Rethinking the Coordinate-Subordinate Dichotomy: Interpersonal Grammar and the Analysis of Adverbial Clauses in English 9783110918199, 9783110199505

Citation preview

Rethinking the Coordinate-Subordinate Dichotomy

≥

Topics in English Linguistics 55

Editors

Bernd Kortmann Elizabeth Closs Traugott

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Rethinking the Coordinate-Subordinate Dichotomy Interpersonal Grammar and the Analysis of Adverbial Clauses in English

by

Jean-Christophe Verstraete

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.

앝 Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines 앪 of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Verstraete, Jean-Christophe, 1976⫺ Rethinking the coordinate-subordinate dichotomy : interpersonal grammar and the analysis of adverbial clauses in English / by Jean-Christophe Verstraete. p. cm. ⫺ (Topics in English linguistics ; 55) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-3-11-019950-5 (alk. paper) 1. English language ⫺ Modality. 2. English language ⫺ Adverb. 3. English language ⫺ Clauses. I. Title. PE1315.M6V47 2007 425⫺dc22 2007007831

ISBN 978-3-11-019950-5 ISSN 1434-3452 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” Copyright 2007 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

Acknowledgements

This book could not have been written without the support and encouragement of many people. First of all, I would like to thank my former supervisors Kristin Davidse and Bill McGregor, for the freedom they gave me to find my own way, for the time they spent discussing draft versions, even when they really did not have the time, and for the generosity with which they always shared their ideas and comments. I am grateful to a number of other people for their comments on the entire manuscript: Renaat Declerck, William Van Belle, David Wilkins, and the series editors of Topics in English Linguistics, Bernd Kortmann and Elizabeth Closs Traugott. I would also like to thank Bernd Kortmann, Birgit Sievert and Wolfgang Konwitschny for guiding me through the publication process. I am grateful to a large number of people who in some way or other contributed to parts of this work. A special word of thanks goes to Patrick Goethals and Peter Lauwers, for our stimulating lunchtime talks about causal constructions, modality and other topics, to An Laffut, for our discussions about methodology and functional analysis, and to Jan Nuyts, for our discussions about modality. Furthermore, I am indebted to the late Machtelt Bolkestein, and to Bert Cappelle, Keith Carlon, Michael Clyne, Bert Cornillie, Mily Crevels, Hubert Cuyckens, Barbara Dancygier, Eirian Davies, Barbara De Cock, Hendrik De Smet, Nick Evans, Ad Foolen, Liliane Haegeman, Kees Hengeveld, Caroline Heycock, Liesbet Heyvaert, Judit Horváth, Anne Jensen, Mary Laughren, Alexander Loengarov, Lachlan Mackenzie, Ricardo Maldonado, Piet Mertens, Philip Miller, Rachel Nordlinger, Susan Reed, Jan Rijkhoff, Stéphane Robert, Ted Sanders, Eva Schultze-Berndt, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen, Jakob Steensig, Miriam Taverniers, Paul Thibault, Ingrid Van Canegem-Ardijns, Lieven Vandelanotte, Wim Vandenberghe, Karel Van den Eynde, Johan Van der Auwera, Willy Van Langendonck and Dieter Vermandere, for their help, suggestions, comments and criticisms at various occasions. I would like to thank the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders for its financial support of this work, in the form of a doctoral fellowship and a research stay at the University of Aarhus.

vi

Acknowledgements

On a personal level, finally, I would like to thank my parents and family. I am deeply grateful to my father and mother for everything they have done for me. And I thank Barbara for her love and support, and for being with me. It is my greatest regret that my mother is not with us anymore, so I dedicate this book to her memory.

Contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations Tables Figures Introduction

v xii xiv xvi 1

Part 1. Parameters of interpersonal grammar in the simple clause Introduction to Part 1 Chapter 1. Modality: Construing a position 1. Introduction 1.1. Modal verbs as an interpersonal phenomenon 1.2. Moods and modal verbs 2. Modal verbs: subjective versus objective 2.1. Two problem areas 2.1.1. Delineation of the categories 2.1.2. Criteria 2.2. A semiotic account of the criteria 2.2.1. Conditional constructions 2.2.2. Interrogation 2.2.3. Conclusion 2.3. Back to the problem of delineation 2.3.1. Subjective deontic modality? 2.3.2. Objective epistemic modality? 2.3.3. Summary 3. Moods 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Moods and subjective modality 3.2.1. The functional correlation 3.2.2. Further justification: the category of tense 3.2.3. Two definitions of the imperative-indicative contrast 3.2.4. Moods as unmarked options? 3.3. Moods and objective modality 3.3.1. Objective deontic modality and the moods

7 13 13 13 15 16 17 17 21 22 22 26 28 29 32 36 38 38 38 40 40 42 46 47 52 53

viii Contents 3.3.2. Objective modality and indicative mood 3.4. Summary

55 57

Chapter 2. Speech function: Assigning responsibility 1. Introduction 2. Declarative and interrogative 2.1. Alternative assignments of responsibility 2.2. The role of modality in interrogative structures 2.2.1. Marked and unmarked modal values in polar interrogatives 2.2.2. Marked and unmarked modal values in wh-interrogatives 2.3. Conclusion 3. The position of the imperative 4. Modality and speech function in relation to illocutionary force 4.1. Interpersonal grammar as a prerequisite for illocutionary force 4.2. Interpersonal grammar and types of illocutionary force 4.2.1. Interpersonal grammar and patterns of interaction 4.2.2. Interpersonal grammar and indirect speech acts 4.3. Conclusion 5. Conclusion

59 59 60 60 62 62 64 66 66 69 70 72 72 75 77 77

Chapter 3. Focus and scope: Delineating a domain 1. Introduction 2. The scope of interpersonal elements 2.1. Focus-presupposition structure 2.2. The scope of interpersonal elements 2.3. Conclusion 3. Scope and clausehood 3.1. Extra-clausal status and scope 3.2. Arguments versus adjuncts 4. Conclusion

79 79 80 80 83 88 88 88 92 94

Part 2. Interpersonal grammar and clause combining Introduction to Part 2 Chapter 4. Parameters of interpersonal grammar and the analysis of clause combining 1. Introduction 1.1. Relation to previous analyses 1.2. Initial delineation of the domain 2. Speech function and clause combining

97 103 103 103 104 106

Contents

2.1. 2.2. 3. 3.1. 3.2. 4. 4.1. 4.2. 5.

Relevance to clause combining Categories defined by the values of the parameter Modality and clause combining Relevance to clause combining Categories defined by the values of the parameter Scope and clause combining Relevance to clause combining Categories defined by the values of the parameter Summary

ix 107 109 112 113 114 117 118 120 124

Chapter 5. Combining the parameters: A typology 1. Relations between the parameters 1.1. Modality and speech function 1.2. Scope and the other two parameters 1.3. Summary 2. A typology of four construction types 3. Why this typology?

127 127 127 129 132 132 134

Chapter 6. Motivating the typology: Function 1. Introduction 2. General interpersonal profiles of the construction types 3. Functional generalizations in clause combining 4. Integration versus non-integration 5. Presupposition 5.1. Presupposition and modality 5.2. Condition and reason 5.3. Challengeability and foregrounding 5.4. Conclusion 6. Equality versus inequality 7. Terminology 8. Conclusion

137 137 138 141 143 145 146 147 150 151 152 156 157

Chapter 7. Motivating the typology: Grammar 1. Introduction 2. Preposability 2.1. Preposing and the parameter of speech function 2.2. Preposing and the parameter of scope 3. Clefting and wh-questioning 3.1. Clefting and wh-questioning as focusing constructions 3.2. Comparison of the resulting categorizations

161 161 162 163 165 167 168 170

x 4. 4.1. 4.2. 5. 6.

Contents

Intonational integration Intonation and scope Non-integrated intonation and degrees of subordination ‘Main clause phenomena’ A comparative perspective: word order in the other Germanic languages Word order and the parameter of speech function Explaining the marking by word order Conclusion

172 174 175 178

Chapter 8. Motivating the typology: Semantics 1. Introduction 2. Conjunctions associated with more than one construction type 2.1. As and since 2.2. When and while 2.3. Because 2.4. So that 2.5. Conclusion 3. The general semantic profile of the construction types 3.1. The primary distinction 3.2. Narrative uses as a principled exception 3.3. The other distinctions in the typology 4. Secondary parameters: further semantic differentiation 4.1. Coordinaton: argumentative and non-argumentative subcategories 4.2. Free/bound subordination: temporal and non-temporal subcategories 5. Conclusion

187 187 188 189 193 197 200 203 204 205 207 208 210

6.1. 6.2. 7.

181 182 184 186

211 215 218

Part 3. Applications and implications Introduction to Part 3

223

Chapter 9. Speaker-related versus SoA-related interpretations 1. Introduction 2. Explaining syntactic behaviour 2.1. Speaker-related interpretation and bound subordination 2.2. Explaining the criteria 3. The subdivision of the speaker-related category 3.1. Modality and speech function 3.2. The status of structures with non-declarative main clauses

227 227 229 231 233 236 237 240

Contents

4.

Conclusion

xi 242

Chapter 10. Initial and final position 1. Introduction 2. Interpersonal properties of initial secondary clauses 2.1. Speech function 2.2. Scope 2.3. Conclusion 3. The relevance of [+/- Scope] 3.1. The parameter of scope 3.2. Relation to initial and final position 4. The relevance of [+/- Speech Function] 4.1. The parameter of speech function 4.2. Relation to initial and final position 5. Conclusion

245 245 246 247 248 250 251 251 253 254 254 256 258

Chapter 11. Typological outlook 1. Introduction 2. Moods in the verb phrase 2.1. Non-indicative moods and absence of illocutionary force 2.2. Moods as markers? 3. Integration phenomena 3.1. Russian converbs: intonation marking for scope distinctions 3.2. Types of subordination in Belhare: lexical marking for scope distinctions 4. The status of deranked verb forms 4.1. Subordinate deranking constructions 4.2. Coordinate deranking constructions 4.3. Conclusion 5. Conclusion

261 261 262 263 267 269 270

Conclusion

281

Notes References Subject index Author index

293 301 315 319

272 275 276 277 279 280

Abbreviations

Abbreviations for corpora BNC CB COLT FLOB IC ICE-GB LOB

British National Corpus COBUILD corpus Bergen Corpus of London Teenage Language Freiburg-LOB corpus of British English Internet Corpus International Corpus of English - Great Britain component Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus

Abbreviations in glosses ABL ADD AUX COG COM COMP CONJ CONV DAT DEF DIM DISTR DS ERG FAC FUT ID IMP IMPF LOC N NPST PROG

ablative additive auxiliary cognitive topic comitative complementizer conjunctive converb dative definite diminutive distributive different subject ergative factive future identificator imperative imperfective locative nominative nonpast progressive

Abbreviations xiii

PST QU REFL STAT SUB SUP TEL TOD.PST TOP

past question reflexive stative subjunctive supine telic today’s past topic

Tables

Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. Table 8. Table 9. Table 10. Table 11. Table 12. Table 13. Table 14. Table 15. Table 16. Table 17. Table 18. Table 19. Table 20. Table 21. Table 22a. Table 22b. Table 23. Table 24a. Table 24b. Table 25. Table 26. Table 27. Table 28. Table 29. Table 30.

The problem of delineation 20 Relevant features for the analysis of deontic modality 34 The subjective-objective delineation for modal verbs 38 The imperative-indicative distinction 39 Two different features in the definition of the indicativeimperative contrast 47 The semantic relation between moods and modals 51 Moods and modals 57 Two aspects of the indicative-imperative contrast 58 Interpersonal meaning in imperative and non-imperative structures 69 Basic interpersonal schemas as defined by the two parameters 73 Types of grammatical structure in relation to scope 93 The relevance of the parameter [+/- Speech Function] 112 The relevance of the parameter [+/- Modality] 117 The relevance of the parameter [+/- Scope] 124 Relations between speech function and modality 129 Relations between scope and speech function/modality 131 The four construction types in the typology 139 Integration versus non-integration 145 Presupposition and challengeability 152 Equality versus inequality 155 Functional generalizations as they relate to the interpersonal typology 159 Categorization on the basis of preposing 163 Interpersonal categorization 163 Preposing and the interpersonal typology 167 Categorization on the basis of clefting and wh-questioning 171 Interpersonal categorization 171 The criteria of clefting and wh-questioning 172 The criterion of integrated intonation 177 Main clause phenomena type 1 181 Main clause phenomena type 2 181 Word order in the other Germanic languages 184 Intra- and extra-paradigmatic resolution of neutralization 185

Tables

Table 31. Table 32. Table 33. Table 34. Table 35. Table 36. Table 37. Table 38. Table 39. Table 40. Table 41. Table 42. Table 43. Table 44. Table 45. Table 46. Table 47. Table 48. Table 49.

xv

Summary of the formal criteria 186 The interpersonal typology and the categorization of conjunctions 187 Relation between interpersonal and semantic differences 189 Constructional associations for the temporal/justificational distinction 193 Constructional associations for the temporal/contrastive distinction 196 Constructional associations for the purpose/result distinction 202 Semantic profiles 205 The basic semantic profiles of the construction types 206 Range of illocutionary forces as a secondary parameter for coordination 215 Modality as a secondary parameter for free and bound subordination 218 Interpersonal parameters and interclausal semantics 219 The distinction between SoA- and speaker-related uses 233 The interpersonal status of secondary clauses in initial position 250 Initial-final position and the parameter of scope 254 Different types of secondary clauses in final position 258 Range of contextualizations for the generalized subordinate clause 266 The interpersonal typology and functional characteristics 284 The interpersonal typology and traditional grammatical criteria 285 The interpersonal typology and semantic categories 286

Figures

Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7.

Focus as a criterion for scope Relations between the values of the parameters Terminological distinctions The distinction between speaker-related and SOA-related structures Bound subordination Speaker-related structure The basic typology

85 132 157 231 232 233 283

Introduction

Orientation This study deals with the analysis of complex sentences in English, focusing on constructions that have traditionally been described as coordinate and adverbial subordinate. The basic argument developed in this study is that the central functional principle underlying the system of complex sentence formation in English is the interpersonal organization of the complex sentence structure. The domain of interpersonal grammar (Halliday 1994, also known as the domain of ‘subjectivity’ from the work of Traugott 1989 or Langacker 1990) covers those aspects of grammatical organization that deal with the encoding of speaker-attitude and speakerinterlocutor interaction, like modal verbs (e.g. may, must, have to), mood types (e.g. indicative, imperative) or basic clause types (e.g. declarative, interrogative, imperative). In this study, I will show that different types of complex sentence constructions can be defined and distinguished from each other in terms of the relative interpersonal status of their component clauses, operationalized in terms of three basic grammatical features. Complex sentence constructions in English have been studied from a variety of perspectives. One perspective has been to focus on the semantic properties of the interclausal relations, for instance setting up classifications of semantic types (e.g. Foley and Van Valin 1984: 268–274; Kortmann 1991: 118–132), investigating specific semantic domains (e.g. Altenberg 1984 for causality, Aarts 1988 for concession) or looking at patterns of polysemy and diachronic development for conjunctions (e.g. König 1985; Traugott and König 1991). Another perspective has been to focus on the discursive properties of complex sentences, identifying discourse functions like presupposition, challengeability, or integration for specific types of clause combinations (e.g. Givón 1980, 1982; Winter 1982; Matthiessen and Thompson 1988) or distinguishing between different domains in which interclausal relations can operate (Davies 1979; Sweetser 1990). Still another perspective has been to focus on the formal and grammatical properties of conjunctions and clause combinations, distinguishing for instance between coordinating and subordinating conjunctions (Greenbaum 1969; Quirk et al. 1985), or looking at intonational properties of clause combinations (Chafe 1984, 1988; Couper-Kuhlen 1996).

2

Introduction

In this study, I will show that there is a unifying principle behind the system of clause combining in English that can integrate and explain the semantic, discursive and grammatical properties of different types of complex sentence constructions. The basic argument will be that this principle is interpersonal: what distinguishes different types of complex sentence constructions from each other is their divergent status in terms of speaker-attitude and speaker-interlocutor interaction. More specifically, I will develop a typology of four basic types of complex sentence constructions on the basis of three features of interpersonal grammar, and I will demonstrate that this typology can serve as a unifying framework for most of the semantic, grammatical and discursive properties that have been observed in the literature. This typology will provide an alternative both to the dichotomy between coordination and subordination from traditional grammar, which is still the basis of the analysis of clause combining in many frameworks, and to more recent proposals that give up the dichotomy in favour of a non-discrete continuum. Outline of the study This study will consist of three parts: Part 1 will deal with the interpersonal analysis of the simple clause, Part 2 will use this analysis to develop a typology of complex sentence constructions, and Part 3 will test the framework developed in the first two parts against a number of specific descriptive problems in the domain of clause combining. In Part 1, I will investigate those aspects of interpersonal grammar in the simple clause that I consider to be relevant to the analysis of clause combining. Chapter 1 will deal with modal verbs (both auxiliaries like can or must and semi-auxiliaries like be able to or have to) and mood types (imperative, indicative), Chapter 2 will deal with basic clause types (declarative, interrogative, imperative), and Chapter 3 will deal with focus phenomena (nuclear accent location, wh-interrogatives). The analysis in these chapters will generally focus on two questions. The first question concerns the interpersonal status of these phenomena: it is not immediately obvious that all of them can be considered interpersonal, i.e. that they contribute to the construal of speaker-attitude and speaker-interlocutor interaction. Various modal verbs, for instance, do not only allow interpretations that relate to speaker-attitude (e.g. epistemic meanings), but also allow interpretations that do not seem to be speaker-related at all (e.g. meanings like ability). The second question concerns the interaction

Outline of the study

3

between these phenomena: given that they all serve to encode aspects of speaker-attitude and speaker-interlocutor interaction, an additional problem is to determine how they relate to each other. Issues that will be addressed here include, for instance, the relation between moods and modal verbs, and the status of the imperative as a mood type (like the indicative) or a basic clause type (like the declarative and the interrogative). Taken together, the results of the first part of this study will provide a model of the interpersonal organization of the simple clause that will be applied to the analysis of clause combining in the second part. In Part 2, the different aspects of interpersonal grammar discussed in Part 1 will be used as parameters for the analysis of clause combining. In Chapter 4, I will show how each of these parameters can take two values in the context of a complex sentence construction, and therefore defines two different structural configurations. In Chapter 5, I will combine these parameters to set up a typology of clause combinations: the possible combinations of values for the different interpersonal parameters will form a basic typology of four construction types. In Chapters 6 to 8, I will demonstrate the usefulness of this interpersonally-based typology by showing how it can integrate and explain a number of basic theoretical and descriptive issues in the domain of clause combining in English. Chapter 6 will deal with the different discursive characteristics that have been associated with types of complex sentences, Chapter 7 will focus on the different grammatical criteria that have been used to distinguish between types of complex sentences, and Chapter 8 will focus on patterns of polysemy that have been observed for specific conjunctions. The general conclusion will be that three of the four constructions in the typology can be regarded as specific subtypes of adverbial subordinate constructions, which need to be distinguished because they have clearly divergent discursive, grammatical and semantic properties. In Part 3, finally, I will provide further evidence for the usefulness of the proposed analysis by testing it against two specific descriptive problems in the domain of clause combining. Chapter 9 will show how it can deal with the distinction between different domains of interpretation for interclausal relations (Davies 1979; Sweetser 1990), and Chapter 10 will show how it can account for the difference in discursive status associated with the distinction between initial and final position for adverbial clauses (Thompson 1985; Givón 1990; Ford 1993). Chapter 11, finally, will round off the study with a tentative investigation of some typological implications of the proposed analysis.

4

Introduction

This study is not situated within any specific linguistic framework. It has been inspired, however, by insights from a number of functional frameworks, including Systemic Functional Grammar (Davies 1979; Halliday 1994), Semiotic Grammar (McGregor 1997), Functional Grammar (Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1997a, 1997b), Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin 1993; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997), and Langacker’s and Traugott’s work on subjectivity and semantic change (Langacker 1990; Traugott and Dasher 2002). Accordingly, these frameworks will form the primary point of reference for certain theoretical issues. The data on which this study is based are taken primarily from two corpora, viz. the Cobuild corpus (Wordbanks online, for more information see http://www.collins.co.uk/cobuild/) for material without prosodic transcription, and the Bergen Corpus of London Teenage Language (see Stenström, Andersen and Hasund 2002 for more information) for material with prosodic transcription. This is supplemented with material from the British National Corpus (see Burnard 1995 for more information), the FreiburgLOB corpus of British English (see Hundt, Sand and Siemund 1998 for more information), the International Corpus of English (see Nelson, Wallis and Aarts 2002 for more information), the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (see Johansson, Leech and Goodluck 1978 for more information), and a personal corpus of internet material. When citing examples from these corpora, the following conventions are used: – The relevant corpus is listed between brackets after each example, together with the relevant subsection and line number, whenever these are available. Conventions for the naming of subsections can be found in the documentation available for the different corpora. – The COLT corpus also provides prosodic transcriptions and uses the following conventions: – # indicates the boundary of an intonation unit – \ , / , – , \/ , /\ indicate the location of the nuclear accent and the nature of the intonation contour, respectively falling, rising, level, falling-rising, and rising-falling. – Within examples, I will also often underline the element or structure under discussion, especially when there is a possibility of confusion in longer extracts. Other changes or comments will be indicated between square brackets.

Part 1 Parameters of interpersonal grammar in the simple clause

Introduction to Part 1

In the first part of this study, I will outline the parameters of interpersonal grammar that I consider to be relevant to the analysis of clause combinations. A detailed investigation of each of these parameters in the grammar of the simple clause will provide the groundwork that is necessary for the second part, where they will be used to set up a typology of complex sentence constructions. A brief presentation of the parameters The parameters of interpersonal grammar that will be investigated in the following three chapters are modality, speech function and scope. Within the grammar of the simple clause, they take care of three interrelated functions, organized around the central function of modality: modality encodes a position towards the propositional content of the clause, speech function assigns responsibility for this position in speaker-interlocutor interaction, and scope delineates the domain over which this position operates. The parameter of modality, which will be dealt with in Chapter 1, serves to encode a particular position towards the propositional content1 of the clause: is it possible, plausible or necessary (epistemic) or is it permitted, desirable or obligatory (deontic)? The modal auxiliary must in (1) and the modal adverb probably in (2) both encode epistemic positions, evaluating the proposition respectively as a necessary or a plausible one, whereas the modal auxiliary must in (3) and the imperative mood in (4) both encode deontic positions, assessing the SoA respectively as an obligatory and a desirable one. (1)

(2)

But still Persian influence lingered. The earliest Malay version of the Panchatantra or Bidpai’s fables was known to the Dutch historian Valentyn in 1726 and from its poor Malay and Sumatran style it must have been translated at Acheh. (LOB lob_g) A strong “treasure house” or sacristy had later been added to the east end of the chapel. A great porch at the west end, of still later date, was probably being built in 1511 when Erasmus described the chapel as “unfinished.” (LOB lob_a)

8 (3)

(4)

Introduction to Part 1

What we want is for the right honourable gentleman to use the full weight of his office. We are getting tired of a cosmetic approach an oversanguine approach. There is a crisis and he must act now (ICE-GB S1B-056 087-089) “You’re late,” he reproved. “I was nearly coming to fetch you. Come in here a minute, Miss Diana, there’s a thing I have to show you before you go in there.” (LOB lob_p)

The parameter of speech function, which will be dealt with in Chapter 2, takes care of the activation of the modal position in speaker-interlocutor interaction, by assigning the responsibility for the modal position to one of the speech act participants. The interrogative in (5) signals that the speaker transfers this responsibility to the interlocutor in the next turn (‘do you allow it?’), whereas the declarative in (6) signals that the speaker takes responsibility for the position in his/her own turn (‘I do not allow it’). (5) (6)

“I need to see Izzy,” I said. “I told you, she’s sound asleep. Deeply asleep.” “May I see for myself?” (CB usbooks) “You may not, you shit-sucking liar! You cheat. You coward. You sit!” I pulled back the heavy dining room chair and sat before the typewriter. (CB usbooks)

The parameter of scope, finally, takes care of the delineation of the domain over which these modal positions operate. The distinction between (7) and (8) below shows that not all structures related to a particular clause fall within the scope of the modal or speech functional elements in that clause. The after-clause in (7) falls within the scope of the modal marker must in the main clause, as reflected in the fact that it serves as the focus for this modal. The although-clause in (8), on the other hand, does not fall within the scope of the modal marker may in the main clause, as reflected in the fact that it cannot serve as focus for this modal (the relation between focus and scope will be explained in more detail in Section 1 of Chapter 3). (7)

Butchers Stanley and Christine Henderson had been accused of selling unfit food after Katie Rammone complained about the blow fly in a sausage roll bought at their east London shop. […] The Hendersons said it must have landed on the meat after they sold it. But tests allegedly showed it had been cooked. (CB today)

Interpersonal function

(8)

9

THOMAS: How does this fit in with finds elsewhere in the world, does it actually tie up with discoveries? STRINGER: To an extent, in that we believe that people spread to many parts of the world, as I indicated, into Europe between 30,000 and 40,000 years ago. They may have got into the Americas 30,000 years ago, although that’s more controversial. (CB bbc)

The first three chapters of this study will mainly be devoted to a detailed investigation of each of these parameters, looking at the relevant grammatical systems, trying to determine their precise function and charting their interrelations. Before going into the details of each separate parameter, however, it is also necessary to look at what they have in common, because that is the central perspective from which this study has been set up: their shared interpersonal function. Interpersonal function What unites the three parameters and what makes them relevant to the analysis of clause combining in the second part of this study is their shared interpersonal function: they all deal with the role of the speaker in the utterance and his/her interaction with the interlocutor. As already mentioned, the term ‘interpersonal’ is borrowed from Halliday (e.g. 1970, 1994: 68–105), but a similar functional delineation of a speaker/interlocutorrelated domain is found in several other analyses, both older ones (compare Bühler’s expressive and conative functions 1982 [1934]: 24–33 or Jakobson’s emotive and conative functions (1960)) and contemporary ones (compare Langacker’s subjectivity (1990), and Traugott’s subjectivity and intersubjectivity (1989, 2003; Traugott and Dasher 2002)). The reason why I have chosen ‘interpersonal’ as a general label for the speaker/interlocutorrelated domain is that it is the only one that explicitly includes both speaker-attitude and speaker-interlocutor interaction (see further in De Smet and Verstraete 2006). As a functional description, however, speaker/interlocutor-relatedness is still too general to count as an adequate characterization of what the three parameters have in common. There are many different ways in which aspects of linguistic structure are related to the speaker or interlocutor, but what distinguishes the phenomena to be discussed here from other contenders like deixis is that they specifically encode some aspect of the speaker’s role or his/her interaction with the interlocutor (Goethals 2002: 76–80).

10 Introduction to Part 1 One well-known type of speaker-involvement in the utterance is deixis, where the speaker and interlocutor serve as the reference point with respect to which categories like tense or demonstratives can be interpreted. An utterance like (9) below, for instance, cannot be adequately interpreted without knowing the temporal and spatial location of the speaker in question: the precise reference of the present and past tense marking on the verb, the personal pronouns, and the demonstrative this can only be interpreted relative to the speaker’s and/or interlocutor’s temporal and spatial location. (9)

I came here and won with Wimbledon seven years ago, but we weren’t scrapping and fighting at the bottom so this is very sweet on this occasion. (CB today)

Another important type of speaker-involvement in the utterance relates to the responsibility the speaker bears for the specific conceptualization implied by his/her choice of particular lexical items or construction types to refer to specific entities or situations. There are many different ways to refer to what is truth-functionally the same situation, but these alternatives usually involve different conceptualizations of the situation in question. The structures in (10a) and (10b), for instance, refer to the same situation in truth-functional terms, but they impose different conceptualizations on this situation (compare Langacker 1988: 6–11): the structure in (10a) evaluates Pete’s appearance while taking Elvis as the point of reference, whereas (10b) evaluates Elvis’s appearance while taking Pete as the point of reference. More generally, the choice of specific lexical items or construction types to refer to a particular entity or situation always imposes a specific perspective on that entity or situation, and it is part of the speaker’s role in the utterance that he/she is the one who bears responsibility for choosing that specific perspective. (10)

a. Pete looks like Elvis. b. Elvis looks like Pete.

The grammatical phenomena that will be investigated here are different from the types of speaker-involvement illustrated in (9) and (10) in that they actually encode some aspect of the role of the speaker and/or interlocutor in the utterance. The construction consisting of the interrogative clause type and the interrogative pronoun what in (11), for instance, specifically serves to encode a particular interactive configuration, more

Interpersonal function

11

particularly the fact that the speaker requires a reply from the interlocutor about Secretary Baker’s reaction. (11)

What did Secretary Baker have to say about that? Clark: Well, he-he said the United States has not shifted its policy on this matter. (CB npr)

The defining characteristic of the phenomena in this category is that their function is to construe the role of the speaker in the utterance: they are not merely related to the speaker or interlocutor, but they have the role of the speaker or his/her interaction with the interlocutor as their signified. The meaning of an interrogative, for instance, will always have to be specified in terms of the role the speaker takes towards the interlocutor, irrespective of the position one takes on the problem of direct and indirect speech acts. This is not the case for the types of speaker-involvement illustrated in (9) and (10) above. Deictic categories like tense or demonstratives do not have any aspect of the speaker’s or the interlocutor’s role as their signified: the signifieds of these categories are the spatial and temporal locations of entities and SoAs. Speaker-involvement merely comes in as a necessary prerequisite for determining the precise value of these locations, but does not constitute the signified as such (see further Goethals 2002: 76–80). Similarly, the copular constructions in (10a) and (10b) do not have the speaker’s or interlocutor’s role as their signified. The meaning of these constructions can be specified in terms of the evaluation of one entity relative to another entity, and speaker-involvement merely comes in as a consequence of the fact that the speaker who uses one of these constructions to refer to a specific situation also bears responsibility for the conceptualization they impose on the situation in question. In conclusion, therefore, the interpersonal nature of the grammatical phenomena to be discussed in the following three chapters lies in the fact that they all serve to construe some aspect of the role of the speaker or his/her interaction with the interlocutor. In this sense, the interpersonal approach to clause combining developed in this study is distinct from the interactional approach to complex sentences – and grammar more generally – in works like Ford (1993) or Ford, Fox and Thompson (2003). While such studies focus on the way specific grammatical resources are used in interactional contexts, and the way interactional contexts can drive the emergence of new categories, the present study focuses on those grammatical resources that specifically serve to encode aspects of the speaker and his/her interaction with the interlocutor (see further in De Smet and Ver-

12 Introduction to Part 1 straete 2006). Like all grammatical resources, interpersonal resources can also be used in specific ways to achieve interactional goals (as will be shown in Chapters 9 and 10 of this study), but what distinguishes them from other grammatical resources is that their basic meaning is also in the domain of speaker-attitude and speaker-interlocutor interaction. It is important to note, finally, that the discussion of interpersonal phenomena in the following chapters does not claim any exhaustiveness in the domain of interpersonal grammar in English. The focus will be on interpersonal grammar from the perspective of clause combining, which means that I will only discuss those features of interpersonal grammar in the simple clause that I consider to be necessary for the analysis of clause combining: modality, speech function and scope.

Chapter 1 Modality: Construing a position

1. Introduction This chapter will deal with modality as an interpersonal phenomenon. The term ‘modality’ in English has traditionally covered a large range of phenomena, ranging from modal auxiliaries and semi-auxiliaries like can, must, be able to or have to over basic mood types like indicative and imperative mood to adverbs like probably, adjectives like possible and nouns like probability. In this chapter, I will focus mainly on the verbal domain, i.e. modal verbs and mood types: more specifically, my concern will be which of these verbal categories have an interpersonal function. In order to use modality as one parameter for the analysis of clause combining, I need to know precisely which categories must be taken into account as having an interpersonal function and which categories do not have any interpersonal function and are therefore irrelevant from this perspective. 1.1. Modal verbs as an interpersonal phenomenon The modal verbs in English are one area where the question of interpersonal versus non-interpersonal function is particularly relevant. The domain of modal verbs is functionally very heterogeneous, and there is a tradition of research in the literature suggesting that it can be subdivided according to the distinction between interpersonal and non-interpersonal functions. This tradition is exemplified clearly by Halliday (1970), who argues that not all modal verbs have an interpersonal function. Some of them, like epistemic must in (1) are clearly interpersonal and signal that “the speaker associates with the thesis an indication of its status and validity in his judgement” (1970: 335); others are not interpersonal at all, but simply “relate to a particular part of the content of the clause” (1970: 347), like dynamic can in (2) which expresses a relation of ability between the agent and the action described by speak in the propositional content of the clause.

14 Chapter 1: Modality (1)

(2)

I remember telling my career guidance officer at school that I wanted to be a professional triathlete. He just looked at me very strangely. But he must have seen the look of determination in my eyes and he knew I meant it and he gave me his full support. (CB oznews) Barmy Boonruang Buachan claims he can speak snake language – and is spending a week in a glass room with 102 killer cobras. Boonruang, 29, will also be with 30 centipedes and 20 scorpions and said: “We are friends.” His only fear during the TV stunt in a Bangkok mall is catching cold from the air conditioning. (CB sunnow)

This line of argument was taken over by Lyons (1977: 797–809, 832– 841), who introduced the terminology of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ for the interpersonal and non-interpersonal functions of modal verbs, and it was further incorporated in the theoretical models of Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984: 213–218) and Functional Grammar (Hengeveld 1987, 1988, 1989), and in Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) analysis of the diachrony of modal verbs in English. In spite of this long tradition of research, however, the distinction between interpersonal and non-interpersonal functions for modal verbs is not yet understood very well, as shown by the fact that two fundamental problems keep coming back in the different models. The first of these concerns the precise delineation between interpersonal and non-interpersonal functions for the different modal verbs: nearly every analysis proposes a slightly different delineation between the two functions, the critical point usually being the position of deontic modality. This problem is related to the second one, which concerns the criteria used to distinguish between interpersonal and noninterpersonal function: it is sometimes argued that the two categories can be distinguished in terms of their ability to occur in conditional or interrogative contexts (Lyons 1977: 799; Hengeveld 1988: 234–236), but corpus evidence clearly shows that both categories can in fact be used in these contexts. These recurrent problems in the definition of interpersonal and non-interpersonal functions will be addressed in Section 2 of this chapter. I will first show that the difference between interpersonal and noninterpersonal modals lies in the way their interpretation is affected by conditional and interrogative constructions rather than in their acceptability in these contexts. On the basis of this alternative analysis, I will then propose a functional explanation for the mechanism behind these criteria, showing why conditional and interrogative constructions can be used to

Introduction

15

distinguish between interpersonal and non-interpersonal modals. Finally, I will show that this analysis makes it possible to resolve the controversies over delineation in the literature, and come to a consistent delineation between the interpersonal and non-interpersonal categories in terms of their divergent reactions to the revised criteria. 1.2. Moods and modal verbs In addition to the modal verbs, another category that is traditionally included under the heading of modality is mood, used to refer to basic mood types like indicative, imperative and subjunctive. There is an obvious functional connection between the indicative mood and epistemic modals and between the imperative mood and deontic modals, which has sometimes led to the suggestion that the moods should be regarded as the unmarked options for the modals (see for instance Palmer 1986: 23–33). In Section 3 of this chapter, I will show that the distinction between interpersonal and non-interpersonal functions for the modals is a complicating factor in the relation between moods and modals, and I will argue that a more differentiated analysis of the basic moods is required, especially in the case of the imperative. One issue that will be addressed is how the relation between moods and modals is affected by the distinction between interpersonal and noninterpersonal functions for the modals. This problem is particularly relevant in the case of the deontic modals, because unlike the epistemic modals they can generally have either an interpersonal or a non-interpersonal function (as will be shown in Section 2.3.1.). I will argue that only interpersonal deontic modals are related to the imperative, and that non-interpersonal deontic modals are actually related to the indicative rather than the imperative. This is reflected in the fact that structures with non-interpersonal deontic modality are tensed just like the indicative, and in the fact that they involve epistemic negotiations about the existence of obligations, necessities or permissions rather than deontic negotiations about the imposition of obligations, necessities or permissions. Another issue that will be addressed concerns the precise nature of the relation between the basic moods and the interpersonal modals, which cannot always be described in terms of an unmarked-marked relation. On the one hand, I will show that the indicative is a purely modal structure, which can be regarded as the unmarked option for the epistemic modals: the indicative mood has all the typical features of unmarked options like

16 Chapter 1: Modality lack of semantic specificity and wider distribution, for instance in contexts of neutralization. On the other hand, however, I will also argue that the imperative is not a purely modal structure and that it cannot be regarded as the unmarked option for the deontic modals. Instead, I will show that the imperative is more adequately analysed as a separate construction type which also has a number of non-modal features in addition to its deontic modal meaning. Unlike the indicative, for instance, the imperative cannot freely interact with the declarative-interrogative system of speech function (see Chapter 2). I will argue that this implies that the imperative does not have a purely modal meaning but also incorporates an element of speech functional meaning, which may also explain why it has traditionally been included both with the indicative in the paradigm of basic mood types and with the declarative and the interrogative in the paradigm of basic clause types. 2. Modal verbs: subjective versus objective In this section, I will focus on the question of the interpersonal status of the modal verbs, more particularly the distinction between subjective and objective2 modality as it has been described in the work of Halliday (1970), Lyons (1977: 797–809, 832–841), Palmer (1979, 1990), Foley and Van Valin (1984: 213–218), Hengeveld (1987, 1988, 1989), and Traugott and Dasher (2002). In spite of the extensive literature on the subject, the distinction between the two categories still remains fairly vague, as reflected in a serious lack of agreement on the delineation between the categories and various empirical problems with the criteria on which the distinction is based. In this section, I will outline an alternative proposal based on the semiotic principle that form and function are two inseparable aspects of one and the same semiotic phenomenon. I will first address the formal side of the problem by pointing out a number of empirical problems with the criteria of conditionality and interrogation as they are used, for instance, by Lyons (1977) and Hengeveld (1988) and I will provide a more accurate description of the way these constructions interact with the subjective-objective distinction. On the basis of these modifications, I will then link back the criteria to the functional side of the problem, trying to explain how and why these constructions can be used to test for the functional distinction between subjective and objective modality. I believe that this semiotic approach to the problem will lead to a better understanding of what the subjective-objective distinction really is, and consequently

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

17

also allow for a more reliable delineation between the two categories in the domain of modal verbs. 2.1. Two problem areas 2.1.1. Delineation of the categories In assigning the different types of modality to the subjective and objective categories, there are three things that most analyses seem to agree on: (i) epistemic modality can be subjective, (ii) dynamic modality (i.e. ability and volition) is always objective, and (iii) deontic modality can be objective. There is a serious lack of agreement on two other possibilities, however: the different analyses diverge on the question whether epistemic modality can also be objective in addition to its subjective uses, and whether deontic modality can also be subjective in addition to its objective uses. The uncontroversial cases are illustrated in (3)-(8) below. All analyses cited above agree that epistemic modality can be subjective, in which case it serves to encode a position of the speaker with respect to the propositional content of the clause. The function of epistemic must in (3), for instance, is to signal that the speaker evaluates the proposition that the person in question has done something to the interlocutor as a necessary conclusion. (3)

Liz: What had she done? She must have done something to you, you wouldn’t have done that unless she had done something. Keith: She was wanting to cut me out of everything, that’s all. (CB today)

A similar level of agreement exists for the objective status of dynamic modality: the modals of volition and ability (grouped together as “dynamic modals” by Palmer 1990: 2) do not express any position taken by the speaker towards the propositional content, but rather indicate relations internal to this content (Halliday 1970: 347–351; Palmer 1990: 35–38; Foley and Van Valin 1984: 213–216; Hengeveld 1988: 233–234; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 114). The modals of ability and volition3 in (4) and (5), for instance, are not related to the speaker in any way, but instead indicate the ability and the (un)willingness of the agent to carry out the action denoted by the main verb.

18 Chapter 1: Modality (4) (5)

I swam in the Magnetic Island race in 1976 and 1977 and struck 25-knot winds both times. Most distance swimmers can handle those conditions without too many problems. (CB oznews) Elie Miller: I’m black and he always wants me to come to the north side and I’ll say, “Man, no. I can come to the north side five days a week. Come to the south side.” And his parents won’t let him come, and he’s kind of nervous about coming. (CB npr)

The same applies to deontic modality (Halliday 1970: 347–349; Lyons 1977: 832–833; Palmer 1979: 91–107; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 114). There are some types of deontic modality that are actually very close to the dynamic category, in that they equally express relations internal to the propositional content of the clause. This is the case for (6), where must expresses an ‘inner necessity’ of the agent, and (7), where it denotes a necessity arising from circumstances. Other types like (8) are further removed from the dynamic category in that they clearly involve a deontic source for an obligation, but they are still objective, because the speaker merely describes the existence of an obligation that originates from another source, without committing him/herself to it. (6) (7)

(8)

You are very special. I must see you again. Please can I have your telephone number? (CB today) German Thomas Reiter, 37, and two Russians were due back in January after 144 days on space station Mir. They must now stay 44 days longer due to lack of funds for a Russian rocket. (CB today) But Ramadan means more than just physical deprivation. It has spiritual and moral obligations, too. Followers must refrain from bad thoughts, words and actions, perform special acts of charity and spend even more time than usual in worship. (CB oznews)

In addition to these uncontroversial types, however, there are also two more controversial issues on which the different analyses do not seem to agree at all. The first concerns the possible subjective status of deontic modality. Halliday (1970: 347–349), Palmer (1979, 1990) and Traugott and Dasher (2002: 114) both include deontic modality together with epistemic modality in their subjective categories, whereas Hengeveld (1988: 234– 240) and Foley and Van Valin (1984: 213–218) deny subjective status in parallel with epistemic modality. Lyons (1977: 832–841) seems to be somewhere in between, allowing for the possibility of subjective deontic

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

19

modality but still treating it differently from the subjectivity associated with epistemic modality (see Verstraete (2001) for a more detailed analysis). In the following sections, I will argue that deontic modality can be subjective just like epistemic modality, both on functional grounds and in terms of its grammatical behaviour. The deontic must in examples like (9) below expresses the speaker’s position just like the epistemic must in (3) above, the only difference being the domain with respect to which positions are taken: epistemic modality expresses positions about the truth of propositions, whereas deontic modality expresses positions about the desirability of actions. In Verstraete (2004), I have argued that this difference in domain is probably the reason why deontic modality has been denied subjective status in frameworks like Functional Grammar (Hengeveld 1988, 1989) and Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997), especially given certain assumptions about the layering of categories inherent in these frameworks. (9)

“How about if I pretend to be a relative? I mean that way I could come visit you, check out the place, see how Mr. Vogel”. Leaning toward the sofa Mel was stretched out on, she placed a finger over his lips. “Cease. Desist, Mel. You must not come to the house. And I don’t want you to be a relative. Are you listening? No relatives. I’m from New York, and my husband knows I don’t have any relatives down here.” (CB usbooks)

A second problematic issue concerns the possible objective status of epistemic modality. Halliday (1970) and Foley and Van Valin (1984) allow only one type of epistemic modality, whereas Lyons (1977: 797–801), Hengeveld (1988: 234–236) and Traugott and Dasher (2002: 113) argue that there is both subjective and objective epistemic modality. Lyons argues that depending on the contextualization, examples like (10) can receive either a subjective or an objective interpretation. (10)

Alfred may be unmarried. (Lyons 1977: 797)

According to Lyons, the objective interpretation applies when the speaker of (10) knows that there are unmarried persons in the community to which Alfred belongs, which means that there is a logical possibility that Alfred is unmarried. In that context, the speaker also “knows, and does not merely think or believe, that there is a possibility (and in this case a quantifiable possibility) of Alfred’s being unmarried” (Lyons 1977: 798).

20 Chapter 1: Modality The subjective interpretation applies when the speaker does not know anything about the presence of unmarried people in Alfred’s community: in that case, the speaker “may be understood as subjectively qualifying his commitment to the possibility of Alfred’s being unmarried in terms of his own uncertainty” (1977: 797). This means that in terms of Lyons’ argument the possibility expressed by may in (10) can either be attributed to the uncertainty of the speaker, as in the subjective interpretation, or that it can be logically inherent in the situation described in the clause, as in the objective interpretation. In the following sections, I will argue that epistemic modality is always subjective, and is not ambiguous between the two categories like deontic modality. I will first show that the potential subjective-objective ambiguity for deontic modality is caused by the presence of a specific semantic feature in the deontic category, and that this feature is absent from the epistemic category. I will then argue, following Nuyts (1992, 1993, 2000), that the apparent ambiguity pointed out by Lyons for examples like (10) is not related to the subjective-objective distinction as such, but rather to the separate parameter of evidentiality. Table 1. The problem of delineation Epistemic

Subjective

+

Deontic + (Halliday, Palmer, Lyons, Traugott and Dasher)

Dynamic

–

– (Hengeveld, Foley and Van Valin)

Objective

+ (Lyons, Hengeveld, Traugott and Dasher) – (Halliday, Foley and Van Valin)

+

+

Table 1 summarizes the controversial and uncontroversial domains in the delineation between subjective and objective modality. Cells with only a plus or a minus sign are the domains over which there is agreement in the literature, while cells with both a plus and a minus sign are the controversial domains, subdivided according to the proposals made in the literature.

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

21

2.1.2. Criteria A second problem in the analysis of subjective and objective modality concerns the criteria used to support the distinction, especially those that focus on the divergent acceptability of the two categories in particular constructional contexts. One often-used criterion in this sense is the behaviour of modal expressions in interrogative constructions. This criterion was introduced in the context of the distinction between modal adverbs and adjectives like probably and probable (Jackendoff 1972: 84– 87; Bellert 1977: 344–346): modal adjectives can easily occur in interrogatives, as shown in (11), whereas modal adverbs often cannot,4 as shown in (12) below. (11) (12)

Is it probable that the President will meet Congress and send in his Message as if nothing had happened? (IC) ?Will the President probably meet Congress and send in his Message as if nothing had happened?

This criterion has been related more generally to the distinction between subjective and objective modality by Hengeveld (1988: 236), who argues that objective modality can be questioned in an interrogative structure, whereas subjective modals cannot. In the following sections, I will show that this is not the case: both types of modality can occur in interrogative constructions, but they differ in terms of the semantic effect of the interrogative construction on the modal expression. In this sense, the criterion is not merely a matter of acceptability in the construction or not, but rather a matter of divergent semantic interaction between the construction and the modal. A second criterion is the behaviour of modals in conditional contexts. Lyons (1977: 799) and Hengeveld (1988: 236) argue that objective modality can occur in the protasis of conditional constructions, whereas subjective modality cannot. Palmer (1990: 182) offers a less absolute account of this criterion: subjective modals can occur in conditional protases, but when they do they echo some opinion that has already been voiced in the preceding discourse or is at least implied by it, as shown in example like (13). (13)

If he may come tomorrow, … = ‘if you say he may come tomorrow’ (Palmer 1990: 182)

22 Chapter 1: Modality Again, this shows that what matters for these criteria is not simply the acceptability in a particular construction or not, but rather the interaction between the construction and the item to be tested. In the following section, I will use these modifications to the criteria as a starting point for a semiotic account of the distinction between subjective and objective modality: I will show that the semantic effects of the constructions on subjective modality provide an important key to its interpersonal status. 2.2. A semiotic account of the criteria 2.2.1. Conditional constructions In its traditional form, the criterion of conditionality is formulated in terms of the divergent acceptability of subjective and objective modality in the protasis of the conditional construction (Lyons 1977: 799; Hengeveld 1988: 236): “objectively modalized predications can be hypothesized in a conditional sentence, subjectively modalized ones cannot” (Hengeveld 1988: 236). There are two problems with this formulation. First of all, it is not empirically correct: subjective modals certainly do not occur frequently in conditional protases, but there is no absolute restriction on subjective modality in conditionals, as shown by examples like (14) below (see further also Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 121–124 for comparable evidence on epistemic will). This also implies that pure acceptability as such is not what distinguishes subjective modals from their objective counterparts in conditional protases. What does distinguish them from the objective category, however, and what is the real motivation behind the low frequency of subjective modals in this construction, is the different semantic effect the conditional construction has on subjective and objective modality. For instance, compare subjective epistemic may and objective dynamic can in the conditionals (14) and (16) with their counterparts in the main clauses (15) and (17): (14)

In distilling a statement of theme from a rich and complicated story, we have, of course, no more encompassed the whole story than a paleontologist taking a plaster mold of a petrified footprint has captured a living brontosaurus. A writer (other than a fabulist) does not usually set out with theme in hand, determined to make every detail in the story work to demonstrate it. Well then, the skeptical reader may ask, if only some stories have themes, if

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

(15)

(16)

(17)

23

those themes may be hard to sum up, and if readers will probably disagree in their summations, why bother to state themes? (CB usbooks) I should say one thing. My fiancée is English. “Eine Engländerin!” Yes. A good English family. She is studying in Vienna. The Corps Commander pursed his lips. This may be difficult, von Arzfeld. You realize this? (CB ukbooks) Edwards: Well, those pitchers settle down, don’t they? Sandy Koufax was pretty wild when they first brought him up. He straightened out pretty well. Barber: Bob, there’s a basic Godgiven thing called power. If you can throw a ball hard, if you can hit a ball hard, they won’t give up on you for years and years. (CB npr) He’s done enough so far to live up to the words of Monarchs head coach Bobby Hammond, who says: ”Brad has size, poise, leadership and a rocket for an arm. He can throw the ball deep and can see the whole field. He’s a class act.” (CB today)

The function of the objective can of ability in the conditional construction in (16) is not different in any way from the function of its counterpart in the main clause in (17). In both cases, can indicates a propositioninternal relation of ability between the agent and the action denoted by the main verb of the clause in question, and the conditional construction does not affect this function in any way. With subjective epistemic may, on the other hand, there is a crucial difference between its function in the conditional in (14) and its normal function in the main clause in (15). In the main clause structure in (15), may encodes a position taken by the speaker: it is the speaker who considers it possible that there will be difficulties ahead. In the conditional in (14), however, it is crucially not the current speaker (in this case the projected ‘skeptical reader’) who takes the position that “themes may be hard to sum up”. The position encoded in may in (14) is not taken by the current speaker in the here-and-now, but rather echoed from a position taken or implied in the preceding discourse: ‘if X believes themes may be hard to sum up, then …’. It will usually be the case that the position echoed was originally taken or implied by another speaker, but this is not a necessary feature: a speaker can also echo positions taken by him/herself in the preceding discourse. The crucial feature is not speaker versus other, but current versus noncurrent speaker. This echoic feature also gives the construction type a special rhetorical potential: it allows the current speaker to use a non-

24 Chapter 1: Modality current speaker’s own positions against him/herself. One such possibility is illustrated by (14) above, which uses another speaker’s position as a premise that leads to a conclusion which this other speaker does not yet accept: ‘if person X takes position Y, then surely person X should also accept conclusion Z that can be drawn from position Y (which as yet he/she does not do)’. Another possibility is the inverse of the schema above, where the target is not so much the apodosis of the conditional construction but rather the position echoed in the protasis itself. This is the category of “indirect inferentials” described in Declerck and Reed (2001), illustrated in (18) below: confronting the echoed position in the protasis with an incompatible but obviously true proposition in the apodosis leads to the conclusion that the position originally taken by the other speaker must be false. (18)

If he may be the richest man in Europe, then why does he lease all his ‘properties’ rather than buying them?

Apart from the empirical problems, a second problem with this criterion is the absence of any explanation in the literature why conditional constructions can be used to test for the distinction between subjective and objective modality, and this is where examples like (14) or (18) become particularly relevant. Examples like these should not be dismissed as rare exceptions to some basic principle that subjective modals do not occur in conditionals: rather, the echoic effect on subjective modality provides the most important clue to the rationale behind the criterion, as I will show in the following paragraphs. The echo-effect observed in (14) and (18) is not restricted to structures with subjective modality, but is actually available for conditionals in general: any conditional can echo a position taken in the preceding discourse, as shown by examples like (19) and (20) below. (19)

Count yourself lucky to live in Australia where a lot of public money has been spent on agricultural research over the years. Because of this investment we Australians spend about 10 per cent of our income on food. In India the figure is upwards of 50 per cent! Without doubt, investment in agricultural research is building Australia’s economy and maintaining a high standard of living. […] You’re probably asking “If food is cheap then why does my grocery bill seem to increase every week?” Remember that a lot of what fills your trolly the aluminium foil, shampoo and razor blades isn’t food. (CB oznews)

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

(20)

25

Airdrie Ace midfielder Kenny Black is ready to quit Broomfield because he says the club is tight-fisted. Airdrie’s record buy has turned down a new deal and says “The new terms they have offered me are an insult. If the club has no money, how come they have been linked with Danny Wallace and Graeme Sharp”? (CB ukmags)

What distinguishes conditionals with subjective modality from echoic conditionals in general, however, is that the echoic interpretation is necessary rather than optional. The echoic effect in (14) and (18) is a necessary consequence of the interaction between the constructional function of the conditional, which is to suspend any speaker-positioning, and the function of the epistemic modal, which is to encode speaker-positioning. Conditionals are special contexts because they introduce suppositions rather than assertions (Declerck and Reed 2001): the conditional marker if typically suspends any commitment of the speaker with respect to the proposition in its scope (see also Dancygier 1998: 18–20) and thus treats it as a mere supposition in the context of the apodosis.5 For objective modals like can of ability in (16) above, this suspension of commitment is unproblematic, because objective modality does not encode any type of speakercommitment. For subjective modals like epistemic may in (14) and (18) above, however, the suspension of speaker-commitment in conditionals clashes with the inherent function of the modal, which is to encode the speaker’s commitment with respect to the proposition. This clash leads to an echoic reinterpretation, which could be regarded as the interpretational compromise between the two conflicting functions in the modal and the conditional: the position encoded by the modal is no longer a position of the current speaker, because the conditional context inherently suspends such positioning, but resumes a position taken in the preceding discourse, usually but not necessarily by another speaker. Thus, echoicity is the only way a modal that inherently encodes a position can still occur in a context which does not allow such positioning by the current speaker. Thus, because the epistemic modal inherently marks a position taken by the speaker, it always imposes an echoic interpretation on the conditional because it clashes with its commitment-suspending function. This is also what distinguishes it from its objective counterparts: objective modals like can of ability in (16) above do not clash with conditionality and therefore do not induce this echoic reading. To be sure, conditionals containing such objective modals can also be echoic just like any other conditional, but in those cases the echoicity does not reside in the modal. Unlike with the

26 Chapter 1: Modality epistemic modal in (14) above, what is echoed in an example like (21) below is not the content of the objective modal, but rather an epistemic position taken with respect to this content: what the speaker in (21) bounces back to the interlocutor is his/her epistemic commitment6 to the ability to predict the future rather than the ability as such, which is entirely internal to the proposition with respect to which the position is echoed. This is reflected for instance in the fact that an epistemic marker like really can still be added in the protasis, as shown in (22), and that this actually reinforces the echoicity of (21). (21) (22)

If you can tell the future, then how come you never win the lottery? If you can really tell the future, then how come you never win the lottery?

2.2.2. Interrogation The criterion of use in interrogative contexts faces the same problems as the previous one. It is usually formulated in terms of acceptability, but I will show that this is not entirely correct: subjective and objective modals are not different in terms of acceptability in interrogative contexts, but in terms of the different semantic effect the interrogative construction has on the modal. As with the conditional constructions, I will show how these semantic effects actually provide a key to an explanation of why the interrogative construction can be used to distinguish between subjective and objective modals. Interrogatives were originally used as a criterion for the distinction between modal adverbs and adjectives (Jackendoff 1972: 84–87; Bellert 1977: 344–346), but Hengeveld (1988: 236) has related it more generally to the distinction between subjective and objective modality, arguing that objective modals can be questioned, whereas subjective modals cannot. In terms of pure acceptability, however, there do not seem to be any inherent restrictions on modal verbs in interrogatives. All traditional categories of modal verbs can occur in interrogatives, as shown in (23)-(26) below, which illustrate dynamic, epistemic, and deontic modals in interrogatives. (23)

Edwards: The best Republican campaigner is probably Ronald Reagan, and he was out on the stump for George Bush over the weekend. Can he make a difference in states like North Carolina

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

(24)

(25)

(26)

27

and Georgia? Shirley: Undoubtedly. I think that Reagan Repub-rallies the Republican faithful and especially the white suburban male that we were speaking of earlier. (CB npr) NARR) In that case, can Mr Gorbachov really be serious then about introducing such changes? Might he just be softening people up for slightly less shocking price rises? MARY DEJEVSKY) I think it’s hard to say that he’s actually softening people up for less harsh price rises – because this is the document which has been in the pipeline now for the best part of three months. (CB bbc) “Must I leave my platoon, sir? At this moment?” “Stop arguing and get down there. It’s nobody’s fault but yours that you speak fluent German. You know perfectly well every linguist’s name is listed.” (CB ukbooks) First-time buyers should ask: Who is responsible for a title search and abstract? Who will provide title insurance? Must the termite inspection be paid before closing (in which case you will need a receipt), or can it be paid at settlement (in which case the settlement provider will pay the fee and you will pay more at closing to cover this expense)? (CB usbooks)

As shown by these examples, the interrogative does not single out any of the traditional modal categories7 in terms of acceptability. The relevant dividing line in the domain of modal verbs is not acceptability but the semantic interaction between the interrogative construction and the modal: the function of the modal can either be affected by interrogation or not. For the modals in (24) and (25), the interrogative construction induces a reorientation towards the interlocutor of the position encoded in the modal. In these examples, the responsibility for the position encoded in epistemic might and deontic must is no longer taken by the speaker as it is in the declarative, but instead transferred to the interlocutor: ‘do you consider it possible …?’ and ‘do you want me to …?’. For the modals in (23) and (26), on the other hand, the interrogative does not affect the function of the modal at all. This is illustrated clearly by comparing the deontic modal in (26) with its counterpart in (25). In (25), as already argued, the deontic position encoded by the modal is re-oriented towards the interlocutor and becomes a question about his/her deontic commitment: ‘do you want me to leave the platoon?’. In (26), on the other hand, it is not the obligation expressed by must that is re-oriented towards the interlocutor: the interrogative will not be interpreted as a question about the interlocutor’s deontic

28 Chapter 1: Modality commitment (‘do you want me to pay the termite inspection before closing’) like in (25), but rather about his/her epistemic commitment to the truth of a proposition about the existence of such an obligation: ‘do you think it is the case that it is obligatory to pay the inspection before closing?’. The same goes for the dynamic modal of ability in (23): what is affected by the interrogative is not the modal of ability as such, but again an epistemic position about the existence of such ability: “do you think that Reagan is able to make the difference?”. These differences in semantic interaction with the interrogative can be explained in terms of the different interpersonal status of the modals, and therefore they can be linked up to the distinction between subjective and objective modality. What the interrogative construction brings to the surface is whether or not the modal is sensitive to speaker-interlocutor interaction. The interrogative generally operates in the plane of speakerinterlocutor interaction: its function is to transfer the responsibility for the position expressed in the clause to the interlocutor (see further in Chapter 2 for a more elaborate discussion of the interaction between modality and interrogative structures, including issues like the relevance of polar and whinterrogatives). For modal verbs, therefore, semantic interaction with the interrogative reveals an interpersonal function. If the modal is affected by the speaker-interlocutor transfer effected by the interrogative, as in (24) and (25), its function is interpersonal: it encodes a position that can be reoriented towards the interlocutor. If it is not affected by interrogation, as in (23) and (26), it is not interpersonal: rather than expressing a position that can be re-oriented, the modal functions within the proposition with respect to which positions can be taken. These positions are what the interrogative will interact with, and not the modal as such, as shown in (23) and (26), where the transfer affected by the interrogative applies to epistemic positions about ability and obligation rather than to ability and obligation as such. 2.2.3. Conclusion A critical investigation of the behaviour of modal verbs in conditional and interrogative constructions has shown that what matters for the distinction between subjective and objective modality is not the acceptability of the modals in these constructions, but rather the semantic interaction with the constructions. More important than these empirical modifications as such, however, is the fact that they allow an explanation for the mechanism

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

29

behind the criteria, and thus provide a better insight into the nature of the distinction between subjective and objective modality. The basic distinction between subjective and objective modality can be defined in terms of the more general distinction between interpersonal positions on the one hand, and the material with respect to which these positions are taken on the other hand. Subjective modals serve to encode positions with respect to a particular propositional content, which can either be taken by the speaker in his/her own turn (declarative), or transferred to the interlocutor in the next turn (interrogative). Objective modals do not encode any speaker-interlocutor position with respect to a propositional content, but rather belong to the content with respect to which these positions are taken. At a more general level, the conditional and interrogative constructions represent two different strategies to bring this functional difference to the surface, both of them exploiting the interpersonal function of subjective modality but going in opposite directions. The first strategy, represented by the criterion of conditionality, is to bring the modal into a constructional configuration which inherently disallows positioning. This will affect only modals that serve to encode positions, producing semantic effects like the echoicity observed with conditionals, but will leave the rest untouched. The second strategy goes in the opposite direction: the basis of this strategy is to bring the modal into a constructional configuration which inherently requires positioning. This will again interact only with modals that serve to encode positions and leave the rest untouched. This strategy is of course represented by the interrogative construction, which because of its function of position-transfer will always interact with the positioning component of the clause. If the modal has any positioning function, therefore, it will interact with the interrogative. On the basis of such insights into the nature of subjective and objective modality, we can now turn to the second problem in the analysis of the distinction, viz. the precise delineation between the two categories in the domain of the modal verbs. 2.3. Back to the problem of delineation As already argued in the introduction to this section, some issues in the delineation between subjective and objective modality are entirely uncontroversial but others are subject to serious disagreement. The uncontroversial issues are the potential subjective status of epistemic modality, the

30 Chapter 1: Modality potential objective status of deontic modality, and the invariably objective status of dynamic modality. All of these are confirmed by the criteria investigated above, briefly recapitulated in examples (27)-(32) below. Epistemic modality can be subjective, encoding a position of epistemic commitment, as shown by its echoic reaction in conditional constructions illustrated in (27) and its interaction with interrogative constructions illustrated in (28). Deontic and dynamic modality, on the other hand, can be objective, functioning as part of the proposition with respect to which positions are taken, as shown by their absence of echoicity in reaction to conditional constructions illustrated in (29) and (31) and their lack of interaction with interrogative constructions illustrated in (30) and (32). What the interrogative interacts with in these cases is not the modal as such but an epistemic position taken with respect to the relations expressed by these modals: ‘is it the case that the obligation or ability exists or not?’. Epistemic-subjective (27) In distilling a statement of theme from a rich and complicated story, we have, of course, no more encompassed the whole story than a paleontologist taking a plaster mold of a petrified footprint has captured a living brontosaurus. A writer (other than a fabulist) does not usually set out with theme in hand, determined to make every detail in the story work to demonstrate it. Well then, the skeptical reader may ask, if only some stories have themes, if those themes may be hard to sum up, and if readers will probably disagree in their summations, why bother to state themes? (CB usbooks) (28) ARR) In that case, can Mr Gorbachov really be serious then about introducing such changes? Might he just be softening people up for slightly less shocking price rises? MARY DEJEVSKY) I think it’s hard to say that he’s actually softening people up for less harsh price rises – because this is the document which has been in the pipeline now for the best part of three months. (CB bbc) Deontic-objective (29) Before speaking to parents or others about co-signing, first-time buyers should ask about lender policies. Co-signing is attractive to lenders because there are more warm bodies to go after if the property must be foreclosed and therefore less risk. (CB usbooks)

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

(30)

31

First-time buyers should ask: Who is responsible for a title search and abstract? Who will provide title insurance? Must the termite inspection be paid before closing (in which case you will need a receipt), or can it be paid at settlement (in which case the settlement provider will pay the fee and you will pay more at closing to cover this expense)? (CB usbooks)

Dynamic-objective (31) Edwards: Well, those pitchers settle down, don’t they? Sandy Koufax was pretty wild when they first brought him up. He straightened out pretty well. Barber: Bob, there’s a basic Godgiven thing called power. If you can throw a ball hard, if you can hit a ball hard, they won’t give up on you for years and years. (CB npr) (32) Edwards: The best Republican campaigner is probably Ronald Reagan, and he was out on the stump for George Bush over the weekend. Can he make a difference in states like North Carolina and Georgia? Shirley: Undoubtedly. I think that Reagan Repub-rallies the Republican faithful and especially the white suburban male that we were speaking of earlier. (CB npr) In this section, I will concentrate on the two controversial cases – can deontic modality be subjective, and can epistemic modality be objective? – showing how the modified criteria and the better understanding of the subjective-objective distinction resulting from them can be used to decide on the controversy. More particularly, I will argue that deontic modality can also be subjective in addition to its objective use illustrated in (29) and (30) above: in such cases, it shows the same function and grammatical behaviour as subjective epistemic modality, the only difference being the domain about which positions are expressed (desirability of actions versus plausibility of propositions). For epistemic modality, I will argue that there is no objective use in addition to the subjective use illustrated in (27) and (28) above: what Lyons (1977: 797–798) tentatively calls the subjectiveobjective distinction for epistemic modality is in fact related to the independent parameter of evidentiality, as shown convincingly by Nuyts (1993: 945–951, 2000: 30–34).

32 Chapter 1: Modality 2.3.1. Subjective deontic modality? The problem of subjective status for deontic modality in fact comprises two related issues. The first is, of course, the question whether or not deontic modality can be subjective: Halliday (1970: 347–349), Lyons (1977: 832– 841), Palmer (1979, 1990) and Traugott and Dasher (2002: 114) all include subjective deontic modality in their analysis, whereas Foley and Van Valin (1984: 213–218) and Hengeveld (1988: 234–240) deny subjective status for deontic modality. Given the possibility of subjective deontic modality, the second issue is whether or not this subjectivity is entirely parallel with the subjectivity associated with epistemic modality: Halliday (1970) and Palmer (1979, 1990) do not posit any difference, but Lyons (1977: 832– 841) seems to differentiate his definition of subjectivity depending on the epistemic or the deontic nature of the modal (see Verstraete 2004 for more details). In this section, I will only deal with the first issue, arguing that deontic modality can be both objective and subjective, on the basis of its range of functions and its behaviour in reaction to the criteria. In terms of function, there are at least three types of deontic modality that can be distinguished in English, illustrated in (33)-(38) below. In examples (33) and (34), the deontic modals may and must serve to encode positions of the speaker with respect to the SoA, respectively concerning permission (‘I do not allow you to …’) and obligation (‘I want her to be …’). (33)

(34)

I was a stupid and spotty person with a predilection for capsleeved T-shirts, and I was therefore daft. Almost daily, I was told No, Clarkson, you are a fool and you may not wear training shoes for school. But today, people with army jackets and odd hair decide to live in trees and yet we think they have something intelligent to say. (CB times) For taking my sister’s life, and all the other lives, too, she must be locked up forever. I want her to become aware of what she has done understand the evil she has done; maybe that is the best punishment. (CB times)

Examples like (35) and (36) below are different from the previous category in that they do not encode a position of the speaker towards the SoA (‘I want the followers to …’ or ‘I want the king to …’), but rather report on the existence of a particular obligation without necessarily committing the speaker to it. Unlike in (33) and (34), the speaker is not the deontic source

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

33

of the obligation or permission, but merely the one who describes the existence of such an obligation, which may itself originate from another source. (35)

(36)

But Ramadan means more than just physical deprivation. It has spiritual and moral obligations, too. Followers must refrain from bad thoughts, words and actions, perform special acts of charity and spend even more time than usual in worship. (CB oznews) They knew that the king would have to give, in exchange, a really wonderful present to equal such a gift. As you know, Mr Karmal, a king must always return a gift with something of similar value. The king was delighted, but perplexed, because he was covetous and stingy and a puppet of his vizier, the prime minister. (CB ukbooks)

Examples like (37) and (38) below, finally, are still different from both (33) and (34) and from (35) and (36) in that no deontic source is involved at all. Must in (37) and (38) does not express an obligation originating from any deontic source (irrespective of the question whether this source is identical with the speaker or not), but denotes necessities inherent in the situation, either arising from some stated purpose, as in (37) 8 or as ‘internal needs’ for the agent to carry out the action denoted by the main verb, as in (38). (37)

(38)

But to reach orbit an object must accelerate to a speed of about 17,500 miles per hour (28,000 kilometres per hour, called satellite speed or orbital velocity) in a horizontal direction; and it must reach an altitude of more than 100 miles (160 kilometres), in order to be clear of the atmosphere. (ICE-GB W2B-035 039) Think about it for a few days. Write down all the things that make you reach out for the packet and all the times when you feel you must smoke. Armed with this knowledge you will have a better chance of succeeding to become a non-smoker. (CB ukephem)

The different functions of the modals in these examples show that there are two relevant features for the analysis of deontic modality, summarized in table 2 below: (i) presence versus absence of a deontic source, and (ii) in the presence of such a source, identification of this source with the speaker or not. In theoretical terms, the first feature is relevant to the distinction between deontic modality proper and what could be called deontic-dynamic

34 Chapter 1: Modality modality. Due to their SoA-internal function, the modals in examples like (37) and (38) are closer to the dynamic categories of ability and volition than to the deontic modals proper in (33)-(36): this is probably also the reason why Palmer (1990: 113–132) describes such uses as “dynamic necessity”. The second feature is relevant to the problem of subjective versus objective status of deontic modality. Given that modals with a deontic source can be further subdivided depending on whether this source coincides with the speaker (and the interlocutor, in interrogative structures, see below) or not, I see no reason to restrict deontic modality to the objective category. In terms of interpersonal function, examples like (33) and (34) are parallel to the instances of subjective epistemic modality illustrated above: in both cases, the modal serves to encode a particular position of the speaker with respect to the propositional content. The only difference is the relevant domain for the position: deontic modality encodes positions concerning the desirability of actions, whereas epistemic modality encodes positions about the plausibility of propositions. As argued in Verstraete (2004), it is probably this difference in domain that has been the reason for excluding deontic modality from the subjective category in frameworks that rely on layered models of clause structure, like Functional Grammar (Hengeveld 1989) or Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984). Table 2. Relevant features for the analysis of deontic modality no source deontic-dynamic (37) and (38)

deontic source deontic, objective (35) and (36) deontic, subjective (33) and (34)

source ≠ speaker source = speaker

The functional parallelism between subjective epistemic modality and what I claim to be subjective deontic modality is also reflected in parallel interaction with the interrogative and conditional constructions. Like subjective epistemic modality, deontic modality can be re-oriented towards the interlocutor under the influence of interrogation, as shown in (39) and (40). In both cases, the responsibility for the deontic position is no longer the speaker’s, but is transferred to the interlocutor’s next turn. The fact that it can be oriented towards the interlocutor shows that deontic modality can be interpersonal just like epistemic modality: a modal can only interact with interrogative constructions if it serves to encode a position.

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

(39)

(40)

35

When you have signed, Agent Grady will debrief you of everything you can possibly tell us. You will be granted use-immunity covering the information which you have given us. “May I intervene here?” MacPherson asked. “Please do.” (CB usbooks) Would you like me to get some food in, some spaghetti or something he asked. Smiling, Ghislaine just shook her head and told him: “No it’s fine.” “Well, what about some drink, then? Shall I get some in,” he asked. “Thanks, but no. Everything is under control,” Ghislaine insisted. (CB today)

The same applies to conditional constructions, although here of course the parallelism with epistemic modality is not entirely complete because of the existence of objective deontic modals in addition to the subjective ones. Since deontic modals in principle can be both subjective and objective, either encoding the speaker’s commitment to obligation or just marking the existence of an obligation without involving the speaker, echoic interpretation of deontic modals in conditionals will never be induced by the mere presence of the modal the way it is for epistemic modality. Because of the systematic ambiguity, there will always be an objective – and therefore non-echoic – reading of ‘existence of obligation’ available for deontic modals in conditionals. But in spite of this absence of constructionally induced echoicity, there are still cases where it is contextually clear that the conditional echoes a deontic position taken or implied by a previous speaker, as in (41) below. What is more, this example also shows the same rhetorical structure as the echoic epistemic example in (14) above, in that it echoes a previous speaker’s position in the if-clause and uses this position to arrive at a conclusion that is not supported by the previous speaker. The fact that it still is possible to ‘bounce back’ deontic positions to other speakers in this way, even though it is contextual rather than constructionally induced, is another reflection of the potentially subjective status of deontic modality. (41)

The key stumbling block remained Republican insistence on a Medicare premium increase. Mr Clinton argued that Medicare increases were not necessary to meet demands for a balanced Budget. “If America must close down access to quality education, a clean environment and affordable health care for our seniors in order to keep the government open, then that price is too high,” Mr Clinton said in vetoing the temporary spending Bill. (CB oznews)

36 Chapter 1: Modality 2.3.2. Objective epistemic modality? The possibility of objective epistemic modality is the second problem area in the delineation between the subjective and objective categories. Halliday (1970: 335–336, 347–350) and Foley and Van Valin (1984: 213–214) recognize only one type of epistemic modality, whereas Lyons (1977: 797– 809), Hengeveld (1988: 234–239) and Traugott and Dasher (2002: 113) allow both subjective and objective epistemic modality. As shown above (see Section 2.1.1), Lyons’ argument is mainly based on the double interpretation of examples like (42), where the possibility encoded by may can either be attributed to the situation (knowing that there are unmarried people in Alfred’s community leads to a quantifiable possibility of Alfred being unmarried) or can simply reflect the speaker’s uncertainty. (42)

Alfred may be unmarried. (Lyons 1977: 797)

In evaluating the validity of this distinction, it is first of all important to ask what might motivate such postulated ambiguity for epistemic modality. For deontic modality, the possibility of both subjective and non-subjective uses is actually motivated by the specific semantics of the deontic category, which points both towards the speaker and the propositional content, as argued convincingly by Halliday (1970: 347–350). On the one hand, the meanings expressed by deontic modals reach into the propositional content, in that they express a certain relationship between the agent and the action denoted by the main verb, more particularly that he/she is under the obligation or has the permission to carry out that action. But this relation of permission or obligation has its origins outside the propositional content, because a permission or an obligation always originates from some deontic source, and that source can be identical to the speaker. The former aspect is what motivates the objective use of deontic modality: deontic modality can merely mark the existence of some obligation or permission for the agent of the action denoted by the main verb without bringing the source into focus. But the identification of this source with the speaker is what motivates its interpersonal function: deontic modality can also focus on the deontic source that brings the obligation or permission into existence, and when this source is identical to the speaker the function of the modal is interpersonal. If we compare the semantics of deontic modality with epistemic modality, there seems to be no similar motivation for any subjective-objective ambiguity. The objective use of deontic modality focuses on the obligation

Modal verbs: subjective versus objective

37

or permission for the agent within the propositional content, but epistemic modality does not reach into the propositional content the way deontic modality does, and therefore does not have the semantic prerequisites for such objective uses. As argued in Halliday (1970: 347–350) and Foley and Van Valin (1984: 215), epistemic modals are entirely proposition-external evaluations without any links to the internal structure of the proposition: the assessment of possibility encoded by may in (42), for instance, does not qualify any internal aspect of the proposition like its objective-deontic or dynamic counterparts, but merely provides an external evaluation of the plausibility of the proposition. Given that there is no semantic basis for subjective-objective ambiguity the way there is with deontic modality, the question is what the distinction proposed by Lyons (1977: 797–798) for structures like (42) actually refers to. Nuyts (1993: 945–951) has argued convincingly that the different interpretations posited by Lyons for such structures are actually a matter of the independent parameter of evidentiality rather than the subjectiveobjective distinction. Knowledge or lack of knowledge about the presence of unmarried people in the community to which Alfred belongs (see Section 2.1.1) does not make the assessment of possibility encoded by may in (42) any more or less an assessment by the speaker, but rather operates on the evidential dimension supporting the speaker’s assessment. Knowledge about the presence of unmarried people in this case is not a factor of subjectivity or objectivity, but rather one type of evidence the speaker may have to support his assessment of possibility, as shown by the fact that it can be encoded in a supporting evidential secondary clause as in (43) below (see further in Chapter 9, Section 3, about such evidential clause combinations). (43)

Alfred may be unmarried, because I know there are a lot of bachelors among the fellows of Trinity Hall.

In this sense, the differentiating factor between what Lyons calls the subjective and the objective interpretations for epistemic structures like (42) is “the quality of the evidence one has for a modal judgement” (Nuyts 1993: 946). Epistemic modals always express judgements external to the propositional content of the clause, which implies that unlike the deontic modals they do not have the semantic prerequisite for subjective-objective ambiguity. What Lyons refers to as the subjective-objective distinction for epistemic modals does not relate to the dimension of subjectivity and

38 Chapter 1: Modality objectivity, but in fact relates to the type of evidence in support of the epistemic assessment made by the speaker. 2.3.3. Summary Table 3. The subjective-objective delineation for modal verbs Subjective Objective

Epistemic + –

Deontic + +

Dynamic – +

Table 3 summarizes the delineation between subjective and objective modality that has been argued for in this section: epistemic modality can only be subjective, deontic modality can be either subjective or objective, and dynamic modality can only be subjective. From the more general perspective of this study, this implies that only epistemic and deontic modality will be relevant to our analysis of clause combining in the second part of the study, since only these types of modality can have an interpersonal function: both encode positions with respect to the propositional content, responsibility for which can either be taken by the speaker or transferred to the interlocutor. Dynamic modality, on the other hand, together with the objective uses of deontic modality, does not serve to encode positions, but rather denotes relations internal to the propositional content, most typically the willingness, obligation, ability or permission of the agent to carry out the action denoted by the main verb. 3. Moods 3.1. Introduction The subjective modals described in the previous section are not the only position-encoding resources in the verbal domain in English. The basic mood types of indicative and imperative form the second major category9 to be dealt with in the analysis of modality as an interpersonal phenomenon. These categories have generally been defined in terms of the features of tense and subject, as summarized in table 4 (Quirk et al. 1985: 803; Davies 1986: 5–11).

Moods

39

Table 4. The imperative-indicative distinction Verb form Imperative

Base form

Indicative

Inflected (tense/person)

Subject NP Restrictions Second/ Generalized third person Obligatory No restrictions

Expression Optional

Imperative structures have bare verb forms without tense or person marking, and do not require expression of a subject NP, as shown in (44) below. When subject NPs are present, these are restricted to second person, as in (45), or generalized third person, as in (46): other types of preverbal NPs cannot function as subject, but only as extra-clausal vocative NPs separated from the imperative structure by an intonational break as in (47). Indicative structures, on the other hand, have verb forms with tense and person marking (where relevant), they have quasi-obligatory expression of subject NP,10 and they do not impose any restrictions on the person of this subject NP. (44) (45) (46) (47)

Where are those tapes? Bring them back. I’ve got to hear them please. (CB ukspok) She clutched his arm. “You be careful, Miguel.” (CB usbooks) “We’ve no time to lose,” Hilton told them roughly. “Everybody get upstairs at once. Stay in the apartment until I come.” (CB usbooks) See if the Journal will run the graphic without the goddamned beard. Karen, give them one of Mrs. Ing’s snapshots of this bastard. Parish, get out to the phone company right now. Wald, either get those citizens to come up with something or get them the hell out of this building. (CB usbooks)

The discussion of the imperative and indicative moods in this section will be centred around two related problems. The first one concerns the relation of the basic moods to the analysis of the modals that has been developed in the previous section. There is an obvious functional relation between moods and subjective modals, in that the moods express the same types of positions as the two categories of subjective modality distinguished in the previous section. The imperative encodes positions about the desirability of actions just like the subjective deontic modals, and the indicative encodes positions about the plausibility of propositions just like

40 Chapter 1: Modality the epistemic modals. There is no such functional relation between moods and objective modals, because objective modality does not have any position-encoding function at all. Still, I will show that the analysis of the moods is also relevant to the analysis of objective modality, because it can account for the presence of epistemic features in structures with objective deontic modals. The epistemic features that come to the surface in applying the criteria for interpersonal status to structures with objective deontic modals (as indicated in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of this chapter) can be attributed to the role of the indicative mood as the basic position-encoding element in these structures. The second issue in the analysis of mood is closely related to the first one. I will show that the functional relation between moods and subjective modals points towards a problem in the definition of the basic mood types: the delineation between imperative and indicative structures on the basis of the deontic-epistemic distinction is different from the traditional delineation between imperative and indicative as defined, for instance, by Quirk et al. (1985: 803) or Davies (1986: 5–11) (see table 4 above). Whereas subjective-deontically modalized clauses belong with the imperative on the basis of their shared deontic function, they are distinct from the imperative and belong with the indicative in terms of a shared feature of obligatory expression of the subject. On the basis of this conflict of definitions, I will argue that the traditional labels of imperative and indicative actually cover two distinct phenomena. The two conflicting analyses highlight two different features, which have traditionally been thought to co-align in the definition of the imperative-indicative distinction but actually relate to two independent phenomena. The feature of subject relates to the imperative as a separate construction type and correlates with other features such as the specific interaction with the declarative-interrogative system (see further in Chapter 2, Section 3), whereas the feature of deontic positioning relates to the imperative as a modal category and correlates with other features such as the category of tense. 3.2. Moods and subjective modality 3.2.1. The functional correlation In semantic terms, the two basic mood types of indicative and imperative can be paired nicely with the two types of subjective modality that were distinguished in the previous section. The imperative encodes the same type

Moods

41

of position as subjective deontic modality, and the indicative encodes the same type of position as subjective epistemic modality. Both the imperative in (49) and the deontically modalized clause in (48) encode positions about the desirability of a particular course of action, whereas the indicative in (51) and the epistemically modalized clause in (50) both encode positions about the plausibility of a particular proposition. (48)

(49)

(50)

(51)

It was getting late and I was worried. As a formal appointment, our meeting might cost several thousand pounds. Then Hide-san smiled and said in perfect English: “I am an old-fashioned girl. I know you have a wife, you must tell her you met me. So we can meet again like this, not business.” (CB times) The highlights of Dad’s Army: in one episode, a captured German officer is taking names for the little black book he will refer to when the Germans win the war. “You, vat iss your name?” he shouts at the soppy-looking boy. Mainwaring snaps immediately: “Don’t tell him, Pike.” (CB times) Thomson: Bellotti’s campaign may have gotten the final boost it needed this week when Lieutenant Governor Evelyn Murphy dropped out of the race and threw her support to Bellotti. (CB npr) They want the United States to lift its embargo so they can begin receiving loans from international lending agencies, like the World Bank, to rebuild a badly damaged and neglected infrastructure. Their cause got a boost from this week’s dramatic visit to Vietnam by French President Francois Mitterand, who spoke through an interpreter. (CB npr)

In this section, I will first provide further evidence for the functional correlation between the basic moods and subjective modality. Especially the correlation between structures with subjective deontic modality like (48) and imperative structures like (49) requires further justification, because it conflicts with the traditional delineation between the mood types on the basis of the feature of subject (see table 4 above). In terms of this feature, structures with deontic modals like (48) belong with indicatives like (51) rather than with imperatives like (49). The delineation on the basis of the feature of subject is of course a valid categorization in its own right, but I will argue that the alternative delineation proposed here is an equally valid categorization in grammatical terms. More particularly, I will show that the distinction between epistemic positions about the plausibility of

42 Chapter 1: Modality propositions and deontic positions about the desirability of actions is also reflected in divergent behaviour with respect to the category of tense, the second grammatical feature in the traditional definition of the imperativeindicative contrast (see again Quirk et al. 1985: 803; Davies 1986: 5–11). In terms of the feature of tense, structures with deontic modals like (48) group with the imperative in (49) rather than the indicative in (51). This argument will not only provide further support for the functional correlation between the two basic moods and the two types of subjective modality, but as a more general outcome it will also show that the traditional labels of imperative and indicative each cover two different phenomena. The features of tense and subject which seemingly co-align in defining the contrast between imperative and indicative can be shown to diverge when taking into account the relation of the basic moods to the modals. Apart from the justification of the functional correlation between moods and subjective modals, a second issue that will be dealt with in this section concerns the precise nature of the semantic relation between the mood types and the subjective modals. The lack of semantic specificity in the moods has sometimes been taken as an argument for regarding the basic moods as the unmarked options in the epistemic and deontic domains, respectively (Palmer 1986: 23–33). I will argue that only the indicative can properly be described as unmarked in the traditional sense (Trubetzkoy 1969 [1939]: 81; Jakobson 1932: 3–6), since it combines absence of formal marking relative to the epistemic modals with wider distribution than these modals, particularly in contexts of neutralization for the feature of epistemic positioning. The imperative, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as an unmarked option in this sense: unlike the indicative, it does not express any position that is distinct from the different modals in its domain, but rather expresses a more general position that covers the more specific positions expressed by the deontic modals. 3.2.2. Further justification: the category of tense The category of subject is not the only feature that distinguishes the two basic mood types from each other. The indicative can also distinguished from the imperative in terms of the category of tense, as has been argued by Bolinger (1968, 1977a), Lyons (1977: 746–747) and Bolkestein (1980: 41). Tense will be defined here as a deictic category, which serves to locate the SoA represented in a clause relative to its temporal zero-point, i.e. the time of encoding and/or decoding of the utterance by the speaker and/or the

Moods

43

interlocutor (Declerck 1991b: 14–16). In this sense, the SoA represented in an indicative clause is always tensed, whereas the SoA in an imperative clause is never tensed. For instance, if we compare examples like (52) and (53): (52) (53)

The Americans came off the plane grim-faced and teary-eyed. (CB npr) “Mr Grady,” I called out. “Come back here.” (CB usbooks)

The VP of indicative clauses like (52) always bears tense marking: came in (53) contrasts with a present come and a future will come, and these different options serve to locate the SoA in the past, present or future relative to the temporal zero-point of the clause. The VP of imperative clauses like (53), on the other hand, does not bear any tense marking: unlike came in (52), come in (53) does not contrast with other tense options like past came or future will come. The imperative can therefore be regarded as an intrinsically tenseless structure: unlike with the indicative, the SoA described in imperative clauses is not located with respect to the temporal zero-point. There are two possible objections that could be raised against an analysis of imperatives as tenseless structures. A first objection might be that the relevant paradigmatic contrast for the imperative in (53) is not come versus came and will come, but come versus have come. There are imperatives which have this perfect form, as shown in (54) below (see further in Davies 1986: 16–17 on this type of structure), but the present-perfect contrast is not a deictic paradigm for imperatives. The perfect form in examples like (54) does not locate the SoA differently relative to the temporal zero-point, but simply indicates that the actualization of the SoA is desired by a specific point in time, here expressed in the adverbial clause before the guests arrive. (54)

Don’t have eaten everything before the guests arrive. (Davies 1986: 16)

A second objection might be that imperatives are not tenseless but have an inherently future orientation, and are therefore similar to future indicatives in terms of tense. There is a major difference, however, between the future orientation of imperatives and the future tense of indicative structures. Future tense is a deictic category: it establishes a relation to the speaker’s (and/or interlocutor’s) here-and-now by locating the SoA at a

44 Chapter 1: Modality point in time beyond the temporal zero-point. The future orientation in imperatives, however, is not deictic: the imperative does not locate the SoA at a particular point in time beyond the temporal zero-point. As an object of the speaker’s desire or will, the SoA in an imperative is not located on the time-line at all, but remains a purely virtual or hypothetical concept (Bolinger 1968: 356–359, 1977a): in this sense, the future orientation of the imperative is not a matter of tense, but merely a consequence of the fact that the default case for the realization of the hypothetical SoAs in the imperative is a realization in the future.11 Compare, for instance, the indicative structure in (55) with the corresponding imperative in (56): (55) (56)

Soccer ace Jamie Redknapp will marry pop singer Louise tomorrow – while afloat on a boat in the Bahamas. (CB sunnow) Marry Louise, Jamie!

The future tense in the indicative structure in (55) serves to locate the marriage between Jamie and Louise at a point in time that is later than the temporal zero-point. The location at a future point in time is a crucial part of the meaning of this structure: if the marriage does not take place, the speaker in (56) will have provided incorrect information. The corresponding imperative in (56), on the other hand, does not locate the marriage of Jamie and Louise in the future, nor anywhere else on the time-line. If Jamie does not marry Louise, the speaker of (56) will not have provided incorrect information: the marriage between Jamie and Louise is merely a hypothetical SoA that is considered by speaker (and interlocutor) in terms of desirability, and location relative to the temporal zero-point is simply not an issue in this structure. In this sense, the imperative contrasts with the indicative not only in terms of the feature of subject, but also in terms of the category of tense. Indicatives have tensed SoAs, which are always located with respect to the temporal zero-point, whereas imperatives have tenseless SoAs, which are not located with respect to the temporal zeropoint, but are purely virtual. Unlike the feature of subject, the feature of tense in the definition of the indicative-imperative contrast does co-align with the distinction between subjective epistemic and subjective deontic modality: the same contrast between tensed and tenseless SoAs that distinguishes indicative from imperative mood also distinguishes subjective epistemic modality from subjective deontic modality. Subjective epistemic modality operates over tensed SoAs, whereas subjective deontic modality operates over tenseless SoAs. Structures with subjective modals are distinct from bare indicative

Moods

45

structures like (52) in that there are in principle two locations for tenserelated paradigmatic contrasts, one on the subjective modal, as shown in (57), and another on the main verb following the modal, as shown in (58). (57) (58)

a. b. a. b.

The teacher may come back. The teacher might come back. The teacher may come back. The teacher may have come back.

The contrast illustrated in (57) is not relevant to the present discussion, because it does not differentiate between epistemic and deontic modality in terms of tense. Because of the subjective nature of the modals, this contrast does not even have a deictic value, neither for the epistemic nor for the deontic categories. The reason lies with the performative nature of subjective modality (see further in Verstraete 2001): taking (or requesting) positions of epistemic or deontic commitment is inherently simultaneous with the time of utterance. This means that past tense marking on a subjective modal like might in (57b) does not serve to locate any aspect of the structure as anterior to the temporal zero-point. Instead, this type of marking can encode tentativeness, it can occur in contexts of indirect speech or free indirect speech (see further Verstraete 2001) and in cases of subjective-objective ambiguity it can shift the modal to the objective category (see further in Section 3.3.1. below). The present-perfect contrast on the main verb illustrated in (58), on the other hand, illustrates the essential difference between epistemic and deontic modality in terms of tense. The perfect form has a different functional value depending on the epistemic or deontic nature of the modal preceding the main verb. For instance, if we compare epistemic must in (59) and (60) with deontic must in (61) and (62): (59) (60) (61) (62)

The briefcase was between my van and a big white car which a porter from a nearby hotel was just parking at the same time. He must feel dreadful (CB today) He must have felt dreadful. You must get your estimate in together and give us it or we’ll be forced to go elsewhere. (CB ukspok) You must have given us your estimate by the end of next week or we’ll be forced to go elsewhere.

46 Chapter 1: Modality In the subjective-epistemic structures in (59) and (60), the function of the contrast between present and perfect main verb is to locate the SoA differently with respect to the temporal zero-point: perfect locates it as anterior to the temporal zero-point, whereas present locates it as simultaneous with the temporal zero-point.12 In the subjective-deontic structures in (61) and (62), on the other hand, the contrast between present and perfect main verb does not serve to locate the actualization of the SoA differently relative to the temporal zero-point. Both with present and with perfect main verb, the SoA is desired and therefore still virtual just like in imperative clauses. Unlike with the epistemic modal in (60), the perfect form in (62) does not locate the SoA as anterior to the temporal zero-point, but simply indicates that actualization of the virtual SoA is desired by a specific point in time, in this case the time indicated in the adverbial phrase by the end of next week. 3.2.3. Two definitions of the imperative-indicative contrast The discussion of tense shows that apart from the traditional distinction between imperative and indicative on the basis of the feature of subject, an equally valid distinction can be made on the basis of the feature of tense. These two features and the corresponding delineations between indicative and imperative neatly correspond as long as the analysis is restricted to non-modalized clauses. As soon as structures with subjective modality are taken into account, however, the two features do not correspond any longer and each defines its own delineation between the basic mood types: in terms of the feature of subject, structures with subjective deontic modality like (61) or (62) above belong with the indicative, but in terms of the feature of tense they belong with the imperative. This divergence shows that the traditional labels of indicative and imperative actually cover different phenomena. The feature of subject is what characterizes the imperative as a specific construction in the grammar of English, in the sense of Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988) or Goldberg (1995: 13–16): the optional expression of subject and its restriction to second person or generalized third person cannot be attributed to any other feature in the grammatical system but must be regarded as an idiosyncratic feature of the structure as such. This is in fact not the only idiosyncratic feature which justifies such a constructional view. In Chapter 2 (Section 2), I will show how the imperative as defined on the basis of subject optionality also behaves differently in terms

Moods

47

of interaction with the declarative-interrogative system of speech function: unlike any other type of main clause, including deontically modalized clauses, imperatives do not allow any declarative-interrogative contrast. The feature of tense, on the other hand, relates to the modal value of the imperative which is not construction-specific but fits into the larger organization of the modal system in English. Any main clause structure expresses either an epistemic position about the plausibility of propositions or a deontic position about the desirability of actions. As shown in the previous section, this distinction is also reflected in the domain with respect to which these positions apply: deontic positions by definition operate over virtual SoAs and therefore apply to a tenseless domain, whereas epistemic positions apply to a tensed domain. Unlike the feature of subject or the absence of declarative-interrogative contrast, therefore, the feature of tense is not specific to the imperative but relates to its deontic modal value. As a deontic position, the imperative applies to a tenseless domain, and this is a fully regular correlation in the grammar of English that is not restricted to the imperative construction in any way. Table 5. Two different features in the definition of the indicative-imperative contrast Subject Optional and 2nd/3rd person Obligatory and any person

Tense Imperative Subjective deontic modality Indicative Subjective epistemic modality

Tenseless Tensed

Table 5 summarizes how the features of subject and tense lead to different delineations: the two features co-align for imperative and indicative as such, but they diverge as soon as subjective modality is also taken into account. The feature of subject characterizes the imperative as a specific construction in the grammar, whereas the feature of tense relates to its deontic modal value and therefore also extends to deontically modalized clauses. 3.2.4. Moods as unmarked options? One final issue that should be discussed in our analysis of the relation between moods and subjective modals is the precise nature of the semantic relation between the basic moods and the modals. The lack of semantic

48 Chapter 1: Modality specificity of the moods in comparison to the modals has sometimes been used as an argument for regarding the imperative and the indicative as the unmarked options within the deontic and epistemic domains. Palmer (1986: 26–30), for instance, suggests that the basic moods combine lack of formal marking for modality with lack of semantic marking for any of the more specific positions encoded by the different modal verbs. In this section, I will argue that the functional relation between the moods and the modals is different for the imperative and the indicative, and that the ‘unmarkedness’ that is allegedly involved in both cases actually covers two different types of semantic relations. The relation between the imperative and the deontic modals is one of vagueness. The different modal verbs each encode specific positions in the deontic domain: can in (63), for instance, encodes permission, must in (64) encodes obligation, and should in (65) encodes strong advisability. These positions are differentiated from each other by semantic features such as the willingness of the agent to carry out the action in question, which distinguishes the permission in (63) – agent willing – from the obligation in (64) – agent not willing (Davies 1979: 24–25; Verstraete 2005). The imperative, on the other hand, encodes a generalized deontic position of ‘commitment to the desirability of the action’, which is simply vague relative to the different more specific positions encoded by the modals: the imperative can be used to give permission, as in (66), impose obligations, as in (67) or give advice, as in (68) (Eirian Davies 1979: 24–25; Eirlys Davies 1986: 33–43; Palmer 1986: 29–30). For the generalized deontic position encoded by the imperative, semantic features that distinguish the different modals like the willingness of the agent for obligation and permission are merely different contextualizations, as shown for instance by the fact that the imperative covers both permission (66) and obligation (67). In this sense, the imperative is in a semantic relation of vagueness to the deontic modals: the imperative merely encodes commitment to the desirability of the action (see also Wilson and Sperber 1988), and is therefore sufficiently general to contextualize as the different more specific positions encoded by the modals. (63)

(64)

After a moment she murmured against his shoulder embarrassed: “You don’t need to wait for me, I take a long time.” “You can take all the time you want.” He was still cradling her head and she relaxed against him. (CB ukbooks) Even if we fired, we couldn’t stop more than half a dozen before they seized us. My only other thought was to charge them with

Moods

(65)

(66) (67)

(68)

49

the vehicles. The consequences were too horrible to contemplate. “You must disperse or we shall open fire,” I said in as stern and authoritative a voice as I could manage. The old woman, standing twenty-five yards away, spat a long stream of filthy green phlegm in reply. (CB ukbooks) Whitlock glanced up at the waitress. “Coffee please.” “You should try the doughnuts,” Montero said between mouthfuls. “They’ve got to be the best in town.” “No, just coffee,” Whitlock said to the hovering waitress then turned to Montero. (CB ukbooks) They were back on the lot again. The opportunity had passed. “It may take an hour or two,” Karen said. “Take all the time you want,” Peggy said. (CB ukbooks) A man came out of a pub and grabbed Chris. His glasses were knocked off, he was hit in the face and he was knocked to the floor The attacker held the MP in a bear-hug and snatched his blue and white rosette. Chris spun round and said: “Give it back”. (CB today) As I said, I’ve only met him once here in Amsterdam. An educated guess, and that’s all it is, would be somewhere in the Jordaan. It’s the nucleus of the city’s art world. Try the Bohemer, a bar on Laurier Street. It’s a regular haunt of young artists. (CB ukbooks)

The situation with the indicative is quite different from that with the imperative: the indicative is not vague relative to the range of different positions encoded by the epistemic modals, but rather adds another position to this range. Just like the deontic modals, the different epistemic modals in (69)-(71) below each encode their own type of epistemic position: might in (69) encodes possibility, will in (70) encodes strong probability and must in (71) encodes necessity. Unlike the imperative, however, the indicative in (72) cannot contextualize as any of these positions: the indicative is not vague relative to the range of positions between probability, possibility and necessity, but simply constitutes a separate type of position in addition to probability, possibility or necessity: commitment to the truth of the proposition. (69)

We would urge anyone who was in St Peter’s Avenue around midnight when the attack took place to come forward. It was a busy area at the time because locals and holidaymakers were

50 Chapter 1: Modality

(70)

(71)

(72)

leaving pubs and clubs. They may have seen the victim, who was in a very distressed state afterwards, or the group of youths. (CB today) He said: “We are certain that other backpackers and holidaymakers who are returning home from Thailand will have seen this girl on their travels and could hold vital information about her whereabouts.” (CB times) She felt her face. It was flushed and hot, as though she had been bending over the fire where that cable was forged. The villagers stared after the visitors, murmuring to one another. Orphan thought they must have seen what had happened to her, but they seemed not to have done so. (CB ukbooks) Neighbour Rosemary Clark said: “Carl seemed to fend for himself at all hours of the day or night. I have seen him walking down to the shops a mile or so away. I have seen him sleeping out in the streets he was so tired.” (CB today)

The difference between the imperative and the indicative shows that the relation between moods and modals cannot simply be generalized in terms of ‘unmarkedness’. In fact, only the relation between the indicative and the epistemic modals can properly be described in terms of the traditional understanding of markedness relations from phonology (Trubetzkoy 1969 [1939]: 77-79, 81) and morphology (Jakobson 1932: 3–6, 1983). Markedness refers to the fact that oppositions such as voiced-voiceless or singularplural are not fully symmetrical but usually have one unmarked member. This unmarked member is characterized relative to the other members of the paradigm by lack of functional specificity (or greater phonetic naturalness in phonological oppositions) and wider distributional possibilities, for instance in contexts of neutralization, where the form used will be identical to the unmarked member of the paradigm. These are precisely the features that we find in the relation between the indicative and the epistemic modals: the indicative constitutes a separate position in the epistemic paradigm that is functionally less specific than the different modals, and it is also identical to the form that occurs in contexts where the function of speaker-positioning as such is suspended, such as adverbial clauses introduced by conjunctions like after or before (see further in Section 3 in Chapter 4; see also Palmer 1986: 28). The imperative is entirely different in this regard: it cannot be described as an unmarked option for the deontic modals, because unlike the indicative it does not even form a paradigm of semantic positions with them. The

Moods

51

imperative does not add any position to the range of positions defined by the deontic modals: rather, it is a separate construction type that covers at least the same functional range as the different deontic modals, but abstracts away from the semantic differences between them. To continue the analogy from phonology and morphology, unlike the indicative the imperative does not stand in paradigmatic opposition to the range of deontic modals but rather in complementary distribution to them: deontic positions can either be expressed in the imperative construction or with deontic modals. In the case of the imperative the deontic position is subject to the constructional restrictions of the imperative (i.e. it is available only for structures with second person and generalized third person subjects), but the distinction between permission, obligation or advisability is a matter of vagueness (compare (66)-(68)): the speaker is not forced to choose between these different positions but takes a position that remains vague in this respect. In the case of the deontic modals the construction-specific restrictions on the imperative do not apply any more (i.e. it is also available for first and specific third person), but the option of vagueness disappears: the speaker is forced to make a choice from the range of positions between permission, obligation or advisability (compare (63)-(65)). Table 6 provides a graphic representation of these different types of relations, with the bottom row in grey representing the constructional restrictions on the imperative and its consequences for the simultaneous availability of imperative and modal expression (only in the case of second person or generalized third person subjects, not for first person or specific third person subjects). Table 6. The semantic relation between moods and modals deontic

epistemic must

must imperative

may may will will

2nd and generalized 3rd person

st

1 and specific 3 person

indicative rd

any person

52 Chapter 1: Modality 3.3. Moods and objective modality Unlike with subjective modality, there is no direct functional relation between the moods and the different types of objective modality. As shown in Section 2.3. of this chapter, objective modals do not themselves have any position-encoding function but rather belong to the propositional content with respect to which such positions are taken. In this respect, objective modality is fundamentally different both from subjective modality and from the basic mood types, and is therefore as such not relevant to the analysis of mood. What is relevant from the perspective of the moods, however, is the larger structure in which objective modals occur. In this section, I will show that structures with objective modality take the unmarked indicative position in the epistemic domain, as reflected in typically epistemic features such as the presence of tense marking and the potential co-occurrence with propositional attitude markers. Section 2.3. of this chapter has shown that there are two types of objective modality, which are different in terms of the availability of subjective uses in addition to the objective ones: dynamic modality, like can of ability in (73), is always objective, whereas deontic modality, which can be both objective like have to in (74) or subjective like must in (75). In this section, I will first focus on the deontic category, where the subjective-objective contrast brings out the specific interpersonal features of structures with objective modality most clearly. On the basis of this analysis, I will then show how these features can be generalized to all structures with objective modality, and explained in terms of the presence of epistemic modalization encoded by the indicative mood. (73) (74)

(75)

Hugh is a true Renaissance Man. He can play any instrument he picks up, while I can’t even sing or dance. (CB today) Tomorrow’s dress code day. Students are expected to come to class dressed as if they were going to a real job interview, girls in dresses and high heels. Boys have to wear dress shirts and ties. But in his office, Jerry Kaplan keeps a rumpled paper bag filled with his old ties. He predicts that tomorrow many will show up without their required neckwear and, sure enough, he’s right. (CB npr) The terrified student who almost became Burton’s second victim last night demanded: “He must never go free.” Debbie Van Gerko – abducted at knifepoint by Burton hours after Rachel’s murder –

Moods

53

said: “For all the other Rachels, I never want him on the street again.” (CB sunnow) 3.3.1. Objective deontic modality and the moods Because of their divergent functions, the subjective and objective categories of deontic modality have a different relation to the basic mood types. Subjective deontic modals like must in (76) encode the speaker’s commitment to the desirability of a particular course of action. In terms of function, therefore, they group together with the imperative mood, an association which is also reflected grammatically in the absence of tense for their SoAs, as has been argued in the previous section. Objective deontic modals like have to in (77), on the other hand, do not encode the speaker’s commitment to the desirability of an action, but merely describe the existence of a particular obligation or necessity for the agent within the propositional content. Functionally, therefore, they do not encode any interpersonal position but rather belong to the propositional content with respect to which such positions can be taken. In this section, I will argue that the specific grammatical characteristics of objective modals suggest that the type of position to which they are subject is epistemic, more particularly the unmarked position of the indicative: structures like (77) involve epistemic negotiations about the existence of some necessity or obligation rather than deontic negotiations about the imposition of the obligation. (76)

(77)

You must answer me, sweetheart. Don’t make Mother angry. Don’t upset your loving mommy. Dear one. Answer Mother. The tears rolled down her cheeks. She thrust a knuckle into her mouth and bit down on it, hard. (CB ukbooks) In Bangalore, computer companies have to do privately what they cannot depend on the government to do. Besides the backup generators and uninterrupted power supplies, they install satellite dishes, phone cables, maybe build a new road, and sometimes even have to subsidize the neighborhood sewer system. (CB npr)

A first indication relates to the category of tense in these structures. As shown in (78) below, the meanings encoded by objective deontic modals can be located in the present, past or future relative to the temporal zeropoint. Unlike with subjective deontic modality, the issue in these structures

54 Chapter 1: Modality is not the speaker’s commitment to the obligation, but rather the existence of such an obligation, and this can be located in the past, present or future just like any other propositional content. In terms of the analysis in the previous section, the presence of tense in structures like (78) can be taken as a first indication of their epistemic nature: subjective deontic positions apply to tenseless domains, whereas subjective epistemic positions apply to tensed domains. (78)

In Bangalore, computer companies have to / had to / will have to do privately what they cannot depend on the government to do.

A second indication is that objective modals can also be combined with propositional attitude markers like unfortunately, regrettably or sadly (Bolkestein 1980: 40–42), as shown in (79) below. (79)

Unfortunately, in Bangalore computer companies have to do privately what they cannot depend on the government to do.

The combination with propositional attitude markers is also a typically epistemic feature, which is not available for deontic structures like imperatives or structures with subjective deontic modality (see also Verstraete 2000: 121–122). This restriction is grammatically reflected in two restrictions on the distribution of propositional attitude markers: on the one hand, they cannot occur with imperatives (see, for instance, Greenbaum 1969: 112), as shown in (80) below, and on the other hand they have an objectivizing effect on subjective deontic modals, as illustrated in (81) below. Deontic modals can of course always be combined with propositional attitude markers like unfortunately or regrettably, but this usually shifts the interpretation to the objective category, as reflected in the specific rhetorical potential of such combinations. The propositional attitude marker in (81), for instance, backgrounds the speaker’s deontic commitment to the prohibition and transforms it into epistemic commitment to the existence of the prohibition, thus presenting it as somehow existing independently from the speaker. (80) (81)

*(Un)fortunately, don’t use this special introductory offer to renew existing subscriptions. Offer valid for new subscriptions in the UK only ordered between the 31st January 1994 until 2nd April 1994. Regrettably, this spe-

Moods

55

cial introductory offer cannot be used to renew existing subscriptions. (CB ukephem) Thus, the restrictions illustrated in (80) and (81) clearly reveal the epistemic associations of propositional attitude markers: they cannot co-occur with inherently subjective-deontic structures like the imperative, and in the case of the deontic modals they shift the interpretation of the modal to the objective category, and the interpretation of the entire structure to the epistemic domain. In this sense, the availability of propositional attitude markers like unfortunately in (79) above can be taken as another indication of the presence of epistemic modalization in structures with objective deontic modality. In sum, what is interpersonally at issue in objective-deontically modalized structures is not deontic positioning about the desirability of actions but epistemic positioning about the truth of propositions concerning the existence of an obligation (‘is it or is it not the case that this obligation exists?’). This epistemic position is encoded in the indicative mood of the structure, which is reflected in the presence of tense and potential combination with modal adverbs and propositional attitude markers. 3.3.2. Objective modality and indicative mood The grammatical features which point to the presence of epistemic modalization in structure with objective deontic modality can in fact be generalized to the entire domain of objective modality. Clauses with dynamic modals of ability and volition equally allow propositional attitude markers and are tensed just like clauses with objective deontic modality, as shown for can of ability in (82) and (83) below. This shows that such structures are equally subject to the unmarked epistemic modalization of the indicative mood: what is interpersonally at issue in these clauses is epistemic negotiation about the existence of ability (‘is it or is it not the case that X is able to …?’). (82) (83)

“I saw him come into the studio at seven years old and he was so talented,” she says. “He could write, he could play any instrument and he had a phenomenal mind.” (CB today) Mrs Maw achieved a relatively satisfactory outcome but unfortunately not everyone can use the media as effectively as she did to push her case. (CB oznews)

56 Chapter 1: Modality The epistemic modalization for objective modals is actually not restricted to the indicative mood. This is only the case when the objective modal is a true auxiliary like can, must, may or will: in these cases, the cooccurrence restrictions with other auxiliaries prevent the epistemic modalization in the verbal system from taking any other form than the indicative mood. When the objective modal is a semi-modal (Palmer 1983: 208–209) like have to or be able to, however, these co-occurrence restrictions are lifted and the epistemic modalization in the structure can actually surface in the form of epistemic modals, as shown in (84) and (85) below: (84)

(85)

Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis arrived in Berlin early this morning for a week-long European trade mission. But as WBUR’s Anthony Brooks reports, he may have to return home to Boston to head off a political revolt inside his own administration. (CB npr) Democratic candidate Dianne Feinstein agrees that specialinterest lobbyists and unelected bureaucrats might be able to exercise undue influence over an inexperienced Legislature. (CB npr)

If we look back at the description of subjective and objective modality in Section 2, the analysis presented here can also explain why the criteria for interpersonal status (conditional and interrogative constructions) bring out epistemic features in objectively modalized structures, as was shown in Section 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. The conditional and interrogative criteria are designed to interact with the subjective modalization in an utterance, and therefore they bring out what is interpersonally at issue in a particular structure. In objectively modalized clauses, this is epistemic positioning about the existence of ability, volition, obligation or necessity. For instance, what the interrogative transfers to the interlocutor in an objective-deontic structure like (86) below is precisely an epistemic position about the existence of obligation: ‘is it the case that this obligation exists?’. The same applies to conditional constructions: what the conditional echoes in the objective-dynamic structure in (87) is again an epistemic position about the existence of a particular refusal: ‘if it is the case that the father refuses to take up responsibility for his son, why does the government trust him with such an important function?’.

Moods

(86) (87)

57

Does my fund have to be a minimum size before I can take a contribution break? What charges will be deducted from my fund during a contribution break? (CB times) Broken-hearted Tracy even had to battle to get the high flier to admit he was Matthew’s dad and pay proper maintenance, after he offered her just 50 a week. Dempsey has just been named as Britain’s drug liaison officer in Rome, trying to stem the flow of narcotics from Europe. But Tracy, 34, who left the Leicestershire force on medical grounds last August, said: “If he won’t face up the responsibility of having a son, how can he take up such a vital role?” (CB sunnow)

3.4. Summary Table 7. Moods and modals Modal positions Epistemic

Deontic

Indicative* Subjective epistemic modals Imperative*

Subjective deontic modals

Propositional content Tense SoA + Tense

Objective deontic modals

+ auxiliary - auxiliary

- Tense

Table 7 summarizes the analysis of the basic mood types in relation to the modal verbs. Imperative and indicative mood are functionally related to subjective epistemic and subjective deontic modality, respectively, in that they express the same type of modal positions as these categories of subjective modality: imperative and subjective deontic modals encode positions about the desirability of actions, whereas indicative and subjective epistemic modals encode positions about the plausibility of propositions. This functional correlation highlights the specifically modal aspect of the mood types, which is further reflected in the distinction between tensed and tenseless SoAs in the propositional content to which the modal positions apply: epistemic positions apply to tensed SoAs, whereas deontic positions apply to tenseless SoAs. It has also been shown, however, that there is another aspect of the mood types that does not correlate with their modal aspect. In terms of the feature of subject, structures with subjective deontic modality do not group together with the imperative but with the indicative: unlike the imperative,

58 Chapter 1: Modality they have obligatory expression of subject and they allow first person and specific third person subjects. This leads to the conclusion that the labels of imperative and indicative actually cover two distinct phenomena, which is why they have been starred in table 7 above. On the one hand, there is the modal aspect of the mood categories, which can be defined in terms of the type of modal position they define and the tensed versus tenseless nature of the SoA to which they apply. On the other hand, there is the specific constructional aspect of the mood categories, which can be defined in terms of their behaviour with respect to the feature of subject (see table 4 above) and other features like the specific interaction with the declarativeinterrogative contrast (see Chapter 2, Section 3). Table 8 summarizes these two aspects of the moods, with the relevant criteria for each subdivision indicated in grey. Table 8. Two aspects of the indicative-imperative contrast Subject Indicative Subjective deontic Subjective epistemic Imperative Indicative Subjective epistemic Imperative Subjective deontic

Declarativeinterrogative

Modal position

Tense SoA

-

+

Epistemic / deontic

+/-

+

+

-

Deontic

-

-

-

+

Epistemic

+

+/-

+/-

+/-

Deontic

-

Optional

Restrictions

-

Chapter 2 Speech Function: Assigning responsibility

1. Introduction In the previous chapter, it was shown that modality can be regarded as a first parameter of interpersonal grammar in the simple clause: subjective modal verbs and basic moods serve to construe an epistemic or a deontic position with respect to the propositional content of the clause. A modal position is only part of what it takes to form a full speech act, however: construal of a position as such does not provide any information about who takes responsibility for this position in speaker-interlocutor interaction. This information is provided by the basic clause types declarative, interrogative, and imperative, which will be discussed here under the heading of speech function (after Halliday 1994: 68–71). In this chapter, I will argue that the meaning of the basic clause types can be defined in terms of the way they interact with the system of modality. In Section 2, I will show how declarative and interrogative constitute the fundamental options in the system of speech function, because they encode alternative assignments of responsibility for a particular modal position: the declarative allows the speaker to take responsibility for the modal position in his/her own turn, whereas the interrogative allows the speaker to transfer this responsibility to the interlocutor in the next turn. I will also show that the interlocutor-oriented component that has traditionally been associated with interrogative structures is complemented by an important speaker-based component: the speaker retains control over the type of modal position that forms the starting point for the exchange initiated by the interrogative. I will argue that recognition of this speakerbased component allows for a principled account of various rhetorical strategies in interrogative structures, like orientation towards a specific modal position or challenge of an interlocutor’s position. In Section 3 of this chapter, I will further elaborate on the special status of the imperative among the basic clause types, a problem which has already been touched upon in the previous chapter from the perspective of modality (see especially Section 3.2.3). I will argue that the imperative must be set apart from the other two basic clause types in that it does not allow for any distributional separation of modal and speech functional

60 Chapter 2: Speech function values. Instead, the imperative represents a constructional fusion between a modal (deontic) value and a speech functional (declarative) value, which probably also explains the indeterminacy in the traditional grammatical treatments between classifying the imperative as a mood type (together with the indicative) or as a basic clause type (together with the declarative and the interrogative). In the final section, I will round off with a more general discussion of the interaction between modality and speech function, arguing that the two parameters together constitute the basic grammatical components of illocutionary force in a clausal structure. This goes against the widespread assumption that the basic clause types as such represent the most important grammatical correlates of different types of illocutionary force: the type of illocutionary force associated with a declarative or interrogative structure crucially also depends on the type of modal value used in the structure. 2. Declarative and interrogative 2.1. Alternative assignments of responsibility The basic meaning of the declarative and interrogative clause types can be defined on the basis of their interaction with the system of subjective modality.13 Given a particular modal position encoded by a modal verb or a basic mood, declarative and interrogative structures serve to encode alternative assignments of responsibility for this position in speakerinterlocutor interaction: the declarative assigns responsibility to the speaker in his/her own turn, whereas the interrogative transfers responsibility to the interlocutor in the next turn (see also Davies 1979: 51–52 on the notion of transfer). Thus, for instance, both the structures in (1)-(2) and in (3)-(4) below contain an epistemic position, encoded respectively in the modal might and the indicative mood, but the difference between the declarative and interrogative members of each pair lies in the assignment of responsibility for the modal position in question. The declaratives in (1) and (3) signal that the responsibility is taken by the speaker in his/her own turn: the speaker in (1) and (3) is the one who is committed to the assessment of possibility marked by might and the assessment of certainty in the declarative. The interrogatives in (2) and (4), on the other hand, signal that the speaker transfers the responsibility to the interlocutor in the next turn: the speaker in (2) and (4) does not take responsibility for the modal position encoded

Declarative and interrogative

61

by might or the indicative mood, but transfers this responsibility to the interlocutor. This does not, of course, imply that the interlocutor will actually take this particular position: rather, transfer of responsibility implies that it is up to the interlocutor to accept, reject or modify the modal position which the speaker has chosen as the starting point for the exchange (see further in the following section on this point). (1) (2)

(3)

(4)

Anderson: Gene therapy might very well become a major new revolution in medicine. This should provide cures for what are presently incurable diseases. (CB npr) “Someone once told me that, being English-made, this camera was rare and possibly a collector’s item. I took no notice at the time but since then I haven’t seen another like it. Might it be of some value?” “I’m afraid this isn’t of any great value, although the Kershaw cameras in general aren’t common.” (CB ukmags) Perot: “Then he got us involved in Iran-Contra. And yet he denied any responsibility even though he was in charge.” Bowers: “But this allegation, like several others made in the ad, is not fully supported by the facts.” (CB npr) “Erm what about erm the incident where your friend’s tyres were slashed? Did the police Were the police involved in that?” “No. They … they never called the police.” (CB ukspok)

The same analysis of declarative and interrogative applies to the deontic domain, the main difference being that the exchanges are no longer about the plausibility of propositions, but about the desirability of actions. Thus, the declarative in (5) signals that the speaker takes responsibility for the position of permission encoded in the deontic modal may, whereas the corresponding interrogative in (6) signals transfer of the responsibility to the interlocutor. Again, of course, this transfer does not imply that the interlocutor will actually take this position, but only that she is the one who will decide about the issue of permission raised by the speaker. (5)

(6)

Pople blinked profusely and shook visibly as he struggled to replace the cap and Army belt he was stripped of during the trial. Judge Edmwnd Moelwyn-Hughes told him: “You may return to your duties, Colonel Pople.” (CB sunnow) “May we sit down?” Andrews asked. “Of course,” Nicole replied, gesturing absently to the remaining chairs positioned around the table. (CB ukbooks)

62 Chapter 2: Speech function 2.2. The role of modality in interrogative structures As noted above, transfer of responsibility for a particular modal position does not imply that the interlocutor will actually take this position. Rather, the role of the modal position in interrogative structures is to serve as a starting point for the exchange initiated by the interrogative: the speaker in an interrogative structure asks the interlocutor to take position on the basis of the specific modal value encoded in the interrogative. In this sense, choice of the modal position is one aspect of the interrogative structure that remains within the speaker’s control, and as such it can also be used by the speaker as a mechanism to steer the exchange initiated by the interrogative. In this section, I will provide evidence for the speaker-based nature of modality in interrogative structures by showing how the choice of specific modal positions can be exploited by the speaker for various rhetorical purposes, such as orienting the interrogative towards a specific modal position, challenging an interlocutor’s position, or triggering genuine rhetorical interpretations of interrogatives. 2.2.1. Marked and unmarked modal values in polar interrogatives The speaker-based nature of modality in interrogatives may not be obvious from simple indicative structures, but it comes to the surface more clearly in the contrast between marked and unmarked modal values in polar interrogatives. There is an important difference in interpretation for interrogative structures depending on whether the epistemic position involved is the unmarked option in the indicative mood, or one of the marked options in the system of modal verbs:14 interrogatives with marked epistemic modality are generally also discursively more marked than their counterparts in the indicative.15 Consider, for instance, the structures in (7) and (8) below: (7)

Certain blood cells have a lot in common with brain tissue. For example, many white blood cells contain identical receptor sites for neurotransmitter molecules that exist also in the brain, and they manufacture some of these substances as well. So if mind “cognitively caresses” brain tissue, might it similarly affect blood cells that are functionally similar? Dr. William G. Braud of the Mind Science Foundation in San Antonio, Texas, put this question to the test. (CB usbooks)

Declarative and interrogative

(8)

63

Casually, Frido said to one of the colleagues in his room -- “Has anybody seen the Chief of Staff since he returned? He must know what’s going on.” “Must he?” Frido met a hard stare. Men were talking in whispers in every office. (CB ukbooks)

If we compare the interrogative with might in (7) with its indicative counterpart in (4) above, the former structure is discursively more marked because it is not neutral as to the speaker’s expectations about the plausibility of the proposition, but implies that the speaker is inclined towards the assessment of possibility encoded in the modal. The same applies to the interrogative with might in (2) above: in both cases, this bias towards possibility is supported by a number of contextual indications, such as the relative rarity of the camera in (2) and the similarity in structure between blood cells and brain tissue in (7). Similarly, if we compare the interrogative with must in (8) above with its indicative counterpart in (4), the former structure is discursively more marked because it has a special ‘challenging’ value (Declerck 1991a: 408). Use of epistemic must in an interrogative usually implies a challenge to an instance of must used or implied by the interlocutor in the preceding discourse, as in (8) where the mustinterrogative challenges the interlocutor’s conviction that the chief of staff must know more about the problems. The fact that the use of different modal values in the interrogative can produce the rhetorical effects observed in (7) and (8) above indicates that the choice of modal value can be used by the speaker as a mechanism to steer the exchange initiated in the interrogative. It is the interlocutor who must take position in the exchange, but it is the speaker who determines the starting point for the exchange by choosing a particular modal value with respect to which he/she wants the interlocutor to take position. The unmarked option here is to choose the least specific position in the system as a starting point, i.e. the indicative mood. Anything that is more specific, like the modals might or must, will trigger the implicature that there is a specific reason for the speaker to choose these marked values as the starting point for the exchange. In this sense, choice of a specific modal position may be exploited by the speaker for various rhetorical purposes, like orienting the interrogative towards the position encoded by the modal, as in examples (2) and (7) above, or challenging an assessment by the interlocutor, as in (8) above.

64 Chapter 2: Speech function 2.2.2. Marked and unmarked modal values in wh-interrogatives The speaker-based nature of modality in interrogative structures is also reflected in the behaviour of marked and unmarked modal values in whinterrogatives. As with polar interrogatives, wh-interrogatives with marked modal verbs are discursively more marked than their counterparts with indicative mood. The precise nature of the discursive markedness is slightly different from that in polar interrogatives, but this difference can probably be attributed to the fact that the exchange between speaker and interlocutor in wh-interrogatives focuses on the specification of the wh-element rather than on the exchange of modal positions. Wh-interrogatives share the essential interrogative component of ‘transfer of responsibility’ with their polar counterparts, but they are different from polar interrogatives in that the exchange focuses on the specification of the wh-element within the propositional content rather than on a particular modal position with respect to this propositional content (Dik 1997b: 257–289). Thus, for instance, the structure in (9) below is unspecified for one element of its propositional content, marked by the interrogative pronoun who: accordingly, the exchange in (9) focuses on the specification of this who-element rather than on the plausibility of the proposition in question. The question of plausibility is entirely backgrounded in the form of a presupposition (see further in Chapter 3, Section 2 on the notion of presupposition in this context): the wh-interrogative in (9) presupposes that someone actually did advise the person in question against selling the property, and focuses on who gave her this advice. (9)

So you know she’s been told not to bother putting her house on the market ‘cos she’ll never sell it. Who said that to her? I don’t know the estate agents presumably. (CB ukspok)

The structures in (10) and (11) below show that wh-interrogatives also allow marked modal values in addition to the unmarked indicative mood in (9). The precise effect of using marked modal values is somewhat different from the effect with polar interrogatives, however: unlike in the polar interrogative in (7), epistemic might in (10) does not imply a bias by the speaker towards the assessment of possibility encoded in might, and unlike in the polar interrogative in (8), epistemic must in (11) does not imply a challenge to a must used or implied by the interlocutor.

Declarative and interrogative

(10)

(11)

65

Abruzzo: There may be a tendency on the part of museum programming planners, curators, directors, to say, “Here we have a sponsorship opportunity. What might interest this corporation? What kind of exhibition might interest this corporation?” If that’s the case, then you will have, then, scholarly curatory decision making being influenced by commercial demands in the marketplace. (CB npr) The Princess of Wales’s broadcast […] From Mr P. M. B. Savage. Sir, What must those two young boys be going through, as they wait for that broadcast? All my life I was a schoolmaster in a boys’ boarding school, and I cannot help worrying. Has their mother not thought of that? Yours faithfully. PATRICK SAVAGE (CB times)

As argued above, the exchange in wh-interrogatives normally centres around the specification of the wh-element in the propositional content of the structure and backgrounds the question of plausibility in the form of a presupposition. The effect of using marked modal values in (10) and (11), however, is precisely to foreground the modal question of plausibility again by bringing in the position of the speaker. In (10), for instance, the choice of might foregrounds the hypothetical nature of the question. A bare indicative structure (what kind of exhibition interests this corporation?) would carry the presupposition that a particular corporation is actually interested in sponsoring the museum, but the use of might emphasizes the hypothetical nature of the interest of the corporation. In (11), on the other hand, the choice of must foregrounds commitment to the position that the TV broadcast must necessarily affect the children. In this particular case, the foregrounding of modal positioning actually pushes the issue of specification of the wh-element to the background again and produces a rhetorical question: the wh-interrogative in (11) does not expect any specification of the what-element by the interlocutor (the effect on the children), but is meant to convey that the effect will be harmful. If we take into account the essential difference between polar interrogatives and wh-interrogatives, therefore, the marked discursive status of the wh-interrogatives in (10) and (11) equally shows that the modal component in these structures remains within the speaker’s control, and can accordingly be exploited by the speaker for various rhetorical purposes.

66 Chapter 2: Speech function 2.3. Conclusion In conclusion, we can say that the interaction of the basic clause types with the system of modality shows that the interrogative should not only be analysed in terms of the interlocutor-oriented dimension that has traditionally been associated with it, but crucially also includes a speaker-oriented dimension. The speaker asks the interlocutor to take a modal position, but retains the control over the choice of the modal position that serves as the starting point for the exchange. The speaker-based nature of modality is reflected in the fact that choice of a specific modal value can be exploited by the speaker for different rhetorical purposes, as has been illustrated in (7), (8), (10) and (11) above. More speculatively, the connection between discursive markedness of interrogative structures and marked values in the epistemic modal system may also suggest a more general connection with markedness. It is probably not a coincidence that in related systems like polarity it is equally use of the marked member – i.e. the negative – that triggers oriented or even rhetorical interpretations for interrogatives (see Quirk et al. 1985: 808–813 on other ‘orienting’ systems in interrogative structures). This general connection might possibly be explained in terms of Gricean principles, more particularly the maxim of quantity (Grice 1975: 45–46; Levinson 1983: 110–111): if a speaker uses the more informative marked option rather than the unmarked one as the starting point for the transfer in the interrogative, this will usually trigger an implicature that there is a particular motivation to do so, which can then be exploited by the speaker for various rhetorical purposes. 3. The position of the imperative The imperative has traditionally been regarded as the third basic clause type in the paradigm, alongside with the declarative and the interrogative (see for instance Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 160; Quirk et al. 1985: 803). In terms of the analysis presented in the previous section, this classification would imply that the meaning of the imperative can be specified in the same way as the declarative and the interrogative, i.e. as a means to assign responsibility for a modal position. In this section, however, I will show that the analysis of the imperative is more complex than its traditional categorization together with the declarative and the interrogative seems to suggest. More particularly, I will provide further evidence for the status of

The position of the imperative

67

the imperative as a separate construction type (see also Section 3.2.3 in the previous chapter), in that it inherently combines a deontic modal value with a declarative speech functional value, two aspects of interpersonal meaning that can be separated distributionally for any other type of main clause structure. The discussion of modality in the previous chapter has already shown that there is a feature of subjective deontic modality in the imperative: imperatives do not only operate over tenseless domains just like subjective deontic modals (see Section 3.2.2), but they also cover the different more specific meanings of permission, obligation, advice that are bound to the different deontic modals (see Section 3.2.4). There are a number of features, however, that distinguish the deontic modal component involved in the imperative from the deontic modal verbs. One of these has already been discussed in the previous chapter (the feature of subject, see Section 3.2.3), and in this section I will show that the imperative is also different from the deontic modals in terms of its interaction with the system of speech function. The various deontic modals can occur both in declarative and interrogative structures, as shown in (12) and (13) below: they can be combined with declarative and interrogative structures depending on whether the speaker takes the modal responsibility him/herself or transfers it to the interlocutor. The distributional separation of modality and speech function in these structures shows that their interpersonal meaning can be defined compositionally on the basis of the two distinct grammatical systems of modality and speech function. (12) (13)

PETER MANDELSON Should they let him in Cabinet? Yes: 0660 100 207 No: 0660 100 208 (CB sunnow) James Elles, Tory MEP for Oxford and Buckinghamshire, said: “The commissioners already earn enough tax-free. For the benefit of their citizens, they should let people know how much they earn outside.” (CB times)

The modal component in the imperative, on the other hand, is not subject to the same speaker-interlocutor transfer as the deontic modals: there is no declarative-interrogative contrast for the imperative. Imperative structures assign responsibility for the deontic position to the speaker, and cannot transfer this responsibility to the interlocutor. Thus, for instance, the deontic position in the imperative in (14) below can only be interpreted as ‘I want you to give the phone number’, whereas the corresponding expres-

68 Chapter 2: Speech function sion with a deontic modal (must or should) could in theory occur both in a declarative (‘I want X16 to give the phone number’) and in an interrogative (‘do you want X to give the phone number’). (14)

“Eva!” he called to her. “Give me Hilton’s phone number!” (CB usbooks)

The fact that the imperative can only encode speaker-commitment to deontic positions provides further evidence for the constructional specificity of this structure. For any non-imperative clause type it is possible to separate the modal feature of position-construal grammatically from the speech functional feature of responsibility-assignment, because any modal verb can be combined with a declarative and an interrogative, thus providing different assignments of responsibility in speaker-interlocutor interaction. For the imperative, however, it is not possible to separate the two components grammatically. It is possible to detect modal and speech functional features semantically on the basis of the functional similarities with the different deontic modals and with the declarative clause type, but the constructional specificity of the imperative lies precisely in the fact that these two components cannot be separated grammatically. Unlike with nonimperative structures, it is impossible to locate the deontic modal component grammatically and to show a paradigmatic contrast to epistemic modality, just like it is impossible to locate the declarative speech functional component grammatically and to show a paradigmatic contrast to interrogative speech function. This implies that the imperative is a separate construction type in interpersonal terms, with the meaning ‘speaker-commitment to a deontic position’ in direct association with the construction rather than compositionally, via the combination of modal verbs as encoders for modal meaning and declarative or interrogative clause types as encoders for speech functional meaning. Table 9 summarizes the special position of the imperative with respect to the interaction between modality and speech function. The constructional specificity of the imperative as a fusion of a modal and a speech functional value may also explain why the imperative has traditionally been located not only in the paradigm of basic clause types, together with the declarative and the interrogative, but sometimes also in the paradigm of basic moods, together with the indicative. Inclusion in the paradigm of basic clause types does justice to its speech functional value of speaker-responsibility, and inclusion in the paradigm of basic moods does justice to its modal value of deontic modality, but neither classification is

Modality, speech function and illocutionary force

69

fully appropriate. The imperative cannot be fully characterized in terms of either a modal or a speech functional value, but crucially represents a constructional fusion of values from both these components. Table 9. Interpersonal meaning in imperative and non-imperative structures

Epistemic

Deontic

Non-imperative structures Declarative Interrogative Speaker-commitInterlocutorment transfer to of epistemic position epistemic position InterlocutorSpeaker-committransfer ment of of deontic position deontic position

Imperative Speakercommitment to deontic position

4. Modality and speech function in relation to illocutionary force The basic clause types of declarative, interrogative and imperative have often been related to the basic speech act types of statement, question and order (Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 160; Halliday 1994: 69), usually with the qualification that the links between clause type and speech act type are only a matter of typical connections, and that the clause types can be put to other uses than the prototypical ones. One upshot of the discussion in this chapter is that such correlations between basic clause types and types of speech acts cannot be maintained, not even in the form of statements about prototypical correlations. Basic clause types like declarative and interrogative as such cannot be directly related to different types of speech acts: declarative and interrogative only take care of the assignment of responsibility for a modal position, but the type of speech act associated with a clausal structure crucially also depends on the type of modal position that is involved. A declarative with epistemic modality, for instance, typically functions as a statement, but the same declarative with (subjective) deontic modality typically functions within an entirely different ‘family’ of speech acts, for instance as an order or a piece of advice. This shows that the system of speech function is only one aspect of the illocutionary force of a particular structure, which crucially also involves the modal value associated with the structure.

70 Chapter 2: Speech function To round off this chapter, I will explore the relevance of modality and speech function for the analysis of illocutionary force a bit further, arguing that the two parameters should be regarded as the basic grammatical components of illocutionary force. This should not be taken to imply that illocutionary force is an entirely grammatical matter: of course the illocutionary force of an utterance is crucially also determined by other factors such as discourse context, background assumptions, and the discourse participants’ assessment of each other’s intentions. Rather, I want to make two points about the relation between interpersonal grammar and illocutionary force. On a more general level, I will argue in Section 4.1 that the systems of modality and speech function serve as the basic grammatical prerequisites for the presence of illocutionary force in a clausal structure. This will mainly be demonstrated on the basis of an examination of the functional and distributional properties of construction types which structurally lack modal and speech functional values, like non-finite ing-clauses and to-clauses. On a more specific level, I will also try to show in Section 4.2 that the systems of modality and speech function do not only function as prerequisites for the presence of illocutionary force, but also have their influence on the type of illocutionary force associated with the structure in question. The different combinations of values for modality and speech function define basic interpersonal schemas (called “literal modal meaning” by Davies 1979: 19–42) whose features are present in any structure associated with those schemas, even in those contexts that could be regarded as instances of indirect speech acts. 4.1. Interpersonal grammar as a prerequisite for illocutionary force I will first argue that the systems of modality and speech function that have been discussed in this chapter and the previous one define the basic grammatical prerequisites for a clausal structure to have any illocutionary force at all. The status of these two systems as prerequisites for illocutionary force is reflected, for instance, in a number of distributional restrictions on structures where they are absent, such as non-finite clauses (see also McGregor 1997: 236–239). Ing-clauses, for instance, are structurally characterized by absence of both modal and speech functional values: unlike their finite counterparts, they do not allow any modal verbs and do not have any primary auxiliary position, and they do not allow any declarative-interrogative contrast. These structural properties go hand in hand with an important distributional

Modality, speech function and illocutionary force

71

restriction: non-finite structures cannot function independently as nonelliptical speech acts in discourse. Using a non-finite structure in discourse always requires co-occurrence with a finite structure, as in (15) below: the non-finite ing-clause in (15) cannot be used independently but can only occur in clause combinations as a dependent on a finite main clause (McGregor 1997: 239). The elliptical use of non-finite clauses, which constitutes an apparent exception to the restriction on independent use in discourse, can actually be said to rely on the same principle of finite support: the occurrence of elliptical structures like (16) equally relies on a supporting finite structure, which in this case is located in the preceding turn rather than the same turn.17 (15)

(16)

For my wife-to-be, the trip held as much nostalgia as romance. Having spent much of her childhood in Kenya, the place had many memories and we were married just a few miles from her old home. (CB today) At Wednesday’s tutorial group where we meet to discuss any problems Mr Tyler introduces me again for those who missed me on Monday. “This is David who’s with us for a while.” “What are you doing?” Will asks. “Trying it out, seeing what it’s like,” I say. He looks puzzled. (CB times)

Irrespective of the precise location of the supporting finite structure, the very need for finite support shows that a non-finite structure as such cannot function as a speech act on its own. In functional terms, this distributional restriction can be interpreted as a reflection of the importance of the parameters of modality and speech function for independent functionality of a clausal structure in discourse. Clauses that structurally lack modal and speech functional values cannot function as independent speech acts, and the necessary requirement for functionality in discourse is precisely support from a structure that does have modal and speech functional values. It may be worth noting that this analysis applies only to those structures that involve the description of some kind of State of Affairs. There are other structures that can function as independent speech acts in discourse and still do not have any modal or speech functional values, like Shit! or Hi there!, but what sets apart such minor clauses (McGregor 1997: 234–236) is that they do not involve any description of an SoA. Structures like these can be defined exhaustively in terms of their function in interaction (expression of annoyance, encouragement, greeting etc), and therefore they can be used as independent speech acts without the intervention of other

72 Chapter 2: Speech function grammatical systems like modality and speech function. It is only when non-interpersonal components like the description of an SoA are involved that modality and speech function are required to enable independent use as a speech act in discourse. What functions in discourse is not descriptions of States of Affairs, but rather the interactive positions taken by speaker and interlocutor with respect to these SoAs: this is why the interpersonal systems of modality and speech function are grammatical prerequisites for independent functionality in interaction. 4.2. Interpersonal grammar and types of illocutionary force The two parameters of interpersonal grammar are not only relevant as necessary prerequisites for the presence of illocutionary force in a particular structure, but they also have their influence on the type of illocutionary force associated with the structure. In this section I will try to show that interpersonal grammar is a useful starting point for the analysis of types of illocutionary force, by focusing on two traditional problem areas in the relation between grammar and illocutionary force. The first of these, to be dealt with in Section 4.2.1, concerns the relation between the very general schemas of interpersonal meaning that can be derived from the basic parameters of interpersonal grammar and the large number of very specific types of illocutionary force that are expressed by performative verbs, such as betting, marrying, baptizing or apologizing. What do such very specific social activities have in common with seemingly general communicative principles like taking or transferring responsibility for a modal position? The second problem, to be dealt with in Section 4.2.2, concerns the status of indirect speech acts, for which the illocutionary force of the utterance does not seem to be in accordance with the basic interpersonal schema encoded in its grammatical structure. Can we still maintain that the interpersonal structure of the utterance is a fundamental component of its illocutionary force if there are such discrepancies between structure and force? 4.2.1. Interpersonal grammar and patterns of interaction Combining the different values for the two interpersonal parameters yields four general schemas of interpersonal meaning, represented in table 10 below. In terms of the analysis presented in this chapter and the previous

Modality, speech function and illocutionary force

73

one, a speaker can take responsibility for an epistemic position, as in (17), transfer responsibility to the interlocutor for an epistemic position, as in (18), take responsibility for a deontic position, as in (19), and transfer responsibility to the interlocutor for a deontic position, as in (20). In this section, I will argue that these general interpersonal schemas define basic patterns of interaction that are socially significant just like the more specific speech acts of betting, baptizing or promising. Table 10. Basic interpersonal schemas as defined by the two parameters Epistemic Deontic

(17)

(18) (19) (20)

Declarative (17) (19)

Interrogative (18) (20)

And I was surprised, I must confess, that Professor Brooks could have made this blunder. Surely he must have known that such a discrepancy in numbers would be held up for criticism. (CB usbooks) Adams: Did he know who you were? Debartola: Yes, because I had just sold him something. (CB npr) “You must never, ever ask me to stop drinking. Do you understand?” asks Ben. “I do,” she says and gives him a hip flask as a gift an act that moves Ben to tears. (CB times) “Hi there. May I join you guys or are you at work?” “You can join but we’re carrying out an interview.” (CB ukspok)

The interactive significance of the interpersonal schemas outlined above lies in the fact that use of these schemas in conversation projects certain expectations on the interlocutor. Using an interrogative structure, for instance, transfers responsibility to the interlocutor and therefore makes a certain type of reply by the interlocutor conditionally relevant (Sacks 1972; Schegloff 1972: 363–370): the speaker who uses a structure like (18) or (20) imposes an expectation of reply on the interlocutor. This expectation is not to be interpreted in any psychological sense, but as an inherent interactive property of the schema in question: the expectation of reply will automatically be projected on whatever reaction follows by the interlocutor, whether or this reaction lives up to the expectation or not. In this sense, even absence of reaction by the interlocutor necessarily becomes meaningful when it occurs after a structure that projects conditional relevance,

74 Chapter 2: Speech function because it is “officially absent” in this context (Schegloff 1972: 364). Consider the structures in (21) and (22): (21) (22)

A: “You must never, ever ask me to stop drinking.” (cp (19) above) B: [silence] A: “Hi there. May I join you guys?” (cp (20) above) B: [silence]

In exchanges like (21) and (22), for instance, silence by the interlocutor will automatically be read as unwillingness to take up the conversational role imposed by the speaker,18 and this unwillingness will receive a more specific interpretation depending on the specific interactive force of interpersonal schema of the preceding structure. The fact that the speaker in (21) takes a deontic position about the desirability of an action by the interlocutor makes a reply by the interlocutor about compliance conditionally relevant: the interlocutor’s silence will accordingly be read, for instance, as a refusal to comply with this deontic position (‘don’t expect me not to ask you to stop drinking’). Similarly, the fact that the speaker in (22) transfers responsibility for a deontic position to the interlocutor makes a reply in which the interlocutor takes position conditionally relevant: accordingly, the absence of reaction by the interlocutor will be read, for instance, as a negative reply (‘don’t bother us’). In this perspective, the general interpersonal schemas derived from the cross-classification of epistemic-deontic modality and declarativeinterrogative speech function cannot be regarded as fundamentally different from the seemingly more socially significant speech acts encoded by performative verbs like betting, apologizing or baptizing. Given that the interactive force of these general schemas is such that their use in discourse can impose expectations on the interlocutor, and that the interlocutor cannot avoid these expectations even by refraining from further interaction, the schemas outlined in table 10 above will be just as much subject to systems of social regulations, prohibitions and sanctions as the more specific speech acts expressed by performative verbs. In this sense, it is not surprising that we find considerable cultural variation in the different domains defined by these schemas. The high degree of indirectness in the deontic domain in British English (Wierzbicka 1985: 150–157, 175), for instance, suggests a strong connection with negative face and thus with social restrictions (Brown and Levinson 1987: 65–66), whereas the near-absence of indirectness in the same deontic domain for other language communities suggests

Modality, speech function and illocutionary force

75

the absence of such social restrictions (see for instance Rosaldo 1982: 204– 207 on Ilongot, Wierzbicka 1985: 150–156; 175 on Polish). On the other hand, there seems to be no comparable social restriction for the epistemic domain in British English (Wierzbicka 1985: 175), whereas other speech communities impose strong restrictions on this domain, as reflected for instance in the treatment of statements and information questions (see Goody 1978: 39–41 on questions in Gonja and Geertz 1976, cited in Wierzbicka 1991: 100–104, on statements in Javanese). Thus, if we look at the different combinations of modal and speech functional values in table 10 above as defining patterns of social interaction, there is no reason to distinguish between these general interpersonal schemas and the more specific speech acts of betting, baptizing or apologizing in terms of social significance: both categories represent socially relevant aspects of interaction, only on different levels of abstraction. 4.2.2. Interpersonal grammar and indirect speech acts A second problem in the relation between grammar and illocutionary force does not concern the nature of the interpersonal schemas derived from the parameters of interpersonal grammar, but the more fundamental question whether the parameters of interpersonal grammar have any role at all to play in the illocutionary force of the utterance. An utterance like Would you like to explain? in (23) below is an epistemic interrogative in terms of interpersonal grammar, and yet its interactive function is situated in the deontic domain, since it tries to get the interlocutor to do something. Such indirect speech acts raise the question whether we can still say that interpersonal clause structure is a basic component of illocutionary force if there are such discrepancies between structure and force. Indirect speech acts are not as problematic for a grammatical account of illocutionary force as they are sometimes taken to be, however, if we take into account (1) that the interactive significance of an indirect speech act is never exactly the same as that of its direct counterpart, and (2) that there is a distinction between what the speaker shows him/herself as doing and how this is eventually interpreted in the full social context. As to the first point, the interactive force of the epistemic interrogative in (23) is different from the force of its counterparts in the deontic declarative in (24) and the imperative in (25). The utterance in (23) is a more polite way for a speaker to get an interlocutor to do something than the utterances in (24) and (25), and the reason is precisely that it is presented in

76 Chapter 2: Speech function the form of an epistemic interrogative. Thus it would be wrong to say that indirect speech acts like (23) are problematic for an account of illocutionary force in terms of interpersonal grammar simply because there is a discrepancy between grammatical form and final interactive force: the basic interpersonal structure of the clause contributes to the final interactive force because that is precisely what makes the speech act indirect and distinguishes its interactive significance from its ‘direct’ counterparts. (23) (24) (25)

I’m interested in the data er with the sixth column of your table two er citizens’ transfer of in republics. Er would you like to explain how did you calculate the these data? (CB ukspok) You must explain, how did you calculate these data. Explain, how did you calculate these data!

The second point to be made in connection with indirect speech acts is that it is important to distinguish what the speaker shows him/herself as doing in an utterance from the final interactive force of the utterance. The speaker of an utterance like Boy it’s hot in here can do all sorts of things with this utterance, like expressing dissatisfaction with the working conditions, getting the interlocutor to turn on the airconditioning, starting up a conversation, or apologizing for profusive sweating, and in any given social context there will usually be little doubt as to what he/she is actually doing. The final interactive force of an utterance is always socially and contextually determined, depending on the topic of the conversation, the social relation between speaker and interlocutor, the activity they are engaged in, the way they perceive each other’s goals and innumerable other social and psychological factors. From a grammatical point of view, however, the question is how much of this is encoded in the utterance: what does the speaker of an utterance like Boy it’s hot in here show him/herself as doing? In the form of his/her utterance, the speaker presents him/herself as offering an assessment of the temperature and nothing more. There is no denying that the interactive significance of this utterance is much richer, but the way the speaker presents his/her own action in the utterance is the foundation of the final interactive force. In this respect, the four basic interpersonal schemas in table 10 above represent the hard core of the grammatical means to present speech acts: if the structure of the clause is such that it forces a speaker to construe either a deontic or an epistemic modal position, and to either take or transfer the responsibility for this position, these interpersonal resources must be regarded as the basic encoders of interactive patterns in discourse.

Conclusion

77

4.3. Conclusion The relation between grammar and illocutionary force is a field of inquiry in its own right, and it would go beyond the scope of the present study to take the analysis any further than the general comments presented in this section. With the arguments outlined in this section, however, I hope to have shown at least that (1) the two parameters of interpersonal grammar discussed in this and the previous chapter are the basic grammatical prerequisites for the presence of illocutionary force in a particular clausal structure and (2) the specific values for these parameters also have their influence on the type of illocutionary force associated with the structure. These two general points about the relation between interpersonal grammar and illocutionary force are what is needed for the analysis of clause combining in the second part of this study, where the parameters of modality and speech function will be used to detect presence or absence of illocutionary force in the clausal structures that make up different types of complex sentences (see especially Sections 2 and 3 in Chapter 4). 5. Conclusion In this chapter, I have tried to show that the meaning of the basic clause types declarative, interrogative and imperative can be described in terms of the way they interact with the system of modality discussed in the previous chapter. I have argued that the declarative and interrogative clause types define alternative loci of responsibility for the positions construed by the system of modality: the declarative allows the speaker to take responsibility for the modal position in his/her own turn, and the interrogative allows the speaker to transfer this responsibility to the interlocutor’s next turn. In addition to the interlocutor-oriented component of transfer, however, I have also argued that interrogative structures involve an equally important speaker-based component: the choice of the modal position for which responsibility is transferred remains within the control of the speaker, who can exploit this for various rhetorical purposes. The second point that has been touched upon in this chapter is the distinction between constructional and compositional encoding of interpersonal meaning, illustrated with the distinction between imperative and declarative-interrogative clause structures. In declarative and interrogative structures, it is possible to separate modality and speech function grammatically, and thus to account for the basic interpersonal meaning of the

78 Chapter 2: Speech function clausal structure in compositional terms. In imperative structures, on the other hand, it is possible to detect similar types of meaning as in its nonimperative counterparts (deontic modality and declarative speech function), but it is not possible to separate these grammatically, which implies that the interpersonal schema of ‘taking responsibility for a deontic position’ must be attributed to the construction as a whole rather than to any of its subparts. The final point that has been discussed in this chapter is the relevance of the two parameters of modality and speech function for the analysis of illocutionary force, both for the presence and the type of illocutionary force associated with a clausal structure. The status of modality and speech function as grammatical prerequisites for illocutionary force has mainly been demonstrated with an analysis of the distributional restrictions on nonfinite clauses and the way these restrictions can be suspended with finite supporting structures. On the other hand, it has also been emphasized that both speech function and modality are relevant to the type of illocutionary force associated with a clausal structure, as opposed to the widespread assumption that it is mainly the basic clause types in the system of speech function that serve as grammatical encoders for types of illocutionary force. Declarative and interrogative have often been implicitly associated with the epistemic domain alone: declaratives and interrogatives encode statements and questions only in an epistemic context, but crucially not in a deontic context, where they encode speech acts like orders, requests or pieces of advice.

Chapter 3 Focus and scope: Delineating a domain

1. Introduction The parameters of modality and speech function each take care of one aspect of the interpersonal organization of the clause, respectively by construing a modal position with respect to the propositional content and by assigning responsibility for this position in speaker-interlocutor interaction. In the previous chapter, I focused on how these two systems form the grammatical basis for the illocutionary force associated with a particular clause. In this chapter, I will focus on how they relate to the propositional content of the clause: more particularly, I will show that it is possible to distinguish between elements of propositional content that fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the clause and elements that do not. Under the general heading of scope, following McGregor (1997: 209–213), this distinction will constitute the third parameter of interpersonal grammar for the analysis of clause combining in the second part of this study. In the first half of this chapter, I will argue that focus-presupposition organization can be used as a heuristic principle to distinguish between elements of propositional content that fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources in a clause and elements that are outside their scope. Focus will be used here in the sense of Halliday (1967a: 199–211), who defines the concept formally in terms of the location of the tonic syllable (nuclear accent) in intonation units, and Jacobs (1984) and Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 214–215), who relate it functionally to the illocutionary force of the clause. The basic principle behind the use of focus as a formal criterion for scope is that elements that can serve as focus for an interpersonal structure can also be said to fall within the scope of this structure. In this sense, the domain over which interpersonal structures have scope extends as far as the focus of these values can extend: focusable elements fall within the scope of these structures, and non-focusable elements do not fall within their scope. In the second half of this chapter, I will argue that the distinction between elements within and outside the scope of the interpersonal structure of the clause also offers an interesting perspective on the definition of clausehood. The traditional opposition between ‘clausal’ and ‘extra-clausal’

80 Chapter 3: Scope or ‘detached’ elements as defined, for instance, by Lambrecht (1994: 192– 195), Dik (1997b: 379–383) and Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 35–40), can actually be shown to correspond to the distinction between elements within and outside the scope of the interpersonal resources of a particular structure. In this sense, clausehood can be regarded as an interpersonally motivated concept: the intra-clausal domain is delineated from the extraclausal domain by the scope of the interpersonal structures associated with the clause. 2. The scope of interpersonal elements The basic argument in this chapter will be an elaboration of McGregor’s (1997: 209–213) hypothesis that the interpersonal structures in the clause have scope over a specific domain in the propositional content of this clause. More specifically, I will show that it is possible to distinguish between elements that fall within the scope of these resources and elements that fall outside their scope, and I will use focus-presupposition organization as a formal criterion to make the distinction between the two categories. In Section 2.1, I will first briefly present the way I will use the concept of focus-presupposition, and how it relates to the modal and speech functional systems discussed in the previous chapters. In Section 2.2, I will then show how this concept can be used to distinguish between material within and outside the scope of the interpersonal structure of the clause: elements that can serve as focus for an interpersonal structure fall within its scope, whereas elements that cannot serve as focus are outside its scope. 2.1. Focus-presupposition structure The interpersonal systems of modality and speech function do not only contribute to the illocutionary force of the clause with which they are associated, as has been shown in the previous chapter, but they can also impose a focus-presupposition subdivision on its propositional content. Formally, such focus-presupposition subdivision is marked with prosodic means, more specifically by means of the location of the nuclear accent in the intonation unit. As argued in Halliday (1967a: 199–211; 1967b: 20–24), spoken discourse is broken up into prosodic units called tone groups or intonation units, which consist of a number of weak syllables organized around a salient (“tonic”) syllable that carries the primary

The scope of interpersonal elements

81

pitch movement. It is this salient syllable in the tone group that marks the location19 of the focus in the structure: for instance, the tonic syllable in (1) and (2) below marks to get Pete off the hook and cos they force her as focal, with the rest of the tone group as presupposition relative to this focus. (1)

(2)

the question \/is# are you actually interes=, attracted to her en\ough# to want to, you kn/ow#, what are y\ou# […] for a start is she interested in y\ou# or is she going with you cos they f\orce her# (COLT b132502.pro 133) A: did Susan did S\usan tell you something ab/out it# what did S\usan say to y/ou# B: S\ue th/ought# that Pete was totally fucked off his h\ead#, and really \out of it# A: that’s absolute cr\ap#, he was so= he was as sober as the d\ay comes#, I can t\ell you#, and it was just a j\oke# B: well maybe she was doing it to get Pete off the h\ook then# A: well that made me feel w\orse actually# wh\at# from m\y point of v/iew#, if someone was totally p\issed# and just got off with you and really emb\arrassed about it#, and thought you know oh my G\od# how could I go for h\er#, d’yo= think that’s, do you think that’s w\orse than# them s-aying#, than it being a bit of a j\oke# (COLT b142703.pro 167-172)

Functionally, this focus-presupposition subdivision implies that the illocutionary force encoded by the modal and speech functional structures of the clause applies specifically to the focal element in relation to the presupposed material (see also Jacobs 1984: 32–37 and Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 214–215 on the relation between illocutionary force and focuspresupposition structure). Thus, for instance, the question encoded in (1) by the combination of indicative mood with interrogative speech functional value pertains specifically to the clause of reason cos they force her to: what is presupposed in this structure is that the girl in question is going out with the interlocutor, and what the speaker asks is whether the reason is that other people force her to. The same applies to the suggestion encoded in (2) by the combination of the epistemic modal adverb maybe with the declarative speech functional value: again, what is presupposed in this structure is that Sue lied to the interlocutor about her relation with Pete, and what is suggested is that she may have done this to get Pete off the hook. In this sense, the focus marked by the tonic syllable in (1) and (2) is crucially a relational concept, both with respect to the presupposed material in the

82 Chapter 3: Scope same intonation unit and with respect to the interpersonal structure associated with this intonation unit. It is this relational conception of focuspresupposition structure that will be used in the remainder of this chapter as a formal criterion to define relations of scope. Before proceeding with the application to scoping relations, however, it is important to note that the formal system of tonic syllable location is not exclusively associated with the focus-presupposition organization illustrated in (1) and (2). There are at least two other possibilities. On the one hand, the tonic syllable can also mark the focus of an interpersonal structure without an associated presupposition. In examples like (3) below, for instance, the focus extends over the entire intonation unit: the assertions encoded by the indicative declaratives do not specifically apply to a focal element in relation to a presupposition, but they apply to the material in the entire intonation unit. (3)

dear Doctor \Anne ... I’m fifteen and I need your adv\ice# last night I had sex with my b\oyfriend# [and then] the next day he said he no longer l\oved [me#] (COLT b132607.pro 17-19)

The distinction between structures like (1)-(2) and structures like (3) is known as marked versus unmarked information focus (Halliday 1967a: 207–208) or predicate/argument focus versus sentence focus (Lambrecht 1994: 221–223). It is possible to distinguish these categories by checking the correlation with other constructions like wh-interrogatives (see Halliday 1967a: 207–208), which as we have shown in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.2) typically focus on the wh-element and presuppose the rest of the material. Thus, for instance, the focus-presupposition structure in (2) corresponds to a wh-interrogative, as shown in (4) below, with the focused element in (2) corresponding to the wh-pronoun in the interrogative. The structure in (3), on the other hand, does not correspond to any specific wh-interrogative, but only allows generalized interrogatives like what happened or what’s the matter, as shown in (5) below. (4) (5)

A: Why did she lie to me about what happened between her and Pete? B: Maybe she was doing it to get Pete off the hook. A: Dear Doctor Anne. I’m fifteen and I need your advice. B: What’s the matter? / What happened? A: Last night I had sex with my boyfriend and then the next day he said he no longer loved me.

The scope of interpersonal elements

83

Apart from the structure in (3) above, still another possibility is that the tonic syllable has no relation to interpersonal structure at all. In examples like (6) below, for instance, there are two intonation units, one unit associated with the clause (they’re best friends) and another unit associated with an extra-clausal element that serves as topic for this clause (Sal and Phil). The tonic syllable in they’re best friends relates to interpersonal structure just like in (1), (2) and (3) above, in that it marks the predicate best friends as the focus of the assertion. The tonic syllable in Sal and Phil does not serve to assert anything, however, but rather to assign prominence to a specific element that is important in the development of the discourse, in this case the Sal and Phil. This type of tonic syllable is called “topic accent” by Lambrecht (1994: 325) and distinguished from what he calls the “focus accents” in (1), (2) and (3). The distinction between those two types of structure will be further dealt with in Section 3 of this chapter. (6)

Phil will tell S\al# and then she’d know it’d be completely the end of \everything# cos Sal wouldn’t put \up with that sort of thing# Sal Ph\il likes h/er# y\eah but#, it’s, it would b-e# jeopardizing th\eir fr/iendship# Sal and Ph\il# they’re best fr\iends# (COLT b142604.pro 36-38)

Structures like (3) and (6) above clearly illustrate that there is no one-toone relation between tonic syllable location, focus-presupposition organization and interpersonal organization. What is important, however, is that the tonic syllable can mark a focus-presupposition subdivision imposed by interpersonal structures, as shown in (1) and (2). The fact that this is possible tells us something important about the status of interpersonal structures in the clause: this is what will be further examined in the following section, where the potential of interpersonal elements to impose focuspresupposition subdivision will be used as a heuristic principle to distinguish between elements that fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the clause and elements that are outside this scope. 2.2. The scope of interpersonal elements McGregor (1997: 209–213) has argued that interpersonal elements like modal verbs, moods and basic clause types are characterized by a relation of scope to the propositional content of the clause: they “apply over a certain domain, leaving [their] mark on the entirety of this domain” (1997:

84 Chapter 3: Scope 210). In this section, I will try to build on the idea that interpersonal elements have scope over a certain domain in two ways. On the one hand, I will show that focus-presupposition organization can be used as a formal criterion to operationalize the concept of scope. The basic principle here will be that if an element can serve as focus for an interpersonal structure, it is necessarily affected by the meaning of this structure: on the basis of this principle, the precise extent of the scope of an interpersonal structure can be determined by checking which elements of propositional content can serve as its focus. On the other hand, I will also show that the idea of interpersonal elements having scope over a domain can be applied negatively: certain elements of propositional content cannot serve as focus for the interpersonal resources associated with the clause, and can therefore be considered as falling outside their scope. (7)

[About the walkman and microphone used for recording the COLT corpus material] A: what’s it d\oing# B: rec\ording# what we’re s\aying#, li\nguistics thing# for N\orway# A: r\eally# [so is it recording m\e#] y\eah# y\es# B: it’s recording you personally [you see this th\ing#] A: did you buy this s\eparately# or did it come in the W\alkman# B: we were l\ent them# (COLT b142103.pro 36-43)

Like the structures in (1) and (2) above, the indicative interrogative in (7) imposes a focus-presupposition organization on the intonation unit: the speaker presupposes that the microphone was bought by the interlocutor (a presupposition that is actually challenged by the interlocutor in the next turn), and the question focuses on whether it was bought separately or as part of the walkman. The crucial point about focus-presupposition organization is that the location of the focus is not in any way fixed in the clause, but can vary within certain limits, as illustrated for instance in the four alternative locations for the focus of the interrogative in (8)-(11) below. The speaker can choose to focus the question on separately, as in (8), on buy as in (9), on you as in (10) and on this as in (11),20 in each case relating to a specific presupposition. (8) (9) (10)

Did you buy this s\eparately# (or with the walkman) Did you b\uy this separately# (or did you borrow it from them) Did y\ou buy this separately# (or did they get it for you)

The scope of interpersonal elements

(11)

85

Did you buy th\is separately# (or just the walkman)

The fact that all of these elements can serve as focus for the indicative interrogative structure in (8)-(11) shows that they are all affected by the speech act encoded by this structure. In this sense, the variability in the location of the focus of interpersonal elements reflects how the interpersonal meanings these elements encode have scope over an entire domain in the structure of the clause. This scope extends as far as the focus can be located (compare Van Valin and LaPolla’s (1997: 210–214) “potential focus domain”), and conversely anything that can serve as focus for an interpersonal element can be said to fall within its scope. Figure 1 below provides a representation of this principle for examples (8)-(11), with the cells in grey representing the potential location of the focus. Indicative Interrogative (8) (9) (10) (11) =>

you

buy

this

separately

Figure 1. Focus as a criterion for scope

This principle may seem almost trivial for examples like (8)-(11) above, because every element of the propositional content can in fact serve as focus in this particular case. The variation in the location of the focus of an interpersonal element is not unrestrained, however, but crucially remains within certain limits beyond which the focus does not extend. Consider, for instance, the structures in (12) and (13) below: (12) (13)

[after you finish] your first t\ape# can we rew\ind it# and so we can all l\isten to it# and then rewind it b\ack# so they don’t so they don’t know we’ve d\one it# (COLT b142103.pro 336-338) Charlie did as w\ell# he came up and ap\ologized to me# after l\essons# wh\o# Ch\arlie# the other d\ay# Jim and Charlie said

86 Chapter 3: Scope they were re= you kn/ow# that they really felt really b\ad# (COLT b142703.pro 19-21) The after-clause in (12) and the after-phrase in (13) both serve as temporal adjuncts for the clause with which they are associated, but unlike the adjunct separately in (7) above, they cannot serve as focus for the interpersonal values of that clause. In the case of (12), the interrogative remains restricted to the intonation unit can we rewind it, and cannot take the temporal adjunct after you finish your first tape as its focus with the main clause as a presupposition. Such a focus-presupposition interpretation would require final21 position for the temporal adjunct and integration into the intonation unit of the main clause, as in (14a) below: this configuration easily allows a reading that presupposes rewinding and focuses on when this rewinding will happen, viz. after the first tape is finished. With the temporal adjunct in initial position in a separate intonation unit, however, such an interpretation is impossible, as shown by the unacceptability of (14b). This shows that the structure in (12) cannot be interpreted as presupposing rewinding and asking about the time when this will happen: instead, the question in (12) focuses on the rewinding as such (is it allowed or not?) and takes the after-clause as a temporal frame for this question. (14)

a. A: Can we rewind it n/ow mummy?# B: No, you can’t rewind it now# A: can we rewind it after you finish your first t\ape# b. ?A: Can we rewind it n/ow mummy?# B: No, you can’t rewind it now# A: after you finish your first t\ape# can we rew\ind it#

The same applies to the structure in (13): the assertion encoded by the declarative indicative remains restricted to the main clause he came up and apologized to me, and does not allow a reading which presupposes the fact that Charlie apologized and asserts the time when this happened (after lessons). Again, this type of reading would require integration of the temporal adjunct into the intonation unit of the main clause, as in (15a) below: this configuration easily allows a reading that presupposes the apology and focuses on the time when this happened. With the temporal adjunct in a separate intonation unit following the main clause, however, such an interpretation is impossible, as shown by the unacceptability of (15b). This shows that the structure in (13) cannot be taken as presupposing the fact that Charlie apologized and asserting the time when this happened; instead, the assertion in (13) focuses on the fact that Charlie apologized and

The scope of interpersonal elements

87

adds the temporal circumstances of the apology as an afterthought to this assertion. (15)

a. A: When precisely did he apologize# B: he came up and apologized to me after l\essons# b. ?A: When precisely did he apologize# B: he came up and ap\ologized to me# after l\essons#

In the case of the after-clause in (12) and the after-phrase in (13), focusability is a matter of construal, as shown by the alternative (a) and (b) constructions in (14) and (15) above. When construed as a separate intonation unit, the element in question cannot serve as focus for the interpersonal resources of the clause, but when construed as one single intonation unit together with the clause, it can serve as focus for these resources. In addition to this type of structure, there are also cases where focusability is not a matter of construal but is inherently bound to certain lexical elements. The although-clause in (16), for instance, can never serve as focus of the conclusion encoded in the modal must in the main clause: this structure cannot be read as presupposing that the speaker did in fact offer to contribute and as concluding the concession made in the although-clause. Irrespective of construal, the scope of the conclusion encoded by must in (16) cannot extend to the although-clause but ends before this clause. (16)

We never acknowledged the cost of that evening, but via much subtle straining of the neck, I saw it began with a two and comprised three digits. I can’t remember whether I offered to contribute. I must have, although I do remember thinking they’d probably never seen a 50-quid cheque guarantee card in Le Gavroche. (CB ukmags)

In conclusion, the structures in (12), (13) and (16) indicate that not every element in the structure of a clause can serve as focus for the interpersonal values associated with this clause. The after-clause in (12), the after-phrase in (13), and the although-clause in (16) are all related to the SoA of the main clause in some way, but they cannot serve as focus for the interpersonal resources associated with this SoA, as shown above. In this sense, the principle of scope can also be said to apply in a negative way: the interpersonal resources of a clause have scope over a certain domain in this clause, but some elements also fall outside this domain.

88 Chapter 3: Scope 2.3. Conclusion In this section, I have tried to show that interpersonal elements have scope over a specific domain in the clause with which they are associated. More specifically, I have used the potential of interpersonal elements to impose a focus-presupposition structure on their domain as a heuristic principle to determine the precise extent of this scope. On the basis of this principle, it is possible to make a distinction between elements that can serve as focus for the interpersonal elements of the clause, and elements that cannot serve as focus: assuming that focused status for an element implies that it is affected by the meaning of focusing element, elements that can serve as focus for an interpersonal structure can also be said fall within the scope of this structure, and elements that cannot serve as focus can be said to fall outside this scope. 3. Scope and clausehood The borderline between focusable and non-focusable material does not only define the precise extent of the scope of the interpersonal element that imposes the focus, but it also offers an interesting perspective on the problem of clausehood. I will show in this section that the distinction between focusable and non-focusable material corresponds to what has traditionally been described as the opposition between “intra-clausal” and “extra-clausal” (Dik 1997b: 379–383) or “detached” (Lambrecht 1994: 192–195; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 35–40) material. On the basis of this correspondence, I will argue that the distinction between the intraclausal and the extra-clausal domain is actually an interpersonal distinction: intra-clausal elements are those elements that fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources in the clause, and extra-clausal elements are those elements that fall outside their scope. 3.1. Extra-clausal status and scope Extra-clausal status can be defined on the basis of a diverse set of characteristics, including intonational criteria like pauses or intonation breaks that set off extra-clausal material from the clause proper (Dik 1997b: 381; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 36), semantic criteria like the possibility to leave out extra-clausal material without affecting the integrity of the clause (Dik

Scope and clausehood

89

1997b: 381), and syntactic criteria like the presence of coreferential pronouns in the clause proper for extra-clausal verbal arguments (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 36). Thus, for instance, the extra-clausal adjuncts in school and everything in (17) and after the operation in (18) are set off from the clause in a separate intonation unit, and they can be omitted without affecting the integrity of this clause. The same applies to the extra-clausal arguments this man in (19) and Professor X in (20): they are equally pronounced as separate intonation units and they can equally be omitted without affecting the integrity of the clause. What additionally distinguishes them from the adjuncts in (17) and (18), however, is that they also require the presence of coreferential elements within the clause, i.e. the pronouns he in (19) and him in (20). (17)

(18)

(19) (20)

and she’s a bit of a sl\ag# she don’t really, you know, I mean she’s got a bit of a reput\ation# I suppose \everyone has but# I hear about her a l\ot# in sch\ool and everything# (COLT b132707.pro 151) “After the operation, he must have reflected on the information we had given his wife,” said Mrs Asher. Later he was asked how the hospital could be improved as part of a quality audit. He suggested that next-of-kin be given a card showing the hospital telephone number, ward number and the name of a contact. (CB times) this m\an, right#, he was a good eighty n\ine, r/ight# \mm# good twenty years older than my gr\andmother, r/ight# (COLT b133203.pro 427-429) Erm Professor X, did you know him? Erm yes now wait a minute X am I thinking of the right man? Geographer? (CB ukspok) [Name removed from corpus, JCV]

The typical function of such extra-clausal elements can be described in terms of interaction management or discourse organization (Lambrecht 1994: 181–184; Dik 1997b: 383–407). This man in (19) and Professor X in (20), for instance, serve to introduce the topic for the clause with which they occur, whereas in school and everything in (17) serves as a discursive “tail” (Dik 1997b: 401) adding an afterthought to the clause. Summing up typical discourse functions does not answer the question what it actually means for an element to be extra-clausal rather than intraclausal, however. On the basis of the connection between focusability and

90 Chapter 3: Scope scope outlined in the previous section, I believe that it is possible to define the distinction between intra-clausal and extra-clause status in interpersonal terms. Consider, for instance, the structures in (21)-(24) below, which systematically contrast the elements in extra-clausal position (in the astructures) with their intra-clausal counterparts (in the b-structures). (21) (22) (23) (24)

a. this m\an, right#, he was a good eighty n\ine, r/ight# (COLT b133203.pro 427) b. This man was a good eighty n\ine, r/ight# a. Erm Professor X, did you know him? (CB ukspok) b. Erm did you know Professor X? a. I hear about her a l\ot# in sch\ool and everything# (COLT b132707.pro 151) b. I hear about her a lot in sch\ool and everything# a. After the operation, he must have reflected on the information we had given his wife (CB times) b. He must have reflected on the information after the operation.

The most important formal characteristic of the distinction between the extra-clausal elements in the (a) structures and their intra-clausal counterparts in the (b) structures is that the former are set off from the clause in a separate intonation unit, whereas the latter are intonationally integrated in the clause. In combination with the analysis of the previous section, this can be regarded as a formal reflection of a difference in focusability. As shown above, the focus-presupposition organization imposed by interpersonal resources operates only within intonation units, with the tonic syllable marking the location of the focus and the remainder of the intonation unit functioning as a presupposition relative to this focus. In this sense, intonational integration into the main clause is a necessary prerequisite for an element to be able to serve as focus for the interpersonal resources of this clause, and intonational separation precludes serving as focus. Thus, for instance, if we compare the extra-clausal argument Professor X in (22a) with its intra-clausal counterpart in (22b), the difference is related to the focusability of the element. Contexts like (25) below show that Professor X in intra-clausal position can serve as focus of the question encoded in the interrogative structure, with the remainder of the structure as a presupposition: the speaker in (25) presupposes that the interlocutor knows some people at the department and asks whether he/she knows professor X. This reading is not available for its extra-clausal counterpart in (22a): as shown in (26), only the intra-clausal coreferential pronoun him

Scope and clausehood

91

can serve as focus for the question with the remainder as presupposition, but not the extra-clausal element Professor X itself. Forming a separate intonation unit, Professor X in this structure falls outside the domain of focus-presupposition imposed by the interrogative. (25) (26)

A: I knew quite a lot of mathematicians when I was a student. B: Did you know Professor X? A: I knew quite a lot of mathematicians when I was a student. B: Professor X, did you know him?

The same difference in focusability can be observed for the intra-clausal and extra-clausal versions of the adjunct after the operation in (24). Contexts like (27) below show that the intra-clausal adjunct in (24b) can easily serve as focus for the conclusion encoded in declarative must, with the remainder of the clause as a presupposition. The structure in (27) presupposes that the patient had the time to reflect on the information at some moment, and concludes that it must have been after the operation. This reading is not available for its extra-clausal counterpart in (24a). As shown in (28) below, it is not possible to take the extra-clausal adjunct as the focus for the conclusion, with the remainder as a presupposition. (27) (28)

When did he have the time figure that out? He must have reflected on the information after the operation. ?When did he have the time to figure that out? After the operation, he must have reflected on the information.

Thus, the contrast between such pairs of structures shows that the distinction between intra-clausal and extra-clausal status for a particular element actually boils down to whether it can serve as the focus for the interpersonal resources of the clause. Since focus-presupposition organization is a formal reflection of scoping relations, as has been argued in the previous section, the distinction between intra-clausal and extra-clausal status can be defined functionally in terms of the scope of interpersonal resources: intra-clausal elements are those elements that fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the clause, whereas extra-clausal elements are those elements that fall outside this scope.

92 Chapter 3: Scope 3.2. Arguments versus adjuncts Given that the distinction between intra- and extra-clausal status can be linked to interpersonal structure, the divergent behaviour of adjuncts and arguments with respect to this distinction also provides an interesting perspective on the interpersonal status of different types of grammatical structure. The most obvious difference between arguments and adjuncts is that arguments in extra-clausal position require a coreferential element in intra-clausal position, whereas adjuncts in extra-clausal position do not.22 Moving the argument my colleague in (29a) to extra-clausal position, for instance, requires a coreferential pronoun him, as shown in (29b), whereas moving the adjunct after lessons in (30a) to extra-clausal position does not require this, as shown in (30b). A further difference is that arguments in intra-clausal position cannot generally be omitted without producing an ungrammatical structure, whereas adjuncts in intra-clausal position can easily be omitted without affecting grammaticality, as shown in the contrast between (31) and (32) below. (29) (30) (31) (32)

a. Have you got my colleague er X on your list at all? b. My colleague er X, have you got him on your list at all? (CB ukspok) a. he came up and apologized to me after l\essons# b. he came up and ap\ologized to me# after l\essons# (COLT b142703.pro 19) a. Have you got my colleague on your list at all? b. *Have you got on your list at all? a. He came up and apologized to me after l\essons# b. He came up and ap\ologized to me#

Omitting intra-clausal elements, as in (31)-(32), and moving elements to extra-clausal position, as in (29)-(30), are actually two sides of the same interpersonal phenomenon: in both cases, the element in question is removed from the scope of the speech act encoded by the interpersonal resources of the clause, either by completely removing it from the structure or by relocating it to a position outside the scope. In this sense, the divergent behaviour of arguments and adjuncts with respect to the two criteria can be regarded as indicative of a different interpersonal status. The fact that neither of these criteria has any structural effect in the case of adjuncts further confirms the observation made in Section 2.2 above that for adjuncts position within or outside the scope of the speech act is purely a

Scope and clausehood

93

matter of construal. Adjuncts like after lessons in (30) are not inherently within or outside the scope of the interpersonal resources of the clause, but are construed as such: after lessons is construed as falling within the scope of the assertion in (30a) and as falling outside the scope of the assertion in (30b). This is different for arguments. Arguments cannot occur outside the scope of the speech act without leaving some trace within the scope: complete removal produces an ungrammatical structure, as in (31b) and removal to extra-clausal position requires a pronominal double within the scope of the speech act, as in (29b). This shows that arguments, unlike adjuncts, are inherently bound to the scope of the interpersonal resources to the clause: even in the case of extra-clausal position there must be a coreferential instantiation of the argument within the scope. In combination with the analysis of Section 2.2 above, the difference between adjuncts and arguments indicates that the scope of the interpersonal resources of the clause does not only have a maximal extent beyond which it does not reach, but also a minimal extent: the scope minimally includes the verb and the arguments that are bound to this verb via valency relations. In this sense, it is possible to define three categories in terms of focusability and scope. At one extreme, there are elements that inherently fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the clause, like the argument my colleague in (29) above: this is reflected in the fact that they structurally require a focusable instantiation within the scope of the speech act encoded by these resources, even though other instantiations may be construed as falling outside the scope. At another extreme, there are elements that inherently do not fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the clause, like the although-structure in (16) above: this is reflected in the fact that these elements can never serve as the focus for the speech act encoded by these resources. In between the two categories, finally, there are adjuncts like after lessons in (30), for which position within or outside the scope of the clause is a matter of construal: unlike the although-type they can serve as focus, but unlike arguments they do not require focusable instantiations within the clause when they do not serve as focus. Table 11 summarizes these three categories. Table 11. Types of grammatical structure in relation to scope Arguments

Adjuncts

Although23

Focusable

+

+/-

-

Scope

+

+/-

-

94 Chapter 3: Scope 4. Conclusion The analysis in this chapter has dealt with scope as a final aspect of interpersonal grammar in the simple clause. The system of scope is different from the other two in that it focuses on the relation of interpersonal elements to the propositional content of the clause rather than their contribution to the illocutionary force of the clause. The basic argument has been that interpersonal structures have scope over a specific domain in the propositional content of the clause: some elements fall within the scope of these structures, whereas others are outside their scope. The criterion that has been used to determine the precise extent of the domain over which interpersonal structures have scope is focus-presupposition organization. This is based on the principle that the ability to serve as focus for a particular element reflects a position within the scope of that element: in this sense, elements that can be focused by an interpersonal structure fall within the scope of this structure, whereas elements that cannot be focused do not fall within its scope. Apart from the problem of scoping relations, the proposed analysis has also been applied to two related theoretical problems. On the one hand, it has been shown that the distinction between focusable and non-focusable material corresponds to the distinction that has traditionally been made between intra-clausal and extra-clausal elements. On the basis of this correspondence, it has been argued that the scoping relation of interpersonal grammar forms the defining principle for clausehood: interpersonal resources carve out a domain over which they have scope, and thereby draw the line between intra-clausal and extra-clausal material. On the other hand, the divergent behaviour of adjuncts and arguments has also been used to show that different types of grammatical structure behave differently with respect to the interpersonal organization. It is possible to distinguish three categories in terms of focusability and scope: arguments are inherently focusable, adjuncts are focusable and non-focusable depending on construal, and elements like concessive clauses are inherently nonfocusable.

Part 2 Interpersonal grammar and clause combining

Introduction to Part 2

In the second part of this study, the focus will shift from the analysis of the simple clause to the analysis of clause combining. The perspective will remain the same, however: my central argument in this section will be that the basic functional principle underlying the system of complex sentences in English is interpersonal. More specifically, I will argue that what defines different types of complex sentences and distinguishes them from each other is the relative interpersonal status of the individual clauses (conjuncts)24 in the complex sentence. This functional principle will be operationalized grammatically in terms of the different values the conjuncts can take for each of the three parameters that were described in the previous section: modality, speech function, and scope. Approaches to clause combining The interpersonal analysis of clause combining that will be developed in the following chapters is meant to provide an alternative to the existing approaches to clause combining, both the simple dichotomy between coordination and subordination from traditional grammar and the richer, multidimensional analyses from the functional and typological literature. The traditional dichotomy between coordination and subordination crystallizes the idea that there is a basic distinction between complex sentences in which conjuncts have equal status and complex sentences in which they have unequal status. This distinction is often based on overt markers of imbalance, such as the fact that one conjunct has a mood category or word order pattern that does not usually occur in main clauses, but it can also reflect the fact that one conjunct occurs in a slot which is normally reserved for the arguments of the other conjunct (Brøndal 1972 [1937]: 23–24, 26– 27). The idea that there is a basic dichotomy between equal and unequal status of the conjuncts in clause combinations is of course fundamentally correct, but such a simple dichotomy is not sufficient in descriptive detail, neither for the analysis of English (see, for instance, Matthiessen and Thompson 1988 and Halliday 1994: 242–248) nor for typological purposes (see, for instance, Haiman and Thompson 1984 or Lehmann 1988). One way to increase the descriptive power of the traditional coordination-subordination dichotomy has been to expand the number of categories,

98 Introduction to Part 2 as is proposed for instance in functional frameworks like Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1994) or Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin 1993; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997). Halliday (1994: 242) has argued that what has traditionally been covered by ‘subordination’ should actually be split up into two quite distinct categories of embedding and hypotaxis, depending on whether the ‘subordinate’ clause takes up an argument slot of the main clause or not. Foley and Van Valin (1984: 239–244), on the other hand, following Olson (1981), have argued for a cosubordinate category in addition to the coordinate and subordinate ones, in order to account for clause-chaining constructions (see further in Chapter 11, Section 4.2), where the non-final conjuncts in the chain are distributionally dependent on the final conjunct because of their reduced verbal morphology, but still not structurally integrated into it like in subordinate constructions. Although both of these additions are justified in themselves, neither of them is sufficient to come to a full descriptively adequate framework for clause combining. As I will show in Chapters 6 and 11 for instance, neither Halliday’s distinction between embedding and hypotaxis nor Foley and Van Valin’s distinction between subordination and cosubordination can account for the considerable range of construction types to be found in the domain of what has traditionally been called adverbial subordination. Another way to deal with the lack of descriptive detail in the traditional two-category distinction has been to give up clear-cut categorization altogether, and to set up one or more parallel continua in order to accommodate the different phenomena, as in the typological and/or diachronic studies of Lehmann (1988), Raible (1992), and Hopper and Traugott (2003: 176–184). This type of approach usually does provide adequate descriptive coverage, but the functional or theoretical basis for organizing the different phenomena into continua is often rather questionable. Most of the continua that have been proposed seem to impose some artificial standard of unity on what are actually formally and functionally very diverse phenomena. It is not clear at all, for instance, what the unifying principle would be behind the often-used continuum of ‘integration’ (see, for instance, Lehmann 1988: 183–192 or Hopper and Traugott 2003: 178–179), according to which clause combining mechanisms can be ordered in terms of increasing integration of one conjunct with the other. In Lehmann’s (1988: 183–192) analysis, for instance, this continuum covers phenomena like the absence of tense and mood marking for one of the conjuncts, or the presence of correlative elements for one conjunct in the other conjunct, but I do not see any grounds why the absence of tense and mood markers should be

Interpersonal grammar and clause combining

99

regarded as an indication of more integration than the presence of correlative elements (as proposed in Lehmann 1988: 185), nor do I see any grounds for the opposite ordering. Both orderings are equally arbitrary, because they rely on a standard of unity that is arbitrarily imposed on the phenomena rather than inherent in them. Interpersonal grammar and the analysis of clause combining In the following chapters, I will use the analysis of interpersonal grammar from the first part of this study to propose an alternative to the existing approaches to clause combining. On the basis of the specific interpersonal properties of clause combinations, I will develop a typology of four basic construction types, and I will try to show that this four-category typology provides the descriptive adequacy that is lacking in the simple dichotomy of traditional grammar, while at the same time also avoiding the theoretical and functional indeterminacy of continua like the ones proposed in Lehmann (1988) or Hopper and Traugott (2003: 176–184). In Chapter 4, I will show that the three parameters of modality, speech function and scope can each take two values in the context of complex sentences. For the parameters of modality and speech function, these values are (i) presence of modality / speech function in both conjuncts in the complex sentence and (ii) absence of modality / speech function in one of the conjuncts in the complex sentence. The formal heuristic that will be used to make the distinction is the paradigmatic availability of the different modal values and speech functional values for each of the conjuncts in the complex sentence: availability of all values points to the presence of modality or speech function, whereas restriction to the unmarked value points to neutralization of the paradigm and consequently absence of modality or speech function. For the parameter of scope, the two values in the context of complex sentences are (i) one conjunct falling within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the other and (ii) neither conjunct falling within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the other. The formal heuristic that will be used to make the distinction in this case is the ability of one conjunct to serve as focus for the interpersonal values of the other, in line with the connection between focus and scope that has been described in Chapter 3 (Section 2). In Chapter 5, I will show how the values defined by the three interpersonal parameters can be combined to form a typology of four basic construction types. Three parameters each with two values can in principle

100

Introduction to Part 2

define eight possible combinations of values, but the resulting typology in this case will consist of only four construction types because there are a number of dependencies between the parameters. These dependencies are a consequence of the nature of the parameters: as shown in the first part of this study, the three grammatical parameters define different aspects of one and the same functional phenomenon (the interpersonal organization of the clause), which means that a number of connections between them are to be expected. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I will try to show that the construction types defined on the basis of interpersonal properties can also capture the basic functional, grammatical and semantic distinctions in the domain of clause combining. In Chapter 6, I will focus on the functional value of the typology, showing how the categories in the typology can integrate and define a number of functional generalizations that are commonly invoked in the analysis of clause combining but usually remain rather vague, like integration (Lehmann 1988; Hopper and Traugott 2003), presupposition (Keenan 1971; Winter 1982), or challengeability (Givón 1982). I will argue that the interpersonal basis of the typology can provide a unitary functional motivation for these concepts, and that the grammatical parameters behind the typology can provide formal criteria for their definition. In Chapters 7 and 8, I will provide a number of arguments for the grammatical and semantic value of the typology for the analysis of clause combining in English. Chapter 7 will demonstrate the relevance of the proposed typology for a number of other grammatical criteria that are commonly used in the analysis of clause combining, such as clefting, preposing, distribution of intonation contours over the conjuncts, and main clause phenomena, as well as the well-known word order phenomena associated with subordination in related Germanic languages like German, Dutch or Danish. I will show that these criteria correlate with individual constructions or groups of constructions as they are distinguished in the typology, and I will argue that the reason for this correlation is the fact that they can actually be explained in terms of the interpersonal parameters on which the typology is based. Chapter 8, finally, will demonstrate the relevance of the typology for the semantics of the conjunctions used in clause combinations in English. I will show that the distribution of semantic categories like causality, temporality or concession over the constructions of the typology is not random, but that they cluster into coherent sets associated with the different construction types. The semantic association of the constructions will be demonstrated specifically on the basis of polysemous conjunctions, for which the different meanings in a number of

The scope of the analysis

101

cases correlate with constructional differences as they are defined by the interpersonal typology. The descriptive and explanatory merits of the proposed typology will be further explored in the third part of this study, where the framework developed here will be tested against a number of specific problems in the analysis of clause combining, such as the existence of correlations between different surface orderings of conjuncts and different discourse functions (Thompson 1985; Ford 1993), or the interpretation of interclausal relations in different domains (Davies 1979: 148–176; Sweetser 1990: 76–112). The scope of the analysis The analysis in the following chapters will not be exhaustive in its treatment of clause combining in English, in the sense that I will not try to capture all structures that have traditionally been dealt with under the heading of ‘clause combining’. I will cover the core area of clause combining, viz. combinations of finite clauses with or without conjunctions, as well as combinations of finite and non-finite clauses, but I will deliberately exclude a number of other structures that have traditionally been dealt with under the heading of ‘clause combining’. Some structures will be excluded because there is no reason to regard them synchronically as clause combinations. The analyses proposed in Lehmann (1988: 190–192) and Raible (1992: 42–54), for instance, include serial verb constructions and auxiliary verb constructions like (1) below as one extreme of a continuum of clause combinations. Such constructions may of course be relevant to clause combining from a diachronic perspective, because in some cases they have developed historically from biclausal constructions, but from a synchronic perspective they are monoclausal and will therefore be excluded from the analysis (see further Foley and Olson (1985) on the borderline between mono-clausal and bi-clausal constructions). (1)

I will go to bed now. (Lehmann 1988: 191)

Another set of structures will be excluded because they are too different from the other types of clause combinations to be dealt with in the same framework. Both Halliday (1994: 219–221, 250–273) and McGregor (1997: 207–211, 251–270) have set apart a category of “projecting” structures (Halliday 1994: 220) within the domain of clause combining, in

102

Introduction to Part 2

which the secondary clause represents the speech or thought of some participant in the main clause, as in the traditional categories of direct or indirect speech illustrated in (2) below. These structures are different from other types of complex sentences in that they combine two levels of interaction. In structures like (2), for instance, the main clause the government promised that signals that the secondary clause the election would be completely honest belongs to a represented interaction between government and people. The presence of two levels of interaction (current and represented interaction) is a complicating factor that justifies treatment of projecting structures as a separate category of phenomena (see also McGregor 1997: 256–257 and Güldemann and von Roncador 2002 for typological arguments in this respect), and this is why they will be excluded from the analysis. I will return to this problem in the concluding chapter of this study, however, where I will show that the framework developed for non-projecting clause combinations can still account for the most important formal distinctions in the grammar of projecting clause combinations, if at least we disregard the double interactional structure as a complicating factor. (2)

This time the government had promised that the election would be completely honest, which created great uncertainty because no-one really knew who was going to win. (CB usephem)

Thus, the focus in this study will be on non-projecting complex sentences, both with finite and non-finite clauses and with or without conjunctions. This corresponds more or less to the traditional categories of coordinate and adverbial subordinate clauses, and excludes the category of subordinate complement clauses.

Chapter 4 Parameters of interpersonal grammar and the analysis of clause combining

1. Introduction In this chapter, I will show how the three systems of interpersonal grammar that were described in the first part of this study can be used to develop an analysis of complex sentence constructions in English. More specifically, I will argue that the parameters of modality, speech function and scope can each take two values in the context of a complex sentence construction, and therefore each define two different structural configurations. These will be used in the following chapter to set up a basic typology of four construction types. Before proceeding with the actual implementation of the parameters in the domain of clause combining, I will first briefly indicate how the use of the parameters in this study differs from previous approaches which have used similar criteria, and which type of structures will be dealt with in this chapter. 1.1. Relation to previous analyses The use of speech function, modality and scope as formal criteria to distinguish between types of clause combinations is by no means new: most of them have been used in one form or other in previous analyses of clause combining. Something similar to what I call speech function, for instance, has been used in Foley and Van Valin (1984: 239–240), Hengeveld (1998: 344–347) and Cristofaro (1998: 7–11, 2003: 29–35); modality is used as an important parameter by Hengeveld (1998: 344–347); and scope is what appears to lie behind the traditional distinction between ‘adjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ clauses, as proposed in Greenbaum (1969: 15–25), Rutherford (1970), and Quirk et al. (1985: 1070–1072). There are two crucial factors, however, that distinguish the present analysis from the previous ones. The first of these is the combined use of the three parameters on the basis of their shared interpersonal function. Although modality, speech function and scope have each been used

104

Chapter 4: Clause combining

individually in different analyses of clause combining, the three of them have not generally been used in combination, nor have their functions in contexts of clause combining been related to each other. In the present analysis, on the other hand, the combined use of the three criteria reflects the central claim of this study that they represent different grammatical aspects of one single interpersonal function, and that this interpersonal function is a unifying principle behind the system of clause combining in English. As has been shown in the first part of this study, modality and speech function form the grammatical input for the illocutionary force of the clause, while scope defines their relation to the propositional content. In this sense, the combined use of the three parameters in the present analysis is fundamentally different from their incidental applications in other frameworks: it is based on the hypothesis that they represent different aspects of the central interpersonal principle behind the system of clause combining. The second distinguishing characteristic of the present analysis is the status of the interpersonal parameters in relation to other criteria. In most existing approaches, criteria like scope, modality or speech function are not accorded any special analytical status, but used in conjunction with other grammatical criteria like finiteness, clefting, or main clause phenomena. In the present analysis, however, the three interpersonal parameters are regarded as the basis of the typology: I will argue that modality, speech function and scope define the most fundamental distinctions in the system of clause combining, and that other criteria which have been proposed are actually epiphenomena of these basic interpersonal parameters. In this sense, the parameters of scope, modality and speech function are not simply part of a larger battery of grammatical criteria, as they have been used so far, but they are the most direct grammatical manifestations of the functional principle at the basis of the system of clause combining. 1.2. Initial delineation of the domain As argued in the introduction, the analysis of clause combining in this study will cover the domain of non-projecting clause combinations, both with finite and non-finite clauses and with or without conjunctions. In this chapter, the analysis will focus on combinations of finite clauses linked by conjunctions. The initial focus on this type of structure is meant to reduce the overt formal variation in the domain of clause combining in order to create something close to a ‘minimal pair’ situation for the implementation

Introduction

105

of the interpersonal criteria. Once the relevance of the interpersonal parameters has been demonstrated for combinations of finite clauses linked by conjunctions, the discussion in Chapters 6 (Section 3) and 11 (Section 4) will show that other types of structures such as combinations of finite and non-finite clauses or combinations of finite clauses without conjunctions can be dealt with along the same lines. Thus, the analysis in this chapter will focus on structures of the form X conjunction Y, with the following specifications: (i) X and Y represent finite clauses. (ii) X conjunction Y covers both the ordering (X conjunction Y) and (conjunction Y, X), wherever the latter pattern is available. Unlike with the distinction between finite and non-finite clauses, this is a parameter of formal variation that cannot be excluded from the initial implementation of the interpersonal parameters, because in some cases ordering is the most important formal correlate of a particular value for the parameters (as will be shown in Sections 3.2 and 4.2 of this chapter). (iii) The category of conjunction will be defined by the following two criteria (Greenbaum 1969: 33, Kortmann 1997: 62–64): (a) immobility in front of the conjunct with which they belong (b) inability to combine with other conjunctions in linking two conjuncts A semantic notion like ‘linking function’ is not sufficient to define the category of conjunctions, because there are quite a number of elements that have such a function: elements like therefore, but, because, secondly, or moreover could all be argued to have some kind of linking function. To delineate the category of conjunctions within this group of clause-linking elements, I will use the criteria of position relative to the conjunct and combination with other conjunctions. An element like therefore, for instance, can take different positions with respect to its conjunct and can be combined with and, as shown in (1b) and (1c) below, whereas elements like but or because are immobile in front of their conjuncts and cannot be combined with and,25 as shown in (2b) and (2c) below. (1)

a. Hadlow is a rural college and part of the community. Therefore anything of this nature is quite shocking to the whole community. (CB sunnow) b. These Acts do not mention pro-lifers specifically. They can, therefore, be used against any group coming into conflict with authority. (CB sunnow)

106

(2)

Chapter 4: Clause combining

c. The high pound means fewer Scottish goods sold overseas and therefore job losses in Scotland as sure as day follows night. (CB sunnow) a. It’s wrong that kids as young as 12 can buy knives over the counter. They can’t smoke, drink, have sex or vote – but they can buy a lethal weapon. (CB sunnow) b. *They can’t smoke, drink, have sex or vote – they can but buy a lethal weapon. c. *They can’t smoke, drink, have sex or vote – and but they can buy a lethal weapon.

The fact that therefore is not immobile with respect to its conjunct and that it can be combined with another linking item like and, as illustrated in (1b) and (1c), shows that it is an anaphoric clause-level adverb without any structural clause combining function (compare also Kortmann 1997: 62– 63). It serves to position one clause with respect to a preceding clause, but without structurally integrating the two clauses into a complex sentence construction, as shown by the fact that the presence of therefore always leaves the possibility of genuine conjunctions like and. Elements like but, and or because, on the other hand, are conjunctions with a structural linking function: presence of one such element always precludes presence of another, as illustrated in (2c), and they remain immobile in front of the conjunct which they connect with another conjunct, as illustrated in (2b). On the basis of these criteria, the category of conjunction will be represented by the following set of items: {and, or, but, for, because, although, whereas, when, while, until, since, as, so that, after, before, once, if}. 2. Speech function and clause combining As shown in Chapter 2 of the first part of this study, speech function forms one of the two grammatical components of illocutionary force, together with modality. While modality serves to construe a particular epistemic or deontic position towards the propositional content of the clause, speech function takes care of assigning the responsibility for this position in speaker-interlocutor interaction. There are two basic options: either the speaker takes responsibility for the modal position in his/her own turn, or he/she transfers the responsibility to the interlocutor’s next turn. Formally, these two options correspond to two basic clause types: the declarative and the interrogative. The contrast between the two clause types applies across

Speech function and clause combining

107

the entire modal domain, but within the deontic subdomain the imperative forms an additional specialized construction type (see further in Chapter 2, Section 3) that inherently combines a deontic modal value of ‘desirability of the action’ with a speech functional value of ‘speaker-responsibility’. In this section, I will apply the parameter of speech function to the analysis of clause combining. More particularly, I will show how this parameter can take two values in the context of a complex sentence construction: (i) presence of a speech functional value in a conjunct, formally corresponding to the availability of the full paradigm of speech functional options, and (ii) absence of a speech functional value in a conjunct, formally corresponding to restriction to the unmarked option and thus neutralization of the paradigm. 2.1. Relevance to clause combining Complex sentences in English can be formally classified according to whether the secondary clause26 allows all basic clause types (declarative, interrogative and imperative) or remains restricted to the declarative, as also observed in Foley and Van Valin (1984: 239–240). I will argue that the functional value of this subdivision is related to the presence versus absence of a speech functional value in the secondary clause: availability of the different basic clause types shows that the secondary clause has a speech functional value of its own, whereas restriction to the declarative shows that the secondary clause does not have any speech functional value of its own. Compare examples (3) and (4): (3) (4)

a. b. a. b.

John offered Mary the money, but she refused it. John offered Mary the money, but didn’t she refuse it? Mary refused the money when John offered it to her. *Mary refused the money when didn’t John offer it to her.

The but-clause in (3a) and the when-clause in (4a) are formally both declarative, but this declarative has an entirely different value for the two examples. The declarative in (3a) potentially contrasts with different basic clause types such as the interrogative in (3b), whereas the declarative in (4a) does not contrast with other basic clause types, as shown by the ungrammaticality of the interrogative in (4b). Thus, the but-clause in (3) allows the full paradigm of basic clause types, whereas the when-clause in (4) remains restricted to the declarative.

108

Chapter 4: Clause combining

The functional interpretation of this distinction relates to the presence versus absence of a speech functional value for the secondary clause in the complex sentence. Paradigmatic availability of the full range of basic clause types for the but-clause in (3) reflects that this clause has a speech functional value of its own. The paradigmatic absence of the full range of basic clause types for the when-clause in (4) reflects that it does not have any speech functional value of its own. The declarative in (4) cannot be regarded as realizing any speech functional value like its counterpart in the but-clause in (3), because it is not in paradigmatic contrast with any other basic clause types. Rather than signalling a particular speech functional value, the occurrence of the declarative in (4) must be regarded as an instance of the general principle of reduction to the unmarked option in contexts of neutralization (Trubetzkoy 1969 [1939]: 77–79, 81; see further in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter 1). If the declarative in (4) really marked an assertive speech functional value, it should also be possible to express this assertion with positively biased interrogatives like the one in (4b). As I will show in Chapter 7 (Section 6), this analysis in terms of neutralization is further confirmed by the fact that constructions like (4), which in English do not allow non-declarative clause types for their secondary clause, correspond to constructions which in other Germanic languages like German or Dutch take OV rather than VO word order, i.e. a word order pattern that is also formally outside the paradigm of basic clause types. The distinction between the presence of speech function in (3) and the absence of speech function in (4) can be further specified in terms of a distinction between presence and absence of illocutionary force. As shown in Chapter 2, the interpersonal systems of speech function and modality furnish the basic grammatical material for the illocutionary force of the clause. The two systems are hierarchically ordered, however, because the responsibility-assignment of speech function presupposes a modal value to operate on (see further in Chapter 5, Section 1.1). This means that presence of speech function in a particular structure also implies presence of modality, and that the presence of speech function in structures like (3) can therefore be regarded as a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for the presence of illocutionary force. In this sense, the presence of speech function in the but-clause in (3) reflects that this structure has an illocutionary force of its own, and that the entire construction consists of two speech acts, one associated with the main clause and another associated with the but-clause: the declarative in (3a), in combination with the indicative mood, encodes an assertive speech act.27 By contrast, the when-clause in (4) does not have any illocutionary force: what formally looks like a declarative in

Speech function and clause combining

109

(4a) does not serve to encode an assertive speech act, but is simply an instance of switch to the unmarked option of the paradigm in contexts of neutralization. The analysis in Chapter 6 (Section 5) will elaborate the precise functional characterization of this contrast in more detail. Thus, the parameter of speech function defines a basic distinction between two types of configurations: the secondary clause in constructions like (4) does not have any speech functional value, as reflected in its restriction to the unmarked value in the paradigm, whereas the secondary clause in constructions like (3) has a speech functional value of its own, as reflected in the availability of both marked and unmarked members of the paradigm. 2.2. Categories defined by the values of the parameter The two values for the parameter of speech function are each linked up with specific sets of conjunctions. Some conjunctions always introduce clauses with the full paradigm of speech functional options, and are therefore invariably associated with the value [+ Speech Function]. This category includes and, or, but and for: examples (5)-(7) illustrate the availability of non-declarative clause types in addition to the basic declarative option for these conjunctions. (5)

(6) (7)

(8)

Specialities include andouillette – a tripe sausage – and steak garnished with succulent marrowbones. Salade lyonnaise is tossed with diced bacon, croutons and poached egg, and don’t miss gratin dauphinois – sliced potatoes baked to a golden crust with cream and garlic. (CB today) Now it was your job, as I understand it, to assign the letter to the writer. Did you make random selections or did you think about which writer would be getting which letter? (CB npr) Q: My mother has been told she is anaemic, but why is she being treated with injections instead of iron tablets? A: Anaemia is a reduction in the amount of haemoglobin in red blood cells. The most common cause is lack of iron but it can also be caused by low levels of vitamin B12. (CB sunnow) Granting his permission, Dwight expressed his kinship with the author and was amused to think how his old comrades Irving Howe and Philip Rahv would snort in contempt “infantile leftism, petty bourgeois romanticism but can’t you see, Dwight, it’s not

110

Chapter 4: Clause combining

POLITICAL.” Dwight added, “And they’d be right, for how could we practice self defense while continuing to love everybody and fuck everybody in the sun, everybody that’s willing of course, and not be a part of the system of violence and death.” (CB usbooks) Another set of conjunctions never allows any speech functional options besides the unmarked declarative, and is therefore invariably associated with the value [- Speech Function]. This category includes after, before, when, whereas, while, since, as, so that, until, once, and if, as illustrated for some of these in examples (9)-(12). (9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

a. Der Spiegel also says it has the text of the report made by the KGB officers in Magdeburg after they had burned the bones. (CB today) b. *Der Spiegel also says it has the text of the report made by the KGB officers in Magdeburg after had(n’t)28 they burned the bones. a. Columbus was so high above water that I think he would have difficulty in getting much supply of food. And I think that he would have to eat a lot of salt-dried meat, whereas we on the raft could eat fresh fish every day and pick the flying fish on-on deck when we got up in the morning. (CB npr) b. *And I think that he would have to eat a lot of salt-dried meat, whereas could(n’t) we on the raft eat fresh fish every day. a. I decided that I ought to be feeling fit for the challenge. As I didn’t have time to go to the gym before I left, I had to jump up and down in my living room for half an hour in front of a video of Anthea Turner grinning insanely in a pink leotard instead. (CB times) b. *As did(n’t) I have time to go to the gym before I left, I had to jump up and down in my living room for half an hour. a. The Iraqis have done exactly what they did during the IranIraq war, which is to create row after row of bunkers and trenches and just lines of defense that they can fall back on. If one line of defense fails, then they can always pull back to the next one. (CB npr) b. *If does(n’t) one line of defense fail, then they can always pull back to the next one.

Speech function and clause combining

111

Finally, there are also two conjunctions that can have both the value [+ Speech Function] and the value [- Speech Function]. Because-clauses and although-clauses allow non-declarative clause types in final position, as shown in (13)-(16), but they do not allow them in initial position, as shown in (17) and (18). In Chapter 7 (Section 2), I will show that the association between initial position and the value [- Speech Function] is actually a more general pattern: initial position never allows any nondeclarative clause types, irrespective of the specific conjunction that is used. (13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17) (18)

I believe it’s time ‘Saint’ George Galloway was officially canonised preferably using an Iraqi supergun. His intentions must be honourable because who in their right mind would go to Baghdad right after the Gulf War, in which British troops died, and praise the lunatic responsible for starting it? (CB sunnow) I could not remember the legality of the arrangement because FX did all that. All I was in charge of was the money. And by the grace of God we made a profit and once we made a … Well we made more than a profit because remember we had to stop people from coming in and then we realize we have to make it bigger and we had to make it out in the street. (CB ukspok) All this news about the anti-American demonstrations which had begun to appear in Berlin and other parts of Germany in the fortnight since the summit hadn’t exactly helped sell what was supposed to be Michelle’s greatest success. Although what did the mid-west care about Berlin? (BNC FSM 0414-0415) Dreaming of horns also warns of an enemy and in my opinion, this enemy in real life is someone that appeared in your dream. If they aren’t actually an enemy then they will let you down in some way. I feel a huge disappointment is coming your way around the beginning of next month. Apart from all of that, your dream has most likely occurred because you recently had a new hairstyle. I wouldn’t worry too much about it, although do prepare for words with this enemy. (CB sunnow) *Because who in his right mind would go and praise the lunatic who started the war, Galloway’s intentions must be honourable. *Although do prepare for words with this enemy, I wouldn’t worry too much about it.

112

Chapter 4: Clause combining

Table 12 summarizes how the different conjunctions are distributed according to the values [+ Speech Function] and [- Speech Function]. Table 12. The relevance of the parameter [+/- Speech Function] Conjunction and, or, but, for because, although when, while, whereas, so that, after, before, once, since, if, until, as

Speech Function + +/-

3. Modality and clause combining Together with speech function, modality forms the second grammatical component of the illocutionary force of an utterance: it furnishes the modal positions with respect to which responsibility can be taken or transferred in the system of speech function. As shown in Chapter 1 of the first part of this study, there are two subdomains within the modal system: epistemic modality encodes positions about the plausibility of propositions, and deontic modality encodes positions about the desirability of actions. Formally, both these subdomains are distributed over the modal auxiliary system and the system of basic mood types, but the form-function relation is less straightforward with the deontic than with the epistemic subdomain. Within the modal auxiliary system, deontic modals are different from their epistemic counterparts in that they also allow non-interpersonal (objective) uses in addition to interpersonal (subjective) ones (see Section 2.3.1 in Chapter 1). Within the basic mood system, the imperative is different from the indicative because it does not constitute an unmarked option in the system, and because it is not a purely modal value but a constructional fusion between a modal value and a speech functional one (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 1). Because of these complications in the form-function relation for deontic modality, I will mainly concentrate on epistemic modality for the analysis of clause combinations in this section. Epistemic modality is easier to keep under control as a formal parameter, because the question of interpersonal status for the modal auxiliaries and basic moods is not complicated by any subjective-objective ambiguities or additional functions. In general, the argument for modality will be similar to the argument developed for speech function in the previous section, again based on

Modality and clause combining

113

paradigmatic reasoning. I will show that the parameter of modality can take two values in the context of a complex sentence construction: (i) presence of a modal value in a conjunct, formally corresponding to the availability of the full paradigm of modal options, and (ii) absence of a modal value in a conjunct, formally corresponding to restriction to the unmarked option and thus neutralization of the paradigm. 3.1. Relevance to clause combining The same type of paradigmatic reasoning as was used with the parameter of speech function can also be used for the parameter of modality: complex sentences can be formally classified depending on whether their secondary clause allows all options in the modal system (indicative mood and subjective29 modal verbs) or remains restricted to the unmarked option (indicative mood). The functional value of this subdivision can again be related to the presence versus absence of a modal value in the secondary clause: availability of the different modal values shows that the secondary clause has a modal value of its own, whereas restriction to the indicative shows that the secondary clause does not have any modal value of its own. Compare examples (19) and (20): (19)

(20)

a. Mary accepted without hesitation, whereas John still has some doubts. b. Mary accepted without hesitation, whereas John may/might still have some doubts. a. Mary accepted without hesitation after John accepted. b. *Mary accepted without hesitation after John may/might have accepted.

The whereas-clause in (19a) and the after-clause in (20a) are both formally indicative, but the value of this indicative mood is very different in paradigmatic terms. The indicative in (19a) potentially contrasts with other modal forms such as the subjective modal auxiliaries may and might in (19b), whereas the indicative in (20a) does not contrast with any other modal value, as shown by the unacceptability of the same modals in (20b). Thus, the whereas-clause in (19) allows a paradigm of modal options, whereas the after-clause in (20) remains restricted to the indicative. As with the analysis of speech function, the functional interpretation of this distinction relates to the presence versus absence of a modal value for

114

Chapter 4: Clause combining

the secondary clause in the clause combination. Paradigmatic availability of the full range of modal options for the whereas-clause in (19) reflects that it has a modal value of its own. The paradigmatic absence of the modal auxiliaries for the after-clause in (20) reflects that it does not have any modal value of its own. The indicative in (20) cannot be regarded as realizing any modal value, because it does not contrast with any other modal options: again, restriction to the indicative here can be regarded as an instance of reduction to the unmarked option in contexts of neutralization. Unlike with speech function, presence or absence of modality cannot be directly linked with presence or absence of illocutionary force: presence of speech function necessarily implies presence of modality, but the inverse is not the case. The whereas-clause in (19), for instance, has a modal value of its own but does not have a speech functional value, as shown by the fact that it does not allow any non-declarative clause types. Thus, the distinction between (19) and (20) is not a matter of illocutionary force: instead, presence versus absence of a modal value in a particular structure relates to whether the proposition in question is open to debate or not. Absence of a modal value implies that epistemic positioning about the certainty, plausibility or possibility of the proposition in question is irrelevant: the question whether John accepted is not open to debate in the after-clause in (20), but functions as a presupposition. Presence of a modal value, on the other hand, implies that epistemic positioning about the probability of the proposition is relevant: the question whether John has his doubts or not is not a presupposition in (19), but is still open to challenge and debate. The precise functional characterization of this distinction will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 6 (Section 5). 3.2. Categories defined by the values of the parameter The two values of the parameter of modality each define their own sets of conjunctions. Some conjunctions are always associated with the value [+ Modality]: the conjuncts they introduce invariably allow marked modal options in addition to the unmarked option of the indicative mood. This category of course includes the conjunctions and, or, but, and for, which also take the value [+ Speech Function], but in addition it also includes the conjunctions although and whereas. Examples (21)-(26) illustrate the availability of modal auxiliaries in the secondary clause of these constructions:

Modality and clause combining

(21) (22)

(23)

(24)

(25)

(26)

115

Henry Wood’s head gardener resided in the Dower House until 1927 and he must have ensured that its surroundings were kept in immaculate order. (CB ukmags) Sammy could have gone north to get away from the exceptional heat of this summer or he may have been chasing fish shoals. The team do not think Sammy was in search of romance because he has not reached breeding age. But things can be tough for young grey seals when mating starts in earnest. (CB today) What was being said in plain language was that the vehicle had an odometer with an actual reading of 47,526 miles but that must be incorrect because the dealer had been unable to confirm that mileage. (CB times) The main language is a French creole; the food is a glorious mix of all the cuisines except English; and the wild, thumping rhythms of the local sega music and dancing is most definitely African in origin. But don’t let any of that deter you, for this must be one of the most friendly places on earth – and Brits are certainly welcome. (CB today) And he cannot really be forced out of government, because there’s no general election for four years and there’s no really crucial state elections now coming up for quite a long period. And I--I expect him to carry on, although he will have lost a great deal of his aura last year. (CB npr) I can only talk from my own experience where I was very happy to go on to if you like the production floor or into the offices and talk to anybody to get information back because information is what we all thrive and live on and none of my directors or managers would have seen that in any way untoward whereas they might have seen it untoward if I’d started giving instructions to their staff. (CB ukspok)

There is in fact one additional conjunction which always allows marked modal options: as shown in Chapter 1 (Section 2.2.1), the conditional marker if in principle allows subjective modal verbs in addition to the basic indicative mood. There are reasons, however, to exclude this conjunction from the category of [+ Modality], because the subjective modal verbs in this context are functionally different from their counterparts in (21)-(26). They do not encode a modal position taken by the speaker or transferred to the interlocutor, but serve instead as propositionalized resumptions of a modal position taken or implied in the preceding discourse, as has been

116

Chapter 4: Clause combining

shown in the analysis in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 1 (see also Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 121–124). This functional difference implies that their availability in if-clauses cannot be taken as evidence for the presence of a modal value. The use of subjective modal verbs as an argument for presence versus absence of a modal value relies precisely on the paradigmatic equivalence between modals and moods as interpersonal values. If the modal in the conditional clause does not encode a position in the current interaction but echoes such a position from the preceding discourse, however, this paradigmatic equivalence is broken because the modal is no longer an interpersonal value. Because of this functional difference, the presence of modal verbs in conditional clauses cannot be regarded as evidence for the presence of a modal value, and if will be classified as [- Modality] Another set of conjunctions does not allow any subjective modal auxiliaries in addition to the indicative mood, and is therefore associated with the value [- Modality]. This category includes after, before, until and once, as shown by the unacceptability of the modal auxiliaries in (27)-(30): (27)

(28)

(29)

(30)

a. In 1986, the Ray brothers made national headlines after they were barred from school in Arcadia, Florida. (CB npr) b. *The Ray brothers made national headlines after they may/must have been barred from school in Arcadia, Florida. a. Once he got that goal against Auxerre in the UEFA Cup, Mark settled down and showed the supporters what I know he is capable of. So it was a shame he damaged his hamstring just then. (CB today) b. *Once he may/must have got that goal against Auxerre in the UEFA Cup, Mark settled down and showed the supporters what I know he is capable of. a. Martha Graham’s works featured powerful female characters, and she was usually the one who performed them until she retired at the age of 76. (CB npr) b. *She was usually the one who performed them until she may/must have retired at the age of 76. a. Dukakis’ departure comes just as the state experienced yet another falloff in tax revenues, and before he left he imposed a series of spending cuts. (CB npr) b. *Before he may/must have left he imposed a series of spending cuts.

Scope and clause combining

117

Finally, there is also a category of conjunctions that can either take the value [- Modality] or [+ Modality]: this includes as, since, because, so that, when, and while. It is not a coincidence that all of these conjunctions are ambiguous, either between temporal and contrastive (when, while), temporal and justifying (as, since), causal and justifying (because) and result and purpose (so that) meanings. In Chapter 8, I will show in more detail how these semantic distinctions correlate with presence versus absence of a modal value: temporal, purposive and causal uses take the value [- Modality], whereas contrastive, resultative and justifying uses take [+ Modality]. This is illustrated in (31) and (32) below for the temporal and justifying uses of since: (31)

(32)

a. UN and British officials say the airlift of relief supplies has been suspended because of the heavy combat around the airport. This is the second time fighting has stopped the aid flights since they began three weeks ago. (CB npr) b. *This is the second time fighting has stopped the aid flights since they may/must have begun three weeks ago. Despite embarrassments like last night’s defeat on fisheries, governments can survive for some time without an overall majority, especially since the Ulster Unionists may be reluctant to exchange their current influence for a majority Labour government. (CB times)

Table 13 summarizes the values of the different conjunctions for the parameter of modality: Table 13. The relevance of the parameter [+/- Modality] Conjunction and, or, but, for, although, so that, whereas as, since, because, so that, when, while before, after, until, once, if

Modality + +/-

4. Scope and clause combining The parameter of scope is different from the previous two parameters in that it does not look at interpersonal elements in terms of their contribution to illocutionary force, but in terms of their relation to the propositional

118

Chapter 4: Clause combining

content of the clause. Accordingly, the application of this parameter to the analysis of clause combining will also be different from that of the other two parameters. Modality and speech function parametrize the internal interpersonal structure of the conjuncts in the complex sentence, relying on paradigmatic reasoning to distinguish between presence and absence of modal and speech functional values. Scope, on the other hand, will parametrize the relation of one conjunct to the interpersonal structure of the other. More particularly, I will rely on different distributions of the focuspresupposition structure imposed by interpersonal elements in the main clause to distinguish between two configurations: (1) complex sentences where the secondary conjunct falls within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main conjunct and (2) complex sentences where the secondary conjunct is outside the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main conjunct. 4.1. Relevance to clause combining It is a well-known fact that complex sentences in English can be formally subdivided according to whether the secondary clause can serve as the focus of operations like interrogation and modalization in the main clause or not: this is the main principle behind Greenbaum’s (1969: 15–25) and Quirk et al’s (1985: 1070–1072) distinction between ‘adjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ clauses. In terms of the analysis proposed in Chapter 3, this can easily be interpreted as an interpersonal phenomenon. Interrogation and modalization are the marked values of the speech functional and modal systems, and the focus imposed by these values is one particular instance of the more general association between focus-presupposition structure and interpersonal systems. In this sense, the traditional distinction between adjunct and disjunct clauses can be regarded as an interpersonal one. Adjunct clauses, which can serve as focus for interrogation and modalization in the main clause, fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause; disjunct clauses, which cannot serve as focus for interrogation and modalization of the main clause, are outside the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause. Compare examples (33) and (34):

Scope and clause combining

(33)

(34)

119

a. He discovered the body before the police arrived. = ‘that is when he discovered the body’ b. Did he discover the body before the police arrived? = ‘is that when he discovered the body?’ c. He must have discovered the body before the police arrived. = ‘that must have been when he discovered the body’ a. He discovered the body in the attic, although the police had already searched the building. b. Did he discover the body in the attic, although the police had already searched the building? c. He must have discovered the body in the attic, although the police had already searched the building.

The grammatical import of the distinction between (33a) and (34a) comes to the surface most clearly in contexts of interrogation and modalization of the main clause, probably because these are the marked values in the speech functional and modal systems. In (33), the secondary clause can function as the focus for the modalization and interrogation, with the rest of the clause complex as a presupposition. Thus, what is interrogated and modalized in (33b) and (33c) is not whether or not the body was discovered, but rather the time when this happened: the speaker presupposes that the body was discovered at some time, and asks whether (in 33b) or confidently infers that (in 33c) this happened before the police arrived. It is important to note in this respect that the criterion here is potential rather than actual focus location. Structures like (33b) and (33c) can of course also be interpreted with the main clause as focus and the secondary clause as presupposition, but that is not what this criterion is about. The question is not whether the secondary clause actually serves as focus, but whether it can serve as focus, and this is where structures like (33) crucially differ from structures like (34). In (34), the secondary clause can not function as the focus for interrogation, nor can the rest of the clause complex serve as presupposition. The structures in (34b) and (34c) cannot be interpreted in parallel with (33b) and (33c), viz. as presupposing that the body was discovered in the attic and questioning (in 34b) or confidently inferring (in 34c) that this occurred in spite of the previous searches of the building by the police. The focus of interrogation and modalization in this second type of structure remains restricted to the main clause, and cannot extend to the secondary clause. In line with the analysis of the focus-presupposition system proposed in Chapter 3, the distinction between structures like (33) and (34) can be

120

Chapter 4: Clause combining

interpreted functionally in terms of a different status of the secondary clause with respect to the interpersonal structure of the main clause. In structures like (33), the interpersonal systems marked on the main clause have scope over the entire complex formed by main clause and secondary clause, as shown by the fact that they can extend their focus to the secondary clause. In structures like (34), on the other hand, the interpersonal systems marked on the main clause have scope only over the main clause and do not extend to the secondary clause, as shown by the fact that the secondary clause in these structures can never serve as focus for these systems. Thus, the parameter of scope defines a basic distinction between clause combinations where main clause and secondary clause form one single complex that falls within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause (+ Scope), and clause combinations where the secondary clause is independent from the interpersonal structure of the main clause (- Scope). 4.2. Categories defined by the values of the parameter As with the previous two parameters, the two values for the parameter of scope also correlate with their own sets of conjunctions. Some conjunctions introduce secondary clauses that can fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of their main clause, and therefore take the value [- Scope]. This is the case for before, after, until, if, when, while, so that, as, since and because, as illustrated in examples (35)-(44). (35) (36)

(37) (38)

Now I notice you were at Lewis’s. Now did you go to Lewis’s before you went to university? (CB ukspok) But it was dropped yesterday after environmental health officers said they had lost the insect in a lab freezer. The Hendersons said it must have landed on the meat after they sold it. But tests allegedly showed it had been cooked. (CB today) What is odd is the amount of time he spent in the house. I was up when he got in, so he must have waited upstairs until I had gone to bed. (CB today) There will, says Fisk, be one particular question in President Bush’s mind: know [sic, JCV] is the degree to which Syrian military forces in Saudi Arabia will go along with any military option taken by the Americans in the Kingdom – in other words, will the Syrian army be prepared to fight the Iraqi army and, quite apart

Scope and clause combining

(39)

(40)

(41)

(42)

(43)

(44)

121

from in the defence of Saudi Arabia, will the Syrians fight if it’s a question of trying to liberate Kuwait by military means. (CB bbc)30 A COURT threatened to repossess a Royal Navy nuclear submarine – because it reckoned a mum in arrears with her mortgage lived there. […] The mum of two, of Gosport, Hants, said last night: “I think it’s a real hoot – I can’t stop laughing. My pals reckon I should frame the letter and put it on the wall. The mistake must have been made when my husband Jeffrey was posted to HMS Vanguard [the submarine, JCV] after we split up”. (CB sunnow) I think it’s very important to measure when and where things occurred. Did they occur when you’re a young person, in your formative years, or did they occur while you were a senior official in the federal government? (CB npr) The quest to be beige is a ritual participated in, for the most part but by no means exclusively, by white Americans. Some may want to tan so that they can be out in the sun without danger of burning, but a lot of others simply feel that brown skin, or coppertone, if you will, is more attractive. (CB npr) Holidaymaker Barbara Milton unpacked her suitcase and grabbed a live snake! The foot-long beast had travelled 4,000 miles from Detroit in the United States, to Cowes, on the Isle of Wight. “It was my worst nightmare,” said Barbara, 43. “It must have crept in as I packed”. (CB today) “After two or three treatments he was a different boy,” says June, who lives in Kent. Then one day he said, “Mummy, my head has gone,” a reference to the fact that the constant headache, which he must have had since he was a baby, had disappeared. ”Osteopathy changed both his life and mine.” (CB times) A poor man in a lungi stopped me. “I was born in 1914 Great War,” he said in an impeccable accent, “and served in Second War in Rangoon.” Did he tell me this because I was English, or because the start and what might have been the end of his life were, for him, its highlights? (CB ukbooks)

Another group of conjunctions invariably take the value [- Scope]: this is the case for the conjunctions and, but, or, for, although, and whereas. Unlike with the previous category, in these cases interrogation or modalization marked on the main clause can never take the secondary clause as their

122

Chapter 4: Clause combining

focus while at the same time taking the main clause as presupposition. The link between focus on the secondary clause and presupposition for the main clause is crucial here: for and, but, and or, the focus of interrogation or modalization marked on the main clause can actually extend to the secondary clause, as shown in (45) and (46), but in that case the main clause equally serves as focus and is not presupposed. This is a different type of configuration from the focus-presupposition configurations illustrated in the examples above, because there is no functional inequality between main clause and secondary clause, which means that it cannot be taken as evidence for the value [+ Scope]. See further in Chapter 11 (Section 4) on this type of structure and its cross-linguistic equivalents. (45) (46)

Adams: Did they round you all up and--and make you go in the basement there? (CB npr) If TW3 in America had stayed on a Friday, I could not have done both. Somebody up there must have liked me, or decided that BOAC needed the revenue. (CB ukbooks)

In addition to the conjunctions which always take the value [- Scope], all of the conjunctions listed above as [+ Scope] can also take the value [- Scope] when they occur in specific grammatical configurations. The most obvious formal correlate for this distinction is of course the distribution of intonation units over the clause combination, as shown in Chapter 3 (Section 2): intonational integration of the secondary clause with the main clause correlates with [+ Scope], whereas non-integration correlates with [- Scope]. Thus, for instance, breaking up the intonational integration of the after-clause in an example like (47) also changes its value for the parameter of scope, as shown in (48). Whereas structures like (47b) and (47c) can presuppose that ‘they found it’ and ask whether or infer that this happened after she had gone, this interpretation is no longer available for the corresponding structures with (48). Examples like (48b) and (48c) can only be interpreted as asking whether or inferring that ‘they found it’, with the secondary clause as a separate specification of the temporal circumstances in the form of an afterthought. See further also in Chapter 7 (Section 4). (47)

a. They found it after she’d gone. b. She had written a note and left it in the summerhouse. Which meant they must have found it after she’d gone. (FLOB flob_l) c. Did they find it after she’d gone?

Scope and clause combining

(48)

123

a. They found it, after she’d gone. b. They must have found it, after she’d gone. c. Did they find it, after she’d gone?

A less obvious formal correlate of the distinction between [+ Scope] and [- Scope] is the distinction between initial and final position: whereas final secondary clauses can take both [+ Scope] and [- Scope] depending on the intonational structure, initial secondary clauses generally take the value [- Scope]. They cannot31 serve as focus for the interrogation or modalization in their main clause, as shown by comparing the (b)-structures with the (c)-structures for (49) and (50). Interrogation in the (b) structures, with the secondary clause in final position, can easily take the secondary clause as its focus while presupposing the main clause. In that interpretation, the question in (49b) is not whether or not the business suffered and the question in (50b) is not whether or not these things happened: the speaker presupposes that these things were the case, and asks whether they happened after the strike was over (in 49b) or while the interlocutor was in government service (in 50b). Such an interpretation is not available for the (c) structures, where the adverbial clause is in initial position. In these cases, the focus of interrogation remains restricted to the main clause and does not allow main clause presupposition with secondary clause focus: the speaker in (49c) and (50c) asks whether or not the business did suffer and whether or not these things happened. The distinction between initial and final position in terms of focusability is further elaborated in Chapter 10 (Section 2.2). (49) (50)

a. b. c. a.

After the strike was over, his business did suffer. Did his business suffer after the strike was over? After the strike was over, did his business suffer? While he was a senior official in the government, things like that did happen. b. Did things like that happen while he was a senior official in the government? c. While he was a senior official in the government, did things like that happen?

For some of these conjunctions, finally, an additional motivation for the distinction between [+ Scope] and [- Scope] can be the semantic ambiguity of the conjunction: this is the case for when, while, as, so that, since and because. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 8, the contrastive,

124

Chapter 4: Clause combining

justifying and resultative uses of these conjunctions invariably take the value [- Scope], whereas the temporal, causal and purposive uses can take both the values [+ Scope] and [- Scope], again following the general formal distinctions between integrated and non-integrated intonation and preposing and postposing. Table 14 summarizes the values of the parameter of scope for the conjunctions investigated in this section: Table 14. The relevance of the parameter [+/- Scope] Conjunction and, or, but, for, whereas, although when, while, if, because, once, so that, after, before, as, since, until

Scope +/-

5. Summary In this chapter, I have shown how the three systems of interpersonal grammar that were described in the first part of this study can each take two values in the analysis of complex sentences, and thus each define two structural configurations. The parameters of modality and speech function deal with two different aspects of the internal interpersonal structure of the conjuncts in the complex sentence. The formal heuristic used in both cases is based on a paradigmatic conception of modality and speech function as consisting of a number of marked and unmarked options: structural presence of all options in a conjunct is taken as evidence for the presence of the value in question, whereas structural restriction to the unmarked option is taken as evidence for neutralization of the paradigm and therefore absence of the value in question. The parameter of scope deals with the external relation of one conjunct to the interpersonal structure of the other. The formal heuristic used here is based on the correlation between interpersonal systems and focuspresupposition structure that was presented in Chapter 3 of the first part of this study: the structural availability of secondary clause focus with main clause presupposition for interpersonal systems marked on the main clause is taken as evidence for a position of the secondary clause within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause, and absence of this pattern

Summary

125

is taken as evidence for the independent status of the secondary clause with respect to the interpersonal structure of the main clause. In the following chapter, I will show how the values defined by the three interpersonal parameters cluster into a basic typology of four construction types. The remaining chapters will then be devoted to demonstrating the usefulness of this typology for the analysis of clause combining in English, both in terms of function, grammatical properties of clause combining, and lexical semantics of conjunctions.

Chapter 5 Combining the parameters: A typology

In this chapter, I will use the results of the analysis in the previous chapter to set up a general typology of complex sentence constructions in English. Each of the three parameters described in the previous chapter represents a different aspect of the interpersonal structure of the complex sentence: combining the values for the three parameters will therefore produce a typology of possible interpersonal profiles for complex sentences. In principle, three parameters each with two values could define a typology of eight construction types, but the parameters are not entirely independent: because of the functional relations between them, a number of theoretically possible combinations of values are ruled out, and the final typology will consist of only four construction types, rather than the expected eight. 1. Relations between the parameters As shown in the first part of this study, the three parameters of speech function, modality and scope represent different grammatical aspects of the interpersonal organization of the clause, and are therefore by definition not independent. This also means that not all theoretically possible combinations of values for the parameters actually occur: a number of combinations are ruled out by the functional dependencies between the parameters, as I will shown in this section. 1.1. Modality and speech function Speech function and modality are functionally related in that they represent two complementary grammatical components of the illocutionary force of an utterance. Modality serves to construe an epistemic or deontic position with respect to the propositional content of the clause, and speech function serves to assign the responsibility for this position in speaker-interlocutor interaction. In this perspective, speech function is functionally dependent on modality: it serves to assign responsibility for a modal position, and

128

Chapter 5: A typology

therefore always requires presence of such a modal position in order to operate. The functional dependence of speech function on modality rules out one of the four theoretically possible combinations of values for the two parameters: presence of speech function in a conjunct can never combine with absence of modality in that same conjunct. This is also the correlation we find in comparing the values for the different conjunctions in tables 12 (speech function) and 13 (modality) from the previous chapter: conjunctions that take the value [+ Speech Function]32 also take the value [+ Modality]. There is just one conjunction from this category that can also take [- Modality]: because is ambiguous both between [+ Speech Function] and [- Speech Function] and between [+ Modality] and [- Modality]. This is not a counterexample to the principle proposed above, however, because the two values are associated with different senses of the conjunction. The [- Modal] value is associated with the simple causal relation, which cannot take the value [+ Speech Function], as shown in (1). The value [+ Speech Function], on the other hand, is associated with the justifying relation, which also takes the value [+ Modality] as in (2) (see further in Chapter 8 (Sections 2.3 and 4.2) for this distinction). (1)

(2)

a. Do you feel just a little bit uncomfortable with the notion that two of the great outlaws of tennis, Jimmy Connors and McEnroe, suddenly become such sympathetic characters because they’re aging? (CB npr) b. ?The great outlaws of tennis, Jimmy Connors and McEnroe, suddenly become such sympathetic characters because they may/must be aging. => [- Modality] c. *The great outlaws of tennis, Jimmy Connors and McEnroe, suddenly become such sympathetic characters because are(n’t) they aging. => [- Speech Function] a. Do try to talk to your wife, because it will relieve the anxiety which is making your problem worse. (CB sunnow) b. All of these ingredients exfoliate the skin and induce peeling. They are obviously very drying. They should not be used in combination because the effect may increase dryness and irritation. (CB usbooks) => [+ Modality] c. Well I don’t really want to meet Anthea Turner. Even for a rollover. Definitely not for a rollover. I never go out on Saturday nights because isn’t the telly really brilliant? If you go out you’d miss all the repeats and Denis Norden rehashing It’ll be

Relations between the parameters

129

Alright on the Night for the zillionth time. (CB sunnow) => [+ Speech Function] Unlike presence of speech function, absence of speech function in a conjunct does not imply anything about presence or absence of modality. Absence of speech function can combine both with presence and absence of a modal value: there are conjunctions which allow the full paradigm of modal options while at the same time not allowing any speech functional options, such as the whereas-clause in (3). (3)

a. If you just look at the demography of the area, you would see that millions of Ukrainians live inside Russia, whereas many millions of Russians live inside Ukraine. (CB npr) b. Erm but erm we jogged along then for quite a while without much development on that side er and erm whereas it must have been a great relief to the Senate division to have this taken off their shoulders erm people forgot that kind of benefit. (CB ukspok) => [+ Modality] c. *Millions of Ukrainians live inside Russia, whereas do(n’t) many millions of Russians live inside Ukraine. => [- Speech Function]

Taken together, the correlations between the values of speech function and modality can be summarized as in table 15, with the grey area indicating the excluded combination of values. Table 15. Relations between speech function and modality + Modality - Modality

- Speech Function + +

+ Speech Function +

1.2. Scope and the other two parameters The parameter of scope is related to the other two parameters in that it deals with the relation between interpersonal systems like modality or speech function and the propositional content of the clause. Within the context of a complex sentence construction, this means that the parameter of scope operates at a different structural location from the other two parameters:

130

Chapter 5: A typology

whereas modality and speech function parametrize the internal interpersonal structure of main clause and secondary clause, scope parametrizes the relation of the secondary clause to the interpersonal structure of the main clause. This functional relation again rules out a theoretically possible combination of values: a value of [+ Scope] cannot combine with a value of [+ Speech Function] or [+ Modality]. A positive value for scope implies that the secondary clause falls within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause, whereas a positive value for either modality or speech function implies that the secondary clause has an interpersonal structure of its own, independent of that of the main clause. These two configurations are of course incompatible. A clause cannot have any interpersonal structure of its own while at the same time falling within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause: the former configuration implies separate illocutionary status, whereas the latter configuration implies construal as part of the propositional content of the main clause. For a conjunct in a complex sentence construction to have interpersonal values of its own, it must function independently from the interpersonal structure of the other conjunct, i.e. it must have a negative value for the parameter of scope. In fact, the restriction on a combination of positive values for scope and the other two parameters can be regarded as an instance of a more general principle that an interpersonal system cannot fall within the scope of another interpersonal system without losing its interpersonal status, because position within the scope of an interpersonal system implies construal as part of the propositional content. This restriction is again reflected in the combinations of values we find for the conjunctions in tables 12, 13 and 14 from the previous chapter: conjunctions which can take the value [+ Scope] generally cannot take the values [+ Speech Function] or [+ Modality]. There are a number of exceptions to this principle: because can take [+ Speech Function] and [+ Scope], and because, as, since, so that, when and while can take [+ Modality] and [+ Scope]. As in the previous case, however, all of these apparent exceptions concern polysemous conjunctions: because has causal and justifying interpretations, as and since have temporal and justifying interpretations, so that has resultative and purposive interpretations, and when and while have temporal and contrastive interpretations. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 8, the apparent exceptions can be accounted for if we take these patterns into account: [+ Scope] is generally associated with causal, purposive and temporal relations, which take [- Modality] and [- Speech

Relations between the parameters

131

Function], whereas [- Scope] is associated with justifying, resultative and contrastive relations, which can take [+ Modality] or [+ Speech Function]. There is actually one case where the conflict cannot be resolved in terms of the ambiguity of the conjunction: a because-clause expressing reason can fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of its main clause while still allowing marked modal values, as shown in examples (4) and (5) below. It is telling, however, that in this case the marked modal values which normally count as evidence for the presence of a modal value in a conjunct do not express the speaker’s position, but are related to the agent of the main clause: the may in (4) is related to the generalized you in the main clause, just like the may in (5) is related to thieves in the main clause (i.e. it is the you and the thieves who think that the job may lead somewhere else and that people may hear breaking glass). In this sense, the apparent counterexamples in (4) and (5) actually confirm the general principle that a conjunct cannot have a modal value while at the same time falling within the scope of the interpersonal values of another conjunct: the only way this configuration can be realized is when the modal value is related to a source within the complex sentence rather than to the current speaker, i.e. when it loses its interpersonal status. (4) (5)

He realises that a musical at a seaside resort is not going to bring the cash rolling in. “You do a job because it may lead you to where you want to be in five years’ time,” he says. (CB times) Most housebreaking can be prevented. In three cases out of ten, a door or window has been left open. Thieves don’t like locked windows because someone may hear breaking glass. (CB ukephem)

Table 16 summarizes the relations between the parameter of scope and the other two parameters, with the area in grey indicating the excluded combination of values. Table 16. Relations between scope and speech function/modality - Scope + Scope

- Speech Function / - Modality + +

+ Speech Function / + Modality +

132

Chapter 5: A typology

1.3. Summary The relations between the different values for the three parameters can be summarized as follows: – speech function and modality: – presence of speech function in a conjunct necessarily also implies presence of modality – absence of speech function is compatible both with presence and absence of modality – scope and speech function/modality – presence of either speech function or modality in a conjunct necessarily implies position outside the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause – absence of modality and speech function is compatible both with position within and outside the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause Figure 2 provides a representation of these relations: [+ Speech Function]

[- Speech Function]

[+ Modality]

[+ Modality]

[- Modality]

[- Scope]

[- Scope]

[- Scope]

[+ Scope]

Figure 2. Relations between the values of the parameters

2. A typology of four construction types On the basis of the relations between the parameters sketched in the previous section, we can now define the four construction types that will make up the basic typology of complex sentence constructions. At this stage, I will not yet provide any labels for the different construction types: this will be done in the following chapter, where the functional properties

A typology of four construction types

133

of the constructions will be investigated and compared with the existing classifications of clause combinations. A first construction type consists of two conjuncts which each have a speech functional and a modal value of their own, i.e. where each conjunct has the basic grammatical prerequisites for having its own illocutionary force. As a consequence, neither conjunct falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the other. This construction type is associated with the conjunctions and, or, but, for, although, and because. (6)

Each beard naturally has its own story to tell, but underlying almost all of them is this basic theme of sincerity. Solzhenitsyn’s Old Testament beard may have contributed as much as any other single factor to the dismantling of Soviet communism [X] for [conjunction] who would be so cynical as to disbelieve the utterances of so awesome a patriarch [Y]? (CB ukmags) X [+Speech Function] [+ Modality]

conjunction and, or, but, for, because, although [- Scope]

Y [+Speech Function] [+ Modality]

A second construction type consists of two conjuncts which each have a modal value of their own, but where the secondary conjunct does not allow speech functional activation of this modal value. In addition, the secondary conjunct does not fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the other. This construction type is associated with the conjunctions whereas, although, so that, when, while, as, and since. (7)

A woman might be puzzled that her boyfriend views a two-hour session of mixed doubles on the tennis court as intimate time together [X] whereas [conjunction] he may have garnered a great deal of information about her from the experience [Y]. (CB usbooks) X [+Speech Function] [+ Modality]

conjunction whereas, as, although, so that, since, when, while [- Scope]

Y [-Speech Function] [+ Modality]

134

Chapter 5: A typology

A third construction type consists of a main conjunct that has its own modal and speech functional values, and a secondary conjunct that does not have any interpersonal values of its own. In addition, the secondary conjunct does not fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main conjunct. This construction type is associated with the conjunctions after, before, when, while, so that, until, once, if, as, because and since. (8)

And er you went there in what did we say ni […] We said from nineteen-seventeen till […] nineteen-twenty-five. That’s right. Now when [conjunction] you went there [Y] erm did you in fact go on some kind of county local authority scholarship [X]? (CB ukspok)

X [+Speech Function] [+ Modality]

conjunction after, before, when, while, if, once, so that, until, because, as, since

Y [-Speech Function] [- Modality]

[- Scope]

The final construction type, like the previous one, consists of a main conjunct that has its own modal and speech functional values and a secondary conjunct that does not have any modal and speech functional values of its own. Unlike with the previous construction type, however, the secondary conjunct does fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main conjunct. This construction type is associated with the same set of conjunctions as the previous one. (9)

When cops went to arrest Murphy, they found mud on his shoes and jacket. He claimed it must have got there [X] when [conjunction] he fell over after leaving a pub [Y]. (CB sunnow)

X [+Speech Function] [+ Modality]

conjunction after, before, when, while, if, once, until, so that, because, as, since

Y [-Speech Function] [- Modality]

[+ Scope]

3. Why this typology? As already mentioned in the introduction to the previous chapter, most of the parameters used to set up this typology have already been used in one

Why this typology?

135

form or other in previous analyses of clause combining. But apart from these, many other grammatical criteria have been proposed, such as nonfiniteness, preposability, non-integrated intonation etc. So why should precisely these three grammatical phenomena serve as the basic parameters for a typology of clause combining in English? And why should the fourcategory typology derived from them be preferred to the traditional dichotomy between coordination and subordination, or to the multidimensional typologies and continua proposed in Haiman and Thompson (1984), Lehmann (1988), Raible (1992) or Hopper and Traugott (2003: 176–179)? In the following three chapters, I will try to show how the three interpersonal parameters and the resulting four-category typology form a unifying principle behind many of the theoretical and descriptive issues surrounding the analysis of clause combining in English. In Chapter 6, I will focus on the functional basis of the typology, demonstrating how it makes sense functionally to categorize complex sentences on the basis of the relative interpersonal status of the conjuncts. I will show how the grammatical distinctions between the different construction types can be given a functional motivation in terms of the interpersonal basis of the typology, and how each of these functional motivations can in turn be linked up with notions like equality, presupposition, integration etc, which are commonly used in the analysis of clause combining but usually also remain rather vague. In Chapter 7, I will explore the relation between the interpersonal parameters behind the four-construction typology and the other grammatical criteria that have traditionally been used in the analysis of clause combining in English, such as preposability, main clause phenomena, clefting, availability of non-integrated intonation, or wh-questioning. I will show that most of these criteria can actually be regarded as epiphenomena of the basic interpersonal parameters: the different criteria neatly follow the constructional boundaries defined on the basis of interpersonal criteria, and functionally their behaviour can equally be explained in interpersonal terms. In Chapter 8, finally, I will focus on the semantic usefulness of the typology, showing that the different types of semantic relations are not distributed arbitrarily over the four categories of the typology, but that they tend to cluster around different constructions or groups of constructions. This association between groups of semantic relations and groups of construction types will also allow for a more precise account of the polysemy of particular conjunctions: I will show how semantic patterns of polysemy correlate with constructional differences as they are defined by the interpersonal criteria.

Chapter 6 Motivating the typology: Function

1. Introduction In this chapter, I will provide a first argument for the usefulness of the interpersonal typology developed in chapters 4 and 5, by showing how it makes sense functionally to describe clause combinations in terms of their interpersonal properties. More specifically, I will argue that the interpersonal typology provides a unifying framework for various functional generalizations that have been proposed in the analysis of clause combining. Such generalizations have usually been associated with the traditional contrast between coordination and subordination, and they include distinctions such as equality versus inequality of status for the conjuncts (Lyons 1968: 178; Quirk et al. 1985: 987; Halliday 1994: 221), autonomy versus integration (Jespersen 1924: 103–106; Brøndal 1972 [1937]: 26–27; Foley and Van Valin 1984: 239–241; Quirk et al. 1985: 987; Givón 1990; Hopper and Traugott 2003: 178–179), assertion versus presupposition (Keenan 1971: 46–47; Winter 1982), challengeability versus unchallengeability (Givón 1982: 101–102), and foregrounding versus backgrounding (Townsend and Bever 1977; Talmy 1978; Tomlin 1985; McKay 1988). In this chapter, I will argue that the different functional distinctions proposed in the literature can actually be associated with different constructional distinctions in the typology proposed in the previous two chapters. In this sense, the interpersonal basis of the typology can serve as an explanatory principle for these often rather vague distinctions. On the one hand, the correspondence implies that the distinctions are basically interpersonal in nature and that they can be given a consistent grammatical definition in terms of the parameters on which the typology is based. On the other hand, the fact that most of these distinctions correspond to a different constructional distinction also indicates that they do not define one single dichotomy between coordination and subordination, as they have usually been regarded, but actually represent different phenomena, relating to different aspects of the interpersonal organization of the complex sentence.

138

Chapter 6: Function

2. General interpersonal profiles of the construction types In the previous two chapters, the interpersonal basis of the typology was mainly described from the perspective of the different parameters in isolation, by focusing on the individual contribution of each parameter to the interpersonal organization of the complex sentence. In this chapter, this will be complemented by a more holistic perspective, looking at the overall interpersonal profiles resulting from the different combinations of parameters. In the following sections, these general interpersonal profiles will be used to investigate how the proposed typology relates to the different functional generalizations proposed in the literature on clause combining. The point of departure for determining the general profile of the constructions is the argument that the individual parameters represent complementary grammatical aspects of the illocutionary force of the simple clause, as has been argued in the first part of this study. As shown in chapters 1 and 2, modality and speech function furnish the basic grammatical material for illocutionary force in the simple clause, respectively by encoding an epistemic or a deontic position towards the propositional content of the clause and assigning the responsibility for that position in speakerinterlocutor interaction. This also implies that the presence of modal and speech functional values in a clausal structure must be regarded as a basic prerequisite for a clause to have any illocutionary force at all, as argued in Chapter 2 (Section 4). What this means for the analysis of clause combining is that the presence or absence of modal and speech functional values in one of the conjuncts must be interpreted as reflecting the presence or absence of illocutionary force in that conjunct. As shown in Chapter 3, the parameter of scope is not directly involved in the construal of the illocutionary force of an utterance, but rather describes the relation of the grammatical components of illocutionary force to the propositional content of the clause. This also implies that its relevance to the analysis of clause combining lies at a different level than the other two parameters. Rather than reflecting presence or absence of illocutionary force in a conjunct, the parameter of scope deals with the status of one conjunct relative to the illocutionary force of the other: if the secondary clause falls within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the main clause, this implies that it belongs to the propositional content of the illocutionary force encoded by these interpersonal values.

General interpersonal profiles of the construction types

139

Table 17. The four construction types in the typology

Construction 1

X [+Speech function] [+Modality]

Construction 2

[+Speech function] [+Modality]

Construction 3

[+Speech function] [+Modality]

Construction 4

[+Speech function] [+Modality]

conjunction

[-Scope]

[-Scope]

[-Scope]

[+Scope]

Y [+Speech Function] [+Modality] [-Speech Function] [+Modality] [-Speech Function] [-Modality] [-Speech Function] [-Modality]

If we look at the different construction types in the proposed typology – summarized in table 17 above – in terms of the contribution of the parameters to illocutionary force, we can see that the typology is characterized by increasing reduction of the grammatical basis of illocutionary force in the secondary clause, and increasing integration of the secondary clause within the scope of the illocutionary force of the main clause. In this sense, constructions 1 and 433 represent the two extremes of the typology in terms of illocutionary force: construction 1 consists of two separate speech acts, whereas construction 4 consists of one single speech act that has scope over the entire complex formed by main conjunct and secondary conjunct. Construction 1 is illustrated in (1) and (2) below: in this structure, the main clause and the secondary clause have their own modal and speech functional values, and neither falls within the scope of the interpersonal values of the other. In terms of illocutionary structure, this implies that both conjuncts have an illocutionary force, and that the complex sentence encodes a relation between two distinct speech acts. The speaker in (1), for instance, gives the interlocutor the permission to come over for the night and conjoins this with a request not to forget the condoms. Similarly, the speaker in (2) concludes that the interlocutor will be disappointed about the election and justifies this opinion with a separate speech act about the interlocutor’s expectations prior to the election. (1)

Warren I love you. Ah? You can come over tonight, and don’t forget the condoms. (COLT b132601.cor 230)

140 (2)

Chapter 6: Function

You must in fact be quite disappointed because didn’t you welcome the prospect of Mrs Thatcher at the next election? (CB bbc)

Construction 4, illustrated in (3) and (4) below, represents the other extreme of the typology. In this construction, the secondary clause has no modal or speech functional values, and falls within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the main clause. In terms of illocutionary structure, this combination of values implies that the whole clause combination constitutes one single speech act, marked on the main clause but with scope extending over the whole clause complex. In both examples, the interclausal relation operates within the propositional content of one single speech act rather than between two speech acts. The speaker in (3) confidently infers that ‘it happened after he left’ and the speaker in (4) asks if it is the case that ‘the difficulty was caused by space limitations in the manuscript’. In this sense, the because-clause in (4) provides a clear contrast with its counterpart in (2): whereas the relation marked by because in (4) operates inside the propositional content of one single speech act, its counterpart in (2) operates between two separate speech acts. (3) (4)

It must have happened after I left. (CB ukspok) Did the difficulty arise merely because the history of Joan exceeded its allotted space? The evidence of several of the earliest manuscripts indicates otherwise, for it would seem that no space whatever was allotted to her in the original version of the Chronicon as written by Martin Polonus himself. (CB ukbooks)

In between these two extremes, the interpersonal typology defines the intermediate constructions 2 and 3, which have in common that one conjunct does not have the full set of interpersonal values, but still does not fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the other conjunct. Absence of interpersonal values for the secondary conjunct in these categories can either be total, as in (5) where the before-clause lacks both modal and speech functional values, or partial, as illustrated in (6) where the since-clause has a modal value of its own, but no speech functional value. (5)

Before the present gulf crisis began, any visit by Secretary of State Baker to the Middle East, particularly the northern part of

Functional generalizations in clause combining

(6)

141

the Arabian Peninsula, would, as a matter of cause, include a stop off in Amman for talks with King Hussein. (CB npr) Many economists argue against easy credit for the Soviet Union. There is no obvious guarantee that western money will be used effectively. In fact it may make things worse since any such subsidies may only delay the harsh decisions that are necessary if the Soviet economy is to be sensibly reformed. (CB bbc)

In terms of illocutionary structure, these configurations of values imply that in both construction types only the main conjunct constitutes a full speech act: the secondary conjunct is independent from the interpersonal structure of the first but does not constitute a full speech act. Within this general category, construction 3 is closer to construction 4 because of the absence of modal and speech functional values in the secondary clause, whereas construction 2 is closer to construction 1 because of the presence of a modal value. In the following sections, I will use these general interpersonal profiles to investigate how the typology relates to the different functional generalizations that have been proposed in the literature. 3. Functional generalizations in clause combining The literature on clause combining has produced several generalizations about the functional basis of different types of complex sentences, usually associated with the traditional distinction between coordination and subordination or with some continuum that is meant cover the same ground as this dichotomy. In this section, I will briefly outline some of the most widespread proposals. In the following sections, I will deal with each of them separately, and I will show how they can be integrated and explained in terms of the interpersonal typology. The most general distinction between coordinate and subordinate structures, on which most authors seem to agree, is that the conjuncts in coordinate structures are equal in status, whereas the conjuncts in subordinate structures are unequal in status (see for instance Lyons 1968: 178; Quirk et al. 1985: 987; Halliday 1994: 221). This is of course a very general characterization, and as such it is not very informative: in the literature, the inequality involved in subordinate constructions has been further specified in various ways, using notions such as integration, presupposition, unchallengeability and backgrounding.

142

Chapter 6: Function

The most widespread interpretation is that subordinate clauses are integrated into their main clause as constituents of that clause. This goes back at least to Jespersen (1924: 103–106), who argues that a subordinate clause is “a member of a sentence which has in itself the form of a sentence” (1924: 103), and is taken up again, for instance, in Brøndal (1972 [1937]: 26–27), Foley and Van Valin (1984: 239–241), and Quirk et al. (1985: 987). Another way to define the inequality associated with subordination has been to relate it to logical and pragmatic principles like presupposition and unchallengeability. Keenan (1971: 45–47) and Winter (1982), for instance, both argue that the information in subordinate clauses is presupposed and the information in coordinate or main clauses is asserted. Givón (1982: 101–102), on the other hand, has argued for a pragmatic redefinition of this distinction in terms of the concept of challengeability: subordinate clauses are not open to challenge by the interlocutor, whereas coordinate and main clauses are. Alternatively, a number of authors have related the distinction between coordination and subordination to discursive principles like foregrounding versus backgrounding (e.g. Townsend and Bever 1977; Talmy 1978; Tomlin 1985; McKay 1988): the information in coordinate and main clauses is prominent and important in the development of the discourse, whereas the information in subordinate clauses represents peripheral information on the background of discourse. Taken together, these proposals show that there are at least five different ways to define the functional basis of the distinction between subordination and coordination, one very general distinction between inequality and equality, and four more specific distinctions between integration and nonintegration, presupposition and assertion, unchallengeability and challengeability, and backgrounding and foregrounding. This of course raises a number of questions. How these distinctions relate to each other: do they define one single contrast between coordination and subordination or do they define distinct categories? What is the precise nature of the distinctions: are they unrelated or can they be explained in terms of a more basic principle? Is it possible to find a grammatical basis for them? In the following sections, I will argue that most of the functional distinctions discussed in this section actually correspond to a different constructional boundary in the interpersonal typology. This will show on the one hand that they can be linked back to aspects of interpersonal structure, and that the interpersonal parameters at the basis of the typology can be used to define them more precisely in grammatical terms. On the other hand, it will

Integration versus non-integration

143

also show that they define distinct phenomena rather than one single contrast between coordination and subordination. 4. Integration versus non-integration As argued in Section 2, construction 4 is different from the other construction types in the typology in that the secondary clause falls within the scope of the illocutionary force of the main clause, illustrated in (7) and (8) below: the whole structure forms one single speech act, with the temporal and conditional relations operating within the propositional content of that speech act. In this section, I will argue that the illocutionary integration that characterizes the secondary clause in (7) and (8) should be regarded as the principle behind the assumption that subordinate clauses are integrated into or part of their main clause: the secondary clause in (7) and (8) is integrated into the main clause because it falls within the scope of the illocutionary force of that main clause, and is therefore part of its propositional content. (7) (8)

You must have bought something while I wasn’t there. (CB ukbooks) And Gary Rubens, of Hainault, Essex, said: “Will they drop prices if the team wins nothing again, just like it hasn’t for the past 18 years?” (CB sunnow)

The principle that has traditionally been assumed to lie behind the integration of subordinate clauses is constituency, as argued for instance in Jespersen (1924: 103–106), Brøndal (1972 [1937]: 26–27), Foley and Van Valin (1984: 239–241), Quirk et al. (1985: 987), and Hopper and Traugott (1993: 170–171). Compare the definition provided in Quirk et al: “[T]he sentence and its subordinate clauses are in a hypotactic relationship, that is they form a hierarchy in which the subordinate clause is a constituent of the sentence as a whole.” (1985: 987) The problem with a constituency account of integration is that it is too broad to provide a precise definition of the notion of integration. The examples of constituent clauses provided in Quirk et al. (1985: 987–991) include, for instance, structures like (9) and (10) below. Both the althoughclause in (9) and the while-clause in (10) are regarded as constituents of their respective main clauses, more specifically as fillers of an ‘adverbial’ or ‘VP-adjunct’ slot34 (see Quirk et al. 1985: 988, 991; also Jespersen 1924: 105; Foley and Van Valin 1984: 239).

144

Chapter 6: Function

(9)

Although I admire her reasoning, I reject her conclusions. (Quirk et al. 1985: 988) (10) She telephoned while you were out (Quirk et al. 1985: 991) In terms of the interpersonal typology, however, these two structures belong to two distinct construction types because of a different value for the parameter of scope. The while-clause in (10) falls within the scope of the speech act of the main clause, and therefore belongs to the propositional content of that main clause, whereas the although-clause in (9) falls outside the scope of the speech act of the main clause and is therefore not part of its propositional content. The same would apply to the preposed or intonationally detached counterparts of the while-clause in (10) (see further in Chapter 4, Section 4). The distinction between (9) and (10) shows that a constituency analysis provides a less accurate indication of integration than the interpersonal approach:35 the parameter of scope generally distinguishes between at least two categories where the constituency analysis recognizes only one, and therefore provides a more restrictive definition of integration. In terms of scope, only constructions like (10) are recognized as integrated and distinguished from constructions like (9) or the preposed or intonationally detached counterparts of (10), whereas a constituency analysis would group all these structures indiscriminately together as ‘integrated’. One alternative would of course be to take the interpersonal non-integration of (9) as an argument against a constituency analysis of these structures, but this would effectively imply taking the parameter of scope as the defining criterion for constituency, and thus implicitly recognizing the more fundamental nature of scope. In conclusion, therefore, the integration traditionally associated with subordination can be defined more precisely and motivated functionally by the interpersonal parameter of scope, as summarized in table 18: the secondary clause in construction 4 is integrated into its main clause in interpersonal terms, because it falls within the scope of the speech act of the main clause. For the other constructions in the typology, the secondary clause falls outside the scope of the speech act in the main clause, and is therefore not integrated into the main clause. In the following chapter, I will provide further evidence for the interpersonal basis of this distinction by showing how it can account for a number of formal criteria that have traditionally been used to measure the integration of the secondary clause into the main clause, such as clefting, wh-interrogation and intonational detachment (Sections 3 and 4).

Presupposition

145

Table 18. Integration versus non-integration

1 2 3 4

Interpersonal properties [+ Speech Function] [+ Modality] [- Scope] [- Speech Function] => Outside scope [+ Modality] illocutionary force [- Scope] [- Speech Function] [- Modality] [- Scope] [- Speech Function] => Within scope [- Modality] illocutionary force [+ Scope]

Functional basis

Non-integration

Integration

5. Presupposition Construction 3, illustrated in (11) and (12) below, is distinct from construction 4 in that the secondary clause does not fall within the scope of the illocutionary force of the main clause, and is therefore not integrated into the speech act of the main clause. What the two constructions have in common, however, and what distinguishes them from constructions 1 and 2, is that the secondary clause does not have any modal value of its own. In this section, I will argue that the absence of modality in such structures is the functional principle behind the notion of presupposition that has traditionally been associated with subordinate clauses. (11)

(12)

Simon: When that happened, did you see that as indicative of exactly the kind of behavior you found it difficult to accept from white liberals, or Meredith: Yes, mo--mostly, that’s exactly right. (CB npr) But I want to create a picnic area where people can relax and view their property. After they have tackled the toll collectors, of course. (CB today)

146

Chapter 6: Function

5.1. Presupposition and modality Apart from the syntactic notion of constituency, the logical-pragmatic notion of presupposition is another principle that has often been associated with subordinate structures (see for instance Keenan 1971: 46–47; Winter 1982; Levinson 1983: 181–184; Nichols 1988). Keenan provides a logical definition of presupposition, using the criterion of constancy under negation: “A sentence S logically presupposes a sentence S’ just in case S logically implies S’ and the negation of S, ~S, also logically implies S’. In other words, the truth of S’ is a necessary condition on the truth or falsity of S.” (Keenan 1971: 45–46) Thus, for instance, the when-clause in structures like (13) below is not affected by negation in the main clause: negation in the main clause cannot negate the proposition that Mary called, as shown in (13a). The same also applies to other types of operators like modalization and interrogation: modalizing and interrogating the main clause does not modalize or interrogate the when-clause, as shown in (13b) and (13c). This is the rationale behind the idea that subordinate clauses are presupposed: they typically remain unaffected by truth-related operations like negation, modalization and interrogation in the main clause, and are therefore logically presupposed in the clause combination.36 (13)

John left when Mary called (Keenan 1971: 47) a. John didn’t leave when Mary called b. John must have left when Mary called. c. Did John leave when Mary called?

What these criteria actually show is that there is an asymmetry between the main clause John left and the secondary clause Mary called in terms of the discursive relevance of the truth question. As argued by McGregor (1988), propositions like Mary called are “out of the range of question of truth value, true or false” (1988: 61), whereas propositions like John left are “open to be assessed as either true or false, and so remain within the range of question” (1988: 61). In terms of the interpersonal typology, this distinction can be captured by the parameter of modality: presupposed status for a particular clause is reflected in the absence of modal values, whereas non-presupposed status is reflected in the presence of modal values. The system of modality is relevant to the problem of presupposition because it takes care of interactive positioning about the likelihood of the proposition in question, as has

Presupposition

147

been argued in Chapter 1. In this sense, presence versus absence of modality in a particular clause is a grammatical reflection of whether debate about likelihood is relevant to the proposition in that clause or not: clauses for which the question of likelihood is discursively relevant will have a modal value, whereas clauses for which this question is not relevant will not have any modal value. Thus, for instance, if we reconsider the structure discussed by Keenan in terms of the parameter of modality, this shows that there is an asymmetry between the main clause and the secondary clause in terms of modality: (14)

a. John left when Mary called. b. ?*John left when Mary may/might/must have called. c. John may/might/must have left when Mary called.

The fact that the secondary clause in (14a) does not allow marked modal values, as illustrated in (14b), is a grammatical reflection of the fact that the question of likelihood is not relevant to the proposition in question: the question whether Mary called or not is not at issue in this structure. Rather, what is at issue in this structure is whether John left at the time of Mary’s call or not, and this is grammatically reflected in the fact that the main clause does allow marked modal values, as illustrated in (14c). In this sense, the asymmetry between the presupposed secondary clause and the asserted main clause can be captured in terms of the divergent behaviour of the two clauses with respect to the interpersonal parameter of modality, which takes care of the question of likelihood. 5.2. Condition and reason A definition of presupposition in terms of modality is more generally applicable than the traditional logical conception of presupposition, because it can also account for a number of cases that are problematic for the logical definition, such as clauses of condition or reason. These structures are difficult to deal with in terms of the logical definition of presupposition, but they can be integrated naturally into the interpersonal definition. One problem for the logical definition of presupposition is that in a number of cases it is difficult to judge whether the secondary clause is logically presupposed, even using the criteria of interrogation or negation. Thus, for instance, it is hard to judge whether the speaker in (15a) below logically presupposes the proposition expressed in the because-clause, viz.

148

Chapter 6: Function

that Bob’s wife cheated on him (see also Karttunen 1973, Kempson 1975: 66–70, and more generally Levinson 1983: 191–198) on parallel problems with ‘factive’ clauses). (15)

a. Bob killed his wife because she cheated on him. b. Did Bob kill his wife because she cheated on him?

Even the criterion of interrogation does not give any decisive answer as it did with the when-clause in (13) above: it is not necessarily the case that the question in (15b) presupposes that Bob’s wife cheated on him. The problem with this structure is that the because-clause can be interpreted as describing the agent’s motivation for the action described in the main clause: in such an interpretation, it describes the content of the agent’s mind (‘he killed her because he thought she was cheating on him’). This may explain why this structure can cause problems for the logical definition of presupposition: the speaker in (15a) and (15b) does not necessarily presuppose that Bob’s wife cheated on him, but may just be representing the idea that motivated Bob to kill his wife. The interpersonal definition of presupposition in terms of the absence of modality, on the other hand, can capture both the parallelism between the because-clause in (15) and the when-clause in (14) above, as well as the difference. The because-clause in (15) is not subject to speaker-interlocutor positioning about likelihood, just like the when-clause in (14), but for a different reason. Unlike the when-clause in (14), the because-clause in (15) does allow subjective modal verbs, as shown in (16) below, but if it represents the agent’s motivation such modals will be related to the agent rather than to the interaction between speaker and interlocutor (see further in Chapter 5, Section 1.2 where this type of structure was discussed in more detail). This implies that in spite of the difference between the becauseclause and the when-clause, the net effect is the same for the two structures: the modal positions that do occur in the because-clause do not figure in speaker-interlocutor interaction but are related to a third party. In this sense, the modal definition of presupposition does not only incorporate problematic structures like the clauses of reason in (15), but it can also explain why such structures behave differently with respect to the traditional logical definition (see further in Verstraete 2006 for cross-linguistic evidence to this effect). (16)

Bob killed his wife because she might have cheated on him.

Presupposition

149

The interpersonal approach to presupposition also allows one to deal with conditional structures, which are equally problematic for the logical definition. As argued in Givón (1982: 101–102), it is difficult to regard a conditional clause as being logically presupposed. Conditional structures like (17) below do not presuppose the proposition of their if-clause: the speaker in (17) does not presuppose that Roger Clemens will actually come back to the team. Instead, conditionals operate with suppositions (Declerck and Reed 2001), in that they suspend any commitment to the truth of the proposition (see also Dancygier 1998: 18–20): the speaker in (17) merely operates on the supposition that Roger Clemens would come back. (17)

One player could make a great big differences over there in the American League, and that’s pitcher Roger Clemens of the Red Sox, who’s got the sore shoulder. If he can come back and win, then Boston has a chance, but Toronto right now leading plus one seems on its way. (CB npr)

In terms of the interpersonal typology, on the other hand, conditional structures can equally be described in terms of the absence of modal values. As with the clauses of reason, conditional clauses do allow subjective modal verbs, but in conditional contexts these are echoic resumptions of positions taken in the preceding discourse rather than interpersonal positions in the current interaction between speaker and interlocutor (see Chapter 1, Section 2.2.1). In this sense, they are taken out of the range of speaker-interlocutor positioning about likelihood just like the when-clause in (14), but again for a different reason. In conclusion, therefore, the interpersonal definition of presupposition can capture the two categories that are problematic for the logical definition of presupposition, and at the same time also explain why they are problematic. Conditionals and clauses of reason are characterized by the absence of interactive positioning about likelihood just like the when-clause above, but the motivation is different: conditionals are not subject to modal positioning in speaker-interlocutor interaction because they operate with suppositions, and clauses of reason are not subject to modal positioning in interaction because they are bound to the agent of the main clause rather than to the speaker or the interlocutor.

150

Chapter 6: Function

5.3. Challengeability and foregrounding Given that the constructions of reason and condition cannot be captured by the logical definition of presupposition, it is actually more appropriate to use a rhetorical term like (un)challengeability, proposed in Givón (1982: 101–102), as an alternative to the logic-based term of presupposition: what structures like (14)-(17) above have in common is that their secondary clause is not construed as being open to challenge by the interlocutor, and can therefore be regarded as unchallengeable. If we look at the interpersonal typology in terms of the parameter of modality, the dividing line between constructions with challengeable and non-challengeable secondary clauses lies between constructions 2 and 3. In constructions 3 and 4, the main clause has a modal value and the secondary clause does not. This means that rhetorically only the main clause in examples like (18) and (19) is open to challenge and the secondary clause is not: what is interpersonally at issue in these structures is whether the children showed interest in reading before nursery school in (18) and whether progress has been made in (19), but not whether they did go to nursery school in (18) or whether the talks began in (19). (18) (19)

and did they show interest erm in reading before they went to nursery school? (CB ukspok) Talks on ending the war in Bosnia continue in Geneva. Since they began over the weekend, little progress has been reported. (CB npr)

In constructions 1 and 2, on the other hand, illustrated respectively in (20) and (21) below, both the main clause and the secondary clause have a modal value, which implies that both propositions in the clause combination are open to challenge. In (21), for instance, both the significance of the disagreements and the explanation in terms of a possible conflict between family and physician are open to challenge, just as Evans’ role in putting the treasure in the tower and his awareness that it is modern are both open to challenge in (20).37 (20)

He was quite angry at me for coming to his house before eight o’clock, but he finally told me that the ring had been made less than five years ago! The whole treasure was modern. Evans must have brought it to the tower himself, and he must have known it was all modern. (CB ukbooks)

Presupposition

(21)

151

Clinicians should ask if there is any disagreement about chronicity within the family or between the family and health-care team and how these different viewpoints are being handled. Such disagreements are significant since they may signal that the family is not accepting the physician’s perspective or that dysfunctional conflicts exist within the family. (CB usbooks)

As argued in Givón (1982: 101), the distinction between challengeable and non-challengeable information can be further linked to the issue of foreground and background status, which is another distinction that has often been associated with coordination and subordination (see for instance Townsend and Bever 1977; Talmy 1978; Tomlin 1985; McKay 1988). If a clause is open to challenge by the interlocutor, this implies that the proposition in this clause takes a more central position in speaker-interlocutor interaction than when it is not open to challenge. In this sense, the secondary clause in structures like (18) and (19) is backgrounded relative to the main clause, whereas main clause and secondary clause are both foregrounded in structures like (20) and (21). In the following chapter (Section 5), I will show that this connection with foregrounding and backgrounding is also confirmed grammatically by the divergent availability of main clause phenomena like negative adverb preposing or VP preposing (Green 1976). 5.4. Conclusion Table 19 summarizes the interpersonal conception of presupposition in terms of the parameter of modality. The secondary clause in constructions 3 and 4 is characterized by the absence of modality, which implies that modal positioning about likelihood is not interactively relevant to this proposition: it is rhetorically not open to challenge and therefore in traditional terms presupposed. The secondary clause in constructions 1 and 2, on the other hand, is characterized by the presence of modality: this implies that epistemic positioning about likelihood is interactively relevant to this proposition, and that it is therefore open to challenge and debate.

152

Chapter 6: Function

Table 19. Presupposition and challengeability

1 2 3 4

Interpersonal properties [+ Speech Function] [+ Modality] [- Scope] => Modal value [- Speech Function] [+ Modality] [- Scope] [- Speech Function] [- Modality] [- Scope] => No modal value [- Speech Function] [- Modality] [+ Scope]

Functional basis

Challengeable

Unchallengeable (Presupposed)

Comparing table 19 with table 18 from the previous section further also shows that the two definitions of subordination in terms of integration and in terms of presupposition do not correspond, but define two distinct categories: construction 4 is characterized by unchallengeability and integration, whereas construction 3 is characterized by unchallengeability and non-integration. The combination of unchallengeability with integration implies that the unchallengeable proposition is part of the propositional content for the speech act in the main clause. The combination with nonintegration, on the other hand, implies that the unchallengeable proposition is independent from the speech act of the main clause and does different types of discourse-organizational work for that speech act, as I will illustrate in more detail in Chapter 10. 6. Equality versus inequality Constructions 1 and 2, illustrated respectively in (22) and (23) below, are distinct from constructions 3 and 4 in that their secondary clause has a modal value: in terms of the analysis in the previous section, this implies that both the main clause and the secondary clause in (22) and (23) represent challengeable propositions.

Equality versus inequality

(22)

(23)

153

Deng’s successors have given little indication of whether they would allow more political freedom in China, and they will probably keep silent on the issue until Deng and the other party elders pass from the scene. (CB npr) I am not, says the Prince of Wales, halfway through his muchhyped documentary, very good at being a performing monkey. This is helpful information, since by then we may have been under the impression that our future monarch was beginning to execute a remarkable impersonation of the breed. (CB today)

The two constructions are not entirely equivalent, however. Construction 1 is distinct from construction 2 in terms of the parameter of speech function: the and-clause in (22) has a speech functional value, whereas the since-clause in (23) does not. This implies that the two constructions have distinct illocutionary structures: the construction in (22) has a balanced illocutionary structure because its main clause and its secondary clause both represent full speech acts, whereas the construction in (23) has an unbalanced illocutionary structure because its secondary clause does not represent a full speech act. Because of this imbalance, construction 2 is distinct from construction 1 and groups together with constructions 3 and 4, which equally have an imbalanced illocutionary structure with a secondary clause that does not represent a full speech act. In this section, I will argue that the distinction in illocutionary structure between construction 1 and constructions 2, 3 and 4 is the interpersonal principle behind the ‘equality of status’ and the ‘independence’ that have traditionally been associated with the conjuncts in coordinate structures. Most authors seem to agree that equality and independence are the two most general features that distinguish coordinate structures from subordinate ones: the conjuncts in coordinate structures are equal in status, whereas the conjuncts in subordinate structures are unequal in status, as argued for instance in Lyons (1968: 178), Quirk et al. (1985: 987) and Halliday (1994: 221). Compare the definition provided by Halliday: “Parataxis is the linking of elements of equal status. Both the initiating and the continuing element are free, in the sense that each could stand as a functioning whole. Hypotaxis is the binding of elements of unequal status. The dominant element is free, but the dependent element is not.” (1994: 221) The distinction between equal and unequal status is further supported in the literature with a number of grammatical criteria: subordinate clauses can occur both before and after their main clause (Greenbaum 1969: 31;

154

Chapter 6: Function

Quirk et al. 1985: 927–928; Halliday 1994: 222–223), and in related Germanic languages like German or Dutch they trigger clause-final position of the finite verb rather than the normal clause-second position (see further in Chapter 7, Sections 2 and 6). It is not clear, however, how these grammatical criteria relate to the functional notions of ‘equality’ and ‘independence’, nor is the precise functional basis of the notions themselves further specified. From the perspective of the proposed typology, the equality and independence that have traditionally been associated with coordinate structures can be defined in terms of interpersonal organization. The conjuncts in construction 1 are equal in interpersonal terms, as illustrated in (22) above: both conjuncts have their own illocutionary force, based on the presence of modal and speech functional values. The other constructions in the typology, on the other hand, are fundamentally unequal in interpersonal terms, because they are characterized by absence of illocutionary force in one of the conjuncts: the secondary clause lacks either a speech functional value (as in construction 2) or a modal and a speech functional value (as in constructions 3 and 4). This interpersonal account of the distinction can also explain why the conjuncts in coordinate structures are considered to be equivalent to independent non-combined clauses (compare Halliday 1994: 221: “each could stand as a functioning whole”). Illocutionary force is a necessary prerequisite for independent use of a structure in discourse, as argued in Chapter 2 (Section 4). In this sense, the clause combination in construction 1 is functionally equivalent to an asyndetic juxtaposition of clauses, in which both clauses by definition have their own illocutionary force. The two constructions differ only in terms of presence versus absence of a conjunction, but crucially not in terms of interpersonal structure: in both cases, the conjuncts are equal and independent in that each has an illocutionary force of its own. Thus, the distinction in illocutionary structure between construction 1 and constructions 2, 3 and 4 in the typology can be regarded as the functional principle behind the distinction between the equality/independence of the conjuncts in coordination and the inequality/dependence of the conjuncts in subordination, as summarized in table 20. In the following chapter (Sections 2 and 6), I will provide further arguments for interpersonal basis of this distinction, by showing how the difference in illocutionary structure can also explain why the grammatical criteria proposed in the literature (clause ordering and the related word order phenomena in German and Dutch) can be used to make this distinction.

Equality versus inequality

155

Table 20. Equality versus inequality

1 2 3 4

Interpersonal properties [+ Speech Function] [+ Modality] => Illocutionary Force [- Scope] [- Speech Function] [+ Modality] [- Scope] [- Speech Function] => No Illocutionary [- Modality] Force [- Scope] [- Speech Function] [- Modality] [+ Scope]

Functional basis Equality / Independence of the conjuncts

Inequality / Dependence of the conjuncts

If we compare table 20 with tables 18 and 19 above, this shows again that a definition of subordination in terms of inequality does not correspond with the definitions in terms of in terms of integration and unchallengeability, but defines an additional category. All constructions in which the secondary clause is integrated and/or unchallengeable are by definition also interpersonally unequal, but not all interpersonally unequal constructions have secondary clauses that are integrated and/or unchallengeable: this is shown by construction 2, where the secondary clause is challengeable and not integrated. In this sense, construction 2 represents a third type of subordination, with a secondary clause that is a challengeable proposition independent from the speech act of the main clause, but that still does not constitute a full speech act because of the absence of a speech functional value. This type of structure has been recognized as problematic by Matthiessen and Thompson (1988), who argue for examples like (24) below that “there seem to be no circumstances under which it would be appropriate to call the as-clause […] ‘unchallengeable’, let alone known; yet it is clearly a hypotactic clause”. (1988: 315) (24)

Someone left a coffee cup in my office over the weekend. Would the owner please come and get it as I think things are starting to grow? (Matthiessen and Thompson 1988: 315)

In terms of the interpersonal typology, such ‘hybrid’ construction types can be accounted for because of the separation of the parameter of speech

156

Chapter 6: Function

function, which takes care of illocutionary force, from the parameter of modality, which takes care of challengeability. The as-clause in (24) is neutralized for speech function, but not for modality, because it allows marked modal values,38 as has been shown in Chapter 4 (Section 3). This implies that it is possible to have structures like the as-clause in (24) which are challengeable propositions but still do not constitute full speech acts and are therefore not fully equal to their main clause. If we maintain the hypothesis that foregrounded status in interaction relates to interpersonal status (see Section 5.3), such structures could also be said to represent an intermediate degree of foregrounding in interaction. They belong to the foreground of interaction because they are subject to modal positioning and therefore open to challenge by the interlocutor, but within the clause combination they are less prominent than their main clause, which has a full interpersonal structure and therefore constitutes a full speech act. 7. Terminology I will now use the comparison between the different construction types in the typology and the functional generalizations in the literature in order to propose a more informative terminological framework for the typology than the numbering used in table 17 above. In general, I will retain the traditional terminology of coordination and subordination as the basis for labelling the different constructions: I do not consider the traditional distinction between coordination and subordination to be wrong in the case of English, but merely incomplete. As shown in the previous section, the category traditionally called subordination covers constructions 2, 3, and 4 in the typology. These are different categories with rather different functional and grammatical characteristics, but they have one very basic feature in common that distinguishes them from construction 1: the distinction between equal and unequal status of the conjuncts. In construction 1, both conjuncts have modal and speech functional values of their own and are therefore balanced in terms of illocutionary structure, whereas in constructions 2, 3, and 4 the secondary conjunct lacks at least a speech functional value, which implies that the construction is imbalanced in terms of illocutionary structure. This is what justifies the basic label of subordination for constructions 2, 3, and 4 as opposed to coordination for construction 1: further distinctions within the subordinate category will be made using additional labels. In the following chapter, I will argue that the choice to make the primary terminological cut

Conclusion

157

between construction 1 and constructions 2, 3 and 4 is also justified from a grammatical perspective. I will show that the basic grammatical criteria used to test for inequality (preposability, and the word order marking in German and Dutch) also set apart construction 1 from constructions 2, 3 and 4. In spite of the shared feature of interpersonal inequality that distinguishes the subordinate category as a whole from the coordinate category, subordination is not a unitary category in English. The discussion in the previous sections has shown that it is necessary to distinguish between at least three types of subordination: one where the secondary clause is integrated into the speech act of the main clause, one where the secondary clause is an unchallengeable proposition accompanying the speech act performed in the main clause, and one where the secondary clause is a challengeable proposition accompanying the speech act performed in the main clause. In order to do justice to these distinctions within the subordinate category, it is necessary to provide a number of additional labels, based on the feature that distinguishes the different types from each other. Constructions 3 and 4 are identical except for their values for the parameter of scope, and will therefore be referred to respectively as free and bound subordination, following the terminology used in Chafe (1984: 437–438) for the intonational phenomena that mark the distinction in scope structure. Construction 2 is distinct from both 3 and 4 in terms of its value for the parameter of modality, and will therefore be referred to as modal subordination. Figure 3 summarizes the proposed terminological distinctions: Coordination

Construction 1

Subordination Modal

Free

Bound

Construction 2

Construction 3

Construction 4

Figure 3. Terminological distinctions

8. Conclusion In this chapter, I have tried to show that it makes sense functionally to describe complex sentences in terms of the parameters of interpersonal

158

Chapter 6: Function

grammar proposed in the previous two chapters. I have tried to argue this point from two different perspectives. One perspective has been to focus on the proposed typology as such, and to show that the interpersonal basis of the typology provides an internally coherent functional framework for the analysis of clause combining. Given that the interpersonal parameters represent different grammatical aspects of the illocutionary force of the simple clause, the different combinations of parameters that define the construction types in the typology represent differences in illocutionary structure for the complex sentence. A complex sentence construction can consist of (i) two separate speech acts – when both conjuncts have their own modal and speech functional values, or (ii) one speech act encompassing the entire clause combination – when one conjunct falls within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the other, or (iii) one speech act restricted to the main conjunct and accompanied by a conjunct that is not a full speech act – when one conjunct does not have a full interpersonal structure on its own but still does not fall within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the other. The last category can be further subdivided into two subcategories: a subcategory that is closer to the two-speech act category because its secondary clause represents a challengeable proposition and is therefore part of the foreground of interaction, and a subcategory that is closer to the one-speech act category because its secondary clause represents an unchallengeable proposition and is therefore part of the background of interaction. A complementary perspective has been to show that the interpersonal basis does not only ensure the internal functional coherence of the typology, but that it can also integrate and explain some of the functional generalizations that have been proposed in the literature on clause combining, such as integration (Jespersen 1924; Brøndal 1972 [1937]; Foley and Van Valin 1994; Hopper and Traugott 2003), presupposition (Keenan 1971; Winter 1982), unchallengeability (Givón 1982) or equality of status (Lyons 1976; Quirk et al. 1985; Halliday 1994). I have argued that most of these functional generalizations can be associated with a particular constructional distinction in the typology, as summarized in table 21.

Conclusion

159

Table 21. Functional generalizations as they relate to the interpersonal typology

Interpersonal parameters

Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

[+ Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [- Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [- Mod] [+ Scope]

Equal status of the conjuncts

Challengeable status of the secondary conjunct

Integration secondary conjunct into speech act main conjunct

+

+

-

-

+

-

-

-

-

-

-

+

The equality of status traditionally associated with coordination can be related to equality in interpersonal status, viz. the fact that both conjuncts in the complex sentence have their own modal and speech functional values. The integration traditionally associated with subordination can be related to integration into the interpersonal structure of the main clause, more particularly the fact that the secondary conjunct falls within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the main conjunct. The unchallengeability that is also traditionally associated with subordination, finally, can be related to the absence of modal values in the secondary conjunct. The association with the different construction types in the typology shows that the traditional functional generalizations can be unified and explained by taking the interpersonal perspective on clause combining proposed in this study. One important consequence of this is that the notorious vagueness surrounding some of these concepts can be resolved in terms of the grammatical parameters that define the construction types. The connection with explicit criteria like modality, speech function and scope allows for a clearer, grammatically based definition of often rather vaguely used notions like presupposition, integration or challengeability. Equally importantly, however, the fact that each of these concepts can be associated with a different construction type in the typology also shows that they do

160

Chapter 6: Function

not simply represent different perspectives on one and the same contrast between coordination and subordination, as they have often been regarded, but represent different phenomena related to different aspects of interpersonal grammar.

Chapter 7 Motivating the typology: Grammar

1. Introduction As mentioned in Chapter 4, the different parameters of interpersonal grammar that form the basis of the proposed typology have already been used in one form or other in previous analyses of clause combining. Usually, however, the interpersonal criteria are not accorded any special analytical status, but rather belong to a larger pool of grammatical phenomena, including criteria like clefting, preposing, wh-questioning, main clause phenomena, integrated versus non-integrated intonation etc. So the question remains: why should the interpersonal parameters rather than these other criteria be used as the basis for setting up a typology of clause combining constructions? The previous chapter has provided one perspective on this question, by showing that it makes sense functionally to take the interpersonal criteria as the basis for the typology: the shared interpersonal basis of the criteria provides an internally coherent framework for the analysis of clause combining, and can also form a grammatical ‘backbone’ for the different functional generalizations that have been proposed in the literature. In this chapter, I will take another perspective on the question of basicness of the interpersonal parameters, by directly investigating their relation to the various other grammatical criteria that have been used in the analysis of clause combining. I will show that these other criteria neatly follow the constructional distinctions defined by the interpersonal parameters: the categories they define systematically correspond to specific construction types or groups of construction types in the typology outlined in Chapter 5. The existence of such systematic correspondences clearly suggests some kind of relation to the interpersonal parameters. In order to explain the existence of such correspondences, however, I will also look at the mechanism behind the other criteria, by asking the question why the criteria work the way they do. This will show that most of these criteria can actually be explained as epiphenomena of the interpersonal parameters: upon closer investigation of how precisely they categorize complex sentences, most of them turn out to rely implicitly on one or more of the parameters of interpersonal grammar.

162

Chapter 7: Grammar

Both the indirectly interpersonal nature of the other criteria and their systematic correspondence with the interpersonally based categorizations show that the notion of interpersonal grammar is basic in the grammatical analysis of clause combining in English. Taking the interpersonal parameters as the basis for the typology, therefore, also does justice to their fundamental position in the grammar of clause combining. In the following sections of this chapter, I will investigate a number of often-used grammatical criteria for clause combining, both in terms of the way they relate to the categories in the interpersonally based typology, and the way the mechanism behind these criteria can be related to interpersonal factors. 2. Preposability Preposing has often been proposed as a criterion for distinguishing between coordination and subordination in English, for instance in Greenbaum (1969: 31), Quirk et al. (1985: 927–928) and Halliday (1994: 222–223). The basic argument is that subordinate clauses can occur both before and after their main clause, as shown for the after-clause in (1), whereas coordinate clauses can only occur after it, as shown for the but-clause in (2). (1)

(2)

a. Their legal people got on to us after they spotted our fans wearing Oasis T-shirts. (CB today) b. After we had shared a carafe of frozen vodka, things started to look up. (CB ukmags) a. I majored in economics in college, but I did do a lot of amateur theater in Philadelphia (CB npr) b. *But I did a lot of amateur theater in Philadelphia, I majored in economics in college.

If we compare the categorization of conjunctions based on the criterion of preposing with the categories in the interpersonal typology – summarized respectively in tables 22a and 22b below – we can see that it corresponds very closely to the distinction between coordination and the different types of subordination. All of the conjunctions in the subordinate categories in table 22b allow preposing, and most of the conjunctions in the coordinate category in table 22b do not allow preposing. There is one exception to the general correspondence between the two categorizations: the conjunctions because and although can be coordinate, but they can also

Preposability

163

be preposed. This is only an apparent exception, however. As conjunctions, because and although do not have any inherent restrictions on preposing like for instance and or but, but this does not mean that the same applies to the constructions associated with them: because and although are different from and, or, but and for in that they allow both coordinate and subordinate constructions, as has been shown in Chapter 4 (Section 2). On this constructional level, the apparent conflict between coordinate status and preposability disappears: as I will show in the rest of this section, coordinate because and although cannot be preposed without losing the specific semantic and constructional characteristics associated with their coordinate status. Table 22a. Categorization on the basis of preposing Preposing impossible and, or, but, for

Preposing possible after, before, when, since, as, while, whereas, if, because, so that, although, once, until

Table 22b. Interpersonal categorization Coordination and, or, but, for, because, although

Different types of subordination after, before, when, since, as, while, whereas, if, because, so that, although, once, until

2.1. Preposing and the parameter of speech function The general correspondence between the two categorizations of course raises the question why the criterion of preposing can be used to make the distinction between the coordinate and subordinate construction types in the typology. The question of explanation has been addressed by Halliday (1994: 222–223), who explains this criterion in terms of the dominantdependent organization of subordinate constructions: given that main clause and subordinate clause are inherently ranked as dominant and dependent, the two clauses can appear in any surface order without affecting this dominance-dependence organization. This type of explanation merely shifts the problem, however, because it does not explain how the ’dominant’ and ‘dependent’ status of main and subordinate clause can be determined independently from their ability to occur in any surface order.

164

Chapter 7: Grammar

What we need is an independent feature that can connect the notions of ‘dominant’ and ‘dependent’ with the formal criterion of preposability. The relevant independent feature that can explain the connection between preposing and subordination is the interpersonal parameter of speech function. Preposing provides a special constructional context that is inherently characterized by the absence of speech functional values that also characterizes the different types of subordination in the typology. Preposed adverbial clauses do not allow any non-declarative clause types, as shown for instance by the ungrammaticality of the interrogative structures in (3b) and (4b) below. (3)

(4)

a. Whereas Thompson still receives a substantial income from commercial interests, Kruger has to go out to work for a living to support his wife and one-year-old daughter. (CB today) b. *Whereas does(n’t) Thompson still receive a substantial income from commercial interests, Kruger has to go out to work for a living to support his wife and one-year-old daughter. a. Before the Persian Gulf crisis sent oil prices soaring, the US economy was already weakening while Japan and Europe were experiencing rapid growth. (CB npr) b. *Before did(n’t) the Persian Gulf crisis send oil prices soaring, the US economy was already weakening while Japan and Europe were experiencing rapid growth.

In fact, the strongest evidence for the association between preposing and absence of speech functional values comes from the apparently problematic cases of because and although mentioned above. In postposed position, because- and although-clauses can occur with non-declarative clause types, as illustrated in (5) and (6) below, which implies that they can have a speech functional value. In preposed position, on the other hand, becauseclauses and although-clauses never allow any non-declarative clause types and therefore do not have any speech functional value, as shown by the unacceptability of the interrogative structures in (5b), (6b) and (7b). The fact that preposing blocks non-declarative clause types for conjunctions that do not have any inherent restriction on non-declarative clause types can be regarded as evidence for the fact that the absence of speech functional values is a constructional property that is associated with the preposed slot rather than with the particular conjunctions associated with it.

Preposability

(5)

(6)

(7)

165

a. The shamed ex-spy, freed early after serving 14 years for offering secrets to the Russians, said: “I want to chill out and get used to freedom. Then I want to look for a job. I would consider anything, even being a postman – after all, a job’s a job. I have to consider anything because who is going to employ me?” (CB sunnow) b. *Because who is going to employ me, I have to consider anything. a. Johnny Depp was very good, although why did he have to have an Irish accent? (IC) b. *Although why did he have to have an Irish accent, Johnny Depp was very good. a. Many of the elderly are already paying as much as 50 percent of their incomes on health care. Take 73-year-old Julia Davis. Because Medicare doesn’t pay for prescription drugs, she’s already had to cut back. (CB npr) b. *Because does(n’t) Medicare pay for prescription drugs, she’s already had to cut back.

In conclusion, we can say that the usefulness of preposing as a criterion for the distinction between coordinate and subordinate construction types can be explained in terms of an underlying interpersonal feature: the preposed construction is inherently associated with the absence of speech functional values that characterizes the different types of subordination. This implies that it can be used as a formal criterion to distinguish between coordinate and subordinate conjunctions, and to disambiguate where the two possibilities are available: if a secondary clause can occur in preposed position, this shows that it is possible to construe this clause as [- Speech Function]. 2.2. Preposing and the parameter of scope There is in fact a further constructional characteristic of preposing, which relates to the parameter of scope. Preposed clauses generally take the value [- Scope]: they cannot fall within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of their main clause.39 Consider examples (8) and (9):

166 (8)

(9)

Chapter 7: Grammar

a. Douglas told me Ginger was seeing another man. After he died, I went back to Ginger. (CB ukbooks) b. After he died, did you go back to Ginger? c. Did you go back to Ginger after he died? a. Saicho, too, was anxious to learn the secret teachings, and while he was in China, he received some sort of an initiation. (CB ukbooks) b. While he was in China, he must have received some sort of an initiation. c. He must have received some sort of an initiation while he was in China.

Both examples represent preposed subordinate clauses. The b-structures illustrate the effect of interrogation and modalization with the preposed configuration, and the c-structures illustrate the effect with the postposed counterpart of the original configuration. Comparing the effect of modalization and interrogation for the preposed (8b and 9b) and postposed (8c and 9c) configurations shows that preposed subordinate clauses do not fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of their main clause. For the postposed structures in (8c) and (9c), interrogation and modalization marked on the main clause can easily take the secondary clause as their focus, with the main clause as presupposition. In that interpretation, the question in (8c) is not whether or not the interlocutor went back to see Ginger, but rather whether this happened after Douglas died; similarly, the conclusion in (9c) is not that Saicho received initiation, but rather that this happened while he was in China. This type of interpretation is not available for the corresponding preposed structures in (8b) and (9b): in these cases, the focus of interrogation and modalization remains restricted to the main clause. The speaker in (8b) asks whether or not the interlocutor did go back to Ginger, with the after-clause providing a discursive background for that question, and the speaker in (9b) concludes that Saicho did receive initiation, again with the while-clause providing a discursive background for that conclusion (see further in Chapter 10 on the role of subordinate clauses like (8b) and (9b) as discursive background for their main clause). Thus, the preposed construction does not only incorporate the value [- Speech Function], but also the value [- Scope]. The association with [- Scope] implies that preposing as a construction correlates only with modal subordination and free subordination, both of which have the values [- Speech Function] and [- Scope], but not with bound subordination, which has the value [+ Scope]. This also explains why preposing can serve as an

Clefting and wh-questioning

167

overt marker of the distinction between free and bound subordination – as already indicated in Chapter 4 (Section 4): bound and free subordination are different only in terms of their values for the parameter of scope. Table 23. Preposing and the interpersonal typology Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

Speech Function +

Scope -

-

-

-

+

Preposing

3. Clefting and wh-questioning The criteria of clefting and wh-questioning have mainly been used as indications of integration of the secondary clause in the main clause (Greenbaum 1969: 21–22; Quirk et al. 1985: 1071–1072). The argument seems to be that clefting and especially wh-questioning are basically clause-internal phenomena, and therefore provide a good way to test the integration of a secondary clause into the main clause. If a secondary clause can occur in a cleft construction or if it can answer to a wh-question, as is the case for when in (10a-c) below, this shows that it is structurally integrated into its main clause; impossibility of clefting or wh-questioning, on the other hand, shows that the secondary clause is not integrated into its main clause, as illustrated for whereas in (11a-c) below. (10)

(11)

a. Dr Church noticed the healing power of maggots when he treated a man who was found in a ditch three days after his car crashed with swarms of maggots infesting deep cuts. (CB oznews) b. When did Dr Church notice the healing power of maggots? c. It was when he was turning to climb back into the pickup that he saw the owl. (CB usbooks) a. Michael Lerner (1969) called this hostility toward White ethnics respectable bigotry. Polish jokes are acceptable, whereas anti-Black humor is considered in poor taste. (CB usbooks) b. [No wh-alternative available]

168

Chapter 7: Grammar

c. *It is whereas anti-black humor is considered in poor taste that Polish jokes are acceptable. Functional generalizations like ‘integration’ are not very helpful, however, unless it is specified which grammatical phenomena they actually refer to, as has repeatedly been stressed in the previous chapter. In this section, I will show that the grammatical phenomenon behind the ‘integration’ indicated by clefting and wh-questioning is actually the interpersonal parameter of scope: secondary clauses that allow clefting and whquestioning fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of their main clause. 3.1. Clefting and wh-questioning as focusing constructions Clefting and wh-questioning are related to the parameter of scope in that they are both focusing constructions. The system of focus-presupposition has so far (see Chapters 3 and 4) mainly been described in terms of its prosodic realization, but there are also other construction types which serve to focus on a particular part of a clausal structure, such as clefting and whquestioning. As with the prosodic realization of focus, the focusing aspect of these constructions can equally be linked up with the parameter of scope: I will argue in this section that the potential for a secondary clause to occur in a cleft construction or to respond to a wh-question reflects a position within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause. Wh-questions are characterized by a focus-presupposition structure in which the wh-element serves as focus for the interrogative, and the rest of the clause serves as presupposition for this focus (see, for instance, Levinson 1983: 184; Declerck 1988: 6–7; Dik 1997b: 264–265; see also Chapter 3, Section 2.1). Thus, for instance, a structure like the why-question in (12) presupposes that the talks broke up early and focuses on why this was the case. (12)

Siegel: Now these talks were due to continue for another day. Why did they break up early? Gjelten: They broke up because the Bosnian government delegation really brought the negotiations to a head. (CB npr)

Wh-questions like the why-question in (12) also impose this focuspresupposition organization on their expected reply. The element in the

Clefting and wh-questioning

169

reply that corresponds to the wh-element will serve as the focus of the assertion, with the remainder of the structure as a presupposition. The because-clause in (12), for instance, serves as the focus of the assertion, with the main clause as a presupposition (‘that is why the talks broke up’). The connection with focus-presupposition organization implies that the criterion of wh-questioning can be interpreted in interpersonal terms: if a secondary clause can serve as a reply to a wh-question, this shows that it can serve as focus for the speech act encoded in its main clause, and thus falls within the scope of this speech act. In this sense, availability of whquestioning for a secondary clause indicates a value of [+ Scope] for that clause. Conversely, if a secondary clause cannot serve as a reply to a whquestion, as in (13a) below, or if it does not have any corresponding whelement,40 as in (13b), this shows that it cannot serve as focus for the speech act in its main clause and therefore takes a value of [- Scope]. (13)

a. The man with the golden tonsils is retiring – after he’s covered his eighth World Cup, that is. ≠ When is the man with the golden tonsils retiring? b. The prayer took place quietly, although afterwards separate processions of men and women marched and chanted slogans. (CB npr) ≠ ??? did the prayer take place quietly?

The criterion of clefting can equally be interpreted in terms of focuspresupposition structure, and can therefore also be regarded as a specific manifestation of the interpersonal parameter of scope. A cleft construction, like the one in (14) below, singles out a specific element as focus and assigns presupposed status to the rest of the clause (see, for instance, Levinson 1983: 182–183; Declerck 1988: 10; Dik 1997b: 291–312). As with wh-questioning, this focus-presupposition structure is linked to the interpersonal structure of the clause. Thus, for instance, the cleft element Klinsmann in (14) is the focus of the assertion encoded in the indicative declarative, and Ander in (15) is the focus of the question encoded by the interrogative. (14) (15)

Cole might have improved on that aspect of his play, but he is not in Sheringham’s class as a linkman, even though at Tottenham it is Klinsmann who has adopted the target role. (CB today) “Was it Ander who convinced her not to take any of us?” asked Berkli, returning to his own line of thought. (CB ukbooks)

170

Chapter 7: Grammar

Given this link with interpersonal structure, a cleft construction can be said to form one single speech act, with the element in the cleft functioning as its focus and the remainder of the construction as presupposition. If a specific clause combination can occur in a cleft construction, therefore, this implies that it is structurally possible to construe main clause and secondary clause as falling within the scope of one single speech act, with the secondary clause as focus. This is the case in (16) below, where the because-clause is construed as focus of the assertion with the main clause as a presupposition. Conversely, if a specific clause combination cannot occur in a cleft construction, this implies that it is structurally impossible to construe main clause and secondary clause as falling within the scope of one single speech act, as in (17) below. (16)

(17)

Saturday night was date night, but not for the three of us. Three friends--Lynette, April and me. Maybe it was because the combined freckle count was in the billions that our phones didn’t ring. (CB npr) a. He threw stuff off the desk, threw chairs around and got as far as the bookcase. He was swearing. I feared for my safety for he was trying to tear my office apart. (CB today) b. *It is for he was trying to tear my office apart that I feared for my safety.

In conclusion, therefore, both the criterion of clefting and the criterion of wh-interrogation can be interpreted as indirect manifestations of the parameter of scope. If a secondary clause can serve as an answer a whquestion or as the focus of a cleft construction, this shows that it be construed as one single speech act with the main clause. If this is not the case, this reflects a structural restriction on single-speech act construal. 3.2. Comparison of the resulting categorizations The analysis of clefting and wh-questioning in terms of the parameter of scope is actually confirmed if we compare the categorization of conjunctions based on the criteria with the categorization of conjunctions based on the parameter of scope, represented respectively in tables 24a and 24b below. Bound subordination is the only construction in the typology that is characterized by the value [+ Scope], but it defines the same set of conjunctions as free subordination: free subordination simply provides a [- Scope]

Clefting and wh-questioning

171

alternative for the conjunctions in the bound subordinate category. If we take this into account, the analysis of the previous section would predict that the conjunctions in the bound (and free) subordinate category allow clefting and wh-questioning, whereas the conjunctions in the other two categories do not allow it. Table 24a. Categorization on the basis of clefting and wh-questioning Clefting and wh-questioning impossible and, or, but, for, whereas, although

Clefting and wh-questioning possible after, before, when, since, as, so that, while, if, because, once, until

Table 24b. Interpersonal categorization Coordination and modal subordination Free and bound subordination and, or, but, for, because, although, after, before, when, since, as, so that, whereas, so that, when, while, since, as while, if, because, once, until

If we compare tables 24a and 24b, we find more or less the predicted situation: all conjunctions in the bound (and free) subordinate category allow clefting and wh-questioning, and most of the conjunctions in the modal subordinate and coordinate categories do not allow clefting and whquestioning. There are six exceptions: clauses introduced by because, when, while, so that, since and as can all be clefted and wh-questioned, but they can also belong to the coordinate or modal subordinate categories. As with the criterion of preposing, however, these are only apparent exceptions: all of these conjunctions can be either coordinate/modal subordinate or bound subordinate, and as I will show in Chapter 8 they usually also have different meanings in these constructions. If we take this into account, the apparent exceptions can be accounted for: coordinate because and modal subordinate while, when, so that, as and since cannot be clefted and wh-questioned without losing their coordinate or modal subordinate status. Thus, for instance, modal subordinate while is different from its bound subordinate counterparts in that the former has a modal value of its own and expresses a contrastive relation, illustrated in (18a), whereas the latter has no modal value of its own and expresses a temporal relation, illustrated in (19a). Only the bound subordinate (19a) has a wh-questioned and a cleft alternative, as shown in (19b) and (19c). The modal subordinate (18a), on the other hand, cannot be wh-questioned or clefted without losing its contrastive semantics to temporal semantics. This will be further illustrated for the other polysemous conjunctions in Chapter 8 (Section 2).

172 (18)

(19)

Chapter 7: Grammar

a. As a reminder of how important burden-sharing is to the US Congress, the General Accounting Office released a report yesterday claiming that in the last Persian Gulf crisis during the Iran-Iraq war, the US bore the brunt of defending oil tankers, while other industrialized nations such as Japan and West Germany offered less help, even though they are more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than the US is. (CB npr) b. ≠ When did the US bear the brunt of defending oil tanks? c. ≠ It is while other industrialized nations offered less help that the US bore the brunt of defending oil tankers. a. He rang me from the lighthouse while he was waiting for the helicopter but I wasn’t there. (CB today) b. When did he ring you from the lighthouse? c. It is while he was waiting for the helicopter that he rang me from the lighthouse.

In summary, this means that the criteria of clefting and wh-questioning correlate with the bound subordinate construction in the typology. The free subordinate construction defines the same set of conjunctions, but in constructional terms it does not correlate with either clefting or whquestioning, because it is characterized by the value [- Scope]. Table 25. The criteria of clefting and wh-questioning Scope Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination

-

Bound subordination

+

Clefting Wh-questioning

4. Intonational integration Another formal parameter that frequently figures in analyses of clause combining is the distinction between intonational integration and nonintegration of the secondary clause into the main clause (see for instance Chafe 1984: 437–438; Haiman and Thompson 1984: 516; and Lehmann 1988: 192): several types of complex sentences can occur both in integrated and in non-integrated format. Thus, for instance, the after-clause in (20)

Intonational integration

173

and the because-clause in (21) are both pronounced as a separate intonation unit, following a clause-final falling intonation in the main clause, whereas their counterparts in the when-clause of (22) and the because-clause of (23) are integrated into the intonation unit of their main clause. (20) (21) (22) (23)

you’ll just have to make sure you clean your sh\eets# after that moose been j\izzling all over it# (COLT b142302.pro 57) was your tuck box l\ocked# because it was open when w\e went in# (COLT b142105.pro 456) n\o#, but the th\ings is#, they always l\augh#, they’re always l\aughing when they get on the train# (COLT b139201.pro 83) why’re they str\ong# and why’re they l\ight# no why they’re strong because they need to b-e#, they n-eed to# be held \up#, the bones need to be held \up# (COLT b136403.pro 112)

The availability of non-integrated intonation structures for conjunctions like because or when has led Chafe (1988: 17–21) to question the subordinate status of these conjunctions in the non-integrated configuration. On the basis of the fact that they allow non-integrated patterns just like coordinating conjunctions, Chafe argues that he “[has] found no clear reason why linkages expressed by connectives like because, when, and if should be regarded as any more subordinate than clauses introduced by and, except for the fact that they may anticipate as well as follow the clause to which they are explicitly linked” (1988: 20). In this section, I will show that the interpersonal typology allows one to capture the distinction between intonationally integrated structures like (22)-(23) and non-integrated structures like (20)-(21) on the basis of the parameter of scope, but also to differentiate within the non-integrated category on the basis of the other parameters in the typology (viz. modality and speech function). This will show that it is an overgeneralization to take the overt distinction of intonation as the only criterion to distinguish between coordination and subordination, as Chafe seems to assume: even in non-integrated configurations, because-, when-, if- and and-clauses can be further differentiated on the basis of their internal interpersonal structure, using the covert criteria of modality and speech function.

174

Chapter 7: Grammar

4.1. Intonation and scope If we look at the intonational criterion in terms of the proposed typology, the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation is obviously the most important formal marker for the different values of the interpersonal parameter of scope. As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 2), the focus-presupposition system that can be used as a criterion for scope operates within intonation units, in which the focus is assigned by means of tonic prominence and the rest of the material in the intonation unit acquires presupposed status (Halliday 1967a: 199–211, 1967b: 20–24). In this sense, integrated intonation of the secondary clause can be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for taking the value [+ Scope], whereas non-integrated intonation implies a value of [- Scope]. Compare, for instance, the structures in (24) and (25) below: (24) (25)

why didn’t she have j\abs# I don’t have a cl\ue# […] right, when I went to T/urkey#, I had three jabs before I went aw\ay#, and every two days I took two t\ablets# (COLT b132503.pro 335) do you wanna ... erm go for a q\uick one# before it cl\oses#. y\eah#. before it cl\oses# (COLT b136103.pro 97-99)

The criterion used in Chapter 4 (Section 4) for determining values of scope was the potential of a secondary clause to serve as focus for the interpersonal systems marked in the main clause, with the main clause as presupposition. Given that the domain for focus-presupposition structure is the intonation unit, focused status for a secondary clause in a complex sentence construction is possible only when it is integrated into the intonation unit of the main clause. This is the case in (24), where the main clause and the before-clause form one single intonation unit: the before-clause in this structure can serve as focus of the assertion in the main clause, with the proposition of that main clause as a presupposition. When the secondary clause belongs to a separate intonation unit, on the other hand, focused status is impossible because the main clause in that case assigns focus within its intonation unit. This is the case in (25), where the main clause and the before-clause each have their own intonation unit. The fact that the main clause in this structure forms a separate intonation unit from the secondary clause also implies that it has its own focus-presupposition structure separate from the secondary clause: the question in (25) is about whether or not the interlocutor will go to the pub, and not about when this will happen. Unlike in (24), the temporal specification in the before-clause

Intonational integration

175

is added as an afterthought in a separate intonation unit and does not serve as focus of the speech act in the main clause. In this sense, the intonational boundary after the main clause in (25) also constitutes an interpersonal boundary, in that the focus of the question encoded in the main clause the main clause cannot reach beyond it but remains restricted to the main clause. 4.2. Non-integrated intonation and degrees of subordination Given that the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation correlates with the parameter of scope, this also means that in the typology it separates bound subordination both from the other subordinate categories and from coordination. In this sense, the intonational criterion clearly teases apart different degrees of subordination, as argued in Haiman and Thompson (1984: 516) and Chafe (1988: 17–21). This does not imply, however, that the constructions with the value [- Scope] should be regarded as one single undifferentiated category, as Chafe (1988: 17–21) seems to assume when he argues that there is no reason to distinguish intonationally nonintegrated because, when and if from genuine coordinators like and. If we look at claims like these in terms of the proposed typology, it is obvious that non-integrated intonation – as a correlate of [- Scope] – is only one of the parameters that are relevant to the analysis of clause combining, and that the other parameters reveal major structural and functional differences within the category characterized as [- Scope]. The constructions in the [- Scope] category can still be further differentiated on the basis of the internal interpersonal structure of the secondary clause, using the parameters of modality and speech function (see also Verstraete 2002). Compare, for instance, examples (26) and (27): (26)

(27)

a. well just say just say n\o#, because I mean she can’t like fucking rule your l\ife# (COLT b133701.pro 297) b. well just say no, because I mean why should you let her fucking rule your life a. is Gemma going out with K\ashu now# y\eah# yeah he’d been going out with her for about ... for two y\ears I think# well, one and a half y-ears # ... before they split /up# ... and th/en# now it’s been about a m\onth I think# (COLT b132602.pro 2425)

176

Chapter 7: Grammar

b. *He’d been going out with her for about, for two years I think, before did(n’t) they split up. Both the because-clause in (26a) and the before-clause in (27a) are intonationally non-integrated, but they are different in terms of internal interpersonal structure. The because-clause constitutes a separate speech act following the main clause, as shown by the fact that it also allows nondeclarative clause types like the interrogative in (26b). The before-clause, on the other hand, does not constitute a separate speech act, as shown by the fact that it does not allow any non-declarative clause types like the interrogative in (27b), but is linked to the main clause as an afterthought. Unlike with the intonational feature discussed by Chafe (1988), these differences in internal interpersonal structure are not overtly marked, but this does not imply that they are less relevant to the categorization of complex sentences. The distinction in internal interpersonal structure between constructions like (26) and (27) does not only further differentiate the [- Scope] category in interpersonal terms, but perhaps it may also point to finer intonational distinctions within this category. The fact that the secondary clause in (26) constitutes a new speech act whereas its counterpart in (27) constitutes an afterthought, may also be reflected in further differences in intonational structure. Couper-Kuhlen (1996) has argued, for instance, that for nonintegrated because-clauses it is possible to distinguish between two types of non-integration on the basis of the phenomenon of declination reset. Declination refers to the fact that the fundamental frequency of the intonational ‘reference line’ for an intonation phrase naturally decreases during the production of the intonation phrase. Couper-Kuhlen shows that even if a because-clause forms a separate intonation unit, it is possible to distinguish between two types depending on whether the because-clause follows the decrease of the reference line set in during the production of the main clause, or whether it resets the reference line to (or towards) the level at which the main clause started, thus effectively creating its own reference line rather than following that of the main clause. She argues that these two patterns are also distinct in terms of the interactional status of the secondary clause. The pattern without declination reset typically forms “a single turnconstructional unit” (1996: 407) in which the because-clause describes a cause or reason for the state of affairs described in the main clause: this is illustrated in (28), where the non-integrated because-clause explains why the speaker wasn’t concerned about his/her time in the marathon. The pattern with declination reset, on the other hand, typically forms “an

Intonational integration

177

augmented two-unit structure for turn expansion” (1996: 407), in which the because-clause forms a separate speech act, providing a justification for some aspect of the speech act in the main clause: this is illustrated in (29), where the non-integrated because-clause forms a separate speech act that justifies the speaker’s belief that the New York marathon is the second largest. (28) (29)

Well the time I wasn’t that concerned about, because I’m not a fast runner at all. (No declination reset; Couper-Kuhlen 1996: 393) I think it’s the second largest, cause they have like uh twelve thousand applicants and they only take eight thousand. (Declination reset; Couper-Kuhlen 1996: 392)

Couper-Kuhlen restricts her analysis to because-clauses, but from the perspective of the interpersonal typology it would be interesting to investigate whether this difference in intonational structure can be generalized to the distinction between structures like (26) and (27) above, which are equally characterized by a distinction in interactional status. It does not seem implausible to assume that the phenomenon of declination reset can be linked more generally to the interpersonal status of the secondary clause, in the sense that speakers would reset the declination line for non-integrated clauses that form separate speech acts in a new turn, whereas nonintegrated clauses that form ‘afterthought’ expansions on the main clause are more likely just to be separated by a pause but to continue intonationally from where the main clause left off, to indicate their afterthought status. This is of course just a hypothesis, but I believe that the difference in interpersonal structure between these structures warrants further research into their precise intonational structure. Table 26. The criterion of integrated intonation Scope Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

+

Integrated intonation

178

Chapter 7: Grammar

5. ‘Main clause phenomena’ ‘Main clause phenomena’ (Green 1976) or ‘root transformations’ (Emonds 1970) refer to a cluster of grammatical phenomena that are typically available in main clauses, but presumably not for subordinate clauses. They include, amongst others, preposing of negative adverbials, preposing of VPs, availability of tag questions, preposing of negative NPs, availability of exclamatory inversion, and availability of rhetorical questions. Thus, for instance, the coordinate but-clause in the a-structures below allows all of these phenomena, whereas the subordinate if-clause in the b-structures does not. Negative adverbial preposing (30) a. I bought SHE at a very low point, but never before has a magazine improved my day so much. (CB ukmags) b. *SHE magazine must be awfully good, if never before has any magazine improved your day so much. Negative NP preposing (31) a. She stood for a moment, blinking into the glare of the spotlight, then, with a tremendous effort, hoisted up the Sousaphone and endeavoured to blast something musical from it. It trumpeted, it farted, it did raspberries, but not one bar of music did it yield. (WC) b. *If not one bar of music did it yield, there must have been something wrong with the instrument. Availability of rhetorical questions (32) a. And he says “Well, I’m an old Footlighter, and I wondered if you felt like a drink.” And this is half past eleven. I wanted to say to him, “I mean, I know we were both in the Footlights, but do you realize how many thousands of us there are? It’s not a blood relationship, you know.” (CB ukmags) b. *If do you know how many thousands of use there are, you must understand that that is no reason to invite me for a drink. If we look at such main clause phenomena in terms of the interpersonal typology, they can actually be subdivided into two categories. First of all, there are a number of phenomena that correlate directly with the parameter of speech function in the typology. The availability of interrogative forms –

‘Main clause phenomena’

179

with speaker-bias or not, see further in Chapter 8 (Section 4.1) on this point – was used as the main criterion to determine presence versus absence of speech function in Chapter 4 (Section 2), and other criteria like the availability of exclamative clause types equally belong to the domain of speech function, as shown by the fact that they define the same range of construction types. Several authors have observed that this category of criteria does not only work for traditional coordinators like and, but and for, but also applies to conjunctions like because and although (e.g. Hooper and Thompson 1973: 492–495; Green 1976: 384–385, 392–393; Lakoff 1984). The conclusion drawn from this observation has usually been that main clause phenomena are not really restricted to main clauses but are also available for a certain range of subordinate clauses. In terms of the analysis proposed in this study, however, the availability of this category of main clause phenomena for conjunctions like because or although is precisely an argument not to analyse them as subordinate. In terms of the availability of basic clause types, these uses of because and although are coordinate just like traditional coordinators like but and for. The only difference is that because and although also have subordinate uses, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6, which is not the case for but and for, but this should be no reason to deny them coordinate status when occurring in an obviously coordinate construction. The second category of main clause phenomena relates to the organisation of the message in the secondary clause: preposing of the VP, negative adverbial or negative NP marks discursive prominence for the element in question. As a discursive phenomenon, however, this category of main clause phenomena is still indirectly related to interpersonal parameters: if we look at the construction types that actually allow these preposing operations, we can see that they are restricted to the coordinate and the modal subordinate categories, i.e. those categories where the secondary clause has at least a modal value. Thus, for instance, conjunctions that are restricted to coordination and modal subordination always allow this type of main clause phenomena, as shown for the although-clause in (33) and the but-clause in (34), whereas conjunctions that are restricted to free and bound subordination do not, as shown in the unacceptability for the afterclause in (35) and the if-clause in (36). (33)

I had already reached an age in which such intimations of mortality (as well as of the ephemeral nature of that which proceeds it) were becoming less rare, although never before had the specter so convincingly assumed the guise of a cow. (IC)

180 (34) (35) (36)

Chapter 7: Grammar

From their elevated position they could overlook the entire valley, but not a single moving object could they see. (IC) *John started worrying after not a single bite did Billy eat. *If never before has the danger been so real, you should postpone the trip.

Furthermore, conjunctions that can occur in both categories of constructions only allow this type of main clause phenomena when they express the semantic relation that correlates with coordination and modal subordination (see further in Chapter 8), as illustrated in the divergent acceptability of negative adverbial preposing for the contrastive (modal subordinate) sense of when in (37) and its temporal41 (bound subordinate) sense in (38). (37) (38)

And why would we embrace becoming a member in a local church, when never before had we been taught to hold our local church in high esteem? (IC) *John started worrying when not a bite would his daughter eat.

The correlation between this second type of main clause phenomena and the coordinate and modal subordinate categories in the interpersonal typology can be explained in terms of the discursive function of the parameter of modality. In the previous chapter (Section 5.3), it was argued that presence of modal values in the secondary clause is a grammatical reflection of the fact that the proposition in question is presented as being open to challenge by the interlocutor, and that this challengeable status in turn implies foregrounded status in the interaction between speaker and interlocutor. In this sense, it is not surprising that marking of discursive prominence through preposing is available only in those contexts where the secondary clause is a challengeable proposition and therefore part of the foreground of interaction. It might even be predicted that within the two categories that allow this type of main clause phenomena, coordination will be freer than modal subordination, since in coordination the secondary clause constitutes a full speech act of its own and in modal subordination it is only a challengeable proposition but not a full speech act.

Word order in Germanic

181

Table 27. Main clause phenomena type 1 Speech Function Coordination

+

Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

-

Main clause phenomena – type 1

Table 28. Main clause phenomena type 2 Modality Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

+

Main clause phenomena – type 2

-

6. A comparative perspective: word order in the other Germanic languages In English, there is no consistent type of overt marking in the domain of clause combining, except indirectly through the association of conjunctions with specific construction types. In most of the other Germanic languages, however, there is an overt distinction in word order which has traditionally been associated with the distinction between main and subordinate clauses. In German and Dutch, for instance, the relevant parameter is the ordering of finite verb and object: main clauses have Verb-Object ordering, with the verb in clause-second position,42 as in the German example (39a), whereas subordinate clauses have Object-Verb ordering, with the verb in clausefinal position, as in (39b). In Danish and Swedish, subordination is marked by the position of the negative particle and certain clausal adverbs relative to the finite verb (see further in Allan et al. 1995: 490–498 on Danish and Holmes and Hinchliffe 1994: 507–510 on Swedish): main clauses have Verb-Adverb ordering, as in the Danish example (40a), whereas subordinate clauses have Adverb-Verb ordering, as in (40b). (39)

a. Der Koch begrüsste die Gäste. the cook greeted the guests ‘The cook greeted the guests.’

182

(40)

Chapter 7: Grammar

b. Als der Koch die Gäste begrüsste, … when the cook the guests greeted ‘When the cook greeted the guests, …’ a. Jan kommer ikke. Jan comes not ‘Jan is not coming.’ b. Hvis Jan ikke kommer, … if Jan not comes ‘If Jan is not coming, …’

6.1. Word order and the parameter of speech function The traditional association of this word order distinction with the distinction between main clauses and subordinate clauses can actually be motivated in terms of the interpersonal analysis of clause combining proposed in this study. The word order phenomena in German, Dutch, Danish and Swedish are sensitive to the presence versus absence of speech function in the secondary conjunct, and can therefore be regarded as formal markers for the distinction between coordination and (the different types of) subordination in the interpersonal typology. Compare, for instance, the Dutch pair of examples in (41)-(42) and its German counterpart in (43)(44): (41)

(42)

a. Jan was op tijd, maar hij zag zijn vrienden nergens. Jan was on time but he saw his friends nowhere ‘Jan was on time, but he didn’t see his friends anywhere.’ b. Jan was op tijd, maar waarom zag hij zijn vrienden Jan was on time but why saw he his friends nergens? nowhere ‘Jan was on time, but why didn’t he see his friends anywhere?’ a. Jan was opgelucht toen hij zijn vrienden zag. Jan was relieved when he his friends saw ‘Jan was relieved when he saw his friends.’ b. *Jan was opgelucht toen zag hij zijn vrienden? Jan was relieved when saw he his friends ‘*Jan was relieved when did he see his friends?’

Word order in Germanic

(43)

(44)

183

a. Jan kommt, aber er bringt die Kinder nicht mit. Jan comes but he brings the children not along ’Jan is coming, but he won’t bring the children.’ b. Jan kommt, aber bringt er die Kinder mit? Jan comes but brings he the children along ’Jan is coming, but will he bring the children?’ a. Jan kommt nur wenn er den Wagen hat. Jan comes only when he the car has ’Jan only comes when he has the car.’ b. *Jan kommt nur wenn hat er den Wagen? Jan comes only when has he the car ’Jan only comes when does he have the car?’

The examples with VO order in (41a) and (43a) always allow nondeclarative clause types, as shown by the acceptability of the interrogatives in (41b) and (43b), whereas the examples with OV order in (42a) and (44a) do not allow any non-declarative clause types, as shown by the unacceptability of the interrogatives in (42b) and (44b). This is in fact a more general pattern: VO (or VA) order correlates with the availability of a full paradigm of basic clause types, and therefore also with the presence of a speech functional value in the clause, while OV (or AV) order correlates with the absence of such a paradigm, and therefore also with the absence of any speech functional value in the clause. In this sense, the distinction between VO/VA and OV/AV word order can be regarded as an overt marker of the interpersonal distinction of presence versus absence of speech function in a clause. From a comparative perspective, it is interesting to note that there is also a correlation between preposing and OV/AV order, which further confirms the relation with speech function (see Section 2). The association between preposing and OV/AV order comes to the surface most clearly with conjunctions that allow both VO/VA and OV/AV ordering. In most of the languages that have the word order distinction, there are one or two conjunctions that can have both patterns, usually the equivalent of because and sometimes also the equivalent of although (see Küper 1991 and Günthner 1993, 1996, 1999 on German weil ‘because’ and obwohl ‘although’, and Steensig 1998 on Danish fordi ‘because’). Both patterns are available in postposed position, as shown for German in the OV order of (45) and the VO order of (46), but preposed position allows only OV order, as shown in (47).

184 (45)

(46) (47)

Chapter 7: Grammar

Ricken ist mein Vorbild, weil er hat den Sprung Ricken is my example because he has the jump vom Jugendspieler in die Nationalelf so frech wie kein from youth-player to the national-team so boldly as no anderer geschafft (IC) other made ‘Ricken is my example, because he has made the leap from youth player to the national team more boldly than any other player.’ Kleinermann bezahlt weil er sich nicht wehrt. (IC) Kleinermann pays because he himself not defends ‘Kleinermann pays because he does not defend himself.’ a. Weil er sein Gewerbe am Neckar because he his profession at.DEF Neckar ausübte, nannte man ihn den Neckar-Müller. (IC) practised called one him the Neckar-miller ‘Because he practised his profession at the Neckar, they called him the Neckar-miller.’ b. * Weil er übte sein Gewerbe am Neckar aus, because he practised his profession at Neckar nannte man ihn den Neckar-Müller. called one him the Neckar-miller ‘Because he practised his profession at the Neckar, they called him the Neckar-miller.’

Table 29. Word order in the other Germanic languages Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

Speech Function + -

OV / AV word order

6.2. Explaining the marking by word order The interpersonal analysis of these word order phenomena in languages like German, Dutch, Danish and Swedish can also help to explain why these distinctions can serve to mark the distinction between coordination and subordination. From the perspective of the interpersonal parameters proposed in this study, the VO and VA orderings that mark coordination as distinct from subordination are actually the characteristic that formally

Word order in Germanic

185

defines the paradigm of speech functional values: declarative, interrogative and imperative all have VO and VA ordering,43 and what distinguishes them from each other are characteristics (position, restrictions on person etc) of the subject. The OV and AV orderings that mark subordinate clauses as distinct from main clauses, on the other hand, are formally distinct from the paradigm of basic clause types: clauses with this word order pattern are formally not declarative, interrogative or imperative, but simply fall outside of the domain of the basic clause types. In this sense, the overt marking of the distinction between subordination and coordination in terms of OV/AV and VO/VA ordering can be linked up with the interpersonal parameter of speech function. VO/VA ordering is a formal characteristic of the different basic clause types in the paradigm, and therefore reflects presence of speech function, whereas OV/AV ordering is formally outside of the paradigm of the basic clause types, and therefore reflects absence of speech function. In this perspective, English is typologically quite different from other Germanic languages like German, Dutch Swedish or Danish in the domain of clause combining. In both cases, the distinction between coordination and subordination is a matter of presence versus absence of speech function, but the major difference between the two types lies in what happens formally in the case of paradigmatic absence of basic clause types. In English, this is resolved intra-paradigmatically: in the absence of a paradigm of basic clause types, English uses the declarative as the unmarked option in the paradigm, in a typical case of switch to the unmarked option in contexts of neutralization (see further in Chapter 4, Section 2). In German, Danish, Swedish and Dutch, this is resolved extraparadigmatically: rather than switching to the unmarked option within the paradigm, the absence of basic clause types is marked by a word order pattern that lies outside the paradigm of basic clause types. Table 30. Intra- and extra-paradigmatic resolution of neutralization

Danish, German, Dutch, Swedish English

Coordination SVO / SVA VSO / VSA (S)VO / (S)VA SVO VSO (S)VO

Subordination SOV / SAV

SVO

186

Chapter 7: Grammar

7. Conclusion In conclusion, we can say that the typology of complex sentence constructions defined on the basis of the three interpersonal parameters is also basic in a grammatical sense. The analysis in this chapter has shown that most of the other grammatical criteria that have been used in the analysis of clause combining neatly follow the distinctions defined by the basic parameters of interpersonal grammar. As shown in table 31, all of these criteria correlate with one or more of the construction types in the typology, and conversely every constructional distinction in the typology is attested in at least one other criterion. Moreover, it has also been shown that these apparently noninterpersonal criteria can also be explained in terms of the interpersonal parameters: in this sense, the existence of the correlation with the interpersonal defined construction types is actually a consequence of the indirectly interpersonal basis of these criteria.

OV/AV Word Order

Integrated intonation

Main Clause Phenomena 2

Main Clause Phenomena 1

Clefting and whquestioning

Preposing

Table 31. Summary of the formal criteria

Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

Further evidence for the grammatical basicness of the interpersonal typology will be presented in the third part of this study (Chapters 9 to 11), where the usefulness of the proposed categorization will be tested against a number of problematic issues in the analysis of English and the typological literature. These will include, for instance, the question why there are particular grammatical restrictions on complex sentences in which the secondary clause relates to the illocutionary act performed in the main clause (Davies 1979; Sweetser 1990), and the debate over the precise status of non-finiteness in clause combining (Foley and Van Valin 1984; Haiman 1985; Tikkanen 1987).

Chapter 8 Motivating the typology: Semantics

1. Introduction In this chapter, I will present a third type of argument for the usefulness of an interpersonal approach to the analysis of clause combining. In addition to the functional and grammatical arguments that were adduced in the previous two chapters, I will try to show here that the proposed typology also makes sense in terms of the semantics of the conjunctions in the complex sentence: the different construction types correlate with semantically coherent classes of conjunctions. Given that there is no overt marking within the verb phrase for the different parameters of interpersonal grammar,44 the different conjunctions are actually the most important type of formal marker in the domain of clause combining in English. In this sense, the proposed typology of construction types can also be regarded as defining a typology of conjunctions, represented in table 32 below: some conjunctions are specific to one construction type in the typology, whereas others can occur in different construction types, indicated by bold type in the table (and the merging of cells in the case of free and bound subordination). In this chapter, I will show that the categorization of conjunctions defined by the construction types is not arbitrary, but correlates with semantic categories. This implies that the interpersonal parameters also define differences in the meaning of the conjunctions in the complex sentence. This will constitute another argument in favour of the interpersonal approach to clause combining: the construction types defined on the basis of modality, speech function, and scope are not only basic in a functional and a grammatical sense, but they also define semantically coherent categories of conjunctions. Table 32. The interpersonal typology and the categorization of conjunctions Construction type Coordination Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

Conjunctions and, or, but, for, because, although whereas, when, while, so that, since, as, although after, before, if, until, once, as, since, so that, when, while, because

188

Chapter 8: Semantics

The second section of this chapter will focus on a number of conjunctions that can occur in more than one construction type, because these cases provide the most direct evidence for the semantic impact of the constructional differences. The categorization of conjunctions presented in table 32 above shows that there is serious lexical overlap between the different construction types: even if we disregard the fact that free and bound subordination overlap completely in lexical terms, there are still seven conjunctions out of a total of seventeen that can occur in more than one construction type. The overlap between the construction types disappears, however, if we also take into account the semantics of the conjunctions in question: I will show that the conjunctions that can occur in more than one construction type are typically polysemous, and that the different meanings correlate with different constructional properties as they are defined by the categories of the interpersonal typology. In the third section of this chapter, I will show that the semantic distinctions uncovered in the second section can in fact be generalized, in that the meaning of the non-polysemous conjunctions associated with a specific construction type chimes in with the specific subsense this construction triggers for the polysemous conjunctions. From the perspective of the proposed typology, this means that there is a more general correlation between the interpersonal properties of a construction type and the semantics of the conjunctions associated with that construction. In the final section of this chapter, I will also argue that a similar correlation between interpersonal constructional parameters and the semantics of the conjunctions exists for some of the secondary interpersonal parameters that were touched upon in the previous chapters, such as speaker-bias in the interpretation of non-declarative clause types, or echoicity in the interpretation of modals. 2. Conjunctions associated with more than one construction type The most direct evidence for the existence of a correlation between interpersonal organization and the semantics of interclausal relations comes from those conjunctions that can occur in more than one construction type in the typology. In this section, I will focus on six conjunctions that can be used in different construction types (see table 32 above): as, since, so that, when and while can be both modal subordinate and free/bound subordinate, and because can be both coordinate and free/bound subordinate. I will try to show that these differences in interpersonal structure correlate with

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

189

differences in the meaning of the conjunction, as summarized in table 33 (terminology for the different types of semantic relations will be explained in the relevant subsections). Table 33. Relation between interpersonal and semantic differences

As, since When, while Because So that

Coordination

Modal subordination

justification -

justification contrast result

Free / Bound subordination temporal temporal cause / reason purpose

2.1. As and since The conjunctions as and since can have both a temporal meaning and a justificational45 meaning, exemplified in (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) below. The structures in (1) and (3) illustrate the temporal meaning of since and as: the since-clause in (1) indicates the point in time from which the parents refused to speak to reporters, and the as-clause in (3) indicates the moment when the two deputies crashed into each other. The structures in (2) and (4), on the other hand, illustrate the justificational meanings: the sinceclause in (2) obviously does not indicate a point in time from which caffeine was suspected as the culprit, but rather provides a justification for this suspicion, and the as-clause in (4) does not indicate a moment when there is a depressing story behind the people queuing for work, but again provides a justification for the assessment of the queue as depressing. In this section, I will show that the different meanings of as and since correlate with the different interpersonal properties of the construction types in which they can occur: the temporal meanings correspond to the free and bound subordinate construction types, whereas the justificational meanings correspond to the modal subordinate construction. (1)

(2)

Cruzan’s parents declined to speak to reporters since the feeding tube was removed. Yesterday, five days after the feeding stopped, hospital officials said Cruzan’s condition had started to decline. (CB npr) Men who are heavy coffee drinkers, over five cups a day, seem to have more than double the risk of heart disease and stroke than people who never drink coffee. Caffeine was suspected as the

190

(3)

(4)

Chapter 8: Semantics

culprit, since it can speed up the heart and raise blood pressure. (CB npr) But Sheriff John Nichols of Oakland County, Michigan, thinks nine crashes in one month is unusual, so he’s sending his deputies to driving school. Most of the accidents involve chases, but there was one last week involving two deputies who crashed into each other as they were leaving a parking lot. (CB npr) “It was the sort of scene you see on television, when they picture the depression of the 1930s,” he said. “But behind each of those queuing was a more depressing story, as they all have families and children. I have never seen anything like it in my life.” (CB today)

A first constructional difference between the justificational and the temporal senses of as and since is the divergent availability of modal values for the two senses. Justificational as- and since-clauses have a modal value of their own, as shown by the paradigmatic availability of subjective modal verbs illustrated in (5) and (6) below, whereas their temporal counterparts do not have any modal value of their own, as shown by the unacceptability of subjective modals in (7) and (8). In terms of the functional analysis presented in Chapter 6, what this means is that justificational and temporal clauses have a different status in terms of speaker-interlocutor interaction: the propositions described in temporal clauses like the since- and as-clauses in (7) and (8) are presupposed, whereas their counterparts in the justificational clauses in (5) and (6) are challengeable propositions rather than mere presuppositions. (5)

(6)

The president is presumably hoping that General Hau while guaranteeing the support of the military, will be less of a political threat than the incumbent prime minister, Lee Huan. However, his plan may backfire, say analysts, since he may not be able to control the General and may end up being merely a figurehead president. (CB bbc) Pliny’s spice, malabathron, probably provides the key to understanding hebhere as a fragrant spice. But what of the mountains? Are we to think of them as “the cloven hills” of the girl’s “breast” (Goulder)? They can hardly be her mons veneris (Haupt), as there must be more than one: such sexual ingenuity does not help. (CB ukbooks)

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

(7)

(8)

191

a. As a result of their analysis, they found that although they had “captured” the hospitals, there was no significant evidence that the health of the people had changed since they had gained control of the medical services. (CB usbooks) b. *There was no significant evidence that the health of the people had changed since they may/must have gained control of the medical services. a. The gunman, Jeffrey Erickson, apparently shot and killed two security officers as he was being taken from the federal courthouse and then turned the gun on himself. (CB npr) b. *The gunman shot and killed two security officers as he may/must have been taken from the federal courthouse.

As observed by Dancygier and Sweetser (2000: 136–137) and Goethals (2002: 113–125), a second constructional difference between the temporal and justificational senses of as and since is that only the former type can fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of its main clause. Temporal as- and since-clauses can easily fall within the scope of modal and speech functional values of their main clause, as shown by their ability to serve as focus of interrogation and modalization in the main clause, illustrated in (9) and (10) below. Justificational as- and since-clauses, on the other hand, cannot fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of their main clause, as shown by the fact that interrogation and modalization in (11) and (12) cannot take the as- and since-clauses as their focus, but remain restricted to the main clause. (9)

(10)

Leaphorn cursed himself vehemently in Navajo. How could he have been so stupid? This is what his subconscious had been prodding him to remember. Had he remembered it too late? He glanced at the carcass. This person must have arrived as George was dressing the deer, which explained why George had abandoned the job unfinished. (CB usbooks) [‘that must have been the time when the person arrived’] A: And we've been on X [name removed from corpus, JCV] a lot more often really this last two or three years. B: Is th … Have you started going there since it’s become a nature area? A: Yes […] Well we we were went there we belonged to a WEA class you see and we saw it gradually grow into a reserve. (CB ukspok) [‘was that the time when you started going there?’]

192 (11)

(12)

Chapter 8: Semantics

a. The ideas were put forward, not as firm proposals, but as a contribution to wider discussion. From that point of view they haven’t yet achieved their objective since they were published too late to make any impression on European newspapers. (CB bbc) b. They can’t have achieved their objective yet, since they were published too late to make any impression on European newspapers. [scope of modalization restricted to main clause] a. Nelson could be free in five years, as he has already been in custody for two years awaiting trial. (CB today) b. Could Nelson be free in five years, as he has already been in custody for two years awaiting trial? [scope of interrogation restricted to main clause]

This difference in scope structure is further corroborated by the fact that it is hard to form cleft alternatives for justificational as- and since-clauses, whereas this is unproblematic for their temporal counterparts (see further in Chapter 7 (Section 3) on the association between clefting and the scope criteria). This is illustrated in (13) and (14) below, where the a-structures illustrate the acceptability of cleft constructions for temporal as- and sinceclauses, and the b-structures illustrate the difficulty of cleft constructions for their justificational counterparts. (13)

(14)

a. It happened as I was entering the restroom. ~ But it was as I was entering the restroom that it happened. (CB npr) b. Now the pendulum has swung back to pin Mr Lamont with the blame again. That is partly his own fault as he doesn’t seem to realise how ludicrous it is to claim you haven’t said something when the nation watched you saying it on TV the previous night. (CB today) ~ ?It is as he doesn’t seem to realize the ridiculous nature of his claim that it is partly his own fault. a. She had ceased doing the same for me only since I had become seven. ~ Piously for health reasons, against burial, she was about to break a glass capsule of eucalyptus beneath her nose, and blow it loudly. It was only since I had become seven that she had ceased doing the same for me in any exposed place. (CB ukbooks)

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

193

b. Recently a lot of supposed Islamic artefacts, exhibited in Japan, were found to be false. But, since they were only traced as far as Iran, everyone thinks that they were forged there. (CB ukbooks) ~ ?It is since the artefacts were only traced as far as Iran that everyone thinks that they were forged there. Taken together, these differences point towards a specific constructional association for the different senses of as and since. The justificational senses belong to the modal subordinate category, where the secondary clause has a modal value of its own and does not fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of its main clause, whereas the temporal senses belong to the free and bound subordinate categories, where the secondary clause does not have any modal value of its own, and can fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of its main clause. The two senses of as and since are, of course, diachronically related (see Traugott 1995), and the analysis in this section has provided further grammatical evidence for Traugott’s argument that this development represents an instance of subjectification: the diachronically secondary reading of justification is associated with a construction in which the secondary clause has more independent interpersonal structure, and can therefore be regarded as more subjective, than the earlier temporal reading. Table 34. Constructional associations for the temporal/justificational distinction As, since Temporal Justificational

Modality +

Scope +/-

Free/bound subordination Modal subordination

2.2. When and while When and while are treated together here because they can both have temporal and contrastive readings, and these different readings can again be shown to correlate with the different interpersonal properties of the two construction types in which they can occur. The temporal readings are illustrated in (15) and (16): the while-clause in (15) indicates the time when the pigeons find it necessary to defecate, and the when-clause in (16) indicates the moment when the director is greeted by applause. The contrastive readings are illustrated in (17) and (18). The while-clause in

194

Chapter 8: Semantics

(17) does not indicate a period in time during which the prince is in favour of maintaining the Arab connection, but rather describes an SoA that is in contrast with the prince’s political preferences. Contrastive readings are less well-established for when-clauses, but examples like (18) show that they do occur (see also Declerck 1997: 42–43): like the while-clause in (17), the when-clause in (18) does not primarily indicate the time when Rosamund tried to make Lambert act like a father and husband, but rather describes something that is in contrast with making him behave respectably, viz. his artistic tendencies. (15)

(16) (17)

(18)

There were hundreds of white doves in the area around his swimming-pool. He liked to sit out by the pool at night with his guests while his employees drove the birds into the branches of the trees overhead until they formed a white blanket stretched out against the equatorial night. All that, as one visitor noted, despite the fact that a considerable number of that immense flock inevitably found it necessary to defecate while they were entertaining Pablo and his friends and did not always do so with the discretion the situation merited. (CB usbooks) Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center Director Dennis Barrie was greeted by applause when he left the courtroom after the notguilty verdict. (CB npr) Prince Abdullah is known in the ruling circle to favor a course that keeps Saudi Arabia firmly under an Arab umbrella, while other members of the family favor closer ties to the United States. (CB npr) Everyone agreed that Rosamund tried to pressurise Lambert into respectability, made him look and act like a husband and father when actually he was a creative artist. (CB ukbooks)

As with the previous two conjunctions, the different readings of when and while correlate with the different interpersonal characteristics of the two construction types in which the conjunctions can occur. Again, the most important difference lies with the paradigmatic availability of modality: the temporal readings do not allow marked modal values,46 as shown in the unacceptability of structures like (19) and (20), whereas the contrastive readings do, as shown by the acceptability of the modals in (21) and (22). For the less well-established contrastive reading of when, overt marking of modality in the when-clause can even serve as a trigger for the contrastive interpretation, as appears to be the case in (22).

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

195

a. Parts of two Republican Guard divisions, the Hammarabi and the Medina, made it back to southern Iraq when the fighting stopped with allied armies. (CB npr) b. *Parts of two Republican Guard divisions, the Hammarabi and the Medina, made it back to southern Iraq when the fighting may/must have stopped with allied armies. a. Today 21 people were wounded when they either jumped or were pushed off a train while it was travelling between stations. (CB npr) b. *Today 21 people were wounded when they either jumped or were pushed off a train while it may/must have been travelling between stations. While Denmark, Poland, and the Baltic states generally saw more positive than negative in the accord, two of Germany’s more important neighbors were decidedly unreceptive to it. The French felt betrayed by their erstwhile ally, while the Soviet Union must surely have wondered what had motivated Britain to agree to such a massive increase in the size of the German surface fleet. (CB usbooks) Textile worker Brian Wilson, 50, of Workington, Cumbria, said: “Blair is trying to force people round to his way of thinking when he must know the majority of us are totally opposed to a single currency”. (CB sunnow)

The difference in interpersonal structure that correlates with the two readings can again be linked up with the functional interpretation proposed in Chapter 6: an SoA that is linked by temporal when or while to its main clause serves as a presupposition relative to the SoA described in that main clause, whereas an SoA that is linked by contrastive when or while to its main clause constitutes a challengeable proposition in its own right. The second constructional difference that correlates with the temporalcontrastive distinction for when and while concerns the integration of the secondary clause into the interpersonal structure of the main clause, as observed in Goethals (2002: 113–125). Just like with since and as, temporal uses of when and while can easily fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of their main clause, as shown by their ability to serve as focus of modalization and interrogation, illustrated in (23) for both when and while. Contrastive uses, on the other hand, cannot fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of their main clause, as shown for instance in (24): if the interrogation in (24b) is acceptable at all, its scope certainly

196

Chapter 8: Semantics

remains restricted to the main clause and cannot take the contrastive whileclause as its focus. This is further corroborated by the difficulty of clefting the structure without losing its contrastive interpretation to the temporal reading, as shown in (24c). (23)

(24)

I think it’s very important to measure when and where things occurred. Did they occur when you’re a young person, in your formative years, or did they occur while you were a senior official in the federal government? (CB npr) a. Japanese stocks fell below 1987 Black Monday levels, while the US dollar picked up nearly a half yen in Tokyo trading today. (CB npr) b. Did Japanese stocks fall below 1987 levels, while the US dollar picked up half a Yen? c. ≠ It is while the US dollar picked up nearly half a yen that Japanese stocks fell below 1987 trading levels.

Taken together, these two characteristics show the same constructional associations for the two readings of when and while as for the two readings of as and since analysed in the previous section. Contrastive when- and while-clauses belong to the modal subordinate construction, as reflected in the fact that they have their own modal values and cannot fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of their main clause, whereas temporal when- and while-clauses belong to the free and bound coordinate construction types, as shown by the fact that they do not have any modal values of their own and can fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of their main clause. As with as and since are, the two senses of when and while are diachronically related (see Traugott and König 1991; Traugott 1995), and again, the analysis proposed here provides grammatical support for Traugott’s analysis of subjectification: the diachronically secondary reading of contrast is associated with a construction in which the secondary clause has some interpersonal structure of its own, and can therefore be regarded as more subjective, than the earlier temporal reading. Table 35. Constructional associations for the temporal/contrastive distinction When, while Temporal Contrastive

Modality +

Scope +/-

Free/bound subordination Modal subordination

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

197

2.3. Because Because can occur both in coordinate and in free/bound subordinate construction types, illustrated respectively in examples (35) and (36) below. The major constructional difference between (35) and (36) lies in the internal interpersonal structure of the secondary clause: the coordinate because-clause in (35) forms a separate speech act with its own modal and speech functional values, whereas the bound subordinate because-clause in (36) functions as part of the propositional content of the speech act in the main clause. (35)

(36)

Well of course there is a lot of bullshit by the media, you know, because why should they accuse me in one place and say that I’m responsible, I and my organisation are responsible for the violence in the country, and then in the next place say that I’m small and can be squeezed out. (CB bbc) “Hah! Who else but me would you send to see an attractive woman?” He didn’t reply, and I couldn’t see his expression because the open book was in the way. (CB ukbooks)

The semantic difference between the coordinate and free/bound subordinate constructions may be less straightforward than in the previous cases, but there are a number of indications that the constructional distinction between (35) and (36) again correlates with a difference in the meaning of the relation marked by because, as argued in Goethals (2002: 111–143). In constructions like (36) above and (37) below, because indicates a simple relation of cause or reason (see Section 4.2 below for a more detailed analysis of the distinction between cause and reason). Because in (36) expresses a relation of causality between the SoA described in the main clause (not seeing the interlocutor’s face) and the SoA described in the secondary clause (a book hiding the interlocutor’s face). The becauseclause in (37) describes the motivation of the US (protection of military secrets) for the action described in the main clause (not allowing UN command for the operation in question). (37)

The US opposes a UN command because it has military secrets that could be jeopardized. (CB npr)

In coordinate constructions like (35) above, on the other hand, the relation marked by because is rhetorically more complex, because of the

198

Chapter 8: Semantics

involvement of the speaker in the because-clause. The because-clause in these structures serves as the speaker’s justification of some aspect of the speech act in the main clause. This difference is reflected in the fact that it allows a number of rhetorically more complex relations that are not allowed for structures like (36) and (37). The coordinate because-clause in (35) above, for instance, does not provide a cause or reason for the fact that there is bullshit in the media: in the because-clause, the speaker justifies his/her statement about bullshit in the media by giving a concrete example of the kind of bullshit to be found there. Similarly, the coordinate becauseclause in (38) below does not provide a cause or reason for the fact that the person in question misheard, but rather provides an argument for the speaker’s conclusion that she misheard, as marked by the modal must. These rhetorically more complex relations justify positing a different type of interclausal relation under the heading of justification, as also argued by Goethals (2002: 113–143): what characterizes the coordinate structures in (35) and (37) is that the speaker uses the because-clause to justify some aspect of the speech act in the main clause.47 The relevant aspect that is justified can be some aspect of the propositional content of the speech act, as in (39) below where the speaker justifies the need not to go out on Saturday nights, but it can also be some aspect of the speech act as such, as in (35) or (38). (38) (39)

She heard him whisper something against her hair which she thought sounded like bastard but she must have misheard, because why would he say that? (BNC H9V 0874) I never go out on Saturday nights because isn’t the telly really brilliant? If you go out you’d miss all the repeats and Denis Norden rehashing It’ll be Alright on the Night for the zillionth time. (CB sunnow)

A further indication of the difference between justificational (coordinate) and cause/reason (subordinate) because is the fact that there is also lexical marking in parallel with the constructional differentiation for because. The conjunction for, which is mainly restricted to the written register in present-day English, has exactly the same constructional characteristics as coordinate because, and can therefore be regarded as a separate lexical marker parallel to the coordinate use of because. Thus, for instance, clauses introduced by for always have their own illocutionary force, as shown by the paradigmatic availability of non-declarative clause types in examples like (40), and can never fall within the scope of the interpersonal

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

199

resources of their main clause, as shown by the ungrammaticality of cleft constructions in (41b) and by the fact that they cannot serve as focus of interrogation or modalization in their main clause, illustrated in (41c) and (41d). In this sense, the existence of a separate lexical marker for the coordinate construction type can be regarded as a further source of evidence for the distinctness of coordinate and subordinate because. (40)

(41)

Professor Himmelfarb asked Professor Bundtzen whether she was not worried that her proposals might foster a new stereotype of women, one that might be “limiting, restrictive, even possibly demeaning. For why shouldn’t women as well as men be concerned with large questions?” (CB usbooks) a. Forest missed Roy yesterday, for he is still recovering from a knee injury. Roy may be ready for the French assignment on Tuesday but Lee is considered doubtful. (CB times) b. *It is for Roy is still recovering from a knee injury that Forest missed him yesterday. c. Did Forrest miss Roy yesterday, for he is still recovering from a knee injury? [impossible to read the for-clause as focus of the interrogation in the main clause] d. Forrest must have missed Roy yesterday, for he is still recovering from a knee injury. [impossible to read the for-clause as focus of the modalization in the main clause]

Another factor in support of the argument about lexical differentiation is the fact that separate lexical marking of justificational constructions is not restricted to English, but seems to be a relatively strong cross-linguistic tendency, at least for the Indo-European languages. Thus, for instance, Dutch, German, Danish, French, Spanish and Serbocroation all have a separate conjunction that shows precisely the same behavioural characteristics (presence of illocutionary force and position outside the scope of the interpersonal resource of the main clause) as the English conjunction for and the coordinate uses of because. Dutch has want as opposed to omdat (Van Belle 1989), German has denn as opposed to weil (Hentschel 1989; Küper 1991), Danish has for as opposed to fordi (Steensig 1998), French has car as opposed to parce que (Groupe λ-l 1975), Spanish has pues as opposed to porque (Goethals 2002), Latin has nam as opposed to quia (Bolkestein 1991) and Serbocroatian has jer as opposed to zato što (Hentschel 1989). In most of these languages, the situation is even further parallel to the situation in English, in that the lexical item that corresponds

200

Chapter 8: Semantics

to English because equally allows constructional differentiation between coordinate and subordinate uses (see Küper 1991, Günthner 1996 on weil in German; Groupe λ-l 1975 on parce que in French; Goethals 2002 on porque in Spanish; Steensig 1998 on fordi in Danish). 2.4. So that The conjunction so that allows both a reading of purpose and a reading of result, illustrated respectively in (42) and (43) below. In the purpose sense, the so that-clause describes what the agent of the main clause intends as the outcome of the activity described in that main clause: in (42), for instance, the so that-clause describes what the sheep-owner has in mind by keeping the feed in a special bucket, viz. not to attract any rats. In the result sense, on the other hand, the so that-clause describes the actual consequences of the event in the main clause, without there necessarily being any relation of intention to an agent in the main clause: in (43), for instance, the so thatclause describes the consequence of the insurers’ court victory, viz. the fact that AIDS testing has become legal. As in the previous cases, the two senses of so that can be shown to correlate with the different constructions in which the conjunction can occur: the purpose reading corresponds with a free or bound subordinate construal, whereas the result reading corresponds with a modal subordinate construal. (42)

(43)

Then he calls them in by name and beds them down in straw and feeds them special granules that he keeps in a lidded bucket so that rats are not attracted. They don’t know how lucky they are, these plump French sheep. (CB ukbooks) In 1985, many major insurers began using such tests. The insurers have survived challenges to that practice in both federal and state courts, so that now AIDS testing by health insurers is legal in all states except California. (CB npr)

The first difference between the two senses lies with the system of modality. A so that-clause in a purpose reading allows subjective modals, but because of its meaning of intended result, these modals do not figure in speaker-interlocutor interaction. A purposive so that-clause describes a potential SoA that is bound to the agent of the main clause: accordingly, modal verbs that occur in the so that-clause will be bound to the agent of the main clause rather than speaker or interlocutor, as in (44) below where

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

201

may expresses what the agent wishes to make possible (Declerck 1991a: 442). In this sense, the purpose reading of so that can be regarded as having a [- Modal] value just like the structure of reason described in Chapters 5 (Section 1.2) and 6 (Section 5.2). A so that-clause in a result reading, on the other hand, does allow subjective modal verbs that figure in speakerinterlocutor interaction. Resultative so that does not describe a potential SoA bound to the agent of the main clause, but rather an SoA that figures directly in the interaction between speaker and interlocutor: this is illustrated in (45) below, where the modal verb could expresses the speaker’s assessment about the possible effect of changing votes in the Senate. (44)

(45)

The Centre claims that Naheed has no financial or family support in Pakistan, and rather than condemn them to extreme poverty and suffering, she would leave her children in Britain so that they may have a reasonable future. (CB ukmags) Remember just this week, the president’s veto of the civil rights bill was sustained in the Senate by only one vote, so that the change of a couple of votes in the Senate could m--could be consequential. (CB npr)

A second constructional difference is that a so that-clause in the purpose sense can fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of its main clause, whereas this is not possible for the result sense. Compare, for instance, the minimal pair of the purpose example in (46a) and the result example (47a) below (taken from Palmer 1987: 99). The purpose clause can be taken as focus of interrogation in the main clause, as shown in (46b), but this is not possible for the result clause, as shown in (47b). Similarly, the purpose clause can be taken as focus of a cleft sentence, as shown in (46c) (although a non-finite construal with to or in order to would probably be more natural here), but this is again excluded for the result clause, unless its interpretation is switched to a purpose reading, as shown in (47c). (46) (47)

a. b. c. a. b.

He worked hard so that he might become rich. Did he work hard so that he might become rich? It is so that he might become rich that he worked hard. He worked hard, so that he became rich. Did he work hard, so that he became rich? [impossible to take the so that-clause as focus of the main clause] c. It is so that he became rich that he worked hard.

202

Chapter 8: Semantics

In terms of the interpersonal typology, the divergent behaviour with respect to scope and modality points towards different constructional associations of the two senses: the purpose sense is associated with free and bound subordinate construal, whereas the result sense is associated with modal subordinate construal, as summarized in table 36. Table 36. Constructional associations for the purpose/result distinction So that Purpose Result

Modality +

Scope +/-

Free/bound subordination Modal subordination

Apart from the distinctions mentioned above, there is one further constructional difference between the purpose and result senses of so that. As observed by Palmer (1987: 99), so that-clauses with a purpose reading can be preposed, as illustrated in (48) below, whereas their counterparts with a result reading cannot be preposed, as illustrated in the unacceptability of (49b) below. Following the analysis outlined in Chapter 7, a correlation with preposing is to be expected for purpose clauses, given their free/bound subordinate character. The impossibility of preposing for result clauses is not expected, however: modal subordinate clauses can generally be preposed, as shown in Chapter 7 (Section 2). The restriction on preposing in this case can probably be attributed to the strong sequentiality implied by the meaning of result clauses, which requires iconic ordering of main clause and secondary clause.48 The existence of such a restriction and its relation to semantic structure seems to be confirmed by Diessel’s (2001: 443–446) findings about the typology of main and subordinate clause ordering, which show that even in languages which allow preposing, result clauses generally follow their main clause and are highest on the scale of typically postposed structures.49 (48)

(49)

So that you can make the most of Crosse and Blackwell’s range of Waistline dressings, we’re giving away five sets of recipe cards plus Portmeirion salad servers with floral porcelain handles. (CB ukmags) a. Some of the scenes look too fussed over and formal so that the movie sometimes constricts when it should expand. (CB npr) b. *So that the movie sometimes constricts when it should expand, some of the scenes look too fussed over.

Conjunctions with more than one construction type

203

2.5. Conclusion The case studies presented in this section have shown that the association of particular conjunctions with more than one construction type in the interpersonal typology is not arbitrary: use in different constructions correlates with differences in the meaning of the relation marked by the conjunction. One theoretical question that has not been addressed explicitly in the analysis is where precisely these semantic differences should be located: on the level of the conjunction (as patterns of lexical polysemy) or on the level of the construction (as constructional specifications for lexical vagueness). The second option seems to be the most economical one for cases like because and so that. In these cases, it seems possible to posit one semantic core for the conjunction as such, and to define the semantic differences on the basis of the different status of the interclausal relation in the construction. For so that, for instance, the distinction between result and purpose can be explained in terms of a basic relation of result that takes a different position in the construction: binding to the agent of the main clause furnishes the feature of intention that combines with result to produce purpose (purpose as ‘intended result’, see also Palmer 1987: 99–100). Similarly, the distinction between justification and cause/reason (see Section 4.2 below on cause versus reason) for because can be explained in terms of a different position of a basic causal relation in the construction: the fact that the because-clause forms a separate speech act furnishes the feature of speaker-involvement in the because-clause that combines with causality to produce justification, and as I will show in more detail in Chapter 9, it can also help to explain the existence of the rhetorically more complex relations illustrated in (35) and (38) above. For conjunctions like when, while, as and since, on the other hand, it does not seem possible to posit a semantic core for the conjunction and to describe the differences in the meaning of the interclausal relation in terms of a different status of this relation in the construction. The justificational senses of as and since and the contrastive senses of when and while are of course diachronically related to their temporal senses (see for instance Geis and Zwicky 1971; Abraham 1976: 20–38; Braunmüller 1978: 113–114; Traugott and König 1991: 194–199; 200–203), but from a synchronic point of view the two senses must be regarded as distinct. Whereas the purpose reading of so that can still be described more economically as a kind of result relation that is distinguished by the additional feature of intention furnished by the binding to the agent of the main clause, the contrastive

204

Chapter 8: Semantics

reading of when and while and the justificational reading of as and since cannot be described as a kind of temporal relation that is distinguished from other temporal relations by an additional feature. The basically nontemporal nature of the contrastive and justificational relations is reflected, for instance, in the fact that the two SoAs connected by contrastive while need not even temporally co-occur or overlap, as illustrated in (50), and that the SoA introduced by justificational since in some cases does not even temporally precede the SoA in the main clause, as illustrated in (51) below (compare Traugott and König 1991: 194–195, 199–200). (50)

(51)

Dear Andy Roxburgh I hear from the land of cuckoo clocks you’ve lifted your head out of those 100-page reports you write for UEFA to tell the world that your pal Craig Brown is a natural “field coach” while Jock Stein wasn’t. (CB sunnow) One real effect of the crisis was its impact on the 800,000 federal workers told not to report to work. But this was symbolic, since they will receive full back pay once the crisis is over. (CB times)

Whatever the precise theoretical status of the differences in meaning observed in the previous sections, however, the fact that they can be correlated with (as with when, while, since and as) or grammatically defined in terms of (as with because and so that) the parameters of interpersonal grammar provides a further argument for the usefulness of an interpersonal approach to clause combining. In the following sections, I will expand on this analysis by focusing on the other conjunctions in the typology and on a number of secondary parameters of interpersonal grammar. 3. The general semantic profile of the construction types In the second half of this chapter, I will show that the analysis from the previous section can be generalized, and that it is possible to set up a general semantic profile for the different construction types. More specifically, I will argue that the most important boundary in semantic terms lies between the two sets {coordination, modal subordination} and {free subordination, bound subordination}.

The general semantic profile of the construction types

205

3.1. The primary distinction It has been shown in the analysis of conjunctions associated with more than one construction type that (i) the free/bound subordinate construction correlates with a temporal reading (when, while, as and since), a reading of purpose (so that) or a reading of cause and/or reason (because), (ii) the modal subordinate construction correlates with a justificational reading (as and since), a result reading (so that) or a contrastive reading (when, and while), and (iii) the coordinate construction correlates with a justificational reading (because). Table 37 summarizes the semantic profiles derived from the analysis of these conjunctions. The fact that the relation of justification is shared between modal subordination and coordination indicates that their semantic profiles are somewhat similar, and this will be further confirmed by the other conjunctions associated with the construction types. Table 37. Semantic profiles Free/bound subordination Modal subordination Coordination

Time (when, while, as, since) Cause/reason (because) Purpose (so that) Justification (as, since) Contrast (when, while) Result (so that) Justification (because)

The other conjunctions investigated in this study relate to the semantic profiles defined in table 37 in one of two ways. A first group of conjunctions mark a semantic relation that is already present in the table: this is the case for after, before, once, until, whereas, but and for. These conjunctions confirm the general tendencies that could be derived from the other conjunctions. Free and bound subordinate after, before, once and until mark temporal relations just like the free and bound subordinate uses of as, since, when and while. Modal subordinate whereas marks a contrastive relation just like the modal subordinate uses of when and while. Coordinate for and but, finally, mark justificational and contrastive relations. This further confirms the semantic similarity between coordination and modal subordination: if we take for and but into account, both justification and contrast occur in coordinate and modal subordinate form. Justification covers coordinate for and because as well as modal subordinate as and since, and contrast covers coordinate but as well as modal subordinate whereas, when and while.

206

Chapter 8: Semantics

A second group of conjunctions do not mark relations associated with any of the categories discussed in the previous section, but add a number of new types to the profile defined in table 37 above. In general, however, these new types further confirm the basic semantic division between {free subordination, bound subordination} and {modal subordination, coordination}: the relations added by these conjunctions either belong exclusively to free and bound coordination, or to modal subordination and coordination. Free and bound subordinate if adds conditional relations to the profile of free and bound subordination, and coordinate and and or, as well as coordinate and modal subordinate although add additive, alternative and concessive relations to the profile of modal subordination and coordination. Taken together, the basic semantic profile of the construction types in the typology can be summarized as in table 38. Table 38. The basic semantic profiles of the construction types

Bound subordination and Free subordination

Modal subordination and Coordination

Time (after, before, until, when, once, while, since, as) Cause/reason (because) Condition (if) Purpose (so that) Justification (as, since, because) Concession (although) Result (so that) Contrast (when, while, whereas, but) Addition (and) Alternation (or)

The fact that the primary dividing line lies between {free subordination, bound subordination} and {coordination, modal subordination} clearly suggests that the internal interpersonal structure of the secondary clause is the primary parameter in terms of the semantics of the interclausal relation marked by the conjunction. Free and bound subordination are characterized by absence of interpersonal values in the secondary clause, whereas modal subordination and coordination are characterized by presence of interpersonal values in the secondary clause, either just modality (in modal subordination) or modality and speech function (in coordination).

The general semantic profile of the construction types

207

3.2. Narrative uses as a principled exception There is one principled exception to the general correlation between interpersonal structure and interclausal semantics presented in table 38 above: for particular types of temporal relations, the secondary clause can have an interpersonal structure of its own without losing its temporal interpretation. This appears to be possible mainly for secondary clauses in final position that describe an SoA that temporally follows the SoA in the main clause, i.e. introduced by conjunctions like when, before and until. Thus, for instance, the before-clause in (52) and the when-clause in (53) below have their own interpersonal structure, as reflected in their ability to take marked modal values, like the modal verb must in (52), and even speech functional values, like the interrogative in (53): (52)

(53)

Hunched against the driving sleet, a queue of perhaps a hundred Russians stood in silent misery outside a bland grey stone building. Lynda Chalker asked her driver to stop so she could find out why they were there. The Overseas Development Minister had walked only a few paces from her black Zil limousine before she must have wondered whether she’d made a big mistake. The crowd, realising she was a British government official who had come to St Petersburg to see how foreign aid could best be given, began haranguing her furiously in words she didn’t understand. (CB today) There was a sort of pocket inside and I just slipped my hand in it when what should I find but a letter in the mistress’s handwriting, tucked away. (Declerck 1997: 223)

These structures have been described as “narrative” temporal clauses (see Couper-Kuhlen 1989; Declerck 1996: 222–226, 1997: 212–225): what is special about them is that the normal foreground-background organization with temporal clauses is reversed. In the standard types of temporal clauses that have been described so far in this study, the SoA of the secondary clause is backgrounded relative to the main clause, providing a temporal reference point for the SoA described in the main clause. In narrative temporal clauses like (52) and (53), on the other hand, it is the SoA in the temporal clause that is foregrounded, with the SoA in the main clause serving as background material. Thus, for instance, the before-clause in (52) and the when-clause in (53) do not provide a temporal background for the main clause events of getting out of the car and slipping the hand in

208

Chapter 8: Semantics

the pocket. Instead, it is the main clause event of getting out of the car in (52) and slipping the hand into the pocket in (53) that functions as background building up towards the SoA that really matters in discourse because it “push[es] forward the action” (Declerck 1997: 37): the realization that it was a bad idea to get out of the limousine in the before-clause in (52) and the finding of the letter in the when-clause in (53). In terms of the interpersonal typology, the prominence that can be attributed to narrative temporal clauses correlates with interpersonal independence. As already mentioned, the narrative structures in (52) and (53) allow marked modal and speech functional values, which shows that they have an interpersonal structure of their own,50 and this is what correlates with foregrounding: the fact that the speaker explicitly takes position with respect to the propositional content brings the proposition in question to the foreground of speaker-interlocutor interaction. In this sense, the exception which narrative temporal clauses pose to the general correlation between interpersonal structure and interclausal semantics (as presented in table 38 above) is a principled one. The presence of interpersonal values in these structures is an instance of the general correlation between interpersonal independence and foregrounding (as outlined in Chapter 6, Section 5.3), which in this case overrules the typical constructional association of temporal clauses. 3.3. The other distinctions in the typology As argued above, the major dividing line in terms of the meaning of the conjunctions lies between {coordination, modal subordination} and {free subordination, bound subordination}. The distinctions between coordination and modal subordination and between free and bound subordination, on the other hand, do not have any specific impact on the meaning of the conjunctions: instead, they define alternative discursive configurations within the categories that do have such impact. Within the category formed by bound and free subordination, the distinction between free and bound construal is based on the parameter of scope, and relates to whether the relation between main clause and secondary clause is construed within one single speech act or not. Thus, for instance, the bound and free subordinate after-clauses in (54) and (55) are not distinct in terms of the semantics of the interclausal relation, but rather in terms of the discursive status of this interclausal relation. In the bound subordinate construction in (54), the relation of temporal succession

The general semantic profile of the construction types

209

functions internally to the propositional content of the speech act marked in the main clause, as shown by the fact that it can become the focus of the interrogation in the main clause. In the free subordinate alternative in (55), on the other hand, the same interclausal relation functions externally to that propositional content, as shown by the fact that it cannot become the focus of interrogation in the main clause. The interrogative in the main clause in this case remains restricted to the propositional content of the main clause, and the secondary clause provides a discursive background for the question encoded by the interrogative structure (see further in Chapter 10 on the notion of discursive background). (54) (55)

“Does the anger ever linger even after you’ve taken a walk?” Deirdre looked uncomprehending. “No if I can’t walk it off or punch it off.” (CB usbooks) “After you left the army did you go straight to X [name removed from corpus, JCV]? Or have you done …?” “No. No.” (CB ukspok)

Within the category formed by coordination and modal subordination, the distinction between coordination and modal subordination is based on the parameter of speech function, and relates to whether the construction is balanced or imbalanced in interpersonal terms (see further in Chapter 6, Section 6). The secondary clause in coordination has a speech functional value, which means that it forms a full speech just like the main clause, and that the construction as a whole is interpersonally balanced. In modal subordination, on the other hand, the secondary clause does not have a speech functional value, which means that it does not form a full speech act and the construction as a whole is imbalanced in interpersonal terms. Unlike with the distinction between free and bound subordination, this distinction is not marked by intonational detachment or preposing of the secondary clause, but usually correlates with lexical differentiation: the modal subordinate markers for contrast (when, while, and whereas) and justification (as, since) are lexically distinct from their coordinate counterparts (but and for). It is interesting to note that there is a parallel situation in other IndoEuropean languages, where the same set of semantic relations is equally associated with two different categories of lexical markers, with similar differences as the ones found in English. For the relation of justification, for instance, German distinguishes between denn and da (Thim-Mabrey 1982), Dutch has a distinction between want and aangezien (Van Belle

210

Chapter 8: Semantics

1989), French has a distinction between car and puisque or comme (Groupe λ-l 1977), and Spanish has a distinction between pues and como or ya que (Goethals 2002). From the perspective of the interpersonal properties of the constructions associated with the conjunctions, the situation in these languages is very similar to the situation in English. On the one hand, both types of conjunctions introduce secondary clauses that are interpersonally independent from their main clause, because they cannot serve as focus of the interpersonal resources of their main clause. On the other hand, however, the two members of the pair are not equal in interpersonal status: in languages like German and Dutch, this is formally marked by the distinction between VO and OV order, which as we have shown in the previous chapter correlates with the parameter of speech function in the interpersonal typology. Thus, for instance, German denn and Dutch want take coordinate VO order, whereas the other members of the pair (German da and Dutch aangezien) take OV order, as illustrated for Dutch in (56) and (57) below. In this sense, the overt word order distinction for these pairs of conjunctions in German and Dutch can be regarded as further corroboration for the divergent status of the coordinate and modal subordinate constructions in English. (56) (57)

Jan komt, want hij heeft zijn auto terug. Jan comes for he has his car back ‘Jan is coming, because (for) he has got his car back.’ Jan komt, aangezien hij zijn auto terug-heeft. Jan comes since he his car back-has ‘Jan is coming, since he has got his car back.’

4. Secondary parameters: further semantic differentiation The previous section has shown how the internal interpersonal structure of the secondary clause functions as the most important parameter for the meaning of the conjunctions: the primary semantic division is between constructions in which the secondary clause has some interpersonal structure of its own (modal and/or speech functional) and constructions for which this is not the case. In the final section of this chapter, I will show how a number of secondary parameters that were touched upon in our initial treatment of interpersonal grammar (Chapters 4 and 5) correlate with further semantic subdivisions for the primary classes of conjunctions distinguished in the previous section. More particularly, I will show that the

Secondary parameters: further semantic differentiation

211

feature of speaker-bias in the interpretation of non-declarative clause types correlates with the distinction between argumentative and nonargumentative semantics of the interclausal relation within the coordinate category, and that the features of echoicity and agent-binding (see below for this terminology) in the interpretation of modal verbs correlate with the distinction between temporal and non-temporal semantics of the interclausal relation for the free and bound subordinate category. 4.1. Coordination: argumentative and non-argumentative subcategories The coordinate construction type is distinguished from the other constructions in that both clauses that make up the complex sentence have an illocutionary force of their own, with their own modal and speech functional values. As argued in Chapter 4 (Section 2), this characteristic is reflected in the paradigmatic availability of the different basic clause types: thus, for instance, the coordinate for-clause in (58) is distinct from the subordinate before-clause in (59) in that the former allows all basic clause types, whereas the latter allows only the declarative, which points to neutralization of the paradigm of speech functional values and therefore also absence of illocutionary force. (58)

(59)

a. Captain Eduard von Pustau, Captain Lothar Persius, and Lieutenant-Commander Hans Paasche, were the worst imaginable, for they had committed the unforgivable acts of leaving the Service and joining the political left. Paasche and Persius had gone so far as to embrace pacifism. (CB usbooks) b. I have never left this island in my life, for why should a woman travel? We have more important things to do. Curiosity is not in itself destructive, but it demands respect, like fire. (CB ukbooks) a. “We knew Matthew had broken his hand before we went to Coffs Harbour to play Wests, but we didn’t have time to arrange a replacement,” Finch said. (CB oznews) b. *Matthew had broken his hand before did(n’t) we go to Coffs Harbour to play Wests.

Within the category defined by presence of illocutionary force, it is possible to make a further subdivision on the basis of the range of illocutionary forces that is available for the secondary clause: the illocutionary potential

212

Chapter 8: Semantics

of clauses introduced by for, because and although is different from that of clauses introduced by and or or. Clauses introduced by for, because and although are typically restricted to a roughly assertive force, as shown in Lakoff (1984: 474–475). This restriction is reflected in the fact that imperative and interrogative clause types in these contexts are typically biased towards an epistemic position taken by the speaker (see further in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 on speaker-bias in non-declarative contexts). The interrogatives in the for-clause in (60) and the because-clause in (61), for instance, do not transfer the responsibility for the epistemic position entirely to the interlocutor: they are biased towards an epistemic position taken by the speaker. The interrogative who would be crazy enough to tether a balloon to a mule in (60) conveys that “nobody but Boyce would be crazy enough to do that” and hasn’t history proved that the English try to do the Irish down in (61) conveys that “history has proved that the English try to do the Irish down”. Similarly, the imperative in the although-clause in (62) does not serve as a deontic position taken by the speaker, but is again biased towards an epistemic position: remember that alcohol dehydrates the body conveys “alcohol dehydrates the body”. It is not to be denied, of course, that the illocutionary force of the speaker-biased interrogatives and imperatives in (60)-(62) is still different from that of the corresponding epistemic declaratives by virtue of their non-declarative form, but what matters here is that they cannot serve as neutral questions or orders. (60)

(61)

(62)

The balloon, inflated, is being tugged along by a mule. The wind blows more strongly; the mule rises from the ground; and balloon and mule float off, never to be seen again. The story would seem hyperbole, for who would be crazy enough to tether a balloon to a mule? Boyce would, of course. (CB ukbooks) It seemed eminently believable that you, or possibly your family, had been annoyed, devastated – whatever – on finding out that your grandfather had been playing around with a young Irish girl, and had sent you over to demand an explanation, exact retribution. Because hasn’t history proved that the English are always trying to do the Irish down? (BNC HGY 4039-4040) Whisk together pineapple and pink grapefruit juice, cassis and lime for an Exotic Blossom, or top orange juice with crushed strawberries for a Tropical Sunrise. You needn’t leave out alcohol, although remember that it does dehydrate the body. (CB today)

Secondary parameters: further semantic differentiation

213

The existence of this type of illocutionary restriction for clauses introduced by for, although and because can be linked up to the shared semantic feature of ‘argumentation’ in the relation they mark. The secondary clause in these cases either provides some type of justification (for and because) for some aspect of the main clause or an argument against it (although), and this is what requires a roughly assertive force, i.e. a bias towards an epistemic position taken by the speaker. Speakers can only provide arguments or counterarguments with utterances that express an epistemic position taken by themselves. Interrogative clause types typically transfer responsibility for an epistemic position to the interlocutor, however, and imperative clause types typically encode deontic positions. This implies that such structures will have to be interpreted as biased towards an epistemic position taken by the speaker when occurring in justificational or concessive structures, as is the case in (60)-(62) above. In clauses introduced by and and or, on the other hand, there is no such argumentative relation, and this is also reflected in the larger range of illocutionary forces available: unlike with for, because and although, interrogatives and imperatives introduced by and and or need not be biased, but they can express neutral questions and orders, as shown in (63) and (64). (63) (64)

But with your mother’s mother and father when they got older did they still live on their own or did they live with the children? (CB ukspok) Warren I love you. Ah? You can come over tonight, and don’t forget the condoms. (COLT b132601.cor 228-229)

The correlation between the biased versus neutral interpretation of nondeclarative clause types and the argumentative versus non-argumentative semantics of the interclausal relation involved is also reflected in the behaviour of the conjunction but, which allows both an argumentative and a non-argumentative reading. The relevant semantic features have been observed in Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) for French, and applied to English by König (e.g. 1985: 5–7): but can be used in a purely contrastive or in a counter-argumentative sense. In the counter-argumentative sense, main clause and but-clause serve as counter-arguments relative to some conclusion: in (65), for instance, the main clause presents costs as an argument against renting a flat on one’s own, and the but-clause presents the privacy this provides as a stronger argument in favour of renting a flat alone. In the contrastive sense, on the other hand, there is no counter-

214

Chapter 8: Semantics

argumentative relation involved, but main clause and secondary clause are simply construed as being in contrast, as in (66) below. (65)

(66)

Gonzalves, a freelance hair and make-up artist, has been renting a one-bedroomed flat in south London for a year, having shared with another person previously. “It’s a bit more expensive but there are so many benefits, like having your own space, being able to see people when you choose basically just being in charge of your life.” (CB times) More than 250 British citizens from Kuwait were also evacuated today. They had travelled overland from Kuwait to Iraq in a convoy, but other foreigners trapped in Iraq and Kuwait haven’t been so lucky. (CB npr)

Significantly, the distinction between argumentative and nonargumentative semantics of the relation marked by but can be shown to correlate with the parameter of assertive versus free illocutionary force. The argumentative meaning of the counter-argumentative use is reflected in the restricted illocutionary potential of the but-clause: the interrogative butclause in (67) below, for instance, is necessarily interpreted as biased towards an epistemic position by the speaker, because he/she uses it as a counter-argument to the argument that studies on NSMs are not relevant to religion. With the purely contrastive use of but, on the other hand, there is no such restriction, as shown by the fact that non-declarative clauses like the interrogative in (68) can be interpreted as neutral questions. (67)

(68)

Certainly, most theorists of NSMs reject notions of transcendence and other-worldliness as sources of motivation, solidarity and integration in late-capitalist society. But does this mean that studies of NSMs can have no bearing on religion? (CB ukbooks) (All three women start talking at the same time, then crying.) Palmer: I know why I’m crying, but why are you guys so sad? A. Ziff: Because I sold my cello to get Bitzi her stupid drumsticks. Palmer: Oh, no. (CB npr)

In conclusion, the range of illocutionary forces available for secondary clauses in coordinate constructions is another example of an interpersonal property that can be shown to correlate with distinctions in the meaning of the conjunction involved in the construction. Restriction to a roughly assertive force is reflected in the feature of speaker-bias in the interpreta-

Secondary parameters: further semantic differentiation

215

tion of non-declarative clause types, and correlates with the argumentative subset of the coordinate category. Absence of such restrictions, on the other hand, is reflected in the availability of neutral interpretations for nondeclarative clause types, and correlates with the non-argumentative subset of the coordinate construction type. Additional evidence for this correlation is provided by the ambiguity of but, which can be either counterargumentative or contrastive, and behaves accordingly in terms of the range of illocutionary forces allowed. Table 39 summarizes the findings.51 Table 39. Range of illocutionary forces as a secondary parameter for coordination Constructional property Restriction to roughly assertive force ~ epistemic speaker-bias for nondeclarative clause types No illocutionary restriction ~ no necessary epistemic speakerbias for non-declarative clause types

Semantics

Conjunctions

Argumentative

because, for, although, but

Non-argumentative

and, or, but

4.2. Free/bound subordination: temporal and non-temporal subcategories Free and bound subordination are distinguished from the other two categories by the absence of interpersonal values in the secondary clause, both modal and speech functional values. For the restriction on modality, it is necessary to distinguish between two different subtypes of free and bound subordination, illustrated in (69) and (70) below. (69) (70)

Hundreds of readers called our Missing Pop Stars Bureau with sightings of the Mysterious Boy after we reported him missing yesterday. (CB sunnow) But if they want to search you they have to have different reasons to the ones for searching a car. They cannot bodysearch you because you may have a stolen television in your car. But they can search both you and the car if the item, like a watch, is small enough to be hidden in either place. (CB ukmags)

Absence of modality can be reflected in two types of structural configurations. On the one hand, there are structures like the after-clause in (69)

216

Chapter 8: Semantics

where the occurrence of subjective modal verbs like must or may (as the marked modal values) is excluded: in these cases, the construction is regarded as free or bound subordinate because there is no structural availability of marked modal values. On the other hand, there are also structures like the because-clause in (70) where subjective modal verbs are not excluded, as illustrated by the occurrence of the modal verb may. The availability of subjective modal verbs as such, however, is not necessarily a reason to regard these constructions as modal subordinate or coordinate rather than free and bound subordinate. As explained in Chapters 4 (Section 3) and 5 (Section 1.2), what matters in this case is not only the availability of a modal verb as the marked value of the modal paradigm, but also the interpersonal nature of this modal verb: the modal in the because-clause in (70) is different from modals in modal subordinate and coordinate constructions in that it does not relate to the current speaker-interlocutor interaction, but rather relates to the agent of the main clause. May in (70) does not figure in speaker-interlocutor interaction, but is an assessment of possibility that relates the agent of the main clause, i.e. it is the police officials who think that ‘you may have a stolen TV in your car’. In this sense, the presence of a modal in this type of structure does not count as evidence for the interpersonal independence of the secondary clause, as was the case for modal subordination and coordination. Instead, it points precisely in the opposite direction: the binding of the modal to the agent of the main clause points towards interpersonal integration into the main clause. The same situation has already been discussed in Section 2.4 of this chapter, in the analysis of the purpose reading of so that. In addition, a similar case has also been discussed in our analysis of the interaction between conditionality and modality in Chapter 1 (Section 2.2.1), where it was shown that conditional clauses do allow subjective modal verbs, but again only when they are echoically related to some position voiced or implied in the preceding discourse rather than to the current speaker. Thus, the distinction between structures like (69) and (70) shows that there are two subtypes within free/bound subordinate category: one type where the secondary clause does not allow any subjective modal verbs at all, as in (69), and another type where the secondary clause only allows subjective modal verbs that do not figure in speaker-interlocutor interaction but are bound to some other conscious being, such as the agent of the main clause (as with the because-clause in (70)) or a speaker from the preceding discourse (as with conditionals). If we further explore the lexical associations of these two subtypes, the conjunctions associated with each subtype also appear to constitute coherent semantic categories. The conjunctions

Secondary parameters: further semantic differentiation

217

that do not allow any modal verbs are the temporal ones, i.e. after, before, since, as, once, when, while and until, whereas the conjunctions that allow non-speaker-bound modal verbs are the conjunctions of reason (because), purpose (so that) and condition (if). Interestingly, there is again one case for which two different readings of the same conjunction relate precisely to the distinction between absence of modals and presence of non-speaker-bound modals, which further confirms the general correlation. It is a well-known fact that because can express both relations of cause and relations of reason. With relations of cause, the realization of the SoA described in the because-clause leads to the realization of the SoA described in the main clause, as in (71) below, which describes Ben’s TV addiction as the cause of his failure in catching thieves. With relations of reason, on the other hand, the SoA described in the because-clause does not necessarily lead to the realization of the SoA in the main clause, but rather describes the motivation of the agent in the main clause for the action described in the main clause (Lowe 1987: 43–45), as in (72), which describes the fans’ motivation to tolerate their team’s boring performance. Only with relations of reason can the because-clause express a modal verb, as also observed in Hengeveld (1998: 346–347): the motivating relation to the agent of the main clause is what allows the binding of the modal verb to this same agent, as in (72) where the assessment of possibility expressed by may in the because-clause is the motivation for the fans to accept the boring level of performance by their team. (71)

(72)

We were in Ben’s hut. He’s the vigilant nightwatchman hired to watch for thieves who habitually steal the roadmenders’ gear. He’s never caught any because he mostly kips in front of the portable telly his daughter bought him last Easter. (CB ukbooks) I’ve been bored by Celtic against Hibs, Dundee United, Aberdeen and Hearts in recent weeks. Their fans are only tolerating it because it may stop Rangers winning 10-in-a-row. They won’t accept it next season. (CB sunnow)

Table 40 summarizes the types of semantic relations associated with the secondary parameter described in this section: absence of subjective modal verbs is associated with temporal and causal relations, whereas presence of subjective modal verbs with binding to a non-speaker source is associated with the relations of reason, purpose and condition. Within the latter category, it is possible to make a further distinction in terms of the location of the source to which the modal in question is bound: the source of the

218

Chapter 8: Semantics

modal assessment is located with the agent of the main clause for the relations of reason and purpose, whereas it is located with a speaker in the preceding discourse for the relation of condition. This further subdivision also makes sense semantically, in that reason and purpose are semantically closer to each other than they are to condition, as reflected for instance in the cross-linguistically frequent overlap of their markers (Kortmann 1997: 198–199). Moreover, the resulting tripartition also fits in nicely with the functional analysis of absence of modality in Chapter 6 (for more details see Section 5.2). The traditional logical presupposition analysis was shown to apply only to those categories with total absence of subjective modal verbs, i.e. the temporal and causal relations: categories with non-speakerbound subjective modal verbs are either a matter of supposition (binding to previous speaker for conditionals) or projection (binding to the agent of the main clause for reason and purpose). Table 40. Modality as a secondary parameter for free and bound subordination Reflection of the absence of modality Absence of subjective modal verbs Presence of subjective modal verbs but binding to a non-speaker source

Location source Agent of main clause Preceding speaker

Semantic relations Time (after, before, since, as, once, when, while, until) Cause (because) Reason (because) Purpose (so that) Condition (if)

5. Conclusion In this chapter, I have tried to show how the interpersonal properties of the different construction types are also relevant to the meaning of the conjunctions in the clause combination. The different types of semantic relations are not distributed randomly over the construction types in the interpersonal typology, but can be shown to correlate with some of the parameters on which the typology is based. The most interesting evidence for the semantic impact of the interpersonal parameters described in this chapter has come from conjunctions that can occur in different construction types: the different senses of these conjunctions can be shown to correlate with the different interpersonal properties of the construction types with which they are associated.

Conclusion

219

The primary parameter with a semantic impact appears to be the internal structure of the secondary clause: presence versus absence of interpersonal values defines a primary contrast between relations of addition, alternation, contrast, result, justification and concession on the one hand, and relations of time, cause, reason, condition and purpose on the other hand. Within these primary categories, there are two secondary parameters that allow further subdivision. For the coordinate category, a further distinction can be made on the basis of the range of illocutionary forces allowed for the secondary clause: with the argumentative relations of justification and concession this is restricted to a roughly assertive force, whereas with the non-argumentative relations of addition, alternation and contrast there is no such restriction. For the bound and free subordinate categories, on the other hand, it is possible to make a further distinction on the basis of two different reflections of the absence of modality in the secondary clause: this can either be reflected in the absence of subjective modal verbs as such, as in the relations of time and cause, or it can be reflected in a non-speakerbound interpretation for subjective modal verbs, as in the relations of reason, purpose and condition. Table 41 summarizes the correlation between the different parameters and the types of semantic relations. Table 41. Interpersonal parameters and interclausal semantics Primary parameter

Secondary parameter

Presence of interpersonal values

Restrictions on illocutionary force

Absence of interpersonal values

Restrictions on subjective modals

No restriction Restriction to roughly assertive force Subjective modals possible but nonspeaker-bound Subjective modals impossible

Semantic categories Addition, alternation, contrast Justification, concession Reason, purpose, condition Time, cause

The existence of correlations with the semantics of the conjunctions involved in the constructions can be considered as an additional argument for the usefulness of the interpersonal approach to clause combining: we would not expect this type of correlation if the parameters were irrelevant to the problem of clause combining. The analysis in this chapter has also made clear, however, that not every constructional boundary in the typol-

220

Chapter 8: Semantics

ogy has a semantic impact: the impact is mainly restricted to the boundary between {coordination, modal subordination} and {free subordination, bound subordination}. The further constructional boundaries within these semantically relevant categories provide different discursive configurations for the different types of semantic relations, as has also been shown in Chapters 6 and 7.

Part 3 Applications and implications

Introduction to Part 3

I will round off this study with an application of the general framework developed in the preceding chapters to a number of specific descriptive problems in the domain of clause combining, and a tentative exploration of some further theoretical implications of the proposed framework, specifically in terms of its typological usefulness. Descriptive problems in clause combining The arguments in the previous chapters focused mainly on the internal organization of the framework as such, by showing how it can incorporate and motivate commonly used functional concepts in the analysis of clause combining (Chapter 6), how the categories in the typology relate to other grammatical criteria (Chapter 7), and how they define semantically coherent categories of conjunctions (Chapter 8). In this final section, I will confront the proposed framework with a number of descriptive puzzles from the domain of clause combining, in order to show how the framework can be put to work usefully in dealing with specific problems in the analysis of clause combining. The first two case studies deal with various aspects of the use of complex sentences in interaction. In this sense, the discussion moves from a more strictly interpersonal approach focusing on encoded meanings, to a more broadly interactional one (in the sense of Ford, Fox and Thompson 2003) focusing on the use of categories in interaction. Specifically, I will show how an interpersonal analysis of complex sentences can also be put to work usefully in analysing how complex sentences are actually used in discourse. The first case-study to be dealt with is the distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related status of interclausal relations (e.g. Halliday and Hasan 1976: 239–241; Davies 1979: 146–176; Sweetser 1990: 76–112), as illustrated in the distinction between (1) and (2) below. In both cases there is an interclausal relation of conditionality marked by if, but in (1) this relation holds between the SoAs described in main and secondary clause, with the if-clause describing a condition for buying new players for the team, whereas in (2) it relates to the speech act performed by the speaker in the main clause, with the if-clause describing a condition on the speaker’s asking of the question in the main clause.

224 (1) (2)

Introduction to Part 3

But he said defiantly: “I’ve never panicked in the past and I’m not going to now. But if the right players come along I will act,” he said. (CB today) “Planning to stay in Harlem long?” “I don’t know yet,” he answered honestly. “Where’re you from, if you don’t mind my asking?” he lied, naming the first state that popped into his mind. “Maine?” (CB usbooks)

The basic semantic and grammatical properties of this distinction have been described in a large number of studies in various theoretical frameworks, but there are several descriptive problems that still remain unsolved or even unaddressed in the literature. These include, for instance, the question why structures like (1) and (2) react differently to syntactic criteria like clefting or nominalization of the main clause, whether any subtypes should be distinguished within the two categories, and whether all semantic types of interclausal relations behave in the same way with respect to this distinction. In Chapter 9, I will show how the interpersonal analysis of clause combining developed in this study can provide a coherent account of the most important semantic and grammatical properties of this distinction, while at the same time also providing an answer to several of the questions that remain unsolved in the existing analyses. The second case-study to be dealt with is the often-noted difference in discursive status between initial and final secondary clauses (e.g. Thompson 1985; Ramsay 1987; Ford 1993), illustrated in (3) and (4) below. In both cases there is a relation of reason expressed by because, but the discursive status of this relation is very different for the two structures. Whereas the final because-clause in (3) has a purely local function, in that it describes the reason for the SoA described in the main clause, the initial because-clause in (4) is not only locally related to its main clause, but also serves as a discursive ‘bridge’ to the preceding discourse, because it summarizes the description of the absence of human noise in the preceding paragraph and links this up with its main clause. (3)

(4)

A little earlier in the evening he’d tried explaining to the tattooed roo-shooter who had asked him the inevitable question in the adjacent bar. “I came here because I wanted to feel clean. I wanted to feel that I could just be me and get away from the past. No strings. No letters to write. Nothing ...” (ACE) At nightfall he had been able to sneak down a hillside and into the jungle, reeking of death. Apprehensively he peered to the left, to

Typological implications

225

the right into the leafy, vine-crisscrossed maze. He decided that the marines must be deploying around the meadow, with the one left to distract him. He strained his hearing. Cautious feet stepping on leafmold; faint creaking of belts and slings; whispers: he heard none of these. Only the hum of insects and the distant fluttering call of a bird. Because he couldn’t hear them, he was more convinced they were there. (BROWN) In Chapter 10, I will show how the difference in discursive status between structures like (3) and (4) can be explained in terms of the interpersonal framework proposed in this study: the non-local function of initial secondary clauses can be attributed to the specific interpersonal properties of the initial position. On the other hand, the confrontation with the interpersonal framework will also reveal a number of inaccuracies in the traditional analysis of this problem. I will argue, for instance that the correlation between final position and local function for the secondary clause cannot be generalized: it is possible to distinguish between different types of final clauses, only one of which typically has a local function. Typological implications In Chapter 11, I will try to show that the interpersonal perspective proposed in this study may also be significant for the typology of clause combining. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine this significance in any detailed way, but on the basis of a number of case studies, I will try to indicate some suggestive links with typological phenomena in the area of clause combining. These phenomena will include, amongst others, the use of marked mood categories in subordinate structures (illustrated with the generalized subordinate clause in Australian languages, e.g. Hale 1976) and the role of non-finiteness in clause combining (illustrated with nonfiniteness in English and in clause-chaining constructions, e.g. Roberts 1997).

Chapter 9 Speaker-related versus SoA-related interpretations

1. Introduction The first case-study concerns the distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related interpretations of interclausal relations. It has often been observed that interclausal relations can function on two different levels, either relating to the SoA described in the main clause, or relating to some aspect of the speaker’s role in that main clause (see for instance Ross 1970: 248; Rutherford 1970; Halliday and Hasan 1976: 239–241; Van Dijk 1979; Davies 1979: 146–176; McTear 1979; Haegeman 1984; Küper 1984; Van der Auwera 1986; Dik et al. 1990; Sweetser 1990: 76–112; Cuvalay 1996; Verstraete 1998; Crevels 2000a: 30–36, 2000b). Consider, for instance, examples (1) and (2): (1)

(2)

“Was that why you returned to Salzburg after the war? In the hope that Elke Knödel would come back, too?” “I came back because this is my home. When you’ve suffered six years in a concentration camp, blending into the scenery, as you put it, seems a welcome, a comfortable refuge.” (CB ukbooks) Now how did you go about that because as a sort of er vicarious beneficiary of this erm I’m very interested in it. Well erm to sum it up there was a small group here in Birmingham some university folk and others er outside erm many of them connected with the Abortion Law Reform Association of which I was a member come to think of it. (CB ukspok)

The structures in (1) and (2) are distinct in terms of the aspect of the main clause to which the secondary clause is related. In (1), the becauseclause indicates a reason for the SoA described in the main clause, in that it explains why the speaker came back to Salzburg after the war. In (2), on the other hand, the because-clause does not indicate a reason for the SoA described in the main clause, but rather for the speech act performed by the speaker: the because-clause in (2) serves to explain why the speaker has asked the question in the main clause.

228

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

In this chapter, I will show how the distinction between SoA-related and speaker-related uses can be modelled in terms of the analysis of clause combining proposed in this study, and how this analysis can account for a number of questions that have so far remained unanswered in the existing analyses of the distinction. More particularly, I will focus on two problem areas. First of all, it has been observed by a number of authors that the semantic distinction between SoA-related and speaker-related uses is also reflected in a number of syntactic differences: SoA-related structures can occur in a number of syntactic configurations that are excluded for their speaker-related counterparts. Thus, for instance, SoA-related structures like (1) can easily be subject to clefting (Rutherford 1970: 100; Davies 1979: 175), why-questioning (Rutherford 1970: 106; Groupe λ-l 1975: 250), or nominalization of the main clause (Rutherford 1970: 98; 104–105), whereas speaker-related structures like (2) cannot occur in such configurations without losing their speaker-related character. Although it has often been noted that these syntactic differences exist, the question why such criteria can test for the distinction has not yet been answered. In the second section of this chapter, I will show that the interpersonal framework proposed in this study, more specifically the parameter of scope that distinguishes between bound subordination and the other categories in the typology, allows one to explain why these syntactic criteria correlate with the semantic distinction. Secondly, a number of authors (like Davies 1979: 146–176; Dik et al. 1990: 35–39; Sweetser 1990: 78–112) have proposed a subdivision of the speaker-related category into two subcategories, one related to the illocutionary force of the main clause, as in (2) above, and another related specifically to the argumentative aspect of the main clause, as in (3) below where the secondary clause serves to support the conclusion drawn by the speaker in the main clause. (3)

Then we had Cliff Barnes of Dallas in the house well actor Ken Kercheval in the house. And, to put it bluntly, there’s a bit of a thing going on between us now! The Big Breakfast team discovered that as well as being shot four times and coming back from the dead at least twice, Cliff had 12 affairs during his time as, er, Cliff. And he must have really got into the part because he spent quite a large part of the morning winking at me. (CB sunnow)

One problem related to this further subdivision is the precise extent of the argumentative subcategory illustrated in (3). Those authors who

Explaining syntactic behaviour

229

propose the subdivision have argued explicitly that it is valid only for structures with declarative main clauses, and that structures with nondeclarative main clauses can only belong to the speech act-related subcategory. On the basis of the interpersonal framework developed in this study, more particularly the distinction between modality and speech function as complementary but separate aspects of interpersonal grammar, I will argue that it is not justified to restrict the argumentative subcategory to structures with declarative main clauses, and I will show that structures with imperative and interrogative main clauses can equally belong to this category. 2. Explaining syntactic behaviour The distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related interpretations for the interclausal relation is reflected in a number of syntactic differences. Thus, for instance, SoA-related structures can easily occur in cleft constructions, wh-interrogatives and nominalized constructions without any effect on their SoA-related interpretation, whereas speaker-related structures cannot occur in these constructions without losing their speaker-related interpretation (see Rutherford 1970: 98; 100; 104–105; Groupe λ-l 1975: 250; Davies 1979: 175). Compare, for instance, the structures in (4) and (5) below: (4)

(5)

John was fired because he didn’t work hard enough. a. It is because he didn’t work hard enough that John was fired. b. Why was John fired? c. John’s being fired because he didn’t work hard enough [came as no surprise] John has been fired, because his wife told me. a. ≠ It is because his wife told me that John has been fired. = It is because his wife told me that I believe John has been fired. b. ≠ Why has John been fired? Because his wife told me. = Why do you believe John has been fired? Because his wife told me. c. ≠ John’s being fired because his wife told me [came as no surprise]

The because-clause in (4) provides a reason for the SoA described in the main clause, viz. the fact that John was discharged. This SoA-related

230

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

structure can occur in a cleft construction, as in (4a), it can be questioned with why, as in (4b), and it can occur with a nominalized main clause, as in (4c). The speaker-related structure in (5), on the other hand, cannot occur in these contexts without losing its speaker-related interpretation. The because-clause in (5) provides a hearsay argument for the speaker’s belief that John has been fired, and this type of interpretation cannot be maintained in the clefted, why-questioned and nominalized alternatives in (5a), (5b) and (5c). In order to maintain the speaker-related interpretation in these constructions, it is necessary to explicitly describe the aspect of the speaker’s role in the main clause to which the because-clause is related, as with the believe-predicate in (5a) and (5b).52 Apart from the different behaviour in reaction to clefting, whquestioning and nominalization, there is also a more indirect criterion that distinguishes SoA-related structures from their speaker-related counterparts. As observed by Sweetser (1990: 82–86), it is only the SoA-related category that can occur under one single intonation contour, as in (6) below, with the main clause as presupposed information and the relation with the secondary clause as the asserted part of the structure. (6)

Why’re they str\ong# and why’re they l\ight# no why […] they’re strong because they need to b-e#, they n-eed to# be held \up#, the bones need to be held \up# and because they won’t break so \/easily# -and erm#, they’re light bec-ause# you don’t want to dr\ag down# to the floor d\o you# (COLT b136403.pro 111-113)

Most of these formal differences between the speaker-related and the SoA-related interpretations are well-known from the existing literature, but one question that has remained unanswered so far is why these criteria can serve to distinguish between the two interpretations. Why is it, for instance, that the cleft construction can differentiate between speaker-related and SoA-related uses, and why can only the SoA-related use occur under one single intonation contour? In the remainder of this section, I will try to show how the framework developed in this study can help to answer these questions, and thus to make the connection between the semantics and the syntactic behaviour of the distinction between SoA-related and speakerrelated uses (see also Verstraete 1998).

Explaining syntactic behaviour

231

2.1. Speaker-related interpretation and bound subordination In terms of the interpersonal typology, most of the syntactic restrictions on the speaker-related structure can be related to the bound subordinate construction. In this section, I will argue that the key to the explanation of these restrictions lies with the general incompatibility of the interpersonal properties of the bound subordinate construction type and the interpersonal properties of the speaker-related structure. In the following section, I will then show how the specific criteria of clefting, wh-questioning and integrated intonation can be related to this general incompatibility. The distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related interclausal relations can be captured grammatically in terms of the distinction between an interpersonal and a propositional component in the grammar of the simple clause (see Part 1 of this study), each of which can serve as the target for some type of secondary clause: speaker-related secondary clauses are grammatically related to some aspect of the interpersonal structure of their main clause, whereas SoA-related secondary clauses are grammatically related to some aspect of the propositional content that falls within the scope of the interpersonal structure of their main clause. Thus, for instance, the because-clause in (5) above provides evidential support for the epistemic modal position taken by the speaker about John’s discharge, which is encoded in the indicative mood of the main clause, whereas its counterpart in (4) above describes the reason for the fact that John was discharged, which is part of the propositional content that falls within the scope of this indicative mood.

Indicative be fired (John)

(5) because his wife told me (4) because he didn’t work hard enough

Figure 4. The distinction between speaker-related and SOA-related structures

232

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

Figure 4 provides a schematic representation of this distinction, based on the conventions used in McGregor (1997: 67) for representing the scoping relation of interpersonal elements relative to the propositional content of the clause (see also McGregor 1999 and Verstraete 2000). This is not simply a trivial formalization of the semantic basis of the distinction: in combination with the interpersonal parameter of scope, it can serve to explain why the syntactic restrictions mentioned above correlate with the semantic distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related uses. The key to this explanation is that in order to function as a comment on the interpersonal structure of the main clause, a secondary clause should at least be outside the scope of that interpersonal structure. As has been shown in Chapter 4 (Section 4), the parameter of scope distinguishes the bound subordinate construction from the other constructions in the typology: the secondary clause in bound subordination falls within the scope of the interpersonal values of its main clause, whereas the secondary clause of the other construction types falls outside the scope of these interpersonal values. Because of its position within the scope, the secondary clause in bound subordination is part of the propositional content with respect to which the speaker defines an interactive position: main clause and secondary clause together form a complex propositional content over which the speech act encoded on the main clause has scope, as shown in figure 5. Main clause interpersonal resources Main clause SoA

because secondary clause

Figure 5. Bound subordination

The defining feature of a speaker-related interpretation, on the other hand, is that the secondary clause is dependent on some aspect of the interpersonal structure of its main clause. This is incompatible with the bound subordinate construction type: a secondary clause cannot at the same time fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of its main clause (as in bound subordination) and serve as a dependent on these same interpersonal resources (as in the speaker-related interpretation). To put it in semantic terms, a secondary clause cannot be part of the propositional content of a particular speech act and at the same time serve as a comment on this same speech act: in order to comment on the speech act, the secon-

Explaining syntactic behaviour

233

dary clause must at least function outside the scope of this speech act, as in the configuration shown in figure 6 below, which is compatible with all three other construction types in the interpersonal typology. Main clause interpersonal resources Main clause SoA

because secondary clause

Figure 6. Speaker-related structure

Thus, the bound subordinate construction can serve to make the distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related structures, because speakerrelated structures cannot occur in a bound subordinate construction. SoArelated structures, on the other hand, are not restricted in this respect: since the secondary clause in these structures is dependent on the SoA rather than on the interpersonal resources of the main clause, the position relative to the interpersonal resources of that main clause is irrelevant to the SoArelated nature of the relation. This explains why the bound subordinate construction distinguishes between SoA-related and speaker-related uses: SoA-related uses, as opposed to their speaker-related counterparts, can easily occur in the bound subordinate construction type. Table 42 summarizes these restrictions. Table 42. The distinction between SoA- and speaker-related uses

SoA-related Speaker-related

Coordination, Modal Subordination, Free Subordination [- Scope] + +

Bound Subordination [+ Scope] + -

2.2. Explaining the criteria Most of the criteria illustrated in examples (4) and (5) above can be shown to rely indirectly on the incompatibility between bound subordination and speaker-related interpretation of the secondary clause. The cleft construc-

234

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

tion, the wh-interrogative and the single-contour construction mentioned by Rutherford (1970: 100), Groupe λ-l (1975: 250), Davies (1979: 175) and Sweetser (1990: 82–86) are all indirectly related to the bound subordinate construction type. This means that the unavailability of these construction types for speaker-related uses can be explained in terms of the general incompatibility between bound subordination and a speaker-related interpretation. The single-contour construction described by Sweetser (1990: 82–86), in which the main clause is presupposed and the focus is on the interclausal relation, can be directly related to bound subordination. As has been shown in Chapter 3, focus-presupposition organization is an essentially interpersonal phenomenon: elements are not focused and presupposed as such, but serve as focus and presupposition relative to some aspect of interpersonal structure. In this sense, the fact that the secondary clause is focused in the configuration described by Sweetser (1990) is significant in interpersonal terms: it implies that the secondary clause falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause, and that the whole construction is therefore bound subordinate. This is also reflected in the fact that any interpersonal modification in the main clause in this configuration affects the focused secondary clause, as shown in (7) and (8) below, where the indicative declarative of the main clause in (6) is replaced respectively by an indicative interrogative and a modalized declarative (see also Rutherford 1970: 98; Groupe λ-l 1975: 251). It is this bound subordinate character of the configuration that explains its incompatibility with speaker-related structures: if the secondary clause falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause, it cannot at the same time serve as a comment on these same resources. (7) (8)

Are the bones strong because they need to be held up? [Is that the reason?] The bones must be strong because they need to be held up. [That must be the reason]

The criteria of wh-questioning and clefting can equally be related to the restriction on bound subordination discussed in the previous section. Clefting and wh-questioning are direct correlates of the bound subordinate construction type because they imply a positive value for the parameter of scope, as has also been shown in Chapter 7 (Section 3). What is specific to wh-constructions is that they have a focus-presupposition structure which they also project onto their expected response. Thus, for instance, the wh-

Explaining syntactic behaviour

235

construction in (9) presupposes that Bastard talked to Fool about the death of his mother, and asks why he did that. Correspondingly, the expected response to this wh-question has the same focus-presupposition structure, with the main clause as a presupposition and the reason described in the because-clause as the focus of the assertion. Cleft constructions equally show such a focus-presupposition structure: the construction in (10), for instance, presupposes that the child can sleep peacefully or play with the other children, and asserts that the child is able to do this because the parent is there. (9)

(10)

Orphan went to get Oracle and found her outside her cavern holding her head in her hands. “Bastard told Fool his mother’s dead,” Oracle muttered deep in her throat, like a growl. “Why did Bastard do that?” asked Orphan. “Bastard did it because he’s a bastard,” said Oracle. (CB ukbooks) Remember to bring something for yourself to do as the hours will seem long – especially if your child is asleep or busy playing with other children. You may feel not needed at these times, but it is because you are there that your child can sleep peacefully after an operation or have the confidence to play with other children. (CB ukephem)

In this sense, the criteria of clefting and wh-questioning can equally be explained in terms of the restriction on bound subordination discussed in the previous section. Because of their focus-presupposition structure with the focus on the wh-element, wh-questions project a bound subordinate construction as their expected response. As has been shown in the previous section, however, this construction type is incompatible with a speakerrelated interpretation, which requires a position outside of the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause for the secondary clause. The same applies to cleft constructions: because of their focus-presupposition structure these can equally be assigned to the bound subordinate construction type, and are therefore equally incompatible with a speaker-related interpretation. The criterion of nominalization, finally, requires a different type of explanation. The reason why speaker-related structures do not have any equivalents with nominalized main clauses lies with the specific differences in interpersonal structure between full clauses and their nominalized counterparts. One of the features that distinguishes the two is precisely that the nominal structure lacks the typical clause-level interpersonal resources

236

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

of modality and speech function (see Mackenzie 1996: 343–344). Thus, for instance, the full clause in (11) and its nominalized equivalent in (12) more or less describe the same type of SoA, but it is only the full clause in (11) that has the modal and speech functional values that are necessary to make it into a full speech act: the same type of modal and speech functional values are lacking for the nominalized equivalent in (12). (11) (12)

The Nimitz must have come very close to Taiwan. “Some people said the Nimitz’s coming close to Taiwan is foreign intervention,” Lee told a rally this weekend. (CB times)

It is this difference between full clauses and their nominalized counterparts that explains why clause combinations with a speaker-related interpretation do not have nominalized equivalents. Nominalization removes the interpersonal resources from the main clause that serve as the target for the secondary clause in speaker-related structures, and therefore also removes one of the necessary prerequisites for a speaker-related interpretation: a secondary clause can only comment on the speech act performed in the main clause if that main clause constitutes a speech act. For SoA-related interpretations, on the other hand, the target for the secondary clause is the SoA described in the main clause, and this explains why such structures do have nominalized equivalents: unlike the interpersonal resources of modality and speech function, the SoA is one aspect that is retained in the nominalized counterpart of the main clause. 3. The subdivision of the speaker-related category A second issue related to the distinction between speaker-related and SoArelated interpretations is the further subdivision of the speaker-related category. Several authors have argued that the speaker-related category actually consists of two subcategories (Davies 1979: 146–176; Dik et al. 1990: 35–39; Sweetser 1990: 78–112), illustrated in (13) and (14) below. The structure in (13) represents what Sweetser (1990: 76–82) calls the “epistemic” category, in which the secondary clause relates to the speaker’s process of reasoning: the fact that the speaker saw the ball bounce in an area where it could not normally be lost serves to support his argument that the ball was picked up by one of the spectators. For reasons that will become clear further on in this section, I will not use the term ‘epistemic’ to refer to this category, but will instead refer to it as the “argumentative”

The subdivision of the speaker-related category

237

(Van Belle 1997) subtype. The structure in (14), on the other hand, represents what Sweetser (1990) calls the “speech act” category, in which the secondary clause relates to the speech act performed by the speaker: the fact that the speaker doubts the reliability of some stories he/she heard about the origin of the word marmalade serves to justify why he/she asks the interlocutor to explain where the word comes from. (13)

(14)

Sam Torrance was feeling sweet then sour during the final round of the Heineken World Cup of Golf. A curious or a wily Chinese spectator pinched his ball on the last hole yesterday in the People’s Republic. […] “The ball was definitely picked up because I saw it bounce twice and there was nowhere for it to get lost,” Torrance said. (CB today) Tell me first of all the history of marmalade. Now where does the name come from? Because I’ve heard stories and I don’t know if they’re true. (CB ukspok)

In this section, I will argue that the distinction between the argumentative and the speech act subcategories can be described more accurately on the basis of the distinction between modality and speech function as complementary but separate aspects of interpersonal structure. I will show that argumentative secondary clauses like in (13) relate to the modal value of their main clause, whereas speech act secondary clauses like in (14) relate to the speech functional value of their main clause. The descriptive usefulness of this approach will be demonstrated by the way it can deal with the problem of determining the precise status of structures with nondeclarative main clauses. It has frequently been argued in the literature that such structures can only belong to the speech act subcategory, and that they are excluded from the argumentative subcategory (Davies 1979: 169; Dik et al. 1990: 54; Sweetser 1990: 78). In terms of the proposed analysis, however, it can be shown that there is no inherent restriction on the occurrence of non-declarative main clauses in the argumentative subcategory. 3.1. Modality and speech function The analysis of interpersonal grammar in the first part of this study (Chapters 1 and 2) showed that the interpersonal structure of the clause can be analysed into two complementary but distinct aspects: modality takes care of the construal of an epistemic or deontic position with respect to the

238

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

propositional content, whereas speech function takes care of the interactive activation of this position by assigning responsibility for this position in speaker-interlocutor interaction. This distinction can be regarded as the grammatical basis of the distinction between the argumentative and the speech act subcategories: the secondary clause in argumentative structures like (15) is related to the modal value of the main clause, whereas the secondary clause in speech act structures like (16) is related to the speech functional activation of this modal value (see also further in Verstraete 1998, 1999). (15)

(16)

You could be forgiven for getting the feeling that people who buy German wines are as hung up about where it comes from as Basil. “Well I tried some once, but I prefer very dry wines myself,” is the fashionable, in trade response. But surely someone must be drinking the stuff, because along with Klinsmann and BMWs, wine is still one of Germany’s most reliable exports. (CB today) A: And er what about erm er how do you find your subjects? Business studies and communication studies? Do you like erm … B: Mm. They’re all right. Really. Communication’s a bit erm boring. A: What do you do in communication studies ‘cos I’m not familiar with it. B: Erm we learn about how the media er Don’t know how to explain it really (CB ukspok)

Modality can be regarded as the basic grammatical encoder of what Sweetser (1990: 23) calls “aspects of the speaker’s reasoning”, viz. that aspect of the main clause that is relevant for an argumentative connection with the secondary clause. As shown in Chapter 1, modality serves to construe a position with respect to the propositional content of the clause, either an epistemic position about the plausibility of the occurrence of the SoA, or a deontic position about the desirability of the SoA. In this sense, it is not a coincidence that the main clause in argumentative structures frequently contains marked modal values, like must in (15) above: if the function of the secondary clause is to support the speaker’s process of reasoning, explicit marking of modality in the main clause is a natural consequence. Moreover, for argumentative structures without marked modal values, a switch from unmarked indicative mood to marked modality usually strengthens the interclausal cohesion, as shown in (17) and (18) below.

The subdivision of the speaker-related category

(17)

(18)

239

Their horn had stopped, so whoever was supposed to be squeezing the trigger had been distracted. Then the twin engines revved again and the high-pitched horn gave a long blast. They were pretty near because I could hear a bow wave, and travelling too fast by the rate at which they passed our starboard side. (CB ukmags) They must have been pretty near, because I could hear a bow wave.

For speech act connections like in (16) above or (19) below, on the other hand, it is not the modal value of the main clause that is the target for the interclausal relation: what is relevant in these structures is the way this modal position is speech functionally activated for use in discourse. Unlike with the argumentative examples in (15) and (17), the secondary clause in this type of examples does not focus on certain types of evidence or counter-evidence for the modal assessment of the propositional content of the main clause, but rather focuses on the interactive and discursive circumstances of the full speech act. Thus, for instance, the cos-clause in (16) serves to indicate how the question asked in the main clause is relevant in the context of the interaction: the fact that the speaker is not familiar with communication studies serves to justify why he/she asks the interlocutor to explain the subject. Similarly, the if-clause in (19) is used by the speaker to emphasize that she makes the assertion in the main clause only because of the interlocutor’s impolite insistence. As has been shown in the analysis in Chapter 2, speech acts are socially charged phenomena because they involve the imposition of certain expectations on the interlocutor, and it is this social aspect that is typically addressed in secondary clauses in speech act-related structures. (19)

“Leo, really, that’s quite enough,” Mrs. Dambar put in, adopting the tone of a rather formidable aunt of hers. “I really can’t sit here and listen to you cross-examine Mrs. Howard like this. If you must know, we stopped in town on the way to the mall. I had a session with Dr. Lahey while Mrs. Howard shopped.” (CB usbooks)

240

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

3.2. The status of structures with non-declarative main clauses This analysis of the distinction between the argumentative and speech act categories in terms of modality and speech function can now be used to assess the frequently encountered claim that structures with non-declarative main clauses can only have speech-act related interpretations (Davies 1979: 146–176; Dik et al. 1990: 35–39; Sweetser 1990: 78–112). Compare, for instance, the formulation in Sweetser: “If any utterance is imperative or interrogative in form, then it cannot reasonably be causally conjoined to another utterance except at the speech act level” (Sweetser 1990: 78) Claims like these disregard the fact that any full clause, including interrogative and imperative structures, also has a modal value in addition to the speech functional value encoded by the basic clause type, and therefore has the basic prerequisite for allowing argumentative secondary clauses. Interrogative structures have a modal value just like declarative structures, but the difference between declarative and interrogative modality lies in the speech functional activation of the modal value: whereas the declarative assigns the responsibility for this modal position to the speaker, the interrogative transfers it to the interlocutor. At first sight, an interrogative speech functional activation may seem to block argumentative interpretations: a speaker can only provide epistemic support for a position he takes him/herself, but not for something about which he/she asks the interlocutor to take a position. The analysis of interrogative in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) has shown, however, that interrogative structures are not entirely interlocutor-based, but also have an important speaker-based component. The speaker still retains control over the type of modal position for which responsibility is transferred in the interrogative, and this can easily lead to biased interpretations of the interrogative, which indicate a certain bias of the speaker towards a specific modal position. It is precisely such biased interrogatives that do allow argumentative secondary clauses, as shown in (20) and (21) below: as soon as there is some kind of speaker-bias towards a certain modal position, this can again be argumentatively supported by a secondary clause. Thus, for instance, the structures in (20) and (21) have an argumentative interpretation, with the secondary clause serving as support for the modal position to which the speaker is rhetorically biased in the interrogative. The interrogative in (20) is rhetorically biased towards the position that it is difficult to determine how many children listen, just like the interrogative in (21) is biased towards the position that the interlocutor will eventually be bored by teaching. The secondary clause in these structures does not address the

The subdivision of the speaker-related category

241

discursive or interactional circumstances of the interrogative speech act, as would be the case with a speech act-related interpretation (compare examples like (16) and (19) above), but rather adduces different types of evidence for the likelihood of the position towards which the speaker is biased. In (20), the fact that children under twelve are not listed in the listening rates serves to support the position that it is difficult to determine the number of children who listen to the programme. Similarly, in (21), the fact that the teaching would involve just computing serves to support the likelihood of the prediction that the interlocutor will ultimately be bored by it.53 (20)

(21)

Simon: Well, I was going to ask how many people listen, but I— I’d imagine, Mr. Jay, isn’t that difficult to find out because the rating services don’t rate listeners under the age of 12, do they? Jay: No, they don’t. And it is really difficult. (CB npr) A: And you want to go on to teacher or teacher technology you know which you’d be quite good at ‘cos you like craft stuff as well. B: Yeah. Yeah. A: But won’t you be bored doing that as well because like now you’ll just have a light on computing? B: Erm well I think when it like with teaching it’s not just teaching them the subject it’s also teaching them and that’s why I want to teach primary or earlies. (CB ukspok)

Like the interrogative, the imperative equally does not have any inherent restrictions on argumentative secondary clauses. As has been shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the imperative can be analysed as a constructional fusion of a deontic modal value and a declarative speech functional value: because of the presence of a modal value, the imperative has the basic prerequisites for allowing argumentative secondary clauses in addition to speech actrelated ones. The fact that structures with imperative main clauses have often been excluded from the argumentative category can probably be attributed to the epistemic bias in traditional linguistic thought, which recognizes mainly truth-related values encoded by epistemic modality as belonging to the domain of reasoning and argumentation, to the exclusion of the desirability-related values encoded by deontic modality. This bias is also reflected in the fact that Sweetser (1990) chooses the label ‘epistemic’ for the category of argumentative secondary clauses.

242

Chapter 9: Speaker-related versus SoA-related

There is no reason, however, to exclude deontic modality from the domain of reasoning and argumentation. The deontic declarative structure in (22) and the imperative structure in (23), for instance, are not fundamentally different from their counterparts with epistemic modality in examples like (13) or (15) above. In both cases, the secondary clause serves as argumentative support for a modal position taken by the speaker in the main clause: the because-clause in (22) provides an argument for the speaker’s position (encoded in the deontic modal should) that it is important not to run away from debt, and the because-clause in (23) provides an argument for the speaker’s position (encoded in the imperative) that the interlocutor should defend himself. The only difference from (13) and (15) above is that the argumentation in (22) and (23) concerns the desirability of an action, with the secondary clause providing an argument why the speaker considers the SoA in question desirable or undesirable, whereas the argumentation in (13) and (15) concerns the likelihood of a proposition, with the secondary clause providing an argument why the speaker believes that the proposition is likely to be true or not. (22)

(23)

In addition, you should beware of running away from debt, because your hope of obtaining another mortgage, or any other form of credit in the future may be severely reduced as a result. (CB times) You’ve got to take a stand Tom. You’ve got to do it mate. […] Don’t stand for it, because if you do you’ll just get trampled on that’s the way football is mate. (CB ukspok)

4. Conclusion In conclusion, we can say that the framework of interpersonal grammar and clause combining developed in this study contributes to the solution of particular descriptive problems in the distinction between speaker-related and SoA-related interpretations for interclausal relations. I have first tried to show that the syntactic distinctions between SoA-related and speakerrelated structures can be explained in terms of the general incompatibility between the bound subordinate construction type and the speaker-related structure. The basic principle is that a secondary clause in a bound subordinate construction falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause, and therefore cannot at the same time serve as a comment on these same interpersonal resources. In addition, I have also tried to show

Conclusion

243

that the distinction between the argumentative and speech act subcategories can be analysed in terms of the distinction between modal and speech functional values in the main clause, and that this type of analysis can do away with misconceptions like the argument that structures with nondeclarative main clauses cannot be used in argumentative structures. Given a full conception of the modal component in non-declarative structures and the way this modal component interacts with speech function, there is no reason to exclude structures with interrogative and imperative main clauses from the argumentative subcategory.

Chapter 10 Initial and final position

1. Introduction The second case-study will deal with the difference in discursive status between secondary clauses in initial and in final position relative to their main clause. It has often been noted (see for instance Thompson 1985; Ramsay 1987; Givón 1990: 844–847; Ford 1993) that these two positions are not simply alternative locations for the secondary clause, but that they also have different functional and discursive properties. Compare, for instance, the final as-clause in (1) with the initial as-clause in (2). (1)

(2)

“I’m sorry you didn’t escape like you planned, Lovejoy.” Another nail in my coffin. “Ta, chuck,” I called back, best I could do with my throat dry. The other bobby was already scribbling this new evidence as we drove off. Education gets everywhere these days doesn’t it. (CB ukbooks) My own illusion in joining the fairground was multiple wrongth. I’d assumed that a travelling fair is jolly, colourful gay – wrong. It’s a million laughs a minute – mistake. After only a cup of tea I slogged with a gorilla called Big Chas and his mate Ern erecting broadwalks and canvases, hauling generators and winching struts and wooden walls. I fetched and carried. Francie wrapped my hands in oily cloths to keep me going. As the fairground took shape I began to peter out so they put me on netting the dodgem cars. God did great making mankind, but He was all thumbs when He came to antique dealers. I felt useless. (CB ukbooks)

The final as-clause in (1) has a local function, specifying the temporal circumstances of the SoA described in the main clause. The initial asclause in (2), on the other hand, does not only have such a local link to its immediate main clause, but it also has wider discursive links: the as-clause in (2) plays a role in the organization of discourse, because it serves as a discursive “bridge” (Givón 1990: 847) between the preceding discourse, which describes the build-up of the fairground, and the following discourse,

246

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

which returns to the main thematic line that describes the unsuitability of the speaker for this type of work. In this chapter, I will investigate the distinction between initial and final position of secondary clauses from the perspective of the interpersonal analysis of clause combining proposed in this study. On the one hand, I will show that the typical discourse-organizational function of initial secondary clauses can be explained in terms of the specific interpersonal features of [- Scope] and [- Speech Function] that are typically associated with the initial position. On the other hand, I will also show that it is an overgeneralization to say that final secondary clauses generally have a local function: I will argue that it is possible to distinguish between at least two different types of final clauses on the basis of the parameter of scope, only one of which necessarily has a local function. I will restrict myself to the general constructional properties of the initial and final position, and I will not go into any additional factors that determine statistical preferences for initial and final position in the actual use of specific conjunctions. Such factors have been studied in detail in the work of Diessel (2001, 2005), who has shown that some semantic categories of conjunctions have obvious preferences, even if they allow both options, like conditionals tending towards initial position or result clauses tending towards final position, and in the work of Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 172–183), who show that at least with conditional constructions, there is a correlation between position and SoA-related versus speaker-related interpretation. 2. Interpersonal properties of initial secondary clauses In Chapters 4 (Sections 2 and 4) and 7 (Sections 2 and 6), it was indicated in passing that secondary clauses in initial position have a number of specific interpersonal properties: they always take the value [- Speech Function] and they generally also take the value [- Scope]. In the following sections, I will argue that it is precisely these interpersonal properties that can explain the difference in discursive status between initial and final secondary clauses, but in this section I will first briefly recapitulate the most important arguments about the specific interpersonal status of secondary clauses in initial position.

Interpersonal properties of initial secondary clauses

247

2.1. Speech Function First of all, the feature of [- Speech Function] is reflected in the fact that initial secondary clauses never allow any basic clause types beyond the declarative, as illustrated in the distinction between (3a) and (3b) below. This is the case even for conjunctions like because or although, which can normally take the value [+ Speech Function] in final position – illustrated in the distinction between (4) and (5) below. This shows that the negative value for the parameter of speech function must be regarded as an interpersonal property of the initial position as such rather than of any specific conjunction associated with the secondary clauses in this position. (3)

(4)

(5)

a. The trio returned to Devon, where Anna was let in by Hewitt’s unsuspecting housekeeper. While devious Anna kept the woman chatting, Lucia, 24, sneaked into Hewitt’s office, grabbed the key and ran to open the safe. (CB sunnow) b. *While did(n’t) devious Anna keep the woman chatting, Lucia sneaked into Hewitt’s office. So jobs are going begging! Is it any wonder, because who on earth can afford to have a decent standard of living in the most highly taxed and expensive country to live in in the world. It’s all right for Ali Baba Blair and his fatcat friends. (CB sunnow) So jobs are going begging! *Because who on earth can afford to have a decent standard of living, is it any wonder?

In addition, there is also typological evidence for the special status of initial position with respect to the parameter of speech function. In a number of other Germanic languages, absence of speech function is overtly marked by OV or AV word order (German, Dutch, Danish and Swedish, see further in Chapter 7, Section 6). In these cases, initial secondary clauses always take OV and AV word order, even with conjunctions that allow VO and VA order for the secondary clause in final position. This is illustrated for German weil (because) in (6) and (7) below: the weil-clause in final position in (6) allows VO word order, whereas its counterpart in initial position in (7) allows only OV word order (see further also Verstraete forthc.).

248 (6)

(7)

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

Ich darf ihm das Auto wegnehmen, weil er hat because he has I may him-DAT the car take-away mir auch die Puppe versteckt! (IC) hidden me-DAT also the doll ‘I am allowed to take away his car, because he has also hidden my doll.’ a. *Weil er hat mir auch die Puppe versteckt, darf ich ihm das Auto wegnehmen b. Weil er mir auch die Puppe versteckt hat, darf ich ihm das Auto wegnehmen.

2.2. Scope With respect to the parameter of scope, the unmarked value for initial secondary clauses is [- Scope]. This is reflected in the fact that initial secondary clauses generally (see below for one exception) cannot serve as focus of the interpersonal values of the main clause that follows them. Consider, for instance, structures (8)-(11) below. (8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

Then you turn and run into the main lounge. He’s there, still curled up and still secured by the tape, but he must have wriggled his way through to here while you were down in the cellar. (BNC FP6 0810) = ‘that must have been the time [focus] when he managed to get into the lounge [presupposition]’ While you were down in the cellar, he must have wriggled his way through to here. ≠ ‘that must have been the time [focus] when he managed to get into the lounge [presupposition]’ I think it’s very important to measure when and where things occurred. Did they occur when you’re a young person, in your formative years, or did they occur while you were a senior official in the federal government? (CB npr) = ‘was that the time [focus] when these things happened [presupposition]?’ While you were a senior official in the federal government, did these things occur? ≠ ‘was that the time [focus] when these things happened [presupposition]?’

Interpersonal properties of initial secondary clauses

249

Structures (8) and (10) represent secondary clauses in final position that fall within the scope of the interpersonal values of their main clause: the while-clause in (8) can serve as focus of the modal must in the main clause, and the while-clause in (10) can serve as focus of the interrogative in the main clause, in both cases with the main clause as a presupposition. In the equivalents of these structures with initial secondary clauses, however, such a focus-presupposition reading is excluded. The initial while-clause in (9) cannot serve as focus of must with the main clause as presupposition. It is impossible to construe a reading in parallel with (8): the structure in (9) cannot be interpreted as ‘that must have been the time when he got into the main lounge’. Similarly, the initial while-clause in (11) cannot serve as focus of the question encoded by the interrogative with the main clause as presupposition: it is impossible to interpret the structure in (11) as ‘was that the period when these things happened?’. The modalization encoded by must in (9), and the question encoded by the interrogative in (11) remain restricted to the main clause and cannot extend to the secondary clause, which means that these structures can be described as [- Scope]: the initial secondary clause in (9) and (11) falls outside of the scope of the interpersonal resources of its main clause. The structures discussed in (8)-(11) above all involve marked interpersonal values in their main clause – a marked modal value in the main clause in (8) and (9) and a marked speech functional value in the main clause in (10) and (11). The situation for secondary clauses preceding a main clause with unmarked interpersonal values – i.e. declarative indicative rather than modal verbs and/or non-declarative clause types – is slightly more complicated. In addition to the standard configuration where the initial secondary clause cannot be focused, such structures also allow a marked configuration where the initial secondary clause does serve as focus of the interpersonal values of its main clause and therefore takes the value [+ Scope] (see also Givón 1975: 196–197, Chafe 1984: 439–441 and Bickel 1993: 46–48 on this construction).54 This is illustrated in (12) below, where the initial temporal adjunct just after Christmas55 serves as focus, as indicated by its status as a reply to a wh-question. In spoken language, this configuration is intonationally distinguished from its unmarked counterparts with a fall-rise intonation pattern on the secondary clause similar to the one found with fronted objects (see Halliday 1967b: 41, Quirk et al. 1985: 1375–1378).

250

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

(12) A: Yes and then she came back to you and it got worse again. B: No she was good A: Right B: Very good A: And then when did it go down again? B: Just after Christmas it’s gone back right down again. (CB ukspok) The marked status of this type of construction is not only reflected in low token frequency (Chafe 1984: 439, for instance, reports 3 examples out of a total corpus of 200 adverbial clauses), but also in a more restricted pattern of distribution. Focused status for initial secondary clauses is structurally available only for those configurations with unmarked interpersonal values in the main clause: with marked interpersonal values in the main clause like the modal auxiliary in (9) or the non-declarative clause type in (11), it is impossible to take the initial secondary clause as focus relative to a presupposition in the main clause, as has been shown above. 2.3. Conclusion As will become clear in the following section, it is only in the unmarked construction with the value [- Scope] that the initial secondary clause has the special discursive properties discussed in the introduction. In terms of the interpersonal analysis of clause combining, therefore, the pattern of initial secondary clauses described by Thompson (1985), Ramsay (1987), Givón (1990: 844–847) and Ford (1993) constitutes a specific construction type characterized by the values of [- Speech Function] and [- Scope], as indicated in the grey area in table 43. Table 43. The interpersonal status of secondary clauses in initial position - Scope

+ Scope

- Speech Function + Speech Function

In the remainder of this chapter, I will show how the specific interpersonal features of initial secondary clauses can help to explain the special discursive status that distinguishes them from their counterparts in final position. In Section 3, I will focus on the parameter of scope, arguing that

The relevance of scope

251

[- Scope] is a necessary prerequisite for a secondary clause to have wider discursive links that go beyond the strictly local links with its immediate main clause. In Section 4, I will focus on the parameter of speech function, arguing that a value of [- Speech Function] implies partial or complete interpersonal de-activation for a secondary clause, and is therefore compatible with a discourse-organizational function. 3. The relevance of [+/- Scope] 3.1. The parameter of scope As has been shown in Chapters 4 and 6, the parameter of scope deals with the question whether a secondary clause falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of its main clause or whether it functions outside the scope of these resources. This question is directly relevant to the distinction between local and non-local function of secondary clauses, because it determines whether a secondary clause has strictly local links with its immediate main clause or whether it is free to have wider discursive links with preceding and upcoming stretches of discourse. If in a particular construction the secondary clause falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of its main clause this means that its function will be internal to the speech act encoded by these interpersonal resources. The while-clause in (13), for instance, falls within the scope of the indicative interrogative structure in the main clause, as reflected in the fact that it can serve as its focus. In functional terms, this position within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause means that the while-clause in (13) is part of the propositional content of that main clause, restricting the SoA described in the main clause by specifying its temporal circumstances. This is why the value [+ Scope] entails a local function: if a secondary clause falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of its main clause, its function will be internal to the propositional content of the speech act encoded in that main clause. (13)

One of the sisters in the convent is a district nurse and she told me about X [name removed from corpus, JCV] Care and they arranged it for me and came to see me. Did she tell you about it while you were in the hospital or after you’d come back home? (CB ukspok)

252

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

Given the fact that [+ Scope] implies a local link for the secondary clause in the construction, the value [- Scope] must be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the secondary clause to have wider discourseorganizational functions in addition to the local ones. When a secondary clause functions outside the scope of the interpersonal values of its main clause, it is not restricted to a purely local function, but can also have nonlocal functions in addition to the strictly local links with its immediate main clause. Thus, for instance, the when-clause in (14) does not only describe the temporal circumstances for its immediate main clause, but also has a wider discourse-organizing function, in that it summarizes the description of the preparations in the preceding discourse and thus serves as a discursive bridge to the main clause, which goes on to the actual description of the parcels. (14)

Then she was in the hall, calling upstairs to summon the girls and Randall. David came back and sat down in the living room. Lainey had gone to find paper and pencils to make thank-you lists as they opened the presents. When they were finally set, Lainey declared that Mack got to be first, because he was the one who’d had to go to the hospital. Mack blushed and then asked for the package that he’d checked on earlier. (CB usbooks)

In conclusion, therefore, the relevance of the parameter of scope for the distinction between local and discourse-organizational functions of a secondary clause can be summarized as follows: – A position within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause implies a local function for the secondary clause – A position outside the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause is a necessary prerequisite for the secondary clause to have a discourse-organizational function It is important to emphasize, however, that a value of [- Scope] does not necessarily imply that the secondary clause will actually have a discourseorganizing function in addition to it local links. A position outside the scope is only a necessary prerequisite, but not a sufficient one. As I will shown in the fourth section of this chapter, there are also secondary clauses with the value [- Scope] that do not have the typical discourse-organizing function of structures like (14) above.

The relevance of scope

253

3.2. Relation to initial and final position On the basis of the analysis of scope in relation to the distinction between local and discourse-organizational functions, we can now investigate how this links up with the specific values of initial and final secondary clauses for scope, and how this relates to the claims found in the literature about the general correlation between position and discursive status. For secondary clauses in initial position, the analysis in Section 2 of this chapter has shown that the unmarked case is the value [- Scope]. In terms of the relation between scope and the local/non-local distinction discussed in the previous section, this implies that initial secondary clauses generally have the basic prerequisite for taking up wider discursive functions in addition to the purely local ones. For secondary clauses in final position, on the other hand, both the values [+ Scope] and [- Scope] are available, illustrated respectively in the bound subordinate construction in (15) and the modal subordinate construction in (16) below. The final while-clause in the bound subordinate construction in (15) falls within the scope of the interpersonal resources of its main clause, and therefore has a local function: it is probably this construction type that is targeted in the traditional claims about the mainly local function of final secondary clauses. The correlation with local function cannot be generalized for the final position, however. As shown in examples like (16), secondary clauses in final position also allow constructions with the value [- Scope], and unlike with the marked [+ Scope] construction for initial position, these cases are not marked or infrequent at all. (15)

(16)

“Whoever took this violin is ultimately stealing from the old, they’re stealing from handicapped kids and they’re stealing from the blind,” said Michael Miller, a court-appointed lawyer who was investigating Morini’s estate. The FBI and the police department believe the instrument was probably stolen while Morini was in hospital shortly before her death. (CB times) You will experience the country from the inside, since you will live in Canada as if you were a resident. You will have the opportunity to get fully involved in the social and cultural life of the local community and make friends with Canadians. (CB ukephem)

In this sense, a general correlation between final position and local function, as implied for instance in Givón’s claim that “post-posed ADV clauses tend to be more integrated into the meaning structures of their main

254

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

clauses” (1990: 844) is clearly an overgeneralization. From the perspective of the interpersonal analysis of clause combining, there are at least two relevant constructions with secondary clauses in final position, one with the value [+ Scope] and one with the value [- Scope]. It is only in the construction with [+ Scope] that the secondary clause necessarily has a local function. Secondary clauses in the construction with [- Scope], on the other hand, are not necessarily local: I will show in the following section that some of these constructions can actually also take up wider discourseorganizing functions. Table 44 summarizes how initial and final position relate to the different values for the parameter of scope. Table 44. Initial-final position and the parameter of scope Position Initial position Final position

Scope [- Scope] => not necessarily local [+ Scope] => necessarily local [- Scope] => not necessarily local

4. The relevance of [+/- Speech Function] The feature of [- Scope] is not the only interpersonal characteristic of secondary clauses in initial position. As shown in Section 2, initial secondary clauses also have a specific value for the parameter of speech function: they always take the value [- Speech Function], reflected in the fact that they do not allow any non-declarative clause types. In this section, I will show how the feature of [- Speech Function] provides the second aspect of interpersonal grammar that is needed to explain the typical discourse-organizational function of initial secondary clauses. 4.1. The parameter of speech function As already mentioned in the previous section, a position outside the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause is a necessary but not a sufficient requirement for a secondary clause to take up a discourseorganizing function. The non-sufficient nature of this requirement is reflected in the way it interacts with the different values for speech function. Compare, for instance, the structures in (17) and (18) below.

The relevance of speech function

255

(17) But why not celebrate further with an entire Sunday tea. Tea time is often ignored today, and that is perhaps not surprising, for who has time to take a leisurely break for a couple of hours in the late afternoon? And, like breakfast, tea is labour intensive if you do it properly. (CB times) (18) On sweet little skis (one metre long) our first task was walking sideways up the hill to the chair lift. The walk was fine, but the chair lift ride was highly unnerving, Alain having said nothing about how to get off the contraption at the top. While we were attempting to disentangle ourselves from the heap of crumpled bodies, Alain coolly skied off into the distance, expecting us to follow. (CB ukmags) The for-clause in (17) and the while-clause in (18) do not fall within the scope of the interpersonal resources of their main clause, and therefore both meet the basic requirement for taking up a discourse-organizing function. This does not mean, however, that these clauses actually have such a function: the precise role of the secondary clause crucially also depends on its internal interpersonal structure, and this is where (17) and (18) are different. The for-clause in (17) has a modal and a speech functional value of its own, and can therefore be considered to form a full speech act, whereas the while-clause in (18) does not have any modal or speech functional values, and therefore does not form a speech act. Because of this difference in interpersonal structure, the role of these two types of secondary clause in interaction is entirely different. The presence of a full speech act in the for-clause in (17) implies that it belongs to the foreground of interaction: the presence of speaker-interlocutor positioning reflects the status of the propositional content in this clause as part of the material that is negotiated between speaker and interlocutor. The absence of interpersonal structure in the while-clause in (18), on the other hand, implies that it is not subject to speaker-interlocutor positioning: it is not part of the material negotiated between speaker and interlocutor on the foreground of interaction. It is precisely this interactionally de-activated status, however, that makes it suitable for doing different types of discourse-organizational work. Rather than contributing to the material that is negotiated between speaker and interlocutor on the foreground of discourse, such interactionally de-activated types of clauses can take up discourse-organizational functions.

256

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

4.2. Relation to initial and final position The interpersonal parameter of speech function furnishes the second element that is needed to explain the typically discourse-organizational function of secondary clauses in initial position. As shown in Section 2, initial secondary clauses do not only have a value of [- Scope], as a necessary prerequisite for non-local functions, but they also a value of [- Speech Function]. In terms of the analysis in the previous section, therefore, the negative value for speech function implies that initial secondary clauses are at least partly interactionally de-activated, and this explains why they typically have a discourse-organizational function. This is illustrated in the as-clause in (19) and the while-clause in (20) below. The as-clause in (19) serves as a bridge between the description of MacLeod’s escape from the court in the car of a council worker and the description of another council worker who has to take care of MacLeod’s car. Similarly, the discursive function of the while-clause in (20) is to shift the attention from the conversation between the main character and Leo to the activities of Shaerl, the third character on the scene. (19)

(20)

The pantomime began when former Scotland ace MacLeod refused to leave Dumbarton District Court, where he’d been fined £ 100, after spotting the photographer waiting outside. After 15 minutes he bolted out of the main door into the passenger seat of a blue Vauxhall Astra with the woman council worker at the wheel. As she drove off the other court official strode up to MacLeod’s souped-up Honda in the court car park muttering: “How the hell does this thing start?” He struggled to start the engine before driving off and stopping 400 yards along the road allowing MacLeod to leap in from the waiting Astra and zoom off. (CB sunnow) When Mr. Dambar got home from a Boosters’ Club executive meeting, where plans had been made to lure the Southeast Christian Handgun Association convention to Tula Springs, he asked Leo if he wanted to go to a movie. It was only three in the afternoon, but he could not bring himself to return to the office. The idea of projecting numbers, percentages, all sorts of calculations into the future – it was estimated tax time – seemed too wearisome to contemplate, especially with The Antibes financing still not settled. Let Francine and Mrs. Sklar hash it out. Neither one of them seemed to mind. “ What’s on?” Leo wanted to know. Mr.

The relevance of speech function

257

Dambar shrugged. “Let’s take potluck. Come on. My treat.” “Not the Leon.” “OK. We’ll check out the Quad.” While they talked Shaerl sat on the trailer’s loveseat mending a pair of Mrs. Howard’s huge, delicate lace panties. (CB usbooks) In addition, the parameter of speech function also provides further evidence for the functional diversification of secondary clauses in final position, and against the general association between final position and local function. As shown in Section 3, secondary clauses in final position can either have the value [+ Scope] and [- Scope]. It was shown that only the type with [+ Scope] typically has the local function associated with final position in the literature, but the precise status of the type with [- Scope] was not further specified. This status can be determined more precisely on the basis of speech function. The for-clause in (17) above, for instance, has a speech functional value of its own, which implies that it is on the foreground of speaker-interlocutor interaction. The when-clause in (21) below, on the other hand, does not have any speech functional value, and is therefore compatible with a discourse-organizational function just like its initial counterparts in (19) and (20). In this particular case, the when-clause serves as an afterthought that re-frames the preceding assertion, indicating how it is relevant to the preceding discourse context, more particularly the inquiry about rude pictures. (21)

I’m gonna get my ph\oto#, tod\ay# will you be here tom\orrow# y\eah# are there any rude ones of m\e# I dunn\o# I haven’t s\een ‘em y/et# cos Jo got a picture of my h\ead#, when I was sl\eeping# (COLT b136402.pro 90-95)

Cases like (21) show even more clearly that final secondary clauses cannot be generally associated with local functions and contrasted with the discourse-organizational functions of initial clauses: given the right value for the parameter of speech function, final secondary clauses can have discourse-organizational functions just like their initial counterparts. Table 45 summarizes the functional differentiation in the domain of final clauses on the basis of scope and speech function.

258

Chapter 10: Initial and final position

Table 45. Different types of secondary clauses in final position Final clauses Type ~ (15) Type ~ (21) Type ~ (17)

Scope + -

Speech Function +

Local function Discourse-organizational function Full speech act

5. Conclusion The analysis in this chapter has focused on the well-known observation that secondary clauses in final position tend to have more local functions, with links restricted to their immediate main clause, whereas secondary clauses in initial position tend to have more discourse-organizational functions, with wider discursive links to preceding and upcoming discourse in addition to the local ones. Starting out from the interpersonal analysis of clause combining proposed in this study, I have tried to show that the interpersonal perspective on clause combining can help to explain why initial and final position are typically associated with different functions, and that it can also provide a number of descriptive refinements, more particularly concerning the claims about the correlation between final position and local function of the secondary clause. The central argument is based on two sets of observations. On the one hand, secondary clauses in initial position can be shown to take a specific value with respect to the interpersonal parameters of scope and speech function. Initial secondary clauses always take the value [- Speech Function], as reflected in the fact that they do not allow any non-declarative clause types, and generally also take the value [- Scope], as reflected in the fact that they cannot serve as focus of the interpersonal resources of their main clause. On the other hand, it can also be shown that precisely these parameters of scope and speech function are important in the explanation of the distinction between local and discourse-organizational functions of secondary clauses. In interpersonal terms, a purely local function for the secondary clause in a construction correlates with the value of [+ Scope], since a position within the scope of the interpersonal resources of the main clause implies that the secondary clause will function within the propositional content of the speech act encoded by these interpersonal resources. A discourse-organizational function, on the other hand, correlates in interpersonal terms with the values of [- Scope] and [- Speech Function]. A negative value for scope is required to ensure compatibility with a non-

Conclusion

259

local function, whereas a negative value for speech function is required to ensure the interactionally de-activated status that is necessary for discourseorganizational work. In combination, these two sets of observations can help to explain the distinct discursive properties of initial and final position, as well as a descriptive correction concerning the precise status of the final position. On the explanatory level, the fact that secondary clauses in initial position take the values [- Scope] and [- Speech Function] explains why these structures are compatible with discourse-organizational functions, whereas the fact that the value of [+ Scope] is available for secondary clauses in final position explains why they are compatible with local functions. On the descriptive level, however, the analysis also shows that a general correlation between final position and local function cannot be maintained. Apart from the final secondary clauses that take [+ Scope] and therefore necessarily have a local function, there are also final secondary clauses that take [- Scope] and even [- Speech Function], which makes them compatible with discourse-organizational functions just like their initial counterparts.

Chapter 11 Typological outlook

1. Introduction In this study, I have argued for an interpersonal approach to clause combining, and I have illustrated the usefulness of this approach in terms of the functional, grammatical and semantic analysis of complex sentences (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), as well as with a number of specific descriptive problems (Chapters 9 and 10). The arguments have so far focused mainly on the situation in English and a number of other Germanic languages, but if there is a functional connection between interpersonal grammar and clause combining, one would also expect this to be reflected crosslinguistically. To round off this study, therefore, I will tentatively explore the possible typological relevance of the interpersonal framework by looking at a number of specific case studies of clause combining in other, mainly non-Indo-European, languages. More specifically, I will look at (i) the use of non-indicative mood in the generalized subordinate clause in Australian languages (Hale 1976; McKay 1988; McGregor 1988); (ii) the distinction between adsentential and peripheral subordinate constructions described by Bickel (1993) for the Tibeto-Burman language Belhare; (iii the issue of detachment in converb constructions (Rappaport 1984; König 1995; Tikkanen 1995); and (iv) the specific value of deranking (Stassen 1985: 76–77) in clause chaining constructions in Papuan languages (Longacre 1972; Roberts 1988). These four case studies do not of course constitute an exhaustive sample of clause combining phenomena, but they are still somewhat representative in the sense that they exemplify two main thematic lines in the theoretical and typological literature on clause combining. The first and the fourth case study exemplify a line of research that focuses on the internal structure of the secondary clause in complex sentences, more particularly on different types of verbal categories like non-indicative moods or non-finiteness. The second and the third case study, on the other hand, exemplify a line of research that focuses on the external status of the secondary clause relative to the main clause, more particularly on different formal reflections of the integration of the secondary clause into the main clause.

262

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

On the basis of these case studies, I will try to show that the typological categories they represent may be analysed as manifestations of the interpersonal parameters that were distinguished in this study. In Section 2, I will suggest that the use of non-indicative moods in case study 1 can be analysed as a formal marker for the absence of illocutionary force in the secondary clause. In Section 3, I will try to show that the different symptoms of integration for the secondary clause in case studies 2 and 3 can be regarded as formal markers for a position within the scope of the interpersonal structure of the main clause. In Section 4, finally, I will argue that deranking (represented by the non-finite ing-clause in English and the clause chaining constructions of case study 4) is ambiguous in interpersonal terms: it can either reflect the absence of interpersonal values or the absence of marking for these values. The discussion of these phenomena is merely intended as an exploration of what could be done from a typological perspective with the framework developed in this study. Since I have to rely on the information available in the existing literature, the analysis will remain tentative for the most part: I will point out a number of suggestive similarities with the interpersonally defined categories. This will be based mainly on the analysis in the second part of this study, which investigated the typical functional (Chapter 6), grammatical (Chapter 7) and semantic (Chapter 8) features associated with the different categories in the typology. Such features can more easily be compared with the primary descriptive information that is available in the literature on the phenomena to be discussed: if a particular formal category in a language shows the typical functional, grammatical and semantic features of a specific interpersonal category, this can be regarded as evidence pointing towards a correspondence with this interpersonal category. 2. Moods in the verb phrase It has often been noted that there is a relation between non-indicative mood categories and subordination (see for instance Brøndal 1972 [1937]: 23–24; Davison 1979: 106; Lehmann 1988: 194–195), in the sense that in languages with different mood types the verb in subordinate clauses is often marked with a non-indicative mood form (e.g. subjunctive). Stating this correlation of course does not amount to much more than mutually defining the two categories: a more interesting question is what the non-indicative mood precisely marks in these subordinate clauses, and what the relation is

Moods in the verb phrase

263

with other uses of the subjunctive mood (Merlan 1981; McGregor 1988). In this section, I will look at one specific instance of the use of non-indicative moods in subordinate clauses, and I will suggest that non-indicative mood in these cases can be analysed as a formal marker for the absence of illocutionary force in the structure in question. 2.1. Non-indicative moods and absence of illocutionary force I will focus on the use of subjunctive mood in the so-called generalized subordinate clause in a number of Australian languages. As argued in Hale (1976), many Australian languages have a type of subordinate clause that is characterized semantically by a very wide range of interpretations, including temporal, causal, conditional and contrastive ones, and structurally by what Hale (1976) calls an “adjoined” status relative to their main clause, which means that they cannot be analysed as embedded under an NP node in the main clause (for other surveys and case-studies of this type of subordinate clause, see for instance Merlan 1981, Austin 1981, McGregor 1988, McKay 1988, Nordlinger 2006). This structure is illustrated in examples (1) and (2), respectively for Warlpiri (Hale 1976) and Gooniyandi (McGregor 1988), with the verb of the generalized subordinate clause indicated by underlining. (1)

(2)

Warlpiri ngatjulu-rlu lpa-rna karli tjarntu-rnu, kutja-ø-npa AUX boomerang trim-PST COMP-AUX I-ERG ya-nu-rnu njuntu walk-PST-hither you ‘I was trimming a boomerang when you came up.’ (Hale 1976: 79) Gooniyandi ngirntaji-nhingi pilika parlanyi Parn-kila-ngi return-FAC-(1SG)N+I this-ABL middle snake murtla I:stepped:on:it ‘When I was going back, I stepped on the snake.’ (McGregor 1988: 54)

The main focus in this section will be on the internal structure of the generalized subordinate clause, more specifically on those cases where it is

264

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

obligatorily marked by a non-indicative mood type. The subordinate status of the generalized subordinate clause is sometimes marked by specific conjunctions like the COMP element kutja- in example (1) from Warlpiri (see Hale 1976), but it can also be marked by the obligatory presence of non-indicative mood categories, like the factive mood marker -kila- in example (2) from Gooniyandi (which also allows subjunctive mood, see McGregor 1988) or the subjunctive mood in Mangarayi (Merlan 1981). The question I will focus on here is what the obligatory presence of these mood categories actually marks in these subordinate clauses. On the basis of a number of correspondences with the different subordinate constructions in the interpersonal typology, I will suggest that the non-indicative moods may be analysed as marking absence of illocutionary force in these structures. A first indication of a correlation with absence of illocutionary force is the general discourse function which some of the authors, notably McGregor (1988) and McKay (1988), ascribe to the generalized subordinate clause. McKay (1988) argues that generalized subordinate clauses in Rembarrnga must be described as backgrounded: they “can be characterized as having ‘backgrounding’, de-emphasizing or non-assertion function” (1988: 34). This is the discourse function that is typically associated with the absence of modal and speech functional values, as has been shown in Chapter 6 (Sections 5 and 6): speaker-interlocutor positioning as encoded in the resources of interpersonal grammar is a necessary prerequisite for foregrounded status in interaction. McGregor’s (1988) characterization of the generalized subordinate clause in Gooniyandi comes even closer to an interpersonal characterization, because he specifically refers to the suspension of speaker-interlocutor positioning as a general property of the subordinate clause in Gooniyandi: “the speaker indicates that, at least for the moment, judgement on the validity of the expressed proposition may be suspended, and the proposition may be presupposed or accepted as true” (1988: 61). A second indication of a correlation with absence of illocutionary force is the range of semantic interpretations available for the subordinate clauses in question. Most of the authors who discuss this type of structure have shown that it covers a whole range of semantic relations that would be formally distinguished by specific types of conjunctions in English and other Germanic languages. Thus, for instance, the generalized subordinate clause seems to cover temporal relations (co-occurrence and succession), conditional relations, and relations of cause and reason, illustrated for Gooniyandi in (3)-(5) below. All of these uses are reported by Hale (1976:

Moods in the verb phrase

265

79, 80, 81), McGregor (1988: 54, 53, 52–53) and McKay (1988: 8–9, 9, 10); in addition, Hale (1976: 87) also mentions a contrastive use for Warlpiri, illustrated in (6) below. (3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Gooniyandi Parn-kila-ngi ngirntaji-nhingi pilika parlanyi middle snake return-FAC-(1SG)N+I this-ABL murtla I:stepped:on:it ‘When I was going back, I stepped on the snake.’ (McGregor 1988: 54) Gooniyandi Kampa-ya kart-ja-wani nyiminpani water-LOC fall-SUB-(3SG)N+ANI he:drowned ‘Because he fell in the water, he drowned.’ (McGregor 1988: 53) Gooniyandi Thirru kalyjini kirra-ya-wumi mangarri kangaroo fast run-SUB-FUT+(3SG)N+MI not nyak-kuwa-wuluni spear-PROG-FUT+(1SG)N+PINI ‘If the kangaroo runs fast, I won’t be able to spear it.’ (McGregor 1988: 53) Warlpiri Kutja-ka-lu yuwali nganti-rni tjurlpu panu-kari-rli build-NPST bird many-other-ERG comp-AUX nest kankarlu watiya-rla, marna-ngka ka-njanu tjinjtjiwarnu-rlu spinifex-LOC AUX-REFL jinjiwarnu-ERG up tree-LOC nganti-rni yutjuku-pardu build-NPST shelter-DIM ‘Whereas many other birds build a nest in a tree, the jinjiwarnu builds itself a small shelter in the spinifex grass.’ (Hale 1976: 87)

As argued by McKay (1988: 8), labels like ‘temporal’, ‘conditional’ or ‘causal’ usually do not represent formally distinct categories in the languages in question, but are different contextualizations which look like the categories that are formally distinguished by different conjunctions in English or other Germanic languages. In order to do justice to the wide semantic applicability of this type of subordinate clause, it is necessary to look for a more abstract semantic core that is compatible with all of the above-mentioned contextual interpretations. I suspect that a general

266

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

characterization in terms of absence of illocutionary force would actually cover the range of semantic domains that is covered by this generalized subordinate clause. If we look at the typical semantic associations of the construction types characterized by the absence of illocutionary force in the English typology presented in Chapter 8 (Section 3.1), we find in fact almost the same range of semantic relations, as illustrated in table 46. Table 46. Range of contextualizations for the generalized subordinate clause Semantic relation and subordination in English Not exclusively [- Illoc Force] Exclusively [- Illoc Force]

Generalized subordinate clause in Australian languages Contrast Time, Cause, Condition, Reason

The different uses for the generalized subordinate clause that are attested in the literature all correspond to those semantic relations that correlate exclusively with the absence of illocutionary force in English. The only exception is the contrastive type, which can occur both with and without illocutionary force in English (but versus whereas and while), but as suggested by the discussion on backgrounding in the previous paragraph, it is probably the contrastive type without illocutionary force that is relevant here. In this sense, the ‘general’ nature of the generalized subordinate clause in these Australian languages may lie in the fact that it can be characterized with the most general definition of subordination in terms of absence of illocutionary force, and could therefore contextualize as any type of semantic relation that is compatible with this general feature.56 Another point of correspondence with the semantic categories defined for subordination in English relates to the distinct status of structures of condition and reason within the generalized subordinate clause. The only formal distinction that is sometimes made within this category is between the relations of condition and reason and the other types: this is the case in Gooniyandi (McGregor 1988: 52–54), where condition and reason are marked with subjunctive mood in the subordinate clause (as in (4) and (5) above) and the other types of relations are marked with factive mood (as in (3) above), or in Warlpiri where condition and reason/purpose interpretations each have their own specific conjunction as distinct from the other uses (Hale 1976: 80–81). In the analysis of free and bound subordination in Chapters 6 (Section 5.2) and 8 (Section 4.2), these same two categories were also set apart in terms of interpersonal structure. It was shown that the absence of speaker-interlocutor positioning for secondary clauses of cause

Moods in the verb phrase

267

and reason is not reflected in the absence of subjective modal verbs, but rather in the features of agent-binding (for reason) or previous-speakerbinding (for condition) in the interpretation of such subjective modal verbs. In this sense, it is probably not a coincidence that precisely these two semantic categories are also overtly distinguished from the other ones within the category of the generalized subordinate clause. In conclusion, therefore, the specific discursive status of the generalized subordinate clause (as described by McGregor 1988 and McKay 1988), as well as the range of interpretations it allows (as attested in Hale 1976; McGregor 1988; McKay 1988), seem to suggest a correspondence with the interpersonal feature of absence of illocutionary force, which typically shows the same discursive status and a similar range of semantic interpretations. In this perspective, the non-indicative mood – and for that matter also the conjunctions in those languages where the generalized subordinate clause is marked with conjunctions57 – might be regarded as a formal marker for the absence of illocutionary force in the generalized subordinate clause, and as a typological equivalent of the specific OV and AV marking in Germanic languages like German and Dutch (see Chapter 7, Section 6). 2.2. Moods as markers? What distinguishes the case of non-indicative moods from the word order phenomena in German and Dutch is that the moods are usually not exclusively associated with subordination but can also be used in independent main clauses (as described for Mangarayi in Merlan 1981: 177–183 and for Gooniyandi in McGregor 1988: 38–45). This may present a problem for the analysis in the previous section: if non-indicative moods can also occur in independent main clauses, it is difficult to regard them as markers for the absence of illocutionary force that distinguishes subordinate clauses from main clauses. This problem crucially depends on the way the relation between subordinate and independent uses of non-indicative moods is conceptualized, however, and on the relative importance assigned to the two uses. An analysis of non-indicative mood as a marker for absence of illocutionary force seems to be problematic mainly on the assumption that the subordinate use is not the primary one, and that it should be related to its basic use in independent clauses. This is not the only way to construe the relation between subordinate and independent uses, however: in this section, I will

268

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

briefly outline two alternative arguments in which an analysis in terms of absence of illocutionary force would not be problematic. One alternative might be to regard the subordinate use as the primary one, and to derive the typical non-subordinate uses from the subordinate use. This is not as implausible as it may seem, if we think for instance of the various conditionally marked constructions in English without an associated main clause, like (7) which has become almost conventionalized as a polite invitation, or (8) which conventionally expresses an unreal wish. (7) (8)

“If you will come this way, Miss Gieves,” said Mrs Taylor. (CB ukbooks) Most people are probably thinking he should just put his foot down a bit more. If only the answer was so simple. When you are running 10th and the guy in front is just pulling away there’s little you can do about it. In Brazil I was flat out but the set-up of the car was wrong. (CB sunnow)

There is little doubt that the specific interactional value of these constructions must at least partially be attributed to the rhetorical effect of using a subordinate construction without an associated main clause. In this type of argumentation, therefore, the use of typically subordinate elements in independent structures should not be regarded as an argument against possible status as markers for subordination, because the whole rhetorical effect of the construction relies precisely on the construal of the clause as if it were subordinate to some main clause. Still another alternative would be to give up the idea of priority altogether in comparing the subordinate and independent uses of moods, and to assign one single value of ‘interpersonal de-activation’ to all uses of nonindicative moods, whether there is another clause around that can serve as main clause or not. In some cases, this may actually do better justice to the status of the moods within the language system: if there are no relational elements like conjunctions in the clauses with non-indicative moods, there is actually no reason to take relationality as a criterion to distinguish between ‘subordinate’ (relational) and ‘independent’ (non-relational) uses of these moods. This view would imply that non-indicative mood simply marks absence of illocutionary force – and associated backgrounding – for a particular clause, with subordination as we know it from languages with conjunctions merely a contextual effect. As with the previous alternative, the idea of absence of illocutionary force for an independent clause without a relational component is not entirely exotic. McGregor (1988: 44-45) has

Integration phenomena

269

shown that in Gooniyandi the factive mood in ‘independent’ structures often occurs at the beginning of narratives as a backgrounded ‘opener’ to establish the setting for the narrative. This also has equivalents in English structures like the narrative opener in (9): the fact that once upon a time there was a king is not something the speaker wants to present as an issue in the discussion, but merely a backgrounded structure to open up the narrative. Indeed, adding marked interpersonal values to this utterance (and thus undoing the interpersonal de-activation), like the modal may in (10) or the interrogative in (11), affects its status as backgrounded narrative opener and transforms the question whether there was a king into a genuine issue in the discussion. (9) (10) (11)

Once upon a time there was a king. Once upon a time there may have been a king. Was there once a king?

On the basis of the available literature, it is of course not possible to decide which of these alternative views is most appropriate for the situation with the generalized subordinate clause discussed in the previous section. At least the analysis proposed in McGregor (1988), however, seems to favour the second alternative, i.e. to give up the idea of priority and to assign a unitary meaning to main and subordinate uses of the nonindicative moods. Not only does he propose to treat non-indicative moods in main clauses as instances of discursive backgrounding, as indicated above, but he also shows how this can lead to a unitary treatment of main and subordinate uses of non-indicative mood as putting a particular structure “out of the range of truth values” (1988: 62), irrespective of whether it is independent or subordinate. 3. Integration phenomena Another factor that is frequently mentioned in typological surveys on clause combining is the ‘integration’ of the secondary conjunct in the main conjunct (see for instance Brøndal 1972 [1937]: 26–27; Lehmann 183–192; Hopper and Traugott 2003: 178–179). In this section, I will look at two case studies that further exemplify the role of focus phenomena and the interpersonal parameter of scope as principles of integration in clause combining. The first one concerns the issue of intonational detachment in Russian converb constructions, as discussed in Rappaport (1984) and

270

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

König (1995), and the second one concerns the distinction between adsentential subordination and peripheral subordination proposed by Bickel (1993) for the Tibeto-Burman language Belhare. 3.1. Russian converbs: intonational marking for scope distinctions Converbs in Russian are non-finite verb forms that can be said to form another type of generalized subordinate clause: they typically form clausal structures that co-occur with finite main clauses, but they are not linked to these main clauses with any conjunction, and they typically have adverbial interpretations like temporal, conditional and causal ones (Rappaport 1984: 11–12; Haspelmath 1995: 3–8). The structure in (12) exemplifies such a converbal construction: the converbal form raz"ezžaja is a non-finite verb form (unlike the main verb navel, which can have different tense and mood forms), it is not linked to the main clause by any conjunction, and it expresses an adverbial meaning of temporal simultaneity. (12)

Russian Raz"ezžaja po strane, on navel spravki travel:IMPF.CONV around country he made enquiries o syne about son ‘Travelling around the country, he made enquiries about the son.’ (König 1995: 61)

The specific value of non-finiteness will be discussed in Section 4 of this chapter. In this section, I will concentrate on a particular intonational phenomenon that characterizes converbs in Russian (and a number of other languages like French and Italian according to König 1995: 89). As argued in Rappaport (1984: 12–15), Russian converbs can occur either in an intonationally detached construction, as in (13), where the converb is pronounced as a separate intonation unit, or in an integrated construction, as in (14), where the converb is pronounced in one single intonation unit with the main clause.

Integration phenomena

(13)

(14)

271

Russian / Alik xodit po ulice spotykajas / Alik walks along street stumble:CONV ‘Alik is walking along the street stumbling.’ (Rappaport 1984: 120)58 Russian / Vitja stoit v korridore / robeja / Vitja stands in corridor feel.timid:CONV ‘Vitja is standing in the corridor, feeling timid.’ (Rappaport 1984: 120)

Rappaport (1984: 100–127) and König (1995: 85–91) show that the intonational distinction between (13) and (14) goes hand in hand with a distinction in terms of focusability. If the converb is intonationally integrated with the main clause, as in (13), it can serve as focus for the entire construction, but if the converb is intonationally detached, as in (14), it has its own focus, as does the main clause. This is reflected, for instance, in the fact that an integrated converb can serve as a reply to a wh-question, whereas a detached converb cannot (Rappaport 1984: 120–121), as illustrated in the distinction between (15) and (16) below. The integrated converb spotykajas (stumbling) in (15) is the focus of the assertion that serves as reply to a how-question, whereas the detached converb robeja (feeling timid) in (16) cannot serve as focus of the assertion that replies to the same how-question. (15)

(16)

Russian A: Kak Alik xodit po ulice? B: / Alik xodit po ulice spotykajas / ‘A: How is Alik walking along the street? B: Alik is walking along the street stumbling.’ (Rappaport 1984: 121) Russian A: Kak Vitja stoit v koridore? B: */ Vitja stoit v koridore / robeja / ‘A: How is Vitja standing in the corridor? B: Vitja is standing in the corridor, feeling timid.’ (Rappaport 1984: 121)

Given the relation between focus-presupposition organization, whquestioning and scope outlined in Chapters 4 (Section 4) and 7 (Section 3),

272

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

the intonational distinction between detached and integrated converbs in Russian can probably be related to the interpersonal parameter of scope: integrated intonation for a converb marks position within the scope of the interpersonal values of the main clause, whereas detached intonation marks position outside the scope. In this sense, the distinction between intonational integration and detachment for Russian converbs presents an almost exact parallel to the distinction between integrated and non-integrated intonation for bound and free subordination in English, which can equally be regarded as a formal marker for different values of scope for the secondary clause (see for instance Chapter 7, Section 4). 3.2. Types of subordination in Belhare: lexical marking for scope distinctions In a study of clause combining in the Tibeto-Burman language Belhare, Bickel (1993) makes a fundamental distinction in the inventory of Belhare clause-linking mechanisms between what he calls “peripheral subordination” and “adsentential subordination” (1993: 24–36). These two types of constructions are illustrated in (17) and (18) below: the morpheme -lo in (17) marks a peripheral subordinate clause that describes the purpose of the action in the main clause, whereas the morpheme hung- in (18) marks an adsentential subordinate clause that describes a reason for the action in the main clause. (17)

(18)

Belhare Tupt-u-ng-lo prUst—a ka-lur-a! understand-3U-1SA-COM clear 1SU-talk-IMP ‘Talk clearly such that I can understand!’ (Bickel 1993: 26) Belhare Ta-yu hung-do yukg-ai>-t-u-ng come-NPST COG-ID keep.for-serve-NPST-3U-1SA ‘Since he is supposed to come, I shall keep [food] for him on an extra plate.’ (Bickel 1993: 27)

One of the criteria59 that distinguish peripheral subordination from adsentential subordination is what Bickel (1993: 30–34) describes as illocution attraction. Peripheral subordinate clauses attract illocution marked on the main clause, as shown in (19) below: what is questioned in this example is the relation of purpose marked by the peripheral subordi-

Integration phenomena

273

nate morpheme -si (‘was sight-seeing the purpose of your trip to Hile?’). Adsentential subordinate clauses, on the other hand, generally do not attract illocution, as shown in (20) below: again, the main clause is marked as a question, but what is questioned in this structure is only the main clause (‘did you do sight-seeing or not?’), and crucially not the temporal relation marked by the adsentential subordinate morpheme -na. (19)

(20)

Belhare Hile yang his-si khar-e-ga i? QU Hile DISTR look-SUP go-PST-2 ‘Did you go to Hile in order to sight-see?’ (Bickel 1993: 33) Belhare Kathmandu khar-a-k-na yang-cha hir-e-ga i? Kathmandu go-CONJ:PST-2-TOP DISTR-ADD look-PST:3U-2 QU ‘When going to Kathmandu, did you also do some sight-seeing?’ (Bickel 1993: 33)

From the perspective of the interpersonal typology, the distinction between (19) and (20) is of course reminiscent of the way the interpersonal parameter of scope was defined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (Section 4): the potential to attract illocution in these cases seems to correspond to the potential to serve as focus for this illocution. In this sense, adsentential subordinate clauses, which do not attract illocution, could be regarded as clauses that fall outside the scope of their main clause, whereas peripheral subordinate clauses, which do attract illocution, could be regarded as clauses that fall within the scope of the interpersonal structure of their main clause.60 Another feature which seems to point towards a correspondence with the distinction between [+ Scope] and [- Scope] is the general functional value which Bickel (1993) ascribes to the distinction between peripheral and adsentential subordination. He argues that peripheral subordinate clauses are “elaborations and enhancements of the main predication” (1993: 34), as in (19) where the si-clause describes the purpose of the main clause SoA, whereas adsentential subordinate clauses are “topics or frameworks for larger discourse units” (1993: 34), as in (20) where the na-clause provides a frame to introduce the question in the main clause. This functional distinction is very similar to the functional value that was ascribed to the distinction between bound subordination (+ Scope) and free/modal subordination (- Scope) in Chapter 6 (Section 4) and Chapter 10. Bound subordinate clauses, which fall within the scope of the interpersonal

274

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

structure of their main clause, are part of the propositional content of their main clause and restrict its SoA, whereas free and modal subordinate clauses, which fall outside the scope, take care of various backgrounded discourse functions for their main clause, such as framing or bridging to preceding discourse. If the correspondence with [+ Scope] and [- Scope] can be generalized for peripheral and adsentential subordination, this provides an interesting typological alternative for the distinction between free and bound subordination in English and the converbal constructions in Russian. In these two cases, any [+ Scope] construction has a [- Scope] counterpart that is distinguished only by features of position (English) and intonation (English and Russian). The situation described in Belhare, on the other hand, is different in that peripheral and adsentential subordination are associated with distinct sets of clause-linking morphemes (the table in Bickel 1993: 25 provides an overview). Thus, for instance, whereas the English when-clause in (21) can be distinguished for [+/-Scope] by position (21b) or intonation (21c), a similar distinction in Belhare is associated with different clauselinking morphemes, as shown in the distinction between (22a) and (22b) below: the peripheral subordinate lo-marker in (22a) can attract illocution, whereas the adsentential subordinate na-marker in (22b) cannot. (21)

(22)

[+ Scope] a. Did you also do some sight-seeing when you went to mandu? [- Scope] b. When you went to Kathmandu, did you also do some seeing? c. Did you also do some sight-seeing, when you went to mandu? [+ Scope] a. Belhare Yeti yeti cok-yakt-a-ng-lo lak-khai>-nge what what do-DISTR-CONJ:PST-e-COM boil-TEL-STAT ‘Obviously [the milk] is boiled over when I was busy other things.’ (Bickel 1993: 26)

KathsightKath-

doing

The status of deranked verb forms

275

[- Scope] b. Belhare Kathmandu khar-a-k-na yang-cha Kathmandu go-CONJ:PST-2-TOP DISTR-ADD hir-e-ga i? look-PST:3U-2 QU ‘When going to Kathmandu, did you also do some sightseeing?’ (Bickel 1993: 33) 4. The status of deranked verb forms Apart from the non-indicative mood types discussed in Section 2 above, there is one other verb-marking phenomenon that is frequently discussed in the typological literature on clause combining. Following Stassen (1985: 76-77), it is possible to make a fundamental distinction between two types of verb structure in complex sentences. On the one hand, there are what he calls “balanced” structures, where both verbs in the complex sentence have a form that verbs in an independent main clause would have. On the other hand, there are also what he calls “deranked” structures, where one of the verbs is reduced with respect to the features that characterize normal main clause verbs:61 a typical example is the non-finite ing-clause in English, which is not marked for primary tense, modality and basic clause type (see Section 4.2.3 in Chapter 1 and Section 4.1 in Chapter 2). Other types of deranked structures are for instance medial verbs in clause chaining structures (to be discussed in Section 4.2), and the converbal constructions discussed in the previous section. Deranking phenomena like non-finiteness or converb constructions have often been regarded as markers of subordination in the typological literature (see for instance Davison 1979: 106; Haiman and Thompson 1984: 512–513; Handke 1984; Lehmann 1988: 185; Haspelmath 1995: 3–8). The argument for subordinate status is usually based on the idea that if deranked structures cannot form independent main clauses, the presence of a deranked verb in a clause must be regarded as a formal marker of the dependent status of the clause in question. This is of course basically correct, but unless the notion of ‘dependence’ is further defined it does not necessarily say anything about subordinate status. A number of authors have rightly observed that the traditional notion of ‘dependence’ as marked by deranking actually covers rather different phenomena, and does not always equal what is traditionally understood as subordination (Foley and

276

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

Van Valin 1984: 239–244; Haiman 1985: 196–229; Tikkanen 1987; 1995: 506–508). On the basis of the framework developed in this study, I will suggest that the functionally ambiguous status of deranked verb forms can be captured in interpersonal terms: I will try to show that deranking can either reflect the absence of interpersonal values, in which case the deranked structure is subordinate, or the absence of marking for interpersonal values which can be recovered elsewhere, in which case the deranked structure is not subordinate but coordinate. 4.1. Subordinate deranking constructions What makes deranked verb forms interesting from the point of view of this study is that the reduction that characterizes these forms usually affects the interpersonal categories marked on the verb (e.g. modality and speech function), often together with tense. In terms of the interpersonal framework, therefore, deranking could be regarded as another manifestation of the absence of interpersonal values, with the reduction or absence of marking for interpersonal categories as a formal reflection of the absence of the interpersonal values as such. If we look at the situation in English, for instance, the availability of the ing-form in structures like (23) and (24) below can be linked to the partial or total absence of interpersonal values in these structures. (23)

(24)

a. After we’ve attrited all the enemy, we’re going to have the new world order. (CB npr) b. After going to drama school, Susannah teamed up with a friend to form the comedy duo The Cellulite Sisters. (CB today) a. He played out of position, was short of fitness after a cruciateligament injury against Coventry last March, but long on motivation. Since he came back, his club contributions have been pronounced. (CB times) b. Buddhism teaches people to consider others, something I’ve always believed in. Since coming back from the East I’ve been reading everything I can about it. (CB sunnow)

The finite after-clauses in (23a) and (24a) are formally declarative and indicative, but as we have seen in Chapter 4, these declarative indicative structures have a different value from normal declaratives and indicatives,

The status of deranked verb forms

277

in that they are not in paradigmatic contrast with non-declarative clause types or marked modal values. Thus, for instance, the declarative in the after-clause in (23a) does not have any interrogative or imperative counterparts, and its indicative mood does not have any counterparts with marked modal values like must, may or will. The secondary clauses in (23a) and (24a) are contexts of neutralization for the modal and speech functional systems, and the formally declarative indicative structures are merely the unmarked options to which paradigms typically shift in contexts of neutralization. Given the context of neutralization, the declarative clause types and the indicative moods are functionally equivalent to structures which do not express any modal or speech functional values at all, like the non-finite ing-clauses in (23b) and (24b). Due to their non-finite status, such structures are formally outside the paradigm of speech functional and modal values: ing-clauses do not allow any interrogative or imperative structures, and they do not allow any marked modal verbs (see Section 4.2.3 in Chapter 1 and Section 4.1 in Chapter 2), and can therefore be considered as equivalent to the declarative indicative structures in the neutralization contexts of (23a) and (24a). In this perspective, the ing-forms in (23b) and (24b) represent functionally equivalent deranked alternatives for the balanced structures in (23a) and (24a), with the absence of marking for interpersonal values in the deranked structures an overt marker for the absence of these values as such. 4.2. Coordinate deranking constructions On the basis of examples like (23) and (24), it is tempting to conclude that the English ing-forms in contexts of complex sentences are formal markers for the partial or total absence of interpersonal values in a secondary clause, and that deranked verb forms in general can be regarded as formal markers for this type of subordination. This is not the case, however, either for the ing-form in English or for the general category of deranked verbs. If we look at the case of medial verbs in chaining constructions from Papuan languages, for instance, the absence of marking for interpersonal values in medial verbs does not reflect the absence of these values at all. It is typical of chaining constructions that one or (usually) more deranked verbs are associated with a verb that is marked for all the normal main clause categories (see for instance Longacre 1972 and Roberts 1997 on clause chaining in Papua New Guinea languages). In this type of construction the deranked verbs are not interpersonally de-activated, but take over

278

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

the values marked on the main verb in the clause chain. Thus, for instance, the deranked verb in the Papuan language Amele (Roberts 1988) is not marked for tense or speech function, but this does not mean that it does not have any temporal or speech functional values: the deranked verb takes over the values from the main verb in the chain, as shown in (25) and (26) below. The verb form for ‘run out’ (busaleceb) is not marked for tense or speech function in either structure, but simply takes over the tense and speech function from the main verb in the chain (Roberts 1988: 51–52): it takes over the past tense and interrogative speech function of the main verb in (25), and the future tense and declarative speech function of the main verb in (26). (25)

(26)

Amele Ho busale-ce-b dana age qo-ig-a fo pig run.out-DS-3SG man 3PL hit-3PL-TOD.PST QU ‘Did the pig run out and did the men kill it?’ (Roberts 1988: 52) Amele Ho busale-ce-b dana age qo-qag-an pig run.out-DS-3SG man 3PL hit-3PL-FUT ‘The pig will run out and the men will kill it.’ (Roberts 1988: 52)

Examples like these show that the functional value of deranking is entirely different in this case. Rather than reflecting the absence of interpersonal values, the absence of marking for interpersonal values here simply reflects that these values can be recovered elsewhere in the structure, more particularly from the main verb in the chain. In terms of the interpersonal framework, therefore, these constructions can be considered as coordinate rather than subordinate (as also argued for instance in Longacre 1972: 2–3 and Roberts 1988: 50–58). The clauses in a chaining construction are not interpersonally de-activated: they have illocutionary force, but not all of them are formally marked for it. Something similar can actually be observed for certain types of ingclauses in English, like the one in (27) below. This construction is markedly different from the ing-clauses illustrated in (23b) and (24b) above in a number of ways, which all point towards coordinate rather than subordinate status of the deranked clause. Most importantly, there is a significant difference in discourse status between this type and the type illustrated above. Unlike the ing-clauses in (23b) and (24b), the ing-clause in (27) is not backgrounded at all: it describes an important and unexpected event in the development of the discourse, and can therefore be considered as

The status of deranked verb forms

279

foregrounded. Secondly, the ing-clause in (27) cannot be shifted relative to the associated main clause: whereas the ing-clauses in (23b) and (24b) can easily be shifted to another position, this is impossible for their counterpart in (27) without affecting the interpretation of close succession of events. (27)

At the same time as the Horsekin were mounting their abortive attack, up in his own country Evandar was listening to the harpers sing a pair of songs and not particularly long ones at that. Sweet though the music was he grew distracted, suddenly leaping to his feet with an oath. “Leave me! Take those squalling strings and go!” With little shrieks of fear they clutched their harps to their chests and fled, rushing out of the pavilion. (CB ukbooks)

Taken together, such differences indicate that the ing-construction in (27) is closer to the coordinate type of deranking constructions of Amele than to the subordinate type of deranking illustrated in (23b) and (24b). Backgrounding and positional mobility are typical correlates of the interpersonal de-activation of the secondary clause in subordinate constructions, as has been shown in the second part of this study, whereas foregrounding and lack of positional mobility are correlates of the full interpersonal status of the secondary clause of coordinate constructions. In this sense, the deranking in (27) should not be regarded as a reflection of the absence of interpersonal values and subordinate status, but can be seen as a reflection of the absence of marking for these values and coordinate status, more or less comparable to the situation in Amele.62 4.3. Conclusion In conclusion, we can say that the formal phenomenon of deranking can have two different types of functional values. The absence of marking for interpersonal values implies that deranked verb forms cannot form any independent clause structures, and that they are therefore inherently dependent on clauses that are fully marked for interpersonal values for their occurrence in discourse. In terms of the interpersonal framework, however, the precise nature of this dependence can take two rather different forms (compare Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 454) on the distinction between “operator dependence” and “structural dependence”). On the one hand, the deranked verb form can be dependent on the main clause for the specification of its interpersonal values, as in (25), (26) and (27) above. In this case,

280

Chapter 11: Typological outlook

the construction is basically coordinate: the deranked verb forms have their own interpersonal values, but these must be recovered elsewhere. On the other hand, the deranked verb form can also be dependent on the main clause because it does not have any interpersonal values at all, as in (23b) and (24b) above. In this case, the construction is basically subordinate: the deranked verb form is interpersonally de-activated. 5. Conclusion Given the scope of this study, the typological outlook in this final Chapter has necessarily been restricted to a small number of case studies based on existing descriptions. With these case studies, however, I hope to have shown at least that the interpersonal parameters proposed in this study can also be relevant in a typological perspective. On the one hand, I have suggested that the absence of illocutionary force that characterizes the different types of subordination in the interpersonal typology can also be attributed to the generalized subordinate clause in a number of Australian languages (Hale 1976; McGregor 1988; McKay 1988). On the other hand, I have also tried to show that the parameter of scope that distinguishes bound subordination from the other subordinate categories in the typology can be identified with the distinction between integrated and detached converbs in Russian (Rappaport 1984; König 1995), as well as with the distinction between peripheral and adsentential subordination in Belhare (Bickel 1993). Finally, I have argued that the structural ambiguity of deranked verb forms (Tikkanen 1987; Haiman 1985; Tikkanen 1995; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997) can be captured in interpersonal terms: the structural reduction that characterizes deranked verbs can reflect either absence of interpersonal values or absence of marking for such values, which are recoverable in another part of the construction.

Conclusion

In this study, I have developed a framework for the analysis of complex sentences in English on the basis of their interpersonal properties, and I have tried to show that this framework can integrate and explain many of the primary descriptive facts of clause combining, such as the discursive characteristics of different types of complex sentences, the role of grammatical criteria in distinguishing between types, and the semantic properties of the conjunctions involved in the complex sentences. The first part of this study identified modality, speech function and scope as the interpersonal systems in the grammar of the simple clause that are relevant to clause combining, and it investigated how they interact with each other. In Chapter 1, modality as an interpersonal system was identified formally with the basic mood types and the subjective uses of the modal verbs, and functionally with the notion of position-construal: modal verbs and mood types take care of the encoding of an epistemic or a deontic position with respect to the propositional content of the clause. In Chapter 2, speech function was identified formally with the basic clause types of declarative, interrogative and imperative, and functionally with the notion of responsibility-assignment: the basic clause types assign responsibility for modal positions in speaker-interlocutor interaction. In Chapter 3, scope was defined formally in terms of focus-presupposition organization, and functionally in terms of the notion of domain: the potential extent of the focus of an interpersonal element delineates the domain over which this element has scope. Taken together, these three systems constitute the grammatical basis for the illocutionary force of the clause. The positionconstrual of modality and the responsibility-assignment of speech function furnish the basic input for the illocutionary force as such, and their scoping relation to the rest of the clause defines its relation to the propositional content. The need to identify the precise grammatical locus of these interpersonal parameters and to describe the way they interact also implies that the analysis in Part 1 had to address a number of problematic issues in the analysis of modal verbs, moods and basic clause types. In this sense, the first three chapters of this study can also be read independently as a study of problem areas in these domains. For the system of modality, the problems addressed include the definition and precise delineation of subjective and objective modality, and the nature of the relation between modal verbs

282

Conclusion

and basic moods. The problem areas dealt with for the system of speech function cover, amongst others, the status of the imperative as a modal or a speech functional value, and the interaction between epistemic modal verbs and interrogative structures. For the system of scope, finally, the issues that were addressed include the formal definition of scoping relations and their relation to the distinction between intra-clausal and extra-clausal elements. In the second part of this study, the three parameters of interpersonal grammar identified in the first part were applied to the analysis of clause combining, resulting in a basic typology of four construction types. The analysis in Chapter 4 showed that each of the interpersonal parameters can take two values in the context of a complex sentence construction, and thus defines two different structural configurations. For the parameters of modality and speech function, the two values are (i) presence of modal or speech functional values in both conjuncts and (ii) absence of modal or speech functional values in one of the conjuncts. The formal argument used to make this distinction is paradigmatic: restriction to the unmarked option in the paradigm is regarded as a formal reflection of neutralization and therefore absence of modality or speech function, whereas availability of the full paradigm of options is regarded as a formal reflection of presence of modality or speech function. For the parameter of scope, the two values are (i) position of the secondary conjunct within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the main conjunct and (ii) position of the secondary conjunct outside the scope of these values. The criterion for this distinction is the ability or inability of the secondary conjunct to serve as focus for the modal and speech functional values of the main conjunct. In Chapter 5, these three parameters were combined with each other to set up an interpersonally-based typology of complex sentences. It was shown that the number of construction types is restricted to four rather than the expected eight, because of the functional dependencies between the three parameters. The resulting typology is recapitulated in figure 7, together with the labels that were proposed in Chapter 6 for each of the construction types:

Conclusion

283

[+Sp Func]

[-Sp Func]

[+Modality]

[+Modality]

[-Modality]

[-Scope]

[-Scope]

[-Scope]

Coordination

Modal subordination Free subordination Bound subordination

[+Scope]

Figure 7. The basic typology

The remaining chapters in Part 2 tried to show how this interpersonally based typology of four construction types can integrate the primary descriptive facts of clause combining in English, more specifically concerning functional properties (Chapter 6), grammatical criteria (Chapter 7) and the semantics of the conjunctions (Chapter 8). The analysis in Chapter 6 focused on how the interpersonal typology can integrate and motivate a number of traditional functional generalizations from the literature on clause combining. It was argued that the primary distinction between coordination and different types of subordination is motivated by the distinction between interpersonal equality and inequality in the clause combination: in coordinate structures both conjuncts have illocutionary force, as reflected in the presence of modal and speech functional values, whereas in subordinate structures there is one conjunct that does not have any illocutionary force, as reflected in the absence of speech functional and/or modal values. The analysis further showed that the subordinate category can be subdivided into modal subordination, where the subordinate clause has a modal value of its own and therefore constitutes a challengeable proposition, and free/bound subordination, where the subordinate clause is unchallengeable. Finally, it was also argued that the latter category can be subdivided into free and bound subordination depending on whether the subordinate clause falls outside or within the scope of the modal and speech functional values of the main clause, as reflected in its focusable status. Table 47 summarizes these distinctions.

284

Conclusion

Table 47. The interpersonal typology and functional characteristics Functional characteristics Interpersonal parameters

Coordination Modal subordination

[+ Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope]

Equality of status of the conjuncts

Speech act status of the secondary conjunct

Integration of the secondary conjunct

+

Full speech act

-

-

Challengeable proposition

-

Free subordination

[- Sp F] [- Mod] [- Scope]

-

Bound subordination

[- Sp F] [- Mod] [+ Scope]

-

Unchallengeable proposition (Presupposition / supposition) Unchallengeable proposition (Presupposition / supposition)

-

+

The analysis in Chapter 7 investigated how the interpersonal typology relates to a number of traditional grammatical criteria in the domain of clause combining. It was shown that the constructional distinctions defined by the criteria of preposing, clefting, wh-interrogation, main clause phenomena, integrated intonation and VO/VA versus OV/AV word order in other Germanic languages, correspond to the constructional boundaries as they are defined by the interpersonal typology. Table 48 summarizes these correspondences: the different grammatical criteria either correspond to a specific construction type or to a group of construction types in the typology.

Conclusion

285

Table 48. The interpersonal typology and traditional grammatical criteria

VO and VA word order

Bound subordination

Integrated intonation

Free subordination

Main clause phenomena 2

Modal subordination

[+ Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [- Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [- Mod] [+ Scope]

Main clause phenomena 1

Coordination

Clefting and wh-questioning

Interpersonal parameters

Preposing

Syntactic criteria

-

-

+

+

-

+

+

-

-

+

-

-

+

-

-

-

-

-

+

+

-

-

+

-

The existence of these correspondences was explained in interpersonal terms. The different grammatical criteria actually rely indirectly on a basic interpersonal parameter: wh-questioning, clefting and integrated intonation rely on the parameter of scope; preposing, VO/VA word order and the subcategory of main clause phenomena that deals with basic clause types (category 1 in table 48) rely on the parameter of speech function; and the subcategory of main clause phenomena that deals with preposing phenomena (category 2 in table 48) within the clause relies on the parameter of modality. The analysis in Chapter 8, finally, investigated how the interpersonal typology relates to the meaning of the conjunctions involved in the clause combinations. It was argued that the different constructions in the typology also define semantically coherent sets of conjunctions. As illustrated in table 49, the primary distinction in semantic terms lies between coordination and modal subordination on the one hand and free and bound subordination on the other hand. This was demonstrated specifically by investigating the constructional associations of conjunctions like while, when, so that, as, since and because, and by showing how the distinct meanings of these conjunctions correlate with distinct construction types. It

286

Conclusion

was further also shown that a number of secondary interpersonal parameters correlate with semantic subcategories of the primary categories as defined in table 49. Table 49. The interpersonal typology and semantic categories

Interpersonal parameters

Coordination

[+ Sp F] [+ Mod] [- Scope]

Modal subordination

[+ Sp F] [- Mod] [- Scope]

Free subordination Bound subordination

[- Sp F] [- Mod] [- Scope] [- Sp F] [- Mod] [+ Scope]

Addition, alternation and, or, but

Semantics Contrast, justification, concession, result

Time, cause, reason, purpose, condition

for, because, although, but when, while, whereas, since, as, so that, although before, after, until, once, when, while, since, as, so that, if, because

The third part of this study, finally, provided further evidence for the usefulness of the interpersonal approach by showing how it can account for a number of specific descriptive problems in the domain of clause combining. The analysis in Chapter 9 focused on the distinction between SoArelated and speaker-related interpretations for interclausal relations, and explained how the interpersonal analysis can help to account for the syntactic correlates of this distinction, as well as for the problem of subdividing the speaker-related category. It was argued that the different syntactic criteria for distinguishing between speaker-related and SoA-related interpretations are based on the incompatibility between the bound subordinate construction and a speaker-related interpretation, and that the subdivision of the speaker-related category into argumentative and speech act subcategories can be justified in terms of the distinction between modality and speech function as targets for the secondary conjunct in the main conjunct. The analysis in Chapter 10 focused on the difference in discursive status associated with initial and final position of secondary clauses, and tried to show how this difference can be explained in terms of the specific

Conclusion

287

interpersonal properties of the initial position, viz. the values of [- Scope] and [- Speech Function]. In addition, it was also argued that the connection between final position and local function is an overgeneralization, and that this can be refined by distinguishing between different types of final clauses on the basis of their values for the parameters of scope and speech function. Chapter 11, finally, tentatively investigated the possible typological relevance of the interpersonal analysis by showing how a number of cross-linguistically widespread construction types can be accounted for in terms of the categories defined in the interpersonal typology. The small-scale typological analysis in Chapter 11 is actually just one of a number of topics that might provide interesting ways to further expand and test the framework developed here, but that have merely been touched upon or not dealt with at all in this study. These topics include both descriptive issues such as projecting clause combinations, the diachrony of clause combining, and the uses of complex sentences in discourse and interaction, as well as more theoretical issues like the relation between lexical and constructional meaning. At the outset of the second part of this study, projecting clause combinations like (1) below were excluded from the investigation because they combine two levels of interaction: one level of interaction associated with the represented speaker and interlocutor (aren’t you … ?), and another level of interaction associated with the current speaker and interlocutor (he said … .). (1)

And he said erm “Aren’t you the chap who does the advert with the […] with the coffee beans?” (CB ukspok)

As argued in the introduction to Part 2, the double interactional status of projecting structures is a complicating factor that justifies treatment of such structures as a separate category. This is also reflected, for instance, in the fact that cross-linguistically phenomena of represented speech do not always belong in the domain of complex sentence formation, as argued by McGregor (1997: 257–258): the represented status of a stretch of speech can also be marked by particles rather than full clauses, and it might even be argued that in stretches of conversational interaction like (2) below the he said – I said patterns could be described more accurately as markers for quoted status rather than as conjuncts in complex sentence constructions. (2)

He then sat down and he rang me later when he was plastered and I wasn’t in the mood for it at all and he said She’s terrific and I

288

Conclusion

said Who’s terrific and he said Claire. I said I know she’s terrific I’ve worked with her for two years. Fabulous lady. He said do you know I’ve told her all about all Around the World for four hours and she listened to […] and she listened to every word. (CB ukspok) When represented speech takes the form of a projecting clause combination, however, with the main clause describing the circumstances of the represented speech event (e.g. he said in (1)), it does appear to obey at least formally to the interpersonal principles of complex sentence construction that were outlined in the second part of this study. It was shown in Chapter 6 that the typology of complex sentences is characterized by gradual reduction of the internal interpersonal structure of the secondary clause: the secondary clause has modal and speech functional values in coordination, it has modal but no speech functional values in modal subordination, and it has no modal or speech functional values in free and bound subordination. The same principle of interpersonal reduction for the secondary clause seems to apply to the three major types of projecting clause combinations that are described in Halliday (1994: 250–273), viz. direct speech, illustrated in (1) above, indirect speech, illustrated in (3a) below, and factive structures,63 illustrated in (4a) below. (3)

(4)

a. But one former colleague Yuri Modin, who controlled the Cambridge spy ring of Philby, Burgess Maclean, Blunt and Cairncross, said that Strelnikov must have been an accomplished spy to spend 10 years at the embassy in London. (CB times) b. *But one former colleague said that must Strelnikove have been an accomplished spy to spend 10 years at the embassy in London? a. To this day he regrets that one of the unanticipated side effects of the Welfare State was the disappearance of granny and grandpa from the family hearth into the old people’s homes. (CB ukbooks) b. *To this day he regrets that was(n’t) the disappearance of granny and grandpa into the old people’s homes one of the unanticipated side effects. c. ?To this day he regrets that one of the unanticipated side effects must have been the disappearance of granny and grandpa into the old people’s homes.

Conclusion

289

The secondary clause in the ‘direct speech’ construction in (1) has no specific restrictions on interpersonal structure: it can take different basic clause types, like the interrogative in (1), as well as different subjective modals. The secondary clause in the ‘indirect speech’ construction in (3a), on the other hand, is restricted in terms of speech function, because it does not allow any non-declarative basic clause types, as shown by the unacceptability of (3b). It does allow subjective modal verbs, however, as shown by the presence of epistemic must in (3a). The secondary clause in the ‘factive’ construction in (4a), finally, is restricted both in terms of speech function and in terms of modality: it does not allow non-declarative clause types or subjective modal verbs, as shown by the unacceptability of the interrogative in (4b) and the strangeness of epistemic must of (4c). In this perspective, the different types of projecting structures seem to follow the formal pattern of other complex sentences. If we disregard the fact that the interpersonal categories in the secondary clause of projecting constructions actually relate to the represented interactants rather than to the current speaker and interlocutor, such a correspondence seems to imply that at least one aspect of projecting clause combinations can be captured in terms of the interpersonal framework: ‘direct speech’ constructions look like coordinate constructions, ‘indirect speech’ constructions look like modal subordinate constructions and ‘factive’ constructions look like free/bound subordinate constructions. In a number of other respects, however, projecting structures behave quite differently from the complex sentences that were dealt with in this study. To give just one example, the principles of clause ordering are entirely different: unlike with modal and free/bound subordination, clause ordering is largely fixed for ‘factive’ and ‘indirect speech’ constructions, and unlike with coordination, clause ordering is free for ‘direct speech’ constructions, because the main clause can generally occur before, after and even interrupting the secondary clause. This is one of the reasons why I have chosen not to integrate projecting structures into the general framework, and to leave them for future investigation. Moving beyond the description of clause combining in English, the analysis proposed in this study might also be used as a heuristic framework for typological, discourse-functional and diachronic investigations of clause combining. Because of the way the framework integrates discursive, grammatical and semantic properties of clause combinations, it constitutes a specific hypothesis about correlations between these properties. Comparing the results presented in tables 47, 48 and 49 above predicts, for in-

290

Conclusion

stance, that semantic categories like concession or contrast will correlate with syntactic properties like non-focusability and availability of main clause phenomena and with discursive properties like challengeability and non-integration, whereas semantic categories like time or cause will correlate with focusability and absence of main clause phenomena, and with unchallengeability and potential for integration. In this sense, the typology also contains an implicit hypothesis about the correlation between types of semantic relations, syntactic criteria, and discursive properties. This hypothesis may form an interesting path for further research, in typological, discourse-functional and diachronic perspectives. In a typological sense, the proposed framework could serve as the starting point for a larger-scale investigation of the correlation between semantic categories, syntactic criteria and discursive properties in clause combinations. The tentative typological analysis in Chapter 11 has illustrated how this could work for a small selection of phenomena, but it might be worthwhile to replicate this on a larger scale, including more phenomena and using a controlled sample of languages. In a discourse-functional sense, the analysis provides an explicit hypothesis about the semantic and grammatical prerequisites for various uses of complex sentences in discourse and interaction. This was explored in some detail in Chapters 9 and 10, focusing on the grammatical prerequisites for various types of speakerrelated clause linkage and bridging functions in discourse, but it can also be expanded in a more general way by looking at the three basic types of discourse function proposed in the model in Chapter 6. Thus, for instance, the general correlation between modality and challengeability could be tested in actual discourse studies by checking in how far the presence of modal elements in a subordinate clause influences whether the proposition described in this the clause is taken up in the further development of the text. Or to give another example that combines the discourse-functional and the typological perspectives, the analysis in Chapter 10 can suggest a richer hypothesis about the relation between position and information structure than those available so far. A cross-linguistic study by Diessel (2001), for instance, has shown that some languages allow both initial and final position for adverbial clauses whereas others allow only initial position, and that for languages with both orderings, information-structural principles can be invoked to determine the choice between the two, in line with the findings in Thompson (1985) or Ford (1993) for English. This seems to suggest that information-structural alternatives are not available for languages in which adverbial clauses are restricted to initial position. From the perspective of the present study, however, what matters in this domain

Conclusion

291

is not the question of position as such, but the functional parameter of scope, one specific instantiation of which – in English – is position. In this sense, it need not be the case at all that languages with initial adverbial clauses cannot make a distinction between more local and broader discursive functions. Rather, the framework proposed here suggests the hypothesis that in these languages, scope can be realized by some other means than position, for instance focus particles, and that such means can be used to distinguish between local functions and broader discursive functions in the adverbial domain. In a diachronic sense, finally, the proposed analysis also provides a hypothesis about the relation between patterns of syntactic and semantic change, specifically between cases of subjectification in conjunctions (as reported in Traugott and König 1991, Traugott 1995) and constructional change. The prediction would be that the semantic development from a meaning that is typically associated with bound or free subordination to a meaning that is typically associated with coordination or modal subordination, is reflected in a parallel pattern of syntactic development. The discussion in Chapter 8 has in fact illustrated the synchronic counterpart of this situation with the polysemous conjunctions when, while, as and since, for which the different meanings were shown to correlate with different grammatical and discursive properties. Traugott and König (1991) have argued that this synchronic pattern of polysemy is the result of diachronic development, and they have described the semantic development from temporal to contrastive or justificational relations as an instance of subjectification in the meaning of the conjunction involved. The interpersonal framework could be used to complement this semantic analysis with a syntactic counterpart, because it predicts the type of constructional changes that may accompany this semantic development. A final more theoretical issue that might be relevant from the perspective of this study is the relation between lexical and constructional meaning. The analysis has not really focused on this question, but some of the case studies discussed in parts 1 and 2 are obviously relevant, and might provide new ‘testing ground’ for the theoretical discussion. In the literature, the question of interaction between lexical and constructional meaning has been investigated mainly in the domain of verb semantics, focusing on the interaction between lexical semantic patterns and construction-level characteristics for verbs (e.g. Davidse 1999; Levin 1993; Goldberg 1995; Laffut 2006). The analysis in this study has dealt with at least two other domains that could furnish interesting new material for this question. The most obviously relevant example is of course the discussion in Chapter 8, which investigated the relation between the constructional parameters of

292

Conclusion

interpersonal grammar and the meaning of the conjunctions involved in the complex sentences. Although the precise theoretical status of the differences in meaning was not really an issue in the analysis, it was suggested that it is possible to distinguish between cases where the semantic differences can be described as patterns of lexical polysemy correlating with constructional distinctions, and cases where they would more appropriately be described as a function of the constructional distinctions. Apart from this, another relevant case study concerned the discussion of subjective status for modal verbs in Chapter 1 (Section 2). The criteria for subjective status are typically on the level of the construction (e.g. interaction of the modal with interrogative and conditional constructions), which seems to suggest that a constructional definition is most appropriate for the features of subjectivity and objectivity. It was also suggested, however, that the subjective-objective distinction can interact with lexical features within the modal verb, like the simultaneous presence of agent-oriented (i.e. clauseinternal) and speaker-oriented (i.e. interaction-based) components in the meaning of deontic modals. Both the case of the conjunctions and the case of the modals warrant a more thorough-going investigation of the relation between lexical and constructional meaning than has been provided in this study.

Notes 1. ‘Propositional content’ will be used here as a cover term for the elements with respect to which modal positions are taken. As I will show in Chapter 1 (Section 2.2), it is necessary to differentiate between types of propositional content depending on the epistemic or deontic nature of the modal position. When specifically dealing with the epistemic-deontic distinction, therefore, I will use the term ‘proposition’ to refer to the propositional content of an epistemic position, and the term ‘SoA’ (State of Affairs) to refer to the propositional content of a deontic position. 2. For ease of reference, I will use Lyons’ (1977) terminology of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ modality rather than the more elaborate ‘interpersonal’ and ‘noninterpersonal’. 3. Modals like shall in Shall I help you do the washing-up? can also be regarded as belonging to the category of ‘volition’, but these are deontic rather than dynamic, since they involve the speaker’s or interlocutor’s volition rather than the agent’s volition (Declerck 1991a: 365–367). 4. This cannot be generalized, however: some modal adverbs like possibly easily occur in interrogative structures (see also Nuyts 1992: 77–78). 5. It is important to note that it is this commitment-suspending function of the conditional marker rather than the presence of the conditional marker as such that leads to an echo-effect. As shown in Declerck and Reed (2001), not all clauses introduced by if have the function of suspending the speaker’s commitment. There are for instance what they call performative conditionals, where “the actualization of the P-situation is brought about by the illocutionary speech act of uttering the P-clause” (Declerck and Reed 2001). Accordingly, such conditionals will not induce any echo-effect for subjective modals, since it is only the commitment-suspending function of if that leads to echo-interpretation for subjective modals. Compare, for instance, examples like If I may interrupt, … (suggested to me by Alex Klinge, p.c.). 6. The evidence for an epistemic component in structures with dynamic modals is further elaborated in Section 3.3.2 of this chapter. 7. There are some types of epistemic modals that do not easily occur in interrogative structures (for instance Palmer 1990: 62; Declerck 1991a: 398–399, 408), but this is usually not due to any inherent restrictions. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 2 (Section 1), the lower frequency of certain epistemic modals in interrogatives is due to the specific discursive effects of epistemic modals as opposed to indicative mood in interrogatives. 8. In fact, this use of deontic modality is more typically realized by semi-modals like have to rather than modal auxiliaries like must (Palmer 1990: 113–116; Declerck 1991a: 376–377).

294

Notes

9. Given the relatively restricted use of the subjunctive in present-day English, I will not deal with this mood type in detail. Present subjunctive mainly relates to deontic modality (e.g. in wishes like God be with you) and past subjunctive mainly relates to epistemic modality (e.g. expressing unreality as in He acts as if he were the owner of the company). See further in Quirk et al. (1985: 1012– 1014) and Declerck (1991a: 353–354). 10. Indicatives can sometimes also occur without subject NP, as in He’s in our Regiment, but I wouldn’t say he’s part of us. Tried to leave us last year when we’d finished in Crossmaglen. (CB ukbooks), but the tense marking on the verb still distinguishes these structures from imperatives. 11. This is only a default case rather than an absolute principle, however. As shown by Bolinger (1968: 348–351), there are structures like Please, don’t have the money on you (in a context of a thief being caught and his partner worrying about the evidence) where realization is in the present but verification in the future. 12. The relation to the temporal zero-point in this case is probably indirect rather than direct. Only the modal verb as such takes absolute tense in that it is related directly to the temporal zero-point, and the present/perfect contrast relates indirectly to the temporal zero-point via its relation of simultaneity/anteriority to the tense of the modal verb (Declerck 1991b: 85). Because of the performative nature of the subjective modal, however, the tense of the modal will always be simultaneous with the temporal zero-point and will therefore be ‘transparent’ for the other tenses that depend on it. 13. See Section 2.2.2 in the previous chapter on the distinction between subjective and objective modality in terms of their interaction with interrogation. 14. The discussion here will remain restricted to the epistemic domain, since the deontic domain does not have any unmarked value (see Section 3.2.4 in the previous chapter) whose behaviour in interrogative structures can be contrasted with its marked counterparts. 15. The discursive markedness of these structures may also explain the often-noted observation that epistemic modal verbs occur less easily in interrogatives than the indicative mood (see for instance Palmer 1990: 62–62). In some cases this is due to specific lexical restrictions, as in the case of may, which is replaced with can in interrogative structures (Palmer 1990: 62; Declerck 1991a: 398– 399), but apart from such cases the lower frequency of epistemic modals relative to the indicative mood can probably be explained in terms of the discursive markedness of marked modal values in interrogative structures. 16. The use of ‘X’ in this context rather than me or you is meant to reflect the fact that unlike the imperative, the different deontic modal verbs are not restricted to a second-person or generalized third-person subject, but can take any subject. 17. The parallelism with the case of ellipsis in (16) should not be taken to imply that non-finite structures in clause combinations like (15) can also be analysed in terms of ellipsis. In some types of non-finite structure such an elliptic analysis is possible, but not in all types, as will be shown in Chapter 11 (Section 4),

Notes

295

where the status of non-finiteness in clause combining will be examined more closely. 18. This will not be the case, of course, if there are contextual indications that there are other reasons for this silence (Schegloff 1972: 368), or if the interlocutor specifically attends to the silence with utterances like Wait a second, let me think. 19. It should be noted that the location of the tonic syllable as such does not yet determine the precise extent of the focus: this can be the word, the phrase or even the entire clause containing the tonic syllable, as illustrated in the cosclause in (1) and the to-clause in (2). See further in Halliday (1967a: 206–207), Taglicht (1984) on the different factors that influence the precise location of the tonic syllable and the precise extent of the focus relative to this syllable. 20. Another possibility is focus on did (\Did you buy this separately), in which case the exchange focuses on the modal position as such, and the propositional content is presupposed. This has not been included because it is not immediately relevant to the problem of scoping relations. 21. See further in Chapter 10 (Section 2.2) on the distinction between initial and final position in terms of focusability. I will argue there that initial position of an adjunct like the after-clause in (12) generally corresponds with nonfocusable status in English. 22. Note that this is not the case in other Germanic languages like German or Dutch, where adjuncts equally require a clause-internal pro-element (see Verstraete 2003 for more details). 23. I have simply used the example of although as a label for this type. Chapter 4 (Section 4) and Chapter 8 (Section 3) provide more examples and a more detailed analysis of this type of structure. 24. Throughout this text, I will use the term ‘conjunct’ (rather than the theoretically loaded ‘constituent clause’) to refer to the clauses in a complex sentence construction. The same term has traditionally also been used to refer to adverbs with a connective function like however, again and still (Greenbaum 1969: 15– 25, Quirk et al. 1985: 501–503): in this text, these will be referred to as conjunctive adverbs. 25. Elements like because can of course co-occur with and, but they will never link the same two conjuncts. The structure will be either [X and [because Y, Z]], as in He was very much an East End boy and because I came from Oxford, I was regarded as some sort of country bumpkin with straw in my hair (CB sunnow) or [[X because Y] [and (X) because Z]], as in She needed and wanted my approval, because I was a woman and because she wanted to look grown up (CB sunnow). 26. ‘Secondary clause’ will be used here as a shorthand term for the clause introduced by the conjunction, irrespective of whether it precedes or follows the main clause. 27. It may have been noted that the interrogative in (3b) is functionally quite close to the declarative in (3a), because it is biased towards the position that Mary

296

Notes

refused the money, and is therefore closer to an assertive speech act than to a genuine question (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2 on bias in interrogatives). In Chapter 8 (Section 4.1), I will argue that this type of ‘assertive’ bias for interrogative structures constitutes a secondary parameter associated with the system of speech function: I will show that it is possible to distinguish between constructions where the interpretation of non-declarative structures necessarily involves speaker-bias and constructions where the interpretation of nondeclarative structures is free. 28. The negation here is added in order to rule out the possibility of biased interpretation of the interrogative: as I will argue in Chapter 8 (Section 4.1), some constructions allow only biased interpretations for non-declarative clause types, so this possibility should also be considered in checking for speech function. See also previous footnote. 29. Reference to modality in this chapter is of course always to the interpersonal modal system that was delineated in Chapter 1: in the absence of further specification, therefore, ‘modality’ should be taken as ‘the interpersonal system of modality’ and ‘modal verbs’ should be taken as ‘subjective modal verbs’. 30. This example is in fact slightly different from the rest, in that the main clause here is not presupposed in the same way as in the other examples. The interrogative in (38) does focus on the if-clause, but it does not presuppose that ‘the Syrians will fight’. In Chapter 6 (Section 5.2), I will show that this is a consequence of the suppositional semantics of the conjunction if. 31. See Chapter 9 (Section 2.2) for one exception to this generalization. 32. This includes both the cases where [+ Speech Function] is the only value and those where it alternates with [- Speech Function]. 33. Throughout this chapter, I will use the numbering system in table 17 to refer to the different construction types. More informative labels will be proposed in Section 7, on the basis of the analysis in the intervening sections. 34. For the sake of the argument, I will disregard the fact that the notion of constituency as such may be problematic for ‘adverbial’ structures as such, like the although-clause and the while-clause in (9) and (10), as argued by McGregor (1992). 35. The problems with the constituency account of subordination have also been recognized in the systemic-functional framework, which systematically distinguishes between ‘embedded’ clauses, which are constituents of their main clause, and ‘hypotactic’ clauses, which are not (see Halliday 1994: 242–243; Davidse 1994). This distinction has been applied to the domain of projection, for instance, in order to account for the distinction between ‘factive’ (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970) clauses and clauses of direct and indirect speech (see Davidse 1994). For structures like (9) and (10), however, the systemicfunctional framework has opted for the inverse solution of Quirk et al (1985), by regarding them as indiscriminately hypotactic. This is equally problematic, because it fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between these structures in terms of scope, as also observed in Huddleston (1988: 144–148).

Notes

297

36. It may be worth noting that the presupposition referred to by Keenan is distinct from the presupposition referred to in the treatment of the focus-presupposition system (see Chapter 3, Section 1 for the simple clause and Chapter 4, Section 3 for complex sentences). The latter type of presupposition is a relational concept, formally and semantically defined relative to the focus of some interpersonal system. The type of presupposition referred to here, on the other hand, is an absolute concept that constitutes a system in its own right. The distinctness of relational and absolute presupposition is reflected in the fact that they can co-occur in one single structure, as in the question in (13c). In this construction, relational presupposition is always relative to the location of the focus of the interpersonal values of the main clause: the focus can vary from the first argument of the main clause (did John leave when Mary called) to the secondary clause (did John leave when Mary called?), with the associated presupposition varying accordingly (respectively, ‘someone left when Mary called’ and ‘John left at some time’). Absolute presupposition, however, is invariably associated with the propositional content of the secondary clause: the presupposed status of the secondary clause when Mary called does not vary relative to the location of some focus, but is inherent in the structure. The interaction between relational and absolute presupposition can also explain a particular constraint on the location of the focus for the interpersonal values of the main clause. Although the focus can extend to the secondary clause, as has been shown in Chapter 4 (Section 4), it cannot usually extend into the SoA of that secondary clause: thus, for instance, what can be interrogated in (13c) is whether John left when Mary called, but not whether Mary actually called. The SoA ‘Mary called’ is an absolute presupposition, and therefore cannot become the focus of interrogation in the main clause. Bearing in mind the relation between focus and wh-elements, this type of restriction is actually reminiscent of Ross’ (1967: 118–158; 1986) extraction constraints, according to which arguments from subordinate clauses cannot be extracted to wh-elements in the main clause, even when they are coreferential with an argument in the main clause. 37. There may be some difference between (20) and (21), however, in terms of the relative importance of the main clause and the secondary clause in discourse, in the sense that the since-clause in (21) is less prominent than the main clause, whereas both clauses are equally prominent in the coordinate construction in (20). See further in the following section. 38. In fact, the reason why the as-clause is regarded as challengeable by Matthiessen and Thompson (1988) is probably the presence of the modal clause I think which functions almost like a modal operator (as shown for instance by its typical behaviour with respect to phenomena like neg-raising). 39. There is one specific exception to this principle: an interpretation in terms of [+ Scope] is marginally possible, given a marked falling-rising intonation contour on the preposed clause. See further in Chapter 10 (Section 2.2). 40. The case in (13b) is an example of a type of semantic relation that inherently does not have any corresponding wh-element. There are other semantic rela-

298

Notes

tions that do not have any specific wh-elements, but can still serve as a reply to a ‘periphrastic’ wh-phrase, as in How long has he been smoking? God … Since he was about six years old. (CB ukspok). 41. This restriction does not apply to the ‘narrative’ temporal uses of when, which can be regarded as modal subordinate rather than free or bound subordinate – see further in Chapter 8 (Section 3.2). 42. The two features of Verb-Object order and verb-second position do not perfectly correspond: imperative and polar interrogative clauses are verb-initial but still have Verb-Object order, whereas declaratives and wh-interrogatives are invariably verb-second but can in some cases have Object-Verb order (when the object is in initial focus position). 43. One exception has already been mentioned, viz. when the object is in focus and occurs in clause-initial position. Even then, however, the verb does not take the clause-final position that is typical of the OV ordering of subordinate clauses. 44. The distinction between finite and non-finite verb forms is of course a serious candidate for verb phrase-internal marking of interpersonal distinctions, but in Chapter 11 (Section 4) I will show that the distinction between finite and nonfinite verb forms is ambiguous in interpersonal terms. 45. See Section 2.3 below on the choice of the term ‘justification’ rather than the more familiar terms of ‘cause’ or ‘reason’, which I wish to distinguish from justification, following Goethals (2002). 46. One principled exception to this generalization is formed by the so-called “narrative” (Declerck 1996: 222–226, 1997: 212–225) uses of temporal conjunctions – characterized by a reversal of the foreground-background structure of main clause and secondary clause – which do allow marking of modality. But this exception merely confirms the basic principle argued here, because it can be explained in terms of the same correlation between foregroundingbackgrounding and presence-absence of interpersonal structure that explains the absence of modal values with non-narrative uses of temporal conjunctions. See further in Section 3.2 for more detailed comments on this problem. 47. This is also what characterizes the modal subordinate uses of as and since discussed in Section 2.1. Like coordinate because, modal subordinate as and since equally allow the justificational relations illustrated in (35) and (38), which is why they have been labelled with ‘justification’ rather than with simple ‘cause’ or ‘reason’. 48. This exception does not invalidate the explanation proposed in Chapter 7. It was shown that preposing as a construction is characterized by absence of speech functional values, and that this explains its use as a criterion to distinguish between coordinate and subordinate clauses: if a secondary clause can occur in this position, this shows that it can be construed with a [- Speech Function] value. The inverse is not necessarily the case, however: it does not imply that any clause characterized by absence of speech function will always be able to occur in this position. As shown by result clauses like (49), other factors such as iconic restrictions may also determine the potential to occur in initial

Notes

299

position (and perhaps also determine the frequency with which clause types that can occur in initial position actually do occur in that position). 49. In Diessel’s analysis, they are actually highest on the scale together with purpose clauses, but at least English, German and Dutch are exceptions to that (see examples like (48)), as Diessel’s (2001: 444) own frequency data also show for English. 50. This is further confirmed by the fact that narrative temporal clauses, unlike their unmarked counterparts, are not felt to answer a wh-question (CouperKuhlen 1989: 359–360; Declerck 1997: 218). As shown in Chapter 7 (Section 3), impossibility of wh-questioning is a further grammatical characteristic that typically correlates with the presence of interpersonal values in a particular structure. 51. It is interesting to note that the subdivision proposed in this section also corresponds to a differentiation in syntactic potential for the subtypes of coordinators in question: it is only the non-argumentative category (and, or, but) that can function outside the domain of clause combining, for instance inside the NP, between NPs, inside the VP and between VPs. 52. In fact, this explicit description of the speaker’s role implies a propositionalization of the speaker’s role. The believe-predicate in (5a) and (5b), for instance, construes the speaker’s role as part of the SoA of the main clause, so that the link in the structures with the believe-predicate effectively becomes an SoArelated one, with a description of the speaker’s attitude as part of the SoA rather than the interpersonal enactment of this attitude in the original structure (see Martin 1992: 228 for this observation and Verstraete 1998: 194-198 for further analysis). 53. In this last example it is also significant that this argumentative reading is what is taken up by the interlocutor, who argues against the likelihood of boredom by rejecting the original supporting argument about the fact that teaching would involve only computing. 54. The distinction between [- Scope] and [+ Scope] for elements in initial position is probably an instance of the more general distinction between the so-called left-dislocated or extra-clausal (see Chapter 3, Section 3) and topicalized or pre-core positions (see further Bickel 1993; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 35– 40; Gregory and Michaelis 2001). 55. This is a non-clausal adjunct: due to the markedness of this structure a corpus search did not yield any clausal examples, but there seems to be no inherent restriction on clausal structures. After Christmas could just as well have been a clausal structure like after we came back. 56. The comparison here is restricted to the domain of clause combining: the generalized subordinate clauses usually also has NP-relative uses, but relative clauses have not been dealt with in this study, which means that there is no point of comparison here. 57. This is essentially the same situation as in English where several conjunctions are exclusively associated with the absence of illocutionary force in the clause

300

Notes

they introduce. The only difference is that these conjunctions are semantically more specific than the generalized subordinate clause in many Australian languages. 58. The forward slashes in these examples represent intonation unit boundaries. 59. Other criteria relate mainly to distributional properties, see further in Bickel (1993: 25–30). 60. Some caution is required in stating this part of the correspondence, because it is not entirely clear whether ‘illocution attraction’ as described by Bickel (1993) refers to a uniform interpersonal phenomenon. The constructions discussed by Bickel are all similar in that the illocution marked on the main clause extends to the secondary clause, but the status of the main clause with respect to this illocution is not explicitly discussed: it is not always clear whether the main clause forms a presupposition (as is obviously the case in structures like (19)) or whether it is equally affected by this illocution. It is only in the former case that illocution attraction corresponds to the value [+ Scope] of bound subordination; in the latter case it would be more akin to the clause chaining constructions to be discussed in Section 4 of this chapter. 61. This is what distinguishes deranked verb forms from non-indicative moods, which do occur in normal main clause structures. 62. The situation is of course not entirely parallel, because the English construction is more restricted than its parallel in genuine chaining constructions, as noted in Tikkanen (1987) and Kortmann (1991, 1995). Thus, for instance, the coordinate interpretation is not available with interrogative or imperative structures in the main clause (Tikkanen 1987: 410–411), it requires absence of conjunctions, it cannot operate in chains longer than two clauses and it is available mainly in contexts of subject co-reference with the main clause (Kortmann 1991: 151– 154, 1995: 220–221). 63. See Halliday (1994: 264–269) and Davidse (1994) on the arguments for regarding factive clauses as a distinct category within the traditional category of ‘complement clauses’.

References Aarts, Bas 1988

Clauses of concession in written present-day British English. Journal of English Linguistics 21: 39–58. Abraham, Werner 1976 Die Rolle von Trugschlüssen in der Diachronie von Satzkonnektoren. In Opuscula Slavica et Linguistica. Festschrift für A. Issatschenko, Heinz Dieter Pohl and Nikolai Salnikow (eds.), 11–72. Klagenfurt: Heyn. Allan, Robin, Philip Holmes, and Tom Lundskær-Nielsen 1995 Danish. A Comprehensive Grammar. London: Routledge. Altenberg, Bengt 1984 Causal linking in spoken and written English. Studia Linguistica 38: 20–69. Anscombre, Jean-Claude, and Oswald Ducrot 1977 Deux mais en français? Lingua 43: 23–40. Austin, Peter 1981 Switch-reference in Australia. Language 57: 309–334. Bellert, Irene 1977 On semantic and distributional properties of sentential adverbs. Linguistic Inquiry 8: 337–350. Bickel, Balthasar 1993 Belhare subordination and the theory of topic. In Studies in Clause Linkage. Papers from the First Köln-Zurich Workshop, Karen Ebert (ed.), 23–55. Zürich: Seminar für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. Bolinger, Dwight 1968. The imperative in English. In To Honor Roman Jakobson, 335–362. The Hague: Mouton. 1977a Is the imperative an infinitive? In Meaning and Form, Dwight Bolinger, 152–182. London: Longman. 1977b Meaning and Form. London: Longman. Bolkestein, A. Machtelt 1980 Problems in the Description of Modal Verbs. An Investigation of Latin. Assen: Van Gorcum. 1991 Causally related predications and the choice between parataxis and hypotaxis in Latin. In New Studies in Latin Linguistics, Robert Coleman (ed.), 427–451. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Braunmüller, Kurt 1978 Remarks on the formation of conjunctions in Germanic languages. Nordic Journal of Linguistics 1: 99–120.

302

References

Brown, Penelope, and Stephen Levinson 1987 Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brøndal, Viggo 1972 Reprint. The problem of hypotaxis. In Syntactic Theory 1. Structuralist, Fred Householder (ed.), 23–30. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Original edition, Le problème de l’hypotaxe. In Mélanges Linguistiques et Philologiques Offerts à M. Aleksandar Belic, 241-249. Belgrado, 1937. Bühler, Karl 1982 Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Stuttgart: Fischer. Original edition, Jena: Fischer, 1934. Burnard, Lou (ed.) 1995 Users Reference Guide. British National Corpus Version 1.0. Oxford: Oxford University Computing Services. Chafe, Wallace 1984 How people use adverbial clauses. Berkeley Linguistics Society 10: 437–449. 1988 Linking intonation units in spoken English. In Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse, John Haiman and Sandra Thompson (eds.), 1–27. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Couper-Kuhlen, Elisabeth 1989 On the markedness of ‘narrative temporal clauses’. Markedness in Synchrony and Diachrony, In Olga Mišeska Tomić (ed.), 359–372. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1996 Intonation and clause combining in discourse: the case of because. Pragmatics 6: 389–426. Crevels, Mily 2000a Concession. A typological study. Ph.D. Diss., University of Amsterdam. 2000b. Concessives on different semantic levels: a typological perspective. In Cause – Condition – Concession – Contrast. Cognitive and Discourse Perspectives, Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen and Bernd Kortmann (eds.), 313–339. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cristofaro, Sonia 1998 Deranking and balancing in different subordination relations: a typological study. Sprachtypologie Und Universalienforschung 51: 3–42. 2003 Subordination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cuvalay, Martine 1996 A classification of conditional satellites. In Complex Structures. A Functionalist Perspective, Betty Devriendt, Louis Goossens, and Johan van der Auwera (eds.), 149–175. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

References

303

Dancygier, Barbara 1998 Conditionals and Prediction: Time, Knowledge and Causation in the Grammar of English if-then Constructions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dancygier, Barbara, and Eve Sweetser 2000 Constructions with if, since and because. Causality, epistemic stance, and clause order. In Cause – Condition – Concession – Contrast. Cognitive and Discourse Perspectives, Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen and Bernd Kortmann (eds.), 111–142. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Mental Spaces in Grammar. Conditional Constructions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davidse, Kristin 1994 Fact projection. In Perspectives on English, Keith Carlon, Kristin Davidse, and Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (eds.), 257–284. Leuven: Peeters. 1999 Categories of Experiential Grammar. (Monographs in Systemic Linguistics 11). Nottingham: University of Nottingham. Davies, Eirian 1979 On the Semantics of Syntax. Mood and Condition in English. London: Croom Helm. Davies, Eirlys 1986 The English Imperative. London: Croom Helm. Davison, Alice 1979 Some mysteries of subordination. Studies in the Linguistic Sciences 9: 105–128. Declerck, Renaat 1988 Studies on Copular Sentences, Clefts and Pseudo-Clefts. Leuven and Dordrecht: Leuven University Press and Foris. 1991a A Comprehensive Descriptive Grammar of English. Tokyo: Kaitakusha. 1991b Tense in English. Its Structure and Use in Discourse. London: Routledge. 1996 A functional typology of English when-clauses. Functions of Language 3: 185–234. 1997 When-clauses and Temporal Structure. London: Routledge. Declerck, Renaat, and Susan Reed 2001 Conditionals. A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. De Smet, Hendrik, and Jean-Christophe Verstraete 2006 Coming to terms with subjectivity. Cognitive Linguistics 17: 365– 392.

304

References

Diessel, Holger 2001 The ordering distribution of main and adverbial clauses. A typological study. Language 77: 433–455. 2005 Competing motivations for the ordering of main and adverbial clauses. Linguistics 43: 449–470. Dik, Simon 1997a The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part 1: The Structure of the Clause, Kees Hengeveld (ed.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b The Theory of Functional Grammar. Part 2: Complex and Derived Constructions, Kees Hengeveld (ed.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dik, Simon, Kees Hengeveld, Elseline Vester, and Co Vet 1990 The hierarchical structure of the clause and the typology of adverbial satellites. In Layers and Levels of Representation in Language Theory, Jan Nutys, A. Machtelt Bolkestein, and Co Vet (eds. ), 25–70. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Emonds, Joseph 1970 Root and structure-preserving transformations. Ph.D. Diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fillmore, Charles, Paul Kay, and Catherine O’Connor 1988 Regularity and idiomaticity in grammatical constructions: the case of let alone. Language 64: 501–538. Foley, William, and Mike Olson 1985 Clausehood and verb serialization. In Grammar Inside and Outside the Clause. Some Approaches to Theory from the Field, Johanna Nichols and Anthony Woodbury (eds.), 17–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foley, William, and Robert Van Valin 1984 Functional Syntax and Universal Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ford, Cecilia 1993 Grammar in Interaction. Adverbial clauses in American English Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ford, Cecilia, Barbara Fox, and Sandra Thompson 2003 Social interaction and grammar. In The New Psychology of Language. Volume 2, Michael Tomasello (ed.), 119–143. Mahwah: Erlbaum. Geis, Michael, and Arnold Zwicky 1971 On invited inferences. Linguistic Inquiry 11: 561–566. Givón, Talmy 1975 Focus and the scope of assertion: some Bantu evidence. Studies in African Linguistics 6: 185–205. 1980 The binding hierarchy and the typology of complements. Studies in Language 4: 333–377.

References 1982

305

Logic vs. pragmatics with human language as the referee. Toward an empirically viable epistemology. Journal of Pragmatics 6: 81–133. 1990 Syntax. A Functional-Typological Introduction. Volume 2. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Goethals, Patrick 2002 Las Conjunciones Causales Explicativas Españoles. Un Estudio Semiótico-lingüístico. Leuven: Peeters. Goldberg, Adele 1995 Constructions. A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Goody, Esther 1978 Towards a theory of questions. In Questions and Politeness. Strategies in Social Interaction, Esther Goody (ed.), 17–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Green, Georgia 1976 Main clause phenomena in subordinate clauses. Language 52: 382– 397. Greenbaum, Sidney 1969 Studies in English Adverbial Usage. London: Longman. Gregory, Michelle, and Laura Michaelis 2001 Topicalization and left dislocation: A functional opposition revisited. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 1665–1706. Grice, H. P. 1975 Logic and conversation. In Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan (eds.), 41–58. New York: Academic Press. Groupe λ-l 1975 Car, parce que, puisque. Revue Romane 10: 248–280. Güldemann, Tom, and Manfred von Roncador (eds.) 2002 Reported Discourse. A Meeting Ground for Different Linguistic Domains. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Günthner, Susanne 1993 Weil – man kann es ja wissenschaftlich untersuchen: diskurspragmatische Aspekte der Wortstellung in Weil-Sätzen. Linguistische Berichte 143: 37–59. 1996 From subordination to coordination? Verb-second position in German causal and concessive constructions. Pragmatics 6: 323– 356. 1999 Entwickelt sich der Konzessivkonnektor obwohl zum Diskursmarker? Grammatikalisierungstendenzen im gesprochenen Deutsch. Linguistische Berichte 180: 409–444. Haegeman, Liliane 1984 Pragmatic conditionals in English. Folia Linguistica 18: 485–502.

306

References

Haiman, John 1985 Natural Syntax. Iconicity and Erosion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haiman, John, and Sandra Thompson 1984 ‘Subordination’ in universal grammar. Berkeley Linguistics Society 10: 510–524. Hale, Kenneth 1976 The adjoined relative clause in Australia. In Grammatical Categories in Australian Languages, Robert Dixon (ed.), 78–105. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies. Halliday, Michael 1967a Notes on transitivity and theme in English. Part 2. Journal of Linguistics 3: 177–274. 1967b Intonation and Grammar in British English. The Hague: Mouton. 1970 Functional diversity in language as seen from a consideration of modality and mood in English. Foundations of Language 6: 322– 361. 1976 Functions and universals of language. In Halliday: System and Function in Language, Gunther Kress (ed.), 26–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1994 An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Edward Arnold. Halliday, Michael and Ruqaiya Hasan 1976 Cohesion in English. London: Longman. Handke, Jürgen 1984 Descriptive and Psycholinguistic Aspects of Adverbial Subordinate Clauses. Heidelberg: Groos. Haspelmath, Martin 1995 The converb as a cross-linguistically valid category. In Converbs in Cross-Linguistic Perspective, Martin Haspelmath and Ekkehard König (eds.), 1–55. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hengeveld, Kees 1987 Clause structure and modality in Functional Grammar. In Ins and Outs of the Predication, Johan Van der Auwera and Louis Goossens (eds.), 53–66. Dordrecht: Foris. 1988 Illocution, mood and modality in a functional grammar of Spanish. Journal of Semantics 6: 227–269. 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar. Journal of Linguistics 25: 127–157. 1998 Adverbial clauses in the languages of Europe. In Adverbial Constructions in the Languages of Europe, Johan van der Auwera (ed.), 335–419. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

References

307

Hentschel, Elke 1989 Kausale Koordination. Die Konjunktion denn und einige ihrer Entsprechungen in anderen Sprachen. In Sprechen mit Partikeln, Harald Weydt (ed.), 675–690. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Holmes, Philip, and Ian Hinchliffe 1994 Swedish. A Comprehensive Grammar. London: Routledge. Hooper, Joan, and Sandra Thompson 1973 On the applicability of root transformations. Linguistic Inquiry 4: 465–498. Hopper, Paul, and Elizabeth Closs Traugott 2003 Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huddleston, Rodney 1988 Constituency, multi-functionality and grammaticalization in Halliday’s Functional Grammar. Journal of Linguistics 24: 137–174. Hundt, Marianne, Andrea Sand, and Rainer Siemund 1998 Manual of Information to Accompany the Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English (‘FLOB’). Englishes Seminar: Albert-LudwigsUniversität Freiburg. Jackendoff, Ray 1972 Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Jacobs, Joachim 1984 Funktionale Satzperspektive und Illokutionssemantik. Linguistische Berichte 91: 25–58. Jakobson, Roman 1960 Linguistics and poetics. In Style in Language, Tomas Sebeok (ed.), 350–377. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 1971 Reprint. Zur Struktur des russischen Verbums. In Selected Writings II: Word and Language, 3–15. The Hague: Mouton. Original edition, Charisteria Gvilelmo Mathesio qvinqvagenario a discipvlis et Circvli Lingvistici Pragensis sodalibvs oblata, 74-84. Prague, 1932. 1983 The concept of mark. In Dialogues, Roman Jakobson and Krystyna Pomorska. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Jespersen, Otto 1924 The Philosophy of Grammar. London: Allen and Unwin. Johansson, Stig, Geoffrey Leech, and Helen Goodluck 1978 Manual of Information to accompany the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus of British English, for Use with Digital Computers. Department of English: University of Oslo. Karttunen, Lauri 1973 Presuppositions of compound sentences. Linguistic Inquiry 4: 169– 193.

308

References

Keenan, Edward 1971 Two kinds of presupposition in natural language. In Studies in Linguistic Semantics, Charles Fillmore and Terence Langendoen (eds.), 44–52. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Kempson, Ruth 1975 Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kiparsky, Paul, and Carol Kiparsky 1970 Fact. In Progress in Linguistics, Manfred Bierwish and Karl Erich Heidolph (eds.), 143–173. The Hague: Mouton. König, Ekkehard 1985 On the history of concessive connectives in English. Diachronic and synchronic evidence. Lingua 66: 1–19. 1995 The meaning of converb constructions. In Converbs in CrossLinguistic Perspective, Martin Haspelmath and Ekkehard König (eds.), 57–95. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Kortmann, Bernd 1991 Free Adjuncts and Absolutes in English. Problems of Control and Interpretation. London: Routledge. 1995 Adverbial participial clauses in English. In Converbs in CrossLinguistic Perspective, Martin Haspelmath and Ekkehard König (eds), 189–237. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.. 1997 Adverbial Subordination. A Typology and History of Adverbial Subordinators Based on European Languages. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Küper, Christoph 1984 Zum sprechaktbezogenen gebrauch der Kausalverknüpfer denn und weil: Grammatisch-pragmatische Interrelationen. Linguistische Berichte 92: 15–30. 1991 Geht die Nebensatzstellung im Deutschen verloren? – Zur pragmatischen Funktion der Wortstellung in Haupt- und Nebensätzen. Deutsche Sprache 19: 133–158. Laffut, An 2006. Three-Participant Constructions in English. A Functional-Cognitive Approach to Caused Relations. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Lakoff, George 1984 Performative subordinate clauses. Berkeley Linguistics Society 10: 472–480. Lambrecht, Knud 1994 Information Structure and Sentence Form. Topic, Focus and the Mental Representation of Discourse Referents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References

309

Langacker, Ronald 1988 An overview of cognitive grammar. In Topics in Cognitive Linguistics, Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.), 3–48. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. 1990 Subjectification. Cognitive Linguistics 1: 5–38. Lehmann, Christian 1988 Towards a typology of clause linkage. In Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse, John Haiman and Sandra Thompson (eds.), 181–225. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Levin, Beth 1993 English Verb Classes and Alternations. A Preliminary Investigation. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Levinson, Stephen 1983 Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Longacre, Robert 1972 Hierarchy and Universality of Discourse Constituents in New Guinea Languages: Discussion. Washington: Georgetown University Press. Lowe, Ivan 1987 Two ways of looking at causes and reasons. In Grammar in the Construction of Texts, James Monaghan (ed.), 37–46. London: Pinter. Lyons, John 1968 Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lyons, John 1977 Semantics. Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, Lachlan 1996 English nominalizations in the layered model of the sentence. In Complex Structures. A Functionalist Perspective, Betty Devriendt, Louis Goossens, and Johan van der Auwera (eds.), 325–355. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Martin, James 1992 English Text: System and Structure. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Matthiessen, Christian, and Sandra Thompson 1988 The structure of discourse and ‘subordination’. In Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse, John Haiman and Sandra Thompson (eds.), 275–329. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. McGregor, William 1988 Mood and subordination in Kuniyanti. In Complex Sentence Constructions in Australian Languages, Peter Austin (ed.), 37–67. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. 1990 A Functional Grammar of Gooniyandi. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.

310

References

1992

The place of circumstantials in systemic-functional grammar. In Advances in Systemic Linguistics. Recent Theory and Practice, Martin Davies and Louise Ravelli (eds.), 136–149. London: Pinter. 1997 Semiotic Grammar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999 How many types of internal conjunction? Functions of Language 6: 139–151. McKay, Graham 1988 Figure and ground in Rembarrnga complex sentences. In Complex Sentence Constructions in Australian Languages, Peter Austin (ed.), 7–36. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. McTear, Michael 1979 The pragmatics of because. LACUS Forum 6: 455–463. Merlan, Francesca 1981 Some functional relations among subordination, mood, aspect and focus in Australian languages. Australian Journal of Linguistics 1: 175–210. Nelson, Gerald, Sean Wallis, and Bas Aarts 2002 Exploring Natural Language: Working with the British Component of the International Corpus of English. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Nichols, Johanna 1988 Nominalization and assertion in scientific Russian prose. In Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse, John Haiman and Sandra Thompson (eds.), 399–428. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Nordlinger, Rachel 2006 Spearing the emu drinking: Subordination and the adjoined relative clause in Wambaya. Australian Journal of Linguistics 26: 5–29. Nuyts, Jan 1992 Subjective vs. objective modality: What is the difference? In Layered Structure and Reference in a Functional Perspective, Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder, and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), 73–97. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. 1993 Modality and the layered representation of conceptual and linguistic structure. Linguistics 31: 933–969. 2000 Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization. A CognitivePragmatic Perspective. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Olson, Michael 1981 Barai clause junctures: Towards a functional theory of inter-clause relations. Ph.D. Diss., Australian National University. Palmer, Frank 1979 Modality and the English modals. London: Longman. 1983 Semantic explanations for the syntax of English modals. In Linguistic Categories: Auxiliaries and Related Puzzles. Volume 2, Frank Heny and Barry Richards (eds.), 205–217. Dordrecht: Reidel. 1986 Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References 1987

311

The typology of subordination: results, actual and potential. Transactions of the Philological Society: 90–109. 1990 Modality and the English modals. London: Longman. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik 1985 A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. Raible, Wolfgang 1992 Junktion. Eine Dimension der Sprache und ihre Realisierungsformen zwischen Aggregation und Integration. Heidelberg: Winter. Ramsay, Violeta 1987 The functional distribution of preposed and postposed “if” and “when” clauses in written narrative. In Coherence and Grounding in Discourse, Russell Tomlin (ed.), 383–408. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Rappaport, Gilbert 1984 Grammatical Function and Syntactic Structure: The Adverbial Participle of Russian. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers. Roberts, John 1988 Amele switch-reference and the theory of grammar. Linguistic Inquiry 19: 45–63. 1997 Switch-reference in Papua New Guinea: a preliminary survey. In Papers in Papuan Linguistics No. 3, Andrew Pawley (ed.), 101–241. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics. Rosaldo, Michelle 1982 The things we do with words: Ilongot speech acts and speech act theory in philosophy. Language in Society 11: 203–237. Ross, John Robert 1967 Constraints on variables in syntax. Ph.D. Diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1970 On declarative sentences. In Readings in English Transformational Grammar, Roderick Jacobs and Peter Rosenbaum (eds.), 222–272. Waltham: Ginn. 1986 Infinite Syntax! Norwood: Ablex. Rutherford, William 1970 Some observations concerning subordinate clauses in English. Language 46: 97–115. Sacks, Harvey 1972 An initial investigation of the usability of conversational data for doing sociology. In Studies in Interaction, David Sudnow (ed.), 31– 74. New York: Free Press. Sadock, Jerrold, and Arnold Zwicky 1985 Speech act distinctions in syntax. In Language Typology and Syntactic Description. Volume 1: Clause Structure, Timothy Shopen (ed.), 155–196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

312

References

Schegloff, Emanuel 1972 Sequencing in conversational openings. In Directions in Sociolinguistics. The Ethnography of Communication, John Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.), 346–380. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Stassen, Leon 1985 Comparison and Universal Grammar. Oxford: Blackwell. Steensig, Jakob 1998 Om fordi i forskellige sætningstyper i dansk talesprog. In Selskab for Nordisk Filologi København. Årsberetning 1996-1997, Kjeld Kristensen (ed.), 179–192. Copenhagen: Selskab for Nordisk Filologi. Stenström, Anna-Britta, Gisle Andersen, and Ingrid Hasund 2002 Trends in Teenage Talk. Corpus Compilation, Analysis and Findings. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Sweetser, Eve 1990 From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taglicht, Josef 1984 Message and Emphasis. On Focus and Scope in English. London: Longman. Talmy, Leonard 1978 Figure and ground in complex sentences. In Universals of Human Language. Volume 4: Syntax, Joseph Greenberg (ed.), 625–649. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Thim-Mabrey, Christiane 1982 Zur Syntax der kausalen Konjunktionen weil, da und denn. Sprachwissenschaft 7: 197–219. Thompson, Sandra 1985 Grammar and written discourse: initial vs final purpose clauses in English. Text 5: 55–84. Tikkanen, Bertil 1987 Finiteness and non-finiteness as parameters in clause linkage. In The Nordic Languages and Modern Linguistics 6, Lilius Pirkko and Mirja Saari (eds.), 405–419. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. 1995 Burushaski converbs in their South and Central Asian areal context. In Converbs in Cross-Linguistic Perspective, Martin Haspelmath and Ekkehard König (eds.), 487–528. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Tomlin, Russell 1985 Foreground-background information and the syntax of subordination. Text 5: 85–122. Townsend, David, and Thomas Bever 1977 Main and Subordinate Clauses: A Study in Figure and Ground. Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.

References

313

Traugott, Elizabeth 1989 On the rise of epistemic meanings in English. An example of subjectification in semantic change. Language 57: 33–65. 1995 Subjectification in grammaticalization. In Subjectivity and Subjectification, Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds.), 37–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003 From subjectification to intersubjectification. In Motives for Language Change, Raymond Hickey (ed.), 124–139. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth, and Richard Dasher 2002 Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth, and Ekkehard König 1991 The semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization revisited. In Approaches to Grammaticalization. Volume 1: Focus on Theoretical and Methodological Issues, Elizabeth Traugott and Bernd Heine (eds.), 189–218. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Trubetzkoy, Nicolai 1969 Reprint. Grundzüge der Phonologie [Principles of Phonology]. Berkeley: University of California Press. Original edition, Prague, 1939. Van Belle, William 1989 Want, omdat en aangezien. Een argumentatieve analyse. Leuvense Bijdragen 78: 435–456. 1997 Conditionele zinnen: een continuum van een dialogisch over een argumentatief naar een logisch verband. Taalbeheersing 3: 215–24. Van der Auwera, Johan 1986 Conditionals and speech acts. In On Conditionals, Elizabeth Traugott, Alice ter Meulen, Judith Snitzer Reilly, and Charles Ferguson (eds.), 197–213. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Dijk, Teun 1979 Pragmatic connectives. Journal of Pragmatics 3: 447–456. Van Valin, Robert 1993 A synopsis of role and reference grammar. In Advances in Role and Reference Grammar, Robert Van Valin (ed.), 1–164. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. Van Valin, Robert, and Randy LaPolla 1997 Syntax. Structure, Meaning, and Function. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Verstraete, Jean-Christophe 1998 A semiotic model for the description of levels in conjunction: external, internal-modal and internal-speech functional. Functions of Language 5: 179–211.

314

References

1999

The distinction between epistemic and speech act conjunction. Belgian Essays on Language and Literature: 119–130. 2000 Attitudinal disjuncts and illocutionary force in clause combining – a response to Bill McGregor. Functions of Language 7: 117–131. 2001 Subjective and objective modality: interpersonal and ideational functions in the English modal auxiliary system. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 1505–1528. 2002 The functional value of non-integration in clause combining: interpersonal versus discursive independence. Word 53: 37–65. 2003 Preverbal positions in three Germanic languages: The role of scope as a functional principle. Languages in Contrast 4: 105–136. 2004 The problem of subjective modality in the functional grammar model. In A New Architecture for Functional Discourse Grammar, Lachlan Mackenzie and María Gómez González (eds.), 243–274. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Scalar quantity implicatures and the interpretation of modality: Problems in the deontic domain. Journal of Pragmatics 37: 1401– 1418. 2006 The nature of irreality in the past domain. Evidence from past intentional constructions in Australian languages. Australian Journal of Linguistics 26: 59–79. Forthc. Formal criteria for subordination in the Germanic languages: in search of an explanation. In Structuring Linguistic Form. Papers Presented to Karel van den Eynde, Bert Cornillie, Dagmar Divjak, Piet Mertens, and Pierre Swiggers (eds.) Leuven: Peeters. Wierzbicka, Anna 1985 Different cultures, different languages, different speech acts: Polish vs. English. Journal of Pragmatics 9: 145–178. 1991 Cross-cultural Pragmatics: the Semantics of Human Interaction. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Wilson, Deirdre, and Dan Sperber 1988 Mood and the analysis of non-declarative sentences. In Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. O. Urmson, Jonathan Dancy, Julius Moravcsik, and C. Taylor (eds. ), 77–101. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Winter, Eugene 1982 Towards a Contextual Grammar of English. The Clause and its Place in the Definition of the Sentence. London: Allen and Unwin.

Subject index

adjunct–disjunct, 103, 118 after, 112, 117, 124, 134, 163, 171, 187, 205–206, 218, 286 although, 111–112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 187, 206, 215, 286, 296 Amele, 278–279 and, 112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 187, 206, 211–215, 286, 299 argumentative relation coordination, 211–215 level of interpretation, 236–242 see also assertive bias as, 112, 117, 123–124, 133–134, 163, 171, 187, 189, 205–206, 218, 286 temporal vs justificational, 171– 172, 189–193 assertive bias, 62–65, 178–179, 211– 215, 236–242 backgrounding see foregrounding– backgrounding balancing–deranking, 275–278 because, 111–112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 187, 189, 197–200, 206, 209–210, 211–215, 286 see also causal relation, justificational relation, reason relation before, 112, 117, 124, 134, 163, 171, 187, 206, 207–208, 286 Belhare, 272–275 bound subordination, 156–157, 162– 186, 205–206, 208–209, 215– 218, 229–236, 266, 273–274, 280, 283–286 but, 112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 187, 206, 286, 299

argumentative vs contrastive, 213–215 car, 199, 210 causal relation, 205–206 cause vs justification, 117, 123– 124, 130–131, 176–177, 197– 200, 205–206, 286, 298 cause vs reason, 131, 147–149, 215–218 challengeability, 137, 142, 150–152, 159, 284, 290 challenging interrogative, 59, 62–65 clause chaining, 261–262, 275–279 clausehood, 79, 88–94 clefting, 144, 167–172, 186, 192, 196, 229–236, 285 conditional relation, 22–25, 29–31, 35, 56–57, 115–116, 147–149, 206, 215–218, 265, 286, 292 conditional relevance, 73–74 conjunction, 104–106, 188–203, 210–218 continuum approaches, 98–99 contrastive relation, 205–206, 286 contrastive vs temporal, 117, 123–124, 130, 171, 180, 193– 196, 263–266 contrastive vs argumentative, 213–215 converb, 270–272, 275 coordination, 152–156, 156–157, 162–186, 205–206, 209–210, 283–286, 299 argumentative vs non– argumentative, 211–215 traditional definitions, 141–143 cosubordinate, 98, 277–279

316

Subject index

Danish, 181–185, 199, 247 declination reset, 176–177 deixis, 9–10 denn, 199, 209 deontic modality, 13–20, 26–27, 30– 61, 66–69, 72–76, 112, 212–213, 240–242, 293–294 deranking see balancing–deranking detachment, 80, 88–91 see also non–integrated intonation direct speech see projection disjunct see adjunct–disjunct Dutch, 154, 157, 181–185, 199, 209–210, 247, 267, 295, 299 dynamic modality, 13–20, 22–38, 52–53, 55–57, 293 echoic effect, 21–26, 30, 35, 54, 116, 149, 215–218, 293 epistemic modality, 13–20, 22–66, 72–76, 112, 212–215, 231, 236– 242, 293–294 equality of status, 141–142, 152– 156, 284 evidentiality, 20, 31, 37, 231 extra–clausal see detachment extraction, 297 factive see projection final position see position of subordinate clause finiteness, 70–71, 101–102, 104– 105, 275–279, 294, 298 focus, 80–88, 167–171 see also presupposition, scope for, 112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 187, 198–200, 211–215, 286 fordi, 183, 199

foregrounding–backgrounding, 150– 151, 264–269 free subordination, 156–157, 162– 186, 205–206, 208–209, 215– 218, 245–258, 269–274, 280, 283–286 French, 199–200, 210, 213, 270 fronting see position of subordinate clause Functional Grammar, 4, 14, 19, 34 generalized subordinate clause, 262– 268 German, 100, 108, 154, 157, 181– 185, 199, 209–210, 247, 267, 295, 299 Gooniyandi, 263–269 if, 112, 117, 124, 134, 149, 163, 171, 187, 206, 286, 293 illocutionary force, 59–60, 69–77, 79–83, 103–104, 107–109, 127– 129, 132–134, 138–141, 143– 158, 211–215, 236–242, 262– 269, 277–279, 284 imperative, 15–16, 38–58, 66–69, 75–76, 107, 112, 184–185, 211– 215, 240–242, 294, 298 see also assertive bias indirect speech see projection indicative, 15–16, 38–58, 62–66, 113–114, 262–269, 293, 294 initial position see position of subordinate clause integration, 100, 141–145, 158–159, 167–177, 208–209, 269–275, 284 see also intonation, detachment interactional approaches, 11, 287 interpersonal grammar, 9–12, 103– 134, 138–141 interrogative, 26–38, 60–66, 106– 112, 178–179, 211–215, 240– 242, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298

Subject index see also assertive bias, wh– interrogative intersubjectivity, 9 intonation, 80–88, 172–177, 186, 230, 234, 270–272, 285 see also declination reset, detachment justificational relation, 117, 123– 124, 130–131, 176–177, 197– 200, 205–206, 286, 298 main clause phenomena, 178–180, 186, 285 Mangarayi, 264, 267 markedness, 15–16, 47–51, 62–66, 106–109, 112–114, 294 see also neutralization minor clauses, 71 modal subordination, 156–157, 162– 166, 178–186, 188–196, 200– 206, 209–210, 283–286 modality, 7–9, 13–59, 62–77, 112– 117, 127–129, 145–151, 178– 181, 189–196, 200–202, 207– 208, 236–242, 283–286, 293, 294, 296, 298 see also assertive bias, deontic, dynamic, epistemic, mood, subjective–objective modality mood, 15–16, 38–57, 62–69, 262– 269 see also imperative, indicative, subjunctive narrative uses, 207–208, 298, 299 neutralization, 107–109, 113–114, 184–185, 276–277 nominalization, 229–236 non–declarative see imperative, interrogative non–finiteness see finiteness non–integrated intonation

317

see intonation, detachment nuclear accent, 79–80 see also focus objective modality see subjective–object modality omdat, 199 once, 112, 117, 124, 134, 163, 171, 187, 205–206 or, 112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 187, 206, 211–215, 286, 299 parce que, 199, 305 performative verbs, 72, 74 polysemous conjunctions, 188–203, 213–215, 291 porque, 199 position of subordinate clause, 123, 162–167, 183–184, 186, 202, 245–259, 285 potential focus domain, 85 preposing see position of subordinate clause presupposition, 80–88, 117–119, 145–152, 167–171, 248–249, 270–272, 284 projection, 101–102, 287–289 pues, 199, 210 purpose relation, 205–206, 215–218, 286, 296, 299 purpose vs result, 200–202 reason relation, 205–206, 286 cause vs reason, 131, 147–149, 215–218 result relation, 205–206, 215–218, 286, 299 purpose vs result, 200–202 rhetorical questions, see assertive bias Role and Reference Grammar, 4, 14, 19, 34, 98 Russian, 270–272

318

Subject index

scope, 7–9, 79–94, 117–124, 129– 132, 143–145, 165–177, 189– 204, 208–209, 231–236, 248– 254, 267–275, 283–286, 296 Semiotic Grammar, 4 since, 112, 117, 123–124, 133–134, 163, 171, 187, 189, 205–206, 218, 286 temporal vs justificational, 171– 172, 189–193 so that, 112, 117, 123–124, 133– 134, 163, 171, 187, 189, 200– 202, 205–06, 215–218, 286, 299 Spanish, 199, 210 speech act indirect speech act, 75–77 see also illocutionary force speech function, 7–9, 59–78, 106– 112, 127–129, 152–156162–185, 193–197, 211–214, 236–242, 247–248, 254–257, 275–279, 283–286, 296, 298 subjectification, 193, 196, 291 subjective–objective modality, 16– 38, 40–58, 112–114 subjectivity, 1, 4, 9, 19 subjunctive, 15, 262–268, 294 subordination, 156–157, 283–286 traditional definitions, 141–143 see bound subordination, free subordination, generalized subordinate clause, modal subordination supposition, 25, 149

Swedish, 181–185, 247 Systemic Functional Grammar, 4, 98 temporal relation, 205–206, 286 contrastive vs temporal, 117, 123–124, 130, 171, 180, 193– 196, 263–266 tense, 38–47, 53–58, 275–279, 294 until, 112, 117, 124, 134, 163, 171, 187, 206, 207–208, 215–218, 286 want, 199, 209–210 Warlpiri, 263–266 weil, 183–184, 199, 247–248 when, 112, 117, 123–124, 133–134, 163, 171, 187, 193–196, 205– 206, 207–208, 215–218, 286 contrastive vs temporal, 117, 123–124, 130, 171, 180, 193– 196, 263–266 whereas, 112, 117, 124, 133, 163, 171, 206, 215–218, 286 while, 112, 117, 123–124, 133–134, 163, 171, 187, 193–196, 205– 206, 215–218, 286 contrastive vs temporal, 117, 123–124, 130, 171, 180, 193– 196, 263–266 wh–interrogatives, 64–65, 82, 167– 172, 186, 229–236, 271–272, 285, 299 word order, 97, 100, 108, 181–185, 210, 247–248, 267, 285

Author index

Aarts, Bas, 1, 4 Abraham, Werner, 203 Allan, Robin, 181 Altenberg, Bengt, 1 Andersen, Gisle, 4, 312 Anscombre, Jean-Claude, 213 Austin, Peter, 263 Bellert, Irene, 21, 26 Bever, Thomas, 137, 142, 151 Bickel, Balthasar, 249, 261, 270, 272–275, 280, 299, 300 Bolinger, Dwight, 42, 44, 294 Bolkestein, Machtelt, 42, 54, 199 Braunmüller, Kurt, 203 Brøndal, Viggo, 97, 137, 142–143, 158, 262, 269 Brown, Penelope, 74, 204 Bühler, Karl, 9 Burnard, Lou, 4 Chafe, Wallace, 1, 157, 172–173, 175–176, 249, 250 Couper-Kuhlen, Elisabeth, 1, 176– 177, 207, 299 Crevels, Mily, 227 Cristofaro, Sonia, 103 Cuvalay, Martine, 227 Dancygier, Barbara, 22, 25, 116, 149, 191, 246 Dasher, Richard, 4, 9, 14, 16–20, 32, 36 Davidse, Kristin, 291, 296, 300 Davies, Eirian, 1, 3–4, 38, 40, 42– 43, 48, 60, 70, 101, 186, 223, 227–229, 234, 236–237, 240 Davies, Eirlys, 48 Davison, Alice, 262, 275

De Smet, Hendrik, 9, 11 Declerck, Renaat, 24–25, 43, 63, 149, 168–169, 194, 201, 207, 293–294, 298–299 Diessel, Holger, 202, 246, 290, 299 Dik, Simon, 4, 64, 80, 88–89, 168, 169, 227–228, 236–237, 240 Ducrot, Oswald, 213 Emonds, Joseph, 178 Fillmore, Charles, 46 Foley, William, 1, 4, 14, 16–20, 32, 34, 36–37, 98, 101, 103, 107, 137, 142–143, 158, 186, 275 Ford, Cecilia, 3, 11, 101, 223–224, 245, 250, 290 Fox, Barbara, 11, 223 Geis, Michael, 203 Givón, Talmy, 1, 3, 100, 137, 142, 149–151, 158, 245, 249–250, 253 Goethals, Patrick, 9, 11, 191, 195, 197–199, 210, 298 Goldberg, Adele, 46, 291 Goodluck, Helen, 4 Goody, Esther, 75 Green, Georgia, 151, 178–179 Greenbaum, Sidney, 1, 38, 40, 42, 54, 66, 103, 105, 118, 137, 141– 144, 153–154, 158, 162, 167, 249, 294–296 Gregory, Michelle, 299 Grice, Paul, 66 Groupe λ-l, 199, 210, 228–229, 234 Güldemann, Tom, 102 Günthner, Susanne, 183, 200 Haegeman, Liliane, 227

320

Author index

Haiman, John, 97, 135, 172, 175, 186, 275, 280 Hale, Ken, 225, 261, 263–267, 280 Halliday, Michael, 1, 4, 9, 13, 16– 20, 32, 36–37, 59, 69, 79–80, 82, 97–98, 101, 137, 141, 153–154, 158, 162–163, 174, 223, 227, 249, 288, 295–296, 300 Handke, Jürgen, 275 Hasan, Ruqaiya, 223, 227 Haspelmath, Martin, 270, 275 Hasund, Ingrid, 4 Hengeveld, Kees, 4, 14, 16–22, 26, 32, 34, 36, 103, 217 Hentschel, Elke, 199 Hinchliffe, Ian, 181 Holmes, Philip, 181 Hooper, Joan, 179 Hopper, Paul, 98–100, 135, 137, 143, 158, 269 Huddleston, Rodney, 296 Hundt, Marianne, 4 Jackendoff, Ray, 21, 26 Jacobs, Joachim, 79, 81 Jakobson, Roman, 9, 42, 50 Jespersen, Otto, 137, 142–143, 158 Johansson, Stig, 4 Karttunen, Lauri, 148 Kay, Paul, 46 Keenan, Edward, 100, 137, 142, 146–147, 158, 297 Kempson, Ruth, 148 Kiparsky, Paul & Carol, 296 König, Ekkehard, 1, 196, 203, 213, 261, 270–271, 280, 291 Kortmann, Bernd, 1, 105–106, 218, 300 Küper, Christoph, 183, 199, 227 Laffut, An, 291 Lakoff, George, 179, 212 Lambrecht, Knud, 80, 82–83, 88–89

Langacker, Ronald, 1, 4, 9, 10 LaPolla, Randy, 4, 19, 79, 80–81, 85, 88, 98, 279–280, 299 Leech, Geoffrey, 1, 4, 38, 40, 42, 66, 103, 118, 137, 141–144, 153–154, 158, 162, 167, 249, 294–296 Lehmann, Christian, 97–101, 135, 172, 262, 269, 275 Levin, Beth, 291 Levinson, Stephen, 66, 74, 146, 148, 168–169 Longacre, Robert, 261, 277–278 Lowe, Ivan, 217 Lyons, John, 14, 16, 18, 19–22, 31– 32, 36–37, 42, 137, 141, 153, 158, 293 Mackenzie, Lachlan, 236 Martin, James, 140, 299 Matthiessen, Christian, 1, 97, 155, 297 McGregor, William, 4, 70, 71, 79– 80, 83, 101, 146, 232, 261, 263– 269, 280, 287, 296 McKay, Graham, 137, 142, 151, 261, 263–65, 267, 280 McTear, Michael, 227 Merlan, Francesca, 263–264, 267 Michaelis, Laura, 299 Nelson, Gerald, 4 Nichols, Johanna, 146, 190 Nordlinger, Rachel, 263 Nuyts, Jan, 20, 31, 37, 293 O’Connor, Catherine, 46 Olson, Michael, 98, 101 Palmer, Frank, 15–21, 32, 34, 42, 48, 50, 56, 201–203, 214, 293–294 Quirk, Randolph, 1, 38, 40, 42, 66, 103, 118, 137, 141–144, 153–154, 158, 162, 167, 249, 294–296

Author index Raible, Wolfgang, 98, 101, 135 Ramsay, Violeta, 224–245, 250 Rappaport, Gilbert, 261, 269–271, 280 Reed, Susan, 24–25, 149, 293 Roberts, John, 225, 261, 277–278 Rosaldo, Michelle, 75 Ross, John, 227, 297 Rutherford, William, 103, 227–229, 234 Sacks, Harvey, 73 Sadock, Jerrold, 66, 69 Sand, Andrea, 4 Schegloff, Emanuel, 73, 295 Siemund, Peter, 4 Sperber, Dan, 48 Stassen, Leon, 261, 275 Steensig, Jakob, 183, 199 Stenström, Anna–Britta, 4 Svartvik, Jan, 1, 38, 40, 42, 66, 103, 118, 137, 141–144, 153–154, 158, 162, 167, 249, 294, 295–296 Sweetser, Eve, 1, 3, 22, 101, 116, 186, 191, 223, 227–228, 230, 234, 236–238, 240–241, 246 Taglicht, Josef, 295 Talmy, Leonard, 137, 142, 151 Thim–Mabrey, Christiane, 209 Thompson, Sandra, 1, 3, 11, 97, 101, 135, 155, 164, 172, 175, 179, 223–224, 245, 250, 275, 290, 297

321

Tikkanen, Bertil, 186, 261, 276, 280, 300 Tomlin, Russell, 137, 142, 151 Townsend, David, 137, 142, 151 Traugott, Elizabeth, 1, 4, 9, 14, 16– 20, 32, 36, 98, 99, 100, 135, 137, 143, 158, 193, 196, 203, 269, 291 Trubetzkoy, Nicolai, 42, 50, 108 Van Belle, William, 199, 209, 237 Van der Auwera, Johan, 227 Van Dijk, Teun, 227 Van Valin, Robert, 1, 4, 14, 16–20, 32, 34, 36–37, 79–81, 85, 88, 98, 103, 107, 137, 142–143, 158, 186, 276, 279, 280, 299 Verstraete, Jean-Christophe, 9, 12, 19, 32, 34, 45, 48, 54, 148, 175, 227, 230, 232, 238, 247, 295, 299 von Roncador, Manfred, 102 Wallis, Sean, 4 Wierzbicka, Anna, 74 Wilson, Deirdre, 48, 195 Winter, Eugene, 1, 100, 137, 142, 146, 158 Zwicky, Arnold, 66, 69, 203