Revolution, Revival, and Religious Conflict in Sandinista Nicaragua [1 ed.] 9789047419358, 9789004156456

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Revolution, Revival, and Religious Conflict in Sandinista Nicaragua

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Religion in the Americas Series

VOLUME 6

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Revolution, Revival, and Religious Conflict in Sandinista Nicaragua by

Calvin L. Smith

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

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This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 1542-1279 ISBN 978 9004 15645 6 © Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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To Kay, Isaac, Gabriella, Katrina, Dominiq and Esther

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CONTENTS List of Maps ............................................................................... Acknowledgements ..................................................................... Frequently-Used Acronyms ........................................................ Glossary .......................................................................................

ix xi xiii xv

Introduction ................................................................................

1

Part One Background to Protestant-Sandinista Relations Chapter One Perceptions of Protestant-State Relations in Revolutionary Nicaragua ........................................................ Chapter Two Survey of Nicaraguan Protestantism (1556–1978) ............................................................................. Chapter Three Nature of Somoza-Protestant Relations ........

15 43 75

Part Two Dynamics of Church-State Relations from the Protestant Perspective Chapter Four Protestant Responses Towards the Revolution ............................................................................... Chapter Five Conservative Protestant Perceptions of Sandinismo .................................................................................

99 137

Part Three Dynamics of Church-State Relations from the Sandinista Perspective Chapter Six Sandinista Repression ......................................... Chapter Seven Sandinista Perceptions of Evangelicals ..........

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169 213

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viii

contents Part Four Conclusion

Chapter Eight

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From Client to Rival .......................................

251

Appendix A Maps of Nicaragua ............................................. Appendix B Selected Biographical Sketches ........................... Appendix C Gustavo Parajón’s response to allegations that CEPAD misused donated funds to buy eleven jeeps for the Sandinista police (reproduced in full) ........................ Bibliography ................................................................................ Index ...........................................................................................

275 279 285 289 307

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LIST OF MAPS Main cities and towns of Nicaragua .......................................... Land utilisation and vegetation .................................................. General concentration of the Miskitu population ..................... Pentecostal heartlands in the northern highlands .....................

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275 276 277 278

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people without whose help I could not have complete this research. Many Nicaraguans expressed a willingness to speak to me, offer advice, suggest a lead, or introduce me to someone else with knowledge of these events. I am especially grateful to all those willing to be interviewed. Their insight played a vital role in establishing what happened and why. It would be impossible to list everyone by name here. However, I want to take this opportunity to thank several people by name. I am grateful to Toni Kapcia, my first Latin American Studies tutor, whose enthusiasm in the classroom first aroused my interest in Nicaragua. Denys Turner (now at Yale) offered many helpful comments. Gustavo Parajón patiently responded to my e-mail queries whenever I sought clarification on an issue, while Carlos Escorcia likewise remained in correspondence. I am especially grateful to several people who provided me with various vital documents. These included Miguel Angel Casco, whose personal archive was something of a gold mine, Alan Wisdom of the Institute of Religion and Democracy, who sent copies of documents long since forgotten and unavailable, and also Ignacio Hernández. Meanwhile, during the final stages of my research Deann Alford suggested some useful leads to pursue. I also thank the Whitefield Institute, Oxford (now the Kirby Laing Institute of Christian Ethics, Cambridge) for its generosity. Finally, several people deserve a special mention. Hugh McLeod was a tremendous source of help and guidance, offering objective criticism and thoughtful comments which helped immeasurably. I am also highly grateful to David Spencer, who not only introduced me to many of the national leaders in Nicaragua, without which this study could not have gone ahead, but also he and his wife Bonnie opened up their home and gave me a place to stay in Managua during my visits. Their help and hospitality is greatly appreciated. Most importantly, though, I thank my family for all their encouragement and patience, to my wife Kay, and my children, Isaac, Gabriella, Katrina, Dominiq and Esther. I dedicate this to them. Needless to say, all the people who helped me cannot be held responsible for the contents of the following pages. That responsibility rests with me alone.

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FREQUENTLY-USED ACRONYMS ANPEN ANPDH AoG CAM CDS CEPAD CEPRES CIEETS CNPEN CPDH DGSE EPS FSLN GN GPP IACHR IRD MINT MPR PLO

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Asociación Nacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua (National Association of Evangelical Pastors of Nicaragua) Asociación Nicaragüense Pro Derechos Humanos (Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights) Assemblies of God Central American Mission Comités de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Defence Committees) Consejo Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo (Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development) Concilio Evangélico de Promoción Social (Evangelical Council for Social Promotion) Centro InterEclesial de Estudios Teológicos y Sociales (InterEcclesial Centre for Theological and Social Studies) Consejo Nacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua (National Council of Evangelical Pastors of Nicaragua) Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (Permanent Commission of Human Rights) Dirección General de Seguridad del Estado (General Directorate for State Security) Ejército Popular Sandinista (Sandinista People’s Army) Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) Guardia Nacional (National Guard) Guerra Popular Prolongada (People’s Protracted War) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Institute of Religion and Democracy Ministerio del Interior (Interior Ministry) Movimiento de Pastores Revolucionarios (Movement of Revolutionary Pastors) Palestine Liberation Organisation

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xiv RIPEN 2 SMP TP

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frequently-used acronyms Segundo Retiro Interdenominacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua (Second Interdenominational Retreat of Nicaraguan Protestant Pastors) Servicio Militar Patriótico (Patriotic Military Service) Tendencia Proletaria (Proletarian Tendency)

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GLOSSARY barrio campesino Casa 50 chaval chiquita Comarca conscientización costeño/a

Departamento derechista El Chipote izquierdista muchacho personería jurídica secta somocista templo turbas (also ‘turbas divinas’)

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District, local neighbourhood. Peasant. DGSE office in Managua where some pastors were ordered to report during the crackdown of 1985. Lad (plural: chavales, ‘the lads’). See also muchacho. Tiny cell used to hold prisoners, usually too small even to sit down in. Small administrative region. Consciousness-raising (i.e. to raise class consciousness). Inhabitant of the Atlantic coast region of Nicaragua along the Mosquito Shore. This region has a distinct cultural identity by virtue of its British colonial past. Large administrative region, which is subdivided into smaller regions. Someone on the right (derecha). Lit. “rightist”. DGSE prison, located behind the pyramid-shaped, former Inter-Continetal Hotel, in the old centre of Managua. Someone on the left (izquierda). Lit. “leftist”. Lad. See also ‘chaval’. Legal status, incorporation papers. Sect. Derogatory term for Evangelical groups. Somozan, i.e. pertain to Somoza or his regime. Lit. temple. Name given in Nicaragua to a churchbuilding. Mobs (or ‘divine mobs’). Part of the DGSE apparatus, set up by Tomás Borge.

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INTRODUCTION On 19 July 1979 jubilant guerrillas entered Managua, capital of Nicaragua, filling the Plaza de la República and ending the dynastic, despotic rule of the Somoza family. The regime of the last Somoza, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was especially unpopular and corrupt, its latter stages marked by such human rights abuses by Somoza’s Guardia Nacional (National Guard, GN) that President Jimmy Carter cut all military and economic aid to this former U.S. client. The assassination in 1978 of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, newspaper publisher and dogged political opponent of Somoza, had led to an outpouring of grief and a national strike that marked the beginning of the regime’s downfall. Brutal efforts by the GN to repress growing unrest were met with ever more daring military escapades by the Sandinista guerrillas (named after 1930s Nicaraguan nationalist hero Augusto Sandino). At the height of an insurrection costing some 50,000 lives, Somoza fled Nicaragua on 17 July. Two days later the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, or simply the Frente) seized power. This was a truly popular revolution, counting business leaders, trade unionists, conservative and liberal politicians, Marxists, peasants and religious among its numbers. Thus, the Nicaraguan revolution represented far more than the efforts of a single political party or guerrilla movement, and while the 1979 revolution and the Frente were, of course, not mutually-exclusive, neither were they fully synonymous. Nevertheless, the Frente was destined to lead the insurrection, not least because it had the organisational capacity already in place to do so. Moreover, after nearly two decades of armed struggle culminating in victory (often termed el triunfo, the Triumph), the Frente was not about to hand over the reigns of power to anyone else. Aside from the broad support it commanded, the Nicaraguan revolution was significant for another reason: the central role within it played by Christianity. On a continent where Catholicism has traditionally looked after its own interests and often those of the elites, grassroots liberation theology Christians aided the guerrillas, some even taking up arms during the insurrection. The role of these revolutionary Catholics was later recognised when four priests, brothers Ernesto and Fernando Cardenal, Miguel D’Escoto and Edgardo Parrales, were given prominent

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introduction

roles in the new Sandinista government. So the Sandinista revolution appeared unique, melding together Marxism, revolutionary socialism and that famously-derided ‘opiate of the masses’, religion. Even Marxist hardliners conceded Christians might, after all, have a role to play in the amelioration of Latin America’s poor. But all was not well in revolutionary Nicaragua. After a honeymoon period, opponents increasingly rejected the Frente’s policies, ideology and ever stronger grip over the country. Even some Sandinistas became disenchanted, most notably former guerrilla leader Edén Pastora (nicknamed Comandante Cero), whose audacious capture of the Nicaraguan parliament in 1978 had secured the release of Daniel Ortega and other Sandinista prisoners, as well as capturing popular support and helping to propel the hitherto little-known guerrilla group to fame. Another civil war loomed as Pastora and others took to the jungles and mountains to form the Contra rebel groups. As leftist guerrilla movements across Central America threatened U.S. hegemony in the region, President Ronald Reagan backed the Contras in a bid to oust the Sandinista government. Thus, during a Cold War in which Nicaragua represented an ideological battlefield, a bitter propaganda war ensued as each side issued claim and counterclaim in a bid to secure the moral high ground. Christianity played a central role in this fracas, with Catholic Archbishop Obando y Bravo and Washington on one side, portraying Nicaraguan Christians as victims of a tyrannical regime, while on the other, Sandinistas and liberation theology allies projected an image of full religious freedom and Christian support for the revolution.1 Liberation theology’s participation in the revolution naturally attracted much theological interest. But the central role of religion in an ideological and propaganda battle ensured that Nicaraguan Christianity became the focus of much wider scrutiny, as academics and journalists explored divisions within Nicaraguan Catholicism, together with Sandinista attempts to synthesise Marxism and Christianity. However, Nicaraguan Protestantism escaped this intense scrutiny, probably because the movement was much smaller than its Catholic counterpart. Moreover, the leadership of the Consejo Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarollo

1 This propaganda war had a far-reaching and divisive effect among Christians in the U.S. See, for example, a series of letters sent to the Reformed journal The Banner in response to several pro-Frente articles it published. The series culminated with a sorrowful editorial encapsulating the divisiveness of the debate (‘Editorial: Nicaragua’, The Banner, 22 September 1986, 5).

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(Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development, or CEPAD), an NGO and umbrella church council claiming to represent most of Nicaragua’s Protestants, supported the Sandinista project. Thus, this perception of Protestantism as essentially homogenous, compared with Catholicism’s bitter divisions vis-à-vis the Frente, may also explain why the former did not attract the same level of interest as the latter. Yet a study of Protestantism, particularly Pentecostalism during the revolution is important for several reasons. Firstly, given how arguments raged over religious freedom in revolutionary Nicaragua, exploring Protestant-Sandinista relations sheds valuable light on how the Frente viewed religion. Secondly, as the next chapter demonstrates, there is no overall, authoritative picture of Protestant responses to the revolution. Many Pentecostals especially feel their experiences of repression under the Sandinistas remain unexplored. They are quite right. ProtestantSandinista relations are greatly misunderstood and further study is long overdue. But perhaps far more importantly, research into Protestant-Sandinista relations enhances our understanding of a major religious phenomenon sweeping across Latin America. There, Pentecostalism draws heavily from among the poor who flock to the churches in huge numbers. Yet Latin America is also the birthplace of another religious movement appealing to the poor: liberation theology. Why is it, then, that Pentecostalism has been so successful in attracting the masses, while liberation theology is declining? Moreover, what are its social and political aspirations? Does Pentecostalism liberate the masses from a life of drudgery and poverty or, as some suggest, does it merely help to reinforce the existing social order, thus representing a useful prop for the elites? A study of Protestant-Sandinista relations in a country where liberation theology and Pentecostalism represented two vibrant yet rival religious movements drawing upon the same social class offers a fascinating case study to explore these questions further. It is surely significant that one of these movements (liberation theology) helped sweep the Frente to power, while the other (Pentecostalism) contributed to its electoral downfall. On a continent where spectacular growth means ever greater Pentecostal participation in the social and political spheres, a study into Protestant-Sandinista relations helps shed light on the movement and its political worldview.

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introduction Structure, Methodology and Sources

This study is divided into three parts. The first consists of three chapters providing essential background to Protestant-Sandinista relations. Chapter 1 sets out current perceptions of those relations. Chapter 2 explores the history of Nicaraguan Protestantism from earliest times to the fall of Somoza, concentrating especially on the twentieth century and identifying its geographical and class distribution. Chapter 3 examines Protestant-Somoza relations, providing an important comparison point for church-state relations during the Sandinista period. Part two moves on to explore the dynamics of church-state relations from a Protestant perspective. Chapter 4 looks at Protestant responses to the revolution, identifying how a minority (headed by CEPAD’s executive) supported the Frente, while the majority of Nicaragua’s Protestants (mainly Pentecostals) were either uninterested or hostile. Chapter 5 explains why the majority of Protestants rejected sandinismo, highlighting how Sandinista rhetoric, foreign links, its educational system, and press censorship all contributed towards a Pentecostal understanding of the Sandinistas as Marxists or communists. Part three explores the nature and dynamics of church-state relations from the Sandinista perspective. Chapter 6 looks at how the authorities viewed and treated non-revolutionary Protestants, while Chapter 7 explores why the Sandinista government regarded Pentecostals with suspicion, examining the movement’s links with the Contras, the Pentecostal view of the state of Israel, and how the movement’s worldview precluded strong participation in social and political affairs. Overall conclusions are reached in Chapter 8. The appendices include a short biographical sketch of the main characters appearing in these pages, together with several maps of Nicaragua. This is essentially an historical study concerned with how both sides perceived each other. Thus, it avoids wherever possible heavily theoretical or theological discussions for their own sake. For example, ‘Nicaraguanists’ cannot even agree among themselves whether all Sandinistas were Marxists, or if some were social democrats. Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect Pentecostals, often politically unsophisticated, to understand the difference between Marxism, Marxist-Leninism or revolutionary socialism. Their judgments were based on what they saw and heard. So while this study engages in theoretical discussions where necessary, it seeks to avoid getting bogged down in unnecessary

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debates that detract from the historical survey. Likewise, lengthy and in-depth theological discussions are also avoided. Naturally, some theological insight is vital in a study exploring a religious phenomenon. Yet here, theological issues are explored only insofar as they shed light on the central topic, that is, Protestant-Sandinista relations. As well as trawling through hundreds of past editions of the official Sandinista newspaper La Barricada, I visited Amnesty International’s archives at Warwick University and accessed various collections held at several British and American universities. In addition, the Assemblies of God (henceforth AoG) in Missouri kindly supplied many useful documents, including denominational pamphlets, letters to and from missionaries, and even financial records, which all helped to paint an invaluable picture of the denomination’s work, history and geographical distribution in Nicaragua before the revolution. Some of the most important material, however, was secured during visits to Nicaragua in 1996, 1999 and 2004. While there, I researched extensively at the La Prensa archives, the Banco Nacional (Nicaragua’s national archive), and also visited many churches and religious organisations. I was also fortunate to obtain some very helpful but longsince-forgotten documents from the 1980s. While in Managua I spent some time with AoG missionary David Spencer, who pastors one of Nicaragua’s largest Protestant churches (the Hosanna Church). He introduced me to various Pentecostal national leaders during the 1980s, who I interviewed extensively. Over time, I built up a broad network of contacts and interviewed many church leaders, both in person and by telephone. These included superintendents and regional directors of several main denominations, as well as national and regional leaders of the Evangelical pastoral organisation Consejo Nacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua (National Council of Evangelical Pastors of Nicaragua, or CNPEN). Also interviewed were prominent Protestants who supported the Sandinista project, including CEPAD founder and president Dr Gustavo Parajón, who I wrote to regularly; Benjamín Cortés, president of the progressive Protestant undergraduate institution Centro InterEclesial de Estudios Teológicos y Sociales (Inter-Ecclesial Centre for Theological and Social Studies, CIEETS); and Sixto Ulloa, a member of the CEPAD executive who later became a Sandinista member of parliament. My interview with Ulloa was kindly arranged by Francisco Chamorro, nephew of the assassinated newspaper editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro and his widow Violeta (whose UNO coalition defeated the Sandinistas

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in the 1990 elections).2 Ironically, when I met him Francisco Chamorro was editor-in-chief of El Nuevo Diario, Nicaragua’s Sandinista-leaning newspaper.3 Clearly, then, interviews with 1980s Christian leaders play an important role in this study. I recognise some historians’ unease with oral history, most notably how memories can fade over time. However, it can also be vital in helping to recreate the past, which Paul Thompson has demonstrated.4 Interviews were very helpful in establishing a Pentecostal perspective. In fact, it is unlikely a full and accurate picture would have emerged without them. The movement was not in the business of documenting all its dealings intricately or extensively. Moreover, though Pentecostals did produce various internal memoranda, meeting minutes and correspondence that I draw upon, one could hardly expect them to commit their candid views of a government they considered to be, at best, authoritarian and, at worse, totalitarian, to paper. Thus, the eyewitness accounts are essential in establishing an accurate picture of the nature and dynamics of Pentecostal-Sandinista relations. One should also note that the interviewees were asked to recall events only some 10 to 20 years after the events, rather than the substantially longer periods of time involved in many oral histories. Asking interviewees to speak about events after the 1980s has also helped to produce more objective, less politicised testimonies. At the height of the propaganda war, both sides were sharply polarised. Yet Nicaraguans today have lived through a corrupt dictatorship, a revolutionary government, and several attempts at capitalism, and while there were exceptions on both sides, nonetheless I found many Nicaraguans to be pragmatic and objective as they recalled those events, making their oral accounts all the more compelling. Yet aside from these important safeguards, it should be noted this study is not exclusively an oral history. Far from it. It also draws on a wide range of documentary evidence that supplements and supports the oral testimony (as the bibliography clearly demonstrates), while 2 For a history of the Chamorro family, see the autobiography by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, Dreams of the Heart (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 3 Like many Nicaraguan families, the Sandinista period divided the Chamorros. For interviews with two Chamorro newspaper editors on either side of the political divide, see Xavier Chamorro and Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, ‘A Free Press or Censorship?’ in Philip Zwerling and Connie Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1985), 180–205. 4 Paul Thompson, The Voices of the Past (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

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oral and documentary sources have been carefully cross-referenced to ensure accuracy. I was also in regular contact with many of the interviewees, permitting me to follow up leads, clarify issues that came to light, or cross examine them again with additional facts at my disposal. Thus, far from producing a range of disparate pieces, the interviews and documentary evidence came together much like a jigsaw puzzle, producing a satisfyingly homogenous picture. The interview sample covered a wide cross-section of opinion and backgrounds.5 Interviewees included national, regional and local Protestant leaders, as well as grassroots Christians; Protestants who supported and rejected the revolution; pastors, theologians, evangelists, functionaries and laity; urban and rural Christians, including inhabitants from the Spanish-speaking Pacific, the English-speaking Atlantic coast regions, and the northern highlands; young and old, as well as people from different class backgrounds. Various denominations were represented. I also interviewed a former member of Sandinista state security, a lawyer, several members of the Ejército Popular Sandinista (Sandinista People’s Army, EPS), a senior Contra commander, peasants, Miskito Indians, a schoolteacher, former school pupils, several journalists, missionaries, church workers, a human rights worker, and others. One of the interviews requires further comment. In Nicaragua I was introduced to a former official of the Dirección General de Seguridad del Estado (General Directorate for State Security, or DGSE), who worked at the highest echelons of the apparatus and came into regular contact with DGSE chief Lenin Cerna. He has since become a Protestant. He spoke only on condition of anonymity, claiming he and others with intimate knowledge of the Sandinista years still feared Cerna and other ex-Sandinistas. (He said, not entirely tongue-in-cheek: “I know where the bodies are buried.”) Certainly, his fears appear justified. The Sandinistas relinquished power only after receiving life-long amnesties for anything they might have to answer for in the future. During recent years, talk of overturning these amnesties has been met with thinly-veiled threats.6 The identity of this ex-DGSE official (here

Thompson’s book provides some useful guidelines on how to do this. For example, see José Adan Silva and Consuelo Sandoval, ‘Asesino fue DGSE’, La Prensa, 11 February 2004; Glen Garvin, ‘Ex-Nicaraguan Chief May be Target of Suits,’ Miami Herald, 18 March 1999; and Michael J. Waller, ‘Will Sandinistas Face Justice,’ Insight on the News (Woodinville, WA), 26 July 1999, http://www.findarticles. com/cf_dls/m1571/27_15/55283467/print.jhtml (accessed 28 January 2004). 5 6

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referred to by the pseudonym José Suárez) was confirmed by a former EPS legal advisor who retains a respected legal practice in Managua.7 His identity was also confirmed by several Protestant national leaders who know him well. His comments confirm information appearing in various other sources. The Sandinista perspective is readily available in a number of interviews published in the 1980s. Yet clearly these were intended to encourage a North American audience to pressure the Reagan administration to change its Central American policy. Therefore, where possible I prefer instead to draw on the Sandinista daily newspaper La Barricada, which came under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) and senior comandante Tomás Borge,8 as a more accurate reflection of domestic Sandinista opinion. Also cited is the magazine Christianity Today, whose contributors are drawn from across the theological spectrum. Initially, Christianity Today’s reports were quite favourable towards the Sandinista government, while it sought to remain objective as tensions increased. I also cite several newspapers that had permanent reporters in Nicaragua, including New York Times bureau chief Stephen Kinzer, who wrote a book about his experiences there, and Glen Garvin of the Miami Herald, who gave me some useful leads to pursue. Many people helped me by being willing to talk, and I express my gratitude in the acknowledgments page. This study also refers several times to interviews given by MINT defectors Alvaro José Baldizón Aviles and Miguel Bolaños Hunter, who detailed Sandinista human rights abuses.9 In the 1980s Sandinista sympathisers rejected these as propaganda by a U.S. government keen to besmirch the Frente. It did not help that this evidence was published by the Institute of Religion and Democracy, a Washington-based religious right foe of the Sandinistas. However, Eric Ison of the progressive 7 Interviewed at his Managua office in May 1999 (name withheld to protect identity of the ex-DGSE source). 8 Also confirmed during a conversation with Julio León Báez, senior archivist at the La Prensa offices, 21 May 2004, Managua. See interview with La Barricada editorial page editor, Augustín Cordova, ‘A Free Press or Censorship,’ in Zwerling and Martin, A New Kind of Revolution, 190–98. 9 Institute of Religion and Democracy, Nicaragua’s State Security: Behind the Propaganda Mask. An Interview with Alvaro Jose Baldizón Aviles (Washington: IRD Briefing Paper No. 6, September 1985); and also The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua: An Interview with Miguel Bolaños Hunter (Washington: IRD Briefing Paper No. 1, December 1983).

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Christian organisation Evangelicals for Social Action (an opponent of the IRD) recognised Baldizón’s testimony had some value, though he still urged caution.10 Yet in light of new information, including human rights reports from the late 1980s, it very much appears that Baldizón’s and Bolaños’ accounts were accurate. Likewise, the U.S. Department of State published several documents highlighting Sandinista abuses. Though not extensively, I do occasionally draw on these, for two reasons. Firstly, by using reports from La Barricada, in the name of balance it is important to use sources from all quarters where they can be proved to be accurate. Secondly, and far more importantly, as with Baldizón and Bolaños, many issues raised in these publications have since been confirmed by various human rights reports. I fully recognise these documents are politicised and the U.S. government drew on reports of abuse to make propaganda capital, but we now know these publications were not, as was sometimes suggested, complete fabrications. Human rights reports referred to include Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights. This study also cites two Nicaraguan human rights organisations: the Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH) and the Asociación Nicaragüense Pro Derechos Humanos (ANPDH). The CPDH, founded in 1977 to investigate somocista abuses, was regularly hassled by the Frente for investigating Sandinista abuses.11 CPDH administrator Miriam Espinosa explained how their offices were ransacked by the Sandinista authorities and their director, Lino Hernández, hassled.12 This study does not draw on the Comisión Nacional de Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos (CNPPDH), the Sandinistas’ own human rights organisation clearly set up to exonerate the government of abuse allegations. For example, Americas Watch explains how CNPPDH was the only human rights organisation permitted to visit the infamous DGSE detention centre El 10 Beth Spring, ‘The Government’s Heavy Hand Falls on Believers,’ Christianity Today, 13 December 1985, 51. 11 Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, Nicaragua: Revolutionary Justice: A Report on Human Rights and the Judicial System (New York: Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, April 1985). Initially, the CPDH sought to work with the Sandinista government. See, for example, CPDH, Los Desaparecidos: Informe Oficial 3 de Octubre 1980 (Managua: CPDH, 1980); and CPDH, Los Prisioneros de la Pólvora? Qué Pasó Con Ellos? (Managua: CPDH, June 1980). 12 Conversation with Miriam Espinosa at the CPDH offices, Managua, 25 May 2004.

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Chipote, located on the hill behind the pyramid-shaped Intercontinental Hotel in downtown old Managua, yet it chose not to do so.13 Terminology One final, brief point needs to be made concerning use of terminology. Throughout these pages the broad term ‘Protestantism’ refers to all movements or denominations who trace their origins (however indirectly) to the 16th century Reformation. Thus, ‘Protestantism’ encompasses groups such as the Baptists, Nazarenes, Methodists, and also Evangelicals and Pentecostals. However, I sometimes distinguish between, on the one hand, Pentecostals and Evangelicals, and on the other, the older established Protestant denominations by labelling the latter ‘historic Protestantism’. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, the majority of Protestants in 1980s Nicaragua were Pentecostals. Pentecostalism represents a branch of Evangelicalism which is a pan-denominational movement (for example, there are Evangelical Anglicans, Evangelical Baptists, and so on). It is a movement within Protestantism, then, rather than a separate denomination. Evangelicalism is notoriously difficult to define. Evangelical scholar Derek Tidball states: Attempts at precise definitions are rather like attempts to pick up a slippery bar of soap with wet hands. Some are too narrow and exclude those that should be included. Such definitions often consist of a long doctrinal check-list. Some are so broad that they include those who patently should not be included, if the definition is to have any meaning.14

R.V. Pierard explains how the term ‘Evangelical’ comes from the Greek word euangelion, meaning glad tidings, or joyful news. In Middle English euangelion was translated to godspell, from which we get ‘gospel’. Thus, Evangelicalism emphasises the gospel, or good news, of Jesus Christ, namely, a transcendent, personal God; the total depravity and sinfulness of man (as opposed to the Enlightenment’s doctrine of man’s innate goodness); divine grace and the provision of a means for man’s sin to be forgiven through a saviour, Jesus Christ; eternal life received on the 13 Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua. Washington: Americas Watch, November 1989, 107. 14 Derek Tidball, Who Are the Evangelicals? Tracing the Roots of Today’s Movement (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994), 12.

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basis of faith; and a visible and personal return of Christ. At the heart of Evangelicalism is an emphasis on sharing this gospel with others, encouraging a personal response to accept the message of the cross (known as conversion, or ‘being saved’), and the centrality of the Bible (usually interpreted literally) in issues of belief and practice.15 Thus, Evangelicalism emphasises actions as well as beliefs.16 Such actions include sharing one’s faith with others, reading the Bible, prayer and devotion, and the pursuit of holy living. Its adherents are very missionary-minded, seeking conversions, especially on a large scale (known as revival), and historically Evangelicalism is associated with the revivalist campaigns of preachers like John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, George Whitefield and D.L. Moody. Evangelicalism, then, emphasises personal conversion, piety and a dynamic one-on-one relationship with Christ, which also makes it a highly individualised faith. David Bebbington has succinctly highlighted Evangelicalism’s four central themes: crucicentrism (centrality of the cross of Christ, or the gospel), conversionism, Biblicism, and activism.17 Derek Tidball suggests that within Evangelicalism Bebbington’s definition “has quickly established itself as near to a consensus as we might ever expect to reach”.18 Pentecostalism demonstrates these same defining features of Evangelicalism, but adds others, including a strong emphasis on the person and work of the Holy Spirit, expressed through acts of power and wonder, such as spiritual gifts (especially speaking in tongues), miracles and divine healing. There have been several Pentecostal movements in the 20th century, for example, the Charismatic Renewal Movement in the 1950s and 1960s. But in 1980s Nicaragua most Pentecostals belonged to and shared the beliefs, practices and outlook of classical Pentecostalism, that is, the first Pentecostal movement of the early 20th century which gave birth to denominations such as the AoG and Church of God.

R.V. Pierard, ‘Evangelicalism’, in Walter A. Elwell, ed. Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984; repr. 1991), 379–382. 16 For example, see Leon Morris, ‘What is an Evangelical?’ in Working Together (Box Hill, Victoria, 1998, Issue 4). 17 David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 18 Tidball, Who Are the Evangelicals, 14. 15

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PART ONE

BACKGROUND TO PROTESTANT-SANDINISTA RELATIONS

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CHAPTER ONE

PERCEPTIONS OF PROTESTANT-STATE RELATIONS IN REVOLUTIONARY NICARAGUA Protestant-Sandinista relations remain relatively unexplored in any great depth. What little material there is falls into three broad categories. The first suggests the Sandinistas were Marxists who systematically persecuted Christians. A second view denies religious repression, instead claiming the majority of Nicaraguan Protestants actually supported the revolution and blaming insignificant counterrevolutionary fundamentalism for masking relatively harmonious Protestant-Sandinista relations. The final position argues that any Sandinista repression was a reaction to Washington’s attempts to portray Nicaraguan Evangelicals as victims of a tyrannical regime in a propaganda war aimed at justifying U.S. intervention in the region. Consequently, Evangelicals became the focus of the unwelcome attention of state security, which was already suspicious of their North American links. Thus, the first of these views sees the Sandinistas as proactively engaged in persecution, the second regards them as passive, while the third considers them reactive. Sandinistas as Proactive Humberto Belli (brother of Sandinista poet Gioconda Belli) regards the Sandinistas as Marxists who persecuted Christians.1 He begins by seeking to establish the thoroughly Marxist-Leninist nature of sandinismo. In the 1970s, disagreements on how to achieve victory led to the emergence of three rival Sandinista factions: the Guerra Popular Prolongada (Protracted People’s War, GPP), led by Tomás Borge, Bayardo Arce and Henry Ruíz; the Tendencia Proletaria (Proletarian Tendency, TP), headed by Luis Carrión, Jaime Wheelock and Carlos Nuñez; and finally, the Terceristas (i.e. emphasising a third way), closely associated with Daniel and Humberto Ortega, and Victor Tirado. It was Fidel Castro who

1 Humberto Belli, Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua (Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1985).

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brought the warring factions together to create the Sandinista National Directorate, composed of these nine comandantes. Few deny the GPP and TP were Marxists. Yet Belli challenges the popular assertion that the Terceristas were a moderate, essentially democratic group, arguing instead that they were also committed Marxists who simply disguised their ideology to win over the Nicaraguan people. They only differed from the GPP and TP in strategy and methodology, not ideology, and this was, in fact, a Marxist-led revolution. Moreover, recognising the deeply religious nature of the Nicaraguan people, the Sandinistas regarded an alliance with liberation theology as essential: Crucial to the successful development of the strategy of linking up with the revolutionary Christians was the idea of creating a vanguard within the vanguard. The Frente was gradually redesigned as an organization of concentric circles; an outer ring of sympathizers and collaborators, an intermediate structure of ideologized militants, and a directive nucleus of committed Marxist-Leninists. As long as the Sandinista nucleus remained faithfully Marxist, the organization could benefit from the support of all kinds of collaborators without jeopardizing its ideological integrity.2

Belli sets about demonstrating the Marxist-Leninist nature of sandinismo, citing leftist symbols and slogans, the creation of mass organisations at neighbourhood level (the Comités de Defensa Sandinista, or CDS, modelled on Castro’s Cuban equivalent), centralisation of power, curbing of political pluralism, a centralised economy and expropriation of private property, close relations with Fidel Castro and an influx of Cuban military personnel, a poor human rights record, and tense relations with independent organisations such as labour unions, the press (which was regularly gagged), business leaders, and opposition political parties. Meanwhile, sandinismo’s Marxism made it the natural enemy of the church, which was persecuted in a covert and subtle manner, undermining people’s religious commitment, curtailing the movement and religious freedom of those unsupportive of the revolution, and expropriating and ‘sandinising’ religious symbols for its own means. The Sandinistas sought to neutralise conservative elements within the Catholic and Protestant churches while forging close links with revolutionary Christians. By embracing liberation theology, the Frente por-

2

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Ibid., 22.

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trayed itself as guarantor of religious freedom. However, that freedom was conditional upon express support for the revolution.3 Several others similarly blame Sandinista Marxism and atheism for poor Sandinista-Christian relations, claiming the Catholic Church represented a potential power rival to the Frente’s Marxist-Leninist ideology, and arguing that the Sandinistas persecuted Protestants who did not align themselves with the revolution.4 Thus, senior Sandinistas accused Evangelicals of subversion and counterrevolution, leaders of the Evangelical umbrella organisation CNPEN were harassed and the organisation denied legal recognition, while the Frente pressured Evangelicals not to criticise CEPAD, the pro-Sandinista Protestant NGO.5 Others concur. Edmund and Julia Robb set out to expose what they regard as the uncritical and hypocritical politics of North America’s religious left.6 Highlighting Sandinista Nicaragua, a cause célèbre among the religious left, they argue that while most Catholics and Protestants suffered brutal treatment from a Marxist government, the religious left in the U.S. supported the regime by channelling funds through proFrente religious groups such as CEPAD, as well as lobbying against the U.S. government, and also spreading disinformation that hid the true plight of persecuted Christians in Nicaragua. These studies all discuss the 1985 state of emergency crackdown

3 Belli writes: “A careful reading of the FSLN statements shows that there was an important qualification in the FSLN’s tolerance of religion. The Sandinistas consistently expounded an approach which evaluated religious beliefs, institutions and leaders on the basis of whether they supported the revolution. The 1969 FSLN program offered to respect religious beliefs and support ‘clerics who supported the working people’ (Clause 9). The program of 1977 repeated this promise: ‘The Sandinista People’s Revolution . . . will support the work of the priests and other religious preachers who defend the working people’ (Clause 8B). In the government’s manual for the literacy campaign, lesson 22 reads: ‘There will be freedom of religion for all those churches that defend the interests of the people’”, 139. 4 Kerry Ptacek, Nicaragua: A Revolution Against the Church? (Washington DC: Institute of Religion and Democracy, 1981); Sister Camilla Mullay and Fr. Robert Barry, The Barren Fig Tree: A Christian Reappraisal of the Sandinista Revolution (Washington DC: Institute of Religion and Democracy, 1984). 5 U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua Under the Sandinistas: From Revolution to Repression (Washington DC: Department of State Publications, 1987). 6 Edmund W. Robb and Julia Robb, The Bertrayal of the Church (Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1986). Internet edition cited here (no pagenumbers), available on the Concerned Methodists’ website: http://www.cmpage.org/betrayal/ (last accessed on 5 Oct 2004).

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against Protestant leaders, who were arrested, held incommunicado at the infamous El Chipote prison, forced to strip, and who endured sleep depravation and psychological torture. Upon release, they were watched and their telephones tapped. Much more brutal was the Frente’s’ treatment of Moravians during the Miskito-Sandinista crisis. Sandinista attempts to incorporate the region, which had a distinct cultural identity via its British colonial history, led many Miskitos to take up arms. For historical reasons, most Miskitos belonged to the Moravian church. It is claimed Moravian church leaders were arrested, people dragged from churches and shot, young Miskito women raped, Moravian pastors forced to submit their sermons for scrutiny before delivery, Bibles and hymnbooks destroyed, and churches used as jails or burned. These studies also claim CEPAD supported the Sandinistas and encountered no such problems. Founded by Baptist doctor Gustavo Parajón after the 1972 earthquake, CEPAD increasingly followed a social agenda and after the revolution sided with the Sandinistas, even promoting them.7 Belli asserts that CEPAD channelled overseas funding to the Frente to help produce pro-government literature and educate pastors in liberation theology. CEPAD also co-published a pamphlet promoting Marxism and the Cuban revolution, while several leaders openly expressed their appreciation of Marx. Meanwhile, CEPAD became the official channel between the government and Nicaraguan Protestants, whether the latter liked it or not. U.S. Christians, unaware of the treatment of Nicaraguan believers, assumed CEPAD represented most Nicaraguan Protestants. CEPAD organised various carefullycoordinated visits by religious entourages from abroad that painted a picture of harmonious church-state relations. Other pro-Sandinista religious groups are similarly singled out as Sandinista tools, notably the Centro Antonio Valdivieso. While non-revolutionary Protestants were repressed, it is alleged that CEPAD’s leaders looked on. During the Miskito crisis and the maltreatment of Moravians, it is argued CEPAD’s leaders actually voiced support for the forceful relocation of the Indians. Also, during the 1982 seizure of the temples, Belli believes CEPAD only intervened when many of its members, already unhappy with CEPAD’s ties with the Frente, threatened to leave the organisation. Even then, the return of the churches was selective, based on pastors adopting a concilia7 For example, see Belli, Breaking Faith, 158. Belli details CEPAD’s very close identification with the revolution and the FSLN in Chontales.

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tory tone towards revolution. Meanwhile, some CNPEN pastors who expressed criticism of the government’s position on religion were singled out and “brought . . . under government pressure, amplified at times by leaders of CEPAD.”8 Sandinistas as Passive Others reject such claims of persecution, highlighting instead the central role religion enjoyed during the revolution. In a series of articles, Michael Dodson (et al.) strongly affirms Protestant support for the revolution.9 He believes Vatican II (1962–5) and the meeting of bishops in Medellín (1968) eventually created two Catholic churches in Latin America. The first—grassroots liberation theology—espoused a radical social and political agenda on behalf of the poor. The second—traditional, conservative and hierarchical—sought to retain Catholicism’s elite role within society. In Nicaragua, this polarisation created an ugly split between those supporting a preferential option for the poor and the conservative wing, led by Archbishop Obando y Bravo, who feared a ‘parallel magisterium’. Thus, Dodson agrees religion was under threat in revolutionary Nicaragua, but not from the Sandinistas. Rather, the church faced disintegration from within. The situation was further exacerbated by external actors, namely the Vatican (which supported Obando) and the U.S. which, aided by far-right religious groups such as the IRD, waged a propaganda war (supported by Obando) to portray the Sandinistas as religious persecutors. For Dodson, then, the issue in Sandinista Nicaragua was not Marxism versus religion, but rather hierarchy versus grass roots Catholicism.

Ibid., 233. This position, which is developed throughout the 1980s in a series of articles, finds its fullest expression in Michael Dodson and Laura O’Shaughnessy, Nicaragua’s Other Revolution: Religious Faith and Political Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). The full list of articles, in date order, is as follows: M. Dodson and T.S. Montgomery, ‘The Churches in the Nicaraguan Revolution,’ in Thomas Walker, ed. Nicaragua in Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1982); M. Dodson and Laura O’Shaughnessy, ‘Religion and Politics’ in Thomas Walker, ed. Nicaragua: The First Five Years (New York: Praeger, 1985); M. Dodson, ‘Nicaragua: The Struggle for the Church’ in Daniel H. Levine, ed. Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); M. Dodson, ‘The Politics of Religion in Revolutionary Nicaragua’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 483 ( January 1986), 36–49; and M. Dodson, ‘Religion in Revolution’ in Thomas Walker, ed. Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991). 8 9

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In sharp contrast, Dodson believes such divisions were generally absent among Nicaragua’s Protestants.10 Tracing their increasing social consciousness from the 1972 earthquake onwards, Dodson believes Protestants were well-placed to support and contribute towards the Sandinista project. Thus, while Obando and his bishops feared encroaching atheism, loss of freedom and church unity, “their concerns were, to a remarkable degree, absent among the [ Protestant] leadership of the country.”11 Dodson refers to a meeting of 500 Protestant leaders shortly after the revolution, known as RIPEN 2 (Segundo Retiro Interdenominacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua),12 who signed a declaration supporting the Sandinista revolution. Protestants became involved in Sandinista social programs, condemned counterrevolutionary activity, and rejected the U.S.’s twenty-year blockade of Cuba, calling on churches there to pressure their government to end it. Yet Dodson believes Protestants were not slavish in their support for the Sandinistas. When the temples were seized CEPAD intervened to secure their return. It also expressed concern over the introduction of compulsory military service (known as Servicio Militar Patriótico, SMP). But unlike Obando, who used SMP to express opposition to the revolution, CEPAD was more constructive, organising a meeting with Sandinistas to discuss the issue. Thus, Dodson believes Protestants sought to remain within and influence the revolution. Significantly, he hardly mentions Nicaragua’s Evangelicals (i.e. conservative Protestants, or fundamentalists), which he regards as an insignificant minority at odds with the majority of Protestants who supported the revolution. This view is discussed later. If Dodson reduces Evangelicals to the political sidelines, others do the opposite. Exploring Central American Evangelicalism in general, Deborah Huntington and Enrique Dominguez argue that a movement ordinarily on the “bizarre fringes of religion” has, by filling the spiritual vacuum created by an ineffective Catholic Church and collaborating

10 When referring to Protestants, Dodson prefers to use the term Evangelical, in keeping with the Nicaragua understanding of the term ‘evangélico’, which can mean Evangelical or Protestant. In my text, I make clear which group Dodson is referring to. 11 Dodson and Montgomery, ‘The Churches in the Nicaraguan Revolution’, in Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution, 176. 12 Second Interdenominational Retreat of the Evangelical (i.e. Protestant) Pastors of Nicaragua. CEPAD had organised the first RIPEN, attended by some 50 pastors, in 1976 to reflect upon Protestant social responsibility.

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with the U.S. and the right wing, become “a serious contender in the struggle for the future of Central America.”13 Through sophisticated marketing and evangelistic techniques, taking advantage of the violence, chaos and social upheaval in Central America, they argue conservative Protestantism has spread quickly, offering stability in the midst of political turbulence, a sense of self-worth, respectability, and “emotional sustenance and a haven from life’s harsh realities.” Furthermore, it promotes North American values and is virulently anti-communist: Many evangelicals confused Christian with American ideals and equated the defense of Christian civilization with the expansion of U.S. empire. If strains of empire-building marked the overture, anti-communism was the theme of the processional.14

It is argued that Evangelicalism captured the attention of U.S. policymakers interested in the region and received financial backing from North American organisations. Its inherent conservatism and anticommunism made it an ideal ‘neutralising agent’ in a region swept by radicalism, and it was “a valuable, if passive, prop for the existing social order.”15 Thus Huntington and Dominguez believed conservative Protestantism demobilised the masses, organising them into an ‘apathetic block’; it mobilised North American Evangelical support for U.S. policy in the region; and finally, it helped discredit the religious left, which opposed Reagan. While CEPAD supported the revolution, Nicaragua’s Evangelicals actively opposed the Frente, likening it to the devil. As historic Protestants engaged in a social program to liberate the masses, conservative Evangelicals preached an otherworldly gospel that reinforced the status quo. They cited destructive floods as God’s judgment upon the Frente, spread fear of communism, and vigorously preached an imminent second coming of Christ, which Huntington and Dominguez maintain was code for the Contras. All this, they argue, was too much for everyday Nicaraguans keen to see the revolution succeed. Thus, frustrated and over-zealous CDS groups, acting on their own initiative, seized the temples in 1982.

13 Deborah Huntington and Enrique Dominguez, ‘Salvation Brokers: Conservative Evangelicals in Central America’, NACLA Report on the Americas 18 no. 1 ( Jan/Feb 1984), 2–36. 14 Ibid., 6. 15 Ibid., 19.

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Luis Serra’s interpretation dismisses religion as irrational and a class enemy of the poor.16 Only liberation theology, which awakens class conscience and mobilises the masses, offers anything of value. He too regarded socially indifferent conservative Protestantism as a U.S. attempt to destabilise the revolution. Consider, for example, how the Moravians exploited the Miskito situation to promote counterrevolution, while anti-communist Evangelicals prevented popular participation in Sandinista mass organisations, cultivating fatalism and passivity, and encouraging people to disobey the authorities. Thus, “the opposition between good and evil was translated into capitalism versus ‘SandinoCommunism.’”17 David Haslam likewise regards Evangelicalism as a disruptive force within revolutionary Nicaragua.18 He sets out to trace divisions within Protestantism over how to respond to the revolution. On one side, he argues, were those whose historical emphasis on critical and contextualised theology prepared them to respond to the revolution positively, for example, Baptists influenced by Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King who participated directly in the armed struggle, and enlightened groups such as CEPAD who supported the aims of the revolution. In sharp contrast, conservative Protestants rejected the revolution. CNPEN and the AoG were highly critical of the Sandinistas, while CNPEN criticised CEPAD for supporting the Frente, which Haslam attributes to jealousy. The AoG, which enjoyed close links with the U.S., promoted an otherworldly gospel. Though it worked among the poor, Haslam believes it did not seek to liberate them. It also stifled any support for the revolution among its members, expelling six of its pastors in 1985 for supporting the Frente. Haslam argues that without the benefits of a critical, contextualised approach to the Bible, Evangelicals’ worldview was completely at odds with that of their historic Protestant counterparts. Their emphasis on Biblicism, an otherworldly gospel, a reliance on North America, and pacifism produced what he terms a ‘theology of death’ (a term originally coined by Tomas Borge), which . . .

16 Luis Serra, ‘Ideology, Religion and the Class Struggle in the Nicaraguan Revolution’ in Richard Harris and Carlos Vilas, eds. Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege (London: Zed Books, 1985), 151–74. 17 Ibid., 161. 18 David Haslam, Faith in Struggle: The Protestant Churches in Nicaragua and their Response to the Revolution (London: Epworth Press, 1987).

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Ultimately involves external control, dependency, structural injustice and despair, and leads to a state of mind which looks for salvation only outwards to an external god who is remarkably North American in character.19

The problem was exacerbated by the fragmented nature of Nicaraguan Evangelicalism, which made a unified Protestant response towards the revolution impossible. Haslam believes this fragmentation, together with a lack of theological education, inherent conservatism, and anti-communism was seized upon by those seeking to undermine the revolution. Meanwhile, CNPEN was adopted by reactionary forces in the U.S. who sought to portray the Sandinistas as totalitarians. Haslam argues these factors ultimately led to the 1985 crackdown against Evangelical leaders. Thus, they brought these actions upon themselves, yet on the whole faced remarkably little repression from a tolerant Sandinista government, despite the U.S. Evangelical propaganda machine managing to blow every incident out of all proportion, so that “it can appear that the entire protestant community of Nicaragua is about to suffer beatings, torture, or in selected cases the gas chambers.”20 Two further studies take a somewhat different approach towards Nicaraguan Protestantism, particularly Pentecostalism. Roger Lancaster draws a parallel between liberation theology and Pentecostal sects in the poorest parts of Managua.21 He believes most members of the professional and upper working class neighbourhoods were socially conservative and supported Archbishop Obando, while in the poorest barrios, which tended to be radical with a history of anticlericalism, the Pentecostal sects and the CEBs22 competed for the same constituency. Lancaster acknowledges Pentecostals in revolutionary Nicaragua experienced some problems. Many were disliked because of their aggressive evangelistic techniques, or because they were regarded as counterrevolutionary. Some evaded the draft. The result was a crackdown by the authorities on troublesome elements. However, Lancaster dismisses the view that most Pentecostals opposed the revolution. While some avoided the draft, many did not. Most were not troublesome.

Ibid., 103. Ibid., 81. 21 Roger Lancaster, Thanks to God and the Revolution: Popular Religion and Class Consciousness in the New Nicaragua (PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1987). This study was later published by Columbia University Press, New York. 22 Comunidades Eclesiásticas de Base, or Christian Base Communities. 19 20

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Once free of external influences, Pentecostals in these barrios took on “a native life of their own”, and their outlook and characteristics fit in well with the revolution. Like liberation theology, he believes they appealed to the very poorest of the masses, that they were class conscious and strongly anti-capitalist. Both the revolution and Pentecostalism sought to transform lives, to create a ‘New Man’. Moreover, Lancaster believes a Pentecostal emphasis on morality and ethics led to a drop in crime and delinquency in their barrios. Indeed he argues that . . . Practicing evangelicals [were] sometimes held up as exemplary role models for the nation at large, and the FSLN has made increasingly vigorous efforts to include evangelicals in the revolutionary process.23

Moreover, Pentecostalism helped to erode the power of the Catholic Church. Thus, both liberation theology and the sects mobilised the masses, one directly and the other indirectly, preparing them for revolutionary participation, while also curbing Catholicism as a powerful societal actor. Abelino Martínez’s study also questions the stereotype of Pentecostalism as apolitical and dependent on external influences.24 As a Sandinista sympathiser, Martínez rejects neutrality as anti-revolutionary: by not supporting and participating wholeheartedly in the revolution one actually opposed it. However, in a survey of seventeen churches in Jinotega, Managua and Carazo he differentiates between those who were apolitical out of genuine political ignorance, and those who employed neutrality as a political reaction. He argues an awareness of society’s contradictions demands a political response: either seeking to rectify them, or else to retain the status quo for the benefit of ruling elites. But many grassroots Pentecostals lacked class consciousness and were ignorant of society’s contradictions prior to the revolution. In other words, they were not reactionary. Thus, for Martínez the more institutionalised a

23 Lancaster, Thanks to God, 81. Dodson also believes the Protestants were hardworking and congenial to the revolution. Thus, he argues, the Sandinista did not interfere with their practices (in Walker, Revolution and Counterrevolution, 181). 24 Abelino Martínez, Las Sectas en Nicaragua: Oferta y Demanda de Salvación (Managua: Centro Antonio Valdivieso, and Sán José, Costa Rica: Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1989). In his research, Martínez was assisted by Luis Samandú, whose study echoes some of Martínez’s approach to Pentecostals in Nicaragua (see Luis Samandú, ‘El Pentecostalismo en Nicaragua y Sus Raices Religiosas Populares’, Pasos 17 (May–June 1988), 1–9). See also Luis Samandú, ed. Protestantismos y Procesos Sociales en Centroamerica (San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana (EDUCA), 1990).

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group of Pentecostals was, the more reactionary, while at a micro or grassroots level they were less likely to oppose the Frente and could be included in the revolutionary process. On the other hand, institutionalised and politically-aware organisations, such as the AoG or CNPEN, employed neutrality as a means of opposing the revolution, while the equally institutionalised CEPAD sided clearly with the revolution. Martínez believes CNPEN took up a position similar to Obando’s Catholics, namely a conservative force which, failing to find allies in Nicaragua, positioned itself with exterior conservative forces such as the IRD. Meanwhile, grassroots Pentecostals’ ignorance made them an easy target for manipulation by external forces. Subsequently, many Nicaraguans perceived them as a CIA front, which explains, Martínez believes, why the local CDS seized the temples in 1982. Repression as Reaction Two studies move away from these partisan approaches. Concentrating specifically on Evangelical-Sandinista relations, David Stoll’s concedes there was religious repression, but believes it was limited and nearly always in reaction to the role of external actors like the U.S. government and the religious right.25 He even suggests Washington might have incited the repression of Evangelicals in order to build a case for intervention in the region. Stoll’s study, which explores the explosion of Protestantism across Latin America as a whole, highlights the irony that, in a socially-deprived continent where radical liberation theology is pushing forward an aggressive social agenda, it is conservative Protestantism that has most successfully attracted the masses. His book contains three case studies, one of which is Sandinista Nicaragua, where liberation theology was so strong. Stoll traces how Nicaraguan Evangelicals became caught up in a propaganda war between, on the one hand, a Sandinista government keen to prove that Christianity and Marxism could work together to make a radical, social difference, and on the other, a Reagan administration and the religious right, who sought to prove Christians were being persecuted as a pretext for military intervention: 25 David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

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chapter one Nicaraguan evangelicals were of special importance in the propaganda war . . . many were unenthusiastic about the revolution and professed neutrality in the contra war, forcing the Sandinistas to question their loyalty. Many also had institutional ties with North American evangelicals, that is, with supporters of a U.S. president waging war against their own government. For the same North Americans, they were the single most important index of the revolution’s popular support and legitimacy—or lack thereof. Given their highly charged position, evangelicals became key figures in the claims and counterclaims of ideological warfare: while the Sandinistas applied the more cooperative to the task of defending the revolution’s image, the Reagan administration used them to justify a war.26

Evangelicals were uneasy with the revolution, especially conscription. Some also received funding from abroad, while Stoll believes many Evangelical pastors were linked in some way or other to the anti-communist, North American National Association of Evangelicals. These factors led many Sandinistas to identify Protestantism with counterrevolution, and Evangelicals soon found themselves the focus of unwelcome attention from the turbas. Matters were made worse when the religious right in the U.S. lionised Miskito leader Steadman Fagoth as a freedom fighter battling religious persecution during the Miskito-Sandinista war, which caused Evangelicals even more problems. These difficulties were exacerbated because some Protestants (CEPAD) supported the revolution (albeit uneasily, Stoll believes). Stoll suggests many conservative Evangelicals regarded CEPAD as too liberal, social-minded and ecumenical, with little emphasis on evangelism. Unfortunately for them, CEPAD became the only official ProtestantSandinista conduit, leading most Evangelicals to see it as a tool for Sandinista demands. Evangelicals also rejected what they regarded as a system of patronage, leading to pro-revolutionary groups receiving overseas money through CEPAD, while its own pastors received very little.27 Thus, many Evangelicals instead joined CNPEN.

Ibid., 222–3. Stoll details how the AoG, one of the largest Protestant groups in Nicaragua, complained when its pastors in Ciudad Sandino, surviving on starvation rations, were given nothing more by CEPAD than a batch of jackets that were totally useless in a tropical climate ( p. 245). This anecdote was echoed by Rufino Soza, a pastor from Ciudad Sandino I interviewed (Interview with Rufino Soza, 31 May 1999, Ciudad Sandino). 26

27

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Though CEPAD had sponsored the formation of CNPEN “as part of its ceaseless efforts to placate conservatives distrustful of the revolution,” it quickly became anti-ecumenical, leading to the ending of its subsidy from CEPAD. By 1983, it was bankrupt, but all this changed when it organised the successful Nicaragua ’84 evangelistic campaign, with Alberto Mottesi, which led many in the U.S. to regard the group as a “plucky defender of religious liberty” against Sandinista persecution. Yet CNPEN experienced difficulties acquiring its personería jurídica (legal status) and was cancelled as an organisation by the Sandinistas shortly after the Mottesi campaign. Its plight was seized upon and publicised by the IRD as a cause célèbre, which set off a backlash against CNPEN: It did so by accusing CEPAD of using church funds to buy eleven jeeps for the Sandinista police, then suggesting that U.S. churches should send their money to the more worthy pastors’ council. For CNPEN, this meant endorsement by a Washington lobby which the Sandinistas regarded as a CIA front. It meant big trouble.28

Others within the religious right also highlighted how Nicaragua’s Evangelicals were suffering, for example, Brother Andrew’s Open Doors, which revelled in the mystique of Bible smuggling to communist lands, and also televangelist Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). Such publicity brought further unwelcome Sandinista attention. Stoll wonders if this was deliberate: When CBN and company used evangelical religion to push the contra war, they did not seem to give any thought to how this could backfire against their unprotected brethren in Central America. Or did they, in a right-wing version of the “provoked repression” tactic attributed to leftist guerrillas? By identifying Nicaraguan evangelicals with the contras, were they trying to provoke Sandinista reactions, to build a case for U.S. intervention?29

Stoll, then, believes Evangelicals were caught in the middle, used as pawns in a propaganda war. They were not Contras, and instead chose neutrality. But Washington deliberately polarised the situation for its own propaganda purposes.

28 29

Ibid., 247. Ibid., 253.

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One further study also suggests Sandinista heavy-handedness towards Christians was a reactive symptom, rather than a proactive policy. Kathleen Mahoney-Norris compares patterns of political repression in two revolutionary societies: Cuba and Nicaragua.30 She concludes that, of the two, there was “no question that Cuban patterns of repression were considerably much higher than those found in Nicaragua.”31 In her discussion of how both regimes perceived religion, she argues that Cuba had a policy of institutionalised religious repression from the top down. Yet she maintains the Nicaraguan government “did not constrain religious activity as occurred in Cuba.”32 There was “no overt or covert plan” to repress Christians, as evidenced by the fact that many Christians supported the government. Generally speaking, the Nicaraguan churches were free to carry out their task, and most abuses aimed at religious groups were carried out by over-zealous lower- and middle-ranking officials at a local level, though the government did not always step in speedily to rectify these abuses. Mahoney-Norris does recognise, however, that there were times when the churches experienced government crackdowns, most notably during the extensions of the state of emergency in 1982 and 1985. She argues that intensified political repression went hand-in-hand with perceived threats towards the revolution. Therefore, because Cuba faced a longstanding and serious threat of a U.S. invasion, it was a more repressive regime. Nicaragua, on the other hand, felt generally less threatened than Cuba, and was therefore less repressive. But once under threat, repression was heightened. Thus she believes the “government’s actions directed against religious officials almost always appear to have been threat driven.”33 Hence, Christians suffered most during the turbulence of 1982 and 1985, or when they spoke out vocally against or evaded SMP at a time when national security demanded conscription.

30 Kathleen A. Mahonney-Norris, An Inquiry Into Political Repression: Revolutionary Cuba and Nicaragua As Comparative Cases (PhD thesis, University of Denver, 1996). 31 Ibid., 284. 32 Ibid., 383. 33 Ibid., 381.

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Evaluation Rather than engaging in a case-by-case analysis of each of these studies, the following section seeks to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the body of literature as a whole, highlighting the need for a comprehensive study of Protestant-Sandinista relations and identifying further areas for research. This section also includes a perusal of several additional incidental articles touching upon Church-state relations in revolutionary Nicaragua. Scope and Depth The most obvious shortfall is the literature’s limited nature and lack of depth. There is a notable shortage of material exploring ProtestantSandinista relations, while Pentecostalism is rarely explored in depth. Humberto Belli dwells little on Protestantism. As a Catholic, references to Protestant-Sandinista relations are incidental, aimed primarily at lending weight to his claims of general religious persecution. Edmund and Julia Robb’s study offers a useful counterweight to studies exploring the religious right, but likewise they fail to concentrate on EvangelicalSandinista relations in any depth, which is surprising given Edmund Robb’s links with the religious right (he was a senior executive of the IRD). In fairness, Nicaragua represents just one case study in Robb’s wider survey of the religious left, but given his background one wonders why Evangelicalism was not discussed more fully. Though Michael Dodson highlights mainly the divisions within Catholicism by comparing Protestant responses with those of a divided Catholic Church, he sheds some light on Protestant-state relations. Unfortunately, insufficient research leads Dodson to generalise and reach unsatisfactory conclusions. He is keen to highlight a more-or-less united Protestant response, compared with Catholicism’s bitter divisions. Thus, by concentrating on CEPAD’s response, and also reducing conservative Evangelicalism (by far the largest Protestant constituency in Nicaragua) to the political sidelines as a small, extreme and insignificant actor, he erroneously paints a somewhat homogenous picture. For example, Dodson and Montgomery believe the five hundred RIPEN 2 leaders (led by CEPAD) who declared their support for the Sandinistas were numerically “about half of the Protestant pastors.” However, not all the RIPEN attendees were pastors or leaders, and some were even Catholic (this is discussed later). Moreover, over time Evangelicals far

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outnumbered pro-revolutionary Protestants (see Chapter 4).34 Thus, Dodson’s concentration on CEPAD yields, at best, a partial picture. Only from 1986 onwards does he begin to differentiate between proand anti-revolutionary Protestants, but still fails to discuss in any depth the strained relations between the two. Other studies also lack depth. Luis Serra presents a single chapter concerned with church-state relations as a whole, but his theoretical discussion lacks any primary sources whatsoever. Roger Lancaster’s research involves some fieldwork in barrios where Pentecostals were numerically well-represented, yielding some useful material mentioned in this study’s conclusion. But his study of Pentecostalism again represents just a single chapter of a work concerned with Nicaraguan religion as a whole. David Stoll’s survey is also a chapter in length, though considerably longer than Lancaster’s. One of its strengths is the impressive range of primary and secondary sources he employs, and his study is useful in that it concentrates mainly on conservative Protestantism. Yet his discussion represents just one part of a much wider narrative exploring the movement within Latin America as a whole. The same is true of the NACLA reports, which focus on the Central American milieu, not just Nicaragua. Meanwhile, religious repression represents just one strand of Kathleen Mahoney-Norris’ comparison of Nicaragua and Cuba. The strongest feature of the two remaining studies outlined above is either depth or scope. Abelino Martínez sets out to produce an in-depth analysis, concentrating on the sects, mainly Pentecostal, in revolutionary Nicaragua. However, by concentrating on grassroots groups he rarely discusses the views of their leaders. Also, Martínez’s study seeks to demonstrate if, to what extent and why Evangelical groups were politicised, that is, engaged in political thought and/or action. Thus, he does not always explore the actual relations between Sandinistas and Evangelicals, but rather, writing in the lead up to the 1990 elections seeks to ensure their revolutionary participation. If Martínez ditches scope in favour of depth, David Haslam does the opposite. His short book succeeds in offering a fast-moving, wideranging survey of Protestantism in Nicaragua based on his sabbatical 34 Even CEPAD founder and president Gustavo Parajón believed the majority of Protestants did not support the revolution, though he did believe that at RIPEN 2 many of those who initially endorsed the Sandinistas were Pentecostal (Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005).

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there. He provides some general background information unavailable elsewhere on several lesser-known organisations and this is to be commended. Nevertheless, Haslam’s work is very short and lacks depth, and while it was probably useful as an introductory guide to Protestantism in revolutionary Nicaragua when it was first published, his study is nonetheless somewhat superficial. In particular, discussions concerning Pentecostals are short and one-sided, lacking sophistication, and subservient to Haslam’s main agenda, which is to eulogise liberation theology Protestantism. Clearly, then, the literature exploring Protestant-Sandinista relations is very limited in nature and superficial, while Pentecostal-Sandinista relations have been given all but the scantest attention, and nearly always as part of a wider investigation. There is not a single, substantial work concerned with establishing the nature and dynamics of these relations. Extent and Nature of Supporting Evidence Another structural weakness of the literature is an acute shortage of primary source material. Some authors (for example, Luis Serra) rely heavily on a very few secondary sources. In other studies, the nature of some sources is also problematic. For example, Roger Lancaster’s research, which is limited to only three Managuan barrios, leads him to make broad assertions about the nature and worldview of Pentecostalism across the whole of the country. His views of the movement also appear to be based mainly on interviews with a single pro-revolutionary Pentecostal leader. Thus, while most Pentecostals were neutral or rejected the revolution (see Chapter 4), Lancaster reaches opposite conclusions based on a very limited sample. Haslam’s study yields a similar problem with sourcing. He relies heavily on his personal experiences in Nicaragua. There is also a notable paucity of primary sources, with an over-reliance on a small number of pro-Sandinista secondary analyses. Moreover, in the few instances where primary sources are employed, these are nearly always pro-Sandinista (though often presented as unbiased). A case in point is Haslam’s negative view of the AoG, based on interviews with Carlos Escorcia and material produced by Miguel Angel Casco, both of whom were expelled from the AoG for supporting the Frente. Naturally, their testimony is vital in any wide-ranging discussion of Pentecostal-Sandinista relations (I interviewed and quote extensively Escorcia and Casco myself ). Yet as

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with Lancaster, one cannot make a judgment about a whole movement based on the testimonies of two (disgruntled) ex-members alone. A far wider array of sources is essential. Now, that is not to say Haslam’s work does not have its merits (its useful broad nature has been mentioned already), but it does not represent an exhaustive attempt at establishing the nature of Protestant-Sandinista relations. Clearly, Haslam’s main aim is to articulate support for Protestant liberation theology. Dodson also relies on secondary analyses, citing few primary sources (though considerably more than Haslam). Moreover, he appears to use his evidence selectively. For example, he explains how, during a visit to Nicaragua he and Laura O’Shaughnessy were guided throughout their tour by CEPAD. Though sympathetic towards CEPAD, they expressed a desire to present their case fairly by speaking with members of CNPEN.35 Yet neither CNPEN nor its pastors’ testimonies appear to receive any further mention in any of Dodson’s material. Edmund and Julia Robb draw on a number of sources that are likely biased from the other direction. For example, when detailing Sandinista treatment of the Miskitos and Moravians, they quote rebel Miskito leader Steadman Fagoth extensively. As with Haslam’s sources, Fagoth cannot simply be discounted as a viable source because, as a participant, his experiences have some value in reconstructing events on the Atlantic Coast. However, his testimony must be employed not uncritically because of his partisan role in the Miskito-Sandinista conflict. Moreover, David Stoll alleges Fagoth himself committed brutal human rights abuses, which further questions the veracity of his testimony.36 Of course, sources are nearly always biased one way or the other, which must be countered by employing objectively a range of sources coming from all sides. But in this respect, Edmund Robb’s uncritical use of Fagoth’s evidence raises questions. Some sources cited in the above studies are downright false. For example, Abelino Martínez details how AoG missionary David Spencer visited Nueva Segovia during a visit to Nicaragua and, during a sermon, discouraged mothers from participating in a Frente-organised vaccination program for children in the region. Presumably, Martínez is alluding to how some Pentecostals refuse medical treatment as this would represent a lack of faith in God’s healing power. Thus, he seeks

35 36

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Dodson and O’Shaughnessy, Nicaragua’s Other Revolution, 12. Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 252.

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to demonstrate how Evangelicals undermined the Frente’s social efforts. However, when asked about the alleged incident in Nueva Segovia, Spencer was incredulous: It’s the first time I had even heard of this accusation against me, but it really doesn’t surprise. I don’t know that [Martinez] was CEPAD [i.e. belonged to CEPAD] . . . but it wouldn’t surprise me as they were out to get my hide because I stood unashamed on the side of CNPEN . . . I would be the first to stand up and be counted for doing a project where people can be vaccinated. I have never been against vaccinating anyway . . . I fully believe in doctors, hospitals and medicine and vaccination for our children and ourselves.37

He explained how he had never even visited Nueva Segovia. Given Spencer’s very high profile and status in Nicaragua, where he now regularly broadcasts on radio and television, it is highly unlikely he would deny having even visited Nueva Segovia in the 1980s unless it were true. Spencer suspected the story came from CEPAD (with whom there was rivalry). In an endnote, Martínez simply cites interviews with Protestant leaders as the source.38 But it is surely significant that Martínez’s study was published by CAV, which was strongly suspicious of Evangelicals. Perhaps the most extensive examples of primary sourcing are by Humberto Belli and David Stoll. This is, in fact, one of Belli’s greatest strengths. He cites an extensive array of FSLN documents that shed light on Sandinista perceptions of religion, though sourced examples of actual persecution are fewer, relating mainly to the Catholic Church. David Stoll packs his single chapter with a bewilderingly wide range of primary source material, which makes his study all the more compelling and authoritative. However, because he is by and large concerned with North American attempts to highlight Nicaraguan Evangelicals’ suffering, much of his evidence is exogenous, rather than endogenous. Because of the lack of sources and evidence available during the 1980s, every anecdote was seized upon by supporters and opponents of the Sandinistas to make propaganda capital, yielding totally different interpretations. Two examples suffice to demonstrate this. The seizing of temples by turbas in 1982 is regarded by many as a clear example of proactive, brutal Sandinista repression. Yet pro-Sandinistas regarded it

37 38

David Spencer, e-mail correspondence, 4 November 2001. Martínez, Sectas en Nicaragua, 192.

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as a reaction by the masses against conservative Protestants who were perceived as enemies of the revolution and in alliance with the U.S. Another example is when Fr. Bismarco Carballo was caught on film by a state television crew as he ran naked through the streets chased by a man. The Sandinistas stated Carballo, aide to Archbishop Obando and a vociferous opponent of the Sandinistas, was found at the home of a female parishioner by a jealous husband. A state television crew just happened to be in the area at that time. However, the Church and opponents of the Sandinistas claimed the whole incident was engineered to discredit an opponent, and that the woman was a state security agent. Thus, both sides cited the incident to bolster their case. Another problem caused by the lack of evidence has been a tendency to generalise. Mention has already been made of how Dodson has not recognised the full extent of Protestant reactions to the revolution. Consider also the following sweeping statement by Luis Serra: The articulation between US policy and Nicaragua’s reactionary religious sector has been manifested in the following ways: (1) The United States has financed and trained pastors from different evangelical sects who have since 1979 gone to the most remote corners of Nicaragua. (2) The mass media in the United States have distorted the religious conflict in Nicaragua. (3) The United States has financed community development projects and the training of religious leaders in towns where popular or government organizations have not been consolidated, with the purpose of creating support for the counter-revolutionary forces.39

Yet not a single piece of evidence is presented to support any of these statements. It is also clear Serra lacks any concrete knowledge of the facts. For example, Pentecostal evangelism in remote areas stretches back to 1912 (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2). Perhaps the best example of how a lack of evidence has led to a generalised and unchallenged view is the manner in which CEPAD is portrayed. Over time, the myth of CEPAD’s involvement in the 1970s anti-Somozan struggle and participation in the final insurrection, that its support for the revolution was representative of Protestantism, and finally, that it lent critical support to the Frente, have all become established ‘facts’. Yet Belli questions CEPAD’s participation in the lead up to the insurrection, claiming its leaders were practically unheard of in anti-

39 ‘Ideology, Religion and the Class Struggle’ in Harris and Vilas, Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege, 163.

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Somozan circles before declaring their support for the revolution. Even Philip Berryman, on the religious left, regards Protestants participation in the final insurrection as minimal, while the few that were involved were not always motivated by longstanding ideological considerations.40 After the revolution, Belli maintains that although CEPAD’s leaders strongly supported the revolution, rank-and-file members did not. In fact, some sought to leave the organisation over the leaders’ handling of the seizure of the temples. He believes CEPAD had become totally identified with and inseparable from the Frente (Stoll is somewhat kinder, and sees CEPAD as nervously engaging the Frente when its members were wronged). Even Berryman concedes CEPAD might have been more critical of the Frente with hindsight.41 Meanwhile, Stoll argues that though CNPEN and CEPAD were often portrayed as mutually exclusive, many pastors belonged to both groups. Therefore, the claim that the pro-revolutionary stance of CEPAD’s leadership was in some way representative of the bulk of Nicaragua’s Protestants is misleading. It is clear CEPAD’s leadership took a very different view from many (the majority, this study argues) of its members. Thus, there has been insufficient critical analysis of CEPAD’s role within the revolution. Partisan Nature of the Literature The literature is also sharply polarised. During the 1980s, Nicaragua became an ideological battleground between left and right, and religion especially represented an important piece in a political game of chess between supporters and opponents of the revolution. Both sides passionately cited religion in support of their view, either claiming it was the victim of a tyrannical power guilty of brutal religious persecution, or else seeking to demonstrate the unique nature of a revolutionary experiment that proved Marxism and Christianity could co-exist peacefully. It is little wonder, then, that opinions on church-state relations in revolutionary Nicaragua are so divided, and most surveys examining Protestant-Sandinista relations tend to be heavily partisan, with both sides bent on shoring up their ideological position.

Philip Berryman, The Religious Roots of Rebellion (London: SCM, 1984), 86. Philip Berryman, Stubborn Hope: Religion, Politics and Revolution in Central America (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1994), 199. 40

41

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A brief survey of the publication dates alone of these studies demonstrates their reactive, rather than proactive, nature. For example, consider an article by the Central American Historical Institute, appearing in the Nicaraguan journal Envio in September 1982.42 Its discussion of ‘counterrevolutionary’ Evangelical sects allegedly linked to the CIA appeared just one month after the seizure of the temples. The article is clearly reactive and apologetic, suggesting the Sandinistas, rather than respond to this counterrevolutionary threat, sat passively by without investigating the sects. However, grassroots Nicaraguans, frustrated at the sects for undermining the revolution, took matters into their own hands and invaded the temples. Thus, the article exonerates the Sandinistas. (It is significant that the Central American Historical Institute, or CAHI, was founded by pro-revolutionary Jesuits who supported the Sandinistas.)43 Meanwhile, Belli writes at the height of the 1985 crackdown on religious elements, while Edmund and Julia Robb’s book was published shortly after. Interestingly, the end of the Sandinista period has resulted in practically no further work in this field, demonstrating how in the 1980s the issue represented little more than an ideological football to be kicked around by both sides. Thus, much of the literature is reactive and lacks objectivity. Concerning this issue of partisanship, one is also struck by how intimately linked with one side or other many of these authors were. For example, mention has already been made of Edmund Robb’s association with the IRD, while Belli (a former Sandinista who converted to Christianity and worked with the bishops, some of the Sandinistas’ fiercest critics) founded the Puebla Institute, also linked to the IRD. On the other side, David Haslam worked closely with pro-revolutionary Protestants during his stay in Nicaragua, while Martínez’s study was published by CAV. A rejection of U.S. foreign policy firmly underpins the NACLA publication, while its treatment of the Sandinistas is uncritical. Such bias has, on occasion, resulted not only in one-sided judgments, but a tendency by commentators to ignore issues detrimental to their own interest that borders on hypocrisy. For example, NACLA

42 Instituto Histórico Centroamericano, ‘The Ideological Struggle in Nicaragua’s Protestant Churches’, Envio 15 (Sept 15, 1982), 11–17. 43 See Robb, Betrayal of the Church, which discusses the history and ideology of the CAHI.

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and Haslam refer to the funding received by CNPEN from external groups, portraying such financial assistance from abroad as somehow morally suspect, or as attempts by external actors to undermine the revolution. Yet neither dwells on how CEPAD also enjoyed a great deal of financial support from overseas. Consider also NACLA’s condemnation of Central American Evangelicals’ apoliticism. Yet on the other hand, they are severely criticised for being strongly anti-communist. Clearly, from NACLA’s point of view apoliticism is simply code for not espousing the right kind of politics. NACLA also dwells at length on how the Evangelicals allegedly seized upon and exploited economic disaster, upheaval and stress, in order to develop growth. Yet so does liberation theology. Thus, partisan analyses can be disingenuous, if not hypocritical. One final example of how a heavily partisan approach may distort the true picture ought to be mentioned in passing. There is a tendency by pro-Sandinistas to counter alleged incidents of religious repression by highlighting Contra atrocities. Yet this implies that two wrongs somehow cancel each other out, and once again partisanship detracts from an objective attempt at establishing Sandinista relations with Christians. (The same can be said of the religious right, which rarely discussed Evangelical links with the Contras.) Partisanship and opinions, then, are inevitable, but in the heat of conflict, too often the truth is sacrificed at the expense of winning an ideological battle through claim and counter-claim, reaction and presupposition. The result is more a type of hagiography, whether Protestant or Sandinista, rather than history. Lack of a Theological Perspective Another structural weakness of the literature is the lack of theological perspective. Clearly, a political and historical approach provides an insight into this turbulent period in Nicaragua’s history. However, the study of the nature and dynamics of Protestant-Sandinista relations cannot simply be limited to the historical and political dimensions. Any investigation into a religious group’s interaction with others around it requires some theological understanding of the faith system underpinning its worldview. Just as Sandinista ideology and its view of society are inextricably intertwined, so too must Protestantism’s interaction with society be understood in light of its theologically-based worldview. Yet many studies exploring Protestant-Sandinista relations often totally ignore the theological dimension. Occasionally, this has led to

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elementary errors. For example, Luis Serra complains that Christians substituted “the popular Sandinista slogan, ‘Sandino, Yesterday, Today, and Always’ ” for their own slogan, ‘Christ, Yesterday, Today and Always’.44 It is true that some religious slogans were captured and employed by counterrevolutionaries.45 But Serra is clearly unaware that this slogan is in fact an allusion to Hebrews 13:8. It was the Sandinistas who originally appropriated this saying, replacing the name ‘Christ’ with ‘Sandino’. Conservative Catholics merely re-appropriated what was originally theirs. Stoll argues many Sandinistas lacked a theological understanding of the various religious groups, which exacerbated tensions between the government and the church. The above is a case in point. Especially important is an understanding of the theological intricacies of Evangelicalism, which few commentators have grasped. Roger Lancaster’s research also lacks a theological perspective. For example, his research into Pentecostalism in some of the poorest barrios of Managua leads him to conclude that Pentecostals are fiercely anti-capitalist, that they “share with liberation theology an orientation towards ‘social order’ that is somewhat class conscious, anti-capitalist, morally ‘conservative’ and economically ‘radical’.”46 Lancaster appears to lack an intimate understanding of the widespread Pentecostal view on prosperity, which many Pentecostals regard as proof of God’s blessing.47 Other studies also lack a theological perspective. Humberto Belli’s political analysis is thorough and compelling, and finds support elsewhere.48 However, given that the focus of his study is specifically concerned with church-state relations in revolutionary Nicaragua, and also his role as a layman and connection with the bishops, it is perhaps Serra, ‘Ideology, Religion and the Class Struggle’ in Harris and Vilas, Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege, 161. 45 For examples, see Andrew Bradstock, Saints and Sandinistas (London: Epworth, 1987), 39. 46 Lancaster, Thanks to God, 203–4. 47 For a brief discussion of social upward mobility of Pentecostals, see V. Synan, ‘Pentecostalism’ in Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 835–839. An important study exploring the importance of health and wealth within the Charismatic and Pentecostal movements is by Bruce Barron, The Health and Wealth Gospel: What is Going On in a Movement That Has Shaped The Faith of Millions? (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1987). Reaping wealth based on sowing is one of Pentecostalism’s earliest principles (see, for example, ‘How will you sow in 1922?’, Latter Rain Evangel 15(4) ( January 1992). 48 See some similar arguments and evidence to that of Belli presented by Jiri and Virginia Valenta, ‘Sandinistas in Power’, Problems of Communism 34 (Sept–Oct 1985), 1–28. 44

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surprising that there is not more of a theological perspective. The same is true of Edmund Robb. This may be because both studies are not so much concerned with events within the church, which is regarded as passive in the face of alleged Sandinista suffering, but rather, that both concentrate on the Sandinistas as progenitors of persecution. If so, this is problematic in itself as it demonstrates how events have been explored from one point-of-view only. Clearly, understanding the dynamics of Evangelical-Sandinista relations requires an examination of how each group regarded the other and why. Dodson’s theological contribution from a Protestant point-of-view is limited. This is a pity, because one of Dodson’s and O’Shaughnessy’s greatest contributions is an examination of the issues from a theological perspective (though in relation to Catholicism, not Protestantism). They parallel the role of religion in the Nicaraguan revolution with that of the English and American revolutions. Unlike the anticlerical French revolution, they argue that the role of religion in Nicaraguan was reminiscent of that played by the Puritans in the English revolution of the 1640s. In a society remarkably like Somoza’s Nicaragua, Dodson and O’Shaughnessy suggest that the Puritans, through their emphasis on reading the Bible, promoting a prophetic vision, and seeking to spread literacy, played an important role in overturning authoritarianism.49 Similar religious attitudes towards politics were promoted through a renewed emphasis on Calvinism during the Great Awakening, and the promotion of Puritan values also played an important role in the mobilisation against the British in the American Revolution. It is ironic, Dodson and O’Shaughnessy believe, that the U.S., which owes so much to these two examples of religious revolutionary participation, does not recognise the true situation in Nicaragua and chooses instead to paint a picture of acute religious oppression as a pretext for intervention. This analysis is interesting, and certainly demonstrates how religion was at the heart of the Nicaraguan revolution. However, after the final insurrection one might argue that the roles were reversed, that the popular liberation theology wing of the church (both Catholic and Protestant) in a sense became a state church, sponsored by the Frente, while conservative elements and doctrinal purists (Obando’s Catholics

49 Dodson first outlines this Puritan analogy in ‘Struggle for the Church’ in Levine, Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America, but it finds its fullest expression in Nicaragua’s Other Revolution, with Laura O’Shaughnessy.

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and Evangelicals) became isolated and were regarded with suspicion by the new pro-revolutionary state church, just as had happened to the original Puritans. Thus, they became the radicals. Of the remaining studies, Martínez examines Pentecostalism as a sociological phenomenon, while Deborah Huntington ( NACLA) looks at Evangelicals from a political angle. Nonetheless, both manage to bring some theological analysis into their work. Huntington attempts to discuss how a Pentecostal worldview led to an emphasis on evangelism rather than politics, which helps to make her study more authoritative. However, both Huntington and Martínez attribute too much to North American influence, and despite Huntington’s effort to understand Pentecostal eschatology (theology of the end times), she stops short of exploring how Pentecostal eschatology and pneumatology (theology of the Holy Spirit) are inextricably intertwined, a position that lies at the core of Pentecostalism’s worldview that explains a strong emphasis on evangelism at the expense of social issues (see Chapter 7). Moreover, the eschatological significance of classical Pentecostalism’s view of the modern state of Israel is not even mentioned. This is very important, given the Frente’s close links with Yasser Arafat’s PLO (also discussed later). Meanwhile, David Stoll explores Evangelicalism from a theological as well as a sociological perspective, which represents one of his strengths over other studies. However, as with much of Stoll’s study, the emphasis is on exogenous influences, and his theological insight is based more on the beliefs and politics of North American Evangelicals and their indirect bearing on church-state relations within Nicaragua, rather than exploring the theology of Nicaraguan Evangelicals themselves. Thus, though Stoll’s arguments are well-founded and supported by compelling evidence, they are primarily externally-based. Finally, as a church minister Haslam also manages to bring some theological insight into his investigation of Protestant-Sandinista relations. However, he examines Pentecostalism from without, specifically from his own theological perspective, which is strongly sympathetic towards liberation theology. By dwelling on what he perceives to be the theological inadequacies of Pentecostalism, and instead concentrating on analysing the revolution from his own liberation theology perspective, Haslam very much misses a much more important issue. The question that ought to be asked here is not so much whether or not Pentecostal theology is good and proper and establishes correct priorities, but rather, how its theology, whether flawed or not, brought it into conflict with the Sandinista authorities.

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A Partial and Unclear Picture Clearly, Protestantism, like Catholicism, was divided in its response towards sandinismo. But beyond this very general conclusion, existing studies paint a partial, unclear and, at times, contradictory picture of Protestant-Sandinista relations. How divided Protestantism was remains to be determined. Agreement cannot even be reached on whether or not Evangelicals were systematically repressed. Sandinista sympathisers say not, while others suggest a pattern of repression aimed at Christians dictated by the highest echelons of government. Several questions also remain unanswered. For example, how did Somoza’s treatment of Evangelicals, or Evangelicalism’s geographical distribution throughout the country, have any bearing on relations? What proportion of Evangelicals supported the revolution, and why? Very importantly, what was CEPAD’s role throughout the whole period? To what extent was the leadership’s support for the Sandinistas reflected across its membership as a whole? What political agenda did CEPAD’s leadership pursue, what tensions did this create, and to what extent did these factors affect Evangelical-Sandinista relations? As the following pages demonstrate, there has been a wholly uncritical treatment by the religious left of CEPAD’s role, while conservative Christians have occasionally contented themselves with sniping at CEPAD’s leaders from the sidelines, happy to propagate rumours and innuendo as fact, sometimes without having explored objectively and honestly some of these accusations. Too often, treatments of church-state relations have been rooted in attempts to shore up a particular ideological position. More objectivity is required. The current literature also does not provide a detailed and comprehensive study specifically aimed at Pentecostals in revolutionary Nicaragua. Rather, our knowledge of Nicaraguan Pentecostalism is gleaned from studies exploring other wider, often only partially related, issues. Thus, there is a real need for objective research expressly concerned with Evangelicalism and its relations with the Sandinistas. Such a study should draw on a range of new primary sources. Where relevant, it must also explore issues from a theological, as well as a political perspective. Only then can some of the contradictions detailed above be eliminated, unanswered questions satisfied, and satisfactory conclusions reached. Finally, several studies offer only a partial picture by focusing on exogenous issues such as the role played by the U.S. government and the religious right, at the expense of endogenous factors like Sandinista political dogma, Nicaraguan Pentecostalism’s worldview, its manifest

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support for the state of Israel, its view of the Contras, local issues, personality clashes, and so on. By far the most masterful, authoritative, well-argued and researched treatment of the role of external actors in helping to shape Evangelical-Sandinista relations is offered by David Stoll. But even he concedes these do not explain fully Evangelical responses to the revolution, recognising that the Frente’s fixation on mass mobilisation and its treatment of opponents were bound to provoke some kind of Evangelical reaction.50 That is not to say this present study rejects as groundless any and all exogenous factors cited. Quite the contrary. Though it may not agree with all of David Stoll’s conclusions, on the whole this study accepts his valuable research and recognises that external actors were partly responsible for events on the ground in Nicaragua. Yet that represents just one part of the story. This study will concentrate on examining and explaining a range of endogenous factors which also influenced Protestant-Sandinista relations. Some fifteen years after the Sandinistas’ defeat at the polls, the issue of Pentecostalism’s popularity among the masses and its collision with the Sandinistas is not simply an academic one. Vatican II and Medellín brought about radical change leading to liberation theology, and in Nicaragua the movement enjoyed tantamount to official status. But years later, liberation theology has arguably failed to live up to expectations, both in Nicaragua and across Latin America as a whole. Meanwhile, Pentecostalism has continued to sweep through the continent. Moreover, massive growth and recent upward social mobility of many of its adherents has resulted in an increasing role within the political arena. Why has Pentecostalism captured the attention of the masses far more successfully than liberation theology? A study of Evangelicalism, especially Pentecostalism, in a society where liberation theology heavily underpinned the government’s ethos and program helps to provide some answers. Perhaps some years after the events of the 1980s, and thus far removed from a once bitter propaganda battle, a more objective study of Protestant-Sandinista relations is now possible. It is certainly due.

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David Stoll, e-mail correspondence, 16 November 2003.

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CHAPTER TWO

SURVEY OF NICARAGUAN PROTESTANTISM (1556–1978) Isolated cases of Protestantism in Central America are known from earliest colonial times. In the sixteenth century the Inquisition chronicled twenty-one instances on the isthmus, the very first recorded in Nicaragua in 1556.1 Further cases led Spain’s Philip II to issue a cédula in 1564 ordering the incumbent bishop to root out all followers of Luther and Calvin in Central America.2 Consequently, there was hardly any Protestant activity in Central America until the nineteenth century. Nicaragua’s geography is such that it divides naturally into two regions, each separated from the other by mountains and inhospitable jungle. The isolated incidents detailed above were recorded in the Spanish Pacific region. However, the origins of a coherent Nicaraguan Protestant history find their roots in the Atlantic coast, within the British sphere of influence. Puritans, Pirates and Priests: Protestantism in Eastern Nicaragua The Mosquito Shore (a.k.a. Mosquito Coast, or Mosquitia) is the home of the Miskito Indians. From Cape Gracias a Dios (the HondurasNicaragua coastal boundary) it stretches westwards into Honduras and southwards into Nicaragua beyond Bluefields. The bulk of the Shore, then, falls within Nicaragua. Much of this tropical coastline remains untamed to this day, its beauty belying an inhospitable, fever-ridden, hot and humid climate and rugged terrain habitually lambasted by fierce tropical storms that leave devastation in their wake. These factors,

1

7–8.

Wilton M. Nelson, Protestantism in Central America (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 1984),

2 Agustín Battle, ‘Iglesias Protestantes: Periodificación de la Historia del Protestantismo en América Latina,’ in Encuentro Latinoamericao de CEHILA (Comisión de Estudios de Historia de la Iglesia en Latinoamérica), Para Una Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina (Barcelona: Editorial Novaterra, 1973), 212–213.

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together with the hostility of the Miskito Indians and the view that the Shore yielded little worth exploiting, led Spanish conquistadores to ignore the region.3 The absence of a Spanish presence led to the Shore falling under British control, eventually paving the way for the arrival of Protestantism in eastern Nicaragua. As Spain plundered Latin America, her treasure-laden galleons represented attractive targets for Caribbean privateers and pirates. Their actions were often sanctioned and financed by rich and influential (mainly English) aristocrats keen to see an end to Spain’s domination over the New World. Among these was Robert Rich, second earl of Warwick, who outfitted privateers to attack Spanish ships during the early seventeenth century.4 As a Puritan, he was also eager to promote religious colonisation ventures (he sponsored the original New England Plymouth colony). In 1629, Rich learned of an uninhabited island—Providence—off the coast of Nicaragua, located within an important Spanish shipping lane. Together with other prominent Puritans (including John Pym), Rich decided to create a colony there along religious principles. In 1631, the first colonists arrived in the Seaflower.5 Eventually, they made contact with the Miskito Indians, who had already come into conflict with the Spanish and were only too happy to forge a friendship with their enemy’s enemy.6 Trade ensued, and a Miskito Indian was elevated to ‘king of the Mosquitos’ by the English traders. This Miskito ‘monarchy’ served to unite the Indians against the Spanish and provided the British with a quasi-official presence on the Shore at the invitation of the Miskito king. The British presence also permitted the influx of Protestantism on the Shore. The Puritan colony did not last long. Providence was ideally located for attacking Spanish ships and quickly attracted so many unscrupulous characters that it soon became one of the most famous pirate lairs

3 Robert A. Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism: The Mosquito Shore and the Bay of Honduras, 1600–1914 (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1989), 19. 4 For details of Rich’s privateering ventures, see W. Frank Craven, ‘The Earl of Warwick, A Speculator in Piracy,’ Hispanic American Historical Review 10 (1930), 457–479; and Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism. 5 Cf. the Mayflower, the ship transporting the New England colonists. 6 For some details of Spanish activity in the south Mosquitia region, along the San Juan River, see Joaquim Rabella Vives, Aproximación a la Historia de Río San Juan, 1500–1995 (Managua: Imprimátur, 1995), 10–20.

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in the West Indies.7 Moreover, constant Spanish harassment, the weather, Puritan preference for a safer New England colony, and an unstable religious situation at home eventually led to the collapse and capture of the colony by the Spanish in 1641.8 Some of the traders and pirates fled Providence with their slaves to set up along the Shore.9 The Providence venture is important because it brought the British into direct contact with the Miskito Indians, a relationship lasting some 250 years that shaped the unique cultural nature of eastern Nicaragua for ever. This lengthy British presence, together with the Miskitos’ willingness to strike a friendship with the enemies of the hated Spanish, also had a major impact on Miskito religious belief and social identity.10 Whereas the Miskitos’ hatred of the Spanish led to their emphatic rejection of Catholicism, their relations with the British, though not initially marking the rejection of their own religious beliefs, nevertheless excluded hostility towards Protestantism. The Miskitos believed they and the British would spend eternity in heaven together, while the Spanish would rot in hell.11 This attitude eventually helped pave the way for the growth of Protestantism on the Shore. For the next two centuries it would be represented by a sporadic Anglican presence. Historians have assumed the lengthy British presence along the Shore was fuelled by expansionist designs to further its Central American interests.12 However, this view has been challenged by the suggestion that the British presence there was infinitesimal, ill-defined, informal, erratic and generally overshadowed by events in Belize to the north.13 According to this interpretation, the Shore was controlled by a tiny

7 Donald Rowland, ‘Spanish Occupation of the Island of Old Providence, or Santa Catalina, 1641–1670,’ Hispanic American Historical Review 15 (1935), 469. 8 Naylor, Penny Ante Imperialism, p. 33. 9 One such ex-Providencer was the Dutch pirate Abraham Blauvelt, who gave his name to what later became the largest settlement along Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast, the port of Bluefields. 10 For a discussion of factors influencing Miskito social identity and religious belief, see Claudia Garcia, The Making of the Miskitu People of Nicaragua: The Social Construction of Ethnic Identity (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1996), 46ff. 11 Ibid., 46. This sentiment was reciprocal. Spanish hatred of the Miskitos was such that, in 1714, Philip V of Spain ordered that the Miskitos either be enslaved or exterminated (see Rabella, Historia de Río San Juan, 31). 12 For an example of this position, see Craig L. Dozier, Nicaragua’s Mosquito Shore: The Years of British and American Presence (Tuscalusa: University of Alabama Press, 1985). 13 As set out by Naylor in Penny Ante Imperialism.

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number of British adventurers and traders who, using ties of nationality, succeeded in entangling successive unwitting British governments in the Shore’s affairs to give weight to their own presence and ensure their protection. Certainly, the British presence there was small prior to the nineteenth century.14 This minor presence scattered along the coast excluded concerted religious activity. Moreover, the hardened Shoremen (mainly logwood cutters) had no need or desire for organised religion. Yet the Shore soon attracted the attention of the Anglican Church.15 As early as 1705, there was an Anglican attempt to evangelise the indigenous population. But the first missionary effort in the region was carried out by the Anglican Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) in 1743, when five Miskito youths were sent to Britain for a Christian education. Several SPG missionaries were sent to the Shore, who mainly schooled Miskito children and ministered to the Indian and slave populations. With the death of the last SPG missionary in 1768, the Miskitos ministered to themselves until the mid-nineteenth century. In 1840 the Miskito monarchy, which still considered itself loyal to the British crown, asked the Anglicans to organise religious instruction on the Shore. (Even today, some older Miskitos distrust Pacific Nicaraguans and long for closer ties with Britain. One elderly Miskito asked me why, during the Miskito-Sandinista war, the ‘British Iron Lady’ Margaret Thatcher had not sent her navy to liberate them as she had the Falkland Islanders!)16 However, nothing came of their request, and this Anglican apathy may have eventually resulted in the

14 Ibid., p. 51. See also Germán Romero Vargas et al, Persistencia Indígena en Nicaragua (Managua: CIDCA-UCA, 1992), 45, which offers a full breakdown of white, mulatto, mestizo and slave inhabitants throughout the various small settlements along the Shore. The number of whites does not exceed 160, and the total number of all the non-indigenous inhabitants was approximately 800. 15 The following brief summary of the SPG’s activity in the region, from 1743 to 1785, is based on CIEETS (Centro Intereclesial de Estudios Teológicos y Sociales), Caminando: Breve Historia de la Iglesia Evangélica en Nicaragua (Managua: CIEETS, 1989); C.F. Pascoe, Two Hundred Years of the S.P.G.: An Historical Account of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts 1701–1900, 2 vols. (London: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1901), 194–5, 234–7, 252, 888; and Revd. H.P. Thompson, Into All Lands: The History of the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts 1701–1950 (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1951), 161–3, 278, 516. 16 Conversation with Bluefields resident, August 1996. This sentiment was echoed to the British press in Matthew Campbell, ‘Desperate plea to ‘Queen Thatcher’; Nicaragua’, Sunday Times, 23 July 1989, and followed up in David Adamson, ‘The scepter of a sceptre’ (Letter), Sunday Times, 30 July 1989.

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Shore’s superintendent, Patrick Walker, extending an invitation to the Moravians to establish a mission.17 During the nineteenth century, the Anglican Church belatedly began to play a role in the religious life of the Shore’s white, black and mulatto populations.18 However, it was only in 1898 that the first purpose-built Anglican church, St. Mark’s of Bluefields, was consecrated. During the twentieth century the Anglican Church grew, spilling over to Spanish Nicaragua. It survives to the present day and in 1956 came under the jurisdiction of the Episcopal Church in the U.S.19 Whereas Anglicanism represented the favoured religion of the black and white populations, in 1847 the Moravians initiated the “first serious Protestant missionary work” on the Shore among the Miskitos.20 At this time the Shore represented a hive of activity. A fast-expanding mahogany trade and the prospect of an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua caused an influx of immigrants and the Shore was no longer a backwater.21 Moravian hegemony in the region expanded rapidly and by 1979 as many as 80% of Protestants in the Atlantic region were Moravians.22 The neglect of this region by successive governments before 1979 meant the Moravian church was a major provider of education and health care there. It is also suggested the Moravians fostered an anti-Catholic attitude, reinforcing the divisions between the Pacific and Atlantic regions, ensuring the Shore remained strongly

17 Carlos Vilas, Del Colonialismo a la Autonomia: Modernización Capitalista y Revolución Social en la Costa Atlántica (Managua: Nueva Nicaragua, 1990), 79, 120 (n). 18 E. Bradford Burns, Patriarch and Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798–1858 (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1991), 163. 19 Episcopalian Church, Information Packet: Nicaragua, produced by the Latin American and Caribbean Partnership Office, July 1993. 20 Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 8. 21 A booming Shore economy in the late 1840s led the U.S., fearful of losing influence and any future canal rights there, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine, which threatened to damage seriously Anglo-American relations. British foreign policy was dictated by Lord Palmerston, who was prepared to withstand such attempts at encroachment with force. In 1849 during the Polk administration, officials of the U.S. State Department recommended that firm action be taken against Britain, and the prospects of an Anglo-American confrontation were so real that both governments agreed to settle their differences by negotiation before events got out of hand. As a result, in April 1850 the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was signed, stating neither side had any interest in colonial expansion in the region, and in it Britain agreed that any future inter-oceanic canal should be jointly controlled. 22 According to senior Miskito pastor Norman Bent in Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 170.

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Protestant.23 Thus, the hegemony and influence of the Moravian church on the Atlantic coast prior to the arrival of the Sandinistas should not be underestimated. Aside from the Anglicans and Moravians, other Protestant groups began to arrive on the Shore, mainly during the twentieth century, so that by 1979 many of the main traditions were represented in some form or another. The history of Protestantism on the east coast, then, stretches as far back as 1633 and remains the dominant religious force on the Shore to this day. In 1893, Liberal leader Santos Zelaya came to power. Subsequently, the Shore was incorporated into the nation of Nicaragua in 1894, and Mosquitia’s tradition of independence came to an end. However, far from threatening Protestantism on the Shore, Zelaya’s arrival marked the beginning of a national Protestant movement. The rise of Liberalism across the continent early in the nineteenth century paved the way for the modernisation of Latin American society, permitting second-generation Liberal leaders like Zelaya to relax laws that prohibited Protestant activity. Embryonic Protestantism in Spanish Nicaragua Protestantism is often perceived as an exogenous force that penetrated Latin America in the twentieth century. This, of course, is correct. Yet this interpretation overlooks the fact that it was Latin American leaders themselves who, in the nineteenth century, introduced and promoted Protestantism to satisfy their own political agendas. Thus, Latin American Protestantism, while exogenous in origin, nonetheless has endogenous roots. This point is now discussed, first in relation to Latin America as a whole, and secondly in the Nicaraguan milieu. The Reformation and Spain’s colonisation of the New World were contemporary occurrences. Thus, Spain exported the Inquisition to the Americas not simply out of religious zeal, but also to stamp out an ideology that threatened Catholic Spain’s control over her new colonies. Protestantism represented a subversive movement, the religion of the maritime enemy, England. David Martin in particular highlights this longstanding Anglo-Hispanic enmity, (he refers to the “clash between 23

230.

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Hazel Smith, Nicaragua: Self-Determination and Survival (London: Pluto Press, 1993),

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the Hispanic imperium and the Anglo-Saxon imperium” as “one of the longest running of all wars”), as typified by the defeat of the Armada.24 Thus, Jean-Pierre Bastian writes: The struggle for maritime and commercial supremacy in the Atlantic . . . had a religious connotation inasmuch as on the seas the Catholic nations (Spain and Portugal) confronted Protestant nations (the Netherlands and England, principally). Within the Portuguese-Spanish colonial territories, therefore, Protestantism was conceived of as a heresy threatening the ideological and political integrity of a composite socio-political totality which had been established with Christianity as a model.25

Protestantism reflected strong liberal tendencies born out of a radical Arminianism,26 questioning the very basis of the Spanish CounterReformation’s model of Catholicism that emphasised order and strict vertical and hierarchical structures, which underpinned Spanish colonial rule.27 Yet in the early nineteenth century an evolving Liberal movement among Latin American ruling elites began to challenge this Hispanic philosophical approach to government: Those who came to be called ‘Liberals’ saw themselves as bearers of ‘progress’: they propounded the ideas of the Enlightenment (including anticlericalism) and advocated independence from Spain (and later on nation-building and new crops, particularly coffee). Conversely, the ‘Conservatives’ sought to defend older traditions and the church, and were more tied to local power.28

These Liberals sought to emulate Anglo-Saxon liberal success, particularly the U.S. model. For them, building a progressive society meant abandoning Catholic colonialism and embracing the Enlightenment thinking espoused by Protestant Europe’s advanced nations. Thus, the struggle for independence became synonymous with the history of longstanding Anglo-Spanish enmity (typified, as Martin points out, by the defeat of the Armada). Rather than aligning themselves with the Hispanic order that had held back progress since that fateful defeat by 24 David Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 9–12. 25 Jean-Pierre Bastian, ‘Protestantism in Latin America,’ in Enrique Dussel, ed. The Church in Latin America, 1492–1992 (Tunbridge Wells: Burns and Oates, 1992), 314. 26 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 12. 27 Bastian, ‘Protestantism in Latin America’ in Dussel, Church in Latin America, 317. Bastian writes: “The colonial order became a corporative and patrimonial, hierarchichal and vertical structure.” 28 Berryman, Religious Roots, 37.

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the English, Liberals sought to embrace a progressive, Anglo-Saxon model which they believed had enjoyed unparalleled success throughout Protestant Europe. They were dealt a helping hand when Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808. Responsibility for governing Spain’s colonies now shifted to the Supreme Junta, which took refuge in Cádiz. Influenced by Spanish Liberals, the council drafted Spain’s first constitution in 1812, offering Latin America’s criollo29 elites a greater decision-making role in their own affairs. Thus, the Constitution of Cádiz . . . . . . became the rallying symbol of Spanish America as much as peninsular liberals, for it promised the Creoles what they had always aspired to—a greater voice in their own government, while retaining the monarchy as a source of legitimate authority.30

However, when the Spanish monarchy was restored in 1814, Ferdinand VII abolished the Cádiz assembly and constitution, to the dismay of the criollos. Subsequently, independence wars rocked Latin America and by 1825 most of the continent had seceded from Spain. Independence marked the end of the Inquisition in Latin America, thus removing a major obstacle for the arrival of Protestantism. The Liberals’ desire to emulate Anglo-Saxon success also helped to pave the way for the introduction of Protestantism across the continent. Liberals regarded it as a religion of progress, unlike Catholicism which embodied “values that restrained the advance of modern thought.”31 It did not help that the Catholic Church hierarchy had sided with Spain during the independence wars.32 Yet Liberals did not ditch Catholicism completely. It was still regarded as . . . The only ideology capable of forging national identities and of cementing fragile nationalities threatened by the centrifugal forces of regional interests and the latent or apparent rebellions of indigenous ‘nations.33

29 The criollos (English: Creoles) were Spaniards born in Latin America who represented the elites of colonial society (as opposed to the English definition, usually referring to someone of mixed European and Black ancestry). 30 Edwin Williamson, The Penguin History of Latin America (London: Penguin, 1992), 214. 31 Bastian, ‘Protestantism in Latin America’ in Dussel, Church in Latin America, 322. 32 See Duncan Green, Faces of Latin America (London: Latin America Bureau, 1991), 172–3. 33 Bastian, ‘Protestantism in Latin America’ in Dussel, Church in Latin America, 318.

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Catholicism also retained a social role in defending the interests of the criollo and white elites. Thus, Latin American Liberals merely sought to curb the power of the Church while retaining its useful functions. Their solution was to permit the entry of some Protestants (though prohibited from proselytising, and numbers strictly regulated) to offer them a minor social role. The first to arrive were the Bible colporteurs, who were encouraged to distribute Bibles and spread those moral and religious values Liberals believed underpinned the Anglo-Saxon world. These colporteurs received help and support from Liberal politicians.34 Another factor contributing towards the rise of Protestantism in Latin America was the need for economic and commercial success. Freed from the constraints of Catholic colonial rule, independence secured the “right (of the Latin American nations) to trade directly with the Protestant manufacturing powers of Europe.”35 Nevertheless, trade alone was insufficient. The new republics, acutely aware of their economic backwardness and illiteracy, believed modernisation could only be achieved through the immigration of a skilled and professional workforce on a large scale. Liberal leaders looked to the developed nations, for example, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, whose successes were attributed to a Protestant work ethic.36 These same nations also enjoyed the science and technology necessary to provide Latin America with suitably qualified immigrants. Yet Protestant immigrants were unwilling to settle in Latin America unless permitted to practice their religion, so some religious freedom was granted, usually through commercial treaties. In some cases, Protestant immigrants also received highly favourable treatment. For example, the Emperor of Brazil paid the salaries of church ministers serving thousands of German Lutheran immigrants out of his own pocket, while in 1882 Northern Presbyterian missionaries had their travelling expenses met by the President of Guatemala.37 It is surely significant that those nations encouraging Protestant immigration enjoyed the greatest 34 See Bastian and Nelson for an overview of the cooperation, both legal and financial, which Protestants received. 35 Helen Defpar, ed. Encyclopaedia of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), 501. 36 For a general discussion of the Protestant work ethic, see Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905). 37 Defpar, ed. Encyclopaedia of Latin America, 502.

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economic successes, while those unwilling to grant even a degree of religious liberty did not.38 A final endogenous factor contributing towards the rise of Protestantism in Latin America was the rise of ultramontane Catholicism. Conservative Catholics reacted against Liberals, rejecting government interference and refusing to relinquish power and control over Latin American society. This movement, spearheaded by French Catholic romantics, sought to “terminate the influence of Enlightenment rationalism and secular government in church affairs and to restore papal power”.39 Second-generation Liberals responded with anticlericalism and a determination to complete the task of modernisation that their forebears had begun, and within their ranks emerged an ultra-radicalLiberalism that sought to institute the full separation of Church and state. Principal among their aims was to neuter Catholicism which, as a key societal actor, had so far denied the full autonomy Liberal politicians believed they were entitled to.40 One way to do this was to accelerate the introduction of Protestantism, which could challenge the Church’s monopoly of certain societal functions, most notably education. They instituted full secularisation and encouraged an influx of Protestant missionaries. For example, in 1873 President Barrios of Guatemala instituted full religious freedom simply to “cripple the secular power of the Roman Catholic Church”.41 The Protestant missionaries established schools, which some Liberal leaders took advantage of, thereby breaking the Catholic monopoly on education. Moreover, these Protestants taught a liberal education which helped develop “an anti-authoritarian and democratic culture grounded in the notion of individual conver-

38 A notable example is Mexico which, between 1830 and 1854, was particularly unwilling to accept any form of Protestantism, even among the immigrant communities. This inflexibility forced a large number of German immigrants to make their way instead to the U.S. and Brazil, where they were greeted enthusiastically. These Germans played an important role in successfully populating certain frontier regions, and as a result, Brazil especially enjoyed an important advantage while Mexico suffered tremendous economic difficulties (discussed by Bastian in Dussel, Church in Latin America, 321–2). 39 R.D. Linder, ‘Ultramontanism’, in Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 1121. 40 See Timothy J. Steigenga, ‘Protestantism, the State, and Society in Guatemala,’ in Daniel R. Miller, ed. Coming of Age: Protestantism in Contemporary Latin America (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 143–172. 41 Virginia G. Burnett, ‘Protestantism in Rural Guatemala, 1872–1954’, Latin American Research Review 24 no. 2 (1986), 128.

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sion as a means of simultaneously acquiring religious, moral and civic responsibility.”42 Across Latin America in the nineteenth century, then, republics had either subscribed to radical Liberalism, which promoted Protestantism for its own means, or an authoritarian Catholic republicanism where Protestantism was far from welcome. (This may explain why some Latin American countries today have embraced Protestantism more enthusiastically than others. For example, Mexico’s unwillingness to grant limited religious freedom in the nineteenth century might explain why it lags behind in the recent explosion of Latin American Protestantism.) Thus, Liberalism paved the way for popular Protestantism in twentieth century Nicaragua. Protestantism in Nineteenth-Century Nicaragua During the nineteenth-century, two Nicaraguan cities symbolised the country’s rival political traditions. Granada’s commercial and military history shaped its inherent Conservative nature, while León’s cultural and intellectual tradition established its strong Liberal tendencies. The period following independence was marked by instability and violence as Conservatives and Liberals struggled for power.43 By 1853, the Conservatives controlled Nicaragua and had forced Liberal leaders into exile. The exiles eventually approached the North American filibuster William Walker, promising him land and money in return for military assistance. Walker agreed and in May 1855 he and his mercenaries arrived in Nicaragua and seized Granada. Though a Liberal government was established, Walker retained overall control of the country. He made English the country’s official language, and even planned for Nicaragua’s annexation by the U.S. Eventually, Liberals and Conservatives joined forces to remove him in a war that cost thousands of lives. A government of national unity was eventually set up, followed by a Conservative government lasting from 1857 to 1893, a period commonly referred to as Los Treinta Años (The Thirty Years). The Liberal and anticlerical program instituted in 1832 by Central American leader Francisco Morazán, who introduced religious freedom

42 43

Ibid. This rivalry existed even before full independence.

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and protection, passed Nicaragua by during the Granada-León civil war.44 Los Treinta Años further helped to prevent widespread Protestant penetration of the country, though a need for economic development led moderate Conservative leaders who had, in part, been influenced and shaped by aspects of Liberalism, to permit some, strictly-controlled immigration.45 By 1892, the U.S. and British and Foreign Bible Societies had taken advantages of these changes and sent Francisco Penzotti to Nicaragua. Penzotti travelled extensively throughout Nicaragua and Central America, preaching and distributing portions of the Bible.46 His work eventually laid the foundations for the Nicaraguan Bible Society, which played a prominent role in the Sandinistas’ literacy crusade. During this period, then, Protestants enjoyed some success among the Liberal elites, who sent their children to Protestant schools. They also played an important role in the economic development of Nicaragua; for example, it was mainly Methodists, Baptists and Anglicans who constructed the country’s first railways.47 Yet Protestant immigrants could not share their faith with Nicaraguans freely (Wilton Nelson describes this phase as ‘foreign Protestantism’). Yet all this changed with the arrival of a Liberal government. In 1893 the Liberal strongman General José Santos Zelaya came to power. Zelaya was a nationalist, keen to promote modernisation and social change. During his dictatorship, which lasted until 1909, Zelaya encouraged foreign investment, so that by the early 1900s Nicaraguan-based U.S. companies controlled much of the country’s economy. Zelaya incurred the wrath of the U.S. by reacting against this informal imperialism, ending concessions to North American companies and proposing the building of an inter-oceanic canal by Washington’s

44 Morazán’s rabid anticlericalism, aimed at liberating Central America’s masses from the power of an outdated, superstitious and corrupt Catholic church, merely served to secure their support for the very institution he intended to subjugate. For a detailed account of Morazán’s anticlerical agenda, see Mary W. Williams, ‘The Ecclesiastical Policy of Francisco Morazán and the Other Central American Liberals’, Hispanic American Historical Review 3 no. 2 (1920), 119–143. 45 Ligia Madrigal Mendieta, La Evolución de las Ideas: El Caso de los Protestantes en Nicaragua (1856–1925) (Managua: CIEETS, 1999), 26–7, 88, which is based on Robert Taylor, Influencia Británica en el Comercio Centroamericano Durante las Primeras Décadas de la Independencia, 1821–1851 (South Woodstock: Plumsock Mesoamerican Studies, 1988). 46 CIEETS, Caminando, 14. 47 Jean-Pierre Bastian, ‘Protestantismo Popular y Política en Guatemala y Nicaragua’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología 48 no. 3 (1986), 184.

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rivals. Gunboat diplomacy ensued, forcing Zelaya’s resignation. Shortly thereafter, U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua until 1933, occasioning a guerrilla movement (led by Augusto Sandino) and leading to the rise of the Somoza dynasty, and ultimately the Sandinista revolution. It is against this historical backdrop that the rise of Protestantism in Spanish Nicaragua must be understood. José Santos Zelaya’s extensive modernisation program included sweeping religious reform.48 Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Nicaraguan Catholic Church still enjoyed widespread influence and power,49 and Zelaya was determined to deal a fatal blow against both feudalism and the Church’s hegemony.50 In 1894 he introduced a radical new constitution which guaranteed full religious freedom. Its purpose was not so much to encourage Nicaraguans to ditch their historic faith. Rather, Zelaya wanted to open up the country to new philosophies (including Protestantism) that would assist and strengthen the Liberal project.51 Liberal leaders regarded Protestantism as a natural “historic ally against feudal and Catholic power.”52 Put simply, Protestantism promoted Liberalism in much the same manner that Catholicism was synonymous with Conservatism. These reforms paved the way for the entry of Protestant missionaries, unthinkable earlier. However, mission societies were slow to take advantage of Zelaya’s reforms.53 It was only after the ecumenical Congress on Christian Work in Latin America (Panamá, 1916), when Protestant denominations divided up Central America among themselves, that mainstream Protestant missionary work began across the isthmus in earnest. The Twentieth Century One missionary society that did not delay in taking advantage of Zelaya’s reforms was the Central American Mission (CAM), founded by Cyrus Scofield, a Dallas-based Congregationalist minister and This period of reform is sometimes referred to as the Liberal Revolution. Madrigal Mendieta, La Evolución de las Ideas, 128. 50 CIEETS, Caminando, 16. 51 Ibid., 17. 52 Ibid., 19. 53 In fact, the first missionary society to send a missionary anywhere in Central America was that of the Presbyterians, as late as 1882, to Guatemala at the personal request of the Liberal President Justo Rufinos Barrios. 48 49

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editor of the Scofield Study Bible. In the 1880s, he was shocked to learn of practically no Protestant missions in Spanish Central America, exclaiming, “We have passed over our Samaria”.54 He founded CAM, a nondenominational mission, to evangelise the region. By 1910 it was the second most important missionary society in Central America after the Moravians.55 CAM’s first missionary to Nicaragua was Alfredo B. DeRoos in 1900.56 By 1901 he and his wife had secured 15 candidates for baptism and had a larger number of followers. In 1903, they were joined by an English missionary nurse, Eleanor Blackmore, a Baptist who later helped establish the first Baptist church in Nicaragua (see below). These missionaries travelled around the country, distributing literature, selling Bibles, and preaching publicly. Despite intense opposition by Catholics the work grew slowly, and by 1911 consisted of 175 baptised believers, two mission stations, four out-stations, and three trained national pastors. The church in Granada was founded in 1924. In the 1930s works began in Chontales, Juigalpa and Bluefields, and by the early 1940s CAM was working up and down the Atlantic region. The late 1940s and 1950s saw mass evangelistic campaigns, the use of radio broadcasting, wide literature crusades, and also correspondence courses, sent even to the remotest parts of Nicaragua. In 1955 there were 19 CAM-affiliated congregations scattered across the country, nearly doubling to 36 by 1958. In 1959 the Nicaragua Bible Institute was opened to train nationals as pastors, and in the 1960s CAM continued to grow and expand. Concerning mainstream Protestant denominations, the delegates attending the ecumenical Congress on Christian Work in Latin America in Panamá, 1916, divided Central America among themselves. Nicaragua was given to the Baptists.57 Mention has already been made of Eleanor Blackmore, the CAM missionary. Another Baptist, Edward E. Barnes, 54 Nelson, Protestantism in Central America, 29. This is an allusion to the commission Jesus gave to the disciples, as detailed in Acts 1:8. 55 Bastian, ‘Protestantismo Popular y Política en Guatemala y Nicaragua’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 185. 56 The following short history of CAM in Nicaragua is taken from Nelson, Protestantism in Central America; Mildred W. Spain, And in Samaria: A Study of More than Sixty Years’ Missionary Witness in Central America (Dallas: Central American Mission, 1954), 213–258; CAM Bulletin (Dallas: CAM, June 1958); CAM Bulletin (Dallas: CAM: October 1960); and an interview with Ruth Sánchez, a longstanding member of the CAM church in Granada, on 23 May 2004. 57 CIEETS, Caminando, 23.

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was working alone in León in 1911, selling Bibles and sharing his faith in the market place.58 (Barnes later joined the AoG).59 His was the only Protestant witness in León, though two missionaries, possibly Baptists, had worked in the city five years previously.60 In 1911 Eleanor Blackmore began to work with several Baptist missionaries also in the country.61 Later, Blackmore joined José Mendoza to open the First Baptist Church of Managua in 1917 (later led by CEPAD founder Gustavo Parajón). Baptist works were also established in Masaya, Diriamba and León. In 1918 the denomination experienced a setback when Mendoza broke away and formed his own independent Baptist group. Nevertheless, the work continued and by the 1930s Baptist churches led by national pastors had been established in various towns and cities. Cooperation between east and west coast Baptists began in 1932, and by 1936 there were 1810 members in eight churches and preaching points, leading to the creation of the Baptist Convention of Nicaragua in 1937.62 A theological seminary was opened in Masaya in 1941, which has since moved to Managua.63 Because of the 1916 Panamá conference it was some time before other mainstream Protestant denominations began to arrive. By 1936 the Seventh Day Adventists had some 275 members in Nicaragua. They built a hospital in Puerto Cabezas on the Atlantic coast, but sold it to the Moravians in 1956.64 From the 1950s Methodism began to enjoy a sustained presence across the country. The Nazarenes arrived from the U.S. in 1943,65 and Ron Galloway, the son of well-known Nazarene missionaries to Nicaragua, recalls the denomination’s work and mission. 58 As stated by Benno Shoeneich, the first Pentecostal missionary to Nicaragua, during an address to The Stone Church on 28th July 1912, shortly before travelling to Nicaragua to begin his missionary career. The address is printed in full in The Latter Rain Evangel, September 1912. 59 From an English translation of a pamphlet produced by the AoG in 1961, detailing the work of Benno Shoneich’s wife, Rosalie (kindly supplied by the Division of Foreign Missions, Assemblies of God Headquarters, Springfield, Missouri). 60 They moved on after a great deal of opposition and obviously enjoyed little success, because in Barnes’ day there was only one other Protestant believer, an old woman, in León (see the early Pentecostal publication Latter Rain Evangel, September 1912, 15. 61 Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 11. 62 Nelson, Protestantism in Central America, 42–3. 63 For further details of Baptist history in Nicaragua see Melvin Paredes, ‘Testimonio de los inicios de la predicación protestante en el pacífico nicaragüense’, Cuadernos Teológicos (Managua: FEET, March 1990), 3–25. 64 Ibid., 47–48. 65 Roberto Zub K., Oficio y Modelos Pastorales: Análisis y Reflexiones Sociológicas Desde Nicaragua (Managua: CIEETS, 1996), 20.

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This included a Bible college in the Rivas area, from which students evangelised the surrounding areas on horseback. When Galloway left Nicaragua in 1970, he recalled eight churches in Managua, one each in León, Granada, Chinandega, Jinotega and San Isidro. In the south, near Costa Rica, the Nazarenes also had some ten churches in the San Carlos area, and also in Solentiname. Churches were also established in northern Costa Rica along the San Juan River, reaching as far as El Castillo.66 The Nazarenes, then, were predominantly based in Managua and southern Nicaragua. One other development ought to be mentioned at this stage. On 23 December 1972 Managua was destroyed by a massive earthquake that killed thousands and left many more homeless. A few days later, the Baptist and Harvard-trained physician Gustavo Parajón founded CEPAD in order to help the victims.67 Though Parajón had the backing of the Baptist Church (several CEPAD leaders, including Gilberto Aguirre and Sixto Ulloa, were also Baptists) other Christians joined the organisation. A month later, CEPAD changed the D in its name from ‘Damnificados’ (homeless) to ‘Desarrollo’ (aid), thus creating a long-term aid agency. By March 1973 it consisted of twenty denominations. Gilberto Aguirre details how membership came from across the denominational spectrum, including the AoG.68 Rather than simply being a pastoral fraternal, CEPAD was primarily a relief agency sponsored by the churches and concentrating on alleviating the suffering of Nicaragua’s poor. ‘Bring Them In’ 69—The Rise of Nicaraguan Pentecostalism70 Since the 1960s Pentecostalism has enjoyed great success in Nicaragua. Yet its origins and early history there were humble. The first Pentecostal Telephone conversation with Ron Galloway, 21 February 2004. For these details of CEPAD’s early history, see Paul Jeffrey, ed. An Oral History of CEPAD’s Ministry, which was published exclusively on the organisation’s U.S. website (www.cepad.info/report/30th/11/), dated 1992 and last accessed 24 February 2004. 68 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre at CEPAD headquarters, Managua, 26 May 2004. 69 Title of an old revivalist hymn. 70 Though several additional sources are cited in the text, this short history of the AoG in Nicaragua is based on the following materials, mainly denominational pamphlets and tracts long since out of publication, but also some personal papers housed at the AoG archives, Springfield, Missouri: Asambleas de Dios, Doctrinas Fundamentales (Managua: Vida, 2001); Assemblies of God, Nicaragua: Field Informational (Springfield: Assemblies of God, 1960 or later); Assemblies of God, Through Deepest Waters. Heroes of the Conquest Series, No. 17. (Springfield: Assemblies of God, undated, but 1946 66 67

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missionaries, Benno and Rosalie Shoeneich, together with Mary Yaegge, arrived in 1912. At this stage Pentecostalism was an infant movement a decade old, while the AoG, later the largest Pentecostal denomination across the world, did not yet exist.71 Shoeneich, the son of a North American merchant based in Costa Rica, established a base in Matagalpa. This choice of location in the central highlands would later have an important bearing on Pentecostal-Sandinista relations. It took nearly three years to secure their first convert. Their work consisted mainly of selling Bibles, distributing literature and talking with individuals in streets and markets. Their experiences and hardships echoed those of the CAM missionaries, and their reports to churches back home paint a picture of a poor, backward land in the grip of a superstitious, conservative Catholicism run by corrupt clergy. They faced a great deal of Catholic persecution. For example, one local priest publicly denounced the Shoeneichs as ‘the Antichrist and his wife.’72 Priests sometimes led small mobs to stone them, and on one occasion a small explosive device was left on their doorstep, injuring three people.73 Nicaraguan converts to Pentecostalism faced similar trials. Yet the Shoeneichs were not without their successes. One significant conversion was that of General Matute, later the military governor of the region. By 1917, the Shoeneichs saw some modest successes and were joined by several more missionaries. They affiliated themselves with or later); Jack Hunka, The History and Philosophy of the Assemblies of God in Latin America (Bachelor of Divinity thesis, Western Theological Seminary, 1967); Adele Flower Dalton, ‘From These Beginnings’, Mountain Movers (February 1981); Adele Flower Dalton, ‘Then and Now’, Mountain Movers (October 1985); Luisa Jeter de Walker, Siembra y Cosecha (Deerfield: Editorial Vida, 1990); Russell & Gladys Kensinger, Personal Papers (Springfield: Assemblies of God, 1966); Bartolomé Matamorros, Historia de las Asambleas de Dios en Nicaragua (dated 2000. No publisher indicated, but probably by Vida, Managua); Marcia Munger, ‘My Father’s Mantle’, Pentecostal Evangel (6 October 1985); ‘Dedication Pays’, Pentecostal Evangel (25 October 1987; ‘Loss to Missionary Staff ’, Pentecostal Evangel (15 September 1945); ‘Nicaragua: Land of Indigenous Churches’, Pentecostal Evangel (28 January 1962); Gerald Robeson, Faith in Eruption (Monroeville: Banner, 1975); Juan Aguirre Sánchez et al, Testimonio Histórico de las Asambleas de Dios (Undated and no publisher indicated, but probably 1997 by Assemblies of God publisher ‘Vida’, Managua); Ellis Stone, God Has No Borders (Farmington: Ellis Stone, 1999); Loren Triplett, Stopped in His Tracks. (An Assemblies of God Division of Foreign Mission tract, undated). There are also various short reports from the Latter Rain Evangel and the later Pentecostal Evangel too numerous to list here, as well as various personal papers and correspondence from the personal file of missionary Benno Shoeneich housed at Assemblies of God headquarters, Springfield, Illinois. 71 The AoG traces its birth to 1914, though its status and doctrinal position was not finalised until 1918. 72 Pentecostal Evangel, 21 Novermber 1921. 73 Ibid.

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the newly-created AoG, and in 1926 formally joined the denomination. Consequently, the entire work and its property came under the auspices of the denomination. Yet their mission did not experience any major benefit, financial or otherwise, as a result of this affiliation.74 The Shoeneichs’ work in Nicaragua came to an end in 1936. After quarter of a century all they had to show for their efforts were some 50 members distributed among three churches in León, Matagalpa and Estelí.75 That year, the AoG work in Nicaragua was radically reorganised by U.S. missionaries Ralph Williams and Melvyn Hodges, who later became the denomination’s key figures in Central America. Hodges formed the Nicaraguan AoG and, together with José Dolores Barrera and José María Pérez, wrote the new denomination’s first constitution. Williams became the first superintendent. In 1937 Hodges founded a Bible college in León to train indigenous pastors. It opened with sixtrainees and is often cited as an important reason for the denomination’s later growth. Another important development from the denomination’s perspective was the arrival of the missionary Oren Munger in 1942. He is credited with leading a revival in 1944 at El Sauce, which represented a key breakthrough for the denomination. Other missionaries continued to trickle into the country, including Loren Triplett, another well-known AoG missionary to Latin America, who served in Nicaragua from 1954 to 1966.76 Yet another was Lewey Spencer (1964–74), who worked at the Bible institute and evangelised the rural north with his son David. In 1956 and 1957, citywide campaigns hosted by visiting evangelists were organised and many hundreds of Nicaraguans were converted. In the late 1950s a work was also established on the Atlantic Coast, a region ignored by the denomination up until then. By the late 1950s the AoG had 25 organised churches, 40 outstations, and two daily radio broadcasts. By 1961 this had grown to 60 churches and some 2000 members, while radio broadcasts reached 15 hours weekly on the Protestant radio station YNOL.

As detailed in Benno Shoeneich’s personal papers, correspondence and request for financial assistance sent to the AoG headquarters in Springfield, as well as details of financial support they received as published in various editions of the Pentecostal Evangel. 75 Nelson, Protestantism in Central America, 41. 76 Stanley Burgess and Gary McGee, eds. Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 853. 74

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During the 1960s and 1970s, several men became prominent figures within the denomination. These included Oscar Godoy, a criminal who had committed murder before converting and eventually becoming an important leader.77 Another was Carlos Escorcia Sequeira, who established many new churches throughout Nicaragua. Godoy would eventually go on to lead a group of AoG rebels in support of the Sandinista government, working closely with Escorcia’s son, Carlos Escorcia Polanco. Also in the early 1970s, Lewey Spencer’s son, David, became a well-known radio broadcaster on Radio Corporación. His shows were concerned with moral issues, presented very much along the lines of an agony aunt, but which had strong moral and biblical overtones.78 The show became so popular it was aired twice daily and listened to by both Protestants and Catholics. Clifton Holland, a statistical expert on Central American Protestantism, believes the show greatly promoted Evangelicalism.79 It also had an impact elsewhere in Latin America, as evangelists such as Luis Palau and Hermano Pablo emulated Spencer’s format.80 The AoG has always been the biggest Pentecostal group in Nicaragua, and by 1978 it was the second largest Protestant denomination in the country after the Moravians.81 Another Pentecostal denomination is the Church of God, based in Cleveland, Tennessee, which arrived in Nicaragua in 1951.82 It is the second largest Pentecostal church in Nicaragua.83 Smaller Pentecostal denominations include the Iglesia Apostólica de la Fe en Cristo Jesús, which arrived from Mexico in 1948; the Foursquare Church (1949); the Church of God of Prophecy (1965); the Apostolic Church of Christ (1965); the National Apostolic Church (1966), and the Misión Pentecostés de Iglesias Cristianas, founded by Nicaraguans in 1976.84 One important development was a split

77 For details of Godoy’s past, conversion and early ministry within the AoG see Robeson, Faith in Eruption, 83–98. 78 Interview with David Spencer, 8 June 1999, Managua. 79 Clifton Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity—Country Profile: Nicaragua (San José: PROLADES, 1990), 55. 80 Telephone interview with Clifton Holland, 3 March 2004. 81 INDEF and CEPAD, Directorio de Iglesias, Organizaciones y Ministerios del Movimiento Protestante: Nicaragua (Sán José: INDEF, and Managua: CEPAD, 1980), 21, and Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 19. 82 Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones, 20. 83 Telephone conversation with Antonio Martínez, Church of God superintendent, 25 February 2004. Also confirmed in INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias. 84 Adonis Niño Chavarría, ‘Breve historia del movimiento Pentecostal en Nicaragua’

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within the AoG, leading to the formation of several new Pentecostal movements (discussed below). Growth in the 1960s and 1970s After the Second World War Nicaragua increasingly became the focus of new experiments in mass evangelism. Leading these efforts was the Latin America Mission (LAM), which won many new Protestant converts during its 1950–2 campaign. LAM leader Ken Strachan rejected short-term, small-scale evangelism and, motivated by the successes of the 1958 Billy Graham Caribbean crusade, sought to develop a new form of mass evangelism on a national scale. A key element of Strachan’s thinking was to work closely with other denominations (this ecumenism brought him into conflict with CAM). His most notable experiment in Nicaragua was the 1960 Evangelism-in-Depth crusade, which consisted of seven months of concentrated activity, including seminars, Bible studies, training of counsellors, and forging links with local churches. It culminated with a massive crusade in Managua. Some 500 prayer groups were formed, and 2000 believers visited 65,000 homes to distribute 200,000 pieces of literature. As a result some 2,500 people were converted.85 While Strachan was not fully satisfied with this effort, nonetheless it served as a model for Nicaragua and other Latin American countries from the 1960s onwards. The AoG also organised its own city-wide campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s, and soon Nicaraguan Pentecostalism, like elsewhere across the continent, was beginning to grow rapidly. Growth was aided by the use of radio, and a Protestant radio station, YNOL, was established in 1959. Although LAM was the driving force behind the venture, several Evangelical denominations and groups supported and contributed to the project, and by 1960 the station boasted a modern studio, a 15,000 watt transmitter and 305-foot antennae.86 By 1978, then, Protestantism had secured its place in Nicaragua’s religious history. Clifton Holland explains how there are only estimates

in Carmelo Álvarez, ed. Pentecostalismo y Liberación: Una Experiencia Latinoamericana (Sán José, Costa Rica: Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1992), 50. See also Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones, 20. 85 Also detailed in Ruth Tucker, From Jerusalem to Irian Jaya: A Biographical History of Christian Missions (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1983), 463. 86 CAM Bulletin, Dallas (October 1960).

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of Protestant growth prior to 1978,87 when he directed the first detailed survey of Protestant churches and ministers in Nicaragua (carried out in part by CEPAD).88 Yet Holland’s own work, together with other estimates of Protestant growth prior to 1978, yields a significant story. In 1957, Nicaragua had only some 38,000 Protestants represented by 10 denominations,89 but by 1978 this had risen to nearly 70 denominations and groups totalling 80,000 members.90 Neither does this figure include non-member affiliates, which pushes the number of adherents much higher (estimated at three times the number of members).91 In fact, in 1960 Protestants represented about 2% of the population, but one estimate suggests by 1970 this figure had nearly doubled, and by 1980 was approaching 10% of the population92 (then around 2.5 million).93 Some Key Observations The history of Nicaraguan Protestantism yields several important issues that should be highlighted for the purposes of this study, as they have a particularly important bearing on Protestant-Sandinista relations. Dominance of Classical Pentecostalism Prior to the Sandinista revolution, Pentecostalism’s numerical growth had outstripped that of others to become the second-largest Protestant denomination after the Moravians. In 1965, Pentecostals represented some 20% of the Protestant population.94 By 1978 this had risen to 45%, and during this period Clifton Holland describes a “notable shift in the type of church growth”, when Pentecostalism increased at a rate of 13.4% annually, compared with 5.1% for non-Pentecostal

Conversation with Clifton Holland. INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias. 89 CIEETS, Caminando, 28–9. 90 INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias, 25. 91 Conversation with Clifton Holland. 92 Patrick Johnstone and Jason Mandryk, Operation World: 21st Century Handbook CD-ROM (Carlisle: Paternotester, 2001). 93 Jan Lahmeyer, ‘Nicaragua: Historical Demographical Data of the Whole Country’ (23 May 2003), available on the University of Utrecht library website. Accessed on 15 April 2005. http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/Americas/nicaragc.htm. 94 Samandú, ‘El Pentecostalismo en Nicaragua’, Pasos, 2. 87 88

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Protestants.95 Thus, Pentecostalism was particularly strong within Nicaraguan Protestantism even before the revolution, and in 1978 represented the bulk of Evangelicals there. Explosive growth in the 1980s meant Pentecostalism went on to dwarf all other Evangelical groups. It is also important to recognise that the largest Nicaraguan Pentecostal denominations in 1978 onwards were the AoG and the Church of God. Both are classical Pentecostal groups. Thus the majority, by far, of Nicaraguan Pentecostals in the 1980s embraced a classical Pentecostal worldview, including the social, political (or lack of it) and doctrinal baggage that entailed. This is compared with the more progressive, leftist and/or nationalist worldviews demonstrated by Pentecostal groups who are far less influenced by the U.S. variant (for example, Chile), and thus do not necessarily espouse a typically classical position. Hence, while there are, of course, exceptions within the Nicaraguan milieu (as discussed below), Pentecostalism there was quite clearly dominated by classical thinking, and as the Assemblies grew in the 1980s to overtake even the Moravians, it is important to remember that its worldview became the majority position within Evangelicalism. This worldview was transmitted by Pentecostal missionaries. Inevitably, missionary activity tends to expose the indigenous population to an exogenous worldview, social norms and politics. Benjamín Cortés, former president of CEPAD (and now director of CIEETS, a progressive Protestant theological college which has begun to research aspects of Nicaraguan Protestantism) correctly points out Nicaraguan Pentecostalism’s links with the U.S.96 However, it is too simplistic to assume, as some do, that Pentecostalism solely represented an imperialist invasion bent on promoting North American interests (see, for example, the NACLA articles discussed in Chapter 1). Perhaps the fullest expression of this view in the Nicaraguan context was an essay by Paul Jeffrey, entitled “La Otra Invasión” (The Other Invasion).97 Jeffrey, a North American progressive Christian on staff at CEPAD in the 1980s who occasionally now writes for Christianity Today, draws a parallel between the arrival in Nicaragua of the U.S. Marines and the first Pentecostal missionaries in 1912. Thus he argues for two invasions that year, one

Holland. Expanded Status of Christianity, 13–14. Interview with Benjamín Cortés, 26 May 2004, Managua. 97 Paul Jeffrey, ‘The Other Invasion: Nicaragua’s Evangelical Church and the U.S. Low-Intensity War.’ The version referred to here was kindly e-mailed by Paul Jeffrey and appeared in The CEPAD Report, July–August 1989. 95 96

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military, the other cultural. The article greatly inflamed the Nicaraguan AoG, leading to their withdrawal from CEPAD in the mid-1980s.98 One must take care not to assume that links with the AoG headquarters (or any other denominational headquarters in the U.S. for that matter) necessarily imply a close association with U.S. foreign policy or vision of society. Neither does being an Evangelical necessarily mean full and complete agreement with all views purported to come from the religious right. Moreover, to suggest the arrival of Pentecostalism in Nicaragua somehow represented an invasion is disingenuous. One need only look at the hardships and failures of the Shoeneichs’ work to see that this was certainly not the case. In fact, it was not until 1937, when Melvyn Hodges reorganised the work that the denomination began to grow, albeit slowly at first. Jeffrey, among others on the religious left, is also keen to point out how such groups received substantial funding from the U.S. which aided growth. Yet the Shoneichs’ regular financial reports, requests for additional funding, and details of the monthly support accorded the Shoeneichs was among the lowest received by AoG missionaries throughout the world.99 It also appears Benno Shoeneich was hoping for an injection of funds when he applied for full missionary status with the AoG in 1925. On his application, he was asked if he would be prepared to avoid business entanglements and financial speculations. He responded in the affirmative, providing funds were forthcoming from the U.S.100 But apparently funds did not materialise, helping to explain why he eventually engaged in financial speculation, buying properties in Nicaragua using the power of attorney he exercised on behalf of the denomination to raise funds.101 This, together with a personal scandal, ended Shoeneich’s missionary work in Nicaragua. Other personal papers belonging to AoG missionaries to Nicaragua during the 1950s also detail constant attempts to raise money for the denomination’s work there.102 Again, funds were not always forthcom98 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (Assemblies of God superintendent), 29 May 1999, Managua, and telephone interview with former superintendent Bartolomé Matamoros, 26 February 2004. Both refer to the original publication date in 1985, when they say the denomination withdrew from CEPAD. 99 Various papers from Benno Shoeneich’s personal file, together with reports in the Latter Rain Evangel and Pentecostal Evangel. 100 From Benno Shoeneich’s original application for recognition as an AoG missionary, 30th September 1925. 101 As detailed in an undated note in Shoeneich’s file, written by Melvyn Hodges. 102 A whole range of financial records, including correspondence, furlough reports, accounts and requests for funding between the AoG missions department and others

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ing as expected. This puts to rest the notion that the AoG, at least in the Nicaraguan context, somehow represented a cultural or political force that enjoyed substantial funding from the U.S. in order to secure a bridgehead. Such views, often voiced by the left, all too often meld U.S. religion and politics. While this has undoubtedly been the case on occasion, it is not always so. Such arguments are also somewhat disingenuous. After all, CEPAD received substantial overseas financial support, much of which was channelled directly into Sandinista social programs.103 There is also evidence to suggest the AoG genuinely attempted to indigenise the work in Nicaragua. When they reorganised it, Melvyn Hodges and Ralph Williams sought to establish a self-sufficient, national movement, without the need for external backing.104 Their missiology was strongly shaped by the writings of Roland Allen, who emphasised a shift towards indigenising missionary work.105 Hodges was keen to build a national church, and when he took over the Nicaraguan AoG work “he began to redirect the church polity from a paternalistic structure, dependent upon American financial assistance, to one based on indigenous church principles”.106 It is not surprising, then, that during the 1950s the number of U.S. missionaries within the AoG rarely surpassed more than a dozen. Instead, the work by the national movement continued to grow and strengthen, and by 1962 all of the country’s AoG churches were pastored by nationals. Nevertheless, North American missionaries retained several key leadership roles within the Assemblies, which caused some problems later on. Benjamín Cortés refers to a group that broke away from the AoG in the 1950s, which he labels ‘Creole’ Pentecostals, in the sense that they were a home-spun variety. They emphasised nationalism and the severing of ties with foreign missionaries.107 This group formed the Iglesia Pentecostal Unida, a nationalist Pentecostal movement which,

seeking to raise funds for the Nicaraguan mission. The items are too numerous to list here. 103 This is discussed later. 104 See Hunka, History and Philosophy, and also Melvyn Hodges, The Indigenous Church (Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 1953). 105 Williams and Hodges were encouraged by Noel Perkin, AoG Missions Coordinator at the time, to read Allen’s books, hence their shift towards indigenisation (see Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal, 710). 106 Ibid., 404. 107 Interview with Benjamín Cortés.

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according to Cortés, accorded some support to the Sandinistas when they came to power. The original breakaway of 14 national pastors is detailed in several AoG pamphlets. Former Assemblies superintendent Bartolomé Matamoros details doctrinal issues that caused the split, but singled out especially their nationalist tendencies, explaining their resentment towards foreigners who held several key administrative positions. In the end, 16 churches broke away in the north and north-east of the country, near the Atlantic. By 1970 Matamoros states they had 60 congregations and 3000 members. He also explains how the younger ministers later disagreed with their older counterparts, forming yet another breakaway group, the Misión Pentecostés de Iglesias Unidas.108 Yet the 1978 census of churches and ministries demonstrates both these groups were relatively small.109 Resentment towards missionaries was not unique. The AoG was deeply hurt by an article written by Carlos Escorcia Jr. (son of the famous church planter) in 1975, with the collaboration of co-rebels Oscar Godoy and Miguel Angel Casco, entitled El imperialismo misionero (‘Missionary Imperialism’). The article suggested foreign missionaries lived like kings, drawing a parallel between the living standards of a missionary and a national leader.110 Escorcia’s nationalist and leftist tendencies are likely the result of spending time at Ernesto Cardenal’s liberation theology Solentiname community.111 Nonetheless, it demonstrates how some viewed the missionaries, together with the key roles they held. For example, former Church of God superintendent Bienvenido López explained how, up to the early 1970s, all the denomination’s key administrative roles were held by North Americans: “We did not elect from among the Nicaraguans, they all came from Cleveland”.112 Rodolfo Fonseca, a Church of God pastor who later became superintendent, expressed frustration at the prominence of foreign missionaries.113 (Interestingly, Fonseca was a first cousin of the Sandinista comandante Walter Ferrety, which is discussed briefly later).

Matamorros, Historia de las Asambleas, 67–68. INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias. 110 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco, 24 May 2004, Managua. 111 Interview with David Spencer, 24–25 May 2004, Managua. Carlos Escorcia says he only spent a short time in Solentiname, and only about half-an-hour with Cardenal (e-mail correspondence, 30 December 2004). 112 Interview with Bienvenido López, 8 June 1999, Managua. 113 Tom Minnery, ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua’, Christianity Today, 8 April 1983, 34–5, 38–42. 108 109

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Even the Baptists, who early on sought to rely less on their missionaries,114 faced a similar split over missionary influence, leading to a breakaway group forming the Church of Christ.115 In summary, then, prior to the revolution classical Pentecostalism represented a major force within Protestantism, and was dominant within Evangelicalism. Their U.S. roots also helped influence their worldview. Benjamín Cortés regards the Church of God as more progressive than the Assemblies.116 This is supported somewhat by an analysis of their voting patterns within Managua in the 1990 elections, which demonstrates they supported the Sandinistas in slightly greater numbers than the AoG.117 However, the same voting research also makes clear that the majority of the denomination rejected the Sandinistas, indicating that the classical Pentecostal anti-communist world view still played a central role in their thinking. It is also true that before and during the Sandinista period there was a nationalist, non-U.S. aligned Pentecostal movement that had broken away from the classical movement. However, its size must be kept in perspective. They did not represent, as they do in Chile, anything like the majority view. When asked about their strength in relation to the others, Benjamín Cortés explained that no surveys had been carried out, but he estimated them at about 30% or so of Pentecostals during the Sandinista period.118 According to Clifton Holland’s figures, they represented a far smaller proportion in 1978.119 Therefore, one must take care not to overemphasise their strength. But they do represent an important development because it helps to explain why some Pentecostals supported the Frente in the 1980s.

Geographical and Class Distribution Historically, Nicaraguan Pentecostalism, especially the AoG, has drawn its greatest support in the central and northern regions, in the rural

114 115 116 117 118 119

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Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 12–13. Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 38. Interview with Benjamín Cortés. ZUB, Roberto. Protestantismo y Elecciones en Nicaragua. Managua: CIEETS, 1993. Interview with Benjamín Cortés. For a breakdown, see Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 18–19.

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areas, and from among the poor. The Shoeneichs chose Matagalpa as their base, which had a major bearing on future expansion as they concentrated on evangelising that region.120 As well as establishing work in León and Estelí, they travelled around the country by mule, visiting some of the country’s remotest areas to distribute literature and share their faith. In 1917 they claimed to have covered some 1400 miles up and down the country this way, traversing mountains and jungle, sleeping in hammocks and cooking by campfire.121 AoG historian Luisa de Jeter describes extensive ministry in this northern mountainous region.122 After the Shoeneichs left Nicaragua, missionary efforts remained concentrated in the central and northern highlands. The AoG literature cited above details how it was not until the late 1960s that work began in earnest in the south and elsewhere. The late 1930s marked a sustained missionary effort in the highlands after Melvyn Hodges’ arrival. Works were established after small revivals in La Garita, Matagalpa, in 1939 and the mountains of Pancasán in 1940. This outpost led to further works in Vilwas, El Cacao, Vijaguas, Jinotega and the whole department of Zelaya, Esquipulas, Nagarote, and an important revival at El Sauce, led by Oren Munger (see above). Consequently, AoG nationals were motivated to evangelise in many new areas, and it was ultimately the central mountain region which received the most attention.123 In the 1940s, Estelí also played a key role in launching sustained missionary efforts throughout Nueva Segovia, and by the 1950s the work was divided into three regions: León-Managua, Matagalpa and Estelí. Carlos Escorcia Sequeira was instrumental in pioneering and pastoring many of the new churches, including works in Sebaco, Rama, Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas, among others. Escorcia, together with José María Pérez, was also credited with planting the first church in Managua. His son, Carlos Escorcia Polanco described how, by 1977, his father had founded 23 AoG local congregations throughout the country.124 Roberto Miranda, Marcelo Dávila and Oscar Godoy were also involved in this widespread church planting and evangelistic activity. Pentecostal Evangel, 25 October 1987. Latter Rain Evangel, September 1917, and Pentecostal Evangel, 18 August 1917. 122 Various descriptions of missionary work in the mountains are littered throughout her section on Nicaragua. 123 Assemblies of God, Nicaragua: Field Informational (Springfield: Assemblies of God), 10. 124 Telephone interview with Carlos Escorcia, 29 February 2004. 120 121

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Further works were added in Waspan in 1961, Granada (1968), Masaya (1971), and also Ometepe and San Juan del Sur in the early 1970s. Thus, by 1978, when Clifton Holland’s church survey was carried out, the AoG was represented throughout the whole of Nicaragua. Much more importantly, however, was its very strong concentration in the central and northern highlands, including along the Honduran border. Arnulfo Sánchez was an assistant pastor in Jalapa (close to Honduras) shortly before the revolution, and confirms various AoG churches there at that time. He also highlights how the denomination enjoyed its greatest strength in the departments of Matagalpa, Jinotega, Estelí, parts of Nueva Segovia, Madríz, and the northern Atlantic Coast region. Thus, numerically, the denomination was strongest by far in the north before and during the Sandinista period.125 As well as this numerical strength in the north, denominational literature often describes the essentially rural areas where evangelism was carried out. One U.S. missionary, writing in the 1950s, stated: There is a great expanse of mountains, hills, and plains, mostly covered with dense jungles. Very few towns exist out there but yet many, many people live there, raising their crops of coffee, cocoa, corn, beans, and many other staple crops.126

Others similarly describe rural ministry, as well as evangelism in tiny villages and comarcas.127 The Norwegian missionary Burger Sandli details the remote nature of these tiny agricultural communities scattered throughout the mountains and the various small AoG churches he saw when he moved to Waslala, north of Matagalpa, in 1988.128 To illustrate the isolated and small nature of such communities, it is worth considering an actual example. Arnulfo Sánchez refers to his work in an AoG church in a small rural comunidad (the smallest unit above a barrio), near Wiwili, in the Rio Coco area. Wiwili itself was not even founded until the 1920s, and it was only in the 1960s that a road was built to it and several small businesses began to move in. Yet Sánchez was not even based in the small town of Wiwili itself, but rather, at one of its fifty or so communities, each with no more than several hundred Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez, 25 May 2004, Managua. Stone, God Has No Borders, 81. 127 Some details of Munger’s work are detailed in several of the AoG publications already cited. The tract Through Deepest Water and Matamoros’ Historia de las Asambleas, 27, specifically refer to evangelism in tiny villages and comarcas. 128 Interview with Burger Sandli, 7 June 1999, Managua. 125 126

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people, scattered across the mountains.129 Such communities were, and still are, often totally cut off from main communication routes and other infrastructure. Neither was such Pentecostal outreach limited to the AoG. Other Pentecostal groups were also represented strongly in the northern and mountainous regions. Bienvenido López, of the Church of God, describes his itinerant work in the north, where his denomination had many churches.130 Burger Sandli, who worked for some years in the central highlands, estimated that at least 60% of churches in the north were Pentecostal.131 Meanwhile, the current president of CNPEN, Norman Marenco drew me a rough map of Nicaragua, dividing it into three broad areas: The Pacific, Caribbean and Northern regions, explaining how Evangelical, mainly Pentecostal churches had always been strongest in the northern region, along the Honduran border, both before and during the Sandinista period.132 All this is confirmed by Clifton Holland’s own statistical survey which, in 1978, numbers Evangelicals at some 55% of the total number of Protestants in the northern and mountainous regions.133 Of course, the explosive growth of Pentecostalism in the 1980s compared with all other denominations raised that proportion considerably by the mid-1980s. It is ironic that the north is also where Augusto Sandino drew his support from among the peasants. Much has been made of how Pentecostals sought Sandino’s help against violent Catholics, leading him to give them a flag to serve as a sign that they were under his protection.134 Yet this was undoubtedly an isolated case; Sandino’s hatred of North Americans is well documented; those falling into his hands were usually assassinated. (For example, in 1931 a Moravian missionary was shot because he was believed to be a U.S. citizen.)135 For this reason, Shoeneich, whose mission also involved ministering among the occu-

129 For a full and comprehensive demographic breakdown of the Wiwili district, visit http://www.pinoleros.com/municipios/nsegovia/wi.htm, maintained by Los Pinoleros, a Nicaraguan web portal. Any figures cited are from 2004–5. The figures would have been lower in the 1970s. Accessed on 6 Jan. 2005. 130 Interview with Bienvenido López. 131 Interview with Burger Sandli. 132 Interview with Norman Marenco, 19 May 2004, Managua. 133 Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 14. 134 Matamorros, Historia de las Asambleas, 37. 135 For details of this event, see Volker Wunderlich, Sandino en la Costa (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1989), 67–83.

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pying U.S. Marines based at Matagalpa, regarded him as a threat.136 One of their letters back home denounced the ‘reds’, whose activities were severely affecting their small, fragile works in several towns.137 Another stated: “We have our house filled with women and children seeking protection under our beloved U.S. flag.”138 In yet another, Mrs Shoeneich refers to increasing dangers and how her husband nearly fell into the guerrillas’ hands.139 The class base where Pentecostalism was strongest is also significant. Most of the people in these northern and rural areas were campesinos, poor peasants eking a living on farmsteads and small patches of land, growing staples such as beans and corn. Miguel Angel Casco, one of the AoG rebels, confirmed that in Nicaragua the Pentecostals draw heavily from the poor, and always have done.140 Burger Sandli also states: The Asambleas de Dios have always been the poor man’s church, going in to the poor areas, especially everywhere out in the agricultural areas where the poor people are living. That’s where the AoG have mostly recruited their members . . . 90% of membership comes from the poor areas.141

Others concur. Former superintendent of the AoG, Roberto Rojas (now president of the Nicaraguan Evangelical Alliance) declared that Pentecostalism had always been strong among the poor classes in Nicaragua.142 Bob Trolese, a missionary from the Verbo group, which counts former Guatemalan leader Efraín Ríos Montt among its members (Trolese is a personal friend of Montt’s) who arrived in Nicaragua in 1980, explained how “all the dirt-poor churches on the corners, they are all Pentecostal.”143 Alfonso Mejilla, a Pentecostal pastor who worked in the north in the 1980s in Jalapa, also stated Pentecostalism enjoyed strong support among the poor.144 Meanwhile, some of the literature reviewed in the last chapter, for example Roger Lancaster’s 136 Letter from William Berry of the United States Marine Corps headquarters, Matagalpa (21 December 1927) addressed to Noel Perkin, head of the Assemblies of God’s Foreign Missions Department. The letter, in response to correspondence from Perkin, details briefly the Shoeneichs’ work among the Marines. 137 Pentecostal Evangel, 16 April 1927. 138 Latter Rain Evangel, May 1927. 139 Latter Rain Evangel, February 1932. 140 Telephone interview with Miguel Angel Casco, 6 February 2004. 141 Interview with Burger Sandli. 142 Interview with Roberto Rojas, 28 May 1999. 143 Interview with Bob Trolese, 1 June 1999, Managua. 144 Interview with Alfonso Mejilla, 8 June 1999, Managua.

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study, expressly points out how Pentecostalism has enjoyed support within the poorest barrios. Various other studies concur (see also the concluding chapter). These geographical and class features of Pentecostalism prior to the revolution are significant and have a vital bearing on ProtestantSandinista relations. It is surely significant that in the two main regions where the Sandinistas faced their greatest opposition and threat—the Atlantic coast and the northern highlands—a religious tradition dominated each. On the Atlantic coast, Moravian hegemony unified the Miskitos in the face of the Miskito-Sandinista war, while the northern and central highland regions, where the Contra war was fought, were dominated by Pentecostalism. As discussed later, many Pentecostals supported the Contras ideologically, and some even took up arms and joined the rebels. Two Emerging Theologies One further development within Protestantism prior to 1979 should be mentioned. By 1979 when the revolution occurred, two diametricallyopposed theological emphases had quite clearly begun to emerge within Protestantism. On the one hand, the majority, represented by classical Pentecostalism, offered an otherworldly, evangelistic, apolitical and wholly spiritual gospel. On the other, a minority position, represented by historic Protestant denominations, mainly Baptists, and expressed through CEPAD, leaned strongly towards a this-worldly, ecumenical, social and political gospel. Of course, there were exceptions within both camps. However, the above serves as a useful generalisation of what was happening within Protestantism. From a quite early stage, the Baptists had emphasised a strong social dimension in their endeavours, building schools, a hospital, and working with the poor.145 As early as 1967 CEPAD’s progenitor, the Baptist medical agency PROVADENIC (headed by CEPAD founder Gustavo Parajón), was engaged in social work in rural areas mostly among the campesinos and the poor.146 Parajón was the personal physician of Ron Galloway, the Nazarene missionary (see above), who recalls Parajón’s strong interest in helping the poor. Galloway was also struck by how

See Haslam, Faith in Struggle, for a discussion of the Baptist work, 37–39. Gustavo Parajón, ‘La Iglesia Evangélica en el Proyecto Nacional: Entrevista con Gustavo Parajón’, Xilotl 3 ( July 1989), 95–108. 145 146

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Parajón, who married a North American and studied medicine in the U.S., chose to return to Nicaragua. Galloway’s own doctoral studies were in biculturalism and assimilation, so he regarded Parajón’s actions as unusual for first generation emigrants, most of whom choose to remain in the richer country.147 Thus, it is clear that Parajón’s theology was shaped by a concern for the poor at that time when, across the continent, liberation theology was fast gaining ground. Subsequently, CEPAD concentrated its efforts on social programmes. Parajón himself states: “From ’73 to ’79, nearly all our work was in the rural zones”.148 It may be that this Baptist emphasis on social concern and praxis, compared with other groups (especially Pentecostals), was due to a different theological approach at their own college. The Baptists had opened a theological seminary, while the Pentecostals opened a training centre aimed at providing basic preaching, leadership and church planting skills. Clifton Holland has also highlighted how many Pentecostals had very little or no formal training.149 Several of those interviewed within the movement confirmed this. For example, Rufino Soza, a pastor who established several churches in OPEN 3 (later renamed Ciudad Sandino), the huge shantytown outside Managua created for the homeless after the 1972 earthquake, admits that “When I began (pastoring) I didn’t know how to read.”150 Miguel Angel Casco also details a lack of theological education when he first worked as an evangelist. He later went to study at the Baptist theological seminary, leading to an increasing progressive emphasis that brought him into conflict with conservatives within the AoG.151 The radicalisation of Nicaraguan Baptists is well-attested, and it was Baptist youth who were most active in the lead-up to the revolution, even taking up arms during the final insurrection against Somoza.

Interview with Ron Galloway. Gustavo Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North (30th Report) 2002, 3, published on CEPAD’s North American website (http://www.cepad.info/ report/30th/03/ last accessed 24 February 2004). 149 Interview with Clifton Holland. 150 Interview with Rufino Soza. 151 Conversation with Miguel Angel Casco (May 2004). 147 148

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CHAPTER THREE

NATURE OF SOMOZA-PROTESTANT RELATIONS An essential aspect of any investigation into the nature and dynamics of Protestant-Sandinista relations is an understanding of the nature of relations between Somoza and Protestants (especially Evangelicals), which in turn permits a comparison of how relations changed with the arrival of the Sandinista. This is a necessary and important exercise, as it is natural and inevitable that Protestants (or any other constituency) would compare their situation before and after the revolution in order to establish any improvements or otherwise. Consequently, the perceived differences in Evangelicals’ minds between both regimes would itself have some bearing on their opinions of the Sandinista government, which in turn helps to explain the dynamics of Evangelical-Sandinista relations. This brief chapter, then, seeks to provide some data on churchstate relations prior to the fall of the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979. It is divided into three sections. The first provides a short but useful historical background, detailing the rise, rule and final overthrow of the Somoza dynasty, as well as considering very briefly the Somozas’ relations with the Catholic Church to shed some light on the dynasty’s view of religion as a whole. Part two discusses what little evidence is currently available in order to ascertain the nature of EvangelicalSomoza relations. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief examination of the charge that Evangelicals in some way represented a prop for the existing social and political order, as some have argued (see chapter 1), and which requires some discussion before moving on to explain the nature of Protestant-Sandinista relations in the next chapter. The Somoza Dynasty1 As stated previously, much of the period following full independence in 1838 was marked by instability and violence as Liberals 1 This short historical survey draws on the following sources: Defpar, Encyclopaedia of Latin America; Stephen Kinzer, Blood of Brothers (New York: Putnam, 1991); Smith, Nicaragua: Self-Determination; Knut Walter, The Regime of Anastasio Somoza, 1936–1956

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and Conservatives struggled for power. The old Conservative-Liberal enmity resurfaced during the presidency of Liberal strongman José Santos Zelaya, while Zelaya’s outspoken nationalism eventually led Washington to side with his Conservative opponents. By collaborating with the U.S. the Conservatives held on to power until 1926, and in 1925, with the help of U.S. military instructors, set up the GN, which would eventually play a major role in Nicaraguan history. Further strife and violence between Conservatives and Liberals in 1926 led to a U.S.-brokered peace deal (the Pact of Espino Negro), which required both sides to lay down their arms. Though the Liberals agreed, one rebel Liberal general, Augusto Sandino, refused to sign the agreement. Instead, he established a nationalist peasant guerrilla army to oust the Conservatives and U.S. forces. At this time a rising star within the Liberal party, Anastasio ‘Tacho’ Somoza García, became leader of the GN. In 1933 the U.S. withdrew from Nicaragua for good. Sandino now agreed to a truce, but insisted the GN, which he regarded as a U.S. instrument, should be disbanded. Somoza had Sandino assassinated, wiped out his army, and over the following years succeeded in taking over Nicaragua, becoming President in 1937. He would rule Nicaragua, either as President or through puppet leaders, until his assassination in 1956. Anastasio Somoza was succeeded by his son Luis Somoza Debayle, while his other son, Anastasio ‘Tachito’ Somoza Debayle, assumed leadership of the GN. The younger Anastasio was particularly cruel and repressive. With the death of Luis from ill health, he took over the presidency in 1967, while also retaining control of the GN. Somoza grew rich from his appropriation of international aid sent in response to the 1972 earthquake, and such corruption led to widespread resentment. After a popular insurrection Somoza fled the country in 1979. He was assassinated in Paraguay in 1980. Somoza-Catholic Relations Catholic-state relations during the Somoza dynasty can be divided into two stages. The first covers the period of the first two Somoza dictators (Anastasio Snr. and Luis), roughly to the late 1960s. During this time, church-state relations were generally cordial and the Cath(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); and Williamson. The Penguin History of Latin America.

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olic Church enjoyed a privileged position within society among a parish consisting predominantly of Nicaragua’s elites. Clifton Holland writes: Under the Somozas, the fact that the Nicaraguan Catholic Church was not constitutionally a State Church did not pose problems in its relations with the government. In fact, the Catholic religion was recognised in practice and it received certain privileges.2

Dennis Gilbert states that during this period the church generally shunned politics, limiting its political activity to a denunciation of atheistic communism, and consequently expressing support for Somoza, who was seen as God’s political agent for that moment in time.3 While several bishops openly opposed Somoza, Gilbert believes the majority of them held the Somozas in a “fawning embrace”, even honoring Anastasio Somoza’s teenage daughter at a ceremony held at the National Stadium in 1942, and also burying the dictator, who was not a particularly religious man, with high Catholic honors. The Archbishop of Managua offered two days’ indulgences for those who prayed for the dictator’s soul. Phillip Berryman suggests that throughout Anastasio Somoza’s dictatorship, the Catholic Church “served symbolically to legitimate the Somoza rule,” albeit unintentionally.4 Meanwhile, according to Michael Gismondi the situation remained more or less the same under Luis Somoza, who promoted the church but also sought to control it.5 Michael Dodson cites a 1962 report, detailing how the church was blind to social problems, unloved, virtually absent in the countryside, and aligned with a regime hated by the people.6 Thus the church, in a sense, represented one of the Somozan pillars of power, similar to its counterpart in Franco’s Spain (though arguably Franco was more religious than the Somozas). The second stage of Catholic-state relations was during the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a period when initial tensions by grassroots Catholics eventually culminated in widespread open criticism and support for the insurrection by Nicaragua’s bishops. The souring

Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 29. Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 130–31. 4 Berryman, Religious Roots, 54. 5 Michael Gismondi, ‘Transformations in the Holy’, Latin American Perspectives 50 (Summer 1986), 24. 6 Dodson and Montgomery, ‘The Churches in the Nicaraguan Revolution,’ in Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution, 162. 2 3

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of relations was for two reasons. Firstly, Anastasio’s dictatorship was far more brutal and corrupt than Luis Somoza’s, so that many more Nicaraguans suffered great economic hardship. Also, from the late 1960s onwards Catholicism was increasingly influenced by the Second Vatican Council, which emphasised social concerns, and the bishops’ conference in Medellín, Colombia, which sought a practical outworking of that theology. Both paved the way for liberation theology, whose condemnation of unjust social structures brought militant priests on a collision course with the regime. This grassroots movement found much support among the population and church in the wake of the 1972 earthquake. A combination of suffering and hardship, Somoza’s appropriation of international aid, and a growing radicalised clergy all converged to create a rift between the regime and many within the church. Consequently, Dodd argues that the church, as a place of refuge, became the focus of unwelcome GN attention.7 After the earthquake, the church hierarchy, too, became increasingly critical of the regime, especially Obando y Bravo, a Salesian who was appointed Archbishop in 1970. Stephen Kinzer believes Obando was noted more as a practitioner than an intellectual, which led Somoza not to oppose his appointment. (Somoza referred to him as “mi indito,” ‘my little Indian’).8 But he would soon regret the appointment of the Archbishop, as Obando became increasingly critical of the regime. For example, Somoza offered him co-leadership of a relief organisation after the earthquake, but Obando rejected the offer, believing the dictator had larceny in mind. He also sold an expensive car that had been a gift from Somoza and used the proceeds to help the poor. Kinzer demonstrates how Obando was also instrumental in helping to publicise the seizure of Parliament by Edén Pastora by smuggling out rolls of film taken of the operation, and acting as mediator between the regime and the FSLN. The pictures were then published in La Prensa, which helped to shoot the Sandinistas to fame.9 As the political situation worsened in Nicaragua, Obando and the bishops became increasingly critical of the regime, and towards the end, they issued a joint statement supporting the insurrection. Sandinista sympathisers have suggested the

7 8 9

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Ibid., 163. Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, 194–6. Ibid., 41.

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bishops had no choice but to support a popular uprising, but it does seem likely that Obando represented a genuine voice for justice after the 1972 earthquake. Did the church suffer actual repression under the Somozas? Though relations were not particularly strong, they were cordial, especially up to the late 1960s, and the regime did not concern itself with Church affairs or impinge upon its freedom. Commenting on church-state relations under the Sandinistas, Bismarco Carballo, the priest filmed naked running through the streets (see Chapter 1), stated that the church had fared far better during 45 years of Somozas than during just five years of Sandinista rule.10 Another interesting testimony comes from Harold Robleto, originally from a strongly conservative, Catholic family known for its strong and vocal opposition of Somoza (the family home was raided by the GN on one occasion). The family went on to support the Sandinista rebels, and several served as Sandinista officials. Yet Robleto, now an Evangelical pastor, stated that Somoza, for all his faults and brutality, always respected religion.11 Tensions did not materialise until the second half of Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s dictatorship. In the 1970s as the regime faced increasing opposition from insurgents, the GN cracked down on militant Catholic priests who were seen to be part of the rebel movement. Somoza-Protestant Relations In his 1980 survey of Nicaraguan Protestantism, statistician Clifton Holland, states: Under the Somoza dynasty, Protestant denominations benefited from the principal of separation of Church and State, with the constitution guaranteeing religious freedom to all Nicaraguan citizens and to foreign residents. Consequently, most Protestant groups grew unhindered . . . supported by constitutional law and the power of the civil authorities. The Nicaraguan police were occasionally called in to protect Protestant missionaries or national believers from religious persecution by fanatical Catholic mobs . . . Protestants, in general, felt that the civil authorities were “ordained of God” for the common good and could be counted on for protection in times of crises.12

10 11 12

In Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind Of Revolution, 14. Interview with Harold Robleto, 19 May 2004, Managua. Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 14–5.

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Though arguably this was not quite the case during the dictatorships of Anastasio and Luis Somoza (see discussion below), a number of first-hand accounts by Nicaraguan Evangelicals confirm that, on the whole, the majority of them genuinely believed they enjoyed more freedom and suffered no harassment under the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, compared with under the Sandinistas. Félix Rosales, president of CNPEN in the 1980s, told Christianity Today that prior to 1979 the situation was far better as far as personal and religious freedom were concerned.13 When interviewed by David Haslam, Rosales elaborated further, declaring that Evangelicals were free in Somoza’s day because the government did not spy on them.14 Saturnino Cerrato, superintendent of the AoG, was adamant that under the old regime, though corrupt, there was no limitation on Pentecostal activity whatsoever. Neither was there any repression or interference of any kind.15 Meanwhile, another leading Evangelical, Guillermo Ayala (currently Managua’s CNPEN leader and one of various high-profile leaders arrested and held at the infamous El Chipote DGSE centre in November 1985) believes the approach of Somoza and the Sandinistas towards the church were poles apart. The latter, he believes, were bound to follow a more interventionist agenda due to their Marxist-Leninist ideology.16 Yet another Protestant leader, Moravian pastor Norman Bent, explained how the Moravian church on the Atlantic coast suffered little interference from Somoza and his government. Moreover, if ever there were isolated incidents with local military officials, the Moravian missionaries would always speak to Somoza, who would attempt to satisfy any concerns they had.17 These testimonies are also supported by grassroots Evangelicals from that time. For example, Mario Espinoza, CNPEN president in the late 1990s but an Evangelical youth worker during the Somoza regime, stated categorically that the Somoza regime had never imposed limitations of any kind upon evangelistic activity:

13 14 15 16 17

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Ron Lee, ‘Ministry Amid Adversity’ in Christianity Today, 6 February 1987, 32. Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 80. Interview with Saturnino Cerrato. Interview with Guillermo Ayala, 31 May 1999, Managua. Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 171ff.

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We were fully free to do carry out any activity in the open. Even during the Bible Day celebrations, the police were very helpful, every year sending the best officers to help organize and patrol the marches . . . We had total liberty. Pastors were very well-respected.18

AoG pastor Alfonso Mejilla also confirmed there was no limit on church activity. It was only with the arrival of the Sandinistas that their activities, such as open air evangelism, were curtailed and controlled.19 Roberto Rojas, currently President of the Alianza Evangélica de Nicaragua (Nicaraguan Evangelical Alliance) and former vice-superintendent of the AoG, maintains that under Somoza there were religious liberties that did not exist under the Sandinistas. There was nothing to obstruct religious freedom, whether Catholic or Protestant: “We always enjoyed the freedom to do as we pleased.”20 Meanwhile, Rufino Soza, who since 1973 has pastored in Ciudad Sandino, felt that, on the whole, Evangelicals were far better off under Somoza, both in terms of personal freedom as well as financially, than under the Sandinistas. Another Evangelical, Juan Reyes (a teenager during Somoza’s regime) recalls no problem experienced by his church at the hands of the authorities.21 Meanwhile, the Nazarene missionary Ron Galloway describes complete freedom for the Nazarenes to do as they wished and go about their business without any interference.22 Even CEPAD director Gilberto Aguirre, who had no love for Somoza, stated: He was an intelligent man, educated in the U.S. at West Point. He recognised the value of the Protestants, and the strength of their voice, the pressure they could bring to bear, in the U.S. So much so that when there were stories of torture in his regime, he asked the Baptists to go to Washington, to President Jimmy Carter, who was himself a Baptist, to explain that no such things were happening. He invited three Baptist leaders to go.23

Moreover, the pro-Sandinista AoG rebel Carlos Escorcia Polanco, who had links with Ernesto Cardenal’s Solentiname community, states categorically that he was “never mistreated physically or in any other way

18 19 20 21 22 23

Interview with Mario Espinoza, 28 May 1999, Managua. Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. Interview with Roberto Rojas. Interview with Juan Reyes, 23 May 2004, Granada. Conversation with Ron Galloway. Interview with Gilberto Aguirre.

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by Somoza’s people”, even though Solentiname faced brutal military sanctions.24 When considering these first-hand accounts, it is important not to interpret them as support for the old regime. Many of those above condemned in the strongest terms the abuses and corruption of Somoza. Neither were they keen simply to suggest that everything under the old regime was rosy and unproblematic so as to demonise the Sandinistas. For example, Saturnino Cerrato, who experienced some harassment at the hands of the Sandinistas, was in some ways quite generous towards them during his interview, recognising some of their positive policies. Throughout the interview he sought to be fair and balanced, even stating that allegations of repression of Pentecostals by Sandinistas in Managua were sometimes exaggerated, and suggesting the church’s situation there could have been much worse. Thus, he did not use the interview to besmirch the Sandinista government for the sake of it, which makes his testimony all the more compelling. It is interesting that several Protestants favourable towards the Sandinistas also refer to Cerrato’s moderate position, compared with other conservative Protestants.25 Roberto Rojas, too, had no love for Somoza, describing him as “the head of an illegal government,” and himself as a “collaborator in the struggle against Somoza.”26 Neither did Norman Bent allow the 1982 Miskito-Sandinista war, during which his own Moravian constituency suffered greatly, to taint his views when discussing these matters. Instead, he expressed some sympathy towards the Sandinistas, explaining that the Moravians prayed for Somoza’s downfall and welcomed it.27 Thus, these accounts of greater church freedom under Somoza are far from uncritical about the nature of his regime. Most were glad to see him go. Even Rufino Soza, who believes the economic situation was far better under Somoza, recognised he was a harsh, brutal and corrupt dictator. Freedom for Protestants under Somoza is confirmed elsewhere. David Stoll details how Somoza permitted open air activity, regarding

24 25 26 27

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Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence, 30 December 2004. For example, see my interview with CEPAD’s Benjamín Cortés. Interview with Roberto Rojas. Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 172.

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it as a harmless diversion for the poor.28 The Iglesia Misión Cristiana (Christian Mission Church) was permitted to engage in mission and social outreach in Nicaragua’s prisons during the 1960s and 1970s.29 The Christian radio station YNOL was allowed to broadcast without interference.30 In a publicity leaflet, CAM also detailed freedom to hold open air meetings and engage in religious broadcasting.31 It is true CEPAD experienced difficulties as a result of Somozan interference shortly after the 1972 earthquake. For example, Gustavo Parajón explains how some international relief supplies were confiscated by customs officials,32 and how on one occasion Somoza’s own son appropriated a new vehicle sent to CEPAD to assist its aid effort. Eventually, though, after forceful representation they managed to get it back.33 Yet such actions did not affect CEPAD’s official status, which was detailed some months later in La Gaceta, the government’s official gazette.34 Protestants were also permitted to organise large-scale evangelistic activity and campaigns without interference from the authorities. Major efforts included the Latin America Mission’s Evangelism in Depth (1960) and Luis Palau’s Continente ’75, held at the National Baseball Stadium in Managua. Palau, a Hispanic version of Billy Graham, organised mass crusades throughout Latin America, spared no expense in purchasing radio and television time, and Continente ’75 represented one of his most spectacular efforts, with some 138,000 attendees over a twenty-two day period. The campaign was also linked by satellite for radio and television throughout the Americas. In Managua, 6,000 new converts enlarged the city’s Evangelical community of 30,000 by a fifth.35 When Palau held such campaigns across Latin America, it was his custom to seek audiences with national leaders in order to secure their help and also to share his faith with them. Though he did not

Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 259. Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones, 28. 30 Paul Pretiz, ‘The Nicaraguan Junta Reassures Evangelicals’, Christianity Today, 19 September 1980. 31 CAM publicity leaflet New Frontiers and New Horizons (October 1960). 32 Gustavo Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North. 30th Report (2002), published on CEPAD’s North American website: http://www.cepad. info/report/30th/03 (accessed 24 February 2004), 2. 33 Ibid. 34 La Gaceta (Managua), 29 March 1974. 35 For an account of the campaign see Peter Meadows, Latin Harvest. London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1979, 96ff. 28 29

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meet with Somoza in 1975, his organisation confirms a brief meeting with his vice president.36 One AoG missionary, Gerald Robeson, also narrated how in 1970 the denomination had been scouring Managua for two months, searching for an ideal location to hold an open air campaign. Eventually, they found an empty parcel of land next to a new, booming suburb under construction. Robeson states, “The President’s mother was the owner and she graciously allowed us to use the lot free of charge for as long as we needed it”.37 Aside from religious freedom, it appears some Protestants also enjoyed actual links with the regime. For example, David Martin refers to some Evangelicals belonging to the GN.38 This is confirmed by a Los Angeles Times report detailing how several Church of God leaders served in the GN, which led to their imprisonment by the Sandinistas after the revolution.39 Roberto Zub states Church of God missionaries also enjoyed good relations with Somoza and the GN.40 It has also been alleged that other North American missionaries enjoyed similar links with the regime. Several CEPAD leaders refer to AoG missionary David Spencer, who traveled to Nicaragua in the 1960s with his father Lewey Spencer, before moving there and hosting his daily radio show. Gilberto Aguirre understood Spencer had acted as a chaplain to Somoza’s troops, though he could not be sure. He suggests this is what had caused Spencer problems with the Sandinistas in the 1980s.41 Gustavo Parajón elaborated further: Mr. Spencer had told me personally, before the insurrection, that he was a chaplain for Somoza’s elite force, the EEBI, and he was very happy that he could share the gospel with the future officers of the GN when he jogged with them every morning, as I understood it.42

When pressed on whether Spencer had actually used the word ‘chaplain’ Parajón responded, “I cannot be sure that was the word he used, but that certainly is the concept I have in mind”.43 36 Jaime Mirón (vice president of Luis Palau’s organisation), e-mail correspondence, 6 February 2004. 37 Robeson, Faith in Eruption, 57–8. 38 Martin, Tongues of Fire, 249. 39 Richard Boudreaux, ‘Managua Frees 1,894 Somoza Guard Veterans,’ Los Angeles Times, 18 March 1989. 40 Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones, 27. 41 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. 42 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 2 January 2005 (1). 43 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 2 January 2005 (2).

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Nazarene missionary Ron Galloway also refers to links between some Nazarenes and the Somoza regime. He explained how Rafael Bello (brother of the Nazarene’s first national superintendent Ernesto Bello) had some or other connection with the GN, which subsequently caused him problems when the Sandinistas came to power. Galloway also spoke of a large, prominent family that attended the church pastored by Ignacio Hernández (leader of the Nicaraguan Bible Society during the Sandinista regime) in Managua. A young member of the family served in the GN and was thus forced to flee on the last ‘plane out of Managua when the Sandinistas took control of the country (the aircraft was overloaded and crashed, killing everyone on board). Galloway wondered if such connections within his church gave the Sandinistas the impression that Ignacio Hernández was a Somocista.44 A Useful Social Prop? Few people dispute an absence of tense Protestant-Somoza relations throughout most of the Somoza dynasty. However, several proSandinista commentators suggest this was because Protestants (and especially Evangelicals) were puppets of the Somoza regime and, by contributing to the atomisation of Nicaraguan society, they helped keep the Somozas in power. The first Protestants, whether mainstream or Evangelical, allied themselves with Liberals such as Anastasio Somoza García and his dynasty as his Liberal party had permitted their entry into Nicaragua. It also represented the opposing power to the Conservatives, who sought to retain the status quo and, being the preferred party of the Catholics, represented Protestantism’s enemy.45 For their part, Liberals applauded how Protestants broke the strong societal role enjoyed by the Catholic Church.46 The latter statement seems likely (see Chapter 2). But this whole argument is taken much further, arguing that Protestants and Evangelicals actually became willing tools of the Somoza regime, while the latter encouraged an influx of missionaries into the country in the 1930s to break the power of their opponents. AoG rebel Miguel Angel Casco told David Haslam that Anastasio Somoza García encouraged North

Conversation with Ron Galloway. Niño Chavaría, ‘Breve historia del movimiento Pentecostal en Nicaragua’ in Álvarez, Pentecostalismo y Liberación, 49–51. 46 Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 18–19. 44

45

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American missionaries to penetrate the mountains where Sandino’s stronghold was located, in order to dilute his power. Casco also believes Evangelicals were used to de-emphasise social and political concerns within religious thinking.47 Thus, it is argued, Evangelicals represented a useful prop for the existing social order.48 They supported, or at the very least did nothing about, a social order and regime that allowed the Somoza dynasty to function unhindered, which the Somozas regarded as useful.49 It is also suggested that strong Evangelical growth in the 1960s further atomised Nicaraguan society. Moreover, Evangelicals refused to speak out against the regime’s abuses and corruption, while their non-revolutionary world view and an individualistic theology totally prohibited any involvement in social concerns. Finally, Evangelicals’ strong link with North America and their rabid anti-communism ensured they were nothing less than tools of North American imperialism, especially those located on the East Coast.50 Why else would they remain apolitical on the basis of Romans 13:1, and thus assist Somoza to retain power, and yet suddenly become fiercely political and anti-Sandinista after the revolution in the face of a government which rejected American hegemony?51 Thus, Evangelicals are seen as at least partly responsible for continued foreign domination under Somoza.52 This imperialist collaboration by Evangelicals is totally at odds, the argument continues, with how several mainstream Protestant churches came to support the struggle of the masses, and by extension the Sandinistas after a process of indigenisation and social reflection. Especially singled out in this respect is the Convención Bautista Nicaragüense (CBN, Nicaraguan Baptist Convention). Abelino Martínez explains how the CBN initially strongly supported the Somozas and their politics, to the extent that they would not even read La Prensa (a Conservative newspaper). However, in the 1960s a growing number of young, progressive Baptists became increasingly radicalised and opposed the Somoza

Ibid., 92. Enrique Domínguez, ‘The Great Commission’, NACLA: Report on the Americas 18 no. 1 ( Jan/Feb 1984), 12–22. 49 Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 20. 50 For example. see Serra, ‘Ideology, Religion and the Class Struggle’ in Harris and Vilas, Nicaragua: A Revolution Under Siege, 159, 161ff., 170. 51 Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 31. 52 CIEETS, Caminando, 26. 47 48

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regime.53 Some Baptists even embraced Marxist interpretations of society, and thus a Protestant liberation theology movement was born in Nicaragua. Consequently, Baptist youths not only participated on the barricades during the final insurrection, but a number of them also took up arms and joined the Sandinista revolutionaries.54 Moreover, the founding of the Protestant umbrella relief organisation CEPAD after the 1972 earthquake resulted in other Protestants becoming more socially aware. CEPAD organised a retreat of pastors in 1976 (known as RIPEN), emphasising social concerns and human rights, leading to a growing opposition of the Somoza regime. Thus, as the Marxist argument goes, the historic, enlightened Protestants, freed from their imperialist links and an anti-social theology, eventually sided with the masses and participated in the final insurrection, unlike the North-American sponsored, reactionary and anti-communist Evangelical sects, whose support for Somoza helped keep him in power for so many years. There are several major flaws with this interpretation. The most obvious problem is that the regime did not intervene to help Protestants when they were persecuted by Catholic mobs. According to Ligia Madrigal Mendieta, persecution intensified strongly against Protestants with the arrival of a Conservative government after the downfall of Liberal president José Zelaya. Conservatives and Catholics regarded Zelaya as nothing less than a vile, demonic creature on who would fall unspeakable divine judgment for the rest of eternity. One Catholic newspaper even likened the Liberal party to Satan.55 It is not surprising, then, that Conservatives sought to reverse Zelaya’s religious reforms and reinstate Catholicism to its privileged position. As a result, Protestants suffered a great deal as Catholics were afforded something akin to official support when persecuting Protestants. Riots were commonplace, pro-Catholic newspapers regularly ran anti-Protestant editorials, and in 1918, in direct contravention of Zelaya’s reforms, the Church publicly

53 For details of this radicalisation process, see Haslam, Faith in Struggle, 12; Domínguez, ‘The Great Commission’ in NACLA: Report on the Americas, 22; Berryman, Religious Roots, 60–1; and José Miguel Torres, ‘El Cristianismo Protestante en la Revolución Sandinista’, Nicarauac (April/June 1981), 42–3. 54 See article by Jorge Pixley, ‘Baptist and Liberation Theology: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean’, through the Baptist History and Heritage Society (2000). This version published on the Internet in 2004 at www.findarticles.com. 55 Madrigal, Evolución de las Ideas, 129.

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excommunicated a bookseller for selling heretical works.56 This mood dominated throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and some Protestant leaders were persecuted and jailed, several even killed. The Catholic Church itself considered Protestantism a threat which challenged its heretofore undisputed monopoly of religion, and was therefore openly hostile, sometimes violently so, towards the Protestants.57 Yet this mood pervaded throughout much of the Somoza period, and the literature cited in Chapter 2 dwells at length on the constant and violent nature of persecution aimed at Protestants. Local clerics and nuns incited the local population so that mobs regularly chanted abuse and threats, stoned chapels, missionaries and converts, and generally made the life of Protestants hell. On at least several occasions, small bombs were placed outside chapels.58 When asked how Protestants fared under the Sandinistas, Ruth Sánchez, who attends the CAM church in Granada, expressed a strong dislike for the Frente and its treatment of Evangelicals. Yet she explained how its treatment of Protestants, at least in Granada, could not compare to the horrors of Catholic persecution they faced in the 1950s and 1960s.59 Many AoG missionaries’ accounts sent back home detail a similar picture. For example, Ellis Stone describes how on one occasion in 1955 an angry mob descended on them, egged on by priests and nuns, who smashed their car and stoned them.60 Yet despite such violence, the regime demonstrated little interest in protecting Protestants. Describing persecution in the 1930s and 1940s, Luisa de Jeter notes how “some of the authorities, far from protecting Evangelicals, maltreated them, imprisoning preachers and prohibiting church services.”61 In Ellis Stone’s description of the angry mob they faced in Chinandega, he goes on to explain how they were so in fear for their lives that they made their way, with the mob in tow, to the GN headquarters of the town in order to seek protection:

Ibid., 58. Ibid., 44. Madrigal discusses the nature of the persecution of Protestants at some length. 58 The incident, together with its aftermath, is discussed by Spain in And in Samaria, 235ff. See similar discussion in some of the literature explored in Chapter 2. 59 Interview with Ruth Sánchez. 60 Stone, God Has No Borders, 49–51. 61 Jeter de Walter, Siembra y Cosecha, writes: “Algunas autoridades, lejos de proteger a los evangélicos, los maltrataron, encarcelaron a los predicadores, y prohibieron los cultos”, 103. 56

57

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We finally made our way to the military headquarters which serve as the police in Nicaragua. There we asked for protection but were laughed at. They told us they had no sympathy for us, the evangelicals, and we had best get out of town as fast as possible.62

Nazarene missionary Ron Galloway echoes a similar story. When asked specifically about protection by the GN, he stated: I don’t ever recall being protected by the police or the Guard. I just think of them being a group who took care of their own interests. The police never came when we were stoned.63

A report by the Pentecostal Foursquare denomination also details how, after a brief absence from the country during the Somoza dynasty, the Catholic Church had succeeded in making returning missionaries personae non gratae as far as regime was concerned. Also, CAM faced a great deal of persecution at the hands of militant, traditional Catholics throughout much of the twentieth century.64 The situation was so bad that on one occasion it was only intervention by the U.S. Department of State, which made representations to the Somoza government, rather than the regime acting on its own initiative, which improved the situation for CAM’s members.65 In fact, Luisa de Jeter has pointed out that persecution, at least of AoG missionaries and converts, did not begin to abate until some time after the effects of Vatican II began to trickle down among grassroots Catholics. Only then did Evangelicals feel they could attend evangelistic campaigns unhindered and without fear of losing their jobs.66 It is clear, then, that during the dictatorships of Anastasio and Luis Somoza at least, far from colluding with Protestants, especially Evangelicals, they expressed such a lack of interest that little protection was forthcoming for Evangelicals besieged by Catholic persecutors. Encouraging Protestantism in order to curb the power of the Catholic Church as a societal actor is one thing. But to suggest the Somozas used Evangelicals as a social prop simply to retain power in the face

62 Stone, God Has No Borders, 50. Postscript: Ten years later it was all very different when they returned, and the commander of the same military HQ asked them to minister in the local prison (p. 51). 63 Telephone conversation with Ron Galloway. 64 CAM publicity leaflet, Nicaragua’s Need (May 1955). See also CAM publication This is Nicaragua Today ( June 1958). 65 CAM Bulletin, 1960. 66 Jeter de Walter, Siembra y Cosecha, 112.

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of their own illegitimate and corrupt power, and that Evangelicals in some way supported the Somozas in this aim, is quite another. As the above evidence indicates, if this was so, then Evangelicals had a raw deal as they seem to have received nothing in return. True, the NACLA reports detail how in 1961 Luis Somoza offered an air force plane to one group to help spread news of an evangelistic campaign.67 But this is either a rare and isolated case, or else NACLA have incorrect information. No Nicaraguan Protestant leaders I spoke with, whether pro- or anti- Sandinista, had any knowledge whatsoever of this incident. It is also important to recognise that NACLA is one of those who postulates the view that Evangelicals represented and benefited from being a Somozan tool. It takes more than a single isolated and apparently unverifiable incident to prove this point. The view that Somoza and Evangelicals colluded is also problematic because it totally ignores tensions that sometimes existed between the two. Take, for example, David Spencer’s chaplaincy work among trainee troops. A lot is made of this by Carlos Escorcia, an acquaintance but also an ideological opposite of Spencer’s (interestingly, Escorcia, who expressed a great deal of anti-North American sentiment throughout the 1980s now makes a living in California). Escorcia also pointed out how Spencer engaged in similar work at Panama’s infamous School of the Americas.68 Is Spencer’s work with trainee officers of the GN evidence of Evangelical-Somoza collusion? It seems highly unlikely, for several reasons. Firstly, Spencer explains how his regular radio broadcast by Radio Corporación from 1970–2 (see Chapter 2) expressed mild anti-Somozan sentiment from time to time.69 Moreover, Escorcia himself suggests Spencer criticised the regime shortly after the 1972 earthquake: There are rumors that he was expelled by Somoza in 1972 after the earthquake when he went on the radio station to tell the people, ‘You see how God punishes you guys for being sinners? The Lord got fed up of you guys and sent you this earthquake’. So the Somoza government asked him to leave the country and declared him non grata and gave him 24 hours to get out of the country.70

67 Deborah Huntington. ‘The Prophet Motive’, NACLA: Report on the Americas 18 no. 1 ( Jan/Feb 1984), 11. 68 Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence, 31 December 2004. 69 Interview with David Spencer, 8 June 1999, Managua. 70 Interview with Carlos Escorcia.

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This hardly suggests a close relationship between both parties. Also, Spencer told me that on one occasion he had been approached by a U.S. official to bring back information to them during his visits to Sandinista Nicaragua. He flatly refused to do so, leading the official to question his patriotism. (Spencer explained to the official he was a minister of the Gospel and not a spy for his government.)71 Again, given this proactive admission, it is difficult to see that Spencer was somehow mixed up with Somoza when he declined to help his government spy on an ideological foe. In fact, there is also a perfectly innocent explanation for Spencer’s work within the military bases in Nicaragua and Panama. He says he was not engaged in military or other improper activities. Rather, it was he who had approached both bases (not the other way around) to ask to share the Gospel with them. At first he had been refused, but had persuaded them over time so as to have an opportunity to have some spiritual input in the lives of the young men training for military service. If offering spiritual counsel constitutes collusion, then CEPAD’s Gustavo Parajón is also open to the same charge, as he admits acting in a chaplaincy capacity to Somoza’s wife, with whom he had regular contact.72 Yet of course such contacts hardly represent endorsement of, much less collusion with, the regime. Interestingly, Spencer maintains he only ever told one person of this chaplaincy work—Carlos Escorcia—who presumably circulated this story within the CEPAD structure, which ultimately caused Spencer such grief with the Sandinistas. Spencer believes these stories were exaggerated and exploited by those who rejected his ministry. (During his difficulties with the Frente in the 1980s he blames CEPAD more than the Sandinistas, with whom he had some sympathies). The social prop theory also ignores some quite severe SomozaEvangelical tensions at the very latter stages of the regime. On the whole, the nature of Evangelical-Somoza relations was unproblematic until the 1970s, much like Catholic-Somoza relations until the late 1960s. The Protestants I interviewed, together with the other sources cited, seem to indicate few problems with the Somoza authorities, except towards the very end of the regime. At that stage, as the insurrection gathered strength and the GN sought to quell the rebellion, relations became strained. In the case of the Catholic Church, mention has

71 72

Conversation with David Spencer, 24 May 2004, Managua. Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North, 2.

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already been made of Archbishop Obando’s criticism of the regime. At this time, grassroots Catholics influenced by liberation theology were regarded as sympathisers of the rebels. Thus a crackdown quickly ensued, and Clifton Holland refers to “harassment of clergy”, “arbitrary detentions, expulsions and deaths”.73 One human rights source confirms such abuses, adding beating and imprisonment of Catholic clergy.74 Meanwhile, though Catholics had become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the regime in the wake of the 1972 earthquake, in keeping with their interpretation of Romans 13:1 Protestants continued to obey and respect the authorities, even though they were not happy with the Somoza regime. However, as human rights degenerated towards the end of the regime, the situation began to change. Parajón has referred to his own tense relations with Somoza during this period, and details human rights abuses by the GN.75 He details one such case of human rights abuses aimed at Evangelicals during the insurrection: In April 1977 a Pentecostal pastor told us that the GN had killed 22 Evangelicals, most of them members of the Assembly of God, in a place near Jinotega. We investigated and found it was true. The CEPAD Assembly asked for an audience with Somoza and sent three of us to make an official protest. We decided to present only three cases, all well documented, with the names of the Guardsmen who had done the killing, along with the time and the place. Somoza received us courteously, but very coldly. He said it couldn’t be true, but he would investigate. Of course, nothing came of it. Somoza’s situation was deteriorating rapidly.76

Likewise, Carlos Escorcia refers to a similar military incident that took place in either 1975 or 1976. Involving the GN, it was sponsored by CONDEAC (Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana), and included American military advisers from U.S. Southern Command of the Panama Canal. During a counterinsurgency sweep in the northern mountains of Nicaragua, Escorcia claims dozens of villages deep in the jungle were wiped out:

Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 30. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Freedom of Conscience, Belief and Religion’, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.45 doc.18 rev. 1 (17 November 1978). Available online at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Nicaragua78eng/chap.6.htm (last accessed 17 January 2005). 75 Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North, 2f. 76 Ibid. 73 74

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In a rural town called Waslala, a military helicopter came to a little house made of bamboo . . . there was a group of AoG parishioners having a prayer meeting and all of them were captured and taken into the helicopter and disappeared for ever. I don’t know how, but the local pastor, Pastor Pérez managed to escape and came to Matagalpa and spoke with Oscar Godoy who was the regional presbyter at the time. Godoy informed Managua, where Rev. Jerónimo Pérez, the then Superintendent and Rev. Miguel Angel Soya, an American missionary with close personal ties to Somoza’s wife, asked him to shut off. Weeks later, Godoy got word that the countryside pastor, Pastor Pérez (Pastor was his first name), had been arrested in Waslala. Godoy took off immediately to Waslala and went to the military barrack. After identifying himself with the commander, he said he was there to enquire about Pastor Pérez. The military guy replied that there was no such person with that name detained in his facility. Then Godoy heard a strong scream coming from the back of the little wooden barrack, “Aquí estoy hermano Godoy.” (I’m here, Brother Godoy). They had him in a hole in the back of the barrack, sort of a holding tank for prisoners to be executed. The military guy said he was mistaken and that he (Godoy) could take Pastor Pérez with him back to his home . . . Godoy told me that that experience was the beginning of his awakening about the brutalities of the Somoza’s GN.77

Perhaps these were isolated cases aimed at Evangelicals in the rural north, where the insurgents were based. Yet whatever the reason for such events it would be a very strange act indeed to alienate the very social prop one is supposed to be relying on to retain the status quo by engaging in such atrocities. Thus, strained relations towards the end of the regime demonstrate that Evangelicals as a whole were not colluding with the Somoza regime. Autocracy Over Communism: The Lesser of Two Evils It seems likely that Protestants preferred a Liberal over a Conservative government, simply because the latter was the party of traditional Catholics at whose hands they suffered a great deal of harassment and persecution. Evangelicals also expressed strong anti-Communism, which they regarded as a rival faith system to Christianity. For example, consider the following statement made by CAM:

77

Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence, 30 December 2004.

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chapter three Communism is bending every effort to sow its ideology in Latin America where these tares find soil prepared by centuries of domination of a small wealthy religious hierarchy over the masses of the people.78

But on the whole, Evangelicals were apolitical and sought only the freedom to propagate the gospel and carry out their message. Meanwhile, their involvement in social issues may have been for reasons other than an otherworldly theology. For example, Wilton Nelson argues that consistent and violent persecution at the hands of traditional Catholics imbued a ghetto, isolationist mentality among Protestants that prohibited them from being involved in social and political issues.79 Perhaps this persecution also had another bearing on Evangelical-Sandinista relations. Having rounded the corner, no longer to face intense and cruel treatment at the hands of their Catholic tormenters, enjoying a period of relative calm and freedom under Somoza Debayle, perhaps they feared the possibility of going back to a regime of persecution, ‘the bad old days’, only this time state-sanctioned under what they regarded as a Marxist-led government. Concerning the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, it is clear that, on the whole (and with some exceptions towards the end of the regime) relations between Protestants and the state were unproblematic, with freedom for the former to do as they wished and to go about their business unhindered. They encountered very little state interference and were permitted to hold open air meetings, national marches, and to preach what they liked without the authorities reading through their sermons and broadcasts beforehand. Protestants could travel freely, open schools and Bible colleges, and hold large evangelistic campaigns on a national scale (including Continente ’75, which was held at the National Stadium and televised). Throughout this period, Pentecostalism grew and spread throughout the country. From their point-of-view, the authorities regarded Evangelicals as harmless. Mario Espinoza, during his interviews, stated that “Evangelicals were respected by the police authorities,” while David Stoll (1990) writes: Protestants did not suffer a great deal at the hands of the Somoza dictatorship . . . “We’re not going to let anyone bother the evangelicals”, a pastor recalls one of the regime’s National Guardsmen saying as he

78 79

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CAM publicity leaflet New Frontiers and New Horizons (October 1960). Nelson, Protestantism in Central America, 55.

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threw a drunk out of the church. “If everyone was an evangelical,” the guardsman remarked, “we would sleep better at night”.80

Only in the latter stages of the regime, when Somoza was under intense pressure, does it appear that abuses were committed against clergy and religious figures, usually by the GN, rather than directed from above by Somoza himself. (For example, concerning problematic priests, Somoza himself claimed any crackdown would have courted world condemnation, so he simply let them be.)81 It is certainly true that church-state relations in Nicaragua during the rebel insurrection were far less violent than in another nearby right-wing state also combating a leftist revolutionary insurgency—El Salvador. There, priests and nuns were targeted by death squads, most notably the assassination of Archbishop Romero and the rape and murder of four U.S. nuns in 1980. Somoza may not have had any great love for the church, but widespread repression of the clergy, even in the lead up to the insurrection, was not a method he favored, though he did employ some particularly brutal methods in order to stamp out the rebel movement. Somoza demonstrated very little interest in Protestantism. He could not care less. The only time he seems to have taken an interest in Protestantism, particularly the Baptists, was as his regime began to crumble. When President Jimmy Carter began to withdraw U.S. support for the regime, Somoza requested three leading Nicaraguan Baptists go to Washington and make representations on his behalf. He was hopeful that, as a fellow Baptist, Jimmy Carter might listen to them. One of those asked to go was Gustavo Parajón, who refused.82 The two who went were Gustavo Wilson (director of the Baptist college) and Norberto Herrera Zuñiga (rector of the Polytechnic University).83 Few dispute that Protestants could work freely under Somoza. Sharp differences of opinion, however, arise when Evangelicals’ actual relationship to the regime is discussed. Marxists regard them as a useful social prop for Somoza’s order, who contributed to the atomisation of society, were otherworldly, anti-communist and ultimately, willing tools Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 224. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Nicaragua Betrayed (Boston: Western Islands, 1980). 82 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre; Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 3 January 2005. 83 Carlos Escorcia, ‘La Manipulación Política de la Iglesia Evangélica’. Posted on Xasa forum website, 13 Dec 2003, www.xasa.com/grupos/en/soc/article/51741/soc. nicaragua (last accessed 25 January 2004). 80 81

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of North American imperialism and a corrupt regime in Nicaragua. On the other hand, Evangelicals argue they were keen only to fulfill their evangelistic role. The arguments from both sides have raged ever since the early 1980s, at the height of a propaganda war between the Sandinistas and the Reagan administration. However, such a debate is academic and unnecessary. The nature of Evangelical-Somoza relations represents one of those rare occasions in history where the actual facts themselves, rather than interpreting those facts, is what actually matters. For the purposes of this study, what matters is not why Evangelicals regard their circumstances to be better under Somoza than the Sandinistas, but rather, that they did regard them as manifestly more favorable in the first place. Their circumstances before the arrival of the Sandinistas provided Nicaragua’s Evangelicals with an important yardstick for them to compare how they were faring under the new revolutionary government. People naturally compare their situation before and after the introduction of any far-reaching changes in society. Examples include the cost of living in the UK before and after decimalisation (1971), the introduction of the European common currency, or life in Russia before and after the collapse of the Soviet system. Such pre- and post-comparisons enable a particular constituency to consider how (if at all) it has benefited from change, and in this respect Nicaraguan Evangelicals were no different. It was inevitable that they would compare their circumstances under Somoza with those under the Sandinistas. This, in turn, provides a useful insight into the dynamics of Evangelical-Sandinista relations. Clearly, Evangelicals’ preference for the status quo ante went on to influence their views of, and relations with the Sandinistas (and vice versa).

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PART TWO

DYNAMICS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS FROM THE PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVE

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CHAPTER FOUR

PROTESTANT RESPONSES TOWARDS THE REVOLUTION Chapter 1 details the generally heretofore unchallenged assumption that CEPAD’s leaders, who were by and large supportive of the Sandinistas, spoke for the majority of Nicaragua’s Protestants. Yet this view belies a far more complex picture. Therefore, this chapter seeks to unravel these complications by exploring in some depth Protestant responses to the revolution. The material is presented in three stages. The first explores the position of those who supported the Sandinistas, as represented by CEPAD’s leaders, together with a minority of Evangelicals. The second part outlines the Evangelical, mainly Pentecostal, response against the revolution. Finally, the chapter concludes by quantifying adherents on both sides in order to establish which represented the majority Protestant position vis-à-vis the Sandinista government. CEPAD and Protestant Support for the Revolution Though Gustavo Parajón had the backing of Baptists when he founded CEPAD to help victims of the 1972 earthquake, other Protestants also joined the organisation.1 Among these was Pentecostal Antonio Videa (brother of Juan Simón Videa, then superintendent of the AoG) who eventually became a vice-president of CEPAD.2 Within a short time, CEPAD became a fully-fledged long-term aid agency, and not just associated with the earthquake. What was CEPAD’s response to the Sandinista revolution? There are two views. The first, held by Parajón and other CEPAD leaders, maintains cooperation (rather than formal links) between the organisation and the Sandinistas, on account of their common aims vis-à-vis Nicaragua’s poor. Throughout the 1970s CEPAD worked mostly in rural areas, at which time, Parajón says, they became acutely aware of how

1 2

Discussed in Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North. Interview with Gilberto Aguirre.

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campesinos suffered at the hands of Somoza’s GN.3 Parajón describes CEPAD’s relations with Somoza as “tense, but courteous and civil”.4 During the insurrection CEPAD also worked with the Red Cross to provide food to victims of the civil war. This emphasis on the poor meant CEPAD had something in common with the Sandinistas. When asked if CEPAD supported the Frente, Parajón responded: Yes, I would say that we were favourable towards the ideals of people in the rural areas having access to medical care. We asked the Sandinista government in August of 1979 to meet with the pastors and Evangelical leaders to find out what their program was. At the end there was a declaration, and we called it the “Declaration of the 500”, and we said that our first loyalty was to Jesus Christ, and that we would not tolerate anything that would conflict with our faith, but that we as Christians would help and carry out programs that would benefit the Nicaraguan people.5

CEPAD executive director Gilberto Aguirre also spoke of CEPAD’s strong social emphasis and work among the poor, which correlated with Sandinista priorities.6 Benjamín Cortés explained how CEPAD sought dialogue with the Frente to demonstrate how Protestants were supportive of the Sandinistas’ social aims among the poor.7 Sixto Ulloa, who declared that he “believe(d) in what the Sandinista government was doing for the people”,8 was appointed as the mediator between the Frente and CEPAD in order to assist that dialogue.9 Clearly, then, a focus on social issues represented CEPAD’s primary aim, and thus it was willing to work with the Frente.10 Parajón at least was impressed by some Sandinistas’ desire to help the poor, compared with some conservative Christians:

See, for example, Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North. Parajón also discusses briefly a focus on campesinos before the Sandinista revolution in ‘La Iglesia Evangélica en el Proyecto Nacional: Entrevista con Gustavo Parajón’, Xilotl, 102–3. 4 Ibid. 5 Telephone interview with Gustavo Parajón, 27 February 2004. 6 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. See also Ronald Frase, ‘Believers Ask Yankees to Remove Cold War Blinders,’ Christianity Today, 27 March 1981. 7 Interview with Benjamín Cortés. 8 Margaret Wilde, ‘Nicaragua: Human Rights and the Miskito Indians’, America 146 no. 15 (April 1982), 295. 9 Interview with Sixto Ulloa, 26 May 2004, Managua. 10 A circular to pastors confirmed support for the Sandinista social project: CEPAD, Carta Pastoral de la Asamblea General del Comité Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo, 3 March 1980. 3

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One of the most difficult lessons I learned in the 1980s was that people that called themselves pastors and servants of the Lord did not hesitate to use slander and lies to achieve their political goals. That depressed me greatly. And then, talking to some Marxists that seemed very interested in the wellbeing of the Nicaragua people was refreshing, because I found out that they respected what had been done for some of the poorest peoples in the rural areas of Nicaragua by Christian people.11

Parajón had always expressed a strong interest in social justice, as detailed earlier by Nazarene missionary Ron Galloway. (Parajón was Galloway’s personal physician; he served many of the missionaries to Nicaragua in that capacity).12 When Parajón returned from studying in the U.S. he founded the Baptist health program PROVADENIC a few years before CEPAD. Thus, it is not surprising that CEPAD worked “shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary government on a variety of social projects”,13 which had made social work a key priority.14 However, the vast majority of Evangelicals were convinced CEPAD’s support for the revolution moved far beyond cooperation in social programs, believing its leaders offered slavish, uncritical support of the regime. AoG superintendent Saturnino Cerrato regarded CEPAD’s leaders as “openly within the Sandinista camp”,15 and that “here the whole world knows that CEPAD was a kind of religious arm of the Sandinistas”.16 His predecessor, Bartolomé Matamoros, also regarded CEPAD’s leaders as ideologically at one with the Sandinistas.17 CNPEN president Félix Rosales explained how CEPAD regarded the revolution and its government as true justice from God and that Evangelicals ought to work with the Frente.18 Juan Reyes, a non-Pentecostal CAM pastor, describes CEPAD as a leftist organisation that was strongly identified ideologically with the Frente.19 Pentecostal pastor Rufino Soza states CEPAD was “hand-in-hand with the Sandinista government”.20 Soza

Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 2 Jan 2005 (1). Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 2 Jan 2005 (2). 13 Tom Minnery, ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua’, Christianity Today. 14 ‘Nicaragua: The Shaking and Shifting of the Church,’ in Christianity Today, 7 December 1979, 44. 15 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). His emphasis. 16 Telephone conversation with Saturnino Cerrato, 31 May 2004. 17 Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. 18 Telephone interview with Félix Rosales, 4 March 2004. 19 Interview with Juan Reyes. 20 Interview with Rufino Soza. 11 12

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describes Parajón as a “dangerous man”, someone who had “the face of a saint” but who was fully behind the Sandinistas. A grassroots Pentecostal during the early 1980s, Roberto Rojas believes it did not matter what the Sandinistas did, CEPAD’s leaders always supported them.21 Church of God pastor Bienvenido López believes CEPAD respected the Sandinista government,22 while another Church of God pastor, Antonio Martínez (later the denomination’s superintendent), believed CEPAD’s leaders were influenced by the government.23 Meanwhile, when Pentecostal pastor (later CNPEN President) Mario Espinoza was asked about CEPAD’s relations with the Sandinistas he stated: I wouldn’t use the word ‘relations’. I would say that they were actually Sandinista. They were like father and son. They had no differences between them. When the youth were called for military service, they [CEPAD] were the first to encourage the youth to go.24

Another Pentecostal, Harold Robleto (a former Sandinista) describes CEPAD as a promoter and supporter of the Sandinistas.25 He also explains how CEPAD was very militant in its support for the Frente.26 Bible Society director Ignacio Hernández, a former vice-president of CEPAD,27 denounced it as the devil’s own organisation.28 Norman Marenco (current president of CNPEN) recalls how several CEPAD leaders identified themselves strongly with the revolution and the Frente.29 Former DGSE agent and defector Miguel Bolaños Hunter alleged that CEPAD worked closely with the government, including providing it with financial help.30 Meanwhile, grassroots Christian Elizabet Miranda also had the strong impression that CEPAD supported the revolution.31 Clearly, then, the majority of Evangelicals were highly suspicious of CEPAD’s politics and motives, something which is readily acknowledged by CEPAD’s former spokesman for pastoral

Interview with Roberto Rojas. Interview with Bienvenido López. 23 Conversation with Antonio Martínez. 24 Interview with Mario Espinoza. 25 Interview with Harold Robleto, who states that CEPAD was the “brazo promotor de apoyo logístico a los Sandinistas”. 26 Conversation with Harold Robleto, 27 May 2004, Managua. 27 Interview with Ignacio Hernández, 25 May 2004, Managua. 28 Telephone conversation with Ignacio Hernández, 2 March 2004. 29 Interview with Norman Marenco. 30 IRD, The Subversion of the Church. 31 Conversation with Elizabet Miranda, 3 June 1999, Managua. 21 22

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affairs, Albino Meléndez, who explained how many Evangelicals were convinced CEPAD was very closely connected with the Sandinista government.32 But what evidence is there that CEPAD moved beyond merely supporting the Sandinistas’ social agenda, actually offering the government concrete support? There was certainly a strong izquierdista (leftist) tendency within the CEPAD executive, as affirmed by Albino Meléndez33 and, when pressed, by Benjamín Cortés.34 After all, several of the main CEPAD leaders belonged to the liberal American Baptist Church. Many Baptists identified themselves strongly with the Sandinistas, and some even took up arms during the insurrection. Baptist pastor José Miguel Torres became one of the most vocal Protestant supporters of the Sandinistas in the 1980s.35 The Baptists would send open letters to Baptists in North America in order to bring pressure to bear on the US government.36 They also invited a Sandinista comandante to address their annual conference,37 and even advertised a reunion of ex-Baptist seminarians in the La Barricada (presumably because it was read by Baptists).38 In particular, Baptist and senior CEPAD official Sixto Ulloa strongly supported the Sandinistas. A close friend of Daniel Ortega, he was appointed as the point of contact between CEPAD and the Frente.39 Ulloa led a delegation to visit Christians in East Bloc countries in 1981, and upon returning to Nicaragua declared that churches they visited were not, contrary to popular opinion, persecuted in any way by the Soviet or any other East Bloc government.40 Ulloa eventually went on to become a Sandinista diputado in the Nicaraguan Assembly, and when I interviewed him in 2004 the Sandinista red and black flag flew high above his home.

Telephone conversation with Albino Meléndez, 26 February 2004. Ibid. 34 Interview with Benjamín Cortés. 35 José Miguel Torres, who headed the Eje Ecuménico, was strongly Sandinista and wrote many articles supporting the government. For details of his support for the Sandinistas, see ‘La reacción abusa de la religion,’ in La Barricada, 18 January 1981. 36 See, for example, ‘World Scene’, Christianity Today, 15 June 1984, 66. 37 Frase, ‘Believers Ask Yankees to Remove Cold War Blinders,’ Christianity Today. 38 ‘Invitacion de los ex—alumnos del Colegio Bautista,’ La Barricada, 26 November 1979. 39 Interview with Sixto Ulloa. 40 ‘Religiosos Nicas Impresionados de Gira por Paises Socialistas’, El Nuevo Diario, 18 July 1981. 32 33

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CEPAD clearly embraced liberation theology. Former DGSE official José Suárez believed the organisation was totally sold out to the revolution, and detailed the strong liberation theology line it took. He also recalled a poster of a black, naked, crucified Christ wearing a Sandino cowboy hat, which he said was endorsed by CEPAD.41 (I could not trace details of this poster. Parajón confirmed a poster of a naked Christ that caused offence, but could not recall the details.42 Gary Becks, a North American who supplied aid to Contras,43 includes in his book an image allegedly from Sandinista Nicaragua of a naked, crucified Christ wearing a Che Guevarra beret.)44 Ruth Sánchez, a grassroots church CAM member from Granada, confirmed CEPAD’s leftist ideology and support for liberation theology: “The government and CEPAD literally pushed liberation theology on us”.45 Gilberto Aguirre explains how, at a CEPAD-organised interdenominational conference in 1974, the attendees began to re-read scripture within a social context,46 while another leaders’ conference in 1976 set out to explore and establish the Protestant churches’ social responsibilities.47 By 1979 this process was complete. Then, CEPAD organised the RIPEN 2 retreat at a Baptist conference centre shortly after the revolution to decide how to respond to the Sandinistas. The 500 or so participants offered clear support for the revolutionary project in the document they drew up, entitled the Declaration of the 500. In it, they thanked “our heavenly Father for the victory of the Nicaraguan people and their instrument of liberation, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional”. They also affirmed that authorities are established by God, and thus recognised the legitimacy of the new Sandinista government; agreed with its social aims, including the creation of a New Man; Interview with José Suárez, 6 June 2004, Managua. ‘José Suárez’ is a synonym (as discussed in the Introduction). 42 Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005 (1). 43 For details of Gary Becks’ work among the Contras, see Eric Bailey, ‘Based in Carslbad- Contra-Aid Group Mixes Guns, Gospel’, Los Angeles Times, 16 January 1989. 44 Gary Becks, But I Can Still Carry Half a Load (San Diego: Code Three Press, 2002), 164. 45 Interview with Ruth Sánchez. 46 Gilberto Aguirre, El Desafio Histórico de la Iglesia Evangélica Nicaragüense, 2. This is a five-page open letter produced by CEPAD. No other details available (dated after 1990 elections). 47 CEPAD. Encuentro de Líderes Evangélicos de Nicaragua. An undated circular detailing the aims of the retreat, held between 22–24 November 1976 at the Baptist retreat grounds Monte de los Olivos. 41

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criticised the blockade of Cuba, and urged Protestants across Nicaragua to support the Sandinistas’ political aims.48 A 1980 circular pastoral letter repeated unequivocal support for the revolutionary project,49 while CEPAD’s own monthly bulletin— Reflexión—often expressed pro-revolutionary and liberation theology views. Just a few of many examples will suffice to illustrate the point. In one edition Ernesto Cardenal sets out a dialogue in which the participants reinterpret Scripture according to a liberation theology hermeneutic (much like at Solentiname).50 The same edition hails the great achievements of the Sandinista revolution, including the nationalisation of Nicaragua’s banks, the organisation of the new Sandinista army, and the introduction of price controls.51 It also contains a devotional about the rise of the New Man, who practices solidarity and is collectivist, fraternal and internationalist.52 Other editions of Reflexión contain similar material. Among its editors was Carlos Escorcia, the AoG rebel. Meanwhile, a series of liberation theology seminars was organised by CEPAD in 1979 and 1980, during which the participants spoke of the revolution in uncritical and glowing terms. Among the contributors were senior comandantes Bayardo Arce and Hugo Torres, as well as several pastors from East Bloc countries. CEPAD gathered these papers into a single publication, which included (among others) a glowing salutation from Interior Minister Tomás Borge, who likened the revolutionary project with Jesus’ ministry, highlighting the redeeming nature of sandinismo.53 Finally, the minutes of two CEPAD assembly meetings in 1980 expressed a desire for a line of communication with the Sandinistas.54 CEPAD’s public statements frequently condemning U.S. policy towards Nicaragua while uncritical of the Sandinistas also gave the impression that its leaders strongly identified themselves with sandinismo. For example, CEPAD once condemned the “war-like, intolerant, and

48 II Retiro Interdenominacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua, 5 October 1979 (mimeo). 49 CEPAD. Carta Pastoral de la Asamblea General del Comité Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo, 3 March 1980. 50 Ernesto Cardenal, ‘Jesus Enseña a Orar’, Reflexión, March 1980, 9. 51 ‘Logros de la revolución Sandinista’ (ibid., 3). 52 Juan Ramón de la Paz Cerezo, ‘El Hombre Nuevo’, ibid. 5. 53 CEPAD, Reflexiones Sobre Fé y Revolución (Managua: CEPAD, 1982), 11–12. 54 Meeting minutes, Asamblea General del CEPAD, 11 September 1980 and 13 November 1980.

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arrogant attitudes of the government of the United States towards Nicaragua.”55 One of many open letters sent to American Christians in order to encourage them to bring pressure to bear on the Reagan administration totally exonerated the Sandinistas from maltreating the Miskito Indians, and instead blamed Somocistas and the U.S. government, calling on U.S. Christians to “persuade your government to stop its policy of aggression towards achieving justice”.56 Though penned by CEPAD’s leaders, the letter was signed: “The General Assembly of CEPAD”, giving the impression of overwhelming Protestant criticism of the U.S. government, which was certainly not the case. Thus CEPAD clearly supported the government, as recognised by the liberation theology press.57 Most Evangelicals I spoke with concerning CEPAD were convinced it received much overseas aid from religious organisations, which then went to support the Frente. They were incensed that this aid, which they believed was given to help Nicaraguan pastors and churches, was, in their opinion instead sometimes made available to Sandinista comandantes. For example, Ruth Sánchez was convinced much of the overseas aid went directly to the government.58 Juan Reyes believed individual comandantes would go to CEPAD, which had plenty of money and equipment at its disposal, to ask for cars and other goods, which were given without question, despite the fact that goods had been donated to help the churches in Nicaragua.59 Bible Society director Ignacio Hernández echoes this view, explaining how a comandante would go to CEPAD to ask for items, and would leave with his car crammed with whatever he wanted.60 Harold Robleto, whose family served the Sandinista apparatus, stated that CEPAD even channelled some funds they received into the war effort, rather than to the poor and pastors it had been given for. Asked if CEPAD knew some of their budget was being used in this way, Robleto declared they themselves initiated

‘World Scene: Nicaragua’, Christianity Today, 7 May 1982, 49. ‘Nicaraguan Christians Call for End to US Aggression’, Latinamerica Press 14(20) (20 May 1982), 5. 57 See, for example, ‘WCC Report Evaluates Conflicts Within Nicaraguan Churches’, Latinamerica Press 15 no. 39 (27 October 1983), 5, which details how CEPAD supported the government 58 Interview with Ruth Sánchez. 59 Interview with Juan Reyes. 60 Interview with Ignacio Hernández. 55 56

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it, which cost them dearly when overseas donors learned about it and withdrew their financial support.61 But perhaps the greatest and most damaging charge of financial collusion came from Kate Rafferty,62 a journalist for Brother Andrew’s Open Doors. In an interview with CEPAD’s nemesis, the IRD, she echoed accusations made by several Nicaraguan pastors that CEPAD purchased eleven new police jeeps for the Sandinistas with money donated by North American Christians.63 If the article’s aim was to discourage American Christians from continuing to donate overseas aid to an NGO closely tied to the Sandinista government and instead promote CNPEN as a plucky rival despised by the Frente, it appears it was successful. A memo from the Church World Service addressed to Gilberto Aguirre and Gustavo Parajón, together with a Spanish translation of Rafferty’s article, discusses ways in which CEPAD should challenge the allegations (including obtaining a statement of support from CNPEN). The document gives a clear impression of an organisation under intense pressure.64 Were these claims true? Parajón adamantly and somewhat angrily denied the Rafferty story.65 During subsequent discussions by e-mail Parajón wrote: Regarding the allegation that CEPAD had used funds to buy 11 jeeps for the Sandinista police in Matagalpa, we were accused, no proof was ever presented. If it were true, the evidence would have been wielded, there would have been all kinds of accusations in the media, and financing from the US Churches that were helping CEPAD would have been immediately discontinued. We had—and still have—yearly Interview with Harold Robleto. A pseudonym, according to Alan Wisdom, vice-president of the IRD (e-mail correspondence, 11 February 2004). 63 Institute of Religion and Democracy, Who Speaks for Nicaragua’s Evangelicals? An Interview With Kate Rafferty of Open Doors (Washington: IRD Briefing Paper No. 5, January 1985), 3. 64 Undated. The letter is a Spanish translation of an English-language letter which indicates it is from the Church World Service (Servicio Mundial de Iglesias, CWS) and sent to Parajón and Aguirre. It is simply signed Bolioli, and indicates the translation was carried out by Damaris A. Milton A. A search on the Internet yielded a page on the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA referring to a Revd. Oscar Bolioli as the head of CWS’s Latin American and Caribbean Office (http://www. ncccusa.org/98ga/news103.html—accessed 16 April 2005). Details of CWS, including information of its current work with CEPAD, can be found at its website: http://www. churchworldservice.org/. 65 Interview with Gustavo Parajón. 61

62

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chapter four audits and nothing of the sort ever came out. Church agencies have always responded to concrete plans and their respective budgets. Eleven “jeeps” would have amounted to more than US$100,000. We have NEVER asked for personal needs of that sort to be fulfilled. I am sure you would agree that if we asked TEAR Fund, or Christian Aid, or Church World Service in the USA to provide cars for 11 pastors they would rightfully deny the request.66

In another lengthy response, Parajón explained in some detail how overseas agencies demanded full details of how donations would be spent, and even had it wanted to, CEPAD simply could not have got away with supplying jeeps to eleven church leaders, much less the Sandinista police.67 (His comprehensive response is set out in full in the Appendix). Parajón goes on to state, “It is difficult to explain an allegation, particularly when the principle of being innocent until proven otherwise is not followed”.68 When asked about the allegation, Gilberto Aguirre also explained how it would have cost a great deal of money to buy eleven jeeps, an amount which simply could not have been hidden from auditors and overseas donors.69 Benjamín Cortés also said the story was a complete fabrication.70 This may well be the case if, as Gustavo Parajón believes, the source was CAM pastor Boanerges Mendoza.71 Mendoza apparently had close ties with the U.S. embassy in Managua and was detained by the Sandinistas in 1985. Several Protestant leaders I spoke to explained how Mendoza suffered mental problems, which likely makes him an unreliable witness. Parajón claims he helped to secure Mendoza’s release from Sandinista custody (see later discussion).72 Yet during the 1980s, charges of financial collusion never abated, and such stories circulate widely within Nicaraguan Protestant circles

66 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 3 January 2005. In a letter published in The Banner, a Reformed journal, Jim Boldenow, Latin America director of the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, responded to charges that CEPAD misused funds, stating the NGO “has yearly financial audits by an accredited international auditing firm” so that they could verify where their $150,000 donations to the NGO in 1986–1987 were being spent, Jim Boldenow, ‘Voices: Dollars in Nicaragua,’ The Banner 22 (24 August 1987), 2. 67 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 6 January 2005. 68 Ibid. 69 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. 70 Interview with Benjamín Cortés. 71 Interview with Gustavo Parajón. 72 Gustavo Parajón, ‘CEPAD’s View’ (Interview with Gustavo Parajón), Christianity Today, 18 April 1986, 99.

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to this day. Bartolomé Matamoros referred to a CEPAD donation to the government, which he had seen reported in El Nuevo Diario.73 He was probably referring to a donation of $20,000 CEPAD gave to the Ministry of Welfare, reported by the Sandinista daily, La Barricada, in 1979.74 Matamoros maintained CEPAD had a great deal of money at its disposal, some $3m at one stage, given by the World Council of Churches. In fact, CEPAD did channel funds into Sandinista social projects. Benjamín Cortés states: CEPAD never channelled vehicles to the government. It did channel funds. CEPAD donated nearly $2m towards the literacy crusade (given to those directing this effort), mostly from the World Council of Church, which is based in the US. CEPAD also channelled nearly $2m to the national vaccination programs.

In the same interview he also stated: In the department of Rio San Juan, CEPAD channelled food in order to support nearly 50% of displaced people. Of course, this could be seen as material support for the FSLN. There were criticisms, where people asked where the material support CEPAD offered for social projects (food, tools and so on) actually played a role in the FSLN’s strategic planning . . . But there was, as far as I know, no deliberate and actual funding by CEPAD of the Frente.75

Parajón himself details how CEPAD was instrumental in arranging financial aid to Sandinista social projects through the Christian Medical Mission, and also several million dollars through the World Council of Churches.76 Gilberto Aguirre also detailed money received from NGOs in Europe, though CEPAD often had no control over where the money went. The donors specified how the money should be used, mainly to support the government’s literacy and vaccination projects.77 Clearly, finances were bound to be a major issue and a cause of jealousy among pastors who were struggling to feed their families. They were already suspicious of CEPAD’s political motives and ties with the Sandinista government, and were bound to make incorrect assertions when they saw funds being given to government projects Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. ‘CEPAD dona 200 mil a Bienestar Social’, La Barricada, 8 September 1979. 75 Interview with Benjamín Cortés. 76 Parajón, ‘The History of CEPAD’ in CEPAD and the North. See e-mail correspondence detailed above and in Appendix. 77 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. 73 74

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while many pastors struggled to survive. About his visit to Nicaragua in 1985, David Stoll writes: The pastor’s council felt that money should be channelled through its members, a feeling heightened by the mounting relief effort for war refuges, of which pastors saw little. “We’re the biggest denomination here,” an AoG leader volunteered, “and we think we’ve done a great deal for CEPAD. But it does unfair things. For example, we asked CEPAD to help the pastors of Ciudad Sandino. Some are getting by on starvation wages as low as four thousand cordobas a month (about $6 in 1985). They’re nearly going around without shoes. But they just gave us a bunch of jackets, which we don’t even need [because of the tropical climate]. So we’ve realized that, while CEPAD has done great things for non-evangelical communities, giving them millions of pesos, the money should be for us.78

Thus it seems many Evangelicals’ allegations of financial irregularity were based on misunderstandings that funds had been donated to help them and their churches.79 For their part, CEPAD seems to have handled the whole financial issue very badly. For example, matters were not helped when CEPAD, which had founded and initially financed CNPEN specifically to look after the wellbeing of Protestant pastors, quickly pulled the plug on CNPEN’s funding shortly after its formation, leaving the fledgling organisation struggling to survive. his is particularly significant given that, according to Benjamín Cortés, CEPAD founded CNPEN to provide, among other things, socioeconomic support for pastors and their families.80 Raul Carazo, a pro-Sandinista Protestant and former seminarian, also explained how finances were a constant source of tension between CEPAD and CNPEN as some money earmarked to help pastors was instead used for social projects.81 Meanwhile, Evangelicals were criticised for receiving financial assistance from abroad, mainly the U.S., which the Sandinistas would not permit. On one occasion the Sandinistas arrested Félix Rosales, Boanerges Mendoza and Ignacio Hernández for returning to the country with what the authorities regarded as “CIA dollars”. MINT (Interior Ministry) Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 245. For example, the Christian Reformed Church donated money specifically towards humanitarian aid programmes through CEPAD, see ‘Editorial: Shalom To Nicaragua’, The Banner, 13 July 1987, 5. 80 Interview with Benjamín Cortés. A CNPEN leaflet confirms the organisation’s social role for pastors (CNPEN, Quien Somos? Que Hacemos? Undated flyer). 81 Interview with Raul Carazo, 19 May 2004, Managua. 78 79

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confiscated the funds and promised to “adjust their attitudes”.82 Ignacio Hernández spoke of being searched whenever he returned to Nicaragua to make sure he was not bringing in money.83 Sixto Ulloa also details funds CNPEN pastors received from a Dutch Evangelical Christian based in Costa Rica who was anti-Sandinista. Ulloa cites this as the main reason why CNPEN was refused its personería juridical.84 Clearly, Evangelicals were refused funds to meet their needs, and David Stoll details the anger expressed by some pastors who felt they had no choice but to go to CEPAD cap-in-hand in order to get help.85 It is not suggested that Parajón and others on the CEPAD executive misspent finances to help Sandinista political projects. He was perhaps too well-known a figure to even contemplate such an action, even if he had wanted to. But neither is it conceivable that the majority of Evangelicals simply invented such stories. They compared their own plight with overseas aid they thought had been given to them, which instead went to help government social projects. Moreover, there is some evidence of misuse of funds by individual regional CEPAD officials. For example, former senior DGSE official José Suárez, while acknowledging there were some very committed and upstanding CEPAD officials, also spoke of widespread corruption within the organisation.86 Harold Robleto also detailed a CEPAD official in the Carazo region who was expelled from the organisation for embezzling money.87 (He even went with his wife to Carazo to confirm with the local church this story so that I had accurate information).88 So it is entirely possible that some eyewitness accounts detailing how some comandantes received help from individual CEPAD officials are true. Though it is far from proper for them to have done so, it would be quite logical for Evangelicals, suffering great need and already suspicious of CEPAD’s politics and links with the government, to associate such actions by local CEPAD functionaries with CEPAD as a whole. What did the Frente think of CEPAD? For their part, the Sandinistas spoke highly of the organisation and its leaders, holding them up as an 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

‘Dolares de la CIA para evader el SMP’, La Barricada, 29 November 1985. Interview with Ignacio Hernández. Interview with Sixto Ulloa. Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 244–5. Interview with José Suárez. Interview with Harold Robleto. Conversation with Harold Robleto, 27 May 2004, Managua.

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example to others. In response to the CEPAD donation to the Ministry of Welfare, presented by Parajón, Aguirre and Ulloa, the Vice-Minister thanked them for “this gesture of solidarity” in the name of the revolution. The Sandinista newspaper, La Barricada, commented: CEPAD is one of the development organisations that has lent its unconditional help towards the Nicaraguan people in these difficult days. Actions like those of CEPAD ought to be imitated by all organisations in solidarity with our process in favour of the great majority of our people.89

Shortly after the revolution, La Barricada also published a headline entitled: “Papel de los Evangélicos: Con la Revolución” (The Role of Protestants: With the Revolution), describing how, at a meeting between Sandinistas and Protestants, the latter had decided to support the government (in fact, there was less than a hundred attendees, a number of which were not even from Nicaragua!).90 Mention has already been made of the greetings and warm words from Interior Minister Tomás Borge and other senior comandantes during several CEPAD-organised seminars.91 Meanwhile, the late 1980s Central American peace plan designed to bring to an end conflict in the region created peace commissions within each Central American republic. Opposing sides within each country were allowed to appoint a representative to the commission, and it is not insignificant that Daniel Ortega appointed Parajón to the Nicaraguan Peace Commission.92 At the very least, then, CEPAD gave a strong impression of supporting the Sandinista government (which the latter reciprocated). In fact, several leaders, notably Sixto Ulloa, openly and very strongly supported the Frente. This created widespread suspicion and mistrust among members who were less enthusiastic about the revolutionary government.93 The Nazarene Nicanor Mairena (a CEPAD regional director) who visited the U.S. as a CEPAD apologist during the height of the propaganda war in the 1980s, maintains Parajón and others in ‘CEPAD dona 200 mil a Bienestar Social’, La Barricada. ‘Papel de los evangélicos: Con la Revolución,’ La Barricada, 6 October 1979, 7. 91 CEPAD, Reflexiones Sobre Fé y Revolución, 11–12. 92 Steve Wykstra, ‘Evangelical Leader Named to National Peace Commission,’ Christianity Today, 2 October 1987, 52. 93 For further insight into CEPAD’s pro-revolutionary stance, see various articles published in the cited edition of the Nicaraguan journal Xilotl, which celebrated ten years of the revolution. 89 90

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CEPAD were not Sandinistas, but rather, found it necessary to give the impression of support for the government in order to fulfil their ministry.94 It certainly seems Parajón adapted what he had to say based on who his audience was. Over time, the myth that CEPAD was substantially involved in the 1979 insurrection became firmly established (Humberto Belli rejects what he regards as an attempt at revising history, explaining how CEPAD had never been regarded as an antiSomoza element).95 But shortly after the revolution, speaking to a U.S. audience, Parajón told Christianity Today that CEPAD had “been able to maintain political neutrality and the respect of both sides”.96 Similarly, after the Sandinistas fell from power in 1990 Gilberto Aguirre claimed CEPAD was a non-partisan organisation.97 In a 1986 interview with Christianity Today for a mainly U.S. audience, Parajón did not endorse the Sandinista government, though one discerns implicit support (for example, he completely downplayed problematic church-state relations at the time).98 However, Parajón’s rhetoric is far more supportive of the revolution in an address he gave to revolutionary Christians in 1980,99 and also to the progressive Nicaraguan Christian journal Xilotl in 1989100 (both were Nicaraguan audiences). In the Christianity Today Parajón affirmed the need for pluralism in Nicaragua.101 Yet in the Xilotl interview he stated: I believe that national life in all its dimensions has been greatly enriched by the pluralism enjoyed by Nicaragua since the Triumph of the revolution. Particularly significant has been the participation that groups which were previously marginalized—the campesinos, women, Protestant churches, among others—have had in national life. I single out these groups because when one talks of pluralism, one tends to think of political parties. The contributions made by whole communities, people, religious groups and others in literacy, health days, communal improvement, the defence of the nation and in other areas, speak for themselves concerning the vibrant pluralism in Nicaragua . . . The widespread participation Telephone conversation with Nicanor Mairena, 24 February 2004. Humberto Belli, Breaking Faith, 177. 96 Stephen Sywulka, ‘Aftermath of Nicaragua’s Civil War: Church and State Regroup,’ Christianity Today, 21 September 1979, 44–5. 97 Aguirre, El Desafio Histórico, 4. 98 Parajón, ‘CEPAD’s View’ (Interview with Gustavo Parajón), Christianity Today. 99 Gustavo Parajón, ‘Devocional’, in CEPAD, Reflexiones Sobre Fé y Revolución, 173–176. 100 Parajón, ‘La Iglesia Evangelica en el Proyecto Nacional’, Xilotl. 101 Parajón, ‘CEPAD’s View’ (Interview with Gustavo Parajón), Christianity Today. 94 95

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chapter four of the whole population is possibly the most important strength of the revolution.”102

Parajón was also very careful never to criticise the Sandinistas, which has led Christian freelance journalist Deann Alford (a Christianity Today contributor), who has interviewed him several times, to wonder if he is a Sandinista apologist.103 The IRD, too, regarded Parajón as an uncritical apologist for the Sandinistas.104 For their part, Evangelicals were highly suspicious of CEPAD. It is widely believed that Parajón secretly recorded business meetings with Evangelicals and then passed them on to the DGSE.105 Félix Rosales also explained how he understood CEPAD helped to smuggle arms into the country, hidden in sacks filled with rice and beans, before the revolution. He especially singles out Sixto Ulloa in this regard.106 A pastor who was an old friend of Sixto Ulloa echoes this view.107 Of course, Sixto Ulloa totally denies these accusations.108 Yet such stories simply will not go away. Clearly, this is because CEPAD’s leaders at the very least lent strong support to the Sandinista project, as demonstrated above. One need only look at some of the material produced by CEPAD in its publication Reflexión, or some of its statements in the Nicaraguan press, or associations with the religious left in the U.S. in the 1980s, in order to see that CEPAD’s leadership (as opposed to the assembly as a whole) had strong liberation theology tendencies and fell quite strongly within the religious left’s camp. Even today it counts Garth Hewitt, a radical British clergyman highly critical of Israel and who lobbies on behalf of the Palestinians, among its closest overseas friends.109 Apparently, CEPAD even had some contact with FSLN guerrillas in Costa Rica in the lead up to the revolution.110 Clearly, then, it is not surprising that CEPAD and the Frente appeared

Parajón. in Xilotl, op. cit. Deann Alford, e-mail correspondence, 23 February 2004. 104 Beth Spring, ‘Evangelical Groups With Differing Views Consider Joint Trip to Nicaragua,’ Christianity Today, 19 April 1985, 64. 105 Parajón himself told me of this accusation, which appears in Kate Rafferty’s IRD interview, during our telephone conversation. 106 Interview with Félix Rosales. 107 Conversation, May 2004, Managua. He wished to remain anonymous on account of that friendship. 108 Interview with Sixto Ulloa. 109 Gilberto Aguirre told me of CEPAD’s close friendship and links with Garth Hewitt during out interview. 110 Interview with Sixto Ulloa. Gilberto Aguirre denied it represented anything other than a chance meeting with the guerrillas. 102 103

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to make such natural bedfellows, and that CEPAD’s leaders should lend the revolutionary government strong support. Pro-Revolutionary Pentecostals While the majority of Pentecostals were suspicious of the Sandinistas (discussed below), some AoG members embraced the revolution with enthusiasm. Rebel AoG evangelist Miguel Angel Casco explained how liberation theology influenced him while studying at the Baptist theological seminary in Managua. He embraced ecumenism and became co-director of the pro-Sandinista Centro Antonio Valdivieso, working with Fr. Uriel Molina.111 Casco and two other AoG rebels, Carlos Escorcia and Oscar Godoy, went on to form the Movimiento de Pastores Revolucionarios (Movement of Revolutionary Pastors, MPR). Casco said: We wrote a weekly piece in the Nuevo Diario, as well as doing radio and TV programmes. We established a radio show on the only Protestant radio station at the time, Ondas de Luz. The programme was called ‘The Voice of the Gospel in the Revolution’, which I directed. We were trying to influence the churches, as well as the Frente Sandinista, because at first the Sandinistas regarded all the churches as sects. So I had to prepare a paper explaining the difference between a sect and a denomination.112

This paper, written in 1980, was his first Sandinista contribution. By the 1990s, Casco was a member of the Sandinista National Directorate. MPR only lasted a year. In a later interview, Casco spoke of a meeting with AoG officials to discuss the tensions within the denomination that MPR had caused. During the meeting an ultimatum was issued by denominational officials: remain in either the AoG or the MPR. Membership of both would not be tolerated. Casco and his colleagues decided to dissolve MPR, but tensions between denominational leaders and the rebels still remained. This is perhaps not too surprising, given how radical the latter were. They churned out various circulars, briefings and other documents littered with revolutionary slogans, liberation theology and izquierdista ideology.113 For example, Casco produced a poem Interview with Miguel Angel Casco, 16 February 2004. Ibid. Details of this radio programme were advertised in La Barricada when it was first broadcast. 113 There are various such documents. See, for example, Miguel Angel Casco G., Juventud Cristiana y Sociedad (undated circular); and Comunidad de la Comisión de Pastores Evangélicos Nicaragüenses, undated declaration signed by 11 Protestants, including Escorcia, 111 112

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extolling the virtues of the revolution,114 while Carlos Escorcia was not only on the editorial board of the CEPAD bulletin Reflexión, but in one CEPAD meeting pushed very hard for close dialogue and cooperation with the Frente.115 He also had his own direct line of communication to the Frente.116 Tensions were acute. For example, an AoG meeting concerning Escorcia’s behaviour was clearly heated, as the minutes indicate.117 Casco explains that the rebels challenged denominational leaders on ideological issues, while AoG officials limited themselves to discussing minor, petty issues in order to besmirch their names.118 Eventually, around 1985 five or six revolutionary Pentecostals were expelled from the denomination.119 Apart from MPR, Godoy, Escorcia and Casco also founded several other fledgling revolutionary Protestant groups, including ANPEN (Asociación Nacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua) and CEPRES (Concilio Evangélico de Promoción Social). The latter included representatives from other denominations. CEPRES strongly supported the Sandinistas,120 and Oscar Godoy went on to become the first Nicaraguan Pentecostal to take up a post in government. Though small in number these pro-revolutionary leaders were very vocal. The Norwegian Pentecostal missionary Burger Sandli believed this was because of their links with the government.121 This strong support for the Sandinistas brought them into severe conflict with AoG leaders. Casco said it also brought them into conflict with the vast majority of AoG members because it was widely held among rank-and-file members that to get involved in politics was sinful.122 (Ironically, some AoG pastors are now involved in politics; for example, Guillermo Osorno now heads the Partido Camino Cristiano Nicaragüense and has stood Godoy, Casco, and several other well-known revolutionary Protestants, most notably Rodolfo Fonseca (cousin of comandante Walter Ferrety) and Baptist José Miguel Torres (mimeo). 114 Miguel Angel Casco, Nicaragua Está de Parto. Poem, dated August 1980. 115 CEPAD meeting minutes, 11 September 1980. 116 Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005. 117 Asambleas de Dios, Acta (meeting minutes), 29 July 1980, Managua. 118 Conversation with Miguel Angel Casco, who provided a running commentary as we went through the documents in his archive, 24 May 2004. 119 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco, 24 May 2004. 120 Reflected in CEPRES’ governing document, CEPRES. Acta No. 1 De La Asamblea General. Managua: CEPRES, 17 December 1986. CEPRES was born out of several antecedents, and thus stretches back earlier. 121 Interview with Burger Sandli. 122 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco, 16 February 2004.

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in elections). Carlos Escorcia was especially bitter about the way the rebels were treated by the AoG leadership, which suspended them: They unleashed an ideological witch hunt against all church members and ministers, mostly young ministers, who sympathised with the Sandinista government. The Assemblies of God is the most strongly ideological, intolerant (church) in Nicaragua with a bitter and violent anti-Sandinista approach. A minister could have—and it did happen in fact, several times—a minister could have an affair with a woman, be suspended, removed from his church, and then treated like a wounded brother. A minister could have a drinking problem—and a few did at some point—he would be suspended and removed from his local congregation, and undergo spiritual therapy and be treated in a loving way as a fallen brother that warranted and deserved the understanding and love of his fellow ministers. But the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, the sin that would never and was never forgiven, was the sin of becoming a Sandinista sympathiser. That was the sin against the Holy Spirit. The person would not only be suspended and separated, but vilified and treated like a demon-possessed human being.123

It is clear the majority of AoG leaders at that time regarded the actions of Godoy, Escorcia and Casco as unforgivable. Vice-superintendent of the AoG Rafael Arista spoke of them with barely concealed disdain.124 Bartolomé Matamoros even disputed their Christian credentials, aiming his strongest criticism at Casco, who he alleged had benefited greatly from the revolution.125 Clearly, the ideological differences were insurmountable. For example, Escorcia spoke of a hearing held by the denomination (he referred to it as a “kangaroo court”), during which he was accused of switching loyalties from Jesus to Sandino. An angry Escorcia detailed how he was the son of a well-known conservative AoG pastor (the church planter detailed in Chapter 2), yet . . . They dared to call me an infiltrated agent of the Sandinista government in the church. They knew who I was, many of them babysat me when I was a baby, the same (people) that‘ court-martialled’ me knew me since I was a baby. And they still dared to accuse me of being infiltrated by the Sandinista government in the church.126

Escorcia’s bitterness may not just be attributable to his revolutionary zeal. It is true he had radical tendencies. But according to Gustavo 123 124 125 126

Interview Interview Interview Interview

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with with with with

Carlos Escorcia. Rafael Arista, 8 June 1999, Managua. Bartolomé Matamoros. Carlos Escorcia.

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Parajón, prior to the insurrection of 1978–9, when Escorcia would visit him at his office to chat and voice his concerns (17 AoG members died in the insurrection),127 he took a very traditional Pentecostal line of not meddling in politics. (This only began to change as the crisis deepened).128 However, Escorcia detailed apparent shoddy treatment of his father, the denomination’s well-known church planter, who had run into problems with local Pentecostals concerning property rights of his church. According to Escorcia, the denomination’s unwillingness to intervene appears to have caused his father severe financial difficulties.129 David Spencer also intimated Escorcia’s father may not have been treated fairly.130 Other than these AoG rebels, there were several other Evangelical leaders closely associated with the revolution. Nicanor Mairena, a Nazarene pastor (later superintendent of his denomination) was one of a group of ten Evangelical pastors brought to the U.S. in 1984 by Evangelicals for Social Action to tour the country and share their experiences of religious life in Nicaragua. At one meeting, Mairena stated: I was educated under the control of the North Americans. They prohibited us from politics. I accepted that. But after three years of the revolution, I have become convinced of the opposite . . . In the first place, it is necessary for the soul to be saved. In the second place, it is necessary for the body to be saved—from illness, from malnutrition, from illiteracy. How can someone serve the Lord well if he is undernourished?131

Mairena was one of several pro-revolutionary Protestants appearing several times as a Sandinista apologist in the Christian press. Another was Rodolfo Fonseca, a Church of God pastor (later, the denomination’s superintendent). Fonseca told Christianity Today how he had decided to acquire a weapon to use in the insurrection, if God required it.132 In another interview, Fonseca and Mairena both spoke of how they had been discouraged by North American missionaries from becoming involved in politics.133 Fonseca spoke disparagingly of blond haired, 127 Ray Jacobs, ‘Lasting Peace for Nicaragua’s Hurting’, Pentecostal Evangel, 18 April 1993, 10. 128 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 24 January 2005. 129 Interview with Carlos Escorcia. 130 Telephone conversation with David Spencer, 11 March 2004. 131 Beth Spring, ‘Does the Sandinista Regime Promote Religious Freedom?’ Christianity Today, 23 November 1984, 43–44. 132 ‘Nicaragua: The Shaking and Shifting of the Church’, Christianity Today. 133 Minnery, ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua’, Christianity Today.

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blue-eyed missionaries who taught him to be apolitical, while Marxists were doing what they ought to be doing as pastors. Fonseca is an interesting character. Bienvenido López (superintendent of the Church of God in the late 1990s) explained how Fonseca sought to persuade the elderly Superintendent Guadalupe, a critic of the Sandinistas, to leave the country. López believed Fonseca was a Sandinista supporter but could not prove it. This was because he was the first cousin of senior comandante and Chief of Police, Walter Ferrety. When López learned that Fonseca had spoken in favour of the Sandinistas in the foreign press, he was flabbergasted, especially as Fonseca had presented himself politically on the right in order to secure the superintendency of his denomination.134 Evangelical Apoliticism and Opposition After the 1979 revolution many Evangelicals expressed concern over a new government they knew little about. Some fled the country. The North American AoG pulled out all its missionaries.135 Carlos Escorcia mocked their actions, declaring they had nothing to fear.136 Interestingly, Bartolomé Matamoros was equally scathing, saying they left Nicaraguan Pentecostals to their own devices at a time when they needed their help most.137 It is certainly true that they left behind an inexperienced pastorate. Rafael Arista (now AoG vice-superintendent) details how many veteran leaders fled the country with the missionaries, leaving the denomination in the charge of mainly youthful and inexperienced pastors.138 At first, some Evangelicals were willing to give the revolution a chance, while others were convinced the Sandinistas were Communists who would soon come after the church.139 But on the whole, many Evangelicals were also fed up with the Somoza regime and therefore Interview with Bienvenido López. Interviews with Rafael Arista and Bartolomé Matamoros. 136 Interview with Carlos Escorcia. 137 Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Missionary Loren Triplett, however, says the local leadership was being trained to take over the national denomination some years before, so that the missionaries’ departure was not problematic (Loren Triplett, ‘What Happened to the Church in Nicaragua?’, Pentecostal Evangel, 25 May 1980, 13). 138 Interview with Rafael Arista. 139 See, for example, Sywulka, ‘Aftermath of Nicaragua’s Civil War: Church and State Regroup,’ Christianity Today. 134 135

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willing to wait and see what transpired. When asked about initial Evangelical responses to the revolution, CNPEN President Félix Rosales said it was time for a change: We didn’t have as Evangelicals any problem with the Somoza government . . . We didn’t receive any problem as the church, but we saw a lot of injustice that the army was doing at that time. This is why when the revolution came it was like a hope that something much better will start.140

Arista also says the Sandinistas enjoyed widespread support immediately after the revolution.141 Saturnino Cerrato explained how the Sandinistas’ message concerning the creation of a paradise for all sectors of society struck a note with him and others, though deep down he was convinced it was too good to be true.142 However, within a short time Evangelicals had become suspicious, even fearful, of the Sandinistas’ motives and actions. Their emphasis on the local neighbourhood defence committees (CDS), modelled on their Cuban equivalent, alarmed many. Félix Rosales said that the CDS, together with talk of controlling the church and economy, made Christians fear another Cuba.143 Rafael Arista also spoke negatively of the CDS, as well as the new Sandinista philosophy—Marxism—aimed at brainwashing the Nicaraguan people.144 Roberto Rojas regarded the Sandinistas as Marxist-Leninist, even the Tercerista faction. Once the Sandinistas were in power, Rojas maintains, they made no secret of the fact they were Marxists, whether on television or in the schools. He believed they were also, by and large, atheists.145 Though they had expensive houses and large salaries, Guillermo Ayala said they spoke and acted like Marxists.146 Mario Espinoza echoed similar views, while Saturnino Cerrato said their communism made them want to control the church.147 Other Protestants recognised how Pentecostals perceived the Sandinistas as communists.148 Given what Evangelicals saw and heard, which is discussed in the next 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

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Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Rafael Arista. Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Rafael Arista. Interview with Roberto Rojas. Interview with Guillermo Ayala. Interviews with Mario Espinoza and Saturnino Cerrato (1999). Interview with Amalia Bell, 4 June 1999, Managua.

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chapter, it is not difficult to see why they believed the Sandinistas were communist. Did conservative Protestants react publicly against the Sandinistas? Several faith-healing, charismatic pastors urged followers to ignore the government’s vaccination programme.149 It is also suggested some Pentecostal pastors preached openly against the Sandinistas from their pulpits, comparing them with the Antichrist and the Beast from the book of Revelation.150 Carlos Escorcia referred to confrontation between AoG leaders and the Sandinista government: The official position of the Assemblies of God, and that includes individuals like Saturnino Cerrato and Bartolomé Matamoros, was to oppose and to confront the Sandinista government.151

Escorcia detailed how Romans 13:1 (“Everyone is to be in subjection to the governing authorities . . .”), was replaced with Acts 5:29 (“We must obey God rather than men”) when the Sandinistas came to power. Thus, Escorcia believes “It became a task of the (AoG) church to resists, to oppose, and to confront by all means the Sandinista government.”152 Several studies detailed in Chapter 1 also refer to how some individuals, most notably CAM pastor Boanerges Mendoza, were open and aggressive in their vocal denunciation of the Sandinistas. This is confirmed by some of the people I interviewed. However, while conservative Protestant criticism of the Sandinistas cannot be denied (ideological differences are explored in the next chapter), the available evidence suggests isolated incidences of criticism, particularly during the early years of the revolution, rather than widespread confrontation with the authorities. The 1982 crackdown made dissent almost impossible. Saturnino Cerrato explained how one could not speak openly against the Sandinistas—to do so invited arrest.153 Others concur.154 Bartolomé Matamoros said Christians were left alone as long as they acted as expected. But any form of dissent was immediately labelled counterrevolutionary. He also explained how

149 Minnery, ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua’, Christianity Today. But note that a similar allegation levelled at David Spencer proved untrue (see discussion, Chapter 1). 150 Interview with Amalia Bell. 151 Interview with Carlos Escorcia. 152 Ibid. 153 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). 154 For example, my interview with Rufino Soza.

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the Sandinistas did not permit neutrality or apoliticism.155 Rufino Soza agreed, stating how everyone was expected, through the CDS, to participate fully in the revolution: We did not attend the local CDS meetings, and so they would not let us have proper food. We had to make do with very poor quality stuff, rather than the better stuff everyone else received. If we did not sing the hymn, “Patria Libre o Morir” [Free Homeland or Death], we were considered counterrevolutionary.156

Rafael Arista, too, referred to how a lack of revolutionary participation labelled one a counterrevolutionary.157 The Pentecostal Evangel confirms the AoG always sought to remain resolutely apolitical and neutral.158 Nonetheless, despite seeking to avoid politics, Evangelicals tried hard to be law-abiding citizens. At a 1986 press conference, Jimmy Hassan (Nicaraguan Director of Campus Crusade for Christ) described his arrest and interrogation by DGSE officials during the 1985 extension of the state of emergency. He described how Evangelicals faced problems despite always respecting the law.159 All this evidence suggests it is unlikely the vast majority of conservative Protestants spoke out openly and aggressively against the Sandinistas. It is more likely such cases were isolated incidents during the early stages of the regime. But the 1982 crackdown, the taking of the temples, and mob violence against dissenting Christians (Protestant and Catholic) quelled open dissent. Neither could the Sandinistas be denounced from the pulpits; many pastors explained how the local CDS would often send people around to listen to sermons (discussed in the next chapter). So the majority of Evangelicals sought to remain aloof from politics, keeping their heads down and getting on with their ministry. Certainly in the case of the AoG, they sought to express themselves in a respectful and non-confrontational manor. For example, a letter sent to the government via Gustavo Parajón (CEPAD was the appointed mediator between the various Protestant Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interview with Rufino Soza. 157 Interview with Rafael Arista. 158 ‘Nicaraguan A/G Plans to Double Churches in ‘87’, Pentecostal Evangel, 29 March 1987, 28. 159 Beth Spring, ‘Campus Crusade Director Describes Government Harassment of Evangelicals’, Christianity Today, 7 Feb. 1986, 52–3. See also Institute of Religion and Democracy, State of Siege: Nicaragua’s Protestants. A Press Conference with Jimmy Hassan (Washington: IRD, Briefing paper No. 7, February 1986). 155 156

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churches and the Frente) expressing a desire that their members’ military service be carried out in their local communities, refers to the “wisdom of our lawmakers” and speaks respectfully of the revolutionary process.160 It appears, then, that when Escorcia refers to anti-Sandinista rhetoric within the AoG, it was an attempt to quell revolutionary sentiment among its own ranks, rather than confront the authorities per se. Saturnino Cerrato denies the denomination ever tried to quash people’s personal political views: “As a church we have never tried to harmonise the minds of our people. So, there were many Assemblies of God [people] who were Sandinista, even today.”161 But clearly, this political freedom did not extend to its own pastors, who were all expected to toe the same ideological line. Thus, Miguel Angel Casco explains how the rebels’ support for the revolution caused problems with leaders and Pentecostal grassroots, especially as they had been taught by North American missionaries that to engage in politics was sinful.162 One issue, however, that many Protestants publicly disapproved of was Servicio Militar Patriótico (SMP). This was a major cause of Pentecostal-Sandinista tension. Most pastors interviewed were unhappy with the draft because they regarded the war as a defence of an ideology (sandinismo), rather than their country. Given that the Sandinista ideology was diametrically opposed to their own, it was inevitable that they would reject the draft, which in turn caused further deterioration of relations. This is discussed in the next chapter. If Evangelicals kept their political opinions to themselves, Moravian Miskitos did not. Casco suggests the Miskito-Indian war was predominantly an ethnic rather than a religious problem.163 Yet Joseph Douglas, an Atlantic coast schoolteacher who eventually joined the Contras, argues it was the Miskitos’ strong Moravian beliefs, which permeated every aspect of their lives, that the Sandinistas sought to stamp out.164 The Miskitos responded with force, and a small group of Moravian pastors joined Miskito guerrillas to fight against government forces. Subsequently, other Moravian pastors found themselves in an impossible Letter addressed to Gustavo Parajón via CEPAD from the Assemblies of God headquarters, Managua, 18 August 1983, signed by Juan Simón Videa, Bartolomé Matamoros and Saturnino Cerrato. 161 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). 162 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco, 16 February 2004. 163 Ibid. 164 Telephone interview with Joseph Douglas, 22 February 2004. 160

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situation. Gerald Schlabach quotes one Moravian leader, Norman Bent, who found himself caught in the middle: I am the meat of the sandwich . . .The revolutionary leadership does not trust me because I am a church leader of the Indian people. Neither am I trusted by my own people, because of my revolutionary approach to interpreting Scriptures.165

Schlabach also explains how Mennonites reacted to the revolution. Many, especially the young, fully supported its social programs. Yet the majority were dismayed by the ideological challenges they faced. As Mennonites they baulked at having to get involved in revolutionary politics, even though they supported Sandinista social aims. Thus, some pacifist Mennonites were labelled counterrevolutionary, hassled, and even refused ration cards.166 Evangelical leaders, then, on the whole were generally united in their initial worries about the new Sandinista government. Later, they rejected sandinismo on ideological grounds. This view was, for the most part, echoed by grassroots Evangelicals (see discussion below, together with Casco’s comments about their pro-revolutionary stance causing widespread dismay among AoG rank-and-file members). Whereas CEPAD was associated with Christians who were pro-revolutionary, Evangelical pastors who did not support the revolution quickly joined CNPEN.167 Yet CNPEN was not a political movement. Félix Rosales, its second president, stated: “We want to win the whole country for Christ, so we don’t want to be identified with either side.”168 Again, CNPEN stressed its apoliticism and a desire simply to preach the Gospel.169 However, as an ideological foe of the Sandinistas, the government refused to grant CNPEN its much-needed legal status.170 Moreover, ideological differences between CNPEN and CEPAD, especially given CEPAD’s close cooperation with the Sandinistas, would also cause further problems for Evangelicals.

Gerald Schlabach, ‘Nicaragua’, Mennonite Quarterly Review 58 (Aug. 1984), 377. Ibid., 375. 167 Conversation with Albino Meléndez. 168 ‘Nicaraguan Evangelical Leader Addresses American Evangelicals’, Pentecostal Evangel, 15 September 1985, 27. 169 Lee, ‘Ministry Amid Adversity’, Christianity Today. 170 Beth Spring, ‘Tensions Between Church and State in Nicaragua Pose Dilemma for U.S. Christians’, Christianity Today, 6 September 1985, 54–56. 165 166

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Which Represented the Majority Protestant View? Which of these two constituencies was larger? While acknowledging some polarisation of opinion, it is often assumed that the majority of Protestants, as represented by CEPAD, were generally united in their support for the Sandinistas. For example, Christianity Today initially stated that CEPAD represented 96% of the country’s 250,000 Protestants.171 Tom Minnery later put that figure at 80% of Nicaragua’s 400,000 Protestants,172 while Beth Spring echoed the 80% figure several years later.173 Rod Jellema spoke of 85% of Protestants “unified within a miracle of an evangelical organisation called CEPAD”.174 Also, CEPAD executive Albino Meléndez spoke of 76 member denominations within the church council.175 Clearly, a lot is made of the number of groups CEPAD represented. Yet Kate Rafferty argues that the large number of denominations within CEPAD belies the fact that many such groups were very small, with some representing just one or two congregations.176 Indeed, this is confirmed in the breakdown of groups and denominations set out in the 1978 INDEF directory of Nicaraguan churches and ministries.177 There are other contradictions. David Stoll points out how many pastors belonged both to CEPAD and CNPEN.178 Also, one must differentiate between CEPAD’s executive and its church assembly. For example, the latter included the AoG, which disagreed strongly with CEPAD leaders’ support for the revolution. Moreover, meeting minutes demonstrate that CEPAD business meetings, which decided CEPAD policy, were small, with typically only 25 or 30 attendees.179 Thus CEPAD executive policy was not necessarily shared by the various groups it claimed to represent.

171 ‘Church Also is Transformed by Nicaragua’s Revolution’, Christianity Today, 25 Jan. 1980, 50–52. 172 Minnery, ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua’, Christianity Today. 173 Spring, ‘Does the Sandinista Regime Promote Religious Freedom’, Christianity Today. 174 Rod Jemella, ‘Our Gift From the Poor in Nicaragua’, The Banner, 26 May 1986, 9. 175 Conversation with Albino Meléndez. 176 IRD, Who Speaks for Nicaragua’s Evangelicals? 177 INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias, 11–25. 178 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 246. 179 Acta (Asamblea General del CEPAD), 11 September 1980 and 13 November 1980.

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Some also point to the Declaration of the 500 at RIPEN 2 as evidence of overwhelming Protestant support for the revolution (notably Michael Dodson, see Chapter 1). Miguel Angel Casco attended RIPEN 2 and believes all those present were pastors.180 But others attendees disagree. Raul Carazo, a pro-Sandinista ex-seminarian, suggested only around 300–350 were actual leaders.181 Arnulfo Sánchez, who also attended RIPEN 2, echoes a similar figure. Moreover, he explains how the participants of RIPEN 2 were not exclusively Protestant; some Catholics also attended.182 Félix Rosales puts the proportion of actual pastors at RIPEN 2 at no more than 60%.183 Besides, the declaration at RIPEN 2 meant very little. All it demonstrated was initial euphoria for the revolution. It is clear the majority of Nicaraguans, regardless of class or political persuasion, were glad to see Somoza go. Most Protestants I interviewed expressed a similar view. As Arnulfo Sánchez explains, this was still a honeymoon period for the Sandinistas: “They had not yet started to pull out fingernails!”184 Gilberto Aguirre also confirms an initial honeymoon period, and that Pentecostals really only began to change their views of the government around a year after the revolution.185 Thus, suggestions that RIPEN 2 represented majority support for the Frente are fundamentally flawed. On the other hand, David Stoll details CNPEN’s claims to represent 520 pastors in 1985, and many more in spirit,186 while CNPEN’s Félix Rosales claimed the organisation counted many more pastors than this figure among its leaders.187 Clearly, it was drawing on a new influx of pastors resulting from an explosion of Pentecostalism in 1980s Nicaragua (see discussion below). How representative was the pro-revolutionary AoG movement? Miguel Angel Casco spoke of 60–70 AoG pastors and leaders within MPR.188 However, ex-superintendent Bartolomé Matamoros was dismissive of this figure, insisting Casco’s group of rebels were nothing

180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188

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Conversation with Miguel Angel Casco, 24 May 2004, CEPRES office, Managua. Interview with Raul Carazo. Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez. Interview with Félix Rosales. Ibid. Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 242. Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Miguel Angel Casco (February 2004).

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(‘nada’), insignificant. He explained how, if someone offered a poor rural pastor or deacon a few dollars for his support, he would gladly say, “I’m with you”, especially if they were hungry.189 Testimony from Casco’s fellow MPR rebel, Carlos Escorcia, would appear to corroborate Matamoros’ statement. He referred to a very small group of pro-revolutionary AoG pastors. He did, however, affirm some support among the campesinos, citing an event in a soccer stadium in the mid 1980s attended by about 10,000 people. Escorcia observes, “That was the peak of the movement. We never got bigger than that”.190 Yet this was a CEPRES event, and therefore ecumenical, rather than exclusively revolutionary Pentecostal. Casco’s figure of 60+ MPR pastors and leaders appears inflated, especially as Bartolomé Matamoros numbered AoG churches some time before the revolution at fewer than a hundred, while the first ever directory of Protestant churches produced in 1980 put them at 159.191 It may be that Casco was using the term ‘pastor’ in a more liberal Nicaraguan sense. Félix Rosales indicated how ‘leader’ could mean pastor, elder, deacon, and so on.192 Clifton Holland also said the term is used very loosely, meaning anyone in a position of leadership, regardless of training.193 Significantly, whenever Pentecostals were asked which AoG individuals supported the revolution, the same three names—Escorcia, Godoy and Casco—are always cited. Escorcia was asked several times to name other rebels, but he never got beyond these three. Likewise, Casco only named several, including a pastor called Roberto Chacón and Antonio Videa (brother of the AoG superintendent Juan Simón Videa). No one in the AoG I interviewed had heard of Chacón, though Félix Rosales believed he might be a Baptist, not Pentecostal.194 Bartolomé Matamoros was not convinced that Antonio Videa was truly revolutionary, suggesting there were several like Videa who sat on the fence.195 A Christianity Today report also refers to a pro-Sandinista pastor in León by the name of Pablo Santiago Picado

189 190 191 192 193 194 195

Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interview with Carlos Escorcia. INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias, 13. Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Clifton Holland. Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros.

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Medina.196 Finally, Abelino Martínez refers to an Assemblies pastor by the name of Mariano Escorcia.197 However, neither Casco, Escorcia nor anyone else I spoke with had ever heard of him. Moreover, if, as Harold Robleto stated, CEPRES’ membership was composed of only 40 or so pastors,198 this makes MPR all the smaller, given that Miguel Angel Casco describes CEPRES as much bigger than MPR.199 Clearly, then, pro-revolutionary AoG pastors, whether involved in MPR or CEPRES, represented a small minority. This was also the case of another revolutionary movement associated with Godoy, Casco and Escorcia—ANPEN. Miguel Angel Casco showed me ANPEN’s membership role, which listed just 50 or so members. Yet many were not AoG pastors, while several others were senior officials within CEPAD. Moreover, the list included several conservative pastors who were arrested by the Sandinistas in 1985, notably Félix Rosales and Guillermo Ayala.200 When asked about this, Casco explained they did not belong to any organisation and probably saw the need to belong to something with a personería jurídica.201 Gilberto Aguirre agreed.202 Whatever the reason, it demonstrates that not all ANPEN members were necessarily revolutionaries. Carlos Escorcia details how their political stance made them well known in the Nicaraguan press.203 (Escorcia and Casco still write pieces for the pro-Sandinista newspaper El Nuevo Diario). They are certainly well-known within Nicaraguan AoG circles—most leaders I spoke with knew of them. But Gilberto Aguirre suggests these rebels were actually little-known in the country.204 Sixto Ulloa was also very dismissive of Casco’s small organisations, stating they did not have un respeto interdenominacional (interdenominational respect).205 Interestingly, it appears there was some rivalry between Ulloa and Casco for the attention of the Sandinistas (both went on to become Sandinista diputados). Ulloa states:

196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205

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Minnery, ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua’, Christianity Today. Martínez, Sectas en Nicaragua, 48. Interview with Harold Robleto. Interview with Miguel Angel Casco (February 2004). ANPEN, Lista de Pastores Miembros de la Asociación (undated membership roll). Telephone conversation with Miguel Angel Casco, 24 May 2004. Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. Interview with Carlos Escorcia. Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. Interview with Sixto Ulloa.

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Miguel Angel Casco put together a group in those days which he made look like it had government backing, part of the government, that it was revolutionary. Only Sandinista pastors joined it.206

Gilberto Aguirre explained how Casco, Escorcia and Godoy wanted to work with the government independently of CEPAD. Apparently, this caused problems. Casco states: In 1985 we in CEPRES held a pro-revolutionary meeting and invited Carlos Nuñez, but when Sixto Ulloa learned about this he got angry as we had not done it through him. He wanted to control all political links with the Sandinistas.207

When I later asked Escorcia if he had to go through Sixto Ulloa to speak with the Frente, he responded: “No, I didn’t have to go through Sixto. I had my (own) direct line of communication with the party.”208 What of grassroots Evangelical support for the revolution? The leaders I interviewed, whether pro- or anti- Sandinista, who hazarded a guess about the total percentage of Pentecostals who supported or rejected the Frente were remarkably close in their assessments. Harold Robleto suggested some 70% of grassroots Pentecostals did not support the Frente, while around 20% did, with some 10% undecided.209 Raul Carazo and Miguel Angel Casco estimated 30% support for the Frente among the Pentecostal masses.210 These assessments tallied closely with Benjamín Cortés’ view that progressive Pentecostals represented about a third of the movement’s population.211 Voting patterns of Pentecostals discussed below strongly support this assessment. Clearly, pro-revolutionary Protestants were a small minority, while CEPAD was not representative at all of Protestant perceptions of the Sandinistas. What additional documentary evidence supports this assertion? The first ever directory of Protestant churches, organisations and ministers in Nicaragua ( jointly published by INDEF and CEPAD) recorded 78,387 official members of Protestant churches in 1978.212 Using the report, Clifton Holland’s formula estimated actual attendance at about

206 207 208 209 210 211 212

Ibid. Conversation with Miguel Angel Casco (May 2004). Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005. Interview with Harold Robleto. Interviews with Raul Carazo and Miguel Angel Casco (May 2004). Interview with Benjamín Cortés. INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias, 25.

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281,000 in 1978.213 Whereas Pentecostals represented only around 10% of the Protestant population in 1950, by 1978 this had risen to 45%.214 Meanwhile, the historic churches saw little growth during this period. Thus, Pentecostal growth up to 1978 had radically altered the nature of Nicaraguan Protestantism. However, during the first half of the 1980s Pentecostalism witnessed a further explosion that was far more significant than growth up to 1978. Andres Opazo Bernales categorises Protestant churches into three groups—Historic, Holiness, and Pentecostal—and then compares the total number of congregations within each in 1980 and 1986.215 In 1980, Opazo recorded a total of 1284 Protestants congregations in Nicaragua: 307 within the Historic churches, 295 Holiness congregations, and 682 Pentecostal congregations. Thus Pentecostalism accounted for well over half of Nicaragua’s Protestant congregations in 1980. Meanwhile, a comparison of each denomination’s church-members ratio (calculable from the INDEF/CEPAD report) suggests Pentecostal congregations in 1978 were, if anything, larger than their historic counterparts. But the real significance of Opazo’s study is how the numbers of congregations had swollen by 1986. By that year, the Historic churches had added a further 48 congregations to reach 355. Meanwhile, Holiness congregations (many of them Evangelical) had increased by 116 to 411. But Pentecostalism saw their already large number of congregations treble from 682 to 2012! Even if Pentecostal congregations were no larger than their Historic or Holiness counterparts (an unlikely assumption, given the movement’s massive growth in Nicaragua and across Central America compared with those churches), it still accounted for at least 70–75% of the total Protestant population. Neither does this take into account those non-Pentecostal churches that were also Evangelical. Thus Evangelicalism represented roughly half of Nicaragua’s Protestants in 1980, and anything between 75 and 85% by the mid 1980s. Such growth is borne out by other sources. Reporting on the invasion of the sects, the Sandinistas’ own newspaper spoke of some 350 AoG churches in 1982.216 Bearing in mind it was published several years later, a 1987 Pentecostal Evangel estimate was more conservative, speaking of at least 400 churches, 450 ministers, and some 60,000 adherents 213 214 215 216

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Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 5. Ibid., 14. In Samandú, Protestantismos y Procesos Sociales en Centroamérica, 32–4.. ‘Quienes son los que dividen a los evangélicos?’ La Barricada, 4 March 1982.

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within the AoG alone.217 In 1984, Charisma magazine referred to large growth within Nicaragua’s second largest Pentecostal denomination (the Church of God), so that by 1984 it had nearly 150 churches with almost 10,000 members.218 Bienvenido López (later, the denomination’s superintendent) confirms large Church of God growth, especially within the prisons. Growth is also verified by other Evangelical leaders. Bartolomé Matamoros spoke of many hundreds of AoG churches by the late 1980s.219 American missionary Bob Trolese explained how Pentecostal growth outstripped that of historic churches.220 Saturnino Cerrato estimated that in the 1980s Pentecostals represented at least 70% of the total Protestant population.221 Others concur.222 Without doubt, the massive growth enjoyed by Pentecostalism in the 1980s ensured Evangelicals represented the majority of the country’s Protestants throughout the Sandinista period, ranging from about 55% during the early years, to at least 75% in 1986, and possibly as high as 85% by 1990. There is simply too much evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, which comes from across the denominational spectrum by supporters and opponents of the Sandinistas, to conclude otherwise. Reference has been made to the almost homogenous non-revolutionary stance of Evangelical leaders. But did grassroots Evangelicals share the same political concerns expressed by their pastors? There is evidence to suggest they did. A very useful study by Roberto Zub, exploring Protestant voting habits in Managua during the 1990 election that ousted the Sandinistas, sheds valuable light on the political views of grassroots Evangelicals at the end of the Sandinista period.223 The study limits its research to six denominations. Three of these were Pentecostal (AoG, Church of God, Foursquare Church), another was a non-Pentecostal Evangelical group (Christian Mission), and the remaining two were historic churches (Baptists and Church of Christ). Thus, Zub’s study helps to provide some concrete indication of how Evangelicals voted. Zub’s methodology includes seeking the opinion of a proportional cross section of interviewees for each denomination, ranging from 217 218 219 220 221 222 223

‘Nicaraguan A/G Plans to Double Churches in ‘87’, Pentecostal Evangel. As reported by Charisma magazine, November 1984, 114. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interview with Bob Trolese. Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). Interviews with Mario Espinoza and Miguel Angel Casco (February 2004). Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones en Nicaragua.

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leaders to laity,224 and taking into account income,225 education,226 and profession.227 The voting patterns recorded by Zub’s team strongly support the view that the majority of grassroots Evangelicals sided with their church leaders. Among AoG members interviewed, 60.7% voted for Violeta Chamorro’s UNO opposition alliance, 19.6% voted for the Sandinistas, while 10.7% abstained. Nearly 70% of the Pentecostal Foursquare denomination voted for UNO, and only 15.6% for the Frente. Within the Church of God, Nicaragua’s second largest Pentecostal denomination after the AoG, 38.5% voted for UNO, while 23.1% voted for the Frente. However, some 13% did not vote, while over 20% supported other political parties.228 These figures indicate, in Managua at least, that the vast majority of grassroots Pentecostals (and by extension, Evangelicals) shared the same views as their leaders. This fits in with Miguel Angel Casco’s explanation of how, when he, Escorcia and Godoy had supported the Sandinistas, the rebels faced the wrath not only of their leaders, but also of the majority of grassroots Pentecostals.229 It is also surely significant that the 1990 election came after several years of rapprochement by the Sandinistas, during which the Frente worked hard to improve its relations with Evangelicals in the lead up to these elections. This included meeting with Evangelicals and attending several of their meetings,230 and also allowing in foreign preachers, including Jimmy Swaggart who preached in the Plaza de la Revolución, which was televised.231 Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest the 1990 election likely represented the high point of EvangelicalSandinista relations, compared with the mid 1980s and the severe and very public crackdowns associated with the 1982 and 1985 states of emergency. This analysis suggests between 20 and 25% of Evangelicals supported the Sandinistas, a not insignificant minority, but one far removed from the common view that CEPAD represented the vast majority

Ibid., 37. Ibid., 45. 226 Ibid., 50. 227 Ibid., 52. 228 Ibid., 66. 229 Ibid. 230 As described, for example, by Sixto Ulloa. 231 Boudreaux, ‘Holy Spirit Drew Him, Swaggart Says’ in Los Angeles Times. Also see Sara Diamond, Spiritual Warfare: The Politics of the Christian Right (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 35. 224 225

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of Protestants. This tallies closely with the projected percentages detailed by church leaders and discussed above. Within some of the non-Pentecostal Evangelical groups, such as the Nazarene Church, the concentration was likely higher. But as Zub’s study demonstrates, even a sizeable proportion of the historic churches he surveyed also rejected the Sandinistas. Even Episcopalians were split on their response to the Sandinistas. Anglican Dexter Cuthbert states: There was a strong belief that the whole revolution was against Christianity, the Christian belief . . . You had priests that believed in the project to build the Kingdom of God, and some that were entirely the opposite.232

An information packet produced by the Nicaraguan Episcopal church, echoes this division: The Church continues to support the government in its efforts to spread literacy and health assistance among the poor, but there are reservations among some Episcopalians concerning the ideological leanings of the government.233

Taking into account historic Protestant divisions concerning the Sandinistas; a high proportion of anti-Sandinista sentiment among nonPentecostal Evangelical churches; and an overwhelming rejection of Sandinismo among Pentecostals, who represented the majority of Protestants as early as 1980 (and at least three-quarters by 1986), it is clear that Protestant suspicion of the Sandinistas, and not CEPAD’s wholehearted support for the revolution, represented by far the majority Protestant response. Thus Evangelicals cannot be sidelined as politically insignificant. When CEPAD leaders expressed strong support for the revolution, they were simply not speaking on behalf of their members. Therefore, it is vitally important to differentiate between CEPAD as an assembly of churches, and its executive, which invoked the whole organisation to give itself legitimacy. Ironically, many of CEPAD’s leaders came from the American Baptist Association, one of the smaller denominations in Nicaragua which had experienced decline and division in the 1960s.234 Thus, Roberto Rojas says of CEPAD:

Interview with Dexter Cuthbert, 7 June 1999, Managua. Episcopalian Church, Information Packet: Nicaragua. The leaflet quoted, which is included in the pack was clearly written during the 1980s. 234 See Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 38. 232 233

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chapter four We had some (Protestants) who gave full backing to the Sandinistas. It didn’t matter what they did, they always supported the Sandinistas. So some people believed all Evangelicals supported the Sandinistas. And it was because of this, that the Sandinistas received a lot of aid. But this impression was not a correct one. They did not represent the majority of Evangelicals. In fact, these people still maintain very good relations with the Sandinistas.

The above discussion, then, demonstrates how, contrary to popular understanding, the majority of Protestants did not support the Sandinistas. RIPEN 2 was not even a landmark portrayal of historic Protestant support for the revolution, much less Evangelicalism. Gustavo Parajón concedes these divisions, though he still seeks to maintain a strong grassroots Protestant support for the revolution: The revolution was a sociological phenomenon that really polarised the Nicaraguan society, the very fabric of society, and Evangelical churches were no exception. The great majority of the leadership in the Pentecostal churches, and I’m talking now particularly of the AoG and the Church of God, were not in favor of the revolution and so they were also polarised. And of course, they did have an influence, an influence on all of the churches. But the great majority of the people, I would say, were active in some of the tasks that the revolutionary government called for all the Nicaraguans to carry out, like the ones I have mentioned, like literacy and health, and protecting the economy, with the labor that was needed to pick coffee, and so on and so forth.235

Yet participation in revolutionary social projects does not equate to support for the Sandinistas, as voting patterns have indicated. Also, some Evangelical pastors encouraged their people to take part in the brigades, picking coffee and other crops, as an alternative to SMP (this is discussed later). Moreover, grassroots Evangelicals had no choice but to participate in local neighbourhood social programs organised by the local CDS, otherwise they would have been denied ration cards. Thus, revolutionary participation does not necessarily imply, as Parajón suggests, support for the Sandinistas. CEPAD’s leaders who supported the Sandinistas were in a clear minority. Evangelicals, on the other hand, represented by far the largest Protestant constituency. Roberto Rojas spoke of the aggressiveness of Pentecostal growth, and believed this was a cause of concern for

235

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Telephone interview with Gustavo Parajón.

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the Frente.236 Mario Espinoza also believed the Sandinistas sought to control Evangelical growth.237 An analysis of the voting patterns in the 1990 elections helps to explain why. It is quite possible that the number of Evangelicals who voted against the Sandinistas may have helped to oust them from power in 1990, as discussed later. Thus, Evangelicals were more of a potent political force as far as the Sandinistas were concerned, than anyone has given them credit.

236 237

Interview with Roberto Rojas. Interview with Mario Espinoza.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT PERCEPTIONS OF SANDINISMO Traditionally, Christianity and Marxism have always been enemies. Sociologist of religion Steve Bruce speaks of “a traditional monolithic religious bloc confronted by the equally monolithic organic ideology of Communism and socialism.”1 Evangelical apologist Francis Schaeffer, while conceding Marx and Engels expressed an interest in man, argued that when their political theory was developed to its logical conclusion “man became devalued in the communist state.”2 Meanwhile, Dale Vree believes synthesising Marxism and Christianity is impossible. He argues recent attempts are only mildly successful because they are dialogues between the revisionists, or dissident, strands within each (he labels them ‘dialogical Christians’ and ‘dialogical Marxists’), rather than traditionalist, or conservative majorities within both, which are wholly incompatible. Thus, Vree speaks of two “disjunctive belief systems” hostile towards each other for more than a century.3 Throughout the twentieth century, then, most Catholics and Protestants rejected communist atheism (the product of Marxist materialism) and decried restrictions faced by churches in the East Bloc. Alasdair MacIntyre writes: Because persecution by Soviet power was designed to deny, so far as it could, any independence to the lives of the churches, Christianity had to identify itself with the cause of the anti-Communist West.4

Evangelical antipathy towards communism (especially in the U.S.) is even more acute. Steve Bruce highlights a 1988 Christianity Today poll of Evangelicals in which 54% of respondents wanted the U.S. to “work harder at fighting communism around the world.”5 Between 1958 and

Steve Bruce, Religion in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 59. Francis Schaeffer, The God Who is There (1968). Edition quoted is from the compendium Francis A. Schaeffer Trilogy (Leicester: IVP, 1990), 44. 3 Dale Vree, On Synthesizing Marxism and Christianity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), viii. 4 Alasdair Macintyre, Marxism and Christianity (London: Duckworth, 1995), v. 5 Steve Bruce, Pray TV: Televangelism in America (London: Routledge, 1990), 181–182. 1 2

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1967 the National Association of Evangelicals adopted seven resolutions condemning communism, more than any other topic it has addressed since 1942.6 Pentecostalism is especially anti-communist. Subscribing to premillennial dispensationalist eschatology (see discussion in Chapter 7) it associates biblical Gog and Magog (Ezekiel 38–39) with Russia.7 Thus, classical Pentecostals viewed the Soviet Union and East Bloc with hostility. (Pentecostal observer Dwight Wilson goes further, detailing how Pentecostal eschatology and Russian anti-Semitism make Pentecostalism anti-Russian, as well as anti-communist).8 Finally, several studies cited in Chapter 1 (especially those by David Haslam and NACLA) also highlight how Central American Evangelicalism was strongly anti-communist, while many of the Nicaraguan Evangelical leaders I interviewed expressed strong anti-communist sentiment. Clearly, then, if the Sandinistas were Marxists or communists this would have been acutely troubling for Nicaragua’s conservative Protestants, and thus have a highly detrimental effect on EvangelicalSandinista relations. Initially, Sandinista ideology was not a major issue. Mark Everingham has pointed out how, by the closing stages of Somoza’s dictatorship, “it was difficult to find a citizen in the country who did not talk like a revolutionary and claim the vindication of national hero and martyr, Augusto Cesar Sandino.”9 Yet after the Triumph, the Frente began tightening its grip on government, and the emergence of an anti-Sandinista opposition prompted discussions among Nicaraguanists concerning the nature of Sandinista ideology. Harry Vanden regards sandinismo as a blend of Third World Marxism, Guevarist revolutionism, and a Nicaraguan national consciousness rejecting U.S. intervention in Nicaragua’s affairs as a sovereign nation.10 This ‘anti-Yanqui’ nationalism drove Sandino’s revolutionary movement and also underpinned the rise of the FSLN in 1961. Thus, Vanden believes this national (rather than class) consciousness, represented the

6 National Association of Evangelicals, Policy Resolutions Text Archives (undated). Appears on the NAE website at: (http://www.nae.net/index.cfm?FUSEACTION=editor. page&pageID=45&idCategory=9), accessed 21 February 2005. 7 An ancient Pentecostal view that was later popularised and expounded by Hal Lindsay, The Late Great Planet Earth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1970). 8 Dwight Wilson, ‘Eschatology, Pentecostal Perspectives On’ in Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal, 266. 9 Mark Everingham, Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua (Pittsburgh: University Press of Pittsburgh, 1996), 3. 10 Harry Vanden, ‘The Ideology of the Insurrection’ in Walker, Nicaragua in Revolution.

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predominant force driving the Sandinistas, who based their roots “in the national past, in the history of a nation that strove to free itself from foreign domination and internal despotism”.11 Elizabeth Dore and John Weeks question Sandinista claims to Marxism, arguing the regime was essentially populist (epitomised in Sandinista slogan “the logic of the majority”).12 The Frente simply acceded to the demands of the majority, while different sections of society supported the revolution simply to benefit from it, whether workers seeking better work conditions and pay; the petty bourgeoisie, which hoped to retain and extend its privileges; or capitalists and landlords, who sought greater access to markets, finance and state power. Hence, the FSLN won the 1984 elections despite an identifiable class base or ideology, Others argue the Frente was essentially Marxist-Leninist. This was the view of Washington and Henry Kissinger’s bipartisan fact-finding commission, which regarded Sandinista Nicaragua as “a crucial steppingstone for Cuban and Soviet efforts to promote armed insurgency in Central America.”13 Humberto Belli also argues strongly that all three Sandinista tendencies were Marxist-Leninist; the only difference between them being one of methodology and strategy, and not ideology (see discussion in Chapter 1). His study draws on various Frente documents and traces the Marxist credentials of most of the nine senior comandantes.14 David Nolan agrees with the thrust of this argument: Developments such as the purge of the social democratic wing of the Terceristas, arbitrary factory confiscations, the attempts to destroy nonFSLN controlled unions, the repression of the Miskito Indians of the Atlantic Coast, the gradual takeover of small-scale commerce by the state, the expansion of prior media censorship to areas outside of the national security field, and the harassment of moderate elements of the Catholic Church raise fundamental questions about the validity of social democratic interpretations of the regime’s internal agenda.15

Ibid., 41. Elizabeth Dore and John Weeks, The Red and the Black: The Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1992). 13 National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, The Report of the President’s National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (New York: MacMillan, 1984), 109. 14 For details of the development of this ideological core driving some of the main Sandinista personalities, consider Tomás Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak (New York: Pathfinder Pres, 1982). 15 David Nolan, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Miami: Institute of InterAmerican Studies, University of Miami, 1984), 5. 11

12

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One might argue that a mixed economy demonstrates the Sandinistas were not Marxists. Yet even the Bolsheviks accepted a temporary alliance between the bourgeois free-market and a centralised economic program as a necessary stage in the transition from capitalism to communism (Lenin’s New Economic Policy).16 Moreover, former Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Trade, Alejandro Martínez Cuenca, indicates a Sandinista economic model increasingly shaped around ideological purity along Marxist lines.17 This included centralisation, control of private property, redistribution of wealth, and large collectivist projects resembling Soviet-style five-year plans. (Consider, for example, the large agro-industrial centres such as the Sebaco Valley, resembling Romanian dictator Ceausescu’s attempts at industrialising agriculture and creating a rural proletariat.) Cuenca explains how the more pragmatic economists within the finance branch of government who disagreed with the Frente’s embracement of Cuban-style socialism did not “dare to enter fully into discussion about the economy for fear of opening fissures in the political unity of the FSLN.”18 Clearly, there is some debate over whether or not the Sandinistas were Marxist. From a religious perspective some of them clearly were, embracing historical materialism and regarding religion as intrinsically reactionary. Others promoted a form of revolutionary Christianity, and thus were technically not Marxist. Nonetheless, leaving all such theoretical discussions aside, ultimately what really matters for the purpose of this study is how Nicaraguan Evangelicals perceived the FSLN. Amalia Bell says most Pentecostals did not understand what communism was.19 She is probably right. The majority of those interviewed labelled the Sandinistas as Marxists, Marxist-Leninists, communists or totalitarians, clearly using the terms interchangeably. However, leaving aside any political sophistication they might have lacked, it is clear that what conservative Protestants feared was another Cuba or Soviet Union that embraced atheism, repressed the church, limited freedom, emphasised mass organisations, introduced state terror, and employed leftist slogans and iconography almost religiously, all aimed at replacing Christianity.

Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution 1917–1932 (Oxford: OUP, 1984), 88. As discussed in Alejandro Martínez Cuenca, Sandinista Economics in Practice (Boston: Southend Press, 1992). 18 Ibid., 50. 19 Interview with Amalia Bell. 16 17

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This is what mattered to them—what they perceived—rather than the political minutiae that separate each. This will now be explored. The Perceived Marxism of Sandinismo After an initial honeymoon period, most Evangelicals quickly became convinced the Sandinistas represented an ideological threat. Rafael Arista referred to a strong Marxist ideology,20 Bartolomé Matamoros repeatedly used the term ‘communists’,21 and Ignacio Hernández described the entire Sandinista period as “the decade of MarxistLeninism”.22 Robert Rojas and Saturnino Cerrato believed all three Sandinista tendencies—the GPP, the TP and the Terceristas—were Marxists. Rojas explained that they made no secret of this.23 (Senior DGSE official José Suárez also stated the three tendencies were strongly Marxist; he especially singled out Jaime Wheelock as a true ideologue.)24 Many others concurred with these sentiments.25 Several others referred to communist tendencies but recognised this might not be the case for all Sandinistas. Guillermo Ayala said they spoke like Marxist-Leninists, but was not sure if all were because they lived in the biggest houses,26 while Mario Espinoza believed not all Sandinistas were committed Marxists.27 Surprisingly, two North American missionaries were the least critical in this regard. Bob Trolese explained that although Tomás Borge was undoubtedly a Marxist-Leninist materialist, nonetheless many Sandinistas employed rhetoric they did not fully understand and were not really Marxists at all.28 Meanwhile, David Spencer, while not making a judgment about the nature of Sandinista ideology, nonetheless expressed some sympathy with Sandinista nationalism and a desire for self-determination.29

Interview with Rafael Arista. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. 22 Ignacio Hernández, Untitled and undated six-page diary of his experiences during the Sandinista period. Hernández had begun to pen his memoirs but never got round to publishing them. 23 Interviews with Robert Rojas and Saturnino Cerrato (1999). 24 Interview with José Suárez. 25 For example, Dexter Cuthbert, Rufino Soza, Juan Reyes and Alfonso Mejilla. 26 Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 27 Interview with Mario Espinoza. 28 Interview with Bob Trolese. 29 Conversation with David Spencer, 4 June 1999, Managua. 20 21

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Given what conservative Protestants saw and heard on a daily basis, which was at odds with the international portrayal of sandinismo the Frente sought to disseminate, it is perhaps not surprising they regarded the Sandinistas as Marxist. We shall now explore why they reached this conclusion. Sandinista Rhetoric Saturnino Cerrato explained how the government was always eulogising Marx and similar ideologues.30 The Sandinista mouthpiece, La Barricada, produced a constant barrage of Marxist rhetoric from the very beginning. In September 1979 it ran a full leading page spread with the headline “The Heroic People of Sandino Salute a Thousand Times the Heroic People of Vietnam”, and underneath “Welcome Comrade Pham Van Dong.” Included were pictures of Sandino and Ho Chih Mhin, together with a communist star.31 Later the paper offers a lengthy full-page discussion of Vietnam’s revolutionary struggle, liberally sprinkled with quotes from Lenin, references to Marx and Engels, and terms such as ‘materialism’, the ‘proletariat’, and ‘socialist revolution’.32 In another edition, La Barricada ran a headline “Great Struggles for the Liberation of Different Peoples,” devoting a full page to revolutionary movements throughout the world the Frente supported.33 Within a year, the newspaper’s headlines were even more problematic for Evangelicals (and other Nicaraguans). In 1980 a front-page lead headline boldly declared, “Sandinismo Is Not Democracy.” People were encouraged to accept a permanent state of revolution and not to succumb to liberal bourgeois attempts to revise sandinismo in line with democracy, as both were incompatible.34 Another full page spread traced the progress of world revolution by highlighting anti-imperialist victories in the Third World during the 1970s.35 The paper ran a series of provocative stories over the next few years, including headlines such

Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). ‘El heróico pueblo de Sandino saluda al mil veces heróico pueblo de Vietnam,’ La Barricada, 13 September 1979. 32 ‘Vietnam, Pueblo en Armas,’ La Barricada, 13 September 1979. 33 ‘Grandes batallas por la Liberación de los Pueblos’, La Barricada, 21 October 1979. 34 ‘Sandinismo no es Democratismo’, La Barricada, 14 March 1980. 35 ‘Victorias antiimperialistas del Tercer Mundo: eje de la Revolución Mundial en los años 70’, La Barricada, 18 April 1980. 30 31

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as, “Anticommunists are Enemies of the People”,36 “All Anti-communists Are Murderers” (front page lead headline),37 “The FSLN: Sole Vanguard,”38 “Sandinismo is Indisputable,”39 and “Sandino: Proletarian Guerrilla.”40 La Barricada also ran a major full-page commemoration of Russian October revolutio, declaring: “63rd Anniversary of the Great October Revolution—When the Proletariat Changed the Course of History.”41 A photograph of Lenin accompanied the article. The anniversary celebrations continued into further editions.42 Another article fondly recalled Carlos Fonseca’s time in Moscow.43 La Barricada also reported how the Frente regional government in Masaya had endorsed a new Centre for Marxist-Leninist Studies, describing it as vital in order to understand the current political process in Nicaraguan society.44 Meanwhile, shortly before the first anniversary the Sandinista revolution, the newspaper’s lead story gleefully announced that Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat, Maurice Bishop (Grenada’s Leninist leader) and Michael Manley ( Jamaica’s hard-line Socialist prime minister) would be attending the celebrations.45 (In fact, Sandinista Nicaragua became home for many terrorists, including members of the PLO, Baader-Meinhof, Red Brigade, and ETA).46 Economic reports also helped to portray the Sandinistas as communists in the eyes of Evangelicals. For example, during a Christian’s response to private property, La Barricada wrote, “A real Christian would find it hard from the Bible to defend a capitalist view of private ownership, that is, the private ownership of the means of production.”47 While 36 ‘Trabajadores del campo denuncian: [and then, in much larger type] “Los anticomunistas son los enemigos del pueblo” ’, La Barricada, 16 May 1980. 37 ‘Asesinos son todos los anticomunistas’, La Barricada, 24 May 1980. 38 ‘FSLN: Única Vanguardia’, La Barricada, 16 September 1980. 39 ‘Sandinismo es indiscutible’, La Barricada, 23 October 1980. 40 ‘Sandino: Guerrillero Proletariano’, La Barricada, 20 February 1981. 41 ‘63 Aniversario de la Gran Revolución de Octubre’, La Barricada, 3 November 1980. 42 For example, ‘En el 63 aniversario de la Revolución de Octubre’, La Barricada, 5 November 1980. 43 Carlos Fonseca, ‘Un Nicaragüense en Moscu’, La Barricada, 4 November 1980 (written by Fonseca in 1957). 44 ‘Inauguran centro de estudios marxistas’, La Barricada, 23 September, 1980. 45 ‘Fidel, Bishop, Manley, Price y Arafat vienen’, La Barricada, 17 July 1980. 46 Juan O. Tamayo, ‘Sandinista Attract a Who’s Who of Terrorists,’ The Miami Herald, 3 March 1986. The article details how members of several of these groups actually served within the Sandinista military machine. 47 ‘Cristianos revolucionarios responden a los nuevos fariseos’, La Barricada, 22 March 1980.

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some Christian Socialists might agree with this, innately conservative Protestants would not. Meanwhile, a major article describing in some detail Sandinista economics was littered with references to centralised panning and nationalisation.48 Religion was also singled out for special attention, helping to reinforce the view among Christians that Marxism in Sandinista Nicaragua was spreading. For example, a front page statement by Fr. Fernando Cardenal (government priest and brother of Ernesto) declared forcefully there was no contradiction between socialism and Christianity.49 Another government priest, Miguel D’Escoto, gave an interview to the World Marxist Review. While it is doubtful most Nicaraguans ever saw it, its contents merely help to reinforce the view that the Sandinistas constantly spouted Marxist rhetoric.50 A regular feature in La Barricada, entitled Cristianos en La Revolución, promoted revolutionary Christianity and slandered those who did not, labelling them Pharisees, anti-Christians, false Christians, and so on. Sandinista slogans such as “Sandino Ayer, Sandino Hoy, Sandino Siempre” (Sandino Yesterday, Sandino Today, Sandino Forever),51 a clear allusion to Hebrews 13:8, were also problematic. Associating a dead Socialist or Marxist guerrilla with the immortal Son of God would have been deeply offensive to Christians. Posters of a crucified Jesus superimposed on the image of a revolutionary fighter with arms outstretched wide, clutching a rifle,52 or of a nativity scene with U.S. helicopters flying overhead, with the caption “Herod Looking for the Child, that he Might Kill Him,”53 or of a black naked Christ on the cross with a Sandino hat,54 (all by pro-Sandinista liberation theology groups) merely reinforced this. Evangelicals also resented the strong ideological conditioning aimed at them. Alfonso Mejilla, an AoG pastor in Jalapa, details a meeting he was required to attend between local military officials and pastors.

‘La Nueva Política Económica’ La Barricada, 18 July 1980. ‘No caben criticas fuera de Revolución en nombre de cristiana’, La Barricada, 20 November 1979. 50 Miguel D’Escoto, ‘We Have Popular Support’, World Marxist Review. March 3 (1983), 89–93. 51 ‘Se manipula la fé para crear reacción política (Comunicado Oficial de la Direccion Nacional del FSLN sobre la Religion)’, La Barricada, 7 October 1980. 52 The poster was designed by the Instituto Histórico Centoamericano and appeared in ‘Fé cristiana y Revolución Sandinista en Nicaragua’, La Barricada, 10 October 1983. 53 Rod Jellema, ‘Touching Nicaragua’ (part 2), The Reformed Journal 35 ( July 1985), 8. 54 Interview with José Suárez. 48 49

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The Sandinistas brought their own theologian, Mejilla explained, who re-interpreted Isaiah 14 (which fundamentalists associate with the fall of Satan): He spoke of how this character was white, blond-haired and blue eyed and how this described very well the physical traits of the Americans. In another part of that passage that says he came from the north [14:13], he said, Where is the United States in relation to Nicaragua? To the north!55

Interestingly, this physical description of North Americans (also echoed by Church of God pastor Rodolfo Fonseca, cousin of the Sandinista comandante Walter Ferrety, see earlier discussion) echoes that of Sandino himself, who described North Americans as “Bestias rubias, barbaros del norte, piratas, mercenaries, malnacidos” (blond beasts, northern barbarians, pirates, mercenaries, swine).56 Did the Sandinistas promote Soviet-style atheism? There is plenty of evidence confirming some comandantes were undeniably atheist, while officials and soldiers sometimes mocked Christians because they believed in God.57 Yet other Sandinistas were not. Moreover, I found little evidence of Soviet-style atheism being officially promoted, which might lead some to suggest the Frente’s view of religion was not strictly Marxist. After all, a full Marxist critique of religion moves beyond historical materialism, regarding religion as reactionary and atheism as a necessary precondition for human freedom.58 Though all three were present among many Sandinistas,59 some Sandinistas were more tolerant of religion, and the Marxist critique was not publicly bandied about. However, the Frente certainly ‘sandinised’ and captured religious slogans and symbols, reworking Christianity to make it revolutionary. This often bordered on blasphemy for many conservative believers, both Protestant or Catholic. Yet whether the unusual Sandinista view of religion owed anything to Marxism, or if it represented a halfway

55 56

110.

Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. Alejandro Bolaños Geyer, Sandino (Masaya: Alejandro Bolaños Geyer, 2002),

For example, as described by Ignacio Hernández during an interview on 25 May 2004, Managua. 58 For a discussion of the Marxist critique of religion, see ‘Marx, Engels, and Religion’ in Edward A. Lynch, Religion and Politics in Latin America: Liberation Theology and Christian Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1991). 59 César Jerez, ‘The Church and the Nicaraguan Revolution’, Cross Currents 34 no. 1 (Spring 1984), 13. 57

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stage to its eventual elimination from Nicaraguan society as many believed (notably Humberto Belli) is not the point here. To politicallyunsophisticated Christians, the Sandinista view of religion was perceived as Marxist, and they feared an encroaching atheist state. Guillermo Ayala states: “I am not sure if they were atheists. They knew the Bible, though. I think that eventually, had they stayed in power, things would have been as bad for Christians in Cuba or the USSR.60 Relations With the East Bloc Christian perceptions of the Sandinistas as Marxist were exacerbated by Nicaragua’s close links with Cuba, which are well-attested. After all, it was Castro who brought the three warring FSLN factions together, which marked the Sandinistas’ rise to power.61 From then on, the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions were inextricably linked. Many Cubans openly held places of importance in the Nicaraguan apparatus,62 and delegations to and from Cuba were constant. Cubans came in large numbers to serve as military, educational and agrarian advisers, working at all levels of government.63 MINT defector Miguel Bolaños Hunter described how many citizens from communist countries worked for state security, including 400 Cubans, 70 Soviets (including several high-ranking KGB officials, East Germans and Bulgarians.64 Former schoolteacher (later Contra leader) Joseph Douglas explained how Cuban instructors had infiltrated the school system in huge numbers.65 Stephen Kinzer points out how the Sandinistas looked to Cuba, which had engaged in a similar venture when Fidel Castro came to power, for help during the 1980 Literacy Crusade: “Cuban administrators helped plan the Nicaraguan campaign and design the texts, and twelve hundred Cuban teachers traveled to Nicaragua to join the army of literacy teachers.66 Meanwhile, Félix Rosales and Guillermo Ayala detailed being interrogated by Cuban officers during their detention

Interview with Guillermo Ayala. As discussed by Nolan, Ideology of the Sandinistas. 62 See, for example, Edward Plowman, ‘The Archbishop Calls for the Gospel, Not Marxism, in Nicaragua,’ Christianity Today, 5 February 1982, 72. 63 Interview with Rafael Arista. 64 Don Oberdorfer and Joanne Omang, ‘Nicaragua Bares Plan to Discredit Foes’, Washington Post, 19 June 1983. 65 Interview with Joseph Douglas. 66 Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, 75. 60 61

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in 1985, and Félix Rosales explained that Evangelicals were worried about another Cuba.67 Aside from links with Cuba, the Sandinistas also brought Nicaragua firmly within the East Bloc camp, despite claims of non-alignment.68 For example, La Barricada strongly supported Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, claiming military help had been requested by the Afghan people themselves. The newspaper went on to condemn those reporting against the USSR’s intervention, accusing them of disinformation and lies which had been produced by capitalist-controlled news agencies.69 The Frente also relied heavily on East German assistance to create, fund and train the state security apparatus, discussed briefly in the next chapter. (These feelings were mutual; Morris Rothenberg traces close relations between Nicaragua and the Soviet Union and other East Bloc countries. The USSR regarded events in Nicaragua as a “major Soviet triumph”).70 More ominous was a full-page report in La Barricada discussing the freedom allegedly enjoyed by churches in the Soviet Union. The report claimed Marxists and Christians worked together, that Christians participated actively in the construction of Socialism, and that the state did not interfere at all in church affairs.71 All this led the majority of Evangelicals (many of them politically unsophisticated) to regard the Sandinista government quite clearly as communist. Such close, fraternal links with the East Bloc, they believed, were evidence of communism just around the corner that threatened their very freedom. Thus, Christianity Today reported how one national Evangelical leader stated: “We need to really get into our Bibles—and get ready to testify to a communist government.”72 Missionary Bob Trolese confirms the prevalence of this mentality, explaining how Evangelicals wanted to do as much as possible before Marxism became fully entrenched.73

Interviews with Guillermo Ayala and Félix Rosales. For a discussion of Sandinista links to the East Bloc and Cuba, see Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994). 69 ‘Victorias antiimperialistas del Tercer Mundo’, La Barricada. 70 Morris Rothenberg. ‘Latin America in Soviet Eyes’, Problems of Communism 23 no. 5 (September–October 1983), 1–18. 71 ‘Como funciona la Iglesia en la URSS’, La Barricada, 24 May 1980. 72 Sywulka, ‘Aftermath of Nicaragua’s Civil War’, Christianity Today. 73 Interview with Bob Trolese. 67 68

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Education in Revolutionary Nicaragua Conservative Protestants were convinced the Sandinistas used the educational system to promote Marxism. Under Somoza education was generally only available to those whose could afford it. However, the Sandinistas’ intention was to provide free education for the masses. A 1969 document entitled The Historic Program of the FSLN sets out the guerrillas’ plans: The Sandinista people’s revolution will establish the bases for the development of the national culture, the people’s education, and university reforms . . . it will push forward a massive literacy campaign to immediately wipe out ‘illiteracy’ . . . it will give attention to the development and progress of education at the various levels and education will be free at all levels and obligatory at some . . . it will nationalize the centers of private education that have been immorally turned into industries by merchants who hypocritically invoke religious principles.74

In a country where illiteracy was rampant among the poor, the revolutionary government embarked quickly upon a nationwide literacy crusade in March 1980 under the leadership of Fr. Fernando Cardenal. This was a national and highly successful effort, reducing the nation’s illiteracy from 50% to around 10% of the population, and earning Nicaragua an award from the United Nations.75 Yet Evangelicals believed the educational system degenerated into a means to foist Marxist ideology upon the population. When asked why he believed the Sandinistas were Marxists or communists, Roberto Rojas placed education at the top of his list.76 Ruth Sánchez, who has some teaching experience, described the national curriculum as revolutionary, even Marxist.77 Bob Trolese also spoke of the transmission of revolutionary ideals, citing elementary textbooks he had seen in which spelling revolved around words like ‘gun’ and ‘bullet’.78 Others interviewees agreed.79 Alfonso Mejilla explained how lessons were aimed at instilling revolutionary consciousness:

74 FSLN, ‘The Historic programme of the FSLN’ reprinted by the FSLN Department of Propaganda and Political Education in June 1981 and appearing in Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak, 16–17. Translated into English by Will Reissner. 75 Hank Beeksma, ‘Nicaragua’s Cry for Justice,’ The Banner (13 July 1987), 9. 76 Interview with Roberto Rojas. 77 Interview with Ruth Sánchez. 78 Interview with Bob Trolese. 79 Interviews with Dexter Cuthbert and Guillermo Ayala.

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In Mathematics, they used drawings of weapons [i.e. in problem-solving] as a means of constant conscientización. They spoke about Carlos Fonseca as the father of Nicaragua and the revolution. The whole education system was geared around conscientización.80

Two pupils also recalled the politicised nature of Sandinista education. Damaris Lugo, who attended primary school in Granada in the 1980s, explained how they had to sing the revolutionary anthem every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, as well as the national anthem. She recalls a great deal of instruction about arms, the revolution, Carlos Fonseca and Sandino, who featured prominently in schoolbooks. Lugo explained how even Math was politicised; a typical subtraction problem might ask if someone has 24 guns (or grenades, or bombs) and four are taken away, how many are left? Also, during practical lessons pupils sometimes had to undertake guard duty.81 Zoila Vílchez’s school experiences in Leon echo those of Lugo. She also explained how Sandino, Fonseca and Che Guevara featured extensively in the curriculum. Vílchez also spoke of having to sing the Sandinista anthem, while the national and Sandinista (Red and Black) flags were flown over the school. Schoolbooks constantly referred to FSLN organisations. Her parents were very unhappy with this political influence within education.82 Several primary schoolteachers recounted their experiences within the Sandinista educational system. Mario Elena Baltodano explained how methodology often revolved around war and revolution: For example, the sound that an ‘s’ makes. They would illustrate it with the word ‘soldier’, with soldiers lined up [in the textbook]. With the letter ‘f ’, they would have a picture in the books of a rifle [fusil].

Sandinista leaders, the war and the United States were the focus of many textbooks, and this extensive politicisation of education at primary and secondary levels troubled many teachers she knew.83 Joseph Douglas, a costeño primary schoolteacher teacher when the Sandinistas came to power, observes: They were anti-religious. I attended the seminars they organised for the teachers when they introduced the new curriculum. In this new curriculum, for example, Math at elementary level, we were told to teach

80 81 82 83

Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. Telephone conversation with Damaris Lugo, 11 June 2004. Conversation with Zoila Vílchez, 7 June 1999, Managua. Interview with Mario Elena Baltodano, 3 June 1999, Managua.

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chapter five counting using war paraphernalia. In a farming community, previously we usually used items they recognised in that setting, for example, eggs, corn, beans, and so on. But the Sandinistas replaced all that with bullets and guns. Also, most of the people in these rural communities were Christians, and the pastor was a main leader in the community; the church was central, and so were Christian values. But the Sandinistas did not believe in that. I remember once when a Cuban instructor came over to tell us how to instruct within schools, he came to a third grade class of mine and asked them if they believed in God. When they said yes, he told them to pray to God for candy. But of course, none came. But then he instructed them to pray to Fidel Castro for candy. When they opened their eyes, there was the candy! The idea was to try and change their way of thinking, so that the community would become less Christian in their mindset. They would also set homework on certain issues, and send the kids home to seek their parents on help on the issues raised. These third-graders would come back the next day and say my parents didn’t agree with this or that, for that reason. So on occasion some of these parents would be arrested, while their kids were in school, for being counterrevolutionary. In some cases, some of these kids never saw their parents again. All this is why a lot of us decided we could not go on with this teaching. We were then labelled counterrevolutionary. At the end of 1980 I decided I was not going to be part of that indoctrination and I was labelled an anti-revolutionary.84

Douglas later learned orders had been issued to arrest him, so he fled his home to become a Contra fighter. He would go on to become a senior Contra commander, with 900 men under his command, before touring the U.S. (including Washington) to promote the Contra cause. Sandinista schoolbooks verify these testimonies. Space does not permit a full survey here, but some illustrations will suffice. The cover of an elementary mathematics book pictures a schoolboy dressed in a Sandinista youth organisation uniform writing the words “Sandino vive” (Sandino lives) on a blackboard next to a picture of Sandino.85 This is a very elementary book, and one wonders how it could possibly project any particular political ideology. Nevertheless, the Sandinista Ministry of Education manages to do so, drawing heavily on the collectivist imagery so loved by the Sandinistas, for example, farming and industry, harvest workers, coffee cutters, and brigadistas. Sandinista organisations like ANS,86 the CDS,

Interview with Joseph Douglas. Ministerio de Educación, Matemática, 2.o Grado (Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1988, Third Edition). 86 Asociación de Niños Sandinistas (Association of Sandinista Children). 84 85

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ENABAS,87 MIDINRA,88 and the Internationalist Work Brigades (i.e. pro-Sandinista foreign workers) also feature widely. For example: An Internationalist voluntary work brigade on Monday harvested 200 sacks of cotton and on Tuesday a further 300 sacks. How many sacks of cotton in total did the brigade harvest during both days?89

Young readers not belonging to the ANS, the Sandinista youth organisation, were left in no doubt that they represented a minority: “In a school class there are 27 children who are members of the ANS and 7 who are not. How many children are there in that class?90 The book also displays strongly militaristic sentiment. One page uses drawings of various soldiers as a visual aid for multiplication and division exercises, while another has Sandinista police lined up outside a police station to teach elementary principles of addition. A subtraction problem is presented thus: “From a company of 90 militiamen, a squad of 10 are sent on a mission. How many militiamen remain at the base?”91 Or, “A detachment of militiamen has been given 22 hours of infantry training and 6 hours shooting practice. How many hours in total of training has the detachment received?”92 Some instances of Sandinista propaganda in this elementary schoolbook are beyond belief. For example, “At a health care centre, 85 appointments cards were issued for people to see a doctor. If 85 people were attended to, how many people did not receive medical help?”93 One Spanish language text for 5th graders contains a salutation to the pupils, which begins: Little Comrade, I am your friend, Spanish Book Number 5. During this year we will be working together, thanks to the sacrifice of many Nicaraguan heroes and martyrs, like Luis Alfonso, La Mascota and others, who fought with all their might for the People’s Sandinista Revolution to triumph. Today it is your turn to imitate them bravely by studying me every day in school and at home.94

87 Empresa Nicaragüense de Alimentos Basicos (Nicaraguan Basic Foodstuffs Enterprise), the government’s food rationing directorate. 88 Ministerio de Desarrollo Agrario e Instituto de Reforma Agraria (Ministry for Agrarian Development and Reform), the Sandinista agrarian reform apparatus. 89 Ibid., 107. 90 Ibid., 27. 91 Ibid., 12. 92 Ibid., 38. 93 Ibid., 36. 94 Ministerio de Educación, Español 5: Libro de texto Para Quinto Grado (Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1985), 3.

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The very first lesson in this book (designed for 10 year olds) contains a photograph of Sandino and a story he wrote in 1929, condemning capitalism and the United States.95 Subsequent lessons draw heavily on Sandino, the EPS, and Sandinista values. Reading fragments extol SMP96 and describe Carlos Fonseca’s visit to Moscow.97 There are portions of speeches by Daniel Ortega98 and Tomás Borge.99 In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the book as a propaganda tool from start to finish. Other schoolbooks are similarly heavily politicised.100 A study by Robert Arnove specifically highlights the highly politicised nature of Sandinista school education.101 It is not denied that the Sandinista made education freely available for all. Amalia Bell, who highlighted the Sandinistas’ brutal treatment of her fellow Miskitos, nonetheless singled out the provision of free education for all as a high point of the Sandinista period.102 AoG superintendent Saturnino Cerrato also identified health and education as positive developments.103 Yet as the above examples demonstrate, Sandinista education quickly became a cause for concern among Evangelicals and other sectors of Nicaraguan society who believed it was being used to transmit Marxist or communist ideals. At the very least, primary and secondary schooling was strongly Socialist and revolutionary, seeking to raise class consciousness, promote revolutionary fervour, eschew nationalism, and promote Sandinista political views. La Barricada regularly declared capitalist education was a politicalideological weapon aimed at retaining the subservience and manipulation of the masses, as opposed to Sandinista education, which served the interests of the majority class. Sandinista education, it was claimed, liberated the exploited masses by raising class awareness, helping to secure the success of their historic struggle by bringing about their economic and political transformation, and consolidating the revolutionary

Ibid., 12–14. Ibid., 36–38. 97 Ibid., 94–95. 98 Ibid., 128. 99 Ibid., 158–159. 100 For example, see Ministerio de Educación, Historia Cuarto Grado: Asi Se Ha Forjado Nuestra Patria II (Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1986). 101 Robert F. Arnove, La Educación Como Terreno de Conflicto: Nicaragua, 1979 –1993 (Managua: Editorial UCA, 1994). 102 Interview with Amalia Bell. 103 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). 95 96

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process with the creation of a new society and a New Man.104 Moreover, the Sandinistas maintained that education provided the means for critical analysis and a ‘dialectical understanding of the world which surrounds us’,105 encouraging educators to assume their ‘historic role’.106 Meanwhile, collective organisations were to decide curriculum and education issues.107 Clearly, Evangelicals could be forgiven for assuming their children were being indoctrinated with Marxist ideas. Patriotic Military Service As the Contra war intensified, the Sandinistas introduced Servicio Patriótico Militar (SMP), or conscription, in 1983. Many Protestants I spoke with regarded SMP as a major problem. From its earliest history Pentecostalism was traditionally strongly pacifist. It was only in the late 1960s that the U.S. AoG softened its position on pacifism, emphasising instead liberty of conscience that permitted members to choose combatant or non-combatant roles during military service.108 Neither was this pacifist position limited to American Pentecostalism. Donald Gee, one of the main leaders of the U.K. movement, was also strongly pacifist.109 Thus, Pentecostals regarded SMP as a major cause of the breakdown of relations with the Frente, especially as it was perceived as something which forced them to defend an ideology (rather than their country) which they disagreed with deeply. Gilberto Aguirre and Amalia Bell single out SMP as one of the main reasons Pentecostals

104 Carlos Fonseca, ‘Se trata, no de lograr simplemente un cambio de hombres en el poder, sino un cambio de Sistema, el derrocamiento de las clases explotadoras y la Victoria de las clases explotadas’, La Barricada, 14 March 1980; Miguel De Castilla Urbina, ‘Contrarevolución y Educación,’ La Barricada, 30 November 1980; and Carlos M. Vilas, ‘La libertad de Educación en la revolución’, La Barricada, Part 1: 22 December 1980 and Part 2: 23 December 1980. See also ‘Educación capitalist vs. Educación sandinista’, La Barricada, 16 January 1981. 105 Ministerio de Educación, La Educación en el Primer Año de la Revolución Popular Sandinista (Managua: Ministerio de Educación, July 1980), 120. 106 Ibid., 185. 107 Ibid., 88. See also Ministerio de Educación, Programa de Gobierno de Reconstucción Nacional (Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1979); and Ministerio de Educación Situación del Sistema Educativo Despues de 45 Años de Dictadura Militar Somocistas y Perspectivas que Plantea la revolución Sandinista (Managua: Ministerio de Educación, Managua, December 1979). 108 D.J. Wilson, ‘Pacifism’, in Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal, 658– 660. 109 John Carter, Donald Gee: Pentecostal Statesman (Nottingham: Assemblies of God Publishing House, 1975), 16–21.

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rejected the revolution.110 Miguel Angel Casco likewise identifies SMP as a major problem.111 Most Evangelical leaders interviewed explained how the issue was a major cause of friction. Many Pentecostals simply refused to fight. For example, on one occasion 800 Pentecostal youths faced imprisonment for making a joint decision at a national conference not to register for the military draft.112 The U.S. government publicised harassment of Evangelicals who criticised SMP: The Sandinistas vilified the church leaders for their criticism of the draft. In October (1983), they unleashed their turbas. The mobs attacked some 20 churches in the Managua area, interrupting services and breaking windows. They physically occupied at least three churches . . .113

Eventually, a concession exempting pastors and seminarians from military service was secured. Bartolomé Matamoros explained how he sent such a proposal to the government, which had the backing of many denominations, and which was eventually accepted by the Sandinistas.114 Casco likewise explains how CEPRES acted as an intermediary between Pentecostals and the government, in order to secure these exemptions.115 Yet clearly CEPAD was the organisation that was instrumental in securing these exemptions from SMP for pastors and students. Raul Carazo confirmed the pivotal role played by CEPAD in this affair.116 Gilberto Aguirre also detailed CEPAD’s dialogue with the government, explaining to the Frente how SMP was a major problem for Protestants, and as a result some 1200 seminarians were exempted. Aguirre explained how Sixto Ulloa played an important role in secur117 ing this concession. Several commentators have highlighted how these exemptions from SMP probably contributed towards the explosive growth of Pentecostalism in the 1980s. While discussing SMP Miguel Angel Casco points out how, paradoxically, this was the period of greatest church growth

Interviews with Gilberto Aguirre and Amalia Bell. Interview with Miguel Angel Casco (February 2004). 112 ‘World Scene’, Christianity Today, 3 February 1984, 55. See also ‘Nicaragua Indian Faithful Revolting After Massacres’ in Charisma, June 1984, 96. 113 US Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua, 37. 114 Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. 115 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco. 116 Interview with Raul Carazo. 117 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. 110 111

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for Nicaraguan Pentecostalism.118 Bartolomé Matamoros explains how there were only four or so Bible institutes among Protestants (the Baptists, CAM, the AoG and the Adventists) at the time of the revolution. Yet when SMP exemptions were introduced, suddenly everyone wanted to attend Bible college! In the case of the AoG, Matamoros explained how originally the denomination scarcely had 40 students, but this figure soon topped 600. Naturally, they embarked upon theological studies to avoid military service, but Matamoros also believes it strengthened the denomination by training new pastors who established more churches.119 Adonis Niño Chavarría has suggested that the establishment of so many new seminaries and Bible colleges helped to encourage a more indigenised form of Pentecostalism, less reliant on external help and influence.120 Sixto Ulloa, who helped to secure these exemptions for pastors, considered this to be a triumph. He declared it demonstrated the Sandinistas’ good faith, pointing out how Evangelicals benefited the most from this policy: When SMP was introduced and I mediated on their behalf, it was mainly conservative Evangelicals pastors and young students who benefited. So this demonstrates how committed the Sandinistas were to solving problems, that there should not be any religious strife, or that they themselves should exploit any tensions, but rather, that all problems should be solved satisfactorily. For example, there were youths who did not want to take part in SMP. So what did we do? The revolutionary government agreed to issue a document exempting seminarians, pastors and evangelists.121

Others felt CEPAD had not done enough, securing only a small number of exemptions for pastors and seminarians, while denouncing Evangelicals for their stance on SMP.122 These exemptions from the draft only benefited a very small number of pastors and seminarians, compared with the many thousands of Protestant youth sent to the front line. Many pastors interviewed spoke of losing most of their youth to SMP. For example, Rafael Arista (based in Jalapa) described how so many conscripts were simply put in the

Telephone interview with Miguel Angel Casco. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. 120 Niño Chavarría, ‘Breve Historia del Movimiento Pentecostal en Nicaragua’, in Álvarez, Pentecostalismo y Liberación, 52–53. 121 Interview with Sixto Ulloa. 122 Interview with Rufino Soza. 118 119

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front line to become ‘cannon fodder’.123 Guillermo Ayala echoed this phrase.124 Many Protestants died as a result of SMP. Mario Espinoza detailed a Pentecostal youth who, shortly before being sent to fight the Contras, promised his mother he would not fire his weapon. During a fire fight his commander learned his weapon had not been fired. In reprisal the youth was put right at the front and was killed shortly after.125 Harold Robleto’s wife lost a brother who had been forcefully conscripted.126 Guillermo Ayala explained how those refusing SMP were hunted down, taken from their homes and churches, and forced to the front line.127 Americas Watch, a human rights organisation that documented Sandinistas atrocities in northern Nicaragua, confirms roving draft patrols which readily employed extreme violence and sometimes even shot on the spot some young men who refused conscription.128 The Americas Watch report is explored in greater detail in the next chapter. Enforced SMP was a major cause of Pentecostal suffering in the northern and rural regions. Alfonso Mejilla detailed how his church youth were targeted for enforced conscription, and how, in Jalapa, he lost various youths (though by speaking with local officials he was able to get most of them back).129 A CAM document explains the problems SMP caused in the north: The church has faced great difficulties in the decade of the eighties. Violence in rural areas forced many to leave homes and farms. Pastors and believers emigrated. Both sides pressed young people into military service . . . Believers often found themselves between two groups, each demanding allegiance.130

Lila Castellón, a member of the CAM church in Granada, explained how Evangelical youth were persecuted and forced into conscription to fight in the war.131 Uriel Tercero, an AoG minister in Nueva Segovia,

Interview with Rafael Arista. Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 125 Interview with Mario Espinoza. 126 Interview with Harold Robleto. 127 Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 128 Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua. See, for example, the case outlined in the Appendix (Letter 471). 129 Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. 130 Central America Mission, Nicaragua at the Crossroads (Dallas: CAM, 1990), no. 3. 131 Conversation with Lila Castellón, 23 May 2004, Granada. 123 124

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stated many Pentecostals in the north were persecuted for refusing to take up arms. Subsequently, they were labelled counterrevolutionary and many were arrested, others imprisoned, some were tortured, yet others were killed.132 Moreover, the Sandinistas did not always honour the exemption clause. While still a Bible student, Alfonso Mejilla and several others were rounded up one day by soldiers seeking new recruits. He was only released because he came into contact with a comandante he knew. Guillermo Ayala was also arrested twice on draft sweeps organised by the military.133 Thus, SMP represented a major problem for Evangelicals, one which caused them much suffering. Juan Cano, a taxi driver, told me: I’m a Roman Catholic, but I know that many Evangelicals suffered during those times. Many were sent to the north, to the war zone, and forced to take up arms and fight, even though it was well known that they did not believe in that. They had no choice in the matter at all. Their youth especially suffered, many of whom were sent to fight, though they were against fighting. The Frente had no respect for religion, but especially the Evangelicals. Many Evangelicals died in the war.134

People from all walks of life despised SMP. The DGSE’s José Suárez explained that one of the reasons for his increasing disillusionment with the Sandinistas was a first-hand encounter with corruption at the highest echelons of government. Such corruption included sons of comandantes escaping military service while thousands of everyday Nicaraguan families lost sons and daughters on the battlefield.135 Guillermo Ayala also explained how SMP could only be avoided by those with government connections.136 Because of SMP, many Protestants (and other Nicaraguans) fled the country. While pastors were exempt, others had to flee to Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras to avoid military service. Other draft-dodgers were arrested and punished, often by being excluded from the rationing system.137 Miguel Angel Casco explains how some pastors helped their youth to flee the country.138 Many went to the U.S.139 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139

Telephone conversation with Uriel Tercero, 25 May 2004. Interviews with Alfonso Mejilla and Guillermo Ayala. Conversation with Juan Cano, 24 May 2004, Managua. Interview with José Suárez. Interview with Guillermo Ayala. Interview with Mario Espinoza. Telephone interview with Miguel Angel Casco. Conversation with Lila Castellón.

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Other Evangelicals sought to resolve this problem through other means. Within the AoG, David Spencer proposed an alternative to an outright rejection of SMP, explaining how the youth ought not to avoid National Service on the basis of Romans 13:1f. Instead he suggested Pentecostals should offer to support the army and government in ways that did not involve combat and killing, for example, building bridges, cooking, manual work, picking coffee, and so on. Initially, this suggestion was unpopular with many AoG leaders who strongly opposed helping the Sandinistas in any way. But eventually, Spencer explains, they recognised the importance of not being confrontational with the government and offered their services in different parts of the country.140 A letter sent by the AoG to CEPAD (the conduit for Protestant-state dialogue) requested that they be allowed to fulfil their “patriotic duty” by working in orphanages, hospitals, health centres, farms, industry, and caring for the old, in order to help with the reconstruction and development of the country.141 But this was unacceptable to the authorities. Saturnino Cerrato explained how pacifist Pentecostals were willing to serve by cutting wood, cooking, and other non-combatant roles. Yet he maintains the Sandinistas always regarded them as counterrevolutionaries because they did not cooperate openly.142 A case in point is the alternative offered by Rafael Arista, AoG regional superintendent for the Jalapa district.143 He explained how the churches approached local officials and explained, “We are not going to war. We are going to do activities which will not involve the shedding of blood.” So they proposed an alternative: to form brigades to harvest coffee. The Sandinistas agreed, though they decided to send the church brigade near the Honduran border, in the heart of Contra territory. After much prayer, the brigade, which numbered 180 Evangelicals, set out to cut coffee. They returned safely, and by the following Saturday the brigade had grown to 500 workers. It continued to grow, reaching 2000 people as it captured support from the local population who preferred it to SMP. Meanwhile, Arista believes the Contras recognised the Sandinistas’ ploy was to send the Evangelicals Interview with David Spencer, 8 June 1999, Managua. Letter from the AoG headquarters, signed by Juan Simon Videa (superintendent at the time), Bartolomé Matamoros (vice-superintendent), Saturnino Cerrato (secretary) and Oscar Polanco Castro (treasurer), sent to Gustavo Parajón, CEPAD, dated 15 August 1983. 142 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). 143 Interview with Rafael Arista. 140 141

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into a danger zone so that when the brigade was attacked by Contras, the latter would see their local support crumble. For this reason, the Contras did not harm them. Yet Arista explains how the local government officials eventually told him, “We can’t keep giving you this concession. You have to send your young people to war”. Repression followed and a local Evangelical leader, Hilario Rugama, was imprisoned at the Casa de Piedra prison for seven months. Arista believes this was an attempt to make the people fall in line. But the opposite happened, Arista maintains, and so a crackdown on grassroots Evangelicals ensued. The Sandinistas believed many had joined the church so they did not have to go to war (Arista concedes this was so in some cases). They began imprisoning people, including 200 youths from Ocoal who had refused to do military service but declared “We’ve worked, we have cooperated, so we are not counterrevolutionaries.” Embryonic Totalitarianism? Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski suggest six prominent features of totalitarianism: a central ideology, single mass party, system of terror, monopoly on communications, monopoly of weapons, and finally, a 144 centrally-controlled and directed economy. Drawing on this model, Alfred Cuzán concluded that revolutionary Nicaragua demonstrated traits compatible with an embryonic form of totalitarian dictatorship even as early as 1980.145 Consider the evidence. Heading Friedrich’s and Brzezinski’s list is a coherent and unifying ideology. This chapter has highlighted Sandinista rhetoric, while Cuzán reviews a wide range of literature to support his view, stating “Sandinista intellectual history thus confirms all the traits of a totalitarian ideology.” Cuzán also explores the concept of a single mass party, citing the Frente’s control of political life, its centralisation of decision-making, educational control, and intolerance of opposition. The Frente certainly claimed to be the vanguard and protector of the revolution.146

144 Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 21ff. 145 Alfred G. Cuzán, ‘The Nicaraguan Revolution: From Autocracy to Totalitarian Dictatorship?’ Journal of InterDisciplinary Studies 1(½) (1989), 182–204. 146 ‘Cristianos en la Revolución’, La Barricada, 2 March 1980.

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In August 1979 the FSLN created the Sandinista Confederation of Labor (CST), insisting all workers should join it, and on 13 September 1979 the Nicaraguan army and police were declared to be branches of the Sandinista party. The Frente also created the CDS, the neighbourhood units created at square block level that were the “eyes and ears of the revolution”. The 9,000 or so CDSs were charged with protecting the revolution, denouncing everyday Nicaraguans demonstrating any counterrevolutionary sentiment. The CDS worked closely with state security. Guillermo Narvaez explains how they were “loyal copies of micro-cells in Cuba”, and how they “controlled the people, block by block and house by house”.147 Many of the pastors interviewed talked of CDS spies sent to monitor or record sermons and monitor pastors’ activities.148 The CDS caused Evangelicals many problems. Arnulfo Sánchez said if they did not do as the CDS demanded, or cooperate with them, then they could be in great trouble.149 Bartolomé Matamoros echoed similar words: “The Sandinistas used to say, ‘Entre Cristianismo y revolución no hay contradicción’ (i.e. that Christianity and the revolution do not contradict each other), however there was never a contradiction only as long as Christians did what they told them to do.”150 Meanwhile, Guillermo Ayala, too, spoke of the control and powers the CDS had over the lives of local people, especially the youth. Another leader who spoke of informants attending church services was Saturnino Cerrato: In every church there were always informants listening to what was going on, and if there was any content they disagreed with, they would denounce them. But that was an everyday part of national life. That is how we lived in that context. The bad things were security, being watched, being controlled . . . food controls, everything rationed . . . control of everything, these Sandinistas would have even controlled breathing! They watched you at block level and also at barrio level. They watched the post, the ‘phone. All this was the ugly, horrible side of the revolution . . . being watched was too much.151

Cerrato raises an important point about food rationing (caused by the war) that had a direct bearing on how Sandinistas treated Evangelicals.

147 148 149 150 151

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Guillermo Narvaez, ‘Nicaragua at the Crossroads’, The Banner, 13 July 1987, 7. For example, interview with Alfonso Mejilla. Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interview with Saturnino Cerrato.

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Sinisterly, several interviewees explained how it resulted in some Evangelicals suffering disproportionately. Rufino Soza describes his own experience: Right here in Ciudad Sandino, for not being a Sandinista supporter, I did not have the right to buy things. For six months my wife and I didn’t have the right to a deodorant. We had to use lemon. This was because we had no rights. Those who were revolutionaries did, they had cards that permitted them to buy from shops, but those of us considered as counterrevolutionary did not. As a preacher, I was watched by the CDS. As my church grew, they began to threaten me, they got the DGSE on to me also, and we had to be very careful when we preached. We did not attend the local CDS meetings, and so we they would not let us have proper food. We had to make do with very poor quality stuff, rather than the decent stuff everyone else received. If we did not sing the hymn, “Patria Libre o Morir” [Free Homeland or Death] we were considered counterrevolutionary.152

Roberto Rojas likewise believed the Frente used food rationing as a weapon. He also suggested the Sandinistas brought pressure to bear upon Evangelicals and any opponents at work, school or university. He also explained how going to university was a privilege, that entry was based on ideological purity rather than intellectual capacity.153 Clearly, then, the CDS were a major means of promoting a single mass party. They were also a major source of tension for Evangelicals. The executive committee of the CDS made clear their intention not to tolerate any anti-revolutionary actions,154 while at one stage the overall CDS committee denounced efforts by millionaires and ‘false Christians’ to work against the revolution.155 Concerning a single party system, consider also how in March 1980 the FSLN unilaterally changed the composition of the State Council, giving itself and its organisations two-thirds of the seats. Such represented only the beginning of its tightening of control and the control of political rivals. Cuzán goes on to discuss the creation of a system of terror in the form of the DGSE, the people’s tribunals (which operated outside the regular court system to try counterrevolutionaries), and the turbas, or mobs, similar to the fascist squadristii. The turbas often broke up meetings

152 153 154 155

1980.

Interview with Rufino Soza. Interview with Roberto Rojas. ‘Vigilancia cuadra por cuadra’, La Barricada, 25 May 1980. ‘Total apoyo de los CDS a Gobierno Revolucionario’, La Barricada, 8 September

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of non-Sandinistas, instituted terror in the neighbourhoods, and generally created an atmosphere of fear. There was also clearly a shift towards the monopoly of communications in Sandinista Nicaragua. For example, in July 1979 all television stations were confiscated by the FSLN, and in December television was declared a monopoly of the Sandinista party. The Sandinistas also imposed strong censorship on newspapers critical of the regime, notably La Prensa. One report defining the nature of totalitarianism concluded with a statement that could be interpreted as an oblique reference to the FSLN. The censors banned its publication.156 Another banned article detailed a statement by Costa Rica’s UN ambassador that Nicaraguan rebels did not have authorised bases in his country from which to attack Nicaragua.157 The censors also banned a story detailing the unexplained deaths of several young people, including a thirteen-year-old found with bullet wounds to the head.158 At times, censorship verged on the ludicrous. For example, a report on a shortage of postal stamps in Matagalpa was prohibited,159 as was the story of a man who discovered his savings at the bank had disappeared.160 In fact, the censors worked overtime and the reports that they banned are simply too numerous to list. They included details of rises in the prices of chicken, fish, sweets and pop;161 the weakness of the national currency, the córdoba;162 the disappearance of a farm manager;163 and a story concerning how the New Year will be celebrated with nacatamales (a Nicaraguan dough recipe which contains only a little meat) rather than chicken or turkey (the normal custom), because the latter are too expensive.164 Complaint after complaint was made by the censor, Lissette Torres Morales, to La Prensa, pointing out how reports were unfair to the FLSN. Agustín Acevedo, La Prensa (unpublished article), 10 December 1985. From La Prensa’s archives. 157 ‘Costa Rica refuta en Consejo de Seguridad’, La Prensa (unpublished article), 15 December 1985. 158 ‘Matan a joven de un balazo en la cabeza’, La Prensa (unpublished article), 15 December 1985. 159 ‘En Matagalpa no hay estampillas para las cartas’, La Prensa (unpublished article), 15 December 1985. 160 ‘Cliente se queja de Banco’, La Prensa (unpublished article), 15 December 1985. 161 La Prensa, 5 December 1985, 4 December 1985, 6 December 1985, and 10 December 1985 respectively. 162 La Prensa, 29 December 1985 (unpublished). 163 La Prensa, 28 December 1985 (unpublished). 164 La Prensa, 31 December 1985 (unpublished). 156

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She even sent a circular informing all press outlets that they could only report on Hurricane Joan using information provided by the government.165 Meanwhile, a government memo reminded various government departments in no uncertain terms that no government statements or advertisements whatsoever should be published with La Prensa.166 Even as the peace process was supposed to be taking hold, La Prensa was arbitrarily prohibited from publishing for fifteen days in 1988 because of its ‘disinformation campaign’.167 La Prensa responded with a communiqué condemning the action as totalitarian in the mould of Somoza himself.168 Interestingly, the close-down came just several weeks after Violeta Chamorro, owner of La Prensa and wife of the assassinated Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, complained to Daniel Ortega about the government’s and La Barricada’s smear campaign against her.169 Jaime Chamorro Cardenal details at length harassment and censorship the paper suffered under the Sandinistas.170 Censorship was not limited to opposition groups. It also extended to cover Christians. Director of Catholic Radio Bismarco Carballo (the priest filmed naked by state television crew) was not allowed to broadcast live; instead everything had to be recorded and passed through the censors, even messages from the Pope.171 Bible Society director Ignacio Hernández, a program director at Ondas de Luz for a while, also explained how he had to receive prior approval from the censors. Eventually live broadcasts were impossible, everything had to be pre172 recorded. Many pastors described how the local CDS sent people to monitor and even record their sermons. Often times, they misunderstood what they heard. Arnulfo Sánchez recalled one particular incident: I remember once, in Estelí, when José Carmen de Ruiz said, during an open air sermon, “Not one jot or tittle of my word will pass away…” [Spanish: no pasaran, from Mt 5:18]. The Sandinistas present mistook it as

165 Circular from Lissette Torres Morales ( Jefe Dirección de Medios de Comunicación, Ministerio del Interior), 19 October 1988. 166 From Rene Nuñez Tellez (Ministry of the President), sent to Compañeros Ministros del Estado Revolucionario, 18 October 1988 (ref. MP-607–88). 167 Letter from Lissette Torres Morales to La Prensa, 11 July 1988. 168 Communiqué issued by La Prensa, 12 July 1988. Signed by Cristiana Chamorro Barrios. 169 Letter from Violeta Chamorro to Daniel Ortega, 7 June 1988. 170 Jaime Chamorro Cardenal, Frente a Dos Dictaduras (San José: Libro Libre, 1987). 171 In Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 16. 172 Conversation with Ignacio Hernández, 25 May 2004, Managua.

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chapter five a saying by the Contras, “No pasaran”. They said it was a pro-Contra political statement. A song that had the words “no pasaran” also caused problems.173

Rufino Soza detailed a similar experience: I was once thrown in jail after a sermon in which I referred to the scripture that says, “I look to the hills, from whence cometh my help. My help cometh from the Lord.” They said I was not waiting for the Lord’s help, instead I was referring to the mountains of the north and the Contras.174

The government claimed such censorship was necessary in light of the war, but the Frente, through its own publication La Barricada, was able to publicise any statement it wished. More ominously, the official government spoke out against the concept of a “free press” as a capitalist ideal.175 Interestingly, another commentator on totalitarianism, Michael Curtis, provides a list of thirteen more narrowly defined features of totalitarianism. Of particular interest in a discussion of Sandinista Nicaragua are his suggestions that totalitarianism emphasises the subordination of private interests at the expense of the collective interest, and a monopoly of the educational and cultural process.176 Yet other totalitarian traits were not as fully developed, hence Cuzán prefers the term ‘embryonic totalitarianism’. Early on, critics labelled the regime authoritarian, but not yet totalitarian. While attending an IRD luncheon in Washington in his honour, Archbishop Obando stated that “it would be wrong to characterise the regime as totalitarian ‘at the present time’ ”.177 Yet Cuzán article, together with some of the evidence cited above, suggests Sandinista Nicaragua might have been moving in that direction. But for the purposes of this study whether this was the case or not is irrelevant. The situation detailed above, what they saw and heard, led the vast majority of Evangelicals to regard the Sandinistas as Marxists and totalitarians. The testimonies of Evangelicals make it abundantly clear that during the course of the regime many of them became increasingly fearful of the creation of a Soviet- or Cuban-style anti-Christian state.

173 174 175 176 177

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Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez. Interview with Rufino Soza. ‘Capitalismo y “libertad de prensa” ’, La Barricada, 14 October 1980. Michael Curtis, Totalitarianism (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1979), 5. P. Lowman, ‘The Archbishop Calls for the Gospel’ in Christianity Today.

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Some drew a parallel between revolutionary Nicaragua and the typical Pentecostal association of communism with Gog and Magog, or the Beast in the Apocalypse. Referring to rationing, and how he and his family, as Evangelicals, were prohibited from the rationing system because they were regarded as counterrevolutionary, Rufino Soza believed the system very much resembled the Mark of the Beast.178 Amalia Bell confirms that many Pentecostals thought this way and also regarded the Sandinistas as communists and allies of the Russians.179 Church of God superintendent Bienvenido López also explained how his denomination’s superintendent at the time of the revolution—Joaquín Guadalupe—labelled the Sandinistas as communists and likened them to the Beast. They came for him one night at 3 am and took him to the frontier at Peña Blanca, Costa Rica, expelling him from Nicaragua for good. It was not rationing as such that led Evangelicals to label the Sandinistas as the Beast. Rather, in the book of Revelation those who did not have the mark of the Beast could not buy or sell (Rev. 13:7). Thus, for Evangelicals rationing was not the problem, but rather, that they were singled out and refused ration cards because they were critical of the regime, which led some of them to draw a parallel between themselves and the Beast of the Apocalypse. The majority of Evangelicals I interviewed sought to keep their heads down and stay aloof from politics. But this was impossible. The Sandinistas often cited the popular slogan in revolutionary Nicaragua, “El que no está conmigo es mi enemigo” (he who is not for me is against me). Not to commit oneself fully to the revolution, or even seen not to be fully behind the revolution, meant being labelled a counterrevolutionary. Interestingly, Alfred Cuzán observes, “A totalitarian tyranny aims at the thorough politicization of all life, demanding not just passive acquiescence to the regime, but active support.”180

Interview with Rufino Soza. Interview with Amalia Bell. 180 Cuzán, ‘The Nicaraguan Revolution: From Autocracy to Totalitarian Dictatorship?’ Journal of InterDisciplinary Studies, 183–184. 178 179

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PART THREE

DYNAMICS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS FROM THE SANDINISTA PERSPECTIVE

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CHAPTER SIX

SANDINISTA REPRESSION Somoza’s regime, especially the latter stages when the GN sought to quell the insurrection, was brutal and repressive. It is against this backdrop of violence and human rights abuses that the Sandinistas came to power. Their immediate abolition of the death penalty, the well-publicised case of previously-imprisoned Tomás Borge forgiving his Somozan tormentors,1 and comparisons between a restrained Nicaraguan military and what was happening in El Salvador and Guatemala all helped to create the myth of Sandinista respect for human rights. Consequently, attempts in the 1980s to highlight Sandinista abuses, especially against Christians, were met with howls of protest by pro-Sandinistas who, at the height of a propaganda war between left and right, rejected such claims as political misinformation. Given that many still hold this view, unaware of what has come to light since the Sandinistas lost power, the first part of this chapter sets about exploding this myth of an essentially fair and decent regime. This then permits an examination of alleged abuses against conservative Protestants at the hands of Sandinistas more objectively. The second part, then, offers a general survey of Protestant-Sandinista relations during 1979–1990. Part three highlights a range of actual cases to illustrate the nature of abuses aimed at Evangelicals. The chapter concludes by asking if these abuses were specifically aimed at Evangelicals because of their beliefs. Sandinista Human Rights Abuses The Sandinista justice system left a lot to be desired. A 1980 Amnesty International report spoke of Sandinista justice in 1979 in almost glowing terms.2 The following year’s report was less enthusiastic, complaining 1 See, for example, Arthur McGovern, ‘Nicaragua’s Revolution: A Progress Report’, America 145 no. 19 (12 December 1981), 378. 2 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1980 (London: Amnesty International, 1980).

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that new laws were imprecise, “open to arbitrary interpretation,” and referring to “significant trial irregularities”. These included somocistas tried for murder where either no victim was named, or described simply as “the Nicaraguan people”.3 One defendant was imprisoned for rape, abduction and assault, based solely on his rank as a GN sergeant.4 Such summary justice continued throughout the 1980s. The Lawyers Committee, another human rights group, met with Nicaraguan judges, Supreme Court justices, prisoners, defence attorneys, even Tomás Borge, to investigate Sandinista justice. It concluded widespread judicial abuses in the mid-1980s.5 The report said the judicial system was “disturbing and unwarranted,”6 the court system lacked independence,7 and police could imprison without trial for up to two years, a power “subjected to substantial abuse.” Moreover, “forms of psychological coercion are commonly employed during interrogations of pre-trial detainees” held by the DGSE.8 The Committee also highlighted how the Popular AntiSomocista Tribunals (TPAs) were unfair and overtly political.9 They tried politically sensitive cases, the lack of proof was disturbing, and the conviction rate—78%—was disproportionately high. Defendants had little protection and there was no right of appeal. The report also noted sharp criticisms of the TPAs by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).10 Even as late as 1989 Amnesty reported widespread practices of imprisonment without trial, lack of access to lawyers, insurmountable barriers placed in the way of the defence, and an over-reliance on pre-court confessions by the prosecution.11 Clearly, then, summary Sandinista justice cannot simply be blamed on post-victory revenge against anyone deemed a Somocista. Judicial abuses were rampant throughout the 1980s.

3 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1981 (London: Amnesty International, 1981), 171. 4 Amnesty International, Report of the Amnesty International Missions to the Republic of Nicaragua, August 1979, Jan 1980 & Aug. 1980 (London: Amnesty International Publications, June 1982), 24. 5 Lawyers Committee, Nicaragua: Revolutionary Justice. 6 Ibid., 1. 7 Ibid., 8. 8 Ibid., 3, 10. 9 Ibid., 8–9. 10 Ibid., 18, 36–38. 11 Amnesty International, Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record, 1986–1989 (London: Amnesty International, October 1989), and Amnesty International, Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record (March 1986) (London: Amnesty, 1986).

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Meanwhile, Sandinista prisons were atrocious. The Washington Post detailed how inmates at La Modelo prison in Tipitapa managed to pass on details of abuses to a visiting delegation, including intimidation, beatings, sexual abuse, mock executions, refusal of medical treatment, and extreme rationing of food and water.12 The Los Angeles Times interviewed former Guardsmen released under an amnesty as part of the Central American peace accord, who spoke of regular beatings and punishments for refusing to participate in ‘re-education’ (i.e. indoctrination) programs.13 The Lawyers Committee also reported various instances of psychological torture, such as threats of death, being forced to undress and threatened with rape, or threatening prisoners with the death, torture or rape of family members. Cells were either very small with no amenities, or brightly lit, with uncomfortable temperatures. Security officials admitted privately some prisoners were deprived of sleep. Confessions were obtained through beatings. The Lawyers Committee blamed the DGSE for most ill-treatment, while limited access to prisoners made such abuses difficult to stop. The International Committee of the Red Cross was not permitted to visit any DGSE centre (though they could visit prisons). These grim descriptions of Sandinista prisons agree with numerous yearly Amnesty reports on Nicaragua. The DGSE was trained and equipped by the notorious East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, better known as the Stasi). John Koehler’s study of the Stasi files details how, during a tour of the East Bloc in 1980 to request assistance Tomás Borge met with East Germany’s Security Minister, Erich Mielke, marking the beginning of close Stasi-DGSE cooperation. Mielke regarded the training and equipping of the DGSE of utmost importance, dispatching Stasi agents and equipment to Nicaragua and bringing hundreds of Nicaraguan security service officials to East Germany for training in border control and coping with dissidents.14 The famous East German spymaster Markus Wolf even visited Managua on one occasion.15

12 Joanne Omang, ‘Inmate Accuses Managua of Abusing Prisoners’, Washington Post, 5 November 1986. 13 Richard Boudreaux, ‘Voluntary’ Work Rewarded by Sandinistas, Others Reported Abused—Freed Somoza Guards Describe Life in Prison’, Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1989. 14 John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). 15 Marcus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, Memoirs of a Spymaster (London: Pimlico, 1997).

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The DGSE was well known and feared for its brutality.16 At any one time, hundreds of dissidents were kept incommunicado for days or months, without trial and often in desperate conditions at El Chipote. Detainees were forced to sign false confessions, deprived of sleep, food and light. Lights would also be left on in the cells. Detainees were often kept in cells known as chiquitas (tiny ones), that were so small (similar to cupboards) they were unable even to sit down. Psychological torture included being forced to listen to the screams of tortured victims, facing mock firing squads, and threatening family members. Physical abuse included forced strenuous exercise, being made to stand for prolonged periods during interrogations, beatings, hanging from the ceiling by the wrists, and being soaked with ice cold water. Despite repeated requests, Amnesty was not permitted to visit El Chipote until 1987 during renovation work, when no prisoners were present. Dissidents endured a never-ending cycle of detention and release, aimed at causing intimidation and fear. The Nicaraguan human rights organisation Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (CPDH) also catalogued many human rights violations under the Sandinistas. Cases include a Masaya policeman who voluntarily handed himself in to the new Sandinista authorities in 1979. His wife spent years looking for him, but his body was not found until a mass grave was discovered in 1996.17 Another testimony is that of Sofonías Cisneros, a Catholic critic of Sandinista secondary education (under the Chamorro government Cisneros became vice-minister to Humberto Belli, minister for education). He details the abuses he suffered, including one incident when DGSE chief Lenin Cerna himself asked: “Do you know who I am?” When Cisneros said no, Cerna pointed a pistol at Cisneros’ head and screamed: “I am comandante Lenin Cerna and you are a son of a bitch who is going to die right here and now.”18 CPDH administrator Miriam Espinosa told me:

16 This brief survey of the DGSE is taken from the following Amnesty International publications: News Release, 12 February 1986 (London: Amnesty, 1986); Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record; Amnesty International Report 1983 (London: Amnesty, 1983); Amnesty International Report 1985 (London: Amnesty, 1985). Also referred to is U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua. 17 CPDH pamphlet entitled Caso: Desaparecido Miguel Jerónimo Herdocia Castillo (Managua: CPDH: 19 August 1996). 18 CPDH. Testimonio de Sofonías Cisneros Leiva (Managua: CPDH, undated pamphlet). Testimony was given in 1985, and the pamphlet refers to subsequent events in 1986.

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The Sandinistas were awful. They did a lot of bad things. Once they even sacked our offices because we were investigating the human rights abuses people accused them of. It is important some of the terrible things they did come out.19

Another human rights group—the Asociación Nicaragüense Pro Derechos Humanos (ANPDH)—also documents various human rights abuses.20 A 1991 ANPDH publication detailed 72 alleged mass graves, only 13 of which so far had been exhumed.21 The number of bodies in each grave ranged from 2 to 45. The human rights group Americas Watch ascribed only two of these to the Contras and the rest to the Frente. Local peasants said they had remained silent for fear of Sandinista reprisals.22 Among those listed is the mass grave of 14 AoG members at Murra, Nueva Segovia, discovered in 1990 and discussed later in this chapter. In 1999 CPDH director Lino Hernández stated his organisation had accumulated evidence of 14,000 human rights abuses during the Sandinista period, including widespread torture, kidnapping, rape, mutilation and murder.23 However, before leaving office, the Sandinistas secured amnesties for themselves and security agents. Moreover . . . Although the [ DGSE] was disbanded following Chamorro’s election, some of its members simply passed over to the police, many into positions of responsibility. The majority were transferred over into the army where they continue their intelligence-gathering function. Reports of misconduct by the police, including former DGSE officers, are more prevalent than 24 those involving army personnel, particularly in rural areas.

In 1996 the Los Angeles Times discussed how ex-DGSE officials were still at large, many serving as senior police officers, free from prosecution as a result of these amnesties.25 There has been talk of waiving such immunity in order to prosecute Lenin Cerna.26 Meanwhile, there have Conversation with Miriam Espinosa. See, for example, ANPDH, El Viento de Mokorón (Managua: ANPDH, August 1990). See also the ANPDH’s monthly bulletin Reflexión. 21 ANPDH, Los Cemeterios Clandestinos de Nicaragua (Managua: ANPDH, September 1991). 22 Americas Watch, Fitful Peace: Human Rights and Reconciliation in Nicaragua Under the Chamorro Government ( New York: Americas Watch, July 1991). 23 Michael Waller, ‘Will Sandinistas Face Justice?’ Insight on the New, 26 July 1999. 24 Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua, 7. 25 Juanita Darling, ‘Nicaragua Faces a Dilemma in Quest for Truth’, Los Angeles Times, 10 November 1996. 26 Garvin, ‘Ex-Nicaraguan Chief May Be Target of Suits’, Miami Herald. 19

20

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been calls within the U.S. to cancel entry visas for senior Sandinistas in light of these atrocities.27 Glen Garvin, Miami Herald reporter and former Managua station chief, explained how people in Nicaragua are still very fearful of Cerna and other leading Sandinistas.28 Garvin and Christianity Today reporter Deann Alford referred to Raul Shade, a photographer who had catalogued many human rights abuses in Nicaragua. Garvin explained how Shade had become disillusioned and bitter with subsequent Nicaraguan governments’ unwillingness to investigate fully these abuses for fear of the Sandinistas, who could still destabilise the country.29 Even now these undercurrents lead some to regard Enrique Bolaños as a lame duck president unable to act independently.30 During my own visit in May 2004, the country was in the grip of a major and paralyzing student strike, which many everyday people explained was being stoked up by the Sandinistas. Recently, Nicaragua’s current political instability caused by a Sandinista-Liberal alliance against Bolaños has been discussed at length in the world’s media. Rural and Northern Regions Sandinista human rights abuses were particularly harsh in the northern and rural areas, usually in and around the war zone. The maltreatment of the Miskito Indians in the early 1980s is well-documented, which included destruction of property, burning of whole villages, beatings, disappearances, and unexplained deaths.31 Reports of abuses in the Atlantic coast region and elsewhere led to urgent calls from the IAHCR for the government to investigate each case. Under pressure, in 1982 the Sandinista Interior Ministry (MINT) established a taskforce to look into these matters, headed by chief investigator Alvaro José Baldizón Aviles. In 1985, Baldizón defected to the U.S., bringing various MINT documents with him. (Naturally, the Reagan administration, keen to demonise the Sandinista regime, publicised his testimony.) In his role as special investigator, Baldizón concluded some 90% of allegations against the Sandinista forces were true. He provided documentary evidence

Glen Garvin, ‘Cancel U.S. visas for Sandinistas, Senator Demands’, Miami Herald, 18 May 2000. 28 Telephone conversation with Glen Garvin, 9 February 2004. 29 Ibid. 30 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005. 31 For example, see Amnesty International Report 1983, 159, and Garcia, Making of the Miskitu People, 104ff. 27

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(including names of victims, dates and places) of torture, rape, beatings and officially-sanctioned assassinations, known as “Special Measures”, which could only be carried out with the prior approval of either Tomás Borge or Luis Carrión (First Vice Minister of the Interior).32 Another U.S. Department of State publication a year later provided considerable evidence of Sandinista abuses and repression, including many photographs and first-hand accounts.33 Among Baldizón documents were multiple references to Miskito rebels being ‘enterrado vivo’ (buried alive). Could the Sandinistas possibly have been so brutal? The IACHR reports a similar claim by Steadman Fagoth, the Miskito guerrilla leader.34 Amalia Bell, a Miskita whose brother joined Fagoth’s Miskito resistance, had also heard of people being buried alive to deter other Miskitos from rebelling.35 Dexter Cuthbert, also a costeño (now Nicaraguan director of the Samaritan’s Purse, founded and headed by Billy Graham’s son, Franklyn) had no knowledge of people being buried alive, but went on to say, “I wouldn’t doubt that something like that could have happened, on both sides. Times were very, very violent, and I wouldn’t doubt it. But it wasn’t anything systematic.”36 Senior DGSE official, José Suárez, also said he was personally unaware of people being buried alive, but explained how many evil things had occurred in the rural areas and it was entirely possible that such isolated incidents could have taken place. He recalled how, during an interrogation of some campesinos, a DGSE colonel asked if they had seen any Contras. Suárez described how, when one man raised his arm, he saw with his own eyes the colonel slash it off with a machete.37 Joseph Douglas, a costeño teacher from the Puerto Cabezas area who eventually went on to fight with the Contras, said “The term ‘brutal’ does not give justice to what they did.” He described how some victims (those regarded as opponents of the Sandinistas) were tortured by having their fingernails removed with pliers, and how some prisoners were locked in large drawers, much like those in a morgue, for days at

U.S. Department of State, Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator’s Perspective (Washington: U.S. Department of State, February 1986). 33 U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua. 34 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights. 35 Interview with Amalia Bell. 36 Interview with Dexter Cuthbert. 37 Interview with José Suárez. 32

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a time.38 The Norwegian missionary Burger Sandli detailed something similar he had learned from his parishioners in the Waslala area: They had these concrete holes eight meters down in the ground. They lowered them, they could only stand, they couldn’t sit, and they had water dripping on them, and they were naked. They could stand there for eight days . . . Some of them were standing there 24 days before they were pulled out. They had over 100 of these tubes down there and they had people all the time in them.39

It is worth noting that, however extreme these forms of punishment may appear, they are consistent with the various human rights reports detailing the chiquita cells and variations. It is important to note how most abuses were carried out in the mountainous northern region, where Pentecostalism was at its strongest. An Amnesty report highlighted the disappearance and murder of various people, including children, in the region at the hands of Sandinista forces. Many of the dead were found horrifically mutilated, including beheaded or castrated.40 However, it is Americas Watch that offers the most comprehensive and detailed report of Sandinista systematic abuses in the north.41 It investigates multiple killings and disappearances (many of them of Contras and their families returning under amnesties as part of the Central American peace accord) by Nicaraguan security and military forces between 1987 and 1989 in an area known as Region 6. It details many assassinations, tortures, detentions, and mutilations in remote areas. The report identified seventy-four murders, fourteen disappearances, and a further twenty possible killings, concluding that the killing was systematic: The concentration of so many cases in a particular geographic area in this period led us to conclude that these killings constituted a pattern, and could not be dismissed as isolated or sporadic.42

Bearing in mind this report was concerned with killings in just one northern region during a two-year period, Americas Watch points out that DGSE and EPS abuses across the whole of the north throughout

38 39 40 41 42

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Interview with Joseph Douglas. Interview with Burger Sandli. For example, see Amnesty International, The Human Rights Record. Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua. Ibid., 6.

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the 1980s must have been far more widespread.43 The events recorded echo similar instances in Pantasma in 1983–4, which Americas Watch also documented. Yet in both cases, Americas Watch noted very lenient sentences in the very few instances where their documented evidence resulted in the perpetrators being tried (most absconded, the Sandinistas claimed): We are troubled that, in some cases, undue leniency seems to have been shown to military and security agents who have committed serious crimes . . . It is particularly distressing to learn of cases in which those convicted of gross abuses remain on active duty, or have been restored to active duty, following conviction.44

Americas Watch explains how the authorities were often unhelpful. Clearly, the Sandinistas sought to sweep such embarrassing revelations under the carpet. This explains why they came down so hard on the CPDH, which documented Sandinista abuses. As early as 1981 Amnesty expressed alarm at the way the Sandinista authorities hassled the CPDH in a bid to silence it.45 A La Prensa article reveals their methods of silencing criticism. It detailed how a young woman of 20 was sexually abused by 4 Managuan policemen who afterwards wanted to kill her but eventually let her go. The girl’s mother told the newspaper that the Sandinista police were supposed to protect the people, not the opposite. The article was banned from publication by the Sandinista censors.46 Neither were cases of summary executions limited to the northern regions. Rosalio Jarquín, a Pentecostal pastor, details a case south of Rama in 1982 that he had firsthand knowledge of during his time on the Atlantic coast: The Sandinistas treated the campesinos there very badly. There was a family there by the surname of Luna, a large family, one of the wealthier families in the area. They were Liberal, not Sandinistas. But they had adapted to sandinismo. But they had enemies within the Sandinista army, who denounced them. So about a hundred soldiers came, Sandinistas, who tied them up and took them away. On the road back, they shot them and left them there. They didn’t bury them, so 24 hours later the villagers went looking for them and found the four bodies. They buried them at

43 44 45 46

Ibid., 14. Ibid., 50–51. Amnesty International Report 1981, 174. Censored and unpublished La Prensa article dated 17 April 1986.

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chapter six about 1 am. I was there and I preached the sermon. I saw them buried, the father and children. They were accused of being contras. I saw the body myself, with a small bullet hole and a large exit hole.47

Survey of Evangelical-Sandinista Relations Evangelical-Sandinistas relations between 1979 and 1990 fall into three discernible stages: 1979–1980, when the Sandinistas enjoyed a honeymoon period among most sectors of Nicaraguan society; late 1980 to 1987, which represented a time of great tension and problems; and finally, 1987 onwards, when the implementation of a peace process to end the civil war helped ease tensions. The Honeymoon Period Several of the Protestants interviewed refer to some initial friction and harassment at the hands of the Sandinistas shortly after the revolution. Miguel Angel Casco stated: They burnt some Evangelical templos in the north of the country, and here in the capital there was some persecution, the taking of some templos belonging to the Adventist church. But this happened during the first two or three months after the Triumph. Neither was this a policy of the (Sandinista) leadership, but rather, the actions of some commanders of the revolution. But this was corrected and stopped.48

Nicanor Mairena also refers to several temples taken during the first year of the revolution.49 Gilberto Aguirre likewise spoke of some isolated, sporadic cases of harassment, including several temples seized and some North American missionaries questioned, but did not believe this represented a systematic attempt at persecution, otherwise it would have been much more widespread.50 It appears these accounts are not referring to the seizure of churches in August 1982 (see below), but rather, short-term confiscations shortly after the revolution. Ruth Sánchez, who attends the CAM church in Granada, described how their church building was seized by the Sandinistas for several weeks in July 1979 and used as military headquarters, but eventually returned.51 47 48 49 50 51

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Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

with with with with with

Rosalio Jarquín, 26 May 2004, Managua. Miguel Angel Casco (February 2004). Nicanor Mairena. Gilberto Aguirre. Ruth Sánchez.

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Carlos Escorcia likewise spoke of several isolated incidents, but opined, “I do not think it was a policy of the Sandinista government to persecute Pentecostals”.52 Gustavo Parajón also suggested most problems were early on. He described some of the initial ignorance and hostility CEPAD faced from Sandinista fighters who associated Protestantism with North American imperialism, and explained that Protestants . . . Had a reputation throughout Latin America, and maybe throughout other parts of the world, that we were very conservative, the way that we had been taught by missionaries . . . we were mostly right wing. And so that was the stereotype. And so, at the beginning, there were problems, but again these were not from, at least I do not perceive them to be from the government as such, but from certain individuals.53

Gilberto Aguirre expressed a similar view concerning initial Sandinista perceptions of Protestants: There were two views within the Frente. Those fighting in the mountains knew of our programs and efforts, and believed the church had a positive role to play. But another sector that never fought in the mountains, those in the urban zones, did not know of our programs. They believed Protestants were tools of imperialism.54

Raul Carazo concurs that initially there was a lack of understanding between Evangelicals and the Frente, especially as the latter did not understand religion well.55 On the whole, though, aside from these isolated incidents it appears many Nicaraguans, including some Evangelicals, were willing to give the Sandinistas a chance. As Mark Everingham has pointed out, the revolution represented a genuine and popular movement ‘from below’.56 Mention has already been made of the Declaración de los 500 which, according to Parajón, included a large number of Pentecostals.57 Miguel Angel Casco also believes many Pentecostals initially supported the revolution.58 Gilberto Aguirre concurs.59 Many Evangelicals I interviewed, both leaders and grassroots, explained how they encountered few major problems during the first year. Arnulfo Sánchez actually labelled it a

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Interview with Carlos Escorcia. Interview with Gustavo Parajón. Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. Interview with Raul Carazo. As discussed in Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua, 3ff. Gustavo Parajón., e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005 (2). Interview with Miguel Angel Casco (May 2004). Interview with Gilberto Aguirre.

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honeymoon period.60 Several Christianity Today reports during 1979–80 also suggest Christians faced few restrictions, despite initial fears to the contrary.61 Certainly, it is unlikely the North American Christian press would fail to report of problems if there was even an inkling of repression. During this honeymoon period, MINT chief Tomás Borge (an atheist) even attended several Full Gospel Businessmen’s Fellowship meetings in Managua62 (discussed at length by David Stoll).63 However, Evangelical leaders who knew about this were unimpressed. Rafael Arista, Roberto Rojas and missionary Bob Trolese regarded Borge’s actions as a strategy,64 pointing out how Daniel Ortega had attended similar meetings. Saturnino Cerrato believed Borge’s aim was simply to demonstrate that “Entre cristianismo y revolución no hay contradicción” (there is no contradiction between Christianity and the revolution),65 presumably to show that Evangelicals had nothing to fear by supporting fully the revolution. Tensions and Problems Within a year or so, however, things clearly began to change. Rafael Arista declared the Sandinistas enjoyed widespread support among Nicaraguans until they began promoting a doctrine similar to that of Cuba.66 Juan Reyes said initially the revolution was very popular, but then the Frente captured it for itself. “We were all in favour of ditching Somoza, but not of the new FSLN system.”67 Mario Espinoza explained how the church faced little pressure at first, but then… Things began to change gradually, in stages, after they triumphed through the revolution . . . the changes they (the Sandinistas) introduced began around 1981, or possibly late 1980.68

Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez. See Sywulka, ‘Aftermath of Nicaragua’s Civil War’; ‘Church Also is Transformed by Nicaragua’s Revolution’; and Pretiz, ‘The Nicaraguan Junta Reassures Evangelicals’, all appearing in Christianity Today. 62 See Pretiz, ‘The Nicaraguan Junta Reassures Evangelicals’, Christianity Today. 63 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 225–27. 64 Interviews with Rafael Arista, Roberto Rojas and Bob Trolese. 65 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). 66 Interview with Rafael Arista. 67 Interview with Juan Reyes. 68 Interview with Mario Espinoza. 60 61

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Saturnino Cerrato concurs that for the first year or two there was little repression, but that after “about a year and a half they began to put pressure on a little, tighten up a little.”69 Bartolomé Matamoros also spoke of persecution reaching a high point between 1982 and 1985.70 Meanwhile, Bob Trolese speaks of some Evangelicals supporting Sandinista politics initially, before falling out with them.71 Interestingly, this shift in relations was during the same time as tensions between the Frente and the Catholic hierarchy in late 1980 and 1981.72 By 1982, relations were deteriorating quickly. In March 1982 the Sandinista daily La Barricada published a provocative three-part series denouncing the Evangelical ‘sects.’ It was the main banner headline on page 1, entitled La Invasión de Las Sectas.73 On 15 March 1982 the Sandinistas declared a state of emergency, followed by a crackdown on religious and other sectors, including opposition groups. A few days later various Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested and expelled from Nicaragua and their temples seized.74 In July 1982 the government prohibited foreign funding of Evangelicals and other church groups.75 In August Sandinista turbas seized some 20 Evangelical temples.76 (Over time, others were taken and it was only in the 1990s that the AoG was able to begin getting them all back).77 The Sandinistas claimed that the seizures represented a knee-jerk reaction by everyday Nicaraguans angry at the Evangelicals’ counterrevolutionary links.78 Yet it came shortly after the Frente alleged that rightists, helped by the CIA and Evangelical sects working as a fifth column, had launched an invasion Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). Interview with Bartolomé Matmoros. 71 Interview with Bob Trolese. 72 It is not appropriate to get bogged down in claim and counterclaim here. Much of the literature detailed in Chapter 1, as well as various studies exploring CatholicSandinista relations, examine some of the key issues in this saga from both sides of the political divide. 73 Alberto Reyes, ‘La Invasión de las Sectas’ (3 March 1982); ‘Quienes so los que dividen a los evangélicos’ (4 March 1982); and ‘Estructura Interna y Externa de las Iglesias Evangélicas’ (5 March 1982), all appearing in La Barricada. 74 ‘In Brief ’, The Times, 22 March 22 1982. 75 Margaret Crahan, ‘Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Nicaragua’ in Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, eds. The Progressive Church in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989). This is confirmed by Lancaster in Thanks to God, 214. 76 See U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua, 43. 77 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999), and Jacobs, ‘Lasting Peace for Nicaragua’s Hurting’, Pentecostal Evangel. 78 ‘Protesta Popular Contra Las Sectas’, La Barricada, 11 August 1982. 69 70

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from Honduras of some 1000 fighters. Tomás Borge and Luis Carrión denounced foreign religious sects in Nicaragua as “nests of counterrevolutionary activity,”79 and clearly this and other denunciations80 at government level led to the mobs seizing the temples. (In fact, DGSE defector Miguel Bolaños Hunter explained how the turbas never worked alone— they formed part of the state security apparatus).81 The inflammatory articles denouncing Evangelicals as North American tools of imperialism came shortly after Interior Minister Tomás Borge’s radio broadcast labelling the sects as CIA-funded enemies.82 The seizures in August were accompanied that week by several other denunciations of Evangelical sects in La Barricada,83 while the paper eulogised Pentecostals (here labelled ‘Christians’ and not ‘sects’) who supported the revolution.84 These events took place the same week of the infamous humiliation of Bismarco Carballo, a close aide of Bishop Obando, on 11 Aug 1982. At her request, Carballo had visited a female parishioner at home, but claimed that when he arrived a man had forced him to undress. The man then chased the naked priest through the streets of Managua, while a state television crew, which happened to be filming in the immediate vicinity, captured the whole incident on film and reported it as a jealous husband seeking revenge.85 Carballo and the church maintained the incident was a ploy to discredit a Sandinista foe and close ally of Archbishop Obando.86 DGSE defector Miguel Bolaños Hunter said the incident was fabricated and the woman involved—Maritza de Castillo—was a security agent and well-known mistress of several Sandinista comandantes.87 The Reagan administration publicised the incident as evidence of Sandinista hostility towards

Reuter, ‘Nicaraguas blame CIA for invasion’, The Times, 17 July 1982. According to former Nixon aide (later Evangelical minister Charles Colson) in August Borge denounced the ‘sects’ in no uncertain terms, so that a turba began to chant, ‘Que se vayan, que se vayan’ (Get them out, get them out). Charles Colson, Kingdoms in Conflict (Grand Rapids: Markham, 1987), 199. 81 IRD, The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua, 5–6. 82 As discussed by Robb, Betrayal of the Church. 83 ‘ExGN Convertidos en Pastores Actuan en Chinandega’, and ‘Campesinos Desenmascaran a Pastores de Sectas’, both appearing in La Barricada, 11 August 1982. 84 ‘Firme Pronunciamiento de Iglesias Cristianas’, La Barricada, 10 August 1982. 85 For Carballo’s version, see ‘Testimonio de Padre Carballo’, La Prensa, 13 August 1982. 86 See Carballo’s interview in Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 13–14. 87 IRD, The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua, 10. 79 80

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the church. Pro-Sandinista Catholics, on the other hand, suggested the U.S. had exaggerated wildly.88 Meanwhile Sandinista sympathiser Philip Berryman says “thoughtful observers in Managua” suspected an amorous liaison but he concedes an element of entrapment, suggesting the incident discredited both church and government.89 However, today most Nicaraguans accept Carballo was the target of a dirty trick, and apparently the Sandinistas have admitted so.90 New York Times reporter and Managua bureau chief Stephen Kinzer details how the incident popularised Carballo among the majority of Nicaraguan Catholics.91 Shortly after the Carballo incident, there was a serious clash between Catholics and turbas in the city of Masaya. Also that year, MINT refused to permit a papal letter supporting Obando to be printed in any of the country’s press.92 All these events in August 1982 suggest a concerted attack by the Sandinistas aimed at non-compliant church groups, whether Protestant or Catholic. Tensions between the Frente and Evangelicals were so bad in Summer 1982 that CAM decided to leave Nicaragua, though its communiqué was careful not to mention political issues: Following an established policy, and to avoid a foreign presence that might be detrimental to the development of the national church, or burdensome to its relationships, CAM has prayerfully decided to redeploy its foreign missionary personnel.93

The year 1982, of course, also witnessed the Sandinista-Miskito conflict which, given Miskitos’ close affinity with the Moravian church, represented another church-state conflict. When the Sandinistas interrupted a Moravian church service in Prinzapolka in 1981 to arrest Miskito leader Steadman Fagoth, anthropologist Claudia García says this “was seen by many Miskitu as an attack on the sacredness of their church.”94 The confrontation resulted in a mêlée killing eight people,

88 For example, see James Goff, ‘Nicaraguans Protest Manipulation of Religion’, Latinamerica Press 14 no. 33 (16 September 1982), 1. 89 Berryman, Religious Roots of Rebellion, 270. 90 Conversation with Julio León Báez, senior archivist at La Prensa. He explained how it was public knowledge among all Nicaraguans. 91 Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, 199, 200, 2003–4. 92 For details of the various events that summer, see Kinzer’s accounts in his book. 93 CAM, ‘Missionaries in Nicaragua Redeployed’ in a CAM bulletin, dated Summer 1982, 11. 94 Garcia, Making of the Miskitu People, 105. See also Jim and Mary Whitmer, ‘Why the Miskitos Are a People Held Hostage’, Christianity Today, 8 October 1982, 56, 86–89.

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four Sandinista soldiers and four Miskitos. García explains how the forced resettlements of whole Miskito villages in 1982 that followed led to 37 Miskitu communities being destroyed, including churches and pastoral homes. Meanwhile, Moravian Bishop John Wilson proposed dialogue. Yet . . . Ignoring the declarations of support for the revolution made by the ecclesiastical institution, its executive board was detained and the pastors that formed it were taken to Managua, where they were held prisoner for a year.95

Sandinista heavy-handed treatment of Miskitos and their Moravian leaders is well-documented,96 even though, according to García few actually sided with the Miskito rebels. She explains how, out of 116 ordained and lay Moravian pastors, 15 were held by the authorities in Managua, two or three had taken up arms, and four had died in fighting.97 In 1983 Evangelical-Sandinista relations deteriorated yet further, as the Contra war intensified and in the summer the Sandinistas introduced SMP (discussed previously). Subsequently, Evangelical-Sandinista relations soured considerably. However, they hit rock bottom in 1985, when the state of emergency was extended. Margaret Crahan details how… In the aftermath of the 1985 expansion of the state of emergency a number of fundamentalist Protestants were detailed by the government. They were accused by the Ministry of the Interior of preaching against universal military service and counselling draft evasion.98

These arrests are also highlighted by Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran, who also detail how Campus Crusade for Christ staff were placed under house arrest, literature was confiscated, and the Nicaraguan Bible Society told to cease its activities . . . In addition, [the government] has cracked down heavily on evangelistic activity, particularly among church groups that have remained politically

Garcia, Making of the Miskitu People, 07. See, for example, Jim and Mary Whitmer (op. cit.); Amnesty International, Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record (London: Amnesty, March 1986); and the testimony of Moravian pastor Norman Bent in Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 175, 178. 97 The lack of Moravian involvement in the Sandinista-Miskito war is confirmed by Norman Bent (ibid.). 98 Crahan, ‘Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Nicaragua’ in Mainwaring and Wilde, The Progressive Church in Latin America, 117. 95

96

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neutral by their refusal to endorse the 1979 revolution that brought the 99 Sandinistas to power.

The 1985 arrests, many of them pastors and leaders returning from religious conferences in the United States,100 are well-known among Nicaragua’s Evangelicals. Nearly every Evangelical I spoke with referred to these arrests, which included CNPEN president Félix Rosales, Ignacio Hernández (director of the Nicaraguan Bible Society), Boanerges Mendoza (senior pastor, First CAM Church, Managua), Jimmy Hassan (Nicaraguan director, Campus Crusade for Christ), Guillermo Ayala (CNPEN), Gustavo Sevilla (CNPEN president, Managua), Manuel Duarte (CNPEN president, Chontales region), Rolando Mena ( president, Ondas de Luz radio station), Juan Simón Videa (AoG superintendent the year before), Modesto Alvarez (director, Child Evangelism Fellowship), Maria Teresa Madrigal (Child Evangelism Fellowship), and twin brothers Roberto and Benedicto Hernández (Campus Crusade staff ). Many were taken to El Chipote, while others were instructed to report to Casa 50 (a DGSE office). AoG superintendent Saturnino Cerrato was also detained and held at the airport for a while after returning from a trip abroad. Guillermo Ayala details how Roberto Rojas was detained with him at the airport. The detentions ranged from a few hours to a few days, and some of the detainees describe brutal treatment. So serious were these arrests, together with increasing tensions and problems throughout 1986 and 1987, that the U.S.-based NAE adopted a resolution condemning Sandinista actions against Evangelicals: The pleas of the evangelical churches in Nicaragua for prayer support have been heard. The tragic loss of religious liberty has made it extremely difficult for many Nicaraguan churches to fulfil their ministries. We are asked by Nicaraguan Christian brothers and sister to join them in a worldwide campaign of prayer that will climax on October 12, 1987. They ask that we pray especially that religious freedom for all churches be restored, that radio stations with religious programming be permitted to reopen and that permission be granted for church publications, now forbidden, to be published and mailed.101

99 Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran, ‘Political Legitimacy and Dissent’ in Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran, eds. Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensioanl Perspective (Winchester: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 117–8. 100 Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 101 NAE Resolution: Prayer for Churches in Nicaragua (Wheaton [now Washington DC]: National Association of Evangelicals, 1987). Posted on NAE website: www.nae.net (accessed July 1997).

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This statement ought not to lead one to regard the NAE as a puppet of the U.S. government. For example, a resolution adopted at the 54th Annual Meeting of the NAE also strongly condemned CIA attempts to use missionaries and clergy to obtain intelligence.102 Easing of Tensions It was only during the late 1980s that Evangelical-Sandinista tensions eased somewhat. In fact, tensions in general within Nicaragua eased as a peace process was implemented. Though the Contadora process failed to bring peace to Central America, a peace effort launched by Oscar Arias (president of Costa Rica) led to the Esquipulas II peace accord, signed in Esquipulas, Guatemala, on 7 August 1987.103 Subsequently, National Reconciliation Committees were set up in each country to try to resolve issues and the region’s problem as a whole. However, the peace commissions did not end all Nicaragua’s problems. In 1988 three of the four Com-mittee members (only Sandinista vice-president Sergio Ramirez, also on the committee, disagreed) believed the Frente had not yet fully complied with the terms of the accord, including allowing full press freedom, lifting the state of emergency, and easing restrictions on dissident groups.104 Moreover, as the Americas Watch report into the killings in northern Nicaragua demonstrates, the amnesty allowing Contras to stop fighting and return home were not always honoured, with many returning Contras and their families assassinated by the Sandinista army. Nevertheless, in the wake of Esquipulas II Evangelicals experienced less harassment and better relations with the state, especially in the lead up to the 1990 elections. Roberto Rojas has no doubt that international pressure and the peace process made the lives of Evangelicals much better in the late 1980s.105 The Catholic radio station, Radio Católica,

102 NAE Resolution: Government Use of Missionary and Aid Workers (Wheaton [now Washington DC]: National Association of Evangelicals, 1996). The full text of this resolution may be found at the NAE website: http://www.nae.net/index. cfm?FUSEACTION=editor.page&pageID=69&IDCategory=9 (last accessed 18 October 2006). 103 Oscar Arias, José Napoleón, Vinicio Cerezo, José Azcona, and Daniel Ortega, Acuerdo de Esquipulas II (7 August 1987). Reproduced on the Library of Congress website: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/law/writings/gtlw1506199802.pdf#search=’Esquipulas%20II’ (last accessed 16 February 2005). 104 Stephen Kinzer, ‘Peace Monitors Criticise Sandinistas’, New York Times, 11 January 1988. 105 Interview with Roberto Rojas.

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returned to air in October 1987, the first time it was permitted to broadcast since late 1985.106 Many prisoners were released, including 1,894 former Guardsmen, some of whom were Church of God believers, and seven of whom became pastors upon their release.107 Also, whereas in the past the Sandinista authorities had hassled visiting speakers to the country (for example, Alberto Mottessi’s visit in 1984, or refusing entry to Morris Cerullo in 1981), the high-profile anti-communist televangelist Jimmy Swaggart was permitted to visit Nicaragua and preach in Managua (though Billy Graham’s request to visit was turned down).108 Swaggart was only the second non-Sandinista (after Obando) to hold a rally in the Plaza de la Revolución, which was attended by some 40,000 people.109 He preached for three consecutive days in the Square, overlooked by posters of Sandino and Fonseca. The Sandinistas claimed they permitted it in order to uphold religious freedom, though there was a problem in the lead up to the visit when it was discovered David Spencer was on the advance team and who, according to one source, had been kicked out of the country six times already.110 Yet the evangelistic campaign eventually went ahead. What is particularly surprising is not only that Swaggart, an avowed anti-communist, went to Nicaragua in the first place, but that he avoided political controversy. Harold Robleto, who attended the meeting, did not recall Swaggart being political,111 while Sara Diamond, a leftist commentator of the religious right, also confirms Swaggart avoided political controversy. She also details how Swaggart was invited to visit a hospital to meet victims maimed by Contra abuses, which she says visibly moved him. Swaggart also prayed with Daniel Ortega.112 Carlos Escorcia believes that Swaggart’s more objective, less emotive, time in Nicaragua cost him dear, pointing out how knowledge of his longstanding immoral behaviour only became known and publicised just three

106 ‘World Scene: Nicaragua—More Press Freedom’, Christianity Today, 6 November 1987, 52. 107 Richard Boudreaux, ‘Managua Frees 1,894 Somoza Guard Veterans’, Los Angeles Times, 18 March 1989. 108 Boudreaux, ‘Holy Spirit Drew Him, Swaggart Says’, Los Angeles Times. 109 ‘Swaggart Crusade Pulls Big Crowd in Managua’, Washington Post, 15 February 1988. 110 Interhemispheric Resource Center, Groupwatch Files: Jimmy Swaggart Ministries. Albuquerque: IRC, January 1989, 4. The files were last accessed at www.namebase. org/gw/swaggart.txt on 25 January 2004, but have since been removed. 111 Interview with Harold Robleto. 112 Diamond, Spiritual Warfare, 34–35.

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days after returning from Nicaragua. Escorcia believes Swaggart made a serious political mistake by meeting Ortega and also pledging, shortly before his departure, to lobby his senator friends to put pressure on the administration to end the war against Nicaragua.113 The late 1980s also saw Puerto Rican evangelist Yiye Avila permitted into the country. Avila had previously been prohibited entry because of an evangelistic campaign in Alfredo Stroessner’s Paraguay.114 Ortega also visited a large AoG church, as well as a large Evangelical pastoral conference, together with Gustavo Sevilla (then CNPEN president) and international evangelist Alberto Mottessi. The Sandinista MP Sixto Ulloa, who helped to organise and attended the event, states: “In the convention centre there some 3000 pastors met. Sevilla, Mottessi and Daniel Ortega all went along, and it was spectacular. All the pastors came out as Sandinistas!”115 Thus, while many Evangelicals were distrustful of the Sandinistas right through to the end of the regime, it is clear that tense Evangelical-Sandinista relations eased during the last third of the 1980s. Nature of Abuses Faced By Evangelicals I came across many examples of human rights abuses and repression of Evangelicals and it is simply impossible to list them all here. Instead, this chapter offers a cross sample of incidents to highlight the nature of problems faced by Evangelicals both generally, and also in the northern and rural areas. General Harassment Nearly every Evangelical leader interviewed highlighted everyday harassment and stress they experienced through being watched constantly by state security. Several examples will suffice to illustrate the point. Arnulfo Sánchez explained how pastors were constantly followed and investigated by the DGSE.116 Bob Trolese said throughout the 1980s he was under state security scrutiny.117 Alfonso Mejilla explains how

113 114 115 116 117

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Interview Interview Ibid. Interview Interview

with Carlos Escorcia. with Sixto Ulloa. with Arnulfo Sánchez. with Bob Trolese.

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this put many pastors he knew under great psychological pressure. He singles out how Rafael Arista (his Jalapa predecessor, now AoG vice-superintendent) faced continuous harassment by the authorities for eight years, who would stand outside his house or stop him in the street at any given time to demand his papers, and even physically threaten both him and his wife. Mejilla explained how some leaders and their families suffered so much stress from threats that they fled the country.118 Clearly, CNPEN president Félix Rosales, whose suffering many Evangelicals highlighted, was one whose family paid a heavy price. Saturnino Cerrato stated: At any moment when he was in his car, a motorbike could appear behind him and they would stop him, just to let him know, “Look, we are watching you.” Sometimes, they would arrive at his house at six in the morning to knock on the door, saying “Look, we just want to remind you that we are watching you.” And they put him under so much pressure that his wife suffered a mental and emotional breakdown, so that a psychologist said, “Listen, you need to leave here and take your family with you, because if you don’t you are going to lose them.”119

Telephones were routinely tapped. Ignacio Hernández recalls how, after Violeta Chamorro’s election victory, he received a telephone call out of the blue from an engineer who told him “Just to let you know your ‘phone is no longer tapped.” Hernández also spoke of constant harassment and how the Sandinistas made life so difficult for Evangelical leaders. He recalls how, as Bible Society director, he was required to attend an important conference in Miami, but had to hide $25 in his sock to cover the taxi fare from Miami airport to the venue, as security officials at Managua airport always refused to let him take out 120 any dollars whatsoever. Evangelicals also faced various limits on their liberty. Félix Rosales claimed Evangelical leaders had little freedom in those days, and could be arrested at any time.121 Guillermo Ayala said he was prohibited from speaking in Ciudad Sandino, where he knew of many acts of repression.122 Evangelicals also needed permission for open air services. Juan Reyes attended an open air service held without such permission in

118 119 120 121 122

Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1990). Conversation with Ignacio Hernández. Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Guillermo Ayala.

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south Managua in 1984. It was quickly raided by the authorities and the minister taken away in handcuffs.123 Harold Robleto explained how even legal open air meetings, as well as services in churches, were often disrupted by the turbas.124 Pastors were also severely restricted in what they could say from their platforms. Both Saturnino Cerrato and Rufino Soza said one could not speak out openly against the Sandinistas; to do so meant arrest.125 Juan Reyes explained it was important never to attack verbally either the Frente or the government system, as spies frequented the congregations.126 The Sandinistas also withheld CNPEN’s personería jurídica for many years. Félix Rosales explained how they used this against him during his detention and interrogation in 1985, saying he led an illegal, counterrevolutionary organisation.127 Clearly, a lack of legal status was a cause for concern for those not associated with a recognised organisation. Sixto Ulloa spoke proudly of how he had managed to secure legal recognition for many Protestant groups during his time as Protestant-Sandinista mediator. When asked, therefore, why it had taken so long for CNPEN to secure theirs, he explained that some CNPEN pastors received monthly stipends from a Dutchman living in Costa Rica.128 (David Stoll details a similar story, referring to anti-communist missionary John Kessler who supported some pastors.129 When I asked Stoll, he confirmed Kessler was of either German or Dutch extraction,130 so clearly both are one and the same). Ironically, while this caused problems for CNPEN’s legal status, the Sandinistas allowed CEPAD to receive millions of dollars of aid from abroad, much of which was channelled into Sandinista social projects. As well as the CDS, the turbas caused many problems for Evangelicals. DGSE defector Miguel Bolaños Hunter explained how the turbas were part of the DGSE mechanism, and owed their origin to Tomás Borge himself.131 It was the turbas that seized and confiscated many

123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131

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Interview with Juan Reyes. Interview with Harold Robleto. Interviews with Saturnino Cerrato and Rufino Soza. Interview with Juan Reyes. Interview with Félix Rosales. Interview with Sixto Ulloa. Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 236. David Stoll, e-mail correspondence, 19 February 2005. IRD, The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua.

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Evangelical temples. Juan Reyes says, “Once, in 1982, I saw them with my own eyes profane an AoG church. They broke in and ransacked it to look for evidence that the church was involved with the CIA.”132 Saturnino Cerrato recalls how they learned a temporary structure they had built as a church was going to be demolished by the Sandinistas one evening: And so that night the brothers decided to stay in the building during a vigil. Around midnight, Sandinistas started to arrive. They destroyed the temple, and two brothers, well one of them, he was very young, they beat him and threw a stone at his eye, he thought he had lost his eye . . . and they threw stones at the other brother. On that occasion a foreign newspaper journalist took pictures and published them. So for the first time we saw the Sandinistas humiliated because someone protested against them. How could they therefore say, “Entre cristianismo y revolución no hay contradicción”? Some revolutionary politicians came to us, saying, “These are disorganised rabble, groups who have nothing to do with our philosophy. Forgive us, pardon us. Look, to prove we did not do that, we are going to give you a piece of land to build a temple”. And they did!133

On another occasion, the turbas tried to break up a large CNPENorganised campaign with Alberto Mottessi. But Roberto Rojas explains how, for once, Evangelicals were ready and retaliated: Once we were meeting in a stadium for an evangelistic campaign, and a group of Sandinista supporters came to cause disruption. For the first time, the Evangelicals reacted. They came to blows with the mob, and on this occasion they left without having managed to disrupt the event.134

Shortly afterwards, however, CNPEN faced a severe crackdown from the government, which interrogated its leaders and cancelled its activities. In Managua, the 1985 arrests marked the low point in EvangelicalSandinista relations. Of these, Benjamín Cortés observes: Several were arrested at the airport. Later they were freed because of intervention by their denominations or by CEPAD. There was speculation that these pastors were subplotting against the government, they worked for the CIA, or were doing and promoting views that threatened the revolution. But it was never proved, it was speculative. These were well-known pastors, for example, Saturnino Cerrato, who was detained

132 133 134

Interview with Juan Reyes. Interview with Saturnino Cerrato. Interview with Roberto Rojas.

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chapter six at the airport, where some security officials speculated he had flown in from the US to cause trouble, or to destabilise the revolution . . . absurd things. But they couldn’t prove these things. It was totally irresponsible of the authorities.135

Several of those arrested detailed their experiences: I was kept there for 7 days, being interrogated. I was stripped, photographed, fingerprinted, and then given an overall known as “el mono” . . . all of this was to destroy my morale. They accused us of being CIA, counterrevolutionary, that we were inciting the population. They said many things. There was also a mixture of Cuban and Nicaraguan agents, and the interrogation was very psychological. They threatened to bring in your family.136

It certainly destroyed Ignacio Hernández’s morale. He explained to me how the whole experience had made him very depressed, while his daughter told me he was very fearful for some years afterwards.137 CNPEN president Félix Rosales, also arrested in 1985, stated: They came for me around 1 am, these guys from State Security. They knocked on my door. My wife told them she refused to open the door. They tried for 30 minutes to get us to open up. Finally, I said if you want to kill us, do it now. Anyway, they gave in and told me I had to meet them at 5 am at their office. There, I met Cerrato and Ignacio Hernández at the same time. We all showed up, and they arrested and handcuffed us. They also blindfolded us, as they took us through these tunnels. My interrogation lasted about four hours. There were two of them, and one spoke like a Cuban. They said they knew all I had done, had all the proof they needed to send me to prison. They were yelling at me. But then they said the revolution wanted to offer me one opportunity to escape this. As CNPEN president, pass on to us the names of all pastors and leaders who are counterrevolutionary and support the Contras. We will give you all the protection you need. But you must make a decision to support the revolution. After four hours of yelling at me and threatening my family, they finally said you have a week to think about it. Either you work for the revolution, or else you leave the country.138

Rosales refused to bow to pressure and was subsequently arrested on several occasions at the airport, where he was questioned about his

Interview with Benjamín Cortés. Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 137 Interview with Ignacio Hernández (March 2004); Telephone conversation with Alma Hernández, 28 February 2004. 138 Interview with Félix Rosales. 135 136

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activities and if he had any dollars, while copies were made of any telephone numbers and addresses he carried. He explained how he was followed constantly. One day, a former church member called Ulises Minar came to him and explained how he was now with state security, and as a friend he had come to warn Rosales that time was running out, that is was very easy for state security to make Rosales disappear.139 Another leader instructed to report to Casa 50 was Ignacio Hernández. He explained how he was imprisoned for 24 hours, but that it seemed like an eternity. He was subjected to a long interrogation but wasn’t tortured physically: They asked my why I directed the Bible Society? Where did I get dollars from? How did I use them? Where do you distribute your Bibles? Things like that. But at Casa 50 I was seen by a Catholic priest called Eddy Montenegro, an excellent man. He got the news out and the whole world learned of my arrest. So I was released the next day. But when I came out I was highly demoralised.140

Others were treated more brutally. Bartolomé Matamoros explained how Juan Simón Videa, Saturnino Cerrato’s predecessor as AoG superintendent, was arrested, stripped, and humiliated by being made to bend right over with his head near his feet, moving him from one cell to another, and threatening him, though they did not actually hit him.141 CAM pastor Boanerges Mendoza seems to have suffered most, both physically and psychologically, during the 1985 arrests. So brutal was his treatment that Norman Marenco and Mario Espinoza are convinced his present mental problems stem from his detention.142 (Several others, including medical doctor Gustavo Parajón, confirmed Mendoza currently suffers mental illness). Mendoza was a very vocal critic of the Frente with links to the U.S. embassy. He was also very critical of CEPAD and Parajón; according to Parajón he was the source of the story of the 11 jeeps published by Kate Rafferty.143 Parajón apparently helped to secure Mendoza’s freedom.144

139 140 141 142 143 144

Ibid. Interview with Ignacio Hernández (March 2004). Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interviews with Norman Marenco and Mario Espinoza. Interview with Gustavo Parajón. Interviews with Gustavo Parajón and Gilberto Aguirre.

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Some pro-Sandinistas dismiss the testimonies of these detentions in 1985. For example, the detention of Campus Crusade for Christ national director Jimmy Hassan145 is regarded by Sara Diamond as an exaggeration for propaganda purposes.146 Yet the various human rights reports cited earlier in this chapter confirm the accuracy of these pastors’ statements about Sandinista methods. One Amnesty report details at length the nature of psychological torture used at El Chipote. It also describes small, concrete cells with no light and poor ventilation (in a tropical climate), how toilets were merely 20 cm wide holes in the floors, how prisoners were refused toilet paper or not permitted to bathe. The report details the experiences of an optometrist, Alejandro Pereira, who was made to watch his wife walk past in a prison overall and told she was undergoing interrogation until he confessed. This tallies with pastors’ reports of threats against their wives if they did not cooperate. Even Guillermo Ayala’s and Jimmy Hassan’s description of the overall they were made to wear (Ayala called it ‘el mono’) is accurate. Amnesty noted: “On arrival at El Chipote prisoners are stripped and issued with a standard one-piece overall to be worn until completion of the interrogation period—which may continue for months.”147 Clearly, detention at El Chipote was very traumatic. I was introduced to Edith Jackson, a costeña who was arrested, she believes (she never learned why) because her husband was a well-known doctor during the Somoza period. She spent three months at the infamous prison, at first placed in a cell with a man she did not know. She detailed dirty, rat- and roach- infested cells, continuous interrogation and abuse, and maltreatment. She explained how she became very depressed and was close to hanging herself when she was finally released. The experience still haunts her, and she was unable to speak about El Chipote without crying uncontrollably. Edith Jackson was arrested shortly after the revolution, but confirmed there were Evangelical Christians at El Chipote even then.148

145 Institute of Religion and Democracy, State of Siege: Nicaragua’s Protestants. A Press Conference With Jimmy Hassan. Briefing Paper No 7 (Washington DC: IRD, 7 February 1986). Jimmy Hassan also supplies details of his detention in Campus Crusade for Christ, ‘Escape From Nicaragua’, Worldwide Challenge (Campus Crusade For Christ: 1995–2000) on the magazine website: http://www.wwcmagazine.org/doubletake/ hassan.html (last accessed 4 January 2005). 146 Diamond, Spiritual Warfare, 154. 147 Amnesty International, Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record, 1986, 19–20. 148 Interview with Edith Jackson, 8 June 1999, Managua.

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Evangelicals in Northern and Rural Areas The situation within Managua was quite different from the rest of the country, especially the north. Rafael Arista, who pastored in Jalapa, said: Those Christians in Managua didn’t have as many problems because Managua was the focal point for the international observers. They all came from Europe, the U.S., all over the world, to observe, and they came to Managua. And they would be told “Don’t go to the outlying regions because the guerrillas there could kill you.” In Managua they tried to present a more favourable side, and the people came, looked around Managua, and said, “This is Nicaragua”.149

Roberto Rojas agreed, explaining how international observers and organisations were not widely based throughout the country.150 Benjamín Cortés confirmed repression was worse in remote and rural areas than in Managua, some of which, he explained, was documented by human rights groups such as IACHR.151 Rufino Soza also explained how, during his time preaching in the north, he saw how Evangelicals suffered much more there than in Managua.152 Bartolomé Matamoros also said Evangelicals suffered most in the rural areas.153 Tercero referred to psychological methods the Sandinistas employed in the north. For example, Evangelical women were targeted by members of the army who attempted to sleep with them so they would fall away from the church in shame. Tercero was convinced the Sandinistas in the north hated Evangelicals.154 Clearly, the north was different because it represented the focus of Contra activity, as well as the region where Pentecostalism was historically at its strongest (Pentecostal-Contra links are explored in the next chapter). As far as the Frente was concerned, it was where Evangelicals were at their most dangerous. In 1982, The Times reported how senior comandantes Tomás Borge and Luis Carrión . . . Denounced foreign religious sects working in Nicaragua as “Nests of counterrevolutionary activity”. They said their often remote temples

149 150 151 152 153 154

Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

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with with with with with with

Rafael Arista. Roberto Rojas. Benjamín Cortés. Rufino Soza. Bartolomé Matamoros. Uriel Tercero.

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chapter six and communities were used by the rightists as supply and training bases, particularly in the north where many of the sects are concentrated.155

The stage was set for the brutal repression of Evangelicals in the northern regions. MINT defector Alvaro José Baldizón Aviles reported how, when a MINT unit was attacked in the Jalapa area in late 1983, Borge ordered reprisals that led to the killing of twelve peasants, including an Evangelical minister in Las Uvas.156 Burger Sandli explained how an Evangelical family, also regarded as Contra, was targeted by a large battery of Russian guns around 5 am one morning. The hill top was totally obliterated and the whole family killed.157 Another case highlighted by Amnesty International was of Simon Sequeira Ramirez, a lay preacher shot dead while reading his Bible by soldiers who burst into his home and fired indiscriminately.158 Individual cases of suffering illustrate in particular some of the brutal repression experienced by some Evangelicals. Sometimes treatment was humiliating, though not life-threatening. One American missionary working on the Atlantic coast explained how she had learned of an Evangelical woman buried up to her neck by the Sandinistas in order to punish and humiliate her for her beliefs.159 At other times it was much more brutal and sadistic. Bartolomé Matamoros spoke of a young man, Oreste Jarquín, a member of the AoG church in Jalapa who refused to accept the military draft. Matamoros was well-acquainted with the case, and explained how, when Jarquín’s body was found, he had been tortured.160 Rafael Arista was Jarquín’s pastor in Jalapa, and explained how he, the boy’s father and several church deacons found the body: They had cut out his tongue, they had beaten him, and they had cut off his testicles. And his fingers had no nails. Imagine the emotional state we were in. We went to Jalapa and arrived there at 7 pm. . . . I went to the police, the chief of Police was called Antonio, and I said, “Antonio, we have just brought the body of the man you captured 4 days ago. We have it at the cemetery. We are going to open the family vault and because it is night time, you are going to accuse us of burying guns. So we want one of you to come along and identify the corpse of the one you killed.161

155 156 157 158 159 160 161

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‘Nicaraguans blame CIA for invasion’, The Times, 17 July 1982. U.S. Department of State, Inside the Sandinista Regime, 8. Interview with Burger Sandli. Amnesty International, The Human Rights Record 1986–1989, 49. Conversation with missionary (name unknown), 30 May 1999, Managua. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interview with Rafael Arista.

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Rafael Arista spoke of another young man, Cesar Pinera, 21, who was also captured and pressed into military service. When he refused he was shot, managed to escape but died in Arista’s arms. Many Evangelical leaders knew of someone murdered by the Sandinistas. Saturnino Cerrato spoke of a case brought to the denomination’s attention of a pastor who was with his wife and children, when soldiers came and separated them. The pastor was shot, but they never learned why.162 Rosalio Jarquín, pastor of AoG church Aposento Alto (Bluefields) detailed another incident in 1987: Once, a Sandinista soldier came threatening us and demanding money from a member of the congregation, called Pablo Barrera. He wanted 10,000 cordobas, but when Pablo didn’t give it to him, he fired his gun in the street, hitting Pablo in the neck. He died instantly. Other congregation members began to run away and he shot at them also.163

The motive was clearly financial. But I came across several examples of believers mocked or harassed by soldiers or officials because they were Evangelicals. Clearly, rogue soldiers saw Evangelicals, who were mocked and labelled counterrevolutionary in the Sandinista press, as easy targets. Joseph Douglas spoke of an incident in the early 1980s when a Pentecostal pastor in Lemos, near Waspan (Puerto Cabezas) was tied up, thrown in a church, and the building set on fire. Fortunately, the fire burned the ropes and the pastor escaped.164 Albino Meléndez referred to a Pentecostal pastor in Condega who was lassoed about his neck and dragged by a horse through the town. Meléndez believes the man did not die, and explains how CEPAD complained about such activities.165 Uriel Tercero also cited the same case, adding that the man came from a place called Laguna, but stating that the pastor had indeed died. He also explained how the perpetrator was a Sandinista army lieutenant, and how the Sandinistas claimed he was insane and forced to leave the army. Tercero said the man now lives in the U.S. with his family.166 Arnulfo Sánchez also knew of this incident, and likewise stated that the pastor had died.167

162 163 164 165 166 167

Interview with Saturnino Cerrato. Interview with Rosalio Jarquín. Interview with Joseph Douglas. Conversation with Albino Meléndez. Interview with Uriel Tercero. Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez.

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Space simply does not permit a recounting of the suffering of every Evangelical in the north I came across. But it was clearly brutal. One case is particularly disturbing, and perhaps out of decency ought not to be recounted here. But given that it demonstrates the cruelty some Sandinistas in the rural regions were capable of, as well as being documented by a human rights group that was initially supportive of the Sandinistas, it is important to note the details of the case. It concerned Candida Martínez García, an 18 year old member of the AoG church Iglesia Canadá Asambleas de Dios. On 16 September 1988 she was taken by soldiers from her home at La Mula, Matiguas (Matagalpa). Her body was later found . . . Naked, her nipples cut off, with a stick in the anus and another in the genital organs, bathed in blood, raped, beaten all over the body, hands tied, with the mouth tied with a piece of camouflaged shirt, wound on the left eyebrow, legs bruised.168

This was no casual, spur-of-the-moment rape. Militiamen came and arrested her from her home before taking her away. Moreover, the mutilations were a pattern Americas Watch uncovered throughout the northern region aimed at members of Contra families, which many Evangelicals were accused of supporting. Once again, military personnel targeted Evangelicals who were deemed a diversionist movement within the Sandinista press. Perhaps the gravest incident aimed at Evangelicals was the mass killing in Murra, Nueva Segovia. The relevant human rights report explains what happened: On April 10, 1982, 14 members of the evangelical group AoG were captured by members of a Sandinista military battalion after being called to a meeting supposedly to resolve a bank loan application. According to witnesses, they were taken to the El Doradito military base and then to Murra, where local authorities would not identify them. They were then taken toward Santo Domingo and executed along the way. Local residents heard machine gun fire and for two days were prohibited from transiting the zone. They later discovered a grave which had been partly disinterred by animals, but, because the zone was considered a military area and they were afraid, residents decided to keep quiet and did not rebury the bodies. Several of the bodies were identified through membership cards from the peasant union UNAG, others by clothing when an exhumation 169 was carried out on August 16, 1990.

168 169

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Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua, letter 478 (appendices). Americas Watch, Fitful Peace, 10.

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This report, which details the names and ages of those involved (some were teenagers) is well known among Evangelicals and was documented by La Prensa and the CPDH. Benjamín Cortés and Sixto Ulloa also knew about it. Uriel Tercero had first-hand knowledge of it as a local leader at the time. Miguel Angel Casco explained how, shortly after the incident, he had spoken to Tercero who was very fearful for his own safety.170 As AoG presbyter for the Jalapa region, Alfonso Mejilla attended the exhumation of the mass grave in 1990. Members of the press were in attendance, and Mejilla recalled how the bodies still carried identification cards confirming their membership of the AoG.171 Both the ANPDH and the original La Prensa report carry photographs of the exhumed remains.172 What was the reason for this atrocity? Some, for example, Sixto Ulloa, claim it was caused by a fire-fight in which the church members were mistaken for Contras.173 But both Alfonso Mejilla and Rafael Arista explained how one of the victims managed to escape with news of what had happened. Arista said the young man came to him, very fearful and hungry, not having eaten for three days, hiding in the jungle. He told Arista of how this was no fire-fight—they had been made to dig their own graves before being executed. He later fled to a refugee camp in Honduras.174 Rural and Urban: Two Different Pictures Many pro-Sandinistas seem unaware of the troubles some Evangelicals faced. For example, Carlos Escorcia speaks of minor incidents but does not believe Evangelicals were repressed.175 When asked about maltreatment of Evangelicals, former government minister for culture Fr. Ernesto Cardenal also said he was unaware of any such problems during the Sandinista period.176 Even CEPAD president Gustavo Parajón seemed unaware of the true extent of suffering, or the length of time Interview with Miguel Angel Casco (February 2004). Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. 172 ANPDH, Los Cemeterios Clandestinos de Nicaragua, 11; ‘Descubren otra fosa común en Murra’, La Prensa, 18 August 1990. 173 Interview with Sixto Ulloa. 174 Interviews with Alfonso Mejilla and Rafael Arista. 175 Interview with Carlos Escorcia. 176 Conversation with Ernesto Cardenal’s secretary who called me on 8 June 1999 in response to a fax I sent Cardenal (Cardenal had asked her to call with a response to my question as he was on his way to Cuba that afternoon, and could not call me personally). 170 171

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some of these arrested in 1985 were detained. When asked in 1986 by Christianity Today about the arrests, he said: About seven evangelical pastors and leaders were called in for questioning. Reverend Boanerges Mendoza was there the longest, about 12 hours. Then all of them went home. Later Mendoza and two others were imprisoned. His church and his wife asked if we could do something, and I said we could. The government responded, and they were released.177

In fact, Boanerges Mendoza was detained for at least eleven days.178 According to Rafael Arista and others (see above) the situation in Managua and the larger cities was very different from elsewhere, especially in the north. Therefore, while the 1985 arrests were humiliating and traumatic for those detained, on the whole (and with several exceptions) most did not suffer severe physical abuse (though they experienced traumatic psychological torture). In the cities, Evangelical leaders were regarded with suspicion and were followed, hassled and threatened. But I found little evidence of the exceptionally cruel treatment some of their companions encountered in rural areas. Thus, speaking of her experiences in the city of Granada, Ruth Sánchez is able to say that they were repressed, but it was not as bad as the situation they faced at the height of Catholic persecutions earlier in the century.179 Even AoG superintendent Saturnino Cerrato, who was in Managua throughout the 1980s, spoke of harassment, instilling fear and being watched, rather than widespread, systematic and violent persecution.180 But he was aware of abuses in the north, referring me to Rafael Arista who, as a regional superintendent there, knew all about them.181 Thus, two different pictures emerge—urban and rural—the latter only really documented towards the end of the 1980s, which perhaps explains why some pro-Sandinista observers were dismissive of Nicaragua’s human rights record compared with more widespread violence

Parajón, ‘CEPAD’s View’, Christianity Today. ‘Seguridad detiene a otros 2 Pastores,’ La Prensa. Censored and unpublished article, 19 November 1985. The report details how Mendoza was beginning his ninth day of detention. This report is the culmination of a series of censored La Prensa articles that discuss the length of Mendoza’s detention (‘Gestionan libertad de pastores evangélicos’, 13 November 1985; ‘CNPEN gestiona libertad de Rev. Boanerges Mendoza’, 15 November 1985; ‘Decretan ayuno por libertad del Rvdo. Mendoza’, 18 November 1985). 179 Interview with Ruth Sánchez. 180 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato. 181 Saturnino Cerrato, e-mail correspondence, 19 February 2005. 177

178

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in Guatemala and El Salvador at that time. Yet in light of additional evidence, it is clear that the U.S. government’s publications did not exaggerate the repression of Evangelicals and other sectors. Some pro-Sandinista observers doubted the veracity of one very high-profile case concerning Prudencio Baltodano, a Pentecostal pastor who was detained in February 1984 by Sandinista soldiers. The U.S. Department of State wrote: Upon learning of Baltodano’s affiliation with the Unified Pentecostal Mission Church, the Sandinistas tied him to a tree and, after taunting him, struck his head with a rifle butt, cut off his ears, and cut his throat with a bayonet. Although Baltodano was left to bleed to death, he survived and managed to escape to Costa Rica.182

The report was accompanied by a picture of Baltodano without his ears. Baltodano declared he had been persecuted as a direct consequence of his faith.183 He explained how the soldiers who tortured him said, “You don’t know what we do to evangelical pastors. We are Communists and don’t believe in God.”184 Clearly, the Reagan administration made political capital from Baltodano’s case and those of others to demonise the Sandinista regime. That is not denied. However, there has been a tendency to dismiss such reports of human rights abuses because Washington seized upon them as ammunition in the propaganda war. A case in point is how the Americas Watch report was criticised by pro-Sandinistas (including several NGOs and churches) for documenting abuses by the Sandinistas in the north.185

U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua, 26. Baltodano’s story is detailed in Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, 254–255; and U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua, 26. The incident was seized upon by Washington, and President Reagan himself referred to Baltodano’s ordeal as a direct consequence of his faith during several speeches at the White House. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Civic Leaders at a White House Briefing on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, January 22, 1988. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1988/ 012288d.htm); and Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua, March 16, 1986 (http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1986/31686a.htm). Both available at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Simi Valley, California) website. 184 ‘Nicaraguan, in Washington, Says He Was Tortured by Sandinistas,’ New York Times, 24 April 1984. The accompanying photograph shows Baltodano with a cloth covering his mutilations, while the U.S. Department of State publication has a photograph showing the full extent of his injuries (page 26). 185 Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua, 15, 23. 182 183

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The sample of evidence collected in this chapter, together with reports by Amnesty International, Americas Watch and other human rights organisations, demonstrates clearly that significant, widespread, systematic and brutal human rights abuses, mutilations and persecution took place throughout the northern and rural regions of Nicaragua, very often aimed specifically at Evangelicals. Pro-Sandinista critics cannot simply dismiss such suffering as an invention by the Reagan administration and the religious right. Was It Because They Were Evangelicals? Do these cases represent the deliberate targeting of Evangelicals? Most Evangelicals interviewed believed so. Consider the Murra massacre, which Uriel Tercero declares was specifically aimed at Evangelicals. The human rights documents cited above detail how the group was taken from their place of meeting after receiving a message to go and discuss a bank loan the church was seeking from their local bank. In other words, the massacre was premeditated and they were deliberately targeted—this was no case of a chance mistaken identity leading to a subsequent fire-fight. Tercero explained that this was a Sunday school gathering (the term ‘Sunday school’ in Nicaragua, as in the U.S., often refers to a Bible study held on a Sunday morning, usually before the main church service), and the victims’ Bibles were still on the corpses when they were exhumed. He is convinced the army’s motive was to create panic among Evangelicals, to weaken the church in the north, but claims the opposite happened: the church, while fearful, came together, members supported each other and grew strong.186 The premeditated action was carried out with the help of a local official, and from the first-hand knowledge he has of the incident, Tercero is convinced they simply could not have been mistaken for Contras while meeting as a Sunday school.187 Of course, Sandinista suspicions that Evangelicals were involved with the Contras inevitably caused problems for Pentecostals in the northern highlands. Bienvenido López explains how the Frente assumed many Evangelicals were in touch with the CIA, so they were sent to prison.188 Evangelical-Contra links are discussed in the following chapter. 186 187 188

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Interview with Uriel Tercero. Ibid. Interview with Bienvenido López.

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However, aside from the Contra issue the Sandinistas were clearly intolerant of what Evangelicalism promoted. During the 1985 arrests, Jimmy Hassan (national director of Campus Crusade for Christ) was detained and interrogated. After fleeing to the U.S. with his family, Hassan told Christianity Today he had been accused of preaching a gospel that drew people away from Marxism, which his interrogators told him they could not allow.189 Ignacio Hernández claimed his interrogators labelled all clergymen “corrupters of the children” and “ideological diversionists”.190 Harold Robleto was from a committed Sandinista family (his brother was in the DGSE). But when he converted to Evangelicalism and spoke out against sandinismo he was arrested and accused of being a counterrevolutionary and an “ideological diversionist.” Robleto claimed to have been the director of the Sandinista ideological schools in Region 4 (Granada), and so “They were concerned to learn why I had switched ideology”.191 An Evangelical pastor who was imprisoned at El Chipote in 1982 for two months because he refused to sever links with a theological college whose staff included North American missionaries, claimed: “I was punished because I don’t accept their ideology . . . There are others in jail on account of their religion”.192 DGSE official José Suárez details a similar case of a MINT official converting to Evangelicalism, who was subsequently arrested and mocked. He also referred to a pastor in the Rivas area called Transito Borillo, who stated publicly that Nicaragua did not need Marxism or the USSR, it needed Jesus. When he repeated the statement several times he was arrested and imprisoned.193 One report alleges how “Guadalupe Castellanos, a coffee worker, disagreed with a DGSE officer about liberation theology and revolutionary violence.” When she was beaten, she broke free and ran away, but she was wounded and her 6 and 12 year old children killed when a grenade was thrown at her. People from her home town in Nueva Segovia confirmed what had happened and how the authorities would not allow the bodies to be recovered for nearly a week.194 Another report

189 Beth Spring, ‘Campus Crusade Director Describes Government Harrasment of Evangelicals,’ Christianity Today). See also William R. Long, ‘Managua Using Intimidation, Dissidents Say’, Los Angeles Times, 15 December 1985. 190 Ibid. 191 Interview with Harold Robleto. 192 U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua Biographies: A Resource Book (Washington: US Department of State, January 1988), 71. 193 Interview with José Suárez. 194 U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua, 23. See also U.S. Department of State, In their own words: testimony of Nicaraguan exiles: Alberto Gamez Ortega, Alvaro

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highlighted how Sixto Martínez Bravo, a religious man taken prisoner on the way home from a neighbour’s house “where he had been to invite them to a religious gathering”. His body was found kneeling (presumably in reconstructed praying position aimed at mocking his beliefs), with his head under his arm.195 Ignacio Hernández details being mocked by troops on account of his belief in God.196 Clearly, the Sandinistas were not prepared to tolerate ideological rivals, as one human rights document detailing the maltreatment of an outspoken critic of Marxism demonstrates.197 Neither were the Sandinistas prepared to allow religion as a vehicle for political opposition, which Daniel Ortega made clear to a meeting of Protestants in September 1982: Manipulation of religion is the last stand in the (propaganda) war against the Nicaraguan Revolution . . . There is no confrontation between the state and religion. But what the state does oppose is the manipulation of religion.198

Kathleen Mahonney-Norris explores patterns of political repression in Cuba and Nicaragua and concludes that the greater the perceived threat the state faced, the more intense the repression of political opponents.199 Opposition groups in revolutionary Nicaragua certainly suffered a great deal of harassment and repression, which was reported widely by the U.S. Department of State, and later several human rights organisations. One Amnesty report detailed how “opposition lecturers, lawyers and trade unionists are subject to frequent short-term imprisonment in Nicaragua in apparent attempts to intimidate and harass them.”200 Interestingly, the extension of the state of emergency leading to the 1985 arrests of Evangelical leaders came when the Sandinistas felt particularly under threat. The Washington Post detailed arrests, cenBaldizon Aviles, Mateo Guerrero Flores, Silvio Herrera, Santiago Dixon, Jose Alonso Valle, Francisco Delgado Flores, Guadalupe Castellanos, Prudencio Baltodano Selva, Oscar and Sarita Kellermann (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1987). 195 U.S. Department of State, Human Rights in Nicaragua, 51. 196 Interview with Ignacio Hernández (May 2004). 197 Nederlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM), Document CCPR-7/CCPR-10–1/ CCPR-14–3-g ( July 1994). Available on SIM website: http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/ CaseLaw/CCPRcase.nsf/3167fd85523cbf75c12567c8004d4280/d5f68647f128a697c 125664b002ca2c0?OpenDocument (accessed on 20 March 2005). 198 Goff, ‘Nicaraguans Protest Manipulation of Religion’, Latinamerica Press. 199 Discussed at length in Mahonney-Norris, Inquiry Into Political Repression. 200 Amnesty International, Amnesty International News Release (London: Amnesty International, 12 February 1986), 1.

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sorship and “tough warnings to leading dissidents in political parties, labor unions and the church.” The authorities’ rationale was to stop any activity that could help U.S. sponsored rebel forces. But CPDH’s Lino Hernández told the Washington Post, “I would say the state of emergency was not directed against the armed counterrevolutionaries, but against civic opposition to the government.”201 He also told the Los Angeles Times that the government’s actions aimed at opponents were designed to “frighten them and threaten them so that they won’t criticise the revolutionary process”.202 Mahoney-Norris’ study sheds light on how Evangelicals were targeted because they were perceived as a political threat, part of the opposition. Norman Marenco believed Evangelicals were targeted mainly for being perceived as opponents of the Frente. He suggested the most vocal and confrontational leaders were the ones who experienced the roughest treatment.203 Consider, for example, the 1985 arrests. Not only were the detainees the leaders of the national Evangelical movement, but many of them were also outspoken Evangelical critics of the Sandinistas. Benjamín Cortés confirms how they had vocally expressed political views (which he believed they had every right to make).204 Significantly, the most vocal of the detainees, Boanerges Mendoza, was held the longest.205 Conversely, Saturnino Cerrato who, though a conservative Evangelical, sought to avoid outright confrontation with the authorities and was regarded by several pro-Sandinista Protestants as objective and fair,206 was held for a short time at the airport.207 The fact that the other detainees were taken to El Chipote, reserved for political prisoners, also demonstrates how Evangelicals were regarded as political opponents rather than lawbreakers. (As early as 1979 Evangelicals were imprisoned at El Chipote. A political prisoner associated with the Somoza regime referred to an Evangelical group there, led by a young preacher called William.)208 201

1985.

Edward Cody, ‘Sandinistas Interrogate Opponents,’ Washington Post, 15 December

Long, ‘Managua Using Intimidation’, Los Angeles Times. Interview with Norman Marenco. 204 Interview with Benjamín Cortés. 205 ‘Seguridad detiene a otros 2 Pastores’, La Prensa. 206 Interviews with Benjamín Cortés and Miguel Angel Casco. 207 The length of Cerrato’s detention was confirmed by Carlos Escorcia in e-mail correspondence to me, 8 February 2005. 208 Carlos H. Canales, Injusticia Sandinista: Carcel y Servicio (Managua: Carlos Canales, 1992), 156. 202 203

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Clearly, then, the Sandinistas had no time for opposition from any quarter, including Evangelicalism, which it regarded as an ideological enemy (see next chapter). One La Barricada report denounced Evangelical pastors who were allegedly seeking to persuade campesinos to ditch their support for the Frente, which was regarded as completely politically unacceptable.209 Another article in the same edition accused pastors of counterrevolutionary activity by attempting to take advantage of simple rural folk and lead them away from the revolution.210 In one edition, La Barricada labelled ‘counterrevolutionary’ Pentecostals with the derogatory term ‘sect’,211 but a day earlier it referred to pro-Sandinista Pentecostals as ‘Christians’.212 Opposition was not tolerated under any circumstances. Writing in the 1980s, Wilton Nelson states: The Sandinistas continue to grant religious freedom to all save those who oppose the regime, which is the ‘unpardonable sin’. It would appear that if the revolutionary government continues to advance Marxist philosophy, the conditions of Christians in Nicaragua will become similar to that in Cuba or even in Russia.213

One need only look at the Sandinistas’ treatment of the Moravian leadership during the Sandinista-Miskito war to see that any perceived opposition from religious quarters was not tolerated. Even the proSandinista Latin America Press conceded that the Sandinistas had made “ill-considered verbal attacks on the (Moravian) church” because of its links with the Miskitos.214 Conversely, pro-Sandinista religious were well-treated. While Christians opposing the Frente were imprisoned or expelled, liberation theology Christians participated in government. The Pope was harassed and right-wing foreign Evangelical preachers were nearly always refused entry to Nicaragua, yet many Christians from the religious left were welcomed into the country.215 CEPAD was eulogised and Gustavo Parajón was selected by the Frente to serve on Nicaragua’s peace commission as part of the Esquipulas peace process.

‘Ex-GN convertidos en pastores actuan en Chinandega’, La Barricada. ‘Campesinos desenmascaran a pastores de sectas,’ La Barricada. 211 ‘Protesta popular contra las sectas’, La Barricada. 212 ‘Firme pronunciamiento de iglesias cristianas’, La Barricada. 213 Nelson, Protestantism in Central America, 78. 214 ‘WCC Report Evaluates Conflicts Within Nicaraguan Churches’, Latinamerica Press 15 no. 39 (27 October 1983), 6. 215 One of these, Hank Beeksma, spoke of “hundreds of brigades and volunteer workers”, and “numerous (external) church groups” who contributed towards helping Nicaragua, Hank Beeksma, ‘Nicaragua’s Cry for Justice’, The Banner. 209 210

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Significantly, the only example of harassment of a pro-Sandinista Protestant that I came across was that of Nazarene Nicanor Mairena (later the denomination’s superintendent). Mairena and several others toured Evangelical churches in the U.S. as apologists for the regime.216 Yet as a regional CEPAD director, he was later imprisoned in a chiquita cell for three days for directing a social program that showed up the inefficiency of local Sandinista officials.217 He believes jealousy by mid-level officials led to his arrest, which helped him to form “a more mature judgment of the Sandinistas”.218 Thus, as Mahonney-Norris has pointed out, Evangelicals (as other groups) were singled out for repression because they were perceived as part of the opposition, and thus a threat to Sandinista hegemony. Yet Evangelicals were also mocked and harassed because of their beliefs. For example, Ignacio Hernández was mocked by a group of soldiers for his belief in God.219 Already cited is Burger Sandli’s description of Evangelicals made to stand for days in pipes sunk upright deep into the ground. Sandli goes on: They would shout out every day, “Have you converted from Christianity? Are you ready?” And they would say, “OK then, we let you stay there another eight days.” Some of them were standing there 24 days before they were pulled out.220

Bienvenido López describes his time in jail as a former Guardsman, where many prisoners had converted to Evangelicalism. He said he had never seen people treated so badly because of their faith, recalling how Edén Pastora and Federico López visited the prison shortly after the revolution, confiscated and burned the inmates’ Bibles.221 López explained how public displays of one’s faith were discouraged, and recalls a particular incident:

216

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Spring, ‘Does the Sandinista Regime Promote Religious Freedom?’ Christianity

Interview with Nicanor Mairena. Nicanor Mairena, ‘An Oral History of CEPAD’ in Paul Jeffrey’s 20th Anniversary Retrospective (web exclusive), 1992. Published on CEPAD’s North American website: http:// www.cepad.info/report/30th/11 (last accessed 24 February 2004). 219 Interview with Ignacio Hernández. 220 Interview with Burger Sandli. 221 Ignacio Hernández also explained in his diary how Bibles the Bible Society gave for prisoner use at the La Modelo prison were never used, that during a visit to the prison they found them unused and stored away in boxes. 217 218

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chapter six I remember once, we used to go outside into the sunshine, and it was not permitted to pray or kneel. They would check our trousers for dust to see if we had been kneeling to pray while outside, to see if we were one of the ‘Hallelujah crowd’ (“los hallelullah”). Once, around 1981 or so we witnessed one of the blackest days for us. We went out into the sun and decided to have a prayer meeting right there outside in the sun. There we were, some 120–130 of us, and we began to hold our service, kneeling openly, happy. When we prayed, we did so loudly, as was our custom. We heard shouts and shots, but we did not stop. And they killed three brothers right there, as they kneeled. For praying. I was right there, I saw it myself.222

López also described how a lad called Cherma would rise early each morning to pray, which he would do very loudly. One morning he was shot for doing so. Many Nicaraguan Pentecostals indeed pray exceptionally loudly (I have witnessed this myself ), and it clearly irritated the Sandinistas.223 López also explained that there were many hundreds of Evangelicals in prison. Clearly, some were political prisoners who had converted subsequent to their imprisonment. But as Carlos Canales points out, the literally hundreds of imprisoned Evangelicals he met at the Zona Franca and La Modelo prisons were led by “well-trained pastors”, and he considers it very doubtful that imprisoned ex-GN officers accounted for the high number of good preachers. Clearly, some pastors were among those who were imprisoned.224 DGSE official José Suárez confirmed many Evangelicals were arrested and imprisoned simply for their faith. Some Sandinistas also took great pleasure in mocking them for the sake of it. When the preacher Transito Borillo was imprisoned (see above), he was refused food for 40 days. His captors said: “You people like to fast, do you? Well now you’re really going to fast!” Asked why he believed the Sandinistas were so willing to persecute them, he responded, “We picked on them because they were fearful.”225

Interview with Bienvenido López. Reyes, ‘La Invasión de las Sectas’, La Barricada. In 1999, a judge ordered Rufino Soza’s church to quieten down its church worship after complaints, ‘Juez Ordena Controlar Sonida a Iglesia,’ El Heraldo 6 ( January 1999), 2. The full judgment, including details of material blared out of loudspeakers at 5 a.m., can be found in the court papers: Sentencia 474, 23 October 1998, Juez Primero del Crimen de Managua, available at the Ruido en Nicaragua—Aspectos Legales website: http://nica42.tripod. com/legal.htm (last accessed 22 January 2004). 224 See Canales, Injusticia Sandinista. 225 Interview with José Suárez. 222 223

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Institutionalised Repression Sandinistas and their supporters are dismissive of claims of persecution, often suggesting many alleged incidents never took place. For example, one ex-Sandinista soldier who fought in the Contra war in the north at first denied any maltreatment whatsoever of Evangelicals. But when asked about Murra and other documented abuses he conceded that soldiers, sometimes sent to investigate links between Evangelical pastors and the Contra, had occasionally made errors of judgment.226 Adonis Niño Chavarría blames radical sectors of society, rather than the government, for the taking of the temples.227 Others are dismissive and downplay incidents of abuse as the work of over-zealous Sandinista soldiers, affectionately termed muchachos (lads). This common theme runs throughout the various Sandinista responses to alleged atrocities, whether in newspaper or human rights reports. David Spencer pointed out how, whenever Evangelicals complained of abuse to Sandinista government officials, they would be apologetic and blame it on overzealous muchachos.228 The former head of the DGSE, Lenin Cerna, sums up this attitude when confronted about such atrocities, blaming it on the “Pain and euphoria, enthusiasm and rancour, eagerness for justice and thirst for vengeance, like in the first days of the French Revolution”.229 In the same article, he blames such mistakes on “mere youthful indiscretions.” (The article’s author, Michael Waller, explains how Lenin Cerna is believed to be the “intellectual author” of the persecution of the Catholic church, and the assassinations of evangelical pastors. I repeatedly tried to speak with Cerna to put these allegations to him, but was unsuccessful. His secretaries were very helpful until they learned of the nature of this study, and I was constantly fobbed off ). In its investigations, both Amnesty and Americas Watch are often critical of this dismissive attitude, which was translated into very lenient sentences for those whose crimes were uncovered and documented by Amnesty and Americas Watch and presented to the government for investigation.230

Conversation with Guillermo Polanco López, 25 May 2004, Managua. Niño Chavaría in Álavarez, Pentecostalismo y Liberación, 52–53. 228 Interview with David Spencer, 1999. 229 Waller, ‘Will Sandinistas Face Justice?’ Insight on the News. 230 E.g. Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua; Amnesty International, Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record; and Amnesty International, Amnesty International Missions to the Republic of Nicaragua. August 1979, January 1980 & August 1980 (London: Amnesty International, June 1982). 226 227

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Even some Protestants with close links to the Frente were similarly indifferent. When asked why Evangelicals had been persecuted, at first Sixto Ulloa was dismissive, claiming this idea was born in Miami and Guatemala by pastors who had fled the revolutionary process. To survive there, Ulloa claimed, these people had to say this stuff, which was totally erroneous, invented. Yet when asked about the very real, documented case of Murra, he responded: We investigated this. It appears there was a battle and people died. But such instances were manipulated. That is not to say that the Frente never caused problems. We knew of serious cases on the Atlantic Coast, like in the Pacific, when we gave the Frente an ultimatum to deal once and for all with such abuses and to correct them. When we made the decision to accumulate and present them with evidence of abuses, the Frente investigated, and some army members were jailed. The majority of these cases were caused by military volunteers. The Frente, then, had to take responsibility, but they always investigated these isolated cases. I can assure you that for a year before and after the Triumph, there was no religious persecution in Nicaragua against Evangelicals or Protestants.231

But as this chapter demonstrates, there was religious persecution, some of it very violent, throughout much of the Sandinista period. Neither could it have been carried out simply by the muchachos. Either the entire Sandinista army was comprised of undisciplined rabble, or else actions blamed on lower ranking officials and soldiers had been authorised at the highest level (MINT defector Alvaro José Baldizón Aviles highlighted how assassinations could only be authorised by Tomás Borge and Luis Carrión).232 Americas Watch makes this precise point when it detailed how the Sandinista government failed to prosecute many it accused of severe human rights abuses: We note that prosecutorial activity was prompted by a decision in Managua only after the matter had become a major national and international embarrassment after publication of the cases . . . (the) authorities were looking the other way or were grossly negligent in controlling the actions of their subordinates.233

Moreover, Americas Watch quickly realised that the more abuses by the DGSE and EPS it uncovered, the more distant and unhelpful the

231 232 233

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Interview with Sixto Ulloa. U.S. Department of State, Inside the Sandinista Regime, 7. Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua, 9.

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Sandinista government, which initially was helpful towards Americas Watch, became. A document produced by the Sandinistas before taking power also provides incontrovertible proof of how, from the very highest echelons of the party, the Sandinistas had a program for dealing with the churches, including Protestants (especially Evangelicals). The Documento de las 72 Horas (72 Hour Document) set out the Sandinistas’ aims and objectives once it secured power. These plans included an intention to neutralise conservative elements within Protestantism and Catholicism. Concerning Evangelicals, the document states: With the Protestant Church, which is generally formed by North American religious sects, we shall adopt a restrictive policy, conduct an intelligence operation on them, and, if they are caught, arrange for their immediate expulsion.234

MINT defector Miguel Bolaños Hunter explains how the Sandinistas set up a special section (F-4) of the DGSE in charge of the Catholic Church and “all the other churches that have means of threatening the Sandinistas”.235 Bolaños also explained how the turbas were also a formal section (F-7) within the DGSE apparatus.236 This is verified elsewhere.237 This explains why the turbas constantly harassed Evangelical groups and churches, even as early as 1979.238 Guillermo Ayala describes how the turbas seized their musical instruments, burned their platforms and beat pastors in Jinotepe in 1980.239 It was the mobs who seized the temples in 1982, while in 1985 the Los Angeles Times noted how, after three years of calm, the turbas were again causing problems for Evangelicals by trying to break up a meeting celebrating World Bible Day.240 Once again, as the state of emergency was extended when the Sandinistas perceived a threat, their opponents were repressed.

234 FSLN, Documento de las 72 Horas. Internal document, 1979, 12. The copy I have is a U.S. Department of State translation. 235 IRD. The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua, 5. 236 Ibid., 5–6. 237 Valenta, ‘Sandinistas in Power’, Problems of Communism, 11. See also Oberdorfer and Omang, ‘Inmate Accuses Managua of Abusing Prisoners’, Washington Post. 238 ‘Sandinista Mobs Harass Protestants—Nicaragua Church-State Tensions Grow,’ Los Angeles Times, 30 November 1985. 239 Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 240 ‘Sandinista Mobs Harass Protestants—Nicaragua Church-State Tensions Grow,’ Los Angeles Times.

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It is clear, then, that the repression of Evangelicals was at least partly dictated by the government, and simply cannot always be blamed on over-zealous muchachos (though this may well have been so in some rural cases). Saturnino Cerrato spoke of a gradual but concerted, widespread effort to put Evangelicals under pressure, of the government tightening its control over the churches, which began a year or so after the revolution.241 Félix Rosales echoed a similar view, explaining how a year or so after coming to power, the government began to bring pressure to bear through the CDS.242 CNPEN was refused its personería jurídica, and Ondas de Luz was censored. Senior CNPEN official Gustavo Sevilla told Christianity Today: Seven years ago the church did not have to get any permission to hold public services . . . Seven years ago there was no censorship. Seven years ago we did not have to send in a list of each of the members of our churches, including their names and addresses.243

The Salvation Army was eventually expelled from the country. In 1985 the main Evangelical leaders were arrested. These were not the actions of muchachos. All this represented state-organised repression of Evangelicals from the very top of government.

241 242 243

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Interview with Saturnino Cerrato (1999). Interview with Félix Rosales. As reported in Christianity Today, 18 April 1986, 33.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

SANDINISTA PERCEPTIONS OF EVANGELICALS* Links between Nicaraguan Evangelical organisations and their U.S. counterparts meant that religious leaders often travelled to North America on church business. But eventually this caused problems for conservative Protestants. CEPAD director Gilberto Aguirre explains how travelling abroad and mixing with right-wing preachers who denounced sandinismo (and sometimes supported the Contras) attracted the attention of Nicaraguan state security.1 Clearly, it was not simply links with the U.S. alone that caused problems for these Protestants. After all, pro-revolutionary CEPAD had close relations with North American churches and organisations, while religious left Christians in the U.S. were singled out and praised for supporting the revolution.2 Moreover, Sandinista Nicaragua welcomed the religious left with open arms, while pro-Sandinista Evangelicals in Nicaragua visited U.S. churches to challenge the view that Protestants were being persecuted.3 These proSandinista pastors were not arrested upon their return to Nicaragua, unlike many of their conservative Protestant counterparts who were detained (several at Sandino airport), interrogated and imprisoned upon their return from trips abroad in 1985. Clearly, then, it was not so much U.S. links that the Sandinistas objected to, but rather, their close association with conservative Evangelical, (especially Charismatic) groups, which Sandinistas regarded with open suspicion.4 As discussed previously, David Stoll has traced how links with North American Evangelicalism caused problems for Nicaraguan conservative Protestants back home. Yet however important this exogenous aspect was in shaping problematic Evangelical-Sandinista relations, it only offers a partial explanation for the breakdown in relations. Several endogenous

* This chapter is based on the article published in Pneuma: The Journal of the Society of Pentecostal Studies, 29 no. 1 (Spring 2007). 1 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. 2 ‘Cristianos de EE.UU. con nuestra revolución’, La Barricada, 14 August 1980. 3 Spring, ‘Does the Sandinista Regime Promote Religious Freedom’, Christianity Today. 4 ‘Cristianos en la revolución,’ La Barricada, 2 March 1980.

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factors are also absolutely essential in helping us to understand why the Sandinistas regarded conservative Protestants in the way they did. Evangelicals’ rejection of SMP, which was explored in Chapter 5, represented one major source of tension between both parties. Three others were Pentecostal apoliticism, their support for the modern state of Israel, and most significantly, Pentecostal links with the Contras. Pentecostal Apoliticism Sandinistas demanded full participation in the revolutionary experiment. Neutrality was not an option, as expressed in the popular revolutionary slogan, “El que no está conmigo es mi enemigo” (he who is not with me is my enemy). When Campus Crusade for Christ’s Jimmy Hassan was arrested, his DGSE interrogators demanded to know why he had not actively spoken in support of the revolution.5 Other pastors likewise received unwelcome state security attention for professing neutrality.6 Yet Pentecostals especially had little time for political engagement, and it was this institutionalised apoliticism that inevitably brought Sandinistas and Pentecostals on a collision course. However, before exploring Sandinista exasperation with Nicaraguan Pentecostal apoliticism, by way of background it is essential first to explore briefly the theological basis underpinning it. Leaving aside, for the moment, its vociferous anti-communism that led to a rejection of Sandinista ideology, why does (or did) classical Pentecostalism preclude any involvement in politics? The answer is found in its unique theological emphasis, especially its understanding of eschatology (the branch of theology concerned with what will happen at the end of time), which has fundamentally shaped its worldview. An Overview of Eschatology Understanding the various eschatological positions within Christianity is complex and time-consuming, made all the more difficult by the various

‘Preacher Alleges Attacks in Nicaragua’, Washington Post, 21 December 1985. For example, speaking at a U.S. gathering of the NAE, Félix Rosales said, “We want to win the whole country for Christ, so we don’t want to be identified with either side” (‘Nicaraguan evangelical leader addresses American Evangelicals’, Pentecostal Evangel, 15 September 1985, 27). Rosales could easily have denounced the Sandinistas before such an audience but instead chose his words carefully. Nonetheless, he was arrested and interrogated shortly afterwards by the DGSE and labelled a counterrevolutionary. 5 6

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ways in which eschatology is categorised. For example, one might hold to a preterist (also known as contemporary-historical, or Zeitgeschichtlich), futurist, historicist or idealist (timeless-symbolic) position, depending on the exegetical approach employed. Alternatively, one could employ a millenarian system of classification,7 which differentiates between pre-, post- and amillennialism. Yet these are broad analyses that must be further subdivided. So a postmillennialist might subscribe to Reconstructionism, Dominionism, Kingdom Theology or Restorationism.8 Within premillennialism there are two very different views on the nature and timing of Christ’s return: pre-tribulationism and post-tribulationism. To confuse matter yet further, most pre-tribulationists subscribe to a highly systematised eschatology known as dispensationalism, while post-tribulationism is sub-divided into the classic, semiclassic, futurist and dispensational varieties.9 It is little wonder Derek Tidball states “premillennialism comes in many forms, some of which require a fair amount of sophistication to understand.”10 Classical Pentecostalism (i.e. the vast majority of Nicaraguan Pentecostals in the 1980s) was, until fairly recently, premillennialist. This view was popularised within revivalist Evangelicalism (from where Pentecostalism originates) by the likes of D.L. Moody and R.A. Torrey.11 Therefore, the following paragraphs will focus on explaining the nature of premillennialism, though its antithesis (postmillennialism) will also be mentioned in passing. Premillennial eschatology, based on a literalist approach to the Bible, believes (as its name implies) that the parousia (second coming of Christ) precedes the millennial period detailed in Revelation 20:1–6. Thus Christ returns to set up his literal earthly reign in person which lasts a thousand years. However, immediately prior to Christ’s return, premillennialists believe in a period of untold horror and misery lasting seven years, known as the Great Tribulation.12 Premillennialism’s antithesis, postmillennialism, argues that the parousia 7 From Latin ‘mille’, meaning ‘thousand-’ based the 1000-year period detailed in Revelation 20:1–6 (also known as ‘chiliasm’ from Gk. ‘khiliasmos’, also meaning ‘thousand’). 8 For a discussion of the various postmillennialist views, see Bruce Barron, Heaven on Earth? The Social and Political Agendas of Dominion Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992). 9 R.G. Clouse, ‘Rapture of the Church’ in Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 910. 10 Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals, 140. 11 Ibid., 143. 12 Based on Matthew 24:21; Revelation. 2:22, 7:14. See also Mark 13:19; Luke 21:23 and Revelation 3:10. These references are linked to other eschatological passages, which build upon the idea of an apocalyptic tribulation period.

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takes place after this thousand-year period (hence its name). Moreover, it regards this millennial period (which may or may not be interpreted literally as a thousand years) as Christ’s reign not so much in person but rather, through the Church. Thus, postmillennialism sees the thousand-year period as one of great advances by the Church as it attempts to establish the kingdom of God here on earth. Millard J. Erickson writes: Postmillennialism rests on the belief that the preaching of the gospel will be so successful that the world will be converted. The reign of Christ, the locus of which is human hearts, will be complete and universal. The petition, “Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven,” will be actualized. Peace will prevail and evil will be virtually banished. Then, when the gospel has fully taken effect, Christ will return.13

The post-apostolic Church held to an embryonic form of premillennialist. However, the melding of Church and State from the time of Emperor Constantine onwards helped establish postmillennialism, which was based on the optimistic notion that the Church was beginning to establish the kingdom of God on earth. This is a theme that runs throughout postmillennialism’s history. In attempting to establish Christ’s earthly kingdom, postmillennialists see the need to capture social and political institutions in a bid to further their aims (for example, the Puritans were postmillennialists). To summarise, premillennial eschatology envisages an apocalyptic end-times scenario, and it is therefore essentially pessimistic. On the other hand, postmillennialism’s social and political agenda, very much like the ethical utterances of the Old Testament prophets, offers a prophetic outlook that calls for action, specifically, social and political change. It is therefore utopian in character and, unlike premillennialism, highly optimistic. Straight away one notes a tension between the two systems: the apocalyptic versus the prophetic; spiritual other-worldliness versus social this-worldliness; a future Kingdom of God established by Christ versus a Kingdom of God here and now, on earth, established by the Church. Already the battle-lines are drawn between Pentecostalism and liberation theology. Within premillennialism there are several views centring upon an understanding of the nature and timing of the Great Tribulation. The most common is pretribulationism, a position which proposes a two-

13 Millard Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992), 1206.

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stage parousia and which has strongly influenced classical Pentecostalism. It states that immediately prior to the Great Tribulation (when the devil and Antichrist will cause untold chaos and lawlessness) the Church will be caught up to heaven, or raptured,14 meeting Christ in the air and thereby escaping the troubles besetting the world. This emphasis on the rapture is an essential doctrine in helping us to understand PentecostalSandinista relations. Pretribulationist Pentecostals believe the rapture can happen at any time without warning.15 Thus, the rapture is imminent, unlike posttribulationism’s emphasis on a timetable set out in Scripture offering some indication when Christ will return. For posttribulationists, then, the parousia is impending. For the purposes of this study, this idea of an imminent rapture is an important point and its significance visà-vis the Nicaraguan situation will be discussed shortly. Before moving on to discuss what all this means for Evangelical-Sandinista relations, there is one final piece of this eschatological puzzle that must be discussed briefly. Most pretribulationists are dispensationalists, a system which has greatly influenced classical Pentecostalism. Its name derives from a koine Greek word referring to stewardship, in the sense of managing the affairs of a household. Dispensationalism, then, believes in a divine plan for the world, which is divided into a series of dispensations, or economies. Dispensationalist Charles Ryrie explains it thus: The world is seen as a household administered by God in connection with several stages of revelation that mark off the different economies in the outworking of his total program. These economies are the dispensations in dispensationalism . . . thus a dispensation may be defined as “a distinguishable economy in the outworking of God’s program.”16

There is some disagreement over the exact number of dispensations, but most commonly postulated is seven, each ending in judgment. These are the dispensations of Innocence (before the Fall), conscience (from the Fall to the Flood), human government (from the Flood to the call of Abraham), promise, law, and grace. There is a seventh, which has not yet come. Central to dispensationalist thinking is how God has singled out the Jews as his chosen people. The current dispensation From Latin ‘rapio’, meaning ‘caught up’. Supporting passages cited include Matthew 24:37, 25:8–10 and 1 Thessalonians 5:2–3. 16 Charles Ryrie, ‘Dispensation, Dispensationalism’ in Elwell, Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 322. 14 15

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(from Christ’s redemptive work at Calvary through to the rapture) is known as the Church age, which represents a parenthetical deviation of God’s dealings with ethnic Israel. Thus, dispensationalists make a clear distinction between Israel and the Church. This emphasis on Israel as God’s people cannot be overemphasised. Charles Ryrie believes dispensationalism developed into a coherent system from about the early eighteenth century in the writings of Pierre Poiret, Jonathan Edwards and Isaac Watts.17 But it was John Nelson Darby, leader of the Plymouth Brethren, who systematised dispensationalism in the mid-nineteenth century.18 In keeping with this concept that each dispensation ended in judgment before the next dispensation was instituted, Darby… Believed that the church was in ruins, as at the end of other ‘dispensations’ of God’s dealings with men and women. The [new Brethren] assemblies were not to be set up with elders and deacons, but simply to be groups of people separated from the world awaiting Christ’s return.19

In summary, dispensationalism heightened the awareness of an imminent rapture, emphasised a sectarian philosophy that demanded separation from the affairs of this world, and regarded the Jews (and later, the modern state of Israel) as God’s distinct people. Moreover, its highly systematised and literalist approach to eschatology resulted in its adherents producing a plethora of end-times diagrammatical representations, each charting in intricate detail the events which would lead up to the parousia. Thus, dispensationalists searched through their Bibles for ‘signs of the times’ to attempt to reconcile current political events with prophecies appearing in the Scriptures. It is also highly apocalyptic, emphasising strongly the final battle between God and Satan, something which very much shaped Pentecostalism’s dualistic tendencies.

Ibid. Interestingly, though many commentators often refer to Latin American classical Pentecostalism’s links with the U.S., the development of its eschatology and pneumatology owes a great deal to Darby and Edward Irving, who were both British. See, for example, Andrew Landale Drummond, Edward Irving and His Circle (London: James Clarke and Co., 1934); and various entries in Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal. 19 Harold H. Rowdon, The History of Christianity (Oxford Lion Publishing, Oxford, 1990), 525. 17

18

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The Imminent Parousia and Aggressive Evangelism Modern Pentecostalism traces its origins to outbreaks of glossolalia (speaking in tongues), first in Topeka, Kansas, in 1901, and later, the Azusa Street Revival of 1906–08 in Los Angeles (there are other cases of glossolalia reported throughout church history).20 Central to the Pentecostal experience is the first Pentecost in Acts 2, when the disciples miraculously spoke in other languages. Peter’s sermon in Acts 2, which explained to onlookers the significance of Pentecost, quotes from the prophet Joel (2:28–32), a passage that equates the pouring out of God’s Spirit with the two rainy seasons in the Holy Land (the former and latter rain, Joel 2:23). If the biblical Pentecost represented the first outpouring of the Spirit, the twentieth century Pentecostals regarded their movement as the ‘latter rain’, or the second outpouring. Given Joel’s strongly apocalyptic, eschatological nature (the theme ‘the day of the Lord’ is paramount in this prophetic writing), the Pentecostals thus associated the ‘latter rain’ (their movement) with the end of the current age. So for classical Pentecostals in the twentieth century, the work of the Spirit associated with their movement (signs and wonders, miracles, speaking in tongues, revival) was regarded as proof that the end of the world was not far away. No wonder Donald Dayton emphasises a clear link between Pentecostal pneumatology (view of the Spirit) and its eschatology (view of the end times).21 Given this hermeneutic, it is hardly surprising Pentecostalism embraced dispensationalism. Its emphasis on an apocalyptic end-times scenario, the imminent return of Christ, and the concept of different dispensations, all fit in nicely with the Pentecostal self-view that their movement marked the end of one age and the beginning of another (that age originating and ending with the two Pentecosts, i.e. the biblical one and theirs). Thus, dispensationalism, with its strong emphasis on the imminent return of Christ and other-worldliness, resulted in a disengagement from social and political issues (though it did express conservative values on, for example, abortion) that shaped the essentially sectarian nature and worldview of classical Pentecostalism throughout much of the twentieth century. 20 For a survey of these, see David Allen, The Unfailing Stream: A Charismatic Church History in Outline (Tonbridge: Sovereign World, 1994); and Allan Anderson, An Introduction to Pentecostalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 21 Donald W. Dayton, Theological Roots of Pentecostalism (Grand Rapids: Francis Asbury Press, 1987), 144–5.

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Dispensationalism was popularised by the Scofield reference Bible, whose impact on Pentecostalism cannot be overstated.22 Another important book that promoted dispensationalism was Hal Lindsey’s Late Great Planet Earth, which by 1990 had sold some fifteen million copies.23 Written in a sensational, fast-moving, easy reading and tabloid style, during the 1970s it quickly became the fundamental eschatological text outside of the Bible among Pentecostal (and many non-Pentecostal) believers. The imminence of the rapture is a central plank of Lindsey’s book. One chapter paints a nightmarish scene of unexplained disappearances marking the beginning of the Great Tribulation—students vanishing before their classmates’ eyes, cars suddenly careering across roads because their drivers have disappeared, and so on. Dispensationalists are also convinced that as we approach the last days, society will grow ever more evil and depraved, and that the only hope for the world is Christ’s return. What is the point in seeking to change society? Society is incapable of any lasting change.24 Lindsey states: The Bible teaches that lasting peace will come to the world only after Christ returns and sits upon the throne of David in Jerusalem and establishes His historic kingdom on earth for a thousand years.25

Up to the late 1980s classical Pentecostalism embraced this view of society wholeheartedly. Things can only get worse, so why seek to change society at all, especially in light of the imminent nature of the rapture? Only Christ can change the world when he returns. Surely it would be far more productive to spend precious time winning souls prior to Christ’s return than engaging in any form of social and political activity? Lindsey makes exactly this point.26 As a result, Pentecostals devote their energies to aggressive evangelism (L.G. McLung refers to the ‘extremely urgent’ nature of Pentecostalism),27 winning souls for Christ before that great and terrible day comes. L.G. McClung has stated:

22 P.H. Alexander, ‘Scofield Reference Bible’ in Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal, 771. 23 Version cited here is published by Bantam Books, New York, 1990. 24 Ibid., 174. 25 Ibid., 159. 26 Ibid., 176. 27 G.L. McLung, ‘Pentecostal/Charismatic Perspectives on a Missiology for the Twenty-First Century’, Pneuma: Journal of the Society for Pentecostal Studies 16 no. 1 (1994), 11–21.

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Pentecostals have seen their evangelistic outreach as more than the mere extension of a religious movement or recruitment to a particular ideology or experience. From the outset of the modern Pentecostal movement there was a sense of ‘divine destiny’, the participation with God in a new work for the last days. The theological mood and atmosphere set by premillennialism and the actualization of the experiences and promises of Scripture (particularly the “outpouring” passages such as Joel 2:28–32 and Acts 2:16–21) caused Pentecostals to view evangelism as an extension of the purposes of God for the world . . . It has been crystal clear in the theology of Pentecostal evangelism that humankind is lost and is under the judgment of eternal punishment unless reached with the good news of the gospel.28

Effects on Pentecostal-Sandinista Relations Eschatology, then, helps explain classical Pentecostalism’s historical unwillingness to engage in social or collective action, to become “entangled by the affairs of this world” (2 Timothy 2:4), instead emphasising aggressive evangelism. Since the late 1980s, many classical Pentecostals in North America were influenced by postmillennialism and began moving into the social and political arena. But in 1980s Nicaragua the premillennial worldview prevailed. Pentecostals were far more interested in preaching the Gospel than social work. Roberto Rojas explained how during both the Somoza and Sandinista periods, few Pentecostals were motivated by a social message. The overriding concern was to win lost souls. Rojas believes Pentecostals were hassled and faced constant oppression precisely because the Sandinistas simply could not bear the “aggressiveness of Pentecostalism’s propagation of the Gospel”.29 AoG superintendent Saturnino Cerrato also accepted that many Evangelicals had not been overly concerned with social issues during the 1980s.30 A number of pastors expressed similar views. Cerrato explained how Nicaraguan Pentecostalism’s involvement in social and political affairs was a relatively new phenomenon, actually highlighting this new social awareness as one of the more positive influences of the Sandinista years.31 One ex-AoG leader, Guillermo Osorno, has L.G. McLung, ‘Evangelism’ in Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal, 285–6. 29 Interview with Roberto Rojas. 30 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato. 31 This is evident in Nicaraguan Evangelical literature produced in the 1990s. For example, an early edition of El Heraldo, a Managuan-based Christian newspaper, contained various reports relating to social concerns and programmes (No. 6, January 28

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since formed an Evangelical party and won representation within the Nicaraguan political scene.32 It is not that Pentecostals have no interest in social problems. They do. Norman Marenco, for example, has established a human rights organisation. Roberto Rojas detailed some work with drug addicts and orphans during the Sandinista period, while Cerrato speaks of similar programs. But these efforts did not represent a systematic attempt to correct underlying causes of social injustice. For Pentecostals, the cause of society’s ills is sin, and their response is to preach the gospel and convert as many people as possible to correct that underlying failure of society. Thus, Veli-Matti Karkkainen believes Pentecostals are not obsessed with influencing existing social structures, because they “have created their own alternative institutions that function as instruments of human justice.”33 This worldview irritated the government and had a detrimental bearing on Pentecostal-Sandinista relations. Humberto Belli stated: The main reason for the open attack on the Protestants singled out by the government seems to be that the Sandinistas had no hope of converting them to the revolution or to Marxist liberation theology. In the eyes of the FSLN, they were too concerned with spiritual and supernatural matters and hence kept their people distracted from the all-important task of supporting the revolution.34

In 1982 La Barricada published its provocative three-part series on the ‘sects’ (discussed previously).35 The series, which frequently drew on the views of several pro-Sandinista clergy, portrayed Evangelicals as guilty of allowing the poor to suffer, encouraging them to remain in their

1999), while a glossy brochure in English produced by the Nicaraguan Evangelical Alliance pleaded for aid in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. The document, which contains several harrowing photographs, concentrates solely on social needs, the only reference to religion being when president Roberto Rojas’ ends his appeal by invoking God’s blessing upon the reader (AENIC: Hurricane Mitch 1998, brochure). 32 Deann Alford, ‘New Evangelical Party Gains Political Power,’ Christianity Today, 3 March 1997. However, Gustavo Parajón feels Osorno has since done little to focus on poverty issues (Deann Alford, ‘Evangelicals Press Political leader to Focus on Poverty Issues,’ Christianity Today, 11 January 1999, 23). 33 Veli-Matti Karkkainen, ‘Mission, Spirit and Eschatology’, International Association for Mission Studies XVI–1, no. 31 (1999), 83. 34 Belli, Breaking Faith, 194. 35 Reyes, ‘La invasión de las sectas’ (3 March 1982); ‘Quienes son los que dividen a los evangélicos?’ and ‘Estructura interna y externa de las iglesias evangélicas’, all in La Barricada.

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present material condition. The movement, La Barricada argued, promoted an otherworldly message and solution. Moreover, the reports also highlighted Evangelicals’ unwillingness to play a part in the revolution, the popular organisations, or any kind of politics, labelling these ‘sects’ ‘anti-dialectic’. Patriarchal teaching was blamed for keeping women docile. The articles also pointed out how a belief in an imminent Second Coming of Christ had created a fatalist attitude among Evangelicals that encouraged them to spend what little time they believed remained carrying out religious deeds to stand them in good stead on the Day of Judgment, rather than engaging in social and political issues. Readers were also told how the Evangelical literacy program ALFALIT was run separately (implying it was a rival) from the government’s own literacy crusade. The articles explained how Pentecostals encouraged conformity and inactivity, and ended by discussing how there was a battle within the movement between, on one hand, those preachers who keep the people enslaved, and on the other, those who see the revolution as an opportunity for redemption. From the very beginning the Sandinistas demanded full revolutionary participation by all. There was no room for neutrality—people were left in little doubt about that. This was to be a massive, unified collective effort. One comandante told a group of Protestants that “all Nicaraguan Christians ought to participate in the (revolutionary) process, because those who separate themselves will not have the moral authority to criticise those who have not contributed.” He went on: “In this country now nothing can be as before . . . The Protestant pastors must help create the New Man”.36 Christians were encouraged to be revolutionaries indefinitely, there was to be no looking back.37 “The Church should be behind the People” exclaimed one headline.38 There was no room for complacency or inaction. One editorial explained how Christian love must be manifest through political action to help the poor, the masses. Christians must contribute to the revolution.39 Meanwhile, as tensions grew between the government and Archbishop Obando’s Catholic Church, the Sandinistas issued their statement on religion on 7 October 1980.40

‘Papel de evangélicos: Con la revolución’, La Barricada. ‘Cristianos en la revolución’, La Barricada 8 March 1980. 38 ‘La Iglesia debe estar con el Pueblo’, La Barricada, 27 March 1980. 39 ‘Cristianos en la revolución’, La Barricada, 19 April 1980. 40 FSLN. ‘The Role of Religion in the New Nicaragua’ in Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak, 105–112. 36 37

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In it, they explained how Christians represented an integral part of the revolution, that faith and politics go hand-in-hand, and that Christians should continue their participation and role in the revolutionary process: We Sandinistas state that our experience shows that when Christians, basing themselves on their faith, are capable of responding to the needs of the people and of history, those very beliefs lead them to revolutionary activism . . . In the new conditions that are posed by the revolutionary process, we Christian and non-Christian revolutionaries must come together around the task of providing continuity to this extremely valuable experience, extending it into the future.41

Integral to the Sandinista view of religion was how they eulogised Christians who supported the revolution, while denouncing those who did not.42 A regular series entitled Christians in the Revolution regularly sang the praises of those supporting the project, but always singled out and criticised in harsh language Christians who opposed it or who were apolitical.43 Divisions within Christianity over whether or not to support the Frente were also criticised.44 Liberation theology was regularly praised, as were pro-Sandinista Protestants. CEPAD was often singled out in La Barricada, sometimes for offering financial and other support for revolutionary projects,45 while CNPEN was refused its personería jurídica for many years. Mention has already been made of how, in response to a CEPAD donation to the government’s social fund, La Barricada praised CEPAD and stated “Actions like those of CEPAD ought to be imitated”.46 Tomás Borge and several other senior comandantes sang CEPAD’s praises at a meeting between Protestants and revolutionaries, urging them to continue serving the people of Nicaragua.47 Yet those not supporting the revolution where labelled false Christians. For example, the 1980 statement on religion made clear that the government supported those siding with the revolution, but had Ibid., 107. For example, see ‘FSLN y cristianos trabajando juntos’, La Barricada, 31 August 1980. 43 See, for example, 9 February 1980, 15 February 1980 and 2 March 1980. 44 ‘Cristianos revolucionarios responden a los nuevos fariseos’, La Barricada. See also ‘Cristianos en la revolución,’ 15 February 1980; and ‘Cristianos en la revolución,’ 8 March 1980. 45 For example, see ‘CEPAD ayuda a refugiados’, La Barricada, 7 July 1980. 46 ‘CEPAD dona 200 mil a Bienestar Social’, La Barricada. 47 See Introduction by Tomás Borge (11–12) and speech by Marcos Somarraba (23–27) in CEPAD, Reflexiones Sobre Fé y Revolución. 41 42

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little time for those within Christianity who opposed it: “Naturally we Sandinistas are good friends of the revolutionary Christians but not of the counterrevolutionaries, even though they call themselves Christians.”48 When some Baptist youths who supported opposition politician Alfonso Robelo denounced the Frente at the Baptist seminary, they were dismissed by La Barricada as unrepresentative of true Christians.49 The government priest Fernando Cardenal explained how no one had the right to criticise the revolution in the name of Christianity. Both went hand-in-hand, and those suggesting otherwise were merely using religion to justify their own interests.50 Liberation theology was regarded as the Latin American model of true Christianity, while Charismaticism was a North American colonial export, and did not represent true Christianity at all.51 Just as the Sandinistas melded party and state, so that to be Nicaraguan meant being a Sandinista, and vice versa, so the Sandinistas sought to appropriate religion for themselves, ‘sandinising’ it so that to be a true Christian meant being a Sandinista (though not necessarily the other way around). Thus, Tomás Borge declared that the central principles of the revolution and Christianity were one and the same.52 Christianity was regarded as an integral part of the revolution, so that one could not speak of an alliance between the two—they were inseparable.53 Both were working for a common goal54 —to be a Christian was to be a revolutionary.55 Even Daniel Ortega said so.56 Senior Sandinista Rene Nuñez Tellez explained how there should be no divisions between faith and the revolution, the two go together.57 A poster produced by the Instituto Histórico Centroamericano and published in La Barricada encapsulated this view. It depicted a crucified Christ with arms outstretched superimposed with a revolutionary in combat fatigues, with arms similarly outstretched, holding a rifle.58

Borge, Sandinistas Speak, 109–110. ‘Provocaciones en el Bautista’, La Barricada, 11 November 1980. 50 ‘No caben criticas fuera de Revolución en nombre de fé cristiana’, La Barricada. 51 ‘Cristianos en la Revolución’, La Barricada, 2 March 1980. 52 ‘Cristianismo y Revolución’, La Barricada, 24 September 1980. 53 ‘Las tareas de la juventud, y los cristianos como parte integral de la Revolución’, La Barricada, 31 August 1980. 54 ‘FSLN y cristianos trabajando juntos’, La Barricada. 55 ‘Jóvenes ven conjunción Cristianismo-Revolución’, La Barricada, 14 October 1980. 56 ‘Ser cristiano es ser revolucionario’, La Barricada, 22 May 1980. 57 ‘La reacción abusa de la religión,’ La Barricada. 58 ‘Fé cristiana y Revolución Sandinista en Nicaragua’, La Barricada. 48 49

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Meanwhile, a La Barricada editorial angrily dismissed any alleged threat to religious freedom, making clear it supported and would protect all “authentic popular traditions”.59 With four Catholic priests in the cabinet and CEPAD in tow, apolitical Pentecostals looked isolated and intransigent. In the eyes of the Frente they represented the complete antithesis of liberation theology. Nicaraguan Pentecostals were accused of caring about nothing other than winning converts and reaping a heavenly reward in light of their belief that Christ’s return was imminent. David Spencer explained how talk of the rapture or second coming of Christ angered the Sandinistas.60 The Frente perceived Pentecostals as concerned primarily with a spiritual message and hope, which put them at complete odds with Sandinista (and liberation theology) materialism. Ironically, by the late 1990s, the shift within U.S. Pentecostalism from pessimistic premillennialism to a Pentecostal version of liberation theology (known as ‘Kingdom Theology’), which borrows heavily from postmillennialism, had begun to trickle down into the Nicaraguan church. Kingdom Theology helps explain why 700 Club President Pat Robertson, an avowed premillennialist, ran for the U.S. presidency and talked of establishing God’s kingdom here on earth. When asked if the Pentecostals are currently more socially active than during the 1980s, Roberto Rojas agrees this is very much the case. School programs, help for the elderly, infirm and poor, large-scale natural disaster programs, various drug addiction programs, and other forms of social activity are very evident in the Nicaraguan Pentecostal church of the twentyfirst century.61 In fact, increasing social activity within Latin American Pentecostalism has been recently documented.62 The manner in which AoG pastors have embraced this work is indicative of the influence Kingdom Theology has had, which has spilled over into the classical Pentecostal wing of the church. Saturnino Cerrato points out how the Sandinista revolution made them far more socially conscious.63

‘Revolución defiende libertad religiosa’, La Barricada, 7 April 1980. Conversation with David Spencer, 4 June 1999, Managua. 61 Interview with Roberto Rojas. 62 Doug Peterson, Not By Might Nor By Power: A Pentecostal Theology of Social Concern in Latin America (Oxford: Regnum, 1996). 63 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato. 59 60

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The Modern State of Israel Mention has already been made of how dispensationalism regards the Jews as God’s chosen people. As such, there is a great deal of interest in the modern state of Israel (it plays a central role in Hal Lindsey’s Late Great Planet Earth). In fact, classical Pentecostalism is essentially Zionist in nature, and both dispensationalism and Christian Zionism were given a major boost with the creation of Israel in 1948 (and covenantal Reformed believers a headache!) Foremost among those with their eye on Israel’s political scene, and who constantly uphold Israel’s virtues, are classical Pentecostals. In fact, Pentecostal support for Israel has been so visible and strong that Israeli officials have actively courted the Pentecostal lobby in the U.S.64 This theological notion, which forms a vital part of Pentecostalism’s doctrinal mosaic, brought it into direct conflict with the Frente. When asked why Evangelical-Sandinista relations broke down, Mario Espinoza, without hesitation, placed Pentecostal support for modern Israel at the top of his list: They would not permit anyone to preach in favour of Israel, or even to mention the word ‘Israel’. To them, it was an abomination . . . they were very much against Israel. Here, you were not allowed to say that the Jews were God’s people. Honestly, I know because we used to preach in the street with the youth, and at University, and we were not allowed to say such things.65

The Norwegian missionary Burger Sandli also confirmed this Sandinista hostility towards Israel.66 Miguel Angel Casco cited it as a major problem for Pentecostals.67 Several Evangelical pastors concurred, while former senior DGSE official José Suárez explained how the Frente had received assistance, both as guerrillas and a government, from Sadam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and Yasser Arafat. Such alliances naturally created intense hostility towards Israel.68 Links between the Frente and Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) are well-documented. Steven Kinzer details how F.L. Arrington, ‘Dispensationalism’, in Burgess and McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal, 247. See also Steven L Spiegel, ‘Religious Components of U.S. Middle East Policy’, Journal of International Affairs 36(2) (Fall/Winter 1982/3), 235–246. 65 Interview with Mario Espinoza. 66 Interview with Burger Sandli. 67 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco. 68 Interview with José Suárez. 64

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Sandinista guerrillas trained with Palestinians, even taking part in PLO operations against Israel: On more than one occasion, Sandinistas fought alongside PLO guerrillas in skirmishes with Israeli troops. Several Nicaraguans also participated in airline hijackings led by PLO commandos. One of them, Patricio Argüello, was killed by Israeli security agents during a failed attempt to hijack an El Al passenger jet on September 6, 1970.69

Jillian Becker also details the PLO’s close links with Cuba, and later, the Sandinistas.70 This relationship included supplying the Sandinistas with arms and opening a PLO office in Managua after the revolution. Becker also refers to Arafat’s attendance of the first anniversary celebrations of the Sandinista revolution, when he declared that “The way to Jerusalem leads through Managua”, a variation on earlier PLO themes that victory would come through Amman, Beirut and Damascus. Here, Becker maintains, Arafat was “stressing the role of the PLO in the world Marxist revolution.”71 She also details how some 50 families, Nicaragua’s entire Jewish population, were expelled after the revolution. Raphael Israeli also highlights PLO camaraderie with many East Bloc nations, as well as Sandinista Nicaragua. He discusses the discovery of various training and sabotage manuals in Spanish (presumably produced by Cuba) and evidence of strong support for the Sandinistas at PLO camps in Lebanon.72 One commentator alleges the FSLN even aided the PLO’s attempt to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan,73 while immediately after the 1979 revolution, the PLO organised loans for Sandinista Nicaragua.74 Three studies in particular highlight the close nature of PLO-FSLN relations. The first explores the PLO’s external relations with foreign powers in order to secure international legitimacy.75 It claims the PLO

Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, 60. Jillian Becker, The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984). 71 Ibid., 166–7. 72 Raphael Israeli, ed. PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983). 73 Myles Kantor, ‘Why Do Jewish Organizations Ignore Hatred of Israel?’ FrontPageMagazine.com, 9 April 2002. Available at: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ ReadArticle.asp?ID=1214 (accessed 7 October 2002). 74 J.W. Wilson, Swirl in the Eye of the Storm. Paper delivered at the War Since 1945 Seminar, 2 April 1984, Marine Corp Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. 75 A.R. Norton and M. Greenberg, eds. The International Relations of the PLO (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989). 69 70

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pursued an “energetic campaign to build and sustain international support,” established diplomatic and information offices in major cities across the world, and even captured more news time than countries such as West Germany, Mexico or France. A chapter by Robert Thomas Baratta deals exclusively with PLO-Latin American relations. At the time of writing (1989) he highlighted the political influence exerted by the PLO within Latin America through the continent’s 2.5 million Arab Muslim and Christian immigrants who, remembering their ancestral links, supported and raised funds for the PLO. Baratta also explains how petroleum was used as a lever to secure Latin American support for the Palestinian cause. During the 1973 oil crisis, the Lebanese foreign minister Fuad Naffah toured seven Latin American nations on behalf of the Arab League stating “no underdeveloped country that backs the just cause of the Arab world will suffer from an energy shortage”. Baratta also argues that Latin American countries chose to support the Arab cause through the Non-aligned Movement as a means of challenging their nemesis, the United States, without incurring its full wrath by siding with the Soviet Union: The Arab nations, through the Nonaligned Movement, projected economic and political influence into Latin America . . . the result of new interdependence is favorable consideration by Latin American nations on Arab issues, notably the Palestinian homeland. Support for this issue and for Palestinian groups become symbolic of Latin American prerogative and independence of action. For instance, in the United Nations, Latin American nations vote consistently against the United States and Israel on Palestinian issues.76

One country keen to demonstrate its independence from its arch foe was Sandinista Nicaragua. (‘Anti-Yanquism’ was a defining aspect of sandinismo.) Baratta details FSLN-PLO links stretching back to at least 1969, PLO support during the Sandinistas’ guerrilla years, how the Sandinistas trained and fought with the PLO (he also mentions the hijacking incident), and large amounts of military aid and equipment supplied to the Frente. Thus . . . Sandinista Nicaragua remains a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause. There is some indication from official Sandinista sources that this support is a solemn obligation of the FSLN in partial repayment to the PLO for its critical support of the Sandinista struggle.77

76 77

Ibid., 173. Ibid., 182.

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David Kopilow moves beyond general PLO international relations, exploring links between radical Arab militants and Central American revolutionary groups, which he claims were neither secret nor clandestine.78 At the heart of this network was Fidel Castro’s Cuba. For example, Illich Ramirez Sánchez, a Cuban trained terrorist better known as Carlos the Jackal, began working closely with Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). More importantly, however, Cuban links with the PLO led to the establishments of FSLN-PLO relations. As Kopilow points out, of the five Latin American countries allowing the PLO to open offices there, only Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua granted the Palestinians full diplomatic status. He then goes on to trace the nature of FSLN-PLO relations, quoting Sandinistas sources that acknowledged with some pride how the guerrillas fought alongside the Palestinians. The Patricio Argüello hijacking of an airplane is also examined.79 Moreover, Kopilow explains how the PLO, wealthy beyond its size because of the largesse of Libya and other Arab states, supplied the Sandinistas with a great deal of aid and military equipment. He highlights the case in July 1979 of a PLO-chartered aircraft, supposedly with relief supplies destined for Nicaragua, which was searched during a stopover in Tunis and found to have some 50 tonnes of arms on board. Meanwhile, Yasser Arafat was pleased to confirm in January 1982 how the PLO had provided military assistance to both Nicaragua and guerrillas in El Salvador. Kopilow also provides details of funding supplies to the Frente. For example, it arranged for 100 million dollars to be channelled from Libya, while the PLO itself contributed some 10 to 12 million dollars to the Sandinistas directly. What did the PLO get out of this relationship? Kopilow explains: The PLO assists Marxist Leninist guerrillas halfway around the world because they are seen as fighting Israel’s main ally, the United States. The intent is to drain US energies and resources and to distract America from playing an active role in the Middle East.80

78 David Kopilow, Castro, Israel and the PLO (Washington DC: Cuban-American National Foundation, 1984). 79 The Sandinistas named an electrical plant in Momotombo after Patricio Argüello. 80 Ibid., 30–31.

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Finally, the study also details the repression of Nicaragua’s tiny Jewish community in Nicaragua after the Sandinistas came to power. This included seizure of their land, while Jewish community leader Abraham Gorn was forced to sweep the streets for two weeks, having been accused of stealing land, until an international outcry led to his release. On the whole, Kopilow’s study is well-sourced and compelling, demonstrating clear inks between the PLO and Nicaragua. However, Kopilow’s study is published by the Cuban-American National Foundation which seeks Castro’s downfall.81 But it is worth noting that even a third study exploring FSLN-PLO links, which is broadly sympathetic towards the PLO and FSLN, does not deny a close relationship between the two.82 Bruce Hoffman believes the PLO’s links with the Sandinistas were not proof of burgeoning international terrorist activity, but more a natural alliance based on solidarity along the world’s revolutionary and national liberation movements, as well as a counterbalance to Israel’s long-standing relationship with Somoza. He describes the nature of the links between the Somoza regime and Israel, which he believes helped forge a strong FSLN-PLO friendship. But whether these relations were evidence of burgeoning international terrorism or (as Hoffman argues) due to Israeli connections in Central America is not the point. What matters for this study is that close links between the FSLN and the PLO existed. Even Hoffman agrees they did, and also concedes the hijacking incident, Sandinista training at PLO camps in Lebanon, close PLO-FSLN links after the latter’s triumph, and how the PLO supplied the Frente with arms and funds. Sandinista affinity with the PLO is longstanding and well documented. In a speech given at the Sixth Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Havana (September 3–9, 1979), Daniel Ortega bunched together ‘Israeli Zionism’ and ‘Yanqui Imperialism’, accusing the Israeli government of carrying out North American aims by proxy by supplying arms to Somoza. He stated: Our people have been struggling against oppression and interventions for more than 150 years. That is why we have historically identified with the struggle of the Palestinians and we recognize the PLO as their legitimate

81 Details about the foundation can be found on their website, http://www.canfnet. org/ (accessed 13 March 2005). 82 Bruce Hoffman, The PLO and Israel in Central America (Santa Monica: Rand, 1988).

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chapter seven representative. And that is why we condemn Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and demand their unconditional return.83

Two years later, at a speech delivered to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 7 October 1981, Ortega condemned Israeli “acts of terrorism” against Palestinians, carried out with full U.S. support. He went on to reaffirm his country’s solidarity with North Korea, Cuba, SWAPO, the independence movement in Puerto Rico, and also the PLO, who he once again refers to as “the sole representative of the Palestinian people”.84 Meanwhile, in an interview with Playboy, Sergio Ramírez again confirmed close relations with the PLO and acknowledged they had accepted an offer by Libya to send them a planeload of arms and other military equipment.85 La Barricada boasted gleefully in its lead headline that Arafat would attend the first year celebrations of the revolution.86 The PLO also retained an office in Managua. When AoG missionary David Spencer moved back to Nicaragua in 1990 he bought a house in the Los Robles area that had belonged to the PLO. When he first moved in to the property, pictures of Arafat still hung on the wall, and neighbours told him Arafat himself had been seen several times visiting the house.87 The ascension to power of Anwar Sadat in Egypt was seen in Nicaragua as a major blow to the PLO’s struggle, and the signing of the Camp David Accord in particularly caused dismay among Sandinistas.88 Aside from close links with the PLO, there is plenty of evidence to demonstrate that the Sandinistas hated Israel with a passion. In October 1979 La Barricada published a story entitled “Great Battles for the Liberation of Peoples.”89 The article, in keeping with sandinismo’s antinationalist and anti-‘Yanqui’ ideology, explored anti-imperial struggles throughout the world which the Sandinistas supported. Concerning the Middle East, the article stated how the western nations needed oil in order to sustain their economies. Therefore… 83 Daniel Ortega, ‘Nothing Will Hold Back Our Struggle for Liberation’ in Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak, 48. 84 Daniel Ortega, ‘An Appeal for Justice and Peace’ in Borge et al., Sandinistas Speak, 142. 85 ‘Playboy Interview: The Sandinistas’, Playboy 1(30) (September 1983). 86 ‘Fidel, Bishop, Manley, price y Arafat vienen’, La Barricada. 87 Conversation with David Spencer, 4 June 1999, Managua. 88 ‘Victorias antimperialistas del Tercer Mundo’, La Barricada). 89 ‘Grandes Batallas por la liberación de los pueblos’, La Barricada.

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To guarantee the domination of the region, imperialism accepted the plans of Zionism: to establish in Palestine a Jewish colony of European extract, building an imperial fortress in full view of the Arab world.

The article goes on to state… Zionism is a Jewish movement, ultraconservative and closely linked with enormous financial interests, of a racist ideology, which maintains that the Jews are the true owners of Palestine. And so, with the support of imperialism was born the artificial State of Israel in 1948.

Were the Sandinistas anti-Semitic? Humberto Belli believes so. Writing about the small Jewish community of some 50 families at the time of the revolution, he says: The small Jewish community in Nicaragua was also a target of early harassment by the Sandinistas. In 1978 the Sandinistas, chanting antiSemitic and PLO slogans, attacked Nicaragua’s only synagogue. Once in power, they confiscated it. They also confiscated the property of many Jewish families on the grounds that they had been Somocistas—some had, some had not. Abraham Gorn, the informal leader of the Jewish community, was arrested in 1979. Other Jews received threatening phone calls advising them to leave the country. Most fled.90

Yet an article in Latinamerica Press, a publication sympathetic towards the Sandinistas, disputes charges of anti-Semitism, claiming this was an example of Reagan propaganda. Nonetheless, the writers of the article had to concede isolated incidences of anti-Semitism in Sandinista Nicaragua, that ‘rebel Sandinistas’ had firebombed the only synagogue in 1978, and that the Sandinista press was anti-Semitic in the way it reported on Israel.91 (The U.S. Department of State also claimed the Sandinistas bombed the synagogue.)92 Anti-Israel reports in La Barricada included a picture of emaciated children in striped prison clothes behind a barbed wire perimeter fence at Auschwitz.93 The caption read, “The Zionists’ Short Memory”, going on to explain how this picture could easily be that of Palestinian children suffering at the hands of the Israelis. It ended: “There is not much to differentiate the history

Belli, Breaking Faith, 192. ‘Charges of Nicaraguan Anti-Semitism Investigated’, Latinamerica Press 15 no. 37 (13 October 1983). 92 U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua: International Religious Freedom Report, 21 October 2001. Available on the U.S. Department of State website: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ irf/2001/5681.htm (accessed 7 October 2002). 93 ‘La Corta Memoria de los Sionistas’, La Barricada, 25 February 1980. 90 91

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of Zionist repression in Palestine from the methods employed by the Nazis.” Another report showed a cartoon of Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin spouting stars of David in a speech caption. The accompanying story spoke of thousands of demonstrators being shot at by troops, the Israelis planting bombs at a Palestinian school and in an Arab lorry. The article was highly derogatory and inflammatory, and the story was sourced by the PLO itself.94 One editorial defined Zionism, offering a highly biased and subjective narrative of the rise of the state of Israel. It noted that, through Zionism, the Jews had been transformed from victims to aggressors, oppressed to oppressors.95 Yet another story spoke of a mafia class that saturated Israeli society and politics,96 while another banner headline quotes Arafat, stating “Israel is the spoiled, bad-mannered child of the United States”.97 Whether or not the Sandinistas were anti-Semitic is open to debate. Though the above reports were clearly anti-Zionist, that is not necessarily the same thing as anti-Semitism (though undoubtedly anti-Semitism is sometimes disguised as anti-Zionism). Some might argue that the above reports do not necessarily reflect anti-Semitism. Yet their tone is harsh, and as already stated, even Latinamerica Press conceded the strongly anti-Semitic nature of some reports. The Sandinistas’ rough treatment of the small Jewish community immediately after the revolution (all of them fled Nicaragua) and their press coverage of Israel at least suggest anti-Semitism. In a 1984 speech to the Jewish organisation B’nai B’rith, President Reagan read out the words of a Jew who had fled Nicaragua, detailing various anti-Semitic slogans painted on walls.98 In 1985 Nicaraguan Jews who lobbied Jewish Congressmen to support Reagan’s policies on Nicaragua presented evidence they said proved the Sandinistas were anti-Semitic.99 Even in 1996, when the Sandinistas claimed their policies towards Jews and Israel had changed,

‘Atentan contra alacaldes palestinos en Israel’, La Barricada, 3 June 1980. ‘Que es el sionismo?’ La Barricada, 6 June 1980. 96 ‘Israel: La pus sale por todos lados,’ La Barricada, 9 July 1980. 97 ‘Dice Arafat: Israel es el niño mimado y maleducado de Estados Unidos’, La Barricada, 23 July 1980. 98 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the International Convention of B’nai B’rith, 6 September 1984. Available online at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, housed at the University of Texas: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1984/ 90684a.htm (accessed on 21 March 2005). 99 Laurie Becklund, ‘Sandinistas Are Anti-Semitic, Group Charges’, Los Angeles Times, 14 March 1985. 94 95

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Nicaragua’s Jews refused to return in case the Frente won the forthcoming elections.100 From another point of view, Robert Parry argues that there was no evidence for Sandinista anti-Semitism; Regan merely pushed this line as a pretext for helping the Contras.101 A Los Angeles Times report similarly denied the existence of Nicaraguan anti-Semitism, citing how Carlos Tunnerman, the Nicaraguan ambassador to Washington, was Jewish.102 Stephen Kinzer has traced the role Sandinista Herty Lewites, the son of a Jewish immigrant, played in the government as Minister for Tourism.103 Nevertheless, what is certain for the purposes of this study is that the Sandinistas certainly had close connections with the PLO. Moreover, the Iran-Contra affair that caused President Reagan so many problems demonstrated Israeli involvement with the Contras.104 The Sandinistas recognised the importance Pentecostals placed on the state of Israel,105 and it is no wonder Mario Espinoza says they were not even permitted to mention Israel.106 The Frente’s hatred of the state of Israel was intense, and inevitably this would have affected Pentecostals preaching about Israel during their evangelistic sermons and outreaches. After all, the centrality of Israel in dispensational thinking must not be underestimated. Miguel Angel Casco explains the importance of this issue, confirming it caused immense problems for Nicaraguan Pentecostals who supported Israel.107 From a Pentecostal perspective, the Frente’s rejection of Zionism was proof in their eyes that the Sandinistas were evil, demonic, enemies of God’s own people. The fact that they were not permitted even to mention the name of Israel only served to prove

100 Brian Harris, ‘Sandinistas Say They’ve Changed But Don’t Convince Jews’, Jewish News Weekly of Northern California, 18 October 1996. Available online: www.jewishsf. com/content/2–0–/module/displaystory/story_id/4705/edition_id/86/format/html/ displaystory.html (accessed 21 March 2005). 101 Robert Parry, ‘Lost History: CIA’s Perception Management’, Consortium News. An internet-based publication: www.consortiumnews.com/archive/ (accessed 5 February 2004). 102 William A. Alvarez, ‘Sandinistas and Anti-Semitism’, Los Angeles Times, 8 April 1985. 103 As detailed throughout Blood of Brothers. 104 For a discussion see NACLA, which devotes a whole edition to Israeli guns and money in Central America, NACLA: Report on the Americas 21 no. 2 (March/April 1987). 105 ‘Estructura interna y externa de las iglesias evangélicas’, La Barricada. 106 Interview with Mario Espinoza. 107 Interview with Miguel Angel Casco.

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to Pentecostals that sandinismo was reminiscent of how dispensationalism stated Antichrist would view the Jews. Evangelicals and the Contras Nearly every conservative Protestant leader I interviewed explained how the Sandinistas labelled them contrarevolucionarios (counterrevolutionaries, or simply ‘Contra’). Pro-Sandinista Protestants also confirmed this. Several human rights investigations into abuses in northern Nicaragua (especially the Americas Watch report) describe how some Evangelicals and their families were caught up in EPS counterinsurgency sweeps targeted at Contras and their support base. Clearly, the Sandinistas were highly suspicious of Evangelicals, regarding them as a destabilising force within revolutionary Nicaragua, as demonstrated by various La Barricada reports in 1982. They were labelled ‘anticommunists,’ unwilling to accept social change and manipulated by external forces.108 Another report called Evangelical pastors “preachers of counterrevolution”.109 A further article claimed many pastors in the Chinandega region were, in fact, former members of Somoza’s GN, causing mischief and promoting counterrevolution by preaching “Cristo viene” (Christ is coming). The report, which also labelled Evangelical pastors as “Pastores Contra” (Contra pastors) alleged they always appeared about the time of Contra attacks.110 Meanwhile, the Sandinistas regarded many Protestants as an extension of U.S. intelligence, alleging the Evangelical New Tribes Mission in Venezuela was infiltrated by North American spies,111 while highlighting how the CIA drew on religious workers to collect intelligence data.112 It is clear the Sandinistas regarded Evangelicals as, at best, Contra sympathisers and ideologues, and that many were actual Contras. So what is the truth about Evangelical involvement with the Contras? Several pastors pointed out how northern Pentecostals were in an impossible position, tormented both by the Contras and EPS.113

‘La invasión de las sectas’, La Barricada. ‘Campesinos desenmascaran a pastores de sectas’, La Barricada. 110 ‘ExGN convertidos en pastores actuan en Chinandega’, La Barricada. 111 ‘Venezuela: Misioneros norteamericanos acusados de etnocidio y espinaje’, La Barricada, 8 February 1980. 112 ‘Periodistas, religiosos y profesores tambien trabajan para la CIA’, La Barricada, 28 February 1980. 113 Interviews with Guillermo Ayala and Rufino Soza. 108 109

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Raul Carazo, who travelled throughout Nueva Guinea in 1984 and 1986–1987, explains how both sides demanded help from Evangelicals. He detailed a meeting he had with a rural pastor who explained how the EPS would pass by his church looking for information on local Contra bands. The Contras, too, would sometimes pass by seeking news about the EPS. Carazo states this impossible situation, together with the suspicion and hostility levelled against them by the EPS, and also the upheaval caused by the war in the region, led many Evangelicals to flee to the Honduran refugee camps scattered along the border.114 Rafael Arista, Alfonso Mejilla and Félix Rosales all confirm that some pastors and their entire congregations fled to Honduras.115 However, it is clear that some Evangelicals actually joined the Contras. Bartolomé Matamoros spoke of some 400 Evangelical ‘chaplains’ who would sing and pray with the Contras, and inevitably the Sandinistas associated Evangelicals with the counterrevolutionaries, saying, “They sing and pray just like this lot does”.116 When asked about these alleged chaplains, Arnulfo Sánchez, who pastored near the Honduras border, elaborated further. Like Arista, Mejilla and Rosales, he spoke of whole congregations fleeing to Honduras, where the pastors would have continued their ministries among the refugee camps where the Contras drew many of their recruits. Subsequently, some Evangelicals joined the Contras either to fight with them or to act in a ‘chaplain’ capacity.117 Mario Espinoza confirms that over time some Pentecostals became involved and took up arms,118 while even Alfonso Mejilla, who believed many northern Pentecostals sought to remain neutral, concedes a few ‘backslid’ and joined the Contras to fight.119 It would appear, then, that many Evangelicals simply fled to Honduras to escape the war, and their presence in refugee camps frequented by Contras, together with an ideological opposition to the Sandinistas (see discussion below), helped reinforce the notion of Evangelicals as Contras. But undeniably a small number actually joined the Contra ranks to play an active role in the insurgency. Americas Watch details how the resistance permitted the first foreign visitors to enter one of their training camps to interview recruits in March 1989. The visiting

114 115 116 117 118 119

Interview with Raul Carazo. Interviews with Alfonso Mejilla, Rafael Arista and Félix Rosales. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Interview with Arnulfo Sánchez. Interview with Mario Espinoza. Interview with Alfonso Mejilla.

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team consisted of two American doctors, Susan Cookson and Tim Takaro of a Unitarian-Universalist field program in Jinotega, and also freelance journalist Larry Boyd.120 I traced Dr Takaro, who was certain there was Evangelical and Catholic activity at the camp.121 (Andrew Bradstock discusses some of the Catholic religious imagery invoked by the Contras.)122 Takaro also explained how they knew Evangelical families in the Jinotega region who had sons fighting for both sides of the conflict. Before examining why some Evangelicals joined the Contras, it is important first to outline briefly the nature of the rebel movement.123 The first Contra bands were composed mainly of surviving members of Somoza’s GN, many of whom were based in Honduras. Eventually, the rebels were brought together into a cohesive fighting force, trained by Argentina and funded by a newly-installed President Reagan. The insurgents launched missions across the border in an attempt to destabilise the country, often inflicting indiscriminate terror to achieve this end. These cruel ex-members of Somoza’s GN were taught terror techniques by their Argentinean trainers, and the Contras quickly became known for their brutal human rights abuses. Yet this depiction of the Contras as exclusively ex-GN has often gone unchallenged, even cultivated in some quarters.124 Several proSandinista NGOs also reinforced this stereotype, highlighting Contra abuses while ignoring those committed by the Sandinistas. Especially vocal was Witness for Peace, whose shock tactics were aimed at challenging U.S. foreign policy towards Nicaragua (one photograph they published depicted a naked mother of 18 next to her 5 year old child, both dead and receiving embalming fluid).125 Roger Miranda (chief of the Sandinista Defense Ministry secretariat, 1982–1987) and William Ratcliff have highlighted how human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch also reported widely on

Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua, 59. Tim Takaro, e-mail correspondence, 3 February 2004. 122 Bradstock, Saints and Sandinistas, 39–40. 123 The following paragraph is based on information appearing in Christopher Dickey, With the Contras (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); and Kinzer, Blood of Brothers. 124 See, for example, WMR Commission, ‘The Contras: A Tool of Imperialism’, World Marxist Review 11 (November 1985), 118–122; and Catholic Institute for International Relations, Right to Survive: Human Rights in Nicaragua (London: CIIR, 1987). 125 Witness for Peace, What We Have Seen and Heard in Nicaragua (London: Witness for Peace UK, 1987), 8. 120 121

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Contra abuses while ignoring those committed by government forces. Yet as “the years passed it became ever more difficult to ignore Sandinista abuses”.126 Thus, towards the late 1980s reports of Sandinista abuses, especially in the rural north, began to emerge (see previous chapter). Americas Watch especially exposed various targeted killings in the north, which were confirmed in a newspaper report.127 So damaging to the Sandinistas was this evidence that Americas Watch was severely criticised by pro-Sandinistas for not taking into account the context in which Sandinista abuses took place (see discussion in last chapter). Americas Watch regarded this as a poor excuse: Regrettably, the polarized conflict in Nicaragua has made some relief, church and development agencies turn a blind eye to abuses against those aligned with whichever side they consider the enemy.128

It is this bias that has allowed the perception of the Contras as exGuardsmen to endure. Yet numerically speaking, this was simply not the case. One Contra estimated Somoza’s GN at about 15,000, half of whom were killed in the 1978–79 insurrection, while many were later imprisoned.129 Christopher Dickey numbers the GN at 14,000 before the war, but suggests only 4,000 were actual fighters. The rest were clerks, drivers, secretaries, policemen and the like.130 The Sandinistas’ own Documento de las 72 Horas spoke of “the capture en masse of prisoners of war” and the “total route” of the GN, so that “nothing was left of that army but shame, smoke and ashes.”131 Meanwhile, Miranda and Ratcliff explain how Carlos Tunnerman, Sandinista ambassador to the U.S., spoke of only “a few hundred ex-GN soldiers” engaged in rebel activity in 1981.132

Miranda and Ratcliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua, 172. A U.S. Department of State letter to Amnesty by a clearly exasperated Elliott Abrams condemned Witness for Peace and Americas Watch, “the bias of which in favour of the Sandinista regime has seriously eroded any claims they make to be independent, objective, or committed to human rights” (letter from Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, to Ian Martin, Secretary General, Amnesty International, London, 3 February 1987). 127 Richard Boudreaux, ‘Nicaraguans Still Dying in Targeted Executions,’ Los Angeles Times, 16 April 1989. 128 Americas Watch, The Killings in Northern Nicaragua, 15. 129 Salvador Icaza, ‘The Contras’, in Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 216. 130 Dickey, With the Contras, 41. 131 FSLN. Documento de Las 72 Horas. 132 Miranda and Ratcliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua, 204. 126

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Thus, while many of the highest-ranking Contras were ex-Guardsmen, the rank-and-file of a reinvigorated Contra army that arose during the 1980s were not. David Stoll highlights how around 80% of the 28,000 Contra fighters (one report puts them at 40,000)133 who were later disbanded came from the northern rural regions, while a further 80,000 or so non-combatants lived with the Contras. Moreover, depending on how many family members offered logistic support to the fighters, the movement may have encompassed as many as half a million people.134 It is little wonder, then, that one Contra estimated that 95% of the rebels were campesinos.135 This irony is not lost on David Stoll, who points out how many leftist Latin Americanists believe the “peasants are structurally disposed to social revolution.” Moreover, Stoll wonders if the left’s lionisation of the peasants, who they claim to represent, helps to explain the endurance of the myth of the Contras as ex-Guardsmen. He states: So what do we make of the Nicaraguan Contras? Could they be infamous not just for the atrocities they committed but for the expectations they violated? The highland peasants who revolted against the Sandinista revolution in the 1980s reversed the usual signs in the wars that ravaged Central America. Unlike the Marxist-led guerrillas of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, who fought rightwing dictatorships, in the Nicaraguan case culminating in the Sandinistas’ 1979 overthrow of the Somoza regime, the Contras were supported by Washington and fought a Marxist government . . . No one expected opposition to the FSLN’s program to extend so deeply into the peasantry.136

There is little doubt that the Reagan administration created and funded a cohesive rebel force to satisfy its own regional policy. But that is hardly the issue. What is important is why the rebel movement attracted such a powerful local support base, eventually making the Contra movement what Miranda and Ratcliff describe as a “far-ranging peasant insurrection.”137 133 Richard Boudreaux, ‘Sandinistas Conclude They Lost Touch With Populace’, Los Angeles Times, 4 March 1990. 134 David Stoll, The Nicaraguan Contras: Were They Indios? Unpublished manuscript e-mailed to me by the author (pages unnumbered). Used with kind permission. A revised version of the manuscript has since been published in Latin American Politics and Society, Fall 2005. 135 Icaza, ‘The Contras’, in Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 216. 136 Stoll, Nicaraguan Contras. 137 Miranda and Ratcliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua, 232.

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Their explanation is that Sandinista policies, especially forced collectivisation that had such a bearing on peasants in the northern rural regions, gave the Contra uprising its vitality and strength: The Sandinista leadership, influenced by the Cuban experience, didn’t understand that what the peasants wanted was a piece of land and the resources to cultivate it. They did not want cooperatives, production units in which peasant families worked together and shared the produce of the land. The collectivization and other programs assured the alienation of the peasants, declining production, and in an agricultural country, a failed economy. These programs and the brutalities that often accompanied them drove many peasants to join the Contra armies.138

Several other commentators echo similar views. Raul Carazo explained how the majority of campesinos in the north identified themselves with the Contras because the Frente did not devote enough time and efforts to the immediate needs and problems of the peasant population.139 Stoll details how former Sandinista vice-president Sergio Ramirez identified blunders and obsessive ideological purism, which led to almost anyone with a truck or finca being regarded as a class enemy to be neutralised. He suggested this caused peasants to be pushed into the arms of the Contras. Thus, the Contras’ message that the Sandinistas would take everything the peasants owned—their liberty, their children (for SMP), their tiny piece of land to grow vegetables, even their religion—struck a resonant note.140 Gerald Schlabach similarly highlights a bullying attitude that even extended to withholding ration cards from pacifist Mennonites by enthusiastic revolutionaries in the countryside.141 Meanwhile, Joseph Douglas, a Contra leader from the Atlantic coast who commanded 900 rebels, details how this imposition of ideology led to the Sandinista-Miskito conflict. He began his Contra life fighting with the Miskitos, who he explains rebelled because the government challenged their traditional way of life and rejected Moravian hegemony. He recalled 90 or so small communities near where he lived which were forcefully uprooted: These were humble, self-sufficient people, not well-educated. They grew their own crops. The Sandinistas came and tried to change their lives and mentality, and humble as they are, they were having none of it. So 138 139 140 141

Ibid., 233. Interview with Raul Carazo. Stoll, Nicaraguan Contras. Schlabach, ‘Nicaragua’, Mennonite Quarterly Review, 375.

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chapter seven they rebelled. Initially, they had nothing, having fled empty-handed . . . the Miskitos live mostly in the north, so they just went over the border to Honduras. The Honduran Miskitos welcomed them but had nothing to offer, as Honduras was a very poor country. While there for a while, seeing how the Sandinistas had changed everything, they decided to try and do something against them. “We have to take our land back” . . . That is how it all began. Most of the people involved in the Contra didn’t know what politics was. All they wanted to do was to go back and live the life they knew, and to go back to their land, to work it and worship their God. Most were illiterate. None of them had any political ambition whatsoever.142

Ray Jacobs, an AoG missionary who worked in the Honduran refugee camps among the Miskitos and Contras for 8 years, spoke of the largescale suffering the Miskitos had faced, how their land had been taken from them, and how the camps he worked at contained many thousands of displaced Indians as a result.143 Thus, Miskitos and Spanish-speaking peasants reacted adversely to what they perceived as a threat, and so joined the Contras. Neither was this action limited exclusively to the peasants. Even Edén Pastora (aka Comandante Cero who had captured the Nicaraguan parliament in 1978) led a rebel band based in Costa Rica. David Stoll, somewhat controversially, has speculated that ethnic ties may have contributed towards mass peasant support for the Contras in the north. Based on evidence available to him, he challenges the common view that Nicaragua is fully mestizo, hypothesising instead a largely indigenous population in the rural north (as opposed to the mestizo population in the cities and towns), and suggests these close ethnic ties created a system of loyalty that created an essentially homogenous peasant reaction to the Sandinistas. He also points out how the Sandinista national directorate lacked representatives from the highlands. Whether or not the ethnicity argument is supportable, nevertheless Stoll highlights how the peasants often had very little contact with the outside world, while drawing on a longstanding series of family networks, close cooperation and loyalty at comarca level within the highlands that is very distinct from the rest of the country. Such a network was ideal for the Contras to tap into, helping to bring the peasantry en masse into the rebel movement.144 142 143 144

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Interview with Joseph Douglas. Interview with Ray Jacobs, 21 May 1999, Managua. Stoll, Nicaraguan Contras.

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Contra cruelty may also have been overstated at times. Clearly, the movement was often guilty of brutality and shocking human rights abuses. Dexter Cuthbert believes this was so,145 while David Stoll points out how even Miami Herald reporter Glenn Garvin, who expressed some sympathy towards the Contras’ aims, was unable to ignore some Contra violence.146 Certainly, Contra attacks were sometimes indiscriminate. Rosalio Jarquín recalls a boat trip from Bluefields to Rama in 1986. Travelling with 13 visiting North American and several Nicaraguan pastors, the boat was suddenly attacked by Contras, who wounded 27 people on board and killed three. Several pastors were hurt, including Jarquín who showed me his bullet scars. When asked why he thought the Contras had attacked, he says they thought they were Sandinistas.147 Moreover, Christopher Dickey highlights how several Contra commanders, notably those going by the names El Muerto, Krill and Suicida, were especially known for their barbarism and actually enjoyed inflicting pain and killing. However, he also details how Krill and Suicida were eventually executed by the Contra higher command for their maltreatment of peasants.148 Moreover, Contra attacks were constantly exploited by the Sandinista propaganda machine, while their own abuses were covered up (see Chapter 6). Even Jimmy Swaggart was taken to a hospital to see Contra victims with the media in tow during his visit to Nicaragua. As Americas Watch makes clear, many abuses alleged to be Contra were often caused by the EPS. A 1991 Americas Watch report into 12 mass graves ascribed 10 of them to the Sandinistas and two to the Contras.149 Alfonso Mejilla believed Contra attacks on the peasants, including Evangelicals, were far less numerous as the number and intensity of those by the Sandinistas.150 Finally, Contra commander Joseph Douglas makes the following comments: When I first came here (to the US), people would say the Contras were baby-killers. But the Sandinistas had their military camps, and they would take the females from the communities, to cook and clean in the camps. These women were equipped also with military uniforms. A lot of these

145 146 147 148 149 150

Interview with Dexter Cuthbert. Stoll, Nicaraguan Contras. Interview with Rosalio Jarquín. Dickey, With the Contras, 250–1. See Americas Watch, Fitful Peace. Interview with Alfonso Mejilla.

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chapter seven women also had children. So they allowed them to bring their children with them. So when a group of Contras attacked these camps, a lot of children naturally were killed. Then the Sandinistas would take pictures of this and publicise them. They had more access to the media than we did. So they used pictures of dead babies to smear the Contras. And it worked. They called us baby-killers, and yes, they died, and maybe even by our bullets. But it was not intentional.

He also spoke of how, after a gunfight, they would go over the bodies and he would occasionally come across children he had taught at school who had been forced to fight for the EPS. Douglas recognised the existence of some Contra brutalities, but believed on the whole this was a civil war in which peasants simply wanted their land, livelihood and freedoms restored. Of peasants in the Contra he said: “They didn’t understand ideologies, or what communism was. It was just something very unfortunate for my country.”151 The word ‘Contra’ conjures up a particular image that is not always accurate. I recall having several ex-Contras pointed out to me at a Nicaraguan church service in 1999 and my immediate reaction was to perceive them as brutal, sadistic child-killers in the pay of a foreign power. Yet such a view, while certainly justified in some instances, more often than not is inaccurate. The word ‘Contra’ often simply denoted one who sympathised with the rebels, or offered them support such as food or shelter. It is surely significant that some commentators, notably David Stoll and those he quotes, are revisiting this issue and questioning some of the heretofore unchallenged Sandinista propaganda. In summary, then, the rank-and-file Contra movement was not Somocista (though some ex-Guardsmen played a leadership role within it). Despite being initiated by those who opposed the Sandinistas, as well as the Reagan government, it eventually became a widespread peasant insurrection in response to economic hardship and ideological bullying by regional Sandinista government, especially in the northern region. Contra abuses are undeniable, but overstated as not everyone was a Krill, Suicida or El Muerto. Many were common peasants who had witnessed their own families suffer unspeakable brutalities. The abuses on both sides reflect a Nicaraguan history of explosive political violence that has existed since independence. It is in this milieu that Evangelical involvement within the Contra must be understood.

151

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Interview with Joseph Douglas.

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Why did some of Evangelicals join the Contras? Moreover, was their decision to do so proactive or reactive? It is significant that Pentecostalism, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, enjoys its greatest strength and thrives in the northern highlands of Nicaragua. Given Stoll’s comments about a network of comarca-to-comarca loyalties and relationships, this may even help to explain Pentecostalism’s explosive growth in the region. Pentecostalism drew its support from the peasant population that was so supportive of the Contra movement. As Chapter 6 demonstrated, it is also the region where Evangelicals suffered the most. This begs an important question: as highland peasants, were Pentecostals simply caught up in the economic pressures, ideological blunders and EPS brutality that affected all the other peasants in the region, thus leading them to join the Contras? In other words, was it geographical location that led to them becoming rebels? Or was it specifically because, as Evangelicals, they were targeted and reacted forthwith? Norman Marenco, current president of CNPEN and leader of a human rights organisation, indicates that Evangelicals at first did not entertain armed opposition until abuses in the mid-1980s became so intense that many felt they had no choice.152 A Sandinista honeymoon period lasted for about a year, and the rebel movement at the time was, according to Dickey, very small and highly insignificant. Problems with Evangelicals did not really take root until 1982, with the taking of the temples. By this stage, the rebel movement was much stronger. (As discussed briefly in the last chapter, Borge accused the Evangelicals of working with rebels in the north shortly before this occurred). But it was SMP which really aggravated Evangelical-Sandinista relations. Thus, it seems clear that Evangelicals did not, initially at least, join the Contras, and that Marenco’s assessment is correct. So what was it that led Evangelicals to join the Contras? SMP was a major issue which helped push some Evangelicals into the arms of the Contras. Many of those abuses discussed in the human rights reports cited previously were caused either by an assumption that the victims were Contras, or that they were seeking to avoid SMP. After all, many fled to Honduras to escape military service. Ray Jacobs explained how, during his eight years working in the camps, he came across many refugees who fled military service.153 Rosalio Jarquín knew of some ten

152 153

Interview with Norman Marenco. Interview with Ray Jacobs.

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Evangelical youths who were taken by the army for forced conscription. They fled and eventually joined the Contra.154 Evangelical rejection of SMP has already been discussed. It is indeed ironic that Sandinista attempts to force pacifist Evangelicals into military service led many to flee to Honduras and some to take up arms against the Sandinistas (one also wonders how seriously pacifist some were). A more important factor, however, was Evangelical ideological support for the anti-Sandinista Contras in the first place, and subsequent Sandinista suspicion of them. We have already traced at length how and why the majority of Evangelicals rejected sandinismo. They were ideological opposites. In the north, where peasants were experiencing first-hand failed Sandinista economic policies, this ideological dislike of the Sandinistas took root. Thus Alfonso Mejilla explains how the majority of northern Pentecostals supported the Contras’ aims, while not actually joining them.155 Dexter Cuthbert also speaks of this ideological support for the Contras.156 One former EPS soldier explained how the army regularly investigated claims that Evangelical pastors were helping the Contra. He believed they ignored Contra abuses when they passed through and clearly supported them. He especially singled out the pastors who provided help and food for Contras passing through.157 Juan Reyes confirms that many Evangelicals in the north identified themselves with and helped the Contras.158 It did not help that some within the North American religious right supported the Contras.159 José Suárez recalls the instance when 700 Club president Pat Robertson blessed a Contra camp at La Lodosa, on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. (Pat Robertson also made TV appeals for Contra funding.)160 A similar occurrence was when U.S. missionary Robert Aston visited Contra forces in a bid to help them in their struggle against the “(FSLN) troops of Satan.” Therefore, Suárez concludes the Sandinistas regarded most Evangelicals as supporters of a foreign force.161

Interview with Rosalio Jarquín. Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. 156 Interview with Dexter Cuthbert. 157 Conversation with Guillermo Polanco López. 158 Interview with Juan Reyes. 159 Discussed several times by Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant. 160 Martin Wroe, ‘God’s Own Candidate’ New Statesman 115 no. 297, (19 February 1988), 23. 161 Interview with José Suárez. 154 155

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Thus, there were various accusations linking Evangelicals to the Contras. Casco explained how several CEPRES people were told that the massacre of Evangelicals at Murra was due to the church being mixed up with the Contra.162 Sixto Ulloa echoes this view.163 Alfonso Mejilla also understands links with the Contra was blamed on Murra.164 Bartolomé Matamoros spoke of a pastor he knew, around 1984, preaching in the mountains, near a combat area, who was killed by the EPS for being a Contra. Afterwards they would not allow him to be buried, instead leaving his body in the open for vermin to dispose of. Matamoros explained how many Evangelicals were automatically assumed to be Contras.165 All this caused a vicious circle, where the Sandinistas accused Evangelicals of supporting the Contras (which many did, ideologically) and as a result treated them roughly, even brutally, which in turn pushed them into the arms of the Contra proper. Thus, some Evangelicals moved beyond ideological support to military involvement, and the Sandinistas’ declarations of the Evangelicals as Contras became a selffulfilling prophecy. Christopher Dickey details the case of an Evangelical who reacted against persecution and accusations of being a Contra by joining the Contras.166 Mario Espinoza explained how Christians joined the Contras because of the persecution they were facing up in the mountains.167 Uriel Tercero stated that the mass killing at Murra led many Pentecostals to flee to Honduras, but some also to join the rebels.168 Rosalio Jarquín detailed how Sandinistas caused Evangelicals much grief, so that they fled out of fear. But many responded by joining the rebel movement: They forced them into SMP, they denied the existence of God, they objected to religion, they accused us of doing nothing for the people. They accused of doing nothing but speaking about God, which achieved nothing. So the Sandinistas gave us (Evangelicals) a hard time, as well as the (local) people, so many joined the Contra.169

162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169

Interview with Miguel Angel Casco. Interview with Sixto Ulloa. Interview with Alfonso Mejilla. Interview with Bartolomé Matamoros. Dickey, With the Contras, 141. Interview with Mario Espinoza. Interview with Uriel Tercero. Interview with Rosalio Jarquín.

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Norman Marenco, too, how EPS heavy-handedness and forced conscription pushed many Evangelicals (including church members, deacons and even several leaders) into the arms of the guerrilla movement. He especially singled out the Misión Evangélica Pentecostés Unida de Nicaragua, many of whose members joined the Contras. One of their leaders, with the pseudonym “Reuben”, became a Contra commander.170 The situation for Evangelicals was far worse in the northern highlands than in cities like Managua, which explains why some joined the Contras. National leaders were accused of being counterrevolutionaries all the time, especially those arrested in 1985. But Bartolomé Matamoros explains how Pentecostals in the mountains suffered more than leaders in the cities.171 Roberto Rojas spoke of himself and other city leaders as ‘ideological Contras’, compared with those in the highlands who fought against the EPS.172 Though they were constantly accused of being counterrevolutionary, it seems highly unlikely they had any actual links with Contra groups, which were based so far away from Managua. Speaking of the AoG’s leaders, Carlos Escorcia dismissed them as incapable of such links, that they did not have the nerve (‘the hormones’, Escorcia said).173 But in the north, where they were routinely persecuted or forced to fight on the front line, some Evangelicals reacted against their tormenters by joining the Contras. They did not take up arms during the 1978–79 insurrection to oust Somoza, but a decade later some at least were prepared to join the anti-Sandinista peasant rebellion.

170 171 172 173

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Interview Interview Interview Interview

with with with with

Norman Marenco. Bartolomé Matamoros. Roberto Rojas. Carlos Escorcia.

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PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER EIGHT

FROM CLIENT TO RIVAL Two distinct stories emerge from the preceding survey of EvangelicalSandinista relations. The first concerns a pro-revolutionary Protestant minority closely associated with the Sandinista government, which in effect replicated the old state-client model typifying early Liberal-Protestant relations. The second story emerging is not only one of a majority Protestant Evangelical bloc that rejected sandinismo, but more significantly, that it also drew on the very same socio-economic constituency the Frente claimed to champion. Thus, within the barrios revolution and revivalism battled to woo the poor, each offering a completely different vision and solution to their problems. Yet as Pentecostalism expanded, the Sandinistas sought to limit such consumerism as it threatened their hegemony on their own ‘patch’. What emerges, then, in revolutionary Nicaragua are tensions within Protestantism between both the religious right and the religious left, juxtaposed with a breakdown in relations between Evangelicals and the government. Meanwhile, Protestants (as well as Catholics) on both sides became (sometimes willing) pawns in a propaganda war in which supporters and opponents of the Sandinistas sought to secure the moral high ground. Client Protestantism Chapter 2 discussed how Latin America’s 19th century Liberals emulated Anglo-Saxon liberal politics and free trade in order to secure national advancement. Thus, religious laws were eased to encourage an influx of Protestant immigrants with the technical knowledge so desired by Liberals, while their arrival helped weaken the Catholic Church’s role as a rival societal actor. Meanwhile, because Protestants depended on the Liberals for their survival and role in society, they naturally supported their patron and relished the opportunity to undermine conservative Catholicism. Thus, the patron-client relationship was born, which survived into the twentieth century.1

1

For example, Stephen Neill has pointed out how military governments put no

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However, the patron-client relationship had not done a great deal to advance Protestantism in Nicaragua. Historic Protestantism’s political influence and growth was somewhat lacklustre (as Clifton Holland’s statistical evidence demonstrates). Meanwhile, by 1978 a burgeoning Pentecostal movement had numerically overtaken and sidelined all the historic churches combined, while by the late 1980s it virtually dwarfed them in terms of numerical strength. Yet the arrival of the Sandinistas offered historic Protestants (as typified by the CEPAD executive) with an opportunity to reinstate the patron-client relationship. In his comparison of Protestant-state relations in Sandinista Nicaragua and Rios Montt’s Guatemala, Jean-Pierre Bastian asks why, in both cases, Protestants supported the dominant political power, though both countries were ideological opposites. He believes it was because in both cases Protestants acquired a privileged political role and the ear of the government for their support. This clientelism suited both governments as it helped to counter the societal role and power of traditional, conservative Catholicism. Thus, CEPAD stepped into the void and publicly voiced support for the Sandinistas.2 Reflecting upon ten years of sandinismo, Gustavo Parajón highlighted how formerly marginalised groups, including Protestants, were now able to participate actively in national life. He went on to describe the vital role played by Protestants in national life during the revolutionary period, so that they too could be counted as true Nicaraguans.3 Consider, for example, how Gilberto Aguirre eulogised CEPAD’s contribution towards Nicaraguan education under the Sandinistas, which he regarded as a significant event for Protestants.4 Benjamín Cortés also discusses how relations between the Protestant churches and the revolution permitted Protestants to be treated on an equal basis with Catholics. He goes on to explain how, since the Frente’s removal from office, Evangelical-state relations under Presidents Violeta Chamorro, Arnoldo Alemán and Enrique Bolaños are non-existent.5 Parajón is similarly concerned about a lack of Protestant participation in the national debate in post-Sandinista Nicaragua. (He especially singled obstacles in they way of Protestant expansion in order to weaken the Catholic hierarchy, in History of Christian Missions (London: Penguin, 1990), 471. 2 Bastian, ‘Protestantismo Popular y Política en Guatemala y Nicaragua’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología. 3 Parajón, ‘La Iglesia Evangélica en el Proyecto Nacional’, Xilotl, 95, 105. 4 ‘Religiosos responded Consulta,’ La Barricada, 11 February 1981. 5 Benjamín Cortés, e-mail correspondence, 22 December 2004.

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out Chamorro’s government, which expressed no interest in working with Protestants).6 For example, former CEPAD executives expressed deep concern over conservative Catholic domination of the school curriculum since the fall of the FSLN.7 Thus, it is hardly surprising that CEPAD and other historic Protestants threw in their lot with the Sandinistas, considering how they had been sidelined by post-Zelaya Conservative governments that had turned a blind eye to the severe persecutions they experienced at the hands of Catholics. With the demise of the Sandinistas, arguably CEPAD is currently struggling to survive, and one is left with the distinct impression that it enjoys very little kudos and financing compared with the 1980s. For their part, as the Documento de las 72 Horas demonstrates, the Sandinistas planned from the outset to neutralise conservative religious elements while “stimulating the revolutionary sectors of the church.”8 Thus, historic Protestants led by CEPAD supported the revolution. Not only did the Sandinistas share a similar social consciousness with progressive Protestants trained in contextual theology, but here was an opportunity for sidelined Protestants to punch far above their numerical weight once again. This was provided, of course, they lent the Sandinistas their unequivocal support. The alternative was being marginalised again. Thus, from the very beginning CEPAD, which feared marginalisation, organised several meetings with senior Sandinistas that quickly led just a few weeks after the revolution to the signing of the highly radical Declaración de los 500. It also sheds light on why CEPAD was so keen to bring in East Bloc Protestant leaders to advise Nicaraguan Protestants on how to participate in the revolution, rather than rejecting it as they had done to become sidelined in their Socialist societies. Parajón states: A number of pastors came from socialist countries to talk to us about how life was there. There were pastors from Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. They explained the situation in their nation to us. This gave us a lot to go on as we thought about how to react. The decision we reached was that while the mission of

Parajón, The History of CEPAD. Deann Alford, ‘Does Religion in Schools Favor Catholics?’ 26 October 1998, 26; Deann Alford, ‘Nicaragua: Baptist School Taps Catholic’, 9 August 1999, 19; and Deann Alford, ‘Nicaragua Schools: Catholic Influence Questioned’, 28 April 1997, 78, all appearing in Christianity Today. 8 FSLN, Documentos de las 72 Horas, 12. 6 7

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chapter eight the churches is to proclaim the Lordship of Jesus, we would support the programs of health, literacy, education, housing, roads, and economy.9

A CEPAD publication details in length the nature of some of these discussions and workshops.10 Throughout, there is a clear message: If Nicaragua’s Protestants are to remain active and influential in society, they had to play a full part in the revolution, unlike Christians in the East Bloc and Cuba. However, for this new societal role to be effective CEPAD had to demonstrate it spoke for the vast majority of Protestants. A study comparing the role of religion in the Russian and Nicaraguan revolutions concludes that the greater a church’s mass support base, the more likely it will play a role in helping to shape the state.11 Yet many of CEPAD’s leaders were Baptists, which represented a small group in Nicaragua.12 (Clifton Holland details how American Baptists suffered a substantial numerical decline between 1960 and 1967.)13 Thus, by continuously emphasising how CEPAD represented the vast majority of Protestants, its Baptist leaders were able to project greater power and punch above their weight. But as Chapter 4 pointed out, though unchallenged by observers and the Christian press, CEPAD represented the minority view vis-à-vis the Sandinistas. (It did not help that the ‘E’ in CEPAD, which stood for Evangélico, actually meant Protestant).14 Thus, by supporting the revolution, CEPAD’s leaders ensured they were the ones not reduced to the political sidelines (much like Michael Dodson believes Evangelicals were). The CEPAD executive, despite a relatively small support base, became an important societal actor within revolutionary Nicaragua, much like the so-called ‘popular church’ within Catholicism, which likewise enjoyed influence and the ear of the Sandinista government despite being numerically far smaller than traditional Catholics backing Obando. Yet CEPAD faced a problem in the form Interview with Gustavo Parajón. CEPAD, Reflexiones Sobre Fé y Revolución. 11 Arthur Greil and David Kowlewski, ‘Church-State relations in Russia and Nicaragua: Early Revolutionary Years’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 26 no. 1 (1987), 92–104. 12 INDEF, Directorio de Iglesias, 14. 13 Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 38. 14 Great care must be taken in Nicaragua concerning terminology, where ‘Evangélico’ and ‘Protestante’ can be used interchangeably, see Jorge Pixley, ‘Somos evangélicos o protestantes?’ Xilotl 4 (October 1989), 41. It is therefore easy to see how external observers might have regarded CEPAD as an Evangelical organisation by virtue of its name. 9

10

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of a burgeoning Pentecostal movement that was completely at odds with CEPAD’s political and theological outlook. CEPAD had to bring this unruly element under control if it was to continue to project the image that it spoke for Nicaragua’s Protestants. This begs an important question: Did pro-revolutionary Protestants, who had the ear of the Sandinista government, make the situation worse for Evangelicals? Did Pro-Revolutionary Protestants Make It Worse? Many Evangelicals are convinced that tensions with the government were exacerbated by CEPAD. Rufino Soza believed this was because CEPAD worked so closely with the Frente.15 David Spencer suggests his arrest, shortly after arriving in the country to act as an interpreter for a CNPEN conference, was initiated by CEPAD, who he believes were jealous of CNPEN’s success.16 (This came at a time when CNPEN was being catapulted into the limelight, which threatened CEPAD’s hegemony). Spencer specifically singled out Gilberto Aguirre as one he believed had caused him a number of problems with the Sandinista authorities.17 (During my conversations with several CEPAD officials, it became clear there was some antipathy towards David Spencer. Whether this was out of jealousy because Spencer now pastors the largest church in Nicaragua,18 which attracts both Protestants and Catholics, or some other reason, was not immediately clear). After his release from prison, former Somoza Guardsman Bienvenido López claimed Gustavo Parajón and Gilberto Aguirre warned him to desist from his itinerary work in the Rio Blanco area, where he acted as regional superintendent (the Contras were active in this area).19 López believes they wanted him to toe a liberation theology line, which he refused. (Apparently, Parajón and Aguirre were the ones who had secured López’s release after being imprisoned for some years).20 Shortly after the conversation with Parajón and Aguirre, López claims he encountered many problems with state security, and was detained, which he blames squarely on the CEPAD leaders. Interview with Rufino Soza. Interview with David Spencer (1999). 17 Interview with David Spencer (2004). 18 ‘Church Led by Missionary David Spencer is Now Nicaragua’s Largest,’ Charisma (August 2003), online version: http://www.charismamag.com/online/articledisplay. pl?ArticleID=7867 (accessed 22 April 2005). 19 Interview with Bienvenido López. 20 Interview with Gustavo Parajón. 15 16

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Some Evangelicals claim CEPAD’s support for the Sandinistas even stretched to cooperation with the DGSE. Rafael Arista referred to security agents travelling incognito with CEPAD-hosted visits from overseas delegations.21 Various pastors accused Parajón and other CEPAD leaders of recording business meetings and secretly passing the tapes on to the security service.22 Félix Rosales (CNPEN president in the 1980s) was also convinced several CEPAD officials worked closely with the DGSE. He is convinced Sixto Ulloa was linked with the DGSE and remembers how Ulloa visited him immediately after his arrest and interrogation: I believe absolutely that people from CEPAD were tied in with state security. When I was in jail during my interrogation, after being arrested at 1 am, Sixto Ulloa showed up after the interrogation, not during (that was a Cuban guy), telling me to be careful, that the CIA are trying to use our organisation. Sixto Ulloa was everywhere the state security was involved with Evangelicals.23

Interestingly, Rosales was unaware of my interview with the DGSE senior official José Suárez, who knew Lenin Cerna and several of the comandantes personally. Suárez spoke of several CEPAD officials being involved on several occasions in behind-the-scenes work associated with the interrogation of Evangelical pastors.24 Suárez’s testimony is verified by Harold Robleto, whose brother also worked for the DGSE, who told him that several CEPAD officials worked with the security services. He referred to a CEPAD functionary named Elio Aguilar who later became a salaried member of the DGSE.25 Robleto also spoke of another CEPAD functionary, Roberto Moján, who was director of CEPAD’s activities in Granada, Rivas, Carazo and Masaya. He described Moján as a Sandinista militant who passed on information about pastors not in (political) agreement with him to the Sandinistas.26 (Robleto and his wife had travelled to Diriamba especially to confirm these details for me. While there, Robleto was also told by local church leaders of several other pastors, including one called Rojas, who were in league with the Sandinista state security apparatus against other Evangelicals). Interview with Rafael Arista. As discussed by Gustavo Parajón when I spoke with him. Several Evangelicals I interviewed believed CEPAD had secretly recorded meetings, but did not mention Parajón by name. 23 Interview with Félix Rosales. 24 Interview with José Suárez. 25 Interview with Harold Robleto. 26 Second interview with Harold Robleto. 21 22

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Meanwhile, Rafael Arista believed the Sandinistas used Carlos Escorcia and Miguel Angel Casco to obtain information about Evangelicals, while Arnulfo Sánchez explained how many Pentecostals were convinced Escorcia had denounced some Evangelical leaders, leading to several of the 1985 arrests.27 A document produced by Escorcia, Godoy and Casco, entitled Análisis Histórico de un Juicio, apparently denounced the AoG as counterrevolutionary and claimed the government had complained about the denomination’s stance. AoG pastors in Managua issued a circular complaining in the strongest possible terms.28 What did CEPAD’s leaders make of these accusations? Concerning Bienvenido López’s accusation, Parajón pointed out he had been the one to secure López’s release from prison in the first place. He explained how López, who was converted to Pentecostalism in jail, was the very member of the GN who had been Ortega’s jailer and torturer. These former links with the GN (López confirms he was a former Guardsman and studied military psychology in North Carolina during the Somoza period), together with an itinerant ministry in a region where the Contras were active, led the Sandinistas to believe López was acting as a courier. Therefore, they had contacted CEPAD to limit his activities. Aguirre explained that they had no power over him but would speak to his denominational superintendent and to López himself.29 Yet López was convinced Parajón and Aguirre had something to answer for30 (Aguirre explained he had repeated the accusation elsewhere on several occasions, and also claimed Aguirre was working with the DGSE). Parajón’s and Aguirre’s explanation is feasible and rings true but clearly there was a strong element of distrust among Evangelicals towards CEPAD, leading López and others sometimes to blame its leaders when they ran into problems with the authorities. Both Parajón and Aguirre emphatically denied ever having heard of a CEPAD official named Elio Aguilar (or similar).31 However, he may have been a low-level CEPAD functionary. Carlos Escorcia was equally emphatic when he was asked if he had been responsible for Interviews with Rafael Arista and Arnulfo Sánchez. Pastores de las Asambleas de Dios del Distrito de Managua, Carta Abierta: Para el Pueblo Evangélico. Circular, 28 May 1981, signed by 16 Managuan pastors, including Arnulfo Sánchez. 29 Interviews with Gustavo Parajón and Gilberto Aguirre. 30 Interview with Bienvenido López. 31 Interview with Gilberto Aguirre, e-mail correspondence from Gustavo Parajón, 6 January 2005. 27 28

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any of the 1985 arrests. Specifically singling out Saturnino Cerrato’s arrest, he stated: Saturnino Cerrato was held for about ONE HOUR at the Sandino airport for interrogations after returning from the U.S. And I found out because the “chatting” and rumours were going around in Assemblies of God circles. The Sandinistas never told me anything about it. The right wing pastors converted a ONE HOUR questioning into a huge scandal that has lasted 20 years, since they still talk about it. What did I have to do with it? Nothing, absolutely nothing . . . They blamed me for every flat tire they had, claiming that Sandinista mobs were persecuting them. In the Latin “Evangelical” culture, you can never beat a rumour, no matter how overwhelming the evidence to the contrary is.32

When asked about the allegation of someone in CEPAD working for the DGSE, Gilberto Aguirre said: This is not true. They said things like this, and even worse things. These people said Dr Parajón recorded meetings with them to pass on to the DGSE. It is just not true. We didn’t do anything like this. It is likely that people working for CEPAD supported the FSLN, but that is quite different to saying we worked with the instruments of state security.33

When his involvement with the DGSE, as alleged by Félix Rosales, was put to him Sixto Ulloa denied any such link, though he acknowledged his support for the Sandinistas and his role as a mediator between Protestants and the Frente.34 Parajón also expressed some anger at any suggestion he was involved with state security, referring to how Boanerges Mendoza, who had been arrested by the DGSE in 1985, made a similar accusation that was later picked up and used by the IRD: I can tell you very concretely that the IRD did publish some things and said what I am telling you, that after the secret meetings that we had in CEPAD that we turned over the cassettes, and so that the secret police could go and look for the pastors, and then imprison them. And actually the IRD said that some were killed, and of course this meant that I was responsible for their deaths. Those were spurious accusations and there was a strategy to get US churches to stop the funding of CEPAD.35

Parajón may well be right. In several of its Nicaraguan briefing papers the IRD portrayed CEPAD as hand-in-glove with the Sandinistas, 32 33 34 35

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Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence, 8 February 2005 (Escorcia’s emphasis). Interview with Gilberto Aguirre. Interview with Sixto Ulloa. Interview with Gustavo Parajón.

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encouraging Evangelicals instead to support CNPEN. Carlos Escorcia labelled the IRD a Reagan think-tank.36 In a series of letters between progressive and conservative North American Evangelicals at the height of a propaganda war between IRD and Witness for Peace, it was suggested that the IRD was formerly linked with the government.37 This is open to debate, though clearly it supported CNPEN, Reagan and a conservative agenda, much like Witness for Peace supported CEPAD and completely ignored Sandinista abuses. Such tensions inevitably led to charges of collusion on both sides. Did any member of CEPAD work for state security? Gustavo Parajón made it very clear that neither he, Gilberto Aguirre or any CEPAD Board member he knew of were involved in such interrogations. Yet his unfinished response suggests room for doubt: “I don’t know, I imagine there is always a possibly that somebody from CEPAD…”38 When asked about a possible CEPAD-DGSE link, several other CEPAD officials likewise thought it unlikely but admitted they could not be sure.39 It seems highly unlikely that respectable leaders such as Gustavo Parajón or Benjamín Cortés secretly recorded meetings to pass on to state security. But Parajón did explain how some meetings were openly recorded to permit meeting minutes to be produced later.40 Norman Marenco believed not all of CEPAD’s people caused problems for Evangelicals, but that a minority had done, for example, by attending Evangelical services and secretly recording sermons to pass on to the DGSE.41 It is only a short step from knowing the CDS listened to and recorded sermons, and hearing that CEPAD business meetings were recorded, to reach the conclusion that CEPAD’s leaders secretly recorded meetings to get Evangelicals into trouble. This is especially so when, as Guillermo Ayala explains, those arrested in 1985 realised that the nature of the questions asked during their interrogations proved someone in CEPAD was working with the authorities.42 Clearly, while several of CEPAD’s leaders may well have been entirely honourable, some CEPAD

Carlos Escorcia, e-mail correspondence (op. cit.). Various letters to and from Ron Sider, Eric Olson, Vernon Grounds and Bill Kallio, of Evangelicals for Social Action, from IRD, Witness for Peace etc. Too numerous to list here, but detailed in the Bibliography. 38 Interview with Gustavo Parajón. 39 Conversations with Albino Meléndez and Nicanor Mairena. 40 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 6 January 2005. 41 Interview with Norman Marenco. 42 Interview with Guillermo Ayala. 36 37

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functionaries were clearly militant in their support for the Sandinistas and likely caused problems for outspoken conservative pastors. Leaving all this aside, however, it can be said with certainty that CEPAD indirectly caused problems for Nicaraguan Evangelicals. CEPAD’s leaders had very close links with the government, despite claiming they only offered the Sandinistas qualified and critical support. When I visited CEPAD quarters, the Sandinista red and black flag was flying high over the building. Church of God pastor (later superintendent) and also CEPAD functionary Rodolfo Fonseca, who often eulogised the Sandinistas when interviewed by Christianity Today, and who travelled to the U.S. to promote Sandinista Nicaragua in Evangelical churches, was the first cousin of senior Sandinista comandante Walter Ferrety.43 Meanwhile, Sixto Ulloa eventually went on to serve in the Sandinista government. His close friendship with Daniel Ortega, a trip to the USSR from which he returned and extolled the virtues of religious freedom under the Soviets,44 allegations (which will not go away) that he helped to smuggle arms for the Sandinistas in sacks of rice and beans,45 and the way in which he dismissed the massacre at Murra all help to explain why Evangelicals believed he worked with state security. Ulloa denied the allegations of smuggling in arms. Yet both he and Gilberto Aguirre confirm they met with Sandinista leaders in Costa Rica prior to the revolution.46 Links, then, between CEPAD and the Sandinistas were strong, and naturally Evangelicals whose conservative nature and worldview precluded such close cooperation were clearly suspicious of their progressive counterparts. More importantly, however, close CEPAD-Sandinista links caused Evangelical-Sandinista tensions. As the Documento de las 72 Horas makes clear, the Sandinistas sought to work closely with progressive elements and neutralise conservative Christians. Tensions between CEPAD and Evangelicals therefore caused problems for the latter, while anyone not supporting CEPAD experienced difficulties. It is true CEPAD sometimes helped Evangelicals experiencing difficulties with the state. For example, when Ignacio Hernández was extorted for money with threats from a Sandinista commander, CEPAD stepped

Interview with Bienvenido López. ‘Religiosos nicas impresionados de gira por países socialistas’, El Nuevo Diario. 45 Interviews with Félix Rosales and a Pentecostal pastor who, as a close friend of Ulloa, wished to remain anonymous. 46 Interviews with Sixto Ulloa and Gilberto Aguirre. 43 44

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in and provided financial assistance.47 Gustavo Parajón explained how he helped to free Boanerges Mendoza.48 (Although it took some time to secure Mendoza’s release, and it is suggested that it was mainly international pressure, rather than Parajón’s efforts, that secured his freedom).49 Yet some Evangelicals were convinced that CEPAD assistance was conditional. Rafael Arista explained such assistance depended on being a revolutionary. “If you were not, they said, ‘Very sorry, we can’t help.’”50 Clearly, CEPAD also did not always help conservative Evangelicals who refused to bow to CEPAD hegemony. Jimmy Hassan explained how, during his arrest, CEPAD did nothing at all to help him51 (though they did help to secure the release of several others). When discussing David Spencer’s arrest, I asked Parajón if CEPAD had done anything to help secure his release. He confirmed they had not (though he suggested it was not sought.)52 CEPAD also appears to have done little to help CNPEN acquire its personería jurídica. At other times pro-revolutionary Christians caused Evangelicals some problems. For example, CEPAD’s Paul Jeffrey wrote an article denouncing the AoG. In 1980 a full page story in La Barricada by a pro-Sandinista Protestant group urged full participation in the revolution by all Christians. They rejected the sects (Evangelicals), which they labelled reactionary, as well as their own literacy programme ALFALIT, and urged all Protestants to support the CDS.53 Miguel Angel Casco, Carlos Escorcia and CEPRES brought unwanted attention to Evangelicals by denouncing North American Evangelical groups in Costa Rica, claiming they were working with the CIA.54 Meanwhile, David Spencer explained how he had only ever told Carlos Escorcia of his evangelistic work among the GN,55 but it soon became public knowledge and caused him many problems with the Sandinista authorities.

47 Interview with Ignacio Hernández (May 2004) and details provided in his diary. 48 Interview with Gustavo Parajón. 49 See earlier discusión about Mendoza’s lengthy detention. See also ‘Billy Graham solicita informes sobre evangélicos,’ in La Prensa (censored, unpublished article), 14 November 1985. 50 Interview with Rafael Arista. 51 Reported in Christianity Today, 18 April 1986. 52 Gustavo Parajón, e-mail correspondence, 3 January 2005. 53 ‘Iglesias evangelicals reafirman compromise con la Revolución y denuncian a oportunistas’, La Barricada, 23 June 1980. 54 ‘Evangélicos denuncian un plan diversionista de CIA’, La Barricada, 2 July 1983. 55 Interview with David Spencer (2004).

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Clearly, CEPAD relished its role as a societal actor. But this meant problems for Evangelicals unwilling to toe the line. While CEPAD’s leadership may not necessarily have gone out to cause Evangelicals problems with the authorities, its own close relations with the government, an unwillingness always to help Evangelicals who did not embrace a socially progressive theology, or the occasional CEPAD functionary who deliberately set out to cause problems for vocal conservative pastors, all contributed towards the souring of Evangelical-Sandinista relations. For their part, Evangelicals were forced to go through CEPAD to reach the government. Saturnino Cerrato explains how, when the AoG left CEPAD, the Church of God decided to stay, though it supported the AoG strongly. Cerrato explains how the Church of God, which was smaller than the AoG, had to be careful because distancing itself from CEPAD hegemony would cause the denomination some problems.56 That is why, he explains, the AoG stayed within the CEPAD structure as long as it possibly could, until Paul Jeffrey’s article represented the straw that broke the camel’s back.57 Cerrato stated CEPAD was the only bridge to the government, whether it was to try and seek exemptions from SMP or whatever. The Sandinistas would only deal with CEPAD, which gave the NGO tremendous power in Protestant circles in revolutionary Nicaragua. Revolution versus Revival The second story emerging during the course of this study is the diametrically-opposed nature of Evangelicalism (in the form of classical Pentecostalism) and sandinismo. More importantly, both movements also drew on the same constituency—Nicaragua’s poor. Most Evangelical pastors agreed that Pentecostalism’s greatest strength was among the poor, whether urban masses or campesinos in the north. Bob Trolese

56 This worry is reflected in a Church of God communiqué, issued in response to suggestions that the denomination rejected the revolution, in which it urges its members to respect the government authorities (Iglesia de Dios, Iglesia de Dios en Nicaragua. Undated communiqué). The AoG also issued similar circulars, including one advising against participation in an air evangelistic campaign because the denomination’s leadership was unaware who had planned or funded it, and it might cause the denomination some problems (Presbítero General de las Asambleas de Dios en Nicaragua, Circular: Aclaración. Managua, 22 December 1980). 57 Interview with Saturnino Cerrato.

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pointed out how Pentecostals were strongest among the poorest barrios.58 Roger Lancaster’s study stated that like liberation theology, Pentecostalism appeals to the very poorest in Nicaragua.59 Luis Samandú also points out how Pentecostalism in the 1980s enjoyed most of its success among the predominantly urban poor.60 In this respect, Nicaraguan Pentecostalism was the same as elsewhere in Latin America, where it is known for attracting the poorest in society. Bernado Campos refers to Pentecostalism as “the religion of the oppressed.”61 Joe Eldridge explains how Pentecostal churches attract the masses: “The churches become a place where humble folk are made to feel completely at home.”62 Veli-Matti Karkkainen encapsulates it best while referring to Doug Peterson’s seminal work exploring Pentecostal social concern in Latin America: Pentecostals do not go around vocalising a preferential option for the poor, because they are the poor. They represent the church of the poor.63 Why does Pentecostalism draw on and attract the poor so heavily? Various commentators put forward a range of reasons which are surprisingly similar. Lidia Susana Vaccaro de Petrella, a Pentecostal leader from Argentina speaking of her own experiences, suggests a strong feeling of community within Latin American Pentecostal churches.64 Another Pentecostal author concurs, explaining how the movement provides a sense of communitpy to Latin American peasants migrating to cities.65 Thomas Birchall, who surveys various studies of Pentecostalism rooted

Interview with Bob Trolese. Lancaster, Thanks to God, 184. This is the case elsewhere throughout much of Central America. A survey of the socioeconomic background of religious in El Salvador found that Protestants/Pentecostals “rank among the lowest in mean income” (Edwin Eloy Aguilar et al. ‘Protestantism in El Salvador: Conventional Wisdom versus Survey Evidence’, Latin American Research Review, 1993, 28 no. 2, 124). See also discussion in Samandú, ‘El Pentecostalismo en Nicaragua’, Pasos. 60 Ibid. One Nicaraguan commentator speaks of the first missionaries reaching out to and identifying with the proletariat, Juan Sanchez, ‘Tema: Pentecostalismo y Sobrevivencia’, Misión Evangélica Hoy 15 no. 5 (1994), 44. 61 Bernado Campos, De La Reforma Protestante a la Pentecostalidad de la Iglesia (Quito: Ediciones CLA, 1997), 36. 62 Joseph Eldridge, ‘Pentecostalism and Social Change in Central America (Honduran Case Study)’, Towson State Journal of International Affairs 25 no. 2 (Spring 1991), 17. 63 Karkkainen, ‘Mission, Spirit and Eschatology’, Cross Currents, 81. 64 Lidia Susana Vaccaro de Petrella, ‘The Tension Between Evangelism and Social Action in the Pentecostal Movement’, International Review of Mission 74 ( January 1986), 34–38. 65 Pedro C. Moreno, ‘Rapture and Renewal in Latin America’, First Things 74 ( June/July 1997), 31–34. 58

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in the Latin American context, explains how the poor are welcomed into Pentecostal churches, where they are made to feel far more comfortable than in a more middle-class setting. He believes workers moving to cities find a new social identity, “relative emotional security” and even some material assistance within these churches, which provide a sanctuary for the poor, alcoholics, and those who are sick, destitute, unemployed and rootless.66 J. Samuel Escobar discusses how Pentecostal churches provide a sense of community to uprooted people who have lost their point of reference.67 Joe Eldridge regards Pentecostal churches as a place of relief and reunion, similarly explaining how those travelling from the countryside to the city who miss their families are welcomed into these churches: “These small Pentecostal congregations provide a perfect setting to recover a sense of family.”68 Virginia Trevino Nolivos has pointed out how this relational aspect of Pentecostalism has the potential to help the typical Latin American family greatly.69 Clearly, by drawing on the masses Pentecostalism was offering the very constituency the Sandinistas regarded as their own ‘turf ’ with a rival ideology and vision that was diametrically opposed to sandinismo. In the first of its denunciations of the sects in 1982, La Barricada accused Evangelicals of targeting on the most vulnerable, the poor.70 It is not difficult to see how Evangelicalism and sandinismo were ideological rivals seeking the attention of the masses. Both strived for a conversion and transformation experience. Roger Lancaster has highlighted the Sandinistas’ desire to create a ‘New Man’. Moreover, the Frente demanded that the church should participate in this task.71 CEPAD expressed a willingness to oblige (the term ‘New Man’ appears frequently in CEPAD literature). But Pentecostals offered an alternative conversion and transformation. Where the Sandinistas promote a this-worldly, collective, materialist New Man, Pentecostals emphasised instead a

66 Discussed in Thomas A. Birchall, A Theological Evaluation of the Growth of the Pentecostal Church in Latin America (MTh Thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, April 1994). 67 J. Samuel Escobar, ‘The Promise and Precariousness of Latin American Protestantism’ in Miller, Coming of Age, 3–35. 68 Eldridge, ‘Pentecostalism and Social Change’, Towson State Journal of International Affairs, 16. 69 Virginia Trevino Nolivos, ‘A Pentecostal Paradigm for the Latin American Family: An Instrument of Transformation”, Cyberjournal for Pentecostal Charismatic Research, May 2001. Available at http://www.pctii.org/cyberj/cyberj11/nolivos.html (accessed 3 Feb 2004). Pages unnumbered. 70 ‘Invasión de las Sectas’, La Barricada. 71 ‘Cristianos en la revolución,’ La Barricada, 28 March 1980.

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personal, individual, spiritual and other-worldly conversion experience, leading to a new man and women in Christ. Not only that, Pentecostalism offered a complete transformation for each and every believer. Pentecostals place a premium on education out of a desire to read the Bible. Virginia Trevino Nolivos points out how Pentecostalism challenges the family to commit to personal and social transformation.72 Eldridge states: Families are often renewed, not only because wages are more likely to be converted into food and shelter for the children, but also because sober husbands with purpose are less likely to beat wives and children.73

The effects of these new spending priorities have proved radical in terms of class structure. Wilton Nelson discusses the Puritan nature of Pentecostalism, which helped to create a pietism that dragged people from their poor roots into middle classes through saving money and spending it wisely.74 The social upward mobility of many Pentecostals, whether in Latin America, Africa, or even among its first poor converts, attests to that. Even a study of Pentecostalism in Brazil demonstrates how alcoholics desperate to change are attracted to it, and successfully ditch the bottle,75 while another demonstrates its success in domesticating Salvadoran youth gang members, both in El Salvador and the U.S.76 Thus, Luis Samandú talks of Pentecostalism offering the marginalised a tremendous feeling of self-esteem, taking them ‘del suelo al cielo’ (from the ground to heaven). Sandinistas offered their own grand vision of social transformation, a historic one that would take time. Yet newly converted Pentecostals began to see the positive effects straight away. As Eldridge points out: The very volume and intensity of the gatherings sends a message into the darkened barrios that something exciting is happening. From the lighted church, a clarion call goes out to all to leave the oppressive reality of

72 Virginia Trevino Nolivos, ‘A Pentecostal Paradigm for the Latin American Family: An Instrument of Transformation”, Cyberjournal for Pentecostal Charismatic Research. 73 Eldridge, ‘Pentecostalism and Social Change’, Towson State Journal of International Affairs, 17. 74 Nelson, Protestantism in Central America, 53. 75 Cecilia L. Mariz, ‘Pentecostalismo y Alcoholismo Entre Los Pobres del Brasil’, Cristianismo y Sociedad 105 (1990), 39–44. 76 Manuel A. Vázquez, Saving Souls Transnationally: Pentecostalism and Gangs in El Salvador and the United States. Conference paper (Lived Theology and Community Building Workgroup meetings, meeting IV, University of Virginia, 12–14 October 2001).

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chapter eight hunger, unemployment and illness and cleave to the celebration inside the church”.77

Not only does Pentecostalism offer an alternative to sandinismo, as Samuel Escobar maintains it has also offered an alternative to Catholicism throughout the continent. He explains how Catholics have been struck by… The freedom Pentecostal churches have in responding to the ‘religious masses’. They have a spiritual vitality and flexibility that allows them to fill the tremendous needs of the millions of poor people going through social transitions, which often go unattended by the Catholic church.78

This rivalry with sandinismo extended beyond a conversion and transformation experience. Their ideologies were similarly dualistic. The Marxist element of sandinismo emphasised dialectical materialism, while Pentecostals differentiated between the spiritual and material. One was collectivist, the other emphasised the individual. The Pentecostal salvation experience revolves around the Resurrection, yet liberation theology in Nicaragua “drew an analogy between the Resurrection and the ‘new birth of Nicaragua’.79 Sandinismo even offered an alternative quasi-religious belief system. Gustavo Aleman Bolaños explains how Tomás Borge was instrumental in devising the cult of Carlos Fonseca, immortalising him and Sandino and even creating a Sandinista Trinity of Sandino (the Father), Fonseca and the FSLN (the Son) and peasants and workers of Nicaragua (Holy Spirit).80 It was Borge who drew heavily on religious symbolism, coining the phrase “Sandino Ayer, Sandino Hoy, Sandino Mañana” (Sandino yesterday, Sandino today, Sandino tomorrow). The Sandinistas, especially Borge, sought to ‘sandinise’ Christianity with slogans such as “With the Virgin Mary on our side, we’ll smash the bourgeoisie”,81 associating the empty tomb with Sandino, and changing the meaning of Christmas to make it revolutionary.82 Inevitably, this 77 Eldridge, ‘Pentecostalism and Social Change’, Towson State Journal of International Affairs, 15. 78 Samuel Escobar, ‘A New Reformation’, Christianity Today, 6 April 1992, 33. 79 Richard Niklaus, ‘Nicaragua: Battle for God’, Evangelical Missions Quarterly 17 no. 4, 241. 80 Gustavo Alemán Bolaños, The Children of Sandino: Tomas Borge and the Millenarian Legacy. Conference paper (Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, Ottawa, June 1993). Available on The Sandino website: http:// www.sandino.org/ children.htm (accessed 2 Oct 2002). Pages unumbered. 81 Bradstock, Saints and Sandinistas, 39. 82 For a discussion of some of these issues, see Belli, Breaking Faith, 138ff.

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created a great deal of tension between revolutionaries and Obando’s Catholic Church. More importantly, though, it demonstrates a rival belief system that brought it into conflict with Nicaraguan Christians, whether Catholics or Pentecostals. Pentecostalism and sandinismo also used the Bible in a rival fashion. In the wake of the Literacy Crusade, Christianity Today reported how Bible sales that year had reached an all-time high.83 In fact, Tomas Borge encouraged an influx of Bibles via the Bible society.84 Yet the Literacy Crusade was heavily politicised, as Stephen Kinzer points out: Peace Corps volunteers from the United States were turned away (from helping) because the Sandinistas mistrusted their motives . . . Literacy teachers conducted their lessons from a textbook that was unashamedly political. Chapters had titles like, ‘Our Democracy is the Power of the Organized People’ and ‘The Revolutionary Workers’ Organizations Promote Production and Guide the Revolutionary Process.’ Teachers were told that their role was not only to teach reading and writing, but also to raise the political consciousness of their students.85

For their part, the Sandinistas did not deny the politicisation of education, and Carlos Tünnermann, Nicaraguan Minister of Education during 1979–1984, pointed out how “All education carries an ideological message”.86 This is true to a degree: education in the classroom tends to reflect society’s values, the current Zeitgeist. However, Sandinista-controlled education went far beyond implicit indoctrination, and was, in fact, overtly political in its aims. Carlos Tünnermann spoke candidly of the Literacy Crusade: The attainment of literacy was not simply the gaining of an academic skill, but the empowerment of a people who became aware of their reality and gained the tools, reading and writing, to affect and determine their future. The Literacy Crusade was not a pedagogical undertaking with political effects; it was a political undertaking with pedagogical effects.87

The Bible played a central role in the campaign, which is why Borge requested them from the Bible Society,88 not so much because Borge

‘World Scene’, Christianity Today, 20 November 1981, 20. Hernández, Personal Diary and interview (May 2004). 85 Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, 75. 86 Carlos Tünnerman in Zwerling and Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution, 66. 87 Ibid., 67. 88 Interview with Ignacio Hernández. 83 84

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(an atheist) sought to promote Christianity, but rather because it could be used to promote a revolutionary ideology. Pentecostalism and sandinismo even displayed a rival eschatological system. Aleman Bolaños details Sandino’s own millenarian views in his writings. Sandino syncretised various belief systems, including spiritualism, and became obsessed with eschatology. He believed the world would end in 2000, marked by intense upheaval before the new age would be ushered in, when all men would become brothers. Sandino believed the peasants had been selected by God to awaken Nicaragua, who would then awaken the whole Indo-Hispanic race to its divine mission: “the redemption of the world’s oppressed and the crushing of the capitalist exploiters led by the United States”.89 Aleman Bolaños correctly points out how Fonseca sought to re-write some of Sandino’s beliefs, glossing over his millenarian hopes. But Borge certainly drew on them and, together with a Marxist emphasis on the historical class struggle, culminating in the victory of the proletariat (led by the vanguard FSLN), one sees a semi-eschatological scheme that rivalled Pentecostalism’s own millenarianism. Moving on, while the Sandinistas emphasised class equality, the Pentecostals created conditions for equality among their own structures. Birchall explains how the movement in Latin America welcomes the socially marginalised with open arms. Pentecostals also see “each member of the congregation as an essential and vital player in the work of the church.”90 Those who were powerless are given new opportunities and responsibilities in the church, and made to feel a vital member with something to offer (cf. the Apostle Paul’s discussion of the body and its many parts, in the context of tongues and spiritual gifts in 1 Corinthians 12). Veli-Matti Kaikkinen also refers to equality: “The belief that Spirit baptism equips every believer, men and women alike, for ministry reveals the levelling influence of modern Pentecostalism and the key to its rapid growth.”91 A study of Pentecostalism in El Salvador points out how the movement is egalitarian and democratic (though some pastors wield a great deal of power).92 Virginia Trevino Nolivos speaks

Alemán Bolaños, The Children of Sandino. Birchall, A Theological Evaluation of the Growth of the Pentecostal Church, 15. 91 Karkkainen, ‘Mission, Spirit and Eschatology’, Cross Currents, 78. 92 Philip Williams, ‘The Sound of Tamberines: The Politics of Pentecostal Growth in El Salvador’ in Edward L. Cleary and Hannah Stewart-Gambino, eds. Power, Politics and Pentecostals in Latin America (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 179–200. 89 90

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of a community without discrimination.93 Moreover, the movement is such that leaders remain close to the people.94 As Eldridge points out, the leaders are typically drawn from the same socio-economic class. “There are no class, ethnic, or racial divisions between the leadership of the neighbourhood church and the neighbourhood itself.” Meanwhile, José Suárez became disillusioned with the hypocrisy of many comandantes who sent young Nicaraguans to the front lines while their own sons avoided SMP.95 Concerning equality, the Sandinistas emphasised a strong role for women in the revolution, promising to transform how they were perceived. Yet Pentecostalism does the same. It empowers women, and while not a feminist movement, it emphasises self-worth and helps them to attain autonomy in a traditional machismo culture. God is also placed above family, freeing Pentecostal women from the fetters of traditional Latin values, while abusive men are no longer regarded so much as masters that must be obeyed, but rather, victims of sin. Thus, women are encouraged to help their husbands. Moreover, “Pentecostalism is able to resolve marital conflict because it redefines the relationship between the individual and evil”.96 Pentecostalism also provides women with skills, power in the church, and thus, legitimacy.97 Finally, both Pentecostalism and sandinismo similarly encouraged activism and participation. Derek Tidball notes that “Evangelicals are great activists. Their religion is always a busy one.”98 Thus, while the FSLN organised mass participation through rallies, workshops, the CDS, work brigades and so on, Pentecostals mobilised their own followers—Nicaragua’s poorest—which detracted them from participating in the Sandinista mass organisations. Thomas Birchall describes how Latin American Pentecostalism offers converts a very active community

93 Trevino Nolivos, ‘A Pentecostal Paradigm for the Latin American Family’, Cyberjournal for Pentecostal Charismatic Research. 94 Escobar, ‘The Promise and Precariousness of Latin American Protestantism’ in Miller, Coming of Age. 95 Interview with José Suárez. 96 Cecilia Loreto Mariz and Maria das Dores Campos Machado, ‘Pentecostalism and Women in Brazil’, in Cleary and Gambino-Stewart, Power, Politics and Pentecostals, 41–54. 97 Carol Ann Drogus, ‘Private Power or Public Power: Pentecostalism, Base Communities, and Gender’ in Cleary and Stewart-Gambino, Power, Politics and Pentecostals, 55–75. 98 Tidball, Who are the Evangelicals, 13.

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life, and how every member is mobilised.99 Joe Eldridge explains how the vibrancy of the informal liturgy is centred on participation; all are invited to share in the proceedings. Virginia Trevino Nolivos speaks of a prophetic community empowered to witness.100 All this activism is not lost on Roger Lancaster: In some respects, evangelical Protestantism has been as vigorous a movement among the poor as liberation theology: its numbers may be smaller, but its religious activism is often far greater. Each sect, every formal or informal congregation, each cell, is consciously envisioned and organized as an actively proselyzing body that is always seeking new converts. And as the figures show, the evangelicals have registered remarkable success at initiating widespread conversion among the urban poor.101

Clearly, then, Evangelicals and Sandinistas were rivals. One sought to promote revolution, the other revival. One promoted a this-worldly, collectivist agenda which sought to create a ‘New Man’ through an encounter with history, while the other preached an otherworldly, individualist gospel, emphasising a personal individual conversion and transformation, and a personal encounter with God. Both were religious; sandinismo drew heavily on religious iconography, rhetoric, theology, even eschatology, which it sought to ‘sandinise’. Meanwhile, both found their greatest support among the poorest in society, which they sought to mobilise. Sandinismo demanded revolutionary participation through the CDS and other mass organisations, but instead Pentecostals would attend the local templo, sometimes most nights of the week. They even drew heavily from the same geographical area: Sandino, later the muchachos (the young guerrillas in the northern hills), and finally a Sandinista government, all drew on and claimed to want to help the campesinos in the highlands. Yet ironically, here is where Pentecostalism drew its strongest support, to the extent that some of them even joined the Contras. Thus, conflict between these diametrically-opposed movements was inevitable. In 1991 Ron Rhodes wondered if liberation theology represented a challenge to Evangelicals, and asked if the latter had ignored a scriptural emphasis on caring for the poor.102 In fact, it is liberation theology that

99 Discussed by Birchall, A Theological Evaluation of the Growth of the Pentecostal Church. 100 Trevino Nolivos, ‘A Pentecostal Paradigm for the Latin American Family’, Cyberjournal for Pentecostal Charismatic Research. 101 Lancaster, Thanks to God, 184. 102 Ron Rhodes, ‘Christian Revolution in Latin America: The Changing Face of

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appears to have failed to live up to expectations, as Pentecostalism is now the religion of choice for millions of (mainly poor) Latin Americans. Pedro Moreno points out how Latin America’s Pentecostals not only questioned existing religious structures (both Catholic and Protestant), but also gave… Expression to a deep-rooted discontent with existing social and economic conditions—the discontentment the Communists were certain existed throughout Latin America, though their revolution failed to spread.103

Meanwhile, David Stoll suggests liberation theology might have been “overemphasized as the vanguard of religious reformation in Latin America.”104 Thus Debra Sabia believes the “aggressive rise of fundamentalism sapped the strength of the CEB movement in Nicaragua,”105 while in the Nicaraguan milieu Luis Samandú, too, regards Pentecostals as a successful rival to the CEBs which, with their otherworldly message, helped to demobilise the Nicaraguan masses from revolutionary participation.106 The history of Evangelical-Sandinista relations is one of revolution versus revival. From Client to Rival The twentieth century began in Nicaragua with Protestants being introduced as a rival societal actor to Catholicism, marking the rise of the patron-client relationship. It continued with CEPAD’s support for the revolution. Meanwhile, majority Protestantism moved firmly away from the client model to one of state rival. When the Sandinistas came to power, Evangelicalism represented a small constituency. Clifton Holland’s 1978 survey estimated about 196,000 Protestant adherents in Nicaragua,107 of which about 45% (some 88,000) were Pentecostal.108 Yet as Chapter 5 demonstrates, Evangelical, especially Liberation Theology’, Christian Research Journal (Winter 1991), 8ff. The version cited here was taken from the Christian Research Institute website: www.iclnet.org/pub/ resources/text/cri/cri-jrnl/crj0080a.txt (accessed 8 April 1997). 103 Moreno, ‘Rapture and Renewal in Latin America’, First Things (internet version cited; pages unnumbered). 104 Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant, xviii. 105 Debra Sabia, Contradiction and Conflict: The Popular Church in Nicaragua (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), 184. 106 Samandú, ‘El Pentecostalismo en Nicaragua’, Pasos, 8. 107 Clifton Holland, Estimated Protestant Church Growth: 1900–2005 (25 November 2000), taken from the PROLADES website: http://www.prolades.com/prolades1/nicaragua/ ingles/nica-pcg.pdf (accessed 25 March 2005). 108 Holland, Expanded Status of Christianity, 14.

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Pentecostal growth during the 1980s was spectacular and by 1990 the Evangelical community was considerably larger. Clifton Holland suggests there were about 450,000 Nicaraguan Protestants in 1991109 (the AoG even overtook the Moravian Church as the largest Protestant denomination by 1991).110 Neither does this figure represent occasional attendees: Edward Cleary suggests many Latin American Pentecostal churches count only ‘habitual attendees’.111 As Chapter 5 demonstrated, about 75% of Protestants in 1986 were Evangelical, rising possibly to as high as 80–85% in 1990.112 Extrapolating those percentages from Holland’s figures, Evangelicals represented anywhere between 337,000 and 382,000. In fact, Patrick Johnstone estimates possibly as many as 500,000 Evangelicals in Nicaragua in 1990.113 Chapter 5 sought to quantify the percentage of Pentecostals who opposed the Sandinistas, and the available evidence from a range of sources (including Roberto Zub’s voting data) was generally homogenous, which estimated opposition to the Frente at about two-thirds. In the 1990 elections, 1,510,838 Nicaraguans voted (a turnout of 86.2%), with Violeta Chamorro’s UNO coalition winning 777,552 of the votes (54.7%) and the FSLN 579,886 votes (40.8). The difference between winner and loser was 197,666.114 If we just take the more conservative of the above figures for the number of Evangelicals in Nicaragua (337,000) and assume only 60% (not two-thirds) voted against the FSLN, the number of votes cast in favour of UNO exceeds 200,000. Taking Johnstone’s figures would suggest Evangelical votes cast in favour of UNO were half as much again. Naturally, this assumes all Holland, Estimated Protestant Church Growth: 1900–2005. Clifton Holland, Membresia de las Denominaciones Protestantes de Nicaragua, 1978–1997 (29 October 2003), taken from the PROLADES website: http://www.prolades.com/prolades1/nicaragua/espanol/denoms78–97graph-1.pdf (accessed on 25 March 2005). 111 Edward L. Cleary, ‘Introduction: Pentecostals, Prominence, and Politics’ in Cleary and Stewart-Gambino, Power, Politics and Pentecostals, 7. 112 Roberto Zub’s voting patterns study details how the majority of Pentecostals interviewed had been baptised for 10 years or less, confirming the data set out in Chapter 5 that many conversions in Nicaragua had taken place during the 1980s (Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones, 35). 113 Patrick Johnstone and Jason Mandryk, Operation World (CD). Johnstone’s estimate (see Chapter 5) that Evangelicals represented 10% of the total population in 1980 fits in with Holland’s figures for 1978, so though 500,000 may appear high, bearing in mind Nicaragua’s population growth to 1990, it is not unrealistic (though higher than Holland’s estimate). Johnstone’s figure also takes into account not just Pentecostals, but also non-Pentecostal Evangelicals. 114 The Carter Center, Observing Nicaragua’s Elections, 1989–1990 (Atlanta: The Carter Center, May 1990), 25–7. Available online: www.cartercenter.org/doc1153.htm. 109 110

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Evangelicals were registered to vote and actually voted. Yet the sample in Zub’s study suggests Evangelical/Pentecostal voters exceeded the high national turnout of 86.2%.115 This compares with between 40% and 50% who chose not to vote in 1984.116 Clearly, Evangelicals, who mainly opposed the Sandinistas, wanted to vote. Of course, there are problems with this analysis, for example, Zub’s study is concerned with Managua alone, and there is a lack of data for the rest of the country. Yet the figure of two-thirds of Evangelicals who opposed the Sandinistas (see discussion, evidence in Chapter 5) is certainly not unreasonable, especially bearing in mind the strong anti-Sandinista sentiment expressed by Pentecostal campesinos in the northern highlands, where it is likely the two-thirds figure was exceeded. Here is a tantalising story, which suggests it is eminently possible that Evangelicals played a key role in the Sandinista electoral downfall. At the very least, we can say that throughout the 1980s, while being abused, sidelined and generally maltreated, the Pentecostal movement grew rapidly and eventually a substantial percentage voted against the Sandinistas. After the Frente’s electoral defeat in 1990, a Los Angeles Times report details how the Sandinistas conceded they had lost touch with population. Ortega admitted they were in a “permanent conversation with all sectors of the population”. The article ends on a particularly ironic note as far as this study is concerned. As the analysis of the electoral defeat commenced, the FSLN campaign chief Dionisio Marenco stated the task ahead for the Sandinistas was to go into each and every barrio to find out who had voted for them, why, and what the party must do to regain the support of those who had turned their back on the Frente. Marenco insisted on a need to get back to their grassroots, visiting every single house, as was the common practice of Evangelicals who go door to door to proselyte and win converts. Thus, Marenco, speaking of what the Sandinistas must do, said, “It is the work of evangelical pastors. House to house”.117 However, many Pentecostals had already been to many of those doors first prior to the 1990 elections, winning new converts and massively expanding their grassroots base.

Ibid., 58. Ibid., 9. Unlike the AoG, Church of God officials urged their members to vote in the 1984 elections (‘Instability in Nicaragua Not Hurting Church of God,’ Charisma, November 1984, 114), but 41% still chose not to (see Zub, Protestantismo y Elecciones, 59). 117 Boudreaux, ‘Sandinistas Conclude They Lost Touch With Populace’, Los Angeles Times. 115 116

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While it does not necessarily follow that Evangelicals actively campaigned against the FSLN, or that we can say for certain their vote was decisive, nonetheless a diametrically-opposed worldview with which new converts were imbued meant Evangelicals, with memories of repression still fresh in their minds, embraced the opportunity to vote against their tormentors.

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APPENDIX A

MAPS OF NICARAGUA

Map 1. Main cities and towns of Nicaragua.

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Map 2. Land utilization and vegetation.

(Map in the public domain available at the University of Texas library website: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/nicaragua.html).

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Map 3. General concentration of the Miskitu population.

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Map 4. Pentecostal heartlands in the northern highlands.

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APPENDIX B

SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES Aguirre, Gilberto. Baptist. Together with Gustavo Parajón, he ran CEPAD throughout the Sandinista period. He is still the NGO’s executive director. Arista, Rafael. AoG regional director for the Jalapa region during much of the 1980s. Intimately aware of many of the problems Evangelicals suffered in the northern highlands. Led non-combatant brigades in Contra areas for those refusing to take part in SMP. Now vice-superintendent of the AoG, based in Managua. Ayala, Guillermo. CNPEN pastor (he is the CNPEN director for Managua). High profile Evangelical leader and one of those arrested in 1985. Baldizón Aviles, Alvaro José. Appointed by MINT to look into alleged Sandinista human rights abuses after international outcry. Defected to the U.S., bringing various documents confirming Sandinista abuses. Apparently died in mysterious circumstances in the United States. Bell, Amalia. Former chief librarian at CIEETS and Miskita from the Atlantic Coast. Her brother fought with Miskito leader Steadman Fagoth. Bolaños Hunter, Miguel. Former member of the DGSE who defected to the U.S., which drew on his testimony for propaganda purposes. Provided detailed information about the state security apparatus and the Sandinistas’ dealings with the churches. Borge, Tomás. One of the founder members of the FSLN in 1961, and later a leader of the Marxist Guerra Popular Prolongada tendency. National Directorate member and one of leading Sandinista comandantes, who became the head of the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) and controlled the La Barricada newspaper. Carazo, Raul. Mildly izquierdista Evangelical (according to his own admission) and former seminarian. Well-educated, with plenty of firsthand experience of events in the 1980s. Knows some of the CEPAD people quite well, particularly Benjamín Cortés.

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Casco, Miguel Angel. One of the AoG rebels who, together with Oscar Godoy and Carlos Escorcia, was expelled from the denomination for taking a strongly pro-revolutionary line. Eventually joined the Sandinista national executive and served in the Nicaraguan parliament in the 1990s. Disagreed and became disillusioned with the FSLN leadership and direction and left the party, apparently having received threats against him. Cerrato Hodgson, Saturnino. Young AoG minister who moved up rapidly through the denomination’s ranks after the missionaries left. A member of the AoG executive in the early 1980s and became CNPEN’s first president in the early 1980s. He went on to become superintendent of the AoG from 1984–1986, followed by Bartolomé Matamoros. Cerrato is the current superintendent of the AoG, and is based in Managua. Cortés, Benjamín. Member of the Church of Christ (a breakaway from the Baptists). A CEPAD executive and former president of the NGO. Now the principal of the Protestant ecumenical college CIEETS. Cuthbert, Dexter. Costeño. Evangelical Episcopalian who now head’s Franklyn Graham’s (son of Billy Graham) Samaritan’s Purse, an NGO. Douglas, Joseph. Costeño. Former schoolteacher near Puerto Cabezas who rejected Sandinista indoctrinisation of the educational system. Fled when orders were issued to arrest him and eventually joined the Miskito resistance. Later became a senior Contra commander with the FDN, leading 900 rebels. He later toured the U.S. to help secure Contra support from Congress and other interest groups. Now resident in North America. Escorcia, Carlos. Son of the well-known AoG church founder, Carlos Escorcia Sequeira. Brought up within the denomination before rebelling and strongly supporting the Sandinistas. Spent some time at Ernesto Cardenal’s Solentiname community. Together with Oscar Godoy and Miguel Angel Casco he was eventually expelled from the AoG for his revolutionary stance. Espinoza, Mario. Evangelical youth leader during the early 1980s before going on to pastor a Pentecostal church. Became president of CNPEN in the late 1990s.

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Galloway, Ron. Son of Nazarene missionaries to Nicaragua in the 1960s. Left the country to study in the U.S. in 1970. Well-acquainted with the Nazarene work and its personnel in Nicaragua. Hassan, Jimmy. National director of Campus Crusade for Christ. A former judge. One of those arrested in 1985. Eventually fled to the U.S. with his family, but has since returned to Nicaragua to continue his ministry. Hernández, Ignacio. Senior Nazarene and director of the Bible society in the 1980s. Conservative Evangelical. Also former programme director at the radio station Ondas de Luz. One of those arrested in 1985. Holland, Clifton. Statistical expert on Protestantism and church attendance in Central America. Founded the organisation PROLADES. Based in San José, Costa Rica. Jarquín Guevarra, Rosalio. Pentecostal pastor on the Atlantic coast during the 1980s, including Bluefields. Well-acquainted with the tensions between church and government in the rural regions. Wounded in a Contra attack. Now pastors in Managua. Jeffrey, Paul. On the religious left, he worked as a member of CEPAD throughout much of the 1980s before moving to Honduras. Wrote a provocative article likening the AoG in Nicaragua to a cultural invasion from the United States, which ultimately led the denomination to pull out of the CEPAD assembly. Currently an occasional contributor for Christianity Today. López, Bienvenido. Former member of the GN, imprisoned when the Sandinistas came to power. López was Daniel Ortega’s jailer (and alleged torturer). Converted to Pentecostalism while in prison, and later became a Church of God regional superintendent. Became the denomination’s national leader in the 1990s. Mairena, Nicanor. CEPAD regional director and Nazarene. Sandinista apologist until he was arrested and imprisoned for three days in a chiquita cell. Later became Nazarene national superintendent before leaving Nicaragua, apparently after some kind of dispute within his denomination. Now pastors in the U.S. Marenco, Norman. Current CNPEN president and Pentecostal minister. Heads a Christian human rights organisation.

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Matamoros, Bartolomé. Member of the AoG executive in the early 1980s, replacing Saturnino Cerrato as superintendent (1986–1994). Together with Cerrato, he was one of the main AoG leaders during the 1980s. Now lives in Canada. Mejilla, Alfonso. AoG regional superintendent for the Jalapa region, having replaced Rafael Arista. Attended the exhumation of the mass grave in Murra containing the bodies of AoG members murdered by the EPS. Now pastors an AoG church in Managua. Meléndez, Albino. Theologian and member of the CEPAD executive, with special responsibility for pastoral issues. Became tired of the tensions and problems within Nicaragua and eventually left the country in 1989. He now lives in the United States. Ortega, Daniel. Together with his brother he led the Tercerista faction. One of the nine comandantes, but also became the main leader of the FSLN. A Catholic, but interested in Protestantism. Guardsman and later Church of God pastor Bienvenido López was his jailer during Ortega’s imprisonment by the Somoza regime. According to Gustavo Parajón, Ortega recognised López when the latter attended a baptism for prisoners. Several Evangelical evangelists have prayed with Ortega. Parajón, Gustavo. Baptist medical doctor trained at Harvard. Pastor of the First Baptist Church, Managua, and founder of CEPAD. Worked closely with Gilberto Aguirre, and appeared in countless newspaper and Christian press reports in North America during the 1980s as someone on the religious left. Appointed by Daniel Ortega to the Nicaraguan peace commission set up in the wake of the Esquipulas peace accord. Reyes, Juan. Teenager when Sandinistas came to power, and then a young churchman during the 1980s. Currently the pastor of the CAM church in Granada. Robleto, Harold. Currently an independent Pentecostal pastor and recently became a CNPEN official. Came from a family that strongly supported the Sandinistas, but he later converted to Evangelicalism. His brother was a member of the DGSE. Rojas, Roberto. Opposed Somoza prior to the revolution. Became a Pentecostal pastor with the AoG during the 1980s, and eventually went

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on to serve as vice-superintendent of the denomination in the 1990s. Now heads the Nicaraguan Evangelical Alliance. His wife recently ran in the Managuan mayoral elections. Rosales, Félix. Succeeded Saturnino Cerrato as CNPEN president, holding the post throughout most of the 1980s. One of those arrested in 1985. Many Evangelical leaders interviewed singled him out as one who had suffered particular harassment at the hands of the Sandinistas, probably because he was leader of CNPEN. Now lives and works in the U.S. Sánchez, Arnulfo. AoG pastor in Managua. Worked in the Jalapa AoG church, close to the Honduran border shortly before and after the 1979 revolution. Sandli, Burger. Norwegian Pentecostal missionary who arrived in Nicaragua in the late 1980s. Worked in the northern highlands in and around Waslala. Sánchez, Ruth. Longstanding, elderly member of the CAM church in Granada. Lay preacher who later became associated with CNPEN. Sevilla, Gustavo. One of those arrested in 1985. Went on to lead CNPEN after Félix Rosales. Soza, Rufino. Pentecostal pastor since the early 1970s in OPEN 3 (shantytown outside Managua later renamed Ciudad Sandino). Ran into various problems with the CDS during the 1980s. Established a number of Pentecostal churches in Ciudad Sandino. Spencer, David. Son of Lewey Spencer, missionary to Nicaragua in the 1960s. Member of the AoG. Worked in Nicaragua as a radio station host until allegedly expelled by Somoza for criticising the regime in the wake of the 1972 earthquake. Returned several times to Sandinista Nicaragua to engage in evangelistic work in and around Jalapa. Member of David Yonggi Cho’s board (Cho pastors the largest church in the world, in South Korea). Closely connected with CNPEN in the 1980s. Now pastors possibly the largest church in Nicaragua. Suárez, Jose (pseudonym). Formerly a senior DGSE official in regular contact with members of the government, including Lenin Cerna. Demonstrates intimate details of the Sandinista apparatus and its policies. Now an Evangelical.

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Tercero, Uriel. AoG pastor at the time and in the district where the Murra massacre took place. Still pastors, and has recently been closely involved in social programmes to help peasants. Trolese, Bob. Missionary with the El Verbo church, which counts Guatemala’s former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt among its members (Efraín Ríos Montt is a personal friend of Trolese). Trolese arrived as a missionary to Nicaragua shortly after the revolution, and has remained there since. Ulloa, Sixto. Baptist and member of the CEPAD executive. Worked closely with CEPAD leaders and the FSLN government, acting as a mediator between Protestants and Sandinistas. Expected all communication to go through him. A close friend of Daniel Ortega. Eventually he joined the Sandinista government. Has since left parliament and returned to church work. Highly political and vocal. Well known in Nicaragua.

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APPENDIX C

GUSTAVO PARAJÓN’S RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS THAT CEPAD MISUSED DONATED FUNDS TO BUY ELEVEN JEEPS FOR THE SANDINISTA POLICE (REPRODUCED IN FULL) Concerning the allegation of the jeeps, I want to emphasize that this allegation was never proved. In addition CEPAD was carrying out development and relief work. Agencies that were donating funds demanded that these funds be used for the needs of the people affected by the war and its consequences. Funds could not be used for the promotion of any faith, and recipients could not be discriminated because of race, religion, or creed. It would have been very discriminating and totally unacceptable from the standpoint of these agencies, (some of which received funds from their respective Governments) if CEPAD would have promised and donated 11 denominations (and even worse to 11 pastors) jeeps for their denominational work. It is difficult to explain an allegation, particularly when the principle of being innocent until proven otherwise is not followed. There are some situations, however, that might show that these accusations had no basis whatsoever. Budget Preparation and Approval CEPAD had a yearly meeting in November with all the cooperating agencies where the yearly plan and budget would be presented. • The staff prepared the budget. • The Board of Directors would study it, modify it if it thought it was necessary. • The General Assembly would approve it. This budget with its plan of action would be presented in the November meetings. These meetings would be called “consortiums.”

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appendix c Adoption of The Budget by The Agencies

• The agencies present would then pledge (in that meeting) an amount and the composite pledges made up the operating budget for the next year. • The European agencies refused steadfastly to fund the programs we had developed for pastors to delve into Scriptures about our responsibility as Christians in all areas of life including the social sphere. Were it not for the US Christian agencies that openly stated they believed the Gospel had a wholistic mission, and thus believed in the importance of all of us delving into Scriptures to be a guide in our programs, we would not have been able to carry out CEPAD’s educational programs for pastors. Can you imagine what the response of these agencies would have been if such a donation would have been given to denominations/ pastors? The Matagalpa police when the Churches’ constituencies were also very polarized? No Significant Loss of Financial Support I am writing without consulting any correspondence or notes, by I do not recall that CEPAD experienced any significant loss of financial support from the US. • Tear Fund UK, and • World Relief, MAP are the agencies that come to mind that stopped their support, but their financial contributions were not that large a percentage of CEPAD’s budget. • Instead UMCOR, Church World Service, Presbyterian Church, American Baptist, Reformed Church, Disciples in Christ and others continued to support us, not only financially, but morally and spiritually. Pastors Making Allegations Should have Some Proof The pastors that made the allegation should have, if the allegations were true.

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• Correspondence, memos, to the CEPAD Director, Board of Directors or General Assembly, where they made the request and justified why they needed jeeps for their work. • Minutes of the General Assembly, where such a commitment would have been made, approved and incorporated into the budget. • They should also have their letters of protest to CEPAD where they would register their specific complaint and where they would state the exact date, meeting and place where such promises would have been made and not fulfilled. (e-mail correspondence to author, 6 January 2005. His emphasis).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources A. Books, Reports and Pamphlets Americas Watch. Fitful Peace: Human Rights and Reconciliation in Nicaragua Under the Chamorro Government. New York: Americas Watch, July 1991. Americas Watch. The Killings in Northern Nicaragua. Washington: Americas Watch, November 1989. Amnesty International. Amnesty International Missions to the Republic of Nicaragua, August 1979, Jan 1980 & Aug. 1980. London: Amnesty, June 1982. Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 1980. London: Amnesty, 1980. Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 1981. London: Amnesty, 1981. Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 1983. London: Amnesty, 1983. Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 1985. London: Amnesty, 1985. Amnesty International. News Release (12 February 1986). London: Amnesty. Amnesty International. Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record. London: Amnesty, March 1986. Amnesty International. Nicaragua: The Human Rights Record. London: Amnesty, March 1989. ANPDH. El Viento de Mokorón. Managua: ANPDH, August 1990. ANPDH. Los Cemeterios Clandestinos de Nicaragua. Managua: ANPDH, September 1991. Asambleas de Dios. Doctrinas Fundamentales. Managua: Vida, 2001. Assemblies of God. Through Deepest Waters (Heroes of the Conquest Series, No. 17). Springfield: Assemblies of God (undated pamphlet, but 1946 or later). Becks, Gary. But I Can Still Carry Half a Load. San Diego: Code Three Press, 2002. Borge, Tomás et al. Sandinistas Speak. New York: Pathfinder Pres, 1982. Canales A., Carlos H. Injusticia Sandinista: Carcel y Servicio. Managua: Carlos Canales, 1992. Carter Center. Observing Nicaragua’s Elections, 1989–1990. Atlanta: The Carter Center, May 1990. CEPAD. Reflexiones Sobre Fé y Revolución. Managua: CEPAD, 1982. Chamorro Cardenal, Jaime. Frente a Dos Dictaduras. San José: Libro Libre, 1987. Chamorro, Violeta Barrios de. Dreams of the Heart. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. CPDH. Caso: Desaparecido Miguel Jerónimo Herdocia Castillo. Managua: CPDH: 19 August 1996. CPDH. Los Desaparecidos: Informe Oficial 3 de Octubre 1980. Managua: CPDH, 1980. CPDH. Los Prisioneros de la Polvora: Qué Pasó Con Ellos? Managua: CPDH, June 1980. CPDH. Testimonio de Sofonías Cisneros Leiva. Managua: CPDH (undated). Dickey, Christopher. With the Contras. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. Hodges, Melvyn. The Indigenous Church. Springfield: Gospel Publishing House, 1953. INDEF. Directorio de Iglesias, Organizaciones y Ministerios del Movimiento Protestante: Nicaragua. San José: INDEF & Managua: CEPAD, 1980. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ‘Freedom of Conscience, Belief and Religion’ in Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.45 doc.18 rev. 1 (17 November 1978).

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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin. OEA/Ser.L./V.II.62 doc. 10 rev. 3 (29 November 1983). Johnstone, Patrick & Jason Mandryk. Operation World: 21st Century Handbook CD-ROM. Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001. Kinzer, Stephen. Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1991. Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights. Nicaragua: Revolutionary Justice (A Report on Human Rights and the Judicial System). New York: Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, April 1985. Lindsay, Hal. Late Great Planet Earth. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1970. Martínez Cuenca, Alejandro. Sandinista Economics in Practice. Boston: Southend Press, 1992. Matamoros, Bartolomé. Historia de las Asambleas de Dios en Nicaragua. Managua: Vida, 2000. Ministerio de Educación. Español 5: Libro de texto Para Quinto Grado. Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1985. ——. Historia Cuarto Grado: Así Se Ha Forjado Nuestra Patria II. Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1986. ——. La Educación en el Primer Año de la Revolución Popular Sandinista. Managua: Ministerio de Educación, July 1980. ——. Matemática, 2.o Grado. Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1988 (Third Edition). ——. Programa de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional. Managua: Ministerio de Educación, 1979. ——. Situación del Sistema Educativo Después de 45 Años de Dictadura Militar Somocistas y Perspectivas que Plantea la Revolución Sandinista. Managua: Ministerio de Educación, Managua, December 1979. Miranda, Roger and William Ratcliff. The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994. National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The Report of the President’s National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. New York: MacMillan, 1984. Robeson, Gerald. Faith in Eruption. Monroeville: Banner, 1975. Sánchez Aguirre, Juan et al. Testimonio Histórico de las Asambleas de Dios. Managua: Vida (undated, possibly 1997). Somoza Debayle, Anastasio. Nicaragua Betrayed, Boston: Western Islands, 1980. Stone, Ellis. God Has No Borders. Farmington: Ellis Stone, 1999. U.S. Department of State. Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator’s Perspective. Washington: February 1986. U.S. Department of State. In their own words. Testimony of Nicaraguan exiles: Alberto Gamez Ortega, Alvaro Baldizón Aviles, Mateo Guerrero Flores, Silvio Herrera, Santiago Dixon, José Alonso Valle, Francisco Delgado Flores, Guadalupe Castellanos, Prudencio Baltodano Selva, Oscar and Sarita Kellermann. Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1987. Witness for Peace. What We Have Seen and Heard in Nicaragua. London: Witness for Peace (UK), 1987. Wolf, Marcus (with Anne McElvoy). Memoirs of a Spymaster. London: Pimlico, 1997. Zub, Roberto. Protestantismo y Elecciones en Nicaragua. Managua: CIEETS, 1993. Zwerling, Philip and Connie Martin. Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution. Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1985.

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B. Newspapers and Journals Christianity Today Alford, Deann. ‘Does Religion in Schools Favor Catholics?’ 26 October 1998, 26. ——. ‘Evangelicals Press Political leader to Focus on Poverty Issues,’ 11 January 1999, 23. ——. ‘New Evangelical Party Gains Political Power,’ 3 March 1997, 60. ——. ‘Nicaragua: Baptist School Taps Catholic’, 9 August 1999, 19. ——. ‘Nicaragua Schools: Catholic Influence Questioned,’ 28 April 1997, 78. Escobar, Samuel. ‘A New Reformation,’ 6 April 1992, 30–34. Frase, Ronald. ‘Believers Ask Yankees to Remove Cold War Blinders,’ 27 March 1981. Lee, Ron. ‘Ministry Amid Adversity,’ 6 February 1987, 32–34. Minnery, Tom. ‘Why the Gospel Grows in Socialist Nicaragua,’ 8 April 1983, 34–42. Parajón, Gustavo. ‘CEPAD’s View’ (Interview with G. Parajón)’, 18 April 1986, 99. Plowman, Edward. ‘The Archbishop Calls for the Gospel, not Marxism, in Nicaragua,’ 5 February 1982, 72. Pretiz, Paul. ‘The Nicaraguan Junta Reassures Evangelicals,’ 19 September 1980. Spring, Beth. ‘Campus Crusade Director Describes Government Harassment of Evangelicals,’ 7 Feb 1986, 52–3. ——. ‘Contras vs. Sandinistas: What Should the U.S. Do?’ 18 April 1986, 36–40. ——. ‘Does the Sandinista Regime Promote Religious Freedom,’ 23 November 1984, 43–44. ——. ‘Evangelical Groups with Differing Views Consider Joint Trip to Nicaragua,’ 19 April 1985, 64. ——. ‘Tensions Between Church and State in Nicaragua Pose Dilemma for U.S. Christians,’ 6 September 1985, 54–56. ——. ‘The Government’s Heavy Hand Falls on Believers,’ 13 December 1985, 51–2. Sywulka, Stephen. ‘Aftermath of Nicaragua’s Civil War: Church and State Regroup,’ 21 September 1979, 44–5. Whitmer, Jim and Mary. ‘Why the Miskitos Are a People Held Hostage,’ 8 October 1982, 86–89. Wykstra, Steve. ‘Evangelical Leader Named to National Peace Commission,’ 2 October 1987, 52. Christianity Today (unnamed authors) ‘Church Also is Transformed by Nicaragua’s Revolution’, 25 January 1980, 50–52. ‘Nicaragua: The Shaking and Shifting of the Church,’ 7 December 1979, 44. ‘World Scene’, 20 November 1981, 20. ‘World Scene,’ 15 June 1984, 66. ‘World Scene,’ 3 February 1984, 55. ‘World Scene: Nicaragua,’ 7 May 1982, 49. ‘World Scene: Nicaragua—More Press Freedom,’ 6 November 1987, 52. La Barricada Fonseca, Carlos. ‘Se trata, no de lograr simplemente un cambio de hombres en el poder, sino un cambio de Sistema, el derrocamiento de las clases explotadoras y la Victoria de las clases explotadas’, 14 March 1980. Fonseca, Carlos. ‘Un Nicaragüense en Moscú’, 4 November 1980 (written by Fonseca in 1957).

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INDEX Aguirre, Gilberto 58, 81, 84, 107, 108–9, 113, 128–9, 179, 213, 252, 255, 257–60, 279 Americas Watch 9, 156, 173, 176–7, 186, 198, 201–2, 209–11, 236–9, 243 Amnesty International 5, 9, 169–72, 176–7, 186, 194, 196, 202, 204, 209, 238, 239n Anglicans 10, 45–8, 54. See also Episcopalians anti-Semitism 138, 232–5. See also Israel Apocalypse. See Revelation, book of Arafat, Yasser 40, 143, 227–8, 230, 232, 234 Arista, Rafael 117, 199, 120, 122, 155, 158–9, 189, 196–7, 199, 237, 246–7, 261, 279 Armada 49 arrests (1985) 18, 80, 110, 122, 128, 184–5, 189, 191–3, 200, 203–5, 212, 213, 214, 248, 256–9, 261 Assemblies of God 5, 31, 66, 84, 181, 183 and Daniel Ortega 188 and links to the U.S. 22, 65–6, 119 and the poor. See Pentecostalism and the poor as largest Pentecostal denomination 26n, 64, 110, 130–1, 272 geographical concentration. See Pentecostals, geographical distribution of history of (in Nicaragua) 58–62, 68–70, 80–1, 88–9 opposition to the Sandinistas 22, 25, 121–4, 125, 158, 248, 257 pacifism 153–5, 158 rebels excluded from 31, 74, 115–7, 132 size of pro-revolutionary movement within 126–8 targeted by Sandinistas 173, 191, 193, 197–9. See also Murra, massacre at voting patterns 131–2, 271–4 withdrawal from CEPAD 64–5, 261–2

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atheism 17, 20, 77, 120, 137, 140, 145–6, 180, 268 Atlantic Coast 7, 32, 43–8, 56–7, 60, 67, 70, 73, 80, 123, 139, 174, 177, 196, 210, 241. See also Miskito Indians Ayala, Guillermo 120, 146, 157, 185, 189, 194, 259, 279 Baldizón Aviles, Alvaro José 8–9, 174–5, 196, 210, 279 Baptists 10, 115, 155 and CEPAD 58, 73, 99, 101, 103, 133 and social concerns 73–4, 86 asked by Somoza to visit Washington 81, 95 history of in Nicaragua 54, 56–7 numerical decline 68, 254 support for revolution 22, 74, 86–7, 103, 225 Beast of Revelation. See Revelation, book of Bible Society 54, 85, 184, 189, 193, 207n, 267. See also Hernández, Ignacio Blackmore, Eleanor 56–7 Blauvelt, Abraham 45 Bolaños Hunter, Miguel 8–9, 102, 146, 182, 190, 211, 279 Borge, Tomás 8, 15, 22, 105, 112, 141, 152, 169–70, 171, 175, 180, 182, 190, 195–6, 210, 224–5, 245, 266–8, 279 brigades 134, 151, 158–9, 206n, 269 Carballo, Bismarco 34, 163, 182–3 Casa 50 185, 193 Casco, Miguel Angel xi, 31, 67, 72, 74, 85–6, 115–7, 123, 126–9, 132, 154, 179, 199, 227, 235, 247, 257, 261, 266–7, 280 Castro, Fidel 15–16, 143, 146, 150, 230 Catholics 1–2, 3, 19–20, 24–5, 29, 38, 39–41, 48–53, 55–6, 85, 92, 122, 126, 137, 139, 145, 163, 172, 181, 183, 186, 193, 200, 209, 211, 223, 226, 238 and the Somoza dynasty 76–9, 91 persecution of Protestants by 59, 87–9, 93–94, 200

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Protestants as societal rivals to 251–5 CDS. See Comités de Defensa Sandinista censorship 162–164 Central American Mission (CAM) 55–6, 59, 62, 88, 89, 94–5, 155, 156, 183 Centro Antonio Valdivieso (CAV) 18, 35, 115 CEPAD. See Consejo Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo Cerna, Lenin 7, 172–4, 209, 256 Cerrato, Saturnino 80, 82, 101, 120–1 123, 131, 152, 160, 185, 190, 191–2, 200, 205, 221–2, 258, 262, 280 Chamorro, Francisco 5–6 Chamorro, Joaquín 1, 4, 6n, 163 Chamorro, Violeta 4, 6n, 132, 163, 189, 252–3 Chile 64, 68 chiquitas 172, 176, 207 Church of God 11, 61, 67, 84, 118–9, 165, 260 and CEPAD 262 and GN 84, 187 geographical distribution of 71 progressive nature of 68 size of 61, 64, 131, 262 voting patterns 131–2 CIA 25, 36, 191–2, 202, 236, 256, 261 Ciudad Sandino 26n, 74, 110, 161, 189 CNPEN. See Consejo Nacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos (Permanent Commission of Human Rights), or CPDH 9, 172–3, 177, 199, 205 Comités de Defensa Sandinista (CDS) 16, 21, 25, 120, 122, 134, 150, 160–1, 163, 190, 212, 259, 261, 269–70 communism 77, 86, 93–4, 137–8, 140, 147, 165, 201, 271. See also Sandinistas, ideology of conscription. See Servicio Militar Patriótico, or SMP Consejo Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo (Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development), or CEPAD 2–4, 17, 20, 29–30, 32, 63–5, 116, 122–3, 158, 179, 197 and alleged links to state security 256–260 and SMP. See Servicio Militar Patriótico

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and Somoza 83, 92 as minority Protestant view in Nicaragua 125–35 cause of tensions between the Sandinistas and non-revolutionary Protestants 255–262 finances of 26, 27, 37, 66, 106–111, 190 focus on social issues 58, 73–4, 104–5 founding of 58, 87 support for the Sandinista revolution 18–19, 21, 22, 25, 29, 34–5, 40, 41, 99–115, 124, 206, 213, 224–5, 226, 252–4, 260–2, 264, 271 Consejo Nacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua (National Council of Evangelical Pastors of Nicaragua), or CNPEN 5, 19, 26, 27, 80, 125, 259, 261 critical of Sandinistas 22, 107, 124 finances of 37, 110–111, 190 numerical size of 126 plight highlighted by Religious Right 23, 255 political view of 25, 124 targeted by Sandinistas 17, 107, 185, 190–2, 212, 224 Conservatives (in Nicaragua) 53–4, 76, 85–7, 93 Continente ’75 83, 94 Contras 2, 4, 26, 150, 153, 156, 158–9, 164, 175–6, 184, 186, 195, 198, 209, 236–248, 255 and Evangelicals 21, 27, 37, 73, 192, 196, 202, 236–248, 257, 270 atrocities 37, 173, 187, 238, 240, 243–44 definition of 244 Cortés, Benjamín 5, 64, 68, 108–9, 110, 129, 191, 195, 252, 259, 280 Cuba 18, 28, 30, 105, 120, 139–140, 146–7, 150, 160, 164, 180, 204, 206, 228, 230–1, 241, 253–4 Cubans in Nicaragua 16, 146–7, 192, 256 Dirección General de Seguridad del Estado (General Directorate for State Security), or DGSE 7, 9, 102, 114, 122, 161, 170–3, 175–6, 185, 188, 190, 203, 209–11, 214, 256–9

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index Douglas, Joseph. See also Contras 123, 146, 149–50, 175, 197, 241, 243–4, 280 earthquake (1972) 18, 20, 58, 74, 76, 78–9, 83, 87, 90, 92, 99 East Bloc. See Sandinistas and East Bloc East Germany 146, 147 state security (Stasi) 171 education. See Sandinistas and Education Ejército Popular Sandinista (Sandinista People’s Army), or EPS 152, 157, 176, 210, 236–7, 243–8 El Chipote 9–10, 18, 80, 172, 185, 194, 203, 205 El Salvador 95, 169, 201, 230, 240, 263n, 265, 268 Episcopalians 47, 133. See also Anglicans EPS. See Ejército Popular Sandinista eschatology. See Pentecostal eschatology Escorcia Polanco, Carlos xi, 31, 61, 67, 81–2, 90–1, 92–3, 105, 115–8, 121, 127–9, 132, 179, 187–8, 199, 248, 280, 257, 259, 261 Escorcia Sequeira, Carlos 61, 67, 69, 117–8 Espinoza, Mario 80, 94, 102, 156, 180, 193, 227, 235, 280 Evangelicals, Evangelicalism abuses against by Sandinistas 188–212 abuses against by Somoza 41, 92–93, 94–95 accused of counterrevolution. See also Contras 34–35 and social prop theory 85–93 and U.S. foreign policy 20–2, 64–6 anti-communism of 21–3, 26, 37, 68, 86–7, 93, 95, 119, 137–8 Contras and. See Contras definition of 10–11 early support for revolution 119–120 numerical size of 129–135, 254, 271–73 relations with Sandinistas 178–188 view of Sandinistas 93–4, 119–134, 137–165, 262–271 voting patterns 131–2, 271–4 Fagoth, Steadman 26, 32, 175, 183 finances. See CEPAD and CNPEN Fonseca, Carlos 143, 149, 152, 153n, 266, 268

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Fonseca, Rodolfo 67, 115n, 118–9, 145, 260 food rationing. See rationing Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front), or FSLN. See Sandinistas Galloway, Ron 57–8, 73–4, 81, 85, 89, 101, 281 glossolalia 11, 219, 268 Godoy, Oscar 61, 67, 69, 93, 115–7, 127–9, 132, 257 Guardia Nacional (National Guard), or GN 1, 76, 79, 84, 88–9, 91, 92, 93, 95, 100 Guatemala 51–2, 55n, 72, 157, 169, 186, 201, 210, 240, 252 Guerra Popular Prolongada (People’s Protracted War), or GPP 15–16, 141 Hassan, Jimmy 122, 185, 194, 203, 214, 261, 281 Hernández, Ignacio xi, 85, 102, 106, 110–1, 163, 185, 189, 192–3, 203–4, 207, 260–1, 281 highlands. See Nicaragua, geography of. See also Pentecostalism, geographical distribution of Holland, Clifton 61, 62–3, 68, 70, 71, 74, 79, 127, 129, 252, 254, 271–2, 281 Honduras 157, 182, 199, 237–8, 242, 245–7 human rights abuses. See Sandinistas and human rights abuses Iglesia de Dios. See Church of God Institute of Religion and Democracy, or IRD xi, 8–9, 19, 25, 27, 29, 36, 107, 114, 164, 258–9, 272 Israel 4, 40, 42, 114, 227–36 Jalapa 70, 72, 144, 155–6, 158, 185, 196, 199 jeeps 27, 107–8, 193 Jeffrey, Paul 64–65, 281 La Barricada 5, 8–9, 103, 109, 142–4, 147, 152–3, 161, 163–4, 181–2, 206, 222–6, 232–6 Latin America Mission (LAM) 62 Liberalism 48–55, 251–2 Nicaraguan 53–55, liberation theology 1–3, 16, 18, 23,

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22, 24–25, 37–40, 42, 74, 78, 92, 115, 144, 203, 206, 216, 224, 226, 255, 263, 266, 270–1 Lindsey, Hal 138n, 220, 227 literacy Crusade 17n, 39, 54, 109, 133, 134, 146, 148, 213, 223 López, Bienvenido 67, 71, 119, 131, 165, 207, 255, 257, 281 Libya 230, 232 Mairena, Nicanor 112, 118, 207, 281 Marxism. See Sandinistas, ideology of Marxist-Leninism. See Sandinistas, ideology of Matagalpa 59–60, 69–70, 72, 93, 107, 162, 198 Matamoros, Bartolomé 67, 109, 117, 119, 121, 126–7, 154–5, 193, 196, 237, 247, 248, 282 Mejilla, Alfonso 72, 144–5, 156, 157, 188–9, 199, 237, 243, 247, 282 Mendoza, Boanerges 108, 110, 121, 185, 193, 200, 205, 258, 261 Mennonites 124, 241 Mexico 52n, 53, 61, 229 Ministerio del Interior (Interior Ministry), or MINT 8, 110–1, 146, 174, 183, 196, 203, 210, 211 missionaries 65–8, 70, 71, 79–80, 84–6, 88–9, 101, 118–9, 123, 141, 178–9, 183, 186, 196, 203, 242, 246, 263n. See also Pentecostalism, history of in Nicaragua Miskito Indians 43–48, 139, 152, 277 Miskito-Sandinista war 18, 22, 26, 32, 73, 82, 106, 123–4, 174–5, 206, 241–2 Moravian Church and 18, 22, 32, 47–8, 123–4, 183–4 Movimiento de Pastores Revolucionarios (Movement of Revolutionary Pastors), or MPR 115–6, 126–8 Mottesi, Alberto 27, 191 Murra, massacre at 173, 198–9, 202, 209–210, 247, 260 National Association of Evangelicals, or NAE 26, 138, 185–6, 214n National Guard. See Guardia Nacional Nazarenes 57–58, 112, 118, 133, 207 and GN 75 Nicaragua British presence in 44–7 geography of 43, 73, 174–8, 199–202,

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276, 278. See also Atlantic coast under Somoza dynasty. See Somoza U.S. involvement in 47n, 53–5, 64–65, 71–2, 76, 105–6, 138, 205 Obando y Bravo, Archbishop 2, 19–20, 23, 25, 34, 164, 182, 183, 187, 223, 254, 267 Open Doors 27, 107 Ortega, Daniel 102, 112, 152, 163, 225, 231, 232, 257, 260, 273, 282 Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO 40, 134, 227–35. See also Israel Parajón, Gustavo xi, 5, 18, 30n, 57, 58, 99–102, 107–9, 111–4, 122, 134, 179, 193, 199–200, 206, 222, 252–9, 261, 282 Pastora, Eden 2, 207 Pentecostalism, Pentecostals and eschatology 40, 138, 214–26, 268, 270 and finances 65–6 and the poor 3, 22–23, 38, 69, 72–3, 221–2, 226, 263–66 apolitical nature of 24, 214–26 definition of 11 dominance of classical variety in Nicaragua 11, 63–68 geographical distribution of 41, 69–73, 278. See also Nicaragua, geography of history of in Nicaragua 59–68 nationalist 66–8 numerical size of 58, 63, 63–4, 68, 129–31, 271–3 (Evangelical size of ?) pro-Sandinista 115–18, 126–9, 205–6 piracy. See Puritanism posters of Christ 104, 144, 225 premillennialism. See Pentecostal eschatology press censorship. See censorship Protestantism, Protestants and liberation theology 18, 23–4, 31, 32, 42, 73–4, 87, 104–6, 114–5, 206, 216, 224 as a religion of progress 49–55 as client 251–5, 271 history of Nicaraguan 43–74 Protestant-Sandinista relations. See Sandinista-Protestant relations Providence, Island of 44–5 Puritans 39–40, 43–5

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index radio broadcasting 56, 60–1, 62, 83–4, 90, 115, 163, 185, 186 Rafferty, Kate 107, 125, 193 rationing 124, 134, 151n, 157, 160–1, 165, 171 Reagan, Ronald 21, 25–6, 106, 174, 182, 201n, 202, 233–4, 238, 240, 259 religious left 17, 21, 29, 35, 41, 114, 206, 213, 251 religious right 25–7, 29, 37, 41, 187, 202, 246, 251 Revelation, book of 121, 165, 215–8 Ríos Montt, Efraín 72, 252 RIPEN 2 20, 20n, 29, 30n, 104, 126, 134 Robleto, Harold 102, 106–7, 111, 156, 187, 203, 256, 282 Rojas, Roberto 72, 120, 134, 141, 148, 161, 185, 186, 191, 282 Rosales, Felix 80, 110, 114, 120, 124, 146–7, 185, 189–90, 192–3, 214n, 256, 258, 283 rural Nicaragua. See Nicaragua, geography of, and Pentecostalism, geographical distribution of Russia 138, 140, 143, 165, 206, 229, 253–4, 250. See also Sandinistas and East Bloc Sánchez, Arnulfo 70, 126, 160, 163–4, 197, 237, 283 Sandinista(s), Sandinismo and East Bloc 137–8, 146–7, 171, 228, 253–4 and education 146, 148–53, 159, 164 and international terrorist organisations 143, 227, 230 demand support of revolution 165, 221–226 human rights abuses by 16, 17–9, 169–78 ideology of 2, 4, 15–19, 37, 120–1, 137–46 justice 169–74 relations with Protestant relations, perceptions of 15–42 religious repression by 15–19, 188–212 revolution 1–2, 35, 39, 74, 78–9, 87 rhetoric 142–6 view of Evangelicals 202–8, 213–48 view of Israel. See Israel

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view of religion 16–17, 33 Sandino, Augusto 1, 38, 55, 71, 76, 86, 104, 117, 138, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 152, 266–8, 270 Sandli, Burger 70–1, 176, 196, 207, 283 Santos Zelaya, General Jose 48, 54–5, 76, 87 Scofield, Cyrus 55–56 Segundo Retiro Interdenominacional de Pastores Evangélicos de Nicaragua (Second Interdenominational Retreat of Nicaraguan Protestant Pastors). See RIPEN 2 Servicio Militar Patriótico (Patriotic Military Service), or SMP 20, 28, 123, 134, 152, 153–59, 184, 214, 241, 245–7, 262, 269 Shoeneich, Benno 59–60, 65 SMP. See Servicio Militar Patriótico social prop theory. See Evangelicalism Somoza dynasty 39, 55, 75–96, 148, 163, 194, 205 and Catholics 76–9 and Protestants 79–96, 100, 113, 119–20 brutality of 169 links with Israel 231–2 overthrow of 1, 74, 126, 138, 248 sources 5–10, 31–5 Soviet Union. See Russia, and also Sandinistas and East Bloc Soza, Rufino 74, 81, 122, 161, 164, 190, 195, 208n, 283 Spanish Inquisition 43, 48, 50 speaking in tongues. See glossolalia Spencer, David xi, 5, 60, 84, 118, 141, 158, 209, 226, 232, 283 accused of opposing revolution 32–3, 121n, 187 and CEPAD 33, 91, 255, 261 and Somoza 84, 90–1 radio broadcasting by 61, 90 Stasi. See East Germany State of Emergency (1982) 28, 132, 181 State of Emergency (1985) 17–18, 28, 122, 132, 184, 186, 204–5, 211 Suárez, Jose 7–8, 104, 111, 141, 157, 227, 246, 256, 269, 283 Swaggart, Jimmy 132, 187–8, 243 templos, 1982 seizure of 18, 20–1, 25, 33–35, 36, 122, 181–2, 191, 209, 211, 245

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Tendencia Proletaria 15–6, 141 Terceristas 15–16, 120, 141 Tercero, Uriel 156–7, 195, 197, 199, 202, 247, 284 Thatcher, Margaret 46 TP. See Tendencia Proletaria totalitarianism 23, 140, 159–65. See also Sandinista ideology Trolese, Bob 72, 147, 148, 180, 181, 188, 284 turbas 26, 33–4, 154, 161, 181–3, 190–1, 211 Ulloa, Sixto 5, 58, 100, 103, 111–2, 114, 128–9, 154, 155, 188, 190, 199, 210, 256, 258, 260, 284 United States 1–2, 19, 20–1, 23, 25–7, 39, 41, 49, 92, 112–3, 118, 137, 150,

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154, 174, 183, 207, 232, 238, 260, 265. See also Washington and Evangelicals 186, 213, 227, 236, 246. See also Evangelicals Department of State 8–9, 47n, 89, 204, 233 involvement in Nicaraguan affairs. See Nicaragua, U.S. involvement in UNO coalition 132, 272–3 Vatican II

19, 42, 78, 89

Walker, William 53 Washington 2, 8, 15, 25, 27, 76, 81, 95, 139, 150, 164, 201, 235, 240 Waslala 70, 176 Wolf, Marcus 171

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