Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations: Figuring out the Enemy (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9781138574830, 9781351273169, 113857483X

Citation preview

Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations: Figuring out the Enemy

Identifying and explaining common views, ideas and traditions, this volume challenges the concept of Serbian-Albanian hostility by reinvestigating recent and historical events in the region. The contributors put forward critically oriented initiatives and alternatives to shed light on a range of relations and perspectives. The central aim of the book is to “figure out” the problematic relations between Serbs and Albanians – that is, to comprehend its origins and the actors involved and to find ways to resolve and deal with this enmity. Treating the hostility as a construct of a long-running discourse about the Serbian or Albanian “Other”, scholars and intellectuals from Serbia, Kosovo and Albania examine the origins, channels, agents and mediums of this discourse from the 18th century to the present. Tracing the roots of the two ethnic groups’ political divisions, contemporary practices and actions allows the contributors to reconsider mutually held negative perceptions and identify elements of a common, shared history. Examples of past and current cooperation are used to offer a critical analysis of all three societies. This interdisciplinary publication brings together historiographical, literary, sociological, political, anthropological and philosophical analyses and enquiries and will be of interest to researchers in the fields of sociology, politics, cultural studies, history or anthropology; and to academics working in Slavonic and East European studies. Aleksandar Pavlović is a Researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade. Gazela Pudar Draško works as a Research Associate at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade. Rigels Halili is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw.

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber

The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times though, including democratization, economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging which seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics and accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond. Social Movements in the Balkans Rebellion and Protest from Maribor to Taksim Edited by Florian Bieber and Dario Brentina Romania and the Quest for European Identity Philo-Germanism without Germans Cristian Cercel The Western Balkans in the World Linkages and Relations with External Actors Edited by Florian Bieber and Nikolaos Tzifakis Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations Figuring Out the Enemy Edited by Aleksandar Pavlović, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/South east-European-Studies/book-series/ASHSER1390

Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations Figuring Out the Enemy Edited by Aleksandar Pavlović, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Aleksandar Pavlović, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Aleksandar Pavlović, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-57483-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-27316-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of illustrationsviii List of contributorsix Forewordxii SECTION I

Whose land is it? The establishment of Serbian-Albanian hostility1   1 Forging the enemy: the transformation of common Serbian-Albanian traits into enmity and political hostility

3

ALEKSANDAR PAVLOVIĆ

  2 Producing Old Serbia: in the footsteps of travel writers, on the path of folklore

22

SRĐAN ATANASOVSKI

  3 “Reconquista of Old Serbia”: on the continuity of territorial and demographic policy in Kosovo

39

VLADAN JOVANOVIĆ

SECTION II

The Yugoslav experiment: Serbian-Albanian relations in comparative perspective59   4 The burden of systemic legitimization in socialist Yugoslavia: discursive reduction of Kosovo protests MARJAN IVKOVIĆ, TAMARA PETROVIĆ TRIFUNOVIĆ AND SRĐAN PRODANOVIĆ

61

vi  Contents   5 Seeing each other: nesting Orientalisms and internal Balkanism among the Albanians and South Slavs in the former Yugoslavia

79

ATDHE HETEMI

  6 Conflicted narratives: the 1998–1999 Kosovo war in history textbooks in Kosovo and Serbia

98

SHKËLZEN GASHI

SECTION III

Intellectuals and war: the mediators of (non-)national justice109   7 Figure of the Other as an open project: literary works of Albanian authors from Albania and Kosovo translated in Serbia

111

SAŠA ĆIRIĆ

  8 We, Sons of the Nation: intellectuals as generators of Albanian and Serbian national ideas and programs

127

RIGELS HALILI

  9 The symbolism of impotence: intellectuals and Serbian-Albanian relations in the post-Yugoslav period

142

GAZELA PUDAR DRAŠKO

SECTION IV

Can there be cooperation after all: cultural and political cross-border practices161 10 Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages: when patriarchy breaks nationalist barriers

163

ARMANDA HYSA

11 Cultural heritage in Kosovo: strengthening exclusion through inclusive legislation JELENA LONČAR

180

Contents vii 12 “Face to Face”: Serbian-Albanian cultural cooperation in the media

197

ANA BIREŠEV

13 The community of the dispossessed: Women’s Peace Coalition

215

ADRIANA ZAHARIJEVIĆ

Index230

Illustrations

Figures 4.1 Formal model consisting of an axis of political power and an axis of discursive articulation of protest demands (axis of ideology)73 5.1 Trend of respondents’ opinion regarding interethnic relations continue to be tense without improvement 90 5.2 Interethnic social acceptance trends 91 11.1 Steps in analyzing the legislative process 182

Tables 2.1 Chronology of the most significant travelogues from Old Serbia and Macedonia 9.1 Review of analyzed texts

25 146

Contributors

Editors Aleksandar Pavlović is a Researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade. He obtained his PhD in Southeast European Studies from the University of Nottingham and received his BA and MA in comparative literature and literary theory from the University of Belgrade. He published Epika i politika and co-edited Politics of Enmity: Can Nation Ever Be Emancipatory (2018) and a volume on Serbian-Albanian relations in Serbian and Albanian. Gazela Pudar Draško is a Researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade. Her fields of interest are political sociology, particularly social and intellectual engagement, youth engagement and ideologies, especially nationalism. She recently authored a book, O čemu govorimo kada govorimo o intelektualcu: ideje i iluzije (Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017) and coauthored Mapiranje političkih orijentacija građana Srbije (Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017). Rigels Halili is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw. He has studied philology, cultural anthropology and international relations at the University of Warsaw, where he also earned his PhD. His research interests include orality and literacy, especially in the Balkans, history of modern nationalism, interaction between memory and culture and normative customary practices in the Balkans and Central Europe. His latest research project was focused on social and cultural memory of communism in Central and Southeast Europe. He published a monograph based on his PhD dissertation in 2012 and has co-edited four books in Polish, Serbian and Albanian.

Contributors Srđan Atanasovski is a Research Associate at the Institute of Musicology SASA in Belgrade, Lecturer at SIT Study Abroad Balkans program in Belgrade and Member and Coordinator of the Center for Yugoslav Studies in Belgrade. In his

x  Contributors research he focuses on nationalism, culture and music in the Yugoslav space. His first book, Mapiranje Stare Srbije (in Serbian, trans. Mapping Old Serbia: In the Footsteps of Travel Writers, Tracing the Folk Song), was published in 2017 by Biblioteka XX vek. Ana Birešev is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, teaching courses entitled Social History – Europe and the Balkans in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Culture of Late Capitalism and Practicum – Sociology. She is the author of a book on sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, several edited volumes and numerous articles in scientific journals. Saša Ćirić is a Founder and Editor of the literary supplement Beton and Editor on Radio 2 of the Serbian Broadcasting Cooperation (RTS). He has published three books of literary and political essays and two books of plays and radio plays. He has also contributed articles and reviews for the liberal press in the region and edited the pioneering anthologies From Pristina With Love and From Belgrade With Love in Serbian and Albanian. Shkëlzen Gashi, born in Prishtina (Kosovo), works as an independent researcher. He studied political science at the University of Prishtina and for his MA at the Universities of Bologna and Sarajevo. He is the author of many publications (books and articles). He has studied the presentation of the history of Kosovo in history textbooks both in Kosovo and countries around Kosovo. Currently, he is writing a biography on Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians from 1989–2006. Atdhe Hetemi is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre on Social Movement Studies at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence. He is a PhD candidate at the University of Ghent, Belgium. Mr. Hetemi has decade-long combined experience in academic institutions and international organizations. He has authored papers and delivered lectures on the topics of political and institutional stability from the public perspective, good governance and development and the contemporary history and politics of the Western Balkans. Armanda Hysa is an anthropologist and Director of the National Center for Traditional Activities, Albanian Ministry of Culture. She defended her PhD in 2012 at the University of Tirana. From October 2012 to October 2014, she has been a Research and Teaching Fellow, Alexander Nash Fellow in Albanian Studies at UCL. Her research interests include urban Ottoman heritage, specifically Balkan charshiya (old bazaars), identity and ethnic relations in Macedonia and interethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians, with particular focus on the recent phenomenon of mixed marriages between Serbian men with women of Northern Albania. Marjan Ivković completed his undergraduate and MPhil studies in sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. In February 2014, he defended his PhD thesis at the Department of Sociology, University of

Contributors xi Cambridge, UK. Currently a Research Associate at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade, he has taken part in international academic conferences and projects. Marjan’s primary area of research is contemporary social theory, particularly the social-theoretic aspects of critical theory. Vladan Jovanović is a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Recent History of Serbia (Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije) in Belgrade. His main research interests focus on the integration of the formerly Ottoman territories of Macedonia and Kosovo into the Yugoslav state. Jovanović, who holds a PhD in history from Belgrade University, is the author of Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS (Beograd: INIS, 2002) and Vardarska banovina 1929–1941 (Beograd: INIS, 2011). Jelena Lončar is an Assistant Professor at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Science. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of York, UK. Her research interests include political representation, ethnic politics, quotas and civil society. In recent years, her research has focused on the performance of minority representation and the performativity of the representative claims about and for minority groups. Tamara Petrović Trifunović is a PhD candidate in sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. She works as a Research Assistant at the Institute for Sociological Research in Belgrade. She participated in several international projects dealing with the study of political communication and media discourse. Her main fields of interest include discourse studies, political sociology, critical sociology of culture, sociology of evaluation and symbolic geography. She is a member of the European Sociological Association. Srđan Prodanović obtained his PhD at the University of Belgrade (Faculty of Philosophy), where he previously finished his BA and MA studies. He currently works at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade. His research is mainly focused on investigating common sense and its theoretical relevance to social theory. His other research interests include pragmatism, interpretative sociology, sociology of everyday life, contemporary social theory and philosophy of social sciences. Adriana Zaharijević is a Researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade and an Assistant Professor of gender theory at the University of Novi Sad. Her books include Postajanje ženom (Becoming Woman, 2010) and Ko je pojedinac? (Who Is an Individual?, 2014). She is currently working on a manuscript on Judith Butler’s political thought.

Foreword

The title of this book carries an ambiguity that encapsulates its central questions. In one sense, to “figure out” means to comprehend and grasp the origins, reasons and actors of the current enmity between Serbs and Albanians. Nonetheless, to figure out, with an emphasis on “out”, also suggests a desire to abandon, push outside or deal with this enmity, to the extent that it does not sound pretentious or utopian. Still, in yet another, perhaps crucial, sense, insisting on the figurative nature of Serbian-Albanian enemity means that we essentially see this hostility as a construct – “Bad Serb” or “Bloodthirsty Albanian”, “Chetnicks” or “Shiptars” are not natural, empirical entities but constructs – embodiment and personification of a long-term discourse about either the Serbian or Albanian Other. It is the origins, agents, channels and mediums of this discourse from the 18th century to the present that comprises the content of this book.

The “Figuring Out the Enemy” project and Serbian-Albanian (scholarly) cooperation The contributions to this volume were written in the course of the project “Figuring Out the Enemy: Re-imagining Serbian-Albanian Relations”. More than a project, it has been an adventure that attracted unusual media attention for something that was essentially a scholarly enterprise and thus deserves here a few words. In addition to its analytical aspect, this project has advanced mutual cooperation and establishment of lasting scholarly and cultural cooperation and joint research on common subjects. The project involved some 30, mostly (at the time) younger, intellectuals and academics, but also journalists, translators and writers. It was especially important that most scholars belong to official institutions: the lead institution on the project was the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (IFDT) of the University of Belgrade in partnership with the civil society organization KPZ Beton, and researchers involved on the project were affiliated, in addition to the IFDT, with the Institutes for Balkanology and Musicology, both parts of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Institute for Literature and Art from Belgrade, the Faculty of Political Sciences and Faculty of Philology of the University of Belgrade, Prishtina’s Faculty of Philology, the Center for Albanian Studies from Tirana, University “Aleksander Moisiu” from Durrës, etc.

Foreword xiii Such a team, therefore, undoubtedly shows that younger generations of Serbian and Albanian scholars share common interests for cooperation and joint research. To the best of our knowledge, this was the first large-scale project since the dissolution of Yugoslavia that involved so many Serbs and Albanians from the humanities and social sciences, media and arts and the first systematic effort to establish anew or revive academic connections torn apart during the 1990s. The themes and topics of the research project were the history of Serbian-Albanian relations followed by a critique of the entrenched myths about the “natural” or “eternal” hostility between the Serbs and Albanians; the analysis of Serbian political and media discourse on Albanians and Kosovo1 during the 20th century; the analysis of contemporary nationalism and parochialism on the political scene of all three societies; comparative analysis of contemporary literary, artistic and media practices; and so on. In addition to one edited volume published in Serbian in late 2015 and one in Albanian in mid-2016, in the past several years, we have published a number of shorter, non-academic texts in Serbian in Beton, the supplement of the Serbian newspaper Danas and in Albanian in Koha ditore, Kosovo’s main newspaper. Furthermore, we have presented our research results in a number of countries through conferences, lectures and publications and have made a number of media appearances in the region. What was the general context in which our project emerged? As scholars who study the Balkans have pointed out, the Balkan people live close to each other, not with each other, and different ethnic groups continue to nurture prejudices against their neighbors.2 Serbian-Albanian relations, in particular, are still overshadowed by tensions and hostility, and mainstream scholarship is no exception. Centuries of common history remain obscure or blurred. Ger Duijzings, in his book Religion and Politics of Identity in Kosovo, claims that “what predominates now in the minds of most Serbs and Albanians, as well as most outside observers, is the image of a deeply rooted and unbridgeable rift between Serbs and Albanians, more ‘ancient’ and clear-cut than the division in Bosnia”.3 Moreover, in Serbia, recent historians have provided an image of inherently conflictual relations, in particular focusing on Islam as the majority religion among Albanians.4 Similarly, most Albanian intellectuals draw a picture of Albanians as Serbian victims and Kosovo as Albanian ethnic territory occupied by Serbs.5 Some official channels of cooperation between Serbia, Albania and Kosovo were established after 2000, yet initiatives remain largely dependent on individuals and CSOs.6 Meanwhile, several valuable publications have appeared, also dealing with aspects of SerbianAlbanian relations. Most notably among these was the publication, first in Serbian and subsequently in Albanian, of Petrit Imami’s Serbs and Albanians through the Centuries (Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove, Serbët dhe shqiptarët ndër shekuj). Originally appearing in 2000, the book has been expanded into three volumes for the second edition, aiming at comprehensively covering all aspects of SerbianAlbanian relations. Its encyclopedic character makes it the first and unavoidable source of information on the subject. Still, although its importance in the region is beyond doubt, its unavailability in English, as well as its journalistic character and occasional lack of scholarly rigor, leave it less appealing internationally. Kosovo

xiv  Foreword and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), edited by Mehmeti and Radeljić, is a most welcome recent contribution to the topic: it brings a wealth of new material authored mostly by Serbian and Albanian scholars themselves, but remains for the most part focused solely on Kosovo (Mehmeti and Radeljić, 2016).

The structure of the volume This research project pushed for change in the current scholarship by initiating an official and long-term scheme of cooperation between scholars in Serbia, Albania and Kosovo. Our emphasis was on Serbian-Albanian relations in general, from the roots of their political divisions in the 19th century, to those contemporary practices and actions that go beyond the narrowly understood Kosovo paradigm as the horizon and limit of all such relations. In a word, the aim of the project “Figuring Out the Enemy: Re-imagining Serbian-Albanian Relations” has been to revisit and reevaluate mutual negative perceptions between the two nations and identify elements of their common, shared past; furthermore, its goal was to emphasize examples of earlier and current cooperation and offer a critical analysis of Serbian, Kosovar and Albanian society. Therefore, the edited volume Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations: Figuring Out the Enemy challenges Serbian-Albanian hostility by reinvestigating events and discourses from the past as well as more recent times. It seeks to identify and elaborate common views, ideas and traditions that undermine the present enmity and promote cooperation. These chapters thus offer an alternative to the dominant discourse of hostility and centennial ethnic hatred between the two nations. In addition, they aim to bridge the existent gap in comparative research on Serbian-Albanian issues that has resulted in a serious lack of joint research projects, cooperation and other cultural activities. As mentioned, this volume contains a selection of articles written during the international “Figuring Out the Enemy: Re-imagining Serbian-Albanian Relations” project (2014–2016). This book has been published in Serbian as Figura neprijatelja: preosmišljavanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa (IFDT/Beton: Beograd, 2015) and in Albanian as Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serb (Qendra Multimedia: Prishtina, 2016). Of the original 24 articles previously published in Serbian or Albanian, 13 have been selected and revised for this edition in English. The mission of this project, involving dozens of scholars and intellectuals from Serbia, Kosovo and Albania, was to put forward critically oriented initiatives and alternatives to current hostilities, provide an environment for discussion and mutual understanding and engage others in a similar task. The project created a base for lasting cooperation and a strong network of scholars and intellectuals but also cultural institutions from Serbia, Kosovo and Albania. The first section, entitled “Whose land is it? The establishment of SerbianAlbanian hostility”, contains three chapters dedicated to the very roots of the conflict. In his contribution, Aleksandar Pavlović claims that Serbian and Montenegrin writers and historians from mid-18th to the mid-19th century actually

Foreword xv portrayed the Albanians in positive terms and that traditional culture, embodied in oral songs and folk customs and stories, in particular, show appreciation towards them as great heroes and honorable, brave warriors. It is only in the last quarter of the 19th century, Pavlović argues, that the Albanian became a figure of hostility, identified as a torturer of the Serbs and thereby equal, if not even worse, than the Turks. Srđan Atanasovski provides a survey of Serbian travelogues about Kosovo published in the press or as books from 1850s to 1910, that is, prior to the Balkan Wars. He shows how Kosovo, terra incognita in Serbia of the time, became constructed as an object of interest. Vladan Jovanović’s chapter about the continuity of policy towards Kosovo from the First through the Second Yugoslavia provides a convenient conclusion to this section. The second section, “The Yugoslav experiment: Serbian-Albanian relations in comparative perspective”, opens with a chapter jointly written by Marjan Ivković, Tamara Petrović Trifunović and Srđan Prodanović. The authors turn their attention to three crucial Kosovo protests in 1961, 1981 and 1988. As they argue, the Yugoslav political elite continually presented the social dimension of these protests in an identitarian mode, thereby – paradoxically – providing the structural impetus for the articulation of Albanian nationalism. Atdhe Hetemi uses the paradigms of Balkanism and Orientalism to describe the ways that the Albanians were perceived by others in the times of the Social Yugoslavia, but also to depict their self-perceptions during this period. In the following chapter, Shkëlzen Gashi provides a comparative analysis of the representation of the 1998–1999 Kosovo conflicts in contemporary Serbian and Kosovo textbooks and clearly shows the diametrically opposite views of these events promoted through each side’s dominant discourse. As he persuasively argues, textbooks of both sides offer contested and mutually exclusive narratives that depict only us as victims and focus only on the crimes of the other side. The third section, “Intellectuals and war: the mediators of (non-)national justice”, debates the role of intellectuals in spurring ethnic hatred in the more recent Serbian-Albanian conflicts. Literary critic Saša Ćirić takes into consideration the entire corpus of contemporary Kosovar and Albanian poetry, fiction and drama translated into Serbian. He examines this literary corpus for the representation of Serbs and the Other in general, identifying differences between the Kosovar and Albanian literary scene in this respect. In particular, Ćirić affirms those narratives that go beyond ethnic hatred and promotion of hostility to defy the simplified discourse of victimization, such as the poems and writings of Arben Idrizi. Rigels Halili compares the (in)famous 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts to the far less known 1998 Platform for the Solution of the Albanian Question of the Albanian Academy of Sciences and shows that both documents have a similar structure – a unified, one-dimensional view emanating from the victimization of their side alone. Gazela Pudar Draško offers a comprehensive critical overview of various positions and proposals for Kosovo made by Serbian intellectuals from Dobrica Ćosić to Matija Bećković and further on, including their reactions to the 2008 Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

xvi  Foreword The chapters in the closing section of the book, “Can there be cooperation after all: cultural and political cross-border practices”, question contemporary social issues and manifestations in Serbia and Kosovo and search for recent and current affirmative practices that promote myriad modes of cooperation, whether traditional, alternative or even utopian. Armanda Hysa, an anthropologist from Tirana, examines an interesting contemporary phenomenon of Albanian women, predominantly from mountainous regions of Northern Albania, marrying Serbs from Sandžak and other areas. Hysa asks a provocative question – is it always justified to equate the patriarchal and nationalist matrix? In other words, can patriarchal demands outweigh national(ist) ones? Jelena Lončar examines the status of the Serbian cultural heritage in the current Kosovo legislation and its implications on a wider political framework in Kosovo. Ana Birešev uses Bourdieu’s sociological framework to investigate and map the art scene and the different forms of contemporary artist cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo. Finally, Adriana Zaharijević’s closing chapter serves as a conclusion. It brings her feminist perspective on the subject of dispossession. Building on the writings of Athena Athanasiou and Judith Butler, Zaharijević inquires after the utopian character of communities not founded on narratives of ethnicity, territory, blood ties or shared memories. Taking the case of recent and ongoing feminist activism from Serbia and Kosovo, she affirms concrete examples of efforts to create communities that could go beyond the present confines of ethnic ties in the Balkans. As an interdisciplinary publication that brings together historiographical, literary, sociological, political, anthropological and philosophical analyses and enquiries, we hope that Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations will have a broad appeal and will be of interest to academics working in the various fields of Slavic and East European studies, whether in sociology, politics, cultural studies, history or anthropology. In addition to being a pioneering book on the subject of SerbianAlbanian relations compiled and jointly written by local authors, it also contains a wealth of material from these two cultures that will be available in English for the first time. As such, it will be a useful supplementary text in academic courses on former Yugoslavia, Balkan and East European history, culture, literature and nationalism. In addition, being diverse in tone and style, the book easily communicates with a broader, less academic audience interested in Serbian-Albanian and Balkan issues in general. Given that its prior, more voluminous and less readerfriendly editions in Serbian and Albanian received sizable interest among local diplomats and civil society experts, it is expected that the revised and abridged English edition will also be welcomed by a wide circle of readers and the public at large.

Conclusion: beyond enmity No doubt, the political constellation is still unfavorable: Serbian-Albanian cooperation remains limited and faces many obstacles. “The drone incident” from late 2014 is just one example, but more importantly, there is the ongoing crisis of implementation of the Brussels agreement between Serbia and Kosovo.

Foreword xvii Nevertheless, political ties between Serbia and Albania have been firmly established and the international community seems firm in promoting this cooperation. Thus, if a few years ago Serbian-Albanian cooperation looked nonexistent, today it feels like – to borrow from the jargon of dialectical materialism – history is on our side. It would have been impossible to implement this project and eventually prepare this volume without the generous help from a number of colleagues, friends and likeminded people. Colleagues from the Centre for Southeast European Studies in Graz provided constant assistance and encouragement throughout this endeavor. We owe a debt of gratitude to Florian Bieber, Marko Kmezić, Armina Galijaš and Hrvoje Paić, whose comments and suggestions contributed in many ways to the final form of these chapters and the book in general. Of course, the remaining faults are solely our own. The civil society organization Beton and its president, Miloš Živanović, were valuable partners and early initiators of this initiative, to which IFDT Director Petar Bojanić offered academic support, even though it raised some eyebrows (to say the least) from conservative mainstream academics. Further, generous support from the Regional Research Promotion Programme (RRPP) of the Swiss Cooperation Office provided us with the necessary funding for this project; the invaluable help we received from our RRPP friends Jamina Opardija and Mihajlo Đukić went far beyond any professional commitments. We are also most grateful to Edward Djordjevic for improving the quality of our chapters in English in numerous instances, often on short (or no) notice and at unfriendly hours and to Miloš Ćipranić for helping us prepare this manuscript for publication in accordance with Routledge’s rigorous standards. Last, but not least, we are deeply grateful to all those who partook in the research, writing and/or translation of these and other articles written during the project, notably to Inis Shkreli, Miloš Miljković, Agron Bajrami, Naile Mala Imami, Anton Berishaj, Basri Çapriqi, Esilda Luku, Marija Mandić, Ana Sivački, Valdete Osmani, Ana Petrov, Predrag Krstić, Aleksandra Ilić Rajković, Filip Vukadinović, Jeton Neziraj and other folks from Qendra Multimedia and many others who helped us in various ways and showed their commitment to Serbian-Albanian friendship and cooperation. Finally, a few words from an editorial perspective are in place here. Since we all deeply believe that theory is fundamentally political and that it is deeply embedded in how we think and construct the world, our goal as editors was to present the public with a book that affirms a critical politics of friendship. In addition, our aim has been to reestablish a dialogue between theorists from Serbia, Kosovo and Albania, a form of communication that has been suspended or prevented for too long, and to widen the scope of the questions that connect and bind us together. We therefore believe that Rethinking Serbian-Albanian Relations: Figuring Out the Enemy provides a vital contribution to our mutual cooperation and research on common Serbian-Albanian topics and issues. Also, this book offers an overview of the scientific and theoretical thought in this field, but also of a currently available critical reflection and its limitations in Serbia, Kosovo and Albania. Finally, a note to those that could – probably rightfully – remark that this book would have

xviii  Foreword been richer or more internationally relevant had we included some articles by foreign authors: We deliberately relied on our own “forces”, having in mind the utter absence of similar efforts in the past, as well as the growing body of publications initiated or edited by authors outside trying to establish a dialogue between us. As we emphasized in different ways in several chapters in this book, we believe it is a time to get personally engaged, to affirm those voices within Serbian and Albanian culture which have acted and/or act in the name of mutual respect, similarities and shared elements between the two nations, seeking to construct a tradition that would, in contrast to the current discourse of hostility, promote some other, different relations.

Notes 1 In line with UNSC 1244 Resolution and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. 2 Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: Vintage, 2004); Michael Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe (Longman: Prentice Hall, 2002). 3 Gerlachlus Duijzings, Religion and Politics of Identity in Kosovo (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2000), 8. 4 Dušan Bataković, The Kosovo Chronicle (Belgrade: Plato, 1992); Dimitrije Bogdanović, Knjiga o Kosovu (Belgrade: SANU, 1986); Đorđe Borozan, Velika Albanija: porijekloideje-praksa (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački institut Vojske, 1995). 5 Rexhep Qosja, La question albanaise (Paris: Fayard, 1995). 6 See Ana Birešev, “ ‘Licem u lice’: srpsko-albanska kulturna saradnja u medijskom diskursu”, in: A. Pavlović, A. Zaharijević, G. Pudar Draško and R. Halili (eds.), Figura neprijatelja: preosmišljavanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa (IFDT/Beton: Belgrade, 2015), 429–446; Orli Fridman, “Structured Encounters in Post-conflict/Post-Yugoslav Days: Visiting Belgrade and Prishtina”, in: O. Simić and Z. Volčić (eds.), Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans (New York: Springer, 2013), 143–162.

References Bataković, Dušan (1992). The Kosovo Chronicles. Belgrade: Plato. Birešev, Ana (2015). “ ‘Licem u lice’: srpsko-albanska kulturna saradnja u medijskom diskursu” In: Figura neprijatelja: preosmišljavanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa., pp. 429–446. Bogdanović, Dimitrije (1986). Knjiga o Kosovu. Belgrade: SANU. Borozan, Đorđe (1995). Velika Albanija: porijeklo-ideje-praksa. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački institut Vojske. Duijzings, Gerlachlus (2000). Religion and Politics of Identity in Kosovo. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. Figura e armikut: ripërfytyrimi i marrëdhënieve shqiptaro-serbe (2016). Edited by Rigels Halili, Aleksandar Pavlloviq, Armanda Hysa, Adriana Zaharijeviq. Qendra Multimedia: Prishtinë. Figura neprijatelja: preosmišljavanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa (2015). Edited by Aleksandar Pavlović, Adriana Zaharijević, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili. IFDT/ Beton: Belgrade. Fridman, Orli (2013). “Structured Encounters in Post-conflict/Post-Yugoslav Days: Visiting Belgrade and Prishtina” In: Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans. Edited by Olivera Simić and Zala Volčić. New York: Springer, pp. 143–162.

Foreword xix Imami, Petrit (2000). Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove. Beograd: Samizat. (Second edition: Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove. III vols. Belgrade: Samizdat, 2017). Kaplan, Robert (2004). Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History. New York: Vintage. Mehmeti, Leandrit and Branislav Radeljić (2016). Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Qosja Rexhep (1995). La question albanaise. Paris: Fayard. Roskin, Michael (2002). The Rebirth of East Europe. Longman: Prentice Hall.

Section I

Whose land is it? The establishment of Serbian-Albanian hostility

1 Forging the enemy The transformation of common Serbian-Albanian traits into enmity and political hostility Aleksandar Pavlović This chapter focuses on the representation of the Albanians in the early SerboMontenegrin historiography, ethnography and oral tradition from the mideighteenth century throughout the long nineteenth century. To be sure, by Albanians, I do not have in mind any fixed entity or identity. Apparently, such claim rests on the assumptions of the constructivist school that all modern nations are “imagined communities”, as Benedict Anderson and other constructivists have persuasively argued.1 The Albanians are certainly not exceptions in this respect. Hence, a number of comprehensive studies investigated the process of constitutions and unification of the Albanian nation, indicating its internal contradictions and contested and shifting attitudes stretching from the nineteenth century to this day.2 Nonetheless, this does not invalidate the investigation of the patterns and ways in which the Albanians have been seen and imagined by others, or Serbs in this particular case. As I will indicate, the Serbian image of Albanians shifted rather dramatically from the mid-eighteenth to the end of the long nineteenth century, chiefly due to the religious diversity of the Albanians and the shifting political circumstances and emerging Serbian concerns over Kosovo. Thus, in the mideighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, in Serbian culture prevailed an image of Albanians as Christians and highlanders, similar to and aligned with Montenegrins in opposing the Turks. With the shifting interest to Kosovo from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, Serbian authors increasingly started identifying Albanians as Muslims and associating them with Turks and hence as Serbian enemies. In order to identify common perceptions about the Albanians throughout this period, I  take into consideration three types of documents. First, I  will briefly consider the two programmatic texts of Serbian Romantic nationalism from the first half of the nineteenth century – Vuk Karadžić’s 1849 Srbi svi i svuda (Serbs All and Everywhere, Karadžić 1849) and Ilija Garašanin’s 1844 Nаčеrtаniје. The Albanians have a rather marginal role in those works and remain largely unknown to its authors, whereas the territories they inhabited did not figure so prominently within the Serbian national agenda of the time. The second group comprises three oldest Montenegrin histories3 and Dositej Obradović’s memoirs of his stay among the Toskas of the Southern Albania,4 all of which constitute rare instances when Albanians were even mentioned. The analysis of these texts shows that the

4  Aleksandar Pavlović educated Serbs and Montenegrins of the time were mostly interested in the Albanians from Northern Albania and the Zeta Valley, which they depict as brave warriors and heroes closely resembling the Montenegrins, with whom they often fight together against the Turks. Hence, the information about the Albanians from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century are found mostly in three Montenegrin histories written during this time, which will be the subject of discursive analysis that takes into consideration the context in which these works originated and the biographies of their authors. The third group of texts herein regarded comprises several transcriptions of popular oral songs from Serbian and Albanian oral epic tradition. In particular, I will examine the common traits in Serbian and Albanian oral and epic tradition by referring to several oral songs about Prince Marko (“Marko Kraljević and Musa the Outlaw”,5 and “Četobaša Mujo i Marko Kralјević”).6 Since Marko Kraljević is the most popular hero not only of Serbian, but of the entire Balkan oral tradition, numerous songs about him recorded in various Balkan languages spanning throughout several centuries enable us to observe from the folkloristic angle how this character and his exploits involve identity perceptions of one’s own and neighbouring communities in the Balkans. It is argued that the appreciation for particular Albanian heroes found in Serbian/ Montenegrin folk oral songs and narratives, and vice versa, stems from a similar social background and shared patriarchal values among the two ethnic groups. Consequently, contemporary authors such as Marko Miljanov7 often insist on the shared values of heroism, hospitality and manliness among Serbs, Montenegrins and Albanians, while scholars like Valtazar Bogišić8 emphasize the similarities in their social institutions and way of life. In the second part of the chapter, I focus on the discontinuity in SerbianAlbanian perceptions, which occurs with weakening of heroic discourse and strengthening of national discourse  – influenced by the Eastern Crisis  – in the post-1878 period. During this time, a number of factors, such as the international recognition of Serbia and Montenegro as independent countries, formation of the Albanian national movement, weakening of the Ottoman rule and territorial disputes over the present-day Kosovo and Northern Albania, gradually led to the increasingly negative and coherent image of the Albanians within Serbian culture. Thus, contemporary Serbian intellectuals abandoned the previously prevailing image of the Albanians as highlanders, Catholics and Serbian allies against the Turks, forwarding instead as the dominant figure of the Albanians as Muslims, Turkish allies and the torturers of the few remaining Kosovo Serbs. This perception coincides with the birth of the geo-political concepts of “Old Serbia” and the growing Serbian interest in the Kosovo and Northern Albanian territory. These negative perceptions gradually evolved into systematic discourse which blended historical claims over the Kosovo territory based on its medieval history, humanitarian claims about the systematic expulsion of the Kosovo Serbs by the Albanians and demographic claims about Albanians being newcomers to Kosovo and Metohija/Dukadjin which for centuries had a stable Serbian majority, all of which thereby justifying Serbian pretentions over the Kosovo territory.9 Following Maria Todorova’s concept of Balkanism, I propose to use the term “Albanism”

Forging the enemy 5 for this discourse that emerges in Serbia on the eve of the Balkans wars and, as exemplified by other contributions to this volume, remains productive ever since. In the concluding part of the chapter, I emphasize several examples of turn-of-the twentieth century intellectuals who publicly opposed these negative views of the Albanians and advocated a change in political attitudes towards them.

An Albanian as a hero, relative and friend in SerboMontenegrin heroic discourse In distinction to the currently widespread view about the centennial hostility between the Serbs and Albanians, available sources from the past indicate that for centuries they did not perceive their relations as problematic, and it would be hard to find anything resembling coherent anti-Serbian or anti-Albanian discourse among them before the second half of the nineteenth century. This claim deserves some further elaboration. The books such as Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans (1997) and Božidar Jezernik’s Wild Europe (2004) offer instances of Balkanism from the mid-sixteenth century. Balkanism is a term somewhat similar to Said’s orientalism. Maria Todorova defined it as a discourse that creates a stereotype of the Balkans, with politics significantly and organically intertwined with this discourse. The term Balkans is often stereotypically used as “a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian”.10 Moreover, one could perhaps trace these negative perceptions of the Balkan peoples further in the past, finding instances of Byzantine writers showing contempt for the “barbaric” ways of the nouveau riches Serbian or Bulgarian rulers, which then ties this all the way to Ancient Greek writers and their descriptions of the Thracians and other non-Hellenic peoples as barbaric. In short, while this external Balkanism has roots that go far back in history, internal Serbian-Albanian Balkanism is its rather recent derivation. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, literate Serbs showed no particular interest in Albanians, and the information about them was scarce. It is indicative, for instance, that the Albanians play no significant role in the two (in)famous founding documents of Serbian nationalism, Vuk Karadžić’s Srbi svi i svuda (Serbs All and Everywhere, published in 1849) and Ilija Garašanin’s Načertanije (The Draft, from 1844). In the opening paragraph of Srbi svi i svuda, Karadžić starts from the assumption that all people speaking the štokavijan dialect should be considered as Serbs, be they Orthodox, Muslim or Roman-Catholic. He then lists all the areas that the Serbs inhabit but mentions with regret that there is no information regarding the Serbs in Albania and Macedonia: It is still unknown how many Serbs there are in Albania and Macedonia. During my stay at Cetinje (in Montenegro) I spoke with two men from Dibra, who told me that in those places there is many a “Serbian” village, wherein Serbian is spoken the way they speak it, that is, across between Serbian and Bulgarian, but nonetheless closer to Serbian rather than to Bulgarian. Uprаvо јоš [sе] nе znа dоklе Srbа imа u Аrnаutskој i u Маćеdоniјi. Ја sаm sе nа Cеtinju (u Crnој Gоri) rаzgоvаrао s dvојicоm lјudi iz Dibrе, kојi su mi

6  Aleksandar Pavlović kаzivаli dа оnаmо imа mnоgо “srpskiјеh” sеlа, pо kојimа sе gоvоri srpski оnаkо kао i оni štо su gоvоrili, tј. izmеđu srpskоgа i bugаrskоgа, аli оpеt bližе k srpskоmе nеgо k prаvоmе bugаrskоmе.11 Correspondingly, Ilija Garašanin wrote his Načertanije as a secret document outlining the strategy for the future Serbian territorial policy and expansion. Garašanin dreamed about restoring the medieval Serbian Kingdom and glory, which for the most part occupied the territories lying south from the then Serbia, but in actual fact, he provided concrete information and plans regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Southern Hungary, while these medieval lands apparently remained practically unknown to him.12 The Albanians are thus mentioned only once in the context of his plans of tightening Serbia closer with the Montenegrins and Northern Albanians as they are the ones holding the keys to the Adriatic Sea,13 which is a rather modest claim compared to the later Serbian policy where Kosovo and Albanians started getting prominent if not the pivotal role. What is more, among these few scarce references to the Albanians, both authors show appreciation for them in terms of their heroism. Garašanin thus emphasizes the fighting spirit of the inhabitants of Montenegro and Northern Albania (“rаtni dug njihоvi žitеlја”) as a suitable feature that Serbia should exploit in order to exercise its influence over them. Karadžić, on his part, praises the Albanians who, unlike the Serbs, feel solidarity for their compatriots of another religious allegiance and act united towards the others.14 The lack of information about the Albanians during this period should not come as a surprise – in Serbia, the knowledge of the people living under the Ottoman rule was generally poor at the time. It is telling that the early nineteenth century writers have surprisingly little to say even about the Montenegrins, whom they perceived as the best of all Serbs as they constantly opposed the Ottoman rule and enjoyed de facto, if not de jure independence in their mountainous lands. Thus, for instance, the father of modern Serbian culture Vuk Karadžić in his seminal 1818 Рjeчник (Dictionary of Serbian Vernacular) describes Cetinje – the Montenegrin capital – as a river and a district. Lukijan Mušicki, the leading Serbian poet of the time, similarly explained that he had not included contemporary Montenegrin ruler Bishop Petar I in his 1818 ode to the great contemporary Serbs because he knew nothing of him at the time.15 Given that in 1818 Petar I was already in the 35th year of his rule in Montenegro, this additionally exemplifies limited knowledge of Montenegro and the highlands of the time and confirms Karadžić’s aforementioned words about the utter lack of knowledge of the regions inhabited by the Albanians. One of the first Serbian writers to provide his impressions about the Albanians was Dositej Obradović. Born in the Habsburg monarchy in 1739, Obradović already as a boy went to the monastery of Hopovo in Fruška Gora and initially intended to become a monk. However, he was soon affected by the ideas of the Enlightenment, left the monastery and for the next several decades travelled across

Forging the enemy 7 the entire Balkans and Western Europe. In his 1783 book Живoт и прикључeниja (Life and Adventures), Dositej describes his 1769 stay near Gjirokastër in Southern Albania among “that brave nation and these beautiful lands”: I was so glad to hear from the Albanians the following: “Whoever becomes the ruler of Serbia, we will acknowledge as our ruler as well, since the Serbian kings were also our kings”. Not far from Hormovo one finds beautiful meadows that the Albanians call “lepažita” (Eng. “beautiful cornfields”). I asked them what it means? “We don’t know”, they said, “it’s the name of the field”. And when I explained to them that it is a Serbian word, they replied: “Hey, you monk, don’t be surprised, we and the Serbs were one family and one people in the old days”. Kаkо је mеni milо bilо оd isti[h] Аlbаnеzа čuti dа gоvоrе: “Kо Sеrbiјоm оblаdа, tоgа ćеmо i mi zа nаšеgа vlаdеtеlја priznаti, zаštо sеrpski krаlјi i nаši su bili”. Nеdаlеkо оd Hоrmоvа nа[h]оdе sе nеkа prеkrаsnа pоlја kоја Аlbаnеzi nе zоvu drugојаčе nеgо “lеpаžitа”. Pitаm i[h] ја štа tо znаči? “nе znаmо”, | kаžu mi, “tо је imе pоlја”. А kаd im ја tо izјаsnih, kаzuјući im dа је sеrpskа rеč, “mоrе kаluđеru”, оdgоvоrе mi, “nе čudi sе ti tоmе; mi smо sа Sеrblјi јеdаn rоd i plеmе u stаrо vrеmе bili!”16 Some recent scholars argued that Obradović was a Serbian nationalist and would thus likely question the veracity of his memories in this case.17 Be that as it may, in this context this account is important as Obradović, in consistency with the eighteenth century Enlightenment spirit, explicitly describes the Albanians as worthy of education and literate culture and as a brave nation inhabiting beautiful lands has and having the common origin with the Serbs. This early account on Southern Albania is a rarity. Much more information on Albanians are found in the writings of Montenegrins or about Montenegro, as for over a century Serbian and Montenegrin writers were familiar mostly with those Albanians living in the present-day Northern Albania and the Zeta valley. The earliest Montenegrin histories are two relatively short accounts written for – or commissioned by – the Russian court around the mid-eighteenth century. I would like to mention here the brave people living around us; they nowadays belong to the Turkish areas, but they were previously under the rule of Zeta and Montenegrin princes: in particular, Mrkojević has and Bijelo Polje, as well as other peoples living around that are warriors by nature, located by the river Drin (Drim), which separates the principality of Zeta and Albania. These peoples are also not quite under the Turkish rule, as others are. Neću propustiti da ovdje spomenem još hrabri narod koji živi oko nas, a koji danas pripada turskoj oblasti, a ranije je bio pod vlašću hercega zetskih i crnogorskih: upravo Mrkojević has i Bijelo Polјe, isto tako i druge narode koji naokolo žive i koji su po prirodi ratnički, a nalaze se do rijeke Drine

8  Aleksandar Pavlović , a ta rijeka Drin dijeli hercegstvo zetsko i Albaniju. Ni ovi narodi nijesu baš potpuno pod turskom vlašću, kao što su drugi narodi.18 Vasilije Petrović Nјеgоš, Istorija Crne Gore (1754) 12. Montenegrins consider as theirs [“k sebi ubrajaju”] various provinces and surrounding Slavic-Serbian peoples: Kuči, Bratonožići, Upper and Lower Vasojevići, Piperi, Rovčani, Moračani, Bjelopavlići, who are Serbian Orthodox but actually Turkish subjects. In the same manner, they also consider as theirs the Catholics: Hoti, Klimenti, Grude, Tuze, Shkrivale, Huze, Malteze, Kastrate and others, who outnumber the Montenegrins. 12. Crnogorci  – razne provincije i pogranične slavenosrpske narode  – k sebi ubrajaju: Kuče, Bratonožiće, Donje i Gornje Vasojeviće, Pipere, Rovčane, Moračane, Bjelopavliće, pravoslavce srpskoga naroda a u stvari turske podanike. Na isti način oni k sebi ubrajaju i katolike: Hote, Klimente, Grude, Tuze, Škrivale, Huze, Malteze, Kastrate i ostale, koji po svom broju nadmašuju Crnogorce.19 The two accounts have certain similarities. The former was written for the Russian court by Bishop Vasilije Petrović Njegoš, member of the Petrović clan from Cetinje that acted as religious but also political leaders of Montenegro for several centuries. As it appears, Bishop Vasilije as the Montenegrin leader had vested interests. He thus does not mention explicitly that the peoples south of the Montenegrins are Albanians and Catholics, as they do not fit into the Russian narrative of helping their Slav-Orthodox brothers under the Turkish yoke. Correspondingly, he emphasizes the fact that these areas were ruled by the princes from Montenegro before the Turks. This is all apparently intended to affirm the role of Montenegro and Bishop Vasilije in the region. However, while we can attribute certain elements in his description to his agenda, I find it obvious that there was no particular political reason for him to describe his Albanian neighbours in the aforementioned passage as “warriors by nature . . . brave peoples . . . that the Turks could not conquer so far” and that this should be interpreted as a token of genuine appreciation for the Albanians and their heroism. The latter quotation dates back from 1757. Its author is Jovan Stefanov Balević, the first Montenegrin with a PhD, and it contains only 18 short sentences. Despite its shortness, this account is quite significant inasmuch as it represents a view of an author who is neither the Bishop nor a member of the ruling family, but is in all likelihood of a modest origin. His account is thus more likely to provide the views typical of the local population than the previous one written by the Montenegrin de iure religious and de facto a political ruler. In distinction to Bishop Vasilije, Balević explicitly mentions by name the “nations” living in the area, and these are all historically verified Serbo-Montenegrin and Albanian tribes, in certain respects akin to, say, Scottish clans. Throughout the Ottoman period, the “highlanders” of the central Balkans had a fragmented social organization and lived separated into various clans and tribes. After their conquest of the Balkans during the fifteenth

Forging the enemy 9 century, the Ottomans accepted and codified this social formation of blood-related clans of shepherds, united in tribes on a collectively owned and shared territory.20 Second, and more importantly, Balević reports that the Montenegrins consider the Albanian Catholics as their own kind.21 This local tradition is fully verified by a number of later sources. In the mid-nineteenth century, Austrian consul in Skadar Johaness Hann recorded among the Albanians the tradition that six brothers were the founders of the tribes: Piperi, Kuči (alb. Kuçi), Hoti, Bonkeći (alb. Bonkeqi), Vasojevići and Krasnići (alb. Krasniqi) (three of those are Serbo-Montenegrin and three Albanian). A decade or two later, Serbian writer Spiridon Gopčević recounts about the same tradition in Montenegro. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and later, both among the Montenegrins and Albanians there was a popular lore about five brothers – Vaso, Kraso, Ozro, Pipo and Oto, the founders of the Vasojevići, Krasnići, Ozrinići, Piperi and Oti tribes (three Montenegrin and two Albanian ones). While the number and names of the brothers and tribes sometimes varies, it is beyond dispute that a number of the Montenegrin and Albanian tribes nourished a tradition about their common ancestors and their relations by blood.22 Finally, the last history of Montenegro (Истoриja Црнe Гoрe) from this period, written in 1835 by Romantic writer Sima Milutinović Sarajlija who resided in Montenegro for a number of years, provides an account about mixed marriages between the Montenegrins and Albanians.23 Describing the former distinguished priests in Montenegro, Milutinović particularly mentions a bishop who deserves special praise among the Serbs because he returned to Orthodox faith the tribes of Kuči, Bratonožići and Drekalovići, who were attracted to Catholicism by the Albanian priests, with whom they border and intermarry, but now in a more clever manner: by the advice and oath imposed by this bishop, they now take women from these (Albanians), but do not give their women to them. osobitu službu učinio i time ne malo Srbstvo probudio i potkrijepio, jer je povratio u istočno bogoslovlјe (Pravoslavlјe – prev) Kuče, Bratonožiće i Drekaloviće iz rimske vjere u koju su bili premamlјeni od strane arbanaških popova, s kojima se graniče i orođavaju se, ali sada pametnije: po pouci i zakletvi toga istoga vladike uzimaju danas od ovih (Albanaca – prev) žene, a njima svoje ne daju.24 As a Serbian Romantic nationalist, Milutinović is apparently unhappy with this practice of Montenegrin women marrying Albanian Catholics. However, this account shows that Montenegrins and Albanians did have a tradition of mixed marriages and even that the Orthodox officials needed to intervene in an attempt to discourage this custom. This is by no means surprising – since these tribes considered themselves close to each other, and respected the other tribes for their heroism and code of honour, they gladly took vows with female representatives of the distinguished clans and families.25 Members of clergy made efforts to eradicate another tribal custom that seemed to them as incompatible with Christianity, called blood brotherhood. Slavs use the

10  Aleksandar Pavlović term pobratim, and Northern Albanians apparently use the same word in a slightly different form of probatim, in distinction to their Southern compatriots who use the term vëllam.26 In a nutshell, when two men wish to formalize their friendship, they perform a ritual and become blood brothers. This relation is then perceived as close kinship, and their families and clans do not intermarry. While the Serbian Orthodox church more or less tolerated this traditional custom and occasionally even allowed for the ritual to be performed in a church, Catholic priests in Albania made efforts to discourage it, but without success.27 In distinction to Catholic priests who describe this tradition in negative terms, local sources offer many instances of distinguished Serbs and Albanians who were blood brothers or godfathers. This custom is praised as particularly significant as it enabled these great heroes to cooperate and to intervene in order to prevent mutual conflicts and blood feuds, which could have lasted for a century and have had devastating effects on the population.28 Early ethnographers and travellers emphasize other common customs among the Serbo-Montenegrins and Albanians, such as great hospitality and code of ethic called čojstvo, rz or besa, all of which served to regulate the relations among the members of different, even hostile communities such as Montenegrin and Northern Albanian tribes, where inter- and intra-tribal conflicts and blood feuds were a regular occurrence. These similarities are particularly striking if one compares the two most comprehensive accounts on traditional legal customs of the Montenegrins and Albanians by Valtazar Bogišić and the Albanian Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit.29 There are many stories about hosts who took a fugitive and defended him fiercely from the prosecutors even at the cost of their own life. These people became celebrated in the local tradition, as the law of hospitality requires that anyone coming to your house must be well received and protected, even if this is the greatest enemy who would otherwise be killed in a battle or under a blood feud.30 Finally, even though the Serbs nowadays tend to claim that Slava – the celebration of a family patron saint – is an exclusively Serbian custom, records show that Northern Albanians also celebrated slava and called it slava just like the Slavs do. Scholars even established that most Montenegrin clans and tribes that trace their origin to Northern Albania celebrate St. Nicholas’ Day, just like all the Malisori (Northern Albanian and Zeta valley tribes), including those Albanians who converted to Islam. Moreover, even systematic efforts to eradicate the celebration of St. Nicholas’ Day among the islamicized Albanians had only limited success.31 To sum up, early written records before the mid-nineteenth century offer a number of examples of mutual respect and cooperation between the Serbo-Montenegrin and Albanian highlanders and perceive them as similar in many respects. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to claim that these sources testify that no hostilities or conflicts between the Serbs and Albanians ever existed, especially if we bear in mind that mutual clashes among clans and tribes in the tribal regions of the central Balkans were a common occurrence. Nevertheless, I believe that the aforementioned texts do exemplify that the Serbs and Albanians during this period did not perceive their relations as being predominantly hostile or antagonistic.

Forging the enemy 11

Albanian hero with “Three Mighty Hearts”: Serbian-Albanian relations in oral epic tradition This discussion of early Serbian-Albanian relations would be incomplete if we fail to take into consideration their oral tradition. Prior to – and even way into – the twentieth century, the vast majority of the population remained illiterate, and oral tradition is therefore the best source to search for the common perceptions. Thus, common, illiterate people nourished their oral songs and passed them on from one singer and generation to another as their collective work. I will focus here on one of the most famous Serbian oral epic song about the popular Serbian (and Balkan) hero Marko Kraljević, or Marko the Prince. I consider it as illustrative for the following reason: contemporary folklorists agree that oral societies practise a variety of narratives, but that there are always some which exceed in length and complexity and enjoy particular social status.32 Among the highlanders, such privileged status predictably belonged to heroic songs and heroic tales sung and told by men. These songs and tales describe famous battles and deeds of distinguished heroes from earlier centuries or from a more recent and present times.33 For this reason, heroic epic occupied a privileged position in the programmes of the nineteenth century Romantic nationalists, while more recently it became criticized as a source of stereotypes and prejudices. While the Balkan epic is certainly not without these antagonizing and potentially warmongering/ nationalistic traits, we should bear in mind that epic also offers outstanding poetic examples of heroism, honour and humanism. A well-known Serbian epic song “Marko Kraljević and Musa Kesedžija” was recorded in the early nineteenth century from a singer from Herzegovina. The song tells about an Albanian Muslim named Musa. After six years of waiting for compensation for his loyal service to the Sultan, he became an outlaw and eventually challenged to a duel the Sultan himself. Having no one able to replace him, the Sultan offers to Serbian Prince Marko to release him from prison, if he agrees to fight against Musa. Marko accepts the offer, recovers for several months and eventually kills Musa in a duel. However, we would miss the point if we consider this plot simply as a typical duel between our representative hero and an enemy and fail to recognize the ambiguities that make this song so appreciated and relevant for the traditional understanding of Serbian-Albanian relations; namely, even though Marko is a Serb, actually the most famous Serbian hero, the singer expresses sympathy for Musa the Albanian, which stems from the similarity in social backgrounds between the patriarchal milieus of the singer and his audience and the one represented by Musa. Thus, when Marko meets Musa on the road and demands that he step aside, Musa replies: а ја ti sе uklоniti nеću, аkо t' i јеst rоdilа krаlјicа nа čаrdаku nа mеku dušеku, u čistu tе svilu zаviјаlа,

I will not do obeisance before thee, Albeit a queen bore thee, In a cardak amongst soft cushions, And wrapped thee in pure silk,

12  Aleksandar Pavlović а zlаćаnоm žicоm pоviјаlа, оthrаnilа mеdоm i šеćеrоm; а mеnе је lјutа Аrnаutkа kоd оvаcа nа plоči studеnој, u crnu mе struku zаviјаlа, а kupinоm lоzоm pоviјаlа, оthrаnilа skrоbоm оvsеniјеm; i јоš mе је čеstо zаklinjаlа dа sе nikоm nе uklаnjаm s putа.

And bound thee about with thread of gold, And nourished thee on honey and on sugar; But as for me – a wild Arnaut woman bore me Amongst the sheep on the cold ground, In a rough black mantle she wrapped me, And bound me about with thorns, And nourished me on porridge; Oft did she make me swear Never to give way to no man.34

Thus, on the one hand, Marko is ours as a hero and a Serbian medieval prince. On the other hand, Musa is also ours in the social sense, as the highlanders were poor but dedicated to values of heroism, personified in this song, not by Marko, who is bred “amongst the soft cushions”, but by Musa, the son of the “wild Arnaut women”, brought up “amongst the sheep on the cold ground”. Thus, the singer praises both heroes. Equally ambiguous is the renowned ending of the song – during the duel, both heroes show great strength, and neither can defeat the other. Finally, after breaking all their weapons and wrestling for hours, Musa turns Marko over and sits on his chests. At that moment, Marko calls his blood-sister vila (a fairy) to help him, and when she speaks up, Musa turns his attention to her for a moment. Marko uses the opportunity to take out a secret knife and rip Musa “From the navel even to the white throat” (“оd učkurа dо biјеlа grlа”). Immediately, however, he realizes that Musa has three mighty hearts in his chest, of which only two were used and the third was resting. With tears in his eyes, Marko admits with remorse: Јаоh mеnе dо bоgа milоgа, “God of Mercy”, quoth he, “woe is me! đе pоgubih оd sеbе bоlјеgа! For I have slain a better than myself”.35 In short, this song shows great appreciation of the singer and the tradition in general for both Serbian and Albanian heroes. The Albanian hero is actually socially close, brought up on the mountain and used to poverty, but dedicated to the values of honour and heroism. What is more, this Serbian song actually appreciates the Albanian Musa as a hero even greater than the national hero Marko Kraljević himself. If an Albanian counterpart to this song is sought for, one could point to the song “Četobaša Mujo i Marko Kralјević”, which I will mention only briefly.36 Marko is heavily wounded by Mujo and Halil, and it takes him seven years to recover. Eventually, he gets better, challenges Mujo to a duel but when they face each other, fairies get involved to make peace between them as they are both equally strong. They become blood brothers and celebrate it first at Mujo’s and then in Marko’s house. The concluding lines celebrate their friendship: Nikad se više nisu rаstајаli, Never again did they part Uvеk im је Bоg pоmоgао, God always came to their aid Nаš mаč је zlо sаvlаđivао. Our sword fought the evildoers.37

Forging the enemy 13 These parallels between Serbian and Albanian oral tradition are by no means isolated cases, and a number of scholars emphasized the similarities and mergers between the South Slavic and Albanian oral traditions.38 What is more, some of the distinguished Balkan oral singers such as Salih Ugljanin were bilingual and had a vast repertoire of epic songs which they performed in both languages,39 as were – and apparently some of them still are40 – many of their fellow singers in the region of Sandžak.

The rise of hostilities The aforementioned reconciliatory verses would provide a convenient closure to this chapter had it not been for the wars and atrocities later committed by the Serbs and Albanians all the way to the present. So, when did the Serbs and Albanians actually became enemies? As exemplified, prior to the 1870s, Serbian perceptions of Albanians mostly belonged to what could be conveniently labelled as the heroic discourse – Albanians were seen as fierce, brave highlanders very close or related to Montenegrins and their usual allies against the Turks. A comprehensive study into the origins of the discourse of hostility towards the Albanians is beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, some of the reasons leading to the discontinuity in the presentation of the Albanians in Serbian culture during the last quarter of the nineteenth century can be identified here. The Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 saw momentous changes such as the international recognition of Serbian independence, the formation of the Albanian national movement, the weakening of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the rise of Serbian claims over the present-day Kosovo and Northern Albania. These processes had great impact on contemporary Serbs and their perceptions of the Albanians. The Berlin Congress of 1878 was a traumatic event for contemporary Serbs, shocked by the Austrian takeover of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Serbs perceived as their land. Serbia was now enclosed from three sides by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Serbian scholars started lamenting over the fact that Serbia is confined (“skоrо оpkоlјеnа zеmlја а mi smо pоstаli uhаpšеn nаrоd”, in the words of Jovan Cvijić) and that in order to survive it needs to breathe, to expand its lungs.41 In these circumstances, the figure of a brave highlander from Northern Albania, our relative and ally against the Turks, faded. The figure of Muslim Albanians from Kosovo, Turkish allies and torturers of Kosovo Serbs who are, in the words of one scholar, “greater evildoer to the Serbs even than the Turks themselves” (“veća zla Srbima činili i od samih Turaka”), was established in its place and became codified in the scientific discourse, press and education.42 Only several decades after Karadžić’s statement that “[i]t is still not known how many Serbs there are in Albania and Macedonia”, Serbian newspapers became saturated with numerous travelogues about Kosovo which as a rule focused on medieval monuments in Kosovo and Albanian brutality over the remaining local Serbs.43 During this period, the geo-political notion of Old Serbia was coined as the name for the present-day Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. Old Serbia captured the territory

14  Aleksandar Pavlović that the Serbs claimed as theirs based on the historical rights, despite the majority of Albanian population inhabiting it.44 On the eve and during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, this anti-Albanian discourse evolved into a proper media propaganda culminating with several blatantly racist “scientific” monographs about the Albanians.45 Thereby the terms used in Serbian culture to describe the Albanians were not any longer “fierce” and “brave”, but “rabies”, “savage”, “blood-thirsty” and the like.46

Re-affirming the discourse of friendship As the intention of this chapter is to re-affirm the voices of friendship and reconciliation, I will conclude my analysis by emphasizing the efforts of two important Serbian public figures who, each in their own way, defied this anti-Albanian hysteria that affected Serbian society and media at the turn of the twentieth century. The first one is Marko Miljanov, a picturesque character born around 1830 in the Montenegrin tribe of Kuči. Miljanov was the greatest hero of his time, praised by both his tribe and other Serbo-Montenegrins and Albanians. In his old days, Miljanov decided to learn to write in order to record the history, songs and customs of his tribe and his neighbours for posterity. In two of his books published around 1900, Miljanov praises the Albanians as great heroes and honest people.47 Thus, in his most famous work, the collection of heroic tales called Primjeri čojstva i junaštva (Examples of Manliness and Heroism),48 one third of some 70 examples of heroism, courage and chivalrous deeds were performed by Albanians. Miljanov also wrote another book – Život i običaji Arbanasa (Life and Customs of the Albanians) – with the explicit intention to counter the popular belief that the Albanians were uncivilized: Albanian ways are unknown to our people who live further from them: thus some of them claim that they are more cruel and savage than all the others, but I don’t think that way, . . . and so I decided to mention some of their present customs, which I’m fond of. . . . An Albanian, despite all forces that were attacking him, neither changed nor became loose, but kept his old language and gun that he was born with. This makes one think that there is something better and more steadfast in these people than others. . . . We have seen how much troubles these people can endure and remain honest, and how far their mental force can reach. They respect their blood brothers, godfathers, hospitality and other things. Običaji arbanaški našijema lјuđima, nijesu poznati, koji su malo dalјe od nji’; stoga se čini jednijema da su oni surovi i divji, više od drugije’ naroda, a mene se ne čini da je tako, . . . a ja da i’ pomenem štogoj malo od sadašnjega običaja, koji se mene dopada. . . . Arbanas, pri svemu napadu sila, ostade pri svome nepromjenlјiv, ni raspasan, no mu, jeno, stari jezik i puška s kojijema se rodio. Ovo daje mislima da jest nešto u ta’ narod bolјe i postojanije od drugoga. . . .

Forging the enemy 15 Viđeli smo koliko ta’ narod sve trpi, a poštenje želi, koliko njegova umna sila doseže. Poštuje pobratimstvo, prijatelјstvo, gostoprimstvo i drugo sitno i krupnije. (Miljanov 1907: 1, 20) While Marko Miljanov was an oldschool hero, half a century younger, Dimitrije Tucović was a modern man, educated in the West and one of the first and most important proponents of socialist ideas in Serbia. Tucović was appalled by the anti-Albanian frenzy in the Serbian media and among the scholars and also by the atrocities committed against the Albanian population during the Balkan Wars. He thus published a book in early 1914 called Serbia and Albania (Srbija i Albanija: jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije, see Tucović 1946) in which he criticizes Serbian politics as imperial politics. Tucović believed that such actions inevitably lead to defeat, emphasized that it brought many victims and prophesied that even more are to come in the future. Unfortunately, his words sound as timely today as a century ago: It has become very risky nowadays to preach the necessity of joint work with the Albanians. In the fatal game to justify a wrong policy, the bourgeois press created an entire mountain of tendentious and false opinions, and Serbian imperial politics with its barbarian methods must have filled the Albanians with a profound hatred towards us. Danas je postalo vrlo rizično propovedati potrebu zajedničkoga rada sa Arbanasima. U pogubnoj utakmici da opravda jednu naopaku politiku buržoaska štampa je stvorila o Arbanasima čitavu kulu neistinitih i tendencioznih mišljenja, a osvajačka politika Srbije sa svojim vararskim metodama morala je Arbanase ispuniti dubokom mržnjom prema nama.49

Conclusion: the birth of “Albanism” In a way, these two voices epitomize the core of my argumentation: one, advocating for the return of the old ways and values, opted for the best within the traditional Balkan society. The other promoted Balkan collaboration and association in the name of social democracy, following the most advanced and emancipatory European political ideals of his time. Furthermore, they indicate two principal possible approaches that could lead to a shift in the perception of the Albanians in Serbian culture, which has for quite a while now been marked with hostility and radicalism. Following Maria Todorova’s concept of Balkanism as a discourse that creates a stereotype of the Balkans, with politics significantly and organically intertwined with this discourse, and its particular articulation in the Albanian context by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers,50 it seems instructive to introduce the term “Albanism” for this discourse emerged in Serbia on the eve of the Balkan wars and has remained productive ever since, as aptly demonstrated by other contributions to this volume.51 As a form of Balkanism, Аlbanism would be an amalgam

16  Aleksandar Pavlović of the following: a. historical claims over the Kosovo territory based on its possession by Serbian medieval rulers and a number of sacral objects erected by them; b. humanitarian claims about the orchestrated ethnic cleansing of the Serbs from Kosovo by Albanians, first raised in the decades preceding the Balkan Wars and exploited in particular during the 1980s onwards; and c. demographic claims based on the assumptions that the Albanians had settled in Kosovo only after the Great Migrations of the Serbs in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, which until the late nineteenth century Serbs still comprised the majority of population in Kosovo and where the expulsion of the Serbs during the Second World War is mostly responsible for the demographic shift that established Albanians as the absolute majority in Kosovo. The affirmation of the voices from within Serbian and Albanian culture that emphasize their closeness and friendship, such as those of Marko Miljanov and Dimitrije Tucović, might help to constitute a different tradition.

Notes 1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 2 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd Fischer (eds.), Albanian Identities: Myth and History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Stephanie SchwandnerSievers, “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes”, in: Andrew Hammond (ed.), The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other, 1945–2003 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 110–126; Cecilie Endresen, Is the Albanian’s Religion Really “Albanianism”? Religion and Nation According to Muslim and Christian Leaders in Albania (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012). 3 See: Marijan Мiljić, Pоvјеsnicа crnоgоrskа (Pоdgоricа: Unirеks, 1998). 4 Dositej Оbradović, Izabrani spisi (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1989). 5 See: David H. Low, The Ballads of Marko Kraljević (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 124–131. 6 See: Dragutin Mićović, Albanske junačke pesme (Priština: Jedinstvo, 1981), 68–73, www.rastko.rs/rastko-al/umetnost/rmedenica-kresnicke_l.php (accessed October 30, 2017). 7 Marko Мiljаnоv, Primjeri čojstva i junaštva (Beograd: Čupićeva zadužbina, 1901); Marko Мiljаnоv, Život i običaji Arbanasa (Beograd: Nova štamparija Davidović, 1907). 8 Valtazar Bogišić, Pravni običaji u Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini i Albaniji (Podgorica: CID, 2004). 9 Olivera Milosavljević, U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o “nama” i “drugima” (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, 2002). 10 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3. 11 Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, “Srbi svi i svudа”, in: Kоvčеžić zа istоriјu, јеzik i оbičаје Srbа svа tri zаkоnа (Bеč: Štаmpаriја јеrmеnskоgа mаnаstirа, 1849), 1. 12 It is important to stress in this context that Garašanin wrote The Draft on the basis of the document made by Franz Zach, who was sent to Belgrade by Adam Czartoryski, the leader of Polish Government-in-Exile at the time. Zach advocated the unification of South Slav lands against Austria-Hungary, which was the true intention of The Draft, and therefore, Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia and Hungary were at the focus of this work. Meanwhile, Kosovo, Lower Morava Valley and Macedonia as the territories under the Ottoman rule attracted far less attention. See: Ilija Garašanin, Nаčеrtаniје

Forging the enemy 17 Iliје Gаrаšаninа: prоgram spоlјаšnjе i unutrаšnjе pоlitikе Srbiје nа kоncu 1844. gоdinе (Beograd: Socijalna misao, 1991). On the origins of The Draft, see: Dušan Bataković, “Ilija Garašanin’s Načertanije: A Reassessment”, Balcanica 25(1) (1994): 157–183. 13 Radoš Ljušić, Knjiga o Načertaniju (Beograd: BIGZ, 1993). 14 Karadžić’s claim, of course, does not illustrate the actual situation on the terrain where Albanian tribal particularism and blood feud, as with Montenegrins, actually presented an obstacle for the establishment of a stable and centralized socio-political order; it rather shows the symbolic role that the Albanians have as a role model for the political and national identification of the Serbs as promoted by Karadžič himself in this work. 15 Ljubomir Zuković, Vukovi pevači iz Crne Gore (Beograd: Rad, 1988), 11–12. 16 Obradović, Izabrani spisi, 182. 17 Branimir Anzulović, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 73. 18 Мiljić, Pоvјеsnicа crnоgоrskа, 25. 19 Jovan Stefanov Balević, Kratak istorijsko-geografski opis Crne Gore, 1757, www. rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/jsbalevic-opis.html. 20 Branislav Đurđev, Postanak i razvoj brdskih, crnogorskih i hercegovačkih plemena (CANU: Titograd, 1984). 21 As Balević signed the report as “Albano-Crnogorac iz Bratonožića” (Albano-Montenegrin from the Bratonožići tribe), one could perhaps think of himself claiming a dual ethnicity, one that would be both Montenegrin and Albanian. While such explanation cannot be excluded altogether, the reference to Albania in this context seems to me to be actually a geographic rather than an ethnic marker – Albania is the name that the Latin writers used for the entire region, and thus, Balević most likely used a relatively new and local geographic marker of Montenegro alongside with the older and more familiar notion of Albania. 22 For a more detailed account on these traditions about the common origin of SerboMontenegrin and Albanian tribes, see: Mirko Barjaktarović, “Predanja o zajedničnom poreklu nekih crnogorskih i nekih arbanaških plemena”, in: J. Bojović (ed.), Stanovništvo slovenskog porijekla u Albaniji  – Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa održanog na Cetinju 21, 22. i 23. juna 1990. godine (Titograd: Istorijski institute SR Crne Gore, 1991), 395–408. 23 Simeon Milutinović, Istorija Crne Gore (Svetigora, Cetinje, 1997). 24 Ibid., 34. 25 The practice of mixed Serb-Albanian marriages continues in the highlands to the present day. See: Armanda Hysa, Match-making Behind Enemy Lines, LSEE Blog, 15 May 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/05/15/match-making-across-enemylines/ (accessed 30 October 2015); Armanda Hysa, “Albansko-srpski brakovi između medijskog predstavljanja i stvarnosti”, Beton 158, 22 April 2015, www.elektrobeton. net/mikser/albansko-srpski-brakovi-izmedu-medijskog-predstavljanja-i-stvarnosti/ (accessed 30 October 2015). 26 On these and many other linguistic exchanges between Serbian and Albanian languages see: Vanja Stanišić, Srpsko-albanski jezički odnosi (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1995). 27 Vuk Stefanović Kаrаdžić, Srpski Rјеčnik istumаčеn njеmаčkiјеm i lаtinskiјеm riјеčimа (Bеč: Štаmpаriја јеrmеnskоgа mаnаstirа, 1852), 512. 28 Мiljаnоv, Život i običaji Arbanasa, 2 et passim. 29 Bogišić, Pravni običaji u Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini i Albaniji; Miloš Luković, “Istraživanja Valtazara Bogišića plemenskog društva u Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini i Albaniji”, Balcanica 24 (2003): 237–265; Štjefen K. Đečovi, Kanon Leke Dukađinija (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1986); Surja Pupovci, Građanskopravni odnosi u Zakoniku Leke Dukađiniјa (Priština: Zajednica naučnih ustanova Kosova i Metohije, 1968).

18  Aleksandar Pavlović 30 See: Мiljаnоv, Primjeri čojstva i junaštva; Мiljаnоv, Život i običaji Arbanasa. 31 Jovan Vukоmаnоvić, “Slično i specifično u slavskim običajima Arbanasa i Crnogoraca”, in: Rad XIV kongresa Saveza folklorista Jugoslavije u Prizrenu 1967 (Beograd: Savez folklorista Jugoslavije, 1974), www.rastko.rs/rastko-al/folklor/jvukomanovicslave_l.php, (accessed 30 October 2015). 32 Richard Martin, “Epic as Genre”, in: J. M. Foley (ed.), A Companion to Ancient Epic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 9; John M. Foley, “Epic as Genre”, in: R. Fowler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Homer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 185. 33 Vuk Stefanović Kаrаdžić, Srpskе nаrоdnе pјеsmе, knjigа čеtvrtа, Sаbrаnа dеlа Vukа Stеfаnоvićа Kаrаdžićа (Beogrаd: Prоsvеtа, 1986), 559. 34 Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Srpskе nаrоdnе pјеsmе, knjigа drugа, u kојој su pјеsmе јunаčkе nајstаriје (Bеč: Štаmpаriја јеrmеnskоgа mаnаstirа, 1845), 407; Low, The Ballads of Marko Kraljević, 129. 35 Karadžić, Srpskе nаrоdnе pјеsmе, knjigа drugа, u kојој su pјеsmе јunаčkе nајstаriје, 410; Low, The Ballads of Marko Kraljević, 131. 36 See: Mićović, Albanske junačke pesme, 68–73. 37 Ibid, 73. 38 Stavro Skendi, Albanian and South Slavic Oral Epic Poetry (Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1954); Rigels Halili, Narod i njegove pesme: albanska i srpska narodna epika između usmenosti i pismenosti (Beograd: XX vek, 2017). Mićović, Albanske junačke pesme; Radosav Medenica, “Arbanaške krešničke pesme i naša narodna epika”, Rad XIV kongresa Saveza folklorista Jugoslavije u Prizrenu 1967 (Beograd: Savez udruženja folklorista Jugoslavije, 1974); Ana Sivački, “Specific Initial (Introductory) Formulas in Albanian (Decasyllabic) Songs of the Frontier Warriors”, Balcanica 44 (2013): 113–138. 39 Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales, 2nd edition, ed. S. Mitchell and G. Nagy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), xv; John Kolsti, The Bilingual Singer: a Study in the Albanian and Serbo-Croatian Oral Epic Traditions (New York: Garland Publishers, 1990). 40 Rigels Halili, “Albanians and Serbs: a Common Epic”, interviewed by Marjola Rukaj, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, 31 May 2013, www.balcanicaucaso.org/ eng/Regions-and-countries/Albania/Albanians-and-Serbs-a-common-epic-135279 (accessed 30 October 2015). 41 Jovan Cvijić, “Govori i članci”, in: Sаbrаnа dеlа, knjigа III (Beograd: SANU, 2000); Zef Mirdita, “Albanci u svjetlosti vanjske politike Srbije”, in: Jugoistočna Europa 1918–1995, Međunarodni znanstveni skup (Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika i Hrvatski informativni centar, 1996). 42 Mihailo Jović, Srpskа istоriја zа IV. rаzr. оsn. Škоlе (Bеоgrаd: Štаmpаriја zаdrugе štаmpаrskih rаdnikа, 1886), 91. 43 Srđan Atanasovski, Mapiranje Stare Srbije: Stopama putopisaca, tragom narodne pesme, Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek/Muzikološki institut SANU, 2017. 44 Bogdan Trifunović, The Collective Memory in the Serbian National Discourse on Old Serbia, 2015 (unpublished). 45 Svetislav Simić, Stara Srbija i Arbanasi (Beograd: Štamparija “Dositije Obradović”, 1904); Jovan Hаdži-Vаsiljеvić, Stara Srbija i Maćedonija (Sa gledišta geografskog, istorijskog i političkog) (Beograd: Štamparija D. Dimitrijević, 1906); Vladan Đorđević, Arnauti i velike sile (Beograd: Štamparija “Dositije Obradović”, 1913); Stojan Protić (Balkanicus), Albanski problem i Srbija i Austro-Ugarska (Beograd: Štamparija “Dositije Obradović”, 1913). For an overview, see: Milosavljević, U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o “nama” i “drugima”. 46 See: Milan Miljković, “Kronika palanačkog sveta: negativne predstave o Albancima u ilustrovatnoj ratnoj hronici (1912–1913)”, Beton 136, 18 June 2013, www.elektrobeton. net/mikser/kronika-palanackog-sveta/, and Vladan Jovanović’s chapter in this volume. 47 Мiljаnоv, Primjeri čojstva i junaštva; Мiljаnоv, Život i običaji Arbanasa.

Forging the enemy 19 48 Мiljаnоv, Primjeri čojstva i junaštva. 49 Dimitrije Tucović, Srbija i Albanija: jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije (Beograd: Kultura, 1946), 116. 50 Schwandner-Sievers, “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes”. 51 In that respect, this rudimentary analysis of “Albanism” should primarily be taken as a prolegomena for the further studies of the discourse of “Albanism” and its counterpart “Serbism”, which would follow Maria Todorova’s discussion of internal Balkanism and Milica Bakić-Hayden’s conception of “nesting orientalisms” in the Balkans (Todorova, Imagining the Balkans; Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia”, Slavic Review, 54(4): 917–931). About the previous usage of the notion of Albanism in a similar context, see: Schwandner-Sievers, “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes”.

References Anderson Benedict (1999). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. Anzulović, Branimir (1999). Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide. New York: New York University Press. Atanasovski, Srđan (2017). Mapiranje Stare Srbije: Stopama putopisaca, tragom narodne pesme. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek/Muzikološki institut SANU. Bakić-Hayden, Milica (1995). “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia”, Slavic Review 54(4): 917–931. Balević, Jovan Stefanov (1757). Kratak istorijsko-geografski opis Crne Gore, www.rastko. rs/rastko-cg/povijest/jsbalevic-opis.html. Bаrjaktаrоvić, Mirko (1991). Stanovništvo slovenskog porijekla u Albaniji – Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa održanog na Cetinju 21, 22. i 23. juna 1990. godine. Edited by Jovan Bojović. Titograd: Istorijski institute SR Crne Gore, pp. 395–408. Bataković, Dušan (1994). “Ilija Garašanin’s Načertanije: A  Reassessment”, Balcanica 25(1): 157–183. Bоgišić, Valtazar (2004). Pravni običaji u Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini i Albaniji. Podgorica: CID. Cviјić, Jovan (2000). Govori i članci, Sаbrаnа dеlа, knjigа III. Beograd: SANU. Đečovi, Štjefen K. (1986). Kanon Leke Dukađinija. Zagreb: Stvarnost. Đоrđеvić, Vladan (1913). Arnauti i velike sile. Beograd: Štamparija “Dositije Obradović”. Đurđev, Branisalv (1984). Postanak i razvoj brdskih, crnogorskih i hercegovačkih plemena. CANU: Titograd. Endresen, Cecilie (2012). Is the Albanian’s Religion Really “Albanianism”? Religion and Nation According to Muslim and Christian Leaders in Albania. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Foley, John M. (2004). “Epic as Genre” In: The Cambridge Companion to Homer. Edited by Robert Fowler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 171–187. Gаrаšаnin, Ilija (1991). Nаčеrtаniје Iliје Gаrаšаninа: prоgram spоlјаšnjе i unutrаšnjе pоlitikе Srbiје nа kоncu 1844. gоdinе. Bеоgrаd: Sоciјаlnа misао. Hаdži-Vаsiljеvić, Jovan (1906). Stara Srbija i Maćedonija, (Sa gledišta geografskog, istorijskog i političkog). Beograd: Štamparija D. Dimitrijević. Halili, Rigels (2017). Narod i njegove pesme: albanska i srpska narodna epika između usmenosti i pismenosti. Beograd: XX vek. Halili, Rigels (2013). “Albanians and Serbs: a Common Epic”. Interviewed by Marjola Rukaj. Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, 31 May, www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/ Albania/Albanians-and-Serbs-a-common-epic-135279 (accessed 30 October 2015).

20  Aleksandar Pavlović Hysa, Armanda (2014). Match-making Behind Enemy Lines, LSEE Blog, 15 May, http:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/05/15/match-making-across-enemy-lines/ (accessed 30 October 2015). Hysa, Armanda (2015). “Albansko-srpski brakovi između medijskog predstavljanja i stvarnosti”, Beton 158, 22 April, www.elektrobeton.net/mikser/albansko-srpski-brak ovi-izmedu-medijskog-predstavljanja-i-stvarnosti/ (accessed 30 October 2015). Jezernik, Božidar (2004). Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travelers. London: Saqi. Jović, Mihailo (1886). Srpskа istоriја zа IV. rаzr. оsn. škоlе. Bеоgrаd: Štаmpаriја zаdrugе štаmpаrskih rаdnikа. Kаrаdžić, Vuk S. (1845). Srpskе nаrоdnе pјеsmе, knjigа drugа, u kојој su pјеsmе јunаčkе nајstаriје. Bеč: Štаmpаriја јеrmеnskоgа mаnаstirа. Kаrаdžić, Vuk S. (1849). “Srbi svi i svudа” In: Kоvčеžić zа istоriјu, јеzik i оbičаје Srbа svа tri zаkоnа. Bеč: Štаmpаriја јеrmеnskоgа mаnаstirа, pp. 1–27. Kаrаdžić, Vuk S. (1852). Srpski Rјеčnik istumаčеn njеmаčkiјеm i lаtinskiјеm riјеčimа. Bеč: Štаmpаriја јеrmеnskоgа mаnаstirа. Kаrаdžić, Vuk S. (1986). Srpskе nаrоdnе pјеsmе, knjigа čеtvrtа. Sаbrаnа dеlа Vukа Stеfаnоvićа Kаrаdžićа. Brоgrаd: Prоsvеtа. Kolsti, John (1990). The Bilingual Singer: A Study in the Albanian and Serbo-Croatian Oral Epic Traditions. New York: Garland Publishers. Ljušić, Radoš (1993). Knjiga o Načertaniju. Beograd: BIGZ. Lord, Albert B. (2000). The Singer of Tales. 2nd edition. Edited by Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Low, David H. (1922). The Ballads of Marko Kraljević. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lukоvić, Miloš (2003). “Istraživanja Valtazara Bogišića plemenskog društva u Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini i Albaniji”, Balcanica 24: 237–265. Martin, Richard (2005). “Epic as Genre” In: A Companion to Ancient Epic. Edited by John Miles Foley. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp.9–19. Mеdеnicа, Radosav (1974). “Arbanaške krešničke pesme i naša narodna epika” In: Rad XIV kongresa Saveza folklorista Jugoslavije u Prizrenu 1967. Beograd: Savez udruženja folklorista Jugoslavije. Mićоvić, Dragutin (1981). Albanske junačke pesme. Priština: Jedinstvo. Rad XIV kongresa Saveza folklorista Jugoslavije (Beograd: Naučno delo), www.rastko.rs/rastko-al/umetnost/rmedenica-kresnicke_l.php (accessed 30 October 2015). Мiljаnоv, Мarko (1901). Primjeri čojstva i junaštva. Beograd: Čupićeva zadužbina. Мiljаnоv, Мarko (1907). Život i običaji Arbanasa. Beograd: Nova štamparija “Davidović”. Мiljić, Мarijan (1998). Pоvјеsnicа crnоgоrskа. Pоdgоricа: Unirеks. Miljković, Milan (2013). Kronika palanačkog sveta: negativne predstave o Albancima u ilustrovatnoj ratnoj hronici (1912–1913), Beton 136, 18 June, www.elektrobeton.net/ mikser/kronika-palanackog-sveta/ Milosavljević, Olivera (2002). U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o “nama” i “drugima”. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava. Milutinоvić, Simeon (1997). Istorija Crne Gore. Svetigora: Cetinje. Mirdita, Zef (1996). “Albanci u svjetlosti vanjske politike Srbije” In: Jugoistočna Europa 1918–1995, Međunarodni znanstveni skup. Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika i Hrvatski informativni centar. Оbrаdоvić, Dositej (1989). Izabrani spisi. Novi Sad: Matica Srpska. Orаоvаc, Tomo (1913). Arbanaško pitanje i srpsko parvo. Beograd: Sv. Radenković i Brat.

Forging the enemy 21 Pеtrović, Vasilije (1754). “Istorija o Crnoj Gori” In: Pоvјеsnicа crnоgоrskа. Edited by Маšо Мilјić. Pоdgоricа: Unirеks, 1997, pp. 7–36. Prоtić, Stojan (Balkanicus) (1913). Albanski problem i Srbija i Austro-Ugarska. Beograd: Štamparija “Dositije Obradović”. Pupovci, Surja (1968). Građanskopravni odnosi u Zakoniku Leke Dukađiniјa. Priština: Zajednica naučnih ustanova Kosova i Metohije. Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie (2004). “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes” In: The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other, 1945–2003. Edited by Andrew Hammond. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 110–126. Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie and Bernd Fischer (eds.) (2002). Albanian Identities: Myth and History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Simić, Svetislav (1904). Stara Srbija i Arbanasi. Beograd: Štamparija “Dositije Obradović”. Sivački, Ana (2013). “Specific Initial (Introductory) Formulas in Albanian (Decasyllabic) Songs of the Frontier Warriors”, Balcanica 44: 113–138. Skendi, Stavro (1954). Albanian and South Slavic Oral Epic Poetry. Philadelphia: American Folklore Society. Sтаnišić, Vanja (1995). Srpsko-albanski jezički odnosi. Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti. Todorova, Maria (1997). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Trifunović, Bogdan (2015). The Collective Memory in the Serbian National Discourse on Old Serbia (unpublished). Tucović, Dimitrije (1946). Srbija i Albanija: jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije. Beograd: Kultura. Vukomanović, J. (1974). “Slično i specifično u slavskim običajima Arbanasa i Crnogoraca” In: Rad XIV kongresa Saveza folklorista Jugoslavije u Prizrenu 1967. Beograd: Savez folklorista Jugoslavije, www.rastko.rs/rastko-al/folklor/jvukomanovic-slave_l. php (accessed 30 October 2015). Zukоvić, Ljubomir (1988). Vukovi pevači iz Crne Gore. Beograd: Rad.

2 Producing Old Serbia In the footsteps of travel writers, on the path of folklore Srđan Atanasovski

* In the period from the middle of the 19th century until the outbreak of the Balkan wars, Serbian intellectuals, chiefly from the Principality (and later the Kingdom) of Serbia, but also from urban centers of the Habsburg Empire, developed a specific discourse of travel writing about Old Serbia.1 The principal aim of these travelogues was, using history, philology, ethnography and geography, to strengthen Serbian nationalist arguments that these geographic areas belonged to the Serbian nation. Their goal was also to enrich scientific texts through personal testimony of researchers, colorful anecdotes and scenes from everyday life. Such travel writing is thus filled with plethora demographic data, historic information, even ethnographic maps found in annexes, aiming to go beyond objective scientific data in fulfilling the requirements of a literary genre, stirring strong affective reactions in the reading public. Further, from the point of view of artistic contribution, the travelogue served as testimony of the traveler’s firsthand experience, a material trace of the writer’s physical presence in the space described. It was thus believed that the travel writer’s story can only be shared with the public if the voyage described was the result of direct experience. This chapter provides a brief historic overview of the development of the discourse of travelogue about Old Serbia and a consideration of literary techniques necessary for the travelogues to function as mechanisms of appropriation of territory. Further, it offers a careful look at the political role of such writing on language and folklore of these regions, as well as the scientific texts derived from these travelogues. We can say that the mechanism of discursive appropriation of territory was different for Macedonia and Old Serbia. In the case of Macedonia, the travel writers used descriptions of language, folklore, customs, etc. to claim that the current (Slavic, Christian) population was subject to Bulgarian propaganda that denied them their “natural rights,” that is, inclusion in the Serbian nation. In contrast, in Old Serbia, which included Kosovo in its narrow sense, northern Albania and possibly northwestern Macedonia,2 regions where the large majority was Albanian, the mechanism of appropriation was supported by historical narrative, geographic and economic arguments, often even with

Producing Old Serbia 23 the fabrication of data, thus opening space for racial and cultural discrimination against non-Slavic peoples. *** Although by Vuk Karadžić’s time the Kosovo myth had already assumed central place in Serbian culture, art, science and even everyday life (in both the Principality of Serbia itself and in Serbian areas of the Habsburg Empire), prior to the Congress of Berlin, there had been relatively few firsthand descriptions of Old Serbia and Macedonia.3 This can be seen in Karadžić’s 1836 text Serbs, All and Everywhere, in which he expresses the wish to visit “these southeastern lands of our people” . . . but has “still been unable”4. It was thought that, in the first decades of the 19th century, these portions of the Ottoman Empire were dangerous for exploratory travel and could only be “traversed safely with a strong Turkish escort.”5 At the same time, travel literature was ever more popular throughout Europe, including various ethnographic studies based on researchers’ personal experience. Indeed, travelogues about the Principality of Serbia, but also Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia, filled with the travelers’ notes regarding traditional customs, appeared ever more frequently in the press or as books. Improved financial status, concentration of wealth, expansion of the road network, all enabled research and travel as a mode of education and leisure and became ever more widespread among the rising bourgeois class in the Principality of Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.6 This only made the lack of writing about this ever more intriguing region, proclaimed as Old Serbia, all the more conspicuous. The first recorded travelogue about Old Serbia penned by a Serbian author was published in 1852. Entitled Dečani’s Pathfinder [Dečanski prvenac], it was written by the monk Gedeon Josif Jurišić, born in Irig in 1809, who resided a few years at the monastery Visoki Dečani, from where he toured the surrounding areas (for chronology of major travelogues from Old Serbia see Table 2.1). The majority of Jurišić’s text is about the monastery itself, its architecture, the frescoes, as well as the manuscripts and other items from its treasury. In the final portion of the text, Jurišić describes the regions of Kosovo, Metohija, Montenegro and Macedonia which he has visited, often considering them through the prism of medieval history, speaking about the current political situation, emphasizing the precarity of the Serbian population and the uncertain future of the monastery itself. Calling all these regions Serbian, Jurišić points out that his manuscript came about in response to the desire of educated Serbs in Austria for research and description of these “Serbian regions” and “Serbian antiquities.”7 The foundations of the travelogue genre about Old Serbia, however, were laid by Miloš S. Milojević, historian, politician and author, who, upon his voyage there, published a three-volume manuscript (1871–1877) and a scientific study on demography, ethnography and geography of the region (1881). As early as 1866, Milojević published a polemic directed against “Bulgarian propaganda” in Old Serbia and Macedonia and began writing a major oeuvre, Songs and Customs of the Whole Serbian People [Pesme i običaji ukupnog naroda srpskog] (1869–1875).

24  Srđan Atanasovski Milojević was also politically active through institutions such as the Society of St. Sava and undertook the trip through Old Serbia on the written recommendation of the Education Minister of Serbia, Dimitrije Matić and the metropolitan archbishop of Belgrade, Mihailo. Certain aspects of travel writing found in Milojević’s travelogues, and to an extent in Jurišić’s, will consistently appear in the publications of later authors: preference for spatial description over temporal; erasure of time as a significant narrative aspect – that is, the introduction of a kind of timelessness of the travel writing genre – the motif of precarity; and finally, the intertwinement of scientific, demographic and historical data with travel prose. Milojević achieves this intertwinement of the scientific approach and a literary text in the very manuscript – such as presenting detailed demographic information within the description of his journey – but also in his overall effort, by shortly thereafter publishing his scientific study as a companion to his travel writing. Following Milojević, this strategy will be employed by several travel writers. Thus, Branislav Nušić published his own scientific study, Kosovo. A Description of Country and People [Kosovo. Opis zemlje i naroda], only a year after his literary monograph of his Kosovo travels. A series of important travelogues about Old Serbia was published in the years immediately after the Serbian-Bulgarian war, which further brought the threat of “Bulgarian propaganda” to the fore. Respectable scientists and politicians of the time, Vladimir Karić and Stojan Novaković published “voyage notes” in 1889 and 1892 respectively. Stojan Novaković was known to the Serbian public as a leading historian and linguist, while Vladimir Karić was mostly an ethnographer and geographer. And although the “notes” these two intellectuals published were a relatively small and less significant portion of their overall oeuvre, it is interesting that they confirm the imperative for researchers to also express themselves as travelers-reporters. The study of Spiridon Gopčević in a certain way also testifies to this imperative. Initially published in German, Gopčević’s travelogue came out in Serbian in 1890, translated by Milan Kasumović. Intended as two volumes, the first part of Gopčević’s text takes the form of a personal detailed description of the journey itself. The second part, entitled “Serbian-Bulgarian Disagreement regarding Macedonia and Old Serbia,” is a political scientific debate directed against Bulgarian “natural” and “historic” rights to these regions, in which the author invokes knowledge of history, linguistics, ethnography and etymology and refers the reader to the first, journey portion for a slew of situations that confirm his positions.8 A special place among travel writers who published their works in the first decade of the 20th century is occupied by Branislav Nušić and Ivan Ivanić. In addition to being an author and poet of distinction, Nušić was active in politics. He published two travelogues – From the Banks of Lake Ohrid [S obala Ohridskog jezera] (1894) and From Kosovo to the Blue Sea [S Kosova na sinje more] (1902b) – notable in the genre for their excellent literary qualities. Nušić’s clever narration enables him to, perhaps more adeptly than other writer, underscore the dimension of space over time and animate the text with dialogue and lyrical reflection. In addition to these two works, in 1902–1903, Nušić published his scientific study, Kosovo. A Description of Country and People, which deals mostly

Table 2.1  Chronology of the most significant travelogues from Old Serbia and Macedonia Year

Title

Genre

1852

Gedeon Josif Jurišić: Dečani’s Pathfinder

1871–1877

Miloš S. Milojević: Travelogue through a Portion of Real (Old) Serbia [Putopis dela prave (Stare) Srbije] Panta Srećković: Journey Images (Kosovo; Tomb of the Mrnjavčević Family; Podrim and Metohija) [Putničke slike (Kosovo; Familijarna grobnica Mrnjavčevića; Podrim i Metohija)] Vladimir Karić: Constantinople, Mount Athos, Thessaloniki. Travel Sketches with Notes about Traditional Customs of the East [Carigrad, Sveta Gora, Solun. Putničke crtice s beleškama o narodnoj propagandi na Istoku] Spiridon Gopčević: Old Serbia and Macedonia. My Travel Report [Stara Srbija i Makedonija. Moj putni izveštaj] Stojan Novaković: From the Morava to Vardar: 1886. Travel Notes [S Morave na Vardar: 1886. Putne beleške] Spira Kalik: From Belgrade to Thessaloniki and Skopje with the Belgrade Singing Society: Traveler’s Notes [Iz Beograda u Solun i Skoplje s Beogradskim pevačkim društvom: putničke beleške] Branislav Nušić: From the Banks of Lake Ohrid [S obala Ohridskog jezera] Milojko V. Veselinović: A View of Kosovo [Pogled kroz Kosovo] Branislav Nušić: From Kosovo to Open Sea [S Kosova na sinje more] Ivan Ivanić: In Kosovo: from Šar, through Kosovo, to Zvečan. The Travel Notes of Ivan Ivanić [Na Kosovu: Sa Šara, po Kosovu, na Zvečan. Iz putnih beležaka Ivana Ivanića] Ivan Ivanić: Macedonia and Macedonians. Travel Notes [Maćedonija i Maćedonci. Putopisne beleške] Todor P. Stanković: Travel Notes from Old Serbia 1871–1898 [Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji: 1871–1898]

literary travelogue (including description of monastery) literary travelogue (illustrated)

1875–1882

1889

1890

1892 1894

1894 1895. 1892–1902 1903

1906–1908

1910

literary travelogue

literary travelogue

ethnographic travelogue

literary travelogue literary travelogue/report (illustrated)

literary travelogue literary travelogue literary travelogue literary travelogue

travelogue and demographic, ethnographic and geographic study report travelogue

26  Srđan Atanasovski with questions of ethnography. Similarly to Nušić, Ivan Ivanić, a diplomat posted in Pristina, Thessaloniki, Bitola and Istanbul, publishing several travelogues from Macedonia and Old Serbia (1901–1903), as well as a travel-scientific study Macedonia and Macedonians [Maćedoniја i Maćedonci] (1906–1908). *** The main task in this analysis of the characteristics of travelogues from Old Serbia and Macedonia is to identify certain mechanisms used by the writers to appropriate these territories. Namely, the authors are attempting to offer their readers a convincing case that these territories are all key portions of an imaginary Serbian national territory. The techniques used to that end are: erasure of time, that is, a narrative that prioritizes the spatial dimension and historical time; erasure or disavowal of political borders; introduction of the motif of precarity; finally, introduction of the documentary method and the intertwinement of travel prose and scientific research, which I will discuss in the final portion of the text. The primacy of the dimension of space over the dimension of time is one of the main characteristics of all the narratives concerning Old Serbia. The temporal aspect of the narration is already conditioned by the narrator and as such does not represent a significant achievement. Time is substituted by space, which not only guides the curiosity of the narrator but represents the main formative criterion and the way the travelogue strings together the anecdotes, dialogues and travel observations, as well as historical, demographic and other information. In such a way, actual, travel time is blended with historic time, as well as with mythological time, that is, with timelessness. On his way, the travel writer describes the landscapes and locations where he finds himself not only through current observations, but through historical stories and popular beliefs tied to that specific place. A typical sentence, from Panta Srećković, describing his journey through Podrimlje, is: “From Mitrovica to Zvečani, I travel through the village of Pantina, where Stefan Nemanja ‘fought a devil of a fight’ for Prizren.”9 Such references, especially in the travelogues of Miloš Milojević, can grow into elaborate digressions in which the author interprets the historical writing carved into ruins and monuments encountered on the way.10 It is particularly interesting to see the way in which the erasure of the dimension of time is implemented on the level of everyday experience. Thus, in a description of a Turkish inn he encounters in Biljač, Stojan Novaković compares the current guest house with descriptions of travel customs found in Dušan’s Code, noting that “in certain remote areas of Turkey . . . the Middle Ages live on in full bloom.”11 Even in Todor Stanković’s terse prose, the history of the medieval Serbian State is unavoidable, and the author triumphantly concludes that “as far as the villages, hills, rivers and valleys carry Serbian names, as long as Arnaut villages have old churches, monasteries and tombstones, . . . there are no Arbanasi people or Albania.”12 Beginning with Jovan Cvijić, the Serbian nationalist discourse includes the idea of an organic, that is, causal connection between natural, geographic characteristics

Producing Old Serbia 27 of “the motherland” and the character and particularity of a nation. In accordance with this understanding of the connection between nature and nation, travel writers from Old Serbia frequently interpret the natural beauty they encounter through the narrative prism of Serbian history, bringing together geographic characteristics with historical narratives. A fantastical poetic image is achieved by Milojko Veselinović, in his 1895 travelogue, A View of Kosovo: In less than an hour the train sped down to Eles-han, and in another hour to Kačanik. Terrifying! It is hard to tell what is more awesome, the Kačanik gorge with her nature or Starina Novak, wearing his headpiece, filled with sorrow and despair, his face glowering! . . . The Kačanik gorge enchants the traveler with its nature. It is not very craggy, rather more forested – a great place for a brigand. Instantly I had before me the old warrior, Starina Novak, it is as if I could see him, flying from hill to hill with his gang, jumping from cover to cover, heroically defending his gorge, pulling the helmet down over his ears! If he was a hero of terrifying gaze, he had reason to be so. Pass there, ye Serb, and if ye not see Starina Novak with his gloomy face and helmet, call me a liar!13 In describing Lake Ohrid at the opening of his travelogue, Branislav Nušić develops a more subtle allegory, in which the tempestuous lake becomes a metaphor for the Serbian nation: How glorious and terrifying this tame lake must look in a tempest! A chained giant, senselessly crashing against the cold cell walls, shattering his shackles, breaking away, making his wardens tremble with his roar. The sky above it writhes, pushing the clouds low, while the lake moves from the deep, reaching high with its enormous waves, the two exchanging heroic howls, entwined in a manly embrace. Does the sky draw its slave to itself in a soothing kiss, or does the slave contort and struggle to smash his fetters and break from the sky’s grasp, to be free at last?14 The Old Serbia travel writers strive in particular to point to the meaninglessness of the state border that divides the Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, and they do so, first, by pointing to the “invisibility” of the border itself and, second, by showing the affinity of language, customs and circumstances in Old Serbia and the Kingdom of Serbia – despite all the obvious differences. And while the latter required scientific reflection, above all in linguistics and ethnology, the former was conducted through poetic imagery and description, primarily relying on the inspiration and literary gift of the author. In that sense, Novaković’s humorous and lively description of the border crossing with Turkey is notable: “Where is the border?” I asked my escort. They pointed to a thin, shallow trench. “That is the border, sir!”

28  Srđan Atanasovski And I beheld closely this line that separates country from country, influence from influence, and a people from itself. Need I say that I wished that my weak eyes could not even behold this narrow line?15 The third motif, that of precarity, pervades travel writing about Old Serbia in a remarkable way, either in the sense of safety of the travel writer himself or a more general precarity, regarding the survival of the entire nation. Indeed, these two levels are constantly entwined and bound up in one unified affect: the travel writer could begin writing about an immediate threat to himself, only to then show how the entire population of the region described is under threat, including the Serbian cultural heritage. Precarity and the feeling of insecurity do not only represent a literary or genre motif, but a technique in which the very act of “reading” the travelogue becomes a highly affective practice. In particular, it is significant how the line between personal security and security of the nation as a whole is elided, thus transferring the feeling of precarity of the nation, via the threat to the writer’s safety, to a feeling of insecurity and vulnerability of the body of the reader – the final consumer. Frequently the entire travelogue is pervaded by a consistent danger to the traveler, bound up with a danger of biological or cultural perishing of the nation. Thus, Gopčević tells us that he has brought with him poison – “a tiny vial of cyanide” – in case he “falls into the hands of Macedonian brigands” who often “use creative torture methods to extort ransom money.”16 Milojević’s travelogue is most frequently punctuated with scenes describing the danger to his personal security, including a scene in which Albanian highwaymen fire at his party in front of the entrance to a Turkish inn.17 This personal level of danger is raised onto the level of the whole nation: in Old Serbia, due to the conflict with the Albanian population, Serbs are under existential threat.18 Descriptions of physical precarity and violence against Serbs appear already in Jurišić19 and can be followed in nearly all the travelogues from Kosovo. We have descriptions of Serbs, who due to violence and constant pressure from the Ottoman government, renounce their faith and nation, meaning that a significant portion of the Albanian (Arnaut) population is “turkified,” that is, taken by the travel writers to be descendants of Serbs from the middle ages, and in Macedonia, Serbian culture is being erased before aggressive “Bulgarian propaganda” (Gopčević 1890: 7). In his demographic descriptions of given regions in Kosovo (such as the areas surrounding Peć, Pristina and Mitrovica), Miloš Milojević does not even seem to recognize other members of the Islamic faith except for “islamized, turkified Serbs” (Milojević 1871: 214ff). The nation is not only endangered on the level of demographic state, that is, in terms of numbers, but also in terms of noble Serbian racial qualities. Milojević thus adopts the discourse of “impurity” from the travelogues of the Orient and the Balkans, applying it to the “racial other” in relation to the Serbian nation, holding nothing back in an attempt to produce disgust and horror in his future readers: On the upper floor, they surround the fire, like ravens or vultures around a carcass. One could see the pure islamized Serb, now called Arnaut, the mixed

Producing Old Serbia 29 type of Serbian and Ottoman, Albanian and Ottoman, Albanian and Serbian Ottoman and Gypsy, etc. In other words, in but a few men there were representatives of many peoples, who have, like hungry wolves, torn apart our true and pure Serbian land. The dirty, the pale, the black, the red, innumerable, impure, trash, disgust, the mixture of all malodors into one, the wild gaze, as well as confounded and desperate – all left a terrible impression on us, who reacted with disgust and revulsion, nausea really, if we may speak plainly, more than fear, terror, certainly no good or beautiful. Imagine if you will this mob, perfectly blackened and greasy, who change their clothes no more than once a year, who never comb nor wash, huddled in a sentry post, uncleaned since it was built. Only then will you be able to come close to the abhorrence and disgust felt, especially of one who for the first time in life sees such sights.20 *** On their voyages through Ottoman lands, Serbian travel authors frequently have to admit that they encountered residents of regions of whose nationality they are not completely certain. Gopčević speaks explicitly about the ambivalence he encounters among his interlocutors in Old Serbia and Macedonia, who say that they have become used to speaking of themselves as Bulgarian even though they are really Serbian.21 Thus, to Gopčević’s question, “then, you are Serbian?” his interlocutor says: “You know, we are Serbs, as it were, but we’ve grown accustomed to saying that we are Bulgarian . . . this is our custom.”22 Jovan Cvijić concluded that in Macedonian Slavs there is no “. . . endogenous national consciousness,” and that they “identify equally easily as Serbian or Bulgarian.”23 Personal declaration of national belonging clearly was an insufficient criterion for the purposes of determining the reach of the Serbian nation. The nation was seen more as an objective and natural given, and less a matter of personal choice of the individual, and it was important for the researchers to establish objective and scientific criteria in order to answer these questions. Jovan Cvijić advocated solving the “Macedonian political problem . . . through scientific findings,” adding that “there is no doubt that in a fluid mass of people that has neither a definite Serbian, nor Bulgarian national feeling, one can find in both language and historical tradition both Serbian and Bulgarian traits, symbols, traces.”24 In the project of scientific determination of national belonging of an undecided population, two fields were of particular value: linguistics and ethnography. The 19th century saw a widespread and frequent use of the Herderian criterion of national language to distinguish nations in Europe.25 And in the case of the Serbian nation, the criterion of belonging, established as early as the works of Vuk Karadžić, was language. Although this criterion was called into question in AustriaHungary, where Catholic and Muslim speakers of the shtokavian dialect did not wish to identify as Serbian,26 the criterion was considered entirely valid on the territory of Old Serbia and Macedonia. In these regions, it was necessary to show both that Muslims of the area (Turks, turkified people, but also Albanians – “the

30  Srđan Atanasovski Arnauts”) are actually converted Serbs and to draw the border with the competing Bulgarian national project, where there was no religious differentiation. Multiple authors, such as Stojan Novaković and Spiridon Gopčević, attempted to delineate clear scientific-linguistic criteria according to which the language spoken by Macedonian Slavs ought to be considered a dialect of Serbian and not Bulgarian. For Stojan Novaković, one of the basic criteria for differentiation was phonetics, and so this author claims that the presence of the letters, that is, phonemes “đ” and “ć” is a reliable sign that the “Macedonian language” is a dialect of Serbian.27 Gopčević’s markers of differentiation, on the other hand, encompass phonetic determinants, as well as those of lexicology, grammar, accent, use of pronouns and suffixes and prefixes. Particular emphasis was placed on the idea that the language of Macedonian Slavs was closer to medieval “Serbian,” that is, the language researchers encountered on medieval Serbian monuments, rather than contemporary standard Serbian.28 However, this way of using linguistics, as Jovan Cvijić himself noticed, had its drawbacks. First, researchers themselves are often unreliable and recognize only things with which they are familiar, and second, speakers easily shift and adapt their language in accordance with immediate needs and the situation.29 It seemed that ethnography promised a more reliable method, since it was based on studying customs and oral traditions that – it was believed – reached all the way back to mythological, pre-historic time. Indeed, the rise of modern nationalism was based and is inextricably tied to the discipline of ethnography or ethnology. Nationalism was based on ideas of “authenticity,” meaning that the study of folklore, for the purposes of uncovering and conservation of forgotten, ancient or endangered layers of culture, presented from the very beginning a powerful tool in the hands of nationalist ideology. Interest in study of “traditional culture” was developed hand in hand with ideas of nationalism: it was the study of folklore that, through discourses of “authenticity,” provided the source of scientific argument about natural and historical rights of the nation.30 The understanding of ethnology as inextricable from the idea of the collective and the people, or the nation, was explicitly present in the works of Serbian scientists at the turn of the 20th century: in On Ethnology (1906), Tihomir Đorđević expresses the view that “ethnology presents not so much the ideas of the individual, but of peoples, groups” and that “the ethnologist is not interested what the individual thinks is good, true or beautiful, or what the individual believes and desires, but rather, he is interested in what corresponds to the general thought of a people.”31 The creation of a causal connection between customs and the nation was also significant: in this way, the question of the nation ceased to be a question of willingly belonging and became an issue on the level of daily practice that could be reliably studied and described by ethnology. The ethnologists and travel writers who researched Old Serbia and Macedonia strove to show that the Slavic population of these regions of the Ottoman Empire had the same customs and corresponding folklore as Serbs in “northern regions,” that is, in the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The most significant indicator of Serbian tradition was the marking of the family saint day. Various authors,

Producing Old Serbia 31 such as Tihomir Đorđević, Spiridon Gopčević and Milojko Veselinović, all agree on this point, describing saint day celebration rituals, comparing them to similar celebrations in Serbia proper.32 Some authors, such as Miloš Milojević and Milojko Veselinović, saw the customs of Old Serbia as part of broader considerations of Serbian tradition. Thus, Milojević, in the first book of his study Songs and Customs of the Whole Serbian People [Pesme i običaji ukupnog naroda srbskog] transmits songs written down in Old Serbia, complete with commentary about their use in rituals characteristic of Serbian customs.33 A prominent place in this discourse is occupied by a voluminous study by the Russian consul in Prizren, Ivan Stepanovich Yastrebov, regarding customs and songs of Serbs in and around Prizren, Peć, Debar and the river Ibar.34 Presenting his entire text as “travel notes,” Yastrebov actually offers a specific hybrid of travel prose, ethnographic study and collection of “transcribed” traditional songs. The study of folklore in the narrow sense of the word – oral tradition, traditional songs, material heritage – required the development of appropriate strategies for an “objective” and scientific way of marking the folklore as Serbian. The collected traditional songs were first analyzed linguistically, to make sure that they were indeed of Serbian and not of the rival, Bulgarian, language. The themes, that is, the analysis of motifs in the poems was equally important, if not even more significant for the determination of national belonging. It was assumed that each nation possessed its own poetic sensibility, according to which the creations of each tradition could be clearly differentiated from that of other nations, thus posing the question of what represents this singular sensibility and how it can be recognized.35 Any mention of a person from Serbian medieval history was proffered as proof of the song’s belonging to the Serbian nation. As the most significant protagonist in this sense, commentators presented Prince Marko.36 Frequently, Yastrebov includes versions of songs already part of Karadžić’s canonical collections and uses comparative analysis of motifs to show that Kosovo is Old Serbia in the poetic sense too, as the territory which gave birth to the poetic core of Serbian traditional poetry, whence it migrated north and northwest.37 Ethnographic researchers emphasized that their discourse on language, folklore and customs is inseparable from the territory this material is supposed to represent, making their ethnographic projects examples par excellence of nation mapping. Whether part of travel writing or ethnographic studies, traditional art and customs are always presented geographically, leaving the temporal dimension of the customs’ emergence to exceptional circumstance. These ethnographers and travel writers tended to see the population of a region as very stable, leading them to conclusions about its national belonging, thus at once mapping the “motherland” of a nation. As Holm Sundhaussen points out, from its inception, ethnology in Serbia had a “key role in the mental formation of the nation and legitimation of its territorial aspirations.”38 The extent to which the spatial thinking of the nation is inscribed into the very methodology of ethnology can be gleaned from Tihomir Đorđević’s study about the delineation of the discipline, in which the author expresses the opinion that, given that folklore is inseparable from the nation, the ethnographer, who has the task of exploring a people, ought to limit

32  Srđan Atanasovski himself to the “region of that people,” collect data and interpret “what is characteristic for that people, its appearance and forms,” “working on [the folklore] of a limited territory of a single people or a given region.”39 Elsewhere, Đorđević is even more explicit: Our folklore has for us also political significance, since it is a powerful tool for the determination of national borders. It is through folklore that the people draws its own national limits. How could a single object, named with the same word from the Adriatic to the Balkan mountains, from the Aegean to Budapest, signify anything other than that it is indeed the product of the spirit and heritage of a single people.40 Such use of ethnography was widespread in Europe at the turn of the 20th century, its political role more prominent in border regions where national belonging of a population was not entirely determined. A paradigmatic example is the 1917 study by Leon Dominian about the role of language and custom in establishing borders in Europe. The study even had direct political influence on the proceedings of the Versailles peace negotiations.41 It was precisely in the context of ethnology as the discipline of nation mapping that one ought to consider the sharp turn of the ethnologist towards the rural, and towards the high value placed on village culture and folklore, which will become a prominent characteristic of the entire nationalist discourse. Urban populations were not only unstable and prone to migrations, but on the territories of Old Serbia and Macedonia, they were in direct conflict with the aspirations of the Serbian intellectual elite, considering that these urban areas were dominated by Ottoman culture. In contrast, it was thought that the rural population was sedentary and that it could thus serve as the “authentic” source of ethnographic material, that is, a repository of timeless oral tradition and the measuring tool for the mapping project.42 Certainly an excellent tool for ethnology as a science of mapping were the “ethnographic maps,” usually included in ethnological studies, but also in travel prose. Ethnographic maps of Old Serbia and Macedonia were in one sense an exceptionally seductive medium of presentation of scientific results and, in another, were frequently entirely and conspicuously arbitrary. Even more than the travelogues, these maps, produced in the international arena, were in open conflict with one another, depending on the (ethno)cartographer’s national allegiance and perspective on the potential solutions to the Eastern, that is, Macedonian question. These maps did not only differ in placement of borders, but which ethnic categories ought to be “delineated.” On the ethnographic map of Miloš Milojević, one can find Serb-Macedonians, Serb-Bulgarians, “Serb-Rašani,”43 de facto giving Serbian national space the lion’s share of the Balkan peninsula. On Gopčević’s map, we find “Greeks of Serbian origin,” “Albanians of Serbian origin,” “Serbs of Muslim faith.” Interestingly, at the beginning of the 20th century, Cvijić criticized heavily this practice of ethnographic mapping, saying that “in all ethnographic Bulgarian maps, all Macedonian Slavs are marked as Bulgarians, in Serbian maps as Serbs, and in Greek maps, the same color is used not only for Greeks, but the

Producing Old Serbia 33 majority or even all Macedonian Slavs.”44 However, Cvijić himself produced a series of ethnographic maps between 1906 and 1918, sometimes including and at other times excluding “Macedonian Slavs” from the map of the Balkans, in which he kept changing the place of the border between Serbs and Bulgarians and altering the colors on the map in order to present the region of Macedonia as closer to Serbia. The fact that ethnology could not free itself of the need to be expressed in maps (which by their very nature remove the possibility of showing the heterogeneity of cultures of a given geographic region) once again speaks to its basic national and territorial principle of research and the essential national-political connotations from which it was never divorced. The description of language and folklore was an inseparable part of travel writing from Old Serbia and Macedonia and at the same time one of the more important mechanisms used by travel writers to represent these regions as part of the Serbian homeland. Precisely by describing, collecting, studying the language and folklore, the travel writers could adopt a seemingly objective perspective in order to prove that these regions belong to Serbia, as well as better convey their experiences to the reading public within the Kingdom of Serbia and in Austria-Hungary. After all, their overall conclusions spoke in favor of seeing the language and customs of Serbs in the Kingdom and in the Dual Monarchy, on the one hand, and the population of Old Serbia, on the other, as being essentially the same, without key differences and barriers that would lead to incomprehension between members of these two populations. In accordance with these criteria, this was one people, not only connected by an ethnic origin and racial characteristics, but a unified culture, folklore, language. It is also important to note that the mechanisms of scientific appropriation of territories were different for the territory designated as Macedonia, where the opposing nation was Bulgaria, from the space called Old Serbia (in the narrower sense of the word), that is, Kosovo and northern Albania, with a majority Albanian population. While in the first case, travel writers and scientists spared no effort in considering current demographic data, as well as linguistic and custom practice, attempting to show that the Macedonian population is closer to the Serbian than to the Bulgarian nation, in the second case, travel writers often ignored reality, using digressions into fields of history, geography or even dubious interpretation of the demographic state. Journeying through Old Serbia, travel writers created a narrative illusion that they are moving through a kind of historical time, with their reflections more often directed at medieval history and the geography of the landscape, rather than the current life of the communities. Finally, when they had to treat the demographic data, travel writers frequently claimed that the population that did not identify as belonging to the Serbian nation, its language and its Orthodox religion, was either recently converted or else had adopted a different language or had emigrated there latterly. This allowed not only for the territories of Old Serbia to be unequivocally marked as Serbian but anticipated the abolishment of political rights and right to self-determination to the entirety of the non-Serbian population, often seen as “unclean,” dangerous, racially and culturally “Other.”

34  Srđan Atanasovski A potential conclusion drawn from this analysis could be that the creation of the myth of Old Serbia required data that was often fabricated or tendentiously interpreted, as well as a discursive context in which these same data could be presented as evidence derived from firsthand experience of the narrator and as incontrovertible truth. Ultimately, the way in which the data about Old Serbia was presented was meant to arouse in the reader affective reactions and engender the identification of the individual with the nation as an imagined community. As such, the discourse of travelogues from Old Serbia became a mechanism of appropriation of territory for the purposes of Serbian nationalism, at the expense of the rights of the actual residents of this region, above all, the Albanian population. This project has had long-term political consequences, given that the views of Serbian intellectuals from the turn of the 20th century are still prevalent in Serbian nationalist discourse and still used to justify nationalist claims. Not only have the texts discussed here gone through new editions and reprints without any adequate critical assessment of context in which they appeared, but there is unfiltered use of pseudoscientific data in contemporary scientific publications (such as reproduction of anachronistic “ethnic maps”).45 A critical confrontation and contextualization of these texts reveals, therefore, the extent to which “truths” on which a given nationalist discourse is based have themselves been fabricated in a previous phase of the development of that ideological matrix.

Notes 1 The term “Old Serbia,” which hereafter will be used without quotations marks for ease of reading, is not used to denote a real geographic area but is rather a reference to a constructed field of meanings produced in Serbian nationalist discourses during the 19th century that stood for a substantial portion of the imaginary Serbian national territory. Cf. Bogdan Trifunović, Collective Memory and the Sites of Memory in the Serbian Discourse on Old Serbia. Doctoral thesis, Faculty of “Artes Liberales,” University of Warsaw, 2004), https://depotuw.ceon.pl/handle/item/1021 (accessed 15 June 2016). Travel writing about Old Serbia written in Serbian has thus far not been treated as a distinct topic. Dušan Bataković edited an anthology about Kosovo from 1852 until 1912, but the primary focus was not travel writing, even though the majority of entries in the anthology were of this type. Dušan T. Bataković, Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji. 1852–1912 (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1988). Other studies have taken up specific aspects of Branislav Nušić’s travel writing about Kosovo and Metohija. Slobodanka Petković (ed.), Knjiga o putopisu (Beograd: Institut za književnost i umetnost, 2001). 2 In drawing lines between these regions, Jovan Cvijić used geographic characteristics, thus putting Skopje in Old Serbia, while Macedonia was reduced to the area around Ohrid and Bitola, a division with which Tihomir Đorđević agreed. Jovan Cvijić, “Geografski položaj i opšte geografske osobine Makedonije i Stare Srbije,” Srpski književni glasnik 11 (1904) and Tihomir. R. Đorđević, Makedonija (Pančevo: Izdavačka knjižara Napredak, 1920), 4. 3 Much like the term Old Serbia, in the writing of these travelers the term Macedonia (which came in two variants: Maćedonija and Makedonija – with the latter orthography surviving into the present), rather than any actual territory, refers to a web of meanings in Serbian nationalist discourse. 4 Vuk S. Karadžić, Etnografski spisi, ed. M. S. Filipović (Beograd: Prosveta, 1972), 31.

Producing Old Serbia 35 5 Bataković, Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji. 1852–1912, ix. 6 Dubravka Stojanović, “Turizam i konstrukcija socijalnog i nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji krajem 19. i početkom 20. veka,” Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju 13 (2007): 41–59. 7 Hedeon Iosif Yuryshyc, Dechansky prvenats. Opysaniye manastyra Dechana, Dyploma kralya Dechanskoh, Opysaniye Ypekske Patriarshiye, mnohy stary zdaniya, mnohy mesta stare Srbiye y Kosovskoh polya (Novy Sad: Nar. knyhopechatnya Dan. Medakovyca, 1852), iii. 8 Contemporary authors have disputed the authenticity of Gopčević’s “travelogue,” concluding that the author never visited the described areas of the Ottoman Empire. Michael Heim, Spiridion Gopčević. Leben und Werk (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966), 90–114. Cf. Christian Promitzer, “Austria and the Balkans: Exploring the Role of Travelogues in the Construction of an Area,” in: C. Promitzer, S. Gruber i H. Heppner (eds.), Southeast European Studies in a Globalizing World (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2015), 204–205. 9 Panta Srećković, “Putničke slike. Treća slika. Podrim i Metohija,” Letopis Matice srpske 130 (1982): 12–35. 10 See, for example, Miloš S. Milojević, Putopis dela Prave – Stare – Srbije (Beograd: Glavna srp. knjižara Jovana D. Lazarevića 1871), 121–123. 11 Stojan Novaković, S Morave na Vardar. Po zidinama Carigrada. Brusa. Putne beleške (Beograd: Kraljevska srpska državna štamparija, 1894), 17–20. 12 Todor P. Stanković, Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji 1871–1898 (Beograd: Štamparija Đ. Munca i M. Karića, 1910), 132. 13 Milojko Veselinović, Pogled kroz Kosovo (Beograd: Štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1895), 4. 14 Branislav Đ. Nušić, Kraj obala Ohridskoga jezera. Beleške iz 1892 godine (Beograd: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1894), 65. 15 Novaković, S Morave na Vardar. Po zidinama Carigrada. Brusa. Putne beleške, 6–7. 16 Spiridon Gopčević, Stara Srbija i Makedonija, trans. Milan Kasumović (Beograd: Parna štamparija Dim. Dimitrijevića, 1980), 22. 17 Milojević, Putopis dela Prave – Stare – Srbije, 127–128. 18 The intertwinement of the motif of precarity on various levels is also present in the text of Todor Stanković (Stanković, Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji 1871–1898). This author, much like Milojević, includes an episode in which he is shot at (30–31) and punctuates the text with moments about the destruction of Serbian churches and monuments (22, 24), with moments of demographic dissipation of the nation due to violent ejections, resettlement, conversion or rejection of the Serbian language (20), and finally, with constant complaints of daily violence against Serbs (24), achieving a synergy effect in a rambling narrative. 19 Cf. Yuryshyc, Dechansky prvenats, 122–123. 20 Milojević, Putopis dela Prave – Stare – Srbije, 103–104. 21 Gopčević, Stara Srbija i Makedonija, 26–27. 22 Ibid., 33. Similarly, Spira Kalik, traveling through Macedonia encounters a boy whom he asks whether he is Serbian, to which the boy answers that he is Bulgarian. Asked how he can be Bulgarian when speaking Serbian, the boy said “That’s what I was told by my teacher, that I am Bulgarian, but my daddy says I am Serbian, like him.” Spira Kalik, Iz Beograda u Solun i Skoplje s Beogradskim pevačkim društvom. Putničke beleške (Beograd: Štamparija P. K. Tanaskovića, 1894), 21. 23 Jovan Cvijić, Promatranja o etnografiji makedonskih Slovena (Beograd: G. Kon, 1906), 13. 24 Ibid., 17. 25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (London i New York: Verso, 1991), 67–82; Patrik J. Gari, Mit o nacijama: srednjovekovno poreklo Evrope (Novi Sad: Cenzura, 2007), 46–51.

36  Srđan Atanasovski 26 Karadžić himself said in 1861 stated that if “the Croatian patriots cannot agree on this [linguistic] rationally engendered division, then nothing remains for us than to be differentiated by confession or faith.” Holm Sundhaussen, Историја Србије од 19. до 21. века (Beograd: Clio, 2009), 103–104. 27 Stojan Novaković, Đ i Ć u makedonskim narodnim dijalektima (Beograd: Kralj. srpska državna štamparija, 1889). 28 Gopčević, Stara Srbija i Makedonija, 250–257. 29 Cvijić thus concludes: “It is still not clear whether what is spoken in Macedonia is a distinct south-Slavic language with multiple dialects, although this is well unbelievable, or whether they are, and to what extent they are, as a whole closer to Bulgarian or Serbian.” Cvijić, Promatranja o etnografiji makedonskih Slovena, 18. 30 Cf. Regina Bendix, In Search of Authenticity. The Formation of Folklore Studies (Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1997). 31 Tihomir R. Đorđević, O etnologiji (Beograd: Štamparija Svetozara Nikolića, 1906), 5. 32 Đorđević, Makedonija, 155; Gopčević, Stara Srbija i Makedonija, 259–263. 33 Miloš S. Milojević, Pesme i običaji ukupnog naroda srbskog, Knj. 1, Obredne pesme (Beograd: Državna štamparija, 1869). 34 Ivan S. Yastryebov, Obichai i pbsni tooryetskih syerbov: v Prizrbnb, Ipyekb, Moravb i Dibrb. Iz pootyevih zapisok (S.-Pyetyerboorg: Tipografіya V. S. Balashyeva, 1886). Yastebov’s study was not translated into Serbian; it was written in Russian, whose orthography was at the time closer to Slavonic-Serbian, but it was advertised in the Serbian press, such as the journal Srpstvo, with the title translated. It is thus safe to conclude that it was available and accessible to the reading public in Belgrade. 35 Joep Leerssen, “Oral Epic: The Nation Finds a Voice,” in: Timothy Baycroft and David Hopki (eds.), Folklore and Nationalism in Europe during the Long Nineteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 36 Gopčević, Stara Srbija i Makedonija, 264; Branislav B. Jovanović, “I. S. Jastrebov: skupljač naših najstarijih narodnih pesama na Kosmetu,” Književni pregled 3 (2010): 34–36. 37 Ibid., 38. 38 Зундхаусен, Историја Србије од 19. до 21. века, 209. 39 Đorđević, O etnologiji, 12. 40 Tihomir Đorđević, Naš narodni život, ed. Ivan Čolović (Beograd: Prosveta, 19844), 19. 41 Leon Dominian, The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe (New York: American Geographical Society, 1917). Cf. Leerssen, “Oral Epic: The Nation Finds a Voice,” 18–19. 42 On the problem of the rural in Đorđević, cf. Ivan Čolović, Politika simbola: ogledi o političkoj antropologiji (Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 20002), 143–155. 43 Literally Serbs of Raška, a denomination which makes little sense, as Raška is itself usually considered the cradle of the Serbian medieval state. 44 Cvijić, Promatranja o etnografiji makedonskih Slovena, 53. 45 Cf. Mirčeta Vemić, Etnička karta dela Stare Srbije. Prema putopisu Miloša Milojevića 1871–1877. god (Beograd: SANU, Geografski institut Jovan Cvijić, 2005).

References Anderson, Benedict (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition. London and New York: Verso. Bataković, Dušan T. (1988). Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji. 1852–1912. Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga. Bendix, Regina (1997). In Search of Authenticity: The Formation of Folklore Studies. Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Producing Old Serbia 37 Cvijić, Jovan (1904). “Geografski položaj i opšte geografske osobine Makedonije i Stare Srbije”, Srpski književni glasnik 11: 115–153. Cvijić, Jovan (1906). Promatranja o etnografiji makedonskih Slovena. Beograd: G. Kon. Čolović, Ivan (20002). Politika simbola: ogledi o političkoj antropologiji. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek. Dominian, Leon (1917). The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe. New York: American Geographical Society. Đorđević, Tihomir (1984). Naš narodni život, IV. Edited by Ivan Čolović. Beograd: Prosveta. Đorđević, Tihomir R. (1906). O etnologiji. Beograd: Štamparija Svetozara Nikolića. Đorđević, Tihomir R. (1920). Makedonija. Pančevo: Izdavačka knjižara Napredak. Gari, Patrik J. (2007). Mit o nacijama: srednjovekovno poreklo Evrope. Trans. by D. Parenta. Novi Sad: Cenzura. Gopčević, Spiridon (1890). Stara Srbija i Makedonija. Trans. by Milan Kasumović. Beograd: Parna štamparija Dim. Dimitrijevića. Heim, Michael (1966). Spiridion Gopčević. Leben und Werk. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Jovanović, Branislav B. (2010). “I. S. Jastrebov  – skupljač naših najstarijih narodnih pesama na Kosmetu”, Književni pregled 3: 23–39. Kalik, Spira (1894). Iz Beograda u Solun i Skoplje s Beogradskim pevačkim društvom: putničke beleške. Beograd: Štamparija P. K. Tanaskovića. Karadžić, Vuk S. (1972). Etnografski spisi. Edited by Milenko S. Filipović. Beograd: Prosveta. Leerssen, Joep (2012). “Oral Epic: The Nation Finds a Voice” In: Folklore and Nationalism in Europe during the Long Nineteenth Century. Edited by T. Baycroft and D. Hopki. Leiden: Brill, pp. 11–26. Milojević, Miloš S. (1869). Pesme i običaji ukupnog naroda srbskog. Knj. 1. Obredne pesme. Beograd: Državna štamparija. Milojević, Miloš S. (1871). Putopis dela Prave  – Stare  – Srbije. Beograd: Glavna srp. knjižara Jovana D. Lazarevića. Milojević, Miloš S. (1881). Narodopisni i zemljopisni pregled srednjeg dela prave (Stare) Srbije: sa etnografskom mapom srpskih zemalja u kneževinama: Srbiji, Crnoj Gori, Kraljevini Rumuniji, Austro-Ugarskoj i Turskoj carevini. Beograd: Zadruga štamparskih radnika. Novaković, Stojan (1889). Đ i Ć u makedonskim narodnim dijalektima. Beograd: Kralj. srpska državna štamparija. Novaković, Stojan (1894). S Morave na Vardar. Po zidinama Carigrada. Brusa: putne beleške. Beograd: Kraljevska srpska državna štamparija. Nušić, Branislav Đ. (1894). Kraj obala Ohridskoga jezera: beleške iz 1892 godine. Beograd: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije. Nušić, Branislav Đ. (1902a). Kosovo. Opis zemlje i naroda, sv. 1. Novi Sad: Matica srpska. Nušić, Branislav Đ. (1902b). S Kosova na Sinje More. Beleške s puta kroz Arbanase 1894. godine. Beograd: Dvorska knjižara Mite Stajića. Nušić, Branislav. Đ. (1903). Kosovo. Opis zemlje i naroda, sv. 2. Novi Sad: Matica srpska. Peković, Slobodanka (ed.) (2001). Knjiga o putopisu. Beograd: Institut za književnost i umetnost. Promitzer, Christian (2015). “Austria and the Balkans: Exploring the Role of Travelogues in the Construction of an Area” In: Southeast European Studies in a Globalizing World. Edited by C. Promitzer, S. Gruber and H. Heppner. Münster: LIT Verlag, pp. 189–206. Srećković, Panta (1882). “Putničke slike. Treća slika. Podrim i Metohija”, Letopis Matice srpske 130: 12–35.

38  Srđan Atanasovski Stanković, Todor P. (1910). Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji 1871–1898. Beograd: Štamparija Đ. Munca i M. Karića. Stojanović, Dubravka (2007). “Turizam i konstrukcija socijalnog i nacionalnog identiteta u Srbiji krajem 19. i početkom 20. veka”, Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju 13: 41–59. Sundhaussen, Holm (2009). Историја Србије од 19. до 21. века. Тrans. by Т Bekić. Beograd: Clio. Trifunović, Bogdan (2014). Collective Memory and the Sites of Memory in the Serbian Discourse on Old Serbia. Doctoral thesis, Faculty of “Artes Liberales”, University of Warsaw, https://depotuw.ceon.pl/handle/item/1021 (accessed 15 June 2016). Vemić, Mirčeta (2005). Etnička karta dela Stare Srbije: prema putopisu Miloša Milojevića 1871–1877. god. Beograd: SANU, Geografski institut Jovan Cvijić. Veselinović, Milojko (1895). Pogled kroz Kosovo. Beograd: Štamparija Kraljevine Srbije. Yastrebov, Ivan S. (1886). Obichai i pbsni tooryetskih syerbov: v Prizrbnb, Ipyekb, Moravb i Dibrb. Iz pootyevih zapisok. S.-Pyetyerboorg: Tipografіya V. S. Balashyeva. Yuryshyc, Hedeon I. (1852). Dechansky prvenats. Opysaniye manastyra Dechana, Dyploma kralya Dechanskoh, Opysaniye Ypekske Patriarshiye, mnohy stary zdaniya, mnohy mesta stare Srbiye y Kosovskoh polya. Novy Sad: Nar. knyhopechatnya Dan. Medakovyca.

3 “Reconquista of Old Serbia” On the continuity of territorial and demographic policy in Kosovo Vladan Jovanović

The idea of soil as the definitive indicator of a community is a part of the “organic political order” and concept of the so-called national state that Serbia cultivated ever since acquiring the first signs of its own statehood.1 As the source of the “founding myth” of the Serbian state, Kosovo is the central toponym both in myths of indigenousness and “the spiritual space of the nation”,2 in which traces of national history and culture decisively determine the ownership of territory, regardless of its actual political status or demographic makeup. Owing to its unusually strong symbolic potential, Kosovo was rightly marked as a “metaphysical space”, in which the self-victimization has become the “mooring point” of identity.3 In order to present the way in which the state policy of Serbia and Yugoslavia corresponded with the “metaphysical” nature of Kosovo spatiality, this chapter focuses on a set of “physical”, that is, administrative-territorial and demographic measures applied in Kosovo from 1912 until the mid-1950s. This chapter goes through several chronological units in following three parallel processes of “deOttomanization” that include attempts of territorial recomposition and demographic leveling of the space (by means of colonization and emigration) under several different states, political and ideological systems. Considering that my previous historical research4 of Serbian and Yugoslav demographic policies in Kosovo has shown a certain overlapping and continuity, this time I would also like to look at the pre-history of the problem, in order to provide a broader chronological framework of my previous findings. *** The terminological designation of the “new regions” annexed to Serbia and Montenegro in 1912 was nothing but the rearranging of geographic borders of a space known in the literature of the time as Old Serbia. This term entered wider use in the 1830s, in order to obtain a specific name for a “classical” Serbian region that remained outside the borders of the autonomous Serbian Principality. After the Serbian-Ottoman wars of 1876–78, various authors used to equate the term Old Serbia with the Kosovo vilayet. On the eve of the Balkan wars, the Serbian historian and politician, Ljubomir Jovanović wrote about a kind of Serbian

40  Vladan Jovanović claustrophobia, whose elites directed their gaze towards the space of Old Serbia, while Branislav Nušić in his harmless etymological analysis of Kosovo borders concluded that this question can be left “for correction” to any layperson’s opinion.5 The term Old Serbia carried within itself a powerful symbolic message about the “ancient” and historic right to this territory, the ethnic structure of which began to change in Albanian favor from the end of the seventeenth century. In addition to theories of the geographer Jovan Cvijić about the “descent” of Albanians to Kosovo as part of “metanastasis” from west to east and socio-economic theories about the “great Albanian campaign to the east”, the theses that acquired the most traction described the aspirations of the Turkish policy to sever the Serbian Principality’s ties to Old Serbia by populating Albanian Muslims onto this territory.6 Evidence for this was that Muslim Albanians were not populated in compact masses, but rather in a dispersed way, meaning that members of a single family were displaced to different regions. Thus, the Ottoman government strategically changed the ethnic makeup of the space, weakening Serbia’s prospects in future liberation wars. According to this theory, Albanians represented a “living wall” from Kosovo to Pčinja that divided the north from the south and prevented the spread of mutual influence.7 After the Serbian-Ottoman wars of 1876–78, this “wall” began to dissipate under the attacks of the Serbian army: Albanians were leaving the areas of South Morava valley and the river Toplica, while their estates were taken over by Serbs. The policy of “cleansing newly liberated regions”, however, did encounter some opposition, even in Serbian military circles. For example, the commander of the Šumadija corps, Jovan Belimarković, with the support of the other commanders, refused to expel Albanians from the Vranje County, because he had previously “been promised that the Serbian government would not harass them”.8 Judging by the further development of his career,9 it seems that this move went through without any adverse consequences. The nature of the relation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia after 1881 contributed significantly to Serbia’s focus southward,10 acquiring an economic logic. In addition to diplomatic efforts of Serbian consuls, Old Serbia and Macedonia began to see an influx of teachers, booksellers, artisans and merchants, while in 1892, the Porte promised Serbs that they could have their schools “just like all the peoples in the Empire”.11 Concomitantly with Serbia’s activities, there was a maturation of “late national Albanian Romanticism in Kosovo”, which manifested itself through ever-greater aggression towards Christians.12 Beginning in 1903, Serbian political circles changed their policy regarding Old Serbia and Macedonia from educational propaganda to supplying local Serbs with weapons, and as early as 1904, Macedonia was overwhelmed by smaller Chetnik units and armed volunteers coming from Serbia, who were supposed to “save their compatriots from extermination”.13 In 1908, when the Young Turk regime,14 as part of its reforms, announced more favorable conditions for the Christian population within the borders of the crumbling Empire, the Albanians raised several armed rebellions, leading to emigration of intimidated Serbs. The Serbian government attempted, to little effect, to win

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 41 over the Albanian rebels by aiding them financially.15 Nevertheless, Nikola Pašić addressed the Great Powers through a memorandum about “the right of Serbia to protect the local Serbian people”, in which he delineated territories to which Serbia laid claim. These borders actually represented Serbia’s military aspirations: Kosovo, Metohija, the sanjaks of Novi Pazar, Skopje and Debar, the northeastern part of the Bitola vilayet and the northwestern part of the Shkodra vilayet.16 Serbia took advantage of the liberation narrative as a kind of international legitimation for an increasingly likely territorial expansion onto the territories of its medieval statehood.

Liberation idea on the brink of betrayal The well-known geomorphologist Vojislav Radovanović described the Serbian army’s entry into Kosovo in 1912 as “the reconquista of lands lost long ago”.17 Indeed, most of the intellectual elite of Serbia was engaged in proving Serbia’s historic right.18 At the same time, Jovan Cvijić wrote a brochure intended for the international public, in which, in lieu of insufficiently convincing historical-ethnic rights, he offered economic reasons for why Serbia ought to have a coastline.19 Despite the non-Slavic population of these regions, Cvijić insisted on the “antiethnographic necessity” of Serbia passing through northern Albania to reach and hold a portion of the Adriatic coastline.20 The Serbian right to Macedonia and Old Serbia is frequently interpreted by simply adopting similar reasons to those in broader, international political use at the time,21 according to which Serbia had to acquire Macedonia in order to have a coastline “even if there was not a single Serb on the way”.22 The historian Milić Milićević presented the six-month adventure of the Serbian army in northern Albania in 1912/13 as “the war for the sea”, waged on the grounds that there would be “no other way, except territorially occupying the coast, that Serbia would be allowed to develop economically”.23 He added that the Balkan wars brought Serbia tangible territorial gains, but not too much material gain.24 And yet, in current Serbian history textbooks, this “publicly stated military goal” of Serbia emerging onto the Adriatic through northern Albania is not mentioned even in chapters on the First Balkan War,25 despite the “Albanian operation” lasting nearly half a year. Indeed, in February 1913, the Montenegrin government asked Serbia “to take Shkodra by any means”,26 which the latter readily did, sending 30,000 troops via Salonica.27 Threatened by the Great Powers, the Serbian-Montenegrin siege of Shkodra was suspended, and Serbia turned to the Vardar valley, demanding “a more equitable distribution of war spoils”.28 The legitimacy of Serbian southern territorial aspirations was additionally burdened by the question of war crimes committed by the Serbian army in the Balkan wars, the subject of a Carnegie committee investigation.29 The report of this body outraged Serbian officials (and historians) beyond all measure, especially given its restraint towards the Serbian side when compared to other participants of the Balkan wars. However, this does not mean that there were no crimes to which the Serbian socialist press did not point. Intrigued by the attacks on the then leading

42  Vladan Jovanović Serbian socialist ideologist Dimitrije Tucović, who allegedly described the Serbian operation in northern Albania and in Kosovo tendentiously, Vladimir Dedijer claims that, in studying documents related to Serbia’s foreign relations at the time, he became convinced of Tucović’s data, going as far as comparing the comportment of the Serbian army with the “beastly violence” of the European colonial forces, committed in South America, Asia and Africa.30 Even though Nikola Pašić tried to present the entire story of Serbian military crimes to the international community as the invention of foreign propaganda,31 both British and German press continued to publish articles about the massive casualties of Albanians in Kosovo and Albania, as well as about the censorship with which the Serbian government tried to hide the truth from its citizens. The strongest accusations were made in the London Times in its 18 January 1913 issue, claiming that members of the Serbian military killed 25,000 Albanians in northeast Albania.32 The role of Russia in the propaganda about Serbian crimes and carving up of Albanian territory was also important. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, consistently warned Pašić (via the Serbian emissary to St. Petersburg) that the Serbian government would have to repudiate each individual case, such as Đakovica, where the Serbian military allegedly shot 300 Albanians. Furthermore, Sazonov reminded the Serbs that the Austrians were already willing to allow Serbia to keep Đakovica until the alleged bloodshed has occurred. He told the Serbian emissary that “Russia has already wrested Prizren, Peć and Debarfrom Albania” and that, while the case of Đakovica would be handled by a special committee, Russia would insist that the committee should be guided “not by ethnographic data, since in that case the affair would be resolved unfavorably for us, but rather using geographic considerations”. Sazonov also told the Serbian emissary to St. Petersburg that, with a little patience, “Đakovica would be ripped away from Albania as well”.33 At the same time, the Austro-Hungarian government decided to defend the Albanian border at all cost: Duke Berthold told the Serbian emissary to Vienna that Albania was “already sufficiently mutilated”34 by cutting away Peć, Đakovica, Ohrid and Debar. In any case, from their outset, the events on which the Serbian military built its image of a liberator caused trepidation amongst the non-Serb population ahead of the upcoming integration. Despite this, the contemporary Serbian view is still largely that the Balkan wars were exclusively a struggle for freedom which is best illustrated by a rather popular quip about “the final liberation of the cradle of Serbdom and occupied brothers”.35 *** From December 1912 until as late as the fall of 1915, the Kingdom of Serbia strove to establish its own administration in the “newly liberated regions”, by applying temporary measures and decrees, but World War I led to new territorial reconstitutions in Kosovo. In the system of Austro-Hungarian military governors, Metohija belonged to the occupied zone “Montenegro”, while a small portion of Kosovo, containing Kosovska Mitrovica and Vučitrn, belonged to the zone “Serbia”. Consequently, Priština, Prizren, Gnjilane, Uroševac and Orahovac, along

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 43 with all of Macedonia, fell within the Bulgarian military section. At the same time, the Austrian military government showed no intention of leaving the administrative organization of Kosovo and Metohija to the local Albanian population.36 After the breakthrough on the Macedonian Front in 1918, the Serbian administration in Kosovo was reestablished. According to the opinion of Vasa Čubrilović, the annexation of Old Serbia and Macedonia to the new Serbian Kingdom was a triumph of Garašanin’s conception, in opposition to “antiquated”, diplomatic methods of Prince Miloš Obrenović and Jovan Ristić.37 The space of “newly liberated regions” was redrawn in the military sense as well, since the territory was divided into five areas. Furthermore, due to the anarchy on the border front, the Serbian Army Minster declared these regions a war zone with all the characteristics of military rule.38 Parallel to the new administrative-territorial reconstitution of the space, there were serious demographic shifts. Only from August 1913 to March 1914, nearly a quarter million Muslims left the Balkans for Turkey, mostly from Greece (determined to “take care of its Muslim element”).39 The Viennese press wrote that, by the end of March 1914, some 60,000 Muslims left the “newly liberated regions” of Serbia.40 According to the report of the Austro-Hungarian vice-consul in Bar, just between April and July of 1914, 16,570 people moved towards Turkey via the port of Bar, and some 40,000 in total left the region annexed to Serbia.41 Thus, the process of demographic de-Ottomanization resulted in new political circumstances following the signing of the Bucharest Treaty (1913).42

The historic province of South Serbia Just like all the other Balkan countries after World War I, Serbia was in a rush to integrate its territorial gains. Kosovo, Macedonia and Sandžak were thus included into the new Yugoslav state and given the formal status of “historic province” and the telling name: South Serbia. Considering this administrative title was not sanctioned by any legal or constitutional act, many Yugoslav politicians had a difficult time elucidating the factual and legal status of the new region. At a meeting of the Legislative Committee of the National Parliament of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in July 1923, the head of the committee along with and one of the ministers could not answer the question whether Peć belonged to South Serbiaor Montenegro.43 The aforementioned geographer, Vojislav Radovanović claimed that the term South Serbia first appeared in 1912 when Old Serbia and Macedonia, as “joined historic regions”, were unified under a single term that gained currency through “the liberation of this old Serbian land to the south from five centuries of slavery”.44 However, the absence of this geopolitical term in primary documents older than 1918 indicates that it appeared just before the creation of the Kingdom of SCS and was the result of a clear political intention to emphasize the unity of erstwhile Turkish regions and their belonging to Serbia. The Yugoslav administration divided the South Serbia province into twelve administrative units,45 comprising territories acquired by the Kingdom of Serbia (after the Balkan Wars), the Kingdom of SCS (after the treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine) and four counties acquired by the Kingdom of Montenegro at the expense of

44  Vladan Jovanović Turkey.46 Serbian laws and regulations were introduced before the end of June 1919 when the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia was formally extended to the entire region and applied until the adoption of the 1921 Constitution. By integrating nearly the entire province into the Vardar Banovina in October of 1929, this controversial name was partially removed from public use.47 Nevertheless, the local population remained at the mercy of “administrative violence”, since it had to travel all the way to Skopje, the banovina capital, for most of its legal needs. *** Part of the effort to integrate and de-Ottomanize the Province of South Serbia, as it was defined, were the agrarian reform and the colonization of Serbs and Montenegrins. Distribution of land to the burgeoning numbers of interested (above all “deserving national workers” who distinguished themselves by fostering armed resistance against the Turkish government in Old Serbia and Macedonia before 1912) was initially performed without a very detailed plan. The nature of colonization policy could be well illustrated by words of the Head of the Ministry for Agrarian Reform, from late 1919 (during the colonization of the Drenica area by volunteers and Montenegrins): “This is the way to prevent further intrusions of Albanians”.48 However, the administration was dissatisfied with the adaptation of “temperamental and truculent Dinaric mountain people” who caused conflicts with the older residents.49 The mostly Serbian colonization of regions that were under the Ottoman rule before the Balkan wars was meant to achieve two goals: improve the quality of life of people from poor, rural parts of the country and, at the same time, to alter the ethnic composition of the region being abandoned by Turks and Albanians. Indeed, the emigration of Muslims from Yugoslav territory into Turkey was officially sanctioned in September of 1928 by Article 55 of the Law of Citizenship. The article confirmed that “non-Slavic” citizens of the Kingdom of SCS could renounce their citizenship within five years. In that case, they would be removed from military and county registers, while they would be provided with benefits for emigration and sale of property by the Ministerial board. Nevertheless, since there was still no bilateral procedure, many émigrés were returned from the Turkish border, which caused a double problem: the Kingdom of SCS was obligated to pay for the return of “failed” immigrants and delay the partitioning of their estate to impatient settlers. The consul of the Kingdom of SCS to Constantinople admitted in a “tacit agreement” that the Yugoslav administration issued Muslims with passports without the right of return. Moreover, the mentioned law was applied so liberally that by 1933 all that was necessary to renounce one’s citizenship was to give a statement, even less for the illiterate – it was sufficient for any clerk from the Ministry to sign the expatriation request in their stead.50

The division of Kosovo into three banovinas and the institutionalization of mass migrations A new territorial division of the Yugoslav state was executed in 1929. Kosovo and Metohija found themselves belonging to three different administrative units

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 45 (the Vardar, Zeta and Morava banovinas), with the Vardar Banovina holding six counties from the previous province of South Serbia. A drastic reduction of the percentage of Muslims on the territory of the Vardar Banovina speaks to the intention of the government to at least administratively eliminate their majority within a single territorial unit, although the “problem” was thus only obscured since the remaining “disloyal” (Albanian) population found itself within the Zeta and Morava banovinas. The methodology of the new delineation of the banovina borders indicated the need to, wherever possible, ensure Serbian numerical superiority or at least strengthen Serbian influence.51 The strategy of territorial administration from the previous decade definitely suffered changes. Abandoning the idea of keeping “former Turkish regions” in a single administrative unit at all costs probably had its basis in the infamous practice of the Yugoslav state from the previous decade. In addition to the partitioning of responsibility for the situation in Albanian regions into three banovinas, there was also the belief that such bureaucratic diffusion would result in the dilution of the idea of a vital Albania and obstruct the consolidation of anti-state elements dispersed around the critical border belt and around the Sandžak area. At first glance, it seems that the break-up of the ethnic compactness of the Albanian population was the primary focus of the border creators of the Vardar Banovina.52 Still, the dissatisfaction of the Albanian population with the first Yugoslavia was too large: opening schools in Turkish among the Albanian population, the impossibility of employing Albanians in public service, the prohibition of forming political parties and the political instrumentalization of their religious leaderships, were all part of the wrongheaded methodology of “pacifying” Kosovo, which was ultimately impossible for a bureaucratic-territorial exhibitionism to execute. The final interwar attempt of administrative sealing of Kosovo as a positively Serbian territory came shortly after the creation of the Banovina of Croatia. Attempting to forestall further disintegration of the country, to calm the public and “preserve the transversal Danube-Morava-Vardar”, in November  1939, Serbian intellectuals and politicians began to work on the “Serbian Lands” project. The outline provided for the inclusion into Serbian lands, with their center in Skopje, the areas of Vrbas, Drina, Morava, Zeta and Vardar Banovinas. The Italian attack on Greece and immanent war threat prevented the presentation of the question to the Council of Ministers.53 The project was prepared by the then Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković with his legal advisers and the Minister of Justice Mihailo Konstantinović, while the regulation was written by the university professor Dr. Đorđe Tasić.54 *** When it comes to the demographic policy of the early 1930s, it seemed that the process of colonization of the south had ground to a halt. The chief agrarian commissioner in Skopje held some 40,000 unexecuted deeds for land distribution, over ten years old. Instead of a division of land according to the order of submission of request, the administration decided to “follow the market”: the higher quality plots were issued to whoever paid more for them, while the money from

46  Vladan Jovanović the agrarian fund was returned to the old owners and villages.55 Despite this, the American magazine Boston Science Monitor published an article on 2 September 1930 about the colonization of Metohija as the most significant endeavor of the Yugoslav government, due to which this region became a “prospective settler center”, ready to accept upwards of half a million people. However, as early as 1936, a new wave of land appropriation from Albanians took place in the border zones, leaving them with less than a half a hectare per member of household.56 A  total of 219,999 hectares of land was enclosed in Kosovo and Metohija, of which only half was reissued to 10,877 colonists and some 8,000 volunteers. In addition, by 1941, the agrarian courts and the High Agrarian Court in Skopje passed down their rulings on the compensation of the former owners of the land and handing it over to land “users” who thus formally became owners.57 Conversely, the emigration of Muslims to Turkey acquired an ever more institutional form. In September 1935, the so-called interministerial conference considered measures to speed up “non-Slavic” migration to Turkey and Albania, suggesting aggressive propaganda about the easy life in Asia Minor, as well as simplified passport procedures, more frequent call-ups for Muslims to military exercises, prohibition on planting tobacco, nationalization of toponyms and last names etc.58 The idea of expulsion of disloyal Albanians culminated in the signing of the Convention of Eviction of 200,000 Muslims to Turkey, which Yugoslavia and Turkey signed in July 1938,59 even though some 19,000 persons had already left the “southern parts” for Turkey in the period of 1927–39.60 On the Turkish side, this unusual project was seen as an “evacuation of lost territories”, and similar arrangements were signed with Romania and Bulgaria. The real Turkish interest for these migrants was the need to settle uninhabited regions in the far east of the country, as well as their potential usefulness in the struggle against Kurds. Although Albanians were not formally the main focus of the Convention, Yugoslav authorities endeavored to provide a broad interpretation of the phrase “people of Turkish culture” to encompass as many of its citizens of Albanian nationality.61

War years of (dis)continuity The breakout of World War II was one of the reasons the Convention was never implemented. Yet, once again, Kosovo, just like during World War I, found itself under triple occupation and was accordingly partitioned. Overlaps with the previous war enable the establishment of yet another continuity, here concerning the international context. In accordance with the German-Italian agreement, in July 1941, most of Kosovo’s territory was turned over to Albania (occupied by Italy). The northern part of Kosovo remained part of occupied Serbia, while the eastern parts fell under Bulgarian control. The “Great Albania” protectorate included this portion of Yugoslav territory, rearranged administratively into four prefectures (Prizren, Pristine, Debar and Peć), and an October 1941 statute turned 820,000 people into residents of Albania.62 On occupied Serbian territory, May of 1941 saw the beginning of functioning of the Civil Commissioner for Kosovo, Sandžak, Debar and Struga, who dealt

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 47 with the reorganization of the administration in “liberated areas”. Towards the end of the summer, the Region of Kosovo comprised the counties Kosovska Mitrovica (the regional center), Novi Pazar, Vučitrn and Podujevo. The Albanian “ethnic group” had its commissioner, in the rank of Assistant Ban, who was involved in all questions that concerned Kosovo. The county heads were Albanians, while the naming of members of the Albanian staff was done in Belgrade in accordance with the leader of the Albanian ethnic group. Assistant county chiefs, assistant police chiefs and assistant county clerks were named from the ethnic group that made up at least a quarter of the population in the given county. The regional court was formed in Mitrovica, which also held the seat of the state prosecutor. This court, on whose bench sat one Albanian judge, was under the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in Niš.63 However, even Nedić’s servile collaborationist administration could not prevent new (and expected) demographic complications in Kosovo. The expulsion of Serbian settlers from Kosovo and Metohija was initially orchestrated by the Germans. After 1943 and the founding of the Second League of Prizren,64 the colonists were put under pressure by the organization’s military wing, the Kosovo regiment.65 Immediately after the April War (of 1941), settlers began to flee Metohija for Montenegro and their residences were being taken over by Albanians.66 Serbian refugees from Kosovo were able to acquire immigration passports quite quickly, but train service was delayed for months. Immigrants boarded in railway stations in Peć, Uroševac, Lipljan, Obilić and Kosovo Polje, whence they were transported to Ravni Gaj near Knić, held in quarantine and then distributed across Serbia. Transport lasted until the end of April 1944 when the German special legal counsel for the southeast sent a telegram to the German consul in Tirana, informing him that another 30,000 Serbs in Priština submitted emigration demands. He ordered the German consul to demand from the Albanian government the suspension of emigration of Serbs “because it caused anarchy that could have a negative impact on Germany”. From this point on, the emigration stopped.67 The hostile stance of Muslims of various ethnic background towards the Partisan movement during World War II. In particular the activities of the Balli and the Albanian volunteer squads that protected the German army during their retreat (expecting in return the promised “natural Albania”), caused mistrust of the new Yugoslav regime towards the entire Albanian population. Thanks to a reserved position and only a modest participation in the antifascist movement, the Kosovo Albanians were once again seen as a “disloyal minority”.68 An exception to this were the regions in which the Albanian population, due to their benevolent behavior towards the Partisans, fell victim to the German occupiers, for example in Đakovica.

Kosovo’s status and demographic situation under “The People’s Government” Even though the rebellion of the Albanians from the Drenica region of January 194569 had not only an anti-Serbian, but also an anti-Yugoslav character,70 it

48  Vladan Jovanović was to be expected that the status of Kosovo in the new country would be formulated in accordance with the pre-war positions of Yugoslav communists. Yet, at the 23 February 1945 meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council, the Montenegrin delegate suggested that “both portions of Dukađin” should be annexed to Montenegro, along with Sandžak, in order to territorially strengthen the Montenegrin federal unit. There were suggestions for “Kosmet” to be divided between Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. Edvard Kardelj, on the other hand, had a more original idea – that Kosovo and Metohija forthwith be annexed to Albania.71 Political speculation regarding the status of Kosovo ended in late August 1945 when the National Parliament of Serbia passed a law about the establishment of the Autonomous Kosovo-Metohija region, “based on the wish of the population of the Kosovo-Metohija region, expressed in the resolution of its regional assembly on 8–10 June 1945”. The region became an integral part of Serbia, comprising 15 counties with Prizren as its capital.72 The law equated in rights the Albanian, Serbian and Montenegrin population as well as the use of Albanian and Serbian languages in schools and public administration. Very reliable evidence of the very beginning of the new government in Kosovo was the report written by the four-member committee of the Yugoslav Ministerial Council who spent two weeks there in May 1945.73 They noticed that the administrative apparatus was mostly composed of the pre-war Yugoslav clerks, while the Albanians were fairly represented only in village boards. Interethnic hatred was still evident, although it was somewhat replaced by the class antagonism expressed during requisitions, such as the seizure of agricultural products from peasants for the military supplies. Members of this committee found that the chauvinist disposition was more acutely visible among Serbs and Montenegrins than among Albanians, who felt a certain guilt for their collaboration with the occupier during the war and were thus more reserved in communicating with the new government. The Serbian refugee board from Peć was particularly belligerent towards Albanians. In February 1945, Kosovo once again faced the introduction of martial law, due to the “amassing of reaction in Kosmet, creation of rogue gangs and their increasingly frequent attacks on villages and cities”, as the aforementioned report cites. Only three months later, the situation calmed down, so the committee that issued the report advised the suspension of military rule, but also a series of political steps, such as regulating the status of Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia, proper selection of representatives, etc. Upon suspending military rule, there were suggestions that the Albanian minority in Kosovo “should be placed in a special quarantine”, which, without disturbing their basic human rights, would “obstruct their expression as a single national collective”. According to this idea, the Albanian minority would gain a certain level of autonomy only when “it proves that it is capable of civilized cohabitation with their Serbian and Montenegrin fellow citizens”.74 *** On 6 March 1945, the first government of socialist Yugoslavia decided to ban the return of Serbian and Montenegrin settlers to Kosovo and Macedonia. Despite the

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 49 ban, some 4,000 Montenegrins returned to Metohija, inducing panic among Albanians. The following month, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Tito stated that “anyone who had lived” in Kosovo and Metohija ought to be able to return, but for some reason the prohibition of return remained in place.75 The new government had a difficult time navigating the anarchic situation, since the multiple buying and selling of properties was usually based on forged contracts. Many Serbs and Montenegrins sought the return of estates they had sold by 1941, claiming that they had been pressured to do so. Out of fear that their land would yet again be taken away, some Albanians left for Albania, while others made individual deals with Serbian settlers. Many in Kosovo believed that, in addition to pre-war Serbian colonists, Albanian land would be taken over by swarms of new settlers.76 In early August 1945, the government passed a law to revise the allotment of land to settlers and agrarian entities in Macedonia and the Kosovo-Metohija region, aiming at “correction of injuries made to ownership rights and interests of land-working indigenous persons” in Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia, committed during the Yugoslav Kingdom.77 Contrary to expectations, this process of radical discontinuity with the national project of the Yugoslav monarchy was entrusted to the very creators of the interwar colonization – Vasa Čubrilović and Sreten Vukosavljević. The two men headed the departments of agriculture and colonization in Tito’s government, working to ensure an as large as possible return of exiled settlers and disqualification of Albanian “political offenders”.78 Along with problems concerning local committees made up of Albanian politicians who used to break protocol in passing decisions against the pre-war settlers,79 after this revision, nearly a fifth of the land taken away from Albanians in the Yugoslav Kingdom was returned to previous owners.80 As early as mid-1946, the new law allowed for pre-war Albanian emigrants who wished to return to Kosovo to do so and to acquire Yugoslav citizenship. This fact was used by many historians as a proof of Tito’s protection of “demographic development of Albanians” and the “Albanization of Kosovo”.81 However, the migratory processes that followed somewhat disrupted the logical construction of the thesis of planned “de-Serbification” of Kosovo. True, the start of these processes coincides with the Cominform Resolution82and the suspension of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. But even as early as 1951, there were new waves of Albanian migrants to Turkey, as well as Muslims of various ethnic origin declaring themselves as Turks in order to be considered for legal emigration. For this reason, the number of people in Kosovo and western Macedonia identifying as Turkish grew 26-fold in the period between the two population censuses (1948–1953). Such identification was supposed to save Yugoslavia and Turkey from unpleasant international reactions due to the expatriation of Albanians.83 In early October 1951, the Turkish government asked Yugoslavia to finally ratify and put into place financial stipulations of the prewar convention. In response, Tito invited the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Köprülü. In January 1953, there was a verbal agreement regarding emigration. The whole event is better known as the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that was

50  Vladan Jovanović supposed to revive the Yugoslav-Turkish convention of 1938.84 As in the interwar period, instead of Turks, the only people who left Yugoslavia were ethnic Albanians. Indeed, the First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade stated in September 1954 that his country was “willing to tacitly accept a certain number of Shiptar”, while the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia warned about a campaign for emigration taking place in Kosovo over the course of the summer, in which people were promised houses, cattle, fertile land and mechanized tools.85 Even after World War II, the initiative for emigration came more from the Turkish side, while Macedonia was again a transit point for the émigrés. There was also a similarity in the simplified procedure for relinquishing Yugoslav citizenship, making it easy to acquire papers of “Turkish origin”; it was, however, nearly impossible to return to Yugoslavia. In both the pre-war and post-war period, the emigration mechanism was entrusted to the Yugoslav Ministries for agriculture and agrarian reform, led by nearly the same people in both periods. Another remarkable similarity was that activities of disarming Kosovo Albanians that preceded large migration waves of the early 1920s and the mid-1950s. In spite of political abuse of emigration statistics and exaggerations in numbers and estimates, the fact is that Muslim migration in the first decade after World War II was far greater than before the war.86 *** Transformation of Kosovo and Metohija into an autonomous province (1963), with the growing powers based on constitutional amendments (1968, 1971, 1974), did not significantly stabilize the political situation, nor did it contribute to social cohesion. As in the previous decades, the administrative-territorial reorganization and demographic leveling (alternate emigration of one side and the settling of the other) could not compensate for a lack of structural reform of society, persistently left out under several different government systems. Given that Kosovo has through centuries of layering of symbolic meaning acquired certain metaphysical properties, in part it is clear why these “mechanical” solutions – such as settlement, emigration and administrative recomposition of territory – have always hit the wrong target, as indicated by nearly all parameters of (neglected) social development of Kosovo in the first half of the twentieth century (literacy, culture, industry, civil and political freedoms). Comparative examples here presented chronologically point to a nearly identical pattern of governing repeated independently of ideological profile of the state to which Kosovo belonged. Even in the first years after World War II, the expected discontinuity with the Serbian and Yugoslav practice did not occur. This can be seen above all in the institutional and personal continuity of the pre-war colonization mechanism with the latent nationalism of Serbian and Albanian communist leaderships. Without losing sight of the influence of international actors, above all, this situation is the result of immature political elites that gave birth to “unfinished societies” in the Balkans.

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 51

Notes 1 Milan Podunavac, “Izgradnja moderne države i nacije. Balkanska perspektiva”, Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka 1 (2007), 93. 2 Ivan Čolović, Balkan – teror kulture (Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2008), 55, 121–122. 3 For more, see Helena Zdravković, Politika žrtve na Kosovu: identitet žrtve kao primarni diskurzivni cilj Srba i Albanaca u upornom sukobu na Kosovu (Beograd: Srpski genealoški centar – Etnološka biblioteka, 2005). 4 See References. 5 Vladan Jovanović, Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929: Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002), 7–8. 6 Rista T. Nikolić, Širenje Arnauta u srpske zemlje (Beograd: Mlada Srbija, 1938), 122. 7 Jovan Trifunoski, “Doprinos Sretena Vukosavljevića proučavanju migracija u Makedoniji”, in: Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića 9 (Prijepolje: Opštinska zajednica obrazovanja, 1981), 54. 8 Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević, Arbanaška liga: arnautska kongra i srpski narod u Turskom Carstvu 1878–1882 (Beograd: Ratnik, 1909), 11–14. 9 As a person of great royal trust, he was later appointed a member of the Council of Regents in early 1889. 10 When Serbian Prince Milan Obrenović concluded the Trade Agreement along with the Secret Convention with Austro-Hungary in 1881, Serbia committed itself not to hinder Austro-Hungarian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In turn, the Austro-Hungarian Empire pledged to look favorably on Serbia’s spread to the south. 11 Jovan M. Jovanović, Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do Oslobođenja (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1941), 132–133. 12 Ljubodrag Dimić and Đorđe Borozan (eds.), Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, Vol. I (Beograd: Službeni list Srbije, 1998), 19. 13 Jovanović, Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929: Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS, 19–20. 14 The Young Turk movement, emerging from secret student societies, advocated political and military reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, seeking to replace the absolute monarchy with a constitutional one. Their 1908 revolution forced the Sultan Abdul Hamid to reinstate the suspended constitution and introduce a multiparty system. 15 Aleksandar Životić, Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile (1945–1961) (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2011), 51. 16 Mihailo Vojvodić, “Srbija i makedonsko pitanje”, Istorijski glasnik 1–2 (1992): 40–42. 17 Vojislav S. Radovanović, Veliki kralj i Južna Srbija (Beograd: s. n., 1934), 3–4. 18 With the initial military successes of the Serbian army in the First Balkan War, a few authors have published in Srpski književni glasnik “scientific proof” of Old Serbia and Macedonia being the cradle of the Serbian people. 19 Jovan Cvijić, Balkanski rat i Srbija (Beograd: Davidović, 1912). 20 Zef Mirdita, “Albanci u svjetlosti vanjske politike Srbije”, in: Aleksandar Ravlić (ed.), Jugoistočna Europa 1918–1995, Međunarodni znanstveni skup (Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika i Hrvatski informativni centar, 1996), s. p. 21 East India, Manchuria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alsace-Lorraine. 22 Aleksandar Apostolov, “Obidi za kolonizacija na Makedonija vo uslovite na nacionalnite propagandi na sosednite državi”, Godišen zbornik na Filozofski fakultet 15: 189. 23 Milić Milićević, Rat za more: dejstva srpskih trupa u severnoj Albaniji i na Primorju od 23. oktobra 1912. do 30. aprila 1913. godine (Beograd: Odbrana, 2011), 7. 24 Milić Milićević, Balkanski ratovi (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2014), 122. 25 Dubravka Stojanović, Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije (Beograd: Peščanik, 2010), 109.

52  Vladan Jovanović 26 Novica Rakočević, “Crna Gora u Balkanskom ratu. Nacionalni, politički i ekonomski uzroci”, in: Vladimir Stojančević (ed.), Prvi balkanski rat: okrugli sto povodom 75. godišnjice 1912–1987 (Beograd: SANU, 1991), 22. 27 Petar Opačić, “Srbija i Bugarska u Prvom balkanskom ratu”, Baštinik: godišnjak Istorijskog arhiva u Negotinu 10: 40–43. 28 Mihailo Vojvodić, “Nacionalne težnje i zahtevi Srbije u Balkanskim ratovima”, Istorijski glasnik 1–2 (1995): 74–75. 29 In 1913, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace formed a committee to identify causes of the Balkan wars and document war crimes committed on this occasion. The Balkan states did everything to obstruct its operations and called into question its findings in order to avoid the judgment of the international public. Still, in mid-June 1914, the Committee was able to complete and publish its report that blamed all the sides in the conflict for territorial megalomania and violation of international conventions (Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars). 30 Vladimir Dedijer, “Balkan u politici 20. veka. Neki metodološki problemi”, in: Andrej Mitrović (ed.), Srbi i Albanci u XX veku: ciklus predavanja (Beograd: SANU, 1991), 19. 31 Dušan Lukač (ed.), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, 6/1 (Beograd: SANU, 1981), 147. 32 Aleksandar Rastović, “Srbija u ogledalu britanske štampe tokom Balkanskih ratova”, Istorijski časopis 50 (2003): 141–150. 33 Ibid., 405. 34 Kliment Džambazovski (ed.), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903– 1914, 6/3 (Beograd: SANU, 1983), 406–407. 35 Slobodan Branković, “Samooslobođenje jugoistoka Evrope. Balkanski ratovi 1912–1913. Novi pogledi: događaji i procesi”, Reči: časopis za jezik, književnost i kulturološke studije 5 (2012): 195–200. 36 Đorđe Borozan, Velika Albanija: porijeklo – ideje – praksa (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1995), 67–73. 37 Dimitrije Bogdanović, Knjiga o Kosovu (Beograd: Književne novine, 1990). 38 Mile Bjelajac and Predrag Trifunović, Između vojske i politike. Biografija generala Dušana Trifunovića 1880–1942 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1997), 50–54. 39 Vladimir Dedijer and Života Anić (eds.), Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, 7/1 (Beograd: SANU, 1980), 616–617. 40 Bogumil Hrabak, Arbanaški upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja 1912. do kraja 1915. godine (Vranje: Narodni muzej u Vranju, 1988), 97. 41 Justin McCarthy, “Stanovništvo osmanlijske Evrope prije i poslije pada Carstva”, in: Fikret Karčić (ed.), Muslimani Balkana: “Istočno pitanje” u XX vijeku (Tuzla: Behrambegova medresa, 2001), 56. 42 The Bucharest Treaty marks the end of the Second Balkan War in which Serbia doubled its territory, gaining all of Vardar Macedonia, Kosovo, Metohija and a portion of the sanjak of Novi Pazar. 43 Jovanović, Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS, 9. 44 Vojislav S. Radovanović, O geografskim osnovama Južne Srbije (Skoplje: Štamparija “Južna Srbija”, 1937), 1–2. 45 Bitola, Bregalnica, Zvečan, Kosovo, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Prizren, Prijepolje, Raška, Skopje, Tetovo and Tikveš. 46 Berane, Bijelo Polje, Metohija and Pljevlja. 47 Jovanović, Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS, 9–10. 48 Dimić and Borozan (eds.), Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, 333.

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 53 49 Đorđo Krstić, Kolonizacija u Južnoj Srbiji (Sarajevo: Bosanska pošta, 1928), 84. 50 Vladan Jovanović, “Iseljavanje muslimana iz Vardarske banovine: između stihije i državne akcije”, in: Mile Bjelajac (ed.), Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije: viđenje srpskog faktora (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007), 89. 51 Branko Petranović, Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1993), 12, 39. 52 Vladan Jovanović, Vardarska banovina 1929–1941 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011), 34. 53 Ljubodrag Dimić, “Srbija u Jugoslaviji”, in: Istorija srpske državnosti, 3 (Novi Sad: SANU – Beseda, 2001), 174–177, 205–209. 54 Vidosav Petrović, Dragiša Cvetković – njim samim (članci, govori, intervjui, polemike, memoari) (Niš: Vidosav Petrović, 2006), 388–389. 55 Vladan Jovanović, “Land Reform and Serbian Colonization. Belgrade’s Problems in Interwar Kosovo and Macedonia”, East Central Europe 42 (2015): 6. 56 Zoran Janjetović, Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2005), 331. 57 Catalogue of Archive of Yugoslavia (AY): Committee for Agrarian Reform and Colonization (97), folder 2, arch. Unit 20, “A Brief History of Populating Southern Regions, in Particular Kosovo and Metohija”, 24 April, 1945. In Kosovo and Metohija alone, 13,938 users were given 57,665 hectares. 58 Vladan Jovanović, “Interministerijalna konferencija Kraljevine Jugoslavije o iseljenju ‘neslovenskog elementa’ u Tursku (1935)”, Prilozi 35 (2006): 105–124. 59 Avdija Avdić, “Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori o iseljavanju muslimanskog stanovništva u periodu između dva svetska rata”, Novopazarski zbornik 15 (1991): 112–114. 60 Sulejman Smlatić, “Iseljavanje jugoslavenskih muslimana u Tursku i njihovo prilagođavanje novoj sredini”, in: Ivan Čizmić (ed.), Iseljeništvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije i njegove uzajamne veze s domovinom (Zagreb: Zavod za migracije i narodnosti, 1978), 251–256. 61 Jovanović, Vardarska banovina 1929–1941, 110. 62 Borozan, Velika Albanija: porijeklo – ideje – praksa, 301–302. 63 Jovanović, Vardarska banovina 1929–1941, 486. 64 The Second League of Prizren was founded towards the end of 1943 with the support of the German intelligence service, as a military-political organization of prominent advocates of the Great Albania idea (Jaffer Deva, Bedri Peyani, Ismet Krieziju). The Second League nurtured continuity with the League of Prizren from 1878 that sought territorial unification of the entire Albanian ethnic space. 65 Branko Bošković, “Naseljenici na Kosovu i Metohiji (1918–1941) i njihov progon (1941–1944), s posebnim osvrtom na bosansko-hercegovačke naseljenike”, in: Nusret Šehić (ed.), Migracije i Bosna i Hercegovina (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 1990), 434–435. 66 AY, 50–89–188, sheet 422, Report of the Revision Committee regarding the state of the colonists in Metohija (1946). 67 Bošković, “Naseljenici na Kosovu i Metohiji (1918–1941) i njihov progon (1941– 1944), s posebnim osvrtom na bosansko-hercegovačke naseljenike”, 435–436. 68 Vladan Jovanović, “Jugoslovensko-turski demografski aranžmani do sredine pedesetih godina 20. veka”, in: Miša Đurković and Aleksandar Raković (eds.), Turska – regionalna sila? (Beograd: Institut za evropske studije, 2013), 206. 69 The rebellion comprised some 6,000 Albanians distributed into smaller Balli squads who, fearing the revenge of Serbian colonists, first attacked Uroševac and Gnjilane. An excessive reaction by a Macedonian brigade provoked new clashes in Gnjilane and Drenica, and considering that the new government did not have the support of the local Albanian population, a four-month military administration was imposed.

54  Vladan Jovanović 70 Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Beograd: VINC, 1992), 701–702. 71 Branko Petranović, “Kosovo u jugoslovensko-albanskim odnosima”, in: Andrej Mitrović (ed.), Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Ciklus predavanja (Beograd: SANU, 1991), 338–339. 72 For more on this, see Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević, Jugoslovenski federalizam – ideje i stvarnost, tematska zbirka dokumenata, 2 (Beograd: Prosveta, 1987), 170–172. In the course of 1959, Kosovo acquired two more counties, Leposavić and Lešak. There is no consensus regarding the motivation for this unusual intervention: from the alleged orientation of these counties to Mitrovica and the mines, to the highly arbitrary motives of Petar Stambolić and Slobodan Penezić-Krcun, as was sensationally put forth in Večernje Novosti on 24 September 2013. 73 AY, 50–89–188, sheets 352–262, “People’s government and military administration in Kosovo and Metohija”, Report of the Heads of the Ministerial Advisory Committee of DFY, of 1 June 1945. 74 Miodrag Jovičić, “Ustavnopravni položaj pripadnika albanske nacionalnosti u Jugoslaviji”, in: Andrej Mitrović (ed.), Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Ciklus predavanja (Beograd: SANU, 1991), 146. 75 Vlajko Potežica, “Sreten Vukosavljević i zabrana povratka Srba i Crnogoraca u Makedoniju i Kosovo i Metohiju”, in: Simpozijum “Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića” 13 (Prijepolje, 1989), 104–107. The laws on revision of the allocated land (1945) and settlement (1947) envisaged a very short deadline for return of colonists to their estates in Kosovo. 76 AY, 50–89–188, sheets 359–362. 77 Službeni list DFJ, No. 56, 3 August 1945. 78 Nikola A. Gaćeša, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1995), 416–419. Incidentally, these two bourgeois politicians who found their way into the first Communist government were left over from the previous regime, thanks to the Tito-Šubašić agreement (1944), as people who know “the atmosphere and situation in the country”. At the same time, they served as a link between the government in exile in London and the National Committee of Yugoslav Liberation. Momčilo Isić, S narodom, za narod, o narodu. Sreten Vukosavljević 1881–1960 (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2012), 159–161. 79 Aleksandar Pavlović, Svakodnevni život kolonista na Kosovu i Metohiji 1918–1941. godine (Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu, 2011), 17. 80 Branko Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 79. 81 Petranović, Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije, 98–110. 82 The Cominform Resolution of 26 June 1948 expelled Yugoslav communists (KPJ) from Cominform, accusing its leadership for the anti-Soviet attitude and deviation from true communism. As a result, Yugoslavia was thrown out of the Soviet block of states while Albania, still loyal to Stalin, became the Yugoslav leadership’s most aggressive enemy. 83 Jovanović, “Jugoslovensko-turski demografski aranžmani do sredine pedesetih godina 20. veka”, 211. 84 Edvin Pezo, “Komparativna analiza jugoslovensko-turske konvencije iz 1938. i Džentlmenskog sporazuma iz 1953. Pregovori oko iseljavanja muslimana iz Jugoslavije u Tursku”, Tokovi istorije 2 (2013): 116–118. 85 Jovanović, “Jugoslovensko-turski demografski aranžmani do sredine pedesetih godina 20. veka”, 211–212. 86 Ibid.

References Apostolov, Aleksandar (1963). “Obidi za kolonizacija na Makedonija vo uslovite na nacionalnite propagandi na sosednite državi”, Godišen zbornik na Filozofski fakultet 15, Skopje, 113–137.

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 55 Avdić, Avdija (1991). “Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori o iseljavanju muslimanskog stanovništva u periodu između dva svetska rata”, Novopazarski zbornik 15: 112–125. Bjelajac, Mile and Predrag Trifunović (1997). Između vojske i politike. Biografija generala Dušana Trifunovića 1880–1942. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. Bogdanović, Dimitrije (1990). Knjiga o Kosovu. Beograd: Književne novine. Borozan, Đorđe (1995). Velika Albanija: porijeklo-ideje-praksa. Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut. Bošković, Branko (1990). “Naseljenici na Kosovu i Metohiji (1918–1941) i njihov progon (1941–1944), s posebnim osvrtom na bosansko-hercegovačke naseljenike” In: Migracije i Bosna i Hercegovina. Edited by Nusret Šehić. Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, pp. 411–438. Branković, Slobodan (2012). “Samooslobođenje jugoistoka Evrope. Balkanski ratovi 1912–1913. Novi pogledi: događaji i procesi”, Reči: časopis za jezik, književnost i kulturološke studije 5: 725–765. Čolović, Ivan (2008). Balkan – teror kulture. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek. Cvijić, Jovan (1912). Balkanski rat i Srbija. Beograd: Davidović. Dedijer, Vladimir (1991). “Balkan u politici 20. veka. Neki metodološki problemi” In: Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Ciklus predavanja. Edited by A. Mitrović. Beograd: SANU. Dedijer, Vladimir and Života Anić (eds.) (1980). Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, 7/1. Beograd: SANU. Dimić, Ljubodrag (2001). Istorija srpske državnosti, 3 (“Srbija u Jugoslaviji“). Novi Sad: SANU/Beseda. Dimić, Ljubodrag and Đorđe Borozan (eds.) (1998). Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, 1. Beograd: Službeni list Srbije. Džambazovski, Kliment (ed.) (1983). Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, 6/3. Beograd: SANU. Gaćeša, Nikola A. (1995). Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije. Novi Sad: Matica srpska. Hadži-Vasiljević, J. (1909). Arbanaška liga: arnautska kongra i srpski narod u Turskom Carstvu 1878–1882. Beograd: Ratnik. Horvat, Branko (1989). Kosovsko pitanje. Zagreb: Globus. Hrabak, Bogumil (1988). Arbanaški upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja 1912. do kraja 1915. godine. Vranje: Narodni muzej u Vranju. Isić, Momčilo (2012). S narodom, za narod, o narodu. Sreten Vukosavljević 1881–1960. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. Janjetović, Zoran (2005). Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. Jovanović, Jovan M. (1941). Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do Oslobođenja. Beograd: Geca Kon. Jovanović, Vladan (2002). Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. Jovanović, Vladan (2006). “Interministerijalna konferencija Kraljevine Jugoslavije o iseljenju ‘neslovenskog elementa’ u Tursku (1935)”, Prilozi 35: 105–124. Jovanović, Vladan (2007). “Iseljavanje muslimana iz Vardarske banovine: između stihije i državne akcije” In: Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije: viđenje srpskog faktora. Edited by Mile Bjelajac. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, pp. 79–99. Jovanović, Vladan (2011). Vardarska banovina 1929–1941. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije. Jovanović, Vladan (2013). “Jugoslovensko-turski demografski aranžmani do sredine pedesetih godina 20. veka” In: Turska – regionalna sila? Edited by Đurković, M. and A. Raković, Aleksandar. Beograd: Institut za evropske studije, pp. 205–215.

56  Vladan Jovanović Jovanović, Vladan(2014). Slike jedne neuspele integracije: Kosovo, Makedonija, Srbija, Jugoslavija. Beograd: Fabrika knjiga i Peščanik. Jovanović, Vladan (2015). “Land Reform and Serbian Colonization. Belgrade’s Problems in Interwar Kosovo and Macedonia”, East Central Europe 42(1): 87–103. Jovičić, Miodrag (1991). “Ustavnopravni položaj pripadnika albanske nacionalnosti u Jugoslaviji” In: Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Ciklus predavanja. Edited by Andrej Mitrović. Beograd: SANU. Krstić, Đorđo (1928). Kolonizacija u Južnoj Srbiji. Sarajevo: Bosanska pošta. Lukač, Dušan (ed.) (1981). Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, 6/1. Beograd: SANU. McCarthy, Justin (2001). “Stanovništvo osmanlijske Evrope prije i poslije pada Carstva” In: Muslimani Balkana: ‘Istočno pitanje’ u XX vijeku. Edited by Fikreta Karčić. Tuzla: Behram-begova medresa. Milićević, Milić (2011). Rat za more: dejstva srpskih trupa u severnoj Albaniji i na Primorju od 23. oktobra 1912. do 30. aprila 1913. godine. Beograd: Odbrana. Milićević, Milić (2014). Balkanski ratovi. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike. Mirdita, Zef (1996). “Albanci u svjetlosti vanjske politike Srbije” In: Jugoistočna Europa 1918–1995. Međunarodni znanstveni skup. Edited by Aleksandar Ravlić. Zagreb: Hrvatska matica iseljenika i Hrvatski informativni centar. Nikolić, Rista T. (1938). Širenje Arnauta u srpske zemlje. Beograd: Mlada Srbija. Opačić, Petar (2008). “Srbija i Bugarska u Prvom balkanskom ratu”, Baštinik: godišnjak Istorijskog arhiva u Negotinu 10: 30–46. Pavlović, Aleksandar (2011). Svakodnevni život kolonista na Kosovu i Metohiji 1918– 1941. godine. Leposavić: Institut za srpsku kulturu. Petranović, Branko (1991). “Kosovo u jugoslovensko-albanskim odnosima” In: Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Edited by Andrej Mitrović, pp. 375–398. Petranović, Branko (1992). Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945. Beograd: VINC. Petranović, Branko (1993). Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije. Beograd: Službeni list SRJ. Petranović, Branko and Momčilo Zečević (1987). Jugoslovenski federalizam  – ideje i stvarnost, 2. Beograd: Prosveta. Petrović, Vidosav (ed.) (2006). Dragiša Cvetković – njim samim (članci, govori, intervjui, polemike, memoari). Niš: Punta. Pezo, Edvin (2013). “Komparativna analiza jugoslovensko-turske konvencije iz 1938. i Džentlmensko(g sporazuma iz 1953. Pregovori oko iseljavanja muslimana iz Jugoslavije u Tursku”, Tokovi istorije 2: 97–120. Podunavac, Milan (2007). “Izgradnja moderne države i nacije. Balkanska perspektiva”, Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka 1: 82–98. Potežica, Vlajko (1989). “Sreten Vukosavljević i zabrana povratka Srba i Crnogoraca u Makedoniju i Kosovo i Metohiju” In: Simpozijum “Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića” 13, Prijepolje, pp. 97–110. Radovanović, Vojislav S. (1934). Veliki kralj i Južna Srbija. Beograd: „Zora“. Radovanović, Vojislav S. (1937). O geografskim osnovama Južne Srbije. Skoplje: Štamparija „Južna Srbija“. 3. Rakočević, Novica (1991). “Crna Gora u Balkanskom ratu. Nacionalni, politički i ekonomski uzroci” In: Prvi balkanski rat: okrugli sto povodom 75. godišnjice 1912–1987. Edited by Vladimir Stojančević. Beograd: SANU. Rastović, Aleksandar (2003). “Srbija u ogledalu britanske štampe tokom Balkanskih ratova”, Istorijski časopis 50: 141–150.

“Reconquista of Old Serbia” 57 Smlatić, Sulejman (1978). “Iseljavanje jugoslavenskih muslimana u Tursku i njihovo prilagođavanje novoj sredini” In: Iseljeništvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije i njegove uzajamne veze s domovinom. Edited by Ivan Čizmić. Zagreb: Zavod za migracije i narodnosti, pp. 249–256. Stojanović, Dubravka (2010). Ulje na vodi: ogledi iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije. Beograd: Peščanik. Trifunoski, Jovan (1981). “Doprinos Sretena Vukosavljevića proučavanju migracija u Makedoniji” In: Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića 9. Prijepolje: Opštinska zajednica obrazovanja, pp. 50–56. Vojvodić, Mihailo (1991). “Naučnici Srbije i Prvi balkanski rat” In: Prvi balkanski rat: okrugli sto povodom 75. godišnjice 1912–1987. Edited by V. Stojančević. Beograd: SANU. Vojvodić, Mihailo (1992). “Srbija i makedonsko pitanje”, Istorijski glasnik 1–2: 33–48. Vojvodić, Mihailo (1995). “Nacionalne težnje i zahtevi Srbije u Balkanskim ratovima”, Istorijski glasnik 1–2: 67–78. Zdravković, Helena (2005). Politika žrtve na Kosovu. Identitet žrtve kao primarni diskurzivni cilj Srba i Albanaca u upornom sukobu na Kosovu. Beograd: Srpski genealoški centar – Etnološka biblioteka. Životić, Aleksandar (2011). Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile (1945–1961). Beograd: Arhipelag.

Section II

The Yugoslav experiment: Serbian-Albanian relations in comparative perspective

4 The burden of systemic legitimization in socialist Yugoslavia Discursive reduction of Kosovo protests Marjan Ivković, Tamara Petrović Trifunović and Srđan Prodanović This chapter argues that Yugoslav socialism, in the period from 1945 to 1991, held the potential for re-articulating Serbian-Albanian relations in a new key, which could have overcome nationalist particularisms. In light of this premise, we examine why the potential for the articulation of universal demands for equality through the language of class struggle in socialist Yugoslavia was not entirely realized, as well as the reasons for which the problems of social inequalities1 were primarily designated in a language of ethnic divisions. Although ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia were seemingly suppressed and the political elite was, in the words of Dejan Jović, “all too sensitive” to any nationalism that could grow into open conflict, the elite also institutionally encouraged nationalism, guided to a large extent by a “politics of limitless decentralization and particularization” of the political, cultural and economic space.2 For lack of a better term, we define this process of experimenting with the socio-economic system as a type of “liberalization”.3 In what follows, “liberalization” will therefore refer to the lowering of participation of central planning in the process of socio-economic reproduction, guided by the conviction of the holders of political power in Yugoslavia that the entire social reality cannot and should not be brought into harmony with the ideal of the socialist society through the central government’s constant and direct intervention on both the macro- and micro-level. The emancipatory potential of the socialist system in Yugoslavia was also subverted by the political elite’s ideological strategy of using the label of “nationalism” to delegitimize social protests in the period from 1968 until the end of the 1980s. With this in mind, we will apply critical discourse analysis to reconstruct the media reporting on the Kosovo protests in 1968, 1981 and 1988. As the reporting was mostly in line with the party’s position, the media are analyzed here as the principal channel of the ruling elite’s strategy of delegitimization, rather than as an independent research subject. By analyzing important dailies in the Socialist Republic of Serbia – Politika, Borba and Večernje novosti – the chapter reveals the political elites’ strategy of framing protest movements, defined here as “discursive reduction”. The research of newspapers is underpinned by a theoretical

62  Marjan Ivković et al. argument that we formalize as a two-dimensional scheme, “the coordinate system of symbolic domination in socialist Yugoslavia”, presented at the end. This model will show that, while the discursive reduction of the protests in 1968 and 1981 follows the relatively clear pattern of stigmatizing the protests as purely nationalist and anti-socialist, the situation becomes much more complex in 1988, as one faction of the political elite led by Slobodan Milošević endorses Serbian nationalism and interweaves it with the attempt at an extensive economic and political reform of Yugoslavia.

The theoretical argument From 1948 on, Yugoslav socialism began differing significantly from other socialist countries in its “added burden” of systemic legitimization4 that emerged from the need to justify what was at the time essentially a strategic geopolitical move on the part of the Yugoslav government – the break with the rest of the socialist world led by the Soviet Union.5 However, with the introduction of the self-management organization of social and economic relations in 1950, the Yugoslav political elite became more open to “experimentation” with economic and political mechanisms of social reproduction. Among the more prominent economic examples are certainly the extensive reforms of 1965, the less extensive, but still far-reaching reforms of 1981, as well as the most radical attempt at transformation in 1988. On the political level, the “experimental” character of Yugoslav socialism is exemplified by the debates about constitutional reforms in the period of 1968–1974, resulting in transformation of the state towards a more confederate system. What unifies these attempts at economic and political reform is a form of experimentation with the socioeconomic system that we have defined as liberalization. The contention here is that these policies from 1950 to 1974 led to the crystallization of a specific form of real socialism, which, in contrast to other countries of the Eastern bloc, was characterized by considerably greater heterogeneity and polycentricism of the economic and political system, as well as tensions within various segments of the Yugoslav political elite.6 The second premise is that, paradoxically, the elite’s willingness to “experiment with institutions of market economy” produced a new kind of challenge for the systemic legitimization process that stemmed from the fact that Yugoslavia was becoming more open to periodic crises within global capitalism. Reforms of the system had by 1968 created a society within which the process of rapid economic growth was interwoven with the growth of societal inequalities between the ruling class of party functionaries and the rest of the population, as well as between developed and undeveloped regions in Yugoslavia.7 It was precisely this process of social differentiation that stood in complete opposition to the nominal ideal of a classless society and that led to the first great protest movement in Yugoslavia: the 1968 Belgrade student protests. Although “elitist” in composition, the student protests of 1968 represented an authentic social revolt against the already ossified order of social inequalities embodied in the party’s “red bourgeoisie”. A few

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 63 months later, in November 1968, the Autonomous Socialist Province of Kosovo, one of the least developed regions of Yugoslavia, saw its first protests in socialist Yugoslavia. Protests that took the form of social revolt could present an existential threat to a political system whose raison d’etre was the establishing of a socially just, egalitarian and ultimately classless society. In that sense, the Yugoslav political elite had no adequate answer to the protest movements appearing in 1968, which is best shown in Tito’s famous statement that “the students are right”. The examples from the data will show that, when the November 1968 protests in Kosovo seriously called into question the legitimacy of the social order, the Yugoslav political elite would for the first time use the strategy of delegitimization through discursive reduction: namely, the strategy of displacing the need for a systemic answer to the socio-economic demands of protest movements onto the domain of the symbolic reproduction of society.8 We would argue that, in moments of crisis such as the Kosovo protests of 1968 and 1981 or the 1971 “Croatian Spring”, the ruling class of Yugoslavia attempted to discursively reduce complex protest movements – within which socio-economic demands were tightly interwoven with, and difficult to distinguish from, symbolic (identity-political) demands  – to their identitarian dimension, defining them as “nationalist”. Given that the sensitivity to identitarian questions was empirically present within the protest movements,9 our premise is that the strategy of discursive reduction in these key moments led to the most desirable outcome for the Yugoslav power elites: the actors involved in the protests implicitly adopted the nationalist label, allowing for a gradual re-articulation of protest demands in a chiefly identitarian form. After the strategy of discursive reduction proved successful, the highest levels of the Yugoslav government could then take up “responding” to the demands of the protest movements. This meant the further “liberalization” of the political order of Yugoslavia towards a greater federalism and a higher level of ethnically based autonomy. Nationalist protests could also more easily be repressed as a threat to the Yugoslav system. The ruling class attempted to compensate for its inability to fix structural problems of the Yugoslav economy (rising social and regional inequalities and periodic economic crises), largely caused by the initial “experiment” of liberalizing the economic system, which in turn produced conditions for new protest movements.

Methodological framework The research decision to test the above theoretical argument on the corpus composed of reports about the protests in Kosovo in printed media10 rested on the assumption that media discourse had an important role in the reproduction of social order in socialist Yugoslavia. This is particularly true of reports in moments of crisis, which the 1968, 1981 and 1988 Kosovo protests certainly were. Reports in the influential news dailies Borba, Politika and Večernje novosti reflected the discourse of the current political elite of SR Serbia and provided the official framing11 of events.

64  Marjan Ivković et al. We applied critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1998) to detect discursive strategies that party officials used to define Us and Them and likewise to reconstruct the practices of “defining the situation” in media discourse. The basic discursive strategies, according to van Dijk, are the strategies of positive self-presentation and “negative other-presentation”. This is done by manipulating the amount of detail, level of description and information provided: a) emphasizing information that is positive for “us” or negative for “them” and b) suppressing or mitigating information that is positive for “them” or negative for “us” (van Dijk 1998: 267–269). For this analysis, it was crucial to reconstruct from the material the discursive strategies of delegitimization of the opponent, by declaring their position illegitimate and the principles on which their positions stand unjust. These strategies could also, among else, be used to attack the legitimacy of membership, actions, goals, norms and values (van Dijk 1998: 255–262). The discursive strategies of delegitimization of Kosovo protests in media reports are, in line with our theoretical argument, part of a larger ideological practice of the discursive reduction of complex protest movements in Yugoslavia to nationalist protests, enacted by the Yugoslav political elite in the period analyzed.

1968: the birth of a new technique of symbolic domination The largest protest in Kosovo in the period of socialist Yugoslavia occurred in 1968 as a reaction to the negative social consequences of liberalization as explained above. The crisis was caused primarily by the decreased import tariffs and growth of retail prices which significantly lowered the standard of living (especially in the less developed regions of Yugoslavia). Thus, the long-term causes of the 1968 Kosovo protest reach back to the economic reforms of 1964/1965, when there were significant changes in the degree of the companies’ powers of accumulation and reproduction of capital.12 Still, perhaps the strongest cause of the destabilization of Yugoslav society (in the above described sense) lies in the fact that the liberalization of self-management institutionalized the market competition between the republics and provinces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), an experiment in which the less developed portions of Yugoslavia such as Kosovo suffered the worst consequences. As mentioned, liberalization in Yugoslavia meant the partial loosening of central power in regulating all aspects of social reality in accordance with the socialist ideal. This consequently meant the legitimization of a multitude of entities on levels lower than the central government of Yugoslavia: republics, provinces, “nations and nationalities”, basic units of self-management – all of which became legitimate actors and decision-makers in the process of social reproduction.13 In this way, the “liberalization” allowed for a gradual (re-)affirmation of various particular identities and loyalties compared to the abstract-universal designations such as “working man”, proletarian, Yugoslav, as well as for a gradual (implicit) normalization of ethnic nationalisms in Yugoslavia and all forms of “competition” between republics. The 1968 protests in Kosovo represent one of the first examples in which an experience of injustice that was initially open to being formulated in either a vocabulary of social justice or the one of identity ended up in demands for

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 65 national autonomy. The specific dynamic that caused such an outcome is the primary theme of our analysis.14 The protests that broke out in multiple towns (Priština, Peć, Gnjilane, Kosovska Mitrovica) of the Autonomous Socialist Province of Kosovo on 27 November 1968 were an articulation of the experience of injustice represented in the fact that, 23 years after the founding of the socialist system, this province was still economically lagging behind all other regions of Yugoslavia and that the Albanian majority there, more than any other ethnic group, faced problems of extreme poverty and social immobility, as well as discrimination along identitarian lines in the 1950s and early 1960s. If we focus on the reporting of dailies, we can see that the protests represented a key phase in the development of the aforementioned strategy of discursive reduction that the Yugoslav elite devised in order to delegitimize protests. In the reporting, there is no major difference between the three dailies  – the authors of the reports mostly interpret the protests as an expression of Albanian nationalism and separatism, negating even the slightest possibility that the causes of the protest can be found in the failures of Yugoslav socialism to resolve structural problems of the Kosovo economy. We can see the foundation of the strategy of delegitimization of protests in texts such as “Assessment of Three Years of Activity” from Borba, which emphasizes that the process of economic and political liberalization begun in 1965 is a “democratization of the system”, that is, a reckoning with “bureaucratic-chauvinist forces”: The reckoning of the forces of self-management with bureaucratic conservatism on the level of CC LCY [Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia] had far-reaching consequences on the political life of this Province. The democratization has opened up the process of suppression of the bureaucratic-chauvinist and factionalist platform of certain forces in, as well as beyond, the League of Communists.15 The author of another article warns that, despite the diversity of protest slogans (“critique of everything existing”), what lies behind the demands of the demonstrators is one single motive – the rejection of Yugoslav socialism: The fact remains that many of the positions and critiques at the University were in line with the well-known slogan “critique of everything existing”, which hid a criticism of the adopted directions of development of our society and the leadership role of the League of Communists.16 On the other hand, the Borba journalist aims to define and classify the types of criticism of the existing socio-economic state in Kosovo, attempting to show their anti-socialist and political-identitarian orientation: [T]he execution of the decisions of the CC LCY and CC LCS and the Provincial Committee was left to various national-chauvinist and anti-socialist elements of Albanian ethnicity. . . . Various abuses of the police departments

66  Marjan Ivković et al. in the past . . . all were ascribed to the socialist system of the League of Communists and its policies.17 In a Politika op-ed, we find the same strategy of reductive discourse: Reactionary forces are attempting to abuse and disable the democratization of the political life in our country. . . . The content of the slogans these reactionary forces have used in the street, as well as the moment they have chosen, all clearly reveal that this is an axis of political opponents of all stripes, beginning with foreign agents, through various remnants of reactionary forces and chauvinists, to various deviants within the League of Communists.18 The protest participants are defined as “class enemies” in another report, a term with stronger negative connotations than the label of “nationalism”. While nationalist demands were hypothetically compatible with the demands for social justice, in the case of “class enemies”, this possibility vanishes: At an expanded meeting of the Basic Organization of the League of Communists of the Faculty of Philosophy held in Priština this evening, the delegates declared that the demonstrations were organized by class enemies.19 A Borba op-ed warns that, although the protests may seem “student” and could thus be linked with the June protests in Belgrade (which were given a primarily social character), they do not reflect the views of the majority of students: Members of the Provincial Board noticed that there had been attempts to qualify the demonstrations as student and that the enemy actions of a group of students of Albanian ethnicity be ascribed to the majority of students.20 Finally, we find the most elaborate example of the strategy of “warning” readers not to succumb to the temptation of seeing any “social motives” in the protests, but to differentiate the “wheat from the chaff” in Politika: Such open defiance is hardly different from the kind that condemns the protests but attempts to find a mass of social reasons in apology of the protesters. Of course, the acuteness of social problems cannot be negated. . . . But in discussion about them . . . we must separate the wheat from the chaff. . . . Obviously, it is not a question of the problems that exist, but of how and by whom they are being manipulated politically in this situation.21 We can see in this discursive strategy the birth of a new technique of symbolic domination, as we will show in the reports about the 1981 and 1988 protests.

1981: counterrevolution in the age of stabilization The far-reaching consequences of the strategy of discursive reduction of Kosovo’s social problems to identitary questions can best be seen in the example of the 1981

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 67 demonstrations. The Yugoslav elite attempted to resolve the “Kosovo problem” in the 1974 constitutional reforms22 through political decentralization. In March 1981, Albanian students protested against the poor conditions at the University in Priština. At the time, 20,000 students who attended lectures in Albanian at the University of Priština faced a lack of job prospects and a poor standard of living due to a linguistic barrier and the fact that Kosovo did not have the capacity to employ highly educated persons. The general economic crisis in which the problem of Yugoslavia’s public debt was once again assuaged through “rationalization” and “stabilization” – basically, a form of austerity measures – contributed to a rise in unemployment and increase in prices.23 In light of this, the revolt against the conditions in the dorms of the University of Priština had an unequivocal social background.24 Our analysis suggests that in the public discourse – particularly in the view of high-ranking Party members – the social character of these protests was suppressed and equated with nationalism. In their vehement denial of the social character of demonstrations in 1981, the high-ranking members were quite creative. During a discussion reported by Politika, Aslan Fazlija, head of the Priština Municipal Party Committee, had no doubt that the protests had a “treasonous character” and that the organizers used “demagogic” social and “nationalist” slogans in their attempts to “seduce” the students. Of course, Fazlija goes on, “our students” are aware that the University of Kosovo in Priština is one of the three largest universities in the country at which classes are held in the students’ mother tongue. Such . . . successful development is unheard of in the history of the development of universities. We are also aware . . . that due to the fast growth of the university, the students in Priština have problems regarding the standard of living, and the problem is being dealt with expeditiously.25 The Chairman of the CC LCY, Dušan Dragosavac, saw the multifariousness of the articulation of the experiences of injustice, yet he claimed that on a “theoretical level”, the best solution was still self-management socialism – for social as well as national problems. The hybridity of self-management socialism here becomes a strategy onto itself, an ideology which erases all other ideologies: We resolved the question of nationalities in the best possible way. . . . Through further development of self-management as an element of the social, that is of class, we also successfully resolve the national questions, which is why we constantly connect the class, social and national component.26 Despite the intrinsic “inclusiveness” of this discourse, Dragosavac quickly finds a basis for discrediting the social component of the protest: [I]n the first protest (on 11 March), the trigger for which was “poor food” at the student dining hall. Quickly, we could see that it was also fueled by other motives. During the protests’ reiterations, there were openly counterrevolutionary demands. It was obvious that the enemy at the demonstration was prepared and organized.27

68  Marjan Ivković et al. A remedy is found by Fadil Hoxha, member of the presidium of SFRY and the presidium of the League of Communists of Serbia: Yugoslavia and its economy, as part of the world economy, as a country in development, bears . . . the same or similar consequences of global events, and thus finds itself slowing down on its path to development, exactly like the great majority of countries around the world.28 Adding that Kosovo, as part of Yugoslavia, is exposed to these same global “economic difficulties”, Hoxha emphasizes they could only be resolved through “a struggle for a greater productivity of labor, in executing the measures of economic stabilization”.29 Denying any possibility that the demonstrations are socially conditioned could be heard at the meeting of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, as reported in Borba: It is necessary to explain to our broadest masses the enemy character and meaning of the slogans the organizers chanted. Above all, in their slogans, the enemy forces that organized the protests expressed not one single real or true social or other problem faced by our working people and youth.30 As we see, the political elite constantly negated the social character of the protests. Such discursive framing elegantly delegitimized the most dangerous form of protest coming from below and also perpetuated the basis of power for the elite, by making it seek the solution of social tension in political and economic experimenting. This made the principle of “self-determination” a potential solution of economic problems of a given group of actors, in particular if the economically exploited social group also held a homogenous identity.

1988: two protest movements through the optic of a hybrid discourse In 1988, the third key point in our analysis, the strategy of discursive reduction reaches a new stage of complexity. By this point, both the party elites and ordinary actors in Yugoslav society were polarized in regard to national identity. The faction of the party led by Slobodan Milošević evolved a specific “hybrid discourse” that managed to interweave the imperatives of the socio-economic reform of Yugoslavia (this time toward considerable liberalization) with Serbian nationalism and the demand for constitutional reform. Precisely this discourse gave Milošević an edge in his conflict with other factions of the party. In the complex events of 1988, the years-long attempts to treat all sorts of social problems in an identitarian way finally created the conditions for a full national mobilization. The foreign debt crisis, first appearing in the early 1980s, culminated towards the very end of the decade when the price hikes and inflation significantly burdened Yugoslav households. The search for a real form of “stabilization” thus

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 69 became the absolute preoccupation of government functionaries and technocrats. However, in the struggles over the articulation of reforms, the ideology advocated by the political elite close to Milošević had a certain advantage precisely because it was effective in unifying the identitarian reduction of social injustice and Serbia’s statist tendency with the “necessity of reform”, through a further development of the market form of social reproduction: The reform, dear comrades, above all has to break with the illusions that the political constituents of society can successfully, through methods of planned economy, regulate economic processes and relations. . . . Decision making in the process of reproduction has to be brought back into the hands of direct producers and their companies, to their motives and interests, their capacities to grapple with risks, with competition, with all those certain and uncertain phenomena that market economy engenders in this world that we are a part of.31 Milošević was thus able to present the social crisis of the 1980s to a great portion of the Serbian public as the product of the unjust status of Serbia in the system of inter-federal market competition. As the experience of injustice had for a while been treated in an identitarian and reductive way, the conditions were prime for the “awakening of peoples”. Shkelzen Maliqi notes and succinctly describes this impossibility of an alternative articulation of universal social problems: The problem of ownership over Kosovo has become of existential importance. Yet what is really of importance for all the residents of Kosovo, regardless of nationality, is promised to be resolved in a nationalist key, “when Kosovo becomes ours”, “when we reclaim it from the usurpers”. In the dominant Kosovo discourse there is very little commentary about the developmental difficulties Kosovo encounters. . . . Instead of real problems, we see the mythologized national ones. . . . Such reductions prevent a real insight into the problem, hinder and even render impossible its peaceful solution.32 It is therefore not surprising that Milošević turned to solving the “Kosovo Problem” as the ageless mythic place of Serbian “national congregation”. His propaganda machine presented the constitutional reforms from 1988 as decisive for the economic and political consolidation of SR Serbia. This task was to be achieved by first righting the “wrong” committed to Serbia in the 1974 Constitution. Attempts to formulate any kind of alternative insight into the nature of the social crisis – found above all in the official mouthpiece of the LCY, Borba – were from their very start undermined by the agility of what we define as Milošević’s “hybrid discourse”, a discourse able to place itself at the triple intersection of liberalism, nationalism and socialism. This once again displayed the capability of nationalism to incorporate, when necessary, elements of socialist, liberal, conservative or other ideologies and tie them all together into a hybrid creation with the potential to mobilize a broad spectrum of actors based on their diverse experience of injustice.

70  Marjan Ivković et al. To demonstrate the change in the discursive strategy used by Milošević’s faction of the political elite in 1988, we shall present the double movement in the press which couples the delegitimization of the Albanian protests with the affirmation of the Serbian “protests of solidarity”. In the summer and fall of 1988, throughout Serbia and Montenegro, there were numerous “gatherings of solidarity with the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo”,33 crowned with the large gathering of “Brotherhood and Unity” in Belgrade. Two days prior, Kosovo saw the outbreak of five-day protests in support of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists, against the dismissal of Azem Vllasi, Kaqusha Jashari and other heads and against the changes to the 1974 Constitution. In the media, these protests were reported with caution but in an overall negative tone. And before they were given an unequivocal nationalist label, journalists pointed to the dramatic character of the events and their potential danger: After the speech of Kaqusha Jashari and Azem Vllasi at the football stadium FK Priština, where some 70 thousand people of Albanian ethnicity gathered, the expectation was that the situation, despite fears, would calm down somewhat. . . . Unfortunately, the fears came true in dramatic fashion.34 The discursive effort to ascribe an unequivocally nationalist character to the protests was already well present in news reports even before the official assessment of the presidium of SR Serbia and CC of LC Serbia, according to which there is “indubitable” continuity with “counter-revolutionary events from 1981”.35 The legitimacy of declared goals and slogans (reports counted how many times one could hear “Kosovo Republic” on the streets) was called into question, as were the legitimacy of the participants and the (never named, but implicit) organizers of the protests. More than a thousand miners from Trepča’s “Stari Trg” halted work this morning . . . to express their “dissatisfaction and bitterness with the attacks of the Union of Serbia claiming that the Kosovo working class comprises mostly of separatists and nationalists”. This was only a justification, and the workers quickly showed their real intentions.36 This, after all, is the goal of those who organized all this, an organization and leadership that has been infiltrated by enemy forces. They have succeeded in manipulating a portion of the workers. From nearly every detail we can see that the entire action is entirely well organized and led . . . in the way certain unacceptable demands are slowly and gradually coming to the surface.37 Most often, the articles point out the “unusual” organization and “synchronization” of the masses, behaving “as if commanded” and following a “well known scenario” and an established “scenography” and “choreography”. (Numerous articles allude to Yugoslav and worker flags and photos of Tito serving only to cover the “real” character of the protests.)

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 71 The same pattern, same scenography, same slogans, chants and demands of the miners who yesterday arrived in Priština at different times, walking in file, has led many to think that their appearance in the streets of the Province’s capital was not at all accidental, that is, that it has all been synchronized.38 In minutes, as if commanded, a mass of people filled the streets of Priština.39 At the conference of the League of Communists of Serbia, participants demanded an official definition of the protest. During the discussion, many sharpened even the most negative media evaluations of the nature of the protests: despite “camouflage”, these are anti-Serbian protests, as well as counter-revolutionary resistance to reforms. Which is why we ask and wonder: what is happening? . . . How many remnants of shameless counter-revolution? The experience from 1981, when there was a slow reaction to the protests, first the students and then the rest, misinformation around the country regarding this question, especially in Kosovo, demand from us that we posthaste call this by its real name. . . .40 [T]hese are essentially anti-Serbian protests of large proportion, prepared in the same kitchen of 1968 and 1981. The basic aims and demands are that nothing change, that existing politics be defended at all cost. This is done with great vehemence . . . so all the camouflage used to hide this – falls flat. There is an attempt to give the protests a pro-Yugoslav character, unsuccessfully so. . . . What has been happening in Kosovo these last few days are protests, but protests as a new emergence of the continuous counter-revolution of Albanian nationalists and separatists. The protests have been subtly prepared, organized and have been thoughtfully led. It has all been worked out to the last detail.41 Standing in contrast to the “enemy protests in Kosovo” is the “majestic gathering at [Belgrade’s] Ušće”. The editorial policy of the analyzed newspapers clearly differentiated the legitimate “Us” from the illegitimate “Them” in the protests at the time. [T]here are thousands of busses and cars coming into Belgrade. People of various ages, professions, education profiles are arriving to express their wish for a unified Yugoslavia, for change, for a better future. . . .42 At the majestic gathering at Ušće  .  .  . speakers spoke about the drama unfolding in Kosovo, about brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia, about reforms, the future of the young generation, strength of the working class, a past of which we can be proud.43 Specially, for the occasion, Politika introduced a column “Echoes of the Gathering of Brotherhood and Unity in Belgrade”, which featured titles such as: “Majestic Gathering Spreads Humanity and Yugoslavness (Osijek)”, “Kragujevac: It Was

72  Marjan Ivković et al. a Symphony”, “Novi Sad: Let There Be Harmony instead of Rancor”, “Sarajevo: Satisfaction with the Yugoslavness of the Behavior”, etc. In such a framework, Kosovo protests could not be on the same level of legitimacy with the solidarity gatherings with the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins and the ultimate gathering in Belgrade. A worker stood up from the crowd and yelled: “Tomorrow there is a gathering in Belgrade. How is that allowed, and this not?” – There the SAWP of Belgrade is organizing a gathering and is taking responsibility for it – said Kaqusha Jashari and added – If you continue speaking like that, I will stop listening.44 As we tried to show in the analysis, the hybrid discourse was used in 1988 in the Milošević-controlled newspapers such as Politika to delegitimize the Albanian protest in Kosovo against the constitutional amendments and, at the same time, legitimize the Serbian protests. This required, for the first time, that a distinction be made in the media between a “positive”, pro-reform and antibureaucratic Serbian nationalism and the “negative”, anti-reform and backward Albanian nationalism. The discourse that was tightly woven around the events of 1988 illustrates the basic characteristics of the discursive reduction of protest movement in socialist Yugoslavia. However, it also shows the long-term outcome of this technique of symbolic domination – the gradual relinquishing of actors to even attempt to articulate their experience of injustice in a social framework.

Concluding considerations In this chapter, we tried to explain how the political elite’s strategy of transposing the crises of legitimacy of Yugoslav socialism from a socio-economic to a symbolic plane gradually evolved from the protests in 1968 to the complex events of 1988. In order to understand the long-term impact of this technique of symbolic domination on Yugoslav social reality, we propose a formal model which consists of an axis of political power and an axis of discursive articulation of protest demands (axis of ideology) (see Figure 4.1). Before the period of experimentation, most actors were located within the upper left quadrant and systemically bound to articulate social claims only through socialist and anti-nationalist discourse. However, self-management reforms acknowledged particularistic articulation of both political and economic demands. Therefore, in the Yugoslav protest movements caused primarily by economic crises and inequalities, two reference frameworks are consistently present: the identitarian and the class. They are mutually entwined within the actors’ experience of injustice. Mobilization of a protest movement requires an intersubjective process of articulating the experience of injustice. The final outcome of this articulation depends on two factors: the “comprehensive vocabulary” (worldview) the actors

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 73

Figure 4.1 Formal model consisting of an axis of political power and an axis of discursive articulation of protest demands (axis of ideology)

have at their disposal, and the efficiency of mechanisms of symbolic domination at the ruling class’ disposal, such as the strategy of discursive reduction. As we tried to show, the Yugoslav ruling class successfully used symbolic domination in decisive moments in 1968 and 1981: the protest participants were thus unable to legitimize their demands as “socialist” either during the protests or in the media. This prevented the concentration of actors in the left bottom quadrant over time, which would allow them to form a social anti-nationalist resistance compatible with Yugoslavness. Instead, in the long term, discursive reduction contributed to the concentration of ordinary actors in the right quadrant, regardless of whether they fully articulated their socio-economic demands in the identitarian framework or they began to interpret their demands as incompatible with Yugoslavia (both modes of articulation were present in protest movements of Kosovo Albanians in 1968, 1981 and 1988). The final outcome of discursive reduction as a strategy of symbolic domination was the split in the Yugoslav elite into two streams and the definitive ossification of protesting actors in the nationalist quadrant in 1988. The use of the nationalist

74  Marjan Ivković et al. label from 1968 until the mid-1980s to delegitimize protests had a reflexive effect on the elite itself. A  significant portion of the elite responded to the structural crisis of the Yugoslav system by resignifying the “nationalist” label itself and partially adopting one of its modes (the nationalism of one’s own ethnic group and a rejection of opposing ethnic nationalisms). In the 1980s, the Yugoslav elite attempted once again to respond to the profound systemic crisis with an “experimental” solution in the sphere of economics, this time with a substantive liberalization of the market. However, the portion of the elite in favor of the reforms led by Milošević, aimed to show the ideologies of market liberalization and ethnic nationalism as inseparable, positioning itself strategically in the upper right quadrant of our model.45 By articulating ordinary actors’ experience of injustice in a nationalist vocabulary, they were fighting the Yugoslav-oriented segment of the elite and were aiming to concentrate all actors into the upper right and lower right quadrants. In successfully beating the antinationalist positioned “reformers” embodied in the Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković, Milošević began a chain reaction of mobilization of all actors along the right side of the coordinate system, which would take hold of all Republics and ethnic groups in Yugoslavia by the first half of 1989. The sketched dynamic of the protesting actors’ experiences of injustice and the strategies of symbolic domination of the ruling class represents one of the reasons for the failure of four and a half decades of the socialist system in Yugoslavia to neutralize nationalism as the primary reference framework for interpreting social reality in Kosovo.

Notes 1 Cf. Mladen Lazić, U susret zatvorenom društvu (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1987); Mladen Lazić, Sistem i slom (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1994); also: Rory Archer, “Social Inequalities and the Study of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution”, in: F. Bieber, A. Galijaš and R. Archer (eds.), Debating the End of Yugoslavia (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014). 2 Dejan Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 41. 3 In Yugoslavia, liberalization could be seen in the decentralization of political power and opening up of space for regulating certain aspects of economic activity through the logic of the market. Another important aspect of liberalization nominally meant a higher threshold of tolerance by the political elites for challenges to the system of legitimization, that is “(self-)criticism”. This was true as long as these challenges were not articulated in a language of class struggle that would question the socialist character of the Yugoslav system itself. 4 Systemic legitimization here means a constant, continuous process of interpreting and reinterpreting all institutional aspects of a given social reality as just, that is, as normatively more universal compared to the existing (or imaginable) alternative forms of institutional order. 5 Cf. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 6 Cf. Susan L. Woodward, “The Political Economy of Ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia”, Socialist Register 39 (2003): 75–76; Susan L. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 75 Press, 1995); Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 7 Although during the existence of SFRY, Kosovo’s absolute economic development was greater than of other regions, its relative advancement was more problematic. In 1953 Kosovo was three and half times less developed than Slovenia, while immediately before the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1989, the difference was 1:8 (Jović 2001: 96‒97; 2003: 31). Dejan Jović, “Razlozi za raspad socijalističke Jugoslavije: Kritička analiza postojećih interpretacija”, Reč 62(8) (2001): 96–97; Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla, 31). Also, see: Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 51, 53; and Dijana Pleština, Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). 8 Symbolic reproduction of order refers to forms of integration of social activity that define individual and collective identities of the actors, their status and justification of the asymmetry of their power in the decision process regarding the collective goals of action. 9 According to our anti-essentialist position, a given protest movement adopts its specific form by the collective formulation of an “experience of injustice” (Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996)) of a group of actors in a specific vocabulary of political struggle – e.g. the vocabulary of distributive justice or the vocabulary of national selfdetermination. The experience of injustice is most often complex and holds within itself “identitarian” and “class” elements, but these elements are pre-discursive. They represent a form of affective and morally intuitive reactions of actors within a specific social situation. If multiple vocabularies are available, the final articulation of the protest in a single vocabulary will depend on numerous factors – the power relations of the actors within the protest movement, reactions of the carriers of political power and their specific techniques of “neutralization” of the challenges the protest movement directs at the legitimacy of the movement. This is how we understand the role of the strategy of “discursive reduction” the Yugoslav elite applied to the protest movements in Kosovo. 10 The initial sample was composed of all issues of Borba, Politika and Večernje novosti published between 1 November–10 December 1968, 1 March–10 April 1981 and 1 November–1 December 1988. 11 Framing means selecting certain aspects of a perceived reality and leaving out others, followed by the emphasis of the former as particularly important in the context of communication. This is achieved by defining a problem, diagnosing its causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies (Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, Journal of Communication 43(4) (1993): 52). 12 Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–74 (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 1977), 173–179. 13 In that sense, we are also interpreting one of the first and most far-reaching moves of liberalization undertaken by the Yugoslav elite as early as the beginning of the fifties: the abandonment of systemic development of a Yugoslav national identity “from above” and substituting this identity with the ideology of “brotherhood and unity” of the Yugoslav peoples. Cf. also David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt (New York: Routledge, 2013), 63‒91. 14 Although it is indisputable that Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbia as an act of imperial domination (cf. Dimitrije Tucović, Srbija i Arbanija: jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije (Beograd-Zagreb: Kultura, 1946), 96–97); John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 97, in which Albanians were frequently reduced to second

76  Marjan Ivković et al. class citizens, with its internationalism, socialism offered the possibility of overcoming the burden of inter-ethnic conflict. 15 Borba, “Ocena trogodišnje aktivnosti”, 14 November 1968, 6. 16 Borba, “Ocena studentskih događaja”, 1 November 1968, 4. 17 Borba, “Šovinisti se služe svim sredstvima da unesu smutnju i nepoverenje”, 9 November 1968, 3. 18 Politika, “Neprijatelj pokazao pravo lice”, 7 December 1968, n.a. 19 Borba, “Prištinski studenti osuđuju demonstracije”, 3 December 1968. 20 Borba, “Demonstracije su naišle na oštru osudu studenata”, 4 December 1968, 4. 21 Politika, “Otvorena suočavanja”, 7 December 1968, n.a. 22 According to interpretations of the dissolution of Yugoslavia that place emphasis on institutional reasons, the logic of the 1974 Constitution and other legal regulation, in particular the Law of Associative Labor (1976) obstructed the functioning of federal bodies and contributed to the disintegration tendencies in society (Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla, 84‒85). 23 Cf. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt, 91‒114. 24 Cf. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1998). 25 Politika, “Osuđene grupe studenata kao neprijateljske”, 29 March 1981, 8. 26 Večernje novosti, “Protiv nacionalizma beskompromisno”, 5 April 1981, 1. 27 Ibid. 28 Borba, “Razvoj Kosova smeta kontrarevolucionarima”, 4 April 1981, 3. 29 Ibid. 30 Borba, “Borba protiv neprijatelja, za poverenje i bratstvo i jedinstvo”, 7 April 1981, 2. 31 Politika, “Nemamo pravo da odustanemo”, 22 November 1988c, 1. 32 Shkelzen Maliqi, “Kosovo kao katalizator jugoslovenske krize”, in: S. Gaber, T. Kuzmanić (eds.), Kosovo – Srbija – Jugoslavija (Ljubljana: Univerzitetna konferenca ZSMS, Knjižnica revolucionarne teorije 1989), 73. 33 For more on the grassroots protest movements of Serbs in Kosovo as an autonomous political factor in the period from 1985 to 1988, see: Nebojša Vladisavljević, “Grassroots Groups, Miloševic or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy over the Origins and Dynamics of the Mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s”, Nationalities Papers 32(4) (2004): 781–796. and Nebojša Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Miloševic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008). 34 Borba, “Protest pod maskom podrške”, 20 November 1988, 5. 35 Politika, “Demonstracije na Kosovu nesumnjivo su kontinuitet kontrarevolucionarnih događaja iz 1981. godine”, 24 November 1988b, 1. 36 Borba, “Remzi Koljgeci VD predsednika”, 18 November 1988, 1–5. 37 Večernje novosti, “Studenti produžili demonstracije”, 20 November 1988, 6. 38 Večernje novosti, “Protest zbog ostavki”, 18 November 1988, 1–3. 39 Borba, “Prestalo, pa ponovo počelo”, 21 November 1988, 1. 40 Politika, “Tri reforme  – mera efikasnosti delovanja Saveza komunista”, 23 November 1988d, 2. 41 Večernje novosti, “Još radi stara kuhinja”, 22 November 1988, 4. 42 Politika, “Danas miting bratstva i jedinstva”, 19 November 1988a, 1. 43 Borba, “Jedinstvom stvorimo budućnost”, 20 November 1988, 1. 44 Borba, “Nemirenje sa kadrovskim promenama”, 19–20 November 1988, 19–20. 45 Cf. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise (New York: Routledge, 1999).

References Sources Borba (1968). “Demonstracije su naišle na oštru osudu studenata”, 4 December, p. 4. Borba (1968). “Ocena studentskih događaja”, 1 November, p. 4.

Systemic legitimization in Yugoslavia 77 Borba (1968). “Ocena trogodišnje aktivnosti”, 14 November, p. 6. Borba (1968). “Prištinski studenti osuđuju demonstracije”, 3 December, n.a. Borba (1968). “Šovinisti se služe svim sredstvima da unesu smutnju i nepoverenje”, 9 November, p. 3. Borba (1981). “Borba protiv neprijatelja, za poverenje i bratstvo i jedinstvo”, 7 April, p. 2. Borba (1981). “Razvoj Kosova smeta kontrarevolucionarima”, 4 April, p. 3. Borba (1988). “Jedinstvom stvorimo budućnost”, 20 November, p. 1. Borba (1988). “Nemirenje sa kadrovskim promenama”, 19–20 November, p. 1. Borba (1988). “Prestalo, pa ponovo počelo”, 21 November, p. 1. Borba (1988). “Protest pod maskom podrške”, 20 November, p. 5. Borba (1988). “Remzi Koljgeci VD predsednika”, 18 November, p. 1–5. Politika (1968). “Neprijatelj pokazao pravo lice”, 7 December, n.a. Politika (1968). “Otvorena suočavanja”, 7 December, n.a. Politika (1981). “Osuđene grupe studenata kao neprijateljske”, 29 March, p. 8. Politika (1988a). “Danas miting bratstva i jedinstva”, 19 November, p. 1. Politika (1988b). “Demonstracije na Kosovu nesumnjivo su kontinuitet kontrarevolucionarnih događaja iz 1981. godine”, 24 November, p. 1. Politika (1988c). “Nemamo pravo da odustanemo”, 22 November, p. 1. Politika (1988d). “Tri reforme  – mera efikasnosti delovanja Saveza komunista”, 23 November, p. 2. Večernje novosti (1988). “Još radi stara kuhinja”, 22 November, p. 4. Večernje novosti (1988). “Protest zbog ostavki”, 18 November, p. 1–3. Večernje novosti (1981). “Protiv nacionalizma beskompromisno”, 5 April, p. 1. Večernje novosti (1988). “Studenti produžili demonstracije”, 20 November, p. 6.

Bibliography Archer, Rory (2014). “Social Inequalities and the Study of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution” In: Debating the End of Yugoslavia. Edited by Florian Bieber, Armina Galijaš and Rory Archer. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 135–151. Burg, Steven L. (2014). Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dyker, David A. (2013). Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt. New York: Routledge. Entman. Robert M. (1993). “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, Journal of Communication 43(4): 51–58. Honneth, Axel (1996). The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Jović, Dejan (2001). “Razlozi za raspad socijalističke Jugoslavije: Kritička analiza postojećih interpretacija”, Reč 62(8): 91–157. Jović, Dejan (2003). Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla. Zagreb: Prometej. Lampe, John R. (2000). Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lazić, Mladen (1987). U susret zatvorenom društvu. Zagreb: Naprijed. Lazić, Mladen (1994). Sistem i slom. Beograd: Filip Višnjić. Lydall, Harold (1989). Yugoslavia in Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press. Malcolm, Noel (1998). Kosovo: A Short History. London: Macmillan Publishers. Maliqi, Shkelzen (1989). “Kosovo kao katalizator jugoslovenske krize” In: Kosovo  – Srbija – Jugoslavija. Edited by Slavko Gaber and Tonči Kuzmanić. Ljubljana: Univerzitetna konferenca ZSMS, Knjižnica revolucionarne teorije, pp. 69–77.

78  Marjan Ivković et al. Meier, Viktor (1999). Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise. New York: Routledge. Pleština, Dijana (1992). Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. (2015). Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rusinow, Dennison I. (1977). The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–74. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. Tucović, Dimitrije (1946). Srbija i Arbanija: jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije. Beograd-Zageb: Kultura. Van Dijk, Teun A. (1998). Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage. Vladisavljević, Nebojša (2004). “Grassroots Groups, Miloševic or Dissident Intellectuals? A Controversy over the Origins and Dynamics of the Mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s”, Nationalities Papers 32(4): 781–796. Vladisavljević, Nebojša (2008). Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Miloševic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Woodward, Susan L. (1995). Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Woodward, Susan L. (2003). “The Political Economy of Ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia”, Socialist Register 39: 73–92.

5 Seeing each other Nesting Orientalisms and internal Balkanism among the Albanians and South Slavs in the former Yugoslavia Atdhe Hetemi Introduction The presence of Orientalist and Balkanist discourses in Yugoslavia produced Western stereotypes. The Orientalist and Balkanist expositions of this region also shaped a variety of discourses among communities living in the Yugoslavia, particularly due to diverse histories and specifics of each ethnic group. However, a uniform interpretation of Orientalism and Balkanism in the context of Yugoslavia cannot be made. This chapter highlights the multilayered and polyphonic character of Orientalism reflected in how the people living in the Yugoslavia viewed themselves, were viewed externally by other peoples in the country and were viewed by the West. Applying an Orientalist and Balkanist theoretical lens on Albanians living in the Yugoslavia, this chapter explores and provides some thoughts on how Albanians defined themselves, how they were perceived by the South Slavic majority within the Yugoslavia and why Albanians considered their nationality as the primary factor in defining themselves, unlike other peoples living in Yugoslavia.

Orientalism Edward Said describes the Orient as a label that designates the East in contrast to the Occident, which refers to the West, while Orientalism, as a concept, is often used as an analytical term on how the East is seen by the West.1 According to Said, Orientalism indicates several things, and it can be argued that all of them are interdependent. Through a philosophical analysis, Said positions the West’s insincere perceptions of “the Orient” as “the other,” different, unusual, fanatical, violent, religious and inferior. By analyzing the Western attitudes towards the East, Said considers Orientalism as a powerful European ideological creation and a way for writers, philosophers and colonial administrators to deal with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs. Said pictures the West’s tendency to deal with the East through a generalized and systematic vocabulary that is used to describe the Orient as unchanging and uniform and as something that the West should fear. He analyzes European and American observations of the

80  Atdhe Hetemi Arab and Islamic culture and general dichotomous attributions these two are trying to ascribe to the East: barbarism versus civilization, Western progress behind “us” versus “them” or Christianity and civilization versus primitivism and Islam.2 Orientalism also addresses universal clichés of human nature involving power and discourse that resonate beyond the broader “East-West” divisions.3 By dismantling the Western tendency to present itself as rational, developed, humane and superior, while presenting the Orient as underdeveloped, aberrant and inferior, Said maintains that the Orient appeared as “the other” in the Western descriptions for the purpose of its domination. Further, Said maintains that abstracts are always preferred to direct evidence that Orientals cannot be trusted because “of liberty, they know nothing; of propriety, they have none: force is their God” (Chateaubriand quoted in Said’s Orientalism 1978: 172). However, Said’s theories were also criticized by a number of scholars. Among others, Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit wrote a critical replication to the Said’s Orientalism, or a book that seeks to account for anti-Western attitudes, entitled Occidentalism: A  Short History of Anti-Westernism. Buruma and Margalit provide examples from historical contexts on how Occidentalism cannot rightfully be regarded as an exclusive, original product of the East, although the main aspects of Occidentalism remain sketched. The word Occidentalism is used by the authors as an antithesis of Orientalism, which aims to highlight that “the West” in the minds of its self-proclaimed enemies remains largely unexamined and woefully misunderstood. As compared to Said, Buruma and Margalit declare that the roots of Occidentalism lie in the Western, rather than non-Western, world.4

Connections of Orientalism and Balkanism with the Balkans Said’s theories on Orientalism are also useful for understanding the importance of how the West imagines the Balkans. Building on Said’s concept of Orientalism, Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden consider that the Balkans can be viewed as a variation of the Orientalist theme which distinguishes this region as part of Europe that used to be under Ottoman rule.5 Milica Bakić-Hayden also uses the term “nesting Orientalism” (1995), and by introducing the idea of “nesting,” she tends to dismantle a likeliness of each region to view the cultures and religions to their East as more conservative and primitive.6 She argues that identities become fluid and overlapping in the process of nesting, while ethnic, national, religious or gender identities could shift or become fixed but are nonetheless changing. In her theory, she also explains how a group that creates the Orientalized “other” can also be the subject of Orientalization by a different group. According to this concept, Asia is more “east” or more “other” than Eastern Europe, and within Eastern Europe, the Balkans are perceived as most “eastern.” Such hierarchy also exists within the Balkans. For example, Yugoslavs who reside in areas that were formerly the Habsburg monarchy distinguish themselves as more European from the Eastern Orthodox peoples who also perceive themselves as more European than those who assumed identities of European Muslims and who further distinguish themselves from the ultimate Orientals, non-Europeans.7

Seeing each other 81 On the other hand, Maria Todorova, the founding figure of Balkanism,8 in her historical analysis, challenges Bakić-Hayden’s argument and insists that Balkanism is an altogether different discourse and that this part of Europe does not present an Orientalist variation.9 She shows convincingly historical facts according to which Balkanism cannot be considered as a sub-species of Orientalism, because the concept evolved independently from Orientalism and is strongly motivated by an aggressive and passionate nationalism, not religion. Nevertheless, Todorova claims that the Balkans’ inconsistent (but usually negative) image in Western culture impacts the paradoxes of cultural reference and its assumptions, still, she argues that the Balkans form a part of Europe, albeit a provincial or peripheral part for the last several centuries. Balkanism, according to Todorova, treats the differences within one type, Europe, rather than the difference between imputed types (the “Occident” and the “Orient”). Todorova thus insists on the difference between Said’s theory of Orientalism and her theory of Balkanism: Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as “the other,” the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and “the West” has been constructed. Balkanism conveniently exempted “the West” from charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance: the Balkans, after all, are in Europe, they are white and they are predominantly Christian.10 The importance of Balkanism as a concept was also emphasized in identity constructions. In the case of the Balkans, the identity constructions involve the dual perception of the Balkans as a part of Europe, but also its opposition and its “darker side.” Thus, according to Todorova, Balkanism evolved independently from Orientalism, and in certain aspects against or despite it, and that, partially, because the Southeastern Europe has been considered geopolitically distinct from the Near or the Middle East.11 Nevertheless, both Todorova and Bakić-Hayden agree regarding the Balkans’ perceived “otherness” in Western eyes, although one argues that it is motivated by aggressive and passionate nationalism12 while the other stresses that the religion impacted further division between the East (Orthodox churches and Islam) and the West (Catholic and Protestant churches).13 When narrowing the focus further to only one part of the Balkans, namely Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that areas populated by majority Catholic inhabitants, who resided in the former Habsburg monarchy, saw themselves as different or “European” when compared to the other areas formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Bakić-Hayden analyzed how the Orthodox community perceived themselves as more European in comparison to those that assumed the identity of European Muslims (Bosnians). After these analyses, Bakić-Hayden concluded that, while Slovenes and Croats used their Catholic religion and former affiliation to the Habsburg Empire to reach their

82  Atdhe Hetemi European aspirations, the advantages of belonging to the Ottoman Empire did not matter at all, particularly for the Muslims.14 The northwest stresses the European character and apparent advantages of once being a part of the Habsburg Empire, while their Ottoman heritage is blamed for the ills of the rest of the country.

Application of the Orientalist and Balkanist theoretical lens to Albanians in Yugoslavia Although most of the peoples of Yugoslavia used their religion as the most important tool to acquire Western and European identities and thus break free from their Ottoman past and from each other, according to Bakić-Hayden, Albanians were the exception. Religion did not impact the Albanian strong sense of national and “non-Slavic” identity.15 Therefore, it was Albanian nationalism – based on language, ethnicity and territory, rather than religion – propagated by the Albanian elites that unified ideologically both the country and its other territories. Yugoslavia’s ethnic Albanians lived mainly in Kosovo, Macedonia, Southeastern Serbia and Montenegro. Due to the lengthy Ottoman rule over some of the lands they inhabited, Albanians are also included on Maria Todorova’s realm of Balkanism where she argues that “it is preposterous to look for an Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The Balkans are the Ottoman legacy.”16 In addition to Todorova’s illustration, the main way in which Balkanism has been internalized among Albanians living in Yugoslavia also includes internal differentiation based on imputed Balkan characteristics or what Bakić-Hayden describes as “nesting Orientalisms.” How Albanians defined their self Being perceived as an Orientalist and a Balkanist or as non-Western society, similarly to most other national elites in the Balkans, Albanian nationalist elites as well required their community to resemble their Western counterparts that were considered as the source of reference for “modernization” and “progress,” during the processes of modernization in the 18th and the 19th century.17 Nathalie Clayer also states that Albanian nationalism in the Balkans have been a product of political transformations permeating the Ottoman Empire.18 Jonilda Rrapaj and Klevis Kolasi from the University of Ankara, when writing about the curiosity of the development of Albanian nationalism periodized its beginning, intensification and expansion in three main phases: a b c

it begins with the period of publication of the first Albanian alphabet in 1844 as a symbolic date, until the collapse of the League of Prizren (1881) or the publication of Sami Frashëri’s nationalist Manifesto in 1899; it intensifies after the crushing of the League of Prizren by the Sublime Porte and especially after the Greek-Ottoman crisis in 1897 and continues even after the declaration of independence, because of the fragile state structure; the spread of nationalism to the masses starts only with the establishment of a proper state structure and political stability after 1920.19

Seeing each other 83 This general periodization is also supported by the detailed research done by Nathalie Clayer.20 Like most of the nations in the Balkans, and during the three abovementioned phases, Albanians embarked on a quest for their pre-Christian lineage that, in their case, was constructed as being Pelasg and later on as Illyrian. One of the main propagators of this idea, followed by Albanian activists, was the Austrian von Hahn, who published in Vienna in 1854 a book entitled, Albanische Studien, which among other things says that the Albanians are autochthonous because they descend directly from the Illyrians, as do the people of Macedonia and Epirus, all stemming from prehistoric Pelasgians.21 As a first element towards their “modernization,” thus seeking to “look different” from the other populations in the Balkans and, obviously, “non-Slavic,” Albanians started viewing themselves as descendants of Illyrians. The main reason for this according to Dukagjin Gorani is that the process of society’s “Westernization” entailed the simultaneous exercise of their “de-Orientalisation,” thus one’s “Westernness” could have only been measured through one’s “non-easterness.”22 Even today, modern Albanians consider the idea of Illyrian heritage as part of their shared heritage.23 Wilkes’ book The Illyrians highlighted that the lands between the Adriatic and the river Danube, now Yugoslavia and Albania, were the home of the peoples known to the ancient world as Illyrians. This is one of the few books in English which focuses solely on these ancient peoples and their province and as such, it carries a lot of weight but also has a lot of problems and disputed historical conclusions.24 There are historians, such as John V. A. Fine who have concluded that Albanians are descendants of populations of the prehistoric Balkans, such as the Illyrians,25 whereas studies in genetic anthropology show that the Albanians share the same ancestry as most other European peoples.26 However, very little evidence of preChristian Albanian culture survived, although their mythology and folklore are of Paleo-Balkanic origin and almost all of their elements are pagan.27 The legitimacy of these claims has been contested and has led to a conflict between Balkan ethnic groups.28 However, parallel to the enforcement of their claims of Illyrian non-Slavic identity, Albanians altered their links with the Ottoman past. Ottoman words were thrown out from the Albanian language dictionaries and those Albanianborn Grand Viziers29 and other important officials who ruled the Ottoman Empire went unmentioned in the Albanian official historical records. In addition, history textbooks started reading that the Ottoman period of Albanian history was dominated by violence. Heated debates went on recently when the Turkish government requested Albania and Kosovo to make certain interventions and remove inappropriate words that describe the Ottomans. As for instance, in a 12th grade history textbook, the phrase “stirred hatred against the Ottoman rule” from page 48 is suggested to be replaced with “caused dissatisfaction with the Ottoman rule” etc.30 Tirana-based sociologist Enis Sulstarova highlights that, sometimes, due to the tendencies of being positioned as the Illyrians, as well as being listed as one of the “Westernized” nations, many Albanian intellectuals and politicians emphasize the early conversion of Albanians to Christianity, dubbing it the “true religion of Albanians” or the “religion of forefathers.”31 Sulstarova also justifies this

84  Atdhe Hetemi approach by saying that “creating a Western identity was a matter of survival for Albanian elites in the late 19th century.”32 Such history-telling started during the 19th century as part of nation-building process known as “national revival,” which portrayed the Ottomans as enemies of Albanians. But, the practice of considering the legacy of Ottoman Empire as responsible for almost every economic, cultural or political issue that the Albanians encountered throughout their history continued during the entire 20th century to the present. It is position of this chapter that there are also other reasons that impacted the survival of tendency to dismiss the legacy of the Ottoman past. First, people might find it easier to blame the Ottomans for current problems by claiming that “had the Ottomans not invaded us, we would have been a developed Western nation today.” This could also be considered as a sort of nesting Balkanism of Albanians vis-àvis the Ottomans. Second, there is a fact that political elites that ruled Albania after the First and Second World Wars, King Ahmet Zogu (1928–1939) and Communist leader Enver Hoxha (1945–1985) were brought to power with the initial agreements and support of Serbia. Thus, these Albanian rulers needed someone to blame, for the fact that their political agreements with the “real enemy” made Albania one of the few states in Europe that left half of its nation out of its borders.33 Another reason that should be considered as an important factor that caused these anti-Ottoman approaches toward history and national mentality, especially during Communism, which in itself has a revisionist character, was simply that the official ideology dictated that any reality created by a foreign rule must always be considered as dark and hated. Still, in an editorial comment on this paper, the Albanian cultural anthropologist, historian and philologist, Dr. Rigels Halili considers class struggle the most important factor in the Albanian tendency to dismiss the Ottoman legacy. Halili highlights that Ottoman rule was perceived as rule of the aristocratic class over the people. Such an approach emerges directly from the Leninist approach to history. And despite the poor communication between Albania and Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia were quite impacted by Albania’s approach toward national, historical and identity definitions and approaches. The reason for this is that literature produced and shaped in Albania influenced Albanians living outside of the country’s borders. However, there are ongoing debates in Albania about the necessity to re-interpret, change or improve historic materials from which Albanian pupils and students learn history in schools and at the universities.34 Dritan Egro, historian of the Ottoman Empire at Albania’s Institute of History in Tirana, highlights for Balkan Insight that this “softening” towards the Ottomans is a result of a more sophisticated approach to social sciences combined with a renewed general curiosity about the period.35 All these circumstances and tendencies to hide or ignore four centuries of history lead us to believe that, so far, Albanians were taught history the wrong way.36 Other intellectuals also agree that Albanian historical records were influenced by nationalist propaganda of the 19th century “national revival” and the Communist regime in the second half of the 20th century.37 Another element that made Albanians “look different” from others living in Yugoslavia was their religious diversity and a strong sense of national identity

Seeing each other 85 as well as language. As opposed to all other nations living in Yugoslavia who used religion as one of the most important identification tools, this was not the case among Albanians. It is necessary to highlight that I am implying that, while national identity of South Slavs was strongly based on religion, in the case of Albanians, national identity was rather constructed based on elements, such as language, territory, history, culture and not religion. As Gorani puts it, “the nation retained the position of a genuine religion of Albanians.”38 Bakić-Hayden also highlights that religion did not impact Albanians’ strong sense of national and “non-Slavic” identity.39 However, Isa Blumi theorizes that such an identity was politically mobilized and that it was culturally opaque and ideologically fluid prior to the 1912 Balkan Wars. In relation to the competition among various state and power structures, be it in the shape of a great power intervention or attempts at building new national identities, Blumi shows that Ottoman reforms were successful in encouraging most subjects of the Empire to commingle local interests with the fate of the Empire, meaning that parochial concern for the survival of the immediate community, as it transformed over time, was directly linked to the survival of the Ottoman state.40 Thus, Albanians in Yugoslavia were perceived first as the national other and then, depending on who was seeing them, also as a religious one. However, even though they were seen as part of another nation, and not necessarily as Mohamedans, a label reserved for Bosnians, still giving priority to the Albanian – linguistic and ethnic – identity presented a reasonable approach, knowing that Albanians were one of the nations with a large religious diversity in the Balkans. I would like to claim here that another reason which considerably pushed toward giving special emphasis to national rather than religious identity is the fact that Albanian Muslims were regarded by other communities living within Yugoslavia as “Turks,” and Albanian Orthodox were regarded as “Greeks” and Albanian Catholics as “Latins” until the 20th century. This insight is based on oral sources gathered from older generations that lived in the Yugoslav era, as well as the writing of Pashko Vasa41 in 1879 and Sami Frasheri42 in 1899, using the very same terms. Trying to abolish this anxiety, in attempt to unify and strengthen national identity, from the Ottoman era onwards, Albanian elites followed the process of replacement of the religious differences with the common national identity that was neither Turk, Greek nor Latin. Yugoslavia’s South Slavic majority’s perception of Albanians As stated earlier, the multilayered and polyphonic character of Orientalism and Balkanism was also reflected in how the peoples living in Yugoslavia were viewed by one another. Albanians were portrayed negatively, particularly by the Serbs, due to historical reasons and conceptions of origins. Stephanie SchwandnerSievers considers this powerful stereotypical imagery against Albanians, a subcategory of Balkanism known as “Albanianism.” Some of the negative features of “Albanianism,” or “Arnauten”43 according to Schwandner-Sievers, include the perception of Albanians as corrupt, violent (in the sense of unpredictable cruelty),

86  Atdhe Hetemi dirty, poor, ignorant of both state and religious law, open to bribery and prone to alcoholism, theft and murder.44 When creating stereotypes, groups usually reflect on the religion, ethnicity, culture, historical, political or other ideas. They use these tools to define important or nonsensical issues, reasonable or ridiculous moments of differentiation between an “us” and “them.” In the case of Serbian stereotypes of Albanians, available sources suggest that Albanians were portrayed very negatively, not necessarily due to their religious or other ideological differences. Noel Malcolm points out that the ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is less a battle over bloodlines and religion than it is the one over differing conceptions of national origins and history.45 However, in addition to these arguments about the secular and ethnical character of the Albanian stigmatization, there are certain Serbian tendencies to use religion as a tool to deepen the stereotypes between these two nations which appeared during the 1970s and 1980s. These stereotypes promoted that Albanians from Kosovo were experiencing an Islamic revival, as illustrated by the popular media in Serbia of that time: [T]he truth about Kosovo and Metohija has not changed much over time, so that even today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knocking at the door of Kosovo and Metohija, is trying to approach Europe. Even those in Europe who do not hold Serbia close to their hearts know very well that this old Balkan state represents the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam.46 Thus, when constructing social perceptions, different actors compete to present themselves in the best possible light, making sure to ascribe specific meaning to particular events. In line with their own interests, different social groups or individuals build different constructs suitable for these purposes. This chapter presents findings which show that negative Serbian stereotypes about the Albanians were initiated directly by high institutional instances – mainly academic and the politically/state-controlled community – and did not necessarily come from the society itself. In his article “Rep kao argument za izlaz na more” (Tail as an Argument for Access to the Sea), Božidar Jezernik tried to explain the interest of Serbia for construction of negative stereotypes against Albanians in general. Providing some historical context, Jezernik argues that these negative stereotypes mainly appeared due to the Serbian aim to get access to the Adriatic Sea through northern Albania. Jezernik considers that Serbia’s most offensive propaganda campaign against Albanians in general began with Vladan Đorđević’s (1844–1930) book entitled Arnauti i velike sile [Albanians and the Great Powers].47 With the intention of influencing the Great Powers, Vladan Đorđević, Prime Minister (1897–1900) and member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, quotes Edith Durham’s “High Albania,” in which she writes about meeting some Albanian highlanders and references J. G. Hahn’s repeated hearsay from southern Albania: reportedly, among the Albanians, there are people with tails similar to

Seeing each other 87 monkeys, hanging down from trees and so ignorant that they cannot distinguish sugar from snow.48 Jezernik underscores that Vladan Đorđević’s “arguments” were also used by the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, who advanced the view that the independence of Albania would be neither in the interest of Albania nor in the interest of Europe because Albanians are neither ready, nor do they deserve independence, not having any people with the knowledge to run the country.49 In his text “Seeing Albanians through Serbian Eyes,” Đorđe Stefanović reveals the origins of Serbia’s negative stereotypes against Albanians. The rise of the modern nation states in the post-Ottoman Balkans, as Stefanović states, was accompanied by stigmatization, coercive assimilation, deportation and even extermination of ethnic minorities, especially the local Muslims who were seen as former oppressors. Stefanović concludes that ethnic Albanians were repeatedly subjected to most exclusionary stigmatization and discriminatory policies in the formative periods of the Serbian state as well as Yugoslavia. While these actions of the Serbian elite were guided by the geopolitical security pressures and the coercive utopia of homogeneous nation-state, Serbian policymakers were also influenced by a strong intellectual tradition of intolerance towards Albanians.50 Expansionist tendencies in territories inhabited by Albanians, as well as Serbia’s negative perceptions of them was also treated by a Serbian publisher Dimitrije Tucović. In his book Srbija i Albanija [Serbia and Albania], he prominently criticized the Serbian policy towards Albanians by reporting Serbian violence from the front. We walked into someone else’s country . . . we have carried out the attempted premeditated murder of an entire nation . . . we were caught in that criminal act and have been obstructed. Now we have to suffer the punishment.51 Prishtina academic Pajazit Nushi added a list of cultural and scientific institutions and individuals who, according to him, contributed to the design and further development of Albanian stereotypes. In his book Të Vërtetat Për Kosovën [Truths on Kosova], Nushi highlights that the negative campaign of Serbian authorities against Albanians living in Yugoslavia was conducted because the Serbian regime wanted to expand toward Albanian territories. After the First World War, the Yugoslav government initiated a program aimed at colonizing Kosovo with the families of its officer corps. If Jezernik thought that the campaign against Albanians begins with Vladan Đorđević, Nushi for his part sought the roots of this stigmatization even earlier. According to him, the roots of these negative and discriminatory approaches toward Albanians originate with intellectual and political elites or, more specifically, with the Serbian historical treatise “Načertanije.” This document notes the experiences of the Serbian army in 1878, 1913, 1937 and 1945; the works of Serbian scientists and writers that became politicians (Jovan Cvijić, Vasa Čubrilović, Ivo Andrić etc.); and activities of Serbian cultural and science institutions influencing policymakers (Serbian Cultural Club, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Associations of Writers of Serbia, Serbian Orthodox Church).52

88  Atdhe Hetemi The negative perceptions of Albanians were even more visible with the ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia. Tito’s Yugoslavia was a nationally pluralistic country, with the slogan Bratstvo i Jedinstvo (Brotherhood and Unity). Despite the 1981 census documenting 1.7 million ethnic Albanians,53 which exceeded the number of Macedonians and Montenegrins, under the 1974 Constitution,54 they were not recognized as one of the “peoples” because, according to the Yugoslav government, their traditional homeland was outside Yugoslavia.55 From the formation of Yugoslavia until the 1970s, Albanians continued to be perceived as one of the most backward nations with high illiteracy rates – even though these rates rapidly diminished during the Communist period – a peculiar social structure, bordering on tribe mentality and with intrinsically criminal tendencies in Yugoslavia.56 As such, the majority of Albanians were poor and unemployed. For example, despite the fact that Kosovo Albanians outnumbered them, the Serbs and Montenegrins dominated the administration of Kosovo, although this started to change in the 1960s, especially after students began to graduate from the University of Prishtina.57 Institutional pressures on Albanians in Yugoslavia were particularly visible during the late 1950s and 1950s, a repressive and painful period. Miranda Vickers blames the regime for extreme measures which, at times, differed only a little from those used by the occupation forces during the wars.58 Also, using various sources, Vickers estimated that stigmatization of Albanians continued uninterrupted between 1944 and 1946, when over 36,000 (maybe as many as 47,000) Albanians were victims of systematic mass executions by Communists during the days of revolutionary fervor and later, through “search and destroy missions,” “pacification,” “disarming” and “rehabilitation programs,” police torture and epidemics of typhoid fever affecting military units.59 The situation changed for the better when the influence of the Albanian’s politician Fadil Hoxha in the Yugoslav Communist Party grew during the 1960s and 1970s. However, as everywhere at that time in Yugoslavia, those who acted against the regime faced repression, prisons and, at times, death. But the majority of those who wanted to make a living had the opportunity to do so. Veton Surroi, Albanian publicist, insists that it was Fadil Hoxha who fought for the expansion of federal aid and development programs in Kosovo, which led to Kosovo’s rapid industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Surroi also credits Fadil Hoxha for the expansion of cultural and educational institutions in the Albanian language, which obviously contributed considerably to the decrease of illiteracy rate among the Albanian population.60 It is also worth mentioning the student movements of 1968 in Prishtina, significantly impacted the initiation of positive developments for Albanians in Yugoslavia during these two decades. American scholar of Albanian origin Peter R. Prifti highlights and lists the main demands of the demonstrators, including: creation of an Albanian language university in Prishtina, declaring Albanian the official language in Kosovo, self-determination for Kosovo and the Albanian areas of Macedonia and Montenegro and bestowing Kosovo the status of a republic within SFRY with its own Constitution.61 Perhaps due to their nationalist nature, as well as politically sensitive student demands, the demonstrations in Kosovo were much more violent than in other countries of the

Seeing each other 89 Former Yugoslavia.62 However, as a result of these student demonstrations, the SFRY Constitution was amended in 1968 and 1971 to allow more local control in autonomous provinces, whereas the University of Prishtina was founded in November 1969. Amendments VII through XIX to the SFRY Constitution gave autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina more autonomy. Amendment VII redefined SFRY as having eight, instead of six, constituent parts: six socialist republics and two socialist autonomous provinces. In place of Serbia, it is the SFRY that became the custodian of the provinces’ rights and duties, and Kosovars were given the right to elect representatives to the SFRY legislature. Amendment XVIII renamed Kosova-Metohija into Kosova.63 Nevertheless, soon after Tito’s death (1980), deep-rooted antagonisms between Serbs and Albanians were intensified again in this troubled region. In 1981, seven years after Kosovo’s provincial government gained direct and separate representation in the main SFRY bodies via the 1974 SFRY Constitution, the students in Kosovo were again at the center of political turmoil. On March 11th, 1981, students started organizing demonstrations and asking for changes. Eleven people died in the course of these demonstrations. The level of intolerance and tension between the Serbian minority and the Albanians was soon transformed into war between the Serbian regime and the Kosovo Albanians. This tense situation was (mis)used by Slobodan Milošević, who, by bringing back institutional stigmatization of Albanians, also consolidated his authority in Serbia. Milošević also took measures to drastically reduce Kosovo’s autonomous status within Serbia and forced cultural oppression of the ethnic Albanian population (Carole 2003). All these discriminatory measures lasted for decades and resulted in a backwardness of the local Kosovo Albanian population. Further, the lack of employment opportunities caused continuous emigration.64 It is worth highlighting that in addition to the discriminatory politics, social conditions and both privileges and pressures of modernization led to emigration as well. During this phase, but especially during the 1990s, the Serbian state media played a crucial role in reviving ideas and opinions from 19th and 20th century texts, making use of hate speech. The warmongering campaign intensified to the point that during the 1999 NATO bombing, the media were identified as a separate target category. On May 23rd, 1999, NATO aircraft bombed the building of Radio Televisija Srbije (RTS), in the center of Belgrade.65 The Serbian government was informed about the attack and the time it was supposed to happen. Long-lasting ethnic tensions between the Serbian and Albanian populations of Kosovo left the region ethnically divided, resulting in interethnic violence, including the Kosovo War of 1999 (Schnabel and Thakur 2000: 20). The interest of Western powers (mainly USA) toward the Albanians living in Yugoslavia increased throughout the 1980s and particularly when interethnic tensions continued to worsen in Yugoslavia.66 Ibrahim Rugova (1944–2006), the Kosovo Albanian political leader built strong relations with the USA and other powerful European countries and managed to gain the sympathy of the Western powers, drawing their attention to the Albanians living in the Yugoslavia. The West’s commitment to stabilize the Albanian situation ended with a NATO military intervention.

90  Atdhe Hetemi However, today, 18 years after Kosovo’s de facto separation from Yugoslavia/Serbia, negative stereotypes among these two communities are still visible. Public Pulse, a research project conducted by the United Nations Development Program in Kosovo used quantitative research methodology67 to document the views Albanians and Serbs held regarding interethnic relations in Kosovo. The trend in the figures show that the perceptions of both communities changed over time, as shown in Figure 5.1. For example, in 2005, about 95% of Serbs believed that interethnic relations in Kosovo were tense and not improving, ten years later (2015), the percentage of those who believed this decreased to about 45%. I think that it is the political developments in the region that might have impacted the public opinion. When analyzing the perceptions of the Albanians, one can notice that while in 2005 only 19% of them thought that relations with Serbs continue to be tense and without improvement, a decade later that percentage increased to about 35%. Over the entire period, however, the percentage of Serbs who believed that the interethnic relations in Kosovo are tense without improvement was constantly higher and remains so. Nevertheless, in the last decade, there were also three points (2007, 2011 and 2014) when the perceptions of Serbs and those of Albanians were almost equal. Similarly, with the data collected by Public Pulse Project and combining the responses of Serbs and Albanians expressing their respective attitudes towards living, working or marrying one another, I have calculated the social acceptance trend for both of these ethnic groups for the last decade (Figure 5.2). The latest findings of the interethnic social acceptance trend indicate that a majority of Serbs (78%) and Albanians (75%) in Kosovo would not be willing to live in the same street, work in the same place or marry one another. Thus, we can conclude that mutual stigmatization – with Serbs definitely being in power and able to enforce it – caused hate, distrust and other negative stereotypes by both parts. As a result, while these negative stereotypes were earlier initiated directly through high institutional lines and did not come from society itself, the opposite seems to be happening today.

Figure 5.1 Trend of respondents’ opinion regarding interethnic relations continue to be tense without improvement

Seeing each other 91

Figure 5.2  Interethnic social acceptance trends

Instead of a conclusion The first part of this chapter shows that the discourses of Orientalism and Balkanism in the context of Yugoslavia produced Western stereotypes. It is only natural that Yugoslavs would not want to be associated with anything negative and consider their Western counterparts as the source of reference for “modernization” and “progress.” As a result, each Yugoslav people’s national elites in the Balkans underestimated their own value and required their communities to resemble the West during the processes of modernization in the 18th and 19th century. This process of “Westernization” involved the immediate exercise of their subjects’ “de-Orientalization,” as each people’s “Westernness” could only have been measured through its “non-Easternness.” Thus, all the people living in Yugoslavia constantly tried to distance themselves from “Orientalism” as well as “Balkanism” and tried to be seen as European as possible. These tendencies produced tensions among the populations living within Yugoslavia, mainly appearing due to the populations’ competitiveness to present themselves as less Oriental and more Western. This included Albanians, the group addressed in this chapter, who decided to accept the submission to the image others had of them as the price of an image of a civilized and pro-Western nation that has to do nothing with the East. Tending to refer to their pre-Christian lineages and building their Illyrian identity based on mythological sources, they ignored the first written historical sources and altered their links with the Ottoman past. Politically, the Albanian Western orientation helped them gain the Western powers’ attention and sympathy. They benefited a lot from this support, particularly during the last two decades, because it led to ethnic Albanians having more political rights and representation in the region and facilitated Kosovo Albanians to gain independence.

92  Atdhe Hetemi The second part of the chapter presented how due to the conceptions of origins and other historical reasons, Albanians were portrayed negatively within Yugoslavia, particularly by the Serbs. Negative perceptions of the Serbs vis-à-vis Albanians – which also led to the continuous stigmatization of this nation – is particularly noticeable in the Serbian media and intellectual and political elite, which presented Albanians as people with tails similar to animals, backward, unable to create and run a state, bloodthirsty, stunted, Muslim fundamentalists, so ignorant that they cannot distinguish sugar from snow, etc. However, most of the available sources seem to suggest that Albanians were not portrayed very negatively by Serbs due to their religious or other ideological differences, but rather due to the differing conceptions of national origins and history. The findings show that Serbs’ negative stereotypes about the Albanians were initiated through direct high institutional lines – mainly academic and political/state-controlled institutions. These stereotypes produced continual stigmatization of Albanians, which caused hate, distrust and other negative consequences to each other on both parts. As a result, while earlier these negative stereotypes were initiated through institutional lines and did not come from society itself, today the opposite seems to be the case. A final conclusion of this chapter is that, particularly during the last two centuries, the Balkans continues to be the region of political and ideological experiments and a place of memory of the failures of local and international attempts to build societies according to civic paradigms. This is because the Balkans is a place that has no history of original political thought, a place that never cleared up its present-day opinion on its Ottoman and Yugoslav past, has never been given the chance to give its own definition of civility, neighborly relations and social acceptance, in the way the West has.

Notes Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978), 210. Ibid., 137–151, 240. Ibid., 246. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (Penguin Publishing Group, 2005). 5 Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review 51 (1992). 6 Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms – The Case of Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54(4) (1995): 917. 7 Ibid., 922. 8 Maria Todorova developed a theory of Balkanism or nesting Balkanisms. She argues that “there is a discourse, which I term Balkanism, that creates a stereotype of the Balkans, and politics is significantly and organically intertwined with this discourse.” 9 Maria Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” Slavic Review 53(2) (1994): 454–455. 10 Ibid., 456. 11 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 20. 12 Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention.” 13 Bakić-Hayden and Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics.”

1 2 3 4

Seeing each other 93 14 15 16 17

Ibid., 923. Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Yugoslavia”; 925–926. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 83, 161. Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in: L. C. Brown (ed.), Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 18 Nathalie Clayer, Në fillimet e nacionalizmit Shqiptar: lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në Evropë (Aux origins du nationalisme albanais: La naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe) (Tiranë, Botime Përpjekja, 2012). 19 Jonilda Rrapaj and Klevis Kolasi, “The Curious Case of Albanian Nationalism: The Crooked Line from a Scattered Array of Clans to a Nation-State,” The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 44 (2013): 195. 20 Clayer, Në fillimet e nacionalizmit Shqiptar: lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në Evropë, 137. 21 Johann Georg von Hahn, Albanische Studien (Vienna, Austria, 1854). 22 Dukagjin Gorani, Orientalist Ethnonationalism: From Irredentism to Independentism Discourse Analysis of the Albanian Ethnonationalist Narrative about the National Rebirth (1870–1930) and Kosovo Independence (1980–2000) (Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies Cardiff University, 2011), 77. 23 The theory that Albanians were related to the Illyrians was proposed for the first time by the Swedish historian Johann Erich Thunmann in 1774. There are any number of scholars who advocate an Illyrian origin of Albanians. 24 John Wilkes, The Illyrians: The Peoples of Europe (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995). 25 John Van Antwerp Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Sixth Century to the Late Twelfth Century (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 10. 26 Michele Belledi, Estella S. Poloni, Rosa Casalotti, Franco Conterio, Ilia Mikerezi, James Tagliavini and Laurent Excoffier, “Maternal and Paternal Lineages in Albania and the Genetic Structure of Indo-European Populations,” European Journal of Human Genetics 8(7) (2000): 480–486. “Mitochondrial DNA HV1 sequences and Y chromosome haplotypes (DYS19 STR and YAP) were characterized in an Albanian sample and compared with those of several other Indo-European populations from the European continent. No significant difference was observed between Albanians and most other Europeans, despite the fact that Albanians are clearly different from all other Indo-Europeans linguistically. We observe a general lack of genetic structure among Indo-European populations for both maternal and paternal polymorphisms, as well as low levels of correlation between linguistics and genetics, even though slightly more significant for the Y chromosome than for mtDNA. Altogether, our results show that the linguistic structure of continental Indo-European populations is not reflected in the variability of the mitochondrial and Y chromosome markers. This discrepancy could be due to very recent differentiation of Indo-European populations in Europe and/or substantial amounts of gene flow among these populations.” 27 Yves Bonefoy, American, African, and Old European Mythologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 253. 28 Brittany Kelley, Chronic Myopia: Foundations of Contemporary Western Perspectives on the Balkans (Denton: University of North Texas, 2012), 7. 29 In the Ottoman Empire, the Grand Vizier was the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Sultanate, with absolute power of attorney and, in principle, dismissible only by the Sultan himself. 30 Shkelzen Gashi, “Report on the Debate of the Portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in Kosova,” Eckert 1 (2015): 2. 31 Enis Sulstarova, “Rilindja’s Place in the Orientalism of Intellectuals in Post-Communist Albania,” Annales. Series historia et sociologia 2 (2012). 32 Enis Sulstarova, Arratisje nga lindja: orientalizmi shqiptar nga Naimi te Kadare [Escaping from the East: Albanian Orientalism from Naim Frashëri to Ismail Kadare] (Chapel Hill, NC: Globic Press, 2006), 9.

94  Atdhe Hetemi 33 Atdhe Hetemi, “(Pa) Varsia e Shqiptarëve (1912–2012) or (In) Dependence of Albanians (1912–2012),” Kosova Press, 23 November 2012: 7. 34 Atdhe Hetemi, “Ri-interpretim, ndryshim apo përmirsim i Historisë or Re-interpretation, Change or Improvement of History?,” Telegrafi, 28 March 2013. 35 Dritan Ego’s interview is available here: www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albaniansquestion-negative-view-of-ottomans (accessed 07 May 2018). 36 Atdhe Hetemi, “Historia; mësimi i mësuar gabimisht or History; the Wrong Learned Lesson,” Gazeta Zëri, 24 September 2013: 9. 37 Sead Zimeri and Fatlum Sadiku, “Knowledge and Imperialist Power: Jews, Palestinians and Other Easterners in the Kosovo Orientalist Discourse – Philosophical/Historical Review,” Albphilosopher and reporteri, 7 August 2014. 38 Dukagjin Gorani, Orientalist Ethnonationalism: From Irredentism to Independentism Discourse Analysis of the Albanian Ethnonationalist Narrative about the National Rebirth (1870–1930) and Kosovo Independence (1980–2000), PhD Thesis, Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies Cardiff University, 2012: 279. 39 Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms – The Case of Yugoslavia,” 926. 40 Isa Blumi (2011), Reinstating the Ottomans Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800– 1912 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 41 Pashko Vasa (1825–1892) was an Albanian writer, poet and publicist of the Albanian National Awakening and Governor of Lebanon from 1882 until his death. 42 Sami Frashëri (1850–1904) was an Albanian writer, philosopher, playwright and a prominent figure of the Rilindja Kombëtare, the National Renaissance movement of Albania. 43 “Arnaut” was the Turkish ethnonym for Albanians related to the Greek arvanitos. Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes,” Anthropological Notebooks 14(2): 56. 44 Ibid., 57. 45 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A  Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 46 Petar Sarić, “Alternativa nasilju” [The Alternative of Violence], Duga 1990: 67–69. (quoted by Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms – The Case of Yugoslavia”) 47 Božidar Jezernik, “Rep kao argument za izlaz na more” [Tail as an Argument for Access to the Sea], Danas, 1 December 2007. 48 Vladan Đorđević, Arnauti i velike sile (Beograd: J. M. Pavlović, 1913). 49 Jezernik, “Rep kao argument za izlaz na more.” 50 Đorđe Stefanović, “Seeing the Albanians through Serbian Eyes: The Inventors of the Tradition of Intolerance and Their Critics, 1804–1939,” European History Quarterly 35(3) (2005): 465–492. 51 Dimitrije Tucović, Srbija i Arbanija [Serbia and Albania] (Beograd/Zagreb: Kultura, 1946). 52 Esat Stavileci and Pajazit Nushi, Truths on Kosova (Prishtina: Albanian World Federation, 2000), 136. 53 Slobodan Stanković, “Yugoslavia‘s Census – Final Results,” RAD Background Report 59, Yugoslavia, 1982. 54 The Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, 21 February 1974, is available at the archive of Yugoslavia online: www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/ en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/ ustav_sfrj_1974.html (accessed on 07 May 2018). 55 Stavileci and Nushi, Truths on Kosova. 56 Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanians: A  History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 57 The ethnic Albanians had Yugoslavia’s lowest literacy rate: 68.5% individuals over the age of ten were able to read in 1979. In 1981 only 178,000 of 1.5 million Albanians in

Seeing each other 95 Kosovo were employed; one in four of those held nominal bureaucratic positions. Meanwhile, the student population of 470,000 was a constant source of political unrest and potentially higher unemployment upon graduation. (Sources: The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Factbook – Data as of December 1990: www.photius. com/countries/yugoslavia_former/society/yugoslavia_former_society_albanians. html) (accessed 07 May 2018). 58 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanians: A History of Kosovo, 148. 59 These sources include: S. Repishti, “Human Rights and the Albanian Nationality in Yugoslavia,” in: Oskar Gruenwald and Karen Rosenblum-Cale (eds.), Human Rights in Yugoslavia (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1986), 238. Several Albanians who were participants in the signing of the Bujan Resolution in 1944 paid with their lives for the ideal of the unification of Kosovo and Albania. Rifat Berisha died fighting in the hills of Drenica in 1948 and Xheladin Hana was murdered by the UDBA (Yugoslav State Security Service) in 1948. Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 25. 60 Veton Surroi, Fadil Hoxha në vetën e pare (Prishtinë: Koha, 2010). 61 See Prifti R. Peter, “Context of October–December 1968: Major Demonstrations for Albanian Self-Determination Held in Yugoslavia,” www.historycommons.org/entity. jsp?entity=peter_r_prifti_1. 62 Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996). 63 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanians: A History of Kosovo, 169–170. 64 Literature on Kosovo migration distinguishes four emigration waves in Kosovo since 1960s and onwards: 1. Late 1960s – early 1970s: Unskilled young men with little education from rural Kosovo emigrate to Germany and Switzerland as guest workers. 2. Beginig of 1989–1997: Kosovo’s autonomy is abolished, and a mass dismissal of Kosovan Albanians from their jobs follows. More skilled and better educated young men from both rural and urban areas migrate to Western European countries to find jobs and escape the Yugoslav military service; 3. Latest war in Kosovo during 1998–1999 when nearly a million of Kosovan Albanians are forcefully displaced from Kosovo during the conflict. This trend reverses immediately after the conflict when a massive return of displaced population occurs; 4. Post 1999: As political stability is established in Kosovo, the immigration policies for Kosovans in (especially) Western European countries are put in place. The emigration wave mainly consists of: a) migration for family reunification purposes; b) illegal migration of unskilled and undereducated youth and c) (temporary) legal migration of highly skilled and highly educated individuals through study or work arrangements (See: Mustafa et al., 2015). 65 Andreas Laursen, “NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation,” American University International Law Review 17(4) (2002): 779. 66 Carole Rogel, “Kosovo: Where It All Began,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17(1) (2003): 167. 67 Since 2009 the Public Pulse Project has been managed and administrated by the author of this chapter. The results are based on an opinion poll sample that surveyed 1,306 citizens of Kosovo of over 18 years of age, of both sexes and from all municipalities and regions of Kosovo, covering both rural and urban areas. The sample included 896 Kosovo Albanians, 210 Kosovo Serbs and 200 Kosovo non-Serb minorities (namely Turkish, Bosnian, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian). The survey’s method is multi-staged random probability sampling. The sample is representative of households in Kosovo. Since 2010 this survey has been conducted semiannually, previously offering trends on a quarterly basis. Public Pulse surveys oversample minorities in Kosovo (K-Serbs, K-Others) in order to be able to disaggregate data by ethnicity; however, when having to calculate the numbers for totals, the data is weighed by actual population figures.

96  Atdhe Hetemi

References Bakić-Hayden, Milica (1995). “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Yugoslavia”, Slavic Review 54(4): 917–931. Bakić-Hayden, Milica and Robert Hayden (1992). “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics”, Slavic Review 51: 1–15. Belledi, Michelle, Estella S. Poloni, Rosa Casalotti, Franco Conterio, Ilia Mikerezi, James Tagliavinia and Laurent Excoffier (2000). “Maternal and Paternal Lineages in Albania and the Genetic Structure of Indo-European Populations”, European Journal of Human Genetics 8(7): 480–486. Blumi, Isa (2011). Reinstating the Ottomans Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800–1912. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bonefoy, Yves (1993). American, African, and Old European Mythologies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buruma, Ian and Avishai Margalit (2005). Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies. London: Penguin Publishing Group. Clayer, Nathalie (2012). Në fillimet e nacionalizmit Shqiptar: lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në Evropë [Aux origins du nationalisme albanais: La naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe], për. Artan Puto. Tiranë, Botime Përpjekja. Cohen, Philip J. (1996). Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. The Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1974), 21 February, www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitu tivni_akti_jugoslavije/ustav_sfrj_1974.html (accessed 07 May 2018). Đorđević, Vladan (1913). Arnauti i velike sile. Beograd: J. M. Pavlović. Fine, John V. A.(1991). The Early Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Sixth Century to the Late Twelfth Century. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Gashi, Shkelzen (2015). “Report on the Debate of the Portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in Kosova History Textbooks”. Eckert. Gorani, Dukagjin (2011). Orientalist Ethnonationalism: From Irredentism to Independentism Discourse analysis of the Albanian Ethnonationalist Narrative about the National Rebirth (1870–1930) and Kosovo Independence (1980–2000). PhD Thesis. Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies Cardiff University. Hahn, Johann V. G. (1854). Albanische Studien. Jena: F. Mauko. Hetemi, Atdhe (2012). “(Pa) Varsia e Shqiptarëve (1912–2012)” [(In) Dependence of Albanians (1912–2012)], Kosova Press, 23 November, p. 7. Hetemi, Atdhe (2013a). “Historia; mësimi i mësuar gabimisht” [History: The Wrong Learned Lesson], Gazeta Zëri, 24 September, p. 9. Hetemi, Atdhe (2013b). “Ri-interpretim, ndryshim apo përmirsim i Historisë” [Re-interpretation, Change or Improvement of History?], Telegrafi, 28 March. Jezernik, Božidar (2007). “Rep kao argument za izlaz na more” [Tail as an Argument for Access to the Sea], www.danas.rs/dodaci/vikend/rep_kao_argument_za_izlaz_na_ more.26.html?news_id=129237 (accessed 07 May 2018). Kelley, Brittany (2012). Chronic Myopia: Foundations of Contemporary Western Perspectives on the Balkans. Master Thesis. University of North Texas. Laursen, Andreas (2002). “NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation”, American University International Law Review 17(4): 765–814. Malcolm, Noel (1998). Kosovo: A Short History. New York: New York University Press.

Seeing each other 97 Mustafa, Muhamet et al. (2015). Diaspora and Migration Policies. Prishtina: Forum, http://riinvestinstitute.org/uploads/files/2016/October/17/ang1476702881.pdf (accessed 07 May 2018). Rogel, Carole (2003). “Kosovo: Where It All Began”, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17(1): 167–182. Rrapaj, Jonilda and Klevis Kolasi (2013). “The Curious Case of Albanian Nationalism: The Crooked Line from a Scattered Array of Clans to a Nation-State”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 44: 185–228. Rusinow, Dennison I. (1977). The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974. Berkeley: University of California Press. Said, Edward (1978). Orientalism. London: Penguin. Sarić, Petar (1990). “Alternativa nasilju [The Alternative of Violence]”, Duga 67–69. Schnabel, Albrecht and Ramesh C. Thakur (eds.) (2000). Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship. New York: The United Nations University. Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie (2008). “Albanians, Albanianism and the Strategic Subversion of Stereotypes”, Anthropological Notebooks 14(2): 47–64. Stanković, Slobodan (1982). “Yugoslavia’s Census  – Final Results”, RAD Background Report 59, Yugoslavia. Stavileci, Esat and Nushi Pajazit (2000). Truths on Kosova. Albanian World Federation: Prishtina. Stefanović, Đorđe (2005). “Seeing the Albanians through Serbian Eyes: The Inventors of the Tradition of Intolerance and Their Critics 1804–1939”, European History Quarterly 35(3): 465–492. Sulstarova, Enis (2006). Arratisje nga lindja: orientalizmi shqiptar nga Naimi te Kadare [Escaping from the East: Albanian Orientalism from Naim Frashëri to Ismail Kadare]. Chapel Hill, NC: Globic Press. Sulstarova, Enis (2012). “Rilindja’s Place in the Orientalism of Intellectuals in PostCommunist Albania”, Annales. Series historia et sociologia 2(2012): 391–400. Surroi, Veton (2010). Fadil Hoxha në vetën e pare. Prishtinë: Koha. Todorova, Maria (1994). “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention”, Slavic Review 53(2): 453–482. Todorova, Maria (1996). “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans” In: Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East. Edited by L. Carl Brown. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 45–77. Todorova, Maria (2004). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tucović, Dimitrije (1946). Srbija i Arbanija or Serbia and Albania. Beograd/Zagreb: Kultura. Vickers, Miranda (1998). Between Serb and Albanians a History of Kosovo. New York: Columbia University Press. Wilkes, John (1995). The Illyrians: The Peoples of Europe. Reprint. London: WileyBlackwell. Zimeri Sead and Sadiku Fatlum (2014). “Knowledge and Imperialist Power: Jews, Palestinians and other Easterners in the Kosovo Orientalist Discourse – Philosophical/Historical Review”, Albphilosopher and reporteri, 7 August.

6 Conflicted narratives The 1998–1999 Kosovo war in history textbooks in Kosovo and Serbia Shkëlzen Gashi The peaceful and the military factions Until the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the passive peaceful resistance led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under Ibrahim Rugova was unrivalled in its struggle. In 1997, Adem Demaçi, who had suffered 28 years in the prisons of Tito’s Yugoslavia due to his involvement in groups working for the unification of Albanian inhabited lands in Yugoslavia with Albania, joined the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK). According to Demaçi, there was a generation of people born in Kosovo who were dissatisfied with the policy of passive peaceful resistance and sought a more active resistance, even a military solution.1 This division in Kosovo’s politics is not presented in the textbooks of either Serbia or Kosovo. Demaçi did not achieve his aim of active peaceful resistance. In September 1996, with the mediation of Community of Sant’Egidio, Ibrahim Rugova signed an agreement with Slobodan Milošević, providing for the return of Albanian pupils and students to school and university premises, which had been taken over by organs of the Serbian state. This fact is also missing in the textbooks of two countries. The Serbian/Yugoslav side did not respect the agreement and so, on 1 October 1997, the students of the University of Prishtina (UP) organised a protest calling for the return to lectures at the UP campus. These protests are only mentioned in the Kosovo textbooks and only with the following sentence, “Serbian repression meant that on 1 October 1997 protests by UP students and the general population erupted against the occupying power.”2 The repression by the Serbian regime is thus called “Serbian repression”; the student protests, in which a number of Albanian citizens became involved, are called “protests by students and the general population,” while the stated aim of the student protests, return to the university campus, is mentioned nowhere. This presentation could create the impression that these protests were organised for the liberation and independence of Kosovo from Serbia. Human rights abuses by the Serbian regime against Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s3 are presented in the Kosovo textbooks as massacres by the Serbian regime across Kosovo, which “inspired the emergence of UÇK to protect the people of Kosovo.”4 The Serbian textbooks do not give any evidence of these abuses,

Conflicted narratives 99 and they present the deterioration in the situation in Kosovo as a consequence of the “robbery and confrontations of Albanian terrorist groups, so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, with associated forces, ever more impacting civilians.”5 However, they do not provide data on the ethnicity of these civilians. Neither the Kosovo nor the Serbian textbooks mention the division between the peaceful and the military factions in Kosovo politics. There is also no reference to the three political and military conceptualisations of war in Kosovo: a) the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), established by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Kosovo government, which was in favour of war led by professional officers; b) the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKÇK), created mainly by former political prisoners, which envisaged the creation of a wide political and military front for the organisation of general armed uprising, where all political and military groups aiming for the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia would be included; and c) the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), created by the Kosovo People’s Movement (LPK), who favoured guerrilla war with the aim of provoking the intervention of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Serb forces. The lack of this conceptualisation means the lack of information on the friction and clashes between them.

War crimes The textbooks of two countries present only the crimes of the “other side.” For example, the Serbian textbooks mention not a single Albanian killed by Serbian/ Yugoslav forces during the armed conflict in Kosovo, while in the textbooks of Kosovo there is mention of not a single Serb killed by UÇK and NATO forces during and after the armed conflict. Both sets of textbooks also exaggerate the crimes of the “other side” and create room for misunderstanding. The Serbian textbooks refer to a letter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) sent to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2000, which stated that since the entry of NATO forces onto Kosovo “899 persons have been killed and 834 have been kidnapped”,6 but they do not give the ethnicity of these people and the fate of those kidnapped. The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), whose headquarters are in Belgrade, notes that 1,123 Serb civilians were killed in the period January 1998 – December 1999, of whom 786 were killed following the entry of NATO forces (12 June 1999 – December 1999).7 On the other hand, the Kosovo textbooks say that during the armed conflict in Kosovo, only in the period January – December 1998 “more than 2,000 Albanians were killed, not counting here a very large number of missing persons.”8 However, also for this period, the HLC’s multi-volume Kosovo Memory Book 1998–2000 registers 1660 Albanians killed, including 678 UÇK soldiers, and 296 Serbs, including 167 members of the Yugoslav Army and the Ministry for Internal Affairs.9 According to the Kosovo textbooks, in the period of the NATO bombings (24 March to 10 June 1999) “the Serbian army killed approximately 15,000 Albanians.”10 The Kosovo Memory Book 1998–2000 gives the numbers of Albanian civilians killed in the period January 1998 – December 2000,

100  Shkëlzen Gashi including the 78-day NATO bombing, as 7,864 in total. Therefore, the number of those killed is doubled in the Kosovo textbooks, but the sources of the data are not given. More or less the same issue as with the presentation of those killed occurs with the presentation of deportations/displacements. The Kosovo textbooks do not note the figures for Serb and non-Albanian displacements after KFOR took control, while in the Serbian textbooks this figure is given as more than 220,000, (Đurić and Pavlović, 2010a, 251) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gives it as 210,000.11 Similarly, the Serbian textbooks do not report the deportations of Albanians from Kosovo during the NATO bombing which, according to UNHCR, included 862 979 people.12 In the Kosovo textbooks this number is more than one million Albanians.13 The Kosovo textbooks describe the crimes of Serb forces against Albanians during the war in Kosovo as genocide.14 Instead of the definition of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, or any arguments as to whether genocide occurred in Kosovo, these textbooks offer phrases such as “the horrible scenes of barbarism of the bloody squadrons.”15 Furthermore, by describing the crimes of the Serbian forces in Kosovo as genocide, the authors of these textbooks ignore the opinion given by the Supreme Court of Kosovo, according to which the actions of the Serbian regime under Slobodan Milošević can be considered crimes against humanity rather than genocide.16 The Serbian textbooks, as explained above, do not mention the crimes of the Serbian forces against Kosovo’s Albanians, but they give information that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had indicted major political and military leaders of the FRY and Serbia,17 but they do not mention the allegations raised. On the other hand, the Kosovo textbooks do not present the crimes committed by UÇK against Serbs and non-Albanians during and after the armed conflict in Kosovo and also do not mention the ICTY indictments for war crimes and crimes against humanity for the two main leaders of UÇK (Fatmir Limaj and Ramush Haradinaj). The crimes committed by UÇK against Serbs and non-Albanians during the armed conflict in Kosovo are not presented at all in the Serbian textbooks. As for the crimes of the UÇK, these textbooks give data only for the crimes committed after the armed conflict ended and the KFOR troops entered Kosovo. The impression given by these textbooks is that during the armed conflict in Kosovo only NATO committed crimes. During the 78 days of the NATO bombing of FRY, according to the Serbian textbooks, “between 1,200 and 2,500 civilians were killed.”18 However, in the table given by these textbooks for the suffering of civilians from the NATO bombardment, data are provided for only 347 civilians killed. In this table, Albanian ethnicity is mentioned only for the 70 civilians killed by NATO forces near Gjakova, while for the 50 civilians killed in the village of Luzhan near Podujevo, the 20 near Peja and 87 in the village of Korisha near Prizren, there is no mention of their Albanian ethnicity. Likewise, there is no mention in the table of the attack of

Conflicted narratives 101 NATO forces on the Dubrava Prison where, according to the HLC, 112 Albanian prisoners were killed. It may be that this attack is not included in the table because only 29 of the prisoners in Dubrava Prison were killed by the NATO bombs on 19 and 20 May 1999 while the others, again according to HLC, were executed by Serbian forces on 21 and 23 May 1999.19 On civilian causalities by NATO, the report of Human Rights Watch, based on field research, says that during the bombing of the territory of the FRY, NATO killed a minimum of 489 and a maximum of 528 innocent civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of these innocent civilians were killed in the territory of Kosovo, giving numbers of between 279 and 318 people.20 The number of civilians killed by NATO is therefore at least doubled by the Serbian textbooks while not being recorded at all in the textbooks of Kosovo.

The Rambouillet Conference Before the Rambouillet Conference, one of the most important events on the political scene was the meeting of the Kosovar delegation, represented by Ibrahim Rugova, with Slobodan Milošević in May  1998, when the parties agreed on a peaceful solution to the Kosovo issue. This is not presented in any of the textbooks from the two countries. One of the most important events leading up to the escalation of armed conflict in Kosovo, namely the conference organised at Rambouillet in France is presented in the textbooks of Kosovo and Serbia in brief and different ways. The Kosovar textbooks say only that the failure of talks at this conference marked “a new phase for UÇK war.”21 However, they do not give the reasons for the failure of these talks, nor the key points of the Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-governance. This document was signed in Paris on 18 March 1999, by the Albanian representatives from Kosovo at the conference and by two of mediators – Christopher Hill (United States) and Wolfgang Petritsch (European Union) – but not by Serbia/FRY representative and the third mediator – Boris Majorski (Russia). Despite the importance of this document, proven by the fact that its implementation was guaranteed by 28,000 NATO troops in Kosovo, the authors of these textbooks say nothing about its content. The reason for that is simple: it envisaged substantive autonomy for Kosovo within FRY.22 In the information they give, the Kosovar textbooks create the idea that UÇK had not given up on their political position. They do not mention the fact that UÇK representatives signed the document, because it runs counter to the prevailing idea in Kosovo textbooks. Namely, the political platform of UÇK was for Kosovo to become free and independent.23 It is therefore made clear nowhere that initially this platform was – as given in the oath sworn by UÇK soldiers – “for the liberation and union of the occupied lands of Albania.”24 The Kosovar textbooks do not mention the substantive autonomy which Kosovo would have enjoyed within the FRY on the basis of the Temporary Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance. The document states: “after three years, an international meeting will be called to determine a mechanism for a final solution for

102  Shkëlzen Gashi Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, the opinions of relevant authorities, the efforts made by each side in relation to the implementation of this agreement and the Helsinki Final Act.”25 It does not specify the people whose will is considered. Besides the phrase “the will of the people,” there is mention also of the Helsinki Final Act, according to which international borders can only be changed by agreement of the two sides. On the other hand, for Serbian textbooks “the NATO aggression occurred because the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet and Paris refused to sign the ultimatum for the withdrawal of the army and police from Kosovo.”26 There is no mention in these textbooks that the Temporary Agreement for Peace and SelfGovernance would have allowed for 2,500 FRY police and 1,500 soldiers to remain in Kosovo and that substantive autonomy was envisaged within the sovereign territory of FRY. The impression Serbian pupils are left with therefore is that “the Western states who got involved, gave open support to the Albanians”27 and had the aim of removing Serbia from Kosovo.

The NATO intervention After Rambouillet, the most important period of the war in Kosovo is undoubtedly the NATO bombing of Serbian/Yugoslav military and police targets, which the Serbian textbooks call aggression on the part of NATO. As mentioned above, the international community did not demand the withdrawal of all Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces from Kosovo, therefore such qualification in Serbian textbooks seems to be presenting Serbia as “a victim of the West who openly sided with the Albanians.” For the Kosovo textbooks, the NATO military interventions was “to stop the wave of crimes committed by Serbia against Albanians.”28 According to these textbooks, Kosovo was liberated from Serbia “after the successful liberation struggle of UÇK and the entry of the NATO troops in June 1999.”29 If UÇK was not in a position to end the wave of crimes the Serbian troops committed against Albanians, and NATO had to intervene militarily, it is difficult to understand how Kosovo was liberated after the successful UÇK struggle and the entry of NATO troops. Equally, the Kosovo textbooks say that “as well as the battle units of the UÇK, NATO forces, with the name KFOR, also entered Kosovo.”30 It thus remains to be clarified if the UÇK troops had not been in Kosovo, but had entered like the NATO troops; but the Kosovo textbooks do not say from where or when they entered. Some of the Kosovo textbooks say that the Serbian/Yugoslav side withdrew from the territory of Kosovo as a consequence of “the NATO bombing and the ongoing campaigns of the UÇK.”31 The Military Technical Agreement on the withdrawal of Serbian/Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, signed on 9 June 1999 in Kumanovo, was agreed upon only by NATO and the FRY – specifically Serbia. The authors of the Kosovar textbooks do not specify that UÇK was not part of this important agreement, which in fact ended the armed conflict in Kosovo. Besides compelling the Serbian/Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosovo, this

Conflicted narratives 103 agreement guaranteed that a portion of these forces – limited to hundreds, not thousands – would be allowed to return to Kosovo,32 but this again is missing from these textbooks. Surprisingly enough, this guarantee does not appear in the Serbian textbooks either. Likewise, none of the historiographies say that initially the aim of NATO was not the withdrawal of all Serbian/Yugoslav military and police forces from Kosovo. This took place only on 3 June 1999, a few days after the end of the bombings, when the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milošević, accepted a document drafted by Strobe Talbott (United States), Martti Ahtisaari (European Union) and Victor Chernomyrdin (Russia), which demanded the withdrawal from Kosovo of all police, military and paramilitary forces of FRY/Serbia.33 The reason the document included this demand was the perceived necessity of military withdrawal in order for refugees to feel safe to return to their homes and for NATO soldiers to establish a safe environment that would prevent further escalations between them and the Serbian forces or between the later and the returning refugees. The demilitarisation and the transformation of UÇK is also presented in the Kosovo textbooks simply as the shift of UÇK to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) “on the basis of an agreement signed in September 1999 between General Agim Çeku, the Commander of UÇK, and General Michael Jackson, Commander of KFOR.”34 There is a lack of information about a document entitled the Demilitarisation and Transformation of the UÇK, which the head of UÇK responsible for political affairs, Hashim Thaçi, presented to general Jackson on 21 June 1999. In this document, Hashim Thaçi pledges that UÇK soldiers would disarm and be integrated into civil society, as a civilian organisation for emergency intervention – the KPC. According to this document, UÇK agreed not to interfere with the FRY staff returning to Kosovo (in hundreds, not thousands) and to complete specific tasks under the authorisation and instructions of the KFOR Commander.35 In the Serbian textbooks, the disarming of UÇK is not mentioned at all. Regarding the civilian rule in Kosovo, established by the UN, and the military control, established by NATO, the Kosovo textbooks offer only the dates and the numbers of troops established. There is no statement anywhere that the aim of NATO mission in Kosovo was to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Equally, there are no data relevant to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which – in accordance with Resolution 1244 – guaranteed Kosovo temporary international administration under which the people of Kosovo enjoyed substantive autonomy within FRY. The Serbian textbooks feature a reference to the guarantee of territorial integrity for the FRY according to Resolution 1244.36

Conclusions Many clear differences are revealed in the approach of the history books in Serbia and in Kosovo towards the 1998–1999 war in Kosovo. These differences can be grouped as follows:

104  Shkëlzen Gashi The most important element of Kosovo’s war were the crimes committed by Serbian army and police against Albanians and the crimes of the Albanians, mainly not organised, against the Serbs. The school textbooks of both sides present only the crimes of the other side, presenting themselves as victims and the other as the aggressor. Thus, the Kosovo textbooks present only the crimes of the Serbs against Albanians. In these textbooks, these crimes are described as “bloody terrorist acts,” “nationalist violence and terror,” “national terror and genocide” or “the horrible scenes of barbarism of the bloody squadrons.” It is rare that these textbooks offer information to quantify the Serbian crimes, and when it is offered, it is in an exaggerated form. The Serbian textbooks present only the crimes of the Albanians against the Serbs, describing them as “the attacks of local gangs of Albanians,” “Albanian terror against Serbs” or “robberies and the confrontations of terrorist groups with the forces of order.” Again, these textbooks generally do not give data for these crimes. Although the penetration of the Serbian army into Kosovo and the crimes of the two sides are presented in a variety of ways, in all textbooks from the two countries there is no mention of the meetings, agreements and collaboration of the political and military representatives of the Albanians with their Serb counterparts. For instance, there is no mention anywhere of: the agreement of the leader of peaceful resistance among the Albanians of Kosovo (1996) with the Serbian president to open up school and university buildings to Albanians in Kosovo; and later also the meetings between them on finding a peaceful solution for the Kosovo issue (1998). A characteristic of the Kosovo textbooks is exaggeration of the aims of Albanian political and military organisations. The organisations are even sometimes given invented names. The acquiescence to substantive autonomy for Kosovo in the Rambouillet Conference by the political representatives of UÇK is not mentioned anywhere; on the contrary, UÇK’s perceived aim was independence, even though the text of the oath of the UÇK soldier speaks of liberation and unification of the occupied lands of Albania. The Kosovo textbooks generally do not describe the political elements present in Kosovo, describing them only under the umbrella “Albanian national movement” or “the democratic movement in Kosovo.” The elements of the most recent war in Kosovo are presented only grouped together as the UÇK. The Serbian textbooks make no reference to these different strands. In none of the school textbooks of Kosovo is there any reference to the division of the peaceful policy into a faction for passive resistance and a faction engaged in active resistance. Moreover, there is no reference to the division between the peaceful and the military arms of Kosovar politics. Missing in the textbooks of Kosovo are the three groupings and their concepts of military policy regarding war in Kosovo: FARK, LKÇK and UÇK. The lack of naming in fact means also a lack of information on the frictions and clashes between them. The aspiration for ownership of the territory of Kosovo, the presentation only of the crimes committed by the other side, portraying oneself as the victim and the other as the aggressor, as well as a silence on Albanian-Serbian collaboration,

Conflicted narratives 105 meetings and agreements, shows that the two countries are not sowing the seeds of reconciliation for the next generation. The distortion of aims and the merging of political elements among the Albanians of Kosovo, in the Kosovo textbooks, leaves the pupil with the idea that Albanians have always been united around one ideal. From the Kosovo textbooks, a picture emerges that in some way, this ideal was national unity and, later, the independence of Kosovo. Ultimately, one could argue that Serbia and Kosovo promote inter-ethnic hatred, not only between the citizens of Kosovo and Serbia, but also between the citizens of Kosovo itself – both Albanian and Serb. Albanian pupils in Kosovo use textbooks published by the Ministry of Education in Kosovo, while the Serbian students (in both Serbia and Kosovo) use history schoolbooks published by the Ministry of Education in Serbia.

Notes 1 Shkëlzen Gashi, Adem Demaçi Unauthorized Biography (Prishtina: Rrokullia, 2010), 121. 2 Jusuf Bajraktari, Fehmi Rexhepi and Frashër Demaj, Historia 10 (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2010), 205. 3 Noel Malcolm, Kosova – A Short History (London: Pan Macmillan, 2002), 349–356; Howard Clarck, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 70–157. 4 Fehmi Rexhepi and Frashër Demaj, Historia 5 (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2009), 104. 5 Đorđe Đurić and Momčilo Pavlović, Istorija 3 (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010), 251. 6 Ibid, 255. 7 Nataša Kandić, Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosova (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre, 2001), 3. 8 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 206. 9 Kandić, Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosova, 457. 10 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 207; Isa Bicaj and Isuf Ahmeti, Historia 12 (Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor, 2005), 202. 11 For more information, see: www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d9f6.html. 12 UNHCR Country Updates – Former Yugoslavia, UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Situation Report: Kosova, 65–70. 13 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 206. 14 Some of the Kosovar textbooks even say that the Reçak massacre was described as genocide by William Walker, the head of the OSCE mission in Kosova. For this, see Bicaj and Ahmeti, Historia 12, 202. However, William Walker described this act as a crime against humanity in the speech he gave at the burial of those massacred. For the speech of Ambassador William Walker and more on the Reçak massacre, see W. Petritsch and R. Pichler, Rruga e gjatë në luftë – Kosova dhe bashkësia ndërkombëtare 1989–1999 (Prishtina: KOHA, 2002), 154–162. Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 207. 15 Ibid., 205. 16 William Schabas, Gjenocidi në të Drejtën Ndërkombëtare (Prishtina, 2003), 467. 17 Đurić and Pavlović, Istorija 3, 253 (Istorija 3). 18 Ibid., 251. 19 On 28 May 2010 HLC made a formal accusation at the Serbian War Crimes Court against the 34 people responsible for the killing of more than 90 and the injuring of more than 150 Albanian prisoners in the Dubrava Prison on 21 and 23 May 1999 after the NATO attacks on the prison of 19 and 20 May 1999. The charges can be found at: www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=13070.

106  Shkëlzen Gashi 20 Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, www.hrw.org/ legacy/reports/2000/nato/. 21 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 206; Bicaj and Ahmeti, Historia 12, 202. 22 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government, Paris, 18 March 1999, https://19972001.state.gov/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html. 23 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 205. 24 The text of the oath of the UÇK soldier can be found on the webpage dedicated to Adem Jashari, https://ademjashari.rks-gov.net/en/betimi-i-ushtareve-te-uck-se. 25 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government, Paris, 18 March 1999, https://19972001.state.gov/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html. 26 Đurić and Pavlović, Istorija 3, 251. See also: Đuro Đurić and Momčilo Pavlović (2010b). Istorija 8 (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike). 27 Đurić and Pavlović, Istorija 3, 251. 28 Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 5, 105. 29 Ibid., 106. 30 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 207. 31 Ibid.; Bicaj and Ahmeti, Historia 12, 202. 32 The Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Forces (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, signed in Kumanovo, 9 June 1999, www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. 33 The document drafted by Strobe Talbott (United States), Martti Ahtisaari (European Union) and Victor Chernomyrdin (Russia) and accepted by the Serbian Parliament on 3 June 1999, is part of Resolution 1244 of UNSC. 34 Bajraktari, Rexhepi and Demaj, Historia 10, 207; Bicaj and Ahmeti, Historia 12, 202. 35 The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation of UÇK, atwww.nato.int/ kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm. 36 Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Countil, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm.

References School textbooks Bajraktari, Jusuf, Fehmi Rexhepi and Frashër Demaj (2010). Historia 10. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor. Bicaj, Isa and Isuf Ahmeti (2005). Historia 12. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor. Đurić, Đuro and Momčilo Pavlović (2010a). Istorija 3. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike. Đurić, Đuro and Momčilo Pavlović (2010b). Istorija 8. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike. Rexhepi, Fehmi (2010). Historia 9. Prishtina: Libri Shkollor. Rexhepi, Fehmi and Frashër Demaj (2009). Historia 5. Prishtinë: Libri Shkollor.

Bibliography Clarck, Howard (2000). Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press. Gashi, Shkëlzen (2010). Adem Demaçi Unauthorized Biography. Prishtina: Rrokullia. Kandić, Nataša (2001). Abductions and Disappearances of non-Albanians in Kosova. Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Centre. Kandić, Nataša (2011). Libër Kujtimi i Kosovës 1998–2000. Prishtina: Fondi për të Drejtën Humanitare. Malcolm, Noel (2002). Kosova – A Short History. London: Pan Macmillan. Petritsch, Wolfgang and Robert Pichler (2002). Rruga e gjatë në luftë – Kosova dhe bashkësia ndërkombëtare 1989–1999. Prishtina: Koha.

Conflicted narratives 107 Schabas, William (2003). Gjenocidi në të Drejtën Ndërkombëtare. Prishtina: FINNISHUNHCR Human Rights Support Programme – Kosova. Schwartz, Stephen (2000). Kosova: Background to a War. London: Anthem Press.

Reports and documents Human Rights Watch (2000). Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, www.hrw.org/ legacy/reports/2000/nato/ (accessed 21 July 2017). NATO (1999a). The Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Forces (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm (accessed 21 July 2017). NATO (1999b). Undertaking for the Demilitarisation and Transformation of the UÇK, www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm (accessed 21 July 2017). UN (1999). Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/ sc99.htm (accessed 21 July 2017). US Department of State Archive (1999). Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Governance in Kosovo, https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html (accessed 21 July 2017).

Section III

Intellectuals and war: the mediators of (non-)national justice

7 Figure of the Other as an open project Literary works of Albanian authors from Albania and Kosovo translated in Serbia Saša Ćirić Introduction Literary works are not written with the intention to replace historiography or empirical findings in social sciences. The primary purpose of contemporary literature, as was the case in past periods, lies in its aesthetic function, just as the inevitable foundation of the reception of a literary text remains immanent analysis, that is, an approach based on formalistic-structural methodology of literary theory. Shifting interest from analyzing the literary text itself to literary and cultural context, to ways that a literary field – as described by Bourdieu – operates or to readings inspired by cultural studies, gender theory, postcolonial theory and the like, have opened up the possibility to understand the meaning of literary works in an analytical intersection between formal and referential meaning. That means examining the ways in which literary texts inscribe what they refer to within a given context, in other words, recognizing the inscriptions of certain historical, social and political subjects in the basic meaning of literary texts. Within a framework of an academic project that puts in critical reflection of Serbian-Albanian relations at the forefront, we could raise the question of whether, and if so to what extent, Serbian and Albanian writers have tackled this issue in their literary works. That is, have they examined the relation of their environment to members of other communities and groups. This question involves the issue of familiarity with writers from the other side or of translation that enables the so-called literary exchange or literary ties between the two sides – something that has always been rather modest between Serbian and Albanian culture. Since cultural ties were nearly nonexistent during the 1990s due to political conflicts and war, in this chapter, I focus my analysis on Serbian translations of writers from Albania and Kosovo published after 2000, when cultural relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians were restored and translations of writers from Albania once again became available. During that period, some classic Serbian and Yugoslav authors, such as Ivo Andrić, Meša Selimović, Vasko Popa, were translated in Albania, and the novels of Dragan Velikić, Vladimir Arsenijević (Koha ditore editions) and Saša Ilić were published in Kosovo, as well as the poetry of Miloš Živanović. In addition, an anthology From Belgrade, with Love (Iz Beograda, s ljubavlju, alb. Nga Beogradi, me dashuri) appeared, containing selected

112  Saša Ćirić short fiction of 24 younger and established contemporary Serbian authors (Qendra multimedia editions). This consideration continues to some extent Petrit Imami’s investigations about Serbian-Albanian literary cooperation, presented in the chapter “Cultural Ties” of his book Serbs and Albanians through Centuries (Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove; Imami, 2000, alb. Serbët dhe Shqiptarët ndër Shekuj). In it, Imami concludes that literary exchange between these nations has mostly remained marked by individual authors or scholarly research activities and not by systematic development of cultural ties. Imami notes that, with few exceptions, the near complete breakdown of Serbian-Albanian cultural ties between Serbia and Kosovo occurred in late 1980s, lasting throughout the 1990s. Yet, during the 1990s, there are examples of restored cultural cooperation in the field of visual arts and literature. Shkelzen Maliqi describes the new art originating in the 1990s, which was presented at the exhibition of contemporary Kosovo art called “Përtej” (“From the other side”) in Belgrade, as “the art of resistance . . . simultaneously critical towards the regime and Serbian repression, but towards academic artistic trends as well”.1 Such tendencies continued and advanced further in the 2000s, after the democratic changes in Serbia. Associations of anti-war minded writers – such as The Writers’ Forum (Forum Pisaca); alternative publishers (Rende, VBZ Beograd, Karver, Samizdat B92); and groups of anti-nationalist writers and critics (KPZ Beton, Links, Group 484) – attempted to provide new translations, with the aim of introducing Serbian readers to both classics and emerging writers of the Kosovo and Albania literary scene. Notably, literary magazines at the time showed increased interest in Albanian writers, such as Sarajevo Notebooks (Sarajevske sveske) and Bridges (Mostovi) from Bosnia, or Sent from Novi Pazar and polemical-critical cultural supplement Beton in the Belgrade daily newspaper Danas. As a result, in the first 15 or so years of the 21st century, we got Serbian translations of the following authors from Albania2: The Feast (Gozba, alb. Gostia) by Baskim Shehu (2003); The Fall of the Stone City (Pad kamenog grada; alb. Kronikë në gur, 1971) by Ismail Kadare (2011); Red like the Bride by Anilda Ibrahimi (Crveno poput neveste, 2013; Rosso come una sposa, 2008); and of authors from Kosovo: Beqë Cufaj’s The Brilliance of the Foreigner (Sjaj tuđine, 2010; alb. Shkëlqimi i huaj, 2003) and Billionaire by Veton Suroi (Milijarder, 2015; alb. Miliarderi, 2013). Occasional fragmented translations of fiction could be found in Serbian literary periodicals, such as short stories of Radvan Dibra and Zija Cele or excerpts from Luan Starova’s novel. The revival of interest in poetry is notable, with collections of poetry from Kosovo poets Xhevdet Bajraj’s Freedom of Terror (Sloboda užasa – two editions, 2000 and 2002; alb. Liria e tmerrit, 2000); Fahredin Shehu’s Fountain Pen (Nalivpero, 2013); Arben Idrizi’s selection of poems entitled Beasts Love the Fatherland (Zveri vole otadžbinu, 2013, alb. Kafshët e duan atdheun); and a short selection of poems by Luljeta Lleshanaku from Albania, entitled Child of Nature (Djeca prirode, 2012; alb. Fëmijët e natyrës, 2006). Two comprehensive anthologies have also appeared recently: From Prishtina, with Love (Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju, 2011) and One Flew

Figure of the Other as an open project 113 Over the Kosovo Theatre (Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta; alb. Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës, 2014). The anthology From Prishtina with Love includes the works of some 20 young and established authors, and each section contains an introduction: Halil Matoshi wrote about Kosovo poetry, Arben Atashi about fiction and Bekim Lumi on drama. The anthology One Flew Over the Kosovo Theatre contains five selected plays of contemporary younger Kosovo playwrights: Ilir Gjocaj, Doruntina Basha, Xhevdet Bajraj, Visara Krusha and Jeton Neziraj. The aforementioned editions comprise the basic sources used in this chapter.

Novels of authors from Albania Bashkim Shehu’s novel Feast (Gozba, alb. Gostia) is a fictional hybrid, partly a political grotesque and partly an esoteric allegory of power. The novel follows the path of an imprisoned former minister and the guard escorting him to the outskirts of the city where an executioner awaits. The relation between a prisoner and his guard, a dethroned man and a representative of the new regime who participates in the execution of high officials of deposed government, changes profoundly due to shifts on the battlefront. These changes enable the former minister to once again become a member of the new government, while his torturer and would-be executioner becomes his new subordinate. The nature of force, reduced to a blind tool of rule and its whims, is at the forefront of this satirical-grotesque transformation. In distinction to Shehu’s novel, whose plot is situated in a country “somewhere between Bratislava and Ruanda”, which strengthens the symbolical-allegorical character of narration, Kadare’s novel The Fall of the Stone City (Pad kamenog grada) is a form of a specific city chronicle of Girokastër, from the capitulation of Italy in 1943, when Albania came under German administrative control, to 1953, that is, the time immediately following Stalin’s death. This timeframe excludes shorter epilogue-like passages in the novel situated in 1993 and 2007, when the victims of executions of the postwar authorities are discovered and when, under the influence of the European Union, efforts are made to reveal and “condemn the communist crimes”. A covert narrator mentions “the sin of resentment” the Girokastër citizens show towards Greek day laborers in the fields, but also disdain of “all Greeks, Hellenic culture, state, politics, even to language”.3 The abduction of girls and brides from pastoral villages of Lundžerija qualify as the greatest collective misdeeds. Kadare’s novel indirectly pictures an ideological conflict between the two main political options in Albanian society before and during the war: nationalists and communists. They approached war differently both before it emerged and while it lasted. The nationalists saw Germans as – either willing or temporary – allies, who will enable them to unite Albanian ethnic territories (the narrative explicitly mentions “Albania, Kosovo and Cameria”),4 while the communists are against the politics of neighboring territorial aspirations. The narrator mentions that “among the communist leaders there were several Serbs, for whom the words ethnic Albania were worse than death”.5 During the war, the nationalists choose passivity and refrain from military action, while the communists opt for active resistance to the Nazis.

114  Saša Ćirić In Shehu’s novel, the pathology of power, its warping into tyranny grounded in fear and terror against the defeated enemy in the civil war, is directly linked to Biblical apocalyptic esotery. For Kadare, in war, power takes the form of retribution in using terror and fear to paralyze any resistance, while in totalitarian systems, power uses conspiracy theories in order to satisfy its paranoid quest for imaginary enemies and execution of real people. In Shehu’s writing, only the death of a person trapped in a system of absolute obedience and summary execution can mark a step outside of that vicious circle of violence and human degradation. Kadare’s novel. The Fall of the Stone City, provides a step away from the poor historiography that has followed the self-destruction of communism. The plot of Anilda Ibrahimi’s novel Red like the Bride encompasses a long historical period, from 1923 to 2003, which makes up almost the entire life of the main protagonist Saba Islami. The novel follows the destinies of the three generations of her family through the political changes of the 20th century: the prewar years of the Albanian Prime Minister, President and King Ahmet Zogu; the postwar regime of Enver Hoxha; and the transitional years of the 1990s. The novel also has three geographical loci: the mountainous rural settlement of Kaltra in Southern Albania where the Islami family comes from; Valona, a coastal city where the family of narrator Dora, Saba Islami’s granddaughter, moves to; and Tirana, the capital where Dora studies. There are other occasional references to European cities that Dora resides in (Zurich, Bern) as well as Rome, where she gets married. In contrast with the previous authors, Anilda Ibrahimi paints a more benevolent picture of communism in Albania, without neglecting its pitfalls and problems. She offers praise for the substantial social reform that did a lot to emancipate women from a profoundly patriarchal society, in which they were kept mostly at home, under constant control of their father, sons or older women, even mothers or mothers-in-law. Women entered the work force on a massive scale, earning and spending money of their own accord, and the amount of abuse and family violence plummeted. On the other hand, the ineptitudes of communist rule are ironically highlighted: endless meetings, slander and spying and corruption in the employment committees. Despite modernization in the economic sphere, political and public life was entirely subjected to party rule and decisionism. The Communist Party even decides which family is allowed to buy a TV or decides an individual’s occupation. Anilda Ibrahimi’s novel has relatively few references to the figure of the Other in Albanian society. The Italians are presented as kindhearted occupiers who become victims of German firing squads after the capitulation of Italy. Albanian peasants even hide some of them in their homes. Like Kadare, Ibrahimi mentions the examples of Albanians hiding their “Chifuts”, i.e. Jews during World War II. The Nazis are portrayed as brutal exterminators, who mercilessly shoot not only three of Saba’s brothers, but also one of their fiancees and their child. Greeks form an integral part of Albanian society and are not particularly marked by either mentality or customs. Regarding the neighboring nations, Serbs are mentioned only once, in an ambiguous phrase “she jumps like a Serbian mare”, which can

Figure of the Other as an open project 115 hold general meaning or be a local proverb.6 Kosovo is also mentioned only once and in passing: “beautiful as a Kosovar”7 the old neighbor Mukades sooths her grandson. When asked where she has seen Kosovars, she replies: in the movies, describing them as “tall, handsome, brave, with those bushy mustaches”.8 In addition, the “internal other”, Albanians of the other faith, that is, Christians, either Roman-Catholic or Orthodox, are perceived by Saba in some kind of sentimental pantheistic philanthropy. Saba marks and celebrates all religious holidays, even in communist times, exemplifying religious tolerance. On one occasion, when a mountain village without an imam of its own is cut off by snowfall, it is a Catholic priest who sings a mourning song for a deceased Muslim.

Contemporary Albanian fiction in Kosovo When it comes to Kosovo fiction, Beqë Cufaj’s novel The Brilliance of the Foreigner has been translated into Serbian in full, while seven other authors are known in fragments from the anthology From Prishtina, with Love (Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju). The latest book translated is Veton Suroi’s Billionaire (Milijarder). Beqë Cufaj’s The Brilliance of the Foreigner situates its plot in two Kosovo milieus: a provincial milieu, in the place called Reka, and a rural one, in an unnamed village. Both locations are predominantly Albanian, and the narration touches upon intra-Albanian religious, social and professional differences (Catholics-Muslims, property owners-tenants, highly educated-uneducated). A mention is made of a specific destiny of a Roma family, living in a semi-derelict small house next to the narrator’s building. This family appears as a personification of a natural Otherness. Its behavior without inhibition and shame stands opposite to the Albanian (and Serbian) patriarchal cultural model, as well as contrasted with the disintegration of the official socialist model. The novel provides in sketches great political themes from the 1980s and 1990s: Albanians left unemployed in the early 1980s, parallel higher education during the 1990s, illegal asylum status in Germany in the late 1990s. The second part of the novel is situated in Stuttgart, amidst the turmoil of exile, focusing on Albanian immigrants, but also containing post-Yugoslav phenomena (Bosnian immigrants) or intra-Balkan phenomena (relations with the Greeks). Still, the main opposition is a cultural one and drawn along the line between the exiled and the local German population. The Brilliance of the Foreigner also carries a critique of Albanian society and mentality. Ricky’s casual remark to his friend Afrim when, in the course of their flight, they find themselves in Montenegro, reveals the interethnic chasm between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo through the practice of stigmatizing those who speak the language of the Other: “Afrim spoke Serbian better than I did, because his father and brothers had a lot of contacts with the Serbs. It never bothered me, even though most people at home resented them for it”.9 In contrast, Arben passes through Belgrade for the first time during the 1990s, on his way to Hungary and Germany. He is impressed by the sheer size of the city and the traffic, but also by the fact that “the city is not at all white as its name implied”.10 Ricky develops

116  Saša Ćirić different theories: erotological ones, about the differences in sexual behavior between Albanian and German women, with the former appreciating an orgasm and wanting to hide their asexual desire out of shame, while the latter sought to be equal even during the sexual act. Ricky also develops a thesis generally popular in Serbia as well, about a partnership and closeness between the Serbs and Greeks that is allegedly also present among these communities in Germany.11 In a manner similar to Cufaj’s, certain short stories from the anthology From Prishtina with Love (Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju) refer to Serbian-Albanian tensions, but are also the place of relativizing the medieval Battle of Kosovo and subtle suggestions about the formation of other sexual identity. The short story “Vranina” by Halil Matoshi refers to two periods of recent Kosovo history: the period before NATO intervention, which the narrator, Adni Maloku, perceives as life in an international ghetto, and the period during the War in Kosovo, which Rudaku spends in a Serbian prison. Ragip Sulaj’s short stories feature the supernatural motif of the Devil, serving as a trigger for concise exposition. It is the life-story of an illiterate shepherd, whose life is marked by poverty and wars, but also the desire that his grandson-narrator write on his behalf a letter about the situation in Kosovo after the events of the early 1980s. In the second story, we find an interesting comparison when the narrator accuses the Devil of becoming “an Apis of some kind”.12 The novel of Ardian Haxhaj, The Principal Chronicle of the Kosovo Battle (Glavna hronika Kosovske bitke; Kryekronika e Fushës së Kosovës), out of which one chapter has been published, thematizes the medieval Battle of Kosovo. In a selected chapter, we follow the conversation of two chroniclers of the Turkish army, Nuredin and Ahmet, during its Balkan campaign. Nuredin concludes that the peoples of this part of Europe are of a similar lifestyle to those in Asia, which surprises him. The chroniclers are uncertain whether the goal of the Sultan leading the campaign is merely conquest or the Islamization of the conquered lands as well. Besa Salihu’s stories are short and show features of prose poetry. Their focus is on the narrator’s relation with an unnamed female person. The narration is from the position of longing for another person or of lost intimacy. In the largely oneiric story “Water”, the woman that the female narrator longs for ends up killing her, unable to stand her kindness and devotion. This female-female relation is open for symbolic and psychoanalytic readings, whether interpreted as sexual or as kinship (sister, mother) or friendship. Ilir Gjocaj’s story “Nothing” is written as a single unbroken sentence that begins and ends with three dots. Such a narrative approach suggests that the story is a fragment of a larger narrative, just as the individual fates of the characters are part of a wider collective history and mentality of that region. The story comprises rumors about a young married couple, a son from the reputed clan of Kucaj and his wife, who come from Paris to live in his family home. She brings with herself a worldly way of life that outrages the locals: she wears trousers, walks alongside her husband and not behind him, as is the village custom, and goes with him to town. This relationship ends tragically. The young husband is found hung, while

Figure of the Other as an open project 117 his bride goes mute and has a mouth wound of an unknown source. In this case, the figure of the Other is the Western, modernized world, represented by Kucaj and his bride. However, that figure is defeated by hostile forces of tradition. When it comes to Serbian-Albanian relations, Veton Suroi’s first novel The Billionaire (Milijarder) is an important text representing several key characteristics of life in Kosovo in the first half of the 1990s: Serbian police repression against the participants of Albanian political demonstrations and a parallel life of Albanian and Serbian communities in Prishtina, which unfolds in the shadow of war waged in other parts of former Yugoslavia. Suroi’s protagonists hold ethnic prejudices and think in stereotypes about both communities. Albanian informants and aids of Serbian rule in Kosovo are found throughout the novel. The most drastic examples of police repression that Suroi’s novel narrativizes are the killings of underage boys during demonstrations, a 16-year-old Liria Cakoli and a high-school pupil, Hektor Gjuraj. Equally brutal is the scene of police beating up three characters from the Human Rights Committee, among them Arber Hasi, and the police maltreatment of the 16 inhabitants of the rural settlement Zabel, accused of being among the persons who attacked and wounded a Serbian policeman. Serbian police label them as terrorists and kills one of the arrested peasants as a retaliation measure. The killing of these minors is represented as collateral damage, that is, an unintended consequence of unprofessional and excessive use of force; in the first case, the violence is employed against protesters at public demonstrations and, in the second, against high-school pupils protesting the closure of their school. Thus, through a series of anecdotes, Suroi’s novel presents the oppression of the Serbian police in Kosovo during the 1990s: using guns and torture against detainees, subverting legal protection of detained Albanians, preventing the media from reporting about the clashes of protesters and police and misinforming the public about the cases of dead demonstrators. Suroi also paints the use of propaganda in the case of the death of Liria Cikoli, who was killed by a stray bullet on her way to purchase a long desired pair of red shoes and who Albanian reports presented as a participant at the demonstrations. The Kosovo Albanians in the novel display political aspirations for independence when, by refusing collectively to sign a document of loyalty to the Republic of Serbia, they lose their jobs. The Union president in Arber Hasi’s company calls on the workers not to sign the loyalty statement, but to sign the one about being fired. Since they are in the right, he claims that one day they will win: “We will get justice, work and state”.13 Informants of the ruling, Serbian side, such as Hamdi Leqior Beqir Kuçi, are treated with collective contempt, boycott and condemnation. Beqir Kuçi’s daughter even commits suicide after her friend tells her that she is “a daughter of a spy”.14 There is a huge chasm between members of Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo. That distance is best personified by two queues. The first one comprises the Serbs, employed in public service jobs, waiting for the so-called “people’s bread”, which is cheaper but harder to buy due to the massive rush on basic groceries. The other queue comprises Albanians, with their idle and aimless strolls on the Prishtina promenade. The Serbs in the line blame the Albanians for the shortages and queues; the Albanians hold the Serbian

118  Saša Ćirić authorities responsible for joblessness and apathy and accuse them of tyranny. There is no contact nor attempt at communication between these two groups living in the same social and economic circumstances.

Kosovo poetry Poetry is arguably the most productive form of Kosovo literature. It is written by the largest number of authors of both sexes, generations, political views and ethnic background. As the anthology From Prishtina, with Love showed, there are more notable and successful poets than prose authors. The overview of Kosovo poetry here rests on the poetry collections of Jevdet Bairai, Fahredin Shehu and Arben Idrizi published in said anthology, comprising nine male and two female poets writing in Albanian. Thematically, new Kosovo poetry moves between love lyrics, evocations of war, social and abstract-symbolical poetry. There are traces of l’écriture feminine and minority, Roma literature. The poetry of Xhevdet Bajraj in his collection The Freedom of Horror (Sloboda užasa; alb. Liria e tmerrit) is mostly without concrete references to historical, political circumstances and geographical context. Their most common attribute is Balkanic, which is not an ethnic or geographical marker, but a cultural, even somewhat mythological one. Bajraj’s poetry from The Freedom of Terror is an implicit hymn to freedom, even though it sings of its deprivation or inexistence or ironically portrays “the freedom of horror” – unrestrained destruction. Occasionally, Bajraj’s verses from The Freedom of Terror bring a bitter mood of satirical scanning of the poet’s own environment. In the poem “Dream”15 death rises from the ground, recognizing friends and enemies, “Continuing battles where they were interrupted”, in the place “Where we are born only to suffer”. Hostility is eternal, undisrupted even by death, and suffering is an existential fate. Faced with madness, even love easily turns to enmity, and no spiritual ties (such as the traditional form of blood brotherhood) can stop the killings. The only way out is a departure or emigration. Fahredin Shehu’s collection of poems “Fountain Pen” contains two kinds of poems: intertextual ones and poetry evoking growing-up and common life in a unified country. The range of intertextual references is wide and marked with encyclopedic breadth and cultural heterogeneity. References to Christian symbols and Islam, as well antiquity, especially ancient Greece and Babylon are frequent, juxtaposed and overlapping. Fahredin Shehu’s poetry is also even more self-effacing from the one of Xhevdet Bajraj when it comes to life in former Yugoslavia and Albanian-Serbian relations. In the poem “Golden Fountain Pen” (Zlatno nalivpero),16 the war is mentioned without any specificity as to who deprived the poet of his TOZ Zagreb fountain pen, given to his sister by his late uncle gave “to pass on to me like a relay”. In the poem “Winter of 1985” (“Zima 1985”)17 there is mention that the sister listened to Vlado Kalember, a popular Croatian pop singer in former Yugoslavia, that his mother knitted him a black-and-white scarf of the Belgrade football club Partizan, while his granddaughter “brought with her wedding gift also the Popular Healer by Vasa Pelagić” (a widely read handbook

Figure of the Other as an open project 119 of Serbian popular medicine).18 All these examples show the lyrical subject’s full integration into a wider, non-Albanian, Yugoslav social and cultural space, where it was quite possible to be a fan of the football club from Belgrade or accept popular medical advice from a 19th century educator Vasa Pelagić. Here, the lyrical subject himself has become the Other, since the war produces a violent break from his previous life. Arben Idrizi’s collection of poetry Beasts Love the Fatherland (Zveri vole otadžbinu, Kafshët e duan atdheun) presents him as one of the rare poets who explicitly refer to the 1990s Serbian-Albanian conflict. Two among the opening poems are narrative and about war crimes: “Among the liquidated, there was a lunatic”19 and “Among those killed was an old lady”.20 These two poems are complementary insofar as they show the unchanged essence of a war: unpunished crime and pillaging, practiced by both sides. The first poem presents a war crime committed by the Serbian police, who shot an old mentally ill man, a blind old lady and a child from a refugee line. The reason for shooting is not given, and the very act appears exemplary: it should frighten other refugees and demotivates them from returning. A rooster the old man carried under his arm becomes a practice and betting target, the stakes of which are “the piles of robbed things”. Since none of the Serbian policemen hits the rooster, they blow it away with “a tank grenade”. The second poem is set in the days after the war ended: “mid-June of 1999 / the time when the extremes met”. The poem accurately states the reasons behind these events: “Kosovo had been liberated. / The Serbian army, police and civilians took flight. / They fled in a panic. / Many fearing that revenge or justice would catch them”. “The avengers” in Idrizi’s poems are actually plunderers, who use the legal interregnum to try to steal and destroy the belongings of the remaining Serbs, knowing that, for a moment, the state is suspended, but also that upon its restoration, it is unlikely to protect the defeated side. Moreover, these are actually false warriors, those who bought uniforms or found used ones when the war was already over, doling out justice on the streets of the liberated city. Idrizi’s book is marked with a critical stance towards the government, transitional democracy, former workers and false patriots. The poem “The Child of War” (“Čedo rata”)21 sharply juxtaposes two categories of people: those who strove to survive the war and preserve their bare existence and those who took part to subsequently grab power. The postwar time is one in which “the wretched suffer”, when “you can never collect a debt”, the time of renewed exploitation of workers who have no legal protection, the time of job loss and hunger. Idrizi’s lyrical subject is therefore a multiple outsider: he resides on the margins of society where he barely makes end meet, is an outcast, smokes moldy cigarettes, and wears worn shoes and a winter coat he got as a gift; he is a marginalized but incorruptible poet who says “to hell with every government”22 and is suspicious of “every patriotism / every revolution”. Similarly to the prose, the selected poetry from Prishtina, with Love contains traces of formation of a sexual other, minority identity and identity marked with the trauma of war. Trina Gojani and Ervina Halili write melic poetry of anxiety

120  Saša Ćirić and fear of the world, speak about abandonment and departure, address the absent lover.23 In their poetry, the city becomes the place of loneliness and loss of self, but far from blaming the city, this is a process that is not lamented. The female lyrical subject loses herself in the city without hesitation or seeking comfort; disappearance in the big city is a form of identification and freedom (“Just walk by the lights of the big city / until the buildings eat you alive”), even though there is an idea about urban seductiveness of the night, an illusion in relation to the faceless rottenness of the day (“By night, all cities are beautiful / the day shows their rust”).24 A cognate interest in the city is found in Balsor Hoxha’s poem “My Bisexual City”. Prishtina is seen there as the city in which the trees and “all that is beautiful / is more valuable than anywhere else in the world” because it is rare. The poem also mentions Prishtina’s strong males and the war of the city against its bisexual nature. Kujtim Paçaku’s poetry is important by its founding role in constituting a poetically fluid Roma identity. In the poem “Memory”25, the memory of November is not a remembrance of a touching late-autumn landscape, but of unresolvable hunger and troubles: how to feed your children and warm them up in the gloomy days of hard rains. The poem “Two Drunkards”26 tells the story of a married musician who becomes an alcoholic for the “smell of white breasts” of a “gadze” (nonRoma woman), even selling his instrument to buy liquor. It shows an individual tragedy of a thwarted and impossible passion, perhaps even love. In addition, the poem shows that, for the Roma too, attraction towards non-Roma is forbidden. The poem “Tell Me”27 makes a direct association to the twofold nature of the Roma identity in Kosovo. The lyrical subject intersects the ethnogenealogy with their present collective habitus. “Tell me how our river runs / As Ganges? / Or as Bistrica?” (a mention is also made of the contrast between the Himalayas and the Sharr Mountain). In both instances, the evocation entwines the past of the ancient Indian homeland and of Kosovo as the present homeland. Halil Matoshi’s poetic triptych “War Trilogy” (“Ratna trilogija”) emphasizes the author’s personal and collective Albanian tragedy during the late 1990s, making an analogy between the “tortures and pains” he suffered in the Serbian prison of Zabela in Požarevac and Jesus on the Cross at Golgotha. After a conversation with a Swedish female member of KFOR leaves a strong impression, he writes a poem about Shote Galica, a “legendary” female rebel from a Kachak uprising from the times of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Halil Matoshi’s poems display the inclination towards the destinies of women, especially those in uniform, who take on male warrior roles, shoulder to shoulder with fighters for national liberation.

Kosovo playwriting in Albanian The anthology of contemporary Kosovo drama One Flew Over the Kosovo Theatre contains a selection of five plays of younger to mature dramatists, whose plots are set between the 1999 war in Kosovo to the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008. In contrast to the enthusiasm over Kosovo independence, these

Figure of the Other as an open project 121 plays question society’s patriarchal foundations and political regime of the newly established state. The figure of Other is here the oppressive Serbian police, or a corrupt autocrat at the head of cultural institutions, and as pater familias, a role that can be occupied by a woman as well. Ilir Gjocaj’s play Basement refers to the time of the NATO bombing in Prishtina in 1999. The play addresses the Serbian repression and wartime violence over the Albanian population in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Sexual frustration and impotence strike an aging professor and politician Enver, in a Strindbergian motif of doubting his own paternity and his wife’s fidelity. The tragic mistake of professor Enver is to prevent the emigration of his son Gent, who is a victim of police brutality at political demonstrations in the 1990s. After the war, Gent is classified as missing. Enver is a character that suffers from a megalomaniac obsession with having a perfect biography. He insists on the concept of an epic past, according to which fear “is not a part of our tradition”,28 and therefore despises his son as immature and spineless. Gjocaj adds a motif of collaboration with the Serbian government to the political dimension of the play: Enver is certain that his political opponent is a “Serbian spy”. The Other, i.e. the Serbs, are situated outside the attention of this play. The Other is militarized, aggressive and destructive. Still, the Other is also a kind of legitimation, a justification for a combative defensive concept of resistance on the road to political and national independence. Doruntina Basha’s play The Finger (Prst; Gishti) contains a motif of a missing son, as the central place of trauma of both heroines: Zoja, the missing son’s mother and Shkurta, his (unconfirmed) widow. Zoja and Shkurta live alone in the house, joined by shared memories of their son/husband who went out on a stormy day, never to return. The role of the Other in Doruntina Basha’s play has been completely taken over by women as figures of the gendered Other in patriarchy: underage girls married by their fathers and sent to faraway places, treated roughly, without caress or affection, by their husbands, humiliated if they bear a female child and celebrated if they bear a boy. Zoja behaves as a bad pater familias: she hounds her daughter-in-law by overburdening her with work, ever unsatisfied with her performance, disproving of her looks and abilities, she is uninterested in her opinions. Zoja is also a victim of patriarchal violence – she has been married away at a young age, her husband was rough on her and neglected her, only to show up as a coward later on by letting his son to get out of the house and be taken away in a stormy night – implying that the Serbian forces bear responsibility for the act. Shkurta is to Zoja that impossible Other, barbaric outsider worthy only of servitude, never kinship, with a determined fate similar to the one that Zoja experienced herself, a surrogate child to become an object of solidarity and protective motherly love. Xhevdet Bajraj’s play The Killing of a Mosquito (Ubistvo jednog komarca; Vrasja e mushkonjës, 2011) is by its form a poetic monodrama that appears to belong to the genre of travesty. Its narrator is “a man” situated in his room, next to his desk, library and bottle of brandy. Bajraj’s play displays fundamental mistrust of ruling elites, presenting them as persons with a surplus of unsupervised power and lack of responsibility and integrity. The second layer contains a critique of the

122  Saša Ćirić transitional democratic procedures and political processes that are seen as a mere façade for immense personal enrichment and striking ignorance of the politicians. “As it appears / a good politician here / is only the one who had plastic surgery / had an ass graft put on his face /who speaks little / but when he does / says nothing”.29 The politician is vain, manipulative; he honors the fallen warriors and fights for the far-fetched state goals (UN membership). Visar Krusha’s comedy Corner Inn (Kafana na raskršću; Kafeneja në udhëkryq) has been shaped in the spirit of the comédie en vaudevilles as a sort of Kosovo adaptation of the popular TV comedy ‘Alo, ‘alo! The plot is set in a restaurant run by Sokol, who is courted by a two young and handsome waitresses (one of them, Enkela, is from Albania). His Hungarian wife, Sara, is a type of naïve spouse, and her mother is a cantankerous and senile old lady to whom Sara is giving ballet lessons. Instead of Nazi occupiers, we have the Serbian policemen Nebojša and Dragan, and their (Gestapo) chief Žuti, from Belgrade. There are also the members of the “resistance movement”. The latter is not only violent, but corrupted as well, which allows both sides to make use of illegal means. A character named Gazi thus obtains Serbian passports through the corrupted policeman Nebojša. Violence is inevitable despite the genre of soft comedy. Thus, Sokol is badly beaten at the police station for attempting to disguise an illegal political who came to a commemoration for his deceased mother-in-law. Sokol is a clever and fortunate opportunist who, like René in occupied France, concedes to the requests brought to him by the representatives of force, but always has in mind his own little private benefit. In that spirit, Sara is persuading him to agree to a risky proposal to host an illegal political gathering in his café and reminds him of the difference between a profile and patriotism: “But, if you don’t take chances for your own people, who’ll come to the hotel? No one! Who’ll give you the license for it? No one! Think well, my dear husband”.30 Jeton Neziraj’s play One Flew Over the Kosovo Theatre belongs to the genre of political farce that equally follows the tradition of Brechtian engaged theater and postmodern travesty. It is situated in January 2008, in the Kosovo National Theatre, at the time of the declaration of Kosovo independence. A small number of characters – a director, actor, actress, stage worker and secretary at the Ministry of Sport (under whose jurisdiction culture belongs) – are given the task to design and produce the ceremony in the honor of the announced a declaration of independence. The very fact that the exact date of the proclamation of independence is unknown, that under the request from above, the content of the play introduces the Prime Minister’s speech they receive a day prior, clearly indicates the character of the state that is to be proclaimed. The field of political force is clearly and ironically sketched in Neziraj’s play: above God is a political God – Kosovo’s Prime Minister, and above him is the representative of the supreme Divinity – the American Ambassador in Prishtina. Owing to the intervention of international protectors, the play is required to celebrate the multiculturality and multiconfessionality of Kosovo and under no circumstances should name the historical enemy, whether Turks or Serbs, since after independence, the latter are to be an exemplary national community.

Figure of the Other as an open project 123

Conclusion The notion of the Other in this chapter applied primarily to the central narrative instance in prose texts and to the lyrical subject of poetry, considered through the ethnic, gender, political, religious, social and sexual lens. The Other is an individual, group or community outside the narrator’s or poet’s, that is, those who do not share his/her identity traits and characteristics. The basic difference between authors from Albania in comparison to those from Kosovo is the preponderance of the political Other (in Albania), as opposed to the ethnic Other (in Kosovo). The authors from Albania are additionally preoccupied with the phenomenon of autoisolationist Albanian totalitarianism, and so the Other appears as a representative of the totalitarian rule, but who is at the same time its victim as well. The political other is a subspecies of the internal other, as someone who is a member of the same community but performs an important political function. A religious other in the works of Anilda Ibrahimi has such status of the internal other. For Kosovo authors, Serb as the ethnic other is important in both senses: ethnic and political, as a representative of the oppressive rule. The ethnic Other as victim is found only in the poetry of Arben Idrizi. For authors from Kosovo, the obsessive traumatic theme is the Serbian-Albanian war in Kosovo and the NATO bombing of 1998/99, as well as the early 1990s when many Albanians lost their jobs and formed a parallel social life under Serbian police repression (Veton Suroi). In the books published after this conflict, the period of common life is a form of epochal otherness and is the subject of reminiscence (Fahredin Shehu). The war itself is presented mainly as a process in which the Other is an oppressor (Halil Matoshi). The end of the war, for its part, brings critical reevaluation, condemns revanchism against the defeated Other (Arben Idrizi) and asks the nature of the newborn national state (Xhevdet Bajraj, Jeton Neziraj) rooted as it is in an unchanged patriarchal substrate (Doruntina Basha). Tradition is the subject of reevaluation (stories and plays of Ilir Gjocaj, poetry of Luljeta Lleshanaku, novel of Anilda Ibrahimi, story of Zija Chela). Emigration turns the narrator into a permanent Other, as a person of hybrid identity (no longer a local and not yet a stranger), as in the case of Beqë Cufaj’s characters. The poetry of Kujtim Paçaku stands out by its focus on the perils of Roma identity, also a hybrid (simultaneously ethnically and culturally Other and socially subjected). The nuclei of constituting the sexual Other can be found in the writings of Besa Salihu and Balsor Hoxha’s poem about the bisexual nature of Prishtina. The least present is the social Other, that is, a narrative or lyrical discourse about poverty, class conflicts or transitional capitalism. Taken in general, the constitution of the Other in the works of Albanian and Kosovo authors is burdened by historical trauma of communist repression in the Albanian and Serbian regimes’ repression and patriarchal tradition in the form of masculine domination. Serbian-Albanian relations have been portrayed as relations of collective distance and profound mistrust, where even the knowledge of the other’s language is suspicious and proscribed. Mixed family offspring families are rare and face a double burden, in terms of both nationality and language. The

124  Saša Ćirić Albanian community practices a collective boycott towards the Albanians that cooperate with the representatives of Serbian rule in Kosovo. Not a single literary piece offers an example of interethnic friendship or love relations. Yet, satiricalcritical resistance to political authoritarianism and patriarchal conservatism, as well as religious tolerance and rejection of revanchism, are a solid foundation for the reconfiguration of the notion of the Other in the context of Serbian-Albanian relations. This applies equally to the transfer of the Other from the category of (induced) enemy and dangerous stranger to the category of neighbor with the perspective of revitalizing erstwhile coexistence and cooperation.

Notes 1 Škeljzen Malići, Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Mostart, 2014), 236. 2 It is worth mentioning that, even though we speak about authors from Albania and Kosovo, some of them have not lived there for a long time: Fahredin Shehu lives in Barcelona, Ismail Kadare in Paris, Anilda Ibrahimi in Rome, Xhevdet Bajraj in Mexico City and Beqë Cufaj in Stuttgart. 3 Ismail Kadare, Pad kamenog grada (Podgorica: Karver, 2011), 13. (Translated by Smajl Smaka i Varja Đukić.) (Albanian edition: Kronikë në gur, Tiranë: Naim Frashëri, 1971). 4 Ibid., 10. 5 Ibid., 16. 6 Anilda Ibrahimi, Crveno poput neveste (Belgrade: Rende, 2013), 233. (Translated from the Italian by Snježana Marinković i Srbislava Vukov Simentić.) (Italian edition: Rosso come una sposa, Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2008) 7 Ibid., 277. 8 Ibid. 9 Beć Cufaj, Sjaj tuđine (Belgrade: VBZ Beograd, 2009), 82. (Translated from the German by Jelena Petrović.) (Albanian edition: Beqë Cufaj, Shkëlqimi i huaj, Pejë: Dukagjini, 2003). 10 Ibid., 113. 11 Ibid., 144. 12 Haljilj Matoši, Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju. Nova albanska književnost Kosova. Ed. J. Neziraj (Belgrade: Algoritam medija, 2009), 218. (Translated by Nailje Imami, Shkelzen Maliqi, Anton Berišaj, Fadilj Bajraj) (Albanian counterpart: Nga Beogradi, me dashuri, Prishtinë: MM, 2011.) 13 Veton Suroi, Milijarder (Beograd: Samizdat B92, 2015), 10. (Translated by Shkelzen Maliqi) (Albanian edition: Miliarderi, Prishtinë: Koha, 2013.) 14 Ibid., 79. 15 Xhevdet Bajraj, Sloboda užasa (Belgrade: Rende, 2002), 19. (Translated by the author.) (Albanian edition: Liria e tmerrit, Prishtinë: Sabaiumbb, 2000.) 16 Fahredin Šehu, Nalivpero (Belgrade: Arhipelag, 2013), 11. (Translated by the author.) 17 Ibid., 18. 18 Ibid., 19. 19 Arben Idrizi, Zveri vole otadžbinu (Kafshët e duan atdheun) (Beograd: KPZ Beton, 2013), 13/4. (Translated by Shkelzen Maliqi.) 20 Ibid., 15/7. 21 Ibid., 31/3. 22 Ibid., 152. 23 Ervina Haljilji, in: Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju. Nova albanska književnost Kosova. Trans. by Nailje Imami, Shkelzen Maliqi, Anton Berišaj and Fadilj Bajraj (Belgrade: Algoritam medija, 2009), 143.

Figure of the Other as an open project 125 24 Trina Gojani, in: Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju. Nova albanska književnost Kosova. Trans. by Nailje Imami, Shkelzen Maliqi, Anton Berišaj and Fadilj Bajraj (Belgrade: Algoritam medija, 2009), 112. 25 Kujtim Paćaku, in: Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju. Nova albanska književnost Kosova. Trans. by Nailje Imami, Shkelzen Maliqi, Anton Berišaj and Fadilj Bajraj (Belgrade: Algoritam medija, 2009), 113. 26 Ibid., 114. 27 Ibid., 116. 28 Ilir Gjocaj, Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta. Savremena kosovska drama (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës. Drama bashkëkohore nga Kosova). Ed. J. Neziraj (Belgrade: RK Links, 2014), 22. (Translated by Anton Berishaj, Qerim Ondozi, Fadil Bajraj, Shkelzen Maliqi.) 29 Xhevdet Bajraj, “Ubistvo jednog komarca”, in: J. Neziraj (ed.), Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta. Savremena kosovska drama (Belgrade: RK Links, 2014), 124. 30 Visar Kruša, “Kafana na raskršću”, in: J. Neziraj (ed.), Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta. Savremena kosovska drama (Belgrade: RK Links, 2014), 246.

References Bajraj, Xhevdet (2002). Sloboda užasa. Trans. by the author. Belgrade: Rende. (Albanian edition: Liria e tmerrit. Prishtinë: Sabaiumbb, 2000). Bajraj, Xhevdet (2014). “Ubistvo jednog komarca” (“Vrasja e mushkonjës”) In: Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës). Edited by Jeton Neziraj. Belgrade: RK Links. Basha, Doruntina (2014). “Prst” (“Gishti”) In: Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës). Cufaj, Beqë (2010). Sjaj tuđine. Belgrade: VBZ Beograd. Trans. from the German by Jelena Petrović. (Albanian edition: Beqë Cufaj. Shkëlqimi i huaj. Pejë: Dukagjini, 2003). Gjocaj, Ilir (2014). “Podrum” (“Bodrumi”) In: Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës). Ibrahimi, Anilda (2013). Crveno poput neveste. Belgrade: Rende. Trans. from the Italian by: Snježana Marinković i Srbislava Vukov Simentić. (Italian edition: Rosso come una sposa. Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2008). Idrizi, Arben (2013). Zveri vole otadžbinu (Kafshët e duan atdheun). Trans. by Shkelzen Maliqi. Beograd: KPZ Beton. Imami, Petrit (2000). Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove. Belgrade: Samizdat. (Second edition: Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove, III Vols. Belgrade: Samizdat, 2017.) (Albanian edition: Serbët dhe Shqiptarët ndër Shekuj. III Vols. Belgrade: Samizdat 2017). Kadare, Ismail (2011). Pad kamenog grada. Trans. by Smajl Smaka and Varja Đukić. Podgorica: Karver. (Albanian edition: Kronikë në gur, Tiranë: Naim Frashëri, 1971). Krusha, Visar (2014). “Kafana na raskršću” (“Kafeneja në udhëkryq”) In: Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës). Belgrade: RK Links. Lješanaku, Ljuljeta (2012). Djeca prirode. Belgrade: Grupa 484. (Luljeta Lleshanaku & Agron Tufa. Fëmijët e natyrës). Tirana: Ombra GVG, 2006. Malići, Škeljzen (2014). Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Mostart. Neziraj, Jeton (ed.) (2009). Iz Prištine, s ljubavlju. Nova albanska književnost Kosova. Trans. by Nailje Imami, Shkelzen Maliqi, Anton Berišaj, Fadilj Bajraj. Belgrade: Algoritam medija (Albanian counterpart: Nga Beogradi, me dashuri. Prishtinë: MM, 2011.). Neziraj, Jeton (ed.) (2014a). Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta. Savremena kosovska drama (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës. Drama bashkëkohore nga Kosova). Trans. by Anton Berishaj, Qerim Ondozi, Fadil Bajraj, Shkelzen Maliqi. Belgrade: RK Links.

126  Saša Ćirić Neziraj, Jeton (2014b). “Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta (Fluturimi mbi teatrin e Kosovës)” In: Let iznad kosovskog pozorišta. Edited by J. Neziraj. Belgrade: RK Links. Šehu, Fahredin (2013). Nalivpero. Trans. by the author. Belgrade: Arhipelag. Shehu, Bashkim (2003). Gozba. Trans. by Shkelzen Maliqi. Belgrade: Forum Pisaca. (Albanian edition: Gostia, Tiranë: Eurorilindja, 1996). Suroi, Veton (2015). Milijarder. Trans. by Shkelzen Maliqi. Belgrade: Samizdat B92. (Albanian edition: Miliarderi, Prishtinë: Koha, 2013).

8 We, Sons of the Nation Intellectuals as generators of Albanian and Serbian national ideas and programs Rigels Halili In his proverbial-sounding definition of nationalism as a sentiment and a movement, Ernest Gellner draws attention to two closely connected domains in which nationalism evolves: the sphere of ideas and of the political action.1 This chapter deals with the former, although refers to the latter for context, when necessary. It focuses above all on the role of Albanian and Serbian intellectuals, especially scholars, in the formation, preservation and implementation of national ideas and political programs. My aim is to focus on two important documents, which as I intend to show, could be understood as symbolically representing a long tradition of thought and ideas in both Serbian and Albanian academia. These documents are the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), which became public in 1986, and a largely unknown Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question presented by the Albanian Academy of Sciences (ASH) in 1998. The need for comparative research in and on the Balkans is not new. The Albanian historian Stavro Skendi, who after emigrating to America wrote one of the most important works on the Albanian national movement of the 19th and 20th century, demanded just such a comparative approach and successfully implemented it in some of his own studies.2 Obviously, comparative elements inevitably are present in the global perspective of analysis used by some of the best historians of the Balkans, to mention only L. S. Stavrianos, Barbara Jelavich, Georges Castellan, Traian Stoianovich, Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Mark Mazower. Taking Skendi’s postulate as a starting point, I would rely here on a rather clearer approach applied by Miroslav Hroch, a leading Czech historian and sociologist. Hroch claimed that four requirements needed to be taken into account: (a) the object to be compared must be defined as precisely as possible; (b) the aim of the application of the comparative method must be laid down; (c) the criteria of analysis for the objects of comparison should be established; (d) the relation of the comparative procedure to the temporal axis (i.e. to historical chronology in an absolute sense) must be clarified.3 I do not wish to analyze these two crucial texts in order “to prove guilt” or “present the truth” of their authors. These very concepts though  – guilt and

128  Rigels Halili truth – served as the main emotional and ideological pillars, which, alongside institutional prestige and political support, gave legitimacy to both documents in question. The structure of both documents is underpinned by the same logic of a clear and nonreversible division into us and them. The recipe is simple and well known from elsewhere: we are the victims with peaceful, truthful and rightful aspirations, whereas they are the aggressors, carriers of false claims and as a rule perpetrators of all crimes that endanger our very existence. Understanding this, though, is only the first step. More interesting and, perhaps, culturally and socially useful would be to expose and critically asses the continuity of the ideas expressed in these documents, the role of scholars in this process and, finally, the influence of scientific and cultural institutions established and/or sponsored by the state. This would require pursuing the analysis on at least two levels: the linguistic and the socio-historical. In a short article written in 1993, Shkëlzen Maliqi, a leading figure among Kosovo Albanian publicists, wrote that the verbal sphere of communication of both Serbian and Albanian extreme nationalist discourses had reached its limit, after which point only war remains.4 It took only a few years for that war to come, and its consequences are and will be felt for a long time in Kosovo, Serbia and Albania. Therefore, a few basic questions need asking: how did this happen, why did it happen, who bears responsibility for these events and how do we deal with their consequences? I will attempt to find some answers by looking closely at both sides, at their dialogue, even when it was absent or they were completely neglecting the very existence of the other side.5 For, to borrow Bakhtin’s term, the comparative approach proposed here could work and be useful only if the analysis took into account the dialogic nature of every ethnic conflict, including the Albanian-Serbian one. And, as Bakhtin would argue, it is a dialogue that extends both ways, by embracing and influencing both of sides profoundly, strongly and simultaneously.6 Both the Memorandum of SANU and the Platform of ASH were products of specific historical circumstances, which need to be taken into account when embarking on such a comparative analysis. The privilege of hindsight may blur the clarity of analysis; therefore, prudence is necessary in this respect. As stated by many scholars, the Memorandum anticipated, and perhaps even influenced, the radical changes in the constitutional position of Vojvodina and Kosovo, implemented in 1989. It is also not a coincidence that the Platform of ASH was presented in 1998, when the armed clashes between the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) and Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces evolved into open war. Several months later, this turned into a humanitarian catastrophe, leading to NATO air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, it is equally important to put these texts in a larger historical context, for they are expressions of a tradition of ideas and ways of thinking that originate as early as the beginnings of modern Serbian and Albanian national movements.

What is in there? For those who study or teach the breakup of communist Yugoslavia, the SANU Memorandum has turned into one of those all-explaining catch-phrases, a sort of

We, Sons of the Nation  129 metaphor that sums up the very essence of Serbian nationalism, the beginning of the path to war, destruction of the country and countless human tragedies. In fact, quite often the Memorandum is not even quoted, facts are misplaced and the content is erroneously simplified. On the other hand, the Platform of ASH is not well known and, to my knowledge, has not yet been an object of any serious scholarly analysis. Therefore, it seems appropriate to start by taking a closer look at the content of both documents. The SANU Memorandum The structure of the Memorandum could be summarized by the titles of its two parts. In the first one, entitled The Crisis in the Yugoslav Economy and Society, the authors analyze the Yugoslav context, while in the second one, entitled The Status of Serbia and the Serbian Nation, they focus on, so to speak, Serbian matters. Interestingly enough, the text starts with the economy, and not with political matters. The authors are blunt: the deep economic and social crisis in Yugoslavia could even lead to “a catastrophic outcome,” such as the country’s ultimate dissolution.7 They locate the problem of the sluggish growth rate and high unemployment of the first half of the 1980s in the mistakes made in the 1960s, when the reform of economic principles caused decentralization and abolition of central planning. This resulted in the fragmentation of the Yugoslav economy into nearindependent economies in each federal republic, leading to a crisis.8 In their opinion, the poor reaction of the federal government was in fact the result of a hidden agenda to give more economic and political power to the leaders of each republic.9 But there is also a “moral crisis” that troubles the authors. It is deep and strikes at the very foundation of Yugoslav society, they claim. There has been a deviation from, or even a failure of the socialist ideals, that manifests itself in narrow peasant mentality, nepotism, corruption, theft, embezzlement and criminality, omnipresent at every level of social life. The destructive influence of unemployment, loss of faith in social equality and intense emigration are additional elements in the mosaic of decay depicted by the authors of the Memorandum. As is usually the case, they claim, the crisis of values goes hand in hand with a crisis of culture. Primitivism, provincialism and kitsch are ever present in literature, music, film, entertainment, radio, press and television. Their conclusion again sounds harsh, but in fact hard to disagree with: official ideology, which instead of a real socialist program, only offers empty political proclamations has largely squandered its ability to win people’s hearts and minds. . . . Deep-rooted as they are in provincial cultural life, separatism and nationalism are becoming increasingly aggressive.10 The lack of transparency and democracy in social life, the failure of the selfmanagement system, so-called etatism, violation of basic rights of the individual, such as freedom of speech and freedom of organization, all these put together, according to the authors, leave Yugoslavia far behind other civilized countries. The grim and dark diagnosis opens the door for the second part of the document,

130  Rigels Halili where the authors discuss the position of Serbia and Serbs in general. Immediately, the reader feels a change of language from an official and somehow mechanic, to one more passionate and sometimes even personal in tone. The authors open with a straightforward statement: Many of the troubles bedeviling the Serbian nation stem from conditions common to all constituent Yugoslav nations. However, the Serbian people are beset by yet other afflictions. The long-term lagging of Serbia’s economic development, unregulated legal relations with Yugoslavia and the provinces, as well as the genocide in Kosovo, have all appeared on the political scene with a combined force that is making the situation tense, if not explosive.11 The authors’ critique focuses most on the Constitution of 1974. For them, this document simply discriminates against Serbia, because it separates Vojvodina and Kosovo from Serbia. The old assumption that “a week Serbia ensures a strong Yugoslavia” was embodied in the principle of parity of representatives from various republics, which resulted in limiting Serbian employment in federal positions. Moreover, the complicated system of competence sharing between Serbia and the autonomous provinces led to huge confusion in decision-making, internal policy and economic development and loss of sovereignty of the Serbian nation. Only the Serbian nation, claim the authors, is not concentrated within one republic. Thus, this matter goes far beyond constitutional disputes, for it concerns the very survival of the Serbian nation and its state. The authors leave no doubt about their main motives, when they turn their attention towards the situation in Kosovo: The physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija is a worse defeat than any experienced in the liberation wars waged by Serbia from the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 to the uprising of 1914.12 From here, the tone of the Memorandum becomes sharp and direct, sounding catastrophic at times, replacing economic arguments with historical ones. The authors point to the legacy of the Comintern policy, the ignorance and opportunism of Serbian politicians, as well as the total neglect of Kosovo’s political elites as the main motives behind the drastic deterioration of the situation of Serbs living in Kosovo. There is an open war, claim the authors, being waged consciously and thoroughly by Albanians against the Kosovo Serbs. It is a war supported by the Tirana government, following a well-detailed and actualized Albanian national plan. Atrocities, violence, terror and vandalism take place in Kosovo against Serbs, as well as events like the Djordje Martinović affair,13 which recall “the darkest days of the Turkish practice of impalement.”14 But most importantly, Serbs are being expelled from the province, and this is the final phase of a process that began much earlier. In support of such a statement, the authors give exact demographic data. Quoting Jovan Cvijić, they state that a half a million Serbs left Kosovo from 1690 until the early 20th century. Of that, some 150,000 left Kosovo

We, Sons of the Nation  131 in the period 1876–1912, terrorized by local Albanian bashi-bazouks. Another 60,000 were forced to abandon the province during World War II, while the number of those forced from Kosovo in the 1970s and 1980s, the authors estimate at around 200,000.15 Such developments leave little hope for the future, conclude the authors. Kosovo, the cradle of Serbdom, may soon be free of Serbs, thus completing the “Greater Albanian racist” program, outlined by the League of Prizren. Yet, despite the lack of support by the provincial authorities, there is opposition rising from below, from the nation, and these people should seek assistance from the Serbian state government. Everything possible should be done for expelled Serbs to be able to return to their homes, otherwise, the authors warn, “this part of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia will become a European issue, with the gravest possible unforeseeable consequences.”16 The claim for an ethnically pure Kosovo, they conclude, will open the door to expansionism, which will endanger all the national groups living in Yugoslavia. After drawing a similarly catastrophic diagnosis regarding the situation of Serbs elsewhere in Yugoslavia, above all in Croatia and Vojvodina, and demanding deep reforms of the system of education, where “evidence of mistreatment of Serbs and all Serbian cultural heritage can be found in the school curricula of all Yugoslav republics,” the authors arrive at their conclusions. They restate and reemphasize the main demands that dominate throughout the text: first, a break with the ideology propagated by the Comintern and embodied in the policy implemented by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and, by implication, its successor – the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; second, the removal of the stigma that the Serbian nation is the oppressor of other nationalities within Yugoslavia; and finally, the “establishment of the Serbian people’s complete national and cultural integrity, regardless of which Republic or province they might reside in, as their historical and democratic right.”17 The authors demand for the autonomous provinces to become integral parts of the Republic of Serbia again, for the “genocide in Kosovo” to be stopped at all cost and for measures allowing Serbs to return to “their ancestral homes.” They end by calling for a general democratic mobilization “of all the moral and intellectual forces of the nation, not just in order to carry out the decisions handed down by political leadership, but rather to devise programs and map out the future in a democratic way.”18 After reading the whole document, one is left with the impression that there is hardly better proof of this mobilization of national intellectual forces and programs than the very text of the Memorandum. The Platform of ASH Despite the different circumstances in which it was written and made public, the tone and rhetoric of the Platform resemble very much those of the Memorandum. The very preface leaves no doubt about the main motives and aims of its authors: it is a document that truthfully reveals the past, analyzes the present and provides solutions for the future. This structure brings to mind the most important manifesto of the Albanian national movement, Sami Frashëri’s 1899 anonymously published book Albania: What it Was, What it Is and What it Will Be. Even though

132  Rigels Halili a century divides Frashëri’s book from the Platform, it is evident that its authors are still under the influence of those same ideas and driven by the same sense of urgency to help the imperiled nation. There is, however, a shift in emphasis. For Frashëri, Albania was a geographical reality, including more or less those territories inhabited entirely or partially by Albanians, but a political entity yet to be formed. For the Platform’s authors, Albania is a political entity, severely handicapped by the fact that almost half of the nation lives outside of the nation-state. Frashëri imagined this state and provided ideas regarding its organization; the Platform’s authors provide solutions for its adjustment. The main concern is not to prove the very existence of the Albanian nation, as it was for Frashëri, but to provide historical and other arguments in support of its rights to self-determination and sovereignty. Frashëri was among the fathers of the nation, while the authors of the Platform tend to present themselves as its concerned sons. The time of writing was decisive. It was 1998, and the situation in Kosovo and the fate of Albanians living there were at the very center of the authors’ attention. However, as was the case with the Memorandum of SANU, Kosovo seems only to be a pretext for discussing the fate of the whole nation. In contradistinction to their Serbian colleagues, the Albanian authors start with history. They situate the origin of the Albanian national movement in the time of “Ottoman occupation,” almost simultaneously with Serbian and Greek national programs, Načertanie and Megali Idea, respectively. It is important to note this stress on the moment of emergence of national programs, for it contests the commonly held belief that Albanian nationalism was a latecomer in the Balkans. To support this statement, they quote several European travelers of that period, understood by the Platform’s authors as objective by definition, who defined the shape of lands inhabited by Albanians, called them “descendants of the ancient Illyrians,” who “have been dwelling in these lands ever since the dawn of history.”19 On this basis, the Platform’s authors draw clear borders of the so-called geographical space inhabited by Albanians. The border goes south from Niš towards Leskovac and Vranje, and then Kumanovo, Prilep and Bitola, and then turns west towards Ioannina and ends in Preveza. It is important to note that the authors use only Albanian forms for these names, i.e. Shkup and not Skopje, or Manastir and not Bitola, Janina and not Ioannina. Particularly conspicuous in this regard is the use of the term Kosova (and not Kosovo) throughout the text.20 It is a deliberate semantic choice, but even more so a political choice, since the same form is also used in the English translation of the Platform. This corresponds very well to the use of the term “Kosovo and Metohija” in the English translation of the SANU Memorandum. The Platform’s authors concede the fact that historically, not only Albanians lived in this territory, but following the line of the official historiography in postWorld War II communist Albania they emphasize that non-Albanian populations were “islands of minorities in the open Albanian sea.”21 They restate the core idea of the political program of the Albanian national movement of the late 19th century, namely the inclusion of four Ottoman vilayets predominantly inhabited by Albanians  – Kosova, Işkodra, Manastir and Yania  – into a single independent Albanian vilayet. But they go further in their interpretation, by linking the

We, Sons of the Nation  133 territory of the vilayet of Kosova with the Illyrian province of Dardania, and the vilayet of Yania with the province of Epirus. Hence, they draw a line of IllyrianAlbanian continuity in these territories, which render Serbian and Greek historical claims and political plans for these regions meaningless.22 Thus, according to the Platform authors, Serbian expansion towards Kosovo and northern Albania was the result of the imperial demand for access to the Adriatic Sea. They find the origin of this policy to be present already in Načertanie, but they do not quote any fragment from that document. In fact, they dismiss a number of claims made by the “Belgrade nationalist circles”: the denial of the Illyrian origin of Albanians is an attempt to deny their historical presence in Kosovo; the Great Serbian Migration of 1689/1690 is a historical invention; the charge that Albanian Muslims cooperated with Ottoman authorities in deliberately destroying Serbian monasteries (when, claim the authors of the Program, the truth is that Albanian families in fact protected and guarded Serbian monasteries). Quite to the contrary, it was Serbian medieval rulers who “occupied Kosovo” and destroyed every monument of ancient Albanian culture and religion.23 Kosovo was always a center of Albanian resistance against the Turks, continue the authors. They mention the Catholic archbishop, Pjetër Bogdani, as the organizer of the 1689 uprising, but they add immediately that Muslims joined the Catholics in fighting the Turks, as in the case of the uprising of 1844 led by Dervish Cara. Kosovo became the center of the Albanian national movement during the League of Prizren and continued to be so up to the general uprising of 1912, which directly set the scene for the outbreak of the First Balkan War. The Platform’s authors emphasize that among delegates, who gathered in Vlora and declared Albania’s independence on 28 November 1912, there were representatives of all the regions inhabited by Albanians, “including Kosova, Macedonia and Çamëria.” Weary from continuous uprisings, Albanians were unable to stop the advance of the Serbian and Greek armies towards Kosovo, Chameria24 and southern Albania. Without any doubt, stress the authors, the decisions of the conference of ambassadors of Great Powers, gathered in London in 1913, were hugely traumatic for Albanians, since Kosovo, parts of Macedonia and Chameria were left out of the newly formed Albania. They call this act a great injustice against “an ancient nation that survived the continuous storms of history.” It led to massive expulsions and forced migrations of Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia to Turkey, with the symbolic end of this long line of suffering and repression being the “biblical exodus of Çams” at the end of the World War II.25 However, the main focus of the Platform’s authors is Kosovo. First, they explain the position of Albanians in communist Yugoslavia. The end of World War II was marked by one crucial event, namely the conference held in Bujan on 1 January 1944. At the conference, Albanian representatives from all over Kosovo agreed that after the war Kosovo’s population would have the right to selfdetermination. They also expressed desire to unify Kosovo with Albania. But, once the war was over, the newly established “Serbian authorities” rejected the Bujan Resolution and Kosovo remained part of Serbia. Thus, Albanians in the new Yugoslavia were not granted their own republic, despite the Albanian population

134  Rigels Halili being six times bigger than the Montenegrin and twice that of Macedonians. Thus, the unequal position of Albanians from pre-war Yugoslavia continued after World War II.26 At this point, the authors of the Platform turn their attention once again to Serbian historiography with claims that have already appeared in polemics previously published by the Albanian Academy of Sciences. They reject the theory of Albanians moving en masse to Kosovo only after 1689/1690. Instead, they stress Albanian autochthony in this region on the basis of the direct link with the Dardans, an Illyrian tribe known to have inhabited Kosovo. They add that Kosovo could not have been the cradle of the Serbian medieval state, because its expansion south only began at the end of the 12th century. Albanians were always present in Kosovo, the proof of which are the many family names from that period with Albanian roots and Slavic suffixes. As many sources testify, they were in fact the majority in Kosovo before the “so-called massive migration of Serbs” from this area in 1689. Therefore, “the claims of the Serbian government over their so called historical rights on Kosova are totally groundless. . . . Kosova has always been and will remain a limb of the Albanian nation.”27 This statement opens the floor for discussing the situation of Albanians in communist Yugoslavia. The authors claim that the regions inhabited by Albanians, i.e. the former vilayet of Kosova, faced further truncation once in Yugoslavia, which they call “the third great partition.” The southern part was accorded to the Republic of Macedonia, the valleys of Medveđa, Bujanovac and Preševo were incorporated into the Republic of Serbia, while the northern part was added to the Republic of Montenegro.28 According to them, Albanians in Yugoslavia lived in terrible conditions that were even worse in Kosovo. In the 1950s and 1960s alone, “as a result of the genocidal Serbian policy, more than 50,000 people were killed and some 300,000 were forced out of Yugoslavia.”29 The Yugoslav constitution from 1974 brought some improvements in the field of education and culture, but it also confirmed the division of Albanian lands, leaving the status of the Albanian population unchanged. It was this that led to the demonstrations of 1981, brutally suppressed using tanks. And when the autonomy of Kosovo was abolished in 1989, which violated both the provincial and federal constitutions, the terror erupted. Albanians massively lost their jobs, schools were closed, and imprisonments, expulsions and killings became quotidian.30 The proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo on 7 September 1990 was the finalization of aspirations already expressed at the conference of Bujan and expressed later in the massive demonstrations in 1968 and 1981. Despite the fact that it was limited only to Kosovo and not to “all ethnic Albanian lands languishing under the Yugoslav yoke,” this act, the authors state, represented a step forward towards the materialization of the major aim of the Albanian national movement.31 Neither the Badinter commission32 nor the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia recognized the rights of Albanians to self-determination, continue the authors, despite the fact that they constituted 90% of the population of Kosovo. Facing repression, if not terror, Albanians began a massive movement that sought to solve the problems of the province through peaceful means alone. Rejection of Albanian

We, Sons of the Nation  135 demands by the Belgrade authorities and inefficacy of the international community were the main reasons for the eruption of armed conflict and the strengthening of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The authors do not elaborate much on UÇK itself, since at the time of writing this organization was still shrouded in mystery, but they appeal to “Big Chancelleries,” to pay attention to the fact that the Kosovo crisis has deep historical, economic, social and cultural roots. Above all, however, “it is the issue of an unjustly split up nation.”33 Influenced by the events taking place in Kosovo, they call for military intervention in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. The future status of the province should be resolved on the basis of the principle of self-determination. However, this should be achieved by using democratic and peaceful means only, in accordance with modern European standards. Furthermore, they emphasize that a lasting solution of the Kosovo issue is strictly connected with the improvement of living standards for the Albanians in Macedonia, who have lived there continually and make up “35% of the entire population.”34 In this context, the Albanian Academy of Sciences proposes the following measures: recognition of the Republic of Kosova as a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, treating Albanians in Macedonia as equal to Macedonians, i.e. granting them the right of a state-forming people, assistance to Albanians in Montenegro to obtain their autonomous province and guaranteeing the Albanians in Greece the right to learn their mother tongue in public schools.35

What’s the story behind the story? None of the views presented in the SANU Memorandum or ASH Platform was new. But the ways of presenting the arguments (programmatic), the institutions involved (academies of sciences) and the impact of these texts (political implications) were remarkable. Two other crucial elements add to this picture: the emotional language and the urgency of the proposed solutions. It is quite striking how easily the authors of both documents abandon the typically cold “scientific style” and use words that carry huge semantic weight, like “genocide,” “yoke,” “racist,” “catastrophe” etc. It is obvious that the communication, if we can speak of any at all, between Albanian and Serbian historians, in both documents is reminiscent of a conversation between two deaf people. The only aim of engaging in any dialogue is to reject the opinion expressed by the other side. No doubt, both documents are expressions of Albanian and Serbian nationalisms in terms of recognizing the primacy of the nation’s interests, which implies an urgency to eliminate all obstacles in order to achieve those interests.36 Both the Albanian and Serbian nation appears in these documents as given entities, compact and homogenous, facing existential threats. But equally important are the motives behind the authors’ efforts. In one sense, they put it very clearly: the concern for the fate of the nation and the sense of duty.37 They go further, though, and present themselves as an authoritative source of knowledge, hence the emphasis

136  Rigels Halili on the institutions, on the group and not on individual authors. Obviously, the authority of the two Academies not only legitimized the historical visions presented in the documents, but also gave political credibility to the demands and solutions proposed by its authors. In a clear and compact way, they offered a rational diagnosis of the present situation, identified the sources of the problems in the past and presented solutions for the future. They presented themselves as the intellectual avant-garde of the nation, a position much in line with the romantic vision of intellectuals as the awakeners of national consciousness and their social function as keepers of knowledge. From this point, there is only one step to political involvement and it seems that the authors of both documents indeed took that step, as they not only generated ideas, but also proposed strategies and measures towards their implementation. We know today quite a lot about the process of the preparation of both documents. During a convention of the Assembly of SANU in May 1985, a decision was taken to present the Academy’s voice on current social issues. In the following month, a committee was formed, headed by the Vice-President of SANU, Antonije Isaković, with members such as the historians Radovan Samardžić and Vasilije Krestić, the philosopher Mihailo Marković and the economist Kosta Mihailović. Two working groups were created, respectively examining the Yugoslav crisis and the state of Serbian national matters.38 While still in its draft phase, the documents were leaked (Mihailović and Krestić insist that they were stolen) to the daily Večernje Novosti and published on 24 September 1986. Nevertheless, Mihailović and Krestić state several times in their account written ten years later, that the Memorandum never acquired the status of a SANU-accepted and -published document. The Platform of ASH came into being in different circumstances, although also as a direct result of intellectuals and scholars’ initiative. Of course, the preparation of the document came as a reaction to what was happening in neighboring Kosovo. However, as suggested in a report by International Crisis Group, it may have been a conscious effort to restore the Academy’s prestige, which suffered a lot after the fall of the communist regime in Albania.39 Such an interpretation seems plausible, taking into consideration that the new democratic government was not eager to finance ASH, seeing it as one of the main institutional strongholds of the old regime. But in 1998, the situation changed after the Socialist Party returned to power, and the new government nominated a new Presidency of ASH. In an interview for the weekly Klan, Ylli Popa, the head of the Presidency, explained the process of the preparation of the Platform. Its first draft was written, discussed and accepted by the Assembly of ASH and thereafter sent to important intellectual figures in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia for remarks and suggestions. After considering these suggestions, the final version was published in Albanian, English and French.40 It is important to note this emphasis in Popa’s statement on the all-Albanian discussion of the text of Platform, which reiterates the ambition of its authors to be the voice of the nation. However, both documents were results of ideas that were long present in the Serbian and Albanian scholarly works and public discussions. The Memorandum

We, Sons of the Nation  137 of SANU is often seen as one of the many documents, appeals, texts and books produced during that period, expressing intellectuals’ concern about the situation of Serbs in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia in general.41 Still, this document is perhaps only the most important in a series of publications that show the rise of Serbian nationalism in the second half of the 1980s. It is tempting to see the Memorandum’s influence in the political changes implemented by Slobodan Milošević, especially in regard to the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. As Ylli Popa emphasized in his interview, the Platform proposed political solutions that were later implemented in the Ohrid Agreement. But even this text was labeled by various Albanian nationalist circles as minimalistic, since it lacked a clear message that the only solution of the Albanian national question would be the unification of all Balkan lands inhabited by Albanians. Popa rejected such accusations and reiterated that the Platform did not call for a violent change of borders in the Balkans, but stood in defense of the rights of Albanian populations. It is important to note that the continuity of ideas is most visible when history is at stake. Both documents rely and recapitulate the main elements of Serbian and Albanian historiographies, especially regarding Kosovo. Two representative facts leap to mind. Only a few months after the scandal surrounding the Memorandum, SANU published the magnum opus of one of its members, the historian Dimitrije Bogdanović, entitled Knjiga o Kosovu. If we consider that this book was accepted for publication in 1984 and the main editor was Antonije Isaković, the head of the committee in charge of writing the Memorandum, then the link becomes clear. But even without the personal link, no doubt Bogdanović’s book and the text of Memorandum show a remarkable resemblance. On the other side, the main theses presented in the Platform could in fact be found in another, larger publication, also by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, entitled The Truth about Kosovo and Albanians in Yugoslavia (E vërteta mbi Kosovën dhe shqiptarët në Jugosllavi), which came out in Tirana in 1990. It contains the same emphasis on Illyrian-Albanian ethnic origin, on the immensity of Albanian presence in medieval Kosovo and on the victimization of Albanians in Yugoslavia(s) in the 20th century. Seen from this perspective, the Platform is only a condensed version of ideas that lay at the very core of Albanian modern historiography.

Conclusions A proper and detailed archeology of this continuity of ideas, in the Foucauldian sense, would require a larger study, but suffice it here to present only a few of the common features of the Memorandum and the Platform. Both documents show a remarkable structural resemblance, which consists in a) demonization of the other; b) victimization of us; and c) presentation of our views as natural, normal, normative but their views as false, wrong, unnatural and non-normative. If we were to narrow the scope of analysis to the history of Kosovo, one could easily demonstrate that both documents present a one-sided vision that gives primacy to one viewpoint, excluding the other. Such a choice has clear political implications, because it seeks to legitimize and/or justify political actions undertaken in the past

138  Rigels Halili or believed to be necessary for the future. Moreover, it is a vision of history that is hegemonic in both time and space and does not take into account plurality of perspectives or historical ebbs and flows. The authors of both documents commit the same methodological mistake of anachronism, since they use the category of nation to interpret historical events outside the modern context. Finally, both documents reveal a rather distinctive indifference and ignorance of the other side, in other words, a belief that all knowledge necessary is already acquired and there is no need for further dialogue. Unfortunately, a few rare exceptions notwithstanding, this is an ever-present tendency in Albanian-Serbian relations. However, while the Platform remains nearly completely unknown to Serbian scholars, the Memorandum was analyzed by Albanian intellectuals, first by those in Kosovo and then in Albania. Perhaps the trend was set by Fehmi Agani, a leading Kosovo sociologist educated in Belgrade and one of the more prominent political figures in masterminding the Albanian peaceful movement in the 1990s. Agani labeled the method used in the Memorandum as a “sneaky continuous lament of the tragic fate of Serbian nation,” displacing reason and addressing only the emotions.42 The victimization of the Serbian nation and the accusation that Albanians carried out armed conflict against Kosovo Serbs, in Agani’s opinion, was a declaration of war. He also concludes that, thanks only to the sobriety of Albanians in Kosovo, who embraced peaceful means of resistance, was a tragedy similar to that in other parts of Yugoslavia avoided.43 Eventually, the tragedy came, and Agani himself was one of its victims.44 I can only wonder at whether he would have noticed that, despite the differences in tone, his words could also be applied to the text of the Platform. I can imagine though that he would have agreed with Nebojša Popov that, “instead of regarding nationalism in a generalized way as a product of destiny or nature that is considered good or evil, we should investigate its true origins and how it has become the ideology of conflict.”45 It is to this kind of understanding that we have sought to contribute with this text.

Notes 1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19912), 1. 2 Stavro Skendi, Balkan Cultural Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), ix. 3 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (London/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 18. 4 Shkëlzen Maliqi, Shqiptarët dhe Evropa (Pejë: Dukagjini,1994), 77. 5 For the lack of space, I will avoid here discussion about the historical context and the dynamic that surrounds both the preparation of these documents and their publication afterwards, but they are both symptomatic examples of precisely that state of total lack of dialogue: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents Diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans la Viellie-Serbie (Vilayet de Kossovo) 1898–1899 (Belgrade: Imprimerie de l’État, 1899); R. Elsie (red.), Gathering Clouds. The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia. Early Twentieth-Century Documents (Pejë: Dukagjini, 2002). 6 Michaił Bahtin, Problemy literatury i estetyki (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1982). 7 Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Answers to Criticism (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1995), 95.

We, Sons of the Nation  139 8 9 10 11 12 13

Ibid., 97. Ibid., 101–102. Ibid., 114. Ibid., 119, 122–123. Ibid., 128. This refers to the so-called “Martinović affair,” which broke out in May 1985 and later on gained much publicity in the Serbian and Yugoslav press. Following an investigation by a colonel in the Yugoslav People’s Army (why the army and not the police, one would ask?), then 56-year-old Djordje Martinović claimed that he experienced an accident during an act of self-pleasuring. This was confirmed also by local doctors. However, a team of doctors from the Medical Military Academy gave support to Martinović’s later version of events, in which he claimed that he was attacked by two Albanian men, who forcibly put a beer bottle into his anus. A second opinion by the commission under the direction of Professor Janez Milčinski concluded that the injuries could be the result of an act of self-pleasuring. The case was never subject to an official investigation by the police and remains open for discussion or speculation. Jasna Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation? Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (London: Hurst, 2002), 132–135. 14 Mihailović and Krestić, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Answers to Criticism, 129. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 130. 17 Ibid., 138. 18 Ibid., 139–140. 19 Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e RSH, 1998), 6. 20 Albanians call the western part of Kosovo Rrafshi i Dukagjinit, and this area corresponds approximately to the Serbian Metohija. In my opinion, the term(s) Kosovo or Kosova is predominantly used in both languages, and the use of longer forms, i.e. Kosovo i Metohija and Kosova and Rrafshi i Dukagjinit, represents a political choice.   This idea appeared first in the writings of the members of the Central Committee for Defending the Rights of the Albanian Nationalities in 1877 in Istanbul. Thereafter, it entered the program of the League of Prizren and thus became a central element of the Albanian national movement. Finally, such a vilayet was formed on 4 September 1912, only to be disbanded a month later with the outbreak of the First Balkan War. See: Stefanaq Pollo and Aleks Buda, Historia e Shqipërisë, Vol. II (Tiranë: Universiteti Shtetëror i Tiranës, 1965), 125. 21 Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question, 6. 22 Ibid., 7. 23 Ibid., 7–8. 24 This region stretches south of the present Albanian-Greek border, following the Ionian cost to Preveza. It is part of Epirus. The “Cham issue,” revived slowly but constantly after the fall of communism in Albania, remains a problematic issue in Albanian-Greek relations. 25 Ibid., 11. 26 Ibid., 17–18. 27 Ibid., 19–21. 28 Ibid., 23. 29 Ibid., 24. 30 Ibid., 26. 31 Ibid., 27. 32 Commonly known under this name due to the fact that it was headed by Robert Badinter, at that time the head of the Constitutional Court of France, the Arbitration Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia was created by the Council of Ministers of European Community on 27 January 1991 to provide legal advice to the Conference on Yugoslavia.

140  Rigels Halili 33 34 35 36

Ibid., 32–33. Ibid., 41. Ibid., 49. Isaiah Berlin, Pod prąd: Eseje z historii idei [Against the Current. Essays in History of Ideas], ed. H. Hardy (Poznan: Zysk i S-ka, 2002), 472. 37 Cf. Mihailović and Krestić, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Answers to Criticism, 9 and Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question, 4. 38 Mihailović and Krestić, Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Answers to Criticism, 13. 39 ICG, “Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?”, Europe Report 153 (2004): 11. 40 www.revistaklan.com/arshiv2/216/popa.asp. 41 See: Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation? Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism, 127–139. 42 Fehmi Agani, Demokracia, kombi, vetvendosja [Democracy, Nation, Self-Determination] (Pejë: Dukagjini, 1994), 141. 43 Ibid., 150. 44 Agani was perceived by many observers as the main strategist of the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratke e Kosovës) and one of the main actors in Kosovo politics. On 6 May 1999, Agani and his family were among Albanian refugees in a train headed from Pristina to Macedonia, but the train was turned back at the border. Near Kosovo Polje (Fushë Kosovë), Agani was taken away by a unit of Serbian police, while his wife and son returned to Pristina. His body was found the next day on a roadside near Lipjan. Serbian police issued a declaration in which it accused the UÇK of isolating and eventually killing Agani. However, in a press release issued in February 2002, the Humanitarian Law Center (Fond za Humanitarno Pravo) gave abundant details about the killing of Agani, including the names of the two policemen who most likely shot him. 45 Nebojša Popov (ed.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), 1.

References Agani, Fehmi (1994). Demokracia, kombi, vetvendosja [Democracy, Nation, SelfDetermination]. Pejë: Dukagjini. Bahtin, Michaił (1982). Problemy literatury i estetyki. Warszawa: Czytelnik. Berlin, Isaiah (2002). Pod prąd: Eseje z historii idei [Against the Current. Essays in History of Ideas]. Edited by H. Hardy. Poznan: Zysk i S-ka. Dragović-Soso, Jasna (2002). Saviours of the Nation? Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism. London: Hurst. Elsie, R. (2002). Gathering Clouds. The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia. Early Twentieth-century Documents. Pejë: Dukagjini. Gellner, Ernest (19912). Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Hroch, Miroslav (1985). Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations. London/New York: Cambridge University Press. ICG (2004). “Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?”. Europe Report 153. Maliqi, Shkëlzen (1993). Shqiptarët dhe Evropa. Pejë: Dukagjini. Mihailović, Kosta and Vasilije Krestić (1995). Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Answers to Criticism. Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

We, Sons of the Nation  141 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (1899). Documents Diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans la Viellie-Serbie (Vilayet de Kossovo) 1898–1899. Belgrade: Imprimerie de l’État. Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question (1998). Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave e RSH. Pollo, Stefanaq and Aleks Buda (1965). Historia e Shqipërisë. Vol. II. Tiranë: Universiteti Shtetëror i Tiranës. Popov, Nebojša (ed.) (2000). The Road to War in Serbia. Trauma and Catharsis. Budapest: CEU Press. Skendi, Stavro (1980). Balkan Cultural Studies. New York: Columbia University Press.

9 The symbolism of impotence Intellectuals and Serbian-Albanian relations in the post-Yugoslav period Gazela Pudar Draško Intellectuals and the national Intellectuals are key participants in the creation, specification, articulation and dissemination of any form of social imagination or any socially conditioned system of knowledge.1 All knowledge is ideological and thus socially rooted. Therefore, ideology is defined as a social construct made of thinking, values and attitudes, organized in meaningful patterns and directing our social agency. In that sense, intellectuals are both the creators of ideologies, including national ones, as well as the primary advocates of acceptance of those ideologies in broader society.2 Benda’s concept of “betrayal of the intellectuals” describes the contribution of intellectuals to political and national passions, marking the 20th century as intellectual organization of political hatred.3 This concept includes the rejection of universal values and acceptance of particular, national commandments that satisfy narrow, egotistical interests, where the victims are usually justice, truth and freedom. Thus, Benda’s conclusion that “indeed, there has never been as much political work coming from those who ought to be the mirror of dispassionate intelligence”.4 It is important to keep in mind that the notion of “intellectual” is certainly not unambiguous, although it is often allegedly obvious within wide colloquial use. Intellectuals, and especially the related and interchangeably used term, intelligentsia, are both often seen as a specific free-floating stratum (Mannheim), as a portion of a class that allows specific class legitimation (Gramsci), as a dominated fraction of the dominant class (Bourdieu) or as a new class (Đilas, Szelenyi). Collini claims that there are at least three interpretations of the notion of intellectual in contemporary use.5 The first and most widespread use includes large groups of professionals in the humanities whose work is primarily concerned with ideas, knowledge or culture. The second, subjective interpretation gestures towards individual interests in ideas, regardless of profession or social role, and as such is difficult to grasp sociologically. Finally, the cultural definition, applied in this text, designates intellectuals as social actors who have developed intellectual authority based on cultural achievements and/or positions and then use that authority in dealing with various topics in the public sphere, regardless of whether they hold expertise in these topics or not.6 Intellectuals always begin with some form

The symbolism of impotence 143 of recognized expertise, on which they build their authority when speaking to a broader, non-expert public, usually positioning themselves as if speaking in the public interest.7 Intellectuals are very important social actors, particularly conspicuous in societies dominated by nationalism, because they have the capacity to sift through a rich national/ethnic tradition, selecting specific moments and elements, which they then combine or emphasize in such a way as to create causal explanations, thus producing a given national ideology. They are, therefore, an irreplaceable ally to different fractions of political elites, when they are not themselves in positions of political power. Their primary role is the production of political ideas and ideals, among which the concept of the nation ranks highly.8 The history of eastern and southeastern Europe, as well as many other parts of the world, testifies to the important position of intellectuals from the formation of the very first national movements, all the way to the present, where they are commonly engaged as leaders of the government opposition or pillars and legitimizers of the powers that be.9 Dejan Jović’s study Yugoslavia, the State that Perished: the Rise, Crisis and Fall of the Fourth Yugoslavia [Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: uspon, kriza i pad četvrte Jugoslavije], testifies to the existence of an entire theoretical school that takes the intellectual elites as a relevant, if not crucial, factor for the unfolding of national upheavals that took place in former Yugoslavia. Although Jović himself does not share this point of view, he does point out that the so-called cultural argument gives particular weight to intellectuals in the creation, and later dissolution, of the Yugoslav nation.10

Serbian intellectuals and Kosovo: (post-)Yugoslav perspective The first moment after World War II in which Kosovo was problematized as a national question is Dobrica Ćosić’s speech given in 1968, where he speaks about underestimation of the national question in the Republic of Serbia in the 1960s and Albanian nationalism and irredentism, from a Marxist internationalist perspective.11 After a short period of silence in the 1970s, Kosovo became an existential question for Serbian intellectuals, along with political and economic crises of Yugoslav society. The deepening crisis and the divisiveness of the power figures in the federal republics upon Tito’s death had a significant impact on the positioning of intellectual elites as bearers of national programs. The Serbian and Slovenian elites initially pushed in a direction that caused more divisiveness, acting as the vanguard of their own understanding of Yugoslav state structure. The differences would become visible during and after the Albanian demonstrations of 1981. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SASA) produced a memorandum that would cause fierce debate in Yugoslav society. The authors of the memorandum consider Serbia the victim of Yugoslav, above all Croatian and Slovenian politics, but also of the ideologues of the 1974 constitution. The idea of Serbs as victims, present already in Ćosić’s speech eighteen years prior, becomes the cornerstone

144  Gazela Pudar Draško of the intellectual discourse maintained to this very day. In the memorandum, Albanians are characterized negatively as an anti-democratic force, aiming to achieve goals set in the texts and actions of the League of Prizren of 1878–81. Due to the absence of adequate response by the proper authorities, these aims were presented a major threat to the state and Serbian nation (Memorandum SANU, 1986).12 In the late 1980s, Serbian intellectuals mobilized and became homogenized around the Kosovo question, exploiting the victim complex by placing it at the very heart of the discourse of nationalism in Serbia. The most prominent intellectuals, defenders of national interests were Mihailo Marković, a member of the Serbian Academy and erstwhile member of the Praxis school of philosophy, which had had a primarily internationalist discourse; further, Dobrica Ćosić, an author of high standing, former official of the Communist Party and later briefly the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and Matija Bećković, the guardian and promoter of traditional epic poetry and author of the catchword moto for the preservation of Kosovo: “Kosovo – the most precious Serbian word”.13 In the cultural and historical elements of Albanian identity, Mihailo Marković saw a negation of Serbian identity, which legitimized Serbian nationalism as a reaction to the Albanian separatist and nationalist movement.14 In 1989, a year marking 600 years of the Battle of Kosovo, Bećković repeated a lecture in several locations of Serbian diaspora, each time emphasizing that “it was [the events] in Kosovo that set our destiny, unspooled our history, purified our soul, giving new life to the Serbian nation; it is in Kosovo that all begins, and it is there that all will end”, adding “were we to lose Kosovo, we would prove only that we are descended from those who committed treason there in 1389; and worse: losing in Kosovo is not the same as losing Kosovo”.15 It is important to say that there were certainly intellectuals who gave no support to this program, such as Nebojša Popov and Miladin Životić, who vehemently opposed the ideology of nationalism and who participated in a series of petitions and initiatives directed at starting a dialogue and preventing conflict.16 As time passed and it became clearer in the 1990s that the nationalist movement would not yield the desired results, there was less support for national ideology among intellectuals, whose number on the political stage only grew. The NATO bombing campaign of 1999 contributed to a partial homogenization and strengthening of the victim complex, decisively marking the national discourse in Serbia. Strengthened, nationalism preserved its place on the social scene even after the change of government on October 5th, 200017 – the period in focus in this text – despite all the calls to throw off the heavy burden of the past, the need to modernize and reorient towards European values. On the contrary, even after the changes, national Us/Them divisions still dominated the intellectual discourse, leaving social divisions largely neglected in the last fifteen years.

Key moments in Serbian-Albanian relations related to Kosovo In what follows, the intellectual discourse on Serbs and Albanians is taken in the context of three key events of the 21st century.

The symbolism of impotence 145 The “Kosovo Pogrom” On March 17th, 2004, there was an escalation of violence in Kosovo after the inhabitants of Serbian villages were attacked and a number of buildings, considered sites of Serbian heritage, burned down. The trigger for this ethnically motivated violence was the wounding of a Serbian boy in Čaglavica, near Priština, and the drowning of three Albanian boys in the river Ibar. The latter event was seen by the Albanian public as revenge for the Čaglavica attack and was the immediate cause of a series of acts of violence against Kosovo Serbs. The violence and subsequent flight of Serbs from Kosovo caused unrest, that is, “reactive violence” in Belgrade and other Serbian towns. Mosques in Belgrade and Niš were burned; in several towns, buildings owned by Albanians were demolished, and the police had difficulty protecting the embassies of Western countries in Belgrade. In the Serbian media, these events were given the name “Kosovo Pogrom”. Declaration of Independence of Kosovo On February 17th, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. At a ceremonious extraordinary session of the Parliament of Kosovo, the 109 present members of parliament unanimously adopted the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, while 11 Serbian members of parliament boycotted the session. The session attracted a great deal of media attention, as it was transmitted live by CNN, BBC and Euronews. The Serbian government reacted by issuing the Decision on the Annulment of the Illegitimate Acts of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo and Metohija on their Declaration of Unilateral Independence [Odluka o poništavanju protivpravnih akata privremenih organa samouprave na Kosovu i Metohiji o proglašenju jednostrane nezavisnosti]. The Brussels agreement of 2013 The first agreement of the principles governing the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Priština was signed in Brussels on April 19th, 2013. The agreement comprises 15 points and envisages the formation of the Community of Serbian Municipalities, a unified Kosovo police force and the integration of judiciary units into the Kosovo justice system as well as a promise by both sides not to block each other’s process of European integration. The negotiations that led to the Brussels agreement lasted two years and were mediated by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. The agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of Serbia, Ivica Dačić, and the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, and was ratified by both parliaments shortly thereafter.

Methodological frame The research analysis presents the intellectual perception of the relations between Albanians and Serbs in the Serbian press. The analysis derives from a critical

146  Gazela Pudar Draško discourse analysis methodology,18 with the aim to reveal discursive strategies of Othering in these striking events and topoi which were dominant in the narratives disseminated not only by Serbian intellectuals, but the broader public, appearing in the selected period. The analysis comprised 186 texts published in the media in the period of 2 weeks following each of the events. These texts contained the positions of intellectuals through genre of op-eds, brief statements or interviews. The texts were taken from the media archive Ebart, which includes Serbian dailies with the highest circulation, collected from 2003 to the present. The archive holds upwards of 3 million texts. Significantly for this analysis, and also making this research easier, was that the texts are grouped by topic, i.e., “Kosovo problem”, with all texts that in any way refer to Kosovo in the Ebart archive (Table 9.1). Even at first glance, it is clear that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence caused the greatest stir in the Serbian public. Večernje novosti led the production of media content for this event, featuring several short statements every day by intellectuals on the topic of independence. After this peak, there was a kind of loss of momentum, reflected in the absence of a more robust reaction of intellectuals in the media to the signing of the Brussels agreement in 2013. Further, the structure of the sample by nationality of the intellectuals showed that, as time went on, the perspective of foreign intellectuals and Kosovar intellectuals, was ever less present in the Serbian media space. Indeed, 2004 saw the publication of six texts by Kosovar intellectuals and eight that included views of foreign intellectuals. In 2008, however, only three texts carry the perspective of foreign intellectuals on the events, while Albanian intellectuals were not present at all in the given period. Finally, regarding the Brussels agreement of 2013, the already limited reaction of intellectuals was followed by a complete absence of consideration of positions by Albanian or foreign. It is important to emphasize here that the limited range of research and the focus on a rather specific research goal does not allow for a conclusion regarding the scope of influence of the intellectuals’ discursive strategies on the citizens of Serbia, although it does, in a sense, indicate its presence. The sociology of intellectuals in general is characterized by a lack of clear parameters that would Table 9.1  Review of analyzed texts Source

2004

2008

2013

VEČERNJE NOVOSTI GLAS JAVNOSTI DANAS POLITIKA KURIR BLIC DNEVNIK OTHER TOTAL

14 12 8 8 5 5 1 9 62

66 13 4 6 1 7 5 5 107

2 / 4 5 / 2 1 3 17

The symbolism of impotence 147 determine the level of influence of intellectuals, and thus this work is primarily focused on the presenting of available elements of discourse and not on determining “the power of intellectual ideas”.

Albanians and Serbs – irreconcilable propinquity A discourse about Albanians as the Other is most conspicuous in the texts regarding the first event, referred to as the “Kosovo Pogrom”. We see a double argumentation strategy of labeling the international community as impotent and misguided in the case of Albanians, who are seen as tribal, anti-civilizational, violent forces led by atavistic drives (first topos). The international community is most at fault for the clashes in Kosovo, due to their entirely wrong assessment, impotence and incapability to stop the raging hordes of Albanian extremists foaming at the mouth.19 [I am] convinced that the international community is entirely incapable to prevent the creation of a “surrogate state” in Kosovo, grounded in the incredible “lack of civilizational fitness” of the Albanians and their habit of accomplishing political goals solely through violence.20 This tribal society, lacking monuments of material culture, is a slave to its own atavisms and urges. Albanians must be freed of this curse, because no one will allow them to create a tribal state, one without law or ties to Belgrade.21 The second topos problematized was disloyalty of Albanians, which is further emphasized with a position of an “outside” intellectual, the Russian Pyotr Iskenderov. Albanians are neither grateful nor loyal: they think that the West has done its job, that it ought to leave and let them rule. . . . Like a spoiled child they have lashed out at their parents who have handed them a semi-independent Kosovo.22 The Albanian extremists have neither supported nor shown respect for the peace troops, but have tolerated them until they decided to cleanse the province of all members of the other faith. . . . We are seeing the last phase in the Albanization of Kosovo, in which there is no room for Orthodox Serbs, their holy sites, for UN bureaucrats or NATO soldiers.23 Extremism bordering on terrorism as a civilizational threat is the third topos identified in the discourse of nationally oriented intellectuals in the Serbian press, strengthening the image of Albanians as a danger not only for Serbs, but all of (European) civilization. [The Presidency of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences] sharply condemns the rampaging of Albanian terrorists, the murder of innocent Serbs and the destruction of their material and spiritual goods in Kosovo and Metohija.24

148  Gazela Pudar Draško Kosovo Albanians are true innovators in the area of terrorism, as they do not only attack Serbs, but also members of the Albanian community loyal to Serbs.25 The Albanian terrorist organization has assaulted 120,000 unprotected Serbs. This is jihad, as they destroyed and burned Orthodox Christian buildings, attacked priests, and showed that it is precisely Albanian terrorism that is most dangerous in Europe.26 What is emphasized at this time is the dissimilarity and irreconcilable difference of Serbs and Albanians, which is the fourth topos identified in the analysis. This distinction becomes stark in the narratives of intellectuals. On the one hand, the irreconcilability precludes any attempt of building a nation state in Kosovo. However, the irreconcilability is also so strong that it results in rejection of the otherwise desirable idea of Kosovo’s return into the Serbian fold, because Albanians would then become a danger to the Serbian nation. We do not need a state in which, due to fictitious ideas of a unified Serbia, we will in the future have two and a half million Taliban, who are at any moment ready to drag the country down into the chaos of terrorism. We do not need a state that would in 30 years be majority Albanian, because we have a responsibility to the generations to come.27 We have on the one hand Albanians who are in emigration, where nationalism is extremely strong and who, in contradistinction to Serbs, have different customs, speak a different language, have different cultural and civilizational habits. It means that there can be no question of applying a model of a fictitious Kosovo nation in this province.28 To Kosovo and Metohija Albanians, Orthodox churches and monasteries are primarily symbols of Serbdom, and less so of Orthodoxy or Christianity, given that there are Christian Catholic objects near Đakovica and Novo Brdo that remain untouched.29 It is interesting to notice that one of the rare voices of Albanian intellectuals in Serbian press emphasize exactly opposite topos of similarity, “birds of a feather”, seeing them as Balkan peoples. I am familiar with all the faults of the people of the Balkans, I am conscious of all the evil they have committed, all their stupidity, their insanity. Madness is characteristic of the Balkans. However, I abjure the systemic scorn to which people from the Balkans are exposed. They are capable of myriad bestialities, but also of the noblest of things. It is not a matter of rhetoric, but reality. They are part of Europe.30 Finally, disunity of Serbs contrary to absolute unity of Albanians are the final topoi identified in the narratives of Serbian intellectuals. In pursuing their goals,

The symbolism of impotence 149 Albanians are seen as unified, as opposed to the Serbs who are divided, broken up, without a clear goal. There is no Shiptar today who will not tell you he is fighting for independent Kosovo. This is their only goal, they have no other. Nor do they need one. Conversely, we have neither goal, nor strategy, nor a developed government policy, by which I mean foreign policy, nor even a domestic policy that would take under its wing the question of Kosovo. We are a diluted state and a smashed people.31 Voices calling for calmer heads and abstaining from language of hate are quite rare in texts from 2004. On March 20th, 2004, Danas published an appeal signed by prominent Serbian intellectuals calling for different politics and different agency of elites. It is high time political actors and cultural elites on both the Albanian and Serbian side to go beyond building institutions and agencies that should ensure freedom and equality, and put more energy into changing the cultural climate, to overcome the language of hate and distrust in order to open pathways of better understanding. Also, the Serbian media carried very rare statements of Albanian intellectuals that indicated the existence of a disavowal of the violent methods and offered justification for the events of March 2004: [He is] surprised by the aggressive behavior of the Albanian youth, attacking people, houses and temples. Explaining the causes of this behavior, he cites that the escalation of violence is the consequence of an absence of Kosovar civil society.32

Impotence and the search for the Other After the explosive reactions to the violence in 2004, it appeared that the intellectuals turned to self-reflection, followed by the already mentioned lamentation of their own nation’s impotence to unite and build alliances in pursuing its own national interests. Although the reactions to the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo were strong, the 2008 narratives feature very little construction of the Albanian Other. One of the rare depictions of Albanian as Other in this period brings topos of Serbs as the European noble elite versus Albanians as unknown peasants: Everything that I am was created in Kosovo. The fresco that reminds me of my origin, the state whose subject I am, the language I speak, the culture I cultivate. Thus, to us, Kosovo is not only 14 percent of the territory. Of course Kosovo also belongs to those Albanians who have been living

150  Gazela Pudar Draško there for generations, centuries. But if you look at those emotionallyphilosophical, cultural, social and historic designations, such as the inception of the state, historical monuments – there is not a single material piece of evidence of Albanian presence in Kosovo. The monastery Dečani was not built by Skenderbeg, but by Stefan Dečanski. It was not built by one whose katun was in the Prokletije mountains, herding goats and sheep, but by enlightened Serbian rulers who at the time belonged to the European elite.33 Here we observe a narrative on Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian civilization, attested to by its cultural traces and opposed to Albanians as a people without strong roots, implicitly on a lower level of civilizational development. The Declaration of Independence and acceptance of this act by many from the international community contributed to a shift in focus from the Albanian as Other. A new discursive strategy emerged, positioning the Other in the West, Europe and America. Therefore, it was not Albanians, but Europeans who contributed to the defeat of Serbian cause. The Kosovo Declaration of Independence has been seen as the most tragic day not only for Serbdom, but also contemporary Europe. Today sees the death in Europe of all those most noble struggles aiming to fully establish the great principles of Europe’s most brilliant visionaries of freedom and humanity.34 “The historical absurdity” of creating “a new state on a territory that has been integral to the Serbian people since the early middle ages”35 was largely induced by external actors who have always sought to advance their own interests in the Balkans. Serbs as victims of interests of great powers is the second topos identified in the “anti-independence” narratives. As far back as 1880, there was an opinion in Vienna that Albanians could be used as a “destructive force” in the south Slavic space in which they could play the role of the “Romanians of the southwestern Balkans”. The historian H. D. Schanderl, thinks that initially the leading role in organizing the Albanian national movement was held by Great Britain. . . . Later, this role was taken by Austria-Hungary. What else is the politics of the West and the US today than one of creation of a “strong Albania”, or “Great Albania”?36 The question of Kosovo will, of course, be decided between Belgrade and Tirana. Anything else is a criminal improvisation of wonton highwaymen for whom this is far from the first raid. Between 1915 and 1999, Europe has bombed us six times. What else needs to happen for us to realize who we are dealing with?37 The culprit for Serbian troubles with Kosovo is personified by the USA, often presented as the archetype of the insidious enemy who goes to any length.

The symbolism of impotence 151 Personally, as someone who considers Kosovo the ur-beginning and overarching reason for his own existence, and I will say this even though it is full of pathos, I had a hard time believing the amount of highhandedness and wantonness in what is called world order, that is, in the entity that represents the world leader at this moment. Of course I mean the US, a country created 200 years ago on genocidal principles, robbery and negating all things human and Christian.38 The Anglo-Americans have taken down the Iron Curtain and instead have implemented “democratory” police wars, in which naughty countries are put under arrest and are re-educated. Has Serbia been arrested in one such war? Everything points to it!39 In this relation, another topos could be identified as bringing a megalomaniacal position of Serbs as an important, although small nation, since in preserving their core values, Serbs stand opposed to all of Western civilization. Serbs are even used by the West for its own reiteration. Punishing Serbia by “civil force” contributes to the strengthening of the European project as a “civil force”. Moreover, the political deviation of Serbia is welcomed by Europe. If it had not happened, Europe would have had to invent it. Its function – falling under Durkheim’s paradox – is positive: Serbs contribute to the idea of an integrated Europe as a healthy “civil force”, and do so more than anyone else [sic!].40 However, it is also noticeable in 2008, that this strategy of introspection into the own nation actions takes more and more space in intellectual discourse. A number of intellectuals have turned towards themselves with not infrequent reexaminations of strategies of national elites from decades past, as well as condemnation of violent reactions in Serbia to the Declaration of Independence. In this period, a(nti-)nationally oriented intellectuals take up more space in the media, which they use to point out the errors of the Serbian elite in previous decades and critically review the lack of denationalization of society. In these narratives, topos of damaging one’s own nation is identified, especially speaking dejectedly about the bad image of Serbia that emerged after the rioting in Belgrade. Images of burning and looting that were seen by the whole world, have completely annihilated the positive political effect of the mass respectful gathering in Belgrade, and have politically greatly damaged Serbia.41 This is an image that shows that we are our own worst enemy, since this is the path to self-imposed isolation. We have shown by this that Serbia is dominated by an anti-European, anti-democratic and an anti-civilizational narrative.42 A portion of the Serbian intellectual “elite” is inciting Serbs to madness and hysteria by pandering to their basest impulses with this obsession with Kosovo. It would hardly be discovering the wheel if I mentioned that over the decades Serbia has been reducing itself to the old joke in which nothing

152  Gazela Pudar Draško remains but the old Ottoman Eyalet of Belgrade. The joke looks like it might sooner or later become reality.43 Two actors are claimed to be responsible for the damaging of the nation. Among intellectuals, the topos of poor leadership has led to a national defeat. The role of intellectuals themselves, together with political elites, is not omitted among a(nti-)nationally oriented intellectuals, who point to the pars-pro-toto instrumentalization of Kosovo in discourse. Defending such an agreement, imposed by bombs, the old regime tried to save a semblance of honor, while the new, democratic governments are trying to hide their own weakness and inability to initiate a new national struggle. By adopting this stance, a portion of the ruling parties (Democratic Party and G17) strive to reach any kind of solution, so that they could move on to talking about and working on European integration. . . . The parties’ hunger for power and political factionalism has led the Serbian people into an absurd and frustrating situation.44 The establishment begins to fall apart into a “light” version (“Kosovo is part of Serbia”), which wholeheartedly “won’t let Kosovo go”, but still possesses some awareness that Serbia is a somewhat larger, more complex, more demanding organism that needs feeding, and in general needs caring for survival and development; and to the hard-core version “Serbia is part of Kosovo”) that sees no point in all the whining and breath-wasting with trite and trivial questions and problems (economic standards, Euro integration, political and media freedoms and such), nor of this relatively unimportant Kosovo province called Serbia, when the Whole, that is, Kosovo, is under attack, the-place-whence-we-all-come.45 Finally, once more, topos of irreconcilable difference emerges, negating even a possibility of unity between members of these two nations. Considering the century-long antagonism and bloody clashes between Serbs and Albanians regarding Kosovo, and especially the most recent ten-year period, these two sides could probably neither establish nor sustain a democratic union for either love or money.46

Abandoning and/or accepting reality If the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo in 2008 was somewhat subdued, because in part accepted as reality and in part as a transitional period towards some “better days” in which Serbia’s hearth will be returned, the act of signing the Brussels agreement was met downright meekly, almost without reaction in intellectual circles. Such a (non)reaction could best be described with the Biblical phrase: “It is done”. In both 2008 and 2013, there is a conspicuous absence of Albanian intellectuals in any of the analyzed texts. The self-reflective focus is also visible in another

The symbolism of impotence 153 way: in all the various reactions, the Albanian Other has completely ceded place to completely dominant discursive strategy of self-accusation and lamentation of inadequacy regarding the long-term historical situation, which was only exposed in the act of de facto recognition of independence. The previously introduced topos of poor leadership becomes very strong in 2013. The strategy of the Serbian elite is evaluated as catastrophic and among nationally oriented intellectuals as even treacherous of Serbian interests. The Serbian political elite traded Kosovo for a vague and uncertain gain manifested in the opening of the process of joining the European Union. This agreement is the final nail in the coffin of Serbian governance of Kosovo. The entire lot of 240,000 kidneys, 120,000 livers and one Serbian heart, everything has been sold for a solitary fish casserole, a holy date [of European accession]. And a date, one is fond of saying, could happen, but it ain’t certain.47 I think that it is all down to the political elites. How can anyone in the world take “the first vice-president” seriously, when he has stated that the pension funds depend on the humiliation and delivery of our people.48 In this historical negotiation process, the Serbs have once again turned out to be inept – although not in relation to the Albanians, rather, to the Albanians’ Western protectors, who were orchestrating the negotiations in which the Serbian representatives humbly accept all conditions. The short-sighted politics and mistakes in making proper allies returned with vengeance, bringing once more weakness of leadership in Serbia into focus. Our completely baseless yielding on key questions (safety of Serbs, return of the displaced, as well as other inherent human rights, all of which were ignored in Ahtisaari’s Plan), and in particular abandoning the UN as the context of negotiation and relocating the dialogue to Brussels in September 2009, excluded any possibility for the ultimate solution to be acceptable for Serbia as well. The incomprehensible omissions in understanding and interpreting post-Cold War politics, common after 1990 (when it comes to strategic decisions of top government officials), could not have been overcome by any diplomatic skill.49 Unlike 2008, where nationally oriented intellectuals referred primarily to political elites and their lack of ability, guilt is here assigned to the cultural or intellectual elite: by showing feebleness, it has weakened the spirit of the Serbian people and damaged its historical resolve to accomplish its civilizational interests, against all odds. An important part of the recipe has been the media and the so-called cultural elite, which has for a long time created an atmosphere in which “Kosovo is already long lost” (except that they squabble over whether it was lost by

154  Gazela Pudar Draško Tadić or Milošević, by Koštunica or Tito, or perhaps even King Aleksandar). For them, this is perhaps for the best – for “what would we do with two million Albanians” – and it is now much more important to “turn to the future” and “a better life for our children”.50 The 2013 texts analyzed here have a glaring omission – that of Albanians – in the narratives of intellectuals. The Albanian Other has disappeared and has ceded place to the discourse of impotence and lament over a nation destroyed due to the weakness of the national elite. This insight can be compared to a comment made by Tatjana Rosić in 2013, in a collection of essays about intellectuals, in which she speaks of “a masochistic turn, always anew, to the place and cause of suffering, followed by an experience of intellectual marginalization/impotence before the events that have taken place”.51

Conclusion Alpar Losoncz, who has studied intellectuals on several occasions, points out that the “self-understanding of intellectuals is always also the thematization of the entire existing order”.52 This position goes hand in glove with Bourdieu’s stance that the intellectual field is precisely the field of struggle regarding who belongs to it,53 also explaining the dominance of a certain way of thinking. Intellectuals are precisely the weathercocks of ideological thought of this period, as national as ever, colored by the syndrome of Serbian victimhood and ineptitude. We can also see “a pattern of reckless behavior” of intellectuals who address the public,54 which closely resembles a lack of Weberian ethics of responsibility among intellectuals. The question from the beginning of these texts – do intellectuals have a duty of public loyalty to their own nation and to the struggle for its “rights” through intellectual means, or conversely, is their duty precisely to protest against a national (or some other) euphoria and a call to universal values – gets its answer in favor of national loyalty, which is overly present in the intellectual discourse of the Serbian press. In the context of three key 21st century events in Serbian-Albanian relations, reckless behavior can almost entirely be deduced from positions expressed by intellectuals, whereby a specific view of events is foisted on the audience. Provisionally, we can distinguish two groups of intellectuals. The first, more numerous group, from which women are completely absent, are the nationally oriented and conservative intellectuals, characterized by a belief that the concept of the Serbian nation is the highest value. This group is awarded disproportionately more space in the media. The second, smaller group of intellectuals is that of a(nti-)nationally oriented intellectuals, who use their all too rare opportunities of influencing public opinion to express the necessity of repudiation of extremism, as well as to expose the role of the larger portion of the intellectual elite in maintaining the pattern of reckless behavior that could in no way lead to the normalization of socio-political life of Serbia. Their significantly lower presence in mainstream media suggests a weaker influence on the public discourse in Serbia.

The symbolism of impotence 155 Throughout the entire decade in question, from 2004 to 2013, we observe the change of discursive strategy argumenting and interpreting Serbian-Albanian relations, going from Albanians as the Other to Europe/the West as the Other. Our analysis shows that intellectuals are primarily focused on internal questions of the Serbian national corpus, especially during the events of 2008 and 2013. After the painful reaction and designation of Albanians as an uncivilized, fascistic and immature Other, following the 2004 escalation of violence in Kosovo, the Albanians slowly recede from the discourse of Serbian intellectuals. As the Albanian Other recedes, so grows the Otherness of the West, which is blamed for the theft of the Serbian civilizational space and spiritual hearth, to the advantage of Albanians who have no right or have far less right to it than does the Serbian nation. In intellectual considerations, Albanians are ever more marginal, pushed aside, often completely removed. Instead, we hear a lament over the terrible destiny of the Serbian people, its elite leading it astray for decades, impotent to prevent the dissolution of the homeland and most often laying the blame for this on foreign powers and their geopolitical interests. These findings indicate that it is possible to define two discursive matrices that overlap and take precedence one over the other through the course of the decade. One matrix precisely interprets the Other, which transforms from a particular enemy nation (Albanians in 2004), into a global civilizational antipode (the West in 2008). In time, the other matrix becomes the more dominant, making use of the self-reflexive lament in which the ineptitude of the Serbian nation and the impotence of its (political and cultural) elites fail to ensure its national interests. In accordance with this second matrix, there is a continuous and dominant view of the Serbian nation as victim: an ennobled, civilizing, progressive entity clashing first with primitive Albanian forces and then powerful foreign forces, its tragic end a result of its inability to give birth to responsible and capable national elite. The intellectual elite of Serbia is faced with new challenges that emerge at the end of the period of this study. As it is almost universally accepted that Kosovo “is gone”, intellectuals have lost an important stronghold of national discursive strategy. Analysis shows that, after April 2013, intellectuals have withdrawn from public space, at least when it comes to this topic. The disappearance of the topic of Kosovo from the public can be in part shown by the shift of focus onto other topics, although the substantiation of this claim requires more detailed analysis of the overall discourse of intellectuals in Serbia. Still, using Losoncz’s parallel regarding the self-reflexivity of intellectuals as thematization of the overall order, we can say that their own impotence, about which they speak openly, indicates the overall insignificance/narrow significance of the Serbian nation on the world stage. The challenges in SerbianAlbanian relations in the period after the Brussels agreement can be used to create a future Us/Them discourse; more likely, however, is that the dyad that will give shape to intellectual discourse in Serbia will be that of pro-European/ anti-European, which is in part already indicated in this text by the shifting of the Other among intellectuals.

156  Gazela Pudar Draško

Notes 1 Manhajm, Karl, Ideologija i utopija. Trans. by B. Živojinović (Beograd: Nolit, 1978). 2 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991); Benedikt Anderson, Nacija: zamišljena zajednica (Beograd: Plato, 1998). 3 Žilijen Benda, Izdaja intelektualaca (Beograd: Socijalna misao, 1996). 4 Ibid., 49. 5 Stefan Collini, “Every Fruit-juice Drinker, Nudist, Sandal-wearer . . . : Intellectuals as Other People”, in: Hellen Small (ed.), The Public Intellectual (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp. 203–223; Stefan Collini, Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 6 Gazela Pudar Draško, Društveno – politički uticajni intelektualci i njihovo shvatanje nacionalnog u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine, PhD Thesis (Beograd: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2015). 7 Barbara A. Misztal, Intellectuals and the Public Good: Creativity and Civil Courage (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 8 Eleonora Narvselius, The Nation’s Brightest and Noblest: Narrative Identity and Empowering Accounts of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia in Post-1991 L’viv (Linköping: Linköping University, 2009). 9 Michael D. Kennedy, “Eastern Europe’s Lessons for Critical Intellectuals”, Center for Research on Social Organization Working Paper Series 430 (1990); J. Jennings and A. Kemp-Welch (eds.), Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie (New York: Routledge, 2003). 10 Dejan Jović, Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: uspon, kriza i pad četvrte Jugoslavije (Beograd: Samizdat B92, 2003). A comprehensive review was given in a study by Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Saviors of the Nation”: Intellectual Opposition of Serbia and the Revival of Nationalism [“Spasioci nacije”: Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje nacionalizma], where she offers a critical view of the role of intellectuals in national movements, with a particular focus on the Belgrade critical intelligentsia and their turn to nationalism. Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Spasioci nacije”: Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje nacionalizma (Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2004). 11 Dobrica Ćosić, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 21. 12 Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, https://pescanik.net/wp-content/ PDF/memorandum_sanu.pdf (accessed 22 March 2015). 13 Quoted in Krstić, Predrag, “Intelektualna obrada ‘Kosova’: srpske recepcije, rezignacije i reakcije”, in: Aleksandar Pavlović, Adriana Zaharijević, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili (eds.), Figura neprijatelja: Preosmišljavanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa (Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju & KPZ Beton, 2015), pp. 319–336. 14 Rei Shigeno, “Nationalism and Serbian Intellectuals”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 5(1) (2004). 15 Matija Bećković “Kosovo  – najskuplja srpska reč” (1989), www.rastko.rs/kosovo/ umetnost/mbeckovic-kosovo.html (accessed 24 April 2015). 16 Dragović-Soso, “Spasioci nacije”  – Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje nacionalizma. 17 The change of government on October 5th, 2000 occurred after mass protests caused by suspicions against the results of elections held on September 24th, 2000. The protests forced Slobodan Milošević to resign from his position as President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, leaving the position to Vojislav Koštunica, the leader of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. 18 Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism (London: Routledge, 2001). 19 Anonym, “Albanci decenijama potkupljuju Zapad”, Balkan, 19 March 2004. 20 Ibid. 21 A. Nikolić, “Sramota za svet. Albanci ruše evropsku civilizaciju”, Glas javnosti, 23 March 2004.

The symbolism of impotence 157 22 D. Simeunović, “Još dva naleta ‘Albanske oluje’ ”, Dnevnik, 21 March 2004. 23 Iskenderov in: Anonym, “Poslednji korak albanizacije”, Večernje novosti, 24 March 2004. 24 Anonym, “Uništeni spomenici kulture neprocenjive vrednosti”, Politika, 24. mart 2004. 25 Anonym, “Napadi na Kosovu delo Al Kaide”, Glas javnosti, 19 March 2004. 26 Anonym, “Albanski džihad”, Večernje novosti, 19 March 2004. 27 O. Nikolić, “Za radikalnu podelu”, Glas javnosti, 25 March 2004. 28 O. Nikolić, “Podela na kantone, jedino rešenje”, Glas javnosti, 22 March 2004. 29 N. Kovačević, “Opravdanje u udžbenicima”, Politika, 26 March 2004. 30 Anonym, “Ideja o velikoj Albaniji je fašistička!”, Nedeljni telegraf, 31. mart 2004. 31 Miro Vuksanović, “Podele olako odbijali”, Večernje novosti, 28 March 2004. 32 Anonym, “Priština: Suroi”, Danas, 20 March 2004. 33 M. Bezbradica, “Što ga manje imamo, Kosovo više volimo”, Glas javnosti, 20 February 2008. 34 Dejan Medaković, “Kosovski nezaborav: pobedila pesnica”, Večernje novosti, 19 February 2008. 35 Anonym, “SANU protiv nezavisnosti Kosova”, Glas javnosti, 19 February 2008. 36 J. Nikolić, “Osveta poraženih”, Glas javnosti, 29 Febraury 2008. 37 I. Janković, “Šta Srbija treba da čini”, NIN, 21 February 2008. 38 Mikojan Bezbradica, “Što ga manje imamo, Kosovo više volimo”. 39 Branislav Crnčević, “Sigurna noć i nesiguran dan”, Glas javnosti, 18 February 2008. 40 Mile Nenadić, “Kao antički Meljani”, Politika, 20 February 2008. 41 Slobodan Vučetić, “Dan posle”, Blic, 29 February 2008. 42 B. D. Savić, “Niko nije smeo da napravi ovakav užas”, Dnevnik, 23 February 2008. 43 Zoran Hristić, “Harmonija”, Politika, 29 February 2008. 44 Čedomir Antić, “Kosmet je svet”, Politika, 25 Februar 2008. 45 Teofil Pančić, “Anamneza jedne parole”, Vreme, 28 February 2008. 46 Slobodan Vučetić, “Srbija bez Kosova, a svet bez OUN”, Blic, 22 February 2008. 47 Anonymous, “Javne ličnosti o sporazumu Beograda i Prištine”, Naše novine, 23 April 2013. 48 Čedomir Antić, “Ako bude sreće, spaseni smo”, Večernje novosti, 20 April 2013. 49 Dušan T. Bataković, “Ahtisari je dobio Nobela, a Albanci tad sproveli svoj plan”, Blic, 21 April 2013. 50 Anonym, “Antonić: veliki istorijski, ali ograničeni politički značaj”, Politika, 20 April 2013. 51 Tatjana Rosić, “Ugled na ponudu: intelektualci, građani i revolucionari”, in: D. Roksandić and I. Cvijović Javorina (eds.), Intelektualac danas: zbornik radova s Desničinih susreta 2013 (Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu/Plejada, 2014), 98. 52 Alpar Losoncz, “Moć i nemoć intelektualca”, in: D. Roksandić and I. Cvijović Javorina (eds.), Intelektualac danas: zbornik radova s Desničinih susreta 2013 (Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu/Plejada, 2014), 41. 53 Loïc J. D. Wacquant, “For a Socio-Analysis of Intellectuals: On Homo Academicus”, Berkeley Journal of Sociology 34 (1989). 54 Richard Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

References Bibliography Anderson, Benedikt (1998). Nacija: zamišljena zajednica. Trans. by N. Čengić and N. Pavlović. Beograd: Plato. Bećković, Matija (1989). “Kosovo: najskuplja srpska reč”, www.rastko.rs/kosovo/umet nost/mbeckovic-kosovo.html (accessed 24 April 2015).

158  Gazela Pudar Draško Benda, Žilijen (1996). Izdaja intelektualaca. Trans. by B. Gligorić. Beograd: Socijalna misao. Collini, Stefan (2002). “Every Fruit-juice Drinker, Nudist, Sandal-wearer. . . : Intellectuals as Other People” In: The Public Intellectual. Edited by Hellen Small. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 203–223. Collini, Stefan (2006). Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ćosić, Dobrica (2004). Kosovo. Beograd: Novosti. Đerić, Gordana (2002). “Mitski aspekti nacionalnog identiteta”, Filozofija i društvo 19–20: 247–266. Dragović  – Soso, Jasna (2004). “Spasioci nacije”: Intelektualna opozicija Srbije i oživljavanje nacionalizma. Trans. by Lj. Nikolić. Beograd: Fabrika knjiga. Jennings Jeremy and Anthony Kemp-Welch (eds.) (2003). Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie. New York: Routledge. Jović, Dejan (2003). Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla: uspon, kriza i pad četvrte Jugoslavije. Beograd: Samizdat B92. Kennedy, Michael D. (1990). “Eastern Europe’s Lessons for Critical Intellectuals”, Center for Research on Social Organization Working Paper Series 430: 1–29. Krstić, Predrag (2015). “Intelektualna obrada ‘Kosova’: srpske recepcije, rezignacije i reakcije” In: Figura neprijatelja: Preosmišljavanje srpsko-albanskih odnosa. Edited by Aleksandar Pavlović, Adriana Zaharijević, Gazela Pudar Draško and Rigels Halili. Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju & KPZ Beton, pp. 319–336. Losoncz, Alpar (2014). “Moć i nemoć intelektualca” In: Intelektualac danas: zbornik radova s Desničinih susreta 2013. Edited by Drago Roksandić and Ivana Cvijović Javorina. Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu/Plejada, pp. 39–50. Manhajm, Karl (1978). Ideologija i utopija. Trans. by B. Živojinović. Beograd: Nolit. Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (sketch) (1986), https://pescanik.net/ wp-content/PDF/memorandum_sanu.pdf (accessed 22 March 2015). Misztal, Barbara A. (2007). Intellectuals and the Public Good: Creativity and Civil Courage. New York: Cambridge University Press. Narvselius, Eleonora (2009). The Nation’s Brightest and Noblest: Narrative Identity and Empowering Accounts of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia in Post-1991 L’viv. Linköping: Linköping University. Posner, Richard (2001). Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pudar Draško, Gazela (2015). Društveno – politički uticajni intelektualci i njihovo shvatanje nacionalnog u Srbiji nakon 2000. godine. PhD Thesis. Beograd: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu. Reisigl Martin and Ruth Wodak (2001). Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism. London: Routledge. Roksandić, Drago and Cvijović Javorina, Ivana (eds.) (2014). Intelektualac danas: zbornik radova s Desničinih susreta 2013. Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Plejada. Rosić, Tatjana (2014). “Ugled na ponudu: intelektualci, građani i revolucionari” In: Intelektualac danas: zbornik radova s Desničinih susreta 2013, pp. 91–106. Shigeno, Rei (2004). “Nationalism and Serbian Intellectuals”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 5(1): 135–159. Smith, Anthony D. (1991). National Identity. London: Penguin Books. Wacquant, Loïc J. D. (1989). “For a Socio-Analysis of Intellectuals: On Homo Academicus”, Berkeley Journal of Sociology 34: 1–29.

The symbolism of impotence 159 Sources Anonymous (2004a). “Albanci decenijama potkupljuju Zapad”, Balkan, 19 March. Anonymous (2004b). “Albanski džihad”, Večernje novosti, 19 March. Anonymous (2004c). “Ideja o velikoj Albaniji je fašistička!”, Nedeljni telegraf, 31 March. Anonymous (2004d). “Napadi na Kosovu delo Al Kaide”, Glas javnosti, 19 March. Anonymous (2004e). “Poslednji korak albanizacije”, Večernje novosti, 24 March. Anonymous (2004f). “Priština: Suroi”, Danas, 20 March. Anonymous (2004g). “Uništeni spomenici kulture neprocenjive vrednosti”, Politika, 24 March. Anonymous (2008). “SANU protiv nezavisnosti Kosova”, Glas javnosti, 19 February. Anonymous (2013). “Javne ličnosti o sporazumu Beograda i Prištine”, Naše novine, 23 April. Anonymous (2013c). “Antonić: veliki istorijski, ali ograničeni politički značaj”, Politika, 20 April. Antić, Čedomir (2008). “Kosmet je svet”, Politika, 25 February. Antić, Čedomir (2013). “Ako bude sreće, spaseni smo”, Večernje novosti, 20 April. Bataković, Dušan T. (2013). “Ahtisari je dobio Nobela, a Albanci tad sproveli svoj plan”, Blic, 21 April. Bezbradica, Mikojan (2008). “Što ga manje imamo, Kosovo više volimo”, Glas javnosti, 20 February. Crnčević, Branislav (2008). “Sigurna noć i nesiguran dan”, Glas javnosti, 18 February. Hristić, Zoran (2008). “Harmonija”, Politika, 29 February. Janković, I. (2008). “Šta Srbija treba da čini”, NIN, 21 February. Kovačević, N. (2004). “Opravdanje u udžbenicima”, Politika, 26 March. Malešević, L. J. (2004). “Još dva naleta ‘Albanske oluje’ ”, Dnevnik, 21 March. Medaković, Dejan (2008). “Kosovski nezaborav: pobedila pesnica”, Večernje novosti, 19 February. Media Archive Ebart, www.arhiv.rs/strana/8/novinski-arhiv (accessed 24–26 March 2015). Nenadić, Mile (2008). “Kao antički Meljani”, Politika, 20 February. Nikolić, A. (2004). “Sramota za svet. Albanci ruše evropsku civilizaciju”, Glas javnosti, 23 March. Nikolić, J. (2008). “Osveta poraženih”, Glas javnosti, 29 Febraury. Nikolić, O. (2004a). “Podela na kantone, jedino rešenje”, Glas javnosti, 22 March. Nikolić, O. (2004b). “Za radikalnu podelu”, Glas javnosti, 25 March. Pančić, Teofil (2008). “Anamneza jedne parole”, Vreme, 28 February. Savić, B. D. (2008). “Niko nije smeo da napravi ovakav užas”, Dnevnik, 23 February. Simeunović, D. (2004). “Još dva naleta ‘Albanske oluje’ ”, Dnevnik, 21 March. Vučetić, Slobodan (2008a). “Dan posle”, Blic, 29 February. Vučetić, Slobodan (2008b). “Srbija bez Kosova, a svet bez OUN”, Blic, 22 February. Vuksanović, Miro (2004). “Podele olako odbijali”, Večernje novosti, 28 March.

Section IV

Can there be cooperation after all: cultural and political cross-border practices

10 Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages When patriarchy breaks nationalist barriers Armanda Hysa This chapter recounts the story of patriarchy present in two zones of the Balkans in rural Albania and Serbia. It is a story of patriarchy as a system of values and ideal order, but it is also a story about everyday practices and how this order is negotiated in reality. It is also the beginning of a narrative about meeting and marriage of men and women who identify with a people they themselves, as well as others, experience as mutual enemies: Serbs and Albanians. Although Albanian women marrying men from outside Albania is not new, mixed marriages between Serbian men and Albanian women are a post-socialist phenomenon. It began after the fall of the dictatorial and isolationist communist regime in 1991. At the time of emigration to Greece, many women from southern Albania, both Muslim and Orthodox Christian, began marrying Greeks from the other side of the border. Many women were burdened by economic hardship and the still widespread perception in Albania that women over 30, in particular divorced or widowed women, were too old for marriage. Despite these perceptions, they began marrying men in Italy and other Western countries. Further, at the beginning of the last decade, men from Macedonia began marrying Catholic women from northern or eastern Albania.1 However, the focus of this anthropological research are mixed Serbian-Albanian marriages, since they are characterized by a complicated historical and social context, a lack of communication and widespread prejudice on both sides.2 My fieldwork showed that Sandžak, Raška, the environs of Javor mountain, the villages on the border with Montenegro, all the way to Nova Varoš and Ivanjica, are the zones with the greatest concentration of mixed Albanian-Serbian marriages. Most of the Albanian women that marry in Serbia or Kosovo come from the villages around Lezhë, Shkodra and Pukë and are mostly Catholic, although some are of Islamic faith. My research has thus far covered five villages and one town, mostly of the Sandžak area, and is based on interviews with 13 couples.3 Through these mixed marriages, I will analyze the complex relationship of patriarchy and nationalism, given that Albanian-Serbian relations are in most cases seen in a negative nationalist light. In contemporary literature, nationalism is considered tightly bound with patriarchy, nearly to the point of complete congruence. The nation is seen as a patriarchal family in which the men have control over women’s bodies, whereby they ensure her purity and the community’s continuity.4

164  Armanda Hysa Thus, in this chapter, I describe nationalism as symbolically patriarchal – where the national community is symbolically called a family and where members of the nation symbolically, in the language of familial ties, call each other brothers and sisters of the same blood. Here, nationalism differs from patriarchy as a basis for a family unit, which I call real patriarchy. The main argument of this chapter points to how mixed Albanian-Serbian marriages subvert the congruence of real and symbolic patriarchy: when the continuation of the family line, as the main concern of real patriarchy, is endangered then it transgresses the borders set by symbolic patriarchy, that is, nationalism. I begin by analyzing the theoretical framework that connects patriarchy, masculinity and nationalism, where I seek to open another possibility of research of relations between patriarchy and nationalism. Further, I analyze the empirical data collected during fieldwork, where I will break down the argument in a caseby-case basis, to gain insight into contemporary patriarchy in two zones of the Balkans.

Theory of intimate mixed relations in the Balkans: patriarchy, masculinity and nationalism Intimate relations usually mean a relationship of love between two people, implying sexual relations, based on the presence of intimacy. As part of “mixed” intimate relations, whether a relationship or marriage, people often consider faith and ethnicity decisive for their life choices.5 In addition, the Western Balkans saw the practice of interethnic sexual violence. It is enough to mention the systematic rape of “enemy” women, used as a strategy during the wars after the breakup of Yugoslavia. If in the case of mixed intimate relations (in or outside of marriage) identity factors influence the life of a couple in various ways, structuring it then is what becomes decisive in the case of multiethnic sexual violence is the conception of the female body as a political body that incarnates the body of the (enemy) nation. What places these two phenomena into one theoretical framework is the fact that they are determined by different relations of interpersonal action between patriarchy, masculinity and nationalism. In “Patriarchy after Patriarchy,” Karl Kaser defines patriarchy as the “whole of formalized rules of inheritance, submissiveness of children, determination of relations, institutional sexual asymmetry, rules against immorality, and submissiveness of women.”6 The intertwining of the hierarchy of age and gender produces a family structure in which men certainly had the higher status, even when their position in an age group was the same as that of women.7 Some of the main factors of traditional patriarchy were patrilineality, the transfer of property from generation to generation, universal presence of marriage, appropriate marriage age, material exchange and local-patriotism. Reproductive power is also a key topic of traditional patriarchy, because it underpins all the previously mentioned points, with age and gender hierarchy the core that binds the one to the other and structures them into a social, patriarchal system. Of particular importance for the topic considered in this chapter is the universality of marriage, the age of

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 165 matrimony and, of course, the continuation of the family through procreation. These considerations raise questions about the connection with patriarchy in the Balkan region today where these marriages are taking place. What is meant by the universality of marriage is not marriage as a universal institution, but marriage as necessity and obligation that none can escape.8 Women’s submissiveness and obedience are also among the most important characteristics of premodern and pre-industrial patriarchy, as they were connected with the reproduction of a tribal unit. As a result, an “honorable and pure” woman was crucial for the renewal and inheritance of the family and the tribe. Thus, women were guardians of honor of the husband’s family, as well as that of the father – the one who reared and nurtured an honorable, conscientious and obedient girl. The woman’s body is thus turned into the key factor of preservation of patriarchal society, and their bodies and sexuality became the main object of patriarchal control.9 Male domination, female submissiveness, honor and the patriarchal body are at the very core of nationalist ideology. Joane Nagel writes that women acquired a symbolic and crucial place as mothers of nations, as the ones that multiply, while at the same time being carriers of familial and national morality: While women may be subordinated politically in nationalist movements and politics . . . they occupy an important symbolic place as the mothers of the nation . . . their purity must be impeccable, and so nationalists often have a special interest in the sexuality and sexual behaviour of their women. While traditionalist men may be defenders of the family and the nation, women are thought by traditionalists to embody family and national honour; women’s shame is the family’s shame, the nation’s shame, the man’s shame.10 Nagel also claims that one of the ways in which importance is given to the participation of women in national processes is their perception as biological producers of members of ethnic collectives.11 Vasiliki Neofotistos analyzed intimate relations between Albanian men and Macedonian women in Macedonia and the ways in which they are structured through nationalist and masculine perceptions.12 The same theoretical line of reasoning is followed by Rozita Dimova13 when analyzing masculinity and female education among Albanians in Macedonia and by Saša Lambeski14 when analyzing homosexual relations between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia. Dimova claims that Albanians with high status in Macedonia express their masculinity, among else, by insisting on virility: the more extramarital connections they create with (preferably educated) nonAlbanians, the greater their manliness. These same men will say that an Albanian woman ought to keep as far away as possible from education, because only then can she safeguard her faithfulness to her husband and family. That way, Albanian women will not meet and fall in love with non-Albanians, preserving the purity of blood and Albanian national culture.15 Yet, however appealing it seems, these observations cannot explain the entire complexity of cross-ethnic intimate relations in the Balkans. In fact, this complexity can reveal that the congruence between nationalism and patriarchy can be

166  Armanda Hysa inviolate only in certain cases. It cannot explain the fact that the basis of mixed relations between Albanian men and Macedonian women, as always, are often feelings and emotions and that the main obstacle to entering mixed marriage are ethno-nationalist and ethno-religious ideologies that carry a host of negative stereotypes and prejudices, rather than patriarchy itself. If we designate nationalism as symbolic patriarchy, because it arguably uses the same framework, then I would describe patriarchy as a way of hierarchical family organization based on age and gender real patriarchy. I claim that endangering a lineage leads to the transgression of ethnic, national and confessional borders and to the creation of mixed Albanian-Serbian marriages. Not only do symbolic and real patriarchy not overlap in this case, but they are mutually contradictory. This transgression, however, does not necessarily mean that Serbian men and Albanian women who enter such marriages will abandon their respective understandings of nationalism.

Crossing borders: creating Serbian-Albanian families Marriages of Albanian women in Serbia began to occur in 2006. For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to understand why someone would decide to seek a wife in Albania. This phenomenon became increasingly widespread, especially when considering the low level of inter-state communication between Albania and Serbia and inter-regional communication between south Serbia and northern Albania, as well as the immense presence of negative stereotypes. What do these men look for and expect from Albanian women, and why do they seek them from Albania at all? Why do Albanian women accept their marriage proposals? Are they under family pressure to do so? What do they expect of Serbian marriage partners? Why do the male members accept these international familial relations? “Albanian sons-in-law” and “diligent Albanian women” At the time of this writing, Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages exist all over (rural) Serbia, in Serbian villages in Kosovo, including a few cases in Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the first cases and the highest concentration of mixed Albanian-Serbian couples can be found in Sandžak. Both Sandžak and the Malësia zone in north Albania are rural areas with a similar natural and agrarian landscape. The area of Greater Malësia, villages around Shkodra, Lezhë and Pukë, which is the origin of the largest number of the Albanian women married in Serbia, are regions in which patriarchal relations have been constantly described and studied by both European and Balkan travel writers, as well as by Albanian researchers for more than 120 years. This is the famous zone in which the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini was put together and codified, along with other variations of the canon; this is the famous zone where there were and still are sworn virgins (virgjinat/virdžine),16 where songs are sung to the traditional one-string instrument lahuta (similar to Serbian gusle), where there are still male mourners singing mourning songs at funerals, where there was and still is blood vengeance. Sandžak is part of this general area.

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 167 Among local men from Sandžak with whom I have communicated, there was an understanding that northern Albania still maintains this traditional culture, which they also nourished until some 50 years ago. I consider this view conditioned by persistence of tradition caused by the isolation of Albania during the decades of communist regime and lack of communication since its downfall. In the imagination of Serbian residents of Sandžak with whom I spoke, things where they live are no longer the way they were due to modernization. They, however, were unaware that Albania too underwent modernizing and emancipatory reforms during the communist regime. When it comes to the emancipation of women and their role in the family, they considered the effects of modernization as generally negative. In their nostalgic view of the past, the wife was “hard-working”: she did not shy away from tough agrarian jobs. The wife was also “obedient”: she did not contradict members of the family, the husband, her in-laws. In this way, she maintains the patriarchal hierarchical structure. The demand for women from Albania is fueled by the belief, encouraged by the media, that by taking Albanian women as wives, unmarried Serbs would bring back into their home all those lost values. Not only will they ensure the continuation of their lineage, but these families would be the way women are supposed to be, as before, with conscientious and obedient wives, family women.17 The positive view of established values among Albanian women was always followed by a negative assessment of Serbian girls who did not want to live in villages, did not want to partake in house or fieldwork, did not want children; or if they did, they did not want to take care of them; they preferred having careers, going out to cafes and night clubs.18 As much as negative stereotypes and prejudices hinder mutual interaction between social and cultural groups, these positive stereotypes can in some ways open pathways for improving ethnic perceptions. In her analysis of the role of ethnic stereotypes in zones with occasional interethnic tensions, Vasiliki Neofotistos holds that positive ethnic stereotypes transform into a negotiating factor between populations and influence the creation of an atmosphere resistant to violence.19 In this particular case, the belief that women from Albania have the aforementioned family values is an indicator of positive thinking not only about them, but about Albanian families in general. However, a distinction needs to be made between advertising positive patriarchal values of the women from Albania – as a type of positive stereotypization – and real practical reasons that lead to the creation of these marriages. Such framing is necessary as a strategy of overcoming fear of familial relations with Albanians and fear of travel to Albania. These explanations have also had an encouraging effect on the proliferation of such marriages in the period of only eight years. However, this is not the only possible encouragement, as we will further see. The actual factors that lead to the creation of these marriages are precisely the universality of marriage, appropriate marriage age and the continuation of lineage (having children). As we have already seen, anthropologists and historians of gender and families have analyzed the universality of marriage as a necessity for the preservation of familial and tribal structures, as basic units of the social and economic organism, as well as the regulation of sexuality, connected to the

168  Armanda Hysa concept of honor. In that sense, the men married to Albanian women were drawn by the representation of Albanian women as guardians of imperiled family values. In reality, they could not even conceive of dying as bachelors and without an heir, as was mentioned by all the men I interviewed. The necessity of marriage as a moral and social norm is deeply embedded in individuals: life before marriage is wasted time and people who die unmarried are to be pitied. The universality of marriage, thus, has not only a social and economic character and function, but also a strong emotional component. Life spent alone, without a wife’s love and tenderness, without caring for children, without the joy of grandchildren, is wasted. Men from Serbia married to Albanian women were older than 37 and the age difference to the women varies between 15 and 20 years. Entering marriage in one’s youth was and remains an important element of patriarchy. Indeed, remaining unmarried as the years pass creates a state of anxiety: fearing an unhappy and lonely life and an even less happy old age, details about the origin and social status of a woman, which would otherwise be importance, lose their significance. These men did not remain unmarried because they waited to find the ideal, conscientious and obedient woman from any part of the world: the reasons their previous relationships did not function are individual and vary from case to case. But news that the few men who dared take women from Albania as wives and started families with them are happy were met with enthusiasm among their unmarried aging rural Serbs,20 while the fact that these women did not fear village life and chores, came as an additional positive factor. Later, various stories of mixed marriages appeared in newspapers and documentaries21 and were followed by a reproduction of positive stereotypes about conscientious and obedient women from Albania. These created a set of general expectations of these women and an increase in demand for brides from Albania. In fact, when I asked how it occurred to them that they could find a bride in Albania, all the men said that they had at least one acquaintance who married an Albanian woman, that they saw firsthand that the marriage was going well, which above all rekindled their lost hope of having offspring. To the question whether they had an initial worry or fear to enter into familial relations with Albanians, the answers varied: all answered that before they thought of finding a wife in Albania, they considered Albania a dangerous country for anyone, but especially for Serbs. Some men said that, upon seeing previous cases, they came to understand that going to Albania is not dangerous for anyone, not even for Serbs. Two of the men interviewed answered identically: “really, we know absolutely nothing about Albania, and the media formed an image in our minds about Albania as a dangerous country.” Zoran from village K., married since 2007, says that he was indeed worried before the journey. “But when I went there,” he continues, I was surprised not only that Albania was not a dangerous country, but how developed it was. There is a lot construction, not like in our country. Further, Shkodra is a big and developed city. The people are kind and hospitable and we did not have any problems, ever. I even began to understand Albanian a little which is very good since I could more easily communicate with my

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 169 wife’s family. Finally, the media played a very bad role with this whole story against Albanians. At the time when I interviewed Zoran, the negotiations in Brussels regarding the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo had only just begun. Although my interviewees did not see the question of Kosovo as directly related to their marriages, most of them at some point introduced it into the conversation, which was the case with Zoran. He and Milan, a second resident of the same village married to an Albanian, were the only ones who openly expressed fear that the process of obtaining citizenship for their wives could be problematic because they are Albanian. They feared that their wives’ passports would contain an invisible mark identifying them as Albanian, causing problems for them and their families. Thus, the beginning of negotiations in Brussels was met with a doubly expressed sense of ease. First, they hope that it would ease their families’ social position, as well as themselves as “Albanian sons-in-law.”22 The less interethnic conflict, the lower the fear of potential stigmatization in the future. Second, they hoped that this would be the end of a long history of conflict over Kosovo, letting “us all live a normal life.” The remaining men interviewed avoided this question by offering the common claim that “people are people, everywhere. I divide people into good and bad, which is why I had no trouble taking a bride from Albania.”23 Understanding that this sentiment had more as its goal avoidance than explanation, I decided to respect my interlocutors’ avoidance of this topic. Occasionally, there are answers that transgressed the ethnic (a man from Serbia seeking a wife from Albania) or value frameworks (men who seek conscientious and obedient women). This was the case of Goran from the village on the Javor mountain. Goran was a young and handsome man, but he only finished elementary school, and he lived in one of the mountain villages of the area. Even in his youth, he thought that these two reasons would prevent him from marrying, since very few girls had no secondary education and even fewer were willing to come live in that village. Goran did not have prejudice towards educated girls, but he thought that a gap in educational level would create problems in the family. Thus, if he only had eight years of school, it would not make sense for him to marry a woman more educated than himself, much as it would make no sense that a man holding secondary or high education marry a woman with only elementary school. According to him, in his youth, during his military service, he went to see a man who read the future from coffee grounds. The fortune-teller convinced him of three things. First, that he would marry after a long time; second, that he would find a wife in a remote region where none of the other locals has been; and third, that he would know his future wife at first sight, for she would be very pale but have very dark eyes, eyebrows and hair. Twenty years passed from this prediction, when a friend mentioned that he ought to look for a wife in Albania, just like four other men from a neighboring village. Goran did not think twice. As he puts it: I immediately remembered what the coffee cup said, that I  would find a woman in a region where nobody had ever been, so I set out to look. A few

170  Armanda Hysa people put me in touch with a woman who works as an intermediary in Albania. After some time, she sent me a message that she had found a woman for me and that it would be best to go see her and decide whether we would accept one another. When I arrived at her home, as soon as I saw her, I recognized her before she was introduced to me. I immediately noted the pale skin, dark hair, eyes and eyebrows. She is the one, I told myself, and I accepted her right away, since destiny is destiny, and you cannot hide from it. Goran’s story about destiny as an all-powerful category could be a chosen strategy to claim that these relationships would be impossible if they depended only on the will of people. In the cosmology of local beliefs that structure human perspectives on the world in everyday life, to one’s self and others, believing in the inevitability of destiny gives other dimensions to the understanding of what is normal and achievable. In a way, this story also draws the attention of us, researchers about the limits of political ideologies, propaganda and stereotypes, in contrast to local cosmologies. In this specific case, these cosmologies strengthen the individual action and structure behavior in such a way to make it go beyond limits imposed by ideology of ethnic division. Independent of personal beliefs about who is right in the SerbianAlbanian conflict, Serbian men married to Albanian women are aware that they have pierced a semi-taboo – that of entering into familial relations with an Albanian family. The complete taboo, a marriage between men and women from Serbia with Albanian men and women from Kosovo, remains untouched. But marriage between men from Serbia with women from Albania was also inconceivable only a decade ago. Seeking a better life: between hope and reality So far, we have given some of the implicit patriarchal reasons that spurred men from Serbia to seek wives in Albania. Patriarchy is here defined not as an ideology of domination, but rather as a social practice of structuring family life: the universality of appropriate marriage age and continuation of the lineage through having children. In this section, we will see what the relation is between these factors and other aspects of patriarchy as an ideology of domination and see how the latter influence women from Albania to choose to marry in Serbia. If the reputation of the upright and patriarchal values of Albanian women contributed to the popularizing of interest in them among Serbian men, the appeal for Albanian women concentrated on the economic side. Intermediaries24 who work on putting together these marriages often exaggerate, to the point of lying, the economic conditions of male candidates from Serbia. A little bit of context is here in order. First of all, in the Shkodra zone of Malësia, the villages of Lezhë and Pukë are the economically poorest regions of Albania. They remained so in communist times, due to the mountainous terrain, and thus local agrarian communes had a lower efficiency than other communes and estates in Albania, keeping the peasants’ income in these regions the lowest in Albania. One of the women

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 171 interviewed tells that the daily income of her parents was 1 lek (10 old lekë), meaning that their monthly salary was 30 lekë, equal to the price of six loaves of bread. Such a level of poverty after 1990 caused these regions to suffer radical shifts in population. The majority of village families descended into the suburbs of Shkodra, Lezhë and Tirana, while the majority of young, able men emigrated to Italy and Greece. The main source of income for most of the families that went to the city suburbs is the money they receive from other family members working abroad. Further, regardless of the fact that the law gives both men and women the right to inheritance, tradition does not allow for it. For these reasons, the parents of these girls, as well as the girls themselves, seek marriages that ensure some kind of economic security. Their background makes them unafraid of village life and chores, but the husband is seen as the main carrier of the family in the economic sense, and thus the acceptance of marriage with a poor man would be acceptance of difficult circumstances for the rest of one’s life. For this reason, intermediaries often exaggerate the economic prosperity of prospective husbands. The second encouraging reason for accepting marriage in Serbia are the ideas held about Yugoslavia. It is interesting how often during the conversation with the women the name Serbia was replaced by the name Yugoslavia. For example, one woman said: “When I came here to Yugoslavia, excuse me, Serbia”; another stated “I imagined Yugoslavia differently, I mean, whatchamacallit, Serbia.” However, as I mentioned above, the real reasons for entering marriage in Serbia differ from case to case. Nevertheless, the universality of marriage and appropriate marriage age remain at their core, as does becoming a mother. If a woman stays unmarried, she lives in the family of one of her brothers for the rest of her life, surrounded by nieces and nephews. Certainly, life in the brother’s family is not straightforward, since the girl will always be in competition with the daughter-in-law for status within the family. Moreover, unmarried women are looked at with derision and they are called unpleasant names such as “spinster” or “old girl.” There is also the danger of rumors about reasons for not getting married. Out loud and open, or behind the woman’s back, these can be that the particular woman has had a love affair and was thus not “virtuous,” calling into question the whole family’s honor. If the social environment were certain that the unmarried woman was indeed “virtuous,” then she must have a physical defect, which can again affect the rest of the family, potentially stigmatized as a family containing an ill person at home. This, in turn, can make it more difficult for other brothers and sisters to find a spouse. Of the 13 women interviewed, only three were older than 27 when they got married (being 28, 30 and 34 respectively), one was 24, while the rest were 20. Certainly, for urban populations and a portion of village populations, marriage at 20 is early. However, the situation changes in specific cases. Among the interviewees, none of the girls had finished secondary school: most of them completed compulsory eight years, one was in school until the seventh grade, another until the fourth grade and one never attended any school. This means that, at 15, the girls have nothing else to do but get married. Male, patriarchal control over the lives of these girls is still strong. This control over the moral purity of the girls

172  Armanda Hysa from the family has nothing whatsoever to do with guarding the purity and control of fertility of Albanian women as guardian of purity of Albanian blood and transmission of pure ethnic culture. Sose, married to Zoran since 2007, tells of being 24 when she got married. She and her family had come from a mountain village deep in Greater Malësia and had just moved to a village near the city of Shkodra. She rejected a few marriage proposals because they were unsuitable. “Had I accepted one of those marriage proposals,” tells Sose, most likely I would have gone back in the first four or five years. Marry and then go back. God forbid! It would bring shame to everyone, to oneself, since there is no chance of avoiding some comments. You are worthless, have no idea, when you go back. A woman about whom there is gossip. So I thought it is even better for him to be old, for me to live with him, even if it is just five years – that’s five years, as long as I have a child with him, you know? As long as I don’t bring shame to the family and myself, otherwise. In Sose’s conversation, her family’s honor is very present. Even if she did not marry at all, rumors would abound. One of the reasons for accepting marriage in Serbia is precisely protecting the family from gossip. She tells that the beginning was very hard, when you do not know either the country or the language or anyone there. But, “we are here because of three brothers and father,” she says, “not to bring shame,” that is, embarrass them. Sose tells that, after 22, a woman is considered a bit old for marriage, and therefore there are fewer options. However, when she saw Zoran, she says that she did not want to decide for herself, but she left the decision to her father: “I said neither yes, nor no. Whatever should happen, let it be done by them, not me. Tomorrow, God forbid, I might return. They could accept me. Had I made my own decision, they could say it is your own fault, figure out where, but you cannot return here.” Maria was only 20 when she got married. She too is originally from Greater Malësia, although her family moved to the city of Shkodra a long time ago, where she worked. Maria tells that she worked from as early as 14 and that she was the best at her job at a shoe factory. She was capable of producing above the daily norm and garnered a bonus on top of her regular pay. She says that she always had money for herself and that, when she moved to Serbia, to a village, although she was sorry to leave the city of Shkodra for a mountain village, she again found odd jobs to earn money she kept for herself. In Albania, she still had not reached an age when girls are called old to marry, but two reasons spurred her to get married in Serbia. In her words: in Albania I was afraid to accept because our men are too fanatical, starting with my older brother. I would go to work, return, and I could not even sit for coffee with girlfriends after work. He locks his wife up like that as well. I knew that if I agreed to marry in Shkodra, my husband would forbid me from working, he would be very jealous, where have you been, who did you see, why did you see so and so. Oh, I couldn’t take it anymore. At the time

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 173 when I was introduced to Milenko, they had just killed my father, they mixed him up with someone. When Milenko’s demand came, I said ok, I have lived here long enough. Maria liked Milenko as soon as she saw him, and she accepted him right away, without imposition. A similar thing that happened to Maria, happened to Vjola from a village near Lezhë. Marta and Diana accepted marriage in Serbia to leave a difficult life behind. They were both married in Albania, and both went through domestic violence. Diana was only 18 when she lost her child due to her husband’s violence. Marta went back to live with her brothers after her divorce, thinking she would not marry again. She was 34 when the marriage proposal came from Miloš (aged 50 at the time). By their local Albanian standards, these women were past marriage age, and I can say that all the interviewed women see marriage as the only hope for the future. For a portion of the women, what played a role in entering marriage was a nearly fairy tale financial life, that is, this was their sense of seeking a better life. However, most of them say that they had better living conditions in Albania than they later had in Serbia, especially since some of their brothers lived and worked in Greece or Italy and sent money. They also tell of the first time their fathers came to see their new place of residence. Sose says that at first she was not satisfied with the living conditions, but her father told her that “it seems that he is a good man and a good marriage opportunity. If Zoran has what to eat, so will my daughter. If he does not, neither will my daughter.” Sose says, however, that she convinced her husband and mother-in-law to use the saved money to invest in a better house. Marta also says that, since she was able to find her brother-in-law a wife in Albania as well, the two of them make joint decisions about expenses and that they have been able to build a new, three-story house. Members of their families have a habit of visiting their daughters in foreign lands a month or two at a time, so the main concern these women had was not only to create comfortable conditions for themselves, but to be able to welcome members of their families. In distinction to Sose or Marta, some of the women say that their parents or brothers, seeing that in reality their living conditions deteriorated, were very sorry and that they said, “we have lost that daughter in vain.” This led to souring of relations between the woman’s families and their husbands.25 Therefore, based on these cases, men who had savings, did not hesitate to invest in renovating their homes and improving living conditions. This, in contrast to the general view of Albanian families as being poor, and of Serbian families as doing better financially, created a real economic balance between Albanian and Serbian families brought together by marriage and actually gave women from Albania married in Serbia an advantage and a voice in the economic decisionmaking within their families. As they do not have greater economic power than the brothers of these women, the husbands are not in a position to make them seem inferior and the making of decisions regarding family expenses is generally balanced.

174  Armanda Hysa Further, the phrase “for a better life” also has a second meaning, tied to the level of male domination over the woman’s morality, movement, social behavior and their bodies. As in the case of Sose, Maria, Diana, Marta, the level of male domination in northern Albania, among the residents originally from Greater Malësia is still high. Sose says that in Serbia “girls do everything” before matrimony, only entering marriage when they have a child in their bellies.26 Among us, God forbid, even if engaged, you are not allowed to go for coffee with your fiancé. Zoran asked me, had we been engaged longer, whether we could have gone out for a walk holding hands. Heavens, I told him, we couldn’t even go for coffee, no less holding hands. Diana tells that not only her husband, but her father and brothers too were quite fanatical and controlling of her life. However, although she thinks that they went too far in their fanaticism – her father would not let his daughters go to school at all, keeping a close eye on how they dressed and where they went in the village – Diana could not stand how girls were raised in Serbia, as it is more liberal than it ought to be. Afterwards, Serbs complain why girls only want to live in the city and have fun (meaning, have a boyfriend before marriage, go out for coffee and to the disco on weekends). Alas! Poor me, I have two daughters, where shall I raise them, what will become of them? However, Diana is alone in her worries. The other women claim that they are satisfied that there is no such control in Serbia, even considering this the most positive aspect of marriage in Serbia. At least their daughters could grow up “the same as other girls in Serbia,” go for coffee, have boyfriends, be joyful, go to college. Milenko says that he himself has never left the village, but that he would buy his son and daughter a house in Kragujevac. He and Maria want their children to be educated and, when the time comes, will sell the land and the village house and all move to the city. There is no future for the village, not because they are not good at agriculture, but because they think that the rest of the infrastructure – schools, hospitals, roads – will not be any better any time soon. Therefore, they see no future for their children in the village. When Albanian women have a problem in marriage, their husbands and other members of the community are quick to remind them of the traditionalism among the men from their region of origin. In these cases, the women answer that although this is true, we are not without voice. In the family, we get a lot of love, support, we say what we like and what not, we offer our opinion and we are respected. And if we married here, we did so for the better, not worse. Before we draw some conclusions about the various levels of patriarchy among these regions based on empirical data about Albanian-Serbian marriages, I need to

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 175 add the ethnic dimension: do Albanians, men and women, accept marriages with Serbs? This is actually the most difficult point for research in the case of women. If most men answered that for them nationality has no importance, more crucial being whether a person is good or not, most women would pretend not even to hear this question, despite me coming back to it several times. At one point, I even thought that, given the level of education of these women, they were saved of at least the form of nationalist indoctrination conducted in school. But conversation with two women changed my view. Lucia, Marta’s sister-in-law, spoke about this even before I asked the question, as soon as we went out for a walk, when I left my notepad behind, thinking that I was done with the day’s research. “Oh sister,” she says, do you think that I do not know that we were at war with the Serbs, huh? Oh my, I know, only too well, what happened between us, what happened in Kosovo. When the brother from Germany found out that we gave our word to a Serb, he sold his car, came home in 24 hours and said that as long as he lives, no Serb will take his sister for a wife. I sold my car and will return the intermediary 3,000 Euros that the groom gave to the intermediary, and we will cancel the wedding arrangements. I know that Lucia is 29, but we will find her a husband elsewhere, let the other brother in Greece look for one, let her marry a Greek, and live like a queen. Father listened to him and let him finish his speech, and then told him – you are right, but if this were so easy, why haven’t you done it by now? Why have you left your sister to reach 29 without getting married? Such is fate, let it be so, we are not withdrawing our word. It is interesting that, in the eyes of Albanians from Greater Malësia, a Serb represents an enemy figure, while a Greek does not, even though both Serbs and Greeks are considered enemies according to Albanian nationalist beliefs. However, the frequency of communication with Greece, multiple economic, social and interpersonal relations created through emigration, have led to the figure of the enemy to fade, in spite of historic nationalist narratives, in spite of interethnic prejudices. It is equally interesting to notice the importance of cosmological category of destiny: a girl must be married, and if fate has sent her towards a Serb, there is no escaping it, as we could see in Goran’s case. Angjelina, married to Goran, also told me: I know what is happening between us and them (Serbs). My grandmother told me what Serbs did in Malësia a hundred years ago. But what does my Goran have to do with what happened a hundred years ago? After all, I am married to him, not to all Serbs. Still, a worried Angjelina showed me how one woman who had problems with her husband, came into her yard and began to yell that the Kosovars were right to do what they did to you. Holy moly! She could get us all in trouble. The other women called me on the telephone worried and told me to go talk to her. We are not fools, we know

176  Armanda Hysa about these things, but as long as we agreed on our own to marry here, it is not up to us to deal with these things. Why? We cannot right what has happened, and we are only making people here nervous and trouble for ourselves. Thus Angjelina, unwittingly, told me that the avoidance of my question was deliberate. These comments highlighted that each period of political and media tension between Albania and Serbia puts these couples in a difficult position, which more closely explains why Zoran and Milan felt easier after the Brussels agreement. In Sandžak, there are cases of male domestic violence against women. In two cases that I have found, it was linked to the women being Albanian, and the rumors and teasing of the social environment spurred the men to violence against them.27 In these cases, social services and the police normalized the situation. People are able to break down barriers in a way previously unimaginable, but the barriers, nevertheless, remain strong. The act of breaking barriers remains feeble in comparison to their divisive potential.

Conclusion The cases analyzed point to a tension between social realities and imagined patriarchal values. The demand for women who exemplify patriarchal values indicates that patriarchal relations still dominate the Sandžak region of Serbia. Still, this is no longer a relationship of unquestionable male domination and age hierarchy in the way it existed a hundred years ago. As we have seen, real patriarchy in Sandžak consists in the fact that universality of marriage and appropriate marriage age are still not questioned. In that sense, the significance of the continuation of lineage by having children also remains inviolate. The husband is still the main member of the family in the sense of ensuring their livelihood, but this is not caused by the patriarchy: Albanian women are coming to live in the house and the estate of the husband, not the other way round. However, women are not prevented from work; on the contrary, such a possibility is eagerly anticipated. The economic decision-making in the household is generally evened out. Compared to the regions of Greater Malësia and the villages surrounding Lezhë and Pukë, the patriarchal traditions in the Sandžak region are not as strict, certain cases notwithstanding. In northern Albanian regions, patriarchy as a social relation, but also as male domination, remains strong. Women and girls’ relationship with the outside world is still under control, although not as much within the family. Girls, for the most part, have the right to accept or refuse marriage opportunities, but they should not remain unmarried. Still, this form of male domination and control has nothing to do with the role and symbolic meaning the female body has for the nation, either on a practical level or on the level of discourse among ordinary people. The transgression of imaginary and real borders set by nationalism does not necessarily mean that men from Serbia and women from Albania entering such marriages abandon seeing the nation and the fatherland, friends and enemies. A portion of them think that the family and nation are two different things, while others think they are entirely unconnected. This chapter is, among

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 177 else, a call to take another look at the relation between patriarchy, male domination and nationalism thoroughly and in a different light, abandoning the approach that sees the basis of this relationship exclusively in the discourse and strategy of political and media elites.

Notes 1 Karolina Bielenin-Lenczowska, “An Albanian Wife and Macedonian ‘National Purity,’ ” Ethnologia Polona 36 (2015): 155–169. 2 Doubtlessly, in cases of emigration to Western countries, there were countless mixed marriages of Albanian men and foreign women. In this text, I deal only with marriages of Albanian women in Western countries, since the study deals with the phenomenon of Albanian women marrying Serbian men. In the case of Macedonia and Serbia, the phenomenon is one-sided: men from these countries marry Albanian women, but the opposite does not happen. 3 The names of persons and villages have been changed. 4 Joane Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(2) (1998): 242–260; Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16(4) (1993): 621–632. 5 Thus, we have cases of intimate relations between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia that rarely end in marriage, due to these limits, as in the case of women from Albania marrying men from Serbia or Macedonia. 6 Karl Kaser, Patriarchy After Patriarchy: Gender Relations in Turkey and in the Balkans, 1500–2000 (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008), 33. 7 Ibid., 39. 8 Ibid., 59. 9 Valentine Moghadam, “Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing Family in the Middle East,” Journal of Comparative Family Studies 35(2) (2004), 141; Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations,” 254. I speak here of patriarchal control, and not male patriarchal control, since women played as much a hand as men in preserving patriarchal values and in maintaining control over one another. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., 253–254. 12 Vasiliki Neofotistos, “Cultural Intimacy and Subversive Disorder: The Politics of Romance in the Republic of Macedonia,” Anthropological Quarterly 83(2) (2010): 292. Cf. Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation”; Katherine Verdery, “From Parent State to Family Patriarchs: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Eastern Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 8(2) (1994): 225–255; Sherry Ortner, Making Gender: the Politics and Erotics of Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Tamar Mayer (ed.), Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation (New York: Routledge, 2000). 13 Rozita Dimova, “ ‘Modern’ Masculinities: Ethnicity, Education, and Gender in Macedonia,” Nationalities Papers 34(3) (2006), 305–320. 14 Saša Lamberski, “Suck My Nation – Masculinity, Ethnicity and the Politics of (Homo) sex,” Sexualities 2(4) (1999): 397–419. 15 Dimova, “ ‘Modern’ Masculinities: Ethnicity, Education, and Gender in Macedonia,” 309. For a broader discussion, see Wendy Bracewell, “Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 6(4) (2000): 563–590; Helms Elissa, Innocence and Victimhood: Gender, Nation, and Women’s Activism in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013). 16 Sworn virgins are women who take a vow of chastity and wear male clothing in order to live as men in the patriarchal northern Albanian society. Sworn virgins were also to be found in parts of Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

178  Armanda Hysa 17 “Albanian women are conscientious” or “You Albanian women are hard-working” were two sentences often heard from both men and women in Serbia whom I spoke to or interviewed. 18 There is no room here to consider this important question in detail, but it needs to be said that such negative stereotypization is fundamentally false, as a village might feature two or three mixed couples, but in the rest of the marriages, Serbian women do the same agrarian and house jobs as the women from Albania. 19 Vasiliki Neofotistos, “Beyond Stereotypes: Violence and the Porousness of Ethnic Boundaries in the Republic of Macedonia,” History and Anthropology 15(1) (2004): f. 48. 20 I elaborated on this point in the article “Albanian-Serbian Marriages between Media Representations and Reality,” published in the column Beton of the Belgrade newspaper Danas, 22 April 2015, www.elektrobeton.net/mikser/albansko-srpskibrakovi-izmedu-medijskog-predstavljanja-i-stvarnosti/ 21 Hysa, “Albansko – srpski brakovi izmedju medijskog predstavljanja i stvarnosti.” 22 Men married to Albanian women in Sandžak called themselves, and were called by others, “Albanian sons-in-law,” which has a somewhat humorous connotation. 23 This answer followed their expressed fear of traveling to Albania. 24 Contacts between Serbian men and families of Albanian women are established through intermediaries, in Serbia and Albania. Intermediaries point out a possible bride according to requests they receive from intermediaries in Serbia, contact their families and facilitate the trips of Serbian men to Albania to meet the families and decide to engage or not in marriage. 25 As mentioned, intermediaries, taking advantage of the families in Albania not speaking Serbian and potential grooms not speaking Albanian, exaggerate or lie not only about the economic circumstances, but other things as well. Angjelina, married to the aforementioned Goran, says that the intermediary lied to her father, who saw the extremely difficult living conditions, by saying that Goran had not invested because he was waiting to get married, but that all his wealth was in the bank. She says that her brothers lived in Greece and that, when they saw where their sister went, became very angry at their father. A year later, her father died of bitterness. 26 Sose was surprised when I told her that the same thing happens in parts of Albania. 27 Certainly, the violence might be justified through ethnic arguments, while actually having less or even nothing to do with it.

References Bielenin-Lenczowska, Karolina (2015). “An Albanian Wife and Macedonian ‘National Purity’ ”, Ethnologia Polona 36 (2015): 155–169. Bracewell, Wendy (2000). “Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism 6(4): 563–590. Dimova, Rozita (2006). “ ‘Modern Masculinities’: Ethnicity, Education, and Gender in Macedonia”, Nationalities Papers 34(3): 305–320. Helms, Elissa (2013). Innocence and Victimhood: Gender, Nation, and Women’s Activism in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Hysa, Armanda (2015). “Albansko – srpski brakovi izmedju medijskog predstavljanja i stvarnosti”, Beton, Danas, 22 April, www.elektrobeton.net/mikser/albansko-srpski-brakoviizmedu-medijskog-predstavljanja-i-stvarnosti/ Kaser, Karl (2008). Patriarchy After Patriarchy: Gender Relations in Turkey and in the Balkans, 1500–2000. Münster: LIT Verlag. Lambeski, Saša (1999). “Suck My Nation – Masculinity, Ethnicity and the Politics of (Homo)sex”, Sexualities 2(4): 397–419.

Serbian-Albanian mixed marriages 179 Mayer, Tamar (ed.) (2000). Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation. New York: Routledge. Moghadam, Valentine (2004). “Patriarchy in Transition: Women and the Changing Family in the Middle East”, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 35(2): 137–162. Nagel, Joane (1998). “Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 21(2): 242–260. Neofotistos, Vasiliki (2004). “Beyond Stereotypes: Violence and the Porousness of Ethnic Boundaries in the Republic of Macedonia”, History and Anthropology 15(1): 47–67. Neofotistos, Vasiliki (2010). “Cultural Intimacy and Subversive Disorder: The Politics of Romance in the Republic of Macedonia”, Anthropological Quarterly 83(2): 279–316. Ortner, Sherry (1996). Making Gender: the Politics and Erotics of Culture. Boston: Beacon Press. Verdery, Katherine (1994). “From Parent State to Family Patriarchs: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Eastern Europe”, East European Politics and Societies 8(2): 225–255. Yuval-Davis, Nira (1993). “Gender and Nation”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 16(4): 621–632.

11 Cultural heritage in Kosovo Strengthening exclusion through inclusive legislation Jelena Lončar

Since the Declaration of Independence, Kosovo has made significant progress in the protection of minority rights. The progress however, refers specifically to the passing of favorable legislation, while problems in the legislation’s implementation persist. Kosovo struggles with widespread violations of minority rights and high inter-ethnic tensions (OSCE 2014, UN Security Council 2014). Much of the relevant literature has focused on Kosovo’s institutional framework for the protection of minority rights,1 but has ignored issues of its implementation. This chapter suggests that we should look into the legislative process, but also the representations of the issues on the agenda and actors involved. The way legislation is framed and justified may help explain the rupture between legal obligations for minority protection and implementation of such laws. To this end, this chapter examines the process of adoption of two minorityrelevant laws: the Law on the Historic Centre of Prizren (hereafter: Law on Prizren) and the Law on the Village of Velika Hoča/Hoçë e Madhe (hereafter: Law on Velika Hoča). There are two reasons for my focus on the process of adoption of the laws on Prizren and Velika Hoča. First, recognition of a group’s cultural heritage symbolizes recognition of the group’s cultural identity and its historical presence on a specific territory. Cultural heritage in Kosovo is deeply connected to the disputes between Albanians and Serbs over the right to the territory. For many Albanians, Serbian cultural heritage symbolizes years of oppression and discrimination, while for many Serbs, it symbolizes the cradle of Serbian nationhood.2 Consequently, it can be expected that the debate on the protection of the Serbian cultural heritage has involved various stakeholders, perceptions, emotions and myriad representations of the other ethnic group. Second, since cultural heritage is not exclusively relevant for members of minority communities, this field could provide possibilities for the formulation of effective strategies to increase inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation. Much of the literature argues that in postconflict situations, cultural heritage often becomes a strong symbol and tool for reconciliation.3 Since culture can either facilitate social cohesion or justify social exclusion, the analysis of the legislation related to minority cultural heritage can teach us about inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. The structure of the chapter is as follows: the first section examines the levels of protection for minority cultural heritage in Kosovo. The second section introduces

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 181 critical frame analysis as a method for investigating the legislative process, while the third section presents the analysis findings. They show that both laws were framed through “threat” and “independence” frame packages, thereby increasing inter-ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians. The same argument is additionally strengthened in the fourth section, which focuses on the exclusion of particular issues and actors from the legislative debate. The fifth section concludes the chapter.

Cultural heritage in Kosovo: legislation versus implementation The protection of the Serbian cultural and religious sites in Kosovo was imposed on Kosovo by international actors and represents one of the major conditions for ending the supervised independence phase (Special Envoy of the SecretaryGeneral 2007). A necessary condition was that Kosovo’s institutions demonstrate willingness and ability to protect minority rights. The need to protect minority cultural heritage was explicitly acknowledged in the Annex V of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (hereafter: Ahtisaari Plan) (Special Envoy of the Secretary-General 2007). In accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan, the Assembly of Kosovo has since 2008 adopted numerous laws and regulations that provide crucial safeguards for the protection of minority rights.4 Among those related to the protection of cultural heritage, the most important are the Law on Prizren and the Law on Velika Hoča, both adopted in 2012. The two laws aim to regulate the establishment and management of the special protective zones in the municipalities of Prizren and Orahovac, that is, to protect, promote and preserve the cultural and religious heritage of these zones and prevent urban development that could in the future affect these sites. Despite the inclusive and minority favorable legislation, there are still incidents of demolition, theft and vandalism against cultural and religious sites, particularly of Serbian heritage.5 There has been a consistent lack of cooperation between local authorities and the national government in the implementation of the laws (EC Ma Ndryshe 2013; OSCE 2014). Implementation of the laws is either boycotted or regularly bypassed by the local Prizren or Orahovac authorities.6 The major problem is illegal construction around the protected sites, often allowed by the municipal authorities (EC Ma Ndryshe 2013, OSCE 2014). With the lack of implementation of the laws relating to the protection of minority cultural heritage in mind, this chapter aims to examine how the laws were adopted, what representations were made of the issues on the agenda, who were the beneficiaries of the law and who were the other actors involved in the process. For instance, if the municipal authorities oppose the implementation of the laws, did they have an opportunity to raise their objections before the laws came into force? Whose voices were heard during the debate? What were the main arguments for the adoption of the laws? The way legislation is framed and justified may help explain the rupture between legal obligations for minority protection and the laws’ poor implementation. Current literature does not provide answers to these questions. Much of the previous research focuses on

182  Jelena Lončar institutional mechanisms for minority protection, providing useful insights into Kosovo’s legislation7 and effects of power sharing.8 However, we still know very little about the rationale behind minority-relevant legislation and the reasons for its slow implementation.

Methods and data Aiming to understand how the laws on Prizren and Velika Hoča were adopted, this chapter focuses on the legislative debate itself instead of looking at its final product. The chapter is based on the analysis of 29 texts that primarily include official documents declaring positions on the draft laws by the main political and civil society representatives. (A list of analyzed documents is included in the Appendix.) In order to understand the legislative process and representations of the issues, the study employs critical frame analysis of the selected documents. Critical frame analysis represents a version of frame analysis that adds voice dimension to the idea of frame package. Frame package, which is a central concept of frame analysis, is used in a variety of fields, such as anthropology,9 sociology,10 social movement literature11 and media analysis.12 The frame package consists of frames and framing and reasoning devices. A frame is usually defined as an idea or storyline that provides meaning to reality.13 It implies a range of different positions that construct meaning through organizing and linking together a variety of symbols, images and arguments.14 On the other hand, framing devices include the word choice, metaphors, descriptions or other symbolic devices that suggest how to think about the policy issue,15 whereas the reasoning devices relate to “explicit and implicit statements that deal with justifications, causes, and consequences in a temporal order, and which complete the frame package”.16 While the frame invites us to read policy proposal in a particular way, its application through the framing and reasoning devices provides a specific articulation of 1. Frame dimension – What are the main frames that shape construction and interpretation of the problem? 2. Problem dimension – What is perceived as the problem? – Why is it seen as a problem? What assumptions lie behind the particular representation of the “problem”? What effects are produced by this representation of the problem? – What is left unproblematic in the framing of the problem? Where are the silences? Which issues are excluded from the debate? 3. Voice dimension – Which actors have the main voice in constructing and articulating the problem? – Whose problem is it seen to be? Who is acted upon? – Which actors are excluded from the debate? Figure 11.1  Steps in analyzing the legislative process

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 183 the problem (diagnosis), an explanation why the problem is important and how it is meant to be solved (prognosis).17 In addition, the “voice” dimension suggests who has a voice in defining the problem and deciding how the problem should be solved. As explained by Verloo and Lombardo,18 “it facilitates an analysis in terms of inclusion/exclusion and power that enables the identification of which voices (perspectives and experiences) are more regularly included or excluded from the possibility of framing policy problems and solutions in official texts”. Relying on this, I have advanced a particular set of questions for conducting the analysis (see Figure 11.1). The questions in Figure  11.1 allow me to identify who had a voice in defining the problems and how the meanings, problems and positions were constructed during the debate on the laws on Prizren and Velika Hoča. Framing the problem in specific ways also selects what should be seen as a problem and diverts attention from other issues.

General findings The laws on Prizren and Velika Hoča were both proposed by the government of Kosovo and prepared in consultation with the International Civilian Office (ICO). They were discussed together in the parliament and because of their similarity received similar objections and amendments. The adoption of the laws in the parliament was preceded by a long and heated debate. Civil society organizations (CSOs) from Prizren and Orahovac organized protests19 against the laws. The petition that the CSOs submitted to the parliament asking it to reject the laws was signed by more than 10,000 people (A4). The draft laws also faced criticism from the local Prizren and Orahovac authorities and national parliament (A8, A9, A10, A11). The Prizren Municipal Assembly organized a meeting to discuss the Law on Prizren and issued a statement with a request to the Assembly of Kosovo to reject the law. The Parliamentary Committee for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Spatial Planning, a functional committee assigned the role of lead committee for the review of laws, also unanimously recommended that the parliament return the laws to the government for revision and called for a broad public debate in the process of drafting the new proposals. Additionally, a group of twelve MPs requested an assessment of the draft laws by the Constitutional Court. There was broad agreement among those who participated in the public and parliamentary debates that the draft laws should be rejected and the laws should be written anew. They called for a transparent and inclusive process, which would include domestic and international experts on cultural heritage, legal experts and civil society organizations. Despite the strong objections, both laws were adopted with only minor corrections in the Assembly of Kosovo on 20 April 2012. The voting majority for both laws was secured by the majority of both the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)20 MPs and communities’ MPs, with the help of several MPs from the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR).21

184  Jelena Lončar The debate on the two laws was shaped around the two main frames: “threat” and “independence”. The “threat” frame was adopted by numerous members of the Kosovo Assembly representing a variety of governing and opposition parties, Prizren and Orahovac Municipal Assemblies and the Prizren and Orahovac CSOs, while the “independence” frame shaped the claims of the government representatives. The protagonists of the “threat” frame package argued that the main problem with the legislative proposals on Prizren and Velika Hoča was inclusion of the Orthodox Church representatives in the municipal councils for protection of cultural heritage. Various justifications and explanations were offered during the legislative debates that created the following frame sub-packages: discrimination, compliance with the Constitution, ownership over cultural heritage and inter-ethnic conflict. On the other hand, the “independence” frame was constructed around the problem of potential rejection of the two draft laws and its consequences. Rejection of the laws was seen as an obstacle for Kosovo’s full independence and respect by the international community.

Threat frame The threat frame was developed through the portrayals of Serbs and the Orthodox Church as the enemy and accomplice in genocide. As such, granting protection to Orthodox church sites and special management rights over these sites was framed as an attack on Kosovo’s statehood. It was argued that the Orthodox Church still considers Kosovo an “inalienable part of the territory of the Serbian nation, state and church” (Nait Hasani, PDK). Serbs were additionally represented as not wanting to integrate and recognize the state of Kosovo (A8). The laws were presented as a threat to hard-won independence, while rejection of the laws was perceived as an act of patriotism and pride. The frames such as “Serbization of Kosovo”, “terror”, “humiliation” and “municipality within municipality” were used to strengthen the threat narrative. For example, Alma Lama (Democratic League of Kosovo – LDK) argued that passing these laws meant the “Serbization of Kosovo” (A11, 20.04.2012). Nait Hasani (PDK), to take another example, argued that the Orthodox religious school in Prizren should not be protected as cultural heritage because it “has educated politicians who committed genocide, crime against humanity, such as Milosevic, and others”. Further, if it came under protection “there would be a lot of hate feelings, a sense of crime, because this school was established by all those who fought us, humiliated us, insulted us and condemned us” (A11, 20.4.2012). In addition, members of the Orahovac Municipal Assembly stated: We, members of the Policy and Finance Committee see the approval of this bill as unreasonable, since it envisages the formation of a mini-municipality in the municipality of Orahovac, to which the village Velika Hoča, inhabited by the Serb minority, belongs. (A8)

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 185 The consequence of perceiving Serbs and the Orthodox Church as a major threat to Kosovo statehood provided strong opposition to the draft laws. What triggered the “threat” frame was a proposed inclusion of the Orthodox Church representatives in the Prizren and Velika Hoča councils for the protection of cultural heritage. According to Article 4.3 of the draft Law on Velika Hoča, the Council of the Village of Velika Hoča shall have five members: two members selected by the Orahovac Municipal Assembly, two members selected by citizens of the village of Velika Hoča and one member selected by the Serbian Orthodox Church. According to the law, the Council has consultative rights in matters related to protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage and in the field of rural planning. Instead, members of the parliamentary committee proposed that the council increase the number of representatives to seven: four elected by Orahovac Municipality Assembly and three elected by citizens of Velika Hoča, thereby excluding the Orthodox Church from participation. Similarly, the Draft Law on Prizren (Article 16) envisaged the establishment of the Council on Cultural Heritage of Prizren with the same competencies as the heritage council in Velika Hoča and inclusion of religious representatives. As initially proposed, and ultimately adopted, the Prizren heritage council consists of seven members: one representative of the Prizren Municipal Office responsible for communities and return and six members from Kosovo’s civil society with experience in the preservation, development and/or promotion of Prizren’s cultural heritage. Among the six civil society representatives, one member should be selected by the Islamic Community, one member should be selected by the Serbian Orthodox Church and one member selected by the Catholic Church. At least two members from civil society should be recognized experts in the field of cultural heritage. The counterproposal of the parliamentary committee was that the Prizren council has six members, all representatives of civil society with experience in preservation, development and/or promotion of Prizren’s cultural heritage, without the inclusion of religious representatives. The parliamentary lead committee, a group of civil society organizations and municipal assemblies, framed the inclusion of a representative of the Orthodox Church in the Prizren and Velika Hoča heritage councils as discriminatory, unconstitutional and in violation of the secular character of Kosovo. Another major concern of the opponents of the law was Article 18.4 of the draft law on Prizren, according to which “the Committee shall seek the agreement of the Serbian Orthodox Church for any activities that would affect the Serbian Orthodox Church’s properties in the Historic Centre of Prizren”. This provision triggered strong emotions. MP Emin Gërbeshi (Self-Determination, alb. Vetëvendosja  – VV), for instance, claimed that “the law is anti-Albanian, anti-historical, and inhuman. It even sends us to the medieval time where the church governed everything” (A11, 20.4.2012). Members of the Prizren Municipal Assembly also objected that all the construction around the Orthodox sites depends on the Orthodox Church. They argued that the Orthodox Church in Kosovo is granted more power than in Serbia.

186  Jelena Lončar The following sections focus in more detail on the perception that the inclusion of the Orthodox Church representatives is problematic.

Discrimination and equality In all analyzed documents, discrimination was the most prominent argument against including Orthodox Church representatives in the heritage councils. Initiated by local NGOs and representatives of the Prizren and Orahovac municipalities, the framing of Orthodox Church representation as discrimination also prevailed in the parliamentary debates. The Orthodox Church is portrayed as the only beneficiary of the laws, which in itself represents discrimination against other citizens of Prizren and Orahovac/Rahovec. For example, MP Liburn Aliu (VV) argued that citizens of Velika Hoča are not only Serbs, but also atheists and members of Islamic and Catholic communities. By protecting only the Orthodox cultural heritage, all other citizens of Velika Hoča are discriminated against. It was also claimed that the Serbian Orthodox Church is prioritized over other religious communities. In their press release, the Coalition of NGOs in Defense of the Historic Center of Prizren claimed that “the content of the bill gives an additional voice to the Orthodox Church” (A3). Positive discrimination of the Orthodox Church over other religious communities was also emphasized by the Islamic Community, other members of the lead parliamentary committee and municipal assemblies. Although the draft law specified that in addition to the Orthodox Church, both the Catholic Church and Islamic Community shall each select one member of the Prizren heritage council, the discrimination arguments focused only on the inclusion of the Serbian Orthodox community. Portrayal of Serbs as a privileged ethnic group reflects not only on perceptions of Serbs but also on the self-perceptions of Albanians as the majority group. Granting additional rights to Serbs puts everyone else in the subordinate position. This is exemplified in the statement of Qemajl Kurtishi, a representative in the Prizren Municipal Assembly, who argued that the Law on Prizren represents an attack on his identity and offends him as “a Kosovar Muslim” (A10).

Compliance with the constitution – secularity and neutrality in religious matters The two laws were not only framed as discriminatory but also unconstitutional and contradictory to the state’s secularity and neutrality in religious matters. Except in the press release by Serbian CSOs and the judgment of the Constitutional Court, all other analyzed documents contained strong portrayals of the laws as unconstitutional. The most vocal in raising the issue of secularism and constitutionality was MP Nait Hasani (PDK) who claimed: “By requiring that religious communities become part of the law, this law violates Article 8 of the Constitution. It should be decided here whether we are religious state or a secular state” (A11, 20.4.2012).

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 187 The Constitutional Court and international actors took a different position within the same frame. The Constitutional Court declared that the principle of secularism was not violated since “It permits religious organizations to conduct their affairs without undue interference from the State and religious organizations cannot mandate what the state can or cannot legislate for” (A1). During the public and parliamentary debate, however, the only actor to take a similar position was Peter Feith, Chief of the ICO, who argued that France is also a secular state and still grants certain rights to its religious communities (A6, 26.3.2012). He further stated that the main intention of the laws is to grant religious rights to the communities. Therefore, excluding the church representatives from the decision-making would violate the main intention of the bills (A6, 26.3.2012). The government that proposed the laws took a rather defensive position by stressing that the Orthodox Church was not granted executive power, but only a consultative role in matters pertaining to the Village of Velika Hoča and the Historic Center of Prizren.

Who owns culture? Another prominent claim was ownership over culture, particularly in the committee debates, which further strengthened the perception of threat. Do the Orthodox sites belong to Serbs or to all Kosovo citizens? Who does the Orthodox Church itself belong to? In debating these issues, the main perception was that the laws take away cultural heritage from the citizens of Kosovo and give the exclusive ownership over cultural heritage to Serbs. Arguing that the Orthodox heritage belongs to Kosovo and not to Serbs only, MPs Liburn Aliu (VV), Nijazi Idrizi (PDK) and several others suggested that the laws not use terms such as “Serbian Orthodox Church” but instead “Orthodox Church in Kosovo”. They further raised the question of the origin of the Orthodox churches and monasteries. They insisted that the Orthodox churches were built on the foundations of Illyrian-Albanian church (Nue Oroshi, A10). These claims additionally strengthen the negative perceptions of Serbs as “Others” as well as a threat to Kosovo state and nation building. The same purpose was served by arguing that religious heritage as such does not exist. The Council for Cultural Heritage argued that the term “religious heritage” is not accepted by UNESCO and hence the entire heritage is “cultural”, not “religious”. Additionally, granting governing rights (and hence ownership rights) to the Orthodox Church was expected to lead to the destruction of Kosovo heritage. Although there was no explanation as to why the participation of the representative of the Orthodox Church in the Prizren and Velika Hoča heritage councils would lead to the destruction of this heritage, this claim was often repeated in the parliamentary lead committee.

Inter-ethnic and religious conflict Another argument against the two laws and particularly against the proposed composition of the heritage council was that giving public authority to religious

188  Jelena Lončar communities provokes hatred and religious conflict. Members of the Orahovac Municipal Assembly stated that the law on Velika Hoča is: harmful not only to the Municipality of Rahovec but also for the citizens of the Serb minority themselves, since it introduces an ethnic divide in our municipality and will reflect negatively by raising of tensions between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. (A8) The conflict frame was also brought up by the Serb NGOs, yet explained differently. In the Appeal to the Civil Society and to Citizens of Prizren to Protect Cultural Heritage, Kosovo Policy Action Network (KPAN) found the cause of the inter-ethnic conflict in the civil society protest events. KPAN suggested that: We fear that this protest will represent a call to extremist groups for religious intolerance, the disrespect towards other cultures and their differences, which, as a rule, comes to a head and turns into violence. . . . We consider the behavior of the civil society in Kosovo to be devastating, seeing how they are the ones who should be the bearers of positive change and reconciliation among communities, instead of increasing tensions with irresponsible rhetoric and hate speech during their protests. (A13)

Independence frame While the threat frame was dominant in the debate, there were separate efforts to frame the laws in a more positive way. These efforts were articulated in the independence frame. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi and Minister Dardan Gashi were the most outspoken within this frame. For them, potential rejection of the draft laws was a major problem during the legislative debate. Since the passing of the laws was required by the Ahtisaari Plan, their rejection would prevent recognition of Kosovo as fully independent and reflect negatively on Kosovo’s international position. The adoption of the two laws was one of the last conditions to end the supervised independence of Kosovo. This argument was repeated on all occasions and was given as answer to most of the objections against the bills. Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi was particularly vocal in framing the laws as the last battle for independence: You are aware that this year, together, we have started passing the last laws from the Ahtisaari package. And [we need] to finish this process, to make sure we end the supervision stage of independence by the international community, specifically the International Civilian Office. This point should be taken very seriously, because it represents another historic moment for Kosovo. It is the moment when Kosovo testifies before the democratic world that we are consolidated as a state, with its institutions, and [that we] continue our

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 189 journey as citizens, completely independent. This milestone proves that our society is not prone to return to the bitter recent past. (A11, 20.4.2012) Commenting on the Law on Prizren, Dardan Gashi, Minister in the Kosovo Government, explained: “This law directly affects the relations of the Republic of Kosovo with the friends and allies of the Republic of Kosovo and as such, I pray and ask you and urge that the law is adopted in the proposed form” (A11, 20.4.2012). Although government representatives defended the draft laws in parliament, their support for the legislation did not correspond to the objectives of the international community. Instead, they framed minority-relevant legislation as a sacrifice for Kosovo’s independence rather than a step towards recognition of minorities. Rather than focusing on the inclusion of minorities, the government representatives framed the debate around international obligations and meeting the requests of international friends. Therefore, while trying to decrease the objections to the laws, the government maintained the “us versus them” narrative, thereby subtly participating in the production of inter-ethnic distancing and intolerance.

Inclusion/exclusion of voices: interpreting the silence The analysis has shown that the most prominent frames were threat and independence. The Ahtisaari Plan envisaged these laws in order to protect the endangered Orthodox heritage and strengthen multiculturalism in Kosovo. However, in Kosovo’s public sphere, the laws were perceived as a threat to the state and the nation building process. As such, the debates additionally enforced the already existing negative representations of Serbian community and the Orthodox Church. These perceptions have affected not only what will be claimed in the debate, but also which actors and issues will be excluded and silenced during the legislative process. Since these issues additionally testify to the complex nature of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo, they will be examined below. The analysis shows three levels of exclusion: first, on the level of issues raised in the debate; second, on the level of actors acted upon or perceived as affected by the legislation; and third, on the level of actors who engaged in the debate and constructed the proposals. First, the multiculturalism frame should have been more strongly presented in the debate on the protection of Orthodox religious and cultural heritage. The debate was mainly focused on the Serbian participation in decision-making, while, for example, no one mentioned the violation of minority rights or the opportunity for reconciliation and strengthening of inter-ethnic dialogue. While many political and CSO representatives maintained that cultural heritage is not exclusively relevant for members of a community, this was not used to reconnect the divided communities and increase inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation. Only Peter Feith emphasized religious rights and the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo on several occasions.

190  Jelena Lončar Second, the actors taking part in the debate claimed to speak either in the interest of Kosovo citizens, citizens of Prizren and Orahovac or Kosovo culture. Although the laws were particularly relevant for the Serbian minority in Kosovo, that particular community or the minorities in general were not perceived as affected constituencies. On rare occasions when the representatives referred to Serbs, they were portrayed more as enemies or culprits than as a minority whose endangered cultural heritage is in need of protection. For example, members of the Orahovac/Rahovec Municipal Assembly stated that the law on Velika Hoča is “harmful primarily for the Serbian minority, because they will isolate themselves, while thinking that they would defend their religion and culture” (A8). Such a claim suggests that the rejection of the laws protecting Serbian cultural heritage is defended on the grounds of being “for their own good”. Finally, the whole process also lacked inter-ethnic dialogue. While numerous actors took part in the debate, the most outspoken were those against the laws. Among them were the representatives of the civil society and a variety of political parties, both from the government coalition (PDK, LDK, AKR) and the opposition (VV, AAK). However, minority representatives, who could have been expected to support the laws, did not fully engage in the legislative debates. There was only one joint meeting between the Committee for Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Spatial Planning and the Committee on Rights, Interests of Communities and Returns. The meeting was organized for procedural reasons. The Minority Committee as a standing committee has the right to review minorityrelevant legislation, to discuss the amendments adopted in the functional committees when they are related to minorities and make recommendations based on the rights and interests of communities. The Minority Committee rejected all amendments adopted by the Committee on Spatial Planning and the joint meeting was scheduled to try to reach a compromise. In addition, minority representatives were almost invisible in the legislative process, although the laws were directly related to minority communities, particularly the Serb minority. Even on rare occasions when they spoke, they took a defensive and conciliatory approach, claiming that they are only supporting the government proposals and referring to the Ahtisaari Plan and the work of the ICO. Similarly, Serbian CSOs were also quiet. Regardless of the very active mainstream CSOs, the Serbian CSOs issued only one statement during almost a yearlong parliamentary debate. In the statement, they appealed to the Albanian CSOs: We invite our colleagues from the civil sector who participated in these protests to change their position, seeing how the destruction of anyone’s cultural heritage of tremendous historic and artistic value can only bring about condemnation by future generations. (A13) The silence of minority political and civic representatives can be explained by their desire not to deepen disagreements and provoke even stronger opposition. I find the support for this explanation in the claim by Serbian MP Petar Miletić

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 191 (Independent Liberal Party – SLS) who said that he had many objections but did not want to encourage disagreements (A7, 24.1.2012). Since the adoption of the laws was required to end the supervised independence, and the international community strongly supported the adoption of the laws, it was to be expected that the laws would be adopted regardless of the interventions by minority representatives. Moreover, activities of the minority representatives in defense of the laws could have polarized the debate, which is usually not conducive to compromise solutions.22

Conclusion The above analysis shows that the laws on Prizren and Velika Hoča were framed through the negative portrayals of Serbs and the Orthodox Church. Serbs were presented as an over-privileged ethnic group that represents a threat to Kosovo’s independence and statehood and refuses to integrate into society, while the Orthodox Church was presented as an enemy and accomplice in genocide. Portrayal of Serbs as a privileged ethnic group also reflected on the self-perception of Albanians as the majority group. Albanians are implicitly constructed as victims and protectors of Kosovo’s Constitution and independence. In advocating for the rejection of the laws, the actors involved used frames such as discrimination, secularity, Kosovo’s culture and a threat of inter-ethnic conflict. Protection of Serbian cultural heritage was framed as discrimination against other Kosovar citizens and non-Orthodox heritage. The proposal that church representatives participate in the local council for the protection of cultural heritage was presented as unconstitutional and turning Kosovo into a religious state. In addition, by granting protection to Orthodox religious sites, the laws were claimed to deprive Kosovo’s citizens of their cultural heritage. Finally, it was argued that the rejection of the laws is particularly important for Serbs since the laws would increase intolerance and hatred towards the Serbian community. While the above arguments were present in the claims of MPs, members of local assemblies in Prizren and Orahovac and civil society representatives, the claims by the government and international actors were in favor of the laws. The government adopted the independence package framing the laws in terms of “state interest”, “progress”, “international obligations” and “historic moment”. It argued that the adoption of the laws was one of the final conditions for Kosovo gaining full independence. The government representatives also tried to decrease the opposition to the laws by arguing that the Orthodox Church is only granted consultation rights. Therefore, while trying to decrease the perception of threat, the government also preserved an “us against them” narrative, thereby subtly participating in the production of inter-ethnic distancing and intolerance. Although a few actors advocated the adoption of the laws, only international actors tried to promote a positive image of them. They emphasized the multiethnic character of Kosovo and the need for protection of minorities. Despite the expectation that minority representatives would promote the laws, minority voices were silenced in the debate. Finally, issues such as discrimination against

192  Jelena Lončar minorities, violation of minority rights, reconciliation and inter-ethnic dialogue were also excluded from the debate. All of these voices testify to the complex inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. Claims made by official representatives have a profound impact on public perceptions and inter-ethnic relations. By constructing negative perceptions of the Other, the debate regarding these two laws has contributed to a reinforcement of systemic group inequality and reproduction of discrimination. Although the laws were eventually passed, this was only due to international pressure and conditionality for gaining full independence. However, although international actors had a crucial role in initiating and passing the laws, they were not successful in changing the “hearts and minds” of the Kosovo citizens, nor the attitudes towards minorities. This finding confirms previous observations of the limited influence of international pressure on minority policies (Agarin 2010, Cianetti 2014, Schulze 2010). Indeed, even minority favorable legislation can serve as an exclusion mechanism. While the legislative framework guarantees full protection of minority rights, political institutions in Kosovo encourage ethnic cleaving and interethnic tension. This chapter, therefore, suggests that, rather than simply looking at outcomes, the analysis of decision-making processes may be a better approach to understanding inter-ethnic relations.

Appendix

List of texts analyzed: A1

A2 A3 A4 A5 A6

A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13

Constitutional Court. Judgment in Cases KO45/12 and KO46/12, Request of Liburn Aliu and 11 other Members of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo for constitutional assessment of the Law on the Village of Hoçë e Madhe/Velika Hoča and the Law on the Historic Centre of Prizren. Këshilli i Kosovës për Trashëgimi Kulturore. Deklaratë për Komisioni Funksional për Bujqësi, Pylltari, Zhvillim Rural, Mjedis dhe Planifikim Hapësinor, Kuvendi i Republikës së Kosovës, 29.11.2011. Koalicioni i OJQ-ve. Deklaratë për Media, Konkluzionet e tekimit të shoqërisë civile të Prizrenit me palët relevante rreth projekt-ligjit për Qendrën Historike të Prizrenit, 26.08.2011. Koalicioni i OJQ-ve. Komunikatë për Media, 24.01.2012. Koalicioni i OJQ-ve. Letër për Znj. Atifete Jahjaga, Presidente e Republikës së Kosovës, 21.04.2012. Komisija za poljoprivredu, šumarstvo, ruralni razvoj, sredinu i prostorno planiranje. Zapisnici sa sednica od: 22.08.2011, 12.09.2011, 05.01.2012, 10.01.2012, 12.01.2012, 13.01.2012, 16.01.2012, 17.01.2012, 03.02.2012, 14.02.2012, 21.03.2012, 22.03.2012, 26.03.2012. Komisija za prava i interese zajednica i povratak, Zapisnici sa sednica od: 24.01.2012, 24.02.2012, 28.02.2012, 17.04.2012. Komiteti për Politikë dhe Financa i Kuvendit të Komunës së Rahovicit. Deklaratë, 17.06.2011. Kuvendi të Komunës së Prizrenit. Deklaratë, 8.9.2011. Kuvendi të Komunës së Prizrenit. Procesverbal nga mbledhja XV, 8.9.2011. Kuvendi të Republikës së Kosovës. Transkriptet e seancave plenare, 23.8.2011 dhe 20.04.2012. OJQ EC Ma Ndryshe. Letër e hapur në lidhje me procesin e hartimit dhe iratimit të projekt/ligjit për Qendrën të Prizrenit, për Kryetarin e Kuvenit të Kosovës, Z. Jakup Krasniqin, 21.10.2011. The Kosovo Policy Action Network. Appeal to the civil society and to citizens of Prizren to protect cultural heritage, 31.01.2012.

194  Jelena Lončar

Notes 1 Adem Beha, “Minority Rights: An Opportunity for Adjustment of Ethnic Relations in Kosovo”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13(4) (2014): 85–110. 2 Jose Maria Arraiza, “A Matter of Balance. Cultural Heritage, Property Rights and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Kosovo”, in: Property and Investment in Jus Post Bellum. Clarifying Norms, Principles and Practices (The Hague: Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, 2014). 3 Ann-Belinda Preis and Christina Stanca Mustea, “The Role of Culture in Peace and Reconciliation” (2013), www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/ images/PeaceReconciliationENG.pdf (accessed 22 March 2018). 4 For example: The Law on Special Protective Zones and the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members in Kosovo. 5 Arraiza, “A Matter of Balance. Cultural Heritage, Property Rights and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Kosovo”. 6 Ibid. 7 Beha, “Minority Rights: An Opportunity for Adjustment of Ethnic Relations in Kosovo”. 8 Jelena Lončar, “Power-sharing in Kosovo: Effects of Ethnic Quotas and Minority Veto”, in: Jovan Teokarević, Bekim Baliqi and Stefan Surlić (eds.), Perspectives of a Multiethnic Society in Kosovo (Belgrade: Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 2015), 359–373. 9 Gregory Bateson, “A Theory of Play and Fantasy”, in: G. Bateson (ed.), Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 177–193. 10 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 11 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology 26(1) (2000): 611–639. 12 William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”, American Journal of Sociology 95 (1989), Baldwin Van Gorp, “The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In”, Journal of Communication 57(1) (2007): 1–37. 13 William A. Gamson, “Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media”, in: David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kreisi (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 242–261; Gamson and Modigliani, “Media and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”; Goffman, Frame Analysis. 14 Gamson, “Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media”. 15 Gamson and Modigliani, “Media and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”, 3. 16 Van Gorp, “The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In”, 64. 17 Carol Bacchi and Joan Eveline, “Approaches to Gender Mainstreaming: What’s the Problem Represented to be?”, in: C. Bacchi and J. Eveline (eds.), Mainstreaming Politics: Gendering Practices and Feminist Theory (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2010), 111–139; Petra Meier, “Critical Frame Analysis of EU Gender Equality Policies: New Perspectives on the Substantive Representation of Women”, Representation 44(2) (2008): 155–167; Mieke Verloo and Emanuela Lombardo, “Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach”, in: M. Verloo (ed.), Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality: A  Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007), 21–51. 18 Verloo and Lombardo, “Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach”, 34. 19 The largest protest was organized in Prizren on 29 January 2012. It gathered several thousand people and was supported by the Prizren Municipal Assembly and the

Cultural heritage in Kosovo 195 following political parties: Self-Determination (VV), AKR and Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo. 20 All of the PDK MPs who spoke in the parliamentary committee and plenary sessions advocated rejection of the laws. However, party discipline prevailed and the government managed to secure the necessary majority. Before voting, several MPs claimed that the PDK MPs received detailed instructions how to vote on each of the amendments. 21 The Law on Velika Hoča was passed with 59 votes and the Law on Prizren was passed with 56 votes. The Assembly of Kosovo has 120 members. 22 Licia Cianetti, “Granting Local Voting Rights to Non-Citizens in Estonia and Latvia: The Conundrum of Minority Representation in Two Divided Democracies”, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13(1) (2014): 86–112.

References Agarin, Timofey (2010). A Cat’s Lick: Democratisation and Minority Communities in the Post-Soviet Baltics. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Arraiza, Jose Maria (2014). “A Matter of Balance. Cultural Heritage, Property Rights and Inter-Ethnic Relations in Kosovo” In: Property and Investment in Jus Post Bellum. Clarifying Norms, Principles and Practices. The Hague : Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies. Bacchi, Carol and Joan Eveline (2010). “Approaches to Gender Mainstreaming: What’s the Problem Represented to be?” In: Mainstreaming Politics: Gendering Practices and Feminist Theory. Edited by C. Bacchi and J. Eveline. Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, pp. 111–139. Bateson, Gregory (1972). “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” In: Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. Edited by Gregory Bateson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 177–193. Beha, Adem (2014). “Minority Rights: An Opportunity for Adjustment of Ethnic Relations in Kosovo”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13(4): 85–110. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow (2000). “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology 26(1): 611–639. Cianetti, Licia (2014). “Granting Local Voting Rights to Non-Citizens in Estonia and Latvia: The Conundrum of Minority Representation in Two Divided Democracies”, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13(1): 86–112. Ec Ma Ndryshe (2013). Erroneous. An Analysis of Numerous and Continuous Faults in Cultural Heritage, Prishtina: Forum 2015, Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. Gamson, William A. (2004). “Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media” In: Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Edited by David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kreisi. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 242–261. Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani (1989). “Media and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”, American Journal of Sociology 95: 1–37. Goffman, Erving (1974). Frame Analysis. New York: Harper & Row. Lončar, Jelena (2015). “Power-sharing in Kosovo: Effects of Ethnic Quotas and Minority Veto” In Perspectives of a Multiethnic Society in Kosovo. Edited by J. Teokarević, B. Baliqi and S. Surlić. Belgrade: Youth Initiative for Human Rights, pp. 359–373. Meier, Petra (2008). “Critical Frame Analysis of EU Gender Equality Policies: New Perspectives on the Substantive Representation of Women”, Representation 44(2): 155–167. OSCE (2014). Challenges in the Protection of Immovable Tangible Cultural Heritage in Kosovo. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mission in Kosovo.

196  Jelena Lončar Preis, Ann-Belinda and Christina Stanca Mustea (2013). “The Role of Culture in Peace and Reconciliation”, www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/images/ PeaceReconciliationENG.pdf (accessed 22 March 2018). Schulze, Jennie L. (2010). “Estonia Caught Between East and West: EU Conditionality, Russia’s Activism and Minority Integration”, Nationalities Papers 38(3): 361–392. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (2007). “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”, Annex to the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status, S/2007/168/Add. 1, 26 March 2007. Toth, Norbert and Balazs Vizi (2014). “Obligations Arising from Public International Law Relating to the Rights of Minorities: Some Observations on the Case of Kosovo”, Pecs Journal of International and European Law 1: 88–97. UN Security Council (2014). “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo”. S/2014/68. United Nations Security Council. Van Gorp, Baldwin (2007). “The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In”, Journal of Communication 57(1): 60–78. Verloo, Mieke and Emanuela Lombardo (2007). “Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety in Europe: Introducing a Critical Frame Analysis Approach” In: Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality: A Critical Frame Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe. Edited by Mierke Verloo. Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, pp. 21–51.

12 “Face to Face” Serbian-Albanian cultural cooperation in the media Ana Birešev

Before we begin analyzing the media’s treatment of the cultural cooperation of artists from Serbia and Kosovo, I would like briefly to present the context surrounding the discourses regarding this cooperation. Context here has a very narrow and specific meaning, referring to the space of symbolic struggles. More precisely, it is the “order of discourse” or “discursive facet of the social order of a social field”, that is, the “conflictual configuration of discourses within a given social field”.1 The media here is seen as the arena onto which the symbolic war of certain social groups as well as intellectual-political and ideological positions is refracted according to the logic of the media itself and the topic presented.2 There have been a number of studies in Serbia that have sketched roughly, to the extent allowed by research methodology and collected data, the constitution of everyday and public speech, identifying its main fault lines, illuminating discursive strategies and showing the linguistic means used in the struggles of its own symbolic rivals. Based on the ethnographic research conducted in the period between 1996–98 among anti-nationalist activists in Belgrade and Zagreb, Stef Jansen analyzed the characteristics of post-Yugoslav cosmopolitan narrative, seeing it as a rhetorical tool used by specific social groups in a struggle against the advocates of the competing nationalist narrative.3 In studying quotidian discourses of status differentiation in Serbia in the early 2000s, Ivana Spasić concluded that the political distinction plays a significant role in drawing symbolic boundaries, while also cutting across and frequently suppressing standard social forms of distinction. Thus, the “key opposition between the two blocs (middle class = culture = antiMilošević oriented versus primitive = bumpkin = uneducated = nationalist = proMilošević)”.4 The study of classification struggles based on focus group interviews,5 conducted by (Ivana Spasić and Ana Birešev), again showed, the low prevalence of class distinguishing strategies that gave way to moralizing discourses and divisions into morally correct (a poorly articulated “we”, we “mere mortals”) and those not (amoral, deceitful, corrupt politicians, but also the nouveau riches and celebrities). In an analysis of the press after 2000, Ivana Spasić and Tamara Petrović note the emergence of different variations of “Third Serbia”, in a space gap between two discursive constructs established in the 1990s – the civic, cosmopolitan and modern “Second Serbia” and the populist, patriotic and traditionalist “First Serbia”.6 “Third Serbia” sometimes combined elements of the two, sometimes went against

198  Ana Birešev or past these two discourses. Some years later, these two authors looked at how the terms cosmopolitanism and patriotism were used by public figures, experts and political analysts in the magazine and website Nova srpska politička misao and on the radio talk show and accompanying webpage “Peščanik”. One of the conclusions was that in determining and using these terms, leading intellectuals produce strongly opposing visions of the political community and its future: one side sees it tied to “the world”, that is integration into the European Union, whereas the other seeks the survival of the nation, in which Kosovo plays a prominent role.7 This research has shown that the space of public speech is overwhelmingly split around the ethno-national – cosmopolitan division.8 Even “Third Serbia” is defined and constructed through one’s attitude towards this division. Such positioning logic has predetermined the sites of several clashes, among which Kosovo appears as one of the most lasting. In the discourse of the “patriotic” bloc, Kosovo often figures as “the cradle of Serbian identity”.9 One of the representatives of the “cosmopolitan” bloc jokingly suggested that Serbia be territorially divided into two parts, with the decisive referendum question: “Europe, the woman that is, or Kosovo, the cradle that isn’t”,10 thus implying that the Kosovo question is “tearing” Serbia into two irreconcilable camps. At the same time, it points to the pervasive tendency of discourse identities to be projected as objective reality, that is, to be institutionalized. The protagonists of symbolic clashes in the intellectual and media arenas of Serbia are also to a considerable extent made up of individuals close to art. Not only were they possessors of cultural capital or consumers of art – they were its producers, belonging to expert criticism or originating in disciplines that, among other, deal with culture and art (sociology, philosophy, etc.). One could, therefore, expect various cooperation projects of local and Kosovo artists, created since 2008, to arouse considerable interest of precisely this portion of the public. “High risk” artistic collaborations, which certainly would include any attempt of connecting the Serbian and Kosovo scenes, would represent an ideal battleground of participants of warring intellectual and political camps. One of the fist of such events was the exhibit of eleven young artists from Pristina, entitled “Exception/ Contemporary Art Scene of Pristina”. This exhibit would be remembered for its opening night at the gallery “Kontekst” in Belgrade on 7 February 2008, when members and sympathizers of the organization “Obraz”11 (along with similar organizations) barged into the gallery and destroyed the work of Dren Maliqi entitled “Face to Face”. The artwork produced considerable controversy when it was displayed two weeks earlier at The Museum of Contemporary Art of Vojvodina in Novi Sad, but it was in Belgrade that it would be “slashed up”. A pop art portrait of Adem Jashari, placed opposite a reproduction of Warhol’s “Elvis”, ended up on the floor of the gallery “Kontekst”, torn in half. Elvis was spared. The media were immediately filled with commentary from the “usual suspects” of the intellectual scene who debated the “incident” for days, attacking and defending, crucifying and redeeming, expressing their patriotism or cosmopolitanism, representing “First” or “Second” Serbia, the right to secession or territorial integrity. Least of all there was talk of art, and what little there was, nobody remembers.

“Face to Face” 199 Since the tempestuousness of 2008 – a year marked by tensions in and outside of the art scene, due to the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo that February – there have been multiple literary, theatrical and artistic joint events in Serbia with their Albanian colleagues. Insofar as they did not end in physical confrontation, they can be said to have been successful. This research aims to present the discourses produced in Serbian media about these events, the extent to which (if at all) they reproduced the logic and instruments of discourses identified in previous studies of local symbolic struggles, as well as how a specific topic  – art  – influenced the form and content of the messages. We begin with the premise that discourses have a specific relation to a given context, that is, the structure of the field of public speech and history of previous symbolic clashes,12 placing the discourses in the service of continuing to seek a more favorable position in the order of discourse and consequently decreasing the chances that something be learned about contemporary Kosovo and its art. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility of the appearance of new discursive formations in which competitiveness with the inner Other still allows for a closer look at the outer Other or even a ceding of place to it completely. The media analyzed are the following: the weeklies NIN and Vreme, the dailies Danas and Politika, the cultural supplement of Danas, Beton, the internet sites Nova srpska politička misao and e-novine, as well as the webpage of the erstwhile radio program “Peščanik”. The given media were chosen because they reserve a portion of their programing for culture. However, the analysis was not confined to their cultural columns and supplements, seeing how many comments regarding this topic could be found among columns about society, politics, the region, news, etc. Even at first glance at the data, we can see that certain op-eds, comments, columns and interviews emerge from the same matrix of positioning established in previous symbolic struggles, with standard discursive tactics used to attach opponents (argumentation, standard figures of speech, semantic moves), thoroughly discussed in previous research.13 What is characteristic is how the political dimension of a given event entirely squeezes out the artistic aspect, which was greatly reflected on the discourse itself. It is not an accident that the majority of such texts appeared directly after “Exception” and, not less significantly, in an atmosphere of expectation of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. As time passed after the declaration, texts of a different structure started to appear: political themes and ideological positions were ever more folded into language about art. We can note three types of discourses here: one develops around the argument that art can and ought to be socially engaged; the second sets art above daily politics, defending the principle of autonomy and freedom of creativity; and the third, which gives art a mediating role in presenting the ordinary life of people and their everyday problems. In what follows, all four discursive constructs are presented, their analysis supported with appropriate quotes. The final result of the research should allow the evaluation of influence of these discourses on society’s relationship to the cultural, as well as other types of cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia.

200  Ana Birešev

Cooperation in the grips of symbolic struggles When the basic intention of discourses is to underscore existent symbolic divisions, they are entirely in the service of this goal, often resulting in the topic of debate receding from center stage, relegating it to status of mere excuse, or worse, becoming a tool in a reckoning of long-standing animosity. Thus for many, the case of cooperation projects with artists from Kosovo served to continue ongoing symbolic battles. Discourses of this type are recognizable above all because they are framed as for or against Serbian-Albanian cultural cooperation, while the art itself fades from view. The figure of the enemy is extremely important, whether present or only intimated, but the primary Other is not the Kosovo artist or statesman, but the interior arch-enemy. The division nationalist – cosmopolitan is revived over the status of Kosovo, recalled here and there, appearing in multiple variations: “Serbian patriots” versus “treasonous scum”, “folksy Serbia” versus “so-called ‘civil’ and so-called ‘artistic’ circles”, terrorism battlers versus terrorists and their apologists. In typically sardonic manner, journalist Petar Luković illustrates this division in his criticism of the incident caused by the right-wing organization “Obraz” at the opening of “Exception”: First Koštunica’s lads of the Nazi-Orthodox-Jugend organization “Obraz” prevented the opening of the exhibit of Albanian painters from Pristina, parading proudly with images of Milorad Ulemek Legija, Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. A  handful of no more than three hundred members of “Obraz” pushed by the light police presence, who peacefully tried their best to remain on their feet thus applying their instructions that “Obraz” remain untouchable. Who the heck, in this age of our sorrow for lost Kosovo, is going to make us follow a code of ethics, if not the very patriotic forces of Serbdom, aware of their cultural mission? Obviously, in these last few weeks, anything that has been putrefying in its own puss has finally crawled out from under a rock: Serbia has wantonly given into the sweet sins of fascism, enjoying the raving illusion that Kosovo’s independence is the perfect cause to once and for all deal with this type of treasonous scum, in particular when the chants are “Peščanik” or “Merkator” or “exhibit of Albanian painters”.14 The division into two blocs is often “intensified” with the usual motif of opposition between a worldly, “urban” and “urbane” Serbia and the Serbia of latterly urbanized hillbillies. With the Albanian artist’s piece serving as pretext for attack on his supposedly elitist supporters from urban Serbia, the following example shows that this motif of urbanity and primitivism comes as part of the anticipated argument of the opposing camp. When the photographs of this “art work” [in which the Kosovar artist Alban Muja placed street signs in the Latin script next to existing ones in Cyrillic] appeared in some newspapers, and when this act encountered public

“Face to Face” 201 disapproval, there were individuals from so-called “civic” and so-called “artistic” circles who rushed to defend his right to artistic expression. Yet I could wager that these are the same “urban” folks who put forth the claim that the right of old time residents of cities is greater than the right of the newcomers, that is, that the recent additions ought to adapt to the city, not the other way round.15 The attempts to say something about the artistic qualities of the work most often only end up being a debate about their political agenda. Another author compares the exhibit “Exception” with the Trojan horse. Whatever one said of the horse, however beautiful, however skillful the hands that sculpted it ever so faithfully, it is ultimately nothing but a transporter of Greek soldiers that, cunningly entering Troy. In this same way, however one might justify these photographs by invoking pop-art, they remain what they are. Whatever one said of them, photographs of Adem Jashari remain photographs of Adem Jashari, the Drenica terrorist. No sweet word will make him more beautiful.16 Advocates of cultural cooperation do not negate the political dimension and intention of these events to achieve political influence, but the defense moves in the direction of discrediting the opponent as not understanding art – simpletons, of limited comprehension, not cut out to comprehend postmodern art and its ironic displays. By slamming this neo-pop-art piece, these new pop-iconoclasts, although without cause, have valiantly stood in defense of our values (there’s no messing with those!) and that way once again demonstrated their proverbial inability to understand and process an even slightly complex message. Irony has, for the umpteenth time, collided with an absolute inability to understand irony.17 On the other side, the critics of “Exception”, or rather the critics of the people who defended the exhibit, resorted to another, well-honed strategy of dismissing the opponent. Since certain intellectuals and artists, organized as “cultural workers”,18 spoke up against the forcible closure of the exhibit, calling it an intervention against the “freedom of expression”, they were charged with reviving political practices and ideological discourse from socialist times. Freedom of thinking and artistic expression was won through difficult political struggles and is today beyond questioning. That is why these ideological disqualifications of “Cultural Workers” fall into the domain of anachronistic political practice tied to iron-clad times with a single, inviolable ideological matrix and political conception. . . . It is truly disappointing that in this day and age someone revives and practices such exclusive ideological speech

202  Ana Birešev expressed in forgotten postulates – ideological orientation, socially engaged art, ideological reaction in a given social moment.19 One strategy, much more commonly used by the adherents of the “patriotic” bloc, consists of pointing out the inconsistency in their adversaries’ opinions, claiming that they provide no such support to similar artistic endeavors on the “Serbian side”. [I]f we take that for these workers in culture, fascist censorship is any revolt against showing any criminal, why did those same people who see February 7th as the death of contemporary art, demand the closure of the exhibit of Vladimir Šćepanović where the artists showed a few authority figures the world at large today sees as a threat to democracy, among whom Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić?20 An even more important dilemma is whether for the director of the Cultural Centre of Belgrade simple empathy includes compassion with Serbian victims of Kosovo and Metohija, about whom no one is making pompous art installations and who are almost entirely forgotten by the public, which, by the way, is the case with the marginalization of current problems in Kosovo.21 While the “patriots” make use of relativization, or else reach for universal values in the hopes that someone will honor Serbian victims with the same artistic treatment, “the cosmopolitans” advocate an art that cuts out cross sections of reality, placing history in parentheses, rendering any kind of justification impossible, even immoral. Perhaps the objects from the exhibit “Bogujevci, a Visual History” will actually become proof, literal, court proof, that “what happened” actually happened and that it was a crime, committed by people and their state, as the Women in Black22 say “in our name”. These people are criminals, subordinate units of the Serbian military. They killed; they fired ceaselessly into anything that moved, even children, and it cannot be relativized, or exchanged, or swallowed, or elided, or slept through.23 In this story [of Bogujevci children], then, there are no other civilians, either Albanian or Serb, there are no neighbors of other nationalities, nor expulsions from work, forced sales of estates, there is no illusion of a normal life, no ethically organized politics, nothing has been said about this by either Thaçi, or UÇK, or the Church. Here we have only five children of a murdered family, and on the other side the Serbian state.24 Both sides want to see stronger criticism of actors in Kosovo. But where the “patriots” criticize certain prominent Albanians for their conformism, [a]s it is [Shkëzen] Maliqi leaves the impression of a frustrated Albanian who forgot all the good from his youth lived in Belgrade when he could

“Face to Face” 203 wear his qeleshe without reproach. Or maybe that is exactly why he is frustrated, because now he has to talk like the flock which he left. Now he needs proof for return and acceptance into the flock of the likeminded, where not a single word that contradicts the ironclad sameness, built even on murder of dissenters.25 The “cosmopolitans” encourage Kosovo Serbs to abandon Belgrade for a more active role in building Kosovo’s cultural scene (speaking about the Serbian theater that left Pristina in 1999 and relocated to the northern, Serbian part of Kosovska Mitrovica): If this theater could succeed in removing the rope that is Belgrade from around its neck, I believe that it could really take a step forward. If the director of the theater, Nenad Todorović would establish contact not with the stage director Kokan Mladenović [Belgrade], but the Kosovo National Theater from Pristina, I believe there would a revolutionary change, which neither Boris Tadić nor Hashim Thaçi would be able to understand, but also not be able not to support. Then they would indeed be the avant-garde.26 Primarily aimed at long-standing adversaries as well as fellow fighters in the intellectual field, the messages produced within the discourse of symbolic struggles have a highly suggestive effect on the anonymous reader – they lead him to choose one of the fully formed discursive identities on offer, in the process leaving very little room for questioning or desire to find out something more about each other neighbors and their art.

Cooperation within the discourse of engaged art As opposed to the previous discourse built in its entirety along already existing symbolic fault lines and in the service of marking the enemy, attacking or defending, the discourse of engaged art revolves around the argument that art can and should change society for the better and that such a role is embedded in the history and structure of the artistic field.27 For example, the name of the first conference organized by “Cultural Workers”, held on 10 May 2008, was called “Art Is Politics”. This discourse is neither neutral nor unmarked by narrow group interests.28 However, the confrontation with intellectual and political opponents within it is only the tail end of a strategy to monopolize the position of engaged art and to establish the legitimacy of that position. The result of this is an idea of engaged art imbued with specific content that primarily aims to broadly criticize negative phenomena in society, and only exceptionally and indirectly the specific groups or persons responsible. An analysis of texts in the media has shown that this strategy is used mostly by anti-nationalist individuals, inclined towards a favorable view of Serbian-Albanian cooperation.29 Engaged art, whether produced on the Albanian or Serbian side, or the fruit of collaboration, has specific grounding. It provokes and asks uncomfortable

204  Ana Birešev questions. It deconstructs dominant cultural patterns. It uncovers mechanisms of myth production. It enables the introduction and understanding of the Other, while also fighting against xenophobia, nationalism, retrograde ideas in one’s own society. It criticizes war and postwar profiteering and all those who stop at nothing in the search for money or fame. The ruined image boldly poses questions to Kosovar society: Is Adem Jashari a pop star? Have we not a more benign person for this role? Is someone getting something out of him?30 In this exhibit [“Exception”], Pristina’s contemporary art scene is questioning dominant cultural hegemonies, national and gender identities through visual art.31 The play [One Flew over the Kosovo Theater] commonsensically, ethically and aesthetically demystifies the influence of politics on art and raises its voice against extreme political ideas, impassioned options that are essentially humiliating and degrading.32 Neziraj laughs uproariously at corruption, brutality, ignorance, unschooledness . . . of the leaders of the national revolution and the new state of Kosovo, as it is unfolding.33 This discourse is characterized by an emphasis on the overlap of aims of art’s social mission in Serbia and in Kosovo, pointing to the presence of similar problems. The same things that perturb contemporary artists on both sides of the border becomes clearer and gives birth to the idea of solidarity along artistic lines. Young artists from Pristina, down to the last, are in favor of Kosovo’s independence, but apart from that, their work is deeply burdened by social topics, and in that there is no difference with other Balkan, including Serbian, contemporaries. A politicized, traditional, closed society is the theme that dominates their oeuvre.34 The play Finger by the young Kosovo author Doruntina Basha starkly shows that the similarities are considerably greater than the differences. This piece, despite its local colors, could have been written anywhere in the Balkans and be understood better than in the rest of the world. This fact alone speaks volumes.35 Sometimes they are unified by the gaze of the internal (class, political, cultural) Other, that equates and levels them, turning them into natural allies. The consequence is that a Kosovo artist ceases to see a Serbian artist as Other, and vice versa. Since the time I have been more actively involved in art, somewhere around 2002, I have had a lot of contact with colleagues from the region, Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Turkey, even Serbia. We have a lot in common and we collaborate well. We understand each other better than

“Face to Face” 205 we are understood in our environments, since, in a way, we provoke traditional art and traditional “taste” of the audience.36 Sometimes, it is precisely the audience and its “taste” that bring them together. I collaborate with people from Serbia for the most natural reasons. We have the same language, that of literature and theater. . . . [T]hey are welcomed here with great enthusiasm. Still, it must be said that we are talking about a minority that follows these events, that is, urban, young, educated people who are capable of valuing such things and come to support them.37 Still other times, sympathy is developed on the basis of criticism of a common enemy – neocolonial rule, foreign observers and humanitarians. Cufaj’s criticism of these missions that become their own purpose intersects with the bitterness of Danis Tanović, whose film No Man’s Land represents one of the sharpest criticism of neocolonial arrogance and bureaucratic obtuseness of “civilizing” missions of the international community in miserable boondocks the world over.38 A further step in this approach to cooperation is the position that social critique is all the sharper if it is artistically valuable. In addition to other cities, it is important that even Belgrade, considered by the people to be the murderer of their families, be gifted a more than precious art piece. I would go so far as to call it a life piece. Literally. So, we have opened an exhibit with very serious engaged art, of which we are in dire need of our own healing process.39 In the discourse of engaged art, the task of the artists is to illuminate negative social phenomena, and they do so by revealing the main culprits for their emergence – policy and ideology creators. In that, it is rather similar to the fourth discourse, presented further on.

Art before and above all Support for artistic cooperation is clothed in yet another discourse. Here the accent is placed on the universal language of art and its power to overcome earthly borders in bringing people together. In this discourse, daily political issues are far less important than in the discourse of engaged art, while political involvement and social engagement are removed from their conventional meanings. Namely, a piece is “political” if it “deals with what very deeply concerns the viewer and her life – always and everywhere faced with three great themes: death, love, power, in that or some other order”.40 Engagement is not equated with critique, emerging into the public and influencing social processes, rather is understood defensively.

206  Ana Birešev The dominant position is that art, by existing and only insofar as it reserves its autonomy from external influences, makes the world better. In that sense, discursive strategies are entirely dedicated to defending autonomy, “purity” of artistic creation, naturally followed by a cosmopolitan openness and a general support for a politics of cooperation. The theater Atelje 212 has neither the power nor competence to recognize the independence of Kosovo; nor is the Theater of Pristina authorized to recognize that “Kosovo is the heart of Serbia”. The only thing they can and should do is to create and produce theater pieces, excellent, bad or mediocre, for those interested – and there are those interested, in Belgrade, Pristina, Milwaukee, Alma-Ata, wherever. As long as there have been theaters in this world, histrionic troupes visit where there are invited (or bring themselves, why not?!), ceremoniously not caring for the trivial divisions of this world.41 When art is contrasted with other practices, such as “massive, populist sport such as football” that only stokes the flames of international hatred,42 this discourse acquires an elitist tone. People who, for example, go to [the Serbian singer Đorđe] Balašević concerts in Zagreb, or the [Serbian band] Partibrejkersi in Sarajevo (or else [the Croatian singer Darko] Rundek in Belgrade, etc.), people who applaud [Croatian theater] Gavella’s visit to Novi Sad or [Serbian theater] JDP in Rijeka, do so because they love this. They do not love this because they are nationally this or that, but because they admire their artistry: the nationality of the artist is an entirely irrelevant category, it holds nothing either good or bad. With a massive, populist sport such as football, this are entirely different.43 The cooperation itself is often the precondition and means of creation of high quality art. This is how the conductor Premil Petrović sees the No Borders Orchestra, comprising Albanian and Serbian musicians. We wish to build a top notch regional orchestra of the highest European standards. What no country can do individually, we can do together. For me, this is the essence of communication.44 Proponents of artistic freedom and disinterestedness set their position in opposition to others, considering it to be exceptional and apart, a shelter and haven. The figure of the damned and misunderstood artist, loner and visionary is inescapably present in this type of discourse. It is entirely unimportant whether Serbian or Albanian. I will not be “celebrating” Dren Maliqi because of the extent to which in his piece destroyed in Belgrade he is critical of the situation in which he lives. I do not wish to make him thus acceptable for “others”, nor seek comparisons

“Face to Face” 207 and balance that could give justification to anyone. I would only like to say that Kosovo, and not only Kosovo, seeks talent, capacity, ideas of individual people, who are out there, beyond this project, and they can, as long as they successfully remain free, study the virtual or real transition of a projected world.45 And then Vladimir Arsenijević stood up and said “let’s not pretend, you saw what happened yesterday, after all, you are not exactly welcome here, do you feel that, do you have some reaction?” They [Jehona, Saranda and Fatos Bogujevci] still refused to say anything bad, rather something like “no, we are no here do give answers, we only offer our artistic vision” and so on. Then a journalist from Koha Ditore said “but you should criticize Ivica Dačić, all this was just a show”. They refuse to do that too. Then you see people who are in deep misunderstanding with everybody.46 One could say that the discourse celebrating art for art’s sake is the official discourse of the art scene, that is, those forces that have historically built and defended its autonomy. We ought to keep in mind that, although it rests on rejecting external pressure, it is not necessarily free from influence of objective reality, that is, belongings, interests and divisions which it comprises.

“Real life” and the quotidian as the base for cooperation and exchange The discourse that at its core holds the desire to truly get to know life in Kosovo through its art has its origins in the deep dissatisfaction with the image of Kosovo generated by local media. “I think that for a long time in Serbia, we have preserved and canned Kosovo as a topic. . . . This imaginary Kosovo from the media has indeed remained forever in Serbia”,47 says a text from 2008. Although the production of oversimplified and warped ideas has continued, there have also been thoughts about their inadequacy, even their damage done. First one side (the cosmopolitans) accused the other (the patriots) of using Kosovo as a “catalyst”, “a medium that performs self-identification and self-narration to the center of symbolic and real power”.48 The media space was then invaded by a criticism of the general state of media, as well as a criticism of all those who used Kosovo topics to further their symbolic wars, delivering only positions and accusations in the public but never insights grounded in fact or immediate experience. A significant portion of this criticism was shaped precisely through artistic practice and texts regarding art. It is little known in Serbia how Serbs live, no less Albanians in Kosovo. Selective informing and representation of the Kosovo quotidian is similar to the way in which [Dren] Maliqi’s work was presented in the last few days. “Pro-Serbian” media refused to show Elvis, whereas the “pro-European” ones cut out Jashari. Meanwhile, the work is called “Face to Face” and is only a whole when the two are facing each other.49

208  Ana Birešev [Ana Dragić, the author of the project “Face the Reflection”] tells the visitors they will be able to see something entirely different than what they see in the media. She further claims that “this is a completely different kind of reality, everyday life”.50 This discourse gave birth to new rivalries – “regular” people versus the politicians and reality versus the political construction of reality. Combining emotions of intolerance and hatred with contemporary consumer dictatorship, Patriotic Hypermarket brings an entirely radical theatrical language: it cuts where it hurts most, throwing back at the political elites and nationalists a bitter dose of reality.51 The visit of the Belgrade theater piece [The Perverse, performed at Oda Theater in Pristina] was an event that showed that there are common themes beyond prejudice and far from negotiating tables.52 Although the political elite was turned into the primary Other, politics as such is not rejected. Even art is seen as complementing politics. By encompassing real life, art ought to force politicians to consider the plight of “the common man” thus contributing to positive social change. Understood thus, the alliance of politics and art would enable the expansion of the space of legitimate issues and questions and once again bring politics closer to those from whom it has become alienated and who have therefore chosen passivity rather than action within a political community. I think the performance rises above the political quotidian, or should I say, political banality. It certainly has an important universal context, which is that when these large global macro-topics or the discourse of IDs, driving licenses and license plates is turned into existential questions, such as what really bothers people, then you realize that it is necessary to complement political dialogue with an expanding artistic discourse that will deal with the most neglected and ignored people when it comes to this big topic.53 I think that the theater is obligated and has a duty to deal with reality, to influence it, to reflect, to consider topics in the environment.54 In this type of discourse, lived history has the advantage over grand History. Personal stories reflect historical processes of long duration and macro-social relations. This idea is illustrated well by Milan Vračar, the coordinator of the project in which The Museum of Contemporary Art of Vojvodina presented the exhibit “Views: Encounters of Personal Histories of Serbs and Albanians”: Our idea was to establish, after years of stagnation, cultural communication between Serbia and Kosovo, and by introducing personal stories and confessions of ordinary people, offer a contribution to a deeper understanding of the mutual history of Serbs and Albanians.55

“Face to Face” 209 The discourse that rehabilitates the quotidian, only because it has already become integral to art, is diametrically opposite to the first discourse of symbolic struggles. In this case, no one individual, no one specific person is called upon. It is a general critique – of those who are so obsessed with the enemy that they no longer see the real world, of politicians, politicizing – uncontaminated by logic of past struggles, and in addition – or precisely therefore – leaves a lot of space for something to be learned about Kosovo today, its art and possibilities of cooperation. Placing the problems faced every day by people from Serbia and Kosovo in the foreground, the goal is to show that they have a lot in common, that they are equally victims of poor policy, if nothing else. Such an artistic gesture establishes immediacy and a closeness that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. It is almost as if contact is established “face to face”. For this very reason, art in this discourse occupies a prominent place – where politics draws borders and separates, art draws parallels and brings together.

Conclusion The reconstruction of the four media discourses and the analysis of their content reveal the existence of various approaches to defining the relationship to SerbianAlbanian cultural cooperation. In the first discourse, support for cooperation is expressed through the defense of the cosmopolitan position, while patriotism is at the root of rejection of the cooperation. In the second, support rests on the long tradition of artists’ struggle to occupy or protect their right to legitimate social engagement. The third presents the cooperation as another means to show the highest art and work out certain universal themes. Finally, the fourth sees the interlacing of art and life as opportunity for recognition of the Other and consequently for building ties. While the first three discourses are rather burdened with self-legitimation, always unfolding in already established frameworks (in previous symbolic struggles  – the first discourse) and frameworks established elsewhere (constituting the art scene as an autonomous sphere, the idea of engaged art – the second and third), the last discourse, which supports the opening of art to real life and lived experience, includes too many “unknowns” to say that it “has anyone’s back”. The last discourse only places boundless hope in the idea that these images and stories, which art breaks off from life and returns processed to anonymous receivers, will be capable of bringing people on both sides of the border together. The fourth discourse also emerges later compared to the first three. The presence of some of its elements was noted in a recent study of the field of everyday speech,56 with which it shares a disenchantment with politics and a fatigue with the war waged by discursive constructs of two or three Serbias in symbolic space. Their similarity ends there. For while this study establishes that everyday discourse mostly serves to justify one’s own retreat into privacy – the only haven from dirty politics – the analysis of public speech that celebrates the return of the “ordinary” and “everyday” in art reveals the desire and intent for things in society, or societies, to change – through comparison, connection, exchange and even

210  Ana Birešev common struggle. Seeing how two discourses develop on the foundation of the same feeling, it is not impossible, nor undesirable in this case, for public discourse to pierce its way to the everyday.

Notes 1 Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 114. 2 Neither the social historical context nor the structure of the media field are the subject of this text. Nevertheless, I adopt the premise that society, that is, social structure, symbolic order, discursive order, as well as various social fields are all in a homologous relationship. Pierre Bourdieu and Löic J. D. Wacquant. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 3 Stef Jansen, “Cosmopolitan Openings and Closures in Post-Yugoslav Antinationalism”, in: Magdalena Nowicka and Maria Rovisco (eds.), Cosmopolitanism in Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 75–92. 4 Ivana Spasić, “Distinkcija na domaći način: diskursi statusnog diferenciranja u današnjoj Srbiji”, in: Miloš Nemanjić and Ivana Spasić (eds.), Nasleđe Pjera Burdijea: pouke i nadahnuća (Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju and Zavod za proučavanje kulturnog razvitka, 2006), 164. 5 Ivana Spasić and Ana Birešev, “Social Classifications in Serbia Today: Between Morality and Politics”, in: Predrag Cvetičanin (ed.), Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia (Niš: Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe, 2012), 155–172. 6 Ivana Spasić and Tamara Petrović, “Varijante ‘Treće Srbije’ ”, Filozofija i društvo 23(3) (2012): 23–44. 7 Tamara Petrović-Trifunović and Ivana Spasić, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in Intellectual Discourse: Peščanik and Nova Srpska Politička Misao”, Filozofija i društvo 26(4) (2014): 164–188. Adopting the notion of symbolic struggle, and sometimes choosing to use critical discourse analysis, the authors of these studies clearly support the theoretical standpoint that treats all discourse as instrument of maximizing symbolic profit and achieving symbolic dominance (in the form of classification struggles) (Pierre Bourdieu, Language et pouvoir symbolique. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2001) and thus indirectly, for a redistribution of objective power. 8 In studies that have dealt with this distinction in everyday communication, the opposition was not as prominent as its media presentation would suggest, where it often appeared in a distorted way, in combination with other forms of classification, ones based in classical sociological criteria, such as status markers, but also morality. The result was a rather unsolidified representation of the Other. 9 Petrović-Trifunović and Spasić, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in Intellectual Discourse: Peščanik and Nova Srpska Politička Misao”, 184. 10 Teofil Pančić, “Predlog za razmišljanje”, Vreme, 10 January 2008. The author is alluding to a widely known novella, “Jelena, the Woman Who is Not” (“Jelena, žena koje nema”), by the Yugoslav Nobel Laureate Ivo Andrić (1892–1975). Jelena is a symbol of elusiveness, of something that cannot be reached or possessed. 11 The Patriotic Movement Obraz (Otačanstveni pokret Obraz) was a right-wing “OrthodoxPolitical Organization” (http://obraz.rs/?page_id=394), active from 1993 to June 2012. The organization was banned by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia for activities that violated guaranteed human and minority rights and for inciting ethnic and religious hatred. 12 This position is close to the dialectical-relational approach, in which discursive reproduction is approached through an analysis of relations between various discourses within a given order of discourse. Norman Fairclough, Media Discourse (London: Edward Arnold, 1995).

“Face to Face” 211 13 Jansen, “Cosmopolitan Openings and Closures in Post-Yugoslav Antinationalism”; Spasić, “Distinkcija na domaći način: diskursi statusnog diferenciranja u današnjoj Srbiji”; Spasić and Birešev, “Social Classifications in Serbia Today: Between Morality and Politics”; Spasić and Petrović, “Varijante ‘Treće Srbije’ ”; Petrović-Trifunović and Spasić, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in Intellectual Discourse: Peščanik and Nova Srpska Politička Misao”. 14 Petar Luković, “Kosovo ili Hollywood?”, Peščanik, 13 February 2008. 15 Zoran Grbić, “Jašari: veličanje teroriste”, Nova srpska politička misao, 6 February 2008. 16 Ibid. 17 Vladimir Arsenijević, “Pop-ikonoklastici u akciji”, Politika, 20 February 2008. 18 The group “Cultural Workers” (Serbian acronym, RUK) was formed on 7 February 2008, at the Centre for Cultural Decontamination. The official gazette of RUK, “February  7th” (www.czkd.org/czkd-arhiva/images/program/22/files/7februar_glasilo_rad nika_u_kulturi.pdf) states that this “group of citizens, spontaneously gathered and selforganized, decided to respond to this violent act through an artistic-political initiative of the group RUK, whose aim is the initiation of a public debate about this incident and the creation of the conditions for opening the censured exhibit, as well as the return of politics into the field of contemporary art”. As RUK members, the gazette cites Ana Bežić, Aleksandar Bošković, Branislav Dimitrijević, Milena Dragićević Šešić, Zoran Erić, Vladan Jeremić, Vladimir Jerić, Vida Knežević, Kristian Lukić, Ivana Marjanović, Nikoleta Marković, Svebor Midžić, Marko Miletić, Gordana Nikolić, Borka Pavićević, Darinka Pop-Mitić, Jelena Radić, Milica Ružičić, Dejan Sretenović, Branimir Stojanović, Milica Tomić, Vladimir Tupanjac, Borut Vild and Jelena Vesić. 19 Marinko Vučinić, “Radnici u kulturi i nova kulturna revolucija”, Nova srpska politička misao, 29 May 2008. 20 D. Perić, “Čistka do poslednjeg radikala”, NIN, 15 May 2008. 21 Marinko Vučinić, “Politikantska provokacija: hoće li biti izložbe u Prištini?”, Nova srpska politička misao, 18 December 2013. 22 Women in Black is a women’s, feminist, antimilitarist peace organization, founded in 1991 in Belgrade, best known for their antiwar efforts and protests throughout former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. 23 Borka Pavićević, “Bogujevci/vizuelna istorija”, Danas, 20 December 2013. 24 Marko Simonović, “Odakle su deca porodice Bogujevci?”, Peščanik, 4 January 2014. 25 Ljubinko Todorović, “Škeljzen Malići u jatu istomišljenika”, Nova srpska politička misao, 8 November 2014. 26 Saša Ilić, “Teatar privremeno izmeštenih”, e-novine, 11 August 2011. 27 Pjer Burdije, Pravila umetnosti. Geneza i struktura polja književnosti (Novi Sad: Svetovi, 2003). 28 Certain authors think that the members of RUK have played their way into the government hands and that they have, just as much as extreme nationalist groups, contributed to the reproduction of “functional political dichotomies”. They think that “the dominant political scene” utilizes these dichotomies for production of conflict among voters in order to more easily manipulate them (Grlja). Others see RUK as “a case of theatrical costume change of the bourgeoisie into workers dress” (Milikić). Still others see in it an attempt to reconcile management and workers to ensure a painless transition from a planned to a market, more flexible and more open model of the economy. Sezgin Boynik, “Teorija incidenta: kako promišljati odnos umetnosti i politike izvan okvira funkcionalizma (slučaj zatvaranja izložbe Odstupanje: savremena umetnička scena Prištine u Beogradu, 7. februara 2008)”, in: Vida Knežević, Kristijan Lukić, Ivana Marjanović and Gordana Nikolić (eds.), Slobodni i suvereni. Umetnost, teorija i politika. Knjiga eseja i intervjua o Kosovu i Srbiji (Novi Sad: Cenzura, 2013), 26–27. 29 Interestingly, this position appears in the majority of media – the exception being only New Serbian Political Thought [Nova srpska politička misao].

212  Ana Birešev Miloš Živanović, “Jašari Has Just Left the Building”, Beton, 19 February 2008. Perić, “Čistka do poslednjeg radikala”. Ana Tasić, “Trgovine patriotizmom”, Politika, 13 December 2012. Goran Cvetković, “Naličje samostalnosti”, Beton, 18 December 2012. Perić, “Čistka do poslednjeg radikala”. Boban Jevtić, “Ogoljene Intime”, NIN, 17 January 2013. Maliqi, in: D. Perić, “Upotreba albanske ikone”, NIN, 31. January 2008. Neziraj, in: Vladimir Arsenijević, “Sa obe strane barikade”, e-novine, 15 September 2012. Dušan Bogdanović, “Mesije i njihove žrtve”, Vreme, 12 December 2013. Predrag Stakić, “Bogujevci i bogojavci”, Peščanik, 19 December 2013. Teofil Pančić, “Glumci nisu stigli, sire”, Vreme, 28 April 2011. Ibid. Teofil Pančić, “Nedeljna porcija mržnje”, Vreme, 5 March 2009. Ibid. Petrović, quoted in: Sonja Ćirić, “Suština kominikacije”, Vreme, 6 October 2011. Borka Pavićević, “Kako misliti Kosovo”, Peščanik, 23 March 2008. Biljana Srbljanović, “Bogujevci/Radio emisija”, Peščanik, 20 December 2013. Dragan Ilić, “Reprize su majka znanja”, Vreme, 14 February 2008. Teofil Pančić, “Floskule u šetnji”, Vreme, 13 March 2008. D. Perić, “Kontekst Adema Jašarija”, NIN, 31 January 2008. Dragić, quoted in: Biljana Lijeskić, “Lica Beograda i Prištine”, Politika, 14 April 2011. Nenad Obradović, “Prateći program sa prevodom”, e-novine, 9 November 2011. R. Stanković, “Dijalog različitih”, NIN, 30 January 2014. Mustafić, quoted in: B. G. Trebješanin, “Svi glumimo Srbe i Albance”, Politika, 19 July 2011. 54 Bogavac, quoted in: Ibid. 55 Vračar, quoted in: Miroljub Mijušković, “Lične ispovesti Srba i Albanaca”, Politika, 14 November 2010. 56 Spasić and Birešev, “Social Classifications in Serbia Today: Between Morality and Politics”.

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

References Bibliography Bourdieu, Pierre (2001). Language et pouvoir symbolique. Paris: Éditions Fayard. Bourdieu, Pierre and Löic J. D. Wacquant (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Boynik, Sezgin (2013). “Teorija incidenta: kako promišljati odnos umetnosti i politike izvan okvira funkcionalizma (slučaj zatvaranja izložbe Odstupanje: savremena umetnička scena Prištine u Beogradu, 7. februara 2008)” In: Slobodni i suvereni. Umetnost, teorija i politika. Knjiga eseja i intervjua o Kosovu i Srbiji. Edited by Vida Knežević, Kristian Lukić, Ivana Marjanović and Gordana Nikolić. Novi Sad: Cenzura, pp. 14–30. Burdije, Pjer (2003). Pravila umetnosti. Geneza i struktura polja književnosti. Trans. by V. Kapor, Z. Glušica, J. Navalušić, S. Gobec and M. Letajev. Novi Sad: Svetovi. Chouliaraki, Lilie and Norman Fairclough (1999). Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Fairclough, Norman (1995). Media Discourse. London: Edward Arnold. Jansen, Stef (2008). “Cosmopolitan Openings and Closures in Post-Yugoslav Antinationalism” In: Cosmopolitanism in Practice. Edited by Magdalena Nowicka and Maria Rovisco. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 75–92.

“Face to Face” 213 Petrović-Trifunović, Tamara and Ivana Spasić (2014). “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in Intellectual Discourse: Peščanik and Nova Srpska Politička Misao”, Filozofija i društvo 25(4): 164–188. Spasić, Ivana (2006). “Distinkcija na domaći način: diskursi statusnog diferenciranja u današnjoj Srbiji” In: Nasleđe Pjera Burdijea: pouke i nadahnuća. Edited by Miloš Nemanjić and Ivana Spasić. Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju and Zavod za proučavanje kulturnog razvitka, pp. 137–171. Spasić, Ivana and Ana Birešev (2012). “Social Classifications in Serbia Today: Between Morality and Politics” In: Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia. Edited by Predrag Cvetičanin. Niš: Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe, pp. 155–172. Spasić, Ivana and Tamara Petrović (2012). “Varijante ‘Treće Srbije’ ”, Filozofija i društvo 23(3): 23–44.

Sources Arsenijević, Vladimir (2008). “Pop-ikonoklastici u akciji”, Politika, 20 February, www. politika.rs/sr/clanak/33652/Pogledi-sa-strane/Pop-ikonoklastici-u-akciji#! (accessed 17 January 2015). Arsenijević, Vladimir (2012). “Sa obe strane barikade”, e-novine, 15 September, www.e-novine.com/region/region-tema/71426-obe-strane-barikade.html (accessed 21 February 2015). Bogdanović, Dušan (2013). “Mesije i njihove žrtve”, Vreme, 12 December, www.vreme. com/cms/view.php?id=1157773 (accessed 12 January 2015). Ćirić, Sonja (2011). “Suština kominikacije”, Vreme, 6 October, www.vreme.com/cms/ view.php?id=1013695 (accessed 9 January 2015). Cvetković, Goran (2012). “Naličje samostalnosti”, Beton, 18 December, www.elektrobe ton.net/anticement/nalicje-samostalnosti/ (accessed 1 February 2015). Grbić, Zoran (2008). “Jašari – veličanje teroriste”, NSPM, 6 February, www.nspm.rs/kul turna-politika/jasari-velicanje-teroriste.html (accessed 5 February 2015). Ilić, Dragan (2008). “Reprize su majka znanja”, Vreme, 14 February, www.vreme.com/ cms/view.php?id=584932 (accessed 3 January 2015). Ilić, Saša (2011). “Teatar privremeno izmeštenih”, e-novine, 11 August, www.e-novine. com/stav/49912-Teatar-privremeno-izmetenih.html (accessed 18 February 2015). Jevtić, Boban (2013). “Ogoljene intime”, NIN, 17 January, www.arhiv.rs/novinska-clanak/ nin/2013/1/17/C1257AE8003BA1FAC1257AF50043C71F/ogoljene-intime (accessed 13 January 2015). Lijeskić, Biljana (2011). “Lica Beograda i Prištine”, Politika, 14 April, www.politika.rs/sr/ clanak/173906/Kultura/Lica-Beograda-i-Pristine (accessed 19 January 2015). Luković, Petar (2008). “Kosovo ili Hollywood? ”, Peščanik, 13 February, http://pescanik. net/kosovo-ili-hollywood/ (accessed 25 February 2015). Mijušković, Miroljub (2010). “Lične ispovesti Srba i Albanaca”, Politika, 14 November, www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/156179/Licne-ispovesti-Srba-i-Albanaca (accessed 18 January 2015). Obradović, Nenad (2011). “Prateći program sa prevodom”, e-novine, 9 November, www.enovine.com/kultura/kultura-sa-lica-mesta/53081-Pratei-program-prevodom.html (accessed 18 February 2015). Pančić, Teofil (2008a). “Predlog za razmišljanje”, Vreme, 10 January, www.vreme.com/ cms/view.php?id=561517 (accessed 2 January 2015).

214  Ana Birešev Pančić, Teofil (2008b). “Floskule u šetnji”, Vreme, 13 March, www.vreme.com/cms/view. php?id=600385 (accessed 3 January 2015). Pančić, Teofil (2009). “Nedeljna porcija mržnje”, Vreme, 5 March, www.vreme.com/cms/ view.php?id=835433 (accessed 5 January 2015). Pančić, Teofil (2011). “Glumci nisu stigli, sire”, Vreme, 28 April, www.vreme.com/cms/ view.php?id=988060 (accessed 8 January 2015). Pavićević, Borka (2008). “Kako misliti Kosovo”, Peščanik, 23 March, http://pescanik.net/ kako-misliti-kosovo/ (accessed 25 February 2015). Pavićević, Borka (2013). “Bogujevci/vizuelna istorija”, Danas, 20 December, www.danas. rs/danasrs/kolumnisti/bogujevcivizuelna_istorija.887.html?news_id=273258 (accessed 25 January 2015). Perić, D. (2008a). “‘Kontekst’ Adema Jašarija”, NIN, 31 January, www.arhiv.rs/novinskaclanak/nin/2008/1/31/C12573B50045C71DC12573E2003A1698/kontekst-ademajasarija (accessed 10 January 2015). Perić, D. (2008b). “Upotreba albanske ikone”, NIN, 31 January, www.arhiv.rs/novinskaclanak/nin/2008/1/31/C12573B50045C71DC12573E2003A20EC/upotreba-albanskeikone (accessed 10 January 2015). Perić, D. (2008c). “Čistka do poslednjeg radikala”, NIN, 15 May, www.arhiv.rs/novinskaclanak/nin/2008/5/15/C12573B50045C71DC125744B004ADF96/cistka-do-posledn jeg-radikala (accessed 12 January 2015). Simonović, Marko (2014). “Odakle su deca porodice Bogujevci?”, Peščanik, 4 January, http://pescanik.net/odakle-su-deca-porodice-bogujevci/ (accessed 28 February 2015). Stakić, Predrag (2013). “Bogujevci i bogojavci”, Peščanik, 19 December, http://pescanik. net/izlozba/ (accessed 27 February 2015). Stanković, R. (2014). “Dijalog različitih”, NIN, 30 January, www.arhiv.rs/novinska-clanak/ nin/2014/1/30/C1257C4A003A6B1DC1257C6F00431CC7/dijalog-razlicitih (accessed 14 January 2015). Tasić, Ana (2012). “Trgovine patriotizmom”, Politika, 13 December, www.politika.rs/sr/ clanak/243005/Trgovine-patriotizmom (accessed 22 January 2015). Todorović, Ljubinko (2014). “Škeljzen Malići u jatu istomišljenika”, NSPM, 8 November, www.nspm.rs/hronika/ljubinko-todorovic-skeljzen-malici-u-jatu-istomisljenika.html (accessed 13 February 2015). Trebješanin, B. G. (2011). “Svi glumimo Srbe i Albance”, Politika, 19 July, www.politika. rs/sr/clanak/184884/Kultura/Svi-glumimo-Srbe-i-Albance (accessed 20 January 2015). Vučinić, Marinko M. (2008). “Radnici u kulturi i nova kulturna revolucija”, NSPM, 29 May, www.nspm.rs/kulturna-politika/radnici-u-kulturi-i-nova-kulturna-revolucija.html (accessed 7 February 2015). Vučinić, Marinko M. (2013). “Politikantska provokacija – hoće li biti izložbe u Prištini?”, NSPM, 8 December, www.nspm.rs/kulturna-politika/politikantska-provokacija-hoceli-biti-izlozbe-u-pristini.html (accessed 10 February 2015). Živanović, Miloš (2008). “Jašari Has Just Left the Building”, Beton, 19 February, www.ele ktrobeton.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/BetonBr39.pdf (accessed 27 January 2015).

13 The community of the dispossessed Women’s Peace Coalition Adriana Zaharijević

The final chapter in this collection of essays dedicated to the figure of the enemy, to taking into account and dealing with the enemy in a way that one does not usually deal with an enemy – by rethinking and reimagining the relation of enmity – focuses on one exceptional example of setting up a community. This singular attempt may compel us to open up certain unsettling questions: how can we be together with one’s ‘enemy’? How to destroy the aura of enmity, built on the premise of the existence of some closed, permanent and unified collective? How can we make room for a different kind of imagination that will work towards dismantling the enmity, grounded in permanence, unity and closedness? How a different community may be produced, and what will be the quality of its difference? The main idea of this text is to reexamine the possibility of alternative communities not based solely on territory, blood and shared memory. The idea germinated from a certain disquiet produced by a single paragraph from one of the rare articles on the relations of feminist activists from Kosovo and Serbia. In “Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains”, published in 1999, Julie Mertus claims: Serbian women who fight for the rights of women, refugees and ethnonational minorities are labeled as traitors by their own communities. To be women’s rights activists, Serbian women have had to choose their gender identity over their identity as Serb – a tag which has become equated in the international community with the oppressor/aggressor/war criminal. So, too, Albanian women who fight for the rights of women and speak in broader terms of human rights for all are in danger of being called traitors by their own people. However, the call for solidarity among Kosovar Albanians is so strong, and the cost of breaking rank so high, that most Albanian women cannot choose to emphasize their gender identity over their Albanian identity. And, unlike, Serbs, they need not do so, as “Kosovar Albanian” is not equated with aggressor but with suffering victim.1 The term ‘community’ appears twice in this short passage, although in entirely different contexts. Neither of them is central to this text, although both strongly impact on the im/possibility of development of the community it wishes to consider. The chosen paragraph segregates the activists, ones from the others,

216  Adriana Zaharijević attaching each group to ‘their own’, either through solidarity or by the fact that ‘their own’ reject them. Their segregation is primarily indicated by their respective demonyms – Albanian and Serbian – but also by the allegory that turns these nationalities into aggressors or victims. Indeed, this paragraph, and Mertus’ text as a whole, seeks to show what gender and national identities can be maintained and under what conditions they may intersect. In contrast, I want to ask whether a community may arise amidst these identitarian divisions, produced by a different kind of intersectionality, by a dispossession from one’s own? Women’s Peace Coalition, created by the Women in Black network from Serbia (Mreža Žena u crnom) and the Kosovo Women’s Network (Rrjeti i Grupeve të Grave të Kosovës) can be understood as an example of a community of the dispossessed. This example seems valuable for understanding the nature of communities that are neither organic and symbolic, such as ‘one’s people’, nor artificial and symbolic in the sense of the ‘international community’. The context in which this community appears – an ambivalent, divided, inoperative state, home to a longfestering war, permeated by both national and international ‘communities’ – will open various dimensions of its alternativity. The obstacles to its preservation indicate also its essentially utopian character.

Feminist community as community of the dispossessed Introducing the multilayered term dispossession in their book of the same title, Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou discuss their two opposite valences. Dispossession has a positive valence insofar as it is the condition for the remaking of autonomy: being dispossessed implies that there are certain heteronomous limits to our self-sufficiency that expose us as fundamentally relational and interdependent beings. In other words, although we are in some possession of ourselves, that possession is never absolute, without remainder and can never exclude various others outside of us – whom we can, but do not have to, consciously include in the determination of our own borders. However, there is also a negative valence – dispossession assumes a state in which we are in some way forced to remain without possession, to become destitute: we are deprived of home, stripped of civil rights, means of existence, land – all of which, whether we want that or not, binds us to something that is ‘ours’, something that is part of our belongings. War or various forms of legal and administrative violence push dispossession to the limits of the possibility of survival or else to a state in which the very possibility of life becomes questionable.2 Further elaborating these valences, Butler and Athanasiou insist on two other key points. Both forms of dispossession structurally depend on regulative social norms, which structure conditions of normative intelligibility.3 Norms are prior to this or that individual and her particular situatedness: they condition the ways one ‘chooses’ autonomy over interdependence, the ways we build and understand our sociability in which we ‘choose’ to invest ourselves. However, the norms do not only condition various forms of reciprocity and investment, but are also defining the radical possibilities of survival. Thus, in some part of the planet names are

The community of the dispossessed 217 subject to a certain type of normativity, since they form a socially established nexus with certain memories and phantasies. Mere names may subject certain persons to various forms of repression, torture, they can become stripped of dignity, even life. However, if there is indeed a structural link between the two valences of dispossession, they should also remain separated, given that between a state of dispossession, that is, our fundamentally relational nature, and our (most often involuntary) becoming dispossessed, stripped of what was our due, there is no “ontological, causal or chronological link”.4 This distinction is vital because it produces room for acting, a space for creation of different communities which may redefine the regulative aspects of existing social norms. What makes the community of feminists a community of the dispossessed? Feminism has a long, if contested, tradition that emphasizes the virtue of relationality,5 a virtue which, it is claimed, women more readily articulate and adopt. The concept of relationality is often connected with the ethics of care, where care constitutes the “social and moral practice characterized by dedication to the proper bearing to the self, others and the material world”, or, in other words, to a raising of awareness that we can only sustain life in the presence of others who contribute to our well-being.6 Not entirely discarding this position – since it can be valuable when dispossession is equated with war-time deprivation and thorough abolition of rights – I wish to place more emphasis here on the limits of autonomy and on a community which can develop only insofar as it keeps these limits open. What makes it alternative is its inherent questioning of the social norms that regulate both the autonomy and the interrelatedness of ostensibly selfsufficient individuals. The process of building a community where relationality is placed alongside autonomy, assumes thinking outside the logic of possession.7 Possession is not reducible only to property here but is also linked to the corollary imaginary right to proclaim a person’s humanity in proportion to her power to be in a possession of herself, an entitlement which has historically been heavily circumscribed on the basis on sex, class and race.8 It is also in equal measure determined by an imagined right to material or symbolic ownership of another and to the unequal distribution of humanity to other.9 To think dispossessedly therefore demands thinking autonomy differently: it demands an understanding of autonomy not founded on hierarchization of capacities for humanity and the consequent production of worthless lives – bodies that are less than human, more easily jettisoned, more justifiably destructible. To think autonomy differently demands thinking and creating a different politics, one that assumes personal and institutional vulnerability, a politics based on disjunction of the logic of possession and the logic of peace. Butler says: Peace is a certain resistance to the terrible satisfactions of war. It’s a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others and susceptibility to being wounded that actually gives our individual lives meaning. And I think this way of viewing things is a much harder place to go, so to speak. One can’t just do it alone, either.10

218  Adriana Zaharijević The logic of peace is built into the very foundation of the community of the dispossessed, given that it is grounded on a rejection of rooting autonomy in revenge and in transferring one’s own vulnerability onto others in infinite perpetuation of violence. Therefore, the community of the dispossessed does not comprise those who are solidary in their state of banishment, deprivation and destitution, in a state of proclaimed non-humanity; rather, this is a community of those who stand together against the possibility of the state, rights and autonomy being determined on a foundation of “differential allocation of humanness”.11 Such a community is not feminist because of the gender of the persons who comprise it.12 What makes it feminist is the resistance to the ideal of the logic of supposedly universal autonomy: an ideal which not only surreptitiously contains masculinism,13 but also a fundamental premise of specific class, race and ethnic origin of persons who hold power to shape themselves as autonomous and who are thus, a fortiori, in a position to declare others as less worthy, less human, dissociable from what ought to belong to them by sheer logic of universality. What makes it feminist is the understanding that the continuum of violence is necessary for the logic of possession to remain the only valid logic: the logic used to defend one’s own inviolability and to justify the destruction of others in war or otherwise legally enacted violence.

People, not territories The right to self-determination of origin, to having a history conceived as a series of facts and not constructed memory, the right to emancipation from chronic distrust and enmity, finally, the right to achieving sovereignty and demands for autonomy – this was and is the framework of the emergence of countless ‘imagined communities’. The construction of an identity – a problematic notion I use with the reference to the quoted passage from Mertus’ text – often goes hand in hand with the peculiar principles of enactment of those that are ‘ours’, peculiar because prior to a certain coercion to enact the ‘we’ and the ‘ours’ there is often no ‘community’ or ‘identity’. The struggle to establish borders, to define territory (soaked in ‘our’ blood, marked by ‘our’ memorial signs) and determine identity has often, both historically and today, turned into armed conflict. In this way, victory in war enables origin, history, identity, territory to all become legitimate, indisputable, conquered possessions. In such context, the definition of the dispossessed community should help us understand the motives to establish peace networks among people living on different meridians, who are separated both by physical borders and by symbolic confines of honor, blood and memory – invisible confines that often delineate territorial boundaries much more effectively than any frontier. In what follows, I will sketch, briefly and perhaps reductively, the process of disassembling of communities in the name of logic of possession to then introduce the feminist dispossessed community in Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia! And you, its respected citizens! What is Kosovo? Where is Kosovo? To whom does it belong? Is there any one among us who is not from Kosovo?

The community of the dispossessed 219 Is there any one among us who thinks that Kosovo is not his? Kosovo, this is a synonym for Serbia! Kosovo belongs to Serbia! Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people! It was always thus, and will be thus forevermore!14 When Vojislav Koštunica, at the time the Prime Minister of Serbia, gave his famous talk at a mass rally in Belgrade opposing the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo in 2008, he offered a series of rhetorical questions, none of which actually referred to a community: not the two (majoritarian) communities, the Albanian and Serbian that have historically inhabited Kosovo, nor the ‘statecommunity’ of Serbia against the emerging ‘state-community’ of Kosovo. Instead of communities of people(s), he spoke of territory and (the damaged) relationship of dominance over it.15 The relations of the opposing ethnic groups in Kosovo, even prior to the dissolution of SFRY, are described as historically determined relations of domination.16 Buttressed by strong and sustained ethnic stereotypes, combined with ever louder calls for ‘historical rights’ throughout the 1980s, these relations wore paper thin by the following decade, when whatever balance remained in the relations was sought to be replaced by new constitutional and institutional solutions in the wake of the abolishment of the 1974 SFRY constitution.17 A relation of open institutional dominance begins with the dissolution of the autonomous Kosovo authorities and subsequent mass firing of Albanians from the state bureaucracy. The Albanian side responded with a series of mass general strikes and an overall boycott of state institutions, followed by the creation of (tolerated) parallel government bodies, independent media, unions, health and education systems.18 With the introduction of a multi-party system, abolishment of the ‘quasi-citizenship’19 and the relative autonomy of Kosovo within a forcibly unified Republic of Serbia, the population of Kosovo becomes effectively split into two ‘communities’ based on ethnic origin and respective loyalty to Belgrade/Pristina. The handling of the logistics to seal off these communities was left to the police force – the embodiment of the new, integrated Serbian republic, conducting a thorough disintegration within Kosovo and the integration of Kosovo into the Republic of Serbia. “By 1992, Kosovo saw the emergence of two irreconcilable political blocs”,20 which will remain the case even when the wars in other former Yugoslav republics end, even after 1999, even after the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, even in the years leading up to the declaration of Kosovan independence, even in the years to follow. The struggle for Kosovo independence that would put an end to the domination of the state over the population had several phases. The leading Albanian policy from the early 1990s of seeking independence through nonviolence, along with a conspicuous absence of any will to interfere on the part of the international community, transformed itself into a steady increase in violence and diminishment of trust in legal or peaceful solutions. This resulted in multilateral forms of armed conflict in 1998–1999. The dominant policy after the conflict, in the presence of the international community that was supposed to guarantee both autonomy and an indivisible sovereignty in unchanged territorial borders, promoted a multiethnic integration in Kosovo within the Yugoslav/Serbian state. The process of

220  Adriana Zaharijević this overseen integration proved unsuccessful, since it operated as a substitute for independence and a means for its delay. The 2008 independence of Kosovo – coming too late and at enormous cost for both sides in Kosovo – abolished neither relations of domination,21 nor the phantasmic character of both states created after 2008. The omnipresence of the international ‘community’ in Kosovo, its importance in redefining sovereignty, Serbia’s refusal to recognize that sovereignty, the strict segregation of ethnic ‘communities’ and the overlap in government competences, an essential redefining of the meaning of integration on a still contested territory22 – all maintain the phantom character of both states and a sacralizing of the territory as a possession to the disadvantage of life as dispossessed. Can people ever be thought of outside the territory which they inhabit? Is there such a thing as human life apart from territoriality into which it is wedged, entirely separate from one’s assigned citizenship? The relations of domination between Kosovo and Serbia demonstrate the complexness of the internal bind among these notions. The state (in this case, FR Yugoslavia, then Serbia) usually acts as the matrix that ought to offer minimal conditions of legally shaped belonging, guaranteed by administrative and armed means (military, police). However, the same means can serve, and did so in Kosovo, to suspend the role of legal protection and obligation of the state towards the population on its own territory. For “if the state is what ‘binds’, it is also clearly what can and does unbind. And if the state binds in the name of the nation, conjuring a certain version of the nation forcibly, if not powerfully, then it also unbinds, releases, expels, banishes”,23 turning these unbound lives into paradigmatically dispossessed lives. If we return to the two valences of dispossession, this question can also be posed in another way. Can humanity be thought outside the logic of possession (of territory [‘Whose is Kosovo?’])? That is, can it be thought as nonterritorial, as beyond the reach of the state that may suspend legitimate statuses and with that very act of delegitimizing renounces certain portions of humanity?

Radical humanity: mourning people, not possessions During the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, for many, became a terrifying toponym. It was seen as the center of production of destruction and dispossession, the center of manipulation through ideas of whose lives were menacing and thus legitimately murderable, due to their jeopardizing the autonomy of individuals and/or the sovereignty of the state. The existence of a different discourse in and from Belgrade – one that does not sacralize territory, does not justify destruction and expulsion of people, does not suppress stories of rape and torture, but on the contrary, publicly testifies, publicly mourns them – was exceptionally important. This reversed and politically radical discursive position – in Belgrade itself all too often proscribed as ‘ustaša’, ‘Moslem’, ‘Šiptar’, ‘foreign’, ‘mercenary’, but also as ‘whorish’ and ‘dykish’, that is, outsider and shameless in all kinds of ways – is not, however, radical only in Belgrade (a symbol here for the state and the Serbian public), nor is it radical only for those who from the outside witness words and deeds contrary to those of official Belgrade. City squares occupied by silent

The community of the dispossessed 221 bodies in black, displaying only simple, disruptive written words – “Albanian women are our sisters”, ‘Ljubenić  – Lubeniq’,24 ‘We remember’ – turn visible yet illicit mourning into an alternative to the sovereign discursive position that holds power to first define the political and then bring it about by way of war or institutional violence. Such politics is thus a radically human politics, one that urges us to ask what forms of life are eligible to be accorded the status of ‘human’, what conditions determine the fragmented horizon of ‘our common humanity’, what bodies are valued, cared for, and mourned, and which ones remain foreclosed, unmourned, and dispossessed, outside and beyond the canon of high humanity.25 The politics of Women in Black takes shape through a public act of ritual mourning for a life that cannot be mourned.26 Paradoxically, this act became the highest form of treason and disobedience. An embodied, wordless protest against the official proclamation of rights to testimony and mourning, against the official proclamation of the state’s right to own and dispossess ‘foreign’ lives, is at the very core of a twofold demand: the obvious one – that the state has neither right to declare humanity nor to suspend it – but also the demand that acknowledges a fundamental interrelatedness and the necessity of a politics of peace. In conditions of ‘communities’ so clearly segregated, mourning losses in the ‘other’ community, ones written off (as worthless chattel) and rendered unmournable (as worthless lives), represents a political act of transgression. Standing in Belgrade’s central square with a seemingly empty and seemingly incongruous message “Ljubenić – Lubeniq”, establishes different modes of what can be seen and heard in the public,27 a different thinking than the one that begins by asking “where is and whose is Kosovo?”, in a word, a different logic of possession and dispossession. The first meeting of the networks of women from Serbia and from Kosovo took place in March 2006.28 The official joint proclamation (Pristina+Belgrade) states that the Women’s Peace Coalition appears as an independent civil initiative based on female solidarity that transcends national and religious divisions, as well as state borders (The Principles 2006). Echoing in the depths of this daring proclamation are the words these women spoke to one another at their first meeting: “Although my brother died in the war, I am able to speak with you today”, “My daughter will be born in a better world”, “I would have never believed that I would cry in front of a Serb”, “Now I am not ashamed to say that I am a feminist”, “We will never stop crying”.29 Crying, as the cathartic resolution of the politics of transgression, wailing together as ‘us’ and ‘them’, suspends the prohibition of public mourning and shifts the discourse from a position of solidarity with one’s own national identity into an unabashedly feminist discourse. This crying is a political gesture of rejection of the derealization of loss, the insensitivity to human suffering and death, rejection of the mechanisms that induce the dehumanization of the unmournable.30 This crying is the point in which solidarity

222  Adriana Zaharijević becomes the cessation of the continuum of violence, in which one becomes fundamentally aware of dispossession, of precarious life, revocable and dependent on the will of the other.

Untimely: how to maintain an alternative community? The joining of Belgrade and Pristina in the Women’s Peace Coalition is a shining example amidst a long history of enmity, which openly and directly opposed the logic of continuous violence, by acknowledging one’s own vulnerability and a resolute rejection of the right of states, institutions or individuals to the destruction of life. Two meetings of the network of Women in Black and the Kosovo Women’s Network, in 2006 and 2007, took place in Macedonia, on, so to speak, no man’s land. During the first meeting, the Women in Black activists gave the first public apology for crimes committed against the Albanian population, carried by Kosovo television RTV21, which had a widespread impact in the Kosovo public.31 At the first meeting, 66 persons were present, and 69 at the second (from Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with representatives of the organizations that supported the meeting). A second meeting took the form of a conference that served as basis for a pamphlet-report published under the same title as the event itself, Through Women’s Solidarity to a Just Peace. The meeting was called due to organizational problems encountered in executing the strategic plan of the Women’s Peace Coalition to increase the number of joint activities and strengthen cooperation by encouraging dialogue among women of various ethnic groups in Kosovo. The conference was also a means to overcome financial problems of communication and the difficult border crossings between Kosovo and Serbia for the Kosovo activists. It was also the occasion for establishing four strategic goals of the Coalition: increase in the quality and influence of the process of transitional justice, inform the international community of best practices of support for existing and future postconflict forms of integration and interethnic cooperation, repairing the relations between the Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo and enlargement of capacity of the Coalition to react in emergency situations and strategically promote peace.32 We can thus see that this community of the dispossessed, initiated by transgressive crying, had a decidedly political character. In order for it to survive, to remain political, it was necessary that it produce further forms of horizontal networking. The content of this networking and its direction were attested by arrangements made during the workshops that took place in September 2007. The enlargement of the coalition would allow for the expansion of the community, in particular through the work of Serbian women from Kosovo with women in Serbia. Through an activity titled “Meet Me so You Can Understand Me”, where women from Kosovo would address audiences across Serbian towns, and vice versa. Through mailing lists that would keep the two networks continuously informed about events in their local areas, which would allow for prompt reaction and support in emergency situations. Through publishing joint statements and declarations. Joint vigils in public places where the

The community of the dispossessed 223 banner “Albanian Women Are Our Sisters” would be complemented by “Serbian Women Are Our Sisters”, a symbolic gesture and invitation to the Serbian community for integration into the life of Kosovo.33 Yet although the very next talks were to be held in November of that year, buoyed by the strong enthusiasm for joint action,34 the Women’s Peace Coalition suspended its activities. Apart from the obvious logistical problem of entering an unrecognized state, or coming from that state into one that does not recognize it, an act that demands more than a reasonable dose of courage, what also needs mentioning here is a perennial issue of having time for activism, in particular of the kind that does not depend on some ‘third community’ and their financial support (such as United Nations Fund for Women – UNIFEM or Kvinna till Kvinna who helped previous meetings), which may cease to be provided with no justifiable reason. Thus, in addition to the question of im/mobility, something thoroughly tied to a question of citizenship, and money that ought to support activists’ enthusiasm (by helping not necessarily affluent women from, say, Leskovac or Tutin [towns in Serbia] travel to Orahovac or Gnjilane [towns in Kosovo] in order to conduct the activity “Meet Me So You Can Understand Me”), there were certainly other reasons that brought about the subduing, although not a formal dissolution, of this community. A single word, unpleasant yet bursting with meaning, can serve as a signpost: untimely. The community of the dispossessed was perhaps formed ‘on time’, neither too soon nor too late. Its beginning could mark the beginning of a different kind of memory, a remembering that wants to break the cycle of violence. But this community did not exist in a vacuum: it was symbolically and materially intertwined with other communities, ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, as well as with numerous third ‘communities’, those that have the power to initiate negotiations of status and those that support financially the travel from Leskovac to Gnjilane. Therefore, one of the demands considered particularly important, perhaps because it was politically strongest, and thus most ticklish – calling for joint visits to towns of atrocities, in particular that of Suva Reka35 – was temporarily suspended and postponed. For this demand, which would have made the community of the dispossessed spill over into other communities without their permission and with certain risk, it was simply too soon.

Too early, too late: utopian elements of the community of the dispossessed The Declaration of Independence on the part of the state of Kosovo in February 2008 was a key moment for understanding the context in which these communities exist from now on. Above all, this is the establishment of something new, foundational, the ‘zero option’.36 Instead of a community of the oppressed ‘ours’, as a divisible territory, the space of quasi-citizenship in a foreign country, Kosovo finally becomes (even in the absence of universal recognition) a legitimate community, and not one postponed, nor a permanently supervised community of quasi-citizens. In addition, given that the state of Kosovo is modeled on the idea

224  Adriana Zaharijević of the ‘new state’,37 it aspires to become a new civil and multiethnic community of all its citizens. Such a new beginning could have effectively abolished the need for alternative communities, given that the state itself could be thought of as possibly becoming an ‘alternative community’ – as better, more equal, more integrative for all its citizens. In other words, it is possible, desirable even, to believe that activism can spill over into an administration that is dealing effectively with the development and implementation of policies that strengthen citizens, their participation in a community, creates open space for facing the past and encourages passing the most expedient decisions for the future of a country. On the other side, however, although Serbia also became a different state with Kosovo’s independence, these foundational conditions, even on a symbolic level, never appeared to be tenable. Hence, only six months after the last meeting of the Women’s Peace Coalition, an event that would test the very survival of the (now cross-border) alternative community took place. The survival of this community greatly depended on the readiness to transfer alternative forms of activist forms of agency into the operating of the state itself. Namely, if the state is believed to have the potential to encourage the positive and thwart the negative aspect of dispossession, then the state itself becomes imaginable as an alternative community. In so doing, it removes or greatly lessens the importance of other alternative communities. This is a plausible cause for the ebbing in activity of this coalition: the beginnings of the two new communities did not coincide, the trust in the state and its potentialities was a moment of disagreement rather than the impetus for a different joint action. The enthusiasm of a robust and extensive network of women’s organizations such as the Kosovo Women’s Network, built on experience in extraordinary and always disjointed circumstances, can hardly be compared with the principles, but also the position of the Women in Black network in Serbia, before as well as after 2008.38 Therefore, it is important to wonder to what extent enthusiasm about the capabilities of the state stood in the way of the development of this community of the dispossessed, if the women from Serbia remained ‘traitors’ of their country, the single political option that is impossible to integrate, while the women from Kosovo attempted to accomplish their aims of recuperation, integration and strengthening within the framework of their new state. With the creation of two states, the context of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ did not disappear: the activists of the two networks remained separated – as Mertus’ passage at the beginning of the text indicates – although this time not through the nation, but through the aspired nation state. In the text that carries the ethics of the Women in Black, presented at the first meeting of the Women’s Peace Coalition, but also on numerous other occasions, Staša Zajović, the coordinator of the network Women in Black, says: As feminists we have an obligation to transgress against the imposed national consensuses, for that is the only way to act in favor of peace. As feminists we have an obligation to be traitors of so-called national interests, because feminism is not only about respect for difference and otherness, but also about our rights to define our interests and needs.39

The community of the dispossessed 225 As feminists who define their interests and needs through dispossession, as the very condition of autonomy, we can renounce our own country, our own territory, and even, through acts of disobedience, delimit our own rights and space for action. However, what the questioning of what is one’s ‘own’ becomes possible only if it is first possessed, even if only symbolically: autonomy, which rests on interdependence, demands an autonomy of the body and autonomous public space in which one is not arbitrarily discarded or deprivable of life. Therefore, in the spirit of the logic of dispossession, this text must of necessity end in questions and not in decisive answers. It is necessary to ask the extent to which the position of a traitor is even measurable, and whether there can be gradations in disloyalty? Is it possible to equally stand for nonviolence if we have seen violence committed against us and if we refuse to acquiesce to violence done in our name? How is it possible to compare potential vulnerability, as a condition for a more equitable world and an event of injury and trauma as a state of permanent dispossession? Can we ever have the same interpretation of dispossession if one is informed by being dispossessed of home or boundaries of one’s body, and the other by a wish to protect the world from banishment or rape? Can peace be experienced in the same way by a person who thinks peace will be guaranteed by her state achieving independence and by a person disclaiming a state, through disloyalty and in permanent resistance, since the state breaks every promise of peace? Finally, can it be said that the condition of possibility of the dispossessed community, emerging in the form of the Women’s Peace Coalition, was precisely the treasonous position of one of its parts and the absence of the state as a legitimate framework for its other portion? If we answer this in the affirmative, we must face another disquieting question. Is the survival of the community of dispossessed ever possible as a permanent state, and not as a temporary measure; is the alternative sustainable in any way other than utopia?

Acknowledgment The outlines of this chapter were first presented at the workshop organized under the auspices of Centre for Southeast European Studies in Graz in May 2015. I am grateful to participants in the session, particularly Armina Galijaš, for their comments. I am indebted to my colleagues and friends, Athena Athanasiou, Gëzim Krasniqi, Miloš Urošević and Tamara Petrović Trifunović, for their willingness to read and comment on earlier versions of this text. My special gratitude goes to a fellow feminist, Ana Miškovska Kajevska, whose readings always help me to see more clearly through things.

Notes 1 Julie Mertus, “Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains”, in: S. P. Ramet (ed.), Gender Politics in the Western Balkans (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1999), 172–173. 2 Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 2–3. 3 Ibid., 92.

226  Adriana Zaharijević 4 Ibid., 5. 5 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 6 Selma, Sevenhuijsen, “Vrednosti koje održavaju život: etika briga o ranjivosti i zaštiti”, in: A. Zaharijević, S. Zajović i T. Belenzada (eds.), Suočavanje s prošlošću: feministički pristup. Beograd: Žene u crnom, 2005), 12. 7 Butler and Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political, 7. 8 Adriana Zaharijević, Ko je pojedinac? Genealoško propitivanje ideje građanina (Loznica: Karpos, 2014). 9 Joanna Bourke, What it Means to be Human? (London: Virago Press, 2013). 10 Judith Butler, “Peace Is a Resistance to the Terrible Satisfaction of War”, Believer (2003) www.believermag.com/issues/200305/?read=interview_butler. 11 Butler and Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political, 31. 12 It should be mentioned that certain policies, such as UN Resolution 1325, which is very important for this context, determine the gender/sex of the actor, emphasizing its crucial role in internal and international state frameworks. The Women’s Peace Coalition has organized a portion of its activities precisely around the application of this resolution. It is also important to point out that in feminist theory and practice there is no unified position about the topic – nature, cause, result – of violence, nor about the politics of nonviolence. See, for example, Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, “Feminism and the Critique of Violence: Negotiating Feminist Political Agency”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2) (2014): 143–163. 13 Butler, “Peace Is a Resistance to the Terrible Satisfaction of War”. 14 “Serbia! And you, its respected citizens! What is Kosovo? Where is Kosovo? To whom does it belong? Is there any one among us who is not from Kosovo? Is there any one among us who thinks that Kosovo is not his? Kosovo, this is a synonym for Serbia! Kosovo belongs to Serbia! Kosovo belongs to the Serbian people! It was always thus, and will be thus forevermore”! (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuQ8vByU2n4) 15 Although perhaps we could say that a portion of this and other speeches was directed at a third, international ‘community’. See Radmila Nakarada, “Slučaj Kosmeta: jedinstvena proizvoljnost”, Sociološki pregled. 41(3) (2007): 305–326. 16 Srđa Popović, Dejan Janča and Tanja Petovar, Kosovski čvor: drešiti ili seći? Izveštaj nezavisne komisije (Titograd: Chronos, 1990). “Every single government – whether Turkish, Austrian, Serbian or Kosovar (since acquiring autonomy) – has, to a greater or lesser extent, for this political reason or another, favored, that is, discriminated against one of the two ethnic groups. Kosovo is a traditional rebel battleground, a site of expulsions, ‘encouraged’ and forced emigration, colonization, punitive expeditions and of course assorted violence. Naturally, the previous domination of one side was ever the cause and justification for the domination coming from the other”. Popović, Janča and Petovar, Kosovski čvor: drešiti ili seći? Izveštaj nezavisne komisije, 8. 17 Ibid: 27; Škeljzen Malići, Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije (Beograd: Mostart, 2014). 18 Janet Reineck, “Poised for War. Kosova’s Quiet Siege”, in: J. Halpern and D. Kideckel (eds.), Neighbours at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). 19 Gëzim Krasniqi, “Overlapping Jurisdictions, Disputed Territory, Unsettled State: the Perplexing Case of Citizenship in Kosovo”, in: J. Shaw and I. Štiks (eds.), Citizenship after Yugoslavia (London/New York: Routledge, 2013). 20 Dušan Janjić, Anna Lalaj and Besnik Pula, “Kosovo under the Milošević Regime”, in: C. Ingrao and T. Emmert (eds.), Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies (Purdue University Press, 2009), 286. 21 Nebojša Vladisavljević, “Kosovo and Two Dimensions of the Contemporary SerbAlbanian Conflict”, in: R. Hudson and G. Bowman (eds.), After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics Within the Successor States (New York: Palgrave, 2012).

The community of the dispossessed 227 22 Krasniqi, “Overlapping Jurisdictions, Disputed Territory, Unsettled State: the Perplexing Case of Citizenship in Kosovo”. 23 Judith Butler and Gayatri C. Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? Language, Politics, Belonging (London/New York/Calcutta: Seagull, 2007), 4–5. 24 The name of the village where grave atrocities on the Albanian population took place. 25 Athena Athanasiou, “Reflections on the Politics of Mourning: Feminist Ethics and Politics in the Age of Empire”, Historein 5 (2005): 44; Athena Athanasiou, Agonistic Mourning: Political Dissidence and the Women in Black (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017). 26 Following Judith Butler, I  would refer to this kind of life as the ‘jettisoned life’, (a verb which originally refers to the act of removal of goods, chattel, from a ship in an emergency situation, to lessen the ship’s load), the lives of those who are not politically recognized but are in certain conditions, above all in situations of establishing order between the nation and the state (nation-state), in excess of power, yet stripped of rights and responsibilities (Butler and Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? Language, Politics, Belonging, 32). Thus, we are dealing with lives that can be legally thrown overboard in order to preserve the unhindered sail. 27 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London/New York: Verso, 2004), 147. 28 This of course does not mean that there were no individual friendships that influenced the formation of this political coalition before this date. An invaluable testimony to this is offered by two ‘letters’ of activists, Lepa Mlađenović and Igballe Rogova. Lepa Mlađenović, “Pismo Igbali Rogova: Beleške o lezbejskim telima u našim heteronormativnim državama”, in: S Zajović and M. Urošević (eds.), Feministička etika odgovornosti (Beograd: Žene u crnom, 2014); Igballe Rogova, “Ljubav iznad granica: Pismo Lepi, mojoj feminističkoj mentorki”, in: Zajović and Urošević (eds.), Feministička etika odgovornosti (Beograd: Žene u crnom, 2014). A curiosity about which Igballe, who is the founder of the first women’s organization in Kosovo, Motrat Qiriazi, as well as the executive director of the Kosovo Women’s Network, writes to Lepa in her letter, refers to the fact that it was Julie Mertus herself who encouraged Rogova to visit Belgrade for the first time, back in 1995, telling her that “Belgrade activists stand each Sunday in the street to protest against the politics of Milošević’s regime. I did not believe her. I thought that all of Serbia is against us. But Julie was persistent. She got me interested, and I had to go see for myself” (Rogova, “Ljubav iznad granica: Pismo Lepi, mojoj feminističkoj mentorki”, 142). 29 Jasmina Tešanović, “Ženska definicija genocida”, in: S. Zajović, M. Perković and M. Urošević (eds.), Žene za mir (Beograd: Žene u crnom, 2007), 157–158. 30 Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, 148. 31 Nicole Farnsworth, Through Women’s Solidarity to a Just Peace: A Report Based on the Women’s Peace Coalition Second Annual Conference (Prishtina/Belgrade: Women’s Peace Coalition, 2007), 4. 32 Ibid., 8. Each of the given goals was followed by a series of activities that aimed to implement the alternative politics. For example, the first goal was to be achieved by organizing civic forums in which Kosovo Albanian women and Serbian women would speak throughout Kosovo and Serbia about the atrocities committed against them and in their name; by organizing street performances that would draw attention to the cooperation of the Coalition; by following Kosovo war crime trials and writing reports on them; by offering moral support to families of Kosovo Albanians during the trials, as well as Kosovo Serb families victims of war crimes; by formulating laws against hate speech and campaigning for its passage in Serbia in order to establish legal mechanisms for victim benefits claims; or by advocating for mechanisms to punish crimes of sexual violence committed during the war, as well as raising awareness for the public to recognize this as a crime and encourage victims to speak publicly about it (Ibid., 9).

228  Adriana Zaharijević 33 Ibid., 55–60. 34 Which can be attested to by a letter from Belgrade, part of a larger correspondence after the first meeting: “After nearly 20  years of Serbian politics of exclusion and destruction of all things Albanian, we have taken a historical step! These were not isolated encounters of a few individual women, that is, some kind of exception or a singular event – this is a coalition”! In response to which, the letter from Pristina says: “Our path will not be easy. We will face numerous obstacles. We are surrounded by hatred and ignorance. But this will not stand in our way, for we are activists. We believe in our activism. We believe in peace and justice. And most importantly, we trust each other and in the future that we will build together” (Ibid., 69–70). 35 Fahri Musliu, Masakr u Suvoj Reci: mart 1999 (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2010). 36 Krasniqi, “Overlapping Jurisdictions, Disputed Territory, Unsettled State: the Perplexing Case of Citizenship in Kosovo”. 37 Rogers W. Brubaker, “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States”, International Migration Review 26(2) (1997): 269–291; Krasniqi, “Overlapping Jurisdictions, Disputed Territory, Unsettled State: the Perplexing Case of Citizenship in Kosovo”. 38 Staša Zajović, “Ne u naše ime: feministička etika i suočavanje sa prošlošću”, in: S. Zajović, M. Perković and M. Urošević (eds.), Žene za mir (Beograd: Žene u crnom, 2007). 39 Ibid., 80.

References Athanasiou, Athena (2005). “Reflections on the Politics of Mourning: Feminist Ethics and Politics in the Age of Empire”, Historein 5: 40–57. Athanasiou, Athena (2017). Agonistic Mourning: Political Dissidence and the Women in Black. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Bourke, Joanna (2013). What it Means to be Human? London: Virago Press. Brubaker, Rogers W. (1997). “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States”, International Migration Review 26(2):269–291. Butler, Judith (2003). “Peace Is a Resistance to the Terrible Satisfaction of War”, Believer, www.believermag.com/issues/200305/?read=interview_butler. Butler, Judith (2004). Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London and New York: Verso. Butler, Judith and Athena Athanasiou (2013). Dispossession: The Performative in the Political. Cambridge: Polity. Butler, Judith and Gayatri C. Spivak (2007). Who Sings the Nation-State? Language, Politics, Belonging. London/New York/Calcutta: Seagull. Farnsworth, Nicole (2007). Through Women’s Solidarity to a Just Peace. A Report Based on the Women’s Peace Coalition Second Annual Conference. Pristina/Belgrade: Women’s Peace Coalition. Frazer, Elizabeth and Kimberly Hutchings (2014). “Feminism and the Critique of Violence: Negotiating Feminist Political Agency”, Journal of Political Ideologies 19(2): 143–163. Gilligan, Carol (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Janjić, Dušan, Anna Lalaj and Besnik Pula (2009). “Kosovo under the Milošević Regime” In: Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies. Edited by Charles Ingrao and Thomas Emmert. Purdue University Press, pp. 274–303. Krasniqi, Gëzim (2013). “Overlapping Jurisdictions, Disputed Territory, Unsettled State: the Perplexing Case of Citizenship in Kosovo” In: Citizenship after Yugoslavia. Edited by Jo Shaw and Igor Štiks. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 69–82.

The community of the dispossessed 229 Malići, Škeljzen (2014). Kosovo i raspad Jugoslavije. Beograd: Mostart. Mertus, Julie (1999). “Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains” In: Gender Politics in the Western Balkans. Edited by Sabrina P. Ramet. University Park: Pennsylvania State University. Mlađenović, Lepa (2014). “Pismo Igbali Rogova: Beleške o lezbejskim telima u našim heteronormativnim državama” In: Feministička etika odgovornosti. Edited by Staša Zajović and Miloš Urošević. Beograd: Žene u crnom, pp. 135–140. Musliu, Fahri (2010). Masakr u Suvoj Reci: mart 1999. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji. Nakarada, Radmila (2007). “Slučaj Kosmeta: jedinstvena proizvoljnost”, Sociološki pregled 41(3): 305–326. Popović Srđa, Dejan Janča and Tanja Petovar (1990). Kosovski čvor: drešiti ili seći? Izveštaj nezavisne komisije. Titograd: Chronos. The Principles of the Women’s Peace Coalition (2006), http://zeneucrnom.org/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=199&Itemid=54 (accessed 30 March 2015). Reineck, Janet (2000). “Poised for War. Kosova’s Quiet Siege” In: Neighbours at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History. Edited by Joel Halpern and David Kideckel. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Rogova, Igballe (2014). “Ljubav iznad granica: Pismo Lepi, mojoj feminističkoj mentorki” In: Feministička etika odgovornosti. Edited by Staša Zajović and Miloš Urošević. Beograd: Žene u crnom, pp. 141–145. Sevenhuijsen, Selma (2005). “Vrednosti koje održavaju život: etika briga o ranjivosti i zaštiti” In: Suočavanje s prošlošću: feministički pristup. Edited by Adriana Zaharijević, Staša Zajović and Tamara Belenzada. Beograd: Žene u crnom, pp. 11–17. Tešanović, Jasmina (2007). “Ženska definicija genocida” In: Žene za mir. Edited by Staša Zajović, Marija Perković and Miloš Urošević. Beograd: Žene u crnom, pp. 156–158. Vladisavljević, Nebojša (2012). “Kosovo and Two Dimensions of the Contemporary SerbAlbanian Conflict” In: After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics Within the Successor States. Edited by Robert Hudson and Glenn Bowman. New York: Palgrave, pp. 26–42. Zaharijević, Adriana (2014). Ko je pojedinac? Genealoško propitivanje ideje građanina. Loznica: Karpos. Zajović, Staša (2007). “Ne u naše ime: feministička etika i suočavanje sa prošlošću”. Žene za mir. Edited by Staša Zajović, Marija Perković and Miloš Urošević. Beograd: Žene u crnom, pp. 79–83.

Index

activists 83, 197, 215, 222 – 224; see also protest administrative: units 43 – 45; violence 44, 216 Ahtisaari Plan 153, 181, 188 – 190 Albania 3, 26, 45 – 49, 86 – 87, 104, 168 – 174, 176 – 177, 204; during communism 84, 114, 132, 167, 170; inter–regional 174 – 175; interstate communication with Serbia 166 – 167; and Kosovo 4, 13, 22, 42, 83, 104, 112, 138; literary scene in 111 – 115, 122 – 123; Northern 4, 6 – 7, 10; Serbian expansion towards 22, 33, 41 – 42, 89, 133; Southern 3, 7, 86, 114, 133; and Yugoslavia 49, 83 – 84, 98, 128 Albanian(s) 14 – 15, 40, 42, 44 – 50, 215, 219; in art and cultural heritage 180 – 181, 185, 203, 207 – 208 (see also art); community 124, 148; and ethnically mixed marriages 163, 165, 167 – 169, 175; in Kosovo 16, 50, 73, 88, 98, 100, 215; as Muslims 13, 30, 40, 86, 92, 163, 186; nationalism 72, 82 – 85, 132, 143; national movement 4, 13, 104, 127, 131 – 134, 150; Northern 4, 6, 10, 176; as the other 33 – 34, 79 – 81, 83 – 87, 90 – 92, 130, 144, 152 – 155; as part of memory politics 98 – 105; representations in literature and ethnography of 3 – 10, 111 – 112, 114 – 115, 117, 123 – 124; question in Albanian Academy of Sciences 132 – 134, 137; in Yugoslavia 45, 67, 73, 79, 82, 85, 87 – 89; see also discourse Albanism 4, 15, 19n51 Arnaut 12, 26, 28, 30, 94n43; see also Albanism art 31, 112, 198 – 209 Athanasiou, Athena 216

Austria 9, 13, 23, 29 – 30, 33, 42 – 43; Austrians 9, 42, 83, 43 Austro–Hungarian Empire see Austria authority 89, 187, 202; intellectual 136, 142 – 143; see also intellectuals autonomy 48, 63, 65, 89, 95, 101 – 104, 134, 199, 206 – 207, 216 – 220, 225 – 226 Bakić–Hayden, Milica 80 – 82, 85, 96 Balević, Jovan Stefanov 8 – 9 Balkanism 4 – 5, 15, 19n51, 79 – 82, 84 – 85, 91 – 92 Balkans 4, 7 – 8, 10, 13, 16, 28, 33, 43; comparative research of 127, 132, 137, 148, 150; personal interethnic relations 163 – 165, 204; in relation to Orientalism and Balkanism 80, 83 – 85, 87, 91 – 93; stereotype of 5, 11 Balkan War 14 – 15, 22, 39, 41 – 44, 85, 133 Bataković, Dušan 34 – 36 Bećković, Matija 144 Berlin Congress 13, 23 Bogišić, Valtazar 4, 10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6, 13, 23, 112, 166, 204, 222 Bosnians 81, 85, 115 Brussels Agreement 145 – 146, 152, 155, 176 Butler, Judith 216 – 217, 225 – 228 civil society organizations 183, 185, 189, 190 colonization 39, 44 – 46, 49 – 50, 226n16 community 33, 122 – 124, 145, 148, 183 – 190, 215 – 227; Albanian 124, 148; alternative 220, 226n32; communication and similarities between different 4, 111, 174; hostile 10, 117, 191; imagined 3, 34; Islamic 185 – 186; minority 180, 190; national 39, 81 – 82, 86, 90 – 91,

Index  231 122, 163 – 164; Orthodox 81, 186; political 198, 208; Serbian 189, 191, 223; in Yugoslavia 79, 85 Ćosić Dobrica 143 – 144, 156 crisis 4, 13, 62 – 64, 67 – 69, 82; economic 63, 72, 143; referring to SANU memorandum 129, 135 – 136 Critical frame analysis 181 – 182 cultural cooperation 112, 197, 200 – 201, 209 cultural heritage 28, 131, 180 – 181, 183 – 191 Cvijić, Jovan 13, 26, 29 – 30, 32 – 36, 40 – 41, 87, 130 Deçan see Dečani Dečani 23, 150 delegitimization 61, 63 – 65, 70 Demaçi, Adem 98 dialogue: lack of 138 – 139; in literature 24, 26; nationalism in 128, 135; opening up 144, 153, 180, 189 – 190, 192, 208, 222 discourse 14, 18 – 19, 66 – 68, 96 – 97, 123, 176, 220 – 221; heroic 4 – 5, 13; intellectual 144, 151 – 152, 154 – 156; media 63 – 64, 177, 209; and orientalism 15, 28, 79 – 81, 91 – 94 (see also Balkanism); in relation to nation 4, 22, 26, 30 – 31, 34, 128; as symbolic struggles 197 – 201, 203 – 212 discourse analysis 61, 64, 96, 146 – 147, 210 discrimination 23, 65, 156, 180, 184, 186, 191 – 192 discursive reduction 61 – 66, 68, 72 – 73, 75 discursive strategies 64, 146, 197, 206 dispossession 216 – 217, 220 – 222, 224 – 226 Djordjević, Vladan 86 – 87, 94, 96 Djordjević, Tihomir 30 – 32, 34, 36, 37 Dukađin see Dukadjin Dukadjin 4, 48, 139n20 Dukagjin see Dukadjin Eastern Crisis 4, 13 elites 40, 63, 121, 177; Albanian 84 – 85; cultural 149, 155; intellectual 143, 153 – 154; national 82, 91, 154 – 155; political 50, 61, 68, 70, 87, 130, 208; Serbian 151, 153 ethnicity 65 – 66, 70, 82, 86, 95, 99 – 100, 164 exception 3, 47, 82, 112, 138, 198 – 201, 204, 228

exclusion 180 – 181, 183, 189, 192, 228 experience of injustice 64 – 65, 69, 72, 74 Foley, John Miles 18 – 19 Frashëri, Sami 82, 31 – 32 Garašanin, Ilija 3, 5 – 6, 15, 19, 43 Hoçë e Madhe 180 – 188, 190 – 191 Hoxha, Enver 84, 114 Hoxha, Fadil 68, 88 hybrid discourse 67 – 69, 72 identitarian 63, 65, 68 – 69, 72 – 73, 75n9, 216 identity 21, 63 – 64, 144, 164, 198, 203; articulated through art 116, 119 – 120, 123; construction of 3 – 4, 75, 80 – 85, 91, 218; cultural 180, 186; gender 204, 215 – 216, 218; national 39, 68, 156, 221 ideology 69, 72, 138, 142–166, 170, 205; of “brotherhood and unity” 70, 88; communist 84, 131; nationalist 30, 143 – 144, 165; official 84, 129 Imami, Petrit 112, 124 – 125 inclusion 22, 45, 132, 183 – 186, 189 independence 104 – 105, 117, 153, 181, 191 – 192, 219, 223 – 225; of Albania 82, 87, 91, 133; of Kosovo 98, 105, 206, 219 – 220, 145, 188 – 189, 199 (in terms of art 120–122, 200, 204, 206); of Serbia 6, 13 inequality 61 – 63, 72, 192 intellectuals 5, 136 – 137, 142 – 144, 146 – 147, 151 – 158, 198, 201; Albanian 83, 84, 138; Serbian 4, 22, 34, 45, 143 – 144; Serbian and Albanian 127, 148 – 149 intelligentsia 142, 156 inter–ethnic dialogue 180, 189 – 190, 192 inter–ethnic tensions 180 – 181 international actors 50, 181, 187, 191 – 192 international community 42, 135, 147, 150, 184, 188 – 189, 191; and war 102, 219 Jezernik, Božidar 5, 86, 87, 94n49 Jović, Dejan 61, 143, 156 Jović, Mihailo 18 Kadare, Ismail 112 – 114 Karadžić, Vuk Stefanović 3, 5 – 6, 13, 16 – 17, 23, 29, 31 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 43 – 44, 120

232 Index Kontekst Gallery 198 Kosovar 98, 101 – 102, 115, 146, 186, 191, 200 Kosovo 39 – 55, 155 – 159, 163, 169 – 170, 175, 177 – 178, 180 – 185; anti–war efforts 216, 219 – 228; in ASH Platform 128, 132 – 137; cultural heritage 180 – 181, 183 – 191, 194; declaration of independence 145 – 146, 149 – 152, 180, 199, 223; nationalism 61, 65, 67, 129, 132, 137 – 138; Pogrom 145, 147; in Rambouillet Conference 101 – 102, 104, 106; in relation to art and cultural cooperation 111 – 113, 115 – 124, 202, 204, 206 – 209; representations in literature and ethnography 3, 6, 13, 16, 22 – 25, 27 – 28, 31, 33; in SANU Memorandum 128, 130 – 131; Serbs 4, 13, 72, 130, 138, 145, 203; war crimes in 99 – 100, 105, 222, 227; Women’s Network 216, 222, 224, 227; in Yugoslavia 61, 63 – 70, 82 – 83, 88 Koštunica, Vojislav 154, 200, 219 League of Communists 65 – 66, 68, 70 – 71, 131 League of Prizren 47, 82, 131, 133, 139n20, 144 legitimization 61 – 65, 67, 69, 71, 73 – 75 liberalization 61 – 65, 68 literature 23, 39, 84, 95, 111 – 112, 118, 129, 205 logic of possession 217 – 218, 220 – 221 Macedonia 5, 16, 48, 82 – 83, 136, 138; Albanians in 88, 133, 135; mixed marriages in 163, 165 – 166; and Old Serbia 13, 22 – 26, 28 – 30, 32 – 33, 34n1, 40 – 41, 43 – 44 Macedonians 32 – 33, 43, 88, 134 – 135, 165 – 166, 177; assimilation attempts of 25 – 26, 28 – 30 Malisori 10 Marko Kraljević 4, 11 – 12, 18 Marko the Prince see Marko Kraljević Martinović, Đorđe 130, 139n13 Medenica, Radoslav 18 media 117, 167 – 169, 176 – 178, 182, 209 – 211, 219; on Kosovo protests 61, 63 – 64, 70 – 73; in Serbia 14 – 15, 86, 89, 92, 145 – 146, 149, 151 – 154; on

Serbian–Albanian cooperation 197 – 199, 203, 207 – 209 Mertus, Julie 215 – 216, 218, 224 – 225, 227 Metohija 4, 23, 25, 89, 132, 139n20, 145, 147 – 148; administrative organization 46 – 50; and Old Serbia 34 – 35, 37; Serbian territorial expansion 41 – 44 Mićović, Dragutin 16, 18 migration 16, 32, 44, 46, 50, 95, 133 – 134 Miljanov, Marko 4, 14 – 16, 20 Milosavljević, Olivera 16, 18, 20 Milošević, Slobodan 89, 98, 137, 154, 184, 197; and Kosovo war 89, 100 – 101, 103; minority politics 89, 98; nationalism and liberalization 68 – 70, 72 (see also liberalization) Milutinović, Sima 9, 17 minority representatives 190 – 191 minority rights 180 – 181, 189, 192 Mirdita, Zef 18, 20, 56 Montenegrin 3 – 10, 13 – 14, 17, 41, 44, 48 – 49 Montenegro 4 – 9, 23, 39, 42 – 43, 47 – 48, 82, 88 multiculturalism 189 Musa Kesedžija 4, 11 Musa the Outlaw see Musa Kesedžija Museum of Contemporary Art of Vojvodina 198, 208 Mušicki, Lukijan 6 Muslims 3 – 4, 29, 40, 43 – 47, 49, 80 – 82, 85, 87, 115, 133 nationalism 19, 35 – 36, 50, 81 – 82, 137 – 140, 143, 176; Albanian 65, 72, 82, 132; as a discursive strategy 61 – 62, 64 – 69, 74; the notion of 30, 127; and patriarchy 163 – 166; Serbian 3, 5, 34, 62, 68, 72, 129, 137, 144; in symbolic struggles 200, 203 – 204 national question 67, 137, 143 NATO 89, 99 – 103, 116, 121, 123, 128, 144 Neziraj, Jeton 113, 122 – 123, 204 Obradović, Dositej 3, 6 – 7, 16 – 17, 20 Old Serbia 4, 13, 27 – 35, 40 – 41, 43 – 45, 47, 49 Orahovac/Rahovec 42, 181, 183 – 186, 188, 190 – 191, 223 order of discourse 197, 199 Orientalism 5, 19, 79 – 82, 85, 91 – 94, 96 – 97

Index  233 Orthodox Church 10, 81, 87, 148, 184 – 187, 189, 191 Ottoman 28 – 29, 39 – 40, 51, 82 – 85, 87, 132 – 133, 152; culture 32; Empire 23, 27, 30, 81; past 91 – 92; period 8; rule 4, 6, 13, 44, 80 Praxis 144 Prizren 18, 26, 31, 42, 46, 48, 100, 180 – 191 protest 70 – 74, 183, 188, 190, 194; in Kosovo 61, 63 – 68; student protest 62, 98 public sphere 142, 189 quotidian 134, 197, 207 – 209 reconciliation 14, 105, 180, 188 – 189, 192, 194 religious rights 187, 189 Rugova, Ibrahim 89, 98, 101 Sandžak 13, 43, 45 – 46, 48, 163, 166 – 167, 176 Schwandner–Sievers, Stephanie 15, 19, 21, 85 secularity 186, 191 self–management 62, 64 – 65, 67, 72 Serbia 4 – 7, 15, 86 – 87, 111 – 112, 116 – 117, 128 – 131, 151 – 156, 218 – 224; cultural cooperation 111 – 112, 111 – 112, 114 – 117, 199 – 200, 203, 209; cultural heritage 28, 131, 145, 180 – 181, 184 – 187, 190 – 191; expansion towards Kosovo 22, 33 – 34, 39 – 42, 89, 133, 149; First, Second and Third Serbia 197 – 198; mixed marriages 163, 166, 168 – 174; nation 22, 27 – 29, 31, 33, 130 – 131, 138 (and intellectuals 144, 148, 154); in Yugoslavia 39, 61, 63, 68 – 71, 89 – 90, 105, 128 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 86 – 87, 143, 147 Serbian–Albanian 1, 3 – 5, 11, 116, 119, 163, 166; conflict 119, 170; cultural

cooperation 111 – 112, 116 – 117, 197, 200, 203, 209; relations 11, 59, 61, 117, 123 – 124, 142, 144, 154 – 155 Serbs 4 – 5, 10, 16, 28, 40, 90, 131, 147 – 148, 175; ethically mixed marriages 17, 163 – 164, 166 (see also Serbian–Albanian); from Kosovo 4, 13, 72, 76, 78, 95, 130, 137 – 138, 145, 203 Skendi, Stavro 18, 127 socialism 61 – 62, 65, 67, 69, 72, 75n7 socio–economic demands 63, 73 statehood 39, 41, 184 – 185, 191 symbolic domination 62, 64, 66, 72 – 74 symbolic struggles 197, 199 – 200, 203, 209 threat 24, 28, 45, 63, 135, 144, 147; frame 181, 184 – 185, 187 – 189, 191 Tito, Josip Broz 49, 63, 70, 88 – 89, 98, 143, 154 Todorova, Maria 4 – 5, 15, 19, 81 – 82, 92 – 93 Toskas 3 Tucović, Dimitrije 15, 42, 75, 87 Turkish 7, 40, 44 – 46, 49, 83, 130; and Albanian alliance 4, 13; army 116 Turks 3 – 4, 8, 13, 29, 44, 49, 122; Albanians against the 133; Albanians as 85 van Dijk, Teun A. 64 Vardar Banovina 44 – 45 Velika Hoča see Hoçë e Madhe Women in Black 216, 221 – 222, 224 Women’s Peace Coalition 215 – 216, 221 – 229 Yugoslavia 39, 50, 91, 128 – 131, 133 – 134, 171, 220; Albanians in 82 – 84, 87 – 89; Communist Party 49, 88, 131; Federal Republic of 99, 128, 135, 144; first 45 – 46; former 19, 117 – 118; socialist 48, 61 – 64, 72, 74; see also League of Communists Zajović, Staša 224, 227