Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States (Palgrave Hate Studies) 3030998037, 9783030998035

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PALGRAVE HATE STUDIES

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States Edited by Barbara Perry Jeff Gruenewald Ryan Scrivens

Palgrave Hate Studies

Series Editors Neil Chakraborti, School of Criminology, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK Barbara Perry, Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, University of Ontario, Oshawa, ON, Canada

This series builds on recent developments in the broad and interdisciplinary field of hate studies. Palgrave Hate Studies aims to bring together in one series the very best scholars who are conducting hate studies research around the world. Reflecting the range and depth of research and scholarship in this burgeoning area, the series welcomes contributions from established hate studies researchers who have helped to shape the field, as well as new scholars who are building on this tradition and breaking new ground within and outside the existing canon of hate studies research. Editorial Advisory Board Tore Bjorgo (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) Jon Garland (University of Surrey); Nathan Hall (University of Portsmouth) Gail Mason (University of Sydney) Jack McDevitt (Northeastern University) Scott Poynting (The University of Auckland) Mark Walters (University of Sussex) Thomas Brudholm (University of Copenhagen).

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14695

Barbara Perry · Jeff Gruenewald · Ryan Scrivens Editors

Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States

Editors Barbara Perry Faculty of Social Science and Humanities University of Ontario Oshawa, ON, Canada

Jeff Gruenewald Department of Sociology & Criminology University of Arkansas Fayetteville, AR, USA

Ryan Scrivens School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University East Lansing, MI, USA

ISSN 2947-6364 ISSN 2947-6372 (electronic) Palgrave Hate Studies ISBN 978-3-030-99803-5 ISBN 978-3-030-99804-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Part I 1

2

3

4

Thinking About Right-Wing Extremism in North America

Introduction: Situating Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States Barbara Perry, Jeff Gruenewald, and Ryan Scrivens

3

Understanding Extremism: Frames of Analysis of the Far Right Randy Blazak

21

Blurring the Boundaries of Mainstream and Extreme: Contexts and Contours of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada Barbara Perry Trump and the Alt Right: The Mainstreaming of White Nationalism Tanner Mirrlees

49

67

v

vi

5

6

Contents

Asymmetric Coverage of Asymmetric Violence: How U.S. Print News Media Report Far-Right Terrorism Erin M. Kearns and Allison Betus Check All That Apply: Challenges in Tracking Ideological Movements That Motivate Right-Wing Terrorism Erin Miller, Elizabeth A. Yates, and Sheehan Kane

Part II 7

8

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119

Diversity Within the Right-Wing Extremist Movement

“We Are the News Now”: The Role of Networked Conspiracy and the Quebec “Tweetosphere” in Shaping the Narrative Around the Anti-COVID-19 Restrictions Samuel Tanner and Aurélie Campana

155

Fantasies of Violence in the Patriot/Militia Movement in the United States Sam Jackson

187

Birds of a Feather: A Comparative Analysis of White Supremacist and Violent Male Supremacist Discourses Meredith L. Pruden, Ayse D. Lokmanoglu, Anne Peterscheck, and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

215

10 They’re Not All the Same: A Longitudinal Comparison of Violent and Non-Violent Right-Wing Extremist Identities Online Garth Davies, Ryan Scrivens, Tiana Gaudette, and Richard Frank

255

9

11

No Longer Alone: Lone Wolves, Wolf Packs, and Made for Web TV Specials Jeffrey Kaplan

279

Contents

Part III

Where the Action Is: Right-Wing Extremist Activities

12

Far-Right Extremist Violence in the United States Steven Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, William S. Parkin, Jeff Gruenewald, Colleen Mills, Brent Klein, Leevia Dillon, and Celinet Duran

13

Pathways to Hate: Applying an Integrated Social Control-Social Learning Model to White Supremacist Violence Colleen Mills

14

15

Right-Wing Extremists’ Use of the Internet: Emerging Trends in the Empirical Literature Ryan Scrivens, Tiana Gaudette, Maura Conway, and Thomas J. Holt Far-Right Violence and Extremism: Global Convergence Arie Perliger and Joshua Mills

16 The Nexus of Right-Wing Extremism and the Canadian Armed Forces Philip McCristall, David C. Hofmann, and Shayna Perry Part IV

301

327

355

381

409

Responses to Far-Right Extremism

17 More Than Walking Away: Barriers to Disengagement Among Former White Supremacists Steven Windisch, Pete Simi, Kathleen M. Blee, and Matthew DeMichele 18

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Confronting Online Extremism: Strategies, Promises, and Pitfalls James Hawdon and Matthew Costello

445

469

viii

19

Contents

Criminal Justice Responses to Right-Wing Extremist (RWE) Violence in the United States Jeff Gruenewald, Katie Ratcliff, and Hayden Lucas

Index

491

515

Notes on Contributors

Allison Betus is a doctoral candidate at Georgia State University in the Communication department. Her current work is focused on US-based White supremacist and far-right violent extremism and US media representations of terrorism. Her work has been featured in Justice Quarterly, Studies in Conflict in Terrorism, and The Washington Post. Randy Blazak earned his Ph.D. at Emory University in 1995 after completing an extensive field study of racist skinheads that included undercover observations and interviews across the world. He became a tenured sociology professor at Portland State University and currently teaches sociology at the University of Oregon. His co-authored book, Teenage Renegades, Suburban Outlaws (Wadsworth, 2001), and his edited volume, Hate Offenders (Praeger, 2009), have been widely adopted. Since 2002, he has been the chair of the Coalition Against Hate Crimes. He has worked with the National Institute of Justice and the Southern Poverty Law Center on hate crime research issues. He is currently the vice-chair of the steering committee in charge of implementing Oregon’s new bias crime law. His scholarship on hate crimes and hate groups has

ix

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Notes on Contributors

made him a regular commentator in media outlets from NPR and CNN to BBC and Al Jazeera. Kathleen M. Blee is distinguished professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh. She has written extensively about organized white supremacism, including Understanding Racist Activism: Theory, Methods, and Research; Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement and Women in the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s, as well as methodological approaches and the politics and ethics of studying racist hate groups and strategies for combatting racial hate. She has also studied progressive social movements, including Democracy in the Making: How Activist Groups Form, and, with Dwight Billings, the origin of regional poverty in The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth and Hardship in Appalachia. Aurélie Campana is full professor of Political Science at Laval University. She held the Canada Research Chair on Conflicts and Terrorism between 2007 and 2017. She is associate director of the Canadian Research Network on Terrorism, Security, and Society (TSAS) and researcher at International Center for Comparative Criminology (CICC) (University of Montreal). Her research has focused for years on terrorism in internal conflicts; diffusion of violence across movements and borders, engagement in extremist movements, including Canadian far-right groups, as well as the use of digital platforms by extremist groups and anti-system activists. Her research appeared in numerous journals, including Civil Wars, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, International Studies Review, News Media and Society, and Global Crime. Steven Chermak is a professor of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. Dr. Chermak’s research on rare events focuses on activities in the area of school shootings, terrorism, and mass shootings. This research includes the development of four databases using open-source materials. First, he and Dr. Freilich developed The American School Shooting Study database. This database includes all fatal and non-fatal shootings occurring on school grounds since 1990 and includes characteristics of incidents, perpetrators, and schools. Second, he and Professor Joshua

Notes on Contributors

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Freilich have collaborated to create the Extremist Crime Database— the first of its kind National Database on criminal activities involving US far right, far left, and Jihadist extremists. Specifically, the database includes data on the violent and financial crimes of these extremists, characteristics of violent groups, and the nature of foiled plots. Third, the Mass Shooting Database includes all mass shooting events occurring in the United States since 1990. Fourth, he is in the process of building database of cyberterrorism incidents with funding from the Department of Homeland Security. Chermak’s research has been published in Justice Quarterly, Crime & Delinquency, and Terrorism and Political Violence. Maura Conway is Paddy Moriarty professor of Government and International Studies in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University and professor of Cyber Threats in the School of Law at Swansea University. She is also coordinator of VOX-Pol, a EU-funded project on violent online political extremism (voxpol.eu). Matthew Costello is an assistant professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology & Criminal Justice at Clemson University. His research focuses on online hate and extremism and domestic and cross-national political violence and rebellion. Garth Davies is an associate professor in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University (SFU) and is the associate director of the Institute on Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism at SFU. Matthew DeMichele is a senior research sociologist in RTI’s Applied Justice Research Division. He is the director of the Center for Courts and Corrections Research and has conducted criminal justice research on correctional population trends, risk prediction, terrorism/extremism prevention, and program evaluation. Leevia Dillon is a doctoral candidate in Criminal Justice at John Jay College the Graduate Center; City University of New York. Her research focuses on violent extremism, online radicalization, and risk/threat assessment.

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Notes on Contributors

Celinet Duran is a co-principal investigator for the United States Extremist Crime Database and a Doctoral Candidate in the Criminal Justice Program at John Jay College. Her research focuses on domestic terrorism and extremist violence. Currently, she is a visiting scholar at SUNY Oswego as a PRODiG Pre- Doctoral Fellow. Richard Frank is an associate professor in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University and director of the International CyberCrime Research Centre. Joshua D. Freilich is a professor in the Criminal Justice Department and the Criminal Justice Ph.D. program at John Jay College, and a Creator and co-Director of three open-source database studies: US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), The American School Shooting Study (TASSS), and the US Extremist Cyber Crime Database (ECCD). Freilich’s research has been funded by DHS and NIJ and focuses on the causes of and responses to bias crimes, terrorism, cyberterrorism, and school shootings; open-source research methods; and criminology theory, especially situational crime prevention. Tiana Gaudette is a Ph.D. student in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University and a research associate at the International CyberCrime Research Centre at Simon Fraser University (SFU). Tiana earned an MA in Criminology from SFU. Jeff Gruenewald is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology & Criminology and Director of the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas. He serves as a principal investigator for the American Terrorism Study (ATS), Bias Homicide Database (BHDB), and US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). His research examines the nature of terrorism and violent extremism and criminal justice responses to ideologically motivated crimes. James Hawdon is a professor of Sociology and director of the Center for Peace Studies and Violence Prevention at Virginia Tech. He researches how communities influence the causes and consequences of violence. Most recently, he has focused on how online communities influence political polarization, online hate, extremism, and cybercrime. He has

Notes on Contributors

xiii

published extensively in the areas of online hate and extremism, criminology, community responses to violence, the sociology of policing, and the sociology of drugs. His recent work has been funded by the National Institute of Justice, the National Science Foundation, and the Commonwealth Cyber Initiative Program. David C. Hofmann is an associate professor of Sociology at the University of New Brunswick and a research fellow with the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society. He has published extensively on Canadian far-right extremism, terrorist radicalization, criminal and illicit networks, and charismatic leadership. Thomas J. Holt is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. His research focuses on cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and the policy response to these problems. Sam Jackson is an assistant professor in the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security, and Cybersecurity at the University at Albany. His research focuses on antigovernment extremism in the United States, conspiracy theories, extremism online, and contentious activity on the internet more broadly. His book, Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Antigovernment Group, was published by Columbia University Press in 2020. Sheehan Kane is the data collection manager for the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) project at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Prior to joining PIRUS, she was the Perpetrator Identification manager on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Before joining START, Sheehan lived in Cairo, Egypt, where she studied Arabic and pursued her Master’s degree. Jeffrey Kaplan has published some twenty books and anthologies and over 100 journal articles and anthology chapters since his graduation from the University of Chicago in 1993. His most recent books include The 21st Century Cold War: A New World Order?, Apocalypse, Revolution, and Terrorism: From the Sicari to the American Revolt Against the Modern World , and the first volume in the Routledge distinguished

xiv

Notes on Contributors

author series, Radical Religion and Violence: Theory and Case Studies. He has researched and taught in many countries, most recently China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Hungary. He is currently a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Danube Institute and a visiting Professor at Óbudai University, both in Budapest, Hungary. Erin M. Kearns is an assistant professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice and the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education (NCITE) Center of Excellence at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Her primary research seeks to understand the relationships among terrorism, media, law enforcement, and the public. Her publications include articles on why groups lie about terrorism, media coverage of terrorism and counterterrorism, public perceptions of terrorism and counterterrorism practices—particularly torture—and relationships between communities and law enforcement. Her work has been funded through a number of sources, including the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, and has been featured on numerous media outlets including CNN, The Economist, NPR, the Washington Post, and Vox. She is currently a National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) Fellow. She serves on the editorial boards of Criminal Justice & Behavior, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict and has served as a consultant for the National Police Foundation and the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Brent Klein is an assistant professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. Dr. Klein’s professional and research interests center on generating more refined explanations of aggression and violence and producing empirical evidence to guide public policy. His interdisciplinary research draws from developmental and life-course criminology, situational theories, and decision-making processes to better inform understandings of aggressive actions, including homicide, gun violence, school violence, mass violence, bias crimes, and political extremism. His recent research has appeared in Crime & Delinquency (C&D), Criminology & Public Policy (CPP), the Journal of Interpersonal Violence (JIPV), the Journal of School Violence (JSV), and Justice Quarterly (JQ), among other refereed journals.

Notes on Contributors

xv

Ayse D. Lokmanoglu is a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Communication & Public Policy at Northwestern University. Her work focuses on malign digital campaigns (hate speech, extremism, disinformation) and utilizes qualitative and quantitative approaches to examine harmful narratives and digital messaging. She has published in journals including Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Journal of Health Communication, and in edited volumes including Islamist Approach to Governance, Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization, and others. Hayden Lucas received his Master of Arts degree in Sociology from the University of Arkansas in 2021. His research focuses on violent extremism, interpersonal violence, murder-suicide, and mental health. Philip McCristall is a post-doctoral fellow in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at Ontario Tech University. He served in the combat trades of the Canadian military in the 1980s and 1990s, and has since published chapters and articles exploring cultural issues surrounding gender, inappropriate and discriminatory behavior within the Canadian military. He is currently conducting an exploratory study examining male veterans and their experiences while serving in the Canadian military as well as a scoping review of Canadian veterans, assessing barriers of access to drug and addiction service. Erin Miller is the principal investigator for the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland. She has been part of the GTD team since 2004, developing efficient and effective data collection strategies and training, and producing accessible analysis that provides context for current events in terrorism and counterterrorism. She frequently consults with users of the database, including researchers, policy makers, analysts, journalists, and students. Colleen Mills is an assistant professor of Criminal Justice at Pennsylvania State University, Abington, and she is a co-principal investigator on the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). Her research focuses on hate crime, far-right extremism and terrorism, racism, and group conflict.

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Notes on Contributors

Joshua Mills is a Ph.D. student in the School of Criminology and Justice Studies at University of Massachusetts Lowell. Before his arrival at UML, Joshua spent five years working with the Midland Police Department as a Community Service Officer. At UML, his current research involves study of the extreme-right with a more specific focus on domestic extremist actors within the extreme-right, extremism in correctional settings, perceptions of perpetrators of racial violence, and the efficacy of CVE techniques. Tanner Mirrlees is an associate professor in the Communication and Digital Media Studies program in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at Ontario Tech University. Mirrlees is the author of Hearts and Mines: The US Empire’s Cultural Industry (UBC Press, 2016), Global Entertainment Media: Between Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Globalization (Routledge, 2013), co-author of EdTech Inc.: Selling, Automating and Globalizing Higher Education in the Digital Age (Routledge, 2019), and co-editor of Media Imperialism: Continuity and Change (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), The Television Reader (Oxford University Press, 2012), and Media, Technology, and the Culture of Militarism (Democratic Communique, 2014). William S. Parkin is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, Criminology, and Forensics at Seattle University. He conducts research on ideologically motivated violence, violent victimization, community public safety, and the relationship between the media and the criminal justice system. Arie Perliger is a professor and the director of the graduate program in security studies at the School of Criminology and Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell. In the past 20 years, Dr. Perliger was engaged in an extensive study of issues related to terrorism and political violence, security policy and politics, politics and extremism of the Far Right in Israel, Europe, and the United States, Middle Eastern Politics, and the applicability of Social Network Analysis to the study of political violence. His studies appeared in nine books and monographs and in numerous articles and book chapters and were cited in more than 1700 academic texts. His recent

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book, American Zealots—Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism, which was published by Columbia University Press, provides an in-depth analysis of the history and contemporary trends of the violent American far right. Dr. Perliger was also engaged in training practitioners from various agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and ICE. Additionally, he provided professional briefings to high-rank officials from the government and military, such as The Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, and SOCOM, AFRICOM, NORTHCOM, and JSOC commanders. Dr. Perliger is also engaged in informing the public via contributions to various media platforms. His articles/interviews appeared, among others, in the NY Times, BBC, and Newsweek. Barbara Perry is a professor in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at Ontario Tech University, and the director of the Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism. She has written extensively on hate crime. She is currently working in the areas of anti-Muslim violence, antisemitic hate crime, the community impacts of hate crime, and right-wing extremism in Canada. She is regularly called upon by policy makers, practitioners, and local, national, and international media as an expert on hate crime and right-wing extremism. Shayna Perry was recently awarded her Master of Arts Degree in Sociology. Her research interests are extremism, terrorism, security, and public safety. She has a passion for helping people and is now pursuing a career focused on security and public safety. Anne Peterscheck is a Ph.D. student based at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, and is affiliated with the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). Her work focuses on the intersection between misogyny and violent extremism. Meredith L. Pruden is a post-doctoral research associate in the Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life (CITAP) at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as well as a Fellow with The Institute for Research on Male Supremacism and an affiliate with The Media Effects, Misinformation & Extremism Lab and at University of Buffalo.

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Her interdisciplinary and mixed-method research is rooted in feminist media studies with specific attention to digital cultures and uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative computational techniques to explore white and male supremacy, extremisms, violent misogyny, and far-right politics, including the mis/disinformation and conspiracy thinking associated with these groups. Katie Ratcliff is the associate director and research program manager of the Terrorism Research Center (TRC) and a course instructor in the Department of Sociology and Criminology at the University of Arkansas. Ryan Scrivens is an assistant professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. He is also an associate director at the International CyberCrime Research Centre at Simon Fraser University and a Research Fellow at the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence. Pete Simi is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Chapman University. He has published widely on the issues of political violence, social movements, and street gangs. His co-authored book with Robert Futrell, American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s Hidden Spaces of Hate, received a 2010 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Book Award. His research has received support from the National Science Foundation, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and Department of Defense. Samuel Tanner is a full professor and director of the School of Criminology at the University of Montreal. He is also a regular researcher at the International Center for Comparative Criminology (CICC), as well as at the International Observatory on the Societal Impacts of AI and Digital (OBVIA) and researcher at the Center for International Studies and Research of the University of Montreal (CÉRIUM). His work focuses on the relations between media (including digital) and social movements, digital activism, and in particular on the use of digital technology by the radical right as well as by protest groups (in particular against the health measures deployed to fight against the COVID-19 pandemic), as well as violent extremism. He is also interested in the impact of security technologies.

Notes on Contributors

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Yannick Veilleux-Lepage is an assistant professor of Terrorism and Political Violence at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. He holds a doctorate in International Relations from the University of St Andrews in Scotland. Dr. Veilleux-Lepage’s research interests include the creation of online narratives and propaganda which fosters or normalizes terrorism; historical antecedents to terrorism; farright extremism and the transnational links of far-right groups; ideological and technical diffusion; and the application of evolutionary approaches to social sciences. Dr Veilleux-Lepage is also an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and a Senior Research Associate of the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society. Steven Windisch is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Temple University. His research relies upon developmental and life-course criminology and symbolic interactionist perspective to examine the overlap between conventional criminal offending and violent extremism. His interests are primarily at the individual-level and focus on how the negative consequences of physical/psychological trauma, identity formation, and interpersonal violence intersect with political extremism. Elizabeth A. Yates is a senior researcher on the domestic radicalization team at START. She works primarily on the suite of datasets associated with Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) and Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS), which use publicly available data to empirically analyze extremist radicalization trends in the United States. She is also a co-principal investigator on a multi-year NIJ-funded project studying extremist offender reintegration. Dr. Yates focuses especially on far-right violence, extremism, and hate crimes and has authored research in these areas. In addition, Dr. Yates has taught undergraduate classes in Terrorism Studies and Sociology at the University of Maryland and the University of Pittsburgh, respectively.

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

1.1 8.1 8.2 8.3

Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 12.1

Typology of right-wing extremism Norm Olson testifying at a congressional hearing Oath Keepers tab-style logo. U.S. Army Ranger tab Image of the Oath Keepers “stack,” circled in red, on the Capitol steps. Photo from a criminal complaint filed against one of the participants Comparison of common words between white supremacist and masculinist texts The sentiment in white supremacist corpora is overwhelmingly negative Male supremacist sentiment analysis Total number of posts—2002–2017 Number of posts related to adversary groups—2002–2017 Proportions of posts related to adversary groups—2002–2017 Average sentiment scores for posts related to adversary groups—2002–2017 Far-right ideologically motivated homicides, 1990–2019

9 189 190

206 230 233 237 265 266 266 267 310

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List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

12.2 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

19.6 19.7 19.8 19.9 19.10

Lone actor versus part of formal group Gender of violent RWE defendants Average age of violent RWE defendants All charges against violent RWE defendants Conventional charges against violent RWE defendants Reference to violent RWE defendant’s terrorist affiliations by federal prosecutors Prosecutorial outcomes for violent RWE defendants Median sentence length in months by gender Median sentence length in months by age category Median sentence length in months by conviction type Average sentence length in months by prosecutorial strategy

314 498 498 499 499 501 502 504 505 506 507

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Table 5.5 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

9.1 9.2 12.1 12.2 12.3 13.1 16.1

Table 18.1 Table 19.1 Table 19.2

Descriptive statistics Amount of news coverage by terrorism episode Does the article mention terrorism? Amount of news coverage by terrorism episode between far-right motives Does the article mention terrorism between far-right motives? Top words in white supremacist texts Top words in male supremacist manifestos Incident characteristics Suspect-level characteristics Victim-level characteristics Open-source documents List of known CAF members involved with RWE (1991–2020) Logistic regression analysis of enacting self-help online Percentage of violent RWE defendant convictions by age and gender Percentage of violent RWE defendant convictions by prosecutorial strategy

107 109 110 112 113 246 247 311 313 315 332 416 482 503 503

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Part I Thinking About Right-Wing Extremism in North America

1 Introduction: Situating Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States Barbara Perry, Jeff Gruenewald, and Ryan Scrivens

As we toiled—individually and collectively—to bring this volume to fruition, events were unfolding on both sides of the border that ensured the relevance of our work. In both Canada and the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic was providing renewed impetus for extreme right-wing extremist (RWE) appeals to an array of conspiracy theories, bringing the mainstream closer to the extreme. In Canada, the B. Perry (B) Faculty of Social Science & Humanities, Ontario Tech University, Oshawa, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] J. Gruenewald Department of Sociology & Criminology, University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, Fayetteville, AR, USA R. Scrivens School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_1

3

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B. Perry et al.

number of active extreme right groups leapt dramatically, again triggering a mass murder of Muslims by an unaffiliated adherent of extreme right ideologies. In the United States, the Trump administration came to a close, with accusations of a “stolen” election further galvanizing the extreme right movement that had become empowered throughout Trump’s administration. In short, attention to right-wing extremism in North America has become possibly more crucial than ever before. It is particularly timely given the recent rise in political populism in countries around the globe that has engendered renewed activism from extreme right contingents. The 2016 U.S. presidential election, in retrospect, seems to have been a key spark for the mainstreaming of hateful and divisive rhetoric in both the United States and Canada. Donald Trump ran a campaign built in part on racist, sexist and xenophobic messaging, fashioning himself as a right-wing populist man of the “people,” defined in very narrow terms that pitted “us” versus “them”: progressive Democrats, feminists, academics/scientists and other liberal elites, Muslims, immigrants, and other minorities. White supremacists embraced his campaign and new administration, in which he helped to engender a climate that in their view provided permission to hate. RWE adherents seemed to grow bolder over the course of the Trump presidency, culminating in the January 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol which saw a loose coalition of white supremacists, ethno-nationalists, patriots, anti-statists, and others wreak havoc in the name of solidarity with Trump’s claims of a stolen vote. The Trump Effect, as it has become known, also had implications for Canada. As a favorite maxim goes, when the United States sneezes, Canada catches a cold. Thus, it has become apparent that the American politics of hate spurred on by Trump’s right-wing populist posturing has also galvanized Canadian white supremacist ideologies, identities, movements, and practices. Online and offline, RWE groups and individuals increased their visibility and activism through a burgeoning number of social media platforms and widespread public rallies and protests. Most striking, between 2014 and 2021, at least 25 homicides—mostly mass murders—can be attributed to the influence of RWE ideologies. As in the United States (Carrega and Krishnakumar, 2021), hate crimes targeting Black Indigenous, persons of color (BIPOC), Muslim and

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Jewish communities, in particular have reached unprecedented levels (Moreau, 2021). Canadian RWEs vowed their solidarity with those Americans who stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Of course, amid Trump’s administration, the world faced the devastating spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This, too, provided fodder for extreme right ideologues and activists. Wildly outrageous conspiracy theories played on public fear and uncertainty about the deadly virus, attenuating already existing narratives of racism, xenophobia, and antisemitism. Conspiracies that lay the blame for the virus on intentional plots by the Chinese or by Jews, either individually or collectively, resonated with extreme right definitions long propagated about “alien” threats. By turns painted as a plot by the Chinese to eliminate all white people, or a Jewish plot to facilitate their world control, or Microsoft founder Bill Gates’s strategy to inject microchips via the vaccine, the extreme right’s manipulation of COVID-19 has provided a means by which they could integrate mainstream and populist anxieties about health, employment, income, and government overreach into their more extreme worldview. In short, the decade bridging the 2010s and 2020s has been a fertile breeding ground for extreme right narratives and organizing. Trump’s right-wing populist political platform catering to white nationalism and exacerbated by COVID-19-related conspiracy theories has galvanized Canadian and American white supremacist ideologies, identities, movements, and practices. Both Trump’s election victory and election loss reenergized white identity politics as a mainstream form of political expression in both countries. Consider also the backlash to the visibility of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in both countries and the Indigenous Lives Matter movement in Canada, the apparent Russian intervention in political and public discourse, and we have a perfect storm that makes a close consideration of Canadian and North American adherents timely and important. Thus, we bring together in this volume leading Canadian and American scholars to explore an array of current contexts, dynamics, patterns, and characteristics associated with the movement in each country. While not a comparative text, as contributors focus largely on one country or the other, this collection of works allows comparisons to be drawn out from the distinct treatments.

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Defining Far-Right Extremism From the outset, it is important to note that we have chosen to use the phrase “right-wing extremism” as a unifying heuristic device. Across North America, an array of terms is used by policymakers, the media and researchers. Broad terms like far right, extreme right, radical right, and right-wing terrorism are common and in fact, often used interchangeably. More specific terms like white supremacist, white nationalist, Nazi/neo-Nazi, fascist, and alt-right have also been used as collective monikers, but are perhaps best reserved for specific elements of the movement. As the latter implies, and as the discussion below highlights, the difficulty is that the movement is wide-ranging in focus and ideological orientation. For our purposes, we have encouraged contributors to consider the consistent use of right-wing extremism as what Miller-Idriss (2022) refers to as the “best bad term” (p. 17). Even accepting an artificial consensus on the terminology, we are left with the challenge of defining what is meant by “right-wing” extremism. A U.S. team of scholars has adopted a broadly descriptive conceptualization of the term: We define the American far-right as individuals or groups that subscribe to aspects of the following ideals: They are fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of centralized federal authority, and reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of taxes), and they believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty, that one’s personal and/or national “way of life” is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and in the need to be prepared for an attack by participating in paramilitary preparations and training, and survivalism (Adamczyk et al., 2014: p. 327).

This is perhaps an apt characterization of the right-wing movement in the United States, but may not resonate with Canadians. There has historically been much less emphasis here, for example, on libertarianism,

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gun rights, or survivalism. Other observers have identified key pillars of right-wing extremism that are likely more descriptive of the movement in both countries. Jamin (2013) suggests that the core tenets are: a. The valorizing of inequality and hierarchy, especially along racial/ethnic lines, b. Ethnic nationalism lined to a mono-racial community, c. Radical means to achieve aims and defend the “imagined” community. Perliger’s (2012) list adds some elements: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Nationalism, Xenophobia, racism, exclusionism, Traditional values, Anti-democratic.

Miller-Idriss’s (2022: 18) conceptualization is similarly inclusive and suggests that right-wing extremism embeds “beliefs that are antidemocratic, antiegalitarian, white supremacist, and embedded in solutions like authoritarianism, ethnic cleansing or ethnic migration, and the establishment of separate ethno-states or enclaves along racial and ethnic lines.” There is, of course, considerable overlap across these definitions, and collectively, they emphasize nationalism and exclusion, along with a reactionary ethos that provides the foundation for potential action/reaction in defense of their ideals. Previously, Perry and Scrivens (2019) distilled these tenets into the following definition: right-wing extremism is a loose reactionary movement, characterized by a racially, ethnically, and sexually defined nationalism. This nationalism is often framed in terms of white power and is grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats posed by such groups as non-whites, Jews, immigrants, homosexuals, and feminists. As a pawn of the Jews, the state is perceived to be an illegitimate power serving the interests of all but the white man. To this end, extremists are willing to assume a defensive

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stance in the interests of “preserving” their heritage and their “homeland.” Most of the contributors to this volume also weigh in on defining right-wing extremism, while still capturing most of the key themes noted above, either implicitly or explicitly. Different extreme right sectors might well emphasize one of these tenets over others or integrate additional concerns. Indeed, given this menu of potential animating worldviews, it is no surprise that the extreme right movements in both Canada and the United States are diverse. The term right-wing extremism as used here is best understood as an umbrella term that subsumes a wide array of distinct yet overlapping ideological and strategic positions. Derived from the ongoing work on the Canadian landscape by Perry, Scrivens, and Hofmann, we offer here a “typology” of the movement as it is currently characterized. This is not intended necessarily as an exhaustive list, and it is certainly not a static list. The RWE movement is in a constant state of flux with new elements emerging and old ones receding. Nonetheless, the following provides a “snapshot” of the core elements that define the movement as we write in 2021 (see Fig. 1.1). White Supremacists believe in the superiority of whites over non-whites and advocate that white people should be politically and socially dominant over non-white people. This can extend to a belief in the need for violence against or even the genocide of non-white people (e.g., Ku Klux Klan). Neo-Nazis, as the name implies, find their roots in the tenets of early twentieth-century national socialism, with particular reverence for Hitler. They are explicitly and unashamedly motivated by race hatred, antisemitism, and, often, anti-statism (e.g., Aryan Strikeforce). Racist Skinheads adopt variants of white supremacist and neo-Nazi ideologies, but are most distinguishable by their subcultural markers which include neo-Nazi tattoos and symbology, shaved heads, and Doc Marten boots. They are also more aggressive and violent in their orientation. While racist Skinheads are dwindling in number as adherents opt for more “sanitized” versions of neo-Nazism and white supremacy, they still populate music scenes in such cities as Portland OR and Montreal QC (e.g., Hammerskins).

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NEO-NAZIS RACIST SKINHEADS

LONE ACTORS

WHITE SUPREMACISTS

IDEOLOGUES & GURUS

RWE

CONSPIRACY THEORISTS

ANTI-MUSLIM

ACCELERATIONISTS

ANTIAUTHORITY

PATRIOTS/ MILITIA

ALT-RIGHT

MANOSPHERE

Fig. 1.1 Typology of right-wing extremism

Ethno-Nationalists embrace a brand of nationalism which defines “the nation” more by ethnicity than race. It is the shared white, Christian, and European heritage that defines the collective nation globally and locally. In part as a means of “sanitizing” their discourses, ethno-nationalists are careful to avoid overt expressions of racism and rarely promote overt white supremacy (e.g., Identity Canada). The Alt-Right, or Alternative Right, is a self-descriptor coined initially by Richard Spencer and intended to signal disillusionment with what he saw as the ineffectual currents of contemporary conservatism. Like ethno-nationalists, members of the alt-right are also at pains to deny

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their racist foundations. In truth, there is nothing inherently “alternative” about the movement as they are grounded in the same nationalist threads that animate so many other elements of the extreme right (e.g., Proud Boys). The Anti-Muslim element of the RWE movement is a loose network of groups and individuals who are threatened by what they perceive as the wholesale invasion and take-over of the West by Islam and by Sharia law. They are virulent opponents of Islam as an ideology and Muslims as a people, but also of contemporary immigration policies which they hold responsible for the “flood” of Muslims into North America (e.g., PEGIDA, from the German acronym for Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West). Accelerationists, as the label implies, are intent on “accelerating” what they hope is an inevitable civil war. For some, this resonates with the traditional RAHOWA or Racial Holy War. For others, it represents an all-out civil war that would delegitimize and destabilize the current regime. Many accelerationists celebrated the events of January 6, 2021, in Washington DC as the onset of this civil war (e.g., The Base). Militia/Patriots, as the name implies, proclaim themselves the true defenders of “the nation,” asserting that the current government is incapable of doing so and is in fact contributing to the demise of their homeland. The state is held to be by turns tyrannical and weak, having succumbed to the undue demands of minorities, immigrants, and globalists. Patriots are thought to be especially likely to draw their membership from military (armed services) and paramilitary institutions (law enforcement), to train in paramilitary maneuvers, and to be heavily armed (e.g., III%). The Manosphere is a loose collection of movements marked by their overt and extreme misogyny. Not all adherents necessarily affiliate with RWE, but there is certainly overlap to the extent that traditional white supremacists and those derived from similar ideological foundations also embrace very traditional visions of gender and gender roles. Both elements are informed by hostility toward feminists, “strong” women, the 2SLGBTQ+ community, for instance, blaming them for the “feminization” of men and the decline in white birth rates (e.g., Incels).

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Anti-Authority adherents represent a typically unstructured collective of individuals who reject state authority. They also tend to subscribe to an array of conspiracy theories, with those on the right-wing of the spectrum especially likely to promote anti-Semitic narratives. Like the Manosphere, those adhering to anti-authority tenets occupy a spectrum from right-wing to apolitical to left-wing. At the extreme, sovereigntists may mobilize as militia (e.g., Sovereign Citizens). It is likely clear from these brief descriptions that there is considerable overlap across dimensions of the RWE movement. The typology is intended only as an heuristic device to lend some clarity to a complex and constantly evolving movement. There are clearly shared grievances that unite the varied parts. Best to think of the movement in terms of a Venn diagram, wherein there are features distinct to each cluster, alongside points of intersection. This, after all, is what allows us to characterize this loose mélange as a “movement.” Nationalism, for example, tends to inform most parts of the movement, but is understood in different ways—it may be grounded in race or in culture. Gendered norms also permeate the movement—that the 14 words shared across groups are testament to that.1 Indeed, if the aim is to preserve the white race— culturally as well as biologically—then white women’s sexuality must be controlled. This links Incels, for example, to white supremacists. And virtually all segments of the movement are inherently antiegalitarian, whether the focus of this is on race, religion, culture, or gender.

Thinking About RWE in Canada and the United States There is a deep and lengthy history of empirical scholarship on RWE, especially in the United States. This body of research has examined the historical evolution of the socio-religious (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1997; Berlet and Lyons, 2000) and white supremacist (Hamm, 1993; Simi and Futrell, 2010) components of the RWE movement over the last several decades in the U.S. Researchers have investigated the racialized (Dobratz 1

“We must ensure the existence of the White race and a future for our children.”

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and Shanks-Meile, 1997) and gendered (Blee, 2005) dynamics of the RWE movement (Ferber, 1998) over the last several decades of the twentieth century and more recently since the turn of the twenty-first century (Miller-Idriss, 2022; Perlinger, 2020). Recent empirical work on violent far-right extremism has stemmed largely from the creation of opensource crime databases (Chermak et al., 2012; Parkin and Gruenewald, 2017), such as the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) (Freilich et al., 2014, 2018). Data from the ECDB have been used to illuminate patterns of deadly far-right violence (Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald and Pridemore, 2012), far-right group activity (Adamczyk et al., 2014), lone actor attacks (Gruenewald et al., 2013a, b), and anti-police violence (Gruenewald et al., 2016). In contrast, little attention has been paid to the Canadian context. In their 2019 publication, Perry and Scrivens (2019) point to small handful of Canadian articles on any variety of RWE in that country. There was a brief flurry of articles in the late 1990s/early 2000s when white supremacist groups like Heritage Front were especially active, but little before or after. Perry and Scrivens (2015, 2019) widely cited “environmental scan” of the RWE movement in Canada was the first comprehensive study, initially published just as Trump’s candidacy was unfolding. The reaction of the extreme right to Trump’s candidacy and subsequent election was manifest in a rapid increase in the number of active individuals and groups, which in turn drew the attention of a new cadre of scholars. Some of that work explored the dynamics of specific groups, such as the Soldiers of Odin (Veilleux-Lepage and Archambault, 2019), Yellow-vesters (De Cillia and McCurdy, 2020; Tetrault, 2021), and racist Skinheads (Tanner and Campana, 2014). There has also been considerable interest in exploring the online engagement of the RWE movement in Canada (Gaudette et al., 2020; Hutchinson et al., 2021; Scrivens et al., 2020). Nonetheless, scholarship on far-right extremism remains underdeveloped here. In spite of the parallel growth of the Canadian and American RWE movement in the 2010s and 2020s, there have been few, if any, distinct efforts to draw direct connections between the two countries. The current volume is not a comparative project per se, but it does include some references to the convergences and divergences across the border

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(e.g., Mirrlees; Perry; Perliger and Mills). It also allows comparisons to be drawn out from the distinct treatment. It would, in fact, be a mistake to think of the RWE movements in the two countries as operating entirely independently. There are considerable similarities in their ideological positions, their respective targets of animosity, and their tactics, although the American movement tends to be more violent. Moreover, the two movements are often linked by common memberships. The Proud Boys, for example, was founded in the United States by a Canadian expatriate, which may explain in part why it also had such a strong following in Canada by 2020. The Base came into sharp focus in Canada with the revelation that a Manitoba reservist was actively recruiting with the intent of creating Canadian cells. And the Canadian III% styled themselves after their American counterparts, although there is considerable confusion around whether they were recognized by the American entity when they first emerged. Beyond the concrete organizational links, the two movements are connected by their online activity. There is considerable exchange between Canadian and American groups and adherents (Hart et al., 2021). For instance, the ongoing charges that the 2019 U.S. election was “stolen” from Trump provided Canadian anti-statists and white supremacists with the opportunity to offer their support—online— to their American brethren. An Institute for Strategic Dialogue report found, in fact, that the U.S. election was the most common topic among Canadian RWE adherents posting online, and that they were as likely to focus on American politics as on politics at home (Hart et al., 2021). In short, there are myriad reasons for examining RWE in North America generally and for considering the contours in Canada and the United States simultaneously. It is a timely reminder of the risks posed by the movement on both sides of the border and about its transnational character. Our hope is that this volume will inspire more collaborative and comparative scholarship on RWE in both nations.

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Structure of the Book We have explicitly structured the collection of papers around four key themes: conceptual and methodological approaches to RWE; diversity within the movement; RWE activities; and responding to RWE in Canada and the United States. This opening chapter in the first section sought to provide sign-posting for what is to follow. In particular, it situates the burgeoning literature in the field within contemporary patterns of political populism that inspired and emboldened extreme right actors. The chapter also highlights the fact that there is no clear consensus as to how to define RWE, or even whether that is the appropriate terminology. Indeed, subsequent chapters typically provide their own definitions and terminology. The introduction also foreshadows the discussion in the second section of the volume by offering a typology for thinking about the diverse elements of the extreme right. The second chapter in this section considers the array of disciplinary and conceptual approaches to thinking about RWE. Subsequent chapters also situate the recent rise in RWE within broader enabling patterns, most notably the political exploitation of right-wing populism (Tanner; Perry). The final two chapters of the section take us in a slightly different direction, exploring first, media (mis)representation of RWE relative to Islamist inspired extremism and second, the implications of the ideological diversity noted above for subsequent analyses of the “movement” collectively. In Part II, the contributions further demonstrate some of the distinct elements of the RWE movement, exploring different types of RWE entities. Chapter 7 is especially timely, exploring as it does the ways in which contemporary conspiracy theories frame the COVID-19 pandemic. It is worth noting, too, that the patriot or militia movement discussed in Chapter 8 is also often animated by conspiracy theories, especially those grounded in suspicion toward a “tyrannical state.” Regardless of whether it is conspiracy theories, or other threads of anti-authoritarianism, the danger lies in the potential—and willingness—for adherents of this segment of the RWE movement to engagement in violence in fulfillment of their “fantasies.” The final two chapters of section II highlight the variations within the movement more directly. On the one hand, Pruden, Lokmanoglu,

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and Veilleux-Lepage focus on two segments of the movement that are often studies in isolation: white supremacist and male supremacists. They remind us, however, that there is in fact obvious synergy between the two factions. Sexism and misogyny run through both, as does the belief that shifting gender dynamics are at least partly to blame for the loss of white supremacy. The final chapter in this section considers a different point of divergence, that being the distinctions between violent and non-violent RWE adherents. Their surprising conclusion is that it is likely that the non-violent individuals who post in online forums may be more rather than less extreme than their violent counterparts. In Part III, the contributors reflect on the forms of and pathways to ideologically motivated narratives and violence within the RWE movement. While the first chapter documents the dynamics of a range of violent activities perpetrated by RWE adherents in the United States, the second chapter is concerned with how members come to the point of willingness to engage in extremist violence. One of the key drivers for mobilization appears to be online engagement with extreme right social media and websites, a theme taken up more directly in Chapter 13. This chapter provides a valuable overview of RWE use of the Internet, with particular focus on the array of functions attributable to online activity. The final chapter in the section tackles an area of considerable attention in the aftermath of the January 6 insurrection in the United States: the engagement of RWE adherents with the military. While the focus is on the Canadian context, the chapter offers lessons for the armed services on both sides of the border. The weaving together of a warrior ethos with xenophobia has already been seen as a dangerous trend in both countries. Having explored the parameters and risks associated with RWE, the final section of the book offers consideration of interventions intended to prevent or challenge RWE activism. Both Chapters 16 and 17 paint a picture of the deradicalization industry that has sprung up globally. They each introduce readers the diverse collection of approaches that have been introduced with the intent of bringing individuals out of the movement, with Chapter 17 focusing specifically on online strategies. However, with an eye to inspiring innovative approaches, both chapters also introduce important caveats that emphasize the limitations of extant approaches. We close the volume with consideration of criminal justice

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responses to RWE violence, with particular focus on law enforcement and prosecution. There are unquestionably gaps in this volume. There are substantive areas that warrant closer consideration: online gaming as “grooming sites”; organizational capacities of extreme right groups; adherent characteristics; extreme right fund-raising, to name a few. It is also a volume heavily weighted toward criminological scholarship, with few entries from other disciplines. Political science can provide rich insights into contemporary right-wing populism (Beland, 2020). So, too, does educational scholarship have plenty to offer, especially with respect to countering RWE through critical digital literacy and critical citizenship, for example (Estelles Frade and Castellví, 2020). Communication studies have provided some of the most critical assessments of the “Trump effect” in particular (Rowland, 2019). For insights into the “minds” of RWE adherents, we can turn to psychology (Rieger et al., 2017). We have also included limited theoretical work, focusing largely on empirical pieces. The bulk of these, moreover, are grounded in quantitative approaches with few qualitative studies drawing on interviews, ethnographies, or discourse analysis, for example. And to be frank, there is very little critical scholarship contained here like that inherent in the work of Henry Giroux (2017) or UK scholars like Aaron Winter (2019) or Aurelien Mondon (2021). Consequently, we have left considerable space for subsequent volumes to take up some of the missing pieces here. Unfortunately, indications are that the subject matter will remain relevant for some years to come.

References Adamczyk, A., Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S., and Freilich, J. (2014). The relationship between hate groups and far-right ideological violence. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30 (3): 310–332. Aho, J. A. (1990). The politics of righteousness: Idaho Christian patriotism. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

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Barkun, M. (1997). Religion and the racist right: The origins of the Christian Identity movement (2nd ed.). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Beland, D. (2020). Right-wing populism and the politics of insecurity: how president Trump frames migrants as collective threats. Political Studies Review, 18(2): 162–177. Berlet, Chip, and Lyons, Matthew N. (2000). Right-wing populism in America: Too close for comfort. New York: The Guilford Press. Blee, K. (2005). Women and organized racial terrorism in the United States. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28: 421–423. https://doi.org/10.1080/105 76100500180303. Carrega, C., and Krishnakumar, P. (2021, August 30). Hate crime reports in US surge to the highest level in 12 years, FBI say. CNN.com https://www. cnn.com/2021/08/30/us/fbi-report-hate-crimes-rose-2020/index.html. De Cillia, B., & McCurdy, P. (2020). No surrender. No challenge. No protest paradigm: A content analysis of the Canadian news media coverage of the “Yellow Vest Movement” and the “United We Roll Convoy”. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie, 57 (4): 656–680. Chermak, S. M., Frilich, J. D., Parkin, W. S., & Lynch, J. P. (2012). American terrorism and extremist crime data sources and selectivity bias: An investigation focusing on homicide events committed by far-right extremists. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28(1): 191–218. Dobratz, Betty A. & Shanks-Meile, Stephanie L. (1997). White power, White pride: The White separatist movement in the United States. New York: Twayne Publishers. Estelles Frade, M., & Castellví, J. (2020). The educational implications of populism, emotions and digital hate speech: A dialogue with scholars from Canada, Chile, Spain, the UK, and the US. Sustainability, 12: 6034–6050. Ferber, A. L. (1998). White man falling: Race, gender, and white supremacy. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing. Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S., Belli, R., Gruenewald, J., & Parkin, W. S. (2014). Introducing the United States extremist crime database. Terrorism & Political Violence, 26 (2), 372–384. Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S., Gruenewald, J., Parkin, W. S., & Klein, B. R. (2018). Patterns of violent far-right extremist crime in the USA. Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(6): 38–51. Giroux, H. A. (2017). White nationalism, armed culture and state violence in the age of Donald Trump. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 43(9): 887–910.

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Hart, M., Davey, J., Maharasingam-Shah, E., O’Connor, C., and Gallagher, A. (2021). An online environmental scan of right-wing extremism in Canada. London: ISD. https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/an-online-enviro nmental-scan-of-right-wing-extremism-in-canada/. Hutchinson, J., Amarasingam, A., Scrivens, R., & Ballsun-Stanton, B. (2021). Mobilizing extremism online: comparing Australian and Canadian rightwing extremist groups on Facebook. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 1–31. Gaudette, T., Scrivens, R., & Venkatesh, V. (2020). The role of the Internet in facilitating violent extremism: Insights from former right-wing extremists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1–18. Gruenewald, J. (2011). A comparative examination of far-right extremist homicide events. Homicide Studies, 15: 177–203. Gruenewald, J., & Pridemore, W. A. (2012). A comparison of ideologicallymotivated homicides from the new Extremist Crime Database and homicides from the Supplementary Homicides Reports using multiple imputation by chained equations to handle missing values. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28: 141–162. Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S. M., & Freilich, J. D. (2013a). Far-right lone wolf terrorism in the United States. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36 (12): 1005–1024. Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S.M., & Freilich, J. D. (2013b). Distinguishing “loner” attacks from other domestic extremists: A comparison of far-right homicide incident and offender characteristics. Criminology and Public Policy, 12(1): 1–27. Gruenewald, J., Dooley, K. M. G., Suttmoeller, M. J., Chermak, S., & Freilich, J. D. (2016). A mixed-method analysis of fatal attacks on police by far-right extremists. Police Quarterly, 19 (2): 216–245. Hamm, M. S. (1993). American skinheads: The criminology and control of hate crime. Westport, CT: Praeger. Jamin, J. (2013). Two different realities: Notes on populism and the extreme right. In A. Mammone, E. Godin, & B. Jenkins (Eds.), Varieties of right wing extremism in Europe (pp. 38–52). Abingdon: Routledge. Miller-Idriss, C. (2022). Hate in the homeland: The new global far-right. Princeton University Press. Moreau, G. (2021). Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2019. Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada. Parkin, W., & Gruenewald, J. (2017). Open-source data and the study of homicide. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 32(18): 2693–2723.

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Perliger, A. (2012). Challengers from the sidelines: Understanding America’s far right. West Point NY: Combating Terrorism Center. Perlinger, A. (2020). American zealots: Inside right-wing terrorism. Columbia University Press. Perry, B., & Scrivens, R. (2019). Right-wing extremism in Canada. London: Palgrave. Perry, B., & Scrivens, R. (2015). An environmental scan of right-wing extremism in Canada. Final Report, Kanishka project. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada. Rieger, D., Frischlich, L., & Bente, G. (2017). Propaganda in an insecure, unstructured world: How psychological uncertainty and authoritarian attitudes shape the evaluation of right-wing extremist internet propaganda. Journal of Deradicalization, (10): 203–229. Rowland, R. C. (2019). The populist and nationalist roots of trump’s rhetoric. Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 22(3): 343–388. Scrivens, R., Davies, G., & Frank, R. (2020). Measuring the evolution of radical right-wing posting behaviors online. Deviant Behavior, 41(2): 216–232. Simi, P., & Futrell, R. (2010). American swastika: Inside the White power movement’s hidden spaces of hate. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Tanner, S., & Campana, A. (2014). The process of radicalization: Right-wing skinheads in Quebec. Waterloo, ON: Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society. Veilleux-Lepage, Y., & Archambault, E. (2019). Mapping transnational extremist networks. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(2): 21–38. Winter, A. (2019). Online hate: from the far-right to the ‘alt-right’ and from the margins to the mainstream. In Online Othering (pp. 39–63). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

2 Understanding Extremism: Frames of Analysis of the Far Right Randy Blazak

Introduction: The Threat of Right-Wing Violence The January 6, 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol brought a new awareness to the threat of organized violence from America’s right-wing counterculture. The storming of the capital by supporters of Donald Trump was meant to stop the certification of the 2020 presidential election, recognizing Joseph Biden as the winner. In the weeks following the attack, the FBI charged over 500 people with federal crimes, many of them members of white supremacist groups. Included in those charged were members of right-wing groups, like the Proud Boys, Three Percenters, and the Oath Keepers. Much of their pre-attack rhetoric had been framed in the language of a second civil war. R. Blazak (B) University of Oregon, Atlanta, GA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_2

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The violence at the Capitol was not the first time, right-wing extremists had attacked a federal building. On April 19, 1995 Army veteran Timothy McVeigh and a small band of co-conspirators orchestrated a bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including 19 children in a daycare center. McVeigh, who emerged from both the white supremacist and patriot militia subcultures, had vowed to launch a civil war against what he believed to be foreign control of the U.S. government. His act of domestic terrorism became a model for right-wing activists to follow, including alt-right activist Jeremy Christian who stabbed two men to death on a Portland commuter train in 2017, nearly killing a third (Pigott, 2017). In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, right-wing violence evolved in various forms. This included the rise of the sovereign citizen movement that saw several attacks on law enforcement, including the killing of two West Memphis, Arkansas police officers by sovereign citizens in 2010. Violence also included a revitalized militia movement that focused on gun rights and land use issues. An example of this was an armed standoff in Oregon in 2016 in which armed militia members held a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) wild life refuge for over a month. In 2017, the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia sought to provoke conflict with anti-racist activists, and ended in the death of 32year-old counter protester, Heather Heyer. In 2020, armed right-wing groups confronted Black Lives Matter protesters, routinely threatening and engaging in violence. The through-line that connects these events, from Oklahoma City to Washington DC, is a desire to instigate a second armed revolution to purge America of its alleged enemies, both foreign and domestic. Its name has changed, from Rahowa (“Racial Holy War”) to Boogaloo, but its methods are the same; to accelerate the collapse of liberal society and reestablish a law and order-based white ethnostate.

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Framing “Right-Wing” Political Positions in Social Science Literature The concept of left- and right-wing extremism is often muddied by political discourse and political complexities. There are those who believe Hitler’s “National Socialism” was socialism when it was, in fact, a fascist rejection of socialist principles and targeted socialists, communists, and trade unionists as enemies of the state. In the simple, right-left spectrum, where do libertarians fit? Can you be a pro-life liberal or an anti-gun conservative? The origins of the right-left dichotomy are in the French Revolution. After the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, the National Assembly met to write the constitution for the new republic. Those that believed in the complete abolition of the monarchy sat to the left of the Assembly president and those that believed the monarchy should be preserved and the king should have veto power sat on the right. The terms became popular in the United States in the 1920s, after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia as a way of characterizing communists (“leftists”) and the growing fascist movement (“rightists”). The terms have subsequently come to reflect a broad political spectrum, with the right supporting the concentration of power in the hands of a few, traditionally a single monarch. The left side favors spreading power out among the many. American political scholars place their representative democracy at the center. Liberal members of the Democratic Party, who favor broadening access to democratic processes, exist on the left of the center. Conservative members of the Republican Party, who support the idea that elected officials act in the best interest of their constituents not at their behest, exist on the right of the center. Within these parties there are internal right-left spectrums (Senator Krysten Sinema (D-AZ) is to the right of Senator Jeff Merkely (DOR) and Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) is to the left of Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX)). To the left of firmly capitalistic Democrats are democratic socialists, then socialists, with communists at the end of the left-wing of the spectrum. To the right of the democratically elected Republicans are oligarchists, and authoritarian fascists occupying the far right-wing of the spectrum.

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This creates a relative nature of political discourse. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) is to the right of the ideas of Hugo Chavez, former president of Venezuela and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) is to the left of the positions of Marine La Pen, the rightist political leader in France. As American political discourse has moved further to the right (Nixon to Reagan to Trump), what was the “far right” 50 years ago, when Nixon was president, is much less extreme today and closer to mainstream conservative narratives. The political positions of George Lincoln Rockwell, leader of the American Nazi Party until his murder in 1967, centered around white nationalism and the opposition of immigration from non-Northern European countries. Those views were framed as “extreme right-wing” positions 60 years ago. Rockwell’s views are less extreme in current political discourse in light of President Trump’s 2018 comments, lamenting immigration from “shithole countries” in Africa and calling for more immigration from places like Norway (Vitali et al., 2018). This shift to the right has made it more difficult to define “right-wing extremism.” The Center for Research on Extremism had defined rightwing extremism as a specific ideology characterized by ‘anti-democratic opposition towards equality” (Gattinari and Segars, 2020). Right-wing extremism typically holds views that are favorable to nationalism, racism, homophobia, xenophobia, transphobia, and authoritarianism, reflected in the fascism of Hitler’s German regime and, more recently, the rhetoric of Golden Dawn in Greece. American right-wing extremists are similarly positioned, framing themselves as anti-communist, opposed to calls for inclusion and diversity, favoring nationalistic, and hyper-masculine positions. Most notable among these new fascist groups are the Proud Boys. The group, formed in 2016 during the candidacy of Donald Trump, identifies itself as an “anti-feminist, Western chauvinist fighting club.” While there are non-white members of the Proud Boys, much of their rhetoric targets middle-eastern and hispanic immigrants and members have been linked to numerous violent attacks. They were also present at the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol (Dreisbach, 2021; Stempel, 2021). As a side note, it should be noted that, within the sphere of neofascism, there is a smaller “third position” movement. This philosophy

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was championed in the United States by Tom Metzger, the late founder of the White Aryan Resistance, and in Europe by Alain de Benoist, the French political philosopher. Third position fascism seeks to adopt leftwing issues, like environmentalism, drug decriminalization, labor union support, and critiques of capitalism to form a left–right populist movement. For example, third position fascists were present at the 1999 antiWorld Trade Organization protests in Seattle, Washington. Among the environmentalists and union activists, were neo-fascists protesting globalization as a product of global Jewish capitalism. The anti-globalization message has evolved into the “America first” rhetoric that was a staple of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Right-wing activists now regularly target corporations for their policies dedicated to improving diversity, equity, and inclusion, most recently seen in the form of conservative boycotts of companies like GoDaddy and Uber for their opposition to the 2021 restrictive abortion law (McFarland, 2021). Recent scholarship has conceptualized current right-wing trends within several diverse, sometimes overlapping theoretical frames. Here, the focus is on five of the most common perspectives: political, cultural studies, social movement, criminological, and psychological approaches. Research and writing after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing has centered on both a micro-level understanding of participants and a macro-level assessment of shifts in culture that have both created societallevel schism and served to “unite the right.” These frameworks have been utilized in contemporary analysis of racist, populist, and fascist social trends, including in the 2021 volume Researching the Far Right: Theory, Method and Practice (Ashe et al., 2021).

Right-Wing Extremism as Political Phenomenon Those scholars examining right-wing extremism as a political phenomenon have focused on the role ideology plays in creating a coherent set of values. The values include the rejection of leftist views that the state has a role in reducing social inequalities (Carter,

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2018). Mudde’s 1995 review of the academic literature identified fiftyeight features of right-wing ideology, with five elements appearing most frequently: support for a strong state, opposition to democracy, nationalism, racism, and xenophobia (Mudde, 1995). Part of this conceptualization has been an analysis of the interrelation of these elements. For example, the relationship of anti-democrat values and nationalism is that loyalty to the state requires a subordination of democratic freedoms. Much of the work on the political aspects of right-wing extremism have been the product of European scholarship, including Roberts’ “Extremism in Germany: Sparrows or Avalanche?” (1993), Betz’s Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (1994), and Copsey’s, Contemporary British Fascism: The British National Party and the Quest for Legitimacy (2008). European research has focused on how right-wing extremists have created semi-legitimate political parties and achieved success in parliamentary elections and policymaking bodies. There is also a smaller focus on how the emotional impact of political ideology can drive right-wing extremists to violence, including the 2016 murder of Jo Cox, a member of parliament in Britain who was killed by a Brexit-supporting white supremacist (Dodds, 2016; Moss et al., 2020). This work was most notably advanced after the 2011 mass murder by right-wing extremist Anders Breivik (Walton, 2012; Bangstad, 2014). Breivik killed eight people in Oslo, Norway by detonating a car bomb outside the nation’s capitol building and then shot and killed 69 Norwegian youth at a summer camp. The day of the attacks he emailed a manifesto that blamed the decline of Europe on feminism and Muslim migrants. Research and analysis on the attack in Norway were folded into scholarship on subsequent right-wing mass violence, including Brenton Tarrant’s assault on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand that left 51 dead (Crothers and O’Brien, 2020). Political framing of right-wing extremism in the United States was largely tied by mainstream media to the rise of Donald Trump in 2015, but the swing toward populism predates the Republican candidate (Mirrlees, 2021). Most of this scholarship focused on the manipulation of the political narrative into a right-wing populist platform and the role racism played in the shift in that political narrative (Aziz, 2017; Bell,

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2019; Pulido et al., 2019, Bonikowski et al., 2018). The significance of the Trump presidency as both a reflection of popular discourse’s shift to the right and being responsible for a new era of right-wing extremism (Jones, 2018) is core to understanding the mainstreaming of previously fringed ideologies. This shift was most recently outlined in anthropologist Alexander Laban Hinton’s recent book, It Can Happen Here: White Power and the Rising Threat of Genocide in the US (2021). The common theme in political science scholarship that focuses on right-wing extremism is the blurring of the line between mainstream conservative rhetoric and violent extremism. This approach see populists gaining political advantage from demographic segments that were previously recruited by more traditional right-wing extremist groups, including neo-fascists. Issues capitalized on by the “new right” in politics include immigration, especially from Muslim and Spanishspeaking nations, fear of cultural change that addresses the privileges of cis-gendered heterosexual white men, and globalization. The rise of neo-fascist political parties in Poland, Italy, Turkey, the U.K., France, and other countries, as well as concerns of fascist elements in the American Republican Party, have been credited to political actors capitalizing on alienation experienced in light of rapid social change (Judt, 2005; Lawtoo, 2019). Populist messages about external economic actors, nonAnglo immigrants, fervent nationalism, and the spread of disinformation that frames the American federal government as a “swamp,” needing to be drained mirror the messages that allowed the rise of fascism in Germany in the 1920s. In her research overview entitled, “Political Science Approaches to the Far Right,” Mayer (2021) highlights the supply-side and demandside factors that drive contemporary European populism. This includes changes in demand due to the fracturing of political parties and the impact of global recessions as well as changes in supply-side issues due to globalization and political convergences. These supply and demand factors have become incorporated into numerous data sets, like the World Values Survey (WVS), to determine the extremist boundaries of political electorates. The value in the political science approaches in studying right-wing extremism is in just that, values. The role values play in moving people

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to fringes of the political spectrum was core to Kenneth Keniston’s pioneering work, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth (1968). Keniston’s observation about how core values, once activated, were key to produce a generation of student activists in the 1960s will be highly useful as we look to unlock pathways into the radical right. For example, political scientists can explore how the values of freedom and entitlement have shifted to include anti-government protests against COVID-19 mask mandates and vaccination programs, many of which have turned violent.

Cultural Studies and the Subculture of the Radical Right Theoretical framing located in the cultural studies approach has followed two paths: ethnographic understandings of the radical right and consideration of the mainstreaming of extreme right-wing ideologies. Cultural studies approaches are rooted in how systems of power, like gender and class, manifest in subcultural phenomenon. With regard to rightwing extremists, theoretical development has been built on studies of how individuals have moved in (and out) of extremist groups and how extremist ideologies have moved into (or been influenced by) mainstream political discourse. A primary methodology of cultural studies has been ethnography, field studies in which researchers immerse themselves in phenomenon to better understand the perspective of subjects. Ethnographies of radical right groups have included detailed field studies of racist skinheads (Blazak, 1998; Simi and Futrell, 2010) and fascist militias (Orsini, 2020). Field studies have typically looked at how participants construct meaning from their activities and see extremist subcultures as providing a solution to some perceived grievance, be it individual-level alienation (Orsini’s study of Italian fascists’ need for a close circle of friends) or societal-level anomie (Blazak’s study of Florida skinheads responding to deindustrialization). Cultural studies ethnographers have also submerged themselves in the texts of right-wing extremists, most recently Tschantret’s 2021 study of

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writings produced by right-wing and Islamist terrorists and their reflection of personality traits that are characterized by chaos and revenge (Tschantret, 2021). Also producing cultural studies frames to understand extremism is the scholarship of Ruth Wodak. Her work has explored discourse around anti-Semitism (Reisigl and Wodak, 2000), nationalism (Wodak et al., 2009), and populism (Wodak, 2015). In Wodak’s most recent work, “Analyzing the micro-politics of the far-right” (2021), she analyzes the text and talk of right-wing populists associated with the Austrian Freedom Party in the form of TV interviews, policy papers, election posters, political speeches, websites, etc. The discourse analysis found that right-wing extremists engaged in strategies of provocation, calculated ambivalence (the ability to deliver contradictory messages), and the denial of racism. Another aspect of the cultural studies approach has been looking at the relationship between extremist ideologies and mainstream political narratives. Historians and legal scholars have tackled this issue, particularly with regard to American fascism in the 1920s (See Wallace’s The American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and the Rise of the Third Reich [2003] and Woeste’s Henry Ford’s War on Jews and the Legal Battle Against Hate Speech [2013]). This focus on the mainstreaming of hate was a feature of Ezekiel’s 1996 ethnographic study, The Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen, which found that hate group leaders looked to mainstream political issues, like immigration, as a tool for recruitment. Much of this theoretical framing was given a scholarly jolt by the ascent of Donald Trump in 2015. This includes the critical pedagogy of cultural critics like Henry Giroux, best reflected in his two 2018 texts, The Public in Peril: Trump and the Menace of American Authoritarianism and American Nightmare: The Challenge of U.S. Authoritarianism. In the last few years, there have been a plethora of cultural analyses that have explored how Trump’s rise reflects a new permissiveness of extremist rhetoric (see Hartzell’s “Alt-White: Conceptualizing the ‘Alt-Right’ as a Rhetorical Bridge between White Nationalism and Mainstream Public Discourse,” [2018]) and how Trump’s rhetoric has inflamed extremism (see Demars and Tait’s “White Nationalism and Donald Trump: How Ambiguous Language Can Create a Space for Hate”, [2019]).

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Right-Wing Extremism as a Social Movement Firmly rooted in sociological scholarship is the perspective that frames right-wing extremism as a manifestation of a broad social movement. Originating with the Frankfurt School’s front row analysis of the rise and fascism in Germany, Italy, and Spain and works like Erich Fromm’s 1941 Escape From Freedom, to contemporary works, like Kathleen Belew’s 2019 Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America, social movement literature takes a linear approach to resource mobilization and the rise of credible messengers in transforming fringe ideologies into coherent movements. The social movement literature revolves around five core themes (Stekelenburg, 2009). First is the reference to the theme of deindividuation, or the response of individuals when they become a part of a larger crowd. For example, many of the insurrectionists involved in the Capitol attack in 2021 reported that they just got “caught up” in the mob momentum (Weiner and Hsu, 2021). Secondly mass society theory emerged after the rise of fascism to address how vulnerable groups are moved toward extremism as a way to find control and predictability in uncertain times (Kornhauser, 1959). The third element of mass movement literature has been a focus on relative deprivation, which has been primarily an expiation for left-wing movements (Davies, 1971). More recently the literature has highlighted the role of political opportunity, for example exploiting the instability in relationships among political elites (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). Finally, social movement theorists have identified the role of resource mobilization in assembling material, moral, organizational, other valued resources to build the movement to achieve its own inertia. Contemporary scholars of the right have looked at the role of the internet in extremist resource mobilization (Gattinara and Iris Beau Segers, 2020; Gaudette et al., 2020). Simi and Futrell’s important 2010 text, American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s Hidden Spaces of Hate, reveals the cultural lives of racist activists that create an internal momentum within white supremacist movements, including the utilization of the internet as a resource tool. Each of these five themes has played a role in contemporary analyses of right-wing extremism.

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Some social movement theorists dissecting right-wing extremism have centered the role of race in the identity politics of the right (see McAdam and Kloos, 2014). The ability of right-wing ideologues to manipulate political instability has also been a theme (Reydgren, 2005; Tarrow, 2011; McAdam and Kloos, 2014). Some researchers have focused on the role religion has played in movement ideology (Aho, 1995; Gardell, 2003) and others have focused the gendered nature of the movement (Dobratz and Shanks-Meilie, 2001; Ferber and Kimmel, 2004). One of the leading scholars on American right-wing extremism, Chip Berlet, has combined the frames of the political phenomenon literature with social movement themes, including in books like Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort (2000) and Trumping Democracy: From Reagan to the Alt-Right (2019), in which he argues that Donald Trump was able to mobilize various populist movements under the banner of an activated “alt-right” political base. Right-wing violence, as seen through the social movement lens, is attributed to actors who want to “accelerate” those right-wing movements. Similar to how the Weather Underground sought to ramp up the anti-war movement in the early 1970s by “bringing the war home,” neo-fascist accelerationists have worked to take advantage of political instability, elevated by the coronavirus pandemic and subsequent economic downturn, to advance their call for the violent uprising they’ve branded the “booglaoo.” Social movement scholars have also noted how the rhetoric on the extreme right has shifted to “white nationalism,” a socio-political movement to create a white ethnostate within the United States and other nations, including Great Britain and South Africa (Weinberg, 1998, Hughey, 2012). The fact that the rise of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement caught many scholars and political pundits off guard, highlights the need for social movement frames of analysis. The fact that right-wing extremists like alt-right gadfly Richard Spencer and the Proud Boys, attached themselves to the candidacy of Donald Trump is evidence of how both right-wing extremists and Trump’s “deplorables” were tapping into the uncertainty of the times social movement theorists focus on. Going forward, social movement theorists should focus on the relative instability of the Trump base in the face of continued social

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deindividuation. This will allow scholars and policymakers to assess the movement of the general MAGA base into extremist violence, including future insurrections.

Right-Wing Extremism as Criminological Phenomena Because of right-wing extremist connections to domestic terrorism and hate crimes, there has also been a role for criminological framing. Some mass casualty acts occupy spaces as both domestic terrorism and hate crime. The clearest example of this was the Walmart shooting in El Paso, Texas in 2019. A white nationalist named Patrick Crusius, published a manifesto, citing President Trump’s rhetoric about a migrant “invasion,” and then drove across Texas to El Paso where he entered a Walmart store near the Mexican border and opened fire, killing 23 people. It was the worst attack on Latinos in American history and stands as the hate crime with the highest casualty count. This work to connect hate crimes to political extremism was first led by the pioneering research of Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt and their 1993 text, Hate Crimes: The Rising Tide Of Bigotry And Bloodshed , in which they identified both the greater harm of hate crimes and the rationale of the acts, located in right-wing extremist ideologies. Criminologists have fed the context, history, and motivations of hate crime through the cannon of criminological theories, best captured in Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino’s Understanding Hate Crimes: Acts, Motives, Offenders, Victims, and Justice (2015). Researchers have centered work on hate crimes within specific criminological theories, including social bond theory (Ray et al., 2004), strain theory (Blazak, 2002), and routine activities theory (Herek and Berrill, 1992). Criminologists have focused on specific victims of extremist violence, including Muslims (Perry, 2003), sexual minorities (Cogan, 2002), and the disabled (Grattet and Jenness, 2003). The criminological analysis has a common theme of uncovering the root causes of engagement in hate-motivated criminal behavior. Research that identifies causal factors, like abusive home environments (Ray et al., 2004), suggests strategies for interrupting extremist violence.

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Perhaps the most complete application of the criminological lens has been represented in the research of Mark S. Hamm, author of Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma to Al-Qaeda and Beyond (2007). Hamm’s long scholarship on extremism often finds a life course into extremism that starts with petty crime. Criminals essentially fall into extremism through contact (often in prison) with charismatic ideologues and are seduced into the cause of righteous violence (Hamm, 2007). Much of Hamm’s work has focused on the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the story of Timothy McVeigh, who, after returning from the Gulf War, fell in with various subcultures of white supremacists, anti-government activists, and patriot militia groups. Hamm’s “sociology of place” research literally followed McVeigh’s path, including into the Kingman, Arizona hotel room where McVeigh consumed copious amounts of methamphetamine as he prepared himself for his attack in Oklahoma. What we see is a criminal, likely engaged in a series of bank robberies as well as theft of bomb-making materials, who sees the racist call to arms, laid out in William Pierce’s 1978 novel The Turner Diaries, giving his life direction. In Hamm’s description of both Aryan and Islamic terrorists, we don’t find highly motivated ideologues, but low-level criminals whose exposure to extremist actors helps provide structure to their chaotic lives. In their recent overview of criminological thinking on right-wing extremism, Perry and Scrivens (2021) lament that the growing field of hate crime studies has been largely atheoretical. Where there is theoretical adaption, it has been tied to social movement theory (discussed above) or identity-based theory that focuses on whiteness and/or masculinities. Perry and Scrivens point out that the creation of extremist databases, like the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) may well facilitate not just empirical but theoretical innovation in understanding RWE activities and activists. The value of these databases to criminologists is immense, as they have been utilized in addressing specific issues with right-wing extremism studies, like assessing the characteristics of murders by right-wing extremists (Gruenewald, 2011). Traditionally, the value of criminological theory has been in its relevance to the development of crime control strategies. If research built on a theory finds a causal (or at least a statistically significant) correlation

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between some variable and a specific type of crime, then a policy solution is suggested. This aspect of connecting theory, research, and policy is desperately needed in right-wing violence studies. If, for example, social learning theory helps to explain how low-level criminals become ideological extremists, as Hamm’s research suggests, then policies to reduce right-wing violence can focus on strategies that target how the relationships that nurture extremist engagement might be interrupted.

Right-Wing Extremism and Psychological Profiles On the most micro end of the spectrum are the scholars who explore the mental or psychological mindset of right-wing extremists. This work starts with Wilhelm Reich’s The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) and the pressing need to understand the rise in fascism in Europe (which Reich attributed to sexual repression). Early psychological profiles of extremists and terrorists largely built on Reich’s psychoanalytical approach, rooted in Freud (for example, hostility toward parents), but as psychiatrist Jerrold Post wrote, “there is a broad spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a different psychology, motivation and decision making structure. Indeed, one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but rather of terrorist psychologies” (Post, 1987). Understanding individual paths to extremism has allowed researchers to explore family dynamics and psychological profiles that have aided in shaping the profile of likely suspects in hate crime and terrorist cases. The individual-level understandings generally break into two categories: cognitive functioning and pre-offending background. Those focusing on cognitive functioning have tried to identify characteristics of the “terrorist brain” or the “mind of an extremist.” Much of this research was rooted in the question of whether conservative brains and liberal brains work differently. Alizadeh et al.’s 2017 study of 10,000 Twitter posts by right-wing and left-wing political activists explored mental processes. The study found that extremists on both ends of the spectrum

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showed more negative emotion than traditional liberals and conservatives. Left-wing extremists showed more anxiety than liberals and right-wing activists showed less anxiety than conservatives. The findings reinforced the tenets of Moral Foundations Theory that conservatives value loyalty, authority, and sanctity over more liberal values, like care and fairness (Alizadeh et al., 2019). This research has been mirrored by the work of political psychologist Ingrid Haas. Her 2017 study scanned the brains of fifty-eight liberals and conservatives while they were evaluating hypothetical candidates and their policy positions. Liberals spent more time evaluating positions, especially if there was incongruent information. Conservatives were more likely to quickly respond based on how the information fit into a liberalconservative binary (Denworth, 2020). This and similar research have pointed to a psychological understanding that those on the far right are more likely to have mindsets that express “knee-jerk” reactions to complex social issues, “going with their gut.” In addition, right-wing extremists are more likely to adopt a binary thinking pattern, where individuals are either on one side of the issue or the other and society is divided into “us vs. them.” Liberal thinkers are more likely to explore the complexity of issues, examine the context and see the various shades of gray. Binary thinkers are more likely to jump to conclusions and find answers in overly simplistic conspiracy theories (Wilson, 2017). This “extremist mentality” was illustrated most clearly in Chip Berlet and Stanislav Vysotsky’s 2006 “Overview of U.S, White Supremacist Groups.” Berlet and Vysotsky found white supremacist groups relied on three general metaframes: conspiracism, dualism, and apocalypticism. Conspiracism reduces the world into puppets and puppet masters, and those who know of the existence of shadowy conspiracies and those who are ignorant. Dualism further divides the populace into simply binaries. The White Supremacist movement presents the world as a place where heroic warriors—white, heterosexual, (mostly) Christian men and women—are in constant battle with a number of “others” (Berlet and Vysotsky, 2006, p. 13). And apocalyptic visions create a ticking time bomb scenario where “their” world is about to end if action is not taken. These same themes were in evidence among the insurgents engaged in the 2021 attack on the Capitol. There was a popular conspiracy that

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the 2020 election was stolen. Insurgents believed they were confronting members of antifa, Black Lives Matter activists, and a general “communist” opposition. Finally, was the motivating belief that if they couldn’t stop Vice President Mike Pence from certifying the election results, “their” America would cease to exist. Attempts to create psychological profiles for the violent right-wing were most clearly articulated in Levin and McDeviit’s 1993 typology of hate crime offenders. Based on reviewing case files from the Boston Police Department, they identified three profiles of hate criminals. The most common type was the thrill-seeking offender who was bored and committed of hate crimes for the pure excitement of the act. The second type is the reactive, or “defensive,” hate criminal. This offender is responding to a perceived threat, perhaps a black family moving into a white neighborhood. Finally, the mission offender is more likely to act alone and believes he or she is attacking some form of social evil. Patrick Crusius, the El Paso shooter, would be an example of this kind of hate criminal. Each type comes with its own psychological profile, but research has shown that mission hate offenders and right-wing extremists are more likely to express sociopathic personality traits (Duspara and Greitemeyer, 2017). While not all hate crime offenders are right-wing extremists (and not all right-wing extremists are hate crime offenders), we have seen the causal factors behind both, as well as the tactics of bias-motivated intimidation, overlap in numerous settings. For example, there were numerous reports of the January 6 insurrectionists using racial slurs against black police officers during their violent attack of DC and Capitol Police (Metzger, 2021). Psychological profiles that look at extremist backgrounds are more empathetic to right-wing extremists. The work of feminist sociologist Michael Kimmel, including in texts like Angry White Men: American Masculinity at the End of an Era (2013) and Healing From Hate (2018), have focused in how men have had long held definitions of masculinity upended by rapid social and economic changes and how a significant number of activists in hate subcultures have been victims of earlier trauma, including child abuse. These profiles see trauma victims finding the world of right-wing extremism as a means of acting out their victimization on others.

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The study of the backgrounds of lone actor right-wing extremists by Bouhana et al. (2018) didn’t find elevated rates of child abuse but did find that extremists had high rates of behavioral and anger issues, as well as problems with impulse control. Right-wing lone actors were also likely to have experienced personal crisis and relationship issues and forty percent has a diagnosed mental disorder (Bouhana et al., 2018). This research is also reflected on the finding of workplace shooters, who are more likely to have experienced early childhood trauma and had experienced a crisis point, typically job loss and/or divorce (Peterson et al., 2021). It’s easy to frame right-wing extremists as Id-driven sociopaths who are willing to amass body counts without guilt. The research shows a much more complex social profile. For instance, Klandermans’ recent study, “Life-history Interviews with Right-Wing Extremists” (2021), contrasted its findings to Adorno’s “authoritarian personality” hypothesis. Interviews with French fascists found no “at-risk” personality types, but rather the psychological benefit of joining a group that had comradery and purpose as well as the esteem activism conveyed on the participant as a defender of a “heroic past.” While the profiling of serial killers and mass murders may be tied to repeated patterns emerging in case studies, what we find in research on right-wing extremists is much more nuanced. This lack of a profile or a “stereotypical case,” actually helps to better understand events like the January 6 Capitol insurrection. The insurgents that day came from a wide variety of backgrounds and with varying psychological motives. Many observers were shocked at the cross section of men and women that stormed the Capitol. Understanding the motivations of leaders and instigators and the motivations of followers will be key in mapping how right-wing activism spills over to political violence. Moreover, research on cognitive and background profiles of violent extremists has been highly useful in designing interventions. Kimmel’s research has championed the utilization of former extremists, several of whom are active in the Life After Hate organization. The stories of these “formers” who are able to detail their paths in and out of extremism have been utilized in the growing countering violent extremism (CVE) field. Similarly, profiles have been used to prevent acts of domestic

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terrorism, including the FBI’s 2020 thwarting of Timothy McVeigh admirer Timothy Wilson who was plotting to bomb a Missouri hospital.

Conclusion: Which Frame of Analysis is Most Useful in the Current Threat Climate? Among the most challenging developments for those who monitor and research right-wing extremism has been the mainstreaming of extremist messages. The xenophobic scapegoating that was common at Ku Klux Klan rallies became common rhetoric from the president of the United States. The ethno-nationalist “great replacement theory” that sees white Americans being replaced by non-white immigrants is now a hallmark of Tucker Carlson’s nightly commentary on Fox News (Bowles, 2019). Historians draw parallels to the rise of authoritarianism in Europe (Snyder, 2017). And social scientists jockey to see which theoretical frame is most applicable when each iteration of the political landscape seems “unprecedented.” Are the frameworks that were used to address tiny subcultures of racist skinheads useful in understanding the thousands of people who descended on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021 or perhaps the millions of people who are followers of the anti-government QAnon conspiracy theories? There is more than one right-wing extremist movement, The Proud Boys are not the racist skinheads of the 1980s. And the Oath Keepers are not the Michigan Militia of the 1990s. The movement is more of a counterculture than a coherent movement, with internal divisions based on everything from the role of religion and women to the debate on whether or not Donald Trump is a stooge of the state of Israel. This counterculture includes traditional participants, like the Ku Klux Klan and the National Social Movement, and newer players like sovereign citizens (including African-Americans in Moorish sovereign citizen movement) and accelerationist groups, like The Base and Atomwaffen Division. Each body represents unique membership profiles and threats of extremist violence. In addition is the growth in “lone wolf” actors who are not acting as members of named groups. While Timothy McVeigh passed through

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an assortment of extremist groups, including the Aryan Republican Army, he was essentially an independent actor in the Oklahoma City bombing, along with accomplices Terry Nichols, and Michael and Lori Fortier. White supremacist Dylann Roof, who walked into a church in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015, and killed nine black parishioners, never attended a hate group meeting or engaged with a right-wing organization. He was self-radicalized online. The specter of lone wolf actors, like the El Paso shooter, provides scholars for opportunities to map life course of right-wing extremists who don’t fit into Hamm’s petty criminal to terrorist profile. The question remains, then, which theoretical framework provides the best tools to understand the root causes of right-wing extremism in light of the variability inherent in the movement. Political, cultural studies, social movement, criminological, and psychological analyses each offer different strengths. Other frameworks also provide clues, including media analysis, medical contagion modeling, and cult studies. Clearly, with the pressing need, an “all of the above” approach works best. While political and social movement research allows us to understand larger trends, criminological and psychological approaches can identify who is most likely to participate in those trends. This pressing need to interrupt extremist violence is increasingly reflected in the surge in violent incidents in the 2020s. In late spring of 2020, two members of the boogaloo movement, including U.S. Air Force sergeant Steven Carrillo, began ambushing law enforcement officers. A drive-by shooting in front of a federal courthouse in Oakland, California left a security officer dead. A week later, the pair killed a sheriff ’s deputy in Santa Cruz County and attacked officers with homemade bombs (Associated Press, 2020). Armed men in Hawaiian shirts (Big Luau is a signifier for support for the boogaloo) have stood on the steps of state capitols in Michigan, Washington, and California to protest COVID-19 restrictions, going so far as to plot to kidnap and perhaps assassinate a governor. Boogaloo supporters have openly discussed exploiting protests by antifa and Black Lives Matter protesters to accelerate social chaos and press for violent insurrection. Many of these same individuals were present at the 2021 storming of the U.S. Capitol. In the summer of 2021

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gun violence between the Proud Boys and members of antifa spilled into the streets of Portland, Oregon and Olympia, Washington. The extreme right-wing movement/counterculture works like a funnel, broad at top and narrow at the bottom. At the top of the funnel, individuals are brought in for a large number of conservative campaigns, including land use rights, gun rights, tax protests, and, now, protests of pandemic restrictions. Those that move down the funnel begin to frame the federal government as the enemy of the people. At the next level that anti-government fervor is fueled by conspiracy theories, including those that are part of the QAnon phenomenon. Even farther down, those conspiracy theories take on an anti-Semitic tone. At the bottom of the funnel are the revolutionaries who have The Turner Diaries as their playbook. This is the milieu that birthed Timothy McVeigh, American terrorist. Based on this model, the more people who come into the top of the funnel, the more who will end up at the bottom with the armed revolutionaries who envision overthrowing American democracy and creating a fascist white ethnostate. Social divisions, aided by the internet, have pushed record numbers of people into that funnel. If there ever was a time for scholars to unpack the mechanics of extremism, this is it. Scholars and researchers have a number of theoretical tools in their belts to address the motives and impact of both those at the top of the funnel and those who occupy the violent tip of the spear at the bottom. Many of these theoretical frameworks were, of necessity, born in the 1920s and sadly resonate again in the 2020s.

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3 Blurring the Boundaries of Mainstream and Extreme: Contexts and Contours of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada Barbara Perry

There is a growing recognition of the need to expand our knowledge and awareness of forms of extremism beyond that inspired by Islamist extremism. A 2015 report that I co-authored with Ryan Scrivens (Perry and Scrivens, 2015; 2019) on the extreme right in Canada concluded that right-wing extremism (RWE) was largely off the radar of law enforcement, intelligence, and policy communities; in many cases, there was a denial that RWE existed in Canada or that it threatened public safety or national security. Consecutive national threat assessments have also been largely silent on RWE, in spite of the dramatic rise in extreme right activity across North America from 2016 to 2021. The threats to human life, to national ideals, and to democracy posed by this movement were brought into stark relief by the January 6, 2021, storming B. Perry (B) Faculty of Social Science & Humanities, Ontario Tech University, Oshawa, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_3

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of the US Capitol building by a mob of angry extremists. Groups like the Oath Keepers, The Base, the Proud Boys, and the III% were urged by then President Trump, to “take back the steal,” reflecting their misguided belief that the 2020 election had been rigged against him. And their Canadian compatriots cheered them on across social media venues and staged “sympathetic” protests of their own in half a dozen cities across Canada. Just eight months later, borrowing from the American playbook, Canadian far-right adherents joined with anti-vaxxers and anti-lockdown activists in staging virulent and threatening anti-Trudeau protests throughout the 2021 Canadian federal election, pelting him with rocks at one stop in London, ON. Xenophobia, racism, homophobia, misogyny, and other related forms of hate—whether perpetrated by extremists or “ordinary” people— threaten the security and well-being of targeted communities across Canada. Recent years have seen dramatic increases in hateful and extremist ideas, movements, and practices, often with dire consequences in Canada. The latest data on police-reported hate crimes indicated a staggering 47% increase in 2017, with another 37% increase in 2020 (Moreau, 2021). As noted above, this has been accompanied by increased activism and violence among right-wing extremists (Mirrlees et al., 2019). There is an urgent need to increase our collective capacity to understand and counter hate on a national scale. I thus open the paper by contextualizing the apparent rise in diverse manifestations of hatred, addressing the normalization of hatred and bigotry in mainstream politics. This global trend has rendered a broader permission to hate that has shaped parallel forms of hate on the street. I then highlight some of the most noteworthy trends emerging within the far-right movement in Canada in the early 2020s. I close with consideration of the limitations in our national response to these patterns.

Enabling Hate The sort of hatred manifesting in rising numbers of hate crime and hate groups does not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it arises within an enabling context. To assume that hate crime is an anomaly ignores the fact that

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it is simply one weapon within a broader cultural arsenal that bestows “permission to hate.” It is nested within an array of other devices that stigmatize, marginalize, and perhaps demonize minority groups. Targeted violence finds its origins in political, rhetorical, and cultural practices of exclusion. Where state policy and practice, for example, send the signal that particular groups are not welcome, this can inform public sentiment and violence. Political discourse reaffirms and legitimates the negative evaluations of difference that give rise to hostility, even hate crime. In North America, the surprising election of Donald Trump in 2016 highlighted the ways in which a national leader can shape this permission to hate. The outcome of the 2016 US presidential election ushered in a four-year period during which the politics of hate went mainstream. Very early in his campaigns for the Republican leadership and for Presidency, Trump established himself as a “man of the people” who infamously promised to “make American great again.” He set up white men, especially, as the downtrodden masses, threatened by progressive changes that, he argued, gave undue privilege to minorities and immigrants, inter alia. For their part, “they” were constructed as unworthy, indeed dangerous Others who posed grave danger to the white majority through their potential for crime and violence, through the destruction of American culture, and through the alternative imposition of foreign values. His campaign messages resonated with white supremacists across the US, who hoped that an election victory would reaffirm white power. Seemingly emboldened by normative hatred, racists, homophobes, and other bigots began acting upon their hateful sentiments. In the first few weeks following Trump’s election win, the Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC), for example, documented more than 800 reports of hate crimes: a swastika was spray-painted on a Mexican–American family home in Washington; a Georgia-based Muslim high school teacher’s students left her a note telling her to use her headscarf to “hang herself ”; and “TRUMP NATION WHITES ONLY” was painted on the wall of an African American church in Maryland (Potok, 2017). Interestingly, Canada also saw evidence of increased hate and rightwing extremist activity, wherein visible minority communities were targeted—both online and on the ground—at staggering rates. Canadian hate crime data also showed an increase of 664 hate crimes between

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2016 and 2017 (Armstrong, 2019). This is a stark reminder that Canadians are not immune to the “appeal” of racialized politics. A glimpse of Canada’s daily media reports following the US election revealed that many Canadians were also attracted to the hateful political rhetoric that had emerged south of its borders. To set the tempo of what was to come, disturbing graffiti was found in a Regina, Saskatchewan, neighborhood the morning following the results of the US presidential election: “niggers go to the U.S. and let Trump deal with you” (Sharpe, 2016). In Ottawa, visible minority communities were the targets of several hateinspired incidents following Trump’s victory, beginning on November 13 and lasting until November 19. Two synagogues, a Jewish prayer house, a mosque, and a church with a Black minister were vandalized with spray-painted racial slurs, swastikas, and white supremacy symbols (Pfeffer, 2017). Similar incidents occurred in communities across the nation. Four years later, following the “disputed” 2020 election, Canadian Trumpers were also adamant in their defense of Trump. It is likely only the fact that the US-Canada border was closed due to COVID-19 that so few Canadians were present at the Capitol insurrection. A crucial backdrop to the uptake of Trumpism in Canada is provided by reactionary trends at federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government. Most notably, the “Harper years” were characterized by a retreat from human rights, the elimination of hate speech protections, fear mongering and hate, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and restrictions on immigrants and refugees to Canada. Especially pronounced was Harper’s vilification of Muslims. After the “terrorist” attacks in Quebec and on Parliament Hill in 2014, Harper introduced Bill C-51 with the claim that “Violent jihadism is not just a danger somewhere else. It seeks to harm us here in Canada” (Janus and Johnson, 2015). During the 2015 election campaign, Harper ratcheted up his Islamophobia, depicting Muslim culture as contrary to Canadian values. He called Islamic culture “anti-women,” declared the wearing of the hijab “offensive,” and said that “We do not allow people to cover their faces during citizenship ceremonies” (Chase, 2015). Conservative party leadership hopeful Kellie Leitch followed suit, raising the twin specters of a “barbaric cultural practices” tip line and screening of immigrants for “Canadian values.”

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We have, however, also seen these patterns play out at the provincial and municipal levels in Canada. Quebec stands out in this respect, in light of ongoing efforts to restrict Muslim markers of identity, first under Premier Marois’s regime, during which she first proposed her Charter of Values (originally Charter of Secularism) in 2012. The provision would have banned the wearing or display of religious symbols in public sector institutions. The rhetoric surrounding the Charter was “dressed in the guise of narratives of gender equality and secular values” (Ameli & Merali, 2014, p. 39). However, it was clear from the outset that it was targeted at Muslims and their “failure” to have assimilated into the “distinct society” that is Quebec. The current Premier, Legault, has deepened the divide, completing Marois’s agenda with the implementation of Bill 21 in 2019 which does, in fact, proscribe the wearing of religious symbols among public workers and ban the wearing of face coverings when seeking public services. In a 2021 Quebec Superior Court decision, Justice Blanchard—reluctantly—found that the law was constitutional, while also acknowledging that “the evidence undoubtedly shows that the effects of Bill 21 will negatively impact Muslim women first and foremost... In one way, by violating their freedom of religion, and in another, in doing the same in regards to their freedom of expression, since clothing constitutes both pure and simple expression, and also the manifestation of a religious belief.” It was also Legault who, two days after the second anniversary of the Quebec City mosque shootings, rejected calls for a national day of recognition of Islamophobia, claiming that “I don’t think there is Islamophobia in Quebec, so I don’t see why there would be a day dedicated to Islamophobia.” The 2018 mayoral election in Toronto is one indicator of the ways in which the extreme right has also inserted itself into municipal politics. For instance, Faith Goldy, long associated with the most extreme elements of Canada’s far-right, ran for mayor. Prior to the election, she had regularly and unashamedly appeared at rallies and in photos with the likes of the Soldiers of Odin and ID Canada, and appeared in YouTube videos reciting the infamous “14 words” slogan of the extreme right. She ran on an explicitly racist and exclusionary platform that included ousting irregular migrants and illegal immigrants from city shelters and monitoring the financial activities of mosques and other

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Muslim community organizations. Goldy came in third place, garnering 3.4%—nearly 26,000—of the vote, in what is arguable Canada’s most multicultural city. However, Goldy’s relative success had been primed by an earlier populist mayor, Rob Ford, who held the office from 2010 to 2014. Rob Ford shared many of Trump’s traits: egotistical, overbearing, an outsider, and someone who claimed he could help “the people” take back the power from entitled elites. Kipfer and Saberi (2014: 134) capture the essence of Ford’s right-wing populist strategy, noting that: Ford’s belligerent interventions deepened existing social divides by pitting an imagined “Ford Nation”—car-driving, home-owning suburban family men, proper “taxpayers” like himself—against a range of enemy others: City workers, downtowners, cyclists, transit users, refugees, gays and lesbians, protestors, and “thugs” (gang members). Ford thus laced the antiestablishment mentality of small property and business owners with vengeful homophobic, racist, sexist, anti-labour, and antienvironmentalist elements.

The insertion of these discourses into all levels of political life normalizes the xenophobia, the nativism, and the populism that are embedded in them. Such representations fall on fertile ground in cultures that are visibly racist, or nationalistic, and that have a history of colonialism, as Canada does. Political and media constructions both feed and feed on popular disdain for minority groups. Sadly, they resonate with national and international surveys probing attitudes toward newcomers or toward specific domestic communities, which reveal high rates of distrust, fear, and hostility toward the same groups vilified by the elite. Indeed, in a 2019 poll, almost a third of Canadians reported that they felt “freer” to publicly express their views of those of other religions and ethnicities; one-quarter felt that it had become increasingly acceptable to be prejudiced against Muslims in the past five years; and 15% said the same about Jews (Simpson, 2019). A 2019 EKOS poll highlighted “an erosion” in support for immigration, revealing that opposition to immigration had doubled since 2005, to 46%. In the same poll, 41% of respondents indicated that they felt there were “too many” visible

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minorities immigrating to Canada, with highest levels of support in Alberta (56%) and Ontario (46%) (EKOS Politics, 2019). More pointedly, in an IPSOS-Global News poll, 37% of respondents indicated that immigration was a “threat” to white Canadians (Simpson, 2019). Cumulatively, the normalization of hatred and bigotry in mainstream politics has rendered a broader permission to hate that has shaped parallel forms of hate on the street, by both extreme right adherents and those unaffiliated with the movement. Political narratives have trickled down to allow the relatively unbridled expression of hateful sentiments that lay the foundations for a resurgence of RWE activity in Canada.

Contours of the Extreme Right in Canada In a study first published in 2015, Perry and Scrivens identified over 120 incidents of violence associated with right-wing extremists in Canada between 1980 and 2014, ranging from criminal harassment, to arson, to murder. To put that in context, during the same period of time, there were 7 incidents associated with Islamist inspired extremism. An even more dramatic illustration of the risk posed by this movement is the mass murders that we have witnessed in Canada between 2014 and 2021. In this time period, at least 25 deaths came at the hands of lone actors animated by some thread of right-wing extremist ideologies. In 2014, Justin Bourque shot and killed 3 RCMP officers. His behavior was shaped by an anti-authority and anti-police stance derived from his right-wing views. In January of 2017, Alexandre Bissonnette killed 6 Muslim men at prayer. A frequently posted photo of him shows Bissonnette sporting a “Make America Great Again” hat, a reflection of his admiration for Donald Trump, and other right-leaning populists such as France’s Marine Le Pen. This would not be the last time far-right extremist would fatally target Muslims, as another mass murder occurred in London, ON, in 2021 when four members of the Afzaal family were struck and killed by 20-year-old man who demonstrated some sympathy for white supremacist ideologies. This occurred just a few months after the stabbing death of the caretaker outside a Toronto mosque, committed by a male affiliated with the neo-Nazi Order of Nine Angels (O9A).

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Alek Minassian’s van attack in Toronto in 2018 took 10 lives. Minassian is an adherent of the misogynistic arm of the movement, Incel, or Involuntary Celibate, as was the youth charged with killing a woman in a Toronto massage parlor in 2020. For them and their “brethren,” women’s increasing freedom and empowerment represent unacceptable threats to masculinity and the right that implies to control women’s bodies. For all of this, RWE is still very low on the list of priorities for law enforcement and intelligence communities. In many respects, the RWE movement of the 2020s is a different entity than it was in the early 2010s. It is, demographically, quite distinct from the traditional composition of the movement in Canada. It is no longer primarily a young person’s movement. The prototypical image of angry, disenfranchised youth in their black uniforms is no longer the only face of the movement. They have been supplemented—but not replaced—by a much older demographic. Participants in anti-immigrant rallies in 2017 and 2018, in Yellow Vest protests in 2018 and 2019, and in COVID-19-related activities in 2021 are visibly older, including men—and women—who appear to be middle aged and older. They also appear to be drawn from different social strata. While we have few data points in Canada to support the notion that contemporary adherents are also more likely to be well educated and well employed, it is likely that there are parallels to the American patterns. Participants in the January 6, 2021, insurrection, for example, were overwhelming middle class and professional: accountants, doctors, lawyers, and military and law enforcement personnel, as examples (Page and Ruby, 2021). In Canada, like the US, those affiliated with the “Alt-right” are especially likely to be professionals. A CBC journalist claims that “most of the protesters are not voices from the fringes. Some have jobs building high-rises or driving for Uber. Others are teachers, pipefitters, real estate agents” (Hames, 2019). McCristall et al. in this volume highlight the number of publicly acknowledged military personnel identified with RWE in Canada. Moreover, several high-profile adherents and ideologues also point to this potential. The likes of Faith Goldy, Paul Fromm, and Chris Saccoccia (aka Chris Sky), as examples, occupy secure middle-class status. Finally, under the guise of “free speech” advocacy, extreme right adherents are

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again active on university campuses across Canada, themselves historical bastions of white privilege (Perry, 2011). While this trend predates the COVID-19 pandemic, the health regulations introduced across the country have provided even more space for the extreme right to engage a broader audience. They have, as Davies et al. (2021) argue, “weaponized” the pandemic, exploiting populist fears of the erosion of freedoms. What were once fringe conspiracy theories attached to QAnon and other wildly outrageous peddlers of false narratives have now settled into the middle ground, with mainstream and extreme becoming increasingly blurred. Soccer moms, doctors, and teachers—people from all walks of life—increasingly find themselves shoulder to shoulder with RWE adherents. The pandemic has been a boon to the far-right, allowing them to meld long-held grievances against the government, against immigration, and against multiculturalism with more widely held paranoia about microchips, Asians, and Jews, inter alia. The RWE movement is spread widely across the country. When we published the 2015 report, we conservatively estimated that there were over 100 active groups across the country, with particular concentrations in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and BC (Perry and Scrivens, 2019). Since approximately 2016—a time period corresponding to Trump’s ascendency—we have seen dramatic growth in the numbers, visibility, and online/offline activism associated with the extreme right. As I wrap up an updated study of right-wing extremism with my colleagues Ryan Scrivens and David Hofmann, we have already documented closer to 300 groups currently active. These include new groups (e.g., Proud Boys, La Meute) and new chapters of already existing groups (e.g., Blood and Honour, PEGIDA). With increased numbers has come increased visibility, not least of which is manifest in the far-right rallies and demonstrations that have peppered the country since 2016. While there was a lull in activity during COVID-19, by 2020 we were seeing RWE co-opt if not lead antilock down and anti-vax rallies across the country. They were also very much in evidence in the disruption of BLM and Indigenous Lives Matter protests across the country, on hand to harass and intimidate anti-racists (Snowdon, 2020). As noted in the introductory chapter, the right-wing movement in Canada is increasingly diverse. Our 2015 study (Perry and Scrivens,

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2015; 2019) focused largely on skinheads, neo-Nazis, and white supremacists. Since that time, however, groups and individuals within the movement have spun out into new more discrete pockets. Each of the clusters noted in the introduction has a presence in Canada, manifest in groups that are unique to Canada (e.g., Canadian Nationalist Party), and that are connected to their American counterparts (e.g., Proud Boys). Law enforcement and intelligence communities have also suggested that there is a growing trend toward atomization of the movement, with more individuals drawn into the web of hate. These “floaters” as I have come to call them consume narratives from an array of online RWE platforms without necessarily affiliating with any one group. Rather, they are “cherry-picking” narratives and conspiracy theories that shore up their own worldviews. We have already seen the damage these individuals can do in the list of extreme right murders above—none of the actors claimed membership in RWE groups, but all were informed by their messaging. Unlike patterns we observed in our earlier study, today’s groups are finding ways to put aside their differences in the interests of “uniting the right,” as so clearly expressed at Charlottesville in the US in 2017. In a move intended to collectively empower the movement as a whole, groups that might previously have engaged in conflict across ideological lines are now creating coalitions, especially at the aforementioned rallies, or during street patrols. It is not unusual to find Soldiers of Odin standing in solidarity with La Meute, or even the Jewish Defense League, while the III% provide armed “security.” As noted above, this has reached a new level of engagement in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, wherein right-wing extremists are exploiting the populist concerns around “loss of freedoms” expressed by anti-lockdown, anti-vaccine, and anti-mask crusaders. Online and offline, these diverse elements now bleed together. The presence of far-right extremists at COVID-19-related events raises another important caveat. Many of the groups are characterized by a much more aggressive stance and distressingly, an obsession with heavy weaponry. The Proud Boys smugly proclaim—along with their “western chauvinism”—that “We love our guns.” Online images of groups like La Meute show a similar attachment to arms, including automatic weapons. The III%, however, take this to the extreme. Allegedly drawing on the training provided by former—and likely current—members of the

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armed services (see MacCristall et al., this volume), the III% are actively engaged in paramilitary training in preparation for what they see as the inevitable “Muslim invasion.” The combination of arms, training, and xenophobia is a potentially deadly one. Equally worrying is the presence of The Base in Canada. This leading and arguably most extreme accelerationist group shares with other farright groups an emphasis on the threat of the “extinction” of not just white culture but the race itself. Where they differentiate themselves is by the insistence on the need to utterly and completely tear down the current social and political structure—with its pandering to minorities and globalists—in order to start afresh. That it is a highly structured and hierarchical entity perhaps explains why it seems to have a particular appeal to military personnel. Indeed, in Canada, the group first came to public attention when it was publicly revealed by a journalist that Manitoba reservist Patrik Matthews was actively recruiting for The Base. Before he could face any disciplinary action by the CAF, he fled to the US where he would later be arrested in the US on weapons charges while on his way to a planned pro-gun rally in Virginia. Consistent with the shifting demographics (i.e., the emerging middle class) and sophistication of the contemporary right-wing hate movement is a corresponding increase in the use of the Internet as a tool both for recruitment and community building within and across nations. The hate movement has been blessed with a valuable gift in the form of the Internet. Since the birth of the Internet in the 1990s, extreme right groups—and those who identify with such beliefs—have used the Internet as an alternative form of media, to both publicize messages of hate, and recruit and connect with like-minded others within and beyond domestic borders (Perry and Scrivens, 2016). Canadian RWE adherents have exploited this resource extensively. A 2020 report disclosed that Canadians were among the three most active users on the most extreme social media platforms (Iron March and Fascist Forge) in 2019 (Davey et al., 2020). Both sites are now defunct, but while they existed they hosted what were possibly the most aggressive and most violent activists on their platforms, including The Base and Attomwaffen (Newhouse 2021).

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Use of the Internet also facilitates global connections. Trans-Atlantic ties across the RWE movement, whether formal or informal, are strengthened by online exchanges (Veilleux-Lepage and Archambault, 2019). Social media borders are porous, indeed, virtually non-existent. It is as easy for Canadian white nationalists to engage online with likeminded others in Oslo, or Budapest, or Birmingham as it is to connect with those in Canadian cities. Vinland Hammerskins, for example, have a page on the international Hammerskin Nation website. Canadian bloggers and posters frequently appear on Stormfront venues, which also have a Canadian subforum. Quebec’s Atalante—one of the most extreme of the extreme groups—provides several links to European Identity movement websites. Similarly, the Creativity Movement Toronto website (http://creativitymovementtoronto.blogspot.ca/search/ label/TCM%20Canada) features numerous links to international groups, such as the British Nationalist Party, and European Creativity groups. They also regularly post interviews with prominent white racialists from beyond our borders—such as members of the Croatian racialist band Invictus, among others. This “strategic connectivity” is among the keys to sustainability for extremist groups. Indeed, the ability to network so easily online facilitates ideological affirmation and recruitment globally. Internet communication knows no national boundaries. Consequently, it allows the hate movement to extend its collective identity internationally, thereby facilitating a potential “global racist subculture.”

Challenges to Addressing Right-Wing Extremism in Canada Unfortunately, RWE is not a threat about which we have developed a strong public dialogue in Canada. That terrorism associated with RWEs is largely absent from the public agenda in Canada is evident from even a cursory review of the Canadian List of Terrorist Entities. It was not until 2019 that any RWE or white supremacist organizations were added to the list of Terrorist Entities. In that year, Blood and Honour and their affiliate Combat 18 were added. In the aftermath of the January 6 attack on the US capitol, groups that were visibly involved there

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were subsequently designated terrorist entities here, namely Proud Boys, The Base, Atomwaffen Division, III%, and Aryan Strikeforce—still only accounting for seven of the eighty odd named groups. Previously, one could also review the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) website, to review a similar list of Terrorist Incidents. While international in scope, as of 2019 (Perry and Scrivens, 2019), includes only one right-wing terrorist incident: Anders Breivik’s horrific attacks in Norway in 2011. None of the Canadian incidents noted above have been included there. Notably, public access to ITAC seems to have been significantly constrained. The website now only offers a cursory introduction to the Centre. Detailed information now appears to be restricted to law enforcement and intelligence communities. Successive Reports on the Terrorist Threat to Canada published by Public Safety have been largely silent or at least dismissive about the threat posed by extreme right groups. Rather, the focus has been almost entirely on Islamist inspired extremists. Where extreme right groups and individuals are mentioned at all, it is generally only to dismiss them as “not ideologically coherent” and thus, not a significant threat. In neither 2014 nor 2015 was there any reference to RWE (50-page and 26-page reports, respectively). In 2017, 3 paragraphs focused on RWE (21 page document) and included the following statement: The extreme right-wing is not an ideologically coherent group and historically, extreme right-wing violence in Canada has been sporadic and opportunistic … As there has been a rise in hate-related incidents reported to police in Canada, there is always the potential for extreme right-wing motivated violence to occur in the future (Public Safety Canada, 2018: 7).

The 2018 report devoted the most space to date to far-right extremism— 5 or 6 paragraphs in the 31-page document—yet still concluded that “while racism, bigotry, and misogyny may undermine the fabric of Canadian society, ultimately they do not usually result in criminal behavior or threats to national security” (Public Safety Canada, 2019: 8). This is in spite of the trends noted above. It is curious that no report has been published since 2018.

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Cumulatively, the ongoing tendency to downplay the extreme right threat signals a failure to acknowledge the breadth and depth of the movement’s activities in Canada. Perry and Scrivens (2019) observed in their interviews with law enforcement and intelligence personnel that there was a tendency toward both a disavowal of risk and a minimization of threat. Castle (2021) explored this further in her examination of law enforcement comments in response to the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA, in 2017, finding that police rhetoric and strategies represented anti-racists as the primary focus of concern rather than the white supremacists that animated the events. This is, perhaps, not surprising. Police are tasked with enforcing a particular social and moral order, one that is classed, raced, and gendered (Perry, 2009; Razack). As Castle (2021) observes, “police will not identify the far-right as a threat to the community because of a shared ideological commitment to maintaining a specific set of social arrangements—an authoritarian one that privileges security and order over the rights of certain individuals to dissent.” Like the political rhetoric noted above, police inaction in response to RWE mobilization implies tacit, if not explicit, sympathy for extremist ideologies. This, too, then, is enabling. It signals the legitimacy of RWE activism and discourse.

Concluding Thoughts In the epilogue to our 2019 book on right-wing extremism in Canada, Perry and Scrivens were optimistic that Trudeau’s “sunny ways” could help to counter the post-Trump rise of the RWE in Canada. Subsequent events seem to have proved us wrong. Rather than deflecting the RWE, Trudeau has become key to their motivation. The rabid anti-Trudeau sentiment is the antithesis of the pro-Trump fervor that has, in part, inspired the rise of the extreme right in Canada. RWE adherents view him as the polar opposite of Trump: he is portrayed as feminine where Trump is manly, elite where Trump is of the people, and a threat to “the nation” where Trump is the savior. This predated COVID-19, but the pandemic provided renewed grounds for finding fault with the prime

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minister. Trudeau became the lightning rod for the fears and anxieties— health, financial, emotional—provoked by government reactions to the pandemic. At the time of writing in 2021, the loose coalition of antivaxxers, anti-lockdown protesters, anti-globalists, and far-right extremists that were finding common ground in their anti-Trudeau narratives was following the Trudeau campaign, hurling ad hominem attacks—and occasionally rocks—at virtually every stop. In short, the extreme right in Canada found new life and new adherents in the context of COVID-19. In spite of the record that the RWE movement in Canada is amassing with respect to violence, threats, and intimidation, there is little sign that we are equipped to challenge their mobilization. There is still a hesitancy to confront RWE activists with the same urgency that meets anti-racist, BLM, or even environmental activists. And there are still signs of political figures pandering to extreme right narratives, whether they are grounded in nationalism (e.g., Maxime Bernier), anti-Muslim sentiment (e.g., Francois Legault), or personal freedoms (e.g., Jason Kenney). It is difficult to imagine a way forward in the current context, where the extreme and mainstream blur in both political milieus and civil society, and where populist anxieties about job losses, health risks, and constraints on public engagement have become woven into extreme right narratives of nationalism and xenophobia. Canada, it seems, is no longer the “peaceable kingdom” it was once imagined to be. In light of the limited interventions around right-wing extremism at the government level, it is more important than ever to consider the significance of multi-sectoral responses to RWE in Canada (Perry and Scrivens, 2019) and especially the role of civil society. Municipal governments show increasing interest in developing partnerships with local community organizations—and academics—in an effort to enhance their ability to respond to local dynamics. Community-based social justice and equity seeking organizations have been crucial in developing programs intended to confront RWE ideologies and actions. Cross-border organizations like Life After Hate, for example, aim to support RWE adherents who hope to leave the movement, as well as assist with early intervention for those heading down that path. The Canadian Anti-Hate Network and Anti-Racist Canada monitor RWE activity, publicizing their activities and the risks associated with them.

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More than ever, we need the energy, determination, and community engagement that such entities bring to the battle against right-wing extremism.

References Ameli, S. R., and Merali, A. (2014). Only Canadian: The experience of hate moderated differential citizenship for Muslims. Wembley, UK: Islamic Human Rights Commission. Armstrong, A. (2019). Police-reported Hate Crime in Canada, 2017 . Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics. Castle, T. (2021). “Cops and the Klan”: Police Disavowal of Risk and Minimization of Threat from the Far-Right. Critical Criminology, 29(2), 215–235. Chase, Steven. (2015, March 10). Niqabs ‘rooted in a culture that is antiwomen,’ Harper says. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www. theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/niqabs-rooted-in-a-culture-that-is-antiwomen-harper-says/article23395242/. Davies, G., Wu, E., & Frank, R. (2021). A Witch’s Brew of Grievances: The Potential Effects of COVID-19 on Radicalization to Violent Extremism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021. 1923188. Davey, J., Guerin, C., & Hart, M. (2020). An Online Environmental Scan of Right-wing Extremism in Canada. London: ISD. EKOS Politics. (2019). Increased Polarization on Attitudes to Immigration Reshaping the Political Landscape in Canada. http://www.ekospolitics.com/ index.php/2019/04/increased-polarization-on-attitudes-to-immigration-res haping-the-political-landscape-in-canada/. Hames, E. (2019). Don’t dismiss them as ‘crackpots’: Who are Canada’s yellow vest protesters? https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/yellow-vests-can ada-alberta-1.4974721. Janus, A., & Johnson, A. (2015). Stephen Harper makes his case for new powers to combat terror. CTVNews. http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/anti-ter ror-bill-gives-new-powers-to-canada-s-spies-1.2213119.

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Kipfer, S., & Saberi, P. (2014). From “Revolution” to Farce? Hard-Right Populism in the Making of Toronto. Studies in Political Economy, 93(1), 127–152. Mirrlees, T., Perry, B., & Scrivens, R. (2019). The Dangers of Porous Borders: The “Trump Effect” in Canada. Journal of Hate Studies, 14(1), 53–75. Mirrlees, T., Scrivens, R., & Perry, B. (in press).You-Tubing White Power Music: An Exploration of Hate Anthems Online, Radical Criminology. Moreau, G. 2021. Police-reported hate crime in Canada, 2019. Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada. Newhouse, A. (2021). The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism. CTC Sentinel, 14(5). https://ctc.usma.edu/ the-threat-is-the-network-the-multi-node-structure-of-neo-fascist-accelerat ionism/. Page, R., & Ruby, K. (2021). The Capitol Rioters Aren’t Like Other Extremists. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/02/thecapitol-rioters-arent-like-other-extremists/617895/. Perry, B. (2011). Identity and Hate Crime on Canadian Campuses. Race and Justice, 1(4): 321–340. Perry, B. (2009). Policing Race and Place: Under- and Over-policing in Indian Country. Lexington Press. Perry, B., & Scrivens, R. (2019). Right-Wing Extremism in Canada. London: Palgrave. Perry, B., & Scrivens, R. (2016). White Pride Worldwide: Constructing Global Identities Online. In J. Schweppe and M. Walters (eds.). The Globalisation of Hate: Internationalising Hate Crime? London: Oxford University Press. Perry, B., & Scrivens, R. (2015). Right-Wing Extremism in Canada: An Environmental Scan. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada. Pfeffer, A. (2017, February 17). Teen who spray-painted racist slurs, swastikas pleads guilty. CBC News Ottawa. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/ canada/ottawa/teen-swastika-racist-guilty-church-synagogue-mosque-1.398 8061. Potok, M. (2017, February 15). The Trump Effect. Southern Poverty Law Centre. Retrieved from https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligencereport/2017/trump-effect. Public Safety Canada (2019). 2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada. Public Safety Canada. (2018). 2017 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. Ottawa: Public Safety Canada.

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Razack, S. H. (2020). Settler Colonialism, Policing and Racial Terror: The Police Shooting of Loreal Tsingine. Feminist Legal Studies, 28(1), 1–20. Sharpe, K. (2016, November 17). Regina homeowners upset after property tagged with racist graffiti. Global News. Retrieved from http://globalnews. ca/news/3074086/regina-homeowners-upset-after-property-tagged-with-rac ist-graffiti. Shihipar, A. (2017, July 4). Why Americans must stop talking about Trump’s mythical “white working class” voters. Quartz. Retrieved from https://qz.com/991072/why-americans-must-stop-talking-about-themythical-homogenous-white-working-class. Simpson, S. (2019). Racism. IPSOS-Global News. https://www.ipsos.com/enca/news-polls/Half-of-Canadians-think-racism-is-a-serious-problem. Snowdon, (2020). RCMP investigate hit-and-run at anti-racism protest in Ponoka. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/protest-ponokahit-and-run-rcmp-1.5720967. Veilleux-Lepage, Y., & Archambault, E. (2019). Mapping Transnational Extremist Networks: An Exploratory Study of the Soldiers of Odin’s Facebook Network, Using Integrated Social Network Analysis. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(2), 21–38.

4 Trump and the Alt Right: The Mainstreaming of White Nationalism Tanner Mirrlees

Introduction: Donald Trump and the Alt-Right In an August 2016 campaign speech to a crowd of supporters in Reno Nevada, the Democratic Party presidential nominee Hillary Clinton called out Republican Party presidential nominee Donald Trump for building his “campaign on [racial] prejudice and paranoia”, “taking hate groups mainstream” and “helping a radical fringe” known as the “AltRight” to “take over one of America’s two major political parties” by “reinforcing harmful stereotypes”, “offering a dog whistle to his most hateful supporters” and supporting the rise of “hardline, right-wing nationalism” around the globe (Politico Staff 2016). Clinton recognized how “there’s always been a paranoid fringe” in American society “steeped in racial resentment”, but went on to depict Trump’s mainstreaming T. Mirrlees (B) Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, Ontario Tech University, Oshawa, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_4

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of this fringe as unique, declaring that “never had the nominee of a major party” been so brazen at “stoking it, encouraging it, and giving it a national megaphone” (Politico Staff 2016). Clinton opined that just as “racists now call themselves ‘racialists’ and white supremacists now call themselves ‘white nationalists’”, Trump was “rebrand[ing] himself ” by saying he would “make America great again”, when really, he aimed to “Make America hate again” (Politico Staff 2016). A few weeks later, Clinton described “half ” of Trump’s supporters as “racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, and Islamophobic,” a “basket of deplorables” that was “irredeemable” and “not America” (Politico Staff 2016). Clinton’s speech is in many ways correct. The Trump presidency (2017–2021) played a significant role in emboldening the rise of the Alt-Right, which is a rebranded white nationalist and white supremacist movement situated on the far-right of the political spectrum (Neiwert 2018; Hawley 2017; Wendling 2018). In general, the “Alt-Right” is a blanket term for all those reactionary white folks who identify themselves with white nationalist and white supremacist ideology and who support a nationalist authoritarian politics of “preserving and protecting the white race”, criticizing “‘multiculturalism’ and more rights for non-whites, women, Jews, Muslims, gays, immigrants and other minorities” and rejecting the “American liberal democratic ideal that all should have equality under the law regardless of creed, gender, ethnic origin or race” (Daniszewski 2016). As indicated by headlines such as “How Trump Has Cultivated the White Supremacist Alt-right for Years” (Mathis-Lilley 2017) and “President Trump is pushing white nationalist ideas into the mainstream” (Sankin and Carless 2018), Trump’s link to the Alt-Right became a “mainstream” idea during his presidency, a popular meme that went viral after Clinton framed both Trump and the Alt-Right as un-American. Yet, Clinton’s representation of Trump and the Alt-Right as unAmerican is idealistic because, as this chapter argues, they are part and product of America’s own lengthy history of white nationalism and white supremacy, not exceptions to them or outliers in some essentially equitable, diverse, and inclusive way of life. As troubling as they are, Trump and the Alt-Right are very American. To show how, the

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chapter’s first section historicizes the racial capitalist and white nationalist structures, ideologies, parties, presidencies, and campaign strategies that preceded Trump’s 2016 election and which made a Trump presidency seem common sense to so many millions of white folks, including the “Alt-Right” deplorables, as described by Clinton. The second section contends Donald Trump is a poster boy for white class power and privilege, and probes the racial contours of his election campaign and White House. The third section interrogates the Trump presidency’s convergence with and eventual divergence from the Alt-Right. Overall, this chapter assesses the mainstream politics of Trump and the Alt-Right with regard to continuity and change in American racial capitalism, the Republican Party’s Southern Strategy, and conservativism’s reactionary mind. This chapter takes a political economy approach to the problem of the Alt-Right in society. In Canada and elsewhere, the political economy tradition represents an interdisciplinary and heterogeneous field of critical, historical, materialist, and praxis-linked research that is “oriented toward understanding the dynamics of power” in society and “identifying processes that may generate” or impede “progressive social change” (Thomas and Vosko 2019, 3). Political economy emerged from eighteenth and nineteenth century studies of the relationship between society’s major economic and political structures, and in the twentieth century, it analyzed how capitalism, the State and politics, and ideology interacted to produce and reproduce social class divisions and inequalities. In the twenty-first century, researchers working in the political economy tradition are producing new knowledge of how the structures and institutions of colonialism, capitalism, the State, and ideology shape and reshape patterns of inequity and oppression related to class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, Indigeneity, citizenship, ability, age, and other social relations, and they are also foregrounding the agency of intersectional social movements to reform and transform society for the better (Thomas and Vosko 2019, 4). This chapter is indebted to the political economy tradition, and as such, it is concerned with how the historical and contemporary structures and institutions of capitalism, corporations and class relations interact with those of the State, political parties, politicians, and ideologies to

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both enable and constrain the Alt-Right. This chapter’s political economy approach takes it as axiomatic that the Alt-Right did not emerge in a vacuum, but rather, came to be in a society with a much longer history of white nationalism that can be changed. The approach emphasizes that white nationalists make and remake themselves with materials cut from social history, can be emboldened or discouraged by the structures and institutions of capitalism and the State, and may be empowered or disempowered by the conduct or practices of the corporate and political actors that exert substantial influence within the system, as well as by social movements to reform or go beyond it. By contextualizing the Alt-Right with regard to continuity and change in the history of American racial capitalism, State formation, party politics, politicians, and ideology, this chapter’s broad look at the society that shapes white nationalism’s renewal or retraction hopes to offer a useful macro-level supplement to meso and micro-level analyses of right-wing extremism.

White Nationalism in America: A Brief History of Mainstream Racism With respect to the US’s 246-year-old history, the reconfiguration of white nationalism in the public mind as part of a radical fringe, not the mainstream centre, is a relatively new discursive-political process. After all, white nationalism has long been mainstream America, interwoven with the beliefs and practices regarded as normal by millions of white Americans (mainstream, as a noun), significant in many of American society’s dominant structures and institutions (mainstream, as an adjective), and constantly renewed and weaponized in political battles (mainstream, as a verb). The US emerged from within the British Empire (a subsidiary white settler colonial State) and just as there would be no such thing as America without British colonialism, there would be no American capitalism without slavery (Taylor 2016). Following the American revolution (1765–1783), the new territorial nation-State was mostly ruled by white bourgeois and slave-owning men. The framers advanced the principle of liberty and equality for all in the Declaration of Independence and

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the Constitution but presided over a State that privileged their class’s rule, property and rights over Black people, women, the working poor, and Native Americans. Up until the latter half of the twentieth century, white nationalism (the idea that America is a nation made by and primarily for white people) and white supremacy (the idea that white people are inherently superior to non-white people) were mainstream in America, embedded in its political and economic structures and institutions (Alexander 2016; Kendi 2016; Taylor 2016; Virdee 2019). For example, the 1790 Naturalization Act granted natural citizenship only to “free white persons” of “good moral character” (Glass 2012). Even after the Civil War (1861–1865) had abolished slavery, Southern Democrats established the Jim Crow Laws (1870–1965) to reconsolidate racial segregation. The State’s immigration policy—the National Origins Formula (1921–1965)—preserved white dominance with a quota system that took Northern European immigrants to be a “superior subspecies of the white race” and privileged these folks for citizenship (Ludden 2006). Until the post-war era, Democratic and Republican presidents (and their parties) propped up the power and privilege of white people in American society by supporting or doing little to transform the institutionalized laws and policies that undermined the civil rights of Black Americans (Feagin 2012). After all, ten of the first twelve US presidents were slave owners and for much of US history, most Republican and Democrat presidents were in mind, word, or deed, racists or tolerant of racial inequality. Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) “publicly deplored the oppression of American blacks yet opposed their ‘social equality’” (Dyer 1980, 92), and his own books celebrated “the heritage, exploits and destiny of the ‘English-speaking race’” (Dyer 1980, 68). William Howard Taft (1909– 1913) publicly decried racial segregation, but didn’t do anything to end it. Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) supported racial apartheid in the South and even established racial segregation in the North’s public service (Yellin 2013). Warren G. Harding (1921–1923) joined the KKK and rejected “social equality between whites and blacks” (Wade 1987, 165). Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929), a believer in the civilizational greatness of white people, framed racial segregation as a state as opposed to Federal problem, and when 40,000 KKK members marched on Washington, he

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was silent (Greenberg 2006, 87). Herbert Hoover (1929–1933), who harboured fears that the white race might one day disappear due to “mongrelization” (Garcia 1979, 510), purged the Black leadership from the Southern GOP to get more white votes, and tolerated the Jim Crow Laws (Garcia 1979, 507). Franklin Roosevelt (1933–1945) refused to support anti-lynching legislation, stymied the desegregation of the military, and preferred immigrants who had the “blood of the right sort” (Medoff 2018). In the post-war era, Harry S. Truman (1945–1953) used his executive powers to ban racial segregation in the public and military service, but still pandered to the Dixicrats (Southern Democratic Party politicians and voters who defended the Jim Crow Laws). Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) ended racial segregation in the nation’s capital but still “loved to tell n***** jokes” (Feagin 2006, 162). He did not publicly endorse the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling, and said the white Southern bigots who opposed school desegregation were “not bad people”, just people concerned “to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes” (Feagin 2006, 162). John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) publicly championed Civil Rights legislation even though he knew that his brother had signed off on the FBI’s surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. During the presidency of Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969), the Civil Rights movement, which was led by Martin Luther King Jr. and Ella Josephine Baker and supported by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), dismantled the American South’s racist apartheid regime and Jim Crow laws. The Johnson presidency passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1966, and overturned the National Origins Formula in 1965. Due to Civil Rights legislation, the US for the first time in its history became a legitimate liberal democracy, but Johnson and many others still described the new law as the “n****** Bill” (Serwer 2014). Nonetheless, from the Civil Rights era of the 1960s to our time, blunt public expressions of white supremacy gradually became less acceptable in society and were discouraged in presidential election campaigns. In 1960s, the Democratic Party started courting Black voters to the chagrin of racist Southern Democrats, and the Republican Party turned

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against Black voters in a bid to capture the bigger vote of white folks. In 1963, the Republican Alabama Governor George Wallace had vowed to support “segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” but in 1968, he launched a “Stand up for America” presidential campaign (Lopez 2013, 16–17). Having learned from Wallace, the Republican Party crafted the Southern Strategy: this new racist approach to elections aimed to win the vote of Southern whites with coded racist rhetoric that was mastered by Richard Nixon and his presidential campaign team between 1968 and 1972 (Feldman 2011; Murphy and Gulliver 1971). Kevin Phillips, a Nixon operative, believed that racially polarizing the electorate would help the Republican Party build and sustain its white voter base As Phillips argued: “the more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans” (cited in Boyd 1970). For many Republicans of the era, the challenge of the Southern Strategy was to pander to the anti-Black racism of many white Southerners without deploying overtly racist rhetoric. As Nixon’s White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman advised, “you have to face the fact that the whole problem is really the blacks” and “recognize this [problem] while not appearing to” (cited in Robin 2017, 50). Lee Atwater, another Nixon presidency insider, explained this “dog whistle” tactic: “You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘N*****, n*****, n*****’”, but by 1968, saying that “backfires” and “hurts you”. So instead, “you say stuff like ‘states’ rights and ‘cutting taxes’, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a by-product of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites” (cited in Lamis 1999, 7–8). During their 1968 and 1972 US election campaigns, Nixon and his political communications team never made overtly white nationalist statements (e.g., “America is and should be a country by and for white people only”) or explicitly white supremacist statements (e.g., “the white race is superior to Black people because of biologically unique racial differences”). Instead, and apropos the Southern Strategy, Nixon tacitly conveyed these ideas with “coded references to race” (Feldman 2011, 320). Nixon’s media campaign associated Black people with crime and deviance, Federal governmental overreach, and social entitlementsdriven social malaise, and represented Nixon himself as uniquely suited

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to solve these racially coded social problems with a Law & Order agenda (getting tough on crime, protest, and riots), support for states’ rights (opposing the Civil Rights Act, busing, and racial tension), fiscal conservatism (reducing Federal expenditure on public welfare programmes which supposedly benefitted Black people more than hardworking and taxpaying white men and their families), and laissez-faire capitalism (spurring new enterprise and compelling Black people to bootstrap in exchange for the wage they needed to live) (Feldman 2011). With a media campaign that mobilized conservative themes of tradition, patriotism, patriarchy, populism, Christianity, anti-Communism, and antipolitical correctness, Nixon won the vote of the Southern States’ white majority and was propelled to victory in both elections (Maxwell and Shields 2019). Embracing Nixon’s success, the Republican Party integrated the Southern Strategy’s “new racism” into its Federal, state, and local electoral playbooks, and subsequent conservative politicians followed the script time and time again (Aistrup 1996). For nearly fifty years, “the GOP has deliberately exploited—and inflamed—white racial animus as a means of obtaining [and keeping] political power” (Levitz 2017). For example, Ronald Reagan’s 1980 “Let’s Make America Great Again” campaign “launched an all-out attack on school desegregation, affirmative action, the Voting Rights Act, the federal civil rights apparatus and public education” (Bush 1981, 40). George W. Bush’s Willie Horton TV ad was decisive to his presidential win. Given this strategy, it is not surprising that overt white supremacists rallied for many Republican presidential hopefuls. After all, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) endorsed Barry Goldwater (1964), Richard Nixon (1968/1972), Ronald Reagan (1980/1984), Pat Buchanan (1992/2000), and Ron Paul (2008/2012). Even though the Republican Party’s Southern Strategy was not overtly white nationalist or white supremacist, it still supported the reproduction of the social power and privilege of white elites. The white business and political elites who disproportionately run and benefit from the Republican Party have long been predictably resistant to egalitarian challenges to their property and privilege, and, time and time again, they’ve relied on racism to divide and conquer working class people (Virdee 2019; Taylor 2016; Du Bois 1965). From the 1970s forward, the Republican

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Party’s neoliberal policies have disproportionately served the interests of society’s wealthiest whites at the expense of the well-being of many Black people, and the Democratic Party’s neoliberal policies—including the 1994 crime bill—have had similar effects, despite the Party’s progressive image (Alexander 2016). But while the Democratic Party pushed a colour-blind approach to the problem of racialized inequality, the Republican Party drove a wedge between two racialized groups, channelling white class grievances away from elites at the top of the system into racial animosity towards people struggling to subsist at or climb from the bottom or middle. Republican Party policies have not protected standard employment for white working people, increased their wages, supported their unions, or provisioned better public goods and services. And yet, millions of white folks repeatedly vote for Republican politicians when they deploy racist dog whistles. Trump is the latest and perhaps harshest example of this approach to electoral politics.

The Trump Presidency: A White House of Class Privilege and Power Trump is a poster boy for white class privilege and power. Heir to the fortune of the New York real estate magnate Fred Trump (who wore a KKK robe and hood in 1927), Trump is worth over $2.4 billion (Pearl 2016). From the 1950s onwards, the Trump Management Corporation prospered off of racialized class discrimination when prioritizing affluent white renters and refusing to rent apartment units to Black people (Mahler and Eder 2016). At the helm of the Trump Organization for four decades, Trump said things like “laziness is a trait in Blacks” and did things like order all Black workers off the floor when visiting his Atlantic City casinos (Paumgarten 2015). Following the (wrongful) 1989 conviction of the Central Park 5 (five Black male teenagers accused of mugging, assaulting, and raping a white female investment banker), Trump spent $85,000 on newspaper ads calling for these boys’ execution. After two decades in prison, these five men were exonerated, but Trump maintained their guilt. Between 2004 and 2015, Trump starred in the reality-TV hit The Apprentice, and reportedly used the N-word on set

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(Hutzler 2019). Between 2011 and 2016, Trump stoked the racism of white conservatives by spreading the birther lie that Barack Obama was not a natural American citizen and thus ineligible for the US presidency and impeachable. When in 2015 Trump announced his presidential ambitions, his personal brand of fortune and fame was already a household commodity in America, and he was admired and idolized by many Republicans. In the lead up to the 2016 election, the American citizenry was asked to choose between two faces of neoliberalism, one inclusionary, the other exclusionary (Fraser 2019). The “progressive neoliberalism” of Hillary Clinton’s Democratic Party fused a meritocratic politic of recognition, inclusivity, and multicultural diversity to an “expropriative, plutocratic economic program” (Fraser 2019, 11) while the “reactionary neoliberalism” of Trump’s Republican Party interwove “Nativism, sexism, homophobia, racism, and xenophobia…with the celebration of private property and wealth” (Panitch and Gindin 2018, 3). While Clinton envisaged America as a land of racial, LGBTQ, and women’s rights, welcoming of immigrant dreamers, and at the technological cutting edge of the global digital age, Trump’s America was unabashedly “politically incorrect”, ethnocentric, and nostalgic for a “time when [white] American men mined iron ore, oil, copper, coal, and bauxite from American soil, built automobiles sold around the world, and built military and civilian aircraft that dominated the world’s skies” (Barrow 2020). Trump pitched his presidency to rich and poor white folks, impressing billionaires and chief executive officers (CEOs) with promises to run government like a business and offers of “tax cuts, deregulations, social programme defunding, and union busting” (Panitch and Gindin 2018, 3). Trump’s media team packaged this billionaire as a man of the people who would fight for the interests of his people against the “crooked” Democrats presumably responsible for Wall Street malfeasance, free trade agreements that decimated manufacturing jobs, and crumbling public infrastructure (Parenti 2016). The Trump campaign communications operationalized the Southern Strategy: it represented Trump as a Law & Order politician who would Make America Great Again by returning the country a safer, simpler, and more prosperous time (a fantasy of the post-World War II era) (Angelo 2019). On Twitter and in his televised

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speeches, Trump deployed dog whistle racism to associate non-white people with crime. He crafted an image of himself as a strong white man who would secure the interests of Big Business Men and Little Worker Guys against the threat of a supposed alliance between liberal globalist elites, non-white minorities and the Left social movements trying to change the world (Angelo 2019). On the campaign trail, Trump demeaned Mexican immigrants as “rapists” who were “bringing drugs” and “bringing crime” to America, associated Somali refugees with rise in crime, and linked Arab and Muslim Americans to global terrorism (Quealy 2021).Trump’s tweets associated Black Americans with urban crime (“the overwhelming amount of violent crime in our cities is committed by blacks”), portrayed “inner cities” with large Black populations as spaces of violent disorder (“there’s killings on an hourly basis virtually in places like Baltimore and Chicago”), and attacked the Obama presidency for supposedly being soft on Black urban rioting (“Our great African American President hasn’t exactly had a positive impact on the thugs who are so happily and openly destroying Baltimore!”) (Quealy 2021). At multiple rallies, Trump urged his white supporters to beat up Black protesters and even offered to pay the legal fees of one charged with assault. Trump’s Southern Strategy proved effective, as he won all sixteen of the Southern states and the majority of white American votes (Pew Research Centre 2018). Trump’s “America First” promise to rebuild American manufacturing and create good jobs undoubtedly resonated with some white workers facing hard times, but it was likely his racist dog whistles that attracted most white voters to his presidency. Across generational, class, gender, and state lines, white people voted for Trump, less because of economic anxieties, and more due to racial and cultural fears and grievances (Cox et al. 2017; Griffin and Sides 2018; Schaffner et al. 2018). Trump’s major base of white support encompassed Republican partisans, namely, suburban and exurban small business owners and middle-class folks nostalgic for Reaganism, and who, afraid of “cultural displacement”, felt a need for protection “from foreign influence”, and supported “deporting immigrants living in the country illegally” (Cox et al. 2017). Traditionally high-status white Christian men, especially

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those who swallowed the Alt-Right’s so-called red pill of being discriminated against in society more than Blacks, Muslims, and women, saw in Trump a leader who would restore the nation’s traditional racial, religious, and sex-gender hierarchies (Mutz 2018). Some of the Rust Belt’s white working-class folks supported Trump as well, and the millions of these people who scraped out a precarious life from pay cheque to pay cheque had good reason to feel angry, but Trump masterfully channelled their real class grievances into cultural conspiracism and racial resentment. Trump did not win the popular vote, but won the election. Upon entering the White House, Trump did not become more presidential, but instead, doubled down on the Southern Strategy. Trump continuously drummed up white fears of racialized urban crime and Black on white crime, tweeting that “no human would want to live” in Baltimore and retweeting a video of man on a New York subway platform shoving a white woman (Quealy 2021). Trump criticized the Black Lives Matter (BLM) uprising and showed his support for police violence against BLM-linked protestors by tweeting “when the looting starts, the shooting starts”, and retweeting a video of a white couple pointing their guns at BLM supporters (Quealy 2021). Trump told Congresswomen Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib to “go back to their own countries” and “help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came” (all except Omar were born in America) (Quealy 2021). He also referred to the home countries of Haitian and African immigrants as “shitholes”, and after saying “take them out”, he clarified he preferred an America with more Norwegian immigrants (Quealy 2021). Channelling the “love it or leave it” mantra of authoritarian nationalists, Trump said the BLM-supporting NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick “should find a country that works better for him” (Quealy 2021). Trump also granted clemency to the racial profiler Sheriff Joe Arpaio and awarded a Medal of Freedom to the conservative shock jock Rush Limbaugh. Echoing the rallying cry of the 2017 Unite the Right event in Charlottesville, Virginia, Trump defended the South’s heritage monuments against efforts to take them down. Trump even retweeted a “Villagers for Trump” golf cart parade video in which a Boomer yells “white power!” (Quealy 2021).

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Trump’s coded and not-so-coded racist rhetoric made daily news headlines, but what gave Trump’s political communications particular virulence was its ability to direct the rage of white people at racialized others, not the workings of the economic system and neoliberal policies that had for decades empowered the rule of the wealthy few over the multicultural working class many (Reich 2020). To launch his Make America Great Again campaign in 2015, Trump spent $66 million of his own cash. “I’m using my own money”, Trump said, “I’m really rich” (Tindera 2020).But Trump’s campaign also welcomed $15.5 million from Robert Mercer, a billionaire who said the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a mistake, used his Cambridge Analytica to support Brexit, and backed the rebranding of Breitbart News into the platform of the Alt-Right (Cole 2019). Trump took in over a million from Peter Thiel, the former Paypal CEO and venture capitalist who had hosted a dinner party with an Alt-Right activist. Trump’s campaign was also backed by foundations and think-tanks run with money from right-wing billionaires such as Richard Mellon Scaife and the Koch Brothers, as well as by Alt-Right multi-millionaires such as Steve Bannon and William H. Regnery II (Fang 2019). Trump’s White House was unsurprisingly white, male, and rich. After winning the 2016 election, Trump declared: “I want people who have made a fortune”, and what he put together was a Cabinet consisting of 17 millionaires, 2 centimillionaires, and 1 billionaire (Alexander et al. 2019). Of the twenty-four people in Trump’s top Cabinet positions, one was Black. Of the eight military chiefs, one was Black. Of the one hundred people who wrote laws in the US Senate, two were Black. Of the fifty State governors, none were Black. Trump’s Federal Government also facilitated and legitimized the operations of an economy whose business elites were mostly white (Lu et al. 2020). During the Trump presidency, America’s twenty-five richest families and twenty-five richest people were all white and all but one of the CEOs of the top twenty-five highest valued American corporations were white men (Kroll and Dolan 2019). Overall, the Trump presidency ruled with and on behalf of white elites by pushing a massive privatization agenda, helping millionaires and billionaires pay less taxes than working class people, attacking workers’ rights and unions, and slashing expenditure on food stamps, Medicaid, housing

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assistance, and other public programmes that millions of Americans need, and which if properly funded, would make for a better society. Trump’s White House was also stocked with Alt-Right-leaning policy advisors such as Steve Bannon, Steven Miller, and Kris Kobach. Bannon, a former Goldman Sachs banker and Hollywood film producer who co-founded Breitbart News in 2007 was the chief executive officer of Trump’s election campaign and the Chief Strategist and Senior Counsellor to the President for seven months. A Trump speechwriter and senior policy advisor, Miller was the chief architect of Trump’s separation of immigrant children from their parents and efforts to reduce the number of refugees to America. Between March 2015 and July 2016, Miller sent nearly 1000 emails to Breitbart News with links to Alt-Right propaganda on websites such as VDARE and American Renaissance (Hayden 2019). Kobach, the Kansas Secretary of State who also worked for the Federation for American Immigration Reform, was another Alt-Right politician who had close ties to Trump. In 2017, Kobach authored an article for Brietbart.com that falsely claimed immigrants committed a disproportionate share of crime and called for mass deportation. Kobach had helped with Trump’s plan to deport about twelve million people, build a border wall with Mexico, and gut the 14th amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to anyone born in the US.

The Trump Presidency and the Alt-Right White, male, and rich, Trump typified the “reactionary mind” of conservativism itself and embodied the will of elites to defend their class and racial privilege in America by mobilizing white people across class and state lines against the progress made by persons of colour (Robin 2017). It was perhaps for this reason that the Trump presidency attracted support from a bunch of white nationalist and white supremacist intellectuals and groups described as the Alt-Right (“alt” as in “alternative” to the mainstream of the Republican establishment) (Hawley 2017; Neiwert 2018; Wendling 2018).

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In the US context, the Alt-Right refers to all the white people who believe that race is essential to their identity and national culture, identify with something called a white race, and perceive themselves to be engaged in a politics of protecting and promoting this white race against threats to it, namely, non-white immigration, multicultural policies, and forms of cultural mixing. Contra Alt-Right propaganda, there is no white race just homo sapiens sapiens, nor are white people in danger of disappearing. Nonetheless, the Alt-Right believes that for its white race to survive and flourish in America and around the world, an ethnostate that separates white people from non-white others and which exists to protect and promote the culture of an idealized white race must be built. The Alt-Right is authoritarian, as it rejects the basic tenets of liberal democracy, wants to remove non-white people from America, and views non-whites, socialists, Jews, Muslims, LGBTQ folks, immigrants, and other minorities as others to, and even enemies of, their white way of life. The Alt-Right castigates all the white people who don’t identify with their racist cause as either cucks (that must be schooled in race realism) or race traitors (enemies of white Western civilization). The Alt-Right is not a single organization, but an ethos shared by various white nationalist and white supremacist individuals and groups: some perpetrate hate crimes and violent attacks in pursuit of their cause and others try to organize consent to their ideology by spreading it across the Internet and laundering it through Republican Party politicians and media outlets. Using a tactical mix of violence and persuasion, the Alt-Right has long struggled for hegemony, but up until 2015, no major presidential candidate had helped its politics leap into the mainstream. When Trump launched his campaign for the US presidency from the golden elevator of Trump Towers, the Alt-Right saw Trump, a white male corporate elite with a racist history, as the man for their movement. The Alt-Right cheered Trump’s declaration that “America First” was the major theme of his administration because this phrase connotes a 1930s motto of Nazi-friendly Americans and the 1940 America First Committee, which, led by the anti-Semite Charles Lindbergh and backed by the industrialist William Regnery, attempted to prevent the US from entering World War II. The Alt-Right read into Trump an avatar of itself and believed “Trump shared their values

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more than any other candidate in recent history” and so made proTrump Internet propaganda, attended Trump campaign events, and even entered Republican electoral politics (Fording and Schram 2020, 194). Numerous Alt-Right influencers supported Trump’s presidency, and hoped the Trump presidency would use its power to make America great again by making it whiter. The Alt-Right figurehead Richard Spencer, who coined the term Alt-Right in 2009, ran The National Policy Institute and RADIX and called for the “peaceful ethnic cleansing” of non-whites, described Trump as “an icebreaker” in “bringing forth” his “kind of nationalism”. Following Trump’s election, Spencer declared “We [the Alt-Right] willed Donald Trump into office, we made this dream our reality!” (Barrow and Lemire 2016). When wrapping up a speech at a November 19th National Policy Institute convention, Spencer shouted: “Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!” A standing ovation and Nazi salutes followed (SPLC 2020a). Andrew Anglin, the neo-Nazi founder of The Daily Stormer website, trolled for Trump (SPLC 2020a). Anglin’s Der Stürmer-inspired platform published numerous pro-Trump articles that venerated Trump as the Alt-Right’s “Glorious Leader” and “Ultimate Savior” (SPLC 2020a). In one article, Anglin announced that “virtually every Alt-Right Nazi I know is volunteering for the Trump campaign” (Mascaro 2016). The day after Trump won, Anglin wrote: “Our Glorious Leader has ascended to God Emperor. Make no mistake about it: we did this” (SPLC 2020a). That same day, Anglin encouraged his Stormer Troll Army to harass Clinton supporters and people of colour until they killed themselves. Jared Taylor, editor of American Renaissance (a white nationalist website) and the head of the New Century Foundation (a white nationalist organization) backed Trump because he believed Trump was “talking about policies that would slow the dispossession of whites” (Posner and Neiwert 2016). Taylor saw in Trump “the last hope for a president who would be good for white people” (Posner and Neiwert 2016). When Trump was elected, Taylor rejoiced: “all of his policies—at least, those pertaining to immigration—align very nicely with the sorts of things we’ve been saying for many years” (SPLC 2020b). Many other Alt-Right activists supported Trump. William Regnery II, a multi-millionaire financier of many Alt-Right organizations, described

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Trump as “a legitimatizer” [sic] of his cause, someone who helped white nationalism go “from being conversation you could hold in a bathroom, to the front parlor”. Rocky Suhayda, chairman of the American Nazi Party, said a Trump presidency would be a “real opportunity” for his cause (Holley 2016). Members of the now defunct Traditional Workers Party and the still active Proud Boys hate group routinely attended Trump rallies to rough up anti-Trump protestors. The American Freedom Party founded an American National Trump Super PAC to raise funds for Trump’s campaign. After Trump’s win, former KKK grand wizard David Duke tweeted: “our people have played a huge role in electing Trump!” (Posner and Neiwert 2016). Rachel Pendergraft said “Trump is one example of the alternative-right candidate Knights Party members and [other KKK] supporters have been looking for” (Posner and Neiwert 2016). Stormfront webmaster Don Black said “we are all pulling for Trump” because Trump was fighting back against white “demoralization” and building something that would “continue independently of him” (Schreckinger 2015). As the Alt-Right rallied for Trump, the news media gave it the coverage and visibility it craved, and soon after Clinton described Trump’s AltRight base as a basket of deplorables, the movement went viral and rode Trump’s retweets of its 4chan and 8chan memes into the mainstream political spotlight (Wendling 2018). Trump retweeted an Alt-Right meme of himself as Pepe the Frog, a hate symbol (ADL 2019). At least twice, Trump retweeted memes from a Twitter user whose handle contained the phrase “white genocide” (@WhiteGenocideTM), and who had tweeted “Hitler SAVED Europe” and “Jews/Israel did 9/11”. Trump also retweeted fake black on white crime statistics from a Twitter account with a modified swastika graphic (Greenberg 2015). Trump retweeted an anti-Semitic Alt-Right meme of Hilary Clinton’s face hovering over a bunch of one-hundred-dollar bills, with what looked to be a Star of David in the corner and the words, “Most Corrupt Candidate Ever!” (Greenberg 2015). Trump’s @realdonaldtrump was followed by AltRight Twitter and social media influencers who included “MAGA” and “Trump supporter” in their profiles (Berger 2018, 5–6) and thousands of

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their followers “invested in Donald Trump’s election campaign” as indicated by the fact that “Trump-related hashtags outperformed every white nationalist hashtag except for #whitegenocide” (Berger 2016, 3). During the four years of the Trump presidency, the Alt-Right’s size and social presence grew, online and off. The Southern Poverty Law Centre’s 2017 Intelligence Report described how 2016 was the year in which “the radical right entered the mainstream” and by the end of 2019, the number of American white nationalist hate groups had increased from 148 to 155 (Southern Poverty Law Centre 2020c). Under the Trump presidency, the Alt-Right’s violence intensified: over one thousand hate crimes were reported in the month following Trump’s election, and in the ensuing years, white nationalists killed numerous civilians (Follman 2019; Southern Poverty Law Centre 2020c). The Alt-Right also organized many public demonstrations, the most infamous being the August 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Furthermore, this Alt-Right expanded its digital footprint on the Internet and World Wide Web, and used its own minor sites and the major social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to recruit and mobilize followers (Devries et al. 2021). Remarkably, the Alt-Right entered the fray of Republican electoral politics, as between 2018 and 2020, at least eighteen Alt-Right figures launched campaigns for Republican House and Senate seats, governorships, and state legislatures (Coaston 2018; Minkowtiz 2018). For example, former American Nazi Party leader Arthur Jones was the Republican Party nominee for Congress in Illinois’s House of Representatives District 3. Sean Donahue, who believes the US was intended to be all white, ran for Pennsylvania’s 11th District. Paul Nehlen, an overt white supremacist, challenged House Speaker Paul Ryan in the 2016 GOP primaries and in the 2018 midterms. Though nearly all AltRight politicians lost, they used their election campaigns to increase their public profile, raise funds for their cause, and build infrastructure. All in all, the Alt-Right used the opening created by Trump to shift the Overton Window rightward. In 2018, about 5.64% of America’s whites or approximately eleven million white Americans reportedly identified with the Alt-Right’s belief in supporting “white interests” above those of other racial groups (Beauchamp 2018).

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Trump never publicly declared an affinity to the Alt-Right and never pushed for a white-only ethnostate, and so some have concluded it is inaccurate to “describe President Donald Trump as part of the Alt-Right” (Hawley 2017, 172). Even though Trump did not say he embraces the Alt-Right, he took great pains to unequivocally reject the Alt-Right and its ideologues. When asked by CNN journalist Jake Tapper to reject David Duke’s endorsement, Trump waffled: “I don’t know anything about David Duke, okay? I don’t know anything about what you’re even talking about with white supremacy or white supremacists” (Coleburn 2016). When asked to disavow the KKK’s support, Trump said: “Well, I have to look at the group…You wouldn’t want me to condemn a group that I know nothing about” (Coleburn 2016). Trump even drew moral equivalences between the Alt-Right and those trying to stop it. After the Alt-Right terrorized and injured hundreds of people in Charlottesville, and killed Heather Heyer, Trump described some Alt-Right acolytes as “very fine people” and then blamed “many sides” for the violence, including the “Alt-Left” (Quealy 2021). “Really proud of him”, tweeted the white nationalist Richard Spencer. “He bucked the narrative of AltRight violence, and made a statement that is fair and down to earth” (Thrush and Haberman 2017). Despite these connections, the link between the Trump presidency and the Alt-Right as a whole was always tenuous. In 2015 and 2016, many people identified with the Alt-Right saw in Trump a man who would make America great by making it whiter, but by late 2017, and after the mass demonstration at Charlottesville failed to Unite The Right, some of the Alt-Right’s key propagandists, representing different AltRight factions and splinter groups, were publishing articles such as “The Trump Honeymoon Is Already Over” (Wallace 2017). Occidental Dissent founder Hunter Wallace described a shift in the Alt-Right’s thinking about Trump from “unqualified reverence” to “an anxious wait and see approach” (Wallace 2017). By late 2017, many Alt-Righters had become disappointed with Trump. They scrutinized Trump for taking Steve Bannon off of the National Security Council, dilly-dallying on building the border wall, and cosying up to Saudi Arabia (for the AltRight, a symbol for the collective Muslim) and Israel (for the Alt-Right,

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a symbol for the collective Jew) with trade deals and military partnerships. Also, Trump’s ratcheting up of the Obama administration’s war in Syria and increases to military expenditure dashed the Alt-Right’s isolationist foreign policy ideal. In a Vanity Fair interview, Richard Spencer explained how “A lot of us feel disillusioned and even burned by Trump. In a sense we thought that the Alt-Right could be Trump’s brain, but now he has Ivanka, and Jared and Paul Ryan for that” (Tenold 2018). Throughout 2018, many on the Alt-Right continued to turn against Trump (Hatewatch Staff 2018). In November, Richard Spencer tweeted to his eighty thousand followers: “The Trump moment is over, and it’s time for us to move on” (Hatewatch Staff 2018). In that same month, Counter-Currents editor Greg Johnson (2018) wrote: “We were never the vanguard of Trumpian populism” and “Trump is not the last chance for the white race in North America”. Johnson furthermore noted how “White Nationalists have been drifting from defeat to defeat basically since Trump’s victory” and “Trump will probably not save us”. Robert G. Bowers, who had subscribed to the Alt-Right platform Gab before terrorizing and murdering praying Jewish people at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh on October 27, 2018, loathed Trump, describing him as a neoliberal “globalist, not a [white] nationalist” (Hatewatch Staff 2018). In a 2019 CNN interview, Richard Spencer described Trump as con man who manipulated the Alt-Right. “He gives us nothing outside of racist tweets”, said Spencer, “And by racist tweets, I mean tweets that are meaningless and cheap and express the kind of sentiments you might hear from your drunk uncle while he’s watching [Sean] Hannity” (Simon and Sidner 2019). In that same year, the “Groyper Army” (led by Nick Fuentes) heckled Trump at a California event for not putting white America first, and for failing to protect and promote white American traditions (Coaston 2019). Anglin also bemoaned how many on the AltRight had “attached themselves to Trump” and been duped by “a big money corporatist, homosexualist, Zionist, globalist agenda” (Coaston 2019). Patrick Casey, leader of American Identity (rebranded from Identity Evropa) described how even though Trump had “racked up some achievements” such as “Supreme Court nominations” and “other judicial appointments”, Trump displayed a “lack of progress” on stopping “immigration”: “If Donald Trump, billionaire and expert dealmaker, can’t make

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it happen, can we expected [sic] any elected official to do so?” asked a disgruntled Casey (Coaston 2019). In sum, although the Alt-Right supported Trump’s Make America Great Again campaign for the US presidency, some leading Alt-Right intellectuals and groups had distanced themselves from Trump nearing its end. But their disappointment was not shared by all folks identified with the Alt-Right and certainly not by the Republican Party’s giant white conservative base, which rallied for Trump in 2020.

Conclusion: From Trump’s Capitol Riot to the Biden Presidency During the 2020 US presidential race between Trump and Joe Biden, Trump tried to get re-elected by rolling out an even rougher version of the Southern Strategy than the one he relied on to win the White House in 2016. Trump tweeted video clips of Black people assaulting white people, called Black Lives Matter a “symbol of hate” for fomenting a “left-wing cultural revolution designed to overthrow the American Revolution”, and directed the Federal government to stop equity, diversity and inclusivity initiatives (EDI) (Quealy 2021). Pandering to his Southern white base, Trump called for the protection of Confederate imagery to preserve American heritage, criticized NASCAR for banning Confederate flags from its races, and tried to veto a bill that would require the US military to remove the names of Confederate generals from its facilities. During a televised and live-streamed presidential debate with Biden, Trump refused to condemn Alt-Right groups, and instead, urged one of them—the militant Proud Boys—to “stand back and stand by” and then declared “somebody’s got to do something about antifa and the Left” (Belew 2020). Trump’s re-election campaign attracted the vote of about seventyfour million Americans, but Biden won the vote of eighty-one million Americans (a large majority being non-white and college educated white people). Trump was defeated Biden, but more people voted for Trump in 2020 than they did in 2016, and even more people of colour voted for Trump 2020 than they did in 2016. 8% of Black Americans, 28%

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of Asian Americans, and 38% of Hispanic Americans voted for Trump in 2020, and despite Trump’s Islamophobia, 35% of Muslim Americans voted for him (Igielnik et al. 2021; Yosufzai 2020). Trump was a white president supported by the Alt-Right, but this did not deter all persons of colour from voting for him. That so many persons of colour imagined life might be better under a Trump White House in the context of a pandemic and recession indicates a complex relationship between racial identity and ideology and suggests that far from being all white, Trump’s style of far-right politics can be multi-racial. After the 2020 election was called for Biden, Trump launched numerous legal attempts to overturn the election and falsely claimed the election was rigged or had been stolen by the Democrats. As Trump’s disinformation spread far and wide across mainstream and Alt-Right news media outlets and websites, it established a pretext for the massive and shocking January 6, 2021 “March to Save America” and “Stop the Steal” rally on Capitol Hill (Wallace-Wells 2021). Trump urged his followers to “walk down to the Capitol” alongside him and “fight like hell” to protest the election’s certification. As a consequence of this incitement, thousands of white conservatives—including petite bourgeois Trump supporters, QAnon followers, and Alt-Right groups—marched on and violently trashed Capitol Hill in a mass riot that killed five and injured hundreds (Wallace-Wells 2021). This was not a coup, because unlike the actual coups the US Empire has orchestrated in many poor socialist-leaning countries, there was no violent overthrow of the existing State. Trump was not impeached for fomenting a mass uprising and violence against his own government, but he will likely be remembered as an authoritarian populist and a proto-fascist politician. Even though the Trump presidency is over, Trump may return to presidential politics in the future and even if he does not, Trump’s style of politics will undoubtedly persist in America, both on the Republican Party’s fringe and at its centre. After all, Trump and his style of politics are part and product of the mainstream historic structures of American racial capitalism, the Republican Party’s Southern Strategy, and conservatism’s reactionary mind. In that regard, Trump tapped into but did not create the Alt-Right’s illiberal ethos and his blunt appeal to white nationalists and white supremacists was “a less elegant version

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of what has been the dominant winning strategy among [Republican] presidential candidates” for nearly half a century (Angelo 2019, 214). But having been played by the Trump presidency, the Alt-Right may for a time exit from electoral politics and return to a prolonged war of position on the Internet and elsewhere, sharpening its ideological battle axe and wielding it against moderate Republicans, neoliberal Democrats, and the democratic socialist Left. As of late, the Alt-Right has been weakened by government repression, Silicon Valley de-platforming, and intense anti-fascist protest and so there may be fewer Alt-Right-linked terrorist attacks and hate crimes perpetrated in the near future, but AltRight intellectuals, activists and groups are regrouping and renewing their movement. In the years ahead, the global COVID-19 pandemic, the worldwide economic downturn, and the political legitimacy crisis of neoliberalism will underpin conditions of social discontent and open more ideological ground for an intensification of the historical polarization and continuing clash between the progressive-democratic and reactionary conservative tendencies that have always been part of the US and other countries. The Alt-Right will continue to threaten the life, liberty, and happiness of many people, and its rise, maintenance, or fall will be shaped by the power of the social movements amassing against it. For more than one hundred years, Black democratic socialists have led civic campaigns against white supremacy that intersected with working class struggles to reform or go beyond capitalism (Taylor 2016). “We must recognize that we can’t solve our problem now until there is a radical redistribution of economic and political power”, declared Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1967. “We must see now that the evils of racism, economic exploitation and militarism are all tied together” and “you can’t really get rid of one without getting rid of the others”, he continued. “[T]he whole structure of American life must be changed”. Now and for the future, that lesson, and brave intersectional movements for racial and economic justice, are more important than ever.

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5 Asymmetric Coverage of Asymmetric Violence: How U.S. Print News Media Report Far-Right Terrorism Erin M. Kearns and Allison Betus

Introduction Much of the twenty-first-century counterterrorism policy and public discourse have focused on Islamist extremist1 terrorism, despite far-right2 1

Islamism as “a phenomenon incorporates a wide spectrum of behavior and belief,” but “[i]n the broadest sense, Islamist groups believe Islamic law or Islamic values should play a central role in public life” (Brookings, 2016). Islamist extremism refers to the fundamentalist and often violent interpretation found most commonly among adherents to Salafi-Jihadism. Thus, we use the term “Islamist extremist terrorism” to refer to acts that meet the definition of terrorism and are perpetrated by Islamist extremist actors. 2 The Global Terrorism Index (2019, p. 45) defines far-right as “a political ideology that is centered on one or more of the following elements: strident nationalism (usually racial or

E. M. Kearns (B) School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, National Counterterrorism Innovation Technology, and Education (NCITE), Center of Excellence, University of Nebraska Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Betus Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_5

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terrorism being both more common in the U.S. and on the rise.3 Until recently, terrorism perpetrated by far-right actors had garnered relatively little attention from the public and policymakers. The nascent literature on media coverage of terrorism has largely focused on differential quantity and framing as a function of the perpetrators’ religious or racial identity (Arva et al., 2017; Betus et al., 2021; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Kearns et al., 2019a; Mitnik et al., 2020; Powell, 2011). These studies mostly compared coverage of terror attacks by Muslims to that of attacks by non-Muslims. Little is known about either coverage of far-right terrorism relative to other terrorism or potential variance in coverage of terrorist attacks within the spectrum of far-right causes. We address this gap by comparing media coverage of far-right attacks to other attacks and by examining potential differences in how often media covers different kinds of far-right attacks as terrorism. In this chapter, we examine variation in print media4 coverage of farright terror attacks in the U.S. from 2006 to 2015 as coded in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD defines terrorism5 as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” Since all attacks examined in this chapter are considered terrorism in the GTD, they could reasonably be expected to be framed as terrorism in media coverage. However, prior research suggests that this will often not be the case and many attacks received no coverage at all—particularly when the perpetrator is not Muslim. Attacks perpetrated by Muslims received significantly more coverage (Kearns et al., 2019a; Mitnik et al., 2020) and media were more likely

exclusivist in some fashion), fascism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration, chauvinism, nativism, and xenophobia.” Thus, we use the term “far-right terrorism” to refer to acts that meet the definition of terrorism and are perpetrated by far-right actors or in pursuance of a far-right cause. 3 http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf. 4 There is certainly value in also considering broadcast news, though this is beyond the scope of the current project. We expect that findings on both the amount of coverage and the framing of attacks would be exacerbated given the time constraints of airtime. 5 Further detail on the GTD can be found here: https://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/ global-terrorism-database-gtd. More detail on coding independence can be found here: https:// www.start.umd.edu/gtd/contact-team/.

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to frame those attacks as terrorism (Arva et al., 2017; Betus et al., 2021; Mitnik et al., 2020; Powell, 2011). Here, we expand that literature to focus on differences in coverage as a function of far-right ideological motivation. First, we focus on far-right versus other types of attacks to examine differences in both the amount of coverage received and whether that coverage mentions terrorism. Next, we examine differences in media coverage between subsets sub-motives of far-right attacks. This chapter is organized as follows: We begin with a discussion of media’s role to agenda-set and frame information, and then we summarize current literature on media coverage of terrorism. Next, we outline our methodological and analytical approach of looking at print news media coverage of terror attacks in the U.S. from 2006 to 2015. We then present and discuss our findings, outline their implications, and note both limitations and future directions for this work.

What We Know About Public (Mis)Perceptions of Terrorism People tend to associate terrorism with Islam, overestimating both the percentage and raw number of terrorist attacks committed by Muslims (Kearns et al., 2019b). Yet between 2008 and 2017, 71% of deaths related to extremism more broadly were attributed to far-right actors.6 Further, in 2019 the Global Terrorism Index reported that far-right actors were responsible for 60% of terror attacks in the U.S.7 The number of murders by white supremacists also more than doubled in 2017.8 Far-right terrorism is nothing new in the U.S. but it has, historically, often gone unpunished or lightly punished (Goldwag, 2012; Levitas, 2004; Zeskind, 2009). This may have something to do with the

6

https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/murder-and-extremism-in-the-united-states-in-2017. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf. 8 https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-report-white-supremacist-murders-more-than-dou bled-in-2017. 7

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uncomfortable fact that some far-right extremist groups9 recruit from, or encourage their members to infiltrate, law enforcement and the military (FBI Counterterrorism Division, 2006, 2015; Levitas, 2004; Johnson, 2012; Zeskind, 2009). For example, the Ku Klux Klan has carried out countless acts of terror with the tacit (or even explicit) consent and support of local law enforcement (Zeskind, 2009). However, this does not mean that far-right extremist groups necessarily respect law enforcement or consider them allies. Within the U.S., the sovereign citizen movement and extreme right anti-government militias have extensive histories of violence against law enforcement despite recruiting from and infiltrating this population (Levitas, 2004; Zeskind, 2009). Members of U.S. law enforcement are still periodically exposed for assisting or belonging to far-right extremist groups such as Patriot Prayer10 and Identity Evropa.11 An investigation of Facebook revealed that hundreds of members of law enforcement participate in hate speech and belong to anti-Semitic, anti-government, pro-Confederate, and white supremacist hate groups on the platform (Carless & Corey, 2019). This can make farright terrorism difficult to confront, or even discuss, in the U.S. without risking retaliation. Bad faith actors can and do willfully mischaracterize this as criminalizing patriotism in order to spur people into attacking their opponents (Levitas, 2004; Johnson, 2012; Zeskind, 2009). In recent years, people attempting to document the actions of far-right and white supremacist groups like the Proud Boys,12 The Oathkeepers, and Patriot Prayer have been harassed, threatened, and physically assaulted.13 , 14 Photographers have documented people at 9 Note: an “extremist group” is a group that adheres to the extremist ideologies defined previously but which does not necessarily engage in violence or terrorism in the pursuit of that ideology. 10 https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2019/02/portland-police-lieutenant-removed-from-rapidresponse-team-as-bureau-investigates-his-texts-with-patriot-prayers-joey-gibson.html. 11 https://www.huffpost.com/entry/virginia-cop-daniel-morley-identified-as-part-of-white-nation alist-group_n_5c90eb26e4b0d50545002d9e. 12 https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/proud-boys. 13 https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/domestic-terror-beat-brings-threats-risks-us-journalis ts-say. 14 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/14/doxxing-assault-death-threats-the-new-dan gers-facing-us-journalists-covering-extremism.

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far-right rallies wearing shirts with slogans urging violence against reporters.15 Far-right actors assaulted reported and called them “fake news” during the failed insurrection on January 6, 2021.16 Many academics and journalists who study and report on far-right violence have been harassed or threated because of their work (Waisbord, 2020). For example, Daryl Johnson was the target of a mass harassment campaign that almost destroyed his career after he wrote a report that acknowledged a law enforcement and military presence in domestic far-right extremist militias (Johnson, 2012). Taken with the evidence of current and former law enforcement and military support for and membership in far-right groups, unflattering coverage of far-right actors could leave reporters feeling especially vulnerable. At the time of writing, no credible evidence has come to light regarding a similar relationship between these institutions and other violent extremist ideologies.

Media Coverage and Terrorism Cultivation theory, one of the most enduring theories in communication research, asserts that media influence the public’s beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of the world around us (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). Because of these roles, media wield a great deal of political power (Iyengar, 1991). Drawing from communication literature, media use two primary mechanisms to structure information, draw audience attention to specific issues, and set the tone of discourse: agenda-setting and framing. Agenda-setting refers to media presenting a topic for discussion. Specifically, by giving (or failing to give) coverage to a topic, media set the tone for public awareness of an issue. Framing refers to how that coverage discusses issues and which aspects of the issue are made salient (Jensen, 2012; McCombs, 2005). Entman (2004) described framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events and issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, 15

https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/2019/10/13/this-t-shirt-advocates-for-lynching-journa lists-it-was-allowed-on-a-united-flight/?sh=48bf8de5d2de. 16 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/capitol-riot-media-attacks/2021/07/02/8af 871d2-daa7-11eb-bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html.

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evaluation, and/or solution.” Frames that reflect the beliefs and views of the dominant political culture are especially powerful because these frames come to be seen as common sense, which teaches and reinforces cultural norms (Entman, 2004). U.S. news media tend to explore social issues by focusing on single, discrete cases rather than focusing on related concepts and the context in which an event exists (Iyenger, 1991; Kim et al., 2010). This method of framing, called episodic framing, influences how people perceive an issue, its cause, and who is responsible for resolving it (Iyenger, 1991). In the absence of personal experience or additional information, framing has the potential to skew individuals’ understanding of the object or issues involved. For example, the consumption of terrorismrelated media increases a person’s fear of terrorism which increases their support for curtailing the civil liberties of Muslims (Nellis & Savage, 2012). Despite the prevalence of far-right terrorism in the U.S., evidence shows that U.S. print media grant much less press coverage to those attacks than to attacks by Islamists (Kearns et al., 2019a). This lack of coverage may erroneously indicate that far-right terrorism is relatively rare and less dangerous. Media also usually assume that far-right mass shooters work alone, are mentally unstable, and act out of an unfulfilled need to spread a message, while Muslims and people of color are depicted far less sympathetically (Gade et al., 2018; Powell, 2011). Violence perpetrated by far-right actors is also less likely to be framed as terrorism than violence perpetrated by Muslims (Arva et al., 2017; Gade et al., 2018; Mitnik et al., 2020; Powell, 2011). Coverage of far-right perpetrators focuses more on personal histories than ideological motivations to explain their attacks (Mitnik et al., 2020). While Dylann Roof explicitly admitted to attempting to spark a race war with the Charleston Massacre, media coverage of him tended to focus on his mental illness (Arva et al., 2017). Compare this to the coverage of Omar Mateen, who was depicted as a terrorist before his motivation and ideology were even known (Arva et al., 2017). Literature comparing depictions of far-right versus Islamist terrorism abounds

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(Arva et al., 2017, Betus et al., 2021; Kearns et al., 2019a; Mitnik et al., 2020; Powell, 2011). However, far-right causes are not monolithic. Media might be more likely to cover and accurately label certain forms of far-right terrorism.

The Present Study In this study, we examine media coverage of far-right terrorist attacks within the U.S. from 2006 to 2015. Prior research clearly shows that compared to attacks perpetrated by non-Muslims, Muslim-perpetrated attacks received a disproportionately large amount of media coverage, and the coverage of those attacks was significantly more likely to mention terrorism (citation(s)?). Accordingly, far-right attacks should generally receive less coverage and that coverage should be less likely to mention terrorism. What we do not yet know, however, is whether coverage of far-right attacks varies by their ideological motivation under the broader far-right umbrella. For example, far-right attacks can be motivated by white supremacy, anti-government sentiments, or anti-abortion views among many other ideologies. Here we focus on far-right attacks specifically to examine variation in both the amount of coverage that these attacks received and the likelihood that the coverage mentioned terrorism as a function of sub-motives in these attacks.

Method Data and Procedure In this chapter, we examine how U.S. print media covered far-right terrorist attacks from 2006 to 2015 compared to other attacks and the differences of this coverage within between the various far-right causes. To do this, we first identified all (n = 170) terrorist attacks in the U.S. during this 10-year period from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD codes at the event level—for example the Boston Bombing has four entries (one for each of the two bombs at the marathon finish line,

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one for the MIT police officer killed in Cambridge, MA, and one for the final standoff with one of the perpetrators in Watertown, MA). Since these attacks were reported on as one event, we collapsed attacks with the same perpetrator(s) into a single event. This yielded 136 terrorism events in the U.S. from 2006 to 2015. Importantly, 36 of the total terrorism episodes were not covered in the sources that we searched and thus are excluded from analyses of how media frame attacks. After identifying the universe of cases, we used LexisNexis Academic and CNN.com to pull U.S.-based print media coverage of each attack. LexisNexis Academic draws full-text articles from hundreds of media outlets, including national sources like The Washington Post and local sources from around the country. To supplement hard-copy coverage, we also searched CNN.com’s online archives. To find coverage, we searched for three main things: the perpetrator(s) (if known), the location, and other key words about each attack (e.g., “marathon” and “bombing” for the Boston Marathon bombing). Our initial goal was over-inclusion of potential articles to ensure that we did not exclude relevant coverage. To be included in the final sample, the article’s primary focus needed to be on the attack itself, the perpetrator(s), and/or the victims(s). To accomplish this, two researchers separately reviewed every potential article to decide if it met our inclusion criteria. Any article that did not meet these criteria was removed from the dataset. The types of articles that we removed most frequently were lists of terrorist attacks, articles focused on a policy position where the attack was used as an anecdote, and articles about memorials held cities other than where the attack occurred. Our dataset for analyses included 3,541 articles from U.S.-based sources that cover 136 terrorism episodes. Importantly, 36 of the total terrorism episodes were not covered in the sources that we searched and thus were excluded from our analyses of how media frame terrorist attacks. After identifying the news articles, two researchers then coded the entire dataset of 3,451 articles separately in Nvivo for 62 total terms to identify how often each term occurred in every article. The authors of this chapter then compared over 200,000 data points in these two datasets to find any coding discrepancies and address them prior to our

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analyses. Most discrepancies arose from Nvivo accidentally coding the URL or comments section or not understanding punctuation marks. In sum, the entire dataset was double-coded—both the articles included in it and the coding for each variable across all articles.

Variables Our primary outcomes of interest are the differences in how media agenda-set (the amount of coverage) and frame (how attacks are covered) terrorist attacks perpetrated by far-right actors versus other attacks and how agenda-setting and framing vary within the broader umbrella of far-right attacks. To examine agenda-setting, we counted the number of articles that covered each attack in our dataset across the media sources that we reviewed. To examine framing, we focused on whether an article referenced terrorism in its coverage. Using the coding method described in the previous paragraph, Krippendorff ’s alpha was above the common threshold of 0.8 for mentions of terrorism (α = 0.88) after our initial coding. The authors then reviewed and discussed all coding discrepancies individually to arrive at a final code for each article. Our main independent variables focused on the perpetrator(s)’s motive. We drew from the GTD coding summary, target type variables, group name variables, and the motive variable to identify the attack’s primary motive coding to identify which attacks were far-right perpetrated. Since we were also interested in any variation in coverage within different far-right motivations, we further coded sub-motives within this broader group. These categories are derived from potential submotivations for far-right extremism, which were not all present in this dataset and which are not mutually exclusive: white supremacist, antiimmigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-LGBTQ, anti-government, anti-abortion, Christian Identity, pro-Second-Amendment, and other. The authors separately coded the sub-motivations for each incident and found that the inter-rater reliability for codes (κ = 0.93) was above the commonly held threshold of 0.7 (Landis & Koch, 1977). We then discussed all of our coding discrepancies to arrive at our final codes for each incident. Of the 68 far-right attacks in our dataset, none had

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anti-LGBTQ or Christian Identity motivations. Given the small number of cases in this study, we collapsed codes for analyses into four categories: identity-based (white supremacist, anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim); anti-government; anti-abortion; and other. Note that two incidents (2.9%) and 21 articles (1.9%) are coded as both identitybased and anti-government, but there was no other overlap between sub-motive categories. Beyond the key independent variables for these analyses, our prior work on media coverage of terrorism showed that other factors can influence both the amount of coverage that attacks received and how that coverage framed incidents (Betus et al., 2021; Kearns et al., 2019a, b). Accordingly, we control for these factors in our analyses here. We created a binary indicator for whether any of the known perpetrator(s) were arrested. Drawing from GTD coding, we included binary variables for whether the perpetrator(s) were affiliated with a known group that uses terrorism and whether the attack targeted law enforcement or government. We measured fatalities based on GTD coding and excluded any perpetrator(s) killed in the attack. The GTD also includes a binary variable for whether there is any doubt that the incident meets all definitional criterial to be coded as terrorism. As a robustness measure, we estimate models including and excluding attacks where there is some doubt about inclusion in the GTD. Full replication materials for this chapter will be posted on the lead author’s website. Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for our variables across incidents and across articles.

Results Coverage of Far-Right Versus Other Attacks Our first set of analyses focuses on differences in both the amount of media coverage (agenda-setting) and how attacks are discussed in that coverage (framing) for far-right attacks versus other attacks. To examine differences in the amount of media coverage that attacks receive, we estimate a series of negative binomial regression models since the outcome variable is a count of the number of articles on each attack, as shown in

Dependent Variables Number of articles per incident overall Number of articles per far-right incident Article mentions terrorism overall Article covering far-right incident mentions terrorism Independent Variables by All Incidents (N = 136) Far-right perpetrator Perpetrator arrested Target law enforcement/government Number killed Does not meet all criteria for terrorism Independent Variables by Far-Right Incidents (N = 68) Motive: identity-based Motive: anti-abortion Motive: anti-government Motive: other Perpetrator arrested Target law enforcement/government Number killed Does not meet all criteria for terrorism Independent Variables by All Articles (N = 3,541) Far-right perpetrator Perpetrator part of a Known Group Number killed

Variable

Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics

26.0 (62.3) 16.6 (35.8) – – – – – 0.7 (2.4) – – – – – – – 0.5 (1.5) – – – 4.00 (4.8)

50.0% 47.1% 20.6% – 16.9% 66.2% 22.1% 11.8% 2.9% 57.4% 8.8% – 17.7% 31.9% 11.6% –

Mean (SD)

– – 39.1% 15.0%

Frequency

– – 2

– – – – – – 0 –

– – – 0 –

3.5 2.0 – –

Median

(continued)

– – 0–15

– – – – – – 0–9 –

– – – 0–15 –

0–460 0–178 – –

Range

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– – – – – – 2.8 (2.9) –

13.8% 51.6% 30.7% 17.4% 2.2% 3.8% – 11.5%

Does not meet all criteria for terrorism Independent Variables by Far-Right Articles (N = 1,129) Motive: identity-based Motive: anti-abortion Motive: anti-government Motive: other Perpetrator part of a Known Group Number killed Does not meet all criteria for terrorism

Mean (SD)

Frequency

Variable

Table 5.1 (continued) Median

– – – – – 0 –

–

Range

– – – – – 0–9 –

–

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Table 5.2. Guided by our prior modeling approach in similar analyses comparing coverage of Muslim-perpetrated versus non-Muslim perpetrated attacks (Kearns et al., 2019a, b), we estimate models with just a binary indicator for whether the attack had a far-right motive (Models 1 and 3). We also present models that control for three other factors— whether the perpetrator was arrested, whether the target was government or law enforcement, and the number of people killed—that impact how much coverage an attack receives (Models 2 and 4). Models 1 and 3 use the full sample of 136 attacks while Models 2 and 4 include only attacks where there is no doubt that they are terrorism according to the GTD. In the constrained models (1 and 3), there is no difference in the amount of coverage that far-right attacks receive as compared to other attacks. However, when controlling for other factors that influence the amount of coverage received, far-right attacks receive on average 66% less coverage than other attacks in the full sample and 63% less coverage in the sample of incidents where there is no doubt that they are terrorism Table 5.2 Amount of news coverage by terrorism episode

Far-right motive

All attacks (N = 136)

Attacks with no doubt that they are terrorism (N = 113)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

−0.76†

−1.07** (0.32) [−66%] 1.67*** (0.27) [434%] 0.86* (0.39) [137%] 0.43*** (0.12) [54%]

0.71 (0.48) [−30%]

−1.00** (0.32) [−63%] 1.65*** (0.35) [419%] 0.51 (0.40) [66%] 0.46*** (0.12) [59%]

(0.41) [−53%] Perpetrator arrested

Target law enforcement/government Number killed

Negative binomial regression models. Constants not reported Coefficients are presented with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses Percent change in expected count reported in brackets Significant results in bold † p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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according to the GTD. As expected from our prior work, attacks generally receive more coverage when the perpetrator is arrested, when the target is law enforcement or government, and when more people are killed. Next, we examine differences in the likelihood that an article mentions terrorism, as shown in Table 5.3. Since our outcome variable here is binary, we estimate a series of logistic regression models. Again, guided by our prior modeling approach (Betus et al., 2021), we estimate models with just a binary indicator for whether the attack had a far-right motive (Models 5 and 7) and then we control for other factors—if the perpetrator was part of a known group that uses terrorism and the number of people killed—that influence whether an article mentions terrorism (Models 6 and 8). Like we did above, we estimate these models with the full sample (Models 5 and 6) and with only attacks where there is no doubt that they are terrorism in the GTD (Models 7 and 8). Across all models, the odds that an article mentions terrorism are between 78 and 85% lower if the incident had a far-right motive. Additionally, when the perpetrator was part of a known group that uses terrorism, the odds Table 5.3 Does the article mention terrorism?

Far-right motive Perpetrator part of known group Number killed

All articles (N = 3,541)

Articles for attacks with no doubt that they are terrorism (N = 3,053)

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

0.17*** (0.05)

0.22*** (0.08) 5.31*** (2.19) 1.06 (0.04)

0.15*** (0.05)

0.18*** (0.06) 3.76** (1.45) 1.04 (0.04)

Logistic regression models. Constants not reported Odds ratios are presented with standard errors clustered on the attack in parentheses Significant results in bold † p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

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that an article mentions terrorism increase by between 276 and 431% depending on the sample. The number of people killed is not related to the odds that an article mentions terrorism.

Variation in Coverage Within Far-Right Attacks Our next set of analyses examine variation in both the amount of coverage (agenda-setting) and how attacks are discussed in that coverage (framing) for different sub-motivations within far-right terrorist attacks. While there are numerous potential sub-motivations that fall under the far-right umbrella, we collapse these into four basic categories—identitybased, anti-abortion, anti-government, and other—and use identitybased as our reference category in analyses. We follow the analytical approaches for the models in Table 5.2 to examine potential differences in agenda-setting and for the models in Table 5.3 to examine potential differences in framing within far-right attacks. In models examining variation in media coverage within far-right attacks, we exclude the control variable for targeting law enforcement or government since one of the sub-motives is anti-government. Table 5.4 presents models examining potential variance in agendasetting within far-right attacks. In the constrained models (9 and 11), there is no difference in the amount of coverage that identity-based attacks receive relative to anti-abortion, anti-government, or other farright attacks. When control variables are included, anti-government incidents receive 291% more coverage than identity-based attacks in the full sample (Model 10), though this effect disappears when the sample is limited to only attacks where there is no question that they are terrorism in the GTD. In the full models, the amount of coverage similarly increases if the perpetrator is arrested and when more people are killed. Table 5.5 presents models that examine potential variation in the likelihood that an article covering attacks with different far-right motivations mentions terrorism. Across models, there is no difference in the likelihood that an article mentions terrorism between anti-abortion and anti-government attacks relative to identity-based attacks. The odds

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Table 5.4 Amount of news coverage by terrorism episode between far-right motives

Motive: anti-abortion

Motive: anti-government

Motive: other

Perpetrator arrested

Number killed

All attacks (N = 68)

Attacks with no doubt that they are terrorism (N = 56)

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

0.57 (0.87) [76%] 0.63 (0.63) [87%] −0.05 (9.73) [−5%]

0.59 (0.52) [80%] 1.36** (0.46) [291%] −0.74 (8.68) [−52%] 1.71*** (0.44) [452%] 0.72*** (0.18) [104%]

0.49 (0.90) [63%] 0.50 (0.88) [64%] 0.57 (0.45) [77%]

0.54 (0.49) [71%] 1.25† (0.64) [249%] −0.09 (0.48) [−9%] 1.64** (0.50) [413%] 0.68** (0.23) [97%]

Negative binomial regression models. Constants not reported Coefficients are presented with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses Percent change in expected count reported in brackets Significant results in bold † p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

that an article covering an attack with other far-right motives mention terrorism are between 77 and 82% lower than for an article covering identity-based attacks. When looking at coverage of all far-right attacks (Model 14), whether the perpetrator was part of a known group that uses terrorism is not related to the odds that articles about that attack mention terrorism. Surprisingly, when limited to coverage of attacks where there is no doubt that they are terrorism (Model 16), articles covering attacks where the perpetrator was part of a known group that uses terrorism were significantly less likely to mention terrorism. There is no relationship between the number of people killed and the odds that an article covering a far-right attack mentions terrorism.

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Table 5.5 Does the article mention terrorism between far-right motives?

Motive: anti-abortion Motive: anti-government Motive: other Perpetrator part of known group Number killed

All articles (N = 1,129)

Articles for attacks with no doubt that they are terrorism (N = 999)

Model 13

Model 14

Model 15

1.05 (0.49) 0.67 (0.29) 0.22*** (0.08)

1.09 (0.43) 0.80 (0.27) 0.23*** (0.06) 0.32† (0.20) 1.03 (0.09)

0.92 (0.46) 0.73 (0.30) 0.19*** (0.08)

Model 16 0.87 (0.37) 0.79 (0.26) 0.18*** (0.06) 0.25* (0.15) 0.99 (0.08)

Logistic regression models. Constants not reported Odds ratios are presented with standard errors clustered on the attack in parentheses Significant results in bold † p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Discussion Consistent with our previous research, far-right attacks receive between 63% (constrained model) and 66% (full model) less coverage than attacks motivated by other ideologies. Yet, differences in the amount of coverage granted by sub-motivation do not exist in the full model, whereas the constrained model shows that anti-government attacks generated nearly three times the coverage of identity-based attacks. The reason for this is currently unclear, but it may be related to the notion that someone attacking a government or law enforcement target with political intent, rather than, for example, because of a personal grievance or for material gain, is simply more existentially threatening and thus more newsworthy. When using the full model, the perpetrator getting arrested and the number of fatalities increase the amount of coverage, but this effect is not present when we use the constrained model. Again, the reasons for this are currently unclear, but it is possible that people

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simply expect someone who had committed crimes that are easily classified as terrorism by the GTD to be arrested and to have killed people, rendering these details less attention-grabbing or noteworthy. Regarding how these articles are framed, articles covering far-right attacks have 78% (full model) to 85% (constrained model) lower odds of referencing terrorism. The perpetrator belonging to a known group that uses terrorism also increases the odds of terrorism being referenced between 276% (full model) and 431% (constrained model). This is unsurprising, since a connection to an established terrorist group greatly reduces ambiguity and potential backlash for framing the incident as terrorism. Interestingly, the number of fatalities is not related to the odds that an article on a far-right attack referenced terrorism. We have previously found that the number of fatalities increased coverage when looking at the overall dataset (Kearns et al., 2019a), which makes this finding stand out even more. While we cannot definitively say why this occurred, we cannot rule out simple bias. Looking at the differences between the amount of coverage of attacks and how the coverage framed those attacks, the constrained model shows no significant differences in the amount of coverage between identity-based attacks (our reference category) and anti-government, anti-abortion, or other far-right attacks. When using the full model and controlling for whether the perpetrator was arrested and the number of fatalities, anti-government attacks receive 291% more coverage than identity-based attacks. The full model also reveals that whether there was an arrest and the number of fatalities both increase the amount of coverage of far-right attacks. Attacks in the “other” far-right category are less likely to reference terrorism when comparing to attacks in the identity-based category in both the full (77% lower) and constrained (82% lower) models. This might be due to attacks within this category being motivated by very specific ideologies that readers may not be able to easily recognize. Interestingly, examining the effects of group membership on framing reveals that, in the full model, belonging to a known group that uses

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terrorism does not significantly impact the odds that an article references terrorism. When we look at the constrained model, belonging to a known far-right group actually decreases the odds of the coverage referencing terrorism. This could indicate a reluctance to potentially antagonize far-right groups by describing them as terroristic.

Conclusion In this chapter, we see that there are clear differences in agenda-setting (amount of coverage) and framing (how attacks are described) between far-right attacks and other attacks in the U.S. Yet, there is less variance in both agenda-setting and framing between sub-motivations of the broader far-right umbrella. Like any study, our findings are not without limitation and room for expansion. We limit our data to print media coverage of attacks in the U.S., so these findings may not replicate to other forms of media coverage or media coverage in other countries, which are two directions for future research. Additionally, with the news sources selected here, we are unable to systematically examine differences in coverage as a function of a news organization’s ideological perspectives, which is another avenue for further exploration. Until recently, policymakers and the public have been generally reluctant to acknowledge and address far-right terrorism (citation needed?). As shown in this chapter, media also cover these attacks less and are less likely to use the word terrorism to describe them. Together, this suggests that attention is being overly focused on some terrorist threats while other real threats to our security are largely ignored or underplayed. While we see similarities between how media cover terrorism and how the public perceives terrorism, more research is needed on the interplay between media and public opinion in this area.

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References Arva, B., Idris, M., & Pervez, F. (2017). A fair press? The American media’s coverage of terrorism. https://sites.google.com/view/fouadpervez/res earch/media-bias-in-terrorism-coverage?authuser=0 Betus, A. E., Kearns, E. M., & Lemieux, A. F. (2021). How perpetrator identity (sometimes) influences media framing attacks as “terrorism” or “mental illness”. Communication Research, 48(8), 1133–1156. Brookings Institute. (2016, June 15). Islamism, Salafist, and Jihadism: A primer. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-sal afism-and-jihadism-a-primer/ Carless, W., & Corey, M. (2019, June 19). To protect and slur: Inside hate groups on Facebook, police officers trade racist memes, conspiracy theories and Islamophobia. Reveal-Center for Investigative Reporting. Retrieved August 1, 2019, from https://www.revealnews.org/article/inside-hate-gro ups-on-facebook-police-ofcers-trade-racist-memes-conspiracy-theories-andislamophobia/ Chermak, S. M., & Gruenewald, J. (2006). The media’s coverage of domestic terrorism. Justice Quarterly, 23(4), 428–461. Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. FBI Counterterrorism Division. (2006, October 17). White supremacist infiltration of law enforcement. Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Assessment. Retrieved July 23, 2020, from http://s3.documentcloud.org/doc uments/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infltration.pdf FBI Counterterrorism Division. (2015, April 1). Counterterrorism policy directive and policy guide. Retrieved July 23, 2020, from https://archive.org/det ails/CounterterrorismPolicyDirectiveAndPolicyGuide/mode/2up Gade, E. K., Card, D., Dreier, S. K., & Smith, N. A. (2018). What counts as terrorism? An examination of terrorist designations among US mass shootings. Talk presented at 2018 Political Methodology Conference, Salt Lake City, UT. Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. (1976). Living with television: The violence profile. Journal of Communication, 26 (2), 182–190. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1460-2466.1976.tb01397.x Goldwag, A. (2012). The new hate: A history of fear and loathing on the populist right. New York : Pantheon Books.

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Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Jensen, K. B. (2012). Media effects: Quantitative traditions. In K. B. Jensen (Ed.), A handbook of media and communication research: Qualitative and quantitative methodologies (pp. 138–155). London and New York: Routledge. Johnson, D. (2012). Right wing resurgence: How a domestic terrorist threat is being ignored . Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login. aspx?direct=true&db=cat06552a&AN=gsu.9923172653402952&site=edslive&scope=site Kearns, E., Betus, A., & Lemieux, A. (2019a). Why do some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others? Justice Quarterly, 36 (6), 985– 1022. https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1524507 Kearns, E., Betus, A., & Lemieux, A. (2019b). When data do not matter: Exploring public perceptions of terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Kim, S.-H., Carvalho, J. P., & Davis, A. G. (2010). Talking about poverty: News framing of who is responsible for causing and fixing the problem. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 87 (3–4), 563–581. Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. Biometrics, 159–174. Levitas, D. (2004). The terrorist next door: The militia movement and the radical right. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press. McCombs, M. (2005). A look at agenda-setting: Past, present and future. Journalism Studies, 6 , 543–557. Mitnik, Z. S., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. M. (2020). Post-9/11 coverage of terrorism in the New York Times. Justice Quarterly, 37 (1), 161–185. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2018.1488985 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from http://www. start.umd.edu/gtd Nellis, A. M., & Savage, J. (2012). Does watching the news affect fear of terrorism? The importance of media exposure on terrorism fear. Crime & Delinquency, 58(5), 748–768. Powell, K. A. (2011). Framing Islam: An analysis of US media coverage of terrorism since 9/11. Communication Studies, 62(1), 90–11. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10510974.2011.533599

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Waisbord, S. (2020). Mob censorship: Online harassment of US Journalists in times of digital hate and populism. Digital Journalism, 8(8), 1030–1046. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1818111 Zeskind, L. (2009). Blood and politics: The history of the white nationalist movement from the margins to the mainstream. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.

6 Check All That Apply: Challenges in Tracking Ideological Movements That Motivate Right-Wing Terrorism Erin Miller, Elizabeth A. Yates, and Sheehan Kane

Introduction Around the world, people and nations are experiencing a wave of rightwing political activity. A highly visible and tragic dimension of this phenomena is the spate of recent mass casualty terrorist attacks in Western Europe and certain countries which were once European “settler colonies” (Australia, Canada, the United States, and New Zealand). However, the specific parameters of violent trends remain obscured, disputed, and undefined (Ravndal, 2019). This is especially true with respect to movement-level analysis of right-wing violence. Among the E. Miller (B) · E. A. Yates University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Kane Human Rights First, Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_6

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continuously circulating debates, scholars ask: Is this primarily a continuation of a white supremacist phenomenon—along the lines of historical neo-Nazi, skinhead, and Klan violence? What is the relationship between the growth of new movements, such as incels or contemporary conspiracy theorists, and older, more established elements of the right wing? And ultimately, what is new or unique about this wave, the forces driving it, and its potential paths forward? Quantitative data has the potential to illustrate and clarify movementlevel trends, but event data often lacks the detail and nuance to answer such questions. Our recent analysis of right-wing terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 2000 to 2020 addresses this gap by classifying events according to perpetrator motivations and movement affiliations (Miller et al., 2022). However, this process is not straightforward. Our goal here is not to present a quantitative analysis; instead, we discuss three primary challenges to characterizing meaningful patterns: (1) substantial overlap and diversity in ideology and membership among far-right movements and actors; (2) ambiguity regarding which aspects of an individual assailant’s identity or belief system are relevant to their use of violence; and (3) inconsistent availability of relevant event and perpetrator information. These challenges associated with disaggregating data on terrorist attacks motivated by right-wing ideologies are important for two interrelated reasons. First, scholars typically agree that right-wing movements are not monolithic and, while they share common themes, treating them as a single entity when analyzing patterns of violence risks ecological fallacies influencing conclusions and policy recommendations (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Gattinara et al., 2020; Miller-Idriss, 2020). Second, individual attacks may be carried out by people motivated by a multidimensional ideological orientation, which impacts even the most basic quantitative analysis. Structured datasets that accommodate only a single dimension of ideological motivation for a given attack may fail to capture important dynamics. To address these issues, we developed a multilevel coding schema that identifies both broad ideological movements and specific motivational animus associated with right-wing attacks in the GTD. This allows coders to check all categories that apply to each attack rather than treating them as mutually exclusive. In this chapter,

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we discuss the methodological challenges and corresponding strategies we implemented while using open-source data to capture nuanced trends in right-wing terrorism documented in the GTD.

Background: Defining Right-Wing Terrorism Among scholars, there is no universally accepted lexicon to discuss the milieu we refer to as “right-wing.” Some existing schemas impose a theoretical axis that differentiates specific ideas as outside of mainstream thought. For example, Jackson (2019: 4) emphasizes right-wing movements’ common objective of preserving or restoring traditional politics and identifies “right-wing extremism” as “purposeful disruptive political behavior that… in reaction to perceptions of negative change, aims to revert fundamental features of the political system to some imagined (though not necessarily imaginary) past state.” Mudde’s (2017) widely cited designation emphasizes an orientation toward the existing political system, distinguishing between the “extreme right” which rejects liberal democracy entirely, and the “radical right,” which rejects only some elements of liberal democracy; both of which he includes under the broader “far right” category. Berger (2018) instead focuses on the social orientation of individuals and actors, classifying “extremists” generally as those who identify and impose specific terms of interaction between “in-group” and “out-group” members. Jupskås and Segers (2020: 7) incorporate both social and political dimensions of ideology, defining “right-wing extremism” as “anti-democratic opposition towards equality.” Within these theoretical bounds, scholars usually identify specific ideas, movements, and ideologies, such as white supremacism, xenophobia, fascism, ethno-nationalism, and anti-government extremism, among others. Theoretical schemas and definitions are useful heuristic devices, but researchers face challenging questions in application. Many of these definitions rely on relative distinctions that require differentiation between “mainstream” and “extreme,” or entirely anti-democratic or only partly, for example. This process is also complicated by the recent “mainstreaming” of previously fringe ideas into political institutions and dialogues

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(Jackson, 2019; Miller-Idriss, 2020). In wrestling with these challenges, scholars sometimes describe various movements without articulating the ideological linkages that theoretically justify the initial categorization or detailing the coding schemas they applied in specific cases. Furthermore, even carefully crafted and operationalized definitions are sometimes no match for the intricacies of real-world human actors who are not inclined to fit their complex and often vaguely articulated beliefs neatly into textbook categories. Although such difficulties are generally endemic to this type of social science research, we attempted to address these challenges as effectively as possible, based on the practical constraints of our data and our analytical objectives. Given this project’s central goal to quantify the diversity of right-wing movements that engage in terrorism, we adopted ideological parameters that are inclusive of the various movements, organizations, and motivating ideas that are broadly understood as “right-wing.” The GTD defines terrorist attacks as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to achieve a political, religious, social, or economic goal, through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2021). The information in the GTD is drawn from open-source reporting. Inclusion in the database requires that an attack have an ideological motive, but there are no requirements about what particular type of ideology is invoked, and the database does not categorize the general ideology that motivated each attack. For this project, we define “rightwing terrorism” as terrorist attacks (per the GTD) that were motivated by ideologies that advocate a return of certain elements of society (and its various political, economic, and cultural institutions) to some imagined historical state (Jackson, 2019), in western history.1 These historical fantasies are typically characterized by a hierarchical society in which specific populations dominate, and/or exclude others (Jupskås & Segers, 2020; Miller-Idriss, 2020; START, 2018). They also explicitly or implicitly reject the central tenets of liberal democracy, such as majority rule, minority rights, freedom of the press, and separation 1

This study focuses on right-wing terrorism in the “western” context, a decision made because of the strong historical and contemporary connections between such movements the United States, Western Europe, and other “settler” countries, due in part to the relative availability of English-language content and source material.

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of powers (Jupskås & Segers, 2020; Miller-Idriss, 2020; Mudde, 2017). Ideological representations of this historical moment may or may not be accurate. Further, this imagined history may undergird direct and articulated goals, such as a return to the gender norms of the pre-Second Wave feminist era. Or, they may merely be invoked in vague references meant to encourage movement identification, like the use of traditional Greek and Roman symbols to represent white European identity. In such cases, movement leaders advocate for a return to specific political arrangements in western history, even if they are not suggesting a literal return to an entire lifestyle from generations past. Within these broad parameters we find attacks associated with many right-wing movements and motivations, including white supremacism, anti-Muslim extremism, male supremacy, anti-government extremism, social fundamentalism, and others.

Quantitative Data on Right-Wing Terrorist Attacks Detailed quantitative data on right-wing violence are relatively scarce and, where this information exists, it typically fails to capture the overlap and evolution of movement affiliations among perpetrators. The three major datasets specifically tracking far-right violence in the United States and Europe include the Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence Dataset (RTV), the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), and Perliger’s dataset on far-right violence in the United States (Freilich et al., 2018; Perliger, 2020; Ravndal et al., 2020).2 These projects have substantially advanced quantitative knowledge of right-wing violence by tracking numbers of incidents, perpetrator group and/or movement information, and target identities. This foundational work outlines the landscape of right-wing extremist violence and identifies defining trends. While this research has been critical in identifying right-wing violence as an enduring and complex threat, each of the three major datasets is 2 While the Global Terrorism Database includes right-wing attacks, to date it has not systematically distinguished them from attacks motivated by other ideologies.

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limited in terms of publicly available, nuanced, movement-relevant data. RTV shows organizational affiliation but does typically not categorize by broader ideological movement, ECDB focuses on victim target type but does not provide structured perpetrator movement affiliations, and reports from Perliger’s dataset also do not appear to support multiple assailant affiliations. This relatively limited emphasis on the motivational dimension of attacks obscures potential relationships and comparisons between and among distinct movements, especially over time and across particular ideological or organizational boundaries. For example, in an analysis of the ideological dimensions of antiabortion violence, Perliger (2020) concludes that anti-abortion actors tend to have the narrowest focus among far-right actors, as over 90% of their targets are abortion-related. According to his data, rarely do other “groups,” such as militia members and Christian Identity adherents, target abortion providers. This data point buttresses a common view of the right wing (not one Perliger advances), that emphasizes racist and anti-government ideologies and sometimes goes so far as to locate anti-abortion violence entirely outside of the right-wing ideological landscape. However, our overlapping and multi-level coding schema indicates that anti-abortion attacks are often motivated by additional ideological views. In fact, of the ten anti-abortion terrorist attacks with named perpetrators in our data, half reflect additional ideologies, including three classified as anti-government and three as xenophobic. One such case is Robert Dear’s 2015 attack at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs, where he killed three people and injured nine (Slevin, 2020). Dear is a devout Christian who reportedly drew a cross in blood on the wall during the attack and has made explicit statements indicating that his attack was motivated by his anti-abortion views (Robb, 2016). However, he was also obsessed with the federal siege in Waco, Texas—a major touchstone for anti-government extremists—and consumed enormous amounts of conspiracy theory-promoting material which posited the U.S. federal government as a controlling force intent on violating citizens’ liberty. Dear initially intended to attack FBI agents, but shifted his focus to Planned Parenthood after determining that agents were too difficult to target. Prior to the attack, he had no known association with other violent right-wing organizations or actors.

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The only other ideologically motivated crime the assailant carried out was an act of vandalism targeting another abortion-providing clinic. Thus, most datasets would typically identify Dear’s fatal attack exclusively as anti-abortion, excluding acknowledgment of anti-government sentiment. Our decision to adopt a “check all that apply” strategy to documenting right-wing ideologies illuminates a more complete tapestry of movements, belief systems, and influences. And, in doing so highlights the nuances associated with right-wing terrorism that might otherwise be overlooked by large-N analysis. In this case, the data suggest that antiabortion assailants—even if organized and acting independently from other right-wing groups—are often integrated into the broader rightwing scene, at least at the level of ideological consumption. It follows that anti-government motivation might play an even larger role in animating right-wing violence than existing data would indicate. By using a multi-level coding schema, our approach addresses a gap in quantitative research on right-wing violence that has neglected the integration and interaction of movement ideologies among violent actors. This research speaks to critical questions such as: What qualifies as “rightwing terrorism?” What are the relative frequency, lethality, and tactical strategies of terrorist attacks linked, even secondarily, to various rightwing ideological movements? What is the relationship between contemporary and historical movements within this milieu? What ideological and organizational elements are the primary drivers of violence?

Perpetrator Information in the GTD It is important to note that our observations discussed here are limited to terrorism. A substantial number of attacks, specifically hate crimes carried out by those with right-wing motivations, take place spontaneously (Sweeney & Perliger, 2018). Decisions about including an event in the GTD are based on information about the assailant, the target, and the tactics reported in open-source media accounts (START, 2021). As a database of terrorist attacks, the GTD includes only acts of physical

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violence for which there was some degree of intentionality or premeditation and excludes most attacks that might be classified as hate crimes, vandalism, spontaneous protest violence, domestic violence, or violence carried out in direct response to law enforcement actions. Unsuccessful attacks or threats are included in the database only if the assailant makes an attempt to carry out the attack and there is a real possibility of violence. Attacks exclusively targeting property qualify as violent acts if they involve firearms, explosives, or arson. Therefore, for example, graffiti spray-painted on a synagogue or a brick thrown through the window of a mosque do not qualify for inclusion in the database. The perpetrator details documented in the GTD characterize the information that is reported about the individual assailants, groups, or organizations responsible for carrying out the attack. The perpetrator group name recorded may be a named organization, a generic identity, or “Unknown” in cases where there is no information available about the assailants. The research team records a named organization only if the attack was specifically claimed, attributed to, or suspected of being carried out by that group in source documents. Claims of responsibility may include manifestos, statements made on social media, self-identification, or messaging left at the scene of the attack. If the attack is not connected to a named organization, but information about the general identity of the assailant(s) is reported, the research team will record the generic perpetrator identity associated with the attack. For example, attacks may be attributed to or claimed by “white supremacists/nationalists,” “incel extremists,” “neo-Nazi extremists,” or “anti-LGBT extremists.” In cases where no perpetrator group is identified and multiple generic identities are applicable, GTD researchers base the coding on the identity most specific to the attack in question. For example, if a mosque is targeted and there is no attribution or claim of responsibility by a formal extremist group, but sources indicate Islamophobia as a motive, the group name would be recorded as “anti-Muslim extremists,” even if “white supremacists/nationalists” or “anti-immigrant extremists” would also be applicable. In cases where little information is available and the significance of the target or messaging is inconclusive, but where there is information indicating a right-wing ideology is behind the attack, the

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research team may record a more general identity, such as “Right-wing extremists.”

Auxiliary Classification of Right-Wing Attacks The purpose of the current project was to build on the GTD to create a dataset of right-wing terrorist attacks and to classify them in more detail according to movements and motivations. The observations discussed in this chapter are based on our work reviewing the attacks documented in the GTD that took place in Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Western Europe between 2000 and 2019. We conducted extensive supplemental research on these cases, based on open-source reporting, to gather information about the ideological movements and motives of the assailants that may not have been included in the original GTD record. We consider “movements” the broader, first-level dimension to this schema, and identify six categories of right-wing movements, requiring at least one of them for inclusion in this dataset3 : • • • • • •

Anti-government Male Supremacism Opposition to the Political Left Social Reactionary/Fundamentalism White Supremacism Xenophobia.

To establish these first-level classifications, we incorporated information from the event itself, including target selection and messaging associated with the attack, as well as any available information about the ideological beliefs or affiliations of the perpetrator generally, even if not demonstrated in connection with the attack in question. For example, in 2009 3 We use “movement” here in a very broad sense, meaning a network of people and organizations linked by political ideas, cultures, identities, and shared spaces (Johnston, 2014; Melucci, 1996; Miller-Idriss, 2020). Importantly, we include individuals who are consciously active in political movements, as well as perpetrators whose actions and expressions implicitly reflect exposure to or the influence of a movement.

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James von Brunn shot and killed a security guard at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (Stout, 2009). Although the target indicates that the attack was motivated by von Brunn’s white supremacist views (particularly anti-Semitism), sources indicate that he also had a history of anti-government activity, including anti-government violence. Because our strategy for first-level categories blends event-level information with assailant-level information to more holistically capture ideological influences, we classified the 2009 Holocaust Museum attack under white supremacism and xenophobia, as well as anti-government, even though the attack did not directly target the government. In addition to the first-level categories, we classified each case based on second-level categories, which are more specific and focused narrowly on motivation of the attack in question. These include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Anti-Abortion Anti-Asian Anti-Black Anti-Immigrant Anti-Latinx Anti-LGBTQ Anti-Middle Eastern Anti-Muslim Anti-Native Anti-Semitic Ku Klux Klan Militia Neo-Nazi Sovereign Citizen.

Unlike the first-level categories, we did not require categorization to a second-level category. For some attacks, the available information only supported classification into the broader categories. Like the first-level categories, each attack may be classified into any of the second-level categories that are applicable, but we based second-level categorization only on information about the particular attack. For example, in a case where an assailant identified as a “skinhead” attacks a Muslim institution, we

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coded the event as white supremacist and xenophobic in the first level, and neo-Nazi and anti-Muslim in the second level. If reports showed that the Muslim institution was targeted because it hosted an immigrant population, we include the second-level coding for anti-immigrant. If the perpetrator had previously attacked an LGBTQ-associated bar, the attack on the Muslim institution would be classified as social reactionary/fundamentalism based on the assailant’s history of anti-LGBTQ violence. However, we would not code the attack on the Muslim institution as anti-LGBTQ because this second-level ideology is not directly relevant to the specific attack in question. At the event level, it is reasonable to make assumptions about higher levels of abstraction (e.g., a neo-Nazi is a white supremacist) but not necessarily lateral levels of abstraction (e.g., an anti-Semitic person is also anti-Muslim). With this strategy in mind, we reviewed the details of more than 1,600 terrorist attacks and integrated available information about the perpetrator’s broader ideological views and influences with the specific motivations and targeting choices associated with individual attacks. Although we include information on the target type, relying only on the identity of the victim might obscure relevant event-specific information. For example, we classified Robert Bowers’ 2018 mass shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh as both white supremacist and xenophobic (first level), and anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant (second level). In this case, the assailant’s online messages posted shortly before the attack indicated that he targeted the synagogue not only as a Jewish institution but more specifically because of his intense animosity toward HIAS, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (Granick & Tevis, 2018; Renshaw, 2018). The Tree of Life Synagogue did not have a direct affiliation with HIAS, yet this case illustrates close ties between anti-Semitism and xenophobic, nativist beliefs.

Key Challenges While completing this initiative, we made several observations that warrant dedicated discussion because of their implications for research— particularly quantitative research—on right-wing terrorism. These

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include substantial overlap and diversity in ideology among right-wing movements and actors, ambiguity regarding which aspects of an individual assailant’s identity or belief system are relevant to their use of violence, and inconsistent availability of relevant event and actor information. We review these issues below, drawing on specific examples of complex cases. Note that some cases are relevant to more than one of these issues, and all cases are influenced by the volume and detail of the information available about the attack and the attacker.4

Overlap Among Right-Wing Movements and Actors Individual actors may be influenced by multiple facets of diverse ideologies at any given time. We noted that the belief systems assailants promote can be complex and inconsistent, and sometimes do not align well with theoretical paradigms. This is especially true in the Internet age, when individuals have access to massive amounts of content and propaganda, without traditional gatekeepers in groups or institutions, allowing actors to pick and choose various elements of movements or ideologies as they like (Blee, 2018). The target itself is only one indicator of motivation. Identifying and quantifying the ideological overlap among perpetrators reveals critical trends, including the prominence of some ideologies or movements relative to others, shifts over time, and the relationship between ideologies and certain types of targets. In our dataset of nearly 700 right-wing terrorist attacks, one-quarter (25%) of all attacks had more than one first-level ideology classification. The people who were killed in this subset of attacks comprise nearly three-quarters (72%) of all deaths in right-wing terrorist attacks in the scope of the project, a fact which reflects the uneven availability of ideological information associated with different types of attacks. Likewise, 4 In our dataset of 698 right-wing terrorist attacks, 193 were carried out by identified individuals who were not known to be affiliated with a formal group, and 72 were attributed to named organizations—which may or may not be well-known with established messaging and clear motives. The majority of attacks (n = 433) were carried out by unidentified assailants, and determinations about the perpetrators’ motives were made based on the attack characteristics and messaging. Even among cases with identified perpetrators, extensive detail about ideology and motivations found in assailant manifestos and communications is not typically available.

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we classified more than one-quarter (28%) of the attacks using multiple second-level ideology categories, with these attacks representing more than half (60%) of all deaths. We expect that if detailed perpetrator identity and ideology data were available for more attacks, these figures would be considerably higher. In one influential example, Anders Breivik carried out two terrorist attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 (CNN, 2021). Breivik first detonated a car bomb targeting the office of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and then proceeded to Utøya Island, where a Labour Party youth camp was taking place. He posed as a police officer and carried out a mass shooting on the island. Breivik killed 77 people and injured 75 across both attacks. Prior to the attack, Breivik compiled a 1,500page manifesto (von Brömssen, 2013). Based on the contents of his manifesto, we classified both of Breivik’s attacks using the first-level categories of male supremacism, opposition to the political left, social reactionary/fundamentalism, white supremacism, and xenophobia. This case demonstrates the ideological complexities and shifting rhetoric within the violent right wing. Breivik’s belief that women should hold traditional, subservient roles and his complaint that the Labour Party advanced the rise of feminism in Norway suggest that the attacks were partly motivated by anti-feminist, male supremacist, social reactionary views (von Brömssen, 2013). Additionally, Breivik’s manifesto promotes the view that multiculturalism is evil and poses a dire threat to European identity and civilization, a clear manifestation of xenophobia (Bangstad, 2014). Furthermore, his decision to target left-oriented political institutions and actors reflected his belief that the political left is responsible for advancing the social and political changes he opposed. While most right-wing actions could be described in opposition to the political left in some manner, Breivik and others like him reflect a specific element of the right-wing that is highly focused on organized leftists—for example, the “anti-antifa” rhetoric of right-wing activists in the United States (ADL, 2021a). Finally, while some have argued that Breivik’s emphasis on Christian and European identity as opposed to white identity distinguishes him from traditional white supremacists (e.g., Hegghammer, 2011), we find this distinction to be more qualitative than categorical. Breivik’s emphasis on socio-cultural characteristics rather

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than racial ones may reflect some level of ideological shift, but ultimately, it is largely a rhetorical one (Bangstad, 2014). Like all social movements, the rhetorical and ideological emphasis of white supremacism has transformed to better fit the grievances and dialogues of contemporary recruits, without abandoning the core prejudice and violence on which it is based. That is, they kept the socio-religious-cultural arguments (which have always played a prominent role in white supremacism), but publicly abandoned the race-based ones. This process is evident in the self-described “white separatists” and “white nationalists” who, behind closed doors, typically remain attached to the racist worldviews of their ideological predecessors (ADL, 2021b; Hughey, 2012). In addition to these first-level categories, we classified Breivik’s attacks using the second-level categories of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim based on his hatred of multiculturalism and repeated references to the “Islamization” of Europe as a motivation for his attacks targeting the Labour Party (Reuters, 2011). Breivik’s multi-faceted ideological commitments illustrate the necessity of accurately capturing overlapping motivations among and within cases. In the time since his attacks, he has come to be viewed as a hero by certain right-wing actors—explicitly embraced by hate group members and individual terrorists, and implicitly referenced in numerous right-wing manifestos produced by terrorists in the last decade as justification against a range of targets (Berger, 2019; Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021). While Breivik’s attacks and views gained international notoriety in in 2011, the attacks by Richard Baumhammers in the United States present an earlier example of overlapping ideological motives within the right-wing sphere. On April 28, 2000, Baumhammers went on a targeted shooting spree, carrying out six separate attacks in Monaca and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Lash & Collier, 2000). He killed five people and injured one across all six attacks, targeting members of the Jewish community, as well as Indian-Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Black Americans. In a manifesto recovered at his home, Baumhammers argued for expanded rights for European-Americans and condemned multiculturalism and immigration from “third-world” countries as “detrimental to White Americans” and “disastrous for Americans of European

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ancestry” (Roddy, 2000). Baumhammers signed the manifesto as the “chairman” of “The Free Market Party” (Roddy, 2000). Based on the information in his manifesto, we classified all six of Baumhammers’ attacks using the first-level categories white supremacism and xenophobia. Given the diversity of targets Baumhammers attacked, we classified each attack using second-level categories according to the specific motivation for target selection. Two attacks were anti-Asian, one was anti-Black, two were anti-immigrant, and three were anti-Semitic. We classified all six as neo-Nazi based on Baumhammers’ use of a swastika during the series of attacks. Baumhammers’ hatred of multiculturalism manifested racist, anti-immigrant, neo-Nazi, and religious antipathies, illustrating how right-wing assailants can have overlapping motivations and diverse targets even on a single day. Finally, in a case that illustrates the international links between the shared views of right-wing assailants, Patrick Crusius opened fire on a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, on August 3, 2019, killing 23 people and injuring 23 more (Martinez, 2020). Prior to carrying out the attack, Crusius posted a manifesto online in which he announced his intention to target the Latinx community. In the manifesto, Crusius (2019: 1) stated “This attack is a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas. They are the instigators, not me. I am simply defending my country from cultural and ethnic replacement brought on by an invasion.” Crusius (2019: 4) also complained about “race mixing” and advocated for physical separation of people into territories by race, claiming this would “improve social unity by granting each race self-determination within their respective territory(s).” Based on these motivations, we classified this attack using the first-level categories white supremacy and xenophobia. Since Crusius targeted members of the Latinx community and stated that he was influenced by his perception of “the Hispanic invasion of Texas,” we classified the second-level categories as anti-Latinx and anti-immigrant. Although Crusius targeted Latinx people, he drew inspiration from Brenton Tarrant, who killed 51 people less than five months earlier in a mass shooting at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand (BBC, 2020). Crusius (2019: 1) stated “In general, I support the Christchurch shooter and his manifesto.” This is in reference to the

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document Tarrant posted online detailing his white supremacist and antiimmigrant beliefs and influences (Smith et al., 2019). Tarrant’s attack specifically targeted Muslims, but his rhetoric indicates broad motivations, including white supremacy and anti-immigrant sentiment. While Crusius supported Tarrant, Tarrant, in turn, identified Anders Breivik as his “true inspiration” (Macklin & Bjørgo, 2021: 16). By capturing the overlapping ideological commitments of these assailants, our coding schema supports a more comprehensive accounting of particular ideological themes within white supremacist movements. Put simply, it allows us to more completely answer the basic question of how many anti-immigrant terrorist attacks took place, for example. It also allows us to locate the attackers more precisely within the landscape of violent, right-wing actors and acts. Baumhammers, Breivik, Tarrant, and Crusius attacked different targets, selected based on political, religious, ethnic, and racial identity groups relevant to their particular local context. However, they clearly share a common hatred of multiculturalism that underpins their motivations and might otherwise be overlooked in an analysis of structured data.

Diversity Among Right-Wing Movements and Actors The ideological and organizational diversity within the right-wing terrorist milieu presents several challenges to researchers. How can movements with conflicting core tenets be lumped together? And if they are, what are the theoretical or policy implications of including them both? In contrast, given that so many movements and ideologies draw on the same principles, symbols, rhetoric, and tactics, how does one meaningfully differentiate between them? Addressing the difficult questions of diversity within right-wing movements and motivations is critical to understanding shifting trends. An example of a right-wing movement that does not fit neatly into a conventional framework of right-wing beliefs is the so-called incel or “involuntarily celibate” movement. Incel beliefs are distinct from the more dominant white supremacist, xenophobic, and anti-government right-wing ideologies in several ways. First, people who identify as incels

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have expressed a variety of ideological claims that span the political spectrum, even supporting a left-wing political candidate (Yang, 2019). Second, individual adherents include people from a range of racial and ethnic demographics, supposedly contradicting the central racism that undergirds much of right-wing extremism. Third, incel assailants frequently emphasize numerous personal grievances, including but not limited to loneliness and misfortune in relationships. Observers often interpret these personal grievances as the primary motivation for violence perpetrated by incels (e.g., Candea & Mooney, 2014). At the same time, however, incels share some of the foundational ideological views of other right-wing movements. Their central belief that men are inherently entitled to sex with women and that this “right” has been thwarted by the sexual liberation of women (Kelly et al., 2021) is entirely consistent with gender ideologies of other violent rightwing movements. Like white supremacy and ethno-nationalism, incels commonly blame feminism for transformations in gender norms, argue that white men are now the most marginalized and maligned people in society, and advocate for a return to the rigid and oppressive gendered expectations of historical eras (Hoffman et al., 2020; Pruden et al., 2021). Incel ideology clearly demands a return to historical arrangements that were exclusive and hierarchical (START, 2018), and thus falls clearly within our study’s definition of the right wing. Assailants promoting these views have carried out terrorist attacks in California, Florida, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, as well as in Ontario. But including terrorist attacks carried out by incel extremists in our study of right-wing terrorism does not merely expand the data to include more movements and specific events. Rather, it reveals critical patterns among right-wing ideologies and actors. For example, while researchers have typically focused on the racist ideologies of white supremacism, the similarities in the gender ideologies of incels and white supremacists highlight the importance of misogynist ideas within white supremacy (ADL, 2018; DiBranco, 2020). For example, sexual liberation among white women is seen by white supremacists as a threat to the white race, in terms of sexual reproduction, cultural perpetuation, and white men’s control in society (Blee, 2002; Perry, 2004). Male supremacists similarly view women’s sexual liberation as a threat that challenges

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their supposedly natural dominance of women (ADL, 2018). Furthermore, despite the racial diversity among incels, their expressed racial ideologies have much in common with white supremacist movements (Pruden et al., 2021). That is, even the non-white adherents express racist views—toward people of other races and even themselves—essentially advancing a white supremacist hierarchy in which people of European heritage are considered more beautiful and thus more worthy of affection, resources, and power (Lavin, 2020). Among the attacks motivated by male supremacism in our dataset, at least two-thirds were also characterized by white supremacism. And of course, incels are not the only contemporary right-wing movement to include non-white adherents. In fact, anti-government, nationalist, Identitarian, and other groups have prominent non-white members. While these organizations may not always advance racist ideologies with the same rigid and uncompromising demands of unambiguous white supremacists, clear evidence of ethno-nationalism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism frequently permeate the rhetoric of such movements (e.g., in the case of the Proud Boys, see Kutner, 2020). The fact that the most infamous incel terrorist, Elliot Rodger, is a mixed-race individual—who expressed racist derision toward interracial couples—draws attention to the complex racial dynamics of the contemporary right wing. That is, the presence of racial diversity does not negate racism among right-wing ideologies, but does indicate its evolution. Similarly, the diversity of economic and sometimes political views among incels highlights the collectivism and anti-capitalist ideologies of fascist and authoritarian arms of the right wing—a sector which may be growing—even as it contradicts the typically individualist beliefs of strident anti-government extremists. Finally, given the acceptability of sexism in society generally, the explicit misogyny of incels makes male supremacy a gateway to the most violent arm of the right wing, white supremacy (ADL, 2018; Lavin, 2020). Thus, by imposing a theoretically established and consistently applied definition of “right-wing,” our project reveals shifting boundaries and expressions in movements across the landscape.

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Ambiguous Motivations The examples above all represent situations where we have a substantial amount of information about the assailants’ motives, even if they are complex or diverse. The attackers made statements—in some cases lengthy diatribes—before, during, or after the attack, or the identity of the target provided a clear indicator of the attackers’ antipathy. In fact, these cases are relatively rare. In contrast, there are many attacks where there were specific indications or symbols invoked that suggest the assailant was at least partly motivated by right-wing ideologies, but the evidence is far more ambiguous. Sometimes the indicators of an attacker’s right-wing beliefs are not particularly prominent or emphatic. Sometimes the facts of the case involve a combination of indicators that suggest the assailant was motivated by personal grievances or objectives in addition to ideological views. Sometimes, the assailant is not identified at all. In these situations it can be difficult, if not impossible, to effectively weigh the relative influence of motivations for a violent attack. Even when the identity of the assailant is known, they may provide minimal indication of the reasons for their actions. Terrorist attacks where the assailant and the victims know each other can be among the most difficult for parsing motives. Did the attacker choose a familiar target because of personal grievances associated with the victims, or out of convenience and accessibility? Are indicators of ideological beliefs central to the attacker’s objectives, or secondary? For example, when Nikolas Cruz attacked his former high school in Florida in 2018, shooting and killing 17 people and injuring 17 others, he had a clear history of violence, disciplinary issues, mental health concerns, and interactions with law enforcement (Washington Post, 2018). Sources report that students who knew him were afraid of him, he had stalked a female classmate, he emotionally abused another female acquaintance who had rejected him (sending her harassing text messages up to and including on the day of the shooting), and he had made threats against the school (Haag & Kovaleski, 2018; Ostroff et al., 2018; Ovalle & Nehamas, 2019). However, in addition to a litany of interpersonal conflicts, Cruz reportedly engaged in racist, homophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant,

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and misogynist hate speech on social media (Murphy, 2018). His messages posted prior to the attack included derogatory slurs and threats of violence. Like Breivik and Rodger, Cruz expressed particular hatred for white women in interracial relationships. He had worn hate symbols and racist slurs on his backpack, and on the day of the shooting, he used 30-round ammunition magazines etched with swastikas (McMahon, 2018). Cruz continued to espouse right-wing views while in jail, writing letters in which he complained about immigrants, stating with no apparent irony, “I feel like there is a reason why we’re trying to stop immigrants. They attack people, destroy property and spread disease. It’s a big issue. I’m waiting for the moment when society collapses because of one of these issues,” (Norman, 2019). Non-ideological indicators like personal grievances and mental illness do not negate ideological indicators, but they may obscure our understanding of an assailant’s motives. In some cases, there may be limited information available about the assailant’s motives, even if the individual is identified. In particular, if the attacker does not survive the attack authorities will not have an opportunity to question them, and there may be less emphasis on pinpointing their motive if no court trial takes place. Stephen Paddock’s 2017 mass shooting in the United States is an example of this scenario. From the window of a hotel room in Las Vegas, Paddock shot at a massive crowd attending an outdoor concert, killing 58 people and injuring hundreds of others before killing himself as law enforcement closed in on him (Lombardo, 2018). The FBI did not identify evidence of a motive, speculating that Paddock carried out the attack because he sought notoriety (Balsamo & Ritter, 2019; FBI, 2019). However, unidentified witnesses indicated that Paddock was motivated by anti-government conspiracy theories, and he carried out the attack to “wake up the American public and get them to arm themselves” (Francis, 2018; Miller, 2018). This major attack—an active shooter assault on a crowd of tens of thousands leading to hundreds of casualties—has serious implications for violence prevention. Analysts investigating patterns of violence must proceed with caution. If we overlook the attack entirely because evidence on the question of motivation is relatively murky, we might fail to account for scenarios where serious acts of violence motivated by

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right-wing movements are preceded by little or no advanced warning of ideological grievance, even among associates of the attacker. In general, our experience evaluating these attacks revealed numerous cases in which the motivations were complex or ambiguous, consistent with conclusions made by Horgan and his colleagues, who found that lone actor terrorist attacks in particular are “usually the culmination of a complex mix of personal, political and social drivers that crystalize at the same time to drive the individual down the path of violent action” (2016: 34). While terrorist actors necessarily communicate motivations to a larger audience, they are likely to obscure and/or emphasize views and motivations for strategic reasons. That is, researchers must acknowledge that we sometimes see what the perpetrators want us to see. Of particular relevance, they may hide more extreme views or affiliations. For example, Breivik’s manifesto drew largely on widely accessible and even popularly cited sources. Furthermore, when he circulated his work prior to his attack, he purposefully avoided sending it to anyone with extremist affiliations, apparently trying to avoid associating his acts with extremist movements (Seierstad, 2015). And yet, after his conviction, he made a Nazi salute in court and, according to the attorney general, was focused on effecting a fascist revolution (Doyle, 2017). The question of whether this dynamic is indicative of variation in ideological commitment is an important area of inquiry. Cases where the attacker appears to lack a full-fledged, well-defined ideological purpose, or is not particularly vocal about it, or appears to adopt symbols or snippets of ideologies out of convenience rather than sincerely held beliefs, are not uncommon. In some situations, these fragmented indicators may even be in direct contradiction to each other. For example, in 2017 William Atchison opened fire at his former high school in the United States, killing two students before killing himself. Atchison— who reportedly engaged in racist, anti-liberal, anti-LGBTQ discussions online, and wore Nazi symbols and misogynist slogans on his skin—was also obsessed with school shootings generally (Bryan, 2018; Gallagher,

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2017; Kellogg, 2018). He claimed his online activity was harmless satire, or “trolling” to irritate people.5 We encountered other attacks where the assailant’s motivation appeared to be less grounded in a profound ideological belief system, and more a matter of highly partisan opposition, based in contemporary, popular political discourse. In 2018, weeks before the November midterm election in the United States, Cesar Sayoc sent 16 package bombs to high-profile targets he viewed as opponents of President Trump (Mullins, 2020). The devices were safely defused. Sayoc, who did not engage in politics prior to 2015 and is described as a “Trump superfan,” seems to have developed right-wing political views out of reverence for the President and a belief that Trump’s supporters were being persecuted and “are not going to take it anymore.” Similarly, in 2017 Mitchell Adkins attacked people with a machete at a university coffee shop in Kentucky, injuring two (Cheves & Eads, 2017). He selected victims after asking their political affiliation and telling one person who self-identified as a Republican, “you are safe.” Adkins had previously complained at length about being ostracized due to his support for President Trump and Republican Kentucky Governor, Matt Bevin. We classified these cases using the “opposition to the political left” category. Although source documents indicate that the assailants’ motives were clearly political, there is little indication about which, if any, traditional right-wing world views they espoused. That said, these attacks illustrate the limitations of open-source research for comprehensive accounting of individuals’ beliefs and motivations. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argue that, rather than being a mechanism for radicalization, ideology provides a justification or rationalization for violence. Others, including Sageman (2017: 6) characterize political violence as a product of in-group/out-group conflict derived from self-categorization and social identity, “a quick, natural, associative, emotional, effortless, and automatic process of simplifying our 5 “Trolling” is often found in communications produced by violent, right-wing assailants. Tarrant, the Christchurch shooter whose messaging was rife with sarcasm, irony, misdirection, memes, and inside jokes indicated that he intended to “agitate [his] political enemies … into action, to cause them to overextend their own hand and experience the eventual and inevitable backlash as a result” (Victor, 2019).

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environment in order to make sense of it…” This is a phenomenon observed across ideologies. We have recently seen several examples of the nexus between western right-wing beliefs and jihadism, illustrating the blending of ideologies and central focus on mass violence. For example, Coleman Blevins, who was charged in 2021 in connection with a plot to carry out a mass shooting at a Walmart in the United States, reportedly expressed white supremacist beliefs, but also embraced jihadism and made jihadist references (Miller & Gais, 2021). Furthermore, in today’s “networked” structure of movements, individual actors likely move within and among groups and spaces—on and offline—consuming content from a range of sources, and interacting with various sources of influence (Blee, 2018; Castells, 2012; Melucci, 1996). While this phenomenon does not diminish the significance of an assailant’s ideology or motives, it may indicate a qualitative difference that is important for analysts to recognize.

Inferences Based on Targets Finally, the challenges posed by cases where we have little or no information about the attacker are among the most difficult to evaluate. These include attacks involving arson or explosives targeting places of worship (e.g., mosques, synagogues, churches with predominantly Black congregations), medical facilities that provide abortions, or private businesses owned by immigrants or racial and ethnic minorities. These attacks sometimes take place while the building is unoccupied, with the intention of causing damage to property rather than injuries to people. We classified the ideology variables for these attacks normally, but marked them as “target-based coding” in order to distinguish them from other attacks where we have more explicit information about the assailant’s motivation. It is important to note that if there is another likely explanation for the attack we did not include it in our dataset of right-wing terrorist attacks. For example, an arson at a synagogue would be excluded from our dataset if sources indicate that it took place within the context of hostilities over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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While these targeted attacks are not typically mass casualty events, they are important for analysis because of their frequency and impact on quality of life and sense of security among marginalized populations. In our review, we identified nearly 45% of the right-wing attacks based only on the symbolic identity of the target as a person or institution typically maligned by right-wing ideologies and actors, rather than explicit messaging or information about the perpetrator’s ideology. This figure includes attacks on refugee centers and abortion clinics where there was no other indicator of motivation. Among the attacks classified based on the identity of the target, none resulted in any deaths, but more than 30 did result in injuries. For example, in 2016 an assailant attacked Syrian refugees with pepper spray outside a welcome ceremony in Vancouver, Canada, injuring 15–30 people (Baker & Larsen, 2016). Likewise, a 2015 fire at a refugee shelter in Heppenheim, Germany injured five people, and sources noted that it was the latest of more than 100 arson attacks targeting asylum shelters in Germany in recent months (Reuters, 2015). Not only does this represent an important pattern that might be overlooked if the dataset excluded attacks lacking assailant information, it suggests that even including these attacks constitutes a severe under-representation of similar events likely motivated by xenophobia. Compared to analysis of domestic Islamist terrorism in the West, studying right-wing terrorism may be especially difficult in this regard, for several reasons: In the United States, far-right crimes are generally prosecuted at the state level, according to a range of statutes and procedures, making public documents and news coverage much more difficult to access, and likely obscuring the ideological dimension of many incidents (Bennett et al., 2009; Taylor, 2019). Also, the political and racial dimensions of right-wing terrorist attacks may make them less likely to receive media attention (Kanji, 2018; Taylor, 2019). Finally, historically, violent assailants associated with right-wing movements have typically used less sophisticated, lower-level tactics (Perliger, 2013)—those less likely to garner news coverage.

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Conclusion and Implications We undertook this auxiliary data collection effort with two objectives in mind. One was pragmatic—we intended to improve the usefulness of the GTD for providing accurate answers to basic questions about the motivations of right-wing terrorist attacks. Due to the limitations of the existing GTD data structure it was difficult to report, for example, the total number of anti-Semitic terrorist attacks that have taken place. Our second objective was to facilitate analysis of the various movements that fall under the “right-wing” ideological umbrella, so researchers can more effectively leverage the GTD to better understand the dynamics of rightwing movements engaging in terrorist violence. In the course of this project, our “check all that apply” strategy highlighted several key challenges to classifying right-wing terrorist attacks and accurately modeling this phenomenon in a structured database. We observed considerable overlap between right-wing movements and considerable diversity among the particular motivations and ideological beliefs of right-wing assailants. We also discussed the significance of documenting cases in which the motivations were ambiguous, which may be important for understanding the relationship between ideology and the use of violence, and for understanding patterns of communication among those who engage in ideological violence. Finally, we noted the importance of documenting attacks with unidentified perpetrators. Accepting that it can be difficult to conclusively establish the motive of these attacks with absolute certainty, the risks of disregarding them are also problematic, given their frequency and impact. Although we present these observations as “challenges,” this is mainly a reference to the task of fitting complex human beliefs and behaviors into simplified boxes for the purpose of analysis. The observations we discuss here have important implications for future research and present clear opportunities for more nuanced quantitative analysis of right-wing terrorism. We encourage analysts to recognize, as many already do, that the ideological category of right-wing terrorism is comprised of multi-faceted actors and different types of attacks. These may necessitate unique considerations with respect to risk assessment and theory development. We also encourage researchers—particularly those conducting

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quantitative analysis—to consider how decisions regarding data structure can easily obscure these patterns, potentially producing inaccurate inferences. Finally, we note that even the more comprehensive assessment we conducted here likely understates the degree of ideological complexity associated with right-wing violence. In addition to the fact that this analysis addresses only terrorist attacks, excluding broader categories of political violence such as spontaneous hate crimes or protest violence, the inherent limitations of open-source research for discovering the motivations of assailants are evident. In many instances, particularly those cases where the perpetrators of violence are never identified, the full spectrum of relevant motivations and movements remains unknown.

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Hughey, M. (2012). White bound: Nationalists, antiracists, and the shared meanings of race. Stanford University Press. Jackson, S. (2019). A schema of right-wing extremism in the United States. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://icct.nl/publication/ a-schema-of-right-wing-extremism-in-the-united-states/ Johnston, H. (2014). What is a social movement? Polity Press. Jupskås, A. R., & Segers, I. B. (2020). What is right-wing extremism? The Center for Research on Extremism. https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/gro ups/compendium/what-is-right-wing-extremism.html Kanji, A. (2018). Framing Muslims in the “War on Terror”: Representations of ideological violence by Muslim versus non-Muslim perpetrators in Canadian national news media. Religions, 9 (9), 274. Kellogg, J. (2018, August 11). Aztec High shooter visited ‘neo-Nazi’ websites, father says. Albuquerque Journal . https://www.abqjournal.com/1207945/ aztec-high-shooter-visited-neonazi-websites-father-says.html Kelly, M., DiBranco, A., & DeCook, J. (2021). Misogynist incels and male supremacism: Overview and recommendations for addressing the threat of male supremacist violence. New America. https://www.newamerica.org/pol itical-reform/reports/misogynist-incels-and-male-supremacism/ Kutner, S. (2020). Swiping right: The allure of hyper masculinity and cryptofascism for men who join the Proud Boys. The International Centre for CounterTerrorism. https://icct.nl/publication/swiping-right-the-allure-of-hyper-mas culinity-and-cryptofascism-for-men-who-join-the-proud-boys/ Lash, C., & Collier, G. (2000, April 30). Returning to the scenes of the crimes. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. https://old.post-gazette.com/regionstate/20000430r oute5.asp Lavin, T. (2020). Culture warlords: My journey into the dark web of white supremacy. Hachette Books. Lombardo, J. (2018). LVMPD criminal investigative report of the 1 October mass casualty shooting. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/1-October-FIT-CriminalInvestigative-Report-FINAL_080318.pdf Macklin, G., & Bjørgo, T. (2021). Breivik’s long shadow? The impact of the July 22, 2011 attacks on the modus operandi of extreme-right lone actor terrorists. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15 (3), 14–36. Martinez, A. (2020, July 9). Suspect faces new federal charges in El Paso Walmart mass shooting. El Paso Times. https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/ news/crime/2020/07/09/patrick-crusius-faces-new-federal-charges-el-pasoshooting/3286985001/

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Ovalle, D., & Nehamas, N. (2019, January 7). Parkland shooter’s mom hated Trump. When she died, he put a Trump hat in her casket. Miami Herald. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article223374745.html Perliger, A. (2013). Challengers from the sidelines: Understanding America’s violent far-right. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://www. ctc.usma.edu/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-vio lent-far-right/ Perliger, A. (2020). American Zealots. Columbia University Press. Perry, B. (2004). “White genocide”: White supremacists and the politics of reproduction. In A. L. Ferber (Ed.), Home grown hate: Gender and organized racism. Routledge. Pruden, M. L., Lokmanoglu, A., Peterscheck, A., & Veilleux-Lepage, Y. (2021). Birds of a feather: A comparative analysis of white supremacist and violent male supremacist discourses. In B. Perry, R. Scrivens, & J. Gruenewald (Eds.), Right-wing violence in North America. Ravndal, J. A. (2019). Right-wing terrorism and violence may actually have declined: Here’s why the way it’s measured matters. Monkey Cage, The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/02/is-rightwing-terrorism-violence-rise/ Ravndal, J. A., Lygren, S., Jupskås, A. S., & Bjørgo, T. (2020). RTV trend report 2020: Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe, 1990– 2019. The Center for Research on Extremism. Renshaw, J. (2018, October 27). Who is Robert Bowers, the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting suspect? Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uspennsylvania-shooting-suspect/who-is-robert-bowers-the-pittsburgh-synago gue-shooting-suspect-idUSKCN1N10S6 Reuters Staff. (2011, July 24). Factbox: Excerpts from 1,500-page Norway killer manifesto. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-manife sto-factbox/factbox-excerpts-from-1500-page-norway-killer-manifesto-idU STRE76N14J20110724 Reuters Staff. (2015, September 3). German police say five people hurt in fire at refugee shelter. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/europe-migrantsgermany-fire-idAFL5N11A02R20150904 Robb, A. (2016, December 19). The making of an American terrorist: Robert Dear shot up a Planned Parenthood clinic and killed three people. Did the right-wing media help turn a disturbed loner into a mass murderer? The New Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/138950/mak ing-american-terrorist-robert-dear-planned-parenthood

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Part II Diversity Within the Right-Wing Extremist Movement

7 “We Are the News Now”: The Role of Networked Conspiracy and the Quebec “Tweetosphere” in Shaping the Narrative Around the Anti-COVID-19 Restrictions Samuel Tanner and Aurélie Campana

In the aftermath of the assault on the Capitol in Washington, D.C. on 6 January 2021, the administrators of Facebook and Twitter closed the pages and accounts of many vocal far-right militants and groups, including QAnon, in the United States and other Western countries such as Canada. This decision followed more limited attempts to shut down militants’ social media accounts in the past following government pressure on these organizations. It also reopened recurrent debates on the role of social media in the construction and propagation of far-right

“We Are the News Now” (#100_III).

S. Tanner (B) Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] A. Campana Université Laval, Québec City, QC, Canada

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_7

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ideologies and the role of big tech organizations in regulating messages published on their platforms. Researchers have looked at the impact of social media on the elaboration and diffusion of far-right discourse, as well as its effect on the mainstreaming of fringe ideas, particularly those on the extreme right of the political spectrum (e.g. Caiani and Patricia, 2015; Conway et al., 2019; Froio and Ganesh, 2019; Lumsden and Harmer, 2019; Gaudette et al., 2020; Heft et al., 2020; Wahlström et al., 2020). Although there are a growing number of studies on regulatory and policy issues (e.g. Gillepsie, 2018; Roberts, 2019; Ganesh and Bright, 2020), many questions remain underexplored, such as how technology and social media affect the shaping and proliferation of fringe ideologies and conspiracy theories or, more specifically, its effect on the materiality and performativity of social media. The materiality of a system or object—here social media—refers to both its structure (what it is) and its effects (what it does) (Drucker, 2013). While some attention has been paid to the materiality of technology in its relation to far-right and conspiracy theories (e.g. Siapera and Viejo-Otero, 2021; Crosset et al., 2019), much remains to be done to better understand how interactions between a system—here social media or digital platforms—its users, and its audience shape discourses and their circulation. This chapter uses Actor-Network Theory (Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1994, 2005; Law and Hassard, 1999) to at least partially fill this gap. Our main objective is to analyze the assemblage of conspiracy theories that proliferated about COVID-19 and the preventive measures instituted by governments. Doing this requires examining the content of these theories as well as the role of the different actors involved. We focus on the Twitter accounts that promoted resistance to the preventive measures put in place by the Canadian and Quebec authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic, hereafter referred to as the resistance Tweetosphere, particularly as they operated in the Province of Quebec, Canada. We analyze tweets posted during the two last weeks of March 2020 following the Quebec government’s imposition of a complete provincial lockdown after the discovery of the first cases of COVID-19 and show that the increase in number and virulence of these tweets was not

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a linear process but an iterative process characterized by a high degree of ideological differences among those posting as well as a number of technical constraints. Many of the activists involved in framing the narrative against preventive measures had contributed in the recent past to the production and diffusion of anti-pluralist, anti-immigration, antigovernment, and/or anti-system views. Subjects traditionally associated with far-right ideological discourse (such as concerns about immigration) were progressively pushed into the background as issues related to the management of the pandemic, theories and ideas concerning it, and discussion of the “return” of the state became prominent.

Networked Conspiracies and the Role of Soft Leaders Although the concept of conspiracy theories became popular in the 1960s and 1970s (Butter and Knight, 2015: 23), such theories have appeared in different epochs and cultures throughout history. Crises of all sorts tend to increase their visibility and resonance, particularly (but not only) in poor and powerless populations that are strongly affected by unexpected and rapid changes that lead to uncertainty and fear (Van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017). Indeed, conspiracy theories have been said “to provide a key” to understanding many political cultures throughout history, from the ancient Athenian and Roman cultures (Roisman et al., 2006; Pagán, 2008) to the contemporary political culture of the Middle East (Pipes, 1996: 1). In 2014, Uczinski and Parent argued that the advent and growing popularity of social media had not led to a spike in conspiracy theories (Uczinski and Parent, 2014). However, this conclusion may have to be revisited in the aftermath of the 2016–2020 Trump presidency, which epitomized a “return to paranoiac style to American politics” (Hellinger, 2019). Both the 2020 US presidential campaign and the COVID-19 restrictions have been important instigators of conspiracy theory ideation and circulation, reflecting the main features of the so-called “post-truth” era (McIntyre, 2018): an increasingly polarized news media landscape, a multiplication of alternative media, and an “increasingly visible emotionality in political life” (Boler and Davis,

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2018). Truth is no longer based on verifiable facts but on emotions, beliefs, and feelings (McIntyre, 2018). Objective facts have less effect on the fabric of public opinion than appeal to personal emotions and beliefs (Flintham et al., 2018). We tend to think that this phenomenon is a feature of our contemporary era, but Robert K. Merton had already noted in the 1940s that “Public definitions of a situation (prophecies of predictions) become an integral part of the situation and, as such, affect its subsequent developments. This is peculiar to human affairs. It is not seen in the natural world” (Merton, 2016: 506). It does, however, give misinformation, including conspiracy theories, greater resonance. Diverse in their nature and content, conspiracy theories are usually based on the premise that a powerful person or a group of persons is acting secretly to deceive and enslave people as a way to gain power or profit. Konda defines conspiracy theories as “a narrative centered on the idea that a malevolent group of people is conspiring to bring about some state of affairs to the detriment of the people in general” (2019: 11). Two strains have been dominant in this thinking: the role of supposed secret societies, such as the Freemasons, the Illuminati, or the Reptilians, in governing the world and the role of Jew in instigating actions intended to lead to world domination (Pipes, 1996). As a “tradition of explanation, characterised by a particular rhetorical style” (Byford, 2011: 5), conspiracy theories controvert the official version of history and provide an alternative interpretation of an event or a chain of events that is based on an emotional new (alternative) reading of facts. Although conspiracy theories provide an often simplistic and comforting answer to the many questions raised by a crisis, close examination shows that their affect-oriented structure and content lead to a high degree of complexity (Zwierlein, 2013: 69). As well, several conspiracy theories, sometimes with contradictory elements, may arise at the same time and attempt to make sense of the same event (Wood et al., 2012). All offer “a counter discourse of some sort, that is, a discourse seeking to challenge the orthodox or dominant explanation for an event” (Konda, 2019: 10). They are not necessarily completely disconnected from scientific theories or from common sense knowledge but they distort original meanings to construct a narrative that “appl[ies] to new circumstances, the body of knowledge, the explanatory logic, and

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rhetorical tropes expounded in texts, books, or pamphlets written and published by conspiracy theorists in the past” (Byford, 2011: 6). Particularly in marginalized groups (Zwierlein, 2013: 69), conspiracy theories have been a catalyst for extremism (Van Prooijen et al., 2015). Some researchers have even suggested a direct connection between the rise of far-right movements and parties and the spread of conspiracy theories (Bergmann, 2018: 3). Although many forms of extremism are plagued with conspiracy theories, conspiracy as a system of beliefs remains “primarily associated with the political Right” (Konda, 2019: 9). Conspiracy theories and far-right movements nurture each other, based on their high degree of distrust of ruling political, economic, and cultural elites in Western societies and, sometimes, lack of faith in democracy. The rapid circulation of information and misinformation on the Internet, particularly on digital platforms, has increased the level of convergence of these two phenomena. In the spring of 2020, when many governments announced lockdowns to prevent or stop the spread of COVID-19, digital platforms became a major window on the world for many people as well as a place to discuss the different aspects of the pandemic and the measures governments and international organizations were taking to try to stop it. Misinformation, including conspiracy theories, spread as quickly as the virus. Pandemics and infodemics often go hand in hand. Misleading information about medical data, its interpretation, and treatment (Tomes, 2020), as well as about medical, social, and political measures aimed at preventing the disease is often widely spread. Social media have not only strengthened the association between misinformation about disease, possible cures, and conspiracy theories but they have also made it harder to control the spread of conspiracy theories (ibid.). The contemporary media ecosystem, including digital platforms, is a powerful vector of dissemination and amplification in the public space. These platforms can be seen as “a set of applications and software based on the ideology and technical foundations of web 2.0, which enable the creation and exchange of user-generated content and play a full role in the choices users make regarding the organisation of their lives and their relationships with their environment” (Kaplan and Haenlein,

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2010: 60, cited in Van Dijck, 2013: 4). Technological communication capabilities, including artificial intelligence, Big Data, algorithms, and digital platforms—with their biases—profoundly influence the information economy. Everyone with a keyboard and a minimal mastery of technologies can affect the public space by producing and relaying fake news and conspiracy theories (Wilbur, 2020). This phenomenon is amplified by what some have called “computational propaganda”—“the assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data tasked with the manipulation of public opinion” (Wolley and Howard, 2019: 4). Computational propaganda is dedicated to influencing politics and is an important example of how information technologies can be used for social control. We use the concept “soft leaders” to capture the role of those who have used digital platforms to shape an anti-restriction narrative. Gerbaudo defines soft leaders as “influential Facebook admins and activist tweeps [and Youtubers] who become choreographers, involved in setting the scene and constructing an emotional space within which collective action can unfold” (Gerbaudo, 2012: 5). They can be seen as influencers, “people who shape public opinion and advertise goods and services through the ‘conscientious calibration’ of their online personae” (Lewis, 2018: 4). While the anti-restriction activists are obviously not selling goods or services, as creators of content they “adopt the techniques of influencers to build [an] audience …” and, in their function of producing, relaying, and making conspiracy theories viral, may be considered to be “political influencer[s]” (Lewis, 2018: 4). Capability and visibility are important for influencers but they are not all that is needed (Soares et al., 2018). High levels of activity on digital platforms, and particularly on Twitter, enhance the visibility of an issue and increase its circulation. In this very fragmented setting where it is easy for single-issue silos, which often act as echo chambers, to develop, the structure of digital platforms and the possibilities they provide create both opportunities and constraints for influencers. The nature and structure of digital platforms “affect the nature of influence”, which has become “networked influence” (Grudz and Wellman, 2014). As Tufekci notes, “As technologies change, and as they alter the societal architecture of visibility, access, and community, they also affect the contours of

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the public sphere, which in turn affects social norms and political structures” (2017: 6). In the next section, we propose a new theory for social media—the Actor-Network Theory (ANT)—that provides new theoretical insights into how soft leaders or political influencers on Twitter shape and circulate conspiracy theories.

Methodology: An ANT Perspective on Conspiracy Theories. Conspiracism, a system based on the belief that nothing is as it seems, nothing happens by accident, and everything is connected (Barkun, 2003),1 can be understood as an ecosystem made up of activists, theories (content), technologies (digital media platforms, such as Twitter, but also bots2 ), and audiences. All these elements interact and influence each other, affecting not only how information is consumed but also what is consumed. For example, digital media platforms have become a central source of information to the point where some groups in society get their news almost exclusively from Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter (boyd, 2019). There has been abundant documentation of the way digital platforms use algorithms to tailor information to consumer preferences, excluding information that conflicts with these preferences (Bronner, 2021; Noble, 2018; Pasquale, 2015). The way actors interact with such platforms thus affects the nature of information they receive, potentially affecting their opinion on issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that the materiality of technology and digital media platforms should be taken into account, recognizing that they have “some property … that provides users with the capability to perform some action. Calling these properties out with the adjective ‘material’ seems a way to remind the reader that the software-in-use [Twitter in the 1 According to Michael Barkun, conspiracism is a system of beliefs that refers to three main ideas: (1) nothing happens by accident; (2) nothing is at it seems; (3) everything is connected (Barkun, 2003). 2 Bots, according to a recent study by Ferrara (2020), play a crucial role in promoting political conspiracies in the US, although their role on Twitter seems to be more focused on public health issues.

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present chapter] does things that cannot be reduced to human intention or action” (Leonardi, 2010: 3). Platforms are not neutral tools but affect objectives and have a significant effect on the ends to which they are put. Our objective is to understand how materiality affects practice through an analysis of anti-restriction activists’ appropriation of Twitter. Appropriation refers to the process of dynamic dialogue between Twitter, activists, and audience, all operating in a political, social, and cultural space that produces practices and uses. We are interested in how activists use Twitter in the pursuit of their objectives and how Twitter affects their projects in the general context of restrictions put in place by authorities in an attempt to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, to what extent do digital platforms structure and shape conspirationist discourse? From a sociotechnical perspective, tweets, or posts, are technical mediations, the outcome of actions and objectives, decisions and intentions, that bring together activists, audience (human actants), and artifacts (non-human actants) such as digital platforms (Latour, 1994). Our analysis is based on a sample of 11,938 tweets from antimask/anti-restriction Twitter accounts collected on a Canadian (digital) network from 1 March to 31 May 2020, as the province—and the country—entered a phase of strict restrictive measures imposed by the federal and provincial governments in an attempt to prevent the spread of COVID-19. These Twitter accounts are referred to as the antirestriction tweetosphere. In the Province of Quebec, both provincial and federal government restrictions began to ease at the end of May 2020 (before becoming tight again in October 2020), ending the first wave of restrictive measures. The first step in the data collection process consisted in identifying hashtags (#) popular at that time on Twitter and used to “structure”, or channel, the discontent over government actions (for example, #deepstatevirus; #QAnon; #CCPVirus; #Tousensemble; #vousallezpayer; #Legaultdictatorship, etc.). Based on the volume of tweets associated with these hashtags, we identified 12 “prolific activist accounts” that stood out because of their higher activity as defined by the number of tweets in relation to the hashtags identified. These accounts are kept anonymous here, both for ethical reasons and to avoid giving

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additional visibility to their discourse. This contrasts with the practices of traditional media, whose interest in such accounts has contributed to their visibility, unintentionally leading to increased exchange of their content and discourse. We also included all accounts whose posts were retweeted at least five times by the 12 prolific accounts or which they interacted with between 1st March and 31st May 2020. Our network of conspiracists is composed of 187 accounts. Tweets were automatically extracted through a program constructed by the authors and were converted into.xls format. They were then imported into NVivo for a manual qualitative analysis. Only the earliest 1,000 tweets were analyzed for the present chapter, providing a window on the “live” or “on-going” development of the anti-restriction discourse. Posts or tweets provide a series of snapshots of activists’ state of mind, making it possible to document the day-to-day evolution of their discourse (as mediated through Twitter) and providing us with a window on the ongoing construction of anti-restriction discourse as it became visible, or entered the public sphere. Our approach made it possible to identify the themes discussed in the next section. Data collected online can be considered to be “assemblage of traces”, whose starting point or end cannot be definitely determined. As we have documented elsewhere (Crosset et al., 2019), digital traces—such as tweets—involve three steps that confer materiality and convey meaning to members of specific communities. The first step is the imbrication found in traces within the larger networks of actors, values, and technologies that exist both online and offline. Despite an apparent convergence of ideology or discourse, the conspiracy sphere remains highly fragmented (Konda, 2019). Conspiracist discourses and ideologies mobilize different repertoires and sources (anti-government, populist, far-right discourse and values, myths, ideas on the pandemic, etc.) that refer to specific issues or to national or local situations and include various elements of digital culture. The level of overlap may vary greatly from one tweet to another, depending on the system of values or beliefs mobilized. Some themes are more accepted than others, and the dominant theme in a tweetosphere is subject to changes according to the “glocal context” and the objectives of the activists, whether operating as a collective or as individuals. These interrelated elements make it possible for digital tools to

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be used to provide a high level of visibility to particular systems of values. Rather than providing an exhaustive description of such ideologies and values, this chapter focuses on how Quebec anti-restriction activity— and, to a certain point, the conspiracist tweetosphere—was influenced by the positions held by both conspiracist and far-right groups. The second step involves inscription. For a trace to become visible in the digital environment, it must be posted by a user or through an automated process (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Chu et al. 2010). Tweeting, or more generally posting, requires registering and creating an account, whatever the platform, and creates both a digital profile and a digital trace. These digital elements are the result of a collective arrangement that brings together technical arrangements (social media platforms, for instance, which not only provide the tool used to convey a message but also shape it), political arrangements (ideologies—whether mainstream or conspiratorial, values, commitments to different groups), and economical arrangements (what is visible on the digital space is constrained by market logics and the commodification of data: the more a post is shared, commented on, and liked, the greater its visibility [Tufekci, 2017; Van Dijck, 2013]). Our main interest here is in the political and social dimensions, as digital platforms such as Twitter provide anti-restriction and conspiracy activists with new opportunities to convey their ideas. The circulation of messages diffusing and shaping conspiracy and far-right ideologies means that these digital traces have reached a third step—representation. Representation is a process of co-construction that gives visibility to a system of values, using the tools of visualization and enunciation to convey special meanings that are accessible first to insiders. One of the main challenges researchers face is how to identify and analyze these signs and traces and link them to a system of values. Our approach faces some limits. First, we have opted for a qualitative analysis of the tweets. This means that we are not able to describe a network based on metrics such as density, strength, reciprocity, transitivity, connectivity, and number of connected components, the classic elements of analysis of discourse on Twitter. Our goal is not so much to determine the reputations and hierarchies within anti-restriction groups

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as to analyze how their narrative was shaped by exploring the references on which it is based.

Ideological Syncretism and the Evolution of Anti-Restriction Activities in the Quebec Tweetosphere Eleven themes were identified in the exploratory analysis of our sample, which looked at 1,000 tweets out of the total of 11,938 tweets. Not all themes were relevant for further study as some included only a few tweets (for example, the themes “Poutine” or “fighting complotism”). However, some were much richer in terms of both number of tweets and qualitative information and these were labeled based on the smallest common denominator that sums up their richness and diversity of data and numbered for ease of future reference. The most important of these were “COVID-19” (I), “denouncing” (II), and “searching for reputation on social media” (III). The discussion that follows concentrates on these three themes.

Imbrication Theme: COVID-19 When the anti-restriction movement began in the province of Quebec, information about the virus had only begun to circulate in traditional media. Uncertainty about its origins, infection rate and duration, and risk of death gave rise to many discussions and sometimes conflicting interpretations. In the Twitter accounts we analyzed, the narratives about COVID-19 during the first two weeks of lockdown in Quebec were extremely volatile. Three discursive narratives characterized the content threshold. These were not mutually exclusive but coexisted and reinforced alternative interpretations to the anti-restriction movement that had just begun.

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The first narrative involved the quality of information about the virus and the disease it produced and was based on the assumption that COVID-19 is a “big international scam” (#1_I).3 Journalists who reported official narratives about the disease were believed to have a large responsibility for propagating “dramatic” (or “tragic”) information about COVID-19 (#12_I; #13_I) and their goal was believed to be to “provoke a panic” (#90_I). However, people who panicked because of the news that circulated about COVID-19 were believed to be “idiot[s]” (#5_I). These ideas led to a conclusion that was widely shared among participants in the conversation on Twitter: an independent and serious analysis of the restrictions imposed and the responses formulated by the government was urgently needed. The second narrative concerns the origins of the disease. No consensus emerged on this issue. Covid was said to come from Iran, China, or Korea, depending on the interpretation and the sources cited (#43_I; #45_I; #46_I; #47_I; #48_I; #49_I). Debates were intense about strain of the virus that was affecting Quebec. The origins of the virus were an important component of these debates, as was the need to get information that could better explain the current situation. Questions about the country of origin of the virus suggest that at least some participants recognized the existence of a disease labeled COVID-19, even if some considered discussion of the supposed disease to be the result of “collective hysteria” (#66_I). However, not everyone who participated in the conversation shared this interpretation. For some, it was “bullshit” (i.e. fake news) (#55_I; #400_II), while others saw it as the result of actions by “deep state” actors (#36_I) (#96_I) (#99_I) (#115_I)/(#193_I) (#228_I) or a new “weapon” being used by global Marxists to create a worldwide panic (#24_I). The third narrative is about the risk of death from the virus or from COVID-19. According to the tweets in our data, the disease could be expected to kill fewer people than the flu (#77_I; #78_I) and should not be considered to be the source of a pandemic (#17_I; #32_I; #377_II). 3

To identify information from Twitter, I, II, or III is used to refer to the main themes (I = COVID-19; II = denouncing, and III = searching for influence on social media). The # indicates the number of the tweet, so #1_I refers to the first tweet in the category “COVID-19”. All tweets have been translated as is by the authors of the chapter.

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It was suggested that scientists and doctors who, like the controversial French doctor Didier Raoult, were less alarmist and had developed treatments that were effective against COVID-19 would be ignored in official discussions (#220_I). Raoult was presented as one of the best scientific sources on virology and infection (#144_I) and his challenge to the official explanations shared by health authorities in many different Western countries was frequently referenced (#144_I; #220_I; #256_I; #269_I; #452_II; #548_II). He strongly recommended chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine as an effective cure. According to his followers, and those who relayed information about this treatment, the use of this medication would prevent further propagation of the disease. As a participant in the conversation proclaimed: “the remedy already exists. It is over. No need to thank me” (#155_I).

Theme: Denouncing Three ideal–typical discursive narratives were found in this large category. At first glance, the category seemed to be a catch-all whose only membership requirement was adopting a posture of denunciation. Further examination showed that these denunciations were aimed largely at elites and at their decisions or failure to decide. The degree of antielitism varies from a more reasoned although still biased critical position to cynicism to a sometimes aggressive anti-system position. Conversations often contained contradictions or incoherent positions but these were usually received without creating tension between participants. The iterative process that leads to an assemblage of discursive traces such as those found in our three central themes depends largely on the audience adhering to one line of interpretation at a given time. This process often means that certain explanatory schemes or values are ignored. For instance, surprisingly, reference to anti-immigrant positions were uncommon in this theme. Some tweets refer directly or indirectly to issues related to immigration, either to blame members of a particular community or to point out what they interpret as incoherent policies. For instance, tweets such as “they close schools but not the ‘chemin

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Roxham’4 (#75_II)” or “what is the priority of the Trudeau government right now? to increase mass immigration” (#187_II)—are illustrative of indirect references to the “clandestine” immigration encouraged by the federal government. However, such tweets were usually intended to denounce political elites rather than deal with the immigration question itself. This first discursive narrative is composed of strong anti-elite statements. Attitudes vary from vigorous criticism to denunciations of municipal, provincial, and federal political authorities and international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization. Anti-restriction activists deconstruct the statements of political leaders to uncover their hidden agendas or to point to what they interpret as inconsistencies or incoherence. For instance, one activist strongly denounced the mayor of Montreal, Valérie Plante, who referred to the need to avoid “prejudice” and “discrimination”: “Is this the time to talk about prejudices when the world economy is about to collapse tabarnak?” (#17_II). Another tweet questioned the decision of the provincial government to provide financial support to artists whose activities and shows had been canceled: “Cancellation of shows: artists will get compensation! Jesus Christ! These millionaire VIPs? #Legault #délire [#delirium]” (#87_II). As one participant in the conversation put it, “I agree that currently the main threat is our political leaders, not the disease” (#4_II). Although municipal and provincial leaders were regularly targeted, attacks focused primarily on Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Trudeau is presented as an inconsistent and inexperienced leader, who is doing nothing good and is strongly influenced by the “globalist” agenda. Sometimes compared to a teenager who is still in the middle of an adolescent crisis (#31_II), he is most often described as a puppet being directed by globalists, China, or a hidden force: “Trudeau and a globalist and all is doing is fake, staged, have been scripted to advance the globalist agenda” (#54_II). On several occasions (debates about masks or border closure), participants insist that Trudeau avoids important decisions or that he is

4 Roxham is on the border between the US and Quebec and is believed to allow easy passage to migrants between the US and Canada.

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not the one making the decisions (ex: #31_II; #32_II; #175_II; #237_II; #284_II). Donald Trump, then president of the United States, serves as a counter-example to Trudeau for many of the participants and is seen as the only one able to put an end to “this”. Most draw a correlation between the pandemic, which is either invented or has been instrumentalized by elites, the crash of the world economy, and attempts to prevent Trump’s reelection in 2020. The “deep state” or those trying to implement a New World Order are believed to be pulling strings in the background: “This crisis has been invented and targets Trump in the perspective of the [then forthcoming] election. The Deep State is trying to save its own butt!” (#127_II). References to the so-called deep state are found in many tweets (ex: #25_II; #127_II; #204_II; #386_II; #408_II; #502_II; #543_II) and are often accompanied by direct attacks on the media (ex: #3_II; #160_II; #310_II; #403_II; #531_II; #582_II). Journalists are seen as assisting in organizing a world panic and should be held accountable for the crisis as well as some of the government/deep state’s decisions (ex: #4_II; #57_II; #94_II; #230_II; #357_II; #373_II; #395_II). In the same vein, anti-restriction activists denounce what they consider to be complicity between political, media, economic, and cultural elites (ex: #55_II; #82_II; #110_II; #423_II). The second narrative focuses on anti-system rhetoric. Strongly aligned with the first narrative, its targets are mainly globalization, liberalism, and socialism. Globalization and the people behind it, the so-called “globalists” [“mondialistes”], are identified as the main culprits. “Globalists are testing us” (#7_II); “Globalists clearly want the coronavirus to spread” (#68_II); “another failure of United Nations ‘science’”. “Like the hogwash about climate, it is not science, it is globalist ideology” (#242_II); “it is globalism; everybody is going crazy at the same time” (#371_II). Depending on the interpretation, globalists are said to either be responsible for the pandemic or to be trying to take advantage of it to advance their hidden agenda. However, for some participants, the pandemic and the reaction of governments that decided to close their borders show that “globalization is over” (#113_II). Often supportive of Trump’s speeches on the need to manufacture vaccines and medicines on American soil, they consider the decision

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of “nationalist” states to close their borders to be a victory over the “globalists” (#232_II). In the same vein, most point to liberalism as a real danger (#230_II) or “a mental disease” (#7_II), while others vehemently denounce “socialism”. Mocking Obama’s slogan during the 2008 US presidential election, one said: “WE CAN destroy lives. WE CAN crash the economy. WE CAN make people fight over toilet paper at the grocery store. With socialism—we can, we can, we can, you absolute numbskull” (#435_II). In the postings of anti-restriction activists, socialism is also associated with the “left-wing ideology of the climatealarmists”, which would allow the pandemic to spread: “no frontiers = transmission; against motor vehicles, 100% for public transportation = transmission; urban density = transmission; reusable bags = transmission; reusable containers = transmission” (#403_II). Interestingly, digital traces show that most of the activists who participated in the Twitter feed make connections between globalism, socialism, Trudeau, and environmental activists, who seem to personify the major threats for the most vehement anti-restriction activists. The volatility of the discourses in this category shows how the conversation increasingly became an arena of contestation over a political and a social system. The third discursive narrative focuses on people living in Quebec. Some participants think that the population is behaving like “sheep going to slaughter” (#578_II). People are portrayed as being unwilling to react to restrictions—even if they were completely inconsistent, they would still be followed without questions. This absence of critical stance is interpreted in four ways. First, it reflects the credulity and submissiveness of Quebecers (#105_II). Second, it reflects the subjugation and enslavement of Quebec society, who are unable to see what is really going on. The idea of a premeditated plan to enslave populations from around the world and establish a world dictatorship is central to this interpretation: “this is one more indication that what they want is to make society collapse, to put as many people as possible under lockdown, to establish wartime measures, vaccination, the forced marking of the herd, and the enslavement of the people to a world dictatorship” (#449_II). Third, the lack of criticism reveals the predominance of individualism in Quebec society and the total absence of reflection by most people who

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fail to see the hidden agenda of Canadian politicians. The rush to buy toilet paper is taken as an example of such an attitude: “It is hard to realize [that the government, with assistance from the media is establishing ‘a Chinese-style tyranny’ (#49_II)] when 95% of the population leave Costco with 4–5 packets of toilet paper to meet their own needs [petits besoins] without thinking of others” (#50_II). Finally, this lack of criticism is a sign that the population is taking the disease seriously, in contrast to politicians, who are making incoherent decisions (#503_II). Whatever the explanation used to explain compliance with the restrictions, tweets suggest that the blindness of the population leaves the field open to political elites who have created or are instrumentalizing the pandemic to implement a hidden agenda.

Inscription As discussed in the previous section, content is important, whether it deals with the nature of the virus or denunciation of and attacks against the restrictions ordered by the authorities in attempts to halt the pandemic. To get the public’s attention, anti-restriction narratives rely on vectors of transmission (media), here, Twitter. As Marshall McLuhan established, the medium is the message (McLuhan, 1964). John Thomson showed that the message is also structured by the medium: the media transforms space and time in social life and creates new forms of action and interaction beyond spatial and temporal frameworks (Thomson, 1995). Media not only use but also extend content (symbolic forms), allowing it to circulate in space and time (amplifying it), but how they do this depends on their characteristics. For example, a broadcast on YouTube makes it possible to create a more fine-grained message than can be captured in a 240 character tweet (boyd, 2019; Tanner et al., 2020). The broader issue of inscription concerns how content is registered by an individual or an automated process to become visible in the digital environment. Our concern here is how social media platforms contribute to the shaping, diffusion, and amplification of antirestriction narratives and content as well as to a conspiracist framework. Inscription is a crucial step in the shaping of “alternative” narratives

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about COVID-19 by those who oppose restrictions because it “converts” raw discursive material into representations (both producing meaning and also warning the public about the content produced by others). Anti-restriction and conspiracy narratives are the result of technical mediation, a series of objectives, decisions, and intentions by actants (human and non-human) in episodes involving Twitter, activists, and audiences (Latour, 1994). These actants exchange properties, providing new possibilities, new goals, new functions that must be accounted for if we are to understand how such discourse is not only shaped but also diffused and amplified so that it circulates in space and time. As “consumers”, we see a tweet, a post, a meme, or a video as a “finished product” or a “black box”. However, it is the result of a complex process of interaction between actants, human and non-human. Anti-restriction narratives are set in motion by a human spark but are clearly nonlinear and rely on a series of contingencies (changing objectives, evolving intentions, degree of mastery of social media platforms, etc.) related to the interaction between human and non-human actants. In this process, technical mediation between activists, audiences, and Twitter enables inscription, so one is helpful to unpack how this works. We consider activists—or human actants—to be the port of entry to such complex anti-restriction assemblages. Our data show that participating in the conversation comes with the possibility of turning previously unknown individuals into popular figures, sufficiently recognizable that they can strategically select and share information about the pandemic and provide alternative interpretations to those circulating in the traditional media and intended to affect public opinion. Two dominant discursive narratives structure the relation of these individuals to social media. The first is in line with the themes “COVID-19” and “denouncing”, analyzed earlier, which criticize traditional media and present participants in the Twitter conversation as not only new sources of information but also the only keepers of THE truth. Social media, including Twitter, provides a medium for presenting authentic information without the risk that this material will be edited by inept journalists (#4_II; #57_II; #223_II). Twitter is also a valuable tool for those who want a megaphone to report what they see as taking place.

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Alloing and Vanderbiest, who focus on the diffusion of rumors on Twitter, refer to such practices, which are intended to shape and recommend information, as “social infomediation” (Alloing and Vanderbiest, 2018: 110). In shaping the anti-restriction narratives, Twitter accounts (actants composed of activists registered on Twitter) provide a selection of the recommended information. Twitter users, when confronted with heterogenous offers of information, select the information that appeals to them and which they consider the most relevant or interesting to their audience. Twitter-in-use affects discourse and social infomediation constantly affects shared information by (re)shaping it to make it fit with the group’s ideas or opinions and to maximize the number of times it is shared and thus the number of people interacting with it (Alloing and Vanderbiest, 2018). Social infomediation operates at three levels: macro (the platform as a whole and how it is used), meso (users’ profiles), and micro (the message—the tweet—and the information relayed). At the macro level, Twitter, until very recently, before the company removed conspiracy accounts in an effort to moderate and prevent the spread of disinformation, was a major tool used by activists to express their discontent with restrictions. Twitter allows for the exchange and diffusion of ideas and opinions but also serves as a place where ideas and opinions can be collected without relying on traditional media. As such, Twitter is a “cognitive artefact” or an “[artificial] device designed to keep, expose and treat information in order to satisfy a representational function” (Norman, 1993: 19, cited in Alloing and Vanderbiest, 2018: 110–111). Discussed here, the representational function consists in promoting and feeding an alternative view that highlights the dangers to liberty posed by the restrictions as well as their conspiratorial nature (as part of the master plan of a few individuals who are part of the Global World elite). This representational function also insists on the corrupted nature of the “traditional” sources of information, thus justifying the need to use alternative sources such as Twitter. In addition to attacks against the traditional media’s partiality and collusion with “democrats”, “globalists”, “leftists”, etc. (ex: #17_III; #66_III; #72_III), criticism extends to the media’s lack of professionalism and journalists’ lack of ethics. In a tweet that reproduces a short segment of a video, an activist can be seen gloating when the producer of the video declares:

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“Journalists do not check anything. They just copy and paste what other journalists have said” (#82_III). For most of the human actants who left traces on this Twitter feed, the alternative to traditional media is social media, considered to be the most reliable platforms, and to watch Fox News (#47_III), a “hyperpartisan” media that personifies “populism’s ideological pillar of ‘us’ versus ‘them’” (Rae, 2020). At several occasions, anti-restriction activists call on people to look for information by themselves, without resorting to traditional media, or to “turn off our TV and think for ourselves” (#73_III), which is presented as the only way to get access to true information. Social media, and the Internet more generally, are considered to be spaces of freedom, where the real truth can circulate: “I put a lot of hyperlinks on about what is going on on a daily basis. I will go on as long as the Internet remains open” (#21_III). This representational function is not involved just with ideas and opinions: it is necessary to understand how to use Twitter (in terms of producing content but also for searching and consuming it) and this also affects how Twitter audiences consume and understand information. At the meso level, a set of signs and clues inscribed on the interface of the platform also contribute to the consumption of the information. Alloing and Vanderbiest identify these as the user’s digital identity: avatars, number of followers, and how many other accounts are being followed (Alloing and Vanderbiest, 2018: 111). “[All] these elements contribute to the self-staging enabling the semiotic and cognitive performance of the [assemblage] …” (ibid.) that facilitates the development of images and meanings in the minds of followers. These attributes provide users—the audience—with a better experience of the information by personalizing it, adding a new subjectivity. Anti-restriction Twitter accounts contribute to producing new informational authorities whose status is based less on the information production processes than on the reputation these signs and clues suggest to the audience (Alloing and Vanderbiest, 2018). This is clearly illustrated by tweets that claim “We are news now” (#100_III; #101_III). Participants in the Twitter conversation regularly congratulate each other and highlight the central role Radio Québec—a popular YouTube channel linked to one of the main protagonists of the anti-restriction movement on Twitter in Quebec—plays in providing information (#11_III; #32_III; #36_III;

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#49_III; #77_III; #94_III). In the early stages of the pandemic, Radio Québec came to be considered a source (#54_III) of pertinent explanations and “smart analysis” (#56_III). The expressions of (self )-praise found in the Tweets emphasizing the “much-needed work” (#84_III) done by its developer, author, and producer contrast with the emotions expressed in the content threshold. Anger, frustration, and resentment seem to be temporarily put aside, replaced by pride and excitement. According to some participants in the conversation, this much-needed approach is likely to meet resistance from big tech, such as YouTube, and Facebook, which would like to “erase” views, likes, or videos to reduce anti-restriction activists’ popularity and diminish their reputations (e.g. #5_III; #80_III; #90_III) and are compared to “censors” (#39_III). Being portrayed as producers of THE truth amidst adversity gives the activists in the center of the network increased visibility (#21_III) and contributes to enhancing their reputations. Finally, at the micro level—the tweet level—adding a hashtag (#) creates a link with other tweets that express the same ideas, creating a repository of information (Alloing and Vanderbiest, 2018). That repository makes it possible to associate a message with a context that frames—and thus affects—the meaning of the message. Finally, adding hyperlinks, emojis, images, or videos also contributes to orienting the way the message will be interpreted. These repositories, diffused through technical mediation, contribute to the metamorphosis of activists, helping to make them soft leaders (Gerbaudo, 2012) whose main objectives are to reveal the truth and arouse and mobilize the masses. Activists are cautious about revealing information on their Twitter (and YouTube) accounts and therefore use doubt as a weapon against what they see as an overly rapid use of scientific methods by the traditional media (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). In that sense, as suggested by Sundén (2003), the assemblage composed of activists, Twitter, and the audience can be considered “a space, or stage where leaders [and activists] can ‘type themselves into being’ as Sundén (2003) would put it, effectively performing their own personae” (cited in Kissas, 2020: 272). As observed elsewhere (Tanner et al., 2020), the assemblage, or collective, has complex effects that turn basement activists and protesters into influential micro-celebrities or soft leaders.

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Representation Analysis of the three themes shows that the level of imbrication varies from one category to another, but also from one time to another. Some themes coexist without converging into congruent narratives. Anti-restriction conspiracy narratives look like an aggregation of interpretations, pseudo-scientific theories, and older conspiracy theories with new systems of justification. While the analysis presented in this chapter concerns only the first two weeks of the lockdown in Quebec, when antirestriction activities had just begun to circulate on Twitter, it reveals three tendencies that characterize the first phases of the process. First, the nonlinear process of co-construction of the discourse of antirestriction looks incremental and disjointed. The early phase shows that contingencies may lead to new themes that supplant those that dominated the earlier conversation. In this sense, looking at inscription reveals how these new themes were introduced into the public domain—via new hashtags, for instance—and how activists calibrate their personas and discourse to relay information that they see as most effective in reaching their audience. The different degrees of social connections created contribute to a conversation that reinforces a feature found in other processes of discourse elaboration. Some of those who participate in the Twitter feed see some information as the result of an error of interpretation and suggest new “evidence”, sending the conversation in a different direction. At the beginning of the conversation about COVID19, there were different opinions about the rate of death from the disease. One of the main participants (who runs one of the prolific accounts we analyzed) mobilized numbers and statistics to show that the flu is far more deadly than the coronavirus: “Influenza, which kills 600,000 people annually, if the media, or let’s say, the JOURNALISTS, were as dramatic in dealing with influenza [as with Covid]” (#12_I). Another participant in the conversation, who apparently lived somewhere in Europe or was of European ancestry, found such a position dangerous as it minimized the risks posed by COVID-19: “We all think that in Europe; I can tell we are not so smart now. Warn people, some will not recover! https://t.co/X6lH3PIoiz” (#20_I). Each protagonist relies on what he/she considers strong evidence, although without any sources

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cited to support this “evidence”. A CN article on the number of infections and deaths in Italy on 10 March 2020 was posted and other activists intervened in the conversation to support the first or second interpretation. Some of the messages were ambiguous. For example, one contained only the URL of another Twitter account that included a document (whose origins were not provided) comparing the symptoms and risk of death from influenza and from COVID-19 and explaining the differences between the two diseases (#26_I) (https://t.co/PYuIMt yYn0). The document is subject to more than one interpretation: while the numbers clearly show that influenza is far more deadly than COVID19, the conclusion states that although at the date of the publication of the document the flu is more deadly, COVID-19 may well have a greater death toll and restrictions should be respected to avoid contagion. The extensive use of hashtags and postings that consist of a URL for a video and a citation supporting one side of an argument make it difficult to determine how positions are being supported. A citation or a video can be interpreted in various ways, particularly in a context in which news about the pandemic and the disease come from sources that vary in quality. This approach, which is indirectly encouraged by Twitter through its limitations on the number of characters in each Tweet, creates an ideological environment in which different interpretations can coexist or compete without being explicitly examined or explained. The material inscribed on the Twitter platform has a large effect on representation, which involves different sets of values that are not always presented coherently or cogently. Secondly, we found that references and values from the extreme right were predominant in our data. Anti-restriction activists often made use of references associated with this ideological current. They tended to focus on people from outside Quebec and Canada as the main culprits in promoting incorrect information and policies and repeatedly called for tightening border controls, denouncing the federal government’s inertia, and praising “nationalist states”, and most (but not all) propose Donald Trump as a model. Reference to the Deep State, new world order, and “we the people” are examples of populist rhetoric as are mentions of the QAnon thesis in the discourse of some of those who were active in the Twitter feed.

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Although they did not always share the same ideological premises, they were all emotional in their questioning of official discourse. Indeed, the “anti-” component of the discourse is greater than the other characteristics of the radical right that inform it. This “anti” dimension is not exclusive to narratives from the extreme right but was found in most of the tweets posted, whether they were about the disease itself, the role of the media, or the role of science. It was used most often to target elites, demonstrating that anti-elitism is a core value in the theories being elaborated. The “anti” dimension also contributed to shaping and diffusing a new definition of the idea of expertise. In the conversations on the Twitter feed we analyzed, scientific research on COVID-19 and medical progress were met systematically with doubt and suspicion and even with violent attacks against medical professionals and researchers. Based on a simplistic and sometimes biased reading of the news as well as interpretations that confirmed the theories developed in the course of the conversation, participants relied on pseudo-science or on information from scientists whose expertise is contested in the general media, such as the French doctor Didier Raoult, whose work was instrumentalized to support conspiracy theories about COVID-19. Speculations and emotions inform beliefs and replace scientific facts. “They take people for fools!” (#355_I), proclaims one activist, referring to what he sees as the prejudice of the media. Numbers reported in other media are manipulated to diminish the importance of the disease and its consequences and to support conspiracy theories whose supreme values are distrust, mistrust, and resentment. The process in which this takes place is a technical mediation between activists, Twitter, and audience in which outputs transform the way information is experienced by users through personalization, adding a new subjectivity. This process is not innocuous, since it exacerbates the logic according to which people increasingly select information because it confirms their beliefs or provokes positive emotions rather than because it is correct (McIntyre, 2018), fulfilling the role of fake news in the post-truth era. Third, one of the objectives of the participants was to deconstruct a discourse thought to be manipulative and to shape and circulate a discourse that conveyed THE hidden truth. However, the unreliability and inconsistency of the discourse and interpretations on the Twitter

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feed led to uncertainty and tension between human actants, and these were only strengthened during the inscription process. Disagreements about basic facts—such as the very existence of the virus—show that the positions of the participants differed and were sometimes incompatible. Some of those who posted were unable to correctly evaluate the medical discourse that they commented on, criticized, or tried to invalidate. The result of these attempts to deconstruct discourse originating in other parts of society is an ideological syncretism with two layers of uncertainty: lack of coherence in discourse and unreliability in relying information from the community they claim to represent. In this context, traces left on digital platforms can be compared to a primitive soup which the process of inscription and representation attempts to structure and to create discourse that will lead to public debate among people who recognize themselves in the values being promoted. Tensions between participants as well as their discursive and ideological instabilities make this process incomplete and incoherent. This explains why, rather than leading to more concrete resistance, the discourses elaborated in the early stages of the pandemic circulated within a community whose boundaries were constantly changing.

Concluding Remarks This chapter looks at the role of social media platforms (Twitter in particular) in shaping the anti-restriction movement in Quebec that emerged during the very first days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on a hybrid approach that blends web scraping and a qualitative research strategy, it provides a digital genealogy of the anti-restriction narratives that circulated in the Quebec Tweetosphere during the first two weeks of the first lockdown by the Quebec government. It shows how, during this very short period, narratives about the pandemic were elaborated and structured and detailed the role of digital platforms in this process. In so doing, we explore the outcome of interactions between Twitter and its users (especially soft leaders) and how social media platforms affect their narratives. Analysis of three processes—imbrication, inscription, and representation—demonstrated the instability of anti-restriction

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narratives and the impossibility of stabilizing them around a common understanding of events and perceptions. According to Kissas, Twitter, as a communication platform, enables a “performative ideology”, or “performative populism”, “the enactment of the political [and ideological] subjectivity of the ‘people’ through the emotionally driven recontextualization of certain, pre-existing meanings of a people and its enemies” (Kissas, 2020: 269). This definition could also apply to “performative conspiracy theories”. Through its architecture and attributes, namely retweets, @mentions, and #hashtags, Twitter enables the remediation of a content scattered in time and space (Kissas, 2020; Bennet, 2019; Trimarco, 2015). Highly emotional discourse, coupled with internal tensions between participants and the concrete repercussions of Twitter attributes, produced an alternative influence network with vague contours. Looked at from that perspective, the use of social media contributes to redefining activism as a technical mediation that assembles traces related to narratives about restrictions that draw on far-right ideological references and pre-existing conspiracy theories. This process results in a quasi-indistinct ideological syncretism that helps make commonplace ideas of conspiracy that target Canadian political elites, as well as popularizing soft leaders who, in a very short period of time, became the figureheads for these ideas of conspiracy.

References Alloing, Camille and Nicolas Vanderbiest (2018). “La fabrique des rumeurs numériques. Comment la fausse information circule sur Twitter?” [The Fabric of Digital Rumors. How Fake News Circulate on Twitter?]. Le Temps des médias, 30(1): 105–123. Akrich, Madeleine (1992). “The De-scription of Technical Objects.” In W. Bijker and J. Law (eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (pp. 205–224). Cambridge: MIT Press. Barkun, Michael (2003). A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

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8 Fantasies of Violence in the Patriot/Militia Movement in the United States Sam Jackson

This chapter is about a particular form of right-wing extremism (RWE) in the United States that I refer to as the patriot/militia movement (P/M movement). This segment of RWE is more commonly referred to as the “Patriot movement” or the “militia movement.” As I have stated elsewhere, I intentionally use the more clunky “patriot/militia” for two primary reasons. First, “patriot” carries a strong positive connotation in the United States: to call someone a patriot is to compliment them. I do not wish to imply—however slightly or incidentally—that those who are part of this movement are admirable patriots. Second, not all of the individuals and groups in this movement are militias in the sense of being S. Jackson (B) College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity, University at Albany, Albany, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_8

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hierarchical paramilitary organizations that deliberately imitate militaries, though some certainly are.1

This movement is defined by two closely related beliefs: the federal government (and possibly some state and local governments) are currently tyrannical or are quickly becoming tyrannical; and American patriots need to be ready to engage in conflict with that government to protect or restore traditional American rights. That conflict could begin anytime, and it could include a range of different types of action including an insurgency-style war. The patriot/militia movement is one of two subcategories of antigovernment extremism in the United States, alongside sovereign citizens.2 There is substantial overlap between these two categories: many participants in the patriot/militia movement entertain sovereign citizen ideas, particularly regarding esoteric ways of interacting with the political and legal systems to exempt themselves from governmental authority.3 Unlike many individuals who are more squarely within the subcategory of sovereign citizens, though, those in the P/M movement focus less on those arcane legal theories and more on understanding and responding to a broad threat of tyranny. The archetypical type of organization within the P/M movement is the militia: an organization that adopts paramilitary authority structures, appearances, and activity. For example, the early militias of the 1990s used military-style ranks, including both officers and enlisted personnel. Infamously, Norm Olson, founder of the Michigan Militia, testified before a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the movement in 1995, 1 Sam Jackson, Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Antigovernment Group (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 17, https://cup.columbia.edu/book/oathkeepers/9780231550314. 2 Sam Jackson, “A Schema of Right-Wing Extremism in the United States,” Policy Briefs (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, November 4, 2019), https://icct. nl/publication/a-schema-of-right-wing-extremism-in-the-united-states/. 3 Matthew Sweeney, “What Is the Sovereign Citizen Movement, What Do They Believe and How Are They Spreading?,” Radicalisation Research, June 19, 2018, https://www.radicalisationr esearch.org/guides/sweeney-sovereign-citizen-movement/; J.M. Berger, “Without Prejudice: What Sovereign Citizens Believe” (GW Program on Extremism, June 2016), https://extremism.gwu. edu/sites/extremism.gwu.edu/files/downloads/JMB%20Sovereign%20Citizens.pdf.

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Fig. 8.1 Norm Olson testifying at a congressional hearing6

wearing camouflage fatigues with ribbons on the left chest that mirror the appearance of ribbons worn on U.S. military dress uniforms.4 And many organizations held regular paramilitary training exercises, with the main events often including some sort of firearms training—or even combat patrol training5 (Fig. 8.1). Other organizations in the P/M movement do not adopt such openly paramilitary characteristics, though, or make them a smaller part of the organization’s activity. A prime example of this is Oath Keepers, one of the most important groups in this movement from 2009 through the present.7 Rather than a paramilitary leadership structure, this group has 4 D. J. Mulloy, American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement (New York: Routledge, 2004), 6; “U.S. Militia Movement,” § Senate Terrorism Subcommittee (1995), https://www.c-span.org/video/?65722-1/us-militia-movement. 5 Amy Cooter’s excellent study of militia participants in Michigan included ethnographic fieldwork at training events, including at least one held at a state park. Amy B. Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms” (University of Michigan, 2013), 102, https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/ handle/2027.42/98077/cooterab_1.pdf;sequence=1. 6 U.S. Militia Movement. 7 Jackson, Oath Keepers.

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Fig. 8.2 Oath Keepers tab-style logo.8 U.S. Army Ranger tab9

a board of directors led by Stewart Rhodes, the founder and president of the group. Oath Keepers does not have a formal uniform (although one of its primary logos evokes a military uniform tab patch; see Fig. 8.2). And though the group does engage in paramilitary training (in the form of its Community Preparedness Teams program), that effort does not have the same centrality for Oath Keepers that it does for other organizations in the movement that are better understood as militias.

Roots of P/M Movement Violence Since it emerged in the early 1990s, the patriot/militia movement has anticipated conflict due to a perception of an increasingly authoritarian government intruding on more and more aspects of the daily lives of Americans. This concern does not emerge from nowhere for those in the movement. They connect it back to the alleged tyranny that led to armed resistance and eventually the War for Independence in the eighteenth century. Much ink has been spilled by those in the movement retelling the story of that revolution and reinterpreting the significance of those events for the contemporary moment.10 As historians have pointed out, political violence as resistance to perceptions of government overreach did not end with the establishment of the United States of America. In the 1780s through 1800, three armed 8

Southern Poverty Law Center, “Oath Keepers,” Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed November 11, 2016, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/oath-keepers. 9 Photo by author. 10 Mulloy, American Extremism; Jackson, Oath Keepers.

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rebellions (Shays Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, and Fries Rebellion) took place in opposition to attempts by the new federal government to collect tax revenue.11 Much of the political violence in American history has been related to issues of race, often on the side of white supremacy: recovering “fugitive” slaves, putting down slave rebellions, enforcing formal and informal racial hierarchies during Jim Crow, and resisting efforts to reduce racial injustice during the Civil Rights movement. Many in the P/M movement would reject this type of political violence as being a precursor for their movement, claiming that they are not racist (a claim that has merit in some cases and is plainly untrue in other cases).12 Instead, they might prefer to claim the violence of John Brown, who attempted to seize the federal armory in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859 in the hopes of starting an armed rebellion against slavery.13 Others in the movement have attempted to claim the legacy of armed advocates for racial justice during the Civil Rights movement.14 More direct antecedents of the P/M movement emerged in the 1970s with the Posse Comitatus movement. Participants in this movement (whose name is Latin for “power of the county”) argued that counties were the supreme political jurisdictions in the United States, and county sheriffs were the supreme law enforcement officers. They also argued that sheriffs could form posses of local men to help them

11

Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Saul Cornell, “Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 81 (2006): 883–903; Robert H. Churchill, To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of the Militia Movement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 27–94. 12 See Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms.” for more on some of the complications around race and racism in the patriot/militia movement. 13 Robert L. Tsai, America’s Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions of Power and Community (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 83–117. 14 Sam Jackson, “‘Nullification through Armed Civil Disobedience’: A Case Study of Strategic Framing in the Patriot/Militia Movement,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 12, no. 1 (2019): 90–109, https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2018.1563904; Lance E Hill, The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

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enforce their understanding of the law.15 (Posse Comitatus was also the source of some sovereign citizen ideas, particularly those involving arcane understanding of the American legal system.) Posse Comitatus was an inherently antisemitic movement, with many of its participants adhering to Christian Identity beliefs.16 For some contemporary advocates of county supremacy (such as the Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association), the explicit antisemitism of the original Posse Comitatus movement has been removed.17

Government Violence and the First Wave Two episodes of violence by law enforcement in the early 1990s are widely acknowledged to be foundational moments for the patriot/militia movement: Ruby Ridge and Waco. At Ruby Ridge in 1992, two people were killed by law enforcement. At Waco in 1993, the total number killed excluding law enforcement was 91 (though how many of these were actually killed by law enforcement is a matter of contention).18 These events were interpreted by some on the far right as the opening shots of a war between Americans and their government. Some even accused the government of deliberately murdering Americans: Linda Thompson famously produced videocassettes allegedly showing tanks with flamethrowers used by federal law enforcement to set fire to the 15

Mark Pitcavage, “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K,” American Behavioral Scientist 44, no. 6 (February 1, 2001): 957–81, https://doi. org/10.1177/00027640121956610; Michael Barkun, “Violence in the Name of Democracy: Justifications for Separatism on the Radical Right,” Terrorism and Political Violence 12, no. 3–4 (2000): 193–208. 16 Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement, Rev. ed (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 217–23; Pitcavage, “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K,” 960. 17 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 20–21; Robert L. Tsai, “The Troubling Sheriffs’ Movement That Joe Arpaio Supports,” POLITICO Magazine, September 1, 2017, http://politi.co/2er3E3M; Ashley Powers, “The Renegade Sheriffs,” The New Yorker, April 23, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2018/04/30/the-renegade-sheriffs. 18 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 92–94.

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Branch Davidian compound at the end of the Waco siege.19 These events have particular resonance for the P/M movement, perhaps, because of the centrality of firearms: in both cases, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF, now called the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives) was involved because of alleged violations of federal firearms and explosives laws. Gun control legislation was also an important driver for the movement in the 1990s. In 1994, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (commonly called the Brady Bill) became federal law, requiring firearms dealers to perform background checks on anyone wishing to purchase a firearm. In the same year, the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB) passed, placing limits on civilian ownership of certain types of firearms and firearm accessories.20 In the aftermath of two events that highlighted for some in the American far right that Americans needed to be prepared to defend themselves against a violent, tyrannical government, these new restrictions on firearms ownership seemed like further evidence that the government wanted to use violence against Americans and was taking steps to limit any resistance to that violence. By 1994, paramilitary groups had been formed in Michigan, Montana, Ohio, and other states.21 The newly emerging patriot/militia movement argued that aggressive violence was illegitimate, but that defensive violence was appropriate and just—even if that defensive violence was used against the government. The Michigan Militia declared that it was “a dedicated DEFENSIVE militia, and will NEVER fire the first shot….”22 The implication here, of course, is that a defensive militia might fire the second shot. The movement urged Americans to prepare 19

Pitcavage, “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K,” 962; Mulloy, American Extremism, 15; Southern Poverty Law Center, “False Patriots,” Southern Poverty Law Center, May 8, 2001, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/ 2001/false-patriots. 20 Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms,” 44–45. 21 Pitcavage, “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K,” 963; Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms,” 35–46. 22 Quoted in Mulloy, American Extremism, 155. Emphasis in original. For more on the 1990s era movement’s thoughts about violence, see Mulloy, 143–60.

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to use defensive violence, and groups organized paramilitary training to build skills with firearms. For these Americans, the events at Ruby Ridge and the Branch Davidian compound demonstrated that the American government was willing to use aggressive violence, and that Americans therefore needed to be ready and willing to defend themselves. The burgeoning movement soon faced controversy, though, in the aftermath of Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. Shortly after McVeigh’s arrest, suspicion grew that he was part of a militia groups.23 Given their rhetoric about violence against the government, such concerns are perhaps not surprising. After this attack, those in the movement felt the need to clarify their views on violence. Some began to develop “rules of engagement” for the future conflict with government.24 For example, in 1996 Mike Vanderboegh provided a list of rules of war in a Usenet group for the movement (misc.activism.militia).25 He advocated for “violence carefully targeted and clearly defensive” (though he also justified violence against informants and researchers like Mark Pitcavage), and he specifically ruled out the use of bombs, terrorism, and any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. At the same time, some movement participants wrote stories to imagine what appropriate violence might look like. Vanderboegh wrote a short story called “Once upon a Tea Party” that depicted a town’s response to an attempt to enforce gun control laws.26 In the story, when ATF agents visit a gun store to collect gun sales documentation to facilitate gun confiscation, locals used firearms to intimidate the agents and drive them out of town.27 J.J. Johnson wrote a longer story that imagined a broad movement response to a Waco-like raid.28 John Ross 23 For example, see Michael Janofsky, “‘Militia’ Man Tells of Plot To Attack Military Base,” New York Times, June 25, 1995, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/25/us/militia-man-tellsof-plot-to-attack-military-base.html. 24 Churchill, To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face, 256–65. 25 Michael Vanderboegh, “Strategy and Tactics,” Misc.Activism.Militia, May 13, 1996, https:// groups.google.com/forum/#!original/misc.activism.militia/3RSYbAuYz1s/f15ykTJNDIIJ. 26 Churchill, To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face, 258–59. 27 Michael Vanderboegh, “Once Upon a Tea Party,” May 31, 2009, http://sipseystreetirregulars. blogspot.com/2009/05/once-upon-tea-party-early-example-of-my.html. 28 Churchill, To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face, 259–60.

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wrote a hefty novel (863 pages) imagining a nation where rogue ATF agents attempt to frame a gun owner (the story’s hero) as a terrorist; the hero kills the ATF agents when they try to enter his house to plant evidence against him, and he then decides to track down and kill ATF agents across the country who enforce gun laws that he considers to be unconstitutional.29 Ultimately, suspicions that McVeigh was involved in a militia group proved unfounded. Despite this, he is important to the history of the patriot/militia movement because of the dramatically increased public attention paid to the movement in the months and years after the attack. Mark Pitcavage argues that this attention led to “a rise in militia membership, as the media attention given to the movement alerted many potential members to the fact that it existed.”30

The Quiet years: Post-Oklahoma City and 9/11 However, any growth brought about by increased media attention after McVeigh’s did not last. Pitcavage suggests that, “By 1997, the militia movement was in disarray.”31 Amy Cooter observes that militia activity and membership in Michigan dropped substantially in the late 1990s.32 Another short-lived bump in interest in the movement coincided with increased fears of Y2K, as many people worried that computer systems would crash as the calendar rolled into the year 2000, taking down numerous critical systems with it.33 However, the Y2K fears were largely unrealized, and the failed predictions of societal collapse served as another point of discouragement for those in the P/M movement.

29

John Ross, Unintended Consequences (St. Louis, MO: Accurate Press, 1996). Pitcavage, “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K,” 966. 31 Pitcavage, 967. 32 Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms,” 49–50. 33 Pitcavage, “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K,” 970; Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms,” 50. 30

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The attacks on September 11, 2001, were a critical pivot point for Americans, including the patriot/militia movement. Though Cooter reports a surge in interest in militia groups in Michigan immediately following the attacks,34 this did not last either. As al-Qaeda was quickly identified as the organization responsible for the attacks, Americans across the political spectrum rallied around the nation and the government. Fears of tyranny threatening American values took a back seat to fears of international terrorism. For several years, support for the federal government during the George W. Bush administration was strong, particularly from the political right. As the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) notes, the number of groups that SPLC refers to as “patriot” groups decreased from a high of 858 in 1996 to only 143 in 2002, with the number remaining under 200 during all of the years of Bush’s presidency.35

Wave 2: The Obama years The quiet years of the late 90s lasted through the Bush administration. But the movement came roaring back in 2008 and 2009, alongside Barack Obama’s campaign for and election to the presidency. By November 2008, Mike Vanderboegh had begun his Sipsey Street Irregulars blog, where he developed ideas that were foundational to the Three Percenters movement.36 On April 19, 2009, Oath Keepers held its first official event outside of Boston, Massachusetts. Stewart Rhodes, the group’s president, declared that he and those who worked with him to create the group were motivated by concern over aspects of the War on Terror; specifically, they worried that the federal government would

34

Cooter, “Americanness, Masculinity, and Whiteness: How Michigan Militia Men Navigate Evolving Social Norms,” 50. 35 Mark Potok, “The Year in Hate and Extremism,” Southern Poverty Law Center, February 17, 2016, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2016/year-hate-and-extremism. 36 http://sipseystreetirregulars.blogspot.com/. Southern Poverty Law Center, “Michael Brian Vanderboegh,” accessed November 10, 2015, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extrem ist-files/individual/michael-brian-vanderboegh-0; Jackson, “‘Nullification through Armed Civil Disobedience,’” 92–95.

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turn tools and authority originally developed to fight terrorism overseas against Americans who expressed dissent.37 This re-emergence of the patriot/militia movement coincided with another important movement on the political right: the Tea Party. Angered by efforts by the federal government to respond to the economic emergency that became known as the Great Recession, some Americans across the country formed groups to protest what they saw as government overreach.38 There was some measure of overlap in the ideas and people in the Tea Party movement and the resurgent patriot/militia movement, and in some cases this was deliberate. Several days before Oath Keepers held its first public event, Stewart Rhodes spoke at a Tea Party rally in Tennessee on April 15.39 As Ruth Braunstein argues, the Tea Party movement embodied an approach to politics that centered conflict: politicians are not to be trusted, and citizens must constantly be vigilant to prevent and root out corruption.40 This matched the posture of the patriot/militia movement, both in its older form from the 1990s and in its newly coalescing form in 2008 and 2009. (Both movements also relied on references to early American history to make sense of their political context and to justify their goals and preferred forms of political action.)41 In the early years of the Obama administration, the patriot/militia movement was in many ways motivated by anticipations of possible conflict and by more ambiguous perceptions of tyranny (for example, 37

OathKeepersOK, Oath Keepers Muster on Lexington Green 4/19/2009 2 of 10, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0sP45wNRD1w&list=PL5AE72FAE3DE00667&ind ex=2; OathKeepersOK, Oath Keepers Muster on Lexington Green 4/19/2009 3 of 10, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NED1UJvXSRQ. 38 Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nella Van Dyke and David S. Meyer, eds., Understanding the Tea Party Movement (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014). 39 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 39–41. 40 Ruth Braunstein, Prophets and Patriots: Faith in Democracy across the Political Divide (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017). 41 Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes; Jackson, Oath Keepers; Sam Jackson, “‘We Are Patriots:’ Uses of National History in Legitimizing Extremism,” Europe Now, October 2, 2018, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/10/01/we-are-patriots-uses-of-nat ional-history-in-legitimizing-extremism/.

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in the form of the Affordable Care Act, more commonly called “Obamacare”). This can be seen in one of the foundational documents produced by Oath Keepers, the group’s “Declaration of Orders We Will Not Obey.”42 In this document, the group anticipated a range of ways that the federal government might attempt to engage in tyrannical power grabs, violating the rights of Americans: unlawfully disarming them, declaring them “unlawful enemy combatants,” declaring martial law, inviting foreign troops to the United States as peacekeepers, etc. Oath Keepers urged members of law enforcement and the military to pledge in advance not to comply with orders to carry out any of these tyrannical acts, and the group framed such refusals within the context of those who fought the British to win America’s independence in the eighteenth century. In 2012, the group started a new Community Preparedness Teams initiative to encourage Americans to prepare for conflict.43 This initiative (originally referred to as Civilization Preservation Teams) was depicted sometimes as an armed neighborhood watch, sometimes as a modified version of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Community Emergency Response Teams program. The group encouraged its members to form local teams that could quickly respond to a variety of crises. Each team was intended to have specialists in security, communications, and emergency medicine, taking the model of Special Forces teams.44 The group promoted this program to prepare its members to respond to threats posed by terrorists, violent criminals, or a tyrannical government.45 As part of his prolific blogging, Mike Vanderboegh began writing fiction again to lay out conditions under which political violence would be acceptable. In his never-finished novel Absolved , Vanderboegh wrote about an armed rebellion that began with a tyrannical government 42

Jackson, Oath Keepers, 141–48, 77–80. Jackson, 44. 44 OathKeepers.org, “CPT - Community Preparedness Teams,” Oath Keepers (blog), accessed November 21, 2017, https://www.oathkeepers.org/cpt-community-preparedness-teams/; OathKeepers.org, “Oath Keepers Is Going ‘Operational’ by Forming Special ‘Civilization Preservation’ Teams,” Infowars, October 1, 2013, http://www.infowars.com/oath-keepers-is-going-operat ional-by-forming-special-civilization-preservation-teams/. 45 Oath Keepers, Webinar - March 4, 2016 , 2016. 43

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targeting gun owners.46 Likewise, Matt Bracken wrote a series of novels beginning with Enemies, Foreign and Domestic that depict a United States torn apart by violent conflict.47 In Bracken’s story, the cause was a “false flag” mass shooting orchestrated by an ATF agent; the increased firearms restrictions in the aftermath of the shooting once again lead to war between Americans and the government. (The three books in Bracken’s series were published in 2003, 2006, and 2009.) These concerns became more acute in Obama’s second term, as mass shootings led to renewed calls for gun control. After the shooting of 20 children and 6 staff members at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in December 2012, in which the shooter used a semi-automatic rifle that is a variant of the AR-15 rifle platform, President Obama encouraged Congress to pass new restrictions on assault weapons.48 This led Vanderboegh to start new efforts to oppose any gun control. After several states passed laws limiting the number of rounds that a firearm magazine can hold, he started a “Toys for Totalitarians” project, mailing illegal high-capacity magazines to politicians in those states.49 He also traveled around the country, delivering speeches opposing any firearms ownership restriction. In a speech in Colorado in 2015, he noted that he brought a shotgun—“Charlotte to her closest friends. She is named after Michael Bloomberg’s mother”—“to grind in the message that there is no unconstitutional law that can be passed that we cannot negate, defy, resist, evade and smuggle in opposition to.”50 46

Jackson, “‘Nullification through Armed Civil Disobedience,’” 99–100; Michael Vanderboegh, Absolved , 2008. 47 Matthew Bracken, Enemies, Foreign and Domestic (San Diego, CA: Steelcutter Pub., 2003); J.M. Berger, “The Patriot Movement’s New Bestseller Tests Their Anti-Racism,” The Daily Beast, June 8, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/08/the-patriot-movement-snew-bestseller-tests-their-anti-racism.html. 48 James Barron, “Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut,” The New York Times, December 14, 2012, sec. New York, https://www.nytimes. com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-at-connecticut-elementary-school.html; Michael D. Shear, “Obama Vows Fast Action in New Push for Gun Control,” The New York Times, December 19, 2012, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/us/politics/obama-togive-congress-plan-on-gun-control-within-weeks.html. 49 Jackson, “‘Nullification through Armed Civil Disobedience,’” 98. 50 Michael Vanderboegh, “‘“Treason” to a Government Based upon Treason to Its Own Founding Document Is No Treason at All.’ The ‘Law’ versus the Rule of Law. ‘The Enemies of Liberty Can Only Make You a Slave to Their Appetites If You Give Them Your Permission

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Gun control has long been the central theme in fears about tyranny in the patriot/militia movement, but it is not the only theme. In some cases, far more specific concerns led to concrete action in which movement participants actively worried about violence or even approached participating in it. A prime example of this is the Bundy Ranch standoff in Nevada in 2014.51 After Cliven Bundy spent years refusing to pay fees to graze his cattle on federal land, a federal court ordered the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to confiscate some of his cattle to pay the more than $1million that he owed. Bundy then sent out messages—including through a blog and YouTube channel—requesting help from Americans. Hundreds responded to the call, traveling from as far as New Hampshire. Many came heavily armed, ready to do whatever it took to prevent BLM agents from taking the cattle, which Bundy and his supporters described as a tyrannical confiscation of property. Bundy’s more militant supporters organized armed patrols around his property. In one video, members of Oath Keepers who were present at the standoff described “going out as scouts” to identify any potential threats.52 Bundy’s supporters also planned to place unarmed women between the armed supporters and the federal agents: one, Richard Mack, declared on Fox News that “If they [the federal agents] are going to start shooting, it’s going to be women that are going to be televised all across the world getting shot by these rogue federal officers.”53 After several tense days, the BLM pulled its employees out of the area over concerns for their safety.54 Though significant bloodshed was avoided at the Bundy Ranch, it set the stage for more violence and aggression in future. First, those in the movement widely interpreted the standoff as a success for them. In by Your Inaction,’” Sipsey Street Irregulars (blog), April 20, 2015, http://sipseystreetirregulars. blogspot.com/2015/04/treason-to-government-based-upon.html. 51 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 46–47. 52 OathKeepersOK, Oath Keepers Bundy Ranch Debrief , 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=4HkSAewoESg starting around 22:50. 53 Jaime Fuller, “The Long Fight between the Bundys and the Federal Government, from 1989 to Today,” Washington Post, January 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/ wp/2014/04/15/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-andthe-federal-government/. 54 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 46.

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particular, it demonstrated to them that heavily armed Americans can prevent the federal government from taking action. Second, two participants in the standoff, Jerad and Amanda Miller, went on to kill three people in nearby Las Vegas, attempting to start a revolution. (Several of Bundy’s supporters told press that the Millers were asked to leave because they were too aggressive or unstable.)55 The federal government was the primary target of the patriot/militia movement’s concern through most of the movement’s first two waves, but its participants did not limit their preparations for violence to anticipated conflicts with the government. Sometimes, those in the movement prepared for violence against enemies such as terrorists. For example, after a Kuwaiti-born American killed five members of the military at a recruiting center and a Navy reserve center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in July 2015, some members of the movement decided to provide armed security for recruiting centers across the country (in large part because those stationed at recruiting centers were not allowed to carry weapons).56 In early 2016, the movement attempted to repeat its success from the Bundy Ranch. In late December, several dozen people traveled to rural southeast Oregon to protest the resentencing of two local ranchers, Dwight and Steven Hammond, who had been convicted of arson on federal property (though they claim they were burning brush). After their conviction, a judge sentenced them to substantially less prison time than the mandatory minimums set by law; upon appeal, a different judge ruled that the men would have to return to prison to serve out the remainder of the mandatory minimum sentences, a ruling that those in the P/M movement broadly (and incorrectly) interpreted as two convictions and sentences for one crime. These protests originally took more typical forms of activism: street demonstrations, public messaging campaigns, etc. But in early January, Ammon Bundy (one of Cliven 55

Mark Berman, “Terror in the American Desert,” Washington Post, accessed September 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/06/14/terror-in-the-ame rican-desert/; Mike Blasky, Ben Botkin, and Colton Lochhead, “Rejected by the Revolution, Jerad and Amanda Miller Decided to Start Their Own,” Las Vegas Review-Journal , June 14, 2014, http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/bundy-blm/rejected-revolution-jerad-and-amanda-mil ler-decided-start-their-own. 56 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 51.

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Bundy’s sons) decided that it was time to take a “hard stand” against the government.57 A handful of armed individuals followed Ammon to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge and began an occupation that would last through early February.58 Unlike the Bundy Ranch standoff, the Malheur Refuge occupation did cross the edge of violence: when law enforcement used a roadblock to arrest some of the leaders of the occupation, one of the leaders, LaVoy Finicum refused to surrender. After shouting at police to “just shoot me,” he reached toward a pocket where he was known to carry a pistol, at which point law enforcement shot Finicum.59 Unlike other standoffs and “security operations” involving the patriot/militia movement, this conflict did lead to violence, though on a much more limited scale than some in the movement anticipated.60

Wave 3: The Trump Reset While the patriot/militia movement continued to worry about tyranny coming from the government during the Obama administration, campaigning for the 2016 presidential election began. This would be an important election for the movement for several reasons. First, Hillary Clinton quickly became the front-runner for the Democratic Party’s nomination. The Clinton family has long been reviled by the movement. Initially, this was due to Bill Clinton’s presidency (especially the gun 57

Carissa Wolf, Peter Holley, and Wesley Lowery, “Armed Men, Led by Bundy Brothers, Take over Federal Building in Rural Oregon,” Washington Post, January 3, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/03/armed-militia-bundybrothers-take-over-federal-building-in-rural-oregon/. 58 Carissa Wolf, Mark Berman, and Kevin Sullivan, “Oregon Wildlife Refuge Standoff Ends as Last Four Occupiers Surrender to FBI,” Washington Post, February 11, 2016, https://www.was hingtonpost.com/national/oregon-wildlife-refuge-stand-off-ends-as-last-four-occupiers-surrenderto-fbi/2016/02/11/eb330550-c782-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html. 59 Lynne Terry, “Robert ‘LaVoy’ Finicum Yelled at Police, ‘Just Shoot Me,’ Witness Says,” oregonlive, February 1, 2016, https://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-standoff/2016/01/ shawna_cox_refuge_occupier_des.html; John Rosman and Conrad Wilson, “FBI: Standoff Continues, Release Video of Finicum Death,” Oregon Public Broadcasting, March 8, 2016, https://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-militia-news-updates/ fbi-standoff-continues-release-video-of-finicum-death/. 60 For more about this standoff, see Jackson, Oath Keepers, 55–57; David Neiwert, Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump (New York: Verso, 2017), 191–210.

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control measures that became law during his administration). Hillary Clinton’s candidacy inherited the rancor related to gun control, and her role as Barack Obama’s first Secretary of State contributed further disdain. Second, Donald Trump declared his candidacy for the Republican Party’s nomination, and over a grueling primary season, he became the nominee. Though some in the patriot/militia movement were initially skeptical about Trump (for example, Oath Keepers said that he made “unacceptable concessions” in comments about gun control during a debate with Clinton), by summer of 2016 the movement was fully behind Trump.61 Though Trump’s authoritarian tendencies were already on display throughout his candidacy, his nativism and Islamophobia (which became increasingly apparent as the campaign progressed) echoed the nativism and Islamophobia common in the patriot/militia movement, particularly among rank-and-file movement participants.62 Indeed, one of the most worrisome acts of (ultimately prevented) violence by the movement in recent years was a 2016 plot to bomb an apartment building housing Muslim Somali refugees.63 As it became clear that Trump and Clinton would face off in the general election, the P/M movement increasing shifted its orientation. Those in the movement continued to worry about the threat posed by government if Clinton were to win, but they also spent more time thinking about the threat posed by the Democratic Party and those Americans on the left side of the political spectrum. By November, Oath Keepers was regularly posting articles to its website warning of potential voter fraud orchestrated by Democrats. If that voter fraud could be prevented, the group said, Trump would win the election in a landslide.64 61

OathKeepers.org, “Trump Debate Responses on Guns Make Unacceptable Concessions,” Oath Keepers (blog), September 28, 2016, https://oathkeepers.org/2016/09/trump-debate-respon ses-guns-make-unacceptable-concessions/. 62 Jennifer Williams, “The Oath Keepers, the Far-Right Group Answering Trump’s Call to Watch the Polls, Explained,” Vox, November 7, 2016, http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 2016/11/7/13489640/oath-keepers-donald-trump-voter-fraud-intimidation-rigged. 63 Mitch Smith, “Kansas Trio Convicted in Plot to Bomb Somali Immigrants,” New York Times, September 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/kansas-militia-somalitrial-verdict.html. 64 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 58.

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Once it became clear that Trump had won the majority of the votes in the Electoral College, the movement quickly pivoted to the alleged threat posed by anti-Trump protestors. Oath Keepers anticipated that “Communists Intend to Overthrow the United States before Inauguration Day” and that “violent thugs” would disrupt Trump’s inauguration on January 20.65 After Trump took office, those in the movement increasingly saw the political left in America as the primary threat they needed to confront. Groups like Oath Keepers and Patriot Prayer brawled with anti-Trump activists across the country, including prominent conflicts in Boston, Massachusetts and Berkeley, California.66 Antifa, a broad movement whose name is a shortening of “anti-fascist,” was a recurrent target of patriot/militia movement concern and counter-activism. These clashes saw the P/M movement act as de facto allies with the white supremacists that antifa protestors organized against.67 Despite this pivot, the patriot/militia movement did not completely forget its fears of tyrannical government. Instead, those fears became more complicated: the movement still worried about government tyranny (often subsumed under the label of the “deep state”) even as they believed they had an ally in the Oval Office in their fight against tyranny and collectivism. During this period, the movement saw some elements of government as potentially on their side in a fight against the threats its members perceived. In fact, some in the movement called on the government to engage in the same kind of behavior that they worried about under the Obama administration. In late summer 2020, in response to ongoing unrest tied to Black Lives Matter protests and clashes at those protests between antifa and different factions of the far right, Stewart Rhodes called on President Trump to declare antifa and 65

OathKeepers.org, “NavyJack - Communists Intend to Overthrow the United States before Inauguration Day (Updated 01/12/2017),” Oath Keepers (blog), January 10, 2017, https://www.oathkeepers.org/navyjack-communists-intend-overthrow-united-states-inaugu ration-day/; OathKeepers.org, “Oath Keepers Call to Action: Help Defend Free Speech from Violent Thugs at Inauguration,” Oath Keepers (blog), January 17, 2017, https://www.oathke epers.org/oath-keepers-call-action-help-defend-free-speech-violent-thugs-inauguration/. 66 Jackson, Oath Keepers, 60. 67 Casey Michel, “How Militias Became the Private Police for White Supremacists,” POLITICO Magazine, August 17, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/17/white-sup remacists-militias-private-police-215498.

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Black Lives Matter to be “communist insurgents” and to federalize the National Guard to put down their insurrection. He also called antifa an “international terrorist organization.”68 The movement’s rhetoric and action related to the presidential election of 2020 revealed that it hadn’t left behind its ideas about illegitimate government. Donald Trump spent months before the election predicting that it would be stolen from him, and the P/M movement went along with that story. Some in the movement (who had increasingly advocated for the QAnon conspiracy theory over the previous few years) engaged in the “Stop the Steal” protests and supported the lawyers who claimed to have insider information about electoral fraud (to be clear, as of April 2022, no information suggesting any sort of widespread fraud has come forth, and numerous official inquiries have found no evidence of such a thing). Efforts to undo Joe Biden’s electoral victory and pending inauguration peaked in early January 2021. On January 6, Trump supporters gathered in Washington, D.C., to protest the election outcome they believed was illegitimate. Eventually, thousands of those supporters marched to the U.S. Capitol, and hundreds clashed with law enforcement and stormed the building. Among this crowd of insurrectionists were right-wing extremists of various stripes including a note-worthy contingent of patriot/militia movement adherents. One of the many striking photographs that came out of that day’s events depicted a group of individuals wearing Oath Keepers shirts and patches who climbed the building’s stairs in a stack—a line formation used by military and law enforcement members in hostile situations (see Fig. 8.3). Though not all of the insurrectionists are best understood as being part of the P/M movement, certainly there was a P/M contingent in the coalition of ideologically diverse actors who attempted to prevent Congress from certifying the election results on January 6.

68 Sam Jackson, “The Long, Dangerous History of Right-Wing Calls for Violence and Civil War,” Washington Post, September 11, 2020, sec. Monkey Cage, https://www.washingtonpost. com/politics/2020/09/11/long-dangerous-history-far-rights-calls-violence-civil-war/.

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Fig. 8.3 Image of the Oath Keepers “stack,” circled in red, on the Capitol steps. Photo from a criminal complaint filed against one of the participants69

An Emerging Wave 4? The months since the January 6 insurrection have been an inflection point for the movement and for right-wing extremism in the United States more broadly. Even those who have been arrested for their participation in the insurrection have expressed different understandings of the movement and their involvement, from continued commitment to 69

https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Kelly%20Meggs%20Connie%20M eggs%20Graydon%20Young%20Laura%20Steele%20Criminal%20Complaint.pdf.

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the cause through a rejection of the activity they engaged in and the ideas that motivated it.70 In the coming months, those affiliated with the P/M movement will continue to make sense of their ideas and behavior over the past few years given the changing context in which they find themselves. Some may continue to describe the Biden administration as legally illegitimate, as a usurper administration holding the authority that allegedly still belongs to Trump. Others might reconcile themselves to the legal legitimacy of Biden’s victory and return to the opposition that characterized the movement during the Obama years. And for still others, January 6 might serve as a moment that leads them to reject the ideas of the movement and their involvement with different movement groups and activities.

Fantasies of Violence Come to Life Over the past 30 years, the patriot/militia movement has been animated by perception of threat. Those in the movement have long anticipated conflict, and they have taken steps to prepare for violence. Some in the movement have even fantasized about that violence—writing novels and short stories where protagonists kill government officials and rogue law enforcement officers, planning “security operations” where they imagine they will face off with armed Bureau of Land Management employees, and developing equipment and supplies (like a “thermal evasion suit” to avoid detection by infrared cameras attached to drones) that would allow 70

For an example of continued commitment, see the remarks of several individuals incarcerated while awaiting trial in Joshua Kaplan and Joaquin Sapien, “In Exclusive Jailhouse Letter, Capitol Riot Defendant Explains Motives, Remains Boastful,” ProPublica, May 11, 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/in-exclusive-jailhouse-letter-capital-riot-defendant-exp lains-motives-remains-boastful?token=1fnMWV3DOiq0OUA8y5HDwG7SC_9TWm2G. For an example of some level of rejection of the events of January 6, see the remarks of the first defendant sentenced after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor related to her actions in Washington, DC, on January 6. Of course, remarks made in the context of criminal sentencing should not be automatically treated as a genuine reflection of a person’s thoughts, but even expressing these thoughts in court is a significant difference from those who still insist that their actions were just or appropriate. Spencer S. Hsu and Rachel Weiner, “In Sentencing Regretful Capitol Protester, Federal Judge Rebukes Republicans,” Washington Post, June 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/captiol-riot-first-sentence/2021/06/23/ 8b2825d8-d39c-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html.

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them to fight an insurgency.71 Much of the time, these fantasies do not result in actual violence. In recent years, though, those fantasies have led to violence more often—though that more frequent violence has been more like street violence and less like what we normally think of as political violence. Participants in the movement have armed themselves and acted as security, allegedly to prevent violence by other Americans. They have engaged in street brawls with other Americans. Some have called for other Americans to be treated as terrorists and insurgents—the very labels they warned would be turned against them in the first two waves of the movement to justify infringement of rights and acts of violence by the government. And some engaged in criminal and violent behavior to prevent elected officials from carrying out official business on January 6, 2021. Some of these fantasies of violence come to life could serve as a wake-up call for movement adherents who may not have realized the implications of the ideas they espoused and the actions they supported. Having seen the violence in Washington, D.C., some may renounce these ideas and actions. For others, though, the fantasies of violence may continue, periodically erupting into actual violence and planned violence. Some will interpret the past four years as a period where alleged patriots held more power and influence in the United States and will work to restore that power and influence. Some will see the law enforcement response to the insurrection as further evidence of a conspiracy to subvert those patriots—a perceived conspiracy which will continue to animate fantasies of violence for years to come.

71

OathKeepersOK, Defeating Drones: How to Build a Thermal Evasion Suit, 2015, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=VnptcYpuHXs.

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Cornell, Saul. “Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion.” Chicago-Kent Law Review 81 (2006): 883–903. Fuller, Jaime. “The Long Fight between the Bundys and the Federal Government, from 1989 to Today.” Washington Post, January 4, 2016. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/15/everything-youneed-to-know-about-the-long-fight-between-cliven-bundy-and-the-federalgovernment/. Hill, Lance E. The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. Hsu, Spencer S., and Rachel Weiner. “In Sentencing Regretful Capitol Protester, Federal Judge Rebukes Republicans.” Washington Post, June 23, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/captiol-riot-firstsentence/2021/06/23/8b2825d8-d39c-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story. html. Jackson, Sam. “A Schema of Right-Wing Extremism in the United States.” Policy Briefs. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague, November 4, 2019. https://icct.nl/publication/a-schema-of-right-wing-ext remism-in-the-united-states/. ———. “‘Nullification through Armed Civil Disobedience’: A Case Study of Strategic Framing in the Patriot/Militia Movement.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 12, no. 1 (2019): 90–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/174 67586.2018.1563904. ———. Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Antigovernment Group. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020a. https://cup.columbia.edu/book/oath-keepers/9780231550314. ———. “The Long, Dangerous History of Right-Wing Calls for Violence and Civil War.” Washington Post, September 11, 2020b, sec. Monkey Cage. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020b/09/11/long-danger ous-history-far-rights-calls-violence-civil-war/. ———. “‘We Are Patriots:’ Uses of National History in Legitimizing Extremism.” Europe Now, October 2, 2018. https://www.europenowjou rnal.org/2018/10/01/we-are-patriots-uses-of-national-history-in-legitimiz ing-extremism/. Janofsky, Michael. “‘Militia’ Man Tells of Plot To Attack Military Base.” New York Times, June 25, 1995, sec. U.S. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/25/ us/militia-man-tells-of-plot-to-attack-military-base.html. Kaplan, Joshua, and Joaquin Sapien. “In Exclusive Jailhouse Letter, Capitol Riot Defendant Explains Motives, Remains Boastful.” ProPublica, May

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11, 2021. https://www.propublica.org/article/in-exclusive-jailhouse-lettercapital-riot-defendant-explains-motives-remains-boastful?token=1fnMWV 3DOiq0OUA8y5HDwG7SC_9TWm2G. Lepore, Jill. The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Michel, Casey. “How Militias Became the Private Police for White Supremacists.” POLITICO Magazine, August 17, 2017. https://www. politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/17/white-supremacists-militias-pri vate-police-215498. Mulloy, D.J. American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement. New York: Routledge, 2004. Neiwert, David. Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump. New York: Verso, 2017. Oath Keepers. Webinar—March 4, 2016 , 2016. OathKeepersOK. Defeating Drones: How to Build a Thermal Evasion Suit, 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnptcYpuHXs. ———. Oath Keepers Bundy Ranch Debrief , 2014. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4HkSAewoESg. ———. Oath Keepers Muster on Lexington Green 4/19/2009a 2 of 10, 2009a. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0sP45wNRD1w&list=PL5AE7 2FAE3DE00667&index=2. ———. Oath Keepers Muster on Lexington Green 4/19/2009b 3 of 10, 2009b. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NED1UJvXSRQ. OathKeepers.org. “CPT - Community Preparedness Teams.” Oath Keepers (blog). Accessed November 21, 2017. https://www.oathkeepers.org/cpt-com munity-preparedness-teams/. ———. “NavyJack - Communists Intend to Overthrow the United States before Inauguration Day (Updated 01/12/2017a).” Oath Keepers (blog), January 10, 2017a. https://www.oathkeepers.org/navyjack-communists-int end-overthrow-united-states-inauguration-day/. ———. “Oath Keepers Call to Action: Help Defend Free Speech from Violent Thugs at Inauguration.” Oath Keepers (blog), January 17, 2017b. https://www.oathkeepers.org/oath-keepers-call-action-help-def end-free-speech-violent-thugs-inauguration/. ———. “Oath Keepers Is Going ‘Operational’ by Forming Special ‘Civilization Preservation’ Teams.” Infowars, October 1, 2013. http://www.infowars. com/oath-keepers-is-going-operational-by-forming-special-civilization-pre servation-teams/.

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———. “Trump Debate Responses on Guns Make Unacceptable Concessions.” Oath Keepers (blog), September 28, 2016. https://oathkeepers.org/ 2016/09/trump-debate-responses-guns-make-unacceptable-concessions/. Pitcavage, Mark. “Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge to Y2K.” American Behavioral Scientist 44, no. 6 (2001, February 1): 957–81. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027640121956610. Potok, Mark. “The Year in Hate and Extremism.” Southern Poverty Law Center, February 17, 2016. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intellige nce-report/2016/year-hate-and-extremism. Powers, Ashley. “The Renegade Sheriffs.” The New Yorker, April 23, 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/30/the-renegade-sheriffs. Rosman, John, and Conrad Wilson. “FBI: Standoff Continues, Release Video Of Finicum Death.” Oregon Public Broadcasting, March 8, 2016. https://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-standoff-bundy-mil itia-news-updates/fbi-standoff-continues-release-video-of-finicum-death/. Ross, John. Unintended Consequences. St. Louis, MO: Accurate Press, 1996. Shear, Michael D. “Obama Vows Fast Action in New Push for Gun Control.” The New York Times, December 19, 2012, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/us/politics/obama-to-give-con gress-plan-on-gun-control-within-weeks.html. Skocpol, Theda, and Vanessa Williamson. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Smith, Mitch. “Kansas Trio Convicted in Plot to Bomb Somali Immigrants.” New York Times, September 10, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/ 18/us/kansas-militia-somali-trial-verdict.html. Southern Poverty Law Center. “False Patriots.” Southern Poverty Law Center, May 8, 2001. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/ 2001/false-patriots. ———. “Michael Brian Vanderboegh.” Accessed November 10, 2015. https:// www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/michael-brianvanderboegh-0. ———. “Oath Keepers.” Southern Poverty Law Center. Accessed November 11, 2016. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/ oath-keepers. Sweeney, Matthew. “What Is the Sovereign Citizen Movement, What Do They Believe and How Are They Spreading?” Radicalisation Research, June 19, 2018. https://www.radicalisationresearch.org/guides/sweeney-sovereigncitizen-movement/.

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Terry, Lynne. “Robert ‘LaVoy’ Finicum Yelled at Police, ‘Just Shoot Me,’ Witness Says.” oregonlive, February 1, 2016. https://www.oregonlive.com/ oregon-standoff/2016/01/shawna_cox_refuge_occupier_des.html. Tsai, Robert L. America’s Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions of Power and Community. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. ———. “The Troubling Sheriffs’ Movement That Joe Arpaio Supports.” POLITICO Magazine, September 1, 2017. http://politi.co/2er3E3M. U.S. Militia Movement, § Senate Terrorism Subcommittee (1995). https:// www.c-span.org/video/?65722-1/us-militia-movement. Van Dyke, Nella, and David S. Meyer, eds. Understanding the Tea Party Movement. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014. Vanderboegh, Michael. Absolved , 2008. ———. “Once Upon a Tea Party,” May 31, 2009. http://sipseystreetirregulars. blogspot.com/2009/05/once-upon-tea-party-early-example-of-my.html. ———. “Strategy and Tactics.” Misc.Activism.Militia, May 13, 1996. https:// groups.google.com/forum/#!original/misc.activism.militia/3RSYbAuYz1s/ f15ykTJNDIIJ. ———. “‘“Treason” to a Government Based upon Treason to Its Own Founding Document Is No Treason at All.’ The ‘Law’ versus the Rule of Law. ‘The Enemies of Liberty Can Only Make You a Slave to Their Appetites If You Give Them Your Permission by Your Inaction.’” Sipsey Street Irregulars (blog), April 20, 2015. http://sipseystreetirregulars.blogspot.com/ 2015/04/treason-to-government-based-upon.html. Williams, Jennifer. “The Oath Keepers, the Far-Right Group Answering Trump’s Call to Watch the Polls, Explained.” Vox, November 7, 2016. http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/7/13489640/oathkeepers-donald-trump-voter-fraud-intimidation-rigged. Wolf, Carissa, Mark Berman, and Kevin Sullivan. “Oregon Wildlife Refuge Standoff Ends as Last Four Occupiers Surrender to FBI.” Washington Post, February 11, 2016a. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/oregon-wil dlife-refuge-stand-off-ends-as-last-four-occupiers-surrender-to-fbi/2016a/ 02/11/eb330550-c782-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html. Wolf, Carissa, Peter Holley, and Wesley Lowery. “Armed Men, Led by Bundy Brothers, Take over Federal Building in Rural Oregon.” Washington Post, January 3, 2016b. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/ 2016b/01/03/armed-militia-bundy-brothers-take-over-federal-building-inrural-oregon/.

9 Birds of a Feather: A Comparative Analysis of White Supremacist and Violent Male Supremacist Discourses Meredith L. Pruden, Ayse D. Lokmanoglu, Anne Peterscheck, and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

Organized hate group activism has been on the rise since 2014 in the United States, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), with 2018 marking a 30% increase over the previous year and reaching M. L. Pruden Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life (CITAP), University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA A. D. Lokmanoglu Center for Communication and Public Policy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA A. Peterscheck Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK Y. Veilleux-Lepage (B) Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_9

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a record high (Beirich, 2019). This trend is prevalent across the globe (Beirich, 2019). Of the 15 hate group ideologies1 tracked by the SPLC, nine explicitly are linked to white supremacy. In this climate, the SPLC also recently has begun tracking male supremacy; arguing there is an explicit link between the two ideologies (Male Supremacy, 2019). Nevertheless, there has been relatively little scholarly attention devoted to the connections between white nationalism and violent masculinist extremism (Berlet, 2004). While violent male supremacism is not a new phenomenon, a new breed of violent misogynists has gained increasing cultural currency— involuntary celibates or incels. The term “incels” refers to an online subculture in which members define themselves as unable to find sexual or romantic partners despite desiring one (Baele et al., 2019; Pruden, 2021). The hatred stemming from this perceived rejection by society— and women specifically—has, at times, manifested itself both violently in real life and online through the glorification, celebration and promotion of violence against women (Hines, 2019). In recent years, misogynist incels2 have been responsible for a number of violent attacks and mass killings targeting mostly women. These attacks, committed on university campuses, crowded sidewalks and in yoga studios, often have been accompanied by ex-ante statements by perpetrators. In perhaps the most infamous example, Elliot Rodger emailed a lengthy manifesto to family and his therapist and posted numerous videos online before killing six and wounding 14 people in the college town of Isla Vista, California. Racism and misogyny both are deeply rooted in mainstream society. However, these bigotries are exploited and amplified by extremist movements rather than caused by them (Berlet, 2004). This chapter explores the intersections of white supremacy with male supremacy—both of which misrepresent women as genetically and intellectually inferior and reduce them to reproductive and/or sexual functions—as discursively 1

The SPLC breaks down its Hate Map by ideology (e.g., anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, Holocaust denial, male supremacy, etc.). 2 Following the Institute for Research on Male Supremacism (IRMS), we recognize the difference between the incel identity and violent misogynist incel ideology (Recommendations for Media Reporting on Incels– Institute for Research on Male Supremacism, n.d.). Although we use the term “incel” throughout the body of this chapter, the materials on which the analysis is based originate from misogynist incels who have committed acts of mass violence.

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performed in representative samples from the white supremacist canon and violent misogynist, including more recent incels and those violent misogynists who came before them, texts. Like the male supremacist and incel movements, the white power movement historically has been characterized by sexism and misogyny. This has been evidenced in the movement’s attempts to retain European heritage and maintain whiteness by policing the behavior and controlling the bodies of white women. Indeed, reproductive politics are a primary tenet of white supremacist movements (Perry, 2004). This is best understood as a form of social engineering designed to increase white birthrates and counter the effects of women’s right to choose and family planning/management (Ross, 2018). Despite this similarity, the influence of white supremacist discourses on physically violent manifestations of the male supremacist movement, such as incels and others, remains understudied. Research on white and male supremacist ideologies3 mostly has been conducted in conceptual silos, primarily focusing on what sets them apart rather than what unites them. This fractionalization of ideologies neglects broadening the scope of inquiry to include interpersonal physical and sexual violence at play in right-wing extremism (DiBranco, 2020). However, white supremacist and violent misogynist discourses have more in common than not. They exist on a “continuum, moving from online to real life, from movement to movement, from house to street” (Renzetti, 2019). As will be further addressed in the following section, male supremacism can be seen both as a gateway to white supremacism and as sharing a similar user base online but is also its own ideology. Therefore, to further illustrate the largely understudied interconnections between white supremacy and violent manifestations of male supremacism, this chapter focuses on the discursive similarities uniting the violent male and white supremacist ideologies. 3

Carian et al. (2021) mount a compelling argument for considering male supremacy as a political ideology. Following Freeden (2003), we view political ideology as “a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern (2) are held by significant groups (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community” (p. 32).

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Using a mixed methods approach, including supervised machine learning and qualitative narrative analysis, this chapter compares a corpus of violent male supremacist manifestos and other multimodal content, such as confessional video transcripts and post-facto police interviews, with highly influential white nationalist texts, such as The Turner Diaries and the manifestos of violent white supremacists. By doing so, this chapter identifies shared beliefs, tropes and, most importantly, similarities in the justifications for both violence toward and subjugation of “The Other”—conceptualized in terms of gender or race—which is imperative for a thorough understanding of both ideologies. This methodology moves from a group-specific to a discourse-specific analysis to not only highlight the deeply entangled nature of white supremacist and male supremacist movements but also provide a deeper understanding of how the violent male supremacist movement frames itself.

The Conjuncture of Male and White Supremacy White and male supremacist ideologies share radical forms of hegemonic beliefs about the roles and positions of women in Western society. These vary across racial, sexual and class-based identities; however, they generally are based on understandings of a two-sex system and advocate for the subjugation of women and a return to a by-gone “golden” era in which men were indisputably “on top.” These beliefs are a form of sexism shored up by misogyny; a disciplinary mechanism to “police gendered norms and expectations” that under patriarchy intersects with other forms of oppression (Manne, 2018, p. 1). It is the method by which patriarchy as social organization and sexism as ideology are reinforced and provides a warning to would-be transgressors (Manne, 2018; Prasad, 2019). These supposed transgressions are used to justify the organized or “networked” harassment4 (e.g., doxxing, cyber stalking, etc.) of women in online spaces (Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2016; Bratich & Banet-Weiser, 2019; Marwick & Caplan, 2018). 4

Networked harassment is common in both white supremacist and masculinist spaces.

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Despite having distinct ideologies and community practices, white and male supremacist groups do experience cross-pollination and should not be considered as operating in isolation (Pruden, 2021). For example, Alek Minassian’s 5 statement to police clearly illustrated his vicious attack was a by-product both of frustrations centered on his lack of success with women and engagement with the 4chan message board, which is a popular platform for the dissemination of far-right , misogynist and racist content (Nagle, 2017; Russell & Bell, 2020). In the following section, we will lay the groundwork for the subsequent analysis of the largely understudied ideological and discursive conjunctures of white supremacy and violent manifestations of male supremacism. The first subsection contextualizes the background and existing research on white supremacy and the Great Replacement. The second subsection examines masculinism and misogyny. The third subsection brings together white and male supremacy. This is imperative for a thorough understanding of both ideologies. The following Data & Methods section outlines specifics about our corpus before moving onto Results and Discussion. In so doing, we hope to shift the focus from a group—to a discourse-specific analysis, which could inform the countering and prevention of violent extremist practices.

White Supremacy and the Great Replacement The perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, Brenton Tarrant, published a manifesto, titled The Great Replacement, prior to the attacks. The title of Tarrant’s manifesto is a reference to the Great Replacement conspiracy theory popularized by French philosopher Renaud Camus. According to Camus, the “native” French population is being replaced by non-white immigrants from outside Europe as a result of massive and uncontrolled migration, which will result in the destruction of France. The same is true for the whole of Europe. For Camus, this phased process represents more than shifting demographics. It is a concerted effort by globalist elites to encourage the “great erasure” of 5

The perpetrator of the 2018 Toronto van attack.

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French culture, national values and collective memory (Camus, 2012). In his manifesto, Tarrant drew heavily from Camus’ replacement theory but also from David Lane’s White Genocide Manifesto (Berger, 2016; Coaston, 2019; Davey & Ebner, 2019), which shares the view of white populations being replaced by non-whites through immigration, integration, miscegenation or abortion (Davey & Ebner, 2019; Ferber, 2000; Perry, 2004). Despite similarities in these writings, there are slight differences between the philosophies of Camus and Lane. For example, Davey and Ebner (2019) note both are “interlinked conspiracy theories,” but Camus privileges the loss of culture while Lane prioritizes a more explicitly racialist narrative (p. 4). According to them both, however, lax policies on immigration are largely to blame, as are women. At the core of these theories is the idea that white birthrates are falling because white women are not having enough children or are “racemixing” with non-whites (Bowles, 2019). This presents an urgent and existential threat that must be addressed in ways ranging from the extermination of non-whites to the re-education of white women (Bowles, 2019; Davey & Ebner, 2019; Schafer et al., 2014). Indeed, it is common to see discussions turn toward banning women from the workplace or the abolition of women’s right to vote (Bowles, 2019). These views have become far more politically prominent in recent years and have come to dominate among the international extreme right (Davey & Ebner, 2019). Perry (2004) examines the supposed justification for the regulation of reproduction and its intersection with the continuation of the white race. In its conception of gender roles, white supremacist ideology attributes one essential function to women: childbearing. This coalesces with the rise of gendered backlash politics, in which supremacist groups (both white and male supremacists) argue a new feminine gender identity has been constructed by feminists and lesbians in which men are becoming increasingly obsolete. This, in turn, poses a threat to men’s masculinity and their patriarchal status but also to the white race as a whole (Perry, 2004). In this light, abortion and race-mixing are understood as avenues for white men’s control of “their” women. White supremacists fear not only the discontinuation of the white bloodline but also the loss of control over white women, which threatens the hegemonic power of white men

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(Perry, 2004). In white nationalist terms, this often is called ethnic hegemony or blood sovereignty, but focusing on the reproductive role of women is not confined to explicitly supremacist ideologies and is not a recent phenomenon. For example, Mussolini waged a failed “battle for births” social policy from 1925 to 1938 that encouraged women to have more children and explicitly associated motherhood and family with the Italian nation (Forcucci, 2010). Today, conservative populist politicians and far-right actors around the world also employ these narratives (Pruden, 2020). Feminist scholars long have linked women’s reproductive labor to their expected domestic role (Duffy, 2007; Hartmann, 1979; Hopkins, 2015; Kaplan, 1998; McRae, 2018), and in particular through its connection to the conservation of whiteness (Domosh 2017; Bonds 2020; see also Loyd 2009, 2011; McRae 2018). Of course, placing white women in the role of domestic managers and walking wombs also reinforces normalized male power. The interlocking of white male privilege and victimization already had been established within white supremacism long before the rise of the so-called “alt-right,” September 11 or the election of Donald J. Trump, (Berbrier, 2000; Daniels, 1997; Ferber, 1998a, 1998b; Hollander, 1999). This conflation of white supremacism and the angry white male identity reframes the phenomenon from a collective movement to the individualized sentiment of a “victimized white male” (Berbrier, 2000, p. 187) that both constructs and capitalizes on a sense of marginalization and oppression and an inability to “‘take back’ their societies from an invented crisis of white culture” (Ganesh, 2020, p. 2). Anxieties around the erosion of Western male white structural privilege are at the center of backlash politics writ large in post-war Europe and North America (Hughey, 2014), stemming from a perceived demasculinization of men following women’s entry into the workforce during World War II and subsequent feminist activism challenging male superiority (Anti-Defamation League, 2018; Ferber, 2000; Kimmel & Ferber, 2009). Just as the Civil Rights movement led African-Americans to “forget their place,” so too has the women’s movement eroded the “natural” relationship between men and women (Perry, 2004, p. 79). The promotion of idealized maleness as the dominant social position, specifically middle class, heterosexual white masculinity, positioned against

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subordinated femaleness is the dynamic condition known as hegemonic masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Against this backdrop, it is evident that patriarchy as an institutional apparatus, the dominant position of men and the continuation of the white race all hinge on the subjugation of women’s bodies, sexuality and capacity for reproduction.

Male Supremacy, Maculinism & Misogyny Much of the literature on white supremacy is concerned only with the racial component of the ideology; however, feminist scholars have shed light on the relationship between gender, race and other interlocking oppressions present in white supremacist ideologies (see for example Ferber, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). Sexism, misogyny and the protection of patriarchy are the pillars of male supremacism and are crucial to a thorough understanding of the same. While we work within this tradition, a fully intersectional analysis is outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses on recent developments in extreme masculinist ideologies facilitated by the rise of the internet. Specifically, we are interested in male supremacist ideologies as professed by those who have committed misogynist mass violence. There is a growing body of work in this area. For example, Beauchamp (2019) suggests incel ideologies are “Internetnative ideologies” born online and advanced through this modern means of communication despite promoting misogynistic disciplinary beliefs that predate it. Moreover, incels have benefitted from many of the same social mobilization and online communication tools as the Islamic State and violent far-right extremist groups, which tap into grievances around loneliness, isolation, rejection and sexual frustration to fuel violence (Hoffman & Ware, 2020). Incels believe society has become a misandrist matriarchy against which men must defend themselves for their very survival (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). As such, their grievances are not only personal (e.g., feelings of loneliness) but also systemic (e.g., an unjust and uneven playing field). In fact, incels see the world as a rigid hierarchy based on appearance and blame women for this state of affairs (Baele et al., 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020). In incel terminology, this hierarchy includes a

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minority of alpha males (or Chads) and females (Stacys) at the top, a majority of average betas (or normies) in the middle and, finally, a small group of unattractive incels at the bottom who are exclusively male and victims of involuntary celibacy6 (Baele et al., 2019; Ging, 2017; Zimmerman et al., 2018). The hierarchical differences between categories are not based purely on physical characteristics; however, but also incels’ ability to see a reality others are either unable or unwilling to perceive (Hoffman et al., 2020). In this way, although they view themselves as physically inferior, the group often positions itself as intellectually superior to “normies.” Drawing on The Matrix movies, these privileged insights are referred to as “pills,” which are common not only on incel forums but also a feature of other online far-right subcultures. None of these groups are homogenous, and each “pill” sends a message about the strand’s worldview. The black pill7 is the most commonly found in violent incel ideologies and the one we focus on here. It relates to a belief in biological determinism in which women have a natural tendency, hypergamy, to seek the best genes for reproduction (Baele et al., 2019, p. 13). For this reason, incels who subscribe to the black pill see society as unfair yet inescapable. Coupled with an understanding of society as a sexual economy that functions according to market-like conditions in which competition drives sexual relations, some incels see sexual competition as biologically wired (Gilmore, 2019), while others have called for “sexual marxism”8 to combat this imperative (Jennings, 2018). Incels believe hypergamy—the tendency of women to seek higher status relationships or “marry up”—was better managed in a nostalgic and highly patriarchal golden age in which individuals followed strict gender roles informed by the traditional two-sex system and law and social conventions helped 6 Not all those who identify as incel also identify as male. In fact, the movement was founded by a woman in the late 1990s, and there are femcels (women who identify as incel), as well as LGBTQ+ individuals who identify as incel. Misogynist incels like those in our corpus, however, would suggest women cannot be involuntarily celibate. 7 Beauchamp (2019) describes the black pill as bundling a “sense of personal failure with a sense of social entitlement: the notion that the world owes them sex, and that there is something wrong with a society in which women don’t have to give it to them.” 8 Jennings (2018) defines sexual Marxism as “a system in which every person is somehow matched with a partner of a similar level of wealth and attractiveness.”

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ensure a fair distribution of sex and relationships (Baele et al., 2019, p. 13) because it was every man’s right to have access to a female partner (Zimmerman et al., 2018). As current solutions to this problem, some incels suggest what has been referred to within the movement as a “sexual welfare state” (Pruden, 2021). Although what this term encompasses varies, it often includes a mix of social policies such as government-enforced or subsidized sex, the revocation of women’s rights, a reduction in the age of consent, sexual slavery, redistribution of women and violence against women and feminists—without the social incentives Mussolini included in his battle for birth (It’s Time to Save Incels From Themselves, 2019; Scaptura & Boyle, 2019; Williams, 2018; Zimmerman et al., 2018). Feelings of entitlement to women and sex also can predispose men to enact mass violence and exist beyond the relatively closed world of inceldom. Research has shown some men may lash out individually and interpersonally (e.g., family, friends or former partners), while others will turn their associated anger outward to more generalized mass targets (Aggeler, 2018; Chavez & McLaughlin, 2018; Scaptura & Boyle, 2019; Wendling, 2018). In fact, Zimmerman and his collaborators (2018) have noted “incel discussions often explicitly connect women’s non-provision of sexual access to the need for sexually marginalized men to deploy brutal violence in the public sphere in order to defend this ‘entitlement’” (p. 2). We consider the violent segment of inceldom to be a politically motivated ideology because it is predicated on the notion that the downfall of society is attributable to women and to feminism in particular and that a violent overthrow of the current system is needed “to reclaim a particular type of manhood based on both male and white superiority” (Zimmerman et al., 2018). More broadly, these beliefs are attributable to violent misogyny.9 While there is no evidence these incels have formally organized, the attacks committed by self-proclaimed 9 Incels are the most recent iteration of violent male supremacism. We highlight incels throughout the chapter but it is important to note that many of the group’s beliefs around anti-feminism, recuperative social policy, etc. predate the incel movement and can be seen in earlier violent misogynist writings as well. We do not see them as distinct from violent male supremacism, as both are driven by violent manifestations of misogyny.

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incels have been premeditated, politically motivated and often inspired by earlier attacks. Moreover, they systematically have targeted civilians. These attributes suggest that inceldom should be understood as a subideology of male supremacism more broadly and that both inceldom and male supremacism should be explored as forms of violent extremism (Zimmerman et al., 2018). However, we also recognize focusing on the left-behind artifacts of incels and male supremacists who have committed mass violence does risk missing more subtle threats, as Beauchamp (2019) suggests, such as the “acts of everyday violence ranging from harassment to violent assault, or simply [making] the women in their lives miserable” (para. 11). Nevertheless, the justifications for violence expressed by male supremacist mass killers, self-identified incels or otherwise, sheds light on the need to better understand how these varied extremist masculinist groups use networked misogyny10 to spread their ideology. This is especially true since incels and other violent misogynist groups are not isolated to the internet but are one node in an interconnected and mediated network of misogynistic practices (Bratich & Banet-Weiser, 2019) or, as Romano (2018) puts it, “extreme misogyny evolving from male bonding gone haywire” (para. 3).

White Supremacy and Violent Misogynists Although white supremacists do not explicitly categorize individuals according to their attractiveness like incels and some other manosphere groups do, these groups share a number of ideological and discursive aspects that make a comparative analysis worthwhile. The AntiDefamation League (ADL) describes the relationship between white supremacy and misogyny as “symbiotic11 ” (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 5). The ADL admits “not all misogynists are racists, and not every white supremacist is a misogynist” but also suggests that a 10

Banet-Weiser and Miltner (2016) define networked misogyny as a “virulent strain of violence and hostility toward women in online environments” (p. 171). 11 This symbiotic relationship also exists between white supremacist movements and the broader, more mainstream, white supremacist culture, which feed off one another and reach wider audiences due to the rise of online platforms, blurring the lines between white supremacist and far-right conceptions of gender and race (Ferber, 2004).

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“misogynist, deep-seated loathing of women acts as a connective tissue between many white supremacists… and their lesser-known brothers in hate like Incels” (Anti-Defamation League, 2018, p. 5). In fact, the online communities embracing extreme anti-woman ideologies increasingly share the same user base (Ribeiro et al., 2020) with male supremacy often described as a “gateway drug” to the far-right (DeCook, 2019; Male Supremacy, 2019; Romano, 2018) and to white nationalism specifically (Lewis, 2019). The idea of using the grievances of “alienated young men” for political mobilization gained efficacy following #GamerGate and was fueled by former Breitbart News head Steve Bannon12 (Rosenthal, 2020, p. 143). DiBranco (2020) adds that misogyny and male supremacism should be considered an ideology in itself rather than only as a gateway. It is, therefore, unsurprising the entanglements between gender and race play an important role in both white and male supremacist ideologies, which define themselves on the basis of characteristics in opposition to racial and gender Others respectively. But, it is not so straightforward. For example, incels of Indian descent often are referred to as “currycels,” while Asian women are called “noodlewhores” (Baele et al., 2019). Both group ideologies structure their beliefs around strong in- and out-groups in which the boundaries are impermeable. Social cohesion is maintained in this system for both white and male supremacists through these determinist perspectives (Ferber, 2000; Lewis, 2004). White supremacists are concerned with safeguarding the white race by controlling female reproduction and bodies, and violent misogynist discourses often are awash in racism and anti-Semitism (Beauchamp, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020; It’s Time to Save Incels From Themselves, 2019).

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Far-right media executive and former President Trump advisor Steve Bannon noted as early as 2007 that gamers and other “alienated young men” offered untapped political potential (Rosenthal, 2020, p. 143). GamerGate was a 2014 hashtag campaign that began with an angry ex-boyfriend abusing his former girlfriend online but quickly transformed into the networked harassment—including doxing, death and rape threats—of many prominent women working in the video game, or gaming, industry. GamerGate confirmed Bannon’s beliefs about the political potential of these groups, and he responded by launching the career of right-wing populist misogynist pundit Milo Yiannopoulos at Breitbart (Rosenthal, 2020).

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Data and Methods In order to measure the mutually recursive ideological impact of white supremacist discourses and physically violent manifestations of the male supremacist movement on one another, we compared the frequency of words and phrases between foundational texts of white and male supremacists. For the white supremacist literature, we focused on the following seven texts: Mein Kampf (Hitler, 1925), Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood Speech (2007, 1968]), The Camp of the Saints (Raspail & Shapiro, 1995, 1973]),13 The Turner Diaries (Pierce, 1978), The White Genocide Manifesto (Lane, 1988), The Great Replacement (Camus, 2012) and the Anders Breivik Manifesto (2011). We wanted to include not only some of the canonical white supremacist texts (e.g., Pierce) but also their inspiration (e.g., Powell and Raspail) and some more recent examples (e.g., Lane, Camus and Breivik). For the violent misogynist texts, we included an exhaustive collection of ex-ante writings of male supremacists, beginning with the incel manifestos of Elliot Rodger and Chris Harper Mercer, transcripts of videos from Elliot Rodger and Scott Paul Beierle, and Alek Minassian’s police interview.14 To cast a wider net into violent male supremacism and demonstrate continuity with incel beliefs, we also included texts from three masculinist extremists sometimes noted as possible post-facto incels,15 including the suicide note of Marc Lepine, the manifesto of Seung Hui Cho and the blog transcript of George Sodini. Finally, we included the manifesto of Tobias Rathjen, who the popular press regularly speculates was an incel but who is more accurately characterized as

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The Camp of the Saints first appeared in French. We used the English translation for this project. 14 We have removed the police officer’s questions and document narrations for a more clear focus on the belief structure of Minassian himself. 15 We do not take the position that Marc Lepine, Seung Hui Cho and George Sodini are post-facto incels because we see inceldom as a new social movement arising from long-term violent male supremacism. However, Lepine, Cho and Sodini are regularly praised within the incel movement and are connected to it through violent misogyny.

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an adherent to the Men Going Their Own Way movement, which is a men’s separatist group.16 We chose to analyze a mix of long-form, more “traditional” texts and ex-ante writings to illustrate the consistency of ideologies across writing styles, as well as the ways in which political ideologies are taken up and disseminated across movements through both formal and informal texts. That said, there is a slippage between formal and informal texts. For example, The Turner Diaries, widely considered the “bible of the racist right,” is written in a memoir style much more similar to the ex-ante manifestos than to a traditional book. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) was developed by Blei et al. (2003) to distill topics from textual datasets so large that “comprehension cannot be feasibly attempted by reading them” (Liu et al., 2015). LDA previously has been employed successfully to extract important topics from large textual datasets, such as online postings (Arun et al., 2010; GayoAvello, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2019; Lokmanoglu & Veilleux-Lepage, 2020; Mittal et al., 2017). In examining the frequencies of words in each corpus, we used term frequency-inverse document frequency (tfid) weight, which is a statistical measure that calculates how important a word is in each document over the whole corpus (Wu et al., 2008). We followed the standard steps for LDA textual analysis: (1) preprocessing; (2) determining the number of topics; and (3) setting the control parameters. The text preprocessing was done by first cleaning both datasets, removing grammatical words that lack semantic meaning (e.g., as, and, the), stemming the words and trimming the total dataset. We then ran four different model comparison metrics, including “Griffiths 2004,” “CaoJuan2009,” “Arun2010” and “Deveaud2014,” and tested to establish the most desirable number of topics to be extracted using LDA (Arun et al., 2010; Cao et al., 2009; Deveaud et al., 2014; Griffiths & Steyvers, 2004). The graph find-topic-model resulted in an optimal k = 16

Elliot Rodger committed the 2014 Isla Vista massacre; Scott Paul Beierle, the 2018 Florida yoga studio attack; Chris Harper Mercer, the 2015 Umpqua college attack; Alek Minassian, the Toronto, Canada van attack; Marc Lépine, the 1989 École Polytechnique shooting in Montreal, Canada; Seung Hui Cho, the 2007 Virginia Tech killings; George Sodini, the 2009 aerobics class murders in Collier Township, Pennsylvania; and, Tobias Rathjen, the 2020 Hanau, Germany mass shooting.

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15 topics for the white supremacist content and k = 15 for the violent misogynist content and provided the most frequent words for each of those topics within the datasets. Topic clustering was then used to build the comparative analysis between both datasets by merging similar topics into topic clusters. Topic cluster headings for these merged topics were decided upon based on the most frequent 25 words therein. The prominence of each word within the topic across each dataset was aggregated to find the prominence of each cluster (Roberts et al., 2014). Dictionary methods and sentiment analysis, as a part of supervised machine learning, is a text classification tool, where it allows the machine to search the text and classify it to a pre-made dictionary. Using premade dictionaries, the researcher compares different classifications of words, by analyzing the relative frequency of the word in each category (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). Supervised machine learning is helpful in seeing the classification of words and the distribution for these classifications; hence they can be helpful in analyzing the bigger picture in large N datasets and become even stronger when they are supplemented by unsupervised machine learning. For this data analysis, pre-made lexicon “Bing” was used to compare the “positive” and “negative” words (Liu et al., 2015). In order to longitudinally calculate the sentiment of each dataset, the text was cumulated every 50 lines. In total, there were seven white supremacist texts (n = 528,273 unique words) and nine masculinist extremist texts (n = 53,510 unique words) in the corpus (n = 581,783 unique words total) (Fig. 9.1). Common overlapping words between the white supremacist and masculinist texts are prevalent (more than 9,200 unique words in common). Although only one of the top 10 words is shared in common (time), the commonly occurring words in the top 200 begin to paint a more vivid picture.17 17

Common words between the two corpora within the top 25 include: life/live/living, people and world. Common words within the top 50 include: day(s), women, kids/children and call(ed). Common words within the top 100 include: party, schools, left, black and found. Common words within the top 150 include: future, social, white, reason, police, past, family, understand, set, completely, front and finally. Common words in the top 200 include: power, home, means, mind, middle, kill(ed), single, change, act and lost.

Fig. 9.1 Comparison of common words between white supremacist and masculinist texts

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We also computed the most common bigrams between the two corpora. When weighted, the most commonly occurring bigrams across both sets of texts include: tongue sticking, world war, German people, human rights, Soviet Union, German nation, short term, Los Angeles, future generations, world view, United Kingdom, national socialist, North Africa, intelligence agency, Cold War, armed forces, education system, million people, War II and world history. Although the distribution between corpora is less equivalent, other noteworthy bigrams include human rights, education system, white girl, human nature, black people, Jesus Christ, double standard, blood money, ordinary people, political science, politically incorrect, common sense, status quo, machine gun(s), assault rifle and primary goal.

White Supremacist Texts LDA topic modeling revealed 14 themes and one artifact18 from the white supremacist texts, including Clash of Civilizations, Cultural Marxism, Racial Hegemony, Religious Violence, Temporality, Civil War, White Rebellion, World War II, Shit Hits the Fan (SHTF) Scenario,19 The Great Replacement, Education, White Genocide and Immigration. These themes were established based on a qualitative interpretation of the top words and other findings arising from the topic model. They support earlier work on the centrality of The Great Replacement and the victimized white male identity. Although The Great Replacement, Racial Hegemony and White Genocide in particular are commonly 18

Artifacts occur when topics within a model are semantically similar and, thus, coherent but are not humanly interpretable. For example, a topic could include words like “good,” “well,” “right” and “much,” which are all positively loaded words that may express desire and are, therefore, semantically similar but provide no context for human interpretation. 19 The SHTF scenario is sometimes referred to as accelerationism, the idea that increased social chaos will break down the existing political system; however, SHTF is not necessarily caused by white supremacists but can be the result of any number of social upheavals or even natural disasters, whereas accelerationism is specifically caused by white supremacist actions.

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attributed solely to white supremacism, they also are intimately linked with societal norms around what it means to be a “real” man that emerge from male supremacist beliefs fueled by institutional patriarchy. Within this corpus, narratives of racial and ethnic Others encroaching on white mens’ ability—and perceived masculine entitlement—to start, raise and financially support white families becomes justification for White Rebellion, Civil War and, at times, SHTF Scenarios. Additionally, these themes highlight animosity toward Cultural Marxism and a belief a day of reckoning is on the horizon. Common bigrams that emerged from the white supremacist corpora illustrate some of these themes. The most prevalent bigrams in these texts (in order of ranking) include: Western Europe(an), justiciar knight(s),20 civil war, knights templar, cultural conservative(s), Middle East, cultural marxist(s)/multiculturalist, European countries, world war, political correctness, pccts knights, foreign policy, German people, Ottoman Empire, political parties, nuclear power, Muslim immigration, human rights, Islamic world, European Union, picric acid,21 Saudi Arabia, Frankfurt school, mass immigration, demographic warfare, western world, prime minister and power plant (Fig. 9.2).

Male Supremacist Texts Thirteen themes and two artifacts emerged from LDA topic modeling of the masculinist texts, including Justification, Sexual Entitlement, Rejection, Attraction, Revolution/Deep State, Martyrdom, Family, Temporality, School, Forever Alone, Backlash Politics, Human Connection and Interracial Dating. As with the white supremacist themes, these were determined based on qualitative interpretation and also lend support to work on masculinism and misogyny that suggests these groups have been red pilled and are, thus, engaged in backlash politics. Moreover, 20

Justiciar was a medieval term for English and Scottish rulers. Anders Breivik wrote that he was a justiciar knight commander for the Knights Templar Europe and a leader in the panEuropean Patriotic Resistance Movement. The Knights Templar was a medieval-era Catholic military order. Similarly, the PCCTS knights is a fictional group noted in Breivik’s manifesto created to deploy guerrilla warfare against multiculturalists. 21 Picric acid is a component in military-grade explosives.

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Fig. 9.2 The sentiment in white supremacist corpora is overwhelmingly negative

these themes indicate the ideological focus on gendered norms around the family and relationships. Additionally, however, these themes also point to notions commonly believed to be more aligned with white supremacism, The Revolution/Deep State theme, for example, indicates the widespread white supremacist conspiracy theory concerning a belief in a deep state cabal that supports the efforts of feminists, Cultural Marxists and so-called social justice warriors in the erosion of primarily white male freedoms. Marc Lepine, for example, wrote that feminists want to “keep the advantages of women… while seizing for themselves those of men.” Seung Hui Cho likens “devout Christians” to a Satanic “American Al-Qaeda” in a manifesto that reads strikingly like Satanic Panic memoirs of the 1980s. Tobias Rathjen repeatedly alludes to a shadowy “secret service” surveilling society in preparation for a “Great Purge.” All of these sentiments have roots in white supremacist conspiracism.

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Many of the common bigrams within the masculinist extremist corpus include names and places associated with the violent acts the authors ultimately carried out. Those are not included here. As with the white supremacist data, the most prevalent bigrams our analysis revealed also reflect the themes that emerged from the topic modeling. These bigrams (again, in order of weighted ranking) include beautiful girl(s)/girlfriend, elementary/middle school, popular/cool kids, video games/player, secret service, Jesus Christ, phone call, winter break, degree murder, pretty girl(s), summer camp, social life, beautiful blonde/blonde girls/blonde hair, swimming pool, fourth grade, happy life, beach house, cool kids, playing wow and beta uprising. Sentiment analysis of the masculinist extremist corpus is, perhaps surprisingly, balanced between positive and negative sentiment. Although there are several negative spikes, there also are significant and somewhat more consistent positive trends.

Discussion When considered in the context of a qualitative reading of the white supremacist texts, our findings indicate a common narrative across these white supremacist writings of an evil plot not only by outside aggressors22 (e.g., the Zionist Occupied Governments, or ZOG, or a broader deep state cabal) but also by internal do-gooders23 (e.g., politically correct multiculturalists) to invade the white homeland, victimize white people—especially white women and children—and, ultimately, snuff out the ethno-European identity, which they see as indigenous to Europe and North America, through uncontrolled mass immigration and racial

22 Themes that reflect a plot by outside aggressors include Clash of Civilizations, Racial Hegemony, Religious Violence, SHTF Scenario, The Great Replacement, White Genocide and Immigration. These themes are not mutually exclusive and may appear in more than one aspect of this narrative. 23 Themes that reflect a concern around internal do-gooders include Racial Hegemony, Cultural Marxism, Civil War, White Rebellion and Education.

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hybridization24 (Archambault & Veilleux-Lepage, 2019). As a result, movement adherents proffer a fraternal call to arms to join an impending Civil War (reflected in the theme of the same name) kicked off by a “shit hits the fan scenario” (the SHTF theme) that will liberate the Aryan race and save it from annihilation. This logic of victimhood at the hands of Others, at least in part, allows the easy slippage between white and male supremacism. The overwhelmingly negative sentiment of the white nationalist texts provides additional context for the wider narrative and indicates white supremacists are highly motivated by an us-versus-them struggle in which they are destined to overcome perceived marginalization and emerge victorious thanks to superior intelligence and unyielding faith in their righteous cause. This victory in the hard-fought war will result in increased freedoms and a return to Constitutional rights (e.g., free speech and the right to bear arms) and, as such, usher in an era of increased societal peace. Perhaps the best example of this belief system is illustrated within The Turner Diaries (Pierce, 1978). In this canonical white supremacist text, which easily could be considered a field guide for the violent overthrow of a government, the SHTF scenario occurs when the U.S. federal government confiscates guns and kicks off a race war. The book, written as memoir, details the subsequent “Great Revolution” in which the white race (the true “patriots”) band together, enact vigilante justice and, ultimately, establish separatist white-only zones before “liberating” the “civilized” West and eradicating the East to build a “New Era.” The book’s protagonist, Earl Turner, dies a martyr to the cause in a suicide bombing of the Pentagon. By comparison, the common narrative that emerges from the violent misogynist corpus evokes wistful nostalgia for happier times (e.g., as a child with their family or in school prior to puberty, as shown in the Family and School themes) but also sees society as irreparably marred by feminization and multiculturalism, which is exemplified by the Justification and Backlash Politics themes. This progressive agenda, as well as the innate nature of women, prevents the relational and sexual success 24 Themes that reflect fears about a disappearing ethno-European identity include Racial Hegemony, SHTF Scenario, The Great Replacement, White Genocide, Immigration, Civil War and White Rebellion.

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to which this group of men feels entitled (as noted in the Sexual Entitlement, Rejection, Forever Alone and Human Connection themes) by adopting women’s liberation movement principles and encouraging white women to date Black men (seen in the Interracial Dating theme). As a result of feeling deprived of Human Connection since early childhood and resigned to being Forever Alone (both reflected in themes of the same names), violent misogynists discursively resort to Justifications for their planned attacks and often view themselves as Martyrs (i.e., the Martyrdom theme) to the cause, giving society what it rightfully deserves for betraying and victimizing them (Fig. 9.3). Like the white supremacist corpus, the sentiment analysis of the violent misogynist texts provides additional nuance to this reading. These discursive artifacts left behind by men who have committed gender-based violence see themselves as entitled to a fair shake at happiness, which is characterized by the ability to secure a fun life with a beautiful (usually white) woman at their side.25 For these men, a pretty girl for a partner is the universal entryway into gaining popularity and wider human connection. Because they have been incapable of attracting and/or keeping a female sexual partner, violent misogynists seem to begin by feeling loneliness before evolving into painful misery and finally landing and lingering in rage at both those who enjoy a supposedly more successful social life but also at society at large for setting up and perpetuating an unjust system. This hatred fuels, in turn, murderous inclinations and calls for a so-called beta uprising. It is a cycle of cumulative radicalization that requires additional analysis. However, it should be noted the sentiment analysis here also points to a drawback of dictionary sentiment methods when used with extremist texts. For example, the positive words in this corpus actually invoke negative connotations when read in the context of male supremacist ideology. Beautiful, attractive, pretty women are something these men feel they can never have. Being socially popular, experiencing love or happiness and getting a fair shake in life are beyond their reach. In contrast, these men 25

Qualitatively, the outlier to this pattern is Virginia Tech shooter Seung Hui Cho. Although his manifesto is deeply misogynist and espouses extensive narratives of rape and sexual violence, he is not focused primarily on women. It also provides evidence of a god complex and a serious pre-occupation with fairness, justice and inspiring future violence.

Fig. 9.3 Male supremacist sentiment analysis

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do not see hatred, rage and murder as negative but view them as a sort of justified reparation against a world that has turned its back on them. When viewed in this light, one can see how the sentiment analysis skews positive when, in fact, the corpus itself is overwhelmingly negative. This is particularly true when read through the lens of the black pill, which sees death as the only escape from a life of isolation and loneliness. Taken together, these drawbacks to sentiment analysis from dictionary methods more broadly can be summed up as missing the historical baggage of these words, failing to take into account that words have lives of their own. In thinking around the shared beliefs, tropes and justifications for violence across male and white supremacists texts in these corpora, several common themes emerge from the top common words, bigrams and qualitative reading. First, there is a focus on women, children and family—in particular, educating current generations about human nature, “accurate” history and how to secure a better future for subsequent generations. For white supremacists, as David Lane writes in the White Genocide Manifesto (which includes the 14 Words), “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children.” White nationalists, in particular, advocate for housewifery and homeschooling to maintain a pseudo separatism from Others in advance of a truly separate white ethnostate. Of course, this places a disproportionate burden on white women, when compared to white men, not only related to familial obligations but also more broadly for the moral guidance of the white race as a whole. It also unfairly lays blame on already-marginalized Others, such as immigrants and people of color, for the supposedly eroding white family and disappearing white race—even as they look back nostalgically to a time when the (white) nuclear family reigned supreme. Similarly, male supremacists look fondly to the prefeminist and Cultural Marxist past as a time when women “knew their place” and men supposedly stood a better chance of finding a female “mate” on a similar rung of the sexual marketplace hierarchy. They also often reminisce about happier pre-pubescent family times. Human nature, based in biological determinism and evolutionary biology pseudoscience, is touted as objective fact in both cases, and both white and

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male supremacists in the corpora seem to see it as their job to teach the supposed truth of humanity and society to the world. Second, there is a pervasive through line of the need for some sort of violent rebellion or overthrow of the existing politically correct status quo because it results in a double standard that marginalizes the ordinary man and privileges the Other (those traditionally understood as oppressed, be they people of color or women). White supremacists see a wide variety of SHTF scenarios around every turn. Whether this is caused by a natural disaster, a civil war or, in many cases, the machinations of a deep state secret society, the looming event will necessitate white mens’ enlistment to the cause for the protection of the white family and, ultimately, the white race. “Real” men will volunteer, and everyone else will be labeled race traitors. Male supremacists, too, call for an uprising. As Chris Harper Mercer wrote in his manifesto, “Every country in the world should be a battleground” where “blood will flow.” For misogynist incels, this so-called “beta uprising” is in response to, as Alek Minassian said in his police interview before claiming to have been in touch with both Elliot Rodger and Chris Harper Mercer on 4Chan, not only an inability to “get laid” but also oppression at the hands of society—based primarily on physical appearance that is out of their control. However, earlier male supremacist killers also recognized supposed inequities aimed at themselves. Marc Lepine, for example, saw the mass murder of women he identified as feminists as part of a rational political plan aimed at ending special privileges for women, many of which had been stolen from men. Additionally, in both white and male supremacist groups more broadly, calls for revolution sometimes feature accelerationist—the concept of hastening societal collapse to rebuild the world according to their conservative beliefs and traditional values—tones. This rebuilding looks very much like the United States 1950s, where communities were frequently segregated by race, sundown towns were prevalent, and women married young, bore and raised children, and lived the majority of their lives within the four walls of their homes. Not all male supremacists are racist, and many are not white, so not all of them would be overtly interested in segregation or sundown towns; however, the concept of easier access to women and a more institutionalized way

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to keep women in their supposedly rightful place (i.e., the private sphere) is clearly appealing to them all the same. Third, this revolution and/or accelerationist perspective is understood not only as common sense for those who have taken the red and black pills but also as an urgent human rights issue that most impacts the every man and, therefore, must be addressed immediately before all is lost. Elliot Rodger, for example, writes that his story is one of “war against cruel injustice,” while The Turner Diaries equates gun ownership with civil rights, and Enoch Powell explicitly states, “The discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm and resentment, lies not with the immigrant population but with those among whom they have come and are still coming.” In framing their perceived plight as a matter of human rights and social justice, white and male supremacists are strategically deploying the language of the progressive Left, including the very multiculturalists and feminists they so despise. This co-optation of sorts is, perhaps, most clearly evident in the central tenets and associated discourses of men’s rights movements (MRM), which frequently invert feminist calls for social justice to apply to men (e.g., the MRM association National Coalition for Men bills itself as a civil rights organization and, as but one example, suggests men and women are equally at risk of domestic violence and, in fact, men are actively ignored by the media and discriminated against by policymakers). These themes can be mapped onto the collective action framework and are more fully explicated in the context of the qualitative narrative analysis below. Collective action frames are the culturally and historically specific but active and interpretive construction of meanings by social movement actors that aid in mobilization and legitimatization of group action (Benford & Snow, 2000). They consist of three core framing tasks, including diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. For the diagnostic frame, both groups identify similar problems and assign blame to the same parties. In many cases, the solutions to these problems and what mobilizations should occur—the prognostic frame—also are very similar. Finally, the motivational frame or justification for action follows a comparable rationale in both cases. The remainder of this discussion will address these in more detail.

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The diagnostic framing of both violent male and white supremacists found in these texts expresses a deep sense of nostalgia for happier times. For the white supremacists, this is a time when white people (and, men, specifically) were in the majority and in control of society through inequitable power dynamics. Women and ethnic and racial minorities “knew their place” and societal structures and systems privileged keeping white men at the top of the hierarchy. Male supremacists, too, wish for a time when men were on top and better able to successfully initiate romantic relationships and control “their” women. These men also regularly seem quite wishful for a return to the happier times of their childhood when they were blissfully unaware of the injustice in the world. In assigning blame for the disappearance of these so-called better times, both white and male supremacists exemplify what has come to be known as backlash politics and assign blame broadly to three things. First, both groups blame feminists and the women’s movement for shifting the power balance through gains in women’s rights and, ultimately, the feminization of contemporary society they see as having made men a marginalized and oppressed group. Second, both male and white supremacists blame widespread multiculturalism for their collective plight. In the case of white supremacists, this is discursively constructed in the rhetoric of white genocide and the dangers ethnic and racial Others pose to white women and children. In the case of violent male supremacists, however, multiculturalism has lowered their chances for securing a sexual partner because of its promotion of interracial dating. Importantly, white supremacists also see race-mixing, which they often call hybridization, as a threat to the white race. White women who date, marry and/or have children with racial or ethnic Others are viewed as “race traitors.” Finally, there is a general hostility toward the culture of political correctness, which both groups blame for pushing them to the fringes of society and see as standing in the way of taking back the power they deserve. Both of these groups have taken the red pill (or the black pill as the case may be) and so believe they see the truth of the world as it really is. The ability to speak freely, without fear of repercussions, about these issues is of the utmost importance to both groups.

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Following from these diagnostic collective action frames, both groups included in this corpus also profess similar solutions and mobilizations, or prognostic frames. This narrative often revolves around a fraternal call to arms that gets discursively constituted as the epic quest of a hero’s journey and may result in martyrdom, which is not only the ultimate sacrifice to the cause but also the ultimate personal reward in becoming essentially sainted within the movement. For both groups, this righteous path typically precludes a place for women to enact this sort of sacrifice; however, there are some differences in the underlying belief structures of this prognostic frame. For example, white supremacists see the white plight as possible to overcome through a white rebellion and violent overthrow of polite society, whereas violent misogynists largely see their circumstances as permanent and their plight as insurmountable. This is particularly true of black pill adherents represented in this corpus who view death as the only escape, while the more “temperate” red-pilled misogynists may also espouse other alternatives, including enforced monogamy and the legalization of rape—ideas which are not far off from white supremacist movements that at the most extreme view women as nothing more than walking wombs but always situate women in subordinate roles. Finally, the motivational frames across both groups are highly affective and draw on normative masculine ideals centered around a Western white, heterosexual middle-class masculinity to justify associated violence and amplify the importance of the respective causes. For both groups, the urgency with which these motivational frames are presented is attributed to nothing less than the potential eradication of traditional—and, by extension, correct—ways of being in the world. The fraternal call to arms functions as a form of reparations for the perceived disappearing ways of life. White supremacists believe the white race is disappearing because of a sickness in society and that it is their duty to perpetuate the race. But there also is an imminent threat to their ability to do this because the safety of both present and future white wives and children are at risk. Therefore, if they want to ensure the safety of their families, they must be prepared to fight for the cause. If they are not willing to do so, they are considered race traitors and will not be welcome in the “New Era” society. This sense of masculinity is to be protected for the betterment

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of the “civilized” white race. For violent male supremacists, on the other hand, the argument is similar but framed in a slightly different manner. The male sex has been emasculated and oppressed because of a sickness in society. Things are bad for those who conform to normative, idealized masculinity but they are far worse for those outside the norm. Those who see this truth have a duty to reinstate men to their rightful place of power, but for those men who cannot conform to this notion of masculinity or who are unhappy with their place in the hierarchy, the only resort is a disciplinary campaign of terror that will push society more in line with their distorted sense of equity and justice.

Conclusion In conclusion, this chapter has provided empirical evidence that extends our understanding of the symbiotic beliefs, themes and tropes nested within distinct white and violent male supremacist ideologies. They are, in fact, birds of a feather. As expected, misogyny is prevalent throughout both the white and violent male supremacist texts. Both movements are preoccupied with women’s reproductive and sexual function and see women as property to own and control. They discursively frame this narrative as based in a “natural” two-sex system that precludes those deemed deviant (e.g., the LGBTQ+ community and racial and ethnic Others) from participation in order to restore their rightful place in society. Feminists, multiculturalists and political correctness have run amok and are to blame for this state of affairs. Therefore, only a hero’s quest can right this so-called wrong. There are some limitations to this study, however. First, including the Breivik and Rathjen manifestos in the white and male supremacist corpora, respectively, precludes the opportunity to examine the extent to which they actually look like both white supremacy and violent misogyny. While this was a methodological decision in the research design, future plans include analyzing them as a third corpus. Similarly, there are longer violent misogynist texts (e.g., Roy Den Hollander’s autobiography and Julius Evola’s Men Among the Ruins) that could have been included. This, too, was a conscious decision; however, based on our findings, future work will include these

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more formal, long-form texts. Despite these limitations, this research does push the study of white and violent male supremacist movements a bit further and illustrates the importance of continuing investigation of these two movements. We envision future work in this area using larger data sets and employing distributional semantic approaches, which may provide predictive value. We hope others will continue building on this work as well.

Policy Implications There are three broad areas of policy implications that arise from this study related to: (1) women, children and families; (2) calls for rebellion; and (3) human rights subervsion. First, it is clear from these results that discussions around the well-being of women, children and families that emanate from white and male supremacists are less about mental and physical safety and more about maintaining the structural power of white men—often at the expense of white women and children and all people of color. More and more, these discourses are being mainstreamed into conservative politics at all levels, from local school boards to the federal government, as far-right actors run for elections by spreading mis/disinformation and conspiracism. As but one recent example, three far-right evangelicals flipped control of North Idaho26 College’s Board of Trustees, leading the college president to resign, amidst accusations the community college was using tax payer dollars to fund #BlackLivesMatter protests (it wasn’t) and indoctrinating young people into radical multiculturalist politics with its diversity programs, which evidence does not support (Pettit, 2021). This is merely one example of the strategic politics of these groups. To better mitigate the spread of mis/disinformation and conspiracism in political advertising, we recommend campaign advertising reform that targets outright falsehoods and patently conspiratorial claims. Additionally, supposedly non-partisan 26

Not coincidentally, Idaho is one of five Northwestern U.S. states identified by a growing traditionalist political movement for evangelicals and self-described libertarians to relocate to be among likeminded people. This is a similar strategy to some white nationalist groups who call for a white ethnostate or Pioneer Little Europe communities.

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organizations at the local level, like school boards, should implement actionable behavior clauses that can more easily remove far-right actors for cause. Second, in order to slow the spread of the dangerous language and calls to arms associated with white and/or male rebellion, the social media platforms where it is most commonly circulated need to be held accountable. These companies must retrain their algorithms to better identify and remove it. In conjunction with improving algorithms for automatic detection of calls for an uprising (by white and male supremacists— and others), social media companies should be financially responsible for employing specialists to moderate extremist content. It is insufficient to hire precarious, underpaid workers (sometimes in the world’s most marginalized places) to make these content moderation calls. Not only are they ill-equipped to discern coded language and symbols used by many extremist groups, but they are often traumatized by repeatedly viewing and interacting with it (Jereza, 2021). Finally, related to the ways in which these groups invert human rights narratives for patently anti-progressive ends, we make two recommendations. First, human rights non-governmental organizations should develop curriculum and public service announcements to counter this phenomenon and set the record straight. Second, journalists must stop quoting these narratives when proffered by interview subjects without also contextualizing and problematizing them. Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank the members of the Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies Working Group for providing very helpful comments on drafts of this chapter and Dr. Dror Walter for his assistance with the computational analysis. This research is partly funded by the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society’s Major Research Project, titled Misogyny, Gender and Engagement in the Extreme Right Movement.

Appendix See Tables 9.1 and 9.2.

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Table 9.1 Top words in white supremacist texts Word

tf_idf

manifesto immigrant zionist Tl genocide islamic muslim Cd Parliament Dependants Immigrant descended wolverhampton Monsieur Nocence katherine Muslims miscegenation Self-evidently sophistry Statistic Ganges recognizing Thatds Turner Intent

0.010578 0.010411 0.009384 0.009254 0.007685 0.007219 0.006072 0.005967 0.005606 0.005518 0.005518 0.005518 0.005502 0.005398 0.005329 0.005314 0.004859 0.004859 0.004859 0.004859 0.004838 0.004692 0.004612 0.004527 0.004192

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Table 9.2 Top words in male supremacist manifestos Word

tf_idf

feminists Youre Fuck Ive black christ sighs fucked annex frontline lepine gonna youdre alright defenseless Im girls jesus blackness rape soul uhuh surveillance blond smirking idm

0.065785 0.040914 0.037503 0.033869 0.031772 0.031582 0.029236 0.028835 0.026314 0.026314 0.026314 0.02475 0.02344 0.021005 0.020184 0.01992 0.019505 0.019156 0.015836 0.014417 0.014417 0.013524 0.013499 0.013494 0.013494 0.01338

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10 They’re Not All the Same: A Longitudinal Comparison of Violent and Non-Violent Right-Wing Extremist Identities Online Garth Davies, Ryan Scrivens, Tiana Gaudette, and Richard Frank

Purpose This study examines the posting behavioral patterns of both violent and non-violent right-wing extremists (RWEs) within a sub-forum of the largest white supremacy web-forum, Stormfront, in general, and whether there are differences in each user types’ radical posting behavior over time, which may contribute to their collective identity formation in particular. This study represents an original contribution to the academic literature on violent online political extremism on three key fronts. G. Davies (B) · R. Frank School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada e-mail: [email protected] R. Scrivens · T. Gaudette School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_10

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First, many researchers, practitioners, and policymakers continue to raise questions about the role of the Internet in facilitating violent extremism and terrorism (Conway, 2017). Questions often surround the impact of the offenders’ consumption of and networking around violent extremist online content in their acceptance of extremist ideology and/or their decision to engage in violent extremism and terrorism (see Scrivens, Gill, and Conway, 2020). Understandably, increased attention has been given to identifying violent extremists online prior to their engagement in offline violence and scrutinizing their online presence (Brynielsson et al. 2013; Cohen et al., 2014; Kaati et al., 2016). A growing interest on these issues notwithstanding, few empirically grounded analyses identify which online users have engaged in violent extremism offline and in turn explore their digital footprints. Instead, research has overwhelmingly focused on identifying “radicals” online (e.g., Scrivens, 2020; Scrivens, Davies, and Frank, 2018, 2020), and not those who adhere to radical beliefs but are violent as well (Scrivens et al., 2021; Wolfowicz et al., 2021). Second, some empirical literature is emerging on the posting behaviors of extremists online (examples include Kleinberg et al. 2020; Scrivens, 2020; Scrivens, Davies, and Frank, 2018, 2020; Scrivens, Wojciechowski, and Frank, 2020), but very little work has identified differences in posting patterns of those who share extreme ideological beliefs but are violent or non-violent in the offline world. In fact, current research does not fully capture nuanced differences between violent and non-violent extremists in general (Freilich and LaFree, 2015; Sarma, 2017; Smith, 2018a, b). Despite claims from scholars about the importance of making such comparisons (Asal et al., 2016; Chermak, Freilich, and Suttmoeller, 2013; Freilich and LaFree, 2015; LaFree, et al. 2018; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Monahan, 2012), terrorism and extremism studies tend to focus on ideologically motivated violence and oftentimes overlook other crime forms and other types of extremists (Freilich, Chermak, and Simone, 2009; Horgan et al., 2016; Knight, Keatley, and Woodward, 2019; Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). Sarma (2017), for example, in his assessment of the challenges associated with conducting risk assessments to combat violent extremism, concluded that “effective risk assessment

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tools need to be able to distinguish between individuals who are on violent and non-violent trajectories” (p. 279). This, in turn, requires, a body of research that has isolated indicators that are sensitive to the different processes. An exhaustive search using dedicated academic research databases produced just three empirical studies on the online behaviors of violent and non-violent extremists. Holt and colleagues (2018) examined the underlying theoretical assumptions evident in radicalization models through a case-study analysis of violent and non-violent extremists, which included an in-depth analysis of the on- and offline behaviors of four extremists. The findings provide initial support for aspects of social control, particularly in the role of peers in facilitating social relationships that increase radicalization and engender criminality. By comparison, there was less support for the role of social learning as peers communicated definitions supportive of radical ideologies but did not consistently serve as sources of imitation nor play much of a role with respect to differential reinforcement for behavior. Wolfowicz and colleagues (2021) used a matched case–control design to differentiate between terrorists and non-violent radicals based on their Facebook profiles for the purpose of identifying new social media level behavioral metrics guided by social learning theory. The findings suggest that terrorists were much more likely than non-violent radicals to post about a terrorist attack that was committed by their Facebook friends prior to their own attacks. The authors also found that the majority of posts made by both terrorists and non-violent radicals consisted of uploaded images. However, the proportion of text-based posts and shared posts differed across groups, with text-based posts making up a larger proportion of posts by non-violent radicals than those made by terrorists’ and shared posts accounting for a larger proportion of terrorists’ posts than radicals’ posts. Lastly, Scrivens and colleagues (2021) examined the posting behaviors of violent and non-violent right-wing extremists by plotting the average posting trajectory for users in an extremist web-forum as well as assessed of the rates at which users stayed active or went dormant in the space and whether specific posting behaviors were characteristic of users’ violence status. The authors found a general decline in posting behavior over time for both violent and non-violent RWEs in their sample, but

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violent RWEs desisted in posting frequency at a much quicker rate than their non-violent counterpart and the only observed characteristic of the violent status was having less total number of posts in the broader forum. In other words, violent RWEs tended to be those who were much less active online than non-violent RWEs. Regardless, that what we generally know about the online behaviors of violent and non-violent extremists is limited (Wolfowicz et al., 2021). We have little scholarship on the posting behavioral patterns of violent and non-violent extremists and fewer efforts to methodologically and systematically analyze their online posting behaviors (Scrivens et al., 2021). There can be little doubt that an assessment is needed. Third, the notion of “collective identity” lies at the heart of the social movement theory framework and has provided valuable insight into the impact of right-wing extremists’ online discussions in shaping their identity (e.g., Futrell and Simi, 2004; Perry and Scrivens, 2016; Scrivens et al., 2018). The social movement literature posits that collective identity is actively produced (e.g., Hunt and Benford, 1994; Snow, 2001) and constructed through what Melucci (1995) describes as “interaction, negotiation and the opposition of different orientations” (p. 43). In addition, according to the social constructionist paradigm, collective identity is “invented, created, reconstituted, or cobbled together rather than being biologically preordained” (Snow, 2001, p. 5). As activists share ideas among other members of their in-group, these exchanges actively produce a shared sense of “we” and, by extension, a collective identity (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; Snow, 2001; Meluuci, 1995; Futrell and Simi, 2004). Additionally, a collective identity is further developed through the construction of an “us” versus “them” binary (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). By “othering,” or identifying and targeting the groups’ perceived enemies, such interactions further define the borders of the in-group (Perry and Scrivens, 2016). Indeed, these same processes of collective identity formation occur within—and are facilitated by—online communications. Similar to how “face-to-face” interactions in the “real world” form collective identities, so too do the “many-to-many’” interactions in cyberspace (Crisafi, 2005). As a result, the Internet’s many online platforms have facilitated extreme

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right-wing identity work (Futrell and Simi, 2004; Perry and Scrivens, 2016). As Perry and Scrivens (2016) explained it: [a] collective identity provides an alternative frame for understanding and expressing grievances; it shapes the discursive “other” along with the borders that separate “us” from “them”; it affirms and reaffirms identity formation and maintenance; and it provides the basis for strategic action. (p. 69)

Each of these elements enhance our understanding of the Internet’s role in developing a collective identity among extreme right-wing adherents. However, research in this space has yet to identify differences in how collective identities take shape between individuals who share extreme ideological beliefs but are violent or non-violent in the offline world.

Current Study Data and Sample We analyzed all postings made by a sample of violent and non-violent RWEs in the open access sections of Stormfront Canada, a Canadianthemed sub-forum of the largest white supremacy discussion forum Stormfront. It is the oldest racial hate site and discussion forum used by members of the RWE movement. Stormfront is also one of the most influential RWE forums in the world (Bliuc et al., 2019; Simi and Futrell, 2015). From the mid-1990s, the extreme right became increasingly reliant on web-forums to facilitate movement expansion by spreading propaganda and connecting with like-minded individuals, both within and beyond national borders (see Daniels, 2009; see also Conway et al., 2019). It was around this time that Stormfront transformed from a website into a forum with an array of sub-sections addressing a variety of topics, including an “International” section composed of a range of geographically and linguistically bounded subforums (e.g., Stormfront Europe, Stormfront Downunder, and Stormfront Canada). Stormfront has also served as a “funnel site” for the

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RWE movement, wherein forum users have been targeted by other RWE users for the purpose of recruiting new members into violent offline groups, including online forums hosted by the Hammerskins, Blood & Honour, and various Ku Klux Klan (KKK) branches (see Galloway and Scrivens, 2018). Today, Stormfront has just shy of 357,000 “members” and contains over 13.5 million posts. Understandably, Stormfront has been the focus of much research attention since its inception, including an assessment of recruitment efforts by forum users (see Hale, 2010; see also Lennings et al. 2010; Wong et al., 2015), the formation of a virtual community (see Back, 2002; see also Bowman-Grieve, 2009; De Koster and Houtman, 2008) and collective identity there (see Futrell and Simi, 2004; see also Perry and Scrivens, 2016), the extent to which Stormfront is connected to other racial hate sites (see Burris et al., 2000; see also Gerstenfeld et al., 2003), and how Stormfront discourse is less virulent and more palatable to readers (see Daniels; see also Meddaugh and Kay, 2009). Although a number of emerging digital spaces have been adopted by the extreme right in recent years (see Conway et al., 2019), Stormfront continues to be a valuable online space for researchers to assess behavioral posting patterns. To illustrate, recent efforts have been made to examine RWE posting behaviors found on the platform (Scrivens, 2020), the development of user activity and extremist language there (Kleinberg et al., 2020), the impact of presidential election results on Stormfront posting behaviors (Scrivens et al., 2020), and the ways in which the collective identity of the extreme right takes shape over time (Scrivens et al., 2020) and is affected by offline intergroup conflict on the forum (Bliuc et al., 2019). However, research in this space has yet to compare how collective identities take shape between Stormfront users who share extreme ideological beliefs but are violent or non-violent in the offline world. Data collection and sampling efforts proceeded in two stages. First, all open-source content on Stormfront Canada was captured using a custom-written computer program that was designed to collect vast amounts of information online (for more information on the webcrawler, see Scrivens et al., 2019). In total, the web-crawler extracted approximately 125,000 sub-forum posts made by approximately 7,000

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authors between September 12, 2001 and October 29, 2017.1 Several forum attributes were also collected during this process, including: (1) usernames and a unique identification number for each author; (2) the date that each author joined the forum; (3) all posted content for each author in the sub-forum; (4) the date and time for each sub-forum posting; (5) a tally of the total number of posts for each author in the sub-forum; and, (6) a tally of the total number of posts for each author in the broader forum. Second, to identify users in the sub-forum who were violent RWEs offline and those who were non-violent RWEs offline, a former violent extremist2 who was actively involved in the North American RWE movement for more than 10 years— in both recruitment and leadership roles, predominantly in violent racist skinhead groups—voluntarily reviewed a list of users who posted in the sub-forum and then selected those who matched one of the two user types.3 This identification process was done under the supervision of the lead researcher of this project, wherein each time the former identified a user of interest, they were asked to explain in as much detail possible why the user was identified as a violent or non-violent RWE. The former was also asked to provide examples of the activities that each user engaged in as well as their association with or connection to each identified user. This was done to verify the authenticity of each user identified by the former. A total of 49 violent and 50 non-violent RWEs were identified from a list 1 September 12, 2001 was simply a date that the sub-forum went live online. Based on our assessment of the first messages posted on the sub-forum, it would appear as though Stormfront Canada was not launched in response to the 9/11 terror attacks. 2 By former violent extremists, we refer to individuals who, at one time in their lives, subscribed to and/or perpetuated violence in the name of a particular extremist ideology and have since publicly and/or privately denounced violence in the name of a particular extremist ideology. In short, they no longer identify themselves as adherents of a particular extremist ideology or are affiliated with an extremist group or movement. 3 Data collection efforts followed the proper ethical procedures for conducting research involving human participants. Here, the former extremist was informed that their participation in the study was entirely voluntary. They were also informed that they had the right to decline to answer questions or to end the interview/withdraw from the study at any time. In addition, the former was informed that they would not be identified by name in any publication, and that all data collected from the interview would be de-identified for the purpose of ensuring participant anonymity. One in-person interview was conducted with the former in June 2017 and was approximately 10 h in length. The interview was audio-recorded and transcribed.

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of approximately 7,000 usernames. Each of these identified usernames represented a unique forum user and there was no evidence of extremists in our sample using multiple usernames. This was confirmed by the former, whose connections were strong enough to be able to link individuals to usernames. The online content for each user was then identified in the sub-forum data: 12,617 posts from the violent users and 17,659 posts from the non-violent users.4 The sample included 30,276 posts, with the first post made on September 1, 2004 and the last post made on October 29, 2017. RWEs who were identified for the current study were actively involved in right-wing extremism. In particular, they were those who—like all extremists—structure their beliefs on the basis that the success and survival of the in-group is inseparable from the negative acts of an outgroup and, in turn, they are willing to assume both an offensive and defensive stance in the name of the success and survival of the in-group (see Berger, 2018). RWEs in the current study were thus characterized as a racially, ethnically, and/or sexually defined nationalism, which is typically framed in terms of white power and/or white identity (i.e., the in-group) that is grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats posed by some combination of non-whites, Jews, Muslims, immigrants, refugees, members of the LGBTQ community, and feminists (i.e., the out-group(s)) (see Conway et al., 2019). However, violent RWEs that were identified for the current study were those who committed several acts of known physical violence, including violent attacks against minorities and anti-racist groups. Violence in this regard aligned closely with Bjørgo and Ravndal’s (2019) understanding of RWE violence, which they describe as “violent attacks whose target selection is based on extreme-right beliefs and corresponding enemy categories—immigrants, minorities, political opponents, or governments […] [or] spontaneous violence” (p. 5). Conversely, non-violent RWEs identified for the current study were those who were actively involved in 4

This study was not an indictment of this sub-forum itself. The sub-forum was selected because it was an online space that the former extremist actively participated in during his involvement in violent RWE, meaning that they were familiar with the users who posted there and could identify individuals who the former knew were violent or non-violent RWEs in the offline world.

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RWE movements and activities offline, including—but not limited to— rallies, marches, protests, postering and flyering campaigns, and group meetings and gatherings, but did not engage in physical violence in any known capacity.

Measures The first step in analyzing the data was to determine which of the various topics found in the sample would be measured. To identify some of the discussions that underpin the collective identity of the extreme right, lists of keywords were developed that accounted for online discussions about their central adversaries. Adversary posts is a calculation of the total number of postings on Stormfront per day that included keywords related to Jews, Blacks, and LGBTQs. In short, these adversary groups are widely discussed and demonized by authors in online discussions forums of the extreme right (including Stormfront) and it is the hateful and derogatory sentiment associated with these adversary groups (and others) that form the collective identity of the RWE movement (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Futrell and Simi 2004). While by no means are these the only adversary groups targeted by them, historically Jewish, Black, and LGBTQ communities have been the primary opponents of the RWE movement (Daniels, 2009). Jews, for example, have been subject to extensive criticism by the extreme right. They have been labeled as “the source of all evil,” “the spawn of the Devil himself,” conspiring to extinguish the white race and breeding them out of existence—through “Jew-controlled” government, financial institutions, and media (i.e., Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG) conspiracy) (Ezekiel, 1995). Black communities, too, have been the primary target of much of the hateful sentiment expressed by the extreme right. Blacks have been constructed as “mud races” and the descendants of animals created before Adam and Eve; “savages” who viciously rape white women and take jobs away from white communities; and the foot soldiers of “conspiring Jews” (Ezekiel, 1995). Adherents of this male-dominated movement have also categorized anyone who is not heterosexual as “contaminated” and “impure,” not only by maintaining

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that the gay rights movement is the killer of the traditional white family and the cultural destruction of the white race, but that gays are responsible for the contemporary AIDS endemic (Perry, 2001). For each of the three adversary groups, a list of keywords was developed by drawing from extensive lists of slur words found online.5

Analytic Strategy The context surrounding each keyword was systematically evaluated using sentiment analysis software. Also known as “opinion mining,” sentiment analysis is a data collection and analytic method that allows for the application of subjective labels and classifications. It can evaluate the opinions of individuals by organizing data into distinct classes and sections, assigning an individual’s sentiment with a polarity score (i.e., a positive, negative, or neutral score) (see Feldman, 2013). SentiStrength, which is an established sentiment analysis program that has been widely used by criminologists in terrorism and extremism studies (see Scrivens et al., 2019), was utilized for the current study, as it allows for a systematic analysis of a user’s discussion that could be considered “radical” in online settings (see Scrivens et al., 2018). To illustrate, it allows for a keyword-focused method of determining sentiment near a specified keyword (see Thelwall and Buckley, 2013). Equally important is another key feature of SentiStrength: polarity scores are augmented by characters that can influence scores assigned to the text, such as active and powerful language, booster words, negative words, repeated letters, repeated negative terms, antagonistic words, punctuation, and other distinctive characters suited for studying an online context. In theory, the higher a polarity score is assigned to a piece of text, the

5 Words were drawn from the Racial Slur Database (http://www.rsdb.org), as well as an extensive list of racial slurs (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ethnic_slurs) and words targeting LGBTQs. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_LGBT_slang_terms). To identify discussions about Jews and Blacks, each list was developed by triangulating the first two lists outlined above. To identify discussions about LGBTQs, a list of words was developed by referring to the third list, simply because a second list—that was similar to list one—was not available. Plural and derivative words were included to the initial keyword lists.

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more likely the text includes intense opinions (for more on the functional capacity of SentiStrength, see Thelwall and Buckley, 2013).

Results The total number of posts by both violent and non-violent users is displayed in Fig. 10.1, which reveal an interesting pattern. From 2006 on, non-violent posters were consistently and significantly more active that violent posters. As demonstrated in Fig. 10.2, this pattern held across all of the adversary categories: Black, Jewish, and LQTBQ. In each case, non-violent posters were routinely more engaged than were violent posters. In the most notable example, posts related to Black communities (Fig. 10.2) were, on average, 88% more likely to be attributable to a non-violent extremist than a violent extremist. Similarly, non-violent extremists were 30% more likely to post about LGTBQ communities (Fig. 10.3), and 6% more likely to post about Jewish communities (Fig. 10.4) than were violent extremists. 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

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Proportions of posts related to adversary groups—2002–2017

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0.1

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Fig. 10.4 Average sentiment scores for posts related to adversary groups— 2002–2017

Another way to consider posting behavior is to assess the extent to which posters focus on particular topics. For examples, Fig. 10.3 shows the proportions of posts that involved the perceived adversary groups. Although the patterns are not as consistent as they were for numbers of posts, the results in Fig. 10.3 nonetheless reaffirms the same general results. This is particularly true of for the proportions of posts related to Black communities and LGTBQ communities. On the other hand, the pattern of results for posts related to Jewish communities illustrated in Fig. 10.3 are more varied. Overall, nonviolent extremists did post about Jewish communities more than did violent extremists, but the differences were much smaller (about three percentage points). There were also several years where the pattern was reversed, and the proportion of posts that comprised violent extremists’ total posts exceed (or was very close to) the proportions demonstrated by non-violent extremists. Finally, a more nuanced approach to comparing violent and nonviolent extremists is provided by sentiment analyses. Rather than focusing on the number or proportion of posts, sentiment analyses reveal how extremists are taking about various topics. In these analysis, lower

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sentiment scores are indicative of more negative opinions and more intense negativity. For example, the trends presented in Fig. 10.4 show that the average sentiment of post attributed to non-violent extremists about the adversary groups was consistently lower, or more negative, than were the posts of violent extremists. The specific group-by-group trends show some volatility, but the general pattern is maintained.

Discussion This study reveals important considerations for thinking about posting behaviors on RWE discussion forums. First, a consistent pattern of results both affirm and highlight the variability of forum users. There are even distinctions within categories of users. Thus, it is not enough merely to differentiate “extremists” from “non-extremist” users, as the category of extremists itself may be further subdivided into “violent” and “non-violent” extremists. The results here demonstrate clear differences between these user groups in terms of posting frequency, focus on perceived adversarial groups, and sentiment. But of greater interest is the direction of these differences. That is, as measured by the three constructs utilized here, violent extremists were not the “most extreme” forum posters. Rather, it was the non-violent extremists who posted more often, focused a greater proportion of their posts to adversary groups, and displayed greater negative sentiment in their posts. These results point to potential complications in how “extremism” online is conceptualized and suggest that it may be necessary to rethink strategies for detecting and evaluating extremism on online forums (see Scrivens et al., 2021). The findings also raise an obvious question: Why does the posting behavior of non-violent extremist appear to be more extreme than that of violent extremists? The literature relating to online identity construction provides useful insights as to possible dynamics. The digital mediation of communication has increasingly resulted in individuals investing heavily in the construction of online identities, projecting a sense of who they are and through their dialogic posting choices (Perry and Scrivens, 2016; Richards, 2006;). Key aspects of identity formation, including interpersonal maneuvering, negotiation,

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impression management, authenticity, and performance, may help to better account for the dynamics revealed in the current study. Just as is the case in offline social contexts, an individual’s identity within an online community is constructed, the result of a process of negotiation. But whereas offline communication is mediated by “face-to-face meaning making cues” (Delahunty, 2012), those cues are absent from online communication. Instead, all that individuals have to convey meaning are their posts. Thus, through the volume, topics, and language of posts, members how they wish to be perceived by others. Identity work in online forums involves a delicate balance. On one hand, users want to signal that they are part of the group. This involves demonstrating an understanding of and adherence to group values and norms. At the same time, users may attempt to differentiate themselves to gain credibility or establish their place in the group hierarchy. On RWE forum such as Stormfront, one way for a member to establish their particular identity within the larger group is through verbal displays of “extremism.” For example, one approach to constructing such an identity might involve persistent posting behavior. Maratea and Kavanaugh (2012) suggest that the frequency of an individual’s participation in a community (in this case measured by posting behavior) symbolizes commitment and loyalty to the group and expresses their level of attachment to the group. Scrivens (2020) similarly found that high-frequency posters on Stormfront engaged with other users there to show their commitment to the online community and, by extension, the radical cause. Perhaps more important than the frequency of posts in establishing identity is the nature of the posts. The emergence of the Internet has altered how individuals interact and present themselves to peers (Lauger and Densley, 2018). Gang researchers have proposed that online spaces function as “virtual street corners” where group members perform their individuals (and collective group) identities (Pyrooz et al., 2015). Through these performances, members cultivate a persona reflective of how they wish to be seen, both within their group and, in the case of right-wing extremists, within the larger movement. In the case of gang members, this involves “doing gang”; that is, emphasizing certain characteristics, such as a willingness to engage in serious violence (Lauger and

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Densley, 2018). In the same way, RWEs may use their posts to presents themselves being “more extremism.” To steal from the vernacular of gang studies, the importance of “doing extremism” appears to feature prominently for some members. Research that has applied a “doing difference” perspective to bias crime has similarly found that certain characteristics are linked to racial/ethnic bias homicides (Klein and Allison, 2018). Social communications online have become dominated by considerations of “authenticity” (Tse et al., 2018) punctuated by “impression management” (Van Hellemont, 2012). In the context of a different online community, Zdjelar and Davies (2021) note that a prominent discussion theme debates over who may or may not be considered to be part of the community; that is, who are “real” members of the community. On a RWE forum such as Stormfront where members have established unique codes of communication (see Meddaugh and Kay, 2009), authenticity is, to a large degree, demonstrated through the appropriate use of established language, tropes, and memes. “Real” extremists are those who know who the “enemies” are, and focus on those groups. But the process of producing authenticity is also dynamic. Those members who post more frequently and more emotively may play more central roles in establishing what is valued within the group. In a tautological manner, these members are establishing a context where how they see themselves is valued (Delahunty, 2012). However, the process of identity formation has implications beyond the individual members; it plays a role in establishing the collective identities of the group as well. Continually emphasizing particular message confirms “identity anchors” (e.g., advice, strategies and practices to help group members maintain their identities) (Eddington, 2020). The repetition of these messages also helps to minimize the influence of contradictory narratives, thereby bolstering the solidarity, but also insularity, of the group (Perry and Scrivens, 2016). The circularity noted at the individual level is identifiable at the collective level as well. The results of the current research suggest that the construction of online identities of the extreme right may be particularly nuanced. The finding that non-violent extremists engage in behaviors that make them appear to be more “extreme” than actual violent extremists is appears at first blush to be counterintuitive. But perhaps it makes sense in this

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specific context. Although the data does not allow us to make a determination one way or another, it is possible that different categories of members have a keen awareness of their different positions within the community hierarchy. If this is the case, it is further possible that violent extremists feel less compelled to exhibit their bona fides through their posting behavior. Perhaps they have already established their identities through their actions, and assume that their reputations “speak for themselves.” In contrast, some non-violent extremists may consider that they have “something to prove.” In this case, they have a much greater stake in “doing extremism,” in performing the constructed identity and consistently reaffirming their authenticity. Further, it is reasonable to assume that posting in an open access RWE forum may have been a concern to the violent users, given the offline activities they were engaged in. Empirical research on the online behaviors of RWEs similarly suggests those who are actively involved in violent RWE activities offline are oftentimes concerned that law enforcement officials and anti-racist groups are monitoring their online activities and may modify their posting behaviors to avoid detection (Gaudette et al., 2020; Scrivens et al., 2021). Empirical research also suggests that violent members of RWE movements are largely clandestine, often paranoid because of the violence they engage in, and for this reason are concerned about revealing their identities (Hamm, 1993; Perry and Scrivens, 2019; Simi and Futrell, 2015). With this in mind, it may be the case that the RWEs in the current study were concerned that, by posting content in an online space that can be publicly viewed, they may be putting themselves in a vulnerable position and could become the subject of an investigation from antihate watch-organizations or even law enforcement. This finding comes as little surprise, given that similar tactics have been adopted by a new generation of RWE who in recent years have exploited various encrypted online platforms and messaging apps to avoid being tracked and detected (see Conway et al., 2019). While this study represents a first step in examining the link between developmental posting behaviors of violent and non-violent RWEs and collective identity formation, there remain several shortcomings. But these shortcomings may be used to as means to drive forward the study of online posting behaviors of RWEs. First, analyses were limited to just

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99 RWE users who were known to one former RWE, which biases our sample and restricted our ability to identify and analyze the posting behaviors of an array of violent and non-violent RWEs found online. Future research should gather a more robust sample in order to provide a stronger understanding of the developmental posting behaviors and identity formation of violent and non-violent RWEs. Second, while the novelty of the data in the current study cannot be understated, their validity is based on one key former RWE informant. Future research should further verify the authenticity of each RWE user by identifying the birth and given name of each individual in the sample. These names could then be triangulated with open-source intelligence (e.g., media reports, court documents, terrorism databases, and social media accounts on each user) or with the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which currently includes over 500 data points on nearly 1,000 violent and 1,500 non-violent RWEs (see Freilich et al., 2018). Third, it is unclear if changes in posting behaviors are driving changes in violent offending or vice versa. Future research should therefore pinpoint exact moments in time that individuals engaged in violence offline and then assess their posting behaviors both before and after the act of violence. Doing so may shed light on whether specific posting behaviors in the online world escalate to violent actions in the offline world. Lastly, there remain many unanswered questions about the characteristics of those identified as violent or non-violent in our study. Unlike the growing body of research that has drawn distinctions between the offline activities and behaviors of violent and non-violent extremists (e.g., Horgan et al., 2016; Knight et al., 2019; Lafree et al., 2018), our data does not include information on key characteristics identified in this literature such as an individual’s employment status, criminal records, history of mental illness, extremist/radicalized peers, and types of grievances, among many others. Future research is therefore needed to assess whether these characteristics (and others) mirror our sample of violent or non-violent extremists as well as whether certain characteristics drive differential posting behavior and identify formation.

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References Adams, J., and Roscigno, V. (2005). White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture and the World Wide Web. Social Forces, 84 (2), 759–778. Asal, V., Chermak, S. M., Fitzgerald, S., and Freilich, J. D. (2016). Organizational-Level Characteristics in Right-Wing Extremist Groups in the United States Over Time. Criminal Justice Review, 45 (2), 250–266. Back, L. (2002). Aryans Reading Adorno: Cyber-Culture and Twenty-First Century Racism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25 (4), 628–651. Berger, J. M. (2018). Extremism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Bjørgo, T., and Ravndal, J. A. (2019). Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses. The International Centre for CounterTerrorism—The Hague, 10, 1–21. Bliuc, A. -M., Betts, J., Vergani, M., Iqbal, M., and Dunn, K. (2019). Collective Identity Changes in Far-Right Online Communities: The Role of Offline Intergroup Conflict. New Media and Society, 21(8), 1770–1786. Bowman-Grieve, L. (2009). Exploring “Stormfront:” A Virtual Community of the Radical Right. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 32(11), 989–1007. Brynielsson, J., Horndahl, A., Johansson, F., Kaati, L., Mårtenson, C., and Svenson, P. (2013). Analysis of Weak Signals for Detecting Lone Wolf Terrorists. Security Informatics, 2(11), 1–15. Burris, V., Smith, E., and Strahm, A. (2000). White Supremacist Networks on the Internet. Sociological Focus, 33(2), 215–235. Chermak, S., Freilich, J., and Suttmoeller, M. (2013). The Organizational Dynamics of Far-Right Hate Groups in the United States: Comparing Violent to Non-violent Organizations. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36 (3), 193–218. Cohen, K., Johansson, F., Kaati, L., and Mork, J. C. (2014). Detecting Linguistic Markers for Radical Violence in Social Media. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26 (1), 246–256. Conway, M. (2017). Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40 (1), 77–98. Conway, M., Scrivens, R., and Macnair, L. (2019). Right-Wing Extremists’ Persistent Online Presence: History and Contemporary Trends. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism—The Hague, 10, 1–24. Crisafi, A. (2005). The Seduction of Evil: An Examination of the Media Culture of the Current White Supremacist Movement. In S. Ni Fhlainn

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and W.A. Myers (Eds.), The Wicked Heart: Studies in the Phenomena of Evil (pp. 29–44). Oxford, UK: Inter-Disciplinary Press. Daniels, J. (2009). Cyber Racism: White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. De Koster, W., and Houtman, D. (2008). ‘Stormfront is Like a Second Home to Me:’ On Virtual Community Formation by Right-Wing Extremists. Information, Communication and Society, 11(8), 1155–1176. Delahunty, J. (2012). “Who am I?: Exploring Identity in Online Discussion Forums. International Journal of Education Research, 53, 407–420. Eddington, S. M. (2020). Alt-resilience: A semantic network analysis of identity (re)construction in an online men’s rights community. Journal of Applied Communication Research: Communication and Resilience: Advances in Theory and Application, 48(1), 114–135 Ezekiel, R. S. (1995). The Racist Mind: Portraits of American Neo-Nazi and Klansmen. New York, NY: Viking Penguin. Feldman, R. (2013). Techniques and Applications for Sentiment Analysis. Communications of the ACM, 56 (4), 82–89. Freilich J. D., and LaFree, G. (2015). Criminology Theory and Terrorism: Introduction to the Special Issue. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27 (1), 1–15. Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., and Simone, J. (2009). Surveying American State Police Agencies About Terrorism Threats, Terrorism Sources, and Terrorism Definitions. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(3), 450–475. Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., Gruenewald, J., Parkin, W. S., and Klein, B. R. (2018). Patterns of Fatal Extreme-Right Crime in the United States. Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(6), 38–51. Futrell, R., and Simi, P. (2004). Free Spaces, Collective Identity, and the Persistence of U.S. White Power Activism. Social Problems, 51(1), 16–42. Galloway, B., and Scrivens, R. (2018). The Hidden Face of Hate Groups Online: An Insider’s Perspective. VOX-Pol Network of Excellence Blog. https://www.voxpol.eu/hidden-face-hate-groups-online-formers-perspective. Gaudette, T., Scrivens, R., and Venkatesh, V. (2020). The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism: Insights from Former RightWing Extremists. Terrorism and Political Violence. Ahead of Print, 1–18. Gerstenfeld, P. B., Grant, D. R., and Chiang, C. -P. (2003). Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites. Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 3(1), 29–44. Hamm, M. S. (1993). American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger.

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Hale, W. C. (2010). Extremism on the World Wide Web: A Research Review. Criminal Justice Studies, 25 (4), 343–356. Holt, T. J., Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., and LaFree, G. (2018). Examining the Utility of Social Control and Social Learning in the Radicalization of Violent and Nonviolent Extremists. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 11(3), 125–148. Horgan, J., Shortland, N., Abbasciano, S., and Walsh, S. (2016). Actions Speak Louder Than Words: A Behavioral Analysis of 183 Individuals Convicted for Terrorist Offenses in the United States from 1995 to 2012. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 61(5), 1228–1237. Hunt, S. A., and Benford, R. D. (1994). Identity Talk in the Peace and Justice Movement. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 22(4), 488–517. Kaati, L., Shrestha, A., and Cohen, K. (2016). Linguistic Analysis of Lone Offender Manifestos. In Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE International Conference on Cybercrime and Computer Forensics, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Klein, B. R., and Allison, K. (2018). Accomplishing Difference: How Do Anti-Race/Ethnicity Bias Homicides Compare to Average Homicides in the United States? Justice Quarterly, 35 (6), 977–1003. Kleinberg, B., van der Vegt, I., and Gill, P. (2020). The Temporal Evolution of a Far-Right Forum. Journal of Computational Social Science. Ahead of Print, 1–23. Knight, S., Keatley, D., and Woodward, K. (2019). Comparing the Different Behavioral Outcomes of Extremism: A Comparison of Violent and NonViolent Extremists, Acting Alone or as Part of a Group. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Ahead of Print, 1–22. LaFree, G., Jensen, M. A., James, P. A., and Safer-Lichtenstein, A. (2018). Correlates of Violent Political Extremism in the United States. Criminology, 56(2), 233–268. Lauger, T. R. and Densley, J. A. (2018). Broadcasting Badness: Violence, Identity, and Performance in the Online Gang Rap Scene. Justice Quarterly. Ahead of Print, 1–26. Lennings, C. J., Amon, K. L., Brummert, H., and Lennings, N. J. (2010). Grooming for Terror: The Internet and Young People. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 17 (3), 424–437. Maratea, R. J., and Kavanaugh, P. R. (2012). Deviant Identity in Online Contexts: New Directives in the Study of a Classic Concept. Sociology Compass, 6 (2), 102–112. McCauley C., and Moskalenko, S. (2011). Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Meddaugh P. M., and Kay, J. (2009). Hate Speech or ‘Reasonable Racism?’ The Other in Stormfront. Journal of Mass Media Ethic s, 24 (4), 251–268. Melucci, A. (1995). The Process of Collective Identity. In H. Johnston and B. Klandermans (Eds.), Social Movements and Culture (pp. 41–63). Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Monahan, J. (2012). The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(2), 167–205. Perry, B. (2001). In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. Routledge. Perry, B., and Scrivens, R. (2016). White Pride Worldwide: Constructing Global Identities Online. In J. Schweppe and M. Walters (Eds.), The Globalisation of Hate: Internationalising Hate Crime (pp. 65–78). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Perry, B., and Scrivens, R. (2019). Right-Wing Extremism in Canada. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave. Polletta, F., and Jasper, J. M. (2001). Collective Identity and Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 27 (1), 283–305. Pyrooz, D. C., Decker, S. H., and Moule, R. K. (2015). Criminal and Routine Activities in Online Settings: Gangs, Offenders, and the Internet. Justice Quarterly, 32, 471–499. Richards, K. (2006). ‘Being the teacher’: Identity and classroom conversation. Applied Linguistics, 27 (1), 51–77. Sarma, K. M. (2017). Risk Assessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism. American Psychologist, 72(3), 278–288. Schmid A. P., and Jongman, A. J. (1988). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. Scrivens, R. (2020). Exploring Radical Right-Wing Posting Behaviors Online. Deviant Behavior. Ahead of Print, 1–15. Scrivens, R., Burruss, G. W., Holt, T. J., Chermak, S. M., Freilich, J. D., and Frank, R. (2020). Triggered by Defeat or Victory? Assessing the Impact of Presidential Election Results on Extreme Right-Wing Mobilization Online. Deviant Behavior. Ahead of Print, 1–16. Scrivens, R., Davies, G., and Frank, R. (2018). Searching for Signs of Extremism on the Web: An Introduction to Sentiment-based Identification of Radical Authors. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 10 (1), 39–59. Scrivens, R., Davies, G., and Frank, R. (2020). Measuring the Evolution of Radical Right-Wing Posting Behaviors Online. Deviant Behavior, 41(2), 216–232.

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Scrivens, R., Gaudette, T., Davies, G., and Frank, R. (2019). Searching for Extremist Content Online Using The Dark Crawler and Sentiment Analysis. In M. Deflem and D. M. D. Silva (Eds.), Methods of Criminology and Criminal Justice Research (pp. 179–194). Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing. Scrivens, R., Gill, P., and Conway, M. (2020). The Role of the Internet in Facilitating Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Suggestions for Progressing Research. In T. J. Holt and A. Bossler (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of International Cybercrime and Cyberdeviance (pp. 1–22). London, UK: Palgrave. Scrivens, R., Wojciechowski, T. W., and Frank, R. (2020). Examining the Developmental Pathways of Online Posting Behavior in Violent Right-Wing Extremist Forums. Terrorism and Political Violence. Ahead of Print, 1–18. Scrivens, R., Wojciechowski, T. W., Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., and Frank, R. (2021). Comparing the Online Posting Behaviors of Violent and NonViolent Right-Wing Extremists. Terrorism and Political Violence. Ahead of Print, 1–17. Simi, P., and Futrell, R. (2015). American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s Hidden Spaces of Hate (Second Edition). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Smith, A. G. (2018a). Risk Factors and Indicators Associated with Radicalization to Terrorism in the United States: What Research Supported by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice. Smith, A. G. (2018b). How Radicalization to Terrorism Occurs in the United States: What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice Tells Us. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice. Snow, D. (2001). Collective Identity and Expressive Forms. University of California, Irvine eScholarship Repository. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/ 01-07. Thelwall, M., and Buckley, K. (2013). Topic-Based Sentiment Analysis for the Social Web: The Role of Mood and Issue-Related Words. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 64 (8), 1608–1617. Tse, T., Leung, V., Cheng, K., and Chan, V. (2018). A clown, a political messiah or a punching bag? Rethinking the performative identity construction of celebrity through social media. Global Media and China, 3(3), 141–157.

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11 No Longer Alone: Lone Wolves, Wolf Packs, and Made for Web TV Specials Jeffrey Kaplan

A Note on Terminology There is some controversy over the term “lone wolf” which goes beyond academic definitional disputes. Many argue that the term glorifies terrorists rather than describing a terrorist act. The term “lone actor” is therefore used in law enforcement and is becoming increasingly prevalent in academic writings as well. Lone actor as a term of art is fine, but the argument that the term “lone wolves” gives the attacker too much credit for cunning and guile is misguided. That their attacks succeed is proof enough that they do not lack either cunning or guile. Thus, while the next section seeks to unpack the terminology, this chapter uses the term lone wolf rather than lone actor. Similarly, the terms radical right, extreme right, and far right too often tend to be used almost interchangeably. Radical right is much favored by J. Kaplan (B) Danube Institute, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_11

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American observers to denote the sector of the right-wing who seek to act outside the norms of the law and the democratic system. In Europe, where the parliamentary system offers an opening in electoral politics for right-wing extremists, far or extreme right is preferred. This chapter focuses entirely on a form of terrorist action that is best described by the term radical right.

Academic Definitions The academic literature of lone wolf terrorism by 2021 has become voluminous, so much so that a full accounting would require a monograph to be comprehensive. This section therefore focuses only on several key contributions. It began with my own “Leaderless Resistance” which appeared in 1997 and perhaps marked the first use of the term “lone wolf” in the terrorism literature.1 Perhaps the most influential monograph on the topic followed in 2004 with Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks, which focused on Islamist terrorism.2 Its redolent catch phrase “a bunch of guys” caught the journalistic imagination. Several important monographs followed including Ramon Spaaij’s Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism (2011),3 George Michael’s Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (2012),4 Peter Phillips’ In Pursuit Of The Lone Wolf Terrorist (2013),5 and Jeffrey D. Simon’s Lone Wolf Terrorism (2013) and his case study The Alphabet Bomber

1 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3 (1997): 80–95. Cf. Keith Ludwick, “Book Review: The Alphabet Bomber: A Lone Wolf Ahead Of His Time,” CBRNE Central , April 16, 2019, https://cbrnecentral.com/book-review-the-alphabet-bomber-alone-wolf-ahead-of-his-time/18566/. 2 Marc Sageman, Understanding terror networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Cf. Marc Sageman, Leaderless jihad: terror networks in the twenty-first century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 3 Ramon Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention, Springer Briefs in Criminology, (Dordrecht Springer, 2011). 4 George Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012). 5 Peter J. Phillips, In pursuit of the lone wolf terrorist: investigative economics and new horizons for the economic analysis of terrorism (Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2013).

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(2019).6 Add to this the anthology Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléna Lööw, and Leena Malkki, Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism (2015)7 and an avalanche of articles too numerous to mention, but wonderfully listed in Greta E. Marlatt’s “Lone Wolf Terrorism – A Brief Bibliography” (2019).8 Each summarized the findings to date and offered various case studies, and each contributed to our understanding of the lone wolf phenomenon. With so much to choose from and so little space, this section will focus primarily on the work of Raffaello Pantucci, Burt Schurman, Ramón Spaaij, Mark S. Hamm, Jeff Gruenwald, and his co-authors and Paul Gill et al. Perhaps the most useful place to begin is Raffaello Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists” whose findings are relevant to the study of far-right lone wolves. Pantucci correctly notes that lone wolf attacks are seldom carried out solely by a true loner with no outside assistance whatever. Instead, he offers a four-part typology based on a detailed analysis of a variety of lone wolf operations. These are the Loner, Lone Wolf, Lone Wolf Pack, and Lone Attacker.9 The true loner—an actor who acts completely in isolation—is rare and exists in a definitional gray area. Joseph Paul Franklin is a case in point. Was he a lone wolf terrorist, a serial killer, or simply an individual so deranged that he was expelled from the American Nazi Party for behavior too bizarre even for their decidedly peculiar standards? Or all of the above? One might argue that the true loner has gone the way of the 8-track tape in the age of social media. As even a cursory examination of groups like the painfully frustrated and utterly isolated Incels 6 Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone wolf terrorism: understanding the growing threat (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2016). Jeffrey D. Simon, The Alphabet Bomber: a lone wolf terrorist ahead of his time (Lincoln: Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2019). 7 Jeffrey Kaplan, Heléna Lööw, and Leena Malkki, Lone Wolf and Autonomous Cell Terrorism (London: Routledge, January, 2015). 8 Greta E Marlatt, Lone Wolf Terrorism—A Brief Bibliography, Department of Homeland Security Digital Library (Washington, DC, 2019), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/24281. 9 Raffaello Pantucci, A typology of lone wolves: Preliminary analysis of lone Islamist terrorists, ICSR (March 2011), https://www.academia.edu/download/24801864/1302002992icsrpaper_a typologyoflonewolves_pantucci.pdf.

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(Involuntary Celibates) demonstrates, no one is too weird to be without compatriots thanks to the internet.10 The lone wolf in Pantucci’s telling is perhaps the most common. The lone wolf does act alone but is nurtured by a supportive milieu. It was also the modus operandi of the pro-life rescue movement where anyone contemplating the use of lethal force would cease all contact with the movement and act alone.11 The lone wolf may and probably does have help along the way and is backed by a supportive milieu, but in the end acts alone. The wolf pack is similar but involves a small relatively autonomous group who Pantucci believes still constitutes a lone wolf pack. This is a point made by many others, most notably Christopher Hewitt who defines a terrorist group as having four or more members while those having fewer still may be classified as lone wolves.12 Paul Gill does not go this far, but notes that individual actors and isolated dyads (two members) would qualify.13 This form of lone wolf action might better be termed autonomous cell structure and classified at best as a lone wolf style operation. However, it has the utility of bringing actions like the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh with the help of Terry Nichols and many similar cases into the lone wolf category. The lone attacker is an increasingly common feature of Islamist attacks but is still quite rare in the radical right where organizational structures are far less developed. The lone attacker according to Pantucci acts alone, 10

Elle Reevel, “This is What the Life of an Incel Looks Like,” Vice News, August 2, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xqw3g/this-is-what-the-life-of-an-incel-looks-like. One memorable character in the chat room, upon being informed that a woman was virtually present, promptly removed his pants and defecated on camera; an act that all in the room had seen him do before. The article notes that, like four others who had been regulars in the chat room, this individual later died by apparent suicide, as did four others in the group. His behavior did not affect his standing in the group. By contrast, when ANP member Dan Burros, who like Franklin was expelled from the ANP, strangled the group’s dog, lovingly named Gas Chamber, he was summarily banished from both barracks and group. Times and sensibilities have changed. 11 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Absolute Rescue: Absolutism, Defensive Action and the Resort to Force,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 128–63. 12 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003). 13 Ramón Spaaij and Mark S Hamm, "Key issues and research agendas in lone wolf terrorism," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 3 (2015): 169.

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but is nonetheless tied to, and to a degree controlled, by an organization.14 In the present day, Atomwaffen, an American-based National Socialist group, has perpetrated violence of this type, although at the cost of having members imprisoned and the group driven largely out of business by government pressure.15 Pantucci’s typology, while of some heuristic utility, leads to the obvious question of whether a wolf pack constitutes lone wolf terrorism at all? While I have argued elsewhere that it does not and that this form of violence would better be analyzed as autonomous cells rather than lone wolf violence, Bart Schuurman and others argue that the wolf pack, like the very concept of lone wolf terrorism itself, has outlived its usefulness to academics and law enforcement alike: We… avoid the oxymoron of “lone wolf packs.” Regardless of how small such dyads, triads, or small cells may be, as soon as two or more people interact with one another with the aim of committing a terrorist attack, small-group dynamics come into play. Peer pressure, leader–follower interactions, group polarization, and other social–psychological processes by definition rule out including even the smallest “packs” under the heading of lone-actor terrorism.16

Schuurman’s criticisms are sound but represents a minority view in the field at present. A complicating definitional factor in the study of radical right-wing lone wolf terrorism is the often fuzzy boundaries between criminal violence and lone wolf violence. Criminal violence, spree killings, and acts perpetrated by the mentally ill greatly complicate the definitional 14

Pantucci, A typology of lone wolves: Preliminary analysis of lone Islamist terrorists. A. C. Thompson, Ali Winston, and Jake Hanrahan. “Inside Atomwaffen As It Celebrates a Member for Allegedly Killing a Gay Jewish College Student,” Pro Publica, February 3, 2018, https://www.propublica.org/article/atomwaffen-division-inside-white-hate-group. Rachel Weiner and Matt Zapotosky, “Five arrested, accused of targeting journalists as part of neo-Nazi Atomwaffen group,” Washington Post, February 26, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ local/public-safety/propublica-named-him-as-an-atomwaffen-leader-feds-say-he-struck-back/ 2020/02/26/c9548ac4-57e5-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532_story.html. 16 Bart Schuurman et al., “End of the lone wolf: The typology that should not have been,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 8 (2019): 771–2. 15

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boundaries of lone wolf terrorism. In this respect, the work of Jeff Gruenwald and his co-authors, writing from a primarily criminology perspective, is particularly useful. Their “Distinguishing ‘Loner’ Attacks from Other Domestic Extremist Violence” focuses on homicide incidents while bringing in mental illness as a key variable. Gruenwald et al. offer a useful variable set to examine both behavioral and tactical factors in lone wolf terrorism.17 Finally, an unavoidable weakness of open source studies of lone wolf terrorism is that by definition they are incomplete, lacking closed source data that are generally zealously guarded by law enforcement and government agencies. Paul Gill et al. address this issue with “What Do Closed Source Data Tell Us About Lone Actor Terrorist Behavior? A Research Note.” The article focuses on the UK and encompasses both Islamist and radical right actors as they evolve from radicalization to action.18 In recent years, there have been fewer works on lone wolf violence than a decade ago. But new research continues to emerge in a field that is still very much contested.19

The Euro-American Radical Right It all began as an almost existential act of despair. The 1980s began with much optimism for the milieu of the radical right. Christian Identity was booming in the United States, where Bible-based hermeneutics were integral to everyday life.20 Explicit National Socialism in the United States hit its dubious high point in the United States in the 1960s 17

Jeff Gruenewald, Steven Chermak, and Joshua D Freilich, “Distinguishing “loner” attacks from other domestic extremist violence: A comparison of far-right homicide incident and offender characteristics,” Criminology & Public Policy 12, no. 1 (2013): 65–91. Cf. Brent L Smith et al., “The emergence of lone wolf terrorism: Patterns of behavior and implications for intervention,” Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance 20 (September 2015): 89–110. 18 Paul Gill et al., “What Do Closed Source Data Tell Us About Lone Actor Terrorist Behavior? A Research Note,” Terrorism & Political Violence (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 10.1080/09546553.2019.1668781. 19 Jonathan Kenyon, Christopher Baker-Beall, and Jens Binder, “Lone-actor terrorism—A systematic literature review,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2021): 1–24. 20 Michael Barkun, Religion and the racist right: the origins of the Christian Identity movement, Rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

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under the charismatic leadership of the Commander, George Lincoln Rockwell, whose American Nazi Party made headlines and launched Rockwell as a media celebrity, interviewed by Roots author Alex Haley in the pages of Playboy and invited to be heckled as a paid lecturer at universities throughout the country.21 By the 1980s, the National Socialist (NS) faithful were scattered in a number of what Roger Griffin aptly called “grouplets” under a menagerie of minifuehers throughout the country.22 Odinism, the racist version of Ásatrú whose worship of the Norse/Germanic pantheon was exploding among the youth, especially in the Biker and prison worlds.23 Skinhead groups, along with their music and dress, were rather thin on the ground in the United States.24 And the milieu of the radical right in America was rich with single issue constituencies—farmers losing their land in the Farm Crisis,

21

Frederick J. Simonelli, American fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999). From the Commander himself: George Lincoln Rockwell, In hoc signo vinces (Arlington, Va., World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists, 1960), https://archive.org/stream/LincolnRockwellGeorge/LincolnRockwellGeorge-InHocS ignoVinces_djvu.txt. 22 Roger Griffin, “From slime mould to rhizome: an introduction to the groupuscular right,” Patterns of Prejudice 37, no. 1 (2003): 27–50. 23 Mattias Gardell, Gods of the blood: the pagan revival and White separatism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). For an insider introduction, see Else Christensen, “Odinism—Religion of Relevance,” The Odinist 82 (1984). On the Ásatrú/Odinist divide, Jeffrey Kaplan, Radical religion in America: millenarian movements from the far right to the children of Noah (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997), ch. 3. 24 Skinheads were much coveted in the 1980s as potential cannon fodder for established radical right leaders. Tom Metzger’s White Aryan Resistance (WAR) did the most in this area. His efforts were immortalized in the thinly disguised biopic “American History X.” A Metzger influenced murder by a skinhead in Portland, Oregon, led to a civil suit against WAR by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) which proved costly to Metzger and the organization. Richard Butler gave it a shot as well by inviting skinheads to the annual Aryan Nations jamboree and cross burning, but their drunken exploits mixed poorly with the strait laced Christian Identity crowd. On Metzger and the SPLC, see Elden Rosenthal, “White Supremacy and Hatred in the Streets of Portland: The Murder of Mulugeta Seraw,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 120, no. 4 (2019): 588–605. On Butler, see Meagan Day, “Welcome to Hayden Lake, where white supremacists tried to build their homeland,” Timeline, November 4, 2016, https:// timeline.com/white-supremacist-rural-paradise-fb62b74b29e0. On Aryan Nations and the scene in general, James Ridgeway, Blood in the face: the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan nations, Nazi skinheads, and the rise of a new white culture, 1st ed. (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1990). John Pollard, “Skinhead culture: the ideologies, mythologies, religions and conspiracy theories of racist skinheads,” Patterns of Prejudice 50, no. 4–5 (2016): 398–419.

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those holding that US currency and the taxation system were fraudulent, Holocaust Deniers insisting it didn’t happen (but should have), End Time Overcomers establishing rural enclaves to survive the coming apocalypse, and many more.25 The European scene in these years differed from that in the United States, although linkages were being formed that would bear fruit in the 1990s and transform the movement in the twenty-first century.26 European movements varied in each country but did share a set of common characteristics. They were far more secular than their American counterparts and publicly or privately, were more explicitly NS oriented. The skinhead subculture was far stronger in Europe, where Ian Stewart’s Skrewdriver inspired a number of others, especially in Germany and Scandinavia.27 Holocaust Denial and expressions of anti-Semitism were ubiquitous, despite the imposition of jail terms for speech designed to incite racial hatred. But the real energy in Europe, in sharp contrast to the United States, was in the formation of parliamentary parties who were forced to mute their public expressions of racial hatred and antiSemitism so as to be allowed to stand for election. Of these, the Sweden Democrats were typical in their evolution from a group of Hitler cultists to a political party who, driven by the fear of immigration, would by the twenty-first century be in position to compete for power.28 Even more startling, the True Finns, a beyond the fringe right-wing party in quiet Finland, underwent a facelift, a name change, and under a mediagenic

25

For an introduction to the White Supremacist Constellation of the time, see Jeffrey Kaplan, “Right wing violence in North America,” Terrorism and political violence 7, no. 1 (1995): 44– 95. For a great contemporary snapshot of the milieu, see James Ridgeway, Blood in the face: the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Nazi skinheads and the rise of a new white culture, Newly rev. and updated 2nd ed. (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1995). http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enh ancements/fy0832/95043138-d.html. 26 Jeffrey Kaplan and Leonard Weinberg, The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical Right (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgters University Press, 1998). 27 John M Cotter, “Sounds of hate: White power rock and roll and the neo-nazi skinhead subculture,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 2 (1999): 111–40. Robert Futrell, Pete Simi, and Simon Gottschalk, “Understanding music in movements: The white power music scene,” The Sociological Quarterly 47, no. 2 (2006): 275–304. 28 Helene Lööw, Country Report Sweden, Strategies for combating right-wing extremism in Europe, (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 425–59.

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leadership emerged as the Finn Party, which in the 2019 elections gained 39 parliamentary seats, only one behind the ruling Social Democrats.29 By the 1990s, the European skinhead groups presented primarily a law enforcement problem. Drunken street brawls, beatings, and the like presented little threat to the state. Attacks on refugee housing, which in Germany could be large scale, were met again with sufficient force to contain or put down the disturbances. Ultimately, skinhead groups, like football hooligans, fought with boots and clubs, causing injuries but seldom deaths and never threatening the state. The American radical right by contrast had guns. Lots of them. With an amazing array of fire power, as well as gun smiths who could modify anything and make weapons to spec. The wildly idiosyncratic Christian Identity/End Time Overcomer compound, Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (CSA), specialized in the trade.30 Worse, an increasing number of these armed groups were becoming overtly revolutionary, at least on a rhetorical level. CSA issued a “Declaration of War” on the United States,31 apparently unaware that Peter Sellers had beat them to it to far greater effect in the film “The Mouse That Roared” (1959). But it was just talk. Robert Mathews’ Brueders Schweigan (Silent Brotherhood), popularly, The Order, put words into action and undertook a series of daring armored car robberies and murders.32 Imprisoned Order member David Lane continues to influence the movement through his 14 Word Press which is named for his now famous 14 Words: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children.”33 The 14 Words are echoed throughout the movement today and would

29

David Arter, "When a pariah party exploits its demonised status: the 2019 Finnish general election," West European Politics 43, no. 1 (2020): 260–73. 30 For a wonderful insider account, Kerry Noble, Tabernacle of hate: Seduction into right-wing extremism (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011). For an overview, Jeffrey Kaplan, Encyclopedia of White Power: a Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000), 71–75, 107–10. 31 For the full text, Kaplan, Encyclopedia of White Power: a Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right, 522–5. 32 Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt, The Silent Brotherhood: Inside America’s Racist Underground (New York: Free Press, 1989). 33 George Michael, “David Lane and the fourteen words,” Totalitarian movements and political religions 10, no. 1 (2009): 43–61.

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be a leitmotif in Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto “The Great Replacement” which will be considered later in this chapter. Then came Waco in 1993. The disastrous raid on the Branch Davidian compound which resulted in the deaths of 76 men, women, and children against the backdrop of a burning homes sent shock waves through the radical right, as well as new religious movement groups and a variety of others whose lives were lived beyond the mainstream.34 No one, however, felt as directly threatened as the radical right. This paranoia was not without foundation. The Order had alerted the federal government that the small and politically isolated groups of the racist right were, with the right leadership, capable of considerable violence. With this in mind, federal authorities became much more engaged in combatting the threat. In 1985, the FBI mounted a raid on the CSA enclave, although by that time its leader James Ellison’s taste for polygamy and underage girls had driven out most of the faithful. Despite a “Declaration of Non-surrender” issued in better times,35 CSA quickly surrendered without firing a shot. The outcome was much worse in 1992, when a combined force of FBI agents and Federal Marshalls surrounded the cabin of Identity adherent Randy Weaver in Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Weaver’s wife and 11-year-old son, as well as a federal Marshall, were killed in the incident. Weaver was sent to prison, but later released with a $3.1 million dollar settlement from the federal government.36 These cases were paradigmatic but here were many more. Tax protestor Gordon Kahl was killed in a confrontation with the FBI in North

34

Catherine Wessinger, “Deaths in the Fire at the Branch Davidians’ Mount Carmel: Who Bears Responsibility?,” Nova Religio 13, no. 2 (2009): 25–60. 35 Specifically, in a 1982 edition of the CSA Journal . For the full text, see Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Roots of Religious Violence in America,” in Misunderstanding Cults: Searching for Objectivity in a Controversial Field , ed. Benjamin Zablocki and Thomas Robbins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 478–509. 36 The best book on the incident remains Jess Walter, Every Knee Shall Bow: The Truth and Tragedy of Ruby Ridge and Randy Weaver Family (New York: ReganBooks, 1995). Cf. Betty A Dobratz, Stephanie L Shanks-Meile, and Danelle Hallenbeck, “What Happened on Ruby Ridge: Terrorism or Tyranny?,” Symbolic Interaction 26, no. 2 (2003): 315–42. Stephen Labaton, “Separatist Family Given $3.1 Million From Government,” New York Times, August 16, 1995, 1.

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Dakota.37 Civil suits initiated by Morris Dees’ Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) damaged or shuttered organizations across the country, including Tom Metzger’s White Aryan Resistance (WAR), several Klan groups, and ultimately in 2000 Aryan Nations, which was forced to close up shop altogether.38 The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was in part revenge for Waco.39 Such was the state of the milieu of the American radical right in the 1990s that faced with relentless government pressure, outright public rejection, and the success of not only government agencies but also private watchdog organizations like the Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai B’rith (ADL) at infiltrating these groups that distrust and then despair became pervasive. As a perfect metaphor of the time, I have in my collection a snapshot of three Klansmen in full regalia proudly displaying a purloined ADL banner. In truth however, one of the Klansmen was reporting to the FBI, one to the ADL, and the third would later commit suicide. Despite an outlier or two such as John Ausonius, the Swedish “laser man” who shot eleven immigrants between 1991 and 1992, killing one, Europe experienced little of the deadly violence by government and right-wing extremists that became increasingly common in America in these years.40

37 James Corcoran, Bitter harvest: Gordon Kahl and the Posse Comitatus: Murder in the heartland (New York Viking, 1990). 38 David Montgomery, “The State of Hate,” Washington Post Magazine, November 8, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/08/feature/is-the-southernpoverty-law-center-judging-hate-fairly/. More recently, Dees was removed from the SPLC for corruption. In better times, Morris Dees et al., A lawyer’s journey: the Morris Dees story, ABA biography series, (Chicago, Ill.: American Bar Association, 2001). For the more prosaic reality, Bob Moser, “The Reckoning of Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty Law Center,” The New Yorker, March 21, 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-reckoning-of-morrisdees-and-the-southern-poverty-law-center. 39 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the tragedy at Oklahoma City (New York: Avon Books, 2002). 40 Liz Fekete, “Sweden’s counter-extremism model and the stigmatising of anti-racism,” Institute of Race Relations 9 (2014): 1–15. Ansonius was sentenced to life terms in both Sweden and Germany, where he murdered a Holocaust survivor. “German court jails Sweden’s ‘laser man’ shooter for life,” The Local , February 21, 2018, https://www.thelocal.com/20180221/swedenslaser-man-killer-verdict-over-frankfurt-murder.

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This was the atmosphere in which Texas Klansman Louis Beam wrote “Leaderless Resistance.”41 Beam credits “Leaderless Resistance.” Beam argues: As honest men who have banded together into groups or associations of a political or religious nature are falsely labeled “domestic terrorists” or “cultists” and suppressed, it will become necessary to consider other methods of organization — or as the case may very well call for: nonorganization.42

Membership in those groups tolerated by the government, Beam argues, comes at a cost, given the poor leadership and thorough penetration by informants. Thus: It is sure that, for the most part, this struggle is rapidly becoming a matter of individual action, each of its participants making a private decision in the quietness of his heart to resist: to resist by any means necessary.43

Beam’s analysis of the state of the movement was accurate enough, but he was hardly the first to note the effectiveness of the lone wolf approach to terrorism. As noted earlier, Joseph Paul Franklin, an expelled member of George Lincoln Rockwell’s original American Nazi Party, is the avatar of the racist lone wolf killer. Over the course of two decades, Franklin acted as a true lone wolf in that he truly acted utterly alone. His victims ranged from interracial couples jogging in Seattle to such high profile figures as civil rights lawyer and Clinton administration adviser Vernon Jordan and Hustler Magazine publisher Larry Flynt, whose pornographic

41

Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” The Seditionist, no. 12 (February 1992). The text can be found in Kaplan, Encyclopedia of White Power: a Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right, 503–11. And online at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~satran/Ford%2006/Wk%202-1%20T errorism%20Networks%20leaderless-resistance.pdf. 42 Beam, “Leaderless Resistance”. 43 Beam, “Leaderless Resistance”.

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portrayals of interracial sex offended Franklin’s sensibilities.44 Franklin was executed for his crimes in 2013.45 Franklin in reality was an inefficient killer—Jordan and Flynt among others survived—and a worse terrorist as he never credited his crimes to the cause. Police and the public perceived his violence as purely local and criminal in nature. This allowed him to move throughout the country and enhanced his longevity as an active shooter, but his impact on the movement or the nation was at best posthumous. But that impact is very real thanks to William Pierce’s fictionalization of Franklin’s career in his novel Hunter —a book which began a wave of similar apocalyptic fiction in the radical right.46 In sum, as the leaderless resistance concept morphed into the lone wolf phenomenon in the waning years of the twentieth century, what began as a tactic of desperation and despair became, in the words of President Obama, the most potent terrorist threat facing the United States since 9/11.47 Despite these rare successes, lone wolf attacks in the twentieth century were largely ineffectual and resulted mainly in the incarceration of the putative lone wolves. No better example might be offered than that of the Joseph Tomassi led National Socialist liberation Front (NSLF) in the 1960s. Tomassi was a visionary strategist with a way with words. His slogan “Pray for victory and not an end to slaughter” perfectly summed up the millenarian dreams of the NS faithful. It was Tomassi who argued that the movement’s dream of the American public one day becoming a revolutionary majority was just that: a dream. Instead, he argued, the future belonged to the few who were bold and committed enough to “get their hands dirty” and take up arms themselves. Two NSLF leaders, 44

Mel Ayton, Dark soul of the South: the life and crimes of racist killer Joseph Paul Franklin (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011). 45 Lateef Mungin, “Serial killer Joseph Franklin executed after hours of delay,” CNN , November 21, 2013, https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/20/justice/missouri-franklin-execution/index.html. 46 Andrew (William Pierce) MacDonald, Hunter (Hillsboro, WV: National Vangaurd Books, 1989). On the literary genre, Jeffrey Kaplan, “America’s apocalyptic literature of the radical right,” International sociology 33, no. 4 (2018): 503–22. 47 “Obama says “lone wolf terrorist” biggest U.S. threat,” Reuters, August 17, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-security/obama-says-lone-wolf-terrorist-big gest-u-s-threat-idUSTRE77F6XI20110816.

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David Rust and Karl Hand, did just that and wound up with long prison terms. James Mason, who today is the éminence grise of the NS-oriented terror groups in America, avoided that fate and wrote their story in the pages of Siege! , the NSLF journal later published as a book.48 Lone wolf attacks gained primacy by the dawn of the twenty-first century, not only from the radical right, but from Islamists, Jewish extremists in Israel such as Yigal Amir who assassinated Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995,49 and many others around the world. And therein lies a tale…

No Longer Alone: Lone Wolves as Streaming TV Stars When “Leaderless Resistance” first appeared in 1997, Windows 95 was in the process of making the internet accessible to greater and greater numbers of people, but it had yet to have a significant impact on the American radical right. That would come soon enough, but even the prescient Klansman Louis Beam could hardly envision what the twentyfirst century’s online world would bring. Schuurman et. al. were certainly on the right track, although their focus on global Islamist groups and terrorism in Europe does not accurately reflect what would develop on the radical right. In this area, they note the importance of Anders Breivik whose 2011 killing rampage in Norway and yet conflate his actions with those of Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, who was active for over two decades in the United States.50 Anders Breivik and Ted Kaczynski are fundamentally different. Kaczynski was a true loner, operating out of a one room shack in the

48

Jeffrey Kaplan, “Real Paranoids Have Real Enemies: The Genesis of the ZOG Discourse in the American National Socialist Subculture,” in Millennialism, Persecution and Violence, ed. Catherine Wessinger (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 299–322. For a more concise discussion, Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance, 42–3. Cf. James Mason, Siege! (Denver, CO: Storm Books, 1992). 49 Ehud Sprinzak, Brother against brother: violence and extremism in Israeli politics from Altalena to the Rabin assassination (New York, NY: Free Press, 1999). 50 Schuurman et al., “End of the lone wolf: The typology that should not have been,” 774.

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wilderness. He lived in such isolation that he was only discovered when, by chance, his brother recognized his handwriting and dropped a dime to the FBI.51 The Unabomber was a creature of the pre-internet 1960s. Kaczynski’s neo-luddite belief system was so idiosyncratic that it was shared by only a few scattered adherents with whom he had no contact whatever. Breivik by contrast was a child of the internet age and an obsessive consumer of numerous anti-immigration web sites a la The Gates of Vienna and racist chat rooms. His voluminous manifesto is a cut and paste pastiche of the writings of many others, assembled together in a package that would embarrass a college freshman who has yet to learn the meaning of the term “plagiarism.” Kaczynski was a true lone wolf, while Breivik, who acted alone, was a creature of a supportive online milieu which nurtured both his fantasies and his sense of mission. Arguably, without that community of true believers, Breivik would not have acted and perhaps not adopted the belief system that led to his violence in the first place. It is the ubiquity of online comradeship that truly distinguishes the 1997 conception of leaderless resistance from the twenty-first-century actions of lone wolves. But it is more as well. Breivik was nurtured by a large supportive milieu, but in the end his actions took place in angry isolation. Today’s lone wolves take their community with them, allowing an audience by the magic of streaming media to vicariously partake in the carnage and thus to be encouraged to take a similar star turn themselves. In most cases, pictures are supported and amplified by words in the form of manifestos, which the next at killer will quote in his (so far, there is a dearth of hers in the radical right) own post-action screed. One more key element distinguishes lone wolf attacks today from those that went before; the globalization of what is somewhat misleadingly termed “white nationalism.” The idea of a global white tribe is hardly novel—it was heard in the 1950s and beyond in southern Africa and it was taken up to a limited degree by the racist right from the 1970s on. Anyone doing fieldwork among these groups, however, would be 51 See in particular the Feral House publication Theodore J Kaczynski, Technological Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski, Aka “The Unabomber” (San Francisco: Feral House, 2010). Cf. Lis W. Wiehl and Lisa Pulitzer, Hunting the Unabomber: the FBI, Ted Kaczynski, and the capture of America’s most notorious domestic terrorist (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2020).

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informed in no uncertain terms in Germany, Scandinavia, Great Britain, and North America that white in their conception was limited to the race they identified as Aryan, and most certainly did not include the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese skinheads who declared their allegiance to the racist right. This was summed up in the traditional British observation that “Wogdom begins in Calais.” Moreover, the primacy of race in those years was aggregated with nationalism. The fight for the race in the eyes of the faithful had to be engaged as a fight for national power. Theirs was after all a world of nation states. The EU, then the European Economic Community (EEC) which existed from 1957 to 1993, was derided in conservative mainstream discourse as those “crazy Euroboys” and denounced as Jewish plot by the radical right. In the American radical right, with the sole exception of the always Germanophile National Socialists, all forms of internationalism were anathema. The lone wolf attacks which are streamed as they happen by the perpetrator by contrast have a global audience. Whether the attack is in New Zealand, the United States, Germany, or points between, nationalist sentiment is replaced by a broad conception of the white race as transnational and endangered everywhere. Live-streamed attacks have occurred in the United States, Germany, and New Zealand in recent years, but the paradigmatic attack was that of Brenton Tarrant, who, on 15 March 2019, attacked a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, killing 51 Muslims and injuring 49 others.52 He livestreamed the event, and his manifesto, “The Great Replacement”—a term that has become a kind of holy writ in the movement. Although few viewed the live feed, the event quickly generated no less than 722,295 Tweets, commenting pro and con on the action.53 The video feed was quickly stuffed down the online memory hole by providers, leaving it to float hand to hand among the faithful. But the 52

For articles on various post-Christchurch attacks in Europe and the US, see CTC Sentinel , vol. 12, no. 11, (December 2019), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CTCSENTINEL-112019.pdf. 53 Hanif Fakhrurroja et al., “Crisis Communication on Twitter: A Social Network Analysis of Christchurch Terrorist Attack in 2019” (paper presented at the 2019 International Conference on ICT for Smart Society (ICISS), 2019), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/896 9839/.

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manifesto circulates freely, including through such academic channels as Academia.edu.54 It is well worth an examination as its influence on the lone wolf attacks to follow is immeasurable. In stark contrast to Breivik’s massive manifesto, “The Great Replacement” opens with an academicese subtitle “Toward a New Society” and a pinwheel chart that well illustrates the bricolage of beliefs commonly held in the far right. Foremost among his beliefs is the threat of immigration. But where racist movements commonly fear miscegenation, Tarrant’s concern is more practical—the low white birth rate as opposed to the much higher fertility rates among immigrant families. This crisis of mass immigration and sub-replacement fertility is an assault on the European people that, if not combated, will ultimately result in the complete racial and cultural replacement of the European people.55

Thus: This is ethnic replacement. This is cultural replacement. This is racial replacement. This is WHITE GENOCIDE.56

What follows is a mock interview in which the author poses the kind of questions to himself that an impartial journalist might ask. A very brief bio is followed by a justification for the action he is about to undertake. The text is written on multiple levels, accessible to a mainstream audience but chock full of terms, witty asides, and in-jokes that would be understood only by the movement cognoscenti. For example, Tarrant describes his means of livelihood as some marginal Bitcoin investments 54

https://www.academia.edu/38978739/The_Great_Replacement. “The Great Replacement.” Educators reading this will be pleased that Tarrant sources his demographic fears, but may blanche at the sole use of Wikipedia for the purpose. 56 Ibid. 55

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and a side job as a “kabob removalist,” which is a reference common on 4 chan and 8 chan chat rooms to the killing of Bosnian Muslims in the Yugoslavian Civil War of the 1990s.57 Radicalization leading to taking up arms is a gradual process, but in many years of fieldwork with radical movements of many stripes, there is one commonality—a triggering event that forces an individual to decide to take action is always a factor; that passive belief, hope, and fervent prayer are no longer enough. For Tarrant, it was the death of a young girl in Stockholm, Ebba Akerlund, who was killed by accident when struck by a car driven by a fleeing Islamist terrorist.58 He concludes that the final push was his tour through France in which he observed the rundown appearance of French towns with large refugee populations. That very little of Tarrant’s justification of his actions centers on New Zealand is important. The international character of the twenty-firstcentury race movements is striking. In stark contrast to the racist screeds of the twentieth century, Jews are hardly mentioned in the document. In fact, Tarrant is at pains to dissociate himself from anti-Semitism. This awareness of movement sensibilities—born of his immersion in the hothouse of chat rooms and social media—is reflected in a section in which he poses to himself hostile questions which he assumes will flow like a river in internal discussions. Similarly, detractors are also anticipated, but this soon morphs into the realm of fantasy and childish dreams with the comic book fantasy he is a kind of Joe Ledger, a fictional rogue American Special Forces operative. The American mythos of all this clear, with peaceful and still largely pastoral New Zealand rating nary a mention. “The Great Replacement” ends with a reprise of the beginning with another poem, “Invictus" by William Ernest Henley.

57

For a brief dictionary of these terms, see Tess Owen, “Decoding the racist memes the alleged New Zealand shooter used to communicate,” Vice News, March 15, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vbwn9a/decoding-the-racist-memes-the-new-zealandshooter-used-to-communicate. 58 “Stockholm quietly remembers victims of terror attack,” The Local , April 8, 2019, https:// www.thelocal.se/20190408/stockholm-quietly-marks-two-year-anniversary-of-terror-attack. The death is a touchstone for the far right as well. See the unauthorized Facebook page titled “Refugees Not Welcome” with a picture of both the little girl and her grave. https://www.fac ebook.com/1004579652932069/posts/1871595482897144/.

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Tarrant closes the manifesto with the slogan “Europa Rises” and a pastiche of photographs which beautifully illustrates Tarrant’s dreams. There are idealized pastoral images of white country life, hunting scenes, a little girl with her mother, a baby with her mother, and of course American soldiers on patrol in what appears to be the mountains of Afghanistan.

In Sum Contra Schuurman et al. the term lone wolf still has heuristic and law enforcement value, but the conception, like everything else in the age of the internet and global social media, has evolved. True lone wolves, a la Franklin and Kaczynski, are virtually extinct. Theirs was a simpler time in which popular media was largely closed to the radical right, save for a few late night talk shows such as that of the late, lamented Joe Pyne who in the 1960s gave airtime to oddballs and wingnuts of every description while lampooning their ideas with an acidic dry wit.59 Playboy magazine also gained a kind of intellectual currency to balance its exploitation of the commercial currency of the female nude by providing in-depth interviews with such cultural outcasts as George Lincoln Rockwell and Malcolm X among others. By the 1980s, movement figures had even less access to the mainstream media, save through giving “shock jock” personalities the opportunity to ridicule and humiliate them. The targets of this verbal abuse were, however, more sensitive than before, as Denver radio shock jock Alan Berg would discover when one of the movement figures he ridiculed on air was none other than David Lane, who with other Order members shot him to death in 1984.60 Today, the kind of isolation which allowed Franklin and Kaczynski to operate for such extended periods of time is nonexistent. There are no 59

Kevin Cook, “Joe Pyne Was America’s First Shock Jock,” Smithsonian Magazine, June 2017, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/joe-pyne-first-shock-jock-180963237/. 60 Stephen Singular, Talked to Death: the life and murder of Alan Berg (New York: Berkley, 1989).

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true loners among lone wolves today. Each is shaped and nurtured by the supportive milieu of chat rooms and social media. Yet when they decide to go operational, they act alone, giving the term “lone wolf” continued utility.

Part III Where the Action Is: Right-Wing Extremist Activities

12 Far-Right Extremist Violence in the United States Steven Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, William S. Parkin, Jeff Gruenewald, Colleen Mills, Brent Klein, Leevia Dillon, and Celinet Duran

Introduction Prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, most scholarly terrorism works were conceptual, philosophical, or broad overview pieces (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). Early terrorism scholarship focused on defining terrorism and related concepts (Gibbs, S. Chermak (B) Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. D. Freilich · L. Dillon John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY, USA W. S. Parkin RTI International, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, NC, USA J. Gruenewald Department of Sociology & Criminology, Terrorism Research Center, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_12

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1989; Silke, 1996; Turk, 1982), understanding important measurement and conceptual issues (White, 1993), and examining the causes and consequences of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1991, 1995, 2001). The post9/11 increase in research funding from the U.S. federal government and nations across the globe led to a remarkable surge in research. Importantly, many new important studies are underway in a variety of scholarly disciplines. For example, Lum et al.’s (2006) systematic review of terrorism and political violence literature found that over 50% of peer-reviewed articles between 1971 and 2002 were published in the last two years of the review period. Silke’s (2008) examination of research published after the September 11th attacks found that more researchers are studying terrorism, collaborations across disciplines are increasing, and more studies include descriptive and inferential statistics. More recent systematic reviews find that these positive developments have continued (Desmarias et al., 2017; Schuurman, 2020). Schuurman examined nearly 3,500 articles published in nine leading terrorism journals and found that increasingly studies used primary data, a wider range of data-gathering techniques, and were less likely to only consist of literature reviews. Despite these improvements, there are still key gaps in the knowledge base. Schuurman (2020, p. 1020) concluded that most empirical terrorism studies use qualitative research methods and there continues to be a need for more quantitative work. This is partially because scholars are unable to fully access government files and records related to terrorism, and this in turn limits their ability to provide systematic quantitative analyses (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Crenshaw & LaFree, 2017). Key to building a stronger scholarly foundation in terrorism studies has been funding researchers to build C. Mills Criminal Justice, Pennsylvania State University, Abington, PA, USA B. Klein University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA C. Duran State University of New York, Oswego, NY, USA

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databases for quantitative analysis capable of answering fundamental research questions about the nature of terrorism. The 9/11 attacks understandably steered the broader terrorism research agenda toward jihadist-inspired studies (LaFree et al., 2016; Lum et al., 2006). This is because scholarly interest in the topic of terrorism has often proven to be dependent upon available research funding provided by governmental and law enforcement agencies, whose interests are largely event driven (Crenshaw, 2001; Lum et al., 2006). For example, during the 1970s and early 1980s, concerns about terrorism and terrorism studies were largely associated with the far-left or nationalist resistance (e.g., Weather Underground, Symbionese Liberation Army) (Crenshaw, 2001; Rapoport, 2002). In the late 1980s and 1990s, attention turned to the increasing activities associated with far-right extremism including the activities of the survivalist, militia, and Christian Identity movement—particularly in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (Barkun, 1996; Crenshaw, 2001). In the aftermath of 9/11, no ideological group or event had generated as much research interest as jihadist-inspired extremism (LaFree et al., 2016; Lum et al., 2006). More contemporary research, however, has made tremendous advances in the quantitative study of terrorism across ideological spectrum. Scholarly datasets, including the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), have employed open-source data as an effective means for quantitatively analyzing the terrorism problem at large (Gruenewald & Pridemore, 2012). LaFree (2011), for example, used the GTD to examine the global terrorism problem, finding most terrorism only occurs in 10% of countries. This study also revealed that terrorism declined in the decade leading up to 9/11 and that the United States is only the 20th most targeted country for terrorism. Studies have used the ECDB to quantitatively assess the terrorism problem in the United States beyond jihadist-inspired incidents and perpetrators. For instance, studies using the ECDB have examined the victims of homicides perpetrated by far-right extremists (Parkin et al., 2015), far-right lone wolf homicides (Gruenewald et al., 2013), county-level variation in far-right homicides (Freilich et al., 2015; Mills et al., 2017), and the organizational dynamics of

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far-right hate groups (Chermak et al., 2013). Similarly, studies have examined the impact of left-wing extremists, especially as it relates to the environmental and animal rights movements (Chermak et al., 2010; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Gonzales et al., 2014). Finally, Chermak and Gruenewald (2015see also Duran, 2021) quantitatively compared jihadist-inspired, far-right, and far-left terrorism in the United States and identified key individual and contextual socio-demographic characteristics across terrorist ideologies. This chapter discusses the nature of far-right extremist violence in the United States from 1990 to 2019. The following section begins by highlighting previous research on the nature of the far-right threat. We then provide a brief review of the (ECDB) and discuss its definitional inclusion criteria. Next, we conduct original analyses on violent attacks in the United States by far-right extremists. We conclude by outlining the implications of our findings and note directions for future research.

Seriousness of the Threat There is considerable empirical and anecdotal evidence that far-right extremism poses a significant threat to public safety in the United States. Domestic terrorism attacks generally outnumber international ones 7 to 1 in the United States, and far-right extremist groups are deemed especially dangerous (LaFree et al., 2006; Freilich et al., 2015). Hewitt’s (2003) domestic terrorism investigation found that far-right extremists claimed over 250 lives between 1978 and 2002, and that the two most likely future terrorist threats are jihadist and far-right extremists. Besides 9/11, the most lethal attack on American soil remains the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The Oklahoma City bombing was committed by Timothy McVeigh, a far-right extremist obsessed about the federal government’s alleged misdeeds and encroachments upon individual liberties. A recent study that examined the terrorism problem in the United States concluded that far-right terrorism is a more significant threat compared to possible attacks from supporters of other extremist ideologies. The authors concluded that “…right-wing attacks and plots account for the majority of all terrorist incidents in the United States

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since 1994, and the total number of right-wing attacks and plots has grown significantly during past six years” (Jones et al., 2020, p. 1), and that far-right terrorism is likely to increase in 2020. In addition, farright extremists have consistently been one of the top threats to public safety over the last 50 years in both their level of fatal attacks and law enforcement’s perceptions of the most dangerous movements (Freilich et al., 2009b). Conversely, both the far-left and jihadist levels of activities have fluctuated. Smith’s (1994) foundational study on terrorism in the United States demonstrated that far-right extremists were active in the 1960s, 1970s, and in fact, was the most-deadly movement operating in the 1980s; more so than the far-left. Jihadists committed almost no deadly strikes prior to 1990 before increasing their level of violence that resulted in the horrific 9/11 attacks in 2001 and over 15 fatal incidents in 2002 (Parkin et al., 2018). Though the far-left was very active in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the movement’s level of deadly activities fell in the 1990s and 2000s, before reemerging in the last four or so years (Duran, 2021; Parkin et al., 2018). The far-right’s level of fatal attacks, however, has remained mostly stable throughout this period of more than 50 years and law enforcement has invariably rated them a strong threat to the public order (Carter et al., 2014; Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014; LaFree et al., 2019). Research has also found a significant far-right extremist presence in most states (Riley et al., 2005). Freilich et al.’s (2009a) survey of American state police agencies showed that almost all agencies rated jihadists as the top national security threat, but far-right extremism was also seen as a significant danger. Carter et al. (2014) subsequently discovered a wide variation in the groups perceived to be a serious terrorist threat. Law enforcement was most concerned about far-right sovereign citizens, followed by jihadists and far-right militia/patriot group members. This study also found that the major concerns of law enforcement have changed considerably over time. In the early to mid-2000s, the main concern was jihadists. In 2013 and 2014, findings revealed that law enforcement’s top concern was far-right sovereign citizens. Research based on the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) has shown that since 1990 far-leftists committed 42 ideologically motivated homicide incidents that took 78 lives and jihadists committed 51 fatal

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attacks that claimed over 3,000 lives. But, far-right extremists in that same period committed 227 ideologically motivated homicide events that took over 520 lives (Duran, 2021; Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014; Parkin et al., 2018). Thus, jihadists claimed more victims, while far-right extremists committed more attacks. Other studies examining different datasets confirm that far-right extremists are a significant threat (see Perlinger, 2012). Perlinger (2012) identified 4,420 violent incidents by far-rightists between 1990 and 2012, with 670 fatalities and over 3,000 injuries. Taken together, these studies illustrate the threat of farright terrorism and highlight the importance of providing an overall quantitative overview of far-right extremist violence. Significantly, far-right extremists tend to purposefully target specific categories of people and they pose a special danger to law enforcement and government officials (Gruenewald et al., 2016; Suttmoeller et al., 2016). For instance, in 2014, two far-right extremists, who were also married, purposefully assassinated two Las Vegas police officers. Similarly, anti-government extremist Steven Vernon Bixby murdered two law enforcement officers in Abbeville, South Carolina, on December 8, 2003. In an attempt to defend their property rights, Steven and his father, Arthur Bixby, barricaded themselves inside their home and engaged in a 13-hours violent standoff with police. The incident claimed the lives of Abbeville County Deputy Sheriff Danny Wilson and Abbeville County Magistrate’s Constable Donnie Ouzts. The largest category, though, of far-right extremist homicide victims has been racial and ethnic minorities like African Americans and Latinos (Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014). One terrible example is the massacre in an African American Church in South Carolina in June 2015 that took the lives of nine elderly congregants. Dylann Storm Roof was a white supremacist who carried out a racially-motivated shooting spree at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Roof attended the church’s Bible study, sitting among the congregants for an hour before opening fire, killing nine people, and injuring another. As he shot his victims, Roof shouted racial epithets and explained his motive to congregants, saying “I have to do it. You rape our women and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go” (Glenza, 2015, para.10). Roof ’s racist motivations were made further clear when

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his online presence turned up a website with a manifesto, detailing his view on people of color. Other recent far-right extremist mass murders have targeted Latino and Jewish persons.

Data Sources on American Far-Right Extremist Violence The primary source of data for contextualizing American far-right extremist violence in the current study is the open-source U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) (Chermak et al., 2014; Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014). The ECDB has data on offenders, incidents, victims, and targets of domestic terrorism, including fatal attacks and failed and foiled plots by far-right extremists. Terrorism cases are included in the database regardless of jurisdiction, encompassing federal, state, and nontried cases. For an ideological homicide to be included in the ECDB, two criteria must be satisfied. First, behaviorally a homicide or a plot must have been committed or attempted in the United States. Second, attitudinally at least one of the suspects must have committed it to further their far-right extremist belief system (Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014). Other publicly available sources also provide information on far-right violence in the United States. We relied on these sources when we were creating the ECDB to identify cases. Three sources, in particular, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the American Terrorism Study (ATS), and Hewitt’s chronology, utilize the FBI’s terrorism definition or policies (Hewitt, 2003). The FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, 1997). While this approach is beneficial because it establishes boundaries, it omits many far-right extremist crimes. Since the FBI has historically required that terrorist acts be committed by group, crimes committed by lone individuals unaffiliated with an organization have in the past been excluded from official lists of terrorism. This led Riley and Hoffman to conclude that the FBI’s terrorism definition was too narrow (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).

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The ATS was created by terrorism researcher Brent Smith and has in the past been conducted in cooperation with the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center. The database includes federally indicted persons because of an FBI Counterterrorism Program investigation. Information collected primarily from federal indictments, trial transcripts, and docket information by the ATS has been used to answer important questions about the adjudication of terrorists and temporal and geospatial patterns of terrorist behavior (Smith & Damphousse, 1995; Smith et al., 2002; Smith & Orvis, 1993). Although the ATS has publicly available data on federal terrorism data ranging from the late 1970s to 2017 that are formatted for statistical use, state-level far-right extremist terrorism cases are excluded from the database. To create his chronology of American terrorism since the 1950s, Hewitt combined information from multiple sources, including other chronologies, the FBI’s annual reports, watch groups, and journalists (Hewitt, 2002). Unfortunately, the FBI ceased publishing its annual Terrorism in the United States reports in 2005, and Hewitt’s chronology ends in 2004. Further, the FBI reports and Hewitt’s chronology are narratives not formatted for statistical analysis.

Defining American Far-Right Extremists As is the case for defining terrorism more broadly, there is a wide variety of definitions used to describe far-right extremism and there is no universally accepted definition. Mudde finds that “to the extent that a consensus of opinion among the scientists concerned with this field, it is confined to the view that right-wing extremism is an ideology that people are free to fill in as they see fit” (Mudde, 1995, p. 205). We therefore draw upon our systematic review of studies published on the topic of far-right extremism, including several studies offering typologies and definitions to operationalize far-right terrorism (Freilich, Chermak, & Gruenewald, 2014). More specifically, we define far-right terrorists as individuals or groups that subscribe to aspects of the following ideals (p. 380):

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Far-right terrorists are “… fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of centralized federal authority, reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one’s personal and/or national “way of life” is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in or supporting the need for paramilitary preparations and training or survivalism. Importantly, the mainstream conservative movement and the mainstream Christian right are not included.”

Far-Right Extremist Homicides in the United States Deadly violence targeting social minorities and government actors remains the most visible manifestation of far-right extremism in the United States. Below we present data on the situational, offender, and victim characteristics of fatal far-right extremist violence in the United States since 1990. Figure 12.1 presents the number of ideological homicides by far-right extremists that occur per year. The total number of homicide events have ranged from 1 to 18 incidents a year, and since 1990, there has been, on average, seven far-right extremist homicide incidents in any given year. In general, the number of ideological homicides committed by far-right extremists has declined over time. For example, there were 101 far-right extremist homicides from 1990 to 1999, 67 homicides from 2000 to 2009, and 50 homicides from 2010 to 2019. Although there were fewer incidents over time, there were more fatalities per incident. Almost 50% of the total number of far-right extremist homicides that have occurred in the last three decades happened between 1990 and 1999. This is an interesting finding and is inconsistent with other work that has examined long-term trends. For example, Perlinger (2012) concludes that the total number of far-right extremist violent incidents in the United States increased significantly between 1990 and 2012, although the differences

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Fig. 12.1

Far-right ideologically motivated homicides, 1990–2019

between studies could be attributed to his focus on all types of violent incidents and not just fatalities. Since 1990, far-right ideological homicides have been distributed similarly across seasons with 23% occurring in fall, 26% occurring in spring, 30% occurring in summer, and 20% occurring in winter. Farright extremist homicides have been somewhat more likely to occur in the West (37%) and South (35%) compared to the Northeast (17%) and Midwest (12%). ECDB data also indicate that California, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Florida are the top states in the number of ideologically motivated far-right homicides (Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014). At the municipal level, Gruenewald and Pridemore found that just over 50% of far-right extremist homicides occurred in small towns and midsized cities with total populations of less than 100,000 (Gruenewald & Pridemore, 2012). As for situational attributes, research by Parkin et al. (2015) showed that the most frequent places where these homicides occurred include businesses, churches, and schools (29%), private residences (25%), remote areas (21%), and in open streets (21%). Table 12.1 presents additional general characteristics of the incidents. Over 76% of the homicides were primarily motivated by anti-minority

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Table 12.1

Incident characteristics

Ideological Motive Number of Suspects

Number of Homicide Victims

Weapon

Strength of Ideological Motive

Total

311

Anti-Government/abortion/other

51

23.4%

Anti-Minority 1

167 125

76.6% 57.3%

2 3 4 5 or more Unknown 1

46 21 15 10 1 174

21.1% 9.6% 6.9% 4.6% 0.5% 79.8%

2–5 More than 5 Blunt object Bodily weapon Firearm Knife/sharp object Other Unknown Weak

34 10 16 20 119 46 17 1 25

15.6% 4.6% 7.3% 9.2% 54.6% 21.1% 7.8% 0.5% 11.5%

Moderate Strong

56 137 218

25.7% 62.8% 100.0%

sentiments and 23% were motivated by anti-government, abortion, or related concerns. Ideological motivation is an interesting and complicated issue. The ECDB created a variable to measure how certain it is that a homicide was committed to further a far-right extremist belief system. This attribute is measured from 0 to 4. The ECDB captures specific types of evidence linking the behavior (committing a homicide) to the ideological motivation (extremist attitude). In fact, the ECDB codes non-ideological homicides, as well as ideologically motivated homicides. For example, if a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member murders his wife in a domestic violence situation, this homicide is coded as a “0,” a non-ideologically motivated homicide. However, if the KKK member murdered a minority in a drive-by shooting while screaming

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“white supremacy forever!”, then it would be coded as an ideologically motivated event. Depending upon the number of indicators demonstrating the ideological motivation and available evidence contradicting ideological motivation, the event could be coded anywhere from 1 to 4. For example, if the KKK killer in addition to screaming “white supremacy forever!” also had a copy of The Turner Diaries in their car at the time and there was no other evidence, it would be coded as a 4 (due to two indicators demonstrating far-right motivation and no contradictory evidence). But, if it turned out the KKK killer and the victim had actually been selling drugs together and had gotten into an argument right before the drive-by shooting, then it would be coded as 1 (since there is only 1 indicator of ideology—screaming “white supremacy forever!”—and 1 competing indicator suggesting it could be a personal dispute). Importantly, ECDB coders specifically indicate all the known pieces of evidence that establish whether an event is ideologically motivated. Many differences across datasets are often tied to variations in inclusion criteria (see Chermak et al., 2012). Sixty-three percent of the ECDB’s far-right homicide incidents had a strong ideological motivation, 20% had moderate ideological motivation, and 12% had weak ideological motivation. Most incidents involved one suspect (57%) murdering one victim (80%). Less than 5% of the incidents had more than five suspects or more than five victims. Firearms were used in nearly 55% of the incidents, knives were used in 21% of the incidents, and blunt objects or bodily weapons were used in 16.5% of the incidents. Table 12.2 includes data on the 412 suspects that have committed a far-right homicide since 1990. It is not surprising that the vast majority, over 90%, of the suspects are male. The average age of the suspects is 28 years old. Twenty-four percent were 14–19 years old, 43% were 20– 29 years old, 17% were 30–39 years old, 7% were 40–49 years old, and 7% were 50 or more years old. Sixteen percent of the suspects had a medically documented mental illness and 45% had some prior criminal record. Only 18% of the suspects were charged with a hate crime. The threat of self-radicalized lone wolves has been of increasing concern over the last fifteen years. High profile incidents, such as Robert Bowers’ murder of 11 at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, the

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Table 12.2

Suspect-level characteristics

Variable

Response

Count

%

Sex

Female Male Unknown Average Standard deviation 14–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50 and over Unknown No Yes No Yes No Yes None Low Moderate Strong Unknown Acted alone Acting with others (no group) Part of formal group Part of informal group Unknown

36 371 5 27.8 12.0 97 175 68 27 29 16 346 66 227 185 338 74 30 27 89 246 20 96 90

8.7% 90.0% 1.2% 6.7% 2.9% 23.5% 42.5% 16.5% 6.6% 7.0% 3.9% 84.0% 16.0% 55.1% 44.9% 82.0% 18.0% 7.3% 6.6% 21.6% 59.7% 4.9% 23.3% 21.8%

113 56 57

27.4% 13.6% 13.8%

Age

Evidence of Mental Illness Prior Criminal Record Charged Hate Crime Ideological Strength

Group Connection

mass shooting by Patrick Crusius that killed 23 at a Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, and Wade Michael Page’s fatal shooting of six at the Sikh temple in Wisconsin, are examples of this threat. Lone wolves are difficult to monitor by law enforcement since they often “fly below radar” (i.e., hiding their intentions) (Kaplan, 1997). In other words, because they are self-radicalized and have few contacts and connections with others, there is less of a likelihood that potential problematic behavior or warnings about an attack being planned will come to the attention of law enforcement. Previous research by Gruenewald et al. (2013) found that loners are different from those with strong network ties to

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25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Act Alone

Fig. 12.2

Part of Formal Group

Lone actor versus part of formal group

extremist groups. For example, loners were older, significantly more likely to be single (including separation or divorced), more likely to have a prior military background, more suicidal, more likely to target multiple victims, and generally less involved in the far-right extremist movement. The ECDB indicates that since 1990, about 23% of far-right homicide incidents were perpetrated by someone who acted alone, 22% acted with someone else, 27% acted with someone as part of a formal group, and 14% acted with someone who was part of an informal group. Figure 12.2 specifically compares the number of lone actor homicides to attacks by individuals linked to formal group over time. Although the yearly numbers are small, the data show that homicides by individuals connected to a formal group were more common in 1990–1999 and much less frequent in subsequent years. There were 96 homicides involving far-right lone actors between 1990 and 2019, and the numbers remained relatively stable over time with spikes in 2009 and 2017.

Far-Right Extremist Homicide Victim Attributes Table 12.3 provides information on the victims of far-right homicide attacks. The average age of the victims was 41 years old and 75% were male. Most victims were white (45%) or Black (29%). Approximately 8% were Hispanic, 5% were Asian, 0.6% were Arab or bi-racial,

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Table 12.3

Victim-level characteristics

Variable

Response

Count

%

Level of Randomness

Purposeful Representative Random Unknown Average Standard deviation Under 10 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70 and older Unknown Female Male Unknown Arab Asian Bi-racial Black non-Hispanic Hispanic (any race) Indigenous White non-Hispanic Other Unknown No Yes No Yes—law enforcement Yes—other

91 209 24 16 40.5 18.6 4 42 65 59 66 43 34 23 4 82 253 5 2 18 2 98 28 1 153 8 30 328 12 295 34 11

26.8% 61.5% 7.1% 4.7% 11.9% 5.5% 1.2% 12.4% 19.1% 17.4% 19.4% 12.6% 10.0% 6.8% 1.2% 24.1% 74.4% 1.5% 0.6% 5.3% 0.6% 28.8% 8.2% 0.3% 45.0% 2.4% 8.8% 96.5% 3.5% 86.8% 10.0% 3.2%

Age

Sex

Race/Ethnicity

Jewish Targeted for Occupation

and 0.3% were indigenous. Over 3% of the victims were Jewish. Most victims were not targeted for their occupation, but when victims are targeted for working in a particular occupation, it is often due to their law enforcement or other government job. As noted, far-right extremists pose a severe risk to the community and law enforcement personnel. Two national studies of state and local law enforcement agencies conclude that jihadists and domestic violent extremists represent major threats

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(Carlson, 1995; Freilich et al., 2009b). Other research has documented over 130 incidents involving far-rightist extremists murdering, injuring, or targeting law enforcement personnel since 1990 (Freilich & Chermak, 2009). In December 2006, hundreds of California and federal law enforcement personnel arrested over 60 members of the neo-Nazi skinhead gang Public Enemy Number One (PEN1) after they learned about a “hit list” targeting police officers. The law enforcement community also is concerned about threats by far-rightist extremists. For example, the FBI (1997, p. 32) distributed a strategic threat assessment (titled Project Megiddo) of the potential for domestic terrorism in anticipation of or response to the new millennium. The report concluded that “law enforcement officials should be alert for the following: (1) plans to initiate conflict with law enforcement, (2) the potential increase in the number of extremists willing to become martyrs, and (3) the potential for a quicker escalation of conflict during routine law enforcement activities (e.g., traffic stops, issuance of warrants, etc.).” Correctional officers also face significant risks from far-right extremists. Racist skinhead Curtis Allgier’s murder of a corrections officer in June 2007 while being transported to a hospital is one example. Gangs like the Aryan Brotherhood and PEN1 are responsible for homicides in and out of prison. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, although far-right white supremacists account for 1% of the incarcerated population, 18% of homicides occurring inside prison included correctional officers as victims (see Hodges & Sommerstein, 2018). We also measured three levels of randomness. A victim/target that is specifically chosen based on who/what it is would be an example of purposeful targeting. For example, if an anti-abortion extremist assassinates Dr. John Smith because of the specific actions and comments of Dr. John Smith, then the victim is considered purposefully targeted. Twentyseven percent of the shootings were purposeful. If a suspect attends a pro-choice rally and shoots into a crowd of demonstrators, killing one, this is an example of a representative targeting. This is to say that the individual was killed for what they represented. Nearly 62% of the victims were killed for what they represented. If an individual is walking outside of an abortion clinic and is killed by an explosion at the clinic, they are an example of a random victimization. The individual was not

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at the clinic; therefore, they were not a representative target, nor did the suspect choose to specifically target the victim. When the location, which the victim has no connection to, is removed from the equation, their victimization is random. Only seven percent of the victim were killed randomly.

Discussion and Conclusion Research on terrorism generally, and far-right extremism and terrorism particularly, has been criticized in various ways by researchers. There are excellent critiques highlighting several concerns (LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Ross, 1993; Silke, 2001). First, most theoretical work and hypothesis testing occur with questionable or insufficient data (Hamm, 2005; Ross, 1993). Second, statistical analysis is rarely used (Merari, 1991). Third, the typical sources used to conduct crime-related research, such as official, victimization, and self-report data, are seldom used to study terrorism because of lack of access and lack of consistency in definition (Hamm, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Ross 1993; Silke, 2001). Fourth, most terrorism research relies on secondary data analysis or interviews (Silke, 2001). Although using interviews has advantages—it is a flexible method, providing researchers a good measure of control, and it tends to have good response rates—Silke concludes that there are substantial disadvantages to using this methodology. Weaknesses include its expense, reliance on opportunity sampling, interviewer bias, access to only a biased sample of respondents, and that the interviewer’s presence may prevent the respondent from answering honestly about sensitive issues. Other limitations include retrospective construction (asking the terrorist about events that occurred long ago), only conducting a single interview and a lack of bounding, and that most interview studies only include terrorists and rarely include a comparison group (Freilich & LaFree, 2016). In 2009, Gruenewald, Freilich, and Chermak published a literature review of far-right extremist criminal activities. The review of over 250 studies supported the following conclusions. First, although many

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studies in the terrorism literature highlight the relationship between farright extremism and a range of crimes, including non-terrorist offenses such as tax refusal, less than a third used empirical data to produce findings. Second, and importantly, there were serious data and methodological concerns with a number of extant empirical works. Indeed, most of the frequently cited works on far-right extremists’ illegal activities were written by journalists and were not systematic (Coates, 1987; Coppola, 1996; Dyer, 1997; Finch, 1983; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Kramer, 2002; Langor, 2003; Neiwert, 1999). Third, some studies mischaracterize the prior literature, while others repeatedly discuss and analyze the same few crimes (e.g., Gordon Kahl; the Order; Oklahoma City), which may result in our “missing” the overall picture (White, 2000). Fourth, criminological studies have mostly restricted their analyses to right-wing “terrorism” and have not examined the non-violent (e.g., gun offenses, tax protests, land use offenses, and financial crime) offenses committed by the movement. Finally, prior research has tended to treat far-right extremists as a single, cohesive entity. Scholars have looked at one segment of the movement and made conclusions about the movement as a whole. Many studies ignore the many differences that plague the movement—for instance, over racism, anti-Semitism, religious views, anti-government views, nature of the conspiracy theories, level of political engagement, reaction to the 9/11 attacks, and level of withdrawal from society (Brannan, 1999; Dobratz, 2001; Durham, 2003; Mariani, 1998). As stated earlier, there have since been significant improvements in the body of research as quantitative data have become more readily available and there are number of databases that have provided some insights into the nature of far-right violence in the United States (Desmarias et al., 2017; Schuurman, 2020). In this study, we build on that growing body of research by providing an overview of far-right violence, highlighting characteristics of the incident, victim, and perpetrators, and linking the results to some of the key studies in this area. There are several key findings from this study. First, although the annual number of homicides is not large, homicides by far-right extremists significantly outnumber attacks perpetrated

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by other movements. We focused our investigation on far-right homicides from 1990 to 2019 for two reasons. First, prior research indicates that far-right terrorists differ in important ways from left-wing terrorists in terms of age, education, occupation, religion, and region of activity (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015) and international jihadists in terms of type of crimes committed (Hamm, 2005). Second, although domestic far-left groups like the Animal (and Environmental) Liberation Front commit destructive acts (Leader & Probst, 2003), most of the crimes focus on attacks on properties. It is interesting that the total number of homicides committed by extremist far-rightists has declined over time and that nearly half of the homicides in the ECDB occurred prior to 1999. One conclusion of this finding might be that far-right extremists have been less active but more lethal since 1999. We think this conclusion is unlikely for two reasons. First, other research that expands the focus on far-right extremist violence to include non-fatal violent attacks concludes that the number of attacks has actually increased since 2000. Second, the ECDB includes events related to failed and foiled plots by both jihadi and far-right extremists, and these data show that the number of far-right extremist plots has increased significantly in the last twenty years. In combination, these points seem to indicate that far-rightist extremists remain a significant threat, but that law enforcement and community-level response strategies to them have improved and they effectively mitigated the harm caused by terrorism acts. This is an empirical question that should be examined in future research. Second, far-right extremist perpetrators that plan and successfully carry out violence are significantly different than perpetrators driven by other ideologies. The demographic characteristics of far-right offenders tend to be male, white, less educated, have signs of a mental illness, have a prior arrest history, and be in a relationship or married at the time of the offense (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015). Their offending patterns are different as well. For example, far-right extremists are significantly more likely to commit non-ideological homicides compared to far-leftists or jihadi perpetrators. Far-rightists are also more likely to have committed a violent crime after the 9–11 terrorist attacks. Although the number of homicides by far-right extremists connected to a formal group is the largest category of events, this number has declined more

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recently and the number of lone wolf attacks has remained about the same with some increased activity in the last ten years. These findings point to the need to do additional comparative work across ideological offenders. Third, far-right extremists rarely pick random victims but instead pick targets representative of their ideological motivation. Far-rightists whose primary motivation is anti-government officials will attack police officers, judges, corrections officers, and other political officials. Farrightists that focus on racial animus will target racial minorities. The victims were more often the sole victim (both fatal and non-fatal), and although a firearm was still the primary weapon used, a large number of victims were stabbed or beaten to death. Many law enforcement and other government officials are targeted by far-right extremists. This is another important area of research that needs to be developed. Although this research has provided some important insights into the characteristics of far-right extremist offending in the United States, it has only scratched the surface and much works need to be done. We conclude with three suggestions for future research. First, the comparison between perpetrators who are successful and those who are not is quite important and it could add additional insights about the nature of violence. There are critical situational factors that have to be considered in understanding the differences between fatal and non-fatal attacks. For example, research on the murder and injury of law enforcement personnel has not focused on situational factors comparing fatal to nonfatal attacks (Freilich, Chermak & Belli, 2014). The extant research has failed to examine the types of police-citizen interactions are likely to lead to fatalities, what about the nature of the stop was critical to the outcome, how the number of other officers and citizens present might impact the outcome, and how strategies used in training officers impact outcomes. Second, although the amount of violence by far-right extremists is a significant concern, it is interesting that the total number of events is not large considering, on average, about eight far-right extremist homicides occur in a year. There are, of course, many thousands of active far-right extremists and may be specifically connected to certain groups but most do not turn to violent crimes. It is thus critical to examine what

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are the critical risk and protective factors that pushed specific individuals to violence or prevented another individual for choosing violence as an outcome. There are several comparisons that would be helpful here including comparing far-rightists to other ideological offenders, to non-violent ideological offenders, to ideological non-offenders, or to “ordinary” offenders that commit homicide. Third, there needs to be much more work comparing the violence of far-right extremists across different countries. Variations in incidence and prevalence would be important to better understand the relative nature of the threat of far-right extremism. In fact, the Research Council of Norway recently funded a study that integrates data from the RightWing Terrorism & Violence Dataset (Ravndal, 2016) that tracks attacks in Western Europe since 1990, with far-right ECDB data. This study is scheduled to begin in 2022. The integration of open-source crime databases being collected in other areas of the world experiencing persistent threats of far-right extremism, like Western Europe, with databases like the ECDB could illuminate how cultural similarities and differences are manifested in incident, victim, and perpetrator characteristics.

References Barkun, M. (1996). Religion, militias and Oklahoma City: The mind of conspiratorialists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 8(1), 50–64. Brannan, D. W. (1999). The evolution of the Church of Israel: Dangerous mutations. Terrorism and Political Violence, 11(3), 106–118. Carlson, J. R. (1995). The future terrorists in America. American Journal of Police, 14 (3/4), 71–91. Carter, D., Chermak, S. M., Carter, J., & Drew, J. (2014). Understanding law enforcement intelligence processes. College Park, MD. START. Retrieved on September 7, 2021 from https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_Unders tandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Chermak., S., Freilich, J. D., Parkin, W. S., & Lynch, J. P. (2014). American terrorism and extremist crime data sources and selectivity bias: An investigation focusing on homicide events committed by far-right extremists. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28(1), 191–218.

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Chermak, S. M., & Gruenewald, J. (2015). Laying the foundation for the criminological examination of right-wing, left-wing, and Al Qaeda inspired extremism in the United States. Terrorism & Political Violence, 27 (1), 133– 159. Chermak, S., Freilich, J. D., & Simone, J. (2010). Surveying American state police agencies about lone wolves, far-right criminality, and far-right and Islamic jihadist criminal collaboration. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33, 1–23. Chermak, S., Freilich, J, Parkin, W., & Lynch, J. (2012). American terrorism and extremist crime data sources and selectivity bias: An investigation focusing on homicide events committed by far-right extremists. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28, 191–218. Chermak, S., Freilich, J. D., & Suttmoeller, M. (2013). The organizational dynamics of far-right hate groups in the United States: Comparing violent to non-violent organizations. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 36 (3), 193– 218. Coates, J. (1987). Armed and dangerous: The rise of the survivalist right. New York: Hill and Wang. Coppola, V. (1996). Dragons of God: A journey through far-right America. Atlanta, GA: Longstreet Press, Inc. Crenshaw, M. (1991). How terrorism declines. Terrorism and Political Violence, 3(1), 69–87. Crenshaw, M. (1995). Terrorism in context. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania State University Press. Crenshaw, M. (2001). Counterterrorism policy and the political process. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24 (5), 329–337. Crenshaw, M., & LaFree, G. (2017). Countering terrorism. New York: Brookings Institute Press. Desmarias, S. L., Simons-Rudolph, J., Brugh, C. S., Schilling, E., Hoggan, C. (2017). The state of scientific knowledge regarding factors associated with terrorism. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 4 (4), 180–209. Dobratz, B. A. (2001). The role of religion in the collective identity of the white racialist movement. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40, 287–301. Duran, C. 2021. Far-left versus far-right fatal violence: An empirical assessment of the prevalence of ideologically motivated homicides in the United States. Criminology, Criminal Justice Law & Society, 22(2), 33–49. Durham, M. (2003). The American far right and 9/11. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 96–111.

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13 Pathways to Hate: Applying an Integrated Social Control-Social Learning Model to White Supremacist Violence Colleen Mills

Introduction After bias-motivated mass shootings in Charleston, South Carolina, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, El Paso, Texas, and elsewhere in recent years, shooting attacks by white supremacist terrorists have garnered greater attention. Such attention mirrors the growing body of criminological research examining hate crime and terrorism, two phenomena that overlap with white supremacist violence (Mills et al., 2017). Such work also increasingly applies existing criminological theories, long applied to “regular” crime, to explain extremist violence (Agnew, 2010; Akers & Silverman, 2004; Akins & Winfree, 2016; Freilich et al., 2015; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; Hamm, 2007; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Mills et al., 2021; Rosenfeld, 2004; Shecory & Laufer, 2008). Mills et al. C. Mills (B) Criminal Justice, Pennsylvania State University—Abington, Abington, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_13

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(2021) apply an integrated social control-social learning model to investigate the pathways to hate and anti-government violence committed by far-right and jihadist extremists. Summarizing the contrasting views of social learning and social control theories and the utility of an integrated model, they write: The former [social learning] perspective suggests that individuals learn from those whom they associate with in small intimate groups while the latter [social control] argues that those with low social control or criminal proclivities are drawn to each other (“birds of a feather flock together”). A potential hybrid perspective would find individuals with low social control drawn to each other, but once they meet in cyber space or real life they nonetheless learn methods and justifications from each other. The use of integrated criminological models to explain delinquency has greatly increased over the last 30 years and to good effect. (p. 702)

Mills et al.’s (2021) analysis demonstrates the value of a hybrid social control-social learning framework to understand extremist violence. They uncover important similarities and differences in the pathways to extremism and violence among far-right and jihadist extremists. Building on this work, the current study uses a similar approach focusing on explaining white supremacists’ radicalization to violence.1

1

This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice under Award No. 2015-ZA-BX-0004; the Office of University Programs Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB—Center Lead) Grant made to the START Consortium (Grant # 2012-ST-61-CS0001). The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security.

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An Integrated Social Control-Social Learning Model of Radicalization to White Supremacist Violence According to Hirschi’s (1969) social bond theory, people engage in crime as their bonds to conventional society weaken. He argues that attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief constitute a person’s bond to conventional society. Attachment entails emotional ties to others. For example, a person with a strong attachment to their family may refrain from criminal behavior, as they would not want to disappoint their loved ones. Commitment to prosocial activities (e.g., a college diploma or a career) prevents people from deviant behaviors that would jeopardize such pursuits. Relatedly, involvement in prosocial activities both accounts for people’s limited time and bolsters one’s commitment to such activities. The more time a person spends obtaining a college diploma reinforces their commitment to getting their diploma. Lastly, belief refers to the extent that a person believes that they should abide by society’s laws. While social bond theory holds that social interactions keep people from deviating from conforming behaviors, social learning theory argues that such interactions explain criminal behavior. Founded on Sutherland’s (1947) work on differential association theory, social learning theory argues that people learn criminal behavior just as they learn any other behavior. Akers (1998) summarizes the learning process as one in which people learn definitions supportive of criminal behavior through differential associations with people supportive of criminal behavior. People then imitate the behaviors they have observed during their interactions with people involved in criminal behavior. He further argues that positive or negative consequences shape behavior through differential reinforcement. In advancing an integrated social control-social learning model of extremist violence, Mills et al. (2021) highlight that “although mainstream criminology has generally treated social control and social learning theories as separate and competing models…both views might

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both be relevant to understand the different stages of the radicalization/indoctrination process” (p. 4). For example, a person without a job, and thus limited involvement under social bond theory, would have more time to engage with extremist groups and in doing so, learn about white supremacists’ justifications for violence. In their analysis, Mills et al. (2021) show that all of the violent extremists possessed absent or weakened social bonds, that further deteriorated as they radicalized after exposure to extremist ideologies through in-person interactions or through the Internet. Replicating prior work comparing violent farright and jihadist extremists, the current study applies an integrated social control-social learning model to explain radicalization to white supremacist violence.

Data and Methods In an investigation of the pathways to white supremacist violence, the current study examines the case studies of four white supremacist offenders included in the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which tracks violent and financial crimes committed by far-right , jihadist, and animal and environmental rights extremists in the United States since 1990.2 The ECDB’s definition of far-right extremism includes the following beliefs: …fiercely nationalistic, anti-global, suspicious of federal authority, and reverent of individual liberties, especially their right to own guns and be free of taxes. They believe in conspiracy theories involving imminent threats to national sovereignty or personal liberty and beliefs that their personal or national “way of life” is under attack. Sometimes such beliefs are vague, but for some the threat originates from specific racial or religious groups. They believe that they must be prepared to defend against this attack by participating in paramilitary training or survivalism. (Freilich et al., 2014, p. 380)

2

For information about the ECDB, see Freilich et al. (2014).

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The ECDB also classifies adherents of misogynistic subcultures (e.g., incels) and anti-abortionists as far-right extremists (Parkin et al., 2021, p. 3). Far-right extremists may subscribe to one or more of these beliefs. The current study focuses on a subset of far-right extremists who view non-white ethnoracial and ethnoreligious groups as threatening and subscribe to a white supremacist belief system. While noting the complexity and heterogeneity of white supremacist ideologies, Simi (2010) describes the foundation of white supremacist groups as “the commitment to white power and defending the ‘white race’ from ‘genocide.’ The future world they envision is racially exclusive, where ‘nonwhites’ are vanquished, segregated, or at least subordinated to white authority” (p. 253). In the current study’s case studies, each of the four men engaged in shootings motivated by white supremacist beliefs. The four perpetrators are briefly described below: 1. Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, 21: member of the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) who carried out a racist shooting spree, targeting Black, Asian, and Jewish persons in Indiana and Illinois, over the Fourth of July weekend in 1999.3 2. Dylann Storm Roof, 21: white supremacist radicalized online who committed an anti-Black mass shooting, killing congregants at AME Emmanuel Church in Charleston, South Carolina, in June 2015. 3. James von Brunn, 88: longtime white supremacist, who once attacked the U.S. Federal Reserve in the 1980s and later carried out an antiSemitic shooting at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in June 2009. 4. Frazier Glenn Miller, 73: white supremacist with a long career in white supremacist activity and criminality, including an attempt to go underground and declare war on the United States in the 1980s, who committed an anti-Semitic shooting spree in Kansas in 2014. For this study, cases were first selected on the criteria that the perpetrators involved were far-right extremists and that they carried out 3

Mills et al. (2021) included Smith in their analysis as an example of a far-right extremist who engaged in hate violence. As this study includes all case studies of white supremacist perpetrators of bias-motivated homicides completed for the NIJ project cited in the previous note, this study thus also includes Smith.

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bias-motivated murders motivated by white supremacist beliefs. Strategically choosing high-profile shooting cases ensured that there would be a sufficient amount of biographical material on the perpetrators to be found in open sources. In an effort to maximize variation (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998), cases were also selected after considering the time period of the perpetrator’s extremist career, including the year of their radicalization relative to the year they carried out their shooting as well as their age at the time of the shooting. Importantly, selecting on these characteristics allowed for investigating variation in the role of the Internet in exposure to and participation in white supremacist movements between the offenders. The case studies were written after a review of the ECDB’s incident case files, which included open sources compiled on each perpetrator. Open sources were gathered according to search protocols for the ECDB (see Freilich et al., 2014). Table 13.1 provides the total number of open sources found for each of the following document types: (1) court and government documents; (2) scholarly articles; (3) news articles; (4) watchgroup documents; (5) books; (6) perpetrator’s social media; and (7) other media (websites, blogs, etc.). The number of sources per document type cited in the case studies is in parentheses. A template guided the writing of the case studies, capturing key constructs from social control and social learning theories (see Appendix Table 13.1

Open-source documents Benjamin Nathaniel Dylann Storm Smith Roof

Court and government documents Scholarly articles News articles Watchgroup documents Books Perpetrator’s social media Other media

James von Brunn

Frazier Glenn Miller

2 (1)

97 (2)

3 (1)

5 (4)

3 (1) 147 (28) 4 (3)

5 (0) 379 (32) 6 (3)

0 (0) 79 (15) 19 (9)

0 (0) 165 (21) 18 (3)

5 (2) 0 (0)

(0) 6 (5)

(1) 4 (3)

2 (2) 226 (4)

6 (1)

10 (2)

17 (0)

5 (1)

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A for the complete case-study template). In addition to providing relevant background on the life course of each offender, the case studies examine each offender’s attachments to family and peers, their commitment to and involvement in prosocial activities, as well as their beliefs in conventional norms and behaviors as observed through their criminal histories. The case studies also document each offender’s exposure to extremist ideology, their participation in extremist activities, and their eventual commission of extremist violence. When possible, the case studies cited to each offender’s own words from their written material (e.g., social media, autobiographical writings) and media interviews in an effort to reveal how they perceived certain life events as they experienced them. The next section includes abridged versions of the full case studies without references.4

Analysis Social Control and Radicalization Attachment All four perpetrators had weak attachments to family and peers. While Smith appeared to be largely unattached to his family, Smith did not appear to experience any negative familial developments prior to his radicalization. Smith’s distant relationships with family members may have contributed to his pursuit of extremist materials as those who knew him found him to be lonely and searching for a sense of belonging. Smith eventually became estranged from his family as he became more involved with the WCOTC. As for peers before his radicalization, Smith originally had a peer group filled with liberal-minded friends of diverse ethnoracial backgrounds. At the same time, Smith began to search for extremist materials during his freshman year of college unbeknownst to his diverse group of friends. Once he started engaging in extremist activities, Smith began to lose his friends due to his violence and increasingly overt racism. 4

The full case studies with references are available upon request.

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After his friends shunned him after he assaulted his girlfriend during his sophomore year in 1997, Smith began openly engaging in extremist acts on college campuses and associating with fellow extremists before eventually joining the WCOTC in June 1998. He had a strong friendship with WCOTC leader, Matthew Hale, and Smith carried out his spree after Hale was denied his law license. Smith’s girlfriend at the time of the shooting was an active WCOTC member. Roof similarly proved to have weak attachments to friends and family. Roof ’s parents divorced before his birth in 1994 and his father divorced his stepmother after allegedly abusing her throughout their marriage. Though his stepmother primarily raised him, he rarely saw her after the divorce in 2011. Roof appeared to avoid his parents, often sleeping in his car at the home of a friend. Regarding his relationships with peers, Roof had a largely transient childhood, frequently moving between schools. He lost touch with his childhood friends after dropping out of high school in 2010. Roof ’s lack of friends during the period of his radicalization may have pushed him to seek out extremist materials. After posting a Craigslist advertisement seeking companions for a historical tour of Charleston (which he ultimately appeared to do alone) in February 2015, a retired child psychologist reached out to Roof to help him. Court documents revealed that “Roof told Hiers that he considered him a ‘nice man’ but that he couldn’t accept the offer because ‘I am in bed, so depressed I cannot get out of bed.’ ‘My life is wasted,’ Roof wrote to Hiers, according to the court document. ‘I have no friends even though I am cool. I am going back to sleep’” (Johnson, 2017, § 9–10). In the months before the attack, Roof reconnected with old friends to drink and use drugs. Roof told his friends of his racist views and violent plans, but they did not take him seriously due to his drunkenness at the time. As for von Brunn, it appeared that his increasing extremism led to negative familial developments throughout his life. Von Brunn admitted in his own writings that his extremism upset both his first and second wives and led to the dissolution of both marriages in 1964 and around 1980, respectively. While von Brunn radicalized during his first marriage, his second marriage failed due to von Brunn’s increasingly apparent extremism, drinking, and abuse of his wife and son. A year after his

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wife left him, von Brunn attacked the Federal Reserve in 1981. Estrangement also marked von Brunn’s relationship with each of his sons from his two marriages. Though von Brunn did not appear affected by his elder son’s death in 2007, he carried out his shooting the following year. While von Brunn’s younger son, Erik, asked him to move in with him, his son hated living with him as his father frequently disrespected him and his fiancée. As a result, he and his fiancée planned to move to Florida to get away from his father shortly before the shooting. This forced von Brunn to find new lodgings and he told his son he would be moving in with a friend in Alexandria. Right before carrying out the shooting, von Brunn sent a letter to Erik, calling him a coward and a terrible son who did not deserve the von Brunn name. As for his peer group, von Brunn appeared to lose prosocial peers in favor of extremist peers as an adult and often alienated acquaintances with his extremism. Von Brunn socialized with a variety of high-profile far-right extremists (e.g., David Duke, Ben Klassen, Tom Metzger, Stan Hess, and Frazier Glenn Miller). Though Miller had a failed first marriage to a Hawaiian woman with whom he had a son that he never saw again years before his radicalization, he appeared strongly attached to his family with his second wife at the start of his radicalization in 1974. Over time, this attachment became more strained as he became more radical. In 1980, his second wife eventually left him, taking their children out of state. In response, Miller quit the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) and started the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (CKKKK) that year. Without his family, Miller chose to dedicate his efforts to building up his own organization and assuming a leadership position in the white supremacist movement. After their divorce, the Millers eventually reunited in 1982 with Miller’s wife helping him run the CKKKK. While his marriage no longer suffered from his extremist involvement during his time leading the CKKKK and the White Patriot Party (WPP), Miller faced another negative familial development. After Miller was convicted of contempt of court in 1986, his father told him not to return home. This rejection, combined with his failure to recruit anyone to his Southern Patriot Party in Hillsville, Virginia, and his general depression over his conviction and “exile” from the movement, led to Miller’s decision to go underground the following year and make his “Declaration of War” against

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the federal government, Jewish, and non-white people. Thus, two negative familial developments preceded two major turning points in Miller’s extremist history: the breakdown of his marriage before he started the CKKKK and his father’s rejection before he went underground. Both events, however, paled in comparison with the loss of two sons with his youngest son dying in a car accident in 1998 and another son dying after police shot him when he shot on them after killing a motorist in 2008; and yet, neither of those events were followed by any major turning points in Miller’s engagement in the white supremacist movement. Miller simply continued his routine involvement with the movement, including producing hate literature, posting on extremist forums, and occasionally campaigning for public office. At the time of the shooting, Miller and his wife were still together, though he was estranged from his eldest surviving son. As Miller failed to discuss much of his life prior to his involvement in the white supremacist movement, it remains unclear what his peer group was like before then. Miller, however, seemed strongly attached to fellow extremists he met once he became actively involved in white supremacist organizations. In the years before the shooting, Miller communicated with, and solicited donations for, incarcerated extremists, including Matthew Hale, Joseph Paul Franklin, and Craig Cobb. At the same time, Miller faced rejection from peers within the white supremacist movement. Miller later achieved infamy as a “race traitor” when he turned informant and testified against fellow white supremacists in the 1980s. While Miller did have supporters on extremist forums, some users frequently smeared Miller for his betrayal of the movement. By the time Miller finally went on his 2014 shooting spree, he had spent years fending off criticism within white supremacist circles. This, in combination with his diagnosis of emphysema right before the shooting, may have spurred Miller to action.

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Commitment and Involvement Prior to Smith’s involvement with far-right extremism, he did not seem to experience any individual failures at prosocial activities. He graduated from high school in 1996, where he reportedly had average grades. Though unemployed, Smith was a college student with a trust fund from his family. When Smith started searching for extremist material, he was a B-average student and involved with several liberal campus organizations in his freshman year. Smith, however, left many of the organizations he joined due to his paranoid suspicions of the other group members as he began pursuing his interest in white supremacism. Due to his persistent violent and criminal activity, Smith withdrew from his first college to avoid expulsion before enrolling at another college in spring 1998. At both colleges, Smith repeatedly switched his major before reportedly selecting criminal justice, so he could prepare to attend law school. Smith desired to become a lawyer; however, he may have believed such a goal to be unattainable after Hale’s attempt to get his law license failed because of his extremist beliefs and activities. Roof experienced several individual failures in prosocial activities, including school, employment, and friendships. Reports described Roof as a “transient student” as his family repeatedly moved throughout his childhood. He apparently started having trouble in school by fifth grade and dropped out in 2010 after failing the ninth grade twice. After Roof dropped out of school, his family worried about his aimlessness as he played video games and used drugs. One of his uncles recalled talking to Roof ’s mother about his concerns about Roof, commenting “I said he was like 19 years old, he still didn’t have a job, a driver’s license or anything like that and he just stayed in his room a lot of the time.” Eventually, Roof obtained a landscaping job, but only at his father’s urging. According to his coworkers, Roof isolated himself at work and alienated his coworkers with his demeanor. Not long before the shooting, Roof quit his job without telling his parents as they pressured him to have a job. Despite his resistance to having a job, Roof did once tell a coworker that he wanted to work as a clerk or in retail, but that no one would hire him due to the way he looked. Roof made efforts to socialize offline with other extremists, but these pursuits also failed.

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After graduating college and serving in the Navy during World War II, Von Brunn’s employment history proved rather inconsistent. He repeatedly failed in careers in advertising and real estate and often attributed these failures to discrimination against him because of his German heritage and blamed Jewish people for his failures. After his difficulties working in real estate, von Brunn moved his family to California in the 1970s, so he could work with Noontide Press and other efforts in publishing far-right texts. After leaving prison in 1989 after serving sixand-a-half years of an 11-year sentence for the Federal Reserve attack, he supported himself by distributing racist newspapers, but he was largely living on Social Security before the shooting. A fellow white separatist and friend of von Brunn relayed that von Brunn “said his Social Security had been cut and that he was barely making it…He felt it was the direct result of someone in Washington looking at his Web site” with his white supremacist views. Prior to his radicalization, Miller did not appear to fail at any prosocial activities. Miller served in the U.S. Army for 20 years, reaching the rank of master sergeant. Miller’s military record included two tours in Vietnam during the Vietnam War and thirteen years in the Green Berets. In 1979, the U.S. Army reportedly forced Miller to retire due to his extremist involvement. Nevertheless, Miller did not seem to react angrily about his retirement. Instead, he largely spoke of the benefit of his retirement pay and his schooling through the G.I. Bill, though he never finished his degree. His retirement also allowed him to devote his energy to his extremist activities. While Miller did not appear to experience many failures in prosocial activities, Miller did endure many failures in his extremist activities. Miller experienced early difficulties in his recruiting efforts for the NSPA. The failures and decline of the NSPA, combined with Miller’s wife leaving him, led to Miller’s decision to start his own racist organization, the CKKKK. A succession of failures pushed Miller to his most extremist act to date when he went underground and declared war on Jews and the U.S. government in 1987. Such failures included his court-ordered exile from his White Patriot Party and his inability to recruit anyone to his short-lived Southern Patriot Party, both of which coincided with his father objecting to Miller moving his family to his farm in South Carolina. Miller himself recalled the depression he

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experienced in response to such rejection and failures that made him feel as if his “whole world had fallen apart.” While Miller had a career in trucking after his release from prison in 1990, he was retired at the time of the shooting.

Belief In addition to records of substance abuse, all four perpetrators had criminal records before carrying out their shooting attacks, but only Smith had a record before his radicalization. Except for Roof, all of the perpetrators’ records show violent offenses, as well as contact with law enforcement because of their extremist activities. Roof had a limited criminal record, experiencing three encounters with law enforcement in the months leading up to the shooting. One contact ended in a misdemeanor drug possession arrest in February 2015, another resulted in no charges for possessing gun parts the following month, and another ended in arrest for trespassing the next month. In addition to the arrest for possession of the opioid Suboxone, Roof had a history of substance abuse, frequently binge-drinking and using drugs in the months before the shooting. With a criminal history dating back to high school, Smith engaged in numerous violent and non-violent offenses as well as drug offenses. While in college, Smith violently assaulted his girlfriend in October 1997 and harassed her until she requested an order of protection. After this incident, Smith’s friendships with his fellow classmates ended and he openly engaged in white supremacist activities on campus. Smith also repeatedly had contact with law enforcement for his extremist activities (e.g., leafletting, distributing racist literature) in 1998 and 1999. By von Brunn’s own account, he repeatedly got into physical and alcohol-fueled altercations throughout his life, serving a short jail sentence for DUI and assault in 1968. Though his second wife accused him of physical abuse, it does not appear this abuse ever came to the attention of law enforcement. In his first act of violent extremism, von Brunn attempted to carry out a “citizen’s arrest” of the Federal Reserve Board in 1981 and received a prison sentence after being convicted of

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attempted kidnapping. Prior to the shooting, von Brunn was possibly involved in harassing a Jewish community with anti-Semitic leaflets. He also had child pornography on his computer at the time of his arrest for the shooting. Miller had a substantial criminal history along with a host of legal troubles. In addition to a number of alcohol-related offenses, Miller engaged in numerous instances of hate violence, for which he never received any prison sentences (including possible involvement in an antigay triple murder in 1987). Miller also received money from the terrorist group, The Order, in 1984. As he started his own white supremacist groups, he faced a civil lawsuit from the Southern Poverty Law Center, which ultimately led to a 1986 contempt of court conviction for failing to abide by the terms of the civil case. He soon went underground and declared war on the U.S. government. Authorities later arrested Miller for these actions and he received a short prison sentence in exchange for testimony against fellow white supremacists charged with sedition. Afterward, he would enter the Federal Witness Protection program as a part of his plea bargain.

Social Learning and Pathways to White Supremacist Violence Exposure to Extremist Ideology Predictably, offline pathways were integral for the older perpetrators’ entry into white supremacist movements. Both perpetrators credited a friend or family member with introducing them to extremist literature. Though an admitted anti-Semite before he engaged with extremist material, von Brunn claimed that Lieutenant General Pedro del Valle gave him John O. Beaty’s The Iron Curtain Over America in 1964. Von Brunn wrote that “For the first time I learned how JEWS had destroyed Europe and were now destroying America.” Miller similarly credited his father with exposing him to anti-Semitism and radical ideology and that his father shared a copy of the racist newspaper, The Thunderbolt, with him. Recalling his first experience reading The Thunderbolt, Miller said that

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“I’ve been obsessed ever since 1974 when I became Jew-wise…When I read that thing, my hair stood up, my neck turned red, and I knew I had found a home.” Smith and Roof were both exposed to extremist ideas before their online engagement, Smith through well-known white supremacist texts (e.g., The Turner Diaries) and Roof through his father who spoke of preparing for a race war. Both perpetrators, however, credited the Internet with solidifying their adherence to white supremacist ideology. In an interview, Smith recalled that “It wasn’t really ‘til I got on the Internet, read some literature of these groups that … it really all came together…It’s a slow, gradual process to become racially conscious.” In his manifesto, Roof chronicled his exposure to online extremist material, which started with the Council of Conservative Citizens website which he found through Google. Since encountering the site, Roof claimed, “I have never been the same since that day.” He soon found his way to neo-Nazi websites, specifically Stormfront and The Daily Stormer.

Beginning of Extremist Participation Once again, the older perpetrators needed to pursue offline avenues to participate in the larger white supremacist movement. After failing in his real estate career, von Brunn decided to travel West to join Noontide Press and other far-right publishers in the 1970s. He claimed that General del Valle and John Beaty’s widow helped him get a job at Noontide Press, where von Brunn worked to distribute the racist newspaper, The Spotlight. He soon quarreled with its founder, the well-known farrightist Willis Carto, which led to his termination. He later worked with other extremists to publish anti-Semitic texts, which he would deliver to his neighbors’ homes. When they moved back East, his wife recalled that von Brunn was often away from home, visiting fellow white supremacists. Miller’s long career in the white supremacist movement began in 1974 with his membership in the National States Rights Party (NSRP) and later, the National Socialist Party of America (NSPA). Miller’s involvement in both groups included attending meetings, distributing literature,

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and donating to the groups. During this time, Miller engaged with more extremist texts, such as Mein Kampf, William Gayle Simpson’s Which Way Western Man, Wilmot Robertson’s Dispossessed Majority, William Pierce’s National Vanguard magazine, and The Turner Diaries. After growing disheartened by both groups’ failure to expand, Miller quit the NSPA and worked to start his own organization, the CKKKK (later the WPP) in 1982. In addition to frequently communicating with news media, Miller ran for the North Carolina State Senate that year in the first of many failed political campaigns, posting campaign posters that proclaimed “VOTE WHITE” with a picture of the Klan and advertising for the CKKKK. Miller also began connecting with other white supremacist leaders, such as David Duke. After engaging with far-right materials both online and offline, Smith began to actively participate in the white supremacist movement. In addition to unsuccessfully attempting to form an on-campus white supremacist group in fall 1997, he began posting white supremacist flyers and leaving booklets with Nazi imagery around campus. He also joined extremists in his hometown to continue leafletting. His extremist activities at his new college garnered media attention as he continued his leafletting efforts and made another unsuccessful attempt at forming a White Nationalist Party on campus. Smith eventually saw WCOTC stickers on campus and sent the media coverage of his extremist activities to their “World Headquarters” and soon met with WCOTC leader, Matthew Hale. After failed attempts at starting his own organizations, Smith finally found his place, joining the WCOTC as a “Brother” in June 1998. Throughout his time in the WCOTC, Smith gained prominence and recognition within the organization and became very close with Hale. While the other three perpetrators’ entry into radical participation largely involved offline associations, Roof ’s radical participation was entirely Internet-based. After his initial exposure to white supremacist ideology on the Internet, Roof began to use the Internet in attempts to engage with other extremists in 2014. Roof started accounts on the neo-Nazi websites, The Daily Stormer and Stormfront , where he posted about his racist beliefs and admired skinhead leaders for their efforts. In addition to his posts on these sites, Roof made several attempts

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to meet other site members. Roof also posted a Craigslist advertisement in February 2015, requesting companions for his historical tour of Charleston (which he ultimately appeared to do alone). He qualified his request with “no Jews, queers, or [N-words].” That same month, Roof started his own racist website entitled LastRhodesian.com, where he posted pictures with white supremacist symbols as well as his manifesto, detailing his ideological beliefs prior to his attack.

Commission of Extremist Violence Both older perpetrators had a long history of involvement in far-right extremism, but they also both engaged in failed attempts to enact extremist violence before their shooting attacks. In 1981, an armed von Brunn went to the Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC in an attempt to do a citizen’s arrest of Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker, and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, crimes for which he eventually went to prison. In the years between his 1989 release from prison and the 2009 shooting, von Brunn continued to participate in far-right extremist activities, attending meetings, distributing literature, and associating with high-profile extremists. He reportedly lived with Stan Hess, a white supremacist and 9/11 conspiracy theorist, and was recognized by Holocaust deniers Jack Wikoff and Ernst Zundel for his activities. Importantly, Von Brunn used the Internet to make connections with fellow extremists through email and posts on other sites. He ran his own website, holywesternempire.org, where he posted autobiographical and extremist screeds. On June 10, 2009, the 88-year-old von Brunn walked into the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, shooting and killing a Black police officer as he held the door open. After the shooting, reports showed that von Brunn’s email communications foreshadowed the shooting as “one of his e-mail blasts expressing his white supremacist views…told readers that they shouldn’t expect to hear from him again… The e-mails were getting violent in tone: ‘It’s time to kill all the Jews’” (Fear & Fisher, 2009, p. A1). Von Brunn also left a notebook in his car that contained an anti-Semitic rant.

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Throughout Miller’s career in white supremacist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s, he allegedly engaged in a variety of illegal activities, including intimidating Black people, stockpiling illegal weapons, plotting to assassinate Morris Dees, and accepting money from and helping members of The Order. After a civil suit against Miller and the CKKKK, Miller faced contempt of court charges for violating the consent agreement forbidding paramilitary activity related to the operation of the WPP. Miller decided to go underground in a war against the U.S. federal government and Jewish people in March 1987. After his release from prison in 1990, Miller refrained from open extremist participation while he was in witness protection. In 1999, however, he reemerged and published his autobiography, detailing his extremist beliefs. By the early 2000s, Miller got involved again in white supremacist circles, attending rallies as well as publishing and distributing hate literature. Just as he had done in the 1970s and 1980s, Miller continued to bring his white supremacist rhetoric to the mainstream, including congressional campaigns, media appearances, and writing to newspapers. Miller was also very active on the Internet, even developing his own website, WHTY.org, where he posted his autobiography and other white supremacist materials. Miller maintained an active presence on the Vanguard News Network (VNN), a white supremacist news site and web forum, where he made over 12,000 posts over ten years. On April 13, 2014, Miller shot and killed three people at a Jewish community center as well as a Jewish retirement home in Overland Park, Kansas. In the days before the shooting, Miller called a Jewish charity hotline, yelling at a Manhattan rabbi about “getting rid of every Jew.” In interviews after the shooting, Miller revealed he was diagnosed with emphysema the month before the shooting, remarking “I was convinced I was dying then…I wanted to make damned sure I killed some Jews or attacked the Jews before I died.” From almost the start of Smith’s participation in far-right extremism, he had attempted to spread the word on white supremacy, posting racist literature from leaflets and longer booklets to his own writings. Except for a couple known stops and an arrest, Smith rarely faced any legal consequences for his leafleting activities. Since before his first flirtations with white supremacism, Smith privately and publicly expressed

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an affinity for violence in both his personal relationships and his ideological beliefs. Smith also reportedly expressed a desire to be a martyr in the coming race war. Hale’s rejection from the Illinois state bar likely spurred Smith to finally take violent action. Beginning July 2 through July 4, 1999, Smith executed a series of shootings across Illinois and Indiana, targeting Jewish, Black, and Asian bystanders. Like von Brunn, Smith left behind a notebook with anti-Semitic writings. While hanging out with his friends, Roof began openly sharing his racist views and violent plans, even telling them his desires for a race war and to do something “crazy.” There is no evidence that Roof posted anything online, openly indicating the need to use violence to further his ideology, in the months before the Charleston attack. While most of Roof ’s forum posts are not very extremist, his last post on Stormfront in February 2015 does praise a skinhead leader for “doing something.” The day of the Charleston attack marked the first time Roof made posts openly advocating for violence in pursuit of white supremacist ideology. Roof called for taking action several times throughout the manifesto he posted right before the shooting. On June 17, 2015, Roof carried out a racist shooting spree, killing nine congregants at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.

Conclusion The four case studies provide support for a hybrid social control-social learning perspective in explaining the radicalization to white supremacist violence. The case studies showed that all four perpetrators either possessed weakened social bonds at the start of their radicalization or experienced a deterioration of such bonds as they became more radical. At the start of their radicalization, both Smith and Roof lacked important emotional attachments as they appeared distant from their families. While Smith alienated his friends with his increasingly violent behavior, Roof did not appear to have any friends. On the other hand, Smith went on to foster connections with other extremists and rise through the ranks of the WCOTC. Importantly, the impetus for his attack appeared to largely stem from a deep-seated attachment to Matthew Hale as he

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committed his spree after Hale was denied his law license. While Miller’s attachment to his wife and family deteriorated as he became more radical, von Brunn’s extremism led to the breakdown of two marriages. Both eventually only closely associated with fellow extremist peers while they alienated acquaintances with their extremist rantings. Two of the perpetrators had romantic partners when they carried out their shooting and both perpetrators’ partners facilitated their extremist involvement to some extent. Smith dated a fellow WCOTC member; thus, it appears safe to assume that she must have been supportive of his extremist beliefs. As Miller became more involved in extremist organizations, his wife seemed supportive, even joining him at meetings and helping him run his own organizations; however, they did divorce at one point over Miller’s involvement before reuniting. While his wife supported and aided Miller in his extremist endeavors, Miller’s eldest son reported that his mother did not share Miller’s extremist beliefs. Regardless of her true ideological orientation, Miller’s wife influenced his radicalization in that she enabled it in her support of him. Further, the initial breakdown of their marriage pushed him to further radicalize and become a leader of his own racist organization. Another striking commonality between the four perpetrators is their relative aimlessness with regard to their careers and/or education. Roof, a largely unemployed high school dropout, spent most of his time refraining from any prosocial involvement. Von Brunn bounced between jobs, often failing at various career pursuits. Though Miller had a long military career and the benefits of the G.I. Bill, he did not appear committed to pursuing a college degree after his forced retirement. Despite attending classes at a technical college for a few years, he devoted most of his time to extremist activities while relying on his pension and benefits to support his family. Coming from a wealthy family, Smith similarly appeared indifferent to his future at college. Along with repeated criminal and disciplinary issues at his first college and his focus on extremist activities, Smith repeatedly changed his major at both colleges he attended, indicating an indecisiveness about his future career until he settled on pursuing law school. Hale’s failure to obtain a law license likely influenced Smith’s perceptions as to whether he could successfully become a lawyer as well. Thus, all four men not only lacked

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commitment to prosocial activities but had the free time to devote to further radical participation. They also had little to lose by the time they committed their shootings. Both von Brunn and Miller were elderly retirees while Smith had bleak career prospects and Roof was decidedly rootless. As for criminal histories, Smith was the only perpetrator with a criminal record before his radicalization while the other three perpetrators started to have run-ins with the law after their radicalization. In addition to several contacts with police over his white supremacist leafletting, Smith’s record of violence became increasingly worse as he radicalized. While von Brunn’s and Roof ’s encounters with law enforcement occurred after they had radicalized, evidence demonstrates that they engaged in deviant behaviors long beforehand as von Brunn admitted to a history of physical altercations and Roof claimed to have started abusing drugs from an early age. Overall, it appears that as these perpetrators became more radical in their white supremacist beliefs, they experienced a diminished sense of belief in conventional morality as they had increasingly frequent encounters with law enforcement. Further, von Brunn and Miller both previously attempted, and served prison time for, ideologically motivated attacks against the government in the 1980s. The fact that all of these perpetrators had criminal records before their shooting attacks complements prior work showing that most perpetrators of ideologically motivated violence by far-rightists have prior criminal histories (Gruenewald et al., 2013). As previously stated by Mills et al. (2021), “although only a small percent of all extremists ever carry out terrorist attacks, it may be that those with prior criminal justice involvement are more likely to carry out such attacks, with the nature of their involvement and their perceptions of it influencing their behavior” (p. 723). The Internet also served an important function for each perpetrator’s radicalization. While the younger perpetrators were drawn further into extremism through the Internet, the older perpetrators relied on the Internet to reengage with white supremacist movements. Both von Brunn and Miller had long careers in violent extremism before the onset of widespread use of the Internet; however, they each used the Internet to resume their involvement with white supremacist movements after

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being inactive in such movements after their failed attempts to carry out attacks against the government. Despite their advanced age, von Brunn and Miller both created and maintained their own white supremacist websites, posting their autobiographical and white supremacist writings. Roof similarly posted a website where he would upload the justification for his attack. As Smith’s Internet activity took place in the 1990s, he used the Internet as more of a point of exposure to white supremacist ideology. The later three cases evidence a pattern of greater use of the Internet to not only participate in white supremacist spheres, but post justifications for extremist violence. Finally, interesting parallels emerge between the two older perpetrators, both military veterans with storied careers in white supremacist activities. As previously stated, offline pathways proved essential for von Brunn and Miller given the time of their radicalization. After initial referrals to extremist texts (by Miller’s father and von Brunn’s friend), both sought out more literature and eventually joined extremist organizations. When they were both younger men, they executed failed attempts in their actions against the government after upheavals in their personal lives and their bonds further weakened. While von Brunn experienced multiple failed marriages and career endeavors, Miller grew depressed by his legal troubles, his failing movement organizing, and his family’s disapproval. Both perpetrators resumed their engagement in extremist circles after their release from prison for their respective crimes, though Miller faced recrimination from movement peers for testifying against fellow white supremacists. While both men largely limited their extremist activities to legal avenues after release from prison, both responded to personal upheavals late in life with anti-Semitic violence. In addition to his estranged son’s death the previous year and alleged problems with his Social Security, von Brunn alienated his other son to the point that his son moved out of the state, forcing von Brunn to find a new home. Miller similarly had little in the way of familial attachments. Though he and his wife were still together, two of his sons had died and he was estranged from his eldest surviving son. Miller himself pointed to an emphysema diagnosis as the catalyst for carrying out his attack. This highlights the growing threat of aging violent extremists, who may seek to, as von Brunn would say, “go out with [their] boots on.”

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Similar to Mills et al.’s (2021) analysis, this study adds further support for the use of an integrated social control-social learning model in explaining radicalization. While the foregoing analysis focuses on this model, patterns emerge across the case studies that also appear to provide support for a strain perspective of white supremacist violence. Agnew’s (2010) general strain theory specifies three forms of strain, specifically the introduction of negative stimuli, the loss of positive influences, and goal blockage. Arguably, all of the perpetrators experienced all of these strains prior to radicalization as well as before their commission of white supremacist violence. For example, all four perpetrators lost important familial or platonic relationships as they radicalized (i.e., Smith’s loss of a diverse, left-leaning peer group after he assaulted his girlfriend). As for negative life events, Miller’s emphysema diagnosis and von Brunn’s loss of housing immediately preceded their anti-Semitic attacks. As for goal blockage, Roof carried out his shooting after failing to establish personal connections with fellow white supremacists “in real life” while Smith likely viewed Hale’s inability to obtain a law license as evidence that he would similarly fail in his own pursuit of a law career. Lastly, Agnew’s (2010) general strain theory argues that people with negative emotionality, experiencing negative emotions such as anger, frustration, shame, or hopelessness, are less able to cope with strain. He argues that alienated persons with such traits and an attitude that they have little to lose may be more likely to engage in terrorism as a method of solving their problems (p. 146). Overall, the four perpetrators emerge as four “angry white men” (Kimmel, 2017), unable to cope with varying strains. Future research thus should further test an integrated social controlsocial learning framework as well as other criminological theoretical models, including general strain theory, to explain radicalization to white supremacist violence.

Appendix A: Case-Study Template • Overview • Birth and Family • Education and Work

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Friends Mental Health Military Experience Criminal History and Legal Troubles Prison

Q1: What are the similarities and differences in the entry process into violent political extremism (VPE), violent targeted extremism (VTE), and non-violent political extremism (NVPE)? • Describe the individual’s entry into the extremist movement and/or radicalization process 1. Exposure to radical ideology • Was there a noticeable change in socialization before and after their interest in extremist ideology/materials? 2. Entry into a radical organization or beginning of radical participation • Was there a noticeable change in socialization before and after their joining of an extremist group/movement (if they did so)? • Was there a noticeable change in online usage/engagement before and after their joining of an extremist group/movement (if they did so)? 3. And the commission of an actual criminal/radical act • Was there a noticeable change in online usage/engagement before and after their interest in VPE, VTE, or NVPE? • What were the sources as the source of their exposure to extremist ideology and what seemed to be most important and why? • Was there an initial push into a search for extremist materials or ideology? 1. Negative social interaction with peer group? 2. Negative familial development (divorce, death of parent, etc.)? 3. Individual failure at any prosocial activity (sports, employment, school)? • Was there an initial pull into searching for extremist materials or ideology?

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– Contact with a recruiter – Contact with someone else who was interested in extremist ideology Was this individual a friend, family member, or someone else? Q2: For VPE, VTE, and NVPE what role does socializing with other radicals or extremists offline as opposed to attachment to prosocial sources offline have in shaping or preventing the radicalization? 1. Do they socialize frequently with other peers? (a) Is this primarily online or offline? 2. Do they socialize frequently with others who are in extremist movements? (a) Is this primarily online or offline? Q3: For VPE, VTE, and NVPE what role does socializing with other radicals or extremists online as opposed to attachment to prosocial sources online have in shaping or preventing the radicalization process? In particular, is it possible that offenders are very strongly attached to parents, peers, or religious leaders but are further radicalized rather than controlled by these attachments (as argued by learning theories)? • Is the individual strongly attached with their parents/grandparents? • Is the individual strongly attached with other family members? • Is the individual married prior to joining an extremist movement/radicalizing? • Is the individual strongly attached with religious groups or leaders? • Do the religious groups or leaders share an extremist ideology? • Is the individual strongly attached to peers (i.e., do they have a strong peer group)? – Is the preponderance of individuals in this peer group involved in delinquent activities? To what extent of seriousness were these activities (i.e., mostly misdemeanors or felonies)?

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– Are any of the individuals in this peer group also interested in extremist ideology? – Are any of these individuals in this peer group also involved in extremist activity?

Works Cited Agnew, R. (2010). A general strain theory of terrorism. Theoretical Criminology, 14 (2), 131–153. Akers, R. L. (1998). Social learning and social structure: A general theory of crime and deviance. Northeastern University Press. Akers, R. L., & Silverman, A. (2004). Toward a social learning model of violence and terrorism. In M. A. Zahn, H. H. Brownstein, and S. L. Jackson (Eds.), Violence: From theory to research (pp. 19–35). Lexis-Nexis Anderson. Akins, J. K., & Winfree Jr., L. T. (2016). Social learning theory and becoming a terrorist: New challenges for a general theory. In J. D. Freilich & G. LaFree (Eds.), The handbook of the criminology of terrorism. Wiley. https://doi.org/ 10.1002/9781118923986 Freilich, J. D., Adamczyk, A., Chermak, S. M., Boyd, K. A., & Parkin, W. S. (2015). Investigating the applicability of macro-level criminology theory to terrorism: A county-level analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 31(3), 383–411. Fears, D., & Fisher, M. (2009, June). A suspect’s long history of hate, and signs of strain. The Washington Post, p. A01. Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., Belli, R., Gruenewald, J., & Parkin, W. S. (2014). Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). Terrorism and Political Violence, 26 (2), 372–384. Freilich, J. D., & LaFree, G. (2015). Criminology theory and terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27 , 1–8. Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S., & Freilich, J. D. (2013). Distinguishing “loner” attacks from other domestic extremist violence: A comparison of far-right homicide incident and offender characteristics. Criminology & Public Policy, 12(1), 65–91. Hamm, M. S. (2007). Terrorism as crime: From the Order to Al-Qaeda and beyond. New York University Press.

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Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. University of California Press. Jensen, M. A., & LaFree, G. (2016). Final report: Empirical assessment of domestic radicalization (EADR). U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 250481.pdf LaFree, G., & Dugan, L. (2004). How does studying terrorism compare to studying crime? Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, 5, 53–74. Kimmel, M. (2017). Angry white men: American masculinity at the end of an era. Nation Books. Johnson, A. (2017, February). Psychologist tried to intervene with S.C. church gunman Dylann Roof. NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews. com/news/us-news/psychologist-tried-intervene-s-c-church-gunman-dyl ann-roof-n716256 LaFree, G., Jensen, M. A., James, P. A., & Safer-Lichtenstein, A. (2018). Correlates of violent political extremism in the United States. Criminology, 56 (2), 233–268. Mills, C. E., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. M. (2017). Extreme hatred: Revisiting the hate crime and terrorism relationship to determine whether they are “close cousins” or “distant relatives”. Crime & Delinquency, 63(10), 1191–1223. Mills, C. E., Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., Holt, T. J., & LaFree, G. (2021). Social learning and social control in the off-and online pathways to hate crime and terrorist violence. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44 (9), 701– 729. Parkin, W. S., Mills, C. E., & Gruenewald, J. (2021). Far-right extremism’s threat to police safety and the organizational legitimacy of law enforcement in the United States. Journal of Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society, 22(2), 1–24. Rosenfeld, R. (2004). Terrorism and criminology. Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, 5, 19–32. Shecory, M., & Laufer, A. (2008). Social control theory and the connection with ideological offenders among Israeli youth during the Gaza disengagement period. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 52(4), 454–473. Simi, P. (2010). Why study white supremacist terror? A research note. Deviant Behavior, 31(3), 251–273. Sutherland, E. H. (1947/1974). Criminology (9th ed.) Lippincott. Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches (Vol. 46). Sage.

14 Right-Wing Extremists’ Use of the Internet: Emerging Trends in the Empirical Literature Ryan Scrivens, Tiana Gaudette, Maura Conway, and Thomas J. Holt

Introduction Close attention by journalists and policymakers to the widespread use of the Internet by violent Western (i.e., American, Canadian, Australian, and European)1 right-wing extremists (RWEs)2 and terrorists is relatively 1 It is worth noting here that there are large and growing RWE constituencies outside of the West, including in, for example, Brazil, India, and the Philippines, that also have substantial online presences and that insufficient attention has been paid to by researchers to-date. However, notable exceptions include a recent examination of Islamophobic sentiment expressed by farright Indian diaspora supporters on Twitter (see Leidig 2019). 2 Following Berger (2018a), we take the view that RWEs—like all extremists—structure their beliefs on the basis that the success and survival of the in-group are inseparable from the

R. Scrivens (B) · T. Gaudette · T. J. Holt Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. Conway Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland Swansea University, Swansea, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_14

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recent (Campion 2019; Perry and Scrivens 2019; Futrell and Simi 2017). It was a reaction, at least in part, to an eruption of hateful content online in 2015 and 2016, which arose out of the United States (U.S.) presidential campaign and subsequent election of President Trump, the Brexit referendum, a spate of Islamic State (IS)-inspired or directed terrorist attacks, and the arrival of large numbers of refugees to Europe from wartorn Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Conway et al. 2019). RWEs sought to capitalize on the fear and anger generated by the terrorist attacks as well as the refugee crisis and the elation generated by the U.K.’s vote to leave the European Union (E.U.) and Donald Trump’s election as the U.S. President to increase its political power and recruit new followers, including via the Internet. They were aided in their efforts by foreign influence campaigns spreading disinformation on many of the same talking points (Berger 2018b). In 2017, more focused attention was drawn to the role of the Internet in RWE activity in the wake of events at the mid-August ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, U.S. Concerns about the political fallout of online extreme right activity, including disinformation and radicalization, continued to receive attention throughout 2018—at least partially due to a series of attacks and failed attacks in the U.S. that appeared to have significant online components (Conway et al. 2019).3 The Christchurch terrorist attack on March 15, 2019, mainstreamed these concerns. The New Zealand mosque attack, in which 51 people died, was peculiarly Internetcentric, including a pre-planned online manifesto distribution strategy and Facebook Live video stream, which has ensured that the threat posed by contemporary RWE online activity is now under greater scrutiny than ever before. The April 2019 Poway synagogue attack, the August 2019 El

negative acts of an out-group and, in turn, they are willing to assume both an offensive and defensive stance in the name of the success and survival of the in-group. We thus conceptualize Western right-wing extremism as a racially, ethnically, and/or sexually defined nationalism, which is typically framed in terms of white power and/or white identity (i.e., the in-group) that is grounded in xenophobic and exclusionary understandings of the perceived threats posed by some combination of non-whites, Jews, Muslims, immigrants, refugees, members of the LGBTQI + community, and feminists (i.e., the out-group(s)) (Conway et al. 2019). 3 These included the U.S. mail bomb scare, the shooting dead of two African-Americans in a Kentucky supermarket, and the Pittsburgh synagogue attack, all of which took place within days of each other in October 2018.

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Paso Walmart shooting, the October 2019 Halle shootings, and a series of similar attacks drew more attention to the role of the Internet in RWE activity (Conway et al. 2019). Most recently, the spread of COVID19 misinformation among QAnon supporters online (see Amarasingam and Argentino 2020) and the planning of the Jan. 6 Capitol Riot by RWEs in various online channels (see Hughes and Miller-Idriss 2021) only furthered the visibility of RWEs on and offline. Yet the RWE-Internet nexus has a much lengthier history than this, and so too does the empirical research on RWEs’ use of the Internet. In fact, research suggests that RWEs were some of the very first users to engage in online politics and were the earliest adopters of Internet technology for violent extremist purposes (see Daniels 2009).4 In this chapter, we highlight the emerging trends in the literature in this regard, organizing the research into five core terrorist and extremist uses of the Internet identified by Conway (2006): information provision, networking, recruitment, financing, and information gathering. Highlighted throughout this chapter are key gaps in the empirical literature and suggestions for progressing research. By no means, however, does this chapter include every study on or trend in RWEs’ use of the Internet, nor do we examine the theoretical or methodological obstacles present when researching RWEs’ use of the Internet (see Ashe et al. 2020 for a detailed discussion on theories, methods, and practices of researching the extreme right). Instead, we focus on what we view as key current and emerging trends in the empirical literature on RWEs’ use of the Internet and associated technologies.

Information Provision Researchers have found that violent extremists and terrorists, including those with extreme right views, have been undeniably quick to adopt and use every emerging online platform at their disposal to spread

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They too have been early adopters of various ‘traditional’ media tools, from print to digital, to mark territory, intimidate some audiences, connect with other (sympathetic) audiences, radicalize, and even recruit (see Scrivens and Conway 2019).

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propaganda and further their movements’ objectives (see Scrivens and Conway 2019). Research suggests that the advent of the Internet has provided RWEs with a medium via which they can disseminate their rhetoric relatively unimpeded to a larger audience than ever before, and through any combination of online communication outlets, ranging from spreading hate propaganda using explicitly extremist (Hale 2012) and ‘cloaked’ websites (i.e., sites that conceal authorship to intentionally hide political agenda) (Daniels 2009), to sharing disinformation via video communications to radicalize, mobilize, and strengthen activism (Davey and Ebner 2017), to utilizing cyberspace as a platform to attack computer systems to spread hateful propaganda (Holt and Bolden 2014), to engaging in ‘psychological warfare’ or ‘cyberfear’ by uploading manifestos prior to acts of violence (Ware 2020). Here empirical research on the spread of online RWE propaganda has largely focused on propaganda found on websites and online discussion forums, oftentimes differentiating between content aimed at ‘insiders’ versus that aimed at ‘outsiders’ (see Wong et al. 2015). In an effort to generate new empirical knowledge on online RWE propaganda, however, a growing emphasis has been placed on how a newer generation of RWE adherents are using (1) mainstream social media platforms and (2) lesser-known and/or so-called dark social platforms to spread propaganda (Conway et al. 2019). A growing body of literature is taking shape on how RWE propaganda via social media platforms enters into the mainstream in on and offline environments. At present, evidence suggests it is the result of the rising popularity in far-right politics and ideologies in the Western world, as well as the role of conspiracies in helping to move these messages (Davey and Ebner 2019). While researchers acknowledge that the racist ‘old guard’ continues to maintain its presence in traditional online spaces (e.g., web-forums), a major focus in recent literature is on how a newer generation of adherents—though not unfamiliar with websites and online forums—are using digital platforms that they are more familiar with, including Twitter (Berger 2018b; Graham 2016) Facebook (Hutchinson et al. 2021; Scrivens and Amarasingam 2020; Stier et al. 2017), and YouTube (Ekman 2014; O’Callaghan et al. 2015). There has been comparatively less researcher attention directed at RWEs on Facebook as compared to Twitter, due at least in part to

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the much more public nature of Twitter than Facebook (Conway et al. 2019). This is slowly changing albeit in a post-Cambridge Analytica context in which researcher access to Facebook data is getting more difficult (Freelon 2018). The vast majority of all research into RWEs on Facebook is therefore focused on RWE groups’ and movements’ public Facebook pages, including the Facebook activity of Britain First (Nouri and Lorenzo-Duz 2019), Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) (Stier et al. 2017), Soldiers of Odin (Ekman 2018), or various group pages (Hutchinson et al. 2021; Scrivens and Amarasingam 2020). Similarly, research on RWE propaganda found on YouTube, a platform described by some as ‘a radicalization machine for the far right’ (Lewis 2018), is almost exclusively focused on individual users as the main protagonists in RWE cyberspaces (Conway et al. 2019). Fortunately, there is some empirical work on how YouTube’s recommender system facilitates the spread of RWE content. O’Callaghan and colleagues (2015), for example, showed that users accessing English- and German-language RWE YouTube videos were very likely to be recommended further RWE content within the same category or related RWE content from a different category, but unlikely to be presented with nonRWE content. Research conducted by Reed and colleagues (2019) had very similar findings, again drawing attention to the way in which ‘the immersion of some users in YouTube’s ER [extreme right] spaces is a coproduction between the content generated by users and the affordances of YouTube’s recommender system’ (O’Callaghan et al. 2015). Regarding lesser-known and/or so-called dark social platforms, some empirical work is examining some of these more fringe spaces and the type of RWE content they are hosting. This content often takes a visual form, and its increased appearance in ‘dark social’ spaces is due, at least in part, to increased takedowns of RWE content by major platforms (for more on takedown efforts of RWE content, see Conway et al. 2019). The fringe platforms trafficked by RWEs are of broadly two sorts: first, dedicated RWE platforms and, second, general platforms with dedicated RWE boards or boards that have been colonized by RWEs. Gab is currently the most prominent platform fitting the first category. Its founder, Andrew Torba, established it in 2016 in direct response to the

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ejecting by major social media platforms of high-profile RWE figures. By the end of 2018, it had approximately 450,000 users that had posted approximately 30 million comments (Phillips et al. 2018). Unlike Gab, Reddit (established in 2005) was not established for the purpose of forwarding right-wing extremism. Similar to Twitter, it currently has around 330 million pseudonymous monthly active users5 and is routinely in the top ten 20 most-visited sites globally.6 Several far- and alt-right related subreddits7 have also been established or greatly expanded in size in recent years, with many of them dedicated either explicitly or tacitly to a wide variety of hatreds and conspiracies. An example of one such RWE subreddit is the now banned r/The_Donald, a once popular pro-Trump space, which researchers found facilitated extreme right-wing identity work (see Gaudette et al. 2020b). A similarly structured website called 4chan was established in 2003 as an image and discussion board with heavy emphasis on Japanese anime and manga. Today, it hosts 70 topic-specific image boards, including those devoted to ‘Photography,’ ‘Food & Cooking,’ ‘Science & Math,’ and a variety of ‘Adult’ themes. It claims to have over 22 million monthly visitors, known as ‘anons’ (dubbed as such due to the site being wholly anonymous) (Palmer 2019). 4chan became more widely known in 2014 as a central node—along with Reddit—in the online harassment campaign against women in computer gaming known as ‘Gamergate,’ which research shows had both RWE and misogynist elements (see Braithwaite 2016). The RWE QAnon conspiracy was also initiated by 4chan posts. Its /pol/ (‘politically incorrect’) board, in particular, continues to serve the extreme right, largely outside of mainstream scrutiny. That is where the strategies and goals of a younger and ‘hipper’ version of the extreme right are developed and eventually packaged for more mainstream consumption and appeal, often in the form of memes, as has been uncovered in recent studies (see Ludemann 2018). The RWE-Internet scene is distributed beyond these high-profile platforms and includes a selection of relatively new and highly accessible 5

This is according to Statista’s ‘Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide’ as of July 2019. See https://www.alexa.com/topsites for the site’s global ranking. 7 Subreddits are subsidiary forums focusing on a specific topic within the overall Reddit forum. 6

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communication ‘applications,’ or apps (i.e., software programs designed to run on mobile devices, such as phones or tablets). Many of these fit into the category of so-called dark social networks, which refers not to the ‘dark’ nature of the content necessarily, but to the difficulties of researching content shared via, for example, messaging apps and other forms of encrypted chat (e.g., Telegram, Discord) (see Conway et al. 2019). These difficulties at least partially explain why less research has been conducted on RWEs’ use of these spaces and apps than may be warranted; the relative newness and niche status of some such apps may be other explanations. Fortunately, some research has considered the spread of RWE misinformation on Telegram (e.g., Gallagher and O’Connor 2021; Walther and McCoy 2021) and Discord (e.g., Davey 2021), but much more empirical work is needed in this regard.

Networking Researchers have overwhelmingly found that violent extremists and terrorists generally, and RWEs particularly, communicate and coordinate in a decentralized ‘all-channel’ manner, which allows for linking sub-groups and external organizations from around the world to central online spaces, such as web-forums, blogs, and social media sites, quickly and at low cost (Scrivens and Conway 2019). A key example is RWEs networking through Stormfront.org, a digital platform that has received much empirical attention (e.g., Bowman-Grieve 2009; De Koster and Houtman 2008; Burris et al. 2000; Bliuc et al. 2019; Kleinberg et al. 2020; Scrivens et al. 2018, 2020a). Stormfront is one of many examples of virtual communities of the extreme right, but it is the oldest and one of the most influential RWE forums in the world (Bliuc et al. 2019). It includes an array of sub-sections addressing a variety of topics, including an ‘International’ section composed of a range of geographically bounded sub-forums (e.g., ‘Stormfront Europe,’ ‘Stormfront Downunder,’ and ‘Stormfront Italia’). In April 2022, Stormfront has approximately 369,000 ‘members’ and contains over 13.9 million posts, but it is now just one node in a much larger constellation of RWE online spaces.

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In recent years, researchers have become increasingly interested in generating knowledge on the development of RWE networks online and their transnational nature, both within and across platforms. To illustrate, while empirical work on RWE online networks has largely explored the extent and scope of communication networks primarily on websites and discussion forums (e.g., Adams and Roscigno 2005; Burris et al. 2000; Caiani and Parenti 2013; Caiani and Wagemann 2009; Gerstenfeld et al. 2003), more recent efforts have been made to assess the formation of RWE communities on platforms such as YouTube (e.g., Lewis 2018; Rauchfleisch and Kaiser 2020) as well as estimate the volume of RWE content within specific RWE networks on Twitter. In a 2016 report, for example, Berger in his exploration of white nationalist social media networks estimated that accounts associated with major American white nationalist movements on Twitter had added about 22,000 followers between 2012 and 2016, an increase of approximately 600% for a total of just over 25,000 followers. In a later report, Berger (2018b) estimated that in the period April to June 2018, ‘the altright’s presence on Twitter was substantial, probably encompassing more than 100,000 users as a conservative estimate.’ More recently, Davey and Ebner (2019) presented data showing that the pan-European white nativist group known as Generation Identity had—as of May 2019— approximately 70,000 followers of its official Twitter accounts. These are just three variants of contemporary RWE online activity and networks, all of which require more empirical attention. Some recent empirical work, although in its infancy, has also considered the impact of trigger or galvanizing events such as the effect of riots (e.g., Bliuc et al. 2019), rallies (e.g., van der Vegt et al. 2019), presidential elections (e.g., Scrivens et al. 2020a), and terrorist attacks (Burnap et al. 2014) on the development of hateful content and RWE networks online. The role of elections as trigger events has become a growing area of research in this regard, with the primary focus of this scholarship on the relationship between tweets about the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the spreading of hatred on Twitter (e.g., Müller and Schwarz 2018) as well as the growth of alt-right networks on Twitter (e.g., Berger 2018b; Ganesh 2020) and 4chan (e.g., Zannettou et al. 2018a, b) in response to Trump’s election victory.

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A growing emphasis has also been placed on understanding the transnational links and exchanges between far- and extreme right organizations and movements (e.g., Burris et al. 2000; Caiani et al. 2012; Caiani and Kröll 2015), with the most recent focus on the transnational links found on social media (e.g., Davey et al. 2020; Froio and Ganesh, 2020; Veilleux-Lepage and Archambault 2019). For example, Veilleux-Lepage and Archambault (2019), in their assessment of the structure of the Canadian chapters of Soldiers of Odin on Facebook and the significance of their links to international branches, highlight the interconnected nature of this movement and the ease with which information and ideological rhetoric flows across the international network online. Davey and colleagues (2020), in their analysis of Canadian RWE community networks across social media platforms, similarly found that their channels, pages, groups, and accounts reached 11+ million domestic and international users (see also Hart et al. 2021). Froio and Ganesh (2020), however, in their analysis of transnational exchanges between far-right organizations online in France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. found that transnationalism on Twitter was only moderate, with far-right Twitter activity mostly limited within national borders. Having said all of this, more comparative research is needed to explore the extent to which transnational exchanges between the far-right differ from those of the extreme right. Given that RWEs maintain a presence on multiple online platforms (Holt et al. 2020), recent efforts have been made at comparative research across platforms. This research has been carried out based in large part on calls by practitioners and policymakers concerned with how extremists network across platforms (see Conway 2017). Of the limited cross-platform studies that have been conducted, Davey and Ebner (2017) explored the connectivity and convergence of the ‘new’ extreme right in Europe and the U.S. on 4chan, 8chan, Voat, Gab, and Discord. Davey and colleagues (2020) also assessed the scale and scope of Canadian RWE activity within and across various platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 4chan, Gab, Fascist Forge, and Iron March. Zannettou and colleagues (2018b) measured the spread of anti-Semitic content across 4chan and Gab. Holt and colleagues (2020) examined the ideological sentiments expressed across several right-wing extremist

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forums. Lastly, Scrivens and colleagues (2021a) quantified the existence of extremist ideologies, personal grievances, and violent extremist mobilization efforts found within violent RWE forums Iron March and Fascist Forge. Together, these studies highlight the connected nature of RWE movements as well as distinctions in their online communications, both within and across platforms. Regardless, this emerging evidence base remains in its infancy and requires further exploration. Researchers who have traced the presence of RWEs online have conceptualized it as an ‘ecosystem’ which is ‘vast, dynamic, multidimensional, and heterogeneous (in terms of ideology and practices)’ (Baele et al. 2020, p. 3; see also Conway 2020). Here RWE websites have played an important role in this online ecosystem, with websites being used extensively by various RWE groups and individuals (see Baele et al. 2020; see also Conway et al. 2019). However, prominent networking sites of the extreme right, such as American Renaissance, which first appeared in the 1990s and is still in existence, have received little academic attention. Another notable networking site that has received very little attention is vdare.com (established in 1999), an American anti-immigration website that—in addition to archiving the content of racists, anti-immigrant figures, and anti-Semites (see Anti-Defamation League 2008)—is ‘best known for publishing work by white nationalists while maintaining that it is not a white nationalist site’ (Weigel 2010). Organized hate groups, which have also received very little academic attention, have similarly developed their own networking sites, with some notable examples including the now defunct forum hosted by the U.S.-based Hammerskin Nation (established in 2002) and the defunct U.K.-founded Blood & Honour (established in 2001). There is also very little scholarship on the presence of the extreme right on violent RWE networking forums such as Iron March and Fascist Forge forums, both of which have gained notoriety for their members’ online advocacy of violence and acts of violence carried out by them (Scrivens et al. 2020c).

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Recruitment In an effort to raise awareness and convince individuals to join an extremist group or movement, violent extremists and terrorists— including RWEs—use the Internet to increase the possibility of interacting with potential recruits, as well as roam online spaces looking for potential recruits (usually young people) (Caiani and Parenti 2013; Galloway and Scrivens 2018; Gaudette et al. 2020a; Hale 2012). This is oftentimes done by making information gathering easy for potential recruits with their online material, which tends to contain a high level of appeal and persuasion. Research in this space—much of which has typically focused on dedicated hate sites and forums—suggests that some of the recruitment materials include very graphic and disturbing texts, images, and videos, while other recruitment materials are subtler. That is, some material contains clear displays of hatred, including neo-Nazi symbols, iconography, and color schemes (Caiani and Kröll 2015; Caiani and Parenti 2013), oftentimes to communicate with the like-minded and express a level of commitment to ‘the cause’ (Bowman-Grieve 2009; De Koster and Houtman 2008). Other material is framed as religious or ‘revisionist’ materials, news sites (Adams and Roscigno 2005; Schafer 2002), joke and game pages, among others (Daniels 2009), in an effort to legitimize their RWE causes and appeal to a wider audience (see Caiani et al. 2012). The latter of the two material types oftentimes masks the extreme and violent element of a movement and instead reconstructs a less hostile and violent image of their campaign by discussing, for example, mainstream social issues and world events to garner sympathy from an international audience (see Weimann 2004; see also Whine 1999). As an example, the National Socialist Movement (NSM), an American neo-Nazi political party, has tried to legitimize their recruitment efforts online by promoting family values, economic self-sufficiency, and withdrawal of the U.S. military from the Middle East, to name a few. Regardless of the recruitment material type, research suggests that RWEs have attempted to recruit through eye-catching and visually appealing content, oftentimes in a multimedia format, featuring audio files, digital videos, interactive chat rooms, bulletin boards, cyber-cafes,

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and webpages featuring caricatures and children’s stories, as well as video games, music, technology, art, dating advice, and humor/jokes pages (Caiani and Parenti 2013). In fact, heavy metal and punk music with overt and covert racist messaging was a staple of the RWE movement in the 1990s, which grew with the Internet and digital music distribution (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003; Holt 2012). The purpose of these efforts is to gain new supporters, particularly younger audiences (Weimann 2004; Whine 1999). Stormfront, for example, when it was more of a website than a forum in the 1990s contained a ‘Quote of the Week,’ an assortment of cartoons, and a downloadable graphics section, as well as links to an array of content and services, from ‘whites only’ dating services to white power music and racist video games (see Daniel 2009). Research also suggests that Stormfront has served as a ‘funnel site’ for the RWE movement, wherein forum users have been targeted by other extreme right users for purposes of recruiting new members into violent groups offline—including, online forums hosted by Hammerskins, the U.K.founded Blood & Honour, and various Ku Klux Klan (KKK) branches (see Galloway and Scrivens 2018). A ‘visual turn’ in research is also now apparent, due to humorous and sarcastic ‘memes’ being used by RWEs to spread propaganda online to a more mainstream audience, and for the larger purpose of recruiting new adherents. RWE ‘humor’ and their use of sarcasm to poke fun at adversaries is not new, however (Billig 2001). Racist cartoons were a central component of the propaganda found on a number of then-popular RWE websites in the early 2000s (see Daniels 2009). Similarly, in one of the many examples of such that can be found on RWE websites, Stormfront users created a number of ‘Joke of the Day’ threads, with one popular thread dating back to 2007 that includes countless jokes with racist, sexist, and xenophobic overtones. Together, the use of humor, sarcasm, and similar types of discourse have historically been used by RWEs to (openly) parade their hateful views, defending the material as ‘just a joke,’ and spread propaganda for recruitment purposes. What is new are RWEs’ heavy co-opting of meme culture (for more on meme culture and the extreme right, see Conway et al. 2019). Memes can take a variety of forms, including catchphrases, easy-to-digest captioned images, and quirky animated GIFs.

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They are widely popular online, with many achieving viral status. On Twitter, for example, researchers have found that memes, particularly those expressing anti-Muslim sentiments, were being used by RWEs as a rally cry and a strategy for recruitment (Crosset et al. 2019). Other empirical research identified similar strategies used by RWEs on Facebook (see Scrivens and Amarasingam 2020), Instagram, 4chan (see Goldenberg and Finkelstein 2020), and Gab (see Zannettou et al. 2018a, b), among others. Empirical studies suggest that such easy-todigest captioned images are increasingly popular among a new generation of RWEs, particularly those targeting Muslims (e.g., Davey and Ebner 2017; Scrivens and Amarasingam 2020). In light of this emerging evidence base, future research is needed to better understand why such propaganda is so popular among a younger generation as well as whether the use of humor and sarcasm represents the future of RWE recruitment efforts, especially on an international scale (Scrivens and Amarasingam 2020).

Financing Due to its immediate, interactive, and global reach, the Internet has greatly increased the potential for extremists and terrorists to raise funds for their activities (see Conway 2005; see also Conway 2006). However, very little empirical research has emerged on how violent extremists and terrorists, including the extreme right, attempt to raise funds online (Keatinge et al. 2019). Of the limited empirical work available on how RWEs raise funds online for their activities, researchers generally suggest that funds are raised via (1) merchandise sales and (2) donation solicitation. Regarding sales of merchandise, empirical research suggests that RWEs sell a wide variety of extremist merchandise online as a way to support a particular group or movement (Gerstenfeld et al. 2003). Previous research in this area has paid particularly close attention to merchandise sales through ‘shop’ pages found on dedicated extremist sites, but the extent to which this content is sold and the volume of the merchandise found there is unclear. Gerstenfeld and colleagues (2003), for example,

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in their content analysis of RWE websites (142 of which were operated by groups or individuals in the U.S. and 15 internationally based) found that 56.4% of the sites sold various far-right merchandise, including books, CDs, videos, clothing, flags, jewelry, and patches, with much of this merchandise appealing directly to youth. Also uncovered was that the merchandise sold on these sites not only financially benefited the extremist groups, but also helped advertise the group and spread propaganda (see Gerstenfeld et al. 2003). On the other hand, Wong and colleagues (2015), in their analysis of discussion threads on five RWE forums and hyperlinks directing users out of the forums, found that just 6% of thread discussions related to financing the sites and very few hyperlinks directed users to merchandise sites. Moving beyond dedicated extremist websites that sell extremist merchandise, recent reports suggest that RWEs have exploited popular online retailers and marketplaces to sell merchandise to raise funds for their activities (e.g., Beirich 2014; Davis 2020; Epp and Höfner 2018). For example, an anti-hate watch group reported that hate groups advertise qualifying Amazon products on their websites to earn a commission of up to 10% on their sale (see Beirich 2014). Journalists have also reported that members of Atomwaffen Division, an extreme right-wing terrorist group linked to a series of murders in the U.S., raised funds by selling Seige, a book by neo-Nazi activist James Mason that forms the basis of Atomwaffen Division’s ideology, on Amazon’s CreateSpace (see Epp and Höfner 2018). Such sales made on online retailers and marketplaces are unlikely to generate a significant amount of funding for a group or movement, but they do enable them to spread their message and serve to keep propaganda available to new recruits as well as maintain a network of like-minded individuals (Davis 2020). For the latter, empirical research—although limited in scale—suggests that crowdfunding and peer-to-peer direct transactions are among the most common methods that RWEs use to solicit donations online (Keatinge et al. 2019; Davey and Ebner 2017; Warreth 2019). Empirical research, for example, found that the RWEs, among other movements, have exploited crowdfunding platforms to finance their own activities with some success, such as, for example, the group ‘American Freedom Defense Initiative’ whose Indiegogo campaign raised approximately 50%

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of the funds required to place anti-Islam advertisements on 100 buses in New York City (Warreth 2019). A report from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) similarly found that crowdfunding platforms, such as GoFundMe, Patreon, Indiegogo, and Kickstarter, have enabled RWEs to solicit donations for projects, products, or for general support (see Anti-Defamation League 2017). In the wake of deadly ‘Unite the Right’ in 2017, mainstream crowdfunding platforms made efforts to remove RWE accounts, which caused many adherents to migrate to alternative crowdfunding websites that cater specifically to them, such as Hatreon and WeSearchr (Anti-Defamation League 2017; Ebner 2018; Keatinge et al. 2019).8 To illustrate, empirical research found that leading members of ‘Generation Identitaire’ solicited funds through WeSearchr for their ‘Defend Europe’ campaign, which sought to charter a ship in order to disrupt the flow of migrants crossing from Libya into Europe and interdict NGO vessels (Davey and Ebner 2017). The Defend Europe campaign on WeSearchr received funding from a ‘cross-border’ network of 3,208 global supporters located in the U.K., France, Germany, the U.S., and several other countries (see Davey and Ebner 2017). Similarly, empirical research suggests that peer-to-peer direct transactions in the form of cryptocurrencies9 have become the popular method for RWEs to send and transfer funds, largely because it is anonymous and a relatively easy to use. Some reports also suggest that RWEs use of cryptocurrencies as a ‘political statement’ because it is an alternative to the traditional banks that are widely believed to be controlled by an elaborate Jewish conspiracy (i.e., ZOG conspiracies) (Ebner 2018). Bitcoin and Monero appear to be the most common forms of cryptocurrencies used by RWEs, especially those who are faced with ongoing concerns about being de-platformed from sites using traditional payment processors, to finance their activities (Keatinge et al. 2019; Newhouse 2019; Warreth 2019). Research suggests that the far-right European 8 WeSearchr has carried out several major RWE fundraising campaigns, including The Daily Stormer founder Andrew Anglin raising over $150,000 for his legal defense against a Southern Poverty Law Center lawsuit (Castillo 2017). 9 Cryptocurrencies are a digital form of currency that are ‘mostly’ built on blockchain technology (Whyte 2019).

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group ‘Order of Dawn’ solicited Monero donations on their website to finance their activities (see Warreth 2019), while other research suggests that some RWE websites, such as The Daily Stormer, publicly solicited donations via the popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin (see Newhouse 2019). While these examples and studies shed light on RWEs’ use of the Internet for financing purposes, the evidence base remains quite thin and requires much more empirical attention.

Information Gathering Given that the Internet contains an overwhelming amount of information, violent extremists and terrorists can collect intelligence on specific targeting opportunities, learn about anti-terrorism measures, share online training manuals about how to make homemade bombs, plan assassinations, and how to avoid surveillance, among other things (Conway 2006). The anonymous and private nature of the Internet has enabled them to strategize and execute their objectives with little risk of being apprehended by law enforcement officials or receiving legal sanctions (Caiani and Parenti 2013). And because of the availability of information on the Internet, violent extremists and terrorists can open-source search documents for information about potential targets. Some research, for example, suggests that Google Earth is a useful tool for choosing and planning how to attack a target (Holt 2012). Yet, similar to the empirical research on how violent extremists and terrorists in general—and RWEs in particular—attempt to raise funds online, little is known about how such individuals gather information. Of the limited empirical work available, researchers have generally unpacked how information is gathered via (1) data mining, which consists of collecting and assembling information about specific targeting opportunities, and (2) information sharing, which is more general online information collection. Empirical research, though very limited, suggests that RWEs collect and share a wide variety of information online with the like-minded, including but not limited to such things as white supremacy-related online books or publications (see Wong et al. 2015) or manuals on avoiding forensic tracing of fingerprints, blood, and hair (see Hale 2012)

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found on discussion forums. Some research has also found a small group of users within a popular RWE forum who possessed advanced technological skills, acting as a ‘key resource’ for less skilled users and answering questions about online security and providing information on how, for example, to use programs like Tor, short for The Onion Router,10 to hide or otherwise anonymize online activity and location data from outsiders and law enforcement (see Holt and Bolden 2014). On the more extreme end of the spectrum are what Hale (2012) describes as tutorials on ‘building bombs, firing weapons, physical fitness training, plotting assassinations, and how to organize and manage an extremist cell’ (p. 347). In-depth investigations from journalists have similarly found a library for would-be RWE terrorist cells on the now defunct Fascist Forge, an online discussion forum that served as hubs for neo-Nazis to connect with the like-minded and for the purpose of committing real-world violence (Lamoureux 2019; see also Lamoureux and Makuch 2019). Here this content featured a guide on militaristic tactics for ethnic cleansing, manuals for making homemade weapons, and instructions on how to dispose of a body (Lamoureux 2019). Also uncovered in this space were details about the most effective weapons to use during urban combat as well as discussions about how to pull off an assassination (see Lamoureux 2019; see also Lamoureux and Makuch 2019). Recent research has also explored RWEs’ use of newer online platforms for information sharing, such as the encrypted messaging platform Telegram. Guhl and Davey (2020), in their assessment of 208 Telegram channels used by RWEs, identified several ‘tactical’ channels and ‘one-to-many’ content banks that were dedicated to sharing tactical information. Tactical channels, for example, included bombmaking instructions, firearm maintenance and improvisation materials, and combat tips. Other channels linked users to manifesto documents of high-profile right-wing terrorists, as well as literature in support of terrorist activity (see Guhl and Davey 2020). Data mining is facilitated by freely available information about potential targets on the Internet (Conway 2006) in amounts described by 10 Tor is free and open-source software that allows users to browse and communicate online anonymously.

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some as a ‘gold mine’ for planning a terrorist attack (see Verton and Mearian 2004). But what we generally know about RWEs’ use of the Internet for data mining is more of a journalistic description (e.g., Verton and Mearian 2004) or accounts from anti-hate watch groups than an academic analysis. The Anti-Defamation League (2019), for example, found that users on Fascist Forge engaged in discussions about targeting infrastructure, such as communication lines and electricity grids in the U.S. Investigative journalists similarly found that materials and discussion on Fascist Forge included calls for direct action such as a race war and targeting public infrastructure (Lamoureux and Makuch 2019). As helpful as these accounts have been in understanding information gathering efforts of the extreme right online, it remains unclear if Fascist Forge users collected information about potential targets. Indeed, empirical research is needed to further explore RWEs’ information gathering efforts, not only on Fascist Forge, but indeed on other platforms that facilitate the extreme right.

Concluding Remarks The trends in the empirical literature on RWEs’ use of the Internet suggest it can be segmented into five core areas as identified by Conway (2006). While we have highlighted several key research trends in this growing space, it is clear that this work remains in its infancy, especially the empirical research on the link between RWEs and financing and information gathering efforts online. It should also be apparent that researchers who have explored RWEs’ use of the Internet have typically focused their attention on dedicated hate sites and forums. As a result, the nature of RWEs’ use of online platforms that are outside the mainstream has gone mostly unexplored by researchers, despite the fact that lesser-researched platforms have provided adherents with spaces to anonymously discuss and develop ‘taboo’ or ‘anti-moral’ ideologies (Gaudette et al. 2020b). Very little is also known about the link between the on- and offline worlds of violent extremists (Gaudette et al. 2020a; Scrivens et al. 2020b, 2021b), whether it involves their efforts to network or recruit. Lastly, there is generally no research on the extent to which

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RWEs are cultivating expertise to utilize cyberspace as a platform to attack computer systems and data (Holt and Bolden 2014). Our hope is that this chapter sparks interest among those working in the field to consider filling these gaps in the empirical research.

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15 Far-Right Violence and Extremism: Global Convergence Arie Perliger and Joshua Mills

Introduction Little more than eight years after Anders Breivik killed seventy-seven people and injured more than three hundred in multiple attacks, which were inspired by white-supremacist sentiments, Norway again received a reminder of the threat from far-right extremists. On Saturday, August 10, 2019, Philip Manshaus, 21 years old from Oslo, wearing body armor and helmet, stormed the al-Noor Islamic center near Oslo while firing from two shotguns obtained earlier. Luckily, while he was able to injure the center’s director, the other two people who were present at that time A. Perliger (B) University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. Mills Pennsylvania State University, Abington, PA, USA

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in the center were able to overpower Manchus and deliver him to the police (Libell, 2019). Just a miscalculation by Manshaus prevented more tragic results, as the following day, more than 1000 people were supposed to attend the center for the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. Several important revelations were disclosed in the police investigation. Manshaus asserted that he was chosen by “Saint [Brenton] Tarrant,” the gunman who killed 51 people at two mosques in New Zealand in March 2019 and broadcast his attack via Facebook Live app. This event came after Tarrant expressed his violent intentions on 8chan and linked to an off-site manifesto explaining his justifications. Furthermore, in a meme Manshaus posted shortly before his own attempted attack, he expressed admiration to three “heroes” of the extreme-right. In addition to Tarrant, the meme includes Patrick Crusius (the El-Paso shooter1 ) and a gunman who attacked a synagogue in California in April that year, killing a woman during the Passover celebration (Ng, 2020). Hence, Manshaus saw his attack as another expression of a global white nationalist movement whose members’ interests’ cross-national borders. The increasing globalization of the contemporary violent extremeright may seem somewhat paradoxical. After all, traditionally, extremeright movements and parties reject processes of globalization and aspire to emphasize national particularistic interests. Moreover, many conspiracy theories that serve as ideological constructs of extreme-right groups use global cooperation as a trope that aims to warn from a sinister Jewish global conglomerate focusing on the advent of the destruction of nation-states (Perliger, 2020). However, this is far from being a new feature of the extreme-right. Some of the more prominent American extreme-right movements “immigrated” to the US from other countries, including the racist skinheads’ subculture, neo-Nazism, and white-supremacist Christian Identity. Moreover, some American extreme-right organizations established chapters in foreign countries, such as the Hammerskin Nations and the more contemporary Proud Boys. 1 Patrick Wood Crusius, a 21-year-old white male, went to a Wal-Mart in El Paso, TX on August 3, 2019, and shot and killed twenty patrons alongside injuring twenty-three others. Crusius stated that his actions were a retaliation against the “Hispanic invasion of Texas” and a desire to emulate the actions of Tarrant.

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In the current chapter, we aim to explore this contradiction between ideological principles and operational practices, as well as provide an overview of the recent trends in the transnational spread of extremeright ideology and violence. Beyond mapping inter-group collaboration and coordination, we will try to explain the factors which facilitate the transition of ideas, people, and weapons between American extremeright groups and similar groups in other countries. We will conclude with some insights about the future of the internationalization of the extreme-right.

Facilitators of Cross-National Convergence in the Far-Right Extremist Sphere Scholars raised multiple reasons for what seems to be a growing transnational collaboration and convergence of far-right extremist groups and ideas. Some of these explanations are focusing on the growing accessibility of the means of collaboration (mainly the expansion of online platforms), while others seem to focus more on the way in which new ideological trends and rhetoric within the extreme-right may encourage collaboration and the convergence of ideas. Lastly, some explanations seem to focus on the similarities in the social and political challenges that both the US and other countries are experiencing.

Increase Accessibility A recurring assertion about the growing trend of globalized right-wing extremism is that much of the collaboration is a result of the increasing ease of internet-based communication (Caiani & Kröll, 2013; Grumke, 2017; Kleinberg van der Vegt, & Gill, 2020; Perry & Scrivens, 2016; Ribeiro, et al, 2020; Scrivens, Davies, & Frank, 2020). Indeed, online platforms allow the sharing of ideology, operational information, intelligence, and propaganda, in a way that is less costly and complicated than in the past. However, there is still a question of how expansive is this collaboration (Caiani & Parenti, 2013; May & Feldman,

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2019)? The prevailing literature suggests a litany of approaches through which domestic collaboration occurs, both online and face to face, so it is conceivable that similar forms of collaboration could occur across national boundaries (Lister, 2020; Whine, 2012). Some clarification is also warranted when discussing far-right extremism in the online domain. “The internet” is a common umbrella term meant to encompass the various realms in which far-right extremists anonymously skulk. However, reducing the varied online platforms in which the acolytes of the extreme-right operate to one homogeneous space fails to account for the unique characteristics and collaborative potential of the different platforms. Prominent forums such as the still functioning Stormfront.com or the archaic and defunct Aryan Liberty Net provided some of the earliest meeting grounds for those with an extremist far-right bent (Donovan, Lewis, & Friedberg, 2019). These forums allowed for the sharing of ideas and collaborative materials in a very direct way (Adams and Roscigno, 2005). On the other end of the spectrum, some groups transitioned most of their operations to social messaging platforms such as GAB or Telegram and thus created a somewhat more hierarchical flow of information via specific seed accounts or the leaders’ accounts, which could reach hundreds of thousands of followers (Frenkel, 2021). Lastly, some groups are still using traditional websites with limited social interactions, such as the short-lived Hatreon (a site emulating the fundraising site, Patreon, without content restrictions), PewTube (a site meant to emulate YouTube with a similar lack of oversight), or any number of “alt-tech” websites built with the goal of ensuring controversial or outright hateful ideas have a space to be heard online (Squire, 2019; Malter, 2017). While many of these sites were short-lived due to their immediate notoriety (and subsequent deplatforming), this has only led to greater splintering as individuals seek new and more hidden sources to promote extremist content online (Coldewey, 2017). Several important characteristics of the online space make it particularly convenient for cross-national interactions. Operating within the near limitless confines of “the internet,” the most frequent crossover of extremists from both America and other countries has been seen in the abstract. Memes, the pictorial format adopted by denizens of

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the internet to promote in-jokes and group-specific humor, have been utilized by a wide variety of users within the proverbial “extremist space” in a way that allows them to overcome any potential language barriers. As a result, certain images and phrases, both context-specific and divorced from any context for broader use, naturally became a regular part of the extreme-right discourse (Bogerts & Fielitz, 2019; Zannettou et al., 2018). Frequently, this meme discourse can shift between legitimate attempts to promote an ideology and baser attempts to simply subvert the accepted norms of politeness. This muddy distinction makes attempts at definitive statements on the actual “point” being made nebulous (which very well might be the point in itself ). This further enhances the echo chamber for far-right extremists to operate within as the language of varied movements’ bleed into one another (Miller-Idriss, 2019). This “universal language” also has the added benefit of affording farright extremists’ messaging to proliferate well beyond the scope of a single space. Unlike forum-specific engagement on websites, memes can be presented on any open-access site. While administrators of these sites might attempt to keep offensive content away, the relative lawlessness of many online spaces such as 4chan (and to a lesser extent Reddit, Facebook, or Twitter) allows extreme-right meme discourse to find a foothold outside of niche corners (Tuters, 2019). Furthermore, the assumption that memes as a form of communication are ultimately “for the lulz” allows the guise of attempted humor to shield malicious content from certain criticism. This, along with direct attempts by some within farright extremist movements to tone down overt hate-speech and disguise propagandistic Nazi frogs as edgy humor, leads to greater potential for globalizing meme discourse (May and Feldman, 2019). The central role of white power music within the extreme-right sub-culture offers similar in-roads for cross-national collaboration. Not only have right-wing extremists been collaborating and promoting their musical endeavors for decades longer than they have been creating hateful memes, but the explosion of the internet has also allowed a new avenue for this medium to evolve (Bláha, 2018; Corte and

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Edwards, 2008; Eyerman, 2002; Lööw, 1998). While relatively wellknown musical acts from the 1980s through the 2000s such as Skrewdriver and Prussian Blue maintained a certain level of notoriety during their stints in the limelight (limelight that complicated their ability to sway unsympathetic audiences to their cause), music within the extreme-right still brings individuals together from varied backgrounds and nationalities (Davis, 2009; Spracklen, 2010). The growing ease of streaming one’s music to a wide audience further compounds the ability of these groups to gain a foothold in the subgenre. The prevailing logic falling within the same confines as in decades past: What works on the surface as a catchy snare to draw in potential new recruits for the movement can subtextually promote and accentuate the goals and ideologies of true believers (Futrell, Simi, and Gottschalk, 2006). The music of such acts as Bound for Glory, Heritage Connection, and Saga is all decidedly political but can still be appreciated by those who might not be in agreeance with the politics but are willing to overlook lyrical politicking (Germanaz, 2020; Phillipov, 2011; Putnam and Littlejohn, 2007). Saga in particular straddles a cleaner line between extremist propaganda and legitimate artist than many of her peers in the right-wing music subgenres. This balancing act allows ideological adherents to buy into the implied message of the music without alienating a listener who might initially find the subtext repugnant (Holt, 2007; Teitelbaum, 2014). Furthermore, while Saga is a Norwegian artist, her music and lyrics are not so inherently tied to her heritage that potential listeners unfamiliar with the national context are automatically locked out. The most successful musical artists within the subgenre emphasize this kind of balance. Walking the line between a facade of artistic legitimacy and just enough political ambiguity to avoid broader dismissal as hate-speech set to music. If a balance can be struck, this affords these acts the potential to cross-pollinate well outside their standard orbit into the international far-right extremist movement. Concerns around extremist music’s ability to foster cross-national extreme-right sub-culture are similar to the growing concern surrounding the nebulous catch-all term “video games.” While some material can be seen about pointedly “extreme-right” video games from the early 2000s (e.g., Ethnic Cleansing, Ghetto Blaster, Racial Holy War, etc.) (Selepak,

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2010), the majority of focus in the 2010s has shifted to recruitment through already-established video game franchises with an online player base (Daniels & LaLone, 2012). This readily available pool of players from across the globe creates a fertile ground for would-be recruiters to ingratiate themselves within a community to determine who might be open to ideations of a more extreme variety (Lombard, 2007). This phenomenon was extensively noted as it pertained to Al-Qaeda and ISIS recruitment in the late 2000s and 2010s, (Al-Rawi, 2018; Davies, et al, 2015; Lakomy, 2019) but has only received limited attention in the realm of right-wing extremism. This lack of specific focus does not negate the prior research on identity-construction on the internet (and by proxy online games) (Bacchini, De Angelis, & Fanara, 2017; Ecenbarger, 2014; Sanford & Madill, 2006; Valkenburg, Schouten, & Peter, 2005), which is indicative of the genuine possibility of recruitment through this medium. However, a dearth of research on the subject leaves it somewhat nebulous as to how much active collaboration might be occurring in this realm. Much of the material addressing the issue is either anecdotal (Kamenetz, 2018), focused more broadly on “gamer culture,” or deconstructing the “#GamerGate” phenomenon specifically rather than actual extreme-right recruiting efforts, either domestically or internationally, within the video game community (Ferguson & Glasgow, 2020; Mortensen, 2018; Peckford, 2020).

Ideology and Rhetoric Some of the current transformations in white supremacists’ discourse worldwide seem to foster transnational identity and collaboration. More specifically, rather than maintain their traditional focus on racial superiority and societal homogeneity, as well as the need to promote extreme nationalist policies, a growing number of white-supremacist or extreme-right ideologists prefer to focus on cultural and normative differences between communities, the need to preserve and protect specific cultural-religious norms and practices which in many cases are transnational rather than particularistic on the national or ethnic level. For example, the founder of the American-Based Fraternal Order

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of Alt-Knights (FOAK), Kyle Chapman, declared that the world and particularly Western nations must protect themselves and fight to rid themselves of Islam and Neo-Marxism (Feuer & Peters, 2017). Similarly, a direct call to a shared (white) European resistance and identity is manifested by a member of the National Socialist Movement, who explains in an online post from 2018 that white-American is an identity as any other, such as African-American or Jewish American, and that all Whites should come together with knowledge and weapons in order to halt the non-Europeans from pushing their secular agenda through the use of government and media. Thus, all Europeans must come together to defeat evil.2 Another ideological development that seems to unite white supremacists from various nationalities is the growing focus on misogynist sentiments and what they describe as the “oppression” of the white male. Already in 2011, Breivik warned that the “…native Christian European heterosexual males…” was reduced to “emasculate[d] … touchy-feely subspecies.” Hence, the masculine exclusiveness, which was always part of the extreme-right subculture, seems to become a prime motivating factor for violence. Indeed, on both sides of the Atlantic, a growing misogynistic extreme-right rhetoric seems to bind members of these groups under a similar ideological pillar. This can be seen most pointedly in the self-described “Western Chauvinism” of the Proud Boys (Kutner, 2020). The racial subtext of Proud Boy ideology is disputed by some of the group’s leadership (although this dispute is frequently undermined by the actions of the same leadership), but the sexist bent of their rhetoric is intentional and inherent (Kitts, 2020). The declining emphasis on traditional aspects of nationalism led to what can be designated as the “embracement of a transnational racial cultural-religious identity” (Perliger, 2020). Whereas racial identity was always a chief component of the ideological universe of the extremeright, it usually evolved in the context of national political frameworks. Hence, “whereas collaborations and coordination existed between similar extreme-right groups from different countries, they still emphasized local 2

Post by JG_1488 at NSM forum, nsm88forum.com, January 4, 2006. Screenshot available. at author’s repository.

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nationalist sentiments and rarely discussed transnational racial issues” (Perliger, 2020). In contrast, current discourse seems to embrace a more continental if not global perspective in defining the “White” constituency and the overall struggles and threats facing the White Race. In this vein, it also seems that past distinctions between different types of white nations and Christian traditions eroded and became less important in the face of the global “cultural clash.” The continuation of such trends inevitably will foster more transnational convergence and collaboration between various extreme-right movements.

Socio-Political Conditions Some scholars tend to point out that similarities in socio-demographic characteristics also play a role in the emergence of transnational extremeright convergence. Specifically, they emphasize that the US, like many European countries, as well as other Anglo-Saxon polities (i.e., Australia, Canada), are all affluent societies that are surrounded by countries with a younger population and which are less developed from an economic and industrial perspective. Such an environment fosters a one-sided push for migration of population and demographic changes, which in many cases facilitate the emergence of extreme-right xenophobic, racist, antiimmigration associations, advocating the perils of demographic changes. A direct example for this kind of shared fears between Americans and their counterparts abroad was a 2014 tweet by regional office of the AfD party (German Nationalist-populist party) which depicted a Native American with the words “Indians couldn’t stop immigration. Today they live on reservations” (Miller-Idriss, p. 35). The normative and cultural changes which are experienced by Western societies also seem to contribute to the evolution of transnational extreme-right identity and collaboration. The decline in the status of traditional family structures and norms, the increased integration and expansion of transnational cultural practices and narratives, as well as the emergence of new counter-ideologies that ignore national boundaries

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(environmentalism, feminism, etc.), also seems to encourage extremeright leaders to seek for a universal ideological framework which can counterbalance what they see as globalized threats. Lastly, the decline in trust and legitimacy to democratic institutions in most Western countries, as well as trust in political parties and leaders, combined with the fact that the generation which fought fascism is becoming less influential in the social and political arena, seems also to provide a convenient atmosphere for the proliferation of extreme-right ideology and movements.

Interactions Between American and Foreign Extremist Far-Right Groups—Analytical Framework The interactions between political groups/movements include multiple facets. While in this chapter we are focusing on positive relationships, which may include cooperation and ideological influence, it is important to note that contentious relationships are the reality in many cases, especially when groups are competing over resources and support in a specific polity (Bloom, 2004). Additionally, interactions also differ in terms of their quality, type, and durability. In order to develop a nuanced analytical framework of the relationships between American and foreign extreme-right groups, which will take these dimensions into consideration, we utilized a modified version of Moghadam’s (2017) classification of collaboration between terrorist actors. While it was initially formulated to assist with the exploration of collaboration between terrorist organizations, it also seems effective when trying to identify patterns of cooperation or convergence between extreme-right groups (which many indeed engage in acts of political violence and terrorism) and ideology worldwide. The first distinction of Moghadam’s framework that should be addressed is between types of cooperation. In some cases, groups will share similar strategic objectives, although they may originate from different motivations. When both organizations are sharing their similar

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strategic goals with the public via a declaration of support and/or call for their supporters to cooperate, we can argue that there is ideological coordination between both organizations. In other instances, even if there is no overlap in the strategic objectives of both organizations, they can still develop some transactional or logistical relationships and share or trade resources. In this case, the organizations identify clear advantages for the cooperation, regardless of their long-term objectives, and may decide to share information and technology, trade weapons and other military materials, or in some cases, assist with training of members of the other group. When one of the organizations is controlling a specific territory, it can also provide a safe haven to members of the other organization. Lastly, operational collaboration is manifested via joint operations. When we combine the above-mentioned types of cooperation with other dimensions such as the length of the cooperation and the level of resource sharing, we can further distinguish between two different levels of quality of cooperation: low-end and high-end cooperation. The latter includes the sharing of human resources, operational knowledge, and in many cases, also joint operations (Moghadam, 2017). Such cooperation demands from both organizations a high level of trust, as well as investing significant resources in merging some of the organizational functions (such as their training apparatus). Hence, usually, such cooperation is manifested between organizations that are interacting and cooperating for an extended period of time and share at least some strategic objectives. The low-end cooperation is usually a short-term initiative for specific tactical objectives and includes no/or limited merging of organizational functions. More specifically, it may include the trading of materials and technology, intelligence sharing, and financial support. The “Unite the Right” rally, a white-supremacist event that took place in Charlottesville, Virginia, from August 11 to 12, 2017, and included members of at least half a dozen groups, is a recent example of such low-end cooperation since it focused mainly on logistical, onetime collaboration for the execution of a single event. The storming of the capitol building on January 6, 2021, again as part of a protest event that included multiple extreme-right groups, such as Neo-Nazi organizations, Militias, and conspiracy movements, seems another example of low-level cooperation. However, the increasing number of such events

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may indicate a growing trend of collaboration and integration between the different parts of the American extreme-right and inclination for a more joint operational agenda. A process that may indicate a progression toward high-end cooperation.

High-End Cooperation Between American and Foreign Extreme-Right As we mentioned earlier, high-end cooperation is manifested in cases where organizations are joining forces in the execution of various activities, including violent ones, for a substantial period of time, and as part of a specific campaign. Such instances seem to be extremely rare with regard to interactions between American and foreign extreme-right. One of the only cases in which we can identify such dynamics is in the current civil war in Eastern Ukraine. The events which made Ukraine a desirable destination for some American white supremacist began to unfold in 2014, following the outbreak of hostilities between Russian separatist militias in Eastern Ukraine and the Ukrainian military. Fairly quickly, several Ukrainian nationalist far-right militias joined forces to assist the Ukrainian military. The most prominent among them was the Azov Special Operations Detachment or “Azov Regiment,” which eventually became a formalized part of the Ukrainian National Guard (Lister, 2020). In 2016, the Azov Regiment created a separate political wing (“National Corps”) that competed in the Ukrainian elections as part of a block of far-right parties. The National Corps became a hub for farright activists worldwide. With other smaller extreme-right groups in Ukraine, the National Corps elevated the visibility, influence, and operational capabilities of its members, as it organized numerous public events and strongly promoted grassroots activism to shape Ukrainian politics (Lister 2020; Miller, 2019). More relevant was the fact that the National Corps became a source of inspiration for extreme-right activists worldwide, including in the US, who were looking for opportunities to manifest their commitment to nationalist ideals via militant and violent activism. Communications that were uncovered in the now-defunct American Neo-Nazi web-forum

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“Iron March” reflect members’ fascination with the prospect of joining Ukrainian militias (Singer-Emery & Bray, 2020). Moreover, American extreme-right leaders embraced opportunities to strengthen the bond between the American extreme-right and their Ukrainian counterparts. Greg Johnson, a prominent Alt-Right ideologist, was a key guest of the 2017 conference of the National Corps in Kiev, and Brandon Russell, the founder of “Atomwaffen Division,” contacted the Azov Regiment in 2015, seeking operational advice on how to train members of his organization (Lister, 2020). Two factors facilitated such dynamics. First was the clear message of the National Corps leadership about the need for all white nationalists to join forces in a united front. Olena Semenyaka, the head of the Corps’s international department, clarified in the group’s podcast that: “We try to reconstruct the problem of this European decline, so to speak. And we want to start a revolt against it. Reconquista, revolt, revolution—of course, all of them are homological concepts which are quite understandable to European right-wingers and other educated persons.” The second was the opportunity that it provides for activists to literally “join the fight” and gain valuable military experience. A number of American extreme-right activists indeed seized this opportunity and joined the ranks of the Corps and other extreme-right militias in Eastern Ukraine. The exact number of American foreign fighters in Eastern Ukraine is not clear and is still debated (Saltskog & Clarke, 2020). But so far, most experts who conducted field research in the region asserted that just a handful of Americans actually fought in Ukraine in the ranks of local militias. The most known case is that of Craig Lang and Alex Zwiefelhofer, Army veterans who arrived in Ukraine in 2014 and 2016, respectively. Lang was one of several foreigners to join the Georgia National Legion, a volunteer group operating in Eastern Ukraine. He later joined the “Right Sector” in 2016, where he met Zwiefelhofer before both returned to the US in 2017 since they felt that the conflict “became trench warfare” (Lister, 2020). Further evidence for American extreme-right activists’ involvement in the Ukrainian white-supremacist scene was uncovered in October 2018, when two members of “Atomwaffen Division” were arrested and then deported from Ukraine to the US, after the SBU (Ukraine’s Security

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Service) determined that they were “urging citizens to commit particularly serious crimes, including murder and terrorist attacks” (Miller, 2020). The SBU also indicated that they “tried to join one of the Ukrainian military units in order to gain combat experience, which the representatives of the group planned to use in illegal activities” (Lister, 2020). Naturally, this phenomenon of extreme-right foreign fighters represents further opportunities for transnational collaborations, the potential growing militarization of the global extreme-right, and the need to account for the ability of such individuals to utilize their military experience upon their return to their homeland. It also exposes the risk involved in allowing extreme-right militias to operate under a legal umbrella, a process that facilitates the enhancement of their political influence and mobilization capabilities. Another manifestation of what can be described as a type of high-end convergence of American and foreign extreme-right is some American extreme-right movements’ tendency to establish chapters in foreign countries or vice versa. While not a feature of all American extreme-right movements, it nonetheless reflects an attempt to develop an international presence and further amplify collaboration and coordination between American and foreign extreme-right groups. Probably the earliest example of such effort was the formation of the British Israelites World Federation in 1920 in London. This organization, which was dedicated to the spread of what would become known as Christian Identity Ideology, was the idea of two American Christian Identity leaders, Ruben H. Sawyer and Howard Rand. Both were prolific writers who spearheaded the spread of Christian Identity in the US in the first half of the twentieth century (Perliger, 2020). Another early example of the internationalization efforts of the American extreme-right was the formation of the WUNS (“World Union of National Socialists”), which was the brainchild of George Lincoln Rockwell, the leader of the ANP (American Nazi Party). The WUNS became a formal organization In July 1962 following a meeting between Rockwell and prominent European Neo-Nazi leaders in Gloucestershire, England. The declared goal of the organization was to promote a National Socialist worldwide revolution, which will also include the continuation of the “Final Solution” for

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the “Jewish Problem” (Kaplan and Weinberg, p. 42). While especially active chapters of WUNS were formed in Iceland, Denmark, France, Belgium, South Africa, Australia, and the UK, the decline of the ANP in the 1960s accelerated the eventual erosion of the WUNS. More recent efforts to internationalize American Far-Right extremist movements are manifested In the efforts of Dennis Mahon, an American KKK leader, who spent time in the late 1980s in the Netherlands and Germany helping with the formation of local KKK chapters, as well as in the late 1990s when chapters of the American Hammerskin Nation were formed in Europe, Canada, and New Zealand. While the Hammerskin Nation would lose its monopolistic status within the American Skinheads landscape in early 2000, its European extensions are still active in certain European countries. Recently, in November 2016, it was discovered that Portugal’s national anti-terrorism unit arrested 20 skinheads who were seeking to “…expel and prevent the entry of all ethnic minorities to Portugal” (Reuters, 2016). Proud Boys, one of the groups within the American extreme-right which was able to gain popularity in the waning years of the 2010s, also seems capable of exploiting its focus on messages of masculinity and militant chauvinism to break out of the American scene and expand into new territories. It seems that initially, the group was able to mobilize support in Canada, a development that prompted the Canadian government to consider placing the group on its national list of terrorist organizations (Ferreira, 2021). A step that seems to encourage some Proud Boys’ chapters in the country to create alternative extreme-right groups such as “Canada First” (Bell, 2021). Today, however, branches of the Proud Boys can be found in multiple European countries as well as a few in Latin American countries as well. It is important to note that, for the most part, the creation of chapters abroad is mainly a platform for further dissemination of the movement’s ideological agenda rather than enabling American members’ activism abroad. We cannot identify any concrete evidence for violent operations in which international collaboration was a defining characteristic, not substantial ongoing collaboration in other, more moderate types of activism. Hence, the internationalization of American movements

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reflects the growing decentralized nature of many of these groups and that ideological roots are the main binding force between them and their chapters overseas.

Low-End Cooperation Between American and Foreign Far-Right Extremists A Convergence of Mobilization Efforts One of the more common types of collaboration between militant political groups is via ideological convergence or the public support of each other’s goals and ideological principles. Indeed, beyond the similar themes which emerge in the rhetoric of both the American and nonAmerican far-right discourse (which we discussed above), various American groups also aspire the represent and to define themselves as part of a transnational network of groups or sub-culture. The spokesperson of Volksfront (one of the major skinheads’ organizations in the US), for example, stated that “…Volksfront is part of an international network of like-minded Aryan organizations, our ideology transcends national barriers and thrives wherever Aryan blood flows” (Kaplan and Weinberg, p. 82). Similarly, one of the icons of American far-right extremism and the founder of the National Alliance (the most influential NeoNazi organization in the US in the 1980s and 1990s), William Pierce, expressed similar sentiments in a keynote speech we gave at the 1995’s at General Meeting of the British National Party in London (Kaplan and Weinberg, p. 83). Hence, it is not surprising that extreme far-right publications and online websites frequently covered foreign far-right issues, as well as providing a platform for far-right leaders from outside the US. Already in the 1960s and 1970s, the ANP newsletter (the official publication of the American Nazi Party) used to cover frequently European far-right groups and events. Similarly, a review of contemporary online platforms such as older forums at Stormfront.org, newer image sharing platforms like 8kun (a rebranding of the temporarily defunct 8chan forums) or similar communities on messaging applications like GAB or Telegram,

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reveals a strong appetite to discuss and analyze, as well as express support, for far-right extremist groups and violent activism in other parts of the globe. After the Christchurch shooting, Brenton Tarrant earned support from those sympathetic to his rallying cry in such spaces and inspired an increased devotion to his cause by like-minded individuals across the globe (Macklin, 2019; Fagnoni, 2019). Such dynamics are symmetric in nature. The Websites and forums of extreme far-right groups in Europe consistently cover and amplify conspiracy theories promoted by their American counterparts, host representatives of American farright groups, and draw constant comparison to the situation in their own countries and the European continent. Tarrant and the would-be Poway synagogue shooter, John Earnest, had little in common with the exception of a shared fear of white genocide and belief in a Jewish-led conspiracy to subvert white supremacy. The proliferation of Tarrant’s manifesto in sympathetic online spaces as well as the ongoing discussion of how to further the cause he rallied was a driving force behind Earnest’s own decision to mobilize toward violence and enter him in the hallowed halls of far-right activists translating online “shitposting” into the real world. Such dynamics also facilitate, naturally, the transformation of regional narratives into global ones (Zauzmer, 2019; Evans, 2019). For example, Odinism (the embrace of the narrative of the Norse and Teutonic pantheon of gods) had spread quickly and become a significant cultural distinction of the extreme-right culture both in the US and Europe.

Cultural Ties As we mentioned above, white power music is an important medium that facilitates convergence between American and foreign extremist farright groups and activists. In this context, it is important to note that the rise of this ideological music scene was not entirely spontaneous but was guided by musicians and producers such as George Burdy and Ian Stuart Donaldson, who were aiming to create a “global community of young Neo-Nazi Skinheads” (Kaplan and Weinberg, p. 89). The case of the Hammerskin Nation reflects that in many cases indeed the music

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fostered international collaboration. The group utilized white power music concerts and festivals to form important relationships with other groups and eventually to become the most prominent American Skinheads organization. This allowed the group, as previously mentioned, to form chapters of the organization outside the US. The rise of services like iTunes, Spotify, and other open-access music streaming services as well as YouTube in the last twenty years has further bolstered these transnational in-roads for extremist music to grow (Sisario, 2017). As a result, figureheads like Burdy or Donaldson are no longer necessary to make sure extremist musical material has a vocal promoter. This making the recruiting power of white power music even more potent than it was in previous decades when it was entirely reliant on these kinds of promoters to maintain online platforms and implement physical releases at festivals and niche venues (Simi, Windisch, & Sporer, 2016). Recently, it seems that cultural connections between European and American extremist far-right groups also include the engagement in martial arts. The American extreme far-right group, which is the most associated with mobilization of youth via the engagement in various martial arts, is RAM (Rise Above Movement). Its members refer to themselves as the “premier MMA (Mixed Martial Arts) club of the alt-right.“ While initially based in southern California, the group was involved in recent years in continuous efforts to spread its influence and form ties with similar groups in Central and Eastern Europe. These efforts include the consistent participation in far-right conferences and festivals in Europe, as well as organizing and participating in European MMA competitions. In April 2018, leaders and members of the groups traveled to Europe, attending the “Schild und Schwert” (Shield and Sword) Festival, which commemorates Hitler’s birthday, as well as participated in a White only MMA competition in the Ukrainian “Reconquista Club” (Winston & Thompson, 2018). Despite the fact that prominent members of the group were arrested following their “European Tour,” the group was apparently able to recover and even to strengthen its ties with White-Supremacist MMA European groups such as “Pride France”

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and the German group “TIWAZ” (Zidan, 2019). The continued proliferation of White Power MMA groups in both the US and Europe seems to ensure that such collaboration with their American counterparts will continue in the future.

Transactional Ties Some interactions between American and foreign extremist far-right groups are motivated by a combination of ideological convergence and more tangible immediate goals, financial or otherwise. Hence, groups try to overcome legal regulations that may undermine their ability to promote their ideology via collaboration with foreign groups. For example, since in some countries, such as Germany, it is prohibited to produce or disseminate texts which are promoting Holocaust denial, as well as Nazi memorabilia and artifacts, local far-right activists will usually utilize the help of their like-minded counterparts abroad in order to obtain and spread ideological materials. Similarly, right-wing extremist personalities and activists looking to cover operational or personal expenses have increasingly looked to “the currency of the alt-right,” as notable provocateur and neo-Nazi Richard Spencer dubbed Bitcoin (Timberg, 2017). The anonymity afforded by digital currency affords right-wing extremists the ability to operate with impunity that was lost in the wake of pushback against the attempted rebranding of ethnonationalism and far-right extremism by Spencer and others in the alt-right movements of the late 2010s. Digital currency like Bitcoin is seen repeatedly in large donations from unknown senders in both Europe and America to prominent groups or individuals within the extremist far-right ideosphere (McLaughlin, 2021). This allows fringe personalities the opportunity to fund large-scale gatherings (and potentially boost recruiting efforts) as well as keeping said personalities from slipping back into anonymity or irrelevance. Moreover, it creates a more accessible and less visible mechanisms for financial and resource sharing between extremist far-right groups from different countries. It also allows individuals consumers anonymity when engaging in purchasing

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far-right related products. For example, since the early 2000s commercial brands associated with the far right both in Europe and the US were able to build a substantial clientele by offering “nationalist streetwear” which include various articles of clothing, embedded with extremist farright symbols, icons, and slogans (Miller-Idriss, p. 79). These brands naturally operated globally and in their own way created new “uniforms” for far-right activists and associations, in many cases also presenting new visual and textual language which cross-national and geographic barriers.

Concluding Remarks In the last couple of decades, both technological and social dynamics, as well as ideological and organizational ones, led to increasing convergence and interaction between extremist American far-right groups and similar associations overseas. This led some experts to argue that the American far-right should not be considered just a domestic threat anymore but a global one. The picture, however, as the current chapter illustrates, is more nuanced. The convergence seems to exist mainly in the ideological and cultural realms. American and foreign groups do not just share similar ideological affinities but also influence each other, inspiring new ideological narratives and focus. Hence, it is not surprising that some of the more recent prominent ideological narratives of the American far-right are manifested extensively abroad and vice versa. A case in point is the “great replacement” narrative, which is based on the idea that foreigners and minorities will substitute white Christians in leading positions in various spheres of society. Originally proliferated among French and later European white nationalists, it was imported to the US and became a rallying cry for many American white supremacists, gaining prominent visibility during Charlottesville’s “United the Right” rally in 2017. Similarly, the idea of pure white ethnostate was a cornerstone of the German National Socialist Party, but over the years has been adopted with some modifications by other groups, including American ones. In the late 1970s, the Aryan Nation, the most important Christian identity organization in the history of the movement, was formed based on the

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idea of creating an independent “White Bastion” that would engulf areas of the states of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming and would be populated by Aryan farm communities. Similarly, the National Alliance promoted the creation of “white leaving spaces” that would ensure the survival of the white race. The cultural convergence also includes the usage of similar mobilization mechanisms. Among them are white power music, sports and MMA clubs, and in recent years online visual and textual propaganda. While there are growing signs that these cultural domains have the potential to expand into potential collaborative activism, currently, such cases are mostly rare and anecdotal. We could not find evidence that similar cultural activities eventually serve as gateways to more joint militant, illegal, and violent activism. That is not to say that they do not provide American and foreign groups legitimacy to further intensify their activities in their homeland. It is also important to emphasize in this context that past attempts to create umbrella organizations that will serve as a platform for fostering resource sharing and more close collaboration, such as the WUNS, proved to be short-lived and had limited impact. This may change as a result of the spread of online communication platforms. The one domain in which we do see the cultural and ideological convergence translated into actual violent activities is in the case of lone actors whose actions transform them into heroes within the far-right subculture. Individuals such as Anders Breivik, Brenton Tarrant, and others were elevated to an almost mythical stature within the far-right narrative. Their ideological manifestos are being dissected and disseminated to far-right communities worldwide, thus providing incentives for like-minded individuals, such as Philip Manshaus, who was detailed in the introduction. Another relatively new operational collaboration is the travel of American far-right activists to Eastern Ukraine to fight alongside local nationalist militias. Two questions that will demand further study and observation need to be presented in this context. First, is this an outlier or rather representation of a broader paradigm shift in which far-right activists are motivated to fight in the ranks of groups from other countries. The rarity of such cases and the fact that even in the Ukrainian case, the number of actual

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foreign activists seems to be limited, suggest that we need to be careful in perceiving it as a new sign of the internationalization of far-right violence. The second question is why other cases of violent ideological activism, such as Jihadi or left-wing terrorism, were able to cultivate transnational collaboration, which led to the creation of effective transnational organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The extreme-right so far seems to have failed to achieve the same levels of international convergence. Could this be related to the long-time animosity toward globalization and focus on particularistic nationalist goals? Or maybe more related to the inability to produce state actors which will be willing to sponsor such efforts, such as the case of Afghanistan with Jihadi terrorism and the Soviet Union in the case of left-wing terrorism. Future studies will need to further explore these factors and the way they shape the current convergence between the American and foreign far-right extremism.

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16 The Nexus of Right-Wing Extremism and the Canadian Armed Forces Philip McCristall, David C. Hofmann, and Shayna Perry

Introduction In the early morning of July 2, 2020, 46-year-old Manitoban Corey Hurren drove his pickup truck through the front gates of Rideau Hall in Ottawa. There, he picked up five of his loaded guns and wandered around the property until confronted by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers, who diffused the situation and convinced Hurren to surrender peacefully after 90 minutes (Humphreys, 2021). During the aftermath of the event, it was revealed that Hurren was an avid conspiracy theorist and anti-COVID-19 activist who dabbled in and consumed online content from far-right websites and social media. P. McCristall Ontario Tech University, Oshawa, ON, Canada D. C. Hofmann (B) · S. Perry University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_16

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Furthermore, it was revealed that Hurren was a member of the Canadian Rangers, an Army Reservist unit whose purpose is to provide a military presence in rural and isolated parts of Canada. This event was the second controversial high-profile event within 12 months that involved a member of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In the summer of 2019, Winnipeg Free Press Journalist Ryan Thorpe revealed that a CAF Reserves combat engineer, Patrik Mathews, had ties to the far-right extremist movement “The Base”, and was planning a violent revolution with contacts in the United States in order to create a white-ethno-state (Pauls & Johnston, 2020). Both of these events dominated media-cycles for weeks and served as a concrete wake-up call to both the CAF and the Canadian public to the potentially dangerous ties between far-right extremism and the military. The link between far-right extremism and the military has been explored at length in the American context (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Koehler, 2019; Lawrence, & Kane 1996; Lokay et al., 2021; Presley, 1996), and other national contexts (Asal et al., 2020; Haugstvedt, 2021; Jackson, 2019; Scrivens et. al., 2021; Taylor 2019). However, to date there have been no theoretical or empirical examinations of the social dynamics, push-and-pull factors, and motivations of right-wing extremists and their relationship with the CAF. While the CAF opposes hateful ideologies and conduct and actively seeks to filter out individuals who engage with these worldviews (Government of Canada, 2020a—DAOD 5019-0 and CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20— CAO 11-82), enlistment remains an attractive opportunity for far-right extremists. Members of far-right extremist groups, particularly those that engage in paramilitary training or who are members of accelerationist movements who seek to ignite a violent uprising in order to establish white Christian republics, recognize the value in the type of resources, training, and knowledge that military training can potentially provide. Several Canadian chapters of these types of movements have even explicitly encouraged their members to seek military training to further their goals (Boire, 2020; CASIS, 2019; Malhotra, 2020; Tebbutt, 2020). The CAF has been proactive in addressing the fallout of both Mathews and Hurren’s far-right extremist ties and motivations (Taylor, 2020; Thorpe, 2020). However, there is both a pressing and practical need for

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a better understanding the complex social relationship that forms the nexus between far-right extremism and the Canadian military. In order to remain a functioning and productive social institution, the Canadian military must retain and maintain a sense of legitimacy from the population that they serve. A successful violent far-right extremist attack where one or more of the perpetrators have ties to the Canadian military has the potential to be both a security and political nightmare. A more proactive scholarly approach towards understanding the nexus between right-wing extremism (RWE) and the CAF that can strengthen efforts to detect and combat far-right extremist and hateful forms of conduct within the Canadian military is therefore sorely needed. Unfortunately, there is very little public or scholarly knowledge about the breadth, extent, and depth of right-wing extremist ideologies within the CAF itself (Perry & Scrivens, 2019), and whether there are concrete social interactions and experiences tied to being within (or a former member of ) the Canadian military that may be conducive to the adoption of far-right extremist ideologies. This chapter therefore seeks to begin addressing this lacuna in knowledge, which will hopefully help generate further empirical and theoretical explorations of far-right extremism in the CAF, in two concrete ways: (1) by contextualizing the historical landscape that has lain the ground for the contemporary and problematic nexus of right-wing extremism and the CAF, and (2) by providing a preliminary overview of the current scholarly knowledge and potentially fruitful avenues for future research into right-wing extremism in the CAF.

The Recent Historical Context of the RWE/CAF Nexus While the recent high-profile events involving Mathews, Hurren, and others tied to the CAF have brought the issue of the nexus between RWE and the CAF to the forefront of Canadian security and politics, it is by no means a new phenomenon. While the Canadian military enjoys a positive international reputation as peacekeepers and staunch allies, its

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history is not devoid of acts of racism, inappropriate behaviour, criticism, and public inquiries into hateful conduct. It would be blind and inappropriate to fail to acknowledge the role those early incarnations of the Canadian military played in the systematic colonization of Canada’s indigenous peoples (Moses, 2000; Savard & Landriault, 2019), and the racist behaviours exhibited by some members of the CAF during the Korean war (Wallace 1993). However, since the focus of this chapter is on the modern incarnation of RWE ideologies and groups, and their relationships with the CAF, it focuses primarily on the nexus of RWE and the CAF from the 1990s onwards, starting with what has come to be known as “the Somalia affair” and the inquiry that emerged as a result. While the overview below is by no means exhaustive and warrants further exploration at a much greater length, it provides some of the historical context of the more highly publicized and visible events that continue to shape CAF practice and policy and have had lasting ramifications on its institutional identity and culture.

The Legacy of the Somalia Affair The Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was formed in Edmonton, Alberta (AB), on April 8, 1968, under the Chief of the Defence Staff General Jean Victor Allard (Adams, 2020). In April of 1977, the Regiment moved to Petawawa, ON, and restructured as a Special Service Force (Airborne Regiment Association of Canada, 2014). According to the Airborne Regiment Association of Canada (2014, n.p.), the purpose of the Regiment was: …to provide a small general-purpose force in central Canada which could quickly be inserted in any national or international theatre of operations…[and] to provide a quick reaction force in support of national security, North American defense and international peacekeeping.

The CAR deployed internationally for the purpose of peacekeeping in 1981, 1985, and 1986 (Adams, 2020). In the early 1990s, Somalia was considered a “failed state”, experiencing increased tensions and fighting among clansmen and warlords, thousands of starving people, and a

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previous United Nations (UN) operation that had failed to establish control of the situation within the area (Granatstein & Oliver, 2013, p. 59). According to Granatstein and Oliver (2013), the Canadian military had been stretched to a bare minimum due to budgetary cuts and force reductions. Therefore, the CAR, the Canadian Forces’ quick reaction force, “was the only suitable combat unit not already deployed, recovering from a deployment, or preparing for one” (p. 59). In late December of 1992, 1,400 Canadian soldiers were deployed to Somalia. Of those soldiers, 900 CAR and 45 US Army Special Forces personnel were assigned to the desert city of Belet Huen in south-central Somalia. These troops were responsible for securing 20,000-square miles of territory—roughly the size of Nova Scotia—near the Ethiopian border (Nemeth, 1993). More specifically, they were tasked with establishing the peace and delivering humanitarian relief to the “ravaged land” (O’Reilly, 1998, p. 244). The ongoing anarchy and starvation in Somalia led to the creation of the UN-sanctioned United Task Force (UNITAF) (Foot, 2019). The new Unified Task Force was authorized by the United Nations as a Chapter VII intervention under the UN Charter that could use force to restore peace (Granatstein & Oliver, 2013, p. 59). The actions undertaken by certain members of the CAR while deployed to Somalia skyrocketed the issue of RWE within the CAF to the forefront of Canadian politics, security, and the media. In March 1993, just weeks after senior CAF leadership gave verbal orders allowing soldiers to shoot at thieves under certain conditions, two Somalis were shot in the back by Canadian soldiers while attempting to break into the local army base, and an additional six Somalian citizens were killed under similar circumstances (Amad, 2018; O’Reilly, 1998; Somalia Inquiry, 1997; Toronto Sun, 2020). Two doctors deployed at the Canadian Army base concluded that the deaths of the two Somalian citizens were suspicious and were likely unjustified (Stewart, 1993). Shortly following these suspicious shootings in the CAF compound, a 16-year-old Somalian teenager, Shidane Arone, was taken into custody, beaten, and allegedly raped and killed by members of the Airborne Regiment (Razack, 2000). Two members of the CAR administered the bulk of the physical abuse to Arone and took sixteen trophy pictures of his torture (The National Magazine, 1997). After Arone’s body was

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found, nine of the soldiers involved were charged in connection with his death (United Press International, 1995). On March 30, 1993, a press release to the public cited the incident, which brought international attention to Arone’s murder. Furthermore, in early 1995, several home-made videos recorded in 1993 showed CAF soldiers posing with bound Somalian children, making racial and discriminatory comments, and flaunting weapons such as clubs and guns. Some of the soldiers were chanting violently about “breaking arms, legs and limbs”, while others claimed none of the Somalian’s were starving and that “they never work, or they are lazy, they’re slobs and they stink” (Harada, 1995; United Press International, 1995). The aftermath of the Somalian Affair led to a three-year public inquest (Bercuson, 2009; Foot, 2019), and much of the blame surrounding the incident was laid on the shoulders of senior CAF leadership (Somalia Inquiry Report, 1997). Findings from the inquest found that “senior officers tried to hide mistakes and shirk responsibility… [and there were] not just a few rotten apples but a system [that was] rotten to the core”. Furthermore: Senior officers both in Somalia and at National Defence Headquarters [NDHQ] tried to cover up the March 4th , 1993, shooting death of a suspected looter and that defence brass destroyed documents in an attempt to conceal the fact they had been tampered with. (Somalia Inquiry Report, 1997)

The effects of the Somalia affair were deeply felt “virtually [within] all aspects of Canadian military life” (Bercuson, 2009, p. 36). The scandal contributed to the disbanding of the elite CAR and contributed to the decline of Canada’s contribution to global peacekeeping efforts (Koring, 2012). The events that led up to and following the death of Shidane Arone by members of the CAR destroyed the reputation of both Canada as a global peacekeeping entity and tarnished the proud history of the CAR (Winslow, 1997). The Somalia affair is often cited as the catalyst that led to the total restructuring of the Canadian military, which involved addressing

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long-standing systemic issues, an overhaul of the professional development system which included the educational requirements and teaching practices for occupational advancement, and a firm codification of the “requirements for commissioned officers and for general officer specifications” (Bercuson, 2009, p. 38). The intent was to create and foster a culture that was focused on “leadership, [increased] accountability, discipline, personnel selection, training, and rules of engagement” (Granatstein & Oliver, 2013, p. 60).

A Timeline of Post-Somalia Affair RWE/CAF Incidents In the subsequent wake of the Somalia inquiry, there has been increased scrutiny by CAF leadership aimed at identifying and preventing hateful conduct within and outside the context of military life, culminating with the CAF’s hateful conduct policy (Government of Canada, 2020d) which was adopted in 2020. According to Shimooka (2021), the impact of the Somalian Commission of Inquiry is generally seen as successful and “effective at weeding out the immediate problems localized within the airborne regiment and significantly raised the military’s overall professionalization” (n.p.). However, not all systemic issues were eradicated following the inquest and many continue to exist in the CAF, and some argue that there remain institutional and cultural manifestations of discriminating and inappropriate behaviour (McCristall & Baggaley, 2019; McCristall, 2020; Taber, 2017; von Hlatky, 2019), which is lamentable, but perhaps understandable considering the difficulties faced by any large institution set on eradicating unwanted behaviours and beliefs among the personnel it employs. Despite increased accountability and institutional oversight, there have been several high-profile and public cases of CAF members holding and expressing RWE ideologies, or engaging in behaviours inspired by these beliefs, with a notable increase around 2010 onwards. An abbreviated timeline is provided below, which outlines and contextualizes the events surrounding these activities, and Table 16.1 lists all known cases of CAF members involved with the RWE nexus from 1991 to 2020.

Sgt

Mark Boland

Pte

Pte

Land Airborne

MCpl

Clayton Matchee (Cree Indigenous) Kyle Brown (Cree Indigenous)

David Brockalbank

Land Airborne Land Airborne

MCpl

Matt McKay

Element

Land Airborne

Land Airborne

Airforce

Rank

Not Available

Matt McKay

1993

1993

1993

1990 1993 1993

1991

Year

Displays of discriminatory and racist remarks on video Torturing of 16-year-old Somali Shidane Arone Negligent Performance of Duties

Neo-Nazi, Skinhead, Aryan Nation Murdered 16-year-old Somali Shidane Arone 2nd Degree Murder Torture Tortured 16-year-old Somali Shidane Arone 2nd Degree Murder Torture

Neo-Nazi, KKK, Aryan Nation

Racist affiliations

List of known CAF members involved with RWE (1991–2020)

Name

Table 16.1

Somalia

Somalia

Somalia

Somalia

Beating Death of Gordon Kuhtey Somalia

Incident

Unfit to attend court due to attempted suicide Guilty of manslaughter and torture and sentenced to five years Served 40 months Released with disgrace Acquitted on criminal charges Pleaded guilty sentenced to 90 days and served 66

Charges Dismissed

Punishment

416 P. McCristall et al.

Major

Captain

Sgt

Captain

WO

Carol Mathieu

Anthony Seward

Michael Sox

Perry Gresty

Michel Rainville

Murphy

Nathan LeBlanc

Rank

Lt. Col

Name

Element

Land Airborne Land Airborne

Airborne

Airborne

Airborne

Land Airborne Airborne

Year

1997

1993

1993

1993

1993

1993

Racist affiliations

Kicked 16-year-old Somali Shidane Arone savagely Fatal beating of Nirmal Gill, 65 years

Commanding Officer

Surrey, BC Sikh Temple

Somalia

Somalia

Somalia

Somalia

Somalia

Incident

(continued)

12-year prison sentence

Acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm Acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm. Convicted of negligent performance of duty Acquitted of criminal charges Acquitted of criminal charges and released from the CAF

Acquitted

Punishment

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Land Reserve Army Reserve

Brandon Cameron Henry Lung

Cpl

MP Reserve

Navy

Grant Gauchier

Ryan Jorgensen

Navy

Erik Maurice

Pte

Navy

David Eldridge

Pte

Navy

Junior Sailor

Element Land 4th Canadian Ranger Group Navy

John Eldridge

Braidyn Pollit

Rank

(continued)

Erik Myggland

Name

Table 16.1 Year

2018

2018

2018

2017

2017

2017

2017

2017

2017

Racist affiliations

Fireforce Ventures

Neo-Nazi affiliations Iron March Fireforce Ventures

Proud Boys disrupted a Mi’kmaw ceremony

Proud Boys disrupted a Mi’kmaw ceremony

Proud Boys disrupted a Mi’kmaw ceremony

Proud Boys disrupted a Mi’kmaw ceremony

A mocking war cry during a recruit Indigenous graduation

Soldiers of Odin the Three Percenters

Calgary

Calgary

Nova Scotia

Halifax

Halifax

Halifax

Halifax

Halifax

Incident

Remedial Punishment No criminal charges No criminal charges

Warning and a permanent mark on pers file Probation No criminal charges Probation No criminal charges Probation No criminal charges Probation No criminal charges

Punishment

418 P. McCristall et al.

OCdt

Cadet Officer

Darik Horn

Lesley Kenderesi

Land

Land Combat Engineer Reserve Reserve

MCpl

Reserve

Patrik Mathews

Wesley Taylor

Element Regular

Navy Reserve

Cpl

Kyle Porter

Boris Mihajlovic

Rank

Cpl

Name

Year

2020

2019

2018

2018

2018

Racist affiliations

Founding Supporter of the Canadian Nationalist Party Warned people against what he described as “a killer vaccine” stating it was “criminal” to administer it to people

The Base

Iron March Blood & Honour Comabt 18

Fireforce Ventures

Fireforce Ventures

Toronto, Ontario

Edmonton

Calgary

Calgary

Incident

(continued)

Under Investigation

No criminal charges No criminal charges Kicked out of the military no criminal charges In Custody

Punishment

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William Condie

Corporal

Rank

(continued)

Corey Hurren

Name

Table 16.1 Element Land 4th Canadian Ranger Group Land (Armoured Reserves)

Year

2021

2020

Racist affiliations

Neo-Nazi forum Iron March back in 2017 Online footprint extends beyond Iron March—Neo-Nazi—also known to chat with known Atomwaffen Division member, “Vex.” used KanadianKommando as his moniker all over the Internet

Crashing his truck into the gates of Rideau Hall

Reserve Armoured Regiment Hull, Quebec

Ottawa, Ontario

Incident

Under Investigation

Awaiting Sentencing

Punishment

420 P. McCristall et al.

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Space constraints prevent a fulsome description of these events; however, a more detailed version of this timeline is available in Perry (2021). In 1997, the CAF ejected a 25-year-old soldier from Canadian Forces Base Petawawa after he was involved in theft and found to have hate literature among his possessions. Just weeks after his removal from Petawawa, the soldier took part in the fatal beating of an elderly Sikh man. He received a 12-year sentence, while some of his fellow neo-Nazis involved in the attack received 15 years in prison. During a subsequent investigation, four other privates in the soldier’s company were identified as having possible racist involvement. No charges were laid, but all four were the subject of administrative action such as mandatory probation and counselling (Pugliese, 2019). In 2011, an investigation was launched into the activities of a 17-yearold Manitoban reservist who expressed white-supremacist views online and made plans to attend an in-person white power rally in Calgary, Alberta (Pugliese, 2019). While the reservist denied being a racist, he admitted to posting comments on a white-supremacist website. Two CAF veterans founded La Meute (the Wolfpack) in 2015 in Quebec. La Meute is avowedly anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, hypernationalist, and espouses far-right extremist worldviews. The group purports to fight against illegal immigration, while upholding what they view as the defence of Quebecois values and culture against othered minorities. An investigation by Radio Canada discovered that up to 75 members of La Meute’s Facebook group were current or former members of the CAF (CBC, 2017). Several members of the CAF were identified as active participants in the neo-Nazi website, Iron March, from 2015 to 2017 (Lamoureux, 2018; Lamoureux & Makuch, 2018). In these posts, the CAF members encouraged other RWE adherents to seek out military training and combat training for the purposes of furthering extremist ideologies and causes. In 2017, two situations arose where CAF members engaged in discriminatory RWE related or motivated activities. During a graduation ceremony on May 11, 2017, onboard the HMCS Fredericton for Indigenous recruits, a junior sailor spouted racial taunts, including a mocking “war cry” directed at Indigenous CAF members (Chiu, 2017). Several

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months later, an Indigenous protest in front of the statue of Edward Cornwallis was disrupted by five CAF members who claimed to be members of the “Proud Boys”, which is an alt-right, Western chauvinist movement that was placed on the Canadian terror watchlist in 2021 (Public Safety Canada, 2019). They verbally accosted the indigenous protestors, challenging the Mi’kmaq’s claims of systemic colonization while asserting that Canada was a British colony, first and foremost (Lagerquist, 2017). The leaders of the Proud Boys posted a statement online saying: “we win, our brothers the Halifax 5 are returning to active military duty with no charges, let the SJW [social justice warriors] tears pour. Proud of our boys” (Quon & Previl, 2017). In 2018, four CAF members were suspended for their involvement in a military-surplus store that avowed white-supremacist ideals and catered to white-nationalist clients (Rumbolt, 2018). Shortly after this event in mid-2019, an undercover journalist identified Patrik Mathews, a Manitoban reservist, as a member of the violent white-ethnonationalist RWE group “the Base”. Mathews attempted to recruit some of his fellow members into the Base to form a white-supremacist terrorist cell, but upon his discovery, he fled to the United States, where he was subsequently arrested at a pro-gun rally in Virginia (Burke & Pauls, 2021). Also in 2019, a Toronto reservist was identified as the founder of the Canadian Nationalist Party, which expresses RWE worldviews, policies, and ideologies. In 2020, two incidents involving the 4th Canadian Rangers caught national attention (Thompson & Brewster, 2020). Erik Myggland’s social media posts dating back to 2017 were discovered, and it was revealed that he was active in online RWE social media forums and posted supportive comments for RWE groups such as the Soldiers of Odin and the Three Percenters (Brewster, 2020). The second Ranger, Correy Hurren, smashed through the gates at Rideau Hall while armed with a loaded weapon, with the intent of confronting the Prime Minister. He was subsequently arrested by the RCMP without any violence.

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Observations on the Contemporary RWE/CAF Nexus There remains a dearth of quality empirical research on the variety and types of social relationships and dynamics that may exist between rightwing extremist groups and the CAF (Perry & Scrivens, 2019). However, based on the preliminary findings from ongoing funded research projects that seek to explore, identify, and better understand some of these relationships,1 and some exploratory empirical research conducted by one of the authors (see, Perry, 2021), we present several informed observations that will likely help guide future research on the contemporary nexus between RWE and the CAF. By no means are these observations to be treated as exhaustive and will need to be expanded upon and further explored with quality empirical research. However, there is sufficient evidence that they are fruitful areas of inquiry for scholars interested in better understanding some of the social factors and dynamics that exist between RWE groups and the CAF. While the CAF actively and formally condemns hateful conduct among its membership and seeks to prevent the admission of recruits with hateful ideologies, it is undeniable that a small percentage of active and former CAF members have been attracted to, and involved with, RWE ideas and causes. Therefore, we argue that the RWE/CAF nexus must be conceptualized as a dyadic “push-pull” relationship, and the interpersonal and social dynamics that may draw some CAF soldiers to RWE lifestyles (and vice versa) need to be part of the larger scholarly and practical exploration. This section begins by outlining several of the identified “pull” factors that may motivate RWE adherents to join the CAF, and “push” factors that may drive a certain subset of CAF members to seek out and engage with RWE ideologies. We then make an argument, based primarily on Perry’s (2021) qualitative empirical research on the RWE/CAF nexus, that the Reserve forces may be more conducive to the

1 Several of the authors are involved in a three-year project (2020–2023) financed by the Canadian Armed Forces to examine this question from a theoretical and empirical standpoint. For more information, see: https://sites.ontariotechu.ca/rwe-caf/index.php.

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adoption of RWE ideologies due to several structural and group social dynamics.

Pull Factors: Veterans and Trauma To date, we have identified two main “pull” factors which may motivate current or former members of the CAF to explore RWE ideologies and potentially engage in RWE-motivated activities: (1) veterans who may seek some form of order or belonging after leaving military service and (2) the expression and management of trauma by combat-experienced soldiers and veterans. There is empirical evidence that some veterans will seek to join and participate in groups that emulate their time and experiences while they were within the military (Abadinsky, 2013, p. 228). Much of the current research in this area points to veteran’s post-military involvement in Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs/Groups (OMCs or OMGs), which offers their membership close social bonds within a group, rigid structure, and the thrill of risk (see, Wolf, 1991). Others may find meaning within formal RWE movements that valorize, mimic, and emulate military lifestyle such as wilderness-based paramilitary and survivalist groups. Further examination of OMCs that taps into the rich criminological literature on the subject may prove to be a fruitful avenue for future research on the CAF/RWE nexus. There are many veteran-themed (see, Perry, 2021, p. 54) and hobbyist motorcycle clubs who embrace the “outlaw” lifestyle associated with bikers (e.g. leather vests, patches, tattoos, certain demeanours, etc.) while remaining productive law-abiding members of society. Some groups, such as Bikers Against Child Abuse (BACA), form their club identities around pro-social causes such as the protection of children, all while maintaining the trappings of an outlaw lifestyle.2 However, the criminal element of OMCs, known as “one percenters” (a term coined by the American Motorcycle Association to refer to the one per cent of motorcyclists who engage in crime, giving the other 99% a bad reputation), overtly integrate hateful, racist, white-supremacist, and 2

See the B.A.C.A International website for more information: https://bacaworld.org/.

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other exclusionary imagery into their group motifs (e.g. swastikas, SS lightning bolts) (see, Schneider, 2017, pp. 286–292, 303–306). While one-percenter outlaw bikers are driven more by their desire for criminal profit, rather than by RWE ideological concerns, a certain subset of CAF members and veterans may be drawn to one-percenter groups and culture as opposed to motives surrounding material gain. In turn, one-percenter groups are known to actively seek out current and former CAF members for the same reasons as RWE ideology-driven groups: for technical expertise, social connections, and general military knowhow (Smith, 2019, pp. 102–107). As a result, a better understanding of the converging nexus between OMCs, the CAF, and RWE may provide interesting insights into some of the push (and/or pull) factors that may motivate current and former members of the CAF to become involved in RWE lifestyles and movements. In several of the qualitative interviews of current and former CAF members undertaken by Perry (2021, pp. 105–106), interviewees indicated that psychological and physical trauma experienced by soldiers deployed to foreign combat tours where the enemy is a member of a racial and religious minority in the Canadian context may help explain why and how some combat veterans embrace RWE worldviews. The scholarly literature on the psychological trauma experienced by combat veterans and the methods they use to cope (e.g. substance abuse, increased hostility, and so on) is long-standing and vast (e.g. Bremner et al., 1996; Jakupcak et al., 2007). There has also been some empirical research that individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have heightened states of threat perception and deficits in executive decision-making involving choices related to political violence (see, Kanagaratnam & Asbjornsen, 2007). It is therefore likely that a certain subset of CAF combat veterans may find some form of therapeutic solace for their personal trauma by embracing RWE worldviews. In their seminal and rigorously empirically tested work on religious conversion to deviant perspectives, Lofland and Stark (1965) provide an analogous explanation as to why some combat veterans may turn to RWE worldviews to make sense of their trauma. They identify five predispositions that may cause someone to adopt a radically new worldview or perspective: (1) experiencing some form of extreme personal tension which may

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drive an individual to seek its resolution, (2) some form of psychiatric, political, or religious solution to the perceived source of the problematic tension, (3) the failure to find solutions for the experienced personal tension through conventional means, (4) a “turning point”: a personal, group, or societal event or moment which disrupts old social bonds and provides an opportunity for the adoption of new worldviews or perspectives, and (5) affective bonds, which consists of the formation of positive interpersonal bonds between the individual and members who hold the deviant worldview. In other words, a small percentage of combat veterans suffering from PTSD or other forms of personal trauma may find a solution to their tension within the narratives and worldviews offered by RWE ideologies. Other means of assuaging this tension (mental-health treatments, pharmacological treatments, self-medication, and so on) have failed, the process of psychologically projecting the source of personal (and by extension, societal) suffering onto a clearly defined “othered” group may offer a sense of meaning and purpose to these individuals, as well as an outlet for diffusion of the extreme tension they experience. This experience may be catalysed through a poignant personal experience, or a large-scale societal event (e.g. the false accusation that Donald Trump had the US election stolen from him in 2020) which may serve as a turning point towards the adoption of an RWE worldview. Last, these individuals may find acceptance, affection, and purpose within RWE groups, which help feed and frame the previously adopted ideological narratives.

Push Factors: The Desire for Expertise Among RWE Groups and “Military Cool” Based on recent cases involving Patrik Mathews and Erik Myggland of the Canadian Rangers, it appears that CAF members are being actively targeted for recruitment because of their expertise related to their military training (Perry & Scrivens, 2019, p. 74; Thorpe, 2019). According to Parent and Ellis (2015), “research has shown a clear trend of right-wing extremist recruitment of active military personnel and veterans” (p. 17). At this stage, we have observed two main factors that may be driving

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these efforts: (1) a desire for the technical and practical expertise that military training can offer RWE movements, particularly those who seek to engage in violence or to catalyse a general conflict in order to establish a white-ethno-state (known as “accelerationist movements”), and (2) the interpersonal social benefits, status, and rewards that a military background offers members of RWE movements. There is a recognition among Canadian RWE extremists that the CAF can offer the training, know-how, discipline, and access to material goods that may be useful in achieving medium- and long-term goals of larger RWE movements (Boutilier, 2018; Lamoureux, 2018). As one CAF member posted on the neo-Nazi Iron March forum in 2018, RWE adherents should look to enlist because “…they [will] pay you to teach you the methods you need to destroy them” (Perry, 2021, p. 11; Rocha & Yates, 2019). Canadian RWE adherents have also been observed discussing efforts to recruit existing or former CAF members, particularly among those who have been deployed, and who have weapons training and leadership abilities (Lamoureux, 2018). While the Internet, paramilitary training, shooting ranges, guidebooks, and other freely available resources can offer RWE movements some form of knowledge and expertise, there is a clear understanding among RWE adherents that the CAF is an accessible resource that can offer a higher quality of training desired by RWE groups. The second push factor that may drive RWE adherents to join the CAF is more personal in nature and involves the recognition and status from other members of RWE groups that a military background may offer. There is evidence that many RWE groups, particularly those that engage in paramilitary training exercises (e.g. the Three Percenters), fantasize about and valorize aspects of military culture, such as loyalty, identity, hypermasculinity, camaraderie, and patriotism (see, Hutter, 2018). A cursory analysis of the recruitment propaganda, social media content, and memes created by Canadian RWE groups reveals a marked preference for military imagery, symbols, and other militaristic trappings like assault weapons, camouflage, and paramilitary training techniques (e.g. see, Allard 2018). It is clear that many members of Canadian RWE groups, particularly those who engage in paramilitary and survivalist activities, place a near-reverent importance on all things military and seek

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to emulate what they believe to be important aspects of military culture and training. This effect, which we term “military cool”, may provide RWE adherents with formal military backgrounds immediate access to leadership and training roles, as well as respect and veneration from fellow RWE adherents who may seek to emulate or learn from these individuals. Since some of the motivations for joining RWE movements can be attributed to personal desires for belonging, acceptance, and purpose (see, Perry & Scrivens, 2019), military training may provide a relatively easy route to gain additional credibility, social status, and interpersonal rewards from their peers.

Location: Army & Combat Arms Trades and Reserve Forces In one of the first scholarly explorations of the RWE/CAF nexus that uses primary data, Perry (2021, pp. 19–20, 63–67) indicates that there is a perception among current and former CAF members that the culture and training found within the Army & Combat Arms trades creates an enabling environment for the spread and adoption of RWE worldviews within the CAF when compared to other trades. In the subsequent analysis of her data, Perry (2021) points to a culture of hypermasculinity, warfare socialization, violent/combat-oriented training, and other sociocultural influences within the Combat Arms trades as likely contributors to the adoption of RWE worldviews for a small subset of CAF members. Perry (2021, pp. 120–124) also highlights several structural and organizational differences between regular and reserve forces that likely contributes to an increased likelihood of certain CAF reservists embracing RWE worldviews when compared to the regular forces. The assertion that RWE beliefs are activities are more prominent within the reserves is supported by the known cases of CAF members who engaged in RWE-related actions listed in Table 16.1, with at least 11 of the cases after 2010 involving members of the reserves (see also, Perry, 2021, pp. 19–20). In her analysis, Perry identifies factors such as the social and physical isolation, and the relatively loose organization of certain Canadian

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Rangers units as potential factors. In more general terms, reservists have relatively more freedom of movement and only a part-time commitment to the military lifestyle, which offers less scrutiny from superiors. This, in turn, may allow RWE ideas to be more freely expressed among members (both privately and within the ranks themselves), with a reduced chance of being observed or caught. Reservists also tend to stay closer to home, while regular force members tend to move around, and are therefore exposed to new ideas, cultures, attitudes, and values, which may be correlated with an increased likelihood of more tolerant worldviews (see, Perry, 2021, p. 122).

What Has the CAF Done to Combat RWE Extremism? As a result of the heightened public attention to the challenges faced by the Canadian military when dealing with RWE within both regular and reserve forces, the CAF has developed a comprehensive definition of unacceptable behaviours, beliefs, and ideologies, which they term “hateful conduct”, in order to combat the potential for the radicalization of service members (Government of Canada, 2020a—DAOD 5019-0 and CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20—CAO 11-82). As of July 2020, the CAF has amended this policy to include an expanded definition of hateful conduct, which is as follows: An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability.

Furthermore, Vice-Admiral Haydn Edmundson, Commander Military Personnel Command, further elaborated on what the CAF means by hateful conduct which:

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...be it through words or actions, is completely incompatible with CAF ethics and values. The women and men who serve in the Canadian Armed Forces are held to the highest standard for their professional and personal conduct and are expected to exemplify Canadian values, including respect for diversity, whether they are here at home or abroad. (Government of Canada 2020b, n.p.)

As part of this policy and the CAF’s mandate, the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit’s (CFNCIU’s) responsibilities have extended to detecting the capabilities and intents of hostile extremist actors within the CAF inspired by RWE ideologies, and to either neutralize or exploit the threat. In a more practical sense, the CAF also established the new Hateful Conduct Incident Tracking System (HCITS) that will leverage the existing Operation HONOUR Tracking and Analysis System (OPHTAS) for CAF members and their respective leadership (Government of Canada, 2020c). This reporting system is intended to allow for consistent tracking and improved reporting of hateful conduct incidents, which will be reviewed, assessed, investigated, and addressed by the chain of command (Government of Canada, 2020c). The current measures to screen out extremists in the military involve an aptitude test, references and conduct checks, security screenings, and personal interviews. However, as some critics have noted, stronger prevention measures are needed to properly understand why extreme behavioural actions occur and in doing so create opportunity to better address identifying and preventing extreme deviance (Malhotra, 2020).

The CAF and the “Wicked Problem” It is clear that the CAF takes the threat posed by hateful conduct as an existential threat to the continued operation of the Canadian military and has taken steps to educate military personnel, codify what constitutes hateful conduct, and in seeking external expertise to better understand the social dynamics involved in the adoption of hateful worldviews. However, a realistic approach to the problem of hateful conduct needs to acknowledge the immensity of the task involved in enacting large-scale

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institutional culture changes aimed at creating an environment where hateful conduct and beliefs become anathema. Military scholars have termed this genre of institutional struggle as “wicked problem(s)” within armed forces that, given the hypermasculine culture and the necessity of engaging in violence that are part and parcel of military life, will inevitable be continual social problems that can perhaps never fully resolved (Huddleston, 2020; Okros, 2021. See also Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 161). This does not mean that efforts cannot and should not be made to enact policies and practices to combat “wicked problems”, but rather, casts these initiatives and the social issues they seek to address as hurdles that need to be continually contained, mitigated, and reduced, while acknowledging that a one-hundred per cent success rate is unlikely in an institution like the CAF that contains 100,000 individuals with their own complex beliefs and behaviours.

Suggestions for Future Research To date, most of the limited research focusing on the nexus of RWE and the Canadian military is fragmented and insufficient to begin generalizing core findings from the existent body of scholarly knowledge. As Okros (2021) argues, much of the current research tends to focus on the roots of the problem, rather than focusing on the variety of symptoms associated with hateful conduct. Given the difficulties that some scholars may have in penetrating institutional barriers in order to obtain quality primary source data, reverse engineering the problem may prove to be fruitful for understanding the both the causes and consequences of hateful conduct in the CAF, and may better inform holistic policies aimed at tackling the issue for both current and former service members. This reverse-engineering approach may also prove to be useful with RWE-inclined OMCs with a high number of veterans. An understanding of how and why a certain subset of veterans may be drawn to these types of outlaw cultures may provide interesting parallels for how and why current service members may be attracted to, or embrace, RWE worldviews. Furthermore, intersectional approaches that critically

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examine systemic privilege and oppression that are embedded in historical and cultural foundations of the social structures that make up the Canadian military may prove to be useful in locating key identifiers, social dynamics, and other factors that may catalyse the adoption of extreme or hateful behaviours within the CAF (see, Blige & Collins, 2016). As some of the existing literature covered within this chapter indicates, there appears to be some form of correlation between RWE and “problem areas” within the CAF, with greater incidences of hateful conduct within certain facets of the military, such as the Combat Trades and the Reserves. If these conclusions are supported by future empirical research, it may provide the CAF with targeted hotspots with which to provide additional service member training aimed at identifying and curbing hateful conduct within the ranks. Studies that take structural or systemic approaches to understanding the social conditions within these “hotspots” may help identify areas for institutional change that can inform effective policies focused on mitigating the growth of RWE beliefs within problem areas in the CAF. A thorough examination of the latent and manifest rituals, traditions, and regimental cultures that may promote RWE worldviews (i.e. use of moral pejorative terms, sexist/racist language or symbols, and so on) may also prove to be fruitful, particularly during the aftermath of a crackdown or new policy instituted by senior leadership. The prohibition or banning of certain manifest behaviours or symbols may lead them to be reshaped into less overt behaviours or symbols that are harder to identify, but may be as equally harmful (i.e. coded language and signs, passive-aggressive attitudes towards anti-RWE and anti-hateful conduct policies, and so on). Furthermore, there are lessons to be learned from the failures and successes of Operation Honour that can and should be applied to the RWE context. Scrutiny of the creation, codification, and roll-out of Operation Honour will likely provide important information on what works, and what needs improvement when crafting similar initiatives aimed at combatting other types of undesirable behaviours within the CAF. According to Okros (2021, n.p.), the military has experienced on occasion some “bad apples”, but states that “there is consequences of putting good apples in warped barrels”. In other words, depending on

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the situation and cultural environment in which these “bad apples” are embedded, their ideologies may influence others reflecting forms of social construction and social conditioning. In addition to areas for future research, there are a number of obstacles that scholars interested in the nexus between the RWE and CAF need to consider and overcome. The first, and perhaps most salient, is that not every scholar has a military background, or a deep understanding of military culture, procedure, or social intricacies. Much like other large bureaucratic organizations such as police forces, a deep understanding of the complexities of military life is almost a must for anyone interested in studying it. However, this is not an insurmountable barrier. Research teams that contain subject specialists without military experience and scholars who have first-hand experience with the military will likely produce the best results. The subject matter experts can inform the research within the larger academic debates, knowledge, and approaches, while those with military experience can ground the team in the realities contained within military life and culture. Another prominent obstacle for researchers interested in the RWE nexus and the CAF are the organizational hurdles that are a constant reality when studying large social institutions. The best case scenario when trying to obtain quality primary data on any military is direct cooperation with and from senior leadership. However, this may not always be possible, particularly if the research cleaves more towards critical approaches. When organizational and institutional barriers prevent access to primary data, methods that use carefully gathered and coded secondary data from open sources (e.g. Perry, 2021; Perry and Scrivens, 2019) may prove to be useful in building up the body of scholarly knowledge, that can eventually be tested when access to quality primary data is possible. As a final thought, research that employs alternate modes of gathering data, such as participant observation, may prove to be incredibly fruitful. In a number of interpersonal communications with CAF members, it was suggested that data gathered from formal interviews with servicemembers will likely be censored, sanitized, or biased based on the expectations and perceptions of interviewees, who need to balance concerns such as personal loyalties, fears of repercussions, or a misunderstanding of the protections offered by academic interviews (e.g. complete

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anonymity, do no harm, etc.). Several of these servicemembers suggested that the “true” data on RWE perceptions and worldviews would likely be gleaned in quintessential “military-life” moments: in the tavern after a few beers or in conversations that take place in the muddy trenches after a 10 km hike in the rain with 60 lbs. of gear strapped to your back. Research of this type will likely be difficult and would undoubtedly require time, patience, and institutional cooperation. However, if done correctly, it may provide absolutely ground-breaking insight and foundational information upon which additional scholarly knowledge can be built.3

Conclusion As this chapter outlines, the study of the nexus between the RWE and CAF is in its infancy. The nascent and emerging literature on this topic over the coming years will be important in informing public policy. To this end, this chapter provides scholars interested in this topic with foundational knowledge about the historical context of RWE within the CAF, the contemporary manifestation of prominent incidents of RWE within the CAF, an overview of the current literature, and future avenues of research. Combatting RWE and hateful conduct within the CAF is not going to be a quick or easy endeavour. While senior leadership in the CAF have taken concrete steps at instituting policies and training aimed at combatting RWE and hateful conduct, there remains a dearth of empirically grounded studies about how and why a small subset of servicemembers are attracted to these worldviews. Compounding the troubles that the CAF is facing with hateful conduct, over the last five years the Canadian military has been faced with several class action lawsuits relating to situations involving discrimination based on race, gender, and sexual orientation (see, Connolly, 2021; McKelvey, 2020). These “wicked problems” are continual thorns in the side of the CAF, which requires public 3 Wolf ’s (1991) research that employed participant observation with Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs is a stellar example of this approach.

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trust and confidence in order to operate properly. Further quality empirical scholarship will undoubtedly help the CAF mitigate and contain these issues to the best of their ability.

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Part IV Responses to Far-Right Extremism

17 More Than Walking Away: Barriers to Disengagement Among Former White Supremacists Steven Windisch, Pete Simi, Kathleen M. Blee, and Matthew DeMichele

Like conventional offenders and gang members, extremists have also been found to disengage from group activities (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Latif et al., 2018; Simi et al., 2019). By disengagement, we refer to “the process whereby an individual no longer accepts as appropriate the socially defined rights and obligations that accompany a given role in society” (Ebaugh, 1988, p. 3). Extremist disengagement occurs in two S. Windisch (B) Department of Criminal Justice, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] P. Simi Department of Sociology, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA K. M. Blee Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA M. DeMichele Research Triangle Institute, Durham, NC, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_17

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forms. First, the individual may alter his/her level of participation in the group, such as avoiding violence or reducing their time with other members (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). In these situations, the individual remains a member but reduces his/her level of investment (e.g., time, money, energy) with the group. Second, disengagement may bring the individual to leave the group entirely. This is the typical scenario envisioned and often involves a complete separation from extremist activities. Disengagement does not require the individual to renounce their belief system but instead is characterized by a change in behavior as the individual is no longer motivated to participate in group activities (e.g., meetings, marches). In recent years, there has been considerable research on various aspects of extremist disengagement (for review, see Windisch et al., 2016). A primary focus has involved exploring the various “push” and “pull” factors that motivate a person to end their extremist careers, such as fear of imprisonment (Aho, 1988; Horgan, 2009), “burn out” that accompanies living a conspiratorial lifestyle (Bjørgo & Carlsson, 2005; Kimmel, 2007), violence (Gallant, 2014), and life changes such as starting a family (Christensen, 2015). However, more recent research has found that disengagement is more encompassing than merely disengaging from extremist activities or physically removing oneself from the group (Simi et al., 2017). Instead, disengagement requires an individual to decrease his/her level of “embeddedness” within the group by de-identifying as an extremist member (e.g., altering appearance). As part of the disengagement process, these individuals shed their “extremist” role and adopt the new role of a “former” extremist. Nevertheless, critical questions remain about the complexities and difficulties related to exiting a highly salient identity. Thus, the focus of the current chapter is on barriers to disengagement. We ask the following questions: what obstacles or barriers are associated with shedding a highly salient identity, and why do people remain tethered to extremism even after questioning or experiencing doubt with their current involvement? To examine this issue, our analysis relies on extensive life-history interviews with 47 former US white supremacist extremists (WSE) who were members of the overlapping networks (Burris et al., 2000) of racist groups in the movement’s four major branches: Ku Klux

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Klan, Christian Identity, neo-Nazi, and racist skinheads (Barkun, 1994; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). While organizational and doctrinal differences exist across these networks, all share fundamental ideas such as the impending catastrophe of “white racial genocide” and the view that a multicultural society is antithetical to the interests of EuropeanAmericans (Zeskind, 2009). By capturing the barriers that encumber extremist disengagement, the current study moves us beyond explanations of disengagement that identify push and pull factors toward viewing exit as a behavioral process by which structural, emotional, and cognitive factors interact as part of an individual’s decision to exit from his/her role as a member of a violent extremist group.

What Influences Extremist Disengagement? Currently, terrorism literature highlights a complex web of micro- and macro-level push and pull factors that compel disengagement from extremist groups. Push factors refer to negative qualities in the group or organization that induce members to leave, whereas pull factors refer to positive considerations outside of the group that attracts members to another life (Howell & Egley Jr., 2005; Venhaus, 2010). One of the most common push factors identified involves disillusionment, which is best understood as the realization that a consistent incongruence exists between idealized expectations and everyday realities associated with those same expectations (Bubolz & Simi, 2015; Casserly & Megginson, 2009). For example, an individual may join an extremist group to receive protection but later become disillusioned by the reality that they are at risk of victimization by fellow group members (Altier et al., 2017). Disillusionment may also result from a lack of loyalty among group members (Latif et al., 2019), loss of faith (Souleimanov & Aliyev, 2014), and tactical disagreement (Hwang et al., 2013). Violence is another common push factor that leads to disengagement. Violence can involve interpersonal conflicts over romantic relationships, money, or respect (Bjørgo & Carlsson, 2005). Constant in-fighting among members reduces the legitimacy of the group and produces frustration with the inability of leaders to manage group dynamics. Disengagement stemming from violence

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can also involve witnessing or participating in aggressive action directed toward bystanders such as children, interracial couples, or members of the LGBTQIA+ community (Van der Valk & Wagenaar, 2010). Extreme emotions (e.g., guilt, shame) produced from engaging in violence have been found to generate moral concerns with movement ideology that leads to burnout (Bjørgo, 1997, 2011; Simi & Windisch, 2020). In addition to push factors, terrorism scholars have examined pull factors such as the prospect of being hired for a legal, legitimate job or returning to or completing school (Mink, 2015). One of the most common pull factors identified is the presence of positive relationships outside of the movement. These relationships have been found to act as motivators that change the individual’s future orientation, outlook, and sense of responsibility (Latif et al., 2019). While children have been identified as the most common type of familial relationship related to disengagement (Bérubé et al., 2019; Simi et al., 2019), relationships to intimate partners, distant relatives, and peer friendships (e.g., co-workers, childhood friends) have also been found to influence disengagement (Aho, 1988, 1994; Blazak, 2004; Gadd, 2006). For these individuals, attachments to these relationships function as a turning point away from extremist behavior because the individual had fewer opportunities to participate (Christensen, 2015). That is, obligations to relationships outside of the movement create a conflict between loyalty to the group and responsibilities to family and friends. In recent years, researchers have found that disengagement is much more encompassing than merely disengaging from extremist activities or physically removing oneself from the group. For example, Simi and colleagues (2017) examined the challenges associated with disengagement after participants exit. The authors found that extremists experienced several residual effects that participants described as a form of “addiction” (p. 1168). These residual effects were found to intrude on cognitive and emotional processes, and participants reported longterm physiological effects that, in some cases, involved complete relapse into extremist behavior. Simi and colleagues’ (2017) findings underscore a holistic understanding of identity beyond how one thinks or feels to include the physical embodiment of identities. Such a formulation suggests that disengagement may be more complicated than “walking

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away” (Horgan, 2008) and beginning another phase of life that involves new social roles and networks. To build on this line of research, the central focus of this chapter is on the challenges associated with disengagement before participants exit such an intensive and marginalized lifestyle. Existing studies of extremist disengagement focus on exit as an absolute endpoint in which push and pull factors act as instantaneous breaks on an individual’s extremist career. However, life does not unfold in this type of linear fashion with clear-cut beginning and ending phases (Wacquant, 1990). Instead, as we analyze, structural, emotional, and cognitive factors tether an individual to his/her role as a member of a violent extremist group and can sometimes prolong disengagement even after that person no longer embraces the extremist lifestyle.

Methodology and Data The current sample consists of 47 former US white supremacists whose activism primarily occurred between 1975 and 2013. Regarding the length of involvement, participation in white supremacism ranged from two to thirty-four years (M = 10.21; SD = 6.9). Participants were interviewed in the places they now live, with 45 located in 21 states across all regions of the country and 2 in Canada. Participants ranged in age from 23 to 57 years (M = 39.98; SD = 9.1) and included 32 men and 15 women. Fifteen participants described their childhood socioeconomic status as lower class, 12 as working class, 17 as middle class, and three as upper class. A large portion of participants had extensive histories of criminal conduct, including property offenses (e.g., shoplifting) and a variety of violent offenses such as murder, attempted murder, street fights, violent initiation rituals, and bomb-making. Of the 47 participants, 32 reported a history of extremist violence, and 28 had spent time in prison. As there is no way to compile a list of former members to serve as a sampling frame, we identified interviewees by snowball sampling from multiple starts to ensure variety in the location and type of extremist group (Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Wright et al., 1992). We developed

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initial contacts through various means, including our research team’s prior research with active and inactive white supremacists, by identifying former extremists with a public presence (e.g., media, books) and by using referrals by our project partners. We benefited from advice by three prominent human rights groups: Anti-Defamation League, Simon Wiesenthal Center, and Southern Poverty Law Center, as well as an outreach organization, Life After Hate, that provides intervention services for individuals trying to leave or who have left far-right extremist groups. As multiple individuals were used to generate unique snowballs, only a tiny segment of the participants were acquainted. Substantial rapport was established before interviews through regular contact with participants via telephone and email. Interviews were conducted in private settings such as hotel rooms and residential homes and public settings like restaurants and coffee shops. Most of the interviews elicited an in-depth life history to produce narratives that reflect the intersectionality of identity, ideology, and life experiences (McAdams, 1997). The interviews included questions about the subject’s family background, involvement, and disengagement, with probes to encourage subjects to elaborate on aspects of their life histories. These insights would not have been available through secondary sources and movement propaganda (see also Blee, 2002). The interviews lasted between four and more than eight hours and generated 5,028 pages of transcripts, which indicate the level of detail generated through the life histories. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed with only minor edits. Finally, all names of research participants are pseudonyms. We analyzed the life-history interview data using a modified grounded theory approach (Berg, 2007; Charmaz, 2006), allowing researchers to combine a more open-ended, inductive approach while also relying on existing literature and frameworks to guide the research. The initial data coding began by reading entire interview transcripts line-by-line to determine differences and similarities within and across the sample. Inductive codes emerged from the initial phase of the line-by-line analysis (Lofland et al., 2006). Next, deductive codes were extracted from the literature on disengagement and related topics. After the initial codes were developed, we compared and contrasted themes, noting relations between first-level

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data and more general categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Several limitations of this study are important to mention. First, the retrospective nature of life-history interviews raises questions about validity and reliability due to memory erosion, distortion, and selective recall (Baddeley, 1979). The practice of remembering is a reconstructive process where memories are reinterpreted during each recall (Bridge & Paller, 2012). Despite these concerns, the life-history accounts provide important insight from the subjects’ perspective. Second, due to the hidden nature of this population, the sample was derived through snowball techniques and, as a result, is not representative, which prevents generalizations. However, the goal of a grounded theory approach is to develop a conceptual explanation that closely fits the data (or incidents), which the concepts are intended to represent. Although grounded theory is not intended to provide generalizations, the hypotheses developed can be tested at a later point.

Results For the purposes of this current study, barriers to disengagement are structural, emotional, and cognitive factors that tether an individual to his/her role as a member of a violent extremist group. Thus, barriers are not necessarily disruptions to disengagement. Instead, these factors lengthen the time between our participants’ initial feelings of doubt regarding their extremist involvement and the legitimacy of the cause and when they “officially” left the white supremacist movement (e.g., returned their patch; were “jumped” out; joined protective custody (or “PC’d up”); moved to a different state/city). Across the sample, our participants’ length of disengagement ranged from 3 to 204 months (M = 38.95; SD = 44.34). In particular, 16 participants’ length of disengagement took between 3 and 12 months, 13 participants took between 13 and 24 months, 4 participants took between 25 and 36 months, 3 participants took between 37 and 48 months, and 11 participants’ length of disengagement took more than 48 months. It is important to note that disengagement often

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represented an informal process. That is, rather than characterizing a clear-cut endpoint, disengagement involved a combination of unceremonious events such as not returning phone calls or text messages, gradually changing one’s appearance (e.g., growing their hair out), or slowly shifting their time and energy away from extremist activities toward familial, professional, or educational obligations. Based on the life-history interviews, participants discussed involvement in the white supremacist movement as encompassing a totalizing set of experiences that permeate all aspects of a person’s thoughts, emotions, body presentations, and actions (Simi et al., 2017). As such, successful disengagement involved participants decreasing their level of “embeddedness” within the group. Across the sample, participants discussed three obstacles associated with decreasing their level of embeddedness, including: (1) severing connections with the white supremacist identity; (2) severing connections with the white supremacist lifestyle; and (3) severing connections with the white supremacist ideology. Thus, rather than constituting three distinct barriers, we view this collection as representing link components associated with one’s level of embeddedness that involve differences in degrees rather than kind. Moreover, this classification is not mutually exclusive. For example, an extremist may sever one of these connections during disengagement, which may be enough to decrease their level of embeddedness, or the extremist may sever multiple connections simultaneously. In the following sections, we provide examples and discuss these barriers in more detail.

Severing Connections with the White Supremacist Identity The first barrier to decreasing their level of embeddedness involved severing connections with their white supremacist identity. Being a white supremacist is comparable to holding a “master status” (Hughes, 1945) that is typically at the core of their self-concept and occupies a central position in their daily lives (Simi & Futrell, 2009). As a member, white supremacists are embedded in a culture of vitalizing and reactive emotions such as hypermasculinity, pride, and honor (Blee, 2002;

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Jasper, 1998) and bodily engagement (e.g., ritualized dances, salutes, and uniforms). As part of the disengagement process, these individuals must decrease their embeddedness within the group by shedding their “extremist” identity and adopting a new identity of a “former” extremist. For example, Ideologically, it was hard, but I was more scared to lose my entire identity. You feel lost, you know, because like your identity and your life are out of sync. It’s depressing, actually… I mean because I spent so much energy reading and learning and a large portion of my life becoming that person… I had to accept that I would need to learn who I was all over again, and that took a while to accept. (Lynn, Interview 47, January 30, 2016)

Lynn’s account underscores the central argument of this chapter by illustrating that white supremacy is about more than just adhering to specific ideas; it is a “totalizing commitment” (Simi et al., 2017, p. 1174) and an entire way of life that includes self-discovery, education, and transformation. Disengaging from this highly salient identity requires the individual to dislodge themselves from various ideological and lifestyle connections. For many participants, the prospect of separating from their extremist identity and seeking new friendship networks and systems of support, altering their appearance, changing musical preferences and clothing styles, and a variety of other lifestyle modifications emerged as a daunting task that prolonged their exit. Similar to Lynn, participants struggled to begin the process of cognitively and emotionally distancing themselves from the movement after deciding to exit, which helps explain why it took more than two years for over half of our sample (n = 24; 51%) to exit officially. Similarly, the internalization of negative qualities of extremism (e.g., “bad,” “evil”) into their identity emerged as an obstacle to disengagement. Because extremism is so ingrained in these individuals’ daily lives, it becomes part of their identity and their sense of self-worth by extension. In this way, progress made on behalf of the white supremacist movement reflects a victory for the cause and represents an individual

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achievement as actors often fuse the collective identity with their identity. Consequently, when individuals recognize flaws and inconsistencies with the ideology and/or movement culture, they also view these deficiencies as detracting from their self-worth. In these situations, the individual internalizes—accurately or not—the idea that they are as “horrible” and “awful” as the culture they embraced, which has the potential of delaying their disengagement as these individuals confront negative emotions such as embarrassment, depression, worthlessness, shame, and guilt. In the following example, Zander discusses his internal struggles with leaving the white supremacist movement over 18 months. Leaving is hard because if this is as horrible as everybody thinks it is, what does that say about me? That just makes me a horrible person, and a sucker, and a tool for being drawn into something awful, and that can’t be right. I’m a good person… pride kept getting in the way. Doubts kept popping up here and there, and I’d beat them back down because I wasn’t ready to address reality and look at myself. (Zander, Interview 39, December 21, 2015)

While Zander notices the WSM’s deficiencies, he cannot disengage because his self-appraisal (i.e., that of a “good person”) does not align with his views of the movement. Zander attempts to neutralize this internal conflict through self-talk. The very act of self-talk suppresses manifestations of doubt and questioning. However, doubt and questioning persist despite self-talk, which leaves Zander with a paradoxical struggle. On the one hand, Zander can try and continue ignoring reality by dismissing the flaws of the WSM and thus shield himself from such negative labels. This course of action, however, leaves Zander doubting and questioning a movement culture that he continues to structure his life around, which has the potential to surface as “emotional leakage” involving expressions of anger, guilt, and shame directed toward the self and the movement (Porter et al., 2012; Waxer, 1977; also see Simi et al., 2019). On the other hand, Zander can disengage from the WSM. By doing so, however, he risks internalizing these negative qualities (e.g., “awful,” “horrible”) as a reflection of his sense of self, given his previous identification with this belief system. For Zander, like many

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other participants, this dilemma was resolved by locating an alternative outlet through which he could channel his sense of self-worth, such as family (especially children), religion, school, or work.

Severing Connections with the White Supremacist Lifestyle The second barrier to decreasing WSE’s level of embeddedness involved severing connections with the white supremacist lifestyle. Involvement in the white supremacist movement includes an extensive set of commitments and involves a totalizing set of experiences that permeate all aspects of a person’s thoughts, emotions, body presentations, and actions (Simi et al., 2017). Even their relationships with institutions such as religion and their peer associations become entirely defined by this worldview. Based on the life-history interview data, participants became enmeshed entirely in daily rituals and basic living practices that were organized around the group’s ideological and criminal lifestyle, which provided them with valued and useful “perks” (Anderson, 1999; Decker, 1996) such as peer acceptance, status, and thrill-seeking opportunities. Alice, a former white supremacist street gang member, discusses how leaving extremism was more difficult than walking away. Instead, this process took more than seven years to complete and required her to give up the lifestyle and activities she had come to “live for.” Even after I felt done, it’s not like I just walked away and became some straight, square person. That lifestyle had become my life. It was a real high-tension lifestyle that I lived for... The lifestyle was always fast-paced. I was always on the edge. The police were ready to come. You might go to jail. There were shootings. There was drugs. There was violence. That life was hard to give up. (Alice, Interview 32, October 30, 2015)

Alice’s desire to live a high-tension lifestyle filled with “sneaky thrills” (Katz, 1988, p. 53) underscores the seductive nature of the white supremacist subculture. These seductive role commitments were so intense that even after Alice no longer identified as a white supremacist, her connection with and attraction to the street lifestyle remained salient.

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Many participants echoed similar sentiments by indicating the time between their initial doubts and their actual disengagement was lengthened due to issues with offending and drug addiction in which they relied on the group as a source of supply and criminal lifestyle as a source of financial income. The attraction to the status, camaraderie, and a sense of belonging functioned as a barrier to disengagement for other participants. For example, I read this book, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, and realized I don’t want my country to be ruled by one person and one ideology… I remember writing my friend saying, “Dude, I’m not about this skinhead thing,” and basically saying I want to drop out. But it didn’t go anywhere. The feeling was just lost after I went back to the yard and everybody was like, “you’re back!”… I was somebody, you know. The respect, the control, the power, the Metzger factor, you know, being accepted and being the cool guy was the most important thing. (Jason, Interview 38, December 20, 2015)

Jason’s recognition that “being accepted” was the most important thing indicates a shift in his frame of reference and offers insight into how the extremist lifestyle can retain its hold even when the individual begins to question the belief system and their future involvement in the WSM. Since the process of becoming a white supremacist involves a way of life in which the individual comes to embody the extremist identity physically (e.g., shave their head, display racially themed tattoos), it is common for participants to avoid friends and family members who oppose their white supremacist activism while a member (Simi et al., 2017). By disengaging, participants resign their extremist social networks and feelings of control, power, and respect. However, these individuals must rebuild trust from the individuals they previously separated from or abandoned in the process. In this way, the fear of finding themselves shunned or rejected by family and peer relationships and having to undertake the daunting task of rebuilding a new group of peers functioned as a barrier to extremist disengagement. It is important to note that white supremacist activism is not a role that is switched on and off as one enters and exits marches, demonstrations, or organizational meetings. Instead, white supremacist activism

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is central to self-identity as a moral status that permeates thoughts and interactions across countless movement and non-movement situations (King, 2004). These actions involve an expression of white supremacist identity and can be viewed as accounts (Scott & Lyman, 1968; see also Orbuch, 1997) provided by each member to others (and themselves) that demonstrate committed activism. A willingness to participate in violent and non-violent crimes, don racially themed tattoos, and structure their daily lives around white supremacy is intrinsically linked to one’s commitment to the cause (Windisch et al., 2020a; Windisch & Simi, 2022). Consequently, participants discussed how negative baggage or “snares” (Moffitt, 1993) such as a criminal record, a lack of education, or receiving racially themed tattoos obstructed their transition to a conventional lifestyle. For example, I think a lot of people want to get out and struggle. Like me and Cliff, we was so deep in, and we tried to climb out, and we tried to do the right thing. We’re trying to get our life together, but we’ve got obstacles… we’re stuck with that image. I mean, Cliff ’s whole face is tattooed. He’s stuck with, you know, negativity and going to prison and things, you know, plus not having any work experience and relevant skills, so much about this life has been wrapped up in the skinhead world. (Marjorie, Interview 15, September 4, 2015)

Even though Marjorie’s disengagement was relatively short compared to most of the sample—unfolding over nine months—her account illustrates the lingering obstacles associated with exiting the extremist culture, including managing a white supremacist social stigma (Simi & Futrell, 2009). While incarceration has been found to function as a push factor away from extremist activities (Bubolz & Simi, 2015), our findings highlight how prior histories of incarceration can also function as impediments to successful disengagement due to the social stigma associated with their status not only as “extremists” but also as “convicts” (also see Jensen et al., 2020). Cliff and Marjorie structured their entire way of life around white supremacy. Cliff ’s emphasis on getting racially themed facial tattoos and pouring their energy into the movement at the expense

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of gaining work experience or an education highlights these participants’ level of embeddedness within the extremist organization.

Severing Connections with the White Supremacist Ideology A third and final barrier to decreasing their level of embeddedness involved severing connections with the white supremacist ideology. Ideologies are ideas formed based on beliefs, experiences, and education that aim to delineate an issue and offer solutions to associated problems (Marx & Engels, 1935). As the understanding of ideology progressed, a consensus has emerged among behavioral and social scientists that white supremacists, like many other social groupings, rely heavily on unifying ideologies (Blee, 2002). These creeds serve to establish group boundaries and provide the basis for a broad range of cultural practices that include everything from violent acts to ordinary lifestyle preferences such as what types of foods to eat and clothes to wear (Simi & Futrell, 2015). In turn, these cultural practices help develop solidarity and commitment necessary to sustain a collective identity (Fantasia, 1988). Because extremists become entirely enmeshed in daily rituals and basic living practices organized around the group’s racist ideology, our participants’ disengagement process was often prolonged as these individuals struggled to envision and construct a new life devoid of these guiding principles. For example, The year leading up to my exit was the hardest... you know, I’m giving up what I’ve believed for decades. I was so hardwired. I didn’t know how to deal with it. I had to strip away my beliefs that guided me, and worse, I’m not just leaving an organization; I felt I was letting down my people. That was the struggle. (Tyler, Interview 1, June 25, 2015)

Throughout his interview, Tyler discussed how adhering to white supremacist ideologies became a struggle and generated an internal dilemma after entering parenthood. On the one hand, as a white supremacist male, Tyler was encouraged to internalize the role of a racial warrior, a guardian of law and order, and, if needed, a martyr. These ideologies gave him meaning, purpose, and a sense of duty. On

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the other hand, the foundation of white supremacist ideology is hatedirected beliefs, feelings, and behavior, including genocidal fantasies against Jewish people, Blacks, Hispanics, sexual minorities, and anyone else opposed to White racial privileges (Berbrier, 2000). While Tyler initially planned to raise his children according to white supremacist beliefs, the erratic skinhead lifestyle that involved partying, illicit drug use, and racial violence became incompatible with his new role as a caretaker and guardian. This realization, however, did not cause Tyler to renounce his extremist belief system but rather to be unwilling to indoctrinate his children in white supremacy. As Tyler indicates, such a predicament generated feelings of guilt and betrayal as he felt he had let down the white race, which helps explain why it took him more than two years to disengage from violent extremism. In particular, Tyler’s account underscores the overlap between the white supremacist ideology and the white supremacist identity. The process of severing both connections prolonged his disengagement as he struggled to redefine his role away from extremism and incorporate a new ideological framework into his daily life. In addition to establishing and making racial boundaries more acceptable and, in some cases, expected (Lamont et al., 2001), white supremacist ideologies can also function as narratives that counterbalance behavioral inconsistencies and flaws of the movement and its members. For instance, over the last several decades, white supremacists have spread the pseudo-religious doctrine known as “Christian Identity,” which depicts non-Whites as subhuman and Jewish people as the literal descendants of Satan (Barkun, 1994). As part of this belief system, white supremacists are educated on the necessity of struggle, sacrifice, and hardship as a path to redemption and the second coming of Jesus Christ. As a result, when participants encounter feelings of doubt or questions regarding the movement’s authenticity, these feelings are interpreted through the Christian Identity doctrine as both natural and necessary for their future salvation. For example, You’re so brainwashed with the ideology that it didn’t matter what happens. You’re in it for the long haul… it’s all about how it is all necessary and how eventually it justifies itself. Kind of an ends justifies the

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means kind of thing and that the struggle is necessary for victory… So, even when I was homeless and living in my car, I made excuses that I was getting stronger, and that got me by for a while. Then I’d run out of gas all over again, you know, that’s how it was for years. (Brittany, Interview 19, September 17, 2015)

The intensive nature of the white supremacy ideology is illustrated by Brittany’s reference to the two years necessary to remove herself from this disposition. In Brittany’s situation, her connection with white supremacist ideologies functioned as a form of “life support” for her continued involvement. Even after Brittany found herself homeless and disavowed by her fellow group members, the white supremacist ideology helped her rationalize this struggle as a necessary path to personal strength and movement victory. For many, successful disengagement was achieved by developing replacement doctrines (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity) that better function in their new environment. For example, This is probably maybe over a year ago, yeah. So, I’m at like a swap meet thing, and I buy some food, and there’s a Black guy sitting at a table, and then there’s an empty table, but the first thing that pops in my head, “I can’t sit there, at the table he’s sitting at.” And I’m like, “No, in the name of Jesus, I will now.” So, I get my food, and I move it over to the table where he’s sitting, and I start a conversation. Do you know what I mean? Praise God. (Maddox, Interview 22, September 19, 2015)

Actors must refashion strong ideological orientations because these new creeds will act as cognitive filters for future decision-making. If the individual’s replacement ideological orientation is weak, they are more likely to draw from previous experiences and continue to rely on old habits when challenged in their new environment. The key point is that the new ideological orientation must completely replace the previous belief system.

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Conclusion While prior disengagement research has explored the various “push” and “pull” factors that motivate a person to end their extremist careers (Bjørgo & Carlsson, 2005; Horgan, 2009; Windisch et al., 2019), more recent efforts have found that disengagement is much more encompassing than merely disengaging from its activities or physically removing oneself from the group (Simi et al., 2017). To build on this line of research, the focus of this current chapter is on barriers to disengagement. Based on the life-history data, participants encountered a broad range of barriers that prolonged their disengagement from violent extremism, including severing connections with the white supremacist identity; severing connections with the white supremacist lifestyle; and severing connections with the white supremacist ideology. In addition, as part of the disengagement process, these individuals decreased their level of “embeddedness” within the group by developing replacement doctrines (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity) that better function in their new environment; locating alternative outlets where they could channel their sense of self-worth through such as family, religion, school, or work; and shedding their “extremist” identity and adopting the new identity of “former” extremist. Overall, our investigation into these disengagement barriers underscores how exit is a multi-dimensional process characterized by numerous “fits and starts” rather than a continuous, linear trajectory. This finding is important, in part, because it indicates that extremist disengagement is not prolonged and disrupted by a single life event but rather is restricted and further impeded by the cumulative impact of the white supremacist ideology, lifestyle, and identity. Rather than constituting three distinct barriers, we view this collection as representing link components associated with one’s level of embeddedness. As such, for an individual to successfully disengage from extremism, it may be necessary for them to untether themselves from all aspects of their previous lifestyle, belief system, and identity. Failing to do so may prolong or derail the exiting process entirely for someone trying to abstain from extremist activities or physically remove themselves from the group.

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Given the necessity and difficulty of untethering oneself from multiple structural, emotional, and cognitive connections, we offer the following recommendations for countering violent extremism and preventing violent extremism service providers. In particular, social workers can help find resources for extremists who are wanting to disengage. Like other types of offenders, extremists need to know they are not alone and others have encountered similar experiences, such as histories of trauma, drug abuse, participation in violent offending (Windisch et al., 2020b), or feelings of “residual” associated with the extremist lifestyle (Simi et al., 2017). Social workers can locate peer support groups, and this may be invaluable for certain types of extremists. For example, consider the social stigma associated with being a white supremacist who has visibly racist tattoos on their face, arms, or neck (Simi & Futrell, 2009). These individuals may have a challenging time finding a space to ventilate and validate their stories. In this case, a social worker can help them identify an appropriate support group. At the same time, the long-term consequences of extremist participation may also involve the need for assistance with mental health professionals such as psychologists or psychiatrists. Mental health professionals can provide additional emotional support during and after the individual’s disengagement. At its core, counseling should entail the process of ventilation and validation (Office of Victims of Crime, 2000). Ventilation refers to the process of allowing participants to retell their life-history narrative. This may be challenging for extremists, but the repetitive process allows them to make sense of extremist careers and integrate it into their new “former” extremist identity. By retelling their life-history narrative, the extremist integrates the experience into their personal life story and ultimately gains a cognitive sense of control over the past behavior decisions. Such an approach is useful as it helps alleviate the individual’s long-term distress and fosters a strategy for completing their disengagement and remaining disengaged. Such counseling may also involve validation, which refers to how the mental health professional confirms that the extremist’s reaction to their experience is normal and expected. At this stage, the extremist should be reassured that although their extremist career may have caused harm, he/she is not “evil” or “bad” because of it. The extremist should be reminded that

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anger, guilt, fear, and overwhelming sadness are normal responses to their experiences. Using the same phrases that the individual uses in describing his/her experiences can help validate their feelings. As research continues to develop in this area, it would be useful for future studies to more carefully trace how individuals’ network embeddedness during involvement shapes their experiences following disengagement. Additional analyses are also necessary to examine the situational dynamics related to specific barriers more closely as they identify additional situational, emotional, and cognitive barriers to disengagement. Finally, future research should compare former activists across a broad range of social movements, including other movements that may also emphasize extreme hatred (e.g., violent jihadists) and former members from other violent but less political subcultures (e.g., conventional street gangs). Acknowledgements This project was supported by Award No: 2014-ZA-BX0005, the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project, “Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists” as well as the Department of Homeland Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs through Award Number 2012-ST-061-CS0001, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB) 2.1 made to START to investigate the understanding and countering of terrorism within the US The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication/program/exhibition are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, START, or the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

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18 Confronting Online Extremism: Strategies, Promises, and Pitfalls James Hawdon and Matthew Costello

Virtual extremism has become a national security threat as a number of recent acts of mass violence have been linked to online radicalization. Indeed, exposure to extremist attitudes is likely an early step toward radicalization as exposure can reinforce extremist views against groups (Cowan & Mettrick, 2002; Foxman & Wolf, 2013) and provide links to extremist causes (Amster, 2009). While extremism comes in many flavors, rightwing extremism has been particularly dangerous recently as mass shootings in Charleston, Pittsburgh, Orlando, El Paso, and elsewhere exemplify. In fact, according to the Anti-Defamation League J. Hawdon (B) Center for Peace Studies and Violence Prevention, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. Costello Department of Sociology Anthropology & Criminal Justice, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_18

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(ADL, 2018), every extremist killing committed in 2018 had a connection to rightwing extremism, and most of these assailants can be directly linked to radicalizing online activities. Given that survey data show that exposure to online rightwing hate and extremism has increased over the last few years (Costello et al., 2019), it is imperative we understand the sources of these ideas, who disseminates them, what patterns exposure to them, the consequences of such exposure, and the efficacy of attempts to limit that exposure and counter its effects. While understanding all of these issues is vital to combatting extremisms, this chapter aims to advance our understanding of what can be done to limit the exposure to extremist ideas in virtual spaces. We begin by discussing the promises and pitfalls of various forms of social control that can be enacted while online, including corporate interventions, government interventions, self-help, and collective efficacy. Then, after presenting data on the extent to which some of these strategies are used among a sample of Internet users, we conduct an analysis of who is most likely to enact the strategy of self-help when they confront hate speech in an online setting. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings and by making suggestions for improving efforts to counter online extremism.

Theoretical Considerations We begin with our definition of online extremism. Online extremism, also referred to as online hate or cyberhate, uses information technology to disseminate opinions devaluing persons because of their race, ethnicity, immigrant status, religion, gender, sexual identity , or political persuasion (Hawdon et al., 2017). This type of cyberviolence differs from cyberstalking or cyberbullying in that it attacks a collective instead of individuals, per se. When individuals are targets of such extremist ideas, it is because of their membership in some targeted group (Costello et al., 2016). While hate groups have always been attracted to the Internet (Meddaugh & Kay, 2009), social media has accelerated the spread of extremist ideologies by offering easily accessible and far-reaching platforms to communicate hate (Potok, 2015). Although online extremism

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comes in many types, far-right extremism is presently the most common form of hate on the Internet in much of the global north (CTED, 2020; Hawdon et al., 2020b; Reichelmann et al., 2020). There are several strategies for stopping or at least slowing the spread of online extremism. These strategies can be broadly classified based on who is enacting the social control. Generally speaking, controls can be enacted by corporations (i.e., service providers), governments, or individual users relying on the informal social control strategies of self-help and collective efficacy. Each of these strategies have potential for limiting the online diffusion of rightwing extremism, but each also has limits.

Target Hardening and Corporate Interventions Generally speaking, target hardening refers to a situational crime prevention strategy that attempts to dissuade would-be criminals from committing a crime by making the target harder to victimize. In cyberspace, target hardening involves using products such as firewalls, cryptography, intrusion detection software, security filters, profile trackers, and privacy settings to deter would-be offenders (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Reyns et al., 2011; Ireland, 2020). Target hardening has been found to be effective against a number of cybercrimes, including fraud, identity theft, virus or malware attacks, and cyberharassment (Hawdon et al. 2020b; contrast Zamzami et al., 2016). In terms of preventing extremism, programs similar to “safe search” filters used to block certain content such as pornography could potentially be used to block sites professing extremist beliefs from showing up on a user’s screen. Deep learning techniques have been used to identify hate speech and cyberbullying on a number of platforms, including Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook (Constine, 2018; Chandaluri & Phadke, 2019; Chatzakou et al., 2017; Raisi & Huang, 2018; Silva et al., 2016). Such systems attempt to automatically detect extremist messages and, once detected, flag them with warnings or block them from view. While constitutional protections of free speech may limit the government’s ability to control the dissemination of hate speech, these considerations do not apply to the platforms on which most of this hate

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is found. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other social networking sites are the platforms on which respondents indicate they most frequently see online hate (see Reichelmann et al., 2020), and these corporations can enforce terms of use that limit what is placed on their platforms. Facebook, for example, claims to have significantly improved their automated detection of hate speech. According to their community standards report (Facebook, 2020), in 2017, 75% of the hate speech that they became aware of was found and removed only after users manually flagged the material and reported it to moderators. By early 2020, 88% of 9.6 million pieces of content they acted on to remove hate speech was found by Facebook’s automated detection tools, which decreased the time needed to take action and restricted approximately four times as much material as they did two years earlier (Facebook, 2020; Hern, 2020). However impressive these claims are, developing such software is difficult because identifying hate speech depends on context as well as knowledge of custom and culture. These are tricky for human moderators to learn, let alone automated detection devices. The problem is that extremism can be framed in many ways, and these frames often are not obviously “extreme” (see Phadke et al., 2018). For example, most extremist sites do not advocate violence, but instead try to promote their group and their cause while denouncing others for defaming their group (see Gerstenfeld et al., 2003; McNamee et al., 2010). In fact, many extremists would not consider their ideas extreme and would argue they are engaging in the healthy debate that is critical to a well-functioning democracy. Similarly, connotative meanings and interpretations of words or phrases vary by culture so a term or phrase that is offensive in one culture may be perfectly acceptable in another, but current IT abilities are incapable of discerning this cultural relativism. Thus, developing detection tools that can parse the subtleties of language and correctly discern between extremist ideas and partisan discussion is likely beyond current IT abilities.

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Government Intervention Governments do regulate the Internet, but most such regulations simply extend existing restrictions to the online world. That is, in most cases, laws already prohibit the behavior (i.e., fraud, harassment, child pornography), and using computer technology to facility the criminal act does not alter that. But, our concern is not about regulating behavior but speech and ideas. Here, the state is more limited, especially in the United States. In the United States, the Constitution’s First Amendment places legal primacy on protecting speech, and therefore speech can be regulated only in specific circumstances. While speech can be regulated for reasons of defamation, obscenity, and state censorship, the courts have been reluctant to regulate hate speech (Bleich, 2011; Hawdon et al., 2017). Based on a number of Supreme Court cases, including Brandenburg v. Ohio and the National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, the court allows material that promotes and incites hatred against groups based on race, national origin, or religion, even if the material intends to do so (Bleich, 2011). While threats that expressly convey intent to commit violence aimed at specifically identifiable people, incitement to imminent violence, and persistent harassment are criminal offenses, the legal standards required to regulate speech are significant. In essence, the interpretation of the First Amendment effectively eliminate hate speech regulations in the United States (Allen & Norris, 2011; Bleich, 2011). Other nations, however, do regulate hate speech while also constitutionally guaranteeing free speech. For example, Germany has among the toughest anti-hate speech laws. Although Germany’s Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, guarantees the right to free expression, it also regulates and specifies punishments for general as well as specific forms of hate speech (Allen & Norris, 2011; Bleich, 2011). For example, Section 130(1) of the German Federal Criminal Code bans speech that “attacks the human dignity of others” and do not require intent or imminent violence. Canada falls somewhere between the United States and Germany with respect to anti-hate speech regulations. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is part of the Constitution of Canada, protects freedom of expression, including freedom of religion, peaceful assembly, association, and “thought, belief, opinion and expression, including

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freedom of the press and other media of communication” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 2, p. 47). While these rights are guaranteed, the Charter also recognizes that the rights and freedoms are subject to limits, provided the limits are prescribed by law and “can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 1, p. 47). Given this possibility of limits on expression, a variety of laws, including the Canadian Criminal Code and federal and provincial human rights codes, prohibit hateful statements. For example, Section 319 of the Criminal Code bans the incitement of hatred and the willful promotion of hate. More specifically, Section 319(1) of the Criminal Code makes it an offense to communicate statements in public that incite hatred against an identifiable group where it is likely to lead to a breach of peace, and Section 319(2) criminalizes the willful promotion of hate against any identifiable group by making statements other than in private conversation (Government of Canada, 2020). While this law has been challenged, in a major decision regarding hate speech (R. v. Keegstra, 1988 ABCA 234 CanLII), the Supreme Court held that hate speech prohibitions, while infringements on the guarantee of free expression, are nevertheless reasonable and justified because hate speech harms both those who are targeted and society at large (see Moon [2008] for a detailed discussion). The question of how effective governmental regulations are is open for debate, but previous research (Hawdon et al., 2017) found that American and Finnish youth were exposed to significantly more hate speech than were German youth and youth from the United Kingdom, both of which have more restrictive policies than do the United States and Finland. The findings suggest that anti-hate speech laws may in fact help limit exposure. The authors conclude, While we cannot say that a relatively liberal legal approach to hate speech is why American and Finnish youth and young adults experience more exposure, the fact that they do is consistent with the argument that anti-hate speech laws are a source of guardianship that reduces the risk. (Hawdon et al., 2017, p. 262)

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Despite this potential evidence that laws may work, there are problems with using governmental regulations to control extremism, even beyond the difficulties of doing so in the United States. First, as with corporate controls, there remains the issue of actually finding the hate speech. Not only is the content that must be searched nearly limitless, the anonymity associated with many posts makes it extremely difficult to find the offender even if the materials are found. Secondly, such laws can result in offenders simply moving from the mainstream to more hidden virtual locations where it would be even more difficult to track, find, and combat. Similarly, what constitutes legal speech varies by jurisdiction, but Internet content can easily cross jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, content posted on a United States-based website may be illegal if viewed in Canada, however, there would be no legal recurse for the Canadian government to shut down the United States-based site if the content was legal there.

Individual Users In addition to corporate and governmental controls, the more prevalent form of control on the Internet is informal social control. Internet users adopt rules and regulations (i.e., “netiquette”) that attempt to govern online behavior and interaction. As Atchison (2000: 95) says, “At the informal level, everyone on the Internet is a watcher and watched. The result is a system of panoptic control.” Generally, informal social control can be enacted by oneself, by someone directly intervening in defense of the victim, or by a general guardian who deters behavior simply by their presence (see Felson & Boba, 2010). If social control is enacted by an aggrieved individual, it is “self-help;” if others intervene on behalf of the targeted victim, it is “collective efficacy.” Self-Help: When individuals enact social control online to defend themselves, it is “self-help” or “handling a grievance with unilateral aggression” (Black, 1984: 74). Acts of self-help range from statements of disapproval to physical violence. With respect to online extremism, a person who encounters materials they consider offensive and then confronts the person posting the materials would be using self-help.

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Self-help can convince the extremist to conform and stop attacking a group with hate speech. Indeed, in recent work, Ireland and colleagues found that actively defending a victim and telling the poster to stop was believed to be one of the most effective strategies for confronting cyberviolence (Ireland et al., 2020). However, while enacting self-help can produce conformity, it often results in retaliatory actions. As Black (1984: 75) states when discussing self-help, “a grievance pursued aggressively begets aggression in return.” Indeed, confronting an offender, especially one who does not define her or his beliefs as extreme, will likely arouse animosity. Therefore, selfhelp can increase the probability of being victimized. As evidence, recent research found that engaging in self-help online increases the likelihood of becoming a target (Costello et al., 2017b). Collective Efficacy: Online social control can also be enacted by others, which can be considered a form of collective efficacy or “the linkage of mutual trust and shared willingness and intention to intervene for the common good” (Sampson, 2001: 95). Thus, in an online setting, collective efficacy occurs when individuals collectively confront a deviant in an attempt to bring about conformity. Substantial evidence suggests collective efficacy is inversely related to crime rates in neighborhoods (e.g., Sampson et al., 1997), so it is assumed a similar relationship would be observed online when trying to limit hate speech and extremism. That is, if others successfully confront the extremists they observe online, those occupying the same virtual space would be less likely to see extremist content. In the research mentioned above (Ireland et al., 2020), collective efficacy, especially if it involved a site manager, was considered to be the most effective method of combating cyberviolence. Yet, despite the relationship between collective efficacy and crime offline, it is possible that collective efficacy will not be effective online. First, the Internet lacks the level of trust needed for effective collective efficacy. A sense of shared community is a key element of effective collective efficacy offline, and this community is often missing online. Moreover, the Internet’s anonymous nature likely reduces the effectiveness of all forms of social control, including collective efficacy. Finally, as mentioned above, extremists often do not believe they are victimizing anyone as they aim to “educate” others, not offend them. Thus,

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any confrontation with them may not increase safety; on the contrary, it may be counterproductive and lead to more expressions of extremist opinions as an attempt to further “educate” the “uninformed” about the “truth” underlying their extreme claims. Thus, despite the promise that these forms of social control hold for combatting online hate and extremism, there are problems and pitfalls with each strategy. Given the numbers of Internet users exposed to online hate, and the frequency with which they see these messages, none of these methods appear to be overly successful at curtailing extremist messaging. Nevertheless, people try, and the extent to which people are involved in these efforts is impressive and perhaps provide rays of hope.

How Frequently Are Forms of Social Control Used? We can estimate the frequency with which people engage in self-help or witness corporate interventions and collective efficacy using a sample of 1,047 18- to 24-year-old Internet users from the United States. Data were collected in early May 2018 from a Survey Sampling International (SSI) panel. SSI recruits potential participants through random digit dialing and other permission-based techniques, and panel members between the ages of 18 and 24 were randomly invited to complete the survey.1 The ages were selected to match previous studies designed to understand the exposure to and perpetration of online hate among youth and young adults (e.g., Näsi et al., 2014; Reichelmann et al., 2020). To determine how frequently respondents engaged in self-help or witnessed collective efficacy or corporate intervention when rightwing hate was seen online, we first asked respondents, “In the past 3 months, have you seen or heard any materials online that expressed negative views about any group because of the group’s race, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity , political views, immigrant status, 1

We used this sample in earlier research (Reichelmann et al., 2020) and similar samples in numerous other studies. Online proportional sampling panels are generally found to be as reliable as random probability-based sampling (Weinberg et al., 2014; Simmons & Bobo, 2015).

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or religion.”2 Over 72% of respondents (758 of the 1,047) reported that they had seen such materials online. We then asked respondents to identify the group that was targeted the last time the saw materials, and we then defined those who said the materials they saw attacked groups based on either race, nationality, ethnicity, or immigrant status as viewing “rightwing hate.” Over half of the sample (557 respondents or 52.9% of the total sample) reported seeing such hate, and this represents 73.5% of the people who reported seeing any type of online hate. This provides additional evidence that rightwing extremism currently dominates the Internet. Respondents were then asked a series of questions about what happens when they see someone on social networking sites being mean or offensive. Respondents were asked to indicate how often (1) “they tell the person who is being offensive to stop,” (2) “they defend the group being attacked,” (3) “others tell the person who is being offensive to stop,” (4) “others defend the person or group being attacked,” or (5) “a site administrator delete the offensive comment or otherwise stops the offensive behavior.” All responses ranged from 1 “never” to 4 “frequently.” We average the responses from the first two items where the respondent himself or herself acted into a measure of self-help, and we average the responses from the next two items where others acted into a measure of collective efficacy. The item concerning site administrators is our proxy measure of corporate interventions. Collective efficacy is the most frequently observed type of intervention with a mean of 2.87 (or nearly equating to a response of “sometimes” on the never, rarely, sometimes, frequently scale). Self-help occurs the next most frequently with a mean of 2.47, equating to between rarely and sometimes. Corporate interventions were rarely seen (mean = 2.38).3

2

The sample overrepresented females so weights were constructed based on the percentage 18to 24-year-old females in the United States. All analyses are performed on weighted data. 3 Comparing these means reveals that both self-help is engaged in and collective efficacy is witnessed significantly more frequently than corporate interventions are witnessed (self-help vs. corporate, T = 2.21; p < 0.027; collective efficacy vs. corporate, T = 13.77, p < 0.001). The means of collective efficacy and self-help are also significantly different (T = 11.25; p < 0.001).

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Based on these findings, individuals are more likely to see others intervene than they are to do so themselves, and they are more likely to enact self-help than they are to see site administrators intervene to regulate hate. This finding is unfortunate. While corporate control where a site administrator removes the content would obviously be the most effective means of limiting the content’s spread, this type of online control is the least frequently observed. As discussed above, there are difficulties in monitoring the entire Internet and developing automated software to do so, but such efforts could be fruitful if these difficulties can be overcome. Short of that, we are left largely with an environment that relies heavily on informal social control. This is especially true in the United States where governmental controls over hate speech are extremely weak. Given the importance of informal social control in combatting the spread of hate and extremism, we ask, “Who is most likely to engage in self-help when they see online hate.” We now turn to that analysis.

Who Intervenes with Self-Help There is considerable scholarship investigating who intervenes when they witness someone being victimized. For example, we know that situational factors, such as the size of the group, influences bystanders’ willingness to intervene in that the larger the group, the lower the probability of intervention. This reluctance to intervene when in a crowd could be because bystanders rely on others, they fear retribution, or they rely heavily on the reactions of others to see if intervening is deemed favorably or not (see Costello et al., 2017a). In other words, an assessment of the risks and rewards of intervening influence the process of deciding to intervene or not (Dovidio et al., 2017). This assessment and decision is also influenced by an assessment of the characteristics of the bystander, victim, and perpetrator (Ireland et al., 2020). For example, bystanders are more apt to assist those who are similar to them (Levine et al., 2002), when they feel a personal responsibility to protect those around them (DeSmet et al., 2014; Hollis-Peel & Welsh, 2014; Moir et al., 2017), and when

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they perceive there are partisans who would defend the victim and them should they intervene (DeSmet et al., 2014; Ireland et al., 2020). Guided by these general factors predicting intervention and our work integrating Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) and Social Structure Social Learning Theory (Akers, 2009) to explain the groups typically targeted by and exposed to online rightwing hate materials (see Hawdon et al., 2019, 2020a), we can make some general predictions about who would use self-help and intervene when they witness online hate. For example, because bystanders are more apt to assist those who are similar to them and those who are typically targeted by rightwing hate are non-heterosexuals, women, ethnic minorities, immigrants, nonChristians, and political liberals, we would predict that people observing rightwing hate who share these characteristics would be more likely to intervene. However, given that these groups are frequently targets of such visceral hate and extremism, it would certainly be understandable if members of these groups would be hesitant to intervene out of concerns about retaliation. Thus, in terms of a person’s differential location in the social structure (e.g., their race, religion, sexual orientation, social class, gender, and citizenship status), we would predict no or very weak relationships between these statuses and intervention because countervailing pressures would likely be at work. However, based on existing research and our integrated model of Routine Activity Theory and Social Structure Social Learning Theory (Hawdon et al., 2019, 2020a), we hypothesize that individuals’ differential social locations (e.g., membership in social groups) would exert stronger influences over their decisions to intervene. First, since people rely heavily on the reactions of others to see if intervening is rewarded or not, we would predict that those who see others intervene in defense of the targeted group would be more likely to intervene themselves (Costello et al., 2017a, b; Ireland, 2020; Ireland et al., 2020). Moreover, we would also predict that those members of groups who hold values that promote equality and diversity (or multiculturalism) would likely be rewarded for intervening and defending those who have been traditionally disenfranchised and denied access to the dominant American institutions through systemic racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, and nativism. Conversely, members of groups who are more inclined to

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promote traditionalism will likely be discouraged from intervening by their associates (Costello et al., 2017a, b; also see Hawdon et al., 2020a). Thus, we would predict political liberals to intervene more than political conservatives. Next, since people are more likely to intervene when they feel they have partisans, those who are embedded in groups that can offer the bystander protection from retaliation will be more likely to intervene (Costello et al., 2017a, b; Ireland et al., 2020). Finally, people’s whose worldviews value equality are more likely to feel a personal responsibility to protect those around them, thus we would anticipate that such people would be more likely to intervene when they witness rightwing hate online. To test these predictions, we performed a logistic regression predicting who used self-help.4 In the first model, we use demographic characteristics that represent respondents’ differential location in the social structure. We include their race (white vs. non-white), religion (Christian vs. non-Christian), sexual orientation (heterosexual vs non-heterosexual), economically marginalized (employed or fulltime student vs. unemployed), sex (male vs. female), and ethnicity (Hispanic vs. non-Hispanic). In the second model, we add variables tapping respondents’ differential social locations. These include if they are members of the Republican Party, if they belong and feel close to an online community, and if they feel close to their primary group (e.g., friends and family).5 We also include a measure tapping acceptance of norms of equality, which represents an aspect of the cosmopolitan worldview rightwing extremists often reject (see Hawdon et al., 2019). This item combines six, seven-point Likert items asking respondents to rate their feelings from very negative to very positive. The items they are asked to respond to reflect if individuals accept or reject norms of equity and include, “increased economic equality;” “increased social equality; “equality;” “if people were treated 4 As noted above, we measure self-help by combining two four-point Likert items that asked respondents how frequently they tell the person who is being offensive online to stop or defend the group being attacked online. For this analysis, we dichotomize the variable into those who never or rarely do these acts and those who do them sometimes and frequently. Based on this measure, approximately 39% of respondents perform self-help. 5 These later items are measured on five-point Likert scales. Online groups consists of one item (how close do you feel to an online group) while primary groups consists of two (how close do you feel to your family and how close do you feel to your friends).

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more equally we would have fewer problems in this country;” “in an ideal world, all nations would be equal;” and “we should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible.” The alpha for this scale was 0.899. Finally, we also include a measure of collective efficacy that combines respondents’ answers to the items asking them how frequently they see others tell perpetrators of online hate to stop or defend the targeted group when they witness someone being offensive online.

Findings The results of these analyses are reported in Table 18.1 and indicate that individuals’ differential locations in the social structure and differential social locations are linked to the likelihood of engaging in self-help in response to online hate. Even so, our specific predictions receive mixed support. We expected online users occupying locations in the social structure commonly targeted by cyberhate to be more inclined to intervene. But, at the same time, we recognized the potential for reticence since self-help can put interveners at an elevated risk of being Table 18.1

Logistic regression analysis of enacting self-help online Model 1

Heterosexual = 1 Male = 1 White = 1 Hispanic = 1 Christian = 1 Economically Marginalized = 1 Close to Primary Group Close to Online Community Republican = 1 Collective Efficacy Accept Norms of Equality Log Likelihood Nagelkerke R2 N *p

Model 2

Coef

Std. Error

Coef

Std. Error

−0.42* −0.06 0.56** −0.41 0.45* 0.15

0.20 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.23

−0.38 0.16 0.54* −0.42 0.36 0.27 0.07 0.19* 0.09 1.0*** 0.23* 589.11 0.24 583

0.22 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.06 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.12

673.02 0.46 583

< 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

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targeted. Findings in the first model show that, in accordance with expectations, individuals who identify as heterosexual are less likely to provide self-help. Trumpeting heteronormativity, rightwing extremism commonly targets perceived sexual transgressors; namely, anyone who is not straight. Sexual minorities might therefore feel compelled to intervene when confronted with online hate out of a sense of solidarity with others who are also commonly targeted by cyberhate. Counter to expectations, we find that individuals who identify as white and Christian are more likely to engage in self-help online, relative to their respective counterparts. This suggests that those occupying privileged positions in the social structure might feel obliged to intervene on behalf of others in more vulnerable stations. Alternatively, this could signal that individuals in privileged positions are less concerned about the potential repercussions of intervening since they are not primary targets of online extremism. Taken together, the results from the first model do not offer a clear picture of the relationship between differential locations in the social structure and the enactment of online self-help. Additional analyses exploring the role of differential social locations, online collective efficacy, and worldviews on equality help bring the picture into focus, though. The second model demonstrates that a person’s differential location in the social structure plays a diminished role in the enactment of self-help when controlling for other relevant factors. In fact, only race remains significant, as whites continue to be more likely to intervene when witnessing cyberhate. Our expectations concerning differential social locations receive modest support in this model. Those who report feeling close to an online community are more likely to engage in self-help, but closeness to a primary group or political party are not significantly linked to online intervention. Online communities tend to coalesce around homogeneous tastes, interests, or beliefs, and feeling supported by likeminded partisans can embolden online users to engage in self-help. This result echoes findings on bystander intervention in the physical world, as one of the key situational factors that persuade bystanders to intervene when someone is in distress is the presence of allies who will likely assist or defend the intervener (DeSmet et al., 2014; Ireland et al.,

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forthcoming). We suspect a similar dynamic is at work here, as embeddedness in an online network can similarly cajole users into action when confronted with extremist material online. Similarly, collective efficacy is positively related to enacting self-help. Seeing others intervene on behalf of cyber-victims increases the odds of acting accordingly. When people witness others enacting informal social control, this can translate to a perception that doing so is normative, or even expected. Hence, a culture of informal policing can emerge in online spaces. Additionally, if online users witness collective efficacy without negative repercussions for the interveners, this sends a message that self-help is not only warranted, but also carries few risks. This finding implies that it is important to join in a collective defense of those being attacked to create an online culture that discourages hate and encourages and supports those who are targeted to speak out and affirm their worth and humanity. Finally, and importantly, we find that a general belief in equality increases the likelihood of engaging in self-help in the context of online hate, in line with our expectations. Online hate is explicitly about highlighting and celebrating perceived inequities and, in doing so, perpetuating and accelerating existing inequality. It is therefore encouraging to see that individuals who affirm beliefs in equal treatment of individuals are confronting individuals online who seek to spread division and hate.

Conclusion The recent spread of online hate material (Costello et al., 2019) poses myriad dangers. Motivated by this reality, we sought to explore factors that lead online users to enact informal social control when they encounter extremist material on the Internet. As we note at the outset of this chapter, the U.S. government’s ability to police the Internet is largely hamstrung by the First Amendment, and while social media titans such as Facebook and Twitter have made strides in detecting and deleting cyberhate from their platforms, much is still missed as extremists find new and innovative ways to dodge auto-detection. Complicating matters, not all online platforms actively police extremist material on

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their sites. Gab, for instance, dubs itself a free speech social network alternative to Twitter, and it is becoming increasingly popular with rightwing extremists banished from other sites for precisely that reason. The limitations of governmental and corporate interventions render individual users vital to curtailing the spread of extremist materials online. Informal social control, such as self-help, carries risks, though; it can “feed online trolls,” encouraging, rather than discouraging, their offensive online behavior, cause interveners to be personally attacked, and potentially create a spiral of hate. However, it can also be effective at reducing cyberhate if enough individuals defend those being attacked. Indeed, as our work shows, people are more willing to engage in self-help if they see others doing so or feel buttressed by online partisans. The challenge, of course, is finding ways to encourage online intervention. Our descriptive results show that individuals, on average, only engage in self-help “rarely-to-sometimes,” and they see others doing so only “sometimes.” If more online users are willing to intervene when they see hateful content, others are more apt to do so as well. The burden to do so should not fall solely on those who are frequently attacked, though. It is critical for individuals occupying locations in the social structure that are not typically targeted to engage in self-help as well. Not only does it send a message of allyship, but it also carries fewer risks for retaliation. Ultimately, we believe that increased informal social control can help shape a cyber-culture where tolerance, not hate, is normative.

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19 Criminal Justice Responses to Right-Wing Extremist (RWE) Violence in the United States Jeff Gruenewald, Katie Ratcliff, and Hayden Lucas

Introduction Empirical studies of right-wing extremism (hereafter RWE) in the United States have grown exponentially since around the turn of the-twenty-first century, as recognized in many of the current volume’s other chapters. Prior to 2001, there were relatively few data-driven studies of violent RWE and terrorism more generally, especially from sociological and criminological perspectives (Gruenewald et al., 2009; see also Silke, 2001). While there is still much to learn, findings have since emerged to illuminate patterned causes and correlates of violence committed by J. Gruenewald (B) · K. Ratcliff Department of Sociology & Criminology, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA e-mail: [email protected] H. Lucas University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2_19

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RWE offenders, their victims, and the situations in which this type of violence occurs (Freilich et al., 2018; Freilich et al., 2019). Less is known, though, about how society chooses to respond to those accused of committing RWE violence in the United States, including official responses by the American criminal justice system. Fortunately, new data on law enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial responses to this type of crime have become available over the last several years through major open-source data collection efforts. More specifically, and largely because of an influx of federal funding for projects like the American Terrorism Study (ATS) and U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) over the last two decades, it is becoming increasingly possible to empirically examine criminal justice responses to RWE. An important reason to examine criminal justice responses to RWE violence is that it remains a serious threat to federal, state, and local law enforcement (Freilich et al., 2009). The potential for RWE violence against police and other government officials was on full display during the January 6th Capitol Riots when hundreds stormed the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington D.C. Extremist groups and other individuals from around the country gathered on that day at the urging of former President Donald Trump to protest and ultimately stop U.S. Congress members from certifying Joe Biden’s 2020 presidential election victory. In the weeks leading up to the Capitol Riots, Trump and his political allies peddled disinformation and conspiracy theories of widespread voter fraud, erroneously suggesting that he, rather than Joe Biden, won the 2020 election. In response, members of White supremacist and antigovernment groups like the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and other conspiracy theorists associated with QAnon arrived in Washington D.C., many believing they were being called by Trump himself to ensure that he remained President. Hundreds of videos taken by both police and protesters are available depicting individuals committing property damage, theft of government property, and threatening to commit violence against lawmakers and former Vice President Mike Pence. Over the course of that tragic day, multiple pipe bombs were discovered, five people were killed, and police officers were dragged, beat, and doused with chemical spray, ultimately leading to the death of one police officer and injuries to more than 150 other officers.

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Since the January 6 attacks, over 500 people have been arrested, mostly men ranging from 18 to 80 years of age, including dozens of current and former members of law enforcement and the U.S. military. At the time of this writing, there remains a massive effort to arrest hundreds more accused of various federal crimes stemming from that day. Only approximately 200 individuals have been indicted by grand juries, placing immense pressure on the Department of Justice and federal court system to seek justice in hundreds of cases ranging from misdemeanors (e.g., disorderly conduct) to serious felony charges (e.g., using a deadly or dangerous weapon or causing serious bodily injury to an officer). The prosecution and sentencing of those charged in connection with the Capitol Riots has only begun, with only approximately 30 defendants pleading guilty and being sentenced to fines, time served, home confinement, and less than a year of incarceration. Many of the more complex cases thus far involve multiple pieces of digital evidence that must be sorted through to build strong cases against those charged with committing violence and members of extremist groups accused of coordinating with others to plan violent attacks (i.e., conspiracy cases). While there remains no federal domestic terrorism statute, some prosecutors have claimed that the acts of some defendants amounted to terrorism, which could ultimately influence prison sentences if they are found guilty. Most RWEs who commit serious acts of violence are prosecuted in American courts just like other criminal defendants who commit a nonideologically motivated, parallel crimes (Smith, 1994). Systematically identifying how prosecutors choose to process cases involving RWEs will inform other criminal justice actors on best practices around the country who face similar criminal cases. Finally, investigating how violent RWEs are sentenced can provide one of the few measures for how society responds to this form of domestic violent extremism. Identifying what factors predict the harshness of criminal sentences will provide insight into how America has perceived the threat of violent RWE as a social problem and justice for these serious crimes over the last few decades. The remainder of this chapter unfolds by first describing the sources of data relied upon to derive the findings. Second, law enforcement involvement in occurrences of RWE violence is discussed, including what we know about the police officers as victims of deadly RWE encounters and

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the involvement of law enforcement in thwarting deadly terrorist plots. Third, we address what is known about how violent RWE defendants are prosecuted in federal courts. Fourth, patterns of sentencing violent RWE defendants, and how patterns might vary by defendant backgrounds and prosecutorial strategies, are presented.

Studying Extreme Right-Wing Violence American Terrorism Study (ATS). As the longest running project on domestic terrorism in the United States, the American Terrorism Study (ATS) has been an integral source of information on RWE violence for the last 30 years (Smith, 1994). ATS researchers have systematically collected and coded federal cases of RWE violence and other terrorismrelated court cases investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) since the last 1980s (Smith & Damphousse, 1996; 1998). These cases have been identified by researchers through a combination of lists provided to ATS researchers by federal officials, lists published by the FBI and U.S. Attorney press releases, and supplemented by systematic searches of other publicly available sources. One of the unique aspects of the ATS is the comprehensive and detailed chronicling of the legal responses for violent extremism and terrorism-related cases. Currently, RWE cases comprise roughly one-third of the more than 1,500 court cases included in the database that encompass completed, attempted, and planned acts of terrorist violence, thus providing the most complete record for how the federal government has chosen to respond to RWE over the last several decades. United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). The U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) was created in 2006 (Freilich et al., 2014). In addition to data on violence planned and perpetrated by Islamic extremists and eco-terrorists, the ECDB includes incident, offender, and victim-level data on RWE violence committed since 1990. These data are unique from those included in the ATS in a couple of ways. First, the ECDB includes data on RWE violence that was not investigated by the FBI or prosecuted in federal court so that RWE cases prosecuted at the state level may also be empirically examined. Second,

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RWE violence not resulting in an official criminal indictment so cases in which offenders were killed or committed suicide prior to arrest (see, e.g., Gruenewald et al., 2019) are represented in the ECDB. For a violent event to be included in the ECDB, there must be evidence that offenders: (1) are associated with the RWE movement and they (2) committed, attempted, or planned to commit an act of violence. As of September 2020, the ECDB includes data on 227 RWE ideologically motivated homicides occurring between 1990 and 2020. In the next section, we rely on data from the ECDB to address the enduring threat of RWE to law enforcement in the United States.

Law Enforcement and Violent RWE While there has been no research to our knowledge specifically evaluating law enforcement policies or programs specifically created for responding to violent RWE (see also Lum et al., 2006), a few studies have examined violent interactions between RWEs and police in the United States. Klein et al. (2019), for example, found that most official investigations of violent RWE plots are led by federal agencies, usually the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), though cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies often occurs, and relatively more so for RWE investigations than other forms of domestic terrorism. Traditional investigatory tactics, including human intelligence (e.g., confidential informants and undercover agents) and surveillance, are most commonly relied upon by federal investigators. Also important, Klein et al. (2019) found that public tips, including tips from those who are close to offenders, are relatively more important for thwarting violent RWE plots in comparison to other types of terrorist plots (e.g., radical Islamic plots) in the United States. RWE Threats to Police. As the government’s most visible and accessible representatives, law enforcement officers have a history of being targeted by anti-government RWEs. Federal law enforcement agencies have long been demonized by the RWE movements, viewed as agents responsible for doing the nefarious bidding of a perceived tyrannical government corrupted by international Jewish bankers (i.e., Zionist

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Occupied Government or “ZOG”) (see Barkun, 1997). It is known, for instance, that when U.S. Army veteran Timothy McVeigh bombed the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah building in 1995 he intentionally targeted it because it housed the offices of federal law enforcement (Michel & Herbeck, 2002). McVeigh was reportedly disillusioned by his participation in the Persian Gulf War and the high-profile standoffs in Idaho (Ruby Ridge Standoff ) and Texas (Waco Siege) ending in federal law enforcement killing citizens. He became convinced that the federal government had effectively declared war on the American people, and thus saw any of its representatives as suitable targets. The majority of law enforcement officers who have been killed by RWEs in the United States have not been employed by federal agencies. Using data from the ECDB, Suttmoeller et al. (2013; see also Gruenewald et al., 2016) found that officers employed by state and local police agencies are disproportionately more likely to be killed by RWEs than federal law enforcement officers. Officers who are killed by RWEs are, on average, around 40 years of age (Suttmoeller et al., 2013). These officers are almost always White, with little indication that RWEs intentionally target officers based on their race or ethnicity. RWEs compare similarly in demographic makeup to their victims, as the majority of offenders are White males, yet slightly younger on average (late 20s and 30s) than the police officers who are killed (Gruenewald et al., 2016). While White supremacy beliefs also permeate the RWE movement, offenders who kill law enforcement officers almost always adhere to anti-government worldviews as well. Data from the ECDB suggest that RWE offenders who murder law enforcement are often known to police prior to these deadly encounters, and that the majority of offenders have, sometimes lengthy, prior arrest histories. One of the most serious RWE threats to law enforcement are known as Sovereign Citizens (or “sovereigns”) (ADL, 2012; FBI, 2011), a more recent manifestation of a long line of tax protestors and racist, antiSemitic, anti-government conspiratorialists. Sovereigns believe that secret federal and international government actors and other elite conspirators replaced America’s original common law system approximately a century ago, either with the ratification of the Constitution’s 14th Amendment

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or the eradication of the nation’s gold standard (see Berger, 2016). According to sovereigns, Americans remain “slaves to the state” until they publicly reject their beholden status and declare their sovereignty. In addition to setting up their own common law courts, sovereigns are known for refusing to register their vehicles, attain drivers’ licenses, and use identifying legal documents (e.g., birth certificates, social security cards). What the FBI has labeled as “paper terrorism,” is commonly practiced by sovereigns who file bogus legal documents (e.g., false liens) to disrupt and congest local courts and harass judicial actors. While most sovereigns are simply nuisances to police and other government officials, many threaten violence if their sovereignty is challenged (Loeser, 2015). Sovereigns have also resorted to deadly violence when directly confronted by law enforcement, usually over routine legal matters like traffic stops (Gruenewald et al., 2016; Suttmoeller, 2013). Likely due in large part to several high-profile killings of police officers, research has shown that law enforcement officers agencies around the country consider sovereigns a serious threat to public safety.

Prosecuting and Sentencing Violent Rwe Defendants Currently, the most comprehensive data on the adjudication of RWE in the United States comes from the American Terrorism Study (ATS). For approximately three decades, ATS researchers have systematically collected federal court records for all domestic terrorists, allowing us to describe patterns in the backgrounds of RWE defendants, the prosecutorial strategies used against them, and how they are typically sentenced for their crimes. The purpose of the current section is to review what is currently known about these topics based on analyses of ATS data. As is true of terrorists in the United States more generally, RWEs who are federally prosecuted in the United States are disproportionately male. Of the 439 RWEs who are currently associated with federal terrorism cases included in the ATS, approximately 90% are male. This finding aligns with prior research which has also found that RWEs significantly

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7.8%

92.2% Female

Fig. 19.1

Male

Gender of violent RWE defendants

19.7%

13.7%

66.3% Under 25 Fig. 19.2

25 to 50

Over 50

Average age of violent RWE defendants

differ from federally indicted left-wing terrorists that involve females in over 25% of federal cases (Smith, 1994) (Figs. 19.1 and 19.2). The average age of a violent RWE defendant indicted in federal court is approximately 39, with most defendants ranging between the ages of 25 and 50 years of age. This makes violent RWE offenders slightly older (36% are over age 40), on average, than members other ideological groups, such as eco-terrorists and radical Islamic terrorists who have also been indicted in the United States for federal terrorism (Smith, 1994).1 Perhaps not surprisingly, RWEs are overwhelmingly White, which also makes them unique from other terrorist movements operating in the Unites States. For example, Smith (1994) found in the past only 29% of left-wing terrorists are White while 71% are racial or ethnic minorities.

1

Contrastingly, other studies (Gruenewald, 2011; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015) have found that RWEs who commit murder are not notably older than others who commit parallel crimes.

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Most RWEs are never charged with terrorism, but instead the vast majority (over 93%) of the more than 9,000 total federal counts currently reflected in the ATS against violent RWEs include conventional criminal charges (see Fig. 19.3). Of those conventional (non-terrorism) charges, slightly over half involve a violent criminal offense, such as carrying or transporting weapons, assault, homicide, robbery, or arson (see Fig. 19.4). Other conventional charges that are considered nonviolent in nature include crimes such as fraud charges, making false statements, and vandalism. In our examination of ATS data, we found that only a relatively small percentage (approximately 7%) of RWE defendants are charged with criminal offenses that are explicitly linked to terrorism, or cases in which lawyers make direct references to relevant terrorism-related statutes or chapters of the U.S. Criminal Code. When discussing prosecutorial strategies, Turk (1982) described two methods that government officials (e.g., prosecutors) use to seek justice against terrorists who are facing criminal trials—exceptional vagueness and explicit politicality. 6.7%

93.3% ConvenƟonal Fig. 19.3

Terrorism-Related

All charges against violent RWE defendants

47% 53%

Non-Violent Fig. 19.4

Violent

Conventional charges against violent RWE defendants

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However, Smith et al. (2002) later added a third method, subtle innuendo, to widen our understanding of how prosecutors make decisions on punishing terrorist offenders. Exceptional vagueness refers to instances where prosecutors and other government actors avoid using the word “terrorism” to describe a criminal offense in order to skirt consequences of labeling the act as politically motivated. Doing so allows prosecutors to bypass the often-questioned intent or motive of the offender, thus making it easier for prosecutors to try a defendant similarly to those accused of committing more traditional crimes. On the other end of the spectrum are prosecutors who explicitly reference the terroristic aspects of alleged crimes. Explicit politicality occurs when government officials utilize the fact that an incident was politically motivated in order to gain momentum in court. This allows prosecutors to label defendants as suspected terrorists, solidifying the defendant’s identity for the news media and, perhaps more importantly, to the jury. Once the defendant is considered a terrorist, the question of intent or motive is more easily answered because “terrorism” by most definitions requires political motivation to necessitate the offense. Lastly, subtle innuendo denotes cases in which prosecutors refrain from clearly defining the offender as a terrorist (i.e., prosecutors are ambiguous in their labeling of the defendant). Although in these circumstances prosecutors often insinuate that the defendant is a terrorist, it is not explicitly mentioned. Prosecutors may choose to subtly reference an affiliation to terrorism because explicitly politicizing a terrorism case rarely results in anything but a trial—which could be less than ideal for some prosecutors and courts. Despite explicit terrorism-related charges remaining relatively rare, ATS data reveal that federal prosecutors mention the ideological or group affiliation at some point during the trial in the majority (58%) of cases against RWEs. In other words, although explicit terrorism charges are atypical in federal cases against RWEs, prosecutors often still make at least a subtle reference to defendants’ terrorism affiliations during the case proceedings (Fig. 19.5). When explicitly charging defendants with terrorism-related offenses, an increasingly common way to charge defendants is to charge them with material support of terrorism (18 USC 2339B). Data from the ATS, for example, reveal that members of the West Virginia Mountaineer Militia

501

19 Criminal Justice Responses to Right-Wing Extremist …

Prosecutors Evoke Terrorism Affilia on

58%

Prosecutors Do NOT Evoke Terrorism Affilia on

42%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Percentage

Fig. 19.5 Reference to violent RWE defendant’s terrorist affiliations by federal prosecutors

were charged with this type of crime as far back as the 1990s, but since the 9/11 terrorist attacks this charge has been brought almost exclusively (and usually successfully) against Islamist terrorists. While radical Islamist offenders are regularly convicted when charged with material support, the statute has been less successfully applied to other types of ideologically motivated offenders. In fact, RWEs and members of other terrorist movements (e.g., eco-terrorists) who have been charged in the past with material support of terrorism have often had the charge dropped or have been acquitted by a jury. One plausible explanation for this pattern is that federal prosecutors may avoid pursuing terrorismrelated charges in cases of RWE because they are historically less likely to result in convictions. If a conviction and comparable sentence can be achieved with no mention of ideological motive, prosecutors may have little incentive to build a case of material support of terrorism against RWEs.

Prosecutorial Strategies and Case Outcomes As shown in Fig. 19.6, over 80% of violent RWEs are ultimately convicted in federal court, with slightly more than half (51.6%) of those convictions resulting from entered guilty pleas. While plea deals are the most common outcome, the next most common court outcome for

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Trial ConvicƟon

31.6%

Guilty Plea

51.6%

Dismissal

8.8%

AcquiƩal

7.9% 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Percentage Fig. 19.6

Prosecutorial outcomes for violent RWE defendants

RWEs is having their case go to trial and being convicted by a jury (31.6%). This is fairly consistent with prior research findings on prosecutions of domestic terrorism from the 1980s and 1990s. Smith’s (1994) research on violent and non-violent RWE found that approximately 27% of case outcomes for RWE resulted in jury convictions, 43% of cases involved defendants who pleaded guilty, 12% of cases were dismissed due to mistrial or government motion, and 18% of federal RWE cases were dismissed due to acquittal. The relative commonality of trials is somewhat unique to terrorismrelated federal crimes, as the vast majority of defendants in more routine (non-ideologically motivated) federal (and non-federal) crimes ultimately plead guilty to charges. Terrorist defendants in the United States, especially RWEs, have historically been more willing to pursue a trial by jury (Bradley-Engen et al., 2009; Damphousse & Shields, 2007). Although rare, some violent RWEs are never convicted for their terrorism-related charges in federal court, either because their case was dismissed (8.8%) or due to acquittal (7.9%). Here again we see relative consistency with our current findings and how RWE counts (both violent and non-violent) were resolved in federal court during the 1980s and early 1990s (Smith, 1994). As demonstrated in Table 19.1, there are only slight differences in the percentage of violent RWEs who are ultimately convicted in federal court, either by pleading guilty or by being convicted at trial by a jury for terrorism-related crimes. On average, the vast majority, between 82 and 90%, of violent RWE defendants who are charged with committing

19 Criminal Justice Responses to Right-Wing Extremist …

Table 19.1 gender

Percentage of violent RWE defendant convictions by age and

Defendant age Under 25 25–50 Over 50 Defendant gender Male Female

Table 19.2 strategy

503

% Convicted

% Not convicted

89.8 82.0 81.7

10.2 18.0 18.3

83.3 82.4

16.7 17.6

Percentage of violent RWE defendant convictions by prosecutorial

Convicted Not convicted

Subtle or no Reference to terrorism (%)

Explicit reference to terrorism (%)

92.4 7.6

75.7 24.3

violent crimes are ultimately convicted. On average, violent RWEs who are relatively younger (under 25) are disproportionately more likely to be convicted, but these differences are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the statistical difference in the likelihood of being convicted is even smaller in the percentage of violent RWE male (83.3%) and female (82.4%) defendants who are convicted in federal court. Overall, age and gender seem to factor very little into the prosecutorial decision-making and overall adjudication for violent RWE defendants. Although demographic differences between RWE defendants who are convicted of violent terrorism remain minimal, there are significant (χ 2 = 9.13, p = 0.000) differences in conviction rates across prosecutorial strategies, or whether federal prosecutors decide to evoke defendants’ alleged terrorist affiliations. As shown in Table 19.2, violent RWE defendants are usually convicted regardless of prosecutors’ decisions to politicize the case by referencing affiliations to terrorism. Importantly, though, defendants who are prosecuted based solely on their criminality or with only subtle reference to the political nature of their crimes are significantly (χ 2 = 14.67, p = 0.000) more likely to be convicted (92.4.9%). Contrastingly, convictions

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Female

29.0

Male

67.0 0

20

40

60

80

Number of Months Fig. 19.7

Median sentence length in months by gender

occur for only approximately 75% of violent RWE defendants when prosecutors decide to charge them with a terrorism-related statute or otherwise explicitly acknowledge their participation in violent extremist movements or specific groups. These findings seem to suggest that prosecutorial decisions about how to charge violent RWEs and whether to explicitly label the defendant as a terrorist may ultimately shape the likelihood of certain legal outcomes.

Sentencing Violent RWE Defendants In this section, we review the most recent findings from the ATS on the length of sentences for violent RWEs convicted of federal terrorismrelated crimes. On average, violent RWEs who are ultimately convicted receive average sentences of 63 months for their crimes. The length of sentences convicted RWEs receive varies by both gender and defendant age. As shown in Fig. 19.7, the median2 length of sentence in months for violent RWEs who are males is an average of 67 months (or slightly over 13 years), while RWEs who are female tend to receive relatively shorter sentences of 29 months (or slightly over 2 years) (Fig. 19.8). These findings appear to align with more general patterns in the criminal sentencing literature, suggesting that females receive relatively lighter sentences in comparison to males who are convicted of similar charges (Bontrager et al., 2013; Daly & Bordt, 1995; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Possible explanations for females receiving more lenient punishments 2

Median is relied on here rather than average to reduce the influence of outlier cases.

19 Criminal Justice Responses to Right-Wing Extremist …

Over 50

505

90.0

25-50

71.0.0

Under 25

55.5 0.0

50.0

100.0

Number of Months Fig. 19.8

Median sentence length in months by age category

include a desire by judges to act chivalrously toward women who are perceived as fulfilling more essential roles in the lives of their families, as well as their views of women as less culpable for their crimes. Additionally, some women indicted in connection with violent RWE plots may be perceived as accessory actors, rather than drivers of the conspiracy. When relying on measures of median sentence length to reduce the influence of outlier cases (e.g., multiple life sentences), there appears to be a linear relationship between age and sentence length. Older RWEs (over 50) tend to receive the harshest of sentences for committing terrorism-related crimes, while the youngest violent RWE defendants receive the most lenient sentences. This finding in part contradicts prior research on criminal sentencing more generally that finds a curvilinear relationship between age and sentencing, or that relatively young and old offenders receive more lenient sentences (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). We can speculate on how perceptions of older and younger violent RWEs may factor into their sentencing decisions. It is possible, for example, that especially young RWEs defendants are perceived as less hardened criminals who could still potentially contribute to society after being released from prison. Moreover, judges may view older RWEs as posing more serious threats to society and also benefitting less from reformative effects of prison. It is also possible that older defendants receive harsher sentences because they are considered to be leaders of criminal enterprises, perhaps because they are perceived as more culpable for their crimes. Our analyses also reveal significant differences in the average sentence length for violent RWEs by conviction type, or whether defendants pleaded guilty or were convicted by a jury. Those defendants who opted

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to go to trial received longer sentences (see Fig. 19.9). In contrast, those violent RWE defendants who pleaded guilty for their terrorism-related crimes were sentenced to less time in prison. Reduced sentences for those violent RWE defendants who pleaded guilty, often for shorter or less serious charges, are unsurprising as receiving shorter sentences is one of the major incentives for defendants to not pursue a trial by jury. Avoiding trials also has advantages for prosecutors and courts more generally who do not necessarily have the resources to take every case to trial. In short, while terrorists may be more likely to take their case to trial than the more common (accused) criminals, plea deals are still generally viewed as advantageous for both violent extremists and the American court system. These findings also align with prior research. In particular, Smith and Damphousse (1996) assert that one of the most salient factors in determining sentence length for terrorists is whether prosecutors decided to make political motivation a part of the case. More specifically, they found that traditional offenders (or non-terrorists) who commit similar crimes typically receive a sentence that is nearly one-third the length of a terrorist who is convicted and explicitly defined by the prosecutor as politically motivated for a similar offense. Thus, more generally, we can ascertain that the sentence length of a case is molded in part by whether or not the prosecutor decides to attach political motivation to the defendant. The average sentence length of RWEs also significantly varies by how prosecutors choose to pursue a case, or more specifically whether prosecutors decide to explicitly evoke a defendant’s affiliation to a terrorism

Jury ConvicƟon

180

Guilty Plea

57 0

50

100

150

200

Number of Months Fig. 19.9

Median sentence length in months by conviction type

19 Criminal Justice Responses to Right-Wing Extremist …

Explicit Reference to Terrorism

507

96

Subtle or No Reference to Terrorism

60 0

50

100

150

Number of Months Fig. 19.10

Average sentence length in months by prosecutorial strategy

movement or group. Supporting prior research (Smith, 1994), we find that violent RWEs are punished more harshly when prosecutors decide to try defendants by explicitly evoking their affiliations with terrorist movements (see Fig. 19.10). In other words, prosecuting a RWE as a domestic terrorist rather than as a routine criminal results in the most severe sentences. This aligns with other research as Damphousse and Shields (2007) have found that defendants who are labeled terrorists receive notably longer sentences than those defendants who are not for the same offense upon conviction.

Advancing Research on Criminal Justice Responses to RWE Violence While the findings reviewed in this chapter further our empirical understanding of responses by police, prosecutors, and judges to RWE violence, there remains much to be learned about the factors shaping criminal justice decisions-making and official responses to those accused of committing ideologically motivated violence. Therefore, we outline in this section recommendations for advancing the nascent study of criminal justice responses to violent RWE. In short, our recommendations include: (1) advancing sociological and criminological theoretical explanations of violent RWE and (2) contributing to the empirical investigation of criminal justice responses to RWE in ways that can meaningfully impact policy and practice.

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We begin by highlighting avenues for advancing theoretical approaches for understanding opportunities for violent RWE targeting police and explaining how extralegal factors may influence prosecutorial and judicial decision-making in the contexts of violent extremism cases. First, our review of relevant research findings suggests that opportunities for RWE violence targeting police may be increased when motivated anti-government extremists encounter law enforcement who engage in overt (and perceivably provocative) acts toward RWEs. Drawing from the tenets of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) (Clarke & Newman, 2006), the risk of deadly RWE violence may be reduced by hardening targets, such as through wearing ballistic bulletproof vests, and implementing practices that promote de-escalation and soft tactical approaches to reduce justifications for violent attacks against police. A second opportunity for theoretical development is in the area of criminal justice decision-making, particularly in explaining what legal and extralegal factors might shape prosecutorial and judicial outcomes in the context of violent RWE cases. The findings reviewed earlier in this chapter demonstrated that legal outcomes often vary even in similar cases of serious crimes like terrorism. A rich criminological literature utilizing feminist and psychological grounded theories of decision-making has amassed over the decades that illuminates the influence of extralegal factors like race, gender, and age of defendants on legal outcomes. What has yet to be explored, however, is how these and other extralegal factors (e.g., ideological affiliations) might influence decisions-making and disparate outcomes for RWE defendants. Despite real challenges to acquiring data on this important topic, open-source databases are creating opportunities to conduct more sophisticated empirical research on criminal justice responses to violent extremism. Official statistics on most other forms of violent crime are publicly available, while official terrorism-related crime data continue to remain largely unavailable to researchers. Common sources of official crime data like the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) are still unreliable sources of data on various forms of violent extremism. Even when violent crimes perpetrated by RWEs and other domestic extremists are captured in national crime statistics, discerning such crimes from other non-ideologically

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motivated crimes remains challenging if not impossible. As a result, researchers seeking to empirically study violent extremism and criminal justice responses to violent extremism must rely on alternative data sources. Fortunately, a significant amount of federal funding in the United States has been allocated toward the creation of open-source terrorism databases over the last 30 years in order to address the unavailability of official sources of data on violent extremism, terrorism-related crimes, and criminal justice responses to these crimes. These include those databases relied on in this current chapter, the American Terrorism Study (ATS), which primarily utilizes federal court documents for data, and the U.S. Extremist Crime database (ECDB), which relies on media sources, court documents, correctional records, police reports, and other publicly available materials. As such, open-source databases have become essential to advancing our empirical understanding of criminal justice responses to terrorism, and, because of the absence of published official terrorism statistics, American policymakers and the public depend on them to learn about terrorism patterns and trends in the United States. Based on these emerging sources of data, it will be up to researchers to comparatively examine how criminal justice responses to violent extremism compare to prosecutorial and judicial responses to parallel crimes that differ in motivational circumstances and offender affiliations. It is expected that criminal justice responses to violent extremists will vary, for instance, across crime types, temporal and geospatial contexts, and defendant affiliations to extremist movements. Identifying patterns of prosecutorial strategies and judicial decision-making can potentially inform criminal justice actors who are seeking justice for the victims of violent RWE crimes. We have shown in this chapter that violent RWEs federally indicted in the United States are often charged with conventional federal charges, such as carrying or transporting weapons, assault, homicide, robbery, or arson. Other conventional charges used against terrorists for non-violent crimes include crimes such as fraud, making false statements, and vandalism. While convictions were the most common legal outcome for RWEs regardless of how they are charged, we found that the likelihood of convictions for RWEs prosecuted on conventional charges in which the political nature of the crimes

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was not made explicit (or referenced at all) differed from those cases not explicitly politicized. These findings have real implications for prosecutors who are seeking to secure convictions in cases involving RWE defendants. These findings also have implications for policymakers who continue to debate whether there is a need for the creation of federal domestic terrorism charges that are more in line with existing charges commonly used against foreign terrorists.

Conclusion How the criminal justice system chooses to adjudicate RWEs who commit socially and politically motivated crimes in the United States is one of the clearest statements a society can make against the perils of violence motivated by anti-government sentiment, White supremacy, xenophobia, and other divisive and dehumanizing ideologies. For this reason, all eyes will be on the adjudicatory outcomes of RWEs indicted on various federal charges stemming from the January 6 Capitol Riots. The decisions of prosecutors in these cases will also have significant consequences on case dispositions and sentence length for violent RWEs. It is our hope that the recommendations for advancing theoretical explanations, comparative research designs, and continued data collection efforts made in this chapter can serve as a guide to researchers and policymakers seeking to better understand and respond to violent RWE in the United States moving forward.

References Anti-Defamation League (ADL). (2012). The lawless ones: The resurgence of the sovereign citizen movement (2nd ed.). ADL Special Report. Retrieved on November 15, 2020 from https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/docume nts/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Lawless-Ones-2012-Edition-WEB-final.pdf

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Barkun, M. (1997). Religion and the racist right: The origins of the Christian Identity movement (2nd ed.). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Berger, J.M. (2016). Without prejudice: What sovereign citizens believe. The George Washington University Program on Extremism. Retrieved on November 15, 2020 from https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downlo ads/JMB%20Sovereign%20Citizens.pdf Bradley-Engen, M.S., Damphousse, K.R., & Smith, B.L. (2009). Punishing terrorists: A re-examination of U.S. federal sentencing in the postguidelines era. International Criminal Justice Review, 19 (4), 433–455. Bontrager, S., Barrick, K., & Stupi, E. (2013). Gender and sentencing: A metaanalysis of contemporary research. Journal of Gender, Race, & Justice, 16 , 349–372. Clarke, R.V., & Newman, G.R. (2006). Outsmarting the terrorists. Westport, CT: Praeger. Chermak, S., & Gruenewald, J. (2015). Laying the foundation for the criminological examination of right-wing, left-wing, and Al Qaeda-inspired extremism in the United States. Terrorism & Political Violence, 27 (1), 133–159. Daly, K., & Bordt, R. (1995). Sex effects and sentencing: A review of the statistical literature. Justice Quarterly, 12, 143–177. Damphousse, K.R., & Shields, C.A. (2007). The morning after assessing the effect of major terrorism events on prosecution strategies and outcomes. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 23(2), 174–194. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (2011). Sovereign citizens: A growing domestic threat to law enforcement. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved on November 15, 2020 from https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/sov ereign-citizens-a-growing-domestic-threat-to-law-enforcement Freilich, J.D., Chermak, S., Belli, R., Gruenewald, J., & Parkin, W.S. (2014). Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database. Terrorism & Political Violence, 26 (2), 372–384. Freilich, J.D., Chermak, S., Gruenewald, J., Parkin, W.S., & Klein, B.R. (2018). Patterns of violent far-right extremist crime in the USA. Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(6), 38–51. Freilich, J.D., Chermak, S., & Simone, J., Jr. (2009). Surveying American state police agencies about terrorism threats, terrorism sources, and terrorism definitions. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21(3), 450–475.

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Freilich, J.D., Gruenewald, J., & Mandala, M. (2019). Situational Crime Prevention and terrorism: An assessment of 10 years of research. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 30 (9), 1283–1311. Gruenewald, J. (2011). A comparative examination of far-right extremist homicide events. Homicide Studies, 15, 177–203. Gruenewald, J., Dooley, K.M.G., Suttmoeller, M.J., Chermak, S., & Freilich, J.D. (2016). A mixed-method analysis of fatal attacks on police by far-right extremists. Police Quarterly, 19 (2), 216–245. Gruenewald, J., Freilich, J., & Chermak, S. (2009). A review of the far-right extremism literature. In R. Blazak & B. Perry (Eds.), Hate crime issues and perspectives. Westport, CT: Praeger. Gruenewald, J., Klein, B., Parkin, W., Freilich, J.D., & Chermak, S. (2019). A situated comparison of suicide and non-suicide terrorist plots and homicides in the United States, 1990–2014. Crime & Delinquency, 65 (9), 1187–1217. Klein, B.R., Gruenewald, J., Chermak, S.M., & Freilich, J.D. (2019). A mixedmethods examination of law enforcement investigatory strategies used in jihadi and far-right foiled terrorist plots before and after 9/11. Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice & Criminology, 7 (2), 29–58. Loeser, C.E. (2015). From paper terrorists to cop killers: The sovereign citizen threat. North Carolina Law Review, 93, 1106–1139. Lum, C., Kennedy, L.W., & Sherley, A. (2006). Counter-terrorism strategies effective? The results of the Campbell Systematic Review on counterterrorism evaluation research. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2(4), 489–516. Michel, L., & Herbeck, D. (2002). American terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the tragedy at Oklahoma City. New York: Harper Collins. Silke, A. (2001). The devil you know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(4), 1–14. Smith, B.L. (1994). Terrorism in America: Pipe bombs and pipe dreams. New York: State University of New York Press. Smith, B.L., & Damphousse, K.R. (1996). Punishing political offenders: The effect of political motive on federal sentencing decisions. Criminology, 34, 289–322. Smith, B.L., & Damphousse, K.R. (1998). Terrorism, politics, and punishment: A test of structural-contextual theory and the “liberation hypothesis.” Criminology, 36 , 67–92. Smith, B.L., Damphousse, K.R., Jackson, F., & Sellers, A. (2002). The prosecution and punishment of international terrorists in federal courts: 1980–1998. Criminology & Public Policy, 1(3), 311–338.

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Index

A

Accelerationists 10, 31 Adversary groups 263, 264, 266–268 Afzaal family murders 55 Agenda-setting 101, 105, 106, 111, 115 Alt-Right 6, 9, 22, 29, 56, 67–70, 78–89, 221, 360, 362, 393, 398, 399, 422 American Terrorism Study (ATS) 307, 308, 492, 494, 497, 499, 500, 504, 509 Anti-abortion 103, 105–108, 111–114, 124, 125, 128, 316 Anti-Asian 133 Anti-authority 11, 55 Anti-Black 73, 128, 133, 331 Anti-government 28, 33, 38, 40, 100, 103, 105–108, 111, 113,

114, 121, 123–125, 127, 128, 134, 136, 138, 157, 163, 188, 306, 311, 318, 320, 328, 492, 495, 496, 508, 510 Anti-immigrant 52, 56, 105, 106, 128, 129, 132–134, 137, 167, 364, 421 Anti-Latinx 128, 133 Anti-LGBTQ 105, 106, 128, 129, 139 Anti-Middle Eastern 128 Anti-Muslim 63, 105, 106, 123, 128, 129, 132, 367, 421 Anti-Native 128 Anti-Semitic 11, 100, 105, 106, 128, 129, 133, 137, 192, 331, 340, 341, 343, 345, 348, 349, 363 Atomwaffen 38, 61, 283, 368

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 B. Perry et al. (eds.), Right-Wing Extremism in Canada and the United States, Palgrave Hate Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99804-2

515

516

Index

B

E

Base, The 10, 13, 38, 50, 59, 61, 410, 419, 422 Black communities 263, 265, 267 Black Lives Matter (BLM) 22, 36, 39, 57, 63, 78, 87, 200, 204, 205

8chan 83, 363, 382, 396 El Paso attack 32, 36, 39, 133, 313, 327, 357, 469 Encryption 361, 371 Ethno-nationalists 4, 9, 38 Extreme far-right 396–398 Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) 12, 33, 123, 124, 272, 303–305, 307, 310–312, 314, 319, 321, 330–332, 492, 494–496, 509

C

Canadian Anti-Hate Network 63 Charter of Values (Quebec) 53 Christchurch 26, 133, 219, 294, 356, 397 Christian Identity 105, 106, 124, 192, 284, 287, 303, 382, 394, 400, 447, 459 Collective identity 60, 255, 258–260, 263, 271, 454, 458 Colorado Springs attack 124 Conviction 75, 139, 201, 335, 340, 501–503, 505, 507, 509, 510 Corporate control of hate speech 475 COVID-19 3, 5, 28, 39, 62, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 165–167, 172, 176–179, 357, 409 Criminal justice 15, 337, 347, 492, 493, 507–510 Criminology 284, 329 Cultural studies 25, 28, 29, 39

D

Discord 361, 363 Disengagement 445–454, 456–463 Disinformation 88, 173, 244, 356, 358, 492

F

Facebook 84, 100, 155, 161, 175, 257, 356, 358, 359, 363, 367, 382, 385, 421, 471, 472, 484 Far-right 6, 12, 29, 50, 55, 57, 59, 62, 68, 97–103, 105, 106, 109–115, 120, 123, 124, 142, 155–157, 159, 163, 164, 180, 219, 221–223, 226, 244, 303–312, 314–321, 328, 330, 331, 335, 338, 341–343, 363, 368, 369, 381, 383–386, 392, 395–402, 409–411, 421, 450 Far-right collaboration 383 Far-right extremism 105, 303–305, 308, 309, 317, 318, 321, 330, 337, 343, 344, 384, 396, 399, 402, 410, 411, 471 Far-right politics 358 Far-right terrorism 98–100, 102, 103, 115, 304–306, 308 Fascist Forge 59, 363, 364, 371, 372 Financing 357, 368, 370, 372 Former extremists 37, 450

Index

Forums 15, 223, 259, 260, 263, 268, 269, 336, 358, 361, 362, 364–366, 368, 371, 372, 384, 396, 397, 422 4chan 83, 219, 360, 362, 363, 367, 385 14 words 11, 53, 237, 287 Framing 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 111, 114, 115, 157, 239, 240 Fundamentalism 123, 127, 129, 131

G

Gab 86, 359, 360, 363, 367, 485 Germany 26, 27, 30, 142, 286, 287, 294, 363, 369, 395, 399, 473 refugee attacks 287 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 98, 103, 105, 106, 109–111, 114, 120–122, 125–127, 143, 303 Goldy, Faith 53, 54, 56 Governmental regulation of hate speech 475 Gun control 193, 194, 199, 200, 203

H

Hammerskins 8, 60, 260, 366 Harper, Stephen 52 Hate crime 4, 32–34, 36, 50, 51, 81, 84, 89, 125, 126, 144 Hate speech 52, 100, 138, 470–476, 479 Homicide 4, 284, 303, 305–307, 309–312, 314, 316, 318–321, 495, 499, 509

517

I

Identity 5, 9, 31, 53, 60, 81, 86, 88, 98, 100, 120, 123, 126, 127, 129–131, 134, 137, 140, 142, 174, 220, 221, 231, 234, 258, 259, 262, 268–272, 360, 362, 387–389, 412, 427, 429, 446, 448, 450, 452–454, 456, 457, 459, 461, 462, 470, 471, 477, 500 Ideological violence 143 Ideology 10, 24–26, 31, 68–70, 81, 88, 102, 120–122, 126, 129–131, 135, 140–143, 159, 163, 217, 218, 220, 222, 224–226, 237, 256, 308, 333, 340–342, 345, 348, 364, 368, 383, 385, 388, 390, 394, 396, 399, 448, 450, 452, 454, 456, 458–461 Information gathering 357, 365, 370, 372 Information provision 357 Insurrection 21, 32, 37, 39, 56, 101, 205, 206, 208 Internet 15, 30, 40, 59, 60, 81, 82, 84, 89, 130, 159, 174, 222, 225, 256, 258, 259, 269, 282, 292, 293, 297, 330, 332, 341–344, 347, 348, 355–358, 360, 365–367, 370–372, 385, 387, 427, 470, 471, 473, 475–479, 484 Involuntarily Celibate/Incel 134, 281 Iron March 59, 363, 364, 393, 418, 421 Islamophobia 52, 53, 88, 126, 136, 203

518

Index

Isla Vista attack 216 J

January 6 insurrection 15, 36, 188, 206 Jewish communities 5, 265, 267 K

Kaczynski, Ted 292, 293, 297 Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 8, 38, 71, 74, 75, 83, 85, 100, 128, 260, 311, 366, 395, 447 L

La Meute 57, 58, 421 Las Vegas attack 138, 201 Law enforcement 10, 16, 22, 39, 49, 56, 58, 61, 62, 100, 101, 106, 109–111, 113, 126, 137, 138, 191, 192, 198, 202, 205, 207, 208, 271, 279, 283, 284, 287, 297, 303, 305, 306, 313, 315, 316, 319, 320, 339, 347, 370, 371, 492–497, 508 Leaderless Resistance 280, 290–293 LGBTQ communities 263 Lifestyle 123, 423–425, 429, 446, 449, 452, 453, 455–459, 461, 462 Lone wolf 38, 39, 279–284, 290–295, 297, 298, 303, 320

Manifesto 26, 32, 126, 131–133, 139, 216, 218–220, 227, 228, 233, 237, 238, 243, 246, 288, 293–295, 297, 307, 341, 343, 345, 356, 358, 371, 382, 397, 401 McVeigh, Timothy 22, 33, 38, 40, 194, 195, 282, 304, 496 Media 6, 14, 26, 39, 52, 54, 59, 73, 74, 81, 83, 88, 98, 99, 101–106, 111, 115, 142, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 169, 171–176, 178, 195, 240, 263, 272, 285, 293, 297, 332, 333, 342, 344, 388, 413, 450, 474, 500, 509 Memes 68, 83, 172, 270, 360, 366, 367, 382, 384, 385, 427 Merchandise 367, 368 Michigan Militia 38, 188, 193 Militia 10, 11, 14, 22, 28, 33, 100, 101, 124, 128, 187, 188, 190, 192–195, 197, 200–205, 207, 303, 305, 391–394, 401, 500 Miller, Amanda 201 Miller, Jerad 201 Minassian, Alek 56, 219, 227, 238 Misinformation 158, 159, 357, 361 Misogyny 10, 15, 50, 136, 216–219, 222, 224–226, 232, 242, 243

N M

Machine learning 218, 229 Male supremacy 123, 136, 216, 219, 226

Narrative analysis 218, 240 Neo-Nazis 29, 58, 371, 382, 421 Netiquette 475 Networking 256, 357, 361, 364, 472, 478

Index

519

Networks 163, 361–363, 446, 447, 449, 453, 456 News coverage 142 Non-violent right-wing extremists (RWEs) 255, 257, 259, 261, 262, 271, 272 Norway attack 24, 26, 61, 131, 292, 381

Propaganda 80–82, 130, 160, 259, 358, 359, 366–368, 383, 386, 401, 427, 450 Prosecution 16, 493, 502 Proud Boys 10, 13, 21, 24, 31, 38, 40, 50, 57, 58, 61, 83, 87, 100, 136, 388, 395, 418, 422, 492 Psychology 16, 34

O

Q

Oath Keepers 21, 38, 50, 189, 190, 196–198, 200, 203–206, 492 Obama, Barak 76, 77, 170, 196, 199, 203, 207, 291 Odinism 285, 397 Oklahoma City bombing 22, 25, 33, 39, 282, 289, 303, 304 Online Collective efficacy 483 Online extremism 470, 471, 475, 483 Online posting behaviors 258, 271 Online social control 476

QAnon 40, 57, 88, 155, 177, 205, 357, 492 Quebec 52, 53, 57, 156, 164–166, 170, 174, 176, 177, 179, 420, 421

P

Package bomb attacks 140 Paramilitary training 59, 189, 190, 193, 330, 410, 427 Patriots 4, 10, 187, 188, 208, 235 Peer-to-peer transitions 368, 369 Pittsburgh attack 86, 129, 132, 312, 327, 469 Political science 16, 27, 231 Political violence 37, 140, 144, 190, 191, 198, 208, 302, 390, 425 Posse Comitatus 191, 192

R

Racial capitalism 69, 70, 88 Racism 5, 7, 9, 24, 26, 29, 50, 73, 74, 76, 77, 89, 135, 136, 216, 226, 318, 333, 412, 480 Radicalization 140, 237, 257, 284, 296, 328, 330, 332–335, 338, 339, 345–349, 356, 429, 469 Recruitment 29, 59, 60, 260, 261, 357, 365–367, 387, 426, 427 Reddit 360, 385 Right-left spectrum 23 Right-wing extremism, definition 6, 49, 57, 62–64, 70 Right-wing populism 14, 16 Right-wing terrorism 6, 121–123, 125, 129, 135, 142, 143 Rodger, Elliot 136, 138, 216, 227, 238, 239 Ruby Ridge 192, 194, 288, 496

520

Index

S

Self-help 470, 471, 475–485 Sentencing 493, 494, 504, 505 Sentiment analysis 229, 234, 236, 237, 264 Skinheads 8, 12, 28, 38, 58, 285–287, 294, 382, 395, 396, 398, 447 Social control 160, 257, 328, 329, 332, 470, 471, 475–477, 479, 484, 485 Social media 4, 15, 50, 59, 60, 83, 84, 126, 138, 155–157, 159–161, 164, 171, 172, 174, 179, 180, 244, 272, 281, 296–298, 332, 333, 358, 360–363, 409, 422, 427, 470, 484 Social movement 25, 30, 31, 39, 69, 70, 89, 132, 240, 258, 463 Social movement theory 33, 258 Social reactionary 127, 129, 131 Soldiers of Odin 12, 53, 58, 359, 363, 422 Southern Strategy 69, 73, 74, 76–78, 87, 88 Sovereign citizen 11, 22, 38, 100, 128, 188, 192, 305, 496 Stormfront 60, 83, 255, 259, 260, 263, 269, 270, 341, 342, 345, 361, 366, 384, 396

T

Tarrant, Brenton 133, 134, 219, 220, 288, 294–297, 382, 397, 401 Tea Party 197 Telegram 361, 371, 384, 396

Terrorism 22, 32, 38, 60, 77, 97–99, 102, 104, 106, 109–112, 114, 115, 122, 125, 142, 194, 196, 256, 264, 272, 280, 283, 284, 290, 292, 301–305, 307, 308, 316–319, 327, 349, 390, 402, 447, 448, 491, 493–495, 497–503, 506, 508–510 Three Percenters (III%) 21, 196, 422, 427, 492 Tor 371 Transnational 13, 294, 362, 363, 387–389, 394, 396, 398, 402 Tree of Life Synagogue attack 86, 129, 312 Trump, Donald 4, 5, 12, 13, 21, 24–27, 29, 31, 32, 38, 50–52, 54, 55, 57, 62, 67–69, 75–89, 140, 157, 169, 177, 203–205, 207, 221, 356, 362, 426, 492 Twitter 34, 76, 83, 84, 155, 156, 160–166, 170–180, 358–360, 362, 363, 367, 385, 471, 472, 484, 485 Tyranny 188, 190, 197, 200, 202, 204

U

United States Capitol insurrection 52 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum attack 128 Unite the Right 22, 25, 62, 78, 84, 85, 356, 369, 391 Utøya attack 131

Index

V

Violence 8, 12, 14–16, 21, 22, 26, 31–34, 38–40, 50, 51, 55, 61, 63, 81, 84, 85, 88, 98, 100–102, 119, 120, 122–126, 128–130, 132, 135, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 188, 191–194, 200–203, 207, 208, 216–218, 222, 224, 225, 231, 236, 237, 240, 242, 256, 257, 262, 263, 269, 271, 272, 283, 284, 288, 289, 291, 293, 304–307, 309, 311, 318–321, 327–330, 333, 340, 343, 345, 347–349, 358, 364, 371, 383, 388, 397, 402, 422, 427, 429, 431, 446–449, 455, 459, 469, 472, 473, 475, 491–495, 497, 507, 508, 510

521

White nationalism 24, 29, 31, 68, 70, 71, 83, 216, 226, 293 White supremacists/supremacy 4, 8–11, 13, 15, 33, 51, 52, 58, 62, 68, 71, 72, 74, 85, 88, 89, 99, 103, 131, 133–136, 191, 204, 216–220, 222, 225, 226, 235, 237, 238, 240–243, 255, 259, 316, 328, 330, 336, 340, 341, 344, 348, 349, 387, 388, 397, 400, 449, 450, 452, 453, 457–460, 496, 510

X

Xenophobia 5, 7, 15, 24, 26, 50, 54, 59, 63, 121, 127, 128, 131, 133, 136, 142, 510

W

Waco 124, 192, 288, 289, 496 Websites 15, 29, 60, 80, 88, 332, 341, 342, 348, 358, 362, 364, 366, 368–370, 384, 385, 396, 397, 409

Y

Yellow Vests 56 YouTube 53, 84, 161, 171, 174, 175, 200, 358, 359, 362, 363, 384, 398