Rise of the Chinese Militray Power 9781400878840

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THE RISE OF CHINESE MILITARY POWER 1895-1912

THE RISE OF

CHINESE MILITARY POWER 1895-1912 BY RALPH L POWELL

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1955

Copyright, 1955, by Princeton University Press London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press L. C. Card 55-6247 Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from the Princeton University Research Fund

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

TO MY WIFE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many teachers and colleagues, both civilian and mili­ tary, have provided me with information, judgments, and advice which have been of value in preparing this volume. It is a great pleasure to express my gratitude to them. I am especially indebted to Professor Teng Ssu-yu of Indiana, Professor John K. Fairbank of Harvard, Professor Joseph R. Strayer of Princeton, and Mr. Herbert S. Bailey, Jr., Director of the Prince­ ton University Press, all of whom read the manuscript. Their comments and criticisms were invaluable. I also wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Fred­ erick F. Liu for inscribing the Chinese characters of the glossary; to Mr. Harvey Stailey for drawing the map; and to Mrs. Lisette Isely for preparing the index. My wife, Helena Finch Powell, rendered unflagging assist­ ance in research, typing, and proofreading. To her the work is dedicated. Publication of the book has been aided by grants from the Princeton University Research Fund, and the financial assistance given is gratefully acknowledged. R.L.P.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES BPP

Parliament, House of Commons Sessional Papers.

CSK Chao Erh-hsun, Ch'ing-shih kao (The Draft History of the Ch'ing Dynasty), 536 chiian, Peiping, 1928. CSL Ta-ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (Veritable Records of Succes­ sive Reigns of the Ch'ing Dynasty), 4485 chuan, Tokyo, 1937-1938. CSS Wen Kung-chih, Tsui-chin san-shih-nien Chung-kuo chun-shih shih (History of Chinese Military Affairs in the Last Thirty Years), vol. 1 of 2, Shanghai, 1930. FR Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, D.C. JATTC Shen Tsu-hsien, and Wu K'ai-sheng, Jung-an ti-tzu chi (An Account of Jung-an [Yuan Shih-k'ai] by His Disciples), 4 chiian, publisher unknown, 1913. LCCCF Shen Chien, "Hsin-hai ko-ming ch'ien-hsi wo-kuo chih lu-chiin chi ch'i chun-fei" (The Land Army of China and Its Finance on the Eve of the Revolution of 1911), She-hui k'o-hsueh (The Social Sciences), vol. 2, no. 2 (January 1937), pp. 343-408. Monthly Reports Monthly Reports of Important Military Events—China. This abbreviation is used for all monthly reports filed under this general War Department, General Staff heading. The titles of individual reports vary some­ what. NCH North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette, Shanghai, weekly. PG

Translation of the Peking Gazette, reprinted from the North-China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette, Shanghai, annually.

WDGS

War Department, General Staff.

YSY Yang-shou-yiian chi-yao (A Collection of Important Memorials of Yang-shou-yiian [Yuan Shih-k'ai]), com­ piled by Shen Tsu-hsien, publisher and date of publication unknown. Vlll

CONTENTS CHAPTER I. THE CHINESE ARMIES PRIOR TO 1895

3

Introduction. The Original Manchu Military Organization. The Period of the Taiping Rebellion. The Shift in the Power Structure. Military Aspects of the Neglected Years. The Sino-Japanese War. CHAPTER 2. THE CREATION OF THE NEW-STYLE ARMIES,

1895-1897 51 The Demand for Reform. Chang Chih-tung and the Selfstrengthening Army. The Origin of the Pei-yang Military Clique. Limited Military Reorganization. Financing the Armed Forces. CHAPTER 3. THE HUNDRED DAYS AND THE BOXER REBEL­ LION, 1898-I9OO

90

The Hundred Days of Reform. The Coup d'Etat. Political Reaction but Military Progress. Military Potential on the Eve of the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer Rebellion. Military Lessons of the Rebellion. The Non-Combatants. CHAPTER 4. MILITARY

MODERNIZATION

PRESS-DOWAGER, I90I-I903

UNDER

THE EM­ 129

The Manchu Reform Decrees. Military Policies of Yiian Shih-k'ai. Military Progress in Hupeh. Affairs in the Other Provinces. The Period in Retrospect. CHAPTER 5. MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, I904-

1906 l66 The Commission for Army Reorganization. Plans for the Establishment of the Lu-chiin. The Report of the Commis­ sion. Proposed Military Schools. Additional Military Re­ forms. T'ieh-liang's Tour of Inspection. Nationalism and Revolution. Administrative Reforms and the Establish­ ment of the Ministry of War.

Contents CHAPTER 6. PROGRESS IN MILITARY TRAINING,

I904-I906 200 Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang Army. The Struggle for Power. Chang Chih-tung's Military Policy. Evaluation of the Military Establishment. CHAPTER 7. THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD ORDER,

1907-1911 243 Problems Confronting the Empress-Dowager. Renewed Military Reforms. The Struggle between the Cliques. The End of an Era. The Regency—The Last Bid for Power. Mutiny in the Lu-chiin. The Military Administration of Yin-ch'ang. The Crisis. CHAPTER 8. THE ARMY AND THE REVOLUTION OF 191I

286

Evaluation of the Military Forces. Institutions Supporting the Military Forces. Revolution and the Return of Yiian Shih-k'ai. Military Policy of the Republican Regime. Mili­ tary Operations during the Revolution. Establishment of the Republic—the Militarists in Power. CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS

338

BIBLIOGRAPHY

345

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS

359

INDEX

371

THE RISE OF CHINESE MILITARY POWER 1895-1912

CHAPTER 1

THE CHINESE ARMIES PRIOR TO 1895

I

Introduction

N the nineteenth century the Chinese Empire was a civil oriental society and the legacy of that tradition has continued to color Western thinking. In fact, until the communists seized power and then intervened to sup­ port aggression in Korea in 1950, it was commonly believed that the Chinese were pacifically inclined and militarily in­ competent. Yet, since the establishment of the Chinese Re­ public in 1912, militarists have played a leading role. Political power has been measured primarily in terms of the military force available to support it. In the last analysis the influence of political factions has depended on the number and quality of the troops they could control. Even today, although it is the Communist Party which dominates the state, military men have far more importance than they were expected to have in the traditional administrative system. The Red Army was a decisive factor in bringing the communists to power and keeping them there; until late in 1952 the major part of China was governed by military-administrative councils, while the senior army generals are still members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It was while serving as a military analyst in China during 1946-1947 that I became interested in the rise of military power and also in the misconceptions which have existed concerning China's military potential. After returning to academic life, I determined to make a study of the develop­ ment of Western-style troops and the role of the military in modern China. Although my ultimate aim is to outline the characteristics as well as the influence of the Nationalist and Communist armies, my research convinced me that before a sound analysis of recent events could be made it was neces­ sary to understand the background from which events arose. The roots of modern Chinese militarists go back to the period of the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century,

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 but it was during the years between the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Revolution of 1911 that warlordism germinated under the decaying fa9ade of rule by a civil bureaucracy. During those years the principal militarists of the republican era either received their military training, or obtained the commands which permitted them to seize power after the collapse of the old order. It is those critical years from 1895 to the abdication of the emperor in 1912 that furnish the basis for this present study. However, since no comprehensive work is available which covers the whole preparatory period from the Taiping Rebellion to 1895, I have found it necessary to write an introductory chapter to lay a foundation for the later period. The basic objectives of this monograph are twofold. First, I have sought to portray the growth of semi-personal armies and the rise of militarists to a position which permitted them to seize power upon the breakdown of the monarchical system. A vital phase of these developments was the struggle for control of military forces that took place during the last years of the Manchu Dynasty. The second major purpose has been to trace the modernization of the land forces of the Chinese Empire and to evaluate the degree of progress that was at­ tained. In attempts to increase their military strength during the last hundred years, Chinese leaders have been faced with a whole series of grave problems. These have included indus­ trial backwardness, poverty, illiteracy, political decentraliza­ tion, nepotism, a shortage of qualified officers and opposition to change. Armies are the products of their society. There is a close relationship between the political, social, and eco­ nomic structure of a civilization and the armed forces which it develops. Fundamental changes in the characteristics of a society will be reflected in the military establishment; on the other hand, changes in the armed forces necessitated by ex­ ternal or internal pressures can modify the other aspects of a culture. An industrial foundation is essential to the main­ tenance of an effective army, while the size and equipment of the armed services ultimately depend on the ability of the

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 economy to finance them. Also the social structure of an army tends to reflect the social status and prestige of the mili­ tary profession. If soldiers are considered to be the dregs of society, they probably will be. Since these principles have all been applicable to modern China, cognizance must be taken of them. The history of the development of an army is a history of institutional training and organization, for the armies of the modern era are highly complex bodies of individual techni­ cians, functioning as members of a team. The form of organi­ zation of the various types of military units is the measured result of theory plus experience gained in maneuvers and in combat. The organizational structure of a unit normally dictates the use made of it in battle. Since it is the adoption of new weapons or tactics that necessitates changes in organi­ zation, the current effectiveness of an army can be judged in part from its structure. This was true of the new-style armies of the Chinese Empire. In the early decades of the nineteenth century the Manchu Dynasty had passed its zenith and was already in decline, but ancient China was still a self-sufficient and self-centered empire, largely isolated from the rest of the world. Many of the basic characteristics of her administrative system—in fact, of her culture—took root before the Christian era. By the time of the T'ang and Sung dynasties they had been institu­ tionalized, and henceforth were preserved with amazingly little change. Moreover, the dominant groups in China de­ sired no real modification of the old order. Almost 2,000 years of history had proved the appropriateness of the Con­ fucian system. Dynasties could come and go, but the system was perpetuated largely intact. The late Manchu Empire was a decentralized autocracy, administered by a bureaucracy in which the civil officials held a preferred status over the military. The social structure was family-centered with a resultant prevalence of nepotism. There was no caste system. In theory or law there were few bars to social mobility, yet in practice society tended to be largely stratified, with the scholar-bureaucrat holding the

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 highest status. The emperor was considered to be the Son of Heaven, ruler of mankind. As long as his rule was toler­ able, he was considered to possess the Mandate of Heaven. When his administration became oppressive and unbearable, Confucian ideology acknowledged the people's right to revolt. Those beyond the pale of Chinese civilization were regarded as barbarians, whose envoys were tribute-bearing representa­ tives of vassal states. The Chinese had no conception of deal­ ing with other states as sovereign equals. Naturally, such a policy was unacceptable to the proud, nationalistic, and rapidly industrializing nations of the Occident. Given these condi­ tions, in addition to the growing interest of the West in trade with China, conflict was inevitable. The Chinese armies of the early nineteenth century were the products of their milieu. Following the consolidation of the Manchu Empire, China had faced no great external threat, so the principal mission of the armed forces had become the prevention of internal rebellion and the preserva­ tion of local order. Since years of relative peace had led to their degeneration, these decentralized armies proved in­ capable of defending China's frontiers against a well-armed enemy. It will be shown that it was the inability of the traditional armed forces to crush the great Taiping Rebellion or to defend China against Western troops in the Opium and Arrow Wars that forced the introduction of modifications in the military structure. In fact, the military system was the first aspect of Chinese society to reflect markedly the impact of Western civilization. Still, so powerful were the forces of conservatism, so ingrained were the traditions of the old order, that it was not until the defeat of China at the hands of her small former protege, Japan, that sufficient Chinese officials appreciated the absolute necessity for change to insti­ gate a radical reform movement. Thus, after 1895 military modernization became only one phase—although a vital phase —of a broad but generally unsuccessful reform movement. It is obvious that the organizational structure, techniques, and equipment of the new armies were borrowed from the

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 Occident. It can also be demonstrated that the modern troops, as products of changing China, were influenced by Western ideas such as nationalism and republicanism. Yet, it will not be surprising to find that they were also deeply imbued with traditional Chinese concepts. Confusion has existed as to the proper designation of the various types of Chinese military units; this situation has been complicated by the change of names which took place during the period. Hence an effort has been made to clarify the terminology. Where possible, the Chinese names for mili­ tary organizations have been translated in terms of the mod­ ern military units which most closely approximate them in size and characteristics. It is hoped that this work will be of assistance not only to students of military affairs, but to all who, being interested in modern China, must deal with the military leaders and armies who march through Chinese history.

The Original Manchu Military Organization In 1644 troops of the warlike Manchus, attacking from their homeland in Manchuria, seized the imperial capital. After entering the walls of Peking, they remained to rule China for over two and a half centuries, their rulers being known as the Ta-ch'ing or Great Pure Dynasty. The Manchus were the most successful of a whole series of "barbarian" tribesmen who for over 2,000 years had invaded across the frontiers during periods of internal weakness. Within a period of sixty years the Manchus had expanded from a small frontier tribe into a state capable of undertaking the subjuga­ tion of the great Chinese Empire. Within two generations able leaders had overrun Manchuria, conquered Korea, and won suzerainty over the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. Neither their victories nor their long reign in China were achieved by military power alone. They made effective use of Chinese administrative techniques, of diplomacy, and of intrigue. Nevertheless, they could not have conquered China, even in

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 a period when it was in decline, without having first created an outstanding fighting force. The Manchus were a militant people, hardened by numer­ ous campaigns. Their virtues were military virtues and even their organizational structure was primarily military in na­ ture. Both the Manchus and their auxiliaries were organized into units known as Banners. These Banners were not, how­ ever, solely military formations, for they also had political, economic, and social functions in the Manchu state. Not only the soldiers, but also their families were enrolled in the Banner companies.1 The creator of the Banner system was Nurhaci, the gifted warrior-statesman who founded the dynasty. This able leader realized that one prerequisite to the building of a strong state was the organization of an efficient and effective military machine. In 1601 he divided his followers into companies (niru), later called tso-ling, and placed them under four banners (ch'i), yellow, white, red, and blue. It was from the color of their flag that the new units took their names. When by 1615 there were some 200 Manchu companies, they were redivided into eight units—banners bordered with one of the four original colors being added. After the Manchus con­ quered Mongol and Chinese territory, they enrolled under the Banners the soldiers of these races who had surrendered. In 1626 a Mongol force came into being which by 1635 had been enlarged and organized into eight Banners. Two Chinese Banners were created in 1637; by 1643 these had also been increased to eight. Hence, the Eight Banners (Pa-ch'i) consisted in fact of twenty-four Banners, eight each of Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese soldiers.2 The majority of the Bannermen were mounted archers, virile warriors of a pre-industrial army. Capable of carving out a great empire in Asia, the Manchu armies were already inferior techno1 A . W . H u m m e l , ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (16441912), Washington, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 1-3, 595-596; Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China, Baltimore, 1942, pp. 64-66, 105-106. 2 Fang Chaoying, "A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 13 (June 1950), pp. 192-193; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 596.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 logically to the armies of Europe. Later the Bannermen came to constitute a hereditary, privileged class in the state; they became the stagnant symbols of a past military glory. After the capture of Peking, the Banner Forces were distributed as an army of occupation throughout the Manchu Empire, an army whose mission was to preserve the conquest status of the greatly outnumbered Manchus.8 Naturally the heaviest concentration of forces was stationed at the capital and in a protective cordon of twenty-five cities in Chihli, the province around Peking. The remainder of the Bannermen were stationed at garrisons in most of the provinces. Strong contingents were left in Manchuria to defend the homeland of the dynasty. Powerful garrisons were located in Western and Northwestern China to guard those traditionally danger­ ous frontiers. In China proper, the garrisons extended in three rough, progressively larger, semicircles southward and westward from Peking as far as Canton and Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan. Only Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Yiinnan provinces had no Banner garrisons. Tartar-generals (that is, Manchu generals-in-chief, chiang-chun, who ranked with, but before, the governorsgeneral) were stationed in every governor-generalship except Yiinnan and Kweichow. A study of the map indicates that the primary function of the Eight Banners was not defense against external aggression but the preservation of the Ch'ing Empire from internal revolt. Furthermore, inside the Great Wall the Bannermen were stationed at strategic administra­ tive, population, agricultural, commercial, and communica­ tion centers: for example, the vital Yangtze River area, key points on the Grand Canal, the Chengtu plains, the delta of the West River, and the North China plains received gar­ risons.4 3 For an extensive analysis, based on Chinese documents, of the organiza­ tion, distribution, ranks, pay, and status of the Banner Forces, see T. F. Wade, "The Army of the Chinese Empire," The Chinese Repository, vol. 20, nos. S, 6, 7 (1851), pp. 250-280, 300-340, 363-422. 4Cf. Pao Chao Hsieh, The Government of China (1644-1911), Balti­ more, 1925, pp. 64-65; W. J. Hail, Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebel­ lion, New Haven, 1927, pp. 3-4.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 As all interested military analysts have learned to their regret, no strength reports of Ch'ing or Chinese Republican armies can be considered fully reliable, although approximate estimates are possible. According to the Chinese scholar Fang Chao-ying, the Manchus in 1644 had a total of 563 com­ panies. At that time a company may have had some 300 men of military age, which would have given a total potential force of about 168,900; but the common practice was to select only one of every three men for active military service. The num­ ber of Banner companies of the three nationalities increased gradually, but not uniformly, from 1601 to 1735, at which time there were 1,155 companies in the Peking garrison. Since the strength of the standing army was in direct propor­ tion to the number of organized companies, the Manchus formed new units when planning a major campaign. Because after 1735 the need for the Banner armies decreased, the number remained relatively stable until 1912.5 It has been estimated that the minimum personnel throughout the empire receiving pay in 1825 consisted of 10,629 officers (figures from 1812), 236,014 non-commissioned officers and privates, 41,422 supernumeraries, and 5,327 craftsmen and retainers. It should be noted that these figures do not include all the Bannermen, for, with the exception of men in the Three Superior Banners, those who did not render military or civil service were not supported by the state.® The second major branch of the regular forces of the Ch'ing Dynasty consisted of the Army of the Green Standard (Lu-ying). In the early days of their reign, the Manchus decided to create an auxiliary Chinese military organization to help preserve order in the provinces. When the invaders conquered China, several Chinese armies fought for their cause. Some of these soldiers were absorbed into the Eight Banners; the remainder formed the nucleus of the Green Standard troops. The balance of the personnel was drawn from Ming armies, from volunteers, and from local corps. B

Fang, op.cit., pp. 193-194, 202, 204, 208. op.cit., pp. 252, 254. Hail (op.cit., p. 3), using the same sources, gives an incorrect figure (10,591) for the total number of officers, eWade 1

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 The officers of this force could be either Chinese or Manchus, but the enlisted men were Chinese and, unlike the hereditary Bannermen, they were recruited by "volunteer" enlistment. Like the Banners, the Green Standard system had been in­ fluenced by the practices of the preceding Ming Dynasty.7 After its organization, the Army of the Green Standard was divided into Land (Lu-Iu) and Marine Forces (Shuishih), the troops consisting of cavalry, infantry, and garrison soldiers. A most significant feature of this Chinese army was that it was widely distributed throughout China in small units. The majority of the men were under at least the nominal command of the provincial commander-in-chief (t'itu), but the governors-general and governors were also allotted a detachment. The troops under a provincial com­ mander-in-chief were divided into brigades (chen-piao), ter­ ritorial regiments (hsieh-piao), and battalions (ying). The battalions were further subdivided into a number of smaller units.8 In the early days of the Ch'ing Dynasty the strength of the Army of the Green Standard was not fixed, but under the K'ang-hsi Emperor (1662-1722) its table of organiza­ tion called for roughly 590,000 men. Although distribution throughout the country was more regular than in the case of the Eight Banners, there were noticeable concentrations in the northwest, along the South China coast, and in Yiinnan, where there was no Banner garrison. In 1764 the Green Standard troops had increased, on paper at least, to approxi­ mately 630,00 men, the only outstanding expansion being an addition to the garrison of Kweichow. By 1785 the authorized strength had decreased to about 590,000, but by 1812 the allotted number had expanded again to approximately 7 CSK Ping-chih 2, p. 1; Wade, op.cit., p. 392; Hail, op.cit., p. 8; Franz 1 Michael, "Military Organization and Power Structure of China during the Taiping Rebellion," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 18 (November I949)i P- 471· For a detailed description of the organization, ranks, mission, and pay of the Green Standard troops, see Wade, op.cit., pp. 363-416. 8 W. F. Mayers, The Chinese Government, 3rd edn., Shanghai, ca. 1896, pp. 64-65; H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Present-Day Political Organization of China, Shanghai, 1912, pp. 337-341.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 660,000. Then the Tao-kuang Emperor (1821-1850) ordered that the fixed number of the army be reduced and that the organization be weeded out.9 By 1825 the strength had been reduced to about 618,000.10 Just prior to the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in 1851, the force may have been further reduced to roughly 585,000 men.11 Intermittent increases in the strength of the Army of the Green Standard coincided with the periods of militant foreign policy or great civil wars. The decline noted by 1785 came after the end of the major campaigns of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor and the increase by 1812 is attributable to the revolts of the Miao tribes and White Lotus Society. The Tao-kuang reign (1821-1850), which was marked by fru­ gality, a less aggressive policy, and the decadence of the troops, saw a progressive decline in the strength of the Army of the Green Standard. It is apparent from its distribution into a horde of small, independent, or semi-independent units that the Army of the Green Standard was a great constabulary rather than a com­ bat army. The mission of the force was primarily the preserva­ tion of peace and order. Its troops had pacification duties among the border tribes and internal aborigines. They en­ gaged in crime prevention and aided in the transport of bullion, grain, prisoners, and mail. The army also manned guard stations throughout the empire, but because of the scattered nature of its detachments, the force could not rapidly mobilize to meet a large-scale internal revolt or a threat of foreign invasion. Since the small detachments were of great service to local officials, any attempt to concentrate a large 9 CSK Ping-chih 2, pp. 19-20. The Ch'ing-shih kao gives exact strength 1 figures for the above-mentioned years, but in every case where a break­ down is made, the total is wrong. If it can be assumed that the individual figures for each province are accurate, the totals should read: K'ang-hsi period, 588,174. not 594,414; and the total for 1785 is 588,194, not 599,814. Lo Erh-kang (Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih [New Gazetteer of the Hunan Army], Shanghai, 1938, p. 1) states that in the K'ang-hsi period the Green Standard numbered about 640,000 men. 10 Wade, op.cit., p. 255. 11 CSK, Ping-chih 2, p. 20.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 force was discouraged as it would leave the civil authorities without the necessary police force.12 The Manchus had begun their rule with a considerable degree of centralized control over their military forces. When the Eight Banners were created in Manchuria, the Emperor had direct command of only one, while the other seven were each controlled by a prince. However, in a deliberate move to increase the power of the Throne at the expense of the imperial clan three of the Banners were placed under the Shun-chih Emperor in 1651 and became the Three Superior Banners. Then the Yung-cheng Emperor (1723-1735) de­ prived the princes of command of the Five Inferior Banners and named his own appointees. The Army of the Green Standard was also under the ultimate control of the central government, especially of the Board of War (Ping-pu). Even more important was the fact that the armies' finances were controlled by the Board of Revenue (Hu-pu). i a Nevertheless, the vastness of China and the inefficiency of communications necessitated the delegation of great power to the provincial officials. Such action was essential, despite the fact that the traditional spirit of provincialism allied with the selfish interests of the bureaucrats to make such a policy detrimental to imperial power. This danger was particularly emphasized during the 1870's by the major rebellion of three influential Chinese officials in the provinces. Therefore, the K'ang-hsi Emperor created a system of checks and balances to safeguard Manchu rule. In its military aspect, this system consisted of the division of military power in each province among a number of authorities. As we have seen, although they directly commanded only a Banner garrison, the Tartargenerals outranked even the governors-general. The latter officials were, however, ex-officio ministers of war and the governors were vice-ministers of war; thus they were listed 12Wade, op.cit., pp. 363-364; Hail, op.cit., pp. 10-11; Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, New York, 1878, p. 18. 13Lo Erh-kang, "Ch'ing-chi ping wei chiang yu ti ch'i-yiian" (The Origins of Private Armies in the Late Ch'ing), Chung-kuo she-hui chingchi shih chi-k'an, vol. 5 (June 1937), pp. 237-239; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 218, and vol. 2, p. 916; Michael, "Military Organization," p. 471.

Η

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 as military officers on the rolls of the Board of War. As such, they were nominally the supreme military officers in their areas, having indirect control over all the Green Standard troops in their provinces. Yet they directly commanded only their brigades. Moreover, the governors-general and gover­ nors acted as a check on each other and, except in those prov­ inces where the governor was concurrently Green Standard commander-in-chief, the provincial commander served as a further counterbalance. Since he was senior in military rank to a governor, he would serve only a governor-general. The commander-in-chief's brigade was almost invariably larger than that of his civil colleagues, but some of their brigadier generals (tsung-ping) had larger units directly under them than did their superiors. The brigadier generals were semiindependent, yet their units were scattered and practically sedentary. Furthermore, their forces were of great service to the local officials, who were opposed to any concentration of troops which would strip their localities of police. Another indication of the Throne's jealousy of its governors-general, governors, and generals was the fact that for over two hun­ dred years the regime specially appointed imperial commis­ sioners to quell serious uprisings in the provinces. These commissioners, who were frequently imperial princes or min­ isters of state, outranked the provincial officials while they were engaged in their military mission. This complicated system may have admirably suited the domestic needs of the K'ang-hsi Emperor,14 but it created an organization which was almost useless in time of war. When the Manchus conquered China, they were a hardy militant race, and the Banner forces were composed of tough, battle-hardened, confident warriors with a will to fight. By invading China, they entered an environment which had debilitated equally hardy warriors in the past. This had been true even of the renowned army of the Mongol Dynasty. As a conquering race, the Manchus naturally sought to preserve the military characteristics of their people and extolled martial 14 Hsieh, op.cit., pp. 258-259, 291-293, 295-298; Wade, op.cit., pp. 266288; Hail, op.cit., pp. 8-11.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 virtues. However, since the Manchus were forced to rely to a high degree on the Chinese Confucian literati to administer their new empire, they perpetuated the prestige of a class who used moral sanctions and tradition to stigmatize the profes­ sion of arms. Chinese history is replete with foreign expan­ sion and civil war, and its dynasties as well as its modern regimes have been created by the sword. The use of military force was obviously the most efficacious method of reaching the pinnacle of power. It is amazing that not only its own people but its conquerors should have been largely convinced of the ideal that the scholar is the acme of all virtues, while the soldier is a rascal, strong as a bull, perhaps, but no more intelligent. In this regard, it must be remembered that al­ though soldiers were a necessary evil required to protect the empire, not only were the literati essential to operate the complex machinery of government, but also it was they who wrote, perpetuated, and propagated as doctrine an ideology which extolled the virtue of civil rule.15 That the Chinese masses were persuaded by them is indicated by the popular proverb: Hao-t'ieh pu-ta ting; hao-jen pu-tang ping, "Good iron is not beaten into nails; good men are not made into soldiers." It is difficult for a small minority, even a ruling one, to preserve a martial spirit in the face of such public opinion. After 1735 the great Ch'ien-lung Emperor began to rely on the Army of the Green Standard to suppress internal uprisings. The subjugation of Sinkiang from 1755 to 1759 was the last campaign in which the Bannermen formed the principal fight­ ing force.1® In slightly more than a hundred years, the Banner troops had ceased to be the dominant military factor in the empire. They continued to be a symbol of the conquest status of the dynasty, but they were no longer a reliable material bulwark. The Manchus were forced to depend upon their system of checks and balances, plus the loyalty or disunity of the Chinese, to preserve their throne. The Chinese military 15 Cf. Michael, Origin of Manchu Rule, pp. 28-29! Hsieh, op.cit., pp. 180, 389; Wade, op.cit., pp. 417-419. 16 Fang, op.cit., p. 203.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 historian Lo Erh-kang states that as early as the K'ang-hsi reign (1662-1722) the Bannermen had become so effete that the Emperor came to depend primarily on the Army of the Green Standard, which he considered to be superior. The Bannermen stagnated as garrison troops while the Chinese soldiers became the "regular army" of the empire. Yet by the latter half of the eighteenth century, evils developed in the Army of the Green Standard and within a few more decades it could not be depended upon either.17 The traditional Manchu military forces proved their inadequacy during the Opium War in 1839-1842. A decade later, by the time of the Taiping Rebellion, they were so corrupt that they were com­ pletely incapable of defeating or even containing the rebels and had to be strongly augmented. Many factors which contributed to the deterioration of the armies of Ch'ing China were common to both the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard. Aside from the hostile political and social climate, the troops were debili­ tated by years of garrison duty; this was especially true of the privileged inactivity of the Bannermen. Corruption and embezzlement were rife, particularly among the officers. Mus­ ter-rolls were padded with non-existent soldiers, while those that were present were irregularly paid an inadequate ration. In some Green Standard units, only a sixth to a half of the listed personnel actually existed. Training had become a picturesque formality among troops whose organization and weapons were antiquated. The officers were still studying the tactics and maxims of the ancient military writers Sun-tzu, Wu-tzu, and Ssu-ma. Discipline was lax or brutal. Superiors could not restrain their subordinates, so the army became a menace to the populace, in same cases, their depredations being worse than those of the local bandits. Officers mis­ treated their men and used them as menials. Both forces were over decentralized. When troops were assembled for training or war, they were drawn in small detachments from a number of units, which meant that the men had different backgrounds 17 Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 239-240; Lo, Hsiang-chun hsin-chih, pp. 1-2.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 and the officers sometimes failed to cooperate. The Bannermen degenerated from hardy warriors into a parasitic class while the soldiers of the Army of the Green Standard began to enter other occupations, including banditry.18 In 1851 Tseng Kuo-fan reported that both the Manchu and Chinese soldiers had connections with the bandits and were addicted to opium-smoking and gambling. General Wu-lan-t'ai also stated that the armies had never recovered from the defeats suffered in the Opium War; that they considered retreat to be normal and failure to hold strategic points to be a casual affair.19 One basic reason for the decline of the armies was the failure to provide competent officers. An elaborate examina­ tion system, superficially corresponding to the highly re­ spected civil service examinations, had been established to select officers for military service. As in the case of the civil examinations there were three sets of tests and degrees lead­ ing from local to the metropolitan examinations in Peking. The theory behind the practice was laudable, for it presumed that officers were to be selected impartially according to ability and merit. Practice fell deplorably short of the ideal. Each examination comprised military exercises and a stilted written examination, consisting of producing from memory a section from the ancient military classics. In spite of the great prestige of scholarship in China, the literary portion of the examinations was a farce. If, as was frequently the case, a candidate was too illiterate to compose the required quotation, he could obtain assistance from a more learned aspirant. The real emphasis was placed on the tests of strength and skill. These consisted of mounted and dismounted archery, bran­ dishing a great sword, pulling a powerful bow, and lifting a heavy stone. The Chinese suffered from the assumption that the only requirements for military leadership were brute 18Lo, Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih, pp. 2-15; CSS, vol. 1, p. 13; (Japanese) Imperial General Staff, compilers, History of the War between Japan and China, Tokyo, 1904, vol. 1, p. 27; Wade, op.cit., pp. 417, 420-421. 19 Ssu-yii Teng, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge, Mass., 1950, p. 47.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 strength and courage. Furthermore the whole program was futile from another standpoint. At least by the late nineteenth century a majority of the degree holders did not join the armed services, while most of the regular officers did not possess degrees. In the middle of the nineteenth century some officials were already proposing that the valueless examina­ tions be abolished. Yet, so deep-rooted was opposition to change that these trials of strength were not finally revoked until 1901.20 Despite the relative worthlessness of the armies, they were not inexpensive and placed a heavy burden on the inadequate financial structure of China. Figures concerning overall mili­ tary expenditures must be considered at best to be rough approximations. After a careful, frequently frustrating study of the personnel strength, pay, allowances, and cost of horses, Sir Thomas Wade estimated that the disbursements of the Board of War in the middle of the nineteenth century amounted to 30,874,540 taels. Of this total, the Banner Forces accounted for 15,963,480 taels, while the expenditures of the Army of the Green Standard were 14,662,650. Wade states that all necessary data were not available and that it would not be greatly in error to assume that from sixteen to eighteen million taels were spent annually on the Eight Banners.21

The Period of the Taiping Rebellion The demoralization of the armed services was not an isolated phenomenon. Unfortunately the decay apparent in the military system was a reflection of the gradual deteriora­ tion of the whole structure of Ch'ing China. Military corrup­ tion was matched by political corruption. Civil officials illegally taxed and squeezed the people, for oppression of the 20 Etienne Zi (Hsii), Pratique des examens militaire en Chine, Shanghai, 1896, passim. 21 Wade, op.cit., pp. 413, 416. For a chart of the Eight Banners and Green Standard expenses by provinces, see pp. 414-415. There is an error on p. 416: the expenses of the Banner Forces should total 15,963,480 taels.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 populace was not limited to the degradations of imperial troops. Riots and disturbances were frequent, but many officials were more interested in holding the lid on until their term of office was completed than they were in ameliorating the distress of the people. Growing popular opposition to alien rule was already apparent in the increased activities of anti-dynastic secret societies. Political and social instability was intensified by and partially responsible for a growing economic depression. The population was increasing rapidly in relation to the expansion of arable land, while an inequi­ table form of tenancy was spreading. The impact of the West manifested itself in the form of an unfavorable balance of trade—chiefly incurred through the heavy import of opium— and a consequent drain on China's silver supply. Natural phenomena joined government neglect to increase famine conditions. The stage being set for a tremendous upheaval against the old order, the impetus came from the Taipings or God-worshipers in Kwangsi. The Taiping Rebellion which grew out of these disastrous conditions was a political, racial, agrarian, and to a degree religious revolution, inspired in part by a perverted form of Christianity. The rebellion had its roots in the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Most of the original God-worshipers were peasants, but there were also a scatter­ ing of other groups, including mutinous imperial soldiers and a few educated men. In 1851 the leaders proclaimed "The Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace," and in 1852 they began a northward march which led to the capture of Nanking early in 1853.22 In contrast to the government's troops, the heterogeneous armies of the Taipings possessed a political, economic, and religious ideology which gave them morale and a will to fight. Furthermore, at least in the early days of the rebellion, their armies were ably led, the strategic and tactical planning being 22This brief outline of the causes and nature of the Taiping Rebellion is based on Teng, op.cit., pp. 35-61; G. E. Taylor, "The Taiping Rebel­ lion," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vol. 16 (January 1933), pp· 546-582, 587-594·

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 astute. While the imperial troops relied on the defensive strength of city walls and artillery, the Taipings adopted the offensive, both psychologically and physically. Cooperation existed among the leaders. Also, despite strict disciplinary regulations, the relationship between officers and enlisted men was good. As a result the early Taiping armies had an excel­ lent esprit de corps.23 Unlike the imperial armies, the Taiping organization gained strength from a system which, although originally based on a unified supreme command, permitted flexibility and initiative on the part of the army commanders in the field. The fact that they treated the populace much better than did the government forces gave the Taipings the necessary degree of public support to carry out the original campaigns. The organization of the Taiping armies was modeled on that furnished by the ancient Chou-li, or Ritual of the Chou, and on the tables of organization of the militia of the Ming Dynasty. The major military unit was the "army" (chiin), consisting of 12,500 soldiers (actually, the chiin resembled a division rather than an army). An "army" was divided into five brigades, which were composed in turn of five bat­ talions of 500 men. Each battalion contained five companies of 100 men. The Taipings made the apparently exaggerated claim that they had 1,300,000 men in their land and water forces. They also claimed to possess a total military establish­ ment of 3,085,021, including officers, engineers, retainers, artisans, servants, and civil employees.24 The eventual defeat of the Taiping armies resulted from a breakdown of the factors of strength noted above. As had been the case with the Ch'ing armies, corruption spread throughout the whole movement, while military discipline and morale decreased. Any unification of command was destroyed by jealousy, ambition, and growth of cliques 23 Teng,

op.cit., pp. 61-66. L. Bales, Tso Tsungt'ang, Soldier and Statesman of Old China, Shanghai, 1937, pp. 119, 121; Teng, op.cit., p. 63. Cf. Lo Erh-kang, Taiping T'ien-kuo shih-kao (Draft History of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace), Peking, 1951, "Ping-chih," p. 121; Taylor, op.cit., p. 596. 24W.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 around the senior commanders. The early death of most of the able leaders further reduced the effectiveness of the troops. The loss of their revolutionary spirit and the waning of public support, as well as failure to win over the gentry and the literati, led to defeat in the struggle between the original principles of the Taipings and the traditional Chinese "Con­ fucian" ideology. Less important, but influential, was the foreign intervention on behalf of the established government.25 In their advance during 1851-1853, the Taiping troops gradually destroyed much of the Army of the Green Stand­ ard, as well as such Banner Forces as they engaged. The situation became alarming, for the Taiping's early successes had proved the inability of the regular military organizations of the Manchus to put down the revolt. As a result several militia armies were recruited in the Yangtze Valley with the objective of stemming the rebellion. Militia ( Yung-ying) had been used as early as the Ch'ien-lung reign (1736-1796) for service in Formosa and against the Miao tribesmen in Kweichow. Also, during the rebellion of the White Lotus Society at the turn of the nineteenth century, large forces of village militia (hsiang-yung) were used to help restore order; yet, despite their contribution, after the campaigns ended the militia units were ordered disbanded. If it proved impossible to disband the troops, as has been so frequently the case in China, the government attempted to incorporate them into the Army of the Green Standard.26 Still by 1830 widespread discontent, increased banditry, and scattered uprisings had increased the need for local protection, which the Banner Forces and the Green Standard Troops were no longer able to furnish. Hence, local groups of many social origins created their own military units. Although these bands were extra25

Teng, op.cit., pp. 66-67, 70-73. Chu Wu1 "Wo-kuo chih lu-chiin" (The Army of Our Country), Kuofeng pao, vol. 1 (1910), pp. 52, 54; Lo, Hsiang-chun hsin-chih, pp. 15-16; Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 240, 249. Shen Chien is in error in stating that the militia were not used to assist the Banner and Green Standard troops until the Chia-ch'ing reign (1796-1820) (LCCCF, p. 347). Michael points out that the government was never able to eliminate completely the organization of local military forces ("Military Organization," p. 472). 26

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 legal and locally financed, Professor Franz Michael believes that after 1845 the government had recognized the corps (t'uan-lien) organized by the gentry and was using them to combat local insurgents. In this process, the gentry gained strength by associating their military units with the move­ ment to reform the decaying internal system.27 In the 1850's to meet the serious threat created by the Taiping Rebellion, a number of primarily civil officials or scholars were commissioned to recruit militia forces. The militia armies thus formed were important not only because they were the dominant factor in the ultimate defeat of the Taipings, but also because they were to a large extent personal armies, the predecessors of such semi-personal armies as those of Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung. They were the forerunners of the private armies of the warlords of twentieth-century China. This is a development which we will examine more fully later in the chapter. The most famous of these militia organizations was the Hunan Army (Hsiang-chun) of Tseng Kuo-fan. Tseng was a scholar who by 1849 had become vice-president of the Board of Rites. In January 1853, while in Hunan, he reluc­ tantly accepted an imperial commission to recruit the militia of that province. Tseng enlisted and trained his organization with care, paying special attention to the inculcation of disci­ pline. He incorporated two smaller militia units, but he also established recruit training camps in each district of Hunan. Before permitting his troops to go into action outside the province, Tseng gave them an opportunity to gain experience by fighting local bandits, despite the criticism of the Emperor, who desired him to throw his forces into combat against the Taipings at once.28 The basic military formation of the Hunan Army was the battalion (ying) which, according to regulations, consisted of five officers and 500 soldiers. Including attached adminis­ trative personnel and carriers, the full strength of a battalion 27

Michael, "Military Organization," pp. 473-476. op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 751-752; Hail, op.cit., pp. 147-149. See also LCCCF, p. 347. 28Hummel,

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 was 688 men. Each battalion consisted of four companies (shao) and a bodyguard. In theory, a battalion was equipped with two light mortars and 48 long, two-man muskets, known as gingals, as well as a considerable number of matchlocks, swords, and spears. In practice, the men were armed with whatever weapons were available, but by 1864 each battalion had several squads armed with foreign rifles.29 Although there was no specified organization above the battalion, from two to ten or more battalions could be grouped as the command of a brigadier general (t'ung-ling). Finally, the forces of two or more brigadier generals could be formed into the "army" (chiin) of a general (ta-shuai). As was to be expected in a society whose ethics and loyalties were based on family and friendship, the method of selecting officers encouraged the development of a personal, rather than a national, loyalty. The "army" commander chose his brigadier generals from among his relatives and friends; they in turn selected their battalion commanders, who supervised recruit­ ing. Furthermore, the battalions were paternalistic organiza­ tions of which the commanding officers might be called the "fathers," the company commanders the "younger brothers" and the men the "sons." The recruits for each battalion were drawn as volunteers from several neighboring villages. Tseng accepted only villagers, especially farmers from the hill coun­ try. Each battalion kept a register of the family backgrounds of its men and it was required that each recruit have a good record in his village. Opium-smoking and gambling were forbidden, while an attack on a woman was a capital offense. By 1856 the Hunan Army is reported to have numbered 60,000. At that time, they were probably all Hunanese, but later, soldiers from the armies of other provinces were at­ tached, so the army may have reached a strength of 200 battalions.80 The superiority of the Hunan Army over the Banner 29 Bales,

op.cit., pp. 43-46. See also Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 241-

242. 80 Bales, op.cit., pp. 46-50; Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," p. 242; see also CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 1.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 Forces and the Army of the Green Standard led to its imita­ tion by gentry and officials in other provinces. The most famous of these later organizations was the Army of the Huai (Huai-chiin), commonly called the Anhwei Army, which was organized in 1862 by Li Hung-chang. Li, who was to become one of the most famous men in modern Chinese history, had been a student and protege of Tseng Kuo-fan. In 1853 he returned to his home in Anhwei to organize militia troops against the Taipings; then for almost a decade he served in various capacities in the struggle against the great rebellion. In February 1862, he brought newly recruited Anhwei soldiers to Tseng's headquarters at Anking, Anhwei. There these picked men were organized in accordance with the system used by the Hunan Army and several battalions of Tseng's troops were assigned to train them.31 The third important militia army which fought under the overall command of Tseng Kuo-fan was the Army of Ch'u (Ch'u-chun) of Tso Tsung-t'ang. Tso had been a teacher, but for several years prior to becoming a troop leader he had served as military adviser to the governor of Hunan. Tseng Kuo-fan finally authorized his fellow provincial to raise an army, and in June i860 Tso was commissioned by the Emperor to recruit a force of 5,000 men in Hunan. Later, this army expanded and fought under Tso's command throughout the remainder of the Taiping Rebellion."2 Militarily, the militia armies were the ultimate solution to the great rebel­ lion, but since the government insisted on preserving the Green Standard and Banner troops, the new militia forces added an extra burden to the overtaxed financial structure of the empire. Since these new armies were outside the regu­ larly established, traditional armed services, they had no prearranged sources of government revenue. Ultimately they 31 Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 52; LCCCF, pp. 347-348; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 464-465; Hail, op.cit., p. 242. 82Bales, op.cit., p. 114, passim; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 763-764. Two smaller militia armies of the period deserve mention because of the tenacity with which they preserved their identity. They were the Shengchiin of Chou Sheng-po, created in 1853, and the I-chiin of Sung Ch'ing, which fought in Honan after 1861 (Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 686-688).

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 were maintained through the initiative of their commanders, with grave consequences for the future. At first the officers depended for funds on the lukewarm support of the local officials and gentry, but after a victory by militia com­ manders, the Throne finally recognized the value of the new troops. As a result the governor-general of Hupeh and Hunan and the governor of Hunan were ordered to aid in securing funds for Tseng's armies. Throughout the rebellion, Hunan continued to support the Hunanese armies, but the aid was insufficient. For years the militia leaders, harassed by financial problems, turned to such expediencies as the sale of ranks, use of the new likin or local merchandise taxes, grants in aid from other provinces, and even private contributions in an effort to maintain armies whose size was limited by the lack of funds.83 The militia generals were well aware of the value of per­ sonally controlling local taxes in order to support their troops. To accomplish this it was necessary for the senior com­ mander to obtain appointment to the exalted civil post of governor or preferably governor-general. The Throne was reluctant to make such appointments, since to the extensive powers of those high offices the generals would add the sup­ port of personally loyal troops—troops who realized that their pay and rations came not from the Throne, but from the efforts of their leaders.34 Nevertheless, the Emperor had little alternative, for the very existence of the dynasty had come to depend on the militia armies. When the Taiping remnants were defeated in 1866, the principal militia leaders were already among the most influential officials in the empire. The power relationship between the emperor and the provincial officials had been basically modified never again to be restored. After the capture of the rebel capital from the Taipings in 33 Lo "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 245-246; Hail, op.cit., pp. 149, 159, 174, 1 194, 203-204; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 752; Michael, "Military Organiza­ tion," pp. 478-479. 34 Lo, Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih, pp. 227-228, 232, 240-244; Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 246-247; Michael, "Military Organization," p. 479.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 1864, Tseng Kuo-fan demobilized part of his Hunan Army and distributed the remainder under independent commands. The raison d'etre of the army no longer existed, but in addi­ tion Tseng's personal power was too great; the court had become suspicious of him and he feared his enemies would attempt to curb him. The disbanded soldiers were sent back to their farms, while some of the officers were used in projects sponsored by Tseng. Later he arranged to use some 9,000 Hunanese, along with twice as many Anhwei men, in the great campaign against the Nien bandits.35 Despite this partial demobilization, the Hunan Army re­ mained a potent military-political force in the lower Yangtze provinces well into the first decade of the twentieth century, long after the death of its founder. Tso Tsung-t'ang used elements of his army, especially officers, against the Nien rebels, as well as in the long drawn-out pacification of the Mohammedan Rebellion in Northwest China. Li Hungchang led the Anhwei Army against the Nien-fei revolt, and in 1870 forty battalions were ordered against the rebels in Shensi and Kansu. After becoming governor-general of Chihli, Li transferred his army to that province and controlled it until his death in 1901. Yiian Shih-k'ai used some men from Li's troops when he created his Pei-yang Army,38 and as late as the Revolution of 1911 battalions of the Anhwei Army were employed to help garrison Chihli province. During the Taiping Rebellion, another development oc­ curred which was of prime importance to the future moderni­ zation of the Chinese armies. This was the use of foreign arms and of foreign-led Chinese troops. The most important of these units was the "Ever Victorious Army" commanded first by the American adventurer Frederick T. Ward and later by the colorful British officer Charles G. ("Chinese") Gordon. For three years, this small "army" rendered valuable, 86 Lo, Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih, p. 194; Hail, op.cit., pp. 289, 296, 299; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 753-754. sa NCH, Oct. 8, 1902, p. 724; Bales, op.cit., pp. 200-201, 204, 325; Lo, Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih, p. 232; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, p. 16; W. R. E. Gill, "The Chinese Army," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, vol. 24, no. 106 (1881), pp. 365-366.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 but sometimes erratic, service in southern Kiangsu province. Another organization which contributed to the imperial cause was the Franco-Chinese force which aided Tso Tsung-t'ang in Chekiang. These troops made a noteworthy, though not decisive contribution to the imperial campaign. More im­ portant, they left behind them a heritage of the use of West­ ern arms, training methods, and tactics by Chinese troops. Throughout the Ch'ing period the armies of the empire had used firearms, but the Chinese had failed to improve basically either their weapons or tactics, so by the middle of the nine­ teenth century they had fallen behind the technical advances made in the West. Tso Tsung-t'ang later stated in a report that the really apt generals who fought in the Taiping and Nien-fei campaigns all preferred foreign weapons, but did not fully comprehend the potentialities of either Western arms or military formations.87 It was not only Western small arms and cannon which impressed some Chinese officials. They also came to appreci­ ate the military value of steamships. Steamers were used by the Chinese on a small scale as early as 1853, and in 1862 Η. N. Lay, Inspector General of Customs, was commissioned to purchase from England a steam-propelled squadron for the Chinese government. Lay contracted for a small flotilla and engaged Captain Shepard Osborn to command it. How­ ever, the fact that Lay demanded a veto over the activities of the ships, while Captain Osborn proved to be satisfied with nothing less than the post of commander-in-chief of the fleet, was viewed with something less than enthusiasm by the proud, suspicious Chinese. Since they objected to possessing a fleet which would not only be commanded by foreigners, but also disturb the decentralized nature of military com­ mand, they politely liquidated the project. Thus ended China's first attempt to develop a modern navy by foreign purchase.38 During the early 1860's there were a few influential civil87Bales, op.cit., p. 339. as For a study of the Lay-Osborn Flotilla, including the policies which led to its creation and disbandment, see J. L. Rawlinson, "The LayOsborn Flotilla," Papers on China, vol. 4 (1950), pp. 58-93.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 ian officials whose duties had forced them into contact with the West and who had become convinced of the necessity for adopting modern weapons. It was this small group of civil­ ians, plus enlightened officials with military backgrounds, who began what was known as the "self-strengthening move­ ment" to build up China's defenses. They, like their more numerous obscurantist colleagues, were convinced of the superiority of China's Confucian society, yet they recognized the technicial military superiority of the Occident and wished to employ firearms and steamships to defend the old order. Despite the fact that they were limited in knowledge of the West, during the decade of the sixties their thought concern­ ing defensive measures passed from the desire to purchase arms through several logical steps. They came to appreciate that modern arms must be manufactured in China by Chinese. Then they realized that in order to accomplish this Chinese had to be trained, but training required the establishment of institutions teaching Western sciences and techniques.89 However, history was to prove that most Chinese officials did not comprehend either this basic principle or the steps through which it was developed. The revitalization of a nation's military system and power structure does not take place in a vacuum. The reforms of the Taiping period were necessitated primarily by the great revolution, but they were also stimulated by other widespread revolts of the period, as well as by a second defeat at the hands of the Western powers in the Arrow War (18571860). Moreover, the internal and external pressures which threatened the very existence of the dynasty and the old order led to a self-strengthening movement of which military reform was only the most conspicuous phase. The challenge presented by the great revolts, as well as the succession of another emperor, led to the rise of new leadership both in the capital and in the provinces. Optimism and an opportunity to rebuild were created by the crushing of the Taiping Re­ bellion and by the conclusion of treaties ending the Arrow 39 Ssu-yii Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West, A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 108.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 War. The result was a renaissance during the decade of the sixties which, owing to the reign title of the period, has been designated as the "T'ung-chih Restoration." One aspect of the Restoration was a nascent, halting West­ ernization motivated primarily by defense considerations. Aside from the beginnings of limited modernization noted above, the movement also produced the establishment of a foreign language school in the capital, the inauguration of the study of international law, and some attempt to under­ stand better the Western "barbarians" and the technological aspects of their society. Yet the renaissance was fundamen­ tally an internal revival, an attempt to restore a declining dynasty. In accordance with Confucian ethics, projects of reconstruction and relief were undertaken; efforts were made to revise the faltering fiscal system and rejuvenate the whole administrative structure, especially the training and selection of able personnel for the vital bureaucracy. Unfortunately, this praiseworthy movement was begun too late; it might better have been instituted after the close of the Opium War in 1842 than after the Arrow War. Even worse, the zeal and energy of the Restoration largely expended itself within a decade. As internal order increased and external pressure diminished, lethargy tended to replace reform. It appeared that only a crisis or the threat of defeat could stir the imperial government to impressive action.40 The general trend toward complacent stagnation was re­ flected in the armed services. After the conclusion of the Taiping Rebellion, most of the militia armies began to de­ generate like their predecessors, the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard, and for many of the same reasons. Their system of organization remained unchanged despite innovations abroad, while most of their weapons were antiquated. The fact that the senior officers of the various organizations were relatives or close friends could not be expected to promote either efficiency or discipline. Since it would have been opposed to the Chinese sense of justice for 40

Ibid., pp. 47, 49, 85.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 the army commanders to remove incompetent or corrupt old officers who had served them loyally, much deadwood en­ cumbered the officers' corps. Also, the officers as a group were ignorant of the techniques of modern warfare. Further­ more, the caliber of the enlisted personnel deteriorated. Mo­ rale declined while training began to lapse.41 Serving under such conditions, scorned by his own society, it is not surprising that the Chinese "brave" appeared to be little more than the caricature of a soldier. The typical Chinese enlisted man had little resemblance to his Western counterpart. His uniform consisted of baggy trousers and a brightly colored, but ill-fitting jacket, topped by a turban or conical bamboo hat. This unmilitary appearance was often accentu­ ated by the addition of a fan and umbrella. The weapons which this neglected son of Mars was expected to carry into battle might include a matchlock, gingal, spear, sword or bow, but in rare instances he was armed with a modern breech-loading rifle. In some cases there was a bull's-eye on the front of his jacket, which was suggestive of the fact that he was cannon fodder. On the back of his blouse he might display the character for courage, the location of which some thought was also suggestive. Underfed, housed in a dirty, inadequate hut, debilitated by enforced idleness he might well be addicted to gambling and opium.42 It is amazing that such underpaid, poorly led, and ill-trained men could call forth during the next few decades not only scorn and derision, but also dire predictions of a yellow peril. Few could then evalu­ ate the true potential of Chinese soldiers, for their real mili­ tary characteristics would not become apparent until they were well trained, equipped, and led. 41Cf. CSS, vol. i, sect, i, p. 12; LCCCF, p. 348; NCH, Jan. 24, 1896, p. 110. 42 For descriptions of the Chinese soldier in the 19th century, see S. W. Williams, The Middle Kingdom, New York, 1883, vol. 2, pp. 88-89, 91! A. C. Colquhoun, Across Chryse, New York, 1883, vol. 2, pp. 52-53; Charles Gutzlaff, The Journal of Two Voyages Along the Coast of China, New York, 1883, pp. 238-239.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 The Shift in the Power Structure The Chinese scholar Lo Erh-kang has developed the im­ portant thesis that the militia armies of the Taiping period and later were fundamentally the private armies of their creators, not imperial troops. Prior to the degeneration of the Bannermen and the Army of the Green Standard, the central government dominated the armed forces, especially by the means of controlling their pay. As we have seen, this was not true of the militia armies, which were not under the command of the Board of War. With the creation of these units, which were recruited and paid by their leaders, there was a shift in loyalty from the Throne to the army com­ manders. Individual authority extended to the point that, unless a personal bond existed between them, senior generals had little control over their subordinates, who commanded their own troops. If a general was dismissed or retired the loyalty of his troops could not be transferred to a new leader; the only real solution was to disband the force. The situation was exemplified by the maxim, Ping wei chiang yu, "The soldiers belong to the generals."43 Furthermore, after the Throne appointed the militia commanders to be governorsgeneral or governors, they gained control not only over the finances but also over the civil administration of their prov­ inces. Professor Franz Michael has further expanded the thesis of the influence of the militia leaders on the power structure of China. He points out that during the Taiping Rebellion provincial financial, political, and military functions were to a large degree absorbed by the new army commanders. Then after the great rebellion the imperial government failed to regain control over these vital matters. As a result, military service became a much more effective means of "rising to power and influence" than it had previously been. Further­ more, the new system demolished the traditional policy of 48 Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 235, 237, 242-247; Lo, Hsiang-chiin hsin-chih, pp. 222-232. See also Michael, "Military Organization," pp. 478480; Hsieh, op.cit., pp. 295-296.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 checks and balances by which the Throne had sought to maintain centralization of authority. Instead, there had been created several regional armies, regionally financed. The government was aware of the growing danger but failed in its efforts to prevent the development of the system. Not only did the governors-general and governors come to select their own military officers, but they also obtained control over the other civil officials in the provinces. The freedom of action of the provincial civil commissioners who could directly memorialize the Throne was restricted. Professor Michael further points out that from 1850 to 1890 there was an amazing shift in the proportion of Chinese and Manchu senior officials. This change favored not only the Chinese, but especially the new militia leaders. Between 1861 and 1890, of the 44 governors-general appointed, 34 were Chi­ nese; and of these, 20 had risen to prominence as militia commanders. During the same period, of the 117 governors selected, 104 were Chinese, and over half of them based their careers on militia leadership. About one-fourth of all the governors did not hold either of the two senior civil service degrees. Most of those who did not had risen to power through military service.44 Lo Erh-kang and Franz Michael have made a valuable contribution to the study of modern Chinese history. Their conclusions are essential to a full understanding of both the military system and the overall power structure of the late Ch'ing period. I am indebted to them for their research and interpretations. Their major theses have been adapted to this study. The conclusion that "the soldiers belong to the generals" as well as the concept of the growing and continu­ ing power of the militia leaders could, however, be over­ emphasized. In applying these important interpretations, several modifying conditions should be kept in mind. ** Michael, "Military Organization," pp. 478-483. Pao Chao Hsieh furnished much the same type of data as Michael, but in regard to the increase in the proportion of Chinese appointments over Manchus, Hsieh merely interprets the trend as being due to the degeneration of the Manchus (Hsieh, op.cit., pp. 296-297, 299, 319).

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 The primary loyalty of the militia soldiers was to their commanders, but it should be remembered that these leaders themselves were or became imperial officials, fighting for years for the Manchu cause. A number of them had been com­ missioned by Peking to raise troops, and they with their soldiers loyally served an alien dynasty over many years against domestic and foreign enemies. Moreover, after the Taiping Rebellion parts of the new armies were demobilized. We know that in the outstanding case of Tseng Kuo-fan, he still had sufficient respect for the power of the Throne to fear its suspicion of his influence. This was one reason for the disbanding of a large portion of his armies. A decline in personnel strength, plus the degeneration of the fighting capacity of the original militia units, gradually decreased their relative influence in the power structure of China. Even more important from this standpoint was the continuing jealousy that existed between the major militia armies and the cliques that were created from them.45 Had unity existed among them, any candidate whom they wished to support could have removed the Mandate of Heaven from the Ch'ing Dynasty, for those who could quell the great Taiping Rebel­ lion could have crushed the weakened Manchus. The fact that unity did not exist permitted the Throne to continue to engage in a policy of divide and rule. Even in its last years, it was able on numerous occasions to force reluctant gover­ nors-general to transfer their troops to help put down dis­ orders in other provinces.40 Also, the size and equipment of the personal armies was limited by the sums which even the wealthiest provinces could appropriate to the maintenance of extra-legal troops. Furthermore, the most famous and influential of the militia commanders, Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang, as well as such other wellknown leaders as Liu Ming-ch'uan, Ting Pao-chen, and 45 See Hummel, op.cit., vol. I, p. 89, and vol. 2, pp. 687, 765, 767; Hail, op.cit., p. 289; Bales, op.cit., p. 343; J. O. P. Bland, Li Hung-Chang, New York, 1917, pp. 195-196. 4eFor example, see YSY, ch. 9, p. 18; NCH, Aug. 2, 1895, p. 177; China, The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 3rd issue, Shanghai, 1913, vol. 2, p. 271.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 later Chang Chih-tung, were men of foresight who promoted modernization in many fields. Their military endeavors, like some of their other projects, indicate a certain degree of en­ lightenment as well as a desire for increased personal power through the employment of private armies. As for the growing number of militia leaders who were appointed to the highest offices in the provinces, one should not underestimate the influence of the semi-personal armies on internal politics. Nevertheless, there are several other factors which should be noted. It had long been the practice of the Throne, even when not under pressure, to reward officials for outstanding service to the dynasty. Certainly the "Con­ fucian" Manchu emperors owed a debt of gratitude to the commanders who had saved their throne. These men had proved their ability as well as their loyalty, and few would claim that during the last fifty years of the Ch'ing reign China had sufficient competent officials to permit the rulers to discard such deserving subjects. The Throne still made senior appointments, but had to take into consideration the influence of the new militia leaders. However, the Throne at various times after the Taiping Rebellion evidenced a con­ siderable degree of authority in degrading, stripping of titles, or dismissing from high provincial office such famous militia leaders as Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tseng Kuoch'iian, Liu Ming-ch'uan, Liu Ch'ang-yu, and Kuo Sungtao.47 Here again, the Throne took advantage of the principle of divide and rule. One of the most interesting phenomenon revealed by a study of Professor Michael's data on the number of militia officers who became governors-general or governors is the fact that, although these officials may have gained recognition as militia leaders, they all transferred to the civil service, as is denoted by the positions they held. This is a strong indica­ tion that even in the last decades of the nineteenth century civilian rank was more prized than military titles. A military career had become a most effective steppingstone to power, 47

Hummel, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 438-439, 516, 528, and vol. 2, pp. 750, 764.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 but the foremost honor and prestige still lay in the civil serv­ ice. In the minds of the Chinese the expression, "The troops belong to the general," had not replaced the proverb "Good men are not made into soldiers." The deeply ingrained pres­ tige of scholarship and civil office could not be rapidly modi­ fied, even by the hard facts of political reality.

Military Aspects of the Neglected Years Subsequent to the close of the Taiping Rebellion, but espe­ cially after 1870, little fundamental progress was made in modernizing the Chinese armies. Still, even after the degen­ eration of the "T'ung-chih Restoration," more changes oc­ curred than Western writers have usually recognized. More important, a foundation was laid for the military reforms of the post-Sino-Japanese War period. During these neglected years, several alterations took place in the military structure of the empire. In the light of the unreliability and expense of the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard, poverty-stricken China should have abolished these decadent organizations, but tradition and vested interests were too strong. Instead, a dual military system was created, with the old existing alongside the new. The Bannermen and the Green Standard troops continued to be the "legitimate" armed forces of Manchu China, but owing to their inability to accomplish their missions of national defense and preservation of the status quo, those functions were to a large extent taken over by the militia armies. The latter began to replace the Green Standard as garrisons for the larger cities and strategic points. Hence the organized militia came to be known as the Defense Army (Fang-Chiin). Therefore, despite the fact that the central government had only indirect control over the militia and the Board of War did not even know its strength, it can be said that to a considerable degree these provincial or regional forces became the regular army of China.48 48

CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. i-ib; Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 235-236,

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 Since the Manchus had long since lost their own military superiority it was to be expected that the Throne would seek to create a counterbalance to the largely independent militia armies, even though they proved their loyalty to the alien dynasty. After the Taiping Rebellion, the Throne attempted to reorganize and strengthen the Army of the Green Standard. Also by 1862 a series of edicts ordered the governors and governors-general to report annually the strength of all their trained militia. However, both of these measures were largely unsuccessful.48 The Green Standard system was too anti­ quated and too corrupt to permit effective regeneration along its traditional lines. On the other hand, the high provincial officials had no intention of keeping Peking informed of the exact status of their troops. Nevertheless, as has been indi­ cated above, financial limitations, rivalry among the militia leaders, and a Confucian sense of loyalty promoted an equilib­ rium which prevented any Chinese military leader from creating a new dynasty. During the period 1851-1874, in order to improve the Army of the Green Standard some of the most decrepit soldiers were discharged and the vacancies filled with militia­ men. However, since the soldiers of the Green Standard con­ sidered the militiamen to be better treated than themselves, many left the government's rolls to join the Defense Army.50 In 1865, therefore, the ministers of the Boards of War and Revenue held a conference to discuss the selection and train­ ing of six disciplined Green Standard "armies" in Chihli. The mission of these troops was to protect the capital. From this action arose the name Disciplined Forces (Lien-chun). Although the Disciplined Forces were selected from within the ranks of the Army of the Green Standard, their tables of organization and rates of pay were in accordance with the system of the Hunan and Anhwei armies. Like the Defense Army the Disciplined Forces were used to garrison strategic 249; Michael, "Military Organization," p. 481. The trained militia were also referred to as Disciplined Militia (Lien-yung). 4 9 CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. lb; Michael, "Military Organization," p. 481. 80 Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," p. 249; CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. lb, 3-3I).

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 points and communications centers. In spite of their similarity of function and organization, and despite the borrowing of both men and principles from the militia armies, it should be remembered that the Disciplined Forces were a part of the Green Standard system. Hence the central government had somewhat greater control over them than was the case with the militia. From 1885 on, frequent edicts urged that the Army of the Green Standard be reformed, but these efforts met with little success. Then in 1894 the Throne stated that the militia were organized to suppress rebellions and insur­ rections, while the Green Standard soldiers had the police function of putting down brigandage and piracy.51 This is evidence that the military balance of power still lay in the hands of the Chinese militia leaders, who had the major mission. The Manchus realized they must rely on the loyalty of the militia armies to suppress any rebellion against the Throne, but who was to defend China against foreign in­ vasion ? During the period 1865-1895, a number of provinces fol­ lowed the lead of Chihli—at least on paper—in reorganizing part of their Green Standard troops as Disciplined Forces. The personnel in the Defense Army rose and fell. While some of the provincial officials increased the Army of the Green Standard at the expense of the militia, others, especially those who had been militia leaders, appear to have placed their reliance on the Defense Forces and argued that the militia could not be further reduced. In 1888 Li Hung-chang, as governor-general of Chihli and superintendent of the northern ports, organized a force known as the Pei-yang Army,52 a 51 CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. lb; Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," p. 249; Chu Wu, op.cit., pp. 51-52; PG (July 25), 1894, p. 138. A lack of clarity concerning military terms exists among both Chinese and foreign writers. It is ap­ parent that on occasion the regular militia armies, such as the Hunan and Anhwei armies, are referred to as Yung-ying, Chuang-yung, Lien-yung, and Fang-chiin. At times, owing to their similarity, the Defense Army and Disciplined Forces are lumped into one category. Another popular fallacy among foreigners was that after the Taiping Rebellion the militia or "braves" were always disbanded when no longer required for a particular campaign; see Upton, op.cit., p. 18. s2 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. 2-6b; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 112.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 name which was to be made famous by his successor Yiian Shih-k'ai. After the Taiping Rebellion, the Chinese armies began to make somewhat greater use of foreign arms or modern weapons manufactured in China. Scattered units, especially of the Defense Army and Disciplined Forces, were equipped with foreign-style rifles and artillery, yet by 1880 only a small portion of the Chinese were furnished with modern arms. The Franco-Chinese War of 1884-1885 further stimulated rearma­ ment, especially the construction of modern coast artillery forts.63 Nevertheless, at the time of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Staff estimated that only three-fifths of the Chinese troops mobilized against them were armed with some type of rifle, many of the soldiers carrying only a pike, spear, or sword.54 In the interior provinces, the percentage still armed with antiquated weapons was even higher. The Tartargenerals, governors-general, and governors had been per­ mitted to send their agents to the port cities to make contracts with foreign firms for the purchase of arms in the name of their provinces. This policy not only resulted in a considerable amount of graft, but it also helps explain the extensive varia­ tion of equipment among the provinces.55 This lack of stand­ ardization, which was to constitute a serious weakness of the Chinese armies throughout the remaining years of the empire, created a logistical nightmare and served as a symbol of the failure to centralize the armed forces. The expanding use of Western-style arms would create a technological revolution in the Chinese military establish­ ment. Yet even more important, because of its ultimate effects on China's social and political structure, was the decision to train Chinese officers in Occidental military science. Closely related to this policy was the employment of foreign military 53 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. 3-6b, and Ping-chih 10, p. 7; Gill, op.cit., p. 364. See also China, Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1882-91, 1st issue, Shanghai, 1893, p. 574; Alexander Michie, The Englishman in China, Edinburgh, 1900, vol. 2, p. 397. 54Imperial General Staff, op.cit., p. 32. 65 PG, 1897, p. 47; Michie, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 398-399; Bland, op.cit., pp. 236-237; Upton, op.cit., p. 29.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 advisers. Late in 1862, a notable edict directed Tseng Kuofan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang to select a group of officers to learn modern military procedures from foreign officers at Shanghai and Ningpo. Upon completion of their mission they were to train other troops, but this was not all. Chinese officialdom vainly hoped to prepare officers capable of replacing the foreigners who commanded the "Ever Vic­ torious Army" and the Franco-Chinese force. Then, too, the project was not limited to militia officers alone; selected personnel from the Green Standard units of the southern coastal provinces and from the Disciplined Forces of Tientsin were also ordered to learn foreign military techniques. It was further directed that a serious study be made of Western methods of manufacturing modern arms. Nevertheless, the troops in the interior were to continue to receive Chinese-style training. In issuing this precedent-breaking decree the Throne had several objectives. Foremost was the motive of selfdefense, both against further foreign penetration and against the Taiping rebels. The government sought to take advantage of the technological superiority of the West, without subject­ ing itself to the dangerous expedient of permitting foreign officers to command Chinese troops. The internal balance of power was also a consideration, for both Green Standard and militia officers were to be trained. Yet, despite the grave mili­ tary situation which existed, conditions were not considered serious enough to demand an expensive and unusual modifi­ cation of the old military system in the hinterland.5® Although the Chinese were realistically opposed to having troops commanded by foreigners, progressive officials were willing to see soldiers trained by Occidental officers. In 1872, and again in 1876, Li Hung-chang sent officers to Germany for training. From time to time, French and German officers were employed, at least in Chihli, Kiangsu, and Kwangtung provinces to train a portion of the armies. Chinese officers 66For a translation of this edict of Nov. 17, 1862, from CSL (Tungchih), ch. 44, pp. 41-43, see Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 68; for a more complete translation see ibid., draft volume, Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 155-157· See also CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 5b.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 and non-commissioned officers who had received foreign instruction gradually began to carry their new training into other provinces as drilimasters, but as the new techniques spread further from their source, they tended to be corrupted by old practices. Also the Chinese were obviously more im­ pressed by the precision of Prussian drill than by the funda­ mentals of Western strategy and tactics.57 They borrowed the external embellishments rather than the basic principles. The sine qua non of military modernization lies in the technical education of troops and especially of officers' corps. During the period 1864-1895, the first faltering steps in this direction were taken. A handful of officers were sent abroad to study, but more important was the establishment of two military academies. These two original academies were to be the forerunners of a plethora of military schools, which would be prime factors in the development of modern warlordism. In 1885, on the recommendation of General Charles G. Gordon, Li Hung-chang established a military preparatory school (Wu-pei hsueh-t'ang) at Tientsin, and employed Ger­ man instructors. Shortly thereafter, Chang Chih-tung founded a military academy near Canton at which he employed a staff consisting of six Chinese and one German.58 Both of these pioneers in modern military education, like so many of their contemporaries throughout the world, had been impressed by the efficiency of the Prussian Army as demonstrated in the Franco-Prussian War.59 The two academies taught Western military science, in­ cluding cavalry, artillery, and engineer corps tactics. Chang's academy, and perhaps both schools, also taught German and English. The officers who were graduated from Li's school 57Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. H I ; Imperial General Staff, op.cit., p. 29; Imperial Maritime Customs, op.cit., p. 576; Upton, op.cit, p. 20; NCH, July 27, 1894, p. 150. 58 CSS, vol. i, sect. 1, p. 15; LCCCF, p. 349; Chang Chih-tung, Chang Wen-hsiang-kung ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i (The Complete Works of Chang Wen-hsiang-kung [Chang Chih-tung], Memorials), edited by Wang Shut'ung, Peking, 1928, ch. 41, pp. 8-8b; hereafter cited as Chang ch'iian-chi·, CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 7; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 28. 59 See Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 41, p. 8; CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 6b.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 were ordered to the various units of the Anhwei Army as instructors, but they were handicapped because command remained in the hands of old-fashioned military leaders. Also, although much of the equipment was modernized, the troops retained their old-style organization. Later, Chang Chih-tung used graduates of both academies as officers in his famous Self-strengthening Army (Tzu-ch'iang chiin).eo However, a few scattered Western-trained officers could make little im­ pression on the vast officers' corps which was sunk in igno­ rance, conservatism, and nepotism. Still the familiarization of even a small portion of China's officials with Western weapons and military science helped prepare the country for further reforms. Important from the standpoint of laying a foundation for the ultimate moderniza­ tion of the army was the construction of arsenals, which like so many phases of military reform began during the Taiping Rebellion. China could never hope successfully to combat external aggression as long as she was dependent on foreign powers for modern arms. That China's most enlightened leaders were aware of this situation is indicated by the fact that by 1894 there were "arsenals"—or at least machine shops —at Shanghai, Nanking, Hanyang, Tientsin, Tsinan, Kirin, Foochow, Canton, and Chengtu. Some of these plants had the finest European machinery, which, if efficiently operated, was capable of producing the latest model breech-loading rifles and guns. Yet, in the same plants where modern arms were or could be made, the Chinese continued to manufacture gingals and muskets.81 The most famous of the arsenals was the Kiangnan estab­ lished near Shanghai in 1867. This institution, with its attached language school and translating department made a considerable cultural as well as a military contribution.62 60 CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 7; Imperial Maritime Customs, op.cit., p. 576; CSS, vol. I, sect. I, p. 15; Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 41, p. 8b. 61Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1882-91, pp. 189-190; The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, vol. 1, pp. 357-358; PG, 1895, p. 94; NCH, July 5, 1895, p. 6; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 28, 465, and vol. 2, pp. 643, 721, 724. 62 Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 721-722.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 However, the arsenals were considered to be provincial insti­ tutions, the great majority of them having been founded by senior officials who were also militia leaders. These plants were thus another indication of military decentralization as well as a further cause of the lack of standardization of weapons. Furthermore, the plants listed above constituted the great majority of the arsenals existing in China by 1911. Since a modern army is no stronger than the industrial sys­ tem which supports it, this is striking evidence of how little real improvement was made in strengthening the economic foundations for the new armies during the reform programs of the last decade and a half of the Ch'ing Dynasty. In conjunction with the limited progress which had been made in the modernization of the land forces, a few officials sponsored the development of a modern navy. In large part, these men were the same who promoted reforms in the armies, including Tso Tsung-t'ang, Li Hung-chang, and their ad­ visers. Some slight successes were achieved, but in the long run these naval reforms had less lasting influence than efforts applied to remodeling the armies. In 1885 a naval office (Haichun ya-men) was established and three years later the Northern or Pei-yang squadron was organized. This was to be a respectable fleet of 28 ships, but its growth was greatly handicapped from the start. In 1888 the Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi, diverted a large sum from the naval appropriations for the repairing of the great Summer Palace.63 The only con­ cession to naval construction was the creation of a lovely marble boat which rests in the lake of the palace. Majestic as it is, the marble boat made no contribution to the hopeless stand of the Chinese navy in the Sino-Japanese War. Aside from the scattered military reforms which were actually accomplished, many other measures were proposed but were either not accepted or not carried to fruition. For example, in the period after the Taiping Rebellion, Tseng Kuo-fan advocated in a series of recommendations that the strength of the Green Standard troops be reduced by dis63

Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 124.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 charging unqualified men, that the pay of the remainder be raised, and that corruption be stamped out. He further stated that the drill, tactics, and equipment of foreign armies were all superior to China's; thus she must not only use modern arms, but like the Western powers continuously improve the quality of her weapons. Li Hung-chang also pointed out the fallacy in continuing to use bows, swords, gingals, and muskets. In 1878 Shen Pao-chen prepared an unsuccessful memorial proposing the abolition of the traditional military examinations. Regarding the reorganization of the armies themselves, in 1874 Tseng Kuo-fan proposed that the coastal provinces train 90,000 troops to be armed with new-style weapons, while the three riparian provinces train a total of 30,000 soldiers. He established that the annual pay and rations of this force would amount to eight million taels.84 It will be noted that, while all of these projects sought to modernize China's armed services, none of them would have increased the authority of the central government. Such schemes, whatever their motivation, were premature; they would not become a reality until the last years of the dynasty, with the creation of the Lu-chun (Army). Influential officials also began to advocate railway construc­ tion. During the 1880's several provincial leaders, all of whom had been militia commanders, proposed the construction of a railway network primarily to strengthen the empire's mili­ tary position. Then in 1889 Chang Chih-tung won the con­ sent of the Throne to an overambitious plan for the construc­ tion of trunk lines. The Throne had approved a limited number of military reforms, but it had not yet been wrenched out of its traditional ways. Edicts continued to call upon officials to be strict in their triennial inspections of troops and insured them that these injunctions were not idle ones.85 Still, the Throne appeared more interested in preventing ei CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 3, and Ping-chih 10, pp. 6-6b; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 644. 65 Μ. E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912, Stanford University, 1931, pp. 12-13; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., pp. 116-118; PG, 1894, pp. 66-67; Upton, op.cit., p. 27.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 rebellion or any further loss of power than in fundamental reorganization and modernization of the armed forces. In this chapter much of the credit for the limited military reform that was accomplished has been given to governors and governors-general who commanded militia armies or who were at least ex-militia officers. They were supported by a small group of primarily civil officials including Prince Kung and Chang Chih-tung, but certainly the militia leaders made a major contribution. More than most of their con­ temporaries, they had witnessed in battle the value of Western military weapons and science. To this extent, they were not characteristic of their age, but their practice of nepotism, their loyalty to worthless old lieutenants, and their tendency to accept only the external manifestations of foreign military science show that to a large degree they were products of their time. Furthermore, by the time of the Sino-Japanese War they had been unable to create armed forces capable of defending the empire.

The Sino-Japanese War In the summer of 1894 Japan precipitated a war with China over that recurrent bone of contention, Korea. The peninsula was the last important dependent state of the once vast tributary system of the Chinese empire, and China, represented by Li Hung-chang, sought to retain suzerain status. On the other hand, Korea was of great economic and strategic importance to rapidly modernizing Japan. These interests, combined with internal considerations, led to the adoption of a militant policy by the Japanese government. The result was a declaration of war—a war which Japan blandly claimed was intended to insure reform and Korean independence. At the outbreak of the conflict, it was generally believed in the West and by the dominant faction in Peking that China would be victorious. Only two months previously, Li Hung-chang had assured the Throne that the armies, fleets, and forts of North China were in an excellent state of pre-

45

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 paredness.68

But, regardless of whether such a report was based on optimism or deceit, it was far from justifiable. Accurate figures as to the strength of the Chinese armed forces at the time of the Sino-Japanese War are, as usual, unavailable. Apparently, there had been no major change in the size of the Banner Forces since the middle of the nine­ teenth century. They were no longer a real military factor, but they continued to play a political role, while forming an important element of "military expense." The authorized strength of the Army of the Green Standard, even if the Disciplined Forces are included, had evidently been reduced, perhaps by 125,000 men.67 The realistic Japanese General Staff included only the militia armies and the Disciplined Forces in their estimates of the effective strength of the Chinese army. Furthermore, they based their figures on the assumption that the average size of a Chinese infantry bat­ talion was only 350 men and a cavalry squadron only 250. Thus they calculated the Chinese armies to consist in actuality of about 350,000 soldiers.68 This figure agrees surprisingly well with the estimates of the Chinese Boards of War and Revenue, which reported that in 1898 the provincial militia, Defense Army, Disciplined Forces, and new-style troops totaled about 360,000 men.69 With the outbreak of hostilities new units were hastily mobilized all over the empire. The Defense Army had been ee PG, 1894, p. 98. See also W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperial­ ism, 1890-1902, 2nd edn., New York, 1951, pp. 172-174; P. H. Clyde. The Far East, 2nd edn., New York, 1952, pp. 250-231. 67 CSK, Ping-chih 2, pp. 20-20b; Hsieh, op.cit., p. 288; Zenone Volpicelli (Vladimir, pseud.), The China-Japan War, New York, 1896, p. 74. Volpicelli's figures, based on unspecified Japanese sources, probably overestimate the strength of the Army of the Green Standard (599,019) and underesti­ mate the "Trained Army" (12,000). See his figures on p. 73 where he states that authorities listed the "Trained Army" (Lien-chiin?) at from 50,000 to 100,000 men. Hsieh's figures for the Banner Forces (157,579) do not include the heavy concentration of Bannermen in Chihli. Also, his overall total is greatly in error, owing to a mistake in addition. It should read 662,256, instead of 1,297,141, for the Banner, Green Standard, and Manchu forces not under the Board of War (see Hsieh, op.cit., p. 288). 68 Imperial General Staff, op.cit., p. 31. 69 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. lb-2.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 maintained at a level closer to a war footing than was the case with the Disciplined Forces, which had to enlist large numbers of raw recruits. The best of the troops involved were those who had been trained by foreign officers or by Westerntrained Chinese, for the other "soldiers" were of little value in combat. Because of factors of space, shortage of transporta­ tion, and provincial jealousies, only a small per cent of the troops mobilized were actually employed in battle. Large numbers of troops from other provinces, especially strong units of the Hunan Army commanded by the Hunanese Liu K'un-i, were ordered northward, but arrived too late to play an important role. The brunt of the fighting was borne by Qiihli and Manchurian troops.70 Therefore, it can be main­ tained that, as in the case of the Opium and Arrow Wars, from the standpoint of China the conflict was not a national but a provincial war, for the forces of the empire could not be concentrated against the foe. The armies were still composed of infantry and cavalry units, with what artillery was available attached to the in­ fantry. Supporting troops, such as engineer, quartermaster, transportation, signal, and medical units, did not exist. Coolie carriers performed many of the functions of transportation, as well as rudimentary engineering. Each "army" had at­ tached to it civilians who served as quartermaster officers. It is also reported that a few "doctors" were assigned to the troops. Rear echelon supply was primarily the responsibility of the provinces which furnished the troops. The logistical system, if it can be described as such, was grossly ineffi­ cient. Some organizations were relatively well supplied and equipped; in other units, even if they had rifles, the ammuni­ tion might not fit. However, even an honest and efficient supply corps could never have furnished proper ammunition for the conglomeration of weapons carried by the troops. The provincial arsenals proved to be a great disappointment, for, although they had incurred large expenses, they were unable to supply China's needs, so as usual the government 70 See Imperial General Staff, op.cit., pp. 28-32; NCH, July 5, 1895, p. s, and Oct. 8, 1902, p. 724; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 687-688.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 was forced to purchase arms from foreign firms.71 Such were the forces upon which China had to rely to maintain her interests in Korea. Widespread confidence in China's ability to achieve victory was rudely shattered. Although war was not declared until August I, 1894, fighting broke out in Korea late in July. In mid-September the heavily fortified city of Pengyang fell to the Japanese. Li Hung-chang's troops retired across the Yalu River, pursued by the enemy, who forced them to retreat across southern Manchuria. Late in October, a second Jap­ anese army made an amphibious landing on the Liaotung peninsula and pushed southward against the strategic ports near its tip. The Chinese commanders, foolishly failing to defend the narrow neck of the peninsula, permitted the heavily fortified harbor of Dairen to fall after a one-day attack. Even more shameful was the surrender on November 21 of Port Arthur, the "Gibraltar of the East," after an equally short and undistinguished resistance. Both cities, but especially Port Arthur, were ringed with heavy, German-built forts and guarded by Krupp guns, installed at great cost. A deter­ mined garrison should have been able to hold these bastions as long as food and ammunition lasted. Early in March 1895, Newchwang and Yinkow were taken by the Japanese. The Chinese forces retreated west of the Liao River, bringing the fighting in Manchuria to a close. The Pei-yang forces proved to be no more successful in Shantung. Late in January 1895, the Japanese army attacked Weihaiwei, the haven of the Chinese Northern squadron. Largely owing to the actions of the fleet in defending the harbor, the base held out until February 12.72 Then an armi­ stice, followed by the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, ended the conflict. The peace treaty left the Japanese poised for a two-pronged attack on Peking from 71 Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-Up of China, New York, 1899, pp. 283-284; Imperial General Staff, op.cit., pp. 28-29, 31; PG, 1895, p. 108. 72 This summary of the military operations of the Sino-Japanese War is based on Capt. Richard Wallach, U.S.M.C., "The War in the East," The Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, vol. 21, no. 4 (1895), pp. 691-740.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 Southern Manchuria and the Shantung peninsula. Supported by their fleet, nothing but strong foreign intervention could have stopped the march of the Japanese, had not the Chinese government capitulated. In the meantime, in September 1894, in a naval battle off the Yalu River a slightly superior Japanese fleet had outmaneuvered and outfought a Chinese squadron under Ad­ miral Ting Ju-ch'ang. Although several of the captains proved to be cowards, the admiral and most of his crewmen were gallant men, but their professional qualifications were not adequate to the task at hand. The coordination of the squadron was poor; the gunnery was worse. The gravest handicap was, however, no fault of the crews; it arose from the fact that the ships were deficient in ammunition, especially of the types most needed. Charges have been made that the shortage was due to official corruption, if not treason. Despite its disadvantages, the fleet fought until dark before with­ drawing. Having suffered considerable losses, it finally took refuge in the port of Weihaiwei. The battle itself had not been completely decisive, but like the German high seas fleet after Jutland, the Chinese squadron failed to sail out again, leaving the Japanese in undisputed control of the Yellow Sea.73 When Weihaiwei was forced to surrender in February, brave Admiral Ting committed suicide and the remnants of the Northern fleet fell to the Japanese. China's attempt to con­ struct a modern fleet had ended in a discouraging failure. The only reminder of the once respectable Northern squadron was the marble boat at the Summer Palace outside Peking. In part, this series of Chinese defeats can be explained by the decentralization of command, the lack of specialization, the inadequacy of training, and the shortage of modern weapons. Even more important was the corruption which extended from top to bottom of not only the military hierarchy but also the civil bureaucracy. Yet the greatest weakness was the matter of leadership. In general, the Chinese commanders 73 Ensign Frank Marble, U.S.N., "The Battle of the Yalu," The Pro­ ceedings of the United, States Naval Institute, vol. 21, no. 3 (1895), pp. 479521, which includes the comments of several naval officers attached thereto.

Chinese Armies Prior to 1895 displayed a deplorable ignorance of basic strategy, tactics, and the employment of weapons. It was criminal to send men into action under such incompetent, old-fashioned proteges of powerful men. In almost every case in which the Chinese had attempted to hold a position, the enemy had turned their flank, forcing a retreat. The Chinese just did not know how to protect themselves. Under such circumstances, it must have provided little solace when the Empress-Dowager gra­ ciously sent fragrant medical herbs to her hard-pressed troops. There were brilliant examples of gallantry and some units offered stiff resistance, but since part of the officers proved to be arrant cowards, the units commanded by such men could hardly be expected to fight to the bitter end. Since the Throne was aware of cowardice and incompetence among its officers, a number of them were cashiered or degraded, but some of the senior officers were then permitted to remain on duty in order to redeem themselves.74 The early military modernizers had failed to provide China with an army which could defend its frontiers, even from a then second-rate power. The semi-private, partially Western­ ized militia armies had proved themselves incapable of pro­ viding an adequate defense establishment, as had their prede­ cessors, the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard. At the same time, the Japanese army had given China a painful lesson in how well an Oriental army could be organized, trained, disciplined, and employed. Unlike the promising Northern fleet, which had been rendered a total loss, the bulk of the militia armies had not been destroyed, but they had been discredited. Both opportunity and neces­ sity existed for new leaders with more modern military con­ cepts to rise to power. It had been humiliating for the proud Chinese to be defeated by the Western powers, but now they had been ignominiously vanquished by an Oriental neighbor who had long been a cultural protege. This was a rude awak­ ening for the Manchu Empire, and part of the powerful literati was aroused as never before. 7iPG,

1894, pp. 158, 199. and 1895, pp. 42-43.

CHAPTER 2

THE CREATION OF THE NEW-STYLE ARMIES, 1895-1897 The Demand for Reform

C

HINA'S defeat by the Western powers in the Opium, Arrow, and Franco-Chinese Wars had called forth a demand from a few far-sighted men for the adoption of modern arms and warships. We have seen how, as their comprehension expanded, they came to realize that China must manufacture her own weap­ ons and, to this end, establish institutions to train Chinese in the Western sciences. Yet the advocates of these innovations were voices crying in the wilderness. Even the awful warn­ ing of the Taiping Rebellion failed to arouse more than a fraction of the complacent literati-official class from their lethargy. Despite the renewed vigor displayed during the "T'ungchih Restoration," the crushing of the great mid-century rebellions plus the lessening of external pressures served, in general, merely to convince the Throne and the bureaucracy of the efficacy of their ways. The exceptions to the rule were primarily those who had been forced into contact with the aggressive foreigners or who had learned a lesson from bitter experience on the field of battle. Then a great turning point came with the humiliating collapse of China's best military and naval forces under the blows of the Japanese, whom China had viewed with disdain. Many Chinese were forced to realize that there was no choice between reform and the preservation of the status quo. China's very existence was threatened.1 The inability of the empire to defend itself was not the only pressure which goaded the progressive intelligentsia into action. The causes of discontent which created the 1 See Dr. Gilbert Reid, "Methods of Reform in China and Their Net Results," NCH, July 3, 1903, p. 26.

Creation of the New-Style Armies Taiping and other recent rebellions had not been alleviated. That this situation constituted a grave internal danger was demonstrated by the large-scale Mohammedan revolt that broke out in Kansu province and by the lesser uprising in Kwangtung in 1895. Opposition to the alien dynasty was strengthened by the obvious inability of the corrupt regime to provide either external or internal security. As Occidental trade penetrated into China, it was accom­ panied by the gradual infiltration of Western ideas and insti­ tutions. This non-materialistic invasion ultimately proved more subversive to Confucian culture than the armies and navies of the foreign powers, for ideas attacked the very foundation of Chinese civilization, rather than its external manifestation. During the decade before the Sino-Japanese War, as individual Chinese sought a solution to the problems imposed by the impact of the West, they came to recognize that guns and warships alone did not account for the invaders' power. Nor was it altogether Western industrial, commercial, agricultural, and educational systems which explained the military might of the Occident. Enlightened Chinese began to realize that the technological civilization of the West was closely associated with its unique political and social institu­ tions. The demands for reform which boiled up by 1895 obviously had been influenced not only by Western military principles and techniques but also by other Occidental con­ cepts. The degree to which various groups had accepted new ideas is revealed by the various shades of opinion expressed by the reformers. Revolutionaries led by or exemplified by Sun Yat-sen (Sun Wen) favored the overthrow of the gov­ ernment and the creation of a republic as the best means to make China strong. Others, like K'ang Yu-wei, also sought modernization in many fields, but under a constitutional monarchy. Both of these groups agreed on the necessity of adopting Western military methods as a vital phase of broader programs. Most of these men were classical scholars and throughout the succeeding years they turned their literary talents to an exposition of the reforms on which they believed

Creation of the New-Style Armies the fate of China rested.2 Still, they were in advance of their time. The bulk of the bureaucracy as yet had little sympathy for or even understanding of these progressives who would drastically change the system of their ancestors. More important from an immediate point of view was the support given to technological and educational reform by powerful officials who were culturally conservative, but will­ ing to adopt elements of Western material civilization and even some administrative practices in order to preserve the fundamentals of Chinese culture. Outstanding among this group was Chang Chih-tung. It was he who popularized their philosophy as it is expressed in the slogan, Chung-hsiieh wei t'i, Hsi-hsiieh wei yung, which might be translated as, "Chinese learning for the fundamentals, Western learning for practical application."8 The most striking feature of the fervent reform activity of the immediate postwar period was that it centered in the younger generation of the literati. Most of these young men had dedicated their lives to the intensive study of the Con­ fucian masters necessary to succeed in the civil service ex­ aminations. Yet they were aroused by China's plight and, surprisingly, these Confucian scholars sought a solution not alone in the ideals of the past but also in extensive borrowings from the West. Following the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, the elite of the Chinese student class assembled to take the metropolitan examinations in Peking. Early in May 1895, K'ang Yu-wei secured from among them a large number of signatures to a memorial of protest.4 This famous document, known as "The Letter of Ten Thousand Words," 2 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, pp. 133, 136-137, 140, 144-152; ibid., draft volume, pp. 344-347, 375-377; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 703. 3 Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 164. 4For a lengthy summary of the reform, see NCH, Dec. 6, 1895, p. 949. See also Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 148; Cameron, The Reform Move­ ment, pp. 26-27. Hummel (op.cit., vol. 2, p. 703) states that the document was signed by over 1,200 scholars. Teng and Fairbank maintain that there were some 1,300 signatures, while the NCH reported that it was said to have been signed by over 1,000 candidates, but that the document only listed 604 names.

Creation of the New-Style Armies not only rejected the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895) but also advocated widespread reforms. Although the me­ morial upheld Confucianism, the numerous changes that it proposed would have destroyed the traditional Confucian structure and Westernized China. The recommendations showed sufficient understanding of Western civilization to place military modernization in its proper perspective as only one vital element in a movement to strengthen China. The memorialists recommended the development of factories, mining, railroads, agricultural reforms, and more schools. They also promoted the sending of students abroad, relief for the poor, and the encouragement of the press, as well as a general overhaul of the administration, including improve­ ment of the caliber and integrity of officials. Following the presentation of their program, the enthusi­ astic young liberals established in Peking and several other cities reform clubs known as "The Society for the Study of Self-strengthening." Although the Society's principal or­ ganizer was K'ang Yu-wei, its members included the soldierofficial Yuan Shih-k'ai and it was patronized by several senior officers.6 Nevertheless, the powerful conservatives, consider­ ing the memorial of the examination candidates to be highly radical, looked with deep suspicion upon the activities of the Society. Too advanced to be realistic, the association's pro­ gram was shelved. During the next three years almost no reform took place, except in the field of military moderniza­ tion, but the ardent young progressives, continuing their agitation, were to have their day in 1898. Since various categories of reformers all appreciated the military superiority of the West, they were willing to adopt new arms, organization, and tactics in an effort to forestall further foreign encroachment. Some, who have been con­ servatives, were apparently convinced by defeat in the recent war that reform was inevitable.6 Others, like the grand 5 Timothy Richard, Forty-five Years in China, New York, 1916, pp. 253255; NCH, Nov. 22, 1895, p. 851, Dec. 13, 1895, p. 964, Jan. 24, 1896, p. 118, and Jan. 31, 1896, p. 151; Cameron, op.cit., p. 28. 6 One such influential conservative who saw the inevitability of reform

Creation of the New-Style Armies councillor Li Hung-tsao and the Manchu political and mili­ tary leader Jung-lu, were converted at least to the extent that they sponsored the creation of a military force patterned after the German Army. Even some Tartar-generals admitted the desirability of foreign weapons and drill. Nevertheless, many officials failed to realize the advantages of an Occidentaltype army for the preservation of the old order. Still, the use of firearms, if not Western organization and training meth­ ods, received perhaps greater acceptance than any other type of military modernization, for guns had long been used—in fact, throughout the dynasty. Firearms had become a part of the established order, so their use could be rationalized as a means of preventing any further change. Even such a re­ actionary official as Li Ping-heng, who opposed all other technical improvements, including a modern army and navy, did not condemn the use of guns as a means of preventing foreign aggression.7 However, the fact that for years to come part of the Chinese troops were equipped with extremely antiquated weapons indicates that the advocates of the bow and arrow continued to be numerous. Few indeed fully com­ prehended the economic and financial structure, the great industrial complex, the technological society, and the exten­ sive educational system which were necessary for the main­ tenance of a modern military establishment. Nevertheless, men of advanced views presented proposals which outlined a number of China's weaknesses and, although premature, forecast most of the extensive military reforms which characterized the last decade of the Ch'ing period. For example, in 1895 a progressive official named Hu Yii-fen advocated the organization of a large force of new-style troops, well-armed and uniformly organized. He recom­ mended that the Pei-yang (Northern) administration train was the Grand Councillor, Weng T'ung-ho; see Ho Ping-ti, "Weng T'ung-ho and the One Hundred Days of Reform,'" Far Eastern Quar­ terly, vol. 10 (February 1951), p. 129. See also the bibliography of Weng in Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 860-861. 1 J A T T C ch. 2, pp. 5b-6; P G , 1896, pp. 8-9, 93, and 1897, pp. 47-48; 1 Hummel, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 407.

Creation of the New-Style Armies 50,000 men, the Nan-yang (Southern) administration 30,000, and Kwangtung and Hupeh 20,000, while the other provinces would each organize a body of 10,000 men.8 In 1896 the progressive Sheng Hsuan-huai made a some­ what similar proposal. He stated that the annual expenses of the Army of the Green Standard and various militia forces were each in excess of ten million taels. This he declared was a vain squandering of financial resources. As an alternative, Sheng suggested that it would be preferable to disband the 800,000 men enrolled in these units and train a total of 300,000 new-style soldiers, imitating Western methods. Sheng, like Hu, also recommended that the troops be levied in the various provinces, their number depending on condi­ tions in each area. The Tsungli Yamen, or foreign office, replied that it would be difficult to cut down the provincial forces rapidly and entirely. Instead, the Yamen's members preferred a gradual extention of modernization, also by prov­ inces.9 It is clear that creation of a truly national army still had few advocates, while the supporters of the old decen­ tralized system had friends in both the capital and the prov­ inces. Moreover, although Chinese officials criticized and even advocated the disbandment of the old-style Chinese troops these same officials did not find it politically expedient to attack the privileged inactivity of the Banner Forces. Modern arms, especially if purchased abroad, and foreign training would not alone provide China with an adequate defense establishment. Two censors touched upon another fundamental defect of the traditional system when they de­ clared that contempt for the military establishment was so deep-rooted that only illiterates and members of the lowest classes would enlist. They indicated that if officers were re­ quired to be educated men and thus actually the equals of civilian officials, the upper classes would permit their sons 8

CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 7b. Ibid., p. 8. J. 0. P. Bland stated that Sheng Hsuan-huai had made a counterproposal to a scheme offered by Herr von Hanneken, a German adviser to Li Hung-chang. Von Hanneken advocated the creation of a 100,000-man imperial army officered by foreigners (Li Hung-chang, pp. 241-242). 9

Creation of the New-Style Armies to serve in the armed forces.10 Late in 1895, and again in 1896, another censor attacked the problem of incompetent personnel. His memorial deprecated the ancient military ex­ aminations, advocated the testing of troops in rifle marksman­ ship, and proposed that in time technical examinations be added. The Throne ordered the Board of War to deliberate on the matter,11 which it succeeded in doing so successfully that it was several years before the examinations were finally modernized by decree. The basic answer to the crying need for technically quali­ fied officers lay in the establishment of military schools. This most necessary reform also had its advocates. In February 1896 Chang Chih-tung, in requesting permission to establish a new academy, proposed the widespread creation of military schools in order to provide the nation with a competent officers' corps.12 Then, in April of the same year, the gover­ nor-general of Chihli, Wang Wen-shao, endorsed the rec­ ommendations of one of his officers to set up both a military and a medical school.13 During the Sino-Japanese War the Chinese arsenals had dismally failed to make their full contribution to the supply of the armies in the field. In the summer of 1895, therefore, a censor proposed that private merchants be encouraged to purchase the dockyards and arsenals. The objective was to encourage manufacturing, promote inventiveness, and save the government money. The Board of Revenue agreed that the institutions were extravagant as well as inefficient and, recognizing their role in strengthening the resources of the empire, concurred in their sale to private interests.14 The 10 NCH,

July 26, 1895, pp. 133-134· (Jan. 1), 1897, p. 2; NCH 1 Nov. 29, 1895, p. 887. 12 Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 41, pp. 8-9b. For long extracts from this memorial, see PG (March 8), 1896, pp. 31-32. This is an excellent example of the confusion which develops concerning the exact dating of memorials. The original date of the document in Chang ch'iian-chi is Feb. 2, 1896, but owing to the time involved in transmission, in passing through the bureaucracy in Peking, and in publication, the memorial does not appear in PG until March 8, 1896. 13 PG, 1896, pp. 47-48. 14 Ibid., 1895, pp. 95-96, 108-109. 11 PG

Creation of the New-Style Armies original memorialist had obviously been influenced by the Western system of private initiative, but in China the shrewd merchants were reluctant to invest in ventures in which the bureaucracy was to be their rather dubious protector. There was also opposition from powerful provincial officials, so the project was not generally carried out. However, in 1896 owing to financial difficulties, Chang Chih-tung sold the great Han-yeh-ping Iron and Steel Works to stockholders.15 In spite of the growing clamor for reform no basic modifi­ cations could be carried out without the support of the Throne. Yet, the Throne, whether it was represented by the sincere young Kuang-hsu Emperor or the wily old EmpressDowager, was obviously not yet convinced of the need for a drastic reorganization. Of necessity, the Throne had long demonstrated an interest in the armed forces, for no dynasty of conquest can long preserve itself in power by political means alone. It had no desire to try to force drastic and un­ popular reforms on the conservative populace, but it was willing to demand that officials and officers carry out their customary military functions honestly and efficiently. It sought to stimulate integrity, diligence, and respect for duty in the officers' corps, as well as to improve the physical standards and the quality of training among the enlisted men. In true Confucian fashion, officers were directed to treat their men with kindness and sympathy. The Throne, moreover, was under no illusion as to the corruption, favorit­ ism, and negligence that existed in the armed forces. It called on the governors-general and governors almost annually— without success—to denounce impartially all those who were too old, ill, weak, or incompetent for service. Edicts also threatened dire punishment for fraud, embezzlement, cow­ ardice, or other crimes.16 However, the Crown had been making such exhortations for decades and, as the Board of Punishments pointed out, conviction depended on the will­ ingness of the senior provincial officials to denounce their l s I b i d . , 1895, p. 109; N C H , Jan. 24, 1896, p. 139; May 29, 1896, p. 838; Hummel, op.cit., vol. I, p. 29. i e P G , 1895, pp. 15-16, 23; 1896, pp. 36, ss, and 1897, p. 26.

Creation of the New-Style Armies colleagues.17 The Peking Gazette is full of edicts cashiering, degrading, or banishing officers for corruption,18 but ap­ parently there was a senior officials' mutual protection society. With rare exceptions the political axe was reserved for those below the rank of governor, and especially for those who were not proteges of the head of a province. It is clear that under these conditions no basic reforms could be carried out. None of the important recommendations noted above were adopted during the period, but several directives were issued which tended either to alleviate a bad situation or have an influence on future events. For example, in an attempt to decrease nepotism in the armed forces, a decree of August 30, 1896, forbade fathers of high military rank to serve in the same province as sons who were in the civil service and vice versa. This regulation extended to the military profession laws similar to those already applicable to the civil bureaucracy.19 An indication of the growing tendency on the part of the Manchu leadership again to pre­ pare its own people for military command was indicated by the fact that in December 1895 the Manchu intendant Yinch'ang was ordered to select a group of young and vigorous Bannermen to be trained as special students at the Tientsin military preparatory school.20 Far more important, the Throne, on the recommendation of its senior military advisers, was willing to experiment with the recruitment of two modern-style brigades. Previously, the policy among the so-called "Western-drilled troops" had been to adopt in part foreign arms and drill regulations, while maintaining the basic militia or Green Standard organiza­ tion. However, in 1895 the situation was so grave that the Throne approved the creation of two brigades which to a major degree imitated the German army's system of organi­ zation, training and tactics, as well as drill regulations and weapons. Thus, despite the lethargy and conservatism of the 17

Ibid., 1896, p. 74. is For example, see PG, 1896, pp. 13, 25-26; 1897, p. 3; 1898, pp. 10-11, and 1899, p. 27. l a PG, 1896, p. 33. 2 0 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 378, pp. 9b-io.

Creation of the New-Style Armies dynasty, there were created two small units which were to become the inspiration and nucleus of the modern armies of twentieth century China. These two organizations were the direct forerunners of the private armies of the warlord period. Furthermore, they were to be the training centers for a new class of militarists. The two brigades were the Self-strength­ ening Army (Tzu-ch'iang chiin) of Chang Chih-tung, and the Newly Created Army (Hsin-chien lu-chiin) of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Their importance to the modernization and control of the Chinese armies makes it worth while to study them in considerable detail.

Chang Chih-tung and the Self-strengthening Army Chang Chih-tung, born in Chihli in 1837, was the de­ scendant of a line of imperial civil officials. A brilliant scholar with an excellent classical education, he received the chin-shih degree in 1863. Unlike many of the outstanding figures of the last half-century of the Ch'ing period, Chang did not rise to eminence through military command. Instead he ad­ vanced up the ranks of the civil service through ability, political astuteness, and an impressive display of scholarship. Although he was an opportunist and obsequious at times, Chang also embodied Confucian virtues of government to a degree rare in his day. By 1882 he was a governor, and in 1884 he was promoted to the exalted post of governor-general. Although Chang Chih-tung was a strong supporter of Confucianism, he was wise enough to comprehend the use­ fulness of defending China's cultural heritage by borrowing Western material techniques. Like most Chinese pioneers in modernization, he was keenly interested in military reform, but, not being a militarist, improvement of the armed forces was only one of his many progressive interests. He was a sincere, yet sometimes impractical, promoter of reforms in numerous fields. Among other enterprises, he established arsenals, mints, tanneries, cotton mills, and silk factories.

Creation of the New-Style Armies More than most of his contemporaries, Chang realized the need for an industrial and educational system to support a military establishment; yet on occasion, he exhibited a naive lack of understanding of strategy and international relations. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War he commissioned Jung Hung (Yung Wing) to secure a foreign loan for the purpose of hiring a body of mercenaries to launch an attack from the west coast of the United States in order to strike Japan from the rear. This highly impractical scheme was blocked by Sir Robert Hart and Li Hung-chang.21 However, despite an occasional flight of fancy, Chang was to make a marked contribution to the modernization of China's armies by the creation of the Self-strengthening Army. This ad­ mirable German-style brigade and its successors became the model for the new-style troops of much of Southern China.22 When Liu K'un-i, the current leader of the Hunan Army, was transferred to Chihli as generalissimo of the Chinese troops in the fall of 1894, Chang Chih-tung was sent from Wuchang to Nanking as acting governor-general. The tempo of his efforts toward military reform was increased by the war with Japan and the possibility of a Japanese invasion of the Yangtze provinces. He improved coastal defenses, purchased foreign arms, and raised a large militia force,23 but his most important and drastic innovation was the or­ ganization at Nanking, in the latter half of 1895, of thirteen battalions of the Self-strengthening Army. This balanced force, Chang reported, consisted of eight battalions of in21 For a scholarly biography of Chang Chih-tung, see Μ. E. Cameron, "The Public Career of Chang Chih-tung, 1837-1909," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 7 (September 1938), pp. 187-210, especially pp. 187-199, 209210. See Chang's biography in Hummel (op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 27-31), by the same author. See also Yung Wing, My Life in China and America, New York, 1909, pp. 225-226. 22Chu Wu, "Wo-kuo chih lu-chiin" (The Army of Our Country), op.cit., p. 55. In contemporary Western reports, the Self-strengthening Army was sometimes referred to as the "Ad Astra Brigade." 28 PG, 1895, p. 36; NCH, July 19, 1895, p. 88; Cameron, "Chang Chihtung," p. 199. Liu K'un-i had never received a literary degree above that of hsiu-ts'ai or licentiate. He rose to power because of his military services as a commander of the Hunan Army (FR, 1902, pp. 268-269).

6l

Creation of the New-Style Armies fantry, two squadrons of cavalry, two battalions of artillery, and one battalion of engineers—all equipped in the style of European armies. Thus this brigade differed widely from the traditional armies of China, and even from the Defense Army and Disciplined Forces of the post-Taiping period. Based in general on the German tables of organization, the unit com­ prised the three basic arms, independently organized, as well as engineer troops. It was planned that doctors, veterinarians, and armorers would be added later. Surprisingly, no mention is made of plans for organized service troops, such as quarter­ master, transportation, or signal units.24 Thirty-five German commissioned and non-commissioned officers, headed by Major Baron von Reitzenstein, were em­ ployed to train the new troops. The most striking feature of Chang's plan in light of the Throne's attitude during the Taiping Rebellion, was the fact that the foreigners were not merely to serve as instructors; until Chinese officers could be trained to fill the posts, the brigade, battalion, and com­ pany commanders were to be Germans. The battalion execu­ tive officers were Chinese officers chosen for their health, honesty and resoluteness. The company executive officers were selected graduates of the Tientsin and Kwangtung mili­ tary preparatory schools, which had been founded in the 1880's by Li Hung-chang and Chang Chih-tung respectively. All authority for training was delegated to the foreign officers, but responsibility for discipline and punishment remained in the hands of their Chinese colleagues. Furthermore, overall powers of inspection and control were retained by the mili­ tary secretariat (ying-wu ch'u) of the governor-general.25 2i Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, pp. 4-4b; CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 6b, and Ping-chih 10, p. 7b. LCCCF (p. 330) is in error in stating that the brigade was first trained at Woosung, Kiangsu. 25 Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, pp. 1, 3b-4; Captain Gadoffre, "Vallee du Yang-tse: Les troupes chinoises et leurs instructeurs," Revue des troupes coloniales, vol. 1 (January-June 1903), pp. 1-2; NCH, March 27, 1896, p. 488. One group of German instructors had been engaged by the Chinese minister in Berlin upon the request of Chang Chih-tung. The other section had originally been destined for Tientsin, but their orders were cancelled and Chang employed them (Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, p. 1; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 1-2). Captain Gadoffre stated that the

Creation of the New-Style Armies Chang Chih-tung was willing to utilize the talents of foreign instructors to an uncommon degree, but he carefully retained ultimate authority over his valuable troops. The soldiers for the new brigade were selected with un­ usual care. They were village youths from the provinces of Kiangsu and Anhwei. No slippery city "braves" were ac­ cepted. The candidates were examined by Western medical standards and had to be strong, vigorous, and healthy. Each recruit was also required to have a certificate of good conduct from his native village and had to enlist for ten years.26 A revolutionary report states that all of the recruits could read and write. This may well be an exaggeration, but it is known that a few years later many of Chang's crack troops trained at Wuchang were literate.27 If it was true that the soldiers of the Self-strengthening Army were literate, then this was one of the first steps in the gradual and partial improvement of the base social status of the military profession which took place in the first decade of the twentieth century. Education had such prestige in China that the enlistment of literates would raise the social standing of the armed services. In terms of contemporary Chinese standards, the payment of the new troops was generous. Regular soldiers, not re­ cruits, received five silver dollars (yuan) per month, while the non-commissioned officers received proportionately more. Uniforms, rations, and quarters were also furnished exclusive of pay. The salaries of the German personnel had been settled abroad by contract. Militia or "braves" officers were usually invested with the rank of expectant (or prospective) officials of the regular services, and this system was evidently applied to the officers of the new-style armies who, like the militia armies, were not part of the regularly established forces. dispatching of the German instructors to China had been a project of the Krupp munitions works, which had sold large amounts of ordnance material and arsenal equipment to the Chinese (loc.cit.). 2e Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou -i, ch. 40, pp. 3~3b. See also NCH, Jan. 24, 1896, p. 139. 27 NCH, July 31, 1903, p. 240; Rev. E. J. Hardy, "The Chinese Army," Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 59 (April 1906), p. 598. See also NCH, May 6, 1904, p. 964, and Sept. 28, 1906, p. 748.

Creation of the New-Style Armies When paying the men, funds were not given to the com­ manding officers in a lump sum, as was customary; instead, foreign instructors and specially deputed Chinese officers jointly paid the troops on the spot in dollars. Thus Chang Chih-tung created a method of keeping both groups of officers honest. The new pay and training system increased the work of the Chinese officers, while at the same time it decreased their irregular sources of income, but the troops benefited by receiving their proper pay and rations.28 This was one reason why Chang could recruit a better class of men. The table of organization called for an infantry battalion of 250 men divided into five companies. The artillery bat­ talions were composed of 200 men organized into four bat­ teries. Each cavalry squadron consisted of 180 men in three troops, while the engineer battalion had only 100 men. Al­ though Chang Chih-tung stated that this assignment of personnel was in accordance with the German system,29 he was not fully correct. However, the brigade did depart from the typical Chinese organizational pattern and had the char­ acteristic of the modern armies of Europe. In a memorial dated December 27, 1895, Chang Chih-tung announced that he proposed to organize a German-trained force of 10,000 men and reported the creation of the first thirteen battalions, as noted above. To rationalize this un­ conventional proposal he pointed to the accumulated de­ cadence, incompetence, and corruption which existed in the old-style Chinese troops, but he avoided indicating that the same weaknesses beset the Eight Banners. Chang informed the Throne that China must thoroughly comprehend and imitate Western methods in order to train competent troops rapidly. Otherwise, she could not adequately defend herself 2s Chang ch'uan-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, pp. 4b-5; Mayers, The Chinese Government, 3rd edn., p. 64; Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 2. 29 Chang ch'uan-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, pp. 4-4b; CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 7b. For a detailed presentation of the training regulations, drill formations, and communication procedures of the Self-strengthening Army see Tzu-ch'iang chiin yang-ts'ao k'o-ch'eng (Foreign Training Manual of the Selfstrengthening Army), Shanghai, 1897, 10 chuan.

Creation of the New-Style Armies against foreign aggression and would only be capable of resisting internal disorders.30 The memorial recommended that after the previously or­ ganized units had been trained for six months, the strength be doubled. The foreign officers would then be transferred to train the new battalions, while Chinese officers could gradually be appointed to command the established units. This process would be repeated until the organization reached a strength of 10,000 men.81 Had this procedure been carried out, within two years Chang could have created a crack divi­ sion surpassing any previous army in modern Chinese history. Chang estimated that the expenses of the brigade would be over 440,000 taels per annum. He acknowledged that funds were scarce and that the greatest economies must be prac­ ticed, but he obviously believed that the value of the new force justified the expenses involved. Chang laid down some sound military principles in the memorial when he stated that leaders must be well qualified, that soldiers must be skilled in mechan­ ical techniques, that troops must consist of able-bodied, fulltime soldiers without extraneous duties, that units must be maintained at authorized strength, that ordnance material must be plentiful, and that pay must be generous. Chang was correct when he declared that under the old pay scale troops would desert rather than face the rigors of Western-style training, but he appears to have been unrealistic in believing that the employment of foreign officers and Western methods would prove to be a panacea for the ills of the Chinese armies. He stated that after the new system had been in effect for several years, it would be followed as a matter of course. Since the officers and men would come to regard it as natural, the evils of padded payrolls, negligence, and squeeze would 30 Chang ch'uon-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, pp. i-2b. See also CSK Ping-chih j 10, p. 7b. When new troops were raised in the provinces, the first con­ sideration was the matter of financing them, and hence it was ordered that the provincial officials report new units to the Throne for approval (see PG, 1896, p. 68). Another objective of the Throne evidently was to main­ tain some check on the number of men under arms in the empire and to prevent any official from creating too powerful a force. 81 Chang ch'Uan-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 40, pp. 2b-3-

Creation of the New-Style Armies have no means of developing.32 This overoptimism may only have been an attempt to convince the conservative court. Still, Chang seems not to have grasped the fact that to a large degree armies reflect their environment and only a basic remolding of Chinese mores could rectify such ingrained practices. The Throne approved Chang's proposals, but questioned, with some justification, the qualifications and high salaries of the German officers. Furthermore, the Throne demonstrated its authority, and perhaps its skepticism concerning the organization of crack military units by individual Chinese officials, by ordering that the new organization be transferred to the returning substantive governor-general, Liu K'un-i, for its completion.33 The brigade was an asset to the defense of the vital Yangtze delta. Also the Throne evidently preferred that such a radical departure from China's traditional military organizations be supervised by the more conservative Liu. On February 14, 1898, Chang Chih-tung pointed out in another memorial that he had originally planned to train 10,000 men, but that expenses were excessive. It had proved unexpectedly difficult to devise means to carry out the plan. Yet, despite the fact that the order to transfer command of his splendid new organization must have disappointed him, he not only urged its preservation but argued it must be increased to a powerful brigade of 5,000 men. In an unusual demonstration of patriotism, Chang even arranged for the financing of an expanded force, which he estimated would cost 700,000 taels annually. He stated that he could maintain the force by allotting to it 200,000 taels saved by reducing the provincial troops of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhwei; 120,000 taels could be appropriated from the rice Iikin tax of Wuhu and 380,000 taels from the rice likin taxes of Soochow and Shanghai.84 Despite Chang's plea, the Self-strengthening Army was not increased by his successor, but at least Liu K'un-i retained it intact. 82 84

33 See ibid., ch. 42, pp. 27-27b. Ibid., pp. 2-2b, 4b, 5. Ibid., pp. 27b-29. Chang proposed to organize six new infantry and two

artillery battalions.

Creation of the New-Style Armies Chang's interest in military reforms was not limited to the organization of army units; he realized the absolute necessity for creating an educated and technically proficient officers' corps. In an approved memorial of February 2, 1896, recom­ mending the establishment at Nanking of a military academy and a railway school, Chang Chih-tung wrote: "In reorganizing an army for defense, the ability of the offi­ cers is of utmost importance. The reason why the German army is first among the Western powers comes from the fact that all men of the country are soldiers, but, even more im­ portant, among its troop commanders there is none who has not been graduated from a military academy."35 The memorial declared that if China were to imitate Ger­ many, she must found numerous academies, for even if academy graduates were not fully qualified to lead troops, they would become so much more rapidly than officers with­ out such previous training.36 Chang proposed that the enrollment of the military acad­ emy consist of 150 carefully selected, literate young cadets. He had already telegraphed the Chinese minister to Germany to employ well-qualified German instructors to present a three-year curriculum. The courses would include the tech­ niques, strategy, and tactics of the infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers, and fortress artillery. Surveying, cartog­ raphy, and German were to be taught as well. The railway school was to consist of three foreign instructors and 90 students.37 85 Ibid., ch. 41, p. 8; for a long partial translation of this memorial, see PG (March 8), 1896, pp. 31-32. The United States minister to China, Charles Denby, accounted for the "strong pro-German tenor" of this memorial by the fact that Chang was said to be in debt to Krupp and other German companies (Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 101, no. 2545, Jtine 10, 1896). Chang's indebtedness may well have been a factor, but it must be remembered that at this time the efficiency of the German army was admired throughout much of the world. zt Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou -i, ch. 41, pp. 8-8b; PG, 1896, p. 31. 87 Chang ch'iian-chi, Tsou-i, ch. 41, pp. 8b-io. It was estimated that the physical plant would cost over 40,000 taels, while the annual expenses of the two schools would total more than 60,000 taels (ibid., pp. 9-iob).

Creation of the New-Style Armies When Liu K'un-i relieved Chang in Nanking in February 1896, fears were expressed that the Self-strengthening Army and the new military academy, which was then under con­ struction, would be discouraged by the more conservative Liu. However, Liu's opinion of foreign organization and training had evidently been modified by the harsh realities of the Sino-Japanese War, for on his return to Nanking he thanked the German officers for their efforts and expressed the hope that they would soon create an effective army.88 Nevertheless, the people of Nanking had developed an ani­ mosity toward the foreign officers. Jealousy existed between Liu's Hunan troops and the men of the new brigade, who were better paid, clothed, and fed. Also, a lack of harmony was reported among the German instructors, whose conduct drew very unfavorable comment. In June 1896, a clash be­ tween Hunanese troops and a detachment of the foreigntrained soldiers led to the wounding of a German corporal. Two German gunboats were ordered to Nanking, but the fact that only the Hunanese were punished made possible a settlement.39 However, the incident demonstrated the danger of political intervention inherent in the employment of foreign advisers. In order to avoid further incidents, Liu in the summer of 1896 transferred the Self-strengthening Army to the more isolated forts at Woosung, Kiangsu. Then when their con­ tracts expired in 1898 he dispensed with the services of the German officers. Nevertheless, during that period the high standard of personnel, training, and equipment of the brigade was maintained.40 Although it is apparent that Liu did not then approve of 38

NCH, Jan. 17, 1896, p. 84, and March 20, 1896, p. 432. June 5. 1896, pp. 871, 883, and June 12, 1896, pp. 916, 928; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 2-4. An official of the U.S. Legation later reported that most of the German instructors were qualified only to be drillmasters. Remaining in an "almost chronic" state of drunkenness, they maltreated and insulted the local populace (Chester Holcombe, The Real Chinese Question, New York, 1900, pp. 141-142). *°NCH, June 19, 1896, p. 956, July 3, 1896, p. 4, and Sept. 25, 1901, p. 607; Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 4. i t Ibid.,

Creation of the New-Style Armies the direct command or even training of troops by foreigners, he ordered three German officers from Woosung to act as instructors in the new military academy at Nanking. Still, despite the prestige of learning, none of the young officers graduated from the school were used in Liu's Hunanese body­ guard. A few trained lieutenants were scattered throughout the other battalions of the Hunan Army, but they made little impression on troop commanders who retained the bow-andsword mentality.41 On February 29, 1896, Chang Chih-tung departed from Nanking to return to Wuchang as governor-general. Deter­ mined to continue his experiments in military modernization, he took advantage of the discontent in Kiangsu to transfer a small group of the German officers to Wuchang. The senior member of the mission was too domineering to be acceptable to the Chinese civil and military officials, but three officers remained to train troops and to teach in the new military schools which Chang established.42 In 1896 Chang organized two new battalions of foreign-style troops, plus a detachment of engineers. This force furnished the nucleus of an elite bodyguard, which later evolved into the meritorious Eighth Division. In forming the new battalions Chang decreased somewhat his close adherence to foreign principles. The new training regulations were a blend of German practices with the techniques of the semi-modernized Tenacious Army (Wu-i chiin) of the province of Chihli. This modification may have been dictated by internal opposition to Chang's previously unorthodox policy. The shift was not, however, a drastic one, for the Tenacious Army was itself modeled in part after the German Army. More important was the fact that, after returning to Wuchang, Chang Chih-tung also gave up the practice of using foreign officers to command his 41 Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 36-37. The officers whom Liu assigned to instruct in the military academy were Capt. Lobbecke, Lt. von Tettenborn, and Lt. Topffer. Lt. Topffer soon departed to serve under Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang (ibid., pp. 5-6). i 2 PG., 1896, p. 43; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 5-6. The three Germans who remained with Chang at Wuchang were Lts. Topffer, Hoffman, and Fuchs (Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 6).

Creation of the New-Style Armies troops and employed them only as advisers or instructors.43 In order to improve the caliber of the provincial troops Chang in 1897 ordered that one-tenth of each of the various battalions be transferred in succession to the provincial capi­ tal for training. On completion of their training, they were ordered to return to transmit their new skills to the remain­ ing troops. It appears that Chang later changed to a policy of furnishing each major provincial force with one or two West­ ern-trained battalions.44 Upon his return to Hupeh, Chang continued to display his sincere interest and faith in military education by promptly founding another military preparatory school at Wuchang similar to the Nanking academy.45 In summary, aside from the use of modern weapons and the temporary employment of foreign officers as troop com­ manders, which was suggestive of the "Ever Victorious Army," the Self-strengthening Army and the Wuchang troops had several elements in common with the semi-private militia armies developed in the Taiping period. The officers were selected by the organizer and only able-bodied villagers were recruited. The organizations were regionally financed and the soldiers' pay was above average. Both types of units existed outside the traditional and regular armed services; both arose from the incompetence of the existing armies in the face of military crisis. However, there are some striking dissimilarities between Chang and his predecessors. The creator of the Self-strengthening Army was a civil official and scholar who had already long enjoyed the highest pro­ vincial rank. Furthermore, unlike the militia leaders, Chang did not recruit men from his native province. And, after the Throne demonstrated its authority by ordering him to turn the army over to his successor, he evinced unusual patriotism i i CSK, Ping-chih 10, pp. 7b-8, and Ping-chih 3, p. 6b; PG, 1896, pp. 47-48; Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1896, Shanghai, annually, part 2, p. 28; Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 6. 4 4 CSK Ping-chih 3, p. 6b; Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 6. 1 45 Capt. Henry Leonard, U.S.M.C., "The Chinese Army," enclosure in Dept. State, Numerical File, vol. 217, no. 2106/2-5 July 1, 1908, p. 154; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 15, 17.

Creation of the New-Style Armies in continuing to take an interest in the expansion of the organization. Then, too, although Chang continued to be a strong supporter of military modernization, the new-style troops which he was to organize never exceeded a division plus a brigade. He even lost direct control over these when he was transferred to Peking in 1907. Such a force was suf­ ficient to preserve internal order in Hupeh and Hunan until 1911, and it set an example for and influenced the develop­ ment of the modern troops of South China. However, al­ though these troops were a factor in the power structure of China, they were never strong enough to be the dominant element. That status was to be seized by the Pei-yang Army of Yuan Shih-k'ai.

The Origin of the Pei-yang Military Clique The other modern military organization resulting from the Sino-Japanese War which, along with the troops of Chang Chih-tung, would form the nucleus of a new regular army was the Pacification Army (Ting-wu chiin) or Newly Created Army (Hsin-chien lu-chiin). This organization was of vital importance to the military and political history of modern China, for it was the core from which developed the famous Pei-yang Army and the Pei-yang clique. Late in 1894, at a critical stage of the war, Herr von Hanneken, who had been a military adviser to Li Hungchang, submitted to Prince Kung, and the Tsungli Yamen a plan for the creation of an imperial army. In this force a corps of foreign officers would not only act as instructors, but would also hold Chinese military rank. The sine qua non of this proposal was that the funds raised for its maintenance be controlled by Sir Robert Hart, the distinguished inspectorgeneral of the Maritime Customs.46 With the exception of 46 Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, Shanghai, 1904, vol. 2, p. 511; Bland, op.cit. p. 241. See also JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 6-6b. Bland states that the scheme called for a centralized army of 100,000 soldiers and 2,000 foreign officers (op.cit., p. 241).

Creation of the New-Style Armies the fact that it was to be an imperial rather than a provincial army, this scheme reminds us of a large-scale version of the Self-strengthening Army. In partial support of the plan, the War Council (Tu-pan chiin-wu ch'u) memorialized the Throne, requesting that foreign-style troops be drilled and that Hu Yii-fen and von Hanneken be ordered to commence recruiting and training a force at Tientsin.47 Naturally, imperial officials placed impediments in the way of this radical proposal. J. 0. P. Bland states that the Manchu members of the Tsungli Yamen were inclined to approve the plan, but that the Chinese members, supported by Li Hungchang, opposed it because they objected to large expenditures, especially if they were to be under the supervision of for­ eigners. They feared the loss of an opportunity for peculation and perquisites of office, including the profits from the pur­ chase of arms.48 This may be true, but racial pride and undue optimism,49 as well as the dangers inherent in foreign control of such a powerful internal force must also have been im­ portant factors in the rejection of the major elements of the scheme. Still, it should be remembered that since the Taiping Rebellion the balance of military power had lain in the hands of Chinese provincial officials. The creation of a centralized force of 100,000 modern troops would have returned domi­ nant power to the Manchu Throne, and this may support the claim that the Manchu leaders approved the plan. One important result emerged from the debate. Hu Yii-fen organized a force of ten battalions which was designated the Pacification Army. Foreign training was adopted only in part, and in its first year the unit did not attain Occidental standards. The brigade consisted, at least on paper, of 3,000 infantrymen, 1,000 artillerymen, 250 cavalrymen, and 500 engineers. Hu employed at least two foreign instructors, Schaller, a German, and a Norwegian officer named Munthe 47 Yuan Shih-k'ai, compiler, Hsin-chien lu-chun ping-liieh lu-ts'un (Record of the Military Plans of the Newly Created Army) ( ?), 1898, ch. i. PPSee also JATTC, ch. 2, p. 6. 48 Bland, op.cit., pp. 242-243. 49 S. F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, Belfast, 1950, p. 646.

Creation of the New-Style Armies who later became a colonel and aide-de-camp to Yuan Shih-k'ai.E0 The grave conditions which led to the creation of the Selfstrengthening Army and the Pacification Army also permitted the rise to power of the "father of the warlords," Yiian Shih-k'ai. Yiian, born in Honan in 1859, was the descendant of a family of Chinese officials, several of whom had been militia officers serving under Tso Tsung-t'ang or Li Hungchang. In spite of his heritage and early classical education, Yiian failed to pass the literary examinations and had to purchase his first official title, in 1880.51 The majority opinion of historians seems to have been expressed by H. F. MacNair when he wrote that Yuan was a civil official who became a military leader "by force of circum­ stance."52 On the other hand, Raphael Verbrugge may well have been correct when he stated that Yiian had a taste of military life and "deliberately" entered a military career.58 Having failed to pass the civil service examinations, he would probably have faced opposition from the chii-jen and chinshih fraternity in a purely civil career, despite his purchased title and influential relatives. He may well have believed that, because of dynastic decline, foreign aggression, and the rise of semi-personal armies, the surest steppingstones to power lay through a primarily military career.64 At any rate, in 1880 Yiian joined the staff of General Wu Ch'ang-ch'ing who commanded a part of the Anhwei Army and who became Yiian's patron in Shantung. In 1882 when General Wu was ordered to Korea, he took Yiian with him. There Yiian trained and disciplined both Chinese and Korean 60Yiian, op.cit., ch. 1, p. 19b; JATTC, ch. 2, p. 6b; CSS, vol. 1, sect, i, pp. 16-17; F· A. McKenzie, The Unveiled East, London, 1907 pp. 214-215. 51 JATTC, ch. i, pp. 1-4; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 950-951 ; Dr. C. D. Tenney, "A Condensed Biography of Yiian Shih-k'ai," IVDGS, Political Conditions in China, no. 7829-17, Oct. 27, 1915. 52 H. F. MacNair, China in Revolution, Chicago, 1931, p. 22. 53 Raphael Verbrugge, Yuan Che-k'ai; sa vie, son temps, Paris, 1934, P- 27· 54 R. L. Powell, "The Rise of Yiian Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang Army," Papers on China, vol. 3 (1949), p. 236.

Creation of the New-Style Armies troops, but when the opportunity occurred he accepted a civilian title. Thus from 1885 to 1894 he served in Korea as China's commissioner of commerce with the rank of a prefect. During this period, he enjoyed great prestige and demon­ strated real ability, but he also gained a reputation for aggressiveness and severity. It was also during this period that he became an important protege of Li Hung-chang.50 Many of Yuan's enemies attributed the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War to his arbitrary actions while resident in Korea. This is probably an exaggeration of Yuan's share in the matter, but apparently his reports and recommendations influenced the sending of reinforcements to Korea, thus pre­ cipitating the Japanese attack. However, neither these accusa­ tions nor Yuan's actual role in bringing on the war detracted from his prestige or influence.57 He was a wily politician with an unusual faculty for avoiding responsibility for blunders. In July 1894, Yiian Shih-k'ai returned to China and was named intendant of a circuit in Chekiang. However, instead of proceeding to his new post, he went to Manchuria as a quartermaster officer to assist in supplying the troops. After the war, he moved to Peking and joined the reform society.58 Although later he was accused, probably with justice, of betraying the reformers Yiian was to prove to be an advocate of moderate change in many fields. It is true that he empha­ sized military reform and his actions were marred by political expediency and personal ambitions, but his military experi­ ence had demonstrated the dangerous weakness of China; so during the remaining years of the dynasty he sought to 55

55Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (A Politi­ cal History of China during the Last Hundred Years), Shanghai, 1947, vol. i, p. 213; JATTC, ch. i, pp. 4-φ; Hummel, op.cit., p. 950. 66A. N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution, Cambridge, Mass., 1930, p. IOl; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 951; Tenney, op.cit., pp. 2-3; J. 0. P. Bland and E. Backhouse, China under the Empress Dowager, London, 1910, pp. 201-202. 67T. F. Tsiang, "Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, 1870-1894," The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vol. 17 (April 1933), pp. 92-105; Bland and Backhouse, op.cit., pp. 170-171, 201-202. 68 Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 951; NCH, Nov. 22, 1895, p. 851; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 28.

Creation of the New-Style Armies increase China's power to resist foreign pressure. While in Peking he also demonstrated another characteristic of his rise to power; namely, the ability to gain the confidence and support of influential political figures. At that time he won the backing of Prince Ch'ing, Jung-lu, the Manchu president of the Board of War, and the Grand Councillor, Li Hungtsao.59 As pointed out above, China's defeat at the hands of Japan led to a desire on the part of a number of senior court officials to carry out military reform. Jung-lu requested Yiian to draw up plans for the foreign-style training of troops. The result was a treatise of several thousand words advocating the use of German techniques in training.80 Li Hung-tsao, seconded by Jung-lu, then recommended Yuan as capable of training an efficient army.®1 After Hu Yii-fen was appointed directorgeneral of the Tientsin-Peking Railroad, the princes and ministers of the War Council memorialized the Throne on December 8, 1895, recommending that Yiian be appointed to command and supervise the instruction of the Pacification Army, the name of which had been changed to the Newly Created Army. They approved of his plans for adopting foreign-style drill and employing foreign officers, stating that in their opinion Yiian's proposals concerning military organ­ ization and rates of pay were comprehensive and satisfactory. The memorialists then advocated that infantry and cavalry be recruited to bring the new brigade up to 7,000 men, organized and paid in accordance with Yiian's suggestions. The regular monthly expenses of the increased force were estimated at over 70,000 taels. If the new unit proved effec­ tive, it was proposed that it be gradually strengthened further.62 s 9 JATTC, ch. 2, pp. sb-6; Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 115, no. 817, Conger to Hay, Nov. 15, 1901, p. 2; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 951. e o JATTC, ch. 2, p. 6. a i Ibid., ch. 2, pp. sb-6. 62 For the text of the memorial, see Yuan, op.cit., ch. i, pp. 19-20. See also JATTC, ch. 2, p. 6b. For Yiian's report to the War Council proposing tables of organization and rates of pay for the Newly Created Army, see CSS, vol. I, sect. 1, pp. 16-37. Prior to the publication of the memorial, the NCH (Oct. 18, 1895, p. 636) had already stated that Yiian Shih-k'ai

Creation of the New-Style Armies The resulting edict of December 8, 1895, appointing Yuan to command the brigade, read in part as follows: "China, in experimenting with the training of foreign style troops, has in general used Western methods only in part. Those who will be trained this time will solely imitate the German regulations. The necessary expenses will be great. If they are without concrete results, it will be a wasted expense."63 In mid-December 1895 Yiian proceeded to Hsiao-chan, not far from Tientsin, to take over his new command. There he rapidly demonstrated his usual energy in reorganizing the brigade, and as early as December 21, 1895, he reported on the status of the unit. The infantry was divided into two wings (regiments) of two and three battalions each. The artillery was organized into three wings (battalions), con­ sisting of a rapid-fire gun, a heavy artillery, and a reserve unit. The cavalry squadron was composed of four troops, while the engineers were divided into six sections, consisting of bridging, fortification, ordnance repair, surveying, minelaying, and telegraph detachments.64 This organization was not strictly in keeping with that of the German army, but, like the Self-strengthening Army it begins to resemble closely the modern armies of the West, with their three basic arms and technical units. Yuan's brigade even had a brass band. The new organization was rapidly increased to about 7,000 men. Yiian sent recruiting officers to Shantung, Anhwei, Honan, and Kiangsu to select healthy young men. He also had been appointed to command the brigade and had published a report that the unit would be raised to 25,000 men. This combination of accurate prognostication and false rumor was characteristic of the NCH of the period. It frequently obtained accurate, unpublished information, but it also often exaggerated the size of the Chinese armies. 63 CSL Te-tsung, ch. 378, pp. 9-9b. Yuan, op.cit., prior to preface. The 1 edict is cited and translated, with slightly different wording, in A. W. Hummel, Jr., "Yiian Shih-k'ai as an OfBcial under the Manchus," un­ published M. A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1949, p. 62. e i JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 7-7b. See also LCCCF, pp. 350-351. For the detailed organization of the Hsin-chien lu-chiin, see CCS, vol. 1, sect. 1, pp. 16-37.

Creation of the New-Style Armies dispatched officers to recruit cavalrymen and purchase horses. Since, as was so common, the weapons of the brigade were not standardized, Yiian requested that new-style rifles, cavalry carbines, and rapid-fire guns be furnished to his troops.65 The German officers who had been employed, evidently through the Chinese minister in Berlin, arrived at the Hsiaochan camp. A German-language school was established and three foreign officers acted as infantry, cavalry, and artillery instructors. Since Yiian Shih-k'ai actually commanded his own troops, much of their progress and fine appearance must have been due to his energy and administrative ability. One can see the influence of the foreign officers, however, in the modernized training program, the reorganization of the staff functions along Western lines, the training under combat conditions, the night maneuvers, and the maintenance of telegraph communications66—all of which were alien to the old-style armies. The lack of an adequate staff, with its specialized distribu­ tion of planning functions, had been a serious fault in China's traditional armies, so after setting up the tables of organiza­ tion for the various battalions, Yiian established a group of new staff offices. These included training, transport, com­ missary, ordnance, and legal sections. Unlike Occidental armies, the staff included a foreign affairs section. However, this office may have dealt with technical intelligence—the study of foreign military training methods and equipment— rather than with foreign affairs in the customary sense. The chief of staff was Hsu Shih-ch'ang,67 an old friend of Yiian. Hsu was only a Hanlin compiler, but as Yiian rose to power Hsii was promoted to be a grand councillor, governor-gen65 CSS, vol. I, sect. I, p. 15; China. Imperial Maritime Customs, Re­ turns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1896, part 2, p. 28; JATTC, ch. 2, p. 7. e e JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 7b, 8b. The commissioner of customs in Tientsin reported that two of the instructors were German, while one was a Nor­ wegian [probably Munthe] (Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade, 1896, part 2, p. 28). 67 JATTC, ch. 2, p. 8b. LCCCF states that the staff consisted of supply, ordnance, medical, transport, and intelligence sections (p. 351).

Creation of the New-Style Armies eral, and grand secretary. Finally, under the Republic, he served as president from 1918 to 1922. Obviously, Yiian Shih-k'ai realized that one of the greatest destroyers of morale in the Chinese armies was the corruption prevalent among the officers, an evil which led to the enlisted men being deprived in whole or in part of their legitimate pay and rations. Yiian established a system whereby funds were issued to the men individually by officers from his head­ quarters. As a further safeguard he personally supervised the paying and outfitting of his troops. Yuan, like Chang Chihtung, was one of those rare officials who not only recom­ mended furnishing his men adequate pay, but actually paid them. He demonstrated that he was aware of the fact that the loyalty of semi-personal armies to their leader depends in large measure on their being paid. Nevertheless, he was not noted for that high degree of personal honesty possessed by Chang, so the charges of embezzlement made against him by a censor may have been justified. However, in June 1896, Jung-lu, who had been deputed to investigate the charges and inspect the troops at Hsiao-chan, not only whitewashed his protege, but also praised Yiian's smartly-drilled soldiers.68 That Yiian's prestige was not lowered by the charges made against him is shown by the fact that in July 1897 he was promoted to be provincial judge of Chihli.69 Considering his functions, in the West he would have been appointed to the rank of brigadier general, but in China the prestige of the civil officials and the lack of specialization in the bureaucracy made it both possible and advantageous for him to be ad­ vanced in the civil service although his duties were military. As Yuan arranged for his own recruits, so too he selected the officers for his brigade.70 It is well worth while to list some of the famous early officers of the Newly Created Army. 68 Beresford, The Break-Up of China, p. 272; JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 7b-8; L. F. Lawton and H. Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-kai," Fortnightly Review, old series, vol. 93 (March 1910), p. 425. e 9 PG, 1897, p. 75. The PG gives the date as July 24, 1897. JATTC (ch. 2, p. 8b), which is not always exact as to dates, gives July 25. 70CSS1, vol. i, sect, i, p. 15, sect. 2, p. 3; JATTC, ch. 2, p. 7b; Verbrugge, op.cit., p. 39.

Creation of the New-Style Armies This roster will substantiate the statement that Yiian Shihk'ai was "father of the warlords"; it will indicate the tre­ mendous range of power seized by the Pei-yang clique within one generation; and it will furnish excellent evidence of the militarism into which China was shortly to fall. The officers and their future titles included the following important individuals :71 Yiian Shih-k'ai Chang Hsiin

Chang Huai-chih Ch'en Kuang-yiian Chiang Kuei-t'i

Feng Kuo-chang Ho Tsung-Iien

Hsii Shih-ch'ang Lei Chen-ch'un

Ma Lung-piao

Meng En-yiian T'ien Chung-yii . Ts'ao K'un Tuan Ch'i-jui Tuan Chih-kuei

President of the Republic, 1912-1916 Military governor (or warlord) of Kiangsu and high inspector of the Yangtze provinces Military governor of Shantung Military governor of Kiangsi Commander of the Resolute Army (I-chiin ) and military governor of Jehol Acting president, 1917-1918 Commander of the First Army (Luchun) Division and Lieutenantgovernor of Chahar President, 1918-1922 Military commander of Chiang-pei and commanding general of the Seventh Army Division Commander of the Fifth Army Division and inspector-general of Peking Military governor of Kirin . Military governor of Shantung President, 1923-1924 Provisional chief executive, 19241926 Military governor of Fengtien and minister of war

71 For a list of these famous officers, but without their future titles, see JATTC, ch. 2, p. fa. Wang Shih-chen was not included in the list, but he began his service under Yuan Shih-k'ai at this time (see Who's Who in China, 3 edn., Shanghai, 1926, pp. 824-825).

Creation of the New-Style Armies Wang Chan-yuan

Wang Shih-chen Wang Ying-k'ai Wu Ch'ang-ch'un Wu Feng-ling

Military governor of Hupeh and high inspecting commissioner of Hunan and Hupeh Premier, 1917-1918 Commanding general of the Second Pei-yang Division Commander of the Fifth Pei-yang Division Commanding general of the Fourth Pei-yang Division

There is no more conclusive evidence of the rise of mili­ tarism in China than the fact that from among the officers of Yuan's single original brigade there arose five future presi­ dents or acting chief executives, a premier, and most of the warlords of Northern China. It is difficult to trace the origins of the individual warlords. In a society where family status and "face" were so important many of the senior militarists had no reason to flaunt their genealogy or original occupations. However, a former U.S. Minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, furnishes some interest­ ing data as to the social backgrounds of some of these future warlords. He states that Chang Huai-chih had been a coolie, Feng Kuo-chang a fiddler, Ts'ao K'un a huckster, and Wang Chan-yuan a stable boy, but T'ien Chung-yu came from a middle class family and was reasonably scholarly.72 Another source informs us that Wu Feng-ling was the relative of a wet nurse in Yuan's household.73 I have been unable to verify these data, but it is certain that many of the warlords arose from low estate and were self-made men. Chang Huai-chih, Ma Lung-piao, Meng En-yuan and Ts'ao K'un were promoted from the ranks at a time when enlisted personnel were held in very low regard. Nevertheless the common and disparaging assumption that these warlords were a group of illiterates is not in large part attested by the facts. It is true that Chang 72 An American Diplomat in China, Garden City, N.Y., 1922, p. 262. A. M. Kotenev gives almost the same data, which are apparently based on P. S. Reinsch's work (The Chinese Soldier, Shanghai, 1937, p. 101). 78 CSS, vol. i, sect. 2, p. 3.

Creation of the New-Style Armies Hsiin, Chiang Kuei-t'i, and Lei Chen-ch'un were old-style militarists. Meng En-yiian was an illiterate, while Chang Huai-chih had little or no education. This is probably also the case with Wu Feng-ling. On the other hand, Yiian Shihk'ai and Hsii Shih-ch'ang, who was primarily a civil official, had good classical educations. Also a number of these officers were products of the first of the modern Chinese military schools. Among those who had attended military academies were Ch'en Kuang-yiian, Feng Kuo-chang, Ho Tsung-lien, Ts'ao K'un, Tuan Ch'i-jui, Tuan Chih-kuei, Wang Shihchen, and Wang Ying-k'ai. Most of them had studied at Li Hung-chang's military school at Tientsin.74 One of the most important observations bears not on the literacy of these officers, but rather on the fact that almost half of them were trained in the earliest military schools and in this sense they were a product of the influence of the West, including West­ ern militarism. The development of the Newly Created Army by Yiian Shih-k'ai laid the foundation not only for the Pei-yang Army, but also for the Pei-yang clique of militarists, sometimes known as the Hsiao-chan clique. The Newly Created Army is also sometimes spoken of as the descendant of the Anhwei Army because it inherited from that organization charac­ teristics which tended toward the formation of a personal army.75 Obviously, this German-trained brigade had a number of elements in common with the famous militia armies, as did the Self-strengthening Army of Chang Chih-tung. However, there were several basic differences between the two units. First, the Newly Created Army, with its use of foreign officers 74 See loc.cit.; Who's Who m China, op.cit., pp. 119, 343, 604, 736, 760, 769, 824; H. T. M. Bell and H. G. W. Woodhead, eds., The China Year Book, 1913, London, 1913, p. 543, 1921-22, pp. 880, 942, and 1923, pp. 818, 858, 864; Hsin Chung-kuo jen-wu-chih (Personalities of the New China), compiled by Sonada Ichiki, trans, from the Japanese by Huang Hui-ch'iian and Tiao Ying-hua, Shanghai, 1930, pp. 26-27, 213; Capt. J. H. Reeves, "Notes on the Chinese Revolution of 1911-12," WDGS 1 no. 6790-42, 1912, pp. 116-119. 70 Cf. CSS, vol. i, sect. 1, p. 16; Lo, "Ping wei chiang yu," pp. 249-250.

8l

Creation of the New-Style Armies as instructors rather than as troop commanders, was the one which was to be characteristic of the modernized armies of twentieth-century China. Yiian's brigade was not region­ ally or provincially financed; instead, it was maintained by the Board of Finance,76 and thus lacked the critical factor of financial independence. Furthermore, Yuan was not a great civil official and scholar whose many interests included mili­ tary reform. He had begun his career as an army officer and the manipulation of military power, coupled with administra­ tive ability and political sagacity, would mark his climb to the position of chief of state. Also, this single brigade would develop into an army of six divisions, dominating the na­ tional capital. At its height, the army would serve not only as an example for the modern troops of North China, but would be the principal military factor in the power structure of China. After the death of its leader, the Pei-yang Army would split to form the cadres of the armies of most of the warlords of the northern half of China.

Limited Military Reorganization After the Sino-Japanese War, the Throne sought, with only partial success, to demobilize part of the swollen provincial armies. It was necessary to retain a portion of the men for service during the Mohammedan Rebellion which broke out in Kansu; others were glad to disband, but a minority mutinied or threatened to do so owing to mistreatment or failure to receive their pay. The situation was further com­ plicated because in some provinces officials attempted to pre­ serve favored units at the expense of others.77 The military debacle of the war, exposing as it did the vulnerability of the capital, also led to a reorganization of the troops which defended Peking. This action affected the still active rivalry between the Hunan and Anhwei Armies. Two of the re­ formed armies were linked with the Anhwei clique of Li T6PG,

1896, pp. 133-134; Beresford, op.ext., p. 269. P G , 1896, p. 95 and 1897, p. 55; N C H , July 26, 1895, p. 143, Sept. 20, 1895, p. 464, and Nov. 22, 1895, p. 860. 77See

Creation of the New-Style Armies Hung-chang, while only one belonged to the rival Hunanese faction. General Nieh Shih-ch'eng selected thirty battalions of Li Hung-chang's troops in Chihli to form a unit which was designated the Tenacious Army (Wu-i chiin). General Sung Ch'ing's allied Resolute Army (I-chiln), which had fought against the Japanese, was reinforced. Wei Kuang-tao, who had served under the Hunanese leader Tso Tsung-t'ang in the 1870's and under Liu K'un-i in the Sino-Japanese War, was in command of a sizable body of Hunan troops at Shanhaikuan, Chihli.78 The metropolitan area had become the stronghold of the Anhwei Army after Li Hung-chang became governor-general of Chihli in 1870, and even though Li had suffered a severe loss of prestige from defeat in the war with Japan, the army was able to retain for a few years longer its favored status in the Pei-yang area. Then it was gradually pushed aside by the more modern and influential troops of Ytian Shih-k'ai. In the fall of 1895, Wei Kuang-tao was appointed governor of Shensi and ordered to lead his Hunan troops, some 25,000 in strength, against the growing Mohammedan Rebellion in the Northwest. Yet in May 1896 there were still twenty bat­ talions of Hunanese at Shanhaikuan. The Anhwei and Hunan Armies were not the only militia armies between whom jealousy existed. In Kansu, Wei's Hunanese and the Kansu soldiers of the provincial commander-in-chief, Tung Fuhsiang, clashed so violently that they had to be transferred to opposite ends of the province.79 Following the Sino-Japanese War, the Manchu military and political leader Jung-lu, as president of the Board of War, sought to improve the defenses of Peking. He not only promoted the organization of the Newly Created Army of Yuan Shih-k'ai, but also sponsored the development of the troops of Sung Ch'ing, the Tenacious Army of Nieh Shih7 a N C H , Aug. 9, 189S, P- 221, and Oct. 11, 1895, p. 396; PG, 1896, pp. 109-110, 133; CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 6b. ™PG, 1896, pp. 59, 109; NCH, Oct. n, 1895, p. 596; Dec. 12, 1900, p. 1252.

Creation of the New-Style Armies ch'eng, and the "Kansu Braves" of Tung Fu-hsiang80 Thus Jung-Iu began to replace the Chinese leader Li Hung-chang as the patron of the troops guarding the capital. This is one of the first important indications of reviving Manchu interest in the direct control of military forces, which had long since passed into the hands of the Chinese. Another important element was again added to the struggle for power. Politically, all of these troops and their affiliations were important, but from the standpoint of military modernization only two of them, the troops under Yuan Shih-k'ai and Nieh Shih-ch'eng, were a real improvement over the backward militia armies. When Nieh Shih-ch'eng weeded out and re­ organized thirty battalions of the Anhwei Army, he not only copied the German system of organization, but also employed German instructors to train infantry, cavalry, and artillery units. In theory the force consisted of 15,000 men, but actually the strength was probably closer to 10,000. Nieh also established a military school, where two Germans taught technical subjects and modern languages.81 Nieh's soldiers were superior to the average Chinese troops, but never reached the standards achieved by the divisions of Yiian Shihk'ai and Chang Chih-tung. Considering the intense intellectual activity and increased demands for reform stimulated by China's unexpectedly poor showing in the war, it is surprising that so little was actually accomplished in the field of military modernization. The evidence indicates that noteworthy progress was made only in the province of Chihli and in the jurisdictions of Chang Chih-tung. Even these advances were on a small scale and did not greatly alter the overall military picture. The reason is obvious. The efficiency of the armed forces depended to a large extent on the actions of the senior provincial officials. Exhortations by the Throne to improve the caliber of the troops had little effect unless the officials in the provinces had the desire, the vision, and the funds to carry out the 80

Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. I, p. 406. Ping-chih 3, p. 6b; PG, 1896, pp. 47-48; Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade, 1896, part 2, p. 28. 81 CSK,

Creation of the New-Style Armies reorganization. Furthermore, military modernization was largely limited to those strategic areas which were most vulnerable to attack, and even in frontier and coastal areas danger had to be imminent to arouse the conservatives. Un­ less they were men of unusual vision, the governors-general and governors whose areas were rendered relatively safe by internal location or natural obstacles were willing to let their more exposed colleagues shoulder the heavy financial burden of substantial armaments. Only minor increases in the number of "foreign-drilled" troops or in the use of modern arms took place from 1895 to 1897. This does not mean that there was no improvement, for even a few Tartar-generals appreciated the need for some change if their troops were to have any wartime value. Nevertheless, bows and spears continued to be used in addi­ tion to not only muskets and gingals, but magazine rifles and breechloading cannon. In the same inspection, troops would be tested in markmanship with both rifles and bows.82 The Tartar-general of Heilungkiang reported that the troops under his command had done so well against the Nien-fei and Red Turban bandits that they had made no change in tactics or weapons since that time. He realized that they were therefore worthless in combat. Nevertheless, he maintained that it would be too expensive to arm his whole force with modern rifles and requested permission to manufacture breechloading gingals83 which were probably almost as ex­ pensive as late-model rifles.

Financing the Armed Forces Because monetary considerations played a crucial role in all attempts to reform the armed forces both then and later, it 82For

examples, see PG, 1894, pp. 124 199; 1896, pp. 8-9; 1897, pp.

47-48, 53-54· 88 Ibid., 1896, p. 93. According to regulations, senior provincial officials who desired to purchase military equipment were required to present an annual estimate of anticipated expenses in advance for the Throne's approval. This rule was not always complied with, for permission was sometimes asked to purchase the equipment first and then report the cost to the Throne (ibid., 1896, p. 97).

Creation of the New-Style Armies is worth while to appraise the proportion of official income which was appropriated for military purposes, even though the figures presented must be considered as only rough ap­ proximations. There are no accurate figures available con­ cerning the large sums which were extracted from the Chinese people by various forms of taxation, but it is believed by specialists that the major portion of the funds were retained by the collecting officials to support themselves, their supe­ riors, and their subordinates. There are insufficient data even on the fraction of the revenues which were accountable and for which official reports were rendered. The imperial financial structure was so complex, so permeated with what the modern West would consider to be deplorable corruption, and so unscientific in its accounting methods that the best estimates are only educated guesses. Two of the outstanding authorities on the subject of Chi­ nese finances during the late nineteenth century were George Jamieson and Ε. H. Parker,84 both of whom had studied the subject as members of the British Foreign Service in China. In 1897 Jamieson, after pointing out the inadequacy of the published sources, estimated that the annual reported revenues of China proper were 88,979,000 taels.85 Parker, working independently, calculated that the revenues were 88,495,000 taels or, if Manchuria was included, 92,285,000.88 84H. B. Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, rev. edn., London, 1913, pp. 76-80. 86 This figure is taken from a report prepared by Mr. George Jamieson, the British Consul in Shanghai, in 1897. It was first published in the Miscellaneous Series (no. 415, 1897) of the British Foreign Office under the title, "Revenue and Expenditures of the Chinese Empire." My source is Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 103, no. 2773, July 8, 1897, p. 16. Jamieson's report is a careful but incomplete evaluation, based primarily on translations from the Peking Gazette. 86 Ε. H. Parker, China, Past and Present, New York, ca. 1903, pp. 36, 38. The report of the Board of Revenue for Kuang-hsu, 22nd year (Feb. 13, 1896—Feb. I, 1897), estimated the national revenue at 72,750,000 taels (North China Daily News, March 2, 1897, enclosure to Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 102, no. 2710, March 13, 1897). Parker gives the Board of Revenue report in rounder figures; he believed that there was an error of 10 million taels in reporting the land tax (op.cit., p. 36). If this is correct, then the Board's figure should read 82,750,000 taels.

Creation of the New-Style Armies It can be assumed, again with caution, that roughly 45 million taels,87 or almost 50 per cent of the official revenues, were expended to maintain the military establishment, in­ cluding land forces, naval squadrons, coastal defense forts, and arsenals. The author had no complete breakdown of the expenses of the various elements of the armed forces, but the following figures, a portion of which overlap, will throw at least some light on the situation. Jamieson assumed that ten million taels were expended on the Northern and Southern squadrons, while another eight million were allotted to coastal defense and fortress guns.88 The greatest source of peculation was the provincial forces, and Parker estimated that the local armies, navies, and fortresses absorbed 27,370,000 taels. In fact, he states that local armies consumed at least one half of all the expenses for which he was able to account.89 The Boards of War and Revenue reported that in 1898 the militia, Defense Army, Disciplined Forces, and the new-style troops expended over 20,000,000 taels.90 Ten million taels a year may have been wasted on the Army of the Green Standard (this figure apparently includes the Disciplined Forces). Fairly accurate figures on the expenses of arsenals totaled 3,385,000 taels.91 None of the sources referred to furnished separate figures for the Banner Forces but Parker believed that the Bannermen in Peking, excluding the garrisons in the provinces, must have received four million taels and one million piculs of rice each year.92 The financial specialists who attempt to unravel the threads of the confused skein of Chinese fiscal practices during the 87 This estimate is based on a tabulation of Parker, op.cit., pp. 38, 39; Hirase Minokichi, Kindai Shina keizaishi (Economic History of Modern China), Tokyo, 1942, p. 100. See also an unofficial report from the ver­ nacular press, published in the NCH, May 1, 1901, pp. 859-860. There are some mathematical errors in the later report and since its reliability is uncertain, it has not been cited in the breakdown of military expenses given above. 88 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 103, no. 2773, p. 20. 89 Parker, op.cit., pp. 38, 40. 90 CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 2. sl Ibid., Ping-chih 10, p. 8; Chu Wu 1 op.cit., p. 52; Parker, op.cit., pp. 38, 40. 92 Parker, op.cit., p. 39.

Creation of the New-Style Armies late years of the dynasty have my sincere sympathy. In the West national revenues are remitted to a central treasury and then disbursed. In China, on the other hand, funds col­ lected from certain taxes in the provinces were allotted piece­ meal for specific purposes in the province of their origin, in the capital, or in other provinces. The proceeds from a single tax in one province might be assigned to a number of agencies in widely scattered areas. Prosperous regions were forced the contribute to poorer provinces, but one area might both give and receive assistance. Nine provinces received grantsin-aid, while five both extended and received assistance.93 Since this system was applied to the financing of the armed forces, a few examples should demonstrate the difficulty in­ volved in arriving at an exact evaluation of their cost, especi­ ally since subsidies were subject to change. In 1894 the province of Chekiang, besides financing its own troops, was contributing to the maintenance of the Manchu and Chinese troops in Peking, to the Pei-yang fleet, and to military re­ organization in Manchuria. Chihli, Anhwei, and Fukien were requested to subsidize the forces of Heilungchiang after the Sino-Japanese War. Wealthy Kiangsu helped support the troops in Peking and Manchuria; Hupeh and Kiangsu both helped to preserve Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army; Honan was assessed to pay the allied army of General Sung Ch'ing; and Szechwan gave aid to both Yunnan and Kansu, the latter also being assisted by Kiangsi. Even the funds which the Board of War paid to the Banner troops and new divisions around Peking came from taxes collected by the various provinces. The sources from which revenues to maintain the military establishment were derived were as varied as the areas from which they came. Among others, land, Iikin, salt, and tea taxes were used in part to pay troops. Native customs revenues were employed and official ranks were sold to cover military expenses.94 The Sino-Japanese War had displayed China's true weak93

Morse, op.cit., pp. 78-79. example, see PG, 1894, pp. 19, 58, 79, 89, 95, 125, 146-147, 150, 194; 1895, pp. 77, 132, and 1896, pp. 61-62, 133-134. 94For

Creation of the New-Style Armies ness to all the world, and her rulers encouraged further aggression by their failure to improve basically the defense establishment. Thus in 1898, when a new wave of foreign demands were made on China, the armed forces of the empire were still grossly ineffectual, although they were absorbing approximately one half of all official revenues. This situation, entailing as it did a heavy financial burden without furnish­ ing an adequate defense, was a primary factor in arousing the most progressive elements of the literati to that intense activity which resulted in the Hundred Days of Reform.

CHAPTER 3

THE HUNDRED DAYS AND THE BOXER REBELLION, 1898-1900 The Hundred Days of Reform k T the close of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, urged /¾ on by Germany and leading her more reluctant ally L—France, intervened to force Japan to disgorge the . Λ JL.strategic Liaotung peninsula. The three powers expected a reward for their intervention and the other major states had no desire to see themselves excluded from any concessions which China might be forced to make. In 1896 Russia received permission to extend the Trans-Siberian Railroad across Manchuria. Then in 1898 she extracted from China a twenty-five-year lease on the tip of the Liaotung peninsula. Thus Russia had seized the area which three years previously she had forced Japan to renounce. It was Ger­ many, however, who increased the tempo of forceful inter­ vention and precipitated a scramble for concessions. In March 1898, the Kaiser's government extorted a ninety-nine-year lease on Kiaochow Bay and other concessions in Shantung province. Between 1895 and 1898 France staked out a sphere of influence in South China. Japan received a pledge that the province of Fukien would not be ceded to a third power. Great Britian, who controlled the preponderance of trade in China, had the greatest incentive for preserving the in­ tegrity of the Chinese Empire and the open door for trade, but after the race for concessions began, Great Britain, rather than fight, sought to obtain the lion's share. Besides receiving two coastal leaseholds, she laid claim to the great Yangtze basin as her sphere. Russia, Britain, France, and Germany extended their financial influence by making loans to the Chinese government. The same powers, plus Belgium, obtained extensive railway concessions. Thus, in the spring of 1898 it appeared that the ancient Chinese Empire was

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion disintegrating and might be "sliced up like a melon" by the foreign powers.1 Defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had not aroused a sufficient number of influential Chinese and Manchus to the necessity for change to make effective the demands for mod­ ernization. By 1898, however, the continued incompetence of the regime, coupled with the increasing threat to the very existence of the Chinese state, gave rise to a revolutionary surge of reforming ardor. China's response to the foreign challenge was the "Hundred Days of Reform," that amazing but hopeless burst of activity which ended with the forced retirement of the Emperor, the execution of several of his leading advisers, and a return to conservatism. The ruler under whose auspices the rapid reforms were decreed was Tsai-t'ien, the Kuang-hsii Emperor.2 A sincere person, interested in Western technology and dedicated to the welfare of his people, he was won over to the necessity of reform. Unfortunately both he and his chief adviser of the Hundred Days, K'ang Yu-wei, proved to be impractical and lacking in political acumen. They attempted to force upon China a program which, although intended for the best interests of the nation, lacked the support of either the bu­ reaucracy or the people. The actual Hundred Days of Reform are generally re­ garded as not having begun until June 11, 1898, but since early in the year there had been an increase in memorials and decrees encouraging an improvement in the armed forces. On January 17 an edict had been issued stating that the principal problem of the day was the matter of reform and reorganization of China's defenses, but that there was a shortage of revenues. The Throne complained that, despite numerous recommendations from provincial officials, the empire remained weak. The senior officials had failed to solve the problems of corruption and padded muster-rolls, 1 For a detailed discussion of the scramble for concessions, see Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd edn., ch. 14, and ch. 21 to p. 683. 2 See the biography of the Kuang-hsii Emperor in Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, pp. 731-733·

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion or to demobilize the Army of the Green Standard. The edict then approved plans of the reactionary Chinese Bannerman and Grand Secretary, Hsii T'ung, which proposed that provincial leaders raise local militia and volunteer units of picked men to replace the useless soldiers of the Green Standard. Officers should be chosen for their loyalty, ability, courage, and experience. Then troops from the interior should be transferred to the coast to strengthen defenses. Hsii T'ung also asked that senior officials be permitted to select officers of ability for positions, even though they were of low rank.8 This was the traditional Confucian approach. The emphasis was on the human factors in the military establishment. Certainly, these are factors vital to the creation of an effective army, yet the same demands had been made on many occa­ sions in the past without appreciable results. Only a funda­ mental remolding of Chinese society could bring them to fruition. As for the widespread creation of local militia units, this too was an echo of the past. Unless the whole political and social structure were changed, a new set of military organizations would soon be subject to the same evils that beset the old provincial troops. Furthermore, this plan deemphasized the material aspects of reform, such as the use of modern weapons and tactics, which progressives had stressed for four decades. However, in March, two steps had been taken which were motivated by Western rather than traditional concepts. Jung-lu, Hu Yii-fen, and a censor had all recommended the modernizing of the obsolete military examinations. The Grand Council and the Board of War, who were directed to report on the matter, recommended that candidates be tested in the use of modern weapons and that the examination 3 PG 1898, pp. 4-6; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 33-34. Again 1 on March 7, 1898, the Throne urged the senior provincial officials to hasten the disbandment of unnecessary soldiers (The Emperor Kuang Hsu's Reform Decrees, 1898, reprinted from the North China Daily News, Shanghai, 1900, p. 7; hereafter referred to as Reform Decrees).

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion on the traditional military classics be abolished. On March 19 an edict had ordered that these changes be adopted, be­ ginning in 1900.4 The Manchus were not to be left out of any military reorganization. In March, the Throne had ap­ proved a plan to provide Western-style training to 10,000 selected men of the Divine Mechanism Battalions (shen-chiying), a semi-modern Banner organization formed in 1862. Still the authority of precedent was so strong that in April Prince Ch'ing had been ordered to determine what the policy of the imperial ancestors had been in regard to military reform.5 It was only after the death of the experienced and con­ ciliatory Prince Kung that the Emperor embarked upon a policy of widespread and revolutionary reform. June 11 marked the start of the Hundred Days of Reform; then on June 15 Weng T'ung-ho, the last prudent close adviser to the young Emperor, was dismissed, leaving K'ang Yu-wei and the other ardent revisionists as the principal councillors.® The opposition was temporarily brushed aside, but they were adherents of Realpolitik. Even at the beginning of this period of drastic change, the foundation was already being laid for a resurgence of the conservatives—a resurgence based on the control of military force. On June 15 Jung-Iu was named acting governor-general of the metropolitian province of Chihli and later in the month the appointment was made i PG, 1898 (Jan. 28), p. 9; (Feb. 16), pp. 13-14; (March 19), p. 19. See also the proposal of Wu Ting-fang, Chinese minister to the United States, that all Chinese and Manchu troops be equipped and trained with modern arms (PG [April 14], 1898, p. 22). 5 CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 7; Reform Decrees (March 17, April 14, 1898), pp. 7-8. The Divine Mechanism Battalions were usually referred to as the Peking Field Force. 8 Scholars differ as to whether Weng T'ung-ho's dismissal was the opening gun of an attack by the conservatives, led by the Empress-Dowager, against those who sought drastic change, or the result of the moderate Weng turning against the radical K'ang Yu-wei and his policies. See Ho Ping-ti, "Weng T'ung-ho and the 'One Hundred Days of Reform,' " Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 10 (February 1951), pp. 125, 127-135; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, pp. 860-861; Bland and Backhouse, China under the Empress Dowager, pp. 184-186.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion substantive.7 Thus a loyal servant of the conservative Em­ press-Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, was placed in command of the troops of the Pei-yang area. Furthermore, he was replaced as president of the Board of War by the reactionary Manchu K'ang-i.8 Between June n and September 21 there emanated from the capital a continuous stream of edicts which, had it been possible to carry out, would have reshaped Chinese civiliza­ tion. Urged on by his zealous advisers, the Emperor decreed a program which was broad in scope but not well organized or coordinated. Innovation and modernization was ordered in the fields of education, industry, commerce, agriculture, communications, administration, finance, and defense. It was commanded that a whole system of schools be established. The civil service examinations were modernized and a free press and the translation of Western works were encouraged. Chinese-financed railways were to be promoted, while in­ centives were offered for inventions and for the establishment of schools and arsenals. An annual budget was ordered to improve the chaotic financial system. Numerous sinecure posts were abolished and the number of petty officials re­ duced. It was even proposed that the lethargic, subsidized Bannermen enter a useful occupation.9 In the midst of the Hundred Days of Reform, Chang Chihtung issued his Exhortation to Study (Ch'uan-hsileh p'ten). By imperial order, the manuscript was distributed to top provincial officials. However, the treatise was not a defense of the precipitous innovations of K'ang Yu-wei and his as­ sociates. Rather it was a plea for moderate evolutionary re­ form, predicated on the assumption of required preliminary education. Chang accepted the Confucian culture as basic, but he proposed to borrow the arms and industry of the Occident, and even some of its administrative techniques. 7 PG, 1898, pp. 34, 37. On June 10, 1898, Jung-Iu had been appointed as a grand secretary (ibid., p. 32). 8 Ibid., p. 32. 9 For a detailed discussion of the reforms of the "Hundred Days," see Cameron, op.cit., pp. 35-47.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion However, he loyally supported the Manchu Dynasty and opposed Western political concepts or systems, though he castigated the ignorance, prejudices, and conservatism of the Chinese bureaucracy.10 Surprisingly, the military decrees included among the flood of reform edicts were in large measure a restatement of established policy. Again stress was placed on economy, the need for stamping out corruption, the selection of better personnel, and the revision of the military examinations. Still, indispensability of modern arms was not disregarded. In order to strengthen the industrial system essential to the maintenance of modern armies, the Throne promised honors to those who would establish arsenals and foundries.11 Since the problem of modernizing the military examinations had not been settled by the decree of March 19, some believed that further modifications were necessary. Chang Chih-tung recommended changes intended to improve the status of the military profession. The governor-general of Shensi-Kansu, as well as the governor of Shansi, also proposed revision of the examinations, but no decision was reached prior to the coup d'etat in September.12 The Emperor's demands that the provincial officials dis­ charge useless soldiers in order to economize was met almost universally with polite opposition. In reply, some officials recommended reducing the militia, others the Army of the Green Standard. Some proposed that the new-style units be cut down, while others claimed that they had reduced their troops as far as was reasonably possible and could not de­ mobilize further.13 Apparently, the only thing that they had in common was a desire to protect favored interests. Perhaps the most important military proposal of the period was a scheme calling for a form of universal military training. 10Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, pp. 164-166; see also pp. 166-174. Cf. Reform, Decrees, p. 18; Cameron, op.cit., pp. 41-42. 11See PG (June 11, 1898), pp. 32-33; Reform Decrees (July 7, 1898),

P- 41· 12 PG, 1898, pp. 40-41, 55, 73; Cameron, "Chang Chih-tung," op.cit., p. 201. 13 PG, 1898, p. 43.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion According to this plan, all male inhabitants of each city or district would, in rotation, be given some military training. The men thus trained would act as a nation-wide reserve for the regular forces and would be called out to preserve order or resist aggression. By an edict of September 5, the Emperor sanctioned the plan. Owing to a current rebellion in Kwangsi (and perhaps also the fact that the Emperor's supporters were strongest in southeast China), the program was ordered into effect immediately in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but all provinces were ordered to report on the progress attained within three months.14 No attempt was made to upset the decentralized nature of the Chinese mili­ tary establishment; the scheme was, as usual, to be carried out by the governors-general and governors. Proposals for universal military training were a recurrent feature of the last years of the dynasty, for after 1870 the Chinese as well as other peoples were impressed by the system which had made possible the German victory at Sedan. The SinoJapanese War had furnished another example of the ad­ vantage of a universal draft, but many Chinese officials failed to realize that a system which could be profitably applied to small, rapidly industrializing Japan would not be as appro­ priate for the great masses of agrarian China. Under the Kuang-hsu Emperor, military reform was only one critical aspect of a broad but poorly coordinated program aimed at strengthening and modernizing China. Military reorganization alone was not the complete answer to the defense of the empire, and, although the revolutionary re­ formers of 1898 may not have been practical in terms of contemporary realities, at least they realized that the great power of the Occident was not based on purely military factors.15 u Reform Decrees, p. 32; cf. G. N. Steiger, China and the Occident, New Haven, 1927, pp. 84, 136. 15Cf. Hsieh, The Government of China, p. 344; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 43.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion The Coup d'lLtat In their desire to modernize China, the Emperor and his advisers had acted too drastically, too hastily. Their sweeping modifications had alienated all but the most ardent advocates of change. Even those moderates who recognized the in­ evitability of reform were shocked by the disregard shown for the traditional culture. The success of a reform program depended on the support of the bureaucracy, both civil and military, as well as on the small literati class, yet the edicts of the Hundred Days had threatened the vested interests of these groups. Sinecures had been abolished, powerful con­ servatives had been cashiered, even the sacrosanct privileges of the Manchus had been threatened. Furthermore, the re­ form brought no relief from foreign pressure, for the race for concessions continued. In fact it was even intensified. The opposition turned to the Empress-Dowager, who shrewdly bided her time, waiting for the reformers to place them­ selves in an untenable position.18 The Emperor's supporters were aware of the growing danger and, as the opposition gathered, it became apparent that if the imperial party was to preserve its policies, or even its members, they must act decisively. Thus the reformers sought military support in an attempt to neutralize the Empress-Dowager. All the troops of the metropolitan area were controlled by her faithful lieutenant Jung-lu, so it was neces­ sary to remove him from the scene. There was only one possibility; that lay in the efficient brigade commanded by the wily Yiian Shih-k'ai. He not only commanded the best troops available, but also in 1895 he had belonged to the reform society and was believed to be an advocate of moderate progress. Hence, Yuan was selected as the agent for a coup d'itat to forestall the conservatives. On September 16 the Emperor promoted him to the rank of expectant vice-presi16 Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 32-33; Bland and Backhouse, op.cit., pp. 180-181; PG, 1898, p. 79; Steiger, op.cit., p. 84; NCH, May 14, 1902, p. 936.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion dent of one of the Six Boards and gave him sole responsibility for training troops.17 The reformers should never have placed their trust in Yiian Shih-k'ai for the majority opinion main­ tains that he betrayed their plans to his patron Jung-lu.18 Forewarned, the Empress-Dowager moved swiftly; in a countercoup, the Emperor was seized and forced into retire­ ment within the Winter Palace. On September 21, 1898, for the third time since 1861, Tz'u-hsi seized the reins of government. Thus ended the sincere but ill-fated Hundred Days of Reform. K'ang Yu-wei escaped, but six of the lead­ ing reformers became martyrs to their cause. There followed a period of reaction and return to "normalcy" which ended only with the Boxer Rebellion.

Political Reaction but Military Progress After the coup d'etat, the Empress-Dowager revoked the great majority of the reform decrees, while paying lip service to the ideal of progress. Little remained of her nephew's flood of edicts or the principles which motivated them, except for an even greater interest in military developments. In fact, the period of reaction leading up to the Boxer Rebellion 17 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 426, p. 1; Bland and Backhouse, op.cit., p. 202; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 47. 18Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 115, no. 817, p. 3. Conger to Hay, Nov. 15, 1901; "Yuan-Shi-Kai: His Enemies," The Outlook, vol. 91 (Jan. 16, 1909), p. 93; Lawton and Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan ShihKai," op.cit., p. 421; Hummel, op.cit., vol. 2, p. 951; A. N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution, p. 101; NCH, Sept. 19, 1900, pp. 614-615; Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (A Political His­ tory of China during the Last Hundred Years), vol. 1, pp. 185-186. Yuan Shih-k'ai admitted that he had informed Jung-lu of the plot on the morning of the coup d'etat, but stated that he had done so to save the Emperor. It was further maintained that Jung-lu did not go to Peking until four days later. See the alleged "Diary of Yuan Shih K'ai" trans­ lated by Kenneth Ch'en in Pacific Historical Review, vol. 6 (June 1937), pp. 182-186. This diary may have been written by Yiian, but it is dated seven days after the coup and has the characteristics of an ex post facto attempt to avoid responsibility for the Emperor's plight, while seeking the gratitude of the Empress-Dowager and Jung-lu. See also The Times (London), Nov. 21, 1911.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion was to be marked by increased military activity and a stiffen­ ing attitude toward foreign penetration.19 The extensive reforms sponsored by the Emperor and his advisers had been one form of response to Western penetra­ tion. They had sought, under unfavorable circumstances, to adopt the method employed by Japan: namely, to strengthen the nation by imitating the West on a wide scale. This at­ tempt had failed. The solution accepted by the conservatives under Tz'u-hsi was a reversion in that it sought to safeguard the empire by again stressing a military answer to the prob­ lems raised by foreign impact. Yet the military program, as well as the political policy, of Tz'u-hsi was dualistic in nature. One object was national defense, but it is obvious that she also sought to maintain the Manchu Dynasty and to increase her own power. Nor was this the only twofold feature of her policy; she retained the decentralized nature of the political and military system,20 yet she also increased the forces under Manchu command. Furthermore, although the official policy was one of non­ discrimination, there was a noticeable tendency to substitute Manchus for Chinese in influential posts. Militarily, emphasis was placed on improving the defenses of the most vulnerable areas: Northeast China, the coastal provinces, and the Yangtze Valley. As far as it went, the policy was strategically sound, but the defense of the capital claimed the greatest attention,21 for it had political as well as military value. Tz'u-hsi's own concept of military affairs and that of her councillors as expressed in her decrees was in general more traditional than that current during the Hundred Days of Reform. It is true that Western drill and modern arms were promoted, but the vital supporting factors, such as industriali­ zation, were largely neglected. Although imperial officials 19 Reform Decrees (Sept. 26, 1898), pp. 45-46; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 53-54; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 89-92, 107. 20 Times (London), April 22, May 10, 1899; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 93, 99. lsl BPP, China No. I (1900), no. 159, p. 129, Bax-Ironside to Salisbury, April 17, 1899; Cameron, op.cit., p. 30; CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. 7.7b; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 100-102.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion were ordered to discharge useless personnel, the old, complex military structure was retained, while more modern organi­ zations were ordered to be formed alongside antiquated units. Yet, at the same time, the Throne complained of the expenses involved and urged economy.22 China could not afford both the old and the new armies, but the internal situation preserved the former, while foreign pressure necessitated the latter. The Empress-Dowager did not possess great breadth of vision, but she was a practical politician. Following the coup d'itat, she sought to win public support and loyalty from the armed forces. In part, her benevolent edicts may have been only the expected expression of a Confucian ruler's interest in the welfare of the people, but certainly she sought to gain approval for her usurpation of authority. On September 29 largess was distributed among the troops of Yiian Shih-k'ai, Nieh Shih-ch'eng, and Tung Fu-hsiang. It was not stated that this was a reward for service to the conservative party,23 but it was the support of the troops of Chihli which had made the coup possible. An important early manifestation of the dual objectives of the Empress-Dowager's military policy was the reorganiza­ tion, under a Manchu, of the troops guarding the metro­ politan province. Only a week after the forced seclusion of the Emperor, Jung-Iu was relieved as governor-general of Chihli and appointed to the Grand Council, but a precedent-shatter­ ing edict directed that he was to retain control over the military forces of the Pei-yang administration. The new governor-general, also a Manchu, was merely to assist him in their management. On the following day (September 29, ϊ898) Jung-Iu was named concurrently controller of the Board of War, but he still preserved his hold over the Peiyang armies. Then on October 11 he was appointed as an imperial commissioner and given sole command of the troops of Sung Ch'ing, Yiian Shih-k'ai, Nieh Shih-ch'eng, and 22 The statement is based on an analysis of the PG for Sept.-Dec. 1898 and all of 1899. 2 3 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 427, pp. 7-7b; see also Reform Decrees, pp. 51, 56,

57·

IOO

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion Tung Fu-hsiang.24 Thus, the soldiers garrisoning the capital area were placed under a Manchu who could be expected both to support the Empress-Dowager and to improve somewhat the quality of his troops. Although the supervision of the forces of the Pei-yang area had been centralized in the capital, Tz'u-hsi was a realist and did not attempt to disrupt the decentralized military power structure in the other provinces. The Empress-Dowager, like the Emperor, had become impressed with the economy and supposed value for China of a nation-wide system of trained volunteer citizen soldiers to act as a reserve for the regular service. Therefore, on November 5 and again at the end of December, she ordered the provincial leaders to encourage such organizations, as well as to establish reserve granaries. Local militia had had a long history in China, and it is apparent that a modernized version of this institution had an appeal to progressives and conservatives alike, for again in March 1899 Tz'u-hsi urged the organization of volunteer units.25 Another time-honored practice renewed by the Em­ press-Dowager was encouragement of robbers and bandits to give up their careers of crime and enlist in the armed serv­ ices.28 Such a policy could hardly be expected to raise the low prestige of the armed forces, but it had the advantage that it was cheaper to enlist bandits in the armies than to attempt to crush them. Tz'u-hsi's attitude toward technical training was formed by an interesting combination of motivations. On November i, 1898, the ancient military examinations, including archery, swordsmanship, and weight-lifting, were reestablished, the excuse being the obviously pertinent one that these tests were a formality. At the same time, she directed that the holders of the two lowest military degrees who had not already joined the provincial forces be sent to the foreign-style military academies, which were to be established in the provinces. Also, all military degree-holders were required to learn to 24

CSL, ch. 427, pp. 4b, 8, 11b. 1898, pp. 99, 113; 1899, p. 17; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 103-105, 136. 2 e Reform Decrees, p. 54; PG, 1898, p. 96. 2 5 PG,

IOl

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion employ firearms as well as bows and swords. Furthermore, Tz'u-hsi refused a request of the Board of Rites to stop the teaching of such technical subjects as mathematics, geog­ raphy, and military science in the provincial colleges and new-style schools.27 In conjunction with the series of edicts exhorting the provincial bureaucracy to improve their troops, K'ang-i, the president of the Board of War, was sent in the spring of 1899 on a tour of inspection. His principal objectives were to strengthen the defenses of the important provinces of Kiangsu and Kwangtung, as well as to increase the imperial revenues. From a financial standpoint at least, he achieved considerable success, for he was described in the foreign press as the "Imperial High Extortioner."28 Despite the verbiage expended to encourage defensive preparations, the results were rather meager, except in the area around the capital. In Chihli, Jung-Iu who realized the relationship between political and military power, sought to improve the efficiency and weapons of the troops under his command. He proposed that the four "armies" under his control be reorganized as an army corps, known as the Guards Army (Wu-wei chiin). The corps was to consist of five divisions (literally, armies), designated Left, Right, Front, Rear, and Center Divisions. In a decree which stressed 27 Reform Decrees (Nov. 1, 1898), p. 55; PG (Nov. 13), 1898, p. 103. See also PG (Jan. 10), 1899, p. 3. 2 a BPP, China No. 1 (1900), no. 292, p. 257, Bax-Ironside to Salisbury, July 10, 1899; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 123-124. In November 1899, the U.S. Minister to China reported that it was "authoritatively stated" that a board had been established to reorganize the Chinese army and that an imperial force of 200,000 men was to be proposed. The army was to be equipped with modern arms, trained by foreign officers, and controlled by Peking. It was hoped by the Chinese that the new unified army could be financed by loans (Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 107, no. 274, Conger to Hay, Nov. 22, 1899). In May 1899 it had been reported that Herr von Hanneken had again arrived in Peking with the objective of proposing a reorganization of China's armies (Times [London], May 27, 1899). The ambitious plan to create a centralized imperial army, if it was ever considered seriously, was never carried out. Perhaps, it was impossible to obtain a foreign loan for such a purpose; certainly, it would have met stubborn opposition from the provincial officials.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion the vital importance of military training, the Empress-Dowa­ ger commended and approved Jung-lu's plans, including the formation of the new Center Division. The edict also directed that the 30,000 other troops in the Pei-yang area should be strictly drilled.29 The Center Division, under the direct command of Jung-lu, was to be newly organized primarily from Bannermen. After its formation, this unit was stationed at Nan-yuan, south of Peking, and although its authorized strength was 10,000, its actual numbers were probably considerably less. The Front Division, the old Tenacious Army of Nieh Shih-ch'eng, was stationed at Lu-t'ai near Tientsin. Late in 1898 it consisted of about 13,000 men, some of whom had been trained by German instructors, who had since been replaced by five Russians. The division was well equipped with Mauser rifles, Maxim machine guns, and various types of artillery, but its discipline was poor. The Left Division had long been the Resolute Army of Sung Ch'ing, who was still in command. The unit was supposed to consist of 20,000 men, but in actuality it could probably muster only some 10,000. The weapons of the division were similar to those of the Front Division. The Rear Division commanded by Tung Fu-hsiang, had formerly been called the "Kansu Braves." This unit was a disorderly rabble of about 10,000 men, most of whom were Moham­ medans. They were poorly armed and trained, but were potentially good fighters. The Right Division stationed at Hsiao-chan was Yuan Shih-k'ai's redesignated Newly Cre­ ated Army, by far the best organization in the Guards Army.80 In general, the organization and supply structure of the Guards Army followed that of Yiian's division, which in turn 2 9 PG (Dec. 7) 1898, p. 109; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, p. 38. The other Pei-yang troops besides those in the Guards Army were reported to include 12,000 men of the Anhwei Army and 19,000 soldiers of the De­ fense Army and Disciplined Forces (CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 7). s o CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 7; Beresford, The Break-Up of China, pp. 270275; CSS, vol. i, sect. 1, p. 38; PG, 1898, p. 102; BPP, China No. 1 (1899), no. 421, p. 322, MacDonald to Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1898; Hummel, op.cit., vol. i, p. 406.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion had been based on the German system, but some modifications were made. It was planned that each of the five divisions should consist of eight battalions (ying)—five of infantry, plus one each of cavalry, artillery, and engineers; in addition there was to be a training battalion attached to every division. Each battalion was to have four companies (tui) of 250 men, but it was reported that only Yiian Shih-k'ai's Right Division and Jung-lu's Center Division complied with the table of organization. For the most part, the other units preserved their old structure. Since the existing weapons and ordnance materiel of the new army were insufficient, the Kiangnan arsenal was ordered to issue to it 3,000 magazine rifles and some quick-firing guns.31 An indication of the prestige and influence of Jung-Iu and his army was the fact that upon his request the Throne ordered a large number of Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol senior officers to the new army. Some of the officers were shifted from distant provinces and at least two were pro­ moted several grades in rank upon being transferred. Among the officers attached to the army was the German-trained Manchu Yin-ch'ang, who was later to serve as Minister of War.82 The Guards Army, or Grand Army of the North, as it was frequently called in Western sources, was not only a cen­ tralized corps especially established to defend the capital and the Empress-Dowager, but also unlike the provincial armies, was financed by the Board of Revenue. The other divisions were already maintained by the Board and an annual sum of 400,000 taels was appropriated for the new Center Division. If available funds were insufficient, Jung-Iu was authorized to divert funds temporarily from the provincial contributions to the Foochow arsenal.38 3 1 CSS, vol. i, sect, x, p. 38; CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 7. It is doubtful that any of these units were organized in exact compliance with the tables of organization. s 2 PG, 1898, pp. 109, 112, and 1899, pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 24, 31; BPP, China No. I (1900), no. 21, p. 15, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 20, 1898. s s Reform Decrees (Dec. 7, 1898), p. 59; Beresford, op.cit., p. 269;

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion The evidence indicates that during late 1898 and through­ out 1899 there took place in the empire widespread, but fairly small-scale reorganization and semi-modernization of pro­ vincial units. As was to be expected, the great majority of reports came from the provinces surrounding Peking, from Manchuria, and from the coastal and riparian areas,84 which were most vulnerable to attack. However, many of the memorials presented to the Throne must have exaggerated military progress. This is certainly true if the inspection reports concerning the units of the Guards Army are typical.85

Military Potential on the Eve of the Boxer Rebellion In the fall of 1898, Rear Admiral Lord Charles Beresford visited China and inspected all but three of the "so-called armies." It was his opinion that by Western standards Yuan Shih-k'ai's troops were the only completely equipped force in the empire. Otherwise, he found that the Chinese armies were in many cases poorly led, in most cases badly paid, and with few exceptions lacking in discipline and training. Even where equipment was fairly good, its value was frequently lost through inadequate training. Beresford counted fourteen types of rifles in the ranks, varying from repeating Winchesters and Mausers to muzzle-loading gingals. Even this strange assortment was seldom fired, for, with the exception of Yuan Shih-k'ai's troops, the armies had little or no target practice. Still, Beresford spoke favorably of the individual Chinese and felt that, well-led, trained, paid, and equipped, he would make a "splendid" soldier. It was also Beresford's opinion that without levying further taxes China could possess a real army of between two and three hundred thousand men, if BPP, China No. ι (1900), no. 21, p. 14, MacDonald to Salisbury, Dec. 20, 1898. See also PG, 1896, pp. 133-134. 8 4 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. 6b-7b. 35 Cf. PG, 1898, p. 102, 1899, pp. 18, 23, with Beresford, op.cit., pp. 273-274. See also Times (London), April 22, 1899.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion the funds allotted to the armed services were properly spent.86 Major Baron von Reitzingen, who for several years had been an instructor for the Chinese armies, made a number of justified criticisms of the armed forces of China. In 1899 he pointed to the weakness of leadership, the lack of unified com­ mand, the failure to standardize weapons, the non-existence of an effective logistical system, and the negligence shown in materiel maintenance. The major also noted the inability of officers to employ combined arms effectively. To these im­ perfections were added the long-standing complaints against corruption, favoritism, padded pay-rolls, and inadequate pay.87 Both Admiral Beresford and Major von Reitzingen were critical of China's attempt to rebuild a modern navy at the expense of army reform. Both recognized that the naval personnel were better trained than those of the land forces, but they believed China had more need for modern soldiers than for warships.88 Moreover, during late 1898 and 1899 86 Beresford, op.cit., pp. 4-5, 270-280, 282-283. While in China, Lord Beresford "unofficially" proposed to the Tsungli Yamen and to the majority of the governors-general that, to preserve her integrity and to preserve foreign investments, China should reorganize her armed forces as a modern, unified army. He signified that if approached the British government might be willing to furnish instructors for the new army. Despite some alleged approval, the plan was not adopted. It appears that in some cases Beresford was misled by Chinese politeness, while some of the Chinese officials took advantage of the proposal to attempt to play Britain off against Russia (see ibid., pp. 3-12, 21, 97-98, 108-110, 157-160, 161-162, 163, 174-176, 262-263; Hsii T'ung-hsin, Chang Wen-hsiang-kung nien-p'u (Chronological Biography of Chang Wen-hsiang-kung [Chang Chih-tung], Chungking, 1944, p. 118). It is doubtful that Lord Beresford's mission was purely unofficial. The British Foreign Office had previously stated that Britain sympathized with China's desire to reform the armed services and that if there was reasonable hope for success Britain would be willing to aid them (BPP, China No. 1 [1898], no. 148, p. 62, Salisbury to MacDonald, April 4, 1898). 37 Major Baron von Reitzingen, "The Chinese Army," Times (London), Sept. 2i, 1899. The article is a translation of portions of an article which appeared in the Wissenschaftliche Mittheilungen of Berlin, Sept. 20, 1899. Von Reitzingen makes some accurate observations concerning the Chinese armies, but he is overly critical. isIbid.; Beresford, op.cit., p. 285. It should be pointed out that Beres­ ford's preference for army rather than navy reform was influenced by his belief that the first mission of China's armed forces should be to

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion the Chinese terminated the contracts of a number of foreign instructors before China herself had sufficient trained officers to replace them.39 This was another handicap, but it can be explained in terms of Chinese pride and growing antiforeignism. As to the number of combat troops available to defend China on the eve of the Boxer Rebellion, estimates vary widely, even if the soldiers of the Banners and the Green Standard are eliminated as being troops in name only. Beresford summed up the situation when he stated: "No one knows the real strength of the Chinese armies, not even the Chinese Government itself."40 In 1898 the Boards of War and Revenue estimated that the strength of the Disciplined Forces, Defense Army, and new-style troops (Hsin-chun) totaled about 360,000.41 It was unofficially reported that the Russian General Staff calculated China's field forces at only 205,000, while the figure for "troops" of all kinds, including Bannermen, the Army of the Green Standard, guards, gen­ darmes, etc., was set at 1,752,000.42 However, as in the past, China would prove incapable of mobilizing more than a frac­ tion of her armed forces in the zone of operations; hence, data concerning the troops actually available to defend the capital are more appropriate than nation-wide calculations. According to figures furnished by Ε. H. Parker, the soldiers in Chihli as of late May 1900 totaled somewhere between 125,000 and 130,000 men, but these included Yiian Shihk'ai's troops, the best in China, most of whom were in Shantung.43 The London Times reported that the regular "provide . . . security for trade and commerce." Fpr a brief discussion and analysis of the Chinese navy as of 1898, see Beresford1 op.cit., pp. 284-286. 89 Gadoffre, "Vallee du Yang-Tse," Revue des troupes coloniales, 2nd year, vol. 1 (January-June 1903), p. 4; NCH, July 11, 1900, p. 57. 40 Beresford, op.cit., p. 268. 4 1 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. lb-2. i 2 Times (London), July 4, 1900. 48 Ε. H. Parker, China, Her History, Diplomacy and Commerce, Lon­ don, 1901, pp. 253-254. In July 1900 Parker estimated that the Chinese troops mobilized against the allies in Chihli, excluding Boxers and secret

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion troops in Chihli numbered 110,000, but that the empire might be able to concentrate some 140,000 men in front of Peking.44 To support her armies, China still had only seven plants which could be classed as arsenals, plus several smaller works. Yet a qualified foreign observer was of the opinion that the Kiangnan (Shanghai) arsenal alone, if efficiently operated and financed, was capable of equipping an army of 200,000 men. The institution included rifle, cartridge, and powder factories, and its modern British equipment was capable of producing guns up to 12-inch fifty-ton rifles. The other arsenals were lesser plants, but most of them had first-class foreign machinery. The management of the arsenals was, however, extremely uneconomical, and in some cases anti­ quated weapons were still being produced with tools which were capable of manufacturing the most modern ordnance materiel. Like most of the armies of China, these factories were under the jurisdiction of the governors-general, Tartargenerals, and governors rather than the central government.45 Furthermore, the Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Foochow, and Canton arsenals were so close to the coast that they were vulnerable to seaborne attack. In spite of her own arms production, China continued to import foreign arms. The very incomplete figures available indicate that the importation of munitions of war decreased materially from 1895 (the last year of the Sino-Japanese War) to 1897. Then the emphasis placed on military matters after the coup of 1898 is clearly reflected. Total imports of ordnance materiel for Tientsin, Hankow, Foochow, and Canton, including imports from other Chinese ports, show only a slight increase for 1898 over 1897, but the arms im­ ports for 1899 more than tripled the figures for 1898. The society members, would not exceed 100,000 men. See Times (London), July 25, 1900, July 28, 1900. ii Times (London), July 19, 1900. 45 Beresford, op.cit., pp. 292-303; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, vol. 1, p. 306, and vol. 2, p. 519; BPP, China No. 1 {1899), end. to no. 53, p. 54, report of Col. Browne, Military Attache; NCH, Oct. 23, 1901, p. 775.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion steadily rising figures for Hankow marked the expansion of the forces in Chang Chih-tung's governor-generalship, but the most striking increase was at Tientsin. There a more than eightfold expansion between 1898 and 1899 indicated the growth and reequipping of the Guards Army and other troops of the Pei-yang area. Then, in 1900, the influx of arms was reduced by almost one-half, a decrease which can be accounted for in large part by the allied seizure of Tientsin's port during the Boxer Rebellion, for the importation of arms into Tientsin fell by over 90 per cent.4® The corruption and inefficiency of the ordnance plants was not always rectified by expensive purchases of arms abroad. Large numbers of rejected and even condemned weapons were sold to Chinese officials by agents of foreign firms, but the dishonesty involved in the transactions was not limited to either party. Exorbitant profits were made possible by extrav­ agant gifts and commissions.47

The Boxer Rebellion Considering the foreign scramble for concessions, the im­ possible desire of the conservatives to return to the old order, and the emphasis on military expansion, it is not surprising that the Chinese court should become involved in a clash with the foreign powers. Anti-foreignism had been gradually de­ veloping in China and it increased in intensity following the 4eImperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1895-1900, part 2, table 3, by ports. The specific figures in Haikuan taels upon which the above analysis was based are as follows: 3,855,811 1895 1896 1,251,725 1897 268,355

Port

Tientsin Hankow Foochow Canton Totals 47 Chester

1897

X9I.376 70,111 4,328 2,540 268,355

1898 77,629 107,589

49,582 46,667 281,467

1899 672,452 138,265 64,428 12,431 887,576

1900

56,235 224,637 38,086 128,812

447,770

Holcombe, The Real Chinese Question, pp. 134-135; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 159.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion Sino-Japanese War. The impact of the West had complicated such native problems as the degeneration of the dynasty, the increase in population, and the corresponding decline in the standard of living. Occidental commerce had destroyed China's favorable balance of trade. Then in the last decades of the century there had been added to the invasion of com­ merce and consuls the infiltration of disruptive Western ideas. Reform made necessary by the penetration of the foreign powers threatened vested interests and treasured customs. Western imperialism aroused many against its propagators. The deep superstition of the people was aroused by the, to them, heterodox beliefs of the Christian mission­ aries and their converts. The most serious of the anti-foreign movements arose in Shantung, where a mystic society known as the Boxers {I-ho ch'uan) created anti-Christian and anti-foreign disturbances. The results might not have been serious had not this growing movement been patronized first by obscurantist local officials, and then by a reactionary clique at the court, a clique who gained control of the central government. It was their ultimate sponsorship of the move­ ment, plus the foreign decision to use force to safeguard their privileges and diplomats in Chihli, which led to that war be­ tween China and the allied powers known as the Boxer Rebellion.48 From the standpoint of the power structure of China, the Boxer Rebellion presented a striking example of the high degree of autonomy possessed by the governors-general and governors. Late in 1899, the Tsungli Yamen or foreign office informed the heads of the coastal and riparian provinces that they were authorized to resist aggression by force or even to declare a state of war without first seeking permission from 48 For a standard work on the Boxer Rebellion sympathetic to the Chinese case, see Steiger, op.cit., passim, especially ch. 8. R. B. Sheeks has produced considerable, but not conclusive, evidence that at least up to 1899 the Boxers were not an authorized militia (t'uan), but a secret society supported by officials in Shantung ("A Re-examination of the I-ho ch'uan and Its Role in the Boxer Movement," Papers on China, vol. I [1947]. PP- 85-93)·

IlO

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion the Throne.49 Yet, an edict of November 21, 1899, had directed the senior civil and military officials throughout the empire to cooperate in case of hostilities.50 The serious need for such an order was noted in the Tsungli Yamen's dispatch mentioned above. The communication pointed out that the provincial officials had a pernicious habit of considering that their responsibilities for defense were coterminous with their areas of jurisdiction and hence ignored attacks on neighbor­ ing provinces. Furthermore, although provincial troops were subject to duty anywhere in the empire, if military forces from one province were ordered to another for service, both provinces might refuse to take responsibility for the pay of the men. The result was that the soldiers sometimes mutinied or turned to banditry,51 thus becoming as great a curse as the enemy. The ultimate test of the autonomy of the provincial leaders came, however, with the outbreak of hostilities in June 1900. Late in May, owing to reports of Boxer outbreaks, the diplomatic corps in Peking requested that foreign guards be sent to the capital and the first detachments arrived on May 31. Further incidents and alarming rumors led to the decision on June 9 to request reinforcements. On the next day an international expedition under the British Vice Admiral Sey­ mour departed from Tientsin. The force, which ultimately consisted of about 2,300 men, was delayed en route by Boxer attacks, but its greatest handicap was the destruction by the Chinese of sections of the railway. Skirmishes with the Boxers also took place outside the legations in the capital. Because of the cutting of telegraphic communications with both the legations and Seymour's column, as well as reports of Chinese troop concentrations, the foreign admirals off Taku, with the American admiral abstaining, felt called upon 49Fi?, 1900, p. 85; NCH Dec. 27, 1899, p. 1289. This dispatch is quoted 1 in Steiger, op.cit., pp. 119-120; see also pp. 117-119. 50 FR, 1900, p. 85; for a summary of this decree, see Hsu, op.cit., p. 130. 51 Col. C. de Grandprey, Les armees de la Chine, extract from Revue de Paris (March 15, 1904), Paris, 1904, pp. 15, 21; Chester Holcombe, op.cit., pp. 129-130.

Ul

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion to take action. As a matter of military expediency, the naval commanders demanded the surrender of the forts at Taku in order to guard the line of communications to Tientsin. About one hour before the ultimatum expired on June 17, the Chinese forts opened fire, but were seized after a six-and-ahalf hour battle. Following this event, Chinese troops were thrown into action against the foreigners. Tientsin was at­ tacked on the 17th. On June 20 a siege of the legations began, and continued with varying degrees of intensity until August 14. The reactionary clique who had seized control of the government had rashly declared war on most of the world and in this decision they apparently had the support of the Empress-Dowager.52 Some of the obscurantists at court may have believed in the magical powers of the Boxers and the ability of China to fight the world, but this view was not shared by the more enlightened provincial leaders of Central and Southern China. After the outbreak of hostilities, they demonstrated an amaz­ ing degree of autonomy. Loyal to the Empress-Dowager, yet aware of the futility of militant anti-foreignism, they steered a middle course. Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, followed by Yiian Shih-k'ai (then governor of Shantung) and the southern governors-general, reached a tacit agreement with the allies, which in actuality neutralized South and Central China. As a result military operations were largely limited to to Chihli and Shansi. These high officials took the attitude that the reactionary Prince Tuan and the Boxers were rebels against the Throne. They guaranteed the protection of peace and order in their areas, but in return they requested the allies not to land troops in their provinces and to assure the safety of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager.53 It was largely 52 For a detailed description of these events, see BPP, China No. 3 (1900), pp. 1-67; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 18921901, vol. 2, pp. 513-514; A. H. Smith, China in Convulsion, New York, 1901, vol. 2, pp. 512-522; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 201-234. For the strength of the Seymour expedition, see BPP, China No. 3 (1900), nos. 113 (p. 52), 115 (p. 52), 124 (pp. 54-55). 53 BPP, China No. 3 {1900), nos. 153, 225, 226, 240; China No. 1 {1901), nos. i, 5, 8, 30, 71, 81, 101, 177, 197, 217, 222; China No. 5 {1901),

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion the action of these officials which permitted the rationalization that the campaign of 1900 was a rebellion rather than an international war. Nevertheless, the provincial leaders were not so inde­ pendent that they could completely disregard the Throne's request for aid. Both out of loyalty and as a safeguard should the Manchus retain the throne, they sent troops north to protect the Empress-Dowager, but in general the soldiers were apparently either recruits or incompetent provincial troops. Furthermore, many of them were sent so late that their only mission was to help establish order in Chihli after the fall of Peking.64 Thus in 1900, as in 1894-1895, it was not China that was to be defeated by the foreign foe; it was again essentially the troops of the metropolitan province of Chihli. On June 18 Admiral Seymour's column was struck by Tung Fu-hsiang's Kansu troops. Then, attacked by both regulars and Boxers, without communications, low on sup­ plies, and burdened by the wounded, the expedition was forced to turn about and fight its way back to Tientsin. Twice they beat off heavy attacks by General Nieh Shih-ch'eng's Front Division. Unable to push on, they were finally rescued by a force from Tientsin and arrived back in the city on June 26, after suffering 300 casualties.55 The retreat of the Seymour expedition temporarily dis­ pelled the popular myth that a small body of modern foreign troops could march from one end of China to the other no. 115; Cameron, "Chang Chih-tung," op.cit., pp. 202-204; JATTC, ch. 2, pp. i6-i6b. s i JATTC, ch. 2, pp. isb-16; Cameron, "Chang Chih-tung," op.cit., pp. 202-203; BPP, China No. 1 (1901), no. 112, p. 49, Warren to Salis­ bury Aug. 5, 1900; ibid., no. 390, pp. 189-190, Carles to Salisbury, Aug. 15, 1900. 65 For three first-hand accounts of the Seymour expedition, see Admiral of the Fleet Sir Ε. H. Seymour, My Naval Career and Travels, London, 1911, pp. 342-354; Capt. J. K. Taussig, U.S.N., "Experiences during the Boxer Rebellion," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 53 (April 1927), pp. 403-420; Clive Bigham, A Year in China, 1899-1900, London, 1901, pp. 168-189.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion without meeting effective resistance. In fact, after the return of Admiral Seymour, official estimates of the forces needed to advance on Peking and maintain lines of communication were increased from 25,000 to from 40,000 to 100,000 men.68 While awaiting reinforcements the allies were first forced to defend the foreign concessions in Tientsin against infantry attacks, as well as heavy and accurate artillery fire. Then the foreign troops took the offensive and in stiff fighting captured the native city of Tientsin. It was during this period that China suffered the destruction of the Tientsin arsenal and the military preparatory school which had been established by Li Hung-chang. During the fighting around Tientsin, men from two divisions of the new Guards Army were em­ ployed. These were the troops of Generals Ma Yii-k'un and Nieh Shih-ch'eng. Also present were a number of soldiers from the old Anhwei Army.67 Because of the danger to the Peking legations involved in any further delay, the foreign generals were unable to await the arrival of what some considered to be necessary reinforce­ ments. On August 4, 1900, an allied relief expedition of between 18,000 and 19,000 men advanced toward the capital. The Chinese were well entrenched at Pei-tsang and their positions had been further strengthened by water barriers caused by flooding, yet they failed to present as determined a resistance as they had at Tientsin. A second line of fortifica­ tions was thrown up at Yang-ts'un, but the allies carried it by storm on August 6. By this time, the morale of the Chinese troops was breaking. T'ung-chou was evacuated without a fight and even the mighty walls of Peking were not utilized for a stiff defense. On August 14, the relief expedition 66 War Department, "Military Operations in China," Annual Reports, 1900, Washington, 1900, part 7, pp. 5-6; BPP, China No. 3 (/900), no. 253, P- 98, Dorward to Sec. State for War, July 4, 1900, and no. 254, p. 99, Seymour to Admiralty, July 2, 1900; General H. Frey, Frangais et allies au Pe-tchi-li, Paris, 1904, p. 135; Smith, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 443-444; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 252-253. 57 See A. A. S. Barnes, On Active Service with the Chinese Regiment, London, 1902, pp. 31-86; BPP, China No. 1 (/901), no. 257, p. 114, Carles to Salisbury, July 17, 1900.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion breached the capital's fortifications, thus raising the siege of the legations. After the fall of Peking, the allies launched "mop-up" campaigns to crush resistance, reestablish order, and assure the acceptance of their demands. In the process, the Germans were particularly vigorous in seeking revenge.58 As the allies entered Peking, the court fled toward Sian in Shensi and the Chinese armies partially dispersed. Li Hung-chang, who had been recalled from Canton to negotiate with the foreign powers, ordered the government troops not to resist further. This action prevented more bloodshed and preserved a larger number of Chinese troops than would otherwise have been the case/69 The failure of the Chinese to destroy the legations during the siege presents an interesting problem, for it is the con­ sensus that the Chinese forces in Peking were potentially capable of seizing the legation quarter. The answer may be in part a military one. Units of the Guards Army, as well as Boxers, were involved in both areas, but the divisions led by Generals Nieh and Ma at Tientsin were superior to those of Tung Fu-hsiang and Jung-Iu in Peking. Yet, this discrep­ ancy does not appear to have been great enough to have accounted for the failure of the siege. It becomes necessary to conclude that the answer was primarily a matter of political considerations. Jung-Iu and certain of the other more en­ lightened ministers at court realized the futility of attempting to rid China of the foreigners by force. They did not have the authority or courage to halt the attacks once they had begun, but they appear to have sabotaged them. There is no indication that Jung-lu's troops, as an organized unit, took part in the assaults. Moreover, upon occupying Peking the allies discovered large quantities of modern guns and rifles which had not been issued to the soldiers or irregulars who 58 War Dept., Annual Reports, 1900, op.cit., part 7, pp. 12, 34-40; Frey, op.cit., pp. 148, 150-306; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, pp. 523-529· s3 BPP, China No. 5 {1901), no. 80, p. 44, MacDonald to Salisbury, Oct. 18, 1900; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 18921901, vol. 2, pp. 525-526.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion were attacking the legations. The failure to employ these weapons may have been due to incompetence, but it is also possible that they were deliberately withheld. Certainly their use would have greatly increased the danger to the defenders of the legations.80

Military Lessons of the Rebellion The military operations of the Boxer Rebellion permit us to evaluate a number of characteristics of the Chinese soldier. Also, to the limited degree that semi-Westernized troops were involved, the campaign serves as a gauge for judging what progress had been made in improving Chinese armies since the Sino-Japanese War. However, it should be remem­ bered that the best units in China, those organized by Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung, were not committed in the operations. In 1900, as in 1894-1895, the greatest single weakness of the Chinese armies lay in the shortage of qualified officers. The principal fault of the officers' corps was a lack of knowl­ edge of basic strategy and tactics. Furthermore, even where individuals had some theoretical knowledge, they lacked ex­ perience in the employment of large forces and in the use of combined arms. As a result, it was evident that the soldiers had little confidence in their leaders. Still, during the Boxer Rebellion accusations of cowardice against officers did not play the conspicuous part that it had during the SinoJapanese War, and this certainly marked an improvement. A number of specific criticisms of the Chinese were leveled at them by the opposing forces. It was pointed out that overall training of the Chinese troops was inadequate. Fire discipline was poor and small arms fire was usually inaccurate. Full use was not made of cavalry squadrons. Even when well-armed, the Chinese generally preferred to remain on the defensive. ao BPP, China No. 1 (1901), no. 351, p. 163, Carles to Salisbury, Aug. 6, 1900; Frey, op.cit., pp. 113-116; Sir Robert Hart, "These from the Land of Sinim," Essays on the Chinese Question, London, 1901, pp. 39-40; Smith, op.cit., vol. 2, pp. 453, 459-460, 502-506, 513; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, pp. 407-409.

Il6

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion Then as soon as their flanks or rear was threatened, they ordinarily retreated. This failing seems to have been due to inadequate combat training and leadership rather than to lack of courage; if their officers set an example, the men would frequently fight to the death. Moreover, the troops of Generals Ma and Nieh in the Tientsin area proved themselves capable of following up an advantage and of launching courageous attacks. Certain faults of the Chinese army which have already been mentioned were still prominent. The failure to develop special arms and services and the lack of a wellorganized staff were all handicaps, as was the employment of heterogeneous weapons.81 Despite a number of defects, the Chinese troops demon­ strated some improvement over the past and furnished several noteworthy lessons for the future. The Chinese artillery at Taku and especially at Tientsin was excellent. Their fire was accurate; their choice of positions was sound; their displace­ ments were well carried out, and in counter-battery fire they frequently proved themselves superior to the allies. The majority of the allied casualties in the capture of the native city of Tientsin came from artillery fire. The Chinese gunners had been foreign-trained, and they had learned their lessons well. On occasion, the Chinese troops made good use of ter­ rain; they prepared extensive and often well-selected field fortifications, and their actions demonstrated that they were masters of cover and concealment. Until outmaneuvered they proved capable of stubborn resistance. To the annoyance of the allies, the Chinese made use of ruses de guerre; for exam­ ple, on one occasion they forced the Seymour expedition to deploy by setting off firecrackers. Furthermore, the popular belief that the Chinese feared the dark now had to be dis­ carded, since both the Boxers and regulars made frequent use of night attacks.62 61 War Dept., Annual Reports, igoo, op.cit., part 7, passim; Frey, op.cit., pp. 102, 103, 107-108, 110; Barnes, op.cit., pp. xiii-xiv, 42-43, 85-86; Seymour, op.cit., pp. 351-352; Taussig, op.cit., p. 418. 62Taussig, op.cit., p. 415; Barnes, op.cit., pp. 85, 112, 114; War Dept., Annual Reports, 1900, op.cit., part 7, pp. 102-110; Imperial Maritime

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion The Boxer campaign again presented an example of the results that could be obtained from Chinese soldiers led by foreign officers. The British forces in the Rebellion included a small regiment of Chinese commanded by British officers. This unit, known as the First Chinese Regiment, fought throughout the campaign under extremely difficult circum­ stances. They were fighting their own countrymen; they had no nationalistic incentives to stimulate morale; and they had had at most little over a year's training. Yet, they were reported to be fine soldiers, loyal to their officers, courageous in battle, intelligent, and capable of great physical endurance. Their record again demonstrated that when well led, trained, and equipped, the Chinese can be first-class fighting men.68 Fortunately for the allies, the imperial government did not develop the tactics or the policy of using guerilla warfare®4 on a large scale, as the Chinese were to do from the 1930's on. The fanaticism and anti-foreignism of the Boxers would have furnished the motivation necessary for the hard and dan­ gerous life of partisan warfare. Had the campaign degen­ erated into a guerilla operation, the allies might have found themselves involved in a long and expensive campaign. Even modern armies with their tremendous firepower, air support, and mechanized speed have found no easy solution to the problem of partisan warfare. Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, vol. 2, p. 520; Smith, op.cit., vol. 2, PP- 437, 446, 448-449, 451, 455- Captain Kotenev did them an injustice when he stated that the Chinese regulars "in a body" were devoid of courage (see The Chinese Soldier, pp. 74-77). es See Barnes, op.cit., especially pp. xi, xiii, 3, 12, 17, 27-30, 41, 50, 51, 67, 70, 78, 80, 128, 149; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, vol. 2, p. 521; Hardy, "The Chinese Army," op.cit., p. 600; NCH, Sept. 11, 1901, p. 497 and May 14, 1902, pp. 946-947. The decision to organize a Chinese unit for service at Wei-hai-wei was made in Octo­ ber 1898. In December, Major Bower of the British army was ordered to enlist non-commissioned officers and interpreters at Hongkong and Shanghai. The privates were recruited in the leased territory at Wei-haiwei. In October 1901, the regiment consisted of 12 companies and over 1,200 men (see BPP, China No. 1 (1899), nos. 354 (p. 266), 356 (p. 266), and 427 (p. 327) ; Barnes, op.cit., p. 200; NCH, May 14, 1902, p. 946. 84 General Frey realized the danger involved if the Boxer Rebellion should develop into a guerilla campaign (op.cit., pp. 119-120).

Il8

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion The Non-Combatants It seems paradoxical that throughout this period of violent political upheaval and war the two finest military organiza­ tions in China should continue their development largely uninterrupted. Neither the shifts in the political wind nor seizure of the national capital by enemy troops forced them into battle. This strange anomaly was made possible by the decentralization of the Chinese administrative system, as well as by the political astuteness of Chang Chih-tung and Yiian Shih-k'ai. In the fall of 1898 Lord Charles Beresford observed a review of Chang Chih-tung's troops at Wuchang, but he was not greatly impressed. Beresford saw only some 450 men and a six-gun battery. About 200 of the soldiers were well trained and equipped, but the others were new recruits. The Krupp guns were hand-drawn and the cavalry was inadequately drilled. Furthermore, it was Beresford's impression that Chang had only some 6,000 soldiers stationed in his prov­ inces. Although his estimates of other Chinese units, based largely on personal observation, appear to have been fairly accurate, Beresford seems to have seriously underestimated Chang's military forces. He also at least partially misinter­ preted Chang's opinion concerning the suggestion that Great Britain train a national Chinese army.85 Perhaps the suave governor-general purposely misled his foreign guest both as to his opinions and his military strength. According to records of the Board of War, in 1898 Chang had 1,093 new-style troops, while there were a total of 25,660 militia and Disci­ plined Forces in Hupeh and Hunan.66 These figures are undoubtedly inaccurate, yet Chang had a reputation for pay­ ing his troops. He therefore lacked the usual incentive for padding reports to the Board of War, and there is little reason to believe that the Board's figures were grossly in error. In July 1900 a British naval observer, Lieutenant Brandon, 65Beresford, ββ

op.cit., pp. 157-161, 276-277; see also Hsii, op.cit., p. 123. CSK1 Ping-chih 3, pp. ib-2.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion visited Chang's troops and observed some of them. He was informed that in the governor-generalship there were 3,000 trained troops, 5,000 more under instruction, and that it was planned to recruit another 7,000. Brandon believed that Chang's soldiers compared "very favorably" with British troops. The men were in fine physical condition, and it was reported that the recruits had to come from "decent" families. Furthermore, one of their German instructors declared that the men were intelligent. The British officer was also in­ formed that as long as they were paid, the troops would fight for Chang, whoever his enemies might be. This must have been a startling concept to an officer of the Royal Navy who fought only for queen and country. Lieutenant Brandon found both the infantry and cavalry armed with modern weapons, while the artillery was amply supplied with Krupp-pattern, six-pound rapid-fire guns manu­ factured at the Hanyang arsenal. His only criticisms were that the cavalry were not fully trained and that the officers were not academy-educated.®7 However, by 1901 the military academy was graduating officers for service with the troops. Chang Chih-tung was continuing his efforts to improve the caliber and technical competence of his forces. Early in 1898 he had requested that Yuan Shih-k'ai send him cadets who were cavalry and engineering specialists. Yiian replied that students who were trained in general military science and tactics would be better, and that as for drilling troops, trained non-commissioned officers would be more useful. Yiian offered to select men in keeping with these principles and sent them to Chang.68 The government in Tokyo also urged Chang to receive a Japanese military mission; so in 1899 he engaged a small group of Japanese, headed by a major and including an engineer, a cavalry officer, a surgeon, and three non-commissioned officers. After their arrival this mission established a school for non-commissioned officers e 7 BPP, China No. 1 {1901), encl. in no. 365, pp. 175-176, Lt. Brandon to Capt. Reynolds, July 23, 1900. See also NCH, Oct. 17, 1900, p. 819. e s JATTC, ch. 2, p. 9.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion (Chiang-pien hsiieh-t'ang) to supplement the military acad­ emy. Besides creating a new school, Chang also sent officers and senior enlisted men to Japan to study military organiza­ tion and to observe field maneuvers.69 During the Boxer Rebellion, Chang again displayed the political sagacity for which he was famous. He joined other provincial leaders in neutralizing South and Central China, yet he complied with the letter of the Throne's request for military aid. While retaining his foreign-style troops, he sent second-rate provincial units,70 without alienating the foreign powers. Thus Chang came through the rebellion with his prestige intact, his military strength increased, and a founda­ tion laid for further modernization. From 1896 to 1898 Yiian Shih-k'ai had strengthened his political ties, but his energy was directed primarily toward building up his military organization. When Lord Charles Beresford inspected Yiian's troops at Hsiao-chan in October 1896, the division consisted of 7,400 men, most of whom were from Shantung. That the qualifications for recruits were similar to those of the Self-strengthening Army indicated a desire to obtain personnel superior to the average Chinese soldier. The benefits of this policy were attested by the fact that the men were fine physical specimens. Their uniforms and most of their equipment were serviceable and well main­ tained. The close order drill and discipline of the troops were excellent and field maneuvers demonstrated that both officers and men understood their duties. The infantry were issued German-made Mauser rifles, the cavalry carried Mauser rifles and lances, while the artillery consisted of ten six-gun bat­ teries, varying from one- to six-pounders. Unlike most 69 Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 6, 7, 22; Chiang Fang-chen, "Chung-kuo wu-shihnien Iai chun-shih pien-ch'ien shih" (China's Military Changes during the Past Fifty Years), Tsui-chin chih wu-shih-nien (The Past Fifty Years), Shanghai, 1923, sect. 13, p. 4; Chang JVen-hsiang-kung i-chi, Tsou-kao (Works of the Late Chang Wen-hsiang-kung [Chang Chih-tung], Me­ morials), edited by Hsii T'ung-hsin, Peping, 1920, ch. 34, p. 26b. ' O j BPP, China No. 1 {1901), no. 112, p. 49, Warren to Salisbury, Aug. S, 1900; Cameron, "Chang Chih-tung," pp. 202-203.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion Chinese units, this division also possessed Maxim machine guns.71 Yiian had already become one of China's recognized "au­ thorities" on military affairs. In May 1899, he memorialized the Throne, outlining a system of training, tactics, military discipline, and suggested weapons. His proposal that uniform military regulations be promulgated throughout the empire was sound, but we can assume that he believed that such nation-wide standards should be based on his own recommen­ dations. On May 29 a confidential court letter ordered that he draw up a detailed report for the perusal of the Throne. In November 1899 the project was completed, and in a me­ morial accompanying the manual Yuan pointed out that he expected his troops to give up the old, evil habits and preserve discipline. Officers, he maintained, should adopt as their principles bravery, honesty, and loyalty, but he neglected to state that the loyalty which he promoted was primarily to himself. Enlisted men should accept diligence, determina­ tion, and obedience as their basic considerations. In accord­ ance with modern practices, Yiian stated that soldiers should first receive basic military training and then proceed to a course in combat tactics.72 In another memorial stressing the necessity for adopting foreign-style training, Yiian urged that senior troop commanders study and imitate foreign military organization.78 Although he was not yet a top rank official, Yiian did not permit modesty to prevent him from interfering with the established order if it were essential and if it would be ad­ vantageous to the Throne. Thus he proposed the creation of a large national arsenal under central control. After point71 Beresford, op.cit., pp. 270-272. Recruits for Yiian Shih-k'ai's division had to have a guarantee as to their character. They were further required to be young and strong, and could not smoke opium (Yuan Shih-k'ai, Hsin-chien lu-chiin ping-liieh lu-ts'un [Record of the Military Plans of the Newly Created Army], ch. 1, pp. 30-30!)). 72 JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 11-12. In preparing the training manual, Yiian was assisted by such academy trained officers as Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Kuochang, and Wang Shih-chen (ibid., pp. llb-12). 13 Ibid., pp. iob-11.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion ing out the defects of the current system, he recommended that the new arsenal be located close to a supply of coal and that it be financed from the sums then expended on the provincial arsenals. Such a plan must have been viewed with considerable disapproval by the provincial officials, and it was not carried out. Yet Yuan's prestige was increasing at court, as was shown by the honors which the EmpressDowager bestowed on him. In June 1899 he was promoted to be junior vice-president of the Board of Works (he had already been granted the somewhat less substantive privileges of riding on horseback into the imperial palace and of using the barges on the palace lakes), but he remained at Hsiaochan in command of his troops.74 In May 1899, two of Yuan's battalions had been ordered to Shantung to assist in defending the province against Ger­ man penetration. Late in the same year, because of the inter­ vention of the foreign diplomats in Peking, the anti-foreign and pro-Boxer governor of Shantung was removed.75 The grave situation in the province, intensified by Boxer attacks against the missionaries, called for a man who could maintain the confidence of both the Empress-Dowager and the foreign powers. In early December Yuan Shih-k'ai was named acting governor of Shantung and in March 1900 his appointment was confirmed.78 Upon proceeding to Shantung, Yuan took the remainder of his division with him. Then by a combina­ tion of persuasion, garrisoning of critical areas, and use of force when necessary, he compelled the Boxers to transfer their activities to Chihli. Yiian had no faith in the Boxers; he was opposed to incorporating them into the armed forces and would have crushed them outright had it been politically expedient. While in Shantung he sought to pacify the people, and at the same time protected foreign interests.77 7 4 Ibid.,

pp. 10, 11; PG, 1899, p. 2. Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, p. 407; vol. 2, p. 951. 7 e JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 12, 12b; PG, 1899, p. 54. 7 7 JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 12, 14; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., draft volume, pp. 504-505; Dept. of State, Despatches, China, vol. 115, no. 817, p. 4, Conger to Hay, Nov. 15, 1901; NCH, Sept. 19, 1900, p. 600. 75 Hummel,

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion Yiian joined the central and southern governors-general in cooperating with the allied powers to prevent the spread of the theater of operations. While professing to carry out imperial edicts, he preserved both the peace and remaining integrity of his province. In June 1900 a decree ordered Yuan either to lead his troops to Peking or send them under another officer.78 He did not refuse, but prepared a memorial claiming that his forces were already insufficient to defend Shantung.79 Nevertheless, Yiian did order some troops to Chihli. He first dispatched 3,000 men from newly reorganized units; then he canceled their orders on the excuse that they lacked training, and in their stead sent six battalions of probably even less competent provincial troops. It was fortu­ nate for the international cause that Yiian refrained from ordering his "modern" troops against the relief expedition, for their intervention might have created a fatal delay in the raising of the siege of the legations. On the other hand, had he sent his troops into Chihli they might well have met the fate of Nieh Shih-ch'eng and his division who were crushed as a result of being attacked by both the Boxers and the allied army.80 The Boxer Rebellion and the German encroachments in Shantung gave Yuan Shih-k'ai both the responsibility and the opportunity to increase the strength of his troops. In turn, this growth constituted an important step in the rise to power of the Pei-yang clique. Two battalions each of infantry, cavalry, and artillery were formed from provincial troops and incorporated into the Right Division of the Guards Army. Thirty-four battalions of militia (yung-tui or "Braves") were reorganized as twenty battalions of newstyle troops, trained by the older units and designated as the Vanguard (Hsien-feng tui) of the division. Had all the units been at full strength, which is most doubtful, the total 7 s JATTC,

ch. 2, p. 15b. China No. 1 (.1901), no. 390, pp. 189-190, Carles to Salisbury, August 15, 1900. 6 0 JATTC ch. 2, p. 16; Barnes, op.cit., p. 132; R. L. Powell, "The Rise t of Yiiah Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang Army," op.cit., p. 240; Li, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 215-216. T O J BPP,

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion strength of Yiian's expanded force would have been about 20,000 men.81 The Boxer campaign had destroyed much of what meager progress military reform had made in North China, the greatest loss being the breakup of the Guards Army. Nieh Shih-ch'eng, who was opposed to the Boxer movement, died in semi-disgrace while fighting for his country at Tientsin and his Front Division was disbanded. The Center Division of Jung-Iu also disappeared from the scene. Jung-Iu himself continued to hold high office till his death in 1903, but ceased to take an active part in military command, although he held honorary titles in the Banner Forces.82 Tung Fu-hsiang's Rear Division escorted the court to Sian, Shensi, after which a partial disbandment of his troops was ordered. The allies desired Tung's death as a war crimi­ nal, but since his troops surrounded the court, it was realized that the Throne was in no position to order his execution. Still, his power and titles were gradually withdrawn and, although he lived until 1908, he too ceased to be a factor in the military power structure of China. The Left Division of the Guards Army continued its long existence until it was finally disbanded after the Kuomintang unification campaign of 1927-1928, but the army never became more than a semimodernized irregular force. In 1908 this privileged unit passed under the control of one of Yuan Shih-k'ai's generals88 and became a part of the troops of the Pei-yang clique. The only element of the "Grand Army of the North" which did not suffer during the Boxer Rebellion was the Right Division of Yuan Shih-k'ai, which emerged with its strength at least doubled. 81 JATTC, ch. 2, pp. 14-15; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 213-214; see also Times (London), July 28, 1900. In the spring of 1901, one of Yiian's officers stated that the battalions were at half-strength (A. J. Brown, New Forces in Old China, New York, 1904, p. 93). s2 CSS, vol. i, sect. 1, p. 39; Chiang, op.cit., p. 3; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 19, 1900, p. 617, and May 28, 1902, p. 1062; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 408. s3 BPP, China No. 5 (1901), nos. 18, 195, 200; NCH, Dec. 5, 1900, p. 1202; Steiger, op.cit., pp. 264, 266, 308; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 688.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion The disintegration of the Guards Army, whose principal mission had been to defend the capital, created a power vacuum in Chihli. Thus, with the signing of the Boxer Protocol in September 1901 and the plans for the return of the court to Peking, it became essential to rebuild the de­ fenses of the capital. It was also necessary to provide for the preservation of peace and order in the badly disrupted metro­ politan area. The logical candidate was that soldier-politician Yiian Shih-k'ai. While acting as governor of Shantung, the expansion of his Right Division had not been the only means by which Yiian increased his power in preparation for future opportu­ nities. His military master-stroke of the period consisted of obtaining command of the Self-strengthening Army which had first been organized by Chang Chih-tung. In July 1901 a confidential court letter ordered that this unit be transferred from Kiangyin, Kiangsu, to Shantung to be trained by Yiian. Chang Chih-tung, surprised by the move, telegraphed to Liu K'un-i at Nanking to inquire the reason for the transfer. Liu memorialized the Throne, protesting the decision and arguing that the troops could not be spared. He stated that the (Yangtze) river defenses were already inadequate and suggested that a different unit be sent.84 Even Yiian memo­ rialized, requesting that the orders be canceled,85 but the Throne was adamant. Still, despite Yiian's protests, it is impossible to believe that this crack unit was transferred to his command without his prior approval; in fact, it must have been done at his instigation. Perhaps he felt that his position was secure enough so that he could afford to step on the toes of the powerful Yangtze governors-general. The transfer of the Self-strengthening Army is an excellent ex­ ample both of the limitations placed upon the development of purely private armies and of the clashes of interest which took place within the political-military power structure of China. This prized organization had been removed, in turn, 84 Hsu,

85

op.cit., p. 150.

YSY, ch. 9, pp. 18-19; JATTC, ch. 2, p. 25b.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion from the control of two of China's most influential officials. Finally, it was given to a third who had better connections with the Throne and whose duty it was to help defend the approaches to the capital. When it was ordered to Shantung, the Self-strengthening Army may have consisted of something under 3,000 men, but the number is in dispute. Despite the loss of its German instructors in 1898, the brigade had continued to be an out­ standing organization. The men were physically fit, neat, and well behaved, while the unit as a whole was well trained. Some of its equipment, however, may have deteriorated.88 With the transfer of the brigade in the fall of 1901 Yiian Shih-k'ai controlled two of the three best military organiza­ tions in China. Both were relatively small, but they were to serve as a valuable nucleus for a larger force. During the period from 1898 to 1900, there had taken place within China two drastic reactions to Western penetra­ tion. One was progressive, one reactionary, yet neither had succeeded in its objectives. The Hundred Days of Reform had failed because its proponents had moved further and faster than the dominant classes had deemed either necessary or desirable. The attempt to oust the foreign powers by force which ended with the Boxer Rebellion was doomed to humiliating defeat. Scattered military reform had by no means strengthened China to the point where such a herculean task was possible. The campaign of 1900 destroyed in part what material progress had been made. Yet, one of the few concepts which were shared by both the progressive and conservative leaders was the necessity for military moderniza­ tion. The reformers had visualized military reorganization as a vital phase of a broader program of modernization. The conservatives had viewed armed might as sufficient in itself to halt foreign encroachments, but the failure of the Boxer movement won new converts to belief in the inevitability of moderate but wide-scale reform. Among these neophytes 8 6 CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 2a; Hsii, op.cit., p. 150; Beresford, op.cit., p. 277; NCH, Sept. 25, 1901, pp. 607, 608, Oct. 23, 1901, p. 775.

Hundred Days & Boxer Rebellion was the most influential figure in the empire, the EmpressDowager Tz'u-hsi. During the remaining seven years of her life she was to patronize the so-called "Manchu Reform Movement," one of the more successful aspects of which was to be the creation of a modern army.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY MODERNIZATION UNDER THE EMPRESS-DOWAGER, 1901-1903 The Manchu Reform Decrees

O

N August 14, 1900, troops of the allied relief expedition entered the gates of Peking, and for the second time in her life the Empress-Dowager fled from the capital in the face of victorious foreign troops. Accompanied by the Emperor and escorted by detachments from the defeated divisions of Tung Fuhsiang and Ma Yxi-k'un, the royal party fled westward toward Sian in Shensi. The shock of defeat had presented China's leaders with another stern lesson. Military progress, as well as reform in general, had been characterized by cycles. Reform tended to proceed in spurts which were motivated by internal crisis or, more frequently, by external pressures. The presence or absence of competent leadership also played an important role. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the tempo of change had been stimulated by the Taiping Rebellion, the Arrow War, the Franco-Chinese conflict, and the SinoJapanese War. Nevertheless, prior to 1900 there had been a tendency toward stagnation, once an emergency ended. Following the Boxer Rebellion, however, internal and ex­ ternal dangers were a constant threat to the decaying regime, so support for reform was more constant. The humiliating collapse of the Boxers' attempt to oust the foreigners from China, plus the hardships of her journey prepared Tz'u-hsi to accept the fact that reforms were inevitable if throne and empire were to be preserved. It was obvious that if moderni­ zation was not inaugurated by the Throne, it might well be forced upon China from without at the expense of the dynasty. Moreover, the Empress-Dowager was encouraged to sponsor reform by some of her more enlightened officials including the loyal and influential governors-general Liu

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung, as well as by the powerful Manchu adviser, Jung-Iu.1 The result was the beginning of a decade of imperial reform which reinstated most of the paper policies of the Hundred Days of 1898. In part, this program proved to be successful, yet it also contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911. Apparently, Tz'u-hsi, in her change of policy, was motivated by a desire not only to preserve China's culture and integrity, but also to placate both the allied powers and the more progressive Chinese officials. Perhaps paramount was her ambition to maintain the throne for herself, as well as for the Ch'ing Dynasty.2 This objective became increasingly apparent as the decade progressed, for the once warlike Manchus made a last futile effort to central­ ize political power and regain the military command which they had lost during the Taiping Rebellion. On January 29, 1901, an important decree outlined the purposes of the Throne. It stated that in order to restore her prestige China must have men of ability, a sound financial structure, and an effective military establishment. Senior officials were called upon to present detailed proposals as to the measures that should be adopted.8 The humiliation caused by the failure of the Boxer move­ ment increased the number of officials who realized the necessity for change. Furthermore, during the Hundred Days of Reform reactionary officials had disregarded with relative impunity the edicts of the politically inept Kuang-hsu Em­ peror, but after 1900 the reform movement, including military reorganization, was supported by the shrewd and powerful Empress-Dowager. The opponents of change now found it expedient at least to pay lip service to her demands. Since 1 Li-Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (A Political History of China during the Last Hundred Years), vol. 1, p. 230; Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 196; NCH, Jan. 23, 1901, p. 169; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, p. 299. 2 Cf. P. H. Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, London, 1912, pp. 25, 30-31; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, p. 299; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 57. 3 Kent, op.cit., pp. 26-29. See also Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 196,

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager the allied victories in Chihli had furnished another demonstra­ tion of the effectiveness of modern arms, during the next few years military modernization was pushed harder than most other aspects of the Manchu reform program.4 In the military field, the three most important trends were the creation of standing army units (Ch'ang-pei chun), the establishment of military schools, and, finally, the shift toward the employment of Japanese techniques and instruc­ tors. It was characteristic of the last years of the Ch'ing period that most policy matters were both formulated and carried out by the top provincial officials.5 Thus, in reply to the Throne's directive, numerous recommendations for change were presented. In April 1901 the Office of Government Affairs (Tu-pan cheng-uuu ch'u) was established to evaluate memorials dealing with reform. The new commission con­ sisted of three Manchus and three Chinese, but its most influential member was Jung-lu. However, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i, who were named associate, non-resident members of the board, made the suggestions that really laid the foundation for much of the Manchu reform program. Later, important recommendations were offered by Yuan Shih-k'ai and others.® In July, Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i presented three memorials which set the tone for future policy. Characteris­ tically, their emphasis was placed on the human factor, on the need for able men who would be capable of operating the efficient administration necessary to carry out a program of modernization. To achieve this basic objective, they pro­ posed four principal, interrelated measures, namely, the estab­ lishment of civil and military schools, the sending of students 4For an analysis of the non-military aspects of the Manchu reform movement following the Boxer Rebellion, see Cameron, The Reform Movement, chs. 3-4, 6-8. 5Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 164; de Grandprey, Les Armees de la Chine, p. 15. β Kuang-hsii-ch'ao tung-hua hsti-lu (Records from within the Eastern Flowery Gate, Kuang-hsii period), Shanghai, 1909, ch. 166, p. ub; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 196; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 230-231.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager abroad, the revision of the civil service examinations, and the abolishment of the traditional military examinations.7 The memorialists declared8 that achievement of sound administration, strength, and wealth were the main factors in building up a nation. One essential element in this pro­ gram was military reform. Hence, along with political, legal, and moral reorganization of the government, they proposed several alterations in the military picture. These included the disbandment of the Army of the Green Standard, the abolition of the military colonists and garrisons, and the institution of a constructive role for the Bannermen. The adoption of Western practices was likewise felt to be im­ portant, particularly in connection with the military estab­ lishment. Specifically, Chang and Liu called for the adoption of foreign military science and training methods. They also stressed the necessity for modern weapons of war, placing emphasis on the construction of small arsenals. Furthermore, their recommendations for increasing industrial development, as well as their plans for translating foreign books and send­ ing students abroad to study, would indirectly improve China's military position. One of the most modern military measures proposed by the two officials was the creation of an imperial general staff modeled primarily on that of Japan. They suggested that the chief of the general staff be a highly qualified professional officer rather than merely a noble or an imperial clansman.9 The establishment of a general staff coordinating the armed forces would have been an important step in the unification of the highly decentralized Chinese armies. Had it been au­ thorized, it would have provided a means for rectifying the lack of standardization in training and equipment. However, the tenor of their memorials as well as their later actions indicate that what Chang and Liu sought was the standardi7

Cf. Li, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 230-231; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., pp. 196-

1W8 For a translation of the essential sections of the three memorials of July 12, 19, and 20, 1901, see Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., pp. 197-205. 9 CSK 1 Ping-chih 10, pp. 8b-9; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 201.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager zation of training, pay rates, and equipment, not the transfer of actual command from the provinces to Peking. In the summer of 1901, China was faced with the need for improving her defenses against both external pressure and internal unrest. In the Boxer negotiations, the allied powers had insisted that safeguards be established to preserve their privileged status and prevent the recurrence of antiforeign outbreaks. Among the safeguards included in the Boxer Protocol was prohibition of the importation of weapons and munitions, or of machinery used exclusively to fabricate them. Since China had no choice but to comply, a face-saving edict issued in August 1901 forbade the importation of arms or arsenal machinery for a period of two years.10 Although the reports of the Imperial Maritime Customs show no official importation of arms during 1901-1902,11 this did not prevent the Empress-Dowager and her supporters from en­ couraging the modernization of China's armies or from seeking to increase internal arsenal production. Many of the reforms which had been outlined by Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung were approved by the Throne and orders were issued to put them into effect.12 A decree of August 29, 1901, finally abolished the old-style military examinations. Henceforth the recipients of the second and third military degree were directed to apply for admission to the military forces of their respective provinces. Military students and those who possessed local degrees were au­ thorized to join the provincial troops until such time as 10 NCH (Decrees), Sept. 11, 1901, p. 512; J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and concerting China, 1894-1919, vol. 1, Manchu Period (1894-1911), New York, 1921, p. 280; see also pp. 292293· 11Imperial Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1901, 1902, part 2, passim. Despite the ban on the importation of arms and ordnance machinery, there were reports that China was illegally import­ ing arms as well as increasing the production of her own arsenals (Times [London], Nov. 4, 1902; NCH, Feb. 18, 1903, p. 332; Brown, New Forces in Old China, p. 316). 12 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 486, p. 15b. See also Teng and Fairbank, op.ctt., pp. 196-197.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager modern military schools could be established.13 In December 1902 a decree extended to Manchu military candidates the obligation to attend military schools. Nevertheless, candi­ dates for promotion in the Imperial Guards continued to be tested in archery.14 Tz'u-hsi was no longer attempting to achieve the impossible by preserving the ancient military examinations while demanding an improvement in the offi­ cers' corps of the armies at one and the same time. But, as was to be expected, examination reform was not popular with either the military degree-holders or the officials who profited from passing those who had "more money than brains and strength."15 The abolition of the traditional mili­ tary examinations cut off the principal source of military officers. Thereafter, the military academies gradually became more important in supplying commissioned personnel, but they were by no means to be the only source. During September 1901, there were issued two notable edicts whose great importance lay in their ultimate effects. On September 1, a decree recognized the value of technically trained officers by directing that all governors-general and governors establish military academies. Since Chang Chihtung, Liu K'un-i, and Yiian Shih-k'ai already had military schools, they were instructed to prepare regulations to govern military education. After receiving imperial approval these rules would be promulgated as a model for the other provinces to follow.1® On the following day the Throne ordered the creation of new military formations based on the Western concept of a regular army supported by reserves. The often repeated demand to weed out the undesirable elements of the Green Standard and militia was repeated, but then each province was to select from the remainder a number of picked battalions. These units were to be trained 1 3 CSL

1

Te-tsung, ch. 485, p. 14b; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 4, 1901, pp.

4SS-4S6. 14De

Grandprey, op.cit., p. 34; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 10, 1902, p. 535. NCH, Oct. 9, 1901, pp. 697-698. i 6 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 485, p. 19b, cited in A. W. Hummel, Jr., "Yiian Shih-k'ai as an Official under the Manchus," unpublished M.A. Thesis, p. 93. See also NCH, Sept. 18, 1901, p. 556. 15

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager and divided into standing army (Ch'ang-pei chiin), firstclass reserves (Hsii-pei chiin), and gendarmerie (Hsiinching chiin).1'' Units designated as standing army troops would gradually spread throughout the empire and later furnish the nucleus of the modern Chinese Army (Lu-chiin). As for reserves, their main function would be to serve as a refuge for old-style units, which should have been disbanded. The Western practice of maintaining a trained but non­ professional reserve did not flourish in China. In February 1902 the provincial officials were again in­ formed that the government planned to demobilize the greater portion of the Army of the Green Standard. Land which had previously been set aside for soldiers in lieu of pay would revert to the crown.18 The degree of immediate success which these edicts attained is indicated by the fact that in March the Throne was forced to complain that the Tartar-generals, governors-general, and governors had procrastinated in re­ organizing the provincial forces. Furthermore, they had failed to report concerning the establishment of military academies.19 The influence of vested interests and official lethargy were still strong enough largely to thwart the imperial demands. The Empress-Dowager herself had accepted two new ele­ ments of military progress; she was now sponsoring the establishment of professional academies in every province. She also entertained the hope of increasing military efficiency at reduced expense by creating regular and reserve forces. However, the proposal of Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung that the government create an imperial general staff was pigeon-holed; an independent general staff section was not established until 1909. At this time, no real effort was made to centralize military control; the imperial policy was to modernize and improve the armed forces within their decentralized framework. More­ over, no action was taken to restrict the privileges of the 17 CSL,

Te-tsung, ch. 485, pp. 20-20b; Tung-hua lu, Kuang-hsii, ch.

168, pp. 20-20b. 18 19

NCH (Decrees), March 5, 1902, p. 439. Ibid., March 19, 1902, p. 547.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager Bannermen. The Empress-Dowager could not but be aware of the fact that the continuation of the dynasty really de­ pended on the loyalty of the Chinese civil and military offi­ cials. This was an inherently dangerous situation, especially in view of the increasing anti-Manchu feeling in the country. Because of the numerical inferiority and degeneration of the Manchu soldiers, this situation could not be basically altered, but, as in the period prior to the Boxer Rebellion, Tz'u-hsi attempted to modernize at least a portion of the Eight Ban­ ners. In December 1902, Yiian Shih-k'ai was ordered to organize a brigade of 3,000 Bannermen, and it was planned that later a second brigade would be formed.20 Unofficially, it was reported that Jung-Iu intended to create a new corps of 30,000 men of which 10,000 would be Manchus. In Febru­ ary 1901, the Throne also ordered that intelligent Manchus be selected to study abroad.21 Still, following collapse of the Boxer Rebellion, Tz'u-hsi owed her throne largely to the loyalty and diplomacy of a few Chinese governors-general. Until her status was again stabilized, she was in no position to alienate the influential Chinese who had served her so ably. Thus in December 1901, Chang Chih-tung, Liu K'un-i, and Yuan Shih-k'ai, along with Jung-Iu and others were rewarded for their efforts to prevent the spread of the Boxer uprising.22 Then on Febru­ ary I, 1902, an edict removed the traditional ban on inter­ marriage between the Manchus and the Chinese. The objec­ tive was to create better relations between the two races by reducing the emphasis on distinctions between the rulers and their subjects, but as a political maneuver it was another case of too little and too late.23 Any effect that it might have had 2 0 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 507, pp. 6b-7; YSY, ch. 21, p. 4b; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 10, 1902, p. 1232. 21 NCH Nov. 19, 1902, p. 1074; Nov. 26, 1902, p. 1122; Cameron, The 1 Reform Movement, p. 63. 2 2 NCH (Decrees), Dec. n, 1901, p. 1138; Wu Yung, The Flight of an Empress, trans, by Ida Pruit, New Haven, 1936, p. 204. 2 3 FR, 1902, pp. 208-209. Cf. Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 230; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 62.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager was shortly to be outweighed by the tendency to concentrate greater power in the hands of the Manchus. The deaths in 1901 of Li Hung-chang, the founder of the Anhwei Army and in 1902 of Liu K'un-i, the recognized leader of the Hunan Army, weakened the political power wielded by these famous organizations. The militia armies, antiquated and corrupt, were not able to compete as instru­ ments of power with the new-style standing army divisions which were formed during the remainder of the decade. The death of Jung-Iu in 1903 closed the career of the most active and influential military organizer that the Manchus had pro­ duced since before the Taiping Rebellion. It was the death of Jung-lu, as well as defeat in the Boxer campaign, which delayed the attempt of the Manchus to regain direct command of the armies of the empire. The facts indicate that the Empress-Dowager and her more progressive advisers were sincere in their efforts to improve China's military position, but the edicts mentioned above were apparently the maximum that the Throne believed it politically practical to demand. Most of them had, in fact, been previously proposed, either during the Hundred Days of Reform or in the earlier memorials of progressive officials. Moreover, after the coup d'etat of 1898 a bifurcation of the reform movement had taken place. The Manchu reforms were not the only program advocating change. Both inside China and abroad anti-Manchu activities increased. While the brilliant pen of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao taught the Chinese patriotism, agents of Sun Yat-sen promoted revolution in China and overseas.24 Still, most of the credit for actual achievements belongs neither to the Throne nor to the revo­ lutionaries, but rather to a few provincial officials, especially Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung.

Military Policies of Yuan Shih-k'ai Two months after the signing of the Boxer Protocol (September 7, 1901) the great viceroy Li Hung-chang died. 24

Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., pp. 195, 220, 223-224.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager Yiian Shih-k'ai was selected to replace his former patron as governor-general of Chihli and, as Superintendent of the Northern Administration (Pei-yang ta-ch'en), he was charged with supervising military and foreign affairs in North China. With the disintegration of the bulk of the Guards Army, Yiian commanded the only military force capable of preserving order in the metropolitan province, thus hastening the withdrawal of the allied troops. His conduct of affairs in Shantung had made him persona grata to the foreigners. Furthermore, having proved his personal loyalty to the Empress-Dowager, Yiian enjoyed her confidence and gratitude. Nevertheless, if it had not been for defeat in the Boxer Rebellion, it is doubtful that Tz'u-hsi would have again appointed a Chinese to control the troops of Chihli, for they dominated the imperial Manchu capital.25 The Throne's reliance on Yiian Shih-k'ai, as well as his rapidly expanding influence, was demonstrated by a series of appointments and honors which were bestowed on him in 1902-1903. In January 1902 he was appointed director-general of the northern railways and adviser to the Office of Government Affairs. In June he was named substantive governor-general of Chihli. Then, in October, Yiian and Chang Chih-tung were appointed high commissioners of com­ merce with orders to work together in negotiating commercial treaties. When, because of their strategic value, the telegraph lines were ordered nationalized in January 1903, Yiian was installed as director-general of telegraphs.28 Control of the armed forces of China was lodged primarily in the hands of the provincial leaders and Chihli was the main center of military strength. Thus Yiian's status as governor-general of Chihli from 1901 to 1907 gave that able, ambitious individual the influence, prestige, and finances necessary to create a powerful semi-personal army. In fact, 25Li, op.cit., vol. I, p. 216; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 951; NCH, Nov. 13, 1901, pp. 914, 937, Nov. 27, 1901, p. 1019, and Dec. 4, 1901, p. 1072. 2 e NCH (Decrees), Jan. 15, 1902, p. 83; Jan. 22, 1902, p. 130; June 18, 1902, p. 1209; Oct. 29, 1902, p. 913; Jan. 21, 1903, p. 122.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager his political authority, plus the command of China's best troops would make him the most influential subject of the Manchu Throne. It is indicative of Yiian's political astuteness that during this period he remained a favorite of the EmpressDowager. He also continued to demonstrate a talent for allying himself with powerful figures. He was a protege of Jung-lu, and, after Jung-Iu's death in 1903, he associated himself with the influential Prince Ch'ing.27 Yiian's own rise to power was marked by the rapid promo­ tion of his military and civil proteges; in turn, their increas­ ing influence enhanced the prestige of their chief. Thus it was during the period 1901-1907 that the Pei-yang military clique became a prime factor in the power structure of China. Yiian's memory has been justly despised by many Chinese, while his role has generally been underestimated in the West. He was a ruthless official who took advantage of every opportunity to increase his own power. Not only did his presidency from 1912101916 degenerate into a second-rate military dictator­ ship, but also more than any other individual he made possible the deplorable era of warlordism which followed his death. Nevertheless, Yiian Shih-k'ai was more than an unscrupulous and ambitious politician. During the period from 1895 to 1908 he proved to be a persistent advocate of moderate reform in many fields. He loyally supported the Manchu re­ form program, and as much as any man he could claim credit for what actual achievements were attained in educational, industrial, and police modernization. But it was in the sphere of military affairs that he was outstanding, for it was there that he placed his greatest emphasis.28 For better and for worse Yuan was one of the most influential nation-builders of modern China. Prior to his death in 1916 he played a more important role than Sun Yat-sen, who is much better known in the West. 27

Li, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 216, 231; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, p. 40. For a scholarly biography of Yiian Shih-k'ai, portraying his activities as a reformer, see A. W. Hummel, Jr., "Yuan Shih-k'ai." See also Hum­ mel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, pp. 951; C. D. Tenny, "A Condensed Biog­ raphy of Yuan Shih-k'ai," WDGS, no. 7829-17. 28

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager When Yuan returned to Chihli in 1901, part of his troops were reestablished at Hsiao-chan; others were ordered to Paoting in central Chihli, while a portion were temporarily retained in Shantung.29 In late spring of 1901, a small brigade of his foreign-trained troops under General Chiang Kuei-t'i had been transferred to Peking to help preserve peace, but by order of the French commander at Paoting the brigade was temporarily halted at Ho-chien, Chihli. During the summer, dissident forces referred to as Boxers or as Allied Villagers were active in south Chihli. Since Li Hung-chang's old Anhwei Army troops were incapable of suppressing them, Li sent Yuan's soldiers against the rebels and the latter's newstyle troops fought a successful campaign before proceeding to Peking.80 In September the brigade entered the capital, where their training and discipline made a favorable impres­ sion on the foreign observers. The troops under Chiang Kuei-t'i also impressed the Empress-Dowager, for she re­ tained them in Peking for years as a special bodyguard.81 Her Manchu guards were retained, along with their medieval weapons, but being a realist Tz'u-hsi added a brigade of modern troops to the picturesque bowmen. It was only after Yiian Shih-k'ai became governor-general of Chihli that he was able to intensify the military expansion and modernization which created the Pei-yang Army and the Pei-yang clique. The Pei-yang Army was to form a core of the Chinese Army (Lu-chiin), while the Pei-yang clique spawned the bulk of the northern warlords of the republican period. Yiian took every advantage of the Manchu reform decrees to increase the size and strength of his forces. In doing so he was motivated by a desire to modernize and strengthen China, but more specifically by a desire to increase 2 8 C S S , vol. i, sect, x, p. 39; N C H , Dec. 4 , 1901, p. 1070, and May 14, 1902, p. 947. i o J A T T C , ch. 2, p. 24; N C H , June 19, 1901, pp. 1173-1174, and Aug. 14, 1901, pp. 309, 311; Brown, op.cit., p. 93. s i F R , 1902, p. 143; N C H , Oct. 23, 1901, p. 773, Jan. 22, 1902, p. 118, and Dec. 10, 1902, p. 1234; NCH (Decrees), Nov. 23, 1906, p. 434.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager his own power.82 On February 5, 1902, imperial consent was given to his request to allot one million taels to the expenses of his foreign-style troops. Then on February 20, he memo­ rialized the Throne concerning the establishment of regula­ tions for the recruiting and training of new-style troops. In accordance with his recommendations he requested permis­ sion to recruit 6,000 able-bodied soldiers to augment his forces. These 6,000 recruits were to be physically fit men of good character and respectable background.38 In preparation for the expansion of his forces, Ytian an­ nounced on June 21, 1902, that he was establishing a modern provincial staff to administer military affairs. After indicating the weakness of the Chinese armies, as well as the numerous types of military units that existed alongside each other, Yiian pointed out that well-organized foreign armies all had regional and unit staffs to supervise military matters. In these staffs, responsibility for specific functions was delegated to specialized officers. Yiian, like all provincial leaders, had too many duties to devote the required time to military adminis­ tration ; hence, he proposed to create a body of specialists to carry out these functions.84 After its organization, this staff was to serve as a model not only for the other provincial staffs created after 1904, but also for the important Commis­ sion for Army Reorganization, established late in 1903. The provincial staff, known as the Department of Military Administration (Chun-cheng ssu) was divided into three sections: Planning (Ts'an-mou ch'u), Military Preparation (Ping-pei ch'u), and Instruction and Training (Chiao-Iien ch'u). Two of the section chiefs selected by Yiian had been academy-trained battalion commanders of his original bri­ gade. They were Feng Kuo-chang (later president of China, 1917-1918) and Tuan Ch'i-jui (future provincial chief execu­ tive 1924-1926). The third section leader was Liu Yung82 See LCCCF, pp. 351-352; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, p. 39; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 216. 3 3 YSY, ch. 13, pp. i, 2-2b; JATTC, ch. 3, pp. 3-3b; Times (London), March 7, 1902. 8 4 YSY, ch. 16, pp. 1-2.

HI

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager ch'ing, whose successful career was cut short by death in 1908 when he had already attained the rank of lieutenant general and commander-in-chief of the Chiang-pei area.85 It is indica­ tive of the rapid growth of militarism that within fifteen to twenty years two of these professional soldiers, section chiefs of a provincial staff, attained the highest posts in the Chinese Republic. In a second memorial dated June 21, 1902, Yiian Shih-k'ai presented regulations for the standing army of the Pei-yang administration. In these he varied somewhat from the system promulgated by the Throne in September 1901. Yiian pointed out that the military structures of various foreign nations included a standing army supported by first- and second-class reserves. This system, moreover, was based not on voluntary enlistments but on conscription. The fact that especially im­ pressed Yiian was that a large corps of trained reserves was far less expensive than a great regular army; yet, in time of war, the reserves could be mobilized rapidly to augment the standing army. Still, he realized the problems involved in hastily applying such a system to China. He, therefore, pro­ posed adopting a modified, small-scale plan, which could then be extended gradually. Yiian accepted the general organ­ izational structure of a modern Western division, but with reduced personnel strength. However, he did not adopt the principle of conscription, which obviously was not appro­ priate for the great masses of China. He also decreased the long-term service in the reserves, advocating instead a threeyear tour of duty in both the standing army and the first-class reserves. As proposed by Yiian, the peacetime table of organ­ ization of a regular army division would consist of two infantry brigades of two regiments each, one regiment of artillery and one of cavalry, plus a battalion each of engineers 3 5 I b i d . , ch. 16, p. 2 ; J A T T C , ch. 3, p. 6. C S S (vol. i, sect. 1, p. 40) states that the third section chief was Wang Shih-chen, also a former battalion commander of the Right Division of the Guards Army, who later served as premier in 1917-18. Wang was not mentioned as a section chief in Yiian Shih-k'ai's original memorial, but he may have served in that capacity later.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager and transportation troops.86 It is evident that by this time progressive Chinese military leaders had become conscious of the value of an organized transportation and supply corps, as opposed to a transient column of conscripted carts and coolies. In keeping with these recommendations, Yuan proposed that he organize two standing army divisions. It was planned to train one division in 1902, and the other in the fall of 1902 and the spring of 1903. The two divisions would form a corps (chiin) with an overall strength of 19,120 men or­ ganized into 42 battalions. The annual upkeep of these two divisions, including pay and miscellaneous expenses, was estimated at over 2,387,600 taels, but the figure did not include such large items as weapons and ammunition.37 By October 1902, the first of these two divisions of the Pei-yang Army was formed. It was the Left Division (Tsochen) of the Standing Army, which later became the Second Division of the Pei-yang Army. As noted above, in Decem­ ber the Throne directed Yiian to organize and train a brigade of 3,000 Manchu Bannermen; after this first brigade was fully drilled and disciplined he was to train a second brigade. During 1903 these Bannermen were organized as the Stand­ ing Army of the Metropolitan Banner Forces, which was later designated the first division of the Pei-yang Army.38 The decision to organize a Manchu division not only indicated that the Empress-Dowager realized the value of modernizing at least part of the Banner Forces, but it also demonstrated her faith in the ability of Yiian Shih-k'ai. Still, it must have been a blow to the pride of the conquering race of once-valiant warriors to be trained for war by one of their subjects; so it is not surprising that Yiian tactfully requested that his friend, the influential Manchu T'ieh-liang, assist him in train88

See YSY, ch. 15, pp. 2b-3b. ch. 15, pp. 3b-4; Chiang Fang-chen, "Chung-kuo wu-shih-nien Iai chun-shih pien-ch'ien shih" (China's Military Changes for the Past Fifty Years), op.cit., p. 4. 3 8 CSS, vol. i, sect, i, p. 40, and sect. 2, p. 2; CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 507, pp. 6b-7; JATTC, ch. 3, p. 10b; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 10, 1902, p. 1232. s 7 Ibid.,

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager ing the Bannermen.39 T'ieh-liang was appointed to serve with Yuan, but he was a shrewd, energetic, and ambitious man. Between 1903 and 1906 he changed from a protege to an implacable foe and leader of the anti-Yuan clique. In July 1903, Yuan Shih-k'ai memorialized the Throne, reporting the organization of 25 battalions of regular army. This force consisted of the new Left Division plus a regiment of cavalry.40 Thus, on the surface Yiian had not achieved his objective of creating two full divisions of 42 battalions, but this report did not include all of Yiian's foreign-drilled soldiers. The Right Division of the Guards Army and the Self-strengthening Army were not yet classified as standing army troops, nor did this figure include the brigade of Bannermen who were to form the core of the First Pei-yang Division. Evidently, the 6,000 men whom Yiian had recruited early in 1902 had not been assigned to the Right Division; instead Yuan had used them as a nucleus for a new division. Therefore, instead of creating the two divisions which were authorized, Yiian by the end of 1903 had sizable cadres for four divisions. During the next year, he expanded them to form divisions, thus doubling his original proposal. The principal reason for this rapid military expansion was the impending Russo-Japanese War. Yuan Shih-k'ai was not only well on his way to creating a sizable force; he also sought to create an effective army. As previously noted, one of the greatest single weaknesses of the armies had been the incompetence and lack of technical training among the officers' corps. This situation Yiian at­ tempted to rectify by hiring foreign instructors and by estab­ lishing military schools. As governor-general of Chihli, Yiian primarily employed Japanese advisers, but he also requested instructors from the foreign-trained troops of Chang Chihtung,41 the only other source of competent soldiers in China. Perhaps Yuan Shih-k'ai's greatest contribution to the aa JATTC,

ch. 3, p. 10b; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 258. YSY, ch. is, p. 3b, ch. 24, pp. 2b-3; Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany), vol. 1, no. 2 (1904), p. 51. 41 Gadoffre, "Vallee du Yang-Tse," op.cit., p. 19. 40

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager modernization of the Chinese armies was the establishment of diversified military schools. This was not merely because of the fact that so many important militarists of modern China attended these schools, but also because he provided technical institutions in which both officers and enlisted men could study at least the fundamentals of the highly specialized art of modern warfare. After transferring back to Chihli, Yuan rapidly founded a group of schools at his great camp at Paoting. By the end of 1903, the French military attache reported that there were six schools at this post, including a staff college with a one-year course; a military academy with a two-year course; a school for non-commissioned officers, who enrolled for three years; a topography school for both officers and enlisted men; an eight-months officers' course in trigonometry and ballistics; and, finally, a school in which old-style officers were taught some Western techniques.42 Furthermore, Yiian not only established his own military schools, but, in April 1902, informed the Throne that he was sending military students to Japan.43 Yuan's Pei-yang Army was never called upon to fight a modern foreign foe; hence it was never required to carry out the major mission for which it was trained. However, during the next two decades it was to see considerable action in civil wars or insurrections. In both 1902 and 1903, Yuan ordered troops to put down local revolts in Chihli. In 1902, the insurgent villagers, who possessed weapons left from the Boxer Rebellion, outnumbered the government forces and were almost as well armed. As a result, the imperial troops suffered initial setbacks. Many of Yuan's soldiers were Chihli men, and it was reported that they were lukewarm about attacking their fellow provincials who had justifiable griev­ ances against the local officials. This was an embarrassing situation, but under imperial prodding Yiian dispatched units from the Right Division and the Self-strengthening Army who crushed the uprising. Some of his troops were accused of atrocities against the people, but Yiian not only avoided 42De

Grandprey, op.cit., pp. 34-35. See also CSK, Ping-chih 10, p. 9. 43 YSY, ch. 14, pp. isb-16.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager condemnation; he succeeded in having a number of his officers rewarded.44 On December 12, 1902, an important military edict was issued; the basic objective of which was to promote uni­ formity among the provincial armies. After pointing out the fact that previous decrees had already ordered a reorganiza­ tion of the military systems of the various provinces, the edict declared that the issue had been evaded, little actual planning having been done except in the areas governed by Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung. Therefore, it was directed that the provinces of Shantung, Hunan, and Shansi select officers and non-commissioned officers to be sent to Chihli (literally Pei-yang) for training. The provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Hunan were ordered to send selected personnel to Hupeh. Upon completion of their train­ ing, these officers were to return to their home provinces to supervise instruction. Yiian and Chang were ordered to memorialize jointly as to the number of men who would be involved.45 While its objective of uniformity was never fully realized, this decree tended to widen the influence and the policies of the Pei-yang and Hupeh armies. Thus it helps to account for the fact that these two organizations served as the model for the armies of Northern and Central China respectively.

Military Progress in Hupeh Chang Chih-tung's services to the Empress-Dowager dur­ ing the Boxer period increased his prestige with the Throne. In the years that followed he played a major role in planning government reform on the national level, especially in the fields of education and commerce.46 Chang not only recom­ mended reform to the Throne, but actually promoted technii i JATTC, ch. 3, p. s; NCH (Decrees), May 7, 1902, p. 909; NCH, May 14, 1902, pp. 967, 969, and June 11, 1902, p. 1147. 4 5 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 507, pp. iob-nb. See also NCH, Dec. 17, 1902, p. 1286, or JATTC, ch. 3, p. 11b. 46 Cameron, "Chang Chih-tung," op.cit., pp. 204-206; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, pp. 30-31.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager cal, administrative, and military modernization in his own provinces. From the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, with the consequent deterioration of foreign relations, he steadily increased the number of his foreign-style soldiers. His princi­ pal purpose in training modern troops was to defend his strategically located provinces.47 This duty included not only defense from external aggression, but also the preservation of internal peace and order. Furthermore, he had to assure his own safety and his position in the power structure of China. Yet, to a large degree, Chang's interest in military mod­ ernization was only one element of his interest in technical modernization, while his basic objective was the preserva­ tion of the core of China's Confucian culture. In order to accomplish his aims, Chang sought to improve all of the troops of Hupeh and Hunan by organizing them in accord­ ance with the German and Japanese military systems. How­ ever, this was at best a long-term project retarded by techni­ cal military problems, and particularly by financial difficul­ ties.48 Unlike Yiian Shih-k'ai, Chang could not draw on the resources of the empire to finance a large semi-private army. He was forced to rely on what could be extracted from his two provinces. Also, since Chang belonged to the older generation, it is doubtful that with his literary background and years of experience as a civil official he placed quite as much emphasis on military power as a tool of ambition as did Yiian Shih-k'ai. In this sense Chang was more typical of the provincial bureaucracy than was Yiian, but both of them were far more progressive than most of their colleagues. What Chang's troops lacked in personnel strength was partially compensated for by their quality. In fact, in 1902 some military observers believed that his troops were the 47 For Chang Chih-tung's attitude concerning the strategic importance and necessity for the defense of his governor-generalship, see Chang Wenhsiang-kung i-chi, Tsou-kao (Works of the Late Chang Wen-hsiang-kung [Chang Chih-tung], Memorials), edited by Hsii T'ung-hsin, Peiping, 1920, ch. 34, p. 28, and ch. 40, pp. 14I5 -15, hereafter cited as Chang i-chi. 48 Chiang, op.cit., p. 4; Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 10.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager best in all China. Even in 19x1, four years after Chang was transferred from Wuchang, the Hupeh regulars were still among the finest in the nation. In the spring of 1902, a French military observer, Captain Gadoffre, inspected the troops at Wuchang. He reported that the nucleus of Chang's troops was a crack, German-trained bodyguard consisting of 7,750 men, divided into infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineer units." This brigade of guards was a fine body of men to whom Chang Chih-tung showed partiality. The com­ mander of the organization, General Chang Piao, was an able officer, loyal to his chief and proud of his troops, but unfortunately he permitted his personal ambition to decrease the overall effectiveness of the Hupeh forces. In order to make himself indispensable, he prevented the provincial division in Wuchang from receiving training or equipment com­ parable to that of his own troops.50 This situation furnishes an excellent example of the injurious effect of the personal relationships and favoritism which existed throughout the Chinese armies. Confucian relationships and political maneu49 Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 23, 33. According to Chang Chih-tung's own report, as of October 1902 his bodyguard consisted of two infantry regi­ ments (ch'i) totaling eight battalions and one battalion each of cavalry, artillery, and engineers. He estimated that the strength of his foreigntrained troops was only about 9,300 (Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, pp. 26b-27). This apparently included only those stationed at Wuchang, but even this figure appears low, for after visiting Wuchang Captain Gadoffre calculated that the combined brigade of guards and the provincial division stationed there totaled 14,750 men (op.cit., pp. 23-24). It would appear that Chang Chih-tung was either misinforming the Throne as to the actual strength of his forces, or at least taking a very conservative view as to what constituted foreign-trained troops. It was nothing unusual for Chinese officials to falsify their strength reports, but the usual procedure was to overstate the figure in order to pocket the difference in pay between the true and reported figures. Since Chang had a reputation for actually paying his soldiers, this apparently was not his objective, but he may have desired to increase his troops to a number greater than he believed the Throne and his opponents would be willing to permit. 60 Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 23-24. General Chang Piao, a favorite of Chang Chih-tung, continued to command the guards brigade even after it became the Eighth Lu-chiin Division. He was still in command when the revolution broke out in Wuchang in 1911, but was cashiered as a result of the out­ break (WDGS, no. 6283-8, "Monthly Reports, March 1 to April 20, 1911," p. 5. See also NCH [Decrees], Oct. 21, 1911, p. 174).

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager verings, rather than national patriotism and personal merit, were the underlying principles of promotion in the Chinese military organization. Besides the bodyguard, it was estimated that in Hupeh and Hunan there was a total of almost 15,700 troops, including 7,000 Bannermen, organized and armed in the Western manner. Aside from these, there were also reported to be some 42,000 "soldiers" who were actually little more than armed coolies. The foreign-style troops of Hupeh were organ­ ized into regiments of two battalions, with four companies per battalion. As in the German army, the companies were divided into three platoons. Insofar as his foreign-trained battalions were concerned, Chang had succeeded in stand­ ardizing the equipment of his troops. Some of the small arms had been purchased in Germany, but others had been manu­ factured at the Hanyang arsenal.51 Captain Gadoffre reported that the close order drill and manual of arms of the foreign-trained battalions were com­ parable to that of Germany's best troops. In fact, a parade of the guards brigade was a remarkable spectacle. The training program for recruits was so strenuous that it resembled the regime of a military academy, and Gadoffre considered that the physical training of the Wuchang troops was superior to that of the French army. The guards brigade, at least, had its own medical unit, which was an important innovation. As in the American army, the engineers were trained to operate as infantry in combat. Gadoffre stated, however, that the maneuvers and combat exercises of Chang Chih-tung's troops were not of as high a quality as their close order drill. In field problems, the guards brigade demonstrated that they had practiced German-style exercises, yet under field condi­ tions control over the units tended to break down. Also, the commanders failed to take full advantage of their artillery, while the marksmanship of the soldiers was only fair. The greatest weakness of Chang's troops, as of the older Chinese armies, was mediocrity and lack of initiative among the offi61Gadoffre,

op.cit., pp. 12-13, 24-26; de Grandprey, op.cit., p. 24.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager cers. It was a case of good troops commanded by unqualified leaders.52 The faults that applied to the bodyguard were even more applicable to the provincial divisions. In the latter organiza­ tions, Chang Chih-tung sought to improve standards by interspersing among the units foreign-trained battalions and young officers from the military schools. Also, details of men were sent from the outlying areas to Wuchang for instruction. However, foreign observers reported that once the Germantrained officers were no longer directly under the critical supervision of the governor-general, their zeal decreased and they began to neglect the foreign principles which they had been taught.63 Chang was aware of the defects of his officers as well as of the necessity for raising the social status of the military profession if men of ability were to enter the armed services. It was for these reasons that he established military schools and compelled officials to enroll their sons in the academies. In order to set an example, he sent three of his own grand­ sons to Japan to be educated in the service schools.54 In 1902 Chang was operating two military schools: one school for officers and another for non-commissioned officers. The cadets in his officers' school even included men with the second civil service degree, as well as a considerable number who had the local literary degree. The candidates were required to pass a literary and a physical examination, but those who were selected came from upper-class families. Besides several Chinese, the faculty of the officers' school consisted of three Germans, who taught exclusively military subjects. The three-year course of study included mathe­ matics, sciences, military history, and geography, as well as infantry, cavalry, and engineer training. Upon graduation the young officers were assigned to one of Chang's units or 52Gadofifre

1

68Gadofifre

1

op.cit., pp. 12-15, 26-33; de Grandprey, op.cit., pp. 25-26. op.cit., pp. 10-11; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, vol. 1, p. 206. 54 GadofiEre op.cit., p. 15. 1

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager on rare occasions were ordered to other provinces.65 This situation was altered after Chang and Yuan Shih-k'ai were directed by decree of December 12, 1902, to train officers and non-commissioned officers from other provinces. Chang was to train men from Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Hunan. Captain Gadoffre believed that the greatest fault of the officer candidates in the Chinese military schools lay in the character of their early literary education. He realized the necessity of recruiting men who had the prestige that came with learning in traditional China, but he felt that the cadets depended too much on rote memory. They replaced initiative and personal opinion by quotations and strict adherence to theoretical rules. Although they were keenly interested in Western science, they showed less enthusiasm for absorbing the unspectacular principles of the art of war.56 The non-commissioned officers' school was commanded by a Chinese officer, but the instructors were Japanese. The Japanese officers were poorly paid and were shown less respect than the Germans. Also, better equipment and facili­ ties were furnished to the German-staffed school. The non­ commissioned officers' school had 100 students, who were enrolled for one year. Some academic courses were given, but stress was placed on purely military subjects and gymnastics. Although the graduates were appointed as non-commissioned officers, they could be selected as officers after serving a period in the ranks.57 5 5 Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, p. 26b; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 15-19. See also Chiang, op.cit., p. 4. One of the German instructors, Herr Hoff­ man, had developed a plan to found a staff college to round out the military center at Wuchang. Such a school was later established (Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 19-21; Chiang, op.cit., p. 4). 56 Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 15, 17-18. 5 7 Ibid., pp. 6-8, 22. The course of study in the non-commissioned officers' schools included military history, mathematics, geography, tactics, and field fortifications {ibid., p. 22). Capt. Gadoffre was under the impression that Chang Chih-tung was dissatisfied with the services of the Japanese military mission and doubted that their contracts would be renewed (ibid., pp. 6-8). However, Gadoffre had misinterpreted the trend of events in China, for not only did Chang retain his Japanese as well as his German instructors, but within six months he proposed to reorganize his troops in

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager As in the case of his officers, Chang Chih-tung was more careful in selecting enlisted personnel than were most con­ temporary Chinese officials. Since Chang was not required to recruit his men in Hunan and Hupeh, he had reverted to the old practice of the militia leaders of enlisting men from his home province of Chihli. He also sent officers to Shantung and Honan to recruit personnel for a six-year term. Although Chang required more of his soldiers than most Chinese com­ manders, he had no difficulty in obtaining qualified men, for his troops were paid regularly, and their food, uniforms, and quarters were far above average. All of the troops were re­ quired to be young, able-bodied, and of good character, but the amazing thing about the Western-trained soldiers was that approximately half of them were literate. Another un­ usual feature of his troops was that instead of letting his soldiers become vagrants or bandits upon discharge, as was characteristic of China, he offered them employment on the railways or in other government service. This policy had another advantage; instead of losing well-trained troops, he preserved them in his provinces as a form of reserve corps. Desertions, which were so common among most Chinese army units, were rigidly discouraged and relatively rare among Chang's Wuchang troops.58 In a memorial dated October 31, 1902 Chang Chih-tung proposed to reorganize the troops of Hupeh in accordance with the edict of September 12, 1901, which had ordered the formation of standing army and first-class reserve units. The nation-wide tendency to model the new armies on the military system of Japan is apparent in Chang's thinking. In 1895 the Self-strengthening Army had imitated the German tables of organization, but in 1902 Chang stated that he proposed to organize two reinforced brigades of standing army troops in accordance with the Japanese military system. A brigade was to consist of two infantry regiments (ch'i) of four battalions, keeping with the organizational system of the Japanese army (see Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, p. 27). ss Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, p. 29; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 11-12, 43; de Grandprey, op.cit., p. 23.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager an artillery regiment of three battalions, a squadron of cavalry, and one battalion each of engineers and transporta­ tion troops. This plan did not require an increase in Chang's foreigntrained soldiers, for he merely planned to reorganize, retrain, and redesignate the troops in Wuchang, including all but one infantry regiment of his bodyguards. Chang pointed out that the organizational structure of these brigades would be similar to the tables of organization of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Newly Created Army but on a reduced scale. He also main­ tained that these two brigades would be insufficient to guard the strategic Wuchang-Hankow area and recommended that, if funds became available, the size of the standing army should be increased. At the very least two understrength brigades should be maintained.59 As for the formation of first-class reserves, Chang sug­ gested that he use militia units commanded by the best avail­ able officers. Then as soldiers began to be discharged from the standing army, they could be sent to the reserves. He was opposed to employing soldiers to carry out the duties of police, but as a temporary expedient he suggested using the Disciplined Forces selected from the Army of the Green Standard. In keeping with the reorganized Pei-yang military system, Chang also recommended the establishment of a provincial military staff office, but because of financial diffi­ culties the staff was to be less elaborate than that of Yiian Shih-k'ai.60 Besides the safeguards and restrictions that Chang had 59

Chang i-chi, Tsou-koo, ch. 34, pp. 27b-28b. Ibid., ch. 34, pp. 28b-29. By the fall of 1902 Yuan Shih-k'ai's Pei-yang troops had already become the standard for comparison; thus Chang Chih-tung reported that his proposed system of organization and adminis­ tration was in keeping with, or only a modification of, Yuan's. In his memorials, Yuan was more specific and detailed in his estimates of military expenses. He was seeking to expand his military establishment and his province did not have to meet the full expense. Chang, on the other hand, furnished less complete figures as to what he planned to spend and he placed greater emphasis on financial difficulties, for his two provinces had to finance their own troops (for example, see KS-F, ch. 15, p. 4; Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, p. 27b). 80

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager set up to assure that his soldiers were actually paid, he issued several other regulations which struck at basic weak­ nesses in the Chinese armies. Regimental, battalion, and company officers were to be required to train their own troops, rather than to delegate that duty to instructors. Also, officers were forbidden to wear the traditional long gown of military officials, nor were they permitted to enter the bar­ racks in sedan chairs. Moreover, they were ordered to treat their soldiers decently. Chang even set an example for his officers by personally attending maneuvers and by making inspections on foot. Still, the Hupeh officers must have con­ sidered it a cruel blow to be forced to look like fighting men. Chang also demanded that the barracks be kept clean and orderly. Soldiers were required to maintain their uniforms and equipment in good order. Grooms were not permitted; each cavalryman was taught to take care of his horse as his first duty.81 These regulations are characteristic of all modern, disciplined armies, but not all of Chang's ideas demonstrated an equal understanding of modern warfare. The foreign-drilled troops, no matter what arm of service, were required to practice artillery drill ;e2 yet the troops were not proficient enough in their basic functions to spend part of their time as artillerymen. The military reforms which Chang had sponsored both in Kiangsu and Hupeh were imitated in Chekiang, Anhwei, and Szechwan. The troops of these provinces also employed Japanese instructors and emulated the military system of Japan, but never attained the degree of efficiency reached by Chang's troops.63 In October 1902, on the death of Liu K'un-i, Chang Chih-tung was again appointed acting governor-general at Nanking. His military and other projects in Hupeh were temporarily turned over to the progressive Manchu Tuanfang. However, Chang did not leave all of his foreign-drilled el Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, pp. 29-31; GadoflFre, op.cit., p. 13; de Grandprey1 op.cit., p. 24. e2 Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, pp. 29-29I); de Grandprey, op.cit., p. 22. 63 Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 55.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager troops in Hupeh. Nanking was still the stronghold of the old, hostile Hunan Army; so, rather than rely on the Hunanese, Chang took with him to his new post four battalions of his guards.64 Chang remained at Nanking for five months, during which time he continued to demonstrate an unorthodox interest in military preparedness. In January 1903, while making an unprecedented winter inspection of the Kiangyin forts, he discomposed the garrison by insisting on actually inspecting the guns and magazines. Then in February he ordered am­ phibious maneuvers to test the defenses of the lower Yangtze Valley. The forces employed consisted of the Nan-yang (Southern Administration) and part of the Pei-yang squad­ rons, as well as foreign-style troops from Hupeh and Kiangsu. After the engineers prepared maps of the areas, the flotilla landed troops against the Kiangyin fortifications. It was rumored that Japanese advisers had planned the maneuvers, and the exercises were not faultless.65 Nevertheless, a large scale amphibious operation is one of the most difficult of all military maneuvers to execute. The carrying-out of this operation was an indication of the real progress made by the best of China's troops. It is also an indication of the development of Chang Chih-tung's appreciation of the tech­ nical aspects of modern warfare. After being relieved as acting governor-general at Nan­ king in the spring of 1903, Chang proceeded to Peking where 6 4 FR, 1902, p. 268; NCH (Decrees), Oct. 15, 1902, p. 796; Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, pp. 27, 28; NCH, Nov. 12, 1902, p. 1021. During this period of semi-private armies it was not unusual for a governor-general or governor to transfer his bodyguard with him from one province to another. Such a guard was both an indication of status and a means of protection against internal disorders. However, Chang had a special reason for taking a regiment of guards with him to Nanking. He was entering the stronghold of the Hunan Army and the Hunanese officials, civil and military, resented his appointment. He did not increase his popularity with the Hunan Army by denouncing one of its generals or by holding unprecedented and thorough inspections (see NCH [Decrees], Feb. 11, 1903, p. 283). e i NCH, Feb. 4, 1903, pp. 213-214; Feb. 25, 1903, pp. 371-372; March 5, 1903, pp. 443-444·

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager he remained for a year. There he was engaged primarily in another of his special interests, the modernization of educa­ tion. Chang was named a member of a committee to draft regulations for a national school system. In its report, pre­ sented to the Throne in January 1904, the committee pro­ posed a system largely based on that of Japan. They called for a hierarchy of educational institutions, including special military schools. The approved school system stipulated that uniforms were to be worn and that military drill was to be taught in all the schools, including missionary institutions. This was striking evidence of the increasing importance of military affairs68 and of a developing military spirit in China. While Chang Chih-tung was in Peking, the formation of his two proposed brigades was obstructed .A sizable revolt broke out in Kwangsi province and, on the request of the governor-general at Canton, eight battalions of Chang's foreign-style troops were transferred to Kwangsi. These were among the battalions which Chang planned to use to organize the new brigades.67 Prior to his transfer to Peking in 1907, Yiian Shih-k'ai was to dispatch troops to other provinces, but since he retained a large degree of influence over them, the transfers served to expand the influence of Yiian and the Pei-yang clique. This was not the case with Chang, who had less political influence than Yiian. Previously, Chang had lost the Self-strengthening Army, first to Liu K'un-i and later to Yiian Shih-k'ai. Then in 1903 he lost eight more battalions to Ts'en Ch'un-hsiian, governor-general at Canton, who like Yiian was a favorite of the Empress-Dowager. eeCameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 71-72; Cameron, "Chang Chihtung," pp. 205-206; Dept. of State, Despatches, China, vol. 129, no. 180, end., report of Ε. T. Williams, Dec. 22, 1905, pp. 13-14. The policy of requiring military and physical drill in the schools applied not only to government schools, but also to missionary institutions. The policy was soon in operation over a wide area (NCH, July 20, 1906, p. 134; Aug. 24, 1906, p. 441; Nov. 16, 1906, p. 360; Nov. 30, 1906, p. 477). 67 The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 3rd issue, vol. 2, p. 271; NCH1 Aug. 14, 1903, pp. 340, 341; Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 34, pp. 27)3-28.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager Military Affairs in the Other Provinces Along with Chihli and Hupeh, the province of Kiangsu under Liu K'un-i was an important military center, but actually the troops of Kiangsu were more typical of the general pattern of modernization than were the forces of Yiian Shih-k'ai or Chang Chih-tung. Liu K'un-i had joined Chang in presenting the famous decrees of July 1901 which had set the tone for the Manchu reform movement. Still, unlike Chang, Liu had risen to power as a militia leader. He was the recognized chief of the Hunan Army, and he retained certain loyalties to the old militia system. Furthermore, as governor-general at Nanking, he was guardian of the central coast and the vital Yangtze River. Since he had seen the warships of many powers anchored off Shanghai and Nan­ king, it was only natural that he thought primarily in terms of developing his fleet and river defenses.88 Nevertheless, Liu did take some steps to modernize his troops, especially insofar as the use of improved weapons and the training of junior officers were concerned. In 1901 Liu utilized Defense Army troops to begin the organization of two standing army units. The remaining soldiers of this type, over 40 battalions, he enrolled as first-class reserves. These so-called Defense Army troops were probably wholly or in large part the Hunan Army. In his own bodyguards Liu preserved the old order of the militia system. The troops were armed with Mauser rifles, but these rifles were not in good condition. The men's equipment was poorly main­ tained; their uniforms were unkempt; and their quarters looked like the straw huts of Chinese peasants. The com­ mander of the guards, a true conservative, had no desire to accept graduates of the military academy. Hence, the body­ guard remained a preserve for old-style officers. In fact, it was the opinion of a foreign military observer that the overall 68 For Liu K'un-i's interest in the fleet and coast defenses, see Gadoffre. op.cit., p. 33.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager condition of Liu K'un-i's troops was such that they could not present stiff resistance to an invading enemy force.89 The tone of Liu's military academy was opposite of that of the guards. Its entrance requirements, curriculum, and general standards were similar to those of Chang Chih-tung's officers' school at Wuchang. The cadets were a fine body of young men, enthusiastic and well-trained. Instruction was directed by two Germans but, unlike Chang Chih-tung, Liu did not give the foreign officers a free hand. The director of the school was a Chinese civilian official. As in the case of the other provincial leaders, Liu was contemplating changing from German to less expensive Japanese instructors. Liu K'un-i was still opposed to the use of foreign officers in the direct training of his troops. This mission fell to the young Chinese officers, graduated from the military academy, but they faced a difficult assignment, for the troops' commanders were old-fashioned officers without training. It was reported that Liu had ordered classes in military science to be held in each battalion, all officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel being required to attend.70 Limiting the instruction to junior officers was a mistake. During the last half-century one of the great faults of the Chinese armies has been that although many younger officers have been quite well trained and anxious to improve their technical knowledge, numerous senior officers were incompetent and too proud or lethargic to learn. The generally pessimistic appraisal of the military forces of Liu K'un-i was applicable to the troops of other "progres­ sive" provincial leaders. The conditions which existed in the remaining provinces were even worse. The degree of modern­ ization varied greatly by provinces. In many areas, reform consisted only of furnishing the troops with some type of magazine rifle and teaching them the German goose-step. 69

CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 8; Gadoffre, op.cit., p. 36. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 33-37; NCH, Sept. n, 1901, p. 514» Aug. 13, 1902, p. 330. The German instructors at the military academy were Lt. Tettenborn and Count Praschma. Liu K'un-i also had a few foreign instructors, mostly English, at the naval academy and the Kiangyin forts. 70

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager Other so-called "soldiers" were still dressed in colorful sleeveless jackets and armed with spears or gingals.71 How­ ever, some slow progress was being made. The use of West­ ern drill and modern arms was gradually becoming more widespread. During the period 1901-1904, aside from the provinces of Chihli, Hupeh, and Kiangsu, standing army units were established in Shansi, Shensi, Kiangsi, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Yunnan. Some military reorganization along foreign lines also took place in several other provinces, in­ cluding Shantung, Honan, Fengtien, Kirin, Fukien, Anhwei, and Szechwan.72 Most of the provinces that created standing army troops also formed first-class reserves. In nearly every case, the standing army units were reorganized from Defense Army battalions, while the reserves were created from troops of the Defense Army, Disciplined Forces, Green Standard or even Bannermen.78 It is doubtful that any real degree of modernization took place in most areas. In many instances, the change was basically only one of terminology. Further­ more, being militia, the Defense Army troops were not part of the regular, legitimate military establishment; hence they were only very indirectly under the Board of War. They were provincial troops, largely controlled by the provincial officials, and they remained so despite their new designation. The establishment of the standing army system denoted at least some military modernization, and it laid the foundation for the later Lu-chun or Army, but it did not tend to centralize control of the Chinese armies. The balance of power between the central and provincial governments remained basically unchanged. 71 For example, see Hardy, "The Chinese Army," op.cit., p. 598; Im­ perial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, vol. 1, p. 124; NCH, July 2, 1902, p. 17. 72 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. 8-8b; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, vol. 2, p. 112; The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 3rd issue, vol. 1, p. 39, and vol. 3, p. 37; NCH, Jan. is, 1902, p. 84, Feb. 11, 1903, p. 256, and Dec. 4, 1903, p. 1172; Chu Wu, op.cit., p. SS73 CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. 8-8b.

1 S9

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager Even more important to the future than the creation of the standing army system was the widespread establishment of military schools. Despite the fact that in March 1902 the Throne had found it necessary to rebuke the provincial leaders for delaying the establishment of military academies, the decree of September 11, 1901,74 ordering the founding of such schools was ultimately one of the best-observed decrees of the Manchu reform movement. By the end of 1903 mili­ tary schools had been established in nearly all of the provinces. Naturally, the quality of the schools and the caliber of their staffs varied. The majority of the instructors were graduates of the Li Hung-chang's military academy at Tientsin, but in a major portion of the schools Japanese instructors were also employed.75 However, a scattering of German officers were still teaching in China. From a technical standpoint, the creation of academies would gradually develop a new generation of professional officers who had been subjected to at least the basic principles of modern warfare and military leadership. The era of the omnicompetent Chinese official who played part-time soldier during a primarily civil career would give way to one of greater specialization. The young officers were taught not only Western military techniques, but also science. Often they were surreptitiously taught Western political ideals. Inevitably this type of training bred discontent with the old order. Some of the young officers had been trained in Japan and their number would increase rapidly. A growing stream of officers would be graduated from the military academies where many of their instructors were returned students from Japan, and Japan was becoming the center of anti-Manchu activities. In fact, one of the primary targets of the revolu­ tionaries was to be the foreign-trained troops, especially the officers' corps. Since any successful revolution against the Manchu Dynasty required the support of armed forces, the new-style troops were the most desirable and susceptible candidates. 74NCH 75

(Decrees), March 19, 1902, p. 547. De Grandprey, op.cit., p. 34.

l6o

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager Moreover, because of the great prestige of learning, educa­ tion, even if not in the classical vein, tended to raise some­ what the inferior status of the military profession. Far more serious, the abolition of the old military examinations and the establishment of military schools would help prepare the way for the rise of a new type of military bureaucrats. They would differ in numerous ways from the civil-oriented Con­ fucian bureaucracy; the basic difference being that the new militarists would come to visualize both the seizure and the maintenance of political power largely in terms of military force. Their concepts would not have been so tragic had it not been for the fact that after the collapse of the old regime their leaders would control the troops necessary to put their policies into effect. As was indicated earlier, one of the major shifts in military policy during the period 1901-1903 was the growing tendency throughout the empire to employ Japanese officers instead of Germans as instructors. Since Japan was anxious to influence the development of China's armies, she encouraged the Chinese to employ Japanese advisers and to adopt her military system. Chinese officers were invited to attend mili­ tary maneuvers in Japan. By 1903 Japanese instructors were not only being used by Yiian Shih-k'ai in Chihli and Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang, but they had also infiltrated into Central China. They were established along the coast, and had even penetrated as far inland as Szechwan. Moreover, it was during 1901 and 1902 that the provincial officials began to send sizable numbers of students to study in the Japanese military schools.76 Since Russo-Japanese relations were approaching the breaking point, Russia objected to China's employment of foreign advisers, especially Japanese,77 but her complaints met with little success. Since the middle 78 "La reorganisation militaire de la Chine," Revue militaire des armies Strangeres, vol. 67 (March 1906), p. 244; Gadoffre, op.cit., pp. 9, 42; Times (London), Dec. 2, 1903; NCH, Oct. 2, 1901, p. 651; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, vol. 2, p. 112. 77Langer The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd edn., p. 715; Cameron, 1 The Reform Movement, p. 90.

l6l

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager of the nineteenth century Britain, Germany, France, and Russia had all furnished China with military instructors. Previously Germany had taken precedence, but the employ­ ment of Japanese had several advantages and gradually obtained the ascendancy. This shift demonstrated a growing conviction that Japan's problems in the modern world and her solutions to them were more closely related to China's conditions than were those of the Western powers. There were also specific advantages in using Japanese advisers. The employment of Japanese reduced the language problem, for they were more willing than most foreigners to learn to speak Chinese. Japanese officers were less expensive to employ; they would accept poorer treatment than Occidental officers; and they more readily adapted themselves to Chinese realities. The Japanese had modeled their army on that of Germany; so the transition from German to Japanese instructors did not necessitate a major change in training methods or techniques. Also, the Japanese sought with considerable success to persuade China that Japan had adopted the best points of all the European armies and that their military system was the one most suitable to the Asiatic peoples.78 Finally, the shift to Japanese advisers was indicative of growing belief that Orientals could match the prowess of the West. This conviction was to be immeasurably strengthened by the defeats which the Japanese delivered to the Russians in 1904-1905. The overall result was a tendency to increase Japanese influence in the internal affairs of China.

The Period in Retrospect During 1901-1903, foreign observers began to note the improvements in the new-style Chinese troops over the old "braves" and soldiers of the Green Standard. The things 78 "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (March 1906), p. 244; General Sir Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army, New York, 1921, p. 32; Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, "The Role of the Military in Chinese Government," Pacific Affairs, vol. 21, no. 3 (Sept. 1948), p. 239.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager that impressed them in the best units were improved disci­ pline, greater neatness, efficient drill, better behavior, and modern equipment. In some cases, it was even reported that a higher type of men were enlisting.79 As these characteristics spread to larger bodies of troops, they tended in time to enhance the status of the military profession. A more im­ portant stimulus to the increasing prestige of the military was to be the development of Chinese patriotism. A nascent patriotism was already discernible in 1903,80 but it was to increase rapidly after the Russo-Japanese War. However, the above conditions were as yet the exception. In 1903 the armed services were still not held in high repute. The great majority of both Manchus and Chinese were not anxious to enlist. Officers still had far less prestige than civil officials, while the enlisted personnel were often looked upon as bandits.81 One factor which continuously reinforced the unpopularity of the military was the fact that troops were employed almost constantly against the populace in some part of the empire to put down riots and revolts. Frequently, the soldiers were guilty of terrorism, atrocities, and looting.82 Such conduct on their part only intensified the extensive opposition to a corrupt and oppressive officialdom, thus help­ ing to prepare the ground for revolution. The situation was further complicated by the development of doubts as to the loyalty of some of the troops themselves. By 1903 conserva­ tive officials were already beginning to believe that the re­ turned students from Japan might be dangerous to the old order. There were reports that revolutionary propaganda denouncing the Manchus had reached the troops in Chihli, while revolutionary documents had been found among the soldiers in Hupeh.83 Despite the modest progress that was made in modernizing 79For example, see NCH, Dec. 5, 1900, p. 1191; April 2, 1902, p. 635; Feb. 11, 1903, p. 267; Dec. 4, 1903, p. 1172. 80De Grandprey, op.cit., p. 9; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 16. 81Gadofifre, op.cit., p. 11; G. Reid, "Methods of Reform in China and Their Net Results," NCH, July 3, 1903, p. 27. 82 See the files of the NCH, 1901-1903. s s Ibid., April 16, 1903, p. 740; June 11, 1903, p. 1157.

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager China's armies during the period, certain basic weaknesses remained unaltered or were even intensified. The creation of the standing army, first-class reserves, and police troops complicated an already involved military structure. Had the new units completely replaced the older types of troops it would have marked a real advancement, but such was not the case. Most of the standing army troops were formed from Defense Army soldiers, but other militia battalions were left unchanged. The so-called first-class reserves were organized from soldiers shifted from several other categories of troops, but did not completely incorporate them. Despite the recommendations of Liu K'un-i and Chang Chih-tung that the Bannermen be reorganized, no major reform took place. Hence, by 1903 poverty-stricken China was attempting to support a great amorphous mass of soldiery including Bannermen, Green Standard, Disciplined Forces, Defense Army, organized militia, standing army, first-class reserve and police troops or gendarmes, as well as local militiamen. The training, equipment, and leadership of these various units were as heterogeneous as their designations. Most of the troops lacked the training, weapons, and morale necessary to be classed as real combat troops. While a few units were holding field maneuvers under the supervision of German or Japanese officers, others were still shooting at targets with bows and matchlocks. While some commanders trained soldiers with Mauser rifles and Krupp cannon, others stored their new weapons and let the troops use old models. Even worse, modern arms were permitted to deteriorate through lack of maintenance.84 No real effort was made during this period to centralize the command of China's armies. The standing army system was modern in conception, but it was as decentralized in operation as the old militia armies. As yet, the Throne had not made its real bid to decrease the military and political authority of the provincial officials. The balance of power still remained largely unchanged. s i Ibid., Dec. 26, 1900, p. 1338; Nov. 27, 1903, p. 1120; Jan. 15, 1904, P- 73·

Modernization Under Empress-Dowager The departure from the scene of such powerful military and political figures as Li Hung-chang and Liu K'un-i pro­ portionately increased the influence of such provincial leaders as Chang Chih-tiing and especially Yuan Shih-k'ai. The last of the great militia commanders of the Taiping period had passed from the scene to be replaced by a new generation of military-political leaders. At court the Manchu militarist, Jung-lu, was replaced as the principal adviser by the powerful but corrupt politician Prince Ch'ing.85 Like Jung-lu, Prince Ch'ing was a patron of the increasingly influential Yuan Shih-k'ai. The period from 1901-1903 was one of military transition and preparation for further change. Military reform had made discernible progress, both technically and psychologi­ cally. The conversion of the Empress-Dowager to the support of wide-scale moderate reform increased the types of military innovations that she would sponsor or at least accept. Also, the development of the concept of maintaining a standing army supported by a reserve corps indicated the adoption of an important modern theory of national defense, even if the practice fell far short of European standards. Lastly, during this period one could observe the slight beginnings of a change in the social status of the military profession and the budding of patriotism. However, the expectation of war between Russia and Japan posed a grave external threat to China's national interests, while internally the growing op­ position to the foreign dynasty and the old order increased the danger of civil war. 85Hummel,

Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 965; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 231.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, 1904-1906 The Commission for Army Reorganization

I

N the winter of 1903 China was faced not only with continued Russian intransigence in Manchuria, but also with the prospect of a war fought by foreign armies in the homeland of the dynasty. The situation was rendered even more critical by growing discontent among the people, discontent caused in part by the increased taxation necessitated by the Boxer indemnity claims. Then, too, scattered anti-foreign incidents had created a threat of foreign intervention. Yet, despite the hundreds of thousands of men in her armed services, China was once again incapable of defending her vital national interests. From an administra­ tive standpoint, the fundamental causes for this condition still included the decentralized nature of the Chinese armies, their lack of uniformity, and failure to standardize equipment. The armies could not be efficiently concentrated for joint training in time of peace, nor could they be effectively combined under unified command in time of war.1 It was in an attempt to rectify this menacing situation that the Throne on December 4, 1903, ordered the establishment of the Commission for Army Reorganization (Lien-ping ch'u, literally the Office of Military Training). The decree stated that while the governors-general and governors had repeatedly been ordered to achieve military standardization, little had been accomplished. It was therefore necessary to create at Peking an office to supervise and inspect the training of the provincial troops. The Commission was divided into three departments: Military Administration (Chun-cheng ssu), Military Command (Chiin-Ung ssu), and Military Edu1 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 126, no. 1755, p. 5, Conger to Hay, Nov. 29, X904; ibid, vol. 129, encl. in no. 180, report of Ε. T. Williams, Dec. 22, 1905; YSY, ch. 16, p. 1, and ch. 22, p. 3.

l66

Military & Administrative Reform cation (Chiin-hsiieh ssu). Prince Ch'ing was named director, Yuan Shih-k'ai associate director, and T'ieh-liang was to be the assistant director.2 On the surface, it appeared that authority in the Commis­ sion was weighted in favor of the Manchus, but, in actuality, it was dominated by Yuan Shih-k'ai. The senior staff posts were packed with his proteges. Yiian's sworn brother, Hsu Shih-ch'ang, was the senior administrative officer, while the three departments were presided over by loyal henchmen.3 Furthermore, Prince Ch'ing was a friend and patron of Yiian Shih-k'ai, while T'ieh-liang had not yet turned against him. Also, the Commission was obviously patterned after the staff which Yuan had established in Chihli in 1902 to supervise military affairs on a provincial level. In fact, two of the department chiefs were the same men. Yiian had recom­ mended the establishment of the Commission; he dominated it, and must be given the greatest share of credit for its accomplishments. Ε. T. Williams, then Chinese Secretary of the U.S. Lega­ tion, and the historian Li Chien-nung have both stated that the Throne's objective in creating the Commission for Army Reorganization was to centralize the Chinese armies.4 These authorities may well be correct, for the defects of the Chinese 2 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 522, p. 10. For a translation of the edict, see Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 124, no. 1452, Dec. 9, 1903; see also NCH (Decrees), Dec. 11, 1903, p. 1236. The Commission for Army Reorgani­ zation was divided into three departments, which were subdivided into several sections. As was typical of the Chinese staff offices of the period, the names of the departments were not fully descriptive of their functions. The Department of Military Administration had personnel, legal, medical, pay, and quartermaster functions. The Department of Military Command had planning, cartography, and storage duties. The work of the Depart­ ment of Military Education included training, education, translation, and naval matters (see Tung-fang tsa-chih [The Eastern Miscellany], vol. i, no. ι [1904], pp. 47-48). 8 Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 1, no. 1 (1904), p. 239; JATTC, ch. 3, p. 15; CSS, vol. i, sect. 2, p. 2. 4 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 126, encl. in no. 1753, report of Ε. T. Williams, Nov. 25, 1904; Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (A Political History of China during the Last Hundred Years), p. 259.

Military & Administrative Reform armed forces could only be rectified by a centralization of military administration and command. However, such con­ centration of power in the capital would abrogate vital privi­ leges of the influential and jealous provincial officials. If carried out, the policy would have destroyed the traditional balance in the power structure of China. Since the beginning of the Manchu reform movement in 1901, the government's military policy had had overtones of an assumption of greater control by Peking. The establishment of the Commission for Army Reorganization was, however, the first real skirmish in a struggle for military power between the court and the provinces, a struggle which was ended only by the revolution of 1911. Still, even in the case of the new Commission, the Throne proved unwilling to force the issue. As a result, the original objective of centralizing authority was soon weakened. On a slightly lower level, it was in keeping with tradition that Yiian should memorialize the Throne, requesting per­ mission to resign some of his concurrent posts in order to concentrate on training troops. After his request was disap­ proved, he asked permission to resign the appointment to the reorganization commission, but this was not granted either.5 Then, after making these concessions to propriety, Yuan continued to hold his numerous important positions in both the central and provincial governments. Still, it was wise of Yiian to have made a gesture toward giving up some of his offices. He was becoming too powerful, and his ambition, plus his zeal for reform, were creating enemies who were as influential as his friends. In order to augment the new program, the Throne again called upon the provincial leaders to stress military organiza­ tion and to abolish existing evils.® Then on January 3, 1904, a decree ordered a reorganization of the provincial military secretariats, including the abolition of two of the principal t CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 523, p. 11, and ch. 525, p. 1; Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. i, no. ι (1904), pp. 239-240; NCH (Decrees), Feb. 5, 1904, p. 236. e CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 522, pp. I5b-i6; see also NCH (Decrees), Dec.

18, 1903, p. 1293.

Military & Administrative Reform positions on each of these staffs. The reason given was the corruption which existed within the provincial staffs.7 Actually, since these institutions played an important super­ visory role in the Chinese armies, it was necessary to regen­ erate them if military reforms were to be carried out. During the next three years, the Commission for Army Reorganization was to promote several fundamental changes in the military system, but before it had time to formulate any large-scale innovations, a reorganization plan came from another source. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Sir Robert Hart, the able British Inspector-General of the Mari­ time Customs, presented a project to reorganize the related revenue and military structures of China. Had it been carried out, this scheme would have been advantageous to both the Chinese and British governments. Hart pointed out that the struggle between Japan and Russia over Manchuria had been made possible by the weakness of China, and that if she was to expect any consideration she must reform her military system. In order to accomplish this, he made a novel and optimistic proposal, the crux of which was a scheme to re­ organize the land tax. Owing to the lack of detailed data concerning the productive acreage of China, Hart made a simplified estimate that a light, uniform land tax could pro­ duce a steady annual yield of 400,000,000 taels. This tax was to be collected by the provincial officials, but it would be trans­ mitted to and disbursed by the central government. Hart not only presented a plan for the collection of the revenues, but also recommended projects on which they should be expended. First, in order to maintain the integrity of the empire, as well as to preserve peace and order, he suggested the creation of four well-paid standing armies of 50,000 men each, supported by first- and second-class re­ serves. These four armies were to be stationed in the Chihli, Hupeh-Hunan, Kiangsu-Anhwei-Kiangsi, and KwangtungKwangsi governor-generalships. Three sizable modern squad7 CSL 1 Te-tsung, ch. 523, pp. I3b-I4; see also NCH (Decrees), Jan. 8, 1904, p. 24.

Military & Administrative Reform rons were to be created and assigned to the Pei-yang, the Nan-yang, and the waters in between. Four arsenals would supply the arms and ammunition for the armed services, and four military academies would train men for the officers' corps. The total annual military expenses were estimated at 90,000,000 taels. Ten million taels would be appropriated for civilian schools, but the largest single item, 160,000,000 taels, would be expended to furnish generous salaries to all govern­ ment officials.8 This would abolish the necessity for, if not the practice of, corruption and squeeze. The reaction to this unconventional plan for strengthening China, especially its central government, was not unexpected. Foreign sources spoke of a "sanguine visionary" or of the promotion of the "Yellow Peril." Chinese officialdom, which must have shuddered at the very thought of such a proposal, succeeded in having the plan shelved. Despite their relatively progressive views, even Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung had no sympathy for such an unorthodox scheme.9 The two principal sources of power of the provincial officials were the extensive control which they exercised over the finances and armed forces of their provinces. Sir Robert Hart's proposals would have undermined the very basis of their strength, thus stripping them of major sources of patronage and illegal exaction. Consequently, they demonstrated no enthusiasm for this plan, even though it would have increased the welfare and security of their country. The military aspects of Hart's recommendations were less revolutionary than the fiscal aspects. Some of the military proposals had been presented before, either by the Throne or by officials. In fact, there is a resemblance between his plan for a standing army, supported by less expensive first- and second-class reserves, and the earlier recommendations of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Like Hart, both Yiian and Chang Chih-tung appreciated the advantages of paying their troops an adequate salary. Most of the governors recognized the value of both s NCH, April 15, 1904, pp. 776-779; Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, pp. 793-796. 8 Wright, op.cit., pp. 796-797; see also NCH, May 20, 1904, p. 1081.

Military & Administrative Reform arsenals and military academies but, with the possible excep­ tion of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the interests of these officials lay in having such reforms controlled on the provincial level. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War presented the Chinese government with an extremely grave threat to the empire's security. China hastily declared her neutrality, but that neutrality was so grossly flaunted by the belligerents that the dynasty was in danger of completely losing its homeland. Hence, during 1904 new battalions were recruited throughout China. Reports of troops marching north or south and of arms purchases at home as well as abroad mingled with the usual wild rumors, all of which helped to confuse the situa­ tion further.10 In the midst of these rumors, the Empress-Dowager with her advisers continued preparations to improve China's de­ fenses. A decree of May 29, 1904, changed the top personnel of the Board of War. A former Tartar-general and friend of Yuan Shih-k'ai named Ch'ang-keng was appointed acting president. Yiian's close adherent T'ieh-liang was made senior vice-president, while Hsii Shih-ch'ang was named acting vicepresident.11 Then, on the following day, an edict ordered the ministers of the Commission for Army Reorganization jointly with the Board of War (now infiltrated with officials of the Commission) to plan concerning two problems: the creation of uniformity of organization, training methods, and pay rates among the Chinese troops; and, second, the abolition or incorporation in another force of the Army of the Green Standard.12 Although joint action was ordered, during the next three years the initiative in military planning and policy was to lie with the Commission, not with the ancient Board of War. As had been pointed out by Sir Robert Hart, an increase in available revenues was necessary for the success of the 10 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 126, no. 1755, p. 5, Conger to Hay, Nov. 29, 1904; Times (London), Aug. 20, Sept. 15, 1904; YSY, ch. 26, pp. i-ib. There are numerous examples in the NCH, 1904-spring

1905. 11 CSL,

Te-tsung, ch. 529, pp. io-iob.

12 Ibid.,

pp. iob-11.

Military & Administrative Reform whole Manchu reform program, especially in its military aspects. Therefore, in July 1904 two edicts dealing with finances were issued. One stressed the need for economy and called on senior officials to abolish useless offices; the other demanded a better accounting of tax revenues.18 However, palliatives were no cure for the antiquated, crumbling tax structure of China. During the remaining years of the dynasty financial difficulties were one of the major stumbling blocks to the creation of a really effective military system.

Plans for the Establishment of the Lu-chun During the summer of 1904, the Commission for Army Reorganization prepared a lengthy, detailed plan for the re­ organization and modernization of the armies. On September 12, the Throne approved the Commission's reports, which constituted two of the most important military memorials in modern Chinese history. The first memorial14 presented the tables of organization, rates of pay, and general policy for the creation of the Lu-chun, or Army, which was to become the principal military force of China. The second presented plans for the establishment of a whole hierarchy of military schools.15 The regulations for the organization of the Lu-chun laid the foundation for the last important imperial phase of modernization of the armies of the Chinese Empire. This was a process which had begun with the creation of militia armies and the "Ever-Victorious Army" of the Taiping period. The transition had encompassed the militia armies, the Defense lt NCH

(Decrees), July 15, 1904, p. 137; July 22, 1904, p. 194. Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 2, no. 2 (1905), "Chfln-shih" (Military Affairs), pp. 31-33, 53-90; CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 534, p. 2; Captain Henry Leonard, "The Chinese Army," in Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 217, pp. 13-98. According to the above sources the memorial was presented by the Commission for Army Reorganization. However, a memorial of the Ministry of War, dated Aug. 29, 1907, refers to the two memorials as having been jointly presented by the Commission and the Board of War. See Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 4, no. 10 (1907), "Chfln-shih," p. 92. 16 See Brunnert and Hagelstrom, Present-Day Political Organisation of China, pp. 312-321; CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 534, p. 2. 14

Military & Administrative Reform Army, the Disciplined Forces, the new-style troops, and the standing army, which was to become the backbone of the Army (Lu-chiin).

The Report of the Commission 1. Derivation of the Plan. The report of the Commission was obviously influenced by Japanese military concepts. Also, many of the principles, regulations, and characteristics of organization were already in practice among Yuan Shih-k'ai's Pei-yang troops or had been recommended by him in earlier memorials. Still, the report is of sufficient importance to be presented in considerable detail, for the later developments in the foreign-style troops were either in accordance with, or, more frequently, deviations from, this basic policy directive. 2. General Considerations. The plan showed a greater com­ prehension of the fundamental principles and psychology of Western military systems, as well as a clearer grasp of the functions of a modern defense establishment, than had most previous Chinese government reports. It also demonstrated a fairly realistic appreciation of conditions within China. The officials of the Commission felt called upon to defend and rationalize their proposals in terms of both Chinese precedent and the practices of the powerful foreign states. They also reported that they had attempted to strike a balance between extravagance and dangerous economy. After studying the military system of the foreign powers, the memorialists had modified their findings to take into consideration the environ­ ment and resources of China. Realizing that political, finan­ cial, and geographic factors differed in the various provinces, they authorized variations in the size, composition, and date of completion of new provincial units. The Commission's members were also aware of the fact that the results of their proposals might be merely a change of names in old institu­ tions; so they provided that the Commission and the Board of War would periodically send officers to the provinces to inspect the progress being made. Yet, despite its elements of realism, these detailed regulations are also one of the early

Military & Administrative Reform examples of a proclivity among twentieth-century Chinese bureaucrats to draw up highly detailed and modernistic re­ form plans which are not brought to full fruition, since they are not wholly practical in terms of actual conditions. 3. Preservation of the Balance of Power. From the stand­ point of the military power structure of China, the most im­ portant feature of the final report was that, despite original intentions, the plan perpetuated the military balance of power between the provinces and the central government.16 Ap­ parently, it had been felt necessary to make a basic concession to the provincial officials, upon whose cooperation the success of the project depended. The whole plan was aimed at stand­ ardizing and modernizing the organization, training methods, equipment, and rates of pay of the Chinese armies, rather than at shifting the balance of power. The commissioners sought to establish conditions under which, in time of war, the troops of the various provinces could be mobilized and integrated into a unified command. They proposed the crea­ tion of forces capable of effective cooperation and of being serviced by one standardized logistical system. This was not a basic modification of traditional practice, for throughout the dynasty imperial commissioners had been appointed to command forces from various provinces during major cam­ paigns. The new proposals were merely an effort to make effective a terribly obsolete and inefficient system. Under the new regulations, in event of local disturbance the Tartargenerals, governors-general, or governors were to employ their own new-style troops; if these were not adequate, the officials could confer with the Board of War and the Com­ mission for Army Reorganization, requesting an edict com­ manding the assistance of troops from other areas. When order was reestablished, these latter units would revert to 16 Although the French military intelligence service drew their con­ clusions from the regulations for the Lu-chiin, as finally promulgated in early January 1905 rather than from the memorial of Sept. 12, 1904, one must doubt their interpretation that the new regulations called for a national army as opposed to the old provincial forces controlled by the governors-general (see La reorganisation militaire de la Chine," op.cit., vol. 65 [June 1905], pp. 525).

Military & Administrative Reform control of their own provinces. This procedure was also in keeping with previous practice. Then, too, the new troops would be recruited, trained, and financed by individual prov­ inces.17 By retaining these vital functions, the provinces would continue to maintain the high degree of control which they had long held over the military forces. 4. Objectives. Despite the fact that variations from the norm were provided for, not all of the objectives established by the report were obtainable under the conditions then current in China. Apparently, the Commission sought to estab­ lish a criterion which could serve as a goal and measuring rod for the progress that could be made. After enumerating the faults of the Chinese armies, recommendations were made to mitigate most of them; one important exception was the failure to tackle the problem of the Eight Banners. 5. Rectification of Weaknesses. Despite the limitations under which they operated, the officials of the Commission did attack a number of the debilitating weaknesses which beset the armed services. They pointed out the need for the education and specialization of the officers' corps, as well as the necessity for both staff and line officers. It was specified that academy-trained officers be given first preference in appointments. The report also called for a tightening-up of the inspection system. Officers' pay was to be increased to cover their actual cost of living, while their corrupt practices were to be strictly forbidden. Safeguards similar to those already employed by Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung were ordered to assure the actual payment of troops, but since the enforcement of these pay procedures was largely left up to 17 The Tartar-generals, governors-general, and governors were respon­ sible for military matters in their provinces, but owing to their numerous responsibilities and probably also to their lack of professional qualifications they were to be permitted to establish a provincial staff. In every province where there was to be a brigade or more of Lu-chiin troops, a provincial staff (tu-lien kung-so) could be established. The heads of the provinces were to act as chiefs-of-staff, but the section chiefs were supposed to be trained officers (Leonard, op.cit., pp. 29-30, 75-76; see also Chu Wu, "Wo-kuo chih lu-chiin" [The Army of Our Country], op.cit., pp. 64, 65-66; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 303-306).

Military & Administrative Reform the provincial officials,18 the restrictions were inadequate to insure honesty in financial matters. 6. Function of Officers. Numerous regulations were laid down to control technical aspects of training and personnel problems. Most of them were surprisingly modern and pro­ gressive, yet, for these very reasons, they were somewhat unrealistic, except as ultimate goals. The memorialists pre­ sented excellent advice to officers concerning the development of leadership, initiative, and training techniques. It was pointed out that previously many uneducated commanders had depended on drill instructors, with the result that in battle they lacked confidence in themselves, while their men had no faith in them. Owing to the lack of qualified officers, each organization was to be permitted to have a training officer to supervise drill and instruction, but when sufficient academy-educated men became available, all officers would be expected to do their own instructing.19 7. Selection of Enlisted Personnel. The detailed regula­ tions for recruiting enlisted men had as their objective the just and legal procurement of a better class of personnel by a form of conscription. It was recommended that one-fifth of the men recruited for a new organization have some knowledge of the written language. These select individuals would then be used to furnish the nucleus of the required non-commissioned officers. Initiative and efficiency among the men were to be encouraged by a system of promotion and demotion.20 18 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 31-34, 45-47, 60-63! see also Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 64. 19 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 41-45. 20 The enlistment requirements were as follows: Age—20 to 25 sui, height about ζ'6ι/2" in the north and about 5*4" in the south. Each recruit had to be able to lift about 133 pounds and was to be in good health, and have a good character. Opium-smokers were to be rejected. A portion of each man's pay was to be remitted to his family and each soldier was to receive a tax reduction. Local authorities were to protect the families of those in service. Had these excellent provisions always been complied with, they would have furnished an incentive for a good class of men to enter the service. For the recruiting system and enlistment regulations of the Lu-chun, see Leonard, op.cit., pp. 34-40; Chu-Wu, op.cit., pp. 64-65; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., p. 286.

Military & Administrative Reform 8. Pensions and Incentives. Among the greatest incentives to the selection of a military career are provisions for eco­ nomic security, promotion, and rewards for outstanding serv­ ice. The report, wisely taking these factors into consideration, recommended that a program of pensions for death, disability, and service be established. Actually, since 1737 the dynasty had had a system of pensions and death gratuities, but it had fallen into disuse.21 Another interesting feature of the report was that it encouraged so many of those factors which im­ prove the morale, esprit de corps, and will to fight of troops. The commissioners sought to promote a sense of patriotism, competent leadership, decent treatment, adequate pay, and medical care, especially on the battlefield. 9. Medical and Supply Services. In regard to special and technical services, the report, after pointing out the necessity for adequate medical and sanitary facilities, optimistically outlined a proposed medical hierarchy extending from the first-aid units of organizations to a base hospital. It also recommended a modern supply system, based like the other proposals on foreign practices. In this regard the plan called for an integrated supply and transportation organization capable, in time of war, of extending from the front line battalions to the base depots in the zone of the interior.22 10. Standardization of Equipment. One of the greatest handicaps to large-scale combat—in fact, to any action—by Chinese troops was the logistical nightmare created by the wide variety of their weapons and equipment. The Commis­ sion realized the problems involved in rectifying the situation, including the ever-present financial considerations, as well as the inadequacy of the Chinese arsenals. It was pointed out that the weapons of the Chinese troops should be the most effective modern models, yet they should also be simple and durable. Nevertheless, the commissioners were unduly hopeful 21 Leonard,

op.cit., pp. 49-57. Ibid., pp. 57-60, 68-71. The uniforms to be issued to the enlisted men were to be functional and inconspicuous—black for winter and khaki for summer (ibid., pp. 65-66). 22

Military & Administrative Reform in requesting a five-year time limit for even a moderate degree of standardization.23 11. Classes of Troops. All of the directives prescribed in the report were formulated to regulate and support the creation of a military system to be known as the Lu-chun, or Army. In accordance with the European practice, the Luchun was to be divided into standing army or regular troops (ch'ang-pei chiin), first-class reserves (hsii-pei chiin), and second-class reserves (hou-pei chiin). In theory, the regulars were to serve for a term of three years; then on discharge they would return to their homes to be enrolled in the firstclass reserves. While on active duty, privates were to receive 4.2 taels per month. The term of service in the first-class reserves was also three years, but the reserves would be called up for drill only at stated times. While on inactive duty they were to receive but one tael a month. Upon dis­ charge from the first-class reserves, the men were to be required to serve for four more years in the second-class reserves. There they were to receive less training and their monthly allowance was to be one-half tael, except when on active duty.24 12. Army Table of Organization. The peacetime organi­ zational structure of the standing army was based on the army corps of two divisions. Each division was to consist of a staff, two brigades of infantry, one regiment each of artillery and cavalry, one battalion of engineers, one transport battalion, and a band. In time of war, several corps could be organized into an army. Provisions were also made for an increase in the strength of each division in case of war. The authorized strength of a division was set at 748 officers or equivalents, 10,436 non-commissioned officers and pri23

Ibid., pp. 67-68; see also Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 65. op.cit., pp. 24-25; Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 61; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 285-286. For the similarities between the organiza­ tional structure of the Lu-chiin and the Japanese military system, espe­ cially regarding the categories and terms of service, as established by the Japanese conscription law of 1879 (see J. C. Balet, Le Japon militaire. L'armee et la marine japonaises en 1910-1911, 2nd edn., Yokohama, 1911, pp. 26-27, 35, 40). 24 Leonard,

Military & Administrative Reform vates, and 1,328 cooks, drivers, carriers, etc., or a total of 12,512 men. The total strength of a corps was to be 1,595 officers and 23,760 enlisted men; each corps would be fur­ nished with 4,469 horses and mules and 108 cannon.25 13. Unit Terminology. The report also established the terminology for the various types of troop units. Prior to this time, there had been no standardized designations among the various new-style forces. The regulations for the new army accepted the terms used in Yiian Shih-k'ai's Pei-yang divisions; these in turn had been inspired in part by the terminology employed in the Army of the Green Standard. Henceforth, down to the revolution, the official designation of the various units was as follows: Ta-chun—army; chiin —corps; chen—division; piao—regiment; ying—infantry, artillery, or transport battalion and cavalry squadron; tui— company, battery, or troop; p'ai—platoon.28 14. Finances. It was estimated that the annual expenses for one corps, including pay, fodder, fuel, uniforms, tentage, medicine, animals, harnesses, etc., would be 2,778,222.76 taels, or roughly 1,300,000 taels per division. However, these figures do not include the very heavy expenses for weapons, equipment, barracks, building, etc.27 15. Divisions Planned. It was estimated that the total authorized strength of the standing army should be thirty-six divisions. This ambitious, but overly optimistic, proposal would call for a regular army of more than 450,000 men, which would cost China roughly 48 million taels per year, 25 Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 2, no. 2 (1905), "Chun-shih," pp. 55, 56, 88; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 25-26, 79, 95; see also CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, pp. 40-43. Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 2, no. 2 (1905), "Chun-shih," p. SS; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., p. 287; M. A. Vissiere, Nouvelles nomen­ clatures militaires en Chine, extract from Journal asiatique (Jan.-Feb. 1914), Paris, 1914, pp. 59-60, 67. Vissiere gives the term "shih-t'uan" for army corps. This term was sometimes used, but chiin was more frequent. " Leonard, op.cit., pp. 95-98. The monthly pay and allowances for the various ranks of the Lu-chiin in taels were as follows: corps commander— 1,600; division commander—1,000; brigade commander—500; regimental commander—400; battalion commander—180 to 260; company commander —58 to 64; lieutenants—25; sergeants—5.1; corporals—4.8; privates first class—4.5; privates—4.2; supernumeraries (cooks, stablemen, etc.)—3.3 (ibid., pp. 87-95).

Military & Administrative Reform not counting initial expenses. The regulations for the estab­ lishment of the Lu-chiin system, including the plans for the creation of thirty-six divisions by 1922, were promulgated during the first days of January 1905.28 The basic factors which had prevented China from be­ coming a major military power—conditions which at that time at least, made ludicrous the recurrent allusions to the "Yellow Peril"—were provincialism, power of tradition, lack of industrialization, and a degenerate revenue structure. The Report of September 12 made no effort to rectify the two latter defects. Furthermore, it made no frontal attack on the forces of reaction, but it did present a blueprint for the improvement of purely military faults in the Chinese military system. Also, despite the fact that the plan recognized the military balance of power which existed in China, had it been possible to put the whole program into operation the result would have been to create greater military centrali­ zation.

Proposed Military Schools In conjunction with the regulations for the establishment of the Lu-chun, the Commission for Army Reorganization presented detailed directives for another essential phase of military modernization, the creation of a hierarchy of mili­ tary schools.29 These recommendations and their approval 2S Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 4, no. 10 (1907), "Chiin-shih," p. 92; see also "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 65 (June 1905), p. 525. Neither the Chinese version of the memorial of Sept. 12, 1904, in the Tung-fang tsa-chih (vol. 2, no. 2 [1905], "Chun-shih," pp. 31-33, 53-90) nor the English translation in Leonard (op.cit., pp. 13-98) mentions the important fact that the authorized strength of the Lu-chiin was set at thirty-six divisions. The French General Staff speaks of the regulations for creation of the Lu-chun, including the plan for thirty-six divisions, as having been promulgated "in the first days of the month of January 1905" ("La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 65 [June 1905], p. 524). The author has been unable to find a reference to this order in the Ch'ingshih lu. It is possible that the memorial of Sept. 12, 1904, was slightly modified and finally promulgated in January 1905 as a joint directive from the Board of War and the Commission for Army Reorganization. 29 For a detailed summary of the types of military schools planned

l8o

Military & Administrative Reform by the Throne were a recognition of the fact that extensive military modernization was impossible unless a corps of competent and professionally trained leaders could be de­ veloped. As outlined by the Commission the military school system was to consist of widespread basic military schools (Lu-chiin hsiao-hsueh t'ang),four intermediate schools (Lu-chiin chunghsueh t'ang), an officers' school (Ping-kuan hsileh-t'ang), and a general staff college (Lu-chiin ta-hsiieh t'ang). It was also envisaged that specialist and technical schools would be established, including schools for the basic arms and services. Equally important was the decision to create schools and instruction battalions for the training of non-commissioned officers. The principal objective of the above-mentioned in­ stitutions was the instruction of young commissioned and non-commissioned officers. It had already been demonstrated, however, that much of the benefit to be expected from train­ ing subordinate officers had been lost because they served under men who were complacently ignorant. Hence, it was planned to establish courses of military instruction (chiangwu t'ang) at the provincial capitals to give some modern training to senior officers. In theory, the normal procedure for educating new officers would be as follows: military basic schools would be estab­ lished in the various provinces and at the Banner garrisons. Graduates of junior primary schools would be enrolled as cadets in the basic school for a three-year course of general education and fundamental military science. Those who graduated would be sent for two years to the intermediate military schools which were to be established in Chihli, Hupeh, Kiangsu, and Shensi. After completing this course, which would again include both civilian and military subjects, the cadets would be required to serve for four months in the ranks; then they would be ordered to the officers' school for one and a half years. Before being commissioned, they would for in the memorial of September 12, 1904, as well as special schools authorized by later edicts, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 312321; see also Chu Wu, op.cit., pp. 67-69.

l8l

Military & Administrative Reform again be required to serve with a unit for six months as a student officer (hsiieh-hsi kuan). At the end of that period, the candidates would be given an examination and the ones who attained a satisfactory mark would be commissioned as company or platoon leaders. Finally, graduates of the officers' school who had rendered two years of outstanding service would be eligible for the general staff college course of two years. Those who completed the course were to be classed as general staff corps officers. Regulations were also pre­ pared for sending both Chinese and Manchu students abroad to complete their military education.80 This somewhat impractical plan was very similar to the system of training officers actually employed by the Japanese army, except that in centralized Japan the military schools were under the direction of either the Ministry of War or the General Staff.31 In China, cadets would begin their education in provincial schools, dominated by the local officials, but their advanced training would be received in regional intermediary schools and completed in Peking. Had it been fully carried out, this plan would not only have helped to standardize military education, it would also have per­ mitted more centralized control and indoctrination. Therefore, it was probably in part due to provincial opposition that the officers' school and staff college were not established in the capital. If it had been possible to implement the policy fully, within a decade China would have been producing a stream of well-qualified young officers; yet it is not surprising that under the empire no officer ever had the opportunity to complete such a military education within the borders of China. Nevertheless, considerable progress was made in the field of military education. The first steps included the re­ organization of the original military preparatory schools as basic schools. Furthermore, because of the urgent need for trained officers, a short-term officers' school (Lu-chiin su30 Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 312-317, 320-322; see also Chu Wu, op.cit., pp. 68-69. 81 Balet, op.cit., pp. 65-66, 67, 70-73, 76-77.

Military & Administrative Reform ch'eng hsiieh-t'ang) was established at Yiian Shih-k'ai's large military camp at Paoting, Chihli, in 1905.82 The Manchu leadership supported the establishment of military schools, but had no desire to see military command limited to the Chinese. This is indicated by the founding of the Military School for Princes and Nobles (Lu-chiin kueichou hsiieh-t'ang). Acting on the recommendation of the Commission for Army Reorganization, the Throne on Octo­ ber 19, 1905, ordered the creation of a school for the sons of princes, imperial clansmen, and senior Manchu and Chinese officials.33 The increasing military power and influence of Yuan Shih-k'ai is shown by the fact that although the super­ intendent of the school was to be a Manchu prince, the director was one of Yuan's lieutenants, General Feng Kuo-chang.84 Most of the numerous military academies in China were well attended, especially after the founding of the School for Princes and Nobles.35 As we have seen, one of the greatest handicaps facing the military schools—in fact, confronting the whole military profession—was the low social status of the armed service. Now the enrollment of members of the 82Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 314-315; Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 69. By early in 1905, China already had a considerable network of military schools on which to build. It was reported that all of the provinces of China proper, except Kansu and Kwangsi, had military academies. There were no known academies in Manchuria, but Sinkiang had a small military school. Several provinces had more than one institution. Chihli had three, while Hupeh, Kiangsu, and Shantung had two each (NCH, Jan. 27, 1905, pp. 209-210; see also Leonard, op.cit., p. 156). 83 For a translation of this edict, see Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 128, no. 128; see also NCH (Decrees), Oct. 27, 1905, p. 202. The selection of the sons of princes, nobles and high officials to attend military schools had previously been recommended by the Chinese diplomat Liang Ch'eng (CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 540, p. 8). ii NCH (Decrees), Jan. 19, 1906, p. 121. 85 Lieutenant G. V. Strong, "The Education of the Chinese Corps of Officers," trans, from the German in Journal of the Military Services Institution of the United States, vol. 47 (Sept.-Oct. 1910), p. 296. The U.S. Legation reported that the Throne went so far in its support of the new educational system as to decide in December 1905 that for three years no vacancies in the Banner Corps would be filled. The funds that would be saved were to be allotted to the support of schools, both civil and military (Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 129, no. 180, p. 15, report of Ε. T. Williams, Dec. 22, 1905).

Military & Administrative Reform imperial family and the sons of senior officials in the new school lent prestige to the other academies. The major faults of the military schools were the same ones that beset the various armies of China. The schools were provincial institutions, established by the governorsgeneral and governors. They were independent of each other; they were not uniform; and, owing to the shortage of com­ petent instructors, their teaching staffs and curricula varied in quality. Yet the establishment of foreign-style schools, both civil and military, tended to reduce to some degree the prejudice held by most officials against borrowing from abroad; more and more bureaucrats became aware of the fact that valuable information could be obtained from outside China.36

Additional Military Reforms An annoying condition which faced the reformers of China's military system was that the terminology used to designate the various types of military units and ranks was as heterogeneous as the weapons carried by the soldiers. The Eight Banners, the Army of the Green Standard, the militia armies, and the foreign-style troops all used different terms. Moreover, since only the Bannermen and the soldiers of the Green Standard had been classed as legitimate armed forces, only their officers possessed official rank. Further­ more, military titles of any type were considered inferior in status to the prized civil service ranks. If the new-style armies were to recruit men of ability and education, it was essential that they be given a recognized status and that attempts be made to raise their position in relation to the civil bureaucracy. Therefore, as a preliminary step in this direction, the Throne on December 20, 1904, approved a joint memorial of the Commission for Army Reorganization and the Board of War establishing a table of ranks for the new army. The memorial pointed out that foreign countries honored the military profession and that in China a better ss Ibid.,

pp. 3-4.

Military & Administrative Reform class of officers was being recruited than formerly. Since many of the officers of the new-style troops were either academy-trained, or returned students, or men familiar with military matters, they deserved a recognized status. Con­ sequently, the memorial proposed a military hierarchy com­ posed of three grades, each divided into three ranks. The new terminology, which borrowed both from the regulations of the Eight Banners and from foreign practice, provided a neat, systematic arrangement as far as the Western-style troops were concerned. More important was the fact that, at least in theory, each rank was to be comparable to the cor­ responding civil title and equal to the corresponding Green Standard rank. The new military ranks were surprisingly exalted when contrasted to the functions of the civil bureauc­ racy. Theoretically, a lieutenant general had rank compa­ rable to a governor-general; a brigadier general ranked with a governor; a major with an intendant; and a second lieu­ tenant with a district magistrate.87 However, this had been true of Green Standard officers for over two centuries, yet their prestige and power had never equaled their rank. The establishment of ranks for officers of the new-style troops did at least help formalize the terminology employed for those units, but the decadent Banner Forces retained their own titles, as did the gradually demobilizing Army of the Green Standard. Moreover, the official records each year continued to announce the cadres of the Bannermen and Green Standard without even mentioning the new ranks.88 37 Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 2, no. 2 (1905), "Chtin-shih," pp. 33-36; CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 537, pp. 14-14!). See also CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, pp. 44-46; Vissiere1 op.cit., pp. S9-6i, 69-70. The summary in the CSL shows this document to have been a memorial of the Commission for Army Reorgani­ zation, but according to the text in the Tung-fang tsa-chih, it was a joint memorial of the Commission and the Board of War. The ranks of the new army and their U.S. Army equivalents are as follows: Cheng tu-t'ung (lieutenant general), fu tu-t'ung (major general), hsieh tu-t'ung (briga­ dier general), cheng ts'an-ling (colonel), fu ts'an-ling (lieutenant colonel), hsieh ts'an-ling (major), cheng chiin-hsiao (captain), fu chun-hsiao (first lieutenant), and hsieh chiin-hsiao (second lieutenant). 38 Vissiere, op.cit., p. 62. For a table of the comparable ranks of the Eight Banners, the Army of the Green Standard, and the Lu-chiin, see ibid, pp. 68-69.

Military & Administrative Reform Urged on by the Throne, the Commission for Army Re­ organization intervened in another critical aspect of the military establishment. In the wars of the last half of the nineteenth century, the several provincial arsenals had in­ variably proved inadequate and incompetent. At each crisis during the intervening years of peace, China had been forced into the dangerous expedient of relying on her potential enemies for munitions. Any attempt to rectify this situation interfered with provincial interests in either the production or purchase of arms. Nevertheless, it was building on sand to create a modern army without providing a secure and self-sufficient source of supply. Consequently, the Commission presented a project which, although technically sound, was certain to arouse animosity. The plan called for the establish­ ment of three large regional arsenals, to be under the super­ vision of the central government. It was proposed to make use of the big Hanyang arsenal, which had been established by Chang Chih-tung, while the second plant would be built either in Kwangtung or the lower Yangtze Valley. The third was to be located in North China, but no final selection was ever made. The new plants were all to be inland, safer from attack than most of the existing works. Upon completion of the factories, the provincial arsenals, including the sizable Kiangnan arsenal at Shanghai, would be closed. This scheme was under consideration for several years, but it was never carried out. Had it been consummated, it would have increased China's military strength.39 Instead, the plan collapsed in the face of financial difficulties, complicated by provincial jealousies. Still, the Throne did take some steps aimed at increasing the government's authority over military supply. In the fall of 1906, the Empress-Dowager approved a recommendation of the Commission for Army Reorganization that the control of all arsenals be turned over to the Commission. Then, after the creation of the new Minis8eLeonard, op.cit., pp. 341-342; "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (May 1906), pp. 451-452; [G. B. Rea] "China's Army and Navy," Far Eastern Review, vol. 7 (Aug. 1910), p. 94; N CH, Dec. 6, 1907, p. 591, and Aug. 21, 1909, p. 442.

Military & Administrative Reform try of War in November, that ministry theoretically took over the direction of the arms plants, but the battle was not won. Since the governors-general and governors continued to finance these institutions, they also continued to exert considerable control over them.40 The central government was never able to strip the provincial officials of their great financial powers and as long as they retained a high degree of control over revenues they could largely block efforts to reduce their other sources of influence.

T'ieh-liang's Tour of Inspection By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese official­ dom was beginning to grasp the importance of geography and modern communications to stategic defense. Despite previous opposition to railway construction, the government had already become aware of the military value of a railway network. They also realized the danger of foreign interference in internal affairs by means of control of the railroads. Hence, the Chinese were determined to regain title to existing rail­ ways, if possible, and to control the construction of any new lines.41 Progressive officials also came to appreciate the vul­ nerability of China's arsenals, most of which were within easy striking distance of the coast. Wei Kuang-tao, the governor-general at Nanking, and Chang Chih-tung me­ morialized the Throne, recommending that the important Kiangnan arsenal at Shanghai be moved to a more secure spot in Anhwei or Kiangsi.42 The Throne, taking advantage of this recommendation, ordered T'ieh-liang, the Assistant-Director of the Commis­ sion for Army Reorganization, to make an inspection of conditions in the Yangtze Valley. T'ieh-liang's mission was 40 WDGS no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes in Chinese Army in 1910," 1 Feb. 20, 19x1, p. 20; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au ier Mars 1910," Revue militaire des armies etrangeres, vol. 75 (May 1910), p. 442; NCH, Sept. 28, 1906, p. 761. 41 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 128, no. 63, pp. 1-2, Rockhill to Sec. State, Aug. 19, 1905. 42 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 536, p. 12; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 2, 1904, p. 1246.

Military & Administrative Reform more extensive than a mere investigation of the proposals of the Yangtze governors-general. He was also ordered to inquire into the income and expenditures of the various provinces, as well as to inspect the actual strength and train­ ing methods of the provincial troops. In fact, his trip, which lasted from August 1904 to February 1905, was one of the first major acts in the movement to create a new military system.43 Furthermore, it is reminiscent of K'ang-i's tour of "extortion" in 1899. There was widespread speculation that the mission had other purposes even beyond those which had been officially announced. It was rumored that T'ieh-liang's objectives included depriving the provincial officials of their control over the finances and armies of the empire, and that he was collecting large sums to finance the Lu-chun. It was even suggested that the Manchus planned to suppress their Chinese subjects. The U.S. Embassy gave some credence to all of these reports except the latter. Ε. T. Williams, the Chinese Secretary of the Embassy, believed that one purpose of the mission was to obtain additional funds for the armed services. He pointed out that the Commission for Army Reorganiza­ tion could not operate without a regular income. He also stated that the Chinese Government sought to strengthen the empire internally and externally and believed that to do so it was necessary to have a strong centralized army. Wil­ liams, however, discounted the rumor that the Manchus sought to suppress the Chinese. As he indicated, the policy of the Throne actually was to bind the leading Chinese to the dynasty by conferring honors upon them, while main­ taining a policy of divide and rule by creating rivalries among the Chinese for imperial favor.44 Obviously, T'ieh-liang did trespass on the financial pre­ serves of the jealous provincial officers, and they had suffi­ cient power to stop his transgressions. An edict of November i a CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 533, pp. 4b-5; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 2, 1904, p. 1246; Leonard, op.cit., p. 99. 44 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 126, encl. in no. 1755, report of Ε. T. Williams, Nov. 29, 1904; NCH, Sept. 2, 1904, pp. 532, 534, and Oct. 21, 1904, p. 920.

Military & Administrative Reform 29, 1904, reaffirmed T'ieh-liang's orders to investigate the transfer of the Kiangnan arsenal and to inspect the Yangtze troops, but it was stated that he need not examine the pro­ vincial treasuries, since the Throne placed that responsibility on the governors-generals and governors.45 During his tour of inspection, T'ieh-liang was accompanied by a German, Herr Heckman, who had formerly been em­ ployed in the Krupp works. Since T'ieh-liang lacked a sound military background, Heckman did the actual inspecting and provided the data for the final report. This document was limited to military matters and, although somewhat naive, it was substantially objective in its praise and criticism of the troops of influential officials. The long memorial described the status of the fortifications, land forces, naval units, and military schools located in the Yangtze Valley. Among the land forces, Chang Chih-tung's Hupeh regulars were desig­ nated as the most outstanding, and the Hupeh military schools were considered to be the finest in the area. The standing army infantry battalions of Honan, the four battalions of Kiangnan, and the four battalions of Kiangsi were found to be fairly satisfactory. The remaining troops of the Yangtze provinces varied from mediocre to almost worthless. It was also reported that most of the military schools had consider­ able room for improvement. The degenerate Army of the Green Standard, which was largely in the process of re­ organization, contributed little to China's strength.46 As a result of this report, the Throne in an edict of Febru­ ary 23, 1905, showed its displeasure that most of the pro­ vincial officials and commanding officers still had not carried out the imperial orders to modernize their troops. Chang Chih-tung alone was commended for his diligence and loyalty, while indignation was expressed concerning the other governors-general and governors. They were ordered to train their soldiers in accordance with the approved regu4 6 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 536, p. 12; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 2, 1904, p. 1246; see also NCH, Aug. 26, 1904, p. 471. 46 T'ieh-liang's report to the Throne is translated in Leonard, op.cit., pp. 99-158; see especially pp. 99, 155-157. See also CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 8b.

Military & Administrative Reform lations drawn up by the Commission for Army Reorganiza­ tion, so that their forces might be worthy of the money expended on them. It was typical that although the senior officials were given only a verbal reprimand, more severe punishment was administered to a number of their subordi­ nates, the unworthy scapegoats of imperial wrath. An intendant, two brigadier generals, a colonel, and a lieutenant colonel were cashiered.47 Then, during the next three months, a whole series of generals commanding military circuits were dismissed or transferred.48 The Throne was demonstrating a desire to improve the efficiency of its armed services, but the Empress-Dowager was not prepared for a major conflict with the senior provincial officials on behalf of military, financial, or political reform. The provincial leaders themselves were not impervious to the shock treatment of foreign aggression. During 1905 the provinces in varying degrees began to respond to the Throne's demands that they reorganize their armies. Yet, with the exception of Yiian Shih-k'ai, who was largely responsible for the plans, even the most progressive officials were either unwilling or unable to comply strictly with the new military system.49 Nevertheless, the growth of nationalism and the spread of revolutionary activities would modify the trend of military affairs.

Nationalism and Revolution Japanese victories in the Russo-Japanese War had a pro­ found effect on modern Chinese history. In fact, Japan's success had a deep psychological influence on the peoples of all Asia. They were intoxicated by the fact that in that age of imperialism an Asiatic state could defeat a European power. In China, Japan's success stimulated three related 47 For a translation of this edict from the Peking Gazette, see Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 126, encl. in no. 1819; see also NCH (Decrees), March 3, 1905, p. 440. 48For example, see NCH (Decrees), March 17, 1905,'p. 540; April 28, 1905, p. 183. 49 See Chapter 6.

Military & Administrative Reform but divergent trends. It encouraged the growth of national­ ism, in the Western sense of that word. It also spurred the development of the concomitant elements, patriotism and a military spirit. At the same time, the rise of nationalism made it ever more apparent that the reigning dynasty was alien. In terms of power politics, Russia's defeat merely replaced one aggressive power in southern Manchuria by another, but, temporarily at least, China's fear of Japanese ambitions was outweighed by pride in her neighbor's achievements. The result was an expansion of the already noticeable Japa­ nese influence in the Manchu Empire, particularly in mili­ tary affairs.50 The creation of the Commission for Army Reorganization itself was to a large degree the result of the conflict between Russia and Japan over Manchuria. The war increased the tempo of military modernization, which then continued largely unabated for another year after the treaty of Ports­ mouth ended the conflict in September 1905. During and after the war, foreign observers took note of a budding nationalism and patriotism which differed from the customary Chinese egocentrism and cultural pride. Closely related to this current was a developing martial spirit, as well as a noticeable shift in public opinion concerning the military profession. Militarism was being encouraged both by the court and by such powerful officials as Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung. In the schools, even in some missionary institutions, members of the student class were not only drilling, but it was reported, doing it creditably.51 Some 60 This statement is based in part on Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 126, end. in no. 175s, report of Ε. T. Williams, Nov. 29, 1904; "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (May 1906), p. 353; Lord Wil­ liam Gascoyne-Cecil, Changing China, New York, 1910, pp. 12-13; Times (London), Feb. 14, 1906. 51 Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 128, encl. in no. 75, Rockhill to Sec. State, Aug. 26, 1905, and vol. 129, encl. in no. 180, pp. 13-14, Williams to Rockhill, Dec. 22, 1905; "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (May 1906), p. 353; Times (London), Jan. 1, 1906; NCH, Nov. 18, 1904, p. 1125, and March 2, 1906, p. 475; Sir Charles Eliot, Letters jrom the Far East, London, 1907, pp. 101, 105; "The New Chinese Army," Living Age, vol. 248 (Feb. 1906), p. 435.

Military & Administrative Reform members of the elite literati class were also entering the military schools. Still, one must view with skepticism the statement of the French military attache that "everyone" wanted to wear a uniform and be drilled.52 Naturally, the growth of a military spirit would tend gradually to raise the base social status of the military profession. Another factor which would change public opinion was the greatly improved appearance, discipline, and behavior of the better new-style troops. Yet this trend should not be overestimated. The best minds were still not seeking preferment as pro­ fessional officers,53 nor had love of country yet replaced the traditional obligation to one's family as the basic loyalty. The Japanese victories on land and sea had proved that the East was not necessarily inferior to the West. It was possible for an Asiatic people to match the industrial and military power of an Occidental state. This realization increased China's zeal for reform, for the advantages of imitating the West had been strikingly confirmed by the policies of Japan. However, the very desire to hasten China's modernization, combined with expanding anti-dynastic feeling, promoted the third major trend of the period, revolutionary activity. In 1905 Sun Yat-sen, in Japan, united his own revolutionary organization with other splinter groups to form the T'ungmeng hui (Common Alliance Society), whose fiery manifesto called for the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a republic. In November the Throne ordered the provincial officials to crush the movement.54 This was a vain endeavor, for widespread discontent and distress facili­ tated revolutionary activity. In July 1906, the American Embassy informed Washington of current reports that Sun Yat-sen had sent agents to China to take "advantage of any 52 From an article by Colonel Valette in Revue des troupes coloniales (July 1906), summarized in NCH, Sept. 21, 1906, p. 701. ™ N C H , May 6, 1904, p. 929; July 15, 1904, p. 125; Nov. 18, 1904, p. 1125; Leonard, op.cit., p. 162. 54 For a translation of the manifesto of the T'ung-meng hui, see Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, pp. 227-229. See also NCH (Decrees), Dec. 1, 1905, p. 487.

Military & Administrative Reform opportunity to stir up trouble."65 One of the most serious aspects of the accelerated revolutionary campaign was that it coincided with the launching of the program to establish the Lu-chun, for anti-dynastic elements were to succeed in seri­ ously infiltrating the new army.

Administrative Reforms and the Establishment of the Ministry of War As revolutionary activities increased, so did the ardor for moderate reform, including long overdue administrative re­ organization. The decentralized features of administration were unsuited to the creation of an effective modern state. Greater concentration of authority over the political, finan­ cial, and military systems was essential if China was to win a status of equality in the community of nations. However, a policy of centralization, even if sincerely motivated, ran coun­ ter to the interests of the powerful provincial forces. Even in the capital many officials, both Chinese and Manchu, opposed reorganization. Progressives and conservatives dif­ fered as to the steps which should be taken, while a clique of Manchus sought a centralization of authority at the expense of the Chinese. The court was also faced with an example of that historical phenomenon in which an ultra-conservative regime, by beginning a program of reform, creates a period of crisis when the demand for change outstrips both the desire and the ability of the regime to promote it. In this case, the reforms which were announced demonstrate that the Throne was motivated by a practical desire to increase the efficiency of the administration without decreasing imperial authority.68 The most important administrative reform was 65 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 32, no. 215, Rockhill to Root, July 7, 1906. 68 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, vol. 171, no. 1518/27-30, Rockhill to Root, Jan. 24, 1907; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., p. 207; Cameron, op.cit., pp. 105, 112; NCH, Sept. 28, 1906, p. 788, and Nov. 16, 1906, p. 380. Li Chien-nung oversimplifies a complex situation in his discussion of the motives which underlay constitutional reform. It was not merely a matter of the Manchu nobles desiring an anti-Chinese con-

Military & Administrative Reform the final decision to do away with the ancient civil service examinations. On September 2, 1905, a decree of great historical signifi­ cance ordered the abolition of the civil service examinations." On several occasions since the seventeenth century, coura­ geous men had proposed the modification of the examinations. In 1903 Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai had advocated gradually discarding the system and relying upon modern schools to furnish men of training and talent. Again, in 1905, Yuan, Chang, and Chao Er-hsiin recommended that the tests be summarily discontinued. In 1903, Chang and Yiian had argued that the traditional examinations were the greatest obstacle to the creation of a modern school system because the ambitions of the people centered around the examination sys­ tem. They felt that until it was abolished there would be no real support for the new-style schools.58 The objective of these men was to promote the welfare and strength of China; yet they, as much as anyone, were responsible for the destruction of the tradition of civilian rule and the rise of the period of military chaos known as warlordism. They not only advocated the abolition of the Confucian examinations, they were also the prime sponsors of the new military schools and the semiprivate modern armies from which the warlords emerged. The decision to abolish the ancient civil service examina­ tions destroyed the principal source of recruitment for the powerful civil bureaucracy. It cut the tap root of an official class which for centuries had to an unusual degree preserved the subordination of the armed forces to civil rule. Hence­ forth, the literary degrees and official appointments were to centration of power. Nor was it only a case of the majority of Chinese officials desiring an opportunity to establish constitutional government and to avoid Manchu oppression, while the Empress-Dowager procrastinated, with the attitude "after me, the deluge" (see Li, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 251252). " N C H (Decrees), Sept. 8, 1905, pp. 553-554. 68Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., pp. 205-207; see also ibid., draft volume, P- 545·

Military & Administrative Reform be bestowed on those who completed courses in the new-style schools in China or abroad.59 In the matter of administrative reorganization, as in mili­ tary affairs, China's leaders sought to discover those elements which made the Western powers and Japan strong. It was seen that among the institutions which powerful nations had in common was a constitution and a ministerial form of gov­ ernment, so in 1905 two commissions were sent abroad to study political practices. In 1906 the commissions returned, confident of the benefits to be obtained from the adoption of a constitution. They were especially interested in the Japanese variety, since it had been presented to the people as a gift from the emperor. Nevertheless, the court realized that China was not yet prepared by experience or education for constitu­ tional government. It would be necessary to make preliminary administrative and educational preparations for such a step.60 According to one Chinese historian, the Throne originally favored a program which in general resembled the Japanese system. The establishment of a constitution would be delayed for a decade or more, during which time the provincial administrations would be revised. The functions of the gov­ ernors-general and governors would be restricted; their im­ portant fiscal and military powers would revert to the central government. However, opposition to these plans was too great to permit their execution. In early September 1906, a decree established a commission of senior officials to formu­ late rules to govern the bureaucracy, but within the committee there was such antagonism to provincial reform that it was decided first to reorganize the central government.®1 Regulations for the revision of the central administration were issued on November 6, 1910. The old Six Boards and other important offices were reorganized as eleven ministries. Previously, the top posts had been equally divided between 09

Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 267, 271-273. 1906, part i, pp. 350-351; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 100-104; Teng and Fairbank, op.cit., pp. 207-209. eiLi 1 op.cit., vol. i, pp. 252-253; FR, 1906, part 1, p. 351; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 7, 1906, p. 570. w FR,

Military & Administrative Reform Manchus and Chinese, but the new directives stated that henceforth no racial distinction would be made. A number of independent bureaus were incorporated into ministries, but others, including the Eight Banners and the Grand Council, were excluded from the reorganization. In fact, the whole settlement was considered to be a compromise between the conservatives and the progressives. It therefore pleased no one, and the publication of the decrees was followed by a surge of reaction. In addition, despite the new policy state­ ment the appointment of ministers was weighted in favor of the Manchus, especially in the case of the new Ministry of War.62 In the past, the Board of War had been fundamentally a civil institution. As a rule, the senior officials had been civilians, while the military officers assigned to the Board had played a minor rule. The civilian chiefs had been products of the civil service system; they held concurrent posts; they were not permanently assigned to the War Office; and, even had they so desired, it was almost impossible for them to become competent military administrators. Also, the activities of the Board of War had been almost completely administra­ tive and logistical. It had no jurisdiction over the imperial guard and, since the supervision of ,provincial forces was so largely in the hands of the provincial officials, the functions of the Board were much more limited than those of the war ministries of the Western democracies.63 62 FR, 1906, part I, pp. 351-352; NCH (Decrees), Nov. 9, 1906, pp. 343344; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 105-107; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, PP- 253-255. After the top twelve appointments had been made, the tally was six Manchus, one Mongol, one Chinese Bannerman, and four Chinese (Li, op.cit., p. 255). 63De Grandprey, Les armies de la Chine, p. 13; Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, pp. 13-15. Prior to the reorganization of Nov. 6, 1906, the Board of War had consisted of four departments: a personnel depart­ ment which supervised promotions, ranks, titles, and organization; an adjutant-general's department which was responsible for inspection, re­ wards, punishments, and the issuance of general orders; a remount depart­ ment which was charged with supplying horses and with relay com­ munications; and a quartermaster and ordnance department which main­ tained service records as well as supplying ammunition and equipment. Prior to their abolition, this latter department had also administered the

Military & Administrative Reform In accordance with the decree of November 6, 1906, the Board of War was renamed the Ministry of War (Lu-chiin Pu) and incorporated the bureau which was in charge of the imperial horse herds. Since neither a navy department nor a general staff corps had yet been formed, functions normally assigned to these agencies were to be supervised by a Naval Bureau (Hai-chiin ch'u) and a General Staff Council (Chiintsu ch'u) within the Ministry of War. By far the most im­ portant feature of the reorganization was the fact that the new Ministry of War assimilated the Commission for Army Reorganization.64 During the preceding three years, the Com­ mission and not the obsolete, inefficient Board of War, had been the principal agent for the encouragement of military modernization. Yet, from the standpoint of efficiency, it was preferable that military reform be placed within the jurisdic­ tion of the new Ministry of War. The amalgamation was in keeping with the legitimate need to concentrate authority. Also, the policy concerning the assignment of military officers to the Ministry changed to one of selecting officers trained in the academies at Tientsin, Paoting, Wuchang, or Japan. A school was even established to indoctrinate the civil officials of the Ministry. Finally, although the ministers were hence­ forth to be Manchus, at least they were men with some experience in military administration. Still, it must be pointed out that the progress made in modernizing the Ministry was only relative; to the end of the dynasty it suffered from con­ flicting authority and limited powers.65 More influential than the legitimate objectives involved was the fact that the reorganization of the Board of War was also a phase in the struggle for power between rival races and cliques. It will be remembered that the Commission for Army Reorganization had been dominated by Yiian Shihold military examinations (Hsieh, op.cit., p. 256; Upton, op.cit., p. 14; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 138-139). e4 NCH (Decrees), Nov. 9, 1906, p. 344; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., p. 139. 65 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Juillet 1908," Revue militaires des armees etrangeres, vol. 73 (Jan. 1909), pp. 52-53; WDGS, no. 6283-8, "Monthly Reports, March i-April 20, 1911," p. 4.

Military & Administrative Reform k'ai. Succeeding events made evident that one of the principal purposes of the reorganization was to reduce the military influence of Yuan and ultimately that of the other provincial officials. At the same time a clique of Manchus sought to increase their own power. T'ieh-liang was appointed president of the Ministry of War, while the vice-presidents were the Manchus Shou-hsiin and Yin-ch'ang.ee In 1903, T'ieh-liang had been the friend and protege of Yuan Shih-k'ai, but by 1906, owing to his own ambitions and to the growing strug­ gle for power between cliques of officials, T'ieh-liang had become a bitter enemy of his former benefactor. Still, Yuan was not completely unrepresented in the new ministry since Yin-ch'ang was one of his supporters. Furthermore, until such time as Yin-ch'ang could reach his post, Wang Shihchen, one of Yiian's generals, was to be acting vice-president.87 Obviously, the elderly Empress-Dowager herself was still balancing one faction against another, but after her death the Regent was to seek greater control over the troops and finances in the provinces. In general, his attempt failed. Yet, it did achieve some temporary successes, the outstanding victim being none other than that promoter of military re­ form, Yiian Shih-k'ai. By the end of 1906, the basic policies for the creation of a modern military establishment had been promulgated. The tables of organization, ranks, and rates of pay for a Westernstyle army of thirty-six divisions, supported by two classes of reserves, had been drawn up. Plans had been issued for a comprehensive system of military schools and for large government-controlled arsenals. Finally, the Board of War had been reorganized in a somewhat more effective form. In formulating these policies, basic concessions had been made to traditional provincial interests, but the whole program had overtones of centralization and the attempt to put it into operation was to lead to an intensified conflict between Peking 66 Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 3, no. 11 (1906), "Tsa-tsu" (Miscellanea) section, p. 48; NCH (Decrees), Nov. 16, 1906, p. 379. e7Li, op.ctt., vol. i, pp. 258-259; Leonard, op.cit., p. 99; Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 3, no. 11 (1906), "Tsa-tsu," p. 49.

Military & Administrative Reform and the provincial capitals—a conflict which did not end even with the fall of the dynasty. The years from 1904-1906 were not, however, limited to theoretical planning. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, progress was also made in the actual organization and training of new-style troops.

CHAPTER 6

PROGRESS IN MILITARY TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION, 1904-1906 Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang Army

T

HE impetus given to military reform by the RussoJapanese conflict and by the creation of the Com­ mission for Army Reorganization presented an opportunity to those who desired to modernize China's armed forces. The achievements of the period were not spectacular, yet the years 1904-1906 saw a more rapid rate of progress than any comparable period during the last half-century of the dynasty. The most striking feature of this advancement is that it can be divided into two nearly equal parts, the greater of which was principally the work of one man, the governor-general of Chihli, Yiian Shih-k'ai. From the standpoint of both numbers and quality, the divisions which he organized were superior to the modern-style forces organized by all the other provincial officials together. This rapid increase in the power of Yiian Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang Army resulted from the seizure of opportunity by a man who possessed energy, ability, loyalty, and great ambi­ tion—a combination of qualities which permitted Yuan to outstrip his competitors, both in the capital and in the provinces. The governor-general of Chihli was held accountable for the defense of Northeast China and the strategically vital metropolitan area. While this fact permitted Yiian to organize a larger army than any other provincial leader, it also pre­ sented him with a grave responsibility. The threat of a foreign war, to be fought primarily in Manchuria, created serious problems for him. In January 1904, Ytian reported to the Throne that both Japan and Russia were prepared for war. Faced with this situation, he estimated that to defend the borders of his governor-generalship he should have over 100,000 men, and that it would require at least 60,000 soldiers

Progress in Military Training to defend Chihli and the imperial capital. Yuan pointed out that the Anhwei Army and Disciplined Forces had deterio­ rated to the point where they were barely able to police the province. Thus, the available combat troops consisted of Yiian's own Right Division of 7,000 men; 9,000 soldiers in the new Standing Army; the Self-strengthening Army of over 2,000 men; the 3,000 Bannermen of the Metropolitan Banner Forces and Chiang Kuei-t'i's unit which mustered 5,000 men. The Left Division of the Guards Army, led by the provincial commander-in-chief, Ma Yu-k'un, and reported to consist of 10,000 soldiers, could also be employed. Yuan estimated that when the troops needed for garrison, guard, and convoy duty were deducted from this total, not over 20,000 men would be available as a combat force. Further­ more, the weapons of these troops were not uniform and they were short of ammunition.1 Yiian had previously consulted with Prince Ch'ing about the situation and had proposed to recruit an additional 30,000 men as well as to purchase more ammunition, but the overall project would cost some six million taels. Therefore, because of financial difficulties, it was recommended that initially only 10,000 men be enlisted. It was planned that three million taels would be collected at first. One million was to be raised in Chihli, while two million were requested from the Board of Revenue. For security reasons, the real purpose of the allotment was camouflaged; nominally, the funds were to be appropriated to launch the program of the Commission for Army Reorganization. These plans were approved, but after two months the Board of Revenue still had not furnished the funds and opposition had arisen to the project. Yuan argued that after hostilities began hastily levied recruits 1 YSY, ch. 26, pp. ib-2b. For a summary of this memorial, see JATTC, ch. 3, p. 15b. A North China Herald report of April 22, 1904 (p. 830), which appears more accurate than usual, listed the troops under Yuan Shih-k'ai's personal command as follows: (the terminology is the author's) Regular Army (Ch'ang-pei chiin), 11,500; Right Division, 7,000; Selfstrengthening Army, 2,700; governor-general's guards, 2,900; Resolute Army, 4,700. Aside from these units, Yiian was reported to have in Chihli and Jehol 7,250 men of the Disciplined Forces.

Progress in Military Training would not be adequate. Likewise, it would then be too late to buy arms abroad. As a result, the Throne ordered the Board to issue the funds without delay.2 In keeping with the policy presented in his memorials, Yiian Shih-k'ai accelerated the tempo of recruiting and train­ ing. During 1904-1905 his military camps bustled with activity, as the Pei-yang Army rapidly expanded. Men were recruited in Chihli, Shantung, Anhwei, and Honan. Yiian and T'ieh-liang issued a proclamation requesting young Manchus to enroll in the modern corps; still, at least in Chihli, when the number of volunteers was insufficient, a form of conscription was employed to obtain personnel. In order to accommodate the new recruits the camp at Paoting was en­ larged, but the number of untrained enlisted men required a sizable increase in officers. As a result, in the absence of Chang Chih-tung, the acting governor-general at Wuchang was directed to send a group of graduates of the Wuchang academy to Chihli. Since some of these officers had done advanced work in Japan,3 they would be an asset to the Pei-yang troops, just as they would be a loss to Hupeh. In November 1904 Yiian announced that a class had com­ pleted the course at the officers' school at Paoting. These men had been selected to attend the Pei-yang military school, in accordance with the edict of December 12, 1902, which had directed that officers from three northern provinces be sent to Chihli. They were scheduled to return to their native provinces of Shantung, Honan, and Shansi.4 Then, in a 2 YSY, ch. 26, pp. 2b-3b; CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 524, p. 4. See also A. W. Hummel, Jr., "Yuan Shih-k'ai as an Official under the Manchus," unpub­ lished M.A. thesis, p. 115; this source cites CSL, ch. 524, pp. i-ib. 3 NCH, Jan. 29, 1904, p. 182; March 11, 1904, p. 517; April 8, 1904, p. 714; April 22, 1904, p. 818; June 3, 1904, p. 1158; and Feb. 24, 1905, P- 375; Lawton and Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-Kai," op.cit., pp. 424-425· 4 CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 536, p. 13. In October 1904 the Paoting corre­ spondent of the North China Herald reported that he had been informed that about 5,000 candidates from all of the provinces had taken the examinations for entrance into Yiian's military schools (NCH, Oct. 21, 1906, p. 906). The figure is probably exaggerated, but it shows the in­ creasing popularity of the military academies.

Progress in Military Training memorial dated March 28, 1905, Yiian pointed out the neces­ sity for training military specialists. As a result of this need he stated that, aside from the basic military schools, he planned to establish a military medical school, for both Chinese and Manchus; a veterinary school; a logistical school for supply officers; and an ordnance school.5 Thus Yiian Shih-k'ai was not only training officers in his own schools and borrowing qualified men from Chang Chih-tung's acad­ emy, but also distributing throughout North China young officers, imbued with the clannishness of the Pei-yang clique. In the face of the war in Manchuria, Yuan moved rapidly to organize his diverse forces into more regularized units. In 1904 the Right Division of the Standing Army was formed. Also personnel from the Self-strengthening Army, formed by Chang Chih-tung in 1895, were reorganized as a cadre for the Third Division. By June 1904, three divisions having been activated, Yiian memorialized the Throne, re­ questing that they be commanded by Tuan Ch'i-jui, Wang Ying-k'ai, and Wu Ch'ang-ch'iin,6 all of whom had served under him in his original modern brigade. In July, Yiian announced that a brigade of Metropolitan Banner Forces had already been organized and that new battalions would be added to this standing army unit.7 Having placed his troops on a more formal organizational footing, Yiian in the fall of 1904 rearranged his staff. In accordance with the directives of the Commission for Army Reorganization, Chihli's Department of Military Administra­ tion (Chiin-cheng ssu) was reorganized as a provincial staff (Tu-Iien kung-so).8 This new staff was largely a redesignation of the department which Yiian had organized in 1902 and which had been the predecessor of the Commission for Army Reorganization itself. In the latter part of 1904 an American officer, Lt. C. Cordier, visiting the Paoting camp was tremendously imYSY, ch. 32, pp. 19-20. See also JATTC, ch. 4, pp. 2-2b. ch. 3, p. 18; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, p. 2; A. W. Hummel, Jr., op.cit., p. 118; see also CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 529, p. ib. r CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 532, pp. I3b-I4. a JATTC, ch. 3, p. 19. 6

a JATTC,

Progress in Military Training pressed, perhaps overly so, by the drill of a whole brigade of Pei-yang troops. He was of the opinion that the officers were intelligent and displayed "splendid training," while the non-commissioned officers not only appeared to know their duties, but carried them out. The soldiers were neat, well drilled, and capable of great exertion. The men were equipped with late-model Mauser rifles, which were very well main­ tained. Also, unlike most Chinese troops, the soldiers ob­ served at Paoting shot as well as United States troops. Lt. Cordier had no important criticism of what he saw, "only admiration." In closing his report, he stated: "Too much lies in this quarter of the globe to be overlooked by nations who are represented in the China Sea—on whose borders five great states hold sway. And it is here that con­ flicts will decide many of the all-absorbing questions of the future in the struggle for supremacy and the balance of power. "To the army of China will be allotted no small part in the drama."9 By the fall of 1904, Yiian Shih-k'ai himself had concluded that the new divisions had progressed to a point where it was possible to hold maneuvers on a division level. Therefore, in November field problems were held near Ho-chien, Chihli. The opposing forces consisted of the Second Division, total­ ing some 5,600 men, pitted against the Third Division sup­ ported by three infantry battalions of Manchu regulars, this latter force consisting of a reported 7,500 men. According to a French intelligence report, the discipline of the troops was excellent and in general they presented a creditable appear­ ance.10 These maneuvers drew little foreign attention, but the following year foreign observers were to flock to view the progress that had been made by the Pei-yang Army. In the spring of 1905, while the Russo-Japanese War raged 9 Lieutenant Constant Cordier, "Imperial Chinese Infantry," Journal of the United States Infantry Association, vol. 2, no. 1 (July 1905), p. 63; see also ibid., pp. 59-62. 10 "Grandes manoeuvres chinoises en Novembre 1904," Rcme militaire des armies etrangires, vol. 65 (March 1905), pp. 251-253,

Progress in Military Training in Manchuria, Chihli's defenses were still inadequate and little effective support could be expected from the other provinces. However, during 1905 Yuan improved the situa­ tion somewhat by activating two more divisions to augment his three Chinese divisions and the Manchu brigade, which was designated as a division. On February 25, 1905, he reported that in accordance with regulations he intended to change the units from Pei-yang standing army troops to Lu-chun (Army) divisions,11 but they were still commonly known as the Pei-yang Army. As finally constituted in 1905, the six original Pei-yang divisions had the following origins: The First Division had been the standing army brigade of the Metropolitan Banner Forces. The Second Division was originally the Left Division of the Standing Army. The Third Division was based on the Self-strengthening Army. The Fourth Division was the re­ designated Right Division of the Guards Army, which was Yiian's oldest unit. The Fifth Division had been built from a cadre of the Second Division and the Vanguard of the Right Division. The Sixth Division was formed from men of the Third Division, plus the remnants of the Self-strength­ ening Army.12 Yiian Shih-k'ai formed his divisions in accordance with the tables of organization established by the Commission for Army Reorganization. By early in 1905 the units were suf­ ficiently advanced for Yiian to request that a senior official be appointed to inspect them.13 The officials selected were Ch'ang-keng, president of the Board of War, and Hsii Shihch'ang, vice-president of the same board. The inspectors presented a laudatory report on the fine appearance of the troops and doubtlessly their praise was largely justified. How­ ever, as a correspondent observed, they could hardly have done otherwise: "First, the soldiers of the Ch'angpeichun [standing army] are certainly the best troops in China at the 11 Y SY, ch. 32, p. 4b; JATTC, ch. 4, p. 1. 12 CSS, vol. i, sect. 1, p. 40, and sect. 2, p. 2; 13 YSY, ch. 32, p. 4b.

JATTC,

ch. 4, p. 3.

Progress in Military Training present day; and secondly, the two inspecting officers are very good friends of his Excellency Yuan Shih-k'ai. . . ."14 In late October 1905, the Pei-yang Army held large-scale maneuvers near Ho-chien, Chihli, in which corps was ordered against corps. Apparently, the objective of these major field problems was to convince the foreign powers that there existed in North China a native army capable of protecting foreign interests, in which case it would no longer be neces­ sary for the powers to maintain their own troops in China. At the same time, it would be obvious that foreign interven­ tion would be more expensive than in the past. Then, too, Ytian Shih-k'ai desired to exhibit to the Throne and to the provinces that the funds which they had allotted to the Peiyang Army had been well spent. Foreign military observers, the press, and representatives from other provinces were invited to attend the war games. Yiian Shih-k'ai and T'iehliang were appointed by the Throne to inspect the maneuvers. The fact that these two high officials appeared at the war games in the uniforms of corps commanders15 rather than in official robes indicated the increasing prestige of the military profession. Units from all six of the Pei-yang divisions took part in the maneuvers, which called for a mock invasion of Chihli from Shangtung. The troops were divided into two "armies," the commanders of which were two of Yiian's ablest generals, Tuan Ch'i-jui and Wang Ying-k'ai. Nearly all of the senior officers involved had served under Yiian since he was a brigade commander. They were old comrades and appeared to be very loyal to their chief.18 The various esti­ mates of the number of men taking part in the war games 14

NCH, May 19, 1905, p. 338. "Les grandes manoeuvres de l'armee chinoise en 1905 et 1906," Revue militaire des armees etrangeres, vol. 69 (May 1907), pp. 447-448, 463; Captain Henry Leonard, "The Chinese Army," in Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 217, pp. 283-285; see also Lawton and Hobden, op.cit., p. 425. le New York Daily Tribune, Oct. 31, 1905; "The Chinese Army," op.cit., p. 289; "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., pp. 15

449-451·

Progress in Military Training ranged from 23,600 to 50,000.17 A similar difference of opinion existed as to who planned and directed the maneuvers. Some gave almost complete credit to the Japanese attaches and advisers, while others assigned them a lesser role.18 Reaction to the maneuvers themselves was also mixed. Chinese and foreign civilian sources, speaking for themselves or claiming to speak for the military observers, were "im­ pressed" or "astonished" at the progress that had been made by Chinese troops since 1900, but part of the press coverage could only be classed as "wild comments."19 The military observers themselves were impressed, but they were more cautious in their praise and pointed out a number of faults, some of which would be difficult to rectify. One ex post facto critic of the maneuvers maintained that much of the praise was a result of the bountiful hospitality extended by Yiian Shih-k'ai, and that the weaknesses of the Pei-yang Army were hidden from part of the observers by a "vinous mist."20 In the period between the 1904 and 1905 war games, the staff corps officers had worked diligently to correct errors and improve the training of the Chihli troops. Marches, field problems, and night exercises had been held. The 1905 war games were planned with great care, the Japanese-style orders and plans being so detailed that they prevented the troops' commanders from exercising tactical initiative. The officers involved were far superior to those who had fought in the Boxer Rebellion. Many of the junior officers were quite well trained. Yet the senior commanders still lacked initiative and were not well versed in strategic or tactical concepts, 17 New York Daily Tribune, Oct. 31, 1905; NCH, Nov. 3, 1905, p. 263; "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., p. 450; Leonard, op.cit., p. 297. 18Verbrugge, Yuan Che-k'ai; sa vie, son temps, p. 70; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 285, 297; Times (London), Jan. 1, 1906, p. 4; NCH, Sept. 21, 1906, p. 701; "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., p. 448. is New York Daily Tribune, Oct. 31, 1905; Times (London), Jan. 1, 1906; Verbrugge, op.cit., p. 70; Chu Wu1 "Wo-kuo chih lu-chiin" (The Army of Our Country), op.cit., p. 47; Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 217, no. 401, Rockhill to Sec. State, Sept. 21, 1906. 20 NCH, Sept. 14, 1906, p. 667.

Progress in Military Training while a large per cent of the non-commissioned officers were not fully qualified. As usual, it was the common soldiers who drew the praise of the observers. The enlisted men were a better type than the old-style soldiers. They were excellent physical specimens, tough, well-fed, and healthy. The discipline was outstanding and, despite some desertions, the morale of the men appeared to be high. Within the units, there were signs of a developing esprit de corps and attempts were being made to stimulate patriotism. From a political and social standpoint, the maneu­ vers had the result of presenting to the common people a disciplined army, far different from the hordes of uniformed bandits with whom they were familiar. In the presence of these well-behaved troops, the local populace soon lost their fear and became curious about the neat and orderly soldiers. The people were finally being shown that the military pro­ fession could be respectable.21 The best trained of the units present were the infantry. In the artillery the crews were well drilled and the guns well served, but the officers were not fully informed as to the capabilities of their weapons. The cavalry, which was still weak, might better have been employed as mounted infantry. Engineer battalions were given no opportunity to display their ability, but at the time only the bridge companies were adequately trained. The transportation troops were equipped with mule-drawn Chinese carts. These vehicles appeared clumsy, yet, considering China's bad road conditions, they were more practical than Western wagons. Medical and veterinary services were very rudimentary, but some use was made of telegraph and field telephones.22 The utilization of the new Peking-Hankow Railway to transport elements of two divisions to the maneuver area was an event of great significance. In her past wars with the 21

"Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., vol. 69 (May 1907). PP- 447-451. 463-465. and vol. 69 (June 1907), pp. 566-567; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 286, 289, 294-297; N CH, Nov. 3, 1905, p. 264. 22 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 287-294; "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., vol. 69 (June 1907), pp. 556-562; NCH, Sept. 21, 1906, p. 701.

Progress in Military Training Occidental powers or Japan, China had been forced to rely principally upon the local troops of the zone of operations, for she had been unable to concentrate her large forces against the enemy. The gradual extension of the railway network and its use to transport troops would decrease the physical diffi­ culties involved in mobilizing her scattered provincial armies, thus increasing Chinese strength. Despite justifiable criticisms, the 1905 maneuvers revealed rather exceptional military progress. Within a period of a few years, Yiian Shih-k'ai had developed a force which was capable of putting into the field two Western-style corps, equipped with modern, if somewhat heterogeneous, arms. In most of the units, training was advancing satisfactorily. Morale was good and the officers, as a group, desired to increase their competence. Also, the newly organized techni­ cal schools gave some promise of alleviating the shortage of professional skills. Therefore, the main significance of the war games lay not in their demonstrating the immediate capabilities of the Pei-yang Army, but rather in indicating its potential. Yiian Shih-k'ai was aware of the continuing defects of his army and insofar as he could, he sought to rectify the situa­ tion. Since the principal criticisms during the maneuvers had been leveled at the senior officers, on the one hand, and the non-commissioned officers, on the other, Yuan attempted to improve the qualifications of both groups. In June 1906 he informed the Throne that in accordance with directives from the Commission for Army Reorganization and Board of War he had established a Course of Military Instruction (Chiangwu t'ang) for officers and an Instruction Battalion (Hsiiehping ying) for non-commissioned officers. Still, Yuan dis­ paraged the advisability of establishing a general staff college at Peking. Instead, he characteristically proposed to organize a staff officers college (Chiin-kuan hsueh-t'ang) at his own camp at Paoting, until such time as a general staff school would be founded at the capital. The initial expenses for establishing his three schools were estimated at 277,000 taels, while the annual expenses would be about 160,000 taels.

Progress in Military Training Yiian reported that since the Pei-yang administration suf­ fered from financial difficulties, it would be unable to finance them. Then that master of the difficult art of maintaining control of institutions, while persuading others to support them, suggested that he take the matter of funds up with the Board of Revenue and other interested agencies.23 Despite its faults, the Pei-yang Army was manifestly the strongest military force in the empire. Considering the ambi­ tion of its creator, it was inevitable that the army should become more deeply involved in the growing struggle for power between contending cliques. Yiian's enemies, led by T'ieh-liang, sought to strip him of command of his prized troops. The ill will that came to exist between the two leaders extended even to the troops, so that at Paoting in the spring of 1906 encounters took place between the Manchus of the First Division and the Chinese of the Third.24

The Struggle for Power The original six divisions which formed the core of the Pei-yang Army were not the final achievement of Yiian Shih-k'ai in his effort to increase his power. As opportunities arose, old units formed cadres for new organizations, thus expanding the influence of the Pei-yang clique. Furthermore, the territorial influence of Yiian and his proteges was not limited to Chihli. Since its origin the Fifth Division had been stationed in Shantung, yet it remained completely under Yiian's control. Then, in April 1905, as part of a local administrative reorganization, the post of commander-in-chief of the Chiang-pei was created in northern Kiangsu province. The officer selected to fill the new post was Liu Yung-ch'ing, a protege of Yiian and already lieutenant general of one of the Banners. A new brigade, the 13th, was organized in Chihli, and in the spring of 1906 it was transferred to the Chiang-pei to serve under Liu's command.25 Although in 23

24 NCH, June 29, 1906, p. 760. YSY, ch. 39, pp. i-4b. CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 540, p. 7; Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 127, encl. in no. 1862, Coolidge to Sec. State, April 22, 1905; NCH (Decrees), 25

Progress in Military Training reality the unit remained a mixed brigade, it was named the Lu-chiin Seventh Division.26 Thus, all of the first seven organizations designated as Lu-chiin divisions had been formed under the supervision of Yuan Shih-k'ai. After inspecting officers from the Commission for Army Reorganization had severely criticized the newly organized troops of Honan, the Commission requested Yiian to furnish officers to reorganize the forces of that province. Wang Juhsien, who had formerly served as artillery commander of the Sixth Division, was selected to lead the Lu-chiin 29th Brigade in Honan. In the spring of 1906, the cavalry of the Third Division was transferred from Paoting, Chihli, to Fengtien to protect that province against the mounted bandits known as the Red Beards.27 Thus, by the end of 1906 troops of the Pei-yang Army were stationed in Chihli, Shantung, Chiang-pei, and Fengtien. Graduates of the Pei-yang schools were returning to their native provinces of Shantung, Honan, and Shansi to serve in the local troops, while Wang Ju-hsien was commanding the 29th Brigade in Honan. The influence of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Pei-yang clique was extended over Northeast China. Not only was Yuan's power spreading geographically, but also he was obtaining rapid promotions for his lieutenants, whose increased prestige further enhanced the status of their patron. Besides promoting his military followers within the ranks of his own divisions, Yiian in many instances obtained senior Green Standard titles for them. Since the standing army and militia were not part of the traditional military structure, their officers had no official standing. Obviously, even the establishment of a hierarchy of commissioned ranks Feb. 2, 1905, p. 238, April 28, 1905, p. 181, May 12, 1905, p. 297; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 191, 197-202; Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 3, no. 3 (1906), "Tsatsu," p. 22; NCH, June 22, 1906, p. 691. 2eAs of February 1906, the Seventh Division consisted of only the 13th Infantry brigade of some 3,000 poorly trained men and 1,000 artillery­ men, who as yet had no guns (Leonard, op.cit., pp. 197-202. See also NCH, July 13, 1906, p. 83). 2 7 NCH, June 29, 1906, p. 760, July 13, 1906, p. 83; Leonard, op.cit., p. 228; Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 3, no. 3, "Tsa-tsu," p. 21.

Progress in Military Training for the Lu-Chiin did little to change this situation. Therefore, in order to provide for their officers, Yiian and the other provincial leaders obtained ranks for them in the recognized branches of the bureaucracy. Especially from 1904 on, a whole series of Yuan's officers were appointed brigadier generals of the Green Standard, while several of his generals were named provincial commanders-in-chief. In Chihli there were posts for only seven brigadier generals, and until his death in 1908 Ma Yu-k'un held the position of commanderin-chief. This situation did not provide sufficient opportunities for such an ambitious faction as the Pei-yang clique and it is an indication of Yuan's influence that his generals began to be named to Green Standard commands in other provinces.28 Yuan had no intention, however, of actually losing the serv­ ices of his loyal officers. This is indicated by the fact that in several instances he obtained permission to retain the officers temporarily in the Pei-yang area.29 Later events proved that the temporary duty was usually permanent in nature. Con­ clusive evidence of the power of the Pei-yang clique was the fact that in several cases they even infiltrated the highest ranks of the Eight Banners.80 Moreover, as has already been pointed out, the important Commission for Army Reorgani­ zation was packed with Yuan's friends or supporters. This whole situation created an unusual collection of inappropriate titles in the Pei-yang Army. A roster of Yuan's senior officers would indeed have given a rag, tag, and bobtail appearance, for their ranks included not only titles from the Army of the Green Standard and the Banner Forces, but also those of expectant intendant and prefect of the civil service.81 28 For example, see CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 526, pp. 7b, 8, and ch. 530, p. φ ; NCH (Decrees), May 12, 1905, p. 297, March 16, 1906, p. 60s; May 4, 1906, p. 251; March 23, 1906, p. 659; Nov. 23, 1906, p. 434; and Sept. 26, 1908, p. 776. 29For example, see YSY, ch. 40, pp. i-ib; CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 530, p. 9b; see also CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 526, p. 7b. 30See NCH (Decrees), May 12, 1905, p. 297; Nov. 23, 1906, p. 433. 31 In addition to the references given in notes 28 and 30, see YSY, ch. 16, pp. 2, 3b; NCH (Decrees), Jan. 15, 1902, p. 83, and March 4, 1904, p. 436. The North China Herald translates the Green Standard title tsung-

Progress in Military Training Yiian not only promoted the advancement of his military lieutenants; the same process applied to his numerous civilian proteges. For example, in June 1901 Hsii Shih-ch'ang had been only an expectant intendant; but by 1906 he was a member of the Grand Council. It was not until 1902 that T'ang Shao-i became an intendant, yet by 1907 he was a governor. Yiian had friends and henchmen both in the capital and in other provinces. His relatives were also well provided for. Although regulations forbade him to employ his kins­ men, friendly governors and governors-general were pleased to befriend the relations of their powerful colleague,32 pre­ sumably on a reciprocal basis. Moreover, as in the past, Yiian continued to maintain influential patrons in high places, including the Empress-Dowager and Prince Ch'ing. On the other hand, while any man of great power and ambition will make some enemies, Yiian Shih-k'ai had created whole classes of them. He was detested by the sup­ porters of the Kuang-hsii Emperor, for they accused him of betraying his ruler; he was also opposed by the anti-dynastic elements because he supported the Empress-Dowager. The reactionaries feared his reforms, and he must have been un­ popular with the officers of the various types of old-style troops for his plans concerning military modernization en­ dangered their livelihood. Since he sought to curb them, the court eunuchs hated Yiian, but, most important, Yiian was opposed by a strong clique of conservative Manchus led by T'ieh-liang. These men were jealous of Yiian's prestige and feared his growing power. A group of provincial leaders were also dissatisfied because they were forced to contribute to the maintenance of the Pei-yang Army.33 That force was ping as "major general," but it is more commonly referred to as "brigadier general" and is so used in this work. 32 Navy Dept., O.N.I., class no. C-10-a, reg. no. 7375, "Record and Political Activities of Mr. Tang shao-yi . . . ," Nov. 14, 1916, pp. 1-2; Who's Who in China, 3rd edn., pp. 343, 706-707; NCH (Decrees), Feb. 26, 1902, p. 390, and July 7, 1905, p. 23; NCH, March 10, 1905, p. 490, April 14, 1905, p. 82. 33 Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (A Political History of China during the Last Hundred Years), vol. 1, p. 259;

Progress in Military Training China's major defensive weapon, yet it was expensive and as a principal factor in the internal power structure it bene­ fited only the Pei-yang clique. Yiian's prestige reached its zenith with the army maneu­ vers in 1905. As pointed out above, the press had exagger­ ated the capabilities of the Pei-yang Army, and many had assumed that these troops were characteristic of all Chinese armies. However, during the following year the pendulum swung to the other extreme. Then the tendency was to dis­ parage the actual progress made by Yiian's divisions. One of his senior Japanese advisers informed the correspondent of the London Times that the Pei-yang Army had numerous faults, that praise was leading to overconfidence, and that there was still no real uniformity among the divisions. As for the Chinese armies as a whole, the adviser stated that corruption was still rife and that if the Japanese instructors were removed the armies would disintegrate.84 Hence the foreign press looked forward with some skepticism to the maneuvers planned for 1906. In the war games held at Chang-te, Honan, in October 1906, troops from Chihli, Shantung, Honan, and Hupeh were represented. For the first time, the two best military organizations in China, the soldiers of Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai were pitted against each other. In addition, the respective forces were led by favorities of the two gov­ ernors-general, the northern army being commanded by Tuan Ch'i-jui and the southern by Chang Piao. During the maneuvers it was demonstrated that not only was Yiian's army larger than that of Chang, but that it was also superior both in training and leadership. In spite of previous pessi­ mism, foreign observers were less fault-finding than had been expected. The Japanese officers who had helped train the Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 91, 92; Lawton and Hobden, op.cit., pp. 425-426, 429; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 3-4; Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 171, no. 517, p. 1, Rockhill to Root, Jan. 24, 1907; Bland and Backhouse, China under the Empress Dowager, p. 82; NCH, Jan. 18, 1907, p. 107, and April 23, 1903, p. 786. si Times (London), Aug. 14, 1906; Cameron, op.cit., p. 91.

Progress in Military Training troops were modestly critical. The French military observers noted some improvement over the previous maneuvers, while the American military attache felt that the officers had made no progress, but that the enlisted men showed the results of another year's training.35 One point on which there was greater agreement than in 1905 was the extensive role played by the Japanese advisers in planning the war games.36 From a political standpoint, the maneuvers of 1905 and 1906 were detrimental to Yuan Shih-k'ai's best interests, for they were a further illustration that he, not the Throne, commanded the strongest and most effective army in the empire. Yiian had become too powerful, and rumors exag­ gerated an already disturbing situation. It was an error to call him a "dictator," but even the United States minister reported that because of his command of the Pei-yang Army Yiian had a preponderant voice in the affairs of China.87 Moreover, there may have been some validity in the report that he was increasing his strength against the day when the Kuang-hsii Emperor would remount the throne and seek vengeance.38 Still, Yiian had proved his loyalty to his imperial mistress, and the evidence does not indicate that at this time he planned to usurp the throne. Yet even the EmpressDowager was apparently willing to permit his enemies to reduce the authority of one who was so powerful that his supporters could threaten the very existence of the dynasty. During the debate over administrative reforms in the autumn of 1906, Yiian Shih-k'ai remained in Peking to support the views of the progressive party. He also sought 35 "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., vol. 69 (June 1907), pp. 567-574; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 303-322; NCH, Nov. 2, 1906, pp. 268, 270; Times (London), Oct. 31, 1906. 36 Leonard, op.cit., p. 163; NCH, Nov. 2, 1906, p. 241; New York Daily Tribune, Nov. 17, 1906; Times (London), Aug. 14, 1906. The French General Staff felt that the influence of the Japanese was decreasing slightly in the Pei-yang Army ("Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., vol. 69 [June 1907], p. 569). 87 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1()10, vol. 171, no. 517, p. 2, Rockhill to Root, Jan. 24, 1907. See also New York Daily Tribune, Oct. 15, 1906. 88 Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 92.

Progress in Military Training to protect his own position, for an intense political struggle was taking place in the capital. Prior to his departure to attend the 1906 maneuvers, there were rumors that Yuan would be retained in Peking. It was already evident that his enemies would probably be able to use the administrative reforms to reduce his influence, "especially by depriving him of the control of the great military power he wielded as Com­ mander in Chief of six divisions of foreign drilled troops, the so-called Northern Army. . . ."89 Yuan, like the earlier militia commander Tseng Kuo-fan, realized that he had become too powerful. Therefore, in a notable memorial of November 18, 1906, he requested that the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions be transferred to the new Ministry of War. Yiian stated that while he alone had been responsible for training five of the divisions, he believed that the organizations should be turned over to the ministry. Nevertheless, Yiian had no intention of giving up all of his troops. After pointing out the size and importance of the Chihli, as well as the fact that not all of the foreign troops had been withdrawn from the province, he requested permission to retain his two oldest units, the Second and Fourth Divisions.40 The fact that the Throne approved the transfer was a major blow to Yuan, for the Pei-yang Army was his principal source of power. Since 1895 the organiza­ tion of that army had taken precedence over all his other projects. Still, this was not his last retreat. Later in Novem­ ber Yiian received permission to resign seven important concurrent posts. In asking to be relieved of these duties, he stated that his numerous responsibilities would arouse sus­ picion and slander. Yiian then drew an appropriate com­ parison between himself and his great predecessor Tseng Kuo-fan,41 who had likewise requested a reduction of his own political and military authority. The major reaction to this 39 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 171, no. 517, pp. 1-2, Jan. 24, 1907. See also NCH, Oct. 5, 1906, p. 27. 40 YSY, ch. 42, pp. 3-3b; see also JATTC, ch. 4, pp. 4-4!). 41 For a translation of the memorial, see Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 171, encl. to no. 517, pp. 3-4; see also JATTC, ch. 4, p. 14.

Progress in Military Training move was that Yuan's preponderant influence had still not been permanently or fundamentally diminished. There were rumors that the Grand Council had recommended returning to him the command of the four divisions, but this did not materialize. On the contrary, a series of minor incidents, including the censuring of two of Yuan's proteges for nepotism, soon created the belief that his power had been seriously decreased. Then, too, Yuan was having financial difficulties for he had been stripped of the funds previously obtained from the posts from which he had resigned. Since the imperial government refused to assist him in financing the Second and Fourth Divisions, it appeared that ultimately he would be unable to support them,42 in which case they would no longer be a factor in the struggle for power. On the surface, it appeared that the transfer of four of China's best divisions to the Ministry of War was a signal victory both for the policy of centralization and for Yuan's enemies. Nevertheless, even after the divisions were handed over, the tradition of personal control of the armed forces conflicted with the centralization of authority. In January 1907 the Ministry of War recommended that a single official be appointed to command the four divisions (henceforth called the Metropolitian Divisions, or the Army of Peking). The officer selected was General Feng Shan, who was a protege of T'ieh-liang. This could have been a routine ad­ ministrative action, but apparently it had as its real objective the shifting of the control of the divisions from the Ministry, where Yuan Shih-k'ai was still represented, and placing them in the hands of T'ieh-liang.43 Late in 1906 it had been rumored that the modern troops 42 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 171, no. 517. PP- 3-4» Rockhill to Root, Jan. 24, 1907; NCH, Jan. 4, 1907, p. 30. 43 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 171, no. 528, Rockhill to Root, Feb. 7, 1907. For a summary of the memorial recom­ mending Feng Shan and the rescript appointing him, see Peking and Tientsin Times, Feb. 5, 1907, filed as an enclosure to the above despatch. By 1907 Feng Shan was the acting commander of the First Division, but in 1902 he had been only a minor police official in Peking. It was owing to T'ieh-liang that he had been rapidly promoted (ibid.).

Progress in Military Training of Chang Chih-tung would also be transferred to the Ministry of War,44 but it is not surprising that this transfer never took place. The conditions were very dissimilar. The Peiyang Army was a distinctive case. It was the principal defense of the capital and the Throne; as such, other provinces were forced to contribute to its maintenance. Therefore, there were special reasons for having it controlled by the central government. Then, too, the Pei-yang Army was much larger than the Western-style troops of the other provinces. Even in their reduced form, Chihli's modern troops were still stronger than those of any other province. Also, the transfer of Yuan's divisions was part of a conflict between cliques, as well as an attempt to reduce the influence of one who threatened the whole balance of power. This shift did not necessarily endanger the other provincial leaders. But, had the Ministry of War attempted to nationalize the standing army troops of Hupeh in Central China, it would have estab­ lished a precedent for centralizing the command of all the provincial armies. Such action would certainly have en­ countered the united opposition of all the governors-general and governors. It was not the policy of the Empress-Dowager to permit such an open clash between Peking and the prov­ inces. Despite his apparent triumph over Yuan Shih-k'ai, T'iehliang was not too successful in controlling his new army. With the exception of the First Division, the division com­ manders and most of the senior officers of all the divisions were loyal lieutenants of Yiian. They not only continued to maintain intimate contacts with him, but T'ieh-liang found himself unable to remove most of them from their posts. However, Tuan Ch'i-jui did resign rather than serve under the incompetent Feng Shan.45 As for the enlisted men of the Pei-yang Army, their loyalty to Yiian was based to a large degree on the fact that he paid them regularly. Therefore, they were not eager to serve under a new leader who might 44 See

NCH, Dec. 7, 1906, p. 551. op.ext., vol. i, pp. 260, 277; NCH, Jan. 4, 1907, p. 30; WDGS, 6562-1, "Report of Changes in Chinese Army in 1910," p. 9. 45 Li,

Progress in Military Training not maintain that efficacious policy. The divisions were to be financed by the Ministry of War, funds having been made available for the first year. Still there was no guarantee that all the pay would reach the troops.48 By early in 1907, Yiian's enemies had won a major battle in the campaign to destroy his great influence, but events would prove that one defeat would not destroy the power of the Pei-yang clique.

Chang Chih-tung's Military Policy From 1895 to 1903, the gradually expanding foreign-style troops of Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung remained roughly comparable in size. Then in Hupeh, as in Chihli, the Russo-Japanese War increased the tempo of military activities. Nevertheless, during the years 1904-1907, the number of Chang's standing army troops rapidly fell behind the growing Pei-yang Army. Three factors account for this situation. First, the Pei-yang area was of greater strategic importance, and it bordered the war zone. Then, too, unlike Yiian, Chang's provinces were forced to bear the full expense of his military establishment. The third factor is less tangible, but ambition and policy played a role in it, for Chang placed less emphasis on the military aspects of power than did Yiian. In October 1902 Chang Chih-tung had proposed to organ­ ize two mixed brigades, but this project had been retarded by the transfer of eight battalions to help put down a revolt in Kwangsi in 1903. In the winter of 1903-1904, another brigade of Western-style troops was transferred to Chihli to strengthen the defense of the capital. This force was not returned to Chang's jurisdiction until September 1906.47 The transfer of units of the already inadequate Hupeh troops during a period of crisis necessitated a reevaluation of the defenses of the province. Thus in the late summer of 1904 Chang memorialized the Throne suggesting that in 4e Peking and Tientsin Times, Feb. 5, 1907, cited in note 43 above; Times (London), Dec. 19, 1906; Cameron, op.cit., p. 93. 47 N CH, May 6, 1904, p. 964; Sept. 28, 1906, p. 748.

Progress in Military Training accordance with financial conditions and human resources he establish an organizational system for the standing army of Hupeh. He further proposed to form two small divisions.48 Since this plan was presented shortly before the Throne approved the regulations for the Lu-chun, Chang's recom­ mendations were referred to the Commission for Army Re­ organization. After the promulgation of the new regulations, the Commission replied that Chang Chih-tung's proposals were not in keeping with the revised system and that in order to obtain uniformity the new policy should be followed. The Throne concurred, and Chang later reported that he complied with the directive.49 Actually, Chang did modify the structure of his units so that they were more in keeping with the Lu-chun system, but they continued to be under strength. When T'ieh-liang inspected the Hupeh troops early in 1905, the authorized size of the standing army units at Wuchang was two brigades, each brigade to consist of two infantry regiments of three battalions, three batteries of artillery, and two troops of cavalry, plus engineer and transport detachments. In reality, each brigade was composed of only one regiment of infantry with attached cavalry, artillery, engineer, and transport troops. The total personnel was reported to be about 11,500. Except for the transport trains, the equipment of the brigades was fairly complete. Although these troops were considered to be the best in the whole Yangtze Valley, they were still a combination of trained soldiers and new recruits, so there was considerable room for improvement. The commander of the 1st Brigade was Chang Chih-tung's old favorite, General Chang Piao, while the corresponding post in the 2nd Brigade was held by Major Li Yuan-hung.50 General Chang's successful career was to be cut short by his discredit­ able conduct during the revolution, but Li Yuan-hung was 48

Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 40, p. 14b. CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 534, p. 4; Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 40, p. 14b. 50 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 138-140, 206-207. In November 1905 an edict appointed Chang Piao brigadier general of a military circuit in Szechwan (,NCH [Decrees], Dec. 1, 1905, p. 487), but, like Yiian Shih-k'ai, Chang Chih-tung retained his protege with him. 49

Progress in Military Training to be a more distinguished example of growing militarism. He would serve as president of the Chinese Republic in 1916-1917. It is obvious that Chang Chih-tung did not fully concur in the new policy of the Throne. On December 7, 1905, he again memorialized, proposing to change the established strength and tables of organization of his regular troops. By that time, he had already received the Lu-chiin regulations drawn up by the Commission for Army Reorganization, but since the directives permitted the provincial officials a considerable degree of leeway concerning the strength and time required to organize their units, Chang took advantage of both con­ cessions. He pointed out that, because of its strategic location as a communication center, Hupeh should have thirty or forty thousand picked men for its defense. As a minimum, two divisions should be trained. However, because of finan­ cial difficulties and a shortage of qualified personnel, what he actually suggested was to organize one division and one mixed brigade. Even these units were to consist of less than the authorized strength. Then, when (and if) financial and human resources increased, two full-size standing army divisions would be formed. Chang hoped to attain that mili­ tary-political ideal of cutting out the fat, while preserving all of the muscle. He planned to reduce the number of noncombatants in each unit without decreasing the effective number of combat troops. Because of the mountainous terrain and numerous waterways of Hupeh, he especially sought to reduce the standard number of horses, mules, carts, and drivers. He also wanted to organize mountain artillery, in­ stead of field artillery batteries. In the light of these considera­ tions, Chang recommended the reduction of the men in the division to 12,071, instead of the prescribed 12,560. The brigade would then consist of 5,180 men, instead of 5,432. Since the pay, rations, uniforms, and fodder for a standard division and a mixed brigade cost roughly 1,800,000 taels, Chang estimated that the proposed reductions would create an annual saving of over 303,000 taels.61 51

Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 40, pp. I4b-i8b.

Progress in Military Training The new official policy being to recruit, as far as possible, by provinces, Chang maintained that the great majority of his soldiers were from Hupeh, but he had almost 2,000 men from northern provinces. These men, he said, were veterans, who should not be hastily discharged. Chang also declared that he had attempted to recruit battalions from single prefectures, but that the results had not been satisfactory.52 In order to activate the new division and brigade Chang planned to reorganize his established units. When the origi­ nal Second "Division" was reconstituted as a mixed brigade, it would leave a surplus that could be transferred to the First "Division." Also, several separate battalions could be at­ tached. This would still necessitate an increase of almost 3,000 men to bring the new division up to the desired strength of 12,071.53 The Throne authorized the two organizations, which were to be designated as the Lu-chun Eighth Division and 21 st Brigade. A vacancy was left in the numerical list of divisions, and provision was made for the brigade ultimately to become the Eleventh Division, which it never did. The central authorities did not, however, fully approve of Chang's recommendations, so he was instructed to alter them in part.54 It was probably for this reason, as well as for financial con­ siderations, that Chang modified his plans. Instead of training both a division and a brigade, he first organized the Eighth Division, which was completed by April 1906. His proposals had also been changed in that field, as well as mountain, artillery units were formed.55 Shortly after its formation, a detachment from the Eighth Division easily and promptly suppressed a local revolt in s2 Ibid.,

pp. 19-19b; see also NCH, Feb. 19, 1906, p. 313. Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 40, p. 18. For a list of the senior officers of the Hupeh First and Second "Divisions," see ibid., pp. i9b-20. si Ibid., ch. 45, pp. iob-11; Leonard, op.cit., p. 223. The numerical designation of the various organizations was given by the Throne. In theory, new-style troops were to be inspected by imperial officials and, if they met the standards set for the Lu-chun, they were to be numbered in succession according to their date of completion (ibid., pp. 23-24). Evidently, in practice, units were frequently given Lu-chun designations long before they reached full strength or met established standards. 65 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 206, 212-213. 63

Progress in Military Training Hunan; yet, the performance of the division in the 1906 maneuvers at Chang-te, Honan, did not equal its splendid achievements on the parade ground. It was the first time that the Hupeh troops had taken part in large-scale war games. Since they had less experience, they proved somewhat inferior to the Pei-yang Army, especially in the matter of leadership.56 However, the fact that units from four provinces all had the same general organizational structure, a fair degree of uniformity of equipment, and made a creditable appearance on maneuvers, represented a great advance over a few years previously. Although the 21st Brigade had not been organized by the spring of 1906, there were sufficient provincial soldiers near Wuchang to form another whole division. This was especially true since these troops included infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineer, and transportation units. Also, some 4,300 of Chang's troops were still on detached duty outside the province. Furthermore, according to the United States mili­ tary attache, there were over 18,000 other soldiers scattered throughout Hupeh, not including local military formations or police." It is obvious from Chang Chih-tung's memorials that, al­ though he sought to modernize the troops of Hupeh, he had his own ideas as to how it should be done. Yiian Shih-k'ai could blithely conform to the regulations established for the creation of the Lu-chun, since he was to a large degree responsible for their compilation. One gathers the impression that, as a more typical provincial leader, Chang did not relish having such a central organ as the Commission for Army Reorganization deeply involving itself in the military affairs of his provinces. In the memorials which have been cited above, he expressed respectful obedience to orders from the Throne, but having the right and duty to meraos e NCH, Dec. 21, 1906, pp. 660, 661, 668; Leonard, op.cit., p. 209; "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., vol. 69 (June 1907), pp. 567-574· 67 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 216-217. By 1907 the 21st Mixed Brigade was organized and was reported to consist of almost 5,000 men (see C SK, Ping-chih 3, p. 11).

Progress in Military Training rialize, he did so; arguing on the basis of local conditions, he sought to modify the regulations which had been issued to him. Frequently, his objections, founded on financial, geographic, and manpower conditions, appear sound and reasonable, yet jealousy also seems to have been a factor. In this way, Chang was characteristic of the struggle between centralization and provincialism. It will be remembered that although Chang had activated only one Lu-Chiin division, he had sufficient provincial troops, including specialized units, to form another full division. As he had invariably pointed out, financial considerations were of the utmost importance. A Lu-chun division with its established tables of organization could be much more expen­ sive than provincial divisions which had no such detailed stand­ ards. On the other hand, the Throne involved itself more deeply in the establishment of the Lu-chun than in the man­ agement of provincial forces; so a distaste for increased intervention may have been a factor in Chang's decisions as well as those of the other provincial officials. It is also interesting to note that the Throne was willing and able to force such a powerful figure as Chang Chih-tung to transfer prized units to other provinces or to modify the organizational structure of his best troops.

Evaluation of the Military Establishment Despite the impetus furnished by the Russo-Japanese War, as well as the urgings of the Commission for Army Re­ organization, the tempo of military modernization in the provinces other than Chihli and Hupeh was far from spec­ tacular. During 1904-1906 the gradual process of weeding out and redesignating the old-style troops continued. Also, the provinces began to establish provincial staffs (tu-lien ch'u or tu-lien kung-so) to train new-style troops.58 Never­ theless, actual progress was rather slow. In November 1905 the Throne had urged the provincial leaders to hasten the 08 Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 3, no. 3 (1906), "Tsa-tsu," p. 21; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 159-160; CSK, Ping-chih 3, p. 8b.

Progress in Military Training reorganization of their forces in accordance with the Lu-chun system and to imitate the Pei-yang Troops.59 Many of the provinces did adopt the terminology of the Lu-chun, but their tables of organization and practices were at variance with official regulations. By late in 1906 the roster of the Commission for Army Reorganization listed ten Lu-chun divisions, plus four bri­ gades. The plurality of these troops and the only large unified force consisted of the Pei-yang Army. By the end of 1905, Yuan had activated and was filling out the six divisions which formed the core of the force. Estimates of the personnel strength of the Pei-yang Army as it existed in 1906 vary from fifty to eighty thousand. According to the records of the U.S. military attache, the personnel numbered approxi­ mately 64,000.6° It is altogether possible that, because of inefficient records and fraud, even Yuan Shih-k'ai did not know the exact strength of his forces. The location and commanding officers of the army were as follows: the First Division, nominally commanded by T'ieh-liang, was actually only a mixed brigade. The unit was stationed at Paoting but was soon moved to the vicinity of Peking. The Second Division, under Ma Lung-piao, was stationed in northeast Chihli, with its headquarters at Ch'ien-an. By the fall of 1906 the Third Division, first commanded by Tuan Chih-kuei and then by Tuan Ch'i-jui, was divided between Paoting and Chin-chou, Fengtien. The Fourth Division, under the command of Wu Feng-ling, was located at Hsiao-chan and Ma-ch'ang, Chihli. The Fifth Division, commanded by Chang Huai-chih, was stationed in Shantung with the bulk of the division at Tsinan and Weihsien. The Sixth Division, first headed by Wang Shi-tsung (Wang Shih-chen?) and later by Tuan Ch'i-jui, was located at Nan-yiian, near Peking.81 69 NCH

(Decrees), Nov. 3, 1903, p. 286. op.cit., pp. 170-193. See also ibid., pp. 222-223; Major Eben Swift, "The Chinese Army," in G. H. Blakeslee, ed., China and the Far East, New York, 1910, p. 177; McKenzie, The Unveiled East, p. 213; New York Daily Tribune, Nov. 17, 1906. 81 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 170-193; YSY, ch. 40, p. 1, and ch. 42, p. 3. Wen Kung-chih lists Wang Ying-k'ai as commanding the Second Division eoLeonard,

Progress in Military Training A growing number of the Pei-yang officers had been trained in military schools. A fraction of these, especially the staff officers, had been educated in Japan. Still, the majority of the officers were not academy-trained. Most of the division commanders were in their forties, while the average age of those from captain to colonel appeared to range from thirty to forty years. In 1906 Yuan Shih-k'ai was only 47 and T'ieh-liang was 43, but some of the junior officers were old men.82 The inadequate number of young officers graduated from the military schools were being rapidly—too rapidly— promoted to positions of responsibility. The youthfulness of the leaders of the Pei-yang Army shows that they, like the army itself, were symbolic of the new era, products of the "response to the West." However, it should not be assumed that even Yiian Shih-k'ai had adopted all of the best features of Western military practices. The Chinese enlisted personnel of the Pei-yang Army were drawn mainly from hardy peasant stock. The soldiers had been recruited from Chihli, Shantung, Honan, and Anhwei. In some units, nearly all the men were from one province; in others, they came from several areas. In spite of the exist­ ence of an official policy of voluntary enlistment, many of the men in actuality had been conscripted. In general, the Chinese soldiers were young, above average in height, hard and muscular, but the Manchus of the First Division were less well developed, and many of their officers appeared effemi­ nate. Foreign observers were impressed by the cleanliness of the barracks, as well as by the fact that, unlike most Chinese troops, these kept their equipment in good order. Also, the uniformly dressed troops had a soldierly bearing. The men were given four hours of drill, and two hours of instruc­ tion daily. As for their close order drill and manual of arms, and Wu Ch'ang-ch'un as heading the Fifth Division, but he does not give the date of the period to which he is referring (CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, pp. 3-4). As of 1906, Wang Ying-k'ai had previously commanded the Second Division. ® 2 YSY, ch. 39, p. 3; "Les grandes manoeuvres en 1905 et 1906," op.cit., vol. 69 (May 1907), pp. 449, 450, 464; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 174-175, 181, 187, 189, 193·

Progress in Military Training it was so good that even a U.S. Marine Corps observer was almost ecstatic on the subject. He further maintained that the physical training of some of the units could only be equaled in a circus—in fact, the program was so strenuous that it caused injuries to the men.88 Yuan Shih-k'ai was an extremely strict disciplinarian, who permitted harsh punishments. Opium-smoking, an evil com­ mon among Chinese troops, was forbidden. Not only was corporal punishment practiced, but desertion was discouraged by decapitation. Yet, despite his severe disciplinary code, Yiian was popular with his troops. This is not unexpected, since he took a personal interest in them and tried to pay them regularly. Furthermore, he inculcated a spirit of loyalty into them, but that loyalty was primarily to Yiian Shih-k'ai rather than to the Emperor. A picture of Yiian hung in each barrack room and he was the source of promotion and demotion.84 One of the great weaknesses of the Chinese armies had been their failure to create a reserve force from their trained manpower. Realizing this, Yuan gradually took steps to form a reserve to support his regulars. However, so alien was this concept to Chinese practice that as late as 1909 two of the Pei-yang divisions were the only ones in China which had sufficient reserves to bring them up to wartime strength.85 The best prospect for the future development of the Peiyang Army lay in the various military schools which Yiian Shih-k'ai had established. Not only officers, but also many enlisted men were being educated. Still, the school system was too new to have provided sufficient professionally trained commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Then, too, the influence of a literary education and the emphasis on rote memory continued to be apparent in the academy-trained 63Leonard, op.cit., pp. 171-196; see also NCH, June 29, 1906, pp. 759760; McKenzie, op.cit., pp. 218, 222, 225, 230. 84 McKenzie, op.cit., pp. 215-217, 225; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 176, 179, 191; NCH, Nov. 4, 1904, p. 1020; Eliot, Letters from the Far East, p. 107; Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 200. 65 Swift, op.cit., p. 181; McKenzie, op.cit., p. 223; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 175, 181-182; YSY, ch. 44, p. 9.

Progress in Military Training officers. They stressed the letter of their regulations but failed to use their own initiative when confronted with an unex­ pected situation. In addition to the lack of fully qualified leadership, the Pei-yang Army had several other weaknesses. As noted above, it had been impossible to maintain uniformity of equipment as the force expanded. A fair degree of stand­ ardization had been obtained within most of the divisions, but this was not true of the army as a whole. The staff realized that this situation would constitute a logistical night­ mare in time of war but lacked the funds necessary to create uniformity. Financial problems probably also accounted for the insufficient firing practice with both small arms and artillery.8® Throughout the organizational period, Yiian Shih-k'ai continued to employ foreign instructors for his troops. That the use of foreign advisers improved the Pei-yang Army appears to be beyond dispute, yet it also seems unquestion­ able that Yiian personally retained control and initiative. As we have seen, the majority of the early instructors were Germans, but later the Japanese became dominant. F. A. McKenzie, who visited Yiian's encampment at Paoting in 1906, was impressed by the competence of the staff officers f yet, the fact that staff planning was done in whole or in part by foreign advisers was a military handicap. Furthermore, since the Pei-yang Army had not experienced large-scale combat, it lacked that core of battle-hardened veterans so valuable to any army. Despite the fact that Yuan had done much to eliminate corruption, a Chinese military historian states that the padding of payrolls and misappropriation of funds existed, especially in units commanded by officials who were products of the old armies. Also, jealousy existed be­ tween the academy-trained officers and those proteges of Yiian who had come up through the ranks. Then, too, some of the general officers were so deeply involved in politics that eeLeonard,

op.cit., pp. 171-195; McKenzie, op.cit., pp. 220, 225-226;

NCH, June 29, 1906, pp. 759-760. 67

McKenzie, op.cit., p. 218.

Progress in Military Training they were forced to leave their military duties to their subordinates.68 Aside from the five Chinese divisions of the Pei-yang Army the only large organization which had all of the required units was Chang Chih-tung's Eighth Division. The com­ mander of the unit was General Chang Piao, who was offi­ cially a Green Standard brigadier general of a circuit in Szechwan. The most outstanding feature of Chang Chihtung's regular troops was that—at least according to T'iehliang—all of the officers had been graduated from military schools in China or had been trained abroad. The infantry close order drill was superior; even the extended order move­ ments were good, but the physical drill was phenomenal. The artillery gun drill was fast and the men were familiar with their duties. As was the case with most modernized Chinese divisions, the cavalry was the weakest element, but even at that they were better than the national average. The whole engineer battalion, as of the spring of 1906, was being trained at a special technical school at Wuchang. One recent improve­ ment was the fact that both the infantry and artillery were being supplied ammunition for annual firing practice on good ranges. As they marched, these stalwart young soldiers of the new era sang a patriotic song attributed to Chang Chihtung.®9 It is not surprising that Chang, with his honesty and belief in Confucian benevolence, should provide better physical facilities for his troops than any contemporary leader. The barracks of the Eighth Division were the best in China. Among the facilities provided were mess halls, kitchens, barber shops, and even recreation rooms supplied with Chi­ nese publications. The buildings were clean, neat, and well ventilated. The basic rations furnished the troops consisted of rice, vegetables, and fish, but meat was issued twice a month.70 Perhaps even more than Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chang Chih-tung 68

CSS, vol. i, sect. 2, pp. 3-4; McKenzie, op.cit., p. 227. Leonard, op.cit., pp. 140, 206-215. 7 0 Ibid., pp. 208, 215-216. 69

Progress in Military Training placed emphasis on the technical education of his troops. During this period, the two principal training institutions at Wuchang were a basic and an intermediate school. By 1906, the basic school, which had opened late in 1903, was reported to have 500 regular cadets and 60 others who were enrolled only in a surveying course. Upon being graduated from the basic course, the cadets could be selected to attend the inter­ mediate school, which had been created from a reorganization of the military preparatory school. Since this institution had been established earlier than the basic school, and since it was as yet difficult to obtain men who were qualified for the more advanced course, the intermediate school attempted to cover both the basic and intermediate curricula in a five-year program. German was added to the introductory course and greater emphasis was placed upon military science. It was planned that in the future the course would be reduced to two years, in which case only the more advanced work would be presented. Graduates of this school would be eligible to attend the general staff college in Peking, if it were established. In the meantime, some of the graduates were being sent to Japan for advanced training. Aside from these two principal academies, there were several other military educational institutions in Hupeh and Hunan. As noted, a special technical school had been set up in Wuchang to train the whole engineer battalion of the Eighth Division. In 1903, an officers' school consisting of students "from the best families of the province," as well as a non-commissioned officers' school for provincial troops had been established at Changsha, Honan. There was also an ineffective school at Hsiangyang, Hupeh, the headquarters of the provincial commander-in-chief, and another school was being built in northwestern Hupeh in 1904.71 One factor which continued to impress foreign observers was the fact that so many of Chang's troops were at least partially literate. In fact, a noteworthy number of students and men with civil degrees enlisted in Hupeh because they were offered attrac7 1 Ibid., pp. 151-154 (quoting T'ieh-liang's inspection report noted above), 266-268; NCH1 April 15, 1904, p. 758, and Oct. 28, 1904, p. 976.

Progress in Military Training tive terms. As one local observer remarked, this was an "epoch-making" situation.72 Equally unorthodox was the fact that the great governor-general did not limit military training to professional soldiers. He had helped draw up the national regulations which stipulated that in the civilian schools the students should wear a uniform and be taught military drills. Hence, in the schools of Hupeh even civilian students were learning close order drill.73 In 1906 Chang Chih-tung was still employing two German military instructors, as well as a number of Japanese. The latter were, however, gradually winning the dominant posi­ tion and ill will existed between the two groups.74 The remaining Lu-chun organizations were far less ad­ vanced than the divisions of Yiian Shih-k'ai or Chang Chihtung. In February 1906, the Seventh Division was a small and incomplete mixed brigade. The Ninth Division at Nan­ king could be called that only by courtesy, since it merely consisted of three partially formed infantry regiments, with no special troops. At Foochow, Fukien, the Tenth Division was composed only of six infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and two companies of engineers. The 25th Brigade in Hunan was actually about the same size as the Tenth Division, but there was a governor-general at Foochow and only a governor at the capital of Hunan. Kiangsi's 27th Brigade was made up of two small infantry regiments, plus an understrength squadron of cavalry. It was claimed that the 29th Brigade at Kaifeng, Honan, had 5,750 men. In reality, it consisted of about 3,000, divided into infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer units. The 31st Brigade in Anhwei was made up of slightly over 2,000 recruits organ­ ized into four infantry battalions. By 1906, several other brigades had been authorized but not yet activated. These included the 21st (Hupeh), 23rd (Nanking), 33rd (Szechwan), and 35th (Hsinkiang). In each case, a vacancy had been left in the numerical list in order that the separate 72 See

NCH, Nov. 18, 1904, p. 1125; see also ibid., Sept. 28, 1906, p. 748. Sept. 2, 1904, p. 521; June 23, 1905, p. 629. 74 Leonard, op.cit., p. 210.

73Ibid.,

Progress in Military Training brigades might later be expanded into divisions. Besides the major Western-style units recognized as belonging to the Lu-chun, there was in Kwangtung province a semi-modern organization known as the Canton Brigade. This body of some 4,400 men possessed units designated to represent the major arms and services, but all of them were still organized as infantry. Finally, the Left Division of the Guards Army commanded by Ma Yii-k'un was still stationed in northern Chihli to police the frontier. Although it was claimed to be a much larger force, the strength of the division was about 6,450 combatants and 1,000 coolies. Besides the troops listed above, nearly all of the provinces of China, by the end of 1906, had at least some units described as standing army troops, but they varied greatly in size, organization, equip­ ment, and training.78 A study of the location and organizers of the various units of the new army indicates that aside from critical financial considerations and the urging of the Throne there were two other basic factors involved in the establishment of these organizations. The first was strategic. It will be noted that all of the Lu-chun formations activated by 1906 were sta­ tioned either in coastal areas, in the vulnerable Yangtze Valley, or on the approach to Peking. Yet, not all vital or wealthy areas were garrisoned by even incomplete Lu-chiin brigades. This was because the other prerequisite was the support of a relatively enlightened and progressive provincial leader who took a personal interest in training soldiers more modern than the local Green Standard or militia troops. The first seven divisions were Pei-yang organizations, which had been promoted by Yiian Shih-k'ai. The Eighth was organized by Chang Chih-tung. At Nanking the Ninth Division had been activated by Chou Fu, a protege of Li Hung-chang, and expanded by the enlightened Manchu Tuan-fang. By direc­ tion of the Commission for Army Reorganization, the Tenth Division had been formed by the military progressive Wei Kuang-tao. On the other hand, the governor-general of viIbid., pp. 170-251.

Progress in Military Training Yunnan and Kweichow blamed his predecessor for the mili­ tary backwardness of the area. Szechwan had no Lu-Chiin units although it was one of the richest provinces of the empire. Honan, close to the center of power of the EmpressDowager and the Pei-yang clique, possessed the 29th Brigade, but its commander worked under a definite handicap because the governor was a conservative who opposed the standing army concept. The exposed province of Kwangtung had no Lu-chiin troops, but did maintain the semi-modern Canton Brigade, which was trained by Japanese instructors.76 The leadership of the various Lu-chiin organizations varied considerably in quality. That of the outstanding Pei-yang and Hupeh troops has already been discussed. In mid-1906 the commander of the Ninth Division was a drunken intendant with tuberculosis and a reputation for dishonesty. More­ over, there were almost no qualified officers in the unit. Later in the year, however, Tuan-fang imported a group of young academy-trained Pei-yang officers and a press report stated that he planned to replace incompetent leaders with graduates of the Nanking, Wuchang, and Pei-yang military schools. In the Tenth Division the officers had had at least some professional training in China or Japan. The com­ manders of the 25th and 27th Brigades had had years of experience in Japan, while the general commanding the Canton Brigade had formerly been head of a military acad­ emy. Nearly all of the officers of the 27th Brigade had at­ tended the military schools at Wuchang or Nanking, while many had also studied in Japan. But the 31st Brigade was led by a civil official, and the officers appeared to lack training.77 As for the enlisted personnel, in some of the new units many of the men were drawn from the Disciplined Forces and militia armies, but in others the great majority were 7s CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 540, pp. 10-iob; NCH (Decrees), Aug. 30, 1907, p. 494; NCH, Nov. 23, 1906, p. 435; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 228, 247-250; The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 3rd issue, vol. 1, p. 407. 77Leonard op.cit., pp. 218-219, 222, 223, 228, 230-231, 232, 247; The 1 Maritime Customs, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 407.

Progress in Military Training new recruits. One interesting feature was the continued wide­ spread use of Hunanese. Not only was the 25th Brigade in Hunan composed of local men, but also the veterans of the Tenth Division in Fukien were Hunanese. The United States military attache believed that some of the soldiers of the Canton Brigade were from Hunan, as were the majority of the standing army troops at the capital of Kwangsi. In the case of the Canton Brigade, the governor-general imported troops because he did not trust the local populace.78 In gen­ eral, however, the use of Hunanese can be accounted for by two factors. One was the heritage and prestige left by the Hunan Army of Tseng Kuo-fan, as well as the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang. The other factor was that the Hunanese have had a reputation for being good soldiers. In creating the Lu-chun, China had one real military asset. Armies are composed of individuals, and qualified military observers have long been impressed with the Chinese peasant as a soldier. This was especially true during the period 19041906, for in general a better class of men was originally selected for the new army than had been the case in the past. Observers differed as to details, but it was usually agreed that the enlisted man possessed adequate intelligence, as well as great physical ability and endurance. He was capable of marching long distances and could endure pain with fortitude. Never having enjoyed more, he could exist on as little as any soldier in the world. Sober and usually obedient, this product of a strict hierarchical society lent him­ self well to military discipline. In battle, if well led, he gave ample proof of courage and, although this point has frequently been exaggerated, he did have a somewhat more philosophical attitude toward death than his Occidental counterpart.79 As 78

Leonard, op.cit., pp. 222, 224, 234, 249. "La reorganisation militaire de la Chine," op.cit., vol. 67 (April 1906), PP- 352-353; de Grandprey, Les armees de la Chine, pp. 10-11; report of Colonel Browne, British Military Attache, BPP, China No. I (1899), enclosure to no. 53, pp. 52-53, data from period July 31-Dec. 31, 1897. For a more recent estimate, see Captain E. F. Carlson, The Chinese Army, Its Organization and Military Efficiency, New York, 1940, pp. 13-14. For a similar analysis of the military qualities of the Chinese sailor, see 79

Progress in Military Training a rule, the new soldier was better treated than in the past. His quarters, food, and uniforms were superior to those of former armies. In some cases, he was even furnished medical facilities, and opium-smoking was declining. In the Lu-chun the troops were receiving their pay with greater regularity than formerly, but it was subject to deduction for rations. Also, one tael per month was held out for the soldier's family. These deductions permitted continued fraud, and it is doubt­ ful that many families ever received the allotment due them. In spite of improved conditions of service, as well as a slight increase in the status of the common soldier, the majority of the men were still obtained by a form of conscription. Each locality was given a quota and the local authorities used their own judgment as to recruiting methods. Although such criticisms were not general, it was reported that in the Tenth Division there was a considerable rate of tuberculosis and venereal disease. Furthermore, the desertions noted in the 27th Brigade must have been fairly common in the Lu-chun.80 One real advancement noted in the standing army organiza­ tions was the greatly improved manner in which they treated their countrymen. No people will loyally support the armed forces of their nation while those troops are as destructive of property as a swarm of locusts and as inconsiderate of their fellow men as a band of robbers. The general social status of the military profession could have risen greatly if the various military organizations had adopted the standards of conduct maintained in the Pei-yang Army and the Eighth Division during this period. Unfortunately, these standards were never widely upheld. A development which gave promise of strengthening the Chinese armies was the establishment of further military schools. Although the plans for a complete system of schools was far from being carried out, according to the French General Staff, China in 1906 had thirty-five military schools Navy Dept., O.N.I., "Reorganization of Chinese Navy," class, no. E-9-d, reg. no. 10, report no. 136, Nov. II, 1909, p. 2. 80 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 164, 219-220, 231; "La reorganisation militaire," oP.cit., p. 352; McKenzie1 op.cit., p. 230.

Progress in Military Training and training establishments. The total enrollment was said to be 787 officers, 3,448 officer candidates, and 2,072 non-com­ missioned officers. It was further reported that there were 691 officers and cadets in Japanese schools, as well as some fifteen in Europe.81 Since the graduates of the naval schools were as apt to serve in the army as in the navy, to the list of military schools should be added the four academies at Chefoo, Nanking, Foochow, and Whampoa (near Canton). These institutions had a total of about 350 midshipmen. Most of the military schools were financed by the provincial treas­ uries, hence they were largely controlled by the local officials.82 Besides the previously mentioned specialist schools in Chihli and Hupeh, there had been set up three institutions classed as military medical schools. These were located at Paoting, Canton, and Chengtu (Szechwan). There was also at Paoting a veterinary school which was presenting only a preparatory course. The curriculum of the general military schools was more uniform than most aspects of the military system. The courses usually included Chinese history and literature, for­ eign languages (especially Japanese and German, but some­ times English), mathematics, chemistry, physics, geography, history, and military science. The faculties almost invariably consisted of Japanese, Chinese who had been trained in Japan, or Germans, but most of the German instructors were not re­ employed when their contracts expired. The theory, and some­ times the practice, was that talented and diligent enlisted men should be given the opportunity to attend the military schools. However, it was generally assumed that the majority of cadets should be sons of "provincial gentlemen." The best-qualified 81 "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (March 1906), p. 247. According to regulations proposed by the Commission for Army Reor­ ganization in 1904 and 1905, military students selected to study abroad were to have come from the following categories: graduates of the military basic schools, of the short-course officers' schools, and of the Military School for Princes and Nobles; Bannermen students; students from the intermediate military schools and from other schools (Brunnert and Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organisation of China, p. 321). 82 Navy Dept., O.N.I., "Chinese Naval Schools," class, no. E-9-d, reg. no. 07-565, July 16, 1907, pp. 1-3; Leonard, op.cit., pp. 256, 263-264, 273276, 282-283.

Progress in Military Training officers were said to have been produced by the schools in Chihli, Hupeh, and Anhwei, but even these were technically inferior to those trained in Japan.83 Obvious improvements notwithstanding, the new Chinese military organizations were still handicapped by the same basic defects as in the past. The most serious weakness was still the quality of the officers' corps. Despite the numerous military schools there was no single and accepted method for selecting officers. The commissioned ranks of the standing army still included civil officials, men shifted from the Eight Banners and other old-style troops, naval officers who had been transferred through the influence of friends, and civilian students returned from abroad. The best-trained officers were those graduated from the military schools, but so great was the demand that a large per cent of the cadets were commis­ sioned before they completed their course. Many of the officers trained in Japan had been converted by the revolutionaries and created discord by spreading propaganda or becoming involved in intrigue. Characteristic of their society, the officers lacked permanent tenure, hence they were forced either to seek a powerful patron or remain inconspicuous.The youthfulness of so many senior officers was not always an asset, for frequently they lacked the experience necessary for high command. In fact, the senior officers were usually less well qualified for their posts than their subordinates; but, under the best of circumstances, it would have taken a generation for competent officers graduated from the military schools to permeate the army from top to bottom.84 Closely associated with the shortage of technically trained officers was the embryonic character of the important staff and service functions. The partially developed general staff corps was composed of young officers with a better than 83 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 235, 254-283; "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (March 1906), pp. 247-248, (May 1906), pp. 443, 448. Captain Leonard stated that the German instructors were former officers who had left the service of their own country "for reasons better not discussed" (Leonard, op.cit., p. 256). 84 Leonard, op.cit., pp. 160-163; "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (March 1906), pp. 248-249; Times (London), Jan. I, 1906.

Progress in Military Training average knowledge of military matters, but they lacked the training, experience, and confidence essential to good military planning. They remained too dependent on foreign technical manuals and Japanese advisers. The joint quartermasterfinance corps was even less well organized. The actual admin­ istration of supply functions was largely in the hands of civilians. Like the military system in general, logistics were still principally within the jurisdiction of the provinces. Mod­ ernization of military justice had made very little headway. The small medical corps was making some progress in im­ proving sanitary conditions in those units in which it existed, but it was totally inadequate to deal with combat casualties. Also, the organization of essential communication troops was in its elementary stages and even that was largely limited to Yiian Shih-k'ai's divisions. The same was true of the ordnance corps, while there was no formally organized re­ mount service.88 Some slight improvement had been made in simplifying the incredible logistical problems created by the diversity of light weapons and equipment. The Lu-chun organizations were in large part armed with either the model-1888 Mauser or the Japanese Meiji 30th-year rifle and, unlike former times, these pieces were now generally well cared for. Their main disadvantage was their age. As for cannon, however, even the modernized Chinese troops "possessed the nucleus for a museum collection." This situation was made worse by the fact that ammunition manufactured in China was not of the best quality, nor did it always fit the guns.86 The Chinese arsenals had never produced sufficient arms or ammunition to supply the armies adequately and little improvement had been made in this situation since 1898. The Hanyang and Kiangnan (Shanghai) arsenals were still the only large, modern works capable of producing various types of ordnance materiel in sizable quantities. The Hanyang factory had increased its rate of production considerably, but 85

"La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (May 1906), pp. 434-

457· 86

Leonard, op.cit., pp. 165-166.

Progress in Military Training by 1906 the output of the Kiangnan arsenal had been reduced in expectation of its being transferred inland. It then appeared that the plans to build two large new arsenals in addition to the Hanyang plant would be carried out, in which case the remaining institutions would be reduced to the status of repair shops. The production of several of them had already been decreased. In 1906 the Nanking plant was the only one besides those at Shanghai and Hanyang which was still producing some guns. The factories at Kaifeng (Honan), Canton, and probably Chengtu (Szechwan) were manufac­ turing a small number of rifles, but the so-called arsenals at Foochow, Nanchang (Kiangsi), and Taiyuan (Shansi) were actually only repair shops. As in 1898, capacity was far superior to output, while the material manufactured was not of the highest standard. Although a few Chinese engineers and technicians had been trained abroad, foreigners were still employed in several plants, including the largest ones.87 Since internal production was not sufficient, large quantities of weapons continued to be imported, especially from Germany and Japan.88 The adoption of Western arms, tables of organization, schools, and military techniques were important external modifications, but beneath the surface the largely unchanged Chinese society exerted tremendous influence on the Chinese armies. Many of their basic characteristics continued to resemble those of the Taiping period. The senior provincial officials rendered polite recognition to the authority of the Throne and the central military organs, but since they recruited, paid, and trained their own troops, they continued 87Cf. Beresford, The Break-Up of China, pp. 292-303, with Leonard, op.cit., pp. 235-236, 332-342, and "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., pp. 449-453. See also Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, 2nd issue, vol. 1, p. 124, and vol. 2, p. 112; NCH, June 16, 1905, P- 588. 88 The figures concerning the importation of munitions of war furnished by the Imperial Maritime Customs in Returns of Trade and Trade Reports are very incomplete for this period. No national statistics are given and no data are available for the great port of Shanghai. Figures are given for imports into Tientsin and Canton and occasionally for Nanking, Foochow, and Hankow.

Progress in Military Training to exercise a high degree of control over what were still semiprivate armies. This remained essentially true despite the government's ability to transfer both officials and their troops from one province to another. Moreover, it was this de­ centralization of control which more than any other factor prevented greater uniformity among China's divisions. The central government realized this situation, but it was frequently forced to compromise.89 Another familiar example of the force of tradition was the wide-scale existence of nepotism and the development of military cliques based on the relation­ ship of patron and proteges. Corruption also remained a constant evil. Every year a series of decrees degraded or dismissed officers throughout the empire. They were denounced by the top officials for a variety of crimes, but especially for padding payrolls and other forms of embezzlement.90 No doubt some of these dismissals represented a sincere attempt to replace dishonest or incompetent personnel. Yet, since they frequently occurred soon after the transfer of governors-general and governors, it is indicated that many of them were the result of the spoils system or political rivalry. Incumbents were removed to make room for new favorites, who might or might not be more honest and efficient. After making an extensive study of the Chinese military establishment, Captain Leonard, the American military at­ tache, prepared a detailed evaluation of the Chinese armies. It was his opinion that the troops who with any justification could be classed as combat soldiers capable of modern war­ time service numbered only about 100,000. Of these, the Pei-yang Army alone furnished roughly 60,000. The other 40,000 were composed of the standing army units of the remainder of the empire. Captain Leonard, who was skeptical of China's military capabilities, felt that if the Lu-chiin re­ mained loyal it could handle any internal uprising. Yet, it was his belief that, faced by well-equipped foreign troops, 89

See Leonard, op.cit., pp. 1-2. examples, see NCH (Decrees), July 24, 1903, p. 185; April 14, 1905, p. 80; Feb. 23, 1906, p. 406; Nov. 16, 1906, p. 379. 90For

Progress in Military Training the new army could not give a good account of itself against a force of more than one-fifth its size.91 The intelligence section of the French General Staff was also critical. The French maintained that, despite improvements, the new army could not defend China until it developed effective service forces, since at present it could neither transport nor supply itself.92 The facts indicate that in large measure these two official reports were accurate; still, they may have underestimated the existing military situation in two respects. The defensive tactics of the Lu-chiin, as displayed in maneuvers, was superior to its offensive power. Had the necessity arisen, it is doubtful that Captain Leonard would have advocated landing to fight the Pei-yang Army with a force of 12,000 or even 24,000 men. The allied commanders in 1900 had considered a larger expedition necessary to overcome troops who were far inferior to the Pei-yang Army. In spite of the extraordinary logistical problems which faced the Luchiin, it would be dangerous to state that they could not supply or transport themselves. In recent years, Chinese armies have proved themselves capable of maneuvering over large areas and of transporting the minimum of essential supplies without recourse to railroads or adequate road systems, since if necessary they used only human carriers. Furthermore, as the French observers themselves pointed out, the completion of the Peking-Hankow Railway in 1905 created a major modification of the military situation in North and Central China. The railway permitted a con­ centration of troops in either direction. It was estimated that by utilizing both the new railroad and the Yangtze River almost 90,000 troops from the Pei-yang area and Central 91 Leonard, op.cit., p. 373; see also "L'armee du Yangtseu," Revue tnilitaire des armees etrangdres, vol. 69 (March 1907), p. 283. As of October 1906, the Peking correspondent of the North China Herald estimated that there were about 240,000 modern equipped and trained troops in China, but that only some 80,000 to 90,000 were effectively organized and led (NCH, Oct. S, 1906, p. 55). 82 "La reorganisation militaire," op.cit., vol. 67 (May 1906), pp. 433-434.

Progress in Military Training China could be concentrated in the lower Yangtze Valley within forty days.98 In spite of its limitations, the reorganization and moderni­ zation of the Chinese armies was of sufficient magnitude to attract the attention of the major powers. Even prior to the Pei-yang Army maneuvers in October 1905, Russia, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, and France were maintain­ ing large staffs of military observers in China. In September 1905, the American minister informed the Department of State of the importance to the United States of obtaining prompt and comprehensive data concerning "the vast re­ organization of China's military forces" which was then "being rapidly pushed."94 The edicts of Septeinber 12, 1904, which had approved the Lu-chun system and called for a hierarchy of military schools, marked a turning point in the military history of China. Even though these plans were never carried to full fruition, they established the basis for a modern, nation-wide, but not national, army. From this time until the Revolution of 1911, the Chinese army was in reality the regular troops of the Lu-chun, a force far superior to its predecessors. The various categories of old-style troops continued to exist in varying strengths, but their mission, insofar as they had a legitimate one, was the preservation of local peace and order, as well as serving as a dubious second line of defense. 98 "L'armee

du Yangtseu," op.cit., pp. 283-284. Dept. State, Despatches, China, vol. 128, encl. to no. 89, Rockhill to Root, Sept. 8, 1905, p. 1. According to a press report, numerous under­ paid officials were selling important government documents to the intelli­ gence agents of some of the foreign powers (NCH, Jan. 27, 1905, p. 187). 94

CHAPTER 7

THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD ORDER, 1907-1911

Problems Confronting the Empress-Dowager

T

HE reorganization of the central government late in 1906 was followed by a surge of reaction. Unre­ constructed conservatives, those who had been de­ prived of their positions and those who feared they might lose them next, opposed even such compromising policies as the Throne had instituted.1 Meanwhile, the foreign pressures which had necessitated the reform movement concontinued. Especially was this true in Manchuria, where Russia and Japan had divided the homeland of the Manchu dynasty into two spheres of interest. The weakness of the Throne's foreign policy further decreased its prestige at home, thus providing a fertile field for revolutionary activity. In addition, the internal stability of the empire was threatened by growing animosity between the Manchus and their Chi­ nese subjects. Confronted by these complex problems, the EmpressDowager was in an unenviable position. The reform program over which she presided could satisfy neither the old guard nor the revolutionaries; one wing considered it too rapid, the other too slow. Nevertheless, spurred on by internal and external pressures, Tz'u-hsi showed perseverance, if not great force, in attempting to modernize China. The EmpressDowager stated her determination to grant a constitution; also in July 1907 the Throne approved regulations for the reorganization of the provincial administration over a fifteenyear period. In these directives there was evidence of a desire to strengthen the central government, but the centralizing features were effectively counterbalanced. The authority of the governors-general and governors was safeguarded by provisions which permitted them to retain preponderant con1 Cameron,

The Reform Movement, p. 107.

The Collapse of the Old Order trol over military and fiscal matters in the provinces, as well as to recommend changes in the law.2 During the remainder of 1907, on paper at least, other steps were taken toward the gradual attainment of a constitutional monarchy. Efforts were also made to stimulate the national economy.3 The promise of evolutionary political reform failed to placate the opposition; in fact, revolutionary activities and popular disturbances increased. This development was not due, however, to anti-dynastic fervor alone. Foreign exploita­ tion, famine conditions, and high prices added to the dis­ content. The revolutionaries who sought to establish a re­ public took advantage of the people's grievances to further their own cause. The Throne sought to rectify the situation by distributing relief, but the officials responsible for the program proved to be both corrupt and negligent. As a result the government was largely unsuccessful in its attempts to alleviate the causes of public discontent; it was also incapable of extirpating the revolutionary leaders. Unrest was most prevalent in Central and Southern China, but it also extended to North China and Manchuria. Radical activities had be­ come "a constant menace and a real source of terror." Such events as the murder of the governor of Anhwei created "excessive nervousness" among the bureaucracy.4 A regime that can no longer depend on the support of its people must place increased reliance on its armed forces, but it was known that there was already considerable dis­ content within the army. The existence of this dangerous 2 NCH (Decrees), Feb. 22, 1907, p. 417; FR, 1907, part i, pp. 179-189; Li Chien-nung, Chung-kuo chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih (A Political History of China during the Last Hundred Years), vol. I, p. 256. For an analysis of constitutional reform in China from 1905 to 1911, see Cameron, The Reform Movement, ch. 6. 8Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 110-112; FR, 1907, part I, pp. 189-192, 195-196, 197-198. * Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 32, no. 215/3-6, pp. 1-2, Rockhill to Root, Jan. 18, 1907; ibid., no. 215/7-12, p. 2, Jan. 29, 1907; ibid., end. to no. 215/1-2, pp. 1-2, Ragsdale to Ass't Sec. State, Jan. 3, 1907; ibid., no. 215/17, Rogers to Ass't Sec. State, April 10, 1907; NCH (Decrees), July 12, 1907, p. 108; Captain Henry Leonard, "The Chinese Army," op.cit., pp. 4-8.

The Collapse of the Old Order situation was confirmed by an admission of the Minister of War. In mid-1907 T'ieh-liang informed a foreign diplomat that although he was confident concerning the well-disciplined northern troops, "he could not say the same" for the partially disaffected soldiers of the Yangtze Valley.8 The Manchu leaders were on the horns of a dilemma; they were attempt­ ing to create a modern army capable of forestalling foreign aggression, but this army was itself a product of changing China and part of it was proving subject to revolutionary conversion. The government was aware of the situation, yet until the outbreak of the revolution in 1911 it continued to promote the expansion of the Lu-chiin. The old-style troops would prove to be politically more reliable, but they were almost worthless against a foreign foe. In the face of growing anti-dynastic feeling, it became imperative that the Manchus seek to placate the Chinese by reducing the distinctions between the two races. In August 1907 an edict claiming that the Throne made no differentia­ tion in the attitude between the two peoples pointed out that the Eight Banner posts of Tartar-general and lieutenant general had been opened to Chinese. Officials were then called upon to make recommendations for equalizing opportuni­ ties for the two races. Among those who replied was the progressive Manchu Tuan-fang. He proposed that the Ban­ ner Forces be disbanded within twelve years, that the pen­ sions of the Bannermen be commuted, and that they be enlisted with the Chinese in the same military units. In Sep­ tember, a decree ordered the gradual demobilization of the Banner garrisons in the provinces. Their pensions were to be replaced by land allotments and the Manchus were to be trained for productive occupations. Then in October the Throne directed that new legal and social regulations applica­ ble to both races be drawn up.® In ordering the disbandment of the garrisons—symbols of 5 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 33, no. 215/67, p. 3, Rockhill to Root, Aug. 9, 1907. e FR, 1907, part 1, pp. 192-195, 197; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 176-177; see also NCH (Decrees), Aug. 16, 1907, p. 380.

245

The Collapse of the Old Order the conquest status of their dynasty—the Empress-Dowager and some of the Manchus were apparently well intentioned. However, it was not to be expected that the indolent Bannermen or the majority of the privileged Manchu officials would view the proposed changes with equanimity. Soon there were accurate rumors that the demobilization of the Banner garri­ sons would be held up by opposition among the Manchus.7 Unfortunately, the plans to create racial harmony remained largely inoperative.

Renewed Military Reforms It had appeared likely that the political reaction of early 1907 might greatly retard military reform. The United States military attache took a pessimistic view of the situation, for he believed that interest in modernizing the Chinese army had been artificially inspired and was dying out. Unless opinion shifted, the new-style troops would degenerate. He also felt that the military system had reverted to provincial control and that within the provinces Japanese instructors tended to dominate the staff offices.8 There were other dis­ couraging indications. The Minister of War was an antiChinese conservative, while the degree of progress that could be expected in the four divisions taken from Yiian Shih-k'ai was indicated by the actions of their new com­ mander. At an inspection of the Sixth Division he insisted that the officers wear Chinese robes, even though they had purchased expensive foreign-style uniforms.9 Nevertheless, just as in the period of reaction following the coup d'etat of 1898, the Empress-Dowager and her con­ servative advisers recognized the necessity of sponsoring military reorganization. Then, too, progressive officials like Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung still had influence over the formation of policy. Thus reforms continued to τNCH, Oct. 4, 1907, P- S3; Oct. 11, 1907, p. 120. Leonard, op.cit., pp. 159-160, 373-374. 9 Ibid., p. 374; Swift, in Blakeslee, China and the Far East, p. 8

179.

The Collapse of the Old Order emanate from both the palace and the Ministry of War, but they were less realistic than they had previously been. By 1907 the Lu-chun was developing as a form of regular army. Owing to the emphasis which was placed on moderniz­ ing the armed forces, it was to be expected that further efforts would be made to reorganize the old-style provincial forma­ tions as a more effective reserve force or constabulary. Hence, on June 29, the Throne approved temporary regulations prepared by the Ministry of War for the Patrol and Defense Troops (Hsiin-jang tui, or Hsiin-fang ying).10 The designa­ tion Hsun-fang ying was in use by 1885, but that which has normally been indicated by this name were the provincial forces or reserve troops organized beginning in 1907. In theory, these units were to be organized from the best soldiers of the Green Standard and militia armies, plus new recruits. Their primary missions were to be the preservation of local order, the prevention of political revolt, and the pro­ tection of lines of communication.11 The Ministry of War sought to create some uniformity among these organizations, so in September 1907 an edict codified the existing regulations concerning them. It declared that the mission of the Lu-Chiin was national defense, and that insofar as possible it should be relieved of pacification duties, which were to be the responsibility of the Patrol and Defense Troops. In typical fashion, these latter units were placed under the provincial leaders, but the Minister of War, who retained ultimate jurisdiction, could send officers to inspect them. Also, in time of war the new formations were to be placed under Lu-chun commanders. The Patrol and Defense Troops were to consist solely of infantry and cavalry units. Several, but not more than ten, battalions or squadrons would form a detachment (Iu), of which no province could have more than five. The infantry battalions were to be made 10 Brunnert and Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization of China, p. 309. 11 See CSK, Pmg-chih 3, pp. 5b, 8b-iob; CSS, vol. I, sect. I, p. 13; "Nouvelle organisation du Sune-Fang-Toue," Revue militaire des armees etrangkres, vol. 71 (May 1908), p. 512.

The Collapse of the Old Order up of three companies and had an authorized strength of 301 men. A cavalry squadron was to be composed of three troops totaling 189 men.12 Like many of the projects of the Manchu reform period, the establishment of the Patrol and Defense Troops was largely a change of terminology rather than of substance. The ultimate objective was to replace the decadent Green Standard, Disciplined Forces, Defense Army, and militia troops with a semi-modern force, but the new organization suffered from most of the defects of its predecessors. Its commanders were old-fashioned officers or civil officials. Most of the enlisted men were from the militia armies or the Army of the Green Standard and were of poor quality. Al­ though the troops were taught Western drill and equipped with foreign-style arms,18 much of their equipment must have been of antiquated models. One of the government's reasons for desiring to disband the various old-fashioned military organizations was to save funds to apply to the Lu-chiin. Yet the actual discharging of Green Standard or other troops created both hardship and resentment, for despite their incompetence these soldiers were regulars with no other profession. The provincial officials could, however, escape this difficulty by transferring men from the Army of the Green Standard into either the Patrol and Defense Troops or the Lu-chiin, instead of dis­ charging them. As for the most truly provincial of all forma­ tions, the old militia armies, they almost disappeared into the Patrol and Defense Troops. Thus they retained a form of existence. If one of the objectives of T'ieh-liang in re­ organizing the provincial troops had been to obtain greater control over them, the attempt miscarried, for the Patrol and 12"Nouvelle organisation du Sune-Fang-Toue," op.cit., pp. 512-513; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 309-312. After the reorganization of the old-style forces as Patrol and Defense Troops began, the military secretariats of the provincial heads were revised and became staffs for the new troops (Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 387-388). 18 CSS, vol. x, sect, x, p. 14.

The Collapse of the Old Order Defense Troops were actually under the control of the gov­ ernors-general and governors.14 By 1907 there was a tendency to demand an acceleration of reforms which already suffered from impractical time limits. On August 29, 1907, the Throne approved a memorial of the Ministry of War renewing the earlier proposals to create thirty-six Lu-chiin divisions and outlining their distri­ bution by provinces.15 Based on a consideration of strategic factors, the wealth of the area, and the degree of internal peace and order, the provinces were each allotted from one to three divisions. The ministry retained command over the four former Pei-yang divisions, but, with the exception of these organizations and one division in Szechwan, the financ­ ing of units was still to be the responsibility of the provincial leaders. This fact alone would assure them the dominant voice in the control of the new army. The point at which this plan strayed furthest from reality was in authorizing the various provinces only from two to five years to achieve their quota. It meant that, instead of organizing thirty-six divisions by 1922 as originally planned, the whole program was to be completed by 1912. This was an objective which China was unable to accomplish. Further­ more, the plan was not altogether sound from a strategic standpoint. Although Manchuria was to have only three divisions, they could be augmented by railway from the six divisions to be stationed in Chihli, but with the exception of 14CSS, vol. i, sect, i, p. 12; LCCCF, pp. 348, 352; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes in Chinese Army in 19x0," Feb. 20, 1911, p. 11; ibid., no. 6283-5, "Monthly Reports, Dec. 1910," pp. 6-7; Navy Dept., O.N.I., "Yangtse River fortifications and reorganisation of Chinese Army," class, no. H-8-a, reg. no. 638, Aug. 26, 1909, p. 8; Times (London), Oct. 21, 1911. 15 For the memorial of the Lu-chiin pu. and the imperial rescript, see Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany), vol. 4, no. 10 (1907), "Chun-shih" (Military Affairs [section]), pp. 92-96. For a summary of the memorial, see CSL, Te-tsung, ch. 576, p. 19. The Metropolitan area was assigned four divisions; Szechwan was allotted three; and Chihli, Kiangsu, Hupeh, Kwangtung, Yunnan, and Kansu were assigned two each. The remaining seventeen provinces, including the three Manchurian provinces and the Chiang-pei, were to have only one division apiece.

The Collapse of the Old Order Jehol province no modern troops were to be assigned to either Outer or Inner Mongolia. Despite its proximity to Russia, the large, isolated province of Sinkiang was to have a single division. Southeast China, the center of revolutionary activity and vulnerable to attack from the sea, was to be defended by only three divisions, two in Kwangtung and one in Kwangsi. Still, in criticizing this allocation of troops, it should be remembered that the decisions of the Ministry of War were restricted by the decentralized revenue system of China. Since the central government could not directly finance a large national army, it was to a large degree forced to distribute divisions in accordance with the ability or even the willingness of the various areas to maintain them. Also, military and financial considerations were blended with politi­ cal motivations. Together, these account for the heaviest concentration of troops near the capital. The instruction and training of troops throughout the empire continued without exceptional progress. It was de­ cided not to preserve the policy of holding large-scale maneu­ vers. The field problems held in 1906 had engendered criticism, much of which was justified. Expensive grand maneuvers had been inaugurated before all of the new divi­ sions had had adequate unit training at lower than division and corps levels. It was necessary to permit the officers more experience in command and staff functions before sending them into large war games. Hence, the maneuvers of 1907 were limited to mixed brigades from the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions. The most noteworthy feature of the field problems was that they were reported to have been executed without the assistance of Japanese advisers.18

The Struggle between the Cliques In the midst of reform, ideological clashes, and racial antagonisms, the political-military struggle for power con16 "Grandes manoeuvres en 1907," Revue militaire des armees etrangires, vol. 72 (Dec. 1908), pp. 555-557; see also NCH, April 26, 1907, p. 183; Sept. 20, 1907, p. 677; Oct. 25, 1907, p. 253.

The Collapse of the Old Order tinued unabated. The balance wheel between the contending factions was the old Empress-Dowager. A shrewd judge of the strong and weak points of her officials, she continued to play the parties off against each other, while retaining the services of all the cliques. The assumption that the administrative reorganization and the transfer of four Pei-yang divisions late in 1906 had drastically reduced the influence of Yuan Shih-k'ai at first proved to be exaggerated. The loss of lucrative posts placed him in an embarrassing financial position, which threatened the continuance of not only his military activities, but also his other reforms.17 Nevertheless, until her death late in 1908, Yiian remained a favored councillor of the EmpressDowager and a power to be reckoned with. The satisfaction of his adversaries over Yuan losing the bulk of his troops was short lived. When the administration of Manchuria was reorganized in April 1907, an attempt was made to placate the Chinese people by appointing four Chinese to the top posts in the Manchu homeland. Three of these men were proteges of Yiian Shih-k'ai. Hsu Shih-ch'ang was named governor-general and imperial high commissioner, with the additional powers of Tartar-general in the three northeastern provinces. T'ang Shao-i, who like Yuan had been bitterly attacked a few months previously, was made governor of Fengtien, while Tuan Chih-kuei was appointed acting gover­ nor of Heilungkiang. This meant that political authority and control over most of the troops in Manchuria was placed in the hands of the Pei-yang clique. Their enemies, however, were not inactive. Tuan Chih-kuei was relieved before taking office because of partially proved charges of bribery.18 In May 1907 Yiian's friend and patron Prince Ch'ing was named controller of the Ministry of War. This was a post 17 Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1911, vol. 171, no. 1518/27-30, pp. 4-5, Rockhill to Root; see also unconfirmed reports in NCH, Jan. 4, 1907, p. 17, and Feb. 1, 1907, p. 233. ls FR, 1907, part 1, pp. 178-179; see also R. F. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, London, 1934, pp. 56-57; NCH (Decrees), May 10, 1907, p. 351; WDGS, no. 6283-4, "Monthly Reports, Nov. 1910," p. 9.

The Collapse of the Old Order senior to that of T'ieh-liang, the Minister of War.19 Hence, the reorganization of the military system was again to be under the supervision of a man friendly to the Pei-yang clique. Also, in June, Wang Shih-chen was appointed commander-in-chief of the Chiang-pei area in Kiangsu.20 This gave him command of the Seventh Division which was thus retained within Yiian's faction. Moreover, it was during this period that a further expan­ sion of the Pei-yang Army took place, partially at the expense of T'ieh-liang and his general Feng Shan. After being ap­ pointed governor-general, Hsii Shih-ch'ang memorialized the Throne, requesting that a division and two brigades of the Lu-chun be transferred to Manchuria for its defense. The Throne, approving the request, directed the Ministry of War to order the Third Division, plus a mixed brigade drawn from the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, to Manchuria. Yiian Shih-k'ai, as governor-general of Chihli, was ordered to send a mixed brigade from the Second and Fourth Divisions. Yiian quibbled about the method suggested for organizing the brigade, made his own recommendations, and presented careful arrangements to avoid all financial responsibility for the venture. He also generously proposed to send a loyal lieutenant to command the troops which were to serve under his friend Hsii. Yiian's recommendations were not fully approved, and later in 1907 the Third Division, plus the 1st and 2nd Mixed Brigades were transferred to Manchuria.21 Still, Yiian had lost only one brigade, and these to a friend. The troops directly under the Ministry of War had con1 9 NCH (Decrees), May 10, 1907, p. 351; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., p. 98. 2 0 NCH (Decrees), June 21, 1907, p. 711. 2 1 Y SY, ch. 43, pp. 2b-4; Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 3rd issue, vol. 3, p. 37. Yuan recommended selecting one infantry bat­ talion from each of his regiments, rather than sending two full regiments. This would have created less disruption and would have permitted the divisions to be more rapidly brought back to authorized strength. Ap­ parently, most of Yiian's proposals were not accepted, for in late 1910 the records of the U.S. military attache showed one full regiment from both the Second and Fourth Divisions detached to the 2nd Mixed Brigade in Mukden (WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 44).

The Collapse of the Old Order sisted of one Manchu and three Chinese divisions; thus, by this maneuver, the Pei-yang clique had in large measure stripped T'ieh-liang and his supporters of one-half of their Chinese soldiers. Although the Third Division continued to be technically under the Ministry of War, it was within the territorial jurisdiction of Hsii Shih-ch'ang. As for the ist Mixed Brigade, even the designation disappeared, for in 1909 it became a cadre for the Twentieth Division allotted to Fengtien. Yet, in the last year of the dynasty, the 2nd Mixed Brigade was still considered to be composed of detach­ ments from the Pei-yang Second and Fourth Divisions. To add insult to injury, the Ministry of War had to supply the funds to support these Pei-yang organizations in Man­ churia.22 While the struggle for power was in progress in North China, the provincial officials in the remainder of the empire were making some headway in forming standing army units. According to official records, by the summer of 1907 Kirin and all the provinces of China proper, except Shantung, had organized some Lu-chun troops.23 However, the only firstline units in Shantung and Manchuria, except Kirin, were units of the orginal Pei-yang Army. Chang Chih-tung, who was more characteristic of the provincial interests than the powerful Pei-yang clique, was still wrangling with the Ministry of War over the composi­ tion of his military forces. According to the plans for an army of thirty-six divisions, Hupeh was assigned two divisions. Chang had only trained one Lu-chun division and a mixed brigade. Although he claimed a desire to obey directives emanating from Peking, he had other projects in Hupeh on 22 LCCCF, p. 365; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, p. 3; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 44, 47. According to the Maritime Customs (op.cit., vol. 3, p. 37), the Twentieth Division was formed in 1908. 23 See memorial of the Lu-chiin pu, rescript dated Aug. 29, 1907, Tungfang tsa-chih, vol. 4, no. 10 (1907), "Chiin-shih," pp. 93-95; see also CSK, Ping-chih 3, pp. iob-Iib. Both of these sources list the Lu-chiin troops as of Kuang-hsii 33rd year (Feb. 13, 1907-Feb. 1, 1908), but, as usual, the figures do not agree. For example, the CSK lists no Lu-chun troops for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, while the memorial of the Ministry of War does.

The Collapse of the Old Order which he could employ the funds that further military expansion would have necessitated.24 In actuality, he never completed a second division nor did his successor. Chang had sufficient provincial troops to form a second division, but he kept them outside the regulated Lu-chun system. Not all senior officials were as anxious to create large and expensive armies as was Yuan Shih-k'ai. Military support had not become the only road to power; political maneuvering and patronage were still reasonably effective.

The End of an Era The successes of the Pei-yang clique had been impressive, but neither the opposition of their enemies nor the unpopular yet inevitable tendency toward centralization had abated. Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung were the foremost of the obstacles in the path of a greater concentration of author­ ity, especially military authority. During 1906 there had been rumors that both men would be transferred to the capital,25 but these moves had not yet materialized. However, the Empress-Dowager undoubtedly recognized that these officials would be just as valuable to her if they did not directly control China's best soldiers. Then, too, the progressive views, energy, and political astuteness of Yuan, as well as the knowledge and honesty of Chang, would be a great asset in Peking, where mediocrity was the norm. Hence, in Septem­ ber 1907 both Yiian and Chang were appointed to the Grand Council in Peking. At the same time, Yuan was named Minis­ ter of Foreign Affairs. Chang, who was already a grand secre­ tary, was soon also designated as Controller of the Ministry of Education. Outwardly, these two influential officials were summoned to advise the Throne on policy and in particular on administrative reform. A more important motive for the transfer was to relieve them both, but especially Yiian, of direct command of their troops and thus reduce their military power.28 24 See

Chang i-chi, Tsou-kao, ch. 45, pp. iob-12. NCH, Aug. 3, 1906, p. 265; Oct. 5, 1906, p. 55. 28 See WDGS, no. 7829-17, "A Condensed Biography of Yuan Shih25

The Collapse of the Old Order Both Yuan and Chang attempted without success to have their new appointments canceled, but it was only their direct military influence which the Empress-Dowager was willing to reduce. She was not attempting to crush two such im­ portant pillars of the empire. Certainly some of their enemies would have desired her to go further, but they were disap­ pointed. The continuing influence of Yiian and Chang was shown by the course of events. Yuan Shih-k'ai, with the sup­ port of Prince Ch'ing, even selected his successor as governorgeneral of Chihli.27 Thus the supervision of the Second and Fourth Divisions temporarily passed to a protege, the new governor-general Yang Shih-hsiang. Although Chang and Yiian no longer directly controlled their troops, they retained a high degree of influence over them. Because of their high multiple offices, their influential friends, and the fact that their divisions continued to be commanded by old henchmen, these two officials—Yiian in particular—maintained a great influence over military affairs.28 They would have been even more powerful had they cooperated with each other instead of being rivals. In spite of their personal ambitions, they re­ mained two of the most able and effective bulwarks of the tottering regime. However, as an adjunct to his more legiti­ mate activities, Yuan joined Prince Ch'ing in an unscrupulous disposal of public offices, with the objective of increasing his Kai," Oct. 27, 1915, pp. 3-4; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 256-257; Dept. State, Central Files, Numerical File, 1906-1910, vol. 171, no. 1518/64, pp. 1-3, Rockhill to Root, Sept. 5, 1907; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 6, 1907, p. 568; JATTC, ch. 4, p. 21; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, p. 31, and vol. 2, PP- 951-952. 27 JATTC, ch. 4, p. 21; NCH, Sept. 13, 1907, p. 619; Sept. 20, 1907, p. 678, and Oct. 11, 1907, p. 92; Lawton and Hobden, "The Fall of Yuan Shih-Kai," op.cit., p. 429. The latter source gives the wrong date for Yiian's transfer to Peking. 28 This statement is based in large part on Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 277, and CSS, vol. I, sect. 2, pp. 4-5. Although it is a superior work, Hummel (Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 952) is in error in stating that after they were removed as governors-general the troops of Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung "were transferred to the Ministry of War." Four of Yiian's divisions had already been so transferred. His remaining two divisions of Lu-chiin troops and the division and brigade of Chang Chihtung passed under the control of their successors as governor-general.

The Collapse of the Old Order power. Chang, on the other hand, was saddled with the responsibility for improvising the plans for the CantonHankow and the Hankow-Szechwan railways.29 This was a thankless task for the projects became embroiled in rivalries among the great powers as well as being a source of internal friction arising from provincialism. After Chang Chih-tung was transferred to Peking, there was no further increase in the number of standing army regi­ ments in Hupeh, but the Pei-yang clique continued its expan­ sion. Certainly, Yiian Shih-k'ai would have liked to have General Feng Shan relieved as commander of the Army of Peking, and it was reported that Yiian recommended Wu Feng-ling as joint commander of these four divisions. This appointment did not materialize, but another henchman, Wang Ying-k'ai, was named deputy commander of that army. Then, after the death of Ma Yii-k'un in the fall of 1908, Chiang Kuei-t'i inherited both the title of provincial commander-in-chief of Chihli and command of the old Resolute Army or Left Division of the Guards Army, as it was later called. Chiang retained the leadership of the army until his own death in 1922.80 From 1905 to 1908, the struggle between the central gov­ ernment and the provinces had expanded to include the control of the railroads and the use of foreign funds to finance them. Patriots, as well as self-seekers, used this popular controversy for their own ends. Then, too, nationalism and dissatisfaction were stimulated by the developing vernacular press, much of which was controlled by anti-dynastic ele­ ments. In the face of these threatening conditions and despite the failing health of the Empress-Dowager, reform edicts continued to flow from Peking. In August 1908, hastily compiled principles for a constitution were published. This document, which was almost a duplicate of the Japanese con29 Lawton and Hobden, op.cit., pp. 428-429; NCH, May 30, 1908, p. 544; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 952; Cameron, "Chang Chih-tung," p. 207. 80 NCH, Oct. 11, 1907, p. 120; Aug. 22, 1908, p. 475; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 26, 1908, p. 776; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 688.

The Collapse of the Old Order stitution, was in keeping with Tz'u-hsi's concept that a con­ stitutional government should encourage closer cooperation between the people and the government without reducing the authority of the Throne. Although both national and provin­ cial assemblies were to be established, they were to have only consultative functions. All of the multitudinous tasks required to prepare the largely illiterate masses for constitutional gov­ ernment were to be accomplished during an interval of nine years. This was indeed "a remarkable piece of optimism."31 The undemocratic nature of the document is shown by its military provisions. They stipulated that the supreme com­ mand of the armed forces was vested in the Emperor, who possessed authority to regulate the strength and composition of the military establishment. The sovereign also had the power to appoint, promote, and demote all officers, as well as the right to mobilize troops, declare war, and make peace. The national assembly was to have no authority to interfere in these matters.32 Thus, in theory, the Emperor was given autocratic control over the armed forces, but there was a vast gulf between legal fiction and political reality. In theory the Emperor was already an autocrat, while in actuality the incumbent had for years been the prisoner of the ambitious Empress-Dowager. A paper constitution borrowed from mili­ taristic Japan would have little effect on the de facto authority of the Chinese provincial leaders. The elderly Empress-Dowager was not given the oppor­ tunity to complete her plans for a constitutional monarchy of the Japanese type. Instead, death spared her the pain of observing the final collapse of the dynasty which she had so long struggled against growing odds to preserve. On Novem­ ber 14, 1908, the death of the Kuang-hsu Emperor was officially announced and the proclamation of the demise of the Empress-Dowager followed on the next day. Before her death she had named as successor to the Emperor a child not yet three years old. This ill-fated infant was a grandson of Jung-Iu and the son of Prince Ch'un, who was appointed 81Cameron s2 FR,

1 The Reform Movement, pp. 112-114, 185-192. 1908, p. 194; Hsieh, The Government of China, p. 371.

The Collapse of the Old Order Regent. The proximity of the deaths of the Emperor and Empress-Dowager has given rise to speculation that the Emperor was murdered, and the previous conduct of his aunt makes that explanation plausible.83 Because of his role in the coup of 1898, it was fortunate for Yiian Shih-k'ai that the Kuang-hsii Emperor died before Tz'u-hsi. J. 0. P. Bland and E. Backhouse quote a will, said to have been left by the Emperor, requesting that Yiian be beheaded.34 The new Regent was a weakling. He had no fondness for Yiian, yet he dared not press serious charges against one who had the support of the diplomatic corps as well as an extremely powerful personal following. However, by a cynical edict of January 2, 1909, the Regent dismissed him from office, alleging that Yiian was incapacitated by a disease in his feet.35 Thus, Yuan Shih-k'ai's enemies, Manchu and Chinese alike, had finally brought about his downfall. Shortly after being relieved of office, he proceeded quietly to his home province of Honan to lead a life of retirement for almost three years.36 Then the outbreak of the revolution in 1911 forced the Regent to make the humiliating decision to recall Yiian to power. It may seem surprising that in its very last years the decadent Manchu dynasty would dare cashier the "strong man" Yiian Shih-k'ai. Actually it is indicative of the continu­ ing influence of Confucian tradition and of the residual power of the Throne that the most influential subject of the empire 33 Li, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 275-276; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, P- 733- It was rumored, without verification, that Yiian Shih-k'ai had been involved in a plot to murder the Kuang-hsii Emperor (Li, op.cit., vol. I,

P- 276). si China

Under the Empress Dowager, p. 460; see also NCH, Jan. 23, pp. 197-198. ss NCH (Decrees), Jan. 9, 1909, p. 79; Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, pp. 41-43 ; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 277 ; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 952; A. W. Hummel, Jr., "Yiian Shih-k'ai as an Official Under the Manchus," unpublished M.A. thesis, pp. 139-141. It had been feared that if the Empress-Dowager died before the Emperor, Yuan Shih-k'ai would attempt to seize power by crowning a puppet emperor (Leonard, op.cit., p. 3). se JATTC, ch. 4, pp. 3ob-3i. 1909,

The Collapse of the Old Order accepted his dismissal and returned peacefully to his home. Prior to the Revolution of 1911, the commanders of the semiprivate armies remained loyal to the dynasty. It was only in the period of warlordism which followed that such a dismissal would probably have created a civil war.37 After Yuan's retirement, although he was not active politi­ cally, he nevertheless maintained close contacts with the Pei-yang organizations. Also, despite the retirement of their chief, most of his proteges continued in office under the Manchus. There was no purge of the Pei-yang clique. Several senior members were cashiered or demoted, but some retained the same or comparable posts, while a number were promoted. The group did not expand its activities rapidly, as it had when Yuan was in power, and it may have bewailed its fate. Nevertheless, for a political and military faction whose recog­ nized leader was in disgrace it retained a surprising number of important offices and commands.38 Following his accession, the Prince Regent placed great reliance on the judgment of Chang Chih-tung, but that loyal and able official died in October 1909. Enmeshed in a web of intrigue and court rivalries, Prince Ch'un was soon forced to dismiss the progressive Manchu official Tuan-fang. Then, within a short space of time, China suffered the loss of several other experienced, if not outstanding, advisers.38 In the face of external pressure and growing internal dissatisfac­ tion, death or political intrigue had stripped the tottering dynasty of firm and able leadership. Given the conditions which existed in China, the passing from the scene of three such pillars of the empire as Tz'u-hsi, Yuan Shih-k'ai, and Chang Chih-tung signified that the end of Manchu rule could not be far distant. During the period 1895-1909, the advocates of military reform had had several objectives. The first was to preserve 37 Johnston,

op.cit., p. 80. the edicts appearing in the North China Herald from early in 1909 to the fall of 1911; CSL, Hsiian-t'ung, ch. 50, pp. 22-22b; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, p. 5. 39Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. Γ18-119. 38 See

The Collapse of the Old Order the empire and protect China from foreign aggression. A second was to maintain internal peace and order. Another was to create a competent, professionally trained military bureaucracy capable of administering and commanding a modern army. These aims were common to all the principal promoters of military modernization, but in addition to these ends the court, headed by a clique of Manchus, had sought to centralize the control of the military establishment. This motive was not shared by the powerful provincial officials, jealous of their inherited military authority. In the field of military reform, leadership had been furnished primarily by Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung, supported by the Empress-Dowager. Their departure marked a critical turning point both in military and political affairs. Without a basic reorganization of the administrative and financial systems, military reform had almost reached its limits. During the remaining three years of the dynasty, no such fundamental reorganization of the governmental structure would take place. Furthermore, the growing nationalism of the Chinese was turning so strongly against the Manchus that when the crisis arrived the bulk of the new troops would not remain loyal to the Throne. As for the half-hearted policy of centralization, it had been and would continue to be largely a failure. The faltering dynasty was incapable of imposing such a program on its provincial bureaucracy. It was true that some successes had been gained. The most influential of the provincial leaders had been dismissed. Four of China's finest divisions had been transferred to the Ministry of War to form the Army of Peking. The Ministry had some control over the whole new army, expressed through inspectors from Peking. The arse­ nals had also been placed, in theory, under the Ministry. Still, this apparent concentration of authority was deceptive. As has been pointed out, two divisions and a mixed brigade of the Army of Peking were under the jurisdiction of either the governor-general of Manchuria or the governor of Shantung. Furthermore, the officials of the various provincial staffs were appointed by the governors-general and governors.

The Collapse of the Old Order The directives of the Ministry of War could not become fully effective unless it could appoint its own nominees, and relieve the provincial leaders of their power to finance the troops and arsenals. This shift in authority, vital to the policy of cen­ tralization, was never accomplished.

The Regency: the Last Bid for Power The new Regent was ill-prepared by experience or ability for the momentous responsibilities which he inherited. Prince Ch'un was a relatively sincere and conscientious individual, but, lacking strength of character, he was totally unable to unify or pacify the divergent factions into which China was divided. Nor could he successfully deal with the continuing pressure of the foreign powers. Corruption and abuses of authority continued, both in the capital and in the provinces. Not possessing able advisers and confronted by the conflict of court factions, the Regent appointed to high office unquali­ fied imperial princes. Coupled with this nepotism was a dangerous disparity between the appointment of Manchus and Chinese.40 Finally, the imperial clan created further dis­ content by rashly attempting to modify the power structure drastically in order to centralize authority. Their actions indicated both the growth of militarism and a desire for personal power. Under Tz'u-hsi those reforms which had been carried out were largely limited to measures which had at least the acquiescence of the bureaucracy. This limitation was even apparent under her successor. The Regent sought to carry on the Manchu reform movement, but he vacillated. Some suc­ cess was achieved in the continuing campaign against opium and in the efforts to increase educational facilities. Unfortu­ nately, efforts in other essential fields largely remained paper monuments to a lost cause. The promised provincial assem40 Dept. State, Central Files, Decimal File, vol. I, no. 893.00, case no. 377, p. 2, Calhoun to Sec. State; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 1, pp. 299-300; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 117-119; Times (London), Oct. 11, 1909; Johnston, op.cit., pp. 60-61.

The Collapse of the Old Order blies convened in the fall of 1909. Although the delegates were restricted to men of education and property, they refused to serve as a polite debating society. Despite some clashes with the provincial officials, they, like the bureaucracy, sought to sabotage the policy of centralization. Soldiers were dis­ barred from voting or being elected to the assemblies, but they were no longer classed with the disreputable professions. They were disenfranchised in exclusive company, along with officials, clerics, and students. The policy was the sound one that the military should not intervene in political affairs. Impetuous and pleased with their local efforts, the provincial assemblymen sought the immediate establishment of a parlia­ ment. Torn by internal rivalries, the faltering administration finally acquiesced, and the national assembly met in Octo­ ber 1910.41 In regard to military matters the Regency proved less compromising. Within a short time it became evident that the Manchu leaders would seek to concentrate control of the military establishment in their own hands.42 Instead of de­ mobilizing the Banner garrisons, as had been promised, efforts would be made to increase the military spirit of that once warlike race. In mid-December 1908, an edict established a commission composed of imperial princes and senior Manchu officials to revise the Banner Forces. The purported purpose of the commission was to equalize the status of the Chinese and Manchus. A decree of December 26 announced that its mission was to teach all Bannermen to earn a living; yet, lest they be apprehensive about the necessity of going to work, it was stated that there was no current intention of canceling their pensions.43 Such half-hearted "reform" could not be expected to please the Chinese or reduce social jealousies. For generations, the Manchu palace guards had been in4lCameron,

The Reform Movement, pp. 120-124; FR, 1908, p. 185. p. 352; Chu Wu, "Wo-kuo chih lu-chiin" (The Army of Our Country), op.cit., p. 47. i 3 NCH (Decrees), Jan. 2, 1909, p. 21; NCH, April 3, 1909, p. 26; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., p. 68. i2LCCCF,

The Collapse of the Old Order capable of defending the Throne, so since 1902 elements of the Pei-yang Army had furnished the effective security patrols around the imperial palaces at Peking. This situation must have been embarrassing to a conquering race and it might well have been politically dangerous. Late in Decem­ ber 1908, two princes, Tsai-t'ao and Yii-lang, in conjunction with T'ieh-liang, were directed to supervise the formation of a new Imperial Guard Corps (Chin-wei chiin). The crea­ tion of a modern Manchu guard would furnish the Regent a loyal body of troops and reduce the possibility of the over­ throw of the dynasty by a palace coup d'etat. Furthermore, the Regent may have wished to emulate the foreign monar­ chies that had corps of guards. This new organization was to be part of and similar in structure to the Lu-chiin, but it was to be under the command of the Prince Regent. It was proposed first to recruit a single division consisting of ablebodied Bannermen, and since the First Lu-chiin Division was the best source of trained Manchus, it was temporarily depleted to form a cadre for the new guards.44 The fact that the guards were given preferment and higher than average pay was certain to arouse resentment among the partially dis­ affected Chinese divisions, but this situation was rectified in part when late in 1910 enlistment in the guards was opened to Chinese.45 In February 1909 another step was taken to strengthen the hold of the imperial clan over the armed forces. An edict of February 19 ordered the establishment of a commission to reorganize the navy. Again it was to be directed by two princes and T'ieh-liang, but this time in addition the chair­ manship was held by Prince Ch'ing. After preliminary ar­ rangements were completed, the commission was reorganized on July 15. The Regent's younger brother Tsai-hsun was named as one of the directors. The other was the Britishtrained Admiral Sa Chen-ping, who was to furnish the 44 CSL, Hsiian-t'ung, ch. 4, p. 3; NCH (Decrees), Jan. 2, 1909, p. 20; WDGS, no. 6283-1, "Monthly Reports, Aug. 1910," pp. 4-5. 45 Bell and Woodhead, The China Year Book, 1912, p. 248, cited here­ after as The China Year Book.

The Collapse of the Old Order technical knowledge lacked by his royal colleague. At the same time, naval affairs were removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War and placed under the new commission. The objectives in forming the commission were to create a national navy and to draw up plans for a separate Ministry of the Navy, which was finally established in December 1910/® Another decree of July 15, 1909, proclaimed the Emperor to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This was a reiteration of the doctrine presented in the outline of the constitution issued in 1908, but it was further announced that during the minority of the Emperor the supreme command would be exercised by his father, the Regent.47 One purpose of the edict was to stimulate a military spirit in the armed services, and had the dynasty been popular, the assumption of the title of commander-in-chief by the Emperor would have increased the prestige of the military profession. How­ ever, bestowal of the rank on a three-year-old child, with the delegation of actual authority to the Regent, made it appear that the move was motivated by a desire of Prince Ch'un to increase his power at the expense of the provincial officials.48 On the same day, July 15, the General Staff Council (Chiin-tzu ch'u) was removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. Prince Yii-Iang was placed in charge, but on the following day the Regent's brother Tsai-t'ao was named as co-director.49 Not only was the General Staff made a separate institution, but also many of the functions of the Ministry of War were transferred to it. The staff was to 4e CSL, Hsiian-t'ung, ch. 7, p. 34b, and ch. 14, pp. 2ib-22; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 64-65; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 98-99. For a short summary of the attempts to create a modern navy during the period 1906-1911, see Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 97-99· 47 CSL, Hsiian-t'ung, ch. 14, pp. 2ob-2ib; NCH (Decrees), July 17, 1909, p. 179. 48 Cf. Cameron, The Reform Movement, p. 96; and [G. B. Rea], "China's Army and Navy," op.cit., p. 90. 49 CSL, Hsiian-t'ung, ch. 14, pp. 21, 25b-26; NCH (Decrees), July 17, 1909, p. 180; July 24, 1909, p. 204·

The Collapse of the Old Order formulate plans for military operations. It was also to nomi­ nate admirals and generals and assign staff officers. Further­ more, it took over the supervision of the provincial staffs and the staff college at Paoting. If carried out, these functions would reduce the military authority of the provincial leaders. In matters concerning national defense, the General Staff's recommendations, after approval by the Throne, were to be forwarded to the Ministry of War as directives. Thus the Ministry became again an organ of execution, stripped of its power over both the General Staff and naval affairs.50 This development clearly demonstrates that all was not harmonious among the principal Manchus. Since T'ieh-liang was Minister of War, the Regent's brothers were increasing their authority at the former's expense. Further friction developed between the General Staff and the Ministry, as the latter tried to retain its powers. It appeared that T'ieh-liang's days of in­ fluence were numbered, for he had already been relieved of his functions relating to training the Imperial Guards. Ac­ curate rumors reported that he would be replaced at the Ministry by one of Yuan Shih-k'ai's former proteges, the Manchu, Yin-ch'ang.51 Another move which would tend to increase central author­ ity as well as to raise the prestige of the military profession was incorporated in a decree of November n, 1909. The Throne approved temporary regulations prepared by the General Staff concerning military ranks. The titles of general of the army (ta-chiang-chiin) and general (chiang-chiin), which were to rank with a grand secretary, were added. Three grades of non-commissioned officers were also created. All officers' ranks were to be equal to corresponding civil ranks. Also officers down to and including lieutenant colonels were to be appointed by imperial edict.52 50 General de Negrier, "Les forces chinoise en 1910," Revue des deux mondes, vol. 58 (Aug. 1910), p. 584; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., pp. 413-414; WDGS1 no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 4-5. sl WDGS, no. 6283-1, "Monthly Reports, Aug. 1910," pp. 2-3; NCH, Feb. 27, 1909, p. 518; May 22, 1909, p. 445. 52 CSL, Hsuan-t'ung, ch. 22, pp. 20-24b; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 1, pp. 45-46,

The Collapse of the Old Order Within a year after the death of the Empress-Dowager, Prince Ch'un and his brothers Tsai-t'ao and Tsai-hsiin had gathered unto themselves administrative supervision over the armed forces of the empire. The Regent was acting commander-in-chief and commander of the Imperial Guards. Tsait'ao, who was charged with training the guards, was also the senior figure in the increasingly influential General Staff, while Tsai-hsiin was to supervise the reorganization of the navy. It is true that the Regent's brothers had colleagues in their various offices, but T'ieh-liang was slipping from favor, Prince Yii-Iang was engrossed with the affairs of the Grand Council, and Admiral Sa could not hope to compete with the prestige of a prince. The two princes who had taken the responsibility for the tremendous task of administering and improving the military establishment were only in their mid-twenties. They had by no means been adequately prepared for their duties just by attending a two-year course of lectures presented by the Military School for Princes and Nobles.53 In 1909, and again in 1910, Tsai-hsiin was sent abroad to study naval matters, and in the spring of 1910 Tsai-t'ao went on a similar mission to inspect military establishments. These tours indicated the importance which the Chinese government placed on military matters and certainly anything that the unqualified princes learned would be advantageous. When Tsai-t'ao returned in September, he not only appeared to be more self-confident, but was also more active in carrying out his duties. While abroad he had developed an interest in the newest military gadgets and was especially fascinated by "flying machines." Several officers were ordered to study aviation, and toy models were purchased for their edification.54 and chart appended to p. 44; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 289293. The new non-commissioned ranks were sergeant first-class (shangshih), sergeant (chung-shih), and corporal (hsia-shih). 5 3 CSS, vol. i, sect. 2, p. 5; WDGS, 6283-3, "Monthly Reports, October 1910," p. ι; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au I Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 414; Chiang Fang-chen, "Chung-kuo wu-shih-nien Iai chiin-shih piench'ien shih" (China's Military Changes for the Past Fifty Years), op.cit., er

P- 4· 54

WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 4, 36.

The Collapse of the Old Order While the Manchu princes were seeking to unify control over the armed forces, the Regency simultaneously attacked that other bastion of provincial strength, the financial powers of the officials. The realistic Empress-Dowager had never dared to demand a drastic financial reform, but her successor was less practical. Undoubtedly, reorganization, purification, and at least partial centralization of the revenue structure was essential to the welfare of China. No other major reform, no other attempt to modernize the empire, could be really suc­ cessful as long as the antiquated and corrupted financial system remained unchanged. In this case, as in the matter of military reform, principle was on the side of the Throne, but morality and national interests were not the only elements involved. Both in the capital and in the provinces, venality and ambition were motivating factors. The Regency sought to give the Ministry of Finance control over all revenue matters. In order to promote this objective it was planned to establish a budget which would permit the strict control of public finances. In January 1909, the Throne established within the Ministry of Finance a committee to reorganize the fiscal structure of the empire, and branch offices were opened in each province. These branches were to furnish data con­ cerning the income and expenditures of the provinces, in order that the committee might draw up an annual budget. Obviously, this plan transgressed the most precious preroga­ tives of the corrupt bureaucracy. As was usual in such cases, the provincial officials argued against the feasibility of the policy, but they complied with the minimum requirements of the law. Financial figures of a sort were rendered. However, the provincial leaders were masters of the art of passive resist­ ance. Although an imperial budget for 1911 was presented to the national assembly, no basic modification of the terribly inadequate financial structure took place. Neither the nation nor the Manchus profited appreciably from the new policy.55 The efforts of the imperial clan to decrease the authority of the provincial bureaucracy created ill-will, yet despite 55 Li, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 256-257; Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 186, 188; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 164-165.

The Collapse of the Old Order external appearances the Regency failed to shift the internal balance of power fundamentally. In the late summer of 191ο the American military attache reported that, regardless of the intentions of the central government, the provincial leaders still had more control over the army divisions than did Peking. This was primarily due to the fact that the provincial officials continued to finance the troops.66

Mutiny in the Lu -Chiin The Regency also continued the practice of attempting to raise the status of the military profession. The French mili­ tary attache was of the opinion that so favorably inclined was the Throne's policy that it could only increase the loyalty of the military to the dynasty,67 but this belief proved to be largely fallacious. Owing to both internal and external condi­ tions the Regent had pressing reasons for seeking to stimulate the loyalty of the new army. In fact, he could have profitably multiplied his efforts, for the degree of disaffection in the army was becoming acute. Beginning late in 1908, an ominous series of mutinies took place in the Lu-chun. Following the maneuvers in Anhwei late in 1908, a mutiny occurred in the 31st Mixed Brigade at Anking. Not all of the troops were involved, but that incident was sufficiently serious so that the brigade was disbanded and had to be reorganized.58 During the spring of 1910, there were wide­ spread disorders in the new army. In February a revolt took place in the division which was being formed at Canton. As a result the organization was deactivated and recruiting was begun anew. Still, conditions remained bad in both Anhwei and Kwangtung provinces. Within a year the unit at Canton had been disbanded and reorganized twice. In the spring of 191ο there was an attempted uprising among the troops of the Seventh Division (13th Brigade) in northern Kiangsu and a riot among the modern troops at Soochow, Kiangsu. WDGS, no. 6283-1, "Monthly Reports, Aug. 1910," p. 2. "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 415. s s NCH, Nov. 28, 1908, pp. 527-528, and Dec. 5, 1908, pp. 598-599; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 418. 68

57

The Collapse of the Old Order Open mutiny threatened in the Ninth Division at Nanking. The 25th Mixed Brigade in Hunan was so unreliable that the governor did not dare call them out to quell a local disturb­ ance, so Lu-Chiin troops from Hupeh had to be sent instead. There was also an unconfirmed report of an outbreak among the new troops in Heilungkiang province. In January 1911 a small mutiny of both old and new-style troops took place in Kwangsi. The number of military malcontents was in­ creased by the gradual elimination of old-style officers, as well as by proposals to disband the Army of the Green Standard. Friction also arose between the cadets in Japan and the officials appointed to superintend them. Growing disloyalty within the foreign-style troops was made doubly dangerous because it was accompanied by the continuation of widespread public disorders.59 There were a number of reasons for discontent among the Western-style troops. Revolutionary propaganda was the most notable, but it was not the only cause. In spite of its modern features, a number of the evils of the old-style armies had been transmitted in part to the Lu-chun. Factors involved in the various mutinies included failure to pay the troops in full or on time, brutal treatment, partiality shown men from the commander's province, and poor discipline. Cases of embezzlement of the men's pay continued to exist, but the practice was becoming dangerous. In a number of instances, the soldiers revolted rather than tolerate it. Another cause for dissatisfaction was the unwise decision of the Regent to place his incompetent brothers at the head of the armed services.60 The revolutionaries did not create these conditions, but, as is so often the case, they took advantage of them. 59 Dept. State, Central Files, Decimal File, vol. i, no. 893.00/365, Myers to Ass't Sec. State, Feb. 14, 1910; ibid., no. 893.00/374, pp. 1-3, Puntius to Ass't Sec. of State, April 1, 1910; NCH, Aug. 15, 1908, p. 414, and April 15, 1910, pp. 149-150; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes, 1910," pp. 11, 15, 26-27; ibid., no. 6283-8, "Monthly Reports, March 1, 1911 to April 20, 1911," pp. 4, 9; ibid., no. 6562-2, "Mutiny of Troops at Nanningfu," March 3, 1911, p. 2. eo WDGS, no. 6283-6, "Monthly Reports, Jan. 1911," p. 10; ibid., no. 6562-2, "Mutiny of Troops at Nanningfu," March 3, 1911, p. 2; Dept.

The Collapse of the Old Order Agents of Sun Yat-sen's Common Alliance Society had been carrying on a campaign to infiltrate the Lu-chun. Their objective was to win over the troops, particularly the young officers, to republicanism. Anti-monarchical activities were believed to be fairly widespread, but the movement was not well organized. Many of the soldiers belonged to secret societies, which tended to be anti-dynastic; yet, unless their officers were also involved it was difficult for them to discover what was transpiring. On the other hand, revolutionary officers frequently were afraid to discuss their beliefs with the enlisted men. The revolutionaries violated a basic safety rule of conspirators for they failed to maintain strict disci­ pline. Also, they sometimes attempted coups without having sufficient funds, ammunition, or loyal troops to achieve suc­ cess.81 Prior to October 1911, all of their revolts failed. When it was claimed by advocates of revolution before 1911 that Sun Yat-sen controlled five divisions and eight incomplete divisions,62 there was a considerable element of wishful think­ ing involved. At least four of the listed organizations existed only in the plans of the Ministry of War. However, after the outbreak of the October revolt, an even larger number of Lu-chiin units did join the republican cause. An analysis of the disaffection within the new army brings to light two important conditions. First, it will be noted that with rare exceptions the mutinies and riots took place in Central or Southern China. None of the original Pei-yang divisions were involved, nor were any of the newer Peiyang organizations in Manchuria or Honan. The revolu­ tionaries claimed, however, the support of one division in State, Central Files, Decimal File, vol. 1, no. 893.00/374, op.cit., pp. 2-3; Negrier, op.cit., pp. 585-587; NCH, April 15, 1910, p. 149. 61 Chiang, op.cit., p. 4; Kent, op.cit., p. 65; T'ang Leang-Li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, 1930, pp. 59-60; NCH, April 8, 1911, p. 102. 62 Memorandum of conferences between Sun Yat-sen and Homer Lea at Long Beach, Calif., March 12, 1910, quoted in F. L. Chapin, "Homer Lea and the Chinese Revolution," unpublished senior thesis, Harvard University, 1950, pp. 118-119. The memorandum claimed that Sun Yat-sen exercised control over one modern division in Manchuria, four in the Yangtze Valley, and eight incomplete divisions located in Southern and Southwestern China.

The Collapse of the Old Order Manchuria and there had been trouble in the Seventh Divi­ sion stationed in northern Kiangsu. On the whole, the revolutionary spirit and anti-dynastic feelings were strongest south of the Yangtze River. Most of the rebel leaders were southerners. Many officers there had studied in Japan, where they had been converted to republicanism. In the North the atmosphere was more conservative. Perhaps most im­ portant, the Pei-yang Army had been dominated by and loyal to the anti-revolutionary Yuan Shih-k'ai. After Yiian's dismissal the Pei-yang officers were dissatisfied because they did not have the preferment which they had enjoyed when their leader was in power,83 but actually most of them re­ tained their commands. With the outbreak of the revolution, with few exceptions, they were to prove their loyalty to Yuan Shih-k'ai, if not to the dynasty. The second observation to be made concerning the Lu-Chiin mutinies is that these revolts were vigorously, mercilessly crushed with the assistance of the Patrol and Defense Troops, who generally remained loyal to the government. Revolu­ tionary agents were inclined to neglect the old-fashioned troops in favor of infiltrating the more Westernized stand­ ing army. Also, the enlisted men of the Patrol and Defense Troops had developed an animosity against the more favored soldiers of the new army and their attitude was shared by the old-style, conservative militarists who led them.64 The prevalence of mutinies and popular uprisings was an indication that China was on the verge of revolution. The key to the crisis was the army. Its actions would largely determine the success or failure of any armed revolt, yet the loyalty of the Lu-chiin was subject to the gravest doubts. In mid-19io the American minister informed the Depart­ ment of State that the revolution might be started by the junior officers of the army.85 63

T'ang, op.tit., p. 59; Chiang, op.cit., p. 4; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, p. 5. no. 6283-6, "Monthly Reports, Jan. 1911," p. 7; "Situation de l 'armee chinoise au I e r Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 424; The China, Year Book, 1()12, p. 248; Times (London), Oct. 21, 1911. 65 Dept. State, Central Files, Decimal File, vol. 1, no. 893.00/422, pp. 1-3, Calhoun to Sec. State, July 5, 1910. iiWDGS,

The Collapse of the Old Order The Military Administration of Yin-ch'ang In the face of a deteriorating situation, T'ieh-liang in February 1910 requested permission to resign as Minister of War. The reason given was ill-health, but the ailment was apparently of a political nature. A month later an edict graciously approved his petition. For some time T'ieh-liang's star had been waning as the prestige of his ministry declined. Several explanations were offered for his resignation, includ­ ing intrigue among the Manchus and a dispute over finances. Others claimed that friends of Yuan Shih-k'ai were repay­ ing an old score.66 The official chosen to replace T'ieh-liang was Yin-ch'ang, a Manchu. Although, by naming another Manchu as Min­ ister of War, the Regent continued his dangerous racial policy, this was actually one of his best appointments. Yinch'ang had an extensive military and administrative back­ ground as well as wide foreign contacts. After studying military science in Austria and Germany, he had acted as director of the military academy at Tientsin. Later he had commanded the Seventh Division and then served as viceminister of war. Twice he had been minister to Germany, where he had taken an interest in the German Army. Able, strong-willed, and possessing the confidence of Prince Ch'un, he was professionally one of the best-qualified men in China for the position. Since Yin-ch'ang was serving as minister in Berlin at the time of his appointment, he did not take up his duties until September 1910. Then he attempted with diligence and energy to modernize military administration. He also sought to carry out the Regent's policy of centralizing control of the armed forces. Yin-ch'ang, however, had been given an impossible mission; his attempts to carry out mili­ tary reform and to concentrate authority were both unpopular and expensive. He alienated bureaucrats at home and created e e NCH (Decrees), Feb. 25, 1910, p. 433; March 25, 1910, p. 691; [Rea], "China's Army and Navy," op.cit., pp. 90-91; NCH, May 29, 1909, p. S02.

The Collapse of the Old Order opposition abroad. Japan and Russia opposed the creation of an effective Chinese army, especially in Manchuria. Britain, on the other hand, objected to any increase of forces in Tibet.87 With the appointment of Yin-ch'ang it was expected that greater harmony would exist between the Ministry of War and the General Staff, for Yin-ch'ang was on good terms with Tsai-t'ao.68 In actuality, under the forceful Yin-ch'ang, initiative in military policy formation tended to shift back to the Ministry. Yin-ch'ang's activities in the year prior to the outbreak of the revolution can be divided into two related phases, military administration and centralization. Until late in 1908 the program of military reform had been pushed with some determination, but during the Regency the same rate of progress was not maintained. The army was again sinking into a state of lethargy. Yin-ch'ang after reviewing the situa­ tion, advocated a set of policies which, had they been possible to carry out, would have renewed the march of progress. Under Yin-ch'ang's supervision a modernization of military thinking took place within the confines of the Ministry of War. Upon taking up his office, the new minister immediately engaged in an effort to bring "order out of chaos." The arrival of this Prussian-trained official created a squall in the placid Ministry. A prerequisite to any attempt to improve the Chinese army was the establishment of an adequate administrative machine; hence, Yin-ch'ang began a radical revamping of the Ministry. He announced that he would wear a uniform in his office, which meant that all of his subordinates must do likewise. Then he not only abolished two hundred sinecure posts in the Ministry, but also estab­ lished the rule that no one would hold a position of responsi­ bility unless he had a military education. Also, in the future 87 "Nouveau ministre de la guerre," Revue militaire des armees etrangires, vol. 75 (June 1910), pp. 503-504; WDGS1 no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 6-7; Times (London), Aug. 7, 1911; J. G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912, Berkeley, Calif., 1935, P- 150. «8 WDGS, no. 6283-1, "Monthly Reports, Aug. 1910," p. 3.

The Collapse of the Old Order no official was to hold a concurrent post in another ministry. This startling disregard for nepotism and patronage created a violent reaction. Even underlings had a patron. Hence, because of opposition Yin-ch'ang was unable to carry out fully his plans to economize on manpower while improving the quality of his personnel.69 Within the Ministry itself, the influential Manchu vice-minister, Shou-hsiin, was a reaction­ ary who neither understood nor approved of the reform program. According to the native press, he successfully hampered the efforts-of the minister.70 Such antagonism did not halt Yin-ch'ang. During his tenure of office, two reorganizations of the Ministry of War were effected. An edict of December 4, 1910, approved plans for a reshaping of the Ministry. Several of the senior posts, including that of one of two vice-ministers, were abol­ ished. Yin-ch'ang retained his post, but so did the the re­ actionary Shou-hsiin. On the same day, an independent Min­ istry of the Navy was established, with the Regent's brother, Tsai-hsun, as minister.71 Thus the Manchu monoply of top military administrative posts was preserved. In April 1911, further regulations for the reorganization of the Ministry of War were issued. Their objective was to reduce personnel and simplify administration, but the American military attache declared that the functions assigned to the various bureaus were so conflicting that the establishment of jurisdic­ tion in any matter would be difficult.72 The failure to achieve any real structural improvement was probably due to internal jealousies, inability to escape from the traditional policy of dividing authority, and a shortage of qualified personnel. 6 9 Ibid., no. 6283-3, "Monthly Reports, Oct. 1910," p. 3, and "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 7-8. 7 0 Ibid., no. 6283-7, "Monthly Reports, Feb. 1911," p. 3. 7 1 NCH (Decrees), Dec. 9, 1910, p. 598; WDGS, no. 6283-5, "Monthly Reports, Dec. 1910," appendix. For an outline of the structure of the Ministry of War as reorganized on December 4, 1910, see Brunnert and Hagelstrom, op.cit., pp. 543-547. 7 2 WDGS, no. 6562-4, "Reorganization of the Lu Chun Pu (War Ministry)," April 17, 1911, pp. 1-2; ibid., no. 6283-8, "Monthly Reports, March 1 to April 20, 1911," p. 4.

The Collapse of the Old Order Yin-ch'ang not only created enmity among the capital bureaucracy; supported by the Regent, he also penetrated deeply into affairs dear to the provincial officials. In April 1911, the Throne approved a memorial from the Ministry establishing new regulations for the provincial staffs. The directors-general of these boards were to be the Tartargenerals, governors-general, and governors. However, the actual supervision of each board was to be in the hands of a councillor who, although serving under the provincial chief, was appointed by and responsible to the Ministry of War.73 In June, and again in August, the Throne sanctioned recom­ mendations of the Ministry for appointments as councillors for the provincial staffs. These men included both civil and military officials.74 As Minister of War, Yin-ch'ang placed special emphasis on military education and the improvement of the officers' corps of the Lu-chiin. There were still numerous older officers who lacked modern training, yet within a few years the mili­ tary schools were scheduled to graduate hundreds of young officers, for whom there would be too few billets. Therefore, it was directed that service records and fitness reports be rendered for all standing army officers. Also, the Minister sought to establish examinations to weed out the incompetent. In the spring of 1911, the commanding generals of the various Lu-Chiin divisions were ordered to Peking, sup­ posedly for a conference, but also because Yin-ch'ang wanted to judge their capabilities. The Regency and the Ministry of War were not only interested in improving personnel; the power struggle was also involved. In the fall of 1910, it was directed that henceforth the provincial leaders could not transfer officers from one province to another. If vacancies arose, the Ministry would furnish personnel. However, the appointment of company grade officers remained within the jurisdiction of the governors-general and governors, although even here commanding officers were ordered to report to the Ministry concerning promotions or dismissals. It was 73

The China Year Book, 1912, pp. 247, 248-250. (Decrees), July 1, 1911, p. 36; Aug. 12, 1911, p. 414.

7i NCH

The Collapse of the Old Order planned, as a restraint, to send officers to the provinces to make confidential investigations concerning the accuracy of the reports. As though these maneuvers would not make him sufficiently unpopular, Yin-ch'ang received the Throne's approval of a proposal to require civilian officials attached to the armed forces to wear uniforms. Also, officers were to wear the insignia of their actual rank rather than that of honorary or temporary rank.75 The budding Chinese military spirit had not yet reached the point where most civilian officials looked forward to appearing adorned with boots and saber. Then, too, what object would there be in pur­ chasing an honorary title if one were required to wear the insignia of one's actual rank? Yin-ch'ang, with the aid of German and Japanese-trained officers, was attempting to graft the procedures of militarilyoriented societies on a civilian-dominated state which was not yet prepared to receive them. In fact, despite improved conditions, the officers of the new army had not yet been given a fully recognized status in Chinese society. In spite of the decrees, which since 1904 had outlined the comparative status of civil and military officials, it was not until April 1911 that an edict granted to the great majority of the division and brigade commanders Lu-chiin rank correspond­ ing to their duties.78 The Regency's attempt further to modernize and improve the status of the military profession was indicated by the issuance of a military code and orders to establish military courts. Crimes committed by military personnel were to be tried before courts-martial, thus removing the armed forces from civil jurisdiction. It should have been foreseen that the immediate reaction would be to create conflicts between the civil authorities and armed personnel who claimed that they 75 WDGS, no. 6283-2, "Monthly Reports, Sept. 1910," p. 2; ibid., no. 6283-3, "Oct. 1910," p. s; ibid., no. 6283-4, "Nov. 1910," pp. 3-4; ibid., no. 6283-6, "Jan. 1911," pp. 1-2; ibid., no. 6283-8, "March 1 to April 20, 1911," p. 3; "Reformes militaire et projets de reformes," Revue militaire des armies etrangeres, vol. 76 (Dec. 1910), p. 441. 78 CSL, Hsiian-t'ung, ch. 50, pp. 22-22b.

The Collapse of the Old Order were no longer subject to civilian control.77 This established a bad precedent for the period of warlordism and flagrant militarism which followed the collapse of the imperial system. It would have been of greater advantage to China's future if the emphasis had been placed on Yin-ch'ang's policy of stimulating patriotism and devotion to duty rather than on any act which would tend to remove the military from civil control. Aside from the above-mentioned directives, the Ministry of War, and in some cases the General Staff, undertook the discussion of several problems common to modern planning. These questions included the strategic location and transporta­ tion of troops, the creation of reserves, a better-coordinated system of military schools, the standardization of weapons, and the achievement of national self-sufficiency in the manu­ facture of ordnance materiel. It was proposed that the latter be accomplished by constructing new plants and improving the efficiency of old ones. Yin-ch'ang complained that weap­ ons purchased abroad were heterogeneous and inferior. In order to determine what weapons were in use, he requested a national survey of arms.78 All of these problems were critical to China's defense, yet an effort to implement them would be expensive and sure to arouse provincial antagonism. Thus, though desirable, they remained largely a dead letter. During this period, nebulous schemes were advanced to increase the authorized strength of the Lu-chun from thirtysix to fifty or fifty-two divisions. According to press reports, Yin-ch'ang himself considered even the formation of thirtysix divisions to be beyond China's financial capabilities. He intended to concentrate on the creation of twenty-five divi­ sions, with the possible addition of some separate brigades.79 77

WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 11. "Reformes militaire," op.cit., p. 440; WDGS, no. 6563-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 8, 12, 42; ibid., no. 6283-4, "Monthly Reports, Nov. 1910," pp. 2-5; ibid., no. 6283-7, "Feb. 1911," pp. 3, 8; ibid., no. 6383-8, "March 1 to April 20, 1911," p. 8; NCH, June 10, 1911, p. 695. 7 9 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 10-11; ibid., no. 6383-8, "Monthly Reports, March 1 to April 20, 1911," p. 2; "Reformes militaire," op.cit., p. 441. 78

The Collapse of the Old Order The recurrent talk of expanding the army was caused by foreign pressure, but, barring an unlikely revamping of the revenue structure, the best means of strengthening the Luchun was to disband the old-style forces. The national assembly recommended the abolition of the provincial troops, especially the Army of the Green Standard, and reduced their allotment in the budget. The Throne called on the Ministry of War to cooperate with the provincial leaders in discussing the matter. Such a policy was in keeping with Yin-ch'ang's philosophy, but the provincial officials protested vigorously. They maintained that the Lu-chun was not sufficiently developed to maintain peace and that the older-style troops were thus essential. They further declared that without the old troops they could not take responsibility for the preservation of order. There was some justification for their stand since the units of the new army were not organized or trained to function as a constabulary. This, however, was not the principal reason for the protests of the local officials. They had vested interests in the maintenance of the Patrol and Defense Troops, as well as the older types of provincial soldiers. Such forces were profitable, for it was easy to falsify the records of funds theoretically spent on them. Furthermore, the provincial leaders by this time had "no confidence" in the reliability of the Lu-chun. The Regency, on the other hand, stressed the creation of modern troops trained for national defense. A principal objective in demand­ ing the abolition of the Army of the Green Standard was to save funds which could be allocated to the new army.80 Military affairs were not the only field in which the Re­ gency was attempting to concentrate authority at the expense of the provinces, but the provincial leaders shrewdly opposed the policy of centralization wherever it was encountered. They maintained that if they were to be held responsible for their provinces, they should be permitted to name their subordinates; that if a cabinet were formed, they should be 8° WDGS, no. 6283-4, "Monthly Reports, Nov. 1910," pp. 4, 6-7; ibid., no. 6283-6, "Jan. 1911," pp. 5-7.

The Collapse of the Old Order consulted; and that the old-style troops should not be dis­ banded until the new police force was completed.81 Provincial opposition notwithstanding, during the period of the Regency there was a steady decline in the outmoded military organizations, yet politics and policy were so inter­ twined that some glaring exceptions were made. One excellent example took place late in January 1911. Chiang Kuei-t'i memorialized the Throne to ask whether or not the Left Division of the Guards Army would be disbanded. In reply, it was stated that the unit had a long combat record; it was necessary for garrison duty near the capital; and it need not be demobilized. The semi-modern Left Division was almost as expensive to sustain as a Lu-chun division, but it had a different table of organization, it was poorly trained, and was armed with diverse weapons. Since it could not be effectively brigaded with the regular divisions, there was no sound military reason for preserving it. Still, the organization had escorted the court in its flight during the Boxer Rebel­ lion.82 Also, it was commanded by Chiang Kuei-t'i, who for several years had helped to guard the imperial palaces and who was an influential member of the Pei-yang clique. Under such circumstances, the Regency found it inexpedient to be ungrateful. In spite of his efforts, during his first six months in office Yin-ch'ang had made such slow progress that he apparently reached the conclusion that no fundamental reorganization of the military structure was possible unless the nation was educated to the necessity for it. He was already attempting to stimulate "love of country" and "devotion to duty" among the soldiers. Now, besides encouraging patriotism among the troops, he advocated the promotion of "general militarism" and advised that basic military training be given in all schools.83 In a land where illiteracy was so widespread, the student class played an unusually important role. They were expected s l Ibid.,

no. 6283-7, "Monthly Reports, Feb. 1911," pp. 13-14. no. 6283-6, "Monthly Reports, Jan. 1911," p. 5. s s Ibid., no. 6283-3, "Monthly Reports, Oct. 1910," p. 5; ibid., no. 6283-8, "March I to April 20, 1911," pp. 2-3. s 2 Ibid.,

The Collapse of the Old Order to furnish the leadership and articulate public opinion for the next generation, so it was essential that they be made aware of the need for military modernization, including a truly national army. If Yin-ch'ang had largely failed in his program to centralize military authority on an empire-wide basis, he obtained more success in Northeast China. He had not been in office a month when an edict ordered a change in the command structure of the Pei-yang Army. All of the six original Peiyang divisions were placed under the direct command of the Ministry of War, the governor-general of Chihli being re­ lieved of control over the Second and Fourth Divisions. The Third and Fifth Divisions were retained in Manchuria and Shantung respectively, but if their services were needed the governor-general and governors of those provinces were to be required to request imperial approval to use them. The incompetent and unpopular Feng Shan was promoted to a sinecure post as a Tartar-general. Yin-ch'ang took personal charge of the six divisions. The Pei-yang generals must have been gratified at the trans­ fer of Feng Shan, but a few of their own number were also replaced. When Tuan Ch'i-jui again gave up command of the Sixth Division to accept promotion to the post of commanderin-chief of the Chiang-pei, he was replaced by the Japanesetrained General Wu Lu-chen. Another outsider, Lan T'ienwei, was placed in charge of a brigade of the Twentieth Division.84 The latter two appointments were a grave political error and demonstrated the poor counterintelligence of the Manchus, for during the Revolution of 1911 both Generals Wu and Lan proved to be adherents of the revolutionary cause. Since the Boxer Rebellion, Japanese military advisers, techniques, and ideology had played an increasingly important role in China, especially in the southern and central provinces. s i Ibid., no. 6283-2, "Monthly Reports, Sept. 1910," pp. 1-2; ibid., no. 6283-5, "Dec. 1910," pp. 4-s; ibid., no. 6283-8; "March 1 to April 20, 1911," p. 2; NCH (Decrees), Sept. 30, 1910, p. 796, and Dec. 30, 1910, p· 785.

The Collapse of the Old Order Japanese advisers had considerable influence in the provincial staffs and a large number of Lu-Chiin officers had been trained in Japan. The same was true of members of the general staff, while officers educated in Japan dominated the Imperial Guards Division. T'ieh-liang as Minister of War had had close relations with Tokyo's representatives in Peking. Yin-ch'ang, on the other hand, was naturally prejudiced in favor of the German military system. It was reported that an assistant German military attache acted as his adviser, and when it appeared that the efficiency of the Fifth Division in Shantung was deteriorating a Germantrained officer was named commander of its Tenth Brigade. Also, as the contracts of Japanese instructors expired, some of them were replaced by Germans. This emphasis on one foreign system or another created friction within the army.88 Moreover, as a result of cultural pride and growing national­ ism, many Chinese opposed all foreign influence or advisers. Related to the preference for different foreign military systems was the development of cliques within the officers' corps of the new army. Some of these factions were founded on personal or provincial loyalties, the best example of the former being the Pei-yang clique, but in some cases the ties which bound the individuals together arose from training in the same foreign state or at the same military school. Thus, on the eve of the Revolution there existed several major factions, including the Pei-yang clique, the students returned from Japan, a great many of whom adhered to republicanism, the supporters of the Manchus, and perhaps a German-trained faction. This cleavage among the officers had its roots in the past and extended over into the period of the Republic, when it would become even more marked.

The Crisis The last three years of the Manchu rule constituted a hopeless attempt by an incompetent regime to stop the tide 8 5 Times (London), Jan. 8, 1909, Aug. 7, 1911, and Oct. 21, 1911; NCH, July 29, 1911, p. 293; WDGS, no. 6283-3, "Monthly Reports, Oct. 1910," p. 2; ibid., no. 6283-6, "Jan. 1911," pp. 2, 4.

The Collapse of the Old Order of history. Foreign encroachment combined with ever-in­ creasing internal problems to bring an end to the imperial system. The claims of the Powers for economic advantages and negotiations with foreign states for loans furnished both a cause and an excuse for growing antagonism to the dynasty in the provinces. The creation of provincial assemblies only increased popular unrest. Racial tensions were isolating the Manchu minority. The opposition, observing the weakness of the government, became more vociferous in its criticism and demands. Badgered on all sides, seeking to preserve the throne and the empire, the Regency had embarked on a policy of concentrating authority, but this policy was weak­ ened by acts of appeasement. In November 1910, as a con­ cession to the national assembly, the Throne promised to convene a parliament in 1913. Thus preparations for repre­ sentative government which could not have been adequately carried out in nine years were telescoped into three. In May 1911 the Regency made a break with the past by abolishing the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council. They were replaced by a cabinet and a privy council, but the cabinet, which bore a striking resemblance to the Grand Council, contained a disproportionate number of Manchus. The Regent had an unusual talent for undiplomatic action. In April 1911, for the third time, the Throne announced the Emperor's assumption of the title of commander-in-chief, with the Regent acting in his behalf. Again, the objective was to stimulate unity, patriotism, and a military spirit. Neverthe­ less, the inclusion of the dynasty's long record of conquest, including victories over the Chinese, could hardly promote racial harmony or insure the loyalty of Chinese troops, even though they were given some share of the credit for past glories.86 The blunders and weakness of the regime proved fatal, for they were the culmination of a century of unsolved prob­ lems, including government corruption, economic decline, 86 See Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 96-97, 126-128, 192-193. For a translation of the edict of April 3, 1911, see WDGS, no. 6562-3, "Edict of Military Reform," pp. 1-3.

The Collapse of the Old Order financial distress, and overpopulation. Natural calamities— famine, flood, or drought—were an ill omen for a decadent dynasty, and they too appeared during the Regency. The foreign powers were divided in their attitude toward China; some favored reform, others did not, but the Regent could not rely on the strong support of any of them in case of war or revolution. The weakness shown by the government in disputes with Russia and Japan over Manchuria and Mon­ golia, as well as with Britian over the Burma border and Tibet, inflamed nationalism and anti-Manchu feeling. Na­ tionalistic ardor was further increased by persistent rumors that the foreign powers were plotting against China. As a result, "volunteer" military units (Kuo-min chiin) were formed throughout the country, ostensibly to aid the govern­ ment against foreign aggression. However, this expression of patriotism was discouraged by Peking, for the situation was so serious that it was commonly believed the mission of these units might be to impose public demands on the Re­ gency.87 It is doubtful that any one individual could have long pre­ served the dynasty, yet it was believed by many, especially foreigners, that the presence of a "strong man" would help stabilize the situation. The obvious candidate was Yuan Shih-k'ai, that able promoter of reform and self-interest. By mid-1909 it was rumored that he would be recalled, but Yuan was all too familiar with the situation. His terms were "effective and not nominal power."88 Only under desperate circumstances could the Regent accept such conditions, yet such a crisis arose in October 1911. In September 1911 an uprising broke out in Szechwan. The immediate cause was the nationalization of the railroads, 87 FR, 1912, pp. 46-47; Cameron, The Reform Movement, pp. 192-193. For an analysis of the relationships of the foreign powers to the Regency prior to the October Revolution, see Reid, op.cit., chs. 2-11, especially p. 241. 88 Dept. State, Central Files, Decimal File, vol. 1, no. 893.00/438, p. 2, Calhoun to Sec. State, Aug. 23, 1910; WDGS, no. 6283-1, "Monthly Reports, Aug. 1910," p. 1; NCH, July 17, 1909, p. 147, and Sept. 9, 1910, p. 611; Times (London), Oct. 11, 1909.

The Collapse of the Old Order but the underlying cause was the conflict between the central government and the provinces.89 Then, on the 9th and 10th of October, a revolt of part of the Lu-chiin garrison at Wu­ chang signaled the beginning of the revolution which was to bring the ancient imperial order to an end. Revolts and disturbances had been endemic in the last half-century of the Ch'ing period. Some of them were more serious than the out­ break in Szechwan and Hupeh, but with the support of the provincial officials and troops they had sooner or later been crushed. However, by the fall of 1911 the people were so alienated from their rulers that few would raise a hand to defend the dynasty. The end had come. The predominant feature of the period 1907-1911 had been the struggle for power between the central government and the provinces. The drastic stages of this conflict were not reached until after the death of the Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi and the dismissal of the most influential of the officials, Yiian Shih-k'ai. Then the Regent, pressed by both internal and external forces, rashly attempted to upset the decentralized balance of power. Administrative control of the armed forces was monopolized by Manchus, especially by members of the imperial clan. Edicts ordered restrictions placed on the traditional military and financial authority of the provincial officials. The six original divisions of the Peiyang Army were placed under the direct command of Yinch'ang, the Minister of War. Despite fears that reaction would put an end to military modernization, the Regency had continued to promote the expansion of the Lu-chiin; had sponsored the reorganization of the provincial forces as semi-modern Patrol and Defense Troops; and had promised gradually to demobilize the Banner garrisons. Nevertheless, to a large degree, the whole military program of the Regent was illusory. Little further progress was made in creating an effective standing army. The Patrol and De­ fense Troops not only remained primarily under local control, but also inherited several of the evils of the Green Standard 89

Kent, op.cit., p. 59.

The Collapse of the Old Order and militia armies, including a good many of their personnel. It is true that the provincial officials had less authority over the Lu-chiin than their predecessors had enjoyed over the old militia armies, yet the new army had not become a truly national force. Furthermore, the resistance of the provincial bureaucracy had largely negated the efforts of the Throne to reduce their revenue privileges. Finally, insofar as the new army was the prize in the struggle between the imperial clan and the imperial officials, both the dynasty and the Con­ fucian civil bureaucracy were doomed to failure. The revolu­ tion was to demonstrate that the majority of the Lu-chiin, followed by many of the old-style troops, would cast their lot with the republican cause. Most of the northern soldiers would prove that their primary loyalty was to an individual, Yiian Shih-k'ai, with little regard as to whether he was serv­ ing as an imperial official or as president of a republic. Both the heritage of personal loyalties and new revolutionary doctrines from the West were at work within the Lu-chiin and both operated against the renewal of the military su­ premacy of the alien emperors. Provincialism, personal loyal­ ties, and the growth of militarism would destroy the old order and its heritage of civilian rule.

CHAPTER 8

THE ARMY AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1911

Evaluation of the Military Forces

T

HE outbreak of the revolution in October 1911 marked the end and the failure of the Manchu re­ form movement. One vital aspect of the reform policy had been the attempt to modernize the armed forces of the empire. This program had its real origins during the Taiping Rebellion; it was intensified by the SinoJapanese War. The semi-modern army developed by Li Hung-chang was badly mauled, and China had proved de­ fenseless against the attack of a second-rate power, but defeat aroused a will to create armed forces capable of preventing further humiliation. Although the military pro­ gram thus launched received a partial setback as a result of the Boxer Rebellion, the effort was renewed with greater vigor after 1901. Leadership in the field of military reform— in fact, reform in general—was furnished primarily by Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung, supported by the EmpressDowager. These three deserve major credit for the im­ provement that had been made and their departure marked the end of an era. After 1908 progress was retarded. Yet, by 1911 military reform had reached the point where the course of the revolution—the fate of both the imperial and revolutionary causes—depended upon the support of the new-style troops. In fact, the Revolution of 1911 was to a considerable degree a revolt of the army, and it was largely military force which caused the abdication of the Manchus.1 Had the modernized troops remained loyal to the Throne, the Wuchang uprising could have been crushed, as had been the numerous earlier revolts incited by revolutionaries or 1 Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, "The Role of the Military in Chinese Govern­ ment," op.cit., p. 241; Captain J. H. Reeves, "Notes on the Chinese Revolution of 1911-12," WDGS, no. 6790-42, 1912, p. 2.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 motivated by other causes of unrest. The demise of the dynasty had long been heralded, but it was by creating the Lu-chun that the Throne had dug its own grave, for the new army divisions of South and Central China were the back­ bone of the republican forces.2 Since the Revolution brought to a close the imperial phase of military reform, and since the armed forces played such an important role in the great revolt, it is appropriate to evaluate the military establishment as it existed in 1911. At that time, the land forces of China were composed of old-style and new-style organizations. The principal cate­ gories of modern or semi-modern troops were the Lu-chiin (Army), and the Patrol and Defense Troops, which could be slightly augmented by the new-style police. The major types of old-fashioned units still consisted of the Eight Ban­ ners, the Army of the Green Standard, Mongolian and Tibetan troops, plus various types of provincial and local militia.8 As has been noted, the failure of some official and un­ official observers to mention the once-powerful Defense Army and provincial militia during the very last years of the dynasty did not indicate that the militia armies had altogether ceased to exist. Some individual soldiers had been discharged, but as an institution the organized militia had merely been transformed into Patrol and Defense Troops. The men were still present, masquerading under a new title.4 Nevertheless, they were no longer the dominant factor in the military power structure that they had been prior to the Sino-Japanese War. With the Boxer Rebellion and the death of their most influential leaders, the semi-private militia armies had given way before the expansion of more modern troops. During the Manchu reform period, the efforts of the leading military reformers at the capital and in the provinces had centered around the formation of the standing army and, since 1905, 2 T'ang, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, p. 59; LCCCF, P- 343· 8 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., pp. 412-413. « LCCCF, p. 348.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 the Lu-chun. This force, whose principal mission was national defense, had become in reality the Chinese army. The Patrol and Defense Troops were actually a gendarmerie or pro­ vincial militia whose primary function was the preservation of internal peace and order. In terms of her accountable revenues, China had spent a tremendous sum since 1902 to create a regular army; yet, the plans to organize thirty-six divisions, plus the Imperial Guards, fell far short of attainment. I estimate that only fourteen divisions of over two-thirds strength and twenty brigades varying from 2,000 to over 6,000 men had been formed by October 1911.5 Of the fourteen divisions and twenty brigades which were in existence, seven divisions and three mixed brigades were the expanded core of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Pei-yang Army. In strength they comprised more than one-third of the Lu-chun; they were better trained than the average unit, and formed the most homogeneous force in the new army. Not only had China failed to maintain the schedule necessary to form thirty-seven divisions by 1912, but little progress had been made during the last several years in completing partially formed units. The policy calling for the creation of a reserve corps to serve as a second line of defense had achieved even less success. In 1910 the British military attache concluded that there were fewer than 24,000 Lu-chun reserves. Of these the original Pei-yang divisions furnished over 16,000, while the remainder all came from Kiangsu province. Furthermore, all the reserves were in­ fantrymen, many of whom were of doubtful value.® As of mid-1908 French military reports had estimated that the total strength of the Lu-chiin was almost 190,000. B For estimates of the order of battle of the Lu-chun, ranging from early 1910 to October 1911, see LCCCF, pp. 357-384; Chu Wu, "Wo-kuo chih lu-chiin" (The Army of Our Country), op.cit., pp. 69-74; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 419; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes in Chinese Army in 1910," pp. 44-47; Times (Lon­ don), Oct. 2i, 1911; The China Year Book, 1912, pp. 254-255; CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, p. 4. There is an unusual degree of unanimity concerning the loca­ tion and designation, but not the strength, of the Lu-chun units. β See WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 25, 33, 47.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 Of these it was believed that about 165,000 were combat type troops. However, only some 120,000 had received sufficient training and equipment to be effective on the field of battle.7 Reports of the personnel strength of the new army on the eve of the revolution vary widely. One evaluation based on Chinese documents from the years 1909 to 1911 gave the total strength as over 266,000.8 The Western mili­ tary attaches were more conservative in their estimates. They were principally interested in the number of actual com­ batants, and in this category the figures rendered in 191 ο by the French, American, and British attaches varied from roughly 152,000 to over 190,000. Still, the foreign observers agreed that the true overall strength of the standing army was only ten per cent below its then authorized figure.® This is an indication that a much higher degree of honesty was enforced in the Lu-chiin than had been true of old-style units, for prior to the Sino-Japanese War it was frequently reported that Green Standard units might consist of only one-fourth to one-half of their authorized strength. Never­ theless, the above-mentioned figures demonstrate that there 7 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier j uillet 1908," Revue militaire des armees etrangeres, vol. 73 (Jan. 1909), p. 60; see also ibid., pp. 51-52. These figures for the strength of the Lu-chiin approximate those of two other sources. The CSK (Ping-chih 3, pp. lob-nb) placed the figure for 1907 at almost 180,000, excluding the modern troops of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Major Eben Swift, U.S.A., estimated that as of 1909 the new army numbered 200,000. He concurred that probably only 120,000 of them were qualified for combat (in Blakeslee, op.cit., p. 180). sLCCCF, p. 389. In 1910 the British military attache, Lt. Col. Μ. E. Willoughby, believed that the total authorized strength of the Lu-chiin was 227,290, plus 23,890 reserves. As of December 1910 Captain James H. Reeves, the U.S. military attache, furnished the figure 252,526 (WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 47-48). The China Year Book, 1912, reported that as of August 31, 1911, the total strength of the new army was 240,815 (pp. 254-255). 8 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 47. As of March I, 1910, Major Brissaud, the French military attache, considered the effective strength of the Lu-chiin to be 152,565 ("Situation de l'armees chinoise au I Mars 19ro," op.cit., p. 420). Captain Reeves of the U.S. Legation rendered the figure 173,034, while the British military attache in 1910 estimated the combat strength to be about 190,000 (WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 47-48). er

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 had been no major increase in the combat strength of the standing army since the death of Tz'u-hsi and the dismissal of Yuan Shih-k'ai. After 1908 not only the quantitative expansion but also the qualitative development of the new army had been retarded. In certain aspects it had deteriorated, a process that was noticed even in parts of the Pei-yang Army. The field training of some divisions continued but on a smaller scale than in 1906. For example, in the fall of 1908 the Eighth Division from Wuchang and the Ninth Division from Nanking held maneuvers in a mountainous section of Anhwei. The objectives were to test the service of supply in an area of poor communications as well as to arouse the interest of the governors of the Yangtze Valley in military reform.10 The personnel of the Lu-chiin differed markedly in ap­ pearance from the old-fashioned soldiers. The Western-style uniforms, neat appearance, and soldierly bearing of the better units gave the illusion of a totally new order. More fundamental was the fact that the social origins of the troops had been broadened. In the officers' schools there were both the sons of peasants and the scions of the literati, but the emphasis was placed on selecting the sons of gentry families. The officers were the products of the new China, a blending of Confucian culture with the technological civilization of the West. Many of them had spent some time in military schools, so their professional training was based on that of modern Japan or the Occident, yet in many ways they were still traditional bureaucrats. Their inherent politeness and improved soldierly bearing gave them an appearance of discipline which was sometimes misleading. Yet, as a class, they were enthusiastic, and experience was gradually giving them greater confidence. Still, their training did not meet Western standards. As for the Manchus, despite the urgings of their leaders, the race had largely failed to regain its 10 "Grandes manoeuvres chinoises en 1908," Revue militaire des armees etrangeres, vol. 72 (Aug. 1908), pp. 176-177; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 19, 1908, p. 720; see also "Grandes manoeuvres en 1907," Revue militaire des armies etrangires, vol. 72 (Dec. 1908), pp. 555-557.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 former interest in military service. In fact, so few qualified Bannermen were available that even in the First Division most of the senior officers were Chinese. Had peace prevailed, time and the military academies might have rectified the weaknesses of the officers' corps. Already by 1911 there were possibly 800 officers serving in the army who had trained in Japan. Since a large number of them were troop com­ manders, staff officers, or instructors, their influence was widespread and their technical knowledge was an asset to the Lu-chun. Nevertheless, they were a threat to the old order, for a large proportion of them were by conviction adherents of republicanism who would seek to overthrow the imperial system.11 The non-commissioned officers who were selected from the ranks were better qualified than their predecessors. Still, they lacked initiative and as a group they were good drill instructors rather than competent small unit leaders. The military qualities of the Chinese have been previously men­ tioned, as well as the fact that military observers had long been impressed with the Chinese peasant as a potential soldier. Furthermore, the improving social status of the armed services had permitted the Lu-chun, especially its best units, to recruit a better class of men than had previously joined the armed forces. Literates and some men from the lower middle class were to be found among the enlisted per­ sonnel. However, the great majority were still illiterate peasants who either were conscripted or volunteered because of economic hardships or social dislocation. Attempts were made to improve the patriotism, morale, and education of the men, but this training gave the Chinese soldier greater confidence, so that he became somewhat more independent and less tractable. In fact, the fine discipline for which the first Lu-chiin divisions had been praised was breaking down, as was so drastically demonstrated by the series of mutinies 11Reeves op.cit., p. 9; Negrier, "Les forces chinoises en 1910," op.cit., 1 p. 587; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Juillet 1908," op.cit., p. 59; WDGS1 no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 27; Times (Lon­ don), Oct. 2i, 1911.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 in the standing army.12 Some foreign observers even believed that there had been a deterioration in the personnel of the standing army since 1906 and that by the time of the revolu­ tion the men of the Lu-Chiin were inferior physically to the soldiers of the Patrol and Defense Troops.13 By 1910-1911 the system of recruiting locally was being more strictly enforced than in the past. This was a blow to the policy inherited from the heyday of semi-personal armies, when the provincial leaders recruited men wherever they desired, frequently from their home provinces. Still, this new system of recruiting a division or brigade from a single prov­ ince had certain disadvantages. Men from some regions made better soldiers than those from other districts. Also, in case of local disturbances units stationed in their own province were not as reliable as troops from another area who had less sympathy for the local population. In theory, recruiting was on a volunteer basis and the recurrent pro­ posals for universal compulsory conscription were never put into effect. The Chinese claimed that when a call was issued sufficient men offered their services. With improved condi­ tions this may possibly have been true in some cases, but such claims are not in keeping with the standard practice of allotting a quota to each magistrate, who then held the village elders responsible for certain number of "volunteers."14 By the end of 1910, the General Staff Corps had been organized into six sections, while the Ministry of War was taking on the attributes of a military organization. The number of foreign instructors was being reduced, and by October 1911 most of their functions had been taken over by the Chinese officers. Nevertheless, the staff officers still 12 The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-1911, 3rd issue, vol. 2, p. 237; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 26-27; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Juillet 1908," op.cit., p. 56; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 421. ls The China Year Book, 1912, p. 248; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 30-31. 14 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au I er Mars 1910," op.cit., pp. 418, 419420; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 25-26; NCH 1 April 3, 1909, p. 26.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 lacked experience, as was evident from the caliber of the staff work. Also, as a rule, the senior commanders were still inefficient. In general, the infantry units had continued to be effective organizations with an unusual talent for close order drill. During the last few years, although infantry units of the older divisions had made no noticeable improvement in maneuvers, newer organizations had profited from field exercises. To the end of the dynasty, the cavalry continued to be the weakest of the basic arms. They rode somewhat better than in the past. On occasion they even carried out satisfactory scouting and patrol activities, but their mounts had not been improved, nor was their training adequate. The artillery gun drill, which was already fast, was improv­ ing and the armament was better, yet the men had almost no opportunity to fire their guns. Surprisingly, the engineer battalions, which required a considerable degree of technical training, were among the best of the Chinese units. Not only were they capable of serving as infantry, but most of the battalions also possessed engineering equipment, which they were "quite expert" at handling. The transportation battal­ ions were not as well trained as the engineers, nor were they as well equipped as the other divisional organizations. Despite the lack of adequate roads and the large amount of pack transportation utilized by the civilian population, the army did not employ pack trains. Skilled packers and equipment were available for the creation of an efficient transportation service, but they were not employed.15 By previous standards, great progress had been made in one decade in the development of the basic arms and services of the Chinese army, but the auxiliary services—medical, veterinary, ordnance, and communications—had remained in a rudimentary stage. There were six army medical schools, of which the one at Tientsin was by far the best. Each divi­ sion and mixed brigade had a "hospital," but there was a serious shortage of both equipment and foreign-trained l s WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Qianges . . . 1910," pp. 4, 28-30; "Situation de l'armee chinoise an Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., pp. 423-424; Negrier, op.cit., p. 587.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 doctors. Nevertheless, the medical corps had made a real contribution by increasing sanitary conditions in the army. Although effective communications were essential to the coordination of troop movements, no separate signal corps units had been established. However, each engineer battalion was supposed to have one telegraph company.16 Since 1906, little further progress had been made in standardizing the weapons of the Lu-chun. A large majority of the troops were still armed with either Japanese Meiji 30th-year, or the Mauser 7.9mm rifle or carbine. A few major units, especially in Southern and Western China, were supplied with older rifles, but there was a satisfactory degree of uniformity within most organizations. Although by 1911 many large units possessed several machine guns, few if any divisions, except the Imperial Guards had formed a separate machine gun detachment. Even though the quality of guns had been improved, the situation in the artillery was still un­ satisfactory. The practice of purchasing abroad various makes and calibers of guns continued,17 despite the directives of the Commission for Army Reorganization and the Min­ istry of War. Considering the logistical difficulties thus per­ petuated, the situation must be considered as evidence of continuing provincial autonomy and of the existence of cor­ ruption on the part of officials who received commissions from foreign firms. The basic concept of the new army was Western; its tables of organization, drill regulations, tactics, uniforms, and equipment were patterned after those of Occidental armies. Nevertheless, throughout its existence the Lu-chun was not only a Western-style army, but a Chinese army as well. Although emphasis has been placed on its modern characteris­ tics, the new army was also a product of its own milieu—a milieu which itself was changing. In the Lu-Chiin the philos­ ophy, customs, and traditions of Chinese civilization were 16 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 19, 30, 35; "Situation de Tarmee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 423. 17 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 29, 44-47, 49; The China Year Book, 1912, p. 253.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 deeply ingrained. A number of such characteristics, includ­ ing provincialism, nepotism, favoritism, personal loyalties, factionalism, and intervention of officers into politics have already been mentioned, as have lack of specialization, "squeeze," emphasis on rote memory, and strict adherence to training regulations. In spite of the fact that some of these factors had been modified by training or by political and military necessity, they continued to color the Chinese mili­ tary system. Certain other practices maintained in even the most modern troops also reflected the customs of Chinese society. In keeping with tradition, memorialists requested the Throne to reward officers and even enlisted men who had done nothing more than carry out their regular duties for three years without incurring the wrath of their superiors. Thus were personal loyalties recompensed. The Chinese concept of "face" also interfered with military efficiency. For example, all those who attended the full course at military schools were graduated irrespective of the quality of their work. This may have preserved the self-esteem of the individual, but it did not improve the officers' corps. Another detrimental feature was the continuing emphasis on external display. The old Chinese armies had presented a colorful pageant with their brilliant flags, bright jackets, cymbals, drums, and spears. The Lu-chun, with its dark blue or khaki uni­ forms, was less colorful, but it was still capable of presenting a spectacle. The precision drill of a well-trained Chinese regiment in review was a magnificent sight. Nevertheless, part of the many hours spent learning the "goose step" might better have been employed on field maneuvers or in the study of weapons. This emphasis on externals rather than on fundamentals can be explained in part by the fact that the officers sought by a brilliant display to impress the powerful officials, who judged an organization by its ability on the parade ground.18 l a WDGS, no. 6283-5, "Monthly Reports, Dec. 1910," pp. IO-II; ibid., no. 6283-8, "March ι to April 20, 1911," p. 6; ibid., no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 28; Negrier, op.cit., p. 587.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 At least in battalions designated as such, the semi-modern Patrol and Defense Troops had expanded rapidly. The exact size of the corps is a matter of speculation, since the number of varying reports is equal to the number of sources available. As of mid-1908, the French General Staff estimated the strength of all such units at 216,000. The American military attache calculated that the actual strength in late 1909 was only about 157,000.19 The figures for 1911 are equally at variance. The Chinese author Shen Chien, basing his estimate on official documents, gave the figure 334,316, but The China Year Book reported only 276,981. The London Times, main­ taining that the latter figure was merely the paper strength, stated that as of October 1911 the actual figure was only 120,000,20 but this estimate must have been too low. Many of these soldiers had some value as reserves for the standing army. They could also guard the lines of communication and serve as garrison troops, as well as attempt to preserve internal order. In time of war, part of this force might have had real value as guerillas operating against the enemy's rear areas. The Patrol and Defense Troops were basically provincial, both as to organization and control. Originally such soldiers were not supposed to be used outside their own province; yet, in practice, when provincial officials called upon each other for assistance to quell local revolts the Patrol and Defense Troops were usually sent. These organizations were composed almost entirely of infantry and cavalry units, plus a very few artillery batteries. The majority of the men were armed with model-1888 Mauser rifles, but there was less uniformity of weapons than in the new army. The official policy was to have all troops ultimately based on the Lu-chun model, so had it been possible to create the full quota of standing army divisions the Patrol and Defense Troops were to have been abolished by 1920.21 19 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au I er Juillet 1908," op.cit., pp. 62-63. WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Qianges . . . 1910," p. 59. 20 LCCCF, p. 389; The China Year Book, 1912, p. 256; Times (Lon­ don), Oct. 21, 1911. 21 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au I er Juillet 1908," op.cit, pp. 62-63;

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 The remaining "soldiers" of China made very little con­ tribution to national defense, nor were they a reliable safe­ guard against internal revolt. The principal function of these large bodies of men was to deplete an already overburdened financial structure. Despite the edict of September 1907 ordering the gradual demobilization of the Manchu garrisons in the provinces, the actual policy of the Regency had been to preserve the Eight Banners and even to increase slightly their combat potential. In 1911 the ranks of the Banner Forces included over 225,000 men. Of these, some 38,000 were reported to have received Lu-chun or similar training, while roughly 37,000 had obtained some training in the Patrol and Defense Troops or comparable units. The re­ maining two-thirds were untrained and of no military value.22 By 1911 the once multitudinous Army of the Green Standard had been reduced to a mere remnant, permeated with opium-smoking misfits, who were struggling against inevitable reorganization or disbandment. An estimate based on official Chinese sources placed the strength of the Army of the Green Standard at over 133,000,23 but it is doubtful that it could actually have mustered much over 50,000 men.24 For financial purposes, the list of military organizations could be, and was, further swollen to include Mongol cavalry­ men, Tibetan troops, various types of local militia, guards, and river police. Actually, in time of war, the Red Bearded Bandits of Manchuria or the pirates of South China, serving as partisan troops, would have been of greater value than most of the old-style forces.25 Shen Chien estimated the overall strength of the Chinese armies on the eve of the 1911 revolution at 1,003, 86720 This WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 59-60; Reeves, op.cit., p. 4. 22 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 426. Shen Chien listed the strength of the Bannermen at 262,962 (LCCCF, p. 389). 28 LCCCF, p. 389. 24 See The China Year Book, 1912, p. 256. 25 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Juillet 1908," op.cit., pp. 66, 68-69. 2e LCCCF, p. 389. This source furnishes a documented survey of the major categories of troops by provinces (see pp. 357-389).

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 figure included only the Banner Forces, the Army of the Green Standard, the Lu-chun, and fortress garrisons. The total figure may approximate the men in these categories for whom pay was being issued, but it certainly far exceeds the number actually under arms and bears almost no relation­ ship to the number who could with any justification be classed as modern combat troops. A more conservative estimate based on the foreign sources noted above would give a total of not over 600,000 men who were actually in service. If this figure is even fairly accurate, it would indicate that two-fifths of the horde of "soldiers" that poverty-stricken China was maintaining were either non-existent or at least rendering no service. Even more serious were the evaluations of military observers concerning the standing army—the only real army in China. It was the opinion of the French military attache that, despite two additional years of training, the Lu-chun as of 1910 still did not possess more than 120,000 men capable of giving a good account of themselves in battle. The United States military attache was even more critical. He did not believe that more than one-half that number were capable of opposing modern foreign troops.27

Institutions Supporting the Military Forces Potentially, the greatest hopes for improving the standards of the Chinese army lay in the military schools. They were better organized than most aspects of the military establish­ ment and more popular. Considering the traditional prestige of education in China, neither of these conditions is unex­ pected. Following the Boxer Rebellion, when leading officials and the Empress-Dowager decided on the necessity for mili­ tary reform, the establishment of military schools became one of the most readily supported phases of the reform program. 27 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 31; see also "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," p. 420. According to H. G. W. Woodhead, the total number of men under arms in October 1911, including the Lu-chUn, Banners, and provincial troops, was only about 520,000 (The Truth about the Chinese Republic, London, 1925, pp. 112-113).

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 In 1908, 7,000 students were already reported to be attending officers' schools or institutions for officials of comparable rank. Enrollment in the non-commissioned officers' schools exceeded 2,500, while there were believed to be 700 students in Japan, plus a few in Europe and America. By the end of 1910, the enrollment in the officers' and specialists' schools of the Lu-Chiin probably totaled some 10,000, while seven provincial schools for the Patrol and Defense Troops had an estimated 600 students.28 In October 1911 there were in China about 70 military educational institutions. These included some 25 military basic schools, with at least one in each province. The last of the four originally planned military middle schools opened at Sian, Shensi, late in 1910. The Officers' School, the third in the planned hierarchy of four types of institutions, had not been established, but the Imperial Officers' School with Abridged Course had been functioning at Paoting in place of it. At the outbreak of the revolution the General Staff College had not been organized either. It was to be opened, however, in 1912 and officers had already been sent to Japan to prepare themselves to be instructors. In the meantime, staff officers were trained at the Staff Officers' College at Paoting or abroad. Also, in a number of provinces officers were still attending military lecture halls. Proposed special­ ists' schools for the arms of the service had not been organ­ ized and few technical schools for the special or auxiliary services had been created since 1906. In fact, some institu­ tions for which there appeared to have been a need were closed. An instructors' school had been formed to train instructors for the basic schools, but by late in 1910 it had been abolished; the same was true of the ordnance school. Even more important, the non-commissioned officers' schools had been ordered closed after original cadres were formed. Few, if any, remained by 1911. On the other hand, since the Chinese had become impressed by the value of topog28

"Situation de l'armee chinoise au

I er

Juillet 1908," op.cit., p.

58 ;

WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 16-18; see also "Situation de l'armee chinoise au

Ier

Mars 19x0," op.cit., p. 416.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 raphy and cartography, a plethora of surveying schools had sprung up.29 They could render a valuable service, although it would appear that a greater diversification in specialists' training courses would have better suited China's needs. The Military College for Princes and Nobles, which was a manifestation of the Throne's desire to increase the military spirit of the Manchus, continued to function, but its principal contribution had been to give prestige to the military school system. The auditors at the college included princes and im­ perial clansmen; even some civil officials attended. The large majority of the cadets were Manchus, but there was a scatter­ ing of Chinese and Mongols. It is not surprising to find among the students grandsons of the noted militia leaders and officials Liu Ming-ch'uan and Shen Pao-chen or of the provincial commander-in-chief Chiang Kuei-t'i, for their families had gained fame from military service. Important from the standpoint of impressing the Chinese literati with the desirability of a military career was the fact that the Chinese minority included descendants of a grand secretary, board presidents, governors, and other senior officials. Also, the fathers of several cadets possessed the coveted metro­ politan civil degree.80 At the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, the military schools were still hampered by a shortage of fully qualified instructors. Although they could have rendered a service, the number of foreign staff members had decreased, for many Chinese had come to feel that it was neither necessary nor desirable to seek foreign assistance. Nevertheless, plans for establishing military academies came closer to achievement than any other phase of the military reform. From the standpoint of the Throne, it was not sound policy to promote institutions which became breeding grounds of revolution, 2a LCCCF, p. 385; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 416; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 16-18; ibid., no. 6283-6, "Monthly Reports, Jan. 1911," p. 7; Chu Wu, op.cit., p. 69. These authorities do not even agree as to the exact number of military schools in China. 80 Lu-chiin kuei-chou hsueh-t'ang t'ung-hsueh Iu (Year Book of the Military School for Princes and Nobles), Peking, 1909, passim.

30O

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 even though the schools were turning out officers whose training was superior to that of their predecessors. As in the case of the new army itself, the leaders of imperial China were caught in a dilemma. Modern training schools were absolutely essential to the creation of an army capable of defending the empire against foreign aggression; yet, it proved impossible to establish Western-style academies which did not directly or indirectly propagate Western political ideals. The service schools played an important role at the time, but they had even greater significance for the future. During the last decade of the dynasty they numbered among their students men who were to influence directly the fate of China in the militarily oriented post-revolutionary period. Included among the cadets who passed through the portals of the military academies were the Nationalist President Chiang K'ai-shek, the warlords Feng Υϋ-hsiang and Yen Shi-shan and the Communist military chief Chu Teh. There had been no basic change in the industries main­ tained to support the armed forces since Lord Charles Beresford rendered his report on arsenals in 1899. In fact, far less progress had been made in the manufacture of ordnance materiel than in the development of the army itself. Super­ vision of the arsenals had been largely taken over by the Ministry of War, and provincial requests for equipment were supposed to be forwarded to the Ministry for approval. Nevertheless, as in the past, the governors-general and gov­ ernors still exerted considerable influence over the factories, since they continued to finance them. Although corruption was still in evidence, the gun factories were no longer wasting a large proportion of their capacity in the manufacture of terribly obsolete weapons. In fact, in some plants the quality of ammunition produced had improved during the last few years. Since the plans to create three large national arsenals had never been carried out, there continued to be only two major plants, those at Shanghai and Hanyang. However, the facilities at Canton and Chengtu (Szechwan) had been expanded to some extent. It is estimated that by 1911 the seven largest arsenals possessed the equipment to produce

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 some 135 rifles or carbines and 170,0(¾) rounds of small-arms ammunition daily, as well as about 100 guns annually. Still it is doubtful that production, with the possible exception of ammunition, equalled half of the capacity. Despite Chinese claims that they could manufacture guns more cheaply than they could be purchased abroad, large orders were still being placed with foreign firms.31 The United States military attache knew of no general supply depots. Each province had an armory or dump where available reserves of arms and ammunition were stored, but these magazines were under provincial control. Only a few Lu-chiin divisions had their own mobilization stores. On the other hand, efforts were being made to free China of dependence on foreign sources of uniforms and equipment. Chinese factories and shops were beginning to compete with Japanese and German companies in supplying troops.82 In terms of today's mechanized armies, the armed forces of China were not expensive, yet they placed a severe burden on the backward national economy. As of 1908, the French military intelligence service believed that the total annual expenses of the land and sea forces amounted to roughly 60 million taels.83 By 1910 Captain Reeves, the United States military attache, estimated the cost of maintaining the land forces, excluding the Bannermen, at 43,735,250 United States dollars or 67,285,000 treasury taels. In China's first budget, prepared for the year 1911 and based on expenses 81Reeves, op.cit., pp. 114-115; WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 20-22; [G. B. Rea], "China's Army and Navy," op.cit., p. 93; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., p. 422. Shen Chien presents a statistical table of the number of factories, shops, and offices which he believed were available in 1911 to support and main­ tain the army (LCCCF, p. 387). The scale of the importation and transfer of ordnance materiel is shown by the reports of The Maritime Customs. In 1910 the net national importation of munitions of war was 3,368,993 Hai-kuan taels. In 1911 the figure fell to 2,727,801, but in 1912, stimulated by the civil war, the net imports jumped to 7,748,040 taels (Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1911, part 1, p. 23; ibid., 1912, part 1, p. 23). 32 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 24; "Situation de l'armee chinoise au Ier Mars 1910," op.cit., pp. 422-423. 33 "Situation de l'armee chinoise au I er Juillet 1908," op.cit., pp. 54-55.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 in 1909, the national assembly, after revising downward the proposals of the Ministry of Finance, recommended a total of 77,915,890 treasury taels for the support of the land forces. Since this sum included almost 8,800,000 taels for the Banner Troops, it closely approximates Captain Reeves' figure. The revised naval budget amounted to about ten million taels. Yin-ch'ang, the Minister of War, had sought a much larger appropriation and the estimate drawn up by the Ministry of Finance generously recommended an army budget of over 126,840,000 taels. Those figures included funds for the Ministry of War, the General Staff, the Imperial Bodyguards, the Lu-chun, the Banner Forces, and the remnants of the Army of the Green Standard (plus the expense of disbanding these troops). The total also incorporated sums for the frontier guards, the provincial troops or Patrol and Defense Troops, and the old privileged Left Division of the Guards Army. It further sought funds for maintaining and expand­ ing military education, purchasing new equipment, financing the arsenals and equipment factories, and paying for the military courier service. By far the largest sum, 58,760,235 taels, was sought for the new armies, but this figure included only 36,857,141 taels for the existing organizations. The remainder was to be used to expand old units and establish new ones. The next largest figure—some 18,622,000 taels— was requested for the provincial troops. About 7,670,000 taels was sought for military education, and almost 9,700,000 for arsenals and equipment factories.34 In the case of the land forces' budget, the national assembly demonstrated sound judgment and foresight. Its revision of the Ministry of Finance's figures indicated that the delegates opposed an increase in the number of existing organizations as well as the maintenance of so many different types of troops. They were, however, "decidedly in favor of further perfecting the instruction and equipment of the existing estab­ lishment, and if possible making the country self-sustaining" 84

WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 36-39.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 in the matter of military equipment. Funds for administrative offices were reduced, while the amount requested for pro­ vincial troops was cut in half. Estimates for the new-style troops were decreased slightly more than 30 million taels, but two-thirds of this sum had related only to future expan­ sion. Almost 5,428,000 taels were retained for military edu­ cation, the reduction being in existing institutions, not proposed expansion. No decrease was made in the recom­ mendations for arsenals, factories, or new equipment. On the other hand, the total sums requested for the Green Standard troops and the military courier service were dis­ allowed. The assemblymen had shown a surprising degree of independence in their relationship with the Throne. Yet, at that late day, they still failed to challenge seriously the privileges of the Manchus. No reduction was made in the Ministry of Finance's generous allowance of over 2,166,000 taels for the Imperial guards, while only a token 71,000 taels was cut from the funds allotted to the Banner Forces.85 In the final budget approved by the national assembly military and naval expenses accounted for over 29 per cent of the total proposed income and expenditures, which were optimistically estimated at 301,910,296 and 298,448,365 taels respectively.36 Following the cuts in the military budget, it was rumored that Yin-ch'ang would resign as Minister of War, but as a matter of fact he was probably well satisfied. It was believed that, like his Western counterparts, he had rendered a very liberal estimate of military requirements to allow for expected reductions on the part of the national assembly. Had the civil war not made the majority of the assembly's recommendations inapplicable, they would appear to have been adequate for the maintenance or even improve­ ment of the existing military establishment. At least a few 35

Ibid., pp. 36-39, 41. a list of the principal items of income and expenditure of the 1911 budget, including the estimates of both the Ministry of Finance and the national assembly, see WDGS, no. 6560-1, "The Chinese Budget of 1911," and its enclosure. For the major items of the budget as revised by the assembly, see The China Year Book, 1912, p. 265. 36For

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 of the recommendations were carried out, for during 191 χ some funds were saved by demobilizing Green Standard and other provincial troops.37 The revolution intervened before the proposed budget for 1912 could be adopted by the assembly. This document, prepared by the Ministry of Fi­ nance, estimated income at 268,009,802 treasury taels and expenditures at 268,311,034. Requests for the land forces had been reduced to 68,268,120 taels, but the naval budget had been increased to 12,192,763.88 However, the outbreak of the hostilities made peacetime budgets completely un­ reliable. Military expenses greatly increased, while the trans­ fer of allegiance of most of the provinces to the republican cause drastically reduced government revenues. The overall results of the military aspects of the Manchu reform movement as portrayed in the above analysis do not represent an outstanding achievement. The failure of the reformers fully to attain their objectives is revealed sharply by the low evaluation given of the capabilities of even the Lu-Chiin in the face of foreign troops. Does this indicate that the whole experiment which led to the creation of the standing army was a waste of time, funds, and energy? No. Not from the standpoint of national defense. Owing to some improvement in the command and logistical structure, as well as to expanded railway and steamship facilities, Chinese troops could be concentrated much more effectively than ever before. It has been calculated that in case of a general mobili­ zation the following number of Lu-chun troops could have been assembled simultaneously at strategic centers within two weeks: Mukden (Manchuria)—40,000; Peking or Tien­ tsin—74,120, plus the 8,000 men of the Left Division of the Guards Army; Wuchang—28,210; Shanghai or Nanking —35,640; Foochow (Fukien)—10,000; Canton—11,200. The inadequate force at Canton could have been reinforced by some 20,000 Patrol and Defense Troops and other pro87 WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," p. 39; ibid., encl. in 6283-11, "Memorandum on the Financial Situation by Mr. Ε. T. Wil­ liams . . . ," April 16, 1912, pp. 3-4, 88 The China Year Book, 1913, pp. 307-308.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 vincial soldiers, many of whom had some aptitude for guerilla warfare. Then, too, the more than 21,000 troops of Hupeh and Hunan could be moved by rail to Peking or by water to Nanking to reinforce those areas.39 This ability to concentrate rapidly a fairly competent army could have had an important international effect. Assuming the willing­ ness of Chinese soldiers to defend their homeland, the age when a small enemy force could land and seize any major objective in China had ended. Early in 1911, the conservative United States military attache estimated that, barring the element of surprise, it would require a foreign army of 50,000 men to capture Peking.40 Even the great powers would have had to consider that their vital interests were very seriously involved before they would undertake such an enterprise. Militarily, China had not guaranteed herself against a major attack, but she had reached the point where, if she offered a united front, such an undertaking would be costly to the invaders and not to be entered into lightly. However, the military position thus indicated was negated by political disunity. The Lu-chun was not used to defend the empire; instead, its elements were hurled against each other in fratricidal strife.

Revolution and the Return of Yiian Shih-k'ai The premature explosion of a bomb in a revolutionary hideout in the Russian Concession at Hankow on October 9, 1911, created a chain reaction—a reaction which ousted the faltering Manchus from the throne of China and destroyed an imperial system that had been in existence during most of two millennia. These momentous events, products of the interaction of the dynastic cycle and the impact of Western civilization, were touched off by an accident. There was no fundamental difference between the uprising planned at Hankow and the various unsuccessful coups attempted dur89

WDGS, no. 6562-1, "Report of Changes . . . 1910," pp. 52-54.

io Ibid., p. 30.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 ing the last years of the dynasty by members of the Common Alliance Society (T'ung-meng hui) or the other anti-Manchu groups. Coordination between the followers of Sun Yat-sen and other adherents of revolution in the Wuhan area was not as effective as conspiratory activities require. The basis of republican strength in Hupeh lay in the revolutionaries' infiltration of the Lu-chiin organizations, yet in October 1911 the majority of the units most favorable to the re­ publican cause had been ordered to Szechwan to pacify that strife-ridden province. Thus, when the uprising was pre­ maturely exposed, it could have been crushed as the coup at Canton had been in the spring of 1911. The regime would have been given another reprieve. Sun Yat-sen himself later stated that such would have been the case except for the flight of Governor-general Jui-cheng and the military com­ mander, General Chang Piao.41 Their cowardice and lack of judgment permitted the revolt to spread. After the plot was discovered, the revolutionary officers revolted largely in desperation. Since the original mutiny was begun by only two battalions, had the governor-general and Chang Piao acted with firmness and courage, they could probably have retained the loyalty of the majority of the troops. Instead, they elected to flee to a gunboat in the river, where they were joined by the bureaucracy.42 The strategic Wuhan area fell to the republicans by default. Deserted by their superiors, most of the modern troops joined the revolt. A few scattered companies remaining loyal escaped across the river to Hankow. In the latter city two of the three battalions of the 42nd Regiment (21st Brigade) mutinied and seized the Hanyang arsenal. In all probability nine to ten thousand regulars joined the revolt, but at least part of the Patrol and Defense Troops appear to have re­ mained loyal. Since the Banner garrisons had no choice but to support their dynasty, some of them were massacred. However, stories of the slaughter of Manchu garrisons 41 Li,

Chien-nung,

op.cit., vol.

I, pp. 299-304.

42 Ibid.; see also edict of October 12, 1911, in

encl. 2 in no. 23, p. 23.

BPP, China. No. 1 {1912),

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 throughout China have been exaggerated.43 None of the important revolutionary figures were in Wuchang at the time of the premature outbreak. Lacking a recognized leader, the troops in revolt more or less forced General Li Yuan-hung to accept command. Li, who was not a member of the revolu­ tionary party, later claimed that he had been compelled to join the rebellion. Nevertheless, he was popular with the troops44 and apparently sympathetic to their cause. Thus, in such a haphazard manner, began one of the most fateful revolutions of modern history. Conditions were ripe for revolution and, encouraged by the success of the uprising in Wuchang, the rebellion spread rapidly. Motivated by hatred of the Manchus and a desire for local autonomy, one province after another seceded, withdrawing its allegiance from the dynasty. In scarcely more than a month, thirteen provinces had declared their inde­ pendence. Moderates who had supported a constitutional monarchy joined the growing revolt. More disastrous to the Manchus was the fact that in every disaffected province except Shantung the troops of the Lu-chiin cast their lot with the revolutionary forces. The Throne acted with sur­ prising speed in a futile attempt to quell the uprising. On October 12, Yin-ch'ang, the Minister of War, was ordered to proceed to Hupeh with two divisions, while Admiral Sa Chen-ping was placed in command of the naval forces ordered to Wuchang.45 By October 27, elements of Yin-ch'ang's units went into action against the rebels outside Hankow. Nevertheless, so rapid was the spread of the revolt that the countermeasures which the Throne could take appeared totally inadequate to restore order. Thoroughly alarmed by the growing seriousness of the situation, the Regent took 48

Reeves, op.cit., pp. 25, 28. Li, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 304-305; Kent, The Passing of the Manchus, p. 75; MacNair, China in Revolution, p. 29. The version given by T'ang Leang-Li which states that Li Yuan-hung was pulled terror-stricken from under his wife's bed and named generalissimo by the rebels is not con­ vincing {op.cit., pp. 77-78). 45For a translation of the edict of October 12, 1911, see BPP, China. No. ι (1912), encl. 2 in no. 23, p. 23. See also Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 307. 44

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 the humiliating step of recalling to office the powerful official whom he had summarily dismissed some two and a half years previously. A decree of October 14 appointed Yiian Shih-k'ai governor-general of Hupeh and Hunan. At that time he was placed in command, or in joint command, of all land and naval forces in Hupeh, as well as those ordered there as reinforcements.46 Yiian had influential friends both in the cabinet and in the foreign legations. Since he was a Chinese, it was assumed that he could win public support. Most im­ portant, it was believed that he could control the Pei-yang troops at a time when whole divisions of the new army were casting off their allegiance to the dynasty.47 Yet, while the situation swiftly deteriorated, Yuan temporized. Yiian Shih-k'ai had several reasons for procrastinating. He was disliked and feared by the Regent, while the re­ publicans had equal reasons for opposing this anti-revolutionary reformer. If he succeeded in crushing the revolt, his reward might well be a second dismissal, yet if he took up arms against the rebellion and lost, he could expect little sympathy from the revolutionaries. Yiian's greatest political asset and instrument of power was the Pei-yang Army, but for four years he had been removed from direct command of that organization. Personnel changes had taken place, including the appointment of several senior commanders who were not his loyal followers. He sought to insure him­ self of an opportunity to regain complete control over his army as well as to obtain the political authority and funds necessary to carry out a policy. Past events would indicate that his motives were not altogether selfish, but it must be remembered that Yuan was a man of almost unlimited ambi­ tion.48 i i BPP, China. No. ι (1912), end. 4 in no. 23, p. 24; NCH (Decrees), Oct. 21, 1911, pp. 174-175· 47Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, pp. 244-245, 250; Kent, op.cit., p. 90; Li, op.cit., vol. I, p. 308. 48 Cf. Kent, op.cit., pp. 100-106, and Li, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 308-305. For a translation of Yuan Shih-k'ai's memorial informing the Throne that his continuing ill-health prevented him from immediately proceeding to his new post, see BPP, China. No. 1 {1912), end. 3 in no. 47, pp. 34-35.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 According to the Chinese scholar Li Chien-nung, Yuan presented six conditions to the Regent. Four of these were political in nature. They demanded the calling of a parlia­ ment, the establishment of a responsible cabinet, removal of the ban on proscribed political parties, and leniency toward the rebels. The remaining stipulations were designed to place Yiian in a dominant position, since they called for his control of the armed forces and the support of adequate military funds.49 On October 27th the Regent capitulated to the two latter conditions, for edicts appointed Yiian imperial high commissioner in command of all land and naval forces ordered to the front. The Ministry of War and the General Staff were ordered not to interfere with military affairs in Hupeh province. Yin-ch'ang was ordered to return to Peking. Yiian was also given plenary powers to pardon or punish. Two of his most trusted lieutenants, Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch'i-jui, were placed in command of the First and Second Imperial Armies respectively. Lastly, the Regent announced that one million taels had been contributed by the new Empress-Dowager for the expenses of the army.60 Political demands similar to those issued by Yiian were presented by the national assembly. These in turn were seconded by the generals of the Twentieth Division, whose 40th Brigade was in northeast Chihli. Faced by a combina­ tion of political and military pressures, the Regent on Octo­ ber 30 accepted the assembly's demands in the name of the Emperor. The old cabinet resigned, and on November 1 Yuan Shih-k'ai was appointed premier in place of his old patron, Prince Ch'ing. Not only had Yiian been named first minister, but he was also directed to retain command of the government forces in Hupeh.51 The remaining powers of the 49Li,

op.cit., vol. I, pp. 308-309; see also Times (London), Oct. 19, 1911. (Decrees), Nov. 4, 1911, pp. 303-304; see also ibid., Oct. 28, 1911, p. 241; The China Year Book, 1912, pp. xxviii-xxix. 51 The China Year Book, 1912, pp. xx-xxiii; NCH (Decrees), Nov. 11, 1911, pp. 383-384. See also Times (London), Oct. 30 and Oct. 31, 1911. A week later, the national assembly elected Yiian as premier (NCH, Nov. 18, p. 466). Evidently the assembly was insisting on its right to elect the premier, hence the reappointment. so NCH

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 imperial government were rapidly gravitating into his hands. Still, although his authority was broad, it was not yet deep. When he was appointed premier, only Manchuria, Chihli, Honan, and Kansu remained loyal to the Throne, although Shantung shortly returned to the fold. The situation was so serious that the Throne was forced to rely for defense pri­ marily on the Pei-yang Army, yet even it had dissident ele­ ments, especially in the Sixth and Twentieth Divisions. After Yiian's dismissal, the Manchu leaders had made the mistake of appointing three Japanese-trained officers to high posts in the Pei-yang Army. Two of them, Wu Lu-chen, commander of the Sixth Division, and General Lan T'ien-wei of the 2nd Mixed Brigade were adherents of the revolu­ tionary party. The third, General Chang Shao-tseng, com­ mander of the Twentieth Division, had previously served under Yuan Shih-k'ai and was not a revolutionary, but he was influenced by the other two and sympathetic to their cause.52 In late October 1911, the bulk of the Twentieth Division, refusing to entrain for Hankow, supported the political re­ forms of the assembly. The dissident generals even made further demands. Their action was instrumental in forcing concessions from the Throne, thus humiliating the Regent, but even after their demands had been largely met the troops remained at Luan-chou, Chihli. The division, refusing to obey imperial orders, yet not fully sympathetic with the revo­ lution, threatened the eastern approaches to the capital. Even more serious was the disaffection of Wu Lu-chen. When Shansi declared its independence, General Wu, with part of the Sixth Division and other troops, was ordered from Paoting against the Shansi uprising. He did not carry out his mission; instead he stopped at Shih-chia-chuang, the inter­ section point of the Peking-Hankow Railway with the branch line to Shansi. Then, while holding that key communication 52Li, op.cit., vol. i, p. 311; Reeves, op.cit., appendix "F," pp. 2-3; CSS, vol. i, sect. 2, p. 5. Li Chien-nung is in error in stating that Lan T'ien-wei was a brigade commander of the Twentieth Division (op.cit., vol. i, p. 311). Lan was commanding general of the 2nd Mixed Brigade.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 center, he entered into negotiations with both the Shansi rebels and the generals at Luan-chou. This situation was critical, for it constituted a threat both to the line of com­ munications of the First Army at Hankow and to the capital. After Yiian came out of retirement, he rapidly moved to re-establish his domination over all the Pei-yang Army. Con­ ditions were soon altered drastically. Wu Lu-chen was mur­ dered. Chang Shao-tseng, promoted to a sinecure, ceased to play an important role, while Lan T'ien-wei escaped to Shanghai. General Lan had been unable to subvert the alle­ giance of the 2nd Mixed Brigade. The Sixth Division created no further trouble, and the Twentieth Division returned to a state of partial loyalty.53 Yiian's role in the Luan-chou affair and in the murder of Wu Lu-chen is in dispute. Certainly, both events tended to strengthen his hand and policy vis-a-vis the Prince Regent. The evidence, however, indicates that General Wu was not assassinated on Yiian's orders, but was killed by Manchus of the First Division, with or without the encouragement of the Court.54 On the other hand, the British Ambassador reported that it was understood that the soldiers at Luan-chou were "acting with the approval, if not at the instigation of Yiian Shi-k'ai [sic], who had been in close communication with them."55 Yet, since Yiian had not fully consolidated his posi­ tion, it would appear that the troops were going beyond the point which he could then sanction. The fate of its commander would indicate that even the Twentieth Division was acting, in part at least, on its own initiative. s s BPP, China. No. τ (1912), no. 19, p. 5, Jordan to Grey, Oct. 29, 1911; ibid., encl. 2 in no. 79, pp. 55-56, and end. in no. 82, pp. 67-68, reports of Captain Otter-Barry, Nov. 2 and Nov. 11, 1911; ibid., China. No. 3 (1913), encl. in no. 51, p. 64, report of Lt. Col. Willoughby, July 20, 1912; Reeves, op.cit., pp. 73, 75; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 310-313; Times (London), Oct. 30 and Nov. 10, 1911. 54See NCH, Nov. 11, 1911, pp. 361, 363; Times (London), Nov. 11, 1911; Reeves, op.cit., p. 75; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 313. The Chinese authors T'ang Leang-Li (op.cit., p. 82) and Wen Kung-chih (CSS, vol. 1, sect. 2, p. 5) maintain that General Wu Lu-chen's murder was instigated by Yuan Shih-k'ai. 5 5 BPP, China. No. 1 (1912), no. 79, p. 53, Jordan to Grey, Nov. 5, 1911.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 Whatever his full role in these incidents, Yuan was swiftly taking steps to solidify his military hold over North China. The semi-modern troops of Chiang Kuei-t'i were increased by some 2,000 men. Yuan also began to reactivate his old Right Division of the Guards Army. A strength of 10,000 was authorized, but by the end of the revolution only some 4,000 were recruited. It is typical of the period that in a crisis even a military progressive like Yuan Shih-k'ai should revert to the reactivation of an outmoded organization. In such a unit personal ties played an even greater role than in the new army. Yiian's objective was obviously to create a force which would render him absolute loyalty in a time of internal strife and intrigue. For both political and military reasons, Yiian also shifted standing army units of the Pei-yang Army and called up its reserves. Part of the Third Division was trans­ ferred from Manchuria to Shih-chia-chuang to hold that key rail center. The Imperial Guards, the First Division, and both the Left and Right Divisions of the Guards Army were originally retained in or near Peking to prevent any hostile action by the troops at Luan-chou. Later, when a group of irreconcilable Manchus threatened his plans, Yiian moved sufficient reliable Chinese troops to the capital to outnumber the Manchu soldiers. The Second Army, the bulk of which consisted of the Third Division and a brigade from the Fifth Division, was used to protect the supply lines of the First Army at Hankow. It also secured the flank facing Shansi and Shensi. The First Division, plus part of Chiang Kuei-t'i's troops, was sent beyond Kalgan to block the northern exit from Shansi. In Shantung the Fifth Division remained loyal, and the provincial assembly annulled its declaration of inde­ pendence. The mutinies which were rumored in Manchuria did not materialize.66 When Yiian accepted command, the military position of the government appeared desperate, but seReeves, op.cit., pp. 74*75, 109; BPP, China. No. 1 (.1912), end. in no. 82, p. 68, report of Captain Otter-Barry, Nov. 11, 1911; see also ibid., China. No. 3 {1912), end. in no. 117, p. 163, report of Lt. Col. Willoughby, Feb. 2, 1912.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 by the end of November the situation, at least in North China, was stabilized. At that time, the troops remaining faithful to the imperial cause were believed to number some 164,000 men, all of whom were in North China. Of these, perhaps 108,000 were from the Lu-chun. This signifies that three-fourths of all the standing army troops that retained their allegiance were from the original or affiliated units of the Pei-yang Army. Almost two-fifths of the remaining irregular troops were the soldiers of the Pei-yang generals, Chiang Kuei-t'i and Chang Hsiin.57 Moreover, events were demonstrating that the loyalty of the Pei-yang troops was not primarily to the Manchu Dynasty, but rather to their old leader, Yiian Shih-k'ai. During Yiian's tenure as premier, the only new organiza­ tion which was formed was his reactivated Right Division Otherwise, what little recruiting was carried out had as its objective maintaining the strength of established units.58 The central government could not afford to create new divisions ; hence, the Pei-yang Army continued to constitute the bulk of the imperial forces. Although the restriction on recruiting may have been forced upon Peking, it was not a military handicap. The northern divisions were retained as veteran units and despite their inferiority in numbers they were far superior in organization, training, and equipment to the amorphous mass of men raised by the revolutionary leaders. In conjunction with these military maneuvers, Yuan in­ creased his political power by packing the high government posts, both military and civil, with his proteges. When he arrived in Peking to take up his duties as premier on Novem­ ber 13, two of his generals were already commanding the First and Second Imperial Armies. Three days later, two equally trusted military followers had been named minister of war and acting governor-general of Hupeh and Hunan.68 57

See Reeves, op.cit., pp. 92, 108-109. Ibid., p. 109. 59 Times (London), Nov. 17, 1911. Hsieh Pao Chao, basing his state­ ment on a survey of the Official Gazette, stated that Yiian Shih-k'ai in the first three months after he became premier appointed or transferred 58

3H

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 After the capture of Hanyang, Feng Kuo-chang was recalled to command the Imperial Guards. Hsii Shih-ch'ang had already been appointed as commissioner in charge of training the Guards, since they might attempt to support the Regent against the Premier. General Feng was replaced at Hankow by Tuan Ch'i-jui, who became both commander of the First Army and governor-general.60 Yiian's presidential policy of placing his faith primarily in military as opposed to civil authority was already apparent. Still, Yiian Shih-k'ai was too subtle to engage prematurely in a completely brazen and open seizure of power. Some attempt was made to placate both the Manchus and the republican opposition. On November 16 Yuan announced the formation of his cabinet. Concessions had been made to various factions, but since several appointees refused to serve, the resulting group was largely composed of supporters of the new premier. Prince Tsai-hsiin's tenure as navy minister had ended with the resignation of the previous cabinet. Although Prince Tsai-t'ao had resigned as chief-ofstaff at the same time, the anti-Chinese Manchu officer Liang-pi replaced him.61 This appointment may have been deemed expedient in view of the fact that until late January 1912 the Manchu troops in Peking outnumbered the Chinese loyal to Yuan. Yuan Shih-k'ai's principal target was the Regent, Prince Ch'un, who was forced into one retreat after another during October and November. Finally, on December 6 an edict from the new Empress-Dowager granted his request to resign as Regent. In a rather pitiful Confucian self-denouncement, Prince Ch'un had accepted responsibility for the corruption fifty-one officers of the rank of brigadier general or above, while the Regent had made only sixty-two such appointments in the preceding nine months (The Government of China, p. 369). e o NCH (Decrees), Dec. 9, 1911, p. 675, and Dec. 16, 1911, p. 747; BPP, China. No. 3 (1912), no. 28, p. 36, Jordan to Grey, Dec. 20, 1911; Reeves, op.cit., p. 118. elLi, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 313-314; BPP, China. No. I (1912), encl. 5 in no. 80, p. 61; NCH (Decrees), Dec. 16, 1911, p. 747. See also Cameron, op.cit., p. 133.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 and increasing public discontent which marked his Regency.68 The resignation of the Regent, preceded as it was by the withdrawal of his brothers from their high military posts, brought to an inglorious end the strenuous attempt by the imperial clan to re-establish dominance over the armed forces of the empire.

The Military Policy of the Republican Regime One of the most striking features of the spread of the revolution was that the seceding provinces did not imme­ diately establish a unified regime. Instead, because of strong provincial loyalties and the lack of a well-coordinated revo­ lutionary organization, various areas tended to proceed inde­ pendently. In most cases the provinces established individual "republics." At the head of these separatist political organisms were placed military governors (tu-tu). The appointment of military rather than civil governors marked a drastic change in the political system of China, even as it had existed under a dynasty of conquesi like the Manchus. Militarism was replacing the tradition of civilian dominance. For an empire which for centuries had been governed by civil servants of the Throne, these early military governors were a strange assortment. They included in several cases incumbent im­ perial governors or provincial leaders, but also professional soldiers like Li Yuan-hung, Ts'ai Ao and Yen Hsi-shan, as well as functionaries of the revolutionary party like Hu Han-min.63 This political fragmentation weakened the repub­ lican movement and multiplied the problems involved in re-establishing unity. Still, opposition to the Manchus and the desire for change were bonds which held the provinces together. Historically, China had been influenced by two forces—the centrifugal pull of localism, as opposed to the 62For a translation of the edict of December 6, 1911, see BPP, China. No. ι {1912), no. 139, p. 122. 63 For a list of the early military governors, see Li, op.cit., vol. 1, pp. 305-307.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 usually dominant urge toward unification. In this case, if the revolution was not to be crushed piecemeal, it was essential that the seceding provinces unite and the trend was in that direction. The first rallying point was the provisional regime at Wuchang headed by Li Yuan-hung, but later the center of activity shifted first to Shanghai and then to Nanking. Since the revolt enjoyed such widespread popularity in South and Central China, the transfer of allegiance in most areas was achieved with little bloodshed. It was only in the Wuhan area, at Nanking, and to a lesser extent in Shensi that serious fighting occurred. Usually, where the use or threat of force was necessary to topple the old regime, the overthrow was carried out by troops of the Lu-chun. Before the end of 1911, every standing army division and brigade except the Pei-yang Army, its affiliated units, and the troops of Manchuria and Jehol had joined the revolutionary cause. The Throne had never been able to mold the Lu-chun into a real national army, and as the various provinces declared their independence the standing army troops severed all con­ nections with the central government. By continuing to pro­ mote the development of the Lu-chiin in South and Central China, even after they doubted the loyalty of its units, the Manchus had actually prepared their own downfall.64 The military policy of the revolutionaries was motivated both by the trend of events and by their political ideology. Following the outbreak of the revolution, unrestricted recruit­ ing on a large scale was undertaken in the rebel areas; from this developed the Chinese version of a mass revolutionary army consisting of citizen soldiers. This mass army had the attributes, both of weakness and strength, of its Western counterparts. Against the size, the early enthusiasm, and the demonstrated courage of the republican forces must be weighed the lack of training, the poor discipline, the hetero­ geneous equipment, and the shortage and misassignment of qualified officers. It is possible that during the revolution 84See Reeves, op.cit., pp. 108-110; BPP, China. No. 1 (1912), end. in no. 82, pp. 68-69, report of Captain Otter-Barry, Nov. 11, 1911; T'ang·, op.cit., p. 59.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 there were recruited in South and Central China a miscel­ laneous force of a million men. This figure would comprise all those who were enrolled as "soldiers" of the revolution, including regulars, irregulars, police forces, bodyguards, home guards, and the armed units which were organized in the cities by merchant organizations. A large per cent of them had no uniforms, arms, training, or discipline, but they ex­ pected to be paid. This was not an army; it was a disorganized horde. The Japanese military attache estimated the organized troops at only about 400,000.65 As a nucleus, the revolu­ tionary leaders had an estimated 97,000 Lu-chun troops, as well as perhaps 100,000 assorted provincial soldiers.68 The remainder consisted largely of new recruits. Originally, some of the Patrol and Defense Troops had remained loyal to the Throne, but later, with the rapid spread and growing popu­ larity of the revolution, it appears that most of them switched sides. Both the Lu-chun and the Patrol and Defense Troops were used to form cadres for new units, but the regulars were so outnumbered by hastily recruited volunteers that the trained organizations were split up without benefiting the numerous new battalions. The republicans sought to create too many major commands, too many posts for political leaders.®7 The provincial government at Nanking drew up regula­ tions for the reorganization of the Republican Army, but these directives were generally disregarded. The tables of organization were similar to those used by the Lu-chiin. As in the new army, a division was to consist of two infantry brigades of two regiments each, a cavalry and an artillery regiment, plus one battalion each of engineers and transport troops. Although firepower was to be increased by adding a machine-gun company to each infantry and cavalry regiment, the cavalry, artillery, and transport units were to be smaller than in the Lu-chun. Instead of having three squadrons of four troops each, the cavalry regiment was to be composed of 65

WDGS, no. 6283-10, "Monthly Reports," April 18, 1912, pp. 2-3. Reeves, op.cit., pp. 109-110. 6 7 WDGS, no. 6562-10, "Chinese Republican Forces," June 30, 1912, p. 4.

ββ

3I8

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 only four mounted troops, plus a machine-gun troop. The artillery regiment was to have only two battalions instead of three, while the transport battalion was to have three com­ panies instead of four. Military nomenclature was changed more drastically than were the tables of organization. The new designations which were adopted for military units became standard for the whole republican period.88 Considering the revolutionary conditions, it was to be ex­ pected that actual practice would not approach the established regulations. In March 1912 T'ang Shao-i, as premier of the coalition republican government, stated that during the revolution eighty republican divisions had been organized. However, Tuan Ch'i-jui, the minister of war in the new cabinet, explained that the Premier had probably meant eighty separate commands, not eighty Lu-chun-type divisions.88 Following considerable personal observation, the United States military attache believed that there was not a single republican division in which all the units were complete or fully equipped. He surmised that the average strength of the republican divisions was only 6,000, but after struggling with the exaggerated reports furnished by republican officers, he finally informed the War Department that the only really accurate method of evaluating the strength of these troops was to go and count them.70 Most of the republican troops were infantry. In the divi­ sions which were observed, the other arms and services were usually represented only by cadres. The artillery was short of both guns and horses. The cavalry could not mount most of the men, while from the standpoint of equipment the engineers and transport troops were in even worse condition. Other services "existed in the imagination only." Another 68 WDGS, no. 6562-9, "Organization of the Chinese Army of the South . . . ," May 24 1912, encl. pp. 1-4. The designations used by the republican forces—nomenclature which became standard through the republican period—is as follows: army (or corps)—chUn; division—shih; brigade—lit; regiment—t'uan; battalion—ying; company, battery, or troop —lien; platoon or section—p'ai; squad—pan. 89 WDGS, no. 6283-10, "Monthly Reports," April 18, 1912, pp. 1-2. 70 Reeves, op.cit., appendix "G," pp. 1-2.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 serious weakness of the revolutionary armies was a shortage of qualified officers. At the company and battalion level, many of the leaders were elected. The company officers seem to have been chosen from the ranks or to have been boys from basic military schools. The field grade and staff officers were more competent, for they were generally from the military middle schools or had had some training in foreign institu­ tions. The best-qualified officers were the brigade com­ manders. Insofar as possible they were men trained in the military schools of Japan. The weakest link in the command structure was at the division and army level for most of these generals were political appointees or old-style militarists of high rank. For almost a decade, the promoters of modernization in the Chinese armed forces had worked to standardize equip­ ment, but the considerable progress which had been made was swiftly destroyed in South China. Despite the fact that most of the arsenals fell to the revolutionaries, there was a rever­ sion to a situation almost as bad as that which Lord Beresford had described in 1898. There was probably no division in which all of the infantry were armed with the same type of rifle. Occasionally, a single company would possess several different models. The majority of the artillery was supplied with mountain guns, but they were of various models and calibers. One modern feature was the fairly large number of machine guns issued to the troops. Although most of the soldiers possessed a uniform of some description, they were even more varied than were the weapons. For this reason the symbol of the republican soldiers became a white patch. The uncontrolled recruiting, coupled with the requirements of military operations, necessitated a concentration of troops and at least a partial centralization of command. Since Nanking and Wuchang became the centers of both combat operations and political activities, the bulk of the "regular" republican troops was finally divided between them. The two senior commanders were Huang Hsing, a prominent revolu­ tionary leader and political general, and General Li Yuanhung, a regular officer. The troops directed by Huang Hsing

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 from Nanking appear to have outnumbered those under General Li by two to one. In addition, provincial troops from several provinces which were not directly under either general were "more or less" subject to Huang Hsing's orders.71 Those republican leaders who would comment stated that they favored ultimately establishing an army for China of three or four hundred thousand men.72 This was a realistic objective, but the indiscriminate recruiting of masses of men had already set a bad precedent for the post-revolutionary period. A mass army coupled with the growing influence of military leaders in South China, as well as Yiian Shih-k'ai's policy of appointing his military henchmen to both military and civil posts in the North, boded ill for the republican period. These conditions laid the foundation for the era of the warlords. Both politically and militarily, it would have been more advantageous if the revolutionary leaders had limited their expansion to bringing to full strength the estab­ lished organizations which joined their cause. Such units could have been more effectively trained, equipped, paid, and hence controlled than a great body of irregular troops. Had this been the policy, the republican regime would not have been faced with the extremely serious problem of demobiliz­ ing a very large body of men.

Military Operations During the Revolution Since the ultimate testing ground of the capabilities of a military organization is the field of battle, the Hankow campaign in October and November 1911 was the only occasion on which major units of the new army were forced to demonstrate their true value. However, even in this case, a fair judgment can apply only to the First Imperial Army, for the Lu-chun troops carefully organized at Wuchang by 71 The above description of the Republican Army is based on WDGS, no. 6562-10, "Chinese Republican Forces," June 30, 1912, pp. 1-4, 7-8; Reeves, op.cit., pp. m-112 and appendix "G," pp. 2-3. 72 Reeves, op.cit., appendix "G," p. 4.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 Chang Chih-tung had been divided by loyalties and further split by revolutionary policy. At Hankow, it was not the crack soldiers of Chang Chih-tung which were pitted against the favorite divisions of Yiian Shih-k'ai. The unity of the Hupeh regulars had been lost in a flood of new recruits. Although they were caught by surprise, the outbreak of the revolution found the General Staff and the northern divisions in unusually favorable circumstances. When Yinch'ang was ordered to Hupeh to oppose the revolt, the Fourth Division and mixed brigades from the Second, Sixth, Twen­ tieth and Guards Divisions were concentrated, fully equipped for maneuvers, in northeast Chihli near the Tientsin-Mukden Railway. Those on the sick list, as well as the green recruits, had been left at the barracks. Ammunition was inadequate, but it could be supplied from the munitions depot at Paoting during the movement southward. The units selected for the operation were the Fourth Division, the mixed brigades of the Second and Sixth Divisions, and an escort for Yin-ch'ang from the First Division. This original force included some 25,000 men.73 The movement of these troops demonstrated that the General Staff not only comprehended the value of rail transportation, but also was capable of commendable logistical planning. The railway lines from Mukden to Hankow were employed to transfer troops in a rather efficient operation. By October 14 troops began to move south. An American general staff officer who observed troop trains from three divisions reported that the movement was well planned. The cars were correctly loaded, the men were well equipped, and rations had been provided for at the various stations en route.74 In the meantime, General Chang Piao, after first fleeing from Wuchang, collected the loyal remnants of the Lu-chun and Patrol and Defense Troops in the Wuhan area. He estab­ lished a defensive position just north of Hankow to hold the vital P'ing-han Railway until the arrival of Yin-ch'ang's divi73 Ibid.,

pp. 31-33. W D G S , no. 6790-33, "Report of Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Beach, General Staff . . . ," Nov. 8, 1911, pp. 5-6. 74

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 sions. On October 18 and 19 the rebels attacked. Although they outnumbered the royalists, most of the revolutionary soldiers were recruits, many of whom were unarmed. Nevertheless, they had such ardor that in two days they forced General Chang to retreat to a stronger position, abandoning some equipment. Still, the poorly led rebels failed to take advantage of their opportunities to seize or destroy strategic points and bridges. On both sides, casualties were reduced by the in­ accuracy of the enemy's fire. The action was not of great military significance, but the rebel victory had an important psychological effect on the whole Yangtze Valley and stimu­ lated rebel morale. Between the 20th and the 27th both sides moved up reinforcements. During the lull inconclusive skirmishes took place, with the honors going to the royalists due to the superiority of their artillery. The main imperial advance had been delayed by a shortage of supplies, but on October 27 Yin-ch'ang launched an attack spearheaded by the 3rd Brigade. The tactics used were those of the contemporary Occident. Covered by artillery fire and the guns of the imperial squadron, the royalists deployed a line of skirmishers followed by troops formed in closeorder company fronts. As the skirmishers advanced, making use of cover, they were supported by volley fire from the main line. The rebels, on the other hand, moved forward in "semidisorder." Groups of some fifty men followed a leader, mak­ ing no attempt to preserve a line. There appeared to be no commanders superior to the group leaders, and the men began to expend ammunition while still almost a mile from the enemy. They maintained this ineffective fire until they ran out of ammunition. The fire of the Pei-yang Army was better controlled and their gunnery was superior, but even they made little effective use of their machine guns. Although frequently brave, the rebels could not withstand advance of the imperial army; they fell back to the outskirts of Hankow, where the attack temporarily halted.75 7 5 BPP, China. No. ι {1912), encl. in no. 61, p. 46, Goffe to Jordan, Oct. 20, 1911; Times (London), Oct. 19, 1911; NCH (Decrees), Oct. 28, 1911, p. 242, Nov. 18, 1911, p. 466; Reeves, op.cit., pp. 34-38; WDGS,

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 On the 28th the rebels, then commanded by Huang Hsing, counterattacked the superior enemy with initial success, but since they exhibited little organization or discipline they were again forced to retreat. During the next two days imperial troops pushed into Hankow, while the majority of the rebels recrossed the Yangtze River to Wuchang. Admiral Sa Chen-ping's squadron was supposed to be guarding the river, but the inaccuracy of its gunnery, together with the revolu­ tionary sympathies of the crews, largely nullified its effective­ ness. Although the squadron did support Yin-ch'ang's attack on Hankow, it also permitted large numbers of revolutionary soldiers to cross the river in both directions.78 One attribute of the Chinese troops praised by the foreign observers at Hankow was their bravery. They might fall back before a resolute onslaught, but there was no general panic. The revolutionary soldiers, who had so little training that they failed to comprehend the effect of modern firepower, suffered heavy and sometimes unnecessary losses. In fact, "foolhardy bravery was a constant cause of casualties."77 However, the Pei-yang troops also displayed courage and, owing to their discipline, years of training, and better leader­ ship, they proved superior to the unorganized foe. Also, the imperial troops were Yiian Shih-k'ai's favorite divisions; he was again their commander and his return from retire­ ment apparently guaranteed their loyalty, which had pre­ viously been questioned. After the fall of Hankow, morale on both sides was good. The government troops had been stimulated by victory, while the rebels, after initial dis­ couragement, were encouraged by the spread of the revolu­ tion.78 no. 6790-31, letter from Captain John Howard to the Adjutant General, Nov. 23. 1911. 76Reeves, op.cit., pp. 42-45; Times (London), Oct. 31, 1911; BPP, China. No. 1 (1912), no. 20, p. 6, and encl. in no. 24, p. 25, despatches from Commander-in-Chief, China, Oct. 28 and Oct. 30, 1911. 77 WDGS, no. 6790-31, cited in note 75 above; see also Times (London), Oct. 31, 1911; Reeves, op.cit., p. 44. 78 CSS, vol. i, sect. 2, p. S; Reeves, op.cit., p. 49; Kent, op.cit., pp. 144-

145·

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 Despite their success, for which they received considerable praise, the northern divisions were subject to criticism. Their tactics were not always sound and they had almost no night security. Foreign observers entering their lines in the dark found that either there were no sentries or else the guards were asleep. Had the rebels taken advantage of the situation, they might well have routed the imperial troops by a surprise attack. Also, the conduct of the government troops had deteriorated badly since they had won praise during the maneuvers of 1905 and 1906. At Hankow they burned part of the native city and engaged in some looting.79 During the early days of the conflict, the behavior of the rebel troops was generally commendable in this regard—a fact that is especially noteworthy since they had been rapidly recruited. In spite of the fact that there was no well-organized system of discipline, the republican leaders sought with considerable success to prevent pillaging and unnecessary bloodshed. They were particularly anxious to prevent anti-foreign outbreaks which would have encouraged intervention by the foreign powers. It was only in Shansi that, unfortunately, a small group of aliens was murdered.80 Later, the continuation of internecine strife, the breakdown of established government, and inability to pay all of the troops led to increased banditry, mutinies, and local disorders. Since on October 27 Yuan Shih-k'ai had been appointed imperial high commissioner in command of all land and naval forces in Hupeh, Yin-ch'ang was ordered to transfer command of the First Army to Feng Kuo-chang. The Ameri­ can military attache stated that General Feng informed Yin-ch'ang that he would accept command on the 31st. However, when on the 30th Yin-ch'ang ordered an attack on Hanyang, Feng announced that he would take charge 78

WDGS, no. 6790-31, cited in note 75 above; Reeves, op.cit., pp. 42, BPP, China. No. 1 (191s), encl. in no. 24, p. 25, C-in-C, China, to Admiralty, Oct. 30, 1911. 80For example, BPP, China. No. 1 (1912), no. 23, p. 21; ibid., encl. in no. 61; ibid., no. 100 and enclosures, pp. 80-87; ibid., China. No. 3 (1912), enclosures in no. 43, pp. 46-48; The China Year Book, 1912, pp. xiii, xviiixix; FR, 1912, p. 164·

44-4S, 46;

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 immediately and thereupon canceled the operation. Instead of launching an offensive, negotiations were entered into, so during the first two weeks of November the front was relatively static. Then on November 12 Admiral Sa's squad­ ron joined the rebels, an act that improved their zeal, but not their gunnery. On November 17, having crossed the Han River, the rebels attacked the flank of the imperial army. The government forces counterattacked with bayonets and drove them back in fighting which displayed considerable courage on both sides. Apparently, by this time Yiian Shihk'ai, who was consolidating his power in the north, had already decided to negotiate a settlement with the republican leaders, but he needed the prestige and bargaining advantage of a military victory, so Feng Kuo-chang was ordered to attack.81 On November 20 the imperial troops began a wide flank­ ing movement against the important arsenal center of Han­ yang. After combat engineers constructed a pontoon bridge across the Han River, elements of two divisions launched an assault across difficult terrain. Foreign observers were forbidden to accompany the troops but, according to the data which they could piece together, the government troops carried out a very creditable attack against strong defensive positions. By the 27th they succeeded in seizing the city. The rebels, demoralized by the fall of Hanyang, streamed back across the river to Wuchang.82 The Hunanese troops, who claimed that they had borne an undue share of the fighting, were particularly discontented. Some of them deserted the Republican Army and moved back into Hunan, looting as they went. Despite the favor­ able situation, Yiian Shih-k'ai ordered General Feng not to press the attack across the Yangtze to Wuchang. Li Yuanhung's political and military position had been weakened; so, after the recapture of Hanyang, both Li and Yuan were prepared to seek a peaceful settlement. Thus, negotiations 81Reeves, op.cit., p. 46; see also pp. 44-48; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, vol. 2, p. 952. 82Reeves, op.cit., pp. 52-60.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 were successfully concluded, ending the campaign in the Hankow area.83 The only other area in which fairly large-scale "organized" operations took place was at Nanking. Although the fighting was not as intensive as at Hankow, the political prestige and strategic location of the old southern capital made its capture more important to the revolution. In October 1911, the Tartar-general at Nanking was the ex-Minister of War, T'ieh-liang, but the old Pei-yang general, Chang Hsiin, was also there as Admiral of the Lower Yangtze and Commander of the Yangtze Patrol Troops. In late October, the garrison of Nanking consisted of about 5,500 men of the Ninth Luchiin Division. The Patrol and Defense Troops, plus the garrisons of the fortresses added over 2,000 men and there were also some 1,500 Bannermen. Chang Hsiin commanded an additional 3,000 to 6,000 semi-modern soldiers and sailors, who terrified the populace more than they did the enemy. When the city was threatened, the governor-general desired to surrender, but T'ieh-liang blustered and threatened to fight. It was the old-style soldier Chang Hsiin, however, who actually seized control and carried on the defense. The Lu-Chiin soldiers were known to be so disaffected that the bolts were removed from their rifles; later they were even moved outside the city walls. Then, after their ranks had been thinned by desertions, the majority of those who re­ mained joined the revolutionaries. Most of the old-style troops remained loyal, but in large part it was personal loyalty to Chang Hsiin. The Manchus fought because, once a defense was decided upon, they had no choice but to sup­ port the imperial cause.84 s a BPP, China. No. I {1912), no. 78, p. 52, no. 85, p. 70, no. 88, p. 71, and no. 98, p. 76; ibid., China. No. 3 (1912), no. 21, pp. 20-21, and encl. 3 in no. 112, p. 142; Reeves, op.cit,, pp. 44, 58. s i NCH, Nov. 11, 1911, p. 376; Times (London), Oct. 17, 1911; BPP, China. No. 1 (1912), encl. in no. 79, p. 54, Wilkinson to Jordan, Oct. 27, 1911; ibid., ends. 1-4 in no. 120, pp. 102-106, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 1911; Reeves, op.cit., pp. 64-66. Major D. S. Robertson, British Military Attache, Peking, "Changes Report for the Chinese Army, 1912," March 31, 1913, WDGS, no. 6562-17, p. 6.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 After the republican leaders resolved to capture Nanking, they dispatched troops from several centers in northern and southern Kiangsu. Although these forces included provincial troops and recruits, they possessed a large nucleus of regulars, the units sent being expansions of the Ninth Division or the Lu-chiin 23rd and 42nd Brigades. Here the conditions were the reverse of those at Hankow. At Nanking it was the rebel army that was largely composed of standing army troops, while the imperial forces consisted primarily of recruits or old-fashioned soldiers. The campaign began on November 9 when soldiers of the Ninth Division attacked a fort outside Nanking, but were forced to retire after substantial losses. Thereafter, the republicans proceeded leisurely to concentrate superior forces around the city. Chang Hsiin then proved himself a callous and technically incompetent general. Purple Mountain east of the city is the key to a defense of Nanking, but General Chang failed to occupy this position in force. On the other hand, he sent against the enemy a body of some 5,000 men, most of whom were recruits, while he retained inside the massive walls his best and most loyal troops. As a result, the poor recruits were surprised and decimated. The remnants fled in panic back into the city. Subsequently the outlying forts surrendered, turning their guns on the city; then when Purple Mountain fell on Decem­ ber i, Nanking was lost. Chang Hsiin, with a large number of his personal troops, escaped across the Yangtze River and withdrew north along the Chin-p'u Railway. Since it had been previously rumored that Chang would attempt to escape, rebel troops and ships guarded the crossing; yet, despite these precautions, his flight was not contested. In light of these unusual circumstances, the local British consul found it "difficult to resist the suspicion that General Chang" had "been bought off."85 During the fighting the republican forces had proved superior both in ability and in courage. This is not surprising, s s BPP, China. No. 3 (1912), encl. 5 in no. 2, p. 10, Wilkinson to Jordan, Dec. 2, 1911. See also ibid., ends, in no. 2, pp. 5-10; Reeves, opxit., pp. 67-71.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 since the majority of the government troops were in sympathy with the rebels, while those who had been sent beyond the walls to fight were ill-trained cannon fodder. The Nanking campaign, as well as the establishment of a republic regime there, brought to light several features which were to be characteristic of the years to follow. The nominal commander-in-chief had little real control; dissension and jealousy existed between the civil and military authorities, while the discipline of the soldiers on both sides left much to be de­ sired.86 The limited fighting of the revolution demonstrated that the staffs of the Lu-chiin divisions were capable of planning and executing fairly large-scale attacks at a considerable distance from their base of supply. Although the tactics were not always infallible, in general they appear to have been adequate. The employment of the infantry and artillery was often commendable. Both officers and men in the new-style units appear to have appreciated the value of terrain and cover. Fire discipline and control had improved greatly over the preceding decade. It is obvious that the officers were far superior to their predecessors who fought in the SinoJapanese War. As has been noted, the movement by rail of a large number of troops was well carried out. From a technical standpoint, China had proved capable of developing modern divisions of a respectable caliber, but unfortunately the conduct of the troops had declined.

Establishment of the Republic The fall of Nanking brought to a close the military phase of the revolution. Although skirmishing continued, the fate of China was to be decided by negotiation. Both sides had gained one important victory, thus tending to balance the prestige accruing from military success. There were a number 86 The Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1902-11, 3rd issue, vol. 1, p. 411; Reeves, op.cit., p. 72; BPP, China. No. 3 {1912), no. 62, p. 80, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 4, 1912; ibid,., ends. 3-4 in no. 62, pp. 84-85, Wilkin­ son to Jordan, Dec. 17 and Dec. 21, 1911.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 of compelling factors which caused the transfer of the deci­ sion from the battlefield to the conference table. Financial difficulties, a military stalemate, the fear of foreign inter­ vention, the danger of political chaos, plus the convictions and ambitions of the leaders on both sides, were to permit a compromise settlement. The imperial treasury was in dire financial straits. In October 1911, there still existed some unexpended funds and the northern troops were already equipped for active service. Hence, the immediate situation would not have been hopeless, if the government had been able to continue to obtain reve­ nues, but the rapid spread of the revolution soon denied to Peking the funds normally rendered by the seceding prov­ inces. Also, owing to conflicts among the foreign powers and their ultimate decision to remain neutral in the conflict, the government was unable to obtain large-scale foreign loans. Nevertheless, Peking was required to continue the repayment of previous foreign loans. Then, too, the imperial troops had to be paid, for on their loyalty the fate of the dynasty de­ pended. As premier, Yuan Shih-k'ai was forced to rely on measures of expediency to prevent complete financial collapse. Imperial household funds were drawn upon, wealth was extracted from imperial clansmen, and "contributions" were levied on officials.87 The distress of the imperial government offered little con­ solation to the republican leaders, for their position was only slightly less serious and was subject to further deterioration. Originally, the seceding provinces had profited from funds which ordinarily would have been transmitted to Peking. The revolutionaries also received remittances from Chinese over­ seas, as well as from sympathizers within China. Yet, as a matter of policy, the republicans in some cases remitted taxes 8 7 WDGS, end. in no. 6283-11, "Memorandum on the Financial Situa­ tion by Mr. Ε. T. Williams . . . ," April 16, 1912, pp. 3-7; see also BPP, China. No. I {1912), encl. 2 in no. 47, p. 34; ibid., no. ιοί, p. 89; ibid., China. No. 3 (1912), no. 65, pp. 93-96, Jan. 6, 1912; NCH, Nov. 4, 1911, p. 282. On October 27, 1911, the government signed a loan agreement with a foreign syndicate, but only for 150 million francs (Reid, op.cit., pp. 248249; PR, 1912, p. ιοί).

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 and in others abolished them outright. Then, with the break­ down of the old political controls, there developed increasing public opposition to paying taxes, so that by the end of Janu­ ary 1912 the rebels were without funds to pay their troops and were striving for a political settlement.88 Although greatly outnumbered, the unified command, the training, and the standardized equipment of the Pei-yang Army made it superior as a fighting force to the Republican Army. Therefore, had Yiian Shih-k'ai possessed the necessary funds and had he acted with dispatch, he might well have crushed the revolt before it spread beyond control. Yuan, however, did not have sufficient revenues to finance an exten­ sive campaign, nor could he depend on his troops if they were not paid. Since the Pei-yang Army was his greatest political asset he could not risk demoralizing his troops in a long civil war. On the other hand, the rebels, lacking unity, could not force the Pei-yang Army from its stronghold in the north. If Peking had secured a large foreign loan, the rebel provinces might have been defeated piecemeal.89 The continuation of the civil war, leading inevitably to a further decline in the power of the empire, increased the threat of foreign intervention. There was particular danger that Russia and Japan would fish in troubled waters. No Chinese leader, either republican or royalist, could completely disregard such a possibility. Hence, preservation of the em­ pire from external aggression, as well as the desire for na­ tional unity, was instrumental in bringing about negotiations for a settlement.90 Yiian Shih-k'ai had no reason to like the Manchus; his debt was to the deceased Empress-Dowager Tz'u-hsi, not to the current rulers. No sooner had he emerged from retirement than he sent emissaries to negotiate with Li Yuan-hung and 8 8 WDGS, no. 6283 -11, "Memorandum . . . by Mr. Ε. T. Williams," PP- 7. 13; The Maritime Customs, op.cit., p. 112; BPP, China. No. 3 (1912), no. 112, p. 139, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 29, 1912. 89 Cf. MacNair, op.cit., pp. 31-32; Kotenev, The Chinese Soldier, pp. 88-89; T'ang, op.cit., pp. 81, 84; Reeves, op.cit., p. 110. 90 For a detailed study of the policies of the great powers concerning the Chinese revolution, see Reid, op.cit., chs. 12-14.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 Huang Hsing. The Throne itself was willing to make extensive concessions, but not as extensive as Yuan was ultimately to propose. The peace delegates made little progress until the recapture of Hanyang from the rebels, but after the fall of that important arsenal center the revolutionary leaders were more amenable. Li and Yuan agreed on an armistice, which was periodically extended.91 During the succeeding negotia­ tions the principal conflict was not between the Manchus and the republicans, but between Yiian Shih-k'ai and both of these groups, neither of whom liked or trusted him. During a twomonth period, filled with intrigue, haggling, and the falling away of the border regions from the empire, Yuan maneu­ vered himself into the leading position. He succeeded in persuading the Manchus, the revolutionaries, and in general the foreign powers that he was the indispensable man. As his representative to discuss terms with the republican leaders, Yiian Shih-k'ai selected a protege of long standing, T'ang Shao-i. To the surprise of some, T'ang late in Decem­ ber accepted conditions which were most disadvantageous to the imperial cause. This agreement included provisions which denied to the Manchu government the right to con­ clude foreign loans. It also required the government troops in five northern provinces to withdraw about thirty-three miles from their present positions without requiring a similar retirement by the rebel forces. Yiian repudiated these clauses and T'ang resigned as peace commissioner. Although Yiian denied that he favored a republic, there were already rumors that he was to be president. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that T'ang, who was soon to serve as premier for President Yvian Shih-k'ai, had deliberately and flagrantly violated his patron's confidence. It appears more likely that this was another step on the part of Yiian toward removing the Manchus so that he might advance his own interest.92 In January Yiian accepted the demand for a partial with91Li, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 329-331; BPP, China. No. 3 {1912), no. 21, pp. 20-21, Jordan to Grey, Dec. 7, 1911; ibid., no. 47, p. 63, Dec. 27, 1911. 82 BPP, China. No. 3 {1912), no. 63, pp. 85-89, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 6, 1912; MacNair, op.cit., p. 31; see also T'ang, op.cit., p. 87.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 drawal of the northern troops, even though the consequent advance of the republican forces lowered the morale of the Pei-yang units involved. By this time Yiian's military position was being weakened by the serious losses arising from deser­ tions and straggling.93 On January 11 a close friend of Yiian informed the British Ambassador that "all parties were now agreed . . . that no settlement was possible unless preceded by the abdication of the Emperor and the retirement of the Court."94 Sun Yat-sen, who had been elected president by the provisional government in Nanking, stated that if the Emper­ or abdicated, he would resign as president in favor of Yiian Shih-k'ai. Sun was aware of the disunity and jealousy which existed in the revolutionary camp. Prior to his return from abroad, the republican leadership had already agreed that Yiian would be acceptable. Also, Sun must have realized that what remained of the prestige of imperial tradition, adminis­ trative experience, considerable foreign support, and the con­ trol of the Pei-yang Army was all in Yiian's favor.95 On January 19 the imperial clan agreed to the abdication. Thus it appeared that all parties concerned were in agreement and that a settlement would soon be reached. However, during the next few days the situation changed rapidly, both the republican leaders and the extremist wing of the Manchus becoming more adamant. The patriot Sun Yat-sen was willing to step down in order to promote national unity, but the republicans had no desire to see a republic established by the decree of a Manchu emperor, nor did they want the capital to be at Peking, the center of power of the Pei-yang clique. Thus, without withdrawing the offer to elect Yiian, they maintained that he must first declare for a republic and be appointed by it. This led to a reaction at court. Emboldened by possible Japanese intervention, a number of younger 93Reeves, op.cit., p. 90; BPP, China. No. 3 (1912), encl. in no. 117, p. 166, report of Lt. Col. Willoughby, Feb. 2, 1912. i i BPP, China. No. 3 {1912), no. 38, p. 42, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 12, 1912, quoted by Reid, op.cit., p. 274. 86See H. F. MacNair, "The Republic: Phase of War-Lordism (19111928)," in H. F. MacNair, ed., China, Berkeley, Calif., 1946, p. 131; Tang, op.cit., pp. 91-92; The China Year Book, 1913, pp. 474-475.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 Manchu princes led by Yuan's old rival T'ieh-liang attempted to prevent the abdication. Again, fate and realpolitik played into the hands of Yiian Shih-k'ai. The courage and aggres­ siveness of the intransigent Manchus was shaken by the assassination of one of their number, General Liang-pi, by a revolutionary agent. A similar attempt against Yuan's life had been unsuccessful, but he profited from the attack on Liang-pi.9e It was the intervention of the united Pei-yang generals, however, which was the final, decisive factor in assuring the abdication of the dynasty. Late in January 1912, a joint memorial from most of the northern generals made it clear that the Throne could no longer rely on the support of their troops. Leaving the Throne no realistic alternative, they requested the establishment of a republic.97 This memorial, initiated by Tuan Ch'i-jui and signed by over forty other senior northern officers, was another ill-omen for the future; utilization of the Pei-yang military clique to apply pressure for the settlement of political problems was to be all too common during the presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Following the presentation of the general's memorial, the removal of the Manchus from the Dragon Throne proceeded rapidly. On February 12, 1912, the Empress-Dowager, acting on behalf of the child Emperor, issued a valedictory edict announcing the end of the 267-year reign of the Manchu Dynasty.98 The abdication meant far more than the passing of a long-lived imperial house. Although it was not fully realized at the time, 96 FR, 1912, p. 62; BPP, China. No. 3 (1912), no. 95 and ends., pp. 122124 and no. 99, p. 129, Jordan to Grey, Jan. 22 and Jan. 27, 1912; Reid, op.cit., pp. 274-277; The China Year Book, 1913, pp. 474-476; Li, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 341-342. 97 WDGS no. 6283-10, "Monthly Reports," April 18, 1912, p. 4; NCH, 1 Feb. 3, 1912, pp. 298-299; Li, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 342; Kent, op.cit., pp. 308309; H. G. W. Woodhead, The Truth about the Chinese Republic, Lon­ don, 1925, p. 43; Reid, op.cit., p. 285. For a translation of the memorial of the northern generals, see BPP, China. No. 3 {1912), encl. in no. 127, pp. 185-187. T'ang Leang-Li is obviously in error in assuming that the memorial was an ultimatum directed at Yuan Shih-k'ai (op.cit., p. 94). 98 For a translation of the edict of abdication, see BPP, China. No. 3 {1912), encl. 2 in no. 129, p. 189.

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 the event marked the passing of the more than two-millenniaold monarchical system. This was no traditional close of a dynastic cycle; this was a momentous break with a great and ancient past. Much to the displeasure of the revolutionary leaders, Yuan Shih-k'ai was authorized by the Throne to organize a provisional republican government. Sun Yat-sen declared that a republic could not be established by the authority of an emperor, and it was requested that Yiian come to Nanking. The latter maintained that he had no intention of taking advantage of the authority delegated to him by the Throne. Since this assurance was regarded as satisfactory, Sun re­ signed on February 14, with the understanding that the capital would be transferred to Nanking. The following day, Yuan was elected president. However, having no desire to enter the lair of the revolutionaries, he claimed that condi­ tions in North China did not permit his departure." As if to prove the point, the Pei-yang Third Division, commanded by Ts'ao K'un, a loyal henchman of Yuan, mutinied and began looting in Peking. The revolt then spread to such other Pei-yang strongholds as Tientsin and Paoting. A republican delegation who had come to the capital to escort the new president to Nanking was forced to seek protection in the legation quarter. Opinion has been divided as to whether or not Yuan instigated the mutiny. A number of contemporary foreign observers cast no blame on him,100 but other foreigners and Chinese have believed that Yuan either ordered or per­ mitted the disturbance for his own ends.101 The Third Divi­ sion had been considered to be one of Yiian's most loyal units. Then, too, after a few days, the disturbances ended almost as rapidly as they had begun, fairly good order being pre­ served from then on. In light of this evidence, it would appear that the so-called mutiny was instigated by Yiian or his sup99

The China Year Book, 1913, pp. 485-488. 1912, pp. 71, 72; BPP, China. No. ,? (1912), no. 150, pp. 209210, Jordan to Grey, March 3, 1912; Times (London), March 2, 1912; Reeves, op.cit., p. 97. 101 Li, op.cit., vol. i, p. 351; T'ang, op.cit., p. 95; Reeves, op.cit., p. 97. 100 FR,

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 porters. It was another example of the growing tendency to employ force or the threat of force to influence political deci­ sions. Still, riots are unreliable tools of policy. In this case it would seem that owing to declining discipline and mob psychology the situation got partially out of hand before it could be again brought under control. One thing is certain: the result of the disturbance was to force the southern leaders to abandon their demands that Yiian proceed to Nanking. On March 10, 1912, Yiian Shih-k'ai was sworn in at Peking as Provisional President of the Chinese Republic. After more than 2,000 years, the imperial system had been replaced by the external forms of a republic. The old order had been discredited by its failure either to solve pressing internal problems or to evolve a satisfactory solution to the intrusion of Western civilization. Yet, the masses of China were not prepared by tradition, experience, or education for the establishment of a functioning democracy. A Confucian civil bureaucracy had governed China during most of the imperial era. The civil officials who had earned the literary degrees had behind them the prestige of over a millennium of tradition. Despite periodic cycles of decay, the system had remained amazingly stable. Throughout the centuries, entry into the civil bureaucracy via the literary examinations had been the chief goal of the able and ambitious. In spite of internal factionalism, intrigues, and occasional decadence, the civil officials had formed a class apart, powerful and generally respected. Nevertheless, the fate of the Confucian literati had been sealed by the impact of the West. They had proved incapable of preserving China's position in a changing world. They were not prepared either by training or conviction to administer a modern state, certainly not a republic. Further­ more, they had become corrupt and, after the collapse of the old order in 1912, the civil bureaucracy was no longer in a position either to preserve order or to maintain their own dominant position. The question was, who could replace them as the governing class? The new Western-trained students, products of the newstyle schools, were insufficient to fill China's need for trained

The Army & the Revolution of 1911 administrators and technicians. They had less prestige than the old Confucian literati. Also, few of them had reached high government office prior to the overthrow of the monar­ chical system. Their class had not had a chance to entrench themselves in power. As a consequence, the modern-trained scholars were not prepared either at the fall of the dynasty or on the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916 to establish them­ selves as the dominant class. The only group who were capable of filling the vacuum and seizing power were the new militarists. After the RussoJapanese War, the growth of nationalism and the expansion of education within the officers' corps had gradually increased the prestige of the military profession. Then, too, by 1912 more of the new-style officers had achieved senior rank than was true of the Western-trained civilians. Militarism had been growing beneath the decaying fa5ade of civil rule. Most important of all was the fact that by 1912 and especially by 1916 they commanded military power, and with the break­ down of the imperial system military force was, unfortunately, the only type of power capable of seizing control. The new president had for years been an imperial official, and it is probably true that he did not favor the establishment of a republic. The next few years were to prove that what he ultimately sought was a strong monarchy with Yiian Shihk'ai as its first emperor, but the revival of the imperial system was no longer possible. Despite the fact that for many years he had held high civilian offices, Yiian thought principally in terms of military rather than civil power. His presidency was to be fundamentally a military dictatorship supported by the Pei-yang Army and the Pei-yang clique.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

M

ILITARY developments in China during the last half century of the monarchy have had a marked and detrimental influence on more re­ cent Chinese history. As a result of military necessity the Manchu rulers were obliged to promote the commanders of the loyal militia armies to the highest pro­ vincial posts. This upset the balance of power between the Throne and the provincial leaders, for to the already exten­ sive political authority of the governors-general and gov­ ernors the new appointees added increased financial and military control. Still, after it was once established this new power structure remained basically unchanged until the Revolution of 1911. The militia leaders did not seek to revolu­ tionize the traditional system. They did not even attempt to overthrow the alien dynasty. Furthermore, they showed a distinct preference for the esteemed civil titles over mili­ tary ranks. This was true even of Yuan Shih-k'ai whose career began at a time when the military profession had already proved to be an effective stepping-stone to power. There was no important modification of this trend until after the Sino-Japanese War. Then, with few exceptions, the principal officers of the new semi-private armies remained in military service, despite the fact that they had powerful patrons capable of obtaining civil appointments for them. The military profession was becoming more respectable as well as advantageous. The creation of the modern armies had necessitated the establishment of military schools and the training of professional officers, to the detriment of the theory of the omnicompetence of Chinese officials in their dual civil and military roles. The fact that soldiers were obtaining an advanced education, even if not classical, tended to raise their social status. The increasing prestige and influence of the military schools attracted many sons of gentry families. Owing to the official existence of a merit

Conclusions system some boys from the lower classes also achieved entry into the academies, but, as in the case of the civil bureaucracy, the majority of the cadets were from upper-class families. Thus there was formed a new military bureaucracy which was the product of the interaction of two civilizations. Like their civil counterparts these officers had originally studied the humanistic political philosophy of Confucius, but in the schools they learned Western science and military thought. A sufficient number of graduates also absorbed progressive ideas so that the southern divisions of the new army con­ stituted one of the groups forming the foundation of the revolutionary movement in China. Nevertheless, indoctri­ nated as they were by German or Japanese instructors, faith in military as opposed to civil authority was to be far more characteristic of the new officers' corps than loyalty to re­ publican ideals. However, one should not overestimate the great political influence of military backing in imperial China, even during the period from 1895 to 1911. Almost constant external pressure and internal disorders forced a tottering administra­ tion to place increased reliance on military forces which it could not directly control. Hence those who dominated the decentralized, semi-private armies gained a potent voice in the affairs of state. Still, the career of Chang Chih-tung indicates that Confucian scholarship, political astuteness and promotion through the civil bureaucracy was still an effec­ tive means of reaching high estate. Chang's new army was never strong enough alone to assure his position. Also, in 1909 Yuan Shih-k'ai was the most powerful official in the empire, yet in its last days the dynasty summarily dis­ missed him without creating a civil war. China was not yet dominated by soldiers as it was to be in the years of warlordism that followed, but the foundation for militarism had been laid. Military leaders had achieved a position which per­ mitted them to seize power. The principal heir to the dual heritage of semi-personal armies and the use of Western techniques arising out of the Taiping Rebellion was Yiian Shih-k'ai. Yiian was a man of

Conclusions ability, ambition and ruthlessness, who took advantage of his heritage, the decay of the imperial system, foreign im­ perialism, and the reform movement to create the most effective army in Manchu China. It was primarily the sup­ port of the Pei-yang Army and clique which permitted him to become the most influential official in the Chinese Empire. Although he was dismissed in 1909, the crisis of the revolu­ tion proved that Yuan and his generals had become indis­ pensable men. Militarism had come into its own. The military reforms of the last decade of the dynasty pre­ sented several serious problems which have continued to confront Chinese leaders, whatever their political ideology might be. Some of these conditions have had a serious effect on China's military position up to the present time. The poverty, the inadequateness of industrialization and the wide­ spread illiteracy of China have continued to be fundamental obstacles preventing her from becoming a first-rate military power. None of those problems is insurmountable but they present gigantic hurdles. It has been pointed out that the construction of military industries stagnated after 1894. The arsenals constructed by that year constituted most of the plants existing in 1911. More impressive is the fact that those which remained in­ cluded most of the principal arsenals available when Japan launched her major attack against China in 1937. China's practice .of depending on foreign powers to supply essential weapons of war was a hazardous policy half a century ago, while today the real power and independence of action of the communist armies is gravely threatened by their depend­ ence on the Soviet Union for such vital weapons as planes, tanks, electronic equipment, etc. Despite her military schools and the officers sent abroad to study, China has suffered from a permanent shortage of technical specialists for her vast armies. This plus her lack of funds and industrial backwardness have largely accounted for the failure to create adequate special or auxiliary services. The deficiency of fully qualified officers is also a prime factor in the continued employment of foreign military advisers.

Conclusions This policy is always potentially dangerous, for the basic loyalty of such officers is to their native country. The tend­ ency has been to engage soldiers from the most favored nation or the one whose military establishment is currently most admired. Hence China is today infiltrated by Soviet officers, as in 19x0 Japanese officers had penetrated through­ out the empire. Another practice which has continued to harass the Chinese people has been the mass recruiting of great armies which the responsible warlord, administration, or regime could not properly feed or equip by Western standards. Closely related to this custom have been the severe problems involved in attempting to disband large armies in an area of critical overpopulation, where opportunties for employment are very limited. After the fall of the monarchy the existence of private or provincial armies became much more characteristic of China than it had been before. The semi-private troops of Yiian Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung were the successors of the Hunan and Anhwei Armies. They were also the predecessors of the personal armies of the warlords, as well as the party armies which the Kuomintang and the communists organized during the 1920's. Even the surge of nationalism created by the Japanese invasion failed fully to unite the Chinese. Dur­ ing World War II the National Government could not directly control nor receive full obedience from all the troops which nominally served under its banners. This was true of some warlord troops, while the communist Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army continued to be Communist Party units. In addition, numerous Chinese soldiers served under the Japanese as puppet troops. Owing to the almost constant foreign or civil wars all modern Chinese regimes have, like the late Manchu rulers, been forced to rely to an unusual degree on military force. This has given military commanders a strong or dominant voice in national policy. Several other characteristics of the late empire have con­ tinued to influence the political and military history of the post-revolution period. Opposition to change among the con-

Conclusions servative Chinese people did not die with the establishment of the "republic" in 1912. Political decentralization was de­ scriptive of the warlord period from 1916 to 1928; it re­ mained a tremendous handicap to the Nationalist's attempt to unify and moderize China. Even the totalitarian ruthlessness of Communism will have difficulty in stamping out provincial loyalties. This is even more true of the deeply ingrained practices of nepotism and favoritism. One confusing aspect of the Chinese military system has been the unreliability of its personnel records. The belief of Lord Beresford that even the Chinese government did not know the size of its armies and the complaint of the American military attache that the only way to judge the strength of a unit accurately was to personally count it—these are con­ victions which have been shared by myself and other recent military observers. An important lesson should have been drawn from a study of the imperial armies. We in the West have seriously under­ estimated the military potential of Oriental troops. This was true in the case of the Japanese in 1941 and of the Korean and Chinese communists in 1950. It is my belief that this miscalculation lay primarily in the field of physiological and psychological characteristics. Western opinion has generally held the Chinese soldier in low regard, yet for over half a century qualified military observers have pointed out that when well trained, equipped, and led, the Chinese peasant is a first-class soldier. Our misconception has arisen from the fact that usually the Chinese soldier has not been adequately trained, equipped, led, or indoctrinated. Unfortunately, it was demonstrated in Korea that the present Chinese Commu­ nist regime appreciates the value of an effective army to an authoritarian government. They have made strenuous efforts to rectify the traditional weaknesses of the Chinese armies in order to create an indoctrinated party army capable of carrying out the party's will.

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1899-1912.

Bibliography Tsiang, Τ. F., "Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, 1870-1894," Chinese Social and Political Science Review, vol. 17 (April 1933)» PP- !"!06Vissiere, M. A. "Nouvelles nomenclatures militaire en Chine," Journal asiatique, nth series, vol. 3 (January-February 1914), pp. 59-70. Wade, T. F., "The Army of the Chinese Empire: its two great divisions, the Bannermen or National Guard, and the Green Standard or Provincial Troops," Chinese Repository, vol. 20 (May, June, and July 1851), pp. 250-280, 300-340, 362-422. Wallach, Captain Richard, "The War in the East," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, vol. 21, no. 4 (1895), PP- 691-740. "Yuan-Shi-Kai: His Enemies," Outlook, vol. 91 (January 16, 1909), pp. 92-93. "Yuan-Shi-Kai: His Friends," Outlook, vol. 91 (January 16, 1909), pp. 93-94. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL Chapin, Frederick L., "Homer Lea and the Chinese Revolution," unpublished senior thesis, Department of Government, Har­ vard University, 1950. Hummel, Arthur William Jr., "Yiian Shih-k'ai as an Official under the Manchus," unpublished master's thesis, Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, University of Chicago, 1949.

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS This glossary is limited to military terms and institutions and to military leaders of the post-1895 period. For the Chinese characters of other individuals cited in the text, the reader is referred to A. W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (164.4-1912), 2 vols., Washington, 1943-1944. In the case of political institutions not listed be­ low, attention is called to H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organisation oj China, rev. by M. T. Kolessoff, trans, by A. Beltchenko and E. E. Moran, Shanghai, 1912.

Glossary Chang Chih-tung Chang Hsiin Chang Huai-chih Chang Piao Chang Shao-ts'eng Ch'ang-keng Ch'ang-pei chun chen chen-piao Ch'en Kuang-yiian cheng chiin-hsiao cheng ts'an-ling cheng tu-t'ung ch'i chiang-chun Chiang Kuei-t'i Chiang-pien hsiieh-t'ang Chiang wu-t'ang Chiao-lien ch'u

361

Glossary Chin-wei chun Ching-ch'i ch'ang-pei chun Ch'ou-pan hai-chiin shih-wu ch'u chuang-yung chun Chiin-cheng ssu Chiin-hsiieh ssu Chiin-kuan hsiieh-t'ang Chiin-ling ssu Chiin-tzu ch'u Ch'u-chun Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi Fang-chun Feng Kuo-chang Feng Shan Feng Yii-hsiang fu chiin-hsiao fu ts'an-ling fu tu-t'ung

362

Glossary Hai-chtin ch'u Hai-chiin ya-men H o Tsung-lien Hou-pei chun Hsia Hsin-yu Hsiang-chiin hsiang-yung hsieh hsieh chiin-hsiao hsieh-piao hsieh ts'an-ling hsieh tu-t'ung hsien-feng tui Hsin-chien lu-chiin hsin-chiin Hsii-pei chiin Hsii Shih-ch'ang hsueh-hsi-kuan Hsiieh-ping ying

363

Glossary Hsiin-ching chiin Hsiin-fang tui H u Yii-fen Huai-chiin Huang Hsing i I-chiin I-ho ch'iian I-hsin, Prince K u n g I-k'uang, Prince Ch'ing jalan Jung-lu Kan-chiin Lan T'ien-wei Lei Chen-ch'un L i Yuan-hung Liang-pi lien Lien-chun Lien-ping ch'u

364

Glossary Lien-yung Liu K'un-i Liu Yung-ch'ing lu Lu-chiin Lu-chiin chung-hsiieh t'ang Lu-chiin hsiao-hsiieh t'ang Lu-chun kuei-chou hsüeh-t'ang Lu-chun pu Lu-chun su-ch'eng hsiieh-t'ang Lu-chun ta-hsiieh t'ang Lu-lu Lu-ying lu M a L u n g piao ma-ping M a Yii-k'un Meng En-yuan Nieh Shih-ch'eng

365

Glossary niru Pa-ch'i pan Pei-yang chiin piao Ping-kuan hsiieh-t'ang Ping-pei ch'u Ping-pu pu-ping p'ai Sa Chen-ping shao Sheng-chiin shih shih-t'uan Shou-hsiin shou-ping Shui-shih

366

Glossary Sung Ch'ing ta chiang-chun ta-chiin ta-shuai T i n g Ju-ch'ang Ting-wu chiin Tsai-feng, Prince Ch'un Tsai-hsun Tsai-t'ao tso-ling tsung-ping Tu-lien ch'u Tu-lien kung-so Tu-pan chiin-wu ch'u tu-tu Tuan Ch'i-jui Tuan Chih-kuei tui

367

Glossary T u n g Fu-hsiang Tzu-ch'iang chiin T ' a n g shao-i t'i-piao t'i-tu T'ieh-liang T'ien Chung-yu Ts'an-ling Ts'an-mou ch'u Ts'an-mou ying-wu ch'u Ts'ao K'un ts'ao-piao t'uan t'uan-lien t'ung-ling W a n g Chan-yuan W a n g Ju-hsien W a n g Shih-chen

368

Glossary W a n g Ying-k'ai W u Ch'ang-ch'ing W u Ch'ang-ch'un W u Feng-ling W u - i chiin W u Lu-chen Wu-pei hsiieh-t'ang Wu-wei chun yang-ch'iang tui Y a n g Shih-hsiang Y e n Shi-shan Y e n Tun-yuan Yin-ch'ang ying Y i n g - w u ch'u yung-tui Yung-ying Yu-lang Y u a n Shih-k'ai

369

INDEX " A d A s t r a Brigade," see Selfstrengthening A r m y administrative reform, 193-194, 195197, 243-244. 256-257, 261-262, 282; see also constitution advisers, see foreign advisers and instructors Allied Villagers, 140 Anhwei, 9, 27, 66, 88, 187, 231; recruiting, 63, 76, 202; training, 146, 151, 237; military reforms, I 54. 159; disaffection, 268; maneuvers, 268, 290 Anhwei A r m y , 37, 38n, 42, 81, 82, 83, 88, I03n, 114, 146, 341; organization, 25, 84; leaders, 27, 73, 84, 187 Anhwei clique, 82 Anking, 25, 268 anti-dynastic activity, 20, 192, 244, 245, 254 anti-foreignism, 107, 109-110, 112, 118, 166 armies, evaluation, Eight Banners and Green Standard, 8-9, 15, 1619; Taiping period, 21-22, 24, 303 1 ; Sino-Japanese W a r , 46-47, 49-50; Boxer Rebellion, 105-106, 116-118; 1903, 164; 1904-1906, 189; Lu-Chun, 225-235, 237-238, 240-242, 288-295; I 9 1 1 ' 287-298, 325, 329; Republican A r m y , 317320, 324; foreign interest in, 242 armies, personal and semi-personal, 4. 23, 32, 35, 50, 81, 138, I55n, 292, 338, 341; source of warlordism, 23, 194; belong to the generals, 32, 33, 78, 240; limitations on, 34, 35, 126, 287; leaders, loyal to Throne, 34, 259; party armies, 341 arms imports, 47-48, 108-109, 133. 239, 302n; purchasing policy, 39, 85n A r m y (Lu-chun), 44, 159, i 7 5 n ; organization, 135, 140, 172-173, 178-179, 180, i8on, 231, 247, 288; plans for, 172-180; finances, 179,

248, 249, 303; strength, 179, i8on, 240-241, 249, 253, 277, 289, 298, 305; pay, 179". 235, 291, 314; disaffection, 193, 244-245, 268-269, 270-271, 284, 307. 308, 317, 318, 322; ranks, 212; regulations, 220, 221, 225; evaluation, 225-235, 237238, 240-242, 288-295; distribution, 232-233, 249-250; weaknesses, 237-238; equipment, 238, 247, 302, 305; mission, 247; key to revolution, 271, 286-287; and provincial officials, 278, 285, 286287; traditional characteristics, 294-295; in Revolution of 1911, 324-329 A r m y (Lu-chun) units: 21st Brigade, 222, 223, 223n, 231, 307; 23rd Brigade, 231, 328; 25th Brigade, 231, 233, 234; 27th Brigade, 231, 233, 235; 29th Brigade, 231, 233; 31st Brigade, 231, 233; 33rd Brigade, 231; 35th Brigade, 231; 1st M i x e d Brigade, 252, 253; 2nd M i x e d Brigade, 252, 311, 312; 3rd Mixed Brigade, 323; 25th Mixed Brigade, 269; 31st Mixed Brigade, 268; First Division, 2l7n, 218, 225, 250, 291, 312, 313, 322; Second Division, 217, 225, 252n, 255, 280, 322; Third Division, 225, 250, 252, 253, 280, 313, 335; Fourth Division, 225, 252n, 255, 280, 322; F i f t h Division, 79, 225, 250, 252, 280, 281, 313; Sixth Division, 225, 246, 250, 252, 280, 311, 312, 322; Seventh Division, 79, 210-211, 231,252,260, 271,272; Eighth Division, 69, 148, 222, 229,

371

232, 290; Ninth Division, 231, 232, 233, 269, 290, 327, 328; Tenth Division, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235; Twentieth Division, 253, 280, 310, 311, 312, 322; First Imperial A r m y , 3x0, 312, 313, 315, 321-322, 325; Second Imperial A r m y , 310, 313, 314

Index A r m y of the Green Standard, see Green Standard, A r m y of the A r m y of Peking, see Pei-yang Army A r m y Reorganization, Commission for, 141, 183, 190, 203, 205, 209, 220, 232; established, 166, 191; organization, 166; influence, 167, 169, 223, 224, 294; Y u a n Shihk'ai dominates, 167, 212; reforms of, 171, 172-180, 180-182, 184-185, 186-187, 221, 236n; abolished, 197 A r r o w W a r , 6, 29, 30, 47, 51, 129 arsenals, 42-43, 57. 60, 87, 94, 108, 133, 320; inadequate, 42, 47, 238; location, 42, 340; capacity, 108, 238, 239, 301-302; proposed, 122123, 132, 186; nationalized, 186187 auxiliary services, 143, 149, 177, 208; shortage of, 47, 61, 62, 117, 238, 293-294, 319, 340 Backhouse, E., 258 balance of power, 71, 79, 82; early, 14; shift during Taiping Rebellion, 26, 32-36; i860's-1895, 37, 38, 40, 72; 1895-1900, 66, 84, 97, i02n, 110-111, 112; 1901-1904, 126, 131, 138-139, 159, 164; 1904-1906, 174-175, 187-188, 197-198, 210, 214, 215-218, 223, 224, 239-240; 1906-1911, 243-244, 250-251, 254, 256, 258-259, 260-261, 267-268, 278, 284-285, 336-337; see also Manchu attempts regain military control banditry, 22, 23, 38, 85, 101, 111, 152, 208, 211, 325 bandits recruited into army, 101 Banner Forces, 24-25, 59, 94, 103, 132, 159, i83n, 212, 236n, 237, 287, 297, 307; organization, 8, 11, 62, 136; decline, 9, 16, 17-18, 22, 30-31, 36, 291; distribution, 9 ; strength, 11, 46, 107, 297; decentralization, 14, 1 7 ; finances, 19, 87, 88, 303, 304; privileged status, 56, 64, 164, 175, 184, 196; Metropolitan, 143-144, 201, 203, 205;

attempted demobilization, 245-246, 262 Belgium, 90 Beresford, Rear Admiral Lord Charles, 105-106, io6n, 107, 119, 121, 301, 320, 342 Bland, J. 0 . P., 72, 258 Board of W a r , see W a r , Board of Bower, M a j o r , Ii8n B o x e r Protocol, 126, 133, 137 B o x e r Rebellion, 98, 127, 136, 145, 166; military operations, 107, 1 l i n e ; causes, 109; effects, 118, 129, 130, J 37, 138, 147, 286, 287; destruction of Guards Army, 125; indemnity claims, 166 Boxers, io7n, n o , 113, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 140 Brandon, Lieutenant, n g - 1 2 0 British diplomatic reports, 312, 328, 333 British Foreign Office, io6n British military attache reports, 288, 289 Burma, 283 Canton, 9, 305; schools, 41, 236; arsenal, 42, 108, 239, 301; ordnance imports, 108, I09n; disaffection, 268, 307 Canton Brigade, 232, 233, 234 Central China, 161, 244, 270, 287, Chang Chih-tung, 58, 78, 109, 126, I 35, 144, 161, 187; and militarism, 23, 191, 194; and personal armies, 35, 60, 70-71, i55n, 341; reform, 35, 44, 45, 53, 60-61, 84, 130, 131133, 137, 146-147, 164, 170, 194, 246, 256, 260, 286; organizes modern troops, 41, 61-66, 69-70, 119120, 147, I48n, 222, 223, 322; schools, military, 41-42, 57, 67, 70, 121, 134, 146, 150-151, 230, civil, 67, 156, 231; career, 60-61, 68, 69, 95, 131, 136, 138, 154, 155156, 165, 254, 255, 339; military concepts and proposals, 60, 64, 65, " 9 , 147, 152-154, 175, 219-220, 221-222, 223-224, 253-254; and literate soldiers, 63, 150, 152, 230-

372

Index 231; recruiting, 63, 120, 152, 222; finances, 65, 147, iS3n, 221, 224; troops evaluated, 68, 69-70, 119120, 147-150, 155. 189. 214. 220, 223, 229; compared with Yuan Shih-k'ai as military-political leader, 70-71, 78, 81-82, 147, 153n, 156, 214, 218, 219; Exhortation to Study, 94-95; and Boxer Rebellion, 112, 116, 119, 121; death, 259 Chang Hsiin, 79, 80-81, 314, 327, 328 Chang Huai-chih, 79, 80, 81, 225 Chang Piao, 148, 214, 220, 22on, 229, 307, 322, 323 Chang Shao-tseng, 311, 312 Ch'ang-keng, 171, 205 Changsha, schools, 230 Chao Er-hsun, 194 characteristic of Chinese soldiers, see soldiers and officers Chekiang, 28, 154 Ch'en Kuang-yuan, 79, 81 Chengtu, 9; arsenal, 42, 239, 301 Chia-ch'ing reign, 22n Chiang K'ai-shek, 301 Chiang Kuei-t'i, 79, 81, 256, 279, 300, 313, 314 Chiang-pei, 210-211, 249n, 252 Ch'ien-lung Emperor, 13, 16 Chihli, 112, 126, 138, 145, 212; strategic center, 9, 138, 200-201; troop strength, 9, 46n, 103, 107-108, 218; Anhwei Army stronghold, 27, 83; troops, 37, 47, 83, 113, 140, 169, 203, 204, 206-207, 2I4> 225, 232, 280; military modernization, 84, 102, 159; finances, 88, 201; and Boxer Rebellion, 110, 112, 113, 123, 124; Pei-yang Army and clique center, 140, 210, 333; schools, 145, 146, 181, 202-203, 236-237; see also Paoting, Peking and Tientsin China Year Book, 296 Ch'ing Dynasty, see Manchu D y nasty Ch'ing, Prince, 75, 93, 139, 165, 167, 201, 213, 251, 255, 263, 310 Chou Fu, 232 Chou Sheng-po, 2Sn

Chou-li, 21 Christianity, 20, 110 Chu Teh, 301 Ch'u, Army of, 25, 27 Ch'un Prince, see Regent Chung-hsueh wei t'i, Hsi-hsueh wei yung, S3 civil service examinations, 336; ordered modernized, 94; proposed revision, 132; abolished, 194 cliques, rivalry of, 34, 37, 82-83, 197, 210, 218 240, 281 Commission for Army Reorganization, see Army Reorganization, Commission for Common Alliance Society, 192, 270, 307 Communist government, 342 Communist Party, 3; armies, 3, 341 Confucianism, 6, 35, 60, 290, 339; literati stigmatize military profession, 16; defeats Taiping ideology, 22; defended and supplemented, 29, 53, 60, 94; influence, 30, 37, 58, 92, 100, 258; undermined, 52, 54, 161, 194, 336 conservatives, 6, 54, 341-342; prior 1895, 29, 51, 53, 59; effect of SinoJapanese W a r on, 54-55; in coup d'etat and Boxer Rebellion, 9394, 97-99, 109-110, 112, 130; and post-Boxer reform period, 127128, 135, 157, 193, 243, 246 constitution, 195, 256 Cordier, Lieutenant Constant, 203, 204 corruption, 47, 49, 58, 72, 78, 86, 87, 91, 106, 214, 240, 244, 261, 294, 315 coup d'etat of 1898, 95, 97-98, 98n, 100, 108, 137, 246 Dairen, 48 decentralization, 5, 341-342; cause of military weakness, 4, 43, 47, 49, 56, h i , 166, 239-240, 249-250; since K'ang-hsi Emperor, 14-15; influence Taiping Rebellion on, 26, 32-33; and Boxer Rebellion, iio-iii, 112, 119; preservation of, 96, 99, 101, 135, 159, 164; attempts to modify, 167-168, 186-187, 193,

373

Index 195, 243-244, 260-261, 284-285; see also balance of power and Manchu attempts regain military control Defense Army, 36, 37, 38, 38n, 39, 46, 46n, 62, 87, I03n, 107, 157. 159, 164, 172-173, 248, 287; see also militia demobilization, difficulty of, 22, 82, 341 Denby, Charles, 67n diplomatic corps, i n Disciplined Forces, 37, 38, 38n, 39, 40, 46, 47, 62, 87, I03n, 107, 119, 153, 159, 164, 173, 20m, 233, 248; see also Green Standard, Army of the Divine Mechanism Battalions, 93, 93 n Eight Banner, see Banner Forces Emperor, 23, 25; abdication, 4, 333, 334; status, 6; commander-inchief, 264, 282; see also Ch'ienlung Emperor, K'ang-hsi Emperor, Kuang-hsu Emperor, Taokuang Emperor, Yung-cheng Emperor Empress-Dowager (Tz'u-hsi), 50, 93n, 104, I94n, 233, 331; diverts naval appropriations, 43; military policy, 58, 98-102, 103, 133, 134137, 140, 165, 171, 186, 298; and provincial officials, 58, 190, 198, 218, 251, 267; and coup d'etat, 9798; and reform, 98-99, 128, 134136, 243, 245-246, 261, 286; and Yuan Shih-k'ai, 98n, 112, 123, 138, 139, 213, 215, 251, 254-255; and Boxers, 112, 113, 129; and Chang Chih-tung, 112, 146, 156, 254-255; converted to reform, 129-130; and constitutional monarchy, 256-257; failing health, 256; death, 257258, 284, 290 Ever Victorious Army, 27-28, 40, 70, 172 Fang Chao-ying, 11 Feng Kuo-chang, 79, 80, 81, I22n, 141, 183, 310, 315, 326

Feng Shan, 217, 2i7n, 218, 252, 256, 280 Feng Yii-hsiang, 301 Fengtien, 159, 211, 251, 253 Finance, Board of, 46, 57, 82, 86n Finance, Ministry of, 267, 303, 304, 305 finances, military, 25-26, 82, 84-85, 85n, 91, 100, i02n, 104, 172, 179, 248, 267, 310, 330; national estimates, 19, 86-89, 169-170, 302-305 First Chinese Regiment, 118 Foochow, 108, I09n, 231, 239n, 305; arsenal, 42, 104, 108, 239; naval academy, 236 foreign advisers and instructors, 27, 39-40, 63, 71, 81-82, 107, 144, 228, 340-341; French, 40, 162; German, 40, 41, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 68n, 69, 71, 77, 84, 103, 119, 127, 150, 151, 158, 160, 162, 164, 228, 231, 236, 237n, 281, 339; Russian, 103, 162, 340; Japanese, 120, 131, 144, 151, 154, 155, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 207, 214, 228, 233, 236, 238, 246, 250, 281, 339, 341; British, I58n, 162 foreign commanders, effectiveness of Chinese troops under, 27-28, 118 foreign encroachment, 22, 40, 54, 68, 89, 90-91, 97, 99, 109, n o , 127, 190, 205, 243, 284, 330, 331 foreign loans, 61, 90, 330, 33on foreign office, see Tsungli Yamen France, 90 Franco-Chinese force, 28, 40 Franco-Chinese War, 39, 51, 129 Franco-Prussian War, 41, 96 French General Staff reports, i74n, i8on, 204, 2i5n, 235, 241, 296, 302 French military attache reports, 145, 192, 268, 289 Frey, General H., n 8 n Fuchs, Lieutenant, 6gn Fukien, 88, 90, 159, 234 Gadoffre, Captain, 148, i48n, 149, 151, 15m gendarmerie, 135, 164 general staff, see staffs

374

Index Germany, 40, 115; military influence, 41, 55, 62, 67, 96, 236, 281; army, 59, 76, 149, 272; encroachments, 90, 123, 124 Gordon, Charles G., 27, 41 Government Affairs, Office of, 131 Grand Army of the North, see Guards Army Grand Canal, 9 Grand Council, 92, 100, 196, 213, 217; abolished, 282 Grand Secretariat, 282 Great Britain, 90, io6n, 118, 119, 162, 283 Great Pure Dynasty, see Manchu Dynasty Green Standard, A r m y of the, 16, 22, 25, 36, 37, 40, 59, 107, 159, 164, 179, 184, 185, 211-212, 247, 287, 289; organization, 11-12, 1415; distribution, 12, 13; strength, 12-13, 46, 297, 298; degeneration, 17-18, 37, 189; finances of, 19, 56, 87, 303, 304; reorganization, 37, 38; demobilization desired, 43-44, 92, 95, 131, 134, 135, 171, 248, 269, 278; see also Disciplined Forces Guards Army, 102, r03, 103n, 104, 105, 109, 114, 115, 125-126, 138; break up, 125 Guards Army units; Left Division, 102, 103, 125, 201, 232, 256, 279, 303, 305, 313; Right Division, 102, 103, 104, 107, 121-122, 124125, 126, I42n, 144, 145, 201, 20in, 205, 313; Front Division, 102, 103, 113, 124, 125; Rear Division, 102, 103, 115, 125; Center Division, 102, 103, 104, 115, 125; Vanguard, 124 guerrilla operations, failure to use, 118 Hankow, ordnance imports, 108, 109, 239n; and 1911 Revolution, 306, 311, 312, 313; military operations, 321-327 Hanneken, Herr von, 71, 72, I02n Hanyang, 325-326, 332; arsenal, 42, 120, 149, 186, 238, 239, 301, 307

Han-yeh-ping Iron and Steel Works, 58 Hao-t'ieh pu-ta ting; hao-jen putang ping, 16 Hart, Sir Robert, 61, 71, 169-170, 171 Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, 20 Heckman, 189 Heilunkiang, 85, 88, 251, 269 Ho-chien, 140; maneuvers, 204, 206207 H o Tsung-lien, 8, 79 Hoffman, Lieutenant, 69n, 15m Honan, 25n, 76, 88, 159, 189, 202, 211, 233, 270, 311 Hongkong, n 8 n Hsiao-chan, 76, 78, 121, 140, 225; clique, see Pei-yang clique Hsinkiang, 231, 250 Hsu Shih-ch'ang, 77-78, 79, 81, 167, 171, 205, 213, 251, 252, 253, 315 Hsu T'ung, 92 H u Han-min, 316 H u Yii-fen, 55-56, 72, 75 Huai, A r m y of the, see Hunan Army Huang Hsing, 320, 321; revolutionary commander, 324; negotiates, 332 Hunan, 9, 26, 71, 146, 147, 230, 231, 269, 309; militia armies organized, 23-24, 25; troop strength, 119, 149, 306; military importance, 155, 234; see also Hunan Army, Anhwei Army, and Army of Ch'u Hunan Army, 37, 47, 6in, 68, 69, 82-83, 155, 157, 3 4 i ; importance, 23, 27, 137, 234; organization, 23-24; equipment, 24, 157 Hunan clique, 83 Hundred Days of Reform, 89, 90-96, 97, 98, 99, 127, 130, 137 Hupeh, 26, 88, 152, 202, 214, 218, 231, 269, 309, 310, 314, 325; military importance, 56, 71, 119, 146149, 153, 155, 157, 219, 221, 224, 249, 253; schools, 70, 150, 181, 230, 236, 237; standing army troops, 152, 159, 189, 219-223, 306, 322; troop disaffection, 163, 284,

375

Index 307, 308; see also Army (Luchtin), Eighth Division and 21st Brigade

Kaifeng, 231; arsenal, 239 K'ang-hsi Emperor, 12, 14, 15 K'ang-i, 94, 102, 188 K'ang Yu-wei, 52, 53, 54, 91, 93, imperial commissioners, 15 93n> 94 imperial government, characteristic, Kansu, 27, 52, 82, 83, 88, i83n, 311 5-6, 14, 20, 51, 86, 193, 195-196, "Kansu Braves," 84, 103; see also 243, 256-257, 261, 264, 282; miliGuard's Army, Rear Division tary policy, early, 14-15, 22-23, Kiangnan arsenal, 42, 104, 108, 186, Taiping period, 23, 25, 26, from 187, 238-239, 301 I86O'S-I895, 30, 37-38, 40, 44, from Kiangsi, 9, 66, 79, 146, 159, 187, 189, Sino-Japanese W a r to Boxer Re231 bellion, 58-59, 66, 82, 85n, 91-96, Kiangsu, 28, 63, 66, 69, 88, 146, 151, 99-103, 118, during Manchu Re155. 159. 181, 210, 268, 328; miliform Movement, 130, 133-135. 137, tary importance, 102, 157, 249n 180-181, 186, 224-225, 246-249, Kiangyin, 126, 155, is8n under Regency, 261-266, 268, 272Kiaochow Bay, 90 281; see also administrative reKirin, 79, 159, 253; arsenal, 42 form and constitution Korea, 3, 7, 45, 48, 73-74, 342 imperial guards, 134, 262-263, 265, Krupp works, 63n, 67n Kuang-hsii Emperor, 99, 112, 129, 294. 303. 304, 315. 322 improvement of Chinese armies, see 130, 213, 215, 252; character, 9 1 ; military improvements and coup d'etat, 97-98; retirement, industry, 4, 54, 59, 99, 302, 329; see 98, 100; death, 257, 258; see also also arsenals Hundred Days of Reform instructors, see foreign advisers and Kung, Prince, 45, 71, 93 instructors Kuo Sung-tao, 35 international relief expedition, 114Kuomintang, 125, 341 115, 124, 129 Kwangsi, 9, 20, 96, 156, 159, l83n, 219, 234, 250, 269 Jamieson, George, 86 Kwangtung, 20, 40, 56, 62, 96, 186, Japan, 6, 45, 96, 202, 273, 302; in232, 250, 289n; revolts, 52, 268; telligence reports, 39, 46, 318; inmilitary importance, 102, 233, fluence in China, 99, 120, 131, 158, 2491. 250 160, 161-162, 173, 182, 190-191, Kweichow, 9, 12, 22, 159, 233 195, 207, 214, 236, 238, 246, 256, 280, 291; Chinese military stuLan T'ien-wei, 280, 311, 31m, 312 dents to, I2X, 145, 150, 160, 233, Lay, H. N., 28 236, 269, 299, 320; anti-Manchu Lei Chen-ch'un, 79, 81 students in, 160, 238, 271; enLeonard, Captain Henry, 240, 241, croachments, 191, 283, 331-332, 246 333 5 puppet troops, 341; see also Letter of Ten Thousand Words, 53, Sino-Japanese W a r 53 n . 54 Jehol, 20m, 250, 317 Li Chien-nung, 167, 310 Jui-cheng, 307 Li Hung-chang, 27, 35, 61, 73, 74, Jung Hung, 61 ' rr5, 232; and Anhwei Army, 25, Jung-lu, 84, 97, 98, 115, 130, 165, 27, 82-83, 88, 140; military re257; and military reform, 55, 75, former, 34-35, 40, 43, 44, 72; and 83, 92, 102-104, 131. 136; career, military schools, 41, 62, 81, 114, 160; and Sino-Japanese War, 45, 75. 93. 94n, 100, 125; death, 125, 48, 83, 286; death, 137, 165 137, 139

376

Index L i Hung-tsao, 55, 75 L i Ping-heng, 55 L i Yuan-hung, 220-221, 308, 30&1, 316. 317. 320-321, 331-332 Liang Ch'eng, l83n L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao, 137 Liang-pi, 315; murder, 334 Liaotung peninsula, 48, 90 literati, 16, 22, 23, 290, 336; and reform, 50, 51, 53, 89, 97 L i u Ch'ang-yu, 35 L i u K'un-i, 61, 83, 112, 136, 156, 157; leads Hunan A r m y , 47, 6 i n ; and Self-strengthening A r m y , 66, 68, 126, 156; as reformer, 129-130, I3I-I33, 134, 135. 157-158, 164; death, 137, 1 5 4 165 L i u Ming-ch'uan, 34, 35, 300 Liu Yung-ch'ing, 141-142, 210 L o Erh-kang, 17, 32, 33 Lobbecke, Captain, 69n Lu-chiin, see A r m y Ma-ch'ang, 225 M a Lung-piao, 79, 80, 225 M a Yu-k'un, 114, 115, 117, 129, 201, 212, 232, 256 McKenzie, F. A., 228 MacNair, H . F., 73 Manchu attempts regain military control, 59, 72, 99, I02n; original centralization, 14; Jung-lu sponsors four armies, 83-84, 100-101; Guards A r m y formed, 102-104; futile efforts 1901-1908, 130, 136, 137. 138, 167-168, 183, 186-187, 188, 196, 198, 248-249, 255, 257, 260-261; regency, 262-268, 274, 275, 280, 282; failure, 284-285, 290-291, 315-316 Manchu ( C h ' i n g ) Dynasty, 4, 35, 43. 96, 99. 130, 215, 243, 314; characteristics, 5, 6-7, n o , 136; early military organization, 7-19, 22; agitation against, 136, 160, 192, 283, 307, 308; fall, 199, 259, 286, 306, 334-335. 337 Manchu Reform Movement, 128, 129-132, 133-137. 139, 157. 160, 165, 168, 172, 193-197, 243, 245247, 248, 256-257, 261-262, 267,

286, 305; see also proposed military reforms, also reforms Manchuria, 7, 9, 14, 86, 88, i83n, 200, 311, 313, 3 1 7 ; and SinoJapanese W a r , 47, 48, 49; foreign interests, 90, 166, 191, 243, 273, 283; modern troops, 105, 225, 249n, 252, 253, 260, 280; and Russo-Japanese W a r , 169, 203, 204; revolutionary activities, 244, 270-271; struggle for power in, 251, 252, 260, 280 Mandate of Heaven, 6, 34 maneuvers, 155, 204, 206-207, 209, 214-215, 223, 242, 250, 290, 322; see also A r m y and Pei-yang Army Maritime Customs, 71 medical services, 47, 149, 177, 208, 235. 238; schools, 57, 69, 203, 236, 293-294 M e n g En-yii&n, 79, 80 Metropolitan Divisions, see Peiyang A r m y M i a o tribes, 13, 22 Michael, Franz, 23, 32, 33, 35 militarism, growth of, 3-4, 142, 339; 1850's-189s, 23, 26-27, 32-33. 41. 7 3 ; 1895-1903, 79-8o, 82, 134, 141, 145. 156, 161; 1904-1906, 191, 194; 1907-1911, 256, 261, 279; 1911 Revolution, 316, 321, 334, 336, 337; limitations on, 34-35, 37, 137 military crimes, punishment of, 50, 58-59, 190, 240 military examinations, description, 18-19; proposed revision or abolition, 44, 57, 92-93, 95, 132; reestablished, 101; abolished, 133134 military improvements, 1850-1900, 20-21, 24-25, 36, 39; 1900, 117118; 1901-1903, 157-158, 159, 162163, 165; 1904-1906, 177, 207, 208, 209, 214-215, 227, 229, 235; 19071911, 293 military modernization, causes, 6 ; Taiping period to 1895, 27-30, 39, 40; Sino-Japanese W a r to B o x e r Rebellion, 50, 51-55, 89, 91, 99, 127; Manchu Reform Movement

377

Index (1901-1911), 129-131, 140, 190191, 192, 200, 246; essentials of modernization, 84-85 military operations, Taiping Rebellion, 20-21, 22, 27-28; Sino-Japanese War, 48-49; Boxer Rebellion, 111-112, 113-118; 1902-1903, 145-146; 1911 Revolution, 313, 322-329 military ranks, 15, 184-185, 211-212, 265 military reforms, proposed, 1860's1895, 43-44. 71-72; 1896-1898, 5558; 1898-1899, 91-96, i02n; 19011903, 131-132; 1904-1906, 169-170, 172-182, 186, 198, 219-220, 221222, 242; 1907-1911, 245, 246, 273278, 279-280; see also Manchu Reform Movement and reform military reforms, results to 1911, 305-306 military unit terminology, 8, 38n, 179, 184-185, 319 military weaknesses, 4, 340-341; Sino-Japanese War, 47, 49-50; Boxer Rebellion, 105-107, 116117; 1901-1911, 149-150, 163-164, 208, 226-228, 237-238, 248, 293; 1911 Revolution, 319-320 militia, 22n, 38, 38n, 40, 59, 70, 92, 172, 184, 285, 297; origins and status, 22-23, 25, 63, 101, 159, 211; and Taiping Rebellion, 22, 23-26; absorbed into other armed forces, 22, 159, 164, 233, 247, 248; importance, 23, 25, 26, 27, 32-33, 36; leaders, 23, 25, 25n, 27, 33, 34-35, 37. 45, 82-83, 137; strength, 24, 46, 119; finances, 25-26, 32, 56, 65n, 87; decline, 30-31, 50, 95, 134, 137, 248; form Defense Army, 36; see also armies, personal Ming Dynasty, 11, 12 Ministry of War, see War, Ministry of missions of armed forces, 6, 9, 17, 36, 37-38, 242, 247, 288 mobilization, difficulties, 15, 47, 107108, i l l , 113, 166, 208-209; im-

provements, 209, 241-242; Army potential, 306 Mohammedan Rebellion, 27, 52, 82, 83 Mongolia, Inner, 7,250; Outer, 250; Russian interests, 283, troops, 287 Mongols, 7, 8, 15, 297 Mukden, 252n, 305 Munthe, Colonel, 72, 77n Nanchang arsenal, 239 Nanking, 61, 68, 155, 157, 239n, 335; arsenal, 42, 108, 239; troops, 6162, 231, 232, 269, 305, 306, 320; schools, 67, 68, 69, 236; and 1911 Revolution, 317, 320, 336; provisional republican government, 318, 333, 335; military operations, 327-328 national assembly, 257, 262, 278, 282, 303, 3ion nationalism and patriotism, development of, 163, 165, 190-191, 2oi8, 229, 256, 260, 279, 282 Nationalist army, 3, 341 Nationalist Government, 341, 342 Naval Bureau, 197 navy, 28, 42, 43. 49. 51. 55, 87, 106, io6n, 157, 263-264, 303, 305, 308, 324, 326 Navy, Ministry of the, 264, 274 Newly Created Army, 83, 103, 153; importance, 60, 715 81; organization, 72, 75, 76, 77; finances, 75, 82; officers, 77, 78-80, 81; see also Guards Army, Right Division Nieh Shih-ch'eng, 83-84, 103, 115, 124; in Boxer Rebellion, 113, 114, 117; death, 125 Nien bandits, 27, 28, 85 Ningpo, 40 nomenclature, see military ranks and military unit terminology North China, 9, 82, 125, 203, 244, 313, 314 Northeast China, 99, 200 Northwest China, 9, 27 Nurhaci, 8 officers, evaluation, 18, 49-50, 116,

378

Index 151, 158, 176, 207-208, 226, 228229, 233, 290; selection, 18-19, 24, 62, 70, 78, 150, 237, 275, 290, 320; foreign-trained, 40-41, 42, 47, 340; Japanese-trained, 160, 164, 281, 291, 311,341; German-trained, 281 Opium War, 6, 17, 18, 30, 47, 51 Osborn, Capt. Shepard, 28 Pacification Army, see Newly Created Army Paoting, 140, 211, 225; schools, 145, 182-183, 197, 202, 209, 236, 265, 299, 322, 335 Parker, E. H., 86, 87, 107 parliament, 282 Patrol and Defense Troops, 278, 287, 297, 299, 303, 305, 327; organization, 247-248; loyalty, 271, 307. 318, 322; evaluation, 284, 288, 292, 296 Pei-yang administration, 55, 83, 100, 138, 210 Pei-yang Army, 145, 210, 219, 235, 270-271, 309, 311-312, 333; organized, 27, 38, 140-144, 203, 205, 210-211; importance, 71, 146, I53n> 179, 200, 215, 218, 263, 288, 309, 337; commanders, 79"8o, 203, 217, 218, 225, 252, 280, 311, 335; finances, 141, 143, 201-202, 213, 217, 252; strength and distribution, 144, 201, 206, 210-211, 225, 240, 252-253; recruiting, 202, 226; evaluation, 203-204, 205, 207-208, 214, 226-228, 290, 323-325; equipment, 204, 208, 228; maneuvers, 204, 206-207, 209, 214, 223, 242, 322; designated Army divisions, 205; Yuan Shih-k'ai loses command, 216, 255, 280; regains command, 312, 313; role in 1911 Revolution, 309-315, 322-326, 331, 335 Pei-yang Army units: Left Division, 143, 144; Right Division, 314; First Division, 144, 205, 210, 216, 225; Second Division, 80, 118, 205, 216, 217, 225, 225n, 253; Third Division, 203, 205, 210, 211, 216, 225; Fourth Division, 80, 205, 217, 225, 253; Fifth Division, 80,

205, 210, 216, 225, 226n; Sixth Division, 205, 211, 216, 225; Seventh Division, 211, 2 i i n ; 29th Brigade, 211; see also Army, First through Seventh Divisions, and Guard's Army, Right Division Pei-yang clique, 71, 218-219, 340; early members, 79-80; origin, 81; expansion, 124, 139, 140, 203, 210, 211-213, 251-253, 256; titles, 212; after Yiian's dismissal, 259; and 1911 Revolution, 314, 333, 334, 337 Peking, 48-49, 54, 87, 88, 101, 225, 333; military importance, 9, 11, 82, 83, 99, 102, 105, 140, 201, 305, 306; and Boxer Rebellion, i n , 114-115, 124, 126, 129; republican capital, 335-336 Peking, Army of, 217, 249, 249n, 256, 260, 280; see also Pei-yang Army Peking Field Force, 93, 93n Peking Gazette, 59 Pengyang, 48 Ping wei chiang yu, 32 pirates, 297 Port Arthur, 48 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 191 Praschma, Count, is8n precedence civil over military officials, 5, 16, 35-36, 56-57, 78, 194, 336, 338; declines, 315, 316, 336 privy council, 282 promotions, basis, 148 provincial assemblies, 257, 261-262, 282 provincial officials, 168, 176, 184,189, 192, 213; control troops, 12, 14-15, 33, 72, 92, 96, I02n, 159, 170, 224, 239-240, 248-249, 260, 268, 275, 278, 284-285, 338; and finances, 26, 32, 84-85, 86-88, 170, 187, 189, 244, 261, 267-268, 285; influence of, 26, 32, 33-36, 37, 39, 58-59, 84,

379

95,

108,

iio-III,

112,

131,

136,

138, 164, 174, 187, 243-244, 284, 338; and reform, 58, 95, 129-131, 135, 158, 170-171, 190, 193, 195, 253; establish republics, 316; see also decentralization and Manchu

Index attempts regain military control punishments, see military crimes, punishment of Punishments, Board of, 58 railways, 54, 90, 94, 256, 283; strategic importance, 44, 187, 208-209, 241-242, 3 1 1 ; military employment, i n , 322, 328 recruiting policies, 341; old-style troops, 8, 11-12, 24; modernized forces, 63, 70, 76, I22n, 152, 202; A r m y ( L u - c h u n ) , 176, 226, 234, 235, 292; 1911 Revolution, 313, 314, 317-318, 321 Red Bearded bandits, 211, 297 Red Turban bandits, 85 Reeves, Captain James H., 302, 303 reform, 6, 23, 29, 59, 154, 156, 159, 340; clubs, 54, 74, 97; contributed to revolution, 130; bifurcation of, 137; less realistic 1907-1911, 246, 249; see also Hundred Days of Reform, Manchu Reform Movement, and military reforms, proposed Regent, 257-258, 259, 269, 279, 283, 3 1 1 ; policies, 198, 261-268, 278, 281-282, 284, 297; and Y u a n Shih-k'ai, 258, 283, 308-309, 310, 312, 315-316; acting commanderin-chief, 264, 266, 282; and Yinch'ang, 272, 275 Reinsch, Paul S., 80 Reitzenstein, M a j o r Baron A . von, 62 Republican armies, organization, 317-319. 328; strength, 318, 319; nomenclature, 3i9n; evaluation, 317-320, 324, 325 Republican regime, 330-331; established, 316-317; military policy, 317-319, 320-321; Sun Yat-sen president, 333, 335 reserves, 101, 227, 288, 296; firstclass, 135, 142, 152, 159, 164, 176, 178; second-class, 142, 170, 178 Resolute A r m y , 79, 103, 20in, 256; see also Guard's A r m y , L e f t Division Revenue, Board of, 14, 37, 87, 104 107, 201, 202, 210

Revolution of 1911, 4. 168, 258, 259, 271, 285, 286, 305, 338; causes, 130, 282-283; outbreak, 283-284, 306-307; spread, 308, 310-311, 316, 3 1 7 ; government reaction, 3083 1 1 ; recall of Y u a n Shih-k'ai, 309310; Yiian's role in Revolution, 312-315, 326, 330-336; military operations, 321-329; negotiations, 326-327, 329-334; abdication, 334; Y u a n as president, 335-336, 337 revolutionary activities, 20, 137, 160, 163, 192-193, 237, 244, 269-271, 291, 307, 339 Rites, Board of, 23, 102 Ritual of the Chou, 21 Russia, 90, io6n, 161, 200, 250, 273, 283, 331 Russian General Staff, 107 Russo-Japanese W a r , 144, 161, 162, 163, 169, 171, 187, 192, 200, 204, 219, 224, 337 Sa Chen-ping, Admiral, 263, 266, 308, 324, 326 schools, military, 67, 69, 84, 101, 131, 133, 183, 189, 197, 303, 304; students abroad, 40, 145, 150, 161, 182, 236, 236n, 290, 299, 320; curriculum, 41, 67, 150-151, 15m, 236; early schools, 4 1 ; faculties, 41, 84, 150, 151, 158, 160, 236, 300; importance, 41, 67, 81, 134, 144145, 150, 160, 184, 235, 298, 300, 301, 340; proposed, 57, 156, 172, 180-182, 277; specialist, 57, 69, 145. 203, 209, 236, 293-294, 299; students, 67, 150, 151, 191-192, 236-237, 295, 320, 338-339; warlords from, 81, 145, 161, 301; noncommissioned officers', 120, 145, 150, 151, 299; ordered established each province, 134, 135, 160; regulations, 134, 146, 180-182; location, 145, 150, 160, i83n, 299; types, 145, 182-183; number, 160, 236, 299; military school for Princes and Nobles, 183, 236n, 266, 300; naval, 236; number students, 236, 299 Self-strengthening A r m y , 42, 61-66,

380

Index 68, 70, 72, 81-82, 145; importance, 60; organization, 61-62, 64, 144, 203, 205; finances, 65, 66; personnel, 62, 63, 127, 201; transfer to Liu K'un-i, 66, 156; transfer to Yuan Shih-k'ai, 126-127, 156 "self-strengthening movement," 29 Self-strengthening, Society for the Study of, 54 Seymour, Vice Admiral Sir E. H., h i , 113; expedition, 111, 113, 117 Shanghai, 40, 66, 118n, 239n, 305, 317; arsenal, see Kiangnan arsenal Shansi, 112, 146, 159, 202, 211, 313, 325 Shantung, 107, 110, 121, 123, 124, 126, 138, 140, 159, i83n, 202, 210, 211, 214, 225, 253, 260, 280, 308, 311, 313; Sino-Japanese War, 48; German interests, 90, 123 Shen Chien, 296, 297 Shen Pao-chen, 44, 300 Sheng Hsiian-huai, 56, s6n Shensi, 27, 83, 159, 181, 313, 317 Shih-chia-chuang, 311, 313 Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 48, 53, 54 Shou-hsiin, 198, 274 Shun-chih Emperor, 14 Sian, 115, 125, 129, 299 Sinkiang, 16, 231, 250 Sino-Japanese War, 4, 39, 57, 61, 74, 90, n o , 116, 329, 338; causes Chinese defeat, 45, 49-50; strength Chinese armies, 46-47; military operations, 48-49; influence, 50, 51, 68, 71, 75. 91. 96, 129, 286 Six Boards, 98, 195 social origins of future warlords, 80-81; of officers, 150, 236, 237, 290, 319-320, 339 social status, military personnel, 5, 80, 95, 150; inferior social standing, 16, 35-36, 56-57, 276; reasons for low status, 16, 31, 101; improved status, 63, 161, 163, 183184, 184-185, 192, 208, 230-231, 235, 262, 268, 291, 300, 337, 338, 339; see also precedence civil over military officials soldiers, evaluation of, 31, 105-106,

118, 119, 121, 208, 226-227, 234, 291-292, 342 Soochow, 66, 268 South China, 12, 61, 71, go, 244, 27on, 287, 317, 318, 320, 321 Southeast China, 250 Southern squadron, 87, 155 Southwestern China, 27on Soviet advisers, 341 Ssu-ma, 17 staffs, 117, 207, 238-239, 266, 277, 281, 310; of Newly Created Army, 77; proposed general staff, 132, 135; provincial, 141, 153, 168169, 203, 224, 248n, 275; Commission for Army Reorganization, 166-167; General Staff Council, 197, 264-265, 292 standardization of weapons, lack of, 39, 43, 47, 76, 105, 106, 117, 201, 238, 294, 320; improvements, 149, 228, 238, 294 standing army, 131, 134-135, 160, 164, 173, 178, 201, 287 Standing Army of the Metropolitan Banner Forces, 143, 201, 205; see also Pei-yang Army, First Division strength reports of Chinese armies, Banner Forces, 11, 46, 297; Army of the Green Standard, 12-13, 46, 297; Taiping armies, 21; Hunan Army, 24; during the Sino-Japanese W a r , 46, 46n; Self-strengthening Army, 61, 66, 127, 201; Newly Created Army, 76; Guards Army, 103; on eve Boxer Rebellion, 107-xo8, I07n; Chang Chih-tung's troops, 119-120, 148, 149, 223; Yuan Shih-k'ai's troops, 121, 124-125, 144, 2or, 225; Luchiin, 179, i8on, 240, 24m, 288289; armies in 1911, 297-298; Republican armies, 318, 319; reports unreliable, 11, 107, 319, 342 Summer Palace, 43, 49 Sun Yat-sen, 52, 137, 139, 192, 270, 270n, 307; provisional president, 333, 335 5 see also revolutionary activities Sung Ch'ing, 25n, 83, 88, 100, 103

381

Index Sung Dynasty, 5 Sun-tzu, 17 Szechwan, 9, 88, 154, 220, 231, 233; revolt, 283-284, 307 Taiping Army, 20-22 Taiping Rebellion, 4, 13, 17, 19-31, 36, 39, 52, 62; influence on military affairs, 3, 6, 23, 26-30, 32-33, 42, 51, 72, 129, 130, 286, 339; causes, 19-20; military forces, 2025 Taiyuan arsenal, 239 Taku, 111-112, 117 T'ang Dynasty, 5 T'ang Leang-Li, 312 T'ang Shao-i, 213, 251, 319, 332 Tao-kuang Emperor, 13 Tartar-generals, see provincial officials taxation, 26, 86, 88, 169, 330-331 telegraph, nationalization, 138 Tenacious Army, 69, 83, 84, 103; see also Guard's Army, Front Division Tettenborn, Lieutenant von, 69n, I58n Tibet, 273, 283, 287, 297 T'ieh-liang, 202, 2i7n, 226, 229, 245, 246, 281, 334; trains troops, 143144, 225; and struggle for power, 144, 198, 210, 213, 217, 218, 248, 251-252, 253; career, 167, 171, 198, 218, 263, 327; inspects troops, 187-189, 206, 220; and Peking Army, 217, 253; decline, 265, 266, 272 T'ien Chung-yu, 79, 90 Tientsin, 40, 62n, 72, 108, 109, 112, 117, 239n, 305, 335; arsenal, 42, 108; schools, 59, 62, 81, 113, 160, 197, 272, 293; and Boxer Rebellion, 111-112, 113-115, 125 Ting Ju-ch'ang, 49 Ting Pao-chen, 34 Topffer, Lieutenant, 69n trade, foreign, 20, 52, 90, 94, n o Trained Army, see Defense Army Tsai-hsiin, Prince, 263-266, 315 Tsai-t'ao, Prince, 263, 264, 266, 273, 315

Tsai-t'ien, see the Kuang-hsii Emperor Ts'ai Ao, 316 Ts'ao K'un, 79, 80, 81, 335 Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan, 156 Tseng Kuo-ch'iian, 35 Tseng Kuo-fan, 18, 23, 25, 26, 27, 34, 40, 43-44, 216, 234 Tsinan arsenal, 42 Tso Tsung-t'ang, 25, 27, 28, 34, 35, 40, 43. 73 Tsungli Yamen, 56, 71, 72, 106, i n Tuan, Prince, 112 Tuan Ch'i-jui, 79, 81, I22n, 141, 203, 206, 214, 218, 225, 280, 310, 319, 334 Tuan Chih-kuei, 79, 81, 251, 315 Tuan-fang, 154, 232, 233, 245, 259 Tung Fu-hsiang, 83, 100, 101, 103, 113, 115, 129, 154 T'ung-chih Restoration, 30, 36, 51 Tz'u-hsi, see the Empress Dowager United States, 61, 242, 299 U.S. diplomatic reports, 68n, I02n, i83n, 188, 192, 242, 271 U.S. military attache reports, 223, 225, 234, 268, 274, 289, 296, 298, 302, 306, 319, 325, 342 universal military training, 95-96, 101, 142 Verbrugge, Raphael, 73 "volunteer" militia units, 283 Wade, Sir Thomas, 19 W a n g Chan-yuan, 80 W a n g Ju-hsien, 211 W a n g Shih-chen, 79n, 80, 81, I22n, I42n, 198, 225, 252 W a n g Wen-shao, 57 W a n g Ying-k'ai, 80, 81, 203, 206, 225n, 226n, 256 War, Board of, 14-15, 37, 83, 94; control of troops, 14, 32, 36, 159, 174; finances, 19, 87, 88; reports, 46, 92, 107, 119, i72n, i8on, 184; organization and functions, 171, 196, 197, 198; see also War, Ministry of

382

Index W a r Council, 72, 75 War, Ministry of, 196, 198, 250, 251, 270, 272, 301, 310; organization, 197, 264, 265, 273, 274, 292; control of troops, 216, 217-218, 219, 252-253, 255n, 260, 261; policies, 247, 249, 275-278, 294; see also War, Board of Ward, Frederick T., 27 warlordism, 4, 23, 41, 60, 73, 79, 80, 194, 259, 277, 329, 341; see also militarism, growth of weaknesses of Chinese armies, see military weaknesses Wei Kuang-tao, 83, 187, 232 Weihaiwei, 48, 49, n 8 n W e n Kung-chih, 312 Weng T'ung-ho, 55n, 93, 93n West River delta, 9 Western penetration, reactions to, summary, 127-128 Whampoa, 236 White Lotus Society, 13, 22 Williams, E. T., 167, 188 Woosung, 62n, 68, 69 World War II, 341, 342 W u Ch'ang-ch'ing, 73 W u Ch'ang-ch'un, 80, 203, 226n W u Feng-ling, 80, 81, 225, 226, 256 Wu-lan-t'ai, 18 W u Lu-chen, 280, 3 1 1 ; murder of, 312, 3i2n W u Ting-fang, 93n Wuchang, 150, 161; troops, 63, 69, 119-120, 148, 223, 290, 305; schools, 69, 70, 120-121, 150-151, 202, 229; and 1911 Revolution, 284, 286, 308, 317, 320, 326 Wuhan area, 153, 307, 317 Wuhu, 66 Wu-tzu, 17 Yalu River, 48, 49 Y a n g Shih-hsiang, 255 Yangtze Patrol Troops, 327 Yangtze River area, 27, 90, 186, 187, 290; strategic importance, 9, 61, 66, 99, 232, 241-242; troops, 22, 126, 189, 232; maneuvers, 155; disaffected troops, 245, 27on

"Yellow Peril," 170, 180 Yen Hsi-shan, 301, 316 Yin-ch'ang, 59, 265; career, 104, 198, 272; Minister of War, 272; military policy, 272-281, 303, 304; nationalizes Pei-yang Army, 280, 284; and 1911 Revolution, 308, 310, 322, 323, 325-326 Yuan Shih-k'ai, 27, 84, 100, 119, 125, 14S, 153, 161, 173, 190, 265, 271; and semi-personal armies, 23, 71, 81, 83, 138, 285, 339; forms Pei-yang Army, 39, 140; reformer, 54, 74, 75, 123-124, 131, 137, 139, 170, 194, 260; trains modern troops, 60, 73, 76-78, 104, 105, 121-122, 124-125, 136, 143, 144, 200-201, 203-209, 214, 225228, 232, 238, 288; career, 73-78, 82, 138-139, 167, 168, 216, 254; enemies, 74, 144, 168, 210, 213, 219; patrons, 74, 75, 138, 139, 165, 213, 251; commands Newly Created Army, 75, 76; military concepts and proposals, 75, 77-78, 122, 141-143, 179, 191, 200-201, 227, 252n; military schools, 77, 144-145, 146, 151, 202-203, 209, 227; "father of the warlords," 79; president of the Republic, 79, 336; principal officers of, 79-80; military finances, 82, 141, 143, 201, 209-210; political power, 82, 122-123, 126-127, 138-139, 140, 156, 165, 168, 171, 183, 197-198, 200, 210-214, 215-217, 251-252, 254-256, 272, 285, 339-340; and coup d'etat, 97-98, 98n; and Boxer Rebellion, 112, 116, 123-124; obtains Self-strengthening Army, 126-127; dismissed, 258, 259, 290; recalled, 283, 308-310; and 1911 Revolution, 312-315, 326, 330-336; death, 337; see also Chang Chihtung, Newly Created Army, Peiyang Army and clique Yii-lang, Prince, 263, 264, 266 Yung-cheng Emperor, 14 Yunnan, 9, 12, 88, 159, 232-233, 249n

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