Riot Control: Materiel and Techniques 0811714896, 9780811714891

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USING MEN

Trends and Challenges

THE DECADE MARKING the beginning of man’s conquest of outer space has also been! a period of unprecedented, world-wide mob violence. Over but a few short years in the U.S., more citizens than ever before have witnessed large-scale civil disobedience, student unrest, racial disturbances and other manifestations of mass social instability and discontent. The assassination of prominent figures has culminated in rioting, looting, fire-bombing, and bloodshed in the Nation’s capitol. The end may not yet be in sight. Everywhere today, law enforcement concerns itself with the possibilities of the escalated, planned-violence situation, conceivably one of real or incipient insurrection and patterned along urban guerrilla-warfare concepts. The increasing militancy of minority and extremist groups has placed U.S. law enforcement in a “‘crisis”’ situation, necessitating substantial Federal funding of special programs which, with: growing public support, point toward better law enforcement and new tactical and strategic approaches for countering civil disturbances. The tactics, weapons and organization needed for today’s challenge are quasi-military in nature, and largely foreign to conventional American police operations of the post-World War decades.

NECESSITY

FOR FOLLOWING

MILITARY

PRINCIPLES

The adaptation by American civil law enforcement of proven military principles governing the training, organization, tactical deployment and other measures necessary when sizable numbers of men are engaged against large-scale, organized mass violence has been, and is, difficult. The transition from a loosely-knit highly individualistic police organization to tightly-disciplined units interacting as squads, platoons, etc., is in direct contrast to most routine law enforcement operations. Police

officials have usually come up “‘through the ranks,”’ and do not act, direct, or organize routine policing actions in the military manner. The effectiveness of riot command

TRENDS

AND

CHALLENGES

15

and performance have suffered, accordingly. This factor combined with a previous lack of political and public support, has been the major obstacle to efficient civil police riot-control operations. Currently, regardless of political or self-imposed restraints, desires of elected officials, or past conceptions of the police role in a democratic society, civil law enforcement agencies must train, organize and operate along modified military lines to meet the challenges presented by large-scale riot control operations so often accompanied by armed violence.

SWIFT

POLICE

RESPONSE

CRUCIAL

As in warfare, the role of the police field-operation or riot commander is the crucial one. His timely, correct reaction to the situation, experience in command,

and

good judgment coupled with sound organizational planning, training, logistical support, and high departmental morale are the essential success elements in modern counter-riot operations. Control of violent civil disorders involving large segments of the population, especially in congested urban areas, requires disciplined, aggressive, police counter-action which at the same time adheres to the basic civil law enforcement “‘necessary-minimum-force”’ precept. Law violators must be arrested and processed within existing legal frameworks by the exercise of reasonable force. Police reaction must be instant and in strength, when possible or forseeable, even though normal law enforcement functions may have to be curtailed during the emer-

PROBLEM PLACARD STAVES Note the use by Japanese police of curved aluminum shields with one-handed police batons. The students are also equipped with hard helmets. The large staves of the signs give them greater

“reach” than the police. This type confrontation is reminiscent of medieval warfare. The police in this instance would be in better tactical position if liquid-type tear-gas projectors such as the Chemical Mace @® were used to avoid physical contact and enable offensive instead of defensive

tactics.

16

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

gency. It is essential that control be immediately established in all parts of the involved area in order to prevent a riot escalation that necessitates back-up military intervention. Police should not be denied access to any area of the disturbance or limited in the use of nonlethal and other weapons due to political pressures, so that they can achieve these basic objectives. If sufficient forces are not initially available, they must be assembled prior to any offensive tactics. Inadequate police strength or indecisive tactics only aggravate the situation. Any initiative lost to rioters must be swiftly regained, and all tactics and strategy should point in this direction. Delay and procrastination in making tactical decisions and in taking firm action to suppress the rioting will create a cancerous ‘‘brushfire’’ effect. that usually spreads beyond civil police capability to control. The year 1968 witnessed fewer massive, riot-control operations involving National Guard and Army units, despite an increasing number of potentially riot-triggering incidents. Prompt police reaction to such situations which in preceding years might have evolved into full-scale mob violence, effectively contained the majority of incidents.

MILITARY

BACK-UP

PROGRAMS

On the Federal level, the seriousness of the situation has finally been recognized, irrespective of the political factors that prevented earlier action. The Defense Department has set up the Directorate of Civil Disturbance and Planning headed by a Lieutenant General and operating with a control center in the Pentagon. Nationwide surveys and studies have been made to increase military and civil law enforcement riot-control capabilities, and to cut down the time lag in committing National Guard and Army units into action. The U.S. Army Military Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia is conducting courses in civil-disturbance control for Army, National Guard, state and city police officers. Increased riot training has been ordered and given to regular Army, Reserve and National Guard units. Special weapons and equipment have been allocated, irrespective of the demands. of the Vietnam war. The scope of all military training has been increased to cover physical security, sabotage, sniping and unconventional warfare tactics. More recently, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has been authorized, by a directive and grant from the office of the U.S. Attorney General, to disseminate technical. knowledge and provide consultant services on nonlethal riot weaponry and allied riot-control measures. The basic back-up function of the military remains founded on the proposition that Federal intervention will be ordered only when a state requests it to support its civil law enforcement agencies. Civil law enforcement and riot suppression remains, basically, a function of municipal and state governments. Although the constitution empowers the Federal Government to “protect” states against domestic violence only when the state requests it, the Army nevertheless has authority to move its forces to Federal property within any state should it wish to do so asa riot precaution. In the spring of 1968, Congress enacted legislation to strengthen, fund, and generally increase the effectiveness of American civil law enforcement. The initial grants and emphasis have been to augment civil police riot-control capability. This is belated recognition that although civil disturbances encountered by a police department are local as far as the police chief on the scene is concerned, they are created by national conditions and political decisions not within local control. This long-awaited and vital legislation has also reaffirmed the fact that riot control in our democratic

TRENDS

MASS

AND

POLICE-CROWD

CHALLENGES

17

CONFRONTATION

This is a very frequent street scene in India. The Indian riot police can be seen in the foreground blocking the approach of the mob with their /athis (long riot batons), held in their hands between

files. The Indian police have made long and frequent use of CN-type tear gas and favor it for all dispersal operations where charges of their /athi-wielding formations fail to achieve their purpose. The huge crowds and demonstrations seen so often in India necessitate the use of large full-time police units utilizing military organization and discipline. Burning-type tear-gas grenades and 37mm riot guns are used for most gas concentration build-up. The new “Fogger’’-type gas generators now in use in the U.S. would be excellent for their purposes and enable use of obscuring smoke and gas agents in a much more economical and better tactical manner. The CS gas has been tested in India, but it is not there favored over the milder CN agent. Press reports indicate that Indian police officials fear that the severe effects of the CS-type agent would create extreme panic conditions, which in large crowds could result in many casualties from trampling.

society is a civil police function needing broad Federal—and general public support— particularly during the current era of world-wide social unrest and social change.

POINTERS

FOR POLICE

PREPAREDNESS

Although strong Federal support for containment of civil disorder is in the offing, those civil police departments most likely to solve their own riot control problems without Federal back-up or intervention are the ones that:

18

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

(1) Have the moral, political and financial support of the citizens and officials within their ownjurisdictions. (2) Have developed the intelligence capacity to keep fingers on the public pulse and national trends. (3) Have worked out mutual support arrangements with all surrounding police departments, supporting municipal agencies, and the State Guard. (4) Have undertaken detailed planning, logistical preparations and established and tested communication procedures involving all supporting municipal, state, and Federal agencies. (5) Have conducted department-wide training and planning, re-equipping, to enable instant, forceful reaction, and mobilization against a civil-disturbance threat.

(6) Have set up command and control centers for all riot-disaster type operations, conducted training exercises in their operation, and resolved all details relating to internal communications and public relations. (7) Have made adequate preparation for handling and processing large numbers of arrestees. (8) Have checked out and tested command personnel, and pre-assigned those most suited for riot operations to posts of command and responsibility. (9) Have considered, thoroughly, in all planning and contingency operations, the physical security, sabotage and organized-insurrection tactics that may be encountered. (10) Have developed and maintained a high departmental morale and efficiency level. (11) Have worked out unified and joint command and control problems. (12) Have established a rumor-control center and method of disseminating correct information to the public during riot emergencies. (13) Have established a graduated system of alerts, based on previouslyestablished warning factors that will permit an orderly, prompt assembly of offduty personnel, State forces, and other support units. (14) Have organized an overall riot-contro] program that enables use of reserves and other units to maintain police protection in non-riot areas so as to free regular personnel for riot contact and permit periodic relief of command and line personnel during protracted operations. (15)

Have conducted scenario training and mobilization exercises that test out

logistic responsiveness, communications, effectiveness of command control techniques and organizational effectiveness, followed by in-depth critiques. An analysis of the above and other elements necessary for effective large-scale civil-disturbance operations usually indicates that most departments in riot-prone areas are not yet fully ready or capable of coping with large-scale civil disorders, alone. This expertise will develop but its growth is dependent on local and political factors peculiar to each jurisdiction. Those departments most prepared are those that have already experienced major riot emergencies and have profited from a critical self-evaluation oftheir experiences. The character and nature of many civil disturbances has changed during the past year. Traditional formation-type tactics and methods of dispersing large crowds and masses of rioters are still necessary. However, these tactics are of little value against disorders involving moving bands of rioters engaged in looting, fire-bombing, sniping, and planned ambush of police personnel. This change in rioter technique necessitates a new police approach, one primarily based on the aggressive patrolling, special-task-force, counter-sniper team concept.

TRENDS

PARAMILITARY

AND

CHALLENGES

FORCE

19

POSSIBILITIES

Special paramilitary-type riot forces have long been employed in foreign countries, but they are a relatively new concept to U.S. law enforcement. At present, some major departments are moving in this direction and have organized, out of necessity, special civil disturbance units, usually composed of police temporarily withdrawn from other routine duties and formed around a nucleus of specially trained officers. This form of special riot force is an expedient method of developing a fast, limited strike capability to contain riots and potentially violent situations. All police force members should receive special riot training, but forseeable in the immediate future is the possible organization of permanent, special riot forces that will be integral to each major police organization. These forces will probably be composed of specially selected and trained officers maintained on a continuous stand-by basis for crowd and riot control, barricade-sniper situations, and other incidents involving planned armed violence. The predicted violent period ahead indicates the need for the formation of such professional police riot units as a command unit separated from normal policing duties. The permanent riot force would preferably be composed of carefully-screened volunteers (recruited possibly on an incentive-pay basis). Counter-sniper teams, bomb-disposal units, and other special services could be incorporated under the same command. The size, exact composition, and tactical scope of such a force will vary with departments. Constant training, testing and evaluation of tactics, techniques, equipment and physical security should be routine. This force would perform a police function comparable to that of the fire department in the public-safety field. The cost of maintaining, equipping and training such a unit would be amortized, many times, in lives, and property saved in those areas where mob violence is an ever-present potential. The special ‘‘built-in” riot-force concept provides the best means for control of civil disturbance and violence in a democratic society. It eliminates the necessity of a national police force, or of Army and Guard units being maintained on a semi-permanent basis to insure public order. Current, nationally-directed programs to prevent riots provide only an assist to the local police agencies faced with civil-disturbance problems. This aspect of Twentieth Century American law enforcement must be met and solved at the local departmental level. The control and prevention of riots and civil disturbances is a distinct police science that cannot be mastered in a haphazard manner within only a short time. The chapters to follow mainly deal with the tactical and equipment aspects of civildisturbance control. They are not all-inclusive, but they cover a combination of police and military tactics which may be directed to the maintenance of public order and domestic peace.

Organizing Effective Forces

and Patrols

OVER TWO THOUSAND years ago, Alexander the Great defeated Darius, the King of the Persians, in one of history’s first recorded major battles(Battle of Issus, 333 BC). Alexander, with a force of 30,000 well-trained and disciplined men, defeated those of Darius, numbering according to historians, over 600,000. The secret of Alexander’s

success was his use of trained, disciplined battle formations based around what became known

as the Macedonian

Phalanx. The phalanx consisted of massed, small,

well-disciplined and trained infantry units, maneuvering and executing all of the present-day conventional-types of military foot movements and formations, on command. They were screened on their flanks by cayalry and light bow-and-arrow armored infantry units. ; The vast Persian horde charged the center of Alexander’s position in an irregular line without any unit formations, discipline, nor any kind of maneuver. Alexander was able to chop his enemy apart, piece by piece, while retaining the integrity of his phalanx formations. Darius was completely defeated and escaped with only about 4,000 of his original forces intact. Historians state that the undisciplined mass of the forces of Darius was so great that not only were.they unable to maneuver to counter Alexander’s tactics, but they were in such great numbers and so disorganized that they hindered one another in their attempted movements during the heat of battle.

FORMATIONS The present-day formations used by the military and police are little different in tactical principle and employment from those of Alexander. This is the basic reason that small, disciplined police units, operating as a team, flexing to meet changing situsations, are able to disperse mobs greatly outnumbering them. It is interesting to note that modern riot forces are also equipped with shields, helmets, and body armor in much the same manner as the Macedonians, the only basic difference being in qual-

ORGANIZING

EFFECTIVE

FORCES

AND

PATROLS

21

ity of armor and the usage of firearms, long batons, and tear-gas launching equipment in place of the spear, sling and bow and arrow. Furthermore, modern riot-control formations are not assigned the mission of destroying an enemy, but mob dispersal. By training, temperament, and profession, the police officer is individualistic. He operates alone or, usually, with another officer during most of his law enforcement career, consequently, he has difficulty adjusting to team-work operations such as riot control formations, tactics and maneuver, without specialized training. This training must be undertaken at regular intervals and practiced consistently to enable successful mob-control tactics in the streets. Such training also results in good morale and aggressive, confident police performance.

PERSONAL

CLOTHING

AND

EQUIPMENT

The riot policeman who operates in formations should wear a protective helmet, gloves, and preferably a coverall-type, special-issue washable uniform of moderate cost. The side-arm is optional. Some departments prefer that men in crowd contact and demonstration control duty be without firearms. Paratrooper-type boots and elimination of all belts, straps and objects that can be seized by rioters are also options. Special pouches can be built in the uniform to hold Chemical Mace-type units, as illustrated.

Basic Principles Basic principles of police confrontations with large mobs evolve around steps relating to priority of force. The first steps are the show of force and the employment of tactical riot police formations to cause mob dispersal and the seizure of mob leaders. These steps are followed by the employment of nonlethal special weapons, riot agents, and finally, fire power, if and when absolutely necessary. Basic squad, and larger formations used in dispersal, are also employed tactically in clearing operations after the occurrence of violence, and as a follow-up to retirement of a mob from the contact area. Patrols and formations are used continually to break the mob up into smaller segments and finally, used in preventing the mob’s re-assembly after it has once been dispersed. The types of formations are varied enough to enable outnumbered police units to conserve their manpower at all times. When a mob is confronted by the appearance of a formation of uniformed, disciplined law-enforcement officers, the psychological impact is very great. Although the public is used to seeing individual police officers in their daily duty routine, crowd

22

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

INTERLOCKED

ARM

FORMATION

AND

TECHNIQUES

EXTENDED

BATON

FORMATION

(Left): This tight formation is useful against a passive non-violent crowd and is used to deny areas, entrances, etc. The command to open ranks and assume a ready, Port Arms position with the long riot batons is given the moment the situation assumes a violence potential. The men in the rear of the line should be armed with grenades, Mace units, and 37mm gas guns to back up the line. (Right): This is a useful method of blocking off a peaceful-type demonstration as long as the crowd is kept out of physical contact with the line and will react to bull horn instructions to do so. Police manpower can be conserved by its use.

members and rioters are particularly affected by the sudden appearance of organized units of police officers, en masse. This impact is very effective during the initial showof-force stage when the crowd is usually ordered to disperse. If sufficient manpower is not available, mob contact should be delayed by the use of other tactics (obscuring smoke and riot-control agents, etc.) until such time as sufficient manpower is available to permit use of formations in the tactical manners for which they are designed. The basic military-type police riot-control formations are built around squads, platoons, and companies. The squad is the smallest, integral operating unit. It can be sub-divided into two sections for certain operations where weakening the squad’s full strength is not dangerous. \ The size of police squads will vary, but the military squad strength of 12 men per squad is very adaptable for law enforcement. The 12-man squad consists of a squad leader, assistant squad leader, and ten men. The police squad of this size can split up and successfully operate in two 6-man sections for special missions such as patrolling etc., one commanded by the patrol leader and the other section by the assistant patrol leader. : The 3-squad platoon is basically the smallest tactically-operable riot-control unit that should be formed,by any sizable police organization. For riot-control operations, some departments prefer the four-squad system using two squads in line in contact with the rioters, one squad in support of the line, and the fourth squad as a reserve for emergencies and other contingencies. The choice as to a three-squad platoon or a four-squad one will depend upon the individual department, its estimated needs and its manpower situation. A company is normally composed of three platoons, and the organization can be scaled up into battalions and larger units, if numbers are sufficient and the magnitude of the proposed riot problem and its estimation so justifies. Basically, the formations used by the squad are the same as those used by the platoon, company, and larger units, the only difference being in numbers. It should be emphasized that police ought not to be either encouraged or permitted

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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to operate as individuals in mob control. By operating in disciplined formations, they are able to achieve the greatest tactical effect with a unification of effort and efficiency, while at the same time they thus provide themselves with the best basic protection. The best results from riot-control formations can be achieved, when the same squad members are trained to work together in the same unit at all times. Each man can then be assigned a place and number in the formation. In most of the formations, the Number 2 man will be at the apex of the wedge, or in the center, flanked by Number 3 and 4. Numbers 2,3,4 of the squad should be the largest and best physical specimens, selected for their courage and calmness in the face of mob excitement. This is particularly important when employing the offensivewedge formation where No. 2, flanked by Numbers 3 and 4, must provide the cutting edge at the apex.

PLATOON

WEDGE

This is normally the largest single police unit that will be used for offensive riot operations. This unit consists of three 12-man squads, two in the line and one in reserve. Its organization and armament permits the widest range of degrees-of-force at the commander's option. The men in the front ranks can be armed with side-arms, Chemical Mace belt-type units and wooden 36”’ riot batons, or Shok batons. Their squad leaders ase in immediate support back of the line armed with riot shotguns, or large Chemical Mace dispersers or gas guns. The squad column in reserve carries riot guns, shotguns with gas grenade-launchers, scope-sighted rifles and carbines, gas and smoke grenades and other optional special equipment. The platoon commander and his assistant carry a bull horn, walkie-talkie, binoculars, and other signaling devices and command equipment. In the rear an armored personel carrier of the R2 type carries reserve manpower and countersniper teams, special equipment such as armored vests, reserve gas munitions, and special longrange public address and Curdler sound systems, lighting equipment, etc.

Tactical Suggestions (1) All changes in formation should be made with precision and executed in unison. This can only be achieved by drill. (2) The number and size of the formations depends on the magnitude of the operation. Riot formations must be accompanied by extra personnel assigned to take care of all factors incident to the movement. This could include: arrest teams, prisoner vans, first aid men, photographers, press officers, etc. The formation should not be delayed nor broken up to perform ‘“‘housekeeping” chores incidental to the action. Any delay involved in making arrests, evacuating prisoners from the scene, and in

ws

§

ORGANIZING EFFECTIVE FORCES AND PATROLS

25

taking any other “‘on-the-spot”’ action necessary, but not directly connected with the operation of the formation, will decrease the effectiveness of the formation in its degree-of-force role. Delay in arresting and prisoner-evacuating procedures can further incite the crowd or mob to violence. (3) Generally, the base of firepower and riot-agent dissemination should be behind the line of contact, and located in support or reserve units. The commander should have the immediate capability to employ these further degrees of force—they should be under his direct control and, once committed to a course of action, he must

have on-the-spot authority to use them. 1 pace

‘@ 1. The

Wedge

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Diagonal

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3. The

Line

THREE BASIC FORMATIONS: WEDGE, DIAGONAL, AND LINE The interval or amount of space between men in the three basic formations is indicated. A pace is from 2-1/2 to 3 feet. This interval can also be measured and “dressed” by use of the basic weapon such as the length of the long riot baton as a control. Note: All details on formation of the wedge, diagonal, and other basic riot control formations

can be found in U.S. Army field manual, CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND DISASTERS. This manual can be secured for a nominal cost by writing U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. and asking for it by name.

(4) During employment of formations such as the wedge, men have a tendency to bunch up as resistance mounts and forward movement slows. The wings of the wedge tend to close toward one another. The commander must recognize this situation and delay forward momemtum or reinforce the line to overcome points of resistance so that the V-shape of the wedge, with its cutting edge at the apex, is maintained. The same procedure is necessary when performing a diagonal sweep or peeling operation. In all cases, the crowd must be permitted time to disperse. Pressure from the back of the mob to the front, toward the police line, can be relieved by use of

either formations, simultanously penetrating from the flanks and rear, cutting off crowd segments and forcing them toward exits. (5) Complete squads, platoons and larger units that have trained together should be used in mob contact. These units should not be broken up, especially if other elements can be assigned for back-up and housekeeping details. Every effort should be

HIGHLINE COLLEGE

LIRRARY

26

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

made to utilize lesser-trained men in holding, blockading and similar operations, so that trained formations can remain intact. (6) When a formation advance is made against a large crowd, it should be done only after study of the crowd depth and mass. This includes observation of the areas of crowd escape or exits available, and the temper of the crowd. Special care should be taken to determine the effect of pressure by those in the rear of the crowd on those frontal elements in direct contact with police. The formation should not be employed if there are indications that the mass, mob counter-pressure and numbers in the rear would cause it to stall after an initial penetration. (7) Unexpected or heavy counter-resistance to offensive movement of the formation that causes it to stall, should result in a slow retreat to an area of security. This is especially true if no immediate reinforcements are available, or where there are no other means available to break up the crowd mass in the rear, such as by the use of gas. All retreat movements should be made slowly, by the entire formation at the same time, moving backward, still facing the crowd. There should not be any breaking of ranks or evidence of police panic during such a strategic retreat. (8) Training and team spirit should be such that if any member of the formation is attacked or restrained by any mob member, counter-attack on the assailant by men nearest or from the reserve, is instantaneous and automatic. This also fosters the im-

pression that the mob is dealing with a unit, not an individual. (9) During operations in which the forward police units are in contact and the preparatory command is given to launch tear gas, the support and reserve elements can mask first and advance through the line, assuming contact, permitting the unmasked men to retire for masking. (10) Maneuverable vehicles can be used at the center or the apex of riot formations to provide a base for firepower or gas employment. They are also usable to block and protect police formations from attack or penetration by mob vehicles, but generally, unarmored vehicles should not operate alone against mobs. Unarmored police vans, fire trucks and other support vehicles are vulnerable to mob damage and should be protected by foot elements. (11) When the resistance of the mob or mob mass is great and the mob contact elements of the formation are in danger of mob penetration or forced to increase their interval, the support elements can be ordered up to reinforce the line, taking positions between men on the line and slightly to the rear of the assault line. (12)

Mounted police are valuable in offensive and defensive crowd-mob control

due to the tactical and psychological advantage of the horseman who has benefit of superior observation of the action, instant mobility, plus the benefit of the horse’s size and the mob’s fear of the animal. Some departments prefer to use mounted police only defensively or in patrolling. Trained mounted units nevertheless can operate in much the same formations as foot elements, but they should then be protected on the flanks and the rear by foot units, who also must be prepared to assume the burden of arrests and prisoner disposition. Mounted police should not individually commit themselves so as to be split-off and surrounded. Foot units must protect the horses from hamstringing or other attacks. On hard surfaces, ball bearings, marbles and other materials can be thrown, causing the horses to slip and fall. (13) Another most valuable aspect of training in the use of formations is the experience and confidence that is developed by police commanders. Many are for the first time exposed in this manner to the problems of maintaining discipline, deployment, manuever, timing and tactics that are always present when units of officers, acting as a team, are used as a degree-of-force.

ORGANIZING

EFFECTIVE

FORCES

AND

PATROLS

27

Training Reference U.S. Army Manual 19-15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters (March 1968) is available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Cost including postage, one dollar. This manual will serve for all training needs in the use of riot formations.

RIOT PATROLS In civil law enforcement, the mass violence incidental to a riot action that requires unit patrolling is an extreme situation. For the military, it is the normal procedure. Conventional riot-control methods involving use of formations are generally directed at the cohesive-type crowd or mob where large masses of people assemble and threaten or commit collective acts of violence on or at some selected group or target. If police action is not swift enough, or of insufficient force, the cohesive mob can degenerate into small groups, spreading out over an ever larger area, committing acts of violence, burning and looting. In this situation, there is no single compelling force, or interest, holding the rioters en masse, and the police problem becomes much more severe, involving numerous sporadic, separate small actions that will vary.in violence. Sometimes, aggressive police patrolling will suffice. In other situations, riot-control agents and firearms will have to be used against looters, arsonists, and armed rioters. The fluid-type riot action does not always erupt or come about as the result of police action disintegrating a large mob which was originally incited by some triggering incident. Instead, the catalytic incident, itself, may be staged or used for launching a

guerrilla-type action by separate organized groups, operating under skilled leadership, using planned diversionary tactics, or using the conventional! mob assembly as a means of diverting attention and drawing off police strength. Police counter-action in these situations is much more difficult and demands great mobility, more manpower, the use of counter-sniper teams, and more heavily-armed combat-type foot patrols, operating with special vehicle support. Individually-armed officers operating free of unit command should not be used in such riot situations. Generally, police action against the “‘hit-and-run”’ tactics of rioters, necessitates multiple small-scale patrol operations. Provided basic police training and organization have been planned along these lines, the 12-man squad, organized into two sections that can be further split into smaller 3-man segments for house clearing and other operations, is a most effective tactical unit for riot-patrol operations. The 12-man squad, operating and equipped as an integral combat unit, is generally large enough to be able to protect itself and perform aggressively and effectively in the most violent, fluid riot operations. Although organizations of police squads into larger units may be necessary in some instances, the attendant problems of command and coordinating action become formidable. Hastily-organized larger police units, above the squad-level size, forced to operate in a hostile, fast-moving riot action involving use of firearms, manuever, and coordinated tactics, are not usually too effec-

tive. Such larger-units tactics are best left to the National Guard or military elements. Past experience further indicates that police should never be committed to any type of violent riot action in units of less than three men. Such a small unit, armed with riot

shotguns, can still provide limited self-protection and perform certain patrolling and policing actions. Vehicular patrols of four men perform the equivalent of smallestunit function.

28

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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TECHNIQUES

Patrolling Important Active, aggressive, patrolling is mandatory after a civil disturbance has broken out and the affected area has been cordoned off. Patrolling should immediately begin in secure areas around the disturbance to prevent the circulation of unauthorized persons in and out of the riot-action scene, and to prevent the assembly and formations of crowds, etc. In the disturbed area, patrols perform a double mission. They provide active, up-to-date intelligence of rioter actions and, when used in sufficient numbers, act as a psychological deterrent to rioter activity. Blanketing a trouble area with numerous foot and motor patrols, known as the “‘saturation technique’’ is a very effective means of quelling a riot or potential disturbance, giving the impression to rioters that the police are everywhere, and there in strength. Police presence, during the fluid-type violent riots, when manpower resources are low, can only be maintained by use of small foot and motorized patrols. However, if reserve forces capable of instant response to calls for assistance are not available, or maintained, this type of patrolling should be limited.

Types of Patrols Suggested Three-man foot patrols or four-man motor patrols are usable over predetermined, assigned areas. These patrols have only a limited capability in the face of superior numbers, or armed force, and must be in constant radio contact with instant-response

or on-call units, located in the area. Motor patrolling is a normal police function and it is usually more easily augmented during civil disorders. The four-man car unit is the best means of mobile patrolling due to the need for security of the vehicle and its communication capability, while other members are investigating an incident, etc. However, both foot and motor patrols must usually be utilized, as vehicular traffic

A POLICE TACTICAL SQUAD This 15-man tactical-riot squad is armed with 26” Shok batons and side-arms. The squad also has a shotgun, and tear-gas capability. The squad leader (with bull horn):has available a complete range of force and optians. Note that the men are wearing protective general-duty helmets and heavy, dark-plastic eye protection.

ORGANIZING

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FORCES

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29

often becomes impossible in some areas. It is good practice to assign small foot patrols time limits, and to plot their movements on maps with check-in systems established, to provide certain specified coverage. Movement of motor patrols should be designated in such manner that they will cross the line of direction of small foot patrols. Shortage of communications between fixed posts can be largely overcome by such active motor patrolling. Personnel in the vehicles also serve as a back-up to other units and guard posts. Equally important is the constant reconnaisance and intelligence functions that the mobile patrolling performs over large areas, especially in a fluid situation. —~A ten or twelve-man police combat patrol is capable of offensive and necessaryforce police measures, provided it is well led and has communications and special armament, such as riot shotguns, gas and smoke munitions, and at least one man with

carbine or a scope-sighted rifle. The squad leader can be armed with an automatic weapon or have a man with this capability under his control. Ballistic helmets, protective vests, shields, and gas masks are optional. During violent actions where gunfire, fire bombs, etc., are present or a potential, the squad should not weaken itself by normal policing action such as performing arrests. Instead, special back-up arrest teams or support, should be called. Patrol actions during major riots must be carefully plotted and designated from the field command post. Their movement, activity, and positions must be covered on the situation map and continuous control of patrolling operations maintained. Communications should be constant, and the flow of information in both directions covered by

DOG

FACING

SIDEWALK CROWD, FROM HANDLER

AWAITS

ORDERS

A policeman with a well-trained dog need not fear being outnumbered or overwhelmed when confronted by a hostile sidewalk group of this size or even larger. The man-dog combination will normally accomplish the same mission that would take a number of uniformed police to achieve, and with a minimum of force. On verbal command the dog will attack or restrain any individual in the group who indicates hostility toward him or the handler. At this stage the dog is passive and indicates no hostility, but he can be changed into an aggressive animal by a word from his policeman teammate. If the handler should be felled by a blow or injured, the dog will instinctively attack the assailant. Normally the dog is kept on the leash. On special occasions, such as the pursuit of a fleeing criminal, the handler will release the dog, who will bring the fugitive down and hold him until the handler arrives to take charge. In crowd control, the dog will be controlled on the leash at all times.

4:9)

30

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

normal security precautions. As in warfare, the selection of and the capabilities and judgments of squad leaders are vital. Foot patrols of squad size are especially valuable in areas of dense population. Even though limited in their range of operations, they are the best means of maintaining police pressure. When numerous patrols are in concurrent operation, they are best controlled and coordinated by means of special officers assigned as mobile patrol coordinators or field-command supervisors. If available, helicopter and small planes can be used to perform surveillance and reconnaissance over the riot-affected areas. They can also be useful to ground commanders in directing police movements. Lines of patrol communications should be as direct as possible to the field commander on the scene. Generally, water patrolling by police and auxiliary craft performs the same function as foot and motor patrols in areas adjacent to a riot area where docks, piers, bridges and similar installations are subject to riot concentration, sabotage, arson, and looting.

BEFORE

AND

AFTER

COMMAND

FROM

DOG

HANDLER

These before-and-after pictures strikingly illustrate what,the troublemaker in the crowd or a rioter

sees when he is confronted by the dog-handler team. One word of command has turned the passive, seemingly uninterested German Shepherd police dog (left) into a potent physical and

psychological weapon (right). The handler, by letting out the leash to its full extent, can slowly advance on the crowd. During this period the dog is snarling, snapping, growling or barking. He will be moving on his leash in an action perimeter of about 20 feet controlled from the center by the handler. Persons confronting this spectacle will normally “melt away.’ In such a situation, and depending on the local ordinances regarding use of police dogs, any person who is bitten is guilty of a misdemeanor and automatically is under arrest. The dog is a police weapon, and like a firearm he can be employed in such manuevers so as to bring discredit on the police department. Used properly, however, they are invaluable for crowd control, mob dispersal, and patrol and security duties during and after civil disturbances. Those departments with dog-handler teams available should consider them as valuable additions to the riot weaponry and tactical field and plan their use in civil distrubances, accordingly.

ORGANIZING

EFFECTIVE

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31

The canine patrol is a very important asset in most civil-disturbance situations. The presence of dog-handler teams is especially effective during nightime patrolling when full advantage can be taken of the dog’s keener perception and alertness. After a violent action has subsided, the canine patrol is very valuable in preventing reforming of crowds, maintaining normal traffic flow, and re-establishing the police presence. The psychological effect and benefits of aggressive canine patrolling activities, during and immediately following a riot, far outweighs occasional public resentment as to their use, and at the same time they conserve police manpower. The mission of the police patrol in a riot operation should be clearly defined, understood, and sustained by the overall command. A single patrol cannot arrest, process prisoners, undertake crowd dispersal, combat snipers, maintain police presence in an area, do community service and public-relations missions, take care of civilian casualties, provide fire-fighter protection, and engage in traffic control, all at the same tume. The patrol should have limited specific missions assigned it during a riot operation, and these do not necessarily entail normal functions. A patrol is a special tacti-cal formation that can be a means of buying time until additional support arrives or some other command option is exercised-The patrol is only as good as its manpower and training permit it to be. The ultimate success of police riot-patrolling operations depends on command decisions as to its missions, and its own capability. Too often this is not well understood.

Tactical Patrolling Suggestions Patrols should maintain constant contact with each other, their supervisors, and command centers. They should report on a regular, routine basis and, if possible, when faced with a special situation, should communicate it prior to taking any action. Once a combat action is initiated, the command headquarters must be kept informed of the evolving status of the situation. Any contemplated action that cannot be performed successfully due to lack of patrol numbers, armament, or strength, should not be initiated. Delaying tactics, such as disciplined retreat, use of riot-gas agents, obscuring smoke, and utilization of temporary defensive positions, should be employed until support units arrive. If there is lack of knowledge of conditions in a riot-affected area, this should be corrected prior to any deep penetration by patrol units. The use of helicopters, observation posts, and sometimes scouting by plainclothes officers, plus all other means should be used to gather intelligence. Aggressive patrol action is mandatory, but it should only be undertaken if conditions are such as to promise success. Every means should be taken to prevent patrols from becoming isolated and cut off. Patrol leaders, prior to being committed to operations where they are out of visual and, immediate contact with other units, should have knowledge of other adjoining patrol assignments, locations of fixed guard posts, roadblocks, and support forces in the surrounding area. Street maps with this information plotted on them, available for inspection prior to a patrol’s penetration of an affected area, are very useful. Special counter-sniper teams can be attached to patrol units to meet any anticipated armed resistance. Such teams with their special equipment and training are the best police means of overcoming lightly-armed attacks by rioters. The chain of command must be definitely decided, prior to any action where patrol units or any other support forces are committed. Movement through the streets by foot patrols must be done with the men maintaining intervals between themselves, regardless of the formation employed. Bunching up, or ‘‘freezing”’ in position when subjected to unexpected gunfire, must be prevented.

32

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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During movement, some men must be assigned to watch roof tops and upper areas of buildings on both sides of the street while others must be designated to cover the ground-level flanks and rear. The patrol leader, normally, takes position near the head of the patrol during forward street movement, where no resistance is being encountered. He maintains surveillance to the front. The second in command covers from the rear of the formation. — Generally, at least one ‘‘point man” precedes or covers the patrol leader, irrespective of the formation used. When the patrol encounters large number of potentially hostile individuals, the leader orders a type of closed formation, as best suited for security or dispersal. He assumes whatever position in the unit necessary to maintain command. Changes in formation are always ordered prior to crowd contact, if possible. When gunfire is encountered, the men should automatically take all available cover and await orders. The patrol leader should delay any decisive counter-action until he has time to estimate the situation and contact other support and command units. Indiscriminate return fire by squad members is not advisable, especially if the source of the fire is unknown. Covering-fire at known targets can be ordered to enable the other patrol elements to change to pre-selected, better tactical positions. When a patrol encounters heavy resistance and gunfire, immediate cover should be taken, coupled with calls for support. During this period, obscuring smoke and covering fire can be used for retreat or movement to better tactical and holding positions. The area must be sealed off so that house-clearing and securing actions can be undertaken by more numerous forces. While isolated sniping incidents can be handled by smaller units, heavy simultaneous, hostile fire encountered from numerous positions

entails military-type counter-action, with equivalent heavier armaments. The squad patrol, when encountering an isolated sniper and fixing his location, should be able to eliminate or apprehend him with its own resources. One section can be detailed to cover all exits, the other to provide the covering fire that will enable a search team to enter the building and eliminate the sniper, provided the building oc~.cupants are cooperative and can be evacuated. If the sniper is not or cannot be pinned down in a given room or area, room-to-room search and arrest procedures accompanied by establishment of security over the search areas to be covered will probably necessitate other police support. Vehicles occupied by ‘‘hit-and-run” type snipers can best be controlled by police

roadblocks and identification checks, coupled with car searches for weapons, etc. Police foot patrols can also ambush such vehicles, provided there is time and they are positively identified. Temporary vehicle roadblocks or obscuring smoke can temporarily be used to canalize traffic or block off areas of exit, etc.

ey) ——— A police casualty from sniper fire should be removed from the area at once. Selected ) men, operating under cover fire from the rest of the patrol, may have to be used to carry out the evacuation. All such movement in this situation must be done on command, and not by the spontaneous response of individual patrol members. Tactics to be used, should a casualty be incurred, are best spelled out in advance so that the entire patrol operation is not demoralized or bogged down. Promiscuous gunfire and uncontrolled actions of patrol members in the event of a casualty, must be kept to a minimum. Support can be called in to evacuate casualties once the patrol members have recovered their own wounded and moved them to cover. Patrol security must be maintained not only during action, but during rest stops and other periods of inactivity. Fraternizing with members of the public in the riot area, splitting off to answer calls of nature, eating, maintenance of equipment, and general housekeeping duties with relation to patrol activity should be controlled by the patrol leader. Men with personal problems that necessitate their leaving the pa-

ORGANIZING

EFFECTIVE

FORCES

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33

trol should do so only with permission of the commander. In hostile areas, men should never be permitted to leave the protection of the patrol body, individually, without command clearance. Fatigue is a condition that will be common to men who have been under tension and continuous patrolling for a long period of time. This will take the form of physical and emotional expression and acts which, when coupled with a triggerfinger, can be very detrimental to the police image and tactical job. Commanders are not immune. This means that whenever there is a respite or opportunity during any extended tour of duty, the men should be ordered to rest or take whatever diversionary actionis possible with due regard to the mission and security. The military may have “built-in” security measures and methods of manpower relief, but this is not necessarily the case in a civil-police riot action. The preparation of any patrol for duty in the affected area should not be haphazard. The assistant squad leader can be assigned this task while the leader is getting his orders and briefing. The basic check items are: physical condition of the men, personal armament, equipment, ammunition, and any special equipment to be issued (tear gas, bull horn, gas masks, lights, first aid equipment, etc.), signals to be used, and specific duties of each squad member. This should be followed by a briefing, given by the leader on the situation, mission, and support to be expected, etc. A review of tactical means of accomplishing the mission and reasons, is helpful. The more inexperienced the patrol members, the greater the depth of briefing. Individual combat tactics, plus any and all other subjects that will enable team action and the preservation of discipline, should be covered. If there is not sufficient time to conduct a briefing at the outset, it should be done in transit, or at the first opportunity. Experienced men, who are not used to working together as a team or who are strangers to one another, should be just as thoroughly briefed as those entering a riot action for the first time. Night patrolling is more difficult from both the operational and command viewpoint. Formations used must be tighter and increased all-around security must be maintained during both movements and halts. Initial penetration into hostile riot areas should be slow, and rear support elements must be in close contact to prevent being cut-off. If the night patrols cannot be maintained in sufficient numbers and strength, backed by adequate reserves, they should not be sent on any offensive-type missions, or used in any uncleared areas where armed rioters are known to be present. Night patrol operations should be supplemented by lights from helicopters, flares, from accompanying vehicles and portable spotlights. If some source of artificial light is not available, activity should be strictly limited. Too much dependence Jhould not be placed on street lighting. Generally, due to the extra hazards of nightime foot patrolling, it is best to put more dependence on motor patrols during hours of darkness. Armored vehicles should be used, whenever available. Effective motor patrols should be conducted on a planned basis, but individual vehicles should constantly change routes and schedules within their assigned area to increase effectiveness.

Special Patrol Missions Special riot-patrol missions can consist of the following, (1) Protection of life, property and maintenance of order. (2) Prevention oflooting. (3) Mobile guard at central points and installations. (4) General apprehension of violators.

or combinations:

34

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

(5) (6) (7)

Maintenance of curfew. Vehicle-control measures. Counter-sniper.

(8)

Stop and search for weapons and dangerous, or forbidden articles.

(9)

Crowd dispersal.

(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)

Isolation and containment of given areas. Asa show of force and to maintain police presence. Asa backup to criminal investigation. Handling and evacuation of prisoners. Emergency evacuation missions. Perimeter control of affected areas. :

(16) Protection of fire fighting, communication, and other necessary riot-control auxiliary services. (17) Protection of city and other officials. (18) Special arrest missions.

(19) (20) sures.

Raids. Other special public services necessitating other than routine policing mea-

EMPLOYMENT

OF PSYCHOLOGICAL

AND

PHYSICAL

FORCE

Tactics and techniques for control of civil disturbances are selected to fit the conditions peculiar to each and its degree of violence. The guiding principle behind all civil law enforcement control operations is the use of necessary force. The degree of force to be used, and when and where it is to be applied, are decisions which should be left

to the field commander or chief of police. The commander of a riot operation should, of course, have general guidelines to follow, ones that have been previously established by agreement with civil authorities, but once the riot-control measures are initiated, he should have the authority and political backing to carry out the police mission without any interference or changes in policy. Major riots that have escalated beyond local law enforcement’s ability to contain, have occurred because of police failure or inability to take strong and immediate counter-measures at the time of the triggering incident, or when the mob action first began. Lack of police preparation and training has been a contributing factor, but not the dominant one. Significantly, most civil police failure to contain and stop the spread of mob violence was due to political pressure and the timidity of civil authorities in making decisions, thus causing delays in police reaction. Hence, when the required firm and strong counter-measures had to be taken and finally were authorized due to escalated violence, police manpower and resources (that earlier would have been able to control the situation) were no longer adequate, necessitating the calling in of National Guard units, usually after police had been forced to withdraw from the scenes. If possible, police departments with a riot potential should establish by means of prior written plans and agreement with city officials, their specific authority, guidelines, responsibilities and actions to prevent and/or control civil disturbances. Public pronouncements should be made, accordingly. Successful riot control measures are those of a tactical nature. Political pressures such as occurred in Washington, D.C. during the riots in April, 1968 resulted in orders to police to take a permissive attitude toward looting in the mistaken belief that this would lower mob pressure and

ORGANIZING

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35

aggressiveness. The contrary resulted. Subsequent riots in the same area, however, were quickly put down by firm police and National Guard action and by the use of tear gas. Large-scale police riot operations are best carried out by the organization of a field force, divided into a number of divisions or segments, each a separate command en-

tity, but all operating under the field commander. The tactical riot unit is the strike force. This unit is committed directly against the mob during, and following the Show-Of-Force phase. The strike force maintains its own ready reserves, and bears the brunt of the physical contact and tactical action. It is supplemented by a special reserve, perimeter control forces, and general-duty, housekeeping units. The special reserve unit is kept in a high state of readiness. It is used as a back-up to the strike force and is the field commander’s contingency unit. It must be highly mobile and capable of operating either in support, or as an independent unit. If committed to an action for an extended period, it must be replaced as soon as practicable. Men from special reserve units can be used for some emergency replacements in the strike force, but normally it should be kept intact, as a separate operational unit. The perimeter or blockade force has the mission and responsibility of maintaining cordons around the critical area and the Secure zone. It can also be given responsibility for patrolling operations in both areas and for the security of the vital installations within. The general-duty or housekeeping command normally is charged with the handling of prisoners, transport and detention centers, transport of wounded to medical stations, care of confiscated weapons and property, and any other of the multiple, mop-up details that follow strike-force action.

NOTES

ON

TRADITIONAL

METHODS

Basic riot-control measures involve apprehension of agitators and leaders, dispersal of crowds and hostile groups, pick-up of participants and arrests of looters, stopping or apprehending the fire-bombers, and prevention of mob re-grouping. Assuming that all non-violent crowd control and dispersal measures have failed, there are a number of basic steps that should be taken by the police riot forces, preferably, but not necessarily in the sequence of topics next considered. This course of action is directed at the large, unruly crowd or mob mass. Show Of Force

The Show-Of-Force can be based on either the surprise appearance of a large unit of riot-equipped police officers in a formation, or by using the saturation technique, massing large numbers of personnel at a given point in full view of the mob. To crowds, the psychological impact of witnessing the arrival of large numbers of police emerging from patrol cars, special riot vans, police helicopters, etc. can be very great. This technique is only effective provided the assembly maneuver can be accomplished speedily, with discipline, and when there are sufficient personnel to provide real security between the crowd and the assembly area. The Show-Of-Force should be the largest possible, provided delay in organizing it does not allow the crowd to become further inflamed and the riot to escalate. If police strength is inadequate, or the build-up time too slow to make a strong psychological

36

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

THE

SHOW

OF

AND

TECHNIQUES

FORCE

The Show-of-Force is a demonstration of police power and numbers. Its purpose is both tactical and psychological. Rapid mobilization of a great number of police, at the outset, may so impress the crowd relative police strength and deterrent power, that no further physical dispersal action is necessary. This is often a very effective tactic, provided it is used early enough and sufficient police manpower is available. The classic Show-of-Force is organized in a secure assembly area, close to, but out of the sight of the mob. The riot unit is assembled, briefed and command decisions made as to a plan of action, if the mere presence of the unit does not effect dispersal. The surprise advance on the mob is made in the direction that dispersal is desired. A column formation is generally used in the approach phase, followed by a deployment out of mob contact into a wedge, or line, so the police and their armament can be fully viewed by the mob.

first impression,

no Show-Of-Force

should

be made,

and it may

be advisable

for

police to resort directly to attack with formations or to use chemical agents and.smoke.

Order To Disperse When the riot force has been fully deployed in front of the mob, an order to disperse and to cease and desist in unlawful acts is usually given by the commander. This can be preceded by personal appeals to the mob by local officials, respected persons with recognized local prestige and authority, ministers and any other person known to be sympathetic with the interests of, or to have an influence on the mob members. While the police unit is deployed in the Show-Of-Force phase, other police units can be positioning themselves at mob rear and flanks, sealing-off critical areas and side streets, and taking any other measures decided upon during the planning stage to expedite the dispersal of the crowd along previously-determined escape routes. Dispersal orders should be clear and simple, following any legal requirements in effect. In every case they must be fully communicated to the crowd. Those in the rear who will have to leave first along the police-desired escape routes, must hear these orders. Powerful public address systems should be used so that all mob members can hear the orders. The orders should be repeated several times. A performance time for compliance can be set and the crowd so advised, if tactically desirable. In large mobs, undercover, or plainclothesmen can be planted in the crowd rear, to lead the way upon dispersal requests so that mob momentum toward exit points will build up.

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38

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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TECHNIQUES

People in crowds and mobs have a tendency to react as others do; when they see others leaving, they react likewise. Orders for dispersal can only be given from positions of strength; bluffing should not be attempted. In conjunction with the orders, warnings of arrest and declarations of further police action are given. Unreasonable orders that cannot be enforced or threats as to forthcoming police action that cannot be carried out, should not be made. Use Of Formations

When the Show-Of-Force and orders to disperse are ineffective, psychological pressure must be replaced by physical pressure. The first degree of police physical pressure is by use of riot formations to seize leaders and agitators and/or to split the mob into segments, forcing their dispersal. Pressure can only be used provided the mob has an escape route. Such routes should be pre-planned, and designated to the mob by police announcements over the public-address systems. Force operations against mobs should always be accompanied by security measures. Roofs must be secured either by physical occupation, or by assigning men in higher buildings to observe adjoining lower roof tops, etc. Windows and doors of buildings on the flanks must likewise be covered, especially when operations are confined to downtown sections, and tenement areas. Possible sniper fire and casualtyproducing objects thrown down on the riot force must always be expected during violent riots. As the strike force moves forward, its flank and roof protection must move

with it. Securing roof tops also enables the establishment of riot command observation posts, points which often serve as excellent launching positions for riot-control agents. Successful use of riot formations to force crowd and mob dispersal, is followed by aggressive patrolling to prevent mob re-grouping. The utilization of 36” riot batons, Shok batons, and the Chemical Mace® liquid tear-gas projectors has greatly increased the effectiveness of police riot formations and enabled better tactical situation control. 7

Employment Of Chemical Agents If it is not possible to use riot formations to achieve dispersal, or if the scope of the violence or size of the mob makes it inadvisable, chemical agents should be employed. If used in quantity and in accordance with good tactical principles, obscuring smoke and the tear-gas agents will normally achieve the police purpose of breaking up the mob. Obscuring smoke can be used as a lesser degree-of-force, prior to the use of tear gas, or be used in conjunction with it, as based on the judgment ofthe unit commander.

Fire By Selected Marksmen If chemical agents are unavailable, or too short in supply, and the performance and security of the riot force is threatened by sporadic, isolated gunfire from mob elements, return fire should be ordered when the targets can be identified. This is done only on command, usually by special marksmen in support and reserve units. If the police unit, in the commander’s judgment, is in danger of being overrun by the violent mob elements, he can also order selected marksmen to eliminate leaders and agitators. Fire-bombers, saboteurs with explosives, arsonists, and some classes of looters fall in

this category of force response.

ORGANIZING

EFFECTIVE

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PATROLS

39

RIOT POLICEMAN WITH 37mm GAS GUN AND VEST WITH MUNITIONS Two obscuring-smoke, two continuous-discharge gas, and two instantaneous-blast grenades are carried in the pouches on the back. Three long-range and three short-range blast shells are carried in the frontal pockets. The gas mask can be carried by the individual, or with reserve gas munitions in canvas bags by extra men assigned to accompany the formation into action. Normally, the gas officer will operate from within the baton-wielding formation. On orders from the commander, he can advance to the line to fire a short-range blast shell or throw blast grenades, or he can launch long-range shells into the mob area from any location in the formation. Ideally, each squad should have one gas officer assigned as an integral part of the formation; more than one may be indicated. Others can be held in the reserve to meet the demands of larger riot situations. Generally, the smaller the size of the riot unit, the greater the need for gasofficer specialists to be assigned or available to make up for lack of numbers. The above comments with respect to the 37mm gun and projectiles apply equally well to the unit equipped with shotgun launchers and either burning or multi-purpose grenades for achieving the same tactical purpose.

Full Firepower This is the last and most infrequently used step in the degree-of-force scale. All members of the riot unit use their firearms, gas capability and other weaponry on command, in a disciplined response to mob action. The command to use full firepower is generally dependent on a decision by the most senior commander of the operation, or the chief. Generally, where full firepower is used against masses of rioters,

the ricochet method is used to reduce fatalities. The riot shotgun is excellent for this purpose. Still and motion pictures and video-tape records of all the major degrees of physical force used in a riot operation should be made by police photographers. This is especially important when there are possible fatalities that will be related to use of firearms. In the military Show-Of-Force, variations of commands ordering the loading of weapons are options sometimes usable by police. Following the use of riot formations, the military advocates the use of water as the next step of escalating force.

40

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

WATER

AND

TECHNIQUES

CANNON

A Mercedes Benz water-cannon truck in action in Caracas, Venezuela—May, I966. These trucks, costing about $35,000 each, are not too effective in riot actions. They must be protected by foot police from Molotov cocktails, etc., and their range is limited. Rioters soon learn to time their activities, awaiting the point after the truck tanks run out of water. Pressure-pump units on these trucks are difficult to maintain and keep in service. Police in Venezuela, Lima, and Ecuador where they are in use, feel that they are not worth the investment. Venezuela had four out of five units out of action due to pump trouble at one time. The water-cannon vehicle has been used with more success in Europe, particularly against rioting students. Generally, its high initial procurement cost, maintenance problems, and limited tactical uses do not make it a very practical piece of equipment. U.S. Army Training Manual 19-15 indicates that pressurized water should be used as a degree-of-force prior to use of riot-control chemicals, however, U.S. Army tables of organization and equipment do not provide for this type of equipment for riot use.

Special water cannons are used by police in Europe and South America with indifferent success. In relation to their procurement costs and tactical results, use of water as a riot-force technique has not had much acceptance in the United States. Fire trucks and pumpers have been utilized as desperation measures in a few incidents, but generally, rioter damage to hoses and fire equipment, the need for excessive police manpower to protect the vehicles, their limited effective range and their lack of mobility, have discouraged the use of water as having a legitimate place on the degree-offorce scale.

Tactical Sequence

:

Police riot-suppression tactics are generally based on the following categories or phases. They should be undertaken, if possible, in approximately the following sequence: (1) Blunting and dispersing the rioter attack. (2) Sealing-off the affected area and establishment of perimeters. (3) The establishment of physical security in the area and control of high ground as well as exit and access routes. (4) Large-unit sweeps of the area and mop-up operations against any remaining centers of mob activity. (5) Aggressive mobile and foot patrolling. (6)

Establishment of guard posts and beats until the situation returns to normal.

Techniques for Riot Containment

THE FOLLOWING PRECEPTS and operational suggestions must be adopted to meet each department’s own requirements. All will not apply as each situation will be, in some respects, different.

TACTICAL AND

STRATEGY

SUGGESTIONS

(1) The mulitplicity and varied nature of civil disturbance control operations make it mandatory in many departments that a high-ranking police officer be permanently assigned to riot operations planning and as organizational coordinator. He should have budget and staff support according to estimated needs. (2) ‘Training security is advisable. Command and alert exercises, firing and maneuver courses, training in use of tear gas, smoke, counter-sniping, basics of street fighting, fire-bombs and explosive counter-measures, conduct of raids and allied subjects, should be conducted, if possible, where screened from the public eye. Security rules should be maintained respecting discussions by all participants. Press releases and publicity on riot preparedness and training should be carefully screened. (3) Police riot-equipment procurement and funding has long been open to press and public scrutiny via the published-bid system. This poses security problems as it pertains to police riot-control operations, and policies re this should be re-examined, especially regarding police procurement of military-type, riot hardware such as teargas, armored vehicles, special firearms, etc.

(4) The more recent riots experienced in major U.S. cities mostly have been confined to areas where the majority of the rioters live. However, hit-and-run guerrillatype tactics may be encountered in the future. Mobility of the rioters must be matched by flexible and mobile police tactics based on a linear-type strategy, along major highways or streets. Such strategy has as its objective the protection of large areas from

42

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

BASIC

POLICE

AND

RIOT-CONTROL

TECHNIQUES

EQUIPMENT

All equipment types portrayed, with model variations, are necessary for police riot-control meas-

ures. (Foreground, left to right): Small

Superior smoke grenade for laying down concentrations; Superior smoke pot for use in large obscuring smoke operations; the Mark IV Chemical Mace, belt model; the Mark IX Chemical Mace, special-issue riot model; the AAI multi-purpose teargas grenade; the Defensor special-issue riot helmet; the Carpenter battery-powered portable spotlight for night and counter-sniper operations; Bushnell 7X35 binoculars for observation and counter-sniping: the Audio-hailer bull horn. (Rear, left to right): The Rowland clear polycarbonate riot shield; The AAI shotgun grenadelauncher mounted on a top-break, single-shot shotgun; Remington, Model 870 riot shotgun with handguard and bayonet adapter; The Universal .30 MI carbine with scope and mount; The Chem-

ical Mace Mark VII 26” riot baton; The 36’’ Shok baton with hot center; The Kohaut 36” hickory riot baton; The 4 lb. Defensor riot protective vest.

looting and arson. It is only possible where there are:large numbers of police or other supporting elements available. The basic tactic is to deploy small groups of officers at each intersection, along the selected streets between the objective and the rioters. Similar linear deployment is then made along other streets running at right angles to the first line established, so as to box in the areas between lines. As each boxed-in area is established, sectors of it

are placed under individual commands. The police field commander maintains a strong reserve and striking force, and reinforces each sector as the situation dictates. Mobile patrolling is maintained along the lines established and also inside the sectors. Manpower permitting, this strategy should protect the sectors and provide good intelligence as well as the flexibility enabling the commander to meet changes in fluid situations. Radio and patrol communication is necessary between intersections and sufficient armed men should be assigned as protection against surprise assault before support arrives. Tear gas and smoke munitions should be available at all posts. (5) Generally, troops or police on riot duty should never be under specific instructions as to the limit of force that they may use. The commander of the military-police unit should be instructed to use the necessary amount of force to disperse or subdue the mob and control the situation. Accordingly, the riot control unit, itself, should contain the entire range of arms necessary. This can include batons, gas munitions,

TECHNIQUES

FOR

RIOT CONTAINMENT

43

and automatic-type firearms. The commander ought to have the option to use them all, if the situation requires. (6)

In extreme-emergency

situations, make an advance decision when to resort

finally to firearms. Let the mob know it and put no restriction on the use of such arms when the proper time comes and the signal is necessary. Do not be forced to resort to the unplanned use of firearms under panic conditions, just because of exhausting the supply of gas munitions. It is better to plan to use live ammunition from the onset and tell the mob so, rather than commit to a policy of gradual attrition of men and gas munitions, with the use of bullets, finally, as a desperation measure. (7) Maximum use of municipal equipment such as tractors, bulldozers, trucks, vans, cherry-pickers, tow trucks, etc., should be made. These units, with drivers and

crews, should be placed in a pool for emergency use. Power, light, and telephone companies should provide standby equipment and crews. (8)

Ina

large civil-disturbance action, a curfew should be declared the moment

manpower permits its enforcement, but curfew declared without enforcement will only encourage more disorder. (9) Local ordinances granting emergency powers to authorities during riots should be completely reviewed and updated, if necessary, to facilitate temporary apprehension of professional agitators, known extremists, and militant leaders. The legal power should be on the books enabling police to confiscate firearms, fire-bombs, and other weapons found on persons and in vehicles during periods of a legally-declared civil disorder. (10) Most larger departments are now setting up special civil-disturbance operational (war room) centers. Access to such centers and the special files and equipment located in them should be tightly controlled and be ‘“‘off-limits”’ to the majority of the police force, press, and public. Personnel assigned to them should be previously screened as to ability, loyalty, dedication, and security-reliability. A pass or identification system should be set up for all personnel, including liaison and others authorized to be present from other agencies. (11) The physical protection of police headquarters must be planned to the point where its surprise assault promises little chance of success. Communications,weapons storage, the command center and any other police functional sections critical to civil disturbance operations should be in areas that can be ‘‘sealed-off’’ quickly. Preferably they should be in locations not readily accessible to the general public or police performing routine duties. Adjoining buildings and roofs should be kept secure by periodic checks and surveillance. Plans should be made so areas surrounding the headquarters can be blocked off from routine traffic. Pass and identification systems, ready for use, should be initiated. Headquarters security must be observed on a 24hour basis. (12) Absolute physical communications security can only be achieved by providing standby generators, in well-protected areas, so as to enable radio transmission irrespective of power blackouts. Too much reliance cannot be placed on ordinary telephone communications. Any well-organized riot-type insurrection incorporates strikes at public power and telephonic communication centers during its first stages. (13) Provision must be made to protect all department transportation, garages and areas of vehicle entrance and exits. The areas surrounding the station and transportation centers may have to be blocked off, especially if it is possible to sabotage police activity by a few well-placed explosive charges, staged accidents, street blocking, etc. Jails, detention centers, police precinct and sub-stations, particularly in riotprone and adjacent areas, must likewise be protected.

44

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

(14) At the time a major civil disorder begins, there are many security measures that can be easily implemented, covering all types of public and commercial installations. An area with the experience of violent riots should be surveyed by police with the objective of strengthening private and commercial security against such disorders. Continuous checks of potential riot targets should be maintained. Special officers of appropriate rank should be assigned this mission. U. S. Army manual FM 19-30 is a valuable aid for law enforcement in such passive-security planning and operations. (15) Communist-type, organized mob warfare usually is coordinated with sabotage, police-diversionary tactics, destruction of public utilities, attacks on police headquarters and stations, and disruption of police communications and transportation facilities. Although security is an automatic and constant consideration during military operations against hostile forces, it usually must be initiated and ‘‘built-in” to civil police plans. (16) Mob destruction of power stations, water supplies, communication centers, transportation facilities and other public installations vital to the general welfare can be of very long-lasting detriment. Large civil-disorder operations make it improbable that police manpower can stretch to protect all vulnerable public and commercial utilities. Until more permanent protective measures can be developed, heavy motorized patrolling should be planned, to be backed up by mobile foot-reserves. When widespread threats or acts of sabotage and the destruction of key utilities and buildings occurs or is predicted by good intelligence sources, local-force reinforcement by military manpower is, of course, usually required. (17) Most police activities are those carried out under rather close public scrutiny. Consequently, the operational-security aspects of civil disturbances are too often neglected or minimized in overall planning. Riot preparation, planning, training and equipping for violent civil disturbances is best done without publicity. Availability of the news media to this phase of law enforcement can be a two-edged sword, although it is always desirable for any police agency to have good public and press cooperation and appreciation of its capabilities. But, if the riot potential is great and if subversive, extremist and militant minority groups are present, good police riot-preparedness security must be practiced.

PERSONNEL

PLANNING

The demands for physical security during a major riot action are heavy and allinclusive. Departmental manpower must not be allowed to become depleted to the point, however, that it is unable to take aggressive counter-riot action with its own units. Basic security planning must, of necessity, first allocate the department’s manpower to insure its own operational capability, then at the same time provide for maintaining a certain predetermined degree of routine policing. Once the manpower needs for this point are determined, requirements remaining for additional men must usually be met through other resources. (1) Where prior planning and manpower permit, one-third of the riot-control force with its gas and equipment should be kept in reserve for commitment only in emergency. This reserve should be used to reinforce weak areas; it can be committed when the mob is breaking up, for special tasks such as limited patrols, and for picking up mob leaders. Reserve units should not be broken up to replace casualties in other units; have a separate pool for this purpose. (2) Plan and provide for first aid and the medical treatment of police, in advance of any mob contact. It is important that police know that they will be taken care of

TECHNIQUES

FOR

RIOT CONTAINMENT

45

should they become casualties. Arrangements should be made for special ambulances to be held in reserve for police, not to be diverted to attending injured rioters until duly released.

OUNCES

OF PREVENTION

(1) Local criminals and professional ‘‘fringe operators” will generally join riot actions for personal gain, unless blocked by check points. Mutual support planning and coordinated police intelligence with agencies in surrounding areas should serve to alert police so these may be intercepted. Many times a car or body search will reveal weapons or other incriminating evidence, enabling their detention. (2) Known outside agitators should be kept under surveillance. Within the bounds of law, police should maintain an ’’automatic pick-up” list for use at the start of any civil-disturbance operation. Police intelligence files, augmented by information provided by Federal agencies, should always be kept current on information concerning out-of-town extremists. (3)

Permissive looting, condoned to decrease violence, is not a successful tactic.

Looting escalation and police morale are affected. Shoot-on-sight policies against looters, however,

are not usable against women

and children. Non-burning,

non-

fragmenting tear-gas grenades are the best means employed to discourage this class of rioter activity. Firearms should only be used when the looting is accompanied by arson or when the act of looting presents a most acute security hazard. (4)

When an area such as a business district is subjected to hit-and-run looting

and fire-bombing attacks by small bands of rioters and the area is not too densely-

FIRE TRUCKS MUST BE PROTECTED Fire trucks must not be permitted to enter riot areas without police protection. In those cases where fire hoses are used to disperse rioters there must be protective forces accompanying each unit. Expensive fire-fighting equipment must be conserved; such units are very vulnerable to fire-bombing, tire destruction, hose-slashing, and other destructive rioter acts.

46

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

populated by hostile elements, fast police control action is necessary. Mobile forces can be rushed to predesignated points within such area with instructions to fan out, as foot patrols, from the detrucking points. This kind of operation can be combined with perimeter control established by hasty roadblocks. Once the area is controlled, heavy vehicular patrolling can be initiated, permitting the foot forces to re-group.

PRECAUTIONS-LOOSE

MATERIALS

Though not easy to do, wherever possible trash cans, bricks, building materials and

other items usable as mob weapons should be removed or cordoned-off from potential confrontation sites. Service stations and other sources of inflammables should be ordered closed in a riot area.

FALSE ALARMS Means must be set up to check out and screen requests for fire and police emergency services during riot situations. Rioters can and do use false fire alarms and police cails to overburden police communications,

create overall confusion and dilute the overall

police effort. The ‘‘officer-needs-help”’ call is frequently faked, and it and others can be used to lure police into ambush situations. A means of call verification of police communication between units and command centers should also be established. The call communication-verification code may need to be changed at intervals during long riot actions to maintain security.

GENERAL (1)

PRINCIPLES

AND

SECURITY

Head-on clashes between a mob and police lines should be influenced towards

points of police choice, if unavoidable. Police lines should be anchored to buildings on each side of the street, and precautions taken that occupants of the buildings are evacuated and the roof tops police-secured or controlled. Police lines are best extended across a street at corners entering intersections so that the mob can disperse down the intersecting streets to the sides. Rear security, by roadblocks at cross streets and points parallel to the police line, must also be established. (2) Movements of large riot-control forces through hostile areas should be covered by advance-reconnaisance units and be attended by flank and rear-guard foot and vehicle patrols. The advantages of photo reconnaissance should not be overlooked; advantage may be taken of the observation platform afforded by the helicopter. Emergency plans should be established for the contingency of police forces being attacked during movement, with immediate-response units designated. Security at assembly and detrucking areas is best provided by the vehicle drivers, who should remain with their vehicles. A ranking officer should be designated to organize and control this security aspect. (3) Control of roof tops and other points of vantage must be secured by countersniper teams or other police elements as early as possible in any riot action. Helicopters are useful in this security phase, when available. (4) Officials commanding should always be at vantage points where they can best observe and direct action. Binoculars can be used from buildings or roof tops, etc.

TECHNIQUES

FOR

RIOT CONTAINMENT

47

HELICOPTERS Police employment of helicopters in the larger urban areas is now commonplace. They will be used in increasing numbers in civil disturbance operations in the future. A great deal of testing and development of special equipment for law enforcement with these versatile aircraft has taken place during recent months. The major manufacturers are now directing their efforts toward the public-safety market. The helicopter, combined with new equipment designed for it, can serve as a gun countersniper platform, tear-gas and obscuring-smoke launching base, observation platform, means of delivery of manpower, patrol vehicle in security, pursuit and surveillance missions, as a mobile command post, a base for illumination and public-address systems, as an ambulance, and in many other missions of tactical nature in riot control. The helicopter adds another dimension to police weaponry and instant-response capabilities in riot, disaster, and other emergencies.

Two-way radio contact with subordinates on the scene is essential. It is a mistake for a commander to plunge into the fray with his men and lose control of the action because he cannot see what is going on. Cover this point and the reasons for it thoroughly in training. (5) Tight police discipline must be maintained before and during a riot confrontation to gain and keep the respect of both mob members and spectators. A well-disciplined, silent, well-armed unit, with every member intent on the mission of control-

ling a mob, creates the desirable impression of a powerful, invincible machine. (6) Police commanders must not let members of a mob aggravate their men into premature action by ‘“‘name calling.”’ Begin police offensive action on official order; do not let the mob members ‘“‘set things off’ by baiting individual members of the police. The reasons and need for this discipline must be clearly explained during training programs and reiterated, if possible, just before mob contact. (7) Never try to bluff a mob and threaten to do things that cannot be accomplished. If the bluff is “called,” the mob thereafter becomes even more lawless and

dangerous. A hollow threat is antagonizing and it may be regarded as a dare. Do not attempt to do more than can be reasonably accomplished with the forces available. If the mob is too large, split it up, use gas munitions in quantity, or create delay by using obscuring smoke while awaiting reinforcements. (8) If police forces are badly outnumbered and faced with a potentially dangerous mob, they should stall for time until reinforcements ean be secured. Don’t put too much reliance on the old axiom, “‘one rioter, one ranger,” when dealing with potentially violent crowds that greatly outnumber police forces. If violence breaks out, the

48

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

USING THE MPG The MPG Multiple-Purpose Grenade can be used tactically in a number of different ways due to its variable fuse and piston system of gas dispersion. The non-fragmenting body permits it to be thrown directly amongst rioters and looters. The non-flammable nature of dispersion enables hand use inside buildings, and shotgun-launch into windows riot situations.

or onto roof tops in barricade and

police should have planned for it in advance, and their position, actions, and stand made in a pre-chosen area. Take advantage of terrain, narrow streets, roof tops, buildings, and obscuring-smoke screens while awaiting reinforcements. (9) The security of police units, and field command posts must be constantly reviewed during large-scale riots. The rear and flanks of tactical units are always vulnerable. Mob encirclement of small units is an ever-present danger and it should be prevented by any means possible, including orderly retreat, if necessary. Police penetration of a large mob in a way or to a degree that leaves police flanks open to encirclement is a very dangerous tactic, especially without back-up forces quickly available.

HANDLING

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

(1) Police should do everything possible to interfere with and break up the chanting, rhythm-beat, slogan-shouting form of crowd incitation used by professional agitators and organizers. These are forms of self-induced mass hypnotism directly related to primitive war dances and chants, and they are a basic means of inciting large masses of people who, thus losing their individuality, become subject to commands of the mob leaders and catalyze into a mob mass. The effect achieved is like that of a cattle stampede, where the herd blindly follows its leaders. Hitler and Mussolini were

both expert practitioners of this technique. This tactic is one to which the most sophisticated as well as the least literate mob member will succumb. Cheering sections at football games, the use of bagpipes and drum beats in battle, hand-clapping, and whistling are all examples of this play of psychological emotional build-up. Leaders of such incitations and any mob members using bull horns or other means to build up the rhythm (drums, cymbals, etc.) should be extracted quickly from the mob, if feasible. The police use of super sound systems, sound trucks blaring music, or variable-pitch electronic sirens is recommended for breaking up this kind of crowd

TECHNIQUES and

mob

self-incitation.

FOR

Noise-bombs,

RIOT

CONTAINMENT

firecrackers,

and

aerial

49 noisemakers

dis-

charged over the heads of a crowd are also useful counter-measures. (2) Plainclothes personnel, operating inside a mob, are valuable for identifying behind-the-scenes leaders and dangerous armed subjects. Interdepartment security as to the identity of these men and means of communicating with them while they are submerged in a riot scene must be carefully attended to. (3) Rock and missile-throwers frequently utilize hit-and-run tactics or operate from the cover of a crowd. Frontal attacks will not always result in their apprehension and flanking manuevers may be necessary. Spotters placed in buildings and on roof tops may be used to locate and identify such subjects for arrest purposes. Plainclothes officers who have infiltrated the crowd can also be utilized.

MOB-ENGAGEMENT

PRINCIPLES

(1) Every disorderly assemblage should first be dealt with merely as a crowd until the point is reached when due orders to disperse are openly disobeyed and actual physical resistance, such as throwing missiles, is encountered. At this point, offensive police tactics should be started. Police should not react passively to such attack and be subject to physical injury while someone tries to decide what tactic to employ. Tactical plans should be made in advance and, if possible, be explained to all officers so they can anticipate the time, manner, and circumstances when offensive tactics will begin. Always use the element of surprise when possible. If sufficient police elements are available and the location of action is favorable, hit the mob simultaneously from the rear and flanks. If there have been static periods during which the mob’s front has been confronted by police elements for some time, send units to hit the mob by surprise from unexpected quarters and in conjunction with a sudden frontal assault. This applies to the launching of gas munitions as well as to the offensive tactical movement of baton-wielding police formations. (2)

The least violent and more timid members of the mob will be found in its rear,

where there will also be spectators. It is often a good tactic to launch a surprise gas attack against these rear elements. Normally, such attacks will cause panic, so these

COUNTER-ACTION FROM MOB’S REAR Rioters attacking specific objectives, buildings and critical installations can often best be dispersed from their rear. Tear gas can be launched from adjoining roof tops or helicopters can be used to drop grenades, etc. Sometimes a police diversionary attack is advisable to attract mob attention while police units place themselves in the rear.

50

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

rear elements tend to disperse more easily. Fear is highly-contagious; if a part of the mob takes flight, tHe rest will tend to panic in confusion and follow others fleeing. (3) The basic principle of attack with riot formations is one of maintaining constant momentum and mobility. As the mob mass is split into segments, other formations should be ordered to split the first segments into smaller ones until no compact groups of opposition remain. Once the mob has been dispersed, its elements should be kept moving by active foot patrols. Foot patrols can be given limit points beyond which they will cease aggressive patrolling and turn this duty over to vehicular units. Regrouping and the efforts of mob leaders and organizers to reform the mob must, of course, be prevented.

(4) Special riot tactics and wedge or diamond formations should be developed in training to enable quick, surprise penetrations of the mob in order to seize leaders or agitators, or to rescue injured or outnumbered personnel. A baton-wielding wedge formation is usually advocated with a reserve and the leader inside. (5) Barbed-wire barricades and vehicles (provided they are expendable) can be extended across the front of police lines to slow down and separate mob movement. In a narrow, front action, water from hoses is usable. However, long-range tear-gas projection from both street level and roof tops, into the mob’s center and rear is a better tactic. Wind permitting, the use of obscuring smoke and tear-gas dispersers is advisable, especially if the police force is greatly outnumbered. Time permitting and the direction of mob attack known, police can formulate plans to make avenues of mob approach to their lines and barricades quite untenable and uncomfortable. A passive defensive position, initially out of mob contact, can be strengthened by: (a) Covering the street with a heavy coating of micro-fine particles of dry tear-

gas dust so that it will become airborne, if the mob stirs it up by marching through it. (b) Use of the new “‘banana-peel”” compounds that when sprinkled on dry, can be wet down to create an exceedingly slick surface preventing movement and destroying equilibrium. Dye can be conbined with this material. (c) Commercial stench compounds (tertiary butyl metcaptan or dimethy] sulfide) in combination with other deterrent material.

(d) Fire-fighting foam, or foam from special breathable foam-producing machines can be used across narrow fronts to good advantage. Combinations with dyes, stenches, or tear gas can be made. (e)

Wire barricades can be made to serve as electric fences. The type of harmless

electrical charge used by farmers can be easily adapted to wire barricades. These devices are inexpensive and portable. Due warning signs must be posted. (6) Vital installations such as utility stations with only limited defensive forces, or high protective fences, may sometimes be taken under siege by large groups of rioters, making it necessary to conduct clearing operations outside the surrounded location. Generally, a surprise assault should be launched on the mob’s rear and flanks while its attention is diverted by its objective. The best immediate and most effective attack is to use chemical agents launched from roof tops and street levels, or a chemical concentration released in gas-cloud form from a line-of-release taking advantage of favorable winds. Obscuring smoke can also be utilized. Usually, the flanks and mob rear in this situation will enable maneuver to take advantage of prevailing air currents. If gas and smoke can’t be used, a formation attack should be employed. Fire trucks with high-pressure hoses, and armored vehicles also can be used. The roof tops around the mob must be secured. If necessary, selected marksmen may be assigned to harass or fire at key agitators, fire-bombers, etc.

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AND

TECHNIQUES

USEFUL CHEMICALS (1) Grenades are very effective to break up a loosely-dispersed crowd, before it becomes a mob, if the crowd can be penetrated with siren-blowing vehicles. Gas grenades can also be used effectively through skylights, down chimneys, through door transoms and from roofs or rooms in buildings overlooking rioters. If the area in which the mob is going to concentrate is known in advance, grenades can be placed in concealed places to be activated from a distance by trip wires. (2) A number of quickly-attachable 12-gauge, tear-gas grenade-launchers are now being offered by the various manufacturers. Some of these also permit firing regular shotshell ammunition without launcher removal. However, it is generally advisable to designate specific arms in the department for grenade-launching assignments. Older, obsolete guns and single-shot, top-break shotguns can be used in training with launchers permanently affixed by welding or soldering. (3) When only a limited quantity of tear-gas grenades are available and it is necessary to disperse a large mob, have persons in civilian clothes enter the mob and move to previously-determined locations. At a given time, have these individuals drop tear-gas grenades among the crowd and begin to run towards previously-selected exits, shouting and inciting panic by yelling, “Gas, let’s get out of here,” etc. When mob members see other people running in panic, the panic spreads and they follow. This maneuver is effective when the gas grenades are of the non-burning invisible type so that the mob cannot discover or avoid the gas munitions. (4) The 37mm long-range, tear-gas projectiles can be fired so that they fall behind, into, or in front of the mob. They normally are fired with the gun held at a 30 to 40-degree angle and the projectile falls into the target area with no velocity beyond that of gravity at time of impact. Foreign experience has resulted in recommendations that 37mm wooden training projectiles can also be fired either directly at or by bouncing the projectiles along the ground toward the mob. This technique can be used if minor casualties are acceptable. This practice may be particularly useful when (a) the mob is beyond grenade-throwing range and there are adverse wind conditions; (b) no other means of projecting gas or reaching the mob ranks are available; (c) physical contact with the mob must be avoided. (5) Small pocket-size colored smoke grenades designed for signaling and spotting air drops are now used by the U.S. Army. They can be obtained from commercial sources and have a possible use in large mob actions. Police mingling with rioters can set them off in mob areas where hard-core agitation is greatest in order to bring down gas concentrations, or to indicate the locations of key leaders and agitators for possible apprehension. They can also be used for daytime police signals in riot control. Visual signals from flare pistols and pen guns are also useful in coordinating action against large mobs. These flares are available from police, sporting goods and marine-equipment supply houses. Yellow and red railway-type flares, called ‘‘fusees”’, contain self-igniters and have a spike in one end that can be driven into a wooden object. Red is best for signaling a danger area or the location of a roadblock. Yellow flares will provide limited-emergency night illumination in operational areas. Fusees are inexpensive. They will burn for approximately thirty minutes in all kinds of adverse weather including rain, wind, and snow.

(6) Escape routes must always be provided when using smoke or gas to disperse crowds or mobs. When it is apparent that mob members in front, in contact with the police, cannot retreat because of pressure from the rear of the mob, the pressure on the front is retained while the rear flanks and center of the mob are attacked with gas, or formations.

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FLARES

Pen-type aerial flares in various colors are very useful for signaling, especially during night riot operations. The fountain-pen size launching unit with cartridges is inexpensive and can be easily carried; the signals are visible for long distances.

NOISE SHELLS Twelve-gauge Teleshot cartridges explode overhead, their airbursts making much noise. These are useful in signaling and they also can be used to a limited degree to frighten crowds and cause dispersal. They are sometimes useful in barricade situations. They should not be fired to burst amongst individual rioters.

(7) In barricade situations where the location of an armed subject has been fixed in a certain room or area, the approved procedure is to launch 37mm barricade projectiles or liquid 12-gauge CS rounds into the room, etc. There is a tendency sometimes to ‘“‘overkill’’, and continue to shoot projectiles into the room even after several direct ‘“‘hits’’ have been made. After several ‘‘hits’”” have been observed, there should be a pause to await the effects of the tear agent on the suspect. If he ceases to fire and fails to emerge, it is logical to assume that he has moved to another room, is wounded

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and possibly overcome by the tear-gas fumes, or has attempted suicide. At any end to armed resistance seemingly brought about by gas or gunfire, the police commander on the scene should immediately make a decision regarding building entry to evacuate the suspect. Gunfire and gas launching in such a situation should be disciplined and under one overall commander. Indiscriminate use of firearms and gas weapons by individual police officers gains nothing, and endangers the public as well as other members of the police group. (8) The new-type Pepper Fog® units have value in certain barricade situations where they can be safely used through windows or from ground-floor areas below the location of a barricaded suspect or an area occupied by snipers. The nature of this continuous fog-type agent emission is such that it does not greatly contaminate, and it tends to rise inside the building, forcing the occupants to exit from the windows or the rooftop for apprehension. (9) Passive, sit-in type obstructionists can be safely but nonviolently evacuated by use of the fogging-type devices as long as places of exit are open. Because the degree of agent concentration and amount of agent release can be closely controlled, only that amount

sufficient to move

the occupants

need be used; this avoids panic and

injury caused by excessive tear-gas concentrations. In this type of operation the agent should best be introduced from the top floor down, permitting ground-level exit through police lines. This tactic can many times avoid “‘manhandling”’ with consequent “‘police brutality” charges when such situations occur.

FIREARMS (1) It is useless in riot control to carry firearms without ammunition or with instructions to the police or military not to use them. There will be a loss of morale in

TROOP

HANDICAP

The soldier or Guardsman armed with a rifle and bayonet that he cannot use as he is trained to, is at a definite handicap when dealing with rioters. Baiting and taunting by demonstrators and rioters can lead to a breakdown of individual restraint. This photograph received world-wide coverage and was played up in the Communist press as a demonstration of American police ; brutality.

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55)

the riot unit, but more important, if the mob discovers the truth about the firearms,

the situation will get out of control. In police action against the mob, it is best for the commander to have the firepower of the unit (small arms such as rifles, carbines, sub-

machineguns, etc.) in the reserve part of his formation. This gives him better control and enables him to make more effecient use of these arms, when necessary. In mob contact, when the men armed only with batons and grenades know they are backed up by firearms, they will perform better and more aggressively. (2) The tactic of sending men armed with unloaded bayoneted rifles without ammunition in their belts against a violent mob which quite possibly is armed, is highly questionable. This practice not only lowers morale, but it leads to lack of discipline. Ordinarily it is difficult to issue ammunition hurriedly to individual men while they are in contact during a riot, or for them to load hastily. Sending men into mob contact who are unarmed, or armed only with a few tear-gas grenades, is also very questionable. (3) Blank cartridges are useful in training but of little value against a mob. If used at all, they must be backed up by live ammunition. The practice of firing volleys of live ammunition into the air over the heads of rioters also has questionable value. If this technique is used and fails, about the only recourse left is a most extreme measure, namely to fire directly at the mob. The high probability of causing fatalities in such a case may be somewhat reduced by firing at the ground in front of the rioters. This achieves all of the psychological and practical effects of firepower, but lessens the likelihood of fatalities because the ricocheting bullets are likely to hit only lower extremities. This tactic can be accompanied by aimed fire of selected marksmen at key leaders and mob agitators. The use of the selected-marksmen, ricochet-fire system also might decrease the danger to spectators or the less-involved crowd members. The riot force commander must not overlook his responsibility to see that the unit has continued protection from snipers, or persons firing from windows, roofs, or trees. Upon first confronting a mob, steps should be taken so that its members clearly see and know that firearms are available for use. A show of strength by formation and exhibition of weapons before an action is many times advisable. If a force lacks the ability to give the mob a convincing impression of its means for complete dominance of the situation by numbers, weapons, or formation, all mob close contact must be avoided. (4) Riots today in densely-populated areas may be accompanied by sporadic gunfire and sniping. Police counter-action to these incidents must not be undisciplined. Controlled counter-fire is imperative. Indiscriminate gunfire at targets that cannot be clearly identified should be forbidden. Trained counter-sniper teams are the best means of control. Mass fire at buildings and areas where suspected snipers are thought to be located should be prohibited. Rumors and reports of heavy fire from certain areas must be carefully screened as too often police gunfire is often reported as sniper action, which fans the confusion. Great restraint in the use of deadly weapons is always necessary to prevent or hold down casualties. (5) When faced with a mob challenge that mounts even in the face of declarations to use firearms, assign selected marksmen to inflict nonfatal wounds on the first of those who violate the ground rules just announced; Have wounds inflicted in the lower extremities in such confrontation. Make a distinction between ‘shot,’ ‘wounded,’

and ‘killed’ when at all possible. (6) Firearms silencers are relatively effective when used on weapons with muzzle velocities less than the speed of sound (1100 ft. approx. per second). Federal regulations restrict the use of these devices from the general public, but do not prohibit their

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A PRESS-EXAGGERATED CONFRONTATION This photograph was widely used by the news media. It shows National Guardsmen in the process of removing illegal sit-down/lie-down demonstrators during a racial disturbance in 1964 in Cambridge, Maryland. Present in the picture are 13 demonstrators, 29 helmeted Guardsmen, 9 cameramen, and 20 bystanders. The demonstrators were finally dispersed by tear gas, but only after much news publicity had been created. Although the incident itself involved little actual violence, authorities were criticized in some news dispatches for use of excessive force, etc. Police should prevent or avoid such situations. The troops with their rifles and fixed bayonets in reality could not use such weapons on the passive, unarmed demonstrators. Good police

techniques, using obscuring smoke, Shok batons, the Mace and other suitable weapons, could have quickly removed the demonstrators without injury, or undue slanted news coverage.

employment by legitimate police agencies. Older Maxim-type silencers are still available, and others can be easily improvised as their car-muffler-type construction is well-known. At the present time, some of the major arms companies and other firms manufacture these devices for military purposes. There would be definite value to police use of silencers in certain barricade and counter-sniping operations. Departments with these problems should explore the procurement and legal use of silenced firearms.

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by

(7) Railway-type, long-burning fusees wired to bayonets, then ignited, can be successfully used in military tactical formations for riot control. This has a strong psychological effect in dispersing mobs as the formations advances. This tactic is especially weird and effective at night. If the supply is limited, fusees can be used on the apex of the wedge and flanks.

POST-RIOT

OPERATIONS

(1) Sweep and mop-up operations are conducted after main rioter resistance is broken up into small groups. This is usually done with squad-size foot patrols operating on a broad front parallel to each other, down the various streets. This kind of sweep operation can also be conducted by mobile patrols ffat dismount only when groups of rioters are to be engaged. These mop-up patrols should not break up to chase individual rioters, and they should be followed up by other police units designated to handle arrestees. If sniping is encountered, the patrols should move in single file, next to buildings. The pace of sweep operations should be steady, yet slow enough to cover inside buildings, alleys and side streets. Additional support forces may be necessary in search operations so that constant forward momentum can be maintained. After sweep operations are terminated, police presence should be maintained and gradually withdrawn as the situation returns to normal. (2) Once a mob has been dispersed by foot formations, patrolling begins so as to contain the situation and relieve other police manpower. The police commander should not break up his tactical strike units or its reserve for patrolling purposes. Police not necessarily trained in riot formations should be used for vehicular patrolling. The tactical strike force must be kept intact because of the possibility of a flareup in other areas having weak patrolling coverage. TRAINING (1) Training in the use of riot batons is always desirable. Many times a crowd can be kept from becoming an unruly mob solely by their use. Baton men should be backed up with tear gas munitions. Develop during training, a signal for orderly withdrawal of baton men at the time gas grenades and other munitions are to be projected over their heads into the crowd. In this case, baton men withdraw—not by turning and running and giving the mob the impression that police are in a state of panic—but in formation, walking backwards, always facing the mob. If baton men in the front rank are without masks, a reserve group of baton men with masks should be

ordered to step into the line prior to the time when the gas munitions are launched. (2) Tactical formations for use in riot control such as the wedge and other offensive and protective formations, must be practiced frequently in training. Signals for offensive action, retreat, and formation changes should also be practiced. Hand signals, whistle blasts, commands from bull horns and flares are all available for this purpose. Colored flares and smoke are particularly useful in situations when the noise and confusion of a large action makes other control means impractical. The commanding officer should also always arrange for some men to be assigned as messengers. In a serious situation, headquarters office personnel can be used in noncombatant jobs such as first aid and as couriers. When the riot unit has been committed to action following a gas barrage, all men should wear masks. The problem of signaling, issuing commands, and general communication while wearing gas masks is difficult.

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Accordingly, hand signals are important. Commercially-available gas masks of the medium-price classdo not permit clearly audible speech communication. If oral commands and communication are considered mandatory, the more expensive speechamplifying masks should be procured for use. (3) The ‘Instant Replay”’ television technique frequently witnessed during sporting events has a valid police application during actual police riot operations, training, and general post-civil-disturbance evaluations. Consideration should be given by every major police agency for use of the T.V. medium in all facets of riot operations. (4) Transistor-type miniature tape recorders and transceiver two-way radio sets that can be readily concealed on the person are extremely useful. Powerful binoculars with built-in cameras that can photograph subjects hundreds of feet away and various

COMMUNICATIONS Voice communication and recording equipment should be in plentiful police supply during all riot operations. Longer-range portable radio units and limited tranceiver types all have specific uses. In emergency cases, inexpensive civilian-type units can be utilized for “line-of-sight” tactical purposes. In mutual support operations involving different departments, National Guard and Army units, differences in wave lengths and frequencies must be compensated for.

other camera-telescope combinations are now being used in the surveillance field.

Their application in riot control situations should not be overlooked. Likewise, minlature cameras such as the Minox have a definite use. Pictures of a given mob action, either still or motion pictures, are often very useful. The pictures can be used later as evidence, to identify agitators, to study tactics, and sometimes are useful in public re-

lations. The fact that mob members know their pictures are being taken dampens the enthusiasm of those who want to remain anonymous.

CONTAINMENT

OPERATIONS

Police response to a real or potential riot situation should always be immediate and be based on pre-planning. The scene of the incident or incidents must be sealed-off as fast as police units and manpower can be assembled. In some situations where the

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focal point of potential disturbance can be pinpointed in advance, an automatic activation of the containment phase, based on previously prepared riot-control plans, takes place. Depending on past experience in a riot-prone area, this automatic reaction may actually initiate a wider containment operation than actually proves necessary, but this does not mean it is necessarily lost effort. Containment of a riot to a given area should take place at the same time tactical measures are being undertaken to suppress it. Isolation of the affected area is done by means of roadblocks, barricades, and the use of police personnel and vehicles. Time is so critical in this phase of operations that if police resources are insufficient, other support should be drawn from adjoining areas even though other policing operations may have to be curtailed temporarily. The first ring of encirclement around a riot core will expand or contract as time passes. Supplementary containment plans should be immediately considered, prepared and, if need be, initiated by the field commander, especially if past and coincidental events indicate that the original center of disturbance is apt to enlarge irrespective of initial police counteraction.

Zoning For Control As soon as the situation becomes identifiable, two command and operational zones should be formed; these are referred to as the Critical zone and the Secure zone. The

Critical zone is that containing the riot core and the adjacent areas to which it is estimated the riot can possibly spread. The Secure zone is established by a cordon, or perimeter, around the Critical zone and it is estimated to be the zone that will remain

under police control. Police barricades, manpower, and vehicle assignments are made accordingly. The Secure zone is generally established following an initial build-up of control forces on the riot scene. It is used for more deliberate staging operations. It remains separated from the Critical zone by the previously-established first perimeter around the heart of the riot. It must continually be strengthened, if necessary, during the second police build-up phase in the secure area. Usually, by the time the Secure zone is established, the nature or target of the mob or the magnitude of the riot can be esti-

mated. Initially, the establishment of perimeters and blockading operations may be defensive in nature, remaining so until police power can be built-up to enable the necessary offensive tactics for final mob dispersal and control. The scope and location of the inner police cordon around the Critical zone (heart of the riot) is determined by the on-scene field commander and is based on his own ‘‘on-the-spot”’ estimate of the situation. He should continually review his ‘“‘sealingoff’ dispositions and strengthen or expand them during the first critical hours. The Secure zone is designated by higher headquarters after an initial review of the field commander’s action and reports of the situation. Normally, the field commander should only have to concern himself with tactics involving his force’s engagement with rioters. Strategy and back-up decisions should be made at the command post or operations center by the overall commander. During and after establishment of the first police cordon and the sealing-off of the Critical zone, the field commander can issue orders permitting uninvolved persons in

the area to leave. They should be screened individually, and not in groups that could possibly re-form to cause disturbances elsewhere. This should also apply to vehicles carrying potential male rioters. Although it is always desirable to let all persons possible evacuate the riot scene, potentially dangerous elements must be kept under surveillance to the extent possible. A system of identification checks and vehicle search,

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at points of exit, may have to be initiated very early and appropriate records maintained. This is not a fixed-rule-type operation and this largely depends on the field commander’s own assessment. It is a proven social phenomenon that the numbers of persons desiring to flee a danger area such as the scene of mob action, are usually outnumbered by the curious individuals from outside the area desiring to enter to see or participate in some way in the events taking place. Such influx of outsiders is further augmented by T.V. and radio coverage of riots. Orders should therefore be issued and steps undertaken at entry points in the perimeters between the Critical and Secure zones to prevent the outside entry of unauthorized civilians. Authority for the entry of the news media should be preplanned and secured from police headquarters prior to their entry. The degree of permissible entry of individuals and vehicles into the Secure zone is variable. At times it may even be necessary to set up additional perimeters. This need will usually be determined by the residential density of the area and movements normal to the Secure zone, its commercial and industrial enterprises, and the location of

vital installations, etc. Inside the Secure zone, police staging areas, parking areas, and command-post operations will normally be located. The field command and operations center should also be secured against entry of unauthorized persons. Specific entry points into the Secure zone and the Critical zone should be designated to enable unimpeded movement of authorized persons, support and auxiliary units. At these entries and check points, there should be full and complete instructions available, signs, etc., escorts, if needed, to expedite arrivals of support units and the transit of of-

ficials to staging and operation centers. Special, separate civilian entry and exit poinis to be transited only by those who live and work in the cordoned-off area, may need to be established so as not to hinder police operations. If the operation is estimated to be of long duration, a pass and check system for all civilian traffic will need to be established. An area census, coupled with a changeable pass system, may be indicated to prevent unauthorized traffic. Search for looted objects, weapons, and other questionable items, as the check points are passed, is standard practice. Generally, no civilian movement should be permitted in the critical and secure areas unless it is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of public discipline and for basic human needs. Inside the Critical and Secure zones, continuous, heavy patrolling should be maintained and every effort exerted to keep residents off the streets, prevented from congregating into crowds, etc. Police orders closing down all industrial and commercial operations may have to be issued.

Other Security Measures Fraternizing of police and other units on riot duty in areas of tension and potential violence should be strictly controlled. Discipline and orders should be such that men on duty or in rest areas and situations be warned against accepting refreshments and other items of food and drink in an indiscriminate manner. Neighborhood service organizations and other agencies desiring to distribute food and beverages to police on this type of duty should be thoroughly investigated and directed to channel their efforts through a police official designated for this purpose. On occasions in the past, plots have been discovered to poison riot police by means of free food and drink dissemination in trouble-prone areas. More recently, riot personnel have been subjected.to what might be termed ‘‘psychedelic warfare” by which LSD and marijuana have been served to units on duty in oranges, cookies, etc. Stand-

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ing regulations against police accepting ‘“‘hand-outs” should be announced and enforced at the outset of any major riot operations. Special closures and inventory and security control may be exercised over: (1)

Bars, taverns, liquor stores.

(2) Gun and sporting-goods stores, pawnshops, drug, hardware stores, jewelry, furniture, grocery and other stores with merchandise representing prime looting targets. (3)

Gasoline stations, fuel-oil stocks, stores of explosives and inflammables.

(4) Any business establishments that may have to remain open to satisfy basic needs but which are also places of public congregation and points of possible agitation. (5)

Schools, club headquarters, theaters, meeting halls, union halls, dance halls,

bowling alleys, recreational centers, political headquarters and churches. The degree of permissible freedom of movement and public gathering can best be established by radio and T.V. announcements prohibiting looting, congregation of groups of more than a few persons, declarations that all persons on the streets are subject to identification checks and search, etc. This should always be coupled with advice to all persons that unless they have to be on the streets for a legitimate reason, they should remain indoors. All the above steps may be taken prior to the establishment of curfew, provided there is a legal and operational basis to do so. Generally, curfew operations should not be decided upon when there are not enough police to enforce it. Depending on the scope of the operation and the police numbers employed, containment operations are placed under a ranking officer, this to be his sole responsibility. Forces that are used to man the perimeter and cordons should be assigned to this command for the duration of the emergency. As most containment operations are maintained on a 24-hour basis, the number of police needed to man such an operation can be large. Many times the additional manpower is best drawn from auxiliary or reserve police units, or those units loaned on the basis of mutual-support arrangements. This frees the main forces of the department involved for direct tactical use against rioters. BARRICADE

AND

ROADBLOCK

OPERATIONS

Barricades and roadblocks are physical and psychological means of containment. They are used against both personnel and vehicles. Such operations are ordinarily mounted early. Against a large, cohesive-type mob, they serve to limit mob movement, contain the mob mass so that it is easier to maintain police counter-action, and

enable full police power to concentrate on the mob and its leadership. The location of barricades and roadblocks must be established rapidly, with due consideration to the mob’s specific target or objective, if any. Barricade Locations. Barricade operations are simple to initiate and result in canalizing mob movement in accordance with police desires, preventing mob build-up and affording protection of any given area with a minimum of manpower. In the direct mob-confrontation phase, they can be placed in front of the mob moving toward police lines. This slows mob movement and also gives time for the psychological ‘‘show-of-force” effect to be felt. Barricades designed for direct contact with a moving mob must be placed so that there is no possible way for mob elements to go around their flanks. Massed police

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or other vehicles across a street leading into an intersection have the effect of not only stopping the mob, but of directing its movement down toward other intersecting side streets, where again other police barricades can be positioned to further divert the mob mass. Barricades are best placed in ‘“‘wall-to-wall”’ positions and always must be placed where there will be an egress route for the mob. Barricades in the middle of intersections and across the end of streets leading into an intersection are many times indefensible. Any attempt to block by vehicles, manpower or obstacles, the movement of a large mass of people must be such as to relieve the pressure from those in.the rear of the mob who are pushing those in front in direct confrontation with the police. This is done by properly positioning barricades, diversion of the mob movement, and by coordinated attacks on the mob flanks and its rear by formations, tear gas, etc. Generally, a barricade operation placed across a street in the middle of a block must take into consideration the fact that it can be overrun purely by mob momentum alone. In this situation, as there is no mob-egress route, the only police recourse is retreat to avoid being overrun, which usually only further incites the mob elements, etc. In selection of barricade sites, the type of buildings on each flank and their occupants must be considered. In hostile areas, danger to police personnel will be present. Barricades and cordons should not only be effective at and in street levels, but also against roof tops traffic and rioter movement from one building to another. Barricade sites that force rioters to remain in certain areas where there are many vulnerable targets, such as a business district, should be avoided. Instead, they should be positioned so that rioter movement is directed through areas less vulnerable to damage such as by fire-bombing, looting, etc. Barricade operations are only as good as the amount of police manpower available to maintain and protect them. An unbroken line of barricades across a long front, such as that placed in front of a large crowd in a city square, is very difficult to protect and maintain without a great deal of manpower. Although such barricades serve to canalize individuals, deny areas, and keep a manuever area between police and the mob body, they are subject to penetration at any place along the line where an organized mob concentrates. Immediate police reaction, from a ready reserve, is essential

to reinforce these points against mob pressure. Ends of flanks of long barricade lines should be anchored to buildings or police vehicle concentrations. When confrontations between police and huge masses of people take place, it is often desirable to have several lines of barricades, in depth, so that police manuever room exists in between

barricade lines. This also serves to absorb mob or forward crowd movement should irresistible pressure of rear crowd elements force its front section (even unwillingly) in the direction of police positions.

Construction Materials And Numbers Roadblocks and barricades can be improvised from material on hand or prepared in advance and transported to the scene. Police departments with any consistent crowd-control problems and a riot potential, should maintain inventories of portabletype wooden or wire barricades. Wooden barricades should be of varying lengths and heights, strongly constructed and designed so that they are difficult to overturn. They should be real obstacles to anyone trying to go over, under or around them. Flimsy, inadequate police barricades require more manpower to support them. Many times these barricades, when placed in a line, are best interlocked or staggered to create more of an obstacle. Those portable barricades constructed in separate sections so that

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BARRICADES—ROADBLOCKS Roadblocks, using police or other vehicles, are frequently used for emergency purposes. Police vehicles however, should be replaced as soon as possible. Civilian cars in the riot area can be pushed or rolled into position, if advisable. Wooden barricades should be portable, easily-dismantled, and transportable. They can be supplemented by other timbers or have barbed wire interlaced and anchored at each end. The wooden barrier is subject to penetration by speeding vehicles. Vehicles can be parked in such a

way to reinforce barriers at their front so that any traffic through the area has to be done in a slow weaving fashion. (See drawing, lower left.) Concertina barbed tape coils that can be carried to roadblock areas, used, and then retrieved are very useful in containment operations where flow of foot traffic, in and out of Secure and Critical zone must be controlled. At lower right, note photo comparing barbed tape (below) with conventional barbed wire. (See Chapter 19 for more details re barbed tape.)

the legs and cross-beams can be assembled on the scene, are best for storage and transport in quantity. Interlocking, portable, metal barricades are available from commercial sources. The most effective anti-personnel barricades are constructed using barbed wire or tape. These types require fewer police numbers to support, and are the most effective when much violence is a possibility. Spools of commercial-type barbed wire can be inventoried. They are transportable and enable construction of barricades on the scene by stringing any number of wire strands between any two fixed objects usable as anchors. Barbed wire can also be intertwined around portable barricades to increase

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their effectiveness. The new retrievable razor-sharp, anti-personnel ‘“‘German Tape” is very effective in containment operations. Plain barbless steel tape is also very useful for crowd-control measures. Rapid construction of temporary roadblocks is best done using concertina tape. Large coils of twisted tape can be emplaced rapidly in critical areas and retrieved again, for re-use, once the situation indicates. Transporting and stockpiling rolls of concertina tape presents no particular problem. Large U.S. Army installations generally have barbed wire in inventory and for issue. Concertina rolls of about 3 feet in diameter will extend approximately 50 feet and can be placed in depth, interlocked or staggered so the ends overlap. The U.S. Army also has under development what it calls ‘‘a rapidly emplaced antipersonnel obstacle.”’ This consists of a box, approximately the size of three shoe boxes, containing a delay-type release device, ejecting a spiral of barbed-tape 15’’ high and 12 feet long. The compactness, transportability, quick-release features make numbers of these units a potentially-useful personnel barricade device. Ends of concertina-wire barricades should be anchored to fixed objects to prevent flanking. Single strands of barbless tape or wire stretched across the area some distance in front of the barbed concertina barricade can be used to hang lighted warning signs, advising of dangers or police counter-action in case of trespass, etc. Roadblocks aimed at slowing down and stopping vehicle traffic and personnel can be improvised by using sandbags, other vehicles, trees and timbers, wire, tape and combinations of such items. Such roadblocks can be constructed so that concertina wire gates can be opened after a vehicle check, or they can be staggered in depth so that the ends overlap. This forces a vehicle to follow a weaving path at a very slow speed. Police and other vehicles can be staggered in a like manner to form hastily, a mobile-type roadblock. In this case, the vehicles are parked on each side of the street, perpendicular to the curb at approximately 50-foot intervals. More permanent vehicle roadblocks, using civilian-type trucks and cars are advisable, if available. Valuable police vehicles can be used to much better purpose during a riot situation. The number of police-manned barricades should always be sufficient to ward off a suprise attack and they should maintain constant radio communication with their reserve elements. Where armed attack is possible, protected positions for personnel must be maintained (sandbags, etc.). At night, warning lights and signs in front of barricades should be in place. Approaches should be lighted. When car search and interrogation of groups of people is being conducted, the entire operation should be covered by other alert armed police, from a protected position. Tear-gas equipment, with launch capability, grenades and obscuring-smoke grenades and pots should be on hand for emergency use. Riot shotguns constitute the best police armament for barricade operations. In those violent riot situations where a barricade position is possibly in the path of two-way traffic to hostile elements, both barricade sides must be protected. The basic riot-control plan must take into consideration the need and scope of barricade and containment operations. Equipment for this purpose, such as wire, portable wooden barricades, sandbags, signs, lights, etc., must be stockpiled. Most important, the ‘‘around-the-clock’’ manpower allocation needed to operate them must

be planned.

CURFEWS The declaration of a curfew condition is always based on legal ordinance or authority. Generally, such an ordinance will enable numerous degrees of curfew restrictions

TECHNIQUES

FOR

RIOT CONTAINMENT

65

and includes authority to curtail sale of liquor, arms, explosives, and other sensitive items, etc. A declaration of curfew should be made over radio, T.V., from helicopters,

and through the news media at frequent, regular intervals. The more fluid the riot situation, the more necessary this becomes. Many times curfew is the only real means of curbing rioting, discouraging outsiders from entering the area, and enabling police to establish and maintain their authority. Law-abiding citizens outside the affected area will normally comply with curfew regulations. However, those within the Secure and Critical zones may only do so because of police presence manifested by heavy and continuous patrolling. Violent rioting, apart from the rioting elements, also triggers-off increased activity by underworld elements who usually try to take advantage of the situation for criminal purposes. The curfew will deter much destruction and looting by such lawless elements. An absolute curfew resulting in the apprehension and arrest of all persons on the streets or in “‘off-limits”’ areas is enforceable only if there is enough manpower. A curfew situation should only be declared if it can be rigorously enforced. Such enforcement can vary from arrest and detention, to ‘‘shoot-on-sight”’ orders. No definite curfew standards or patterns are available to follow other than that they must be legal, enforceable, and meet the needs of the situation. These conditions are not gen-

erally listed in any dictionary description of the word.

PREVENTION

OF

LOOTING

Fast, police preventive action is necessary to forestall looting and pillaging during civil disturbance. In the fluid-type riot, looting frequently takes place concurrently with fire-bombing. Although looting may start as an isolated incident, word soon spreads. If those involved are not quickly apprehended, similar acts spread throughout the area. Recent experience shows that although looting may be started by those more violent-prone, if allowed to spread, it is not restricted to either sex or age groups. Lack of policing, in fact, may cause most residents of the area to engage in the act with little regard for its penalties. Successful looting by some is regarded as license to loot by others. Juvenile offenders may not even consider they are committing lawless acts.

Shops And Businesses Most Vulnerable Normally, looters will first strike liquor stores followed by attacks on drug stores, super markets, arms and ammunition stores, pawn shops, jewelry and householdappliance stores. The longer looting is permitted to continue, the larger the items stolen. Major department stores are often plundered and then burned, so as to destroy records of charge accounts.

Police Measures Control of looting begins with instant police reaction to the first incidents. The contagion of successful looting spreads so fast that unless the problem is speedily dealt with, large numbers of officers and patrol units may eventually be needed to stamp it out. An area affected by looting must be sealed-off. Violators should be removed from the area at once. Saturation patrolling must then be initiated and sometimes continued until stationary guard posts are established.

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AND

TECHNIQUES

During the hours of darkness, looting attempts will increase. Police strength should be allocated accordingly. Vulnerable areas should be illuminated, if possible. The degree of looting will often determine the need for and operational hours of a curfew. In large, prolonged riot actions, it is advisable to chart periods of looting and firebomb activity to determine police strength requirements. The degree of force used to curb looting is variable due to the diverse types of looters who may be involved. Specific instructions to police should be laid down on the degree of necessary force to be used and arrest procedures, where children and all age groups as well as both sexes are apt to be involved. Personal police weaponry such as Shok-batons, Chemical Mace®, tear-gas projecters, gas and smoke generators and long-lasting-rigid foam concentrations are very useful. Non-burning, non-fragmentation plastic tear-gas grenades with dry dust-type loadings are also effective as they can be launched from considerable distances into stores and areas where looters operate. After forcing the looters to flee, the tear-gas powder settles and remains active. Subsequent looters maystir it up into the air where it will be effective again. Use of obscuring smoke to blanket a looting area is also a very useful tactic. As the smoke clears, police can apprehend or evacuate all persons encountered, as appropriate. Criminals in riot areas will always take advantage of a disturbed situation not only to loot, but also to perpetrate more serious types of crimes under cover of rioting. Banks and other installations that are nominal targets of criminal attack become especially vulnerable. At times, planned incidents are used to set off rioting to divert police attention from the main crime objective. The amount of loot taken during a riot situation can be even so great that it is not usable to the looters, themselves. In many such situations, criminals will establish collection points where they will pay looters for their stolen goods, warehousing it in other hidden locations. Police intelligence and underworld contacts should always be alert for this aspect of looting and the eventual disposal of pillage after a disturbance is over. Past police and National Guard practice in which the press and T.V. depicted police and Guardsmen standing by under political restraint, without taking any arrest action despite looting going on openly in their presence, should be entirely discredited. Looting, like fire-bombing, is so contagious that it must be stopped, though preferably by nonlethal force. Strict law enforcement should never be hindered by political decisions in which open pillage and plundering are made permissible for this is, in effect, the antithesis of law and order.

The ultimate control of serious looting may have to be ’’shoot-on-sight”’ orders in some extreme situations. In such a case, they should be well broadcast, prior to their

execution. This extreme step may be necessary against certain type looters who operate in extremely sensitive areas where such acts Will incite others to the point where the entire riot-control effort is endangered. Permissive looting has been argued as a means of diminishing the possibility of police-rioter violence. This has never been a satisfactory solution, however, to mob

violence. Looting escalation does not diminish, even if permitted at all, without police arrests and action. Property rights are the oldest of all human rights, antedating even other civil rights, and they must be upheld if a stable society and public support of law and order is to be maintained.

Police

Raids

THE ESCALATION IN violent crime and rioting emphasizes the law enforcement need for special task forces, counter-sniper teams and other units trained in basic streetfighting tactics. The riot-action potential of our major urban areas makes it mandatory that such police units be organized and that special combat and additional weaponry training be given all police officers. Recent police performance in major civil disturbances indicate that they are still largely untrained in many of the operations and techniques to be discussed. Where much violence attends a major civil disturbance, raids and assaults against armed, barricaded rioters, extremist headquarters, and other centers of armed law-

breakers are a necessary part of the overall police control plan. They usually take place after the affected area has been sealed-off and a curfew imposed; then police search, seizure, and raid operations, preferably carried out by units of trained men, are mandatory. Properly planned and executed, such raids can be made successfully and with a minimum of casualties. Training in common-sense precautions and basic principles of cover, concealment, fire and movement, as practiced by combat infantry men, should be given to all law enforcement officers that are apt to be involved.

POOR

POLICE

OPERATIONS

A classic example of what can happen when a police raid is poorly planned and executed is an incident involving the notorious Barrow brothers. Although outnumbered and surprised, they successfully shot it out with twelve law enforcement officers and escaped!

‘Bonnie and Clyde’

Incident

On the night of 17 July 1933, the two Barrow brothers, wanted for murder, accompanied by two women companions, rented a cabin at the Crown Cabin Camp, six miles southeast of Platte

68

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

City, Missouri. It was a brick double cabin, with a covered garage between the two rooms. Each room had one door facing to the south and one door opening into the garage. After the gangsters had parked their car in the garage, it could be backed out only on the southern side. Late next afternoon, a tip was received by the Sheriff at Platte City. He posted deputies to watch the cabin and asked the State Highway Patrol and the Sheriff of Jackson County for assistance. The mixed force included four deputy sheriffs from Kansas City in a police squad car armed with one submachinegun, two riot shotguns, and one revolver; three State highway patrolmen, armed with another submachinegun and their revolvers; the Sheriff with another submachinegun; and his four deputies armed with one rifle and their revolvers.

The cabins were dark as the officers approached. The squad car was driven to within about fifteen feet of the garage door, and its headlights played on the door of the east cabin. The captain of the State Highway Patrol, and the Sheriff, carrying bullet-proof shields in front of them, went toward the east cabin. The Sheriff commanded

the occupants to come out for

questioning and was answered by a woman’s voice, saying ‘“‘As soon as we get dressed.”’ After a few minutes wait, the sheriff called out that unless they came out, the cabin would be bombarded. His answer was a fusillade of shots. The sheriff was hit three times, but the shield

protected vital spots. As he commenced firing, the captain’s submachinegun jammed.

The two officers withdrew. Bullets were now peppering the squad car. After firing about six shots, the submachinegun in the car jammed and at about the same time, the driver was shot through the legs. The squad car was then backed away from the garage. Another officer was wounded. Just then the door of the east cabin flew open and a man and a woman ran out. They stumbled under a burst of fire but made the garage, raised its door, and reached their car. Here they were joined by the other pair, who came directly from the west cabin into the garage. The car dashed backward out of the garage and drove off into the night. It was a clean getaway, though a number of weapons were left behind and fresh blood stains indicated that at least one of the group had been wounded. Despite the advantage of complete surprise in this raid, the bandits had fought their way through a cordon of officers and escaped—twelve armed officers against only two men and two women!

Criticism. The four deputies in the squad car were too close. This did not permit a full field of fire for their guns; their car instead, presented an excellent target from within the cabin. They obviously did not take cover behind the front of the car where the engine block would have given more protection. Using the car at first to block the garage was an excellent idea, but moving it, just because one man was shot in the legs, enabled the bandits to escape. The submachineguns used had, undoubtedly, not been checked as to their operable condition.

The officers had been so certain of success that they had not planned for a pursuit contingency. They were completely surprised at the sudden appearance of the cabin occupants and demoralized by the fire from the cabin. Before they could recover, the gangsters had fled. Six of the officers were armed with revolvers. This weapon is not suitable for engaging those who may be armed with submachineguns or sawed-off shotguns. Firing at night with a revolver at a running target is usually ineffectual. If each officer had carried a riot shotgun, the gangsters should not have escaped. A non-burning tear-gas grenade or projectile thrown or projected into each of the rooms, would probably have produced more effective results than the many shots fired by the officers. Not only does a failure such as this waste lives, but law enforcement in general loses prestige and public confidence. Conversely, it increases the arrogance and self-confidence of the lawless.

Romero Case

The Barrow incident is not an isolated case. In 1966, the Associated Press reported

POLICE

RAIDS

69

another incident (below) that again demonstrates the need for more and better law

enforcement barricade-operation training and the coordinated use of weapons under controlled conditions. TWO BROTHERS, DEPUTIES FIGHT Over 1,000 Shots Fired During Gun Battle New Iberia, La.(AP)—Two elderly brothers opened fire Monday on deputies attempting to serve them with legal papers, starting a 90-minute gun battle that involved 15 deputies, more that 1,000 shots. Four men were left wounded. Officers finally subdued Andre Romero, 60, and

Andrew, 65, at their farmhouse near here. The sheriff said his men fired more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition, and the brothers emptied two boxes of shotgun shells containing 25 shells each, and a 50-bullet box of .22’s.

RAID

PRINCIPLES

If at all possible, police raids should be executed under conditions and at such times as will be a complete surprise to the raided party. A well-planned raid, executed without the benefit of surprise and made in the face of gunfire, involves much more risk and requires skilful execution. The discussion in this chapter should be considered only as a general pattern for planning a successful raid. No two raids will be exactly alike. The local situation, time element, nature of the objective and the police force involved, will all influence raid planning and execution. Initiative and common sense must be coupled with the use of well-disciplined and trained men.

RAID COMMAND

AND

PERSONNEL

The raid commander, once chosen, must be given full authority and his decisions carried out explicitly by all members of the raiding party. For leading a raid, innate qualitites of leadership, experience, and sound judgment are prerequisites. If only one agency is involved, the choice of a raid commander is ordinarily dictated by rank. however, in riot actions, overlapping jurisdictions and a need for additional strength and experienced personnel will, at times, result in the raiding party being a joint operation, the party made up of representatives of State, Federal, county and municpal police. Mixed raiding parties often operate under considerable handicap because of differences in levels of training, experience, and attitude toward cooperation. This handicap must be recognized and surmounted in the planning stage. Failure to coopperate, or to obey orders, for any reason after the actual raid has started, can lead to

casualties and failure. If at all possible, the major phases of any raid should be carried out by a single police organization under the leadership of a man known for his ability, one who has the confidence of the other members of the raiding party and who knows their capabilities. The raid commander should be given his choice, when possible, of the men, armament and equipment necessary for the operation. Men who know one another by sight are preferable. He must then consider some or all of the following factors: (1) (a)

The number to be apprehended or subdued. Will they surrender peaceably if given the chance?

(b) What kind of leader do they have? (c) Are the legal penalties for the violations involved such that anything other than force is likely to succeed?

70

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL (d)

AND

TECHNIQUES

Are they skilled in fighting? Have they had previous experience against police? Have

they possibly been in the Armed Forces?

(2) Armament (a) What specific types of weapons do they have—rifles, shotguns, handguns, submachineuns? :

(b)

What do their past records, if any, show about their attitude and ability toward the

use of weapons? Any particular weapon? (c)

(d)

(3)

Is their ammunition supply limited? Extensive?

Is there a possibility that they may employ trip wires, booby traps, or explosives?

Location and Surroundings.

(a) What type of building are they occupying? Is:it wood, brick, concrete? How many floors?. Vulnerable to penetration by gunfire? (b) Where are the doors, windows, fire escapes, skylights located? What is their relation to adjoining buildings and to the terrain?

(c)

Is the roof accessible from adjoining buildings? Is it a possible source of hostile fire,

or a likely means of approach, or escape? (d)

Is there

a basement? Where are its entrances and exits? Does it connect with base-

ments of other buildings? Is it a likely place for hostile fire, or approach? (e) Is there a garage? Can it be entered without exposure to gunfire? Could a car from the garage be used to make a sudden break to escape? (f) Where in the building are the fugitives located? Can this be determined by drawing fire, informers, or by studying the defense possibilities? (g) What is the interior plan of the building? Can this information be obtained from the owner, landlord, tenants, neighbors, architects, city records?

(4)

Other factors

(a) Is it safe to use high-velocity weapons (or any firearm) because of the proximity of other residences and citizens? By delaying the action, can tear-gas equipment be obtained and used to good advantage? Obscuring smoke? (b) What is the attitude of the surrounding populace toward police authority, toward the use of extreme degrees of force, if necessary? What about any innocents in the building? Those not so innocent? Can they be evacuated? (c) Will the death of any offenders or their associates due to police action bring on undue criticism from the press or public? Their escape? (d) Are any women involved in the action? Hostages? (e)

(5)

Should surveillance and delay be continued until answers are obtained?

Hostile capabilities.

(a) Considering knowledge and characteristics of those involved, what reaction can be expected from a surprise approach; is it possible? (b) Do they have lookouts posted? (c) Should a contact be made to try to bring about a peaceful surrender? Is a last-ditch fight to be expected? . (d)

Can contact be made by phone, sound system, voice, or intermediary, if desired?

(e)

What will be the probable result of display of force and armament?

(f)

Can the water, light, gas and other utilities be cut off? What will be the result?

(g)

Can an armed break be expected? Where is this most likely to take place?

The raid commander who has the answers to these questions should, by the exercise of good judgment and with due consideration to suggestions from other members of the raiding party, be able to work out a successful plan. Caution should be exercised to avoid too much high-level planning. Persons in higher authority who are not going to participate should avoid entering into detailed operational plans. Arbitrary decisions and restrictions on degrees of force and action can cause the raid commander and his men to act against their own judgment and without the aggressiveness needed for success.

POLICE

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71

Members of the Raiding Party Personnel making up any raiding party should be selected by the officer in charge, if possible, and each should be known to him and to each other. Volunteers with courage, initiative, known ability, coupled with past infantry experience and who are veterans of previous police raids, are the most desirable. The size of the raiding party will depend on the resistance expected. Generally it is a sound plan to use the military principle demanding numerical superiority of at least three to one, provided the number to be apprehended is known. Surprise, superior armament, thorough planning, and skill must compensate for any lack of numbers. Time permitting, it is usually possible to concentrate a superior force of officers against any group of lawbreakers. If the size of the raiding group is such that the commander does not have personal knowledge of the experience, training and abilities of all the men at his disposal, he should at least assign key missions to men of known ability.

Briefing the Raiding Party The plan for the raid should be presented to all members of the party. The mission should be stated clearly and reviewed in detail. The commander must make clear WHO is to do WHAT—WHEN, WHERE, HOW. Each man should be briefed on his role and given an opportunity to ask questions. The raid commander should explain the “‘whys’’ for certain steps, especially if the men in the raiding party are inexperienced, unknown

to each other, have had different levels of training, or are

from different organizations. If the raiding party is large, subordinates should be assigned to arrange for weapons and munitions, transportation, communications, equipment, support, etc. The leader can issue maps, sketches, written orders, and oral instructions. Any action that will eliminate possible error and strengthen control is advisable. Rehearsals are always indicated, if practicable. ACTUAL

RAID

PROCEDURES

The decision on the type of raid to be undertaken will depend on the local situation and the degree of expected opposition. A surprise raid, requiring several simultaneous entries into a building in order to force immediate surrender, is one method. Or it may be desirable to place the men in position, contact the fugitives, and order them to surrender. Where the latter have been alerted and made known their intention to fight, the opening phase of the operation could be simultaneous, concentrated fire and gas attack upon the building. A raiding party of any size should be split into two sections. One section to seal off the area and the other to make the actual assault. The party surrounding the area is responsible for cutting off attempts to escape, for covering the police assault group by gunfire, gas or smoke, and for providing for any unforseen incidents by holding some men and special weapons in reserve. The area should be sealed off to keep out vehicular traffic and the public, to permit unhampered operations. Auxiliary police who are not actual members of the raiding party may be used for the containment phase of any large-raid operations. Command control is difficult in any situation involving a fire fight. It is best kept by having the men well briefed, and by having a logical, simple plan, one flexible

UB

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

enough for any contingency. Principal and alternate methods of communication must be planned. The commander can best maintain control by remaining where he can observe the major phases of the action. This does not mean that he should necessarily lead the assault or entry. A covered position, strategically located, should be selected for his command post. All men should know where he can be contacted at any time. Control, through a workable means of communication, is especially necessary when the raiding party is large and when the operation takes place at night. At night, the raid’s final phase must be particularly well-organized and controlled, to prevent confusion and the possibility of casualties from crossfire. Means of Control

(1) Time.—In a surprise operation, a set time for initiating the action with all watches synchronized, should be considered. Time can also be the means of launching other set phases, diversionary actions, gas attacks, etc. It may be advisable to have a secondary visual or sound signal, for launching or calling off the assault, in case something goes wrong before the various phases begin or are completed. (2) Sound.—-Signals, such as whistle blasts, bull horns, public address systems and oral commands, can be utilized if other noises, such as gunfire, permit and do not betray the raid. Sound commands, when employed, must be powerful enough to penetrate during the operation. (3)

Sight.—In

daytime,

colored

smoke

or, at night, colored

flares, provide a

means of controlling various phases of the action. (4) Radio.—The use of radio-equipped cars and walkie-talkies should be mandatory, especially, in a large operation. Ideally, a raid commander should always be able to communicate directly with each man. Special helmets with radio receivers in the crown, are now under development. (5) Messengers.—Hand-delivered written messages are better than oral ones. Oral messages are subject to distortion and misinterpretation, especially if they are lengthy. Transmission speed and security are important. The requirement for written acknowledgment of receipt for messages sent by vehicle or foot should be standard procedure. Basic signals which should be explained in the briefing are those for Open Fire, Cease Fire, Hold Ground, Advance, Retreat, and for the reserves or surrounding party to close in, etc. The character of each raid determines which of these signals or others will be necessary.

The Approach A secured assembly point should be designated in the immediate vicinity of the objective; in a surprise raid, this point must be out of sight and hearing. Here an assembly is held for last-minute check of plans, weapons, communications, and other equipment. The raid commander should then send the men to their designated positions, allowing ample time for the purpose. Men and vehicles move to stand-by for pursuit, roadblocks, or other emergency purposes. Up to the point of engagement, the organizational phases of all raids are very similar. The scope of the raid, situation and resistance, real or potential, influences the action once the operation is launched.

Most police departments should prepare ‘‘canned”’ plans and basic procedures for emergency raids and barricade actions. These plans should be standardized, to take care of all foreseeable situations and be covered periodically during departmental training sessions.

POLICE

RAID TACTICS-APPROACHING

RAIDS

BUILDINGS

73

OR

BARRICADES

(1) Whenever possible, tear gas and obscuring smoke should be used; non-burning grenades and projectiles should be used indoors. (2) Fields of fire must be set up to cover all exits. Automatic weapons or riot shotguns should be concentrated on the area from which hostiles are most likely to make a break, and where gunfire from the building is most likely. (3) Closed garages and other possible car exits should be covered, so as to prevent escapes by vehicle. If a possible escape car is visible and accessible, its tires can be deflated or shot out, the distributor disconnected, etc., to deny its use.

(4) Adequate cover should be selected for all firing points. If sufficient cover is not available at close range against low-velocity weapons such as handguns and riot guns, riflemen should be placed in areas farther away where cover is available and positioned so as to have a good field of fire. (5)

Men ordered to advance, by stages from one covered position to another, must

be protected on their flanks. For this protection men and weapons should be specifically assigned. (6) The kind of weapons used by the fugitives should always be considered when planning an advance and selecting cover. Most protective vests and shields will not protect against high-velocity rifle fire. If a car is used for cover against rifle fire, its engine block offers the best protection. (7) Any open approach towards entry of a building defended by armed lawbreakers should be initiated under concentration of fire on its windows,

doors, roofs, or

other points from which hostile fire may be received. (8) Running advances, from cover to cover, or toward the defended building, should be made in a zig-zag manner, with the body in a crouched position. Such advances can be made simultaneously by a number of men under covering fire. Advances should be made in short runs, or bounds, from one covered position to another, so that the time of exposure to hostile gunfire is limited. (9) An assault in the face of gunfire should only be made when there are sufficient numbers in the assaulting party to enter the building and subdue the defenders. Single, isolated, uncoordinated charges carried out by individual members of the attacking party, often result in needless casualties. (10) Well-trained snipers and observers with telescope-sighted rifles can be used to great advantage in such raids; the raid commander, too, should have binoculars. (11) Many buildings have blind sides that can be approached safely. Once the blind side of a building is reached, the party can follow around outside the walls to enter at a previously chosen location. If accurate covering fire supports police seeking entry

in this manner, it is difficult for the defenders to stop the approach by gunfire without unduly exposing themselves. (12) The raiders should avoid bunching up. They should advance as a line of skirmishers, one man running forward to cover, then another. Since there is always a possibility of fugitives possessing automatic weapons, submachineguns, or shotguns, a direct frontal assault should be made only after such weapons have been silenced by covering fire. | (13) If the number of defenders is small and their exact location is known, a basic strategy of keeping them and their weapons busy by returning fire, no matter how inaccurately directed, can be used. This will enable other officers to approach and enter.

(14)

When armed opponents are barricaded in such a manner that they can only

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RAIDS

Ths)

be approached frontally, a truck or automobile with its rear compartment loaded with bullet-resisting material can be used. Packed newspapers, magazines, firewood, sand bags, and sacks of coal are usable for this. Then the vehicle is backed up in the attack, but special armored police vehicles are better used for this type action. Bundles of magazines and newspapers tied together compactly, will provide a satisfactory shield against most small-arms fire. Twenty pounds of newspaper tied in a bundle (full sheet-size) will stop ordinary handgun and shotgun pellets, but not high-velocity rifle bullets. Magazines, being a higher-quality paper, can be made into even more effective shields. Scoop shovels, heavy planks, sacks, and boxes of dirt or coal, pieces

of furniture, doubled-up mattresses, etc., can be used. In improvising such shields it is only common sense to consider the armament that will be used against them, and to test them with a comparable weapon, time and circumstances permitting. (15) Ina large raid, especially one at night, the protective cordon placed around the area should include several squad cars, with engines idling. They should be pointed in the direction of potential escape routes so they can quickly pursue in case the unexpected happens and the fugitives try to break away in an automobile. If there is a possibility of vehicle escape and there is a lack of police pursuit vehicles or an insufficient force, roadblocks can be constructed. These may consist of logs, spiked boards, commandeered cars or trucks, barbed wire, or any other bulky material that

will stop or slow down a speeding vehicle. Armed police should be stationed in a covered position near such road blocks, to make them effective. (16) If surprise is possible, an attempt to scare or “‘flush”’ fugitives from a house can be made. After all exits and escape routes have been covered, approach a blind side of the building with a squad car and sound the siren. This may succeed in forcing the occupants into the open in attempts to escape, especially if the covering party is not visible. Once the occupants clear the building, the covering party can force a surrender, or at least be in an advantageous position should a fire fight ensue. Should the fugitives fail to leave the building, they can be ordered to surrender. This failing, the cover party can remain in place and time can be taken for organizing the necessary attack and capture. (17)

When CN tear-gas, CS, or obscuring smoke are not available, police may re-

sort to demolitions. Dynamite sticks with short fuses can be used as concussion grenades, to be thrown through windows, dropped down chimneys, through skylights, etc. Use of explosives and charges to blast down barricades and walls should be confined only to men with a knowledge of demolition. (18) When a fugitive is holed up in an out-building where there is no danger of fire spreading, a fire-bomb can be used to force him out. (19) Ina night operation, all critical areas of the defensive position should be subject to instant illumination, on command,

by means

of spotlights, flares, etc. Cars

with spotlights should, when possible, be placed in protected positions to eliminate drawing fire. Portable spotlights should be used in like manner. Aside from the obvious advantages of being able to light up any given area at will, the psychological effect of light on defenders is sometimes very great. The use of helicopters with powerful high-intensity floodlights, hovering out of guniire range, is a newer technique that has been used successfully. (20) Fire control is essential. Police should not fire blindly when there are no targets. Covering fire is best delivered on orders so that the advance of assault police can be coordinated. Ample ammunition should be in reserve and available. Automatic weapons should be fired only in short bursts, and by experienced men.

76

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL RAID

TACTICS

AND

INSIDE

TECHNIQUES

BUILDINGS

(1) When approaching a door, take advantage of cover, if available. Stand to one side. (2) After asking those possibly behind a locked door to open it with no result, kick or knock the door down by firing at its lock, or use a pry bar from the side. (3) Throw a non-burning-type tear-gas grenade through the open door or transom if gunfire is anticipated or encountered. Hand-held smoke grenades are also useful to force evacuation (cry ‘‘Fire,”’ to help flush occupants); carry gas masks. (4) Eyes must be conditioned to poor light and special care must be taken in passing unsearched, dark stair wells, and recesses. (5) Firearms should be kept at ready positions. Men searching rooms should operate in pairs with other men stationed inside the building to guard searched areas and stairways, points of exit, and to watch for possible gunfire from sections not yet searched. Riot shotguns, carbines, handguns, and submachineguns are the best indoor weapons. (6) All room occupants should be covered by firearms at time of entry. If a room has too many occupants, they must be searched and cleared before proceeding. The wall search, or “‘hands-up”’ position facing the wall, should be employed during such a holding period. (7) All closets, possible hiding places including in and under beds, must be searched progressively and not be by-passed, for to do so would endanger the searchers from the rear. Generally, one officer carries out search while the other covers him from a secure position inside the room with his back to the wall, next to the door of initial entry, etc. (8) All doors into closets and rooms should be slammed all the way open; their failure to open completely, or lack of an impact or thudding noise when the door is thus swung, may indicate the presence of a hostile. (9) When a raid is in process and a dark room is encountered, only one man should enter it at a time, until it is found to be safe.

(10) Surprise response is always possible and any strange sound or sign of recent occupancy (cigarette burning in ash tray, etc.) demands caution. Blaring radios and T.V. sets likewise indicate recent fugitive presence and cover surprise or escape. (11)

Dangerous areas such as attics, basements and darkened

rooms

should be

sealed off as fast as possible. They can be entered only by men using shields, if armed resistance is expected. In some circumstances, occupants already arrested and disarmed can be forced to enter them first. Non-burning tear-gas grenades should be used, if available.

(12) When gunfire is encountered and orders to surrender are not obeyed, use gas, or clear the rooms adjoining those above and below. Employ a riot run using rifled slugs through the floor, ceiling or through the walls, etc. (13) When physical entry is absolutely necessary into a room containing an armed defender, it should be done in a rush from the side. The officer should cross the door

jam diagonally, and assume a prone, back-to-wall position on the inside of the room opposite the door hinge. This is usually done at the time a door is first slammed open, the other team member first directing covering fire through the open door at opposite room corners. Normally the armed occupant will be facing the door as his source of danger. The officer now inside returns hostile fire on/y when he can locate its source. Hall lights should be extinguished for this operation if the target room is also dark. This is, of course, a very dangerous and sometimes costly way of clearing a room. It should only be employed after all other means such as tear-gas have failed or are unavailable.

POLICE

REACHING

RAIDS

SNIPER

YU

IN HOUSE

Barricaded snipers that cannot be flushed out by tear gas or other means may be attacked through ceilings, floors, walls and doors. High-velocity rifles such as .30/06 calibers and 12gauge rifled slugs usually penetrate. Approach to the firing points should be as quiet as possible and can be made under covering fire directed at the windows from the outside. Systematic fire should be laid so that all areas of the room are covered. Pauses in firing should be done on command so that the room can be checked for noise of movement. Lulls in firing can also be used to demand surrender, commands to throw weapons out of window, open doors, etc.

(14) Booby traps, explosive devices, dummies to deceive police or draw their fire, may be encountered. Obvious devices such as trip wires, seemingly valuable items such as firearms on floors, etc., should be approached with care. Police caution

should be at its greatest when forcing entry to buildings and places long occupied by known hostiles such as meeting halls and headquarters, buildings of subversive and extremist groups, etc. Delay-type explosive and arson devices may also be encountered. (15) Where resistance is clearly to be expected, personnel engaged in raids should be equipped with protective vests, helmets, gas and smoke grenades, shields, gas masks and all other basic portable support items. It is advisable for men conducting clearing operations to remain as mobile as possible, but personal protection equipment still should be a priority budget item. (16) During and after a raid, outside security must be maintained; the hostility of neighboring elements determines the degree. (17)

The headquarters of militant extremists and rioters can be kept under covert

surveillance, even after a raid. Some members sought from such organizations may be unaware that a raid has taken place, and can later be picked up when arriving.

78

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

(18) For a large-scale raid, the officers involved should have previously-prepared voice recognition signals. At times, white arm bands can be used to aid quick recognition and avoid mistakes of identity. This is especially important if the various officers are not acquainted and are in civilian attire. (19) Good searching teams should not be split up to handle and transport prisoners. Use other men for this purpose. (20) Occupants and prisoners apprehended should be taken from the raid area as rapidly as possible. Their continued presence in the area ties up police, and may be provocative if other hostiles are in the area.

SURPRISE AND NIGHT- RAID TACTICS In a surprise raid calling for night entry of a building, the following points should be considered: (1) A covering party should remain outside to block all possible exits (roofs, doors, windows).

(2) A plan of the inside of the building should be studied before raid entry points are selected. Door locks can be picked. The location of sleeping quarters should be ascertained if the raid is to be made at night. (3) Silent night-entry of a building is best confined to one point, only. Simultaneous entries from different directions are dangerous because of the crossfire hazard. If it is necessary to enter from more than one point, adequate recognition signals must be prepared. If a plan of the building is available, definite paths and limits of penetration for each man can be set to prevent confusion and accidents. (4) Entry from a point where it would be least expected, such as from a skylight, should always be considered. (5) Asignal should be arranged for ordering the outside covering party to close in, should they be needed. (6) Ina night entry, at least ten minutes should be allowed for members of the party to condition their eyes to darkness. Similarly, a brightly-lighted area should be entered, from darkness, only after the eyes have become conditioned to the glare. (7) Doors and windows should be transited rapidly and diagonally, so as to avoid positions in line of fire or presenting silhouette targets against a lighter background. A listening pause should be made after the initial entry, and frequently thereafter during movements. (8) Each man should carry a flashlight. (9) If the effect of surprise is lost, it is advisable to have the headlights of squad cars or spotlights pre-positioned, to cover building exits against escapes. (10) Stay close to the walls when advancing down hallways or up stairs. (11) In old wooden buildings, watch out for squeaky floors and stairways. Stairs can best be ascended by stepping slowly along the wall side. Doors with creaky hinges can often be opened more silently by lifting the door up slightly, thereby taking the strain off the hinges. (12) In advancing through a dark room containing furniture, it is best to keep to the middle of the room, to avoid obstacles that produce noise. (13) If one makes a noise inadvertently, while trying to move silently through a darkened room, he should pause until certain that no alarm results. If the noise alarms the occupants, it is best to drop to the floor in a prone position and face the source of danger; the revolver should be in hand and out in front.

POLICE

RAIDS

79

(14) Patience in silent night-entry is essential. If two hostile parties are aware of each other’s presence in the same darkened area, the best strategy is to remain still and let the opponent move first, thus disclosing his location. Under this strain, natural heavy breathing should be suppressed as it gives away position. If gun battle is imminent, throw some pocket object such as a coin into a corner away from you. If the opposition fires at the noise, shoot at his gun flash, placing shots on each side of his muzzle-blast. When firing first from a prone position, roll over and away, if possible, so as to escape fire returned at your own muzzle-blast. If standing upright when opening fire, drop down the instant the shot is fired. A position on top of a piano or table is very advantageous in darkroom combat, especially if it places you above the expected line of fire and can be occupied prior to contact, and there maintained without noise. (15) Handguns are the best weapons to carry when making silent entry raids in darkness. Shoulder weapons are unwieldy noise-makers. Parts of the clothing or police uniform that make noise when moving or crawling, such as gun-and-belt harness, etc., should be removed before entering. Wristwatches with luminous dials also should be removed, or covered. Shoes can be removed; for this work, those with thick

rubber soles are best. (16)

When a lone fugitive is located in bed in a darkened room, shine a flash-

light held away from the body in his face, and clap his forehead hard when awakening him. The sudden glare will blind him when he opens his eyes. Desperadoes often sleep with their weapons under the pillow or beside them under the covers. Hence, if possible, make your approach from behind the head of the bed, out of the occupant’s line of sight. Night raid entry presents many hazards, especially where desperate men are likely to be encountered. It is rarely attempted. Unless the members of the raiding party have skill, team training, experience and courage, it is advisable instead to cover the house from the outside, awaken the occupants and demand, by phone or bull-horn, that they surrender, even though they may not do so without a fight. This is especially the rule when a large building with many occupants is involved and when the building’s construction and exact room arrangement are unknown.

Dealing With Gasoline and

Explosive Devices

A LARGE

URBAN

area with its complex of water, power, sewage, transportation and

communications networks is very vulnerable to sabotage and disruptive action brought about by, or executed under the cover of rioting. The degree of chaos that can be created and the amount of actual damage done 1s subject to the intent, motivation, training and opportunity of the dissident elements, and the physical-security measures taken by government, police and fire agencies.

TODAY’S

FORMIDABLE

THREATS

A study of recent Communist-issued, guerrilla-warfare manuals indicates that the sabotage section of the guerrilla staff organization is considered one of the most important. The first insurrectionist act to bring down a government or change a “status quo,” involves the cutting of rail lines and roads and blowing up of bridges and tunnels in conjunction with destruction or disruption of all communications and utilities networks. This is coupled with instigated riot actions and other carefullytimed, organized and directed mass demonstrations, strikes, slow-downs, and other

public-protest manifestations, and finally, with terrorist tactics. Overall strategy will be coordinated around operations aimed at hamstringing police and fire-fighting counter-action, attacks on their headquarters, and denial of their maneuver capability. Major police departments should have available, or preferably, as an integral part of their organization, bomb-disposal and sabotage-detection specialists. These men must be expert in fire and explosive devices, and have a knowledge of mechanical and chemical means of sabotage. Additionally, police officers should be at least generally conversant with the construction of various forms of fire-bombs and other deadly devices. To their own detriment they might otherwise overlook, in searches of premises or vehicles and in other

DEALING

WITH

GASOLINE

AND

EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES

81

instances requiring considerable alertness, unassembled components or other evidence pointing toward threats of this form. Hence, the importance of this chapter. During June and August, 1967, police in New York and Philadelphia made arrests of members of an organization known as the Revolutionary Action Movement— RAM. RAM is described by the F.B.I. as an extremist, left wing Negro group with ideological ties to Red China. Charges placed against the persons indicted were plots to poison Philadelphia police and officials during an instigated riot action, the assassination of moderate Negro leaders, blowing up of subways, and the commission of arson. Seized in conjunction with the raids on homes of RAM members were quantities of arms and literature indicating the organization was dedicated to arming Negroes in the slums, and training and inciting them in guerilla warfare. A guerilla warfare training manual of Cuban Communist origin was seized. This manual gave detailed instructions in all phases of guerrilla activities, including instruction in manufacturing and use of incendiary devices, “home-made” grenades and arms, time bombs, Molotov cocktails, bombs to destroy vehicles and motors, the use of explosives to cut

rails and destroy bridges and buildings, construction of roadblocks and vehicle mines, booby-traps, destruction of iron and steel beams, methods of sabotaging railways and highways, methods of mechanical and physical sabotage, attacks on police headquarters and stations, methods of ambush and sniping, and the use of rumors to discredit and demoralize police and fire departments, etc. The methods advocated are

time-tested and have been used elsewhere in the world with varying degrees of success. This and other manuals are now widely circulated on college campuses and in ghetto areas and elsewhere by militant extremist groups.

Needed Security Programs Police departments

must,

in view of the present threat, undertake a number

decisive actions. Unfortunately,

of

until recently, most departments have considered

PL AIT DSM Lad CadSad

DTUWEDAMIIOM Re eine HOW

TO

MOLOTOV

MAKE

A

COCKTAIL

O55

AND See THEM RSE NSE i REE RUNS ph ie as

VIOLENCE

ON

THE

STREETS

This handbill was passed out on the streets of Harlem during racial violence in New York City in July 1964. Since that time, this type of material and more handbooks have been circulated, throughout the Nation, providing detailed diagrammed instructions on the manufacture of backyard explosive devices, booby-traps, ways to sabotage critical public installations, and other techniques of urban guerrilla warfare.

82

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

occasional bomb threats and arson attempts to be the actions of ordinary criminals and psychotics. This is no longer the situation. A definite, planned physical security program is now indicated. This should include: (1) Integrated training between police and fire personnel in all phases of riotarson-bomb activities. Civil defense, adjoining military, National Guard, plant security,and other police units to be included in such training, where indicated. (2) Plans for specific police-fire-civil defense and military action against coordinated fire-bomb arson and sabotage attacks. (3) Establishment of security plans based on mapping of all potential local sabotage targets, and their vulnerability. (4) Establish a means of intelligence and surveillance covering this specific type of activity, with appropriate records kept up to date. (5) Study revision or addition to laws, control and registry over materials used in the manufacture of bombs, explosives, and their criminal use, etc., where possible.

(6) Procure proper equipment and locations for analysis of sabotage devices, detection, bomb-disposal, and allied equipment. (7) Establish and maintain a regular, general, training program for all department personnel, with special emphasis on select training of a group of specialists. This to be coupled with a reference library and maintaining liaison with other departments and agencies in the physical-security aspects of law enforcement.

FIRE-BOMBING

‘Flaming Riot’’ is the newest descriptive phrase characterizing recent major civil disturbances. This is due to the escalating use of the fire-bomb. Fire damage has been so great in connection with riots that insurance rates in certain riot-prone areas are now raised to prohibitive heights, or the coverage is being cancelled. In 1967, reliable sources indicate that property damage incurred during riots was over 100 million dollars and that the majority of the loss was due to arson. The Watts riot alone, in 1965, resulted in over 200 buildings being destroyed by fire and more than 700 damaged. In one instance, rioters turned service station gasoline pumps into the streets and then ignited the fuel. Many states have recently passed laws against possession, transport or use of any type of fire-bomb, explosive or incendiary device, or the commission of arson during a riot. In California, a minimum penalty of five years has been set for possession and use of fire-bombs and new Federal laws are in the offing. Fire-bombs, originally known as the Molotov cocktail, came of age during the Spanish Civil War in the late Thirties, and in World War II. Named after Viacheslaw

Mikhailovich Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister, they were used with indifferent success by the Spanish Republican Army against the Franco forces. The original fire-bombs were principally used against tanks and armored cars. Certainly, many of them were ineffective due to lack of sophistication in their manufacture and the materials used. The Russian Handbook of Guerrilla Operations, issued in 1942, gave the following instructions: Bottle with Gasoline You can prepare this bottle yourself. (1) Fill a bottle with gasoline of any grade, or prepare a mixture of half gasoline and half kerosene. (2)

Leave a space of 8 to 9cm. in the neck ofthe bottle to allow for expansion of the liquid.

(3)

Cork the bottle tightly.

DEALING

WITH

GASOLINE

AND

EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES

83

(4) Soak some jute, cotton or rag in gasoline, and fasten this together with matches to the lower part of the bottle. It is best to use insulating tape to tie the jute and matches; if it is not available, use a piece of cord.

When the tank is from 15 to 20 meters away, light the matches on the bottle before throw-

ing it. Hurl the bottle against vulnerable spots of the tank.

In the January 6, 1968 issue of the National Guardian, a self-styled radical newspaper (New York), appeared a reprint of an article by Robert Williams, a black militant extremist (currently under U.S. indictment) writing from Red China--quote: Molotov cocktails are very effective weapons in urban guerilla warfare. However, a jumbo size is even more effective. The jumbo size or the Black Power Bomb can be most effectively used against tanks and armored troop carriers where streets are narrow and buildings are three or four stories high. The jumbo size of the gasoline bomb can be made by using an empty syrup bottle of one-gallon capacity. These gallon sized glass jugs are usually available around confectionaries, drug stores, restaurants, and warehouses. Each is equipped with a screw-on cap and is fitted with a finger grip or a built in ring by which to handle the bottle or jug with a single finger. This type of jug can be filled with almost three-fourths gasoline, about one fourth extra duty motor oil with lubrication grease added. The screw-on cap should be tightened after which a tampax, well soaked in gasoline, should be securely taped or wired to the jug. The soaked tampax or well-soaked rag is lit when the individual is ready to heave the Black Power Bomb. The glass jug or container breaks on impact, thus igniting the gasoline, oil and grease resulting in a napalm-like effect. This is highly effective when heaved from a roof top into personnel (troop) carriers. It can also be thrown as a satchel charge against tanks and other armored vehicles. Satchel charges can deal deadly blows to armored vehicles. U.S. regulation type and instructions can be obtained from U.S. servicemen.

Williams states further that the match and gasoline are the most effective weapons in what he calls (U.S.) urban guerilla warfare. He advocates formation of three and

four-man fire teams, roving in automobiles for sabotage, with the mission of setting strategic fires, not only in urban areas, but in the unguarded countryside as well, so as to draw and spread thin, military and police forces, etc. Other instructions of Communist origin being circulated state: In an actual attack on a building, it might be wise to first smash with a brick a window of the room to be hit, then to throw a very fragile bottle through the resulting hole to insure that the bottle shatters inside the building. As soon as the firebomb explodes inside the building, several other fragile bottles of gasoline and oil can be quickly tossed in to feed the flames and to make the fire hotter, thus insuring major damage.

In Vietnam, U.S. Servicemen are being instructed in making and using advanced fire-bomb techniques. More and more Servicemen are returning with experience in making and using these weapons. One Service formulation involves the use of measured amounts of gasoline, acid, water, sugar and potassium salts, to make more

sophisticated devices that are sedf-1gniting on impact, and that have indefinite shelf life. Since the summer of 1965 when fire-bombs were first used in quantity during the Watts riot, they have been used increasingly in racial disturbances. The most extensive use, to date, was during the Newark and Detroit riots in the summer of 1967. During

some actions in the recent past, previously-prepared mimeographed sheets were passed out describing their make-up, with pictures. Descriptions and instructions on firebomb manufacture can also be found in now-obsolete Army field and training manuals. Molotov cocktails can be made with only limited knowledge and training necessary, and their degree of effectiveness depends on their ignition system and the type of fuel loading. The most common flammable liquid used is gasoline, not because it is the best, but because it is the most readily-available and inexpensive.

84

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

Containers

AND

TECHNIQUES

®

Any fragile glass bottle (or fruit jar with top) that will shatter when thrown against a hard object will suffice. Large capped-bottles, jars and syrup jugs are the most dangerous due to the greater fuel capacity. Fuel Gasoline,

kerosene, alcohol, and combinations

with fuel and lubrication oils are

the most common loadings. Generally, the pure fuels burn rapidly and do not adhere long to surfaces. A much more effective fuel resembling napalm, or jellied gasoline, can be devised. This jellied, longer-burning type fuel is made with gasoline combined with materials such as: lye, soap, eggs, liquid-latex, powdered resin, butter, margarine, tallow, and animal blood. The proportions ofthe various materials to gasoline by weight are not too critical, but a certain amount of knowledge and expertise is needed to develop the most efficient mixtures.

Ignition Systems The simplest means of ignition, used in the crudest and most basic type of firebomb, is by use of a cloth wick which is made from toweling or strips of similar cloth material. One end is stuffed into the gasoline-loaded bottle and the end remaining outside is lighted. These types are not foolproof, and many times fail to ignite. They can be dangerous to the thrower, particularly if the wick has soaked up a quantity of gasoline and it spills off. Other more efficient manual ignition types can be made with the bottle sealed by a cap or a cork, the gas or oil-soaked strips of cloth tied around the neck, or body of the bottle, and then ignited. These are safer to the thrower and more positive in ignition. Large wicks or fuses are not needed. Modern safety matches

VARIOUS TYPES OF FIRE BOMBS (Left): Any type of fragile glass container can be used to improvise Molotov cocktails; the ignition element can either be inserted into the neck of the bottle or wrapped around it. Loadings can be pure gasoline or combination with other materials to get a napalm, burning-globule effect. The larger-type syrup jug containers are very dangerous when dropped or hurled from roof tops, windows, etc. (Right): A Self-|gniting Fire-Bomb. Glass jars or bottles with acid-resistant tops or stoppers are used for such device. The fuel is mixed with acid. The cloth around the jar is impregnated with a different type of acid that is allowed to dry. When the bottle is thrown, the contact of the dry acid crystals with the mixture inside causes it to burst automatically into flame. This type device has an indefinite shelf-life and its construction and use is taught to special units of the Armed Forces. Police should be able to recognize such bottles and jars whenever encountered.

DEALING

WITH

GASOLINE

AND

EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES

85

taped to the body of the bottle, or books of matches or pieces of dynamite fuse passed through the holes in the cork and road safety flares can also be employed. Much more sophisticated types of ignition systems can be made that do not have to be manually-ignited, that will ignite when the bottle breaks on impact. Delayedaction fire-bombs can be manufactured from chemicals purchased in drug stores and chemical supply houses. Potassium chlorate, sulphuric acid and sugar are the combinations mostly used. Mechanical fire-bomb ignition devices can be made using the military or commercial pull-igniter on the end of a fuse. A very effective pull-ignition system can be fashioned from a book of paper matches. Although most fire bombs are hand-thrown, they can also be projected considerable distances by rioters using home-made slings of the David-Goliath type, large versions of sling shots using strips of innertubes tied to wooden uprights, or by tying a cord to the bottle and whirling it around the head, before letting it go. Guerrilla warfare manuals describe how to make crude but effective launchers using single-barrel shotguns and black-powder shotgun shells from which the pellets have been removed. Fires can also be started by use of the old Indian flaming-arrow tactic, using either long or crossbows.

Delay-Type Arson Devices Simple delay-type incendiary and explosive devices for sabotage can also be readily made from commercially-available chemicals and materials. The increasing evidence of professional Communist direction leads to the inevitable conclusion that these devices will become part of the riot pattern in the future. Such devices, pre-planted, will serve to focus police and fire attention at many different places, at the same time spreading police and fire manpower and equipment thinner, and drawing them away from the area of the main riot effort. The simplest of such devices are the candles allowed to burn down into flammable substance, or burning cigarettes inserted into book matches. More sophisticated longer-delay devices involve use of sulphuric acid, potassium chlorate and sugar. In this method, rubber or other type of diaphragms separate the ingredients that burst into flame after the sulphuric acid eats it away through the diaphragm. Thickness of the diaphragm will determine delay time until ignition. Such devices can be made in all sizes and shapes and they are usually made from glass containers that do not react to acid contents. POLICE In violent

DEFENSE

civil disturbances,

attacks

AGAINST by means

FIRE BOMBS of fire bombs

can

be expected

against police and firemen, their vehicles and buildings. Burning missiles will be thrown from windows, doorways, roof tops and from within crowds. Crowds must be dispersed, streets cleared and roof tops secured in areas where police operations are taking place, or planned. Specific, armed personnel should be assigned to cover all windows, doorways, roof tops and other areas from which fire-bombs may be thrown. In serious situations, orders may have to be given to shoot all fire-bombers while in the act, etc. This is usually preceded by a warning given by means of police publicaddress systems, press, T.V. and radio.

Fires set by rioters further increase mob self-incitation. Fire rituals have been used since time immemorial to arouse and stimulate basic human emotions and create excitement. The unrestrained use of fire-bombs likewise increases the tempo of violence. Police must make all possible efforts to stamp out and suppress their use at the

86

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

STRIKER

ACID

AND

TECHNIQUES

PIN

AMPOULE

INCENDIARY COMPOUND

p-COMBUSTABLE

/

WASTE

IGNITION

DELAY

DEVICES

(Upper left): A professional pen-type delay, incendiary device. The cap with clip is removed and the striker pin is activated by a blow. When the acid ampoule breaks, it begins to eat through the lead or metal disk. When the acid makes contact with the incendiary compound, it creates an

extremely hot flame. Such devices are supplied from Communist sources abroad such as Cuba, Red China, etc. (Upper right): A lighted cigarette placed in a packet of book matches provides a 5-7 minute delay-type incendiary ignition system. Cigarettes taped to dynamite fuses perform the same function. (Lower left): The burning candle placed in a container of combustible material is an old arsonist delay-device. The candle, when it burns down, ignites the material, etc. The length and diameter of the candle determine the delay-time until ignition. The lightbulb acid bomb is a delicate but favorite device for use in riot actions. The hole in the base of the bulb is corked and the unit thrown or dropped at police and military targets.

(Lower right): Book matches can be used to manufacture effective pull-igniter devices for use on fire-bombs or to ignite the fuse on an explosive device. The tips of the rolled-up devices are pulled across the emery-board striking section of the match book cover to cause ignition.

DEALING

WITH

GASOLINE

AND

EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES

87

very outset. Molotov cocktails beget more Molotov cocktails. In addition, riot situations where fire-bombs are used have a tendency to ‘‘set-off’’ people with pyromaniacal tendencies.

Safeguarding Vehicles and Personnel Police vehicles must be secured and guards placed on fire equipment. If possible, police vehicles should be withdrawn from the combat areas, otherwise more manpower will have to be expended to guard them. If it can be determined, areas under this type of attack should be sealed-off and all occupants ordered to stay off the streets and remain in buildings, being cautioned to stay back from windows, off roof tops and fire escapes. Metal screen protectors for police and fire equipment windshields should be installed. Exposed personnel on fire apparatuses should be given protective covers, vehicles should be equipped with safety rims so that they can move away from an area although tires are flat from tacks, broken glass, or other rioter action. Prior to get-

PROTECTION

OF

FIRE-FIGHTING

UNITS

Fire department vehicles and firemen must be protected while fighting rioter-instigated fires. Sniping, thrown missiles, and attempts to fire-bomb the equipment have occurred in some violent riots. Police protection should therefore be furnished, when available. The degree of protection will vary from men assigned to ‘ride shotgun’ on the equipment to the necessity of sealingoff entire areas around fire-fighting activities. This drain on police resources can be very large. In many cases auxiliary police and reserves can be designated for this task. In others, the Guard or Army assumes this function. Some fire departments are equipping their men with riot shotguns, but generally the policy still in effect is to rely on police and military units for protection.

ting into a riot area, all gear on the outside of fire vehicles such as axes, shovels, crowbars and hand tools, should be removed and carried concealed. In the event personnel are set on fire by a fire-bomb, counter-action must be very

prompt, to avoid serious injury. The person on fire should not fan the flames by running and, if possible, he should fall to the ground and roll out ofthe fire area, thus protecting eyes and lungs that would be affected if he remained upright. In a panic situation when a man loses self-control and starts to run, he should be knocked down

88

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TECHNIQUES

or tripped to the ground, rolled and covered with a coat, blanket, etc., to smother the flames. The best follow-up counter-action is to wrap the victim in a heavy, wet blanket. These can be carried in wide-mouthed plastic bags, folded, accordian-style, to facili-

tate their quick removal. Dry blankets and coats will also help in an emergency. Although there will be much flame present when a man’s clothing is on fire, other people can approach to help beat it out with little liklihood of harm due to the nature of fires produced by volatile fluids. If companions of the man affected act promptly and quickly and extinguish the flames, normally no serious injury will occur. CO2 or drychemical fire extinguishers will work efficiently in most cases, however, use of CO2 extinguishers on the victim’s face can cause serious eye damage. Dry-chemical types best serve the all-around needs. The wet blanket is the best and most sure means of extinguishing the flame. Water streams used on gasoline fires cause them to spread and soda-acid extinguishers can cause severe irritation to burns, when used. To date, there is not available any small, portable, personal-type fire extinguisher that can be carried on the officer’s person. Police personnel in vehicles set afire on the outside by a normal bottle-size Molotov cocktail are not as subject to danger as it might seem, but police vehicles answering riot calls should do so with windows up. If the car windows are closed, heat build-up inside is not such as to require immediate exit. The auto should be removed, or should

continue moving out of the area of initial impact and ignition, before personnel exit. Exit should be made from the side free of flame. A vehicle fire is best suppressed with large dry-chemical type extinguishers. Fire extinguishers must be carried in the occupant compartment, not in the trunk. Use of extinguishers on the outside of burning vehicles should concentrate initially in putting out the fire on the ground under the car’s gas-tank area. All vehicles operating in Molotoy-cocktail-prone areas should have A, B, and C-rating dry-chemical extinguishers at ready access for all types of fires. Combat reports and military experiments have shown that extreme panic among the crews of tanks and other vehicles hit by fire-bombs is responsible for many casualties. Drivers stop their vehicles and try to exit with their crews at the time of impact and are then killed by enemy gunners, waiting in ambush, Military manuals advocate immediate vehicle exit from the contact area first, then escape from the vehicle. Police problems are similar. It is vital that all police personnel be taught safety and protective techniques and above all, that they be convinced by demonstrations and training with old cars and actual “‘live’’ fire-bombs that they are not as dangerous, or to be as much feared, as usually is imagined. Gloves, helmets with protective face-pieces, long-sleeved shirts and types of clothing that can be quickly discarded are the best types for the individual officer to wear, but above all, he should keep his ‘“‘cool.’’ This can be done only through demonstration and training. Fire departments and police should cooperate in these exercises and their plans should be coordinated for mutual support tactics and methods of protection.

Detecting Subversive Weapon Components Samples of, and detailed data on the construction and formulation of fire-bombs,

“do-it-yourself” incendiary devices, backyard explosives, zip-guns and home-made firearms should be in the training section and library of every progressive police department. Detailed specific information secured from the Army, and other sources should be carefully disseminated by the department on a ‘‘need-to-know”’ basis.

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Personnel in police raids, and during and after riot operations, should be cognizant of all types of fire-bomb weapons and be able to recognize them either in their completed stage, or by their components. Undue concentrations of seemingly-innocent, everyday household and commercial items in improbable locations should be immediately suspect. Police should also recognize that where empty bottles are everywhere, rioters can siphon gas from their own or other car tanks and make fire-bombs on the spot. This is an additional good reason for sealing-off an area and halting all public vehicular traffic. Evidence of possible fire-bomb manufacture, past or future, are combinations of and unusual concentrations of: empty bottles and glass jugs (beer, wine, large types), kerosene, alcohol, gasoline fuels, in quantity, in various types of containers, quantities of book and wooden matches, emery and sandpaper, disassembled paper match books, strings of cloth, wicks, fuses, wire, tape, heavy twine, tar, diesel oil, other

types of oil (including cooking), butter, oleomargarine, potassium chlorate (KELO3) sulphuric acid (H2S04), quantities of old car batteries (battery acid--H2S04 source), sugar, small glass vials, glycerine, lye, bar soap, powdered resin, tallow, coffee grinds in quantity, saltpeter, baking soda, vinegar, acetic acid, all kinds of wax, liquidlatex, eggs, animal blood, fish oils, lime, Epsom salts, dried tea leaves and hydrochloric acid, ammonia, aspirin, metal tubing, iron oxide, granular aluminum, barium

nitrate (magnesium fire-bomb), etc. New, strong Federal and state penalties are now in effect, but they are not yet a sufficient deterrent to this malignant activity. Immediate police counter-action to apprehend fire-bombers, and/or ‘‘shoot-on-sight” orders, after due advance notice has been given, is many times indicated. The 1968 Civil Rights Act provides for penalties of $1,000 fine and five-years imprisonment for teaching the use, demonstrating, transporting, or manufacturing any firearm, explosive or incendiary device for use in a riot or civil disorder; or for interfering with a law enforcement officer or fireman engaged in helping put down a civil disorder. Its wording is strict, but questions as to definitions and enforceability have already been raised. The legal-basis for police action has been strengthened, but the necessity for police presence and containment of the fire-bomb threat is still basic and essential.

IMPROVISED

FIREARMS

Irrespective of any gun-control laws, prohibitions and registry, it is still easily possible for criminal elements to manufacture ‘“‘home-made”’ effective, limited-range single-shot firearms. Cheap guns of this type in the form of a 12-gauge single shotgun, and a .45 caliber singlé-shot pistol, were U.S. Government-manufactured during World War II, for delivery by air and submarine to the underground in German and Japanese-occupied areas. Ammunition of sporting types is plentiful, easily-concealable, and transportable. Plumbing shops and hardware stores supply all the manufacturing materials needed to assemble these crude but deadly arms. Guns that will shoot .22 caliber, pistol, and lower-velocity rifle cartridges, can also be fabricated with few tools and little skill. It is important that police recognize such weapons, especially in their disassembled state.

IMPROVISED

EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES

The rank and file law enforcement officer should not be expected to dispose of unexploded bombs and incendiary devices incident to a riot action. However, ail

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

THE WATER-PIPE

SHOTGUN

AND

TECHNIQUES

BOOBY-TRAP

FIREARM

(Left): The water-pipe shotgun has appeared in recent riot actions. It can be constructed from new materials at a cost of less than $3 and can be easily carried and concealed. This gun takes the form of two pieces of steel pipe, of different diameters, a pipe tee, a pipe nipple, and a pipe cap. A shotgun shell is inserted base first into one end of the smaller diameter pipe. When the slightly longer, smaller pipe with the shell in it, is slammed down against a fixed nail or screw protruding inside from the larger-piece pipe cap, it fires. The force necessary to fire can either be applied manually or the muzzle-end of longer pipe with shell can be forcefully shoved against the intended victim. This kind of weapon, which has many lengths and variations, is easily carried unassembled and concealed.

(Right): This simple device can be built out of plumbing-shop and hardware-store components. It closely resembles a ‘’mole’’ gun, now outlawed, used by farmers years ago to control pests. The device can be triggered by a push or pull movement. The pipe coupling with the plug firing-pin section is first unscrewed and the shotshell round inserted.

ZIP GUN

IMPROVISED

RIFLE

(Left): This type home-made firearm and other similar-type weapons are found in street gang arsenals and in riot prone ghetto areas. Water, gas pipe and electrical-conduit tubing can be used for the barrel assembly. Rubberbands, nails, tire tape, wire and springs make up the rest of the

component parts. Generally, .22 rimfire or low-velocity center-fire pistol cartridges are used. Low tolerances and cheap materials make some of these arms dangerous to the user, but because of low breech pressures developed, they usually function at least once. (Right); This home-made rifle is similar to the water-pipe shotgun. These type arms and other similar ones are backyard-manufactured types that clearly indicate the futility of police reliance on restrictive gun laws and registration to keep such weapons out of the hands of criminal and insurrectionist elements.

Complete instructions including proper sizes of components,

necessary

tools for manufacture, sources of materials, etc., are all available in manuals and literature freely available to those interested in the critical urban areas where they are principally made and used. Police casualties from this type of throwaway’

weapon can be expected to increase, irre-

spective of gun controls. The easy availability and concealability of ammunition, plus simplicity of manufacture of a firearm from stock hardware-store components make this type of firearm a continuing threat,

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IMPROVISED RIFLE This is another arm similar to the water-pipe shotgun. Due to the larger bore possible and stock, the various shotgun calibers can be used for deadly effect.

police personnel should be generally familiar with materials used and the external appearance of the most basic types of backyard explosive devices and components. As with fire-bombs, general knowledge of the materials most likely to be used will also help identify sources of danger and manufacturing activity, prior to criminal usage. Actual bomb disposal and transport should be done only by trained men from either police or military units. Like fire-bombs and firearms, the basic, ‘“‘easy-to-get”’ materials, and instructions

are available, enabling terrorists, saboteurs, and Communist-instigated and subversive movements to train selected personnel in the construction, improvisation and use of explosives. Such techniques are instructed, on an assembly-line basis, in almost all Communist-oriented guerrilla-warfare training centers such as those in Cuba, Red China, North Vietnam, and Russia. Such instruction is also given in selected military

training centers in the U.S. and abroad, particularly in those combat training centers dealing with guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency. In Vietnam, the terror bombings of the Viet Cong are an important aspect of enemy strategy. U.S. and allied troops destined for duty in this area are given varying degrees of indoctrination in enemy bomb and booby-trap techniques, so as to develop defensive capabilities, etc. The past two major world conflicts have also trained thousands of American soldiers in the use of such explosive and clandestine devices. These externally-crude devices are often refered to as ‘‘backyard or home-spun explosives.” They are, if properly made, almost as destructive as those fabricated under controlled manufacturing conditions. Modern military demands have created special, hollow-charge type, explosive munitions which are capable of penetrating inches of steel and many

feet of concrete, yet the trained terrorist, using a hollow-

based wine bottle, can achieve much the same effect by using the simplest of components available from hardware, hobby and sporting goods stores. The trained saboteur can make an explosive bomb by correctly combining a compound of potassium chlorate, vaseline, a burning-type fuse (purchased or home-made) and a piece of pipe. Black powder can be made from saltpeter, charcoal and sulphur. Its formulation can be found in many basic high school chemistry texts.

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TECHNIQUES

Over the past few years, advertisements have regularly appeared in magazines such as the populat mechanics-type and others appealing to the ‘“‘do-it-yourself”’ reader. The firms concerned purportedly appeal to the pyrotechnic or home-rocketry hobbiest. They legally sell, via the mails at nominal prices, the complete components and instructions enabling the home manufacture of thermite, stink bombs, various

types of explosives and detonators, and fireworks. These same firms and others sell reprinted authoritative military manuals on demolitions, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and allied subjects. One manual currently being advertised nationally for two dollars is entitled “Explosives Like Grandad Used to Make.” Usually, the terrorist will not have to manufacture his explosive compound. He will buy it, or steal it from contractors, warehouses, munition dumps, sporting-goods stores, or even dismantle fireworks such as those used on the Fourth of July. Nitrogen fertilizer (ammonium nitrate) is a very powerful explosive and it is available in quantity, in almost any area. Ammonium

nitrate, mixed with a liquid fuel, is used as an

explosive for road building and general construction purposes. The major explosive disasters that occurred at Texas City, Texas in April, 1947, and at Roseburg, Oregon in August, 1959, were due to fire and detonation of ammonium nitrate.

FACTS ABOUT

COMMON

EXPLOSIVES

In addition to being at least generally familiar with the legal regulations governing sale and use of explosive components within his locale, every law enforcement officer should know some of the basic facts about the common kinds of explosives. Blasting caps used in construction are sometimes mislaid as well as stolen. When found by children, they often find their way to playgrounds thus endangering others as well as their finders. From actual inspection of a few samples, law enforcement officers will

be apt to recognize them thereafter on sight. Black Powder

Black powder does not have a powder appearance. It is the type used in fireworks, salute cannons, and muzzle-loading firearms. It comes in several grades and is available in different sizes of granules, from the very smallest of grains to larger pellets of irregular shape. The grains and pellets carry a luster or shine because they are coated with a graphite substance during manufacture to prevent caking, and to make them free-running, when poured. This, most ancient of explosives, is easily ignited by friction, or sparks, and gives off, on detonation, a dense white smoke. Following the ex-

plosion, there is a characteristic ‘‘rotten-egg”’ odor, (hydrogen disulphide). Black powder is classed as a low-order explosive, but it must be handled with care due to its sensitivity to sparks, either man-made or those caused accidentally by friction. Black powder is relatively slow-burning, developing gas and explosive power over a longer period of time than that of high-order explosives such as dynamite. It functions best when detonated in a confined space such as a capped tube, rifle barrel, pipe bomb, etc. The black powder explosion pushes and shoves whereas dynamite breaks up and shatters at time of activation. Smokeless Powder

Smokeless powder is neither smokeless, nor a powder. It is a nitro-cellulose material, less sensitive than black powder, and it can be formed in regular flakes, strips,

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pellets, sheets or perforated cylindrical grains. Like black powder, it works best when confined, but it is more powerful on detonation. It gives offa light-colored smoke, one not nearly as dense as that from black powder. It can be ignited by sparks and flame. In the natural state, it is amber-colored, but it is usually coated with graphite to pre-

vent caking and to enable easy flow when poured. Smokeless powder will not burn when wet, but cannot be destroyed by immersion in water. To dispose of it, it must be burned in an unconfined state in small amounts, etc. Generally, smokeless powder is

not used for any commercial construction purposes. The sportsman’s hobby of reloading small-arms ammunition, plus military needs, accounts for most production. Sporting-goods stores stock the varying brands and types of smokeless powder for handloading purposes.

Dynamite Commercial dynamite is prepared by absorbing liquid nitroglycerine in porous absorbent material, such as sawdust. Dynamite is sold in the form of cylindrical sticks (cartridges) ranging in length from 6 to 12 inches and approximately 1-1/2-inches in diameter. The sticks are wrapped in heavily-waxed paper, the wrapper indicating the percentage of explosive present. Generally, dynamite can be handled safely, provided it is in good condition and has not deteriorated to the extent that the nitroglycerine has seeped through the wrapper making it extremely sensitive to shock and rough handling. It can be destroyed by unconfined burning in the open, by trained personnel. Dynamite, in varying grades and types, is the best-known and still most widelyused of commercial explosives. Most general blasting, field clearing, and rock quarry work is done with this explosive. However, ammonium nitrate explosives are becoming widely-used, especially in the larger construction and earth-moving fields. TNT-(Trinitrotoluene)

This is a stable explosive widely-used by the military. It is yellow-colored, usually found in 1/4-pound rectangular blocks or containers. It is safer to handle than most explosives and when burned in small quantities in the open, will not detonate.

Nitroglycerin The most hazardous explosive manufactured today is nitroglycerin. It is usually encountered in a yellow or brown liquid form. It is extremely sensitive to shock and friction and has been known to explode even while merely decomposing in storage.

Plastic Explosive (Composition C) This is a very stable military explosive, pure white, and resembling putty or molding clay. It is the favorite of the saboteur as it can be safely molded into any shape or form, stuffed into cavities, etc. It is waterproof and without any odor. Generally, its source is military. More recently, a commercial type of plastic explosive has become available, supplied in the form of amber-colored plastic sheets of varying thickness. Generally, the black and smokeless powder and dynamite will be used by most ‘“non-professionals,”’ engaged in making ‘‘backyard explosives.” This is due to their accessibility and low cost. More powerful, dangerous-to-handle explosives such as nitroglycerin can be distilled from dynamite sticks, but for this a professional approach is needed. Ordinarily, the professionally-trained saboteur will make use of

96

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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TECHNIQUES

the military types of explosives such as TNT, nitro-starch blocks, and Composition C (plastic). These are more powerful and are packaged to permit more flexibility in operations. Plastic explosives, when available, have now become the favorite of the truly, professional revolutionary. Detonation

Low-order explosives such as black powder and smokeless powder can be fuse detonated, but the higher-order dynamite, TNT, and plastic explosives must be used employing either electric, or non-electric ignited blasting caps. Almost all of the above-mentioned explosives are commercially-available in varying degrees. Sources in any critical areas should require police attention, surveillance, and some sort of sales record and control. When warehouses and depots are robbed of these materials, it is usually only as a step towards furthering other criminal purposes.

BOOBY-TRAPS The modern revolutionary or terrorist is also trained in booby-trap devices to set off explosive or incendiary bombs. These trip and trigger devices, used to detonate explosive and fire-bomb charges, are mostly improvised from ‘‘easy-to-get,”’ “‘run-ofthe-mill,”’ commercially-available objects. The technique is well-known to the animal trapper and to the Communist guerrilla, trained insurrectionist. Booby-trap use against police and fire-fighting forces are part of an increasing degree of ‘‘professionalism”’ in the riots on today’s scene. Books on guerrilla warfare (many military manuals) cover use of booby-traps by both enemy and friendly forces. In the Vietnam war, one out of every five American casualties is stated to have resulted from a bobby-trap device. National news weeklies, perodicals and the newspapers have almost all printed stories with illustrations that can be used as booby-trap fabrication-primers for criminal application.

The military axiom in dealing with booby-traps is “‘Eternal vigilence is the price of safety.” This also applies to the police or fireman during an insurrection-type riot action where either police intelligence or sad experience has pinpointed such devices used in conjunction with fire-bomb and explosive charges. An Allied World War II military training manual on enemy booby-traps carried the following introduction: It is difficult to ignore the obvious analogy between the layer of booby traps and the trapper. Ingenuity, surprise, and skill are the major weapons of the “‘trapper,”’ and in all cases, it is the unwary or careless animal that is caught. This also applies to the man, or policeman, who is injured. On the other hand, there are always those animals who evade the trapper or fishermanthe old trout in the stream who has defied thousands of skilled anglers, and the old and wise animal who, by exercising a counter-ingenuity and his knowledge of past experiences, lives to die of old age.

Certain elementary precautionary measures are necessary in dealing with boobytraps. Whenever it is suspected that such traps are about, a careful search should be made for disturbed surfaces on the ground and for trip and tension wires; in fact, for

anything in the immediate area that looks unnatural. Traps may be operated by any normal activity such as opening a door, or window, the movement of loose boards or of any inanimate objects in rooms, and not only by these known methods, recently used and listed, but in any other way, limited only by man’s ingenuity and the equipment which is available for this work. Suspect everything in an area that has been in-

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habited by hostile elements. Nothing unusual in the riot-combat area should be interfered with simply out of curiosity. Booby-trap capabilities can be identified with common household and hardware items encountered in suspicious quantities, in unlikely places, and in unlikely combinations of seemingly unrelated items such as: clothespins, mouse traps, stove wire, steel wire, springs, pipe, ammunition, nails, electric wire, switches, dry-cell batteries,

electricians’ tape, vials of acid, pull and electric-type fuse-ignitors, ingredients to make explosives, fire-bombs, etc.

The incidence of use of booby-traps against police in recent riot actions has been fortunately low. However, fire departments have reported encountering floor joists sawed part way through, so that the floor would collapse from a fireman’s weight, holes cut in the floor near doorways and covered with paper, and stair wells undermined by a variety of means. Police and fire call-boxes have also been encountered with explosive devices attached. Booby-traps are natural allies of fire-bombs and explosive devices, and their use can be expected to expand with the guerrilla-type riot actions that have taken place and the kinds some forecast for the future.

There has been recent use of explosive devices against ROTC headquarters and power and communication facilities in California, Chicago, and New York. A recent press report covers almost all of the combined aspects of guerilla tactics by criminal elements in this frustrated plot. From Portland Oregonian, January 27, 1968. Seattle, Washington (AP)—FBI agents arrested seven men Friday and charged them with conspiracy to blow up a police station and power plant and then rob four banks in Seattle suburbs. J.E. Milnes, FBI agent in charge here, said the seven—including several members of the ultra patriotic Minutemen organization, were seized shortly before the alleged conspiracy was to have been carried out. Four of the men, waiting in an automobile, were arrested in a parking lot at Lake City, a Seattle suburb. The other three, in another car, were picked up at another parking lot at Bellevue, east of Seattle.

In the cars, Milnes said, were explosives and weapons. He said the arrests followed an FBI investigation with aid of the police department at Redmond, Washington, location of three of the banks. Seized along with the seven were 10 Molotov cocktails and an arsenal including two .38 caliber revolvers, a .32 caliber automatic, nine sticks of dynamite and blasting caps, a pipe bomb and floor plans for the banks and the police department. The FBI said the seven planned to rob three banks at Redmond, Wash., and had discussed robbing another at Des Moines, Wash. The FBI also said they planned to dynamite the Redmond, Wash. power plant and police facilities as diversionary tactics, immediately prior to the robberies.

MISCELLANEOUS

IMPROVISED

RIOT-MOB

WEAPONS

Weapons of the mob will vary and many are determined by the momentary availability of materials from buildings under construction or demolition, trash dumps, uncollected garbage cans, etc. Some are improvised as a by-product of looting and destruction, while others are purposely accumulated in advance for use against law enforcement as follows: Any type of flammable material or liquid in a barrel or container, that can be ignited, thrown, dropped or rolled; rocks, bricks, concrete blocks, bottles, flowerpots,

flattened tin cans, pieces of steel and iron, pieces of plate glass, tin cans filled with dirt

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

and sand, pieces of chain, short lengths of barbed wire, cement balls with nails pro-

truding, pieces of pipe, wooden clubs, pointed sticks and spears, clubs with lengths of barbed wire or chain attached, baseball bats, boards with nails in the end, hose,

hand sickles, axe handles, golf clubs, rolled up newspapers, shovels, picks, pitchforks, hammers,

mattocks,

machetes,

axes,

hatchets,

knives,

triple-pronged

fish-hooks,

rubber balls impregnated with needles, tin can lids, ice picks, poles used to carry signs and banners, bags of pepper and dye, glass ashtrays, light bulbs and fragile bottles with cherry bombs inside, bottles filled with acids, lye, molasses and lye, ammonia and household bleaches, spray-on oven cleaners, garbage, human

and animal urine

and excrement in plastic bags, and cans filled with sand, rotten fruits, eggs and vegetables, chimney soot, coal and coal dust, stenches, bags of paint, water pistols loaded with dye or acid, dart guns, fire crackers, cherry bombs, sky rockets, containers with

Black Widow spiders, raw potatoes and soap bars with razor blades embedded, golf balls with nails embedded, marbles and ball bearings (to throw under the feet of horses, tacks and pointed metal devices to puncture tires, oil and grease put on streets to deny use of wheeled police vehicles, sand, water, sugar placed in gasoline tanks, directing motor-driven or gravity-propelled vehicles (sometimes with explosive charges) towards police, driving animals from stockyards toward police lines ahead of mob, etc.

Serious injuries have resulted when rioters pick up sections of broken plate glass from windows and “‘sail’”’ them at police and firemen. When thrown at night, these objects are almost impossible to see. Police entering riot areas should do so with vehicle windows rolled up against this hazard, as well as against fire-bombs. Marking police cars with cans of paint spray, slashing tires and smashing windows are common rioter tactics. However, the most bizarre weapon of all is that used in Portugal where students are reported to carry cats under jackets to hurl them at police dogs should they attack. The modern version of the ancient crossbow is a lethal, silent weapon. All type of arrows, including poisoned ones, can be fired with accuracy, using rifletype sights, from some distance. It is not only a deadly, but a very demoralizing weapon. Various types of crossbows are available from mail-order and from sportinggoods stores and they can also be home-made, utilizing steel car springs for bows and shooting pieces of welding rod, etc. Due to their power and range, crossbows can be used to launch fire-arrows and explosive charges. Currently, in the Vietnam war, both sides are reported to have used this ancient weapon with deadly effect. The effectiveness of these weapons should not be discounted, and they should certainly be categorized in the same class as firearms during police raids and searches, etc. Ancient-type catapult devices can be used from roof tops to drop rocks and bricks on police and fire elements. Versions of the slingshot are available in toy and sport ing-goods stores that shoot metal balls and arrows with accuracy. Home-made-type slingshots can be improvised from rubber innertube strips and elestic bands. A brick can be launched from some distance by tying a piece of cord to it, whirling it around the head and “‘letting go.”’ Likewise, a large towel can be used in the same manner, both ends being held while the object inside is hurled around the head; letting go one end launches the projectile. Larger-type slingshots fabricated of pieces of innertube, tied to crotches of trees, or fastened to posts, or used from roof tops, enable bricks and

large stones to be launched at ranges well out of police contact. Piles of bricks, stones, bottles and other missiles observed in riot-prone areas or on roof tops of buildings, from helicopters, should always be suspect and are often tip-offs to planned assaults. The U.S. Defense Department has only recently put into effect procedures and equipment to screen parcel post packages sent back to the states by Armed Forces per-

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sonnel on duty in Vietnam. All indications are that sizable quantities of live grenades, plastic explosives, submachineguns and other arms and munitions have been sent back to the states by Servicemen. All of the above weapons have been used in the past by criminals and during planned civil disturbances. Use of such weapons and their variety are limited only by human ingenuity and imagination, one of the latest versions being a suggestion that motor-powered model airplanes be used to deliver explosive charges. Hazards from these many types of weapons in violent riot actions are always present. Tactics, counter-action, training, and protective measures are indicated accordingly. It must be recognized that traditional police methods and tactics in riot control are well-known to the professional mob agitator. In recent riot actions, police informants in the mob have reported that not only have instructions been given on how to counter police tactics, but that sources and instructions on the use of improvised weapons have also been given. Recent issues of leftist newspapers have carried specific suggestions on countering police tactics and weaponry. Fiber-glass helmets, leather jackets, crotch protectors, boots and gloves are advocated for protection against police action during violent demonstrations. Subversive instructions are given in the construction of picket signs for use as possible shields against police together with information promoting the selection of street sign poles for use as spears and weapons, etc. In anti-war demonstrations in front of the Pentagon in October, 1967, in Communist-inspired student riot actions in Sasebo, Japan in January, 1968, and at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, 1968, this kind of advance rioter-preparation for violent action was most evident.

COMMUNIST

TACTICS

Recently, the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities published a 65-page booklet entitled, Guerilla Warfare Advocates in the United States. The report, available on request, states that future racial riots will soon lead

to general rebellion, and links the activities of the various minority extremist groups to Red Chinese concepts (House Report No. 1351 May 6, 1968).* In May, 1967, the Red Chinese Communists launched a campaign to destroy civil authority in Hong Kong. The following article, reprinted with permission from the English publication The Police Journal (December, 1967), graphically describes a successful police counter-action against a large-scale attempt to destroy the government of the Crown Colony. This article is indicative of a type of combined mobguerrilla action that could be expected, if planned, organized, and extremist-predicted racial insurrection is experienced in the ghetto areas of major urban centers in the future. The modern mob-combat role of the police helicopter and paramilitary police are vividly described. COMBINED

OPERATIONS—HONG

KONG-STYLE

Early in May this year, local communist organizations in Hong Kong launched a campaign to disrupt the security of the Colony. The campaign began with the exploitation of labor disputes, but these were soon forgotten as its engineers discarded pretence and turned to their real objective—a direct political confrontation with the British and Hong Kong Governments similar to that which the Portuguese authorities had faced in Macao during the latter half of 1966. In dealing with this situation, the police displayed a calm, steadfast conduct and determined discipline that earned the highest praise not only of the Hong Kong community but of the world *Also see Hearings, Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives: Subversive Influences in Riots, Looting and Burning, Parts One and Two; Oct. 25, Nov. 1, 1967; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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press who observed and recorded the events. These qualities also singled out the police force as a primary target for the virulent propaganda with which the organizers ofthe disturbances gave vent to the frustrations which the police action had engendered. The propaganda mounted in hysteria as the Communist-inspired riots and disorders met with increasingly firmer measures adopted by the police, who were backed by emergency legislation drafted to meet these contingencies and were supported by the overwhelming majority of the populace. Failing in their efforts to discredit the authorities, disaffect the people and demoralize both, the instigators switched their tactics to a strategy of harassment and sabotage, attacking the economy and disrupting public transport. Strikes were attempted in the bus, train, taxi and ferry services, food markets, and harbor facilities. Workers were induced to participate with offers of

strike pay and other supposed benefits and when these were rejected, by open threats and intimidation, some initial success was gained, but the firm stand taken by the Government, the companies concerned, and the public at large soon resulted in another failure for the Communists, who fell far short of their ambitions in this field. The partial strikes caused inconvenience, but transport services, though sometimes greatly reduced, continued to operate, and Hong Kong’s patient and persevering people continued to get to work and proceed about their business. As an expression of barely-concealed spite for the defeat of endeavors that had cost them a great deal financially and in loss of reputation, the Communists returned to tactics of undisguised violence, and street disturbances erupted once more, this time mainly directed at the operators of public transport who had defied their earlier threats. On a few occasions, the police were obliged to open fire to disperse would-be arsonists and ringleaders. The advent of home-made bombs, while intensifying the degree of terrorism, was in itself an indication of the setbacks the Communists had suffered. Nobody could have embarked on a course so indiscriminate in its menace, and so calculated to alienate whatever sympathies they might still hope to win, unless they were driven to it as an act of desperation. Coinciding with this return to violence, the police demonstrated the increasing initiative they had steadily gained since the early phases by seeking out known agitators and troublemakers in the premises where they sheltered and plotted. Raids were carefully planned to insure surprise and effect a quick entry. Information indicated, and subsequent experience confirmed, that the occupants of these premises had prepared for the event by arming themselves with sharpened iron piping, knives, daggers, baling hooks, axes and choppers, bicycle chains, and other improvised weapons. Acid was held in readiness to repel raiding parties. Oil and soapy water were used to swill down staircases in order to hinder movement. Home-made gas masks, goggles and face pads were provided against gas attack, and buckets of water were at hand to douse tear-gas shells and cartridges. Metal grilles protected doorways and entrances. Frequently the premises to be raided were located on the upper floors of buildings six or more stories high, where the occupants might be expected to gain fairly easy access to the roof top and either effect an escape to adjoining buildings or make use of an advantageous position to resist for as long as possible. In planning such raids, the early seizure of the roof top was therefore considered of the greatest importance. The selected points of entry would invariably include the roof top and at least one approach from the ground, with perhaps other routes as well. On some occasions it was necessary to break through walls from adjoining flats. The front and rear doorways and staircases were secured, with special attention paid to the floors immediately above or below the target premises. On the way up, obstructions had to be cleared, and special oxy-acetylene cutting parties of police officers were formed to deal with iron grilles and doors. Twice explosives had to be used to blast open particularly obstructive metal barriers. Large stocks of weapons and acid were frequently found, but only in a few instances was actual resistance offered. When encountered, this resistance was fanatical, necessitating the use of firearms to quell it. Two buildings of 27 stories, adjacent to and opposite from each other on a main thoroughfare, had proved particularly troublesome during periods of street disturbances. One housed a large, Communist-owned

retail emporium

on its lower floors, and both had served as sanc-

tuaries for rioters and troublemakers. A dormitory for these people was believed to be located on the top floor of one of these buildings, and the usual crop of weapons, acid, and other defensive measures was anticipated by the raiding party.

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Since both buildings were considerably taller than neighboring blocks and could not be approached from adjoining roof tops, the use of helicopters offered the only prospect of immediate access to the top floors. The aircraft carrier H.M.S. Hermes was due in Hong Kong on a rest and recreation visit early in August, and it was decided to enlist the help of its naval helicopters for this purpose. Locally-based helicopters were not large enough to deliver, with sufficient speed, the personnel required for the operation. The Nelson touch being still very alive, the Navy responded with enthusiasm. The 1st Battalion, the Welch Regiment, who were providing cordon duties for the raid, insisted on extending their cordon to the roof tops as well. Helicopters could not touch down on either of the two roofs for fear of undue structural stress, aside from which there were too many obstacles in the way of water tanks, wash lines and radio aerials for a landing to be effected with any degree of safety. As the police were inexperienced in roping down orjumping out from helicopters, some preliminary training was clearly necessary. The divisional superintendent in whose area the target premises were located called for volunteers, and was overwhelmed by the response from the officers and men of his riot company. Time was short, and the best that could be managed was an afternoon at the training school gymnasium, brushing up on rope-climbing, followed by one practice with the helicopters. For the practice session, the police moved into the barracks of the Welch Regiment, both policemen and soldiers taking part in the emplaning, roping-down and jumping drills. As a security precaution, the police borrowed olive-green Army uniforms for the exercise. At 0430 hours on August 4, 1967, the military and police airborne parties were ferried out to H.M.S. Hermes to join the aircraft. Three Wessex helicopters were detailed for the operation, and five flights were scheduled to ferry one platoon of soldiers and two platoons (89 men) of police onto the two roof tops. Timing was coordinated with ground raiding parties under the command of a senior superintendent. Two companies of the Welch Regiment provided cordon parties for the ground operation. At first light at 0641 hours, the helicopters hovered over the first target and dropped two sections of the Welch Regiment and the police headquarters section onto the roof. For the benefit of the uninitiated, the technique used by the helicopter pilots was one known as ‘“‘mountain

climbing.’ They flew towards the buildings at the level of the 23rd floor and then, when close to the targets climbed up to roof level. The aircraft returned for their second ‘‘sticks” and five minutes later the soldiers and police in this group had secured the roof of the second target. A shuttle service then built up the police parties to platoon strength on each building, ready for the downward clearance. While this was in progress, the ground raiding parties had entered and were moving upwards to their target floors. The cordon was in position and traffic diversions were put into effect. The plan worked smoothly, surprise was achieved, and no resistance was encountered. Some boobytraps were discovered, including a wire mesh capable of electrification, screening a doorway. Located in‘one building was a well-concealed unregistered hospital, complete with operating theatre, X-ray equipment, and a drug store. It was still in its construction stages and did not appear to have been used. A nearby four-story building was searched at the same time as the two main targets.

Over 1,000 police and troops took part in the raid, which ultimately involved visiting and checking over 700 flats. The operation took about nine hours to complete, but proved well worthwhile. A number of important arrests were made and a quantity of weapons, inflammatory posters and documents were seized. In addition, invaluable experience was gained. Since this operation took place, the situation in Hong Kong has continued to improve, and the scope of activity has become increasingly restricted for those who have pitted themselves against society. Home-made bombs, whose manufacture and distribution involve comparatively few people and are correspondingly difficult to detect, now provide the Communists with almost their sole means of retaliation against a public which has so wholeheartedly rejected them. Occasionally, these bomb outrages involve injury and loss of life, usually to innocent bystanders. But to see the bustle of this teeming city continue much as it ever did, to witness the familiar kaleidoscope of color in the bustling streets, would lead the casual observer to conclude that nothing can dispirit or deter Hong Kong’s irrespressible people. He might almost remain blissfully unaware of the challenge that has been and is being so strikingly met with a confidence and cheerfulness that belies its importance.

102

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

A,

AND

TECHNIQUES

Police

Ll

5

ree ess

eral

J >

ee em Sy \ oo 91? @@ Pt Ore 2 929101 \ haan |

2

Fig. 1. “Shows the mob advancing toward its objective. It is faced with only a few policemen, who will attempt to block off the path.

Fig. 2. Shows how the police have deployed into two lines to oppose the mob, and have advanced to meet it before it enters the intersection. At contact, selected . 5 A mob members in front engage police units in combat, permitting the rest of the mob to surge out around the flanks into the intersection and continue toward the objective.

Fig. 3. Shows that the police meeting the mob have formed into the classic phalanx or wedge formation for mutual protection. Again the formation has advanced to meet the mob before it breaks into the intersection.

Fig. 4. Shows the police phalanx being engaged by selected hard-cOre mob members and the beginning of an envelopment action. This action will result in the police unit being surrounded while the mob moves on to its target.

COMMUNIST

MOB

TACTICS

“Note: Figures 1 through 12 are tactical illustrations which appeared in a Communist training manual on the creation of mob violence and destruction of police opposition. The manual was referred to in hearings of the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (circa June, 1961)

DEALING

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aa.

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Fig. 5. Shows a mob moving forward which has not yet met any police resistance. During this period scouts are sent out and intelligence organized so the mob leaders will know where and what kind of police resistance can be expected. Here the mob has not made any provision for protection or counter police action, so is vulnerable to police action. See fig. 6.

Fig. 6. Demonstrates how the police would take counteraction

against

a poorly

action. This shows and having reserve

planned

and

unprepared

mob

police units blocking the advance units in adjoining streets that can

move in any direction to penetrate its dispersal.

the mob

and force

Fig. 7. Demonstrates how the mob would advance into action against planned police resistance. “Action units,” specially-armed and trained, protect front, flanks, and rear of the mob against the police.

Fig. 8. Another tactical formation of mob advancing along parallel lines in segments, preceded by an “action unit.” This formation flexibility for envelopment tactics and forces to extend over a wide area.

COMMUNIST

MOB

approach, each being gives great the police

penne, a TACTICS

(Continued)

103

RIOT CONTROL— MATERIEL

104

AND

TECHNIQUES

=

Fig. 9. This is the military type envelopment technique. The central mob column meets and surrounds the police units from the front and at the same time the two columns on the parallel streets flank the police lines guarding the center.

444004 —

~

j i

\

Fig. 10. This is another technique to meet the same police formation as in fig. 9. In this case the single mob column breaks into three segments, one moving to the right, the other to the left, in order to flank the police bdsssssssogs = = = >sh lines.

: a

Y J

Fig. 11. In case of police roadblock, the mob column splits into four groups that enables a coordinated attack

on the police elements from all sides.

Fig. 12. A plan to protect a public square where a meet-

ing or demonstration are stationed at all These action units entrance into the crowd to build up action.

COMMUNIST

MOB

TACTICS

is being organized. ‘Action units”

points of entrance to the action area. will divert the police, delay police square, and protect and permit the to where it can be incited to mob

(Continued)

Dealing With the Sniper Problem

SNIPING INCIDENTS AND rioter use of firearms are on the increase throughout the world. Police reports indicate that the majority of the riot-sniping incidents that have occured so far do not, however, involve professional snipers operating in a manner contemplated by military definition.

ABOUT

TODAY’S

SNIPERS

The dictionary defines a sniper as a‘... soldier, who, from some unexpected place of concealment, picks off those of the enemy that expose themselves to his fire.”’ Too many times the term “‘sniping”’ mistakenly means to the public the expert marksman, equipped with a high-velocity rifle and telescopic sight, who is able to kill from great distances with extraordinary accuracy. As used by the news media, “sniper” generally refers to the unskilled rioter using any and all types of firearms against police, firemen, or capriciously against targets of opportunity such as civilians or automobiles in the street. The deadly accuracy and selection of targets, hallmarks of the professional sniper, have been only occasionally encountered to date in civil disturbance and police ambush situations. However, the emergence of the sniper, expert or not in recent civil disorders, has so changed the character of civil-disturbance control that special counter-sniper training is now being given to National Guard and Army units. Likewise civil law enforcement must train, prepare and equip for counter-sniper operations. Limited-range sniping in urban areas has mostly taken place under the cover of darkness, from buildings and areas where it has been difficult to “find and fix” the person firing the weapon. Calibers of weapons have varied. The majority of the incidents reported show that the types of weapons most commonly used have been in the shotgun, .22 rimfire, and center-fire pistol categories.

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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BUNCHING UP (Above): Subjected to gunfire, the instinctive tendency of untrained men is to herd or huddle-up together behind the nearest available object. All the cardinal sins are evident here. These officers would have been at the mercy of a trained sniper. They present easy targets, looking over the car top with their heads and shoulders exposed and relying on a car body (that can be penetrated by high-velocity bullets) for protection. The variety of weapons displayed also indicates that there is no organization or unit discipline present. (Below): Men subject to surprise gunfire in the open should not squat or crouch in an exposed

area. They are sitting ducks to even the most inexpert concealed sniper. At the moment

of gun-

fire, regardless of the source, unknown or otherwise, rapidly take a covered position in a doorway, against a wall, behind a telephone pole or behind an auto, etc. White helmets, shirts, and the

bunching-up process make easier targets.

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107

Although there has been little evidence as yet that organized, skilled snipers with scope-sighted weapons have engaged the police during riot actions, basic sniping techniques are well-known and the equipment is available from many sources. The published intent of various extremist groups, corroborated through police intelligence, indicates an increase in skilled sniping. For this work, infantry veterans of recent military service are among those most likely to be sought out for attempted recruitment by revolutionary-subversive elements. In the thoroughly-organized, professionally-planned riot-insurrection action, deliberate sniper fire will usually be combined with organized looting and the'use of firebombs or explosives to disorganize and divert police and fire-fighting forces. Some selective fire may be directed at key officers and officials, while at the same time non-

selective fire may be used to delay or prevent police counter-action and movement, or to stall police personnel and vehicles in pre-selected, strategic areas. Usually the “‘hitand-run” type of sniping action will also take place where individuals or small groups fire a few shots from a concealed position and then rapidly move to another firing location, etc. Police can also expect to encounter the psychopathic sniper who may be “‘triggered-off” by other riot violence. Like the barricaded and armed lawbreaker, this type individual can be extremely dangerous and skilled in the use of firearms. The ‘‘Texas sniper” incident has been described as the most savage, one-man rampage of this kind in the history of American crime. On August 2, 1966, Charles Whitman,

a mentally-disturbed, ex-Marine marks-

man, murdered his wife and mother, then killed twelve other people and wounded thirty-one more, while barricaded on the top of a tower on the campus of the University of Texas in Austin. For over an hour and a half, he dominated a situation over a wide area of the campus, despite the counter-fire of police and volunteer civilians armed with rifles. He was finally killed by two policemen who were able to get within pistol range inside the tower. Whitman’s armament consisted of a Remington 7mm Magnum rifle with a 4-power scope, a .35 caliber Remington semiautomatic rifle, a .30 caliber carbine, a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun, a .357 Magnum revolver, and a 9mm Luger pistol. During the long fire fight, Whitman used all of these weapons. Because he changed his position on the tower’s balcony frequently and used different-sounding firearms it was difficult, initially, for police to determine whether one or more snipers were firing. The Whitman incident was a combination of the two types of sniping that law enforcement officers must be prepared to handle. Whitman apparently fired indiscriminately at closer targets of opportunity as they appeared on the campus, and also fired, with deadly accuracy, over long ranges at other targets, using his scope-sighted rifle. During the later stages of the 1967 civil disturbances in Newark and Detroit, there was evidence of some rioter-sniper organization. The Governor of New Jersey, in a published interview (U.S. News and World Report, July 31, 1967) stated: “The snipers with their cross-fire techniques and their dispersal techniques of jumping from one place to another, gave evidence of being very expert.”

In Newark, indiscriminate sniper-fire went on for four days before suppression by police and National Guardsmen. A policeman and a fireman were killed during this action, and many others were wounded. In the rioting in Detroit, taking place during the same period, there was an even greater incidence of sniping. Several police and firemen were killed by snipers and there were over seventy persons wounded. In Cleveland, in July, 1968, a non-riot ambush incident resulted in the deaths of three policemen and eight civilians. Good police intelligence in riot-prone areas where a sniper threat exists is vital. Information garnered should be backed up by planned raids before any riot action is

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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expected on caches of weapons, training areas, and the headquarters of known or suspected extremist organizations. A planned sniper attack that takes place simultaneously in a number of locations over a wide area, in conjunction with arson, ambush of police, and use of explosives, is usually beyond normal police ability to suppress or contain, due to its magnitude, surprise, and a usual lack of police manpower. Handling this scale of insurrection requires military force equipment. To completely dominate or prevent such an attack, it is necessary to deploy great numbers of men on roof tops, in windows, doorways, and at other locations, and then follow up with search-and-sweep operations. Sniping must also be distinguished from heavy, continuous rifle and automatic small-arms fire from a given area or building in which circumstance it is obvious that a number of individuals are involved. Combat developing from this kind of action is defined by the military as a ‘“‘fire fight,” and it necessitates the counter-employment of superior fire power, sometimes armored vehicles and the use of automatic weapons, grenade launchers, obscuring smoke, or other military measures. Although some major police departments have or are developing capabilities to initially counter such insurrection, combat in cities on any large scale is a military function. National Guard and Army units are best equipped for this work. Civil police control and elimination of the increasing sniper menace can only be achieved by quick aggressive tactics carried out by well-equipped and trained officers, acting in most cases as a team. The fewer the police numbers, the more aggressive and immediate the counter-action must be. A police force, paralyzed by sniper fire, cannot effectively prevent mob violence from spreading out of control. The skilled sniper usually operates from a position in a darkened room, well back from a window or opening, so that the muzzle-flash, smoke, and report of his weapon will be difficult to locate from the target area. The amateur sniper can often be located by his muzzle-flash. The professional will always take advantage of cover and usually change his position immediately after firing. The skilled sniper, using high-velocity, scope-sighted firearms, can operate from a distance. This further complicates the police problem, as only the impact of the bullet or its sound in passage may indicate his approximate position. Concealed snipers, using. low-velocity weapons such as .22 caliber rifles, can fire at targets from very close ranges and still be relatively secure from police counter-action, especially if they firesin the presence of riot noise and confusion. The advantages of cover, concealment, and surprise are all on the side of

the sniper. This makes his elimination a dangerous task, one to be undertaken only by trained police, operating offensively, practicing proven military-type tactics with great skill.

POLICE

COUNTER-SNIPER

TACTICS

When an officer is fired upon from an unknown position, he should take cover and return the fire, if he is within range and able to locate the source definitely. Indiscriminate police counter-fire endangers bystanders and also due to muzzle-flash and smoke, pinpoints the police position to the advantage of the sniper. A report of the sniping incident should be made immediately, as soon as cover is established. If an officer is unable to locate the exact position of the sniper, the report should give as much detail as possible as to area of action, approximate location of the source of fire, the building, etc. Observation from cover should be maintained until

the arrival of support. Police personnel initially arriving on the scene should cordon off the area, if the building occupied by the sniper can be identified. Officers should be placed in strategic positions on roof tops, adjoining buildings, etc., so as to prevent the

DEALING

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SECTION

(Left): Cover against sniper-rioter fire should be well selected and be of a type that will withstand high-velocity bullets, if these are being used. A thorough coverage of the various caliber bulletpenetration capabilities in ordinary type obstacles and street objects should be given in training. For example, automobile bodies, aside from the engine-block area, will not provide protection against high-velocity military-caliber bullets. Cover against hostile rifle fire is one thing, concealment is another. They should be differentiated in training. (Center): This may be an old Indian-fighting trick, but such a baiting-type tactic can often lure the inexperienced criminal or rioter into firing and disclosing his position. Such a tactic is advisable in counter-sniper operations. One man can furnish the “‘bait’’ while the other observes with binoculars from a concealed position, etc. Be sure the cover will protect against the type of gunfire encountered.

(Right): Shadow from the sun in daylight, or artificial light at night, can be friend or enemy. Men on security missions, stake-outs and counter-sniping operations must be aware of how their shadows look to “hostile eyes.”

sniper’s escape. If the sniper continues to shoot, his fire should not be countered unless his location can be firmly fixed as this involves the safety of other people usually in the same building, or area. In the event the exact sniper location is not determined, police observation posts should be established on roof tops and other points of vantage, covering the general area. These posts should be manned by pairs of officers, one officer with binoculars searching an assigned sector for the sniper location. The other, preferably armed with a riot shotgun, etc., furnishes support and protects the observer’s flanks and rear. During the observation phase, constant radio communication with other observation posts and the officer in command of the operation should be maintained. Once the area has been sealed off and the location of the sniper has been fixed, disciplined covering and aimed fire can be directed until he has been silenced, forced to change his position, or flee. Prior to this stage, all occupants of the building should be ordered to evacuate. All who comply should be removed from the area as rapidly as possible, and immediately interrogated as to knowledge, identity and location of the sniper. Failure of the sniper to respond to police orders to surrender, or of occupants to clear the building, sets the stage for the use of artificial illumination, tear gas and obscuring smoke. It should be recognized that some building occupants may be unable to obey police orders, due to threats of the sniper. This may delay or modify assault plans. The police assault party should be covered by protective fire, if exposed. An armored vehicle or obscuring smoke can be used to cover movement. Entry from the roof level is advocated, if possible and practical. All points of possible exit must be covered. Each room should be thoroughly searched for occupants and weapons, all individuals encountered, male and female of all ages, should be cleared

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COVER, FIRE AND MOVEMENT Coordinated aggressive action by trained men and counter-sniper teams is necessary in sniperbarricade situations. Tear-gas projectiles, obscuring smoke and a covering base of fire can be used as men advance from one protected area to another by ‘leaps and bounds’, toward the source of criminal or rioter fire. The commander can exercise control by using radio, voice or bull-horn signals. At night, flares can be used. This dangerous operation should be undertaken on command by units of trained men, not indiscriminately by individual officer volunteers.

from the building and detained for interrogation. If the building and area has been effectively sealed off, the sniper suspect will normally be apprehended. Usually, at this stage, no one will still be carrying a weapon. Nitrate tests may be performed, and fingerprints taken of building occupants, if necessary, for check against any weapons discovered. Hostile firing from the center of crowds—out in the open—is not the skilled sniper’s method, for he needs cover and concealment for his operations. If snipers can be pinpointed, the best tactic is to return the fire from cover or prone positions. If the sniper cannot be identified or separated from others in the crowd, basic procedures such as cordoning-off the area, bull-horn advice to the crowd to pass through police lines for search and identification, and other control measures must be used. Crowd

failure to comply should be followed up by the use of tear gas and smoke to get it moving. All avenues of exit should be controlled by police so as to permit checking the crowd elements. Counter-sniping operations can be greatly aided by police-type armored vehicles and helicopters. They can serve as mobile observation posts, sources of light and close-quarter bases for gunfire and launching chemical agents. In some instances, helicopters can be used to land police on roof tops for counter-sniper and raid operations.

:

POLICE COUNTER-SNIPER UNITS The best response to the sniper menace is the formation of a special police unit, authorized to move against a single sniper or a sniper-infested area. The basic counter-sniper function must be undertaken by trained officers working in concert, as a team under a separate command specially directed toward the problem. This same force can also be used in barricade situations, for protection of dignitaries, stake-outs,

to control

a situation

when

police manpower

is insufficient,

and

in

violence-prevention assignments. The duties, training and equipment of such an organization must be clearly defined at the highest command level, and the integrity

DEALING

WITH

THE

SNIPER

PROBLEM

111

COUNTER-SNIPER AND BARRICADE SITUATIONS (Left): The counter-sniper team from an observation vantage point can call in helicopters to make announcements over its sound system, land extra men on roof tops, or drop chemical and smoke munitions on the area. This type of support is contingent on exact knowledge of the sniper’s lo-

cation and the latter's inability to fire on the copter. (Right): A barricade situation where the source of hostile fire is known. Note that the officers behind the car have the protection of the engine block. Covering fire to keep the sniper down is being used while the officer with shield approaches the house.

of this type unit maintained despite the demands, emergency or otherwise, on police personnel, especially during riot action. Although police concepts as to local needs will cause some different evaluations as to the size, scope, degree-of-force capability, and tactical operations of such a Counter-Sniper unit, the principle of freedom of operation must be maintained. Such units have to have the authority to counter, disperse, apprehend, or even kill snipers, if the emergency should require. Military policy in counter-sniper action states that ‘‘. . . selected marksmen can be most effective when authority is given them to open fire without orders on individuals who commit any overt act which seriously endangers life of troops.”’ Civil law enforcement must adopt a similar answer to the problem. Only mature, experienced officers should be selected and trained for counter-sniper operations. They must be in good physical condition, have good eyesight and even temperment. Officers already skilled marksmen by natural abilities or shooting interests should be screened and recruited first, especially if they have had combat infantry experience. The team commander must have all the basic qualifications plus good judgment, leadership, and the aggressiveness needed for dangerous missions. Voluntary recruitment, in conjunction with the establishment of eligibility and qualifications, should be used, if possible. The number of special sniper units needed will vary with the department. However, any department that faces a continuing riotsniper potential should maintain at least one Counter-Sniper unit. In some areas, it will be advisable to have such a unit available on a 24-hour basis, usually as an

integral Some volving Tactics)

part of the task force operation. progressive major departments that have already experienced action insnipers have organized special four-man SWAT (Special Weapons and teams with the primary mission of eliminating snipers. Such teams operate

WZ

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

‘‘on call,” and can be attached to any size unit. The four-man team usually consists of a commander, one officer with scope-sighted rifle, one officer as a spotter with binoculars and shotgun, and one officer with shotgun for back-up. The four-man team, in this tactical concept, is not necessarily specially trained (with the possible exception of the rifleman), and it is organized only at the time of emergency. Some departments base the size of these teams on the capacity of a single police vehicle, not on tactical considerations. Ideally, a special five-man counter-sniper team should be organized, with a mobility factor that permits it to operate independently from a single unmarked policepatrol or panel-type vehicle, one that can carry all the special equipment needed for such operations. This team concept permits the coordinated operation of two pair of scope-rifled marksmen with supporting spotter-observers. An additional man can be assigned to guard the vehicle, if necessary. The five-man team permits a commander to deploy his two-man units while serving himself as a base for covering fire with an automatic weapon, or performing other needed command, coordination, and support functions. The departmental status of the Counter-Sniper unit with its special training and skills should be developed to the point where its morale is of the highest order. Its members should be considered by other men in the department as a back-up force, capable of handling the most dangerous, risk-filled situation. Volunteer, incentive pay recruitment should be considered.

Personnel- Armament And Basic Individual Equipment A

commanding

officer—transceiver

radio,

7x50

binoculars,

side arm, whistle,

shoulder-type automatic weapon, ballistic protective helmet and vest. Two expert marksmen—scope-sighted high-velocity rifles, side arm, binoculars, ballistic protective helmet and vest. Two officer observers—side arm, riot shotgun \(rifle-type sights or, preferably, the 2-1/2-power scope), 7x50 binoculars, ballistic protective helmet and vest, transceiver radio (ear attachment, if possible), and handcuffs.

Clothing should be a dark coverall-type; helmets, vests, shields and other equipment also to be dark. Rubber-soled paratroop-type boots, all insignia, glistening objects that will reflect light, etc., should be removed or covered. Spotting scopes, night-vision devices, and infrared sniper scopes should be employed, when available.

Basic Operational Principles The counter-sniper team members must be able to move rapidly from one position of cover to another, as inconspicuously as possible and be prepared to perform scouting missions, if so ordered. The equipment carried by the men should be kept to a minimum during fire and movement phases. The vehicle with auxiliary equipment must be readily accessible and secured, not left unguarded; other police can be assigned for this task. The overall principle of operation for the Counter-Sniper unit demands mobility and an immediate capability to meet a changing situation. Its members should not be tied down for guard duty, messenger service, etc. Additional police, from personnel on the scene should be assigned the team commander on his

DEALING

WITH

THE

SNIPER

PROBLEM

iis

COUNTER-SNIPER EQUIPMENT Shown is a ballistic fiber-glass helmet that will provide protection against all small-arms bullets traveling under 1300 fps. The 7 Ib. fiber-glass armor vest is of the rigid-form breast-plate type. It protects the shoulders and collar bone as well as the groin area against low and medium velocity projectiles such as .45 ACP .38 Spl. and .22 Long Rifle. This design permits sitting, kneeling, and unhampered movement. A solid form-fitting back protective unit is also available.

SPECIAL-EQUIPMENT—COUNTER-SNIPER

TEAM

Optional equipment in vehicles, ballistic shields, bullet protective vests and ballistic helmets (all men), tear-gas grenades and lauching equipment, gas generators, masks, obscuring-smoke grenades, signal and illuminating flares, protective shields, bull horn, flashlights, battery-powered portable and auto spotlights, grappling hook and line, rope ladders, fire axe, pry bar, first aid kit, infrared night vision and sniper-scope equipment, if available. (This list is not all inclusive, but includes essentials.)

114

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

request. Authority established.

for securing

AND

TECHNIQUES

this ‘‘on-the-spot””

support

should

be clearly

The commander assumes a cover position where he can best observe the overall scene and direct the action. He deploys his men in pairs (one expert marksman supported by an officer-observer). Communication is maintained at all times with both two-man teams (if cost of radio equipment is a major factor, equip with inexpensive Citizen’s Band transceivers, preferably modified to police frequencies). The commander remains in constant contact with his men and supporting units; he has the capability of using automatic fire to cover his men, or to employ it as the situation warrants. In certain situations where a sniper has been located and manpower is short, the commander

can order his men

to work-as

individuals, but generally the

two-man team concept, enabling protection, covering fire and movement, maximum observation, efficiency and aggressiveness should be maintained.

HINTS FOR COUNTER-SNIPER

OPERATIONS

(Upper left): Men assigned as observers or counter-snipers should not permit themselves to be “’skylighted’’ day or night. Observation of firing from a room should be conducted well back from the window, door, etc. (Lower left): Shadow and movement in hostile areas must be coordinated to protect against hostile eyes and possible gunfire. Look around corners from a prone position; be sure you are not ‘profiled’ by a light background. (Upper right): Firing should take place with as little of the body exposed as possible; leaning out of windows, shooting or peering over walls with the head and shoulders exposed are marks of the amateur and can be fatal. Side-arms are not accurate long-range weapons. They should be used from a cover position with a rest, in riot-barricade situations where deliberate aimed fire is possible.

(Lower right): Go over obstacles under hostile fire or surveillance “belly down,’ not like climbing a fence into a cow pasture. The passage over, under, or around any obstacle should be planned and deliberate. When made, movement must be swift, with a knowledge of where immediate cover exists on the other side.

DEALING

WITH

THE

SNIPER

PROBLEM

11h)

Basic Sequence Of Operation (1) Report of sniper incident. (2) Dispatch of police to seal off the area. (3) Dispatch of Counter-Sniper unit to scene. (4) Commander of Counter-Sniper unit estimates situation, coordinating his planned operation with senior police commander on scene, arranges for additional support, if needed. (5) Deployment of unit against snipers. (6) Coordinate any building entry and search operations with on-scene police commander and supporting units.

Training Programs By definition, a good sniper is an expert rifle marksman who can consistently, hit with his first shot a target as small as a man’s head at distances up to 300 yards under varying conditions of light and weather. A police sniper-team training program should develop this kind of accuracy in its team members, and they should become equally expert with all other weapons issued, including those used with chemical agents. Because so much police riot-action involves fire at partially-concealed fleeting targets under very poor light condition, the telescopic sight is essential in countersniper operations. Scopes with post and crosshair reticules should be mounted on all shoulder weapons including shotguns. However, police administrators must understand that a telescope sight does not improve, in any way, the ability of the poor and average marksman, but that its principle function is to enable the expert marksman to see his target better. In a special training program covering care and use of telescopic sights, methods of range estimation, effects of light, wind, and trajectory on hit capability, firing at moving targets and partially-concealed targets at unannounced ranges, the effects of ricochets and bullet penetration must also be covered. Ammunition allowances should be ample enough to enable consistent, regular practice after the training program. The marksmanship objective of all unit members should be the ability to fire a 10inch group at 300 yards. This capability is estimated to be that covering most sniper problems. Additional basic training should include the use of concealment and cover, methods of fire and movement, use of binoculars in observation, radio and signal transmission,

maintenance of good physical condition, building-search techniques, and basic street fighting tactics. The final stage of training should be devoted to practical problems reviewing all training phases. If possible, built-up areas should be used with all foreseeable sniperbarricade

situations simulated,

covering the observation,

planning,

movement

and

deployment phases including, if possible, supporting police units. The team concept must be practiced constantly. This is best done by realistic training exercises and problems that are limited only by the ingenuity of the training officer. Teams and personnel who have trained together should be maintained and used intact whenever needed. A typical military ten-day training program follows. The same basic pattern can be used, with necessary modifications, for police operations, and equipment.

RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

116

AND

TECHNIQUES

A.M.

P.M.

Familiarization and organization,

Knownedistance firing. Zero rifles and check techniques Additional practice

inspection of equipment. Firing shot group. Qualification, 100-300 yds. Elimination. Searching areas a) Exercises to develop speed b) Exercise to develop patience Nomenclature, use and care of telescopic sights and binoculars Zeroing of rifles at 300 yards

Range estimation

Selection of firing positions Use of concealment and camouflage ‘Selection of and movement by covered concealed routes Study of trajectory, effects of wind and light Known-distance firing with telescopic sights to determine hold-off, and sighting at elevated and depressed

targets Known-distance firing for

Same as A.M., but using concealed

additional practice in hold-off, using obvious targets

targets

Firing unknown ranges at Same as A.M.., but using concealed obvious targets targets Firing exercises involving selection and occupation of firing positions. Concealment and Camoflage. Free firing at concealed, fleeting moving targets. Dawn and dusk visibility. Searching areas for periods of varying length. Same as 7 Same as 7

Final examination, preferably involving terrain not previously used Final elimination of those who fail to qualify

Military Counter-Riot Tactics

CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT should know enough of military techniques and methods so that they can cooperate fully in integrated operations. Police officers are also customarily assigned to accompany military patrols as guides, and to perform arrest and other functions in conjunction with military clearing activities. More important, civil police must know what to expect from military back-up forces so that they can plan their operations based on their own capacities for responding to problem situations, while at the same time being better able to recognize when a situation has deteriorated to a point requiring outside help. In widespread civil disorder where it is necessary to re-occupy and clear large sections of cities controlled by armed organized rioters, the situation is usually well beyond the control capability of most civil law enforcement agencies, for such a situation is, indeed, an unusual emergency. In the U.S., it is necessary to rely upon National Guard and Army units for such operations.

DOCTRINE Current U.S. Army doctrine is based on the increased need for control of fluid riot operations involving small unit patrolling in conjunction with, or supplementary to conventional riot-control formations, and techniques normally used against very large mob masses. National Guard experience in recent civil disorders has required countermeasures against small groups looting, fire-bombing, and threats to the security of vital utilities, Government offices, etc. Extensive patrolling in both business and residential areas has become increasingly necessary to combat arson, sniping, and looting. Knowing the techniques for clearing buildings from the roof down, and how to control roof tops is considered basic. Greater emphasis is being placed on the use of riot-control agents and how to launch them at the longer ranges with 40mm launchers and other devices. In today’s building-clearing techniques, the increased

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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use of obscuring smoke and chemicals, followed up by searching teams is advocated. Fire by selected marksmen is stressed, but it is strongly emphasized that bases of automatic-weapons fire, as used against’ organized resistance in street fighting, not be used. The value of discipline and small-unit control is also being stressed. STANDING Active Army

and Federalized

ORDERS-INDIVIDUALS

National

Guard

and Reserve soldiers, when called

upon to deal with a civil disturbance, are each given a card which they must always carry listing their special orders. Reflecting care for the rights of all citizens, these

orders read:

;

e [| will always present a neat military appearance. I will conduct myselfin a soldierly manner at all times and I will do all I can to bring credit upon myself, my unit, and the military service. e J will be courteous in all dealings with civilians to the maximum extent possible under existing circumstances. e J will not load or fire my weapon except when authorized by an officer in person, when authorized in advance by an officer under certain specific conditions, or when required to save my life. ¢ [| will not intentionally injure or mistreat civilians, including those I am controlling, or those in my custody nor will I withhold medical attention from anyone who needs it. e [will not discuss or pass on rumors about this operation. ¢ I will if possible let civilian police make arrests, but I can if necessary take into temporary custody rioters, looters, or others committing serious crimes. I will take such persons to the police or designated military authorities as soon as possible. It is my duty to deliver evidence and to complete evidence tags and detainee forms in accordance with my instructions. ¢ I will allow properly identified reporters and radio and television personnel freedom of movement, unless they interfere with the mission of my unit. ¢ I will avoid damage to property as far as possible.

TACTICS-GENERAL In general, the military have closely followed basic law enforcement techniques, emphasizing a modified form of street combat that also can be employed by civil law enforcement, provided police manpower is available. A military clearing operation designed to control a civil disturbance, after police have either failed or are unable to do so due to the magnitude of the task, will utilize as necessary any and all the force it possesses or can muster. ‘‘Necessary-minimumforce’’ police guidelines do not always apply, due to the nature of military training, philosophy, numbers, and armament. The aftermath of military clearing operations is also a police problem that may demand more than ordinary policing methods. The tactics of house-to-house fighting against strongly-entrenched, heavily-armed defenders, in the ‘‘Stalingrad”’ sense, are not normally advocated for domestic, mili-

tary riot clearing operations. Street fighting against entrenched, well-armed forces requires the use of a degree of military force and armament alien to civil law enforcement. Riots in which arson, limited sniping, looting and isolated centers of armed resistance are encountered require a heavy policing action or, conversely, ‘“‘light”’ military tactics employing great numbers of troops. On the other hand, the concrete jungles of our great urban centers, when used as a battleground by Communistinspired or other organized guerrilla-type elements, present some very formidable problems that only the military can solve. Aside from liaison and intelligence activity, police action in this circumstance would mostly be relegated to intelligence gath-

MILITARY

COUNTER-RIOT

CLEARING-OPERATIONS

AND

TACTICS

119

CARELESSNESS

This photo does not indicate any specific type of disciplined formation in use. Note that no attention is being paid to flank or rear security, and that observation of the buildings, a source of missiles on either side above eye level, is not being exercised. The news release for this photo was as follows: San Francisco, Sept. 28—National Guardsmen clear the streets. California National Guardsmen, mobilized by Gov. Edmund G Brown, march up Third street with bayonets fixed clearing Negroes from the streets before the 8 p.m curfews tonight. A number of Negroes and police were injured in the rioting in San Francisco's Bay View—Hunters Point district.

(1966)

ering, control of unaffected areas, and general ‘‘housekeeping’’ measures prisoner handling, containment operations, etc.

such as

In extreme situations tantamount to armed rebellion, the military, on the basis of

martial law, is expected to not only crush resistance, but sometimes also carry out occupation duties that can extend over long periods of time. Current doctrine involving the use of National Guard or Army units to control violent riots that have escalated beyond civil law enforcement capabilities is to rely first on the physical presence of large numbers of troops; secondly, the use of chemical munitions; and finally, the

use of firepower, plus any other force necessary. The kind of violence being encountered at the time military and National Guard forces are committed, will dictate the tactics that have to be employed.

WAR-TIME

AND

MILITARY

OCCUPATION

OF CITY

The following is a military approach to riot clearing and street-fighting operations against organized, in-depth, armed, civilian resistance. That which is usually a wartime military operation is undertaken with armament to do the job and, at times, it allows little regard to the niceties of police community relations. During widespread war-time city disorders, assuming for example, that enemy military forces have fled but that much resistance remains, it may become necessary to occupy or retake entire metropolitan areas. In this case, provision must be made to

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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occupy the affected area with great rapidity, even if unexpected resistance should develop. Armed resistance is dealt with in kind, after all other means of controlling the

situation have failed. Surprise may best be effected by a daybreak occupation. Prior to the attack, air recon and photo missions search out critical areas and obtain information permitting troops to familiarize themselves with the plan of the city, the nature and location of sensitive points, its major obstacles and barricades. Aircraft may also be used for dropping proclamations (coupled with T.V. and radio declarations of intent), and orders to cease resistance, to clear the area, and to designate exit points, etc.

If plans provide for moving through the entire city, the occupying force will be deployed across one side of the most densely-populated area and each street assigned to a separate unit. The advance of troops will be coordinated, block by block, with parties simultaneously overcoming resistance on streets, searching buildings and houses, and working forward over the roof tops until the city has been covered. In moving through the city, all buildings will be searched, particularly for weapons. To prevent later sniping, this search is conducted as the troops advance. Strategic points within the city, including all public utilities, communication facilities, oil and gas stations, transportation centers and important buildings are seized and secured at the earliest moment. In the occupation of a city by the block-by-block method, the infantry battalion is normally the largest unit employed. Its duties include removing all opposition, searching for and collecting arms, and providing a temporary guard for the occupied section until relieved by a following permanent-guard detachment. This necessitates the assignment of narrow battalion and company zones of action, but this helps insure uniformity of command, movement, and avoids confusion.

The duty of clearing away opposition and searching for arms is usually undertaken by the leading company or platoons, that organize into strike forces consisting of Street, Roof, and Searching detachments. Opposition by snipers is to be expected most often from the following places: ) Behind steps )

In windows

.

) Loopholes and notches in false fronts ) Rooftops and from buildings )

On cross streets, at intersections

) Skylights ) Sunken stairwells and basement windows

In a city prepared for heavy armed resistance, the residents probably will have broken walls between buildings to increase their mobility and defensive capabilities. As additional forces move into the disturbed area, unit commanders

are able to take

more comprehensive measures against centers ofresistance. A number of sentry posts are established at selected locations, for instance, and patrolling is conducted between

these posts. Every patrol or small detachment sent into unfamiliar areas should have with it at least one local policeman or a civilian who knows the area. Radio contact with all patrols is maintained.

CLEARING

HOUSING

AREAS-WAR-TIME

Military attack of houses and buildings. In raiding a house, a half-squad may first surround the house to prevent anyone escaping by doors or from windows within jumping distance of the ground. Officers and men actually searching the houses

MILITARY

COUNTER-RIOT

TACTICS

AL

should be armed with riot shotguns, submachineguns, carbines, gas grenades and pistols. In attacking a building that is strongly held, frontal attacks should be avoided whenever possible. In a present-day insurrection, if rifle fire opens on troops attempting to capture the occupants of a house, the troops would normally first reply with chemicals. If chemicals are not successful, then heavier weapons must be employed. The house is isolated and guarded while its weapons are secured. Depending on necessity, artillery, tanks, dynamite, bazookas and infantry mortars could conceivably be used to force building occupants to surrender. In that case, these weapons would be employed according to their normal combat principles, but with due regard to the presence of any innocents who should first be evacuated, if possible. When foot troops only are employed and the house jis one of a block of adjoining houses of about the same size, it should be attacked from adjacent roofs. After securing an entrance, there should be no pause in progress from room to room, until the last resister has been subdued. If necessary, a searching party can break or blow holes in the roof to enter the building. In moving downward, every room must be searched. Members of the searching party must be ready and alert to render each other any needed support quickly. One man should search a room while another stands in the doorway prepared to give fire support. In cases where opposition forces are in locked or barricaded rooms, holes are punched through the walls and non-burning gas, fragmentation or concussion-type grenades are thrown in. It may be necessary to shoot through walls to dislodge armed and determined resisters. It is better to shoot down than up, whenever possible, to prevent dislodging plaster and attendant problems. A pre-arranged signal is given to the company commander as soon as the building has been cleared. All out-houses, garages, barns and other suitable hiding areas in back yards, must also be searched, usually by a separate detail from the Searching detachment. All resistance is overcome and all prisoners marched to collection areas for handling by the police. Follow-up squads enter the building as soon as the signal has been given that resistance has been overcome. These men systematically search each house or building, collecting all arms and other munitions for loading into the collecting trucks. The process is repeated until all buildings in the first block are secured. As the city blocks are occupied, battalion halts are called or timed so there is uniform advance by all units. The progress of troops and the military measures used against armed insurrectionists are relentless. Those who fail to surrender and break from a building into the street trying to flee, are promptly fired upon by members of the Roof detachments. Snipers concealed along the street are silenced by the covering fire of machinegunners and riflemen. In almost every building where resistance has been long and heavy, some type of booby-trap can be expected, but once begun, house-to-house street fighting in areas that are determinedly held must not be allowed to lose momentum until the mission is accomplished.

STREET FIGHTING The following are hypothetical examples of different military riot problems. More than one solution is possible. It should be emphasized that these involve military tactics, built around a badly-escalated situation.

Scenario-Military Clearing Operation-Insurrection Assumed Situation—That an insurrection of dangerous proportions flares up in

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

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TECHNIQUES

certain ghetto areas of a large city populated exclusively by a militant minority. When faced with the likelihood of mass arrest, a sector of the affected area breaks into open,

armed rebellion. Assume also that secret militant organizations have concealed substantial quantities of weapons and ammunition in the area. Raids by police have already captured a number of militants together with considerable quantities of arms and ammunition. Action—The problem area is a compact, densely-populated sector of the city, but its rebellious sector is soon sealed off by police and any military units called in. Sufficient military forces are then concentrated to permit an attack against the entire sector. This area is divided into zones of action which run from one side straight to the other. The depth ofthe affected area will average 1-1/2 miles. This necessitates long, narrow battalion zones to insure unity of command and avoid confusion. The infantry battalions have been assigned a frontage of one entire block. The infantry battalion is the working unit. Its duties include: (a) Overcoming all opposition (b) Capture of every adult and adolescent male in the sector (c)

Searching for arms

(d) Collecting arms (e) Screening and evacuating all children and females Military police units will reinforce the street detail to collect and march all prisoners to the prisoner-handling area. The support units of each battalion will be furnished additional trucks and loading details to secure all collected arms and ammunition. Captain, Company C is ordered to move along a certain street. The street has a continuous line of buildings and tenement houses bordering both sides. In the rear of these houses are open yards and fences. The roofs are mainly flat and nearly uniform in height. Company C is divided into a Street detachment, a Roof detachment and a Searching detachment. The first platoon forms both the Street detachment and the Roof detachment. The Street detachment, comprising two squads of the first platoon, should operate on the sidewalks and yards of the east and west sides. They will particularly watch the windows on the opposite sides of the street. They will take charge of prisoners turned out from the houses and buildings by the Searching detachment, and see that they are turned over to the police for escort to the rear. In addition, they will assist in guarding captured arms and ammunition temporarily placed on the sidewalks awaiting collection by support units of the battalion. The first squad is to operate on the roofs and is divided into sections, one for each side of the street. As the advance starts, these half-squads or sections, will gain the

roofs through the first buildings on either side of the street and advance from roof to roof until the last is reached. From this point the detachment can fire on any opposition located on the roofs or in houses on the opposite side of the cross street, or it can fire down the street on which it is operating. The detachment should remain on the roofs until new roof detachments have gained the tops of the houses on the far side of the cross street. The first roof detachment should then rejoin its main body. The Searching party will consist of one platoon for each side of the street. Under cover of automatic weapon and rifle fire, an assault squad from each of the platoons rushes across the street and forces an entrance into the first building. The first echelon in this squad is a door-smashing detail. As soon as the door is down, lookouts are posted to prevent a rear attack. A second man is stationed to prevent any person from coming downstairs. The other men of the squad divide into pairs and promptly begin to clear the ground floor, then the cellar. Every man must be on the lookout for booby

MILITARY

COUNTER-RIOT

TACTICS

123

PATROL TACTICS AND MOVEMENT If the patrol is moving into an area where snipers are known to be operating, marksmen can be placed on roof tops to cover the advance. The squad should advance in two wide-interval files, adjacent to buildings on each side of the street. While moving forward, men in each file are assigned to watch the opposite side of the street, covering all openings, windows and doorways and top edges of buildings. Movement should be in deliberate stages from one pre-selected point to another. Extra marksmen can be assigned to cover all roof tops from higher points of vantage, when possible. As the unit moves forward under the sniping condition and until the sniper is definitely located, all roof tops and flank positions should be kept under armed surveillance. (Right): The squad column is the fastest means of moving through an area where light resistance is expected. The column should operate from the center of the street. Men in the column should be assigned definite areas to cover as the column moves, some assigned roof tops and windows and both sides of the street, others the ground levels. A line formation across the street can be used to sweep stragglers before it who offer little resistance. Again, in this case, specific men should be assigned to watch roof tops, windows, doorways and flanks, and the rear.

traps. Before entering a room in a building where opposition has been encountered, a panel of the door should be broken in or a hole punched through the plaster wall and a gas grenade thrown in. Immediately after its burst, masked men rush into the room to capture any resisters. In this way, insurrectionists on the lower floor are either eliminated or compelled to surrender. Those who surrender are disarmed and marched (with their hands clasped on top of their heads) through the front door and turned over to support units of the Street detachments. The squad then listens intently for any movement on the upper floors, and fires at any sound or movement upward through the ceiling. The searching detail then moves upstairs. The upper floor is cleared in a manner similar to the lower floors. The Roof detachment should promptly follow the Searching detachment into the first building on each side of the street. As soon as this building is cleared, the Roof detachment goes up through the

attic out to its roof.

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

TECHNIQUES

Scenario-Capturing Looters Barricaded in a House Assumed Situation—That during a serious civil disturbance in a town called Lynville, local law enforcement agencies were unable to contain rioting. Assume military

units were then sent into the town and are slowly restoring order. During the second day of military occupation, a motor patrol (consisting of one corporal, a policeman and two military) surprised a large group of looters in the act of plundering a drug store. In attempting arrests, a fight develops in which one enlisted man and two of the looters are killed, some of the others wounded. Prevented from escaping in their cars, the remaining looters barricade themselves in a small apartment house. Both sides of the street are lined with these small, identical apartment houses, all two

stories in height, and all having both back and front.entrances. The rioters have some hunting rifles, shotguns, and pistols and, apparently, a plentiful supply of ammunition. The corporal and one man guard the exits while the other man telephones for assistance. Soon Lieutenant Jones arrives with one infantry platoon which detrucks a block away and remains under cover while the corporal explains the situation. The troops are armed as prescribed for riot-duty operations except that, based on the report of the corporal, an additional supply of smoke grenades was brought. No gas projectors are available. Some axes, sledge-hammers, and other special equipment were brought to assist in breaking down barricaded doors. No wind is blowing. Solution—All traffic is stopped along the street and the area sealed off. Additional sentries are placed to observe both the front and back to prevent any person from escaping. There is no exit to the roof of the apartment building, but two men with a few tear-gas grenades are sent to its roof from an adjoining building. Troops are placed so that all windows can be covered. The first-floor windows, both front and rear, are

broken by shotgun fire. Two smoke grenades are ignited and slid along the sidewalk in front of the main entrance. Two others are ignited and thrown into the back yard as close as possible to the rear entrance. Concealed by obscuring smoke, men advance closer to the entrances where they throw non-burning gas grenades through the broken windows, at both the front and rear. Another grenade is dropped down the chimney. On the basis of one gas grenade to one room, the resultant concentration of the gas should be sufficient to overcome or force put all persons on the first floor. However, closets and tight-fitting doors to inner rooms can furnish considerable protection. A bull-horn is used to order the occupants to surrender. Time is allowed for the tear-gas to take full effect. If the occupants have not come out, they may have masks or will likely have retreated to the second floor, or to closed inner rooms, or down into the basement. The platoon commanders orders a detail of six masked men into the building. Two ofthese men have riot shotguns, holding them ready for instant use on anyone resisting. Two men carry gas grenades ready for immediate use. The other men are riflemen. Sentries remain outside the building. Preceded by penetration fire, an entrance is forced through the barricaded rear door, the detail moving rapidly into the hall and pausing briefly while grenades are thrown down into the basement and into the hallway on the second floor. With their weapons ready for action, the detail then moves promptly from room to room. Captured occupants are assembled in one room and kept under guard. The platoon leader and his men next move to the second floor. Troops opening doors of inner rooms or closets exert caution. The trapped fugitives will probably use their weapons, usually shooting through the doors near the knob. On the second floor, the detail proceeds from room to room, capturing or eliminating any occupants found. In case the door to an inner room is blocked and gun fire is encountered, a hole

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125

should be broken in a door panel and a gas grenade thrown through the opening. When doors are found to be locked, a rifle bullet or shotgun blast, fired from about

four feet, will tear apart the lock. When armed fugitives “hole up” in a small closet or dark area, the troops employ the riot shotgun, fired from the far side of the room. Its pattern covers a sizable area and the nine 00 buckshot pellets will easily penetrate wooden doors.

ge

Part Il

USING RIOT CHEMICALS

Employing CommerciallyAvailable Nonlethal Agents TO DATE, U.S. law enforcement has had relatively little tactical experience in the use of nonlethal, riot-control agents. This has been due to a previous lack of political and governmental support for police tear-gas employment, and a lack of budgeting to enable sufficient inventory and proper training. The F.B.I., in its 1965 manual, Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots, was

the first civilian law enforcement agency to take a favorable position with regards to police use of nonlethal riot agents, however, it was not until after the July, 1967 riots in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan that strong Federal advocacy of the employment of such gases began. The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,:Jr., in April, 1968, triggered rioting, looting and arson in the nation’s capitol and elsewhere, on a scale never before experienced in the U.S. This event, closely following the March issuance of the special report of the President’s Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, again placed renewed emphasis on the tactical and political advisabiltity of the use of nonlethal riot gases in place of firearms, to control violence, and curtail widespread looting and fire bombing.

NONLETHAL

CHEMICAL

AGENTS

ACCEPTED

On August 13, 1968, the Attorney General of the U.S., in a circular to all major

law enforcement agencies, stated the official Government position on use of nonlethal riot control agents: “Although they are not universally adaptable to all police uses, nonlethal chemical agents represent the best immediate alternative to the use of deadly force--or no force at all. They are now proven to be the most effective, safest, and most humane method of mob control. Used with caution when the need arises, they will reduce death, physical injury, and property loss to a minimum.”

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Emphasis on the nonlethal chemical weaponry aspects of individual command and riot control is expected to be extremely heavy in the years ahead.

HISTORICAL

NOTES

French law enforcement is reputed to have been the first police organization to have used a chemical lacrimator (tear-producing agent) in a hand-thrown device. At the start of World War I (1914-1918) the French Army inventoried limited stocks of hand and rifle grenades, loaded with a liquid tear-producing agent called ethylbromaacetate. Although tear-producing agents were utilized prior to the war by the French with limited success in quelling civil disturbances, they were not used once the war began. They were soon replaced by the more toxic, lethal war gases such as phosgene and chlorine, etc. After the initial successes of the first World War I poison-gas attacks, and the full implications of this type of warfare became more apparent, a tremendous amount of crash research and development was undertaken by both sides. It was discovered that one particular substance, Chloracetophenone (CN) produced, in proper concentrations, copious, uncontrollable tears and had an accompanying mild, temporary incapacitating effect, and that in fresh air, the effects of CN soon dissipated, with no harmful

after effects. Because of its mild irritant, nontoxic

nature, it became very

useful in training soldiers to wear their gas masks properly as protection against the more lethal war gases being used in combat. Knowledge of CN and its special properties returned with the American Expeditionary Forces. The obvious special application to the problems of postwar law enforcement resulted in the formation of several companies devoting their efforts to sales and promotion of CN’s police applications. U.S. civil and Federal law enforcement agencies, faced with postwar unrest, violent strikes and crime, during the gangster era, made extensive use of this new, humane, weapon against lawless elements of the period. Police CN usage increased through the Thirties. Long-range 37mm gas projectiles, grenades, and protective devices for banks and prison control became standard equipment in many progressive departments and institutions. The CN agent was disseminated from various devices, utilizing the burning or liquid tear-gas method of dissemination. Combustion-type munitions released a CN gas vapor into the air through a burning process, and the liquid-type tear gas, on exposure to the air, immediately volatilized to produce its irritant effect. During World

War

II (1941-45)

it was discovered

that micro-pulverized

CN,

(talc-sized gas particles) produced a longer lasting and greater irritation effect. The dust-type loading is generally now considered to be a more effective, more incapacitating, more persistent and more tactically efficient method than that achieved by either the burning or liquid-gas vaporization methods. Currently, tear gas manufacturers market both the older burning-type munitions and those that released their contents by blasting, or by expelling talc-sized, dry gas particles into the air. Liquid tear gas, due to its highly volatile and nonpersistent nature, is no longer loaded, although outdated stocks are still on hand in many police arsenals. PRINCIPAL USES OF CHEMICALS Control of mob violence, whether spontaneous, or instigated and directed by professional agitators, is one of the most serious problems facing present day U.S. law

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enforcement. Usually outnumbered, many times lacking political support, and underequipped, civil police are nevertheless expected to break up, or control such disturbances.

Riot Control and Mob Dispersion Firearms,

when

used against rioters, can result in unnecessary

casualties,

mob

retaliation, and unfavorable publicity. Many times the improper and excessive police use of firearms incites even greater violence. A show of force, with instant police re-

action and mobilization to a riot-triggering incident, verbal persuasion, use of riot batons and tear-gas, should all be tried prior to any actual use of firearms in present day mob control. Failure to suppress a mob action, one accompanied by looting and arson, usually results in escalating violence with an increased liklihood of losses in lives and property. It also causes the police, individually and collectively, to lose morale, prestige, public support and “‘face.”’ Failure of civil law enforcement to dominate a mob in its early, more vulnerable stage, will normally compel the use of the more numerous and heavily-armed state Guard or military units to do so. Proper use of tear-gas muniitions by trained police is the modern, humane, practical, and most politically acceptable way for present day law enforcement to handle the most serious civil disturbance situations.

The Barricaded Fugitive The armed criminal, rioter, sniper, or insane person who barricades himself in an area, room, or building, presents one of the most frequent and dangerous situations

confronting the police officer. Prior to the discovery of tear-gas, assault were usually the only means by which these individuals subdued. Attendant police casualties have many times been occur, daily, where tear-gas grenades and projectiles provide a solution to this hazardous phase of police work.

gunfire and physical could be captured or excessive. Situations prompt and effective

Individual Protection

Tear-gas cartridges in various calibers for discharge from conventional firearms, police-type tear-gas batons, pen-type tear-gas projectors and miniature tear-gas pistols, are all commercially available for individual citizen protection. They are loaded with the dust-type tear-gas and their effectiveness is directly related to the amount of agent discharged, their one-shot limitation, the range and wind conditions. More recently law enforcement has had available the much more effective, safer, and

tactically practical Chemical Mace® devices that fire liquid tear-gas droplets from a pressurized container, or chemical baton. Prisons and Mental Institutions

From time to time riots occur in penal institutions. Generally, they are a maneuver to draw public attention to real or supposed hardships imposed by the prison authorities, etc. At other times riots are instigated in coordination with mass breakout attempts. Prisoners in their individual cells can be controlled, but when massed together in prison yards, mess halls and exercise yards, they present a potential threat to authorities and their guards, who are usually heavily outnumbered. Any

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LINE OF RELEASE

a Combustion

NONLETHAL

gas and smoke-type

GRENADE grenades

USE should

be employed

using the ‘line-of-

release’ system, away from contact with the mob, and utilizing wind blowing in the direction of the rioters. A number of burning-type grenades are thrown out in front of the police ranks, in a horizontal line, equal distances apart, so that they form a line between the police and rioters. The clouds of ‘visible’ tear gas from each grenade will eventually merge into a single gas concentration, as they approach the target, /f there is a favorable wind. It is desirable to throw the required number of grenades on a sufficiently-wide ‘line-of-release’ or front, so that the merged cloud covers the entire width of the mob body. Large mobs can also be split by releasing small continuous clouds. Due to variables and safety factors, it is well to release a cloud twice as. wide as the estimated target. The following table will give a basis for tactical use of the combustion-type grenades. Throwing only a few individual combustion grenades in an irregular fashion will leave gaps and holes in the visible-gas concentration that rioters can easily see and avoid.

QUANTITIES OF BURNING CN-CS MUNITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE CONCENTRATIONS (Average field conditions; target at 250 yards downwind; all munitions fired simultaneously and evenly distributed on the front.)

Width Of Line

Point 25 100 250

*Fire this number

Number of Munitions

Height of Cloud

Width of Cloud

Length of Time Action

Required *

(Yards)

(Yards)

Lasts on Target

4 6 15 25

50 40 40 40

50 ws) 150 300

2 2 2 2

minutes minutes minutes minutes

of grenades every two minutes to maintain effect.

This chart indicates that large numbers of relatively costly burning grenades must be expended to maintain any concentration over an extended period of time. Civil police can make better tactical and less costly tear-agent concentrations by use of the ‘Pepper Fog” and back-pack tear dust dispersers now available.

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organized or mass violent action by prisoners in such a situation must either be countered by gunfire or, preferably, by use of a heavy concentration of tear-gas. Modern prisons are equipped with gas grenades, built-in tear-gas systems, and liquid tear-gas projectors. Inmates of mental institutions must always be handled with care and with a minimum of violence, regardless of how dangerous they are. Here again, tear-gas and the Mace devices perform in a humane, incapacitating manner, against either groups or individuals.

Protection of Banks, Vaults and Safes Some banks maintain special gas projection devices which can be activated by employees in case of a robbery attempt. Safes and vaults can be protected by inside installations of special trip-type tear-gas devices. Tear-gas in its various forms is now a Federally-recommended, recognized, legitimate nonlethal police weapon. It has “‘come of age” during the past half-century and will become an increasingly essential weapon for law enforcement. Chemical riot control agents provide the police commander with a distinct advantage in combating civil disorder. They are the most effective means of mob neutralization with a minimum of force or injuries to either rioters or police. They offset shortages of police and enable economy of force and material. TYPES OF TEAR-GAS

AGENTS

CN (Chloracetophenone) This is the preferred type of tear-gas currently in use by world law enforcement. Delivered in sufficient concentration, CN will ordinarily produce enough irritant effect and personal discomfort, to cause mob dispersal and control. CN has an odor similar to apple blossoms and causes intense tearing and irritation to the eyes, a burning sensation on the skin and the mucous areas of the mouth and nose. All of these irritant effects and sensations are fleeting in nature and disappear a few minutes after the individual is removed from the area of gas concentration. Treatment is simple and includes exposure to clear air currents, washing face and eyes in plain water, use of acommercial eye-wash, or bathing in a mild salt-water solution. In street, or open field conditions, where CN is normally used, there is little need

to be concerned about any damaging or serious toxic aftereffects to exposure. However, in barricade situations and in situations where the CN is confined and the indi-

vidual is subjected to a heavy concentration for a long period of time, greater caution should be exercised. A longer recovery period may be necessary, along with medical attention, etc. CS (Orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile)

This is the most recent addition to the riot control, chemical-agent field. It is a much more potent and powerful agent than CN (See Chapter 9). Generally, treatment for exposure to CS is the same as for CN and its nontoxic aftereffects disappear in a similar manner. Due to its stronger psychological and physiological effects, CS is normally recommended for use in the escalating-degree-

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RIOT CONTROL—MATERIEL

AND

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of-force scale after the milder CN has failed, and/or just prior to the use of firearms. Used as a primary‘ riot-control agent, it should be employed in lighter concentration than that normally used with CN.

DM (Diphenylaminachlorarsine)

This is also known as sickening, or vomiting gas. It is usually loaded in combination with CN as it needs a short period of time to take effect, while the CN simultaneously is producing a more immediate reaction. Severe headaches, vomiting and nausea similar to a severe state of sea sickness are present and the effects are much longerlasting and often so severe that medical treatment is required. DM is capable of poisoning water and open food stuffs in the riot areas affected. DM is not now considered a basic riot-control agent, but it is still used in some

extreme situations.

It

can be secured on special order by civil law enforcement. However, the irritant gas, CS, is now generally preferred as the alternative to DM in violent riot situations.

Characteristics--Persistency Riot control agents are characterized as nonpersistent and persistent. The nonpersistent agents remain effective in the open for a period of ten minutes, or less, at the point of release. Liquid tear-gas vapor or fumes generated by burning or combustion-type grenades are categorized as nonpersistent. Persistent agents remain effective in the open field for periods in excess of ten minutes at the point of release. CN or CS, micro-pulverized type tear gas is considered a persistent agent.

METHODS

OF TEAR-GAS

Combustion or Pyrotechnic Method

DISSEMINATION

.

This is the oldest and original method of riot.gas dispersion. A burning process is used to liberate the tearing agent into the air in the form of a vapor. CN crystals are mixed with a smokeless powder that acts as a fuel. Burning grenades and projectiles are still widely used but are being gradually replaced by munitions of the type that disseminate tear gas agents in the form of micro-fine powder particles, and by portable, or back-pack dispersers. Due to photographic and T.V. coverage, the general public still usually associates tear gas with the opaque white smoke cloud that occurs from a burning grenade. In commercial circles, the whitish gas cloud from the combustion grenade is called “visible” tear gas. The British use another descriptive phrase, calling the loading “tear smoke.” CN, CS, and DM can all be disseminated in a volatile, vapor form, by the burning, or combustion process.

The Explosive Expulsion System Here gas dispersion is achieved by surrounding an explosive charge with the dusttype, tear-gas crystals. The detonation of the charge in the grenade, or projectile, ruptures its body and forces the fine CN, or CS particles into the air. The end effect is the same as that achieved if a handful of talcum powder was thrown into the air.

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Explosive force from a primer, or powder charge, is also used to expel tear-gas dust from short-range blast cartridges and pen-type devices. There is also a relatively new piston-actuated system, a ‘“‘safe and soft’? method of releasing the dust-type tear-gas agent into the air. In this, a power-actuated piston, operating within the hermetically-sealed, nonfragmenting, plastic, grenade body, forces the loading out through a special orifice in the grenade base.

The Pressurized Expulsion System Compressed air cylinders, Freon-charged containers and nitrogen-charged tanks can be used to blow fine tear-gas particles into the air. This system is similar to that used in the dry-type fire extinguisher. The U.S. Army uses vehicle or helicoptermounted cylinders under air pressure to disseminate tear-gas dust in large mob actions. A portable back-pack pressure unit, similar in external appearance to that of a flame thrower, is also issued. More recently the pulse-jet type gas generator has become available to law enforcement. TYPES OF TEAR-GAS

Combustion

GRENADES

or Pyrotechnic Grenades

The origin of the combustion-type tear-gas grenade can be traced back to World War I (1914-18). Their design or functioning characteristics have changed little during the past fifty years. While burning-type grenades are relatively efficient producers of tear-gas vapor, this system of gas release has a number of tactical disadvantages that greatly limits their effectiveness in riot actions:

WRONG TACTICS—BURNING-TYPE TEAR GAS GRENADES Burning-type tear-gas grenades should not be used in this manner. Although the people in the target area are passive and clearly non-violent, they could throw the grenades back at the police line. In this particular situation, the grenades should have been used from a line-of-release so that the tear/smoke from each individual munition would merge into one cloud to pass over the objective. Visible-type gas used in this manner against non-violent, illegal groups of demonstrators also invites photography and unfavorable police publicity. It would have been much more advisable had they been available, to have used blast-type grenades with “invisible” gas-type delivery.

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(1) It takes from 15 to 150 seconds for a burning grenade to liberate its contents. Successful use depénds on a favorable wind blowing into or towards the target area. The chances are only one in three that such favorable air currents will exist. A “no wind” situation, or air currents moving toward police lines is equally possible. Burning grenades are best used when placed in a line across the front of the mob, some distance from the rioters. This permits the visible clouds of gas from individual grenades to merge while advancing toward the mob. Combustion grenades are not tactically efficient when used singly or in limited quantities. (2) If used in close and thrown amongst rioters, the burning grenade or projectile, because of its delayed discharge time and visible gas cloud can either be avoided, kicked aside, or thrown back at police. From U.S. Army Training Circular 19-3, Contra of Ciwil Disturbances, January, 1968, paragraph 46: (a) The burning-type grenades are available with CS. These where the intense heat could start fires. Burning-type grenades can about 150 meters using the rifle grenade launcher and the M2A1 Burning-type grenades are not thrown into a mob because they may

grenades should not be used be projected to ranges up to grenade-projection adapter. be thrown back.”

IMPROPER USE—BURNING GRENADE A young Buddhist rioter (left) hurls a rock as another reaches for a burning tear-gas grenade to throw back at Saigon police during an anti-government disturbance in April, 1966. This is an example of burning grenades being used improperly, thrown incorrectly amongst rioters. The gaps between separate grenade clouds can be clearly seen while the students stand around avoding the clouds. These grenades should have been used from a line-of-release so that the individual grenade clouds merge into a large concentration, covering the entire street to achieve dispersal.

To reduce the throwback hazard of burning grenades, a commercial variation has been produced that breaks into three smaller, separate burning sections when thrown. This device is only partially effective because a reduced gas charge is delivered, and the direction each section flies is erratic and beyond control. Many times one section returns back toward the police lines. The individual sections travel fast enough to cause injury if they strike a person in flight. The individual burning sections discharge their loadings during a 15-120 second cycle, and they can also be kicked aside, avoided, or picked up and thrown back at police, etc.

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FEDERAL TRIPLE CHASER The Federal Triple Chaser grenade breaks into three separate sections, as illustrated, approximately two seconds after being thrown. Each section travels in an unpredictable direction for varying distances. Each burning section expels its CN or CS visible gas (approximately 25 grams) in about 100 seconds.

TRIPLE-CHASER IN ACTION Buddhist monks run from a tear-gas grenade during anti-government demonstration in Saigon, June 14, 1966. Streamer of smoke is from a triple-section grenade designed to thwart demonstrators from throwing the grenade back at the police. Usually the top and middle section of the grenade separate and remain fairly close together. The bottom section at times takes off for long distances, sometimes back toward police lines. In this illustration, the bottom unit does not perform its dispersal function in the target area and can be seen traveling through the air away from the action scene.

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(3) The opaque, white cloud caused by the burning action of the fuel and containing tear gas in the form of vapor eminating from a burning grenade is easily visible to rioters. What they can see, they can avoid. Burning-type gas munitions with white “tear smoke”’ pouring out, are visible day or night. (4) The fire hazard must always be considered when using combustion-type grenades and projectiles in areas, rooms or buildings where flammable and combustible material is present. In training, this fire hazard is also prevalent in areas covered with dry grass and brush. From U.S. Army Training Circular 19-3, Control of Cwil Disturbances January, 1968, paragraph 50, Section C: ‘‘When rioters or snipers are barricaded in a building, riot control agents can be used to suppress fire or flush them out. Bursting grenades can be thrown through shattered windows. Smoke may be used to control and conceal the approach of grenadiers toward the building. It must be remembered that burning type grenades should not be used if there 1s danger that a fire may be started.”

(5) Generally, burning-type grenades should not be used inside buildings, or in the enclosed areas often encountered in sniper-riot or barricade situations. Aside from the throwback and fire hazards present, the possibility of a fatality due to suffocation, exists.

(6) Shelf and storage life of commercially-supplied burning-type grenades can be very limited, especially if stored where continuous heat and humidity are present. Leakage of the tear gas loading and the resultant gas odor is especially noticeable when poor storage conditions are unvaoidable or present. Like photographic film, burningtype grenades start to deteriorate slowly at the time of loading. The chemical reaction between the tear-gas crystals and fuel mix begins with the entry of moisture that initiates a gradual but progressive deterioration and leakage. The older the grenade becomes, the slower it burns and the lower the gas concentration produced. Although the manufacturers of combustion-type grenades indicate by dating that the grenades have a three-year shelf life, there is no fixed replacement warranty. Unlike the military vacuum-packed munitions, these commercially-packed, burning grenades and projectiles are susceptible to moisture entering through the sealed-over exit ports in the grenade or projectile body. Burning-type grenades, in their cardboard containers, are usually shipped in sealed metal drums so that leakage in storage, or in transit, is less apparent. Many police departments have discontinued carrying this type munition in car trunks during hot-weather periods because of the heat and humidityinduced excessive-leakage factor. Due to limited shelf life, the producers usually prefer to load and ship only after receipt of a firm order. Burning-type grenades are the cheapest to produce, but because of the uncertainty of their shelf life, especially where storage conditions are less than ideal, they are the most uneconomical and tacticallylimited of all tear-gas munitions. ’ (7) “Visible” tear-gas clouds from burning grenades show up well in photos. If the press chooses, this provides them an opportunity to play up the “‘police brutality” theme by showing photos of the gas cloud versus rioters, etc. (8) Field experience and recent official tests show that pyrotechnic grenades are much more likely to malfunction; aside from an occasional primer or ignition failure common to all grenades, a blow-torch effect occurs, and fire instead of tear smoke comes out the exit ports. (9) Commercial pyrotechnic grenades are generally advertised to have a gas emission time of from 25-35 seconds. Actually, the burning time during which they are expelling their loading is normally found to be from two to three times that listed

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specifications. Longer burning times enable more opportu-

nities for throwback and fire starting. BURNING OR PYROTECHNIC-TYPE GRENADES: Lake Erie 2CN, 2CS Federal Spedeheat #112,555CS Federal Triple Chaser

Penguin CN/Smoke

Federal 109 Pocket Grenade

U.S. Army M7A1, M7A2

Brunswick Skitter Grenade

LAKE ERIE TEAR-GAS GRENADE The Lake Erie 2CN burning-type gas grenade is a combustion grenade similar to U.S. Army grenade M7A2, and an exact counterpart of the Federal Spedeheat grenade No. 112. CS loadings are also available. These grenades release their loadings of “visible’’-type gas over periods of from 30-60 seconds. These types of munitions are not designed nor recommended to be thrown directly among rioters because they can be thrown back at police. They are best used from a ‘‘line-of-release” and in areas where no fire hazard exists. Used singly, or widely separated, the rioters can easily see and avoid the visible gas cloud produced.

FEDERAL SPEDEHEAT TEAR-GAS GRENADE This combustion-type grenade and its military counterpart, M7A1, have been the “work horse” grenades used in the majority of past riot actions throughout the world. It takes from 60 to 120 seconds for the contents to be liberated by the burning system of release. This accounts for the commercial description of “continuous-discharge” type. These grenades are not designed or recommended for throwing directly among the rioters. They are best used in areas where no fire hazard exists and from a protected line of release, out of contact with the mob, utilizing a favorable wind that will carry the gas toward the rioters.

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,

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TECHNIQUES

BURNING-TYPE GRENADES AFTER FIRING Two expended combustion-type tear-gas grenades. The Federal #112 Spedeheat, (on the left) releases its contents through holes on the sides; the U. S. Army M7A\1 (right), from emission ports at the top. The discolored, burnt condition of the labels and sides of the canisters is indicative of the heat generated during the gas expulsion process and demonstrates why this type grenade must be used with due regard to the fire hazard.

Blast or Bursting-Type Grenades A grenade dissemination system that projects dry CN, or CS micro-pulverized, talc-sized particles of gas into the air is generally considered the best and most effective hand method of dispersing tear gas. The fine dust-type tear-gas particles expelled produce a more persistent, longer-lasting, irritating effect than does the more volatile vapor from burning grenades. The effective range of dust-type agents also compares favorably with that of the burning type. Generally, blast-type grenades release their contents in a fraction of a second, do not start fires, there is no throwback

hazard, and some models can be thrown directly.amongst rioters with no fragmentation or concussion hazard. From U.S. Army Manual 19-15, December, 1964, Civil Disturbances & Disasters: “RIOT CONTROL AGENTS. CN and CS produce a temporary effect and do not prevent a mob from re-forming. An agent in the form of a micro-pulverized powder is more persistent than in vapor form. Powdered agents disseminated inside a building may remain persistent for days

or even weeks. Persons exposed to a cloud of CN1 or CS1 inhale it and the powder gets into their eyes, hair, and clothing and on their skin. Such persons may be affected for several hours.”’

(Note: CN1 and CS1 are military terminology for the loading of the dust-type agents.) From Tear Gas Munitions, T.F. Swearengen, Charles Thomas, Publisher, 1966: ‘When these dust agents are in clouds they react similar to vaporized agents and follow all the general rules governing the flow of air... When this cloud makes contact with an individual, some of the dust particles are inhaled, others are fixed on the moist surfaces of the eyes, causing immediate and severe physiological reactions. Other particles in the cloud settle in the individual’s hair, on his skin, and embed themselves between the fibers of his clothing. Even though the person may no longer be in the dust cloud, any movement he makes will cause some of the dust particles to become airborne again, where they may easily continue to produce their physiological. effects. This results in the same total effects as persistency and causes the irritating actions ofthe agent to last for some time.”’

EMPLOYING

COMMERCIALLY-AVAILABLE

NONLETHAL

AGENTS

141

While it is generally agreed that heavy, airborne tear dust concentrations are more effective than burning-grenade type vapor emissions, commercial and militaryproduced blast grenades used to deliver this type agent must be employed with due regard for the safety of both the user and the rioter. The basic precept is to use gas munitions to disperse and not to maim, or otherwise cause injury. Ideally, and tactically, the instantaneous blast or bursting grenade, should be thrown directly into or above the crowd so that its charge is expelled while it is still

WRONG

THROWING BURSTING GRENADES It is hazardous to throw bursting type grenades directly amongst rioters so that they burst in the air in the head area. Concussion, lacerations and eye and ear injury can result. Military grenade M25A2, Penguin baseball, Federal 120, 121 and Lake Erie Models 3CN and 3CS are in this category. These grenades are best rolled among rioters. Air bursts above the heads of the rioters are difficult to achieve consistently due to varied throws and fuze delay time.

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