasons behind their choice of location and type of dwelling. The first category (“the only affordable place”) indicates that households could not afford any proper ‘land’ on solid ground and, hence, had to establish housing space through erecting platforms on stilts over the river on which they could build their dwelling – while still being located in the urban centre. The below quote by one of the leaders of Can Tho City’s DOLISA captures this pressure in very distinct way: “In the urban areas, many people along canals and rivers extend their houses over the water as this brings the opportunity to increase the otherwise mostly very small living and working place. Usually the people along the water-ways do not have much money to buy big parts of land. The extension of their houses over the water allows them to make ends meet with a small patch of land as they do not have to pay for the space over the water; they only have to pay the actual amount of ‘land’ they occupy.” (KI-11-GOP: 50)

The in-depth household interviews also revealed that the third category (“relatives and/or friends lived here”) shows into the same direction. What is often behind

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this explanation is that people cannot afford any other land and need to find some relatives or friends who tolerate to have stilt houses being erected next to their own house – ‘in their backyard’. Hence, this reason is given much more often within the group of stilt house dwellers (25 percent) than in the other groups (0 to 13 percent). In addition, water access for income generation has been reported as one of the most important reasons to move close to the river front. Hence, a clear pattern can be observed, i.e. economic pressures are the more dominant the closer a household is located to the water. As a result people with the highest economic pressures are pushed into locations with also the highest hazard exposure, i.e. with often accumulative exposure to flooding, storms and especially erosion (see above). In terms of historic root causes and path dependencies, the household survey and the expert interviews revealed that many of Can Tho City’s makeshift settlements along the rivers and canals developed during the Second Indochina War due to the combat activities in the Mekong Delta and the forced evacuation policy (cf. 4.6) which caused heavy migration of socio-economically deprived refugees into the city (KI-48-IP: 115; KI-64-IP: 22). Also the household survey data confirms that a lot of households settled along the inner-city riverbanks during that time (Figure 6.10). However, it is important to note that the establishment of dwellings and entire settlements along those river-banks continues until today, particularly for the group of households having to revert to dwellings built entirely onto the water (see Figure 6.10). In fact, the data suggests that settlement has over the years been shifting closer and closer to the waterfront or even onto the water. Hence, the increasingly limited space is used more intensively, leading to rising densification. This is to be understood as a clear indication of the continuing pressures in the social and economic system, also in relation to the economic reform and transforming political economy.

Figure 6.10: Time of settling in exposed areas, own draft based on household survey data

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Related to the fact that settling next to the river bank can be predominantly attributed to economic pressures, a number of economic opportunities were mentioned. These are most notably related to the free access to open resources (or common property resources) such as river water. Resulting is, hence, a trade-off between difficulties and opportunities which is distinctly captured in the following quote by an independent Vietnamese consultant who has been living in Can Tho City for many decades and has been working for the World Bank and other international organizations: “From 1975 to 1995 – something like that – the public space was crowded. […] And the only way to have the piece of shelter is to move out of the river surface so that they can drain all the waste and they can have their toilet over the water without any construction, without and costs. And they can expand there over the water without any renting fee. That’s why a lot of the slum-area is around the water surface. You can also use the freshwater without any charge.” (KI-48-IP: 115).

Yet, overall the relevance of river water utilization for daily uses has been decreasing over the last years. In the household survey, those households living in the current location for ten years or longer and living within a 20 meter range of the river front had been asked for which purposes they have been using the river water at the time of the survey and ten years earlier55. The data shows a strong reduction in the use of river water across all types of usage (Figure 6.11). This is in line with the overall expansion of the piped water network over the same timeframe. While, for example, around 55 percent of the households had been using the river water for drinking in 1999, this figure went down to around 12 percent in 2009. Similarly, the percentage of households using river water for washing their dishes came down from 62 to around 22 percent. Yet unarguably, the figures for the year 2009 are still very high especially when considering health-relevant uses such as waste disposal, toilet, cooking or personal hygiene. Remaining is, thus, a considerable risk, particularly during times of flooding when the personal contact with water increases substantially (this issue will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.2.2 on susceptibility).

55 The earlier time step was in the interviews triangulated through the enquiry of important time markers in memory such as Typhoon Linda two years earlier or the installment of piped water connection in the respective case study areas.

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Figure 6.11: Utilization of river and canal water, own draft based on household survey data

In conclusion, the data reveals that while in earlier years the disadvantages had been counter-balanced by the advantages and opportunities arising from the direct access to water, these advantages have lost in relevance over the last years. River water is still being taken for daily use by a considerable proportion of the households; yet, the majority today uses piped or bottled water for daily uses and has access to at least some sort of sanitary infrastructure. In addition, a lot of the water-borne transportation, trading and business has been shifted to the streets – even though this shift is less significant in urban Can Tho City when compared to rural areas. The following quote from an in-depth household interview with an old lady living since many decades on the river bank in Binh Thuy Ward encapsulates how this shift is perceived by the residents (similar statements have been made in a number of other households interviews, e.g. HH-21-ALW; HH-22-LBW): Interviewer: “Why did you move so close to the water when you moved here?” Household member: “You know, we have already been living here since a very long time, since I was a small child. And back in the past my parents used to fish here. In addition, there was no tab water here in the past. Therefore the river was very important as a source for water. […] That is why we moved here. […] But today the situation is different. There are many problems now with living close to the water here. So if we had enough money we would like to move to some other place. But in fact we do not have the money to do so.” Interviewer: “So you would say that in the past there have been many advantages from living close to the water but today there are more disadvantages.” Household member: “Yes, of course. This is what I just explained to you!” (HH-29-BTW)

Therefore, the majority of the households living along the river banks today consider this location as primarily hazardous and disadvantageous. A household head, with a house built entirely on stilts in An Lac Ward, for example, emphasizes in particular the accumulation of multiple-hazard exposures and the resulting pressure on the household capacities – coupled with the lack of capacity for more fundamental adaptation such as moving to another location:

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“In the past – when we moved here – we did not have enough money to buy proper land. That is why we had to move onto the water. In the beginning the house was made of leaves and some wooden poles only. Then we saved some money and worked very hard to be able to upgrade the house gradually. [...] People should be living inland on secure land and not on the riverbank because the land here erodes and sinks and it is very dangerous. We have to take care of the riverbank and have to be concerned about that day by day. [...] I do not see any advantages. I mean, there are so many disadvantages even in addition to the flooding problem and the erosion, like the strong wind and cyclones. [...]” (HH-19-ALW)

Similarly, the results of the household survey underscore and specify the perceptions on the hazard-location-nexus amongst the residents living along the river bank (cf. Figure 6.12). Over 80 percent of the interviewees living in these areas agree that the relative importance of river access has diminished in contrast to street access. 60 percent would move further inland if they had sufficient financial resources – with the majority of the remaining households having stated in the interview that they would also prefer to move if it was not for the close interpersonal ties they have established with their family members and neighbors in the very location. The vast majority of interviewees emphasized that they are more concerned about flooding than they used to be in the past and that flooding bears considerable potential for damage. Yet, interestingly health risks in relation to flooding are less widely considered – an issue which will be taken up in more detail in chapter 6.2.2.3.

Figure 6.12: Water-bound residency: from opportunity to risk, own draft based on household survey data

6.2.1.7. Hazard exposure and socio-economic status Based on the genesis of exposure patterns, it needs to be asked whether and how the current exposure profiles of Can Tho City’s population correlate with socioeconomic status and development at household level. Within the case study areas, the household survey confirmed the apparent correlation between the elevation of individual houses and the flood occurrence within these houses. Yet, interestingly

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only a weak correlation could be found between the flood occurrence within houses and the horizontal gradient from the canal or river to locations further inland (C*=0.233 with p≤0.05). This is in line with the observation that there is a quite strong heterogeneity within the case study areas in terms of the actual height of housing floors, which is due to individual elevations at household level in the past (cf. 6.2.4). Not surprisingly, the correlation between the housing location and the exposure to erosion is much stronger (C*=0.488 with p≤0.001). However, the exposure to extreme events is only weakly correlated to the case study areas with increased incidences being reported particularly in the peri-urban areas (C*=0.314 with p≤0.001; with adjusted standardized residuals of up 2.3). In addition, the exposure to multiple concurrent hazards is considerably correlated to the case study area (C*0.366 with p≤0.001) and the location of the house in relation to the water (C*=0.307 with p≤0.001). This can be explained largely by the proximity to the water and the lack of adaptive capacity in these makeshift settlements (see in detail below). In addition to the case study areas and the housing location, a number of significant correlations can also be observed between hazard exposure and socioeconomic parameters. Regular flooding in particular is experienced more often by households with poor socio-economic status. It is correlated to the household asset index measure (C*=0.326 with p≤0.001). The detailed analysis of the residuals shows that in particular such flooding affecting the entire floor space of the house occurs much more often with households in the lowest asset quintile. Also, those households with the entire house affected regularly by flooding have belowaverage educational levels (C*=0.204 with p≤0.05 and with a residual level of 3.8 between ‘entire house flooded’ and ‘lowest educational level’). Similarly, multiple hazard exposure is correlated to the household asset index (C*=0.258 with p≤0.01), even though this correlation is weaker than in the case of flooding – which can be explained by the more dispersed exposure to extreme events. 6.2.1.8. Preliminary synthesis on household level exposure The above analysis has shown that a considerable proportion of the households in Can Tho City are exposed to one or even several natural hazards, with a clear trend towards intensification. As the external side of vulnerability (cf. 2.1.1; 3.2) household level exposure in Can Tho City has been found to be shaped by a mixture of interacting structural factors in the larger political economy as well as cultural-cognitive and agentive factors of the exposed actors themselves, supporting the heuristic structure suggested in the conceptual framework (cf. 3.2). In terms of dynamic developments, the data reveals that exposure patterns are shaped by a combination of historic root causes (cf. 2.1.1) and more recent economic and institutional pressures (i.e. structural factors) resulting from the ongoing transformation process around doi moi. The latter relate most notably to the pricing of land which can be considered as a gradient with an inverse relationship to hazard exposure. Levels of exposure therefore vary widely between the case study areas

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(with their distinct socio-economic and urban-morphological profile) as well as within the case study areas, depending on the specific housing location. Accordingly, exposure has also been found to strongly correlate with overall endowments of a household, particularly in terms of physical and human livelihood assets. However, whether and how the observed exposure turns into impacts and hardship depends on the susceptibility of the respective households as well as on their coping capacity (cf. 6.2.3) and their more long term capacity for adaptation. These three elements will therefore be discussed in the following sub-chapters (cf. 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4, respectively). 6.2.2. Susceptibility In accordance with the conceptual framework presented in chapter 3.2, vulnerability does not only depend on exposure but also on susceptibility, i.e. the inherent predisposition of humans and other elements conditioning the degree of harm which can be experienced when exposed to a hazard. Following the research questions (cf. 1) and the emphasis on the latent nature of vulnerability (cf. 3), the analysis approaches susceptibility from two directions. It examines the susceptibility factors that can be observed in hazard impacts in the past (and present) but also asks which additional factors are relevant in the face of projected future hazard trends (cf. 4.2). In line with the mixed methods approach (cf. 5) the catalogue of relevant susceptibility factors therefore results from a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning. Most importantly, they emerged from the semistructured household and expert interviews. Yet, partly they are also deduced from the conceptual and empirical literature and specifically from the conceptual framework (chapter 3.2). The latter are particularly associated to future hazards and might not yet be on the agenda of the actors in Can Tho City. 6.2.2.1. Poor housing conditions (history and implications) The research reveals that one of the most central parameters influencing a household’s susceptibility is the physical quality of the house. This is because housing provides a number of key functions in addition to the living space, most importantly for income generation, shelter and socializing. Therefore, housing relates to multiple dimensions of susceptibility – which can also imply simultaneous harm in those dimensions, should the functionality of the house break down due to natural hazards. In addition, the interviews have shown that the house itself is usually amongst the most important physical assets of a household, hence, representing a major share of its wealth. Analyzing the physical quality of the house is also important since its maintenance (or even upgrading and adaptation) consumes a considerable share of a household’s resources and not all households have the same capacity to do so.

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Given these reasons, the next paragraphs will analyze and compare the housing quality in the different case study areas and of different populations groups within them. In a second step, correlations and causal dependencies between the physical susceptibility of housing and other vulnerability factors such as exposure or response capacities are explored. As in other Vietnamese cities, many households in Can Tho City use their residential house also for income generation. This comprises, for example, smallscale manufacturing (e.g. in the textile business), workshops for mechanics, smallscale gastronomy, offices or small shops for trading goods. Those houses are commonly referred to as shop houses – and are in general not specific to Can Tho City as they can be found throughout many Southeast Asian cities. Hence, flooding, storms and erosion affecting the house do in those cases not only disturb the residential function of the house but also have economic impact which needs to be considered in the vulnerability assessment. In total, 19 percent of the interviewed households are living and working in shop houses, showing the high relevance of this group of buildings. The to-beupgraded river bank settlements in An Nghiep Ward has by far the highest percentage of shop houses which is due to the fact that this area is one of the most active market areas in Can Tho City (Figure 6.13; see also Figure 10.15 in the Appendix). In the other case study areas, the proportion of shop houses is in a range between 10 and 22 percent.

Figure 6.13: Shop houses in the case study areas, own draft based on household survey data

In order to analyze the physical susceptibility of the houses to floods, storms and erosion, the building materials and structural configurations of the buildings have been assessed. The household survey thereby focused in particular on the properties of the walls, the roof, the erosion protection (where applicable), the windows,

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the foundation and the floor. In order to condense all of this information into workable data, a housing quality index has been developed and calculated for each household (cf. Table 5.1 for the calculation method). This index hence allows representing the physical susceptibility of a household’s dwelling within one value which can later be juxtaposed and cross-analyzed with other vulnerability factors. The four groups of housing quality are ‘fully makeshift’, ‘largely makeshift’, ‘semi-solid’ and ‘solid’ (cf. Table 5.1). Vietnamese statistics as well as much of the international literature often refer to makeshift houses as ‘temporary’ or ‘semitemporary houses’. However, these terms are misleading given that in most cases the houses are in fact not only used temporarily but make for the permanent housing of the respective households, mostly existing for many years or even decades as the household survey clearly shows. Figure 6.14 displays the housing quality distribution in each of the seven case study areas. A number of key findings can be identified: Overall, the number of fully solid houses is very low, which is mainly due to the fact that even such houses which are otherwise more solid mostly have their roofs made partly or entirely of corrugated iron sheets, making them susceptible to typhoons and storms. The peri-urban case study areas have the highest percentages of makeshift dwellings, accounting for over 40 percent in Hung Phu and 36 percent in Binh Thuy Ward. Most importantly, within Can Tho City’s urban core, the river-bound areas which are due for urban upgrading have significantly higher proportions of makeshift dwellings than the areas further inland and the already upgraded area in An Cu Ward. The river-bound areas in An Nghiep and An Lac therefore not only face a higher hazard exposure than their counterparts further inland of the wards (cf. 6.2.1), they also feature higher degrees of physical susceptibility in the housing stock. The statistical analysis confirms that this correlation between housing condition and case study area is significant at the level of p≤0.001 (with C*=0.393).

Figure 6.14: Quality of housing, own draft based on household survey data

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However, even more significant are the disparities on a micro-scale, particularly within the most exposed (cf. 6.2.1) river-bound settlements along the river banks. Figure 6.15 clearly shows a clear gradient of diminishing average housing quality the closer a household lives to the waterfront or even on the water. Also the correlation analysis confirms that there is a very strong and highly significant correlation between these two variables (C*=0.508 with p≤0.001). Particularly the group of houses built on stilt platforms onto the water has by far the lowest building quality, i.e. the almost 80 percent of the houses in this group can be considered as fully makeshift (meaning the lowest category). Importantly, this correlation exists even though the foundation framework (e.g. wood poles or gravel infill) is not built into the equation for the quality of housing. When conducting this correlation analysis it, hence, becomes evident why the foundation structure was deliberately left out of the quality of the housing index (cf. Table 5.1). Next to the above illustrated correlations, it is little surprising that the housing quality is also strongly correlated with the level of professional attainment (C*=0.330 with p≤0.001) as well as with the overall household wealth measures in terms of the asset index (C*=0.391 with p≤0.001).

Figure 6.15: Relation between quality of housing and location of house, own draft based on household survey data

For those households living directly next to the waterfront, erosion protection infrastructure is an additional key parameter for the physical susceptibility of the house since it aims at mitigating the risk of undercut erosion and collapse. 53 percent of those interviewed households with their house being built partly on land and extending partly onto the water have implemented some sort of physical erosion protection. Of those houses being located completely on land but directly next to the waterfront, even 51 percent have erosion protection. Depending on the intensity of the erosion and the available resources this is either made from con-

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crete (53 percent) or from cheaper but also less durable materials such as sand bags (16 percent), simple gravel (15 percent) or tiles, wood planks and even building rubble (around 3 percent each) (see also Figure 10.6 in the Appendix). Maintaining and upgrading these measures in the light of increasing erosion (cf. 6.2.1) has been emphasized to be of key relevance. Yet, the capacity to do differs widely across different socio-economic groups, which will be analyzed in detail in chapter 6.2.4 on adaptive capacity. 6.2.2.2. Household profiles and susceptibility parameters Next to the housing condition, the semi-structured household and expert interviews revealed that the profile of the household members and the entire household composition are central parameters for susceptibility. This is because the direct physical susceptibility of a person has been found to significantly influences the level of harm suffered in case of a hazard impact – not only for the person him- or herself but eventually for the entire household. The research findings suggest that amongst the most important factors regulating this individual susceptibility are health conditions as well as physical mobility and self-sufficiency. In addition, impacts suffered from a high level of direct human susceptibility (e.g. sickness) can lead to secondary hazard impacts, hence, indicating secondary susceptibility, e.g. in economic terms due to income loss or in social terms due to the inability to keep-up otherwise needed care-taking or support functions. Here, the dual character of susceptibility and coping – illustrated in the conceptual background (cf. 3) – becomes relevant in its interplay, together forming the internal side of vulnerability (cf. 2.1.1; 3.2). Further, the household profile influences the long-term adaptive capacity of the household, e.g. through the availability of labor force or education and professional training – these links will be discussed in more detail in the below chapter on adaptive capacity (cf. 6.2.4). Therefore household profiles are important to consider. Data on household size has been collected in order to get a general feeling for the household compositions and the relation to susceptibility factors. In the case study areas, the household size has been found to range from 1 to 11 household members but no statistically significant difference of the average household size or the range of household members could be found between the case study areas. The mean household size over all areas is 4.8 household members with a standard deviation of 2.1. The median of all households is at 4 members the third quartile at 6. Around five percent of the households have 9 or more members. Some negative correlation could be found between the household size and the per capita asset index (C*0.378 with p≤0.001) as well as the income index (C*0.306 with p≤0.001). This means that, on average, larger households have lower material wealth – which bears some implications for the later discussion of adaptive capacity and the substitution of capacity assets (cf. 6.2.4). Besides these general statistics, the dependency ratio has been computed for each household in order to analyze the household composition in detail and to

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reduce the information to one measure which allows for examining whether and how the household composition is correlated and causally linked to other factors of vulnerability and adaptive capacity. This indicator measures the ratio between the number of elderly and children in relation to the member of household members in working age (cf. Table 5.1 for a detailed explanation of the calculation method and the interpretation of dependency ratio values). The rationale behind using this indicator in the context of susceptibility to natural hazards is threefold: Firstly, children and elderly are on average more susceptible to extreme natural hazards given their bio-physical predispositions (for example, through comparatively lower or slower mobility). Secondly, household members in the working age usually bear the major brunt of taking care of the children and elderly – both in terms of income generation as well as day to day physical care. Therefore, the ratio between the receivers and providers of these care-taking and support functions is of central interest56. This causal structure has been supported by many indepth household interviews. Figure 6.16 represents the overall findings of the dependency ratio, split in different categories. Interestingly, no statistically significant differences in the ratio could be found between the case study areas. Over 30 percent of the interviewed households have a ratio of more than 100 percent, meaning that each person in the working age matches at least one child or elderly. 6 percent of the households even have a ratio between 200 and 500 percent. Interestingly, however, the percentage of elderly-only households is comparatively low, at 1.7 percent. In line with this finding, the child dependency ratio (considering only the younger age group) turns out to be significantly higher – around twice of the Median value – when compared to the aged dependency ratio (calculated only with the elderly) (see Table 6.4). This matches with the reports given in the in-depth household interviews where the challenge of child care in hazard situations was raised much more often than the respective challenge with taking care of elderly household members. These findings are further in line with the general disaster loss statistics in the Mekong Delta showing the high mortality amongst children (cf. 4.1). The data also suggests that the susceptibility of children is of high relevance in the face of extreme hazard events expected in the future. This increased susceptibility is supported by both the causal vulnerability links disclosed in the in-depth interviews as well as the demographic relevance of child dependency, examined through the above-illustrated survey data. Contrasting these findings with the formal disaster risk management measures in Can Tho City (cf. 6.1.1), it is interesting to observe that currently no particular attention is being paid to the question which role state-led risk reduction schemes can play to support specifically the reduction of children’s susceptibility and to assist households in this respect. Chapter 7 will revert back to this point and will 56 Of course the distinction between the providers and beneficiaries of care taking and wider support are by far not as clear-cut as the age groups of the dependency ratio might suggest. The roles might be very different in individual households. However, on aggregate this measure provides a useful proxy for the general household structure in this context.

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explore the resulting recommendations for future disaster risk management in Can Tho City. 1.7

200-500

Mean

Total dependency ratio 64

100-199

Median

50

21.3

42.7

50-99

Maximum

500

200

300

25 Percentile

25

0

16.7

75 Percentile

100

33.3

61.7

6.0

only elderly 16.5 23.1

29.6

0-49 23.1

0

Figure 6.16: Dependency ratio parameters, own draft based on household survey

Aged dependency ratio 21.3

Child dependency ratio 42.8

Table 6.4: Dependency ratio parameters, own draft based on household survey data

Interestingly, however, no statistically significant correlation could be found between the dependency ratio and the case study areas or the location of housing in relation to the river. Neither does a statistically significant correlation exist with the housing quality or the hazard exposure. Also the correlation between the dependency ratio and the income is only rather weak (C*=0.278 with p≤0.01) with higher income households having – on average – a lower dependency ratio. The latter means that the dependency ratio can only to a limited extent indicate financial susceptibility but is a strong indicator for susceptibility in terms of human harm. Another key susceptibility factor related to the household profile is the prevalence of physical and mental challenges or disabilities amongst the household members. The in-depth interviews clearly revealed that challenged household members do not only need particular care in flooding or storm situations, they are also often – depending on the type of disability – more susceptible to catching diseases or suffering from physical impacts (e.g. injuries) or mental impacts (e.g. increased stress levels) induced by the hazard event (e.g. HH-14-ALW; HH-24ALW). The household survey therefore captured the conditions of each household member, particularly asking for mobility, physical challenges, mental challenges, weak eyesight or amaurosis and weak listening or deafness. 29 percent of the households reported at least one member with one or multiple of these challenges. There is a strong correlation between the number of challenged household members and the dependency ratio (C*0.347 with p≤0.001) which shows that particularly the elderly are often physically or mentally disabled and deserve increased care – especially in crises and hazard situations. Considering that flooding is amongst the major current and future hazards in Can Tho City, the ability to swim is one of most fundamental susceptibility factors, especially against the background of extreme flood events predicted for the future (cf. 4.2). This holds true in particular for children – as the high casualties in this age group in past disasters reveal – but is also of key relevance for adults.

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Strikingly, in only 26 percent of the interviewed households, all household members are able to swim. In contrast, 63 percent of the households have some members who cannot swim, including infants, children and elderly, but also adults in working age. In 9 percent of the cases, none of the household members can swim, marking a particularly high susceptibility for the entire household. Particularly the susceptibility of infants has been emphasized in the in-depth interviews given that infants cannot swim and are at risk of drowning even in comparatively low flood levels – hence making them considerably susceptible already to today’s flooding patterns. The following quote by a household head in Binh Thuy Ward underscores such concerns: “When we still had the higher flooding in the house I was very much afraid that my small grandchildren could drown in the water, particularly at night time when the children and we were sleeping and sometimes the children slept on the ground.” (HH-29-BTW)

Yet, despite the high susceptibility of infants and small children the inability to swim is also wide-spread amongst people in working age. In a striking 52 percent of the interviewed households, none (15 percent) or only some (37 percent) of the household members aged 15 to 64 can swim. Hence these households face a particularly high susceptibility in relation to extreme flooding, not only because the mid-aged household members are susceptible themselves but also because their ability to take care of other members (infants, children, elderly and immobile) in flooding situations is seriously limited. Interestingly, the detailed analysis shows with a high level of significance (p ≤ 0.001) that the closer the households live to (or even on) the water, the higher is the capacity to swim amongst the adult age cohort (C*=0.328). A similar correlation can, hence, also be found with respect to the larger case study area (C*=0.438 with p≤0.001). This, again, hints at the close link between coping and susceptibility. 6.2.2.3. Health effects The interview data shows that health conditions can surely be considered one of the central susceptibility factors in terms of, both, harm experienced from current hazard conditions as well as potential impacts resulting from future hazard trends. Hence, the analysis of health-susceptibility-links can be informed by health impacts observable from past hazards as well as by triangulating health implications likely to co-evolve with future trends in hazard profiles – as well as with trends in health related coping capacity which will be explored in the next chapter (cf. 6.2.3). While the rate of casualties and severe injuries incurred by extreme hazard events has in the past been rather low in Can Tho City, a significant number of the exposed households reported to suffer health impacts around the time of the regular flooding. The most prevalent impacts are fever and coughing (see Figure 6.17). Interestingly, diarrhea and skin disease – while repeatedly being mentioned in the in-depth interviews as relevant problems – are not being strongly associated to flooding and were argued to play only a minor role in this context. Secondary in-

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quiry revealed that they are predominantly associated to food. Overall, 28 percent of all interviewed households have reported health effects from flooding for at least one member of the household; and 10 percent even of two or more members from different age groups. Most interviewees argued that infants and children are particularly susceptible, partly because they ingest water and have a weaker immune system. However, the data shows that health impacts have in fact been also wide-spread in the other age groups (Figure 6.17). Yet interestingly no statistically significant differences exist between the case study areas and the health impacts (cf. Table 6.4).

Figure 6.17: Health effects attributed to regular flooding, own draft based on household survey data

In addition to the health impacts listed above, a number of households reported on more severe problems, as the following quote from a household in Binh Thuy ward exemplifies – which in the meantime elevated its house to avoid flooding: “But the health problems resulting from the flooding were even worse [earlier, she had explained a range of other impacts]. We even caught polio in our family. Nobody else around in the neighborhood had polio, only we.” (HH-33-BTW)

However, the detailed inquiry in the in-depth household interviews also showed that it is hard to ascribe such health impacts to the flooding exclusively and to discern them from other causes. Therefore very detailed data with a fine temporal resolution and medical triangulation would be needed to single out the effect of flooding on the health situation, in contrast to other daily health hazards such as poor hygiene more generally. Yet, such a detailed assessment could not be achieved within the scope of this study. In contrast, the health impacts due to extraordinary extreme hazard events can be discerned more clearly. Yet, the prevalence rates are also much lower in this context than the ones for the regular flooding which can be related to the comparatively seldom occurrence of extreme events in Can Tho City’s past (cf. 4.1).

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Only 12 percent of the household having experienced extreme events directly in their house had also experienced any considerable health impacts out of which children up to 15 years account for more than half (6.4 percent). In terms of hazard types, extreme flooding had much higher reported impacts than storms. Fever, diarrhea, coughing and skin diseases were – in this order – again the most prevalent issues. Interestingly, however, no statistically significant correlation between the prevalence rate of health impacts and the location of the house in relation to the water could be found for the health impacts of extreme events. However, the latter could also be due to the low number of cases for the statistical analysis. 6.2.2.4. Health insurance In line with the above health risks, health insurance coverage has been repeatedly mentioned in the expert interviews to be a prime factor of vulnerability, closely related to susceptibility according to the framework used here (cf. 3.2). Two main causes for this link can be found. Firstly, people with health insurance have been argued to be – on average – in a better health condition, primarily because chronic diseases or injuries usually do not go untreated in these cases. Hence, the baseline physical susceptibility is kept low. Secondly, people with health insurance have been argued to be more secured economically, should they suffer health impacts form a hazard event, necessitating otherwise costly treatment. Hence, their (secondary) economic susceptibility is lowered. The latter can be understood as the inverse of coping capacity (cf. 6.2.3), hence, underscoring the afore-mentioned close connection between both dimensions (cf. 3.2). In accordance with the national situation on health insurance coverage (cf. 4.3), also Can Tho City’s population has a relatively low average health insurance coverage. Of the 588 interviewed households, only 18 have all household members covered by health insurance. In a staggering 25 percent none of the members are covered and in another 28 percent only less than half. The remaining households have coverage for half (10 percent) or more than half (19 percent) of the household members. This means that a high percentage of households face the risk of high out-of-pocket payments in case household members get injured by strong hazard events. Of particular importance for the hazard context is that those households living in stilt houses on the river – and facing increased levels of a number of vulnerability parameters – have a significantly lower coverage compared to people living further away from the waterfront (C*=0.269 with p≤0.01; see Figure 6.18). There is also a highly significant statistical correlation between the wealth of a household, measured in terms of the household asset index, and the health care coverage (C*=0.362 with p≤0.001; see Table 6.5). This means that on average households have better overall health care coverage the wealthier they are. Similarly, high correlation exists between the educational level and the health care coverage (C*=0.392 with p≤0.001).

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Apart from the governmental insurance scheme, the role of private (additional) health insurances – propagated by recent policy initiatives (cf. 4.3) – is almost negligible in Can Tho City. Only 16 of the interviewed households (i.e. less than three percent) have purchased such insurance for one or more of their members, all of which come from households in the upper two wealth quintiles. Also the indepth household interviews reveal that these private insurance schemes are widely considered inaccessible to low income households, due to the high costs involved.

Figure 6.18: Coverage with public health care insurance, own draft based on household survey data

6.2.2.5. Economic susceptibility and opportunity costs In addition to the susceptibility related to physical harm and health, the interviews revealed considerable susceptibility related to economic activity and income earning. Particularly those households living and working in shop houses in the areas most prone to flooding, notably in An Nghiep Ward and An Lac Ward, reported economic losses related to flooding. Yet, given that a separate PhD thesis with the WISDOM project concentrates exclusively on numeric flood loss modeling in Can Tho City, the following section is kept at a limited level of depth in terms of the quantitative analysis (see in more detail the ongoing work of Do Thi Chinh, GeoForschungsZentrum Potsdam, whose findings support the below-presented results, cf. Chinh 2013). The interviews and field observations suggest that, in terms of regular flooding (cf. 6.2.1), the group most affected are grocery retailers who often use the floor of their shop or the space in front of it to display their products (cf. Figures 10.8 and 10.15 in the Appendix). The direct loss of products due to flood damage was reported to be comparatively low, given that most of the flood events are foreseeable with the tide cycle. However, income losses nevertheless were report-

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ed to occur due to the fact that the products had to be evacuated during times of flooding, meaning that no trading can take place during those times. In other words, the economic opportunity costs resulting from flooding constitute a substantial problem in terms of economic susceptibility to date. These are further increased by the costs for flood preparation (e.g. the evacuation of goods) as well as the recovery (e.g. the cleaning and refurnishing of the shop) (e.g. HH24-ALW). All of these activities take-up substantial manpower which otherwise could be used for income generation. The research clearly showed that these economic opportunity costs are often highest amongst households in the lower wealth quintile groups because it is those households that most often have to revert to informal income generation activities within their own shop house. Hence, these households face a double pressure from precarious income constellations and an increased economic susceptibility in respect to flooding and other natural hazards. Additionally, a number of households reported income losses inflicted by health impacts (cf. 6.2.2.3). The survey data reveals that to date such nonproductive time usually lasts up to two or three days, depending on the sickness. Furthermore, a number of flood affected household members reported to suffer from reduced productivity during and after times of flooding, as the following quote illustrates: “When the flooding occurred at night time we had to stay up and could not sleep. This is very bad for your health and also you cannot concentrate and work well on the following days.” (HH-33-BTW)

Next to the economic susceptibility around income loss, the damage or loss of physical infrastructure is the most central challenge in terms of economic susceptibility. However, in contrast to the above-presented income loss due to regular flooding, the loss or damage of physical assets is most commonly related to extreme hazard events (cf. 6.2.1). Of those households having experienced extraordinary strong floods or storms in the past, 27 percent experienced partial or complete destruction of their house which needed to be repaired. A weak correlation can be identified between the housing location (i.e. the distance to water bodies) and the damage experienced due to extreme hazards over the last years (C*=0.280 with p≤0.01). More than half of the households suffering from loss and damage to the house needed to repair the roof; with walls, floors, doors and fundament poles making for the remainder. In line with the hazard experience (cf. 6.2.1; 4.1) the most important single event in terms of experienced damage was in this context the typhoon Linda in 1997. Yet, also the increase in extreme storms and floods over the recent years (see Figure 6.7 in chapter 6.2.1) is mirrored by an increase in the amount of loss and damage that can be recorded over the recent years. More detailed figures on the financial means needed for repairing those damages are provided in the next chapter focusing on coping mechanisms and capacities (cf. 6.2.3). In addition to the damage in the housing structure, 14 percent of the households affected by extreme events in the past suffered considerable losses in terms of furniture and appliances at a level so that assets had to be repaired or replaced.

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Interestingly, they mainly concern wood furniture; in contrast electronic devices such as television sets, radios, computers or refrigerators were only of minor importance – which is at least partly due to the fact that they had not been as common in 1997 and can be evacuated out of the danger zone today. There is a high correlation between damage related to the housing structure and the appliances (C*=0.530 with p≤0.001), showing the double burden of the most affected households. The question which level of long-term economic harm can be caused by natural hazard events also depends on the capacity to buffer income loss and to overcome crises situations, e.g. through reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and through economic recovery more generally. These aspects will be discussed in detail in the following chapter on coping capacity (cf. 6.2.3). 6.2.2.6. Preliminary synthesis on household level susceptibility The above paragraphs have examined the main patterns and factors of susceptibility in relation to natural hazards events in Can Tho City. Based on the previous section on exposure, this sub-chapter has hence embarked on the internal side of vulnerability and has asked for the predispositions that shape the level of harm experienced by exposed households. Drawing on the empirical research, a number of key susceptibility factors could be identified, most notably in relation to the housing conditions, the household profile, the human physical conditions and the economic activities. In line with the conceptual framing (cf.3), the findings reveal that susceptibility needs to be understood in multi-dimensional terms, comprising physical, social, economic and institutional dimensions. These dimensions can also be framed along the five capital stocks suggested in the sustainable livelihoods framework (cf. 2.1.1), which will be done in more detail in the discussion chapter (cf. 7.1.1). In particular, the analysis has shown that these dimensions are linked through multiple feedbacks and that the above indicated key susceptibility factors can simultaneously have influence on all these dimensions (as the example of house damage or sickness incurred by natural hazards have shown). However, the findings also underscore that susceptibility can only be understood in its coexistence and close interplay with capacity to cope, i.e. the capacity to counterbalance or compensate existing susceptibility. Only from this integrated perspective can the internal side of vulnerability (cf. 3.2) be captured in its entirety. Therefore, the next sub-chapter examines coping capacities and mechanisms in more detail.

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6.2.3. Coping capacities and measures “Ráng mỡ gà, có nhà thì chống” [When the clouds at dusk appear yellow, you should prepare your house against the coming storm.] Vietnamese Proverb

Based on the above analysis of the exposure and susceptibility patterns, the analysis now turns to the coping capacity. It asks how the affected households in Can Tho City deal with the respective natural hazards and what can be learned from the current coping mechanisms for appraising future dynamics related to not only changes in the hazard profiles but also in the socio-economic conditions. Guided by the conceptual framework (cf. 3) the analysis is considerate of coping action shortly before, during and after the actual hazard situation. Since particularly the preparatory coping measures are tightly related to the prior awareness and knowledge on the hazard, the availability and processing of early warning information is shortly analyzed. However, apart from currently observable coping mechanisms the analysis aims to dig deeper and to assess also the (latent) capacity with respect to extreme hazard events and creeping hazard trends projected to potentially happen in future (cf. 4.2). 6.2.3.1. Early warning The capacity to prepare for and cope with hazards strongly depends on the availability and quality early warning information. Since the floods and storms experienced in Can Tho City are rather slow-onset hazards, early warning is not of such central importance as under different rapid onset hazard conditions (e.g. Tsunami risk). However, taking a closer look at early warning is nevertheless important given that the most severe urban floods in Can Tho City only develop when tidal floods coincide with high overall water levels in the rivers and especially with heavy precipitation events – which are hard to predict through lay appraisal. In addition, also the intensity of upcoming storms or even typhoons is hard to estimate without more professional prediction from the meteorological service (cf. 4.1). The interview data shows that the early warning conception of the households differs widely from the one of the local authorities. The latter have – in the expert interviews – put strong emphasis on the personal early warning by ward and group leaders and its combined function to share information and advice on required preparatory action (cf. 6.1.1). In contrast, the survey data shows that the households in fact consider this source of information of very limited relevance only, with television being by far the most dominant source of earl warning information (Figure 6.19). Yet, interestingly in those case study areas with lower socio-economic status of the population, the information provided directly by the local authorities was considered slightly more important than average – with, for

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example, eight percent of the households in the river-bound settlement in An Lac Ward considering this as their primary source of early warning information. The interviews revealed that this kind of personal warning happens primarily in households regarded by the local authorities as particularly vulnerable. The following quote by an old lady living in An Lac Ward illustrates that: “In 2006 there was storm number six which was a strong storm that destroyed parts of my roof. […] In general I had learned from the TV and the radio that a storm is approaching Can Tho. But before the storm hit here, there were some people from the local People’s Committee who came to my house and gave me a lot of information on the upcoming storm and on what to do. [...] One hour before the storm got really bad, one officer from the information house went around and warned the people again. He had also come to my house.” (HH-18ALW)

Yet, the in-depth interviews have also revealed that the functioning of such personal care depends heavily on the engagement of the respective local officers and does not work effectively in all case study areas. This is in line with observation made in the literature that despite the centralistic government structure there can be strong differences in the governance modes between administrative units even at the most local grid in Vietnam (cf. 4.5).

Figure 6.19: Sources of early warning information, own draft based on household survey data

The importance of an effective early warning system gets underscored when considering that the majority of interviewees stated to have been taken by surprise at least once in the past in terms of the occurrence and/or the severity of an extreme flood or storm event. Out of those interviewees having experienced extraordinary high flooding or extraordinary strong storm events affecting their house in Can Tho City in the past (which applies to 48 percent of the surveyed households), 60 percent stated to have been “completely surprised” or “not know[ing] that the flood would be coming”. An additional 22 percent stated to have in general been aware of the upcoming hazard event; but that the event turned out to be more extreme than expected. Only 14 percent had not been surprised about the severity at

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all. Interestingly, even for those households having experienced more than one of those extreme events, two thirds had been again fully or partly surprised by intensity of the hazard. This problem is further intensified by the changes in hazard patterns (cf. 6.2.5.1) which increasingly challenges the reliability of local knowledge and experience and underscore the need for fine-gridded and reliable early warning. One interviewee often affected by flooding phrases this aspect as follows: “The weather is increasingly becoming different from what we were used to in the past. The rains are much heavier now, so we get very extreme rains in a short time. […] Also the seasons come very suddenly now and the change between the seasons is faster and not as regularly as in the past. So sometimes the flood arrives earlier now and sometimes later. […] That is why we have to listen more carefully to the weather forecast now.” (HH-34-ANW)

Considering the above issues in conjunction, it is little surprising that in the household survey an overwhelming 98 percent of the interviewees agreed to the sentence that “official warnings on upcoming storms and strong floods could be more effective if they came earlier” (with 60 percent stating to “agree strongly” and 38 percent to “agree”). In general, these findings support the concern raised in the expert interviews with local authorities that – independent from the mode of communication – the information in the warnings is often not specific enough or even issues wrong predictions (cf. 6.1.1.3). 6.2.3.2. Fortifying the house Based on the early warning information or on own experiences and predictions (e.g. regarding the tide calendar) many households fortify their house against strong winds and/or increased erosion. 13 percent of the interviewees have reported to fortify their roof in case of storm warnings through, for example, applying additional wood planks or old motorbike tires as ballast. Almost all of these cases are households with makeshift or partly makeshift buildings including roofs of corrugated iron sheets or even palm leafs. In order to cope with flooding, a number of households build small temporary dyke systems (with gravel or even sand bags) or apply other constructions, e.g. they block off their doors with plastic sheets (see Figure 10.9 in the Appendix). Yet, these temporary systems are not too common. The survey revealed that they are only used by around 13 percent of the households regularly affected by tidal flooding. Even though the representatives from the party-state apparatus had in the expert interviews emphasized that financial and practical support for house fortification would be provided to the most vulnerable households (cf. 6.1.1), the survey indeed yields a different result. Contrary to the assertions from within the partystate-apparatus, the instructions on how to prepare and fortify the house were backed with financial support in only one case. Also support in terms of work force is – if needed – self-organized and coming from neighbors and relatives, but not from governmental organizations. A household head in a makeshift dwelling

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built over the water in An Nghiep Ward summarizes these points in his own experiences as follows: Household head: “The local leaders came to my house and went through all rooms. They showed me in detail which parts of my house I have to improve and reinforce.” Interviewer: “And will you follow their instructions?” Household head: “Oh yes, of course, I have to!” Interviewer: “But do you also get financial support?” Household head: “No.” Interviewer: “What happens if you don’t have enough money?” Household head: “I hope that this will not be a problem for me.” (HH-35-ANW)

Also a ward leader in Binh Thuy Ward confirmed that there is usually no financial support from any government organization paid for preparatory work but that financial support is – if at all – only provided for recovery and repair after the hazard event: “We do usually not give money to the households to prepare for the storm or flood. We only distribute money if there in fact was a storm or flood and houses got damaged. In those cases we often pay money for the repair. In terms of the preparation there is a different budget for that which is the budget for supporting households with a poverty certificate. But this is then only of the poor households.” (HH-32-BTW; with the interviewee being the head of a residential block)

The implications of this re-active, rather than preventive, focus are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 6.2.3.3. Elevating appliances and other household assets Much more common than the fortification of the house is the elevation and/or temporary removal of household assets when strong flooding is expected (see Figure 10.9 in the Appendix). 38 percent of all interviewed households apply this measure. 69 percent of this group are households which are regularly affected by tidal flooding and, hence, have to repeat this measure frequently. Yet, the other 31 percent only has to do this occasionally in cases of extraordinary flood events. Interestingly, the vast majority (97 percent) only elevate furniture and appliances within the house and do not move anything to other places outside the house. In those few cases in which assets are moved out, the places of relatives or neighbors, but also local pagodas, have been mentioned as primary locations. Further, those households having a house with more than one storey have the opportunity to move valuable assets into the upper floor(s). Yet, particularly in makeshift settlements along the river banks in An Lac and An Nghiep Ward most of the dwellings only have one storey. Hence, these households do not have the opportunity for such elevation – despite being faced with the highest exposure and susceptibility levels (cf. 6.2.1; 6.2.2). Thus, in terms of vulnerability drivers, they face a tri-

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ple-pressure which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Local neighbors and relatives are the primary sources of labor support should this be needed. Interestingly – and in line with the above sections – no single household has reported to receive labor force support from any state institution for elevating or evacuating household assets. 6.2.3.4. Evacuating children and other household members to safe(r) places Next to the elevation of physical household assets, the evacuation of susceptible household members has been found to be one of the most important coping strategies. Nine percent of all interviewed households have in the past evacuated some or all household members in the event of strong storms and/or floods to prevent physical harm. Evacuation has in this context been operationalized as a mid-term strategy of relocation to another building lasting at least for half a day. In around half of the cases only children, elderly and invalids have been evacuated. In the other half, all household members left the house. Evacuation is applied most often in the river bank settlement in An Lac Ward as well as in the peri-urban case study areas where a high hazard exposure concurs with low housing qualities and, hence, an increased risk of housing damage or even collapse during strong storms and floods. Therefore, a correlation can be observed between evacuation activity and the case study area (C*=0.378 with p≤0.001) as well as the location of housing in relation to the river (C*=0.344 with p≤0.001). A weak correlation can also be observed to the household income with households in the lower two quintiles showing above-average evacuation activity while the upper two quintile groups have lower values (C*=0.221 with p≤0.05). Serving as evacuation shelters are either the houses of relatives and friends in safer locations and with better building structures, or public buildings, most importantly pagodas, local government buildings, churches, or school buildings (in this order). Similarly to the above-presented findings on house fortification and the elevation of assets, support has been – where necessary – mainly coming from neighbors and relatives. Only one household reported that government staff helped with the evacuation. In terms of potential evacuation behavior in case of stronger floods or storms in future, an overwhelming 91 percent of the interviewed households maintained that they would evacuate their families and themselves to other places if the local authorities issued a respective advice. This is in line with the in-depth interviews and shows that there is in general a wide-spread acceptance of (hypothetical) evacuation. However, a number of disadvantages and problems are also seen in relation to evacuation. The interviews reveal that the most important concerns are, first, the fear of theft when the house is unattended and, second, the perceived need to stay at the house in order to react directly to impending damages. In particular the risk of theft is of wide-spread concern (stated by 43 percent of all households interviewed in the survey). The data from the in-depth interviews suggest that this

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concern currently prevents many household members from opting for evacuation. The following quote by a person living in An Lac Ward illustrates this worry: “I cannot really protect my house. So when there is a storm or something and I have to take refuge somewhere else, thieves can break into my house quite easily and can steel my things.” (HH-19-ALW)

Therefore, combined modes are often implemented – as the following quote by another person from the same ward illustrates: “In 2005 when we had a strong storm coming up the officers from the local People’s Committee came to our house and told us to bring the children to the information house [local People’s Committee office] so that they are more safe. The children then stayed there for a couple of hours. […] But the officers had told us to stay at home and take care of the house.” (HH-14-ALW)

Interestingly, of those few interviewees who have experienced state-led evacuation in the past (either of their own household members or of other related people) more than 40 percent complained that the evacuation was ‘quite chaotic and did not really work’, due to for example a too short lead time and an uncertainty on both sides (evacuees as well as local authorities) on the places and procedures. However, despite the shortcomings in the implementation, evacuation is in general widely judged as a “good measure that helps to prevent that people drown or get injured” (with 98 percent of the interviewees being in general agreement to this statement). In parallel, 89 percent of the households maintained that generally the local government “knows better than [us] if, when and where to go” in case evacuation is necessary in emergency situations. Together with the assessed shortcomings above, this general approval provides an important base for debating the feasibility and acceptance of evacuation mechanisms for the future. Yet, given the low overall relevance of evacuation in the past, it is also little surprising that only 12 percent of all the interviewed households were able to tell in the household survey, where they would find official evacuation shelters should there be a strong typhoon or flood. This low proportion shows that the official policy of establishing evacuation shelters for typhoons and raising awareness, as envisaged in Can Tho City’s current Action Plan for Disaster Risk Prevention (cf. 6.1.1), is not yet comprehensively implemented. 6.2.3.5. Repair and recovery All households affected by flooding and storms have emphasized the need to invest time, labor and resources for the aftercare of the house and property. While cleaning is commonly described as annoying and tiresome – particularly where households are frequently affected by flooding – it usually does not imply any serious problems or the need for larger livelihood capital investments57. In con57 This does not consider the income loss and other opportunity costs during flooding periods (which is discussed in chapter 6.2.2.5 above).

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trast, if parts of the houses are damaged or household assets lost, their repair and replacement have been stated to require serious efforts and capital expenditures which significantly strain the household’s capacities, often beyond their own limits. Based on the earlier-explored damage figures (cf. 6.2.2.5) it is of great relevance to ask how the costs for repair and replacement are borne as well as whether and from where external support is provided should the costs exceed the household’s own capacities. The reported costs for repairing damages of physical structures inflicted by single hazard events range from 30,000 (around 1.70 USD at the time of the interviews) to 60 million dong (around 3,360 USD), with a mean value of around 3.3 million dong (around 185 USD) and the third quartile being at 1.85 million dong (around 104 USD)58. Interestingly, the values for the damage of household assets other than the housing structure (most notably appliance, furniture, motorbikes etc.) were even higher. Ranging up to 100 million dong in extreme cases (around 5,600 USD) the mean loss per hazard event was at around 5.95 million dong (around 334 USD), yet the third quartile at 4 million dong (around 225 USD). Correlating the costs for repairing housing structures with the households’ material wealth (measured along the household asset index) shows that households in first four asset quintiles experience a similar range of costs. This demonstrates the high pressure on the lower wealth quintiles, since they face housing damage costs comparable to those in the medium wealth quintiles, yet with a lower capacity to negotiate those costs. In terms of other household assets (appliances, furnishing etc.), the costs have been found to increase more steadily with the overall household wealth. Yet, also here a distinct jump in the costs can be observed between the third and fourth quintile group. The data from the household survey and the in-depth household interviews reveals that the costs for repair and recovery are largely borne by the respective households themselves with outside support only playing a comparatively minor role. The number of households who received financial support (donations and/or private loans) from relatives or other social contacts was surprisingly low. In fact only 10 percent of those households who had to repair their house after extreme hazard events in the past received such support. Similarly, only 21 percent of those households suffering other asset losses received external support from private social networks. The in-depth interviews suggest that the latter is slightly higher because of the fact that such items, e.g. furniture or kitchen equipment, are more widely available amongst the households and can thus be more easily shared. Overall, the in-depth interviews suggest the surprisingly low rates of support (in terms of, both, donations and loans) are largely due to the fact that the social contacts of these households are also little wealthy and only have very limited resources to make considerable financial contributions. This linkage is also supported by the fact that the received support is correlated with the access to 58 Dollar values are calculated based on the price level and currency rate at the time of the household survey.

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general income remittances (C*=0.218 with p≤0.001) and also features a low correlation to the own asset endowment (C*=0.182 with p≤0.001). Analysis of the residuals underscores that those households with low asset endowments and little access to remittances also register below-average support rates from relatives and other social contacts. In other words, the data shows that a low income and wealth profile will not automatically be compensated by increased support from other social networks. Rather the opposite is true in Can Tho City: Those households featuring a low income and assets profile also face the greatest difficulties in receiving external financial support from private contacts, given that their social networks are often in a similarly precarious situation. In order to overcome this stratification of social support networks and to increase support across income groups there is in principle a redistribution mechanism under the direction of the local authorities, i.e. the Flood and Storm Fund introduced in chapter 6.1.1. One of the interviewed household heads who is also a leader in his residential group describes this mechanism as follows: Household head: “If houses are strongly damaged by floods or storms, the government usually collects money from the middle-class people and gives it to the poor.” Interviewer: “How is this organized?” Household head: “Usually, officers of the ward’s people’s committee do that. When there is a strong flood or storm, the people’s committee prepares a list of damages and asks richer people to help and give money for the poorer households. I have also done this in the past.” (HH01-HPW)

However, the household survey results indicate that the actual number of beneficiaries is in fact rather small, covering only 14 percent of those households in need of repairing parts of their house. In most cases, the amount was below one million dong but given the low number of cases no statistically sound analysis can be accomplished (this variable is therefore not considered in Tables 5.1 and 6.5). This low rate of beneficiaries is remarkable particularly due to the fact that amongst the remaining households, a high number holds a poverty certificate and would hence, according to the law, be entitled to special support for housing improvement (cf. 6.1.1). Based on the households’ limited past experience with extremely high loss and damage costs and especially with external support for overcoming them, the question is of key relevance how households would hypothetically overcome even higher damage in the event of stronger hazards in the future (e.g. an intensive typhoon). This question is closely in line with the conceptual interest in assessing the vulnerability and coping capacity towards currently latent hazards which might not yet have stricken but are likely according to geo-physical hazard projections (cf. 4.2; 1; 3.1). The in-depth interviews showed that in principle four modes for financial support and risk spreading would be conceivable should loss and damage exceed the household’s own capacities for repair and recovery. Firstly, in terms of relatives and other social contacts, the households were asked to estimate which social contacts within Vietnam and/or overseas could provide considerable financial support for repairing or rebuilding the house should

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it be destroyed or damaged in an extreme flood, storm or erosion event. In terms of networks within Vietnam, only 11 percent of the households suppose that they would indeed receive such support, with the majority estimating the potential maximum support to remain below 10 million dong (see Figure 6.20). Of the remaining households, 54 percent think that they simply do not have any social contacts with such a capacity, while 24 percent think to have such contacts but that they would not be willing to issue such support. 11 percent find it hard to tell. These figures are in line with the above-presented findings on the fairly low levels of external support that can be observed to date. Strikingly, the potential support considered from outside of Vietnam is only slightly smaller, with 8 percent of the households feeling assured of such backing. This indicates the noticeable importance of expatriate Vietnamese who keep close ties with their relatives and contacts in Vietnam and support them in multiple ways (e.g. also through regular remittances). The data, hence, suggests that such international contacts (could) play an important role when considering the hypothetical coping mechanisms with respect to extreme disasters in the future. Yet again, the option of such support pertains to a limited number of households only. The data shows that those households being in the most precarious situation currently also do not have wealthy overseas relatives who could support them in crises situations – otherwise, they would probably be wealthier already, as the in-depth interviews suggest, due to constant flows of remittances. Together, three percent of households would expect double support, i.e. from contacts outside as well as inside Vietnam. In the rest of the cases, households expect support only from one or the other source, which means, however, that the total percentage of potential receivers is larger than the above figure on the single categories would suggest – amounting to 17 percent of all interviewed households. Interestingly, there is a quite strong correlation between the expected support and the overall asset endowment of the household itself, particularly with regards to physical capital and human capital. A statistically highly significant correlation can be observed, for example, between the income of a household and its perceived potential for external support from social contacts within Vietnam (C*=0.341 with p≤0.001), meaning that households in the lower income quintiles are less likely not have this opportunity than households with higher income. This relation can also be observed with regards to support from overseas contacts – even though it is weaker in that case (C*=0.288 with p≤0.05). In addition, a moderate correlation between the educational and professional level of the household and its opportunity to receive external financial support from within Vietnam as well as from overseas can be shown (between C*=0.232 and C*=0.305) with a very strong or strong level of significance (p≤0.001 and p≤0.01) (see also Table 6.4). The detailed analysis of the adjusted standardized residuals reveals that the lower the educational attainment of the household members the less likely the households can revert to external financial support for damage and loss recovery following a disaster.

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Needless to say that these estimations can only serve as broad proxy measures and can contain high uncertainties. However, they have been triangulated in the in-depth interviews (both with households and experts) and match with the figures on the overall income and remittances. They are hence used here as a broad indication for future coping assistance and they reveal the difficulties and limited potential to compensate financial or economic constraints with external support provided by private social networks.

Figure 6.20: Social contacts for potential financial post disaster support, own draft based on household survey data

Secondly, households can potentially borrow money but the access to loans or private money lenders is quite limited for low income households with low asset endowment. The in-depth interviews have revealed that particularly these low income households – which have amongst the highest vulnerability anyhow (cf. 6.2.1; 6.2.2) – do mostly not have sufficient collaterals to get access to bank loans (e.g. HH-25-BTW; HH-13-ALW; HH-31-BTW). Related to the previous point, also the access to private money lenders, e.g. relatives or neighbors, is limited since they either are resource-starved themselves or consider the chances for receiving paybacks as low and, hence, want to avoid dissent (e.g. HH-19-ALW). Therefore, a certain paradox has been repeatedly mentioned in the semi-structured interviews: On the one hand, household members expect that in case of a disaster and, hence, a financial emergency the willingness to support relatives and social contacts would be higher. On the other hand, if the disaster takes effect on a meso-scale (e.g. in case of a typhoon) it is considered likely that also the potential supporters are affected and need to tap their financial buffers for themselves. Further, it has been noted that the emergency situation worsens the chances for payback even further, due to potential long-term costs as well as disruptions in terms of income generation. Hence, the motivation for lending money to affected relatives and friends is hampered, despite the felt pressure to provide support (HH-01HPW).

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Thirdly, the semi-structured interviews as well as the household survey data suggest that a lot of the residents’ trust is placed on governmental support for repair and recovery should a strong disaster take place. However, there are also wide-spread concerns that the amount of support would not be sufficient. The following statement by a comparatively poor household head in Hung Phu Ward illustrates these concerns and places them in the larger context: Interviewer: “Imagine your roof would be destroyed by a very strong storm, how would you pay for repairing the damage?” Household head: “If a storm damaged or destroyed my roof, I would have to pay for the repair by myself. I would probably try to ask for some help from relatives. But if they could not help me, I would ask for some support from the government. However, repairing a strongly damaged roof would probably cost around 10 million dong. But the government would probably only give me around 500,000 dong.” (HH-01-HPW)

Fourthly, the survey data clearly underscores that private asset insurances are almost nonexistent amongst the residents in Can Tho City. In fact only 2 percent of the interviewed households have any private asset insurance whatsoever out of which only less than half cover the residential and/or shop house against floods and storms. The remaining asset insurances cover mainly car theft. Given this low average coverage, private asset insurance only plays a negligible role for supporting repair and recovery processes should a strong disaster happen in the near future. Considering the above limitations, the question is also of interest, whether people would in future contribute more to the CFSC fund (see chapter 6.1.1.2) so that its volume could be increased and could reach a higher number of beneficiaries. While 30 percent of the interviewees stated that they would in fact contribute more to the CFSC fund in case of a particularly strong disaster would happen, 56 percent claimed that they would not spend more, either because they do not consider themselves to have sufficient resources to do so (40 percent) or because they are not willing to contribute more (16 percent) – with the remaining 14 percent of the interviewees answering not to know what they would do in such a situation. Moderate to strong correlations can be found between the perceived ability to spend more and a number of the most important household wealth indicators, i.e. the household asset endowment (C*=0.413 with p≤0.001), the household income (C*=0.366 with p≤0.001), the educational level (C*=0.290 with p≤0.001), professional level (C*=0.277 with p≤0.001) and the location of housing in relation to the river (C*=0.312 with p≤0.001). Interestingly, there is also a negative correlation with the exposure to regular tidal flooding in the house (C*=0.301 with p≤0.001) and the need to elevate and/or evacuate household assets during flooding situations (C*0.339 with p≤0.001). Hence, even those households which experience flooding themselves and would therefore – one could expect – have a higher willingness to donate for the CFSC fund do not have the sufficient resources to do so (with a very large positive adjusted standardized residual of 5.2 between “elevate assets inside the house” and “would spend more but cannot afford”).

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6.2.3.6. Preliminary synthesis on coping capacity and action at household level The above analysis has applied an integrated perspective. It considered current coping measures and the respective capacity patterns, while also exploring the (gaps in) latent capacity to cope with future hazard extremes which have not yet been experienced but which are projected for the future (cf. 4.2). The most commonly applied coping measures comprise activities before, during and after the hazard events. The data reveals considerable disparities of capacity portfolios between different socio-economic groups. Further, correlations and causal feedbacks with the other vulnerability dimensions could be observed, meaning that those groups facing the highest exposure and susceptibility are in many respects also faced with the greatest constraints to cope with future hazard scenarios, even though effective ways for coping with current hazard conditions might have been found. This is linked to the finding that future changes in hazard profiles imply increased challenges in all three phases, e.g. in terms of fortifying the houses against stronger storms, reaching thresholds for vertical elevation of household assets in the face increased flood levels or being in need of increased resources for negotiating higher levels of physical loss and damage. The findings underscore that both hard and soft measures are of key relevance and need to be understood in their close interconnection. Accordingly, the analysis has revealed that coping capacities are rooted in different types of livelihood assets. For example, the intellectual capacity to acquire and process early warning information (soft measure) is only rendered useful if it is matched by the capacity to implement hard coping measures drawing either on own physical and economic capital or on social capital to acquire external support. However, regarding the latter, the analysis has revealed some unexpected limits, particularly regarding the access to support from social networks which could be used for compensating own deficits in economic or financial capacity. Similarly, a fairly poor integration has been found between the state-led action for disaster risk response and the coping measures and capacities at household levels. The gaps are eventually rooted in the changing political economy of risk management since doi moi. The latter aspect and the wider implications resulting from these mismatches are discussed in more detail in chapter 7, in conjunction with the findings from the other chapters. In sum, the revealed barriers and limits in coping capacities urge the question how vulnerabilities can be reduced more strategically with a longer-term focus. Therefore, the next chapter concentrates on the adaptive capacity and on already implemented adaptation action at household level in Can Tho City.

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6.2.4. Adaptive capacity and implemented adaptation measures “Có còn hơn không” [If you cannot have the best, make the best of what you have.] Vietnamese Proverb

Based on the vulnerability assessment in the previous chapter, the analysis now turns to the question what the households in Can Tho City do, can do or cannot do in order to reduce their vulnerability and adapt to the current and future hazards. In accordance with the conceptual considerations provided in chapter 3 the analysis is sensitive to the fact that adaptive capacities might not or cannot always be turned into adaptation measures. Therefore the analysis concentrates on, both, currently implemented adaptation measures as well as measures that are aspired or considered thinkable in general but are currently not (yet) implemented due to a lack of capacity and/or other agentive and structural factors (cf. 3.2). In addition, the analysis considers that adaptation might be aimed at the different vulnerability factors. For those reasons, the following chapter is structured into a number of sub-chapters addressing adaptive capacity and realized adaptation measures in the fields of exposure reduction, susceptibility reduction and coping capacity enhancement. The empirical research has shown that most adaptation strategies and specific measures address not only one of those dimensions but two or even all three simultaneously. However, in most cases a certain hierarchy can be identified in the sense that a specific adaptation option targets primarily one of these three dimensions while the effects on the other dimensions are to be considered of secondary importance. Hence, the conceptual separation is kept for structuring this chapter, yet, acknowledging that adaptation activities in reality are more mingled in their aims (cf. the conceptual reflections in the discussion of chapter 7.2). In line with the importance of urban upgrading and resettlement programmes in Vietnam (cf. 4.6) and particularly its increasing role in climate change adaptation debates in Can Tho City (cf. 6.1.3) special attention is in this chapter paid to the current resettlement projects in Can Tho City (cf. 4.7) and their vulnerability and adaptation implications at household level. This part of the analysis draws heavily on the second household survey, covering 154 relocated households in two resettlement sites (cf. 5). However, given that resettlement is only one of the relevant adaptation strategies, the analysis has to be kept very brief here and distils only selected findings of key relevance. As discussed in chapter 3, adaptation cannot be understood without first assessing risk perception and evaluation, i.e. the question whether and how the future hazards are perceived, how their potential impacts are perceived, how they are weighted against other hazards and how the limited resources for adaptation are therefore distributed and activated. Therefore, these questions are tackled below, in the first section of this chapter.

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6.2.4.1. Perception and evaluation of future hazards and associated risks In line with the observed flood trends in the past (cf. 6.2.1.5), the majority of the households (55 percent) expects an increase in the water levels of Can Tho City’s rivers in the future and, hence, an increase in flood occurrence. The number of households not expecting such an increase is very low at 8 percent with the remaining 37 percent feeling that they cannot tell. Even 71 percent of the interviewees expect that their house will be more severely affected by hazards in the future. Interestingly, no statistically significant differences could be found to the case study areas, the locations of the house or the educational profiles of the households. In accordance with the hazard perception, the in-depth household interviews revealed a high awareness that future adaptation of the houses might become necessary. Similarly, the awareness that river bank erosion might even increase further in future was very high amongst those households already affected. However, the vast majority of interviewees, in both the semi-structured interviews and the household survey, emphasized that even though they might in general expect and increase in future flood occurrence, their knowledge on the future trends and their capacity to project the changes in a more detailed way are very limited. They therefore stressed that they will ‘wait and see’ and react to the changes when they become more apparent. While this strategy might appear intuitive with creeping hazards, such as rising water levels in Hau River (cf. 6.1.1), it gets more daring with regards to the adaptation to other hazards, most notably extreme and sudden-onset events. The interviews have shown that the awareness towards more severe typhoons – which are projected by most of the climate modeling assessments (cf. 4.2) but have only to a limited extent been experienced in Can Tho City – is much lower. 65 percent of the respondents held that Typhoon Nr. 5 in 1997 (cf. 4.1) was the worst possible typhoon that can potentially hit the Mekong Delta and Can Tho City. Similarly, 71 percent share the perception that typhoons will remain an issue relevant only for the northern and central parts of Vietnam. These perceptions are in line with the risk perceptions raised in the expert interviews where typhoon risk was considered on paper but no action taken accordingly – indicating that the risk in fact not perceived of too high priority (cf. 6.1.3). For those fewer households who do perceive typhoons as a risk for the Mekong Delta, the majority still holds that it – also in future – will mainly be of concern for the delta’s coastal areas; hence not for Can Tho City further inland. The below quote by a household member in An Lac Ward represents this viewpoint: Interviewer: “Do you expect stronger storms in the future?” Household member: “I think that Can Tho is not so much the problem. I experienced storm number 5 in Ca Mau [coastal province in the Mekong Delta]. That was bad! But Can Tho should not be so bad.” (HH-23-ALW)

These insights on the risk perception regarding the future hazard trends provides an important frame for understanding the below exploration of the currently implemented and/or debated adaptation measures.

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6.2.4.2. Exposure reduction The empirical research has revealed that, at household level, moving out of the hazard’s reach, i.e. reducing one’s exposure, is widely considered the most effective and aspired solution for vulnerability reduction – and eventually risk reduction. This perception holds true particularly for those household currently affected by flooding or other hazards (cf. 6.2.1) but is in principle shared by all other groups of stakeholders, i.e. the political authorities, national and international development organizations and scientists. Two main types of relocation-based exposure reduction can be discerned. First, households are being resettled within the framework of formal risk reduction and urban upgrading programmes (see chapter 4.6 for a general introduction). Second, households not covered by formal programmes move out – or wish to move out – of hazard exposed areas individually and independent from any larger adaptation programme. Both types are discussed in the following sections. Relocation in the context of formal resettlement programmes A high number of households in Can Tho City have over the recent years been resettled away from hazard exposed areas within the framework of governmental upgrading projects (cf. 4.6 for the detailed numbers). While the main resettlement parameters are in these cases set by the project management units (e.g. the question which households are to be resettled and how financial compensation is handled) the research has clearly revealed that the adaptive capacity of individual households has a great influence on how well a household can deal with the resettlement and can adapt to the new conditions. In other words, the question whether the resettlement can lead to a long-term vulnerability reduction depends on how well the project mechanisms respond to the needs and capacities of the resettled people. Both major resettlement initiatives in Can Tho City (cf. 4.7) have been considered for this analysis. Firstly, the World Bank-financed Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project (VUUP) relates in particular to An Cu Ward which has experienced substantial upgrading and the resettlement of more than 200 households formerly living in makeshift settlements along the waterways. These households have been resettled to the resettlement site in An Khanh Ward (see Figures 10.12 and 10.14 in the Appendix), which is the first of the below-discussed case study areas (cf. Table 5.2; Figure 10.3 in the Appendix). In addition, the river-bound parts of An Nghiep Ward (neighboring An Cu) are earmarked for upgrading and resettlement in the near future. The inland parts of An Nghiep Ward have already undergone some upgrading within this project, e.g. the elevation and bituminization of alleys or the improvement of drainage and sewerage infrastructure (see Figure 10.13 in the Appendix). Also the inland parts of An Lac Ward have partly benefited from the VUUP project; however, not to the extent as in An Nghiep (KI-47-GOP). Secondly, the governmental project on the erosion protection wall

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in Hung Phu Ward (cf. 4.7; Figure 10.16 in the Appendix) has lead to the resettlement of households into the Hung Phu resettlement site (see Figure 10.12 in the Appendix), which is the second of the below-discussed case study areas. A project similar to the one in Hung Phu is currently envisaged for the river-bound settlements in An Lac Ward. The households there are, hence, due for resettlement in the mid-term future and lessons from the Hung Phu Ward-project will be of relevance. However, at the time of the research no detailed plans for the timing and implementation of the project in An Lac had been issued. Exposure effects of resettlement The majority of the relocated households interviewed in the resettlement sites of An Khanh and Hung Phu had been living on or directly next to water prior to resettlement, meaning along the banks of rivers or canals in An Cu and Hung Phu Wards (Figure 6.21). This observation matches the above illustrated project objectives according to which primarily those households living in highly exposed areas should be resettled. Housing location prior to flooding

8%

Flood occurance prior to flooding

Entirely on stilts

3

14%

More than half on stilts

13%

Yes, entire house

more than half on land On land but next to water

9%

25%

28%

42%

45%

Yes, parts of the house

No

5 - 10m from water front 10 - 20m from water front

Further away from water n=154

Figure 6.21: Housing location prior to resettlement, own draft based on household survey data

13%

n=154

Figure 6.22: Flood occurrence prior to resettlement, own draft based on household survey data

Accordingly, the household survey data also confirms that the majority of the resettled households had been frequently exposed to flooding prior to resettlement (Figure 6.22). This is in line with the findings of the other household survey which had identified similar exposure profiles in those case study areas with comparable settlement conditions, notably the river-bound parts of the An Lac and An Nghiep Wards. The survey data reveals that also the flooding duration and depth had been quite similar as well as the exposure profiles with regards to storms, extreme flooding and river bank erosion (cf. chapter 6.2.1). In contrast, the exposure to flooding has decreased considerably after the resettlement due to the fact that the resettlement plots are situated inland and on

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plots elevated between one and two meters by land infill. In fact, none of the households interviewed reported flooding in the new house. Housing conditions and physical susceptibility before and after resettlement While the resettlement policy in Can Tho City focuses primarily on a reduction of exposure (i.e. ‘to get the people out of harm’s way’), the findings clearly reveal that resettlement also entails secondary effects on physical susceptibility related to housing – at least for those residents that succeed to establish a new livelihood in the resettlement site. Only 3 percent of the interviewed households had been living in fully solid houses prior to the resettlement, while more than 25 percent had lived in fully makeshift houses according the housing index presented in chapter 5. Another 37 percent had been living in partly makeshift and 60 percent in semisolid houses. This means that most of the households had the walls of their shelters at least partly built of thatched elements, woods planks, or corrugated iron sheets prior to resettlement. In contrast, the survey reveals that in the resettlement sites almost 100 percent of the walls were entirely built with bricks. Similar improvements could be observed with respect to the roof and particularly the floor and foundation of the houses (cf. Figure 10.12 in the Appendix). Given the improved building structures, the majority of the interviewees argued that their perceived physical susceptibility to strong winds and typhoons could be reduced – next to the above illustrated reduction in the exposure to flooding. Effects of resettlement on income generation However, apart from the exposure and susceptibility effects, the data clearly shows that resettlement leads to a host of secondary problems for the majority of resettled households. Amongst the most fundamental challenges were negative effects on income generation resulting from the resettlement. Similarly to the condition in the to-be-upgraded ward of An Nghiep, many of the households relocated from An Cu and Hung Phu had earned large parts of their income through running small businesses in their shop houses. Others had worked as mobile or semimobile vendors or used direct access to water ways for working in the transportation sector. The interviewees emphasized that those activities are not only dependent on the place-specific production assets (e.g. canals, boats, workshops, markets) but also on the proximity to established networks of customers and trading partners. They are, hence, greatly place-based and challenged by resettlement. Therefore, almost half of the interviewed households in An Khanh and 37 percent in Hung Phu stated that one or more members of the household had to change their job due to the resettlement. In most cases, those changes are coupled with a substantial decrease in overall income, ranging between 5 and 40 percent, i.e. a reduction of 1 to 4 million Vietnamese dong per month and household (equalling between 52 and 208 USD at the time of the interviews). As a result, 71

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percent of the respondents stated that they are concerned about the economic situation with respect to their business or income earning after the resettlement. Other financial effects resulting from resettlement Next to the income effects, financial deficits resulting from the loss of the original land and house were repeatedly stated as being the most important concern. These can pose serious problems for the long-term economic sustainability of the households, particularly when coupled with deteriorating income levels. Deficits have to be explained with the detailed political economy behind compensation and land pricing as well as building costs. In theory, the resettled households are eligible to being appropriately compensated for the loss of the land and house as well as for other private and income related assets. Both of the analyzed projects in Can Tho City apply a mixture of monetary and in-kind compensation. That means, households receive monetary compensation and additionally are provided guaranteed access and discounted prices for new land plots, or sometimes even ready-built houses, in the resettlement areas. The basic infrastructure of these areas such as roads, sewerage systems, electricity grids and piped water is usually provided by the project units. However, in reality a number of shortcomings have been raised in the interviews, leading to significant economic difficulties for most of the resettled households (HH-39-AKW; HH-40-AKW; HH-43-AKW; HH-45-HPW; HH48-HPW; HH-54-AKW; HH-55-AKW): (1) The amount of compensation has been reported to be far below the market prices for construction materials, workforce and particularly land (even in cases where the new land lots in the resettlement areas are subsidized under the resettlement scheme)59. (2) Households lacking the official land use certificate prior to resettlement received considerably reduced amounts of compensation. (3) Compensation is usually restricted to the actual land area. This means that those parts of dwellings that are extended onto the water with stilt constructions are not considered eligible for compensation or are, depending on the project, only calculated with a minimum rate. However, the entire housing structure is usually included for calculating the second, yet much smaller, component of compensation which is for re-constructing demolished buildings. (4) Loss of income has not been adequately compensated and vocational training not sufficiently provided. As a result of these shortcomings, up to 60 percent of the interviewed households experienced a financial loss due to relocation. Out of them, around 74 percent experienced deficits of up to 200 million VND (i.e. around 10,350 USD at the 59 Readers interested in the detailed regulations and the precise figures of compensation rates and price schemes may refer to the more extensive explanations provided in Garschagen (2010) and Garschagen et al. (2011).

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time of interviews). These deficits result from the difference of the costs for the new land lot and house compared to the compensation for the old house and land (Figure 6.23). The remaining households even reported deficits of more than 200 million VND. For those households who experienced losses, the median value was marked at 104 million VND and the third quartile still at 56 million VND. In order to negotiate these deficits, the vast majority of households stated that they had to revert to own savings, loans from relatives or loans from friends and neighbors. In-depth interviews, however, support the assumptions that also “own savings” eventually equal loans from relatives and friends to a substantial share. Only eight percent of the households managed to draw bank loans. Others stated that lacking collateral impedes access to bank loans – a situation that in many cases was accredited to pending official certificates for the new land plots, which had not been provided in due time, in turn inhibiting mortgaging of the land. These figures show that the loan programme envisaged in the resettlement project’s planning documents does in fact not reach the majority of households or gets thwarted by institutional barriers.

Figure 6.23: Cost balance after relocation, own draft based on household survey data

Since all resettled households were able to move their belongings from the original place, no losses in household assets such as electronic devices or furniture were reported. A limited number of households even received a higher compensation than needed for purchasing the new land lot and house. This was the case where the household previously had a large piece of land and, hence, received a comparatively high amount of compensation. However, as Figure 6.23 shows, this only applies to few households compared to the much higher numbers suffering deficits.

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Social effects of resettlement In addition to the economic and financial effects of resettlement, impacts on social networks have been reported but proved to vary widely. 43 percent of the respondents shared their concerns about negative effects for their social networks resulting from resettlement. The remaining 57 percent held that they are not affected. The in-depth interviews and the cross correlation with other variables suggest that these differences can be explained by the household profile and, hence, the mobility to travel to the old location in order to maintain periodic social relationships with former neighbors, family and friends. Elderly people and small children were reported to face the greatest challenges in maintaining social relationships outside the household. Therefore, also previously existing social support networks to cope with hazard or crises situations (cf. 6.2.3) were assumed to be damaged by the resettlement, putting their effectiveness on the line, e.g. with respect to care-taking of children, elderly or handicapped household members. Public infrastructure and amenities in resettlement sites As far as public infrastructure and amenities are concerned, the timely and affordable provisioning of water supply, electricity, transportation, schools and kindergartens was stated to be the issue of most concern in both the household and expert interviews. These issues, hence, proved to be of high relevance for the overall acceptance – or disapproval – of resettlement at large. One third of the respondents in An Khanh maintained that they had experienced delays of several months or even more than one year until they obtained their electricity and water connections in the new location. Most of those delays were stated to be caused by problems in relation with the issuance of land use and housing certificates without which the infrastructure services cannot be obtained60. The semi-structured interviews found that a number of schools and kindergartens had been implemented in a timely fashion in both resettlement sites. However, more than 85 percent of the households interviewed stated that they had not transferred their children to the new facilities, but had kept them in the old school or kindergarten. The reasons were either a lack of alternatives in the new place (with only one new kindergarten being established in An Khanh so far) or the good reputation and existing social networks at the old facility. Many households stated that for this reason, they were not interested in transferring their official residency status to the new ward in order not lose their entitlement to their spots in the old school and kindergarten. However, concerns were also raised about an increased amount of driving since most children had to be carried to and from the schools or kindergartens by motorbike given that public transportation connection

60 The technical details of this institutional mechanism are explored in more detail in Garschagen (2010).

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were reported to be poor. This not only implies direct costs for fuel but also indirect opportunity costs through the increased expenditure of time. Similarly concerns have been raised with regards to the access to markets, shops and other service facilities. New market halls with individual compartments for small shops have been provided in the resettlement area from the beginning. Yet, given the relatively small numbers of customers, the number of shops that opened in these markets stalls remains very small. Hence, the majority of households reported that they need to drive to the city centre for doing their shopping, again resulting in increased opportunity costs. In conclusion of these effects, 67 percent of the respondents, therefore, considered the resettlement cluster too far away from the original home site. In sum, the above findings on the effects and pressures of resettlement underscore one of the main tenets in the conceptual framing of this study. That is, vulnerability and adaptation towards natural hazards always has to be considerate of other non-environmental hazards simultaneously taking effect on the adapting actors. In addition, multi-dimensional hazards that are even evoked by adaptation action itself need to be considered. Accordingly, the survey data shows distinct shifts when comparing the risk perception before and after relocation (cf. Figure 6.24). Before resttlement (An Lac Ward)

After resettlement (An Khanh Ward)

The figure presents selected results of a comparative risk ranking conducted in both household survey campaigns. Interviewees were asked to rank the following five risks according to their perceived importance and risk potential: loss of job; catching a disease or injury; strong flooding; traffic accidents; bad storms/typhoons. These risk types had in the semi-structured household interviews been identified to be of importance. Matching five risk types with five weighting options, columns as well as rows add up to 100 percent. The two plots compare two selected case study areas, i.e. the river-bound makeshift settlements in An Lac Ward which are due for resettlement in the near future and the resettlement site in An Khanh Ward.

Figure 6.24: Risk ranking before and after resettlement (selected hazards and case study areas), own draft based on household survey data

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Being asked for ranking top risks for their livelihoods, interviewees in the resettlement site of An Khanh, for example, ranked the risk of losing their job significantly higher than interviewee in An Lac Ward, where resettlement has not yet happened. At the same time, the findings reveal in accordance with the reduced exposure and the improved building quality that the risk of flooding and typhoons is less important in comparison to the areas not yet undergoing resettlement. In addition, shifts in the perceived risk of traffic accidents can be observed which need to be seen in connection with the increased need for commuting between the resettlement site and the city center. Pressure to leave the resettlement cluster – and move back into exposed makeshift housing? Resulting from the above-explored financial deficits and the underlying political economy of resettlement compensation, a significant proportion of households is not able to sustain a land lot and house in the resettlement cluster or even to purchase it in the first place. Many interviewees in the household survey and the indepth interviews reported cases of neighbors or relatives who did not succeed in paying back the debts and who eventually had to sell their land and house in the resettlement site and move out to cheaper grounds. Hence, while the project management units and the People’s Committee officers use to claim that households who do not move to the resettlement sites do so because they “prefer” to live somewhere else (KI-47-GOP; KI-59-GOP), the household level data suggests that financial pressures are the main reason why households move out of the resettlement areas or do not even move there but sell their reserved land lot right away. While neither the local government nor the project management units keep track of that, former VUUP staff members, local scientists and ward officers estimate that between 40 and 50 percent of the originally resettled people no longer lived in the resettlement site at the time of the research, i.e. two to four years after resettlement (e.g. KI-36-GOW). Given the financial pressures and lack of land title, it seems reasonable to assume that a large share of them eventually ends up in other places with poor housing and living conditions, for example, in other urban slumlike areas with high exposure and susceptibility to flood and storm hazards. However, detailed analysis is lacking to date, calling for future research that tracks those households and assesses in detail their long-term vulnerability pathways (cf. 7). Acceptance amongst to-be-resettled residents Against the above-illustrated experience with current resettlement practices, the question appears essential how the plans for future resettlement activities are received amongst the to-be-resettled residents – particularly against the background that resettlement is increasingly discussed as a future adaptation option to reduce

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vulnerability (cf. 6.1.3). Given the negative experiences, which are communicated to other parts of the city by word-of-mouth or even by some local media, there are considerable concerns amongst the residents living in other areas due for upgrading and resettlement in the future, notably the river-bound makeshift settlements in An Nghiep Ward and An Lac Ward. The in-depth household interviews revealed that the concerns touch on similar issues as the shortcomings identified by the already resettled people, i.e. most importantly the risk of facing income losses and financial deficits due to uncertain compensation as well as the risk to lose social networks in the established neighborhood and to find adequate access to social services such as kindergartens and schools (HH-13-ALW; HH-17-ALW; HH-15-ALW; HH-19-ALW). For those families that have been living in the old location since a long time and that have strong family ties in the area, also the spiritual ties to the land were mentioned as an important factor why people are opposed to being resettled (e.g. HH-17-ALW). The wider relevance of these concerns could be confirmed through the larger household survey: In terms of social networks, 69 percent of those households that need to be resettled are concerned that the “relocation would have negative effects on the networks with […] neighbors and relatives”. 49 percent of the tobe-resettled households consider the resettlement sites too far away from the old place. Only 22 percent expect that the distance does not pose a problem for them. Financial and economic concerns are amongst the most dominant issues also in this survey data. Out of those households knowing for sure that they have to be resettled, 85 percent stated concerns in the household survey that they “will face financial problems in relation to the resettlement because building a new house will cost more than [they] will get out of the compensation”. In terms of income generation, 71 percent of the to-be-resettled households communicated severe concerns that they can no longer pursue their current income generation in the resettlement site or at least will experience considerable losses in income. In accordance with all the above concerns, 72 percent of the to-be-resettled households would prefer to stay in the current location and not be resettled, despite the disadvantages and difficulties which come with living in their curent locations (cf. 6.2.1-6.2.3). The majority of the remaining 28 percent stated to be so heavily affected by flooding and/or river bank erosion that they would in general agree to resettlement. However, also these households raised strong concerns about the financial feasibility and the potential income losses (see above). Thus, the in-depth interviews clearly showed that most of these households call for greater choices in the resettlement process, as far as timing, location, type of houses and financial mechanisms are concerned. Being in general for relocation should therefore not be mistaken with agreement to the institutional procedure of the current resettlement programmes. Hence, 54 percent hold that, in theory, the resettlement can be a chance for improving the general standard of living – yet on the condition that the institutional framework is sensitive to the needs of the affected people. This skepticism is true despite the fact that a considerable 49 percent of the to-be-resettled interviewees are generally in favor of the architecture in the residential clusters, which is widely perceived to stand for modern and eco-

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nomically developed middle-class housing. The latter point matches the political aspiration for driving urban upgrading and resettlement in the first place (cf. 4.6). But the above data clearly shows that urban development cannot be implemented per government decree and through building ‘nice’ and ‘modern’ houses in resettlement sites only, as long as the needs and limited capacities of the to-be‘modernized’ population are not adequately considered and catered for (cf. the discussion in chapter 7 for more detail). In terms of the institutional shortcomings in the resettlement process, a lot of emphasis is also put on the need for improved information sharing and a smooth and fast implementation of the resettlement, once a decision has been taken. The explanations by two affected interviewees in An Nghiep and An Lac Wards serve for illustrating this point in more detail: “I think the fast implementation is very important for the people here. In the moment the situation is quite bad because it is not clear at all what will happen in the future. So, for example, most people do not invest in their houses anymore. […] In addition the transition phase will be very difficult. It will be hard to find new customers and so forth.” (HH-34-ANW) “When the government compensates us it probably takes two to four years until the government has compensated everybody here. So it could be that we have to wait very long and that we have to rent another house in the transition time. Therefore, it could be that we have to spend all compensation money already in the meantime before we in fact have the chance to buy a new house in the resettlement areas.” (HH-17-ALW)

However, despite all of the above criticism, most of the households feel that they do not have any option of opposing to the resettlement or take significant influence on the institutional parameters such as the amount and mechanism of compensation. The head of a to-be-resettled household in An Lac Ward, for example, recaps a long interview on such shortcomings with the below conclusion: “But anyhow, it does not make a big difference because we will have to obey the decision of the government and do not have much of a choice.” (HH-19-ALW)

Individual relocation independent from resettlement programmes Despite the above shortcomings and disapproval of current resettlement policies, a certain paradox with regards to relocation-based exposure reduction can be observed in Can Tho City – which already shined through some of the abovepresented findings. That is, amongst those households which are not currently or in future covered by a formal resettlement programme but which are exposed to flooding or erosion, moving out of the exposed location is in principle considered a highly aspired adaptation strategy. The interviews clearly show that the preferred option would be to resettle independently from the restrictions by any formal programme and just to take all resettlement-related decisions on the timing, location, modus etc. individually. However, at the same time the majority of the hazard-affected households consider this option unachievable, mostly for economic and institutional reasons. The following quotes by two heads of households

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living in flood affected stilt houses emphasize the aspirations but also the financial limitations inhibiting a move: Interviewer: “If you had a lot of money, would you still live here, on the water, or would you prefer to move to another place and live on the land? Household member: “[laughs] Of course we would move in order to live on the land because our house is flooded so often. Between July and October we usually have up to 50cm of water in our house two times per day during the middle and the end of the lunar month.” (HH-14ALW) Interviewer: “Did you ever try to buy land somewhere else, further away from the river? Household member: “No, no, we do not have enough money for that! A decent piece of land would cost around 100 million dong. That is way too much for us!” (HH-19-ALW)

Closely linked to the question whether or not a household can afford to buy land somewhere else is the question, whether it can divest its current land plot in order to receive the capital needed for buying the new piece of land. Since the reform process, and particularly since the new land laws in 1993 and 2004 (cf. 4.3; 4.6), this point depends mainly on the question whether or not a household holds an official land use certificate for its land. The latter is the prerequisite for being allowed to trade or mortgage the land. However, the survey data clearly shows that many households do not have such a certificate (cf. Figure 6.25), hence, implying an additional barrier to voluntary resettlement – but also to acquiring loans and other capital for upgrading the house (see in detail in the next chapter).

Figure 6.25: Endowment with land use certificates in case study areas, own draft based on household survey data

In total, 31 percent of the interviewed households reported to lack a land use certificate. Yet, distinct disparities can be observed between the case study areas.

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Those areas with the highest hazard exposure and the highest susceptibility in terms of housing quality also feature amongst the highest proportions of households without land use certificate. Most notably these are the river-bound settlements in An Lac Ward (with 49 percent of the interviewed households lacking a certificate) and An Nghiep Ward (31 percent). In addition, strong disparities can be observed even within the case study areas, leading to a high correlation between the housing proximity to the river and the lack of land use certificates (C*=0.402 with p≤0.001). This further indicates a comparatively higher likelihood of lacking certificate the more exposed the respective households are to natural hazards. The data gathered in the household interviews clearly shows that there are manifold barriers to obtaining the land use certificate – hence, explaining the high proportion of households lacking it. The most important barrier is related to the implied costs, i.e. the administrative fee for obtaining the certificate as well as the annual tax that is due once the official certificate is issued. Even though in theory standardized rates are ought to apply for these two positions (cf. KI-14-IP; KI-48IP), the interview data strongly suggests that their actual height and handling varies widely. Resulting is a high uncertainty and a wide range of observed costs. This – according to some of in-depth household interviews and expert opinions – needs to be seen in the context of, firstly, poor and incoherent implementation of the legislation and, secondly, corruption and foot-dragging amongst the local tax and land certificate bureaus at ward and district level (KI-14-IP; KI-48-IP). The following quote by an affected household member illustrates the resulting uncertainty and the observed range of costs: Interviewer: “Do you consider getting a land use certificate for your land and house?” Household member: “No, that would be much too costly. I am not sure but I think that I would have to pay around one million dong to get the certificate.” [for a small house next to the river] (HH-30-BTW)

A second important barrier is the fact those households living in areas earmarked for future upgrading projects are mostly not permitted to obtain a land use certificate if their house is (potentially) within the scope of the project. As Figure 6.26 shows, this is particularly relevant in the highly vulnerable river-bound areas in An Lac and An Nghiep Wards where resettlement is planned in the near future (cf. 6.2.4.2). While the respective households are expected to benefit from future upgrading projects, this situation also means that their current condition of high exposure and susceptibility (cf. 6.2.1; 6.2.2) is further aggravated. This is because the lacking access to land use certificates leads to an increased institutional insecurity, contributing to the obstacles for successful adaptation. Another key barrier emerging from the interviews is the lack of knowledge and capacity to navigate the administrative procedures for requesting the certificate (Figure 6.26). This also mirrors the fact that local administrative procedures are often not implemented to the letter and can vary widely across different local state-bureaucracy branches. In addition, Figure 6.26 indicates that a comparatively high number of households tried to obtain a certificate but had been rejected, ei-

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ther due to being located within an upgrading project, or for (alleged) administrative errors in the application procedure, or because they had not been able to bear the costs. Again, the data shows that this problem is most significant in the areas also featuring the highest vulnerability levels towards natural hazards (cf. 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 6.2.3).

Figure 6.26: Barriers for obtaining land use certificates, own draft based on household survey data

Nevertheless, 90 percent of all respondents lacking land use certificate regard their current ground as “my land” – with the remaining 10 percent mostly living in rented houses. This discrepancy, between not holding the official land use certificate but still considering the land (legitimately and lawfully) to belong to them, is the major source for disagreements and conflicts when it comes to resettlement and compensation claims (see above). In conclusion, the above sub-chapter has shown that exposure reduction through moving out of the hazard’s reach is by different stakeholder from the state and the non-state domains considered a very potent option for vulnerability reduction. However, the analysis has also illustrated that there is a very fine line between forced and self-controlled resettlement, turning the topic into a politically contested one. While self-paced resettlement is largely restricted by economic and institutional barriers (notably around land pricing and land use titling), forced resettlement has to negotiate institutional shortcomings that put the long-term success and the livelihood sustainability of the resettled households on the line. Therefore, many households seek ways to reduce their vulnerability by adaptation targeting the other vulnerability factors, most notably through in situ susceptibility reduction, which will be explored in the next chapter.

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6.2.4.3. Susceptibility reduction Next to the exposure reduction, in situ adaptation targeting the reduction of susceptibility is amongst the most commonly applied strategies for vulnerability reduction. This means that the households remain in the current location but apply, for example, structural adaptations to their house so that the impacts of the hazards are reduced. In general such measures are applied to flooding, erosion and storms, yet with the latter being less common to date. Physical adaptation of that kind has been found to play a more important role than other soft measures of susceptibility reduction. This chapter therefore concentrates predominantly on analyzing the hard infrastructure-based measures. The role of soft measures will be discussed in more depth in chapter 7 together with the findings from the other chapters. Elevation of houses The most widely applied adaptation mechanism for in situ susceptibility reduction is that households elevate their house or parts of their house (see pictures in Figure 10.10 of the Appendix). Of the 588 households interviewed in the main survey, 71 percent reported to have elevated their floor, or parts thereof, at least once over the last 50 years. In general, two trends could be identified in this context (Figure 6.27): Firstly, the number of households elevating their floor or house has been rising over the last years. Secondly, the amplitude of elevation has been increasing. 60 percent of all households elevated their house between 30 and 70 cm and 14 percent even more than 80 cm. Around half of the reported elevations were implemented after 2002 and only 17 percent before Typhoon Linda in 1997.

Figure 6.27: Housing elevation as adaptation, own draft based on household survey data

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The increase of housing elevation activities over the last years correlates with the increasing water levels (cf. 6.2.1.) and, hence, the fact that the majority of households have been experiencing an increase in flooding height and frequency in their houses (cf. 6.2.1). Also the in-depth household interviews clearly underscore that the elevation is usually a direct response to trends in flood occurrence: “I lifted the floor of my house one year ago and made it about 60 centimeters higher. Before that, we had very often flooding in our house up to the knee or higher, particularly in the rainy season.” (HH-33-BTW)

In addition, many households reported that the ground in their location is in fact sinking, making repeated elevations necessary, as, for example, the following quote of a household living directly next to the waterfront in Binh Thuy Ward illustrates: “We had to elevate the house three times since 1962: 30 centimeters in 1972, another 30 centimeters in the 1990s, and another 70 centimeters in 2005.” (HH-28-BTW)

However, it also needs to be asked in how far this recent increase in elevation activity is to be attributed to other factors such as the increased availability of resources – along with socio-economic progress – or simply the city’s population increase over the last years. The latter effect can be cross-checked along household survey data and the settlement history of the respective case study areas. The survey data shows that for those households having elevated the floor in the past, the mean time between moving to the current location and implementing the elevation is rather long at almost 29 years. 86 percent of the households having elevated their floor had been living in the current location since longer than 2000, meaning within the time-frame of the most intensive increase in elevation activity (cf. Figure 6.27). These figures are further in line with the expert interviews and in-depth household interviews which suggest that – apart from the new developments in Hung Phu Ward – all of the case study areas are in principle residential areas with a rather long residential history and a limited rate of residential replacement. Hence, the question whether the recent increase of elevations is caused simply by recent in-migration can be negated. The second of the above mentioned potential effects is of more relevance – i.e. that the increase in elevation is not only conditioned by necessity but also by capacity and the increase in the available resources. For example, there is a moderate positive correlation between the frequency of applying house elevation and the households wealth measured in terms of the asset endowment (C*=0.267 with p≤0.001). However, the increase in water levels remains the main driver – supporting the necessity argumentation. The households in the survey were asked whether they plan any renovation or elevation within the next year and – if so – what the main reasons were. Since often a number of reasons apply at the same time, yet with different priorities, Figure 6.28 represents the results organized into primary, secondary and tertiary reasons. What can be clearly seen is that rising water levels and increased flood occurrence is by far the dominant reason – making the primary reason for almost 50

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percent of these households and the secondary or tertiary for most of the others. Interestingly though, the reason “not to appear poor” and to show that one has the financial capacity to upgrade the house has been the second most important reason, followed by an increase in income and, hence, an amplified capacity to actually invest in the upgrading. Increases in family size and, therefore the need for a better functionality of the house even during times of flooding, also plays a significant role, especially as secondary or tertiary reason. Comparing the above indicated necessity and capacity argument, the data demonstrates that the plan to elevate the house is stronger correlated to past exposure (C*=0,315 with p≤0.001) than to the overall asset endowment of the household (C*=0.151, not statistically significant; cf. Table 6.5). This supports the above finding that necessity remains to be a stronger driver than the increase in capacity, even though both factors obviously interact.

Figure 6.28: Reasons for planned housing elevation, own draft based on household survey data

In addition, a certain chain reaction can be observed in those areas where the streets get elevated in the course of urban upgrading projects in order to reduce flooding. A construction worker who has been working on many housing elevation projects in Can Tho City describes the resulting pressures as follows: “Many people have in the recent past lifted their house. This is because when the street next to their house gets lifted they feel that they also have to lift the floor of their house because otherwise the water flows directly from the street into their house when there is heavy rain or tidal flooding.” (HH-47-ALW)

Similarly, a resident in Binh Thuy ward describes the imperatives resulting from street elevation in a larger context: “Once the street had been elevated in 2008, our house was much lower than the street. Therefore, we also had to elevate the house by around 40 or 50 centimeters. But this was very costly for us because we also had to change the doors and the windows. In fact, it would have been good to also raise the roof but this would have been way to expensive. […] However, the water levels are rising each year. […] So I am quite worried that in the future I would need to elevate my house again.” (HH-27-BTW)

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The latter quote is illustrated by pictures in the Appendix 10.2 (Figures 10.10) and leads over to exploring in more detail the structural changes applied to the houses and the linkages that can be drawn to adaptive capacity. 60 percent of the households had raised only the floor, while 37 percent then also had to make additional changes to the structure. This is because the in-fill of the floor only works up to a certain threshold until also other elements such as the windows and doors and sometimes even the roofs or pipe-works have to be elevated along (see Figure 10.11 in the Appendix). Whether or not these other changes are necessary has significant implications for the implied costs. Figure 6.29 shows that those households which also had to elevate their windows, doors or even roof have to bear much higher costs than those which only elevated the floor. While the third quartile of all the reported costs is at around 15 million Vietnamese dong for those households only elevating the floor, it is almost five times higher at 70 million for those households also changing other elements in the construction (i.e. around 833 and 3,889 USD, respectively, at the time of the interviews). For households only doing floor elevation the data confirms that there is a positive correlation between the costs of floor elevation and the vertical elevation gain per square meter (Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: r=0,374, at the 0.01 interval). Interestingly, such a correlation cannot be found in the cases where also doors and/or windows need to be altered. There are also differences in the time and labor needed for the elevation work, with the mean number of work days needed for floor elevations only being at 14 in contrast to 42 for those cases where also other element are elevated.

Figure 6.29: Costs for elevation of housing, own draft based on household survey data

Hence, significant tipping points in the process of housing elevation can be observed. The data shows that while the costs and the labor expenditures for elevation progress roughly linearly with the floor space and the gain of elevation, they suddenly jump up once the threshold is reached after which elevation of the windows and doors is necessary as well. A floor elevation of 20 to 50 centimeters

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might – depending on the height of the windows and ceilings – still be feasible without altering the wider structure of the house. However, most of the households elevating their floor by more than 50 centimeters also had to change at least the windows and door frames if not also the entire roof. Elevation of the roof is already costly in single storey houses or in middle class houses with two to three stories and comparatively high ceilings. Yet, it turns out to be particularly problematic in squatter settlements where makeshift houses have been gradually upgraded and stories added successively. In those cases a twofold problem exists: Firstly, the ceiling height is usually very low, leaving only limited room for floor elevation until an adequate lift of the ceiling becomes unavoidable. Secondly, however, the ceiling cannot be simply lifted in most cases given the existence of the upper floors. Interestingly, the field observation and the household survey clearly show that this problem – again – is most prevalent in the makeshift settlements along the river-banks in An Nghiep and particularly An Lac Wards. This adds to the increased exposure, the heightened susceptibility and the reduced response capacity anyhow observable amongst most households in those areas (cf. 6.2.1; 6.2.2; 6.2.3). Overall, these tipping points in the housing elevation processes have strong implications for the context of adapting to the projected increase in future flooding depth, resulting from, both, climate change and anthropogenic alterations of the physical environment (cf. 4.6). These implications and their repercussions for the conceptual discourse on adaptation are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. On the basis of the above, the analysis now turns to the key input factors for the elevation of floors and other house elements. It concentrates particularly on the question of how and by whom the costs for such elevations are borne and how the capacities are distributed. Figure 6.30 summarizes the sources for the three major input factors (financial input; building materials; and work force). In terms of the work force the data shows that a surprisingly high proportion of the households revert to hired work force as primary source (74 percent) and secondary source (42 percent) of labor input. Only 30 percent use the workforce of household members exclusively. However, the data clearly reveals that the lower the wealth of a household (measured with the asset index) the more likely it is to revert to the workforce of the household members only and not to hire external workers (C*=342 with p≤0.001). A similar relation can be seen with respect to household income (C*=0.316 with p≤0.05). In terms of the sources and acquisition of the building materials necessary for the elevation works, the vast majority of the households (89 percent) purchase the materials. This is usually handled by middlemen who buy the materials from traders and transport them to the houses. Interestingly, less than one percent of the households stated to collect all the necessary materials for free – which is the case where only a simple infill with gravel or sand is undertaken without any other ground cover such as tiles. The in-depth interviews clearly showed that the availability of open property building materials such as gravel or sand is very limited in the city. This means that contrary to wide-spread opinion, also most of the im-

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poverished households have to buy even the basic building materials if they want to elevate their house and cannot mobilize any other support, e.g. from governmental authorities. Along the same line, the vast majority of households (91 percent) bear all the costs for the elevation by themselves; only 4 percent borrow money from relatives or friends. This low percentage is to be explained by the combination of two facts: Firstly, the in-depth interviews suggest that most households are averse to taking loans, even with friends or relatives, as long as not absolutely necessary. It is rather perceived as an option for emergency situations. Yet, secondly, the need for housing elevation does usually not occur suddenly but looms over time. The timing can hence be planned in advance and mostly is pushed until sufficient financial savings could be accumulated (e.g. HH-35-ANW; HH-38-ANW). Yet, the statistical analysis of the standardized residuals has shown that those fewer households that have to borrow money from relatives or other social contacts mostly belong to the lower wealth groups (i.e. a moderate correlation can be observed of C*=0,311 with p≤0.05). Primary and secondary work force 1.7 1.2 22.9 19.7

hired workers only HH members

1.4 1.4 42.3

35.2

Sources of building material

73.8

Financial support

bought

2.9 3.9

relatives/friends free governmental organizations soil/gravel free

relatives/friends governmental organizations other

none

2.1 4.1

relatives in Vietnam governmental organizations relatives overseas I do not know

I do not know I do not know

92.0 other

91.4

other n=420

Figure 6.30: Sources of selected input factors for housing elevation, own draft based on household survey data

Interestingly, across all three input factors the contributions from government organizations are extremely minor. Only 1.2 percent of the households with elevation activities have received work-force-support from any of the government organizations. Similarly, not even 3 percent received building materials and only 2.1 percent of the households received financial support from any of the governmental schemes, notably the funds of the Fatherland Front or the other funds for risk prevention measures (see chapters 6.1.1 and 6.1.3). On first sight, such low numbers might not be surprising given that the maintenance and the upgrading of residential buildings is generally within the responsibility of the private owners. However, these figures are nevertheless remarkable given that they are in stark contrast to the assertions raised in the expert interviews with government authorities. Particularly at higher levels, these authorities did in the interviews not get tired to claim that households in need of support for necessary upgrading are assured financial support from at least one of the government’s funds (see in detail chapter 6.1.1.2). Yet, the above data (Figure 6.30) clearly reveals that these claims do not match with the reality on the ground. Even of those households holding a poverty certificate (see below), only 17 percent have received financial

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support from a government organization if they needed to elevate the floor. Only 13 percent received support in terms of work force and 17 percent for building materials, respectively. In those cases where financial support was granted, it mostly only covered a part of the total costs with the government contribution being – depending on the size of the house – up to 10 million dong, i.e. covering only a fraction of the potential costs (cf. Figure 6.29). Accordingly, correlations are lower than expected between the governmental support received and the ownership of a poverty certificate (C*=0.233 with p≤0.001) as well as with the income (C*=0.250 with p≤0.01; see Table 6.5). Therefore, high numbers of households which would be in need of elevating their floor to decrease flood impact can in fact not do so since they are lacking the necessary resources. This is mirrored by the high number of households reporting to still have their entire housing space flooded at high tides during the rainy season or after heavy rains (cf. 6.2.1). Interestingly, Figures 6.31, 6.32 and 6.33 clearly show that the governmental support is even lowest in the areas with the highest exposure and the worst quality in the housing stock, i.e. the squatter settlements along the river in An Lac and An Nghiep Ward (cf. 5.3). In both areas, urban upgrading projects have been discussed for a long time, in the context of which most of the river-bound houses are envisaged to be resettled to other areas (cf. 6.2.4.2). Yet, there remains large uncertainty as to when and how these projects will be implemented. The expert interviews suggest that therefore the governmental support has entirely been put on hold in order not to spend money and resources on the upgrading of houses that later on might be resettled anyhow (KI-18-GOW). Similarly, many households themselves refrain from implementing necessary upgrading works given the high uncertainty regarding the future implications of the governmental upgrading project and the potential resettlement. This uncertainty is particularly related to the question whether and how the current land and house will be recognized in the calculation of the compensation. The following quote by a household head in An Nghiep and Binh Thuy Ward exemplify these worries: “I had indeed already decided to rebuild the house a while ago but then I also heard something that my house is in the project area for a new resettlement project. So when I heard this I had changed my mind and decided not to rebuild the house because we did not know what would happen and if the money we would spend for rebuilding the house would maybe be lost.” (HH-34-ANW)

In addition, a number of households in this situation have reported that the local government even inhibited them from investing in a more permanent housing structure, even if the households had the necessary recourses available. This policy aims at reducing the potential for later conflict but it results in precarious living conditions, particularly due to the repeated postponement of the project and the resulting uncertainty – as the following quote by an affected household members underscores:

316

Analysis of Primary Empirical Data “The government told us 7 years ago that this land belongs to a new development project in the future. But until now, we are still here. But the government does not allow us to build a permanent house here; we are only allowed to build a temporary one.” (HH-06-HPW)

As a result, all these households remain with high levels of physical susceptibility – and in many cases even deteriorating conditions since important maintenance works are neglected.

Figure 6.31: Primary work force for housing elevation, own draft based on household survey data

Figure 6.32: Sources of building material for housing elevation, own draft based on household survey data

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Figure 6.33: Sources of financial support for housing elevation, own draft based on household survey data

Erosion protection In addition to the housing elevation, many of the households living directly at the waterfront reported that they regularly have to maintain and upgrade their erosion protection measures in response to (the increasing) river bank erosion (cf. 6.2.1). As laid out in chapter 6.2.2.1 on the quality and susceptibility of buildings, the materials and structures of these measures can range from fixed walls all the way to simple accumulation of rubble (see Figure 10.7 in the Appendix). This depends largely on the available resources. The head of a household living in a makeshift dwelling next to the waterfront in An Lac ward, for example, explains his strategy for collecting freely available resources for the erosion protection as follows: Household member: “In the past we had a lot of river bank erosion affecting our house. Therefore we decided that we have to build an erosion protection. For this we collected the burned coals [honeycomb briquettes] from other people and put them to support the river bank. I have been collecting these briquettes for more than two years now but I constantly have to keep on collecting them and re-fresh the erosion protection. […] Luckily I do not have to pay for the coals. It is more like collecting the waste of other people.” Interviewer: “Are there many other people collecting these coals as well?” Household member: “Yes, there are. But I have an agreement with many households and shops in this area that I can collect the coals from them.” (HH-24-ALW)

Overall, 28 percent of the households applying erosion protection use low quality waste materials (e.g. gravel, building rubble or sand bags) and usually do not have any costs implied. In contrast, the costs for maintaining and upgrading concrete structures have been reported to reach up to 10 million Vietnamese dong (i.e. around 555 USD at the time of the interviews). Interestingly, the data shows a

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clear correlation between the material or construction type used and the source of the labor force: While almost all of households using lower quality and cheaper materials do the maintenance work themselves, two thirds of those households investing in concrete constructions hire professional workers. This clearly underscores that the capacity to reduce the susceptibility towards erosion depends largely on the income situation of the household. In addition, a strong correlation between the frequency of required maintenance or even renewal and the used material could be confirmed by the household survey data. Almost 60 percent of those households able to invest in concrete walls stated no need for further maintenance over the following years. On contrast, 86 percent of all the other households using more provisional materials need to maintain or even renew their construction at least once per year – 27 percent even several times per year. Hence, these households are faced with a constant pressure for re-investment. Stilt improvement The households with dwellings partly or entirely on stilts have reported that the maintenance and adaptation of the poles underneath the house is of central importance. Many interviewees have reported that ideally they would like to invest in strong poles, preferably made of concrete, which would allow for the greatest stability and durability (e.g. HH-34-ANW). However, since these are also the most expensive ones and require a large investment, many households face difficulties to realize this step in the adaptation and rather have to refrain to lower quality materials. Yet, these then have to be replaced more frequently, resulting in a constant financial pressure. One resident in An Lac Ward explains this cycle in more detail: “The poles under the house regularly break. So we often have to replace them. Some of the smaller poles we have to replace every three to four months or at least every year. But the wood is expensive and therefore we have to buy cheap wood which is usually a waste product. We usually have to pay around 7,000 dong per board and 10,000 per a simple pole with bad quality. The more stable poles of better quality cost around 300,000 dong. We would like to change the entire structure to those stable poles; but this is too expensive for us. But in the places most important for the stability, we need to invest in these more stable poles.” (HH-12ALW)

Overall, almost 100 percent of the households with such structures have renewed or upgraded the poles at least once – mostly multiple times – over the last years. A weak statistical correlation could be found between the housing quality and the frequency (C*=0,249 with p≤0.001) meaning those households with weaker housing structures have to invest in the renewal of poles more often. Similarly to the building materials for housing elevations also the poles are bought in most cases (94 percent) and do not come from other sources such as donations or are selfproduced. As in the case of housing elevation, poorer households again have to

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revert more often to the workforce of the household members while wealthier households are commonly able to hire workers to renew the poles. Interestingly, the support from government organizations is again very limited. In fact, only three cases over the entire household survey have received financial support and building materials from government funding mechanisms and only one household for labor force. Joint initiatives for street elevation Next to the adaptation at the level of individual households a number of small scale adaptation initiatives have been implemented in which residents jointly adapt common infrastructure, most notably the streets in front of their houses. These activities vary in the detailed mechanisms but all of them have in one way or the other been negotiated locally – partly in conjunction with the local authorities. One of the most sophisticated mechanisms that could be identified in the case study areas is a joint initiative along a heavily flood-affected street in Binh Thuy Ward where the government and the residents jointly negotiated and implemented an adaptation scheme. This is summarized by one of the participating residents as follows: “The flooding in the street was horrible in the past. It was flooded by the tide and by strong rain, particularly in the wet season. […] Therefore the street was elevated in 2008 which was done jointly by the government and the people living here. […] Many meetings were held between the local government and the local residents to discuss how the street could be implemented and how the costs could be handled. […] In the end there was a common agreement. […] The government paid 60 percent of the costs and the local people the other 40 percent. […] There was a rule and a measurement how much each of the households has to pay. […] So in general the people with the bigger pieces of land and wider fronts facing to the street had to pay more. [Land plots with a front width of eight meters, for example, had to pay 700,000 dong, i.e. around 39 USD.] […] Households with a poverty certificate got additional support from the government and did not have to pay the full contribution.” (HH-27-BTW)

This initiative remarkably emphasizes the diversity and complexity of local political processes (cf. 4.4) at the interface of governmental and non-governmental action. However, the interviews also reveal that the cooperation between the governmental and the non-governmental actors is not necessarily as consensusoriented or voluntary as the above quote might suggest. Interviews with residents affected by another upgrading project in An Nghiep Ward – where the street was widened and lifted along with a new sewer system – strongly suggest that once the decision on the adaptation modus is taken, the supposedly ‘free choice’ turns into an obligation to participate, regardless of whether or not individual households are in agreement and have sufficient resources available (HH-38-ANW). In this case, the households along the street were asked to provide a part of their land so that the street widening could be implemented. “Saying no” was thereby not a “real option” as several residents argued in the semi-structured interviews (e.g. HH-38-

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ANW). The implications of such hybrid political processes for future adaptation activities will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Small-scale dyke systems Next to the above measures, some small scale flood protection systems in the form of low earthwork dykes can be observed. These systems exist particularly in the peri-urban areas in order to also protect small horticulture or agriculture plots next to the residential sites. This scheme is closely related to the communal dyke management in rural areas (cf. Huu et al. 2009) and is, besides the peri-urban fringe, not of great importance for the inner-urban areas. It is hence only briefly discussed here but some of the institutional lessons are of key concern for the discussion of future adaptation mechanisms also in the inner-urban areas. Each dyke unit usually comprises a small group of neighboring residents and the construction and maintenance is in most cases organized by the local authorities. One resident in Hung Phu Ward describes the procedure as follows: “Every year the People’s Committee ward officer sets up a committee for dyke control. They make a list of the households within the dyke system. […] The committee officer then supplies information and instructions and tools necessary. So this is a public work and everybody has to do this. In addition, the committee ward officer brings in volunteers who do not belong to the dyke system but are from the same ward. […] In bad flood years, also the ward officers themselves have to help.” (HH-02-HPW)

However, this constellation with the government supervising the process while the residents having to contribute their labor force leads to contested ownership questions. The following complaints of a second resident in Hung Phu Ward exemplify these disputes to the point: “Right now, the dyke belongs to the local people but the government thinks that it belongs to the government. But I do not agree to the opinion of the government because this dyke in fact has been built by the local people three or four years ago. For example, the law by the government tells you that a dyke has to be 2 meters wide. But the people here did not agree. […] The local people work better than the government. They have a better understanding for the problem and they put more effort into it. The government sometimes comes and just does some bad [counterproductive] work like pumping up the land.” (HH-03-HPW)

Such open criticism is quite remarkable and indicates the great potential for tensions between the remnants of socialist authoritarian mechanisms and the growing aspirations and claims of the population for increased participation and ownership on risk management questions. This conflict and the implications for adaptation processes will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. In situ adaption to other hazards In line with the low risk perception in terms of future typhoons there are only limited accounts of household-level adaptation measures specifically targeted at mak-

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ing the house, especially the roof, more storm-safe. However, it has been emphasized in several in-depth interviews that some upgrading of roofs and walls has commonly been taking place over the last years along with general improvements in housing conditions. Yet, it is interesting to observe, that compared to the pertinence of housing elevation (71 percent of all interviewed households) the general upgrading of roofs and walls has been happening less often (46 and 43 percent, respectively). In addition, such general house upgrading – in terms of roofs and/or walls – is not positively correlated with the main hazard exposure patterns (cf. Table 6.5). This indicates that it is not primarily geared towards natural hazards but rather signifies more general upgrading in the context of socio-economic progress. In fact, in those areas with the highest (multiple) hazard exposures, i.e. the riverbound areas in An Lac and An Nghiep Wards, the percentages of households having implemented such upgrading are amongst the lowest. Only 42 percent in An Nghiep and 45 percent in An Lac have implemented roof upgrading over the last years compared to, for example, 62 percent in An Cu Ward. Similarly, only 23 percent in An Lac and 27 percent in An Nghiep have implemented wall upgrading, compared to 48 percent in An Cu ward. These findings underscore the lower capacity for upgrading and adaption in these areas. Remarkably, however, the support from government organizations is a little bit higher than in the case of the house elevations. Overall, 4.6 percent of those households having upgraded the walls of their houses over the last years have received financial support from a governmental organization. Similarly, 5.2 percent of those having upgraded the roof received such support. One could expect that there have been higher governmental contributions in those case study areas having higher proportions of makeshift houses. Yet, the data shows that in both cases (roofs and walls) the support has been fairly similar across the case study areas. In conclusion, the above section shows that a considerable amount of adaptation activities is being implemented in Can Tho City to reduce households’ susceptibility. Attention is thereby foremost given to the physical susceptibility of the houses. Yet, considerable barriers to susceptibility reduction remain. Adaptation particularly targets creeping hazards, most importantly rising flood levels. Susceptibility reduction focused on potentially emerging extreme events is much less common. Therefore, the question arises whether this lack of attention is being compensated by adaptation targeting an increase in coping capacity – which will, hence, be examined in the following sub-chapter. 6.2.4.4. Enhancing coping capacities The research has revealed that adaptation taken specifically for enhancing the capacity to cope with current hazards and projected hazard extremes is very limited. This observation is striking, given the earlier finding (cf. 6.2.3) that the current capacities for coping with extreme hazard events are often insufficient, particular-

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Analysis of Primary Empirical Data

ly amongst the most exposed and most susceptible households. The latter is true for all three phases of coping, i.e. the anticipation and preparation, the response action during the actual direct hazard influence, and the recovery after the hazard has stricken. Linked to this shortcoming, it is of great relevance to explore the agentive and structural factors behind adapting the own coping resources (cf. 3.2). As a first step, it needs to be asked who Can Tho City’s residents view responsible for disaster risk management, particularly for preparation, protection and recovery – and how this frames their own (lack of) action and investment for enhancing coping capacity. The in-depth household interviews and particularly the survey reveal that the vast majority of residents (still) attribute the main responsibility for flood and storm preparation, protection and recovery to the local government authorities (see Figure 6.34). Interestingly, the percentage of residents seeing the main responsibility at the level of the individual household or other non-governmental entities is much smaller, even though they are often considered to carry secondary or tertiary responsibility. The analysis showed that this perception is wide-spread across different socio-economic groups. Hence, only a limited number of correlations with other vulnerability factors can be found (cf. Table 6.5). However, a medium strong correlation can be found to the case study areas (C*=0.349 with p≤0.001). The standardized residuals reveal that the perceived responsibility of the government is highest in the most exposed and susceptible areas, i.e. in the river-bound settlements in An Nghiep and An Lac as well as the peri-urban sites in Cai Rang and Binh Thuy.

Figure 6.34: Perceived responsibility for disaster risk management, own draft based on household survey data

This predominant belief in government responsibility surely yields open questions when juxtaposed against the earlier illustrated low levels of support for flood and storm preparation, protection and recovery contributed by Can Tho City’s government organs in the past (cf. 6.2.3). Potential mismatches are particularly problematic when considering the increase in the challenges and costs expected for the

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future. Based on the intensification of hazards over the last years, 87 percent of all interviewees stated to be concerned that in future they “will need more money to fortify and repair [their] house in view of erosion, floods and storms and [that] this will create a serious financial problem” for their household. Out of these 87 percent, 62 percent even stated “strong concern”. Similarly, 84 percent are concerned that due to stronger storms their roof could soon be damaged. Even 92 percent are concerned that their income could soon be negatively affected, should the flooding continue to intensify. In combination, it is interesting to observe that these risk perceptions lead to adaptive action in terms of adjusting the physical structures of the house (cf. 6.2.4.3) rather than to action that seeks to improve the soft mechanisms for coping with these hazards, e.g. arrangements for evacuation contingencies or the solidification of support networks. This point will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 6.2.4.5. Preliminary synthesis on adaptive capacity and realized adaptation measures The above analysis has revealed that households in Can Tho City currently apply a considerable array of measures to adapt to the experienced changes in natural hazards (cf. 6.2.1; 4.7), notably the increase in flood occurrence and flood intensity and the rise in river bank erosion. Hence, the major part of adaptation action has been found to be reactive, i.e. adaptation has been implemented after the negative impacts of changed hazard patterns have been felt. Precautionary and anticipatory adaptation action – called for in the conceptual literature (cf. 2.1.2) – has been found to play a negligible role. Most adaptation measures directly target the exposure or physical susceptibility of the household, most notably through moving out of the hazard zone or improving the housing conditions, respectively. Therefore, most of the current adaptation activity is based on hard measures such as the physical elevation of the floor height. Soft aspects of adaptation such as the rehearsal of evacuation procedures or the elicitation of potential financial coping mechanisms (e.g. insurances) in view of potentially occurring extreme hazard events in the future have been found to be much less common. Related to this point, also adaptation action specifically targeting an increase in coping capacity has been found to be virtually non-existent. The data demonstrates that current adaptation action is often co-motivated by an increase in available resources and the improvement of overall living conditions; however, the data also reveals that the direct link to flood and storm vulnerability remains to be the major factor driving adaptation decisions. The findings further show that the costs for adaptation are largely borne by the individual households. External support and, especially, state assistance only plays a minor role, even in the case of lower income groups. This is in line with the observation that the materials and labor inputs for adaptation are increasingly processed through markets, making financial capital more and more important within the baskets of overall adaptive capacity. The data

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therefore suggests that social disparities in adaptive capacity are high and further rising. However, the analysis also highlights that the question whether or not households can effectively implement adaptation action depends not only on the portfolio of adaptive capacity in the different capital types according to the sustainable livelihood framework (cf. 2.1). Rather, the empirical results clearly underscore that the agentive and structural factors considered in the conceptual framework (cf. 3.2) have great relevance on the question how existing capacities can be (or are chosen to be) activated into adaptation action. Many interviewees, for example, reported that they have saved money for elevating their house but then decided not to invest into such upgrading when they learned that they might be resettled in the mid-term future (cf. 6.2.4.3). The findings therefore confirm the theoretical assertion suggested earlier (cf. 3.2) that adaptive capacity cannot be equated with adaptation action. Hence, even though the monetization of adaptation resources has been identified as a key trend (see above), the analysis also leads one to caution that neo-classical approaches that capture the potential for effective adaptation only through the enumeration of adaptive capacity stocks fall short of representing the real context of adaptation action. Rather, adaptive capacity needs to be understood in its embededness into the agentive and structural factors that regulate the accumulation and further activation of capacities. Finally, it is important to reiterate that the above analysis on currently observable adaptation measures allows for drawing important lessons with regards to the opportunities, barriers and limits of likely adaptation modes towards future natural hazards, which are projected to emerge from, both, human intervention into the Mekong Delta’s hydraulic infrastructure as well as climate change. This is because the current increase in overall water levels, notably in Hau River (cf. 6.2.1), features a hazard trend that is comparable to the projected changes coming along with sea level rise and increased flood variability (cf. 4.2; 4.7). The adaptation findings contributed here can therefore be considered a laboratory for assessing the fabric of future adaptation action. This situation is different for the projected increase in typhoon activity for which – as the data has clearly shown – people in Can Tho City take virtually no precautionary adaptive action given that this type of hazard is not experienced currently and, hence, ranks much lower in the interviewees’ risk perception (cf. 6.2.4.1). 6.2.5. Interim synthesis: vulnerability, adaptive capacity and adaptation action at household level A number of synthesis points on the nexus of vulnerability, adaptive capacity and adaptation action at household level can be drawn from the analysis presented in the above chapter 6.2. Yet, given that the next chapter (7) provides the overall synthesis and discussion of the entire study, this interim synthesis provided here will be kept rather short.

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325

The empirical analysis has substantiated the conceptual claim raised earlier (cf. 3.2) that vulnerability at household level in Can Tho City needs to be understood through the combination and interaction of the households’ exposure, susceptibility and coping capacity. Adaptation therefore needs to be considered the counterpart, i.e. capacity and action for reducing vulnerability along these three factors. The findings, particularly of the correlation analysis, show that exposure, susceptibility and the lack of coping capacity often cross-fertilize each other, resulting in high overall vulnerability. This pattern could be observed foremost amongst low-income households. Yet, it should not be misinterpreted in a deterministic manner, given that the results in many cases also suggest diverging conditions in the single vulnerability factors. This is the case, for example, where high flood exposure has lead to sophisticated patterns of coping including the provisional preparation of the house, the evacuation of assets and the social networks shared with family, neighbors and friends for taking care of children and elderly during flood or storm situations. In particular, the findings underscore that coping and susceptibility need to be considered in close correlation, often influencing each other in inverse ways (i.e. the better the coping, the lower susceptibility and vice versa). Nevertheless, it makes sense to separate the two conceptually and empirically in order to increase the analytical precision. While, for example, the household profile, measured along the dependency ratio, has great influence on susceptibility (particularly when considering infants, elderly and challenged household members), it also indicates elements of coping capacity in terms of the potential for care-taking before, during and after hazard events. Both aspects are closely related but are surely not identical. In terms of the vulnerability to future hazards projected along with climate change, many doubts remain as to whether the current coping patterns would be sufficient to deal with extreme events in the future. The low awareness on typhoon risk or the limited options for financial coping in case of extreme disasters serve as prime examples. This is in part due to a perplexing perception on climate change impacts. While there is increasing talk on the topic in Can Tho City, this general awareness does neither translate stringently into detailed knowledge on the hazards to be expected nor into precautionary or preparatory adaptation action. Rather, most of the adaptation action has been found to be reactive and to only target some of the vulnerability dimensions, most notably the physical susceptibility related to housing. Those measures being primarily implemented (e.g. the elevation of housing floors) hence represent the current solution space that is spanned by both the perception on possible or necessary types of adaptation (related to agentive factors) as well as the framework conditions implied by Can Tho City’s political economy (related to the structural factors). The latter comprise, for example, the rocketing land prices which prevent many flood-affected households from moving out of the exposure zone or the limited amount of information that is shared by the local government on pending projects of upgrading and resettlement. The uncertainties regarding the latter have been found to hamper otherwise

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implemented adaptation solutions, hence, leading to a perpetuation of vulnerability. In sum, the findings underscore that household-level adaptation is conditioned by both the wider structural conditions as well as agentive factors. The question which type of factors is more important depends on the adaptation measure in question, but overall the findings urge to stress the interplay between both rather than trying to establish an artificial hierarchy. The above-illustrated case of the interplay between structural uncertainty on impending resettlement, on the one hand, and the resulting shifts in the prioritization of own adaptation decisions, on the other hand, can be taken as a prime example in this context. The findings suggest that both are dynamically changing along with the country’s ongoing transformation process (which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7).

Area House Loc. HH Size Depen. Ratio Literacy HH High Education High Prof. Gov. Staff Mem. Org. Health Ins. Challenges HH Pov. Cert. Assets Income Remit In Remit Out Land Cert House Qual. Multi Haz. Reg. Flood Ext. Haz. Erosion Able Swimming Repair Ext. Haz. Repl. Ext. Haz. Supp. Rel. Health Ext. Elev. Asset Evac. People Health Reg. Gov. Supp. Elevat. Elem. Elev. Height Elev. Gov. Elev. Stilt New Gov. Stilt Roof Upgr. Gov. Roof Plan Elev. Plan Roof Plan Stilts Plan Wall Wat. Reas. Wind Rea. Supp. VN Supp. Int. Resettl. Fund Past Fund Pot. DRM Gov. DRM HH

0,666 0,206 0,222 0,323 0,390 0,358 0,249 0,322 0,296 0,296 0,136 0,427 0,304 0,228 0,225 0,387 0,393 0,366 0,290 0,314 0,356 0,438 0,227 0,286 0,106 0,245 0,460 0,378 0,210 0,122 0,295 0,296 0,322 0,288 0,337 0,336 0,290 0,283 0,219 0,149 0,205 0,224 0,155 0,206 0,396 0,352 0,654 0,276 0,411 0,349 0,456

Area

0,178 0,236 0,266 0,237 0,293 0,189 0,282 0,269 0,125 0,170 0,289 0,245 0,214 0,192 0,402 0,508 0,307 0,233 0,175 0,488 0,328 0,280 0,205 0,151 0,167 0,372 0,344 0,160 0,214 0,238 0,261 0,259 0,223 0,579 0,518 0,154 0,143 0,138 0,177 0,173 0,132 0,131 0,123 0,217 0,190 0,482 0,211 0,312 0,288 0,299

0,666

House Loc.

0,336 0,370 0,183 0,202 0,101 0,234 0,346 0,241 0,082 0,378 0,306 0,226 0,110 0,166 0,118 0,121 0,235 0,151 0,079 0,243 0,098 0,105 0,148 0,109 0,131 0,103 0,062 0,143 0,145 0,111 0,146 0,114 0,109 0,178 0,055 0,083 0,136 0,132 0,108 0,121 0,127 0,123 0,170 0,088 0,198 0,113 0,110 0,146 0,232

0,206 0,178

HH Size

0,232 0,224 0,116 0,094 0,171 0,139 0,347 0,102 0,173 0,278 0,307 0,120 0,140 0,133 0,119 0,137 0,085 0,032 0,267 0,135 0,129 0,189 0,165 0,127 0,200 0,017 0,108 0,156 0,189 0,158 0,110 0,074 0,082 0,113 0,141 0,040 0,034 0,051 0,066 0,071 0,130 0,248 0,087 0,137 0,084 0,131 0,151 0,231

Depen. Ratio 0,222 0,236 0,336

0,294 0,270 0,162 0,153 0,112 0,371 0,304 0,368 0,346 0,153 0,134 0,106 0,214 0,158 0,086 0,108 0,104 0,103 0,090 0,076 0,085 0,082 0,168 0,179 0,057 0,245 0,073 0,108 0,151 0,116 0,115 0,104 0,058 0,188 0,082 0,061 0,059 0,117 0,064 0,072 0,060 0,116 0,191 0,274 0,245 0,214 0,135

0,323 0,266 0,370 0,232

Literacy HH

0,581 0,356 0,337 0,392 0,184 0,204 0,542 0,404 0,173 0,128 0,310 0,297 0,233 0,204 0,177 0,134 0,143 0,201 0,220 0,094 0,118 0,122 0,098 0,054 0,042 0,200 0,179 0,165 0,167 0,077 0,096 0,095 0,098 0,265 0,152 0,147 0,184 0,105 0,153 0,251 0,232 0,083 0,300 0,290 0,198 0,272

High Education 0,390 0,237 0,183 0,224 0,294

0,404 0,240 0,286 0,176 0,321 0,580 0,513 0,198 0,161 0,303 0,330 0,182 0,132 0,128 0,080 0,137 0,100 0,162 0,057 0,187 0,117 0,057 0,141 0,169 0,186 0,228 0,206 0,225 0,146 0,157 0,026 0,159 0,169 0,083 0,103 0,072 0,127 0,042 0,242 0,305 0,101 0,319 0,277 0,172 0,180

0,358 0,293 0,202 0,116 0,270 0,581

High Prof.

0,348 0,271 0,180 0,115 0,336 0,277 0,113 0,137 0,185 0,208 0,123 0,090 0,094 0,088 0,094 0,049 0,122 0,134 0,121 0,105 0,134 0,089 0,037 0,111 0,139 0,125 0,120 0,091 0,092 0,026 0,077 0,140 0,112 0,142 0,091 0,045 0,060 0,101 0,104 0,072 0,043 0,215 0,219 0,159

0,249 0,189 0,101 0,094 0,162 0,356 0,404

Gov. Staff

0,248 0,193 0,074 0,314 0,272 0,174 0,161 0,171 0,128 0,155 0,180 0,104 0,058 0,215 0,107 0,108 0,076 0,125 0,069 0,173 0,152 0,073 0,132 0,239 0,158 0,115 0,036 0,092 0,113 0,110 0,114 0,104 0,064 0,101 0,098 0,095 0,137 0,145 0,153 0,188 0,229 0,164 0,200

0,322 0,282 0,234 0,171 0,153 0,337 0,240 0,348

Mem. Org.

0,057 0,229 0,362 0,243 0,171 0,167 0,181 0,219 0,233 0,208 0,161 0,153 0,155 0,126 0,168 0,123 0,117 0,121 0,067 0,077 0,143 0,153 0,112 0,136 0,087 0,130 0,114 0,071 0,064 0,130 0,079 0,056 0,043 0,089 0,140 0,117 0,070 0,099 0,096 0,175 0,172 0,148

0,296 0,269 0,346 0,139 0,112 0,392 0,286 0,271 0,248

Health Ins.

0,253 0,321 0,293 0,177 0,103 0,157 0,126 0,134 0,094 0,080 0,124 0,098 0,150 0,088 0,153 0,155 0,101 0,085 0,105 0,098 0,068 0,079 0,118 0,100 0,136 0,121 0,093 0,120 0,122 0,083 0,090 0,055 0,085 0,034 0,049 0,142 0,148 0,180 0,258 0,232 0,262

Challenges HH 0,296 0,125 0,241 0,347 0,371 0,184 0,176 0,180 0,193 0,057

0,344 0,334 0,120 0,103 0,150 0,051 0,122 0,061 0,040 0,028 0,124 0,028 0,109 0,021 0,129 0,049 0,037 0,042 0,205 0,132 0,124 0,119 0,233 0,127 0,156 0,055 0,037 0,154 0,035 0,045 0,059 0,083 0,075 0,047 0,103 0,110 0,266 0,167 0,106 0,110

0,136 0,170 0,082 0,102 0,304 0,204 0,321 0,115 0,074 0,229 0,253

Pov. Cert.

0,484 0,258 0,216 0,276 0,391 0,258 0,326 0,184 0,124 0,251 0,169 0,149 0,182 0,215 0,174 0,133 0,139 0,061 0,267 0,292 0,293 0,294 0,192 0,173 0,066 0,176 0,151 0,047 0,031 0,063 0,177 0,120 0,229 0,270 0,195 0,364 0,413 0,220 0,211

0,427 0,289 0,378 0,173 0,368 0,542 0,580 0,336 0,314 0,362 0,321 0,344

Assets

0,294 0,292 0,277 0,243 0,249 0,148 0,225 0,107 0,173 0,182 0,213 0,121 0,179 0,126 0,221 0,162 0,193 0,247 0,234 0,281 0,250 0,066 0,095 0,072 0,157 0,169 0,112 0,102 0,111 0,132 0,079 0,341 0,228 0,151 0,246 0,366 0,174 0,236

0,304 0,245 0,306 0,278 0,346 0,404 0,513 0,277 0,272 0,243 0,293 0,334 0,484

Income

0,130 0,150 0,207 0,155 0,137 0,066 0,113 0,063 0,116 0,107 0,218 0,099 0,135 0,133 0,147 0,067 0,130 0,103 0,117 0,127 0,089 0,154 0,206 0,201 0,106 0,057 0,077 0,054 0,092 0,104 0,381 0,623 0,113 0,086 0,232 0,152 0,202

0,228 0,214 0,226 0,307 0,153 0,173 0,198 0,113 0,174 0,171 0,177 0,120 0,258 0,294

Remit In

0,164 0,096 0,081 0,110 0,082 0,089 0,032 0,077 0,079 0,044 0,076 0,082 0,115 0,171 0,042 0,123 0,147 0,179 0,147 0,104 0,114 0,114 0,110 0,055 0,127 0,062 0,047 0,059 0,049 0,133 0,167 0,057 0,076 0,102 0,159 0,112

0,225 0,192 0,110 0,120 0,134 0,128 0,161 0,137 0,161 0,167 0,103 0,103 0,216 0,292 0,130

Remit Out

0,285 0,289 0,192 0,230 0,222 0,132 0,183 0,120 0,035 0,085 0,105 0,190 0,113 0,052 0,215 0,232 0,200 0,208 0,301 0,265 0,072 0,094 0,127 0,097 0,067 0,072 0,096 0,043 0,103 0,175 0,126 0,224 0,160 0,128 0,266

0,387 0,402 0,166 0,140 0,106 0,310 0,303 0,185 0,171 0,181 0,157 0,150 0,276 0,277 0,150 0,164

Land Cert

0,230 0,239 0,175 0,170 0,203 0,168 0,227 0,126 0,140 0,293 0,123 0,214 0,159 0,193 0,175 0,168 0,173 0,249 0,269 0,140 0,148 0,084 0,118 0,112 0,143 0,103 0,060 0,086 0,123 0,279 0,274 0,251 0,187 0,235

House Qual. 0,393 0,508 0,118 0,133 0,214 0,297 0,330 0,208 0,128 0,219 0,126 0,051 0,391 0,243 0,207 0,096 0,285

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Table 6.5: Statistical correlations between key variables listed in Table 5.1, own draft and own calculations based on the household survey data (continued on next page)

Area House Loc. HH Size Depen. Ratio Literacy HH High Education High Prof. Gov. Staff Mem. Org. Health Ins. Challenges HH Pov. Cert. Assets Income Remit In Remit Out Land Cert House Qual. Multi Haz. Reg. Flood Ext. Haz. Erosion Able Swimming Repair Ext. Haz. Repl. Ext. Haz. Supp. Rel. Health Ext. Elev. Asset Evac. People Health Reg. Gov. Supp. Elevat. Elem. Elev. Height Elev. Gov. Elev. Stilt New Gov. Stilt Roof Upgr. Gov. Roof Plan Elev. Plan Roof Plan Stilts Plan Wall Wat. Reas. Wind Rea. Supp. VN Supp. Int. Resettl. Fund Past Fund Pot. DRM Gov. DRM HH

0,722 0,745 0,742 0,186 0,493 0,278 0,150 0,208 0,467 0,205 0,023 0,215 0,153 0,170 0,164 0,131 0,187 0,170 0,137 0,128 0,315 0,219 0,159 0,160 0,356 0,162 0,089 0,174 0,253 0,106 0,241 0,154 0,208

0,366 0,307 0,121 0,119 0,158 0,233 0,182 0,123 0,155 0,233 0,134 0,122 0,258 0,249 0,155 0,081 0,289 0,230

Multi Haz.

0,221 0,110 0,135 0,207 0,125 0,042 0,170 0,453 0,100 0,062 0,086 0,230 0,255 0,297 0,208 0,061 0,083 0,124 0,126 0,304 0,230 0,121 0,142 0,371 0,226 0,141 0,193 0,149 0,101 0,301 0,135 0,182

0,290 0,233 0,235 0,137 0,086 0,204 0,132 0,090 0,180 0,208 0,094 0,061 0,326 0,148 0,137 0,110 0,192 0,239 0,722

Reg. Flood

0,239 0,160 0,474 0,366 0,201 0,264 0,219 0,113 0,109 0,196 0,155 0,107 0,142 0,138 0,072 0,091 0,028 0,054 0,170 0,148 0,151 0,126 0,174 0,119 0,119 0,094 0,121 0,070 0,096 0,172 0,206

0,314 0,175 0,151 0,085 0,108 0,177 0,128 0,094 0,104 0,161 0,080 0,040 0,184 0,225 0,066 0,082 0,230 0,175 0,745 0,221

Ext. Haz.

0,164 0,271 0,140 0,080 0,107 0,271 0,189 0,052 0,138 0,078 0,086 0,125 0,093 0,195 0,222 0,138 0,218 0,005 0,016 0,000 0,015 0,027 0,012 0,142 0,141 0,236 0,055 0,136 0,134 0,176

0,356 0,488 0,079 0,032 0,104 0,134 0,080 0,088 0,058 0,153 0,124 0,028 0,124 0,107 0,113 0,089 0,222 0,170 0,742 0,110 0,239

Erosion

0,139 0,109 0,152 0,195 0,127 0,176 0,163 0,080 0,090 0,136 0,169 0,103 0,111 0,105 0,060 0,062 0,006 0,036 0,058 0,012 0,012 0,081 0,219 0,197 0,175 0,096 0,116 0,141 0,214

Able Swimming 0,438 0,328 0,243 0,267 0,103 0,143 0,137 0,094 0,215 0,155 0,098 0,124 0,251 0,173 0,063 0,032 0,132 0,203 0,186 0,135 0,160 0,164

0,530 0,278 0,236 0,176 0,191 0,024 0,131 0,142 0,130 0,170 0,142 0,078 0,088 0,104 0,100 0,039 0,048 0,092 0,036 0,084 0,164 0,163 0,087 0,141 0,025 0,118 0,155 0,154

Repair Ext. Haz. 0,227 0,280 0,098 0,135 0,090 0,201 0,100 0,049 0,107 0,126 0,150 0,028 0,169 0,182 0,116 0,077 0,183 0,168 0,493 0,207 0,474 0,271 0,139

0,196 0,381 0,102 0,198 0,087 0,288 0,156 0,172 0,195 0,204 0,127 0,117 0,135 0,266 0,185 0,173 0,256 0,215 0,111 0,149 0,132 0,137 0,118 0,079 0,141 0,189 0,313

Repl. Ext. Haz. 0,286 0,205 0,105 0,129 0,076 0,220 0,162 0,122 0,108 0,168 0,088 0,109 0,149 0,213 0,107 0,079 0,120 0,227 0,278 0,125 0,366 0,140 0,109 0,530

0,044 0,160 0,189 0,045 0,048 0,103 0,078 0,164 0,099 0,112 0,147 0,087 0,115 0,037 0,032 0,011 0,018 0,029 0,048 0,182 0,175 0,086 0,003 0,047 0,108 0,134

0,106 0,151 0,148 0,189 0,085 0,094 0,057 0,134 0,076 0,123 0,153 0,021 0,182 0,121 0,218 0,044 0,035 0,126 0,150 0,042 0,201 0,080 0,152 0,278 0,196

Supp. Rel.

0,167 0,146 0,325 0,048 0,211 0,084 0,131 0,130 0,095 0,087 0,073 0,127 0,072 0,083 0,046 0,051 0,094 0,338 0,127 0,099 0,207 0,097 0,135 0,166 0,239

0,245 0,167 0,109 0,165 0,082 0,118 0,187 0,121 0,125 0,117 0,155 0,129 0,215 0,179 0,099 0,076 0,085 0,140 0,208 0,170 0,264 0,107 0,195 0,236 0,381 0,044

Health Ext.

0,362 0,070 0,041 0,115 0,145 0,166 0,094 0,235 0,210 0,124 0,119 0,180 0,122 0,140 0,071 0,235 0,183 0,183 0,211 0,312 0,123 0,339 0,220 0,218

0,460 0,372 0,131 0,127 0,168 0,122 0,117 0,105 0,069 0,121 0,101 0,049 0,174 0,126 0,135 0,082 0,105 0,293 0,467 0,453 0,219 0,271 0,127 0,176 0,102 0,160 0,167

Elev. Asset

0,175 0,078 0,114 0,112 0,114 0,106 0,237 0,238 0,048 0,047 0,038 0,055 0,103 0,081 0,041 0,175 0,030 0,086 0,081 0,131 0,109 0,278 0,175

Evac. People 0,378 0,344 0,103 0,200 0,179 0,098 0,057 0,134 0,173 0,067 0,085 0,037 0,133 0,221 0,133 0,115 0,190 0,123 0,205 0,100 0,113 0,189 0,176 0,191 0,198 0,189 0,146 0,362

0,023 0,077 0,065 0,073 0,084 0,137 0,144 0,127 0,139 0,146 0,062 0,077 0,053 0,106 0,056 0,311 0,126 0,051 0,132 0,152 0,174 0,254

0,210 0,160 0,062 0,017 0,057 0,054 0,141 0,089 0,152 0,077 0,105 0,042 0,139 0,162 0,147 0,171 0,113 0,214 0,023 0,062 0,109 0,052 0,163 0,024 0,087 0,045 0,325 0,070 0,175

Health Reg.

0,027 0,033 0,033 0,520 0,011 0,189 0,045 0,556 0,047 0,014 0,020 0,027 0,038 0,039 0,056 0,091 0,057 0,114 0,043 0,104 0,119

0,122 0,214 0,143 0,108 0,245 0,042 0,169 0,037 0,073 0,143 0,098 0,205 0,061 0,193 0,067 0,042 0,052 0,159 0,215 0,086 0,196 0,138 0,080 0,131 0,288 0,048 0,048 0,041 0,078 0,023

Gov. Supp.

0,845 0,839 0,866 0,147 0,141 0,350 0,322 0,126 0,046 0,051 0,056 0,134 0,076 0,195 0,136 0,058 0,138 0,186 0,092 0,124

0,295 0,238 0,145 0,156 0,073 0,200 0,186 0,111 0,132 0,153 0,068 0,132 0,267 0,247 0,130 0,123 0,215 0,193 0,153 0,230 0,155 0,078 0,090 0,142 0,156 0,103 0,211 0,115 0,114 0,077 0,027

Elevat.

0,857 0,847 0,258 0,238 0,411 0,364 0,019 0,089 0,099 0,067 0,053 0,049 0,181 0,125 0,047 0,126 0,177 0,094 0,119

0,296 0,261 0,111 0,189 0,108 0,179 0,228 0,139 0,239 0,112 0,079 0,124 0,292 0,234 0,103 0,147 0,232 0,175 0,170 0,255 0,107 0,086 0,136 0,130 0,172 0,078 0,084 0,145 0,112 0,065 0,033 0,845

Elem. Elev.

0,836 0,222 0,217 0,364 0,329 0,082 0,089 0,048 0,046 0,096 0,112 0,240 0,145 0,044 0,105 0,178 0,159 0,185

0,322 0,259 0,146 0,158 0,151 0,165 0,206 0,125 0,158 0,136 0,118 0,119 0,293 0,281 0,117 0,179 0,200 0,168 0,164 0,297 0,142 0,125 0,169 0,170 0,195 0,164 0,131 0,166 0,114 0,073 0,033 0,839 0,857

Height Elev.

0,141 0,366 0,362 0,601 0,064 0,017 0,061 0,037 0,070 0,075 0,161 0,160 0,098 0,183 0,185 0,062 0,107

0,288 0,223 0,114 0,110 0,116 0,167 0,225 0,120 0,115 0,087 0,100 0,233 0,294 0,250 0,127 0,147 0,208 0,173 0,131 0,208 0,138 0,093 0,103 0,142 0,204 0,099 0,130 0,094 0,106 0,084 0,520 0,866 0,847 0,836

Gov. Elev.

328 Analysis of Primary Empirical Data

Table 6.5: Statistical correlations between key variables listed in Table 5.1, own draft and own calculations based on the household survey data (continued)

1,000 0,343 0,354 0,099 0,083 0,028 0,076 0,026 0,038 0,091 0,071 0,297 0,028 0,070 0,174 0,206

Stilt New 0,337 0,579 0,109 0,074 0,115 0,077 0,146 0,091 0,036 0,130 0,136 0,127 0,192 0,066 0,089 0,104 0,301 0,249 0,187 0,061 0,072 0,195 0,111 0,078 0,127 0,112 0,095 0,235 0,237 0,137 0,011 0,147 0,258 0,222 0,141

0,352 0,324 0,112 0,097 0,049 0,090 0,053 0,070 0,100 0,073 0,279 0,035 0,068 0,164 0,190

Gov. Stilt 0,336 0,518 0,178 0,082 0,104 0,096 0,157 0,092 0,092 0,114 0,121 0,156 0,173 0,095 0,154 0,114 0,265 0,269 0,170 0,083 0,091 0,222 0,105 0,088 0,117 0,147 0,087 0,210 0,238 0,144 0,189 0,141 0,238 0,217 0,366 1,000

1,000 0,025 0,021 0,028 0,055 0,015 0,009 0,050 0,113 0,145 0,005 0,167 0,078 0,089

Roof Upgr. 0,290 0,154 0,055 0,113 0,058 0,095 0,026 0,026 0,113 0,071 0,093 0,055 0,066 0,072 0,206 0,114 0,072 0,140 0,137 0,124 0,028 0,138 0,060 0,104 0,135 0,087 0,073 0,124 0,048 0,127 0,045 0,350 0,411 0,364 0,362 0,343 0,352

0,085 0,036 0,039 0,065 0,030 0,233 0,057 0,151 0,135 0,150 0,203 0,135 0,118

Gov. Roof 0,283 0,143 0,083 0,141 0,188 0,098 0,159 0,077 0,110 0,064 0,120 0,037 0,176 0,157 0,201 0,110 0,094 0,148 0,128 0,126 0,054 0,218 0,062 0,100 0,266 0,115 0,127 0,119 0,047 0,139 0,556 0,322 0,364 0,329 0,601 0,354 0,324 1,000

0,759 0,697 0,732 0,838 0,322 0,110 0,005 0,090 0,066 0,119 0,084 0,190

Plan Elev. 0,219 0,138 0,136 0,040 0,082 0,265 0,169 0,140 0,114 0,130 0,122 0,154 0,151 0,169 0,106 0,055 0,127 0,084 0,315 0,304 0,170 0,005 0,006 0,039 0,185 0,037 0,072 0,180 0,038 0,146 0,047 0,126 0,019 0,082 0,064 0,099 0,112 0,025 0,085

0,795 0,792 0,592 0,485 0,108 0,056 0,088 0,032 0,065 0,082 0,173

Plan Roof 0,149 0,177 0,132 0,034 0,061 0,152 0,083 0,112 0,104 0,079 0,083 0,035 0,047 0,112 0,057 0,127 0,097 0,118 0,219 0,230 0,148 0,016 0,036 0,048 0,173 0,032 0,083 0,122 0,055 0,062 0,014 0,046 0,089 0,089 0,017 0,083 0,097 0,021 0,036 0,759

0,842 0,487 0,252 0,105 0,053 0,075 0,041 0,066 0,126 0,199

Plan Stilts 0,205 0,173 0,108 0,051 0,059 0,147 0,103 0,142 0,064 0,056 0,090 0,045 0,031 0,102 0,077 0,062 0,067 0,112 0,159 0,121 0,151 0,000 0,058 0,092 0,256 0,011 0,046 0,140 0,103 0,077 0,020 0,051 0,099 0,048 0,061 0,028 0,049 0,028 0,039 0,697 0,795

0,488 0,348 0,090 0,032 0,115 0,052 0,049 0,124 0,229

Plan Wall 0,224 0,132 0,121 0,066 0,117 0,184 0,072 0,091 0,101 0,043 0,055 0,059 0,063 0,111 0,054 0,047 0,072 0,143 0,160 0,142 0,126 0,015 0,012 0,036 0,215 0,018 0,051 0,071 0,081 0,053 0,027 0,056 0,067 0,046 0,037 0,076 0,090 0,055 0,065 0,732 0,792 0,842

0,456 0,065 0,044 0,129 0,017 0,159 0,168 0,201

Wat. Reas. 0,155 0,131 0,127 0,071 0,064 0,105 0,127 0,045 0,098 0,089 0,085 0,083 0,177 0,132 0,092 0,059 0,096 0,103 0,356 0,371 0,174 0,027 0,012 0,084 0,111 0,029 0,094 0,235 0,041 0,106 0,038 0,134 0,053 0,096 0,070 0,026 0,053 0,015 0,030 0,838 0,592 0,487 0,488

0,071 0,067 0,098 0,005 0,134 0,131 0,175

Wind Rea. 0,206 0,123 0,123 0,130 0,072 0,153 0,042 0,060 0,095 0,140 0,034 0,075 0,120 0,079 0,104 0,049 0,043 0,060 0,162 0,226 0,119 0,012 0,081 0,164 0,149 0,048 0,338 0,183 0,175 0,056 0,039 0,076 0,049 0,112 0,075 0,038 0,070 0,009 0,233 0,322 0,485 0,252 0,348 0,456

0,477 0,140 0,018 0,172 0,236 0,265

Supp. VN 0,396 0,217 0,170 0,248 0,060 0,251 0,242 0,101 0,137 0,117 0,049 0,047 0,229 0,341 0,381 0,133 0,103 0,086 0,089 0,141 0,119 0,142 0,219 0,163 0,132 0,182 0,127 0,183 0,030 0,311 0,056 0,195 0,181 0,240 0,161 0,091 0,100 0,050 0,057 0,110 0,108 0,105 0,090 0,065 0,071

0,076 0,157 0,226 0,172 0,349

Supp. Int. 0,352 0,190 0,088 0,087 0,116 0,232 0,305 0,104 0,145 0,070 0,142 0,103 0,270 0,228 0,623 0,167 0,175 0,123 0,174 0,193 0,094 0,141 0,197 0,087 0,137 0,175 0,099 0,211 0,086 0,126 0,091 0,136 0,125 0,145 0,160 0,071 0,073 0,113 0,151 0,005 0,056 0,053 0,032 0,044 0,067 0,477

0,168 0,215 0,127 0,195

Resettl. 0,654 0,482 0,198 0,137 0,191 0,083 0,101 0,072 0,153 0,099 0,148 0,110 0,195 0,151 0,113 0,057 0,126 0,279 0,253 0,149 0,121 0,236 0,175 0,141 0,118 0,086 0,207 0,312 0,081 0,051 0,057 0,058 0,047 0,044 0,098 0,297 0,279 0,145 0,135 0,090 0,088 0,075 0,115 0,129 0,098 0,140 0,076

0,237 0,129 0,205

Fund Past 0,276 0,211 0,113 0,084 0,274 0,300 0,319 0,043 0,188 0,096 0,180 0,266 0,364 0,246 0,086 0,076 0,224 0,274 0,106 0,101 0,070 0,055 0,096 0,025 0,079 0,003 0,097 0,123 0,131 0,132 0,114 0,138 0,126 0,105 0,183 0,028 0,035 0,005 0,150 0,066 0,032 0,041 0,052 0,017 0,005 0,018 0,157 0,168

0,232 0,323

Fund Pot. 0,411 0,312 0,110 0,131 0,245 0,290 0,277 0,215 0,229 0,175 0,258 0,167 0,413 0,366 0,232 0,102 0,160 0,251 0,241 0,301 0,096 0,136 0,116 0,118 0,141 0,047 0,135 0,339 0,109 0,152 0,043 0,186 0,177 0,178 0,185 0,070 0,068 0,167 0,203 0,119 0,065 0,066 0,049 0,159 0,134 0,172 0,226 0,215 0,237

0,715

DRM Gov. 0,349 0,288 0,146 0,151 0,214 0,198 0,172 0,219 0,164 0,172 0,232 0,106 0,220 0,174 0,152 0,159 0,128 0,187 0,154 0,135 0,172 0,134 0,141 0,155 0,189 0,108 0,166 0,220 0,278 0,174 0,104 0,092 0,094 0,159 0,062 0,174 0,164 0,078 0,135 0,084 0,082 0,126 0,124 0,168 0,131 0,236 0,172 0,127 0,129 0,232

DRM HH 0,456 0,299 0,232 0,231 0,135 0,272 0,180 0,159 0,200 0,148 0,262 0,110 0,211 0,236 0,202 0,112 0,266 0,235 0,208 0,182 0,206 0,176 0,214 0,154 0,313 0,134 0,239 0,218 0,175 0,254 0,119 0,124 0,119 0,185 0,107 0,206 0,190 0,089 0,118 0,190 0,173 0,199 0,229 0,201 0,175 0,265 0,349 0,195 0,205 0,323 0,715

The numbers provide the C* values. Grey shading indicates the strength of the correlation. Dark grey: very strong and strong correlations (C*>0.5); medium grey: medium strong correlations (0.3